Opinion ID: 6226222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Yakich's Arguments On Appeal

Text: ¶26 Yakich makes several arguments in favor of his position on appeal. First, he accurately notes that Wis. Stat. § 971.17 does not explicitly state that circuit courts may run NGI commitments consecutively. The court of appeals noted this fact in C.A.J. See C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 139 (explaining that the statute's language does not specifically indicate whether the maximum term of commitment may be based on consecutive terms). It did not impact C.A.J. when it was decided, and it does not impact the analysis now. The plain text of the statute ties NGI commitment periods to the length of confinement that would have occurred if the defendant were not NGI. § 971.17(1). Criminal terms of confinement can run consecutively, and so can NGI commitment terms. If the legislature wanted to limit NGI This does not necessarily mean that Yakich will be 11 institutionalized for five years. [A] defendant who succeeds on an NGI defense and is committed may file a petition for conditional release every six months, and if on conditional release, may file a petition to terminate the underlying order of commitment. Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶29 (citing Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4), (5) (2015-16)). 16 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR commitment in a way that it did not similarly limit criminal sentencing, it could have delineated the length of commitment for multiple offenses, as it did for probationary terms. Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2). Alternatively, it could have explicitly limited commitment periods to the maximum sentence the circuit court could have imposed for the most serious offense, as it did with competency proceedings. Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5). The plain text of § 971.17 supports the conclusion that circuit courts may impose consecutive NGI commitment periods. ¶27 Yakich also cites court of appeals decisions holding that terms of probation and juvenile dispositions cannot run consecutively. See State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 136, ¶15, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 631 N.W.2d 240 ([T]he concept of consecutive sentences is foreign in the context of juvenile adjudications and dispositions.); State v. Schwebke, 2001 WI App 99, ¶29, 242 Wis. 2d 585, 627 N.W.2d 213 ([W]e have repeatedly held that probation cannot be made consecutive to probation.). Yakich argues that the same logic should apply to NGI commitments. Nonetheless, the text of the probation statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2), explicitly defines and limits the length of probationary terms when an individual is convicted of multiple offenses. Section 973.09 is readily distinguishable from Wis. Stat. § 971.17. Further, [a]lthough the juvenile system is similar in some respects to the criminal system, we have specifically rejected an exact equation of institutional placement of a juvenile with the incarceration of an adult. E.C. v. DHSS, 142 Wis. 2d 906, 918, 420 N.W.2d 37 17 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR (1988). That is very different from § 971.17, which by its terms ties the length of NGI commitments to maximum terms of criminal incarceration. ¶28 We will not opine on the correctness of the decisions cited by Yakich. It suffices to note that probation and juvenile dispositions are distinguishable and not at issue in this case; Wis. Stat. § 971.17 provides circuit courts authority to impose consecutive NGI commitments. ¶29 Yakich targets his argument more narrowly and cites a court of appeals decision that prohibited criminal sentences from being run consecutively to NGI commitments. See State v. Harr, 211 Wis. 2d 584, 587-88, 568 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1997). The court of appeals in Harr interpreted Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2) (1995-96), which allows circuit courts to impose criminal sentences consecutive to any other sentence. Id. The court of appeals held that because an NGI commitment was not a sentence, § 973.15 did not permit a circuit court to impose a criminal sentence consecutive to the commitment. That analysis is not relevant to the question at issue in this case. Whether a circuit court may impose a criminal sentence consecutively to an NGI commitment under § 973.15 has simply no bearing on whether a circuit court may impose consecutive NGI commitments under Wis. Stat. § 971.17. ¶30 Finally, Yakich argues that the court of appeals decision in C.A.J. is no longer good law because the legislature has amended Wis. Stat. § 971.17 several times since C.A.J. was decided. At the time C.A.J. was decided, § 971.17 stated: 18 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR When the maximum period for which a defendant could have been imprisoned if convicted of the offense charged has elapsed, subject to s. 53.11 and the credit provisions of s. 973.155, the court shall order the defendant discharged subject to the right of the department to proceed against the defendant under ch. 51. If the department does not so proceed, the court may order such proceeding. § 971.17(4) (1987-88). ¶31 Like it does now, Wis. Stat. § 971.17 when C.A.J. was decided based the maximum time in which a defendant could be subject to NGI commitment to the maximum term of criminal imprisonment. At that time, the maximum term of criminal imprisonment included the possibility of consecutive terms. C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 140. There is no dispute that remains true today.12 See Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2). Furthermore, we are not bound by court of appeals decisions. As the state's highest court, we interpret legal questions independently. See State v. Lira, 2021 WI 81, ¶45, 399 Wis. 2d 419, 966 N.W.2d 605 (While respecting court of appeals precedent is an important consideration, it is not determinative.). To the extent that § 971.17 may have changed since C.A.J., applying de novo review, the logic underlying the court of appeals decision nonetheless remains convincing. 12In fact, the language included in Wis. Stat. § 971.17 at the time of C.A.J. is almost identical to the language included in the statute today. Compare § 971.17(4) (1987-88) (limiting NGI commitment to the maximum period for which a defendant could have been imprisoned if convicted of the offense charged), with § 971.17(1) (2017-18) (stating that NGI commitment periods must be based on the maximum term of imprisonment [or confinement in prison] that could be imposed against an offender convicted of the same felony [or misdemeanor]). 19 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR Independently interpreting § 971.17, we agree with C.A.J.'s reasoning. ¶32 Yakich contends that the statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 971.17 indicates that the legislature has rejected the reasoning in C.A.J. After C.A.J. was decided, the legislature amended § 971.17 to allow circuit courts to commit NGI defendants for a specified period not exceeding two–thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed under s. 973.15(2) against an offender convicted of the same crime or crimes, including imprisonment authorized by ss. 161.48, 939.62, 939.621, 939.63, 939.64, 939.641 and 939.645 and other penalty enhancement statutes, as applicable, subject to the credit provisions of s. 973.155. 1989 Wis. Act 334, § 5 (emphasis added). ¶33 Beginning in the late 1990s, Wisconsin transitioned to automatic bifurcated sentences under Truth-in-Sentencing laws.13 Replacing the more indeterminate system of parole, under Truthin-Sentencing, circuit courts were required to impose a bifurcated sentence consisting of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended supervision. State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶¶16-17, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769; see Wis. Stat. § 973.01. As part of this reform, the legislature in 2001 13Wisconsin enacted Truth-in-Sentencing in two phases. The first phase, TIS–I, was enacted in June 1998 and applied to offenses committed on or after December 31, 1999. See 1997 Wis. Act 283. The second phase, TIS–II, was enacted in July 2002 and became effective February 1, 2003. See 2001 Wis. Act 109. State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶16, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769 (quoting State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶7 n.3, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197)). Bifurcated sentencing was enacted in the first phase. Id. 20 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR amended § 971.17 to tie NGI commitments for felonies committed after July 2002 (and subject to Truth-in-Sentencing) to the maximum term of confinement in prison that could be imposed, i.e., the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence. § 971.17(1)(b). The legislature kept the original language for NGI commitments based on felonies committed prior to July 2002 as well as misdemeanors; felonies subject to life imprisonment remained subject to lifetime NGI commitment. See, e.g., § 971.17(1)(a) ([T]he court shall commit the person to the department of health services for a specified period not exceeding two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed . . . .). ¶34 Yakich points out that the legislature removed the reference to Wis. Stat. § 973.15 when it made its reforms in 2001. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.17 no longer contains the language under s. 973.15(2) in the portion of the statute setting the maximum length of NGI commitment. ¶35 Yet it is well accepted that [w]hen the legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed to act with full knowledge of the existing laws. Hoffer Props., LLC v. DOT, 2016 WI 5, ¶35, 366 Wis. 2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533. C.A.J. provided thorough and convincing analysis on statutory language contained in Wis. Stat. § 971.17, and the version in existence at the time of C.A.J. did not materially differ from the version of the statute enacted after 2001, namely neither cross references the criminal sentencing statute. Section 971.17 was changed in 1989 to include explicit statutory cross references to Wis. Stat. § 973.15, but, even after 21 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR 1989, the statute continued to include language tying NGI commitment to the length of criminal sentences. When the explicit cross reference was removed in 2001, the legislature could have accompanied the 2001 changes with an express statement that NGI commitments must run concurrently, or other amendments that would serve to prohibit consecutive commitment periods. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5) (stating that commitment to obtain competency cannot extend longer than a period not to exceed 12 months, or the maximum sentence specified for the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged, whichever is less); see also Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶¶17-23, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120 (holding that newly imposed limitations on medical malpractice damages did not implicitly repeal the decision of [n]umerous Wisconsin courts limiting the class of individuals entitled to recover for loss of society and companionship in medical malpractice suits, noting the lack of express language to the contrary); Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 (reiterating that legislative enactments are made in the context of caselaw and reasoning that changes in the statutory proof of intent for punitive damages did not alter prior cases interpreting the meaning of intent). Instead, the legislature chose to retain language largely tracking the statute interpreted in C.A.J., which, by 2001, had become accepted jurisprudence in Wisconsin. ¶36 While statutory history can be helpful when interpreting the meaning of a statute, in this case the legislature did not 22 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR enact the substantial change Yakich advances through the removal of a Wis. Stat. § 973.15 cross reference. State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶17, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467. With knowledge of existing caselaw, the legislature reverted Wis. Stat. § 971.17 to the language interpreted by the court of appeals in C.A.J. In so doing, the legislature made no express statement or change in the functioning in the statute to override decades of accepted Wisconsin jurisprudence.14 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.17, as it did when C.A.J. was decided, permits consecutive NGI commitment terms.