Opinion ID: 835638
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: admissibility of prior bad acts testimony

Text: Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's decision to admit certain testimony that defendant challenged as prior bad act or propensity evidence. Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine regarding the admissibility of the testimony of 98 persons whom the state had identified as potential witnesses. The motion was directed primarily at limiting or excluding testimony about defendant's prior crimes or bad acts. Before the trial court decided the motion, the state indicated that it intended to use only 32 of the 98 witnesses identified in the motion. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the motion, with certain exceptions. Defendant assigns error to that order, arguing that all the testimony should have been excluded. [10] Defendant's challenges pertain to testimony in both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of his trial. The challenged guilt phase testimony falls roughly into four categories: (1) testimony by various young women that defendant gave them alcohol, morphine, or other drugs that caused them to black out or become ill, some of whom further stated that defendant had sexually abused them while they were incapacitated by the drugs defendant had administered; (2) testimony of witness Franklin that a female friend had told him that defendant had drugged and raped her; (3) testimony of witness Robinson about two interactions with defendant; and (4) testimony of a witness that he was defendant's probation officer and that defendant was living at his mother's Washington County residence in February 1998. [11] Although defendant describes the foregoing categories of witnesses in his arguments to this court, he does not make separate arguments regarding the purposes served by the testimony of each category of witnesses. Instead, he argues, generally, that all the testimony from those witness had only one conceivable purpose  to prove his bad character and that he had acted in accordance with that character. We consider, first, how that argument pertains to the witnesses who testified in the guilt phase of defendant's trial. As a general proposition, evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs or bad acts is not admissible in a criminal case to prove the defendant's antisocial or criminal propensities. OEC 404(3). However, such evidence may be admissible to prove other facts that are relevant in the case, as long as the chain of logical relevance connecting the evidence to the other fact or facts does not ultimately rely on an inference relating to the defendant's character or propensities. Id. See also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or. 98, 105 n. 11, 806 P.2d 110 (1991) (OEC 404(3) provides an avenue for admitting evidence that proves guilt without any inference to character). Notably, this court has observed that the rule stated in OEC 404(3) employs an inclusionary approach to the prior bad act problem. See State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 548, 725 P.2d 312 (1986) (so stating). That means that, while the rule sets out a list of possible exceptions to the general prohibition on prior bad act evidence (motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident), the rule does not purport to cover every imaginable purpose to which prior bad act evidence might logically and lawfully be applied. Id. at 549, 725 P.2d 312. Thus, the essential inquiry under OEC 404(3) is not whether the testimony can be made to fit into one of the listed categories, but whether and how it is logically relevant to a noncharacter issue in the case. Id. We begin with the first category of witnesses described above, viz., young women who claimed that defendant had drugged them to the point of incapacitation with morphine or other substances. Some of those witnesses also claimed that defendant had taken advantage of them sexually while they were under the influence of the drugs that defendant had administered or supplied. The state argued that the testimony of those witnesses was relevant to prove several elements of its case against defendantmost notably, that defendant had raped Fraser before he murdered her. In that regard, we note that the state had strong direct evidence that defendant had had sexual intercourse with Fraser shortly before she died but had no way of proving directly that that defendant's sexual contact with Fraser was nonconsensual. [12] However, when combined with the toxicology report showing a significant level of opiates in Fraser's system, the testimony at issue would be powerful circumstantial evidence that defendant's sexual contact with Fraser occurred after he had drugged her, and that he took advantage of her incapacitated state. The inferences that the state wished to rely on would not include a general subjective assessment of defendant's character or involve any allegation that defendant had a propensity to commit rape. Instead, the evidence made the state's explanation of the facts (defendant's seminal fluid in Fraser's vaginal cavity and a high level of morphine in Fraser's body) more likely, and thereby made defendant's guilt both of rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree more likely. We still must consider whether the evidence is sufficiently probative with respect to that theory. In past cases, this court has described the different factors that trial courts must consider when deciding whether to admit prior bad act or crime evidence for purposes of a particular theory. Our cases suggest that, if evidence of prior crimes is to be admitted to prove identity based on modus operandi, the trial court must find a very high degree of similarity between the charged and uncharged crimes, as well as a methodology that is highly distinctive. Pinnell, 311 Or. at 109-10, 806 P.2d 110. On the other hand, when prior crime evidence is to be admitted to prove intent, this court has indicated that a high degree of similarity is helpful but is not essential, and that a distinctive methodology is entirely irrelevant. See Johns, 301 Or. at 555-56, 725 P.2d 312 (so stating). In our view, the analysis of the prior crime evidence in the present case falls somewhere in between Pinnell and Johns. There is no requirement that the evidence of the uncharged crime demonstrate a distinctive methodology or signature crime, as when such evidence is used to establish the identity of the perpetrator. However, it is essential that the uncharged crimes evidence involve a method of incapacitation (administration of an intoxicating substance) that would support the narrow inference that the state seeks to draw from itthat sexual contact between Fraser and defendant occurred while Fraser was incapacitated by morphine that defendant had administered. [13] And, although there is no requirement that the uncharged crime closely replicate the crime that is charged (as there is when prior crime evidence is used to establish identity), any similarity in the circumstances increases the probative value of the prior crime evidence and enhances the argument for admissibility under OEC 404(3). Likewise, the timing of uncharged crimes vis-à-vis the charged crime and the number of instances that are shown may affect the question of admissibility. No categorical rule exists, but timing, repetition, and similarity of both the act and the surrounding circumstances all are important considerations. Applying the foregoing points to the first category of witnesses, we conclude that the trial court permissibly concluded that the witnesses' testimony was admissible for the non-character purpose of showing that Fraser did not consent and, in fact, was incapable of consenting to the sexual contact that she had with defendant. All but one of the witnesses testified that defendant had either offered them or slipped them a drug that caused them to pass out or become ill. [14] One of the witnesses learned from a drug screen that the drug she had taken was an opiate  the same substance found in Fraser's system. She testified that defendant later had acknowledged that he had slipped some morphine into her drink and had told her that the morphine was left over from a supply that hospice staff had provided to his father, who had suffered from cancer. Another witnesses testified that defendant also had acknowledged giving her morphine that he had gotten from his dad. The testimony of most of the other witnesses strongly suggests that the drug involved was liquid morphine. [15] One witness indicated that defendant had poured a liquid from a brown bottle onto a rag and held it over her mouth until she passed out. Another witness also spoke of a liquid poured from a bottle onto a rag, but said that defendant had given her the rag to smell. Still another testified that she passed out after defendant gave her a capful of a liquid, which he told her was Ecstasy, to drink. Four of the witnesses testified that defendant had sexually abused them in some fashion while they were passed out from the intoxicants that defendant had administered. One awoke to find defendant next to her and her underwear pulled down, two awoke to find defendant feeling their breasts, and another awoke to find defendant having intercourse with her. The testimony of those witnesses demonstrated that defendant had developed a method for obtaining sexual access to women without their consent (which method involved administration of incapacitating drugs, commonly liquid morphine) and permitted the jury to infer that the victim, like others, had not consented to the sexual contact with defendant that other evidence all but conclusively established had occurred. [16] It also permitted the jury to draw another inference that was relevant to the state's theorythat defendant had administered the morphine that was found in Fraser's system. That inference is strengthened by the multiplicity of similar incidents (suggesting a pattern), the fact that all the incidents occurred within the year preceding Fraser's murder, and the fact that the victims of those uncharged crimes all were teenage girls who moved in the same circles as Fraser. In short, the testimony in the first of defendant's guilt-phase categories is relevant to a significant noncharacter issue in the case and therefore passes muster under OEC 404(3). [17] Defendant also appears to challenge the trial court's decision to admit the testimony of a young man, Franklin, to the effect that one of the young women who testified about being drugged and sexually assaulted by defendant had reported the incident to him at the time that it occurred. We conclude that, although the testimony referred to prior bad acts by defendant and contained hearsay, it served a purpose other than establishing defendant's bad character or the truth of the matter asserted. On cross-examination of the young woman in question, defense counsel brought out that she willingly had taken some drugs from defendant, that her memory may have been impaired by drugs and alcohol, and that she had not reported the incident to the police. Franklin's testimony was admissible for the purpose of rehabilitating a witness whose truthfulness and accuracy of memory had been challenged in cross-examination. OEC 801(4)(a)(B). Defendant also appears to be challenging the guilt-phase testimony of Robinson, a young woman who was acquainted with defendant. Robinson testified that, a week before Fraser died, defendant had come to her home, had shown her that Fraser was passed out in the back seat of his car, and had referred to Fraser as a lesbian and a model. Robinson also testified that, on February 28, 1998, defendant had arrived at her home early in the morning, had gotten into her bed uninvited, and had asked her if he could stay at her apartment. Robinson reported that she had refused defendant's request and that she also had berated defendant for getting her 15-year-old sister drunk. In the hearing on defendant's motions in limine, defendant argued that Robinson's testimony was inadmissible prior bad act evidence. However, and assuming that the first incident that Robinson described even qualifies as a prior bad act, it is clear that it was relevant to other facts at issue in the case. Robinson's description of the incident suggested the nature of defendant's relationship with Fraserthat, even if defendant were attracted to Fraser, he knew that she was a lesbian and, therefore, less likely to be attracted to him. Robinson's testimony about the second incident fits more easily into the prior bad act mold, in that it showed that defendant had provided alcohol to a minor. However, that aspect of Robinson's testimony was a relatively minor part of her overall story, which was relevant to show that, as of February 28, 1998, defendant was trying to avoid his own home (a possible indication of guilty knowledge). Moreover, defendant did not separately object to it, as he was required to do if he wished to have it excluded. We find no error. Defendant also challenged the guilt-phase testimony of his probation officer, Crocker, on the ground that it necessarily informed the jury of his criminal past. However, Crocker's testimony was relevant to the issue of defendant's residency in Washington Countyan issue that defendant chose to contest and that was vital to an element (venue) of the state's case. Crocker's testimony was limited to that issue: Crocker reported what he knew about where defendant was residing in February 1998, when the murder occurred and avoided any mention of defendant's past crimes. Crocker's testimony was relevant to a noncharacter issue and its admission did not violate OEC 404(3). Defendant also suggests that, even if relevant for some noncharacter purpose, all the foregoing testimony was unfairly prejudicial and, as such, was inadmissible under OEC 403. We disagree. Although the testimony clearly was prejudicial, it also was strongly probative with respect to issues that were vital to the state's case, viz., whether Fraser consented to sexual contact with defendant, whether defendant had administered the opiates that were found in Fraser's system, whether defendant intended to take advantage of Fraser's incapacitated state, whether defendant had access to morphine, and whether defendant resided in Washington County at the time of the murder. None of the testimony is of such a character that OEC 403 necessarily would require its exclusion. We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony. [18]