Opinion ID: 2298009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Question Two: Peremptory Strikes

Text: Questions Two through Four regard the various arguments Grandison raises in support of his motion to reopen a postconviction proceeding. First, we observe that Maryland law limits a defendant to one postconviction proceeding. See Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 375, 879 A.2d 1064, 1069 (2005); Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 4, 728 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1999); see also Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.) § 7-103(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article (For each trial or sentence, a person may file only one petition for relief[.]). Additionally, [t]he court may reopen a postconviction proceeding that was previously concluded if the court determines that the action is in the interests of justice. Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 7-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article. [8] Grandison argues that his postconviction proceedings should be reopened to consider the question of whether the State engaged in racial discrimination in exercising peremptory strikes on potential jurors preceding Grandison's 1984 trial. The Circuit Court denied Grandison's motion to reopen his postconviction proceeding on this point. The Circuit Court found Grandison's claim that the State systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury to be without merit. The Circuit Court did not, however, address the issue of whether Grandison had waived this claim. [9] To raise an allegation of error in a postconviction proceeding, it must not have been waived previously. Under the postconviction statute: (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, an allegation of error is waived when a petitioner could have made but intelligently and knowingly failed to make the allegation: 1. before trial; 2. at trial; 3. on direct appeal, whether or not the petitioner took an appeal;    6. in a prior petition under this subtitle; or 7. in any other proceeding that the petitioner began. (ii) 1. Failure to make an allegation of error shall be excused if special circumstances exist. 2. The petitioner has the burden of proving that special circumstances exist. Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol), § 7-106(b)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article. [10] Our cases have further defined when a petitioner waives claims in postconviction relief. The requirement that the waiver be knowing and intelligent applies only to whether the claim involves a fundamental right; a lesser standard applies to waiver of claims of error that are non-fundamental. As we explained in McElroy v. State : We reasoned that the legislature did not require intelligent and knowing waiver in the case of all errors, but only with respect to errors which deprived a petitioner of fundamental constitutional rights. As to those fundamental rights, intelligent and knowing waiver requires that the petitioner's knowledge of the right and the petitioner's personal waiver of the right be reflected on the record. As to lesser or non-fundamental rights, the petitioner will be deemed to have waived any claim of error if petitioner or petitioner's counsel failed to exercise a prior opportunity to raise it notwithstanding a lack of personal knowledge of the right of which petitioner was deprived, except when the failure to allege the error is excused by special circumstances. When an allegation of error affecting fundamental constitutional rights could have been made by petitioner in a prior proceeding, [the postconviction statute] provides that there shall be a rebuttable presumption that said petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to make such allegation. The burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption of waiver is placed upon the petitioner. (Footnotes and citations omitted.) McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 140-42, 617 A.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1993). [11] We need not pass judgment here, however, on whether Grandison's jury selection claim implicates a fundamental right, as his failure to raise the claim in any number of prior proceedings constituted a knowing, intelligent waiver. Grandison acknowledges that [t]he issue of racial discrimination in jury selection was not raised, on direct appeal, by Mr. Grandison's assigned public defender in Grandison II. But Grandison's delay in raising this issue goes further than he acknowledges. As the State argues: Grandison never raised this claim, either on its merits or as part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in any prior proceeding before this one, including Grandison III, Grandison IV, Grandison V, or in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Grandison first raised this claim on March 9, 2006, when his counsel... filed a Second Addendum to Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Proceeding and Request for Hearing and Discovery.... In the Second Addendum, [counsel] acknowledges that [t]he racial skewing of the jury in Mr. Grandison's case has inexcusably never been raised. At no point does Grandison address waiver in his brief, nor does he point to any special circumstances that might excuse such waiver. Grandison's failure to allege this particular error or to explain why it was waivedon direct appeal, during habeas corpus proceedings, or at any other stage of this caseare fatal to his claim at this point in the proceedings, as he does not rebut the statutory presumption of waiver against him. As such, we affirm the Circuit Court's denial of his motion on this point, without reaching the merits.