Opinion ID: 1324615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Violations of Fifth Amendment

Text: The Appellant also asserts that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated by the delay in this case. As discussed above, the determination of whether a particular delay is to be analyzed as a potential Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation or a Fifth Amendment due process violation is critical in attempting to apply the standards of evaluation. As this Court observed in Drachman and discussed above, the Fifth Amendment due process standard is applicable to pre-accusatory delay. See also State v. Smith, 809 So.2d 556, 559 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2002) ([f]or preaccusation delay, due process [Fifth Amendment] is the standard.). A discussion of the interplay between Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment analyses must also include a recognition of a factual peculiarity in this case. The two and one-half year delay existent in the present case is post-arrest, but pre-indictment. That obviously creates a slight oddity within the conventional nomenclature for addressing these types of cases. In order to identify the time period being referenced with more precision, many jurisdictions have employed very descriptive terminology, stating that the Sixth Amendment attaches at the post-accusatory stage, and the Fifth Amendment applies at the pre-accusatory stage, thus encompassing the pre-arrest or indictment time period. An illuminating discussion of this distinction was presented in People v. Guzman, 163 Misc.2d 237, 620 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1994). The Guzman court noted the methodology identified by the United States Supreme Court in distinguishing between pre-accusatorial delay and post-accusatorial delay and explained the foundation for the Sixth Amendment/Fifth Amendment distinctions as follows: For federal constitutional purposes, the delay occurring before either arrest or indictment... is analyzed differently from delay in bringing the accused to trial after arrest or indictment. Post-accusation delay is measured against the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; see, People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 444-445, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303 [ (1975) ], People v. Singer, 44 N.Y.2d 241, 252, 405 N.Y.S.2d 17, 376 N.E.2d 179. Delay occurring before either arrest or indictment is scrutinized under the lens of due process. U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468; U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 [ (1977) ]; People v. Singer, 44 N.Y.2d at 252, 405 N.Y.S.2d 17, 376 N.E.2d 179. (Footnote omitted) 620 N.Y.S.2d at 230. The Guzman court also very concisely described the similarities and differences in elements of consideration for Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment claims. Some of the same considerations in evaluating post-accusation delay apply to pre-accusation delay, for example, whether the government has shown good cause for its inaction. See, U.S. v. Lovasco, supra . The principal distinction, however, is that in order to prevail on a federal due process claim of pre-accusation delay, the accused must demonstrate that he has suffered actual prejudice as a consequence of the government's inaction. U.S. v. Marion, supra ; U.S. v. Lovasco, supra. This is because delay occurring before the government initiates a prosecution involves neither the public obloquy attendant upon official accusation or pre-trial detention-the chief concerns of delay occurring after accusation. Accordingly, the failure to bring timely charges rises to a federal due process violation, only upon a showing that the passage of time actually impaired the defendant's ability to mount a defense. U.S. v. Marion, supra ; U.S. v. Lovasco, supra ; People v. Singer, 44 N.Y.2d 241, 252, 405 N.Y.S.2d 17, 376 N.E.2d 179. Id. at 230. Another excellent discussion was included in People v. Singer, 44 N.Y.2d 241, 405 N.Y.S.2d 17, 376 N.E.2d 179 (1978). In that case, the crime had occurred in 1970, but the defendant had not been arrested and charged until 1974. The Singer court reasoned as follows: Characterization of the delay as preindictment or postindictment is often determinative. Delay in bringing the defendant to trial after indictment or arrest is measured against the Sixth Amendment speedy trial requirement which takes into account a number of factors, including actual or potential prejudice to the defendant's case through the loss of witnesses and the dulling of memory. Preindictment delay, on the other hand, is governed by the due process clause which generally requires a showing of actual prejudice before dismissal would be warranted. 405 N.Y.S.2d 17, 376 N.E.2d at 185 (citations omitted). The Singer court further explained that such distinction is based essentially on the theory that the speedy trial guarantee was designed primarily `to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, [and] to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.' Id. (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 320, 92 S.Ct. 455). Furthermore, the Singer court explained that [t]he distinction assumes that these considerations do not become relevant until the defendant has been arrested or formally accused. Id. In an effort to clarify the precise triggering event critical to an analysis of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of an accused with regard to allegedly prejudicial delays in prosecution, the events occurring within the defendant's chronology should be characterized as pre-accusatory or post-accusatory. Pre-accusatory delays, encompassing the time period before the moment of accusation whether by arrest or indictment, are evaluated under the Due Process provision of the Fifth Amendment. Post-accusatory delays, encompassing the time period after the moment of accusation whether by arrest or indictment, are evaluated under the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment. Thus, the Fifth Amendment is not the proper standard governing review of the post-accusatory delay occurring in the present case. The Fifth Amendment is violated, under certain circumstances, where the delay in question is pre-accusatory, i.e., before the Sixth Amendment becomes applicable. The pre-accusatory delay in this case was only twenty-five days. Moreover, even if the Appellant could reasonably assert a claim of a Fifth Amendment violation, he would be entitled to relief only if he demonstrated that he had suffered actual prejudice as a result of the delay. This standard was enunciated by this Court in State ex rel. Knotts v. Facemire, 223 W.Va. 594, 678 S.E.2d 847 (2009). In Knotts, this Court explained that a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice in order to prevail in a Fifth Amendment delay argument, specifically stating as follows in syllabus point two: To maintain a claim that preindictment delay violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution, the defendant must show actual prejudice. To the extent our prior decisions in State ex rel. Leonard v. Hey, 269 S.E.2d 394 (W.Va.1980), Hundley v. Ashworth, 181 W.Va. 379, 382 S.E.2d 573 (1989), and their progeny are inconsistent with this holding, they are expressly overruled. The Knotts Court specified that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the actual prejudice. Syllabus point three of Knotts explained: In determining whether preindictment delay violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution, the initial burden is on the defendant to show that actual prejudice has resulted from the delay. Once that showing has been made, the trial court must then balance the resulting prejudice against the reasonableness of the delay. In balancing these competing interests, the core inquiry is whether the government's decision to prosecute after substantial delay violates fundamental notions of justice or the community's sense of fair play. To the extent our prior decision in Hundley v. Ashworth, 181 W.Va. 379, 382 S.E.2d 573 (1989), and its progeny are inconsistent with this ruling, they are expressly overruled. Syllabus point four of Knotts continued: To demonstrate that preindictment delay violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution, a defendant must introduce substantial evidence of actual prejudice which proves he was meaningfully impaired in his ability to defend against the state's charges to such an extent that the disposition of the criminal proceeding was or will be likely affected. The Appellant has not demonstrated anything near actual prejudice in this case. As discussed fully above, the evidence of prejudice is severely lacking. Moreover, the Appellant has not shown he was meaningfully impaired in his ability to defend against the state's charges to such an extent that the disposition of the criminal proceeding was or will be likely affected[,] as required by syllabus point four of Knotts. We consequently find no Fifth Amendment violation.