Opinion ID: 520594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Arrest and Abuse of Process

Text: 90 Hill, Rose and Kolimaga further assert that their section 1983 claims for false arrest and abuse of process likewise are not time barred. 17 The district court held that Rose's claims for false arrest and abuse of process accrued in March 1984, when he was charged with criminal activity. Rose v. Bartle, 692 F.Supp. at 529. It held that Kolimaga's claims for false arrest and abuse of process accrued in August 1983 based upon his allegation that he was fired from his job on or about August 11, 1983 because of the false charges which defendants conspired to lodge and pursue against him. Kolimaga v. Bartle, slip op. at 6 (citing Kolimaga Complaint p 25). The court held that Hill's claims for false arrest and abuse of process accrued [a]t the very latest ... when the matter was held over for trial in October of 1984. Hill v. Bartle, slip op. at 14-15. 91 Notwithstanding their reliance upon Deary for the proposition that their malicious prosecution claims are not time barred, the plaintiffs ignore the Deary court's statement that a section 1983 claim for false arrest accrues on the date of the arrest, as does a section 1983 claim for abuse of process, because on that date a plaintiff would have reason to know of the injury which those two torts encompass. Deary, 746 F.2d at 197 n. 16. Even if we were inclined to do so, it would be difficult to dismiss this portion of the Deary court's analysis as mere dictum. 18 Moreover, the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the weight of authority is consonant with Deary. 92 The plaintiffs, however, point to Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016, 107 S.Ct. 1894, 95 L.Ed.2d 501 (1987), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that because, under common law principles, an action for false arrest cannot be maintained if the arrest was followed by a conviction, conviction is a complete defense to a section 1983 action for false arrest. Id. at 387-89. Although Cameron did not address the issue of accrual, the plaintiffs maintain that if conviction is a complete defense to a section 1983 false arrest action, such an action, like a section 1983 malicious prosecution action, cannot be deemed to have accrued until the plaintiff is acquitted. 19 93 Although the plaintiffs' argument has some force, it appears that this court has never indicated that favorable termination is a requisite element of a section 1983 false arrest claim, but rather has suggested to the contrary. See, e.g., Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir.1978) ([c]learly, an arrest without probable cause is a constitutional violation actionable under section 1983.). Moreover, although Cameron has been followed by a number of courts, at least one court, in a decision issued before Cameron, expressed some doubt as to the rule there adopted. See Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1448-49 n. 8 (5th Cir.1984) ([w]hile the common law rule was clear that an outstanding conviction barred an action for malicious prosecution respecting the same charge ... it appears considerably less plain that such a conviction had the same effect on an action for false arrest.). 94 Furthermore, whatever the prevailing common law rule, we have some doubts as to the policy determinations underlying Cameron. The Cameron court reasoned that if a conviction is obtained, the arrest without probable cause is simply premature and that the resultant injury accordingly is insubstantial, and that the exclusionary rule is a sufficient deterrent to arrests lacking probable cause. 806 F.2d at 388. It concluded that its holding reflected the proper accommodation between the individual's interest in preventing unwarranted intrusion into his liberty and society's interest in encouraging the apprehension of criminals. Id. at 388. We have some misgivings as to this accommodation, especially in light of the availability of qualified immunity as a defense. 95 We also point out that the reference to the conviction rendering the damage insubstantial supports the concept that the conviction is a defense in the civil action to be established by the defendant and thus is distinguishable from proof of termination of the criminal action in the plaintiff's favor in a malicious prosecution case which is an element of the claim which the plaintiff must establish. On such an analysis the false arrest claim would accrue at the time of the arrest. We add, however, that our conclusion is not dependent on this distinction. In short, we reaffirm the Deary court's analysis of accrual and hold that the plaintiffs' section 1983 false arrest claims accrued on the dates they were arrested. 96 Cameron is not relevant with respect to the plaintiffs' claims for abuse of process. As one court has noted, [at] common law, a civil damage suit for abuse of process is not necessarily barred merely because the criminal (or other) proceeding involving the allegedly abused process has not terminated favorably to the damage suit plaintiff. Brown, 721 F.2d at 1449 n. 8 (citations omitted). Here, as in Deary, the plaintiffs' claims for abuse of process accrued on the dates of arrest because the plaintiffs would have had reason to know on those dates of the injuries which the tort encompasses. 97 Although none of the plaintiffs' amended complaints reveal the dates on which the alleged arrests took place, it is apparent from other dates set forth in the complaints that they could not have taken place less than two years before each complaint was filed. 20 Accordingly, the plaintiffs' respective section 1983 false arrest and abuse of process claims were properly dismissed.