Opinion ID: 3019200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Risk of Torture and Death Upon Extradition

Text: Lastly, Petitioner asserts that he should be granted habeas relief because he will be tortured and may be killed by the Albanian authorities if he is extradited.13 Under the traditional 11 In that case, the Albanian High Court explicitly rejected a claim that the extradition treaty between the United States and Albania was invalid. 12 Petitioner also argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying Petitioner’s request to provide evidence from a legal expert who would have testified about the history of the extradition treaty. Given that the critical factor in determining treaty validity is the intent of the participating governments and that both Albania and the United States recognize the validity of the treaty, the testimony of the expert was not relevant. The Magistrate Judge’s ruling therefore was not an abuse of discretion. 13 The “torture” Hoxha fears is being beaten and tortured as a police suspect and as a prisoner. As the District Court noted, “[t]he U.S. State Department is aware that Albanian police have beaten and tortured suspects and that prison conditions in 13 doctrine of “non-inquiry,” such humanitarian considerations are within the purview of the executive branch and generally should not be addressed by the courts in deciding whether a petitioner is extraditable. See, e.g., Sidali, 107 F.3d at 195 n.7 (“[W]e note that it is the function of the Secretary of State—not the courts—to determine whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian grounds.”); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Under the rule of non-inquiry, courts refrain from investigating the fairness of a requesting nation’s justice system, and from inquiring into the procedures or treatment which await a surrendered fugitive in the requesting country.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The non-inquiry principle serves interests of international comity by relegating to political actors the sensitive foreign policy judgments that are often involved in the question of whether to refuse an extradition request. See Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990); Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005). Once an individual is certified by a court as extraditable, the Secretary of State “exercises broad discretion and may properly consider factors affecting both the individual defendant as well as foreign relations” in deciding whether extradition is appropriate. Sidali, 107 F.3d at 195 n.7; see also Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 109-110 (noting that “[t]he Secretary may . . . decline to surrender the relator on any number of discretionary grounds, including but not limited to, humanitarian Albania are poor.” Hoxha v. Levi, 371 F. Supp. 2d 651, 660 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Albania – 2004 (Feb. 28, 2005)). The District Court went on to articulate its own concerns that Hoxha would be subject to these abuses and strongly encouraged the State Department to “seriously examine the charges of torture that Hoxha has levied against Albanian authorities and faithfully uphold[] this Government’s clear policy of refusing to extradite a person when there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be subject to torture.” Id. We echo the Court’s concerns and urge the State Department to consider seriously Hoxha’s allegations, particularly in light of the declarations from Daut, Bajame, and Ardjana Hoxha averring that their initial statements were the product of torture by the Albanian police. 14 and foreign policy considerations,” and “may also elect to use diplomatic methods to obtain fair treatment for the relator”). Under the principle of non-inquiry, and in view of the evidence before it, the District Court correctly declined to consider Petitioner’s humanitarian claims in the context of the extraditability analysis.14 Petitioner nonetheless argues that his humanitarian arguments are relevant under Section 2422 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARR”), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998) (codified as Note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231), which implemented Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the “Torture Convention”).15 Section 2422(a) of FARR provides: 14 In Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960), the Second Circuit suggested in dicta that an exception to the noninquiry principle might exist in particularly extreme cases. Id. at 79 (“We can imagine situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court’s sense of decency as to require reexamination” of the non-inquiry principle.). Since Gallina, several courts have hinted at the existence of such an exception. See, e.g., Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999) (assuming possibility of Gallina exception but finding it inapplicable in the case presented); Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 112 (same). But see Martin v. Warden, Atlanta Pen, 993 F.2d 824, 830 n.10 (11th Cir. 1993) (rejecting Gallina dicta). The exception remains theoretical, however, because no federal court has applied it to grant habeas relief in an extradition case. Regardless of whether such an exception might be justified in some circumstances, we find that it does not apply here. 15 The United States has ratified the Torture Convention. See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 130-32 (3d Cir. 2005). The Convention is not self-executing, however, and therefore does not in itself create judicially enforceable rights. Id. at 132 & n.7 (“Treaties that are not self-executing do not create judicially-enforceable rights unless they are first given effect by 15 It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States. This policy is to be enforced by the heads of “the appropriate agencies”—here, the Department of State—who “shall prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3” of the Torture Convention. Section 2242(b). FARR also provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the [Torture] Convention or this section, or any other determination made with respect to the application of the policy set forth in subsection (a), except as part of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . . Section 2242(d). Although this provision makes clear that FARR does not create court jurisdiction, Petitioner contends that the Secretary of State’s enforcement of FARR is reviewable by the federal courts under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000). The APA provides that court review is available as to “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. In response, the government argues that court review is unavailable because FARR did not abrogate the principle of non-inquiry, and that principle precludes review of the Secretary’s actions.16 This implementing legislation.”). 16 The Ninth Circuit discussed this issue in a series of cases beginning in 2000. In Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 16 debate is premature. The APA provides for review of “final agency action,” but the Secretary of State has yet to take any action on Petitioner’s case, and may ultimately decide not to extradite Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner’s claim under the APA is not ripe for review, and we decline to consider it at this time. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the United States recognizes that Petitioner’s 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Cornejo-Barreto I”), the Ninth Circuit held that, under FARR and the APA, “a fugitive fearing torture may petition [through habeas corpus] for review of the Secretary’s decision to surrender him” following a court certification of extraditability. Id. at 1014-15. Because the Secretary had not yet made an extradition decision in the case, the Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief without prejudice to a new filing should the Secretary decide to extradite the petitioner. Id. at 1016-17. After the Secretary made the decision to extradite, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition, based on CornejoBarreto I. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the conclusion in Cornejo-Barreto I as to the availability of APA review was non-binding dicta, because the Secretary had not yet made a decision to extradite when that case was decided. CornejoBarreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Cornejo-Barreto II”). Considering the issue anew, the Court concluded that, under the doctrine of non-inquiry, the Secretary’s decision to extradite was not subject to judicial review, and FARR and the APA did nothing to change this result. Id. at 1087. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in the case, but following the government’s decision to withdraw its extradition claim, the case was dismissed as moot. Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 386 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004); Cornejo-Barretto v. Siefert, 389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004). As a result, neither Cornejo-Barreto I nor Cornejo-Barreto II is binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit. 17 claim under the APA is not ripe, it urges us to resolve the claim nonetheless, arguing that leaving open the possibility of a second round of court review in extradition proceedings disrupts extradition law and interferes with the Executive Branch’s ability to fulfill its duties. This argument is unconvincing. Our refusal to address Petitioner’s APA claim leaves this area of extradition law unchanged, and does not inject any new uncertainty into extradition proceedings. Moreover, the ripeness doctrine clearly precludes us from resolving questions that will have practical relevance to the parties only if a contingent event occurs at some future time. See Wyatt, Virgin Islands, Inc. v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 385 F.3d 801, 806 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that a case “ripe for judicial intervention . . . cannot be ‘nebulous or contingent’ but ‘must have taken on fixed and final shape so that a court can see what legal issues it is deciding, what effect its decision will have on the adversaries, and some useful purpose to be achieved in deciding them’”) (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952)). Nothing in our jurisprudence suggests that we abandon that principle here. Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the District Court’s finding that Petitioner’s humanitarian arguments in this case are irrelevant to the certification decision. We do not address Petitioner’s additional assertion that, should the Secretary of State decide to extradite Petitioner, we would have jurisdiction to review that decision under the APA.