Opinion ID: 382670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: What Does the Full and Fair Exposition Test Require?

Text: 37 The Treasury definition of educational may also be challenged on the ground that it fails to articulate with sufficient specificity the requirements of the full and fair exposition standard. The language of the regulation gives no aid in interpreting the meaning of the test: 38 An organization may be educational even though it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion. On the other hand, an organization is not educational if its principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion. 39 Treas.Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (1959). What makes an exposition full and fair? Can it be fair without being full? Which facts are pertinent? How does one tell whether an exposition of the pertinent facts is sufficient ... to permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion? And who is to make all of these determinations? 40 The regulation's vagueness is especially apparent in the last clause quoted above. That portion of the test is expressly based on an individualistic-and therefore necessarily varying and unascertainable-standard: the reactions of members of the public. The Supreme Court has recognized that statutes phrased in terms of individual sensitivities are suspect and susceptible to attack on vagueness grounds. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague ... in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.). See also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 701-02, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 1372, 3 L.Ed.2d 1512 (1959) (Clark, J., concurring in the result); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-05, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781-82, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952). 41 An additional source of unclarity lies in the relationship between the two sentences comprising the full and fair exposition test. Appellant argues that the two should be read as counter-examples-an organization fails to satisfy the test only if its principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion. The Government, on the other hand, contends that tax-exempt status must be denied BMR, Inc. if a substantial portion of its newspaper consists of unsupported opinion. Again, the language of the regulation does not resolve this issue. 13 42 The district court's interpretation of the full and fair exposition test, and the one advocated by the Government, is no more precise. The district court found the Treasury regulation capable of objective application because it asks only whether the facts underlying the conclusions are stated. 494 F.Supp. at 480. But distinguishing facts, on the one hand, and opinion or conclusion, on the other, does not provide an objective yardstick by which to define educational. The distinction is not so clear-cut that an organization seeking tax-exempt status-or an IRS official reviewing an application for exemption-will be able to judge when any given statement must be bolstered by another supporting statement. 14 43 One of the five examples cited by the Government as evidence of BMR 's failure to meet the full and fair exposition test may be used to illustrate our point. Most of the article, discussing Susan Saxe's 1975 plea of guilty to charges stemming from a bank robbery in Philadelphia, is simple journalistic reporting. It discusses the terms of the plea bargain, the reaction of local feminists, the differential treatment accorded Saxe supporters and white men who went to observe the pretrial hearing, and police questioning of women in Philadelphia. In return for Saxe's plea, the Government apparently agreed, among other things, to call off its investigation of the women's and lesbian communities in the area and not to ask Saxe to testify against anyone she has known or know (sic ) about in the last five years. By forcing Saxe to choose between her own interests and those of other women, the article continues, the Government has clarified for us, once again, that we, as women, are inextricably bound up with each other in the struggle. Big Mama Rag, July, 1975, at 1, cols. 1-3, reprinted in App. 447. 44 Certainly, the author's viewpoint is not disguised in the last sentence. But is the statement one of fact or opinion? If the latter, is the author's description of the terms of the guilty plea sufficient to inform readers of the basis underlying her opinion? Or is further proof of the existence of the struggle necessary? If so, would the article satisfy the full and fair exposition test without that final statement? Neither the Treasury regulation nor the proposed fact/opinion distinction is responsive to these questions. And one's answers will likely be colored by one's attitude towards the author's point of view. 15 45 The futility of attempting to draw lines between fact and unsupported opinion is further illustrated by the district court's application of that test. The court did not analyze the contents of BMR under its proposed test but merely stated, without further explication, that the publication was not entitled to tax-exempt status because it had adopted a stance so doctrinaire that it cannot satisfy this standard. 494 F.Supp. at 479. Instead of applying the purportedly objective test the court had formulated, it was forced to resolve the case by resorting to the subjective notion of whether the publication was doctrinaire. We can conceive of no value-free measurement of the extent to which material is doctrinaire, and the district court's reliance on that evaluative concept corroborates for us the impossibility of principled and objective application of the fact/opinion distinction. 46 Appellees suggest that the Treasury regulation at issue here embodies a related distinction-between appeals to the emotions and appeals to the mind. 16 Material is educational, they argue, if it appeals to the mind, that is, if it reasons to a conclusion from stated facts. Again, the required linedrawing is difficult, a problem which is compounded if the difference between the two relies on the aforementioned fact/opinion distinction. 47 Moreover, the Treasury regulation does not support such a narrow concept of educational and we cannot approve it. Nowhere does the regulation hint that the definition of educational is to turn on the fervor of the organization or the strength of its language. As the Supreme Court has recognized in another context, the emotional content of a word is an important component of its message. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1788, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). 17 48 An example raised by appellees in their brief and discussed at oral argument is illustrative. The American Cancer Society's cause may be better served by a bumper sticker picturing a skull and crossbones and saying Smoking rots your lungs than by one that merely states Smoking is hazardous to your health. Both are intended to impart the same message, and they are identical in degree of specificity of the underlying facts. Although the first may be said to appeal more to the emotions, and the second to the mind, that distinction should not obscure the similarities between the two. They should be considered equal in educational content. 49 Even if one could in fact differentiate fact from unsupported opinion, or emotional appeals from appeals to the mind, these proposed distinctions would be inadequate definitions of educational because material often combines elements of each. In such cases, appellees suggested at oral argument, a quantitative test would be appropriate. But the Treasury regulation makes no mention of such a test. Even if a quantitative approach were authorized, it is unclear how much of a publication's content would have to be factual, or appeal to the mind, in order to satisfy the full and fair exposition standard. Also unanswered is who would apply the test and determine the requisite amount of factual material. Certainly, the Treasury regulation itself gives no clue. 18 50 Thus, neither of the distinctions proposed here remedies the imprecise language of the full and fair exposition standard or clarifies the requirements imposed by that test.