Opinion ID: 2689948
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to a Trial by Jury

Text: {¶ 30} Arbino initially contends that R.C. 2315.18 violates the right to a trial by jury. The relevant constitutional language states that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in civil cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less than threefourths of the jury.” Section 5, Article I, Ohio Constitution. {¶ 31} This right serves as one of the most fundamental and long-standing rights in our legal system, having derived originally from the Magna Carta. See Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday (1933), 127 Ohio St. 278, 284, 188 N.E. 1. It was “[d]esigned to prevent government oppression and to promote the fair resolution of factual issues.” Arrington v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, ¶ 21. As Thomas Jefferson stated, the right to trial by jury is “the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by which a {¶ e} “Noneconomic loss” is defined as “nonpecuniary harm that results from an injury or loss to person or property that is a subject of a tort action, including, but not limited to, pain and suffering, loss of society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection, advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, training, or education, disfigurement, mental anguish, and any other intangible loss.” R.C. 2315.18(A)(4). 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO government can be held to the principles of it’s [sic] constitution.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), reprinted in 15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Boyd Ed.1958) 269. {¶ 32} However, the right is not absolute. See Arrington at ¶ 22. Section 5, Article I guarantees a right to a jury trial only for those causes of action in which the right existed in the common law when Section 5 was adopted. See Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner (1929), 121 Ohio St. 393, 169 N.E. 301, paragraph one of the syllabus. It is settled that the right applies to both negligence and intentional-tort actions. See Arrington at ¶ 24. {¶ 33} Arbino claims that this provision necessarily includes the right to have a jury determine the full amount of a plaintiff’s damages. Thus, she argues that any limitations on the process, such as the damages caps in R.C. 2315.18, unconstitutionally infringe upon this “inviolate” right. We are not persuaded. {¶ 34} To properly approach this issue, one must define what exactly is guaranteed under this right. We are guided by long-standing precedent in this regard: “The right thus intended to be secured by the constitution, was the right of trial by jury as it was recognized by the common law; and within the right thus secured is the right of either party, in an action for the recovery of money only, to demand that the issues of fact therein be tried by a jury.” (Emphasis added.) Dunn v. Kanmacher (1875), 26 Ohio St. 497, 502–503. In short, the right to trial by jury protects a plaintiff’s right to have a jury determine all issues of fact in his or her case. See Sorrell, 69 Ohio St.3d at 422, 633 N.E.2d 504, citing Miller v. Wikel Mfg. Co. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 76, 81, 545 N.E.2d 76 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because the extent of damages suffered by a plaintiff is a factual issue, it is within the jury’s province to determine the amount of damages to be awarded. See Sorrell. {¶ 35} Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution clearly protects this fact-finding function from outside interference. Any law that prevents the jury 10 January Term, 2007 from completing this task or allows another entity to substitute its own findings of fact is unconstitutional. We reaffirmed this principle in Sorrell by striking down a statute that required a court to determine any collateral benefits received by a plaintiff and deduct them from a jury award, regardless of whether those benefits were duplicated in the award. Sorrell, 69 Ohio St.3d at 422, 633 N.E.2d 504. This statute was unconstitutional because it allowed courts to ignore the jury’s finding of facts on collateral benefits. Id. {¶ 36} However, the fact that the jury’s fact-finding function is protected does not mean jury awards are insulated from all outside influences. {¶ 37} So long as the fact-finding process is not intruded upon and the resulting findings of fact are not ignored or replaced by another body’s findings, awards may be altered as a matter of law. There is no dispute that the right to a trial by jury does not extend to the determination of questions of law. See Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292, 595 N.E.2d 862. Thus, without violating the Constitution, a court may apply the law to the facts determined by a jury. {¶ 38} We have recognized several ways in which a court may apply the law to change a jury award of damages without running afoul of the Constitution. For example, courts have the inherent authority to order remittiturs to reduce jury awards when they deem the amount to be excessive based on the facts found by the jury. See Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 444, 715 N.E.2d 546 (noting, though, that the successful plaintiff must consent to such an order). {¶ 39} Additionally, there are numerous statutes that treble jury damages awards in certain causes of action. See, e.g., R.C. 901.51 (unauthorized removal of timber), 1331.08 (Valentine Act violations), 1345.09 (Consumer Sales Practices Act violations), 2307.61 (willful damage to or theft of property), 2923.34(E) (engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity), and 4905.61 (public- 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO utilities-law violations). In each of these statutes, the General Assembly demonstrated a clear policy choice to modify the amount of jury awards. We have never held that the legislative choice to increase a jury award as a matter of law infringes upon the right to a trial by jury; the corresponding decrease as a matter of law cannot logically violate that right. See Hemmings v. Tidyman’s, Inc. (C.A.9, 2002), 285 F.3d 1174, 1202. {¶ 40} So it must be with R.C. 2315.18. By limiting noneconomic damages for all but the most serious injuries, the General Assembly made a policy choice that noneconomic damages exceeding set amounts are not in the best interest of the citizens of Ohio. The statute is distinguishable from those allowing courts to substitute their own findings of fact on collateral benefits or requiring repayment plans that “further reduce the jury’s award of damages already once reduced to present value.” Galayda, 71 Ohio St.3d at 425, 644 N.E.2d 298. Courts must simply apply the limits as a matter of law to the facts found by the jury; they do not alter the findings of facts themselves, thus avoiding constitutional conflicts. {¶ 41} Such limitations are also permissible under the analogous Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in the federal system. “Federal courts uniformly have held that statutory damages caps do not violate the Seventh Amendment, largely because a court does not ‘reexamine’ a jury’s verdict or impose its own factual determination regarding what a proper award might be. Rather, the court simply implements a legislative policy decision to reduce the amount recoverable to that which the legislature deems reasonable.” (Footnote omitted.) Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares (D.Kan.2003), 270 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1277–1278. {¶ 42} Because R.C. 2315.18 follows these principles, it does not offend the right to a trial by jury under Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.