Opinion ID: 2608831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicability of Section 47(2) to Attorney Farnell

Text: (7) Farnell argues that lawyers should enjoy a special immunity from liability for violation of the privacy act or other illegal or tortious conduct. He argues that the broadest possible application of section 47(2) to attorneys' misconduct is necessary to avoid the conflict of interest that may result when an attorney is forced to defend against a cause as a codefendant with his clients. We are not persuaded. Nothing in the text of section 47(2) suggests the existence of such an attorney exception. He argues, further, that if an attorney is required to defend himself under such circumstances, opposing counsel will inevitably file complaints, however frivolous, to force the attorney either to reveal work product, violate the attorney-client privilege or obtain substitute counsel. These derivative actions, he urges, will delay bringing the action to trial and prejudice the attorney's clients. Again, we are not persuaded by these claimed perils. First, Farnell has not explained how, if at all, he has been or will be forced to reveal his work product. Second, the attorney-client privilege does not apply if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime. (Evid. Code, § 956.) Thus, Farnell cannot assert the attorney-client privilege to defend against charges that he violated the privacy act, a criminal offense punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. (Pen. Code, § 632, subd. (a).) [9] Indeed, the only case that Farnell cites to support his claim that section 47(2) should apply to the illegal conduct of an attorney, makes no mention of section 47(2) whatsoever. In Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal. App.3d 934 [155 Cal. Rptr. 393], the court held that a defendant title company could not cross-complain against the plaintiff's attorney for comparative indemnity based on malpractice where the attorney was not a true joint tortfeasor, because the attorney's liability, if any, would proceed from a totally different source than that of his client's opponent, the cross-complainant. Even if applicable by analogy to this case, however, Farnell's alleged liability proceeds directly from the same course of conduct as that of his clients. Accordingly, under Commercial Standard Title Co., he could be subject to liability on a cross-complaint. Finally, Farnell urges that attorneys will be chilled in their advocacy of their clients' causes if such immunity from suit is not provided. To be sure, the threat of liability in a civil action based on violation of the privacy act or other illegal conduct may cool the zealousness of an attorney's efforts in the advance of his or her client's cause. We conclude, however, that such forbearance is, in fact, healthy to the extent it inhibits an attorney from assisting clients in the commission of crimes. [10]