Opinion ID: 362223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: legality of the electronic surveillance orders

Text: 8 There were three separate orders of the district court authorizing the challenged electronic interception of loan shark related conversations: that relating to conversations of John Cifarelli, Robert 'Bob' Ebeling, and others as yet unknown conducted over the target phone, which was the telephone at the office of Dade Office Supply Company; the order extending the authorization for an additional 20 day period; and that authorizing electronic interception of similar conversations for the same 20 day period on the telephone, 822-8030, at Ebeling's home.
9 One of the requirements for the issuance of a wiretap authorization is that the evidence presented to the judge must enable him to determine on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a). The appellants contend that no probable cause was set forth in the affidavit of the FBI agent presented to the trial judge. This contention borders on the frivolous. The trial judge's order authorizing the interception was supported by a lengthy affidavit by FBI Agent Styles. The affidavit in turn was based on statements made by Melnick, the alleged victim of the offense; by a business partner whose separate statement corroborated much of the information supplied by Melnick; and admissions by Cifarelli which were also corroborative of many of the details necessary to support the order. Statements from two confidential informers further bolstered the Styles affidavit, as did an intercepted conversation between Melnick and Ebeling, resulting from a consensual body tape recording placed on Melnick. This conversation disclosed extensive participation by the appellant in loansharking activities, the details of which closely corresponded to the information supplied by the other persons. The affidavit also contained FBI investigatory and surveillance information regarding appellants and identification of the place of business which, according to telephone records, had only one telephone listed, bearing the number 305-822-5172. We thus do not have an affidavit based Solely on information provided by an unidentified informer as to which the Supreme Court has carefully delineated standards for determining the informer's reliability in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 10 Melnick is not an unidentified informer. He is the alleged victim who, under criminal sanctions, See 18 U.S.C. § 1001, gave a statement to the FBI. In United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1972), we stated as to the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements: (W)e have discovered no case that extends this requirement to the identified bystander or victim-eyewitness to a crime, and we now hold that no such requirement need be met. 11 Moreover, as already indicated, there was ample other independent support for the affidavit, part of which included statements made by one of the accused himself. 12 The second wiretap authorization, for an additional 20 days, was equally well supported by the showing that wiretap information received under the outstanding authorization showed the existence of a conspiracy involving certain identified individuals, and also revealed what appeared from the wiretaps to be a larger organization involving others who were not yet identified, which information might be available during the extended period. 13 Finally, we find Ebeling's challenge of the authorization to tap his residence phone number 822-8030 is unavailing. In his attack on this order, Ebeling does not seriously challenge the fact that there was an adequate showing by the affidavit that loansharking activities were being carried on from at least one of the two telephones in Ebeling's home. The gist of his claim here is that there was not sufficient information supplied in the affidavit as to the actual use of the particular phone that was actually tapped. We do not reach the question whether, when an affidavit in support of an authorization order clearly demonstrates that in a residence having two telephones there is active and frequent use of one of the telephones for the carrying out of the illegal act, it is necessary for the affidavit to identify which of the two instruments has been used. We conclude that there was sufficient information in the affidavit to identify the phone number 822-8030 for the purpose of the order. 14
15 Title 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) requires that an application for a wiretap order include, a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 16 This court has interpreted section 2518(1)(c) in United States v. McCoy, 539 F.2d 1050, 1055-1056 (5th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied 431 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 2185, 53 L.Ed.2d 230 (1977). There, we said: 17 We observed in United States v. Robertson, 5 Cir. 1974, 504 F.2d 289, Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913, 95 S.Ct. 1568, 43 L.Ed.2d 778, that the statutory requirement 'must be read in a common sense fashion.' Accord, United States v. Cacace, 5 Cir. 1976, 529 F.2d 1167; United States v. Armocida, 3 Cir. 1975, 515 F.2d 29, 37, Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858, 96 S.Ct. 111, 46 L.Ed.2d 84; 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2190 (S.Rep.1097, section-by-section analysis of statute). Common sense dictates that the purpose of the statute 'is not to foreclose electronic surveillance until every other imaginable method of investigation had been unsuccessfully attempted, but simply to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques.' United States v. Pacheco, 5 Cir. 1974, 489 F.2d 554, 566, See United States v. Smith, 9 Cir. 1975, 519 F.2d 516, 518. In order to uphold the wiretap order, all that need be found in the affidavit is a 'factual predicate.' Armocida, 515 F.2d at 38. 18 539 F.2d at 1055. 19 The affidavit upon which the trial judge issued the authorization in this case is a more adequate factual predicate for the judge's finding that other investigative procedures . . . appear unlikely to succeed than the affidavit reported in McCoy, supra. We consider it entirely adequate, and therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the results from the interceptions.