Opinion ID: 1936097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: whether the trial court failed to properly instruct jurors on the proper presumptions to guide sentencing deliberations

Text: Jackson next contends that the circuit court erred in preventing him from adequately informing the jury regarding the option of life imprisonment. The circuit court granted the State's Motion in Limine to Prohibit Discussion of Meaning of Life Sentence, prohibiting counsel for Jackson or the State from mentioning to the jury that imposition of a life sentence would mean either that the defendant would be imprisoned for the rest of his life or that he could be eligible for parole, because of the prejudice that could result from either statement. Jackson now contends that granting the order prevented him from making a proper argument to the jury regarding the nature of the available sentencing options. He further asserts that the circuit court erred in refusing to grant his requested instruction, D-S-5, which would have instructed the jury on the presumption of life imprisonment. There is no merit to Jackson's arguments. Eligibility for parole, actions of the parole commission and the judge's determination of the configuring of sentences are not the proper subject either of closing arguments or jury instructions. Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 798 (Miss. 1987) (Jessie Derrell Williams); Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss. 1984) (Walter Williams, Jr.). See also, Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 553 (Miss. 1990) (prosecutor's mention of possibility of parole during closing arguments contributed to cumulative errors warranting reversal of case). In so far as the jury instruction is concerned, in Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829 (Miss. 1994), where it was asserted that an instruction allowed by the trial court improperly shifted to the defense the burden of proving that mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances, we flatly rejected the appellant's argument that a defendant should go into the sentencing phase with a presumption that life is the appropriate punishment. Chase, 645 So.2d at 860. See also, Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 650 (Miss. 1983) (if defendant had not been convicted of a capital offense, there would be no need for the sentencing hearing and he would simply be sentenced to serve a life term. This does not mean though that the procedure is unfair or faulty.) Accordingly, we find no merit in either argument.