Opinion ID: 1511651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ability of Sean to Express Himself.

Text: In order to satisfy the competency requirements of Evid. R. 17, a prospective witness must have the ability to understand questions and to frame and express intelligent answers.... State v. Grossmick, supra , 153 N.J. Super. at 192, aff'd o.b. 75 N.J. 48 (1977). R.R. points to the fact that Sean's responses were at times inconsistent, as well as the utilization of leading questions during his examination, as demonstrating that the child failed to satisfy this criterion. Having reviewed the record as a whole, we are of the view that R.R.'s contentions in this regard lack merit. It is well-settled that a court may in its discretion allow counsel to use leading questions in order to elicit testimony from an infant. See, e.g., Eberle v. Stegman, 98 N.J.L. 879 (E. & A. 1923); McCormick on Evidence, supra, § 6 at 10. The extent to which such questions are employed bears upon the weight which should be attributed to the infant's testimony by the trier of fact. It is not ordinarily, however, relevant to a determination of whether the infant is competent to testify at all. See, e.g., Eberle, supra, 98 N.J.L. at 879. In the present case, although counsel often had to rephrase questions in order that Sean could understand them, only a few occasions occurred when either counsel could not get a specific idea across to the child. Moreover, most of the child's testimony was communicated by means of gestures and complete sentences. The trial judge thus acted well within his discretion in concluding that Sean was capable of expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be understood by the judge.... R.R. also maintains that Sean's inconsistencies on the stand and the need for counsel to use leading questions in order to elicit his testimony show that the child did not possess an independent recollection of the events that transpired. He cites to numerous cases which hold that an infant witness, in order to be qualified, must initially demonstrate that he possesses an independent recollection of the events which have transpired. See, e.g., Bradburn v. Peacock, 135 Cal. App. 2d 161, 286 P. 2d 972, 973-974 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); State v. Ridley, 61 Wash. 2d 457, 378 P. 2d 700, 702 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 156 A. 2d 307, 310 (Sup. Ct. 1959); State v. McClain, 541 S.W. 2d 351, 355 (Mo. App. 1976); People v. Lamb, 121 Cal. App. 2d 838, 264 P. 2d 126, 130 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). See generally, Note, The Problem of the Child Witness, 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 217 (1956). Indeed, the common law rule was that a child, prior to testifying, had to satisfy the judge that he possessed such an independent recollection. See 2 Wigmore, supra, § 506 at 596; McCormick, supra, § 62 at 140. Evid. R. 17, however, makes the competence of a witness dependent merely upon his ability to express himself. The Rule thus abandons the criterion of independent recollection as a condition to testifying. Instead, questions concerning the child's recall are now relevant only insofar as they bear upon the weight which the factfinder places upon testimony that has in fact been given.