Opinion ID: 1697047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: constitutionality of adoption statutes as applied

Text: Armour contends that the application of the adoption statutes to his case denied him due process. Armour argues that because he filed a notice of intent to claim paternity within 5 days under § 43-104.02, applying § 43-104.05 deprives him of his constitutionally protected interest of parenting his child. At the time Armour filed his petition for adjudication of paternity in district court, § 43-104.05 provided in part: If a notice of intent to claim paternity and obtain custody is timely filed with the biological father registry pursuant to section 43-104.02, either the claimant-father, the mother, or her agent specifically designated in writing shall, within thirty days after filing the notice, file a petition in the court in the county where such child is a resident for an adjudication of the claim of paternity and right to custody. If such a petition is not filed within thirty days after filing the notice, the claimant-father's consent to adoption of the child shall not be required and any alleged parental rights of the claimant-father shall not be recognized thereafter in any court. Section 43-104.22 provided: The court shall determine that the biological father's consent is not required for a valid adoption of the child upon a finding of one or more of the following: .... (7) The father failed to timely file a petition to adjudicate his claim of paternity and right to custody as contemplated in section 43-104.05[.] This court has not addressed whether § 43-104.22 can violate due process as applied. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that state intervention in a parent-child relationship is subject to constitutional oversight. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). The Court has held that an established familial relationship is a liberty interest entitled to substantial due process protection. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). But the Court has made clear that the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985. The Court explained that the protection given to the familial relationship stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association. Thus, when a biological father has not taken the opportunity to form a relationship with his child, the constitution does not afford him an absolute right to notice and opportunity to be heard before a child may be adopted. As the Court explained: The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie. 463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985. In Lehr, the putative father of a child born out of wedlock never supported the child and failed to enter his name in his state's putative father registry, 463 U.S. at 251, 103 S.Ct. 2985, which would have entitled him to notice of any adoption proceedings. When the child was over 2 years old, the biological mother and her husband filed a petition for adoption and an order of adoption was entered. The biological father sought to vacate the adoption, arguing that the requirement that he file notice with the putative father registry in order to be given notice of the adoption violated his constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the putative father failed to grasp any opportunity interest he had in raising his child. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that it was concerned only with whether the state had adequately protected the putative father's opportunity to form a relationship with his child. The Court held that the putative father registry protected that right and further stated that the possibility that the father failed to use the registry because of his ignorance of the law could not be a sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself. In Nebraska, a putative father is required under § 43-104.02 to file a notice of intent to claim paternity within 5 days of either the child's birth or receiving notice from an agency or attorney of the birth. Under § 43-104.04, if the putative father fails to file such a notice, his consent or relinquishment are not required. Citing to Lehr, we held in Friehe v. Schaad, 249 Neb. 825, 545 N.W.2d 740 (1996), that §§ 43-104.02 and 43-104.04 did not violate due process as applied. In Friehe, the putative father, after learning of the child's birth, infrequently visited the child at the hospital. The father agreed to place the child in temporary foster care and did not file a notice of intent to claim paternity within the 5 day time period required by § 43-104.05. The putative father argued that §§ 43-104.02 and 43-104.04 unconstitutionally violated his rights to due process and equal protection. We noted that the liberty interest at stake did not involve the termination of established custodial rights. Instead, the interest involved was a putative father's opportunity to potentially form a familial bond with his child. We then specifically noted the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lehr as follows: `The Constitution does not require either a trial judge or a litigant to give special notice to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting and protecting their own rights.' 249 Neb. at 836, 545 N.W.2d at 748, quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). We held that the putative father had it within his own power to assert his rights and obtain an opportunity to be heard by filing a notice of intent to claim paternity. Because it was his own failure to act upon the notice given to him of the child's birth, we determined that his due process claim was without merit. Armour did not have an established familial relationship with the child guaranteeing him due process protection. Armour never saw the child and did not assist in paying for the child's birth or in supporting the child. Armour did, however, timely file a notice of intent to claim paternity pursuant to § 43-104.02, in which he acknowledged his obligation to pay support. Armour later failed to timely file a petition for adjudication of paternity under § 43-104.05 because his attorney filed the first petition in the wrong court. A motion for visitation was also filed in the wrong court. The question is whether Armour has sufficiently grasped his opportunity interest in a relationship with his child requiring further notice of adoption proceedings and an opportunity to be heard under the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. In accordance with Lehr, when Armour failed to file a petition for adjudication of paternity under § 43-104.05, Armour and his attorney were presumed to know the law. Indeed, Armour's notice of intent to claim paternity, filed under § 43-104.02, stated that he understood that he must file a petition for adjudication of paternity in the county court within 30 days. That the error of filing in the wrong court was made by Armour's attorney does not change the analysis. As Lehr makes clear, the issue is whether the state has adequately protected the putative father's opportunity interest. The failure to properly follow § 43-104.05 because of ignorance of the law can not be a sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself. As we indicated in Friehe, Armour is presumptively capable of asserting and protecting his own rights. Further, after our decision in Armour v. L.H., 259 Neb. 138, 608 N.W.2d 599 (2000), Armour failed to make any further attempts to comply with § 43-104.05. As a result, Armour failed to ever file a petition for adjudication of paternity in county court. We determine that it was not impossible for Armour to properly comply with § 43-104.05 and that he was not denied any reasonable opportunity to do so. The statutes at issue adequately protected Armour's opportunity to form a relationship with his child. We determine that Armour did not sufficiently grasp his opportunity interest and that the application of §§ 43-104.05 and 43-104.22 to Armour's case did not deprive him of due process.