Opinion ID: 880774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: 4(d Future Damages.

Text: Arthur Shenkin projected damages to be sustained by the Clinic in the future to December 2002 based upon the supposition that the IRB would not have been called in 1992. Shenkin also calculated however that if the bonds were called on December 1, 1992, and replaced by conventional financing, the Clinic's damages would have been $4,316,545. In determining whether the IRBs would not have been called in 1992, Shenkin testified that he relied on the expertise of Jerry LaSeur of Security Mortgage for this purpose. LaSeur had testified that an IRB is called if the existing bond holder no longer wants the bond and if a purchaser cannot be found to replace the existing bond holder. If the bond is purchased by a new bond holder, the bond has not been called, and its tax-exempt status continues. LaSeur testified that because of the credit quality of the Clinic and the earnings situation of the proposed bond holder, First Interstate Bank of Arizona, that a call of the bond by First Interstate would be remote. LaSeur testified that almost with no doubt he could replace the bond with a buyer in need of tax-exempt income if First Interstate decided to shed itself of the bonds. Peat Marwick objected to Shenkin's testimony for relying on LaSeur, because LaSeur's testimony was speculative, as to what might occur in the future, and because whether the bonds would be called by First Interstate was not within the expertise of LaSeur. If the trial court had sustained the objection, the damages under Shenkin's testimony might have been reduced by approximately $500,000. The District Court, however, overruled the objection. In arriving at the year 2002 damages in the amount of $4,827,945, Shenkin assumed that the bonds would not be called in 1992, based on LaSeur's opinion. The jury verdict on damages was the sum of $4,475,000, between the high and low figures given by Shenkin. By law, damages must in all cases be reasonable, § 27-1-302, MCA, and damages which are not clearly ascertainable both in their nature and origin cannot be recovered for a breach of contract, § 27-1-311, MCA. The amount of damages however need not be proven with mathematical precision, Jarussi v. Board of Trustees of School District Number 28 (1983), 204 Mont. 131, 664 P.2d 316. The amount of future damages rests in the sound discretion of the trier of fact and need only be reasonably certain under the evidence. Frisnegger v. Gibson (1979), 183 Mont. 57, 598 P.2d 574. The question presented on this issue is whether the approximately $500,000 of additional damages testified to by Shenkin that would be incurred if the bonds were not called in 1992 was established with reasonable certainty. The testimony indicated that the present loan with First Bank-Billings will stay in effect because the loan is a good earning asset for the Bank and the Clinic is a desirable customer. Moreover the Clinic is not likely to obtain a lower rate than prime plus 1/4 percent. LaSeur testified that the tax-exempt status of the IRB bonds would most likely have continued until 2002. The evidence made it reasonably certain for the jury to assume that the bonds would not be called in 1992, and that the damages incurred by the Clinic would therefore continue until the payoff of the First Bank loan in 2002. The amount of future damages were discounted to present value under Shenkin's testimony. We find no reason to disturb the jury's finding on this portion of the damages.