Opinion ID: 844231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: parole decisions and the some evidence standard

Text: In light of the Court of Appeal's overreaching in this case, today's decision correctly emphasizes that judicial review of Board decisions is deferential: While the evidence supporting a parole unsuitability finding must be probative of the inmate's current dangerousness, it is not for the reviewing court to decide which evidence in the record is convincing. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 211, italics omitted, citing In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1204, 1212 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 190 P.3d 535] ( Lawrence ).) As we observed in Lawrence, `[r]esolution of any conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given the evidence are within the authority of the Board.' ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204, quoting In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 656 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174] ( Rosenkrantz ).) More broadly, we have explained that judicial review of parole decisions under the some evidence standard must be highly deferential so that it does not impermissibly shift the ultimate discretionary decision of parole suitability from the executive branch to the judicial branch. (44 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) The emphasis on judicial deference is part of the court's effort to summarize the principles governing judicial review of parole decisions. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 220-221.) Because today's opinion focuses on the obligations of reviewing courts, I think it useful and complementary to summarize a few principles governing the Board's obligations as well. As we have repeatedly said, the parole statute and regulations put the onus on the Board to justify denial of parole: `[T]he governing statute provides that the Board must grant parole unless it determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of incarceration for the individual because of the gravity of the offense underlying the conviction. (Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (b).) And as set forth in the governing regulations, the Board must set a parole date for a prisoner unless it finds, in the exercise of its judgment after considering the circumstances enumerated in section 2402 of the regulations, that the prisoner is unsuitable for parole. Accordingly, parole applicants in this state have an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.' ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 654, italics added; see also In re Smith (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 343, 366 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 655] [`parole is the rule, rather than the exception'].) ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204.) In light of this basic statutory obligation to grant parole unless public safety is at risk, we have held that the Board, as a matter of due process, has a duty to provide a definitive written statement of its reasons for denying parole. ( In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 272 [113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97] ( Sturm ).) The requirement of a definitive written statement of reasons serves two functions. First, it serves to adequately inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial ( ibid. ) so that the inmate is given a fair opportunity to make the life changes necessary to be considered suitable for parole in the future. Second, the requirement fulfills the mandate that a basis for administrative action must be set forth with sufficient clarity as to be understandable so as to afford an adequate basis for judicial review. ( Ibid. ) Although the Board is not required to comprehensively marshal the evidentiary support for its reasons (maj. opn., ante, at p. 214, fn. 11), it is required to point to evidence in the record that supports its reasoning. Otherwise, the statement of reasons would be conclusory and would fail to concretely inform the prisoner and the reviewing court of the Board's decisionmaking process. The Board's obligation to provide a definitive written statement of reasons for denying parole shapes the nature of judicial review. As we said in Lawrence, the task of reviewing courts is to determine whether the facts relied upon by the Board or the Governor support the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1213) and specifically to determine whether the Board's or the Governor's decision includes reasoning establishing a rational nexus between identified unsuitability factors and current dangerousness ( id. at p. 1210). In other words, the focus of judicial review is on the rationality of the Board's or the Governor's decisionnot only the ultimate conclusion of current dangerousness but also the evidence and reasoning on which the Board or Governor actually relied to reach that conclusion. Today's opinion says that [t]he court reviews the entire record to determine whether a modicum of evidence supports the parole suitability decision (maj. opn., ante, at p. 221) and that [o]nly when the evidence reflecting the inmate's present risk to public safety leads to but one conclusion [(i.e., nondangerousness)] may a court overturn a contrary decision by the Board or the Governor ( id. at p. 211). (See also id. at p. 214 [a court must consider the whole record in the light most favorable to the determination before it, to determine whether it discloses some evidence ... supporting the denial of parole].) Although these statements properly underscore the deferential nature of judicial review, I do not understand today's opinion to contravene the principle that the reviewing court's primary focus is on the facts and reasoning relied on by the Board ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1213, 1210). If that were not the case, at least three problems would arise. First, judicial review would not serve to enforce the Board's obligation to provide a definitive written statement of its reasons for denying parole. ( Sturm, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 272.) Second, judicial review would run the risk of impermissibly shift[ing] the ultimate discretionary decision of parole suitability from the executive branch to the judicial branch. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) Third, judicial review would not serve to ensure that the Board and the Governor have complied with the statutory mandate and have acted within their constitutional authority. ( Id. at p. 1213.) For how can a court determine whether a parole decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards ... ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677) unless judicial review focuses on the Board's or the Governor's actual decisionmaking? Given these concerns, it is no surprise that our consistent practice has been to examine the evidence and reasoning on which the Board or the Governor actually relied. (See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1221-1227; In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1258-1260 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213, 190 P.3d 573] ( Shaputis I ); In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1095 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 104 P.3d 783]; Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 678-683.) In undertaking that inquiry, we have been mindful of the deference owed to the Board's and the Governor's authorities. And, as explained in part II. below, we have considered the entire record for the purpose of determining whether the evidence on which the Board or the Governor relied rationally supports a finding of current dangerousness in the context of all other evidence that the Board or the Governor is obligated to consider. But reviewing courts have not upheld the parole authority's decision based on evidence substantially different from that on which the authority actually relied. While the court is correct that some evidence review is more deferential than the substantial evidence standard used to review criminal jury verdicts (maj. opn., ante, at p. 214), it is also a more focused form of judicial review. Unlike the Board, a jury is not required to give a definitive written statement of its reasons ( Sturm, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 272) for a verdict, and the reasons for protecting the sanctity and secrecy of jury deliberations (see, e.g., People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 475 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225]) have no applicability to the Board. Given these differences, appellate review of jury verdicts properly examines what evidence and inferences a rational fact finder could have relied on, while judicial review of parole decisions properly examines what evidence and inferences the Board did rely on. At the same time, a jury verdict must be supported by evidence substantial enough to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, while a parole denial need only be supported by some evidence that is rationally indicative of current dangerousness. Further, although appellate review of trial court decisions for sufficiency of the evidence extends to the entire record, and is not limited to facts mentioned in [the] statement of decision (maj. opn., ante, at p. 214, fn. 11), that is because what matters to an appellate court is the lower court's judgment, i.e., whether its ultimate determination regarding guilt or liability was correct. Judicial review in the parole context examines the rationality of the parole authority's decision, an inquiry that properly focuses on the authority's reasoning, including the evidence cited by the authority in support of its reasoning.