Opinion ID: 1830356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the Tuition Contract Violate the Statute?

Text: The key question in this case is whether the fee, gift, tip, gratuity, or other remuneration or consideration language of subsection 8(1) of the WFBA invalidates the contract that defendant was obliged to sign to secure employment with plaintiff. Section 1, which defines other terms in the WFBA, does not define these terms. Where the Legislature has not expressly defined the terms used in a statute, this Court may turn to dictionary definitions to aid our goal of construing those terms in accordance with their ordinary and generally accepted meanings. [7] People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). In interpreting the language of a statute, it is appropriate to consult a lay dictionary when defining common words or phrases that have not acquired a unique meaning at law. This is because the common and approved usage of a nonlegal term is most likely to be found in a standard dictionary, not in a legal dictionary. Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 756, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998). See also Consumers Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 460 Mich. 148, 163, n. 10, 596 N.W.2d 126 (1999), and M.C.L. § 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1). Plaintiff argues that the language of subsection 8(1) of the WFBA evinces a legislative purpose to prohibit the selling of jobs. We agree. However, its use of broader language here indicates a design to do more: to prevent kickbacks or payments of any kind to an employer in return for employment or its continuation. We consider the words that the Legislature used. The most relevant definitions of fee, gift, tip, and gratuity from Random House Webster's College Dictionary, as applicable here, are as follows: fee is defined as a sum charged or paid, as for professional services or for a privilege; gift is defined as something given voluntarily without payment in return; tip is defined as gratuity; and gratuity is defined as something given without claim or demand. Fee, gift, tip and gratuity are words that suggest values or benefits flowing to the employer, in addition to the wage-for-work exchange common to almost any employment arrangement. The statute also contains a general catch-all prohibition of other remuneration or consideration. According to Random House Webster's College Dictionary, remuneration is reward, pay. Consideration is a legal term and has acquired a unique meaning under the law. It is [t]he inducement to a contract. The cause, motive, price, or impelling influence which induces a contracting party to enter into a contract. The reason or material cause of a contract. Some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other. [Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 306.] [C]onsideration for agreements [exists where there is] a benefit on one side, or a detriment suffered, or service done on the other. [ Plastray Corp. v. Cole, 324 Mich. 433, 440, 37 N.W.2d 162 (1949).] Defendant argues that the obligation in the tuition contract is a fee and a bond. We find it unnecessary to decide these questions. Regardless of whether it is a fee or a bond, the obligation was other remuneration or consideration, and it was required of defendant as a condition of his employment. The statutory doctrine of ejusdem generis supports this conclusion. [Ejusdem generis] is a rule whereby in a statute in which general words follow a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated. [ People v. Brown, 406 Mich. 215, 221, 277 N.W.2d 155 (1979).] Plaintiff conditioned defendant's employment on his agreement to pay $50 a week for the first three years, minus $50 a week for each week worked in the next three years. Thus, plaintiff required that defendant grant it a contractual right to financial recovery in the event he did not complete six years of employment. This repayment arrangement represents remuneration or consideration that ran from defendant to plaintiff. We reject the Court of Appeals equation of the training repayment arrangement in the contract to an employer's right to be reimbursed for personal phone calls or employer-provided tools kept after employment. A policy requiring an employee to reimburse his employer for personal phone calls or to pay for tools after he leaves is not a condition of employment. Employees are not required to make personal phone calls, and they need not take tools with them after leaving employment. Hence, such policies are not conditions for obtaining employment, but rather workplace rules similar to docking pay for tardiness or excessive sick days. We note, also, that some employers offer to fund employees' educations with the understanding that the employees will repay, unless they remain with the employer for a specific period. Such programs do not violate subsection 8(1) of the WFBA. As with reimbursement for personal phone calls and paying for employer-provided tools removed after a job ends, they are optional and not a condition of employment or continued employment. In contrast, the tuition contract was a condition of employment. Defendant could not work for plaintiff without submitting to its repayment provisions. [8]