Opinion ID: 442000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Removability of Maintenance and Cure Claim.

Text: 19 A more difficult question for our consideration is whether a Jones Act claim and a maintenance and cure claim are separate and independent for purposes of Sec. 1441(c) removal. While this Court has not directly addressed this issue, we find support in the Second Circuit's decision in Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Co., 733 F.2d 1020 (2nd Cir.1984), for the position that a maintenance and cure claim is not sufficiently distinct from a Jones Act claim arising out of the same set of operative facts to warrant removal. Id. at 1026. This issue has also been addressed by three district courts, all of which have rejected removal. Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 9 (E.D.Pa.1983); Skaw v. Lady Pacific, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 2 (D.Alaska 1983); Sawyer v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 37 (S.D.Ill.1982) (vacating an earlier ruling, 510 F.Supp. 39, to the contrary). 20 In Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.1952), we held that where there is but a single wrongful invasion of a single primary right, a claim for unseaworthiness joined with a claim under the Jones Act is not a separate and independent claim for the purposes of removal. Id. at 501. In Pate we did not address the removability issue with regard to appellant's claim for maintenance and cure because the maintenance claim failed to satisfy the requisite jurisdictional amount to be removable. 4 Texaco asserts that, unlike the plaintiff in Pate, Addison is seeking relief for the alleged invasion of two separate rights: contractual rights under maintenance and cure and rights founded in tort under the Jones Act. For support, Texaco cites Professors Gilmore and Black: By unquestionable authority a maintenance and cure claim is 'separate and independent' from ... the Jones Act ... for the purposes of res judicata or Sec. 1441(c) or anything else. G. Gilmore and C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, Sec. 6-28 at 358 (2d ed. 1975) (emphasis in original). 5 The authors, however, go on to make clear that the cases to date have assumed that, notwithstanding a claim for maintenance and cure, the assertion of a Jones Act claim prevents removal of the entire action. Id. 21 Texaco correctly points out that Jones Act negligence and maintenance and cure are based on different legal theories, and that the damages recoverable under each are different; as a result, it argues the two claims are separate and independent. While these distinctions are not insignificant, we are directed in this area to the guidelines established in American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951). In Finn, the Supreme Court held that where there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocking series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under Sec. 1441(c). Id. at 14, 71 S.Ct. at 540. To determine if there is a single wrong, the court must examine whether or not there was wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintiff, not how many different legal causes of action are alleged. Id. at 13, 71 S.Ct. at 540 (quoting Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321, 47 S.Ct. 600, 602, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927)). If all damages come from a single incident or all claims involve substantially the same facts invasion of a single, primary right is indicated. Id. 341 U.S. at 16, 71 S.Ct. at 541. 22 Addison has received only one injury; the only relief he seeks is compensation for that particular injury. His injury arose from a singular occurrence; moreover, both his maintenance and cure and Jones Act claims involve substantially the same facts. While it is true that maintenance and cure and Jones Act claims have been held independent actions for some purposes, see, e.g., Pacific Steamship Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 49 S.Ct. 75, 73 L.Ed. 220 (1928) (election of remedies); Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.1972) (no double recovery), they have also been held closely related for other purposes. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963) (submission to jury). 6 23 Our holding today that maintenance and cure claims are not separate and independent from Jones Act claims for Sec. 1441(c) removal purposes is bolstered by four additional considerations. First, Sec. 1441(c) requires that a removable claim must be both separate and independent from a non-removable claim. In 1948, Congress' addition of the word independent gave emphasis to its intention to require fairly complete disassociation between the claims. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, supra, 341 U.S. at 12, 71 S.Ct. at 539. Notwithstanding the different legal theories underlying the Jones Act and maintenance and cure, we find that the claims in this case are not sufficiently disassociated from each other; rather, they are closely associated. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., supra, 374 U.S. at 18, 19 n. 6, 21, 83 S.Ct. at 1649 n. 6, 1650; cf. Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 322, 47 S.Ct. 600, 603, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927) (maintenance and cure claim is purely dependent and contingent on negligence action). Moreover, injured seamen have traditionally joined their negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure actions in a single three-count lawsuit. See, e.g., Gilmore & Black, supra, Sec. 6-25 at 349. This traditional and historic pattern of joinder is some evidence of the dependent rather than independent relationship between these two claims. 24 Second, Congress intended that seamen have the choice of a state court or federal court forum in Jones Act cases. See 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1333(1), 1445(a) Gilmore & Black, supra, Sec. 6-28 at 357. In addition, the Jones Act and claims thereunder should be liberally construed in favor of injured seamen. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 53 S.Ct. 173, 77 L.Ed. 368 (1932); see Norris, The Law of Seamen Sec. 662 (1970). Removal by virtue of the maintenance and cure claim, however, would seriously limit a seaman's right to elect his forum. To prevent removal, an injured seaman would be forced to bring maintenance and cure as a separate action or forego maintenance and cure damages above $10,000. Skaw v. Lady Pacific, Inc., supra, 577 F.Supp. at 4. 25 Third, voluntary and contemporary payment of maintenance and [cure] is highly encouraged to ensure that payments will be made to injured seamen when needed most. Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir.1972). Allowing removal in this context will encourage Jones Act defendants to dispute and withhold payment on maintenance and cure claims to ensure removability of actions of this nature. 26 Finally, we note that here, unlike a typical Sec. 1441(c) case where a removable claim is joined with a claim which lacks federal jurisdiction, the removable claim is joined with a federal claim that Congress prefers to leave in state court if that is where a plaintiff has filed it. Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Co., supra, 733 F.2d at 1022. We think this preference in favor of Jones Act plaintiffs lends support to our holding, particularly where, as here, the two claims are historically and factually tied together.