Opinion ID: 2497296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether An Arbitration Agreement Exists Between FIA and Weaver

Text: Having disposed of the primary legal issue, we are left with an evidentiary issuewhether FIA has presented sufficient evidence for a court to find the existence of a binding agreement to arbitrate. It is undisputed that the original agreement between Weaver and MBNA contains no arbitration clause. According to FIA, the arbitration clause was added later via two pamphlets giving notice of a change of terms in the agreementone dated 1999, one dated April 2001. Weaver is not bound by the terms of the later-added arbitration clauses unless he consented to them, as a substantive change in the terms of a contract requires the consent of parties. Lanier v. Alenco, 459 F.2d 689, 693 (5th Cir.1972); Isadore v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 So.2d 247, 249 (La.App.Orl.1954); La. Civ. Code art. 1927. At oral argument, FIA conceded Weaver never actually signed a contract containing an arbitration clause. However, it is black letter law that, if a credit card company sends a notice of change in terms of the agreement, the customer assents to the new terms by his continued use of the card. See NCO Portfolio Management, Inc. v. Walker, 08-1011 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/09), 3 So.3d 628, 637 (citing Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909 (N.D.Tex.2000)). In other words, if Weaver made even a single purchase after receiving notice of the updated terms, he is bound by the arbitration clause. FIA therefore had the burden of presenting admissible evidence that 1) the pamphlets containing the arbitration clause were mailed to MBNA's customers, including Weaver, on a certain date, and 2) Weaver made at least one purchase after this date. FIA did not meet its burden. The record contains a form credit card agreement and two pamphlets setting forth additional terms to credit card agreements. Neither the original agreement nor either of the purported addenda are authenticated by an accompanying affidavit or other evidence. This alone is fatal to FIA's claim, as authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility which is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the [document] is what its proponent claims. La. Evid.Code art. 901(a). Even assuming the documents in the record are true copies of credit card notices printed by MBNA, there is no evidence showing when or if the notices were mailed to customers. [7] Nor has FIA shown that, after receiving these notices, Weaver continued to use his credit card. The record is silent as to when Weaver opened his credit card account and when he used it. It may be that MBNA gave proper notice of the new terms and, upon receiving notice, Weaver continued using his card. However, this Court is constrained by the evidence in the record, and from this evidence we are unable to conclude that Weaver ever consented to resolve his credit card disputes via arbitration. FIA counters that defendant was given the opportunity to present evidence in support of his allegation of the non existence of an agreement to arbitrate to the fact finder. It is not defendant's burden to prove the non-existence of an agreement; it is the burden of the party seeking to enforce a contract to show the contract exists. La. Civ.Code 1831. See also Kosmala v. Paul, 569 So.2d 158, 162 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990) (The party seeking to enforce arbitration provisions has the burden of showing the existence of a valid contract to arbitrate.) FIA did not meet this evidentiary burden. [8]