Opinion ID: 742620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: RICO Conspiracy in Interstate Commerce (White and Hicks)

Text: 90 White and Hicks argue that there was insufficient evidence that the First Street Crew's RICO conspiracy was engaged in or substantially affected interstate commerce and that the district court's instructions on the interstate commerce element of the conspiracy were incorrect. 8 They base their arguments principally on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), in which the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the ground that it did not have a constitutionally sufficient connection to interstate commerce. Under our [325 U.S.App.D.C. 305] post-Lopez decision in United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364 (D.C.Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1437, 137 L.Ed.2d 544 (1997), however, their interstate commerce argument fails. 91 In Edwards, we held that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Drug Act) regulates activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and thus that the Drug Act is within Congress's commerce clause power. See Edwards, 98 F.3d at 1369; see also United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir.1995) (concluding intrastate activities regulated by Drug Act are clearly tied to interstate commerce). If the underlying activity (e.g., drug dealing) substantially affects interstate commerce, conspiracies engaging in that activity also substantially affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Conn, 769 F.2d 420, 424 (7th Cir.1985). Accordingly, the voluminous evidence of the underlying drug offenses also serves as evidence of the conspiracy's substantial effect on interstate commerce. Moreover, the fact that the district court did not require the jury to find that the conspiracy in this case affected interstate commerce to any particular degree is irrelevant. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 ( '[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.' ) (emphasis in original) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 2024, n. 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968), overruled on other grounds, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2468, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976)). J. Instructions on Drug Conspiracy 92 The appellants argue jointly that the district court's instructions on their multiple conspiracy theory, on the knowledge element of the drug conspiracy and on their buyer-seller relationship theory were erroneous. 9 We conclude that the court conveyed the essential information regarding the appellants' multiple conspiracy theory, their argument about the knowledge element is based on a misreading of the pertinent instruction and the buyer-seller relationship instruction was accurate. 1. Standard of Review 93 While two of the appellants' lawyers objected at trial to the district court's instruction on the buyer-seller relationship, Tr. 1/25/94 at 5572, 5596, there were no specific objections to the instructions on the multiple conspiracy theory and the knowledge element. One defense counsel, however, objected to all instructions that differed from the defense's proposed instructions, id. at 5584, and we will assume arguendo that the three issues were preserved for appeal. 10 We therefore review de novo whether the district court's instructions properly conveyed the elements of the drug conspiracy to the jury. United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1301 (D.C.Cir.1995). We defer, however, to the district court's choice of language unless that language constituted an abuse of discretion. Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C.Cir.1993). 2. Multiple Conspiracies 94 The appellants argue that the district court inadequately charged the jury on the difference between a single conspiracy (as the government alleged) and multiple conspiracies (as they claimed). Specifically, they contend that the instruction did not require the jury to acquit if it found separate conspiracies and did not explain how to distinguish a single conspiracy from multiple conspiracies. 95 The district court instructed the jury that the separate drug sales did not amount to a single conspiracy under White's defense theory, Tr. 1/28/94 at 23, that proof of several separate conspiracies would not be proof of the single, overall conspiracy charged in the indictment, id. at 45, and that, to convict, each defendant must have joined in the main conspiracy, id. at 42, and the conspirators [325 U.S.App.D.C. 306] had to have entered into a common undertaking, id. at 43. The appellants rely exclusively on United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S.Ct. 174, 102 L.Ed.2d 143 (1988), to challenge those instructions. But the only relevant charge given in Tarantino and omitted here was the express instruction to acquit if there was no single conspiracy as charged and the statement that [i]f you find that a particular defendant is a member of another conspiracy, not the one charged in the indictment, then you must acquit the defendant. Id. at 1400. 96 As to the first point, in addition to instructing the jury that proof of multiple conspiracies is not proof of the single conspiracy as charged, the court explained the government's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of each of these offenses. Tr. 1/28/93 at 26. The court was not required to additionally remind the jury, as it discussed each offense, to acquit the defendant if that offense was not proved. On the second point, the court's instructions that, to convict, the defendants had to have entered into a common undertaking and could not instead have been members of separate conspiracies adequately conveyed the notion that a defendant who is a member of a conspiracy other than the single, charged conspiracy must be acquitted. Accordingly, the instructions on the multiple conspiracy theory were adequate. 3. Knowledge Element 97 The appellants next argue that the district court improperly instructed the jury that a defendant need not have been aware of the conspiracy's common purpose or have known that the conspiracy existed. The appellants misread the pertinent instruction. 98 To support a conspiracy conviction, a defendant must have knowingly participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 929 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 578, 133 L.Ed.2d 501 (1995); see also United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 707 (D.C.Cir.1995) (conspiracy is specific intent crime requiring knowing participation), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1098, 116 S.Ct. 825, 133 L.Ed.2d 768 (1996). Accordingly, the district court instructed the jury that, to convict, it had to find that the defendant knowingly and willfully joined and participated in the conspiracy with the specific intent to distribute crack or to possess it with intent to distribute it. Tr. 1/28/94 at 42. The appellants do not contest the accuracy and adequacy of that instruction but contend that the following charge undermined it: 99 It is not necessary that the government prove that a particular defendant was aware of the common purpose, had knowledge that the conspiracy existed, and was a member of the conspiracy from the beginning. Different persons may become members of the conspiracy at different times. 100 Id. at 44. In the appellants' view, the above instruction allowed the jury to convict a defendant who had no awareness of the conspiracy's common purpose and no knowledge of the conspiracy's existence. The disputed charge, however, occurred in the middle of a series of instructions spelling out in more detail, but not superseding or eliminating, the earlier, more general instructions regarding the elements of a conspiracy. Viewed in the context of the entire charge, therefore, we conclude that the more natural reading of the sentence is that the phrase, from the beginning, modifies all three of the preceding clauses. In other words, the instruction explained that a defendant need not have been aware of the conspiracy's common purpose from the beginning, have known of the conspiracy's existence from the beginning or have been a member of the conspiracy from the beginning. The court's phraseology thus was plainly within its discretion. See Joy, 999 F.2d at 556 (district court's choice of language in instructions reviewed for abuse of discretion). 4. Buyer-Seller Transaction 101 Finally, the appellants argue that the district court's instruction on their buyer-seller defense theory was not balanced. Specifically, they complain that, although the court provided an accurate explanation of the theory, it did not summarize the evidence supporting the theory and added an explanation [325 U.S.App.D.C. 307] that other evidence may combine with a buyer-seller relationship to establish a conspiracy. 102 After instructing the jury that [a] simple buyer-seller relationship alone does not make out a conspiracy, the court explained the circumstances in which such a relationship may combine with other evidence to prove the existence of a conspiracy. 11 Tr. 1/28/94 at 43. The appellants characterize the latter portion of the instruction as summariz[ing] the facts relied upon by the government but not those advanced by the defense. Appellants' Joint Br. 78. Relying on United States v. Conlon, 661 F.2d 235, 237 (D.C.Cir.1981) (refusal to give defense theory instruction not error if court does not recite facts supporting government's theory), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1149, 102 S.Ct. 1015, 71 L.Ed.2d 304 (1982), they contend that the instruction was impermissibly imbalanced. Some of the factors--such as multiple sales and sales on credit--the district court identified as examples of factors that can combine with a buyer-seller relationship to prove the existence of a conspiracy did overlap with the facts of this case. Nevertheless, the examples the district court used accurately illustrated the legal point and did not rise to a review by the Trial Court of the facts relied upon by the government. Id. We therefore reject this assignment of error.