Opinion ID: 2967272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 3(a), (b), (e).

Text: The requirement to obtain a special exception, however, does not apply to all nonresidential uses. In particular, Zoning Ordinance § 59- G-2.19(c) provides the following exemption: The requirements of this section shall not apply to the use of any lot, lots or tract of land for any private educational institution, or parochial school, which is located in a building or on premises owned or leased by any church or religious organization, the government of the United States, the State of Maryland or any agency thereof, Montgomery County or any incorporated village or town within Montgomery County. While Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) exempts from the special exception requirement private schools located on property owned or leased either by the national, state, or local government or by a church or religious organization, it is the portion exempting a parochial school, which is located in a building or on premises owned or leased by any church or religious organization that the Renzis challenge as improperly establishing religion. 5 Connelly School argues that the exemption created by Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) represents an appropriate effort by Montgomery County to accommodate religion by simply excusing religiously-affiliated entities from regulatory burdens placed on others. It maintains that the exemption's purpose is to alleviate government interference with the ability of religious organizations to fulfill their religious missions; that its effect is tomake it easier for religious organizations to advance religion; and that it avoids the entanglement that would follow from subjecting religious schools to the special exception process. The Renzis contend, on the other hand, that Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) evinces no secular legislative purpose and that it does not remove a burden from the free exercise of religion as required for Connelly School's `accommodation of religion' argument. They argue that the exemption also indirectly aids religion. While they acknowledge that such aid is permissible if it arises from a neutral and generally applicable law, they maintain that it is impermissible when it only benefits religious landowners. Finally, the Renzis argue that Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) fosters excessive government entanglement with religion because it is likely to cause or intensify political fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines. We are thus confronted with the question of whether exempting a parochial school from the procedures and restrictions otherwise required to obtain a special exception in Montgomery County violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.