Opinion ID: 1388611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Motion to fire counsel.

Text: On Friday, October 15, 1982, one day after the already-postponed guilt trial had been scheduled to begin in Judge Grossfeld's court, defendant moved before Judge Boskovich to fire his appointed trial attorney, Vincent O'Brien, for failure to appeal [certain pretrial] motions. After inquiry, Judge Boskovich denied the motion. Defendant makes a number of arguments in connection with this incident. None has merit. The context of defendant's contentions is as follows: The People proceeded by information, and search-and-seizure issues were litigated at the preliminary hearing. (§ 1538.5, subd. (f).) On March 2, 1982, defendant was arraigned in superior court. On April 30, 59 days later, defendant joined Madrigal's and Williams' motion to set aside the information under section 995. The section 995 motion urged (1) that the prosecution's evidence stemmed from an allegedly illegal search and seizure during the Barstow traffic stop, and (2) that there was insufficient evidence of lying in wait. After postponements, the section 995 motion was heard and denied on June 22. On July 7, Madrigal and Williams sought a writ of prohibition to overturn the June 22 order. The petition, which defendant did not join, raised both the search and seizure and lying-in-wait issues. It was summarily denied on August 26. [8] Meanwhile, on July 14, defendant joined Madrigal's July 2 superior court motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5, subdivision (i). The motion made search-and-seizure claims similar to those already rejected by the trial court under section 995. On September 28, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted in part and denied in part the section 1538.5 motion. Defendant was precluded by statute from seeking pretrial review of this denial because the section 1538.5 motion had been filed more than 60 days after his arraignment. (§ 1510.) [9] Trial was originally set for September 28, but the date had been continued to Thursday, October 14. The matter trailed thereafter pending completion of final pretrial motions. Judge Grossfeld, to whom the matter was assigned for trial, had constantly reminded the parties that trial should begin no later than Monday, October 18. Judge Boskovich was also involved in the completion of pretrial motions. On Friday morning, October 15, with all defendants present, Madrigal moved before Judge Boskovich to relieve his appointed counsel, Robert Peters, and represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525]. [10] Madrigal said he was dissatisfied because counsel had failed to appeal the denial of pretrial motions. Peters responded that writ relief had been sought from denial of the section 995 motion, and that counsel were trying to prepare one on the denial of the 1538.5. The court declared that counsel's representation had been excellent, that the motion for self-representation was untimely, and that if it were granted, the ensuing trial delay would not be in the interest of justice. The court denied the Faretta motion and proceeded to other matters. Later the same day, defendant interrupted the proceedings, stating that he wanted to fire O'Brien, his appointed counsel. Like Madrigal, defendant declared that his dissatisfaction stemmed from counsel's failure to appeal pretrial motions. The court asked O'Brien for a response. O'Brien explained that a writ petition challenging the section 1538.5 denial is to be filed on Monday and that the one for the [section] 995 [denial] has already been filed. Judge Boskovich indicated he would take the word of an officer of the court. A writ petition, said the judge, had obviously been filed on these particular motions and I don't know what else [defendant] could ask for. Accordingly, [t]he Marsden motion to discharge counsel (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44]) was denied. Coville immediately stated that he also wished to fire his appointed counsel for conflict of interest because pretrial motions had not been appeal[ed]. Defendant interjected that [w]e feel they're trying to get us into trial before we can get these motions into Appellate Court and get a ruling on them. Once again the court sought counsel's response. Coville's attorney, Lloyd Riley, explained that he intended to seek section 1538.5 review on behalf of Coville as soon as a transcript of the trial court proceedings became available. Riley expected the writ petition would be filed in the Court of Appeal by Wednesday, October 20, the day jury selection was scheduled to begin. The court declared that all counsel had obviously done everything possible to present pretrial motions and writs, and that it appeared we have reached the stage where ... the defendants ... are just trying to delay progress.... Coville's motion was denied. On Monday, October 18, all defendants jointly filed in the Court of Appeal a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's partial denial of relief under section 1538.5. Citing section 1510, the Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition as untimely. Defendant first argues that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to join the only timely writ proceeding, that arising from denial of the section 995 motion, and for failing to file a section 1538.5 motion within 60 days after arraignment. Counsel's omission, he urges, effectively denied him pretrial appellate review of his lying-in-wait and search-and-seizure claims. (5) The appellate record fails to disclose the reasons for counsel's conduct. Even if we assume that counsel could have had no sound tactical purpose (see People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425-426 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1]), defendant fails to show prejudice warranting reversal. Madrigal and Williams did seek writ review of the section 995 denial; their petition properly raised the lying-in-wait and search-and-seizure issues common to all the defendants. The Court of Appeal summarily denied pretrial relief, and defendant fails to show that the result might have been different had he joined the petition. In any event, by timely pursuing trial court remedies under sections 995 and 1538.5, counsel took all steps necessary to preserve defendant's claims for appellate review. The law permits an accused to seek pretrial writ review after motions under sections 995 and 1538.5 have been denied in the superior court (see §§ 999a, 1538.5, subd. (i)), but these procedures are optional. Counsel's failure to preserve defendant's pretrial writ rights did not preclude defendant from raising his lying-in-wait and search-and-seizure arguments on appeal from his convictions. Moreover, as we explain elsewhere (see discussions ante and post ), those arguments fail on their merits. Hence, any inadvertent mishandling of pretrial writs by Attorney O'Brien does not undermine confidence in the outcome of defendant's case. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; see People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) Nor was counsel's omission so serious as to cast doubt on the overall reliability of the adversarial process. (See United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668, 104 S.Ct. 2039].) (6a) Defendant next argues that when he moved to discharge his attorney, counsel misled the trial court by implying inaccurately that defendant had joined the section 995 writ petition, and by failing to disclose that the anticipated section 1538.5 petition would be untimely. Defendant also suggests the court itself overlooked the statutory time limits applicable to the pretrial writs. As a result, he urges, the court ruled on his motion without realizing the legitimacy of his complaints. (7) When a defendant moves for substitution of appointed counsel, the court must consider any specific examples of counsel's inadequate representation that the defendant wishes to enumerate. Thereafter, substitution is a matter of judicial discretion. Denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would substantially impair the defendant's right to assistance of counsel. ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 520 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640]; People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63, 76 [252 Cal. Rptr. 494, 762 P.2d 1218]; People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-124.) (6b) Here the court satisfied its duty to consider defendant's complaints. It allowed defendant to explain his single ground of dissatisfaction  counsel's handling of pretrial writs. The court sought a response from counsel and considered the information provided in reaching a decision. There is no evidence that counsel intended to mislead the court. The court was entitled to accept counsel's explanation and was not obliged to inquire, sua sponte, into the actual efficacy of counsel's efforts. Nor did the court err in denying the motion for substitution. Even if evidence of counsel's inadvertence had been before the court, defendant's showing indicates neither constitutionally inadequate assistance nor a fundamental breakdown of attorney-client relations. (See People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1163-1164 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) [11] Absent more convincing indicia that retention of Attorney O'Brien might substantially impair defendant's right to counsel, there was no obligation to appoint new counsel. Defendant suggests the court might nonetheless have exercised its broad Marsden discretion differently had counsel's oversights been revealed. We are not persuaded. Even under defendant's assumptions, counsel had committed no serious transgression. Having observed counsel's pretrial performance at some length, the court maintained that all defendants were receiving excellent representation. Three of the defendants suddenly presented similar motions to discharge their lawyers on the eve of an already-postponed trial. The court expressed its paramount concern, supported by the evidence, that these developments were an orchestrated last-minute attempt to delay trial. It does not appear reasonably probable that any gaps in the Marsden evidence affected the result of the motion. No basis for reversal appears. (8) Defendant claims he was also making a constitutional Faretta motion to represent himself. If his purpose was not immediately clear, he urges, the court had a sua sponte duty to inquire about his intent. However, there is no such duty. A defendant seeking to proceed in propria persona must make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time before trial. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 409 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1219-1220 [259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698]; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 [137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187].) Defendant never hinted he wished to proceed without any lawyer, even though he was present when Madrigal earlier made just such a request. No Faretta error occurred.