Opinion ID: 1892746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard for determining effective assistance of counsel

Text: The defendant argues initially that the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel established by this court is in conflict with the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), because of the locality rule added to the Nebraska standard. As most recently articulated by this court in State v. Patterson, 232 Neb. 304, 308, 440 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1989), the standard to be applied is as follows: When, in a postconviction motion, a defendant alleges a violation of his or her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel as a basis for relief, the standard for determining the propriety of the claim is whether the attorney, in representing the accused, performed at least as well as an attorney with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law in the area. Further, there must be a showing of how the defendant was prejudiced in the defense of his or her case as a result of the attorney's actions or inactions. According to the defendant, the Court in Strickland, supra, did not suggest that the effective assistance of counsel is to be measured by the relative competence of a small group of lawyers in a particular region of the country. However, the Court did hold that  [w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Emphasis supplied.) 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. This court decided prior to Strickland that ineffective assistance of counsel would be measured by the performance of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law in his area. (Emphasis supplied.) See State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 489, 222 N.W.2d 573, 577 (1974). Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the Nebraska standard is not in conflict with the Strickland standard. In Nebraska, the objective standard of reasonableness to be used is the performance of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law in the area. In further support of his contention, the defendant cites Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.1981), in which the court rejected a locality rule in sixth amendment cases. A careful reading of the opinion, however, reveals that a locality rule is not invalid, it simply is not accepted in federal courts. In Hawkman the court explained: Appellant state of Nebraska argues that the federal district court ordered an evidentiary hearing in this case to determine whether the performance of Hawkman's counsel was at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law in his area, namely, the area of Valentine, Nebraska. In ordering the hearing, the district court stated, inter alia, [s]ince in this case evidence regarding the standard of performance for an attorney was not developed at the state hearing, an evidentiary hearing is, therefore, appropriate. It appears to us that the district court convened the hearing simply to elicit opinions as to what actions a reasonably competent attorney would have taken on Hawkman's behalf.... It is true that all witnesses who testified at the federal hearing were from western Nebraska and specifically from Valentine or Scottsbluff. However, the federal district court: (1) correctly set forth the applicable constitutional standards of counsel competence in this circuit; (2) expressly stated in its opinion that an evidentiary hearing was held concerning the standard of performance for an attorney with ordinary training and skill; and (3) clearly did not apply the Nebraska standards of counsel effectiveness set forth in State v. Leadinghorse, supra, 222 N.W.2d at 577. If the Leadinghorse standards differed from the federal standards delineated in our opinions, they would, of course, not bind a federal district court. 661 F.2d at 1165-66. The defendant's contention that the effectiveness of counsel cannot be measured by comparison with the performance of a lawyer of ordinary training and skill in the criminal law in the area is without merit.