Opinion ID: 2634934
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of Pending Probation Revocation Proceeding Is the Consequence for Failing to Comply with Section 1381

Text: Broughton reached a different conclusion from the Rudman court. The Broughton majority believed that section 1381.5 entitled a defendant to be `brought ... for sentencing' within the time constraints of section 1381.5, with the consequence of the failure to do so dismissal of the underlying conviction.  ( Broughton, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 316, italics added.) [8] After acknowledging that any statutory construction analysis `begin[s] by examining the language of the statute,' Broughton relied on the `principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend. [Citation.]' ( Broughton, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 316.) The Broughton majority stated that, [i]f sections 1381 and 1381.5 were to apply to probation revocation hearings, the `action,' not the pending proceeding, must be dismissed if the defendant is not brought to the hearing in the manner prescribed by those sections. Such a dismissal would lead to the peculiar result that a probationer could have a conviction dismissed under a `speedy trial' statute months or even years after the conclusion of his or her trial and appearance at a timely sentencing hearing at which imposition of sentence was waived in favor of probation. [¶] In tacit recognition that [the Legislature could not have intended such a result, the Rudman court] simply ignored the express statutory command to dismiss `the action' and, without any analysis or explanation, directed the trial court to dismiss only the probation violation charge. [Citation.] A far more reasonable construction of the statute is to limit its application to defendants awaiting an initial sentencing hearing. ( Broughton, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 317.) In this statement, in the course of reaching its conclusion that section 1381 applies only to defendants awaiting an initial sentencing hearing, the Broughton majority simply assumed, without significant analysis, that the sanction for violating the 90-day rule of section 1381 is dismissal of the original conviction. That assumption is not entitled to much weight because the summary and conclusory nature of [a] decision ..., virtually devoid of reasoning, undermines its status as substantial authority. ( City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 533 [162 Cal.Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362].) In any event, we conclude that Broughton 's statutory interpretation may `lead to absurd results' that `are to be avoided.' ( People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313].) The language at issue includes the 1971 amendments to section 1381 and reads, in pertinent part, as follows: Whenever a defendant has been convicted ... [of a felony or misdemeanor], ... and at the time of the entry upon the term of imprisonment... there is pending, in any court of this state, any other indictment, information, complaint, or any criminal proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced, ... [i]n the event that the defendant is not brought to trial or for sentencing within the 90 days the court in which the charge or sentencing is pending shall ... dismiss the action.  (§ 1381, italics added.) In this context, the phrase dismiss the action refers back to the action that is pending, in this case, the probation revocation proceeding. (§ 1381.) The 1971 addition of the phrases any criminal proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced and or for sentencing necessitated a concomitant modification of the consequence for failure to meet the 90-day requirement from dismiss the charge, which would apply if there is pending an indictment, information, complaint, to a word that would encompass both dismissal of the charges and dismissal of any criminal proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced. ( Ibid. ) As the Court of Appeal aptly noted, Black's Law Dictionary defines `action' broadly as a `civil or criminal judicial proceeding.' (Black's Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 28.) Under this definition, a probation revocation proceeding is an action. Reading the above language as the Broughton majority suggests would mean that the failure to abide by the 90-day time requirement of section 1381 could force a court to dismiss the charges against a defendant who years earlier had either admitted the charges by a plea of guilty or no contest or was found guilty by trial. We conclude that the Legislature would not have intended such an absurd result when it expanded the speedy trial provisions in section 1381 to include  any criminal proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced. (§ 1381, italics added.) [9] We also disagree with Broughton 's claim that the fundamental policies advanced by speedy trial statutes such as section 1381.5avoiding prolonged imprisonment, limiting anxiety attendant to an unresolved criminal charge, reducing the effect of lapse of time on trial witnesses and providing the opportunity for imposition of concurrent sentence, are not similarly implicated by a probationer. ( Broughton, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 319.) As noted above, one purpose of section 1203.2a is to prevent inadvertent consecutive sentences ( People v. Ruster, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at p. 870), thereby avoiding prolonged imprisonment and limiting anxiety attendant to an unresolved criminal matter.