Opinion ID: 1824017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Residual Hearsay.

Text: Rule 804 provides in part: Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: .... (5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interest of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. Iowa R.Evid. 804(b)(5). Aside from the requirement that the declarant be unavailable, the requirements of this rule are identical to the requirements of rule 803(24). The five-fold requirements for admissibility under rule 803(24), identified in State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Iowa 1983), apply to the admissibility of hearsay evidence under rule 804(b)(5). These catch-all hearsay exception provisions should apply only when there is significant indicia of reliability. Prior to the adoption of the Iowa rules of evidence in 1983, we admitted evidence of a homicide victim's fears of the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 1979) (victim's fears were relevant in a murder case to show prior relationship between accused and the alleged victim); State v. Fowler, 248 N.W.2d 511, 515-16 (Iowa 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072, 99 S.Ct. 842, 59 L.Ed.2d 37 (1979) (a validly asserted homicide-related accident defense may, under appropriate circumstances, open the door to admission of state of mind testimony disclosing the victim's fear of his or her assailant); State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1975) (victim's fear of the accused, communicated by the victim to a third person, held admissible as a part of the res gestae, particularly where the killer's identity is in issue); State v. Ebelsheiser, 242 Iowa 49, 54, 43 N.W.2d 706, 710 (1950) (statements made some hours before the fatal event, to the effect that the victim was afraid to go into the house when defendant was there, were admissible as part of the res gestae ). The res gestae exception was subject to criticism and is no longer a part of our evidentiary rules. State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1981). The state of mind exception is rule 803(3). In United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C.Cir.1973), the federal court recognized a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and allowed the admission of extrajudicial statements to show the state of mind if that is at issue. The statements may consist of direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. The court stated: The threshold requirement of admissibility of such hearsay statements of fear of defendant in homicide cases is some substantial degree of relevance to a material issue in the case. While there are undoubtedly a number of possible situations in which such statements may be relevant, the courts have developed three rather well-defined categories in which the need for such statements overcomes almost any possible prejudice. The most common of these involves defendant's claim of self-defense as justification for the killing.... Second, where defendant seeks to defend on the ground that the deceased committed suicide, evidence that the victim had made statements inconsistent with a suicidal bent are highly relevant. A third situation involves a claim of accidental death, where, for example, defendant's version of the facts is that the victim picked up defendant's gun and was accidentally killed while toying with it. In such cases the deceased's statements of fear as to guns or of defendant himself ... are relevant in that they tend to rebut this defense. Of course, even in these cases, where the evidence is of a highly prejudicial nature, it has been held that it must be excluded in spite of significant degree of relevance. Id. at 767. We have cited with approval the Brown case. Fowler, 248 N.W.2d at 519. Here, the trial court admitted the testimony of Powell as to statements made by the victim twelve to fourteen hours before she was shot. Before Powell was called as a witness by the State, counsel for the defendant urged the court to prohibit Powell's testimony about Joann's fear of Nance. The court commented that evidence had been received in response to questions by both sides indicating that there was nothing but a good relationship between Joann and Nance. The court suggested if someone could say something to the contrary, he or she could testify based on the existing record. During the State's examination of Powell he testified, without objection, that Nance had dropped off rock cocaine to Joann on October 19. She was selling it for him. He saw the drugs after Nance had left the apartment. He knew Joann owed Nance money for drugs. When the State attempted to introduce evidence of Joann's fear of Nance, defense counsel again raised the hearsay objection. The State urged the evidence was admissible under rule 804(b)(5) and was also admissible to contradict prior testimony of a close and kind relationship between the victim and the defendant. The court said: I think what you are trying to elicit is maybe a statement of material fact. I think the record does disclose, both as to the testimony in response to the State, as well as the defendant's counsel's questions, the relationship between the victim and the defendant in this matter. And I am going to allow the question. Counsel for the State then asked the following questions and Dick gave the following answers: Q. I think you indicated in prior testimony that Joann Powell was selling cocaine for Mr. Nance. Wasif you know, was she selling it, or was she using it? A. Well, she was selling, but on this day she ended up doing it. Q. And by doing it, what do you mean? A. She smoked it. Q. Now if you smoke it, you don't have any to sell; is that correct? A. Correct. Q. Did Joann Powell make any comment to you about getting the money for Mr. Nance? A. Yes, she did. Q. What was that statement she made to you? A. She said if she didn't give him his money, that he was going to fuck her up. Q. He was going to fuck her up? A. Yes. Q. And what did you take that to mean? A. I figured beat her ass. THE COURT: Record should reflect, Mr. Feuerbach, that you have objected previously to that whole line of questioning, and you have objected to this, but my ruling has stopped you from doing so, other than in chambers. Although the court found the hearsay statements were offered as a material fact, it made no findings as to other determinations required under rule 804(b)(5). Powell testified that both he and Joann had been and were using drugs at the time of the conversation. The autopsy of Joann found a very, very high concentration of cocaine in her blood at the time of her death. No other witnesses testified as to Joann's fear of Nance. The trial court made no finding of the necessary circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. It was an abuse of discretion for the court to allow the testimony relating to Joann's fears of Nance. The State argues we should affirm the trial court ruling on a separate ground that the statements were not hearsay or were admissible as state of mind testimony permitted under rule 803(3). [W]e will affirm a ruling which admits evidence over a hearsay objection on any proper ground appearing in the record, even if it was not raised below. State v. Rawlings, 402 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Iowa 1987). Although Joann's comment was hypothetical in nature, not a statement of fact, we look at the purpose of the evidence to determine if it was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. We conclude her statement was offered as an assertion of her fear of the consequences of not paying the crack cocaine debt. It was hearsay evidence. Although it may be state of mind evidence, it was inadmissible because the probative value of the evidence did not substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. Iowa R.Evid. 403. The admission of Powell's testimony about Joann's statement of fear was prejudicial error. Because we reverse and remand this case for retrial, we will review other evidentiary issues raised at trial that may arise on retrial.