Opinion ID: 1496557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Status of the appellants to appeal.

Text: Under the applicable statutory law, two conditions precedent must be met before a person has standing to appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County from a decision of the Board: (1) he must have been a party to the proceeding before the Board, and (2) he must be aggrieved by the decision of the Board. In the present case, three of the appellants were parties at the hearing before the Board. They are the appellants Bryniarski and Stewart who testified before the Board and the appellant Seigel, who by filing a letter which was accepted and filed by the Board as part of the record in the case, became a party, as we recently held in Hertelendy v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 554, 226 A.2d 672 (1967), subsequent to the decision of the lower court in the case at bar. The question then arises as to whether these three appellants were aggrieved by the decision of the Board. The requirement that a person must be aggrieved in order to appeal to the Board and from the Board to a court of record was originally included in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Statute and generally appears in State Zoning Enabling Acts and in municipal zoning ordinances throughout the United States. See 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, sections 63-14 to 63-15 (3d ed.) and particularly note 3. This requirement is contained in the Maryland Zoning Enabling Act, Code (1957), Article 66 B, sections 7 (d) and 7 (j). The term person aggrieved generally appears in the municipal zoning ordinances, including, as we have indicated, the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance. There have been many cases in Maryland and in other states considering the meaning of a person aggrieved, but, apparently, the word aggrieved has never been legislatively defined. Generally speaking, the decisions indicate that a person aggrieved by the decision of a board of zoning appeals is one whose personal or property rights are adversely affected by the decision of the board. The decision must not only affect a matter in which the protestant has a specific interest or property right but his interest therein must be such that he is personally and specially affected in a way different from that suffered by the public generally. DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 185, 213 A.2d 487 (1965). The circumstances under which this occurs have been determined by the courts on a case by case basis, and the decision in each case rests upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case under review. Certain principles, however, have evolved. They are as follows: 1. There is a distinction between the degree of certainty of allegations and proof of aggrievement in cases in equity and in cases involving a petition for a writ of mandamus on one hand, and in statutory appeals from the board to the original court of record on the other. (a) When the suit is in equity and a declaration nullifying a zoning ordinance for constitutional or other reasons is sought, the allegations by the plaintiff of how he is specially damaged by the zoning ordinance must be definite, and he must meet the burden of showing such special damage by competent evidence. Richmark Realty Co., Inc. v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 282, 173 A.2d 196 (1961); Loughborough v. Rivermass, 213 Md. 239, 131 A.2d 461 (1957); Cassell v. Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950); Bauernschmidt v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Md. 647, 139 Atl. 531 (1927). (b) In a mandamus action the same rule is applicable. Lawler v. Bart Realty Corp., 241 Md. 405, 216 A.2d 729 (1966). 2. In cases involving appeals under the provisions of a zoning ordinance: (a) It is sufficient if the facts constituting aggrievement appear in the petition for appeal either by express allegation or by necessary implication. Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 225 A.2d 294 (1966). (b) An adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner is deemed, prima facie, to be specially damaged and, therefore, a person aggrieved. The person challenging the fact of aggrievement has the burden of denying such damage in his answer to the petition for appeal and of coming forward with evidence to establish that the petitioner is not, in fact, aggrieved. Thus, in Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 243 Md. 138, 147, 220 A.2d 589 (1966), the party seeking rezoning offered expert testimony that there would be no diminution in value of adjoining houses  one of which was owned by the protestant  if the rezoning came about. The trial court found, on conflicting evidence, that the protestant was a person aggrieved, and we held there was no error in that ruling. (c) A person whose property is far removed from the subject property ordinarily will not be considered a person aggrieved. Wilkinson v. Atkinson, 242 Md. 231, 218 A.2d 503 (1966); DuBay v. Crane, supra ; City of Greenbelt v. Jaeger, 237 Md. 456, 206 A.2d 694 (1965); Marcus v. Montgomery County Council, 235 Md. 535, 201 A.2d 777 (1964); Pattison v. Corby, 226 Md. 97, 172 A.2d 490 (1961). But he will be considered a person aggrieved if he meets the burden of alleging and proving by competent evidence  either before the board or in the court on appeal if his standing is challenged  the fact that his personal or property rights are specially and adversely affected by the board's action. 3. A person whose sole reason for objecting to the board's action is to prevent competition with his established business is not a person aggrieved. Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209, 167 A.2d 345 (1961). 4. If any appellant is a person aggrieved, the court will entertain the appeal even if other appellants are not persons aggrieved. See e.g., Marcus v. Montgomery County Council, supra . 5. The status of a person to appeal as a person aggrieved is to be distinguished from the result on the merits of the case itself. In determining status to appeal, the question is whether the property owner may reasonably be thought to be specially damaged if the application is approved. Testimony may be taken on the point by the trial court. Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, supra . If, on the merits, the board acted properly in approving the application, the protesting property owner is not damaged in law, however much he may be damaged in fact. His damage is then damnum absque injuria. Because the result on the merits might be adverse, however, does not mean that the protestant would not have status to challenge the board's action. As Judge Oppenheimer stated, for the Court, in Town of Somerset : When the issue of the standing of an appellant to appeal is raised in the court in which review of the administrative action is asked, we have approved the practice of trial judges in permitting testimony on the point to be taken before them.    The question is not one of taking additional testimony on the merits of the substantive issues decided by the Board   , but of determining whether the appellants have the requisite standing to have those issues reviewed. (245 Md. at 63, 225 A.2d at 301). A most helpful and well considered note on the general subject of a person aggrieved appears at 8 W. & M.L. Rev. 295 (1967). See also an interesting and provocative article by Professor Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 55-63 (1966). Applying these principles to the present case, it seems clear to us that the appellants Bryniarski, Stewart and Seigel were persons aggrieved and entitled to maintain the appeal from the Board to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and, a fortiori to maintain the appeal from the Circuit Court to this Court. In the petition for appeal, they are described as owners of property immediately contiguous or in close proximity [1] to the subject property. This fact appears from the attached vicinity map. It also appears from Exhibit 2 before the Board which is a List of Adjoining and Confronting Property Owners required by the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance to be given notice of the pending proceeding and of the Board's action in that proceeding. See sec. 111-31 of the Montgomery County Code (1965). The three petitioners mentioned are listed by name, their addresses are given and they received the required notice. It is obvious that this notice is required by the ordinance to give persons likely to be aggrieved, notice of a proceeding which will likely have an adverse effect upon their property. It is a statutory recognition that the adjoining and confronting property owners are, prima facie, persons aggrieved and proper parties before the Board. As we have indicated, the petition for appeal also alleges that these petitioners are eligible to bring this petition as aggrieved parties according to the principles of law laid down by the Maryland Court of Appeals. This allegation is even more definite in alleging aggrievement than was the allegation sustained by us in Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, supra , and is legally sufficient to allege the necessary elements of aggrievement, including special damage. In the petition in this case, moreover, there is the further allegation that the alleged unlawful granting of the special exceptions aggrieved especially the petitioners herein as to traffic, noise and quiet enjoyment. This was a sufficient allegation of special damage. Although the appellees denied these allegations in their answers to the petition for appeal, they did not go forward at the hearing before the Circuit Court to introduce evidence to rebut the presumption of fact that the petitioners were persons aggrieved. The presumption, therefore, was effective and the petitioners were established as persons aggrieved. Moreover, in evidence before the Board, there was testimony sufficient to establish that the petitioners Bryniarski, Stewart and Seigel would, in fact, probably be aggrieved by the granting of the proposed special exceptions. Mr. Bryniarski, who pointed out the location of his property on the aerial map and stated that he received the necessary notice, testified in regard to the alleged adverse effect of additional traffic which would be generated by the proposed apartment hotel as contrasted with the expected traffic to be generated from the operation of a medical office building; and, the alleged adverse effect of the proposal upon the general plan for the physical development of the District. Col. Stewart gave general testimony to the same effect and pointed out that his property would probably be more adversely affected than any other property, particularly because of the height of the proposed building. Mr. Seigel's letter of May 11, 1965, expressed his belief that his property would be injured by the increase in traffic and the change in the nature of the use of land in the area. In our opinion, apart from the presumption, there was sufficient evidence in the record before the Board to establish, prima facie, that the petitioners mentioned were persons aggrieved.