Opinion ID: 787590
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Time Protection

Text: 92 Vermont also submits that it has a compelling interest in assur[ing] that candidates and officeholders will spend less time fundraising and more time interacting with voters and performing official duties. Indeed, the District Court found that the need to solicit money from large donors at times turns legislators away from their official duties. 118 F.Supp.2d at 468. The District Court also indicated that the State proved that this concern exists, and that Vermont's expenditure limits addressed this interest, among others. Id. at 482-83. 93 Again, we are mindful of Shrink 's guidance that [t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised. 14 528 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 897. On this score, the time protection rationale has been recognized as compelling, although not in the context of candidate spending limits. Indeed, the Buckley Court considered this interest in assessing, and deemed it sufficiently important to support, the public financing scheme for Presidential election campaigns — a provision it upheld. See 424 U.S. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Congress properly regarded public financing as an appropriate means of relieving major-party Presidential candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions) (citing Senate Rep. No. 93-689); 424 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Congress was legislating for the `general welfare' . . . to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising.). See also Republican Nat'l Committee v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F.Supp. 280, 284-86 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge District Court) (upholding constitutionality of expenditure limits as condition of accepting presidential public financing in part on ground that it would give candidates the opportunity to lessen the `great drain on (their) time and energies' required by fundraising `at the expense of providing competitive debate of the issues for the electorate') (quoting Senate Rep. No. 93-689), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 1639, 64 L.Ed.2d 231 (1980). 94 Moreover, other circuits have more recently recognized the compelling nature of the time-protection interest in similar contexts. See Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir.1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1229, 117 S.Ct. 1820, 137 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1997) (upholding Minnesota's voluntary public financing scheme because the government has a compelling interest in reducing the time candidates spend raising campaign contributions, thereby increasing the time available for discussion of the issues and campaigning); Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that statute survives exacting scrutiny because Rhode Island has a valid interest in having candidates accept public financing because such programs `facilitate communication by candidates with the electorate' [and] free candidates from the pressures of fundraising.) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. 612). Indeed, the Rosenstiel court determined that it is well settled that this interest is compelling. 101 F.3d at 1553 (collecting cases). 95 The Buckley Court, in determining that the expenditure limits in that case were unconstitutional, alluded to this time-protection interest only in passing. 424 U.S. at 91, 96, 96 S.Ct. 612 (mentioning generally Congress' desire to relieve political candidates from the rigors of soliciting and fundraising); see also Blasi, supra, at 1285-86 & n. 15 ([D]uring the public and legislative debates that led to the passage in 1974 of mandatory spending limits for congressional races, and during the Buckley litigation which resulted in the invalidation of those limits, candidate time protection was almost wholly ignored as a justification for campaign spending limits.). Only Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, observed that imposing expenditure ceilings would ease the candidate's understandable obsession with fundraising, and so free him and his staff to communicate in more places and ways unconnected with the fundraising function. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 264-65, 96 S.Ct. 612 (There is nothing objectionable — indeed it seems to me to be a weighty interest in favor of the provision — in the attempt to insulate the political expression of federal candidates from the influence inevitably exerted by the endless job of raising increasingly large sums of money.). One commentator explains that candidate time protection was not at the center of either the reform agenda or the constitutional analysis because Buckley was decided [b]efore the advent of pervasive war chests and candidate-PAC merchandizing bazaars. 15 Blasi, supra, at 1287. 96 Plaintiffs argue that this interest is no different than the goal of reducing the skyrocketing costs of political campaigns, rejected by Buckley as an insufficiently compelling interest to support expenditure limits. 424 U.S. at 57, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Sixth Circuit agreed in Kruse, reasoning that [t]he need to spend a large amount of time fundraising is a direct outgrowth of high costs of campaigns. However, because the government cannot constitutionally limit the cost of campaigns, the need to spend time raising money, which admittedly detracts an officeholder from doing her job, cannot serve as a basis for limiting campaign spending. 142 F.3d at 916-17. We are unpersuaded by this reasoning. 97 Indeed, we think the language of Buckley, as well as an examination of the Buckley briefs, oral argument, and subsequent commentary from judges and scholars, precludes such an interpretation. In its discussion of the federal campaign expenditure ceilings at issue in Buckley, the Buckley Court explained that the limits appear to be designed primarily to serve the governmental interests in reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns, and cited the statistics put forward by appellees and appellants on how the percentage increase in campaign spending in recent years compared to the rise in the consumer price index, gross national product, and total expenditures for commercial advertising over the same time period. 424 U.S. at 57, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court concluded that, regardless of the import of such statistics, the mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns in and of itself provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign spending and the resulting limitation on the scope of federal campaigns. Id. (emphasis added). Particularly in light of the recent statements of three Justices indicating that this time protection rationale may be a compelling interest, see supra at 108 (quoting Shrink, 528 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); and Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 649-50, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting), we see no reason to read Buckley more broadly than its language indicates. 98 At trial, Vermont presented powerful evidence concerning the time pressures which the prospect of unlimited expenditures places on candidates for office. In particular, there is strong evidence that unlimited expenditures have compelled candidates to engage in lengthy fundraising in order to preempt the possibility that their political opponents may develop substantially larger campaign war chests. The Vermont General Assembly found that such fundraising by candidates requires an inordinate[] amount of time. 1997 Vt. Laws P.A. 64 (H. 28) (finding No. 1). The large, and growing, campaign war chests in Vermont have created strong pressures on elected officials to ensure that they can raise funds comparable to any opponent. One witness, former State Senator and Lieutenant Governor Peter Smith, described the stampede or nuclear arms race mentality that we currently have, which is just keep building the bank because you never know what's going to happen. Under the current system, Vermont candidates feel like you had two races you were running. The first was for the money. . . . (testimony of Donald Hooper). 99 Although there may be no inherent problem with candidates competing to raise large quantities of funds, the evidence in Vermont is clear that the pressure to raise large sums of money greatly affects the way candidates and elected officials spend their time. Special interests, well placed to take advantage of candidates' fear of losing this fundraising war, dominate candidates' time and thereby have been able to exercise substantial control over the information that passes to candidates. They do this by increasingly consuming the opportunities candidates have for meeting with constituent groups and forcing candidates to choose contributors over private citizens who make small or no contributions. This command of available time, inherent in endless fundraising, drastically reduces opportunities that candidates have to meet with non-contributing citizens. 16 100 Legislators explained at trial that officials are more likely to return donors' phone calls. If I have only got an hour at night when I get home to return calls, I am much more likely to return [a donor's] call then I would [a non-donor's] .... [W]hen you only have a few minutes to talk, there are certain people that get access. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). A former candidate for Congress and current lobbyist in Vermont, Anthony Pollina, described the process: 101 [C]andidates and policymakers ... can only talk to so many people in a day. They can only respond to so many phone calls. The governor can only have so many meetings in a day. And if in fact large contributors are using their contributions to buy access to the governor or other policymakers ... then that means that the policymaker, the governor and others are not spending their time talking to other people who have not provided other large contributions.... 102 Nor is this just a theoretical concern. One widely reported case involved the differing access that state officials granted to interested groups as the state government considered whether to label milk produced using genetically engineered hormones. Major dairy companies, who in the past had been contributors, were able to arrange meetings with critical state leaders, whereas local farmer organizations that lacked importance as contributors could not arrange similar meetings. 103 By giving money, contributors haven't bought the person, but they have certainly bought a piece of that time there where they have that person's attention. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). Even if candidates receive valuable information during every hour spent fundraising, their time is being controlled by those with campaign cash, and this effect is corrosive. The Vermont legislature considered one article in the Burlington Free Press stating that [m]oney not only threatens to corrupt the process, it sabotages the political dialogue as well. Candidates spend too much time begging for dollars and too little time talking issues.... See Democratic Process Relies on Reform, Burlington Free Press, Oct. 6, 1997 at 6A. 104 Public officials testified at trial that the financial necessity imposed by fundraising, and bred by the arms race mentality in campaigns with unlimited spending, requires that elected officials spend time with donors rather than on their official duties. One state Senator testified that legislators have to spend time at party fundraising events to give donors access to elected officials. (testimony of Cheryl Rivers). Another Senator explained how spending limits would affect her time: 105 If I can go out and raise what I have to raise and know that those limits are in place, I can spend the whole rest of my campaign, once I have raised that money, out with the public, okay. I can go door-to-door. I can go around to local events. I can go to the county fairs. I can have a little booth, you know, and be talking to people. I am not going to be locked away, you know, in the Democratic Party somewhere or in my own office somewhere making fundraising calls. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). 106 Simply put, every hour spent drumming up financial contributions is an hour that cannot be spent independently studying legislative proposals or meeting with constituents who may not be likely donors. And the public understands this reality: at trial, Vermont presented survey data that 85% of Vermonters are concerned that political fundraising took away time from important government business. (testimony of Celinda C. Lake). 107 Indeed, although we do not balance interests, the fact that this time-protection interest is itself fundamental to our representative democracy, and related to First Amendment values, cannot be ignored. As one First Amendment scholar put it, the quality of democratic representation suffers when legislators continually concerned about re-election are not able to spend the greater part of their workday on matters of constituent service, information gathering, political and policy analysis, debating and compromising with fellow representatives, and the public dissemination of views. Blasi, supra, at 1282-83. 108 Unfortunately, without spending limits, the contribution limits would exacerbate the time problem. A lobbyist who supports Act 64 noted that contribution limits coupled with unlimited expenditures would require that candidates continue to spend more time and energy raising those smaller contributions to see who could raise the most money and outspend their opponent and therefore win the race. So the spending limits, tied to the contribution limits, create a situation where the candidates simply don't have to spend as much time and energy raising money.... [The limits] change the way campaigns are run, in a sense, and make them more people oriented or voter oriented as opposed to fundraising oriented.... (testimony of Anthony Pollina). Cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 656 (The `overall effect' of dollar limits on contributions is `merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons.') (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22, 96 S.Ct. 612). That same lobbyist also explained that with contribution limits alone, the unfortunate thing is that candidates would feel compelled to look for those other sources because they would still be trying to outspend... their opponents, and that would cause them to then spend more time and more energy into looking for those other sources of funding. It might then encourage the bundling practices that were referred to earlier, and ... it would not address the problem that we are hoping to address. (testimony of Anthony Pollina). 17 109 In sum, our independent review of the evidence adduced at trial supports the District Court findings that the Vermont public perceives, legitimately, that candidates frequently spend an excessive amount of time fundraising and not enough time interacting with voters, and that the need to solicit money from large donors at times turns legislators away from their official duties. 118 F.Supp.2d at 468, 470. So long as the danger remains that a political opponent might severely outstrip a candidate's financial resources, candidates have continued to feel it necessary to raise ever larger sums of money. For elected officials, this will mean giving more time to contributors over non-contributors, and expending more effort on relatively generous contributors over less important ones.