Opinion ID: 4398244
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excluded Allied Erecting Testimony

Text: Allied Erecting next argues that the district court should have allowed it to put on testimony about its present and future plans for the development of parcels around the Canfield Branch and the Haselton Yard. Those plans were relevant to Allied Erecting’s intent behind the negotiations with Conrail, Allied Erecting argues, so they “were proper extrinsic evidence” of the meaning of the agreement and the quitclaim deed. Appellant Br. at 23. Norfolk Southern responds—as did the district court, in granting Norfolk Southern’s motion in limine—that Allied Erecting has not demonstrated that any of the development plans existed at the time the agreement and the quitclaim deed were negotiated, so the plans are irrelevant to the question of the parties’ intent at the time of contracting. We need not address the relevancy point, however, because Allied Erecting has not identified what evidence it believes was improperly excluded. Despite the district court’s ruling on the motion in limine, it allowed counsel for Allied Erecting to elicit over a transcript page’s worth of uninterrupted reminiscence from Ramun about Allied Erecting’s reasons for wanting the Canfield Branch in 1994. Allied Erecting leaves to our imagination what more evidence of its development plans it would have introduced but was not permitted to: it identifies no witness, document, exhibit, or other evidence with which it would have educated the jury. Not knowing what it is the district court excluded, we cannot say that the alleged exclusion was erroneous. C. Exclusion of Testimony Relevant to the Powers Crossing Next, Allied Erecting contends that the district court erred in excluding evidence relevant to its claim of a preexisting easement, by way of the Powers Crossing, over the Canfield Branch. 17 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. First, Allied Erecting challenges the district court’s preventing its witnesses from reading aloud and testifying about the “under and subject to” clause in the quitclaim deed. Second, Allied Erecting argues that the district court erred in excluding testimony about an exhibit containing a map that Allied Erecting claims shows the location of the Powers Crossing.4 We must determine whether the district court’s reason for excluding this testimony was correct, and, even if not, whether the evidence was nevertheless properly excluded. The answer to the first question is no, but the answer to the second is yes. 1. The Powers Deed Argument Was Not an Affirmative Defense In excluding the testimony, the district court held that Allied Erecting’s argument that it had a right to cross the Canfield Branch was an affirmative defense, and Allied Erecting had forfeited the defense by failing to assert it in its answer. As a general rule, “[f]ailure to plead an affirmative defense in the first responsive pleading to a complaint” forfeits the defense. Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 911 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). However, for the district court’s reasoning to have been correct, the Powers Deed argument must in fact be an affirmative defense to breach of contract. The district court cited no authority in support of its conclusion. After reviewing the pleadings in this case, as well as Ohio law on affirmative defenses and on breach of contract, we conclude that Allied Erecting’s argument is not an affirmative defense. 4 Allied Erecting’s principal brief indicates that the “under and subject to” clause in the quitclaim deed as well as the exhibit were excluded entirely. That is not true; the entire quitclaim deed as well as the exhibit were admitted into evidence. However, Allied Erecting is clearer in its reply brief: it takes issue with the district court’s decision to prevent witnesses “from mentioning, testifying about, and/or drawing the jury’s attention to” the “under and subject to” clause and the exhibit. Reply Br. at 4. Allied Erecting argues that the map contained in the exhibit would have been meaningless to the jury without testimony explaining it; having seen the map, we have sympathy for this contention. 18 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. As to affirmative defenses, Ohio law provides: An affirmative defense is a new matter which, assuming the complaint to be true, constitutes a defense to it. An affirmative defense is any defensive matter in the nature of a confession and avoidance. It admits that the plaintiff has a claim (the “confession”) but asserts some legal reason why the plaintiff cannot have any recovery on that claim (the “avoidance”). State ex rel. The Plain Dealer Publ’g Co. v. City of Cleveland, 661 N.E.2d 187, 189–90 (Ohio 1996) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted); see also R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. GBS Corp., 2009-Ohio-6808, No. 08 MA 83, 2009 WL 4981226, at ¶ 41 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2009) (“An affirmative defense attacks the legal right to bring a claim as opposed to attacking the truth of the claim.” (citation omitted)). As to breach of contract, Ohio law requires four elements. The plaintiff must show (1) that a contract existed, (2) that the plaintiff “performed its contractual obligations,” (3) that the defendant “failed to fulfill its contractual obligations without legal excuse,” and (4) that the plaintiff “suffered damages as a result of the breach.” Garofalo v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 661 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). Allied Erecting’s filings show that its theory was that Norfolk Southern could not make out a prima facie case of breach. First, Allied Erecting’s answer clearly denied all paragraphs of Norfolk Southern’s complaint alleging that Allied Erecting had failed to fulfill its contractual obligations. Later, Allied Erecting’s opposition to Norfolk Southern’s summary judgment motion fleshed out the denial. It explained that on Allied Erecting’s reading of the “under and subject to” clause, that clause protected Allied Erecting’s right to cross the Canfield Branch at the Powers Crossing. In other words, the “under and subject to” clause was as much a part of the quitclaim deed as the clause reserving an easement to Norfolk Southern, and Allied Erecting argued that it 19 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. had not breached the terms of the quitclaim deed by taking advantage of the “under and subject to” clause. An Ohio case with analogous procedural facts illustrates why Allied Erecting did not forfeit the Powers Crossing argument. In Red Head Brass, Inc. v. Buckeye Union Insurance Co., 735 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999), the plaintiff sued its insurer claiming (among other things) breach of contract based on the insurer’s alleged failure to provide for the plaintiff’s legal representation in underlying litigation. The insurer moved for, and was granted, summary judgment. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court had improperly considered two defensive arguments by the insurer that should have been disregarded as forfeited, as the insurer had not specified them in its answer. The first defensive argument was that the insurance policy required the insurer only to defend the plaintiff against legal claims, not to represent it on claims or counterclaims it chose to assert. Id. at 53. The second defensive argument was that the plaintiff had not complied with a provision of the insurance policy requiring the plaintiff to provide the insurer with adequate notice of underlying litigation in which the plaintiff wished to be represented. Id. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that these arguments about “the extent of [the insurer’s] duty to defend under the insurance policy and to reimburse [the plaintiff’s] legal expenditures” were not affirmative defenses because they were not “an admission of [the plaintiff’s] claim coupled with a theory of avoidance of recovery.” Id. Therefore, the insurer’s answer—which had (1) denied that the plaintiff had fulfilled its contractual obligations, (2) denied that the insurer had a duty to bring a counterclaim on behalf of the plaintiff, and (3) denied that the plaintiff’s claim for reimbursement of litigation expenses was “in accordance with the Policy”—was “sufficient to put [the plaintiff] on notice” of the insurer’s defense. Id. 20 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. Similarly, although Allied Erecting did not cite specific clauses of the quitclaim deed in its answer, it clearly denied having breached its obligations under the quitclaim deed or the agreement. That denial was adequate to preserve Allied Erecting’s defense based on the “under and subject to” clause. 2. The District Court Properly Excluded Testimony About the Powers Deed Having concluded that Allied Erecting did not forfeit its argument based on the Powers Deed, we must determine whether the district court nevertheless properly excluded testimony about the Powers Deed. Norfolk Southern argues that even assuming Allied Erecting has not forfeited the argument, the district court properly excluded the testimony because Allied Erecting does not have an easement across the Canfield Branch. On Norfolk Southern’s reading, the Powers Deed created an easement in gross, which is “personal only to the grantee” and is not descendible or transferable. Walbridge v. Carroll, 875 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). The Powers Deed did not confer a perpetual right, argues Norfolk Southern; it simply granted a wagon crossing to the Powers brothers that would expire when they died or conveyed their land to another. In response, Allied Erecting argues that the Powers Deed created an easement appurtenant that runs with the land under Ohio law. An easement appurtenant involves two parcels of land: the dominant estate (also sometimes referred to as the “dominant tenement”) is benefited by the easement, and the servient estate (or “servient tenement”) is subject to the easement. See Goralske v. Parsell, 59 N.E.3d 730, 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). On Allied Erecting’s theory, the Powers brothers retained a right for themselves and all future owners of their property, the dominant estate, to cross the Canfield Branch, the servient estate. Because an easement appurtenant benefits the dominant estate regardless of changes in ownership, see id., Allied Erecting believes that as the 21 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. owner of the erstwhile Powers parcel bordering the southern end of the Powers Crossing, it has a right to use that crossing. However, even assuming that Allied Erecting is correct about the nature of the easement created by the Powers Deed,5 Allied Erecting has no easement. The doctrine of merger, which Ohio recognizes, dictates that an easement appurtenant is extinguished “when the dominant and servient tenements come into the ownership of the same party.” Shah v. Smith, 908 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). As the Ohio Court of Appeals has put it, “there is no reason for an owner to hold an easement against himself.” Id.; see also Warren v. Brenner, 101 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (stating that an easement “is an invisible and intangible right and interest . . . conferring upon the grantee some lawful use out of or from the estate of another” (emphasis added)). Here, Allied Erecting already owned the dominant estate south of the Powers Crossing when it bought the Canfield Branch from Conrail in 1994.6 That conveyance made Allied Erecting the owner of both the dominant and the servient estates and extinguished any easement Allied Erecting may have had. Therefore, Allied Erecting cannot assert a right to use the Powers Crossing as an “easement[] . . . affecting the Premises” to which Norfolk Southern’s reserved easement is allegedly subject. Because Allied Erecting has no easement based on the Powers Deed, that deed provides no defense to Norfolk Southern’s breach-of-contract allegations. Therefore, the district court did not 5 For reasons relating to the particular wording and vintage of the Powers Deed, the answer to the in-gross versus appurtenant inquiry is not clear. However, an unpublished decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals both explains (with gratifying thoroughness) the unclarity in this area and reaches a result strongly suggesting that Allied Erecting is correct, and the Powers Deed created an easement appurtenant. See Merrill Lynch Mortg. Lending, Inc. v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 2010-Ohio-1827, No. 24943, 2010 WL 1692011 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2010). 6 As noted above, AID owns the parcel north of the Canfield Branch that used to belong to the Powers brothers. But AID is not a party to this lawsuit and its right (or lack thereof) to cross the Canfield Branch is not at issue. 22 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. err in excluding testimony about Allied Erecting’s alleged right to cross the Canfield Branch at the Powers Crossing. D. Manifest Absurdity Finally, Allied Erecting argues that the district court’s interpretation of the contract, reflected in its declaratory judgment and order granting specific performance to Norfolk Southern, is manifestly absurd. As noted above, Allied Erecting made a motion in limine to exclude any testimony by Norfolk Southern employees about Norfolk Southern’s interpretation of the agreement and the quitclaim deed. Part of Allied Erecting’s argument for excluding the testimony was that Norfolk Southern’s proposed interpretation was manifestly absurd. However, Norfolk Southern argues that Allied Erecting’s appellate manifest-absurdity argument is a new theory of error that this court should ignore as unpreserved, because Allied Erecting’s appellate argument is not couched solely in evidentiary terms. Alternatively, Norfolk Southern contends that if we view Allied Erecting’s motion in limine as having raised the manifest-absurdity argument, we should still disregard the argument on the theory that a motion in limine does not preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal. As to Norfolk Southern’s first point, we believe that Allied Erecting adequately raised the manifest-absurdity argument in its motion in limine. Although Allied Erecting no longer styles the argument as an objection to the admission of evidence, the substance of the argument is the same as in the motion in limine. Allied Erecting views the district court as having erroneously adopted Norfolk Southern’s interpretation of the agreement and the quitclaim deed—an interpretation which, in Allied Erecting’s view, is so absurd that testimony supporting it should have been excluded. 23 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. This leads us to Norfolk Southern’s second point, which gets the law half right. We agree that “if the [district] court’s ruling” on a motion in limine “is in any way qualified or conditional,” the moving party must object again when the evidence is offered at trial. United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999)). However, “if the trial court has made an explicit and definitive ruling on the record of the evidentiary issues to be decided, and has not indicated that the ruling is conditioned upon any other circumstances or evidence, then counsel need not renew the objection at the time the evidence is offered.” Brawner, 173 F.3d at 970; see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(b) (“Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”). Here, although the district court did enter a ruling on Allied Erecting’s motion, it did not specifically address the manifest-absurdity argument. We need not determine whether the district court’s ruling was “explicit and definitive” or “qualified or conditional,” however, because even under the abuse-of-discretion standard that applies to a preserved evidentiary objection, see Poulsen, 655 F.3d at 510, Allied Erecting’s manifest-absurdity argument fails. The district court did not “rel[y] on clearly erroneous findings of fact, use[] an erroneous legal standard, or improperly appl[y] the law” either in admitting King’s testimony or in entering judgment for Norfolk Southern. United States v. Arny, 831 F.3d 725, 730 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). At trial, Allied Erecting took the position that the agreement gave it an option to build Norfolk Southern a new roadway within ten years; Norfolk Southern argued that Allied Erecting had undertaken an obligation to do so. As for the quitclaim deed’s reservation of an easement to Norfolk Southern, Allied Erecting would have argued at trial (had it been permitted to) that the “under and subject to” clause gave it a right to cross the Canfield Branch at the Powers Crossing. 24 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. The jury heard evidence from both sides and determined that Allied Erecting had indeed undertaken an obligation to build Norfolk Southern a new roadway and that Allied Erecting was obligated to, and had failed to, provide Norfolk Southern with an exclusive easement between Poland Avenue and the Haselton Yard. Then, the district court entered judgment accordingly. Under Ohio law, “common words appearing in a written instrument are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results or unless some other meaning is clearly intended from the face or overall contents of the instrument.” Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 374 N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ohio 1978) (citations omitted). Despite citing this standard, Allied Erecting does not explain which words in the agreement and the quitclaim deed should be given any meaning other than their plain and ordinary meaning. Instead, it seems to argue that the district court’s interpretation of the agreement and the quitclaim deed reflects a set of obligations so unfavorable to Allied Erecting that Allied Erecting would never have agreed to them. However, as the Ohio Supreme Court has made clear, “[c]ases of contractual interpretation should not be decided on the basis of what is ‘just’ or equitable. This concept is applicable even where a party has made a bad bargain, contracted away all his rights, and has been left in the position of doing the work while another may benefit from the work.” Ervin v. Garner, 267 N.E.2d 769, 774 (Ohio 1971). Here, we cannot say that the jury’s and the district court’s determination that the parties intended the agreement’s terms to be obligatory was manifestly absurd, given that the agreement did not contain the word “option” or provide for a period of time after which the agreement’s terms would lapse. As to Norfolk Southern’s reserved easement, the district court was correct to exclude evidence of the Powers Deed, for reasons explained earlier. Once that evidence had been excluded, it was not manifestly absurd for the district court to conclude that Norfolk Southern’s reserved 25 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. easement was supposed to be exclusive, even as against Allied Erecting. Other than its argument based on the Powers Deed, Allied Erecting offers no alternative reading of the quitclaim deed that would prevent its terms from being manifestly absurd in Allied Erecting’s view. Because Allied Erecting does not persuade us that the district court’s interpretation of the agreement and the quitclaim deed is manifestly absurd, as opposed to simply burdensome to Allied Erecting, we hold that the district court did not err in admitting Norfolk Southern’s evidence or in entering judgment for Norfolk Southern. E. Application of the Standard of Review As discussed above, a party is entitled to JNOV if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable mind could rule for that party. See Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc., 731 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 2013). Allied Erecting has not satisfied that standard here. First, Allied Erecting has shown no error with regard to the alleged exclusion of its development plans and, at most, harmless error with regard to the admission of King’s testimony. Although the district court was not correct in its grounds for excluding testimony about the Powers Deed—Allied Erecting’s second argument—the exclusion of that evidence was nonetheless proper, so Allied Erecting cannot show error. Finally, Allied Erecting’s manifest-absurdity argument is meritless. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Norfolk Southern, we conclude that the jury’s verdict and the district court’s judgment were reasonable, so Allied Erecting is not entitled to JNOV. Allied Erecting is not entitled to a new trial either: harmless error does not satisfy the abuse-of-discretion standard, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial motion. See Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1330 (6th Cir. 1994). 26 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc.