Opinion ID: 2686712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: vagueness challenge to part 261

Text: We next consider whether Part 261 is unconstitutionally vague because § 261.2, which defines “National Forest System road or trail,” “exempt[s] . . . county roads from the prohibitions of part 261.”3 Although Parker did not raise the constitutionality of Part 261 before the district court, we permit the as-applied challenge because a person may “attack the constitutionality of the law under which he is charged for the first time on appeal.” United States v. Tabacca, 924 F.2d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1528–29 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that “[s]uch 3 We construe Parker’s argument in the reply brief as reiterating that his challenge to the regulations on vagueness grounds is an as-applied, rather than a facial, challenge. UNITED STATES V. PARKER 11 claims are attacks on the sufficiency of the information to charge an offense”)). Laws are void for vagueness if they “fail[] to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited.” Id. Because Parker’s challenge does not involve the First Amendment, we “need only examine the vagueness challenge under the facts of the particular case,” and need not “address whether the statute is vague as to its other potential applications.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We must “decide whether, under a reasonable construction of the statute, the conduct in question is prohibited.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 946 (9th Cir. 2013). Part 261 has several sections, and a fair reading of the regulation as a whole reveals that the definition of “National Forest System road” is only one avenue for determining prohibited conduct under the regulation. As discussed above, the prohibitions extend not only to National Forest System roads (which exempt public rights-of-way) but also to activities that “occur” in the national forest or “affect” property administered by the Forest Service. 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.1(a)(1)–(2); cf. United States v. Vasarajs, 908 F.2d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that “it would seem fair to charge the individual with such knowledge of a statute’s meaning and applicability as he could obtain through competent legal advice”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Not surprisingly, Parker does not suggest that the overall requirement for a special use permit is unclear. Instead he takes aim at the narrow issue of the categorization of the county road. However, in keeping with the principles 12 UNITED STATES V. PARKER described above, a person of ordinary intelligence would be aware that dispatching snowmobiles from a road into a National Forest is an activity that both occurs in, and affects, property administered by the Forest Service. Of particular significance in Parker’s situation, where a defendant’s conduct demonstrates that he was on notice that the conduct was proscribed by a statute, we have held that the person’s conduct will defeat, or contribute to the defeat of, an asapplied challenge. See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1257 (9th Cir. 2009). Parker knew that he needed a special use permit to operate his snowmobile business from the Salmon la Sac road. Roberson told him so before these incidents, Parker was previously cited for the same violation, and when Roberson confronted him in February, Parker said he would “take the ticket,” thus acknowledging that he knew “the rules of the road,” so to speak. Parker’s vagueness challenge to Part 261 is without merit.