Opinion ID: 1391736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Defendant's Statement to Police Officers

Text: At trial the People were permitted, over defendant's objection, to introduce a tape-recorded statement given by defendant to police officers during a custodial interrogation. In the statement, defendant admitted his complicity in the Curtis and Ott murders. (14) Defendant contends that the statement was inadmissible because (1) the officers represented to defendant that the statement would not be used for court purposes; (2) the officers promised defendant leniency in order to induce him to confess; and (3) the officers continued their interrogation after defendant had invoked his right to remain silent. None of these contentions has merit. a.) Alleged Deceit. The tape-recorded statement contains some preliminary discussion between Officers Bohnlein and Kavenaugh regarding the future use of the statement. Contrary to defendant's present assertion, however, the record fails to suggest any deception whatever by these officers. Thus, according to the record, after the officers had recited the date and time of the interrogation, the following conversation ensued: BOHNLEIN: Are you gonna use that? KAVENAUGH: Yeah, that's all. BOHNLEIN: Then are we gonna use it from, for court purposes? KAVENAUGH: I don't know. BOHNLEIN: Then we just... KAVENAUGH: Just so we don't forget anything. BOHNLEIN: Do you mind if these statements are taped? JACKSON: Uh, no. Officer Kavenaugh testified regarding the foregoing conversation in the course of a pretrial hearing conducted for the purpose of establishing the voluntariness of defendant's statement. According to Kavenaugh, the interrogating officers frequently use a tape recorder to assure that none of the contents of an interrogation is lost or forgotten. The discussion recited above related to whether we were going to use the tape for court, or whether we were going to use it to refresh our memories when we dictate our reports. The quoted excerpt indicates that the officers discussed possible uses of the recording. They made no statement or assurance to the effect that the recording would not be used for court purposes. We think it significant that, although defendant himself testified at the pretrial hearing regarding the circumstances surrounding the recording of his statement, he did not assert that he was deceived or misled regarding the court use thereof. Indeed, prior to the conversation at issue, the officers had carefully advised defendant, among other things, that anything he told them could be used against him in court. The present case, therefore, is clearly distinguishable from People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 702-703 [159 Cal. Rptr. 684, 602 P.2d 384], wherein the officers elicited defendant's confession after apparently acceding to defendant's request for an off the record interview. Here, the record affords no basis whatever to support defendant's present contention that the officers made false and misleading statements regarding the ultimate use of defendant's statement. Nor does the record disclose any clever softening-up conversations of the type which we condemned in People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 160 [141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050]. We conclude, accordingly, that defendant's statement was not rendered either involuntary or inadmissible by reason of the interrogating officers' brief reference to the possible future uses of that statement. b.) (15a) Alleged Promise of Leniency. The transcript of defendant's statement discloses that at one point during the interrogation, following defendant's assertion that he didn't do it (referring to the burglary and murder of Mrs. Curtis), Officer Kavenaugh stated If you did, you are going to feel better if you tell us. Later in the interrogation, Officer Wren asked defendant if he could point out the house where some of the stolen property was taken and Officer Collette stated We wouldn't let anybody see you. You are cooperating with us. You are helping yourself and you are helping us to get this ... cleared up. If we take you out there at night, hide you so nobody could see, you could point it out and get all the stuff back that was taken out of the place. Defendant contends that the foregoing remarks constituted improper promises of leniency or other benefits which rendered his statement involuntary. (See, e.g., People v. Jiminez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 611 [147 Cal. Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672]; People v. McClary (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218, 228-229 [142 Cal. Rptr. 163, 571 P.2d 620].) We do not agree. (16) As we explained in McClary, In Hill [ People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536 (58 Cal. Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908)], we observed a line between mere police exhortation urging the suspect to talk to them, on the one hand, and express or implied offers of leniency, on the other; we explained that the distinction `does not depend upon the bare language of inducement but rather upon the nature of the benefit to be derived by a defendant if he speaks the truth, as represented by the police.' (P. 549.) We noted that `When the benefit pointed out by the police to a suspect is merely that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct,' the subsequent statement will not be considered involuntarily made. ( Ibid. ) On the other hand, `if ... the defendant is given to understand that he might reasonably expect benefits in the nature of more lenient treatment at the hands of the police, prosecution or court in consideration of making a statement, even a truthful one, such motivation is deemed to render the statement involuntary and inadmissible. The offer or promise of such benefit need not be expressed, but may be implied from equivocal language not otherwise made clear. [Citations.]' ( Ibid.; see also People v. Nelson (1964) 224 Cal. App.2d 238, 250-251 [36 Cal. Rptr. 385].) (20 Cal.3d at p. 228.) (15b) In the present case, it cannot reasonably be said that Officer Kavenaugh's statement that defendant would feel better if he confessed constituted any promise of benefit other than the psychological benefit which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct ( Hill, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 549). It is also noteworthy that defendant himself expressly acknowledged at the conclusion of his statement that no tangible or official benefits were promised him. Similarly, Officer Collette's statement that defendant would be helping himself by cooperating with the officers was not made to induce any statement or confession, but occurred in the context of a request that defendant escort the officers to the location of the stolen property. Significantly, this request was made after defendant had already admitted his complicity in the Ott burglary and murder. Furthermore, our previous holdings support the conclusion that the foregoing remark would not have constituted an improper promise or inducement even had it been made for the purpose of eliciting a statement. As we noted in People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 433 [20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714], we find no suggestion of threats or promises. We do find searching questions and exhortations to help himself by revealing the acts of others. But absent something other than mere questions, or exhortations to tell the truth or clear his conscience or help himself by revealing facts ..., there appears to be nothing on the face of the record which would support a finding of overreaching or coercion. (P. 433, italics added; accord, People v. Hill, supra, 66 Cal.2d 536, 548-549 [officers urged defendant to help himself].) In similar fashion, we conclude that the officers' remarks to defendant did not render his statement involuntary. c.) (17) Alleged Miranda Violation. Defendant next argues that the officers improperly interrogated him despite the invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent and to consult an attorney. The record discloses that, prior to interrogating defendant, Officer Bohnlein carefully explained to defendant his various rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], and then inquired Having those rights in mind, do you want to talk to us regarding these allegations? According to the transcript of the tape recording, defendant replied No. I want to talk to  yes  (Inaudible). Thereupon, the interrogation proceeded without further objection by defendant. Defendant argues that his response to Officer Bohnlein was an assertion of his right to remain silent, thereby rendering all subsequent statements inadmissible. It is well settled that once a suspect indicates his refusal to waive his constitutional rights, all further, interrogation must cease. ( People v. Braeseke, supra, 25 Cal.3d 691, 702; People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 237-241 [145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108]; People v. McClary, supra, 20 Cal.3d 218, 226.) Further, the record must contain evidence from which the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement at issue was the product of a knowing and intelligent waiver of defendant's Miranda rights. ( People v. Braeseke, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 701; see People v. Jiminez, supra, 21 Cal.3d 595, 608.) On the other hand, as a reviewing court, we must examine the uncontradicted facts in the record to determine independently whether the trial court's finding of intelligent waiver was properly made. As to conflicting testimony, we must accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record. (See People v. Jiminez, supra, at p. 609.) Defendant unsuccessfully litigated the question of his waiver of constitutional rights at two separate stages of these proceedings. First, at a pretrial hearing on defendant's motion to exclude his statement (Evid. Code, § 402), the interrogating officers testified that defendant had responded affirmatively to their request to talk with him. According to Officer Kavenaugh, he wanted to talk to us, it [defendant's response] was not a `no.' Further, Kavenaugh testified that defendant said nothing to indicate he wanted to talk to an attorney. Officer Bohnlein confirmed that defendant never requested to talk to an attorney. Defendant was called to testify on the matter, and he claimed that he told the officers that I wanted to talk to a lawyer, and that Officer Kavenaugh agreed to obtain a lawyer for defendant. To assist in resolving the foregoing conflicting testimony, a police sound-laboratory expert examined the tape recording and testified that in his opinion the transcription was accurate and that defendant's response had been No, I want to talk to  yes, without more than a second's pause between the word yes and the rest of the sentence. The witness concluded that defendant's response could not have included a request for an attorney because There is not enough time between the words `to' and `yes.' Based upon its evaluation of all of the foregoing testimony, the trial court denied defendant's motion, stating that I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and the mechanics of the production of this tape eliminated any possibility of, after the word `to,' the defendant saying lawyer, attorney, P.D. or anything else. Thereafter, at trial, defendant renewed his objection to the tape recording, and additional testimony was elicited outside the presence of the jury. Officer Bohnlein stated that when defendant was asked if he wished to talk to the officers, he initially stated No, but then agreed to discuss the matter. At no time, according to Bohnlein, did defendant ask to talk to an attorney. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that his response to Bohnlein's inquiry was No, I want to talk to a  to a  to a Public Defender. Subsequently, defendant changed that testimony, stating that although he attempted to request an attorney, I never did finish my sentence, whatever I said. At the conclusion of the foregoing hearing, the trial court expressly found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. As indicated by the summarized testimony, there was ample evidence to support the trial court's ruling. Defendant's initial assertion that he had requested an attorney was contradicted by the interrogating officers and the police sound technician. The plain inference from the record is that defendant declined to talk with the officers and then, in the same breath, changed his mind and agreed to do so. Although defendant now contends that all interrogation should have ceased once defendant invoked his rights by stating No in response to the officer's inquiry, it is well settled that A suspect who has asserted his rights and prevented further lawful interrogation nonetheless retains the option, thereafter, voluntarily to initiate a confession.' [Citations.] ( People v. McClary, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 226, italics in original.) In the present case, although defendant may have fleetingly invoked his Miranda rights, he immediately agreed to waive those rights without the intervention of any urging or interrogation by the officers. The record discloses no cajoling or badgering by the police. Rather, the decision to talk appears to have been the free, voluntary decision of defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting defendant's statement into evidence.