Opinion ID: 1281991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: When considering a circuit court's grant of summary judgment, this Court noted in Syllabus Points 1 and 2 of Jones v. Wesbanco Bank Parkersburg, 194 W.Va. 381, 460 S.E.2d 627 (1995): 1. `A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. ' Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). 2. ``A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.' Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992).' Syl. pt. 2, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the circuit court determines there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. See, e.g. W.Va. R.Civ.P 56(c). See generally Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.E.2d 265 (1986). The burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests on the party seeking summary judgment; in assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material facts, the circuit court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. The inferences to be drawn from the underlying affidavits, exhibits, answers to interrogatories, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. On a motion for summary judgment, neither a trial nor appellate court can try issues of fact; a determination can only be made as to whether there are issues to be tried. To be specific, if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference can be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is improper. As succinctly stated in both Peavy and Williams, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court is governed by the same principles and we review the record de novo. Although we have said that Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure applies equally to claims of discrimination, [2] we suggested in Williams a cautious approach to summary judgment motions where issues of motive and intent must be resolved. [3] In most discrimination cases, once a plaintiff's allegations and evidence create a prima facie case (showing circumstances that permit an inference of discrimination on an impermissible bias), unless the employer comes forward with evidence of a dispositive nondiscriminatory reason as to which there is no genuine issue and which no rational trier of fact could reject, the conflict between the plaintiff's evidence establishing a prima facie case and the employer's evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason reflects a question of fact to be resolved by the factfinder at trial. See generally Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 457 S.E.2d 152 (1995). [4] It is significant to understand that in discrimination cases, although the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence, the showing the plaintiff must make as to the elements of the prima facie case in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment is de minimis. Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2nd Cir.1994). In determining whether the plaintiff has met the de minimis initial burden of showing `circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination,' the function of the court on a summary judgment motion is to determine whether the `proffered admissible evidence shows circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer a discriminatory motive. It is not the province of the summary judgment court itself to decide what inferences should be drawn.' Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 204 (2nd Cir.1995). (Citation omitted). To be sure, summary judgment has a special niche in civil litigation. Its role is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether a trial is actually required. The device allows courts and litigants to avoid full blown trials in unwinnable cases, thus conserving the parties' time and money and permitting courts to husband scarce judicial resources. However, although summary judgment is the appropriate device for putting a swift end to meritless litigation, Rule 56(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure [5] implicitly forbids courts from entering summary judgment where there are material and genuine issues of fact to be resolved. Even [i]f there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, ... we [must] next determine if the substantive law was correctly applied by the ... [circuit] court. Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 781 (10th Cir.1995). Based upon our de novo review of the record, we find the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the applicable law and in its holding that no genuine issues of material fact exist.