Opinion ID: 1316068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sparks' section 3604(b) claim

Text: ¶ 51 There are two methods a plaintiff may use to establish a disparate treatment discrimination claim under section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act: directly, using either direct or circumstantial evidence, or indirectly, utilizing the inferential burden method outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Kormoczy v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 53 F.3d 821, 823-24 (7th Cir.1995). Direct evidence is evidence which can be interpreted as acknowledging the defendant's discriminatory intent. See id. at 824. Where direct evidence is used to show that a housing decision was made in violation of the [FHA], the burden shifting analysis is inapposite. Id. As the United States Supreme Court stated in a Title VII case, [W]hether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (emphasis added), quoted in Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1500-01 (10th Cir.1995). International Union continues, [T]he absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Id. Specifically with regard to housing discrimination, a plaintiff need not prove the malice or discriminatory animus of a defendant to make out a case of intentional discrimination where the defendant expressly treats someone protected by the FHA[] in a different manner than others. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501 (citation omitted). ¶ 52 The seven-day notice says that Sparks must cure the alleged violation that gave rise to the notice by removing every body [sic] except for you & your 2 daughters. The notice could not be more clear. The notice constitutes direct or circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer that Malibu intended to evict Sparks because of the presence of her grandchild. Analogizing to the statutory interpretation context, omissions are significant and should therefore be taken note of and given effect. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217, 219 (1973). The burden now shifts to Malibu to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible factor. Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 824. [3] ¶ 53 The majority states that Malibu has asserted multiple valid, good-faith justifications for Sparks' eviction, and absent a showing of pretext, the alleged discrimination by Malibu in the seven-day notice is immaterial. This is incorrect for two reasons: first, Sparks has offered convincing evidence of direct discrimination and, second, even if one were using a McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis, Sparks has countered Malibu's good-faith justifications with testimony that contradicts their assertions regarding her numerous and/or unregistered guests. Summary judgment cannot be granted with regard to the seven-day notice because both Malibu's intent and the underlying violations are disputed. ¶ 54 The majority relies on several admittedly still uncured maintenance violations listed in the seven-day notice as dispositive of whether summary judgment was properly granted on Malibu's eviction claim. In my view, Malibu should be estopped from arguing that the cure period of seven days has run; thus, Sparks is not yet in violation of the notice. Requiring Sparks to cure the maintenance violations before litigating whether the notice constitutes illegal discrimination would place before her a Hobson's choice of spending her scarce resources to cure the maintenance violations with the possibility that she would have to move anyway if the seven-day notice were found to be nondiscriminatory. Sparks has sworn that she makes approximately $5.80 per hour sewing piecework and that she could not spend the money curing the maintenance violations before she knew the outcome of the lawsuit. If the landlord had not illegally discriminated against her grandchild, Sparks would have been able to cure the maintenance violations. Therefore, the landlord's illegal action is the reason that she is in violation of the notice. ¶ 55 The majority relies on Crescentwood Village, Inc. v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 1267 (Utah Ct.App.1995), to uphold the landlord's position that Sparks' eviction is legal. The instant case, however, is clearly distinguishable from Crescentwood. In Crescentwood, the landlord served a notice similar to the ones served on Sparks, to the effect that future violations of these rules would result in eviction without a further opportunity to cure. See id. at 1268. In Crescentwood, the tenant cured all of the violations, and later committed new violations. See id. Here, Sparks is still on round number one in that she has not had a chance to cure her violations while not also under the threat of having to leave her home because her grandchild cannot stay. Surely, under these circumstances, Sparks should not be bound by the Crescentwood standard. It permits the landlord to both create the circumstances of an illegal eviction and get away with it.