Opinion ID: 171697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Counties' Fee Waiver Request

Text: We review a FOIA fee waiver decision de novo, and limit our review to the record before the agency. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii). The record contains the initial FOIA request, the agency's response, and any subsequent materials related to the administrative appeal. Forest Guardians, 416 F.3d at 1177. A requester of a FOIA fee waiver has the burden of demonstrating that the statutory conditions are met. Id. Thus, a requester must demonstrate that `disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.' Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)). A fee waiver request is different than a records request, and should be evaluated independently. Id. at 1180 n. 9. The Department of the Interior has established several criteria that must be met for a requester to obtain a fee waiver. 43 C.F.R. pt. 2 app. D; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Entitlement to a fee waiver requires a showing that (1) the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations and activities of the Government, and (2) the request is not primarily in [the requestor's] commercial interest. 43 C.F.R. pt. 2 app. D(a). In determining whether to grant a fee waiver, the BLM considers (1) how the records concern the operations or activities of the government, (2) how the records contribute to the public understanding of government operations and activities, (3) whether release of the documents will contribute significantly to the public understanding (i.e., whether the information requested is new), and (4) whether disclosure is in the requester's commercial interest. 43 C.F.R. pt. 2 app. D(b). The Counties argue that the district court improperly upheld the BLM's denial of their fee waiver request for two reasons. First, they argue that the district court improperly found that the information sought by the Counties from the backup tapes had already been provided to the Counties. Aplee.-Cross-Aplt. Br. 8-9, 16. Second, the Counties argue that, because the Utah State Office did not rely on the unduly burdensome justification as a basis for denying the fee waiver, the district court improperly relied upon this justification. Aplee.-Cross-Aplt. Br. 8-9, 24-25. The Counties further argue that such a justification should be unavailable because agency records must be maintained in such a manner as to be readily reproducible. Aplee.-Cross-Aplt. Br. 25. Prior to the fee waiver denial, the Counties filed several FOIA requests with the BLM. The BLM ultimately responded. See Aplee.-Cross-Aplt. Br. 3-6; Aplt.-Cross-Aplee. Br. 4-5. The Counties complain that, at the time of the fee waiver denial, the BLM had not yet responded appropriately to their requests and that those responses did not adequately set out what was provided. They argue that the BLM itself made a distinction between what it had previously provided and remaining e-mails, suggesting that older e-mails related to their inquiry do in fact exist. See Aplee. Supp.App. 120-21. According to the Counties, the BLM granted fee waiver requests with respect to the former, but not the latter, and for no apparent reason. These arguments are unavailing. The record suggests that the BLM did provide some responsive information without challenge, Aplee. Supp.App. 158, and that the National Monument office was willing to provide these records for e-mail currently residing on staff computers or any printed copies of e-mail that may be in our files, Aplee. Supp.App. 142. The National Monument office then directed the Counties to the Utah State Office for the potential recovery of older e-mail records not maintained on site. Aplee. Supp.App. 142. The fee waiver denial indicates that [c]opies of some of the e-mails responsive to your request have previously been printed and are included with the documents you have requested from the [National Monument]. Aplee. Supp. App. 120. While it is true that the fee waiver denial speaks of remaining e-mails, that does not mean that relevant e-mails that would meet the fee waiver standard existwithout performing the search of the backup tapes, it is impossible to know whether such records exist. We know of no requirement that requires the BLM in denying a fee waiver request to catalogue the e-mails already produced. To the extent that the BLM did not provide those e-mails in a manner acceptable to the Countiesand there seems to be some difference of opinion on that point, see Aplee.-Cross-Aplt. Reply Br. 3the Counties apparently do not challenge this lack of production on appeal, and we see no reason why the district court could not rely upon the statements in the record suggesting that some e-mails had been produced or access to the e-mails had been granted. Finally, there is an obvious and critical difference between granting a fee waiver with respect to printed records (or those available on existing databases) and denying one regarding a request to search 610 backup tapes with no indication that such records may exist. The BLM is required to print and store hard copies of all documents that meet the definition of a record, including e-mails. Memorandum from the Department's Chief Information Officer (Sept. 10, 1999) (http://www.doi.gov/ocio/records/news/ emailguidrev2.htm) [hereinafter CIO Memo]. We assume that the BLM complied with all procedures required of it in its maintenance of records. See Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1238-40 (Fed.Cir.2002) (good faith). The Counties argue that this policy raises troubling issues because employees can delete electronic records from their computers as long as they have filed a paper copy of the records in their official recordkeeping system. CIO Memo (emphasis omitted). According to the Counties, this suggests that employees can elect not to print records, opting instead merely to rely upon a backup system. This strained interpretation is belied by the balance of the memo, which clearly requires employees to manage their e-mail and print out records. With respect to the burden the Counties' request entails, the government argues that we may look to the affidavit of a BLM employee, Stewart Nelson, regarding the technical aspects and costs involved in searching backup e-mails. Aplt.-Cross-Aplee. Reply Br. 27-29. The government claims that the affidavit merely explains why the search would be time consuming and cost prohibitive as claimed by the agency. The affidavit certainly supports the district court's conclusion that the costs and resources required were exorbitant in relation to the speculative nature of the whole endeavor. Regardless, the district court declined to rely upon the affidavit because the Counties objected and it was not part of the agency record. The affidavit was not contained in the administrative record or the agency's denial, and therefore we decline to rely upon it here. See Forest Guardians, 416 F.3d at 1177. That said, the district court was correct in upholding the denial of the fee waiver because the underlying search would be unduly burdensome given the speculative nature of the records requested. Although the Counties argue that the BLM did not rely upon this ground, only the most myopic reading of the record yields that conclusion: the BLM initially stated that [s]earching backup e-mail tapes is extremely time consuming and cost prohibitive, Aplee. Supp.App. 137, then provided a revised cost estimate of $280,430.70 for such a search of more than 600 backup tapes, Aplee. Supp.App. 126. We have no doubt that the Counties were on notice that the agency was claiming an undue burden from the outset. The argument that the BLM should be responsible for the fees because it did not maintain its records in readily reproducible form ignores the fact that the backup tapes simply are not the official means by which the BLM complies with FOIA requirements, see CIO Memo, and that searches for electronic records are not required when they would significantly interfere with an agency's automated information system, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(C); 43 C.F.R. § 2.21(a). As the Counties explain, the data on backup tapes is not organized for retrieval of individual documents or files, but rather for purposes of disaster recovery. Aplee.-Cross-Aplt. Br. 29-30. In its opinion, the district court found that the BLM, through its prior disclosures to the Counties, likely produced all the relevant e-mail communications, and thus any records maintained on the backup tapes would not contribute significantly to public understanding. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Kane County, 2007 WL 2156613, at ,  (citing 43 C.F.R. pt. 2 app. D(b)(3)). Further, the district court found that the fee waiver request was based upon mere speculation that a search through the backup tapes by the BLM would yield new material that is meaningfully informative. Id. at . Even with liberal construction of the fee waiver provision for noncommercial requestors, plaintiffs must still satisfy the statutory standard that the disclosure contributes to the public's understanding of the operations and activities of the BLM on this issue. See Forest Guardians, 416 F.3d at 1177-78. The Counties have not demonstrated that the backup tapes might reveal additional or different information than that provided or promised by the BLM. Thus, we cannot determine how such information would contribute significantly to public understanding, and the fee waiver request was properly denied. The Counties can still proceed, but they must pay for the search of the more than 600 backup tapes.