Opinion ID: 1060419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Deterrence of Intentional or Reckless Conduct

Text: With regard to deterrence as an objective of capital punishment, the majority notes that mental retardation may prevent a defendant from fully appreciating the consequences of actions. Again, while this proposition may be true in some cases, I see no evidence that it is invariably true. We have recently explored in detail how deterrence is affected by sentencing behavior, and we recognized that punishment can work to deter intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. See State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn.2000); see also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-99 (We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be taken.); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158-59, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) (expanding the culpability requirements of Enmund to include major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life). Therefore, where the defendant's mental condition does not affect his or her capacity to intend that death follow from certain actions, then deterrence remains permissible justification in the capital context. Indeed, deterrence would also be a permissible justification even if the victim's death was only the result of reckless conduct. Even assuming that the petitioner possesses an I.Q. of sixty-five, however, no evidence has ever been presented that he was incapable of forming an intent to kill or was otherwise unable to murder with premeditation and deliberation. As I acknowledged earlier, this Court has previously found that the murder of Kai Yin Chuey was the result of a specific intent to kill. See Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 482. Moreover, the petitioner's major participation in the felony, even if not the result of a specific intent to kill, was certainly the result of knowing or extremely reckless conduct. With good reason, the law has always supposed that these types of actions can be deterred by punishment. Therefore, when the defendant's mental condition does not prevent him or her from appreciating that death would follow from certain action, then deterrence certainly remains a legitimate penological goal in the capital context.