Opinion ID: 2518340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the assistance provided by griffin's trial counsel ineffective?

Text: In May 2003, after his appeal had been docketed in this court, Griffin filed a motion seeking remand for a determination whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. The court granted the motion in June 2003. In a November 2003 letter, the trial judge advised the court that a hearing had been conducted and the claim of ineffective assistance denied. In December 2003, a journal entry was filed, which recites that a hearing was conducted and the defendant's request for relief was denied. The trial judge announced his ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing. He began with the general observation that defendant was represented throughout the course of the underlying trial by an attorney with extensive trial experience in criminal cases, trying between 160 and 170 cases for the defense, who devoted 250 to 300 hours to preparing and trying the case. The trial judge also noted that Griffin's counsel watched Dixon's trial before Griffin's began. In the judge's view, that presents to a defense trial counsel a unique perspective of literally having seen the case tried previously and being able to adopt an approach and a strategy based upon what he had seen and heard of the prior case. Here are the concluding paragraphs of the trial judge's remarks from the bench: I, therefore, find based upon the totality of my circumstances here that the defendant has not met its burden to demonstrate, first of all, that trial counsel's performance was deficient; secondly, even if I had so found then I must go on to the question of whether or not that conduct was prejudicial. . . . But I think I want to make it very clear for this record that even if I had taken a different view and determined that there were errors on the part of Mr. Brown, I cannot conclude under these circumstances that those errors were in any way prejudicial. To do so I would have had to find that there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. The evidence against Mr. Griffin was quite extensive. The jury gave considerable thought to that evidence and applying the evidence to the law as they were instructed. In fact, as I recall some not-guilty decisions were rendered in this regard. I cannot see in any respect, having looked back through this case and reconsidered this matter, how a change in the defense' tactics would have altered or in any way changed the decision of the jury. Consequently, it would be my secondary finding that there was no prejudice even if one found that there was a deficient performance. Under these circumstances the request of the defendant to set aside the verdict based upon Sixth Amendment grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel is denied. Before counsel's assistance is determined to be so defective as to require reversal of a conviction, the defendant must establish two things. First, the defendant must establish that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance was less than that guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Second, the defendant must establish that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309, 314, 85 P.3d 1164 (2004). Both the performance and prejudice prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact on appeal requiring de novo review. Easterwood v. State, 273 Kan. 361, 370, 44 P.3d 1209, cert. denied 537 U.S. 951 (2002). On appeal, Griffin makes 10 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State objects to the court's consideration of half of the claims on the ground that Griffin did not raise them in the district court. Griffin contends that some of the claims were presented to the district court and, even if they were not, it does not matter because this court is obligated to base its ruling on a review of the entire trial record. He cites State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 608, 932 P.2d 981 (1997), which does not involve the question whether an instance of alleged ineffective assistance will be considered for the first time on appeal. In Rice, the trial court determined that defense counsel's performance, which included advising his client for unsound reasons not to testify, was not unreasonably deficient. This court disagreed but upheld the trial court's overruling of the motion for new trial on the ground that Rice was not so prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance as to be denied a fair trial. 261 Kan. at 607-09. In discussing that the trial court's ruling on prejudice undoubtedly would have been negative if the second prong had been reached, this court made the following statement: It is apparent the trial judge was not limited to the evidence presented at the ineffective assistance hearing, but took into consideration, as we must do, the totality of the evidence before the jury. There is considerable evidence sufficient to uphold the verdict which would not have been affected by Rice's testimony. 261 Kan. at 608-09. Taking all the evidence into consideration is not the equivalent of considering an issue for the first time on appeal. Generally, an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 647, 88 P.3d 218 (2004). The trial court, which observed counsel's performance and was aware of the trial strategy involved, is in a much better position to consider counsel's competence than an appellate court and should be the first to make a determination of such an issue. State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, 119, 716 P.2d 580 (1986). This court, however, has made exceptions in a few cases where the record on appeal was sufficiently complete for the appellate court to decide the issue. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 785, 47 P.3d 783 (2002); State v. Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 433, 14 P.3d 1138 (2000); State v. Jenkins, 257 Kan. 1074, 1079-80, 898 P.2d 1121 (1995). (a) Griffin contends that his trial counsel should have introduced Griffin's testimony and the prosecutor's closing argument remarks about Griffin's testimony from Dixon's trial in order to show Griffin's lack of culpability. The State contends that the issue was not raised before the trial court. In his reply brief, Griffin states that it was raised and cites certain portions of the transcript of the hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Examination of the specified portions of the record shows that the principal contention presented to the trial judge was that Griffin would have benefitted from testifying in his own defense. Griffin's testimony from Dixon's trial and a question the prosecutor asked Griffin, but not the prosecutor's closing remarks, are cited. In reference to Griffin's position in testifying in his own trial, Griffin's appellate counsel asked and Griffin's trial counsel answered the following questions: Q. . . . What was Mr. Griffin's position on testifying? A. He did not want to testify. Q. And that would have been after consultation with you? A. Several consultations, yes. . . . . Q. His decision not to testify after consultation with you. A. Yes. Q. Do you recall whether or not you advised him that his testimony in Dixon's trial could be beneficial to him in his own trial? A. I don't believe we had that conversation, no, sir. In another instance, Griffin's appellate counsel argued that Griffin should have been advised to testify in his own defense. The trial judge stated that he didn't hear anything about that today, and [w]e don't have any evidence of that, to which Griffin's appellate counsel responded, I don't have that evidence, no. Later, Griffin's appellate counsel stated, I don't think the prosecution should be switching positions between one defendant  codefendant's culpability to obtain a conviction on the other one and then reverse it again when it's the next defendant's time for trial, and that would have plainly come out if he would have taken the stand. The last cited excerpt is a question by the prosecutor and Griffin's response, which appellate counsel commended to the trial judge as showing that in Dixon's trial the State characterized Griffin as less culpable than in his own trial. The trial judge asked Griffin's appellate counsel, [I]s there anything that you wanted to submit in written form that you haven't already submitted either in the motion for remand or otherwise here today that you think I need to read before I can rule? In response, Griffin's appellate counsel suggested that the trial judge read page 1890 of Dixon's trial transcript. At pages 1890-91 of Dixon's trial transcript, Griffin testified about when Hall and Hayes stayed at Donnie Wishon's house and Griffin left with Dixon. The prosecutor asked, You were along for the ride? Griffin answered, I was ready to go. He asked me  I was just  I was ready to go and I was in the car, yeah. Although the issue as framed on appeal was not clearly presented to the trial judge, the issue will be considered to the extent that it was brought to the trial judge's attention. The question would be whether trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing Griffin's testimony from Dixon's trial in Griffin's trial. The first part of the analysis is whether Griffin has established that trial counsel's performance was deficient, which requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that his performance was less than that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Such a serious error in this context would be trial counsel's failure to introduce clearly exculpatory testimony from Dixon's trial. What Griffin brought to the trial court's attention is that, in response to the question whether he was just along for the ride when he and Dixon left Wishon's residence, Griffin answered that he was ready to go. Griffin's readiness to accompany Dixon, who earlier had purchased a bucket of gasoline and spoken of burning and blowing up Alicia Shaw's apartment and had fired a number of shots at Griffin's friend's feet, indicates Griffin's readiness to associate himself with a person who intended to and did engage in criminal activity. It is not exculpatory, and trial counsel's failing to introduce it was not deficient in this regard. (b) Griffin contends that trial counsel should have objected to and corrected misstatements of law made by the prosecutor in closing argument. Griffin refers the court to Issue 2 for the list of misstatements. As discussed in Issue 2, the prosecutor's statements that Griffin complained of were not misstatements of the law. (c) Griffin contends that trial counsel should have more extensively cross-examined Agents Jimerson and Durastanti and Shameika Holmes. The State contends that the issue was not raised before the trial court. Griffin's response is obscure: [M]ost of the points were clearly presented as to whether the prosecution's evidence on these points was relevant. In addition, in assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, this court reviews the entire record of the trial. It does not appear that the question of the cross-examination of the specified witnesses was raised for the trial court's consideration. (d) Griffin complains that trial counsel did not object to Jimerson's and Wright's testimony about law enforcement officers' attempts to find Griffin during August 2001. They testified that, after Dixon was arrested, a warrant was issued for Griffin's arrest. They looked for Griffin at the Burger King where he had been employed and at the apartment of his girlfriend, Shameika Holmes, and they conducted surveillance of both places. They expected that Griffin would try to get his paycheck from Burger King. After Holmes picked up the check, the officers followed her to Griffin's aunt's house in Kansas City, Missouri. Griffin left the house and ran. Thirty to 45 minutes later, officers found him hiding under a bush in the 45-degree angle of a fence. On appeal, Griffin admits that evidence of the foot chase was relevant. He does not state specifically on what ground he contends the rest of the testimony was objectionable, but his admission seems to suggest that he contends the rest of the testimony was irrelevant. The relevance and admissibility of flight evidence is long established. See State v. Walker, 226 Kan. 20, 22, 595 P.2d 1098 (1979). In the recent case of State v. Jamison, 269 Kan. 564, 569, 7 P.3d 1204 (2000), the court stated: Evidence of flight may be admissible to establish the consciousness of guilt, the commission of the acts charged, and the intent and purpose for which those acts were committed. [Citation omitted.] Even where other evidence may weaken this inference of guilt, the objection to such evidence goes to the weight rather than the admissibility. [Citation omitted.] Hence, trial counsel's not raising a relevance objection did not constitute a deficient performance. Griffin also contends that testimony about Shameika Holmes taking his wages to him is irrelevant and misleading. His contention, however, is based on speculation that is not borne out by the record. According to Griffin, a close reading of the following testimony shows that law enforcement officers suggested to Holmes, through Cassandra McClain, that she go to Griffin so that they could follow her: Q. Okay. Mr. Jimerson, when you were receiving this information in the 24 hour period prior to the defendant's arrest, did you guys have somebody that was being a source for you as to what Miss Shameika Holmes was . . . . A. I'm sorry. Q. Did you guys have someone who was a source of information that was close to Shameika Holmes in order to be able to track or anticipate her movements? A. Yes, it was Cassandra McClain. Q. What was Cassandra McClain doing? A. She was actually driving Miss Holmes [to Kansas City] which was great assistance to us in the surveillance. Q. How was she passing this information to you? A. Agent Wright was the one that was dealing directly with her. My job was overall supervision of the surveillance. Q. Was she calling you during this time? A. She would call Agent Wright different times. Q. And give Agent Wright the plans? A. Yes, but I don't think she knew exactly where she was going. That was one of the problems, we didn't know exactly where we were going because it would have been a lot easier if we did. Where Holmes got the idea to take Griffin's wages to him is not revealed, or even hinted at, in this testimony. There is no basis beyond speculation for Griffin's contention. Griffin contends that his trial counsel should have objected to evidence that Griffin accompanied Dixon to see Dixon's lawyer. Griffin does not state on what ground the objection should have been made, but rather refers to the discussion of Issue 7. Issue 7 is framed as a matter of prosecutorial misconduct. As previously discussed, appellate review for prosecutorial misconduct does not depend on a contemporaneous objection. The evidence of Griffin's accompanying Dixon to see Dixon's lawyer is set out in our discussion of Issue 7. It shows that Dixon asked Griffin to go to his lawyer's office with him. Griffin said little. There was no evidence that Griffin sought legal advice or that either Griffin or the lawyer believed there was an attorney-client relationship between them. Even if the evidence was objectionable, it was brief and there would seem to be little likelihood that the jury would have inferred defendant's guilt from the evidence that Griffin went to Dixon's attorney's office at Dixon's request, said little, and established no relationship with the attorney. (e) Griffin complains that trial counsel failed to argue that the deaths of Dana and Gabriel Hudson were not felony murders within the language of K.S.A. 21-3401(b). The statute provides: Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being committed. . . in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto. Burglary is an inherently dangerous felony. K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3436(9). Although the State asserts that this claim was not raised in the trial court, it was in fact raised by Griffin. As already discussed with regard to Issue 2, Griffin's argument is based on an overly restrictive construction of the statute. (f) Griffin complains that defense counsel failed to argue that there was no evidence that Griffin intended to commit a felony when he entered Alicia's apartment the second time. In fact, trial counsel argued both that there was no evidence of defendant's intent and that Griffin did not participate in Dixon's felonious conduct during the second entry. In so arguing, trial counsel made the argument that Griffin now complains he failed to make. If trial counsel vigorously argued there was a lack of evidence that Griffin aided and abetted Dixon, as Griffin concedes, and placed less emphasis on a lack of intent to commit a felony within the apartment, that is merely a matter of trial strategy. Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . . State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. at 644. And, as the court stated in State v. Orr, 262 Kan. 312, 333, 940 P.2d 42 (1997): Hindsight . . . is not the vantage point from which we judge allegations of incompetence. [Citation omitted.] It may be that had defendant's counsel on appeal conducted the defense at trial, he would have done things differently. Whether or not he would have fared better before the jury is a matter of conjecture. Where experienced attorneys might disagree on the best tactics, deliberate decisions made for strategic reasons may not establish ineffective counsel. [Citations omitted.] (g) Griffin complains that trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of three expert witnessesAgent Durastanti, Peter Lobdell, and Dr. Erik Mitchell. (1) Durastanti was asked to describe his training in interviewing techniques. He also was asked about interviewing Griffin, and, based on the foundation established, at least in part, by Durastanti's testimony, the videotape of Griffin's interview was offered into evidence. Griffin contends that trial counsel should have objected to Durastanti's testimony on the ground that it invaded the province of the jury by commenting on defendant's credibility. There is only one objectionable comment in the whole of Durastanti's testimony. He was asked and answered: Q. Did [Griffin] appear to be able to respond intelligently and appropriately to your questions? A. Yeah. He responded appropriately for a deceptive person, someone who was hiding something, in my opinion. The State contends that the comment was rather superfluous because when the jurors watched the videotape they could see for themselves that Griffin was evasive. The State's observation about Griffin's conduct during the interview is accurate to the extent that Griffin initially gave almost no information and only gradually over the hours of the interview became somewhat more cooperative. The State cites State v. Walker, 28 Kan. App. 2d 700, Syl. ¶ 6, 20 P.3d 1269 (2001), which states: The mere fact that an officer testifies that the defendant lied, when it is obvious that the defendant did lie, is not cause to grant a mistrial. In response to the question what a witness had said about the man in the back seat of the patrol car, the officer stated: 'He positively identified Robert A. Walkerwell, he stated his name was Robert A. Walker, he [Walker] lied to me about his nameas being one of the individuals who was firing towards three black males.' 28 Kan. App. 2d at 710. What the officer said in Walker was that the defendant had given him a false name. What Durastanti said in the present case is that the defendant was deceptive when interviewed by law enforcement. There is a difference in that Durastanti commented on defendant's lack of forthrightness while being interviewed by law enforcement agents, and the videotape of the interview was shown to the jury so that Durastanti's statement was a comment on the credibility of what Griffin told the agents. Durastanti's comment was objectionable, but defense counsel did not object to it. Although the State's observation that Griffin's evasiveness is plainly apparent in the videotape does not make Durastanti's comment unobjectionable, it does weigh against the comment's being prejudicial. The failure to object to the comment did not prejudice Griffin. (2) Lobdell testified about an intentional incendiary act, an intentional gas leak in this apartment, and that the defendants caused that to happen inside the apartment. Griffin contends that whether the gas leak was intentional was a question of fact for the jury to decide and that trial counsel should have objected that the testimony invaded the jury's province. The trial court's view was that Lobdell's testimony was intended to communicate his observation that the break in the pipe would not have occurred in the absence of manual manipulation. It does appear that Lobdell's use of the term intentional was meant to communicate manual manipulation rather than criminal intent. It does not appear to have been objectionable as actually invading the province of the jury, but the testimony probably was objectionable because the particular words he used could have been misconstrued by the jurors. Lobdell's testimony, however, added nothing to what the jurors learned from Griffin's own evidence abut Dixon kicking over the stove. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failing to object to the agent's remarks. (3) Mitchell testified that the cause of the deaths of Dana and Gabriel Hudson was exposure to heat and inhalation of fire gases and that the manner of each death was homicide. As the coroner, Mitchell completed the official death certificates for Dana and Gabriel Hudson. The certificate forms have a space for manner as well as cause of death. Mitchell's testimony was given in connection with introduction of the death certificates into evidence. The certificates are required to be filed with the state registrar and are the official death record. K.S.A. 65-2412. K.S.A. 65-2416(b) provides that the state registrar shall not certify a death certificate in which the manner of death is marked other than natural unless the death certificate is signed by a district coroner. Mitchell, as the district coroner, was required to sign the death certificates of Dana and Gabriel Hudson, and, as a matter of law, he was qualified to do so. The death certificates, which classify the deaths as homicides, were admitted into evidence. Griffin does not complain of their admission. If admission of Mitchell's testimony as to the manner of death was error for any reason, the error would be harmless because the testimony merely restated the contents of the death certificates. There was no deficiency in trial counsel's not objecting to Mitchell's testimony. (h) Griffin complains that trial counsel failed to object to Jerry Hall's testimony on the ground that his probation order required him to testify consistently with his inquisition. The State argues that the issue was not raised in the district court, and Griffin does not deny it. As we previously stated, issues not raised in the district court will generally not be considered on appeal. This issue was raised in State v. Dixon . In Dixon, we held that it was error to allow Hall to testify; however, because Hall's testimony was basically duplicated by Rodney Hayes, it was not reversible error. For that reason counsel's failure to object did not prejudice Griffin. (i) Griffin complains that trial counsel's motions were inadequate. He concedes that counsel filed 12 motions on his behalf but claims that the motions were short on law and argument and contrasts them with the presumably adequate motions filed on behalf of Dixon. That Dixon's presumably adequate motions did not provide him a means of avoiding conviction demonstrates that, if Griffin's counsel's motions were wanting, no prejudice has been shown as a consequence.