Opinion ID: 195115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Florida law.

Text: 15 It is important to remember, as noted above, that more than one workers' compensation statute can apply to a single compensable injury, so long as each state has a more-than-casual interest in the case. 4 Workmen's Compensation Law Sec. 86.00, at 16-48. Florida law may apply to Garcia's injury, therefore, even if another state--or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico--has more substantial interests in his claim. [T]he test is not whether [Florida]'s interest is greater than that of any other state, but only whether [Florida] has a valid interest. Id. Sec. 86.34, at 16-60 (citing Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d 441, 444-45 & n. 3 (Me.1986)). 16 Garcia claims that Florida law is wholly inapplicable to his injury, and that the exclusive remedy provision contained in the Florida workers' compensation statute therefore may not be invoked to bar his damages lawsuit in Puerto Rico. Florida law does not apply, he claims, because neither he, his job, nor his injury has a Florida connection. He emphasizes that he is a Puerto Rico resident based in Puerto Rico; that he entered into his employment relationship with the airline, a Delaware corporation, in Texas; and injured himself while traveling between San Juan and Newark, New Jersey. 17 In support of his argument, Garcia relies heavily on a Florida Supreme Court case, Wainwright v. Wainwright, 237 So.2d 154 (1970), in which a Georgia resident employed by a Georgia corporation sought benefits under the Florida workers' compensation statute for an injury suffered in Georgia. The court upheld the administrative denial of the claim and, in the course of its opinion, noted that the statute could not be applied to other states in which ... the State of Florida has no interest and to cases over which the State of Florida has no authority, id. at 156. Garcia maintains that the same factors upon which the Florida Supreme Court relied to reject the claim in Wainwright exist here: an extraterritorial injury to a non-resident employee working for an out-of-state employer. 18 Garcia's argument, and his reliance on Wainwright, are misplaced. Unlike in Wainwright, neither the employer's business nor the employee's work are located exclusively outside Florida. American Airlines operates in Florida, and Garcia worked on flights into and out of at least two Florida cities. See Sworn Statement of Jorge Olascoaga, Flight Service Supervisor, at 6. Although Garcia is correct that Florida's contacts with his injury are limited, this is at least in part because of the inherently mobile nature of both his job and American's business. The airline has 21,000 flight attendants spread across the country, and no single state has a substantial relationship with all of them. 4 19 Moreover, even if these contacts were deemed insufficient to trigger the coverage provisions of the Florida act directly, Garcia nevertheless would be covered because of American's voluntary assumption of liability under the Florida system. The Florida statute permits an otherwise excluded employer to waive the exclusion and bring itself or a specific injury within the act's coverage by choosing to participate in the Florida worker's compensation scheme. See Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 440.04(2). 5 See Mandico v. Taos Construction, 605 So.2d 850, 852 (Fla.1992) (per curiam); Blair v. Edward G. Gerrits, Inc., 193 So.2d 172, 174-75 (Fla.1966); Rainwater v. Vikings Men's Hairstyling, 382 So.2d 1313, 1314-15 (Fla.App.1980). For more than a decade before Garcia's accident, American voluntarily provided accident insurance for its employees in Florida, and, in this case, it specifically facilitated Garcia's application for benefits by providing him with the required form. 20 Even more to the point, we think it decidedly inequitable for Garcia to claim that Florida law is inapplicable now that he has received all the benefits that law provides. Workers' compensation systems are designed around a quid pro quo: employees secure a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents, Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476, 67 S.Ct. 801, 806, 91 L.Ed. 1028 (1947), while employers secure a limited and determinate liability, id. Unlike in Wainwright, where the employer and the Florida Industrial Claims Commission both denied the employee's claim for benefits, Garcia has received substantial compensation under the Florida scheme. Indeed, it is undisputed that the compensation he received exceeds the benefits to which he would have been entitled under Puerto Rico law. Garcia makes no offer to return the Florida benefits. Having acquiesced in the applicability of Florida law when it suited his interest, Garcia cannot fairly be allowed to disclaim its application now. 6 21 Determining that Florida law may be applied does not lead inevitably, however, to the conclusion that the present action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision in Florida's compensation act. The Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected the notion that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution requires a second jurisdiction to defer to limiting provisions contained in the workers' compensation legislation of the jurisdiction in which an injured worker first received benefits. 4 Workmen's Compensation Law Sec. 88.12, at 16-183. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 279-80, 284-86, 100 S.Ct. at 2659-60; Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413-14, 75 S.Ct. 804, 807-08, 99 L.Ed. 1183 (1955); McCartin, 330 U.S. at 628-30, 67 S.Ct. at 889-90. This means that Garcia not only is permitted to seek additional benefits, but also that Puerto Rico is free to disregard Florida's exclusive remedy provision. 22 When a worker's second claim is for common-law damages rather than additional benefits, however, most states, on grounds of comity and policy, will respect the other jurisdiction's exclusive remedy provision immunizing the employer from non-statutory liability. 4 Workmen's Compensation Law, Secs. 88.00, 88.10, at 16-171-183 (citing cases); see, e.g., Kelly v. Guyon Gen. Piping, Inc., 882 F.2d 108, 110 (4th Cir.1989); Woodner v. Mathers, 210 F.2d 868, 873-74 (D.C.Cir.1954). The rationale underlying this uniform treatment is compelling. The central purpose of compensation acts is to substitute a limited but certain remedy for the former remedy in tort--a compromise benefiting both employer and employee. 4 Workmen's Compensation Law, at Sec. 88.13, at 16-187 (citing Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958)). When an employee who has received benefits under such a compensation scheme later tries to get back into the common-law damage system, he is essentially un-doing this fundamental quid pro quo. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Secs. 183, 184 (1971). 7 Courts that give effect to foreign exclusive remedy provisions therefore do so to effectuate broad compensation principles. See Wilson, 141 A.2d at 778; Woodner, 210 F.2d at 874. 23 Whether Puerto Rico would follow this course in the present circumstances is the ultimate question we must answer. We therefore turn to a review of the relevant Puerto Rico law. 24