Opinion ID: 3134232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ill Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111½, par. 5101. See also Hill v. Jackson

Text: Park Hospital, 39 Ill. App. 3d 223, 225 (1976) (Act serves to prevent chilling effect on the exercise of sound medical judgment); Glass v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 32 Ill. App. 3d 237, 241 (1975) (Act ensures that strict liability will not impinge on the exercise of sound medical judgment in a field where an individual's life might be at stake). These clear expressions reveal the legislative view concerning the types of judgments involved in blood banking as well as the level of expertise attendant to these scientific procedures. Any construction of section 3 must be consistent with these expressions of the Act's purpose. See People v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261 (1995) (statute should be given construction that is consistent with purposes and policies of the statutes). Moreover, the legislature apparently deemed it necessary to enact section 3, a provision which imposes a particular form of statutory liability apart from existing common law negligence liability, despite that the Act's express purpose was fully accomplished by section 2. Accepting the express purpose of the Act, there was no need for the legislature to go beyond section 2 in crafting a specific statutory liability for blood service providers; existing common law negligence standards of care would have sufficed. During legislative debates concerning a subsequent amendment to section 3 (see Pub. Act 78--31, eff. June 22, 1973), one legislator expressed his understanding that a basis for the Blood Labeling Bills was a past shortage of blood to the extent that physicians had to sometimes rely on purchased blood. The legislator additionally stated that certain protection was given to [p]hysicians and [h]ospitals in that they are acting in good faith and exercising due care in the transfer of blood to the extent that it is  possible to know the blood [sic] and uncontaminated. 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 13, 1973, at 67-68 (statements of Representative Lauer) (extending the waiver of strict liability from July 1, 1973, to July 1, 1976). We glean from these statements only that legislators assumed that blood transferors, referred to as physicians and hospitals, were shielded under the law because they act in good faith and exercise due care in transferring blood to the extent of their knowledge. An additional statutory construction aid is the common law. The common law, having been classified and arranged into a logical system of doctrine, principles, rules and practices, furnishes one of the most reliable backgrounds upon which analysis of the objects and purposes of a statute can be determined. Tyrrell Gravel Co. v. Carradus, 250 Ill. App. 3d 817 (1993); see also 2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §50.01, at 90 (5th ed. 1992). It is appropriate then to rely on that body of law to interpret section 3. See In re Balay, 113 B.R. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (statute should be construed so that it may be given effect and is consonant with the common law. In Illinois, the basic standard of care in instances of negligence is that of the ordinarily careful person (see IPI Civil 3d No. 10.02) or reasonably prudent person (Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 376 (1974)). This basic formulation reflects the community's demand for a standard that is external and objective. To be complete, however, a standard of care must also be subjective, in that it makes proper allowance for the actor's capacity to meet the risk apparent to him, and the circumstances under which he must act. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §32, at 173 (6th ed. 1995). Accordingly, the basic reasonable person standard allows for and incorporates the physical characteristics of the defendant, himself. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §32, at 175 (6th ed. 1995); W. Curran, Professional Negligence--Some General Comments, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 535, 536-37 (June 1959). Other circumstances may be similarly incorporated into the reasonable person standard. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §32, at 179 n.47 (6th ed. 1995) (citing Lewis v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 97 Ill. App. 3d 227 (1981), as applying standard of care that child of actor's age, intelligence, capacity and experience would exercise). The professional standard of care accomplishes this incorporation of certain subjective qualities and circumstances. Professionals are held to a particularized form of the basic reasonable person standard because in addition to that degree of care, they are expected to possess a higher degree of skill, care, and learning than the average person. The common statement that due care is the degree of care that a reasonable person is bound to exercise is thus only a statement of the general negligence standard of conduct or duty in its most basic terms. Professionals, in general, are required not only to exercise reasonable care (i.e., due care) in what they do, but also to possess and exercise a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §32, at 185 (6th ed. 1995); see also Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38 (1965) (while architect has duty to act with reasonable care and diligence, the skill and ability that an architect is bound to exercise is that ordinarily required of architects). In Illinois, the established standard of care for all professionals is stated as the use of the same degree of knowledge, skill and ability as an ordinarily careful professional would exercise under similar circumstances. Taake v. WHGK, Inc., 228 Ill. App. 3d 692, 708 (1992) (same general standard of care applies to all professionals, including architects); Eaves v. Hyster Co., 244