Opinion ID: 3052077
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A person commits the crime of identity theft if

Text: the person, with the intent to deceive or to defraud, obtains, possesses, transfers, creates, utters or converts to the person’s own use the personal identification of another person. .... (4) As used in this section:
living or deceased, or an imaginary person. OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800. [5] As the Government concedes, Oregon’s identity theft statute plainly encompasses conduct not comprehended within the scope of a generic theft offense. First, and perhaps most obviously, the Oregon statute is broader than the generic definition of a theft offense because it extends to the creation and use of fictitious identities. Oregon law criminalizes the obtaining, possession, transfer, creation, utterance or conversion of the personal identification of “an imaginary person.” OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800(4)(a). As a result, an individual may be convicted under the Oregon law if, for example, he possesses a fake social security card containing a fabricated social security number. See OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800(4)(a); see, e.g., State v. Porter, 108 P.3d 107, 109 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (defendant convicted under section 165.800 for creating what appeared to be templates for Oregon identification cards or driver’s licenses). In such case, none of the elements of the generic theft offense is satisfied. There is no “taking of property or [ ] exercise of control over property” because a false social security number belongs to, and is therefore the property of, no one. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1205 (internal citation omitted). Similarly, lack of consent is missing because a false social security number has no rightful “owner” whose consent the offender failed to receive before MANDUJANO-REAL v. MUKASEY 5937 placing the number on a fake card. Id. (listing “without consent” as an element of a generic theft offense). Finally, for the same reason, the offender’s intent in using such a number cannot be to “deprive [an] owner of the rights and benefits of ownership.” Id. The same is true, of course, with respect to using the identities of dead persons, also a violation under the statute. See OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800(4)(a). [6] Second, even if a living person’s identity is involved, the Oregon law still encompasses conduct that is broader than that proscribed by the generic theft definition — conduct that does not constitute theft. For example, a person may be convicted under the law even if the owner of the identity consents to or participates in the identity fraud by encouraging his friend to use the owner’s alien identification number on a job application. A defendant may also be convicted under Oregon’s identity theft provision if he uses another’s home address in order to secure the enrollment of his child in a particular school or to obtain a residential parking permit. OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800(4)(b)(A). Although such acts may be undertaken without the address owner’s consent, the defendant’s intent in such a case is not to defraud the homeowner but to deceive the city into providing a benefit to which he would otherwise not be entitled. An intent to deceive a third party by using another’s address is not akin to an intent to deprive the owner of the property of the rights and benefits to which his ownership entitles him. [7] Because Oregon’s identity theft statute encompasses conduct that is beyond the scope of the generic definition of a theft offense, we hold that Mandujano-Real’s conviction under that law is not categorically an aggravated felony for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).