Opinion ID: 1966073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Suppress the Statement to Detective Vazquez

Text: Mr. Bido's final argument on appeal alleges that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress the statement he made to Det. Vazquez on July 2, 1991. Mr. Bido moved to suppress the statement before trial, and the court held a voir dire midtrial when Det. Vazquez arrived to testify. Detective Vazquez retired from the New York City Police Department in 2000. During the voir dire, Det. Vazquez testified that he arrested defendant in July 1991. Detective Vazquez explained that Mr. Bido began talking while they were driving back to the police station in a police car after the arrest. Mr. Bido said, I know what this is about. This is about Rhode Island. I'll tell you whatever you want to know. We'll talk about that. Detective Vazquez responded, Let's not talk about it now. I'm not in a position to write. I'm driving. We have time. We'll get back. That's what we're going to talk about and we'll do it in a couple of minutes. When they arrived at the police station, Det. Vazquez placed defendant in an interrogation room. Detective Vazquez testified that he read Mr. Bido his Miranda warnings before they spoke about the incident in Rhode Island. Detective Vazquez, who is fluent in Spanish, used a printed Miranda warning interrogation card and read defendant the Miranda warnings in Spanish. Detective Vazquez testified that he read the Miranda warnings verbatim from the interrogation card and that he read each Miranda question individually, after which he said to defendant, Do you understand? or Answer yes or no to each and every question. According to Det. Vazquez, Mr. Bido answered yes after each individual Miranda warning. Detective Vazquez also directed defendant to write yes or no on the interrogation card after he read each warning, after which Mr. Bido wrote yes for each question in Spanish. Detective Vazquez described defendant as calm during the interrogation, and he testified that defendant never asked for an attorney. After Mr. Bido waived his Miranda rights, Det. Vazquez said, You want to talk to me about the Rhode Island case? This is about the Rhode Island case. Tell me what you wanted to tell me back at the scene. Mr. Bido then began to speak to Det. Vazquez. Detective Vazquez took notes relating to defendant's statement, but he was unable to find them before testifying at Mr. Bido's trial. Detective Vazquez explained that he searched for his notes for five hours at his old New York City homicide office on the Monday before trial, but that his search was unsuccessful. Detective Vazquez theorized that the notes might have been lost when his office moved in the early 1990s and that, since Mr. Bido's crime was committed in Rhode Island, not New York, it probably did not have a New York case number. He also was unable to find the Miranda interrogation form he used, which contained defendant's signed responses, because he turn[ed] that over to the detectives in Rhode Island. I'm almost sure of it. In any event, Det. Vazquez testified that he vividly    remember[ed] this particular case, because it was the first and only contact I had in my 20-year career with anything to do with Rhode Island. During the voir dire, Det. Vazquez testified that he refreshed his recollection of Mr. Bido's statements by reviewing a summary by Det. J.J. Corley of the Providence police, which was made when Det. Vazquez relayed the substance of Mr. Bido's statements to Det. Corley on the evening after the arrest. At the conclusion of the voir dire, the trial justice ruled that defendant gave a voluntary statement during his interrogation in New York. The court found that the arrest was an orderly stop and that defendant showed an early indication that he wanted to speak, even before he was advised of his rights, when he spontaneously said in the police car that I know what this is about. This is about Rhode Island. The trial justice found that Det. Vazquez read defendant the Miranda rights in Spanish, his native language, and that defendant understood each right, after which he began to talk. The trial justice also acknowledged that Mr. Bido did not request an attorney and that he remained calm at all times and appeared cooperative. The court further found that Det. Vazquez could not find his notes because it was a Rhode Island case. However, the trial justice said that the notes from the Providence police were adequate to refresh Det. Vazquez's recollection, and that he had a vivid memory of the arrest because of its uniqueness in his professional career. The court concluded that Mr. Bido's statement was voluntarily made and the State has established this by clear and convincing evidence. Before this Court, Mr. Bido argues that the state failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he knowingly `and intelligently waived his constitutional rights and made a voluntary statement to Det. Vazquez. Mr. Bido alleges that the state did not produce a signed Miranda rights form or a signed statement and that the state provided no explanation for why these documents were not produced by the Providence police. Mr. Bido also argues that Det. Vazquez had no independent memory of the substance of his alleged statement and that he was able to testify only after reading Providence Det. Corley's report about the encounter. Finally, defendant claims that there was no evidence to suggest that he had previous experience with the criminal justice system or that he possessed sufficient intellectual capabilities to understand his rights and make a valid decision to waive them. Both the Rhode Island and the United States Constitutions bar the use of a defendant's involuntary statements in a criminal trial. State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1274 (R.I.1998). When deciding a motion to suppress, a trial justice can admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona. State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420, 423 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Nardolillo, 698 A.2d 195, 200 (R.I.1997)). On appeal, this Court performs a two-step analysis to review a trial justice's decision on a motion to suppress a statement that is alleged to be involuntary. Perez, 882 A.2d at 588. The first step is to `review the trial justice's findings regarding the historical facts relevant to the voluntariness of the challenged confession.' Id. (quoting Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273). This Court will not overturn a trial justice's findings of historical fact relevant to the voluntariness of a confession unless such findings are clearly erroneous. Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273 (citing State v. Bailey, 677 A.2d 407, 410 (R.I. 1996)). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Perez, 882 A.2d at 588 (quoting State v. LaRosa, 112 R.I. 571, 576, 313 A.2d 375, 377 (1974)). We are mindful that the trier of fact, which in this case was the trial justice, is in the best position to assess the relative credibility of witnesses. See Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273. The second step of the analysis, assuming we accept the trial justice's findings of historical fact, requires this Court to apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice's determination of the voluntariness of the statement. See Perez, 882 A.2d at 588. A defendant's statement is voluntary when it is the product of his free and rational choice.' Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274 (quoting State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I.1981)). A statement is involuntary if it is extracted from the defendant by coercion or improper inducement, including threats, violence, or any undue influence that overcomes the free will of the defendant. Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274 (citing State v. Griffith, 612 A.2d 21, 25 (R.I.1992)). In deciding whether a statement is voluntary, this Court considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged statement. State v. Ramsey, 844 A.2d 715, 720 (R.I.2004) (quoting State v. Carter, 744 A.2d 839, 845 (R.1.2000)). The factors this Court may consider are the background, experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the level of a suspect's educational attainments. Ramsey, 844 A.2d at 720. After carefully reviewing the record and keeping in mind that this Court gives deference to the trial justice's findings of historical fact, we cannot say that the trial justice's findings clearly were erroneous. Detective Vazquez was the only witness during the voir dire. Later in the trial proceeding, the trial justice remarked, if there ever were to be a model to use for police officers    one could look to retired Detective Vazquez as an example of how it's supposed to be done. See Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273 (upholding a trial justice's findings of historical fact that seem[ed] firmly grounded on the credible and consistent testimony of police officers involved in the capture, arrest, and interrogation of the defendant). The trial justice was in the best position to assess Det. Vazquez's credibility, and defendant put forth no evidence that contradicted Det. Vazquez's account of the circumstances that preceded defendant's statement. Although we are troubled by the state's inability to produce defendant's signed Miranda form, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Perez, 882 A.2d at 588 (quoting LaRosa, 112 R.I. at 576, 313 A.2d at 377). Accordingly, we accept the trial justice's findings of historical fact and proceed to review his determination of the voluntariness of Mr. Bido's statement de novo. Considering the totality of the circumstances, and applying the findings of historical fact, we conclude that the defendant's statement was voluntary. He `was properly informed of his Miranda rights in his native language, and he signed a waiver form that indicated each right was waived. See Ramsey, 844 A.2d at 720; Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274. There was no evidence that Mr. Bido was subjected to coercion or that he was intimidated in any way. See Ramsey, 844 A.2d at 720. To the contrary, the defendant appeared calm during the interview, and he spoke spontaneously even before Det. Vazquez administered the Miranda warnings. Detective Vazquez even went so far as to warn the defendant not to speak until they arrived at the police station. Further, during the suppression hearing, Mr. Bido put forth no evidence that would have allowed the trial justice to make findings of historical fact about his background, experience, or educational attainment that might have tipped the totality of the circumstances in his favor. In sum, we agree with the trial justice that the defendant's statement was voluntary and was not the product of his overborne free will.