Opinion ID: 2174346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Venireperson Kent Thompson

Text: Christeson claims that the trial court erred in striking venireperson Kent Thompson for cause at the state's request. In response to the voir dire questions, Thompson first indicated that he could vote to impose the death penalty, then said he was uncertain, then said he could not sign his name on the verdict form as a foreperson, and finally said he could consider the death penalty. These responses, according to Christeson, did not disqualify Thompson from serving. During voir dire, the following dialogue took place: PROSECUTOR: Having reached the final point of decision ... could you vote for life in prison without parole? VENIREPERSON THOMPSON: Yes. Q: Could you vote for the other alternative of the death penalty? A: Yes. Q: Is there any hesitation, sir? You seem to be thinking about that as you were getting ready to answer, and certainly giving something some thought is often a good idea. A: It would be hard. Q: Okay. Would it be fair to say you have some uncertainty about one or the other of those penalties? A: Uncertainty about death. The subject was addressed again during later questioning: PROSECUTOR: You were saying you had a hard time with the death penalty if I understood what you were saying; correct? VENIREPERSON THOMPSON: Yes. Q: Mr. Thompson, I want you to assume that not only are you on this jury but that you have been elected foreperson of the jury. I will tell you that while the jurythe vote of jury [sic] must be unanimous as to punishment, either for life or for death, that the foreperson of the jury would be the person that would come out and announce the verdict in open court. Do you think you could come out into open court and announce a death verdict? MS. LEFTWICH: I'm going to object, your honor. I think is [sic] inappropriate line of questioning under the law, and it misstates the law. He doesn't have to come out and announce the verdict. The foreperson signs on the line. PROSECUTOR: Well, I'll get to that too, and I think this line of questioning is specifically approved by the Supreme Court. THE COURT: The court will overrule that objection. Go ahead. PROSECUTOR: You may answer, sir. VENIREPERSON THOMPSON: Would you repeat that again. Q: All right, understand that while the verdict must be unanimous, that when the jury comes out, it is the foreperson of the jury who turns over the verdict and announces the death verdict if that were your conclusion in open court. Do you think you could do that? A: No. Q: No. I'll ask the next question just to make it clear. I will tell you again that while the verdict must be unanimous, the verdict is signed by the foreperson alone. Could you sign a death verdict? A: No. Thereafter, defense counsel questioned Mr. Thompson in an attempt to rehabilitate him: MS. LEFTWICH: One more, Mr. Thompson. I missed you for a minute. Okay, again are you telling meyou talked to Mr. Ahsens previously about the death penalty. I think you finally indicated that you wouldn't beyou didn't think you [could] sign a verdict form imposing the death penalty; is that correct? VENIREPERSON THOMPSON: Yes. Q: Could youCould you consider the death penalty after you had found someone guilty of one, two or three first degree murders? A: Yes. Q: Okay you will be able to consider it? A: (Nods head.) Q: Is that yes? A: Yes. In striking venireperson Thompson for cause, the court stated: [M]y impression was that he was not ... for the death penalty. He had a hard time even sayinglooking at him and watching him, he'd look down and, very softly, he saidhe finally said he might be able to vote for the death penalty. But he never said he could sign a verdict. I think I'm going to strike ... as not being able to realistically, I think, substantially comply with the law. A trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause will be upheld on appeal unless it is clearly against the evidence and is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 32 S.W.3d 532, 544 (Mo. banc 2000). The relevant question is whether a venireperson's beliefs preclude following the court's instructions so as to `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' State v. Johnson, 22 S.W.3d 183, 187 (Mo. banc 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 935, 121 S.Ct. 322, 148 L.Ed.2d 259 (2000) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). A venireperson's qualifications as a prospective juror are not determined by an answer to a single question, but by the entire examination. Id. at 188. The trial court is in the best position to evaluate a venireperson's qualifications to serve as a juror and has broad discretion in making the evaluation. Id. A venireperson's equivocation about his ability to impose the death penalty in a capital case, especially when coupled with an unequivocal statement that he could not sign a verdict of death, provides a basis to exclude him from the jury. See Smith, 32 S.W.3d at 544; Johnson, 22 S.W.3d at 186. Christeson's claim, as we understand it, is that the trial court's ruling was based solely on Thompson's unwillingness to sign a verdict of death, which, according to Christeson's reading of Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and other Supreme Court precedents, is alone insufficient to disqualify Thompson from serving. In fact, the Supreme Court has not addressed the precise issue here presented: Whether a prospective juror's unwillingness to sign a death verdict as a jury foreman will prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror ..., even though that juror is otherwise willing to consider imposition of the death penalty. In this case, however, it does not matter. Regardless of Thompson's unwillingness to sign a death verdict, he was equivocal in his responses about his ability to impose the death penalty, which is an independent basis for the trial court's discretionary ruling. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 840 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 961, 118 S.Ct. 2387, 141 L.Ed.2d 753 (1998); State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 597 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1056, 118 S.Ct. 711, 139 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). Despite Christeson's tacit assumption to the contrary, Thompson's answers to defense counsel's rehabilitative questions did not reconcile with his earlier answers to the state's questions, nor was he asked to reconcile those answers. Under these circumstances, this Court will not dispute the trial court's evaluation that the answers, on the whole, were equivocal and, hence, disqualifying. In light of Thompson's equivocation about imposing the death penalty, and his unequivocal assertion that he could not sign a verdict form assessing the death penalty, the record supports the conclusion that his views would have substantially impaired the performance of his duties as a juror. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking him for cause.