Opinion ID: 1153244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Wrongful Death Actions

Text: The heirs of infants Jonathan Kevin Sweeney, who died on June 26, 1984, and Brandon Allen Sweeney, who died on April 15, 1986, filed wrongful death claims against Dr. Preston in March 1987. It is well established that an action may be maintained under our wrongful death statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13, for infants who die at birth. Terrell v. Rankin, 511 So.2d 126, 127 (Miss. 1987) (wrongful death action could be maintained for stillborn infant); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 283, 72 So.2d 434 (1954) (wrongful death action can be maintained for fetus after it reaches the prenatal age of viability ... if such child dies before birth as the result of a negligent act of another). Thus an action can be maintained for the death of an infant who lived less than forty-eight hours. Applying the discovery standard articulated in Williams v. Kilgore and following our decision in Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So.2d 1117 (Miss. 1992), we further find that these causes of action were still viable pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36. In Gentry, we reaffirmed our recognition that wrongful death and medical negligence are two separate and distinct causes of action. [1] Id. at 1119. In that case, Mary Gentry was initially diagnosed with cancer in her right breast in 1981, and underwent a radical mastectomy. After experiencing new symptoms, she was treated by Drs. Wallace and Pittman between September, 1984 and March 1, 1985. She was neither diagnosed nor treated for cancer. Id. at 1118. She sought a second opinion and was advised on March 1, 1985, that she suffered from a metastic breast carcinoma, but that the cancer was too advanced for any meaningful treatment. She died of breast and lung cancer two weeks later. Her son filed a wrongful death action on March 16, 1987, two years and one day after her death. Id. The trial court granted the doctors' motion for summary judgment, finding that the statute of limitations on the wrongful death action had started to run when Mrs. Gentry discovered her doctors' failure to diagnose her condition. However, reversing the circuit court's decision and explaining the error of its logic, we stated: [p]rescription does not begin to run against one who is ignorant of facts that would entitle him to bring an action. Ayo v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 771 F.2d 902, 906 (5th Cir.1985). The most basic fact a wrongful death plaintiff must know in order to be aware that he is entitled to bring an action is that a death has occurred. A physician can engage in the most wretched acts of negligence in plain view of a patient's family, but until the patient dies, the family members cannot know the one indispensable fact that would entitle them to bring an action. In the wrongful death context, therefore, the alleged act, omission or neglect to which § 15-1-36 necessarily refers is lethal conduct. There is no logical way that a potential wrongful death plaintiff can know or discover conduct entitling him to sue until the decedent dies. Id. at 1122. In Gentry, we rejected the notion that a wrongful death claim accrued when the negligent act was discovered even if was discovered prior to the death of the victim of the doctor's negligence. Id. at 1121. Rather, we found that the statute of limitations was triggered by death, reiterating our holding in Owens that a cause of action does not accrue until an injury occurs. We further found that under the statute, the limitations period does not begin to run until the heir knows or should reasonably know about the medical negligence which caused the death. Gentry, 606 So.2d at 1119. When considering an appeal from an order of summary judgment, we consider the evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brown v. Credit Center, Inc, 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983). We must, therefore, look at the evidence as it favors the heirs of the Sweeney infants. From the record, it appears that the heirs of Jonathan Kevin Sweeney had no reason to know of the medical negligence that caused his death until nearly a year after he died. There is no evidence that Brenda requested or was asked to request copies of her medical records from Dr. Preston until 1985, nor as we pointed out in Williams, was she obligated to do so. 618 So.2d at 55. Affidavits filed by the Sweeneys reveal only that Brenda was first made aware of her Rh iso-immunization sensitivity during a pregnancy which culminated in the delivery of a healthy infant daughter in 1977 and later advised that there could be risks in any future pregnancies. However, a second healthy daughter was born in 1980. Nothing in the affidavits filed by Brenda's physicians suggests either that any of her doctors informed her that her condition could cause the death of an infant, or further, that her iso-immunization sensitivity was caused by Dr. Preston's mistyping of her blood and his failure to administer Rhogram after the 1974 stillbirth. Only in 1985, when Brenda obtained her records, noted that her blood type was incorrectly identified as B positive, and questioned Dr. Preston was a causal link made between his actions in 1973 and the death of Jonathan Kevin Sweeney. Thus, the heirs did not have the facts needed to know that they were entitled to bring an action against Dr. Preston for the infant's death until that time. The Sweeney's cause of action for the wrongful death of second infant, Brandon Allen, who was born and subsequently died in April, 1986, falls squarely within the two-year statute of limitations.