Opinion ID: 802866
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “[Nigro] failed NICU.”

Text: 3. “[Nigro] on a regular basis would leave the Clinic to go home early.” 4. “There has been no evidence of improvement or intention to improve in weak areas.” 5. “There is no change in apathetic/disinterested approach or demonstrated interest in learning despite 3-4 months of discussion and coaching.” 18 6. “Plaintiff has poor time management with respect to internal medicine rotation.” 7. “Plaintiff is making the same mistakes repeatedly after corrective instruction such as rough or painful Pap smear technique on GYN.” 8. “Plaintiff has flattened affect, body language, disconnect from patient interaction and the appearance in many forms of being disinterested in doing food care for patients.” 9. “There is faculty consensus that [Nigro] may be suffering from depression or poor career choice.” 10. “Dr. Nigro was more interested in getting tasks done in order to leave than in caring for the medical issues presented.” Appellant’s Br. 34-36. Statements (1), (4), (5), (6), and (8) are opinions and therefore not actionable under Virginia law. See Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 101 (Va. 1985) (“Pure expressions of opinion, not amounting to ‘fighting words,’ cannot form the basis of an action for defamation.”). Nigro attempts to circumvent this general rule by relying on Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Association, 575 S.E.2d 861 (Va. 2003), which held that “defamatory words that prejudice a person in his or her profession or trade are actionable as defamation per se.” Id. at 861 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Nigro’s 19 reliance is misplaced, however, because it assumes the matter at issue--that statements of opinion can be defamatory. But as the Virginia Supreme Court has explained, statements that do “not contain a provably false factual connotation, or statements which cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about a person” are opinions and therefore not defamatory. Yeagle v. Collegiate Times, 497 S.E.2d 136, 137 (Va. 1998) (footnote omitted). Dennehy’s statements regarding Nigro’s lack of progress and apparent disinterest are expressions of opinion because they are based on his perceptions of her performance and cannot be proven false. Statements (2), (3), and (7) are not sufficiently harmful to be defamatory. We acknowledge that statement (2)--that Nigro failed NICU--is technically false, despite Dr. Lee’s statement that she would have failed in a different year and that part of why she passed was because the rotation did not want her back. Nonetheless, looking to our precedent in Chapin, we do not find any of these statements defamatory because we cannot conclude that they would “deter third persons from associating or dealing with” Nigro or make her “appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous.” Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1092. As alleged, the statements suggest that she still had much to learn as a resident. The very point of residency is to serve as a training vehicle allowing the resident to benefit from guidance and 20 instruction. For this reason, none of these statements can prejudice her in her profession so as to be actionable per se, nor do they satisfy Chapin’s test. Finally, statement (9)--Dennehy’s claim that there was faculty consensus that she was suffering from depression or a poor career choice--is not defamatory because it is true, as borne out by the fact that the faculty voted unanimously not to renew her contract. That some non-voting faculty members may have disagreed does not render the statement that there was a “consensus” false. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Nigro failed to state a claim for defamation against Dennehy. 2. Turning to allegedly defamatory statements made by other Program employees--(1) an alleged statement that Nigro “tapped telephones on Valley Health property” and (2) an alleged statement that Nigro “recorded conversations on Valley Health property”--we agree with the district court that these statements are not defamatory. As the Virginia Supreme Court has explained, “[c]ommunications between persons on a subject in which the persons have an interest or duty” are privileged. Larimore v. Blaylock, 528 S.E.2d 119, 121 (Va. 2000). It is indisputable that employees running the Program have an interest in ensuring that residents follow Hospital rules. “[A]n 21 employer, or his proper representatives, [must] be permitted to discuss freely with an employee, or his chosen representatives, charges affecting his employment which have been made against the employee to the employer.” Id. (quoting Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins, 156 S.E. 429, 441 (Va. 1931)). “However, the privilege attaching to such occasions is a qualified privilege which may be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defamatory statement was made maliciously.” Id. Even reading the evidence in the light most favorable to Nigro, she forecasts no evidence of malice with respect to these statements. We cannot assume, without any evidence, that hospital employees were not genuinely concerned about the Hospital’s policy on taping. Since Nigro failed to show that there was a question of material fact on this issue, we find that summary judgment is appropriate.