Opinion ID: 1734074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: was the dismissal of van meter's appeal an appropriate sanction?

Text: ¶ 6. Van Meter was delinquent in filing a designation of record, an estimation of costs, and a Rule 11(b)(1) certificate of compliance. Appellants are instructed to file a designation of record and an estimate of costs within seven (7) days after the notice of appeal is filed. See M.R.A.P. 10(b)(1) & 11(b)(1). Appellants are further instructed to file simultaneously a Rule 11(b)(1) certificate of compliance when the estimate of costs is filed. ¶ 7. However, these deficiencies do not necessarily mandate a dismissal. M.R.A.P. 3(a) states that the [f]ailure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the perfection of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the [appellate court] deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. (emphasis added). Van Meter timely filed his notice of appeal; therefore his appeal was perfected to the circuit court. Because M.R.A.P. 3(a) is permissive as to the imposition of sanctions for appellate deficiencies, the appellate court should consider the full panoply of sanctions before imposing the most harsh sanction of dismissal. See also M.R.A.P. 11 cmt. (Even though Rule 3(a) no longer makes prepayment of costs an absolute criterion for perfecting an appeal, the [appellate court] can respond under Rule 2(a)(2) to such failure with an appropriate sanction, including dismissal.). ¶ 8. However, the consideration of imposition of sanctions is appropriate. Even though Van Meter did not receive actual notice from the court clerk, Alford's motion to dismiss provided constructive notice that his appeal was subject to dismissal. The administration of justice was hindered when Van Meter, who was under a duty to insure that proper appellate procedure was complied with, sat back and waited for the court to give him actual notice of something of which he already had constructive notice and something he had a duty to know. Alford has a right to a speedy disposition of this case. ¶ 9. The Court finds that the dismissal of Van Meter's appeal was too harsh a sanction. See, e.g., Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 755 So.2d 395, 404 (Miss. 2000) (interpreting M.R.C.P. 41 and quoting Wallace v. Jones, 572 So.2d 371, 375-76 (Miss.1990) ([D]ismissal ... is appropriate only where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct and lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice. This is so because dismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.)). However, these concerns must be balanced with any prejudice further delay may impose upon the appellee: The predominant reason for creating time limitations in appellate procedure is to bring an expeditious termination to the dispute and a final resolution to the matter as quickly as possible. Garrett v. Nix, 431 So.2d 137, 139-40 (Miss.1983), overruled on other grounds, Moran v. Necaise, 437 So.2d 1222 (Miss. 1983). ¶ 10. There is no evidence in the record that the deficiencies in Van Meter's appeal were the result of clear delay or contumacious conduct. The Court is therefore of the opinion that lesser sanctions may be appropriate in this case.