Opinion ID: 1033503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statements About Operation Woodchop

Text: On appeal, defendant Bodison argues that the district court was required to grant his motion for a new trial because the court violated Rule 404(b) by admitting testimony from law enforcement witnesses that the investigation and prosecution of Bodison stemmed from Operation Woodchop. Because Bodison did not object at trial to the statements regarding Operation Woodchop on Rule 404(b) grounds, we review the admission of these statements for plain error. See Nixon, 918 F.2d at 904–05. A review of the record establishes that three of the government’s witnesses mentioned Operation Woodchop. First, Detective Grant Meade of the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (“OCSO”) explained that he had first begun conducting surveillance of Bodison while working on Operation Woodchop. Detective Meade stated that Operation Woodchop involved “a two-month wiretap and several hours of physical surveillance as well” around “[p]retty much the whole area of Zellwood.” He also stated that he had recruited Brown to work as a CI in the broader investigation and that Brown had performed controlled purchases from various drug dealers, including Bodison, during the two-year investigation. Second, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) Special Agent Dominick Braccio testified that he had worked on “the case on Mr. Bodison, as well as an operation known as Operation Woodchop which encompassed several more individuals in a 10 Case: 12-15812 Date Filed: 07/11/2013 Page: 11 of 22 larger area.” Third, Special Agent Joshua Baker, also with the DEA, testified that he had been the “lead agent over the entire case . . . . not just Mr. Bodison, but all other defendants and targets [the law enforcement agencies] were investigating.” 4 These brief references to Operation Woodchop provided context to the witnesses’ investigations of Bodison. They were “natural part[s] of the witness[es’] accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses,” and therefore were outside of Rule 404(b)’s scope. See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the effect of the Operation Woodchop references was not so unfairly prejudicial as to substantially outweigh their probative value in violation of Rule 403. Because the testimony about Operation Woodchop was not barred by Rules 404(b) or 403, the district court committed no abuse of discretion, much less plain error, in denying Bodison’s motion for a new trial on this ground. D. Brown’s Statements About a Murder and About Being Shot Bodison next argues that a new trial was warranted because the district court violated Rule 404(b) by admitting CI Brown’s testimony that (1) the intersection where Brown and Mobley arranged to meet on June 15, 2011 was where Brown’s former acquaintance, Bradley Blanton, had been killed; and, (2) during the course 4 The government also sought to solicit testimony regarding controlled drug purchases from other targets of the investigation; however the district court excluded such testimony on relevance grounds. 11 Case: 12-15812 Date Filed: 07/11/2013 Page: 12 of 22 of Operation Woodchop, CI Brown “got shot at twice.” Bodison’s arguments fail for two reasons. First, although Bodison objected at trial to Brown’s two statements, he did not challenge these statements in his motion for a new trial. The district court could not have abused its discretion in declining to grant a motion for a new trial on grounds not even raised in that motion. Second, even if we were to construe Bodison’s appellate brief as directly challenging the district court’s admission of CI Brown’s two statements (rather than challenging the denial of a motion for new trial), his arguments fail. “[W]e review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, but will reverse only if the error may have had a substantial influence on the outcome of the proceeding.” United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1127 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, even if the admission of CI Brown’s two statements was erroneous, it could not have substantially influenced the trial. As for Brown’s testimony about the death of his former acquaintance, Bradley Blanton, Brown testified that, while waiting to conduct a controlled purchase from defendant Mobley on June 15, 2011, Brown stood at an intersection where “Brad got killed at.” When the government attempted to elicit details about Blanton’s death, Bodison objected on relevance grounds and the district court sustained the 12 Case: 12-15812 Date Filed: 07/11/2013 Page: 13 of 22 objection. There was no suggestion whatsoever that Bodison had anything to do with Blanton’s killing, and Bodison does not explain how this statement was otherwise prejudicial. As for CI Brown’s testimony about being “shot at twice,” Brown made this statement during the course of questions regarding payments he received from the DEA for his work as a CI and for relocation expenses. Specifically, the government asked whether anything happened to cause Brown to fear for his safety, and, over Bodison’s objections, Brown responded: “Well, I got shot at twice.” Again, there was no suggestion that Bodison had anything to do with this shooting. In fact, when the district court expressed concern that Brown’s testimony was “getting something in that shouldn’t be,” the government expressly stated that it was “not suggesting that Mr. Bodison had anything to do with [Brown being shot at].” CI Brown agreed, testifying: “not him, just over the whole investigation, what we [were] talking about, I got shot at twice . . . . [i]n Zellwood.” Afterwards, the district court advised the government to “move on” and the government returned to the broader discussion of payments Brown received for his CI work. In light of the foregoing, there is no possibility that the admission of Brown’s statements about the death of Blanton and being shot at, even if 13 Case: 12-15812 Date Filed: 07/11/2013 Page: 14 of 22 erroneous, had “a substantial influence on the outcome of the proceeding.” See Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1127 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Accordingly, we affirm the district court on this issue. 6