Opinion ID: 653668
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conflict of Interest of Trial Counsel

Text: 17 Flores, Rodriguez, and Fontanez all claim that their right to conflict-free trial counsel was violated. Rodriguez and Flores--as their enhanced sentences reveal--have a long history of criminal activity that precedes their cocaine distribution business in this case. Each needed lawyers to represent them in their prior run-ins with the law. In this case, they needed lawyers again. So, like sick patients who call up longtime family doctors, they contacted attorneys who had represented them before. Potential conflict of interest problems developed, however, as the three defendants and their attorneys played a virtual musical chairs game of attorney-client relationships. The lawyers chosen to represent Flores and Fontanez, respectively Michael Green and Roberta Samotny, represented Rodriguez in prior, unrelated criminal proceedings. Further, Rodriguez's counsel, Glenn Seiden, initially represented Fontanez in the current case then switched to Rodriguez. The government asked the district court to disqualify all three lawyers because of alleged actual and potential conflicts of interest. The court held a hearing on the matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c). 5 18 At the hearing, the district court asked the defendants and their respective attorneys about the alleged conflicts. The court questioned each attorney to make sure he or she had explained the problem to their respective clients. The court then asked each defendant if he wanted to continue with his current counsel. The court's questioning of Flores went as follows: 19 THE COURT: I want you to understand that under the Constitution, you have the right to have an attorney that represents your own personal best interests, nobody else's. Do you understand that? 20 MR. FLORES: Yes, yes. 21 THE COURT: And my concern is that your present attorney, having represented Mr. Rodriguez, that you understand that it is your best interests you must consider and your attorney must consider and not Mr. Rodriguez's best interests. His attorney must consider his best interests, and I want you to understand that fully. 22 And I'd like to mention to you some of the potential--and I don't know that this would ever happen, but I want you to understand why I'm concerned. In the event Mr. Rodriguez decided to take the witness stand and cooperate with the government and testify against you, your attorney might be in the position of cross-examining somebody he once had an attorney-client relationship with. And that presents two types of problems. One is will he zealously and conscientiously represent your interests against his former client's interests; or, on the other hand, from Mr. Rodriguez's point of view, will he, because he knows Mr. Rodriguez, be at an unfair advantage because of that prior relationship. 23 So I want you to be aware of this situation. Have you thought about, under these circumstances, have you though about whether you wish Mr. Green to continue representing you in this case? 24 MR. GREEN: She's asking if you've thought about whether you want me to continue being your lawyer. You have to answer her. 25 MR. FLORES: Yes, your Honor. 26 THE COURT: ... [Y]ou must be free to get the kind of objective legal advice on [the issue of cooperation with the government] if you're at all concerned or wish to consider any advantage to you.... That's another matter that you should consider in deciding whether or not you wish Mr. Green to represent you. Do you understand what I'm talking about? 27 MR. FLORES: Yes, your Honor. 28 THE COURT: Does it make sense to you? All right. Well, having considered these matters, what do you wish to do? 29 MR. GREEN: Do you want me to be your lawyer or not? 30 MR. FLORES: Yes, I would like him. 31 THE COURT: You wish to continue with Mr. Green's representation? 32 MR. FLORES: Yes, your Honor. 33 January 31, 1991 Transcript at 13-15. Next, the court questioned Samotny and Fontanez. That exchange went as follows: 34 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fontanez--well, let me ask you, Miss Samotny. Have you gone over with Mr. Fontanez his right to counsel and the implications involved in that? 35 MS. SAMOTNY: Certainly I have, Judge. 36 THE COURT: And Mr. Flores, I myself--I'm sorry, Mr. Fontanez, I myself must advise you of your right to counsel, and that means an attorney who will act in your own personal best interests and no one else's. Do you understand what I'm saying? 37 MR. FONTANEZ: Yes. 38 THE COURT: ... I want you to understand that your attorney and your relationship is a confidential matter. It's not something I want to get into in terms of anything said between you, but I want you to also understand that the person who represents you must represent only you and do what would be best for you, particularly in view of the fact you have no prior felony conviction, that you may wish to testify on your own behalf because you have no prior felony conviction, and it might be in your best interests to do so. I don't know what the facts that go into that decision are in this case, but it might be in your best interest. It might be in your best interest to cooperate with the government because it might, in effect, reduce your potential sentence. Are you aware of these things? 39 MR. FONTANEZ: Yes, I do. 40 THE COURT: And have you given some thought as to whether or not you wish Miss Samotny to continue representing you in this case? 41 MR. FONTANEZ: Yes, I would like for her to represent me. 42 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 43 Id. at 19-21. Finally, the court questioned Seiden and Rodriguez: 44 THE COURT: Have you advised Mr. Rodriguez about the potential problem of your having appeared on behalf of Mr. Fontanez? 45 MR. SEIDEN: Prior to the 44(c) motion we received the day before yesterday, I've had individual--I found it necessary to have individual, of course, individual meetings with my client wherein I had to advise him that I was interested in him, only him, and that we would not be meeting with attorneys or other family members. Yes, we have discussed this in some detail, Judge. 46 THE COURT: All right. I would like to address Mr. Rodriguez directly-- 47 MR. SEIDEN: Please. 48 THE COURT: --on this issue. 49 Mr. Rodriguez, I wish to tell you that under the Constitution of the United States, you have the right to have a lawyer represent you that represents you, only you, in your own personal best interests. Do you understand that? 50 MR. RODRIGUEZ: (Through interpreter:) Yes. 51 THE COURT: Do you understand that you must make your own decisions in this case with the assistance of an attorney-- 52 MR. RODRIGUEZ: (Through interpreter:) Yes. 53 THE COURT: --who will consider your interests, rather than those of your co-defendants? Even though they're family members, and I understand you're concerned what happens to your family, your attorney must be your own loyal spokesman here in the court and no one else's. Do you understand that? 54 MR. RODRIGUEZ: (Through interpreter:) Yes, yes. 55 THE COURT: Have you thought about this matter? 56 MR. RODRIGUEZ: (Through interpreter:) Yes. 57 THE COURT: What do you wish to do? 58 THE COURT: Do you wish Mr. Seiden to continue to represent you in this matter? 59 MR. RODRIGUEZ: (Through interpreter:) Yes. 60 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 61 Id. at 25-26. The district court respected the expressed preferences of each defendant and declined the government's invitation to intrude into the defendant's counsel of choice. Id. at 32. The court concluded that a severance was the best way to deal with the situation and therefore scheduled a separate trial for Rodriguez. Id. 62 On appeal, the government claims that Flores, Fontanez, and Rodriguez waived their right to conflict-free counsel by their answers at the Rule 44(c) hearing. The defendants counter by arguing that the district court should not have accepted their waivers because their waivers were not knowingly or intelligently made. They charge that the district court failed to make a detailed inquiry into how the conflict of interest might relate to the individual defendants and note that the defendants' answers were usually only one or two words. These arguments lack merit. 63 First of all, there is no requirement that the district court follow some pre-ordained, detailed script when eliciting a criminal defendant's waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. 6 United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1387-88 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080, 109 S.Ct. 2099, 104 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). We do not ask whether a defendant's decision to waive is foolish. Rather, we ask only whether the defendant made an informed decision. A waiver is sufficient if it was made knowingly and intelligently, that is to say, if it was made with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 60 (7th Cir.1992). The district court need not conduct a long-winded dialogue with counsel and defendants when inquiring about a waiver. Roth, 860 F.2d at 1389. It is enough that the district court inform each defendant of the nature and importance of the right to conflict-free counsel and ensure that the defendant understands something of the consequences of a conflict. Id. at 1388. 64 The district court in this case satisfied these standards. The transcript of the Rule 44(c) hearing reveals that the district court carefully questioned each attorney and each defendant about potential and actual conflicts created by the prior representation of co-defendants. After the district court explained the right to conflict-free counsel, each defendant made clear that he wanted to stick with his current attorney. 65 We note that the district court must recognize a presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel of choice. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1699, 100 L.Ed.2d (1988). The district court, with this presumption in mind, chose to respect the decision of the defendants. We do the same. Flores, Fontanez, and Rodriguez, made their decision to waive their right to conflict-free counsel before the district court and cannot now reverse course. 66 The defendants' other argument--that their waivers are not valid because most of their answers at the Rule 44(c) hearing consisted of only one or two words--is also without merit. In United States v. Kladouris, 964 F.2d 658 (7th Cir.1992), the criminal defendant waived her right to conflict-free counsel by answering the district court with such brief answers as: Yes, sir.; Yes, sir.; No, I don't, because I'm not.; Yes, sir.; and No. Id. at 666-667. We affirmed the district court's decision that such a waiver was valid and affirmed the defendant's conviction. Similarly, we affirm here. The defendants answers at the Rule 44(c) hearing adequately expressed their preferences. 7 We respect the defendants' choice of trial counsel and hold that the defendants waived their Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. 67