Opinion ID: 3181052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pre-Approval/Ratification

Text: The Board found that Parkinson exhibited a lack of candor when he testified that: “Nothing was done with any of the tenant improvement funds that was not approved by [Rodda].” See J.A. 635. The Board so held because it concluded that the statement “provides an appearance of pre-approval by the landlord of the expens18 PARKINSON v. DOJ es,” and “for the appellant’s statement to OIG to have been accurate and complete, he would have had to explain the approvals were after-the-fact ratifications, not explicit pre-expenditure authorizations to spend the funds in particular ways.” With little further analysis, the Board found that “in the absence of any other plausible explanation for his misstatement . . . the appellant made it to deceive OIG about the extent of the landlord’s involvement in approving the expenditures.” The problem with the Board’s analysis of Parkinson’s state of mind is two-fold. First, the context of the question was whether Rodda approved the expenses, not when he did so. Parkinson’s use of “approved” in that context instead of “ratified” is thus not enough to prove the necessary element of a knowing failure to be forthright. Second, “approved” is a generic way of saying “pre-approved or ratified,” and Parkinson’s statement could thus be read to be wholly accurate. Though this does not necessarily preclude a finding of a lack of candor based on other evidence of the speaker’s state of mind, the use of the generic term does not alone provide substantial evidence that Parkinson “knowingly” failed to be forthright. We thus hold that the lack of candor charge with re- spect to the pre-approval/ratification distinction is unsupported by substantial evidence. D. Availability of Judicial Review of Parkinson’s USERRA and Whistleblower Claims It is undisputed in this case that Parkinson has no right to assert before the Board an individual right of action under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., or the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. The issue here is whether a preference eligible FBI agent with the right to appeal an adverse personnel action before the Board is foreclosed from asserting USERRA violations and whistleblower reprisal PARKINSON v. DOJ 19 as affirmative defenses in such an appeal to the Board. These are issues of first impression in this court. There is no dispute in this case that the Board has jurisdiction to consider the propriety of Parkinson’s removal by the FBI as a whole. The chain of statutes creating this jurisdiction, and defining allowable affirmative defenses is as follows. Title 5, section 7513(a) allows an “agency” to “take an action covered by this subchapter [(titled “Removal, Suspension for More than 14 Days, Reduction in Grade or Pay, or Furlough for 30 Days or Less”)] against an employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” That same section creates a judicial enforcement mechanism for this provision, by providing that “An employee against whom an action is taken under this section is entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 7701 of this title.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). Most FBI personnel are not afforded this judicial enforcement mechanism because § 7511(b) states: “This subchapter does not apply to an employee . . . (8) whose position is within the . . . Federal Bureau of Investigation.” However, the statute voids the exception for employees of the FBI for whom “subsection [5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B)] of this section . . . is the basis for this subchapter’s applicability.” 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(8). Section 7511(a)(1)(B) defines an Employee as “a preference eligible in the excepted service who has completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar position[]—(i) in an Executive Agency.” 4 In other words, preference eligible FBI employees against whom adverse employment action has been taken may appeal such action to the Board, though non-preference eligible FBI employees do not have such a right. 4 It is undisputed that the FBI is “an Executive Agency” for purposes of this subchapter. 20 PARKINSON v. DOJ Title 5, U.S. Code, section 7701, the Board’s general jurisdictional statute, provides that “[a]n employee, or applicant for employment, may submit an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board from any action which is appealable to the Board under any law, rule, or regulation.” The Board may sustain the agency decision: “Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection . . . only if the agency’s decision . . . (B) . . . is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1). This section forms the basis of Parkinson’s challenges to the factual bases of the lack of candor and obstruction of the OPR process charges above. Paragraph (2) goes on to preclude the Board from sustaining agency decisions as follows: (2) Notwithstanding [5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)] para- graph (1), the agency’s decision may not be sus- tained under subsection (b) of this section if the employee or applicant for employment – ... (B) shows that the decision was based on any prohibited personnel practice de- scribed in section 2302(b) of this title; or (C) shows that the decision was not in ac- cordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2). 5 The Government and Parkinson agree that this section generally allows petitioners to 5 Section § 7701(c)(2)(B) uses the phrase “prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b),” and section 2302(b) uses the phrase “personnel action.” Section 2302(a)(1) defines “prohibited personnel practice” as “any action described in subsection (b).” Neither Parkinson nor the Government distinguishes between the phrases “personnel practice” and “personnel action.” PARKINSON v. DOJ 21 assert certain affirmative defenses to contest agency personnel decisions. The parties disagree whether Parkinson, as an FBI agent, can assert the Whistleblower Protection Act and USERRA rights as affirmative defenses under §§ 7701(c)(2)(B) or (C). The relevant whistleblower protections are codified, inter alia, in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (emphasis added): “Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority . . . (8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of (A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences (i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation . . . [or] (11)(A) knowingly take, recommend, or approve any personnel action if the taking of such action would violate a veterans’ preference requirement.” Section 2302(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added) defines a “personnel action” as, inter alia, “(iii) an action under chapter 75 of this title or other disciplinary or corrective action [including removal]. . . with respect to an employee in, or applicant for, a covered position in an agency.” In turn, section 2302(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added) defines “agency” as “an Executive Agency and the Government Publishing Office, but does not include . . . the Federal Bureau of Investigation.” A divided Board here dismissed Parkinson’s whistleblower reprisal and USERRA affirmative defenses, relying on its previous decision in Van Lancker v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 514 (2013). In Van Lancker, another divided Board dismissed a preference eligible FBI agent’s affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation, holding that “The FBI is specifically excluded from coverage under 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and therefore the reference to 2302(b) in section 7701(c) is inapplicable to FBI employees.” 119 M.S.P.R. at 517. The Board reasoned that 22 PARKINSON v. DOJ Congress could have carved out an exception to the prohibition in § 2302 for preference eligible employees, or “refrain[ed] from referencing section 2302(b) exclusively in section 7701(c)(2)(B)” in defining a prohibited personnel practice. Id. at 517–18. Finally, the Board distinguished cases where it had allowed affirmative defenses of whistleblower reprisal by preference eligible Postal Service employees—though those employees too are generally excluded from coverage under § 2302. It distinguished Postal Service and FBI employees because of the likelihood of sensitive information being revealed with respect to FBI whistleblowers and Congressional intent that FBI whistleblower claims be resolved internally, as manifested by Congress’s creation of § 2303 to provide a separate internal enforcement mechanism for whistleblower claims by FBI agents. See id. at 518–19 (discussing Mack v. U.S.P.S., 48 M.S.P.R. 617 (1991) and Butler v. U.S.P.S., 10 M.S.P.R. 45 (1982)). The Board here added that § 7701(c)(2)(C) could not allow Parkinson’s whistleblower affirmative defense because, though whistleblower retaliation against FBI employees generally is not in accordance with the law under § 2303, the Board has no review authority over violations of that section in whatever posture presented. Vice Chairman Wagner filed dissenting opinions in both Van Lancker and in this case. In Van Lancker, Vice Chairman Wagner argued that “the existence of section 2302 does not justify disregarding the holdings in Butler and Mack,” since both the Postal Service and the FBI are excluded from individual causes of action under § 2302 and both have internal procedures for enforcement of whistleblower retaliation claims. Van Lancker, 119 M.S.P.R. at 524–25. Vice Chairman Wagner reiterated that position in her dissent in this case. Parkinson argues that: 1) Van Lancker was wrongly decided because the exclusion of the FBI as an “agency” in § 2302(a) only applies to claims made under § 2302 and PARKINSON v. DOJ 23 not to affirmative defenses where the Board otherwise has jurisdiction over the personnel action; 2) there is no principled way to distinguish Parkinson’s case from the preference eligible postal workers in Mack and Butler; and 3) the “not in accordance with law” provision in § 7701(c)(2)(C) may use the prohibition against whistleblower retaliation at the FBI found in § 2303 and against USERRA violations at the FBI found in 38 U.S.C. § 4325 as affirmative defenses. 1. Whistleblower Retaliation Defense With regard to his whistleblower defense, we agree with Parkinson. As a preference eligible FBI agent, Parkinson was an “employee” under § 7511, with the right to appeal his removal to the Board under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513(d) and 7701. Section 7701(c)(2)(C) unambiguously provides, inter alia, that “the agency’s decision may not be sustained under subsection (b) of this section if the employee . . . (C) shows that the decision was not in accordance with law.” Section 2303 unambiguously prohibits whistleblower reprisal at the FBI: Any employee of the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion . . . shall not . . . take or fail to take any per- sonnel action with respect to any employee of the Bureau as reprisal for a disclosure of information by the employee to the Attorney General (or an employee designated by the Attorney General for such purpose) which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences – (1) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a). The statute goes on to define “personnel action” as “any action described in clauses (i) through (x) of section 2302(a)(2)(A) of this title with respect to an employee in, or applicant for, a position in the Bureau.” Id. Section 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii) covers adverse actions under 24 PARKINSON v. DOJ chapter 75, such as the removal taken here against Parkinson. Thus, if Parkinson was removed in reprisal for his whistleblowing disclosures, his removal would be “not in accordance with law,” and the Board would be statutorily prohibited from sustaining the agency’s decision to remove Parkinson. The only issue is whether the creation of an FBI- specific enforcement mechanism for whistleblower retaliation in § 2303 preempts the availability of an affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation by a preference eligible FBI employee before the MSPB. The Government offers three arguments why it does. First, the Government emphasizes that the statutory language in § 7701(c)(2)(B) does not support a distinction between individual causes of action and affirmative defenses. In either case, the FBI is not an “agency” and is thus incapable of taking “personnel action” under 5 U.S.C § 2302(a). Thus, the Government argues, Parkinson cannot show that the FBI’s removal decision “was based on any prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b)” for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B), even as an affirmative defense. The Government notes that the Supreme Court has stated that Congress exempted the FBI from “the requirements of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) entirely,” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 923–24 (2015). Even assuming without deciding that the reference in § 7701(c)(2)(B) to “prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b)” necessarily excludes Parkinson’s affirmative defenses, such a determination does not undermine Parkinson’s argument under § 7701(c)(2)(C) that his removal was not in accordance with the whistleblower law directly applicable to FBI personnel, i.e., § 2303. Second, the Government argues that § 7701(c)(2)(C), as a general “catch-all” provision, cannot “evade [§ 7701(c)(2)(C)’s] clear limitations to section 2302,” PARKINSON v. DOJ 25 because, as a general rule, the “specific [statutory provision] governs the general [statutory provision], as explained in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992). Section 7701(c)(2)(B) and (C) do not stand in a specific/general relation to one another with respect to the FBI. If it is true, as the Government argues, that the FBI is incapable of taking a prohibited personal action under § 2302(b), then § 7701(c)(2)(B) says nothing about affirmative defenses available to FBI employees, and there can be no conflict between the “specific” provision of § 7701(c)(2)(B) and the “general” provision of § 7701(c)(2)(C). The FBI’s exclusion from the definition of an “agency” in § 2302(a)(2)(A) does not mean that an FBI decision based on the prohibited personnel practices described in § 2302(b) would thus be in accordance with law. To the contrary, as evidenced by § 2303, the prohibited personnel practices at issue here are prohibited by law at the FBI. In other words, although the FBI is excluded from the scope of § 7701(c)(2)(B), that subsection does not prohibit the applicability of § 7701(c)(2)(C) to the FBI. Finally, the Government argues that even if § 7701(c)(2)(C) could be used as a basis for Parkinson’s affirmative defense, § 2303 cannot form the predicate violation of law because that section gives the Attorney General the power to promulgate regulations to prevent whistleblower reprisals, and gives the President the power to enforce § 2303, and these powers are to be exercised in a way that did not provide for judicial review with the Board and this court. In other words, the Government argues that the Department of Justice regulations promulgated under § 2303(b)—creating a non-judicial resolution mechanism of whistleblower retaliation claims at the FBI—preempt the right of preference eligible FBI employees from asserting whistleblower retaliation as an affirmative defense under § 7701(c)(2)(C). The Government also argues that whistleblower reprisal claims by 26 PARKINSON v. DOJ employees in the intelligence community raise serious security concerns, as the Board held in Van Lancker, and allowing such defenses at the Board and this court violates the Congressional intent in § 2303 to resolve those claims within the Department of Justice. This is roughly the argument accepted by the dissent-in-part, “that a sufficiently specific remedial regime can displace an otherwise-available general remedy whose application would impair policies evident in the specific remedial provisions.” Dissent-in-part at 3 (citing cases). This argument is ultimately unconvincing because it fails to appreciate the distinct rights Congress provided to preference eligible and non-preference eligible FBI employees. As discussed supra, most FBI employees have no right of appeal to the Board under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(a), 7513(a), and 7513(d) by virtue of the exclusion of FBI employees from the definition of “employees” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(8). As such, 28 C.F.R. § 27 provides an important, and potentially exclusive, procedure for most FBI employees to resolve whistleblower retaliationmotivated agency actions. Preference eligible FBI employees, however, do have a right of review over certain adverse agency action to the Board, and such employees are explicitly protected from action that is taken “not in accordance with law.” Neither the Government nor the dissent explain how the existence of internal FBI procedures for resolving whistleblower retaliation undermines this statutory right. Section 2303 gives to the Attorney General the responsibility of prescribing regulations “to ensure that such personnel action shall not be taken against an employee of the Bureau as a reprisal for any disclosure of information described in subsection (a) of this section,” and gives to the President the responsibility to “provide for the enforcement of this section in a manner consistent with applicable provisions of sections 1214 and 1221 of this title.” 5 U.S.C. § 2303. Although the promulgated regulations do not provide for judicial review, see 28 PARKINSON v. DOJ 27 C.F.R. §§ 27.1–27.5, nothing in the statute prohibits judicial review of whistleblower retaliation claims when presented as affirmative defenses under a separate statute providing for such review in cases affecting preference eligible FBI employees. This is not a situation where the statutory scheme evidences a clear Congressional intent to exclude whistleblower affirmative defenses from judicial review. See e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452 (1988) (considering the effect of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, including 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701, 7511 and 7513, on the appeal rights of non-preference eligible employees in the excepted service). To the extent that the FBI’s exclusion from § 2302(b) evidences a Congressional intent to exclude the actions of at least some FBI employees from judicial review, cf. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 923–24 (noting in dicta that Congress exempted the FBI from “the requirements of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) entirely”), 6 such a determination is more than balanced by the Congressional intent evinced by the explicit statutory right given to preference eligible FBI agents to have adverse employment actions judicially reviewed and to allow affirmative defenses based on violations of law presented during such a review. 6 MacLean concerned a Department of Homeland Security employee’s eligibility to challenge his removal under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) for making disclosures of sensitive information. Unlike the FBI, Homeland Security is not one of the agencies listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I), and the issue was whether an exception withholding whistleblower protection for statements prohibited by law extends to statements prohibited by regulation. The availability of an affirmative defense to a preference eligible FBI employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(C) or § 7701(c)(2)(B) was simply not at issue in that case. 28 PARKINSON v. DOJ Section 7701(c)(2)(C) does not exclude FBI employees, and § 2303 does not prohibit judicial review. In the absence of a clearer Congressional mandate, and in light of Congress’s solicitous treatment of preference eligible FBI employees, we decline the Government’s invitation to read § 2303 to impliedly overrule the explicit statutory availability of affirmative defenses under § 7701(c)(2)(C). The legislative history of the 1978 Act manifests an intention that the appeal rights of preference eligible FBI agents be grouped with other preference eligibles rather than other FBI employees. Title 5, Sections 7701, 7511, 7513, 2302, and 2303 were all part of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. That Act abolished the Civil Service Commission, and assigned its adjudicative functions to the Merit Systems Protection Board. S. Rep. 95-969, at 5 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2727. At that time, preference eligible veterans, including preference eligible FBI employees, already had the right to appeal their removal to the Civil Service Commission under Section 14 the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 390, as amended 61 Stat. 723 (“[A] preference eligible . . . shall have the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission from an adverse decision of the administrative officer.”). Preference eligible FBI agents could exercise this right just as well as preference eligible employees of other agencies. See id. (granting appeal rights to preference eligible employees “in any establishment, agency, bureau, administration, project, or department” without qualification on agency); Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussing preference eligible FBI agent’s rights under the Veterans Preference Act). Cf. Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238, 1242 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“Because of the exemption of the FBI from the civil service laws, the Bureau is generally free to discharge its employees for any reasons it chooses,” but “like any other employer, the FBI is subject to the provisions of § 9(c) of the Universal Military Training and PARKINSON v. DOJ 29 Service Act by which Congress granted special rights and protections to the returning veteran,” though that agent could not appeal to the Civil Service Commission because he was not preference eligible). The focus of the 1978 Act was to expand the proce- dural and substantive employment rights of non- preference eligible members of the excepted service. H.R. Rep. No. 101-328, at 3, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 695, 697 (“The key difference between the protections available to competitive service employees and preference eligibles in the excepted service, on the one hand, and excepted service employees who are not preference eligibles, on the other, is the right to appeal an adverse action to the Merit Systems Protection Board for independent review. H.R. 3086 eliminates that difference.”). The 1978 Act was not intended to restrict the rights of preference eligible employees at the FBI: The bill limits the procedural protections for employees of . . . the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) . . . solely to preference eligibles, thereby preserving the status quo. The committee pre- served the status quo in relation to the FBI and NSA because of their sensitive missions. Id. at 699. See also id. at 697 (“An estimated 30 to 40 percent of the remaining 445,700 excepted service employees already have appeal rights because they are veterans preference eligible.”). Although the Act did not extend Board appeal rights for FBI employees, nothing in the text or legislative history with respect to §§ 2302, 2303, 7511, 7513, or 7701 suggests that Congress intended to curtail rights already extant—such as those available to preference eligible employees. Congress maintained this right despite a clear recognition of the security concerns of doing so. This is in contrast to employees of “some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the General Accounting Office, [where] 30 PARKINSON v. DOJ even veterans do not have appeal rights.” Id. The FBI’s exclusion from § 2302 and the creation of a separate offensive enforcement mechanism for FBI whistleblowers in § 2303 should thus not be read to undermine by implication rights already extant before 1978. The dissent-in-part’s cited cases are not to the contrary. For example, United States v. Bormes, 133 S.Ct. 12, 18 (2012) held that the Little Tucker Act is not available as a waiver of sovereign immunity because the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) “contains its own judicial remedies” for its violation. The case further held that the Little Tucker Act is available only where “no special remedy has been provided,” and the FCRA created a detailed remedial scheme with particular rights, that was “plaintiff-specific,” and “precisely defined the appropriate forum.” Id. However, that case says nothing about the scope of proper adjudication where judicial review is already clearly available (under § 7513 and § 7701). In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC. v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012), the Supreme Court addressed the interaction between two statutory provisions for repayment of a creditor by a bankruptcy debtor: one provision (clause (ii)) allowing a sale of a property and repayment with the proceeds—but requiring the debtor to allow a creditor “credit-bid”—and a second catch-all provision (clause (iii)) allowing repayment with the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of the creditor property. The Supreme Court precluded a mechanism equivalent to the first provision but without the “credit-bid” option using the second provision because otherwise the general provision would swallow up the specific one. This case too cannot apply to the instant situation—the FBI’s exclusion from § 2302(b) was not directed to the availability of an affirmative defense for a preference eligible with independent Board appeal rights, and the FBI is not excluded in § 7701(c)(2)(B). As such, the allowance of the whistleblower defense to the FBI here under § 7701(c)(2)(C) PARKINSON v. DOJ 31 would not swallow up the specific provision. The remainder of the cited cases are similarly inapposite. Our decision is bolstered by consideration of 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214 and 1221. See 5 U.S.C. § 2303(c) (“The President shall provide for the enforcement of this section in a manner consistent with applicable provisions of sections 1214 and 1221 of this title.”). Those sections allow employees with “the right to appeal directly to the Merit Systems Protection Board under any law, rule, or regulation” to seek corrective action for prohibited personnel action first to the Board, whereas other employees must first seek corrective action from Special Counsel. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a), (b), and 1213(a)(3). We therefore reverse the Board’s decision prohibiting Parkinson from raising the affirmative defense of Whistleblower retaliation under 5 U.S.C. § 2303. 2. USERRA Violation Affirmative Defense Similarly, Parkinson argues that his removal would be not in accord with law under § 7701(c)(2)(C) if it is brought in violation of USERRA. In contrast to the whistleblower retaliation defense, however, the USERRA violation claims do manifest a clear Congressional will to withhold all judicial review of USERRA violations for FBI agents. Parkinson does not explain the specific USERRA violation herein, and cites only 38 U.S.C. § 4315. That section, titled “Reemployment By Certain Federal Agencies” provides, inter alia, as follows:
2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5 [including the FBI] shall prescribe procedures for ensuring that the rights under this chapter apply to the employees of such agency. 32 PARKINSON v. DOJ (b) In prescribing procedures under subsection (a), the head of an agency referred to in that subsec- tion shall ensure, to the maximum extent practi- cable, that the procedures of the agency for reemploying persons who serve in the uniformed services provide for the reemployment of such persons in the agency in a manner similar to the manner of reemployment described in section 4313. Section 4315 goes on to wholly exclude the FBI’s determination of reemployability under that section from judicial review as follows: (c) (1) The procedures prescribed under subsection (a) shall designate an official at the agency who shall determine whether or not the reemployment of a person referred to in subsection (b) by the agency is impossible or unreasonable. (2) Upon making a determination that the reemployment by the agency of a person referred to in subsection (b) is impossible or unreasonable, the official referred to in paragraph (1) shall notify the person and the Director of the Office of Per- sonnel Management of such determination. (3) A determination pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to judicial review. (emphasis added). Unlike 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a), which sets forth a procedure for the internal resolution of whistleblower rights, 38 U.S.C. § 4315 explicitly indicates that the substantive determination of reemployability “shall not be subject to judicial review.” Although such a prohibition applies by its terms only for “a determination pursuant to this subsection,” i.e., pursuant to internal agency procedures, the Congressional intent to insulate the substantive determination from judicial review would be frustrated by allowance of judicial review under 5 PARKINSON v. DOJ 33 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2). Cf. Dew v. United States, 192 F.3d 366, 371–72 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)) (“‘Whether and to what extent a particular statute [provides or] precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.’”). We note also that unlike the whistleblower act, which protects both veteran and non-veteran employees, USERRA by its terms applies only to veterans. See 38 U.S.C. § 4303 (defining “service in the uniformed services”) and 38 U.S.C. §§ 4311–4312 (prohibiting certain acts against those who “serve in the uniformed services”). As such, it makes little sense to allow Parkinson—by virtue of his having served in the military service—access to judicial review over an affirmative defense grounded in a USERRA violation, when claims by others who have served are explicitly insulated from judicial review. Congress’s coupling of a specific procedure for enforcing USERRA reemployment violations at the FBI and similar agencies, coupled with an affirmative prohibition on judicial review of the substantive determination made thereby, leads us to conclude that Congress intended to exclude the substantive determination from judicial review of any kind, including when presented in the context of an affirmative defense under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2). E. Remand In light of our disposition reversing the lack of candor determination, lifting the Board’s prohibition of Parkinson’s whistleblower retaliation defense, and sustaining the obstruction charge and the Board’s prohibition of Parkinson’s USERRA defense, we vacate the Board’s affirmance of Parkinson’s removal and remand. On remand, the only matters remaining for consideration are 34 PARKINSON v. DOJ the obstruction charge, Parkinson’s whistleblowerreprisal defense thereto and the appropriate penalty, if any, after such consideration. We note that the penalty determination section of the FBI’s dismissal letter relating to the obstruction charge states: The investigation also established you violat- ed FBI Offense Code 2.11 (OPR Matter – Obstruc- tion). The standard penalty for this offense is a ten-day suspension. Mitigating factors warrant a three- to seven-day suspension. Aggravating factors warrant a fifteen-day suspension to dismis- sal. Your misconduct was repeated. You not only had Person # 1 [Rodda, it seems] sign a document, prepared by you, setting out the facts concerning a check for $1,215.67 written directly to you, but also contacted SA # 2, after the OIG investigation had begun, and questioned her regarding her rec- ollection of witnessing the paying of a laborer in cash, prior to her interview. Based on the circum- stances of this case, I would normally impose a 30- day suspension for your 2.11 offense, aggravated due to the multiple occurrences of attempting to influence witness statements. However, since I am dismissing you for your 4.5, 5.22, and 2.6 of- fenses, I am not imposing a separate sanction for your 2.11 offense. J.A. 114–15. We note also the AJ’s observation at J.A. 16 that “[t]his was not an especially egregious case of obstruction. The agency did not prove that the written statement [Parkinson] drafted for the landlord was incorrect or that he asked the landlord to lie about any- thing. Tr. 105, 116. The agency’s proposal suggested that this was the least serious of the charges, and that on its PARKINSON v. DOJ 35 own it would have merited only a suspension rather than removal.” From the foregoing, it should be appreciated by the Board on remand that the penalty of removal, which was predicated on the now overturned lack of candor charge, cannot be sustained. Moreover, this court and the Board have made clear that, when “the Board sustains fewer than all of the agency’s charges,” the Board must defer to the agency’s clear statement in “its final decision . . . that it desires a lesser penalty [than the maximum reasonable penalty] be imposed on fewer charges.” J.A. 49 (Board decision in this case) (citing Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, the maximum penalty that can be sustained by the Board for the sole charge remaining in this case is a suspension of up to 30 days. Whether and to what extent the FBI, in the Board proceedings, has established more than the single instance of obstruction noted in the AJ’s opinion at J.A. 14– 16 and the Board’s opinion at J.A. 38–40, or any other basis to warrant greater than a 10-day suspension for the obstruction charge is a question to be determined by the Board on remand.