Opinion ID: 6345596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Career-offender designation

Text: Whether Hubbert’s conviction in state court for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute qualifies as a prior, predicate conviction for purposes of the career-offender designation constitutes a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Woods, 556 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2009), overruled in part on other grounds by Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54–56, 128 S. Ct. 586, 599–600 (2007). We find no error in the district court’s treatment of the state conviction as a prior offense rather than as relevant conduct. As pertinent here, the career offender guideline requires that a defendant have “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” § 4B1.1(a)(3). There is no dispute that Hubbert’s conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a prior conviction for a crime of violence, nor is there any dispute that the conviction for possession with the intent to distribute qualifies as a conviction for a controlled substance offense. The only dispute is over whether the latter conviction should be considered a “prior” conviction—that is, a conviction for conduct that both pre-dates and is separate and distinct from the criminal activity charged in this case. Whether the state conviction for possession with intent to distribute qualifies as a prior conviction for purposes of the career offender enhancement depends on its relationship to the federal offenses. Section 4A1.2(a) defines a “prior sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt … for conduct not part of the instant offense.” The commentary to the guideline in turn provides that “[c]onduct that is part of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions No. 20-3110 7 of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct.)” § 4A1.2, comment., (n.1). See United States v. Liddell, 492 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2007). For offenses like narcotics crimes as to which Guidelines section 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts of conviction, 4 the relevant conduct guideline treats as relevant all acts that were part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. § 1B1.3(a)(2) & comment. (n.5(B)); see United States v. Tankson, 836 F.3d 873, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d 363, 372–73 (7th Cir. 2008). To determine whether the defendants’ prior acts meet that test, a court looks to whether there is a “strong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the convicted offense,” taking into account such factors as “similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity.” United States v. Ortiz, 431 F.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Rollerson, 7 F.4th 565, 572 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 631 (2021); United States v. Blackman, 830 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2016). However, the mere fact that the defendant has committed the same or similar crime on another occasion is not by itself sufficient to compel the conclusion that the prior offense constitutes relevant conduct vis-à-vis the conviction for which 4 Offenses that are closely related are grouped together for sentencing purposes and essentially treated as a single offense. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. D, intro. comment. Section 3D1.2 thus provides that “[a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group.” As relevant here, the guideline goes on to identify crimes for which the offense level “is determined largely on the basis of … the quantity of a substance involved” as offenses that involve substantially the same harm. § 3D1.2(d). Narcotics trafficking crimes fall into this category of offenses. See § 3D1.2 (citing offenses covered by § 2D1.1 as among offenses to be grouped under section § 3D1.2(d)). 8 No. 20-3110 he is being sentenced. Ortiz, 431 F.3d at 1040; see also United States v. Clark, 935 F.3d 558, 571 (7th Cir. 2019). Hubbert’s prior possession offense involved a single transaction in 2011 that involved the sale of powder cocaine. Hubbert argues that the state offense should be characterized as relevant conduct rather than a discrete, prior crime. But to a significant extent his thinking on this point is colored by the fact that the prosecution for the 2011 offense was still pending when the criminal conduct underlying the subsequent federal prosecution began. In fact, however, there was a significant temporal gap between the two sets of offenses. Although Hubbert was not convicted and sentenced for the state possession-with-intentto-deliver offense until late in 2016, after the first of the controlled buys underlying this federal case took place, there was a five-year gap between them, which by itself tilts against a finding that they were part of the same course of dealing. See United States v. McGowan, 478 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bullock, 454 F.3d 637, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2006); Ortiz, 431 F.3d at 1041; United States v. Palmer, 248 F.3d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v. Ruiz, 178 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 1999); cf. United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2013) (where evidence showed defendant was engaged in uninterrupted course of drug dealing in years leading up to charged offense, not plain error to treat sales that occurred nearly three years prior to charged offense as relevant conduct). Indeed, Hubbert was incarcerated on a traffic offense for a period of 18 months in 2013-14, which (presumably) imposed a hard stop on any ongoing narcotics trafficking. Although neither the passage of time nor his intervening incarceration (which was obviously not of his own choosing) necessarily precludes a finding that the prior conviction constitutes relevant conduct, see Ruiz, 178 F.3d at 881– No. 20-3110 9 82, a strong showing of similarity and/or regularity would be required to connect the 2011 sale to the 2016-17 sales, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment., (n.5(B)(ii)); Ortiz, 431 F.3d at 1041 (collecting cases); see also United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, there are significant differences between the 2011 transaction and the 2016-17 transactions: The former involved the sale of two-tenths of a gram of powder cocaine, whereas the latter involved the sale of significantly larger, multi-gram quantities of crack cocaine. There is also evidence that Hubbert was working in concert with at least one associate (his co-defendant, Tyrone Bond) in 2016-17. To be sure, there are several similarities between the two sets of sales: both took place in Decatur, Illinois, both were made to a confidential source (although the source in 2011 was not the same one who made the 2016 purchases), and both comprised controlled transactions instigated at the behest of the Decatur Police Department. And although the 2016-17 sales involved crack rather than powder cocaine, the confidential source to whom Hubbert made those sales reported to the Decatur police that he had previously purchased powder as well as crack cocaine from Hubbert. But given the lengthy passage of time and the points of distinction between the two sets of sales, the evidence does not show that the two sets of sales were part of a steady, unified, years-long course of drug dealing. See United States v. Stephenson, 557 F.3d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 2009).5 5 A November 2016 Decatur police officer narrative concerning the investigation into Hubbert notes that Hubbert “has been responsible for distributing substantial quantities of cocaine for several years.” R. 64-1 at 1. The narrative goes on to report a representation by the confidential source that he had been purchasing powder and crack cocaine from several individuals, including Hubbert, in the prior “few years.” R. 64-1 at 2. These statements certainly suggest that the federally-charged sales that took 10 No. 20-3110 The 2011 sale was not part of the same course of conduct as the 2016-17 conduct charged in this case and does not qualify as relevant conduct. Hubbert’s conviction for the 2011 offense was properly treated as a prior conviction for purposes of the career offender guideline.