Opinion ID: 4533974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Alternatively, Gonzalez maintains that he may collaterally challenge his removal order apart from the requirements under § 1326(d) as “an ultra vires [agency] action.” Br. of Appellant at 34. In that regard, Gonzalez asserts that the immigration officer who ordered his removal exceeded his statutory authority because such an officer is authorized only to order the removal of an alien who has actually been convicted of an aggravated felony. According to Gonzalez, the Pennsylvania theft offense for which he was convicted is not an aggravated felony, and, as a result, the immigration officer “lacked subject matter jurisdiction” to order his removal. Id. at 34–35. his deportation proceedings improperly deprived him of the opportunity for judicial review as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(2).” 724 F.3d at 1126. 11 Gonzalez has not cited a single case to support his ultra vires argument in the context of a § 1326 prosecution. Instead, he cites several appellate decisions wherein courts found in the first instance that the Board of Immigration Appeals lacked jurisdiction to remove an alien where an immigration judge had not ordered removal. See, e.g., Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2003); James v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 505, 514 (5th Cir. 2006); Rhodes-Bradford v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2007); Munoz Erazo v. United States, 506 F. App’x 938, 944 (11th Cir. 2013); Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012). Critically, these cases are distinct because the jurisdictional challenges were raised on direct petitions for review. Again, Gonzalez waived his right to apply for judicial review. Thus, these cases have no application here. More fundamentally, these cases highlight the differences between an agency with authority to act, but which acts based on factual or legal errors, and a governmental body with no authority to act at all. Only the latter is ultra vires. The Court finds Gonzalez’s ultra vires argument unpersuasive for the reasons set forth in United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2019). There, the parties assumed that a successful challenge to the immigration court’s subject matter jurisdiction would allow for a collateral attack of the removal order. Id. at 356. We rejected this notion, explaining that “there is no freestanding rule allowing for collateral attacks based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” and a jurisdictional assertion “is not meaningfully distinct from a more routine claim that an immigration court has misconstrued the INA[,]” subject to the § 1326(d) requirements. Id. at 357–58. Although the ultra vires assertion was addressed in dicta, the reasoning set forth in Cortez is convincing and applicable to 12 Gonzalez’s identical claim here. Whether based on an official’s authority to act or an incorrect application of that authority, a collateral challenge to a removal order cannot skirt the requirements of § 1326(d). Accordingly, Gonzalez must satisfy § 1326(d)’s criteria to proceed with a collateral challenge to his removal order.