Opinion ID: 771175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: use of christie's testimony

Text: 34 Downs also contends that the state's lengthy effort to revive the memory of Christie, the only eyewitness, involved suggestive questioning and improper influence which resulted in tainted testimony and denied her a fair trial. Downs also argues that trial counsel's failure to challenge the competency of Christie's testimony denied her effective assistance.
35 Downs argues that the prosecutors and investigators improperly influenced Christie's testimony by coercing her to identify her mother as the shooter. The facts on which Downs relies to establish that Christie's memory was tainted are: the sheer number of interviews (at least eighty before Christie's trial testimony, a number the state vigorously disputes); their allegedly coercive nature; the predominance of suggestive, closed-ended questions that had to be answered yes or no; and her extended state custody surrounded by persons under state control. (Downs was denied access to her daughter both before and after the trial.) 36 The district court held that this claim was not defaulted. We agree, albeit for a different reason, having found that Downs's briefs in the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court make specific reference to the larger issue of the coercion and manipulation of a traumatized 8 year old. 37 In response to Downs's sweeping generalizations, the state in its brief presents a chronology of the treatment of and communications with Christie, detailing the care with which state agents dealt with Christie and debunking Downs's claims regarding the coercive nature of the interviews. We note particularly Christie's first substantive interview on June 1, 1983, referred to by counsel in oral argument, in which she recounted, in the presence of Dr. Wilhite and nurse Zaklan (and for a time Paula Krogdahl, a retired childcare worker), that she remembered going for a ride with her mother, sister, and brother and no one else in the car on the day she was hurt, and that there were no males present on the night of the shooting. In short, while Christie's youth, suggestibility, and medical condition (she was aphasic, or unable to communicate with speech, when she first awoke after the shooting) may have been a basis for challenging her credibility, there are no grounds for finding a due process violation. We therefore see no clear error in the rejection of this claim.
38 Downs further contends that trial counsel's failure to object to the competency of Christie's testimony constituted ineffective assistance. She argues that the district court, which held that the claim was procedurally barred, erred in failing to reach the merits because she has made a credible showing of innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), holds that if a petitioner . . . presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying claims. Id. at 316. To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial. Id. at 324. It is not enough that the evidence shows the existence of a reasonable doubt; the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that `no reasonable juror' would have convicted him. Id. at 329. To overcome the procedural bar, Downs's Strickland and Brady claims must be so substantial as to bring the case within the`narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'  Id. at 315 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)). Downs's Strickland claim does not rise to the level of nonharmless constitutional error. Downs, as noted above, has not demonstrated that Christie's testimony should have been excluded as tainted, but even had it been excluded, Downs's innocence claim is undermined by the compelling ballistic evidence. Cf. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (petition qualified for gateway on a showing principally that the chief prosecution witness had confessed to the crime under oath in the postconviction court and that prosecution had failed to produce file disclosing that witness was a known liar). As discussed above, Downs's Brady claim is not persuasive and so cannot support her gateway claim either. Likewise, the affidavits Downs submitted to the district court, which contain conflicting versions of another person's confession, do not support the showing that no reasonable jury could convict. Accordingly, we conclude that Downs's gateway claim is without merit. 39 Downs also argues that the district court erred by failing to hold a limited evidentiary hearing for the purpose of hearing Christie's testimony. AEDPA bars an evidentiary hearing [i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2). Downs argues that she was barred from deposing Christie before trial and then from calling her as a postconviction witness. However, even if Downs surmounts this bar, AEDPA bars a hearing 40 unless the applicant shows that 41 (A) the claim relies on 42 . . . 43 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 44 (B) the facts underlying the claim would be suffi cient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 45 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii)-(B). 46 As discussed above, the claim based on Christie's testimony fails to meet that test. The facts underlying the claim are insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the alleged constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found her guilty. Moreover, even assuming Downs's claim could clear the hurdle posed by S 2254(e)(2), the fact that a hearing would be permitted does not mean that it is required. The district court retains discretion whether to hold one. McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1998). Here, the district court permitted Downs a year of discovery to develop the record in support of her petition. Its decision to deny an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion. See Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1998) (We have long held that the need for an evidentiary hearing may be obviated by . . . expansion of the record).