Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior-murder-conviction Special Circumstance.

Text: (9) As proof of the prior-murder-conviction special-circumstance charge, the prosecutor introduced documentary evidence that in 1982 defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of White. Relying on Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 and People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302 [208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669], defendant contends the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance must be set aside because there was no finding in either the present or prior case that he intended to kill. [5] Any contrary result, he maintains, would irrationally distinguish between defendants whose multiple murders were joined for trial (see Turner, supra, at pp. 328-329, requiring intent to kill in at least one of two joined felony murders) and those whose offenses were severed or, as here, jurisdictionally precluded from being jointly tried (§ 777; People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 14 [130 Cal. Rptr. 129, 549 P.2d 1225]). Defendant also maintains the prior-murder-conviction special-circumstance finding is invalid because the underlying murder occurred subsequent to the present offense. In People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 596 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350], we held intent to kill is not an element of the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance. Defendant's concern that this holding irrationally distinguishes between defendants is answered by Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104. In Anderson we rejected the reasoning of Carlos, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, and Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d 302, and determined intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder or the multiple-murder special circumstance unless the defendant was an aider or abettor and not the actual killer. (43 Cal.3d at pp. 1147, 1149-1150.) As indicated, the jury in the instant case was instructed in compliance with Anderson. Thus, application of the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance to render defendant death-eligible results in no irrational distinction between defendants tried jointly and those whose offenses are separately tried. Defendant's further contention that the prior murder must have preceded the present offense was rejected in People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, 595-596. The order of the commission of the homicides is immaterial. ( Id. at p. 596.)