Opinion ID: 855577
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Munitions List Counts

Text: On the Munitions List counts, the prosecution alleged that Wu and Wei twice unlawfully exported phase shifters2 to China without a license. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2); 22 C.F.R. pt. 121. Wu and Wei argue that the Munitions List convictions should be reversed because the Munitions List restrictions are unconstitutionally vague. In the alternative, they argue that their convictions should be vacated because the jury instructions were fatally flawed.3 We consider both arguments de novo. See Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597 F.3d 423, 434 (1st Cir. 2010) (jury instructions); United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2004) (vagueness). We reject the constitutional vagueness argument, but we agree that the jury instructions were flawed and so vacate the convictions on the Munitions List counts. We address 2 Two waves are said to be out of phase when they have the same frequency but reach their peaks at different points. A phase shifter can change the phase of one of the two waves so that the waves exactly line up with one another (or, vice versa, so that waves that were previously in phase no longer line up with one another). See generally Weisman, The Essential Guide to RF and Wireless, at fig. 4-23 (2d ed. 2002). 3 Wu and Wei also raise several additional challenges to the Munitions List convictions, but we need not reach them because we vacate the convictions due to the flawed jury instructions. -12- Wu and Wei's constitutional arguments inasmuch as they affect the scope of the remand. Compare Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (retrial barred by Double Jeopardy Clause if evidence supplied by the government would be legally insufficient to sustain conviction), with United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 297 (1st Cir. 2008) (new trial permissible where error is confined to jury instructions), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 612 (2010). Statutory and Regulatory Framework. The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the President to control the import and the export of defense articles. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). Under the AECA, the President may designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles and promulgate regulations for the import and export of such articles. Id. The President has delegated this responsibility to the State Department. Exec. Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (Jan. 18, 1977). A designated defense article may not be exported from the United States without a license from the State Department. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2). The AECA criminalizes willful[] violations of this export license requirement. Id. § 2778(c). The AECA further provides that the designation of an item as a defense article[] made via regulations issued under [the statute] . . . shall not be subject to judicial review. Id. § 2778(h). Because the United States suspended munitions exports to China after the Tiananmen Square killings in 1989, the State -13- Department will not grant a license to export defense articles to that country. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(a); Suspension of Munitions Exports to PRC, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,539 (June 7, 1989); see also United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 157 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1084 (1995). Pursuant to the President's authority under the AECA, the State Department has promulgated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-130, which include the U.S. Munitions List, id. pt. 121. The Munitions List is not a compendium of specific controlled items; instead, it is a series of categories describing the kinds of items that qualify as defense articles requiring export licenses. The Munitions List contains attributes rather than names, and for good reason. As has been explained: [A]n effort to enumerate each item would be futile, not only because some are bound to be overlooked (imagine a regulation that tried to list all bicycles by manufacturer and model number) but also because manufacturers change their designations. The Mark 4 may be succeeded by a Mark 5, or the CQ/T model may become the CQ/X. United States v. Pulungan, 569 F.3d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, C.J.). A manufacturer unsure about whether a particular item is a defense article covered by the Munitions List may file a commodity jurisdiction (CJ) request with the State Department. The determination is made by the Directorate of Defense Trade -14- Controls within the State Department, in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Commerce, as well as other government agencies and industry. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4.4 These CJ determinations are never officially published in regulations or other government pronouncements. The specific phase shifters at issue in this case were both made by M/A-Com, formerly a subsidiary of Tyco Electronics, and bore the product numbers MAPCGM0003 and MAPCGM0002. The government alleges that these phase shifters fell under Category XI(c) of the Munitions List. That category covers [c]omponents, parts, accessories, attachments, and associated equipment specifically designed or modified for use with the equipment in [Categories XI(a) and XI(b)], except for such items as are in normal commercial use. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(c)(XI)(c).5 Vagueness. At the outset, we address the defendants' argument that this carefully crafted regulatory scheme--which has 4 Nothing in the relevant regulation states that manufacturers are the only parties that can submit CJ requests, see 22 C.F.R. § 120.4, although the State Department prefer[s] that the manufacturer submit the request because of the background and sales information required. U.S. State Dep't, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) FAQs (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/faqs/documents/FAQ_CJ.pdf. 5 Categories XI(a) and XI(b), in turn, contain examples of products that qualify as [e]lectronic equipment . . . specifically designed, modified or configured for military application, ranging from underwater acoustive active and passive countermeasures to systems [d]esigned or modified using burst techniques . . . for intelligence, security or military purposes. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(c)(XI)(a), (a)(2), (b)(2). -15- remained in place for more than a quarter century--is unconstitutionally vague. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that a criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (per curiam); see also United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678 (1st Cir. 1985). The void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two discrete due process concerns: first, . . . regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). Wu and Wei emphasize only the first of these two concerns, and appropriately so, since Munitions List Category XI(c), when placed within its larger regulatory framework, sets forth reasonably precise standards for enforcement. To be within the reach of the Munitions List at all, an item must qualify as a defense article, a term defined by the ITAR with considerable specificity.6 Moreover, the particular Munitions List category at 6 An article . . . may be designated or determined in the future to be a defense article . . . if it: (a) Is specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a military application, and (i) Does not have predominant civil applications, and (ii) Does not have performance equivalent (defined by form, fit and function) to those of an article or service used for civil applications; or (b) Is specifically -16- issue in this case--Category XI(c)--ties its coverage to Categories XI(a) and XI(b), which in turn contain specific examples of electronic systems and components covered by the ITAR. See supra note 5. And to ensure that the regulation does not ensnare unwitting exporters selling to non-military clients, Category XI(c) also explicitly excludes items in normal commercial use. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(c)(XI)(c). All together, this framework provides specific guidance that would allow individuals and law enforcement officials alike to determine whether the phase shifters fall within Category XI(c). At trial, both the government and the defendants presented expert testimony regarding the design and the use of phase shifters; on this basis the jury could have made discrete factual determinations on the matter. Granted, the evidence presented at trial could support alternative interpretations, yet a regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult to prove an incriminating fact but rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2317. Here, it is quite clear what specific facts would determine whether the phase shifters fall within Category XI(c): whether they were designed for military use; whether they are used in conjunction with the designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a military application, and has significant military or intelligence applicability such that control under this subchapter is necessary. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3. -17- items described in Categories XI(a) and (b); and whether they are also amenable to normal commercial uses that would take them outside the scope of the ITAR. Wu and Wei have a somewhat stronger case when they emphasize that Category XI(c)'s broad language and lack of technical parameters do not give fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that phase shifters are Munitions Listcontrolled. Cf. id. at 2317. After all, as the defendants note, phase shifters are small, technologically complex microchips; unlike the bomb and ammunition parts at issue in other cases,7 the phase shifters may not have a self-evidently military purpose in the eyes of an ordinary person. But Wu and Wei are not just ordinary people sending gifts to friends living overseas. They managed a multimillion-dollar enterprise; their company, Chitron, specifically pursued military customers; and Wu promoted himself as both an exporter of military supplies and an export compliance expert. The export of military equipment in particular is a sensitive business directed by a relatively small group of sophisticated international businessmen. United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); see also United States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d 7 See, e.g., United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2002) (tail-gun pods, underwater mines, missile fins, and assemblies for various weaponry); United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988) (Redeye missile, M-16 rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989). -18- 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1979). It is not too much to ask these businessmen and businesswomen to comply with export control regulations, even if the meaning of those regulations might not be immediately obvious to someone lacking the same sophistication. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (economic regulations are subject to a less strict vagueness test because . . . businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action). Furthermore, the ACEA's implementing regulations establish the commodity jurisdiction determination process in order to allow private parties to obtain an official government answer on whether an item is covered by the Munitions List before they engage in potentially unlawful conduct, see 22 C.F.R. § 120.4, a feature that further mitigates any concern about the law trapping an unwary dealer. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498; see also Lachman, 387 F.3d at 57; Lee, 183 F.3d at 1032.8 Finally, the AECA's scienter requirement covers only willful[] violations of the law's export restrictions. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c). The Act does not impose criminal penalties on innocent 8 While State Department guidance suggests that Wu and Wei would have needed a letter of authorization from M/A-Com in order to obtain a CJ determination, see U.S. State Dep't, Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) FAQs, there is no reason to doubt that Wu and Wei could have satisfied that requirement if they had made any effort to do so. -19- or negligent errors. United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1978). Where a statute explicit[ly] provi[des] that a criminal violation of its terms must be 'willful,' the void-forvagueness doctrine is especially inapposite, see United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers & Allied Workers v. Meese, 823 F.2d 652, 659 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.), since the statute itself ensures that good-faith errors are not penalized, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 n.17 (1980). By criminalizing only willful violations of the law, the statute's scienter requirement protects the innocent exporter who might accidentally and unknowingly export a proscribed component or part. Lee, 183 F.3d at 1032-33. Outside the First Amendment context, we consider whether a statute is vague as applied to the particular facts at issue, for a defendant who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2719 (2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We need only determine whether the AECA and its regulations were vague as applied to these particular defendants--in other words, whether Wu and Wei in fact had fair notice that the statute and regulations proscribed their conduct. United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2004). And as the district court concluded, there was ample evidence at trial -20- that Wu and Wei actually believed that the phase shifters required government licenses for export. Before any of the exports at issue occurred, Chitron-US received a purchase order and later a price quotation from its supplier, Richardson Electronic; both documents warned Chitron specifically that the MAPCGM0003 phase shifter was subject to export control under the authority of the State Department, that exporting the item may require prior government approval, and that the phase shifter fell under Category XI of the Munitions List. Chitron-US also received similar warnings in regard to the MAPCGM0002 phase shifter: first, from another supplier, Microwave Components, Inc., which sent Chitron a price quotation and later an invoice for the MAPCGM0002 phase shifters that included a disclaimer cautioning that exports may require prior authorization from the U.S. government and that it was the purchaser's sole responsibility to comply with U.S. export licensing requirements; and second, from Richardson Electronics, which sent Chitron a price quotation on the MAPCGM0002 phase shifters that included a warning that the part was subject to State Department export controls, that it may require prior government approval for export, and that it fell under Category XI of the Munitions List.9 9 Wu and Wei raise several objections to this evidence. First, they contend that the purchase order on which the district court relied was in fact a picking document used internally by -21- The jury could infer that Wu and Wei were aware of these warnings. The two were hands-on micro-managers, Wei supervised the Chitron-US office and was involved in the day-to-day purchasing, and Wei communicated daily with Wu via tasking lists-- all good reasons to attribute Chitron's knowledge to the defendants. Moreover, Wu and Wei repeatedly attempted to disguise the fact that they were exporting to China and that they lacked the necessary licenses to do so--further evidence that the defendants knew they were violating U.S. export regulations when they shipped the phase shifters to China without government permission. See United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Cranston, 686 F.2d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 1982). Richardson, to which Chitron would never have had access. However, testimony at trial indicated that the picking document was identical to the packing list Richardson included in the package for the buyer. Second, Wu and Wei argue that the district court regarded the Richardson warnings as unreliable, and admitted them as business records only as to the question of whether or not [the phase shifters] were bought and sold, but not as to the contents of the accompanying warnings that Chitron received. But in fact, the court admitted the picking document for the MAPCGM0003 phase shifter for all purposes, and admitted the testimony of Richard Catey, a Richardson employee, for the purpose of establishing the contents of the warnings that Chitron received. Third, Wu and Wei claim that because the Richardson warnings only advised that the phase shifters may require prior government approval for export, the warnings fell short of constitutional notice requirements. However, the warnings specifically referenced the State Department's authority over the phase shifters and their presence on Munitions List Category XI. As a whole, the language of the warnings was sufficient to put Wu and Wei on notice and direct them to conduct a further inquiry as to the license requirements for exporting the phase shifters. -22- In sum, Wu and Wei cannot claim that they lacked fair notice of the Category XI(c) restrictions, and those restrictions are not so standardless as to allow for arbitrary enforcement. Accordingly, we hold that the Munitions List restrictions--as applied to Wu and Wei–-are not void for vagueness. Accord Hsu, 364 F.3d at 196-98 (rejecting void-for-vagueness challenge to the Munitions List); Lee, 183 F.3d at 1031-33 (same); United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1437 (8th Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988); Swarovski, 592 F.2d at 132-33 (same). Jury Instructions. Wu and Wei are on much stronger footing when they challenge the district court's instruction to the jury that it must accept without question the State Department's after-the-fact determinations that the phase shifters were controlled by the Munitions List. Wu and Wei argue that by removing from the jury the question of whether the phase shifters fell under the Munitions List, the instructions violated their right to a jury finding on each essential element of the crime. As an initial rejoinder, the government claims that since the AECA precludes judicial review of defense article designations, see 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h), the statute also bars jurors from deciding whether a particular item identified as a defense article in a CJ determination actually meets the criteria of the Munitions List. The Seventh Circuit previously rejected this argument, observing that § 2778(h) only covers designations made in regulations, and -23- that a CJ determination by the Directorate is not in a regulation. Pulungan, 569 F.3d at 328. However, the government urges us instead to follow the decision in Karn v. U.S Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), remanded on other grounds, 107 F.3d 923 (table), 1997 WL 71750 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion), which held that § 2778(h) does shield CJ determinations from judicial review. See id. at 5-6. In this case, however, we need not decide the difficult questions of whether the provision's reference to regulations includes CJ determinations or certifications to courts, or whether the phrase judicial review applies to juries. Even if § 2778(h) does bar jury review of CJ determinations and/or certifications, there would be serious constitutional problems if we read that provision to render Directorate determinations issued after exports have already occurred as being retroactively dispositive as to the coverage of the Munitions List. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Our concern is not whether the form of the designations sufficed, but the timing: the government may not decide for itself that some prior act by a criminal defendant violated the law, and thereby remove that determination from the province of the jury. As of June 2006, the time of the exports in question, no official determination had been made as to the presence of the phase shifters on the Munitions List. Indeed, at the time there -24- was disagreement even within the government as to the proper categorization of the phase shifters. The items apparently had some commercial utility, including in civilian aviation and cell phone technology. In February 2002, the Commerce Department issued Commodity Classifications concluding that the phase shifters were dual-use items covered by the Commerce Control List (which would indicate that they did not fall within the scope of Munitions List Category XI(c)). But in August 2003, the Defense Department's TriServices Committee verbally informed the manufacturer of the phase shifters that the items should be ITAR-controlled and thus under the authority of the State Department. This advice was never made public.10 It was not until December 2007, 18 months after Chitron exported the phase shifters in question, that the Directorate 10 The fact that government officials disagreed about the proper classification of phase shifters does not mean that Category XI(c) is fatally vague. For instance, two police officers might disagree whether the barrel of a shotgun is greater or less than 18 inches, perhaps because they have different ideas about how length should be measured. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 670 F.3d 360, 365-66 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing methods for measuring barrel length). But that does not mean the statutory provisions defining firearm by barrel length, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(1)-(4), are void for vagueness. A statute can satisfy the Due Process Clause and still present occasional close calls. Moreover, the fact that government officials disagreed about the proper classification of phase shifters does not defeat the mens rea element of the offense. Wu and Wei might well have believed that the phase shifters were Munitions List-restricted even while some government officials were doubtful. After all, the defendants were not privy to the State and Commerce Departments deliberations on the matter. -25- issued a CJ determination confirming that the MAPCGM0003 phase shifter fell within the coverage of the Munitions List. The Directorate never issued a CJ determination at all for the MAPCGM0002 phase shifter, but rather simply certified to the district court before trial, years after the export, that it was in fact covered by the Munitions List. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the trial, the district court, over the defendants' objections, instructed the jury that it should not consider the appropriateness of the determinations made by the State Department as to whether the phase shifters fell under the Munitions List. Instead, the court told the jury that it should only decide whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Secretary of State determined that the charged parts were defense articles on the [Munitions List] at the time of export. To see why this instruction improperly wrested a key question from the jury, we go back to first principles. In the criminal law, both a culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980); accord United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir.) (Lynch, J., and Howard, J., opinion of the court in part and concurring in part), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 897 (2008). To use a straightforward and familiar example: the crime of possessing an unregistered firearm, -26- 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), requires (1) that the defendant possessed an unregistered weapon classified as a firearm under the National Firearms Act (the actus reus), and (2) that the defendant knew of the features of his [weapon] that brought it within the scope of the Act (the mens rea). Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994). In the ordinary course, the actus reus element will be easier to prove than the mens rea. The National Firearms Act says that a shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches must be registered, see 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), and barrel length may be readily measured. Thus, in United States v. Shaw, 670 F.3d 360 (1st Cir. 2012), it was uncontested that the barrel of the defendant's shotgun measured only sixteen and a quarter inches; the issue in dispute was whether the defendant knew that the barrel was shorter than the requisite length. Compare id. at 364 (majority opinion), and id. at 368-69 (Boudin, J., concurring), with id. at 376 (Lipez, J., dissenting). But even where the evidence is sufficient to show the necessary mens rea, the government still must always meet its burden of proving the actus reus of the offense. United States v. Whiteside, 285 F.3d 1345, 1353 (11th Cir. 2002). For instance, if a defendant mistakenly thinks that the barrel of his unregistered shotgun is shorter than eighteen inches when in fact it is longer than that length, he is innocent of the crime of possessing an -27- unregistered firearm, even though he had the requisite guilty mind. Cf. United States v. De La Torre, 599 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2010) (government must prove[] the defendant had the requisite guilty mind and prove the defendant did possess the particular controlled substance charged in the indictment), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 227 (2010). Here, to convict the defendants of violating the AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c), the jury had to find not only that the defendants acted with the requisite mens rea (willfulness), but also that they actually committed the actus reus charged (violation of regulations issued under the statute). Put differently, even if the jury found that Wu and Wei believed that phase shifters fell within the Munitions List restrictions, it would still have to conclude that the phase shifters actually did fall within the Munitions List restrictions (regardless of Wu and Wei's beliefs). And as to whether Wu and Wei violated regulations issued under the AECA, the proper question for the jury was whether Wu and Wei's conduct violated the relevant regulations as those regulations existed at the time the conduct occurred. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937) (The Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.). In defense of the jury instructions, the government argues that the question of whether the phase shifters fall within -28- the Munitions List is a legal issue not suited for jury determination. Cf. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106-07 (1895) (juries decide factual questions, not legal questions). In support, it cites to our cases construing the felon-in-possession statute, in which certain issues of law embedded in the definition of prior conviction (such as whether a former felon's right to carry a firearm has been restored) are denied to the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436, 440 (1st Cir. 1995). Yet in Bartelho, we held that a showing that the [defendant's] right to carry a firearm has not been restored is not an element of a [felon-in-possession statute] violation. Id. at 439. By contrast, we have held that a showing that an exported item was on the Munitions List is an element of a § 2778 violation. See United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1988). And in order to convict a defendant under a criminal statute, the government must prove each element of the offense to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2350 (2012). This is not to deny that Congress enjoys latitude in determining what facts constitute elements of a crime which must be tried before a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and which do not. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d at 20 (Lynch, J., and Howard, J.). But Congress has never said that a criminal defendant may be -29- convicted on the basis of an ex post determination by a State Department official outside the regulatory process. The government also invokes United States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 864 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989), and United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), both involving government designations that juries were required to accept. But crucially, in both cases the government designations at issue were made before the defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct occurred. See Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 331; Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 864 F.2d at 1468-69. To determine whether the defendants committed the charged actus reus by violating the laws as they existed at the time, the trial courts simply had to determine whether the prior designations had actually been made. See Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 864 F.2d at 1473; Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 331. In this case, no State Department designation had been made at the time that the defendants engaged in the charged conduct. Perhaps it would have been possible for the prosecution to persuade the jury--beyond a reasonable doubt--that the phase shifters really did fall within the Munitions List restrictions as those restrictions stood at the time of the defendants' exports. For instance, the prosecution could have presented evidence that the phase shifters were designed for use with other Category XI -30- equipment and that they were not in normal commercial use. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(c)(XI)(c). Here, we only go so far as to say that under the existing statutory and regulatory scheme, the question of whether phase shifters were items controlled by Category XI(c) of the Munitions List was a question for the jury--not a question that could be decided ex post by the State Department as a matter of law. We acknowledge that instructional error is not necessarily grounds for reversal, even when the error amounts to the complete omission of an element of the charged offense. As the Supreme Court has held, where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999); see also United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). But here, the defendants did contest the prosecution's claim that the phase shifters fell within Category XI(c) of the Munitions List at the time of the export, thus making this case different from Neder. In any event, given the dissension between the State and Commerce Departments on this very matter, we cannot conclude[] beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. Cf. Neder, 527 U.S. at 17. -31- We also acknowledge that our holding means that in at least some cases involving Category XI(c) of the Munitions List, the question of whether a particular part fell within Category XI(c) of the Munitions List at the time of the alleged export will be a question for the jury. This is not out of the ordinary. Juries are commonly called upon to decide complex cases. Green Constr. Co. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 1005, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993). These include highly technical patent and tax cases as well as cases concerning terrorism and espionage. So too, juries are capable of determining whether phase shifters are specifically designed for military use with the items listed in Munitions List Categories XI(a) and (b) and whether they are exempt from the restrictions due to normal commercial use. Although permitting juries to decide questions like these may complicate enforcement of our nation's export control regime, the constitutional rights at issue--the guarantee of due process of law, the right to a jury trial, the protection against ex post facto laws--are of surpassing importance. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.11 11 In any event, as defense counsel noted at oral argument, it appears that these complications may be largely avoided through the State Department's own recently proposed amendment to Category XI of the Munitions List, which would revise that provision, especially subsection XI(c), to include a positive list of specific controlled items in place of its current catalogue of generic descriptions. See Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revision of U.S. Munitions List Category XI and Definition for Equipment, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,958 (proposed Nov. 28, 2012) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121). The proposed revision of Category XI(c) appears to include phase shifters -32- Our decision to vacate the Munitions List convictions only affects two of the seventeen counts on which Wu was convicted and two of the thirteen counts on which Wei was convicted.12