Opinion ID: 1900189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: La Civ.Code Ann. Art. 3422 and Acquisition of the Right to Possess

Text: Although not addressed in our first rehearing opinion, an argument which perhaps more than any other prompted the first rehearing grant with a consequent first change in the result in this case, originated with the contention in the dissent by the Chief Justice that the acquisition of the right to possess is itself a kind of prescription which cannot run against the state. This notion is founded on both the language of La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 3422 and the substance of La.Code Civ.Pro.Ann. art. 3658(2), which provide that a possessor for over a year acquires the right to possess and to maintain a possessory action. Proponents equate the one year period before acquisition of the right to possess or ability to bring a possessory action with a prescriptive period running against the state. Of course, prescription against the state is prohibited by both La. Const. art. 12, § 13 and art. 9,§ 4(B). [12] However, we can ascertain little foundation for this position in either the Civil Code or jurisprudence of this state. We point out that the term, right to possess, was not found in any French text, the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the Louisiana Code of Practice, or the Code of Civil Procedure. The term first appeared in Justice Tate's concurring opinion in the denial of an application for rehearing in Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 319 So.2d 766 (La.1975) and was subsequently adopted by the redactors in a 1982 amendment to La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 3422. It was apparently devised in recognition of the confusion [which] has resulted in Louisiana from the use of the word `possession' in the Civil Code and in the jurisprudence to denote both physical control and the right to possess, the availability of a possessory action. Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 319 So.2d at 781. Thus, the right to possess is little more than a shorthand method of saying that one has acquired the right to bring a possessory action. It does not involve any other consequence in Louisiana law and was never intended to alter the civilian scheme of real actions for the protection of possession and ownership of immovable property. According to La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 3422, [p]ossession is a matter of fact. La.Civ. Code Ann. art. 3423 provides that the possessor is considered provisionally as owner of the thing, a presumption which apparently commences immediately (without delays, prescriptive or otherwise). Likewise, as soon as possession commences, the possessor may be entitled to fruits and reimbursements of certain expenses. La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 486. Thus, the fact of possession and its attributes are not contingent upon the running of any period of time nor is possession a right acquired by the running of time. It either exists or does not exist without regard to any notion of prescription. Even the availability of the possessory action, furthermore, is not always delayed one full year from the beginning of possession. According to La.Code Civ.Pro.Ann. art. 3658(2), the requirement of possession for more than a year prior to disturbance is not applicable when the possessor is evicted by force or fraud. It should also be noted that the history of La.Code Civ.Pro.Ann. art. 3658 supports our conclusion that, in connection with the required one year of peaceful possession, prescription is not involved. The source of art. 3658 is art. 49 of the Code of Practice, which in turn corresponds to the 1806 French Code of Civil Procedure art. 23, and the official comment to Article 3658 assures us that no change has occurred in the law with the article's incorporation in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. French commentators have explained that the requirement of one year's actual possession for the availability of the possessory action is an emphasis on continuity, which expresses the quality of possession, and the period takes into account the agricultural cycle of preparation, planting and harvesting. [13] Such a period is no prescriptive right, but a procedural assurance of the fact of undisturbed possession.