Opinion ID: 1902977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: misinterpretation of the elements of the charge

Text: ¶ 8. The indictment and jury instructions in this case misconstrued the elements of attempted aggravated assault. Morris did not object at trial to the indictment or instructions on the elements of the charge. However, he did offer Instructions D-2 and D-3, which required the jury to find Morris not guilty if they found that he did not intend to cause bodily injury to the officers. The trial court denied the instructions, finding that Morris need not have had any intent, because it was a case of reckless disregard. We find that Morris adequately preserved this error for appeal by filing his own instructions on the element of intent. ¶ 9. Morris was charged under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a), which stated in pertinent part, A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life ... Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a) (1994). [1] Counts 1 and 2 of Morris's indictment charged that he did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, purposely, knowingly or recklessly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, attempt to cause bodily injury to James Grimm and Scott Johnson by swerving his car at their patrol car. (emphasis added). Similarly, the jury instructions on the elements of attempted aggravated assault, Instructions 9 and 10, included the purposely, knowingly or recklessly attempt  language. ¶ 10. In Harris v. State, 642 So.2d 1325, 1327-28 (Miss.1994), we warned the bench and bar against use of the recklessly attempt language in jury instructions and indictments defining the elements of aggravated assault. The defendant in that case was charged with aggravated assault after running into an officer with a pick-up truck and attempting to run over him as he lay on the ground. Harris, 642 So.2d at 1325. We stated: As can be readily seen, one violates the statute by simply attempting to cause serious bodily injury. One also violates the statute when one causes serious bodily injury either intentionally or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The indictment mixes the concept of attempt which, as noted hereinabove, embraces the element of intent, with the concept of actually causing injury through recklessness, which requires no specific intent. The indictment goes on to specify the exact conduct charged and, therefore, standing alone, is salvageable. The jury instructions were drafted in conformity with the indictment, however, and contained the phrase recklessly attempt. This phrase was, in turn, used as a spring board for the prosecutor to argue that the jury need not find an intent to run over Lee in order to find Harris guilty of attempting to run him over. An objection to that argument was erroneously overruled. Many courts have recognized `intentional' and `reckless' are inconsistent terms. ... Those terms are mutually exclusive when applied to the statute here in question. Miss.Code Ann.1972 § 97-3-7(2) (Supp.1991). The indictment, instruction and argument were erroneous. Id. at 1327-28. ¶ 11. The crime of attempt consists of three elements: 1) an intent to commit a particular crime, 2) a direct ineffectual act done toward its commission, and 3) failure to consummate its commission. Edwards v. State, 500 So.2d 967, 969 (Miss.1986). Harris, 642 So.2d at 1327. As we explained in Harris, the definition of attempt precludes its application to the portion of the aggravated assault statute defining aggravated assault as causing serious bodily injury to another recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, because one may not act intentionally and recklessly at the same time. Id. at 1328. We went on to affirm Harris's conviction and sentence, however, because he failed to object to the indictment and instruction at trial, and did not raise the issue in his appeal. Id. at 1328. ¶ 12. The indictment and instructions in the present case mirror the erroneous indictment and instruction in Harris. As distinguished from Harris, we find that in this case Morris preserved the error for appeal by offering his own instructions defining the required element of intent and by raising the issue on appeal. ¶ 13. The State attempts to distinguish Harris on the fact that the instant case was an attempt case, whereas in Harris, the defendant actually struck the officer with his vehicle. The distinction is irrelevant, because the careful analysis of the aggravated assault statute, particularly the inconsistency in the terms reckless and intentional, in Harris is applicable to the current case. ¶ 14. The undisputed evidence in this case showed that Morris at least acted recklessly during the high speed chase. What is disputed is whether he intended to harm the officers when his vehicle swerved toward their patrol car. Reasonable minds could have differed on the issue, because the officers testified that in their opinion Morris intentionally swerved his vehicle toward theirs, whereas Morris testified that he had no intent to harm anyone. Determining which testimony was credible was completely within the jury's purview. Swington v. State, 742 So.2d 1106, 1111 (Miss.1999). However, the jury was not even properly instructed that it had to find the element of intent, so we cannot know what the verdict would have been had the trial court given a proper instruction on the elements of attempted aggravated assault. ¶ 15. Based upon the holding in Harris, we find that the entire trial in this case erroneously turned on an improper interpretation of the elements of attempted aggravated assault. The indictment and jury instructions incorrectly listed the elements of the charge in this case. The questioning at trial and the prosecutor's closing argument tracked that improper interpretation of the law, focusing on reckless rather than intentional conduct. This resulted in the denial of due process, requiring reversal in this case.