Opinion ID: 760821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent to Enter the House

Text: 27 The Fourth Amendment provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This principle generally prohibits the warrantless entry of law enforcement personnel into a person's home. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). The prohibition does not apply, however, to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained. Id. It is the government's burden to prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). 28 In the case sub judice, Ivy claims that he did not consent to the police entry into his home, and that this fact, in conjunction with the fact that the police did not have a search warrant, renders the search invalid. Ivy relies on his and Jones' testimony at the suppression hearing to support this claim, and argues that the district court's credibility finding was flawed. Ivy asserts that it is reasonable to suppose that he and his girlfriend were saving money in the night stand, and that his explanation to this effect at the suppression hearing did not taint his credibility in general. Ivy's arguments, however, miss the essential issue. 29 The district court made a finding of fact based upon the credibility of the witnesses it observed at the suppression hearing. Officers Harvey and Setliff testified that Ivy said okay when they asked if they could enter this house, and that they did not touch him. The district court believed their testimony over that of Ivy and Jones. The district court's credibility finding carries considerable weight. This Court has noted [f]indings of fact anchored in credibility assessment are generally not subject to reversal upon appellate review. United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 404, 121 L.Ed.2d 330 (1992). Indeed, when there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. (quoting United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d at 1490, 1494 (6th Cir.1989)). 30 In this case, the district court chose between two competing accounts of what happened when the police arrived at 6706 Silhouette. The court adopted the version recounted by Officers Harvey and Setliff, and based its determination upon the credibility of different witnesses. In light of the significant fact-finding advantage the district court possessed in its opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to make critical judgments about their credibility, there is no basis for this Court to find that the district court committed clear error by finding that Ivy consented to the officers' entry into his house. Therefore, the district court's determination that Ivy consented to the officers entry into his house is affirmed.