Opinion ID: 1890795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of guilty but mentally ill verdict

Text: Appellant's next allegation of error is based on the constitutionality of giving the jury an option to find a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. The crux of Appellant's complaint is that this option confused the jury so that they did not return a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. Appellant believes that the promise of treatment lured the jury into returning a guilty but mentally ill verdict rather than a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, but contends that such a verdict does not necessarily guarantee that a defendant will receive treatment while in prison. In support of this argument, Appellant introduced the affidavit of Deputy Warden Paige McGuire, who oversees the Correctional Psychiatric Treatment Unit at the Kentucky State Reformatory. In her affidavit, the Deputy Warden stated that the guilty but mentally ill verdict has no impact on the classification process nor the psychiatric treatment provided. Further, she noted that the Department of Corrections conducts its own independent evaluation and will provide appropriate psychiatric care. This, Appellant maintains, shows that the guilty but mentally ill verdict is a charade. Appellant argues that such a verdict violates his due process rights, is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as it may result in an insane person being found criminally responsible. In addition, Appellant argues that the jury instructions were inadequate. We disagree. KRS 504.120(4) authorizes the verdict of guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense. According to KRS 504.130(1), a defendant may be found guilty but mentally ill if [t]he prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense; and [t]he defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense. Once a guilty but mentally ill verdict is reached, treatment shall be provided the defendant until the treating professional determines that the treatment is no longer necessary or until expiration of his sentence, whichever occurs first. KRS 504.150(1). Thus, the guilty but mentally ill verdict is intended to provide an in-between classification whereby a defendant bears the legal responsibility for criminal conduct, but is provided treatment while incarcerated for mental illness. People v. Jackson, 80 Mich.App. 244, 263 N.W.2d 44 (1977). Appellant points to no evidence supporting the proposition that guilty but mentally ill verdicts increase the possibility of improper compromises by the trier of fact. Appellant has not cited, and we cannot find, any authority indicating that compromise by the trier of fact is inconsistent with due process. To the contrary, the great weight of authority states that such verdicts do not lead to improper compromise verdicts. See People v. Smith, 124 Ill.App.3d 805, 80 Ill.Dec. 310, 465 N.E.2d 101 (1984); People v. Ramsey, 422 Mich. 500, 375 N.W.2d 297 (1985); Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 Pa.Super. 549, 543 A.2d 1106 (1988); State v. Neely, 112 N.M. 702, 819 P.2d 249 (1991); State v. Baker, 440 N.W.2d 284 (S.D.1989). It seems Appellant is suggesting that, given the choice between verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity and guilty but mentally ill, jurors in this case chose the latter because of the alleged similarity and confusion between the two verdicts. We believe this supposition is entirely too speculative and presupposes that jury compromise occurs in every case where more than one verdict or charge is submitted to the jury. Put another way, there is no indication that but for the guilty but mentally ill instruction, the jury would have found Appellant not guilty by reason of insanity. If Appellant believed that the jury improperly arrived at a compromise verdict, he was free to poll the jurors. Nor do we believe that the guilty but mentally ill verdict constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Such a verdict merely allows for accommodation of the mental health needs of those defendants who are guilty, but have a mental disorder that falls short of insanity and delusional compulsion. Appellant's argument misapprehends the nature of the guilty but mentally ill finding. A guilty but mentally ill offender is no less guilty than one who is guilty and not mentally ill. Unlike an insanity verdict, a guilty but mentally ill finding or plea does not relieve an offender of criminal responsibility for his conduct. Appellant's situation must be distinguished from that of a person who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity. A person found not guilty by reason of insanity is one who lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. KRS 504.020(1). A finding of insanity functions as a complete defense to conviction. See Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 229, 263 S.W. 752 (1924). A defendant who is mentally ill, but not insane, cannot make a similar claim. By definition, the guilty but mentally ill offender is able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior and is able to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. With respect to that offender, deterrence and retribution then remain valid considerations in his punishment. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). In addition, we find no error in the jury instructions in this case. In Brown v. Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Ky. 1996), this Court stated that the constitutionality of the guilty but mentally ill statute depends, at least in part, upon how the jury is instructed in the rendering of such a verdict. In this case, the trial court used the following instruction, provided by defense counsel: If you find William Star guilty of one or more of the offenses mentioned in these instructions, but further believe from the evidence that at the time he committed the offense or offenses he was suffering from a mental illness, as that term is defined in these Instructions (but was not insane), you shall state in your verdict that you find Mr. Star guilty of the offense, but mentally ill. If you find William Star guilty but mentally ill, he will be sentenced in the same manner as a defendant found guilty but not mentally ill. Treatment may or may not be provided while Mr. Star is incarcerated depending on (1) whether or not the state makes funds available to the Department of Corrections to provide such treatment, and (2) whether or not the correctional mental health professionals believe treatment is necessary at the time he is evaluated at the prison. These instructions fully comply with and alleviate any concerns expressed by this Court in Brown . The constitutionality of guilty but mentally ill verdicts has been an issue courts across this country have faced. To date no case has been found in which an appellate court has held a guilty but mentally ill statute to be unconstitutional. Debra T. Landis, J.D., Guilty But Mentally Ill Statutes: Validity and Construction, 71 A.L.R.4th 702, 707 (1989). It has long been held that a statute enacted by the General Assembly carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. Martinez v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.3d 581, 584 (Ky.2002). A statute will not be invalidated as unconstitutional unless it clearly, unequivocally, and completely violates provisions of the Constitution. Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Ky. 2001). Further, the party questioning the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving its contention. Id. at 572-73. Appellant has simply not met that burden in this case. As such, we find no error.