Opinion ID: 210274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissions by Counsel

Text: The third and final reason Toyota urges us to overturn the jury's finding of infringement relates to a portion of the opening statement made to the jury by counsel for Paice: And keep in mind that Toyota can cut off damages tomorrow. Toyota can make sure they never have to pay Paice another cent by doing what? By going back to the Prius I and don't use Dr. Severinsky's high voltage/low current invention anymore and stop using road load. J.A. 1130 (emphasis added). According to Toyota, this is a binding judicial admission by Paice that the Prius I does not infringe any of the patents in suit. In Toyota's opinion, the undisputed evidence established that the structural configurations of the accused vehicles are the same as the Prius I for purposes of determining infringement. Appellants' Br. 58. Therefore, Toyota argues, this admission necessarily implies that none of the accused vehicles infringe. The district court agreed with Toyota to a certain extent, and held that the above statement constitutes a binding admission that Prius I does not infringe the patents-insuit. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211, Docket No. 225, slip op. at 13 (E.D.Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). The district court noted, however, that the jury did not consider whether the claim limitations were met equally by the Prius I as the Prius II. Id. slip op. at 13-14. Therefore, the district court disagreed that the evidence established that the structural configurations of the accused vehicles are the same as the Prius I for purposes of determining infringement. Instead, the court concluded, there is sufficient evidence underlying the jury's verdict and that verdict should not be overturned based on the conclusory admission by Plaintiff's counsel. Id. slip op. at 14. In effect, the district court treated the statement as merely an evidential admission as opposed to a conclusive admission which the jury was free to weigh against the other evidence adduced at trial. [12] See Pickens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 413 F.2d 1390, 1393-94 (5th Cir.1969) (holding that a district court properly treated an admission as evidential and submitted it to the jury for consideration). In light of what we view as tenuous logic in Toyota's argument, and the conclusory nature of the admission itself, we think the district court acted well within the confines of its discretion by ruling as it did. Having rejected all three reasons set forth by Toyota for overturning the jury's finding of infringement, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Toyota's motion for JMOL.