Opinion ID: 150080
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Protected Act

Text: The filing of a trademark application is a formal communication to the USPTO seeking official action in a process governed by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (Application for registration; verification). We conclude that the application is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute as a writing made before . . . [an] executive [or] . . . other official proceeding authorized by law. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(e)(1). The application may also be a writing made in connection with an issue under consideration . . . by . . . [an] executive . . . body, or any other official proceeding. Id. § 425.16(e)(2). California appellate courts interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute have distinguished between communications made in the course of official proceedings, which are protected, and mere ministerial business communications, which are not. For example, in ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1009, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 (2001), the court of appeal found that filing a complaint with the SEC that was designed to solicit an investigation qualified at least as a statement before an official proceeding under § 425.16(e)(1). [C]ommunication to an official administrative agency . . . designed to prompt action by that agency is as much a part of the `official proceeding' as a communication made after the proceeding had commenced. Id. (internal citations and some quotation marks omitted). In Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District, 39 Cal.4th 192, 199, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 41, 138 P.3d 193 (2006), the California Supreme Court held that a hospital's peer review procedure qualifies as an `official proceeding authorized by law'. . . because that procedure is required under [California] Business and Professions Code section 805 et seq., governing hospital peer review proceedings. In Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 52 Cal. App.4th 1036, 1049, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 (1997), the court of appeal similarly concluded that an investigative audit conducted by a state auditor was an authorized, public proceeding because it is government-sponsored and provided for by statute. In contrast, California appellate courts have held that ministerial acts involving primarily private transactions are not protected acts. For example, in Blackburn v. Brady, 116 Cal.App.4th 670, 677, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 696 (2004), the court of appeal rejected the contention that statements made in connection with a Sheriff's auction could amount to protected speech under the anti-SLAPP law. The ministerial event of a Sheriff's sale or auction simply does not concern an issue under review or determine some disputed matter as contemplated under the anti-SLAPP law. Id. It was a mere business dealing or transaction. Id.; see also Kajima Eng'g & Constr., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 932, 116 Cal. Rptr.2d 187 (2002) (The submission of contractual claims for payment in the regular course of business before the commencement of litigation simply is not an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.) (citing People ex rel. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Bldg. Permit Consultants, Inc., 86 Cal.App.4th 280, 285, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 71 (2000); Ericsson GE Mobile Commc'ns, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomms. Eng'rs, 49 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601-02, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 491 (1996)). Filing a trademark application is more than merely a ministerial act connected with a business transaction. It is an attempt to establish a property right under a comprehensive federal statutory scheme. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992); 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (registering a trademark provides constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership thereof). The filing party seeks a determination by USPTO examiners that it is the presumptive owner of a protectable mark. See, e.g., Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBAY, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2007) (Registration of a mark on the Principal Register in the Patent and Trademark Office constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark on the goods and services specified in the registration. (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)); Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir.2005) (Federal registration of a mark constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark.). We therefore conclude that such a filing is a protected act under the anti-SLAPP statute.