Opinion ID: 1728361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Some Other Clear Directive

Text: ¶ 96 The failure of the mandate line to include the word remand does not sink the circuit court's powers. The majority opinion allows a circuit court to reopen a case and amend the pleadings when in the absence of a remand order in the mandate line, the circuit court is given some other clear directive from the appellate court (emphasis added). Majority op., ¶¶ 2, 67. The standard some other clear directive is not easy to apply and is susceptible to manipulation. ¶ 97 As I see it, this court in Tietsworth II did give the circuit court a clear directive. In Tietsworth II, the court announced that the plaintiffs have warranty and contract remedies for the alleged defects in their motorcycles and did not declare that these remedies were barred: As such, the plaintiffs have warranty remedies for the alleged defects in their motorcycles. In addition, there are contract remedies at law and in equity to the extent that the plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to purchase their motorcycles. A contract fraudulently induced is void or voidable; a party fraudulently induced to enter a contract may affirm the contract and seek damages for breach or pursue the equitable remedy of rescission and seek restitutionary damages. . . . The economic loss doctrine does not bar these contract remedies for fraudulently induced contracts. . . . Tietsworth II, 270 Wis.2d 146, ¶ 36, 677 N.W.2d 233. ¶ 98 The court continued, stating that although the plaintiffs are barred from pursuing tort claims, they may have contract remedies: In short, we see no reason to recognize an exception to the economic loss doctrine to allow this consumer contract dispute to be remedied as an intentional misrepresentation tort. The economic loss doctrine bars the plaintiffs' common-law fraud claim. The plaintiffs may have contract remediesbreach of contract/warranty or rescission and restitutionbut may not pursue a tort claim for misrepresentation premised on having purchased allegedly defective motorcycles. Tietsworth II, 270 Wis.2d 146, ¶ 37, 677 N.W.2d 233. ¶ 99 The majority opinion unpersuasively plays down the importance of these two lengthy paragraphs in Tietsworth II, in which the court explicitly declared that the plaintiffs have viable claims against Harley-Davidson grounded in contract and warranty. [12] ¶ 100 The majority opinion asserts in a conclusory fashion that the Tietsworth II court was simply saying that the economic loss doctrine would not bar these claims, not that the plaintiffs may bring these claims. Majority op., ¶ 47. And how does the majority opinion divine that these two paragraphs do not give the plaintiffs the opportunity to bring their contract claims? By just saying that the two paragraphs are fairly interpreted as this court's explanation of the application of the economic loss doctrine to fraud claims. Majority op., ¶ 47. That's the legal equivalent of a parent answering a child's query of why with a because I said so. ¶ 101 I conclude that paragraphs 36 and 37 in Tietsworth II are just as easily and just as fairly interpreted as leaving open the opportunity for the plaintiffs to bring contract and warranty claims. The Tietsworth II court acknowledged that the plaintiffs  have warranty remedies  and  may have contract remedies claims (emphasis added). The Tietsworth II court deliberately employed the present tense in these paragraphs, not the past tense, thus leaving open the possibility that the plaintiffs may pursue these claims in the future. ¶ 102 That the mandate line in Tietsworth II does not explicitly remand the cause to the circuit court for purpose of allowing the plaintiffs to amend the complaint does not dispel the significance of our language in paragraphs 36 and 37. That the court did not explicitly direct or order a remand or an amendment to the pleadings is not unexpected. The plaintiffs did not request a remand to amend the complaint. It is likewise inconsequential that the court did not provide, in the paragraphs preceding the mandate, instructions to the plaintiffs in regard to bringing these claims. The court does not usually give legal advice to the parties and does not ordinarily address amendments to the pleadings unless raised by the parties. ¶ 103 Under the circumstances of the Tietsworth II case, an appellate court would not necessarily order the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint asserting these additional theories of liability and would not likely provide explicit guidance in regard to amending the complaint, but it mightand didleave open the possibility that the plaintiffs may take the initiative under Wis. Stat. §§ 808.08(3) and 802.09(1) to file an amended complaint. ¶ 104 If the majority opinion is looking for some clear directive that the amendment of the pleadings is permitted on remittitur, paragraphs 36 and 37 in Tietsworth II may be as clear a directive as the court could legitimately provide given the issue actually before the court and the procedural posture of the case.