Opinion ID: 802001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Ribeau’s Procedural Due Process Claim

Text: The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from, among other things, depriving a person of “property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “Under the Due Process Clause, procedural due process ensures the state will not deprive a party of property without engaging fair procedures to reach a decision . . . .” Nichols v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 506 F.3d 962, 969 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). “The Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. at 577. A legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit is “created and [its] dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 4 Although the district court addressed Mr. Ribeau’s claimed right to a pretermination hearing in its Rule 59(e) order, see Aplt. Appx. at 133, Mr. Ribeau raised this issue in his response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the parties agree that our standard of review is de novo. See Aplt. Br. at 9; Aple. Br. at 4. -6- state law.” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (quotations omitted). If state law gives rise to an entitlement, we still must determine whether the entitlement “constitutes a property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. That question “is ultimately one of federal constitutional law.” Id. at 757. Accordingly, this appeal concerns whether (1) under Kansas law Mr. Ribeau had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a pre-termination hearing before the Board and (2) if so, whether that entitlement is a constitutionally protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because we decide that Mr. Ribeau did not have a pretermination hearing entitlement, we do not reach the second issue.
Mr. Ribeau argues that under Kansas law he had an implied-contract right to a pretermination hearing before the Board. This entitlement, he argues, was created by his express employment contract, the Handbook, and his and Mr. Katt’s deposition testimony. We conclude that Kansas courts would not recognize Mr. Ribeau’s impliedcontract theory. Under Kansas law, Mr. Ribeau had an express employment contract, not an implied contract. In addition, Mr. Ribeau’s express contract is unambiguous and does not provide a right to a pre-termination hearing before the Board.
-7- “Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied.” Hyland v. Dewey, 73 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Kan. 1937) (quotations omitted). “Contracts implied in fact are inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case and are not formally or explicitly stated in words.” Atchison Cnty. Farmers Union Co-op Ass’n v. Turnbull, 736 P.2d 917, 922 (Kan. 1987). In the employment context, “[t]he implied contract theory recognizes an implied obligation on the employer to not terminate an employee arbitrarily where a policy or program of the employer, either express or implied, restricts the employer’s right of termination at will.” Allsup v. Mount Carmel Med. Ctr., 922 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (quotations omitted).5 Where an express employment contract exists, however, Kansas courts have declined to consider implied terms outside the written contract. For example, in Dickens v. Snodgrass, Dunlap & Co., 872 P.2d 252 (Kan. 1994), the plaintiff argued that “her continued employment with pay increases establishe[d] satisfactory performance and created an implied contract of continuing employment over and above the written contract.” Id. at 260 (emphasis added). In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court of Kansas explained that the plaintiff’s implied-contract theory relied on cases that did not “involve[] written contracts of employment establishing the employee’s status.” Id. The court noted that, “[i]n the absence of written contracts, it was necessary [in those cases] 5 In Allsup, the plaintiff sued his former employer for wrongful termination. 922 P.2d at 1098. The Allsup court made no mention of a written employment contract, and the parties assumed for purposes of summary judgment and appeal that the employer’s discipline policies gave rise to an implied contract of employment. Id. -8- to look at all the facts to determine whether there was an implied contract of continuing employment at the time of the commencement of the employment.” Id. Before and after Dickens, Kansas courts have repeatedly noted the distinction between express contracts and implied contracts. See, e.g., Stover v. Superior Indus. Int’l, Inc., 29 P.3d 967, 971 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that Dickens did not foreclose a plaintiff’s implied-contract theory because “[i]n this case, there is no written employment contract to modify, and Dickens is not on point”); Kastner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 894 P.2d 909, 915 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (“In this case, Kastner acknowledges that no express contract existed between the parties. Instead, he maintains that an implied-in-fact contract of employment was created . . . .”); see also Duvanel v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 227 P.2d 88, 92 (Kan. 1951) (“An express agreement or covenant excludes the possibility of an implied one of a different or contradictory nature.”).6 6 Although express and implied contracts are conceptually distinct, Kansas courts have recognized that an implied contract may modify an express contract if the parties have demonstrated “mutual assent, or a meeting of the minds with respect to the proposed amendment.” Dickens, 872 P.2d at 259 (quotations omitted). However, “[a]n implied contract which modifies a written contract also requires fresh and independent consideration.” Id. (quotations omitted). Mr. Ribeau argues that his and Mr. Katt’s deposition testimony demonstrate that both men believed classified employees were entitled to a pre-termination hearing before the Board. This testimony is insufficient, however, to establish that an implied contract modified Mr. Ribeau’s express employment contract. Mr. Ribeau has not provided evidence of “fresh and independent consideration” establishing an implied contractual provision for a pre-termination hearing. -9- Because Mr. Ribeau had an express employment contract, we conclude that Kansas courts would not recognize his implied-contract theory.
Although we reject Mr. Ribeau’s implied-contract theory, we must determine whether his express employment contract created a legitimate claim of entitlement to a pre-termination hearing before the Board. If an unambiguous written contract exists, Kansas courts “will not imply an additional term.” Havens v. Safeway Stores, 678 P.2d 625, 629-30 (Kan. 1984). “When a contract is complete, unambiguous, and free from uncertainty, parol evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings tending to vary the terms of the contract evidenced by the writing is inadmissible.” Decatur Cnty. Feed Yard, Inc. v. Fahey, 974 P.2d 569, 574 (Kan. 1999) (quotations omitted). A contract may incorporate an extraneous writing by reference, however, and the writing “becomes a part of the contract only so far as to effectuate the specific purpose intended.” Starr v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 75 P.3d 266, 269 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003). Mr. Ribeau had an express employment contract stating that he “may be terminated . . . at any time, for any reason.” Aplt. Appx. at 60. The contract also provided that Mr. Ribeau “agree[d] to observe, enforce, and be directed by rules and regulations adopted by the Board.” Id. Mr. Ribeau argues that the Handbook contains “rules and regulations adopted by the Board” and that it is thus incorporated by reference -10- into his employment contract. We agree and look to the Handbook to determine what rules and regulations governed Mr. Ribeau’s employment. Mr. Ribeau contends that three Handbook provisions support his claim that he was entitled to a pre-termination hearing before the Board. The provisions state that (1) the superintendent may suspend employees “until the suspension is resolved by [B]oard action”; (2) the “[B]oard may terminate a classified employee at any time, with or without cause”; and (3) an employee may file a complaint with a “supervisor concerning a school rule, regulation, policy or decision” and appeal the supervisor’s decision to the superintendent, whose decision is final. Id. at 68 (emphases added). None of these provisions, however, provides for a pre-termination hearing before the Board. The first provision relates to suspension, not termination, and does not contain language entitling employees to a Board hearing. The second provision also does not provide for a pre-termination hearing. To the contrary, under this provision the Board may terminate an employee “at any time . . . without cause,” which indicates that the Board may terminate an employee without holding a pre-termination hearing. Finally, the third provision, which allows employees to file grievances with supervisors and the superintendent, does not mention the Board or a pre-termination hearing.7 In his reply brief, Mr. Ribeau also appears to argue that the Handbook provisions, 7 In addition, Mr. Ribeau fails to highlight other relevant portions of the Handbook. For example, one provision states that “[a]ll classified employees are employed on an ‘atwill’ basis . . . and may be dismissed at any time.” Aplt. Appx. at 70. -11- read together, are ambiguous as to whether he was entitled to a pre-termination Board hearing. He suggests that because the Handbook confers termination power on the Board, and because an employee can challenge termination in the grievance process, the Handbook could be read as requiring an appeal to the Board as the final step of a grievance challenging a termination. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 14. He is wrong. First, as previously noted, the Handbook authorizes the Board to terminate employees, but it says nothing about a pre-termination Board hearing. Instead, it declares that “[t]he Board may terminate a classified employee at any time . . . without cause,” Aplt. Appx. at 68 (emphases added), and that “[a]ll classified employees are employed on an ‘at will’ basis . . . and may be dismissed at any time,” id. at 70 (emphases added). Second, the grievance provision does not apply to terminations. It permits an employee to file a grievance with a supervisor,8 but someone who has been terminated is no longer an employee and no longer has a supervisor. In addition, the Handbook places the final grievance decision with the superintendent, but it places the termination decision with the Board. See Aplt. Appx. at 68. Third, even if, as Mr. Ribeau argues, the Handbook could be read as allowing a termination to be grieved and as providing an appeal to the Board as the final step, he cannot overcome the lack of any authorization of a pre-termination Board hearing in the 8 Under the Handbook’s grievance provision, an “employee may file a complaint with [a] supervisor concerning a . . . decision that affects the employee.” Aplt. Appx. at 68. -12- Handbook. “Before a contract is determined to be ambiguous, the language must be given a fair, reasonable, and practical construction.” Liggatt v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 46 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Kan. 2002). Mr. Ribeau’s argument ignores the Board’s power to terminate an at-will employee at any time without cause, the inapplicability of the grievance process to termination decisions, and the absence of any reference in the Handbook to a pre-termination Board hearing. The Handbook is unambiguous: it confers no right to a pre-termination Board hearing. We decline to find “ambiguities or uncertainties where common sense says there are none.” Jones v. Reliable Sec. Inc., 28 P.3d 1051, 1059 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).