Opinion ID: 859212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial court’s ruling on mental retardation

Text: ¶31 Finally, Boyston challenges the superior court’s ruling that he did not prove mental retardation, arguing that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We have no basis for overturning the court’s ruling, however, because Boyston failed to establish mental retardation by even a preponderance of the evidence. Cf. Grell III, 231 Ariz. at 160 ¶¶ 35-36, 291 P.3d at 357 (holding that Atkins barred the execution of a defendant who established at the penalty phase his mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence).
¶32 “Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” is defined as “a full scale intelligence quotient of seventy or lower.” A.R.S. § 13-753(K)(5). A rebuttable 15 presumption of intellectual disability arises when the trial court determines that the defendant’s IQ is 65 or lower. Id. § 13-753(G). Boyston contends for the first time on appeal that because the IQ tests administered by Drs. Young, Gaughan, and Keyes all indicated his IQ was 65 or lower, he was entitled to the rebuttable presumption. But even if such a presumption arose, “[t]he presumption of mental retardation based on the IQ scores vanishes . . . if the State presents evidence that calls into question the validity of the IQ scores or tends to establish that [the] defendant does not otherwise meet the statutory definition of mental retardation.” Arellano, 213 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 13, 143 P.3d at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted). “At that point, the IQ scores serve as evidence of mental retardation, to be considered by the trial court with all other evidence presented.” Id. ¶33 The evidence relating to Boyston’s intellectual functioning was conflicting. Dr. Seward’s opinion that Boyston was malingering, Boyston’s school and prison records, and testimony from his third-grade teacher (Merilee Wortham) and maternal aunt (Romla Robinson) arguably “call[ed] into question the validity of the IQ scores” on which Boyston relies. Id. But even if Boyston established the intellectual deficit element of mental retardation, it would not change the result unless he also satisfied the other statutory prerequisites, discussed 16 below.
¶34 “Adaptive behavior” is defined as “the effectiveness or degree to which the defendant meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of the defendant’s age and cultural group.” A.R.S. § 13-753(K)(1). Although the DSM-IV defines impairments in adaptive functioning based on deficits in two areas, the DSM-IV definition is not the same as the statutory definition. Grell II, 212 Ariz. at 529 ¶ 62, 135 P.3d at 709. The statute, by contrast, “requires an overall assessment of the defendant’s ability to meet society’s expectations of him.” Id.; see also Grell III, 231 Ariz. at 155 ¶ 7, 291 P.3d at 352. ¶35 Boyston contends that the superior court ignored academic records and adaptive functioning measurements that showed impairments in adaptive behavior and instead “cherry picked” evidence that showed his strengths. The court gave significant weight to jail telephone conversations in which Boyston set up fraudulent “burn line” accounts for other inmates, allowing callers to make collect calls without the call recipient being charged. In other conversations, Boyston helped his daughter with math homework, told his girlfriend he was reading The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman, explained how to do certain home repairs, and talked about keeping himself and 17 his cell clean. The court found that the phone conversations “represent[ed] a true day to day picture of [Boyston’s] cognitive abilities and behaviors,” and determined that “there was no credible evidence in the record to establish mental retardation.” Boyston cites a district court case that found jail telephone calls largely irrelevant to a defendant’s adaptive functioning. See United States v. Davis, 611 F. Supp. 2d 472, 494 (D. Md. 2009). But, as the finder of fact, the trial court “has broad discretion in determining the weight and credibility given to mental health evidence.” Grell II, 212 Ariz. at 528 ¶ 58, 135 P.3d at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶36 The record here supports the conclusion that Boyston did not prove substantial impairment in adaptive functioning by even a preponderance of the evidence, let alone by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory standard of proof the superior court applied. Dr. Seward’s opinion was based on Boyston’s school, health, and prison records, jail phone calls, interviews of Boyston’s acquaintances, and other sources, and he opined that Boyston “demonstrates an intact ability to adapt to his current environment.” Significantly, Boyston’s own mentalretardation expert, Dr. Keyes, declined to make a finding on Boyston’s adaptive skills “due to his fruitless attempts to malinger,” and the prescreening expert, Dr. Gaughan, did not 18 evaluate Boyston’s adaptive behavior. ¶37 Boyston relies heavily on portions of the testimony of his aunt and third-grade teacher (Robinson and Wortham), but the trial court determines how much weight and credibility to give conflicting testimony. Because the record supports the superior court’s factual findings, we defer to them. Given the paucity of evidence, by expert testimony or otherwise, that Boyston had significant impairments in adaptive behavior, we have no basis for overturning the court’s determination that Boyston failed to establish that prerequisite.
¶38 Boyston argues the superior court ignored the evidence that Boyston’s mental retardation began before age eighteen, pointing again to the testimony of Wortham and Robinson. But sufficient evidence supported the court’s conclusion that Boyston did not have substantial deficits in either intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior before age eighteen. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Boyston’s mental-retardation claim.