Opinion ID: 2010554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Durand raises two issues: (1) whether the Industrial Commission's decision setting the date of the accident on an unspecified date in either September or October 1997 was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (2) whether this decision was contrary to Illinois law. The Industrial Commission is the ultimate decisionmaker in workers' compensation cases, and it is not bound by any decision made by the arbitrator. Cushing v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 Ill.2d 179, 181-82, 277 N.E.2d 838 (1971). Instead, the Commission must weigh the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing and determine where the preponderance of that evidence lies. See Steiner v. Industrial Comm'n, 101 Ill.2d 257, 260, 78 Ill.Dec. 256, 461 N.E.2d 1363 (1984); Wagner Castings Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Ill.App.3d 584, 594, 182 Ill.Dec. 94, 609 N.E.2d 397 (1993) (it is solely within the province of the Commission to weigh the evidence (emphasis in original)). A reviewing court will not reverse the Commission unless its decision is contrary to law (see Butler Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 85 Ill.2d 213, 216, 52 Ill.Dec. 623, 422 N.E.2d 625 (1981)) or its fact determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence (see Shockley v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Ill.2d 189, 193, 25 Ill.Dec. 798, 387 N.E.2d 674 (1979)). A reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence, or reject reasonable inferences drawn from it by the Commission, simply because other reasonable inferences could have been drawn. See International Harvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Ill.2d 59, 65, 66 Ill.Dec. 347, 442 N.E.2d 908 (1982); Benson v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Ill.2d 445, 450, 64 Ill.Dec. 538, 440 N.E.2d 90 (1982). Fact determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent  that is, when no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency. See D.J. Masonry Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 295 Ill.App.3d 924, 930, 230 Ill. Dec. 450, 693 N.E.2d 1201 (1998). Section 6(d) of the Workers' Compensation Act provides that an injured employee must file a workers' compensation claim within 3 years after the date of the accident. 820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 2004). When the accident is a discrete event, the date of the accident is easy to determine: it is, obviously, the date that the employee was injured. When the accident is not a discrete event, this date is harder to specify. An employee who suffers a repetitive-trauma injury still may apply for benefits under the Act, but must meet the same standard of proof as an employee who suffers a sudden injury. See AC & S v. Industrial Comm'n, 304 Ill.App.3d 875, 879, 238 Ill.Dec. 40, 710 N.E.2d 837 (1999); Nunn v. Industrial Comm'n, 157 Ill.App.3d 470, 480, 109 Ill. Dec. 634, 510 N.E.2d 502 (1987). That means, inter alia, an employee suffering from a repetitive-trauma injury must still point to a date within the limitations period on which both the injury and its causal link to the employee's work became plainly apparent to a reasonable person. Williams v. Industrial Comm'n, 244 Ill. App.3d 204, 209, 185 Ill.Dec. 43, 614 N.E.2d 177 (1993). Setting this so-called manifestation date is a fact determination for the Commission. Palos Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill.App.3d 920, 930, 247 Ill.Dec. 548, 732 N.E.2d 603 (2000). Here, Durand argues that the Commission's finding that her injury occurred sometime in September or October 1997 was against the manifest weight of the evidence. She contends that September 8, 2000, the date she was conclusively diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome, was the date of the accident; consequently, her January 12, 2001 claim was timely. Durand also argues that the Commission's finding was unfair, unrealistic, and contrary to law. According to Durand, Illinois cases have looked at the date when the employee requires medical treatment or becomes unable to work in determining when an injury manifested itself. Durand asserts that an injury in a carpal tunnel syndrome workers' compensation case cannot be established before the employee seeks medical consultation to confirm such a condition. RLI responds that the Commission's findings were consistent with Illinois law and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Initially, we reject Durand's argument that the decisions below were contrary to Illinois law. The appellate court, the trial court, and the Industrial Commission all employed the correct standard in determining when her injury manifested itself. That standard comes from Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Ill.2d 524, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026 (1987). In Peoria County, an employee in a nursing home laundry room experienced pain, numbness, and tingling in her hands and fingers on October 4, 1976, and consulted a neurologist regarding these symptoms the next day. The employee continued to work for nearly a year, then underwent outpatient carpal tunnel surgery on August 23, 1977. She filed a workers' compensation claim the next day, alleging that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her work. The arbitrator awarded temporary and permanent total disability benefits. The Industrial Commission affirmed that decision; the trial court, in turn, confirmed the Commission's decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. This court framed the issue as whether an injury sustained as a result of work-related repetitive trauma is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act without a finding that the injury occurred as a result of one specific incident traceable to a definite time, place and cause. Peoria County Nursing Home, 115 Ill.2d at 527, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026. We stated that the purpose behind the Workers' Compensation Act is best served by allowing compensation where an injury is gradual but linked to the employee's work. Peoria County, 115 Ill.2d at 529, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026. We continued: Requiring complete collapse in a case like the instant one would not be beneficial to the employee or the employer because it might force employees needing the protection of the Act to push their bodies to a precise moment of collapse. Simply because an employee's work-related injury is gradual, rather than sudden and completely disabling, should not preclude protection and benefits.    To deny an employee benefits for a work-related injury that is not the result of a sudden mishap    penalizes an employee who faithfully performs job duties despite bodily discomfort and damage. Peoria County, 115 Ill.2d at 529-30, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026. We then discussed the limitations period. The employer argued that the employee's claim was time-barred because the injury was not traceable to a specific date. Peoria County, 115 Ill.2d at 530, 106 Ill. Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026. We agreed with the appellate court that the date of the injury in a repetitive-trauma compensation case is the date when the injury manifests itself  the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the claimant's employment would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person. Peoria County, 115 Ill.2d at 531, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026, citing 1B A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 39.50 (1985). The employee experienced pain, numbness, and tingling in her hands and fingers on October 4, 1976; these symptoms were severe enough that she sought medical treatment the next day. Peoria County, 115 Ill.2d at 531, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026. Thus, October 4 was the last day that the employee worked before the fact of her injury and its causal connection to her work became apparent. Peoria County, 115 Ill.2d at 531, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026. We concluded that because she filed her claim less than three years later, her claim was timely. Peoria County, 115 Ill.2d at 531, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026. The appellate court has applied Peoria County in several carpal tunnel syndrome cases, and some of these cases provide useful insight regarding how to determine the manifestation date. In Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 176 Ill. App.3d 607, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174 (1988), an employee cut meat at a slaughterhouse for 15 years. In 1981, he experienced numbness, tingling, and burning in his hands and elbows. The employer's doctor examined the employee and performed an EMG test. The doctor told the employee that he suffered from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and the employee refused surgery, opting for more conservative treatment. A year later, the employee's doctor performed a second EMG test, which indicated that the employee's condition was deteriorating. Another year later, the doctor performed a third EMG test, which confirmed that the employee's condition was still deteriorating. The employee had surgery on May 12, 1983. On April 5, 1984, the employee filed a workers' compensation claim, listing his date of injury as the date he had surgery. The arbitrator awarded benefits to the employee, but the trial court reversed, concluding that the employee failed to prove that the date he had surgery was the date of accident. The appellate court reversed the trial court. Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill.App.3d at 608, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174. According to the appellate court, the employee acknowledged that he knew of his injury and its relationship to his work before he had surgery. Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill.App.3d at 608, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174. The appellate court, however, refused to read Peoria County narrowly: By their very nature, repetitive-trauma injuries may take years to develop to a point of severity precluding the employee from performing in the workplace. An employee who discovers the onset of symptoms and their relationship to the employment, but continues to work faithfully for a number of years without significant medical complications or lost working time, may well be prejudiced if the actual breakdown of the physical structure occurs beyond the period of limitation set by statute. [Citation.] Similarly, an employee is also clearly prejudiced in the giving of notice to the employer [citation] if he is required to inform the employer within 45 days of a definite diagnosis of the repetitive-traumatic condition and its connection to his job since it cannot be presumed the initial condition will necessarily degenerate to a point at which it impairs the employee's ability to perform the duties to which he is assigned. Requiring notice of only a potential disability is a useless act since it is not until the employee actually becomes disabled that the employer is adversely affected in the absence of notice of the accident. (Emphasis in original.) Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill.App.3d at 611, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174. The appellate court stated that fact of the injury is not synonymous with fact of discovery. Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill. App.3d at 611, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174, citing Peoria County, 115 Ill.2d at 531, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026. That is, the date on which the employee notices a repetitive-trauma injury is not necessarily the manifestation date. Instead, the date on which the employee became unable to work, due to physical collapse or medical treatment, helps determine the manifestation date. Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill.App.3d at 611, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174. The appellate court noted that the standard remains flexible: Just as we reject [the employer's] contention the date of discovery of the condition and its relation to the employment necessarily fixes the date of accident, we reject any interpretation of this opinion which would permit the employee to always establish the date of accident in a repetitive-trauma case by reference to the last date of work. Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill.App.3d at 612, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174. Where the employer concedes that the injury was work-related and that the employee continued to work until the day before surgery, the Commission could reasonably conclude that that day was the date of accident. Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill. App.3d at 611, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174; but see Castaneda v. Industrial Comm'n, 231 Ill.App.3d 734, 738, 173 Ill. Dec. 402, 596 N.E.2d 1281 (1992) (holding that an employee's last day of exposure to repetitive trauma is not, in and of itself, the day of accident for the purposes of repetitive injury cases). In Three D Discount Store v. Industrial Comm'n, 198 Ill.App.3d 43, 144 Ill. Dec. 794, 556 N.E.2d 261 (1989), an employee buffed floors for a discount store. After five months, the employee noticed swelling in his hands and shooting pains in his right arm. He visited his doctor, who prescribed pain medication. At that time, he was also being treated by an endocrinologist for a diabetic condition. The employee experienced more severe pain, then numbness and tingling in his fingers and hands. The endocrinologist referred him to a neurologist. On June 27, 1984, the neurologist performed an EMG test and sent a report that the employee had carpal tunnel syndrome to the endocrinologist. The endocrinologist discussed the neurologist's report with the employee and referred him to an orthopedic surgeon. The orthopedic surgeon examined the employee on July 10, 1984, and scheduled surgery for August 1984. The employee then informed his supervisor that he had carpal tunnel syndrome and that it was work-related, and he continued to work until August 10, 1984. He later filed a workers' compensation claim. The arbitrator rejected this claim, finding that the employee failed to offer any evidence about when his injury occurred. The arbitrator concluded that if there was a work-related injury, it occurred when the employee first noticed swelling and pain, not when he left work in August 1984. The Commission reversed the arbitrator's findings. The Commission decided that the employee's injury was work-related and that it manifested itself when he left work. The Commission awarded benefits to the employee, and the trial court confirmed this decision. The appellate court initially reversed the trial court's decision, but on rehearing affirmed. Three D Discount Store, 198 Ill.App.3d at 47, 144 Ill.Dec. 794, 556 N.E.2d 261. The appellate court stated that the evidence established that the endocrinologist discussed the neurologist's report with the employee, but did not establish that the endocrinologist ever told the employee that his condition was work-related. Three D Discount Store, 198 Ill.App.3d at 47-48, 144 Ill.Dec. 794, 556 N.E.2d 261. The employee learned that his injury was work-related sometime in the month before he informed his supervisor and left work. Three D Discount Store, 198 Ill.App.3d at 48, 144 Ill.Dec. 794, 556 N.E.2d 261. The appellate court concluded that a reasonable person would have been on notice that this condition was work-related and medically disabling on July 10, 1984. Three D Discount Store, 198 Ill.App.3d at 48, 144 Ill.Dec. 794, 556 N.E.2d 261. After reviewing Oscar Mayer, the appellate court stated: An employee who continues to work on a regular basis despite his own progressive ill-being should not be punished merely for trying to perform his duties without complaint. On the other hand, it is not this State's policy to encourage disabled workers to silently push themselves to the point of medical collapse before giving the employer notice of an injury. Three D Discount Store, 198 Ill.App.3d at 49, 144 Ill.Dec. 794, 556 N.E.2d 261. The facts must be closely examined in repetitive-injury cases to ensure a fair result for both the faithful employee and the employer's insurance carrier. Three D Discount Store, 198 Ill.App.3d at 49, 144 Ill.Dec. 794, 556 N.E.2d 261. RLI argues, and we agree, that fairness and flexibility are the common themes in these cases. Indeed, the rule in Peoria County is broad enough to accommodate unique scenarios presented in different cases, and the Commission should weigh many factors in deciding when a repetitive-trauma injury manifests itself. But despite RLI's repeated invocations of flexibility, it asks us to limit the inquiry in this case to only one fact: the unspecified date in September or October 1997 on which Durand first noticed her hand and wrist pain, opined it could be carpal tunnel syndrome, and guessed it may bear some relation to her work, but declined to mention it to her supervisor for at least three months. As the appellate court correctly noted in Oscar Mayer, To always require an employee suffering from a repetitive-trauma injury to fix, as the date of accident, the date the employee became aware of the physical condition, presumably through medical consultation, and its clear relationship to the employment is unrealistic and unwarranted. Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill. App.3d at 610, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174. The inquiry is not so narrow. Professor Larson's workers' compensation treatise provides a summary of the case law: The practical problem of fixing a specific date for the accident has generally been handled by saying simply that the date of accident is the date on which disability manifests itself. Thus, in [ Ptak v. General Electric Co., 13 N.J.Super. 294, 80 A.2d 337 (1951)], the date of a gradually acquired [back] strain was deemed to be the first moment the pain made it impossible to continue work, and in [ Di Maria v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 23 N.J.Misc. 374, 44 A.2d 688 (1945)], the date of accident for gradual loss of use of the hands was held to be the date on which this development finally prevented claimant from performing his work. However, for certain purposes the date of accident may be identified with the onset of pain occasioning medical attention, although the effect of the pain may have been merely to cause difficulty in working and not complete inability to work. 3 L. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 50.05, at XX-XX-XX-XX (2005). In short, courts considering various factors have typically set the manifestation date on either the date on which the employee requires medical treatment or the date on which the employee can no longer perform work activities. See Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Ill.App.3d 880, 887, 93 Ill.Dec. 689, 487 N.E.2d 356 (1985), aff'd, 115 Ill.2d 524, 106 Ill.Dec. 235, 505 N.E.2d 1026 (1987) (holding that determining the manifestation date is a question of fact and that the onset of pain and the inability to perform one's job, are among the facts which may be introduced to establish the date of injury). A formal diagnosis, of course, is not required. The manifestation date is not the date on which the injury and its causal link to work became plainly apparent to a reasonable physician, but the date on which it became plainly apparent to a reasonable employee. See General Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 190 Ill.App.3d 847, 857, 137 Ill.Dec. 874, 546 N.E.2d 987 (1989). However, because repetitive-trauma injuries are progressive, the employee's medical treatment, as well as the severity of the injury and particularly how it affects the employee's performance, are relevant in determining objectively when a reasonable person would have plainly recognized the injury and its relation to work. See Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill.App.3d at 610, 126 Ill.Dec. 41, 531 N.E.2d 174. Against this legal background, the question before us is simply whether the date chosen by the Commission was against the manifest weight of the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing. We believe it was. According to RLI, Durand admitted that she knew about carpal tunnel syndrome and even suspected she had it in September or October 1997. RLI contends that Durand presented no evidence to show that she changed her mind about her injury or its relation to her work, and concludes that the manifestation date was in 1997. RLI essentially asks us to rely on expert medical testimony from a layperson, Durand, and ignore her testimony about her intermittent pain and how it affected her performance. At the arbitration hearing, Durand testified that she told her supervisor about her hand and wrist pain in September or October of 1997, but she didn't know at the time what it was, even though she believed it was work-related. Durand reached that expert opinion based solely on the pain she was having, not on any doctor's advice. Durand later reiterated that she wasn't sure her pain was carpal tunnel syndrome because it wasn't real constant and real severe in 1997. She then testified that she might have heard of carpal tunnel syndrome and knew people who had had it, and so surmised that she too had developed work-related carpal tunnel syndrome. Durand was never reassigned to other work, and she never sought medical treatment for her hand and wrist pain until August 15, 2000, when she visited Dr. Escorcia. Dr. Escorcia noted that Durand reported her pain began 18 months earlier, or a year after she spoke to her supervisor, but the pain was on and off. Dr. Blume noted that Durand reported her pain began two years before he examined her on September 8, 2000, and progressed when she worked. Dr. Pomerance noted that Durand reported gradual onset of hand and wrist pain in mid-2000; she had symptoms approximately 18 months earlier, but these were not that bothersome to her. Similarly, Dr. Conner noted that Durand reported problems in her arms in mid-2000. Dr. Martin stated Durand's carpal tunnel syndrome could have manifested itself with her hand and wrist pain in 1997, but gave no indication whether he reached that conclusion using the Peoria County standard. If Durand would have filed a claim in 1997, she certainly would have had difficulty proving her injury. Her description and understanding of the hand and wrist pain was sketchy and equivocal. At that time, it was not so constant or severe that it warranted medical treatment or reassignment to different work. As Justice Holdridge suggested in his dissent, the circumstances signal periodic discomfort leading to doubt about the existence of a distinct injury. 358 Ill.App.3d at 246, 294 Ill.Dec. 715, 831 N.E.2d 665 (Holdridge, J., dissenting, joined by Donovan, J.). The record strongly suggests that this doubt lingered until 2000, when Durand's pain finally necessitated medical treatment. A reasonable person would not have known of this injury and its putative relationship to computer keyboard work before that time, and it was against the manifest weight of the evidence to conclude otherwise. Durand's claim was timely. We decline to penalize an employee who diligently worked through progressive pain until it affected her ability to work and required medical treatment. However, we must remand this cause to the Industrial Commission. RLI, relying on testimony from Dr. Pomerance, disputed whether Durand's work activities caused her injuries. The Commission decided this case solely on the limitations period issue, and did not weigh the evidence on causation. We decline to usurp this function of the Commission, based upon the paper record before us.