Opinion ID: 2142011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strict Application of the Void Ab Initio Doctrine

Text: In support of their argument for strict application of the void ab initio doctrine, defendants rely principally on the Gersch opinion. In Gersch, we considered whether our earlier decision in People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill.2d 209, 127 Ill.Dec. 791, 533 N.E.2d 873 (1988), should apply retroactively to Gersch's case. In Joyce, we held that section 115-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115-1), which granted the State a right to demand a jury in certain criminal trials, was unconstitutional. Gersch argued in his direct appeal that the State's jury demand in his case violated his constitutional right to a bench trial. In holding that Joyce would apply retroactively to Gersch's case, we stated: A constitutionally repugnant enactment suddenly cuts off rights that are guaranteed to every citizen (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 1 (`All men    have certain inherent and inalienable rights')), and instantaneously perverts the duties owed to those citizens. To hold that a judicial decision that declares a statute unconstitutional is not retroactive would forever prevent those injured under the unconstitutional legislative act from receiving a remedy for the deprivation of a guaranteed right. This would clearly offend all sense of due process under both the Federal and State Constitutions. [Citations.] Along with these considerations, we note that this court has expressly held that a defendant cannot be prosecuted under an unconstitutional act. Gersch, 135 Ill.2d at 397-98, 142 Ill.Dec. 767, 553 N.E.2d 281. We concluded that where a statute is violative of constitutional guarantees, we have a duty not only to declare such a legislative act void, but also to correct the wrongs wrought through such an act by holding our decision retroactive. Gersch, 135 Ill.2d at 399, 142 Ill.Dec. 767, 553 N.E.2d 281. To correct the wrong wrought in Gersch's case, we reversed his conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. Gersch, 135 Ill.2d at 401-02, 142 Ill.Dec. 767, 553 N.E.2d 281. Unlike the statute at issue in Gersch, the portion of Public Act 89-7 that removed section 13-214.3(d) from the attorney malpractice statute of limitations did not suddenly cut off rights guaranteed to every citizen or even to these particular defendants. Attorneys in this state possess no constitutional guarantee of a particular limitations or repose period for malpractice actions. Thus, the change made in the repose period by Public Act 89-7 did not perpetrate a wrong against defendants requiring correction. Indeed, the amendment to the repose period was rendered invalid simply because it could not be severed from the balance of Public Act 89-7, and not because it contravened any constitutional principle. In other words, the invalidity of the amendment to section 13-214.3 was simply collateral damage from the force of this court's declaration in Best that the core provisions of Public Act 89-7 were substantively unconstitutional. Under these circumstances, and in contrast to the Gersch case, failing to adhere strictly to void ab initio principles would not deprive defendants of a remedy for the deprivation of a constitutional right because no such right is implicated. Notwithstanding these important factual distinctions between Gersch and the present case, defendants argue that the void ab initio doctrine must be strictly applied in this civil case just as it was in Gersch. Defendants note that Gersch, itself, contains citation to civil cases from this court applying the doctrine. E.g., Gersch, 135 Ill.2d at 390, 142 Ill.Dec. 767, 553 N.E.2d 281, citing Van Driel Drug Store, Inc. v. Mahin, 47 Ill.2d 378, 265 N.E.2d 659 (1970). The civil cases cited in the Gersch opinion establish, at most, that the void ab initio doctrine can be applied to a civil case; they do not establish that the doctrine should be applied to civil cases generally, or to this civil case in particular. Moreover, the Gersch opinion left open the issue of whether application of the void ab initio doctrine is always appropriate in cases outside the area of criminal prosecutions: We must note, however, that courts have been struggling with the potentially harsh results of the ab initio doctrine, particularly where law enforcement officials have relied in good faith on the validity of a statute [citations], or where the invalidation of rules of criminal procedure would allow otherwise guilty criminals to win their freedom [citation]. Attempting to avoid these problems, courts have attempted to temper the ab initio doctrine's harsh results    to minimize unfairness. [Citation.] However, scholars have noted that in the area of criminal prosecution, the ab initio principle is especially appropriate. (Emphasis added.) Gersch, 135 Ill.2d at 399-400, 142 Ill.Dec. 767, 553 N.E.2d 281. We are, therefore, reluctant to extend the reach of Gersch beyond cases involving criminal prosecutions. Defendants also cite our more recent decisions in Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill.2d 439, 261 Ill.Dec. 728, 764 N.E.2d 19 (2002), and Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 211 Ill.2d 286, 285 Ill.Dec. 165, 811 N.E.2d 652 (2004). Defendants argue that Petersen and Jorgensen establish that the void ab initio doctrine must be applied in this case despite the possibility of harsh results. We disagree. As defendants note, Petersen and the present case involve the same statute. At issue in Petersen, however, was the proper construction of section 13-214.3(d). Petersen states: The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the exception to the six-year statute of repose for attorney malpractice actions    applies only in cases where the assets of the deceased pass by way of the Probate Act   . Petersen, 198 Ill.2d at 441, 261 Ill.Dec. 728, 764 N.E.2d 19. In the course of deciding that issue, we quoted with favor the following passage from an earlier case: `Where the words employed in a legislative enactment are free from ambiguity or doubt, they must be given effect by the courts even though the consequences may be harsh, unjust, absurd or unwise. [Citations.] Such consequences can be avoided only by a change of the law, not by judicial construction.' Petersen, 198 Ill.2d at 447, 261 Ill.Dec. 728, 764 N.E.2d 19, quoting County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill.2d 546, 557, 243 Ill.Dec. 224, 723 N.E.2d 256 (1999), quoting People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic, 32 Ill.2d 11, 15, 203 N.E.2d 393 (1964). Whether, under our rules of statutory construction, an absurd or unjust result should impact our reading and application of a clearly worded statute is unrelated to the issue of whether the void ab initio doctrine should be applied in a given case. Defendants are correct that, in a footnote, the Petersen opinion implicitly applies the void ab initio doctrine. Petersen, 198 Ill.2d at 443 n. 1, 261 Ill.Dec. 728, 764 N.E.2d 19. We note, however, that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant attorney argued that the void ab initio doctrine should not apply in that case. Consequently, we were not asked to consider whether it is ever appropriate to temper the doctrine's harsh results. Any harsh results in Petersen resulted from our construction of the statute, not from application of the void ab initio doctrine. Defendants' reliance on Petersen is misplaced. The Jorgensen case is also distinguishable from the present dispute. At issue in Jorgensen was whether the General Assembly and the Governor violated the Illinois Constitution when they attempted to eliminate the cost-of-living adjustments [COLAs] to judicial salaries provided by law for the 2003 and 2004 fiscal years. Jorgensen, 211 Ill.2d at 287, 285 Ill.Dec. 165, 811 N.E.2d 652. We answered that question in the affirmative and refused to suspend constitutional requirements for economic reasons, namely, the impact on the state's budget. Jorgensen, 211 Ill.2d at 316, 285 Ill.Dec. 165, 811 N.E.2d 652. In the course of our decision, we held Public Act 92-607, which suspended the 2003 COLA, constitutionally infirm and void ab initio. Jorgensen, 211 Ill.2d at 309, 285 Ill.Dec. 165, 811 N.E.2d 652. Here, plaintiffs do not request that we suspend constitutional requirements by enforcing an unconstitutional statute. Rather, plaintiffs ask that we consider the equities of this case and allow their complaint to proceed. Jorgensen does not aid in our resolution of this issue. We acknowledge that defendants' positionadvocating strict application of the void ab initio doctrinehas a certain surface appeal, creating as it would a bright-line rule which could be applied with relative ease. Defendants' position, however, unduly discounts the real-life consequences flowing from a statutory enactment. When the General Assembly enacts legislation such as Public Act 89-7, that legislation is presumptively valid. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill.2d 489, 509, 289 Ill.Dec. 218, 819 N.E.2d 714 (2004) (Statutes are presumed constitutional); Beaubien v. Ryan, 198 Ill.2d 294, 298, 260 Ill.Dec. 842, 762 N.E.2d 501 (2001) (statutory enactments are cloaked with the presumption of validity). Individuals, including plaintiffs here, are entitled to rely on State statutes when `making decisions and in shaping their conduct.' Board of Commissioners of the Wood Dale Public Library District v. County of Du Page, 103 Ill.2d 422, 429, 83 Ill.Dec. 224, 469 N.E.2d 1370 (1984), quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 36 L.Ed.2d 151, 160 (1973). See also Adukia v. Finney, 315 Ill.App.3d 766, 770, 248 Ill.Dec. 854, 735 N.E.2d 174 (2000) (recognizing, in a post- Best case, that a party should not be penalized for his good-faith reliance on existing law). Individuals are not required or empowered to determine whether the law is constitutional; that duty belongs to the judiciary. Gersch, 135 Ill.2d at 398-99, 142 Ill.Dec. 767, 553 N.E.2d 281. Strict application of the void ab initio doctrine fails to take into account these realities, creating a Catch-22. Individuals are entitled to rely on a legislative enactment, presuming it is valid, but must suffer the consequences of doing so should this court later hold that law unconstitutional. Although defendants note that courts in other jurisdictions strictly apply the void ab initio doctrine ( e.g., Spanish Cove Sanitation, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, 72 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Ky.2002); McGuire v. C & L Restaurant Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 614 (Minn.1984)), our research reveals that courts do not do so universally. As discussed below, courts in other jurisdictions frequently consider the equities of a case and will take steps to ameliorate the harsh results from the doctrine's strict application. Whether Illinois should adopt a similar approach is the issue we now consider.