Opinion ID: 430879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Claims Against Brown and Georgia-Pacific

Text: 32 Appellants contend that the district court erred in finding that their cause of action against Brown and Georgia-Pacific for breach of oral promises was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. 12 Appellants argue that the complaint they filed in May 1979 was timely because the cause of action accrued on one of three dates: 1) in October 1977, when PBGC conclusively denied appellants' window period claim; 2) in July 1977, when the trustees of the Georgia-Pacific Pension Plan purchased the annuity which would pay reduced pension benefits; or 3) in July 1978, when the litigation between Georgia-Pacific and Brown for appellants' pro rata share from the Brown Pension Plan was resolved. 13 33 It is well established that the statute of limitations for breach of an oral promise begins to run from the time of the breach. See Hoffa v. Fitzsimmons, 499 F.Supp. 357, 366 n. 39 (D.D.C.1980), remanded on other grounds, 673 F.2d 1345 (D.C.Cir.1982). Contrary to appellants' assertion, the companies' oral promises, if they exist at all, were breached no later than April 1975. By April 1975, the trustees of the Georgia-Pacific Pension Plan had notified appellants of the decision to reduce appellants' pension benefits. Appellants could then have sued the companies for breach of oral promise. Because appellants waited until May 1979 to file their complaint, they are barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Oppenheim v. Campbell, 571 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C.Cir.1978) (litigant's action accrues when his right to resort to court is perfected). 34 The alternative dates asserted by appellants must be rejected. As the district court noted: 35 [Appellants] advance the untenable legal position that a statute of limitations on one claim does not run until [appellants] exhaust all other potential claims that could eliminate their alleged loss. That argument must be rejected because it would allow plaintiffs to determine when various statutes of limitations commence dependent upon the legal theories they choose to advance at a particular time. Statutes of limitations must remain objective standards that are triggered as soon as litigants' rights have been breached. 36 J.A. at 918-A to 919 (footnote omitted). Appellants' alleged rights were breached no later than April 1975. Accordingly, appellants are barred by the statute of limitations in their claim against the companies for breach of oral promises. 14 37
38 Appellants contend that the district court erred in finding they have no contractual rights under the purchase and sale agreement. Appellants argue that they are third party beneficiaries of the agreement, and that both companies guaranteed in article 7(b) that the benefits under the Georgia-Pacific Pension Plan would be equal to or better than those under the Brown Pension Plan. 39 Assuming, but not holding, that appellants are third party beneficiaries, 15 we agree with the district court that article 7(b) of the agreement provides no support for an express or implied promise by either Brown or [Georgia-Pacific] to guarantee [appellants'] pension funds. J.A. at 916. Articles 7(b)(i) and (ii) require Georgia-Pacific to bargain collectively with appellants on the subject of pensions, and to establish as a goal pension benefits for appellants comparable to those appellants would have received under the Brown Pension Plan. Supra note 1. Setting a goal of achieving comparable benefits in collective bargaining does not constitute a binding promise that such benefits will be achieved. 16 Moreover, and more importantly, Georgia-Pacific fully complied with articles 7(b)(i) and (ii) when it entered into a collective bargaining agreement that provided pension benefits that were at least comparable to those provided by Brown. 17 40 Similarly, we find no basis for a contractual claim based on article 7(b)(iii) of the agreement. Under that provision, Brown agreed to transfer to Georgia-Pacific appellants' pro rata share of money in the Brown Pension Plan, and Georgia-Pacific agreed to apply this money to appellants' new pension plan. Supra note 1. Both companies fully complied with this provision. Moreover, any claim that Brown transferred an inadequate amount of money to Georgia-Pacific has been fully adjudicated. See supra note 13. Accordingly, appellants may not now assert contractual rights under article 7(b) of the agreement. 18 III. CONCLUSION 41 For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court's judgments for PBGC, Brown, and Georgia-Pacific. 42 Affirmed.