Opinion ID: 78597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: K.W.'s Prior Sexual History

Text: Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a) provides that, in general, in a criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct, [e]vidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior is inadmissible. The rule also provides, as a narrow exception to this broad general principle, that evidence of a victim's prior sexual history is admissible when the exclusion of such evidence would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(1)(C). Culver contends that his case implicates the narrow exception to the general rule and that the district court erred by refusing to allow him to present evidence of K.W.'s sexual history. Culver claims that he should have been allowed to present such evidence to rebut evidence offered by the government that Culver was responsible for condoms and a broken abstinence card found in K.W.'s room. As with other rulings on the admissibility of evidence, we review a district court's application of Rule 412 for abuse of discretion. [5] See Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 1997). In determining the admissibility of a victim's other sexual behavior under Rule 412(b)(1)(C), we start with the premise that defendants have a constitutional right under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to introduce evidence in their defense. United States v. Pumpkin Seed, 572 F.3d 552, 559 (8th Cir.2009). However, the right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2711, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). [T]rial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on [testimony] based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Limitations on a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence are permissible unless they are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 1747, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991). The district court's exclusion of evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual history was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes that Rule 412 was designed to serve. The admission of such evidence would have confused the jury and harassed K.W., and the evidence is marginally relevant at best. The key issue in this case is the identity of the female on the tape and in the photographs. Whether Culver was the source of the condoms or the broken abstinence card found in K.W.'s room is not relevant to the issue of the identity of the female on the tape. [6] See United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1213 (11th Cir.2009) (explaining that victim's other sexual conduct was irrelevant to issue of identification in child pornography production case under § 2251(a)). Furthermore, the district court allowed Culver to cross-examine K.W. on every issue concerning her prior sexual history that was potentially relevant to the charged conduct. The female depicted on the tape had a shaved pubic region, and on cross-examination, Culver was allowed to ask K.W. when and why she had shaved her pubic region in an effort to prove that K.W. is not the female depicted in the tape. At that time, K.W. revealed that she had shaved her pubic region to please her boyfriend. In addition, the district court allowed Culver to attempt to establish K.W.'s bias by allowing testimony that K.W. had gotten into trouble early in the morning on November 11 and that K.W. was extremely angry with Culver for his role in disciplining her. We agree with the district court that the jury did not need to hear the details of the conduct for which K.W. was disciplined in order for Culver to have a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to impeach K.W. Because the evidence Culver claims he needs to rebut is irrelevant, and the district court allowed Culver to cross-examine K.W. on every issue that had any potential relevance to his defense, we conclude that Culver has not shown that the district court's application of Rule 412 violated his constitutional rights. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual history, but assuming arguendo that the district court erred by excluding evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual history, we conclude that any such error was harmless because the evidence establishing Culver's guilt was overwhelming. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a); United States v. Harriston, 329 F.3d 779, 789 (11th Cir.2003) (explaining that error is harmless where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.).