Opinion ID: 2823818
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duty Factors

Text: Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â To determine whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty to act to avoid injury, we assess: (1) the risk involved in the defendantâs conduct; (2) the foreseeability 5 and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the defendantâs conduct; (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. HealthONE, 50 P.3d at 888; Smith v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986). See generally Grund, supra, Â§ 10:5, at 143. We address each factor in order, cognizant that no single factor is controlling and that these factors are not exclusive or exhaustive. See Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 57. Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â The risk of drunk driving and injury here was high, even though the possible availability of a taxi may have mitigated that risk. Some (if not all) members of Grohâs group were intoxicated. They caused enough of a commotion that the Westinâs security guards decided to evict them. Conscious of this intoxication, the Westinâs security guards evicted Groh and her companions from the hotel. Ejecting these intoxicated guests from the hotel posed at least two definitive risks of harm: (1) the risk that aÂ drunk person would choose to drive (or travel with a drunk person who drives); and (2) the risk that an evicted guest would suffer some harm because of winter weather conditions. âThe risk of harm presented by a belligerent, intoxicated person operating a motor vehicle is foreseeable. It is common knowledge that drunk driving directly results in accidents, injuries and deaths.â Cullum v. McCool, 432 S.W.3d 829, 835 (Tenn. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Colo. 1989) (acknowledging, in a wrongful death action by the mother of an intoxicated patron killed in an automobile accident against a tavern owner, the âobvious possibility that the inebriate might attempt to drive an automobileâ and the ârisk that the inebriate will suffer severe injuryâ), superseded by statute, Â§ 12-47-801, C.R.S. (2014). Winter weather presents an additional risk of injury to an intoxicated person who is exposed to the elements, such as passing out in a low-visibility location and suffering hypothermia or slipping and falling in icy conditions. Groh, Â¶ 32. Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â A reasonable person could foresee that a group of intoxicated individuals evicted from a hotel might be involved in a drunk driving accident that causes injuries. Intoxicated individuals typically have impaired physical abilities and judgment and thus do not always make well-reasoned decisions about transportation home. Despite some social utility in allowing the Westin to end its special relationship with Groh in order to provide other hotel guests with a more secure environment, the seriousness of the potential harm militates in favor of imposing a duty. See Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 49 (explaining that â[a]s the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihoodÂ of its occurrence need be correspondingly less to generate a duty of precautionâ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Relatively low-cost options are available to ensure that a particular eviction is reasonable in light of the circumstances, including, but not limited to, requesting police assistance, allowing intoxicated guests to wait in the lobby after they call a taxi, or procuring a taxi for an intoxicated guest. Granted, some of these options require that a hotel incur expenses, which in turn it might pass on to its customers. But any modest increase in business costs is justified. See id. (finding, in a lawsuit by a patron against a restaurant for injuries sustained during a robbery, that âsome economic burdenâ on the defendant âand a predictable corresponding increase to customersâ was acceptable because the costs of protecting customers from robberies through improvements like better lighting, video cameras, signs, employee training, and locks were ârelatively inexpensiveâ). Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Taking into account the risk of harm involved in the Westinâs conduct, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury to Groh, and low-cost options available to facilitate a safe eviction, coupled with the special relationship between innkeepers and their guests, we hold that the Westin had a duty to exercise reasonable care while evicting Groh, 6 which required the hotel to refrain from evicting her into a foreseeablyÂ dangerous environment. Whether a foreseeably dangerous environment existed at the time of eviction depends on Grohâs physical state and the conditions into which she was evicted, including the time, the surroundings, and the weather. Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â In recognizing this duty, we are not implicitly holding that hotels must provide safe transportation off premises during eviction, or even that hotels must ensure that evicted guests actually take advantage of available safe transportation after the eviction occurs. 7 To attempt to fashion liability by imposing a bright-line, inflexible rule that purportedly governs all circumstances would result in âa kind of âblinking lightâ of duty that is arbitrary in practice and not helpful to the future development of the law.â Raleigh, 130 P.3d at 1021 (Mullarkey, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Â¶39Â Â Â Â Â Â In a highly fact-specific case like this one, the appropriate means of addressing limits on liability lie not in the articulation of the duty that exists, but in the application of causation principles: The causation element in a tort action functions as a natural limitation of liability. . . . â[D]uty is a preferable means for addressing limits on liability when those limitations are clear, are based on relatively bright lines, are of general application, do not usually require resort to disputed facts in a case, implicate policy concerns that apply to a class of cases that may not be fully appreciated by a jury deciding a specific case, and are employed in cases in which early resolution of liability is particularly desirable. . . . On the other hand, when the limits imposed require careful attention to the specific facts of a case, and difficult, often amorphous evaluative judgments for which modest differences in the factual circumstances may change the outcome, scope of liability [or proximate cause] is a more flexible and preferable device for placing limits on liability.â Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts Â§ 29 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005)). The issue of duty is broad in its implication; it is a juryâs negligence determination that must be strictly confined to the facts of a particular case. See Nelson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 465 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).