Opinion ID: 744671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction of old chief's prior felony conviction.

Text: 4 We review the district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir.1993). Prior to trial, Old Chief made an offer to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon. He argued that introduction of his prior felony assault conviction to prove the element of the unlawful possession charge would be unduly prejudicial. The prosecution refused to stipulate, and the district court denied Old Chief's motion. 5 Regardless of the defendant's offer to stipulate, the government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense through introduction of probative evidence. See United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir.1993)(citing United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir.1982)). Under Ninth Circuit law, a stipulation is not proof, and, thus, it has no place in the FRE 403 balancing process. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 691-92. 6 Old Chief argues that our decision here is controlled by that in United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1171, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995). But Hernandez stands for the proposition that a defendant's stipulation to a prior felony is sufficient evidence to fulfill the requisite element of § 922(g)(1). It cannot be read for the quite different proposition that a defendant's stipulation to a prior felony must always be accepted to prove the requisite element of § 922(g)(1). 7 Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Old Chief's prior conviction to prove that element of the unlawful possession charge. 8