Opinion ID: 1345383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Durham's Appeal

Text: Defendant Durham advances but two contentions. They reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the prosecution's theory of the case. [1a] Durham first contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of first degree murder under either of the two theories of conspiracy and aiding and abetting advanced by the prosecution, thereby denying Durham a fair trial. In support of this point, he argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him under the prosecution's conspiracy theory because any conspiracy to rob had terminated prior to October 16 and there is no substantial evidence to show a conspiracy to resist arrest on or before October 16; and (2) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him under the prosecution's aiding and abetting theory because the only evidence introduced in support of this theory is that indicating that Durham lowered his hands after Officer Treutlein had ordered him to keep them raised after the shooting  and this last item of evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that he aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. [5] Thus would defendant Durham divide and conquer. The difficulty is that the prosecution's theory of the case cannot be split into such fragments. We observe at the outset that the defendants were not charged with the crime of conspiracy; they were charged with murder. Durham was found guilty of that charged crime as a principal. Our Penal Code provides in relevant part: All persons concerned in the commission of a crime ... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission... are principals.... (Pen. Code, § 31.) [6] Since Durham was present at the time of the act constituting the offense, and since he did not directly commit that act, it is clear that he was found guilty as a principal on the theory that he aided and abetted in the commission of the act. It is true that in presenting its case the prosecution had recourse to the principles of conspiracy. However, this thesis, far from seeking to establish a basis of criminal liability separate and apart from that of aiding and abetting, was pursued for the purpose of demonstrating Durham's intimate involvement in the continuing criminal enterprise which culminated in the shooting of Officer Du Puis. [7] In the frequently cited case of People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal. App.2d 128 [318 P.2d 828], the court set forth the following principles relevant in the case before us: [2] To be an abettor the accused must have instigated or advised the commission of the crime or been present for the purpose of assisting in its commission. He must share the criminal intent with which the crime was committed.... [3] [W]hile mere presence alone at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to make the accused a participant, and while he is not necessarily guilty if he does not attempt to prevent the crime through fear, such factors may be circumstances that can be considered by the jury with the other evidence in passing on his guilt or innocence. [4] One may aid or abet in the commission of a crime without having previously entered into a conspiracy to commit it. [Citations.] [5a] Moreover, the aider and abettor in a proper case is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged. Whether the act committed was the natural and probable consequence of the act encouraged and the extent of defendant's knowledge are questions of fact for the jury. [Citations.] (Italics added.) (156 Cal. App.2d at pp. 133-134; see also 1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1963) §§ 44, 45, pp. 46-49.) [1b] In the instant case the prosecution, in support of its sole theory of guilt as to Durham, sought to show that he instigated or advised the commission of the crime in that he was a party to a compact of criminal conduct which included within its scope the forcible resistance of arrest and that he was also [8] present for the purposes of assisting in its commission in that his conduct at the scene of the incident, viewed in its totality, was wholly consistent with such purposes. The jury determined that the evidence produced supported the prosecution theory and accordingly found Durham guilty. The evidence supports the finding. In the early case of People v. Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331 [92 P. 361], we considered a contention identical to that at bar. There defendant and five other men devised a plan to burglarize the safe at a cemetery. They provided themselves with burglars' tools and each, with the exception of defendant, armed himself with a pistol. When they arrived at the cemetery, however, they found an armed guard and decided to return to the city. They rode as far as possible on a streetcar and then began to walk toward the downtown area, where they had their rooms. In the course of the walk two of their number became involved with police in a manner which does not appear from the opinion; in any event, a gun battle ensued in which a police officer was killed. Defendant, found guilty of second degree murder after a trial wherein the foregoing facts were presented in detail, urged that the evidence did not support the judgment because there was no showing that he had taken any active part in the actual killing, and, on the contrary, it had been shown that at the time of the shooting he had been standing still with his hands in the air. This court, in rejecting this contention, held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was a member of a combination or conspiracy [9] whose purposes included that of common resistance to arrest and detection while going to and coming from the scene of the proposed burglary  and that the evidence was therefore sufficient to support the judgment against defendant as an aider and abettor. In the course of our discussion we considered the very contention which defendant Durham here advances: The contention of the appellant is that the unlawful combination or conspiracy embraced only the proposed burglary at the cemetery, and that when this project was abandoned by reason of the discovery of an armed guard on the premises, the conspiracy or common design was at an end, and that anything done thereafter was the individual act of the party doing it. If, as a matter of law, it can be said that the criminal combination embraced no more than this contemplated burglary, and that the shooting of [the policeman] was not within the reasonable and probable consequences of the common unlawful design, it would follow that no case was made out against the appellant. [5b] But whether or not the act committed was the ordinary and probable effect of the common design or whether it was a fresh and independent product of the mind of one of the conspirators, outside of, or foreign to, the common design, is a question of fact for the jury, [citations], and if there be any evidence[ [10] ] to support the finding of the jury on this question, its determination is conclusive. (152 Cal. at p. 335.) We went on to hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding, observing that pistols are used by burglars not for breaking into safes but for preventing interference with the criminal design or arrest by those who may discover its existence. (152 Cal. at p. 337.) In People v. Wheaton (1923) 64 Cal. App. 58 [220 P. 451], the facts were even more closely parallel to those of the instant case. There five men determined to undertake a series of burglaries. All were armed except defendant Wheaton. After an unsuccessful attempt to break into one store and a discussion concerning the burglary of another, they noticed that their automobile was being followed by police. The officers stopped defendants' car and engaged in a short discussion, whereupon one of the officers entered the back seat of defendants' car and told them to drive to the police station. After they had driven a short way, a scuffle broke out in the back seat and the officer was killed by gunfire. Defendant Wheaton, who had been in the front seat and had not fired any shot, was nevertheless convicted of first degree murder. In response to his contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment the court said: The evidence in the case ... establishes beyond controversy that the five defendants, on the night of the shooting, were jointly engaged in an expedition of crime.... Wheaton, while not as active as the others, was fully aware of their intentions and the purposes of their trip.... His presence with the other defendants on the night of December 6th can only be accounted for upon the theory that he was one of them and stood ready to participate in any crime which they might decide to undertake. The evidence shows that on the night of December 6th there was a thorough understanding among the five men to commit the crime of robbery or burglary, or both of such crimes, and if detected by the officers to resist arrest, even at the risk of taking the lives of those who should attempt to arrest them. Under such a state of facts, all who participated in any such understanding or conspiracy are equally guilty of any crime which is the natural and probable consequence of such an enterprise, whether he personally commits the act or whether its commission is done by any one of his associates in carrying out the common purpose. [Citations.] (64 Cal. App. at pp. 66-68.) Observing that the facts in the case before it were much stronger than those of Kauffman, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the judgment against Wheaton. Again, in People v. Lapierre (1928) 205 Cal. 470 [271 P. 500], defendant had been engaged with her husband and brother in an extensive series of burglaries. When police officers went to their house to make an arrest for these crimes, defendant allowed them to enter, but her husband and brother, who were concealed in the kitchen, then became engaged in a gun battle with the officers and one of the officers was killed. This court, sustaining defendant's subsequent conviction of manslaughter against a contention of insufficient evidence, observed that the evidence warranted a finding that defendant, her husband, and her brother, were coconspirators in an agreement or combination to rob victims, and burglarize buildings and places of business and to commit forgeries, even contemplating the resistance of attempts on the part of police officers to apprehend and arrest all or any of them, to the extent of taking human life if necessary. Not only this, but appellant under the evidence actually aided and abetted her said husband at the very time of the shooting, and she could well have been convicted of murder instead of manslaughter. (205 Cal. at p. 471.) [11] [6] In view of the evidence in the instant case which we have outlined above the jury could reasonably have found that defendants for some time prior to October 16, 1966, had been engaged in a joint expedition which involved the commission of robberies as they moved westward across the country and which included among its purposes the forcible resistance to arrest; that Durham was fully aware of the fact that Robinson both had exhibited his pistol in the commission of said robberies and had actually fired it at one who had sought to apprehend them in the act of escaping; that at the very time they were stopped by Officers Treutlein and Du Puis, defendants were further engaged in the commission of a crime, namely, the driving of an automobile stolen by them (Veh. Code, § 10851); that Durham knew that Robinson was armed when they emerged from the car; and that in the totality of circumstances Robinson's act was, and was known by Durham to be, a reasonable and probable consequence of the continuing course of action undertaken by the defendants. [12] The finding of such facts would be sufficient to support the finding of Durham's guilt as an aider and abettor under the principles we have above set forth. Since the jury was adquately instructed in the premises, we must conclude that the indicated findings were made  and that the evidence is therefore sufficient to support the verdict as to Durham. [1c] What we have said above renders unnecessary a consideration of Durham's second and final contention, to wit, that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that before it could convict him of murder, it must agree unanimously on one or both of the two theories of guilt upon which Durham was allegedly prosecuted. [13] As we have shown, the prosecution proceeded on a single unified theory of guilt as to Durham, that he aided and abetted in the murder of Officer Du Puis.