Opinion ID: 1908352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Sewer Permit Case)

Text: The WSSC and State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene challenge the lower court's decree on a number of grounds. Each contends that the WSSC did not officially act on or deny the permit, and that the lower court was in error in concluding that it did. The WSSC contends that Woodies failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review; it suggests that the Board of Review of the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol., 1976 Cum. Supp.) Art. 41, §§ 206A and B had jurisdiction to hear the case prior to an appeal being taken to the circuit court. The Department does not join in this contention; it does, however, raise other issues respecting whether the circuit court exceeded its powers of judicial review and unlawfully assumed the functions of the administrative agency itself. The WSSC argues that the lower court was clearly in error in holding, on the evidence adduced at the trial, that no greater sewage flows would result from construction of the Town Center than were generated by the existing store; and that the Department's sewer moratorium order of August 16, 1973 did not inhibit construction of the project. The Department does not join in this contention. It maintains, however, that the lower court's decree was defective in that it failed to incorporate language recognizing the Department's paramount authority to control discharges to the waters of the state in order to protect the public health. Finally, the Department takes issue with that part of the court's decree which would permit a sewage flow of 15,053 gallons per day for 365 days per year rather than 26 days per month, or for 312 days per year  an error of 797,809 gallons per year, which Woodies concededly now recognizes. As interesting as these issues may be, we need not reach them in the present posture of the case. Quite simply, the basic issue in the case is whether the Town Center project, as proposed by Woodies' building plans, would generate a sewage flow in excess of the facility it was designed to replace, and whether the sewer moratorium order barred service to the site. On conflicting expert and other evidence, Judge Mathias found that no greater flows would be involved and that Woodies was entitled to the sewer permit. While our review of the evidence indicates that Judge Mathias was not clearly in error in so holding, it is manifest that his decree of December 18, 1974 cannot be implemented by issuance of a sewer permit consistent with the conditions therein outlined. The Town Center cannot now be constructed under the comprehensive zoning plan for Friendship Heights which was before us in Montgomery County, Maryland v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., supra . Since Woodies has no vested rights in its earlier C-2 zoning, and since the County did not cause any wrongful delay in the issuance of the sewer permit, the County is not estopped from enforcing its downzoning resolution. Accordingly, whether Woodies is entitled to a sewer permit for the Town Center is now a moot issue. As Judge Digges said for the Court in Md. Tobacco Grow. v. Md. Tob. Auth., 267 Md. 20, 25-26, 296 A.2d 578 (1972), when the chronology of a case makes it apparent that nothing we could do could undo or remedy that which has already occurred, except under the most extraordinary circumstances ..., the case must be dismissed as moot. We do not give opinions on abstract propositions or moot questions and appeals which present nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course. State v. Ficker, 266 Md. 500, 295 A.2d 231 (1972); Potts v. Governor, 255 Md. 445, 258 A.2d 180 (1969); Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 111 A.2d 379 (1954). In the circumstances of this case, it would be an act of futility, a useless gesture of no effect whatsoever, to consider this appeal. Md. Tobacco Grow. v. Md. Tob. Auth., supra (267 Md. at 26). As to No. 6: Decree of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County dated December 18, 1974 vacated; appeal dismissed; costs to be paid by appellants. As to No. 133: Order affirmed; costs to be paid by appellants.