Opinion ID: 4584805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balancing the Interests

Text: The plaintiff next argues that, “even if it were appropriate for the trial court to consider factors in addition to the maintenance burden on the Town,” the benefits to the Town that would result from the discontinuance of McMillan Lane do not outweigh the plaintiff’s interest in its continuance. The plaintiff contends that, because the new road will remain privately owned and maintained by Settlers, the discontinuance of McMillan Lane as a public road deprives the plaintiff and its employees, guests, and other invitees of the “unfettered legal right to access [its] property” from Route 302 “by a legally protected public way.” Because the Town has no legal obligation to maintain and provide public access to a private road, the plaintiff argues that it will have no recourse if Settlers or its successors do not maintain or otherwise deny access to the road due to the “fail[ure] to act cooperatively and in good faith” or due to financial failure. The plaintiff contends that, in disregarding the plaintiff’s concerns about future access as “too uncertain to outweigh Conway’s interests,” the trial court erroneously overlooked the legal distinction between a public road and a private road open for public use and the potential negative consequences that may flow from the new road’s private status. 1 Such a limited scope of review is also contrary to the balancing test that applies to appeals of a town’s decision to lay out a public highway, see Rodgers Dev. Co., 147 N.H. at 59-60, upon which we relied, in part, in Town of Hinsdale to determine the proper balancing test, see Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 74. 8 Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision in a discontinuance appeal is deferential. See Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 74. We will uphold the trial court’s decision in a discontinuance appeal if it is “supported by some evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). We will not disturb its determination in the absence of gross mistake or fraud. Id. The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate that its interests outweigh those of the Town. See id. We find the plaintiff’s argument to be unavailing. As an initial matter, evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Settlers will not cease maintaining the new road or close it to the public. Historically, Settlers has not failed to maintain and provide public access to Settlers’ Green Drive or the private portion of Common Court, and, once the Town voted to discontinue McMillan Lane, Settlers has kept it open to the public and has consistently maintained it. Indeed, it is in Settlers’ interest to continue to maintain all of its private roads that provide access to Settlers’ Green, including the new road, which will abut and provide public access to the businesses within the retail village. As the principal of Settlers testified, Settlers believes that the new road is “paramount” to ensure public access to the development, and that, even if the proposed grocery store failed, Settlers “would still maintain that road just like” it maintains Settlers’ Green Drive. Additionally, Settlers’ principal understood the planning board’s site plan approval to require Settlers to keep the new road open to the public, and that, if Settlers failed to do so, the planning board could revoke its approval. Thus, not only does the evidence demonstrate that the plaintiff currently has access to the now-privately owned McMillan Lane, it shows that this access will continue given Settlers’ significant business and legal interests in continuing to keep the new road open to the public and maintained. Furthermore, although the plaintiff contends that it has no legal recourse to ensure its access to the new road, the evidence in the record suggests otherwise. First, although the plaintiff complains that it has not been granted an easement over the new road, the principal of Settlors provided undisputed testimony that the plaintiff has never requested an easement, and that, if it did, Settlers would “be happy to” provide it with one. Second, the trial court heard testimony from the Town’s planning director that the planning board’s conditional approval required Settlers to open the new road to the public prior to closing McMillan Lane. He further testified that, “if there is a violation” of a requirement set forth in the planning board’s approval, “anybody can bring that [violation] to the attention of the Town,” which can then “take action on it” by revoking the certificate of occupancy, obtaining injunctive relief, or imposing fines. See RSA 676:4-a, I(c) (Supp. 2019), :15 (2016), :17 (2016). The plaintiff makes no contention that these remedies are unavailable to it should Settlers fail to maintain or provide access to the new road. Finally, even if Settlers or its successors failed to maintain or provide access to the new road — whether due to intentional malfeasance or 9 circumstances beyond its control — the plaintiff fails to identify any evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff would suffer harm as a result. According to the record, hotel guests can continue to access the hotel from Settlers’ Green Drive over which the plaintiff holds an easement, and which, unlike McMillan Lane, connects directly to Route 302 and includes signs for the hotel. According to the testimony of the plaintiff’s principal, Settlers’ Green Drive, which he described as the hotel’s “main entrance,” is the primary way in which guests access the hotel. Hotel guests can also access the hotel from NorthSouth Road by using Fairway Lane, a public road, where a sign for the hotel also appears. The plaintiff does not contend, and the record fails to demonstrate, that these two ways would not provide sufficient access to the hotel should public access to the new road somehow become restricted. Thus, based upon the record, it was reasonable for the trial court to give less weight to the plaintiff’s concerns over future access when balancing the interests of the parties. The plaintiff further asserts that, in weighing the interests in favor of the Town, the trial court considered factors that are not supported by the record. First, it argues that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that the new development would provide additional residential housing to the area. However, even if we accept the plaintiff’s argument and cast aside any consideration of the addition of residential housing or the other indirect economic benefits that may flow from the private development, there is still some evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision, such as the public benefits gained by the Town by virtue of: (1) the reduction in yearly maintenance costs; and (2) the use of a new road, at no cost to the public, to replace McMillan Lane — an approximately $1 million project, according to undisputed testimony. See Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 74. According to the record, Settlers and the Town agreed that the road would be built to current standards and would include sidewalks, bike paths, and a 10-foot grass esplanade, providing a significant upgrade from McMillan Lane, an older road originally constructed in 1992. The cost-free construction of this new road with additional amenities and the elimination of the Town’s yearly maintenance obligations support the trial court’s conclusion that the benefits to the Town of discontinuing McMillan Lane outweigh the plaintiff’s interests in continuing the road. Accordingly, even if unsupported by the record, the trial court’s consideration of residential housing did not constitute “gross mistake or fraud” in light of the other evidence in the record that supports its decision. See Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 74. Second, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously found that the new road would revert to the Town when it stated that the road would be “dedicated to public use.” The plaintiff contends that this statement is a “faulty finding of fact and of law” that is not supported by the record. As a legal matter, the dedication of land for public use occurs when an owner devotes “land to a public use,” which, if accepted by the town, “turns the street 10 into a public highway, and thereby renders the accepting . . . town liable for its construction and maintenance.” Hersh v. Plonski, 156 N.H. 511, 515 (2007) (quotations omitted). Despite the trial court’s use of this phrase, the trial court’s findings and rulings demonstrate that it found that Settlers, not the Town, would be responsible for operating and maintaining the new road upon its completion. Specifically, in weighing the potential harm to the plaintiff against the benefits to the Town, the trial court found “no evidence . . . to suggest that Settlers or its successors will cease to maintain . . . [the new road] once it is built.” The trial court also considered the amount of yearly maintenance costs that the discontinuance would save the Town. Thus, the trial court’s order demonstrates that its use of the phrase “dedicated to public use” did not constitute a finding that Settlers would legally dedicate the new road to the Town, but instead, that it would construct and maintain the new road for public use.