Opinion ID: 202083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Potential violation of the district court's order

Text: 44 The appellant next argues that the government committed reversible misconduct in its closing arguments to the jury. Before the closing arguments commenced, the district court instructed the parties that they were not to argue to the jury that DeCicco was, or was not, responsible for the fires. The appellant here argues that the government violated this order when it explicitly argued to the jury that DeCicco had a motive to want the building gone. Such an argument, contends the appellant, the jury could only have interpreted as suggesting DeCicco's responsibility for the fires. Appellant, in particular, points to the following statements by the government during closing arguments: 45 Now finally, there was this argument that the defendant got nothing out of this. I suggest to you, just use your common sense. You've got a building that's useless. You've got a building that people are chasing you after. You've got a building where your tax liabilities for the property are ballooning as time goes on. And you owe the bank a lot of money. . . . 46 This defendant had every incentive to want that building gone, to be rid of that building. And by getting [Scottsdale] to get him off the hook and basically pay the entire mortgage, everything that was due and owing to the bank on that, as well as everything he had to pay to Kevin Mahoney and Randy Adamson to take the building down, you can't say that the defendant got nothing. He got the entire benefit of that. He got completely free and clear of that horrible investment that he made for whatever reason back in 1989. 47 Trial Tr. 5-93-94 (emphasis added). This argument, the appellant argues, was highly prejudicial and warrants reversal of his conviction. 48 On this issue, the appropriate standard of review is clear. Because DeCicco did not object to the government's closing arguments, we review for plain error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. 49 After reviewing the record, we do not believe that the government violated the district court's order when it stated that the appellant had every incentive to want that building gone, to be rid of that building. For several reasons, we think that in making such a statement, the government was addressing the appellant's desire to have the building gone in an economic sense (as in gone from his portfolio). We also think this is how a jury would have understood such a statement. 50 First, and most importantly, we look at the context in which these words were uttered. At the time the government made the statement at issue here, it was discussing the nature of appellant's investments, tax liabilities, and mortgages. The government was not discussing any allegations that the appellant was responsible for the fires. The context of the government's statement leads us to believe that the government desired only to discuss how the appellant sought to maximize his recovery from Scottsdale and rid himself entirely of a horrible investment through the submission of false claims. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 466, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (Words that can have more than one meaning are given content, however, by their surroundings.); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (discussing the relevance of the noscitur a sociis canon — which literally means it is known from its associates and instructs that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it — in assessing the validity of a jury instruction); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-09, 24 L.Ed. 586 (1878) ( copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu — the coupling of words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense. And where the meaning of any particular word is doubtful or obscure, . . . the intention of the party who has made use of it may frequently be ascertained and carried unto effect by looking at the adjoining words. (citing Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 450)). 51 We also read the government's statement as a response to the appellant's earlier comment that he had gained nothing from the alleged fraud. Appellant's counsel had stated: 52 I just want to point out to you again what I've said all along. When you're out there deliberating, remember, Gary got nothing out of this. It cost Gary money out of his pocket. Gary lost an asset, a building, that although it was tough to get to, was described as the triple-thick walls, huge beams, a good, solid building he had and he lost. Gary had no reason — there was no rhyme, no reason for Gary to do anything. 53 Trial Tr. 5-89. The government's statement was an attempt to address this argument. In stating that the appellant had every incentive to want that building gone, to be rid of that building, the government was attempting to counter the appellant's argument and show that the appellant did indeed reap a benefit from the alleged mail fraud. The complained-of statement addressed the appellant's motive in committing the fraud — namely his desire to have a troublesome financial investment removed from his portfolio by having Scottsdale pay off his mortgage and the entire cost of demolition. 54 We therefore find that the government did not violate the district court's order to refrain from discussing the appellant's responsibility for the fires. Once again, the appellant fails to show the error required under the plain error test.