Opinion ID: 1356581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ex Parte, In Camera Review of Responsive Records, If Any Exist

Text: Plaintiffs argue that, even if the government cannot publicly produce any responsive records, a court presented with a Glomar response should conduct ex parte and in camera review of any records (assuming they exist) to provide a more probing judicial review. We disagree. A court should only consider information ex parte and in camera that the agency is unable to make public if questions remain after the relevant issues have been identified by the agency's public affidavits and have been tested by plaintiffs. See Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1013. We are mindful of our legal system's preference for open court proceedings, see, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980); see also In re N.Y. Times Co., 577 F.3d 401, 410 n. 4 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that although there are circumstances in which a nonpublic proceeding is appropriate, courts seek to balance the need for transparency in the judiciary with the effective protection of sensitive information), and there is no compelling reason in this case to deviate from this general practice by conducting or requiring an ex parte, in camera review of any classified materials the agency might present in justification of its response. We join our sister Circuit in holding that, [i]f an agency's statements supporting exemption contain reasonable specificity of detail as to demonstrate that the withheld information logically falls within the claimed exemption and evidence in the record does not suggest otherwise... the court should not conduct a more detailed inquiry to test the agency's judgment and expertise or to evaluate whether the court agrees with the agency's opinions. Larson, 565 F.3d at 865. When, as here, a court finds that the government's public affidavits sufficiently allege the necessity of a Glomar response, ex parte and in camera review of additional, confidential material is unnecessary and beyond the role assigned to the judiciary by applicable law. [W]e have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 927. We affirm our deferential posture in FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive purview of national security. Larson, 565 F.3d at 865 (internal quotation marks omitted). Recognizing the relative competencies of the executive and judiciary, we believe that it is bad law and bad policy to second-guess the predictive judgments made by the government's intelligence agencies, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), regarding questions such as whether disclosure of terrorist-related surveillance records would pose a threat to national security. In any event, a searching review of the kind suggested by plaintiffs would not provide plaintiffs with the information they seekknowledge of whether they were or are being surveilled in their interactions with their detainee clients. Plaintiffs claim that the purpose of gaining this information is to determine whether or not to alter the way in which they represent and interact with their clients. Appellant's Br. 9; Tr. 4-5. Whether the NSA asserts in public affidavits, or whether the court finds in camera, that the NSA's Glomar response was indeed sufficient (as it invariably would do, given the breadth of the NSAA), plaintiffs in the end would have the same answerneither confirmation nor denial of whether any responsive records exist. We conclude that the government's affidavits were sufficiently specific in this case and we therefore decline plaintiffs' invitation to conduct an ex parte, in camera review of any classified material of the agency providing further justification for failing to confirm or deny the existence of any records pertaining to plaintiff attorneys' communications with their detainee clients.