Opinion ID: 2010991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Superior Court Denies Motion to Dismiss

Text: The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss. The Superior Court found that PDI was not a necessary party to the appeal and that, even if PDI was a necessary party, its interests could be represented by CCS. The Superior Court found that CCS was a necessary party to the appeal, but that the petitioners-below could amend their petition to add CCS as a party under the relation back doctrine and Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c). [19] The Superior Court then granted the petitioners' motion to amend the caption of their petition to name both CCS and PDI as parties. The Superior Court explained that Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(7) provides that the Superior Court may dismiss a claim for relief for failure to join a party pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 19. [20] Rule 19 provides for the joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. [21] The Superior Court considered whether or not there is any room for forgiveness when a petitioner for a writ of certiorari seeking the Superior Court's review a decision of a zoning board fails to comply with the letter of the[] standards governing amendments to appellate proceedings. [22] First, the Superior Court stated: It is well-settled Delaware law that appeals should be decided on the merits rather than `nice technicalities of practice.' [23] The Superior Court noted, however, that different standards govern amendments to appellate proceedings, depending on whether the appeal is brought in the Supreme Court [24] or in a trial court. The Superior Court explained that amendments to appeals brought in the trial courts are governed by Rules 15 and 19. As an example, the Superior Court cited Council of Civic Organizations of Brandywine Hundred v. New Castle County, in which this Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's dismissal of an appeal for failure to join a necessary party under Court of Chancery Rules 15 and 19, after the time to perfect the appeal had expired. The Court of Chancery found that the action could not proceed because the unnamed party was indispensable to the appeal. [25] In Sussex Medical, the Superior Court dismissed an appeal for failure to join a necessary party after applying Superior Court Civil Rules 15 and 19. [26] Second, the Superior Court determined that this Court's decision in Hackett established a standard for joinder in certiorari appeals. [27] In Hackett, the Superior Court applied Superior Court Civil Rules 15 and 19 to determine whether the omission of a party to a certiorari appeal from a decision of the Board of Adjustment of Rehoboth Beach was an amendable defect. [28] The Superior Court dismissed the appeal because the petitioner failed to name a necessary partythe property owner/successful applicant before the Board of Adjustment. [29] This Court affirmed, holding that the landowner is an affected party that must be named in an appeal of a decision of a board of adjustment affecting the landowner's property. The Superior Court noted that the facts of this case are very similar to the facts of Hackett because both cases involve certiorari appeals to the Superior Court from zoning board decisions, both omitted the successful applicant and both petitioners failed to denote the omitted party as a party in the body of the petition. [30] The Superior Court stated that this case does not present a simple defect in the caption and that the issue in this case is not whether the caption can be corrected so that a previously named party can be properly identified, but whether an entirely new party (PDI and/or CCS) can be joined under Rules 15 and 19 after the expiration of the time for appeal. [31] The Superior Court explained that under Hackett, it must determine first whether PDI and CCS are necessary parties to the appeal pursuant to Rule 19(a). Then, if the court found that either PDI or CCS was a necessary party, it must determine whether the petitioners can join that party by amendment under Rule 15(a). The Superior Court further explained that an amendment to the notice of appeal may relate back to the date of the original filing only if the petitioners satisfy the three requirements of Rule 15(c). If it is not possible to join PDI and/or CCS, then the Superior Court explained that it must determine whether it can proceed without the missing party or if it must grant the motion to dismiss because the missing party is indispensable under Rule 19(b). Third, the Superior Court explained that a petitioner for a certiorari appeal must comply with certain pleading requirements, such as notice to a party affected by the administrative ruling, either directly or through a designated agent. [32] The Superior Court noted that the petitioners in this case complied with the pleading requirements of section 328 and Rule 72. They satisfied section 328 by timely filing a verified petition setting forth the grounds for their appeal of the ZBA's decision. They satisfied Rule 72 by naming the petitioners, designating precisely the order appealed from, stating the grounds of the appeal, naming the Superior Court, and signing the petition. They also complied with the official forms published with the Superior Court Civil Rules by naming the ZBA in the caption of the petition. Therefore, the Superior Court concluded that the petitioners-below had invoked the Superior Court's appellate jurisdiction. [33] Fourth, the Superior Court considered whether the petitioners complied with Rules 19 and 15. First, the Superior Court found that PDI was not a necessary party to the appeal pursuant to Rule 19(a) because it was not a party to the ZBA proceeding. The Superior Court reasoned that the variance application lists CCS as the applicant and that PDI did not participate in the ZBA hearing and was not mentioned in the ZBA's written decision granting the variance. The Superior Court stated that [t]o the extent PDI has an interest in these proceedings, it would be well-represented by CCS. The Superior Court found that CCS was a necessary party to the appeal pursuant to Rule 19(a) because, like the unnamed parties in Sussex Medical, CCS has a vested interest in this appeal. [34] The court explained that any reversal or modification of the ZBA's decision would affect CCS's right to develop Gibraltar in accord with the variance it obtained. The Superior Court concluded that the petitioners could amend their petition under Rule 15(c) because they satisfied the three requirements for an amendment to relate back to the original filing date. [35] The Superior Court determined that the first requirementthat the claim asserted in the amended pleading arise out of the same conduct or occurrence set forth in the original pleadingwas satisfied because the petitioners proposed amendment relates to the same conduct or occurrence set forth in the original petition, as the conduct or occurrence that is the subject of this proceeding is the issuance of a use variance by the ZBA to CCS. The court found that [t]his focus would not change by allowing Petitioners leave to amend the Petition to add CCS as a party. The Superior Court determined that the second requirementthat the party to be added by the amendment receive notice of the action within the required statutory periodwas satisfied because CCS had notice of the institution of the appeal when Goddess sent an email with a copy of the petition attached to Stabler, the attorney who represented CCS at the ZBA hearing. The court explained that it may liberally construe the type or quality of notice, which need not be formal, such as service of process, and need not be in writing. [36] The court further explained that this Court's holding in Hackett did not preclude a finding that notice of the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari to the attorney who represented the party in the hearing before the ZBA was sufficient. Instead, the court stated that Hackett held, on those facts, there was no basis in the record to impute an ongoing attorney-client relationship between [the property owner's attorney in the ZBA hearing] and [the property owner]. [37] The court concluded that there must be evidence of an agency relationship to support constructive notice in the absence of a prior understanding communicated to the petitioner and that in this case, notice to Stabler, the attorney who represented CCS at the ZBA hearing, could be imputed to CCS because notice to a party's attorney concerning a legal matter will, in certain instances, provide constructive notice to the party, [38] particularly if the attorney-client relationship has been disclosed. The court stated that a petitioner may not assume that an ongoing attorney-client relationship exists at the close of an administrative proceeding. [39] But, the court reasoned, if there is evidence that the attorney-client relationship is ongoing and a prior understanding of that relationship is communicated to the petitioner, then notice to counsel for the party will be sufficient to satisfy the notice prong of 15(c). The Superior Court concluded that there was a basis in the record to conclude that CCS received notice of the appeal through Stabler, its attorney. The letter that Stabler sent to DiPinto on September 13, 2006, provided evidence that she continued to represent CCS after the ZBA released its decision. Stabler identified CCS as her client in the letter and proposed continuing discussions with the city on behalf of CCS. The court further found that [h]er reference to the ZBA decision and her attempt to contact Mr. Goddess further demonstrate that she intended to represent CCS in `obtaining remaining approvals over the next few months.' [40] Finally, the letter provided petitioners with an understanding of an ongoing attorney-client relationship between Stabler and CCS prior to the filing of the petition. Therefore, the court concluded that notice of the appeal to Stabler through Goddess's email could be imputed to CCS. Stabler did not receive the praecipe and the pleading it directed to be served on CCS until after the time for appeal had expired and so the court concluded that the praecipe could not be considered for purposes of notice. The Superior Court did find the praecipe relevant to the third requirement that within the same statutory period, the party to be added knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party to be added to the pleading. The court considered whether CCS knew or should have know that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against CCS. First, the court considered whether the petitioners were mistaken as to the identity of the proper party. Under the strict approach, followed in Delaware, a mistake occurs when the petitioner makes a true mistake as to the identity or name of the proper party as opposed to where the plaintiff merely chose the wrong party to sue. The Superior Court determined that Delaware courts tend to focus on the reason the moving party failed to include a party in the complaint or petition to determine whether the failure constituted a `mistake.' The courts generally decline to find a mistake when the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an intent to include the unnamed party before the limitations period expired but will find a mistake if the plaintiff intended to sue certain parties but was misled as to the identity of those parties. In this case, the Superior Court concluded, the petitioners were misled by the forms on the Superior Court's website, which indicate that only the ZBA should be named in the caption as the defendant in error. The court concluded that the petitioners' intent to prosecute the appeal against both the ZBA and CCS was well-documented in the record. The petitioners offered evidence of their intent to name CCS as a party to the appeal prior to the expiration of the statutory appeal period in: their praecipe; Goddess' email to Stabler; and the petition itself. The Superior Court stated that the petitioners' counsel was nonetheless led astray by the Superior Court's forms, which clearly (albeit) incorrectly suggest that only the ZBA should be named as the defendant in error. Therefore, the court concluded that the mistake was not inadvertent. The court stated that counsel for the petitioners deliberately, but mistakenly, chose to name only the ZBA in the caption of the Petition because he reasonably believed that was what this court required. [41] After concluding that the petitioners were mistaken, the Superior Court considered whether CCS knew or should have known of the mistake. The court concluded that CCS knew or should have known of the mistaken because Mr. Goddess' email to Ms. Stabler attaching the Petition and Ms. Stabler's rejection of Sheriff's service upon CCS as directed in the praecipe demonstrates that Ms. Stabler, on behalf of CCS, appreciated that the failure to include [CCS] in the petition for the writ of certiorari was an error and not a deliberate strategy. [42] The court found that CCS should have known of the mistake because Stabler saw that CCS was omitted from the caption of the copy of the petition emailed to her from Goddess. In conclusion, the Superior Court found that the addition of CCS through an amendment to the Petition, after the time for appeal has expired, is permissible because the conditions of Rules 15(a) and 15(c) are satisfied. Accordingly, the Superior Court held that CCS could properly be joined and the court need not address whether CCS is a necessary party under Rule 19(b). [43] The court denied the respondents' motion to dismiss and granted the petitioners' motion to amend the caption of the petition to add CCS and PDI as parties.