Opinion ID: 1631049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Moral Change and Recognition of Wrongfulness

Text: The factors of moral change and recognition of the wrongfulness of past conduct are intertwined, and the Panel followed our lead in previous cases and considered these factors together. See, e.g., Holker, 765 N.W.2d at 639 n. 2. The Panel recommended that Dedefo not be reinstated to the practice of law at this time because he failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he has undergone the requisite moral change and recognizes the wrongful nature of his prior misconduct. The Panel found deficiencies in Dedefo's evidence regarding whether he understands the wrongfulness of his misconduct and whether he is truly remorseful for the consequences of that conduct. Regarding Dedefo's understanding of his misconduct, the Panel stated generally that Dedefo's demeanor at the hearing and the actions he and other witnesses cited in support of that recognition do not establish [his understanding] by clear and convincing evidence. The Panel more specifically disapproved of Dedefo's blam[ing] his wife for the events leading to the suspension even after [the] suspension occurred. According to the Panel, [c]ontinuing to blame others, even in part, [for the suspension] weighs against a finding that [Dedefo] recognizes the wrongfulness of his misconduct.... Regarding remorse, the Panel said that Dedefo's references to misconduct as a mistake for which he was sorry appeared... more scripted than heartfelt. The Panel specifically faulted Dedefo's repeated use of the word shocked to describe his feelings at the time of his suspensiona word choice that the Panel concluded express[ed] more remorse for what happened to him than for the consequences to the victims of his conduct and to the profession as a whole. The Panel further objected to Dedefo's use of cultural explanations for why he had failed to make amends to his ex-wife and the defendants in his lawsuit. We generally will defer to a panel's finding that a petitioner's testimony that he has undergone the requisite moral change is not credible. Mose, 754 N.W.2d at 362; see also In re Trygstad, 472 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Minn.1991) (concluding that a petitioner's testimonial conflict did not bar reinstatement when the panel found genuineness in petitioner's remorse and change in his moral character). Two of the Panel's nonspecific conclusionsthe reference to Dedefo's demeanor and the statement that his remorse appeared to be more scripted than heartfeltare akin to credibility findings. But the Panel supported its recommendation primarily with other, noncredibility-based findings about the evidence at Dedefo's reinstatement hearing. Those findings contain troubling deficiencies that create doubt about the Panel's ultimate recommendation. The Panel focused heavily on Dedefo's testimony about his mental state at the time of his suspensionespecially his references to being shocked and his initial placement of blame for the suspension on his ex-wife and the defendants in his meritless lawsuit. But the appropriate inquiry is not whether the petitioning attorney underwent a moral change before suspension or immediately upon being suspended. Rather, we examine a petitioner's conduct up to the time of the reinstatement hearing and his or her mental state and values at that time. See, e.g., Holker, 765 N.W.2d at 637-39 (denying petition for reinstatement based on the content of the petitioner's testimony at the reinstatement hearing); Anderley, 696 N.W.2d at 385-86 (reinstating an attorney largely because of the dramatic rehabilitation and character change he had undergone during the period of time following his discipline). The Panel's finding that Dedefo, even after his suspension, has on occasion blamed his wife ... rather than accepting full responsibility for his own misconduct illustrates that Dedefo did not immediately undergo a complete moral change at the time of suspension. But we do not expect a petitioner to undergo instantaneous moral change upon suspension. The record reflects that Dedefo gradually came to realize the wrongfulness of his conduct and that by the time of the reinstatement hearing, Dedefo had ceased blaming others and taken full responsibility for his actions. The Panel understood Dedefo's use of the word shocked to mean he was surprised to be suspended because he did not understand the nature of his wrongdoing. Dedefo candidly admitted this point during his reinstatement hearing. But the Panel's assessment ignored Dedefo's extensive, internally consistent testimony about his process of coming to understand his past failings and his subsequent efforts to ensure he does not repeat them. Dedefo testified about how the shock of the suspension operated to initiate a moral change by forcing him to enter a period of self-examination and improvement. He gradually came to understand that he had committed serious wrongdoing when he filed the lawsuit against his friends and filed a false affidavit as part of the suit. Dedefo's testimony makes clear that he is no longer surprised that he was suspended, and that he now understands he alone was at fault. This gradual process of reflection and moral progress lends support to Dedefo's claim that he has undergone the requisite moral change in preparation for return to the practice of law. The Panel made a finding that Dedefo knowingly provided false evidence at his 2007 disciplinary hearing and described the production of false evidence as more recent conduct involving dishonesty. Dedefo argues that the Panel's finding presents an impossible Catch 22. Dedefo's false testimony at his disciplinary hearing occurred prior to his suspension. We concluded that he testified dishonestly at his disciplinary hearing, Dedefo, 752 N.W.2d at 529, and considered that fact in choosing the appropriate discipline. Id. at 531-32. In our discussion of the discipline to be imposed, we said that Dedefo refused to acknowledge that his conduct in his deposition was discovery abuse, acknowledging only that `looking at the matter in hindsight, he might have handled it differently.' Both at the referee hearing and before this court, Dedefo continued to vehemently deny abusing [his wife.] Dedefo used his abusive relationship with [his wife] to file a false affidavit with the district court. Id. at 531. The Panel's finding on this point is another example of its focus on Dedefo's mental state at the time of suspension rather than the time of his reinstatement hearing. We typically look favorably on petitioners who have openly admitted the wrongfulness of their conduct. See, e.g., In re Wegner, 417 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Minn. 1987). Dedefo cannot now deny his dishonesty at the time of his disciplinary proceedings without continuing the course of misconduct that led to his suspension. See, e.g., Holker, 765 N.W.2d at 637 (denying a petitioner's reinstatement petition in part because he continued to minimize and dispute his past misconduct). Dedefo's present candid admissions of his past misconduct weigh in favor of his reinstatement. The Panel also expressed concern about Dedefo's continuing resort to cultural concerns to explain and defend his actions. Our review of the record makes clear that Dedefo did not present evidence about his cultural background to defend his actions or minimize his wrongdoing. Rather, Dedefo explained elements of his culture in order to show his understanding of how and why the misconduct occurred in the past and how he now `perceives and rejects the wrongfulness of his previous conduct.' Swanson, 405 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn.1979)). Dedefo expressed awareness of one of the precise causes of his misconductthe heavy influence of cultural beliefs that conflicted with his legal obligations. Because he now understands where he went wrong, Dedefo believes that he will be able to avoid pitfalls resulting from cultural discrepancies in the future. In its opinion and during the reinstatement hearing, the Panel revealed its concern with Dedefo's failure to mak[e] amends by apologizing to his ex-wife for abusing her and to the three former friends for the expense and inconvenience Dedefo's lawsuit caused them. To the extent that the Panel suggests that Dedefo must apologize to his ex-wife for abusing her, the Panel misinterprets the reinstatement requirements. Dedefo's abuse of his wife was wrong and illegala fact that he now acknowledgesbut the abuse was not the conduct for which we suspended him. And although our past cases make clear that restitution, apologies, and other methods of making amends to the victims of wrongdoing are probative of a suspended attorney's moral change, we have never held a failure to apologize to a victim against a reinstatement petitioner. Dedefo's testimony about his moral change was unrefuted by any evidence in the record and was corroborated by two witnesses. Both Hassan Hussein and Kassim Hussein know Dedefo well, and both testified that they observed marked changes in Dedefo's affect and behavior after he came to understand how he had made a serious mistake by filing the lawsuit against his friends. Both witnesses testified that Dedefo counseled others to take care not to allow their decisions to be driven by anger and to follow the law even when it conflicts with traditional Oromo culture. The Panel described both witnesses as thoughtful but nonetheless dismissed their testimony as insufficient, without further explanation as to deficiencies in the witnesses' testimony. The Panel's focus in this case strayed from the moral change analysis that we have fashioned for reinstatement proceedings. The Panel focused its inquiry on Dedefo's mental state and values at the time of his suspension rather than at the time of his reinstatement proceedings. Further, the Panel placed undue weight on Dedefo's failure to apologize and misinterpreted his evidence about his cultural background as a justification or defense of his misconduct. The Panel also erroneously characterized Dedefo's dishonesty at the time of his disciplinary proceeding as new misconduct. Finally, the Panel disregarded Dedefo's candid, internally consistent testimony about his dramatically changed view of his misconduct, his efforts to manage anger, and his public acknowledgement of his wrongs, coupled with advice to others about how to avoid similar downfalls. That testimony was corroborated by two witnesses whose testimony the Panel viewed favorably. In light of these problems with the Panel's analysis, we conclude the Panel's finding that Dedefo has not undergone a moral change is unsupported by the record and clearly erroneous. Our independent review leads us to conclude that Dedefo has clearly and convincingly shown that he has undergone the moral change required of a petitioner for reinstatement to the practice of law.