Opinion ID: 78551
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Principles: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To show ineffective assistance, the defendant must satisfy both the performance and prejudice prongs. Id. As to counsel's performance, the Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices. Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 13, 17, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, to establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that his counsel's conduct fell `below an objective standard of reasonableness' in light of `prevailing professional norms' at the time the representation took place. Id. at 16 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65). In assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance, courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (quotation marks omitted). [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Furthermore, the defendant's own words and deeds play a role in assessing the reasonableness of counsel's conduct. See id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.). A mentally competent defendant's instruction not to investigate or not to present mitigation evidence may make counsel's decision not to investigate or present mitigation evidence reasonable. See, e.g., Cummings v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356-59, 2009 WL 4452816, at -25 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2009) (collecting cases); Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1276-77 (11th Cir.2008); Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1202-05 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1336, 173 L.Ed.2d 607 (2009). Although counsel may not blindly follow his client's instructions not to look for or use mitigation evidence, Newland, 527 F.3d at 1208; Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir.1998), when a competent defendant clearly instructs counsel not to investigate or not to present mitigation evidence, the scope of counsel's duty to investigate is significantly more limited than in the ordinary case. See, e.g., Cummings, 588 F.3d at 1359, 2009 WL 4452816, at  (collecting cases); Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 750 (11th Cir. 1988); Tafero v. Wainwright, 796 F.2d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.1986). To establish the prejudice prong, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. In considering whether prejudice exists, courts must look at all the available mitigation evidenceboth the trial evidence and the evidence adduced during postconviction proceedingsand then re-weigh that evidence against the evidence in aggravation. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In that process, what matters is not merely the number of aggravating or mitigating factors, but their weight. Van Hook, 130 S.Ct. at 20. Thus, the prejudice-prong question in this case is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. In this question, too, the defendant's instructions to counsel are relevant. See Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 475-77, 127 S.Ct. at 1941-42 (stating that where a defendant instructed his counsel not to offer any mitigation evidence and would have... refused to allow his counsel to present any such evidence, counsel's failure to investigate further could not have been prejudicial under Strickland ); Cummings, 588 F.3d at 1359, 2009 WL 4452816, at ; Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 551 n. 12 (11th Cir.2000).