Opinion ID: 889628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by imposing a condition forbidding Johnson from frequenting places where children are present or reasonably expected to be present absent an approved adult and forbidding him from attending private social gatherings where children and alcohol or drugs are present?

Text: ¶ 18 The District Court imposed the following conditions: 14. The Defendant shall not frequent places where children congregate. This includes, but is not limited to: schools, parks, playgrounds, malls, movies, fairs, parades, swimming pools, carnivals, arcades, parties, family functions, holiday festivities, or any other place or function where children are present or reasonably expected to be present, unless accompanied by an approved and appropriately trained, responsible adult who is aware of the Defendant's conviction and approved by his Probation Officer and sex offender treatment provider. The Defendant shall obtain permission from his Probation Officer prior to going to any of the above places. . . . 27. The Defendant will not host or attend private social events where alcohol or drugs are present with minors. Johnson argues that the above conditions are overly broad, redundant and, at least in some aspects, have no relationship to either Charley or the offense for which he was convicted. . . . He states that many of the conditions imposed on him are repetitive and unwieldy, requiring approval of his probation officer and another party before he can attend to basic needs such as purchasing groceries and receiving medical care. He suggests that condition 14 should be restricted to the first sentence, [t]he Defendant shall not frequent places where children congregate and that condition 27 be stricken because his offense was not related to drugs or alcohol, and he does not have a history of drug or alcohol abuse. ¶ 19 Under § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA (1999), a sentencing judge may impose any other limitation reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society. We have explained that while this grant of authority is broad, it is not without limit. Ashby, ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16, ¶¶ 11-12, 293 Mont. 133, 974 P.2d 620). In order for the condition to be reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society, the condition must have a nexus to the offender or the offense for which the offender is being sentenced. Ashby, ¶ 15. ¶ 20 However, Johnson again failed to object to either one of these conditions at his sentencing hearing, failing to preserve the issue for appellate review. We thus decline to address whether the imposition of these conditions constituted an abuse of discretion. Holt, ¶ 17; Kotwicki, ¶ 22 Beyond that, it is our observation that the conditions challenged here appear to be quite restrictive of Johnson's movements. There is good reason for the imposition of restrictions, but if these prove to be unduly burdensome in practice, Johnson and/or his probation officer may seek relief from the District Court. ¶ 21 This case is remanded for calculation of future restitution in compliance with § 46-18-244, MCA (1999). The District Court may conduct any additional proceedings it deems necessary to resolve the question. Otherwise, this matter is affirmed. We concur: BETH BAKER, PATRICIA COTTER, MICHAEL E. WHEAT and BRIAN MORRIS.