Opinion ID: 2570523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: First-degree murder by an enumerated means versus first-degree felony murder

Text: The State analogizes murder under NRS 200.030(1)(a) to felony murder under subsection (1)(b). In the latter case, by law the malice required for murder is supplied by the intent to commit an enumerated felony. Likewise, the State argues, the requisite malice arises as a matter of law from the use of an enumerated means under subsection (1)(a). However, this and other courts have never followed the view urged by the State (we discuss exceptional cases treating murder by torture below). The California Supreme Court explained this matter clearly in People v. Mattison, 4 Cal.3d 177, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193, 196 (1971). Thus if a killing is murder within the meaning of sections 187 [defining murder as an unlawful killing with malice aforethought] and 188 [defining express and implied malice], and is by one of the means enumerated in section 189 [i.e., poison, lying in wait, or torture], the use of such means makes the killing first degree murder as a matter of law. It must be emphasized, however, that a killing by one of the means enumerated in the statute is not murder of the first degree unless it is first established that it is murder. If the killing was not murder, it cannot be first degree murder, and a killing cannot become murder in the absence of malice aforethought. Without a showing of malice, it is immaterial that the killing was perpetrated by one of the means enumerated in the statute. It is true that murder may be committed without express malice, i.e., without a specific intent to take human life. To be so committed, however, unless the felony-murder rule is applicable, the defendant must intend to commit acts that are likely to cause death and that show a conscious disregard for human life. [ Thomas, 261 P.2d at 7 (Traynor, J., concurring).] ... The above rules apply to all murders, other than felony murders, regardless of whether they are committed by one of the means enumerated in section 189. See also Harper, 365 S.E.2d at 72 (quoted above); Benjamin, 124 Cal.Rptr. at 813 (cited above); cf. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156-57 (Utah 1991) (first-degree murder first requires proof of what would otherwise be second-degree murder and then proof of an enumerated aggravating factor, e.g., administering poison). This court's case law is in accord with Mattison. That malice is required to find murder by an enumerated means was implicit to this court's reasoning in Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 286, 352 P.2d 824, 831 (1960). In that case, the court upheld the giving of a jury instruction which stated: All murder which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait is murder of the first degree. Id. Appellant contends that this instruction was defective because the court failed to explain that murder must first be established before the question of lying in wait can arise. In the other instructions given the court defined murder and stated that to find appellant guilty thereof all of the elements must have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.... [T]his instruction was proper to aid the jury in determining the degree of the offense in the event they found the appellant guilty of murder. Id. (emphasis added). The court accepted the appellant's premise that murder must first be established before the question of lying in wait can arise. In Moser v. State, 91 Nev. 809, 812 & n. 3, 544 P.2d 424, 426 & n. 3 (1975), the appellant challenged an instruction which read, The unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought, with express or implied intent, which is committed by a person lying in wait for his victim, is Murder in the First Degree. (Emphasis added.) This court held that the instruction was properly given and quoted People v. Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 346 P.2d 764, 772 (1959), for the proposition that the elements constituting lying in wait 'are watching, waiting, and concealment from the person killed with the intention of inflicting bodily injury upon such person or of killing such person.' [12] Id. at 813, 544 P.2d at 426 (emphasis added). Again, there was no question that malice was a required element to prove murder by an enumerated means. The state's position is not only contrary to the law regarding murder by enumerated means, but seeks to expand the doctrine of felony murder when the weight of authority calls for restricting it. Many commentators criticize the felony-murder doctrine, and the trend has been to limit its applicability, not extend it. See Model Penal Code § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 29-42; LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law § 7.5, at 622-23, 632, 640-41. Furthermore, first-degree murder by an enumerated means fundamentally differs from felony murder. Although child abuse, as discussed below, is a special case, the means originally enumerated in subsection (1)(a)use of poison, lying in wait, and torturedo not denote crimes. Thus, it cannot be presumed that they necessarily carry a felonious intent which can supply the malice necessary to characterize a killing as a murder. For example, friends and family who spring a surprise birthday party on a middleaged man as he steps into his home may be lying in wait, but they are not liable for murder if he collapses and dies from a heart attack because they did not act with malice. As noted, lying in wait is defined as watching, waiting, and concealment from the person killed with the intention of killing or inflicting bodily injury upon that person. [13] See Moser, 91 Nev. at 812 & n. 3, 544 P.2d at 426 & n. 3. In effect, this definition places the requisite malice within the element of lying in wait. Of course, a prosecutor would not charge murder in the case of a surprise party, but even wrongful acts involving an enumerated means and causing death may not constitute murder. For example, if a nurse carelessly administers a lethal dose of the wrong medicine to a hospital patient, he has killed someone by means of poison. But the nurse is liable for murder only if he acted with extreme recklessness regarding the risk to human life, an abandoned and malignant heart. See Mattison, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d at 197 (holding that absent a specific intent by the defendant to kill, to find murder by means of poison, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had full knowledge that his conduct endangered the life of decedent, but that he nevertheless deliberately administered the poison with conscious disregard for that life). Murder by torture warrants further discussion because the State has cited authority for the proposition that the malice required for murder can be transferred from the commission of torture. This is the only authority that supports the state's position, and it provides support only if it can be extended to apply to murder by other enumerated means. However, it appears that no court has taken this approach with poison, lying in wait, or any other enumerated means. More important, we conclude that the approach is not sound even in regard to torture. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reasoned that murder by torture is analogous to felony murder in that malice may be implied by the very act of torturing the victim. Torture is a dangerous activity of such reckless disregard for human life that, like felony murder, malice is implied by the law. State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466, 406 S.E.2d 579, 587-88 (1991). The California Supreme Court also held: When a killing is perpetrated by means of torture, the means used is conclusive evidence of malice and premeditation, and the crime is murder of the first degree. People v. Turville, 51 Cal.2d 620, 335 P.2d 678, 685 (1959), overruled on other grounds by People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 44 (1964). Although as a practical matter malice may almost always be factually present when there is a killing by torture, the decisions in Crawford and Turville err in abandoning the established analysis of first-degree murder by enumerated means and concluding that, given torture, malice must be present as a matter of law. Such an approach introduces laxness and inconsistency into the application of a statute which defines first-degree murder by enumerated means in a uniform, reliable way. This lax approach is not sound because it is conceivable that torture, like other enumerated means, can be done without legal malice. [14] Actually, although Turville has not been expressly overruled on this point, the California Supreme Court has since reiterated that to prove murder by torture, [i]t must be established that the defendant intended to `cause cruel suffering on the part of the object of the attack, either for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy some other untoward propensity.'  Mattison, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d at 197 (quoting People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 207 P.2d 51, 54 (1949)). The required untoward propensity goes to the element of malice. The California Supreme Court has also explained that murder by torture is first-degree murder not because of the amount of pain inflicted but because of the state of mind of the torturerthe cold-blooded intent to inflict pain for personal gain or satisfaction. People v. Steger, 16 Cal.3d 539, 128 Cal.Rptr. 161, 546 P.2d 665, 669 (1976). Therefore, the court has held that first-degree murder by torture is murder committed with a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain. Id.; see also People v. Wiley, 18 Cal.3d 162, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881, 887 (1976). Further, in cases of murder by torture in California, the current standard jury instructions require the jury to find both malice aforethought and that [t]he perpetrator committed the murder with a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain upon a living human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose. California Jury Instructions, Criminal 8.24 and accompanying use note (6th ed.1996). Thus, despite the unqualified statement made in Turville, malicious intent must be independently proved to establish murder by torture in California. As already discussed, child abuse was added only recently to the means enumerated in NRS 200.030(1)(a) and is somewhat anomalous, but the State has not argued nor would we agree that this is a basis to treat it differently from the other enumerated means. To maintain coherency and rigor in the application of the statute, first-degree murder by child abuse can and must be proven in the same manner as the other three enumerated means. To reiterate, poison, lying in wait, and torture are not separate statutory offenses, but all are consistent with deliberate, premeditated action. Child abuse, on the other hand, can denote a crime, but does not appear to do so in NRS 200.030(1)(a) because the statute provides its own definition of child abuse in subsection (6)(a) rather than referencing the independent offenses involving abuse or neglect of children proscribed in NRS 200.508. Child abuse more clearly diverges from the other three enumerated means in that it does not strongly correlate with deliberate, premeditated action since it can be and often is committed in a rash, impulsive manner. Therefore, it is critical that jurors expressly find malice aforethought before convicting a child abuser of first-degree murder under subsection (1)(a). Otherwise, a single rash, impulsive act by an otherwise decent parent leading to a child's deathan act which was abusive to the child but lacked legal malicewould constitute first-degree murder. [15] Thus, unlike felony murder pursuant to NRS 200.030(1)(b), to establish that a killing is murder under subsection (1)(a), the State must prove that the killer acted with malice aforethought, i.e., with the deliberate intention unlawfully to take life or with an abandoned and malignant heart. See NRS 200.020. Proof of an enumerated means then establishes that the murder is of the first degree. The jury instruction in this case improperly relieved the State of this requirement. For Collman's actions to constitute murder, the jury had to find that he acted with malice aforethought. This malice could not be presumed simply from his commission of child abuse pursuant to NRS 200.030(6)(a), i.e., physical injury of a nonaccidental nature to a child.