Opinion ID: 1244797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The New Jersey Tests

Text: In the adoption of tests to determine when property interests must accommodate the exercise of constitutional rights by persons invited on private property, the New Jersey court proceeded from the same premise as stated in Marsh v. Alabama, supra (that the more the owner of private property opens the property for public use, the more the owner's rights are limited by the constitutional rights of those who use it, 423 A.2d at 629), as did this court in Whiffen II, supra. The New Jersey court then held that: Since it is our State Constitution which we are here expounding, it is also fitting that we look to our own strong traditions which prize the exercise of individual rights and stress the societal obligations that are concomitant to a public enjoyment of private property. See Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass'n, supra, 83 N.J. [86] at 100-101, 415 A.2d 1156 (1980); State v. Shack, supra, 58 N.J. [297] at 305-308, 277 A.2d 369 (1971); Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, supra, 129 N.J.Super. [379] at 386-387, 324 A.2d 35 (1974). Accordingly, we now hold that under the State Constitution, the test to be applied to ascertain the parameters of the rights of speech and assembly upon privately-owned property and the extent to which such property reasonably can be restricted to accommodate these rights involves several elements. This standard must take into account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its `normal' use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the property. This is a multi-faceted test which must be applied to ascertain whether in a given case owners of private property may be required to permit, subject to suitable restrictions, the reasonable exercise by individuals of the constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly. State v. Schmid, supra, 423 A.2d at 629-30. In this case, the primary and normal use of this property is as a large retail one-stop shopping center store, selling a wide assortment of goods. The extent and nature of the public's invitation is to come upon that property and into that store to purchase goods there offered for sale, and the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken on such property is the solicitation of signatures on initiative petitions, a constitutionally-protected activity. Upon consideration and application of the New Jersey test to the evidence in this case, I would find that the sidewalk of this Fred Meyer store is a place where constitutional rights to gather signatures on initiative petitions may be exercised. Further, I would find that the gathering of such signatures on the sidewalk near the entrance to this Fred Meyer one-stop shopping center would not substantially interfere with its operation and that the rule adopted by Fred Meyer absolutely barring the solicitation of signatures on initiative petitions on any part of its property was not a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. There is no evidence of interference. The conduct of this defendant in seeking signatures on initiative petitions while standing on the sidewalk near, but not blocking, an entrance to this Fred Meyer store did not interfere in any substantial way with the business of the store. In Whiffen I, supra, 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d 1294, this court held that [t]he solicitation of patrons does not in and of itself constitute substantial interference. In Whiffen II, supra, this court held, in effect, that the rules adopted by the Lloyd Center may restrict initiative signature gathering only to the extent that such activity substantially interferes with its commercial enterprise. It follows, in my opinion, that upon application of the New Jersey tests defendant had the right under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution to seek signatures on initiative petitions while standing on the sidewalk near the entrance to this Fred Meyer store. For the same reasons, it is my opinion that the direction given to defendant to leave the Fred Meyer property was not a lawful direction under ORS 164.205(3)(b), because it violated his constitutional rights under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. This is not the first case in which a state court has permitted the exercise of a constitutionally protected right on a privately-owned sidewalk of a large retail store. In Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, supra, 153 Cal.Rptr. at 859, 592 P.2d at 346, the California Supreme Court quoted with approval the following statement by it in its previous decision in In re Lane, 71 Cal.2d 872, 79 Cal.Rptr. 729, 733, 457 P.2d 561, 565 (1969), in which that court held, with reference to a privately-owned sidewalk outside a large grocery store: Certainly, this sidewalk is not private in the sense of not being open to the public. The public is openly invited to use it in gaining access to the store and in leaving the premises. Thus, in our view it is a public area in which members of the public may exercise First Amendment rights. (Emphasis added.) I agree with the statement of that principle and believe that it is applicable to rights under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution to gather signatures on initiative petitions. [2] II. ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 FREEDOM OF SPEECH Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution provides as follows: No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.  (Emphasis added.) Courts in other states have considered the application of similar provisions of the constitutions of such states.