Opinion ID: 1245622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Penn Central Governs This Case

Text: Byrd's regulatory-inverse-condemnation action is governed by Penn Central because it stems from Byrd's having suffered a temporary denial of less than all economically viable use of his property. [8] Until recently, there might have been some confusion as to whether a case like Byrd's was governed by Penn Central, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980), or both. In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc ., which overruled Agins, it is clear that Penn Central controls. ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876. To the extent that some of our previous cases have applied Agins alone or both Agins and Penn Central, we overrule them. Infra, note 9. The general rule is that regulatory-takings cases require essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, balancing all relevant circumstances to determine whether the government has taken property. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d at 648. Two circumstances are especially important: (1) the economic impact on the claimant, and, particularly, the extent to which the [government] has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (2) the character of the governmental action. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d at 648; [9] see also Denene, Inc. v. City of Charleston, 359 S.C. 85, 98-99, 596 S.E.2d 917, 924 (2004); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 345 S.C. 418, 430, 548 S.E.2d 595, 601 (2001). When, however, it has been factually determined that a property owner has been deprived of all economic use of his property, there is a taking per se. [10] Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2892-95, 120 L.Ed.2d 798, 812-15 (1992). Because Byrd's loss was only temporary, and because Byrd was able to farm his property, no taking per se occurred here. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court held that Lucas does not apply when the property owner has suffered a temporary loss of all economically viable use. 535 U.S. 302, 331-32, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1484, 152 L.Ed.2d 517, 546-47 (2002). Because time is a component of an interest in property, the property owner in that situation has suffered a partial loss, not a total one. Once the temporary restriction is lifted, value will return. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32, 122 S.Ct. at 1484, 152 L.Ed.2d at 546. In such a case, the court must apply Penn Central to determine whether there has been a taking. The City argues that Byrd's case is distinguishable from Tahoe-Sierra in that Byrd has not alleged a temporary loss of all economically viable use. As a matter of law, the City asserts, there is no taking if the property owner has suffered a temporary loss of only part of the economically viable use of the property. We disagree. While this case might be factually different from Tahoe-Sierra, there the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the adoption of categorical rules in the context of regulatory takings. If Lucas does not apply, then Penn Central does. [11] That is the case here.