Opinion ID: 1394852
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Intimidation of Eugene Wallace

Text: (11) Petitioner claims that the referee's determinations relating to prosecutorial interference with his constitutional right to present the testimony of Eugene Wallace at trial are supported by the law and the evidence. He relies on the portion of the report summarized below. Eugene Wallace was Powell's cellmate throughout Powell's confinement in the San Diego County jail during the summer of 1981, and was facing robbery charges. He would have testified at petitioner's trial that he helped Powell fabricate a story to implicate petitioner in the Crake murder. He was prepared to tell the prosecution about Powell's efforts to frame petitioner as early as mid-June 1981. He had asked his then defense attorney, Charles Adair, to inform the prosecution of information he had pertaining to another case. Adair confirmed he had such a discussion with Wallace. Following petitioner's arrest, the report goes on, Wallace read about Powell's story in the newspapers. Through another inmate, Michelle Bernard, Wallace made contact with petitioner's attorney, Leslie Osborne, and told him he had valuable exculpatory information. Osborne learned Wallace and Bernard wanted bail and an enormous sum of money in return for the information they had about Powell and an alleged document that was a script worked out by Powell and other inmates to frame petitioner. Osborne feigned agreement to the terms and immediately contacted the prosecution. The prosecution arranged a fake release  or phony roll out  of Wallace and Bernard in the hope the inmates would bring whatever documents they had with them when they were about to be freed. On September 22, 1981, the phony roll out took place. Found in the belongings of Wallace was a paper bearing Powell's handwriting which gave directions to petitioner's office and details about his family and other personal matters. Later that same day, Wallace was interviewed by investigator Wilson. Wilson and Wallace differ on their recall of the conversation. Wallace testified he told Wilson that petitioner was not guilty and that the district attorney's office was prosecuting the wrong man. He said he had helped Powell fabricate his story to frame petitioner. Wilson told him he did not know anything about the case and it sounded like he was involved in an extortion attempt which could bring on habitual criminal charges. Wilson admitted having small talk with Wallace about extortion and being handled as a career criminal. He also admitted probably talking to Wallace about sentence enhancements. Further, he admitted that Wallace claimed Powell fabricated the story. By September 1981, the report continued, Barton Sheela represented Wallace on his pending robbery charges. His representation began in mid-1981 and extended through the spring of 1982. During his negotiations with the district attorney's office, he was never told of the alleged extortion or related possible charges alluded to by Wilson in his September 22, 1981, interview with Wallace. When Wallace was subpoenaed to testify in petitioner's trial in March of 1982, however, prosecutor Pippin informed Sheela in no uncertain terms  according to Sheela  that if Wallace testified, he would be prosecuted for any crimes his testimony disclosed. Pippin also made clear he would cross-examine Wallace on the extortion. According to Sheela, Wallace was well aware of Aguilar's arrest. He advised Wallace, There was probably close to 100 percent probability that he'd be prosecuted if he testified on petitioner's behalf. Sheela was of the impression the prosecution's intent was to persuade Wallace not to testify. Wallace expressed to Sheela his concern about Wilson's threatening statements in the September 22, 1981, interview. Pippin, the report continues, testified he gave Sheela the same admonition he had previously given Riley's attorney, Matthew Lees  he was blanketly refusing to grant immunity of any kind to any witness in this trial, and if Wallace testified and implicated himself in a crime he would be prosecuted if he could be. Pippin was aware of the September 22, 1981, interview. By the time of petitioner's trial, he believed Wallace could have been charged with attempted extortion. To Pippin's knowledge, however, Wallace had not been informed, prior to petitioner's trial, that he would actually face such a charge. It appears a real threat to prosecute Wallace for the alleged plot to commit extortion arose when he was about to testify for petitioner. Wallace explained his refusal to testify at petitioner's trial: he felt threatened by Wilson's September 22, 1981, statements; he believed on the basis of Pippin's statements that if he testified he could be prosecuted; he felt sure that the prosecution would make good on its threat because of Aguilar's arrest. The portion of the report summarized above concludes as follows. Petitioner has sustained his burden of proof in demonstrating witness Eugene Wallace was intimidated and refused to testify based upon such intimidation. Here, the prosecution was well aware of Wallace's alleged effort to extort money beginning from September 22, 1981. At no time during the months which followed did the prosecution mention bringing such charges against Wallace. The issue of extortion arose only when Wallace appeared as a witness for Martin. As with Mr. Riley, Mr. Pippin's statements alone are sufficient to find witness intimidation. Telling only defense witnesses they will be prosecuted if they testify and implicate themselves in any crime is far too threatening and over broad a statement, and completely unnecessary as a response to a question on whether he will grant the witness immunity. A simple no would have sufficed. Additionally, Mr. Wilson's admitted statements to Wallace concerning possible extortion charges, a career criminal act prosecution, and sentence enhancements, were hardly calculated to encourage later cooperation of Wallace with petitioner's defense. Coupled with the arrest of Aguilar and Mr. Pippin's announced position to Sheela, Wallace reasonably would believe his testimony for Martin would bring on a plague of criminal charges. Further, the testimony of attorney Bart Sheela corroborates Martin's claim Wallace was intimidated. Sheela, a former Assistant United States Attorney and county prosecutor, testified Mr. Pippin did not merely state a position of his office, but went out of his way to say Wallace would be prosecuted if he testified. Eugene Wallace should have been permitted to make his decision to testify without the intimidating influence of such heavy-handed prosecution statements. The Attorney General raises several objections to the referee's determinations. He claims at the threshold that because there was apparently no contemporary complaint about prosecutorial misconduct the determination that misconduct occurred must be rejected. As we have explained above, such a claim lacks merit, especially when as here the misconduct alleged constituted a successful attempt to silence a witness. The Attorney General next claims that the determination that Wilson engaged in misconduct toward Wallace cannot be accepted. He impliedly concedes that if Wilson made the statements at issue he would have committed misconduct, but argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that Wilson in fact made those statements. Specifically, he asserts in essence that the finding turns on the credibility of the witnesses and that Wallace is a bad man and a liar and hence cannot be believed. But even if the premise of the argument is sound, the conclusion does not follow: even a bad man and a liar can tell the truth  as the Attorney General himself argues when he urges us to credit the testimony of Powell. [9] In conclusion, we hold that the referee's determination that Wilson engaged in misconduct toward Wallace must be accepted. The referee's finding that Wilson threatened Wallace with, among other things, prosecution for extortion is entitled to great weight, depending as it does on an assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and is in fact amply supported by the evidence. It is plain, as we have explained above, that such behavior amounts to misconduct. The Attorney General also claims that the determination that prosecutor Pippin engaged in misconduct toward Wallace cannot be accepted. Specifically, he maintains that the finding that Pippin told Sheela, Wallace's counsel, that Wallace would be prosecuted if he testified is based on a misinterpretation of Sheela's testimony. He further asserts that in response to a request for immunity made by Sheela Pippin simply made the same statement he made to Riley's counsel, Matthew Lees  viz., if a witness testified and implicated himself in a crime that could be proved, he would be prosecuted; if the witness committed perjury and there was sufficient evidence to prove perjury, he would be prosecuted. The point lacks merit. To begin with, the referee's finding does not appear to be based on a misinterpretation of Sheela's testimony. Sheela testified: I recall Mr. Pippin using words that let me know in no uncertain terms that Mr. Wallace would be prosecuted, but not saying, `Mr. Wallace will be prosecuted if he testifies.' The Attorney General argues that Sheela's testimony reveals only his subjective belief that Mr. Pippin would prosecute Wallace.... Given a reasonable reading, however, Sheela's testimony is to the following effect: Pippin told me Wallace would be prosecuted if he testified  but he did not use those precise words. [10] In any event, the statement that the Attorney General claims Pippin made to Sheela  like the same statement he claims Pippin made to Lees  amounts to misconduct: for the same reasons we held that statement improper we must hold this statement improper as well. Accordingly, we conclude that the referee's determination that Pippin engaged in misconduct toward Wallace must be accepted: the governing law is clear, and the facts that establish misconduct under that law are admitted. Finally, the Attorney General claims that the determination that prosecutorial misconduct was causally linked to Wallace's refusal to give testimony on petitioner's behalf must be rejected. He first argues that the arrest of Aguilar could not have contributed to the refusal on the part of any witness, including Wallace, to give testimony on petitioner's behalf at trial. For the reasons we rejected this argument when he made it with reference to Riley, we also reject it now. The Attorney General next argues as follows: Wallace was prepared to testify for petitioner if he was granted immunity or if he was examined on only those matters on which he would not incriminate himself; when his conditions were not met, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege; the fact that his testimony would be incriminating was not the fault of the prosecution; moreover, his willingness to testify on petitioner's behalf after the September 22, 1981, interview belies the conclusion he was afraid to testify because Wilson threatened him. The argument misses the point. That Wallace may have been willing to testify on petitioner's behalf if he was granted immunity or if he was examined on only those matters on which he would not incriminate himself does not show that his decision to invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was not substantially caused by the threats of the prosecution. Indeed, Wallace's willingness to testify only on conditions shows he took the prosecution's threats seriously and therefore is consistent with the conclusion that those threats were a substantial cause of his making his decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to testify on petitioner's behalf. We conclude that petitioner has sustained his burden of showing a causal link between prosecutorial misconduct and Wallace's refusal to testify on his behalf. To carry that burden, as we have explained above, all he need do is to demonstrate that the misconduct under challenge was a substantial cause of the witness's refusal to testify. Petitioner has demonstrated that the misconduct here amounted to such a cause. We also conclude that petitioner has carried his burden of demonstrating the materiality of Wallace's testimony under both federal and state standards: that testimony would have squarely contradicted the crucial testimony of Powell. After independent review, we hold that the referee's determination that prosecutorial misconduct interfered with petitioner's constitutional right to present the testimony of Eugene Wallace at trial was correct and accordingly adopt it as our own.