Opinion ID: 2624991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applying the standard to clark and smith

Text: ¶ 17 The Utah Code defines the crime of forgery as follows: A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: (a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered writing; or (b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999) (emphasis added). ¶ 18 The district court dismissed the forgery charges against both Clark and Smith because the State failed to demonstrate that they had acted with the requisite intent. However, in doing so, the district court applied the directed verdict standard. Because we reject the notion that the probable cause standard is equivalent to the directed verdict standard, we apply the clarified probable cause standard. [4] ¶ 19 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the facts presented at the preliminary hearing were sufficient to meet the reasonable belief standard. The State presented evidence that both Clark and Smith attempted to cash forged checks at local banks mere hours after those checks were reported stolen. After a brief delay while bankers told Smith that they were seeking approval to cash the check, Smith exited the bank, abandoning the forged check. Similarly, when told that there was a problem with the account and that he would have to take it up with the account holder, Clark abandoned the forged check and left the bank. ¶ 20 The issue is whether this evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable belief that Smith and Clark uttered forged checks with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that [they were] facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone. Id. Here, the facts give rise to two alternate inferences. On the one hand, Clark and Smith may have been unaware the checks were stolen. After the delays, they may have simply assumed they had themselves been defrauded and, thus, felt there was no reason to take the checks with them. On the other hand, one could reasonably infer an intent to defraud. If Smith were a holder in due course he would have waited for approval rather than leaving when he had been given no other explanation for the delay. If Clark were a holder in due course, he would have taken the check with him to take that up with the account holder. Further, both Clark and Smith presented the checks only hours after the reported thefts. While one could infer that Clark and Smith received the checks in otherwise legitimate transactions, this does not negate the reasonable inference that, in light of the timing, they either stole the checks or knew they were stolen. Viewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the State, the State has shown probable cause. Therefore, the district courts' findings to the contrary are reversed. [5]