Opinion ID: 4669093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Assault and Battery Claims

Text: With respect to her assault and battery claims relating to Sergeants Mattera and McManus, Tardif argues that she is entitled to a new trial on several grounds. 27 As to the trial testimony, Tardif argues that the district court erred in restricting the questions that could be asked on her direct examination regarding her personal background. Tardif’s remaining two grounds focus on the district court’s instructions to the jury on the defense of justification—that is, assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force. In particular, Tardif contends that a justification defense by a police officer is applicable under New York law only in an arrest situation and, thus, the district court erred in applying that instruction to the use of force by officers against her on March 21, 2012, because no arrest was being made. Moreover, Tardif asserts that the justification instruction erroneously advised the jury that the officer’s subjective intent was a permissible factor in assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct. As set forth below, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining objections to certain questions regarding Tardif’s background. We also conclude that the district court correctly determined that a justification defense exists under New York law for police officers utilizing force in a non-arrest situation. However, as the defendants concede, the instruction given to the jury was erroneous because it suggested that there was a subjective element to the reasonableness analysis, even though New York law (like federal law) uses an objective standard to assess 28 an officer’s use of force. We further conclude that, although the error was harmless as to the claim against Sergeant McManus (and the related respondeat superior claim against the City arising from Sergeant McManus’s alleged conduct) because justification was not at issue with respect to the claims against him, the error likely prejudiced Tardif as to the jury’s assessment of Sergeant Mattera’s conduct and warrants a new trial on the respondeat superior claim against the City arising from his alleged assault and battery.
Tardif contends that, during trial, the district court erred in limiting testimony regarding her personal background. Specifically, she contends that such testimony was necessary to demonstrate her commitment to social justice in order to rebut the City’s opening argument that she had exaggerated her story and was only suing for the money. In the City’s opening argument, defense counsel contended that Tardif was “inventing and exaggerating” the events surrounding each of her claims at trial, App’x at 679, and that she “want[ed the jury] to give her money for those inventions and exaggerations,” id. at 686. During Tardif’s direct examination, in addition to other background testimony regarding her involvement in the Occupy 29 Wall Street movement, her counsel attempted to elicit testimony regarding the fact that Tardif adopted two children from Honduras who were refugees, that Tardif herself was adopted from Peru, and that she worked as a sign language interpreter for hearing-impaired children. Following multiple, sustained objections by defense counsel, the district court at side bar instructed Tardif’s counsel that it did not “want [him] to elicit anything that plays upon the sympathy of jurors” but instead “to get right to the heart of matters.” Id. at 879. At the end of Tardif’s direct testimony, plaintiff’s counsel submitted an offer of proof as to how additional background testimony was necessary in order to rebut the City’s theory that her lawsuit was simply motivated by money. The district court declined the request to elicit such additional evidence, concluding that Tardif’s testimony had made clear “that her motives are pure and that she’s trying to make the world a better place” by making sure that “people who are arrested [are] treated appropriately.” Id. at 925-26. Tardif now challenges that evidentiary ruling. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and reverse only for manifest error. See Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 247 (2d Cir. 2003). Although relevant evidence is generally admissible, Fed. R. Evid. 402, district 30 courts “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Background evidence may provide necessary context to a witness’s substantive testimony, but district courts have “wide discretion concerning the admissibility of background evidence.” United States v. Blackwell, 853 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1988). Here, we conclude that the district court operated well within its broad discretion in limiting the scope of the testimony regarding Tardif’s personal background. More specifically, the district court determined that the proffered testimony—namely, Tardif’s adoption of two refugee children, her own adoption as a child, and her work as a sign language interpreter for hearing impaired children—might prejudice the jury by playing upon their sympathies and would waste time. Moreover, to the extent Tardif sought to introduce these details of her “social justice commitment” to rebut the City’s accusation that she was motivated by money in making the allegations in the lawsuit, App’x at 879, Tardif was permitted to testify to other facts establishing her concerns for social justice. For example, Tardif testified about the purpose of the Occupy Wall Street movement, 31 why she became involved with the movement, how she remains a member of Occupy Wall Street, how she feels about being part of the movement, why she continued to participate in protests after November 2011, and how she contributed to the protests by “tend[ing] to” protestors injured during marches as a “street [medic].” Id. at 884-85. The district court also, over defense counsel’s objection, allowed Tardif to testify as to why she brought this lawsuit. See id. at 924 (“I had originally wanted to make things better for people in custody that had disabilities so that there would be a standard protocol to treat people instead of just throwing them to the side.”). Thus, contrary to Tardif’s argument, the district court permitted Tardif, through her testimony, to rebut any suggestion by the City that she brought this action for financial reasons. Under these circumstances, it is well within a district court’s discretion to determine, under Rule 403, that the probative value of any additional background testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendants because of juror sympathy and by the additional time that would be necessary to explore that background, especially where the district court concluded that there had already been “so much wasted time from [Tardif’s] side.” Id. at 879. Accordingly, we conclude that this 32 evidentiary determination by the district court was not an abuse of discretion and provides no basis for a new trial.
Tardif also contends that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the availability of a justification defense to assault and battery claims under New York law. “We review a claim of error in the district court’s jury instructions de novo . . . .” Sheng v. M&TBank Corp., 848 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2014)). “A jury charge is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard, or if it does not adequately inform the jury of the law.” Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 116 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 552 (2d Cir. 1996)). In describing the purported error in this case, Tardif takes the position that under state law, “any force used” in a non-arrest context “must give rise to a claim for assault and battery,” and no justification is permitted. Appellant’s Br. at 38-39. Contrary to Tardif’s contention, New York courts have never articulated such a sweeping theory of assault-and-battery liability and we decline to do so here. Instead, as set forth below, we hold that New York law—consistent with federal Section 1983 excessive force jurisprudence—permits a police officer to use an 33 objectively reasonable degree of force in the performance of a public duty, including a non-arrest situation. The elements of New York assault and battery and Section 1983 excessive force claims are “substantially identical.” Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1991). Under New York law, civil assault “is an intentional placing of another person in fear of imminent harmful or offensive contact.” Charkhy v. Altman, 678 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (1st Dep’t 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Girden v. Sandals Int'l, 262 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2001). Civil battery “is an intentional wrongful physical contact with another person without consent.” Charkhy, 678 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Girden, 262 F.3d at 203. To succeed on assault or battery claims in the law enforcement context, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant officer’s conduct “was not reasonable within the meaning of the New York statute concerning justification of law enforcement’s use of force in the course of their duties.” Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 391 (2d Cir. 2005); accord Jamison v. Metz, 541 F. App’x 15, 20 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order). 34 New York Penal Law § 35.30 establishes a justification defense for an officer’s use of force in the performance of several enumerated public duties. The statute states, in relevant part, that: A police officer . . . may use physical force when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect [an] arrest, or to prevent [an] escape from custody, or in self-defense or to defend a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30(1). 13 Section 35.30(1) “requires the jury to conduct precisely the same analysis as does the reasonableness standard” under the Fourth Amendment. Heath v. Henning, 854 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, per the text of the statute, the use of physical force “when and to the extent [the officer] reasonably believes such to be necessary,” is the “functional equivalent” of an objective reasonableness standard. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30(1)). Although Tardif argues that this justification defense is limited to 13Although codified in New York’s penal law compilation, New York courts have applied Section 35.30 to both civil and criminal claims against police officers. Compare Brunelle v. City of New York, 702 N.Y.S.2d 648, 648-49 (2d Dep’t 2000) (applying the justification statute to civil action against the City by police officer seeking to recover damages from injury sustained from fellow officer in the course of performing their duties), with People v. Colecchia, 674 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1st Dep’t 1998) (applying the justification statute to manslaughter charge against police officer). 35 the circumstances enumerated in Section 35.30(1), and thus cannot apply to a nonarrest situation involving crowd control, we disagree for several reasons. First, we have never limited public authority defenses under New York law to arrest situations. To the contrary, as noted above, we held in Nimely that, even though justification is a defense under New York Penal Law, a lack of justification is part of a plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating the unreasonableness of an officer’s action “in the course of their duties.” 414 F.3d at 391. Second, both the penal law and case authority in New York make clear the limited grounds for justification articulated in Section 35.30 are not meant to be exhaustive as it relates to any police action. With respect to the statutory framework, New York Penal Law § 35.05(1) states, in relevant part, that “use of physical force . . . is justifiable and not criminal when . . . [it] is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of his official powers, duties or functions.” Id. (emphasis added); see also People v. Mattison, 428 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (3d Dep’t 1980) (“[Section 35.05(1)] is chiefly meant to afford limited protection when provisions defining malum prohibitum offenses are violated in the performance of official responsibilities.”). 14 The New York Court of Appeals likewise, without 14Tardif’s assertion that the New York Pattern Jury Instructions (“PJI”) on a justification defense support her interpretation of New York law is also unavailing. Appellant’s Br. 36 any reference to limitations on the use of force to arrest situations, has described the analysis of a police officer’s use of force as more broadly focusing upon whether such force was “more than necessary under all the circumstances.” Jones v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 275, 280 (1973) (analyzing force used by corrections officer during a riot at a prison under the same standard as would be used by the police in “making an arrest, maintaining someone in custody or investigating a traffic infraction”); see also Kline v. State, 278 N.Y. 615, 616 (1938) (finding that liability existed for an assault on plaintiff by troopers during a clash with a group of people on a highway trying to block a truck, where the force was “without cause or provocation and unjustifiable”); Disla v. City of New York, 986 N.Y.S. 2d 463, 465 (1st Dep’t 2014) (stating that “battery committed in the performance of a public duty” requires “excessive force”). Pursuant to this legal framework, New York courts have dismissed assault and battery claims in non-arrest situations where it was clear from the record that at 37 (citing 2A N.Y. PJI–Civil 3:4). The pattern instruction is based upon New York Penal Law § 35.30 and discusses the circumstances enumerated in that section, including an arrest. However, nothing in the PJI suggests that such situations are exclusive. To the contrary, the instruction at issue is broadly entitled “Battery Committed in Performance of Public Duty or Authority.” 2A N.Y. PJI–Civil 3:4 (emphasis added). Moreover, the comment for this instruction also broadly references “performance of a public duty,” which would undoubtedly include crowd control by a police officer. See id. cmt. at 24-25. 37 the use of force was justified and reasonable. In Harris v. City of New York, for example, the Second Department affirmed the dismissal of assault and battery claims because officers, while executing a search warrant for the plaintiff’s house, used “reasonable force to effectuate the detention of the occupants” by handcuffing them for the duration of the search. 62 N.Y.S.3d 411, 413-14 (2d Dep’t 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, in Ahmad v. City of New York, the First Department held that “minor contact between plaintiff’s and the officer’s hands did not constitute excessive force,” where an officer effecting a traffic stop on foot made contact with the plaintiff while reaching into the car for the gear shift. 15 101 N.Y.S.3d 48, 49 (1st Dep’t 2019). Finally, we note that Tardif’s position would render a police officer incapable of performing some of his or her most basic functions and responsibilities using reasonable force, without being subject to civil liability for 15 In this regard, New York law is entirely consistent with the scope of the analysis of a police officer’s use of force under the Fourth Amendment in both arrest and non-arrest situations. More specifically, in Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court recognized that, where the use of force occurs “in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen,” courts should analyze the reasonableness of the use of force, which generally requires “a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 38 assault or battery. In other words, if an officer’s ability to lawfully use any force is constrained to the narrow contours of Section 35.30, a police officer would have no authority to make any degree of physical contact in the performance of a plethora of non-arrest duties, such as patting down a suspect during a traffic stop, stopping a distracted pedestrian from walking into oncoming traffic, or engaging in basic crowd control on New Year’s Eve in a packed Times Square or at a large demonstration. Thus, Tardif’s interpretation of New York law is not only contrary to the relevant case authority, but also defies logic from a practical standpoint. See Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.) (“It is axiomatic, for instance, that government officials may stop or disperse public demonstrations or protests where ‘clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears.’” (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940))); see also Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 541-42 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Our sister circuits and district courts in this Circuit have routinely applied excessive force principles to crowd control situations. Training our focus on controlling authority, we see that this Court has repeatedly emphasized that officers engaging with protesters must 39 comply with the same principles of proportionality attendant to any other use of force.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, although neither of the two police encounters at issue on March 21, 2012 involved Tardif’s arrest, we hold that the district court correctly determined, under New York law, that the jury should be given an instruction regarding justification in connection with Tardif’s assault and battery claims involving Sergeants Mattera and McManus as it related to their alleged use of force on that date.
Tardif further argues that the justification instruction that the district court provided to the jury on the assault and battery claims was erroneous because it included a subjective element in the jury’s assessment of the reasonableness of the officers’ use of force. We agree. When charging the jury regarding the assault and battery claims prior to the commencement of deliberations, the district court instructed that assault is “the intentional placing of another person in fear of imminent harmful or offensive conduct,” and that battery occurs when a person “intentionally touches another person without that person’s consent and thereby causes an offensive bodily 40 contact.” App’x at 1076-77. The district court explained that, when an alleged assault or battery occurred during a lawful arrest, a plaintiff must prove that the police conduct or use of force was “unreasonabl[e] under the circumstances.” Id. at 1077; see also id. at 1078 (“If the alleged battery occurred during a lawful arrest, plaintiff must also prove that the officers’ use of force was unreasonable in light of the circumstances.”). The district court further instructed—over Tardif’s objection—that, in determining whether the officers “acted unreasonably under the circumstances,” the jury “may consider the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of any injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 1077 (instruction concerning assault); see also id. 1078 (same with respect to battery). The district court failed to provide additional instructions regarding assault and battery claims in a non-arrest context. On the morning the deliberations began, the jury sent a note, requesting to view all video evidence involving Sergeant Mattera at standard speed and in slow motion, and asking whether there is “anything unique about a police [officer] carrying out a law enforcement function (but not a lawful arrest) that should be 41 considered when assessing an assault and battery claim.” Id. at 1203. The district court—again over Tardif’s objection—responded with a supplemental instruction that repeated the initial charge that was given for an arrest situation: The answer to your question is that because police have the obligation to maintain the public peace and to keep individuals safe, you can determine whether they acted reasonably, and in determining that . . . you may consider the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of any injury inflicted, whether the force was applied in good faith—in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline— or maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm. Id. at 1105. The district court’s instruction was based upon our decision in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), partially rejected by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), where we addressed the relevant factors for a Fourteenth Amendmentbased excessive force analysis for pretrial detainees. We conclude, as the City concedes, that the subjective intent language in the initial instruction, as well as in the supplemental instruction, was erroneous. It is well settled under New York law, with respect to assault and battery claims, that the use of force by a police officer is analyzed “under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness.” Hernandez v. Denny’s Corp., 114 N.Y.S.3d 147, 151 (4th Dep’t 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Harris, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 414. Thus, New York law is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 42 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as set forth in Graham, which explicitly rejected the argument that the use of Glick’s “malicious and sadistic” factor is “merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.” 490 U.S. at 397. The Graham Court explained that “[w]hatever the empirical correlations between ‘malicious and sadistic’ behavior and objective unreasonableness may be, the fact remains that the ‘malicious and sadistic’ factor puts in issue the subjective motivations of the individual officers, which our prior cases make clear has no bearing on whether a particular seizure is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Thus, the Court emphasized that “[t]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of ‘objective reasonableness’ under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like ‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place in that inquiry.” Id. at 399; accord Heath, 854 F.2d at 9 (“There is no room for consideration of the officer’s motives or intent under this standard . . . and no requirement that an officer have acted with an improper motive in order to have acted unreasonably.”). 16 16We also note that, even with respect to excessive force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment (from which the Glick framework derived), the Supreme Court has limited the application of the Glick factors and clarified the applicable standard for such claims brought by pretrial detainees. More specifically, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, although noting that the fourth Glick factor (i.e., a malicious and sadistic purpose to cause harm) “might help show that the use of force was excessive,” 576 U.S. 389, 402 (2015), the 43 In short, the jury should not have been told that, in assessing the reasonableness of the police officer’s use of force, they could consider “whether the force was applied in good faith—in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline—or maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.” App’x at 1105 (supplemental jury instruction); see also id. at 1077-78 (initial jury instruction). Once it is demonstrated that an individual police officer intended to use force of some kind, the subjective motivations of that officer simply have no bearing on whether the particular degree of force used is unreasonable and excessive under the Fourth Amendment or New York law. Accordingly, because the district court’s initial instruction and supplemental instruction on the assault and battery claims incorporated a subjective element, those instructions were erroneous. C. Harmless Error Analysis Although conceding that the district court incorrectly charged the jury on the officers’ subjective intent, the City argues that Tardif has failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice warranting a new trial on her assault and battery claims. We Supreme Court emphasized that “the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one,” id. at 397; see also Edrei, 892 F.3d at 537 (describing Kingsley’s “new formulation” of an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment as “a modest refinement of Glick’s four-factor test” because “our own precedents . . . have repeatedly assessed excessive force claims without looking to subjective intent”). 44 hold that the charging error prejudiced Tardif’s assault and battery claims involving Sergeant Mattera (as asserted against the City), but that the error was harmless as to her claim against Sergeant McManus, as well as the corresponding respondeat superior claim against the City. An erroneous instruction requires a new trial if we find that the error is not harmless. See Uzoukwu v. City of New York, 805 F.3d 409, 418 (2d Cir. 2015). Error in a jury instruction is not harmless “when an appellant can show that the instructions considered as a whole prejudiced [her].” Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 118 (2d Cir. 2003) (erroneous instruction not harmless when “th[e] evidence could support a jury’s reaching the opposite conclusion” had it been instructed correctly). With respect to Sergeant Mattera, there are several factors that collectively preclude us from finding that the erroneous instruction was harmless. As a threshold matter, this is not a situation where the jury was initially provided with a correct instruction, and the district court then misspoke in re-stating the law at some other juncture in the charge. The jury was given the erroneous instruction on subjective intent during the initial charge when the elements of the assault and 45 battery claims were set forth, and that same erroneous instruction was reiterated in response to a jury note. Thus, the jury was never provided with the correct instruction on those claims. The City points to a portion of the initial charge where the district court discussed how the plaintiff must show that “any force used was objectively unreasonable” and “without regard to his underlying intention or motivation.” App’x at 1069. Importantly, however, that instruction related to the excessive force claim under Section 1983 against Sergeant McManus. We have no reason to believe that the jury would have assumed that such language would apply to a different defendant on different claims, especially where the actual instruction on the assault and battery claims not only omitted the critical language as it relates to this issue (that is, “objectively” and “without regard to his underlying intention or motivation”) but also affirmatively told them that good faith did apply to those claims. See, e.g., Hudson v. New York City, 271 F.3d 62, 6970 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that, even though the district court referenced “objective reasonableness” at some point in its instruction, it did not cure the defect caused by earlier reference to defendant’s intent because it made it “confusing as to whether intent to do wrong was required to find a violation of [plaintiff’s] Fourth 46 Amendment rights”). Therefore, we disagree with the City’s assessment that the error in the instruction was “technical[]” or “minor.” Appellee’s Br. at 2, 18. Moreover, we need not guess as to whether the jury was focused upon this particular instruction during their deliberations as it relates to the assault and battery claims involving Sergeant Mattera, because there was a note during deliberations that makes that focus abundantly clear. As noted above, at around 10:20 a.m. on the first day of deliberations, the jury sent a note, requesting to view all video evidence involving Sergeant Mattera at standard speed and in slow motion, and asking whether there is “anything unique about a police [officer] carrying out a law enforcement function (but not a lawful arrest) that should be considered when assessing an assault and battery claim.” App’x at 1203. Tellingly, because the initial charge only referenced the reasonableness standard in the context of an arrest situation, the jury astutely sent this note asking what standard applied when the officer used force in a non-arrest situation, as they were simultaneously seeking to review evidence regarding Sergeant Mattera. In response to that note, the district court again repeated the erroneous instruction, thus advising the jury that the analysis included “whether the force was applied in good faith—in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline—or 47 maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 1105. The district court then replayed the requested videos for the jury. At around 2:15 p.m., after several additional hours of deliberation, the jury again requested to review video recordings of the incident with Sergeant Mattera and also requested to review transcripts of both Sergeant Mattera’s and Tardif’s testimony regarding their encounter. After viewing the video of the encounter with Sergeant Mattera multiple times and conducting additional deliberations over the course of the next ninety minutes, the jury reached a verdict in favor of the City and the individual defendants. In short, the substance and timing of the note, in the overall context of the jury’s undeniable focus on the evidence involving Sergeant Mattera, together raise a substantial concern that the jury’s decision on the assault and battery claims involving Sergeant Mattera may have been impacted by the erroneous instruction. See, e.g., Heath, 854 F.2d at 8-9 (new trial required where the district court gave an instruction when initially charging the jury, and again when receiving a note, erroneously stating that a finding of malice was required for plaintiff to prove the officer’s unreasonable use of deadly force). The receipt of the note and the potential effect of the erroneous instruction are further magnified by the nature of the proof that the jury was considering as 48 to Sergeant Mattera’s conduct, which could have naturally placed his intent at the forefront of the jury’s discussions. Although the parties provided different accounts regarding the lead-up to Sergeant Mattera’s grabbing of Tardif, Sergeant Mattera admitted that he “grabbed” Tardif, “pull[ed] her off to the side,” which caused her body to “twist[] around,” and that he then “lost grip of her and she fell down.” App’x at 781, 797. A frame-by-frame video recording of the incident, although evolving rapidly, also shows Sergeant Mattera grabbed her. However, a significant portion of Sergeant Mattera’s testimony related to his motivations and good faith, thereby implicating the erroneous instruction. For example, Sergeant Mattera testified that Tardif suddenly appeared in his field of vision and it looked like she was about to run into the back of another police officer. To “prevent the situation from further escalating,” he “instinctively” used force against her in order to prevent a possible collision. Id. at 801. Sergeant Mattera further stated that he did not intend for Tardif to fall to the ground and that he was unable to break her fall. He also testified that he believed that he had used “the minimal amount of force that [he] needed to use.” 17 Id. at 803. 17Although the City’s summation primarily focused on the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct without reference to mental state, we note that there was a reference in the summation to the officers not being “these cruel, violent monsters” as plaintiff implied, id. at 1050-51, which also could have, in combination with Sergeant Mattera’s testimony 49 Given Sergeant Mattera’s testimony, even if the jury credited Tardif’s and Daniel Shockley’s testimony and found that the degree of force employed by Sergeant Mattera was excessive under the circumstances, they could have also credited Sergeant Mattera’s testimony and concluded that he had no bad motive in using the excessive force. Such findings, if considered in the context of the erroneous instruction, could have led the jury to find in Sergeant Mattera’s favor because, even though he applied objectively unreasonable force, he did so “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” and not “maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 1105 (supplemental jury instruction). That verdict, if based on those findings and the erroneous instruction, would have been contrary to New York law and thus prejudiced Tardif. See Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that erroneous instruction that allowed consideration of subjective intent of the police officer was not harmless because “[u]nder the district court’s instruction, the jury could have concluded that there was no violation because [the officer] did not intend to use enough force to break [plaintiff’s] jaw”); see also Callahan v. Wilson, 863 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2017) and the faulty instruction, erroneously (though perhaps inadvertently) further focused the jury on the issues of subjective intent, such as good faith or malice. We further note that the City’s summation was silent on whether the reasonableness standard was objective or subjective. 50 (holding that erroneous instruction on the use of deadly force was not harmless because it “allowed the jury to decide the case on different grounds than [the law] permits”). In reaching this decision, we recognize that it is also entirely possible that the jury’s verdict in favor of the City on Sergeant Mattera’s conduct could have been based upon a finding, entirely independent of his motive, that his use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. To find harmless error, however, we must be “convinced that the error did not influence the jury’s verdict.” Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000). That standard has simply not been met as it relates to the assault and battery claims pertaining to Sergeant Mattera when the erroneous instruction is considered, in light of the substance of the jury note and the nature of the proof surrounding his conduct. See Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 67 F.3d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that charging error required retrial because “[w]e d[id] not know what the jury would have done had it received a correct instruction”). Accordingly, Tardif is entitled to a new trial on the respondeat superior claim against the City based upon Sergeant Mattera’s alleged assault and battery. 51 With respect to the assault and battery claims against Sergeant McManus, the focus of the evidence and issues were entirely different, and we thus find that the district court’s charging error was clearly harmless. Unlike the testimony regarding the force used by Sergeant Mattera, the jury was presented with no evidence regarding Sergeant McManus’s subjective intent for using force because he testified that he never used any force against Tardif. Sergeant McManus testified that he first noticed Tardif when she was on the ground approximately fifteen feet from him. He categorically and repeatedly denied having any physical contact with Tardif. See, e.g., App’x at 827 (“Q. You didn’t shove her in her chest while she was on crutches? A. No.”); id. at 833 (“Q. But it’s possible you made contact with her, isn’t that right? A. No.”); id. at 837-38 (“Q. Would you push a woman off of her crutches simply because she was asking you for the name of another officer? A. Absolutely not.”). To be sure, Tardif testified that Sergeant McManus came “through the [police] line . . . and . . . pushed” her off of her crutches while she was attempting to locate the officer from the incident earlier that morning. Id. at 905. However, if the jury credited Tardif’s testimony, that gratuitous use of force would have been unreasonable no matter what the circumstances. In fact, in the City’s summation, 52 Tardif’s testimony was summarized as claiming “for no reason at all Sergeant McManus comes running out of the police line, his brow is furrowed, his skin is blazing red, and he is filled with rage, and he pushes her off her crutches like some villain from a Charles Dickens novel.” Id. at 1037-38. The City, in addition to questioning Tardif’s credibility as to whether any officer did that at all, argued to the jury (from the testimony and photos) that it could not have been Sergeant McManus. Therefore, even in the face of these starkly different versions of events, the jury would have had no occasion under either version to consider whether Sergeant McManus subjectively used force in good faith, and thereby rely on the incorrect elements of the instruction. The only question—assuming the jury found that a police officer had gratuitously pushed Tardif off of her crutches—would have been whether Sergeant McManus was that officer or not. Given the limited nature of the evidentiary dispute regarding the claims against Sergeant McManus, we are confident that the erroneous instruction regarding subjective intent could not possibly have influenced the jury’s verdict in Sergeant McManus’s favor on those claims and, therefore, the error was harmless. See, e.g., Hill v. Kemp, 833 F.2d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that erroneous instruction on intent was harmless 53 where alibi defense was asserted and there was no argument that a lack of intent existed for the person who committed the offense); Hill v. Quigley, 784 F. App’x 16, 20 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (holding that any error from reference to intent in a use of lethal force instruction was harmless because “intent was not at issue at trial”). Accordingly, no new trial is warranted as to the assault and battery claims against Sergeant McManus and the respondeat superior claim against the City related to his conduct based upon the erroneous instruction.