Opinion ID: 566004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Obstruction of Justice--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503

Text: 7 Masterpol was prosecuted under the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, which authorizes criminal prosecution of one who corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice. Masterpol contends that he was improperly convicted of violating section 1503. He claims that section 1503, after its amendment in 1982, no longer covers witness tampering. In his view, if he was to be charged under the Obstruction of Justice chapter of Title 18, section 1501 through section 1517, he should have been charged under section 1512 or not at all. We agree. 8 We confronted a similar issue in United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.1984). There the defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1503 and 1512 for threatening a witness in order to obtain documentary evidence. The defendant in Hernandez conceded that he was properly convicted of violating section 1512. He argued, however, that the enactment in 1982 of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982), removed from section 1503's purview witness tampering. In support of this argument, he noted that Congress in 1982 deleted all references to witnesses from section 1503, entitled Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally, and enacted a new provision, section 1512, which was entitled Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant and which was addressed specifically to contacts with witnesses. Hernandez, 730 F.2d at 898. The government sought to counter this argument by contending that although Sec. 1512 absorbs some of the jurisdiction previously given to Sec. 1503, Congress intended, in effect, to create two crimes, making witness intimidation and harassment punishable not only under Sec. 1512, but also under the residual clause of Sec. 1503. Id. After examining what Congress did in simultaneously enacting section 1512 and deleting all references to witnesses in section 1503, as well as what Congress said it did in the relevant legislative history, see id. at 899, we rejected the government's argument. We noted that congressional intent was graphically demonstrated by examining those portions of Sec. 1503 that congress expressly deleted and conclude[d] that congress affirmatively intended to remove witnesses entirely from the scope of Sec. 1503. Id. at 898. See also United States v. Jackson, 805 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir.1986) (construing Hernandez as holding that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512, a specific victim and witness protection statute, overrode the more general obstruction of justice statute, [section 1503]), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 1384, 94 L.Ed.2d 698 (1987). 9 The government now seeks to limit Hernandez. It notes that Hernandez involved a coercive attempt to influence a witness, whereas in this case Masterpol urged witnesses to make false statements without resort to intimidation or harassment. Such noncoercive witness contacts, says the government, are still covered by the residual clause of section 1503 because, otherwise, noncoercive witness tampering, including corrupt efforts to urge witnesses to make false statements, would not be proscribed by either Section 1512 or Section 1503. This limiting construction of Hernandez has been accepted by other circuits and by district courts in this Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Beatty, 587 F.Supp. 1325, 1331-33 (E.D.N.Y.1984). The force of these precedents, however, was diminished significantly in 1988 when Congress amended section 1512. 10 Section 1512(b), as amended, reads in pertinent part: 11 Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so ... with intent to-- 12 (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding ... [violates the laws of the United States]. 13 (emphasis added). The corruptly persuades language was added to the statute in 1988--well before Masterpol's obstructive conduct in January 1990. Notably, this language reaches noncoercive witness contacts. In fact the conduct described in Masterpol's indictment is nearly identical to that which may be charged under section 1512. The indictment charges that Masterpol corruptly ... attempted to persuade  witnesses Cooper and Tagliamonte. The government, moreover, candidly admits in its sur-reply brief that if it had been aware of the 1988 amendment of Section 1512, the Assistant United States Attorney responsible for the case might have sought to charge Masterpol ... under both 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503 and Sec. 1512. Thus, what justification there once was for giving Hernandez a narrow construction now lacks merit, at least where, as in this instance, there appears to be no statutory vacuum. In any event, to the extent a gap remains in the legislative scheme covering noncoercive witness contacts, the proper remedy is not for the courts to distort the plain language of [the statute] but for Congress to enact legislation to close the gap. United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir.1985) (rejecting attempt to extend section 1512 to nonmisleading, nonthreatening, nonintimidating attempt to have a person give false information), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018, 106 S.Ct. 1203, 89 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986). Furthermore, the government points to no cases decided after the 1988 amendment to section 1512 that have given Hernandez a narrow reading. In view of these developments and the plain import of Congress' actions in both adopting section 1512 and deleting from section 1503 all references to witnesses, we see no reason at this juncture to retreat from the position we took in Hernandez, that congress affirmatively intended to remove witnesses entirely from the scope of Sec. 1503. 730 F.2d at 898. 14 Masterpol's obstruction of justice conviction under section 1503 therefore must be reversed. 15