Opinion ID: 2086213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendant's mental health records and journal

Text: Defendant claims that he was also denied effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to seek suppression of the statements he made to Julie Rice. Defendant claims that Rice is an agent of the State and that Rice knew when she was speaking with defendant that some of her questions could have elicited incriminating responses. Since he was in custody at the time of Rice's visit, defendant claims he should have been given Miranda warnings. Defendant argues that defense counsel erred when he failed to recognize that the statements were obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights and when he failed to move to suppress the statements on this ground. Defendant also claims that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to have the statements suppressed. As mentioned, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that defense counsel's actions were so deficient that they were unreasonable and that the actions prejudiced the result of the trial. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.) In support of his position, defendant relies on the case of Estelle v. Smith (1981), 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that a defendant was entitled to Miranda warnings before he was questioned by a court-ordered psychiatrist who had been assigned to conduct a neutral competency examination of the defendant after he had been charged. ( Smith, 451 U.S. at 467, 101 S.Ct. at 1875, 68 L.Ed.2d at 371-72.) The Supreme Court noted that the psychiatrist essentially became an agent of the State when the psychiatrist testified as to defendant's statements at the penalty phase of the defendant's trial. ( Smith, 451 U.S. at 467, 101 S.Ct. at 1875, 68 L.Ed.2d at 372.) Defendant's reliance on Smith is faulty. Unlike the defendant in Smith, the defendant here had not been charged with the murders and armed robbery before Rice went to visit him. Rice's visit was not court ordered. The purpose of Rice's visit was to assess whether defendant was still suicidal, and not to interrogate defendant about S & S. Thus, defendant did not have the right to be read Miranda warnings before Rice spoke with him. As a general rule, trial counsel's failure to file a motion does not establish incompetent representation, especially when that motion would be futile. (See People v. Pecoraro (1991), 144 Ill.2d 1, 13, 161 Ill.Dec. 296, 578 N.E.2d 942.) Whether or not to file a motion is a matter of trial strategy which will be accorded great deference. ( People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill.2d 448, 459, 132 Ill.Dec. 415, 539 N.E.2d 1221.) Defense counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress defendant's statements to Julie Rice did not result in ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, defendant has failed to prove that the use of the statements prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The statements which defendant made to Rice did not constitute all of the State's evidence against defendant. The State provided other witnesses who testified that defendant told them that he had committed an armed robbery and shot someone; defendant's own statements about his involvement were also admitted. We cannot say that the result of the trial would have been different had the statements been suppressed. Defendant also claims that the statements he made to Rice and his journal entry should have been excluded from evidence under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 91½ par. 801 et seq.). Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine based on the Act, seeking to preclude use of the statements and journal entry. Defendant asserted that the statements he made to Rice and the journal entry did not relate directly to the facts of a homicide. In denying the motion in limine, the trial court judge concluded that the homicide exception applied to both the statements and the journal entry. The Act provides that [a]ll records and communications shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 91½ par. 803(a).) A communication is any communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 91½ par. 802(1).) An exception provides that records can be disclosed in the investigation and trials of homicides without the consent of the patient when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 91½ par. 810(a)(9). The admissibility of evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Illgen (1991), 145 Ill.2d 353, 364, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515.) The trial court's decision to admit evidence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. ( Illgen, 145 Ill.2d at 364, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515.) We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the statements made to Rice and defendant's journal entry into evidence. The oral statements which defendant made to Rice fall within the homicide exception of the Act. Rice's notes and records from her meetings with defendant contain statements that when the police questioned him about S & S defendant responded that four persons could tell that he did it and that he would be buried if he told who actually committed the murders. Since these statements refer directly to the facts of the S & S homicide, they were admissible under the homicide exception of the Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 91½ par. 810(a)(9). Part of defendant's journal entry which was admitted at trial read as follows: As I lay here in a jail cell some 63 miles from what use to be my home (Springfield, Illinois). I find myself drowning in my own tears over a socalled [ sic ] crime that I didint [ sic ] even commit, but yet here I lay ready to go back to prison, for trying to turn a gun in to what is called the law[.] All becouse [ sic ] my women wanted to see me become some-one other then the man i [ sic ] use to be, for you see I use to be what you call a stick up man, going out and takeing [ sic ] from others what didnt [ sic ] belong to me. Couse [ sic ] you see in my life i [ sic ] never did have anything that i [ sic ] could call mine and after my comeing [ sic ] from a worn family who had nougthing [ sic ] to give but it's [ sic ] love I wanted to kind of give back some of the love that was give,en [ sic ] me, as a way of saying thank you, but then yet saying I'm sorry for all the pain that I coused [ sic ] you while growing up. Although this statement does not use the phrase S & S, it can be interpreted as referring to the S & S armed robbery/murders. Defendant was under investigation for and charged with three counts of murder and one count of armed robbery at S & S, and his journal entry explained his reasons for committing armed robberies. Thus, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the homicide exception applied to defendant's journal entry. Finally, defendant claims that the State's Attorney abused the grand jury's subpoena power to obtain Rice's records, which did not contain the journal, and thus his statements to Rice should not have been admitted at trial. The State's Attorney served a subpoena on the McLean County Center for Human Services for production of all clinical records regarding defendant. The subpoena and records were made returnable to the State's Attorney's office, rather than to the grand jury. The subpoena stated that the records were needed by the grand jury in the investigation of a homicide and that the records were related directly to the immediate circumstances of a homicide. The subpoena was not prepared at the direction of the grand jury, but at the direction of the State's Attorney. The State's Attorney claimed that he acted in anticipation of the grand jury's consideration of matters under investigation when issuing the subpoenas. The records were never shown to the grand jury. Defendant sought a motion in limine to bar the use of the records at trial. The trial court denied this motion, finding that the State's Attorney had issued the subpoena as an agent of the grand jury, that nothing was wrong with the procedure used, and that the State's Attorney had not acted in bad faith. The grand jury has the power to issue subpoenas to obtain documents relevant to its inquiry when an individual is under investigation for a crime. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 112-4(b).) Grand jury subpoenas are returnable to the grand jury, similar to how a witness, who is subpoenaed by the grand jury, must report to the grand jury. Issues of privilege and relevance of the documents are not relevant at the grand jury stage of an investigation, since the rules of evidence do not apply. (See United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc. (1991), 498 U.S. 292, 298, 111 S.Ct. 722, 726, 112 L.Ed.2d 795, 805.) The grand jury has the power to disclose subpoenaed documents to the State's Attorney for the purpose of the State's Attorney's furthering his responsibility of enforcing the law. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 112-6(c)(1).) A State's Attorney also has the power to subpoena documents. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 155-2.) These subpoenas, however, should be made returnable to the court, so the court can determine whether the documents are relevant and material, whether the documents are privileged, and whether the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive before the State's Attorney has access to the documents. See People ex rel. Fisher v. Carey (1979), 77 Ill.2d 259, 265, 32 Ill.Dec. 904, 396 N.E.2d 17. The State's Attorney in the instant case misused the grand jury process in obtaining the subpoenas, by substituting his authority to obtain subpoenas for that of the grand jury and by not requiring that the documents be returnable to the grand jury. If proper procedures had been followed, however, the State's Attorney could still have received the documents from the grand jury. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the process used to obtain his mental health records.