Opinion ID: 794810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Ballesteros' Claims and the REAL ID Act

Text: 16 Next, Mr. Ballesteros raises an argument that falls within the REAL ID Act's expansion of this court's jurisdiction to review constitutional claims or questions of law. He argues that DHS violated the APA and, therefore, his due process rights when it reorganized the detention boundaries without notice and comment. Before the REAL ID Act, this claim would have been precluded by either § 1252(a)(2)(B)— which precludes review of the BIA's denial of discretionary relief—or § 1252(a)(2)(C)—which precludes review of removal orders for criminal aliens—but it now falls within our jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 17 The DHS reorganization did not, however, require the notice and comment process. If a challenged agency action creates a legislative rule, then full compliance with the APA's notice and comment processes is required. Mission Group Kansas, Inc. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 781 (10th Cir.1998). Legislative rules affect[] individual rights and obligations. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). But interpretive rules, general statements of policy or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice can be implemented without notice and comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). Interpretive rules must `be derivable from the statute that it implements by a process fairly to be described as interpretive; that is, there must be a path that runs from the statute to the rule, rather than merely consistency between statute and rule.' Mission, 146 F.3d at 783 n. 8 (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 953, 962 (1997)). 18 Mr. Ballesteros relies on the unpublished opinion of United States v. Seward, Nos. 79-1711 et seq., 1981 U.S.App. LEXIS 21300 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 1981), for support that the DHS reorganization was a substantive rule. In Seward, the Department of Energy expanded the trespass buffer zone around a nuclear facility without notice and comment. Id. at . Sixteen days later, Seward and others protested on the property and were arrested for trespass. Id. The change in the buffer zone brought the area in question within the scope of the trespass regulations for the first time, thereby creating a criminal offense where there had been none. Id. at  (emphasis added). In this case, however, the DHS reorganization did not create a new offense or affect a legal obligation. As discussed earlier, aliens have no legal right to have the removal proceedings in a particular location. Latu, 375 F.3d at 1019. And there is no evidence that the change upset any settled legal expectations. That the reorganization had a substantive effect on the Mr. Ballesteros' removal proceedings does not mean that the change was a legislative rule. See Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. Dep't of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 383 (D.C.Cir.1990) (Silberman, J., dissenting) (Of course, procedure impacts on outcomes and thus can virtually always be described as affecting substance, but to pursue that line of analysis results in the obliteration of the distinction [between legislative and interpretive rules] that Congress demanded.). 19 The DHS reorganization was an interpretation of the statute that gives the DHS the authority to conduct removal proceedings. The implementing statute gives DHS the authority to arrange for appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending ... a decision on removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1). The DHS reorganization merely interpreted the grant of statutory authority, and that interpretation did not create or alter a legal obligation. In this case, the pertinent right is Mr. Ballesteros' right to choose the location of removal hearing, and that right was not affected by the DHS reorganization—he did not have the right before, and he does not have the right after. Because the DHS reorganization was an interpretive rule, it was exempt from the APA's notice and comment process and is therefore valid. 20 Even after the REAL ID Act, Mr. Ballesteros' remaining arguments—that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to change venue and that he was arrested without a warrant—still fall outside of our jurisdiction. The regulation governing change of venue in removal proceedings states that [t]he [i]mmigration [j]udge, for good cause, may change venue only upon motion by one of the parties [and] only after the other party has been given notice and an opportunity to respond to the motion to change venue. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b) (emphasis added). This regulation gives the immigration judge complete discretion, even to the extent that the immigration judge may still deny the a change of venue motion when good cause is present. See, e.g., Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 39 (5th Cir.1993) (The decision of whether to grant a change of venue is committed to the [agency's] sound discretion....). Because the BIA's discretionary decisions are precluded from our review by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the venue argument must raise either constitutional question or raise a question of law. 21 Mr. Ballesteros' venue claim raises neither and is, therefore, beyond our review. While in the criminal context at least, venue is a right of constitutional dimension, United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir.1997), an alien has no legal right to have removal proceedings commenced against him in a particular place, Latu, 375 F.3d at 1019, and Mr. Ballesteros' venue arguments focus on matters of convenience and not constitutional violations. Neither does his venue claim present a question of law. In civil cases, the question of whether a litigant has brought an action in the proper court is a question of law, while the question of whether to dismiss or transfer an action filed in an improper venue is within the district court's sound discretion and reviewed for abuse of discretion only. First of Michigan Corp. v. Bramlet, 141 F.3d 260, 262 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Pierce v. Shorty Small's of Branson, Inc., 137 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir.1998)). Mr. Ballesteros' argument is not that venue was improper in Colorado but that venue was more convenient in the Ninth Circuit. His argument attacks the BIA's discretion to, for good cause, transfer a removal proceeding to another venue. This does not present a question of law. See Bautista-Contreras v. INS, No. 90-9589, 1991 WL 164276, at  (10th Cir. Aug.21, 1991) (applying an abuse of discretion standard of review to the BIA's denial of a motion for change of venue before the statutory prohibition on our review of the BIA's discretionary decisions); accord Slingluff v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 425 F.3d 861, 866 (10th Cir.2005) ([W]e review an agency's decision under the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard, [and] we must uphold the agency's action if it has articulated a rational basis for the decision and has considered relevant factors. However, these limitations do not apply to questions of law.). Because Mr. Ballesteros' venue claim presents neither a question of law nor a constitutional question, our review of it is precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 22 Last, we hold that Mr. Ballesteros' constitutional claims, chief among them that he was arrested without warrant, are outside our jurisdiction. Our review of this type of constitutional claim is precluded by a subsection of § 1252 for which the REAL ID Act's constitutional claim exception does not apply. In addition to the already discussed specific limitations on review, § 1252 also contains a general jurisdictional limitation—it limits our review to final order[s] of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Mr. Ballesteros analogizes his situation to that of a criminal defendant and seeks to use alleged constitutional violations to overturn his removal, while he hopes that any future removal proceedings would be conducted in the Ninth Circuit. But removal is a civil, not criminal, proceeding, and the various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984). As the Supreme Court noted, [t]he Court of Appeals have held, for example[,] that the absence of Miranda warnings does not render an otherwise voluntary statement by the respondent inadmissible in a deportation case. Id. at 1039, 104 S.Ct. 3479. No remedy for the alleged constitutional violations would affect the BIA's final order of removal. Any remedy available to Mr. Ballesteros would lie in a Bivens action. He is not, therefore, in the same position as a criminal defendant and is not, even if his allegations prove true, entitled to a reversal of his removal based on a fruit of the poisonous tree theory. Because the alleged constitutional deficiencies are beyond the scope of the BIA's final order of removal, they are also beyond our review. 23 We AFFIRM the BIA's final order of removal.