Opinion ID: 1811971
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relationship factor.

Text: [T]he purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish the wrongdoer and to deter the wrongdoer ... from committing similar wrongs in the future. Green Oil, 539 So.2d at 222 (emphasis added). Society's goal is to deter not to destroy the wrongdoer. Id. To effectuate that purpose, a punitive-damages award `ought to sting in order to deter.' Id. (quoting Ridout's-Brown Serv., Inc. v. Holloway, 397 So.2d 125, 127 (Ala.1981) (Jones, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added)). A party does not have a right to a Hammond hearing on the question of the adequacy of punitive damages. Ex parte Weyerhaeuser Co., 702 So.2d 1227, 1229 (Ala.1996) (emphasis added). In regard to punitive damages, the purpose of the Hammond hearing [at which the Green Oil factors are considered] is to protect a defendant against due process violations arising from an award of excessive damages. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, where a jury has awarded punitive damages, a trial court may not, consistent with the right to a trial by a jury as guaranteed by Ala. Const.1901, § 11, order an additur of punitive damages under any, or any combination, of the Green Oil factors. Bozeman v. Busby, 639 So.2d 501, 502 (Ala.1994). In that connection, Vulcan states: If a defendant has conceded that its financial position provides no basis for remittitur, then further discovery directed to that factor is pointless because a court's analysis of the factor will not change in any way based upon the relative wealth of the defendant. ... [W]hen presented with such a concession, there is simply nothing more for the court to consider. Reply brief, at 7-8 (emphasis added). We agree. Because the Green Oil factors are considered for the benefit of defendants, a defendant may waive the benefit of one or more of the factors. In fact, our cases have held that a defendant's failure to produce evidence of its net worth effectively negates the benefit to the defendant of the relationship factor. In other words, a defendant cannot argue as a basis for reducing the punitive-damages award that the award stings too much, in the absence of evidence of the defendant's financial status. See Shiv-Ram, 892 So.2d at 319 (defendant's concession that it was insured, coupled with the absence of evidence that payment of the damages awarded [would] cause it any undue financial hardship.... weigh[ed] against a finding of excessiveness); Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas, 731 So.2d 1204, 1220 (Ala. 1999) (where the defendant produced no evidence of its net worth or evidence showing that the verdict [would] affect its future insurability, the relationship factor would not benefit the defendant); Employees' Benefit Ass'n v. Grissett, 732 So.2d 968, 981 (Ala.1998) (where the defendant stipulated that it would not be crippled financially if it had to pay the punitive damages award, the relationship factor was of no benefit). Moreover, it has, indeed, been heldcorrectly, in our viewthat a defendant may avoid extensive inquiry into its financial affairs simply by stipulating to its net worth, Sprague v. Walter, 441 Pa.Super. 1, 62, 656 A.2d 890, 920 (1995) (it is a sound defense strategy to prevent freewheeling financial discovery by stipulating to a specific net worth), or to its ability to satisfy a punitive-damages award. Cobb v. Superior Ct. of California, 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 551, 160 Cal.Rptr. 561, 566-67 (1979) (inquiry into the effect of a verdict awarding punitive damages can often be satisfied by a simple request for a stipulation). Here, by expressly conceding that its financial position does not warrant reduction of the punitive award, Petition, at 7, Vulcan has disclaimed reliance on the relationship factor as a reason for remitting the punitive-damages award. That disclaimer requires the trial court to weigh the relationship factor against a remittitur. Consequently, financial discovery as to that factor is unnecessary and irrelevant.