Opinion ID: 164842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mr. maggiore

Text: Mr. Eden argues the district court wrongly concluded the allegations of conspiracy against Mr. Maggiore were insufficient. He also argues that his allegation that Mr. Maggiore “approved and ratified” Ms. Ortiz’s and Mr. Voss’ -20- actions sufficiently alleged both a conspiracy by Mr. Maggiore with Mr. Voss and Ms. Ortiz to violate his rights and supervisory liability because Mr. Maggiore was in a supervisory position over Mr. Voss and Ms. Ortiz. The district court decided that the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply, that Mr. Eden did not allege that Mr. Maggiore caused Ms. Ortiz to violate Mr. Eden’s constitutional rights, and that the bare allegation that Mr. Maggiore approved Ms. Ortiz’s actions failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Also, the court dismissed the conspiracy claim because it lacked the requisite specificity to state a claim. As we noted before, we review the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Duran , 238 F.3d at 1270. “The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc. , 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted), cert. denied , 124 S. Ct. 1411 (2004). “Dismissal is inappropriate ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his] claim which would entitle [him] to relief.’” Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 186 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In making this review, courts take the complaint’s factual allegations as true. Zinermon v. -21- Burch , 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990). “The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support [his] claims.” Ruiz v. McDonnell , 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 1908 (2003). Supervisor liability “requires allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Woodward v. City of Worland , 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). Mr. Eden “must demonstrate an affirmative link between [Mr. Maggiore’s] conduct and the constitutional deprivation; liability based upon respondeat superior will not do.” Snell , 920 F.2d at 700. Mr. Eden must show that Mr. Maggiore “expressly, or otherwise, authorized, supervised, or participated in conduct which caused the constitutional deprivation.” Id. Mr. Eden asserted that Mr. Maggiore “approved and ratified” the actions of Ms. Ortiz and Mr. Voss. Under the liberal standards afforded to pro se litigants, the assertion is legally sufficient to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Maggiore based on supervisory liability. For a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff “must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among the defendants.” Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents , 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Salehpoor v. Shahinpoor , 358 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring plaintiff to allege by direct or -22- circumstantial evidence that defendants had meeting of minds or agreement). “Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim.” Tonkovich , 159 F.3d at 533 (quotation omitted); see also Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 355 F.3d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding conclusory conspiracy allegations are not sufficient to state a constitutional claim). Although we recognize that the nature of conspiracy is such that it is often impossible to provide details at the pleading stage, Brever v. Rockwell Int’l Corp. , 40 F.3d 1119, 1128 (10th Cir. 1994), read liberally, the complaint here states only conclusory allegations of conspiracy, which are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that the conspiracy allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. E. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDGE WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT Mr. Eden argues the district court erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice without considering granting him leave to amend. Apart from a one line request in his response to Mr. Maggiore’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Eden never requested the district court’s permission to amend his complaint. This court has held that the district court does not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a plaintiff leave to amend if the plaintiff never properly sought leave to amend. See Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. , 181 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 1999) (normally, district court need not grant leave to amend when -23- plaintiff fails to make formal motion; informal request to amend in response to motion to dismiss is insufficient if it fails to give grounds for proposed amendment and merely “dangl[es]” at end of response). Mr. Eden’s first suggestion that he should be granted leave to amend his complaint in the entirety was made to this court. Yet he does not indicate how he would amend his complaint. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Eden’s assertion that the district court erred in failing to grant him leave to amend his complaint. F. UNKNOWN DOES 1-10 Mr. Eden argues the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of the unknown Does 1-10 should be reversed with the direction that he be allowed to conduct sufficient discovery to determine their identities and to allow time to amend the complaint once he discovers their identities. In light of our remand on other issues, we conclude Mr. Eden will have an opportunity to conduct discovery. G. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Mr. Eden argues the district court erred in awarding defense counsel attorney’s fees and costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) when the court specifically stated it would not impose sanctions against him. Mr. Eden did not appear for a Rule 16 scheduling conference due to car trouble. Accepting that Mr. Eden’s failure to attend was a matter outside his control, the district court declined to -24- impose sanctions against him under Rule 16(f). Instead, the court ordered, pursuant to Rule 16(f), that Mr. Eden reimburse opposing counsel for one hour of attorney time at the rate of $150.00 per hour and travel costs of $42.34. An award of attorney’s fees and expenses is part of a broad range of sanctions available to a district court under Rule 16(f) 11 to impose on a party for that party’s failure to appear at a scheduling conference. 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 16.15[1] (3rd ed. 2003); see Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., Inc. , 931 F.2d 655, 667 (10th Cir. 1991) (referring to award of attorney’s fees and expenses as sanction); see also Olcott v. Del. Flood Co. , 76 F.3d 1538, 1555 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing punitive purpose of Rule 16(f)). Thus, under Rule 16, the district court had authority to impose attorney’s fees and expenses as a sanction. It was therefore inconsistent for the district court to impose attorney’s fees and expenses against Mr. Eden and to declare it 11 Rule 16(f) provides in pertinent part: Sanctions . If . . . no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling . . . conference, . . . the judge . . . may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of . . . any other sanction , the judge shall require the party . . . to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney’s fees, unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (emphasis added). -25- was not imposing a sanction. Accordingly, on de novo review, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and expenses. See Utah Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt , 136 F.3d 707, 709 (10th Cir. 1998) (reviewing de novo legal analysis underlying sanction imposition). We remand to the district court for further proceedings.