Opinion ID: 836322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: suchodolski

Text: The majority holds that the smoking restriction of the regulation was encompassed within the Suchodolski public policy exceptions to Michigan's at-will employment doctrine. I reject this conclusion and also would not extend these exceptions to include regulations that do not apply statewide. In Suchodolski, this Court recognized exceptions to the at-will doctrine based on the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable. Id. at 695, 316 N.W.2d 710. [7] The Court cited as the circumstances in which such exceptions would apply those involving: (1) adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty, (2) an employee's failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment, or (3) an employee's exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment. Suchodolski, supra at 695-696, 316 N.W.2d 710. Importantly, in Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid, Inc., 443 Mich. 68, 80, 503 N.W.2d 645 (1993), [8] the Court limited Suchodolski, stating that a public policy claim is only sustainable when there is no statutory prohibition against discharge in retaliation for the conduct at issue. [9] The majority holds that `the regulation's restriction of the general right to discharge an employee at will is consistent with the exceptions to that doctrine set forth in Suchodolski. ' Ante at 24. [10] I disagree for two reasons. First, I would not extend the Suchodolski exceptions to include a local regulation that conflicts with our statewide public policy. The Suchodolski exceptions refer to a statutory right or duty, a law, and well-established legislative enactment[s]. The instant regulation at issue is not a statute, and it is not a well-established legislative enactment. Nor is a county board the Legislature, although it is a legislative body. While the regulation constitutes the law in the four counties, it does not constitute the law in any other Michigan counties, much less in all the other Michigan counties. Moreover, the public policy reflected in the regulation is stricter than the public policy established by our Legislature in the Michigan Indoor Clean Air Act and that now applies in all other counties. That is, while the regulation does reflect the public policy of the four counties that enacted it, it cannot, in my judgment, be fairly said to reflect the public policy of the state of Michigan. I would not extend the Suchodolski exceptions beyond the limits of statewide public policy, at the very least where a local regulation is more restrictive or burdensome than our default statewide public policy. It is one thing for a private employer to be legally accountable for a wrongful discharge that violates a statewide public policy as in Suchodolski, but it is considerably more burdensome to subject employers to wrongful discharge lawsuits for a termination that arguably only violates a local public policy, given that all 83 counties could theoretically adopt varying local public policies. [11] Justice Cavanagh contends that under Suchodolski there is no reason to differentiate a legally recognized right or duty created by a state statute and a legally recognized right or duty created by local law. Ante at 29 n. 4. I disagree. Indeed, the use of the modifier well-established in Suchodolski in describing the kind of legislative enactment that would serve as the foundation for its third exception further indicates that Suchodolski itself was attempting to draw distinctions between types of legislative enactments, possibly in order to ensure the kind of notice that would be much more effectively communicated to an employer doing business in multiple counties throughout the state by a statewide statute than by a local regulation. [12] Second, each Suchodolski exception requires a valid statutory right or duty, a law, or a well-established legislative enactment before it is applicable. As previously explained, that part of the regulation that purports to create a private cause of action against private entities is invalid because it exceeds the authority that MCL 46.11(j) grants a county board. Thus, I do not join the majority in its exercise of this Court's common-law powers to extend the exceptions of Suchodolski to local regulations. [13] Anticipating that this Court might conclude that the private cause of action provisions of the regulation is invalid, defendants point out that the regulation has a severability clause [14] and argue that even if that part of the regulation that restricts an employer's general at will authority to discharge an employee is invalid, the remaining part of the regulation that restricts smoking would still be enforceable pursuant to the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq., because the regulation comes within the WPA's prohibition against discriminating against an employee for reporting a violation of a regulation promulgated by a political subdivision of the state. MCL 15.362 provides: An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. [Emphasis added.] Defendants argue that the regulation here clearly comes within the law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to a law of this state, [or] a political subdivision of this state language in the WPA. Thus, defendants contend that the regulation may be enforced by a plaintiff under the WPA. Because this argument was not considered by the trial court or the Court of Appeals, I would remand to the Court of Appeals to consider this issue in the first instance. If defendants are correct that the regulation is enforceable under the WPA, then the Dudewicz limitation, to wit, that a public policy claim is only sustainable when there is no applicable statutory prohibition against discharge in retaliation for the conduct at issue, would apply because the WPA would constitute an applicable statutory prohibition against discharge in retaliation for the conduct at issue. Finally, to the extent that plaintiffs' arguments suggest that the part of the regulation that restricts smoking more stringently than the Michigan Clean Indoor Air Act is unwise and results in bad policy, these concerns must be addressed to the Legislature or the county boards of commissioners. People v. Kirby, 440 Mich. 485, 493-494, 487 N.W.2d 404 (1992). See also Halloran v. Bhan, 470 Mich. 572, 579, 683 N.W.2d 129 (2004). Plaintiffs, of course, are also free to pursue remedies through the electoral and political processes. [15]