Opinion ID: 478987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Termination Agreements.

Text: 36 Appellants maintain that the district court erred in allowing the defendant to amend its answer to assert the termination agreements as defenses. Three months before trial E-M moved for summary judgment based on the releases. The district court denied the motion. It is apparent that the appellants were on notice that the releases would be relied upon by E-M. Moreover, the raising of the releases in the complaints and the denial of their fraudulent nature by E-M placed the releases in issue. We conclude that there was no prejudice to the appellants in allowing E-M to amend its answer. F.R.Civ.P. 15(a). 37 Appellants further assert that the termination agreements were fraudulent and that the trial court erroneously submitted them to the jury. Their claim rests solely on the fact that E-M's severance policy did not contain the word discretionary, as referred to in the Termination Agreements. The severance policy states that a severance may be payable. We therefore conclude that the question of whether the severance pay was in fact discretionary was properly put to and decided by the jury. 38 Appellants Thompson and Dwinnell claim they could not release their ADEA claims. In support of their position, they point to Runyan v. National Cash Register, 759 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir.1985), vacated, 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir.1986) (en banc). Relying on cases which hold that FLSA rights cannot be privately waived, the Sixth Circuit originally held that ADEA rights cannot be waived by a private, unsupervised release. 759 F.2d at 1258. However, the Sixth Circuit subsequently vacated the original panel's decision, and decided en banc that when there is a fact dispute over intent and motivation, an ADEA claim can be waived. 787 F.2d at 1044-46 (en banc). 39 The issue in the instant case is whether E-M's discharge of the appellants was in violation of the provisions of the ADEA. This is a fact dispute involving intent and motivation. Consistent with Runyan, we believe that fact disputes of this nature should be compromised and settled by the plaintiffs accepting a payment of damages in a sum less than demanded and the defendant paying damages in a sum in excess of that offered. We do not believe that a settlement of a fact dispute in this fashion compromises the policies of the ADEA, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or unconscionable overreaching, and is in accordance with encouraging amicable arm's length settlement of private disputes. 40 In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 precludes a claim of error based on improper instructions to the jury in the absence of an objection to the instruction prior to the time the jury retires to deliberate. Appellants' counsel proffered an instruction with regard to waiver of an ADEA claim after the jury had been charged, but before they had begun to deliberate. Counsel did not provide the court below with either authority for the proposition, nor a clear explanation of the theory upon which the proffered instruction was based. As a result, even if there were reason to believe that appellants Dwinnell and Thompson could not have released their ADEA claims, we conclude that this argument was improperly preserved for appeal. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the appellants' proffered instruction with regard to the waiver of the ADEA claim. 41 Finding no error in the district court's rulings on the Termination Agreements, we affirm its denial of a new trial on this ground. 42