Opinion ID: 581143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Christon's Guilty Plea Voluntary?

Text: 7 Christon claims that his plea is invalid because the government coerced him into making the agreement by threatening to prosecute his loved ones. The record makes clear that at the hearing in which Christon pled guilty, the prosecutor agreed not to file charges against Grant, Kent, or Mr. Jackson and Mae Christon would also not be charged with any violation. We review de novo the question of whether a guilty plea is voluntary. Hayes v. Kinchloe, 784 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). 8 Third party promises are not coercive per se. See, e.g., United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1254 (1984). Thus, in determining whether petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary, we look to all the circumstances surrounding his decision. Where the district court has held a hearing of some length on the matter, and finds that the defendant has failed to sustain his burden of showing that the guilty plea was involuntary, we will not grant the petition. Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). Based on the record in this case, we find that the district court's dismissal of Christon's petition was proper. 9 The record of Christon's plea agreement is quite developed. The extensive plea agreement as well as the oral arguments and briefs which accompanied the withdrawal of plea motion hearing show that the courts adequately considered the questions of coercion and voluntariness. This case is quite unlike Johnson v. Wilson, 371 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.1967). In Johnson, the district court had not considered whether alleged police threats to charge appellant's wife with a narcotics offense and to turn his infant daughter over to juvenile authorities influenced the appellant's decision to plead guilty. Id. at 912. Thus, we held that the court was required to address them in an evidentiary hearing. 10 Similarly, in Cancino v. Craven, 467 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.1972), we held that defendant's factual averments regarding the circumstances of his confession are prima facie adequate to raise the issue of voluntariness of his confession and its adverse impact on his decision to plead guilty. The record did not demonstrate that the defendant's plea was voluntary; it reflected only a brief exchange of about ten words between the defendant and the prosecutor, and these words did not contradict defendant's averments. We again concluded that defendant was at least entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Id. at 1246-47. 11 In Christon's case, by contrast, the guilty plea was quite extensive. The exchange between Christon and the prosecutor covered all portions of the agreement as well as all constitutional guarantees and waivers. Significantly, the question of his voluntariness in relation to all aspects of the agreement was examined by the prosecutor and the judge. In light of these facts, we deny Christon's petition. 12