Opinion ID: 625561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ACCA Predicate Offense

Text: We move on to the sentencing issue raised by the defendant. To be sentenced pursuant to ACCA, Hart had to have been convicted of three prior violent felonies, serious drug offenses, or a combination thereof. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). We review de novo whether Hart's Massachusetts conviction for ABDW categorically qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense. See United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455, 464 (1st Cir.2011) (citing United States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir.2009)). ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Clause (i) is referred to as the force clause, while the portion of clause (ii) following the enumerated offenses is called the residual clause. Dancy, 640 F.3d at 465 (citing United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252, 256 (1st Cir.2011)). Under either clause, we take a categorical approach in determining whether a conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense, meaning we consider only the offense's legal definition, forgoing any inquiry into how the defendant may have committed the offense. Holloway, 630 F.3d at 256 (citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). State court construction of the relevant state law dictates our result. Holloway, 630 F.3d at 259. Our analysis is complete if the statute subsumes only ACCA predicate offenses. See id. Where the statute encompasses multiple offenses, and not all of the offenses qualify as ACCA predicates, a district court may consult so-called Shepard documentswhich include the indictment, plea colloquy, and jury instructionsto determine the offense of conviction. United States v. Giggey, 589 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143). If the Shepard documents prove inconclusive, such that the court cannot ascertain the offense of conviction, the conviction cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate. Holloway, 630 F.3d at 257. An offense qualifies under ACCA's residual clause if it is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. [3] 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The offense must (1) present a degree of risk similar to the degree of risk posed by the enumerated offenses, and (2) be roughly similar in kind to the enumerated offenses. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143, 128 S.Ct. 1581. Offenses similar in kind typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. Id. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dancy, 640 F.3d at 466. We have previously held that Massachusetts assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW) qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense under the force clause, [4] Am, 564 F.3d at 33, and that ABDW is a predicate offense under the residual clause of the career offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). [5] United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 79-82 (1st Cir.2009). Hart urges us to revisit our ABDW precedent in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010), and our subsequent decision in United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d at 262. Johnson called for federal courts to use state court construction of state law in determining whether a state conviction qualified as a predicate offense under ACCA. 130 S.Ct. at 1269. The Johnson Court determined that a slight touching, such as a tap on the shoulder without consent, would satisfy a Florida battery statute, and concluded that such a conviction did not categorically qualify as a violent felony under ACCA's force clause. Id. at 1269-71 (quoting State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 219 (Fla.2007)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson prompted our decision in Holloway, in which we held that a conviction for Massachusetts simple assault and battery (AB) did not bring the crime under the purview of ACCA's residual clause because the statute encompasses reckless simple AB, an offense which does not involve the requisite purposeful conduct. Holloway, 630 F.3d at 262; see also Dancy, 640 F.3d at 467. Hart argues that, because ABDW also may be committed recklessly, it cannot qualify as a categorical ACCA predicate. Accordingly, we consider whether our holding in Holloway requires a different result than the one obliged by Glover, and we conclude that it does not. Pursuant to the residual clause analysis as outlined in Begay, we first evaluate ABDW's comparative degree of risk. 553 U.S. at 143, 128 S.Ct. 1581. The Massachusetts ABDW statute criminalizes an assault and battery upon another by means of a dangerous weapon, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(b), and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has defined the offense to require that the elements of assault be present, that there be a touching, however slight, that that touching be by means of the weapon, and that the battery be accomplished by use of an inherently dangerous weapon, or by use of some other object as a weapon, with the intent to use that object in a dangerous or potentially dangerous fashion. Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (1980) (internal citations omitted). ABDW clearly poses a serious potential risk of injury, comparable to the degree of risk posed by the enumerated offenses, as the definitional element of the crime is a touching by means of a dangerous weapon. See Glover, 558 F.3d at 81. Massachusetts case law recognizes that weapons may be dangerous either per se or as used. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d at 1056-57, 1059. A per se dangerous weapon is an instrumentality designed to cause death or great bodily harm, and defendants are charged with knowledge of [its] inherently dangerous nature, Appleby, 402 N.E.2d at 1059 n. 6 (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 78 N.E.2d 697, 702 (1948), whereas an otherwise innocent instrument is considered a dangerous weapon if, as used by the defendant, [it] is capable of producing serious bodily harm. [6] Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 433 Mass. 305, 741 N.E.2d 827, 833 (2001) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Appleby, 402 N.E.2d at 1057 (listing cases); Farrell, 78 N.E.2d at 702. In light of these definitions, logic dictates that ABDW ineluctably poses a serious potential risk of physical injury because the defendant effected the touching with an instrument designed to cause, or wielded an object in a manner capable of producing, serious bodily harm. Glover, 558 F.3d at 81. The second prong of the Begay inquiry requires an offense to be roughly similar in kind to the enumerated offenses in that it must typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. 553 U.S. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581. Hart seizes on the characteristic of purposefulness, maintaining that ABDW categorically cannot be classified as an ACCA predicate because the statute encompasses reckless conduct, see Holloway, 630 F.3d at 261, and he points to several Massachusetts cases in which ABDW was committed recklessly. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 803, 901 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (2009); Commonwealth v. Fettes, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 917, 835 N.E.2d 639, 640 (2005); Commonwealth v. Burno, 396 Mass. 622, 487 N.E.2d 1366, 1369 (1986); Commonwealth v. Broderick, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 941, 450 N.E.2d 1116, 1117 (1983); see also Commonwealth v. Filoma, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 16, 943 N.E.2d 477, 482-83 (2011). It is true that an ABDW conviction may rest on a recklessness theory, [7] and it is not insignificant that reckless ABDW may be committed with a seemingly innocent object used in a dangerous fashion, as in the case of reckless, vehicular ABDW. [8] See, e.g., Cruzado, 901 N.E.2d at 1249; Burno, 487 N.E.2d at 1369. But this fact pattern does not represent the vast majority of ABDW convictions, and our analysis under the residual clause is explicitly, and necessarily, limited to the ordinary case. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). In United States v. Dancy , we examined the crime of assault and battery on a police officer (ABPO), and we observed that ABPO requires additional elements, which distinguish it from simple AB, ensuring the underlying conduct is typically purposeful as required by Begay. Dancy, 640 F.3d at 469. In that case, we suggested that ABDW, like ABPO, also includes additional elements that distinguish it from simple AB, see id. at 467, that is, ABDW requires the battery to be perpetrated by means of a dangerous weapon, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(b). In contrast to simple AB, which merely requires that the defendant's conduct involve[ ] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another or disregard of probable harmful consequences to another resulting in injury, Holloway, 630 F.3d at 261 (quoting Commonwealth v. Welch, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 271, 450 N.E.2d 1100, 1102-03 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted), ABDW requires the defendant to have wielded a dangerous weapon and effectuated a touching using that weapon. The objective of ACCA, moreover, is to identify prior convictions which indicate that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145, 128 S.Ct. 1581. The residual clause is broad by design to capture a range of crimes indicative of dangerousness. Adjectives like `purposeful' and `aggressive' denote qualities that are ineluctably manifested in degree and appear in different combinations. [9] United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2008) (footnote omitted). ACCA's enumerated offenses must only typically involve purposeful conduct, Dancy, 640 F.3d at 468 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581), and so we must look to the usual circumstances of the crime, not allow[ing] hypothetical fact patterns to negate commonsense. Dancy, 640 F.3d at 468. In considering the ordinary case[ ] of ABDW, James, 550 U.S. at 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, we must conclude that a composite of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct is the norm. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581. Nothing in our holding in Holloway changes our conclusion in Glover, and we hold that a conviction for Massachusetts ABDW qualifies as a predicate offense under ACCA's residual clause, pretermitting the need to analyze it under the force clause. [10]