Opinion ID: 1774411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143?

Text: We now turn this formula to the ordinance before us. [20] The ordinance is violated if [a] person ... remains in a public place and intentionally solicits, induces, entices, or procures another to engage in unlawful conduct contrary to L.R.S. 40:966 through 40:971.1. The trial court found that the ordinance was invalid because part of proving a violation of the ordinance was a showing that LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1 had been violated as well. Insofar as the trial court found sections 40:966 through 971.1 of R.S. 40 to be lesser-included offenses of the ordinance, the trial court failed to appreciate the nature of the offense established by the ordinance as one of criminal solicitation. It is clear that solicitation and the other inchoate offenses are not lesser included offenses of the principal crimes. People v. Landwer, 254 Ill.App.3d 120, 193 Ill.Dec. 273, 282, 626 N.E.2d 306, 315 (1993), appeal allowed, 155 Ill.2d 570, 198 Ill.Dec. 548, 633 N.E.2d 10 (1994). Accord, State v. Beavers, 394 So.2d 1218, 1224 (La. 1981) (inciting to riot and participating in a riot are separate offenses); State v. Eames, 365 So.2d 1361 (La.1978) ( Id ). Thus, double jeopardy would not lie under Blockburger for consecutive prosecutions under the ordinance and for the direct commission of any of the felony offenses found in LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1, and therefore this contention is not sufficient to invoke the preemptive application of LSA-R.S. 14:143. Nevertheless, we find that the ordinance is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143 because its criminal solicitation provision overlaps with LSA-R.S. 14:28, which makes it a felony offense to incite a felony. The Baton Rouge ordinance makes it a misdemeanor offense to solicit or procure another for the purpose of violating LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1, the majority of these sections being felonies; LSA-R.S. 14:28(A) makes it a felony offense to incite or procure another person to commit a felony. Insofar as a number of the offenses defined at LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1 are felonies, the municipal ordinance and LSA-R.S. 14:28 define the same offense under Blockburger. The fact that the ordinance contains as an element of the offense that the proscribed conduct take place in public does not vary our decision, since both the ordinance and LSA-R.S. 14:28 must require proof of a fact the other does not for them to be separate offenses under the Blockburger or same elements test. See Note 18, supra. There is simply no fact that must be demonstrated to show a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:28 that would not also satisfy in part the city prosecutor's burden in proving a violation of the Baton Rouge ordinance. [21] Therefore, we find that Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143. [22]