Opinion ID: 867281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Juror O.

Text: ¶ 17 Garcia also argues that the trial court, over his objection, erroneously struck a life-scrupled juror because of his views on the death penalty. We review a trial court's decision ... to strike jurors for cause for abuse of discretion. Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 46, 116 P.3d at 1207. ¶ 18 During defense counsel's questions, Juror O. stated that I don't know if I can make the decision to vote for the death penalty. I don't know if I can say yes to death. I can'tI don't know if I can do that. I am very conflicted about it. After further questioning, Juror O. said that he thought he could vote for death if the State meets its burden beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the law and the facts. However, when questioned by the State, Juror O. later stated that he was not sure he could vote for death. ¶ 19 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Juror O. Although Juror O. said at one point that he could follow the law, he also testified that he was not positive that he could vote for death, would heavily lean in favor of life, and that it would be almost impossible for him to vote for death. Even if a juror is sincere in his promises to uphold the law, a judge may still reasonably find a juror's equivocation `about whether he would take his personal biases into the jury room' sufficient to substantially impair his duties as a juror, allowing a strike for cause. State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 137 ¶ 89, 140 P.3d 899, 920 (2006) (quoting Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 48 ¶ 49, 116 P.3d at 1208). Here, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Juror O.'s performance would be substantially impaired by his feelings about capital punishment. See State v. Montaño, 204 Ariz. 413, 422-23 ¶¶ 38-39, 65 P.3d 61, 70-71 (2003).