Opinion ID: 1903505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the trial judge err in excluding Hughes from chambers during the jury selection process?

Text: ¶ 8. Hughes argues that he was denied his right to be present during the jury selection process, a critical stage of the proceedings. This alleged error was not raised at trial or in the motion for new trial. A review of the record shows that Hughes was present when the jurors were questioned and that he was able to confer with his attorney about any possible disqualifications. During the jury selection in chambers, counsel for Hughes was told by the trial judge that Hughes had a right to be present. Rogers Druhet, Hughes's trial attorney, responded that he did not want Hughes present during the jury selection process in chambers. Hughes now argues that the jury selection process was a critical stage and that he had a right to be present. ¶ 9. In Davis v. State, 767 So.2d 986, 992 (Miss.2000), this Court held that the critical stage of the jury selection process is when the jurors are questioned about matters regarding whether they know or are related to anyone involved in the case, know or have read about the case, or whether some hardship related to the charge might give cause for sequestration. The issue of whether the peremptory challenges stage of the jury selection process is a critical stage has not been before this Court. Furthermore, the issue of whether the defendant's counsel can waive the defendant's right to be present during peremptory challenges has not been before this Court. ¶ 10. Other state courts have held that the peremptory challenges stage of the jury selection process is a critical stage at which the defendant has a right to present. See State v. Collins, 133 Ariz. 20, 648 P.2d 135, 138 (1982); Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343 (Fla.2001). This Court in Chase v. State, 699 So.2d 521, 534 (Miss.1997) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987)) held that a criminal defendant `is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceedings that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.' We find that a defendant's presence at the peremptory challenges stage would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. The trial judge recognized that Hughes had a right to be at the peremptory challenges and so does this Court. ¶ 11. However, this Court must now decide whether Hughes's counsel could effectively waive Hughes's right to be present during peremptory challenges. This Court has held that a party is bound by the acts of his attorney. Stringer v. State, 627 So.2d 326, 330 (Miss.1993). There are exceptions where a personal waiver of the defendant is required; however, the right to be present during peremptory challenges is not one of those exceptions. See Wardley v. State, 760 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). Due to the trial counsel's decision to waive Hughes's right, we find no error in Hughes's exclusion during peremptory challenges.