Opinion ID: 844172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Marilyn Young’s Statements

Text: Defendant contends the court erred by allowing the prosecution, over defendant‘s objections, to admit the entire two-hour audio-recorded interview of Marilyn Young by Detective Purcell as a prior consistent statement, following Young‘s cross-examination. Defendant argues the playing of the entire tape 47 violated Evidence Code sections 791 and 1236, along with his rights to due process and confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We conclude that any error was harmless. 1. Events leading to the admission of the audio recording as a prior consistent statement During his cross-examination of Marilyn Young, in order to impeach or clarify her trial testimony, defense counsel referred at least five times to her audiorecorded interview with police, which was conducted on the day after the killings. Defense counsel made the first two of these references when questioning Young concerning the incident in which defendant allegedly broke into Connie‘s condominium through a skylight and hid in a closet while she and David packed clothes for the week. Defense counsel claimed Young‘s testimony that Connie learned of this incident directly from defendant was inconsistent with her police interview where Young had said that Connie learned of this incident through their mutual friend Don Clapp. Defense counsel also mistakenly implied that Young had told police that Clapp had referred to an astrology chart before the homicides. However, Young clarified in her testimony that she had told police that an astrologer, who was a friend of Connie‘s, had read the astrology chart, not Clapp. The third defense reference to Young‘s police interview came when Young testified that Connie said she was frightened by a loud bang from her patio on the night of March 2, 1983. Defense counsel mistakenly claimed that Young never told the police about this incident. But Young responded she believed she had 18 done so in her audio-recorded interview. 18 Young was correct. Near the end of the interview, she told police that on the night before the homicides, Connie had reported hearing a ―big, loud bang‖ that ―scared‖ and ―frightened‖ her. 48 Defense counsel also referred to the interview a fourth time, in attempting to clarify the exact wording of defendant‘s threat to hurt Connie (―I could hurt you if I wanted to . . . and nobody would be able to do anything‖), which he made while Connie and Young had breakfast. Defense counsel claimed Young told police that defendant had said, ―I don‘t want to hurt you, but if I wanted to I could do it right here,‖ emphasizing that defendant began by saying that he did not want to hurt Connie. Young mistakenly conceded that that was what she had told 19 police. Finally, defense counsel attempted to impeach Young with her audiorecorded interview. Young testified about a message defendant had left on Young‘s answering machine, soon after their breakfast, in which in an ―unbelievably breathless voice‖ he promised to leave Connie alone. Defense counsel asked Young whether she had told the police about this message during her audio-recorded interview. Young claimed she was sure that she did, but did 20 not know why it could not be located in a transcript of that interview. After defense counsel completed his cross-examination of Young, the prosecutor moved to admit the entire audiotape of Young‘s police interview, arguing that it was admissible under Evidence Code section 1236, as a prior 19 In the audio-recorded interview, Young did not report defendant saying to Connie, ―I don‘t want to hurt you.‖ Instead, Young told police that defendant said to Connie, ―you think I‘[m] going to hurt you [but] if I wanted to hurt you I‘d hurt you right here, you know, is anybody going to stop me.‖ Later during the same audio-recorded interview, she described defendant‘s statement again as: ―if he wanted to hurt her he could hurt her right there in front of everybody. Nobody would do anything.‖ 20 Our review of the audio recording reflects that Young did tell the police about this message. 49 consistent statement, to rebut a claim of fabrication and the claim that her interview was inconsistent with her testimony. Defense counsel objected and argued that only the parts of the recording that concerned his specific questions to Young were relevant because he did not dispute her entire testimony. The prosecutor responded that the entire tape was admissible because defense counsel‘s cross-examination suggested that Young may have fabricated her testimony or lied outright. The trial court ruled that the entire tape was admissible because ―the whole spectrum‖ of Young‘s audio-recorded statements to police were the subject of cross-examination. The prosecutor then played the tape for the jury. At some point while the tape was playing, defense counsel interrupted and interposed an objection. Defense counsel stated, ―I think this tape about 30 minutes ago went far beyond any purpose envisioned by the Evidence Code‖ because it includes the officer‘s and Young‘s theories about ―what happened, why it happened, and all of the surrounding circumstances,‖ and speculation about whether defendant had ―gone berserk and so forth and so on.‖ Defense counsel acknowledged that such evidence might be relevant at the penalty phase, but argued that ―at this point it‘s just totally hearsay, it‘s totally prejudicial, and it has nothing to do with rehabilitating this witness‖ based on Young‘s cross-examination about inconsistent statements. He concluded, ―[t]his is just two hours of theory, speculation, innuendo.‖ He also noted that ―several jurors are sleeping.‖ Defense counsel further added that his transcript of the tape ended about 20 minutes earlier than the tape played to the jury. The prosecutor explained that it would be difficult to stop the tape now since it would not complete the prior consistent statement, and he suggested that the court could instruct the jury to disregard any speculation made by Young or the officer during the interview. 50 The trial court agreed to play the rest of the tape, and instructed the jury as follows: ―When you hear the participants, that is, the witness and the investigating officer, talking and theorizing about what they think went on and things like that, you‘re not to consider that at all, all right? That‘s pure speculation on their part. We‘re only interested in what the witness indicates she told the police officer.‖ After a recess, the court played the remainder of the tape. 2. The contents of Young’s audio-recorded interview Young‘s audio-recorded statements to Detective Purcell duplicated much of her trial testimony. There are, however, a number of noteworthy statements on the tape that were not part of her trial testimony. First, in the audio-recorded statement, Young characterized defendant as ―psychotic‖ and ―berserk.‖ She explained that, although defendant normally refrained from using drugs or alcohol, she believed he had been drinking or using drugs in the period leading up to the killings. She also suggested defendant had ―connections‖ with ―bad guys‖ in the criminal ―underworld.‖ Second, Young offered additional details concerning the incident in which defendant broke into Connie‘s condominium and forced her to sleep with him. Young, apparently repeating descriptions given to her by Connie, said defendant forced Connie to have sex with him but he could not achieve an erection and, instead, was ―enraged‖ and acted ―like he was having sex with her.‖ Third, Young further described one of the encounters she and Connie had with defendant when he followed them to a restaurant. According to Young, they briefly spoke with defendant, who claimed it was coincidental that he was there. After their conversation ended, defendant continued to stare at them as Young and Connie walked away. Young stated that defendant had cuts on his hands, as if he had recently ―broke into something.‖ 51 Fourth, Young described an incident in which she was at Connie‘s home preparing dinner. Young said she looked out Connie‘s window and was shocked to discover defendant outside staring inside the condominium through the window. At first, she thought he was holding a gun, but quickly realized that he was holding Connie‘s dark-colored cat in his arms. Immediately thereafter, Young‘s daughter arrived for dinner, and Connie let defendant inside where they talked for more than an hour. Fifth, Young offered additional details concerning Connie‘s decision to stay away from her home on the weekend before the killings. Young told Detective Purcell that Connie was annoyed when her friend, an astrologer, predicted that defendant would be ―in a rage‖ that weekend. Connie later spoke with Donnie Clapp, however, who warned her that it appeared to him that defendant was ―very angry,‖ and that Clapp had never seen him so angry, and Connie took seriously his advice to leave town. Connie decided to leave her home and asked Young to pick her up that evening. When defendant suddenly appeared outside Connie‘s home as Young arrived to take her away for the weekend, Young said defendant had the face of ―a crazy man.‖ That night, Connie slept at Young‘s house, and Young was so afraid that she barricaded the doors with chairs. Young‘s daughter saw the chairs and became upset. As a result, Young and Connie decided to stay at a hotel in Laguna Beach for the rest of the weekend. In the interview, Young stated that, after Donnie Clapp warned Connie that defendant had broken into the condominium through the skylight over the weekend, Connie inspected the skylight and noticed a crack. Sixth, Young claimed defendant had broken into the residence of one of Connie‘s neighbors, the Rasmussons, the weekend before the homicides, allegedly looking for a duplicate set of Connie‘s keys, and he stole a watch. She also described Rasmusson‘s discovery that Connie‘s door lock was nearly sawed off. 52 Seventh, with respect to the morning defendant appeared at a breakfast on the day before the killings, Young stated that, just after defendant spoke with Connie, defendant complained to Young that Connie seemed ―real brave‖ over the telephone and she appeared willing to ―get mean‖ with him during their phone conversations. Defendant admitted he ―couldn‘t stand it‖ and that her behavior ―just enrages‖ him. Eighth, Young described to police two other stalking incidents that she had not personally observed. She briefly described the incident involving George Hoefer, whom defendant stalked after Hoefer had dinner with Connie. Young also offered her own description of the incident in which defendant broke into the condominium while David Navarro was home sick from school. Ninth, during the interview, Young wondered why defendant decided to kill Connie on that particular night, given all the prior opportunities he had had to do so. She speculated that the homicides were not ―premeditated‖ and that defendant might have followed Connie and Sue that night and might have seen something that enraged him enough to kill both of them. Finally, throughout the audio-recorded interview, Young repeatedly expressed her fear of defendant, wondering whether defendant would try to target her next, and asked Detective Purcell whether she should be talking to the police and whether she should be given protection. She also expressed her hope that defendant had killed himself. 3. Forfeiture Defendant has forfeited virtually all of his claims regarding the admissibility of the audiotape of Young‘s entire police interview. First, except to the extent his claims rely on the same facts and legal standards the trial court itself was asked to apply, defendant has forfeited his contentions of federal 53 constitutional error by failing to assert them before the trial court. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 809 [confrontation clause claim forfeited by failing to raise it below].) Below, defendant expressed his objections purely on state law grounds, specifically under the Evidence Code, and made no mention of any confrontation clause or due 21 process violations. Second, in initially objecting to the playing of the entire audiotape, defendant failed to ―fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.‖ (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.) Only after the court had made its ruling and permitted the playing of the tape in its entirety did defense counsel raise the specific objection that portions of the audiotape contained speculation. Furthermore, defense counsel made no argument in the trial court, as he does now, 21 Although forfeited, we also reject defendant‘s confrontation clause and due process claims on their merits. Because Young was subject to cross-examination at trial, the admission of her audio-recorded statements did not violate defendant‘s right of confrontation. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59, fn. 9 [―we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements‖].) As to Detective Purcell‘s statements, although he did not appear as a witness at trial and was not subject to defense cross-examination, the trial court clearly instructed the jury not to consider his statements, but instead to consider only those of Young. Crawford makes clear that the confrontation clause ―does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.‖ (Ibid.) Here, Detective Purcell‘s statements were admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of giving context to Young‘s answers. Defendant‘s confrontation and due process claims, therefore, fail on the merits. 54 that the audiotape contained prejudicial evidence of Young‘s fear of defendant, her belief in defendant‘s guilt, or Detective Purcell‘s belief as to defendant‘s guilt. The trial court certainly had no prior knowledge of what was on the audiotape, and it, therefore, depended on the parties to alert it to any irrelevant or prejudicial material. ―A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct.‖ (Ibid.) The sole claim defendant has preserved for review on appeal is the claim that the admission of the entire audiotape did not comport with Evidence Code, section 1236, the hearsay exception for prior consistent statements. We will examine this claim on the merits. 4. The admissibility of the entire audio-recorded interview To be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, a prior consistent statement must be offered (1) after an inconsistent statement is admitted to attack the testifying witness‘s credibility, where the consistent statement was made before the inconsistent statement; or (2) when there is an express or implied charge that the witness‘s testimony recently was fabricated or influenced by bias or improper motive, and the statement was made prior to the fabrication, bias, or improper motive. (Evid. Code, §§ 791, 1236.) We are presented with the latter situation — an express or implied charge that Young‘s testimony recently had been fabricated or influenced by bias or improper motive — governed by subdivision (b) of Evidence Code section 791. In the cross-examination of Young, defense counsel suggested that Young, in her police interview, had failed to mention important facts and was thus fabricating her testimony. ―[R]ecent fabrication may be inferred when it is shown that a witness did not speak about an important matter at a time when it would have been natural for him to do so,‖ and in such a circumstance, ―it is generally 55 proper to permit rehabilitation by a prior consistent statement.‖ (People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 143; see also People v. Williams (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 995, 1011-1012; People v. Gentry (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 462, 473.) Specifically, defense counsel claimed, in cross-examining Young, that she had never told police that Connie reported hearing a loud bang from her patio the night before her death or that defendant left a message on Young‘s answering machine in a breathless voice. Defense counsel also claimed that Young had never told police that defendant threatened Connie that he could hurt her if he wanted to. Instead, defense counsel claimed Young had told police defendant said he did not want to hurt Connie. These claims by defense counsel were refuted by Young‘s prior consistent statements in her audio-recorded interview with Detective Purcell. Although portions of Young‘s audio-recorded statements to the detective were properly admitted to refute defendant‘s characterization of her testimony, this circumstance does not necessarily establish that the entire recording was admissible. To justify admission of the rest of recording, the Attorney General invokes the rule of completeness, which would allow admission of the entire 22 recording if necessary to the understanding of the otherwise admissible portions. (Evid. Code, § 356.) But it does not appear that the portions of the audio recording relevant to rehabilitate Young created a misleading impression requiring the playing of the entire recording to correct any such misimpression, and the 22 Evidence Code section 356 provides: ―Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence.‖ 56 prosecutor made no such argument below. (People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 130 [―The purpose of Evidence Code section 356 is to avoid creating a misleading impression‖].) Certainly, Young‘s long narratives to Detective Purcell, which merely duplicated much of her trial testimony about the history of defendant‘s relationship with Connie, had little relation to either the specific language with which defendant threatened Connie on March 2, 1983, or whether Connie had been awakened by a loud bang the night before her death. Accordingly, the trial court erred in admitting those portions of the audio-recorded interview that did more than rehabilitate Young‘s testimony. 5. Admission of the entire audio-recording was harmless error We conclude that any error under the Evidence Code in admitting the entire audio-recorded statement (and not only those statements that refuted defense counsel‘s characterization of Young‘s testimony) was harmless. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [state law error measured under reasonable probability standard].) Any prejudice from Young‘s beliefs about defendant‘s criminal associations, her fear of defendant, and her speculation that the killings were not premeditated, was substantially mitigated by other admissible evidence. As we explain, other evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom established a basis for Young‘s beliefs. There was considerable evidence of defendant‘s criminal association with partner-in-crime Samuel Sabatino, his suspected involvement in numerous burglaries, and defendant‘s repeated acts of breaking into Connie‘s residence. In addition, defendant himself bragged that no locks could keep him out. Thus, Young‘s beliefs about defendant‘s criminal associations and his burglary skills were amply confirmed by other admissible evidence. 57 Young‘s fear of defendant and concern for her own safety was a reasonable inference based on the evidence that Young had been present numerous times where defendant stalked Connie. Young also had personally observed Connie‘s fear of defendant in the weeks leading to her death. Under these circumstances, even without Young‘s audio-recorded statements, it was reasonable and, perhaps, inescapable to infer that Young feared defendant and would have become more afraid upon learning of her close friend‘s death. Young‘s speculative statements about why defendant killed the victims on the night he did and her skepticism about whether the killings were premeditated, could not have prejudiced defendant. In fact, her speculation assisted defendant by suggesting a lesser culpability, induced by a heat of passion. With respect to defendant‘s claim that he was prejudiced by Detective Purcell‘s similar speculation during the audio-recorded interview, we note the detective made few pronouncements during his questioning of Young. He discussed his opinion of defendant only as he tried to assure Young that she would no longer be in danger if she cooperated with the police. In particular, Detective Purcell assured Young that the police were ―going to get him,‖ and that she would probably be in less danger if defendant knew she had already talked to police, because ―then what‘s he got to gain by silencing you?‖ The closest the detective came to expressing his belief in defendant‘s guilt was when he reacted to Young‘s hope that defendant had killed himself. Detective Purcell responded, ―I suppose officially I shouldn‘t hope that. But that would certainly end a lot of misery.‖ More importantly, the effect of any of the speculation voiced by Young and Detective Purcell during the audio-recorded interview was quelled by the trial court‘s admonition to ignore this ―pure speculation‖ and focus only on what Young ―told the police officer.‖ We assume the jury complied with this instruction. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 240.) 58 Overall, although Young‘s audio-recorded statements to Detective Purcell recounted not only additional details concerning defendant‘s stalking but also included incidents she had not described during her testimony, her statements, viewed in context of the entire guilt phase, added nothing that was prejudicial to defendant. Young‘s descriptions of the George Hoefer incident and the incident in which defendant broke in while David Navarro was home from school did not stray significantly from the direct testimony of both Hoefer and Navarro in describing these incidents. In fact, her descriptions of these incidents were comparatively vague compared to the witnesses‘ actual testimony of the incidents. Young‘s belief that defendant had broken into the home of Connie‘s neighbor — and her description of the incident in which defendant appeared at Connie‘s window holding her cat — were cumulative to all of the other incidents of stalking personally witnessed and testified to by the prosecution‘s witnesses, including Young. Similarly, the additional details that Young provided to Detective Purcell concerning the night defendant broke into Connie‘s home and slept with her, and Connie‘s actions on the Friday before her death, added additional credence as to Connie‘s fear of defendant. These details, however, were cumulative to the enormity of evidence showing that Connie was increasingly afraid of defendant in the week before she was killed. B. Limitations on Defendant’s Impeachment of James Navarro Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by preventing the defense from impeaching James (Mike) Navarro concerning alleged alterations to a taped conversation in which Connie 59 23 sought advice in obtaining a restraining order. We conclude the court properly exercised its discretion in limiting impeachment under Evidence Code section 24 352. 1. Background concerning the answering machine audiotape Mike Navarro testified that he had remained good friends with Connie, despite their divorce, and she had confided in him about her problems with defendant. Connie and David stayed at Mike‘s residence in the days before the killings. During that time, Connie told him that she was terrified of defendant and was considering seeking a restraining order against him. He referred her to an attorney to help her obtain a restraining order. Mike said that he believed Connie did consult with the attorney he recommended. Mike was the person who discovered Connie‘s and Sue‘s bodies at Connie‘s condominium. Mike testified that, just a few weeks prior to testifying at trial, he discovered his answering machine had recorded a telephone conversation between Connie and an unidentified female about obtaining a restraining order. Mike explained that, at the time Connie stayed at his residence, he had an answering machine that would answer on the first ring, and if someone answered the call in another room, the machine could have recorded an incoming call, unbeknownst to the parties. Mike stated that he had removed the tape from his answering machine 23 Defendant asserts he was prevented from cross-examining Navarro on this issue, but, as will be explained, the claim is better framed as alleged interference with a defense attempt to impeach Navarro. 24 Evidence Code section 352 states: ―The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‖ 60 soon after the killings because he knew it would have Connie‘s voice on it, but he did not play the entire tape at that time because it would have been painful for him to hear her voice. He explained that in preparing for his testimony, he decided to listen to the entire tape and discovered the conversation about the restraining order. He then notified the prosecutor of his discovery. On the tape played to the jury, which Mike identified as being taken from his answering machine, Connie is heard talking to an unidentified female. Connie does not specifically mention defendant‘s name. Connie complains of harassment and tells the other party that ―he had threatened all kinds of things‖ but had not threatened ―to kill me or hurt me.‖ The unidentified female advises Connie to obtain a restraining order because then the harassment would be actionable by police and ―our office‖ could ―file a complaint and have him cited into court . . . on charges.‖ Connie explains that she is supposed to meet with an attorney that morning and asks whether it would be cheaper if she sought help through a women‘s legal clinic. The unidentified female says that she can give Connie the telephone number of the Los Angeles County Bar Association for a referral, but after the unidentified female places Connie on hold, one of the parties terminates the call and the recording ends. Defense counsel impeached Mike with a 1975 court document produced during his divorce from Connie. The document showed that Connie had obtained a restraining order against Mike because he had threatened her. Mike did not recall the part of the order that prohibited him ―from annoying, harassing or molesting‖ Connie. More than a week after the court played the answering machine tape for the jury, defense counsel informed the trial court that they had learned the tape Mike had provided was a brand and type of cassette tape that was not manufactured until 1992 — some nine years after the alleged date of the recording. Defense counsel 61 also claimed that the rest of the tape sounded to him more like a wire tap than an answering machine tape. The trial court postponed the trial for one day to allow the defense time for an expert to examine the tape. On the next court date, defense counsel reported that his expert further concluded both that the tape was recorded in stereo and, therefore, inconsistent with being an answering machine tape from 1983, and that the tape had possibly been edited. Defense counsel stated his expert had concluded the tape was a copy and the expert was going to testify the following day to explain the anomalies. The following day, the prosecutor announced that the dispute regarding the tape was a ―nonissue‖ because he had learned from Mike that Mike had copied the conversation from the original tape to the tape used in court. The prosecutor also stated that the reason it appeared that Connie‘s conversation had been edited was that subsequent messages had been recorded over the conversation. The prosecutor further explained that the conversation could not have concerned Connie‘s 1975 restraining order against Mike because the other conversations and messages on the tape dated from the time around the homicides. The prosecutor warned that if the defense sought to dispute the authenticity of the original 1983 tape, he would be compelled to call numerous witnesses to establish the timeframe for the recording, and that some of this additional evidence might be harmful to defendant. The prosecutor gave the defense the original 1983 tape for inspection by the defense expert. The court thereafter permitted defense counsel to question Mike about the tape outside of the jury‘s presence. During questioning, Mike stated that he never testified that the tape played for the jury was the original. He explained that he had decided to make a copy of the tape because the original tape contained many personal messages for himself and his son, including a conversation between his son and his son‘s maternal grandmother expressing concern over Connie‘s safety, 62 and an earlier conversation about his son becoming intoxicated over New Year‘s Eve in 1982. Later that same day, after the defense expert had conducted a preliminary analysis of the original tape, the defense sought a stipulation regarding the manufacture date of the tape that was played to the jury, and also sought to crossexamine Mike about the inconsistency. Defense counsel argued that evidence of the tape‘s manufacture date was relevant to impeach Mike. Counsel conceded that Mike never used the word ―original‖ when describing the tape to the jury, but asserted that Mike had lied because he had identified the tape as being from his answering machine. In response, the prosecutor renewed his objection on Evidence Code section 352 grounds. The trial court agreed, observing that there was no evidence the recording was not of Connie or was not accurate. The court noted that the recorded conversation was a ―very small part‖ of the prosecution‘s case, and concluded that the proposed impeachment was not material. The court also observed that, in light of the other firsthand accounts of defendant stalking and harassing Connie, the credibility of Mike would not be a significant issue for the jury. Subsequently, defense counsel stated that their expert had examined the original tape for a few hours, but the expert needed more time for a meaningful analysis. The prosecutor offered that, if the defense expert found any relevant anomalies, he could have the FBI conduct an examination in approximately two days, but he added that any further delay did not seem to be time or cost effective. Thereafter, defense counsel made no specific request for a continuance, and the parties began their guilt phase closing arguments the following morning. The defense ultimately put forth no evidence challenging the authenticity of the original tape. 63 2. Under Evidence Code section 352 the court properly denied defense counsel’s impeachment of Mike Navarro with the manufacture date of the tape played to the jury ―A trial court has broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to ‗exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‘ This discretion allows the trial court broad power to control the presentation of proposed impeachment evidence ‗ ― ‗to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.‘ [Citation.]‖ ‘ ‖ (Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 195, quoting People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 374-375.) On appeal, we evaluate rulings under Evidence Code section 352 using the abuse of discretion standard. (Mills, supra, at p. 195.) The circumstances here clearly demonstrate that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court reasonably concluded that Mike‘s use of a copy, without any evidence suggesting that the original recording of Connie‘s conversation was not authentic or different from the copy, was of no relevance. Even if the defense had been permitted to impeach Mike regarding the tape, Mike presumably would have offered the same explanation he provided to the defense when he testified outside the jury‘s presence. Based on our review of the original tape, Mike‘s explanation was credible and understandable. 25 On the original tape, following the recording of Connie‘s call about the restraining order, there is a recording of her son David speaking to his 25 The original tape was marked as People‘s exhibit No. 113, but it was ultimately not played for the jury or used during deliberations. 64 grandmother in which she expresses concern about Connie and her safety in relation to defendant. On the other side of the tape is a series of recordings that appear to have been made on New Year‘s Eve 1982. It contains several messages from Connie expressing her worry about being unable to locate David. These messages are followed by a seven-minute conversation between David and Connie, in which Mike occasionally comes on the line. During the call, David jovially admits he is drunk and rambles for much of the conversation while Connie lovingly humors him. Thus, any impeachment of Mike regarding his actions with respect to the tape would not have suggested to the jury, as defendant argues, that Mike was a third party suspect who was attempting to frame defendant. Instead, his actions simply reflect that he was sensitive to his son‘s privacy in light of his mother‘s death. The tape‘s sentimental value is evident, and any impeachment based on the tape would have generated only greater sympathy for Mike and his son before the jury. Finally, in the absence of any error under Evidence Code section 352, we also reject defendant‘s various constitutional claims. The routine and proper application of state evidentiary law does not impinge on a defendant‘s due process rights. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1010.) Additionally, ―reliance on Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence of marginal impeachment value . . . generally does not contravene a defendant‘s constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination.‖ (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545.) ―Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.‖ (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20.) As the trial court correctly noted, the proffered impeachment was of marginal value. 65 Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by denying him a continuance to explore further the authenticity of the original tape. We discern in the record no defense request for a continuance to allow further evaluation of the original 1983 tape, and hence defendant has forfeited this claim. In any event, ―[i]n the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant, a denial of a motion for a continuance does not require reversal of a conviction.‖ (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1126.) The trial court did not prohibit defense counsel from further testing of the original 1983 tape, and, more importantly, the record does not disclose how any further testing of the original tape would have been favorable to defendant. C. The Admission of Connie’s Statements Concerning Her Fear of Defendant 26 Defendant asserts the trial court violated Evidence Code section 1250 and his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by admitting Connie‘s statements about her fear of defendant. He also asserts the court‘s failure to exclude these statements under Evidence Code section 352 violated not only state law but also his federal right to due process. He further claims the erroneous admission of these statements was prejudicial and could not have been cured by any limiting instruction, which, in any event, the court failed to give. As we 26 Evidence Code section 1250 permits admission of ―evidence of a statement of the declarant‘s then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) . . . when: [¶] (1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant‘s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a).) The section does not, however, permit admission of ―a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (b).) 66 explain below, most of Connie‘s statements, and her conduct in conformity with those statements, were relevant to proving defendant‘s motive and were admissible, and any error in admitting all her statements was harmless. In conducting this analysis, it is important to distinguish among concepts of relevancy, hearsay, nonhearsay, trustworthiness, and prejudice, all of which require distinct consideration in determining whether Connie‘s statements were admissible. 1. The trial court ruling admitting Connie’s fear of defendant and evidence of his stalking her In order to examine the relevance of Connie‘s fear of defendant, we describe the circumstances leading to the trial court‘s rulings admitting evidence of Connie‘s fear of defendant and evidence that defendant had stalked her prior to the killings. Before trial, the defense moved to exclude any evidence offered to establish Connie‘s fear of defendant, asserting that such evidence was inadmissible hearsay, irrelevant, and prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. The prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing that the evidence was admissible as nonhearsay, and that no hearsay exception was required to admit evidence of Connie‘s state of mind and her behavior in conformity with her fear. The prosecutor also argued that Connie‘s fear of defendant was relevant to show that she would not have admitted defendant into her home on the night of the killings. The defense countered that Connie‘s state of mind was not in question, and the issue of whether defendant was welcome in her home was uncontested, because the defense contended defendant was elsewhere at the time of the homicides. The parties also filed motions regarding evidence of defendant‘s stalking, and the prosecution‘s motion contained references to Connie‘s state of mind and her statements expressing her fear, many of which the prosecutor ultimately 67 introduced at trial. The prosecutor‘s written motion seeking to admit evidence of defendant‘s stalking contained four exhibits: (1) a police interview statement, in which David Navarro described the incident when defendant broke into the condominium and handcuffed him; (2) police notes of an interview of George Hoefer, in which Hoefer described defendant‘s threats after Hoefer had dinner with Connie; (3) Detective Purcell‘s interview notes for the audio-recorded interview of Marilyn Young, described ante, part III.A.; and (4) police interview notes of a statement given by Craig Spencer, in which he broadly described Connie‘s problems with defendant and described seeing defendant feign shooting a gun at Connie with his forefinger. At the hearing on the motion to admit evidence of defendant‘s stalking, defense counsel objected to the stalking evidence, arguing that its ―blanket introduction‖ would present the danger of introducing ―third-, fourth-hand type hearsay.‖ The prosecutor responded by identifying ―the four specific instances‖ of stalking that he had attached as exhibits to his motion. The prosecutor, furthermore, assured the trial court that the state‘s witnesses would testify only as ―specifically to percipience and will have nothing whatsoever to do with hearsay,‖ and that he intended to put forth only witnesses who ―were present that physically saw things.‖ The court ruled that the stalking incidents witnessed by Connie‘s son David, Craig Spencer, George Hoefer, and Marilyn Young were admissible but if ―their testimony is different, then I would anticipate there would be an objection by counsel for defendant and I would rule on that objection.‖ Although Connie‘s son David, Craig Spencer, and George Hoefer had each described discrete incidents of stalking, Marilyn Young‘s statements to Detective Purcell did not, and neither the parties nor the court identified which incidents described by Young were admissible. 68 Immediately thereafter, the parties argued the motion regarding the admissibility of Connie‘s statements. Defense counsel again asserted that it appeared the prosecutor sought to admit hearsay evidence merely to bolster his theory of the case, and argued that the defense was not placing at issue Connie‘s fear of defendant on the night of the killings, but was instead relying on an alibi theory. The prosecutor replied that, despite defendant‘s alibi defense, the prosecution was required to prove that Connie would not have let defendant into her home. He advised the court, however, that some of Connie‘s statements might be ―so prejudicial to the defense that under [Evidence Code section] 352 you‘re going to keep them out.‖ The prosecutor went as far to ―concede‖ that ―a 352 objection would be appropriate‖ and that ―352 should keep out‖ Connie‘s statements relating to her alleged kidnapping at gunpoint and the incident when defendant allegedly disabled her vehicle in a parking garage. The prosecutor clarified he sought to admit only ―innocuous‖ statements in which Connie said she was afraid of defendant, as well as her statements concerning her fear of staying at home, her decision to change her locks, her attempts to stay away from her condominium, her inquiry about obtaining a restraining order, and the letter she had addressed to defendant. The prosecutor clarified that he believed such evidence was admissible, and again conceded that if ―we go too far overboard that it is too prejudicial.‖ The court ruled that the ―specific acts‖ identified by the prosecutor identified were admissible to show Connie‘s fearful state of mind and her actions in conformity with that fear, and that ―we‘re staying away from these fact situations . . . that don‘t relate to whether or not your client was in the apartment or not at this time.‖ The court also concluded that the probative value of ―those specific instances‖ outweighed any prejudicial effect they might have. 69 2. Evidence of Connie’s fear of defendant During trial, Marilyn Young testified that Connie told her that she wanted to end her relationship with defendant, and that defendant was no longer welcome in her condominium. Young reported that someone had told Connie that defendant had broken into her condominium through the patio, and that Connie became ―petrified‖ when her neighbor, Carl Rasmusson, had discovered that someone had tampered with the lock on her patio door. According to Young, Connie told her she changed her locks and installed a rudimentary alarm system because she was frightened that defendant would hurt her. She also related Connie‘s descriptions of the incident in early 1983 in which defendant broke into Connie‘s condominium and forced her to sleep with him, and the incident when Connie‘s car failed to start and defendant suddenly appeared in the parking garage claiming he had tampered with the wires. Young also recounted Connie‘s description of the ―kidnapping‖ weekend in which defendant took her away her at gunpoint and stayed with her in a hotel room. She testified that Connie was ―very upset‖ by the incident in which defendant broke into the condominium while David was home and threatened to kill himself, and recalled that Connie discussed obtaining a restraining order against defendant. Young explained that she and Connie went out of town the weekend before the homicides because one of Connie‘s friends had warned her that defendant ―was in a rage‖ and that she should leave. She testified that when they returned home from that weekend, Connie discovered that the condominium‘s alarm system had been disabled, and she subsequently learned from a friend that defendant may have broken in through a skylight, and was hiding in a closet at the condominium while Connie and David were there to retrieve clothes. Young described keeping Connie company as much as possible because of Connie‘s fears concerning defendant. 70 Carl Rasmusson testified that Connie had confided to him and his wife about problems she had been having with defendant. Rasmusson stated that Connie asked the couple to keep an eye on her condominium because she was frightened and believed she was being followed. He described Connie as ―very upset and distraught‖ and ―very afraid for her life.‖ His wife, Janet Rasmusson, testified similarly. Mike Navarro testified that Connie was ―terrified‖ of defendant and was considering obtaining a restraining order. Mike also related Connie‘s description of the ―kidnapping‖ incident, and her disclosure that defendant had forced her to call Mike that weekend to tell him that she was all right, even though, as she later explained to him, she was not. Mike explained that, just before her death, Connie told him she had decided to return to her condominium because defendant had assured her that he would leave her alone. Stephanie Brizendine described a letter, apparently written by Connie, that defendant showed to Brizendine on the night of the killings. According to Brizendine, the letter revealed that Connie was ―absolutely living in fear‖ because defendant had been breaking into her residence and refused to leave her alone. Finally, in addition to the audiotape of Connie‘s phone call concerning a restraining order and her day planner showing she had changed her locks on January 31, 1983, the court admitted the draft of Connie‘s letter, dated February 18, in which she vividly expressed to defendant how his conduct was frightening her. 71 During the above described testimony, defendant did not renew any specific objections under Evidence Code section 352.27 3. Connie’s state of mind was relevant to prove defendant’s motive In determining the admissibility of Connie‘s statements, we first examine the threshold requirement of relevance. (Evid. Code, § 210.) ―A hearsay objection to an out-of-court statement may not be overruled simply by identifying a nonhearsay purpose for admitting the statement. The trial court must also find that the nonhearsay purpose is relevant to an issue in dispute.‖ (People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 585.) Similarly, Evidence Code section 1250, which authorizes the admission of out-of-court statements to prove the declarant‘s state of mind, permits the admission of such evidence only if the declarant‘s state of mind ―is itself an issue in the action‖ or if the evidence ―is 27 Given the in limine proceedings, it is questionable whether defendant preserved many of his claims on appeal. ―Generally when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal.‖ (People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 975, fn. 3.) In light of the prosecutor‘s assurances that he did not intend to introduce hearsay evidence of stalking and because some of the now challenged statements solicited by the prosecutor clearly exceeded the scope of the trial court‘s in limine rulings, it is debatable whether the defense‘s in limine objections dispensed with the need for defendant to renew his objections when many of Connie‘s statements actually were introduced during the course of the trial. (Ibid. [―The reason for this rule is that until the evidence is actually offered, and the court is aware of its relevance in context, its probative value, and its potential for prejudice, matters related to the state of the evidence at the time an objection is made, the court cannot intelligently rule on admissibility‖]; see also People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 547; Evid. Code, § 353.) The Attorney General, however, does not argue forfeiture, and given the sheer number of statements admitted ―from the grave‖ in this matter, we will examine the merits of defendant‘s arguments regarding all of the complained-of statements. 72 offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) ―[R]elevant evidence is evidence ‗having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.‘ ‖ (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 821 (Jablonski), quoting Evid. Code, § 210.) Evidence that ―tends ‗logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference‘ to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive‖ is generally admissible. (People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177.) Although motive is normally not an element of any crime that the prosecutor must prove, ―evidence of motive makes the crime understandable and renders the inferences regarding defendant‘s intent more reasonable.‖ (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 707.) ― ‗Evidence tending to establish prior quarrels between a defendant and decedent and the making of threats by the former is properly admitted . . . to show the motive and state of mind of the defendant.‘ ‖ (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 668, quoting People v. Cartier (1960) 54 Cal.2d 300, 311.) We review a trial court‘s relevance determination under the abuse of discretion standard. (Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 821.) At the time of the in limine ruling, the trial court ostensibly admitted Connie‘s statements of fear, and her conduct in conformity with that fear, to prove her lack of consent to defendant‘s entry into her condominium on the night of her death. The trial court, however, did not instruct the jury as such, nor would Connie‘s lack of consent appear essential to prove any of defendant‘s charged crimes. (People v. Deptula (1962) 58 Cal.2d 225, 228 [―the settled interpretation of the statute is that one who enters a room or building with intent to commit larceny is guilty of burglary even though express or implied permission to enter has been given to him personally or as a member of the public‖]; see also People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 953, 954 [defendant who enters house with 73 requisite intent is guilty of burglary, even if the victim consents to entry]; People v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 382 [―one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent, provided he does not have an unconditional possessory right to enter‖].) The trial court‘s instructions, however, indicated that Connie‘s statements of fear, and her conduct in conformity with that fear, could be considered for the limited purpose of proving defendant‘s motive for the crimes. The court specifically ruled, and instructed the jury, that evidence of defendant‘s uncharged ―other crimes‖ was relevant for the limited purpose of showing defendant‘s motive and to show that defendant ―had knowledge or possessed the means‖ necessary for the charged crimes. It also instructed the jury that ―[p]resence of motive may tend to establish guilt.‖ At issue here, therefore, is whether Connie‘s out-of-court statements of fear and her conduct stemming from that fear were relevant and admissible to prove defendant‘s motive to kill her. Our cases repeatedly have held that under Evidence Code section 1250, a victim‘s out-of-court statements expressing fear of a defendant are relevant only 28 when the victim‘s conduct in conformity with that fear is in dispute. (Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 819-820; People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 872; People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 608 (Ruiz); People v. Armendariz, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 585-586; People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 526-527; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 23, fn. 9; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 28 Closely related is Evidence Code section 1251, which permits the admission of a declarant‘s statement describing his or her prior ―state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation‖ if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, and ―the evidence is not offered to prove any fact other than such state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1251.) 74 522, 529-530.) We have upheld the admission of such evidence under Evidence Code section 1250 when the victim‘s fearful state of mind rebutted the defendant‘s claims that the victim‘s death was accidental (People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 778-780), or provoked (People v. Spencer (1969) 71 Cal.2d 933, 945-946), or that the victim voluntarily disappeared (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 840), or when the victim‘s state of mind is relevant to an element of an offense (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 629). In Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th 774, for example, the defendant‘s estranged wife and her mother were assaulted and killed inside their home. Both had made statements to third parties describing their fear of the defendant. We noted that, unlike the wife‘s statements, the mother‘s stated fear of the defendant had been communicated to him and that this circumstance rendered the evidence relevant to whether the defendant premeditated the murders. (Id. at p. 820.) Although we held that the mother‘s statement was not admissible to prove that she was actually fearful under Evidence Code section 1250, we held that this evidence was relevant for the nonhearsay purpose of its effect on defendant. We explained that the mother‘s stated fear of the defendant was relevant to show its effect on him because such evidence ―had some bearing on his mental state in going to visit the women‖ and as to how the defendant ―planned to approach the victims (by stealth as opposed to open confrontation) both of which, in turn, were relevant to premeditation.‖ (Jablonski, supra, at p. 821.) Two cases, however, suggest a possible conflict as to whether a decedent‘s out-of-court statements expressing fear of a defendant are relevant under Evidence Code section 1250 to prove the defendant‘s motive in the crimes against the victim. In Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 589, we rejected the contention that the victims‘ fear of defendant was admissible to prove that the relationships between the 75 defendant and the victims were troubled, thereby supplying defendant with a motive to kill them. ―[A] victim‘s prior statements of fear are not admissible to prove the defendant’s conduct or motive (state of mind). If the rule were otherwise, such statements of prior fear or friction could be routinely admitted to show that the defendant had a motive to injure or kill.‖ (Id. at p. 609; see also People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 622.) But a Court of Appeal decision, upon which the Attorney General relies, held that the victim‘s state of mind and conduct were relevant to prove the defendant‘s motive in a wrongful death civil action because ―[t]he proffered evidence explained how Nicole was feeling about Simpson, tended to explain her conduct in rebuffing Simpson, and this in turn logically tended to show Simpson‘s motive to murder her.‖ (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 594 (Simpson).) Without this evidence, ―the jurors might believe there was nothing in the relationship between Simpson and Nicole which would precipitate a murder.‖ (Id. at p. 595.) Neither Ruiz nor Simpson cites any authority for its holding concerning the relevance of a decedent victim‘s fear to prove a defendant‘s motive. Moreover, nothing in Evidence Code section 1250 expressly prohibits or allows the admission of such evidence to prove motive. The Assembly Committee on the Judiciary‘s comment to the statute, however, observes that a decedent‘s statements describing ―threats or brutal conduct by some other person‖ cannot be used to ―prove the truth of the matter stated‖ or ―as a basis for inferring that the alleged 29 threatener must have made threats.‖ (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted 29 The Assembly Committee on the Judiciary also noted that the Legislature passed Evidence Code section 1250, in part, to repudiate the holding of People v. Footnote continued on next page 76 at 29B pt. 4 West‘s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1250, p. 282 (West‘s Ann. Evid. Code).) The different conclusions reached by Ruiz and Simpson are generally compatible if one additional foundational circumstance is considered in the analysis — whether the defendant was aware of and reacted to the decedent victim‘s fearful state of mind and the victim‘s actions in conformity with that fear. This circumstance is crucial in determining a relevant connection between a defendant‘s motive and the victim‘s state of mind. In Ruiz, the three victims made statements to third parties that they disliked the defendant, and were ―frightened‖ and ― ‗scared to death‘ ‖ of him. One victim reported that the defendant had assaulted him. (Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 600, 602.) Another victim told third parties that she intended to move out of the defendant‘s household and warned, ― ‗If you don‘t see me or hear from me in two weeks, I won‘t — I will be dead‘ ‖ and that if she or her son ― ‗show up missing, raise hell with the police.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 602.) Unlike Jablonski, our decision in Ruiz contained no suggestion that the defendant was aware of these statements or that similar statements had been communicated to him. There also was no indication whether the defendant was aware of actions the victims had taken in conformity with their fears. In such circumstances, the victims‘ fear of the defendant, Footnote continued from previous page Merkouris (1959) 52 Cal.2d 672, which held that the decedent victims‘ statements describing the defendant‘s threats were admissible to show not only their fear of him but also to show that the defendant had in fact threatened them. ―The exception created by Merkouris is not based on any probability of reliability; it is based on a rationale that destroys the very foundation of the hearsay rule.‖ (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1250, p. 281.) 77 standing alone, was not relevant to prove anything about his conduct or state of mind. In contrast, in Simpson, the Court of Appeal described a wealth of evidence establishing that the defendant was aware of the victim‘s fear, which explained her rejection of him, and was motivated by that rejection. The evidence established, among other facts, that the defendant had physically assaulted the victim in the past, the victim had divorced the defendant and moved out of their home, the defendant later had forced an entry into her residence and she called the police to have him removed, they had argued, and on the day of the crimes defendant appeared angry because the victim had refused to invite him to a family function. (Simpson, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 582-583, 587-590.) The victim‘s fear of the defendant, therefore, was relevant because it explained her repeated rejection of him and her conduct in refusing to reconcile with him, which in turn generated his anger and motive to kill her. (Id. at pp. 593-594.) Upon examining the differences concerning each defendant‘s knowledge in Ruiz and in Simpson, the basis for the opposing relevancy determinations in the two cases becomes clear. The victims‘ state of mind in Ruiz was not relevant to the defendant‘s motive without foundational evidence that the defendant was actually aware of their fear, and any conduct in conformity with that fear, and was motivated by it. But the victim‘s state of mind in Simpson was relevant to the defendant‘s motive in that case because there was ample foundational evidence, independent of the victim‘s statements, that the defendant was aware of the victim‘s fear, which explained her conduct in conformity with that fear, and he reacted to her conduct by becoming enraged due to the victim‘s refusal to reconcile. Thus, Ruiz and Simpson differ because in the latter case the victim‘s fear led to a rejection of the defendant that motivated him to kill. The victim‘s fear 78 may explain the victim‘s conduct, but standing alone it does not necessarily provide a defendant‘s motive to kill. Generally, it is the rejection that provides a defendant‘s motive, not the victim‘s fear. Accordingly, the victim‘s fearful state of mind concerning the defendant explains in part why a victim may not wish to reconcile, and the defendant‘s knowledge of that rejection may have a deleterious effect on the relationship that can be relevant to a defendant‘s subsequent actions and motive, even though at trial the defendant does not directly dispute the victim‘s state of mind. (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1).) In the present case, as in Simpson, ample foundational evidence, independent of Connie‘s statements, suggested that defendant was well aware that Connie was fearful of him, no longer desired a relationship with him, and took actions in conformity with her fear. In addition to the eyewitness testimony describing defendant‘s numerous acts of stalking Connie, all of which would unquestionably cause her to become fearful, defendant admitted he was despondent over the end of the relationship, acknowledged he had disabled her newly installed home alarm, claimed he had stolen a letter describing Connie‘s fears, and admitted to Connie that, despite her precautions, he could hurt her if he wanted to. Defendant also complained to Young that Connie seemed ―real brave‖ over the telephone and she appeared willing to ―get mean.‖ He admitted to Young that he ―couldn‘t stand it‖ and that her behavior ―just enrages‖ him. Moreover, as in Jablonski and Simpson, the evidence also revealed that defendant reacted to Connie‘s fear and rejection and was not only motivated by it, but also sought to manipulate it. As their relationship deteriorated, defendant tried to force Connie back into a relationship and also tried to ensure that she did not date anyone else. By mid-February 1983, however, Connie had made clear that their relationship was over. Defendant responded by escalating his pattern of stalking behavior that suggested he intended to ambush and kill her. This led 79 Connie to become increasingly fearful of him, eventually culminating in her decision to leave her home. When defendant lost track of her, he broke into her home and discovered a letter vividly describing her fear of him. Defendant then adjusted his strategy by assuring Connie in public that he would leave her alone, which caused her to become less fearful of him and move back into her home. Defendant exploited her reduced fear and her decision to return home by ambushing her there. Thus, defendant‘s uncharged ―other crimes‖ of stalking, and the fear it generated in Connie‘s mind, were uniquely relevant to his guilt in the charged murders. Defendant‘s knowledge and manipulation of Connie‘s fear of him illuminates his motive and, as in Jablonski, his actions reflected he used that 30 knowledge as a premeditated means to ambush and kill her. Therefore, Connie‘s statements describing her fear of defendant and her actions in conformity with that fear, given defendant‘s awareness of these circumstances and his responses to them, explained how a once peaceful relationship had deteriorated into a case of stalking leading to murder. Accordingly, we conclude that evidence of the decedent‘s state of mind, offered under Evidence Code section 1250, can be relevant to a defendant‘s motive — but only if there is independent, admissible evidence that the defendant was aware of the decedent‘s state of mind before the crime and may have been motivated by it. (See Commonwealth v. Qualls (Mass. 1997) 680 N.E.2d 61, 64 [―The state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule calls for admission of evidence 30 We also note that California‘s statutory definition of stalking specifically requires the People to prove that a defendant stalked his victim ―with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety‖ (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)) and that the defendant‘s harassment caused the victim to be ―seriously‖ alarmed, annoyed, tormented, or terrorized (id., subd. (e)). 80 of a murder victim‘s state of mind as proof of the defendant‘s motive to kill the victim when and only when there also is evidence that the defendant was aware of that state of mind at the time of the crime and would be likely to respond to it‖]; Commonwealth v. Sharpe (Mass. 2009) 908 N.E.2d 376, 382-383 [same]; see also State v. Calleia (N.J. 2011) 20 A.3d 402, 415 [―when a victim‘s state-of-mind hearsay statements are relevant to show the declarant‘s own conduct, and when such conduct is known or probably known to the defendant, it also can give rise to motive, and the statements become admissible for that purpose‖]; Jones v. State (Del. 2002) 798 A.2d 1013, 1016-1017 [same]; People v. Fisher (Mich. 1995) 537 N.W.2d 577, 582-583 [same]; People v. Gladney (Colo. 1977) 570 P.2d 231, 233 [same].) We caution, however, that those statements that go no further than to indicate the victim‘s fear of the defendant, even if known by a defendant, generally cannot be admissible unless they have some relevant effect on the defendant‘s behavior. (See Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 608; see also Qualls, supra, 680 N.E.2d at p. 65 [―A murder victim‘s statement that he feared the defendant, even if made known to the defendant, sheds no light on whether the defendant had a motive to kill him, and therefore is not admissible in the defendant‘s trial for murder‖].) In Simpson, the victim‘s statements of fear regarding the defendant were relevant only in that they tended to explain her rejection of the defendant, which, in turn, was relevant to his motivation in the killings. In Jablonski, the defendant‘s knowledge that one of his intended victims feared him was relevant to how the defendant predeliberated his ambush of the victims. In the present case, not only did the victim‘s statements of fear regarding defendant tend to explain her rejection of him and supply a motive for defendant to murder her, but they also were relevant to defendant‘s intent to stalk her and his plan to ambush her at home. 81 Accordingly, because independent evidence established that defendant was aware of Connie‘s state of mind and may have been motivated by it, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Connie‘s statements concerning her fear of defendant, and her actions in conformity therewith, satisfied the threshold for relevance. 4. Trustworthiness Defendant contends the evidence of Connie‘s statements was unreliable and lacked trustworthiness, and therefore was inadmissible under Evidence Code 31 section 1252. More particularly, he argues that Marilyn Young‘s descriptions of Connie‘s statements were unreliable because they were based on multiple hearsay, and that Mike Navarro‘s descriptions of Connie‘s statements were unreliable because he had a motive to blame defendant for the killings. Defendant did not raise this contention in the trial court, and therefore has forfeited this challenge. In any event, defendant misconceives the trustworthiness requirement. Statements that are otherwise admissible under Evidence Code section 1250 may be rendered inadmissible by the trustworthiness requirement of Evidence Code section 1252, but this requirement applies ―to the statement made by the hearsay declarant . . . not to the testimony of the witness who relates the hearsay statement to the trier of fact.‖ (People v. Spencer, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 946, italics omitted; see also People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608-609.) Accordingly, defendant‘s attacks on the reliability of Marilyn Young‘s and Mike Navarro‘s descriptions are inapt. 31 Evidence Code section 1252 states: ―Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this article if the statement was made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.‖ 82 In any event, to withstand scrutiny under Evidence Code section 1252, a declarant‘s statements ―must be made in a natural manner, and not under circumstances of suspicion, so that they carry the probability of trustworthiness. Such declarations are admissible only when they are ‗ ―made at a time when there was no motive to deceive.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 820, quoting People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 405.) In the present case, the vast majority of Connie‘s statements were made to her friends and family under circumstances that showed she was seeking their help, and she was not seeking to deceive anyone. None of her statements were made to law enforcement or other persons to whom there may have been an incentive to lie or exaggerate. Connie‘s draft letter, which described her fears, was addressed to defendant, and there was no indication she intended anyone except him to see it. The only possible exception was Connie‘s audio-recorded statement to an unidentified female about obtaining a restraining order, but because Connie did not identify defendant by name and explained that defendant had never actually threatened her with physical harm, this statement does not appear contrived. Finally, Connie‘s statements of fear were not unfounded and were corroborated by her conduct, directly observed by Marilyn Young, Mike and David Navarro, Craig Spencer, and George Hoefer. Under the circumstances, nothing raised a doubt regarding the trustworthiness of Connie‘s statements to others insofar as they related to her fear of defendant and her conduct in conformity with that fear. 5. Failure to give limiting instructions for nonhearsay evidence admitted to establish Connie’s state of mind We further conclude that, in the absence of any request by the defense, the trial court did not err by failing to give, on its own motion, an appropriate limiting instruction concerning some of Connie‘s statements that described or assessed 83 defendant‘s conduct. To understand the nature of the issue presented, we must carefully analyze Connie‘s statements. Connie‘s statements comprised two different categories with two different theories of admissibility — statements that were admissible as hearsay under Evidence Code section 1250, and statements that were nonhearsay. (See People v. Ortiz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 377, 389 [noting that ―[i]t is important to clearly distinguish these two theories‖].) In the hearsay category of statements were Connie‘s direct declarations of her state of mind — e.g., ―I am afraid of [defendant].‖ Although these statements were hearsay, they were admissible under the hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1250 to prove the truth of the matters asserted. Connie‘s statements that she was ―terrified‖ of defendant, and statements in her letter in which she described her fear of hearing the telephone ring and other noises in her home were hearsay evidence because they were offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted — that she feared defendant and had become fearful of noises inside her home. If the declarant‘s state of mind is directly relevant to a disputed matter in the case, such hearsay statements will generally pose little danger of undue prejudice. In the nonhearsay category of statements were Connie‘s indirect declarations of her state of mind, because they contained descriptions or assessments of defendant‘s conduct that engendered Connie‘s fear or altered her conduct — e.g., ―[Defendant] kidnapped me at gunpoint.‖ These statements were not hearsay to the extent they were admitted to prove circumstantially Connie‘s state of mind or conduct, and not to prove the truth of matters asserted regarding defendant‘s conduct. (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (b) [―This section does not make admissible evidence of a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed‖]; see People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 23, fn. 9.) 84 This nonhearsay category of statements presents an elevated danger of prejudice if the jury is unable to distinguish between the truth of the matters asserted and the inferences concerning the declarant‘s state of mind. (See People v. Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 389-390.) Prior to the enactment of the Evidence Code, we stated that a victim‘s statements of fear referring to a defendant‘s past conduct are so prejudicial that no limiting instruction could ever sufficiently cure the potential undue prejudice posed by such nonhearsay evidence. ―This is so because to try and separate state of mind from the truth of the charges is an almost impossible task.‖ (People v. Hamilton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 881, 894 (Hamilton).) We held that such statements could be admitted only if they describe ―threats as to future conduct on the part of the accused‖ and ―when they show primarily the then state of mind of the declarant and not the state of mind of the accused.‖ (Id. at p. 893.) The enactment, however, of Evidence Code sections 1250 and 1252 and the comments of the California Law Revision Commission and the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary concerning those sections specifically repudiate Hamilton‘s restrictions on the admission of evidence of a victim‘s fear of the accused. (See People v. Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 385-389.) As Evidence Code section 1252 was being enacted, the commission recognized the limitations previously established in Hamilton, but characterized them as ―confusing and contradictory,‖ and explained that Hamilton‘s ―additional limitations are unnecessary‖ because the new Evidence Code provisions ―make it clear that statements of a declarant‘s past state of mind may be used to prove only that state of mind and no other fact.‖ (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1252, p. 304.) The commission further noted that trial courts should utilize Evidence Code section 352 to address any dangers arising from the potential misuse of such evidence. (Cal. Law Revision 85 Com. com., supra, foll. § 1252, p. 304.) ―The Evidence Code does not freeze the courts to the arbitrary and contradictory standards mentioned in the Hamilton case for determining when prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.‖ (Ibid.) In addition, the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary‘s comments concerning Evidence Code section 1250 make clear its view that a limiting instruction can mitigate the concerns described in Hamilton. According to the Assembly committee nonhearsay evidence of a victim‘s fear may be admitted ―because it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.‖ (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted at West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1250, p. 281.) The committee cautioned: ―This limitation is necessary to preserve the hearsay rule,‖ because, ―[i]f the evidence of that state of mind — the statement of memory — were admissible to show that the fact remembered or believed actually occurred, any statement narrating a past event would be, by a process of circuitous reasoning, admissible to prove that the event occurred.‖ (Ibid.) Thus, the Legislature rejected the notion that, for this kind of nonhearsay, it is always ―impossible for the jury to separate the state of mind of the declarant from the truth of the facts contained in the declarations.‖ (Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 895.) We give the California Law Revision Commission comments ―substantial weight‖ in construing the Evidence Code (HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 62), and we agree that People v. Ortiz correctly concluded that the Legislature‘s enactment of Evidence Code sections 1250 and 1252 abrogated Hamilton‘s prohibition against references to past conduct. (See People v. Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 385-389; Simpson, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at 86 p. 598.) Hamilton‘s blanket prohibition against references to past conduct is no longer required in light of the trustworthiness requirements of Evidence Code section 1252 and the balancing test of section 352.32 Further, we disagree with defendant that such evidence must always be accompanied by a limiting instruction, even in the absence of a request. The trial court did not err in failing to give such a limiting instruction on its own motion. Generally speaking, absent a request, the trial court has no duty to give an instruction limiting the purpose for which evidence may be considered. (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1134; see also People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 214-216 [applying the same rule to state of mind evidence but without referring to the explicit restrictions of Evid. Code, § 1250].) Although the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary‘s comments declare that statements admitted under Evidence Code section 1250 cannot be used ―to show that the fact remembered or believed actually occurred‖ (Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted at West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1250, p. 281) or ―as a basis for inferring that the alleged threatener must have made threats,‖ and that such uses constitute ―inadmissible hearsay evidence‖ (id., p. 282), such admonitions do not generate a categorical duty on the part of the trial court to give limiting instructions consistent with these comments. Evidence Code section 355 provides: ―When evidence is admissible . . . for one purpose and is inadmissible 32 Despite these legislative pronouncements, a few of our recent cases have continued to invoke the reasoning of Hamilton, and they are also disapproved on this point. (See People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 579; People v. Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 876; People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 84-86.) 87 . . . for another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.‖ (Italics added.) We see no reason to deviate from this codified practice when a victim‘s statement, admissible under Evidence Code section 1250, describes the defendant‘s conduct. Given the rules of relevancy, the trustworthiness requirements of Evidence Code section 1252, and the balancing required by Evidence Code section 352, we presume that trial courts will appropriately screen the value of such evidence in light of the evidentiary problems that may stem from its admission. If a statement bears little relevance or trustworthiness, or presents significant danger of prejudice by describing a defendant‘s conduct, a trial court presumably will refuse to admit such evidence of the victim‘s state of mind. Additionally, if the evidence nonetheless passes such scrutiny, there may be situations in which the decision to seek a limiting instruction is best left to defense counsel‘s discretion in order to evaluate whether the risk of such an instruction highlighting the defendant‘s conduct outweighs any benefit the instruction may provide. Accordingly, in the absence of a request by the defense, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that Connie‘s statements, which were relevant as circumstantial evidence of her state of mind, were not admissible to show that the facts remembered or believed had actually occurred. 6. Prejudice As noted ante, in part III.C.1., based on the representations of the prosecutor before trial, the trial court explicitly ruled that the following three pieces of evidence were admissible: Connie‘s statement that she decided to change her locks, her inquiry about obtaining a restraining order, and the letter she addressed to defendant. Although the trial court did not specifically rule on the 88 admissibility of the remainder of Connie‘s statements, we conclude, based on the entire record, it is not reasonably probable that defendant‘s guilt verdict was affected by any evidentiary error. a. Statements that the trial court specifically ruled were admissible We will first review under an abuse of discretion standard whether the trial court correctly concluded, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, that the probative value of the first three pieces of evidence ―was not substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.‖ (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13.) As explained below, we conclude that generally the court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 concerning these statements, and that any error was not prejudicial. Addressing first the evidence of Connie‘s entry in her day planner to change her locks, this evidence was clearly relevant to show her state of mind: that she intended to end her relationship with defendant; that he was no longer welcome in her home, and that she attempted to prevent defendant from freely entering. It was also highly relevant to show defendant‘s motives in breaking into her condominium, and to explain his statement, made shortly before the killings, that no locks could keep him out of her home. The probative value of this evidence outweighed any risk of undue prejudice, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this evidence admissible. Connie‘s inquiry about obtaining a restraining order was relevant to show Connie‘s escalating concerns regarding defendant‘s behavior, particularly in the days leading to her death. Her inquiry also reinforced the other evidence showing that Connie still feared defendant right before her death. Any risk of prejudice from this evidence was mitigated by the circumstances that Connie did not 89 mention defendant‘s name, made clear the individual had not physically threatened her, and gave no detailed description of the individual‘s conduct. The probative value of this evidence, therefore, outweighed any risk of undue prejudice, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this evidence admissible. Finally, Connie‘s letter to defendant poses a slightly more complicated analysis because it contains a mixture of hearsay and nonhearsay statements of her state of mind. For example, she wrote that she felt afraid of defendant and had become fearful of otherwise routine noises within her own home. She also described her prior affectionate feelings toward defendant. These statements were directly probative of her state of mind, and carried little potential to cause undue prejudice to defendant because Connie described only her general fear of defendant and did not identify any instance in which defendant was the cause of noises within her home. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these statements. The same letter, however, contained several nonhearsay statements that were relevant only as circumstantial evidence of Connie‘s fear and her actions in conformity therewith. Connie wrote she suspected that all of the hang-up telephone calls were from defendant, and that she believed defendant was ―so angry‖ and felt the need for ―venge[a]nce and punishment.‖ Connie wrote that she and defendant had both come from ―abandoned childhoods,‖ but defendant had been unable to ―make some changes‖ in his life, and she could not help him do so. Her statements regarding her belief as to defendant‘s hang-up telephone calls and his anger were strong circumstantial evidence of Connie‘s fearful state of mind. In addition, because the statements were clearly speculative as to defendant‘s involvement in the hang-up telephone calls and the statements did not otherwise describe defendant‘s conduct in any significant detail, they did not carry 90 significant risk of undue prejudice. Therefore, the probative value of these statements outweighed any risk of undue prejudice, and the trial court properly admitted them. Last, that defendant had come from an ―abandoned‖ childhood or was unable to make changes in his life was not relevant to Connie‘s fear of defendant, or any other issue in the case, and that evidence should not have been admitted. But even assuming the jury believed such statements, these vague assertions could hardly have been prejudicial. In summary, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting most of the statements identified before trial, and defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice under either state law or the federal Constitution. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [state law error requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable that the error had an effect on the verdict]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [reversal is required under the federal Constitution unless the error was 33 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) 33 Even assuming, for sake of argument, that Connie‘s telephone call regarding the restraining order was made to law enforcement, or a related entity, and therefore might be deemed ―testimonial‖ and implicate error under the federal Constitution (Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51), we further conclude that defendant forfeited his claims under the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation clause. Defendant voiced no objection based upon the confrontation clause or due process, and expressed his objections purely on state law grounds, specifically arguing that the evidence was not relevant and was prejudicial under the Evidence Code. These objections ―presented legal issues different from those underlying an objection that the admission of testimony would violate the confrontation clause‖ and, therefore, did not preserve his Sixth Amendment claim. (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 732, fn. 19.) As to Connie‘s other statements, they were made to her friends and family and not to any government officers under formalized circumstances that were ―testimonial‖ within the meaning of Crawford. (Crawford v. Washington, supra, at p. 51 [―An accuser Footnote continued on next page 91 b. Statements admitted without a trial court ruling As described ante, in part III.C.1., in light of the prosecutor‘s assurances before trial, the trial court did not have the opportunity to make specific rulings concerning the admissibility of the remaining statements admitted to prove Connie‘s fear of defendant, her fear of staying at home, and her conduct in conformity with those fears. But even assuming defendant was not required to lodge fresh objections to these statements as they were admitted during trial (see ante, fn. 27), he fails to demonstrate that it is reasonably probable his verdict was 34 affected by any evidentiary error. (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 611.) As explained post, these statements could not have prejudiced defendant because the assertions within them were either proved by other admissible evidence, the assertions were facially speculative, or the described conduct was cumulative to other properly admitted evidence detailing incidents of defendant‘s stalking. Although many of Connie‘s statements concerning her fears and her conduct in conformity with her fears included her beliefs and assertions of defendant‘s conduct, several of these beliefs and assertions were proved by other admissible evidence. Among these statements were allegations that defendant had Footnote continued from previous page who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.‖].) We also reject, as we have before, the contention that the hearsay exception for state of mind is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception and that such statements are unreliable. (People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 405.) 34 Because the trial court was not asked to exercise its discretion in determining the admissibility of these particular statements, we have no occasion to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, and consider only whether any error was prejudicial. (See People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 41.) 92 been following Connie, had repeatedly broken into her home while she was away, had disabled her alarm, and had broken into her home through a skylight. Several percipient witnesses saw defendant following Connie or showing up uninvited at various occasions. In addition, defendant‘s telephone calls to George Hoefer revealed that defendant had a jealous interest in following Connie. Connie‘s belief that defendant had broken into her condominium was verified by her son‘s direct observation of defendant breaking in and defendant‘s assertion that no locks could keep him out of her home. Defendant also took responsibility for disabling her alarm system. Finally, Connie‘s belief that defendant had broken into her home through a skylight was verified by his admission to Samuel Sabatino. Because the prosecutor presented compelling admissible evidence that proved the truth of Connie‘s assertions, the admission of these statements could not have been unduly prejudicial, even if the jury construed them for the truth of the matters stated. With respect to Connie‘s statements that were not directly corroborated by admissible evidence, we conclude that (1) some of the statements could not have been prejudicial, because they were inherently and obviously speculative; and (2) the remaining statements were not prejudicial because they were cumulative to other evidence that overwhelming established defendant‘s guilt. Connie‘s belief that defendant would be angry on what turned out to be the weekend before the killings was based partly upon the prediction of an astrologer and merely predicted defendant‘s future behavior. Connie‘s belief that defendant had hidden in a closet while Connie and her son briefly retrieved clothing from the condominium was based on a secondhand source, Donnie Clapp, without Connie‘s firsthand knowledge. Consequently, the jury likely would have considered these statements from Connie based on secondhand information to show only why Connie was afraid to stay at home, particularly in the last week before the killings. 93 Accordingly, defendant suffered little or no prejudice from the admission of these statements. Connie‘s other uncorroborated statements that were not speculative, however, may have been accepted by the jury as evidence of truth of the matters stated. These included Connie‘s statements that defendant had broken into her condominium and forced her to sleep with him, disabled her car and approached 35 her in a parking garage, and kidnapped her at gunpoint for a weekend. Nonetheless, this evidence was cumulative to the properly admitted evidence concerning defendant‘s stalking and victimization of Connie. Evidence of defendant‘s motive was supplied by Connie‘s rejection of him, followed by his numerous acts of stalking her and inciting her fear. The incident described by George Hoefer, in particular, showed that defendant was not only unwilling to let Connie begin a relationship with another man, but would go to great lengths to prevent it. Evidence that defendant premeditated Connie‘s death included the incident in which defendant armed himself, broke into Connie‘s home with a firearm, attempted to conceal his break-in, hid the firearm, and handcuffed David Navarro, but ultimately was deterred by David‘s presence. Defendant admitted to Sabatino that he was contemplating killing Connie. On the Wednesday before the murders, defendant admitted he knew Connie was not staying at home, and he assured her 35 There was some circumstantial corroboration of Connie‘s statements concerning the weekend she alleged defendant kidnapped her. Marilyn Young testified that she was surprised not to find Connie when she arrived to pick her up, and she later received a telephone call from Connie in which she explained that she was with defendant in a motel room, but Connie ―sounded nervous.‖ This evidence, however, by itself, did not prove that defendant had kidnapped Connie at gunpoint. 94 he would leave her alone, presumably to allay her fears so she would return to her condominium. Finally, evidence that defendant was the perpetrator is supplied by the circumstances that defendant was armed and upset on the night of the killings, and that he was near the location of the killings shortly before they occurred. Defendant‘s fingerprint was found outside the linen closet into which Connie‘s body had been placed. Defendant‘s immediate flight from the state, abandoning his possessions, his facial plastic surgery, and his later admissions also left little doubt that he was the perpetrator. Under these circumstances, and the testimony of the percipient witnesses to his stalking of Connie, the erroneous admission of hearsay did not create a reasonable probability that defendant would have received a more favorable result in the absence of the error. (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 231; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal. 2d at pp. 836-837.) D. Defendant’s Admission of Guilt to His Father Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence that he had confessed guilt to his father, Pat Riccardi, who had died by the time of trial. He claims the statements did not come within any applicable hearsay exception, lacked reliability, and that their admission violated his state and federal rights to confront witnesses and to due process. We disagree. Just before opening statements, the prosecutor gave counsel a copy of a declaration of defendant‘s stepmother, Rosemary Riccardi made by telephone one week earlier. In that statement, she described a telephone call from defendant to his father in March 1983, after which Pat Riccardi appeared visibly upset and claimed that defendant had confessed to killing ―two girls.‖ Later, midtrial, 95 Rosemary Riccardi appeared for a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 to determine, outside the presence of the jury, the admissibility of her testimony. At the hearing, Rosemary recalled receiving a telephone call from defendant late at night in which he urgently asked to speak with his father. Rosemary woke up Pat, gave him the telephone, and left the room. Approximately 15 minutes later, she noticed that their conversation was over, and returned to the bedroom. She found Pat sitting on the edge of the bed crying, something she had never seen Pat do in the 23 years she had known him. Pat had difficulty speaking for a few minutes, but he eventually said that defendant had ―killed two girls.‖ Pat explained that defendant had ―shot them‖ after going to his girlfriend‘s apartment and finding her and her friend there. On cross-examination at the hearing, Rosemary made equivocal statements about her interest in writing a book about defendant. She admitted that Pat disagreed with her belief that defendant should turn himself in, and that this disagreement severely strained their marriage. She also claimed she had previously told the FBI about defendant‘s confession to Pat on at least two occasions, the first being in 1983. The prosecutor offered to stipulate that no FBI report mentioned Rosemary stating that defendant had confessed to the crimes to his father. The prosecutor argued that defendant‘s hearsay statements to his father were admissible as admissions or confessions, and that his father‘s statements to Rosemary were admissible as excited utterances. Defense counsel argued that Rosemary‘s and Pat‘s statements were inadmissible hearsay, because there was no indication Pat was actually repeating a statement made by defendant, thereby precluding a finding that Pat‘s statement reflected an admission or confession of defendant. Defense counsel also argued that the statements lacked indicia of credibility or trustworthiness, especially given Rosemary‘s conflicting motives 96 and the lack of any FBI corroboration that she had previously disclosed the confession. Finally, defense counsel asserted that defendant‘s right to confrontation would be violated, given that his father was no longer alive to testify and verify the accuracy of Rosemary‘s claims. The trial court ruled that the statements were admissible as an admission by defendant and as a spontaneous statement by Pat. The court also concluded the statements met the elements of trustworthiness and reliability. At trial, Rosemary gave testimony similar to her testimony at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing. The defense presented the testimony of FBI Agent Gary Steger, who had reviewed the agency‘s files concerning this case and found no mention of defendant‘s confession to his father, despite the agency‘s having had 27 contacts with Rosemary between 1985 and 1986 alone. Defendant renews the claims he raised below. ―The admission of multiple hearsay is permissible where each hearsay level falls within a hearsay exception.‖ (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 199, fn. 3, citing Evid. Code, § 1201.) On appeal, determination of preliminary facts by the trial court made in the course of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 540-541, citing People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236.) As explained below, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s conclusion that at the first level the statements were admissible as a party admission because defendant confessed the crimes to his father, and at the second level the statements were admissible as a spontaneous statement, because Pat related defendant‘s admissions to Rosemary under the stress of learning his son had killed two girls. 97
―Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party . . . .‖ (Evid. Code, § 1220.) Defendant notes that Pat did not repeat defendant‘s statements verbatim, and speculates that Pat had merely offered his opinion to Rosemary about defendant‘s culpability. We have long recognized that, in this context, persons are often unable ― ‗ ―to state the exact language of an admission.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 800, quoting People v. Bemis (1949) 33 Cal.2d 395, 399.) This recognition, however, does not automatically render any statements of a party inadmissible, but instead merely goes to the weight of such evidence. Accordingly, when there is some doubt as to the exact wording of a party‘s statement, we require an instruction to advise jurors to view such statements with caution. (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1200.) Here, Pat received an urgent late-night telephone call from his son and had a 15-minute conversation with him. After the conclusion of that conversation, Pat reported that his son had shot his girlfriend and her friend. Under the circumstances, Pat clearly was repeating the substance of what defendant had told him. That Pat provided a succinct summary of his 15-minute conversation rather than a verbatim recounting did not render the statements inadmissible. In addition, the trial court properly warned the jury to weigh whether defendant had actually made the admission, and to view defendant‘s admissions with caution. (CALJIC No. 2.71.) Accordingly, the court properly concluded the statement came within the hearsay exception for the statements of a party.
―A statement may be admitted, though hearsay, if it describes an act witnessed by the declarant and ‗[w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by‘ witnessing the event. (Evid. Code, 98 § 1240.) ‗ ―To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been [made] before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 809-810, quoting People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318.) Defendant contends Pat‘s statements to Rosemary do not qualify as spontaneous statements because minutes had elapsed between his telephone call and his statement to her, and because he made statements only in response to her questioning. Neither the passage of time nor Rosemary‘s questioning precluded the trial court from finding that Pat was still under the stress of the excitement. The evidence clearly showed that Pat had difficulty talking when speaking to Rosemary. Thus, Rosemary‘s description of his demeanor provided substantial evidence establishing the preliminary fact that Pat was still under the stress of learning that his son had killed two girls. (See People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 541 [statement made two and one-half hours after the stressful event was still spontaneous].) Moreover, Rosemary‘s question merely asked why Pat was crying, was simple and nonsuggestive, and could not have deprived Pat‘s statements of their spontaneity. (People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d 306, 319-320.) Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded Pat‘s statement came within the hearsay exception for a spontaneous statement. 99 3. Trustworthiness and reliability under the Sixth Amendment We reject defendant‘s claim that the statements were ―testimonial‖ within the meaning of Crawford. Pat‘s statements were made to his wife and not to any government officers under formalized circumstances that were ―testimonial.‖ (Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51.)36 In addition, defendant‘s challenge to the reliability and trustworthiness of these statements is inapt because his challenge is directed against Rosemary‘s credibility. Thus, defendant again makes the mistake of questioning the reliability of the witness who testifies about the hearsay statement instead of examining the circumstances surrounding the declarant‘s making of the statements. (People v. Spencer, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 946.) In any event, defendant had ample opportunity to confront Rosemary‘s truthfulness, and the jury could properly make its own determination of her credibility. Here, there were no circumstances that would raise any doubt concerning Pat‘s statements. As defendant admitted at trial, he was close to his father; thus, it was not inconceivable that defendant would confide in Pat. The fact that Pat thereafter helped store and sell items that defendant had abandoned in California tended to show that he was aware his son was a suspect in the crimes at issue in their case. Finally, it was not inconceivable that Pat would share his shock with 36 We also reject defendant‘s contentions, made before the high court decided Crawford, that admissions and spontaneous statements are not firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, which carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation clause. (People v. Silva (1988) 45 Ca1.3d 604, 624 [admissions are a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule]; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 529 [spontaneous statements are a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule].) 100 his wife, especially immediately after listening to his son admit to killing ―two girls.‖ Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability and trustworthiness. (See People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745.) The court properly admitted defendant‘s admissions and Pat‘s spontaneous statements. E. The Effect of the O.J. Simpson Media Coverage Defendant claims the media coverage of the homicides involved in the O.J. Simpson case affected his right to a fair trial and due process, because his trial began just after Simpson was arrested for the killings in that case, and the circumstances of those homicides were allegedly similar to the allegations against him. He asserts his jury was affected by this media coverage, and that the jurors impressions of that case ―would be carried over unconsciously and used in [the jurors‘] evaluation of the evidence against‖ defendant. Accordingly, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his repeated requests, before and during trial, to continue the trial until media coverage of the Simpson case waned. A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for a continuance, and we review any denial for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 646-647.) ―Denial of what is essentially a motion for a continuance, when no good cause is demonstrated, is not an abuse of discretion.‖ (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1196; § 1050.) Here, defendant‘s showing of good cause rested completely on speculation. (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 451 [vague and speculative reasons do not constitute a showing of good cause].) Defendant argued before the trial court that press coverage of the O.J. Simpson case caused the community to be ―worked up into a frenzy‖ and set into a ―lynch mob mentality,‖ and 101 engendered the prospect of ―trial by newspaper.‖ But at no point did defendant provide the trial court with evidence showing that any juror was actually biased against him or considered evidence presented outside of trial as a result of the publicity concerning the O.J. Simpson case. Moreover, defendant fails to show a substantial likelihood of prejudice flowing from the denial of the requests for continuance. None of the publicity in the O.J. Simpson case mentioned defendant‘s case or otherwise related to his own guilt or innocence. The newspaper articles defendant submitted with his motion for continuance merely convey the circumstances of the killings, Simpson‘s celebrity status, his attendance at his ex-wife‘s funeral, suspicions of his involvement in the killings, his attempt to flee in a slow-speed vehicle chase, his threats to commit suicide, and his subsequent arrest. The articles contain no allegations that Simpson stalked his ex-wife, and only one article briefly discussed their prior marital discord. Thus, the two cases were only superficially similar. The infamy surrounding the O.J. Simpson case largely centered around the allegation that a former professional athlete, actor, and television personality had killed his ex-wife and her friend. None of these circumstances were present here. Moreover, unlike Simpson, defendant was not a celebrity, did not have a long history of physically assaulting Connie, had a three-month pattern of stalking Connie, and fled under completely different circumstances. Therefore, assuming the jurors were following the media coverage of the O.J. Simpson case, this publicity would not have been an improper influence. In addition to the newspaper articles, defendant submitted to the trial court eight declarations from three local criminal defense attorneys expressing their concern about the fairness of defendant‘s trial in light of the O.J. Simpson media coverage. These declarations engage in the same speculation defendant repeats on 102 appeal. More importantly, defendant had ample opportunity during voir dire to question jurors about the effect of their exposure to the O.J. Simpson press coverage, but he did not do so. Instead, defendant would have us divine prejudice when he failed to develop a record to support his claim. Assuming any of the jurors were exposed to the publicity surrounding the O.J. Simpson case during this trial, there was no substantial likelihood that they were actually biased against defendant by that media coverage or that they could not decide a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial. (See People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 686-688.) The trial court properly denied defendant‘s motions for a continuance. F. Cumulative Error Defendant argues that reversal of his conviction is necessary because of the cumulative effect of errors in the guilt phase of his trial. At the guilt phase, the errors we have identified are the admission of the entire audio-recorded police interview of Marilyn Young, the admission of Connie‘s letter about defendant‘s abandoned childhood and his inability to make changes, and the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction concerning the nonhearsay purpose of Connie‘s various statements. We concluded that these statements either duplicated other admissible evidence or could not have been prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant‘s guilt. Considered cumulatively, the errors described above could not have prejudiced defendant at the guilt phase.