Opinion ID: 2607859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admissibility of evidence of victim's habit of carrying large sums of money

Text: In pre-trial communications with the defense, the state indicated its intent to establish a motive for the murder by introducing evidence showing that Bailey was in the habit of carrying large sums of money. Defendant moved in limine to preclude the state from introducing the evidence until it could show he had been aware of the habit. Defendant claimed that absent such a showing, the evidence had no relevance to establish motive. Based on the state's offer of proof, the trial court admitted evidence of Bailey's habit. When the state failed to meet the offer of proof, defendant moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied, notwithstanding the trial court's recognition that the prosecution had failed to meet its specific and strict offer of proof. The court found the evidence was material and admissible to establish motive whether or not the defendant knew of the habit because the evidence showed that the defendant knew Bailey had sums of money. The state's theory was that the defendant killed Bailey for her money  specifically, the rent money he was to relinquish to her and the money she would have in her purse when she came to collect it. Evidence that the defendant knew she was in the habit of carrying large sums of money was essential to support the proposition that he killed her for the additional money in her purse and not only for the rent money she was due. Defendant is correct that absent proof that he knew of Bailey's alleged habit, evidence of that habit would be irrelevant to show motive and therefore inadmissible. However, the alleged motive, pecuniary gain, was properly before the jury as there was evidence that the defendant, as part of his managerial duties, was required to collect and deliver rent money to Bailey every Saturday. Based on that evidence, the jury could have found the defendant killed Bailey to keep the money he was to relinquish. Therefore, the fact that the state failed to establish pecuniary motive by showing defendant knew Bailey habitually carried large sums of money renders admission of the evidence of the alleged habit non-prejudicial. UNDISCLOSED WITNESS Defendant argues he was denied a fair trial because the state presented hearsay testimony and testimony of an undisclosed witness to prove motive. The facts relevant to disposition of this issue follow. In response to a question by the state, Det. Quaife of the Phoenix Police Department testified that the last deposit into Bailey's Continental Bank checking account was made on August 30, 1981. On cross-examination it became clear that this testimony was hearsay and that Det. Quaife lacked personal knowledge of it. [6] To cure the improper admission, the court granted defendant's motion to strike and told the jury to disregard the statement until the state could prove it. The state then requested permission to call the custodian of the records of Continental Bank (custodian). Defense counsel argued that the state should be precluded from doing so because it had failed to disclose the custodian as a witness as required under Ariz.R. Crim.P. 15. The court granted the state's request. On appeal, the defendant challenges that decision. The imposition and selection of sanctions for a violation of Ariz.R.Crim.P. 15 are within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Piedra, 120 Ariz. 53, 583 P.2d 1373 (App. 1978). The rule in Arizona is that it is frequently not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit a previously undisclosed witness to testify if the court believes that no prejudice will result to the accused or that any prejudice which might result may be rectified by other means. Id. See also State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493, 543 P.2d 1122 (1975). The trial court, however, should seek to apply sanctions that affect the evidence at trial and the merits of the case as little as possible since the Rules of Criminal Procedure are designed to implement, not to impede, the fair and speedy determination of cases. State v. (Joseph Clarence, Jr.) Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 599 P.2d 199 (1979). Prohibiting the calling of a witness should be invoked only in those cases where other less stringent sanctions are not applicable to effect the ends of justice. Id; see State v. (Joe U.) Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 681 P.2d 1374 (1984). The court should also consider how vital the precluded witness is to the proponent's case, whether the opposing party will be surprised and prejudiced by the witness' testimony, whether the discovery violation was motivated by bad faith or willfulness, and any other relevant circumstances. Id. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to permit the custodian to testify. We agree with the defendant that the custodian's testimony was not vital to the state's case; the state had other evidence to support its claim that the defendant killed Bailey for pecuniary gain. See Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances supra. However, we must reject the defendant's claims given our assessment of other factors enumerated in Smith, supra . Defendant's claim that he was surprised and prejudiced by the custodian's testimony must fail. The state had informed the defendant that it intended to prove a pecuniary motive. Though he can claim that he did not expect the state to do so by showing that Bailey had not made a deposit in her checking account in approximately two weeks, he cannot claim he was surprised to the extent that he could not have adequately defended against it. Rule 15 was promulgated to enable an accused to advisedly prepare his defense. State v. Von Reeden, 9 Ariz. App. 190, 450 P.2d 702 (1969). Though the state did not inform the defendant that the custodian would be a witness, the defendant was on notice that the state would be seeking to prove a pecuniary motive for the murder. The custodian's testimony, at best, invited the jury to infer from the fact that Bailey had not made a recent deposit in her checking account that she had large sums of money on her person when she went to collect rent from the defendant. Any prejudice the defendant might have suffered could have been reduced if not eliminated. On cross-examination, defense counsel could have inquired into the custodian's knowledge of whether Bailey had other bank accounts to which she might have made deposits after August 31 [7] or requested a continuance so that he could pursue that inquiry on his own. In addition, the record reveals no bad faith on the state's part. The prosecutor's express reason for seeking to introduce the evidence of the last date of deposit through Det. Quaife was to save time. The prosecutor had not purposefully failed to inform the defendant of his intention to call the custodian; instead, he had erroneously thought it was unnecessary to call her. The state's effort to expedite the proceedings in this way shows only a misconstruction of the Arizona Rules of Evidence; it does not show bad faith. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the custodian to testify.