Opinion ID: 1159595
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to strike venireperson Gail Schroeder for cause

Text: ¶ 23 Gail Schroeder provided several answers on her jury questionnaire that suggested her potential inability to act as a fair and impartial juror. For example, in response to Question # 1, which asked if the jurors had any strong feelings about the case which might affect their ability to be fair and impartial, Ms. Schroeder stated, I've already made up my mind from news reports but could be wrong. Jury Questionnaire # 80, Question 1. Two follow-up questions asked the potential jurors if their pre-existing opinions about the case could be set aside or changed. Ms. Schroeder answered, No to both questions. Jury Questionnaire # 80, Question 8. Ms. Schroeder also responded that she favored the death penalty and added that it was not used enough. Jury Questionnaire # 80, Question 41. Curiously, when asked if she would be satisfied to have twelve people with her background and frame of mind decide her case if she were accused of a similar offense, Ms. Schroeder responded, Yes. I feel I can be very impartial. Jury Questionnaire # 80, Question 50. On the next question, however, which asked, In light of the subject matter of this case or the matters related above, or anything else, do you feel you could sit as a fair and impartial juror?, Ms. Schroeder answered, No. Jury Questionnaire # 80, Question 51. ¶ 24 In light of these inconsistent answers, the trial court questioned Ms. Schroeder in chambers about her ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror. Ms. Schroeder retracted her earlier answers and provided consistent responses assuring the trial court that she could be fair and impartial. To the trial court's question, [D]o you think that you still are of such an opinion that you can't be fair in this case?, Ms. Schroeder replied, I think I can be fair. Tr. Sept. 8, 1997 at 141. The trial court then asked, So whatever opinion that you had before, is it your thought that you can put that aside here? Ms. Schroeder responded, Yes. Id. ¶ 25 During this in chambers voir dire, Martinez' counsel specifically asked Ms. Schroeder about her response to Question # 51 and Ms. Schroeder responded that she did not know why she answered that she could not sit as a fair and impartial juror. Id. at 142. He asked Ms. Schroeder again if she could be fair and impartial to which Ms. Schroeder answered, Yes, I could. Id. at 143. He then asked Ms. Schroeder if she still had an opinion regarding Martinez' guilt based on the news reports she had heard. Ms. Schroeder replied, News don't tell you all the facts soI don't really have an opinionI don't really have an opinion until I hear all the facts. I know that they don't always put all the facts in the paper or on the news. Id. The trial court then asked Ms. Schroeder a follow-up question on the burden of proof. Ms. Schroeder explained that she understood the presumption of innocence and agreed with that concept. After this questioning ended, Martinez' counsel moved to strike Ms. Schroeder for cause. The trial court denied this motion. Martinez then exercised one of his peremptory strikes to remove Ms. Schroeder from the panel. ¶ 26 On appeal, Martinez argues that from her responses to the questions on the jury questionnaire there were reasonable grounds to believe that Ms. Schroeder could not be fair and impartial. Martinez relies on State v. Huerta, 175 Ariz. 262, 264, 855 P.2d 776, 778 (1993) (holding that reversal is required if the court abused its discretion by failing to strike a juror for cause, and the defendant is required to use a peremptory strike to remove the challenged juror), to claim he was denied a substantial right because he had to exhaust one of his peremptory strikes on Ms. Schroeder who should have been stricken for cause. [6] ¶ 27 Because it was not error to fail to remove the juror for cause, the predicate for Martinez' argument fails. In Huerta, the challenged juror could not be rehabilitated. Id. at 262, 855 P.2d at 776. Here, Ms. Schroeder assured the trial court that she could be fair and impartial despite her earlier answers on the jury questionnaire. In response to the trial judge's question asking her whether she could be fair in this case, Ms. Schroeder specifically stated, I think I can be fair. Tr. Sept. 8, 1997 at 141. She qualified her answers regarding the news reports she had heard and acknowledged that, News don't tell you all the facts soI don't really have an opinion. Id. at 143. She also retracted her answer to Question # 51, and said that she did not know why she answered that she could not sit as a fair and impartial juror. ¶ 28 A juror's preconceived notions or opinions about a case do not necessarily render that juror incompetent to fairly and impartially sit in a case. State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 398, 698 P.2d 183, 193 (1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). If a juror is willing to put aside his opinions and base his decision solely upon the evidence, he may serve. Id. The trial court can rehabilitate a challenged juror through follow-up questions to assure the court that he can sit as a fair and impartial juror. See, e.g., State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 609, 905 P.2d 974, 988 (1995); State v. Chaney, 141 Ariz. 295, 302-03, 686 P.2d 1265, 1272-73 (1984) (concluding that it was not abuse for the trial court to refuse to excuse the challenged juror for cause because he assured the court that he could render an impartial verdict). Ms. Schroeder provided assurances that she could sit as a fair and impartial juror and decide the case under the presumption of innocence. The trial court was in the best position to observe Ms. Schroeder's demeanor and judge her answers. We find no abuse.