Opinion ID: 1751760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dickerson's Shackling at Trial

Text: Dickerson claims that, despite the absence of any reference to his shackling on the record, he was required to wear steel anklets at trial in violation of his due process rights under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). Dickerson argues that the motion court erred in overruling his 29.15 motion without a hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Dickerson's shackling at trial. An evidentiary hearing on a Rule 29.15 post-conviction relief motion is only required if: (1) the motion alleges facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) the facts alleged raise matters not refuted by the case files and the records; and (3) the matters of which the movant complains have resulted in prejudice. Rule 29.15; Ringo v. State, 120 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Mo. banc 2003). With respect to claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel, to obtain an evidentiary hearing, the movant must allege facts, not refuted by the record, showing that counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney and that movant was thereby prejudiced. State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 497 (Mo. banc 1997) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In his motion, Dickerson alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Dickerson's shackling at trial. Dickerson argues that a reasonably competent attorney would have been aware that [t]he law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase of a criminal trial absent some essential state interest. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). Dickerson correctly notes that the longstanding prohibition against shackling a defendant at trial, a rule with deep roots in English common law, has become axiomatic. Deck at 626, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 317 (1769)). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Deck , [v]isible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process by suggesting to the jury that the justice system itself sees a `need to separate a defendant from the community at large.' Deck at 630, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (citing Holbrook at 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340). To merit an evidentiary hearing under Rule 29.15, a movant must allege that the factual basis for his claim is not refuted by the record. Id. The motion court found that because there is no evidence on the record that Dickerson was shackled at trial or that the shackles were visible to the jury, Dickerson's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were refuted by the record. Thus, the motion court reasoned, Dickerson was not entitled to a hearing under Rule 29.15. It is true that the trial record in this case contains no reference to the use of shackles at Dickerson's trial. For the record to refute Dickerson's claim, however, the record would have to rebut the claim or prove [the claim] to be false. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004). Since the mere absence of any reference to shackling on the record does not prove Dickerson's allegation that he was shackled at trial to be false, the allegation is not refuted by the record. It is important to note that this is not a case where a convicted defendant raises after-the-fact allegations of shackling where it is apparent that the question was not raised because shackling was not contemplated and did not occur. In this case, the question of shackling was raised in a pre-trial motion. Inasmuch as it indicates Dickerson's concern, prior to trial, that he would be shackled, the presence of this motion on the record suggests there may be facts to support Dickerson's claim. At a minimum, a hearing is needed to determine whether shackling in fact took place, whether it was visible to the jury, and whether it was justified. The motion court also determined that Dickerson was not entitled to a hearing on his ineffectiveness claim under Rule 29.15 because Dickerson did not allege that counsel was aware that Dickerson was shackled. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the motion court explains its reasoning, stating that [m]ovant cannot complain of inaction by counsel, when he does not allege at any point that he notified counsel of the situation. Without a specific allegation that counsel was aware that Dickerson was wearing shackles at trial, the motion court determined that Dickerson's pleadings were deficient. The motion court is incorrect. Although Dickerson does not specifically allege that trial counsel knew of the shackles, Dickerson's amended 29.15 motion contains facts sufficient to show that counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney. Brooks at 497. In the motion, Dickerson alleged that trial counsel filed a pre-trial motion seeking to prevent the use of shackles at trial. After filing such a motion, reasonably competent counsel would have sought a ruling thereon or, at the very least, checked to determine whether Dickerson was in fact wearing shackles at trial so that counsel could object if necessary. That Dickerson fails, in his amended motion, to allege specifically that trial counsel was aware of Dickerson's shackling at trial does not render the motion deficient. Although Dickerson's trial counsel filed a pre-trial motion to prohibit the use of shackling at trial, counsel failed to subsequently seek a ruling on the motion. Counsel also failed to object to Dickerson's shackling at trial, despite the absence of any special need justifying an exception to the general prohibition barring the use of restraints on criminal defendants at trial. If he was visibly shackled, without sufficient justification, a court must conclude, following Deck , that Dickerson was denied a fair trial. Given the well-established rulearticulated by the United States Supreme Court in Deck prohibiting the routine use of visible shackles during criminal trials, the failure of trial counsel to object to Dickerson's shackling, if he was, in fact, visibly shackled, is a fact warranting relief under Rule 29.15. [3] To merit relief, Rule 29.15 also requires that Dickerson demonstrate prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to object to Dickerson's shackling at trial. The United States Supreme Court has held that, because requiring a defendant to wear visible shackles at trial undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process, it is inherently prejudicial. Deck at 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (internal citations omitted). Thus, if Dickerson establishes that he was visibly shackled, without the requisite finding of necessity, Dickerson demonstrates prejudice. Brooks at 497 (citing Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). With respect to the shackling issue, the motion court erred in overruling the motion without a hearing.