Opinion ID: 2613958
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Instructions Regarding Circumstantial Evidence and Requisite Mental States

Text: Pursuant to defense counsel's wishes, the trial court gave CALJIC No. 2.01, which instructs on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove a defendant's guilt, [45] rather than CALJIC No. 2.02, which instructs more specifically on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove a defendant's specific intent or mental state. [46] (31a) Defendant now contends the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on CALJIC No. 2.02. He claims the error was prejudicial because the prosecutor relied substantially, if not exclusively, upon circumstantial evidence to prove the requisite mental states for the crimes charged. (32) It is the general rule that a trial court is not required to instruct on the rules of law applicable to circumstantial evidence where the alleged circumstantial evidence is incidental to, and corroborative of, direct evidence. [Citations.] ( People v. Malbrough (1961) 55 Cal.2d 249, 250-251 [10 Cal. Rptr. 632, 359 P.2d 30].) Moreover, when the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte. ( People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal. App.3d 787, 794 [155 Cal. Rptr. 152].) Although defendant and the Attorney General agree that substantial circumstantial evidence was presented below, they disagree as to whether such evidence was merely incidental to the direct evidence, and whether it gave rise to only one rational inference regarding the requisite mental state. We need not resolve these disputed issues. (31b) Because the trial court delivered the more inclusive instruction under CALJIC No. 2.01, its refusal to additionally instruct with CALJIC No. 2.02 clearly was not prejudicial error. ( People v. DeLeon (1982) 138 Cal. App.3d 602, 608 [188 Cal. Rptr. 63]; see People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 352 [233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].) (33) Defendant next contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct with a modified version of CALJIC No. 3.31 (concurrence of act and specific intent). While conceding that the trial court's unmodified instruction was correct with respect to the specific intent crimes of burglary, attempted robbery and the felony-murder theory of first degree murder, defendant maintains it was inadequate with respect to the prosecutor's other theory of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. [47] In essence, his position is that the unmodified instruction could have led a reasonable juror to conclude that this theory did not require concurrence of act and the mental states of premeditation and deliberation. If defendant believed that a modification to CALJIC No. 3.31 was required, he was obligated to request it. In any event, the court's instructions, when considered as a whole, properly guided the jury's consideration of the evidence. ( People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 943 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212].) Immediately after delivering CALJIC No. 3.31, the court gave CALJIC No. 8.20 on the elements of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder, including the instruction: If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree. This instruction adequately expressed the need for joint operation of act and intent on that theory. ( People v. Kozel (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 507, 522 [184 Cal. Rptr. 208]; cf. People v. Benjamin (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 63, 84-85 [124 Cal. Rptr. 799].) (34a) Defendant next contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by giving an inadequate version of CALJIC No. 8.83.1 (special circumstances  sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove required mental state), by failing to give CALJIC No. 8.83 (special circumstances  sufficiency of circumstantial evidence  generally) and by failing to give CALJIC No. 3.31 as to the special circumstance allegations (concurrence of act and specific intent). We disagree. First, we are not persuaded by defendant's assertion that the court's version of CALJIC No. 8.83.1 was misleading in referring to the term required mental state in the singular rather than plural form, or in failing to list each of the required mental states to which it applied. Even if defendant's failure to request such clarifications below is disregarded, the point is not well taken. As defendant himself points out, the court instructed on the mental state required for each of the special circumstances (CALJIC No. 8.81.17) immediately before reading the circumstantial evidence instruction. [48] Considering the instructions as a whole, no reasonable juror would have understood the challenged instruction not to apply to each of the requisite mental states. There was no error. [49] (35) We are likewise unconvinced by defendant's next argument that the court's failure to give CALJIC No. 3.31 as to the special circumstance allegations permitted the jury to conclude that concurrence of act and specific intent was not required in order to find such allegations true. Assuming the court's omission constituted error (see Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.83.1; Use Note to CALJIC No. 2.02), the instructions, when considered as a whole, properly guided the jury's consideration of the evidence. ( People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 943.) The jury was instructed that CALJIC No. 3.31 applied with respect to the underlying crimes of burglary and attempted robbery. It was also instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.81.17. (See fn. 48, ante. ) A reasonable juror receiving these instructions would have understood that concurrence of act and specific intent was required for the special circumstance allegations, and could not have believed otherwise. (See People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 676 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].) The perceived error was harmless under any standard. ( Ibid. ) (34b) Further, we find without merit the argument that, since the prosecutor substantially relied upon circumstantial evidence to prove that defendant's purpose in committing the charged murder was to carry out the burglary or attempted robbery, or alternatively, to facilitate escape or to avoid detection, CALJIC No. 8.83 should have been given instead of CALJIC No. 8.83.1. As indicated previously, the court's version of CALJIC No. 8.83.1 instructed on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove the required mental state for the special circumstance allegations. (See fn. 48, ante. ) A reasonable juror would have understood this instruction to apply to the circumstantial evidence concerning defendant's purpose in committing the murder. No error appears. In sum, we conclude that none of the perceived instructional errors, whether considered singly or together, warrants the reversal of defendant's conviction. We come to this conclusion whether we employ the reasonable probability test or the less tolerant reasonable doubt test. Likewise, we find no violation of defendant's state or federal constitutional rights.