Opinion ID: 2802105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Officer Thomas Pawlak

Text: For Isom’s second motion for mistrial the facts are as follows. Thomas Pawlak was one of the police officers dispatched to the scene that evening. After he arrived and exited his vehicle he heard multiple gunshots but was unable to identify the precise location from where the shots were coming. At about the same time, a car pulled up and two unidentified black males got out of the vehicle and ran to the middle of the street in front of the apartment building. “They were waving their hands, jumping up and down, yelling and screaming towards the building.” Tr. at 8084. Officer Pawlak heard the men shouting, “Kevin, what are you doing? Stop this sh.” Tr. at 8085. When attempts to order the men to get out of the street failed, Officer Pawlak pulled the men aside to safety behind a parked car at which point he inquired who was doing the shooting. The men stated that the shooter was their cousin, Kevin Isom, and he was inside the apartment with his wife and two children. Two other officers—Sargent Mark Davis and Officer Peter Baum—who had been dispatched to the scene joined Officer Pawlak behind the parked car. Shortly thereafter the two unidentified black males left the scene, purportedly to retrieve Isom’s mother who lived a short distance away. Officer Baum attempted to follow 9 them, which prompted another round of gunfire, forcing him to seek cover behind another parked car. Officer Pawlak and Sargent Davis also remained trapped. The officers remained there for approximately 3 hours until the SWAT team arrived to provide assistance. The two men never returned to the scene, none of the officers obtained their names, and neither of the men appeared at trial. Instead, their statements were recounted through the testimony of Officer Pawlak. Isom objected on grounds of hearsay and a violation of his right of confrontation. The trial court overruled the objection. As to Isom’s hearsay objection, the trial court cited exceptions under Evidence Rule 803(1) (present sense impression) and Rule 803(2) (excited utterance). 4 With respect to Isom’s right of confrontation claim, the court concluded that under the circumstances there was no such right. Isom moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. As a preliminary matter, the State contends that Isom has waived this issue for review. The State argues that because Isom failed to request an admonishment regarding Officer Pawlak’s testimony, the issue has been waived. When faced with a circumstance that a defendant believes might warrant a mistrial, generally the correct procedure is to request an admonishment. Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ind. 1999). If counsel is unsatisfied with the admonishment or it is obvious that the admonishment will not be sufficient to cure the error, then counsel may move for mistrial. Id. A “failure to request an admonishment or move for a mistrial results in waiver of the issue.” Id. (emphasis added). First, it is not apparent what admonishment Isom might have requested. After extended argument outside the presence of the jury, the trial court overruled Isom’s objection to Officer Pawlak’s testimony. See Tr. at 8016-83. Essentially no admonishment 4 At the time of trial, Indiana Evidence Rule 803 provided in relevant part: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. (1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining a material event, condition or transaction, made while the declarant was perceiving the event, condition or transaction, or immediately thereafter. (2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 10 could cure the error about which Isom complained. See Holsinger v. State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 366 (Ind. 2001) (Dickson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“When an admonishment would be futile, the failure to request one does not preclude appellate review of a denial of an otherwise timely motion for mistrial.”). In any event waiver occurs where there was neither a request for admonishment nor a motion for mistrial. Because Isom sought a mistrial, appellate review of his claim has not been waived. We thus proceed to the merits. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and we will disturb the court’s rulings only where the petitioner has shown an abuse of that discretion. Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011) (quotation omitted). “But where, as here, a constitutional violation is alleged, the proper standard of appellate review is de novo.” Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 2299 (2014). Isom does not challenge the trial court’s ruling with respect to his hearsay objection. Rather, Isom contends the trial court violated his federal constitutional right of confrontation. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court has determined that a statement violates the Confrontation Clause if, among other things, it is “testimonial” in nature. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004). To determine whether a statement is testimonial, we must decide whether it has “a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). “Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Conversely, a declarant’s statements “are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 11 In order to determine whether a statement is testimonial versus nontestimonial, we must consider: (1) whether the declarant is describing present or past events; (2) whether there is an ongoing emergency at the time that the statements are made; (3) whether the nature of the questions asked and the responses given were made in an effort to resolve a present emergency; and (4) the degree of formality during the course of the police questioning. Id. at 827. Simply put, statements generally elicited from individuals seeking help during an ongoing emergency are not classified as testimonial. See Id. at 828. Isom’s claim requires us to consider two separate statements made to the police. The first is “Kevin, what are you doing? Stop this sh.” Tr. at 8085. This statement was made almost immediately after the two unidentified men arrived and not made in response to any police questioning. Indeed, it was blurted out by two men who appeared in the middle of the street while someone was firing a weapon pinning down police officers, and their comments were directed towards the individual they believed to be shooting inside the apartment building rather than in response to police questioning. Officer Pawlak simply happened to be within earshot when the statement was made because he too was on the scene at the time the crisis was ongoing. As the trial court explained: “The words are an effort by the concerned parties to stop the event which is still in progress, not an interrogation by the police.” Tr. at 8072. Consequently, the trial court concluded that this statement was not testimonial and thus did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. We agree and discern no error on this point. The second statement about which Officer Pawlak was allowed to testify was offered in response to the officer’s question, “who’s shooting,” to which the men responded, “their cousin Kevin Isom.” Tr. at 8166. Because this statement was apparently “made in the course of police interrogation” at the scene of the crime, the question to be resolved is whether the “circumstances objectively indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the interrogation [wa]s to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. According to Isom, “[t]he testimony that Kevin was doing the shooting was elicited in violation of the appellant’s confrontation rights because he was not allowed to cross examine the declarant and it was extremely prejudicial to his defense.” Br. of Appellant at 29. As best we 12 can discern Isom seems to contend that because the information that Officer Pawlak received from the declarants identified a particular individual as the shooter, it “was not elicited to help with the ongoing emergency but was elicited by the police in their investigative role.” Id. at 28. We cannot agree. When Officer Pawlak arrived at the scene he was greeted with the sound of gunfire and soon thereafter forced to run for cover. Before the police were able to identify the source of gunfire, two men arrived and began shouting towards the apartment from where the shots originated. After Officer Pawlak secured the men behind a vehicle—sheltered from the gunfire’s range—he began to inquire what the men knew of the shooting. At this time, he was informed that they believed the defendant to be the shooter and that he resided in the apartment with his wife and two children. This information was regarding “events as they were actually happening,” and was necessary to aid the officers who were “facing an ongoing emergency.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (emphasis omitted). Because the shooting was ongoing at the time the information was sought, it was certainly “necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency” rather than simply investigating past events. Id. (emphasis omitted). “Officers called to investigate [ongoing] disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004). Based on the facts presented here, we conclude the declarants’ identification of Isom as the shooter was a nontestimonial statement and the trial court did not violate Isom’s constitutional rights by allowing it at trial. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (concluding that declarant’s identification of the defendant to an emergency response agent during her 911 call was not testimonial and thus admissible at trial because “the circumstances of [the victim’s] interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”); but see 547 U.S. at 832 (concluding that declarant’s identification in Hammon v. Indiana of the defendant as her abuser after the alleged attack occurred was testimonial because the declarant’s “statements were neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a threatening situation”). 13