Opinion ID: 1705889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to Certain Alleged Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct.

Text: ¶ 63. Spicer argues that his counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's send-a-message argument during closing arguments of the guilt phase, and that the failure to object equates ineffective assistance of counsel. Spicer admits that this Court considered the substantive claim on direct appeal. This Court held that the send-a-message statements made to the jury by the prosecutor were error and noted that Spicer's trial counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection. Despite the arguable procedural bar, this Court discussed the merits of Spicer's claim and found the error to be harmless. Spicer, 921 So.2d at 317-19. ¶ 64. Even assuming that trial counsel was deficient, this Court already has determined that Spicer was not prejudiced. Therefore, Spicer fails to meet the second prong of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
¶ 65. Spicer asserts that his trial counsel failed to object to numerous remarks, which he alleges were improper, made by the prosecution during closing arguments at the sentencing phase of the trial. On direct appeal, this Court substantively addressed the comments now raised by Spicer, save one. We also note that some of them were objected to and some were not. As for the prosecutor's comments in closing that were substantively addressed on direct appeal and determined to be free of error, they will not support Spicer's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because he cannot show prejudice. Further, Spicer is precluded from relitigating the substantive issues under the guise of poor representation. Foster, 687 So.2d at 1129. ¶ 66. The one issue raised by Spicer in the instant petition which was not addressed by this Court on direct appeal deals with trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's comment that, if the jury did not vote for death, Spicer would have to be supported in jail with our tax dollars. This Court stated in Spicer's direct appeal: ¶ 70. There is no distinction between the latitude given by this Court with regard to closing arguments during the sentencing phase as compared to the guilt phase. Wells v. State, 903 So.2d 739, 742-43 (Miss.2005). Attorneys are afforded a wide latitude in arguing their case to the jury, but they are not allowed to employ tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. Sheppard v. State, 777 So.2d at 661. This Court will reverse a conviction because of lawyer misconduct if it concludes that the natural and probable effect of the improper argument was to create unjust prejudice against the accused and was likely to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Id. Furthermore, alleged improper prosecutorial comment must be considered in context with the circumstances of the case. Ahmad v. State, 603 So.2d 843, 846 (Miss.1992). In this case, the Court must review the prosecutor's comments in conjunction with the opening salvo from defense counsel. Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 299 (Miss.1999). Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 323 (Miss. 2006). ¶ 67. During the closing argument of the defense, counsel made a plea for the jury to have mercy on Spicer and to consider his age of 37. Defense counsel went on to say: If you give him life in prison without parole, I don't know what his life expectancy is, none of us know, that's up to the Lord, but however long it is, he'll be thinking about this every day and every night as to what he has done and what you convicted him of. . . . He has spent most of his life in jail now, and it looks likewhat I'm asking you to do is for him to spend the rest of it in there. ¶ 68. The prosecutor made the following comments, to which Spicer argues his counsel should have objected: He is either going to die in prison, which is a death penalty, and the State is going to support him forth the next 50 years until he dies, with our tax dollars, or he will die sooner. Either way, it's a death penalty. And. I submit to you, why should he be allowed to sit for the next 50 years and watch TV and have friendships and to have associations and to have hope and to have all the things that living people have when Edmond Hebert is dead? ¶ 69. The decision to make certain objections fall[s] within the ambit of trial strategy and cannot give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Powell v. State, 806 So.2d 1069, 1077 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767, 777 (Miss.1995)). Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's comment, the natural and probable effect of the argument by the prosecution was not to create an unjust prejudice against Spicer resulting in a decision influenced by that prejudice. See Howard v. State, 945 So.2d 326, 356 (Miss.2006). Because Spicer cannot show prejudice, he cannot pass the standard set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.