Opinion ID: 545588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Designation of a Vicinity Property

Text: 35 This case comes down to the question of whether DOE's interpretation of UMTRCA is reasonable and permissible. DOE concluded that the Durita property did not meet the UMTRCA requirements for a vicinity property. In order to qualify as a vicinity property under UMTRCA, a site must meet at least three basic requirements. The property must (1) be in the vicinity of a processing site, (2) be contaminated with residual radioactive materials, and (3) the contamination must be derived from the processing site. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7911(6)(B) (1982). Both parties agree that the Durita property is in the vicinity of the processing site on the Naturita property. Both parties also agree that the Durita property is contaminated with radioactive materials. However, DOE argues that the contamination is not residual radioactive material and that it was not derived from the Naturita site. In addition, DOE claims that Ranchers' state license removes the Durita property from UMTRCA consideration. 36 UMTRCA defines the term residual radioactive material as follows: 37 The term residual radioactive material means-- 38 (A) waste (which the Secretary determines to be radioactive) in the form of tailings resulting from the processing of ores for the extraction of uranium and other valuable constituents of the ores; and 39 (B) other waste (which the Secretary determines to be radioactive) at a processing site which relate to such processing, including any residual stock of unprocessed ores or low-grade materials. 40 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7911(7) (1982). DOE's position is that the material taken from the Naturita site to the Durita site was not waste as required by the definition of residual radioactive material because the material was used as the raw material for a processing plant that produced uranium for commercial sale. Therefore, DOE argues that the material at the Durita site is not residual radioactive material. 41 DOE's interpretation of the statute is questionable. After the definition of vicinity property, the statute states: 42 A license for the production of any uranium product from residual radioactive materials shall not be treated as a license for production from ores within the meaning of subparagraph (A)(ii) if such production is in accordance with section 7918(b) of this title. 43 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7911(6) (1982) (emphasis added). This language clearly indicates that uranium can be produced from residual radioactive materials--just as occurred at the Durita site. This sentence implicitly assumes that tailings used to produce uranium can still be designated as residual radioactive materials. Thus, DOE's conclusion that residual radioactive material is no longer waste--and therefore no longer residual radioactive material--when it is used to produce uranium is incorrect. We hold that DOE's interpretation of the statutory language residual radioactive material is unreasonable. 44 However, we uphold on other grounds DOE's ultimate conclusion that the statute does not include the Durita site. First, we agree with DOE's finding that the residual radioactive material at the Durita site is not derived from the Naturita site. UMTRCA does not define the meaning of derived from. However, we conclude that DOE's position--that the waste at the Durita site is derived from the processing on that site and not from the Naturita mill--is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. If Ranchers had merely transported the tailings to the Durita site for safer storage, then they would be derived from the Naturita site. However, when the tailings are used as raw material in a reprocessing procedure, we hold that it is a permissible interpretation of the statute to categorize the new waste produced by the reprocessing procedure as material derived from the new procedure at the new site. UMTRCA was enacted to make safe uranium tailings that were produced in order to fill government contracts. When these tailings are subsequently used in a private commercial reprocessing venture, the resulting residual radioactive material is derived from the commercial venture and not the initial processing at the production site. 45 In addition, we find DOE's interpretation of the statute reasonable because of the licensing limitation found in the statute's definition of processing sites. The statute excludes from the definition of processing site any properties for which a state license for the production of uranium was in effect on or after January 1, 1978. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7911(6)(A)(ii) (1982). Ranchers obtained its reprocessing license from the state of Colorado in 1977. Thus, if the license limitation found in section 7911(6)(A)(ii) applies to the Durita property, the site is clearly not covered by the statute. 46 Unfortunately, the statute does not make clear whether the license exception was intended to apply to vicinity properties. The exception is contained in subsection (A) of the definition of processing site, while the definition of vicinity properties is found in subsection (B). However, immediately following subsection (B)--with no separate numerical designation--is the language previously quoted concerning licenses to produce uranium from residual radioactive materials. This language provides that the license exception does not apply to licenses given for production of uranium from residual radioactive materials if such production is in accordance with 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7918(b) (1982). It is undisputed that Ranchers' production at the Durita site was not in accordance with section 7918(b). We think a fair inference from this language is that if production from residual radioactive materials is not in accordance with section 7918(b), then the license exception applies and the government is not obliged to pay for the cleanup of the property. We also believe that the placement of this language following subsection (B) makes the statute ambiguous as to whether the language is meant to apply to the vicinity properties under subsection (B) or solely to the processing sites defined in subsection (A). DOE applied the licensing exception to the Durita property. We hold that this is a permissible interpretation of the statute. 47 The legislative history of UMTRCA also supports DOE's interpretation of this ambiguous statute. One House report on UMTRCA states: 48 The committee questioned the expenditure of Federal funds to clean up uranium mill tailings in cases where the commercial uranium milling industry can be required through regulatory authorities to assume those costs. It would seem therefore, that the Secretary of Energy need not designate any sites to be included in the authorized program which are currently under active license, or which contain tailings from commercial production, unless it can be shown that the tailings hazards could in no way be remedied without such designation. 49 H.R.Rep. No. 1480(I), 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7433, 7436. Thus, at least the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee felt that the government's obligations under UMTRCA would be limited to sites that were not under active license requiring the stabilization of the tailings. 50 The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee also reported its belief that the main purpose for enacting UMTRCA was to clean up tailings where the owners of the property were not then under any state or federal obligation to perform their own cleanup. 51 The lack of any control over these inactive sites under the 1954 act and other laws to require clean up of these sites is the principal basis for committee action to authorize this remedial program. This situation does not exist at active mill tailings sites. 52 ... [W]e stress that the lack of any specific statutory authority requiring the effective stabilization of these mills by the NRC or the States after operations ceased and licenses terminated is the principal reason for recommending this program. 53 H.R.Rep. No. 1480(II), 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7450, 7457. Because the Durita site was under active license requiring the stabilization of the tailings, the legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend for the Durita property to be designated a processing site. 54 Plaintiff continually refers to the broad language found in the purposes section of UMTRCA stating that the statute is intended to stabilize and control such tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner. 42 U.S.C. 7901(b)(1) (1982). However, even this section is specifically limited to inactive mill tailings sites. Id. Thus, we conclude that DOE's application of the license exception to a vicinity property is a permissible interpretation of the statute. We hold that DOE's conclusion--that the Durita property does not fulfill the statutory requirements for a processing site--is reasonable. Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for all the federal government defendants.