Opinion ID: 1855796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness of Appellant's Statements and Waiver of Miranda Rights

Text: Appellant next argues that the state failed to prove that statements she made to various law enforcement officers prior to and after her arrest were voluntarily made or that she validly waived her Miranda rights. Whether a defendant has voluntarily waived her right to remain silent and whether statements made by the defendant were made voluntarily are two separate issues. State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn.1995) (citations omitted). However, the factors to be considered are the same and, therefore, the analysis of the two issues significantly overlaps. Id. The fact that a defendant suffers from a mental deficiency is, alone, insufficient to render a statement or a waiver of Miranda rights involuntary. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Instead, coercive police activity is a predicate to a finding that a statement or waiver was made involuntarily. Id. at 167, 170, 107 S.Ct. at 521-22, 523. Voluntariness must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence and the question for the court is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the police actions were so coercive, so manipulative, [or] so overpowering that defendant's will was overborne. State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn.1991). In reviewing a trial court's determination of voluntariness, we make an independent determination of voluntariness on the facts found, but do not reverse findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Hardimon, 310 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Minn.1981).
At the time appellant was interviewed by police officers on February 6, 1995, she was not under arrest. Officer DeConcini testified that, at that point, everyone was a suspect and no one was a suspect. Appellant was being interviewed as a [v]ery important witness, the widow of the deceased and the person who co-discovered the body. Appellant was driven to the interview in a police car but DeConcini testified that she was not in custody and that it is not unusual for the police to provide transportation for people they want to interview. She was asked general questions about the chronology of events on the day of the murder and whether the victim kept guns in the house, but Deconcini never challenged her story or asked her if she had committed the murder. DeConcini testified that she was able to track his questions and the transcript of the question and answer session makes it clear that she was capable of providing logical answers. Appellant never requested that the interview be stopped. DeConcini's questions were factual and straight forward and the record is devoid of coercion, manipulation, or trickery. Detective Palmer similarly testified that when he interviewed appellant on February 7, she was not really a suspect in the murder. Rather, the purpose of the interview was simply to establish a rapport with her and to gain a better understanding of the case. Appellant was not arrested and she and Lattu were given a ride home after the interview. Again, there is no indication that appellant objected to the interview or that Palmer engaged in any coercive conduct. We therefore hold that the trial court properly admitted appellant's February 6-7 statements into evidence.
Detectives Palmer and Krebs questioned appellant again on February 16, 1995. Because Lattu had just confessed and appellant was now the primary suspect in the murder, the detectives advised appellant of her Miranda rights prior to questioning and videotaped the interview. At trial, Detective Krebs testified that, during this interrogation, appellant told the detectives that she had once tried to poison the victim and demonstrated that she knew how to use a bolt-action gun. The videotape shows the detectives advising appellant of her Miranda rights. Upon inquiry as to whether she understood them, appellant told the detectives that she understood that she did not have to talk to them but stated that she had nothing to hide. The detectives then told appellant about the evidence that led them to suspect her and Lattu and informed her of Lattu's confession. Appellant denied any involvement in the victim's death and, when the detectives asked about her relationship with the victim, appellant stated that she and the victim got along great but that she often got mad. At that point, the detectives asked her whether it was her or one of her personalities that got mad and whether it was possible that one of her personalities killed the victim. Appellant replied that she did not know, but that awhile back one of her other personalities tried to poison the victim. Relative to the murder weapon, appellant demonstrated that she knew how to use the victim's bolt-action big gun. At that point the detectives placed appellant under arrest. This court has stated that the fact that police officers use a sympathetic approach in interrogating a suspect does not, in itself, render a defendant's statements involuntary and it is not improper to inform a defendant of the inculpatory evidence the police have gathered. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 333-34. Further, the fact that a defendant is emotionally distressed does not necessarily make her statements involuntary. Id. at 334. While Palmer and Krebs' approach had sympathetic elements, appellant spoke rationally throughout most of the 45 minutes of questioning. The only question even arguably coercive was whether one of her other personalities could have committed the murder; but neither the question asked nor appellant's response, I don't know, were introduced at trial. Finally, given that appellant did not in fact confess, it cannot be said that her will was overborne by the detectives' questioning, see id. (That he adhered to this woven tapestry of lies shows that [the defendant's] will was not overborne.), and we therefore conclude that appellant's waiver of Miranda rights and her statements during the February 16, 1995 interrogation were voluntary.
Appellant also argues that various statements she made to Deputy Linda Sanders while in Hennepin County Jail were obtained through an exploitation of appellant's mental problems and were therefore involuntary and should not have been admitted at trial. Appellant argued at the Rasmussen hearing that the statements she made to Sanders were obtained in violation of appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Appellant did not argue, as she does now, that the statements were involuntary. Because the issue was not raised below, it was waived. See State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn.1989) (Usually, we will not decide issues which are not first addressed by the trial court and are raised for the first time on appeal even if the issues involve constitutional questions regarding criminal procedure.) (citations omitted).