Opinion ID: 1634989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The March 30, 2001 Amended Judgment and Commitment Order

Text: As an initial matter, the sentence imposed in the March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order is illegal in two respects. First, the original judgment reflects a sentence of forty years' imprisonment, as well as a twenty-year suspended imposition of sentence, for a total of sixty yearsa sentence not authorized for a class Y felony. Second, because the suspended portion of the sentence requires Mr. Harness to report to a supervising officer, the sentence is in reality imprisonment followed by probationa sentence specifically prohibited by statute. Even though neither Mr. Harness nor the State challenges the legality of the sentence on appeal, we treat problems of void or illegal sentences similar to problems of subject-matter jurisdiction and review them even if not raised on appeal and not objected to in the trial court. Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992); Lambert v. State, 286 Ark. 408, 692 S.W.2d 238 (1985). Sentencing is entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas. Bunch v. State, 344 Ark. 730, 738, 43 S.W.3d 132, 137 (2001). No defendant convicted of an offense shall be sentenced otherwise than in accordance with this chapter. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-104(a) (Supp.2001). A circuit court has jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence even if it has been placed into execution. Meadows v. State, 324 Ark. 505, 922 S.W.2d 341 (1996); Bangs v. State, supra ; Nelson v. State, 284 Ark. 156, 680 S.W.2d 91 (1984); Massey v. State, 278 Ark. 625, 648 S.W.2d 52 (1983). If we hold that a trial court's sentence was illegal and that the error had nothing to do with guilt, but only with the illegal sentence, we can correct the sentence in lieu of remanding. Bangs v. State, supra . In Lewis v. State, this court set out the parameters for interpreting a trial court's judgment. 336 Ark. 469, 986 S.W.2d 95 (1999). [J]udgments are generally construed like other instruments and the determinative factor is the intention of the court, gathered from the judgment itself and the record, including the pleadings and the evidence.... [I]t is to be presumed that a defendant has been accorded a fair trial, and that the judgment of conviction is valid. Id. at 475, 986 S.W.2d at 98. The March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order imposed a sentence of 480 months' imprisonment and a suspended sentence of 240 months, for a total of 720 months (or sixty years). The sentence for a Class Y felony is ten to forty years, or life. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl.1997). Mr. Harness's attorney pointed out the illegal length of the sentence to the trial court. After a brief discussion among the judge, the prosecutor, and Mr. Harness's attorney in which all agreed on the intended sentence, the judge ruled as follows: [a]ll right, then it will be amended to reflect 20 year sentence with 20 suspended. Based upon the record in this case, the clear intent of the circuit court and the understanding of both the State and the defendant was that Mr. Harness be sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, followed by a twenty-year suspended imposition of sentence. One of the conditions imposed by the circuit court in connection with the twenty-year suspended sentence was as follows: You must report as directed to a supervising officer and permit him or her to visit you in your residence, place of employment, or other property. This reporting requirement makes the actual sentence imposed by the circuit court one of probation rather than suspension. Section 5-4-104 of the Arkansas Criminal Code provides in relevant part as follows: The court may sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment and suspend imposition of sentence as to an additional term of imprisonment, but the court shall not sentence a defendant to imprisonment and place him on probation, except as authorized by § 5-4-304. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(c)(3) (Supp.2001). Section 5-4-304 permits confinement as a condition of suspension; however, the period of confinement cannot exceed 120 days in the case of a felony or thirty days in the case of a misdemeanor. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-304(d)(1) (Supp.2001). The original commentary explains that this section recognized the practice of Arkansas judges to use the shock of a short period of incarceration to enhance the effectiveness of a subsequent period of suspension or probation by giving the offender a taste of imprisonment. Original Commentary to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-304 (Repl.1995). As noted earlier, the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney all agreed that the circuit court intended to sentence Mr. Harness to twenty years' imprisonment followed by a twenty-year suspended imposition of sentence. The issue before us is whether the condition that Mr. Harness report to a supervising officer transformed the suspension into probation. We addressed this same issue in Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294. The distinction between probation and suspension is one of supervision. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-101 (1987) defines both probation and suspension as release without pronouncement of sentence. However, probation is defined as release without pronouncement of sentence but subject to the supervision of a probation officer and suspension is defined as release without pronouncement of sentence and without supervision.  Id. at 239-40, 835 S.W.2d at 296 (emphasis added). [1] The Bangs court explained that when the current criminal code was written, imprisonment followed by suspension was authorized because it was a widespread practice by the Arkansas trial bench. Id. However, probation was prohibited from following imprisonment because supervision by both the court and the Board of Pardons and Paroles is a needless duplication of effort conducive to jurisdictional disputes. Id. at 240, 835 S.W.2d at 296. The Bangs court held as follows: we affirm the trial court's revocation based on the escape and modify the conditions so that appellant is no longer required to report to a probation officer. Id. at 242, 835 S.W.2d at 297 (Mr. Bangs had fled during the period of suspension). Accordingly, the conditions imposed by the circuit court in this case are hereby modified so that Mr. Harness is no longer required to report to a supervising officer. As modified herein to reflect a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, followed by a twenty-year suspended imposition of sentence, and with the above-mentioned modification to the conditions of suspension, the March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order imposes a legal sentence. This then leads us to a consideration of Mr. Harness's point on appeal whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to issue its amended judgment and commitment order on January 16, 2002, revoking Mr. Harness's suspended sentence and imposing a term of thirty years' imprisonment.