Opinion ID: 4454215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Contempt. Mark claims that the district court erred when it determined that Christina was not in contempt of the decree of grandparent visitation as a result of the May 19, 2018, event. We find no merit to this assignment of error. [5-7] We recently described civil contempt proceedings as follows: Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit when a party fails to comply with a court order made for the benefit of the opposing party. See, Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh, 283 Neb. 369, 808 N.W.2d 867 (2012); Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010), disapproved on other grounds, Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh, supra. Willful disobedience is an essential element of contempt; “willful” means the violation was committed intentionally, with knowledge that the act violated the court order. Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh, supra. - 308 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports KREJCI v. KREJCI Cite as 304 Neb. 302 Outside of statutory procedures imposing a different standard or an evidentiary presumption, all elements of contempt must be proved by the complainant by clear and convincing evidence. See, id.; Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, supra. Martin v. Martin, 294 Neb. at 117, 881 N.W.2d at 182. We are aware that a parent may use a child’s hesitation to visit a noncustodial person as a subterfuge for contumaciously interfering with the visitation. Mark relies on the event of May 19, 2018, to establish his claim of contempt. However, in Martin, we observed that a “singular event,” which is not in accordance with a court decree, may be defensible. Id. at 119, 881 N.W.2d at 183. Except for this event, the record shows that grandparent visitation had gone smoothly. To illustrate this history, we refer to the order dismissing the contempt complaint in which the district court found “[e]vidence was also adduced that as recently as March of 2018 [the granddaughter] traveled to Florida to visit with her grandfather over spring break. Her brother was unable to attend because of a recent ear surgery.” This case presents a singular event, but not a pattern. The district court heard the evidence and stated that the “primary reason” for the failure of grandparent visitation was the fact that it was scheduled on the deceased father’s birthday, which the court described as an “upsetting day.” In its order, the district court stated: “[The granddaughter] testified that she and her brother were very upset because the visitation was to take place on the birthday of their deceased father. She further testified that her mother, [Christina], did in no way encourage them not to participate in the visitation.” The district court accepted this testimony and did not err in doing so. The district court specifically found that with respect to the granddaughter, “[i]t definitely was her decision not to visit.” While we do not endorse the proposition that the responsibility for adhering to a visitation plan devolves to the children, - 309 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports KREJCI v. KREJCI Cite as 304 Neb. 302 a logical conclusion which results from the district court’s findings in this contempt case is that Christina did not encourage or instruct the minor children to refuse to participate in the grandparent visitation. The district court viewed the event of May 19, 2018, in the overall context of a general history of compliance with the decree and the unusual circumstances of that particular day persuaded it that Christina’s failure to strictly enforce the terms of the order on that date was not willful. The district court’s determination that Christina was not in contempt was not an abuse of discretion. Modification. Mark claims that the district court erred when it modified the grandparent visitation decree in its order filed after the contempt hearing. Given the procedural history of this case, we find merit to this assignment of error. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the order of July 2, 2018, which modified the decree of grandparent visitation, and we vacate the order of modification. [8] At common law in Nebraska and elsewhere, “‘“grandparents lacked any legal right to visitation and communication with their grandchildren if such visitation was forbidden by the parents . . . . Indeed, the parents’ obligation to allow such visitation was a moral, not a legal obligation.”’” Hamit v. Hamit, 271 Neb. 659, 673, 715 N.W.2d 512, 525 (2006), quoting Pier v. Bolles, 257 Neb. 120, 596 N.W.2d 1 (1999). However, every state has adopted a statutory scheme permitting grandparent visitation under varying circumstances [i]n part due to changing demographics and the presence of single-parent households in which grandparents and other persons “outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing,” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000), and in part due to a recognition of “the importance of the grandparentgrandchild relationship in the lives of children,” Moriarty - 310 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports KREJCI v. KREJCI Cite as 304 Neb. 302 v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 97, 827 A.2d 203, 210 (2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1408, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004) . . . . Hamit v. Hamit, 271 Neb. at 673-74, 715 N.W.2d at 525. Thus, in Nebraska, grandparent visitation is controlled by statute. Id. Modification of grandparent visitation may be ordered pursuant to § 43-1802(3), which provides: “The court may modify an order granting or denying such visitation upon a showing that there has been a material change in circumstances which justifies such modification and that the modification would serve the best interests of the child.” Because we determine, as explained below, that the process by which the district court modified the grandparent visitation plan was flawed in this case, we do not address the propriety of combining contempt and modification of grandparent visitation in one hearing upon proper notice. As explained in our statement of facts, Christina filed a complaint to modify the decree of grandparent visitation on June 21, 2018. An evidentiary hearing on Mark’s complaint for contempt was conducted on June 28. The district court dismissed Christina’s complaint to modify on its own motion on July 2, because it found that it lacked jurisdiction. The result of the evidentiary hearing on Mark’s complaint for contempt was contained in the district court’s order of July 2, in which it dismissed the complaint but proceeded to modify the decree of grandparent visitation. Mark contends in general that he did not receive proper notice that modification would be considered at the hearing of June 28, 2018, and in particular that he was denied the opportunity to present certain evidence that would have pertained to modification. The record is consistent with Mark’s contentions. [9] It is fundamental to due process that a person has reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights - 311 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports KREJCI v. KREJCI Cite as 304 Neb. 302 which might be affected by it. See Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 299 Neb. 76, 907 N.W.2d 275 (2018). The procedural record in this case shows that the district court effectively dismissed Christina’s complaint to modify prior to the contempt hearing and that it was reasonable for the parties to conclude that modification was off the table. In fact, the bill of exceptions shows that the court stated at the commencement of the hearing on June 28, 2018, that the purpose of the hearing was to consider Mark’s complaint for contempt. We agree with Mark’s contention that under the circumstances of this case, the court’s consideration and determination of modification as a consequence of the contempt hearing were improper due to a lack of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the order of July 2, 2018, which modified the decree of grandparent visitation, and we vacate the order of modification.