Opinion ID: 2697172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assertedly Improper Joinder of Charges

Text: Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when (1) it denied his request to sever the Martinez (home invasion robbery, attempted murder), Weir (home invasion robbery, carjacking) and J.S./E.G. (home invasion robbery, sex offenses, carjacking) charges from each other; and (2) when it joined those charges to the Witters capital charges, over his objection. We find no abuse of discretion. 13
On November 18, 1996, defendant moved to sever the Martinez, Weir and J.S./ E.G. cases, which had previously been joined by the trial court at the prosecution‘s request. Defendant also joined codefendant Vera‘s motion to sever the J.S./E.G. case from the Martinez case. Defendant argued severance was required in the interests of justice because, contrary to the prosecution‘s contention, the various crimes were of different classes. In addition, he argued a joint trial would be unfair because the evidence was much stronger in the Martinez case, where the victim positively identified him as a perpetrator, than it was in the other two cases, where there was little or no evidence identifying him. Vera argued there was an absence of ―commonality‖ with respect to the nature and timing of the offenses and the witnesses to them; the evidence was not crossadmissible; and there was a danger of a ―spillover‖ effect in which the stronger evidence in the Martinez case might bolster the weaker J.S./E.G. case. The court denied the motions. It properly did so. ― ‗[B]ecause consolidation or joinder of charged offenses ordinarily promotes efficiency, that is the course of action preferred by the law.‘ ‖ (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 493.) ―Section 954 governs the issue of joinder of counts and it provides in pertinent part: ‗An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, . . . or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.‘ ‖ (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 924.) The crimes involved here—attempted murder, robbery, the sexual offenses, and carjacking—―are . . . deemed to be of the ‗same class,‘ insofar as [they] share common characteristics as assaultive crimes against the person.‖ (People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 276.) ―Because the charges were 14 properly joined under section 954, ‗defendant must make a clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant‘s severance motion.‘ ‖ (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 119.) That is, defendant must demonstrate the denial of his motion exceeded the bounds of reason. (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 574.) ― ‗ ―Refusal to sever [charges] may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a ‗weak‘ case has been joined with a ‗strong‘ case, or with another ‗weak‘ case, so that the ‗spillover‘ effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 575.) Regarding cross-admissibility, however, ―section 954.1 expressly provides that ‗where two or more accusatory pleadings charging offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses have been consolidated, evidence concerning one offense or offenses need not be admissible as to the other offense or offenses before the jointly charged offenses may be tried together before the same trier of fact.‘ (Italics added.) Thus, ‗cross-admissibility is not the sine qua non of joint trials.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) Moreover, ―[a]s we explained in People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, the issue of cross-admissibility ‗is not cross-admissibility of the charged offenses but rather the admissibility of relevant evidence‘ that tends to prove a disputed fact. (Id. at p. 589; see Evid. Code, § 210.)‖ (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 576.) Thus, we have said, ― ‗complete (or so-called two-way) cross-admissibility is not required. In other words, it may be sufficient, for example, if evidence underlying charge ―B‖ is admissible in the trial of charge ―A‖—even though evidence underlying charge ―A‖ may not be similarly admissible in the trial of charge ―B.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 493.) 15 Here, all three incidents involved a home invasion robbery, and in all three a victim‘s car was taken. The offenses occurred within the same geographical area (the eastern San Gabriel Valley) and within a relatively short period of time (between December 13, 1995, and January 19, 1996). Additionally, the J.S./E.G. and Weir robberies shared common characteristics in their commission. In both cases, the victims were initially approached in their garages as they returned home. The perpetrators covered their faces with ski masks and asked similar questions of the victims. Such evidence would have been cross-admissible to show a common plan or design. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Defendant maintains that these similarities were not distinctive. But ―[t]o establish the existence of a common plan or scheme [under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b)], ‗the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.‘ ‖ (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 586.) The J.S./E.G. and Martinez cases featured another common characteristic: In each case, the perpetrators used items taken from the closets of the victims to tie them up. 6 Finally, stolen items from all three of the noncapital offenses were stored at Gladys Santos‘s apartment. Thus, the evidence was potentially cross-admissible in these three connected robberies. ―We emphasize, however, that, even if cross-admissibility did not support consolidation of the cases, the absence of cross-admissibility alone would not be 6 Defendant argues that the prosecutor‘s offer of proof regarding the crossadmissibility of evidence, made in opposition to defendant‘s severance motion, was not supported by the record of the preliminary hearing. Defendant did not object to the offer of proof, so we may assume the prosecutor‘s representations about the evidence were accurate and made in good faith. Moreover, defendant fails to cite any authority that would limit the prosecutor‘s offer at a pretrial hearing on severance to the record of the preliminary hearing. 16 sufficient to establish prejudice where (1) the offenses were properly joinable under section 954, and (2) no other factor relevant to the assessment of prejudice demonstrates an abuse of discretion.‖ (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 577.) Defendant attempts to establish prejudice by pointing to two other factors: (1) the facts of the J.S/E.G. and Martinez cases assertedly would have inflamed the jury against him and prevented a fair assessment of the evidence in the Weir case and; (2) there was a danger of a ―spillover‖ effect by the joinder of the stronger Martinez case, where defendant was identified as the perpetrator, to the J.S./E.G. crimes, where evidence of his participation was weak. We are not persuaded. Defendant asserts that the sexual offenses perpetrated against J.S. and the attack on Martinez were so brutal as to ―evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and make the jury convict on bad character rather than subjecting the prosecution‘s evidence to scrutiny.‖ The issue is not whether evidence of a violent offense evokes repulsion, but whether ― ‗strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak prosecution case‘ on another crime.‖ (People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 934.) First, it is not the case that the evidence of his participation in the J.S./E.G. and Weir home invasion robberies was ―weak.‖ Defendant‘s connection to those crimes was established by evidence that both J.S. and E.G. had identified defendant as a perpetrator—J.S. in open court during the preliminary examination and E.G. at a live lineup. Additionally, J.S. had repeatedly identified Pritchard and Vera, defendant‘s confederates, as perpetrators. While neither Ruth Weir nor her husband was able to identify any of their assailants, the prosecutor represented that defendant had admitted his participation in the Weir robbery to a witness, Gladys Santos. Thus, even to the extent the Martinez incident could be viewed as more inflammatory, joinder was not likely to prejudice him with regard to the jury‘s decision on the other charges. 17 Second, evidence of the Martinez attempted murder was not more inflammatory than the other crimes. Defendant himself equates the potentially inflammatory nature of the sexual assault on J.S. with the attempted murder of Martinez. His contention that evidence adduced regarding these charges would inflame the jury with respect to the ―nonviolent robbery‖ of the Weirs minimizes the terrifying circumstances of the latter offense: Two days before Christmas, an elderly woman was confronted by armed, masked assailants who forced her at gunpoint into her own home; forced her and her husband to lie on the floor while they ransacked her residence; told her they would kill her if she was lying about whether there was money in the house; and when she protested the theft of her Christmas presents, held a gun to her head and asked her to choose between the presents and her life. These circumstances do not support defendant‘s characterization of the Weir home invasion robbery as ―nonviolent.‖ Accordingly, we reject defendant‘s claim that evidence of the J.S. and Martinez offenses was so much more inflammatory it would have rendered the jury incapable of fairly assessing the evidence pertaining to the Weir robbery. Finally, defendant contends the consolidation of the Martinez case, in which defendant was identified as a perpetrator, with the J.S./E.G. and Weir cases, in which evidence of his identity was more circumstantial, would have had a ―spillover‖ effect by ―improperly bolstering the prosecution‘s weak evidence implicating [defendant] in the Weir and [J.S./E.G.] crimes.‖ As explained above, the evidence connecting defendant to the latter crimes was not weak. Accordingly, the trial court could reasonably find that the jury would be able to fairly assess defendant‘s guilt as to all the charges, and did not abuse its discretion by denying the severance motion with respect to the J.S./E.G., Weir and Martinez crimes. 18 2. Consolidation of Noncapital Charges With Special Circumstance Case Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when, after denying his severance motion, it subsequently consolidated the noncapital charges with the Witters capital murder case. Again, we find no abuse of discretion.
The prosecution filed an information charging defendant and Drebert with the special circumstance murder of Witters and moved to consolidate that case with the case charging them, along with Pritchard and Vera, with the J.S/E.G., Weir and Martinez crimes. Defendant and Vera opposed consolidation. Vera, in particular, argued that he would be prejudiced because he was not involved in the murder. The court agreed and denied the consolidation motion. The prosecution responded by asking the court to sever defendant and Drebert from Pritchard and Vera, and then consolidate the capital and noncapital charges against defendant and Drebert. Over defendant‘s continued objection, the court granted the request.
As noted, section 954 represents a legislative preference for the consolidation of charges ―connected together in their commission‖ or ―of the same class of crimes or offenses‖ (ibid.) because such joinder ― ‗ordinarily promotes efficiency.‘ ‖ (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 493.) Unquestionably, the Witters murder case, like the noncapital charges, involved an ―assaultive crime‖ against a person (People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 276) and could be properly joined. Defendant nonetheless contends consolidation was error because evidence of the noncapital crimes would not have been admissible in the guilt phase of the Witters special circumstance case had it been tried separately. The prosecutor‘s theory of crossadmissibility was that defendant admitted his participation in both the Witters and Weir cases to the same witness, Gladys Santos. The prosecutor also argued Drebert‘s participation in the Witters case was admissible to defeat any claim by Drebert that he 19 was unaware that defendant intended to attack Martinez when Drebert agreed to enter Martinez‘s apartment and commit a robbery. On appeal, defendant contends Santos‘s testimony regarding defendant‘s admission that he robbed the Weirs would not have been admissible at a separate trial of the Witters murder, nor would his admission that he killed Witters have been admissible at a separate trial of the Weir case. He argues further that the cross-admissibility of evidence regarding Drebert‘s knowledge and intent is, essentially, irrelevant to the question of the cross-admissibility of the evidence as to defendant himself. Although the prosecutor did not argue this point below, we have already noted that evidence of the geographic and temporal proximity of the four home invasion robberies, along with certain common characteristics of those crimes, would have been admissible to show a common plan for purposes of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). In any event, even if we assume there was no cross-admissible evidence between the Witters case and the other three cases, the absence of such evidence is not dispositive. ― ‗Crossadmissibility . . . is sufficient but not necessary to deny severance. [Citation.] As the four-part test is stated in the conjunctive, joinder may be appropriate even though the evidence is not cross-admissible . . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 440.) The remaining relevant considerations favor consolidation. The murder of Koen Witters was not less inflammatory than the evidence of the sexual assault of J.S., the attempted murder of Martinez or the invasion of the Weirs‘ home. Thus, joinder was not ― ‗ ― ‗unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 439.) Nor was the evidence in the Witters case weaker than such evidence in the other cases so as to create the danger of a spillover effect. (Ibid.) Finally, the fact the Witters case was a capital case did not cut against consolidation where the ―evidence of each charge [was] so strong that consolidation is unlikely to [have affected] the verdict.‖ (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 423.) 20 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in consolidating the capital and noncapital charges. 3. Gross Unfairness Defendant lastly contends that, even if the trial court‘s severance and consolidation rulings were correct when made, reversal of the judgment is required because the joint trial resulted in such gross unfairness as to amount to a due process violation. (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 494.) The claim is meritless. Defendant contends joinder allowed the prosecutor to improperly use Martinez‘s identification of defendant as his assailant to bolster weaker evidence of defendant‘s participation in the remaining offenses. We perceive no such impropriety.7 Evidence that defendant was the ringleader of a group that included Drebert, Pritchard and Vera, and that J.S. identified Pritchard and Vera as two of the perpetrators, along with DNA evidence connecting defendant to the sexual assault against J.S., could, combined with other evidence, support the inference that defendant was one of the other men involved in the other incidents. As we explained in similar circumstances, a prosecutor may properly argue that defendants probably acted in concert when the evidence established they had a history of doing so. (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 152.) In short, we reject defendant‘s claim that there was anything unfair, much less grossly unfair, in the manner in which the prosecutor connected defendant to the four crimes. Defendant also argues he was denied due process because consolidation of the cases allowed the prosecutor to present inflammatory evidence suggesting defendant belonged to a gang. The only evidence that defendant was a gang member was 7 To the extent defendant is asserting that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the evidence in his closing argument, that claim is forfeited by his failure to have lodged a timely objection to the statements at issue. (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1205.) 21 Martinez‘s testimony that he feared defendant because he believed defendant was a gang member. The prosecutor did not refer to this testimony. The prosecutor made a few references to the gang-like appearance and behavior of defendant and his three cohorts, but these references, fleeting and ambiguous, did not identify defendant as a member of a known street gang. To the extent defendant‘s complaint is that there were suggestions defendant, Drebert, Pritchard and Vera acted like a gang in the colloquial sense, the short answer is that they did. Such a colloquial understanding is quite different, however, from a potentially prejudicial suggestion that defendant belonged to one of the well-established criminal street gangs operating in Southern California. Other than Martinez‘s brief testimony, no such connection was made by the evidence or suggested by the prosecutor. B. Asserted Errors During Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors 1. Dismissal of Jurors Who Stated They Would Be Unable to Impose the Death Penalty Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury by excusing 22 prospective jurors who, in response to the court‘s query, stated they would be unable or unwilling to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. In support of his claim, he relies on People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425 (Stewart), and People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946 (Heard), in which we found error. We reject defendant‘s claim the circumstances of this case are analogous to those in the cited cases. The trial court conducted a preliminary screening of four panels of prospective jurors. The court first considered financial hardship requests. It then described in general terms the nature of the case. It told the first panel: ―One of the charges against [defendant] in this case is murder, and it‘s alleged that it‘s murder in the first degree. [¶] It‘s further alleged that due to the manner in which the murder was committed, that special circumstances exist. [¶] If the jury in this case finds [defendant] guilty of murder in the first degree, and further finds that the special circumstances allegation is true, the jury in this case will be asked to determine the penalty in this case. [¶] The jury will 22 have two options, and two options only, and that will be life without the possibility of parole, that will be life in prison, or death. [¶] The reason I‘m mentioning that is this: Now, without knowing anything at all about this case, is there any juror sitting in the audience right now that, regardless of what the evidence might be, has such feelings about the death penalty that he or she would be unable to vote to impose the death penalty in this case. [¶] If the answer is yes, if you‘d rise, please.‖ Ten jurors in the first panel responded affirmatively. The court questioned each of them to confirm they would refuse to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. For example, the court asked Prospective Juror C.M.: ―Miss [M.], that is regardless of what the evidence is; is that correct?‖ When she answered ―yes,‖ the court excused her. Prospective Juror D.G. was asked, ―Miss [G.], your answer is that you would be unable to vote to impose the penalty of death, regardless of the evidence?‖ The juror answered ―yes‖ and was excused. The court asked essentially the same question of the remaining eight jurors: whether, regardless of the evidence, the prospective juror would be unable to vote to impose the death penalty. It excused the jurors when they answered affirmatively. The trial court asked a similar question with respect to whether any prospective jurors would vote to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. No prospective juror responded affirmatively. Only after this screening was completed were the remaining prospective jurors asked to fill out the juror questionnaire. Defendant‘s objection to the procedure was overruled, as was his renewed objection later in the proceedings, and the trial court used the same procedure when conducting its preliminary screening of the other three panels. The court briefly explained the charges against defendant and the penalty options that would be before the jury should defendant be convicted and the special circumstances found true. The court then asked whether, because of a prospective juror‘s feelings about the death penalty, that person would be unable to vote to impose death regardless of the evidence. The court 23 questioned each prospective juror who answered affirmatively to confirm he or she would not vote to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. Some of these colloquies were more extensive than others, and on three occasions when there was ambiguity in the prospective juror‘s response the trial court did not excuse the individual. In all, the trial court used this procedure to excuse 22 prospective jurors. ―Under decisions of the United States Supreme Court, prospective jurors who express personal opposition to the death penalty are not automatically subject to excusal for cause as long as ‗they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.‘ (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176; see Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522 . . . .) To determine if a prospective juror is excusable for cause without compromising a defendant‘s constitutional rights, we inquire whether the prospective juror‘s views on the death penalty ‗would ―prevent or substantially impair the performance‖ ‘ of the juror‘s duties in accordance with the court‘s instructions and his or her oath. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).)‖ (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 778.) ―Under Witt, a prospective juror is ‗substantially impaired‘ and may properly be excused for cause if he or she is unable to follow the trial court‘s instruction and ‗conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.‘ ‖ (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 635.) ―In according deference on appeal to trial court rulings on motions to exclude for cause, appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person‘s responses (noting, among other things, the person‘s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record. [Citation.] As the high court observed in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 428, ‗the question whether a venireman is biased has traditionally been determined through voir dire culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the venireman‘s state of mind . . . based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that 24 are peculiarly within a trial judge‘s province.‘ Indeed, as the high court noted in Witt, ‗ ―[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a question of fact, except in a clear case.‖ ‘ ‖ (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451.) Defendant characterizes the trial court‘s questioning of prospective jurors as ―perfunctory‖ and argues it was inadequate to protect his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because the court failed ―to explain[] the applicable law or conduct[] any inquiry into whether the jurors could temporarily put aside [their opposition to the death penalty] and follow the law in this case.‖8 We are not persuaded. ―Recent decisions of this court have emphasized the importance of meaningful death-qualifying voir dire. We have reminded trial courts of their duty to know and follow proper procedure, and to devote sufficient time and effort to the process. [Citations.] At bottom, both the court and counsel ‗must have sufficient information regarding the prospective juror‘s state of mind to permit a reliable determination as to whether the juror‘s views [on capital punishment] would ― ‗prevent or substantially impair‘ ‖ the performance of his or her duties.‘ [Citation.] . . . [¶] Nonetheless, the trial court has broad discretion over the number and nature of questions about the death 8 The Attorney General contends defendant has forfeited this claim because he failed to specifically object to the adequacy of the trial court‘s voir dire of the prospective jurors. Defendant objected twice to the trial court‘s excusal of the prospective jurors. In any event, at the time of defendant‘s trial, a no-forfeiture rule was in effect with respect to Witherspoon/Witt claims. (People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 637.) We abandoned that rule in McKinnon, and now require an objection to preserve such claims, but ―because at the time of this trial we had not expressly held that an objection is necessary to preserve Witherspoon/Witt excusal error on appeal, we do not apply this rule here.‖ (Id. at p. 643.) 25 penalty. We have rejected complaints about ‗hasty‘ [citation] or ‗perfunctory‘ voir dire.‖ (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 539–540.) While the trial court‘s preliminary screening of the prospective jurors here was relatively brief, the question it posed to the prospective jurors—whether, regardless of the evidence, they would be unwilling or unable to impose the death penalty—was unequivocal. (See People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 780.) In Riccardi, question No. 68 of the juror questionnaire asked: ― ‗Do you have such an opinion concerning the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence that might be developed during the penalty phase of the trial . . . you would automatically and absolutely refuse to vote for the death penalty in any case?‘ ‖ (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 780.) The defendant argued that four prospective jurors were improperly excused based solely on their answers to the juror questionnaire because, taken as a whole, their responses were ambiguous and required further examination. Three of those prospective jurors had answered ―yes‖ to question No. 68. In rejecting the defendant‘s argument, we observed: ―Given that question No. 68 was phrased unequivocally, a prospective juror‘s decision to write ‗yes‘ as an answer clearly established that the prospective juror held a bias against the death penalty that ‗would ―prevent or substantially impair‖ ‘ the performance of his or her duties as a juror even if the evidence leaned in favor of imposing death.‖ (Ibid.; see People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 531 [―The questionnaire at issue here . . . asked whether a prospective juror held such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence or the strength of proof, he or she ‗automatically‘ would refuse to return a first degree murder verdict, find a special circumstance true, or impose the death penalty. Any juror who ‗automatically‘ would vote in ways that precluded the death penalty would clearly be disqualified under [Wainwright v.] Witt[, supra, 469 U.S. 412].‖].) Here, too, the trial court asked whether any prospective juror‘s opposition to the death penalty would preclude her or him from imposing it regardless of the evidence. 26 Those who answered ―yes,‖ and whose answer was confirmed by further questioning by the trial court, were disqualified. While brief, the trial court‘s questioning was not rote. Some prospective jurors expanded their responses making it even clearer their opposition to the death penalty would preclude them from imposing it. For example, one prospective juror informed the court, ―I am strongly against the death penalty. I‘m against it.‖ When the court asked, ―In any case?‖ the prospective juror replied, ―In any case. Life imprisonment, I‘m okay; but death, I‘m against it.‖ The court continued the colloquy, asking, ―So you would be unable to vote to impose the death penalty in this case or in any case; is that right?‖ ―Yes,‖ the prospective juror replied. She answered ―yes‖ again when the court asked a final question: ―Regardless of the evidence?‖ Another juror explained that even killing a fish while fishing had been so upsetting to her that ―there is no way I could even consider anything like [the death penalty].‖ The court asked, ―You couldn‘t conceive of an instance so terrible that you would vote to impose the death penalty?‖ The prospective juror replied, ―No, not at all.‖ Still, the court probed further, eliciting from the prospective witness repeated statements affirming she would not impose the death penalty in any case (―Everything has a right to live‖), under any circumstance (―No circumstance‖), and regardless of the evidence (―Regardless‖). On the other hand, the three prospective jurors whose answers were confused or ambiguous were not excused. Moreover, unlike in People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th 758, or People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 491, the trial court had the opportunity to observe the prospective jurors as they responded to its questions, permitting it to evaluate their credibility and their conviction. The trial court‘s ability to ―assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, [is] a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.‖ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9.) Thus, ―the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts.‖ (Ibid.) Finally, ―[w]hen a juror has clearly expressed an inability to vote for the death penalty regardless of the 27 evidence that may be produced at trial, the court has discretion to limit further voir dire directed toward persuading the juror that there may be some circumstance which he has not considered that could cause him to modify his conscientious or moral attitude toward the death penalty.‖ (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 846; accord, People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 714.) Defendant‘s reliance on Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, and Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, is misplaced because those decisions involve factual circumstances not present here. ―[T]he trial court in Stewart excused prospective jurors based solely on their answers to a written question concerning whether their death penalty views would ‗ ―prevent or make it very difficult‖ ‘ to determine the appropriate penalty, and without engaging in oral voir dire. (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 444, 446–447, italics omitted.)‖ (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1017.) ―As we observed, even one who gave a straightforward ‗yes‘ answer to such questions would not necessarily demonstrate disqualification under Witt, because mere difficulty in imposing the death penalty does not, per se, prevent or substantially impair the performance of a juror‘s duties. The prospective juror might nonetheless be able to put aside his or her personal views and deliberate fairly under the death penalty law. Yet the Stewart questionnaire did not inquire whether the prospective juror could do so.‖ (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 530.) In this case, unlike in Stewart, the jurors were personally questioned by the trial court. And unlike the questionnaire in Stewart, the court‘s questions here did not use the ―make it very difficult‖ formulation, but asked the jurors unequivocally whether he or she would be unable to apply the death penalty. Accordingly, Stewart is inapplicable here. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, also involved circumstances quite different from those presented in this case. In Heard, a prospective juror indicated on the juror questionnaire he believed life without possibility of parole was a worse penalty than death. When questioned by the trial court about his response, however, the prospective 28 juror ―made it quite clear that he would not vote ‗automatically‘—in other words, ‗no matter what the evidence showed‘—either for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or for death, and also that he would not be reluctant to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder or to find the special circumstances true ‗so as to avoid having to face the issue of the death penalty.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 964.) Given the prospective juror‘s oral responses, we concluded the trial court had improperly excused him for cause. (Ibid.) In this case, by contrast, the excused jurors clearly stated they would be unable to impose the death penalty regardless of what the evidence showed. We thus reject defendant‘s contention that Stewart and Heard require reversal in this case. The dissent maintains that the trial court‘s excusal of 16 prospective jurors from the first two panels was error because the trial court did not conduct a further inquiry after they unequivocally stated they would not impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. The dissent would have had the trial court explain to the prospective jurors the bifurcated nature of a capital case, the possibility that evidence in aggravation and mitigation might be presented at the penalty phase and the weighing process the jury engages in with respect to such evidence, and have inquired of them whether they could put aside their views and follow the law. As noted, the trial court exercises its discretion over the number and nature of questions about the death penalty. (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 539–540.) There is no requirement that a trial court engage in the exposition the dissent would impose upon it. The issue here is not whether the prospective jurors were simply opposed to the death penalty or ―did not believe in it,‖ a circumstance that would require further voir dire, but whether their opposition would disable them from imposing the death penalty regardless of the evidence. Although the trial court did not ask the jurors if they could set aside their feelings and follow the court‘s instructions, the court‘s inquiry did call on the jurors to assess their ability to vote for death. If a prospective juror states unequivocally that he or she would be unable to impose the death penalty regardless of 29 the evidence, the prospective juror is, by definition, someone whose views ―would ‗prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‘ ‖ (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) Further inquiry concerning the juror‘s ability to follow the law is not required. In reviewing the trial court‘s determination, we apply a ―rule of deference‖ (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7) based on the trial court‘s ability to assess the demeanor and credibility of the prospective witness (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 178). The dissent rejects application of the rule here, asserting the trial court spent insufficient time questioning the individual prospective jurors to have drawn any conclusions regarding their demeanor or credibility. (Dis. opn., at pp. 14–15.) Certainly the trial court could have conducted a fuller inquiry and the better practice is to do so. But the reviewing court applies the rule to the circumstances before it, not the circumstances it might have wished for. (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, at p. 7 [―Deference is owed regardless of whether the trial court engages in explicit analysis regarding substantial impairment.‖].) The fact remains the trial court was present at the voir dire and we were not. The dissent cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court must spend a certain amount of time, give certain explanations, ask certain questions, or make findings on the record in support of its determination before a reviewing court applies the rule of deference. The dissent‘s reliance on the Darden decision is misplaced. That opinion does not stand for the proposition that a trial court cannot excuse a prospective juror based on his or her unequivocal answer to a single question unless the record reveals the prospective juror received additional information regarding assessment of the penalty. The claim raised and rejected in Darden was that the trial court had misstated the Witt standard. (Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 175–178.) The court‘s examination of the context in which the challenged question was asked was to determine whether the court had ―stated the correct standard when questioning individual members of the venire.‖ 30 (Id. at p. 177.) The court concluded it had and that the jurors whose excusal was challenged had heard the court repeatedly do so. (Id. at pp. 177–178.) In sum, we conclude the trial court did not improperly excuse those jurors who expressed an unequivocal inability to apply the death penalty regardless of the evidence. Although not a model for future courts, the voir dire technique used here resulted in no constitutional impropriety. We note, however, that a more complete voir dire by trial courts would assist our review of a defendant‘s claim of Witt error, and we encourage trial courts to question prospective jurors at sufficient length to clearly establish their views on their ability to impose the death penalty.
Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused for cause Prospective Juror No. 2361, a juror who, although not excused in the initial questioning discussed ante, was subsequently found to be unable to fairly consider the death penalty. We reject the claim. Asked in his juror questionnaire about his ―general feelings‖ toward the death penalty, Prospective Juror No. 2361 wrote, ―I don‘t believe in death penalty.‖ He indicated further his view that California should not have a death penalty and that the death penalty should not be used. In response to a question whether he would be able to impose the death penalty ―if you believed, after hearing all of the evidence, that the penalty was appropriate,‖ he answered, ―No.‖ Finally, in response to a question that asked, ―What do you believe the purpose of the death penalty to be?‖ he responded, ―I don‘t believe in death penalty.‖ When questioned by the trial court about these responses, however, the prospective juror stated he could vote to impose the death penalty ―[d]epending on the evidence.‖ When asked by the court whether he could set aside his personal beliefs and apply the law objectively, he responded, ―Right.‖ Upon questioning by the prosecutor, the prospective juror repeated his statement he could vote for the death penalty 31 ―depending on the evidence.‖ The prosecutor then asked: ―Is there a reason why [when] the questionnaire asked you that question, or asked you the question of whether or not you could impose death on someone, despite your personal views, you indicated that you couldn‘t? [¶] Have you changed your mind since the questionnaire?‖ The prospective juror replied, ―No.‖ The defense made no further effort to rehabilitate him. Over defendant‘s objection, the trial court excused the juror, explaining, ―he . . . indicated in response to the district attorney‘s questions that his basic decision hasn‘t changed from what he wrote down on the questionnaire, [on] which he indicated he did not believe in the death penalty.‖ As noted, under Witt, a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of that individual‘s views on the death penalty if such views would ― ‗prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‘ ‖ (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) Witt instructs further that ―this standard . . . does not require that a juror‘s bias be proved with ‗unmistakable clarity.‘ This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‗unmistakably clear‘; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. . . . [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.‖ (Id. at pp. 424– 426, fn. omitted.) ―[I]n determining whether the removal of a potential juror would vindicate the State‘s interest [in having jurors who are able to apply the death penalty within the framework of the law] without violating the defendant‘s right [to an impartial 32 jury], the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts.‖ (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9.) ― ‗ ―On appeal, we will uphold the trial court‘s ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court‘s determination as to the prospective juror‘s true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 752.) The explicit reason given by the trial court for excusing the prospective juror was that, notwithstanding his oral assertion that he could vote to impose the death penalty ―depending on the evidence,‖ he also said the strongly anti-death-penalty views he had expressed in his juror questionnaire had not changed. In the questionnaire he stated he would decline to apply the death penalty regardless of the evidence, a statement in direct conflict with what he said in court. The record thus supports the trial court‘s ruling because it shows the juror gave inconsistent statements regarding his ability to vote to impose the death penalty. Implicit in the trial court‘s ruling was its conclusion the prospective juror‘s questionnaire responses, rather than those he gave in court about his willingness to consider the death penalty, reflected his true state of mind. ―This determination of [his] state of mind is binding.‖ (People v. Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 752.) We thus reject defendant‘s challenge to Prospective Juror No. 2361‘s dismissal for cause. 3. Denial of Request for Individual Sequestered Voir Dire Concerning the Death Penalty At the time of defendant‘s trial, Code of Civil Procedure section 223 (section 223) provided in relevant part: ―Voir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.‖ This statute, enacted in 1990 as part of Proposition 115, abrogated our decision in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, which, as a rule of judicial procedure, had 33 required the death-qualification portion of voir dire in capital cases to be sequestered. (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 240.) Defendant filed a pretrial motion asking the trial court to exercise its discretion under section 223 and conduct sequestered voir dire. Citing Hovey, the motion asserted generally that such sequestered voir dire ―is the most effective method of preventing prospective jurors from being influenced by others in the responses to the deathqualification aspect of the voir dire process and enabling the parties to discover bias.‖ Without ruling on the motion, the trial court conducted its preliminary screening of the first and second panels of prospective jurors, during which, as noted, it excused some members of the panel based upon their professed inability to vote for the death penalty. During a break in the proceedings following the screening of the second panel, the trial court took up defendant‘s sequestration motion. The prosecutor joined in the motion, although he acknowledged ―the Court has the discretion to go either way, and I‘ll submit on [defendant‘s] papers.‖ The court denied the motion without further discussion. Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under section 223, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) He also contends the trial court‘s ruling violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, trial by an impartial jury, effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable death penalty. (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th, & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 16.)9 The claims are without merit. 9 ―As to this and virtually all other appellate claims, defendant contends that an issue raised and decided in the trial court resulted in constitutional violations, but he did not present those constitutional theories below. In such instances, it appears that (1) the appellate claim is the kind that required no trial court action to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court‘s act or omission, in addition to being wrong for reasons actually presented to that court, had the legal consequence of violating the United States and California Constitutions. To that extent, defendant‘s new (footnote continued on next page) 34 Defendant claims the trial court‘s failure to provide reasons for its ruling amounted to a failure to have exercised its discretion under section 223. Not so. Unquestionably, the trial court was aware of its discretionary authority, given that defendant‘s motion and the prosecutor‘s comments explicitly mentioned it. There is nothing in the statute requiring the trial court to set forth its reasons for its rulings on such a request. Moreover, defendant‘s motion was a generic, boilerplate one that made no attempt to show specifically why open court voir dire in this case was not practicable. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288 [group voir dire may be impracticable ―when, in a given case, it is shown to result in actual, rather than merely potential, bias‖].) Accordingly, nothing in defendant‘s motion required a detailed trial court ruling. ―In view of the circumstance that defendant offered only generalized grounds for conducting individual voir dire, not specific to his case, the trial court‘s ruling did not fall outside the bounds of reason.‖ (People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 241.) Thus, we reject defendant‘s claim that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion and, to the extent he also contends denial of his motion was an abuse of discretion, we reject that argument as well. (People v. Watkins, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1011.) 4. “Death Qualification” of the Prospective Jurors Defendant contends the process by which a death penalty jury is selected in California, and which was used in this case, violates the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth (footnote continued from previous page) constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17 . . . , applying People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433–439.) In the latter case, no separate constitutional discussion is required or provided where rejection of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue presented to that court necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or ‗gloss‘ raised for the first time here.‖ (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 139, fn. 17.) We apply this principle here and elsewhere where defendant asserts on appeal constitutional claims not advanced below. 35 Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the state Constitution, by depriving him of his rights to due process, a fair trial, a fair and reliable guilt and penalty phase determination and to a jury selected from a representative crosssection of the community. He acknowledges both we and the United States Supreme Court have rejected the claims he makes here. (Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176 [exclusion of prospective jurors based on their views of capital punishment does not contravene a defendant‘s Sixth and 14th Amend. right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community or to an impartial jury]; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1120 [exclusion of prospective jurors based on their views of capital punishment does not contravene a defendant‘s state constitutional right to due process and jury protections]; People v. Watkins, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1011 [there is no federal or state constitutional right to individual sequestered voir dire in capital cases].) Defendant contends that Lockhart was wrongly decided. His criticism of Lockhart is more properly addressed to the United States Supreme Court. In any event, we are not persuaded that our precedents were in error and thus decline to revisit our decisions. C. Guilt Phase Claims 1. Assertedly Erroneous Limitations on Cross-examination of Prosecution Witness Gladys Santos Defendant contends the trial court erroneously restricted his cross-examination of Gladys Santos when it precluded questioning her about (1) her two misdemeanor petty theft convictions; (2) whether she bartered drugs for stolen property and whether her credibility was affected by her concern this information would adversely impact her custody of her children and her eligibility for public assistance; and (3) the prosecutor‘s contacts with the department of children‘s services (Department) on Santos‘s behalf. The claims are both forfeited and meritless. 36
In an in camera discussion before he presented Santos‘s testimony, the prosecutor disclosed Santos‘s two misdemeanor convictions for petty theft. He disclosed further that, because of threats from defendant, the district attorney‘s office had relocated Santos and her family. He also revealed that the Department had threatened to remove Santos‘s children because, in its view, her status as a witness in this case endangered them. The prosecutor said he had spoken to the Department on her behalf to prevent the removal of her children. Finally, the prosecutor said Drebert‘s attorney had told him she intended to ask Santos whether she had supplied methamphetamine to Drebert and defendant. The prosecutor had a detective ask Santos about this allegation. According to the prosecutor, Santos told the detective she had supplied defendant with methamphetamine twice because defendant was ―bugging‖ his cousin, Joanne Rodriguez, with requests for drugs. After revealing this information, the prosecutor argued Santos‘s misdemeanor convictions were inadmissible. The trial court responded: ―[T]he law is quite clear that the convictions themselves are hearsay, so the convictions themselves are not admissible. [¶] However, if any witnesses are prepared to testify to exactly what she did on those occasions, that would be admissible.‖ The prosecutor replied, ―There is [sic] no witnesses I‘m aware of that are here.‖ At that point, defendant‘s counsel interjected that Santos had been on probation at the time of the offenses and argued her probationary status was admissible. The trial court agreed but ―without specifying what the offense is.‖ The court granted the prosecutor‘s request her status be characterized as misdemeanor probation. The court excluded as irrelevant evidence of the prosecutor‘s dealings with the Department. Defendant‘s counsel replied, ―I wasn‘t going to go into that.‖ The trial court further ruled that the defense could inquire into the issue of whether Santos had supplied drugs to the defendants. The court confirmed, in response to a 37 question by the prosecutor, that the petty theft convictions were not admissible absent witnesses who could testify to the underlying conduct. On the issue of Santos‘s relocation, defendant argued that her request to be relocated was relevant. The court responded: ―And it becomes relevant as to why she made the requests,‖ impliedly referring to the fact that defendant had threatened her. Defense counsel agreed: ―That‘s the other side of the coin.‖ The court replied: ―So you decide if you really want to get into that, [counsel.]‖ Later in the proceedings, Drebert‘s attorney informed the court she intended to ask Santos whether she had dealt drugs to individuals other than Drebert and defendant. She argued Santos‘s drug dealing was relevant to her credibility because, if she were revealed to be a drug dealer, she might lose custody of her children and her public assistance benefits. When asked by the trial court whether she had any witnesses to testify to buying drugs from Santos, Drebert‘s attorney replied she had had a phone call from a potential witness but could not confirm if there were sufficient facts and details. The prosecutor objected that such testimony would be collateral and irrelevant. The trial court disagreed: ―The sale of drugs is an act of moral turpitude, and whether or not she‘s ever been arrested or convicted for such conduct, the conduct in and of itself would appear to me to be relevant.‖ The court limited evidence of Santos‘s prior narcotics transactions to those with defendants unless, as Drebert‘s counsel stated, ―I produce someone . . . that will take the stand.‖ At no point did defendant‘s counsel join in the discussion of whether such evidence was admissible or indicate such witnesses were available.
―Cross-examination may expose facts from which jurors can appropriately draw inferences about the reliability of a witness, including the possibility of bias. The trial court, however, has wide latitude to restrict such cross-examination, and such testimony 38 is properly barred unless the defendant can show the prohibited cross-examination would have produced a significantly different impression of the witness‘s credibility.‖ (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 560; see People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 513.) Regarding Santos‘s misdemeanor convictions for petty theft, defendant contends the trial court erroneously ruled that ―evidence of [the underlying] conduct had to be supplied by someone other than Santos.‖ The record reveals some ambiguity about whether the trial court so ruled. Consistent with our decision in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, the trial court ruled the fact of Santos‘s convictions was inadmissible hearsay but evidence of the underlying criminal conduct was admissible ―if any witnesses are prepared to testify to exactly what she did on those occasions . . . .‖ (See id. at pp. 295–300.) Obviously, Santos herself would have been a percipient witness to her own conduct and the trial court‘s initial ruling did not explicitly preclude defendant from questioning her about it. Later, however, the trial court did state that, while Santos could be questioned about her probationary status, ―there will be no inquiry as to what particular offense she was on probation for.‖ This does suggest the trial court intended to preclude the defense from questioning Santos about the circumstances surrounding her misdemeanor convictions. Such ruling would have been error. (Id. at p. 300, fn. 14 [―proof of impeaching misdemeanor conduct‖ may be in the form of a ―witness‘s admission on direct or cross-examination that he or she committed such conduct‖ as well as by other means].) Nonetheless, any error was harmless. The jury heard evidence that Santos was on probation, had supplied defendant with drugs, and initially had been arrested because she had lied to the police about harboring him, and that her apartment had been a repository for defendant‘s stolen goods. Evidence that she had also committed petty theft would not have produced a significantly different impression of her credibility. Defendant also argues the trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to question Santos about whether she bartered drugs to third parties in exchange for stolen 39 property. Defendant forfeited this claim because it was Drebert, not he, who sought to question Santos on this point. During the extensive discussion between Drebert‘s counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court about this issue, defendant‘s counsel remained silent. He did not join Drebert‘s request, much less make an offer of proof as to the relevance of the evidence to his defense (as opposed to Drebert‘s). His claim is therefore forfeited. (Evid. Code, § 354.) Moreover, the trial court did not absolutely bar Drebert (or defendant) from cross-examining Santos about her alleged drug dealing. To the contrary, the trial court acknowledged that it would be a permissible area of inquiry for impeachment purposes. Reasonably viewing the discussion, the court properly required only that Drebert demonstrate a good faith basis for asking such questions by, for example, identifying a potential witness to her having dealt drugs. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 434.) Drebert failed to do so; defendant did not add anything. Similarly forfeited is defendant‘s claim the trial court improperly restricted him from cross-examining Santos regarding the prosecutor‘s contacts with the Department on Santos‘s behalf after the Department threatened to remove her children because of her status as a witness in this case. The trial court ruled the subject matter was irrelevant, at which point defendant‘s counsel replied, ―I wasn‘t going to go into that.‖ Defendant not only failed to challenge the court‘s ruling, he indicated agreement with it and a preexisting decision not to question her about the contacts, perhaps again to avoid mention of the threats defendant had made. Accordingly, defendant may not now assert the ruling was error, nor does the record support a conclusion that it was the ruling, rather than his own tactical decision, that led to the absence of cross-examination on the subject. 2. Asserted Aranda/Bruton Error Defendant claims that Gladys Santos‘s testimony regarding the circumstances under which she questioned defendant about whether he had killed Koen Witters constituted Aranda/Bruton error because it revealed the source of her information was 40 codefendant Drebert. (People v. Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d 518; Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. 123 [a nontestifying codefendant‘s extrajudicial statement that incriminates the other defendant is inadmissible as a violation of the latter‘s rights to confrontation and cross-examination].)10 The claim is meritless. Defendant and Drebert were tried together but before separate juries to avoid defendant‘s jury hearing Drebert‘s detailed statement to Santos inculpating defendant. Defendant‘s jury did, however, hear Santos testify to her conversation with defendant during which he admitted to killing Witters. The source of Santos‘s information with which she confronted defendant was Drebert. Before her testimony, the prosecutor sought guidance from the trial court regarding how to approach that issue. The court told the prosecutor he could not mention Drebert as the source of Santos‘s information. Defendant‘s counsel suggested the Aranda/Bruton problem could be resolved if the prosecutor asked Santos, ―Did you receive information about the homicide?‖ and ―[D]id you receive that information from another party . . . ?‖ The prosecutor suggested he ask Santos whether she had received the information about the murder from a civilian source (as opposed to a police source). The trial court agreed: ―Yes, civilian source with personal knowledge.‖ Before the jury, the prosecutor asked Santos whether in December 1995, she had ―a conversation with someone who had indicated that they were present at a murder?‖ When she responded affirmatively, the prosecutor clarified: ―This person . . . wasn‘t a police officer; is that right?‖ After ascertaining the conversation occurred before Christmas, the prosecutor asked: ―After you had this conversation with this person who said he had been at a murder, did you have a conversation with [defendant]?‖ Santos 10 To the extent Aranda ―require[d] the exclusion of relevant evidence that need not be excluded under federal constitutional law, it was abrogated in 1982 by the ‗truth-inevidence‘ provision of Proposition 8.‖ (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 465.) 41 said, ―Yes, I did,‖ and that she talked to defendant three days after her conversation with her source. Asked by the prosecutor how she had begun the conversation, Santos replied: ―I asked him, ‗Is it true? Did you really kill someone with a belt?‘ ‖ The prosecutor asked to approach the bench. At the bench, the prosecutor told the court he expected Santos would testify that defendant responded to her question by asking, ―Did Mike [Drebert] tell you that?‖ The prosecutor argued that because it was defendant himself who brought Drebert into the conversation ―there is no Aranda problem.‖ The court allowed the prosecutor to proceed with the questioning. Santos testified that, in response to her question, defendant eventually said, ―That pussy Mike told you, huh?‖ whereupon she denied Drebert was her source. When she asked defendant why he had done it, he changed the subject. Later that evening, however, she again asked him whether he killed someone with a belt. He admitted he had and described the murder of Koen Witters in great detail. Defendant contends the trial court violated the Aranda/Bruton rule by allowing the prosecutor to ask Santos whether the source of her information was a civilian with personal knowledge of the murder. He also claims the violation was compounded when Santos was permitted to testify about defendant‘s response—―Mike told you, huh?‖— when she asked if he had committed the murder. The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. As we have observed, ― ‗Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ―nontestifying codefendant‘s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant‘s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citation.] The United States Supreme Court ‗limited the scope of the Bruton rule in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 . . . . The court explained that Bruton recognized a narrow exception to the general rule that 42 juries are presumed to follow limiting instructions, and this narrow exception should not apply to confessions that are not incriminating on their face, but become so only when linked with other evidence introduced at trial. (Richardson, supra, at pp. 206–207.)‘ ‖ (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 874, fn. omitted; see People v. Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th 451, 463–464.) The high court went on to hold in Richardson that admission of a nontestifying codefendant‘s confession against the defendant does not violate the defendant‘s confrontation right if the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant‘s name but any reference to his existence. (Richardson, supra, at p. 211.) ―When, despite redaction, the statement obviously refers directly to the defendant, and involves inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial, the Bruton rule applies and introduction of the statement at a joint trial violates the defendant‘s rights under the confrontation clause.‖ (People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 231.) This case does not present a conventional Bruton issue because the prosecution was not attempting to directly introduce codefendant Drebert‘s confession at a joint trial before the same jury. Separate juries had been impanelled precisely to avoid such a problem. (See Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185, 194–195 [because the use of an accomplice‘s confession ―creates a special, and vital, need for cross-examination,‖ a prosecutor desiring to offer such evidence must comply with Bruton, hold separate trials, use separate juries or abandon the use of the confession].) Rather, the question is whether defendant‘s confrontation right was violated by the manner in which the prosecution sought to explain Santos‘s knowledge of the murder, resulting in introducing defendant‘s admissions to her. Defendant argues the prosecution had no valid reason to identify the source of Santos‘s knowledge at all except to invite the jury to make the connection to Drebert. That is a relevance objection he could have made at trial, but did not. The resolution of the Bruton claim before us requires a determination whether the court improperly 43 admitted a statement by Drebert inculpating defendant. It did not. Santos never testified that Drebert told her defendant killed Witters; in fact, her testimony included her denials to defendant that Drebert was the source. The jury heard that Santos had a conversation with someone who had been present at a murder, and she later asked defendant whether it was true he had killed someone with a belt. The testimony implied that the unknown person told her defendant killed someone with a belt. Statements that incriminate by implication, however, are not within the scope of Bruton. (People v. Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 463.) Moreover, the challenged testimony is reasonably viewed as explaining the basis for Santos‘s questions to defendant and to give context to his responses. Introduction of Santos‘s testimony, including recounting defendant‘s accusations that ―Mike‖ must have told her, did not ―pose[] a substantial threat to [defendant‘s] right to confront the witnesses against him.‖ (Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 137.) Accordingly, his rights were not violated. 3. Asserted Violation of Constitutional Right to Confrontation Citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), defendant contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights when it admitted (1) an expert witness‘s testimony about DNA testing the witness herself did not conduct; and (2) testimony regarding the autopsy of Koen Witters by a pathologist who did not conduct the autopsy. We need not decide whether the challenged DNA evidence was erroneously admitted. Any error was harmless because, in addition to testifying to her colleague‘s DNA testing, the expert conducted and testified about her own testing that was consistent with her colleague‘s results. Similarly, even if we assumed error in the admission the autopsy report, such error is harmless. (People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608; People v. Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th 658.) 44 a. DNA Evidence 1. Background Anjali Swienton, a forensic DNA analyst with Cellmark Diagnostics, testified about DNA testing pertaining to the sexual assault of J.S. DNA was extracted from blood samples provided by J.S., defendant, Drebert, Pritchard and Vera and then compared to DNA extracted from oral and vaginal swabs taken from J.S. following the sexual assault on her. Swienton explained that the type of DNA testing performed in this case is called polymerase chain reaction (PCR). The PCR test allows the analyst to identify certain points along a DNA chain and then compare those between known samples and samples obtained from a crime scene or victim. There are three steps to PCR testing. DNA is extracted from the known and the unknown samples and then the DNA is amplified, a process Swienton described as making a ―genetic Xerox‖ of the DNA. After amplification comes the ―typing step,‖ in which comparisons are made between DNA profiles generated from known and unknown samples. Swienton explained there are two different typing processes within PCR technology, the DQalpha/polymarker test and the short tandem repeats test (STR). The DQalpha/polymarker test uses six sites along the DNA chain as a basis of comparison among the samples provided to the analyst. The STR test uses three sites and also allows the analyst to determine the gender of the donor of the sample being tested. In this case, both the DQ-alpha/polymarker test and the STR test were conducted, the former by a Cellmark analyst named Lisa Grossweiler and the latter by Swienton herself. Grossweiler‘s tests revealed that defendant could not be excluded as a donor of the DNA present on a vaginal swab taken from J.S. after she was raped. Swienton‘s later STR test revealed that defendant‘s DNA was consistent with the DNA from the vaginal swab. On cross-examination, Swienton testified that the frequency of the STR marker combination obtained from the vaginal swab was 1 in 1,300 for the Caucasian population and 1 in 2,700 for the Latino population. 45 2. Discussion Defendant contends his confrontation rights were violated by Swienton‘s testimony regarding the DQ-alpha/polymarker test conducted by Grossweiler. ―The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees a defendant‘s right to confront adverse witnesses. [Citation.] In addition, the prosecution may not rely on ‗testimonial‘ out-of-court statements unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59 . . . .)‖ (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 839–840.) At the outset, the Attorney General contends defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object at trial. We have rejected this assertion, noting that, because Crawford was ―a dramatic departure from prior confrontation clause case law,‖ a defendant‘s failure to object is excusable in cases like this one where the trial occurred long before Crawford was decided ―because defense counsel could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate this change in the law.‖ (Harris, at p. 840.) In Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [183 L.Ed.2d 89, 132 S.Ct. 2221], the United States Supreme Court considered whether the defendant‘s confrontation rights were violated when an Illinois State Police forensic biologist testified that a DNA profile generated by a Maryland laboratory from vaginal swabs taken from a rape victim matched a DNA profile generated by the Illinois State Police Laboratory from a sample of the defendant‘s blood. A four-judge plurality opinion ―concluded on two alternative grounds that [the] expert testimony did not violate the federal Constitution‘s confrontation right. First, the plurality reasoned that [the expert‘s] testimony was constitutionally permissible because it was admitted not for its truth but only for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of [her] independent conclusion, based on her expertise, that the defendant‘s DNA matched the DNA in the semen found on the vaginal swabs. [Citation.] Alternatively, the Williams plurality reasoned, there was no confrontation right violation because the Maryland laboratory‘s report was prepared for 46 the primary purpose of finding a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not ‗for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.‘ [Citation.] In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality‘s conclusion that [the] expert testimony did not offend the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation right, but for a completely different reason: The Maryland laboratory report on which [the expert] relied ‗lack[ed] the solemnity of an affidavit or deposition‘ and was therefore not ‗testimonial.‘ [Citation.]