Opinion ID: 1653891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment at the close of the prosecution's case.

Text: ¶ 14. Wolfe contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by allowing the case to go to the jury on the element of torture, which was not mentioned in the indictment, after finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the element of serious bodily harm. Consequently, Wolfe claims that this case should be dismissed in his favor. The State responds that Wolfe had full notice of the torture element, asserting that the grand jury indictment cited Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(1994), which includes torture, although it did not specifically cite subpart (b) nor mention the word torture. The State asks this Court to affirm Wolfe's conviction and subsequent life sentence as an habitual offender. ¶ 15. At the close of the prosecution's case, the defense moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the element of serious bodily harm. The trial court agreed that proof of the element of serious bodily harm was insufficient. However, the trial court found that the prosecution had presented a prima facia case on the element of torture and therefore denied Wolfe's motion for a directed verdict. Specifically the trial court held: The Court has already denied the motion for directed verdict and has stated that the element of serious bodily harm has not been proven, but it will be submitted to the jury on the question of torture. Okay. So, it will go forward to the jury on the question of on the charge of felony child abuse. And, after that, if the State or the defense wish to put in any lesser-included offenses, then the Court will deal with that during the instructions, but at this point, the Court finds that the State has proved has shown a prima facie case on the element of torture. Wolfe complains that this decision by the judge amounted to a mid-trial amendment of the indictment and was a violation of due process, rising to the level of reversible error. ¶ 16. The indictment returned by the Grand Jury states in pertinent part: ... that Freddie Wolfe ... did unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously and intentionally whip Vicky Wolfe, a child ten (10) years of age, by striking her about the back and shoulders with a purse strap thereby causing serious bodily harm to said child to wit: deep bruises to these areas, in violation of Section 97-5-39(2), of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. ¶ 17. The indictment refers only to serious bodily harm, and generally cites Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2), without referring in any way to the other two elements which are listed in subparts (a) and (b) of the statute as follows: (2) Any person who shall intentionally (a) burn any child, (b) torture any child or, (c) except in self-defense or in order to prevent bodily harm to a third party, whip, strike or otherwise mutilate any child in such manner as to cause serious bodily harm, shall be guilty of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child.... Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(1994). ¶ 18. The Mississippi Constitution, Art. 3, § 27, requires that before a criminal defendant may be prosecuted for a felony, the grand jury must advise the defendant of the charges against him via an indictment. State v. Berryhill, 703 So.2d 250, 256 (Miss.1997); Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197 (Miss.1990). It has long since been the law of this State that courts may not amend an indictment as to a substantive matter, without the agreement of the grand jury which issued the indictment, unless the amendment only regards mere formalities. Quick, 569 So.2d at 1199. ¶ 19. In Quick v. State , the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault under one specific subsection (Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(b)) which requires that the defendant acted purposefully, but on the morning of the trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to allow the jury to convict under a different subsection (§ 97-3-7(2)(a)) which requires only that the defendant recklessly caused serious bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. This Court specifically held in Quick that We hold here when the grand jury returned this indictment under sub-section (b), requiring purposeful and wilful and knowing actions, that stated the charge upon which this defendant could be tried. When the proposed amendment was offered to allow the jury to convict under section (a) of the statute to include recklessly causing serious bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, this proposed a change of substance and not of form. Quick, 569 So.2d at 1199-1200. ¶ 20. Because the indictment in the present case only mentioned serious bodily harm, the element in § 97-5-39(2)(c), and did not mention torture, the element in subpart (b), Wolfe claims that this decision by the trial court prejudiced him because he was not prepared to answer to the element of torture. Because the element of torture, in this context, has not been defined by statute, or by precedent in Mississippi, we agree. However, we disagree with Wolfe's assertion that this case should be dismissed in his favor. ¶ 21. When the trial judge ruled that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence on the element of serious bodily harm, the judge erroneously based her decision on our holding in Yates v. State, 685 So.2d 715 (Miss.1996). In determining that the State had failed to prove the element of serious bodily harm, the trial judge misstated our holding as follows: Since we're going back to serious bodily injuries, I think under the Gates (sic) case, it states that in order for it to be serious bodily injury, you have to show an injury that will be detrimental to death or some disfigurement. In Yates, (citing Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 293 (Miss.1992)), this Court recited the definition of serious bodily injury contained in the Model Penal Code § 210 (1980), which states: serious bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Regarding this definition, we said specifically in Yates that: The revised statute requires a showing of serious bodily harm but does not provide a definition for `serious bodily harm.' Necessarily we must look to our case law for a definition. In Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 292 (Miss.1992), this Court cited favorably the definition for `serious bodily injury' provided in Model Penal Code § 210.... ¶ 22. In Yates, this Court did recognize the above-stated definition to demonstrate that the defendant's whipping of a little boy on the upper leg and buttocks with a belt which resulted in superficial bruises and contusions did not rise to the level of felony child abuse. However, we did not expressly adopt the Model Penal Code definition to serve as the threshold standard to determine if serious bodily harm had been inflicted on a child in the context of a child abuse case. It should be noted that the definition cited in Yates, a child abuse case, came from Fleming, an aggravated assault case. This Court recognizes that applying the same standard for serious bodily harm in a child abuse case and an aggravated assault case is highly problematic due to the heightened level of vulnerability inherent in victims of child abuse. Employing the same definition in both contexts would necessarily raise the standard too high to ensure the safety and protection of children in the State of Mississippi. ¶ 23. Consequently, a definition of serious bodily harm more suited to the context of child abuse cases is necessary. The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect in its Model Child Protection Act has defined physical injury that amounts to child maltreatment as death, or permanent or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of any bodily organ or function. Model Child Protection Act § 4f (U.S. National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect 1977). The difference, though subtle, is important. Impairment of any bodily organ or function is a lower threshold than the protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. ¶ 24. We find that the Model Child Protection Act definition more appropriately describes the type of injuries classified as serious bodily harm in the context of child abuse cases. Therefore, this Court adopts the definition of serious bodily harm, as it pertains to Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(c)(1994), as follows: bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or permanent or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of any bodily organ or function. ¶ 25. It is important to note, however, that this Court's decision to lower the threshold for the proof of serious bodily harm in felony child abuse cases should in no way be construed as an attempt to prevent parents, teachers and other custodians involved in child care from properly disciplining their children. As long as the discipline is moderate and reasonable in light of the age and condition of the child, and other surrounding circumstances, the parent or custodian will not incur criminal liability. ¶ 26. This Court finds that the trial judge's dismissal of the element of serious bodily harm was plain error, because it was based on a misstatement of a standard never expressly adopted by this Court. This Court further finds that requiring the defendant to go forward on the element of torture, given the wording of the indictment, was prejudicial and reversible error. ¶ 27. Because the disposition of the first issue renders the others moot, we do not consider the remainder of Wolfe's claims.