Opinion ID: 2371821
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Graduation from a California high school or attainment of the equivalent thereof.

Text: (3) Registration as an entering student at, or current enrollment at, an accredited institution of higher education in California not earlier than the fall semester or quarter of the 2001-02 academic year. (4) In the case of a person without lawful immigration status, the filing of an affidavit with the institution of higher education stating that the student has filed an application to legalize his or her immigration status, or will file an application as soon as he or she is eligible to do so. (b) A student exempt from nonresident tuition under this section may be reported by a community college district as a full-time equivalent student for apportionment purposes. (c) The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges and the Trustees of the California State University shall prescribe rules and regulations for the implementation of this section. (d) Student information obtained in the implementation of this section is confidential. [1] (3) Plaintiffs contend this statute is invalid on various grounds. Their main argument is that federal immigration law preempts it. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law. ( Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 935 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569].) The `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.' ( In re Jose C. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 534, 550 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 674, 198 P.3d 1087], quoting De Canas v. Bica (1976) 424 U.S. 351, 354 [7 L.Ed.2d 43, 96 S.Ct. 933].) While the immigration power is exclusive, it does not follow that any and all state regulations touching on aliens are preempted. ( De Canas v. Bica, supra, at p. 355.) Only if the state statute is in fact a `regulation of immigration,' i.e., `a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain' ( ibid. ), is preemption structural and automatic. Otherwise, the usual rules of statutory preemption analysis apply; state law will be displaced only when affirmative congressional action compels the conclusion it must be. ( Id. at pp. 356-357.) ( In re Jose C., supra, at p. 550.) Because section 68130.5 does not regulate[] who may enter or remain in the United States, we proceed under the usual preemption rules. ( In re Jose C., supra, at p. 550.) (4) We have identified four ways in which Congress may preempt state law: express, conflict, obstacle, and field preemption. ( In re Jose C., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 550.) Plaintiffs' main preemption argument is that two federal statutessections 1621 and 1623expressly preempt section 68130.5. Because the argument concerning section 1623 is the stronger of the two, we will consider that one first and then the section 1621 argument. Then we will consider plaintiffs' remaining arguments. The parties disagree as to whether a presumption against preemption exists. The point is unclear. In the past, the high court has indicated that a general presumption against preemption applies even in the context of immigration law. (See In re Jose C., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 551, citing De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 356.) However, more recent high court authority suggests that no particular presumption applies. (See Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 939, and cases cited.) We need not resolve the question here because, as we explain, we find no preemption even without a presumption. Before we turn to the issues, we must comment on terminology. Defendants and supporting amici curiae generally refer to a person not lawfully in this country by a term such as undocumented immigrant. Plaintiffs and supporting amici curiae generally use the term illegal alien, as did the Court of Appeal. The term undocumented immigrant is vague and is not used in the relevant statutes. It is also euphemistic, because it is unlawful to be in this country and to be undocumented in the sense in which defendants use the term. On the other hand, some view the term illegal alien as pejorative. Wishing to be as neutral, yet as accurate, as possible in our terminology, we turn to the most relevant statutes for assistance. Section 68130.5, subdivision (a)(4), uses the phrase a person without lawful immigration status. The federal provisions, sections 1621(d) and 1623(a), use the phrase an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States. Both of these phrases are too bulky to be used continually. We believe it best to shorten these phrases to the two-word term unlawful alien. Accordingly, we will use that term in this opinion.