Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interception of Telephone Call

Text: Defendant contends evidence of a telephone call from him that was intercepted by police officers when they were in his apartment was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and should have been excluded at trial. Evidence presented in the trial court at a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the telephone call established the following: When the police interviewed the victim (Mr. Flores) about 15 minutes after the robbery, he reported a license plate number for the motorcycle that had been used by the robbers. Defendant was the registered owner of that vehicle. His name and the address used for the registration were broadcast over the police radio. Officer Webster heard the broadcast and promptly went to the address, where he was told that defendant no longer resided at that location but now resided in a duplex in the vicinity of Third and Hedding in San Jose and that he drove a white Cadillac. As Officer Webster drove around the area of Third and Hedding, he observed a white Cadillac parked in a driveway in front of a house. Webster ran a check on the license plate and found that the Cadillac was registered to defendant. The officer watched the house for approximately 20 minutes until additional officers arrived. He and two other officers went to the front door, and he knocked at approximately 6:15 or 6:30 p.m. The door was answered by Lawrence Santiago, who stated when asked that he was not defendant and that defendant was not in the house. Officer Webster asked Santiago whether he would mind if the officers entered and looked around. Santiago said he was just visiting but that he did not mind, and stepped back to let the officers in. Millie Dominguez also was present. The officers entered and searched the house but did not find defendant. One of the two occupants of the house mentioned that defendant had called earlier and was expected to call back. When the telephone rang, the officers instructed the occupants not to answer it. Officer Guerra picked up the phone, pretending to be Millie Dominguez. The caller identified himself as defendant and said that he was hot and that the police were looking for him. He instructed her to lock the doors of the apartment and the Cadillac and to take a walk. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the officers' entry into the house was consensual, and that the interception of the call was the result of a fresh pursuit situation. Officer Guerra was permitted to testify at trial concerning the contents of the telephone call. In its opinion reversing defendant's first conviction, this court concluded that counsel at defendant's first trial provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to suppress evidence of the intercepted telephone call. We observed that because the officers' entry into the apartment was without a warrant, it was presumptively unlawful. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 227, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) However, we also noted that if counsel had challenged the admissibility of the call, the prosecution may well have been successful in rebutting the presumption of unlawfulness, and stated that the prosecution was not foreclosed from attempting on retrial to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness. ( Id. at p. 227, fn. 11, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839; see also id. at p. 236, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) [concluding that it appeared the police entry was not based on voluntary consent and that even if it was, the consent did not extend to interception of the telephone call, but noting that if defense counsel had challenged the admissibility of the intercepted call, the prosecutor might have presented evidence and argument to show that the entry was lawful or that the intercepted telephone call was admissible].) We conclude, based on the record of the retrial, that the prosecution succeeded in rebutting the presumption that the entry into defendant's house and subsequent interception of the telephone call were unlawful. To establish consent, the prosecution was required to prove that the officers reasonably and in good faith believed that Santiago had the authority to consent to their entry into the apartment. (See Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148; People v. Escudero (1979) 23 Cal.3d 800, 153 Cal. Rptr. 825, 592 P.2d 312.) Although Santiago was just visiting, he and Dominguez were present in the apartment in the early evening when defendant was not at home. Cases from a number of jurisdictions have recognized that a guest who has the run of the house in the occupant's absence has the apparent authority to give consent to enter an area where a visitor normally would be received. (See, e.g., United States v. Turbyfill (8th Cir.1975) 525 F.2d 57; Nix v. State (Alaska 1981) 621 P.2d 1347; State v. Thompson (Minn.1998) 578 N.W.2d 734; see also 4 La Fave, Search and Seizure (4th ed.2004) § 8.5(e).) Furthermore, the police may assume, without further inquiry, that a person who answers the door in response to their knock has the authority to let them enter. (See Mann v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380, 472 P.2d 468 [entry was consensual where the police knocked on the door of the defendant's house, in which a party was taking place, and voices inside called out come in].) There is no indication that the consent given here was involuntary. The officers asked Santiago for permission to enter and inspect; such a request, by its nature, carries the implication that permission may be withheld. ( See People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 116, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.) Therefore, the officers reasonably believed they had consent to enter and were lawfully in the apartment when they answered the phone. [16] The officers' interception of defendant's phone call when they were lawfully present in his apartment was not improper, because it was based on probable cause, and exigent circumstances justified the officers' failure to obtain a warrant. The information supplied by Santiago and Dominguez gave them reason to believe that the incoming call would be from defendant and that, by answering it, they would obtain information leading to his imminent capture. (See People v. Sandoval (1966) 65 Cal.2d 303, 308, 54 Cal.Rptr. 123, 419 P.2d 187 [officers who were engaged in a lawful search justifiably could answer the telephone and conceal their identity, because they had information that the telephone was being used in drug transactions]; People v. Drieslein (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 591, 216 Cal.Rptr. 244 [same].) The delay required to obtain a warrant obviously would have resulted in the loss of this opportunity. People v. Harwood (1978) 74 Cal.App.3d 460, 141 Cal.Rptr. 519 is distinguishable. In that case, the court held that consent to enter and search the premises did not include consent to intercept telephone calls. In Harwood, the police suspected that narcotics were kept in the apartment but had no specific information indicating that the telephone was being used for narcotics transactions. ( Id. at p. 468, 141 Cal.Rptr. 519.) In the present case, the police had specific information that defendant was likely to call and thus reason to believe that answering the telephone could lead to information regarding his location.