Opinion ID: 3134373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ill 2d 138, 145 (1982); see also Geary v. Dominick's Finer Foods,

Text: Inc., 129 Ill. 2d 389, 407-08 (1989). Given these principles, the circuit court should have liberally construed the affirmative relief requested in the answer. Section 2--608(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a counterclaim shall be pleaded in the same manner and with the same particularity as a complaint. 735 ILCS 5/2--608(c) (West 1992). Barnard did, in fact, allege the elements needed to state a claim under the Act. It alleged that Barnard and Valenz entered into a contract on October 15, 1991, that the work was completed on November 23, 1991, and that the amount due was $25,725.84 plus interest. Barnard further alleged that it recorded its claim for mechanic's lien in the recorder's office and attached the claim for lien as an exhibit. See 735 ILCS 5/2--606 (West 1992) (written instrument attached to pleading constitutes a part of the pleading for all purposes). The claim for lien contained a legal description of the property and asserted a claim against the interest of La Salle and JMB, among others. In its prayer for relief in the answer, Barnard asserted its lien and sought foreclosure based on the lien. As the appellate court stated, [t]he only thing missing from the document was the word `counterclaim.'  277 Ill. App. 3d at 151. Accordingly, Barnard's claim should not have been dismissed without its consent. See 770 ILCS 60/9 (West 1992); 735 ILCS 5/2--1009 (West 1992). La Salle and JMB argue that the Act is in derogation of the common law and the provisions of the Act are to be strictly construed. The strict construction rule, however, applies to the provisions of the Act that specify the substantive requirements upon which the right to a lien is based. The procedure established in the Act for perfecting a lien must be strictly followed in order to create the lien. See, e.g., Mutual Services, Inc. v. Ballantrae Development Co., 159 Ill. App. 3d 549, 552-53 (1987) (contractor's failure to timely record a claim for lien within four months of completion of the work made lien unenforceable against third parties). In light of section 12, the strict construction rule does not generally apply to technical objections to pleadings. See United Cork Cos. v. Volland, 365 Ill. 564, 572 (1937) (strict construction rule is applied where a material requirement of the statute is lacking but was not intended as a pitfall to the unwary, in good faith pursuing the path marked by the statute, nor as an ambuscade from which an adversary can overwhelm him for an immaterial misstep); Fitzgerald v. Van Buskirk, 96 Ill. App. 2d 432, 434-40 (1968) (allegations in complaint construed liberally); see also Abbott Electrical Construction Co. v. Ladin, 144 Ill. App. 3d 974, 981 (1986); Armco Steel Corp. v. La Salle National Bank, 31