Opinion ID: 163082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crown Point's Due Process Claim

Text: 18 In order to prevail on its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that it suffered a deprivation of a federally protected right. See Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir.2000). Crown Point claims a deprivation of its Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. To state a claim for a violation of due process, plaintiff must first establish that it has a protected property interest and, second, that defendants' actions violated that interest. See Weathers v. West Yuma County Sch. Dist., 530 F.2d 1335, 1337 (10th Cir.1976). We need only address the first condition because we conclude that Crown Point has failed to establish that it has a protected property interest. 19 A property interest includes a legitimate claim of entitlement to some benefit created and defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Here, plaintiff alleges that it has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the special use review procedures set forth in Parker's Land Development Code § 13.04.205. Specifically, it alleges that it has a property interest in the right to proceed on the assumption that a governing body will follow its own mandatory notice and public hearing procedures as set forth in a city code, before depriving a landowner of the use and enjoyment of its property. Appellant's Brief at 34. Crown Point contends that had the hearing been held, as the local ordinance requires, it would have had the opportunity to persuade the Town Council that the Northern Route was not appropriate. The District Court found that plaintiff had not established a property interest because [it] would have no reasonable guarantee of prevailing on its request that the transmission line be rerouted even if the omitted hearing had taken place. (A.299.) 20 It is well established that the mere existence of an entitlement to a hearing under state law, without further substantive limitation, does not give rise to an independent substantive [property] interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.1991); see also Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir.1989) (In order to give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest, a statute or ordinance must go beyond mere procedural guarantees to provide some substantive criteria limiting the state's discretion.). In this case, Crown Point has pointed to no criteria in the procedures set forth in the Land Development Code that would limit Parker's discretion in granting or denying Intermountain's proposed land use. 21 As we explained in Hyde Park, when a party challenges a land use decision by a governing body on due process grounds, the proper inquiry is whether that body had limited discretion in granting or denying a particular zoning or use application. See Hyde Park, 226 F.3d at 1210. 4 A property interest exists if discretion is limited by the procedures in question, that is, whether the procedures, if followed, require a particular outcome. Id. However, where the governing body retains discretion and the outcome of the proceeding is not determined by the particular procedure at issue, no property interest is implicated. Id. (Whether a property interest exists in the outcome of a particular zoning board decision depends not on the probability of a favorable result, but on the degree of discretion vested in the decision-maker.) 22 We find additional support for our conclusion in the Colorado Supreme Court's recent decision in Hillside Comty. Church v. Olson, 58 P.3d 1021 (Colo.2002). In that case, the court held that a state procedural failure alone ... does not create a violation of constitutional proportions. 58 P.3d at 1027. In Olson, the city of Golden's Municipal Code required it to hold a public hearing before granting a special use permit to a landowner. Plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arguing that their due process rights were violated because the city failed to hold the required public hearing before allowing a neighboring church to build an addition on the property. Plaintiffs contended that they had a legitimate claim of entitlement to participate in a special use permit hearing. In denying plaintiffs' claim, the Colorado Supreme Court explained that there can be no property right in mere procedure. 58 P.3d at 1026. The court continued: The crux of our examination is not compliance with or violation of the prescribed procedure; rather, it is determining whether Respondents had a preexisting entitlement which gives rise to constitutional due process guarantees, an inquiry we answer in the negative. Id. at 1027. 23 In the case before us, Crown Point states that it has legitimate claim of entitlement to participate in a hearing prior to Parker's approval of Intermountain's proposed land use. However, it fails to point to any limitation on Parker's discretion that would create a protectible property interest in the special use review procedure. 24 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.