Opinion ID: 1707193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court erred in imposing an illegal sentence of life without parole.

Text: ¶ 16. At the time of Jerry's murder, Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-21 provided that anyone convicted of capital murder shall be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary. At the time of Ilene's trial, § 97-3-21 had been revised to allow for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty but prior to the granting of the sentencing instructions, defense counsel explained to Ilene that he could urge the trial judge to submit to the jury the option of life without the possibility of parole. Defense counsel told Ilene that she would have a better chance of a life sentence if this option were provided to the jury. The trial judge asked Ilene if she understood the proposal and Ilene stated that she did. The trial judge allowed the instruction insisted upon by Ilene. She now complains that the trial judge erred. We think otherwise. ¶ 17. The jury returned a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The defense filed a motion to amend the judgment challenging the legality of the sentence. The trial judge found that the sentence did not violate the ex post facto clause of the federal or state constitutions and that the defense had waived any objections by requesting that life without possibility of parole be provided as a sentencing option. Relying on Stevenson v. State, 674 So.2d 501 (Miss.1996), the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence finding that the defense had waived any ex post facto claims. ¶ 18. In Lanier v. State, 635 So.2d 813 (Miss.1994), and Patterson v. State, 660 So.2d 966 (Miss.1995), the defendants bargained for life sentences without the possibility of parole in order to avoid the death penalty. This Court found that even though the defendants had knowingly and voluntarily waived the possibility of parole, the trial court did not have the authority to impose such a sentence. In Lanier, the defendant was originally sentenced to death, but bargained for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after his sentence was reversed and remanded. He appealed the denial of his request for post-conviction relief asking that this Court simply delete the without possibility of parole language. This Court found that the agreement was void and that upon remand, Lanier was subject to the death penalty. Lanier, 635 So.2d at 819. Patterson involved a guilty plea. In finding that the guilty plea was invalid, this Court determined that Patterson had the right to be sentenced by a jury and that the State had the right to seek the death penalty. Patterson, 660 So.2d at 969. ¶ 19. Stevenson also involved a guilty plea. This Court determined that the guilty plea was unenforceable and of no effect. Stevenson, 674 So.2d at 506. Upon remand, this Court gave the following options: (1) the State can plea bargain with Stevenson and ask for his waiver of a potential ex post facto violation and have life without possibility of parole imposed under the new statute; (2) Stevenson can go to trial with the possibility of receiving the death penalty or life imprisonment with the possibility of parole; or (3) the State can allow Stevenson to enter a plea with the imposition of a life sentence with the possibility of parole. ¶ 20. The Court of Appeals found that Stevenson allows for the waiver of an ex post facto claim. Stevenson, however, involved an invalid plea bargain. This case involves an actual sentencing instruction presented to a jury. ¶ 21. In Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), the statute at issue provided that anyone sentenced to life imprisonment must serve at least 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. The previous statute did not contain such a provision. The defendant, however, was sentenced to death. Dobbert did not receive a life sentence, and so any added onus attaching to it as a result of the change in Florida law had no effect on him. Id. at 298, 97 S.Ct. 2290. Dobbert, having been sentenced to death, may not complain of burdens attached to the life sentence under the new law which may not have attached to it under the old. Id. at 301, 97 S.Ct. 2290. ¶ 22. The Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937) (citations omitted). In California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995), however, the United States Supreme Court stated that the disadvantage language in Lindsey was unnecessary. Id. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597. [T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of `disadvantage,' ... but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. Id. ¶ 23. Unlike Dobbert, the minimum penalty in the case at hand did not change. Life imprisonment with the possibility of parole was still an option. The maximum penalty, death, also did not change. The new statute only provided for an optional sentence that was more than the minimum and less than the maximum. ¶ 24. The Court of Appeals did not specifically state that the sentence violated the ex post facto clause, but it did find that ex post facto claims could be waived. This Court, however, finds that the amended statute is ameliorative. The amended statute is not onerous. It does not alter the definition of criminal conduct or increase[] the penalty by which a crime is punishable. Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in allowing the jury to consider the option of sentencing Ilene to life without the possibility of parole. This Court finds that Ilene's sentence does not violate the ex post facto clause.