Opinion ID: 4533836
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sympathy Strike

Text: Next, Local 120 argues that refusing to cross Local 41’s picket line was a statutorily protected sympathy strike.3 The district court concluded Local 120 waived that protection in the CBA, and we agree. “Section 7 of the [NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157], generally protects employees who engage in sympathy strikes in support of a lawful, primary strike by another union.” Amcar Div., ACF Indus. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 561, 566 (8th Cir. 1981). “However, in the collective bargaining agreement, employees may waive their right to engage in sympathy strikes.” Id. (citing NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80–81 (1953)). The waiver can be express or implied, but “an implied waiver must be ‘clear and unmistakable.’” John Morrell, 913 F.2d at 551 (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983)). In addition to the language and structure of the collective bargaining agreement, courts may look to the parties’ bargaining history and any other relevant conduct that shows their understanding of the contract. Amcar, 641 F.2d at 567. The No Strike clause in Article 23 of the CBA states: “In order to assure stabilized employment and uninterrupted service, the parties hereto mutually agree that there shall be no lockout, strike or any other interference with the operation of the business during the life of this Agreement.” Citing our decisions in Amcar and 3 “A sympathy strike involves two unions; one is striking to force some concession from the employer; the other strikes in sympathy with the first’s objectives. Sympathy strikes are a common manifestation of traditional union solidarity.” John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of United Food Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 548–49 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sympathy strike, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)); Sympathy strike, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A strike by union members who have no grievance against their own employer but who want to show support for another union involved in a labor dispute.”). -10- John Morrell, Local 120 contends this language is too general and cannot be read to constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to engage in sympathy strikes. We disagree. In Amcar, we held that a no-strike clause stating “there shall be no lock out, strike, stoppage of work or slow down” was “insufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a waiver of the right to engage in sympathy strikes.” Id. Only after considering the parties’ bargaining history and other relevant extrinsic evidence did we conclude the union clearly and unmistakably waived the right to engage in sympathy strikes. Id. But here, Article 23’s No Strike clause goes significantly further than the no-strike clause in Amcar by prohibiting not only strikes generally but “any other interference with the operation of the business.” (emphasis added); see Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31 (2004) (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)). In our view, this language clearly and unmistakably encompasses sympathy strikes generally. This view is reinforced by the CBA’s separate inclusion of Article 24’s Picket Lines clause. Read together, Article 23 prohibits sympathy strikes in general, but Article 24 then carves out the ability to engage in a specific kind of sympathy strike, i.e., employees retain the right to respect another union’s primary picket line where it is on primary strike. This structure indicates Article 23’s No Strike clause refers to sympathy strikes of any other kind. See R.L. Coolsaet Constr. Co. v. Local 150, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 177 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that an “exception for certain sympathy strikes . . . strongly implies that sympathy strikes in general were included in the no-strike clause”); W-I Canteen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738, 745 (7th Cir. 1979) (“It follows from the phrasing of this [picket-line] clause as an express exception that the no-strike clause relates to sympathy strikes as well.”). Accordingly, the CBA waived the right to engage in any sympathy strike not expressly preserved in Article 24’s Picket Lines clause. And as discussed above, -11- Local 120 failed to establish that its members’ refusal to cross Local 41’s picket line was permitted by Article 24. Local 120 also argues the district court should have considered extrinsic evidence, including the parties’ bargaining history, in determining whether the right to engage in sympathy strikes was waived. We have, in prior cases, taken this approach. See Amcar, 641 F.2d at 567; Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters N. Am., 597 F.2d 1138, 1144 (8th Cir. 1979). But it is not necessary where, as here, the language and structure of the collective bargaining agreement as a whole are unambiguous and are, themselves, enough to clearly and unmistakably prohibit the kind of sympathy strike engaged in by the union. See Sara Lee Bakery Grp., 746 F.3d at 347 (explaining extrinsic evidence should not be considered unless the language of the collective bargaining agreement is ambiguous or is reasonably susceptible of another proposed meaning).