Opinion ID: 806661
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inapplicability of any exception

Text: The petitioner having carried her burden, we now consider whether Rivera Castillo has established that an exception to the Convention applies. Rivera Castillo argues that the “consent” exception set out in Article 13 of the Convention applies in this case. Under this exception, a district court is not bound to return a wrongfully removed or retained child if the respondent demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner “had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention.” Hague Convention, art. 13(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). We agree with the district court that Rivera Castillo’s argument is unavailing. As previously discussed in the context of our review of the parties’ latest “shared intent,” Asuncion Mota’s consent to her daughter’s relocation was conditioned upon her own ability to join father and daughter in New York. The 18 failure of this condition annulled Asuncion Mota’s consent. Cf. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “[t]he nature and scope of the petitioner’s consent, and any conditions or limitations, should be taken into account” in examining a consent defense under Article 13 of the Convention). Rivera Castillo also urges us to consider whether the exception set forth in Article 12 of the Convention might apply here. Under Article 12, a court is not bound to return a wrongfully removed or retained child if the respondent shows by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the return proceeding was commenced more than one year after the wrongful removal or retention, and (2) that the child “is now settled in its new environment.” Hague Convention, art. 12; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). But Rivera Castillo did not raise this issue before the district court, and makes only passing reference to it in his reply brief on appeal. We therefore treat this argument as waived. See In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Although we may exercise discretion to consider waived arguments where necessary to avoid a manifest injustice, the circumstances normally do not militate in favor of an exercise of discretion to address new arguments on appeal where those arguments were available to the parties below and they proffer no reason for their failure to raise [them].” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that “stating an issue without advancing an argument, or raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief” do not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal). 19 Moreover, declining to consider this new issue does not result in a “manifest injustice,”see Nortel Networks, 539 F.3d at 133, particularly in light of the urgent need for definitive custody proceedings to begin and this suit to be resolved. Rivera Castillo has not developed an adequate record on which to decide whether Elena is “settled” in her new environment—a standard different from that of acclimatization, developed in Gitter. Hewing to the salutary principle that exceptions to the Convention must be interpreted narrowly, see 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4); Blondin, 189 F.3d at 246, we are doubtful that the exception would apply even were we to reach this issue.