Opinion ID: 314135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: achievability of emission standard

Text: Section 111 of the Act requires the degree of emission limitation achievable [which] . . . the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated. Petitioners contend that the promulgated standard for new stationary sources has not been adequately demonstrated, raising issues as to the interpretation to be given to this requirement, the procedures followed by the agency in arriving at its standard, and the scientific evidence upon which it was formulated. An examination of these questions requires a brief description of the process used to manufacture portland cement and the devices presently employed to control emissions.
In the manufacturing process for portland cement, [56] the principal ingredients, limestone and clay, are combined, after having been reduced to a powdery fineness, to make a substance known as raw feed. The powdered limestone and clay are mixed by either the wet process or the dry process. In the wet process, water is added to the limestone and clay to make a slurry, which is then introduced into a kiln. In the dry process, the two substances are mixed mechanically and by use of air before the mix is introduced into a kiln. Raw feed is introduced to the kiln at ambient air temperature and is then heated to a temperature of about 2700° Fahrenheit, produced within the kiln by the use of various fuels. The emission standards under challenge here relate solely to the control of particulate matter produced by the kiln operation. The kiln operation involves the chemical process known as calcining limestone; carbon dioxide is driven from the limestone, converting calcium carbonate (CaCO3) into calcium oxide (CaO), (CaCO3 yields CO2 + CaO). The calcium oxide later combines with the clay to form a substance known as clinker, the basic component of cement. The calcination process produces gases and dust as by-products. The particulate matter is suspended in the hot exhaust gas and the various types of emission control devices remove this matter from the gas, before it is emitted into the atmosphere through a stack. The two types of equipment principally used in removing particulate matter from the exhaust gas are electrostatic precipitators and glass fabric bags, impregnated with graphite, located in a bag house. When the precipitator is used, dust particles are charged and pass through an electrical field of the opposite charge, thus causing the dust to be precipitated out of the exhaust gas and thereafter collected by the device. When glass fabric bags are used, the exhaust gas is cooled, sometimes by a water spray, so that the bags will operate without damage from excessive heat. The bag filters out the particulate dust, though sometimes the coolant combines with the dust to form a gummy substance as residue in the bags, which must be continuously cleaned out in order to avoid impairing the permeability of the bag. It is the ability of control devices such as precipitators and bags to separate out a sufficient amount of particulate from the exhaust  in accord with the proposed standards  which is under challenge by the manufacturers. The standard requires that the particulate matter emitted from portland cement plants not be in excess of 0.30 lb. per ton of feed to the kiln . . . maximum 2-hour average.
We begin by rejecting the suggestion of the cement manufacturers that the Act's requirement that emission limitations be adequately demonstrated necessarily implies that any cement plant now in existence be able to meet the proposed standards. Section 111 looks toward what may fairly be projected for the regulated future, rather than the state of the art at present, since it is addressed to standards for new plants  old stationary source pollution being controlled through other regulatory authority. [57] It is the achievability of the proposed standard that is in issue. The language in section 111 was the result of a Conference Committee compromise, and did not incorporate the language of either the House or Senate bills. [58] The House bill would have provided that the Secretary . . . [give] appropriate consideration to technological and economic feasibility, while the Senate would have required that standards reflect the greatest degree of emission control which the Secretary determines to be achievable through application of the latest available control technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives. The Senate Report made clear that it did not intend that the technology must be in actual routine use somewhere. [59] The essential question was rather whether the technology would be available for installation in new plants. The House Report also refers to available technology. Its caution that [i]n order to be considered `available' the technology may not be one which constitutes a purely theoretical or experimental means of preventing or controlling air pollution [60] merely reflects the final language adopted, that it must be adequately demonstrated that there will be available technology. The resultant standard is analogous to the one examined in International Harvester, supra . The Administrator may make a projection based on existing technology, though that projection is subject to the restraints of reasonableness and cannot be based on crystal ball inquiry. At 425 of 155 U.S.App.D.C., at 629 of 478 F.2d. As there, the question of availability is partially dependent on lead time, the time in which the technology will have to be available. Since the standards here put into effect will control new plants immediately, as opposed to one or two years in the future, the latitude of projection is correspondingly narrowed. If actual tests are not relied on, but instead a prediction is made, its validity as applied to this case rests on the reliability of [the] prediction and the nature of [the] assumptions. International Harvester at 45.
We find a critical defect in the decision-making process in arriving at the standard under review in the initial inability of petitioners to obtain  in timely fashion  the test results and procedures used on existing plants which formed a partial basis for the emission control level adopted, and in the subsequent seeming refusal of the agency to respond to what seem to be legitimate problems with the methodology of these tests.
The regulations under review were first proposed on August 3, 1971 and then adopted on December 16, 1971. Both the proposed and adopted rule cited certain portland cement testing as forming a basis for the standards. In the statements accompanying the proposed rule, the Administrator stated: [61] The standards of performance set forth herein are based on stationary source testing conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency and/or contractors . . . . On December 16, this test reliance was reiterated: [62] The standards of performance are based on stationary source testing conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency and/or contractors . . . . As indicated in the earlier statement of the case, the proposed standard was accompanied by a Background Document which disclosed some information about the tests, but did not identify the location or methodology used in the one successful test conducted on a dry-process kiln. Further indication was given to petitioners that the Administrator was relying on the tests referred to in the Background Document, when the statement of reasons accompanying the adopted standard were expanded in mid-March of 1972, in the supplemental statement filed while this case was pending on appeal to our court. The Administrator there stated: [63] The proposed standard was based principally on particulate levels achieved at a kiln controlled by a fabric filter. For the first time, however, another set of tests was referred to, as follows: After proposal [of the regulation], but prior to promulgation a second kiln controlled by a fabric filter was tested and found to have particulate emissions in excess of the proposed standard. However, based on the revised particulate test method, the second installation showed particulate emissions to be less than 0.3 pound per ton of kiln feed. These two testing programs were referred to in the March 1972 supplemental statement, but the details, aside from a summary of test results, were not made available to petitioners until mid-April 1972. At that time, it was revealed that the first set of tests was conducted April 29-30, 1971, by a contractor for EPA, at the Dragon Cement Plant, a dry process plant in Northampton, Pennsylvania, and that the second set was performed at the Oregon Portland Cement plant, at Lake Oswego, Oregon, a wet process plant, on October 7 and 8, 1971. The full disclosure of the methodology followed in these tests raised certain problems, in the view of petitioners, on which they had not yet had the opportunity to comment. Their original comments in the period between the proposal and promulgation of the regulation could only respond to the brief summary of the results of the tests that had been disclosed at that time. After intervenor Northwestern States Portland Cement Company received the detailed test information in mid-April 1972, it submitted the test data, for analysis of reliability and accuracy, to Ralph H. Striker, an engineer experienced in the design of emission control systems [64] for portland cement plants. He concluded that the first series of tests run at the Dragon Cement Company were grossly erroneous due to inaccurate sampling techniques to measure particulate matter. [65] Northwestern States then moved this Court to remand the record to EPA so that the agency might consider the additional comments on the tests. This motion was granted on October 31, 1972. [66] This action by the Court was based on the flexibility and capacity of reexamination that is rooted in the administrative process. International Harvester , at 428 of 155 U.S.App.D.C., at 632 of 478 F.2d. We considered this opportunity to make further comments necessary to sound execution of our judicial review function. [67] We are aware that EPA was required to issue its standards within 90 days of the issuance of the proposed regulation, and that this time might not have sufficed to make an adequate compilation of the data from the initial tests, or to fully describe the methodology employed. This was more likely as to the second tests, which were begun during the pendency of the proposed regulation. In contrast, more than three months intervened between the conduct of the first tests and the issuance of the proposed regulation. Even as to the second tests however, as we indicated in International Harvester , which involved the issue of the availability of the Technical Appendix upon which the auto emission suspension decision was based, the fact that the agency chose to perform additional tests and release the results indicates that it did not believe possible agency consideration was frozen. Slip opin. at 26. It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that, critical degree, is known only to the agency.
In this case, EPA made no written submission as to the additional comments made by petitioners. Our remand was ordered, as to Northwestern, on October 31, 1972. All that EPA did was to comply with the mandate that the analysis of Mr. Striker be added to the certified record. It may be that EPA considers Mr. Striker's analysis invalid  but we have no way of knowing this. As the record stands, all we have is Mr. Striker's repudiation of the test data, without response. The purpose of our prior remand cannot be realized unless we hear EPA's response to his comments, and the record must be remanded again, for that purpose. We are not establishing any broad principle that EPA must respond to every comment made by manufacturers on the validity of its standards or the methodology and scientific basis for their formulation. In the case of the Striker presentation, however, our prior remand reflects this court's view of the significance, or at least potential significance, of this presentation. If this were a private lawsuit, we might reverse the order under appeal for failure of its proponent to meet the burden of refutation or explanation. Since this is a matter involving the public interest, in which the court and agency are in a kind of partnership relationship for the purpose of effectuating the legislative mandate, we remand. This agency, particularly when its decisions can literally mean survival of persons or property, has a continuing duty to take a hard look at the problems involved in its regulatory task, and that includes an obligation to comment on matters identified as potentially significant by the court order remanding for further presentation. Manufacturers' comments must be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement of materiality before any lack of agency response or consideration becomes of concern. The comment cannot merely state that a particular mistake was made in a sampling operation; it must show why the mistake was of possible significance in the results of the test. This was certainly done by Mr. Striker, who on the basis of some extensive mathematical calculations stated: It is my personal opinion that the particulate matter emissions of .202 pounds in test 1 per ton of kiln feed reported in the summary sheet on Page vii and again on Page 6 of Exhibit 4-A is grossly erroneous, and that the correct emission of particulate matter is in the neighborhood of .404 pounds per ton of kiln feed. In order that rule-making proceedings to determine standards be conducted in orderly fashion, information should generally be disclosed as to the basis of a proposed rule at the time of issuance. If this is not feasible, as in case of statutory time constraints, information that is material to the subject at hand should be disclosed as it becomes available, and comments received, even though subsequent to issuance of the rule  with court authorization, where necessary. This is not a requirement that the rule be suspended, though the court may consider an application for stay based on probability of success and furtherance of the public interest. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers v. F.P.C., 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921 (1958). Conversely, challenges to standards must be limited to points made by petitioners in agency proceedings. To entertain comments made for the first time before this court would be destructive of a meaningful administrative process. There are claims made in this court which were not presented to EPA. For example, petitioner Portland Cement Association states in its brief, [68] in regard to the first set of tests at the Dragon Cement Plant: Mistakes and conditions occurred which prevented the test from using observed, measured values. Encrusted solids were thought to cause a high reading in Run 1 so lower readings from other tests were substituted. The area of a duct was calculated rather than measured due to the presence of deposits. And liquid from Run 3 was erroneously poured into a beaker from Run 2. From the reference supplied in petitioner's brief, we discern that this criticism of testing procedure was based upon data released on the testing after the 45 day period of comment had passed, and so there was no opportunity at that time to bring this sampling error to the attention of the agency. However, our October 1972 remand gave EPA an opportunity, in its updating and ongoing reexamination, to make a specific comment on petitioner's objection to the Dragon plant test. Instead, only the comment of Mr. Striker was presented. Ordinarily, we would not consider comments not presented to EPA. But here there was belated disclosure by EPA of back-up testing, and remand will be necessary concerning the Striker criticism. Accordingly, we will provide that EPA should, on remand, consider the contentions presented in briefs to this court, though not previously raised, unless EPA explains why they are not material. It will be for EPA, on the remand, to examine the relevancy and import of petitioners' criticisms of the Administrator's methodology.
A troublesome aspect of this case is the identification of what, in fact, formed the basis for the standards promulgated by EPA  a question that must be probed prior to consideration of whether the basis or bases for the standards is reliable. Nominally, there would seem to be three major bases for the rule and its standards: (1) the tests run on the dry-process Dragon Cement Plant, (2) the tests run on the wet-process Oregon Cement Plant, and (3) literature sources. The two tests were discussed by EPA in the supplemental statement issued subsequent to the issuance of the rule. As to literature sources, the Background Document issued with the proposed rule identifies as a principal literature source a government study, undertaken under the auspices of HEW in 1967, entitled Atmospheric Emissions from the Manufacture of Portland Cement. In the briefs to this Court, EPA counsel disclaim reliance on these three sources, despite statements directly to the contrary accompanying the proposed and promulgated rule, and the supplementary statement of reasons issued on the basis of Kennecott . In regard to the tests, the EPA brief states: [69] Since the tests conducted by EPA were used, along with other items, to assist in determining what emission levels were being achieved by properly maintained and operated control equipment, and were not used as the primary basis for the cement standards, petitioner's criticisms of such tests and testing procedures are irrelevant. (emphasis supplied) The brief further states that the HEW study was not relied upon to support the achievability of the cement standards. [70] Counsel on appeal cannot substitute new reasons for those offered by the agency. [71] Certainly, counsel cannot disclaim reliance on reasons offered by the agency in its statement of reasons, except in the sense that errors may be asserted to fall within the limited harmless error doctrine applicable to administrative agencies. We turn now to the specific technical problems raised by the cement manufacturers.
Two kilns were tested by the EPA contractor at the Dragon Cement Plant. [73] A test of a dry-process kiln controlled with a baghouse is used for support of the standard since testing showed particulate emissions of 0.20 pound per ton of feed, which is below the proposed standard. [74] This particular plant was selected for testing on the basis that it was reportedly one of the 12 best controlled plants in the United States. The first point raised by petitioner, and included in the comments by cement manufacturers presented to the agency on its proposed standard, [75] was that a single test offered a weak basis for inferring that all new cement plants would be able to meet the proposed standards. As we stated in International Harvester, supra, at 428 of 155 U.S.App.D.C., at 632 of 478 F.2d, It would . . . seem incumbent on the Administrator to estimate the possible degree of error [inherent] in his prediction. The significance of the lack of any indication of statistical reliability was underscored by T. E. Kreichelt, the author of the HEW study relied upon by the Administrator, in a letter, by way of comment, on the proposed standard. [76] He stated that the emission limit was based on one (1) test, i. e. the fabric filter test. . . . I do not believe that the emission limits should be selected on only four tests, much less one test. Mr. Kreichelt raised a second and related point addressed to the reliability of a prediction based on a successful dry-process plant, for a prediction that wet-process plants would be able to also meet the standard. He stated in this regard: [77] Another outcome of basing emission limits on insufficient data is that the limit may represent only part of a given industrial classification. For example, is 0.30 lb/ton of feed attainable only for dry-process kilns? Or is it also attainable for wet-process kilns? Probably both, but there is not even one test to substantiate the limit for wet-process kilns. For each variation of each process of each source classification, the number of tests required sould be sufficient (say, three tests within the limit) to result in statistically sound limits. We are not here considering a regulation that was issued in the contemplation that all new cement plants will be dry-process, and controlled by baghouses on the theory that this is the best system of emission control. Possibly such an approach would be feasible, but in any event it would require underlying reasons, by EPA, to terminate the process which the HEW had identified as major now and in future projection. [78] A second objection is to the techniques used by the EPA to measure emissions from the Dragon plant. These sampling techniques assume particular importance if they deviate from procedures, outlined by regulation, for ascertaining compliance with prescribed standards. Although this difference could be eliminated  as the Administrator attempted to do in International Harvester  by rewriting sampling techniques, rather than lowering standards, a significant difference between techniques used by the agency in arriving at standards, and requirements presently prescribed for determining compliance with standards, raises serious questions about the validity of the standard. [79] The cement manufacturers point, in this regard, to the absence of continuous sampling in the EPA data, since the longest elapsed time of any sampling episode was 30 minutes, [80] whereas under the regulations promulgated, conformity is to be measured on the basis of maximum 2-hour averages. [81] It is incumbent on the Administrator to explain the discrepancy. The second point raises the question, on the basis of a handwritten note made by the EPA contractor, as to whether the tested plant was operating at maximum performance during testing. The contractor had noted, Baghouse is undersize and production is held back due to this. [82] Compliance tests under the regulation require, however, that All performance tests shall be conducted while the affected facility is operating at or above the maximum production rate. . . . [83] Thirdly, petitioner contends that mistakes made in the measurement process prevented the test from using observed, measured values. As previously noted, encrusted solids can collect in the bag, and must be constantly cleaned out if the baghouses are to operate with efficiency. In one of the runs conducted, the presence of the solids in a duct leading to the stack were thought to cause a high reading so lower readings from other test runs were substituted. On another run, the liquid, which was to be the basis for a measurement of particulate concentration, was erroneously poured into a beaker from a previous run. [84] However, deviations from prescribed measurement techniques are not necessarily significant as to testing results, and if petitioners press this point on remand they must establish that such test deviations bear significant consequences. Finally, engineer Striker claims significant errors of measurement were made in determining the measurement of the cubic feet of stack gas per minute, and a resulting understatement of the true volume of calcining carbon dioxide included in total stack gas. He states that commonly 35% (plus or minus 1%) of raw feed is converted into carbon dioxide in the burning process. [85] He then notes that an accurate measure of raw feed is the volume of calcining carbon dioxide [86] appearing in stack gas, which in turn depends on an accurate measurement of the volume of stack gas. His own calculations, based on EPA data showing a stack flow rate of 51,187 cubic feet per minute of dry gas, indicate that there were 2153 cubic feet per hour of stack gas in the test attributable to calcining carbon dioxide coming from the raw feed and that as a matter of basic chemistry 2153 cubic feet of calcining carbon dioxide comes only from 22.11 tons of raw feed. [87] This was at variance from the kiln rate of 44.03 tons of raw feed per hour reported in the test. He concludes that the error lay not in the measurement of the raw feed, but in the test data reported on the stack gas volume  flow rate of 51,187  which in his judgment requires more sophisticated equipment for recording than does the raw feed which is easily measureable. Having corrected the stack gas figure, he states his opinion that the EPA assumption of emissions satisfying its ultimate 0.30 standard was in error. [88] He concluded: It is my personal opinion that the particulate matter emissions of .202 pounds in test 1 per ton of kiln feed reported . . . is grossly erroneous and that the correct emission of particulate matter is in the neighborhood of .404 pounds per ton of kiln feed. We are not competent to decide if Mr. Striker's methodology and conclusions are correct. We can note, however, that he claims that as a matter of basic chemistry two test values, for feed and gas volume, cannot co-exist. This is certainly the type of criticism EPA should be required to discuss on remand.
The Oregon plant was wet-process controlled by a baghouse. Three tests were made on the kiln operation. The brief of petitioner Portland refers to the test results of the EPA contractor, and points out that these show that in test 1 and 2, particulate emissions were .535 and .361 pounds per ton of kiln feed. Only in the third test was there a result of .291 pounds. Petitioners argue that when only one out of the three tests meet the EPA standards (0.3 percent), the data undercut the validity of the standard. EPA's brief did not address itself to this point, relying instead on its general expertise. If our study of the matter is accurate, it appears that petitioners failed to take into account that the standard, as promulgated, eliminated one of the sampling techniques required by the standard as proposed. This undercuts petitioner's contention. [90] A more serious matter is presented by intervenor Northwestern, which points to the fact that the EPA contractor's report indicates that sampling was not conducted when process operation was interrupted and that sampling was only conducted during the periods of normal operation. The report states: Several conditions contributing to these interruptions were: (1) excessive pressure drop across bag house, (2) visible emissions from leaking bags, and (3) breakdown of dust removal equipment. (C.R. Tab V (h) at 9). The concern of the manufacturers is that start-up and upset conditions, due to plant or emission device malfunction, is an inescapable aspect of industrial life, and that allowance must be made for such factors in the standards that are promulgated. On August 18, 1972, some eight months after the issuance of the standards under review, and prior to our October, 1972 remand, the EPA proposed a new regulation to take startup, shutdown and malfunction problems into effect. [91] The proposed regulation, which as yet has not been adopted, sets up a procedure by which emissions due to malfunction will not be the basis of an enforcement action. It requires reports from manufacturers in cases where emissions exceed standards, recording the violation and indicating what measures will be taken to correct or minimize the excess emission levels. The proposed regulation provides: [92] (f) Nothing in this section shall relieve a source from compliance with the standards set forth in this part unless the Administrator determines that (1) the occurrence in question did not result from the failure by the owner or operator of the source to operate and maintain properly the affected facility, (2) all reasonable steps were taken to correct, as expeditiously as practicable, the condition causing the emissions to exceed the standards, including the use of off-shift labor and overtime if necessary, and (3) all reasonable steps were taken to minimize the emissions resulting from the occurrence. The proposed regulation, if adopted, may have consequences which go beyond mere provision for malfunctions. In some sense it imparts a construction of reasonableness to the standards as a whole and adopts a more flexible system of regulation than can be had by a system devoid of give. As we noted in International Harvester, supra , a regulatory system which allows flexibility, and a lessening of firm proscriptions in a proper case, can lend strength to the system as a whole. The limited safety valve permits a more rigorous adherence to an effective regulation. At 437 of 155 U.S.App.D.C., at 641 of 478 F.2d quoting from WAIT Radio v. FCC, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 323, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159. If the EPA adopts, or intends to adopt, this proposed regulation, it may take the attendant flexibility into account, on remand, as pertinent to the manufacturers' objections, even though the new regulation has been proposed in a proceeding with a different docket number and caption.
The principal source in the scientific literature used by EPA, HEW's Atmospheric Emissions from the Manufacture of Portland Cement, [93] is called into question by petitioner on the ground that the test methods used to compile the results of the study were at odds with those used by EPA in its own tests. [94] While counsel for EPA disclaims reliance on the source, the study was cited in the EPA's Statement of Reasons, and EPA should address itself to this contention on remand. In this connection, a comment on the proper use of scientific literature may be in order. If such literature is relied upon, the agency should indicate which particular findings of that literature are significant. A generalized reference, to a work as a whole, will avail the agency little if a problem arises on judicial review. On remand, any findings in the literature that are relied on by EPA should be specifically indicated. The same procedure is contemplated here as for the test data not submitted to the manufacturers prior to promulgation of the rule, that there be opportunity for comment, and an explanation presenting the EPA position on any challenge. [95]
Apart from the standard directly regulating particulate concentration, EPA has adopted an opacity standard which provides that there shall be no discharge of particulate matter from the kiln which is: [96] Greater than 10 percent opacity, except that where the presence of uncombined water is the only reason for failure to meet the requirements for this subparagraph, such failure shall not be a violation of this section. Opacity is defined by the regulation as the degree to which emissions reduce the transmission of light and obscure the view of an object in the background. [97] It may be, as EPA argues, that the opacity test is an important enforcement tool, [98] and that the results of an opacity test, which is normally performed at some distance from the plant by trained observers, offers a cheaper and faster method of determining compliance than enforcement of the particulate concentration standard. [99] However, it is one thing to use a method of testing to observe possible violations of a standard; it is another to constitute that method as the standard itself. If the opacity test is to be a standard, and if violations can result in enforcement actions without further testing, the standard musta be consistent with the statute and congressional intent. The thrust of the manufacturers' comments to EPA, and repeated here, is that the opacity test is arbitrarythat inspectors will be unable within any reasonable degree of accuracy to determine whether permitted opacity is 10%. The critical question is how accurate can opacity observations be. On this point we essentially have before us only the contentions of the parties. The manufacturers do point to a test conducted for the National Center for Air Pollution Control (U.S.Dept.H.E.W.), where six trained smoke inspectors evaluated a white training plume known to have 0% opacity. [100] All six inspectors rated the plume at more than 0% opacity and 3 evaluated it at more than 20%. A plume known to be at 20% opacity was rated higher than 20% by 5 of the 6 inspectors (one rated it lower) and 2 of them rated it at almost 40%. Problems may also be posed for deciding when opacity is due to water content and when it is not. [101] The difficulty is that this test has the thrust of indicating that opacity measurements are inherently inadequate, and does not seem to be probative of the manufacturer's quite different claim, namely, that it is at the low ranges that opacity tests become less reliable, and too unreliable to be a legal standard. On the other hand, EPA's brief does nothing more than point to the fact that many states have required that the plumes from stack emissions conform to a specified percentage of opacity. We note, however, that the opacity standard is at least 20% in the states cited, which corresponds to No. 1 on the Ringelman Smoke Chart. [102] We think the HEW test adduced by petitioners, though not decisive, suffices to require further consideration and explanation by EPA on remand, and a showing on the record that 10% opacity measurements can be made within reasonable accuracy. [103]