Opinion ID: 161451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Miranda Warnings

Text: 65 Mr. Mitchell next contends that, although he received and waived his Miranda rights at the commencement of his interview, admission of statements he made during that interview after being informed that he was in custody should have been suppressed because he was not given Miranda warnings again at that point. Mr. Mitchell first raised this issue in state post-conviction proceedings, and the state appellate court held the matter procedurally barred by his failure to raise it on direct appeal. See Mitchell, 934 P.2d at 348 n.9. The court did, however, review and summarily reject the merits of the claim in addressing Mr. Mitchell's argument that his counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it on direct appeal. On federal habeas, the district court likewise held this argument without merit, distinguishing the cases upon which Mr. Mitchell premised his argument and pointing out the lack of any case requiring a person in Mr. Mitchell's position to be given a second set of Miranda warnings. 66 We turn first to the issue of procedural bar. [F]ederal habeas review of claims defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule is barred 'unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.' Sherrill v. Hargett, 184 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). Attorney error amounting to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes 'cause' for a procedural default. Hickman v. Spears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998). To establish ineffectiveness, a petitioner must show that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency was prejudicial to his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Prejudice, in turn, requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. If the ineffective assistance claim itself has no merit, it cannot constitute 'cause' for [a petitioner's] default in state court. Sherrill, 184 F.3d at 1176. If the issue Mr. Mitchell's appellate counsel failed to raise would not have prejudiced his defense, therefore, counsel was not ineffective and Mr. Mitchell's claim is not cognizable on federal habeas. 67 Mr. Mitchell argues that the Miranda warnings given here were ineffectual in view of the lengthy period between the time they were given and the point at which he was actually told he was in custody. 9 He asserts that the officers who conducted the interview did not promptly place him in custody after identifying him as a likely suspect and that the delay in custodial interrogation minimized the effect of the previously given warnings. We are not convinced. Numerous courts have rejected the argument that the passage of time alone invalidates previously given Miranda warnings. The mere passage of time . . . does not compromise a Miranda warning. Courts have consistently upheld the integrity of Miranda warnings even in cases where 'several hours' have elapsed between the reading of the warning and the interrogation. United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir. 1997) (listing cases). In United States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995), for example, the court determined that new warnings were not required when the defendant was interviewed the day after the warnings had been given. 68 The Supreme Court has considered the issue in a related context. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curiam). There, the defendant was given Miranda warnings before undergoing a polygraph test and agreed to take the test without counsel present. At the conclusion of the test less than two hours later, he was told that the test indicated some deception. He then made incriminating statements to an investigating agent. At that point, the defendant was given Miranda warnings again and questioned by a different agent and a police chief, to whom he repeated his incriminating statements. At trial the defendant sought to suppress the testimony of the two agents and the police chief regarding his statements, arguing that they were made in violation of his right to counsel. The state courts denied suppression on the ground that the defendant had been advised of his rights and had waived them. On federal habeas, the circuit court acknowledged that the defendant had waived his right to counsel during the test, but held that he had not done so with respect to his post-test interrogation because the defendant had not been given 'meaningfully timed Miranda warnings.' Id. at 47 (quoting Fields v. Wyrick, 682 F.2d 154, 160 (8th Cir. 1981)). 69 The Supreme Court criticized the circuit court for failing to examine the totality of the circumstances, and held that the defendant had validly waived his right to have counsel present at 'post-test' questioning, unless the circumstances changed so seriously that his answers no longer were voluntary, or unless he no longer was making a 'knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment' of his rights. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)). In making this assessment, the Court looked to whether the character of the interrogation had changed significantly, and whether the questions put to the defendant subsequently would have caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and which he had previously understood. Id. at 47-49. 70 The totality of the circumstances of Mr. Mitchell's interrogation clearly indicate that his statements were not rendered inadmissible by his failure to receive Miranda warnings after he was no longer free to leave. Although Mr. Mitchell had just turned eighteen, he was experienced in the juvenile criminal justice system, having gone through a delinquency adjudication and a three-year confinement. And even though Mr. Mitchell progressed from a witness to a suspect during the interview, the nature of the interrogation itself did not change: he was continuously questioned about the circumstances of the crime. Finally, it is significant that several hours after the interview began Mr. Mitchell asked the officers if he needed an attorney, indicating that he was aware then of his right to have counsel present. In sum, the totality of the circumstances does not show that Mr. Mitchell was unaware of his rights, or that he was naive about the process in which he was involved. Consequently, his rights were not violated by the admission of the post-custodial statements he made during his interrogation, notwithstanding his failure to receive warnings again at that time.