Opinion ID: 772959
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Death Penalty Selection Instructions

Text: 102 Allen argues that the district court erred in failing to submit to the jury his tendered mercy instruction which would have informed the jury that they never are required to impose a sentence of death. When reviewing a challenge to the jury instructions, we recognize that the district court has wide discretion in formulating the instructions and [we] will affirm if the entire charge to the jury, when read as a whole, fairly and adequately contains the law applicable to the case. United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1057 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Casas, 999 F.2d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1078 (1994)). 103 Our review of the instructions given to the jury convinces us that the district court committed no error in fairly and adequately presenting the applicable law. The relevant portions of the district court's instructions to the jury were as follows: 104 Again, whether or not the circumstances in this case justify a sentence of death is a decision that the law leaves entirely to you.... If you unanimously conclude that the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death... you shall record your determination that death is justified in Section 6A of the special verdict form for each count of the indictment. 105 (Instr. No. 8, Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 37-38.) The district court also instructed the jury that, [a]t the end of your deliberations, if you determine that Billie Jerome Allen should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of release, the Court is required to impose that sentence. (Instr. No. 9, id. at 39.) 106 We think these instructions accurately explain the jury's role in sentencing under the FDPA, which reads as follows: 107 [T]he defendant... shall be sentenced to death if, after consideration of the factors set forth in section 3592 [delineating possible aggravating and mitigating circumstances] in the course of a hearing held pursuant to section 3593, it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified.... 108 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (emphasis added). In § 3593, entitled Special hearing to determine whether a sentence of death is justified, the FDPA states the following: 109 [T]he jury... shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death.... Based upon this consideration, the jury by unanimous vote... shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence. 110 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (emphasis added). Based upon the plain language of the statute, once a jury makes a final, unanimous determination that a sentence of death is justified, then the FDPA requires its imposition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3594 (requiring that once a recommendation of death or life imprisonment is made, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly). 111 Allen argues that the language in § 3593(e) requires a jury to make two decisions--first, whether a sentence of death is justified and second, whether a sentence of death should actually be imposed. Although § 3593(e) could lend itself to this interpretation when read in isolation, we reject this interpretation as inconsistent with the Act as a whole. 14 See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 900 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that we apply common sense meaning to the text of statutes and interpret provisions in a manner logically consistent with the Act as a whole). Allen's two-decision interpretation of § 3593(e) would allow the jurors to disregard a unanimous determination that a sentence of death is justified. We conclude that such an interpretation contradicts the language of § 3591(a)(2), stating that a defendant shall be sentenced to death if the fact finder determines that a sentence of death is justified after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. To consistently harmonize the two sections, we must read § 3593(e) as specifying the jury's options within this framework. We already know from § 3591(a)(2) that a unanimous finding that death is justified requires a recommendation of a death sentence. The jury's remaining options, then (life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence), are only valid options for the jury to recommend if the balancing process favors the mitigating factors and does not justify a sentence of death. 112 Thus, we read the requirement in § 3593(e) that the jury recommend by unanimous vote the sentence to be imposed to be a procedural mechanism to record the jury's findings, first on the question of whether a death sentence is justified, and if not, then on whether the sentence should be life in prison or some other sentence imposed by the court. We do not read § 3593(e) as requiring from the jury a second, substantive determination regarding a sentence of death once it decides that a sentence of death is indeed justified. 113 In another context, the Controlled Substances Act, Congress clearly has provided that the jury regardless of its findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, is never required to impose a death sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (requiring the jury to be instructed in this manner). This language would explicitly allow the jury to make the second, substantive determination that Allen seeks. No similar language exists in the FDPA, however, and we are not permitted to legislate this language into the Act ourselves, particularly in light of the contrary language explained above which already exists in the FDPA. 114 Under the FDPA, the jury exercises complete discretion in its determination of whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. The jury was informed that whether or not the circumstances justify a sentence of death was a decision left entirely to them. Mercy is not precluded from entering into the balance of whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The FDPA merely precludes the jurors from arbitrarily disregarding its unanimous determination that a sentence of death is justified. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1993) (explaining that 'it would be very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the fate of a defendant to turn on the vagaries of particular jurors' emotional sensitivities with our longstanding recognition that, above all, capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and non-arbitrary') (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990)); Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493 (stating that the government must not cut off full and fair consideration of mitigating evidence; but it need not grant the jury the choice to make the sentencing decision according to its own whims or caprice). Congress is free to pass a statute which confines arguments of mercy to the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances and in its final determination of whether the aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors. We also note that Allen was not prohibited from urging the jury to be merciful in its deliberations and in its consideration of asserted mitigating factors. The district court stated as follows: 115 There will be no ruling by the Court that mercy is a factor that cannot be considered. Certainly jury nullification cannot be argued nor any argument permitted beyond a statutory scheme. So there's no doubt about it, the defense will not be precluded from arguing that the jury may be merciful in its deliberations. 116 (Trial Tr., Vol. XIX at 22-23.) For these reasons, we conclude that the instructions given in this case adequately state the law and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Allen's proposed mercy instruction. 117 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1), we have addressed all of the substantive and procedural issues raised by Billie Jerome Allen's appeal from the sentence of death. We have also considered whether his sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and conclude that it was not so imposed. We further have carefully considered whether the evidence supports the jury's special findings of the existence of the aggravating factors, both statutory and non-statutory, which the jury found to exist, and we conclude that the evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury's special findings.