Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims of Pre-Trial Error

Text: Although we have determined that remand to the district court is appropriate, we must consider the remainder of Mr. Wilson's claims, as he has presented several arguments which, if meritorious, would require reversal of either his conviction or sentence. We therefore proceed to those claims.

Mr. Wilson contends that he was denied his right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment. . . . Uttecht v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007). The trial court began its examination of the issue by inquiring whether each juror was opposed to or in favor of the death penalty. Tr. trans. 2/3/97, at 38. Only after this question did the court ask whether, if the case should reach the penalty phase, the juror would automatically vote against the death penalty, regardless of the evidence and the law. Id. at 48. Three jurors informed the court that they were opposed to the death penalty; upon further questioning, they told the court that they would automatically vote against it, regardless of the evidence and the law. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 459. Two jurors stated that they were in favor of the death penalty, but that either their conscience or religious convictions would not allow them to impose it. Id. Though Mr. Wilson's argument is less than clear, our best interpretation of his complaint is that by eliciting information on the jurors' views on capital punishment, the court considered irrelevant information in its decision to strike jurors and removed jurors in violation of the standard set forth in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). The OCCA found that while the trial court could have improved the manner in which it conducted voir dire, there was no error because [t]he trial court's follow-up questions were designed to determine whether the jurors' personal views on the death penalty would impair their ability to render an impartial verdict. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 459. The district court similarly denied relief on this basis. Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at -38. A capital defendant's right to an impartial jury prohibits the exclusion of venire members simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). However, the state has a strong interest in jurors who are able to apply capital punishment within the framework state law prescribes. Uttecht, 127 S.Ct. at 2224 (citing Witt, 469 U.S. at 416, 105 S.Ct. 844). To balance the defendant's right to an unbiased jury and the state's interest in a jury that can apply the death penalty, the Supreme Court has instructed that removal for cause is appropriate only when the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844. The trial court must determine `whether the venireman could follow the court's instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.' United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1270 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting Dutton v. Brown, 788 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir.1986)). The trial court's evaluation of bias is a factual finding entitled to substantial deference by reviewing courts. Uttecht, 127 S.Ct. at 2224; Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). We agree with the OCCA's ruling. The trial court retains great flexibility in conducting voir dire. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). The record indicates that all jurors removed for cause stated that they could not impose the death penalty, no matter what the evidence presented. Mr. Wilson points to no jurors who were removed simply because of a general disagreement with the death penalty. Nor has Mr. Wilson highlighted some other form of prejudice, such as providing an example of how the initial questions might have skewed the jurors' answers about their ability to apply the death penalty. Our own thorough review of the record has not shown any reason to believe that this occurred. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of relief.
Mr. Wilson also argues that both his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and his due process rights were violated by the trial court's refusal to conduct individual, sequestered voir dire. He claims that the group voir dire educated the jurors on what answers would automatically result in their removal from jury service. The OCCA found no evidence that the potential jurors were anything but candid in their answers to the trial court's questioning, and so there was no error. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 459. The district court agreed. Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at . A defendant's right to an impartial jury includes the right to an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). There is no absolute constitutional right to individual voir dire in capital cases, Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597, 606-07 (10th Cir.1987); McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 721 F.2d 1493, 1496 (11th Cir.1983) (en banc), but the method of voir dire must comport with due process requirements, Trujillo, 815 F.2d at 607. An exercise of discretion to deny sequestered voir dire . . . may comport quite easily with due process under the specific circumstances, whereas that same exercise of discretion may offend notions of fairness in another setting. Id. There may be a case where en masse death-qualifying voir dire may be so egregious and may so taint the jury that the process denies the defendant his constitutional right to an impartial jury. Id. We might be concerned, for example, if a juror stated in front of other venire members that he was aware that the defendant had been arrested in another state for some heinous crime; Byrd v. Armontrout, 880 F.2d 1, 11 (8th Cir.1989) (finding, however, that this questioning was harmless error); or if a juror expressed his opinion on guilt or innocence, formed because of pre-trial publicity, thereby tainting the entire venire, United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505, 508 (11th Cir.1983) (same). Mr. Wilson has failed to show that his voir dire was so egregious that it violated his due process rights. Trujillo, 815 F.2d at 607. Though the trial court conducted an en masse voir dire in front of a venire of sixty jurors, Mr. Wilson has not shown any evidence of prejudice resulting from that process. See Kilgore v. Bowersox, 124 F.3d 985, 994 (8th Cir.1997) ([T]here is no indication in the record that group questioning of potential jurors was insufficient, or that the composition of the jury would have been different. . . .); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1140 (D.C.Cir.1998) (Although the collective voir dire is not ordinarily the instrument of choice for discerning the impartiality of jurors, sometimes, general questions to the jury are an appropriate way to root out bias.). Lacking such evidence of prejudice, we find that the decision of the OCCA was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law.