Opinion ID: 553843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coiro's Other Claims

Text: 46 Coiro asserts that the district court erroneously admitted evidence regarding the drug-trafficking arrest of Salvatore Greco and William Cestaro, two members of the Ruggiero organization, because its prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value of the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403. The two men were arrested after they met and exchanged packages, four pounds of heroin from Greco to Cestaro and two carry bags containing $150,000 from Cestaro to Greco. The government's evidence included the heroin and pictures of the carry bags and the money. 47 A determination that evidence is admissible after Rule 403 weighing may not be set aside unless there is a showing that the court abused its discretion, or acted arbitrarily or irrationally. United States v. DiTommasso, 817 F.2d 201, 217 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 1451, 55 L.Ed.2d 496 (1978). 48 The evidence of Cestaro and Greco's arrest was relevant to show the existence of the narcotics enterprise charged in the indictment. The RICO count charged Coiro with being a member of a drug-trafficking enterprise, and with holding and helping launder the proceeds of that business. Moreover, the evidence regarding the arrests is admissible under Rule 404  'to inform the jury of the background of the conspiracy charged,'  and  'to complete the story of the crimes charged.'  United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 589 (2d Cir.1986)); United States v. Harris, 733 F.2d 994, 1006 (2d Cir.1984). The evidence regarding the arrest of Cestaro and Greco, which was presented in a summary fashion, did not unfairly prejudice Coiro so as to warrant exclusion under Rule 403, regardless of his belated offer to stipulate to the arrests. 49 Coiro also objects to the government's introduction of evidence regarding his bribery of the employee in the Nassau County District Attorney's office. He claims that the indictment, which did not specifically mention the bribe, did not give notice of this charge, and that the evidence is inadmissible under Rule 404 because it is proof of an uncharged crime. He further alleges that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 because any probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. These claims are without merit. 50 In 1984, Coiro received notice of the bribery as part of the RICO count when he obtained from the government a copy of the tape-recorded conversation of May 21, 1982 among Coiro, Ruggiero and Gotti discussing it. Later, in response to Coiro's motion to suppress that tape on attorney-client privilege grounds, the government expressly identified the conversation as an example of Coiro's role in the enterprise. 51 The evidence of the Nassau County bribery was clearly relevant to the crimes charged as conduct designed to prevent Government detection of the illegal activities of the members of the enterprise, as alleged in the RICO count. Since the evidence was directly probative of a central allegation in the indictment, the fact that it may also have been probative of a separate uncharged crime is irrelevant. Finally, it was not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. 52 Coiro next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the money laundering allegation against Coiro in the RICO count. This claim borders on the frivolous. A defendant challenging the legal sufficiency of trial evidence bears a heavy burden. United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109, 109 S.Ct. 3164, 104 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1989); United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680, reh'g denied, 315 U.S. 827, 62 S.Ct. 629, 86 L.Ed. 1222 (1942), and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, see, e.g., United States v. Khan, 787 F.2d 28, 33-34 (2d Cir.1986), we easily conclude that the jury could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Coiro knowingly helped conceal and launder drug proceeds. See United States v. Resto, 824 F.2d 210, 212 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The evidence on this score, including Coiro's conversations with Ruggiero and Gotti concerning his and Kobus's holding and laundering of money, was more than ample. Coiro's claim that he did not know that the money represented proceeds of narcotics trafficking, based in part on a statement by Ruggiero made in Coiro's presence denying he was involved in selling drugs, is simply unavailing in the face of evidence from which the jury could infer that Coiro was fully aware of the nature of the enterprise in which he was a participant. 53 Finally, Coiro attacks the RICO pattern requirement, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1962(c) and 1961(5), arguing first that it is unconstitutionally vague because courts have had difficulty defining a pattern of racketeering activity, and also that, apart from its constitutionality, his conduct in this case did not establish such a pattern. Currently, demonstrating a RICO pattern requires proof of multiple racketeering predicates--which can be part of a single scheme--that are related and that amount to, or threaten the likelihood of, continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2898-2902, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). See also United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 56, 107 L.Ed.2d 24 (1989). We have previously found that RICO was not unconstitutionally vague in a variety of applications, see United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831, 105 S.Ct. 118, 83 L.Ed.2d 60 (1984); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105, 95 S.Ct. 775, 42 L.Ed.2d 801 (1975), and we so find here, notwithstanding comments in the concurring opinion in H.J. Inc. See 109 S.Ct. at 2909 (Scalia, J., concurring). 54 In the absence of first amendment considerations, vagueness challenges must be considered in light of the facts of the particular case. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92, 96 S.Ct. 316, 319, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975). As RICO was plainly intended to encompass the illegal activities of organized crime, see H.J. Inc., 109 S.Ct. at 2903-04; Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 923, we are confident that the statute provided Coiro with fair notice that his contemplated conduct--bribery and money laundering on behalf of the Ruggiero narcotics enterprise--fell within RICO's strictures, and thus the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Accord United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1102-05 (3d Cir.1990) (rejecting vagueness challenge to RICO, noting that potential due process problems cited by Justice Scalia are not present in organized crime cases); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1178-80 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 130, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) (same). The present indictment is not invalid simply because other marginal cases, real or imagined, criminal or civil, might involve facts that create undue uncertainty as to the application of RICO's pattern requirement to a defendant's activities. See Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 923; Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1104; Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1179. 55 Finally, under H.J. Inc. and Indelicato, the trial evidence of Coiro's numerous activities involving bribery and money laundering on behalf of organized crime was more than ample to establish a RICO pattern, including the requisite relatedness and continuity. As the jury was charged, a threat of continuity may be established if the predicates themselves involve a distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity, either implicit or explicit, or where the predicates can be attributed to a defendant operating as part of a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes. H.J. Inc., 109 S.Ct. at 2902; see also Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383-84 ([w]here the enterprise is an entity whose business is racketeering activity, an act performed in furtherance of that business automatically carries with it the threat of continued racketeering activity). 56 Coiro's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, the predicate acts with which Coiro was charged did not derive solely from the period immediately following Salvatore Ruggiero's death. The jury was entitled to infer from the evidence that the Ruggiero organization was a long-term criminal enterprise engaged in narcotics trafficking both before and after Salvatore's death; that Coiro was an active participant from at least as early as February, 1982; and that the instances of Coiro's bribery and money laundering were calculated, connected activities in furtherance of the enterprise, were ongoing prior to Salvatore's death, and continued and threatened to continue after his death. In short, the evidence established that Coiro had become a full-fledged member of the enterprise, and that his activities designed to prevent detection and prosecution of the organization's illegal activities were part of a consistent pattern that was likely to continue for the indefinite future, absent outside intervention.