Opinion ID: 2624863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Enforceability of the Waiver

Text: The primary question is whether, and if so, to what extent, this waiver violates the legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity. The State Legislature abolished sovereign immunity. Washington State and its subdivisions are therefore liable for their torts and subject to suit like any other person or corporation. See RCW 4.96.010(1) (All local governmental entities ... shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct.). The Howes argue that conditioning a building permit upon an exculpatory waiver violates the letter and spirit of RCW 4.96.010 by resurrecting sovereign immunity. We agree that if this waiver does resurrect sovereign immunity, it violates state law and is thus void. Howe primarily relies upon two of our opinions for support, Rivett, 123 Wash.2d 573, 870 P.2d 299, and Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wash.2d 606, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991). In both cases, we voided city ordinances purporting to grant limited immunity from suit to the cities. The County argues Rivett and Employco are inapplicable. In Employco we considered whether a Seattle ordinance limiting city liability violated the abolition of sovereign immunity. The ordinance said: Seattle City Light Department `shall not be liable for any loss, injury, or damage resulting from the interruption... of electric service from any cause.' Employco, 117 Wash.2d at 608, 817 P.2d 1373. Employco brought suit after an underground fire caused widespread power outages and interrupted business. Seattle argued the suit was barred by the ordinance. We found the ordinance was void, reasoning: The City may exercise only such power as is delegated to it by the Legislature. It is a general requisite to the validity of an ordinance that it conform to, and not violate, general statutes. In case of conflict, the ordinance is void. Employco, 117 Wash.2d at 617, 817 P.2d 1373 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in Rivett, we invalidated an ordinance requiring property owners to maintain the sidewalks abutting their property and to indemnify Tacoma for all losses. Rivett, 123 Wash.2d at 578, 585, 870 P.2d 299. We ruled that [T]he requirement of indemnification is in violation of the abolition of governmental immunity ... because it purports to immunize the City from payment for damages caused by its own negligence. Rivett, 123 Wash.2d at 583, 870 P.2d 299. Of course, Rivett and Employco do not govern this case, as they are both analytically rooted in the supremacy of legislative enactments over municipal ordinances; a conflict not present here. However, both cases articulate a powerful principle of Washington jurisprudence; that state sovereign immunity has been abolished and this Court will carefully scrutinize apparent local government attempts to recreate it. We will not hesitate to void such ordinances. Before turning to whether this exculpatory clause violates the letter or underlying principles of the abrogation of sovereign immunity, we will consider the County's contention that this waiver is actually required or at least authorized by RCW 58.17.165. That statute says in relevant part: If the plat ... is subject to a dedication, the ... written instrument shall contain the dedication of all streets and other areas to the public ... and a waiver of all claims for damages against any governmental authority which may be occasioned to the adjacent land by the established construction, drainage and maintenance of said road. RCW 58.17.165. The Court of Appeals found RCW 58.17.165 was evidence of a legislative policy authorizing such waivers, and concluded waivers were not forbidden by the public policy of this State or the abolition of sovereign immunity. While we agree with much of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, we hold that it took its conclusion too far. We agree RCW 58.17.165 demonstrates a legislative acceptance of waivers of liability in the limited circumstance where a local government is taking title to infrastructure constructed by a developer. Reading RCW 58.17.165 in the context of the abolition of sovereign immunity, we conclude that this waiver went too far to the extent it exculpates the County for its own future negligence. Where governments must, by law, accept streets, public areas, and other improvements constructed by a private developer, they may limit their liability for harms caused by the private developer. That is precisely what RCW 58.17.165 requires, and impliedly what it authorizes. However, RCW 58.17.165 is limited, and we decline to extend it. First, the statute is limited to plat subdivisions subject to a dedication. Second, the statutory waiver is limited to damage occasioned to the adjacent land. Third, the statutory waiver applies only to roads and the associated drainage systems. Finally, and for our purposes, most importantly, the waiver is limited to all claims for damages against any governmental authority which may be occasioned to the adjacent land by the established construction, drainage and maintenance of said road. RCW 58.17.165 (emphasis added). Established [3] modifies construction, drainage and maintenance, and must be read to apply to that infrastructure at the time it is dedicated to the County. The County's interpretation of this waiver goes far beyond the type authorized by RCW 58.17.165 and, to the extent it exculpates the County for its own future negligence, violates the Legislature's explicit abolition of sovereign immunity. Blanket grants of immunity secured routinely for the performance of a public function, such as granting a plat or development, differ little from passing ordinances immunizing the granting body from actions for its own negligence, and are not allowed. We reaffirm our holding in 1515-1519 Lakeview Boulevard Condominium Ass'n v. City of Seattle, ___ Wash.2d ___, 43 P.3d 1233 (2002). We find no evidence the Legislature intended to bar local governments from bargaining with permit seekers to limit liability for allowing development in marginal lots. A narrowly drafted release for risks specific to a particular activity or condition is not an impermissible attempt to functionally recreate sovereign immunity and does not violate RCW 4.96.010. In 1515-1519 Lakeview we hold that if because of the shape, composition, location or other characteristic of property to be improved there exists risks unique to that particular property, parties may reach an arms length, bargained-for agreement, which may include waivers of liability limited to the proposed use and character of the property. Therefore, we hold such waivers that are fairly authorized by statute, or that merely exculpate local government for harms caused by identified or obvious preexisting conditions of the property, are allowable. We also reaffirm our holding in 1515-1519 Lakeview that such waivers may not be used to exculpate local governments from their own negligence. To the extent that this waiver limits the County's liability for otherwise actionable negligence, it is void.