Opinion ID: 844218
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Continue the Trial

Text: On the day of trial, defense counsel filed a motion for a continuance of three days. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant contends the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion that violated defendant's constitutional right to due process of law, effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable verdict under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This contention is without merit. [7] In the motion, counsel requested the continuance because additional preparation [was] necessary. Counsel represented that over the weekend he had had a painful tooth infection that prevented [him] from working on [his] final trial preparation. In addition, the defense investigator had been attending court in another case, and this had prevented him from doing some final investigation for [counsel] that is necessary for trial. Other than being aware of tenderness in the tooth, counsel felt he could conduct the trial, but he was planning, if possible, to have a root canal performed within the next three days to prevent a recurrence of the debilitating toothache. Counsel stated he planned to review the evidence, to go through all the documents and everything to sort of fine tune myself to be adequately prepared, and, more importantly, there also were some last things for [the] investigator to do. The trial court noted that this promises to be a rather short trial, and that the court had had to make special arrangements involving some considerable effort in order to have a jury called in on the Monday following the Independence Day holiday. The court also observed it was unlikely that more than jury selection would be completed the first day, there would be periods of dead time probably between now and certainly the defense case, and defense counsel was an experienced attorney. In addition, the court stated its view that counsel's medical condition, although at that time under control, posed a lurking problem, and it would be best to get the trial over and [then counsel could] seek whatever treatment he needed. After the trial court stated it was denying the motion for a continuance, defense counsel requested and was granted an ex parte sidebar conference with the court so that counsel could explain what investigation still needed to be completed. Counsel stated he intended to call Deputy Blair's ex-wife to testify concerning her declaration from their marriage dissolution proceedings in which she described his violent temper, but the investigator had not yet located her. [8] The trial court explained that in the court's view, counsel likely would have the time during trial to have your investigator looking for her, noting that we're not going to get to the defense case until next week. After the sidebar conference, the court reiterated that it was denying the motion for a continuance. (2) [T]he decision whether or not to grant a continuance of a matter rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] The party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked. [Citation.] [¶] Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered. [Citations.] Moreover, the denial of a continuance may be so arbitrary as to deny due process. [Citation.] However, not every denial of a request for more time can be said to violate due process, even if the party seeking the continuance thereby fails to offer evidence. [Citation.] ( People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920-921 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 153 P.3d 955] ( Beames ).) [T]he trial court may not exercise its discretion `so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to prepare.' [Citation.] ( People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11].) From the record in the present case, we conclude defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion or violated his constitutional rights by denying the motion for a continuance. Here, the expressed general need for counsel to go over the evidence and to fine tune himself before beginning the trial was not particularly compelling. Indeed, counsel himself characterized it as less important than the need to locate Deputy Blair's ex-wife, and stated he would make his last preparations in the evenings if the court denied the continuance. Even assuming counsel was required to complete his fine-tuning in the evenings during the trial, this would not have been so unusual or burdensome that we would conclude the trial court's decision was outside the bounds of reason. In addition, although the need to locate Blair's ex-wife was significant for the defense, as the trial court stated, the need to do so before the trial could begin was slight; indeed, the defense did ultimately call her as a witness despite the denial of the continuance. (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1013 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183] [[o]ne factor to consider is whether a continuance would be useful].) Although defendant cites on appeal examples of counsel's asserted unpreparedness during the trial, defendant fails to relate them to the denial of the motion for a continuance. Moreover, defense counsel did not base his request for a continuance on grounds that he was unprepared in specific areas. Therefore the trial court cannot be faulted for failing to grant a continuance on those grounds. ( Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 921; see also People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 132 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, 180 P.3d 224] ( Rundle ) [review of the trial court's ruling on a motion is based upon the evidence before the court when it made its decision].) It was not beyond the bounds of reason for the trial court to deny a three-day continuance because counsel's expressed needs could be reasonably met without delaying the trial. Further, the court appropriately considered the inconvenience to prospective jurors that would result from postponing the trial, as well as the potential complications that might result if defense counsel had a root canal and needed additional time to recover before the trial could commence. The court reasonably found that starting the trial as scheduled would minimize the inconvenience and risks, while not impinging to any significant degree on defense counsel's ability to complete his final preparations. ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044] [in ruling on a continuance motion, [t]he court considers `not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also the likelihood that such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or defeated by a granting of the motion'].) The denial of a continuance was not an arbitrary insistence on expeditiousness, but rather a reasoned assessment of the need for delaying the trial in light of the potential problems such delay might cause. Nor was defendant denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare; as respondent points out, trial counsel had been defendant's attorney of record for approximately eight months, and counsel's own statements established that the remaining preparations were counsel's final polishing of the defense and the locating of a witness that could be (and, apparently, was) accomplished in the time before the defense portion of the trial began. For these reasons, the denial of the request for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion or a violation of defendant's constitutional rights.