Opinion ID: 774755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: crst

Text: 25 CRST asserts that the insurance policy affords coverage of its claim because its lease agreement with Rapid was an insured contract which fell under an exception to the policy's contractual liability exclusion. CRST also argues that section IV(C) of the SIR endorsement does not apply to its claim because that exclusion applies to claims arising out of tort and CRST's claim arises out of contract. Likewise, CRST contends that the District Court erred in holding that (1) the SIR endorsement was a provision of the contract, 6 (2) the insurance contract was unambiguous, and (3) CRST failed to establish the basis for the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine. We respectfully disagree. 26 We hold that the CRST-Rapid lease agreement was not an insured contract under Iowa law, because it was not specific enough to create an obligation in CRST to indemnify Rapid against Rapid's own negligence. [A]n indemnity agreement generally will not be construed to cover losses to the indemnitee caused by his own negligence. In order to do so the agreement must be clear and unequivocally expressed. Evans v. Howard R. Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 916 (Iowa 1975); Herter v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., 492 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1992). General, broad and all-inclusive language is insufficient for the purpose. Evans, 231 N.W.2d at 916. The CRST-Rapid lease agreement provides: 27 Indemnity. Lessee shall indemnify Lessor against, and hold Lessor harmless from any and all claims, actions, suits, proceedings, costs, expenses, damages and liabilities, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys fees and court costs arising out of, connected with, or resulting from the equipment, including without limitation the manufacture, selection, delivery, possession, use, operation or return of the equipment. 28 JA 26. 29 Rapid seeks indemnification for amounts it paid in defense and settlement of Mr. Veasley's negligence claim. Therefore, Rapid seeks indemnification for losses it suffered because of its own negligence. The language in the indemnification provision is insufficiently clear to cover losses to Rapid caused by its own negligence. The indemnification provision at issue here is unlike the ones enforced in Thornton v. Guthrie Co. Rural Elec. Coop. Assoc., 467 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Iowa 1991) (indemnification provided regardless of whether [losses] were caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder), Payne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Bob McKines Excavating & Grading, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Iowa 1986) (subcontractor agrees to indemnify contractor regardless of whether or not [loss or damage] is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder), Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 534 F.2d 775, 785 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Iowa law) (party agreed to indemnify city for loss or damage that occurred through any excavation, structure, or device of any kind, made, placed or permitted to exist by the city), or Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 521 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Iowa 1994) (Licensee forever indemnifies the Railway Company against and agrees to save it harmless from any and all claims... even though the operation of the Railway Company's railroad may have caused or contributed thereto). 30 In fact, the language here is more akin to the language considered too general in Evans and Trushcheff v. Abell-Howe Co., 239 N.W.2d 116 (Iowa 1976). The agreement in Trushcheff provided: 31 It is understood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor will indemnify and save harmless the General Contractor and the Owner from and against any and all claims for injury or death to persons or damage to property (including cost of litigation and attorneys' fees) in any manner caused by, arising from, incident to, connected with or growing out of the work to be performed under this contract regardless of whether such claim is alleged to be caused, in whole or in part, by negligence or otherwise on the part of the Sub-Contractor, its employees, agents or servants. 32 Trushcheff, 239 N.W.2d at 134. 33 Similarly, the agreement in Evans provided, 34 In the event of any suit against the Owner, its officers, engineers, or employees on account of any alleged act or omission of the Contractor, the Contractor shall defend said suits and shall pay any and all judgments or settlements resulting therefrom and failing so to do, any judgments against or settlements made on account thereof shall become a lien against any funds due the Contractor and may be held by the Owner from any funds due the Contractor. 35 Evans, 231 N.W.2d at 915-16. 36 Neither does the language in the indemnification provision here evidence a clear intent to indemnify Rapid for its own negligence. See Hysell, 534 F.2d at 785 (stating a contract need not expressly specify that it will operate to indemnify a party for its own negligence if the clear intent of the language is to provide such indemnification). Since the indemnification provision is ineffective, CRST is not contractually obligated to assume the tort liability of another, and the lease agreement is not an insured contract. Thus, CRST's claim for liability assumed under the CRST-Rapid lease agreement is excluded by the policy. 37 Since we have determined that the CRST-Rapid lease agreement was not an insured contract under Iowa law, and since CRST's assertions of ambiguity depend on the definition of an insured contract under the policy, we hold that the policy unambiguously excludes coverage. Also, for the same reasons that the doctrine of reasonable expectations does not apply to Rapid, we hold it does not apply to CRST. 38 Because our holding disposes of CRST's claim, we do not address its remaining assignments of error on appeal.