Opinion ID: 2453006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sodomy Charge

Text: As to the sodomy charge, a reversal is mandated, with the case to be remanded for new trial. Pritchard argues that the trial court erred in entering a judgment of conviction for sodomy and in sentencing him to fifteen years imprisonment because the court deprived him of the benefit of a statutory amendment reducing the punishment for the offense. Pritchard further alleges that the jury was instructed to assess his punishment in accord with the former provisions that carried a range of five years to life imprisonment, and if left uncorrected, this error will result in manifest injustice. Pritchard was charged with one count of sodomy as follows: JOHN DOC TROY PRITCHARD, in violation of Section 566.060, RSMo, committed the felony of sodomy, punishable upon conviction under Section 566.060.2, RSMo, by life imprisonment or a term of years not less than five years, in that on or about the 26th day of August, 1994, in the County of Buchanan, State of Missouri, the defendant had deviate sexual intercourse with [K.G.], to whom defendant was not married and was then less than fourteen years old. Section 566.060.3, RSMo Supp.1993, under which Pritchard was charged provides that [a] person commits the crime of sodomy if he has deviate sexual intercourse with another person to whom he is not married who is less than fourteen years old. The term deviate sexual intercourse was defined as any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth, tongue, hand or anus of another person. Section 566.010(1), RSMo Supp.1993. (Emphasis added.) In 1994, chapter 566 was amended by the Missouri legislature. Effective January 1, 1995, two degrees of statutory sodomy were enacted, sections 566.062 (first degree) and 566.064 (second degree). The relevant section, 566.062.1, provides that [a] person commits the crime of statutory sodomy in the first degree if he has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years old. Furthermore, deviate sexual intercourse was redefined as: an act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth, tongue, or anus of another person or a sexual act involving the penetration, however slight, of the male or female organ or the anus by a finger, instrument or object done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person. Section 566.010(1). Under the statutes in effect when Pritchard was charged, any hand-to-genital contact, with or without penetration, with a person under 14 years of age would have been punishable as sodomy. However, under the amended section, unless the hand-to-genital contact involves digital penetration of the victim's sex organ with requisite purpose, such conduct would not constitute deviate sexual intercourse and would not be punishable as sodomy. Section 566.068.1, which took effect January 1, 1995, provides that: [a] person commits the crime of child molestation in the second degree if he subjects another person who is twelve or thirteen years of age to sexual contact. Sexual contact means any touching of another person with the genitals or any touching of the genitals or anus of another person, or the breast of a female person, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person. Section 566.010(3). Consequently, under the present statute, if Pritchard could not be charged with statutory sodomy in the first degree, then he could be charged with child molestation in the second degree pursuant to section 566.068 because the victim, K.G., was 13 years old at the time of the alleged offense. [2] Pritchard contends that since the present statute was in effect when he went to trial on May 17, 1995, section 1.160 and this Court's precedents require a new trial in which the jury would be instructed only as to child molestation in the second degree. The state contends that section 1.160(2) does not apply at all in this case because Pritchard's punishment for the offense of sodomy was not reduced or lessened. Alternatively, the state argues that if section 1.160(2) had some application, it is clear that Pritchard's crime involved hand-to-genital touching with penetration, and the punishment for that offense, although now called statutory sodomy in the first degree, is still five years to life imprisonment. The state concedes that the verdict-directing instruction for sodomy did not require the jury to find that Pritchard's conduct involved penetration, but it contends that Pritchard did not object to the instruction on that basis at trial, and he is foreclosed from making such an argument for the first time on appeal. Pritchard is correct in contending that he is entitled to a new trial, but he is mistaken in his assertion that the punishment for his offense is limited to the punishment for second-degree child molestation. The state also errs in contending that the evidence established digital penetration. While the child's statement that Pritchard put his finger between [her] private parts may imply penetration, penetration was not an issue in the trial and was not submitted to the jury.