Opinion ID: 4548568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intake Defendants

Text: Pulera ﬁrst contends that Burke’s testimony created a dispute whether Sarzant was aware of his suicidal thoughts. If Sarzant saw what Burke did, that might be true, but she testiﬁed she did not, and no competent evidence contradicts her testimony. All she saw was Pulera standing on a bench and yelling (which even he says was because he was cold, not because he was suicidal) and that was some time later. Critically, Burke did not identify Sarzant as one of the oﬃcials “in the vicinity” or whom he told of Pulera’s distressed statements and gestures, and no other evidence places her near Pulera’s cell at that time. All we have is an invitation to speculate that because Burke could (barely) see and hear Pulera, so could Sarzant. Speculation of this sort is not enough for a plaintiﬀ to escape summary judgment. See, e.g., King v. Hendricks Cty. Comm'rs, 954 F.3d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 2020). Next, Pulera argues that Gerber violated the county’s policy by failing to review his history at the facility, recognize No. 19-2291 15 that a crisis worker previously had him on suicide watch, and order a second mental health risk assessment. The county knew that Gerber and other booking oﬃcers ignored its special instruction policy, Pulera asserts, yet it allowed this noncompliance to persist. One obvious ﬂaw with these arguments is that Gerber followed the county’s policy (which went beyond just the special instruction that we focus on here). The policy required him to obtain an extra risk assessment at booking if an arrestee had a special instruction reﬂecting that he previously had been on level one suicide watch. Gerber checked the database, but it is undisputed that Pulera’s history included only a level two watch, so he did not have a special instruction. Even if Gerber had ignored the policy, though, a violation of a jail policy is not a constitutional violation enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). The only question that matters for our purposes is whether Gerber or the county violated the Fourth Amendment. Pulera has failed to show a genuine dispute on that issue. He argues that, given his answers at booking, Gerber should have known he was at a risk of suicide. Taking Pulera’s version of the facts, as we must, he told Gerber that his mother and brother had both recently committed suicide and that his doctor had prescribed him clonazepam for depression. These scant comments do not raise an issue of fact. “[N]ot every prisoner who shows signs of depression … can or should be put on suicide watch.” Matos ex rel. Matos v. O'Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2003). The same goes for every arrestee who also has had recent family deaths. Id. Given Pulera’s express statement that he was not considering suicide and the 16 No. 19-2291 absence of more or more signiﬁcant indirect signs, no rational jury could ﬁnd that Gerber unreasonably placed Pulera in general population. Pulera’s theory against the county rests on his belief that Gerber did not follow the special instruction policy and that “ignoring a policy is the same as having no policy,” Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929 (7th Cir. 2004). The county, however, had a policy aimed at preventing suicide that Gerber did not ignore; one part of the policy simply did not apply to Pulera. So, to succeed on his Monell claim, he had to show that the county was deliberately indiﬀerent to the risk that its polices (or a gap in them) would cause a constitutional violation. Lapre v. City of Chicago, 911 F.3d 424, 430–31 (7th Cir. 2018). He has not developed this argument by, for example, showing that county oﬃcials knew that formerly level-two arrestees were attempting suicide at heightened rates, and oﬃcials nevertheless made a “conscious decision not to act.” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 966 (7th Cir. 2019). Certainly, the county could have expanded its policy to require second screenings of more arrestees, but the mere “existence or possibility of other better policies … does not necessarily mean that the defendant was being deliberately indiﬀerent.” Lapre, 911 F.3d at 431 (quoting Frake v. City of Chicago, 210 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2000)). The district court also properly entered summary judgment for Zawilla. He is not liable under § 1983 merely as a supervisor, even assuming his subordinates had erred. See, e.g., Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Zawilla did not have any personal contact with Pulera and merely reviewed reports that did not record any indications of suicide risk. Pulera presents no contrary argument. No. 19-2291 17