Opinion ID: 1386055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: State Confrontation Clause

Text: Section 15 of article I of the state Constitution guarantees to the defendant in a criminal case various procedural rights, including the right to be confronted with the witnesses against the defendant. We relied on that provision in Mills v. Superior Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 951, 956-960 [232 Cal. Rptr. 141, 728 P.2d 211], to invalidate a former version of Penal Code section 872 that deprived defendants of certain confrontation and cross-examination rights at preliminary hearings. Under the former statute at issue in Mills v. Superior Court, supra , a finding of probable cause could be based on the hearsay statements of a witness who was neither an eyewitness nor a victim, but only if the defendant failed to make reasonable efforts to secure the presence of the witness at the preliminary hearing. We grounded our decision invalidating the statute on prior California cases acknowledging the critical importance of the preliminary hearing as a mechanism to weed out groundless claims. As we stated, Only by preserving the adversarial character of the preliminary hearing can we enable the magistrate responsibly to `weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts and give or withhold credence to particular witnesses.' [Citations.] (42 Cal.3d at p. 957.) We concluded that the challenged statute, by requiring a defendant to expend reasonable efforts to secure a witness's presence at the hearing, unduly strains defendant's rights under article I, section 15, of the California Constitution. ( Id. at p. 958.) (4) By virtue of the passage of Proposition 115, Mills v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.3d 951, is no longer controlling authority. Although the state Constitution continues to afford an independent source of relief from infringement of the right to confront one's accusers (see Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336 [invalidating Prop. 115 to extent it would have required interpretation of confrontation clause, and other procedural rights, consistently with federal Constitution]), nonetheless, by reason of the adoption of new section 30, subdivision (b), of article I, the state Constitution now expressly permits the admission of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings, as provided by law. (Cf. Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d) [added in 1982 by Prop. 8 to provide that all relevant evidence is admissible at trial or pretrial hearings, subject to then existing statutory hearsay rules].) The new constitutional provision thus represents a specific exception to the broad confrontation right set forth in article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. (See Izazaga v. Superior Court, supra, ante, 356, at p. 371, and cases cited [applying to reciprocal discovery provisions of Prop. 115 the rule that more recent, specific constitutional provisions override or limit older, more general provisions]; cf. People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 181 [228 Cal. Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913] [express constitutional provision of Prop. 8 allowing in-court proof of defendant's ex-felon status overrides prior decisions stating contrary rule under state due process clause].) Thus, in this state, any future constitutional objection to the admission of such hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings must be founded on federal constitutional principles.