Opinion ID: 622319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The mixed-motive instruction

Text: We review Jiten's preserved challenge to the district court's mixed-motive jury instruction de novo, though we will reverse only if we find that the court committed an error that was prejudicial based on a review of the record as a whole. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 660 F.3d at 503 (quoting Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 552 F.3d 47, 72 (1st Cir. 2009)). To put Jiten's challenge to the district court's mixedmotive instruction in context, we begin with a brief overview of the current status of the mixed-motive framework under state and federal law. A mixed-motive case is one in which an employee alleges that [s]he suffered an adverse employment action because of both permissible and impermissible considerations. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2009). Once a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case establishes that her membership in a protected class was a motivating factor for an employment action, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision regardless of the impermissible consideration. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Price Waterhouse, which established the mixed-motive burden-shifting analysis, was a Title VII case. The Supreme Court -7- recently held, in Gross, that the mixed-motive framework does not extend to ADEA cases, because [u]nlike Title VII, the ADEA's text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor. 129 S. Ct. at 2349. Thus, Diaz was not entitled to (and did not receive) a mixed-motive instruction with regard to her ADEA disparate treatment claim. Rather, under federal law, she was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action. Id. at 2352. Under Massachusetts law, however, the mixed-motive analysis survives in age discrimination cases, at least for the time being. In construing Chapter 151B, the Massachusetts SJC has sometimes looked to federal case law for guidance, see Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 729 N.E.2d 1068, 1080 n.29 (Mass. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Stonehill Coll. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205 (Mass. 2004), but the SJC frequently do[es] not follow the reasoning of Federal appellate decisions applying Title VII, Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 750 N.E.2d 928, 939 (Mass. 2001). In Wynn & Wynn, the SJC did choose to adopt Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting analysis and apply it to all actions under Chapter 151B in which the plaintiff, armed with some strong (direct) evidence of discriminatory bias, demonstrates that at least one factor -8- motivating the employer's decision is illegitimate. 729 N.E.2d at 1078. Though Wynn & Wynn was a gender discrimination case, Jiten does not argue that the SJC limited the applicability of the mixedmotive framework to gender discrimination cases. Indeed, the broad language of the Wynn & Wynn opinion does not seem to support such an argument. See id. at 1079-81. After the Supreme Court decided Gross, the SJC reexamined the validity of the mixed-motive framework under state law in Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 59 (Mass. 2009). Although the SJC recognized that the mixed-motive analysis had generated considerable controversy and criticism and resulted in splits in the United States Courts of Appeals, id. at 77 n.27, the SJC nonetheless affirmed the lower court's issuance of a mixedmotive instruction, id. at 76-78. The SJC said the following about the status of the mixed-motive analysis under state law post-Gross: In Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., . . . citing ongoing difficulties in applying the mixed motive analysis in any context, and the absence of a mixed motive requirement in the Federal statute on age discrimination in employment, the United States Supreme Court determined that a mixed motive analysis is not permitted in age discrimination cases. We do not consider today whether we will retain a mixed motive analysis under Massachusetts law. Id. at 77 n.27. Though Haddad was a gender discrimination case, the opinion did not distinguish between state law gender and age discrimination cases, nor did it suggest that the reasoning in Gross might apply to state law age discrimination cases. Rather, -9- as we read the opinion, the SJC implicitly affirmed the ongoing validity of the mixed-motive framework in all Chapter 151B cases, though it left open the possibility that Massachusetts might not retain that framework indefinitely. See id. Because the SJC said, in Wynn & Wynn, that it would follow the guidance of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the allocation of burdens of proof in mixed-motive cases, 729 N.E.2d at 1080, Jiten's brief argues that it is reasonable to conclude that the SJC would reject a mixed-motive analysis in the context of age discrimination. But the SJC clearly did not reject the mixed-motive analysis in Haddad, and Wynn & Wynn thus remained good law at the time that the district court instructed the jury in this case. Furthermore, Jiten reads too much into the SJC's statement in Wynn & Wynn. While the SJC did choose to adopt the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive burden-shifting analysis, that did not mean that the SJC was somehow bound by the Supreme Court's later decision in Gross. The SJC has made clear that it routinely does not follow federal law in interpreting Chapter 151B. That is true for a number of reasons, including the existence of material differences between [the Massachusetts] statutory scheme and the Federal scheme and the legislative directive that G.L. c. 151B is to be applied liberally. Cuddyer, 750 N.E.2d at 939; see also id. at 939-40 (citing cases in which the SJC has construed Chapter 151B -10- differently than the federal courts have construed Title VII). Hence, in Haddad, the SJC did not adopt Gross's reasoning, instead leaving for another day the question of whether we will retain a mixed motive analysis under Massachusetts law. 914 N.E.2d at 77 n.27. Finally, we note that, from a statutory perspective, it makes sense that the mixed-motive framework might apply to state age discrimination claims but not to federal age discrimination claims. There is just one Massachusetts statute that outlaws both age and gender discrimination (Chapter 151B), whereas two separate statutes outlaw age and gender discrimination in the federal context (the ADEA and Title VII). The Supreme Court's conclusion in Gross that the mixed-motive framework did not extend to ADEA claims was premised on the fact that Title VII is materially different [from the ADEA] with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348. That is not the case in the state context. Thus, for purposes of Diaz's state law age discrimination claim, Wynn & Wynn controlled at the time the district court instructed the jury, and we find no error in the court's decision to issue the mixed-motive instruction. See, e.g., Phoung Luc v. Wyndham Mgmt. Corp., 496 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 2007) (a federal court applying state law will not create new rules or significantly expand existing rules). -11-
Jiten separately challenges the mixed-motive instruction by arguing that the district court should have certified the question to the SJC, an argument that Jiten made below as part of a motion to alter or set aside the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b). Our standard of review here is for abuse of discretion. See Negrón-Almeda v. Santiago, 528 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (abuse of discretion review applies to the denial of a motion to alter or amend the judgment); Muñiz v. Rovira-Martinó, 453 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 2006) (same for a motion to set aside the judgment); U.S. Steel v. M. DeMatteo Const. Co., 315 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2002) (same for the district court's decision not to certify a question of law to the SJC). A federal court may, in its discretion, certify to the SJC a question of Massachusetts law that is determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of [the SJC]. Mass. S.J.C.R. 1:03; see also In re Hundley, 603 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 2010). For the reasons discussed above, this was not an instance in which there was no controlling precedent. In Wynn & Wynn, the SJC established that the mixed-motive framework applies in Chapter 151B cases, and in Haddad, the SJC implicitly affirmed the framework's ongoing -12- validity under Massachusetts law. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to certify the question to the SJC.