Opinion ID: 2508491
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Materiality of the August 21, 2001 Modification

Text: ¶12 We first consider whether the August 21, 2001 modification to the July 21, 2001 judgment materially altered the substance of the judgment, thereby constituting a new final judgment for purposes of appeal. [6] The modification Garner refers to is a notation added to the description of his plea as conditional. We agree with the court of appeals that this notation was not a material change to the judgment. ¶13 As the court of appeals observed, Garner's plea was entered as a Sery [7] plea. Further, the original order already explicitly stated in the last paragraph `CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA' entered conditioned on being able to appeal detainer motion to dismiss. In other words, the original judgment stated that it was based on a conditional plea, and the later addition to the order further referencing that fact was a redundant addition, not a material change. See, e.g., Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that clerical clarification indicating plaintiff's entitlement to his taxable costs, in addition to attorney fees, was not of sufficient importance to change the character of the judgment and was [i]ndeed . . . completely unnecessary because costs are awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise orders).