Opinion ID: 1860134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instructions in negligent hiring/retention claims

Text: Ten Broeck argues that the trial court's instructions, impermissibly imposed respondeat superior liability on it contrary to Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005), as well as, erroneously precluded it from asserting the defense that Brooks was not raped. As to the former, Brooks asserts that the challenge to the ordinary care instruction was not preserved. Having reviewed the record, including the instructions tendered to the trial court by Ten Broeck, Ten Broeck's motion for judgment n.o.v., Ten Broeck's brief to the Court of Appeals, as well as its motion for discretionary review, we find that the objections and arguments made by Ten Broeck necessarily called into question the form of the instruction given and therefore this issue was preserved, although inartfully so. [7] Throughout the trial, Brooks' counsel argued, and Brooks testified, that she was raped. Brooks' damage witness, Dr. Goodman, testified in general about the injuries suffered by women who are raped. Her testimony rested solely upon her research regarding damages sustained by women in the general population who have been raped. She never saw, evaluated or diagnosed Brooks. She noted she was not testifying as a clinician and had made only a cursory review of Brooks' medical records. Further, although she did not know the elements of rape under Kentucky law, she testified that Brooks was raped. Ten Broeck objected to any characterization of the alleged assault as a rape, or any reference to Brooks as a victim of rape. [8] The court, in ruling upon Ten Broeck's objection, noted that Dr. Goodman used the term rape, noted that the jury may have some non-legal view of what rape is and determined that as long as the jury heard what the expert said, the court would not exclude use of the term rape. However, during the later instruction conference, Brooks' counsel argued that it made no difference whether Brooks was raped, because Gilbert admitted he had intercourse with Brooks. No instruction concerning (or defining) rape or sexual assault was given. Consensual sex, however, was Ten Broeck's factual, if not legal, defense to Brooks' claims of liability and damages. [R]ape, one of the most aggravated batteries, is, if the woman consents, neither rape nor even assault. Goldnamer v. O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S.W. 831, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 1386 (1896) (Thus, a woman who immorally yields to her seducer cannot sue, because she consented to and participated in the wrong whereof she complains.). Therefore, consent if valid under the circumstances, is a defense to sexual assault, or said more appropriately, [l]ack of consent is an essential element of [the] battery [constituting the sexual assault.] Therefore, the absence of consent must be proved as a necessary part of the plaintiffs case. Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 658-659 (Ky.2000). The consent, however, must be knowingly and intelligently given and may not be the result of ... incompetence. 6A C.J.S., Assault § 22 (2008); see Koch v. Stone, 332 S.W.2d 529, 531, 532 (Ky.1960); see also KRS 510.020(3). The basic function of instructions in Kentucky is to tell the jury what it must believe from the evidence in order to resolve each dispositive factual issue in favor of the party who bears the burden of proof on that issue. Palmore, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, Vol. II § 13.01 (5th ed.) ( citing Webster v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky.1974)). And [i]t is the duty of the court to furnish a criterion for the measurement of damages. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Consolidated Tel. Co., 252 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Ky.1952). Thus, an instruction is erroneous if it assumes or has the appearance of assuming an essential fact concerning disputed evidence. Conley v. Foster, 335 S.W.2d 904 (Ky.1960). Here, the court gave two (2) liability instructions, Instruction No. 3 and No. 4. [9] Instruction No. 3 was premised upon a general duty of ordinary care. As we discuss this instruction at more length in Argument IIIB, we will not consider it further in regards to this issue, other than to note that to find for Brooks thereunder, the jury was only required to find that the Defendant failed to comply with [the duty of ordinary care expected of reasonable and prudent hospitals acting under similar circumstances] and that such failure on [Ten Broeck's] part was a substantial factor in causing injury to [Brooks]. Instruction No. 4 read as follows: It was the duty of Defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, acting by and through its employees, to exercise ordinary care in hiring Feotis Gilbert as an employee or in retaining Feotis Gilbert as an employee when they knew or should have known that he was unsuitable for the position for which he was hired. [10] If you are satisfied from the evidence that Defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, failed to comply with that duty and that such failure on their part was a substantial factor in causing injury to [Brooks], you will find for the Plaintiff, [Brooks], and against the Defendant and proceed to Verdict Form A; otherwise you should proceed directly to Verdict Form B. In that the jury verdict did not reference which of the two instructions the jury found liability under, we are unable to ascertain with certainty their findings by which to resolve the issues of consent and damages. [11] Absent a finding of sexual assault (i.e., the rape), meaning it was nonconsensual, we cannot find support in the evidence for the damages awarded, since Dr. Goodman's testimony regarding damages hinged upon the occurrence being rape. Although Ten Broeck's liability under Instruction No. 4 is properly premised upon its own negligence in the hiring or retention of Gilbert, the compensatory damages therefore must, in some form, be a measurement of the victim's injuries from the employee's acts. And, were it consensual, there could be no sexual assault. In order for [an] employer to be held liable for negligent hiring [or] retention... the employee must have committed a tort. Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 799 P.2d 15, 18 (1990) (citations omitted). The underlying tort may be intentional, such as a sexual assault, or negligent, such as a breach of care. Cf. Flor-Shin , Inc., 964 at 438; see also Lexington Hospital v. White, 245 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Ky.1952) (It is not questioned that a private hospital ... receives patients under an implied obligation to exercise ordinary care and attention for their safety, and that such degree of care and protection should be in proportion to the physical and mental ailments of the particular patient.). But, whether an intentional sexual assault, or consensual sexual encounter, will support an action in negligence against a party based upon the breach of a professional standard of care is a question that has yet to be answered in this state. A sexual assault, however, is a battery and we have noted that [b]attery is an intentional tort; it is not committed by a negligent act. Vitale, 24 S.W.3d at 656. (citation omitted). Several states, however, have answered the question. See Russell G. Donaldson, J.D., Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Clinic for Sexual Relationships With Patients by Staff Physicians, Psychologists, and Other Healers, 45 A.L.R.4th 289 (1986); see also Brendan de R. O'Byrne, B.A. LL.B., Annotation Civil Liability of Doctor or Psychologist for Having Sexual Relationship with Patient, 33 A.L.R.3d 1393 (1970); Phoebe Carter, J.D., Annotation, Employer's Liability for Assault, Theft, or Similar Intentional Wrong Committed by employee at Home or Business of Customer, 13 A.L.R. 5th 217 (1993). In McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 353 (D.C.1998), the court found the physician could be liable in tort for medical malpractice for engaging in sexual acts with his patient, if such conduct was established as a breach of the applicable standard of care. However, the court also noted, [c]onsent to the sexual acts, freely and competently given, would be a defense to such a theory of liability. Whether a particular plaintiff is capable of consenting to such a relationship is a question of fact to be determined at trial. Id. at n. 4. In Gunter v. Huddle, 724 So.2d 544, 546 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), the plaintiff alleged that her affair with the physician occurred `within the shadow of [a] professional relationship,' and, therefore, that it constituted malpractice. Id. In upholding the dismissal of the plaintiffs claim, the court held We likewise adhere to the majority rule... and hold that where, as here, a patient of a nonpsychiatric physician does not present evidence that he or she was led to believe by that physician that the sexual relationship was part of the patient's treatment, a sexual relationship between the patient and the physician is outside the scope of the physician's professional services and does not constitute professional malpractice. Id.; see also N.X. v. Cabrini Medical Center, 280 A.D.2d 34, 719 N.Y.S.2d 60, 64 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.2001) (In our view, no amount of legal rhetoric can ever transform the heinous act committed by Dr. Favara into anything other than what it was  a sexual assault. Moreover, no amount of rhetoric can obscure the dissent's failure to explain how a sexual assault furthers a hospital's business as a medical care provider.). In Hoopes v. Hammargren, 102 Nev. 425, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (1986), the plaintiff claimed that the physician used the physician-patient relationship to induce her into a sexual relationship and that such conduct constituted malpractice. Recognizing the physician-patient relationship as fiduciary in nature, the court held that taking [s]exual advantage of the physician-patient relationship can constitute malpractice. Id. at 242. In explaining its holding, however, the court noted: The nature and extent of the circumstances surrounding the alleged exploitation must be carefully examined. For example, we will not presume that Ms. Hoopes was incapable of giving consent. The sexual relationship which admittedly existed could have been personal and unrelated to the parameters of treatment.... We also caution that Ms. Hoopes not only is required to prove exploitation, but also that it was the proximate cause of any claimed harm. Id. at 243. Zuidema v. Pedicano, 373 N.J.Super. 135, 860 A.2d 992 (2004) dealt with both medical malpractice and sexual assault. Here, the allegation supporting both claims was that the plaintiff was sexually assaulted in the physician's office. The jury found that the plaintiff did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that [the physician] assaulted and battered her. However, the jury unanimously found that [the physician] was medically negligent. Id. at 997. In its consideration, the court further noted, that [w]hether the verdict could be considered a finding by the jury that [the physician] and Zuidema had a consensual sexual relationship was not resolved. The trial judge did comment in passing that the incident may have been consensual. Id. at n. 4. Thus, the court reversed the jury's verdict, holding: Simply stated, sexual relations between a physician and patient are certainly not condoned, but [the plaintiff] may not utilize a medical malpractice type theory to support a claim based on an intentional act independent of a physician's practice, or for a claim of sexual assault. The jury found that there was no sexual assault, thus rejecting this claim, and the jury incorrectly considered a medical negligence issue because it was improperly based on an intentional act. Thus, we reverse the jury's verdict. Id. at 1000 (citation omitted). In its commentary, the court also noted that [t]here is no reported case that we are aware of that has allowed any form of negligence to be proven by a sexual assault, an intentional act. Id. at 998. Also, in Fragosa v. Haider, 17 A.D.3d 526, 793 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2005), the court held, [t]he complaint does not state a cause of action alleging medical malpractice. The injuries as asserted in the complaint stemmed from the alleged intentional assault by the [plaintiff], not the medical services rendered. Yet, in Bunce v. Parkside Lodge of Columbus, 73 Ohio App.3d 253, 596 N.E.2d 1106, 1111 (1991), the plaintiff, while a patient in a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility for treatment of her cocaine addiction, engaged in a sexual relationship with a senior counselor at the facility. She later filed suit against the facility and the counselor, alleging among other claims, sexual assault and malpractice. In upholding her right to proceed under the theory of malpractice, the court held: Maintenance of a malpractice claim does not rely upon the question of whether [the plaintiff] validly consented to the sexual contact but upon the possible breach of a duty owed her by [the counselor]. It is axiomatic that, although consent would be a valid defense to a criminal charge of sexual assault or rape, consent is not a defense to a malpractice claim based upon sexual contact. Malpractice involves the breach of a professional duty; where the duty itself is to refrain from sexual contact, consent would not excuse the breach. The action for malpractice arises out of []a public policy to protect a patient from the deliberate and malicious abuse of power and breach of trust by a [therapist] when that patient entrusts to him her body and mind in the hope that he will use his best efforts to effect a cure. [] Id. at 1111 citing Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc.2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 301 (1975) ( rev'd on other grounds 85 Misc.2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1976)). Aside from the question of whether an intentional sexual assault may support an action against an employee for negligent breach of the duty of care, and thus a claim against the employer for negligent hiring/retention, we either had a sexual assault, or we did not. The proof of damages was, to a great extent, dependant upon it. The determining factor is consent, a critical factual question not presented to the jury by the instructions. Thus, Gilbert's underlying act was ignored by Instruction No. 4, which focused only on Gilbert's unsuitability for the job, Appellant's knowledge of such unsuitability, and whether Appellant's hiring or retention of Gilbert was a substantial factor causing injury to [Brooks]. Flor-Shin does not support such a narrow instruction. 964 S.W.2d at 438. In Flor-Shin , the victim sued both the tortfeasor and the employer. Thus, at trial, the instructions would have presented the jury with the requirement of finding the sexual assault prior to consideration of the employer's liability. [12] Therefore, unlike here, the issue of consent would have been addressed. Here, since the evidence concerning whether or not the event constituted a sexual assault, or consensual sex, was disputed, the court's failure to give an appropriate instruction under the negligent hiring/retention claim, from whence the jury could make a finding as to whether a sexual assault was committed by Gilbert, was error. There must be a finding of a tort to support liability and damages under a theory of negligent hiring/retention. [13] A party to civil litigation is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury for its acceptance or rejection if there is any evidence to sustain it. Risen v. Pierce, 807 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Ky.1991). This was not the case in this instance and it was error. Upon retrial, should the evidence be substantially the same, the jury should be able to make findings regarding Gilbert's alleged sexual assault of Brooks. Only then may it consider and make findings against Ten Broeck on Brooks' claim of negligent hiring/retention. Thus, on retrial, the court should, among others, instruct as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. ____ (Definitions) Mental IllnessMeans a substantially impaired capacity to use self-control, judgment or discretion in the conduct of one's affairs and social relations, associated with maladapted behavior or recognized emotional symptoms where impaired capacity, maladapted behavior or emotional symptoms can be related to physiological, psychological or social factors. Mentally IncapacitatedMeans that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising her conduct as a result of the influence of a controlled or intoxicating substance administered to her without her consent, or administered with her consent in a hospital or other medical care facility. The phrase incapable of appraising her conduct means that a person does not know that a sexual act will be performed. [14] Ordinary CareMeans such care as a jury would expect an ordinarily prudent person engaged in the same type of business to exercise under similar circumstances. Physically HelplessMeans that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act. INSTRUCTION NO. ____ (Duty of Care) It was the duty of the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, acting by and through its employees, to exercise ordinary care in hiring or retaining Feotis Gilbert as an employee when and if, it knew, or should have known, that he was dangerously unsuitable for the position for which he was hired or retained. INSTRUCTION NO. ____(A) (Liability) You will find for the plaintiff Artemecia Brooks against the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, under this instruction, if you are satisfied from the evidence that: a. Feotis Gilbert engaged in sexual contact with Artemecia Brooks without her consent, expressed or implied; [15] AND b. That prior thereto, the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital knew, or reasonably should have known, that Feotis Gilbert was dangerously unsuitable for the position for which he was hired or retained as an employee; AND c. That Ten Broeck Hospital failed to comply with its duty of ordinary care in the hiring or retention of Feotis Gilbert as an employee; AND d. That such failure on the part of the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, was a substantial factor in causing injury to Artemecia Brooks; otherwise you shall find for the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, against the plaintiff, Artemecia Brooks, under this instruction. INSTRUCTION NO. ____(B) (Liability) If you do not find for the plaintiff, Artemecia Brooks, under Instruction No. ____(A), you will find for the plaintiff Artemecia Brooks against the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, under this instruction, if you are satisfied from the evidence that: a. Feotis Gilbert engaged in sexual contact with Artemecia Brooks at a time when she was incapable of consent because she was mentally ill, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, [16] of which he was, or should have been, aware; [17] AND b. That prior thereto, the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital knew, or reasonably should have known, that Feotis Gilbert was dangerously unsuitable for the position for which he was hired or retained as an employee; AND c. That Ten Broeck Hospital failed to comply with its duty of ordinary care in the hiring or retention of Feotis Gilbert as an employee; AND d. That such failure on the part of the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, was a substantial factor in causing injury to Artemecia Brooks; otherwise you shall find for the defendant, Ten Broeck Hospital, as against the plaintiff, Artemecia Brooks under this instruction.
An employer's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior requires that the proximate cause of a plaintiffs injury must have been an act committed by an employee acting within the course and scope of his employment. Patterson, 172 S.W.3d at 366. An employee's scope of employment includes an intentional tort committed by [an employee] where its purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the [employer's] business. Id. at 369. If, however, an employee acts from purely personal motives ... which [are] in no way connected with the employer's interests, he is considered in the ordinary case to have departed from his employment, and the master is not liable. This [sound] approach conforms to the economic theory of vicarious liability, [, discussed above,] because when the employee acts for solely personal reasons, the employer's ability to prevent the tort is limited. Papa Johns Intern. Inc. v. McCoy, 244 S.W.3d 44, 52 (Ky.2008) (internal citations omitted). Negligent hiring and retention claims differ, however, from liability based upon respondeat superior. These claims require that an employer use reasonable care in the selection or retention of its employees. Flor-Shin, 964 S.W.2d at 442. Here, under respondeat superior, the employer is strictly liable for the act, while under the theory of negligent hiring/retention, the employer's liability may only be predicated upon its own negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care in the selection or retention of its employees. Thus, [i]n any case in which [an employer] faces liability for the criminal actions of a third party, the focus [must necessarily be] on whether the criminal activity was foreseeable. Ex parte South Baldwin Regional Medical Center, 785 So.2d 368, 370 (Ala.2000). Thus, absent foreseeability, no duty, the breach of which entails liability, could arise. In this regard, instruction No. 3, as given by the court, provided: It was the duty of Ten Broeck Hospital to exercise that degree of care and skill ordinarily expected of reasonable and prudent hospitals acting under similar circumstances. If you are satisfied from the evidence that the defendant failed to comply with that duty and that such failure on their part was a substantial factor in causing injury to Artemecia Brooks, you will find for the plaintiff, Artemecia Brooks, and proceed to Verdict Form A; otherwise proceed to Instruction No. 4. [18] Ten Broeck Hospital's written personnel policy prohibited its employees from engaging in sexual activity with its patients. Thus, sex with its patients by Ten Broeck's employees, whether forcible or consensual, is necessarily outside the scope of their employment. Nor, can it be said to further Ten Broeck's interest. See Cabrini Medical Center, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (No amount of legal rhetoric can ... explain how a sexual assault furthers a hospital's business as a medical care provider.). Analyzing Instruction No. 3 within the context of the evidence introduced at trial, one discerns that a jury may find Ten Broeck liable solely upon the occurrence of Gilbert's sexual conduct with Brooks. If intended to be applied in this context, the instruction violates the rule of an employers' liability enunciated in Patterson and Papa Johns . If, on the other hand, the breach of the duty imposed upon Ten Broeck under Instruction No. 3, is predicated upon the same factual foundation as Instruction No. 4, i.e., negligent hiring/retention, it is redundant. Moreover, an ordinary care instruction is based solely upon negligence and [t]here is properly speaking, no such thing as negligent assault. City of Louisville v. Yeager, 489 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Ky. 1973) ( citing Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, at 40, 41 (4th ed.1971)); see also State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. van Gorder, 235 Neb. 355, 455 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1990); Martin v. Yeoham, 419 S.W.2d 937, 945 (Mo.App.1967) (Testimony tending to sustain the charge of negligence and carelessness would negative [sic] and disapprove willfulness or intentionality, and proof that the wrongdoing on the part of the defendant was deliberate would exclude negligence.). An assault and battery is not negligence. The former is intentional; the latter is unintentional. Yeager, 489 S.W.2d at 822 ( quoting Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167, 138 S.W.2d 350 (1940)). To instruct in such circumstances on a separate and distinct tort of negligence is not only doctrinally unsound but a potential source of jury confusion. It also raises the risk that even where no [intentional tort is committed], the jury will conclude that some undefined negligence was present for which relief of some sort is justified. District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 707, 708 (D.C.2003). [A] plaintiff cannot seek to recover by `dressing up the substance' of one claim, here assault, in the `garments of another,' here negligence. Id. at 708. In fact, [i]t is well settled that negligence and assault and battery claims are mutually exclusive. Pravda v. City of Albany, N.Y., 956 F.Supp. 174, 183 n. 9 (N.D.N.Y.1997) ( citing United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Tunnel. Inc., 988 F.2d 351, 353 (2d Cir.1993)); see also Armoneit v. Ezell, 59 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo.App. E.D.2001) ([P]roof of a willful act resulting in bodily harm ... will not justify or support jury submission of the case on a hypotheses that the injury for which recovery is sought was a result of an act of negligence.) As said before, [n]egligence claims and assault and battery claims are mutually excusive. 65 C.J.S. Negligence, § 12; but see District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C.1982). Since it is clear beyond question that [Gilbert's] act was beyond the scope of his employment and not in furtherance of [Ten Broeck's] interests, [it] can only be held responsible as master[ ] if it is established that they were negligent in selecting, employing or retaining him. Fleming v. Bronfin, 104 A.2d 407, 408 (D.C.App.1954) citing Ledington v. Williams, 257 Ky. 599, 78 S.W.2d 790 (1935). Consistent with the above, we pointed out in O'Roark v. Gergley, 497 S.W.2d 931 (Ky.1973), the familiar principle that when an employe[sic] steps outside the scope of his duties and indulges in some act of a personal nature his employer will not be held responsible in the absence of reasonable forewarning. Instruction No. 3, as given by the trial court, does not guarantee this requirement. In fact, as previously mentioned, Ten Broeck could have been found liable under this instruction strictly upon Gilbert's conduct being a breach of its standard of care, which prohibited sexual relations with patients absent any forewarning to Ten Broeck of any such propensity. The Instruction was therefore erroneous, and should not be given at retrial. Under Kentucky law, the elements of negligent hiring and retention are: (1) the employer knew or reasonably should have known that an employee was unfit for the job for which he was employed, and (2) the employee's placement or retention at that job created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff. Flor-Shin, 964 S.W.2d at 442. Conversely, in Patterson , we noted: the doctrine of respondeat superior[ ] is not predicated upon a tortuous act of the employer but upon the imputation to the employer of a tortuous act of the employee by considerations of public policy and the necessity for holding a responsible person liable for the acts done by others in the prosecution of his business, as well as for placing on employers an incentive to hire only careful employees. Ordinarily, an employer is not vicariously liable for an intentional tort of an employee not actuated by a purpose to serve the employer but motivated, as here, solely by desire to satisfy the employees own sexual proclivities. Patterson, 172 S.W.3d at 369 citing American Gen. Life & Accident Inc. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Ky.2002) (emphasis in original). The difference being, respondeat superior is based upon the employer/employee relationship and imposes strict liability, whereas claims of negligent hiring/retention focus on the direct negligence of the employer which permitted an otherwise avoidable circumstance to occur. For reasons that Instruction No. 3 violates this rule, it is erroneous.