Opinion ID: 69601
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crane Operator License

Text: Bouvier claims gender discrimination caused the delay of her official transfer to the crane operator position. Although Bouvier’s male coworker Sallinger did not receive his official transfer until March 1, 2007–the day after Bouvier’s official transfer–Bouvier claims that she saw Sallinger wearing the license on his badge in January 2007.1 Even viewing this in the light most favorable to Bouvier, her delay in obtaining a license to wear on her badge was 1 Bouvier made this assertion in her sworn statement in opposition to Northrop’s summary judgment motion, but this particular allegation did not contradict previous testimony, and may therefore be considered. See, e.g. Taylor v. Coastal Secs., Ltd., 45 Fed. App’x 326 (5th Cir. 2002) (striking only the portions of an affadavit that were inconsistent with deposition testimony). 6 not an adverse employment action. See Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that a delay in promotion was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff received the promotion with retroactive pay and seniority). We have held that, for Title VII discrimination claims, an adverse employment action “‘include[s] only ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.’” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Green v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002)).2 Because the delay in promotion was temporary, it was not an “ultimate employment decision” and the district court correctly granted summary judgment.