Opinion ID: 358303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Individual Participation in the Conspiracy

Text: 42 It is, of course, fundamental that in order to establish participation in a conspiracy the government must show more than mere presence or association, United States v. Littrell, 5 Cir., 1978, 574 F.2d 828, 833. There must be evidence that the individual defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy and with that knowledge voluntarily joined the conspiracy, United States v. Littrell, supra, at 832; United States v. Marable, 5 Cir., 1978,574 F.2d 224, 229. 43 Because all three were directly involved in key transactions in the recited course of events, there can be no doubt that Berg, Lubov, and Cowen were members of the conspiracy. Berg was responsible for procuring the chemicals, he was present when two shipments of these chemicals were received, and accepted the delivery of one such shipment by signing the invoice, always hiding behind an alias. Lubov was present during all three deliveries of the chemicals, signed the invoices for two such shipments, and, further, purchased other chemicals and equipment that could be used in the manufacture of methaqualone, likewise using his alias. 44 Cowen was present during the delivery of one of the chemical shipments, purchased equipment that could be used in the laboratory, rented the Capri Street house when he already resided in a nearby apartment, and transferred the supplies from the warehouse to the Capri Street house. 45 That Berg and Lubov were never observed at the Capri Street residence does not command their exoneration. It was a part of the total picture to be evaluated by the jury. A conspirator need not be involved in every transaction comprising the conspiracy and need not work with every member of the conspiracy in order to be convicted, United States v. James, 5 Cir., 1978, 576 F.2d 1121, 1124, 1126. Without a doubt, the operations at the warehouse, for which Berg and Lubov were primarily responsible, were connected with those at Capri Street. Berg and Lubov are further linked to the Capri Street end of the conspiracy by their association with Cowen who was the chief actor in the Capri Street operations. 46 We next consider the cases of Gordon and Garcia. 47 On February 17, Gordon and Cowen drove separate vehicles to the warehouse. Garcia rode with Gordon. At the warehouse, Gordon and Garcia opened the garage doors to enable Cowen to back in his U-Haul truck. All three individuals remained inside the warehouse for thirty minutes and then drove to Capri Street with the warehouse supplies in Cowen's truck. During the course of this transfer Gordon operated his car as a counter-surveillance vehicle for Cowen. Upon their arrival at Capri Street, Gordon and Garcia assisted Cowen in backing up his truck to the garage. Ramps were then placed from the back of the truck to the garage. Cowen unloaded the supplies from the truck while Gordon and Garcia balanced them to prevent their falling. Gordon and Cowen went on a shopping spree and purchased certain equipment that could be used in the laboratory. Garcia picked Cowen up at a service station after Cowen returned his U-Haul truck there. Embarrassingly enough, Garcia was in the Capri Street residence when the search warrant was executed. 48 The evidence supports the conviction of all five defendants. IV 49 The Destruction of the Experimentally Produced Methaqualone 50 An important element of the government's case was the testimony of the DEA chemist, Dr. Hanel, that methaqualone could be and, in fact, had been manufactured by using three of the chemicals seized and laboratory equipment similar to that found at Capri Street. The methaqualone he had produced had been destroyed immediately. There is no indication that the government had an improper motive for destroying the methaqualone. As a result of this destruction, samples of the methaqualone so manufactured were not made available to the defendants and could not be introduced at the trial. However, the government did make available samples of the three seized chemicals that the government had used in producing the methaqualone. 51 The defendants first learned that the government produced methaqualone by using three of the chemicals seized at a June 13, 1977, hearing before a magistrate concerning the destruction of items that had been seized. The government was ordered to disclose the formula to the defendants. After unsuccessfully appealing the production order to the trial court, the government produced the formula on September 30, 1977, two weeks before trial. By this time, the defendants had used up their samples of the three essential chemicals originally seized by the agents. 52 On the afternoon of the second day of trial the defendants objected to testimony about the experiment conducted by Dr. Hanel. This objection was made prior to Dr. Hanel's taking the stand. Following a lengthy discussion between counsel and the trial court, the motions to exclude Dr. Hanel's testimony that he had manufactured methaqualone were denied. The trial court concluded that the defendants would not be improperly prejudiced by Dr. Hanel's testimony, reasoning that since the defendants had samples of the essential chemicals and of the formula they could determine on their own, with the aid of their chemist, whether methaqualone could be produced and, further, that the defendants would be able to effectively cross examine Dr. Hanel as to the procedures he followed to determine whether he could have actually produced methaqualone, Transcript at 351-353. The trial court also ruled that exclusion of Dr. Hanel's testimony was not required because the government had destroyed the methaqualone and therefore was no longer in possession of the substance within the meaning of F.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(C). 53 It is now contended that the failure of the trial court to exclude Dr. Hanel's testimony regarding his experiments offended Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. 54 We think that the product of Dr. Hanel's experiment was clearly discoverable under the specific terms of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) 5 and that the material instead of being destroyed should have been submitted for inspection. At the same time, it is equally clear that the destruction of the controlled substance was done in good faith, not for the purpose of inflicting a disadvantage upon the defendants. 55 The crucial issue, then, is whether the lack of the experimentally produced methaqualone requires reversal because it would have been likely to have changed the verdict, Armstrong v. Collier, 5 Cir., 1976, 536 F.2d 72, 77 (there dealing with an alleged violation of constitutionally guaranteed due process). Or, as the Supreme Court put it in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), did the absence of Dr. Hanel's product have any reasonable likelihood of affecting the judgment of the jury? An important factor to be considered in resolving that question is whether the evidence was crucial to a determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, United States v. Hildebrand, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 406. 56 If the defendants had been on trial for the actual manufacture of methaqualone and none of their own product had been seized and analyzed it might reasonably be said that the experimentally produced controlled substance was indeed crucial. The defendants were on trial, however, for Conspiring to manufacture. In such a case, since no overt act is required, they could have so conspired although they had been entirely mistaken in the belief that the materials they had would actually do the job. 57 Moreover, the failure of the government chemist to produce what he claimed to have manufactured could well have militated against his credibility. 58 The defense chemist, Dr. Cornette, testified that he had the necessary chemicals and equipment in his own laboratory with which to have conducted the Hanel experiment. Indeed, Dr. Cornette testified that he had experimented with the Hanel formula, submitted under protest by the government, and that it could not successfully be used for the manufacture of methaqualone. The government was then caught without the Hanel product which could have been submitted to a disinterested expert to verify its authenticity. The affair was thus reduced to a credibility contest between Hanel and Cornette, and Hanel had to testify without the one thing which could have elevated what he said to an almost irrefutable status. The jury could and did resolve the conflict (if it had any real affect on the verdict). We conclude, therefore, that if anybody suffered any prejudice from the absence of the experimentally manufactured methaqualone it was the government and that this aspect of the trial was not reasonably likely to have affected the verdict in a manner prejudicial to the defendants. Consequently, it provides no adequate ground for the reversal of these convictions. 59 The government chemist was on the witness stand, duly confronted, and cross-examined. There is no merit in the argument that the absence of the methaqualone denied the defendants a Sixth Amendment right, United States v. Herndon, 5 Cir., 1976, 536 F.2d 1027; United States v. Williams, 5 Cir., 1971, 447 F.2d 1285, 1288, 1291 (En Banc ). V Delegation 60 The defendants urge that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 unconstitutionally delegates the power to define otherwise legal activity as criminal to the United States Attorney General where it has been, in turn, delegated to the DEA. The defendants contend such delegation and sub-delegation is constitutionally impermissible on two grounds. First, certain relevant standards provided in the Act are unconstitutionally vague. Second, the delegation complained of violates the doctrine of the separation of powers by vesting the power to define crimes with the prosecutor. 61 The Act established five schedules of controlled substances, 18 U.S.C. § 812(a). Congress initially listed the substances to be placed on these schedules, Id. at § 812. In addition, the Act provides the Attorney General with the authority to schedule, transfer between schedules, or remove any drug or substance from a schedule in accordance with statutory procedures and criteria, Id. at § 811. Thus the Attorney General may, by rule, schedule or reschedule a drug if he 62 (A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for abuse, and 63 (B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings prescribed by subsection (b) of section 812 of this title for the schedule in which such drug is to be placed. 64 Id. at § 811(a). 65 Section 811(a) control proceedings must be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 Et seq. After gathering the necessary data but before initiating control proceedings under § 811(a), the Attorney General shall request a scientific and medical evaluation and recommendation whether a drug should be controlled from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Id. at § 811(b). The Secretary's recommendation shall be binding on the Attorney General with respect to scientific and medical matters and the Attorney General shall not control a drug if the Secretary so recommends. After receipt of the Secretary's report, the Attorney General shall initiate proceedings for control of a drug under § 811(a) if he determines that there is substantial evidence of a potential for abuse such as to warrant control . . .., Id. at § 811(b). 66 In determining whether to control a particular drug under § 811(a), the Attorney General shall consider certain criteria provided in § 811(c). The Act further provides criteria which must be met for the particular scheduling of a drug once it is determined that such drug should be controlled, Id. at § 812(b). 67 The Attorney General's authority under the Act was transferred to the DEA in 1973 pursuant to Executive Order No. 11727, 38 Fed.Reg. 18357 (1973). 68 The placement of a drug on a particular schedule will determine under what circumstances such drug can be manufactured, distributed, and used, See Id. at §§ 823-829 and, of particular importance here, the penalties for unauthorized manufacture, distribution, or possession, Id. at §§ 841(b)-848. 69 On two previous occasions delegation under the Act has been attacked in this Court. In United States v. Jones, 5 Cir., 1973, 480 F.2d 954, Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1071, 94 S.Ct. 582, 38 L.Ed.2d 476 (1973), it was argued that statutory procedures for reclassification of controlled substances was unconstitutionally vague. We declined to resolve this issue because the defendants were charged with violations of the Act involving marijuana, a substance placed on the schedules by Congress and not reclassified by the Attorney General, Id. at 960. In United States v. Westlake, 5 Cir., 1973, 480 F.2d 1225, we similarly declined to reach the issue whether the Act impermissibly delegated the power to reschedule drugs to the Attorney General when the defendants were charged with illegally importing cocaine, a drug initially scheduled by Congress and not subsequently rescheduled by the Attorney General, Id. at 1226. 70 In the case Sub judice, on the other hand, the defendants were charged with conspiring to manufacture methaqualone. Methaqualone was not initially scheduled by Congress in 1970 but rather was scheduled by the Administrator of the DEA in 1973, 38 Fed.Reg. 27519; 28 C.F.R. 1308.13(2)(1) (1973). We must therefore determine whether the authority under which the DEA scheduled the methaqualone was impermissibly delegated.A. Standards 71 The defendants contend that the delegation of authority to schedule drugs is unconstitutional because the standards provided in 21 U.S.C. §§ 811 and 812 are so vague and inadequate as to render a conviction for activities involving a drug scheduled pursuant to that delegated authority violative of due process. Specifically, the defendants point out that the potential for abuse finding which is a prerequisite to scheduling a drug under 21 U.S.C. § 811(a), 811(c) is nowhere defined in the Act. 72 The federal constitution provides that (A)ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, United States Constitution, Art. 1, § 1. Congress may not abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested, Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935); Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935). On the other hand, the federal constitution does not deprive Congress of 73 necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. 74 Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, supra; Schechter Corp. v. United States, supra, 295 U.S. at 530, 55 S.Ct. 837. 75 Thus, Congress is permitted to authorize other bodies to determine specific facts and may also establish general standards and delegate to others the responsibility of effectuating the legislative policy, Schechter Corp. v. United States, supra; Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, supra, 293 U.S. at 426, 55 S.Ct. 241. 76 Ordinarily, the standards provided by Congress in delegating power may be broad, United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274, 88 S.Ct. 419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967) (Brennan, J. concurring); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542, 543, 72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952). This is so because Congress is only required to legislate so far as reasonable and practicable. Carlson v. Landon, supra, at 542, 72 S.Ct. 525. Therefore, when considering an attack on congressional delegation, we must not only examine the entire Act to determine what standards, if any, have been provided but also whether such standards are sufficiently definite in light of the complexity of the area at which the legislation is directed and the susceptibility to change of the area in question, Carlson v. Landon, supra, at 542, 544, 72 S.Ct. 525; See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965). 77 Two circuits have faced the delegation issue now before us. Both circuits have concluded that the standards provided in the Act are not impermissibly vague. 78 In United States v. Pastor, 2 Cir., 1977, 557 F.2d 930, the potential for abuse standard was found to be sufficiently precise in light of the numerous other standards provided in the Act and the detailed legislative history relating directly to the abuse standard, Id. at 941. In addition the Pastor Court observed that the delegation is made pursuant to a clear statement of Congressional policy and thus the standards are consistent with this policy, Id. Moreover, they found it important to note that there is a necessity for speedy, detailed and expert agency action in the area of drug technology, Id. Finally, the detailed procedures to be followed in determining whether to control a drug and the availability of judicial review were found to provide more than adequate safeguards against arbitrary action by the Attorney General, Id. Pastor was followed in United States v. Friedman, 2 Cir., 1977, 558 F.2d 1125, where the defendant was convicted of offenses under the Act involving methaqualone. 79 In United States v. Davis, 9 Cir., 1977, 564 F.2d 840, Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S.Ct. 733, 54 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978), the Act was found to contain sufficient guidelines and standards in light of the numerous factors that must be accounted for under the Act before a drug may be controlled and, further, in light of the protections of the Administrative Procedure Act, Id. at 844. In reaching this conclusion, the Davis Court relied on the discussion of the district court in United States v. Piatti, E.D., N.Y., 1976, 416 F.Supp. 1202. There the defendant was convicted of offenses of the Act involving methaqualone. After reviewing the elaborate procedure mandated by Congress for the control of drugs the Piatti Court concluded that the standards and safeguards prescribed by §§ 811 and 812 would appear to be more than sufficient to meet the delegation objections raised by the defendant. 80 We agree with the conclusion and reasoning of Pastor, Friedman, Davis, and Piatti. Although there may be some ambiguity in the Act's standards, we believe these standards are sufficiently precise to apprise the delegatee of the circumstances under which a particular drug may be controlled. Moreover, given the constant changes in the area to be regulated, more precise standards could not be drawn without undermining the Act's purpose. Finally, there are sufficient safeguards against the arbitrary control of drugs. B. Separation of Powers 81 The defendants also contend that the delegation under the Act is improper on two additional grounds. First, because the DEA has the power to schedule drugs and thereby define otherwise lawful activity as unlawful, the defendants argue that Congress has impermissibly delegated the authority to legislate. Second, the power to schedule drugs has been delegated to the very body responsible for enforcement of the Act and therefore, the defendants urge, this concentration of power is inherently unfair. 82 It is well established that a delegatee may formulate rules for violation of which the statute itself provides penalties imposable by judicial process, Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127, 45 S.Ct. 34, 69 L.Ed. 202 (1924); McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397, 39 S.Ct. 324, 63 L.Ed. 668 (1919); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911); L. Jaffe & N. Nathanson, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (4th Ed., 1976) at 143. We conclude that the authority delegated under the Act is constitutionally permissible, United States v. Davis, supra, at 843, 844; United States v. Piatti, supra, at 1205, 1206. It is clear that the DEA was provided carefully limited and defined authority under the Act and that Congress, not the DEA, ultimately is responsible for the scheduling of drugs. The defendants' reliance on Howell v. Mississippi, 300 So.2d 774 (Miss., 1974) is misplaced. 83 We also conclude that delegation of the authority to schedule drugs is constitutionally permissible. As we have already noted the Act contains sufficient safeguards against arbitrary and, hence, unfair action by the DEA, United States v. Pastor, supra. 6 We also note that this is not a case where a law enforcement agency has wide discretion to define what conduct is criminal and the defendant, without notice of what specific conduct would be regarded as unlawful, was forced to act at his peril, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573, 575, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165, 169, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). Indeed, no contention is made by the defendants that they lacked notice that conspiring to manufacture methaqualone was unlawful. Thus, we are unable to see how the delegation here was unfair in any way. VI