Opinion ID: 1275251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Refusal to Order Discovery of Witnesses' Correctional Records.

Text: (15) Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for discovery of Department of Corrections records pertaining to prosecution witnesses in general and Gary Brady in particular. We first discuss contentions relating to Brady. Brady testified on direct examination that, while they were both in custody in the Stanislaus County jail, defendant admitted his guilt to Brady. Defense counsel then moved for discovery of Brady's Department of Corrections file, stating he had been informed Brady had once been committed to Patton State Hospital after a section 1368 competency hearing, and the file was needed to cross-examine Brady effectively as to his mental competency. The trial court denied the motion, commenting Brady had indeed been committed to Patton State Hospital, had escaped, and had been wounded and apprehended in Arkansas. Defense counsel argued the file might contain psychiatric evaluations and other evidence casting light on Brady's mental capacity to tell the truth. The trial court denied the motion on the basis the material sought was privileged. It acknowledged, however, that if defense counsel furnished some authority to the contrary, the appropriate course would be to conduct an in camera review of the file to determine specific questions of relevancy and privilege. Defense counsel did not renew his discovery motion, but cross-examined Brady extensively on his prior criminal history, his involvement in unrelated crimes, his history of testifying against other defendants in return for favorable treatment by the prosecutor in his own cases, and the terms of the arrangement under which he was testifying in defendant's case. Additionally, defense counsel cross-examined Brady concerning his psychiatric history. Brady acknowledged suffering from a mild seizure disorder. He also acknowledged having been sent to Patton State Hospital at a time when he was smoking a lot of PCP and was in a fantasy trip, where an EEG (electroencephalogram) revealed slight, temporary abnormalities caused by use of drugs. Brady also stated that after a full psychiatric examination he had been diagnosed as having a psychopathic personality with some paranoid schizophrenic coloring under stress. Asked to elaborate on those diagnoses, Brady stated psychopathic personality ... is the type of outlaw type dude like I am. I have been fighting the law all my life.... And the schizophrenic coloring is that under due [ sic ] stress or something like that, I get frustrated and I keep thinking that someone is against me or trying to, you know; otherwise, I provoke something that isn't really there. Brady admitted that if alone and under stress or in a state of anxiety, he sometimes imagines things and has violent rages. Defendant contends he was entitled to discovery of Brady's correctional file in order to secure a fair trial and an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446]; Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 315-316 [39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353-354, 94 S.Ct. 1105]; Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218-219, 83 S.Ct. 1194].) Defendant also suggests the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution may be read to require the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence. (But see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 55-56 [94 L.Ed.2d 40, 56-57, 107 S.Ct. 989] (plur. opn. by Powell, J.) [declining to decide how the guarantees of the compulsory process clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment].) He contends the trial court failed to follow established procedure, in that no representative of the state first asserted the privilege, no in camera review took place, and no balancing occurred of defendant's interest in gaining access to the file against the state's interest in maintaining its confidentiality. (See Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 807-814 [268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934] ( Delaney ) [articulating the test defendant must meet to overcome newsperson's privilege under shield law].) Against defendant's claim of entitlement to Brady's correctional records, the Attorney General focuses on the generally confidential nature of Department of Corrections files (see § 2081.5; Alanis v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 784, 787 [83 Cal. Rptr. 355, 463 P.2d 707] [prisoner has no right to access his own correctional file in support of motion for resentencing; implying only those persons authorized by § 2081.5 may have access to correctional records]; Yarish v. Nelson (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 893, 902 [104 Cal. Rptr. 205] [media representatives not entitled to prisoner records]), and emphasizes defendant received full disclosure of Brady's felony record and inducements to testify. In light of these disclosures, the trial court's refusal to order disclosure of Brady's correctional file, according to the Attorney General, could not have prejudiced defendant. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. 39 [94 L.Ed.2d 40, 107 S.Ct. 989] ( Ritchie ), is instructive in resolving this issue. In Ritchie, the defendant, accused of sexually molesting his daughter, sought discovery of confidential files maintained by the state child protective agency, claiming the files were needed to enable him effectively to cross-examine his daughter in his criminal trial. The trial court denied disclosure of the files; the state's highest court reversed that ruling, concluding defendant, through his attorney, was entitled under the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment to search the files for any useful evidence. On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. A plurality of the high court analyzed the case under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting the confrontation clause is a trial right, not a guarantee of pretrial discovery ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 52-53 [94 L.Ed.2d at pp. 56-57, 107 S.Ct. 989]), and declining to decide the precise contours of the compulsory process clause ( id. at pp. 55-56 [94 L.Ed.2d at pp. 56-57]). A majority of the court went on to note it is well settled the government must turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. ( Id. at p. 57 [94 L.Ed.2d at p. 57].) Materiality, the Ritchie majority observed, is established on a showing there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different, a reasonable probability being a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Ibid., citing United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682 [87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494, 105 S.Ct. 3375].) The Ritchie majority acknowledged the state's contention the files were confidential, but because Pennsylvania law recognized specified exceptions to their confidentiality, the Ritchie majority saw no reason to believe the relevant information would not be disclosed on a showing of materiality to the defense of the accused. ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 57-58 [94 L.Ed.2d at pp. 57-58, 107 S.Ct. 989].) Accordingly, the majority affirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court judgment to the extent the latter directed a remand to the trial court for a determination of materiality. The Ritchie majority concluded, however, that an in camera review by the trial court, rather than full disclosure to defense counsel, would suffice to protect both defendant's interest in due process and the state's policy of protecting the confidentiality of its child abuse files. ( Id. at pp. 58-61 [94 L.Ed.2d at pp. 58-60].) Although it appears the trial court in the present case short-circuited the adjudication of the privilege issue in the first instance by failing to require the prosecutor to assert the privilege now claimed, as provided in Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785 (see also Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for North. Dist. of Cal. (9th Cir.1975) 511 F.2d 192, 198, affirmed, 426 U.S. 394 [48 L.Ed.2d 725, 96 S.Ct. 2119] (1976) [specifying procedure under federal law for assertion of privilege in correctional records]), we conclude reversal is unwarranted. ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 57 [94 L.Ed.2d at p. 57, 107 S.Ct. 989]; United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678 [87 L.Ed.2d at pp. 491-492, 105 S.Ct. 3375]; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1272 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].) First, assuming Brady's file contained information concerning his 1977 commitment to Patton State Hospital in a temporary, phencyclidine (PCP)-related fantasy state, defendant does not suggest how that state might be relevant to Brady's mental stability either in 1981, when defendant allegedly confessed his crimes to him, or in 1983, at the time of trial. Second, the jury heard Brady's version of his diagnosis and its significance; although we cannot, of course, say whether Brady's testimony accurately reflected the contents of his correctional file, it did raise questions about his mental stability, to which the jury was entitled to give whatever weight it deemed appropriate. Finally, Brady's credibility was extensively impeached with evidence of his prior criminal history, his involvement in other crimes, and the inducements for his testimony. Even assuming Brady's file contained psychiatric evidence casting doubt on his credibility, therefore, we see no reasonable probability the outcome of this case would have been different had it been disclosed to the defense. ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 57 [94 L.Ed.2d at p. 57, 107 S.Ct. 989].) [7] For the same reason, we are unpersuaded defendant suffered prejudice as required by People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at page 684, where the denial of Pitchess discovery (see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305]) deprived [the defendant] of the possibility of presenting evidence on the issue whether his confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. As to the contention the trial court erred in refusing to order disclosure of the probation and parole records of other prosecution witnesses, we likewise conclude that, despite any error by the trial court in failing to proceed as discussed above, defendant makes no adequate showing of prejudice in light of the discovery order that was made, i.e., requiring disclosure of prosecution witnesses' felony records and inducements to testify.