Opinion ID: 2135602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Statutory Defenses to the Claim.

Text: The State asserts three statutory defenses to plaintiff's claim that we must consider before examining the issues involving alleged procedural errors at trial. A. Legal sufficiency of the State Appeal Board claim. The State contends that the plaintiff failed to state a dollar amount in its demand filed with the State Appeal Board. That circumstance, the State asserts, renders the statement of claim invalid. It argues that this results in a situation in which no valid claim was filed within the time required by Iowa Code section 25A.13 (1989). We disagree. Although we have never declared that a specific dollar amount is essential in order for a valid claim to be considered by the State Appeal Board, we will assume that this is the case. We agree, however, with the conclusion of the United States Court of Appeals under the federal tort claims act that no particular form or manner of giving such notice is required as long as the agency is somehow informed of the fact of and amount of the claim within the ... period prescribed. Williams v. United States, 693 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir.1982). In the present case, the appeal board consented to consider the claim beyond the six-month period in which the plaintiff might have commenced its action. Within the period of the general statute of limitations and during the time the claim was being considered by the board, plaintiff submitted a demand for a specific dollar amount. Although that demand was presented to an assistant attorney general rather than directly to the board, the assistant attorney general was, at the time, actively representing the board with respect to plaintiff's claim. We conclude that there was no deficiency in the notice of claim to the State Appeal Board. B. Failure to designate the proper party plaintiff within the period of limitations. The State also asserts that the petition failed to correctly designate the plaintiff entitled to sue within the period of the statute of limitations contained in section 25A.13. As we have previously noted, the action was originally commenced in the name of Estate of Jessica L. Smith. Later, and more than two years from the date of Jessica's fatal accident, the petition was amended to name Jessica's personal representative as the plaintiff. Section 25A.6 provides that suits under chapter 25A shall be in accordance with the rules of civil procedure. It is provided in the rules of civil procedure that: Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. Iowa R.Civ.P. 89. This rule has most recently been interpreted in Porter v. Good Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 1993), and Grant v. Cedar Falls Oil Co., 480 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Iowa 1992). The portion of this rule that pertains to changing parties or names of parties, as interpreted in Porter and Grant, only speaks to identity of defendants. We believe, however, that similar principles should govern relation back of an amendment changing the plaintiff or correcting the name of the plaintiff. Clearly, in the present case, the initial notice of suit in the name of Estate of Jessica L. Smith adequately conveyed to the State the nature of the claim being made. It further imparted information from which the State knew or should have known that, but for a mistake in naming the proper party, the action would have been brought against it. Consequently, we conclude that the amendment changing the name of the plaintiff relates back to the filing of the initial complaint. C. The discretionary-function defense. The State also argues that it has a valid defense to plaintiff's claim based on the discretionary-function exemption contained in Iowa Code section 25A.14(1). Again, we disagree with the State's contention. The so-called discretionary-function exception does not extend to all governmental activities involving an element of choice. In order for the State to be immunized from liability, the choice must represent a policy judgment of superior authority that a particular task be done in accordance with the prescribed policy. See Stanley v. State, 197 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 (Iowa 1972). Plaintiff's most prominent claims of negligence are based on a failure of playground supervision and a failure to track a missing student upon return to the classroom following recess. There is nothing to indicate that the State had adopted any formal policies with respect to either of these situations. It entrusted the supervising teachers at the Iowa School for the Deaf to exercise such care as was necessary for the particular situation. The alleged lack of supervision of and accounting for the deceased minor child may not be established as conforming with a policy determination of superior authority. The district court correctly rejected the State's theory of defense based on the discretionary-function exception to liability. Before leaving our discussion of the discretionary-function defense, we wish to re-examine our prior conclusion expressed in Hyde v. Buckalew, 393 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa 1986), and prior cases cited therein, that the defenses contained in section 25A.14 are jurisdictional in nature. That conclusion was initially arrived at because of the fact that these defenses are stated as exceptions to a claimant's ability to sue the state on the types of claims enumerated under section 25A.14. Upon further consideration, we conclude that the latter circumstance does not render the defenses in question jurisdictional. The existence of sovereign immunity, in whole or in part, is just as easily characterized as a defense on the merits to a claim against the State. The advantages to that characterization are many. It more readily facilitates the joining of several defenses, some of which have previously been considered to be jurisdictional and some of which clearly are not in a single procedural motion. More significant, we believe, is the fact that viewing these matters as defenses on the merits will require them to be presented at the same time as other defenses in the litigation. This will preclude the undesirable potential that such defenses may be presented for the first time on appeal or in a subsequent proceeding. We recently declared that analogous defenses to tort claims against political subdivisions will be considered as defenses on the merits rather than jurisdictional. See Moyer v. City of Des Moines, 505 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Iowa 1993). We now hold that the same is true of the defenses enumerated in section 25A.14. We disavow any suggestions to the contrary in our prior cases.