Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues related to guilt and special circumstance

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his attempted murder of Olin Davis, because such evidence was impermissible character evidence (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), and because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value (Evid.Code, § 352). He also claims that its admission violated his federal constitutional right to a fair trial.
In addition to the Thompson/Robinson murders, defendant was originally charged in a third count with the attempted murder of Olin Davis, but the trial court granted defendant's motion to sever the attempted murder count from the two murder counts. The court noted that if the prosecution wanted to offer evidence relating to the attempted murder in the double murder trial, it could seek a hearing on its admissibility under Evidence Code section 1101. At a later hearing regarding the admissibility of evidence of the attempted murder, the prosecutor proffered evidence that, two days after the double murder, Robert Williams overheard defendant tell Richard Johnson at Davis's house that he was planning to kill Davis because Davis knew defendant had killed Thompson and Robinson and because Davis had been known to provide information to the police. The prosecutor acknowledged he had not told the trial court of this evidence at the severance hearing. The court responded it had earlier ruled that Davis could testify about the circumstances that led him to give the police information about the two murders, and it ruled that Williams could testify about the conversation between defendant and Johnson. Moreover, because the prosecutor planned to present evidence that defendant's alleged motivation to kill Davis was clearly related to the two homicides, the court said it was having a hard time thinking of any reason to limit any of the evidence in the third count. The court further stated that the extent to which the prosecutor wished to prove the attempted murder was something that we can deal with witness by witness and objections at the time.
Relevant evidence includes evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness ..., having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid.Code, § 210.) In determining the credibility of a witness, the jury may consider, among other things, [t]he extent of his capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate any matter about which he testifies, [t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive, and the witness's attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward the giving of testimony. ( Id., § 780, subds. (c), (f), (j).) The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by any party, including the party calling him. ( Id., § 785.) But evidence of the good character of a witness is inadmissible to support his credibility unless evidence of his bad character has been admitted for the purpose of attacking his credibility. ( Id., § 790.) And [e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible. ( Id., § 351.) Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), generally prohibits the admission of a criminal act against a criminal defendant when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. Subdivision (b), however, provides that such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity...). To be admissible, such evidence `must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.' [Citation.] ( People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) Under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of the proffered evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Evid.Code, § 352; People v. Ewoldt, supra, at p. 404, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on relevance and admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. (See People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Defendant here contends that evidence of the attempted murder of Olin Davis was irrelevant, and that the prosecutor used it in violation of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) to show defendant was of bad character and thus must have committed the double murders. He asserts this was precisely what the prosecutor argued to the jury. But, as the Attorney General notes, whether evidence was erroneously admitted does not depend on counsel's later argument to the jury. [2] Here, evidence of defendant's attempt to murder Davis was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to prove his identity as the killer of Thompson and Robinson. Davis testified that a day or two after Thompson and Robinson were killed, defendant admitted to Davis that he killed them. And Robert Williams testified that a few days after the murders, he overheard defendant tell Richard Johnson that he (defendant) should kill Davis. Under these circumstances, defendant's attempt, a week after the double murders, to kill Davis  to whom he had admitted the murders  was probative of defendant's consciousness of guilt, which in turn was probative of his identity as the perpetrator of the charged offenses. (See People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 940, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; see also People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 154, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 127-128, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) The evidence of defendant's attack on Davis also bolstered the credibility of Davis's testimony that defendant told him he had killed Thompson and Robinson, because it explained why, after the attack, Davis told the police about defendant's admission, when he had not previously done so. (See Evid.Code, § 210 [credibility evidence is relevant].) Defendant argues that even if evidence of his attempted murder of Davis was admissible to show consciousness of guilt, the probative value of this evidence, which was detailed and extensive, was substantially outweighed by its undue consumption of time and the probability of substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Evid.Code, § 352.) To preserve a claim that a trial court abused its discretion in not excluding evidence under Evidence Code section 352, a party must make a timely and specific objection when the evidence is offered. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1014, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248; accord, People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 108, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) At trial, defendant objected both to the admission of photographs of Davis after he was shot by defendant and to the admission of the videotaped reenactment of the drive to the park as unduly prejudicial, but he otherwise posed no objections to the detailed testimony of the attempted murder. On appeal, defendant argues additional objections would have been fruitless. We disagree. At trial, when the court and the parties discussed the admissibility of evidence of the attempted murder of Davis, they appeared to agree that no specific objection or ruling could be made until a witness was ready to testify or a specific question on the matter was posed to a witness. Thereafter, defendant made no objection other than to the photograph of the injured Davis at the hospital and to the videotaped reenactment. Defendant alternately argues he could not have objected under Evidence Code section 352 to the voluminous evidence of the attempted murder until all of the evidence had been admitted, at which point an objection and admonition would have been futile. Defendant's argument is specious. The purpose of a timely and specific objection to the admission of evidence is to prevent just such a result. Even had defendant objected, the trial court would not have abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of the attempted murder of Davis. Davis testified at length about the events of May 4, 1987, including the fight with Robert Williams, his visit to defendant that night, his car trip with defendant and defendant's brother Gino, his struggle with defendant, his escape, and his discussions later with the police at the hospital. There was, however, no substantial danger of undue prejudice to defendant, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. The court repeatedly instructed the jury it could not consider the evidence relating to the attempted murder of Davis as evidence of defendant's bad character or as showing he had a propensity to commit murders. During the opening statement of the defense, the court instructed the jury that defendant was not charged with the May 4, 1987, shooting of Davis, but that there would be evidence of that incident, which the jury was to consider in light of the instructions the court would give at the end of the trial. Before Davis testified on this subject, the court again instructed the jury that defendant was not charged with a crime relating to the May 4 incident, and that it should not consider the evidence in determining defendant's guilt of the charged double murder of Thompson and Robinson or as showing he was a person of bad character. The court further explained that such evidence was admitted for a limited purpose that included assisting the jury in evaluating Davis's testimony and fleshing out the relationship between Davis and defendant. Still later in Davis's testimony, in response to a juror's question, the court reiterated to the jury that the only issues to be decided were two counts of murder, and that the incident involving Davis on May 4, 1987, was admitted for a limited purpose, to be explained in detail later. Last, after the close of evidence, the court instructed that if the jury found defendant had tried to suppress evidence against himself in this matter, such as by intimidating a witness or attempting to eliminate a witness, that attempt might be considered by the jury as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt, but that such conduct was not by itself sufficient to prove guilt. The court also told the jury that certain evidence had been admitted for a limited purpose and the jury could not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.
Defendant argues the trial court effectively vacated its severance ruling and de facto tried him on two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder, in violation of his right to a fair trial. We disagree. Section 954, which governs joinder of counts in a single trial, provides: An accusatory pleading may charge ... two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts.... But section 954 also provides that `the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses ... be tried separately.' ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 257-258, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) Here, the trial court granted defendant's motion to sever the attempted murder count from the two murder counts. The trial of the attempted murder count trailed that of the Thompson/Robinson murder counts, and the court granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss the attempted murder charge after the penalty phase retrial. Defendant, however, argues that the court effectively vacated and de facto denied the severance motion because it admitted evidence of the attempted murder at the trial on the double murders. Defendant provides no authority for such a proposition, and no California court has so held. We decline to do so here. Defendant's claim is, in substance, a reformulation of his contention that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the attempted murder. For the reasons stated, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
At trial, defendant objected to People's exhibit No. 3D, a photograph depicting Davis on a gurney in the hospital after defendant had shot him, as irrelevant or, if relevant, unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the photograph. Defendant contends that the photograph was irrelevant because he did not dispute that Davis was shot in the mouth, and that the trial court should have excluded it under Evidence Code section 352 because it was gruesome and cumulative to testimony from Davis and several police officers about the nature of the injury. As we shall explain, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph. The admissibility of photographs is governed by the same rules of evidence used to determine the admissibility of evidence generally. (Evid.Code, §§ 210, 350; see also People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 972-973, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53; People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 641, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) The trial court has broad discretion in deciding the relevancy of such evidence. ( People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 641, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) The photograph showing Davis on a gurney in the hospital showed that Davis had been shot in the head. This corroborated Davis's testimony that defendant tried to kill him. Evidence that defendant tried to kill Davis, in turn, tended to show that defendant had killed Robinson and Thompson, based on the prosecution's theory that defendant tried to kill Davis because he feared that Davis would reveal defendant's identity as the killer of Robinson and Thompson to the police. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the photograph as evidence relevant to prove defendant's guilt of the murders with which he was charged, and that was not merely cumulative of the testimony of Davis and the officers who observed Davis's wound. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) We also reject defendant's argument that the trial court erred in not excluding it as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. The court's exercise of its discretion to admit assertedly gruesome or inflammatory evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the evidence clearly is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. ( People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 975-976, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53.) Having reviewed the photograph, we are satisfied that it is not unduly gruesome or inflammatory, and its admission did not violate state evidentiary law. (See People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 642, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.)
Defendant contends People's exhibit No. 73, a videotaped reenactment of the route to the location where defendant shot Davis on May 4, 1987, was cumulative to other evidence and unduly prejudicial, in violation of Evidence Code section 352. The videotape, which had no sound, was made by the Alameda County District Attorney's Office on January 15, 1992, almost five years after defendant shot Davis in the face. It was taken from a car similar to the station wagon in which defendant and his brother Gino Harrison transported Davis, with a police officer in the driver's seat taking the role of Gino, another officer in the front passenger seat taking defendant's role, and Davis in the back seat. The tape began at 98th Avenue and Bancroft, where Davis began his ride with the Harrison brothers, and ended at the park where Davis was shot, with the officers and Davis reenacting the fight. At trial, the court held a hearing on defendant's motion in limine regarding the admissibility of the videotape. Defendant argued that the lighting conditions in the videotape, which was made in broad daylight, were unlike the conditions at the time of the shooting, which occurred at night, and that the videotape was thus improper demonstrative evidence. He also argued that the videotape was cumulative to testimonial and physical evidence and unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. The court concluded the difference in lighting did not make the videotape inadmissible, and stated: [I]t helped me understand the testimony [of Davis] better, and I assume, therefore, it would help the jury, and it would be more real than looking at a map. But the court ruled that the end of the videotape, depicting the reenactment of the assault, should not be admitted because it was not made under the same lighting conditions and was not exactly as Davis described it. The redacted videotape ended with the station wagon stopping at the park, before anyone got out. Before playing the redacted videotape for the jury, the court instructed that the tape was not intended to show the lighting conditions or to attempt to recreate the visual experience that occurred but rather to show the route taken, as described by Davis. As the tape was played for the jury, the prosecutor questioned Davis about it. In ruling on the admissibility of videotapes under Evidence Code section 352, `the court enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.' [Citation.] ( People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 532, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) Defendant's contention that the trial court erred under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting the videotape because it was cumulative of the testimonial and other physical evidence presented lacks merit. (See, e.g., People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 532, 122 Cal. Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 616, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 19, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.) As the court noted, the videotape could assist the jury in understanding and evaluating Davis's testimony. Moreover, we have reviewed the videotape and do not find it unduly prejudicial. As the trial court observed, it merely depicted the route taken. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotape. Defendant also contends that the admission of the videotape at the penalty phase retrial violated Evidence Code section 352. Because he failed to object to the admission of this evidence at the penalty phase retrial, he may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 615, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) Even if defendant had preserved the challenge, for the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not err in admitting the videotape.
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted one portion of Richard Johnson's statement to Olin Davis and certain portions of his statement to Sergeant Voznik. We address each of these contentions in turn.
Defendant contends the trial court's admission of Johnson's statement to Davis that defendant killed Thompson and Robinson violated his right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. On direct examination by the prosecution, Davis testified that Johnson came to his house on Tuesday, April 28, 1987, after defendant had visited. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked, And when you talked to [Johnson], he told you that he was there [when Thompson and Robinson were killed]? The prosecutor objected on the ground of hearsay, and the trial court excused the jury and heard the parties' arguments regarding the proffered testimony. Defendant's offer of proof was that Davis would testify Johnson told him he was present when Thompson and Robinson were killed and warned him not to tell anybody about it. Defense counsel acknowledged such testimony was hearsay, but sought to introduce it as a declaration against penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230. The parties stipulated Johnson was an unavailable witness, and defense counsel argued the proffered evidence was relevant to show that Johnson was present at the scene of the murders, had the opportunity to commit the murders, and ultimately committed the murders. The prosecutor responded that the statement defense counsel was trying to introduce was completely out of context and that, if the court admitted the statement, he would ask the court to admit Johnson's entire statement under Evidence Code section 356, because to do otherwise would be extremely misleading. The court asked the parties whether Johnson's entire statement to Davis would be admissible under Evidence Code section 356 if it ruled that defense counsel's question called for a proper declaration against penal interest. Defense counsel answered yes and noted that if the full statement were admitted, the defense could bring in other hearsay statements to show prior consistent or inconsistent statements, acknowledging that doing so would be a tactical decision that the defense would have to live with. The trial court concluded that, based on defendant's offer of proof, Johnson's statement to Davis about his presence at the scene of the murders was a declaration against penal interest, and that it was prepared to rule such evidence relevant, subject to the provisions of Evidence Code section 356 and other provisions regarding prior inconsistent and consistent statements without ruling on what else comes in. The court added that if the defense chose not to cross-examine Davis on the contents of the conversation, the issue could nevertheless become relevant in the defense case, subject to cross-examination and rebuttal evidence as to his prior consistent or inconsistent statements. Based on the court's ruling, the prosecutor withdrew his original hearsay objection. The following then occurred during cross-examination of Davis by the defense: Q. After the conversation, did Rick [Johnson] tell you not to tell anybody about this particular conversation he was having with you? A. Yes. Q. And the conversation related to the homicides of Betty Thompson and her old man; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And what Rick told you ... was that he was present at the time of these particular murders, correct? A. Yes. Q. And then Rick proceeded to lay the murder on [defendant]; is that correct? THE COURT: Do you understand the question? [DAVIS]: No. THE COURT: Could you translate your slang and reframe your question. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The slang is, Rick blamed [defendant] for the murder; isn't that correct? [DAVIS]: Your Honor, can I answer the question  THE COURT: Yes. [DAVIS]:  and give  say something else? THE COURT: Well, yes, but start with  the question is, in this conversation you had with Rick, did he blame [defendant] for the murders, that's the question. [DAVIS]: Well, he said [defendant] did it, yes. THE COURT: What is it you wanted to explain? [DAVIS]: But what I want to explain is that when he said that [defendant] did it, I mean he just told me that he was there, [defendant] did it, and keep everything to myself, okay, that was it. But [defendant] had already told me he did it hisself [ sic ]. Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted Johnson's hearsay statements because they were not proper declarations against penal interest excepted from the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1230, and because they violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. We need not decide whether the trial court erred in admitting Johnson's hearsay statements, for defendant invited any error. (See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1214, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Defense counsel expressly acknowledged that eliciting testimony on the portion of Johnson's statement admitting he was at the scene of the crime was a tactical decision on their part, as they knew that admission of such evidence likely would mean that the portion of Johnson's statement attributing the murders to defendant would also be admitted to place the statement in context of the entire conversation between Johnson and Davis under Evidence Code section 356. [3] Defense counsel wanted the jury to learn that Johnson was present at the scene of the crime so that they could later argue during closing argument that Johnson was the shooter.
Sergeant Voznik, a defense witness who had also testified for the prosecution, testified that on May 12, 1987, Johnson came to the police station with his attorney. Voznik told them that Johnson would be treated as a suspect and that, if Johnson wished to give a statement, the police would thereafter make a determination as to Johnson's involvement in the murders. Johnson asked to speak privately with Jesse Slaughter, who had come to the police station shortly after Johnson. Sergeant Voznik allowed Johnson, his attorney, and Slaughter to speak privately. Johnson then declined to give a statement to the police, and was arrested on an outstanding warrant. The next morning, Johnson telephoned Sergeant Voznik from jail and said he had changed his mind and wanted to make a statement. Voznik contacted Johnson's attorney, and the three met that afternoon at the police station. During the ensuing interview, Johnson told Voznik that, on April 27, defendant negotiated with Thompson about buying crack cocaine and gave her money for it. Johnson also said that he was present when Thompson and Robinson were killed and that defendant had killed them. On cross-examination by the prosecution, Sergeant Voznik testified that his interview with Johnson was tape-recorded. The prosecutor marked for identification a 28-page transcript of Johnson's interview and referred to the transcript in questioning Voznik about the details of the interview. Johnson told Voznik that defendant shot Thompson and Robinson about 10:00 p.m. on April 27, 1987, in an alley outside the apartment of Lisa McKaufman. Defendant snatche[d] Robinson with his left hand, pulled a gun from the front of his pants with his right hand, placed the gun to Robinson's neck and fired one shot. Robinson just drop[ped], and Thompson lay on the ground in a fetal position screaming and hollering. Defendant then straddled Thompson and shot her two to three times on the side of her head. Defendant did not object to any of this testimony. When the prosecutor asked Sergeant Voznik where defendant went after shooting Thompson, defense counsel objected to the testimony as being no longer within the realm of [Evidence Code section] 356. The trial court overruled the objection. Voznik then testified that Johnson said that defendant leaped past him after shooting Thompson. Without objection from the defense, Voznik also stated that defendant's gun was a rust-colored revolver with a three-inch barrel. The court sustained several of defendant's objections to identified portions of the Johnson interview as outside the scope of Evidence Code section 356 or as cumulative. Over defendant's objection that the testimony was cumulative, Sergeant Voznik further testified that during the interview Johnson said that when defendant shot Robinson the gun was touching Robinson's neck, and when defendant shot Thompson the gun was two or three feet from Thompson's head. Defendant contends that Johnson's statement to Sergeant Voznik providing details about the Thompson/Robinson murders, which the prosecutor elicited during cross-examination, was inadmissible hearsay. Because he did not object at trial on this ground, he has not preserved the issue for review. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1035, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Even if the issue was properly before us, the contention lacks merit, as discussed below. Evidence Code section 356 permits introduction of statements `on the same subject' or which are necessary for the understanding of the statements already introduced. [Citation.] ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 419-420, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Accordingly, once defendant had introduced a portion of Johnson's interview with Sergeant Voznik into evidence, the prosecution was entitled to introduce the remainder of Johnson's interview to place in context the isolated statements of Johnson related by Voznik on direct examination by the defense. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) The trial court's admission of Johnson's statements was therefore proper under California statutory law. Defendant also contends that by admitting the statement the trial court violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. Even if he has not forfeited this claim by his failure to raise it at trial, the claim lacks merit. Recently, the United States Supreme Court stated that when testimonial hearsay evidence, which includes [s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations ( Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d 177), is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands ... unavailability [of the declarant] and a prior opportunity for cross-examination ( id. at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1374). But the high court has not said whether Crawford applies to cases that, like this one, were tried before it was decided. Assuming for the sake of argument that under Crawford, admission of Johnson's statements to Voznik violated the Sixth Amendment, admission of the statements would require reversal unless we found beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent any error. ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 7-10, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35; see also People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) Under that standard, any error in admitting Johnson's statements was harmless. The important factual issue at trial was identity, not the manner in which the victims were killed. On this point, defendant himself elicited from Sergeant Voznik the statement by Johnson identifying defendant as the shooter, which was consistent with defendant's admission of guilt to Davis. The details of the murders provided by Davis, as relayed to him by defendant, were largely identical to the details provided by Johnson, but for the order in which the victims were killed. The locations and the analysis of the victims' wounds corroborated evidence that they were killed at very close range. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt the jury's verdict would have been the same absent the admission of evidence elicited by the prosecution on cross-examination of Voznik about the details of Johnson's statement to him.
Defendant accuses the prosecutor of misconduct before and during trial, thus violating his rights to a fair trial and due process under the state and federal Constitutions.
Defendant contends the prosecution frustrated his efforts to call Richard Johnson as a defense witness. He asserts the prosecution behaved irresponsibly by stating before trial that it would call Johnson as a witness, only to tell the defense, after jury selection had been completed and four days before opening statements, that it would not call him after all. At this point the defense, which wanted to call Johnson as a witness, began an unsuccessful effort to locate him. After the evidentiary portion of trial was under way, the parties stipulated that they each had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate Johnson to testify at trial, and that he was an unavailable witness under Evidence Code section 1230. As further evidence that Johnson was unavailable the trial court noted that Johnson had failed to appear at a probation revocation hearing, as a result of which the superior court had issued a no-bail bench warrant for his arrest. Defendant's contention that the prosecution frustrated his efforts to call Johnson lacks merit. Before trial began, the parties and the court discussed potential evidence pertaining to Johnson. At that time the prosecutor noted that Johnson could not be found, that he had received information as to where Johnson might be staying, and that he had given this information to the defense. The prosecutor did nothing to prevent defendant from attempting to find and subpoena Johnson. Although defendant claims the prosecutor acted in bad faith by waiting until after jury selection to say he would not call Johnson to testify, we see no evidence of bad faith. The defense was responsible for securing the presence of any witness it wanted to call at trial, regardless of whether the prosecution would also be using that witness. If the defense wanted to ensure that Johnson would be available to testify, it could have begun looking for him at any time, without waiting to see whether the prosecution would also call him. Defendant also claims that the prosecution had a duty to undertake reasonable good faith efforts to locate Johnson, and that it violated this alleged duty. But defendant made no such claim at trial. Indeed, as explained above, he stipulated that both parties had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate Johnson. Defendant therefore has not preserved the issue for appeal. (See People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 763, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267 [involving discovery rights].)
When the police interviewed Richard Johnson in May 1987, he said he saw defendant kill Thompson and Robinson, and he described in detail the manner of the killings. Later, in October 1991, Johnson told an investigator from the district attorney's office he knew nothing about the murders because he was not there. He said that he had lied to the police in May 1987. At trial, during a discussion in chambers regarding the admissibility of certain evidence not relevant here, this colloquy occurred: [THE PROSECUTOR]: [W]hen [Johnson] gave his statement to the police after a day and a half in custody, he got as far  he sanitized himself as much as he possibly could. He laid everything on [defendant], and, in his own words, he said basically he was just standing there. THE COURT: Which belies  [THE PROSECUTOR]: It belies common sense, belies the truth, it belies everything.  (Italics added.) Later, when cross-examining Sergeant Voznik, the prosecutor elicited the detailed description of the murders that Johnson had given to Voznik in May 1987. Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting this description, because he had previously expressed the view, in the discussion quoted above, that Johnson's statements were false, and because he knew that Johnson had later recanted his statements. Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal because he did not object to that testimony at trial. ( People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.) In any event, there was no prosecutorial misconduct. A prosecutor's misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. ( People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 18 P.3d 11; accord, Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431.) In other words, the misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. ( United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342.) A prosecutor's misconduct that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair violates California law only if it `involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' ( People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204; accord, People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 167, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) Under well-established principles of due process, the prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of which it is aware in the evidence it presents.... ( People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 647, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175.) But the prosecutor here did not know that Johnson's initial statement to the police was false; he merely suspected that was the case. When, as here, the prosecution has doubts as to the truth of a statement it intends to present at trial, it must disclose to the defense any material evidence suggesting that the statement in question is false. But, notwithstanding those doubts, the prosecutor may still present the statement to the jury, as we explained in People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 110 Cal. Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298. In Gordon, the prosecutor told the jury in his opening statement that he believed his chief witness `would not be telling the truth' because she would be testifying that the defendant was the sole perpetrator of the murder charged in that case, whereas the prosecutor suspected that the witness was actually an accomplice. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 472, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.) We rejected the defendant's claim that the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial by knowingly presenting perjured testimony, explaining that the prosecutor did not know  ( Id. at p. 474, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298) the witness was lying and that the jury could decide for itself which of the conflicting versions of the incidents in question was true ( ibid.; see also People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1181-1182, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969 [quoting Gordon with approval] ). Here, the prosecutor's comment about Johnson's statement to the police  It belies common sense, belies the truth, it belies everything  appears to express the view that Johnson was lying when he claimed to be an innocent bystander, and that he actually assisted defendant in committing the murders. Thus, the prosecutor's doubts about the truth of Johnson's statement mirrored the doubts of the prosecutor in Gordon regarding the truthfulness of the latter's chief witness. But, as in Gordon, those doubts were based on the evidence presented at trial, not on facts of which the jury was unaware. (See generally People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 648, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175 [So long as the prosecutor's doubts are based solely on the evidence presented at trial, the jury is capable of deciding which of the competing experts is the more convincing....].) Just as the prosecutor in Gordon was entitled to call his chief witness to testify, the prosecutor here was entitled to introduce Johnson's statement. The jury, which also heard from the defense that Johnson had later recanted his statement, could make its own decision as to Johnson's credibility. Defendant also contends the prosecutor had a duty under Mooney v. Holohan (1935) 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, and its progeny, to tell the jury that Johnson's account of the murders to Sergeant Voznik could not be believed because Johnson had repudiated it. It is true that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with `rudimentary demands of justice.' ( Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, citing Mooney v. Holohan, supra, 294 U.S. at p. 112, 55 S.Ct. 340.) But as explained in the previous paragraph, the prosecutor did not deceive the court or jury by presenting evidence of Johnson's statements to the police.
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when, in closing argument during the guilt phase, he ascribed various negative characteristics to defendant, argued at length about the uncharged March 1987 incident involving defendant's possession of a firearm, and (according to defendant) fabricated facts. He further contends the cumulative impact of the various acts of misconduct could not have been cured by an admonition, and the misconduct violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial.
At the threshold, the Attorney General contends defendant forfeited appellate review of all these claims. Defense counsel objected to only one of the prosecutor's allegedly improper remarks and in no case did he request an admonition or curative instruction. Defendant argues that a request for an admonition would have been futile and would not have cured the harm because the prosecutor's misconduct was pervasive. A defendant will be excused from the necessity of either a timely objection and/or a request for admonition if either would be futile. [Citations.] In addition, failure to request the jury be admonished does not forfeit the issue for appeal if `an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct.' [Citation.] ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Here, however, defendant objected to virtually none of the prosecutor's purportedly improper statements and never sought an admonition. A timely objection and request for admonition at the first sign of any purported misconduct might have curbed the vigor of the prosecutor's argument. (See People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 521, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) Moreover, even if defendant had preserved the right to raise these claims on appeal, no reversal would be required, as discussed below.
When the issue focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40, overruled on another point in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; accord, People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) A prosecutor is given wide latitude during closing argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it is a fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn therefrom. `A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case and is not limited to `Chesterfieldian politeness' [citation], and he may use appropriate epithets....' [Citations.] ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567-568, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) A defendant's conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct ... unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct. ( People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.)
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing to the jury that defendant enjoyed killing Robinson; that he enjoyed killing Thompson with the relish and degree [ sic ] of a little kid opening his toys at Christmas; that he plotted to kill Davis because he likes to kill, likes to intimidate, and likes to bully and strong-arm; and that in his glee, with [h]is mind made up to kill Davis, he jumped into the back seat [with Davis], gun exposed to smell and feel the last bit of life he's going to take. These statements did not exceed the bounds of proper argument. Given the evidence that defendant killed Thompson and Robinson in cold blood, at point-blank range, apparently over a fraudulent cocaine purchase, and that a week later he tried to kill Davis after he had shared beer and taken a car ride with him, the prosecutor's characterizations of defendant fell within the permissible bounds of argument. Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's description of defendant as a prowler and a denizen of the night who was in his element at night, and the prosecutor's repeated references to defendant as a man of concealed intent. Through these descriptions the prosecutor evidently was alluding to a March 1987 incident when the police saw defendant, who was loitering at night in a crime-ridden area, pull a gun from under his jacket and toss it away. Defendant did not object to the admission of evidence of this incident, and thus cannot complain about it now. In any event, the prosecutor's descriptions of defendant were permissible comments on the evidence. As for the later description of defendant as a man of concealed intent, the prosecutor argued defendant intended to harm Thompson and Robinson as he stood outside Lisa McKaufman's house during the early morning hours of April 28, and that he had a similar intent toward Davis during the car trip on May 4, 1987. Again, based as they were on the evidence, these comments did not exceed the bounds of proper argument. Defendant also contends the prosecutor improperly argued defendant was a habitual killer. Specifically, defendant cites as improper these descriptions of him: a creator of victims ... who turns people from life into death; the executioner; the terminator of precious life; a head hunter; one who had no respect for the dead, the living, or anybody; and one who kills or threatens, threatens or kills, whatever serves his purpose. Defendant further contends the prosecutor improperly argued: This is a one-man crime wave. He may not be a serial killer, but killing is his byline. Two deaths and an attempt and an invitation and threats to back it up. A one-man gang, a worldly [ sic ] dervish of energy, poised and striped [ sic ] to kill. That's [defendant]. The challenged statements did not exceed the bounds of proper argument, given the evidence that defendant shot two people in the head at point-blank range over a purchase of fake cocaine. Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to convict him of murder based on an alleged predisposition to kill, based on these comments: [Defendant] decides to execute in cold blood two helpless human beings that never ever saw this coming. Snatches with the left, shoots with the right, similar to the way he attacked Olin [Davis]. [¶] So, ladies and gentlemen, he had a predisposition to kill and he acted it out. And he got them to where he could mutilate them where nobody could see it and he did it.... (Italics added.) The Attorney General counters that predisposition to kill was the prosecutor's shorthand way of saying that defendant intended to kill Thompson and Robinson when Thompson could not get the money back for the fake rock of crack cocaine she had bought for defendant and Johnson. We need not decide what the prosecutor meant by his statement, for any misconduct was harmless. The statement was a tiny part of an otherwise permissible argument that spanned two days. That a more favorable verdict would have been received in the absence of the error is not reasonably probable, given the strong evidence that defendant shot Thompson and Robinson at point-blank range. Defendant also cites as misconduct the prosecutor's assertion that defendant wanted to kill Olin Davis's brother Bruce at the same time he killed Olin: And he wants to take Bruce along too so he can talk to Bruce. That's four. That's four. That's four. Another double homicide is contemplated on May 4th. Defendant objected to this comment, and the court sustained the objection, stating that the prosecutor was in excess of the instruction on the purpose for which Mr. Davis' testimony was limited. The court told the prosecutor to confine [his] remarks to the evidence as limited. The admonition cured any harm. Defendant also contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by describing defendant as evil. The prosecutor argued: The case was about defendant's utter evil; dealing with defendant was like peeling the skin of an onion, with every layer being a level of evil and every layer peeled being that much closer to the evil hard-core; defendant was the lowest common denominator and the complete and total essence of evil; and [t]he layers of evil within [defendant] surrounded a cold unyielding heart. None of these characterizations exceeded the permissible scope of closing argument.
Toward the end of his rebuttal argument at the guilt phase of trial, the prosecutor said he had to look at something to make sense out of this, something to put this into some perspective because in 45 years [he had not] seen anything that [he could] compare ... to this case. He stated that although he was not a religious person by any stretch of the imagination he had read about the apocalypse as described in Revelation, the last book of the Bible. [T]he word apocalypse, he said, put defendant's conduct in proper perspective, except that in contrast to the apocalypse, defendant did not have the necessary mandate to carry out his actions. The prosecutor explained that in the apocalypse, a crowned rider on a white horse who came to conquer the world was followed by three other men on horses who came to kill and take peace away so that the world could start anew. Describing the apocalypse as the mandate of God, the prosecutor argued to the jury: On what steed, with whose authority does [defendant] cut a path through the City of Oakland leaving murder and death and destruction and utter annihilation in his wake? By what authority is he guided? [¶] This man is the disciple of Satan, ladies and gentlemen. He has worked his way up into this community from the deep inner core of this planet like a sour foul putrid weed. He has cracked the soil and killed all before him so he can live, and when the sun goes down he comes out and he slaughters and he maims and he murders. [¶] But, ... he's not the judge and jury in this case, you are, and that's where he comes up short. The man is the utter harbinger of senseless total annihilation, no more, no less. You must take the sword from him and cast it down and tell him that he was wrong and he may go no further. The prosecutor continued: [T]he institutions that govern the conduct of the people in this world are to be taken most seriously. The Penal Code of this state consists of thousands of laws but they mean nothing until you give them life through your verdict and set the appropriate standard of conduct. We repeatedly have held that prosecutors may not appeal to religious authority in a closing argument to the jury. Our opinions have most often discussed such arguments when made at the penalty phase of a capital case, because the decision whether to impose the death penalty is an ethical and normative question that at first glance seems amenable to religious argument. As we have explained, such argument is improper, because to invoke God may diminish the jurors' sense of personal responsibility for the decision whether to impose the death penalty or may encourage jurors to base their penalty decision on a different or higher law than that found in the California Penal Code. ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 100, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 761-762, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 519-521, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 836-837, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1063, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544; People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 260-261, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 193-194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Here, the prosecutor's biblical reference came at the guilt, not the penalty, phase of trial. Appeals to religious authority at the guilt phase are also impermissible, but for a different reason than at the penalty phase. The jury at the guilt phase is not charged with making an ethical or normative decision; instead, it decides questions of historical fact based on the evidence and applies to those facts the law as articulated by the trial court. Religious input has no legitimate role to play in this process. (See generally People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 463, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209.) But not every reference to the Bible is an appeal to religious authority. Not only is the Bible a religious text, but it is also generally regarded as a literary masterpiece; indeed, it is among the oldest and best-known literary works in our culture. The English departments of major secular universities teach courses on the Bible as literature. [4] And this court has repeatedly held that in closing argument attorneys may use illustrations drawn from common experience, history, or literature.  ( People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 730, 16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 366 P.2d 33, italics added; see also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 463, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1026, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710; People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 193, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862; People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 567, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290; People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 922, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940; People v. Thornton, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 763, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267.) As an article in a respected law journal explains, fiction, anecdotes, jokes and Bible stories are commonly regarded as acceptable in closing argument. (Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum (1956) 105 U.Pa. L.Rev. 139, 147, italics added.) When references to the Bible are involved, the line between literary allusion and religious appeal is often a fine one. A prosecutor who mentions the Bible in closing argument runs a grave risk that a reviewing court will find that the line has been crossed and will reverse the defendant's conviction. Because any use of biblical references in argument must be carefully scrutinized, cautious prosecutors will choose to avoid such references. Nevertheless, so long as they do not appeal to religious authority, prosecutors may refer to the Bible in closing argument to illustrate a point. Here, a reasonable juror likely would understand the prosecutor's biblical references merely as a powerfully dramatic illustration of the gravity and enormity of defendant's crimes. The prosecutor did not argue that biblical law or doctrine required defendant's conviction of the charges against him. [5] Indeed, he prefaced his remarks with a statement that he himself was not a religious person. Because the prosecutor did not use the biblical allusion as an appeal to religious authority, we do not find prosecutorial misconduct in this case.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor said in reference to defendant's attempted murder of Davis: [W]hen [defendant] gets out of that car, he comes around with the gun extended in his right hand up in the ready position, he opens the door, he looks at his friend [Davis] and he says, `My friend, you are through, you're through. I'm going to kill you. You're not going to live to testify against me in the superior court trial. You're going to die. ' That's exactly what his intention is. (Italics added.) Pointing out that Davis testified defendant said only you're through after opening the car door, defendant contends the prosecutor fabricated evidence. While counsel is accorded `great latitude at argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel believes can properly be drawn from the evidence [citation],' counsel may not assume or state facts not in evidence [citation] or mischaracterize the evidence [citation]. ( People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th 73, 133-134, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide. ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 522, 71 Cal. Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) Here, the prosecutor did not fabricate evidence. After making the argument in question, he immediately said, That's exactly what [defendant's] intention is. The prosecutor thus merely suggested an inference that the jury could draw from Davis's testimony.
During his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury there was evidence defendant possessed a firearm in March 1987. But the prosecutor promptly told the jury defendant was not on trial for the March 1987 incident and that the jury could consider evidence of that incident only to show defendant had access to the kind of firearm used in the double murders. Defendant contends that the trial court should not have admitted evidence of the March 1987 incident, and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument by relying on the incident to persuade the jury that defendant had a criminal disposition. Evidence of the March 1987 incident was admitted without objection. Thus, the prosecutor was permitted to refer to such evidence. Contrary to defendant's argument, moreover, the prosecutor did not argue that he was a man of criminal disposition because he possessed a firearm in 1987. No misconduct occurred.

As stated, before Olin Davis testified about the attempt to kill him, the trial court instructed the jury: Mr. Davis is about to testify to a series of events that took place on May 4th, 1987, which involve interaction between Mr. Davis, [defendant], and Mr. Ronald Gino Harrison. And the evidence ... will reveal the commission of a crime against [Davis], namely an assault with a deadly weapon at the very least. What I want to have you understand is this. [Defendant] is not charged with this crime in this case, and you are not to consider this evidence for determining his guilt for this crime that he's not charged with, or to hear it to come to some conclusion that he's a bad person because of what happened here. This evidence is being admitted to explain  to evaluate  to assist you in evaluating the testimony of Mr. Olin Davis and to flesh out, if you will, the relationship between Mr. Davis and [defendant], and it may become relevant for purposes for which you will be specifically instructed otherwise. But I want to make sure you understand it's evidence of an uncharged crime, and it's being heard here for very limited purposes. And you must not  it is not direct evidence on the issues that you're here to ask about the two counts of murder, but it relates to Mr. Davis' credibility and believability as you should evaluate that, the motives that he may have for testifying here in relationship to [defendant], and other factors which may become apparent upon which you will be specifically instructed. At a sidebar conference immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked to have the instruction read back during the break because he was concerned the court had instructed the jury it was not to consider this evidence in any form as to defendant's guilt. The court denied having done so, but the prosecutor nevertheless asked to read the transcript of the instruction to make sure. The trial court then told the jury: As is frequently the possibility when we speak extemporaneously, I may have misspoken. I'm going to have this transcript reread to me. I want to make sure all I'm telling you here is that this testimony that you're about to hear is special testimony, and it will be heard by you for limited reasons which will be fully explained at the conclusion of the trial. And I want you to understand that and to keep it separate from the testimony of Mr. Davis on, for instance, attributed to him, that he attributes certain statements to [defendant] directly relevant to the two counts, and we'll leave it at that. [¶] If I've misspoken myself, I'll correct it when I've reread the transcript. All of this will be cleared up at the end of trial, I hope. The prosecutor read the relevant portion of the reporter's transcript during a break. Thereafter, he said he had no objections to the wording of the court's instructions to the jury. At the close of the guilt phase, the trial court gave the standard jury instruction on evidence limited as to purpose (CALJIC No. 2.09 (5th ed.1988)) [6] and a modified jury instruction on other crimes evidence (CALJIC No. 2.50 (5th ed.1988)). [7] Defendant challenges these instructions on several grounds. First, defendant contends the trial court's limiting instruction to the jury during Davis's testimony was erroneous because evidence of defendant's attempt to kill Davis should not have been admitted at all. As discussed in part III.A, ante, the court properly admitted that evidence. Accordingly, we reject the argument that the limiting instruction on this issue was erroneous on this basis. Next, defendant complains this instruction must have confused the jury because the trial court told the jury it might have misspoken in instructing the jury, without identifying the portion of the instruction at issue. Thus, defendant argues, the jury was left without guidance as to how to consider the evidence of defendant's attempted murder of Davis. Not so. The court expressly instructed the jury that it could consider such evidence for limited purposes, such as credibility, believability, and motive, and that, if other purposes later became relevant, the jury would be instructed accordingly. In any event, any possible jury confusion engendered by the trial court's statement that it might have misspoken was cleared up at the end of trial when the court gave a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.50, which identified the particular limited purposes for which the jury could consider other crimes evidence. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury was confused and misconstrued or misapplied the instruction (see People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 662-663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705), and defendant's argument to the contrary is speculation. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in giving a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.50, because it was unnecessary and irrelevant. He argues that instructing the jury that other crimes evidence may be considered for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show the defendant had knowledge or possessed the means that might have been useful or necessary for the commission of the crimes charged was unnecessary because at trial defendant did not deny that he had access to guns. He also argues that instructing the jury that other crimes evidence may be considered for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show [that] ... the defendant had a consciousness of guilt with respect to the crimes charged was erroneous because the March 1987 incident was irrelevant on this issue. We find no error. [T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) In addition to the above instructions, the trial court instructed the jury: Whether some instructions apply will depend upon what you find to be the facts. Disregard any instruction which applies to facts determined by you not to exist. (See CALJIC No. 17.31 (5th ed.1988).) Viewed as a whole, the instructions adequately advised the jury how to consider evidence limited as to purpose and other crimes evidence. Finally, defendant contends the trial court's guilt phase instructions were inadequate to overcome the voluminous evidence admitted on attempted murder and the prosecutor's improper closing argument that defendant's character, as shown by other crimes evidence, proved he committed the double murders. Defendant's contention essentially repeats earlier claims of erroneous admission of evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, which we have already rejected.

At the time of trial, Bruce Davis, a prosecution witness and the brother of Olin Davis, was in jail facing six counts of robbery. Robert Williams, another prosecution witness, testified at trial that he had been originally charged with four felony counts stemming from his May 4, 1987, altercation with Olin Davis, but the day after he testified at defendant's preliminary hearing three of these counts were dismissed. Williams pleaded guilty to one count of assault with a deadly weapon and, in 1989, was sentenced to 18 years in state prison. He was serving his sentence at the time of trial. Defendant requested, but the trial court refused, this special instruction (special instruction C): The testimony of a witness who provides evidence against a defendant in the hope or expectation of leniency in his punishment must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than would be applied to the testimony of an ordinary witness. [¶] The jury should examine such testimony to determine whether it is colored in such a way as to place guilt on the defendant in order to further the witness' own interest, for such a witness, confronted with the realization that he can secure leniency or freedom by incriminating another has a motive to falsify. In requesting this special instruction, defense counsel explained it focused on the expectation of leniency by Bruce Davis and Robert Williams and the effect of such expectation on their testimony. In refusing the instruction, the court noted that the requested instruction was overspecialized, and that CALJIC No. 2.20 adequately focused the jury's attention on the existence or nonexistence of bias, interest, or other motive of a witness. Defendant contends the court erred in so ruling, and thereby violated his right to a fair trial. We have suggested that `in appropriate circumstances' a trial court may be required to give a requested jury instruction that pinpoints a defense theory of the case.... ( People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 558, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) But a court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it merely duplicates other instructions. ( Ibid.; see also, e.g., People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 191, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664 [no error in refusing to give a special instruction that would have cautioned the jury to examine with greater care the testimony of an informer, for the jury received adequate standard instructions on the credibility of witnesses].) Here, the jury received instructions on the credibility of witnesses in general (CALJIC No. 2.20) and on the credibility of a witness who has been convicted of a felony (CALJIC No. 2.23). Together, these instructions adequately informed the jury that the existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive and a witness's prior conviction of a felony were factors it could consider in determining the believability of a witness. Defendant cites no authority to support his argument that these instructions were inadequate, and we find none. Accordingly, the court did not err in refusing to give defendant's special instruction C. Thus, defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated.
Defendant also requested, but the trial court refused, this special instruction (special instruction D): If a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce a witness whose testimony would be material on any matter in issue, the fact that he does not creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable to that party. In requesting this instruction, defense counsel noted that the prosecution had the power to produce Richard Johnson and Olin Davis's roommate Moe but did not do so, and claimed that their testimony would have been material to the murders themselves and to defendant's admission to the murders. In refusing the instruction, the trial court noted it was not satisfied that the requested instruction correctly stated the law. Defendant contends the court's refusal to give this instruction violated his right to a fair trial. Defendant argues that special instruction D reflects the provisions of Evidence Code section 412. That section provides: If weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust. We need not decide whether special instruction D is consistent with Evidence Code section 412, for instruction on this issue was inapplicable in any event. It was undisputed at trial that the prosecution tried to locate Johnson for trial but could not do so. As for the purported application of the requested instruction to Moe, from the record it appears that no one had any information about him beyond his first name. Thus, the prosecution did not have enough information about Moe to produce him as a witness. Further, there was no evidence that Moe was present at the scene of the murders or when defendant made his admission to Davis. Davis testified that Moe was in the room when defendant came to his house a day or two after the murders, but that Davis and defendant walked out to the porch before defendant admitted to Davis that he killed Thompson and Robinson. Davis also testified that Moe was present when defendant returned to the house the next day with the newspaper clipping of the double murders, but that he was not present when defendant and Davis further discussed the murders. Therefore, even if the prosecution could have found Moe, his testimony would not have been material. Accordingly, the court did not err, under state or federal law, in refusing to give special instruction D.
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the trial court's alleged errors and prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase resulted in an unfair trial, an unreliable verdict, and a miscarriage of justice under the state and federal Constitutions. For the sake of argument, we have assumed that the trial court erred by admitting Richard Johnson's out-of-court statement to Olin Davis (although defendant invited any error), and we have assumed that several of the prosecutor's comments in closing argument amounted to misconduct, although defendant forfeited the latter claims by failing to object or to request a curative admonition. In each of these instances, we have found the error harmless. The combined effect of these assumed errors did not deny defendant a fair trial, a reliable verdict, or any other constitutional right.