Opinion ID: 1621671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Communication Between Bailiff and Jury

Text: Floyd asserts that the district court erred when it overruled his motion for a new trial on the basis of improper communications between the bailiff and jurors. A bailiff's failure to perform his or her duty can result in a reversal of a conviction. See State v. Myers, 258 Neb. 272, 603 N.W.2d 390 (1999). The State argues that because the court did not make a finding whether the bailiff's version of the communication was accurate or whether the jurors' version of the communication was accurate, the record is not sufficient for this court to review the issue. We conclude that either version was an improper communication and that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Floyd's motion for a new trial on the murder and manslaughter charges based on the improper bailiff communication. A criminal defendant claiming jury misconduct bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) the existence of jury misconduct and (2) that such misconduct was prejudicial to the extent that the defendant was denied a fair trial. State v. Harrison, 264 Neb. 727, 651 N.W.2d 571 (2002). In a criminal case, misconduct involving an improper communication between a nonjuror and a juror gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice which the State has the burden to overcome. Id. The question of whether prejudice resulted from jury misconduct must be resolved by the trial court's drawing reasonable inferences as to the effect of the extraneous information on an average juror. Id. Improper communication between a nonjuror and a juror may involve communication between the bailiff and a juror if such communication goes outside certain limits. Such limits are set forth in Neb. Rev.Stat. § 29-2022 (Reissue 1995), which provides in relevant part: When a case is finally submitted to the jury, they must be kept together in some convenient place, under the charge of an officer, until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged by the court. The officer having them in charge shall not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them whether they have agreed upon a verdict, unless by order of the court; nor shall he communicate to anyone, before the verdict is delivered, any matter in relation to the state of their deliberations. (Emphasis supplied.) We further note that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1116 (Reissue 1995) provides that if, after the jury has begun deliberations, the jury desires to be informed as to any part of the law arising in the case, then the jury may request the officer to conduct them to the court where the information upon the point of law shall be given. Although § 29-2022 states that the bailiff, as the officer having the jury in his or her charge, shall not make any communication to jurors except to ask whether they have agreed upon a verdict, we recognize that some incidental communication between the bailiff and jurors beyond that specified under § 29-2022 will unavoidably occur. When such communication is limited to simple, practical matters of logistics such as the location of the facilities used for deliberations, such communication is not likely to be prejudicial to the defendant or deny the defendant a fair trial. We note in this regard: Many of a bailiff's legitimate functions involve perfunctory communication with the jury, from taking their meal orders to telling them where the restroom is located. Thus, it is too broad a statement to say that all communications from a bailiff to a jury are forbidden. . . . The law forbids only communications that could possibly influence deliberations. . . . Communications necessary for the proper care of the jury, such as lunch orders and other administrative matters, do not raise an inference of impropriety because communications are neutral and innocuous. State v. Yonker, 133 Wash.App. 627, 636, 137 P.3d 888, 892 (2006). While communications concerning administrative matters may not be prejudicial, when communications involve matters of law, the risk of prejudice is present and communication by the bailiff to jurors on such matters is improper. See Alexander v. State, 919 S.W.2d 756, 766 (Tex.App. 1996) ([t]here is no error when the bailiff communicates to the jury on logistical matters not dealing with the case on trial; however, there are numerous . . . cases providing that a bailiff's communications with the jury about the case on trial constitutes error). See, also, State v. Merricks, 831 So.2d 156, 160 (Fla.2002) (the potential for prejudice is the same, if not greater, when a bailiff, rather than a trial judge, answers a jury's inquiry directly without notice to and outside the presence of defense counsel and the State). When jurors have questions regarding the case on trial, including questions regarding the potential duration of deliberations, the bailiff should refer such questions to the court pursuant to § 25-1116. With respect to the communication between the bailiff and jurors in this case, the State asserts that this court cannot review the trial court's decision on the matter because the court did not make a specific finding as to which version of the communication was accurate. We note that although the bailiff and the jurors gave descriptions that differed in certain respects, each person agreed that some question and answer regarding the potential duration of deliberations occurred. All agreed that the bailiff told jurors that the deliberation could continue the rest of the week or until Friday. The main difference in the testimonies is that juror J.K. testified that the bailiff said that the judge would keep sending the jury back until you reach a unanimous decision, while the bailiff testified that she said there's no time limit to the deliberations. We conclude that either version of the communication between the bailiff and jurors in this case was an improper communication. Because either version was improper, it is not necessary to remand the cause to the district court for a finding as to which version was accurate. Whether the bailiff in this case told jurors that they would be required to deliberate until they reached a unanimous verdict or whether she told them that there was no time limit to deliberations, either statement, combined with her statement that the jurors could be required to deliberate the rest of the week, was an improper communication. The communication went beyond simple administrative matters. The jurors' questions regarding continued deliberations should have been referred to the court, and the bailiff should not have attempted to give any direct answer to the question. The proper response on the part of the bailiff would have been to refer the question to the court. We therefore determine that the district court erred in concluding that there was no improper communication between the bailiff and jurors and in failing to find that jury misconduct had occurred. Having determined that jury misconduct occurred, we further conclude that such misconduct was sufficiently prejudicial that Floyd was denied a fair trial. The question whether prejudice resulted from jury misconduct must be resolved by drawing reasonable inferences as to the effect of the occurrence on an average juror. See State v. Harrison, 264 Neb. 727, 651 N.W.2d 571 (2002). Although J.K. stated in her affidavit, admitted over the State's objection, that the communication from the bailiff affected her verdict, the question of prejudice in this case must be based on a determination of the effect on an average juror rather than the actual effect on J.K. In this regard, we note that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-606(2) (Reissue 1995) provides: Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him indicating an effect of this kind be received for these purposes. Disregarding statements made by J.K. in her affidavit regarding the effect of the communication, we conclude that the improper communication from the bailiff to the juror would have affected the average juror in a way that would have prejudiced Floyd and denied him a fair trial. In reaching this conclusion, we consider the circumstances surrounding the communication. At the time the communication was made, the jury had been ordered to return to deliberations after it was determined that the jury's verdicts on the murder and manslaughter charges were not unanimous. The communication was made to the juror who was known to be the lone dissenting juror. Either directly or indirectly, the communication focused on the potential effect that the juror's continued dissent would have on the length of deliberations. We determine that the communication could have pressured the average juror to change his or her vote in order to avoid protracted deliberations. Because the communication occurred when the jury was not yet unanimous on the charges of first degree murder and manslaughter of an unborn child, we conclude that the improper communication was prejudicial to Floyd and denied him a fair trial on those charges. We note, however, that the jury was polled prior to the improper communication and that the jury was already unanimous as to Floyd's guilt on the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. We therefore conclude that the improper communication which occurred after the unanimous verdict on the firearm charge had been announced was not prejudicial as to the firearm conviction. Because the improper communication denied Floyd a fair trial on the murder and manslaughter charges, we determine that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant Floyd a new trial on these convictions. It is therefore necessary to reverse Floyd's convictions on the charges of first degree murder and manslaughter of an unborn child. Upon finding error in a criminal trial, the reviewing court must determine whether the evidence offered by the State and admitted by the trial court, whether erroneously or not, would have been sufficient to sustain the conviction before the cause is remanded for a new trial. State v. Beeder, 270 Neb. 799, 707 N.W.2d 790 (2006). Although the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions do not protect against a second prosecution for the same offense where a conviction is reversed for trial error, they bar retrial if the reversal is necessitated because the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the conviction. Id. Because the evidence admitted was sufficient to sustain convictions on the charges, we conclude that Floyd can be retried on the murder and manslaughter charges without violating double jeopardy. We therefore reverse the murder and manslaughter convictions and remand the cause for a new trial on first degree murder and manslaughter of an unborn child.