Opinion ID: 1968159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right to Trial by Jury and the Habitual Offender. Act

Text: The defendant's final argument attacks the enhanced sentence he received under § 12-19-21, after the sentencing justice deemed him to be a habitual criminal. The defendant filed a motion to strike habitual offender notice, arguing that the fact of a prior conviction had to be alleged in the indictment or information and that Hall's prior convictions also must be proven as a fact beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. He argued that because it allows the trial justice alone to designate him a habitual criminal by a preponderance of the evidence, the statute runs afoul of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The Court denied the motion, and defendant renewed his objections at the sentencing hearing, at which Hall was sentenced to serve an additional fifteen years for being a habitual criminal. On appeal, defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), which held that prior convictions did not require a jury determination for sentencing enhancement, is on shaky constitutional ground and is ripe for reversal. Conceding that Apprendi remains good law today, defendant speculates that its future looks bleak in the aftermath of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), where the Court held that all facts that increased the maximum sentence of a defendant, except for prior convictions, must be found by a jury. In addition, defendant argues that this Court has interpreted Rhode Island's constitutional provisions preserving the right to a jury as providing even greater protection than the United States Constitution, and we should hold that they provide so here. When reviewing a constitutional challenge to a statute, this Court will use the greatest possible, caution. Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 822 (R.I.2004) (quoting Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 7, 186 A. 832, 837 (1936)). The statute bears a presumption of validity, and it is the defendant's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional. Id.; see also In re Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.T. 200, 211, 4 A.2d 487, 488 (1939). Recently, in State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254, 1257 (R.I.2007), we addressed the issue of whether the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a prior conviction to be proven before a jury to increase a defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed maximum. In Ramirez, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder. Id. At sentencing, the trial justice found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant satisfied the requirements of the Habitual Offender Act and he received a twenty-five-year enhancement as a habitual offender pursuant to the statute. Id. Ramirez brought the identical federal constitutional challenge to his enhanced sentence that this defendant advances here, arguing that the Habitual Offender Act was applied in an unconstitutional manner because the enhanced sentence was based on facts that were not found by the jury, as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 1268. This Court held that, in accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, the fact of a prior conviction does not need to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1270 (citing Cunningham v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 856, 864, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007)). Accordingly, Hall's first argument requires little further analysis and must fail. Having dispatched Hall's argument with respect to the United States Constitution, we now turn our attention to his contention that the statute violates the Rhode Island Constitution. This requires a somewhat different analysis. Although defendant cites only article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution, this Court has said that the various provisions in article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution, pertaining to the right to a jury, including sections 7 and 15, all must be read together. [13] In re Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.I. at 204, 4 A.2d at 489. Indeed, Nile right to trial by jury has its own unique basis under the Rhode Island Constitution. State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945, 946 (R.I.1981). In Vinagro, the defendant was convicted by the District Court of four violations of the Cruelty to Animals statute. Id. at 945. The defendant kept pit bulls for the purpose of having them take part in fights. Id. The defendant was fined the maximum amount provided by the applicable statute, $50 per charge. Id. The statute provided for review of his convictions by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id. However, the defendant contended that he should get a de novo appeal to the Superior Court, and the opportunity to be tried in front of a jury. Id. at 946. The defendant conceded that he was not entitled to have a jury trial under the Federal Constitution because the maximum penalty for each charge in the case at bar [was] a $50 fine, but contended that the Rhode Island Constitution's right to jury trial provided greater protection. Id. We agreed and held that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 947. However, in Vinagro, we said that the decisive issue presently before us is whether a defendant was entitled to a jury trial in 1842 for the type of offense with which [the defendant] is charged. [14] Vinagro, 433 A.2d at 947 (emphasis added). Unlike the situation in Vinagro, Hall is not charged with any discrete offense under the Habitual Offender Act. Rather, after he received a trial by jury and was convicted on the substantive offenses, his sentence was enhanced as a result of his impressive prior criminal record. See State v. Sitko, 457 A.2d 260, 261 (R.I.1983); see also State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1026 (R.I.1988). The defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court has limited the distinction between an element to an offense and a sentencing enhancement, even while keeping its exception for recidivism, by requiring any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348). However, recidivism is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). In our opinion, [t]he existence of a prior convection is a simple historical fact which may be ascertained through official documents and it either exists as a matter of public record or it does not. Ramirez, 936 A.2d at 1271 (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 508 Pa. 114, 494 A.2d 1067, 1071 (1985) and Commonwealth v. Aponte, 579 Pa. 246, 855 A.2d 800, 811 (2004)). We, therefore, see no merit in Hall's argument that the Habitual Offender Act violates his right to a jury trial under the Rhode Island Constitution. Finally, we see no public policy that would be advanced by having prior convictions proven to a jury. See Ramirez, 936 A.2d at 1271. Indeed, by requiring recidivism to be proven to a jury, we would directly contravene the intricate safety mechanisms that are in place to protect defendants from the potential prejudice of such disclosure of earlier offenses to the finders of fact. [15] The defendant also contends that the facts attendant to deeming him a habitual criminal should be pled in the information or criminal complaint. However, because sentencing based on a finding that one is a habitual criminal is not an element of the offense charged, but rather the enhanced punishment,    is only an incident to the last offense. The act does not create a new substantive offense. It merely prescribes a longer sentence for the subsequent offenses which triggers the operation of the act. Sitko, 457 A.2d at 262 (quoting Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219, 223 (Fla.1980)). The defendant concedes that the enhancement was not triggered until defendant actually was convicted of the third offense. Only then does the trial justice give an enhanced sentence and only for that final conviction. See Sitko, 457 A.2d at 262 (state may not charge the defendant with being a habitual criminal by a separate indictment, seven months after sentencing already has taken place on the third offense). There simply is no legitimate purpose to require the fact of prior conviction to be contained in the information. Therefore, we hold that the Habitual Offender Act does not offend the United States or Rhode Island Constitutions, and Hall properly was sentenced as a habitual offender.