Opinion ID: 2364711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Judicial Influence of Jury Deliberations

Text: ¶ 34 Because the jury was still in the deliberative process when the court returned the jury to the jury room, the question becomes whether the court's comments improperly influenced the jury's verdict under Watkins and CrR 6.15(f)(2). Turning first to CrR 6.15(f)(2), that rule provides that [a]fter jury deliberations have begun, the court shall not instruct the jury in such a way as to suggest the need for agreement. We have explained that [t]he purpose of this rule is to prevent judicial interference in the deliberative process. Boogaard, 90 Wash.2d at 736, 585 P.2d 789. Because we cannot know at what point in the deliberations individual jurors will reach their final decision, these protections must endure as long as the jury continues to operate in its deliberative capacity. ¶ 35 In this case, upon seeing the blank verdict form for count I, the court said, I'm sending the jury back to the jury room. Verdict form No. 1 is completely blank. It must be filled in. VRP (Aug. 29, 2007) at 390. The written jury instructions required unanimous agreement in order to fill in the form and return a verdict. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 35. Thus, by telling the jury that the verdict form for count I must be filled in, the court effectively required the jury to come to an agreement that Mr. Ford was guilty or not guilty. This removed from the jury the option of leaving the verdict form blank. This is an option to which the jury was entitled under the law, as we do not allow courts to essentially hold jurors hostage until they can come to a unanimous verdict. Simply put, under the written jury instructions and settled law, the jury had three options in terms of the decision it could reach: agree guilty, agree not guilty, or leave the form blank. But, after the court's comments, the jury had only two options to consider: agree guilty or agree not guilty. By removing the third available option from the jurythe option to leave the form blankthe court improperly interfered with the jury's deliberative process. ¶ 36 The lead opinion sees no harm in the court's comment, reading it as merely a restatement of the court's written instructions to the jury. Lead opinion at 101. The lead opinion highlights the written jury instruction stating that the jury `must fill in the blank provided in each verdict form the words not guilty or the word guilty. . . .' Id. (quoting CP at 35). While at first glance this instruction and the court's comments appear similar, they are in fact critically different. The written instruction required the jury to fill in the verdict form guilty or not guilty, but only if the jury came to a decision in the first place. This is evident from a reading of the entire instruction, including the last clause, which the lead opinion omits from its quotation: You must fill in the blank provided in each verdict form the words `not guilty' or the word `guilty,' according to the decision you reach.  CP at 35 (emphasis added). The instruction to fill in the verdict form therefore presupposed the jury had come to a unanimous decision of guilty or not guilty. But nothing in the jury instructions actually required the jury to fill in the form. A permissible way for the jury to indicate it was unable to reach a unanimous decision, for example, was to leave the verdict form blank. The court's verbal instruction materially differed from the written instructions because the judge categorically told the jury it had to fill in the verdict form for count I, which gave two options, guilty or not guilty. This improperly suggested the obligation to reach a unanimous verdict in violation of CrR 6.15(f)(2), while the written instructions provided a correct statement of the law. [7] ¶ 37 The trial court's comments in this case implicate the broader principle we recognized in Watkins that the jury must be free from judicial pressure in reaching its verdict. 99 Wash.2d at 176, 660 P.2d 1117. Contrary to the lead opinion's view, Watkins does not require an affirmative showing of intentional judicial misconduct. Nor does it require a showing that the court forced the jury to reach a particular result. Here, the Watkins standard is met because the trial court's statements narrowed the options available to the jury during its deliberations by requiring a unanimous decision of guilty or not guilty, thereby presenting a reasonably substantial possibility that the verdict was improperly influenced by the trial court's intervention. Id. at 178, 660 P.2d 1117.