Opinion ID: 200481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Teague Exceptions.

Text: 10 The Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane constitutes a general bar to the retroactive application of newly announced rules of criminal procedure. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-13, 109 S.Ct. 1060). The Teague bar admits of two exceptions. The first allows retroactive application of new rules that either (a) prohibit criminal punishment for certain types of primary conduct, or (b) forbid the imposition of certain categories of punishment for particular classes of defendants. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997). This exception is patently inapposite here: Apprendi neither places any particular type of conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law nor pretermits any particular type of punishment for a specific class of defendants. Accord McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1256 (11th Cir.2001). Thus, the petitioner's challenge necessarily stands or falls on the strength of the second exception. 11 The second Teague exception allows retroactive application of watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). For this exception to flourish, the new rule must pass two tests. First, [i]nfringement of the rule must seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the new rule must itself alter the accepted understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the integrity and fairness of a criminal proceeding. Id. 12 Nothing in the Apprendi decision indicates to us that infringements of its rule will seriously diminish the accuracy of convictions (which, by definition, must take place before any such infringement occurs). The case before us provides a practical illustration of why this is so. The petitioner was tried before a jury and convicted of witness intimidation upon proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no indication that, in the course of his trial, he received less than the process that was due. The procedural error to which the petitioner adverts may raise questions as to the length of his sentence, but inaccuracies of this nature, occurring after a defendant has been duly convicted, are matters of degree and do not trump what the Justices have termed the general rule of nonretroactivity. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665, 121 S.Ct. 2478. 13 We add, moreover, that the length of the petitioner's sentence was not plucked out of thin air, but, rather, was determined by a federal judge based upon discrete findings of fact established by a fair preponderance of the evidence. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that findings by federal judges, though now rendered insufficient in certain instances by Apprendi, nonetheless are adequate to make reliable decisions about punishment. Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 844 (7th Cir.2002). After all, even in the post- Apprendi era, findings of fact made by the sentencing judge, under a preponderance standard, remain an important part of the sentencing regimen. See, e.g., United States v. Caba, 241 F.3d 98, 101 (1st Cir.2001) ([A]fter Apprendi, ... sentencing factors that boost a defendant's sentence but do not trip a new statutory maximum remain grist for the district judge's mill under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.); see also United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir.2001) (rejecting the argument that when facts found by the judge trigger or increase a mandatory minimum sentence, an Apprendi violation occurs). Consequently, Apprendi's new rule not only fails to impugn the accuracy of convictions that became final beforehand but also falls short of rendering sentences imposed under the pre- Apprendi regime seriously inaccurate. See Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir.2002); cf. United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir.2002) (We do not believe that requiring the jury to make drug quantity determinations beyond a reasonable doubt will greatly affect the accuracy of convictions.). 14 By the same token, we do not believe that the Apprendi rule can be characterized as a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Without in any way denigrating either the importance or the impact of Apprendi, that decision cannot plausibly be said to have altered the commonly accepted understanding of the bedrock procedural elements of our criminal justice system. Accord United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 150 (4th Cir.2001) (rejecting the notion that, pre- Apprendi, the country's criminal justice system malfunctioned... fundamentally). Watershed rules affecting bedrock procedural elements are few and far between. The quintessential example of such a rule — the only example specifically mentioned by the Supreme Court — is the landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The sweeping rule of Gideon ... established an affirmative right to counsel in all felony cases. O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 167, 117 S.Ct. 1969. It protected each accused, though he be not guilty, [from] the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345, 83 S.Ct. 792 (citation omitted). This pronouncement — that representation by counsel is fundamental to a fair trial — reshaped the legal landscape and dramatically revised the common understanding of what the Due Process Clause demands in a criminal case. 15 Other concrete examples of watershed rules are hen's-teeth rare. See Graham, 506 U.S. at 478, 113 S.Ct. 892 ([W]e operate from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt [that] it [is] unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.). One reason for this phenomenon is that the Supreme Court has exhibited reluctance to showcase prototypes of rules that might enjoy this venerated status. That is understandable because the Teague exception is clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 157, 117 S.Ct. 1969. 16 Apprendi is not within this small core of cases. The rule that it announces merely assures a previously convicted defendant that increased punishment, over and above the default statutory maximum, can only be imposed if the factual predicate for the increase — other than a prior criminal conviction — is confirmed by a jury to a higher quantum of proof. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others,... it necessarily follows that the defendant should not ... be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached.) (emphasis supplied). Although the Apprendi rule is important as a means of clarifying the proper factfinding roles of judge and jury, it affords an innocent defendant no additional shield from wrongful conviction. Refined to bare essence, the rule merely limits the potential penalty to be imposed on [an undoubtedly] guilty defendant to that designated by statute. Goode, 305 F.3d at 385. 17 In sum, a decision ... by a judge (on the preponderance standard) rather than a jury (on the reasonable-doubt standard) is not the sort of error that necessarily undermines the fairness ... of judicial proceedings. Curtis, 294 F.3d at 843. Applying Apprendi's procedural mandate retroactively would create an unacceptably high risk that those found guilty of criminal conduct might escape condign sentences. Hence, we join every court of appeals that thus far has decided the question and hold that the Apprendi rule fails to qualify as a watershed rule within the meaning of the second Teague exception. See Coleman v. United States, 329 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.2003); Goode, 305 F.3d at 382-85; United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 307-10 (5th Cir.2002) (per curiam); Curtis, 294 F.3d at 843-44; United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 (10th Cir.2002); Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 667; McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257-58; United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir.2001); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151. 18 In an effort to turn aside the combined force of reasoning and precedent, the petitioner offers several diversions. None is persuasive, but three of his sallies merit brief comment. 19 In the first place, the petitioner emphasizes that no less an authority than Justice O'Connor has characterized the majority opinion in Apprendi as one that announces a watershed change in constitutional law. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). The petitioner's reliance on this statement demonstrates the verity that a single word often has the capacity to convey multiple shades of meaning. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1503, 1504 (1st Cir.1989) (explaining that words can be like chameleons, which reflect the color of their environment) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Justice O'Connor warned that the most significant impact of the Court's decision in Apprendi was that it threaten[ed] to unleash a flood of petitions by convicted felons seeking to invalidate their sentences. 530 U.S. at 550-51, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Her concern was a practical one, prompting her to chastise the majority for not say[ing] whether [determinate-sentencing] schemes are constitutional. Id. at 550, 120 S.Ct. 2348. She did not advert to Teague, and her use of the word watershed, taken in this context, cannot plausibly be interpreted as a definitive conclusion that she — or anyone else — would hold the Apprendi rule to be a watershed rule for Teague purposes. 20 Next, the petitioner posits that the Apprendi rule is not strictly a rule of criminal procedure, but, rather, possesses a substantive component, requiring those facts that warrant sentence enhancement to be considered elements of an aggravated crime. This formulation contains more cry than wool. 21 The Apprendi decision is about criminal procedure, pure and simple. Accord Curtis, 294 F.3d at 843. Long before the Court decided Apprendi, basic principles of criminal and constitutional jurisprudence protected defendants from being convicted on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every element of a charged crime. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the [charged] crime). Notwithstanding the prevalence of this principle, courts routinely approved the practice of enhancing sentences based on a judge's factual determinations. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 204 F.3d 381, 383 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Grimaldo, 214 F.3d 967, 974-75 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Lindia, 82 F.3d 1154, 1160-61 (1st Cir.1996). The Apprendi rule limited that widespread practice. 3 The fact that the Apprendi rule implements certain underlying constitutional protections makes it no less a rule of criminal procedure. See Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151. The Supreme Court has instructed us that the distinction between substance and procedure is an important one in the habeas context, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998), and we cannot disregard that distinction in applying the Teague screen. 22 In the last analysis, [t]he Teague doctrine is founded on the notion that one of the principal functions of habeas corpus is to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Pre- Apprendi practice, though incorrect, created no such risk. While the Apprendi rule may improve the correlation between crime and punishment in future prosecutions, it does not render the correlation for past convictions completely (or even seriously) unreliable. Thus, the procedure required by Apprendi has the capacity to improve substance — but it is not substance in and of itself. 23 The petitioner's third line of attack attempts to compare Apprendi to the Supreme Court decisions in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), and Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999). Based on these comparisons, the petitioner asserts that the rationale for applying the Bailey and Richardson doctrines retroactively supports giving Apprendi retroactive effect. We reject this attempted analogy for the most basic of reasons: the cases are not fair congeners. 24 Bailey involved a determination of what conduct Congress criminalized in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The Bailey Court determined that possession was not use and vacated the defendant's conviction. 516 U.S. at 143, 116 S.Ct. 501. Because Bailey involved substance, not procedure, the decision provides no guidance for a Teague analysis. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604 ([B]ecause Teague by its terms applies only to procedural rules, we think it is inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute enacted by Congress.). 25 Richardson is not quite so far afield. That case involved both the interpretation of a criminal statute and the procedural safeguards attendant to a defendant's right to have a jury make factual findings leading to conviction thereunder. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816, 119 S.Ct. 1707. Although the latter half of this hybrid bears some similarities to Apprendi, the first half strays from Apprendi in so material a way as to undermine the attempted analogy. 26 The core holding in Richardson required jury unanimity as to each violation in the series of violations needed to convict under the continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848. See Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818-19, 119 S.Ct. 1707. Jury discordance as to the identity of the individual violations that comprised the necessary series would threaten the accuracy of any conviction for violating the CCE statute, a factor that makes retroactive application of Richardson more appropriate under a Teague analysis. 4 Apprendi errors pose no such threat. Thus, we find the petitioner's comparison of Apprendi to Richardson to be like comparing a plum to a pomegranate. 27 That ends this aspect of the matter. We hold, without serious question, that Apprendi prescribes a new rule of criminal procedure, and that Teague does not permit inferior federal courts to apply the Apprendi rule retroactively to cases on collateral review.