Opinion ID: 1131047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of Greater Sentence Allowed.

Text: The state argues that under this Court's decision in State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991), the Court should not hear the appeal challenging the greater sentence imposed on resentencing because the legality of Robbins' sentence was not presented to the trial court. We first point out that it is a misreading of I.C.R. 35 and Martin to construe Robbins' claims of violation of his right to due process in his resentencing as a claim that his sentence was illegal. Martin dealt with the imposition of a sentence that was not authorized by the statute specifying the penalty for driving without privileges, a felony. This was the meaning of illegal sentence in that case. This is the same meaning given illegal sentence in State v. Howard, 122 Idaho 9, 830 P.2d 520 (1992). In Howard, the sentence at issue was not authorized by the statute providing the penalty for vehicular manslaughter. The Court held that the sentence was illegal. Id. at 10, 830 P.2d at 521; see also State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 845, 828 P.2d 871, 874 (1992) (sentence imposed in excess of that provided by statute was illegal); cf. State v. Vetsch, 101 Idaho 595, 596, 618 P.2d 773, 774 (1980) (fact that defendant received a greater sentence than accomplice does not make the sentence illegal). Even if Robbins' sentence violated his right to due process of law as he asserts, it was not illegal in the sense the term is used in I.C.R. 35 and Martin. The more relevant focus for the issue raised by the state is the basic proposition that underlies our decision in Martin. As we said less than four months after that decision: The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are presented for the first time on appeal. Recently we applied the rule to dismiss the appeal in a case where the state asked us to rule on an issue that was not raised in the trial court. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991). Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991) (citation omitted). The fact that Robbins did not raise in the trial court the issue of the constitutionality of imposing a greater sentence does not, however, completely resolve whether we will address this question on appeal. As we recently reiterated: We will consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial. In order to determine whether we will consider an issue presented on appeal that was not presented to the trial court, we first must assess whether the error would be fundamental if there were error.... . . . . ... An error that goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights is a fundamental error. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (citation omitted). In Kenner, we held that if the trial court had violated Kenner's privilege against self-incrimination, this would have been a fundamental error. In this case, we must consider whether the errors Robbins asserts the trial court made would be fundamental, if they were errors. In making these decisions, we must determine whether errors such as these go to the foundation or basis of Robbins' rights. Robbins' due process challenge to the sentence imposed on him by Judge Haman on resentencing is founded on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). If Robbins were correct in his assertion that the greater sentence imposed on resentencing violated his right to be free from a vindictive sentence on resentencing, the error would be fundamental, because it would go to the foundation or basis of Robbins' rights. Therefore, we will address the merits of this issue.