Opinion ID: 1283881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Lifetime Registration

Text: [7, 8] We have previously addressed the question of whether SORA registration requirements are punitive in the context of an ex post facto challenge. In State v. Worm, [20] the defendant argued that the lifetime registration requirement under SORA was punitive in nature and therefore in violation of the ex post facto clause as applied to him. We analyzed this issue under the intent-effects test established by the U.S. Supreme Court which requires an initial determination of whether the Legislature intended the statute to be criminal or civil. [21] If a court determines that the Legislature intended a statutory scheme to be civil, that intent will be rejected `only where a party challenging the [statute] provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention.' [22] In Worm, we first concluded that in enacting SORA, the Legislature intended to create a civil regulatory scheme to protect the public from the danger posed by sex offenders, which intent is not altered by the statute's structure or design. [23] We then examined the factors set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez [24] to determine whether the effect of the statute was so punitive as to negate the Legislature's intent. These factors include: (1) `[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint'; (2) `whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment'; (3) `whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter '; (4) `whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence'; (5) `whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime'; (6) `whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it'; and (7) `whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.' [25] We concluded in Worm that SORA's offense categories and registration periods were reasonably related to the danger of recidivism and consistent with SORA's regulatory objective of assisting law enforcement in future efforts to investigate and resolve sex offenses. We concluded that the registration provisions had not been shown to be so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature's intention to create a civil regulatory scheme. We wrote, Because the registration provisions are not punitive, we defer to the Legislature's determination of what remedial action is necessary to achieve the Legislature's goals. [26] The intent-effects test utilized in Worm to determine whether a statute was civil or punitive for purposes of ex post facto analysis has also been applied to make this determination in a double jeopardy context. [27] But previously, in State v. Schneider, [28] we declined to employ the intent-effects test to determine whether a court was required to advise a defendant of the SORA registration requirements before accepting a no contest plea. Instead, following the holdings of other state courts, we concluded that a court is not required to inform a defendant of the collateral consequence of the duties imposed under [SORA] before accepting his pleas. [29] [9, 10] Because Apprendi/Blakely focuses upon whether a defendant is subjected to punishment beyond that which is permissible on the basis of the jury verdict alone, we conclude that the intent-effects test is the appropriate standard to determine whether the lifetime registration requirement under SORA and the lifetime community supervision requirement under § 83-174.03 are punitive in nature. If they are not, there can be no Apprendi/Blakely error. Based upon our holding in Worm that the registration provisions of SORA are not punitive, the trial judge's finding of an aggravating offense triggering the lifetime reporting provisions did not violate the constitutional principles articulated in Apprendi and Blakely.