Opinion ID: 709014
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exposure to the Hazards

Text: 31 The more difficult problem in this case implicates the question of just who was exposed to the hazards posed by the crane. With respect to some of the hazards, the ALJ specifically found that Paisley was exposed. With respect to other hazards, the ALJ found that Mid-West employees were exposed, but did not specifically say whether Paisley was exposed. And with respect to one of the violations--the failure to maintain inspection records--the ALJ did not find that any employee was exposed. ACR does not dispute these findings, but does dispute their legal consequences. Each category requires a separate analysis.
32 The ALJ specifically found that Paisley was exposed to (1) non-insulated exhaust system, ALJ Decision at 12 (Respondent's field mechanic ... had access to the areas with the heated pipes and could have been burned.); (2) lack of a fire extinguisher, id. at 13 (mechanic [was exposed] when he was in the cab or actually working on the crane); (3) improperly adjusted boom hoist ratchet pawls, id. at 31 (Respondent's employee was at risk when he was near the crane.); (4) modifications to boom down ratchet pawl, id. at 41 (Respondent's field mechanic ... could have been injured in the event of parts failure.); (5) lack of preventative maintenance program, id. at 46 (All of Anthony's own employees ... were exposed to the hazard of cranes which had not been subject to an appropriate preventative maintenance program.). On the basis of the record before us, we affirm the Commission's finding of liability with respect to each of these violations. 33 ACR offers several arguments why, despite the exposure of its repairman, it should not be held accountable. First, ACR argues that it should not be penalized because it is basically like a seller of equipment. See Brief for ACR at 23. Although it is true that sellers are generally not held liable under the OSH Act for supplying equipment that does not meet OSHA standards, see, e.g., Johnson v. Koppers Co., 524 F.Supp. 1182, 1189 (N.D.Ohio 1981), app. dismissed, 705 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.1982), ACR was not a mere seller of equipment. To the contrary, it maintained a repair facility for cranes and serviced cranes both in the field and in its own facility. After each rental, the crane was returned to ACR for inspection and necessary repairs. Thus, unlike a typical seller, ACR was in a favored position to learn of defects and to take actions to correct them. See Central of Ga. R.R. v. OSHRC, 576 F.2d 620, 623 (5th Cir.1978) (OSH Act focuses liability where the harm in fact can be prevented). 34 Second, ACR argues that it would be unfair to penalize it for the mere act of sending an employee to repair a problem with the crane. Under the Secretary's theory of liability, ACR argues, any repair company could be cited for an OSHA violation by sending an employee into a situation where a hazard exists, even though repairing the problem will make the worksite safer for all the other employees. Here, however, ACR was found to have created the very hazards to which Paisley was exposed. Paisley did not go to the worksite merely to repair defects that arose out of the operation of the crane, but rather, defects that ACR should have identified and corrected before renting out the crane. 3 Our narrow holding today in no way addresses the general issue of whether an employer which exposes its repair workers to hazards created by others can be held liable under the Act. 35 Finally, ACR argues that holding it liable for OSH Act violations under the circumstances of this case would be contrary to public policy and would frustrate the Act's purpose of promoting worker safety, because liability would dissuade lessors from performing repairs. We fail to see, however, how holding the party in the best position to know of any work hazards responsible for exposing its employees to those hazards runs contrary to public policy. At any rate, our review of Commission decisions does not extend to choosing among competing policy options. To the contrary, so long as the path chosen by the Commission is reasonable and consistent with the law--as it was here--we will uphold it. 36 Therefore, we affirm the Commission's findings and penalties with respect to the above-listed citations. 37
38 There is a second group of violations, with respect to which the ALJ did not specify whether Paisley was exposed, but did find that employees of Mid-West were exposed. These violations were (1) hoist drum power down, ALJ Decision at 33 (crane operator, oiler and others working around the crane were exposed); (2) boom cable shroud cover, id. at 35 (employees, particularly the ironworkers handling the crane's loads, were exposed); (3) tail shaft governor, id. at 37 ([a]s with similar hazardous conditions, the operator, oiler and those working near the crane at the site were exposed); and (4) failure to make prompt repairs, id. at 43 ([t]here was exposure of the operator, oiler and other construction workers working in the vicinity). 39 It would not be altogether unreasonable to infer that Paisley, as well as other on-site employees, was exposed to some of these hazards. For example, both the boom hoist ratchet pawls and the hoist drum mechanism prevent the boom or the loads it is carrying from falling, and since the ALJ explicitly found that Paisley was exposed to the former, it would not take any great leap of logic to suppose he was exposed to the latter as well. But on review, we do not feel free to choose between competing inferences that can be drawn from essentially factual matters. It is up to the Commission, not us, to determine whether Paisley was exposed to any or all of this second group of hazards. See Dole v. Williams Enters., 876 F.2d 186, 190 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1989) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943)). 40 The Secretary argues, however, that even if Paisley was not exposed to certain hazards, ACR can still be held accountable under what is called the multi-employer doctrine. As the Commission explained it, an employer at a multi-employer construction worksite is responsible ... in the absence of exposure of its own employees, for any hazardous conditions which it creates or controls. OSHRC Decision at 6. 41 This doctrine, first enunciated in Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.1975), has developed over the past 20 years as a means of apportioning liability at multi-employer worksites where one employer has created a hazard, and some employees, but not necessarily its own, are exposed to it. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804-05 (6th Cir.1984) (Once an employer is deemed responsible for complying with OSHA regulations, it is obligated to protect every employee who works at its workplace.). See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH LAW Secs. 161-169 (3d ed. 1990). The basic theory underlying the multi-employer doctrine is that while the language of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 654(a)(1) 4 is specifically limited to situations where an employer's own employees are exposed to hazards, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 654(a)(2) creates liability for violations of specific industry standards (such as the construction industry standards here) where any employees are exposed, even if they are not employees of the employer responsible for the violation. 42 Before Brennan v. OSHRC, several courts and the Commission had taken the position that the language in Sec. 654(a)(1), which says that an employer's duty runs to his employees, precluded liability in those situations where employees of another company were exposed. See, e.g., Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.1974) (affirming OSHRC decision that general contractor was not responsible for safety of subcontractor's employees). At the Secretary's invitation, the Second Circuit rejected this position: 43 But to draw from [the language of Sec. 654(a)(1) ] a general rule that standards under the Act can be violated only when a cited employer's own employees are shown to be directly exposed to a violation of a standard seems to us to be wholly unwarranted. It also fails to give effect to the clause under which [the subcontractor] was cited, subparagraph (2) of Sec. 654(a). That subparagraph requires employers to comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under the Act. This specific duty to comply with the Secretary's standards is in no way limited to situations where a violation of a standard is linked to exposure of his employees to the hazard. It is a duty over and above his general duty to his own employees under Sec. 654(a)(1). 44 Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d at 1037-38 (footnotes omitted). In Teal, the Sixth Circuit attempted to further dissipate the confusion that had arisen due to the different duties imposed by subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2): 45 The difficulty which courts have experienced in attempting to define a particular employer's responsibilities under the Act is due primarily to the varying nature of the separate duty provisions. The general duty clause was intended by Congress to cover unanticipated hazards; Congress recognized that it could not anticipate all of the potential hazards that might affect adversely the safety of workers. Accordingly it enacted the general duty clause [654(a)(1) ] to cover serious hazards that were not otherwise covered by specific regulations.... In contrast, Sec. 654(a)(2) is the specific duty provision. The class of employers who owe a duty to comply with the OSHA regulations is defined with reference to control of the workplace and opportunity to comply with the OSHA regulations. Accordingly, an employers' [sic ] responsibilities under the Act depend upon which duty provision the employer is accused of breaching. 46 728 F.2d at 804. 47 Thus, if an employer is accused of breaching a specific duty--such as the construction industry standards here--the Secretary brings the charge under Sec. 654(a)(2), and urges the Commission and reviewing courts to apply the multi-employer doctrine. Although some of our sister circuits have applied this doctrine in circumstances similar to those here, see, e.g., Beatty Equip. Leasing, 577 F.2d at 536-37 (subcontractor who supplied and erected a scaffolding liable, even where his own employees not exposed); Marshall v. Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.1977) (general contractor has duty to protect all employees at worksite), the Fifth Circuit has declined to adopt it, e.g., Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir.1981) (In this circuit, therefore, the class protected by OSHA regulations comprises only employers' own employees.). And indeed, in the peculiar circumstances of duty to warn cases, we have upheld OSH Act violations where the employees exposed were not those of the violating employer. See Durez Div. of Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OSHA, 906 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1990) (rejecting petition for review by chemical manufacturer charged with not adequately warning downstream employees of hazards, but not addressing applicability of multi-employer doctrine); General Carbon Co. v. OSHRC, 860 F.2d 479 (D.C.Cir.1988) (same). But as the Secretary candidly admits in his brief, this court has not yet explicitly considered whether the duty to comply with the standards imposed by Sec. 654(a)(2) requires an employer to protect employees other than its own. 48 There are two concerns which militate against making that decision on the basis of the present record in this case. First, it is not clear to us that the multi-employer doctrine is consistent with the Secretary's own construction industry regulation, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.12(a). That regulation, discussed in supra Section II.A. of this opinion, requires employers to comply with the occupational safety and health standards of 29 C.F.R. Part 1926. In other words, Sec. 1910.12 requires compliance with the specific industry standards referred to in Sec. 654(a)(2). However, the language of Sec. 1910.12, which says that [e]ach employer shall protect the employment and places of employment of each of his employees  (emphasis added), is in marked tension with the multi-employer doctrine we are asked to apply here. In contrast, the Hazard Communication Standards at issue in Durez and General Carbon 5 specifically required chemical manufacturers to furnish information to 'downstream' employers, General Carbon, 860 F.2d at 481, thus making it entirely consistent with application of the multi-employer doctrine. Here, the relevant regulation by its terms only applies to an employer's own employees, seemingly leaving little room for invocation of the doctrine. At any rate, the parties have not briefed this issue, nor has any court that has adopted the multi-employer doctrine explicitly considered it. Consequently, we leave to a later date the critical decision of whether to apply the multi-employer doctrine where an employer has been cited under the construction industry regulations of 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.12. 49 Moreover, as we pointed out, it is possible that Paisley was in fact exposed to some of the hazards in question here, and that the ALJ merely failed to make a sufficiently explicit finding to that effect. It is certainly not beyond the pale to believe that if the improperly adjusted boom hoist ratchet pawls exposed Paisley to the risk of the boom falling, other violations, such as the improperly adjusted boom cable shroud cover, which risked causing the boom to snap, produced a comparable exposure for Paisley. We hesitate to plunge into the thicket of the multi-employer doctrine if there is a narrower ground on which liability may be imposed. 50 Accordingly, the findings of liability for the above-listed violations are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Commission, which may conduct further inquiries or make further findings as to the exposure of ACR's own employees to this category of risks. 51
52 The ALJ and Commission did not specify whether any employees were exposed to the hazard arising from failure to maintain written inspection records. See ALJ Decision at 20-24. Although there may well be some OSH Act violations for which exposure is not required, see generally ROTHSTEIN, supra, Sec. 169, the Secretary has not argued here that this violation is among them. Accordingly, this citation is vacated, and on remand, the Commission may make more detailed findings as to exposure.