Opinion ID: 331054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jury prejudice

Text: 27 Chiarizio also claims that the comments of one prospective juror on voir dire, to the effect that he knew Chiarizio, but not in the context of Chiarizio's 'business,' biased those jurors who heard the comment. In Chiarizio's view, the prospective juror's statement was understood by those who heard it to refer to Chiarizio's alleged gambling activities. Such comments assertedly prejudiced the jury by confirming Chiarizio's guilt before the trial started. 28 The government maintains (1) that the reference to Chiarizio's 'business' was ambiguous and nonprejudicial because it may have been understood to refer to a legitimate profession and (2) even if the comment was understood as a reference to gambling, the district judge had wide discretion to screen the jury for bias and should not be overruled on the facts of this situation. 29 The government's position relies heavily on the decision of this court in United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299 (2d Cir. 1971). As we read Colabella, its relevance to this case is twofold. First, the court's decision in Colabella indicates that to show reversible prejudice, defendant must go beyond 'speculation over thoughts or attitudes not manifest.' Colabella, supra at 1302. Defendants must demonstrate more than a single ambiguous remark with potential for prejudice. Rather, they must demonstrate that prejudice in fact existed in the minds of the jury. 30 Secondly, before an appellate court will overturn the trial judge's discretion on voir dire, the defendant must show that the possibility of prejudice at the trial court was a substantial one, rather than an isolated minor incident. In Colabella, defendant claimed that the spectacle of several voir dire declarations of prejudice biased the veniremen who remained since they were exposed to a series of persons declaring their belief in the defendant's guilt. This court, while encouraging the practice of in camera questioning of jurors, declared that the facts of Colabella did not establish a case of juror bias. 31 When one contrasts the single, ambiguous statement here with the quantum and directness of the voir dire statements of prejudice in Colabella, it is clear that defendant cannot prevail in the instant appeal. If the facts of Colabella were insufficient for reversal on the grounds of prejudice, a fortiori the more innocuous statement here is inadequate to overturn Chiarizio's conviction.