Opinion ID: 2055188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: General First Amendment Principles

Text: A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and thus offends the first amendment if, in addition to forbidding speech or conduct which is not constitutionally protected, it also prohibits the exercise of constitutionally protected speech. See State v. Copple, supra . Not all speech is protected by the first amendment. State v. Broadstone, 233 Neb. 595, 447 N.W.2d 30 (1989); State v. Monastero, supra ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Material which is obscene, as defined in accordance with the standard set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), reh'g denied 414 U.S. 881, 94 S.Ct. 26, 38 L.Ed.2d 128, is not protected by the first amendment. Miller v. California, supra ; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that in order for a statute which regulates the content of speech which is protected by the first amendment to withstand constitutional challenge, the government must show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that the statute is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators'Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, generally, statements may not be punished merely because they are profane and therefore offensive to listeners, unless substantial privacy interests are at stake. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971), reh'g denied 404 U.S. 876, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 124 (The ability of the government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is... dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner). That speech is directed toward a captive audience, one which cannot easily avoid exposure to the speech, is a factor to be considered in favor of allowing restriction on the expression. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978), reh'g denied 439 U.S. 883, 99 S.Ct. 227, 58 L.Ed.2d 198; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974). In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation , a plurality of the High Court upheld a Federal Communications Commission sanction pursuant to federal statute against a radio station which broadcast obscene, indecent, or profane language during a monologue entitled Filthy Words. The Court stated: `[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' 438 U.S. at 746, 98 S.Ct. at 3039. Further, Although these words ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment. Id. The Court determined that even speech protected by the first amendment could be prohibited in contexts where it is especially offensive, such as where a broadcast confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. 438 U.S. at 748, 98 S.Ct. at 3040.