Opinion ID: 1745728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: former indiana prosecution

Text: Stephenson argued to the Court of Appeals that the Commonwealth could not prosecute him under the Jefferson County indictment because he has already been convicted, and punished, for the same conduct by the State of Indiana. We consider this argument in connection with the constitutional and statutory double jeopardy protections, and conclude that Stephenson's Indiana DUI conviction does not constitute a double jeopardy bar to his prosecution in Kentucky because Stephenson's initial premise is incorrectthe Commonwealth does not seek to punish Stephenson for the same conduct for which Indiana punished him. Count Two of the indictment returned by the Jefferson County Grand Jury reads: That on or about the 17th day of April, 1999, in Jefferson County, Kentucky, the above named defendant, Stephen Stephenson, committed the offense of Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Intoxicants Fourth Offense by operating a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth of Kentucky while (a) the alcohol concentration in his blood or breath is 0.10 or more based on the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005; OR (b) under the influence of alcohol; OR (c) under the influence of any substance or combination of substances which impairs one's driving ability; OR (d) under the combined influence of alcohol and any other substance which impairs one's driving ability, after having committed that offense three times within the previous five years. (Emphasis added) KRS 189A.010 states that [a] person shall not operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle anywhere in this state [10]  while under the influence of alcohol and/or other impairing substances as further defined in the statute. Thus, here, the Commonwealth only seeks to prosecute Stephenson for his criminal conduct within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In any event, however, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution offers Stephenson no refuge. As the United States Supreme Court held in Heath v. Alabama, [11] the United States Constitution does not prohibit successive prosecutions for the same conduct by two (2) or more states or jurisdictions because each jurisdiction, as an independent sovereign, has the power to enforce its own criminal laws: The dual sovereignty doctrine, as originally articulated and consistently applied by this Court, compels the conclusion that successive prosecutions by two States for the same conduct are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law conception of crimes as an offense against the sovereignty of the government. When a defendant in a single act violates the peace and dignity of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct offences. As the Court explained in Moore v. Illinois [14 How. 13, 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852)], [a]n offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law. Consequently, when the same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense; but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly punishable. [12] The Commonwealth argues that Heath is dispositive of the issue at bar. We agree with the Commonwealth to the extent that we find that the dual sovereignty doctrine disposes of Stephenson's constitutional double jeopardy claims involving his former prosecution in Indiana. In order to fully address Stephenson's double jeopardy claim, however, we must consider Stephenson's argument regarding the applicability of Kentucky's statutory double jeopardy protections. KRS 505.050, which suspends the dual sovereignty doctrine as it relates to subsequent Kentucky prosecutions for a certain class of offenses by applying Kentucky's other statutory double jeopardy provisions to conduct that violates the criminal laws of two different jurisdictions, i.e., this state and the United States or this state and a sister state, [13] provides: When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of the United States or another state, a prosecution in such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state under the following circumstances: (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, a conviction which has not subsequently been set aside, or a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense involving the same conduct unless: (a) Each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other prosecution; or (b) The offense involved in the subsequent prosecution was not consummated when the former prosecution began; or (2) The former prosecution was terminated in a final order or judgment which has not subsequently been set aside and which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution. [14] In Hash v. Commonwealth, [15] the Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of KRS 505.050 to a factually similar case where an intoxicated driver committed crimes in both Kentucky and in Tennessee: In the early morning hours of January 19, 1992, the appellant, Charles Hash, was operating his vehicle inappropriately in Knox County, Kentucky. Hash, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, nearly struck two Kentucky State Police vehicles and a chase ensued southbound on I-75. After Hash entered Tennessee, he continued to exhibit improper driving etiquette by operating his vehicle in a southerly direction in the northbound lane of I-75 at high rates of speed. Hash was ultimately apprehended by Tennessee troopers and charged with several crimes including the following: felony reckless endangerment, driving under the influence, failure to yield to emergency equipment, speeding (110 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone), improper turn and driving on the wrong side of the road. He pled guilty to the reckless endangerment and the DUI charges, and received a sentence of 11 months, 29 days on each, to be served consecutively. On June 12, 1992, Hash was indicted on several crimes including two counts of wanton endangerment (KRS 508.060), driving under the influence (KRS 189A.010), reckless driving (KRS 189.290) and resisting arrest (KRS 530.090). All the charges were dismissed with the exception of the two counts of wanton endangerment. Hash tried to convince the trial court that the Commonwealth was barred from prosecuting him on these two charges by the protections offered under the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Being unsuccessful in this regard, Hash entered a plea of guilty on November 19, 1992, conditioned on his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss.... In his appeal Hash argues that his prosecution in Kentucky for the same conduct for which he was convicted in Tennessee violates KRS 505.050. [16] The Court of Appeals concluded that KRS 505.050 ha[d] no applicability to the instant case [17] because Kentucky had punished Hash for criminal conduct he committed within the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Tennessee had punished Hash for criminal conduct he committed in that jurisdiction: [T]here is no ... evidence that Hash was prosecuted in the state of Tennessee for his conduct in Kentucky; and if he was, the Tennessee court lacked jurisdiction over the offenses. See KRS 500.060. The two crimes of wanton endangerment in Kentucky were completed in Kentucky against two Kentucky victims before Hash ever entered Tennessee. ... As far as we can tell from the documents relied upon by the appellant, he pled guilty to two crimes in Tennessee for criminal conduct that took place solely in Tennessee. [18] Similarly, in the case sub judice, Indiana has punished Stephenson for the crime he committed by driving drunk within Indiana, and the Commonwealth seeks to punish Stephenson for the criminal conduct he allegedly committed, and completed, in Kentucky by driving under the influence in this jurisdiction. And, conceptually, this case is no different than if Stephenson had stolen a car in Kentucky and driven that car to Indiana, and committed a robbery in the State of Indiana. The fact that he committed the same or a similar criminal offense in both states during one trip behind the wheel is inconsequentialIndiana did not seek to punish Stephenson for his criminal conduct within the territorial jurisdiction of Kentucky and Kentucky does not seek to punish Stephenson for his criminal conduct within the territorial jurisdiction of Indiana. Accordingly, the indictment at issue does not involve conduct that constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and ... another state. [19] Concurrent jurisdiction is [j]urisdiction exercised simultaneously by more than one court over the same subject matter and within the same territory .... [20] For instance, in Benton v. Crittenden, [21] the investigating authorities alleged that the defendant forced his way into the victims' vehicle, forced the driver to drive the vehicle around Franklin and Shelby Counties, and then shot and killed the driver. [22] For this same conductall of which was committed in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Benton was indicted by a federal grand jury with carjacking under federal law, and, after he was acquitted in federal court, indicted by a Franklin County Grand Jury for murder, kidnapping, and robbery under Kentucky law. [23] While the most common concurrent jurisdiction situations involve conduct that constitutes a crime under both state and federal lawe.g., controlled substances and firearms offensesstates may also, under some circumstances, exercise concurrent jurisdiction over criminal conduct occurring outside their borders in another state. [24] The fact that Kentucky and Indiana both provide criminal sanctions for those who drive drunk within their own state borders, however, does not involve an issue of concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, like the Court of Appeals panel in Hash , we hold that KRS 505.050 has [no] application in this case that we can surmise. [25] As such, the fact of Stephenson's former DUI prosecution in Indiana provides no basis for the relief granted by the Court of Appeals.