Opinion ID: 1232435
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as Applied to the Navajo Nation

Text: Tracy contends that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to Indian tribes and that the immunity provision in the Navajo Code, 17 Navajo Trib.Code § 208, does not provide constitutionally adequate immunity to a witness who is compelled to give incriminating testimony. Historically, Indian tribes were not subject to the Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees limiting the federal and state governments. In Talton v. Mayes, the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment right to a grand jury was not applicable to a tribal prosecution against one of its members because the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution and therefore [these powers] are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment. 163 U.S. 376, 384, 16 S.Ct. 986, 989, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896). Talton 's holding was subsequently extended to various other constitutional provisions, providing the basis for the Supreme Court's statement in Santa Clara Pueblo that [a]s separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those Constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority. 436 U.S. at 56, 98 S.Ct. at 1675-76. The Talton Court recognized, however, that Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the powers of local self-government that the tribes otherwise possess. 163 U.S. at 384, 16 S.Ct. at 989. In accordance with this power, Congress enacted the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act (the ICRA), which imposes on the tribes restrictions similar to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 to 1303 (1983 & 1990 Supp.). The articulated purpose of the bill that eventually became the ICRA was: [t]o protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments. This is accomplished by placing certain limitations on an Indian tribe in the exercise of its powers of self-government. These limitations are the same as those imposed on the Government of the United States by the United States Constitution and on the States by judicial interpretation. S.Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (Dec. 1967) (emphasis added). Although the primary purpose of the ICRA was to provide Indians with protection from arbitrary action by their tribal governments, the protections of the act extend to any person subject to tribal jurisdiction, which the courts have read to include non-Indians. See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 934 (10th Cir.1975); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 24 (D.C.Ariz. 1968) (noting that legislative history indicates that any Indian language was changed to any person so that provision would cover all persons subject to tribal jurisdiction). The ICRA specifically imposes on the tribes the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, stating in relevant part that no Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4). The language in section 1302(4) is virtually identical to that of the fifth amendment. Tracy argues, however, that the privilege against self-incrimination offered by the ICRA provides protection inferior to that of the United States and Arizona Constitutions. We disagree. It is true that certain provisions of the ICRA do not mirror those of the federal constitution and have been interpreted somewhat differently from their federal counterparts. [16] On the other hand, provisions of the ICRA that clearly mirror the federal provisions in language and intent, such as the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure, have been interpreted under the federal standard and are generally held to be identical to their federal counterparts. See, e.g., United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1091-92 n. 3 (8th Cir.1981) (fourth amendment standard is used for analyzing search and seizure conduct of tribal officers under ICRA) (citing United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 872 (8th Cir.1981)); see also United States v. Strong, 778 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir.1985); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir.1975). The privilege against self-incrimination appears to fall within this latter category. Strong, 778 F.2d at 1397. The language duplicates that of the federal constitution and clearly could not be interpreted to provide any lesser protection. We believe, therefore, that when testifying in tribal court, Tracy will enjoy a federally imposed privilege against self-incrimination that is substantially coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege. Presumably, then, the Navajo Nation could not compel Tracy's testimony without a grant of use and derivative use immunity sufficient to meet the dictates of the fifth amendment. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Tracy argues, however, that a provision of the Navajo Tribal Code, 17 Navajo Trib. Code § 208(A) and (B), purports to override the federal privilege. [17] We are unable to conclude from the statute's language and structure that it authorizes a court to order a material witness to testify without any grant of immunity, where that witness faces a threat of incrimination. [18] Even if the statute purports to do this, we believe it would be held invalid by the Navajo Nation's judicial branch as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination set forth in the ICRA and the privilege against self-incrimination set forth in the Navajo Bill of Rights, 1 Navajo Trib.Code § 5. A tribal code provision cannot operate in violation of the ICRA, and the Navajo courts are the proper forums to adjudicate this issue. As the Supreme Court noted in Santa Clara Pueblo, [t]ribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA, and § 1302 has the substantial and intended effect of changing the law which these forums are obliged to apply. 436 U.S. at 65, 98 S.Ct. at 1680. [19] Finally, even in the unlikely event that the Navajo courts force Tracy to testify without a constitutionally adequate grant of immunity, he has an adequate remedy in federal court through the habeas corpus provision of the ICRA, 25 U.S.C. § 1303. Section 1303 provides that [t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe. A writ of habeas corpus is available whether the petitioner is held under civil or criminal process. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571, 5 S.Ct. 1050, 1053, 29 L.Ed. 277 (1885). A habeas action may be used to discharge a witness who is restrained under a contempt order made by a court in excess of its jurisdiction. See Ex Parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 384-85, 39 S.Ct. 337, 340, 63 L.Ed. 656 (1919). When a witness asserts his privilege against self-incrimination and the court improperly denies the privilege, any commitment of the witness in contempt is in excess of the jurisdiction of the court and is therefore void. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195, 35 L.Ed. 1110 (1892). Moreover, the habeas corpus provision of the ICRA is quite expansive. The petitioner need only be detained by the tribal court order, and need not be in custody. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. Even prior to the effective date of the ICRA, at least one court held that federal habeas review lies where the petitioner has merely been fined by the tribal court, rather than imprisoned. See, e.g., Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903, 90 S.Ct. 1690, 26 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970). Apparently, then, Tracy may use the habeas corpus remedy whether he is fined or imprisoned in a civil contempt action. We hold that issuance of a subpoena by an Arizona court, compelling Tracy's attendance in Navajo court, creates no undue hardship to Tracy with regard to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.