Opinion ID: 1395057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence to withstand raymark's motions to dismiss

Text: The first issue we must address is if Lockwood presented sufficient evidence of causation so as to survive Raymark's motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial. Raymark argues that the evidence was too tenuous to establish that exposure to its product proximately caused Lockwood's injury and, therefore, that the trial court erred in denying its motions. Essentially, the trial court determined that Lockwood had established a prima facie case against Raymark by presenting evidence that exposure to asbestos causes asbestosis; that once asbestos dust is released, it can remain in the air and drift with air currents for a long period of time; and that Raymark's product was located at shipyards where Lockwood was employed during the period when he worked there. [1] In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court must accept the truth of the nonmoving party's evidence and draw all favorable inferences that may reasonably be evinced. Levy v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 90 Wn.2d 846, 851, 586 P.2d 845 (1978). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 102 Wn.2d 68, 73, 684 P.2d 692 (1984). The court may grant the motion only where there is no competent evidence or reasonable inference which would sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. If there is any justifiable evidence upon which reasonable minds might reach conclusions that sustain the verdict, the question is for the jury. Levy, at 851. With this standard in mind, we must review the record to determine if Lockwood presented sufficient evidence against Raymark so that the jury should decide the question of Raymark's liability. Lockwood presented experts who testified about how shipyard workers were exposed to asbestos. Dr. Steven Levin, a physician in occupational environmental medicine, testified that individuals who did not work directly with asbestos but worked in areas where asbestos work was performed could be exposed to asbestos as bystanders. He stated that asbestos dust released into the air by asbestos workers would hang in the air and become diffused, so that persons working in the area where asbestos was being used could inhale asbestos fibers. Dr. Levin further testified that released asbestos fibers drifted with air currents, thus spreading over time throughout a working area. He also stated that riggers in shipyards were exposed to asbestos as bystanders in areas where asbestos insulation was being applied or torn off. Other experts also testified that asbestos dust could remain floating in the air once it was released; that bystanders not directly working with asbestos were at risk of becoming diseased; and that exposure to asbestos has a cumulative effect in contributing to disease. In addition, a shipyard worker testified that when asbestos insulation is removed or installed, asbestos dust is created. Lockwood also presented witnesses who identified certain manufacturers' asbestos products as having been present in shipyards in the Puget Sound area. George Norgaard, who worked for an insulation subcontractor and supervised workers applying insulation products on ships from 1957 to 1960 in the area, testified that Raymark, among other manufacturers, supplied his employer with asbestos cloth. Benjamin Bradley, who worked as an insulator from 1935 to 1957 in Seattle area shipyards, testified that he saw Raymark asbestos cloth in the warehouse at Todd Shipyards during the period from 1940 to 1943, and that Raymark cloth was used on the job there. He further testified that during that time period, he saw the same materials at the warehouse at the Seattle-Tacoma yard. Bradley also specifically identified Raymark's product as present at the warehouse in the Seattle-Tacoma yard in 1946. In addition, Bradley testified that while working on the conversion of a large liner called the George Washington at Puget Sound Bridge and Dredge in 1947 and 1948, insulators used the same asbestos materials as those used at Todd in 1946. Bradley also specifically testified that Raymark asbestos products were used on a large liner conversion at Puget Sound Bridge and Dredge in 1947 and 1948. Albert Lockwood himself identified the names of manufacturers of some of the asbestos products that were in the shipyards when he was there. Raymark was not one of the manufacturers he identified, although he testified that there were others besides those he could recall. Lockwood also testified that he had worked on the overhaul of the George Washington and that there was asbestos on that kind of job. Raymark argues that the evidence presented by Lockwood was insufficient to establish that exposure to its product proximately caused his injury and, therefore, the question of Raymark's liability should not have been presented to the jury. Raymark emphasizes that Lockwood did not personally handle asbestos products in his work, and that his primary exposure to asbestos occurred when asbestos was torn from vessels during rigging. It observes that there was no specific, direct evidence that asbestos torn by riggers was asbestos cloth, let alone cloth made by Raymark. Raymark also points out that the identification of its cloth at trial related to the application of asbestos rather than the tearing out of old asbestos. In addition, other asbestos cloth manufacturers served shipyards where Lockwood worked. Raymark also relies on testimony by one of its officials that asbestos cloth is cleaner than other types of asbestos products such as cement and block products. Raymark further emphasizes that Lockwood himself never personally identified its product as present during ship repair. In addition, there is no direct evidence that Lockwood worked with or near Raymark cloth on the George Washington or that Raymark cloth was torn from that vessel. Generally, under traditional product liability theory, the plaintiff must establish a reasonable connection between the injury, the product causing the injury, and the manufacturer of that product. In order to have a cause of action, the plaintiff must identify the particular manufacturer of the product that caused the injury. Martin v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wn.2d 581, 590, 689 P.2d 368 (1984). [6] [2] This does not mean, however, that a plaintiff in Lockwood's position must personally identify the manufacturers of asbestos products to which he was exposed in order to recover from those manufacturers. Because of the long latency period of asbestosis, the plaintiff's ability to recall specific brands by the time he brings an action will be seriously impaired. A plaintiff who did not work directly with the asbestos products would have further difficulties in personally identifying the manufacturers of such products. The problems of identification are even greater when the plaintiff has been exposed at more than one jobsite and to more than one manufacturer's product. See Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 573, 609-10 (1983); Note, The Causation Problem in Asbestos Litigation: Is There an Alternative Theory of Liability?, 15 Ind. L. Rev. 679, 681 (1982). Hence, instead of personally identifying the manufacturers of asbestos products to which he was exposed, a plaintiff may rely on the testimony of witnesses who identify manufacturers of asbestos products which were then present at his workplace. Viewing the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to Lockwood, we believe that it would be reasonable for a factfinder to infer that he was exposed to Raymark's product. Several portions of the record, in combination, create such an inference. First, Benjamin Bradley's testimony that Raymark's product was used on a large liner conversion at Puget Sound Bridge and Dredge in 1947 and 1948, and Lockwood's testimony that he had worked on the overhaul of the George Washington and that there was asbestos on that type of job, indicate that Raymark's product was used on a ship where Lockwood worked. The second significant portion of the record is the expert testimony that after asbestos dust was released, it drifted in the air and could be inhaled by bystanders who did not work directly with asbestos. Thus, even if Lockwood did not work directly with Raymark's product on the George Washington, it is reasonable to infer that since that product was used on that ship when Lockwood worked there, Lockwood was exposed to it. In addition, it does not matter if the identification of Raymark's cloth on the George Washington related to newly applied cloth rather than old asbestos products, because evidence was presented that the application of new asbestos as well as ripping out of old asbestos creates asbestos dust. Finally, although a Raymark official testified that Raymark cloth was clean compared to other types of asbestos products, Raymark has not pointed to any evidence in the record that the handling of Raymark cloth creates no asbestos dust. In sum, the evidence Lockwood presented creates a reasonable inference that he was exposed to Raymark's product. When this is combined with the expert testimony that all exposure to asbestos has a cumulative effect in contributing to the contraction of asbestosis, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that Lockwood's exposure to Raymark's product was a proximate cause of his injury. Therefore, the trial court properly determined that Lockwood presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against Raymark, so that the question of Raymark's liability should be taken to the jury. We affirm the trial court's denial of Raymark's motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial on these grounds. [3] While we agree with the trial court's ultimate conclusion as to Lockwood's establishment of a prima facie case against Raymark, we recognize that, because of the peculiar nature of asbestos products and the development of disease due to exposure to such products, it is extremely difficult to determine if exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos product actually caused the plaintiff's injury. Trial courts should consider a number of factors when determining if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that causation has been established. They should consider the evidence of plaintiff's proximity to the asbestos product when the exposure occurred and the expanse of the work site where asbestos fibers were released. They should also take into account the extent of time that the plaintiff was exposed to the product. As the time of exposure to asbestos dust increases, so does the severity of diseases associated with such exposure. See 15 Ind. L. Rev. at 693. Courts should also consider the types of asbestos products to which the plaintiff was exposed and the ways in which such products were handled and used. Asbestos products exist in a wide variety of forms, which differ in the amounts and percentages of asbestos they contain. In addition, the tendency of such products to release asbestos fibers into the air depends on their form and on the methods in which they are handled. See 15 Ind. L. Rev. at 691-92. In addition, trial courts must consider the evidence presented as to medical causation of the plaintiff's particular disease. Such evidence would include expert testimony on the effects of inhalation of asbestos on human health in general and on the plaintiff in particular. It would also include evidence of any other substances that could have contributed to the plaintiff's disease, and expert testimony as to the combined effects of exposure to all possible sources of the disease. The consideration of other potential sources of the plaintiff's injury is necessary because exposure to materials other than asbestos may also cause a number of the diseases associated with inhalation of asbestos fibers, and the risk of contracting disease may be increased by the combined effects of exposure to more than one substance, such as asbestos and cigarette smoke. See 15 Ind. L. Rev. at 694-95. Ultimately, the sufficiency of the evidence of causation will depend on the unique circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the factors listed above are matters which trial courts should consider when deciding if the evidence is sufficient to take such cases to the jury.