Opinion ID: 1318244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: right to challenge the search

Text: The State argues that the defendant does not have the right to challenge the search and seizure because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises from which the contraband was seized. [2] The search was made of a house rented to the defendant's girlfriend, where he frequently stayed. The State relies on State v. Tadder, ___ W.Va. ___, 313 S.E.2d 667 (1984), where we held that a passenger in a truck which he did not own had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the truck. Consequently, he had no constitutional basis to object to a search of the truck. We relied on Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), one of several decisions by the United States Supreme Court relating to a defendant's right to challenge a search and seizure. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). These opinions have had the effect of narrowing the holding of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, supra , which had accorded to a guest of the apartment's owner the right to challenge the search of the apartment. The owner had let him temporarily use the apartment. We recognized the principle of Jones in Spaulding v. Warden, West Virginia State Penitentiary, 158 W.Va. 557, 212 S.E.2d 619 (1975), but declined to apply it to the search of an automobile where the defendant had no interest in the vehicle and was not present when it was searched. Syllabus Point 2, in part. [3] In Jones, the Supreme Court also accorded automatic standing to challenge the validity of a search and seizure to defendants charged with an offense involving possession of the seized evidence, which in the case of Jones was narcotics. This was premised on the theory that if the defendant had to acknowledge a possessory interest in the seized contraband to claim standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the validity of the search and seizure, he would be incriminating himself under the Fifth Amendment. [4] See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). However, in Salvucci the Supreme Court abolished this automatic standing rule, concluding that defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated, 448 U.S. at 85, 100 S.Ct. at 2549, 65 L.Ed.2d at 623, and summarized the nature of the inquiry as follows: While property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, see Rakas, [439 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 431 n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401 n. 12], property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of this Court's inquiry. In Rakas, this Court held that an illegal search only violates the rights of those who have `a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' [439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401.] Earlier in Rakas, the Supreme Court, although reaffirming Jones on its facts, rejected a second holding in Jones which had accorded automatic standing to anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs.... 362 U.S. at 267, 80 S.Ct. at 734, 4 L.Ed.2d at 706. By way of example, the Rakas Court indicated that a casual visitor to another person's kitchen at the time of the search would not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the other person's basement. Moreover, a casual visitor, who walked into another person's home just before the search and left shortly thereafter, could not object to the legality of the search. 439 U.S. at 142, 99 S.Ct. at 429-30, 58 L.Ed.2d at 400. [5] We believe that under the foregoing United States Supreme Court cases a defendant who is more than a casual visitor to an apartment or dwelling in which illegal drugs have been seized has the right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution to challenge the search and seizure of the illegal drugs which he is accused of possessing. Other courts have arrived at much the same conclusion. E.g., United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321 (D.C.Cir.1983); United States v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir.1984); People v. Hamilton, 168 Cal.App.3d 1058, 214 Cal.Rptr. 596 (1985); State v. Whitehead, 229 Kan. 133, 622 P.2d 665 (1981); People v. Wagner, 104 Mich.App. 169, 304 N.W.2d 517 (1981); State v. Isom, 196 Mont. 330, 641 P.2d 417 (1982). We think Mr. Adkins meets this test. As we have previously stated, the evidence was seized from a house rented by the defendant's girlfriend. He had access to all parts of the residence and was present when the police searched the home and seized the evidence. Although the defendant lived in Charleston with his mother, he had stayed with his girlfriend in her house on and off for six years and was there as long as two and three weeks at a time. From these facts, it is clear that he was more than a casual visitor to the residence and, therefore, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence while he was there. The facts in the present case are rather similar to those in State v. Whitehead, supra , where the Kansas Supreme Court found standing based on the fact that the defendant lived with his girlfriend on an irregular basis. 229 Kan. at 133, 622 P.2d at 667.