Opinion ID: 22619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Texas Capital Punishment Statutes

Text: Doughtie’s final ground for appeal is the oft-made and consistently rejected argument that the Texas capital murder statutes and the death penalty provisions thereof (Tex. Penal Code § 19.03 and T.C.C.P. Art. 37.071) are unconstitutional. Doughtie breaks no new ground in his constitutional attack on the Texas death sentencing scheme, asserting that (1) a finding of future dangerousness on the first special issue jury question may be based solely on the circumstances of the capital offense itself; (2) the burden of proof on the mitigation special issue is not placed upon the State; and (3) the jury’s answers to the special issue questions are not subject to meaningful appellate review. Doughtie’s arguments run contrary to clearly established precedents. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-71 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) (discussing the “narrowing function” of the Texas penal statute). The district court’s order denying habeas corpus fully refutes this standard “throw in” constitutional argument. Because reasonable jurists could not disagree over whether Doughtie has shown ineffective assistance of counsel, any error by the district court in denying an evidentiary hearing, or 12 a constitutional violation in the Texas capital murder statutes, there is no basis for granting a COA. Certificate of Appealability DENIED. 13