Opinion ID: 2427524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Provision of Personnel and the Subsequent Provision of Expert Services by Such Personnel Are Distinct Forms of Material Support

Text: Chief Judge Dearie submits that the time and distance to be traveled by Sabir before he actually provided any medical treatment to al Qaeda warriors was too great to permit a jury to find that his actions constituted a substantial step towards commission of the charged crime. See Dissenting Op., post at [178, 179-80]. This mistakenly equates the provision of personnel to a terrorist organization with the subsequent provision of services by that personnel, a misapprehension that pervades the dissent and informs its conclusion that Sabir stands guilty for an offense that he did not commit. Id. at [183]. While it may frequently be the case that a defendant who intends to provide a terrorist organization with personnel also intends for the personnel to provide the organization with services, § 2339A(b)(1) specifically recognizes personnel and servicesparticularly services in the form of expert advice and assistance, such as medical treatmentas distinct types of material support. [21] Thus, even if the provision (or attempted provision) of these two forms of material support may be simultaneous in some cases, it may not be in others. For that reason, evidence sufficient to demonstrate a substantial step towards the provision of personnel may not always be sufficient to demonstrate a substantial step towards the personnel's provision of services. Whether or not Sabir's May 20, 2005 actions were a substantial step in the provision of expert medical services to terrorists, we conclude that they were a substantial step in the provision of Sabir himself as personnel. To illustrate, assume that, instead of offering himself as an on-call doctor to al Qaeda, Sabir had recruited a doctor who was, in all respects, identically situated to himself. Assume further that Sabir then brought that doctor to a meeting in New York where the doctor swore allegiance to al Qaeda, promised a supposed al Qaeda member that he would work as an on-call doctor for the organization, and gave the member contact numbers so that wounded jihadists in Saudi Arabia could reach the doctor when necessary. Even the dissent concedes that such evidence would be sufficient to prove Sabir guilty of attempting to provide personnel, although the recruited doctor would not provide actual medical services until some time in the future and after he traveled from New York to Saudi Arabia. Dissenting Op., post at [179]. Because Sabir would be guilty of attempting to provide personnel in the circumstances hypothesized, we think it necessarily follows that he is equally guilty on the record facts. He is guilty of attempting to provide himself as personnel to al Qaeda on May 20, 2005, even if he is not yet guilty of attempting to provide medical services to that organization. In concluding otherwise, Chief Judge Dearie submits that the recruiter in the hypothetical has done something. He has provided a service to the organization. Id. By contrast, he submits that Sabir has done nothing more than conspire. Id. at 179. [22] We disagree. Section 2339(B) criminalizes providing personnel through self-recruitment ( i.e., volunteering oneself to serve under the direction of a terrorist organization) no less than through recruitment (securing another person to serve under such direction). [23] By volunteering himself as an on-call doctor for al Qaeda, Sabir rendered, or attempted to render, that organization as much of a service in producing personnel as the recruiter who solicited a doctor for that purpose. To hold otherwise would be to apply a different standard of sufficiency to the provision of personnel depending on whether the person being provided is oneself or another, a distinction for which there is no support in a statute that equally proscribes the provision of oneself or another to work under the direction of a terrorist organization. Chief Judge Dearie suggests that a constitutional concern arises when a defendant is prosecuted for providing himself rather than a third party as personnel because in the former circumstance a defendant `could be punished for, in effect, providing [himself] to speak out in support of the program or principles of a foreign terrorist organization, an activity protected by the First Amendment.' Dissenting Op., post at [182 n.10] (quoting United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 118 (2d Cir.2009) ( dictum )). The Supreme Court, however, has now held otherwise, explaining that the material support statute leaves persons free to engage in independent advocacy, proscribing only conduct directed to, coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2728; see id. at 2721 (observing that § 2339B makes clear that `personnel' does not cover independent advocacy (emphasis in original)). Here, there is no question that Sabir was providing himself to work under the direction and control of al Qaedathe jury heard him solemnly swear to do so. By dismissing this evidence as insubstantial and immaterial, and demanding proof of a greater level of engagement, activity or compliance to support conviction, Dissenting Op., post at [183], our dissenting colleague persists in conflating the provision of personnel with the provision of services by that personnel. While the latter form of material support may require proof of particular engagement or activity, the former focuses on submission to the direction and control of a terrorist organization. [24] The importance of the distinction we draw between the evidence necessary to prove a defendant's provision of personnel to a terrorist organization and that personnel's subsequent provision of services to the organization reaches beyond this case. Experience teaches that terrorist organizations frequently recruit persons into their ranks at times and places removed from any service they might render. Thus, someone who supplies suicide bombers or pilots or chemists or doctors or simple foot soldiers to a terrorist organization may reasonably be understood to provide the organization with material support in the form of personnel when the recruited individuals pledge to work under the direction of the organization, even though they may not be called upon to render any particular service for months, years, or at all. By the same reasoning, when a person supplies himself as the bomber or pilot or doctor sought by the terrorist organization, he providesor certainly attempts to providematerial support in the form of personnel as soon as he pledges to work under the direction of the organization. In both circumstances, the organization acquires an important asset, reserve personnel, which can facilitate its planning of future terrorism objectives. See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2725 (recognizing that material support not directly furthering terrorism can be valuable in free[ing] up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends). Thus, even if Sabir needed to return to Riyadh before he could provide actual medical services to members of al Qaedasomething he planned to do within two weeks, see GX 906T at 15his actions on May 20, 2005, constituted a substantial step clearly intended to culminate in supplying himself as personnel to work under the direction of that terrorist organization.