Opinion ID: 4520957
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competence to Stand Trial

Text: Kelsey first argues that the district court violated his right to due process by finding him competent to stand trial because (1) in doing so, the district court reversed its prior finding that he was incompetent to stand trial without a hearing and in the face of conflicting medical opinion, and (2) subsequent events including Kelsey’s behavior on the first day of trial, his refusal to be interviewed by probation, and the district court’s remarks about Kelsey’s mental health at sentencing required that it hold another competency hearing. We reject Kelsey’s 2 challenges to the district court’s finding that he was competent to stand trial. To find a defendant competent to stand trial, a district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has “(1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 46 (2d Cir. 1998). 1 The district court’s determination may rest on both medical evidence and its own observations of the defendant. United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 411 (2d Cir. 1995). Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e), when the director of a facility in which a defendant is hospitalized determines that the defendant has recovered to the extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense, the director shall promptly file a certificate with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e). At that point, the court that ordered the defendant’s commitment is required to hold a hearing to determine the competency of the defendant. Id. At the hearing, the defendant “shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses on his behalf, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d). We review the district court’s competency finding for clear error, see Morrison, 153 F.3d at 46, and its decision on whether to order a new hearing for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “Where the record on competency may plausibly be read to indicate the defendant may not have been competent, we still defer to the judgment of the district court, which had the benefit of examining the defendant 1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, we omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, and alterations. 3 and hearing from the fact and expert witnesses in person.” Morrison, 153 F.3d at 46. Contrary to Kelsey’s contention, the district court did hold a competency hearing as required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(e) and 4247(d) after a forensic psychologist issued a report concluding that Kelsey was competent to stand trial (the “Marquez Report”). 2 At the hearing, Kelsey did not challenge the district court’s proposed finding of competence based in part on the Marquez Report or seek to present evidence supporting a finding of incompetence. Rather, defense counsel represented that he and Kelsey “have had an opportunity to talk and he looks like he’s engaged and he looks like he wants to participate in the defense and he’s indicated that [to defense counsel].” Appellant App’x at 117. Those representations constitute substantial evidence in favor of a finding of competence. United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[S]ince incompetency involves an inability to assist in the preparation of a defense or rationally to comprehend the nature of the proceedings, failure by trial counsel to indicate the presence of such difficulties provides substantial evidence of the defendant’s competence.”). Accordingly, we identify no clear error in the district court’s competency finding, which was based on the Marquez Report, defense counsel’s representations, and its own observations of Kelsey. Kelsey’s behavior at and after trial and the district court’s discussion of Kelsey’s mental health at sentencing do not undermine the district court’s finding. We therefore reject Kelsey’s challenges to the district court’s finding that Kelsey was competent to stand trial.