Opinion ID: 1356581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Glomar Doctrine in This Case

Text: Although plaintiffs do not take issue with the Glomar doctrine as a general rule or as a permissible response to some FOIA requests, they contend that the NSA's invocation of the Glomar doctrine in this particular case was inappropriate because (1) the TSP is no longer a secret national security program, (2) any responsive records, if they exist, are not exempt under FOIA, and (3) the NSA's affidavits in support of its invocation of Glomar, which are part of the public record, are insufficient to sustain the agency's burden of proof. We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment in FOIA litigation. See, e.g., Tigue v. Dep't of Justice, 312 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir.2002). We also conduct de novo review when a member of the public challenges an agency's assertion that a record being sought is exempt from disclosure. A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir.1994). The agency asserting the exemption bears the burden of proof, and all doubts as to the applicability of the exemption must be resolved in favor of disclosure. See id. ; see also Carney v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) ([T]he defending agency has the burden of showing ... that any withheld documents fall within an exemption to the FOIA.). Affidavits or declarations ... giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption are sufficient to sustain the agency's burden. Carney, 19 F.3d at 812. The [a]ffidavits submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs first argue that Glomar may be invoked only to preserve the secrecy of a covert intelligence program or secret intelligence sources and methods, Appellants' Br. 12, and that the NSA inappropriately provided a Glomar response in this case because the TSP is no longer a secret program in light of the government's public acknowledgment of its existence and purpose following its controversial disclosure by the news media and ensuing public controversy. Whether the Glomar doctrine may be invoked in response to a FOIA request for records obtained under the TSP is also an issue of first impression for our Court. We now hold that, as a general rule, (1) an agency may provide a Glomar response to FOIA requests for information gathered under a program whose existence has been publicly revealed, and may do so specifically with respect to information gathered under the TSP, and (2) that such a response will be reviewed in the same manner as any other Glomar response to a FOIA request. The government's decision to make public the existence of the TSP does not alter the rationale for allowing an agency to provide a Glomar response namely, to prevent the sort of harm that a FOIA exemption is designed to prevent. The record is clear that, although the general existence of the TSP has been officially acknowledged, the specific methods used, targets of surveillance, and information obtained through the program have not been disclosed. President Bush announced that he had authorized the NSA to intercept the international communications of people with known links to Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. President Bush's Address, supra. Additionally, CIA Director [6] Michael Hayden noted that the general procedures the NSA implements in conducting electronic surveillance were also applicable to the TSP. He also indicated that, under the TSP, the NSA was targeting communications where one party is outside of the United States. General Michael V. Hayden, What American Intelligence & Especially the NSA Have Been Doing To Defend the Nation, Address to the National Press Club (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20060123_ speech.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2009). However, at no time have the President or other members of the national government in either the Bush or Obama Administrations publicly confirmed or denied that particular persons were targeted or subject to surveillance. The Glomar doctrine is applicable in cases where to answer the FOIA inquiry would cause harm cognizable under a[ ] FOIA exception, Gardels, 689 F.2d at 1103in other words, in cases in which the existence or nonexistence of a record is a fact exempt from disclosure under a FOIA exception. An agency is therefore precluded from making a Glomar response if the existence or nonexistence of the specific records sought by the FOIA request has been the subject of an official public acknowledgment. If the government has admitted that a specific record exists, a government agency may not later refuse to disclose whether that same record exists or not. See Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378-79 (D.C.Cir.2007); cf. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir.1989). Here, although the public is aware that the TSP exists, the government has found it necessary to keep undisclosed the details of the program's operations and scope the subject of plaintiffs' FOIA request in this case. The fact that the public is aware of the program's existence does not mean that the public is entitled to have information regarding the operation of the program, its targets, the information it has yielded, or other highly sensitive national security information that the government has continued to classify. Indeed, the fact that the TSP's existence has been made public reinforces the government's continuing stance that it is necessary to keep confidential the details of the program's operations and scope. We therefore hold that, as a threshold matter, and as a general rule, an agency may invoke the Glomar doctrine in response to a FOIA request regarding a publicly revealed matter. An agency only loses its ability to provide a Glomar response when the existence or nonexistence of the particular records covered by the Glomar response has been officially and publicly disclosed. We hold, in particular, that an agency may invoke the Glomar doctrine with respect to the TSP, at least with respect to those aspects of the program that have not been the subject of such disclosures. Accordingly, we now turn our attention to the question of whether the NSA in this particular case has met its burden to justify its Glomar response.
Plaintiffs contend that even if the Glomar doctrine may be invoked in the context of a TSP-related FOIA request, the records plaintiffs seek here are not exempt from public disclosure under FOIA. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, confirming or denying the existence of these records is not exempt from public disclosure. We agree with the District Court that, in order to invoke the Glomar response to a FOIA request, an agency must tether its refusal, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at , to one of the nine FOIA exemptions. In other words, a government agency may ... refuse to confirm or deny the existence of certain records ... if the FOIA exemption would itself preclude the acknowledgment of such documents. Minier, 88 F.3d at 800. We adopt the District Court's careful and well-reasoned analysis, and affirm its judgment, including the holding that NSA's Glomar response was properly tethered to FOIA Exemption 3, under section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959. The NSA tied its Glomar response to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. Exemption 1 permits the nondisclosure of records that are (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). In invoking Exemption 1, the NSA specifically relies on Executive Order 12,958, 60 Fed.Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995), as amended by Executive Order 13,292, 68 Fed.Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003), which provides that an agency may classify records relating to, inter alia, intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology, and vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism. 68 Fed.Reg. at 15,317. Under Executive Order 12,958, as amended, an agency may classify information when it determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage. Id. at 15,315. As the District Court noted, the Executive Order specifically countenances the Glomar Response, permitting a classifying agency to `refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested records whenever the fact of their existence or nonexistence is itself classified under this order or its predecessors.' Id. at 15324. Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at . FOIA Exemption 3 applies to records specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, provided that the statute requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). In invoking Exemption 3, the NSA relies on three statutes that preclude disclosure of the documents plaintiffs seek. First, the NSA argues that the documents are exempt under section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (NSAA), Pub.L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 63, 64 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 note), which provides that: [N]othing in this Act or any other law... shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, of any information with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles, salaries, or number of persons employed by such agency. Second, the NSA relies on section 102(A)(i)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-l(i)(1)), which requires the Director of National Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Third, the NSA invokes section 798 of Title 18 of the U.S.Code, which criminalizes disclosure of information concerning, inter alia, the communication intelligence activities of the United States. Because defendants need only proffer one legitimate basis for invoking the Glomar response and FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 are separate and independent grounds in support of a Glomar response, we consider only the applicability of FOIA Exemption 3. See Larson, 565 F.3d at 862-63, ([A]gencies may invoke the exemptions independently and courts may uphold agency action under one exemption without considering the applicability of the other.). The District Court held that the NSA's affidavits provide the requisite detailed explanations for withholding the documents requested in FOIA Request No. 1 under FOIA Exemption 3. Specifically, defendants have demonstrated that acknowledging the existence or nonexistence of the information entailed in FOIA Request No. 1 would reveal the NSA's organization, functions, and activities, in contravention of Section 6 of the NSAA. Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at . We agree with the District Court's holding with respect to FOIA Exemption 3, and we adopt its thorough analysis, which for convenience we set forth in full below: In CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985), the Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged approach to evaluating an agency's invocation of FOIA Exemption 3: First, the court must consider whether the statute identified by the agency is a statute of exemption as contemplated by Exemption 3. Second, the court must consider whether the withheld material satisfies the criteria of the exemption statute. Id. at 167 [105 S.Ct. 1881]; see Fitzgibbon v. C.I.A., 911 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C.Cir. 1990). As the D.C. Circuit has observed, [e]xemption 3 presents considerations distinct and apart from the other eight exemptions inscribed in FOIA. Ass'n of Retired R.R. Workers v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 336 (D.C.Cir.1987): Exemption 3 differs from other FOIA exemptions in that its applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of specific documents; the sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld material within the statute's coverage. Id. Defendants argue, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that Section 6 of the NSAA qualifies as an exemption statute under Exemption 3. The D.C. Circuitthe only circuit court to have considered this questionconcurs. See Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C.Cir.1979); Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381, 1389 (D.C.Cir. 1979). Indeed, the language of Section 6 makes quite clear that it falls within the scope of Exemption 3. Section 6 states that no law ... shall be construed to require the disclosure ... of any information with respect to the activities of the NSA. Pub.L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 63, 64, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402. Section 6 thus specifically exempt[s] certain information from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at  (alterations in original).

As we stated above, the agency resisting disclosure has the burden of proving the applicability of a FOIA exemption and may may meet its burden by submitting a detailed affidavit showing that the information logically falls within the claimed exemptions. Minier, 88 F.3d at 800 (internal quotation marks omitted). At oral argument before our Court, plaintiffs argued that the NSA had not met its burden and that the government's declarations were inadequate to support its invocation of Glomar. We are not entirely convinced that plaintiffs preserved this argument, [7] but even if we were to reach the merits of whether the government's affidavits are sufficient, we agree with the District Court that the NSA has met its burden in this case. An agency that has withheld responsive documents pursuant to a FOIA exemption can carry its burden to prove the applicability of the claimed exemption by affidavit, and we review the agency's justifications therein de novo. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C.Cir.2003); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Summary judgment is warranted on the basis of agency affidavits when the affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith. Ultimately, an agency's justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible. Larson, 565 F.3d at 862 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In evaluating an agency's Glomar response, a court must accord substantial weight to the agency's affidavits. Minier, 88 F.3d at 800 (internal quotation marks omitted). In according such weight to the affidavits on which the District Court relied, we conclude that they provide sufficient detail that the question of the existence or nonexistence of the requested records falls within Exemption 3 of FOIA. The NSA asserts that it cannot provide any more information without doing cognizable harm, and we agree. The affidavits sufficiently establish that nondisclosure is appropriateperhaps essentialfor reasons of national security and confidentiality. Minor details of intelligence information may reveal more information than their apparent insignificance suggests because, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, [each detail] may aid in piecing together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself. Larson, 565 F.3d at 864 (alterations in original). In the interest of thoroughness, the District Court provided a detailed explanation and analysis of the affidavits submitted by the NSA to support its claim that even confirming or denying the existence of the requested records would cause a harm that the exemptions to FOIA seek to avoid. We adopt that analysis as follows: Defendants contend that [a]cknowledging the existence or non-existence of the information requested by Plaintiffs' FOIA Request No. 1 would unquestionably reveal NSA's organization, functions and activities by revealing the success or failure of NSA's activities. In support of this contention, they have submitted affidavits from Joseph J. Brand, Associate Director, Community Integration, Policy and Records for the NSA; J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence; and David M. Hardy, Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. In his affidavit, Brand avers that the TSP is a SIGINT program that [is] critical to the national security of the United States. Operation of the TSP depends upon the collection of electronic communications, which can be easily compromised if targets are made aware of NSA capabilities and priorities. Giving the Glomar Response to FOIA Request No. 1 was essential, Brand attests, because [a]cknowledging the existence or non existence of those individuals or organizations subject to surveillance would provide our adversaries with critical information about the capabilities and limitations of the NSA, such as the types of communications that may be susceptible to NSA detection. Confirmation by NSA that a person's activities are not of foreign intelligence interest or that NSA is unsuccessful in collecting foreign intelligence information on their activities on a case-by-case basis would allow our adversaries to accumulate information and draw conclusions about NSA's technical capabilities, sources, and methods. Similarly, McConnell states that [t]o confirm or deny whether someone is a target of surveillance ... would reveal to our adversaries that an individual may or may not be available as a secure means for communicating or, more broadly, the methods being used to conduct surveillance. The disclosure of such information would run afoul of Section 6 of the NSAA, Brand contends, because it would reveal the sources of intelligence ... and would tend to reveal the methods by which such intelligence is collected.... Further, confirmation or denial of this information would reveal the limitations of NSA SIGINT capabilities. Even the disclosure of what appears to be the most innocuous information about the TSP poses a threat to national security, McConnell avers, because it might permit our adversaries to piece together sensitive information about how the Program operated, the capabilities, scope and effectiveness of the Program and our current capability, which would be utilized by the enemy to allow them to plan their terrorist activities more securely. These affidavits demonstrate that the documents sought in FOIA Request No. 1 relate to the organization or any function of the National Security Agency and seek information with respect to the activities thereof, Pub.L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 63, 64, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402, all of which are exempted from disclosure by Section 6 of the NSAA. The affidavits aver that the TSP is a SIGINT program, and signals intelligence is one of [NSA's] primary functions; the release of the SIGINT information would disclose information with respect to [NSA] activities, since any information about an intercepted communication concerns an NSA activity. Hayden, 608 F.2d at 1389. Moreover, the affidavits explain in detailed, nonconclusory fashion, Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir.2005), why the Glomar Response is appropriate. The affidavits thus giv[e] reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption, and are therefore sufficient to sustain the agency's burden. Carney, 19 F.3d at 812. Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at -5.
An agency invoking Glomar must show not only that the requested records would be exempt from disclosure, but also that the FOIA exemption would itself preclude the acknowledgment [even confirming or denying the existence] of such documents. Minier, 88 F.3d at 800. Congress's broad language in section 6 of the NSAA eases that burden for the agency, as it exempts from disclosure any information with respect to the activities of that agency. Pub.L. No. 86-36, § 6. Confirming or denying the mere existence of specific records in a general surveillance program would logically be both confirming or denying that the NSA was targeting a specific individual and confirming or denying that the NSA is conducting a general surveillance program. Either disclosure would be information with respect to the activities of the NSA and therefore exempt under FOIA. Id. Even if the NSA affidavits, standing alone, are insufficient, as plaintiffs argue, the very nature of their requestwhich seeks records concerning whether their communications were monitored by the NSAestablishes that any response would reveal information with respect to the activities of the NSA. Because the NSA is exempt under the NSAA from revealing such information, FOIA Exemption 3 also applies and the NSA's Glomar response was therefore justified.
Having concluded that the affidavits more than sufficiently support the NSA's claim that FOIA Exemption 3 encompasses confirmation or denial of the existence of the requested records, we now consider plaintiffs' claims that the NSA invoked the Glomar doctrine for the purpose of concealing illegal or unconstitutional actions. We cannot base our judgment on mere speculation that the NSA was attempting to conceal the purported illegality of the TSP by providing a Glomar response to plaintiffs' requests. A finding of bad faith must be grounded in evidence suggesting bad faith on the part of the [agency]. Larson, 565 F.3d at 864. Ultimately, an agency's justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible. Id. at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted). After reviewing the record before us, we agree with the District Court that the agency's affidavits and justification are both logical and plausible. We do not find any evidence that even arguably suggests bad faith on the part of the NSA, or that the NSA provided a Glomar response to plaintiffs' requests for the purpose of concealing illegal or unconstitutional actions.