Opinion ID: 1810649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Whether Crawford was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

Text: ¶ 82. Crawford's assertion that counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a continuance is without merit. Not only did counsel request adjournment for the evening, but the judge granted the request and the penalty phase of trial did not begin until the following morning.
¶ 83. Crawford claims ineffective assistance in that counsel failed to object to the prosecution's use of the testimony of Officer James Wall to establish prior convictions. While Crawford does cite the best evidence rule, he cites to no authority for the proposition that the prosecution is required to provide certified copies of convictions to prove aggravators at the sentencing phase of a capital murder case. ¶ 84. In addition, Crawford is unable to show any prejudice. Were this testimony objected to, the State could have used the same certified copies that were used and admitted into evidence at the hearing on Crawford's habitual offender status. Because he can show neither deficiency nor prejudice, Crawford's claim fails. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.
¶ 85. Crawford claims that counsel failed to litigate, in a meaningful manner, victim impact evidence presented by the victim's mother and grandmother and thus, was ineffective. However, the record reflects that an objection to this evidence was made and this issue was examined on appeal. There, the court found nothing improper about the victim impact evidence that was presented at sentencing. Therefore, Crawford is unable to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice and his claim fails. See id. ¶ 86. Crawford also argues that the identification of two of Crawford's previous victims was error and the failure to litigate ineffective assistance. However, Crawford fails to cite a single authority in support of this proposition and it is thus without merit.
¶ 87. Crawford next claims that he was prejudiced by counsels' ineffectiveness in dealing with juror speculation regarding Crawford's parole eligibility. However, Crawford fails to make any showing that any of the jurors were confused on this topic. In addition, while Crawford claims his counsel only mentioned that there was no possibility of parole if given a life sentence three times, it was mentioned at court, regardless of speaker, around nineteen times. This claim is without merit.
¶ 88. Here, Crawford complains that his counsel failed to come together and create one common theme in mitigation. He laments that one lawyer dealt with the impropriety of the death penalty itself, while the other concentrated on the insanity defense and other related arguments. However, as Crawford has failed to provide this Court with any case law that has accepted the same or a sufficiently analogous argument, his claim is without merit.
¶ 89. Crawford next contends that counsel failed to conduct a professional and effective investigation for the penalty phase of trial. However, Crawford's argument concerns the alleged failure to investigate mitigating evidence, which will be addressed in the following issue.
¶ 90. The United States Supreme Court has very recently discussed this exact issue. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). In Wiggins, the petitioner claimed that he received ineffective assistance because counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at his sentencing. [11] Id. at 2535. Counsel rebutted the assertion by claiming that they did conduct a limited investigation, which reflected a strategic decision not to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing, but to attempt to implement an alternate strategy instead. Id. ¶ 91. In a 7-2 decision, finding ineffective assistance in the investigation, the Court clarified the manner in which such claims are to be reviewed. Id. at 2531. Quoting Strickland, the Court reiterated that strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Id. at 2535. Therefore, since counsel is under a general duty to reasonably investigate, a court should not simply concentrate its analysis on the decision not to present evidence, but instead, should focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence ... was itself reasonable.  Id. at 2536. ¶ 92. Thus, a court is to determine whether counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in conducting its investigation based on an assessment of the prevailing professional norms, including a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen `from counsel's perspective at the time.' Id. We accept this instruction and stand ready to analyze this issue under the guidelines announced above. ¶ 93. In the case at bar, Crawford claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence surrounding the following: (1) emotional illnesses and mental disturbances, (2) sexual and physical abuse, (3) adaptation to prison conditions, (4) remorse, and (5) long-term substance abuse. However, Crawford has failed to even allege any information outside of the knowledge of counsel, much less provide the necessary affidavits of such. With such a glaring lack of evidence by which to determine if Crawford was prejudiced, there is no need to even examine the reasonableness of counsels' investigation. ¶ 94. The lack of new evidence also impacts Crawford's claim that counsel was ineffective in their presentation of evidence during the penalty phase of trial. Because Crawford is unable to challenge the investigation, we are left with no alternative but to treat it as complete and judge counsels' decisions regarding the presentation of evidence as if they had been made according to a complete investigation and, thus, give great deference to any claims of trial strategy. Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7. ¶ 95. As this Court held in Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 990-91 (Miss.1998), where petitioner has given this Court such a sketchy outline of the investigation performed by counsel without any way of knowing counsels' impressions or the reasons behind counsels' decisions, we are left with the presumption that counsel had this evidence, reviewed this evidence, and considered it, as a matter of strategy, that it was in his client's best interest not to bring it out. Notwithstanding, we do not find that the evidence mentioned, even if it all had been presented at sentencing was of a nature, in its entirety, to cast any doubt as to the propriety of the jury's verdict and, as a result, this claim fails. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.
¶ 96. Crawford uses this sub-issue to state his displeasure with one member of counsel's closing argument. He objects to counsel's argument that the jury should not give the death penalty because that is exactly what Crawford wanted. Instead, Crawford claims that counsel should have presented mitigating evidence before the jury and should have made a strong argument for life. ¶ 97. The record is clear in this case that mitigating evidence was presented through the testimony of family members and expert testimony of Dr. Webb. In addition, the record is equally clear that the other member of counsel gave a strong argument in favor of life. Therefore, this issue is basically a heading under which Crawford is simply expressing his displeasure with one member of counsel's argument strategy. Crawford's opinion, however, is not a sufficient basis for a claim of ineffective assistance. This claim is without merit.
¶ 98. Crawford's final assertion is that counsel failed to take steps to ensure that the prosecution did not violate his rights during their closing argument. He first complains that the state instructed the jury not to consider the mitigating circumstances of Crawford's alleged lack of capacity. However, upon reading the statements provided by Crawford, it is clear that the prosecution was merely rebutting the assertion that Crawford lacked capacity. Attempting to disprove a mitigating factor is not the same as instructing the jury not to consider one. See Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 762 (Miss.1991). ¶ 99. Crawford's contention that the prosecution presented evidence that was not in the record is also misguided. The evidence complained of, a first ransom note, was received into evidence at the end of his mother's testimony and the fact that he wrote it is a reasonable inference given her testimony. In addition, we find that even were this evidence erroneously admitted and counsel deficient for not contesting it, the necessary level of prejudice could not be found. Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7. ¶ 100. Crawford's contention that the prosecution instructed the jury to consider premeditation as a factor is without merit. No such instruction can be inferred from the quote offered by Crawford. The most that can be inferred is that the prosecution was attempting to rebut mitigation evidence that Crawford could not appreciate his actions because he was suffering from extreme emotional disturbances. ¶ 101. Finally, contrary to Crawford's assertion, the prosecution did not improperly attempt to place the jury in the victim's shoes. Much like in the case of Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 655-56 (Miss.1996), he requested that the jury imagine the last moments of the victim's life and what she must have thought. Because Crawford is incorrect as to the underlying assertion in regards to each of the above claims, they are without merit.