Opinion ID: 1390955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motion for extension of time

Text: The motion made by the appellee that he be given adequate time to prepare a defense must be considered within the same framework that outlines the Board's reasons for refusing to make more definite and certain the charges to the effect that Mr. Spiegel's philosophy was unacceptable and that he could not work harmoniously with the administration. The total time expanse between the resolution of the Board recommending termination and the commencement of the hearing was twenty-four days. The appellee filed a motion for an extension of time within which to prepare two days before the hearing. The appellant argues that such a motion, because it was not timely filed as provided by Rule 6(d), W.R.C.P. [14] was properly overruled. Appellee urges that this rule is intended to apply to the trial procedure and therefore should not be so interpreted as to penalize him. We tend to believe, under the circumstances of this case, that the appellee's interpretation is correct. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure leading up to the trial of a civil case, there are certain time frames provided for filing various pleadings, making motions, arguing motions and doing all of the other and various things considered necessary to the bringing of the civil litigation to the trial phase. In the administrative proceeding, the various pleadings and motions not being required, the time provisions provided for them by the rules cannot be thought about as inflexible. Especially is this true where the administrative tribunal which filed the charges is in complete control of the procedures which govern the details of not only the hearing itself but the pattern of preparation for the hearing. The motion for a more definite statement of the charges was timely made and if it had been granted and the charges specified in detail as we have said they should have been, it would no doubt have been clear and obvious to all concerned that the time for preparation of a defense should have been extended. We affirm the District Court's holding that it was an abuse of discretion and therefore error for the administrative board to have refused to extend the time within which Mr. Spiegel could prepare his defense. FREEDOM OF SPEECH `Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in the eye. John Milton, Areopagitica, (1644), in R.M. Hutchins, ed., 32 Great Books of the Western World 384 (1952).' [From appellee's brief] The balancing and counter-balancing which this great issue requires contemplates that Mr. Spiegel may not be constituted a First Amendment eunuch just because he is a teacher  neither can he exercise his rights in such a way as to destroy the system. Somewhere in between he may speak and teach; and the schools may function. The record, together with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, clearly show to this Court that Mr. Spiegel's contract was not renewed for the reason, in part at least, that he spoke out critically of schools generally and specifically the administration of the school in which he was a teacher. The criticism complained of was published in writings which were authored in pursuit of his union activities. [15] We acknowledge it to be the law that a teacher has the right to criticize his or her employers. [16] The author of the opinion in Pred v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Fla., 5 Cir.1969, 415 F.2d 851, 855, said: ... Simply because teachers are on the public payroll does not make them second-class citizens in regard to their constitutional rights ... It was not imperative, as contended by the Board, that Spiegel prove that the sole reason for his failure to have his contract renewed was his participation in constitutionally-protected activities. If his penalty was imposed by the Board for even partially being in retaliation for his exercise of a protected right such as freedom of speech, he is entitled to relief. Fluker v. Alabama State Board of Education, 5 Cir.1971, 441 F.2d 201. Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract based in part on a protected activity and in part upon an unprotected activity is not a proper decision. Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, (W.D.Wis. 1970), 310 F. Supp. 972, 982, aff'd 446 F.2d 806, 7 Cir.1971, reversed on other grounds 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. In Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 660 (N.D. Tex. 1973), the court said of a teacher's right: ... this court cannot affirm the decision not to reemploy Lusk if it `was even partially in retaliation' for Lusk's public remarks which are constitutionally guaranteed under the First Amendment, even though there were valid nonconstitutional reasons for dismissal. Fluker v. Alabama State Board of Education, 441 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir.1971). See, United States of America v. Northside Realty Associates, 474 F.2d 1164, at 1171 (5th Cir. March 14, 1973); NLRB v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1962). The conclusions of law authored by the Board with respect to the utterances in question relate that they were in disregard of the rights and requirements of others. (Conclusion No. 22) The conclusions further state that they constituted a neglect of duty and that  Any one and all of the foregoing oppositions, rejections, objections, actions, attitudes or statements are sufficient, good and just cause for termination of Spiegel's contract of employment. (Conclusion No. 27) [Emphasis supplied] The ORDER then says: Wherefore, it is ordered that the recommendation for termination of employment of Spiegel by the District be, and the same hereby is, approved. It is further ordered that, for the reasons aforesaid, Spiegel's contract of employment with the District be, and the same hereby is, terminated effective at the end of the 1972-73 school year ... [Emphasis supplied] There can be no doubt, therefore, that one of the reasons for not renewing his contract was because of his criticism of the schools while in pursuit of his labor union affairs. The contract teacher may not be deprived of employment contract renewal without cause. Monahan v. Board of Trustees, supra. Cause may not be found in a constitutionally-protected reason. [17] Even nontenured teachers cannot be dismissed for exercising constitutional rights. [18] Freedom of speech is constitutionally protected under Article 1, Section 20, of the Wyoming Constitution and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. [19] If the above represents the ying, the yang is as appellant says in its brief: Constitutionally protected free speech is not an all inclusive license to say anything at any time. Statements made in complete disregard of the rights of others are not within the right of protected free speech. Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137. [Emphasis in appellant's brief] The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the school's duty to control and conduct the schools when, in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, it said: ... the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools. See Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, 393 U.S. [97,] at 104, 89 S.Ct. [266,] at 270 [, 21 L.Ed.2d 228]; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. [390,] at 402, 43 S.Ct. [625,] at 627 [67 L.Ed. 1042] ... The issue becomes more refined when the appellant urges that Spiegel's utterances as a union executive transcended the boundaries of his right to speak freely and became ... attacks on the character, reputation and intelligence of administrators and administration . .. They were attacks upon an established method and procedure necessary for operation and existence [sic] of the school system ... (Appellant's brief) Mr. Spiegel, of course, counters by urging that such is not the case and that whatever he published in connection with his union activities was outside the scope of the Board's power to regulate and punish and within, therefore, his constitutionally-guaranteed right of freedom of expression. Thus, he says his statements do not constitute the cause requisite for the nonrenewal of his contract. The District Court held the Board to have been in error for failing to renew Spiegel's contract because he exercised his constitutionally-guaranteed right of free speech. The Court said: Spiegel was terminated, at least in part, for his public and private comments in union publications which are constitutionally guaranteed. We affirm this holding. The utterances of Mr. Spiegel in behalf of his union activities were protected by the United States and Wyoming Constitutions, supra. The policy of the State of Wyoming in relation to such matters is delineated in § 27-239, W.S. 1957, where it is said ... to be the policy of the State of Wyoming that workers have the right to organize ... and that in the exercise of this right ... workers should be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents in any concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. The District Court Judge, in his learned opinion, took notice of the freedom of expression policies of the Board itself when he observed that it encourages constructive criticism  proclaims there to be and exist a climate of administrative freedom with encouragement to speak and talk freely without fear of personal repercussion and comment of and on school policy. It strongly endorses the right to freedom of expression. [20] Teachers are encouraged to help students work through controversial issues and are promised protection against unjust attack. It was said in Tinker, supra, at 393 U.S. 506, 89 S.Ct. 736: ... It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate ... In Tinker, at 393 U.S. 508, 89 S.Ct. 738, the Court goes on to say: In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint ... 68 Am.Jur.2d, Schools, § 182, p. 513, states: Under the free speech clause of the First Amendment, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment, in the absence of proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, and public school teachers may not constitutionally be compelled, as a condition of retaining their employment, to relinquish the First Amendment rights that they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work ... The Court observed in Lusk v. Estes, supra, at 361 F. Supp., page 660: ... School authorities must nurture and protect not extinguish and inhibit, the teacher's right to express his ideas. Only if the exercise of these rights by the teacher materially and substantially impedes the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or disrupts the regular operation of the school will a restriction of his rights be tolerated. Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 581 (5th Cir.1969) ... The Board could not penalize Speigel unless his activities outside the school house disrupted or impaired discipline in the teaching processes and substantially interfered with the requirements and discipline in the operation of the school. [21] In Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, at 391 U.S., 563, page 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731, page 1738, where a teacher was dismissed for writing a letter to the editor criticizing his board and administrative supervisor for the handling of public funds, the United States Supreme Court held that, ... in a case such as this, absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment ... In reaching its conclusion that there was inadequate cause for termination, the Court, in Pickering, reasoned that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution has been held to prohibit a state from authorizing damage recovery by a public official for defamatory statements directed at him except where such statements are shown to have been made either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity ... [22] The Pickering Court concludes therefrom that if the teacher had been a member of the general public, the State's power to afford the board the right to sue him would have been limited by the New York Times rule. Acknowledging the right of teachers to speak on matters of public concern as being protected by the First Amendment, even though their criticism is pointed at their superiors, [23] and recognizing that termination of employment is a potent means of inhibiting free speech, the Court held: ... However, in a case such as the present one, in which the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher, we conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general public he seeks to be. In the instant case, the standard against which we must test Spiegel's union writings is as though he were a member of the general public. There is no proof that the statements made by him in pursuit of his union activities were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. ( New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) and there is no proof that his published statements have impeded the performance of his teaching duties or in any way disrupted the functions of the school. The criticized publications, therefore, furnish no cause or grounds for failure to renew the teacher's employment contract.