Opinion ID: 6335137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Mandamus is Clear and Indisputable

Text: The United States must prove that its right to mandamus is clear and indisputable. This is satisfied where the district court commits a “clear abuse of discretion or judicial usurpation of power.” In re Univ. of Mich., 936 F.3d at 466. In seeking mandamus, the United States alleges two errors by the district court: (1) the court participated in plea negotiations by expressing its disapproval of appeal waivers during a pretrial hearing; and (2) the court improperly rejected the resulting plea agreement based on the court’s policy of refusing to accept those same terms.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits a district court from participating in plea negotiations. The Rule provides: “An attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney . . . may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1).1 We have “stringently” interpreted and enforced that prohibition. United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 765 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1993). Classic examples of prohibited judicial participation are when a district court attempts to “rewrite the plea agreement from the bench,” 1 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were revised in 2002. Prior to that revision, Rule 11(e)(1) contained the prohibition against judicial participation in plea negotiations. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 605 n.3 (2013). No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 8 Fleming, 239 F.3d at 765, or endeavors to “facilitate a plea,” United States v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193, 196 (6th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597 (2013). Rule 11 does, however, allow the district court to be involved in the acceptance or rejection of certain plea agreements. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(2), (c)(3)(A). But in those circumstances, the court’s role is limited to evaluating the plea agreement once it has been finalized by the parties and disclosed to the court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)–(5); United States v. Harris, 635 F.2d 526, 528 (6th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Markin, 263 F.3d 491, 496– 98 (6th Cir. 2001) (comparing cases in which judicial involvement occurred after the completion of the plea agreement with those in which the involvement occurred during plea negotiations— noting that the latter “clearly would have violated [Rule 11]”). Accordingly, when a district court expresses its preference for or against certain plea-bargaining terms in an unfinalized or hypothetical plea agreement, the court impermissibly participates in plea negotiations in violation of Rule 11. The district court here did just that. Rather than wait to consider a finalized plea agreement, the court initiated substantive plea-related discussions. More specifically, during a pretrial hearing, the court expressed to the parties its preference—calling it a “practice”—that plea agreements not include sentencing-appeal and collateral-review waivers. The court then warned the parties to “keep [the court’s position] in mind as [they] engage[d] in . . . discussions.” The court implicitly affirmed its position in a subsequent email when it informed the parties that the plea agreement would be rejected as written. At best, this conduct strongly suggested that the parties should not include those terms in their plea agreement. At worst, it conditioned the court’s approval of a future plea agreement on the absence of those terms. Either way, this left the parties with the legally insupportable impression that no defendant could waive his or her appellate rights in a plea agreement before that judge. See United States v. Milliron, 984 F.3d 1188, 1192 (6th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that a defendant may waive his right to appeal by means of a plea agreement); United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775–76 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Any right, even a constitutional right, may be surrendered in a plea agreement if that waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.”). No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 9 That the court made those comments while plea negotiations were ongoing is crucial. That is precisely the type of judicial participation most clearly prohibited by Rule 11. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). And for good reason. Judicial participation of any kind is “inherently coercive,” United States v. Ushery, 785 F.3d 210, 219 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted), and it is particularly so when the district court cautions the parties to “keep [its position] in mind” while they negotiate. See Harris, 635 F.2d at 529 (“If the court puts its imprimatur on a plea offer, the defendant might be coerced into taking it . . . .”). Judicial participation also undermines fairness and judicial neutrality. Barrett, 982 F.2d at 195–96. Here, the district court does not meaningfully defend its actions in its appellate brief. But its written opinion rejecting the plea agreement cites United States v. Rankin, 94 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), for the proposition that no judicial participation occurs where the court does not comment on the defendant’s “case, any aspect of sentencing, or [the defendant’s] possible guilt or innocence.” We are unpersuaded. There is no indication that our decision in Rankin was meant to provide an exhaustive list of possible Rule 11 violations. We considered a similar claim of judicial participation in Ushery, 785 F.3d at 219–21. In that case, the district court allowed the parties to negotiate a plea agreement in its presence, and after the court “commented on a proposed plea that [the defendant] had not yet agreed to, . . . the specific items that the court raised became the focal points . . . of the continued negotiation.” Id. at 220. We observed that the district court “may” have violated Rule 11(c)(1) but refrained from deciding the issue because the defendant’s “substantial rights” were not affected. Id. at 218, 220–21. We now make it clear that Rule 11 absolutely prohibits judicial involvement of any form in plea negotiations, an interpretation that is widely held among circuit courts. Barrett, 982 F.2d at 195; see, e.g., United States v. Baker, 489 F.3d 366, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Cano-Varela, 497 F.3d 1122, 1132 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1139 (5th Cir. 1993). In this context that means that while plea negotiations are ongoing a district court is prohibited from commenting on a hypothetical plea agreement that it would or would not accept. Other circuit courts, again, agree. In re Benvin, 791 F.3d at 1103 (granting mandamus and finding that “the court’s suggestion that the parties add a particular term to the plea agreement constitutes impermissible involvement”); United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 10 (finding a Rule 11 violation because a court’s pre-plea agreement suggestions are improper “indications of what the judge will accept” (quotations omitted)); United States v. Pena, 720 F.3d 561, 570–73 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that a court’s comments on a hypothetical plea agreement violated Rule 11). Because Rule 11 “means what it says,” Barrett, 982 F.2d at 195, once a district court has gone beyond its role in accepting or rejecting a finalized plea agreement, Rule 11 has been violated. While the district court’s conduct may have been motivated in good faith by its concern for defendants, there is “no good motives exception” to Rule 11. Ushery, 785 F.3d at 220 (quoting Harrell, 751 F.3d at 1240). Therefore, the district court’s involvement violated Rule 11’s prohibition on judicial participation.
The United States argues that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the parties’ plea agreement. Because we find that the district court did not base its decision on the circumstances of the case, we agree. District courts have discretion to accept or reject plea agreements that are governed by Rule 11(c)(1)(A), such as the one at issue in this case. United States v. Doggart, 947 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court is under no obligation to accept a Rule 11(c)(1)(A) plea deal even if the defendant and the government both agree to it.”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (“[T]he court may accept the [Rule 11(c)(1)(A)] agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.”). But a court’s discretion is not unfettered. CotaLuna, 891 F.3d at 647; see United States v. Sabit, 797 F. App’x 218, 221 (6th Cir. 2019). First, the court’s discretion is constrained by separation of powers concerns when it considers Rule 11(c)(1)(A) agreements, otherwise known as “charge bargains.” A charge bargain is a type of plea agreement that contemplates the government’s dismissal of charges, or its assurance to not bring additional charges, in exchange for a defendant’s guilty plea to another, typically lesser, charge. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A); see Doggart, 947 F.3d at 882–83. Unlike sentencing decisions, charging decisions traditionally fall within the power of the Executive branch—in this case, the prosecutors. United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 564–65 (9th Cir. No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 11 1983). A court considering a charge bargain must, therefore, exercise its discretion with due regard to prosecutorial prerogatives. Id.; United States v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 1266, 1277 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 745 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Second, if the court decides to reject a plea agreement, it must explain why. United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1990). And the explanation must be a “sound” one. Cota-Luna, 891 F.3d at 647 (requiring district courts to exercise “sound judicial discretion” and “articulate a sound reason” before rejecting a plea agreement (quotations omitted)). What is considered “sound” will often depend on the case at hand. But generally, a district court may not act arbitrarily, Moore, 916 F.2d at 1135, invidiously, United States v. Walker, 922 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 474 (2019), or pursuant to a categorical policy, Cota-Luna, 891 F.3d at 651 (Kethledge, J., concurring); Miller, 722 F.2d at 565. Applying these principles, we have held that a district court may reject a plea agreement when, for example, the agreement does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense, see Doggart, 947 F.3d at 882, unduly cabins the judge’s sentencing discretion, see Sabit, 797 F. App’x at 221, or is “contrary to the sound administration of justice,” see Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136 (quoting United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1986)). Finally, the district court must give every case independent consideration and base its decision on the specific plea agreement before it. Miller, 722 F.2d at 566; Walker, 922 F.3d at 249–50. The court cannot reject a plea agreement based on abstract or extraneous policy considerations unrelated to the particular case, because a court which does that abdicates its duty to exercise any discretion at all. Walker, 922 F.3d at 249 (“[F]ailure to consider the specific agreement would constitute an abdication—and hence an abuse—of discretion.”); Miller, 722 F.2d at 565 (“[T]he existence of discretion requires its exercise.”); Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136 (“The authority to exercise judicial discretion implies the responsibility to consider all relevant factors and rationally construct a decision.”). In this case, we cannot ascertain any case-specific reason why the district court rejected the plea agreement. The district court’s opinion states none, and on appeal, neither the amici nor the district court point to one. For these reasons, the district court failed to articulate a “sound reason,” and we conclude that it abused its discretion. No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 12 The district court’s primary concern was that the plea agreement was “contrary to the public interest” because it contained appeal waivers that were “overly broad” and the United States “failed to identify any discernable substantial criminal justice interest” that justified including these waivers. To the court’s credit, it carefully and thoroughly laid out its qualms about appeal waivers, specifically, and plea bargaining, generally. The court explained its belief that appeal waivers “embargo” trial court mistakes, “insulate” the government’s conduct “from judicial oversight,” effectively “coerce” guilty pleas with offers “too good to refuse,” and “inhibit[] the development of the Sentencing Guidelines.” But, to reiterate, a district court’s policy concerns in the abstract are not case-specific exercises of its discretion. We see no individualized assessment here. For example, the district court repeatedly expressed concern that the appeal waivers were “broad.” While that is a legitimate consideration, the court never articulated what would support that finding in this case. The court merely offered generalized reasons that boil down to policy disagreements with appeal waivers in general. And those reasons make little sense here where the appeal waivers are not absolute. The waivers still allowed Townsend to appeal any sentence over the government’s recommendation, seek relief under the First Step Act, and file ineffective-assistance and prosecutorial-misconduct claims. It is an abuse of discretion for a court reject a plea agreement based on a finding that is clearly not in accord with the facts of the case. Cota-Luna, 891 F.3d at 648 (finding an abuse of discretion where the district court rejected a plea agreement based on its mistaken belief that the agreed-upon sentence was too lenient); see also United States v. Mandoka, 869 F.3d 448, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2017). The district court also criticized the government’s legitimate interest in finality, again citing only global reasons. In doing so, it made no effort to explain why, in this case, added finality would cause a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Mathews, 534 F. App’x 418, 424–25 (6th Cir. 2013) (suggesting that an otherwise valid appeal waiver would be unenforceable if it results in a “miscarriage of justice”). What is particularly troubling is that the court’s reasoning would seemingly prohibit every plea agreement containing appeal waivers, regardless of the defendant’s case, the agreement’s charging or sentencing terms, or the parties’ reasons for negotiating those waivers. We cannot credit the district court’s argument that it No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 13 engaged in an individualized assessment simply because it inserted the phrase “the circumstances of this case” at various points in its opinion. Without more explanation from the court, such language is mere surplusage. The district court also seemed to question whether the waivers were “fully knowing,” because Townsend could not knowingly waive his right to “seek[] relief based on rights that have not yet been recognized by the law.” As the United States correctly points out, though, a defendant can validly waive his rights in a plea agreement even if he does not anticipate future factual or legal developments in his favor. United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 463–64 (6th Cir. 2005) (“A valid plea agreement, after all, requires knowledge of existing rights, not clairvoyance.”); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756–57 (1970). Even though the district court’s reasoning in this regard was mistaken, we find that it was not a principal basis for the court’s rejection. We do emphasize, however, that a district court’s “misunderstanding of law does not count as a sound reason for rejecting a guilty plea and thus amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Doggart, 906 F.3d at 509. The district court was certainly under no obligation to accept the plea agreement, but categorical rejections are improper. They may leave criminal defendants such as Townsend worse off. For example, Townsend’s plea agreement sought to reduce his mandatory minimum by half, which also would have provided the district court with more discretion at sentencing than if Townsend were convicted at trial. Hence, under the agreement, the court could have sentenced Townsend anywhere between 10 years and life, instead of 20 years to life. The United States argues that the district court cannot consider at all whether charge bargains contain appeal waivers. It provides two reasons, neither of which has merit. First, the United States implies that, because appeal waivers are an “enforceable . . . part of the pleabargaining process,” their presence in a plea agreement cannot form the basis for a district court’s rejection. That is simply not true. That appeal waivers are enforceable does not mean that district courts lack the discretion to scrutinize them when deciding whether to accept a plea agreement. In the same way, it also does not mean that district courts necessarily abuse their discretion when they reject what they reasonably perceive as an overly broad appeal waiver. See United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992). No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 14 Second, the United States argues that the district court’s authority to accept or reject a charge bargain is limited to two considerations: first, whether the remaining charges adequately reflect a defendant’s criminal conduct, and second, whether they unduly restrict the court’s sentencing discretion. In the United States’s view, the structure of Rule 11 indicates that the district court’s decision must always relate to its sentencing power in some way. While it is true that the Judiciary wields significant power over criminal sentencing and has no authority over the Executive branch’s charging decisions, those separation of powers concerns are best addressed on a case-by-case basis, not with a bright-line rule. So long as the district court’s assessment is soundly based on the circumstances of the case and does not frustrate prosecutorial independence, we generally do not otherwise limit what the district court may consider. See United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 1993) (analyzing a charge bargain and noting that “Rule 11 does not limit the reasons for which the district court may reject a proposed plea agreement”); United States v. Yates, 698 F.2d 828, 829–30 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“Acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement is the prerogative . . . of the district court.”). Therefore, a court may consider the propriety of every term in a proposed plea agreement— including terms such as sentencing-appeal and collateral-review waivers. In support of its argument, the United States cites United States v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2015). In Vanderwerff, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting a plea agreement because the agreement included appeal waivers. Id. at 1271. That case, however, is distinguishable and provides little guidance. The district court’s rejection in Vanderwerff was predicated on legally irrelevant sentencing factors and a “grievous[] misread[ing]” of two Supreme Court cases. Id. at 1272–76. We have no similar “error[s] of law” here. See id. at 1272–73. Moreover, although the district court here surely criticizes plea bargaining, it does not mistakenly suggest that plea bargaining is “of dubious legality” as the court did in Vanderwerff. Id. at 1276. To summarize, a district court does not possess unrestrained discretion to reject a plea agreement. It must, among other things, make an individualized assessment of the agreement and predicate its decision on the specific facts and circumstances presented. Because the district court here failed to do that, this is the narrow circumstance in which the district court abused its No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 15 discretion. Accordingly, the United States has a clear and indisputable right to mandamus on this ground.