Opinion ID: 1149593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Legislative Alternative to the Present Scheme

Text: Adoption in Louisiana is a creature of statute, and the ultimate responsibility for establishing the necessary procedures to effect adoptions belongs to the Legislature. Ball v. Campbell, 219 La. 1076, 55 So.2d 250 (1952); State ex rel. Harner v. Karpe, 151 La. 585, 92 So. 124 (1922). In establishing these procedures, however, the Legislature may not violate the fundamental rights of natural parents. Because there have been no previous decisions in this area, we offer the following ideas regarding potential safeguards to protect natural parents. This is not the only alternative that would satisfy due process, and we do not presume to prescribe the procedures that must or should be adopted by statute. Rather, these guidelines are intended as illustrations of a possible statutory scheme that would allow private adoptions while adequately protecting the rights of the natural parents. In our opinion due process requires at least rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken classification of persons as unfit or disinterested parents and against arbitrary deprivation of their protected interests in relationships with their children. For example, the natural father could be given written notice by mail of a proposed order approving surrender of the child and termination of his interest, if his identity and whereabouts are ascertainable with reasonable diligence. And he could be given a brief period before issuance of the order within which to make an informal oral or written statement why the child should not be surrendered and his rights not be terminated. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental requirement of due process. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); see also Friendly, 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 1281. We stop short of construing the due process clauses to require that the natural father be given the opportunity to confront and cross examine witnesses, or to call witnesses. To impose in each case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities. Requiring effective notice and informal discussion permitting the natural father to oppose the termination of his interest would provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous or unfair action without being unduly burdensome. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 593, 95 S.Ct. at 740, 42 L.Ed.2d at 739; Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So.2d at 901. Of course, less formal initial pre-termination hearings heighten the importance of post-deprivation review of those informal decisions. The Supreme Court has upheld informal pre-deprivation procedures when the person whose rights are terminated may ultimately have his claims considered by a court. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, supra; Mathews v. Eldridge, supra. When, as here, the interests at stake are fundamental, we believe that there must be an opportunity for judicial review, although this review may take place after the natural father's rights are administratively terminated. By Act 361 of 1989, the Legislature has established a putative father registry. Under this Act, anyone who claims to be or is adjudicated to be the natural father of an illegitimate child can be identified as such by consulting the registry. Recordation in the registry creates a rebuttable presumption that the person filing is the father of the child. The Act provides, however, that it shall not be construed to require that anyone obtain the consent of the putative father for the adoption of the child. While this Act may be helpful in ascertaining the identities of natural fathers, if such fathers file with the registry, it alone is patently insufficient to meet the basic requirements of due process. A similar registry has been established by the State of New York. A man who files with the New York registry and thus demonstrates his intent to claim paternity of a child born out of wedlock is entitled to receive notice of any proceeding to adopt that child. The purpose of the New York statute, however, appears to be to enable the person served pursuant to it merely to present evidence to the court relevant to whether the adoption is in the best interests of the child, rather than to allow him to assert his right to veto the adoption. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 251 n. 5, 264 n. 20, 103 S.Ct. at 2988 n. 5, 2994 n. 20, 77 L.Ed.2d at 620 n. 5, 628 n. 20. The New York registry law survived both a due process and an equal protection challenge in Lehr v. Robertson, supra. The law was not really tested, however, because the natural father in that case actually did not have a protected interest in the child due to having rarely seen and never supported the child in the two years since her birth. 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. at 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d at 626. Furthermore, the petitioners for adoption were the natural mother and the man she had married after the child's birth. The stepfather had acted as the father of the child for over a year before the adoption petition was filed. 463 U.S. at 250, 103 S.Ct. at 2987, 77 L.Ed.2d at 619. Had the prospective adoptive parents been strangers seeking to adopt the child and had the father not forfeited his protected interest in the child it is obvious that the result could have and should have been different. Finally, if the father had been deprived of an interest protected by the constitution without due process of law, it is difficult to see how this wrong could be remedied by merely enabling him to register his name and receive notice of an adoption proceeding at which he could only present evidence to the court relevant to the best interests of the child. The Louisiana registry law affords the unwed father even less protection; it does not even require that he be notified of an adoption proceeding. In light of the fact that the New York statute, even with its notice provisions, might well not survive a constitutional attack, we do not believe that the Louisiana registry statute, which has no such provisions, is sufficient in itself to protect the natural father's interests. Accordingly, while the registry law may prove to be a helpful adjunct to a constitutional child-surrender and parental right-termination procedure, it is no substitute for notice and some kind of pre-termination procedure before a neutral decisionmaker.