Opinion ID: 427394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: an expedition into free exercise doctrine

Text: 16 Interpretation and application of the free exercise clause has created, within that field of constitutional doctrine, areas dotted by unanswered questions. Fortunately, those unanswered questions do not hinder resolution of the issues in this case. A tour through the doctrine including the areas of uncertainty, will serve, however, to highlight the reasons behind our confidence of result in this case. In the course of this tour, we first traverse the surface of two threshold principles of free exercise doctrine. We then turn to the doctrinal centerpiece, balancing itself, and discuss the weighing of government interests, the weighing of religious interests, and the reaching of a final equilibrium.
17 Before a court balances competing governmental and religious interest, the challenged government action must pass two threshold tests. The first test distinguishes government regulation of religious beliefs and opinions from restrictions affecting religious conduct. The government may never regulate religious beliefs; but, the Constitution does not prohibit absolutely government regulation of religious conduct. Given a regulation's focus on conduct, government action passes this first threshold. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). 5 18 The second threshold principle requires that a law have both a secular purpose and a secular effect to pass constitutional muster. First, a law may not have a sectarian purpose--governmental action violates the Constitution if it is based upon disagreement with religious tenets or practices, or if it is aimed at impeding religion. Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, 366 U.S. at 607, 81 S.Ct. at 1148. Second, a law violates the free exercise clause if the essential effect of the government action is to influence negatively the pursuit of religious activity or the expression of religious belief. Id. This is not to say that any government actions significantly affecting religion fail this threshold test. Rather, any nonsecular effect, regardless of its significance, must be only an incident of the secular effect. 6 Past these two thresholds, we now begin our journey into balancing.
19 If a government action challenged under the free exercise clause survives passage through the belief/conduct and secular purpose and effect thresholds, the court then faces the difficult task of balancing government interests against the impunged religious interest. This constitutional balancing is not a simple process. We gain some sense of direction, however, from one basic principle: the balance depends upon the cost to the government of altering its activity to allow the religious practice to continue unimpeded versus the cost to the religious interest imposed by the government activity. This principle marks the path of least impairment of constitutional values. And, although previous court balancings provide us more detailed guidance in assigning weights to the competing values, the balancing map is far from complete. While we turn to examine previous precedent for the guidance that it can supply, we must keep in mind that our journey is into an area of the free exercise landscape where solid ground occasionally gives way to crevices of uncertainty. 20 1. The Burden on the Government.--In general, the burden on the governmental interest depends upon the importance of the underlying policy interests and the degree of impairment of those interests if the regulation were changed to impose no burden on religious conduct. One principle that has emerged in free exercise doctrine, the least restrictive means test, reflects the logic of our calculus. That is simply, if the government can effectuate its policy through a nonburdening technique the degree of impairment equals zero. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of three Jehovah's Witnesses for breach of the peace and for soliciting contributions without a state certificate. The defendants' conduct consisted of going house to house and playing an anti-Catholic record to those who would listen. In reversing the convictions, the Supreme Court reasoned that the government's actions went beyond the least drastic, most narrowly constructed means of accomplishing state goals. Prevention of fraud and maintenance of public safety were held to require neither a discretionary licensing system for religious solicitation, nor arrest of nonthreatening, nonabusive individuals for breach of the peace. The government did not need to burden religious practice to accomplish its secular goals. 21 In cases like Cantwell, where the government suffers no burden in changing its actions to accommodate religious conduct, any sectarian interest regardless of how lightly it weighs wins the balancing. Properly analyzed, therefore, the least restrictive means test constitutes just a special application of the general balancing test. 22 Free exercise doctrine suggests another step in implementing the government burden formula outlined above: we must consider the impact of a specific, religion-based exception upon government's policy objectives. In contrast to the clarity of the least restrictive means test, however, ambiguities pervade the standard for determining whether a religion-based exception is constitutionally mandated. In Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania's Sunday retail sales prohibition against a free exercise challenge. A merchant and member of the Orthodox Jewish Faith claimed that the mandated Sunday closing prevented him from compensating for the business he lost by following his faith's command that he not work on Saturday. In rejecting his contention that the state must grant a religion-based exception to the Sunday closing laws, the Court was deferential to government assertions that any exception would be unworkable. The court relied on reason and experience in concluding that potential problems in administration and enforcement necessitated the law's blanket application. 23 In contrast, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), while declining to overrule Braunfeld in any respect, applied a religious exception standard much more exacting of the government. Sherbert struck down a state's application of its law where the effect was to pressure a worker to abandon her religious convictions regarding the day of rest. The worker had been discharged from her job because of her refusal to work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. Application of the state's unemployment compensation eligibility rules resulted in denial of her claim for unemployment compensation benefits. In discussing the government's asserted interests in not granting an exception to the eligibility regulations the Court rejected, as unsupported by any proof in the record, the contention that an exception would induce fraudulent compensation claims based on feigned religious objections. Government arguments that administrative problems would result from having to determine the legitimacy of exemption claims and that granting exceptions would undermine the soundness of the unemployment fund also failed to impress the Court. 24 But then, in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982), government arguments similar to the ones that failed in Sherbert convinced the Court that a religion-based exception to a challenged law would be too costly. The free exercise claim in Lee stemmed from the federal government's collection of social security taxes from all employers. Although the payment of social security taxes violated the religious beliefs of the Amish, the Court held that the government's interest in the integrity of the social security system outweighed the burden on religion. The rejection of a religion-based exception rested explicitly upon concerns about the potential impact of such an exception on the program's fiscal soundness. 25 Conflicting indications from Sherbert on one hand and Braunfeld and Lee on the other leave open important questions as to when a religious exemption is mandated: How much weight should be given the potential for feigned religious claims for exemption? To what extent can a court consider administrative costs and inconvenience as opposed to necessary impairment of the primary policy goal? Generally, what degree of impact upon the government's broad policy goal should be tolerated before rejecting exceptions? 26 2. The Burden on Religion.--Having examined existing guidelines for measuring the burden on government, our journey changes direction and we turn to the religion side of the calculus. The formula for calculating the burden on religion essentially parallels the formula used to figure the government's burden. The importance of the burdened practice within the particular religion's doctrines and the degree of interference caused by the government both figure into the calculus. Symmetry between the government burden formula and the religion burden formula is not complete, however. Although a focus on the importance of a religious belief occasionally proves instructive, 7 the determination of how important the practice is can prove more difficult than evaluating the importance of a government policy. Religious doctrine may exist, to a large extent, as a reflection of individual adherents' interpretations. Reliable indicia of the importance of particular religious conduct may be hard to find. Courts, therefore, often restrict themselves to determining whether the challenged conduct is rooted in religious belief or involves only secular, philosophical or personal choices. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-216, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (1980). Only conduct flowing from religious belief merits free exercise protection; no weight measures on the side of religion unless the government action ultimately affects a religious practice. This latter determination is also difficult, but it is one that must be made in all free exercise challenges. Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 215-216, 92 S.Ct. at 1533. Id. Finer distinctions, as to the weight of the burden, must usually be based upon the degree of interference element in the formula. 27 Focusing on the degree of interference factor, it is clear that when the government totally precludes religious conduct by imposing criminal sanctions, the burden weighs at its heaviest. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at 307-308, 60 S.Ct. at 904-905. Less clear is how courts are to estimate the burden on religion when the government does not criminally prohibit religious conduct but infringes upon free exercise in some other way. In Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563, the Supreme Court appeared to indicate that burdens on religion, other than affirmative impositions of criminal penalties, weigh lightly against government interests. Creating a direct/indirect dichotomy with which to classify burdens on religion, the Court said: 28 In [cases where religious practices conflict with the public interest], to make accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority is a particularly delicate task, [citations omitted] because resolution in favor of the State results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution. But ... this is not the case before us because the statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive. 29 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, 366 U.S. at 605, 81 S.Ct. at 1147. The Court further noted that to strike down legislation which imposes only indirect burdens would, absent the most critical scrutiny, radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature. Id. This distinction led to a conclusion that, 30 if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden. 31 Id. at 1148. Under such an analysis the real-world impact of a burden--in Braunfeld, the merchant's choice between his religion and his business--becomes a second level inquiry. By creating a presumption of validity for laws meeting the secular purpose and effect standard and imposing only indirect burdens, Braunfeld produced a wide fissure through which certain government actions can escape thorough-going balancing. 32 The Supreme Court moved to narrow the width of that fissure two years later in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965. The state's defense of its unemployment compensation eligibility rules centered on the fact that the burden on religious conduct did not result from criminal liability. Rather, the state maintained that the burden on religious conduct flowed indirectly from state welfare legislation. The Court rejected this argument in broad terms. 33 Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derived solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship. 34 Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. at 404, 83 S.Ct. at 1794. Recently, the Court employed identical reasoning to strike down a state's denial of unemployment compensation benefits when a worker quit because of religious objections to working in his employer's weapons production department. Thomas v. Review Board of the Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). Although Sherbert specifically avoids overruling Braunfeld, combined with Thomas it significantly transforms Braunfeld 's direct/indirect distinction. Affirmative imposition of criminal penalties no longer distinguishes direct from indirect governmental burdens. Absent the illumination that the penalty versus benefit distinction provided, the contours and consequences of the direct/indirect distinction are less obvious. It is especially unclear whether Braunfeld still creates presumptive validity for governmental actions that impose only indirect burdens. 8 No Supreme Court case since Braunfeld has relied on the direct/indirect rhetoric to uphold governmental action. 35 One unifying principle for calculating the burden on religion remains intact, however. Governmental actions that burden religious conduct by focusing on the conduct itself, regardless of whether the action constitutes an imposition of a penalty or a denial of a benefit, impose heavy burdens on religion. 36 3. The Final Balance.--In our examination of the methods by which burdens on government and religion are calculated two principles surfaced that merit repetition here. The first flows from the least restrictive means test. When the government can as easily achieve its policy objective without burdening religious conduct, the burden on the government is zero and the scale necessarily reads against upholding the government action. Similarly, the second principle operates when the burden on religion is zero. When the burden imposed by the government rests on conduct rooted only in secular philosophy or personal preference, the scale always reads in favor of upholding the government action. 37 Another principle appears if we reexamine the Supreme Court's balancings in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965, Thomas v. Review Board of the Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15. The Supreme Court suggests in Sherbert and Thomas that once a government action passes the threshold tests of conduct focus and secular purpose and effect, a showing of compelling state interest on the government side will justify inroads on religious liberty. Yoder articulates the standard differently, referring to interests of the highest order. Substantively, however, the same message emanates from all three cases. If avoiding the burden on government rises to the very upper ranges of government interest, a free exercise challenge will fail. 38 Beyond this basic principle, though, we must make our way without the guiding beacons of sure and certain legal principles. When the government interest in continuing an action that burdens religion does not rise to those upper ranges, the standards are vague as to what government interests will counterbalance free exercise interests. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971), individuals, who opposed the Vietnam War on the grounds of conscience and religion and desired exemption from military service, asserted that the government's restriction of conscientious objector status to those who objected to all war rather than a particular war violated their free exercise rights. The Court held the government's substantial interest in maintaining a fair and evenhanded system of exempting individuals from military service sufficient to override the asserted burden on religion. 39 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) indicated that a whole range of government interests can justify burdening religion, the requisite level depending upon the significance of that burden. There, the free exercise challenge involving the government's denial of veteran's educational benefits to conscientious objectors who performed alternative civilian service failed. The government's interest proved to be of a kind and weight to justify the very minor burden on religion. This language suggests that an ad hoc balancing is appropriate when existing, broad principles do not command the result. 40 Viewed collectively, relevant Supreme Court cases provide only the most general hints for reaching a proper, final balance of free exercise and government interests. Little background exists as to what constitutes a substantial government interest. And, courts called upon to make an ad hoc balance receive precedent guidance only in the discrete factual contexts involved in prior balancings.