Opinion ID: 3202889
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second-Degree Theft

Text: Appellant next argues that his theft conviction should be reversed because no one actually saw him take the money. In reviewing appellant’s sufficiency claim, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government . . . .” Cannon v. United States, 838 A.2d 293, 296 (D.C. 2004). In so doing, “we do not draw any distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 297. To prove second-degree theft, the government must present evidence “(1) [that the defendant] wrongfully obtained the property [of another], (2) that at the time he (…continued) necessarily mean that the threatened bodily harm had to be as serious as we have subsequently required it to be in aggravated assault cases.”). 13 obtained it, he specifically intended either to deprive [the owner] of a right to the property or a benefit of the property or to take or make use of the property for himself . . . without authority or right, and (3) that the property had some value.” Nowlin v. United States, 782 A.2d 288, 291 (D.C. 2001) (citations, internal quotation marks, and original brackets omitted). Here, the trial court credited Ms. Brown’s account of the incident. Thus, even though no one directly observed appellant take the money, the strong circumstantial evidence provided by Ms. Brown is sufficient to prove appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Graham v. United States, 12 A.3d 1159, 1163 (D.C. 2011) (“We have repeatedly held that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction.”). Specifically, Ms. Brown testified that she had $736 in her wallet before she went to bed, and that she placed her wallet underneath her pillow for safekeeping. Appellant knew Ms. Brown had “hundreds” in her wallet after seeing her pay for carryout the night before. In the morning, Ms. Brown chatted with Ms. Eddie in the living room, while appellant retreated to the bedroom by himself for a significant period of time. After appellant left the apartment and never came back, Ms. Brown walked into her bedroom and noticed that her wallet was out of place, and that the money was missing. Taken together, the evidence established that appellant was the only 14 person who had the opportunity and means to steal Ms. Brown’s money. And because the trial court credited Ms. Brown’s version of events, the court could have further inferred that the fact that appellant never came back to the apartment after throwing away the trash and later verbally threatened Ms. Brown for bringing up the money evidenced his guilt. See, e.g., Ebron, supra note 7, 838 A.2d at 1148 (evidence of threats relevant to show consciousness of guilt). Accordingly, appellant’s theft conviction is affirmed.9 9 Relatedly, appellant also challenges the trial court’s decision to discredit his testimony that he decided not to return to the apartment after taking out the trash because he saw someone associated with a man who had previously shot him. He claims that the trial court was required to credit his testimony because Ms. Brown had “confirmed” appellant’s story when she testified that appellant had left her a voicemail about someone who came over to Ms. Brown’s apartment (Ms. Brown: “He was talking about the dude that came over. He said y’all good for each other”). We are unpersuaded by appellant’s argument that a voicemail about some unknown individual that appellant claims came over to Ms. Brown’s apartment corroborates his testimony. The trial court was not required to speculate, as appellant contends, and did not clearly err in not deciding, that the individual appellant claimed to have seen is the same person as the one referenced in the voicemail. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 63 (D.C. 2009) (“This court . . . reviews the trial court’s [credibility] findings only for clear error.”). 15