Opinion ID: 1035557
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: A “deliberate ignorance” instruction is proper when the evidence shows (i) “subjective awareness of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct”; and (ii) “purposeful contrivance to avoid learning of the illegal conduct.” Bieganowski, 313 F.3d at 289 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The essential feature of deliberate ignorance is the conscious action of the defendant—the defendant consciously attempted to escape confirmation of conditions or events he strongly suspected to exist.” Vasquez, 677 F.3d at 697 (citations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Lopez commented to CS1 that Salas’s LC Contractors was not in business “to make money.” Also, in 2008 and 2009, Lopez’s Via Italia business received significantly more funds from cash deposits and loans than from sales. Additionally, both Lopez and Galaviz controlled bank accounts for which they did not receive monthly statements, as well as accounts that received large cash deposits and wire transfers from drug traffickers in Mexico. Moreover, Lopez controlled bank accounts from which she regularly allowed others to sign checks that drew on those accounts. Finally, Lopez and Galaviz made multiple false statements on loan, sale, or other official documents. For example, they referred to Salas (their immediate relative) as “Daniel Obregon.” Salas, Lopez, and Galaviz initiated or participated in large transfers of money across 38 bank accounts that they controlled, and engaged in a host of transactions for which they did not have sufficient legitimate finances to have conducted. For example, they deposited many times more money into the various bank accounts than they had earned from legitimate occupations. 25 Case: 11-41376 Document: 00512323905 Page: 26 Date Filed: 07/29/2013 Nos. 11-41376 c/w 11-41392 On appellate review in these circumstances, this Court considers “the totality of the evidence.” Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 952. In light of the above evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that there had been “a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct,” and that Lopez and Galaviz had “consciously attempted to escape confirmation” of it. See Vasquez, 677 F.3d at 697 (citations omitted); Bieganowski, 313 F.3d at 289 (citation omitted).10 C. Challenges to the District Court’s Pinkerton Instruction Alaniz and the ML Appellants submit that the district court abused its discretion in the manner in which it gave this Circuit’s pattern jury instruction concerning “Pinkerton liability” as to Counts 3 through 4, 6 through 9, and 11 through 15. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946). 1. Additional Standard of Review “We review claimed deficiencies in a jury charge by looking to the entire charge as well as the arguments made to the jury.” United States v. Chagra, 807 F.2d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1986). “Our inquiry is whether in the context of the true trial scene the jury was given incorrect instructions.” Id. “This is a common sense approach that recognizes that the jury charge does not stand alone for separate examination; that the charge is part of a larger picture of what the jury was told.” Id. “Examined apart from context, charges frequently have seemingly ambiguous expressions and understandably so, given the need of trial courts to assemble the divergent requests of counsel into a meaningful whole.” Id. 10 To the extent that the district court did err by giving the “deliberate ignorance” instruction—perhaps with respect to Salas who almost certainly had “actual knowledge”—the error was harmless because the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of either “deliberate ignorance” or “actual knowledge” with respect to Salas and all three ML Appellants (including Magana). Miller, 588 F.3d at 906 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Demmitt, 706 F.3d 665, 677 n.1 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Even if both prongs of the test were not satisfied and the district court erred in giving the deliberate ignorance instruction, we hold the error harmless because there was substantial evidence that Demmitt was aware of the scheme.” (citation omitted)). 26 Case: 11-41376 Document: 00512323905 Page: 27 Date Filed: 07/29/2013 Nos. 11-41376 c/w 11-41392 2. Additional Facts Here, the jury instruction given matched our pattern instruction word-forword. See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 2.22 (2012). Alaniz, however, argues that the instruction was not clear that, while he was charged with his co-conspirators’ substantive drug trafficking conduct, he was not charged with conduct arising out of the separate money laundering conspiracy (even though Salas was common to both). The ML Appellants make the same argument with respect to their charge encompassing substantive money laundering conduct but not the separate drug trafficking conspiracy. The crux of these arguments is that the district court did not pay sufficient heed to our language in United States v. Armstrong that “Pinkerton liability attaches only to substantive crimes, not to other conspiracies.” See 619 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). 3. Applicable Law “[A] substantive conviction cannot be upheld solely under Pinkerton unless the jury was given a Pinkerton instruction.” United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 619 n.4 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). In this Circuit, the pattern Pinkerton instruction is read in the disjunctive, allowing for liability “if the offense was committed in furtherance of, or as a foreseeable consequence of, the conspiracy[.]” See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 2.22 (2012) (emphasis added). Armstrong, 619 F.3d at 387 (citations omitted); but see United States v. Gonzalez, 570 F.3d 16, 26 n.8 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (reading the First Circuit’s comparable instruction in the conjunctive). 4. Analysis Alaniz and the ML Appellants argue that the district court did not sufficiently distinguish between the drug trafficking conspiracy (Count 1) and the money laundering conspiracy (Count 10), and the substantive counts respectively relating to each (drug trafficking: Counts 3-4, 6-9; money 27 Case: 11-41376 Document: 00512323905 Page: 28 Date Filed: 07/29/2013 Nos. 11-41376 c/w 11-41392 laundering: Counts 11-15). Because they raise this objection for the first time on appeal, review is for plain error. The district court distinguished between the substantive drug trafficking charges, which it called “the possession counts” and specifically linked to “the conspiracy charged in Count 1”; and the money laundering charges, which it called “the transactional counts” and specifically linked to “the conspiracy charged in Count 10.” In light of the unavoidable ambiguity in a jury charge involving multiple defendants and multiple instances of alleged conduct, and the “common sense approach” to examining a jury charge that this Court has adopted, see Chagra, 807 F.2d at 402, we perceive no error, plain or otherwise. D. Challenges to the District Court’s Decision Not to Eliminate Count 10’s “in Order to Avoid a Reporting Requirement” Lopez and Magana maintain that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to amend its jury instructions to eliminate Count 10’s “in order to avoid a reporting requirement” in the specific charges against them. 1. Additional Standard of Review The applicable standard for reviewing a properly preserved challenge to the district court’s jury instructions, including those not given, is set forth supra under Part IV.A. We presume that a jury follows the instructions given by the district court. See United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 132 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 2. Additional Facts Count 10 charged Salas and the ML Appellants with: (i) the concealment of drug trafficking proceeds; (ii) in order to avoid a reporting requirement; (iii) by moving funds outside the United States and engaging in monetary transactions of a value greater than $10,000 through a financial institution. At closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following: 28 Case: 11-41376 Document: 00512323905 Page: 29 Date Filed: 07/29/2013 Nos. 11-41376 c/w 11-41392 You can convict every one of these four defendants on a different theory of money laundering. For example, the only person who is really involved with the avoidance of currency transaction reports is going to be [Salas]. . . . He would be the one that you could convict beyond a reasonable doubt for conspiracy to engage in money laundering for the purpose of avoiding a monetary currency transaction report. Lopez and Magana contemporaneously objected that the prosecutor’s statement at closing argument had amounted to abandonment of the “in order to avoid a reporting requirement” as to all Appellants except Salas, and that the applicable jury instructions required amendment to reflect the abandonment. 3. Analysis This challenge is unavailing. Here, the district court already had instructed the jury (i) to base its verdict “solely upon the evidence”; (ii) to “consider only the evidence presented during the trial”; and (iii) to “[r]emember that any statements . . . made by the lawyers are not evidence” and “not binding.” The jury is presumed to have followed those instructions. See Ebron, 683 F.3d at 132 (citation omitted). The district court rightly rejected Lopez and Magana’s objection because the jury is presumed to have understood that the prosecutor’s statement was merely her assessment of the evidence, rather than evidence in and of itself. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to amend its jury instructions. V. Challenges to Various Statements Made by the Prosecutor A. Standard of Review Where a defendant had objected to allegedly improper statements made by a prosecutor, and the district court admitted the challenged statements over the defendant’s objection, we review the admission of those statements for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gracia, 522 F.3d 597, 600 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In doing so, “we must first decide whether the prosecutor 29 Case: 11-41376 Document: 00512323905 Page: 30 Date Filed: 07/29/2013 Nos. 11-41376 c/w 11-41392 made an improper remark” and, “if an improper remark was made, we must determine whether the remark affected the substantial rights of the defendant.” Id. (citations omitted). To determine whether a remark prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights, we assess “the magnitude of the statement’s prejudice,” “the effect of any cautionary instructions given,” and “the strength of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 320 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the defendant had made no contemporaneous objection to the challenged statements, we review only for plain error. Gracia, 522 F.3d at 600 n.2 (citations omitted). To demonstrate plain error, the defendant must show that there was error, it was plain, and it affected his or her substantial rights. Id. at 600 (citations omitted). Even if the defendant can meet this burden, “we still would have discretion to decide whether to reverse, which we generally will not do unless the plain error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding.” Id. (citations omitted).