Opinion ID: 1915285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffectiveness Relating to Voir Dire

Text: Appellant next claims that the jury selection process was defective in violation of his rights pursuant to the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 9 and 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This argument has several subparts. First, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask specific questions regarding racial bias and attitudes towards race because this case involved an African-American man charged with murdering three white women. The trial court granted trial counsel permission to ask the following three questions during voir dire: (1) Do you feel that black people are more likely to commit a crime than white people?; (2) Do you have any prejudices towards black people?; and (3) Would you give more credence to the testimony of a white person over that of a black person simply because he was a white person? Brief for Appellant at 64. Appellant alleges that during the voir dire process, trial counsel asked only the first question, rather than all three. This, he claims, rendered counsel ineffective. Again, in order to be entitled to relief, Appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is at issue did not have a reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the PCRA petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's action or inaction. Pierce, 786 A.2d at 213. Assuming arguendo that this claim has arguable merit, we first turn to whether counsel had a reasonable basis for asking only one of the three permitted questions. As the PCRA court noted, an effective attorney may refrain from asking a prospective juror repeatedly about racial bias if he believes doing so may anger, embarrass, or annoy a potential juror that the attorney finds acceptable. PCRA Court Op. at 19. Therefore, counsel may have had a legitimate reason not to ask all three questions concerning racial prejudice to each prospective juror. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 504 Pa. 358, 473 A.2d 1361, 1364 (1984) (noting that there are valid reasons not to ask questions concerning racial issues even in a case where the victim is white and the defendant is black); Commonwealth v. Henry, 550 Pa. 346, 706 A.2d 313 (1997) (finding counsel was not ineffective for failing to ask racial prejudice questions in a case involving a black defendant and a white victim). Moreover, the mere fact that counsel was permitted to ask three questions but only asked one does not alone demonstrate prejudice. Having gotten an answer regarding whether the prospective juror felt that black people were more likely to commit a crime than white people, it is difficult to see how Appellant could persuasively demonstrate prejudice because counsel did not also ask that juror whether he or she had racial prejudices against black people or would credit a white person's testimony over that of a black person. Second, Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to rehabilitate jurors who showed they were hesitant to impose the death penalty when the prosecutor was death qualifying them. Appellant asserts that the prosecutor challenged for cause eleven jurors who initially stated some form of opposition to the death penalty, and trial counsel failed to object or attempt to elicit more detailed information about whether the particular jurors were so predisposed that their personal beliefs would substantially impair their ability to judge the sentencing proceeding fairly. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (holding that potential jurors may not be excluded merely because they voice general moral or philosophical reservations about the death penalty). The decision to disqualify a juror is within the discretion of the trial court, and will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 913 A.2d 220, 262 (2006); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 543 Pa. 429, 672 A.2d 293, 299 (1996). A potential juror may be excluded if he holds views on capital punishment that prevents or substantially impairs that person from adhering to the trial court's instructions on the law. Carson, 913 A.2d at 262; Commonwealth v. Lark, 548 Pa. 441, 698 A.2d 43, 48 (1997). A juror's bias need not be proven with unmistakable clarity. Commonwealth v. Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 701 A.2d 516, 525 (1997). Appellant makes no argument whatsoever regarding the prejudice prong, nor does he argue that he is not required to argue prejudice. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief because of his failure to meaningfully address the necessary prongs of ineffectiveness. See Jones, supra , Bracey, supra . Further, we have held that a trial court is within its discretion to exclude jurors who expressed reservations about imposing the death penalty, and that trial counsel has no constitutional obligation to attempt to change the jurors' views. See Carson, 913 A.2d at 262. Finally, Appellant asserts that the empaneled jurors were not asked if they could impose a life sentence, making it likely that at least one juror was empaneled who would automatically vote for the death penalty. [19] Prior to trial, counsel petitioned the trial court to include specific voir dire questions for venire, including two questions that the trial court rejected: (1) If you found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, would you automatically vote for the death penalty? and (2) Do you feel that capital punishment is a deterrent to murder? Brief for Appellant at 68. Appellant argues that during voir dire, trial counsel did not probe the juror's beliefs on the death penalty once the juror stated that he or she could impose that sentence. Appellant relies on Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), where the United States Supreme Court held that during voir dire in a capital case, a trial court may not, without violating the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, refuse questioning regarding whether a juror would automatically impose a death sentence following a first degree murder conviction: A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror.... If even one such juror is empanelled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence. Id. at 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (emphasis supplied by Appellant); Brief for Appellant at 67. It appears that Appellant is arguing trial court error in denying counsel's requested questions, rather than trial counsel ineffectiveness. In Commonwealth v. Blystone, 555 Pa. 565, 725 A.2d 1197 (1999), the appellant argued, as Appellant does here, that he was deprived of his right to an impartial capital jury as a result of the trial court's refusal to allow trial counsel to life qualify potential jurors. We rejected this claim, and found that the appellant's reliance on Morgan was misplaced because Morgan was a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure for voir dire in capital cases, and therefore did not apply retroactively. Id. at 1203. We recognized that prior to Morgan, the United States Supreme Court had not imposed a mandatory requirement that a defendant be afforded a life qualifying voir dire question upon request. Id. Nor did Pennsylvania have such a requirement. Therefore, we held that the appellant was not entitled to have his counsel life qualify the jury, according to the law at the time of trial. Id. We reach the same conclusion here. Appellant was tried and convicted in 1988. This Court rejected his appeal in 1989. Morgan was decided in 1992. Thus, the law at the time of Appellant's trial did not mandate that juries be questioned on life qualification, and the trial court did not err in rejecting counsel's questions. See Carson, 913 A.2d at 262. [20]