Opinion ID: 793749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Town's Challenges to the Due Process Rulings

Text: 42 Defendants challenge the district court's ruling that they deprived the Ambulance Corps of its property without due process, arguing principally (1) that the ambulances and other property detained by the Town belong to the Town, not to the Ambulance Corps, (2) that what is at issue is a simple contract right, not a constitutionally protected property right, and (3) that even if property rights of the Corps are at issue, the Corps was afforded all the process that was due. They also challenge the award of attorneys' fees on procedural grounds. We reject all of these challenges. 43
44 The Town contends that the district court erred in finding that the Corps was the owner of the seized ambulances and equipment, arguing (a) that the contracts did not provide that the Corps was to own the ambulances, and (b) that even if the contracts allowed the Corps to own the ambulances, those contracts are unenforceable because they violate the New York State (State) Constitution's provision prohibiting municipalities from making gifts of money or property to private corporations. 45 The question of who owns a given item of personal property is a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., Iselin v. Starin, 144 N.Y. 453, 460, 39 N.E. 488, 489 (1895); McKee v. Jessup, 62 A.D. 143, 144, 70 N.Y.S. 796, 797 (1st Dep't 1901). To the extent that the determination of ownership turns on the interpretation of provisions of a contract, the existence and terms of the contract are questions of fact, but the effect of those terms on ownership is strictly a question of law if the provisions are unambiguous, for under New York law, the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law, see, e.g., K. Bell & Associates v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 97 F.3d 632, 637 (2d Cir.1996); Teitelbaum Holdings, Ltd. v. Gold, 48 N.Y.2d 51, 56, 421 N.Y.S.2d 556, 559, 396 N.E.2d 1029 (1979). However, if the contract is ambiguous and relevant extrinsic evidence as to its meaning is available, its interpretation is a question of fact for the factfinder. See, e.g., Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 59, 66 (2d Cir.2000); Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 573 (2d Cir.1993); Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir.1985); In re Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co., 77 N.Y.2d 144, 150, 565 N.Y.S.2d 434, 436, 566 N.E.2d 633 (1990). Further, under New York law, the existence of an implied contract is likewise a question of fact. Shapira v. United Medical Service, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 200, 210, 257 N.Y.S.2d 150, 157, 205 N.E.2d 293 (1965). 46 In interpreting an ambiguous contract provision, the factfinder should, when possible, apply the same measure as the parties have applied in performing their obligations. William C. Atwater & Co. v. Panama R. Co., 255 N.Y. 496, 501, 175 N.E. 189, 191 (1931); see, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 118, 33 S.Ct. 967, 57 L.Ed. 1410 (1913) (of great significance is the practical interpretation of a contract by the parties to it for any considerable period of time before it comes to be the subject of controversy). Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the interpretation of the agreement. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(4) (1979); see also Brooklyn Life Insurance Company of New York v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273, 24 L.Ed. 410 (1877) (There is no surer way to find out what parties meant, than to see what they have done.... Parties in such cases often claim more, but rarely less, than they are entitled to.). 47 When the district court as factfinder has considered relevant extrinsic evidence in connection with a contract provision that was not unambiguous, its findings as to the meaning of the provision are findings of fact that may not properly be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); see, e.g., In Time Products, Ltd. v. Toy Biz, Inc., 38 F.3d 660, 665 (2d Cir.1994); Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. International Organization of Masters, 878 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 724, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990); Network Publishing Corp. v. Shapiro, 895 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir.1990). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 48 Various sets of legal principles may govern the determination of ownership under an established set of facts. As a matter of New York law, the certificate of title of a vehicle is presumptive evidence of the vehicle's ownership. See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 2108 (McKinney 1996). [T]his presumption of ownership is not conclusive, and may be rebutted by evidence which demonstrates that another individual owned the vehicle in question. Aronov v. Bruins Transportation, Inc., 294 A.D.2d 523, 524, 743 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (2d Dep't 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 49 The New York State Constitution, invoked by the Town, provides that no municipality shall give or loan any money or property to or in aid of any individual, or private corporation or association, or private undertaking. N.Y. Const. Art. 8, § 1. This anti-gift provision was intended to curb raids on the public purse for the benefit of favored individuals or enterprises furnishing no corresponding benefit. Taylor v. McGuire, 100 Misc.2d 834, 837, 420 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (Sup.Ct. N.Y.Co.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prohibition on gifting requires that a municipality expend its funds only to meet its lawful obligations incurred as a result of the performance of its governmental functions. Corning v. Village of Laurel Hollow, 48 N.Y.2d 348, 353, 422 N.Y.S.2d 932, 935, 398 N.E.2d 537 (1979). Notwithstanding that prohibition, New York law allows a town to [c]ontract with one or more individuals, municipal corporations, associations, or other organizations to supply, staff and equip emergency medical service or ambulance vehicles suitable for such purposes and operate such vehicles for the furnishing of prehospital emergency treatment. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 122-b(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 2004). 50 We review the district court's conclusions on questions of law de novo. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. Local 100, Transport Workers Union of America, 91 F.3d 316, 322 (2d Cir.1996). The matter of whether a given agreement is barred by law is, of course, a question of law. 51 In the present case, we see no clear error in any of the district court's factual findings that, as a matter of contract, the Corps owned the ambulances and other seized equipment. Although the last written contract between the parties was in 1985, and the 1985 Agreement was silent as to the ownership of the ambulances, the court was amply justified in relying on the parties' course of conduct over the years in order to determine their intent as to who would own the ambulances and other vehicles. Until their seizure in February 2004, not one of the eight vehicles in question had been claimed by the Town as Town property at any time. Rather, the parties' conduct prior to the present controversy included the purchase and operation of each of the four ambulances and four other vehicles exclusively by the Corps; the registering of title to each of those eight vehicles in the name of the Corps; the insuring of each of those eight vehicles in the name of the Corps; and the Town's not listing any of those vehicles on the Town's property inventory. 52 Further, the manner of the vehicles' procurement supports the district court's finding that the parties understood the vehicles were to be owned by the Corps, not the Town. The vehicles were not acquired through a State contract or a competitive bidding process; rather, each year, the Corps submitted a budget request to the Town that included both capital and operating expenses. It is undisputed that the Town considered these requests item by item; but after a budget was approved, the Town simply made a lump sum payment to the Corps. Further, the Town classified these budget items as contractual expenses, not as purchases for the Town or donations to the Corps. 53 The court inferred that placement of title to the ambulances in the name of the Corps was in accordance with the parties' intent that the Corps own the vehicles, and not merely an oversight on the part of the Town. It drew this inference in part from the above evidence and in part from the fact that when the Town purchased an ambulance with funds raised through the 1994 public bond issue, the Town took title to that ambulance in its own name. The court's inference was permissible and hence cannot be termed clearly erroneous. 54 Further, the Corps had total control of its accounts, and it could use the funds paid by the Town to purchase equipment as it saw fit. The Town did not pay the Corps's bills; and, aside from reviewing the Corps's expenditures 4-6 times a year for procedural irregularities, the Town did not actively involve itself in the Corps's business decisions. Finally, unlike funds held by Town departments, any surplus funds remaining in the Corps's account at the end of the year did not revert to the Town; they instead remained the property of the Corps. 55 In sum, the record furnishes ample support for the inferences that the Town paid the Corps pursuant to a contract for services that could not be available without expensive equipment; that the moneys paid were intended to and did become the property of the Corps; and that the Corps thus purchased the ambulances and other equipment out of its own funds and thereby owned the vehicles and equipment. The trial court's finding that as a matter of contract, the parties intended that the Corps would own the ambulances and other equipment is well supported by the evidence. 56 Nor do we see any error in the district court's conclusion that the contract pursuant to which the Corps was meant to own the vehicles was not in violation of New York law. Although, as set forth above, the State Constitution forbids municipalities to make gifts to private entities, State law expressly authorizes municipalities to [c]ontract with independent entities  to supply ... emergency medical service or ambulance vehicles suitable for such purposes, N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 122-b(1)(c) (emphases added). Interpreting these provisions, the State's Comptroller, its highest-ranking fiscal officer, has opined that although the provisions of section 122-b(1)(c) may not be utilized as a means of circumventing the [State Constitution's] prohibition against gifts of municipal money, Op. 80-702, 1980 N.Y. St. Comp. 193, 193, 1980 WL 8103, at  (State Comptroller's Nov. 1980 Opinion), § 122-b(1)(c) does allow a municipality to pay an ambulance corps sufficient sums to permit the ambulance corps to purchase corps ambulances and other vehicles. Responding to an inquiry from a county that planned to contract with a volunteer ambulance corps that would provide its own vehicles, the Comptroller opined that 57 [i]n determining the amount which it will pay, we believe a municipality may consider such things as the corps' need to replace its vehicles, supplies and/or equipment; the corps' need for new, different and/or additional equipment, supplies and vehicles; and the corps' ability to raise money from donations. 58 ... [I]t follows from the foregoing that an ambulance corps may use the money paid by the county to replace and/or purchase vehicles ... which are no longer repairable ... and to purchase needed new, different and/or additional vehicles .... 59 State Comptroller's Nov. 1980 Opinion at  (emphases added). 60 We conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that the contracts for emergency medical services under which the Town paid the Corps sums sufficient for the Corps to purchase the ambulances and other equipment needed for the rendering of such services did not contravene State law, and that the eight vehicles, along with other equipment, were owned by the Corps. 61
62 The Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of, inter alia, property, without due process of law. Defendants argue that there could not have been a due process violation because—notwithstanding their initial stance that  [n]o contract for services existed between the Town and New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps (Second Town Letter at 1 (emphasis added))—they now contend that this dispute is a simple contract dispute (Defendants' brief on appeal at 10), rather than a dispute over a property interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. In support of this contention, defendants cite only S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962 (2d Cir.1988) ( S & D Maintenance ). We find that case inapposite. 63 In S & D Maintenance, the plaintiff (S & D) had entered into contracts with the City of New York to maintain the City's on-street parking meters for two consecutive two-year periods; the City thereafter refused to pay three invoices, submitted by S & D for interim payments, pending the outcome of a criminal investigation into the circumstances under which S & D had obtained the first of the contracts. As a result, S & D informed the City that S & D would suspend performance under the second contract; the City thereafter terminated the second contract. S & D sued the City for denial of due process, contending that both the withheld moneys and the second contract itself were property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. We rejected those contentions. We noted that `[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.' 844 F.2d at 965-66 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). We upheld the grant of summary judgment dismissing the complaint because S & D had no legitimate claim of entitlement either to the continuation of its contract or to prompt interim payments for past services. 64 The present case bears little resemblance to S & D Maintenance. The Ambulance Corps did not assert, as did S & D, that it had a property right to the continuation of its contractual relationship with the Town. Nor did the Corps suggest that money unpaid for the period January 1 to February 10, 2004, was the subject of its due process claim. Rather, the Corps asserted that it owned the ambulances and other vehicles and equipment that were seized and withheld by the Town. Given the district court's ruling, upheld above, that the Corps owned the seized items, the Town's contention that no protectable property interest was at stake here is meritless. The district court correctly ruled that the tangible physical assets owned by the Corps constituted property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. 65
66 The Town also contends that even if the ambulances and other equipment were property of the Corps protected by the Due Process Clause, the Corps received all the process it was due because it could have brought a proceeding under Article 78 of New York's C.P.L.R. or a plenary contract action after the seizure (Defendants' brief on appeal at 12 n. 4). We disagree. 67 In general, the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (emphasis in original); see also Gudema v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717, 724 (2d Cir.1998) (Ordinarily, the Due Process Clause requires that the state not deprive an individual of a significant liberty or property interest without affording notice and some opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation.  (emphasis added)). Although postdeprivation remedies can provide constitutionally sufficient process in circumstances where the deprivation was caused by a state agent's conduct that was random and unauthorized, Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 130, 110 S.Ct. 975; see, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), on the rationale that the state cannot reasonably anticipate such conduct, see, e.g., Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129, 110 S.Ct. 975, the principle does not apply where the deprivation was caused by high-ranking officials who had final authority over the decision-making process, Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir.1985), modified, 793 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.1986); see, e.g., DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988, 124 S.Ct. 2018, 158 L.Ed.2d 492 (2004); RR Village Ass'n v. Denver Sewer Corp., 826 F.2d 1197, 1204 (2d Cir.1987). 68 Here, the district court found that the seizure was ordered not by any low-ranking employee, but by Meyers, see, e.g., District Court April 20 Opinion at 9, who was the Town's highest ranking official, chairman of the Town's governing body, and a policymaking official, id. at 2. Meyers's actions cannot be termed random or unauthorized; his actions with respect to the Corps were the actions of the Town itself. Id. Accordingly, the Corps was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Town seized its property. It received neither. 69 We conclude that the district court correctly ruled both that the Town seized property owned by the Corps and that the Town's failure to provide notice and a hearing before seizing Corps property violated the Corps's right to due process.
70 Finally, the Town makes a terse half-sentence procedural challenge to the district court's award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to the Ambulance Corps as the prevailing party on its § 1983 claim for denial of due process, arguing that the award should be vacated because the Town was not given an opportunity to respond to the fee motion. ( See Defendants' brief on appeal at 13.) We see no basis for reversal of that award. 71 Rule 54(d)(2), which governs motions for awards of attorneys' fees that are not an element of the damages to be proven at trial, provides, in pertinent part, that with respect to a motion for attorneys' fees the court shall afford an opportunity for adversary submissions  [o]n request of a party.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(C) (emphasis added). This subparagraph of the Rule 72 assures the parties of an opportunity to make an appropriate presentation with respect to issues involving the evaluation of legal services. In some cases, an evidentiary hearing may be needed, but this is not required in every case. 73 Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 Advisory Committee Note (1993). The district court of course has discretion to order a response and/or to order an evidentiary hearing even if there is no request. But if the party against which attorneys' fees are sought has not made any request for an opportunity to respond, the Rule does not require that such an opportunity be afforded. See, e.g., 10 Moore's Federal Practice — Civil ¶ 54.155[2] (3d ed. 2003) (If the fee movant properly carries the burden of establishing the right to the fee and its amount, the burden shifts to the fee opponent to contest the fee with its own evidentiary submissions. Upon the `request of a party or class member,' the court is obliged to allow adversary submissions.) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(C)). 74 In the present case, the Ambulance Corps's motion for an award of attorneys' fees was made on April 27, 2004. In its brief on appeal, the Town does not represent that it made any request for an opportunity to respond to the motion, nor does the record suggest that it did so. The fee motion was granted by the court in the Judgment on May 7. The record contains no indication that the Town thereafter asked the court to reconsider that portion of the Judgment, either on the ground that the Town had wished to respond to the motion or on the ground that there was any flaw in the award. Nor has the Town on this appeal suggested that there was any defect or abuse of discretion in the award. In light of all the circumstances, we decline to vacate the district court's award of fees to the Corps on its § 1983 claim. 75