Opinion ID: 220347
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tabatha Henness's Testimony

Text: Henness first argues that the trial court improperly held that Tabatha, his wife, was competent to testify. Henness raised this claim on direct appeal, so there is no procedural default issue. Under Ohio Evid. R. 601(B), a spouse is not competent to testify against her spouse unless she elects to do so. She must make a deliberate choice to testify, with an understanding of her right to refuse. State v. Adamson, 72 Ohio St.3d 431, 650 N.E.2d 875, 877 (1995). In Ohio, the trial court must instruct the witness on the issue of spousal competency and find, on the record, that she voluntarily chose to testify. State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 873 N.E.2d 858, 870 (2007). Prior to trial, Tabatha sent Henness letters stating that she would not testify against him. She changed her mind, however, by the time of trial. Before she testified, the court advised her of her right not to testify unless she chose to do so, and confirmed that she understood her right. Tabatha said that she wanted to testify. During defense counsel's examination, Tabatha repeated her desire to testify and stated that she had not been threatened in any form and was not being coerced. Defense counsel later opined in a post-trial affidavit that Tabatha acted under improper pressure from the prosecution, but her in-court statements belie this claim. Her voluntary intent to testify is clear from the record. Henness maintains that Tabatha's actions subsequent to testifying raise questions about whether her choice to testify was truly voluntary. After testifying on direction examination, Tabatha fled the jurisdiction and did not return for a week. When she returned, the trial court conducted a voir dire examination. Tabatha explained that her trial testimony made her nervous and stressed out. She returned because she knew she was under subpoena and could be arrested for failing to return, but no one made any threats or promises to induce her to return. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Henness would suffer no prejudice if Tabatha was allowed to finish testifying. Under these circumstances, Henness does not show that the admission of Tabatha's testimony was so fundamentally unfair that it resulted in a due process violation. Henness also argues that Tabatha was not mentally and emotionally competent to choose to testify against him. He presented evidence in the district court of her history of suicide attempts, mental health treatment, and antidepressant and antianxiety medications. He claims that Tabatha was not taking her medication at the time of his trial, which rendered her incapable of intelligently and voluntarily deciding to testify. However, Henness never made this argument or presented this evidence to the state courts. Therefore, we cannot consider those facts in reviewing this claim. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398-1400, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011); Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir.2002).