Opinion ID: 4547167
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defined Scope

Text: In light of our concerns regarding the statute of limitations and the need for fair notice, we look instead to whether the initial EIS purported to be the EIS for the subsequent action. Our precedents support looking to the language of the EIS to help us form “an accurate description of the [agency’s] proposed action.” Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 801; see also Block, 690 F.2d at 761 (“The starting point in our analysis is ‘to describe accurately the “federal action” being taken.’” (quoting Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), 422 U.S. 289, 322 (1975))). For instance, in NAEC v. Lujan, plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the National Park Service’s EISs regarding mining in three national parks in Alaska, arguing that the EISs contained insufficiently site-specific analysis given the agency’s decision to authorize mining operations. See 961 F.2d 886, 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1992). We rejected plaintiffs’ characterization of the federal action, relying on the EISs’ own description that “[i]f, however, the National Park Service determines that the impacts of proposed mining operations would violate the decision standards for plan of operations approval, and the effects could not be sufficiently mitigated, the plan would be disapproved.” Id. at 890 30 NAEC V. USDOI (citation omitted). We thus concluded that no irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources had occurred. Id. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Mayo relied on the EIS’s statement that its “level of analysis [was] sufficient to allow several management actions to be carried out without having to complete additional environmental analyses (e.g., environmental assessments) prior to implementation.” 875 F.3d at 18. The court factored this EIS statement into its ultimate determination that the Park Service was not required to prepare “additional environmental analyses (e.g., environmental assessments)” prior to each year’s elk hunt. See id. Furthermore, the NEPA regulations emphasize the need for EISs to carefully define the proposal(s) under consideration, and specify detailed criteria to be consulted in the process. For example, the regulations provide that: Agencies shall make sure the proposal which is the subject of an environmental impact statement is properly defined. Agencies shall use the criteria for scope (§1508.25) to determine which proposal(s) shall be the subject of a particular statement. Proposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a). The regulations further specify that the following types of actions “should” be included within the scope of a single EIS:
that: NAEC V. USDOI 31
actions,”
without other actions, or
larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification”; and
that have cumulatively significant impacts. Id. § 1508.25(a). A third category, “Similar actions,” “may” be included within the scope of a single EIS. Id. Agencies must use a public “scoping” process to decide the scope of “actions, alternatives, and impacts to be considered in an environmental impact statement.” Id. §§ 1501.7, 1508.25. Thus, in deciding whether a previous EIS is the EIS for a subsequent action, we find it appropriate to rely on an EIS’s defined scope. If the defined scope of the initial EIS included the subsequent action, NEPA requirements for the subsequent action would fall under the supplementation rubric. If the defined scope of the initial EIS did not include the subsequent action (but presumably the analysis in the initial EIS is to some extent relevant), NEPA requirements for the subsequent action would fall under the tiering rubric. 15 Of course, we recognize that the defined scope of 15 These two frameworks are not mutually exclusive. If an agency wishes to tier a new NEPA analysis to a previous NEPA analysis, the agency may have to take into account whether the previous NEPA analysis requires supplementation. Also, we are not aware of anything 32 NAEC V. USDOI the initial EIS may be ambiguous with regard to whether it does or does not include the precise subsequent action at issue. Applying our standard of review, we must determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the scope is reasonable. Ka Makani, 295 F.3d at 959 & n.3. Although the adequacy of the initial EIS for purposes of the subsequent action may be relevant in an extreme case, where the inadequacy of analysis is so clear as to demonstrate that the scope of the initial EIS cannot reasonably be construed as including the subsequent action, we do not think our scope inquiry constitutes “judicial review of the adequacy” of the initial EIS within the meaning of the NPRPA statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 6506a(n)(1). It cannot reach the adequacy of the initial EIS for those actions actually within its scope.