Opinion ID: 1444047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: other tort causes of action

Text: The Yoakums also allege that Hartford was negligent. Since Hartford's actions were clearly intentional in hiring Thompson to reinvestigate the accident and adjusting the claim, and designed to produce exactly the result the Yoakums are complaining of, it is difficult for us to envision how Hartford's actions can also be considered negligent. This suffices to dispose of this allegation, without further analysis of whether there even exists a duty under these circumstances between Hartford and the Yoakums. The Yoakums have also requested this Court to find that the district court erred in concluding that the tort of outrage is the same cause of action as intentional infliction of emotional distress for which the court granted Hartford's motion for summary judgment. In Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 833-34, 801 P.2d 37, 40-41 (1990), we briefly outlined the development of the tort of outrage but declined to adopt this tort under the facts of that particular case. We nevertheless provided a definition of the tort of outrage noting that liability is generally based on conduct `exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, and of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.' Id. at 832, 801 P.2d at 41. This is strikingly similar to the definition we have given for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress involving conduct that is extreme and outrageous which either intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress. Id. (citations omitted). As the district court concluded, it appears that the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrage are identical or at least involve very similar elements. The Yoakums have not articulated any cogent reason for us to find in this case that these two torts should be distinguished and we affirm the district court's conclusion that these causes of action, at least for the purposes of this case, are identical. The Yoakums also allege that Hartford, through its claims manager, made various derogatory statements about the claimants during the course of investigation the accident that were defamatory. Defamatory utterances are actionable without allegation and proof of special damages if they fall within one of four categories. Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 890, 522 P.2d 1102, 1111 (1974). As the Court in Barlow pointed out, these categories are set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and involve statements which impute to the plaintiff either a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, a matter incompatible with his trade, business, profession, or office, or serious sexual misconduct. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 570-574 (1977)). If an alleged defamatory statement does not fall within one of these categories, a plaintiff must allege and prove that some special harm resulted from the utterance. Barlow, 95 Idaho at 890, 522 P.2d at 1111. In this case, the Yoakums allege that Hartford's claims manager told the vehicle driver's mother of Mr. Yoakum's supposed comment to several people that he was going to retire on the proceeds of his wrongful death claim against McCall. Although this alleged statement may be defamatory, it does not fall within one of the four categories of slanderous utterances which would make the allegation and proof of special damages unnecessary. The Yoakums have failed to allege or prove any special harm resulting from this alleged utterance and, thus, we affirm the district court's granting of Hartford's motion for summary judgment on the slander cause of action.