Opinion ID: 2159046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Unsupported Factual Findings

Text: Hill next argues a reversal of the commissioner's decision is necessary because he utilized facts not present in the record. We consider this issue under the confines of section 17A.19(10): The court shall reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action, equitable or legal and including declaratory relief, if it determines that substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced because the agency action is ... [b]ased upon a determination of fact ... that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)( f ) (emphasis added). We have found this substantial rights language analogous to a harmless error rule. City of Des Moines v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 1979); see Bonfield, at 61 (labeling section 17A.19(10) simply a rule of harmless error). We recognize the commissioner's action should not be tampered with unless the complaining party has in fact been harmed. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d at 759. This form of analysis is appropriate because it would be inefficient for us to provide relief from invalid agency action when the particular invalidity has not prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioner. Bonfield, at 61. Therefore, Hill bears the burden of demonstrating both the invalidity of the agency's action and resulting prejudice. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)( a ); see Titan Tire Corp. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 641 N.W.2d 752, 758 (Iowa 2002) (it [would be] unnecessary to determine whether the ALJ erred or abused its discretion in admitting this evidence because [petitioner] has not shown that any error prejudiced its substantial rights). We will analyze whether each disputed statement was supported by facts in the record and then analyze whether the inclusion resulted in prejudice to Hill.