Opinion ID: 814829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Standards to Facts

Text: The district court captured Murray's essential theory: He alleges that, contrary to the statements and testimony of the federal agents, the FBI had prior knowledge of the location of the Warehouse because of information provided by Bulger. He claims that to avoid disclosing that Bulger was acting as an informant, the agents lied in the warrant affidavit, perjured themselves at the motion hearing and trial, and failed to disclose to him exculpatory information about the source of the information. This misconduct, Murray claims, caused violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights, rendering the proceedings leading to his 1984 conviction fundamentally flawed and necessitating the issuance of a writ of coram nobis. Murray, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (citations omitted). Murray argues that these lies were material to the motion to suppress as well as to the agents' testimony at trial. He asserts he was denied a fair trial and should be released, or at least granted resentencing. As to his petition, we make certain assumptions in Murray's favor. First, we will assume that his assertions about Bulger and the FBI were timely and could not have been reasonably made before the time he brought his petition.9 We next assume in Murray's favor that this petition is not an attempt to evade the 9 Murray relies on information from a 2006 civil trial in the District of Massachusetts, which concerned the FBI's relationship with Bulger. See McIntyre v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Mass. 2006). The district judge in that case found that Bulger had provided the FBI with the location of the South Boston warehouse as retaliation against a criminal competitor. Id. at 94. -14- restrictions on federal post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Trenkler, 536 F.3d at 95-100; Barrett, 178 F.3d at 5457. We also assume Murray may apply for the writ despite the fact that he is still in custody, because of the considerations outlined in Morgan. See 346 U.S. at 512-13 (Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties . . . .). The district court, too, made a number of assumptions in favor of Murray. Most particularly, the court credited Murray with having made a substantial preliminary showing that Agent Cleary did have prior knowledge of the location of the warehouse and lied about how he came to know of it. Murray, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of this appeal only, we will assume so arguendo, although the evidence for the assumption is weak. These various assumptions would establish the first two prongs of the coram nobis test in Murray's favor, and so we turn to the third. On the question of whether Murray's 1984 conviction rested on a fundamental error, we conclude that it did not. Further, on the fourth element of the coram nobis inquiry, we conclude the writ should not issue. The district court likewise determined that Murray had not demonstrated fundamental error relating to the issuance of the -15- search warrant, the agents' trial testimony, or the government's Brady disclosures. Id. at 468-74. We need not repeat the many grounds of the district court's analysis, but limit ourselves to a few. First, we conclude, as did the district court, that the omitted and allegedly false statements in the affidavit in support of the warrant were not material to the issuance of the warrant. There was ample probable cause to search the warehouse and no basis to suppress. As the district court pointed out, the warrant was supported by information from two other CIs who were not Bulger and who offered more detailed information about a large-scale marijuana conspiracy. Id. at 469. There was no basis for any insinuation that the CIs fabricated this information. Id. at 468-69. Further, the warrant affidavit included eyewitness observations by multiple agents about the unusual behavior of individuals and vehicles on April 5 and 6, 1983, which eventually led to the agents observing two vehicles leaving the warehouse and discovering that those vehicles contained bales of marijuana. Id. at 463-65. The surveillance combined with the marijuana in the vehicles gave the agents probable cause to believe that the warehouse contained additional marijuana and evidence of trafficking. See id. at 466. From these facts, the district court concluded that even if Bulger had been identified as the third CI (and thus the information linked to him been rendered unreliable), and even if -16- Agent Cleary's purportedly false story about discovering the warehouse had been omitted, the remainder of the affidavit readily established probable cause. Id. at 468-70. We agree. And because the allegedly withheld information was not material, it cannot be the basis for a finding of fundamental error. In a variant on his core argument, Murray argues that had Bulger's identity and relationship with the FBI been disclosed, he would have had more ammunition to cross-examine the federal agents at trial. Even if we assume this to be so, this line of argument ignores the fact that other evidence strongly pointed to Murray's guilt. A blue van registered to Murray had appeared multiple times in the course of the federal agents' surveillance of the suspected conspirators. Id. at 463. The agents had observed Murray driving a white van out of the warehouse; they had seen him stopping the van and handing the keys to another suspect; and when the agents pulled the white van over shortly thereafter, they found that it contained sixty bales of marijuana. Id. at 464-65. The warehouse itself was filled with more marijuana. Id. at 465. There was strong and direct evidence of Murray's guilt, unaffected by the claimed new ability to impeach.10 10 The same conclusion applies to Murray's argument that certain withheld documents would have helped him to impeach government witnesses because those documents did not list him as a member of the Joe Murray crew (the criminal group under investigation for marijuana trafficking). First, it appears that Murray did not raise this argument in the district court until after the court had entered its order denying the petition. But -17- We see no basis for impugning the original verdict of guilt in light of that evidence. The issue of whether or not the FBI agents were untruthful regarding how they first learned of the warehouse, and regarding Bulger's role in providing that knowledge, does not undermine confidence in the conviction. The fact remains that Murray did eventually accept a reduced sentence for the 1984 conviction rather than pressing his case after remand from the Supreme Court. There is, and can be, no serious argument that Murray's post-remand agreement was not knowing or voluntary. As we pointed out in United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, those who have pled guilty are subject to higher standards for issuance of coram nobis. See id. at 256-57. Although Murray's agreement may or may not be rightly characterized as a guilty plea as such, see note 3 above, it shares the characteristics of such a plea that are relevant to the coram nobis inquiry, including the abandonment of claims he could have raised on appeal and implication of the interests of finality. See George, 676 F.3d at 256-57. even if we do not treat the argument as waived, the evidence to which Murray refers was not material under Brady. The documents, which contain notes about information Bulger provided to the FBI, do not purport to include complete lists of all members of the Joe Murray crew. In fact, at one point the notes specifically state that the named crew members are [a]mong others. At no point do the documents indicate that Michael Murray was not a member of the Joe Murray crew, as Murray now claims in his briefing. Again, given the overwhelming evidence of Murray's guilt, these documents would not have been material to Murray's conviction. -18- In the end, Murray's petition for coram nobis is based on the thoroughly improbable theory that the FBI agents lied about everything in Murray's case, not just about how they knew the location of the warehouse, and that despite the other bases for the warrant affidavit, and all of the direct evidence of Murray's guilt, those lies were material. Like the district court, we note that this is sheer speculation, see Murray, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 47274, and is certainly not enough to support issuance of the writ of coram nobis. Even if there were trial errors, and we do not suggest there were, Murray's case would fail under the fourth element of the coram nobis inquiry. Issuance of the writ would not be warranted under the facts and circumstances of this case. See George, 676 F.3d at 255. Indeed, the interests of justice are best served by denial of the petition. It was entirely appropriate that Murray's sentence for his current conviction take into account a previous crime he committed. In rejecting this petition, we in no way excuse or condone the FBI's illicit involvement with Whitey Bulger. See generally United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming racketeering conviction of FBI agent who conspired with Bulger). But the connection to Murray's 1984 conviction, for a crime he did commit, is too attenuated to support his petition. Affirmed. -19-