Opinion ID: 2747917
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The BIA’s Factual Findings

Text: We next turn to the BIA’s determination that the disclosure did not give rise to a reasonable inference that Owino was seeking asylum-related relief in the United States. Owino asserts that this conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence, and we agree. Prior to the disclosure in 2010, Owino’s asylum case had been discussed in a 2009 Daily Journal article, and the testimony of Eric Owino and the letter from Michael Nasubo indicated that people in Kenya were aware of the article. In light of this, Kenyan police could have interpreted inquiries by U.S. government investigators about Owino’s arrests and warrants as confirmation of the information in the article and reasonably inferred that Owino had applied for asylum on the basis of police abuse. 6 It is possible that the agency conflated the concepts of breach and remedy when it focused on whether the disclosure would indicate that Owino had sought asylum, as a new claim for relief is most likely to arise in the context of retaliation against asylum seekers. See Lin, 459 F.3d at 263–64 (focusing on risk that foreign government will retaliate against asylum seekers based on their failed attempts to emigrate); Averianova, 509 F.3d at 899–900 (same). Under this theory for relief, a new claim arises only if the disclosure indicates that the applicant was seeking asylum-related relief in the United States. There nevertheless may be situations when the applicant risks persecution based simply on the facts or allegations disclosed, regardless of whether the foreign officials infer that the applicant asserted these facts or allegations in the context of an asylum petition. OWINO V. HOLDER 19 The BIA instead concluded, however, that the police would have assumed that the investigators’ inquiries related to Owino’s employment in the United States, reasoning that “[Owino’s] cousin went to the Kenyan police herself to obtain information regarding his arrest record.” But in determining that the documents were fraudulent, the agency disbelieved the cousin’s account of how she obtained the documents. The agency cannot assume a witness’s testimony is false for the purpose of denying relief on one ground, then assume that the same testimony is true for the purpose of denying relief on another. We find that the BIA erred in concluding that the disclosure did not give rise to a reasonable inference that Owino was seeking asylum in the United States. Accordingly, we direct the agency on remand to determine whether this indication that Owino was seeking asylumrelated relief gives rise to a new claim under CAT. See Dayo, 687 F.3d at 657; Anim, 535 F.3d at 253; Lin, 459 F.3d at 267–68. D. Admission of the Overseas Investigation Evidence Although the rule against hearsay does not apply in removal proceedings, both the INA and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause require that “aliens be given a reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses.” Hernandez–Guadarrama v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Fifth Amendment also requires that evidence be “probative and its admission [be] fundamentally fair.” Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Espinoza, 45 F.3d at 310). 20 OWINO V. HOLDER Owino asserts that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the use of certain investigation evidence that falls short of the standards articulated by our sister circuits. See Anim, 535 F.3d at 256–59; Alexandrov v.Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 404–08 (6th Cir. 2006); Lin, 459 F.3d at 268–72. Owino correctly notes that the investigation materials submitted by the government – specifically, the Bar Ober letters and related testimony and the letter from the Nairobi police officer – do not satisfy the standards adopted by these circuits. Subsequent to the briefing in this case, however, a divided panel of this Court issued its decision in Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2013), expressly declining to follow these other circuits. Owino’s due process claim is foreclosed by Angov.7 In addition, Owino argues that the IJ deprived him of due process by admitting his former attorney’s declaration, in which she denied that she had advised him not to disclose his first arrest, without affording him an opportunity to crossexamine her. Owino failed to raise this claim to the BIA. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider it. Arsdi v. Holder, 659 F.3d 925, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2011); Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 7 We recognize that a petition for rehearing en banc in Angov is currently pending, and the mandate in that appeal has not yet issued. Because Owino is currently detained and because he may prevail on remand on issues wholly apart from this due process question, we decline to wait for en banc activity to conclude in Angov to issue this decision. If rehearing is granted, and the Angov panel opinion is vacated, the agency should reconsider Owino’s due process claim in light of any en banc decision that follows. OWINO V. HOLDER 21 E. The Agency’s Inadequate Consideration of the Evidence An alien seeking CAT relief must show that “it is ‘more likely than not’ that he or she would be tortured if removed.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). In evaluating an applicant’s CAT claim, the BIA must consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3); see Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014). Although the BIA “is not required ‘to discuss each piece of evidence submitted,’” Pirir-Boc, 750 F.3d at 1086 (citation omitted), we have remanded cases where the agency has failed to give reasoned consideration to highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence. Id. at 1085–86. See also Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771–73 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding for consideration of expert testimony, where agency failed to acknowledge one expert witness and its rationale for rejecting another expert’s opinion was “entirely unsupported by the record”); Eneh v. Holder, 601 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding where there was no indication that agency considered documentary and testimonial evidence that prison officials would single out petitioner for mistreatment). Owino contends that the agency failed to adequately consider several important pieces of evidence in support of Owino’s CAT claim, and we agree. First, Owino submitted two documents from Dr. Oketch: his notes from July 1997 and a letter the doctor wrote to Owino’s cousin, Eunice Akinyi. These documents indicate not only that Owino was injured in July 1997, but also that he reported having been abused by the police and that this explanation was consistent with his injuries. Although the doctor’s letter describes a dislocated wrist, whereas his notes 22 OWINO V. HOLDER do not, this difference is not a contradiction, and in fact the documents are generally consistent. Further, although the IJ was suspicious of the July 1997 date of the doctor’s notes, it appears that she was confused about the dates of Owino’s arrests. The medical documentation evidences Owino’s July 1997 arrest and abuse by police, and the agency inadequately explained its decision to discount it. The agency also inadequately explained its decision to discount the testimony of Eric Owino, Owino’s half-brother, who testified to Owino’s two arrests in 1997 and the fact that police were still looking for him. The IJ stated that this testimony “deserves little if any weight . . . in light of [Eric’s] relationship to Respondent and [his] desire to assist him in his efforts to avoid his removal to Kenya,” and that Eric “exaggerated [Owino]’s political activity, asserting events and circumstances that were never testified to by [Owino] himself.” An IJ may not refuse to credit testimony merely because of the witness’s relationship with the alien and consequent interest in helping him. Cf. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 905 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that “excluding documents for being ‘self-serving’ is not a sound practice”), overruled on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Due process principles prohibit an IJ from declining to hear relevant testimony because of a prejudgment about the witness’s credibility or the probative value of [the] testimony.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Eric’s inclusion of details not set out in Owino’s testimony is not an inconsistency; slight differences in the recollection or perception of different witnesses are a common occurrence. The agency also failed to explain its decision to discount the letter from Michael Nasubo. OWINO V. HOLDER 23 In denying CAT relief, the agency failed to justify its rejection of evidence indicating that Owino had been arrested previously and is at risk of being arrested again. We remand to the agency to consider all evidence in support of Owino’s claim or to explain its reasons for discounting it. F. Owino’s Credibility Finally, Owino challenges the agency’s adverse credibility finding. Under the REAL ID Act, credibility determinations must be made “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances[] and all relevant factors.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The agency “may consider any inconsistency,” though “trivial inconsistencies that under the total circumstances have no bearing on a petitioner’s veracity should not form the basis of an adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1043–44. The agency must support its finding with “specific and cogent reasons.” Id. at 1044 (quoting Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2009)). In affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, the BIA relied on Owino’s submission of purportedly fraudulent arrest documents and inconsistencies in his arrest dates and medical records. As discussed above, we do not find that there are any meaningful discrepancies in the medical evidence offered in evidence. We also note that evidence rejected by the agency may shed light on whether the arrest documents originally submitted were genuine and whether Owino reasonably believed them to be genuine. See Yeimane-Berhe v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 907, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing adverse credibility determination based on the use of one allegedly fraudulent document where nothing in the record suggested that applicant knew that document 24 OWINO V. HOLDER was fraudulent). On remand, the agency should reexamine its credibility analysis in light of all the record evidence. We also have considered Owino’s argument that the evidence compels a positive credibility determination, and find this argument unavailing. On remand, the agency must revisit the question of Owino’s credibility on the basis of the complete and accurate record, but the credibility determination is for the IJ to make in the first instance. See Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1093–96 (9th Cir. 2009).