Opinion ID: 377146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Damage Award Was Clearly Erroneous.

Text: 9 The government's first point on appeal is that the court's award is clearly erroneous under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The government contends that the court did not acknowledge the extent to which maladies unrelated to plaintiff's Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) contributed to plaintiff's condition and that the amount of the damage award was, in any event, excessive. 10 As examples of maladies ignored or misinterpreted by the court, the government cites the plaintiff's thyroid problems, her markedly diminished hearing, her partial blindness, the fracture of her shoulder in 1975, the arthritis in her knees, and the nervous tremor in her hands. With the exception of the tremor (which grew worse, the court indicated, as a result of the swine flu shot), the court did not mention these maladies in assessing plaintiff's loss. 11 Our own review of the record convinces us that the amount of the award was based on no error of law or clearly erroneous finding of fact. The court properly compared the plaintiff's condition immediately before her illness with her condition thereafter and made sufficiently detailed subsidiary findings to support his ultimate conclusions. The evidence is uncontroverted that, prior to her swine flu injection, plaintiff enjoyed an active life style, her maladies notwithstanding. 3 During and after her illness, which subjected her to debilitation and paralysis, plaintiff has led a life of confinement. The court was entitled to find that plaintiff's mental anguish and loss of health and mobility stemmed from her bout with GBS and not from her other maladies. Indeed, the existence of plaintiff's maladies, far from diminishing the government's responsibility for her present condition, increased it to the extent that these maladies were aggravated by GBS 4 and to the extent that these maladies now make a greater contribution toward her disability. Cf. Heppner v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 297 S.W.2d 497 (Mo.1956) (in action brought under Federal Employer's Liability Act, railroad was liable for death of employee where railroad's negligence caused him to strike his head against a window and thereby activate a dormant cancer which resulted in his death). We conclude there was substantial evidence for the court to find that plaintiff's present problems her disabilities and her heightened risk of injury through falling were directly and proximately caused by the illness, for which the government has conceded responsibility. 12 The government also contends that, however we view the evidence of causation, the amount of the damage award is excessive. Although the amount of damages entered in a non-jury case is a finding of fact and therefore subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), any application of that general standard must take account of the special circumstances in which that kind of factual finding is rendered. We have long subscribed to the view that 13 excessiveness of a verdict is basically, and should be, a matter for the trial court which has had the benefit of hearing the testimony and of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and which knows the community and its standards; that this is a responsibility which, for better working of the judicial process and for other seemingly obvious reasons, is best placed upon its shoulders; and that we shall continue to consider review, as we have said before, not routinely and in every case, but only in those rare situations where we are pressed to conclude that there is plain injustice or a monstrous or shocking result. 14 Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 447-48 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929, 82 S.Ct. 366, 7 L.Ed.2d 192 (1961). Accord, Hysell v. Iowa Public Service Co., 534 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1976) (Solomon standard applies in a non-jury as well as a jury case). 15 The district court arrived at its figure of $106,500 in general damages by awarding plaintiff $1,000 a month for the thirty months from her illness and hospitalization to the date of trial and $750 a month for the 8.6 years of her life expectancy at the date of trial. Although the award appears generous, we are not, after reviewing the record, pressed to conclude the award is monstrous, shocking, or plainly unjust. We accordingly decline to interfere with the trial court's assessment of plaintiff's loss. 16