Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Redirect Examination of State's Witnesses

Text: ¶ 170. Beckwith argues that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution, over defense objections, to conduct redirect examination of witnesses John Chamblee, Tom Van Riper and Reed Massengill on matters that were not first brought out on cross-examination. He cites Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rule of Circuit Court Practice 5.08, which provided, Redirect examination is limited to matters brought out on cross-examination. See also West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048, 1055 (Miss. 1985). Beckwith asserts that redirect examination is limited only to new matters brought out on cross-examination which were not brought out on direct. We find this is an unduly restrictive limitation which is not required by the rule. ¶ 171. Beckwith complains that on redirect examination of John Chamblee, the prosecutor questioned Mr. Chamblee about whether statements by two witnesses confirmed the theory that the shot that killed Medgar Evers came from the nearby trees, which witnesses were not discussed on direct or cross-examination. However, the record reflects that on cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Mr. Chamblee about whether it was possible to determine if the shot was fired from the clump of trees. Beckwith also complains that the prosecution questioned Reed Massengill on redirect about Beckwith's religious beliefs. The record reflects that defense counsel as well questioned Mr. Massengill about Beckwith's religious beliefs on cross-examination. Regarding Tom Van Riper, Beckwith complains that the prosecution questioned Van Riper on redirect about the Neshoba County murders, but the record reflects that defense counsel on cross-examination questioned Van Riper about that case as well. ¶ 172. The trial court has broad discretion in allowing or disallowing redirect examination of witnesses. West, 463 So.2d at 1055. When the defense attorney inquires into a subject on cross-examination of the State's witness, the prosecutor on rebuttal is unquestionably entitled to elaborate on the matter. Hart v. State, 639 So.2d 1313, 1317 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Hogan v. State, 580 So.2d 1275, 1278 (Miss. 1991)); Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 133 (Miss. 1988). We decline to adopt Beckwith's construction of the rule to require that redirect examination be limited only to matters first brought out on cross-examination. If such were the rule's intent, the rule would so provide. Because these matters were all brought out on cross-examination, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing redirect examination on the matters.