Opinion ID: 2632568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Attorney Fees Provision-Arbitration

Text: The arbitration agreement also provides that [t]he prevailing party in any arbitration may be entitled to receive reasonable attorney's fees. CP at 36 (emphasis added). Zuver argues that this provision is substantively unconscionable because it would dissuade individuals who have endured discrimination from pursuing their claims because an arbitrator might make them pay the employer's attorney fees if they failed to prevail. Zuver further asserts that in the event she does prevail, the arbitrator is not obligated to award her attorney fees as would be required under RCW 49.60.030(2). [8] Airtouch, however, argues that this court cannot assume that the arbitrator would fail to abide by RCW 49.60.030(2), and that nothing in the Arbitration Agreement reduces Zuver's right to recover attorney's fees if she were to prevail on the merits. Br. of Resp't at 26. In instances such as this, where parties dispute the potential but unknown effect of a particular provision in an arbitration agreement, the United States Supreme Court's decision in PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 123 S.Ct. 1531, 155 L.Ed.2d 578 (2003), provides guidance. There the Court considered an arbitration agreement which stated `[t]he arbitrators ... shall have no authority to award any ... punitive or exemplary damages.' Id. at 405, 123 S.Ct. 1531 (quoting App. 212). But the party opposing arbitration, Book, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which provides for treble damage awards. Id. at 406, 123 S.Ct. 1531. Book argued that the arbitration agreement's prohibition on punitive damages would effectively deny him the relief he was entitled to under RICO, i.e., treble damages. Id. at 404, 123 S.Ct. 1531. The Court, however, noted that it had construed RICO's treble damages to be both punitive and remedial in nature. Id. at 406, 123 S.Ct. 1531. Consequently, it reasoned that: [W]e should not, on the basis of mere speculation that an arbitrator might interpret these ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts their enforceability into doubt, take upon ourselves the authority to decide the antecedent question of how the ambiguity is to be resolved. In short, since we do not know how the arbitrator will construe the remedial limitations, the questions whether they render the parties' agreements unenforceable and whether it is for courts or arbitrators to decide enforceability in the first instance are unusually abstract. Id. at 406-07, 123 S.Ct. 1531 (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541, 115 S.Ct. 2322, 132 L.Ed.2d 462 (1995)). Thus, the Court compelled arbitration. Id. Similar to the punitive damages provision in PacifiCare, the effect of the attorney fees provision in Zuver's and Airtouch's agreement is, at this point, purely speculative. The provision does not use the directive shall but rather, uses the permissive word may. CP at 36. Thus, Zuver merely speculates that an arbitrator might construe this provision to deny her attorney fees if she prevails on her discrimination claim. See PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406-07, 123 S.Ct. 1531. Likewise, it is mere speculation to assume that the arbitrator would disregard case law holding that a prevailing defendant may receive attorney fees only if a plaintiff's discrimination claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), cited with approval in Wash. State Republican Party v. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n., 141 Wash.2d 245, 289, 4 P.3d 808 (2000). Consequently, we conclude that this attorney fees provision is not substantively unconscionable.