Opinion ID: 1134602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff's Collateral Attack

Text: The City's second contention is that plaintiff is barred from collaterally attacking the County Court's 1952 order because (1) the only means of challenging the 1952 order is by writ of review, [9] and plaintiff's predecessor in interest failed to pursue that remedy, and (2) plaintiff's collateral attack is barred by the passage of time. In light of our conclusion above that the Lane County Court never validly acquired the property of plaintiff's predecessor in interest, we must reject the City's contention that plaintiff is now barred from seeking a remedy because her predecessor failed to challenge the County Court's 1952 order by writ of review. On this point we agree with the analysis contained in Judge Joseph's concurring opinion below: On the record before us, the defendant city simply entered on property it did not own. It did not own it because the County had never got beyond the stage of simply declaring its intention to take the property by resolution    and posting the notices. 32 Or. App. at 326, 574 P.2d at 343. We find the City's claim that plaintiff's remedy is barred by the passage of time equally unconvincing. The City argues that plaintiff's predecessor in interest had to challenge the County Court decision within 60 days, the period established by the writ of review statute. [10] Alternatively, the City argues that plaintiff's claim is barred by the statutes of limitation because more than 10 years have passed since the order of the County Court. [11] Both of these arguments beg the basic question, which is whether or not the 1952 order was binding on plaintiff's predecessor. If it were, plaintiff would lose on the merits. If not, the present controversy simply arises out of a trespass by the City that occurred in 1975. With respect to the City's claim that plaintiff's remedy is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, we are generally in agreement with the analysis contained in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, even were we to agree with the City that plaintiff was on notice of the County's claim when she purchased her property in 1967, we are aware of no rule of law that would require plaintiff to immediately have brought a declaratory judgment procedure or the like in order to determine whether that claim was valid. There was no actual interference with plaintiff's rights until the City began improving Barger Drive in 1975, and she then asserted her claim immediately. The fact that the City planned for, held hearings on, financed and began construction of the improved road did not serve to charge her with knowledge that the City planned to take her property without compensation.