Opinion ID: 4321458
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Downward Departure or Variance

Text: Haro contends that the district court erred in failing to grant a downward departure based on her family ties and responsibilities. “We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure from the Guidelines only if the refusal was based on an error of law.” United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786, 797 (5th Cir. 2003). And “[a] refusal to grant a 8 Case: 17-40539 Document: 00514683708 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/16/2018 No. 17-40539 downward departure is a violation of law only if the court mistakenly assumes that it lacks authority to depart.” United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230, 248 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Yanez–Huerta, 207 F.3d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, Haro makes no argument that the district court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to depart, and nothing in the record suggests that the court held that view. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision to deny the departure. See Cooper, 274 F.3d at 248. Haro alternatively contends that the district court erred in failing to grant a downward variance, which amounts to a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. This court reviews the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. Scott, 654 F.3d at 555. The district court sentenced Haro to 130 months of imprisonment, within the Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months. When a district court sentences a defendant within a properly calculated Guidelines range, the sentence is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Gutierrez-Hernandez, 581 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 2009). “The presumption is rebutted only upon a showing that the sentence does not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors.” Scott, 654 F.3d at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). Haro argues that the district court failed to account for a factor that should have received significant weight: her family ties and responsibilities. In determining that a Guidelines sentence was warranted, the district court emphasized the seriousness of the offense, noting that Haro had engaged in multiple transactions over an extensive period and that her moneylaundering efforts helped perpetuate the drug trade, which in turn caused substantial societal harm. The court also found that Haro participated in the 9 Case: 17-40539 Document: 00514683708 Page: 10 Date Filed: 10/16/2018 No. 17-40539 conspiracy to achieve financial gain, despite the risk to her family if she were caught. Thus, the district court considered Haro’s arguments regarding her family, but concluded that they did not warrant a sentence below the Guidelines range. Haro does not point to any precedent suggesting that the district court was required to give significant weight to her family-ties argument, let alone that it required a downward variance. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sentence. See United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that our review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is highly deferential to the sentencing court, which sits in a better position to find facts and consider the § 3553(a) factors). B. Challenges to the Forfeiture Order Imposing a Money Judgment The district court imposed on Haro a forfeiture order of $1.825 million, holding her jointly and severally liable with several of her coconspirators, and further ordered Haro to forfeit $13,908 in cash seized from her house upon her arrest to be credited toward the total forfeiture amount. 2 Haro appeals the district court’s forfeiture order and money judgment, bringing several challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold them, the district court’s calculation of their amounts, and the constitutionality of the money judgment under the Eighth Amendment. We address each of her arguments in turn. 1. Substitution The district court relied on 18 U.S.C. § 982’s provision for the forfeiture of substitute property to order forfeiture of funds that were not seized by the 2 A court may enter a money judgment establishing the total amount of a defendant’s forfeiture liability. See United States v. Cessa, 872 F.3d 267, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2017). The court’s forfeiture order apparently rested on 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which provides: The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of this title, shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property. 10 Case: 17-40539 Document: 00514683708 Page: 11 Date Filed: 10/16/2018 No. 17-40539 Government. Section 982 permits such substitution when a defendant, through her acts or omissions, has concealed or dissipated forfeitable assets. Section 982(b)(1) states, “The forfeiture of property under this section . . . shall be governed by the provisions of [21 U.S.C. § 853].” The substitute-asset provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), in turn, state that if, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant, the tainted property subject to forfeiture “cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence,” “has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court,” or is otherwise unavailable, “the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant, up to the value of” the unavailable, tainted property. However, § 982(b)(2) qualifies the Government’s ability to seek substitute assets from money launderers, stating: The substitution of assets provisions of [§ 853(p)] shall not be used to order a defendant to forfeit assets in place of the actual property laundered where such defendant acted merely as an intermediary who handled but did not retain the property in the course of the money laundering offense unless the defendant, in committing the offense or offenses giving rise to the forfeiture, conducted three or more separate transactions involving a total of $100,000 or more in any twelve month period. Here, the district court expressly found at sentencing that Haro “conducted three or more separate transactions involving a total of $100,000 or more in any twelve month period.” Though Haro conclusorily argues on appeal that there was not sufficient evidence for this finding, she provides no support for her argument. Accordingly, she has failed to demonstrate that this finding was clear error and therefore the forfeiture of substitute assets under § 982 was proper. 2. Calculation Haro brings three challenges to the amount of the district court’s forfeiture order. First, she conclusorily contends that the amounts are speculative and unsupported by competent evidence, “almost entirely based on 11 Case: 17-40539 Document: 00514683708 Page: 12 Date Filed: 10/16/2018 No. 17-40539 what people who did not package, count, or even see the money thought or claim the amounts were.” However, Haro does not explain how the evidence was unreliable, and the district court at sentencing may rely on sources that do not have firsthand knowledge. See United States v. Nava, 624 F.3d 226, 230–31 (5th Cir. 2010) (“In making factual findings for sentencing purposes, the district court may consider any evidence ‘which bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy, including hearsay evidence.’” (quoting United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 455 (5th Cir. 2002)). Second, Haro claims that her $1.825 million money judgment should be reduced by the amount forfeited as part of two of her codefendants’ plea agreements. Her claim is meritless: these codefendants agreed to forfeit the $440,000 and $300,206 seized from their vehicles, respectively, and the district court did not include these amounts in calculating Haro’s money judgment. Third, Haro contends that the district court erred in ordering the entire $13,908 seized from her residence on the day of her arrest forfeited, claiming that $7,908 of the $13,908 included child support payments from Jose as well as rent payments from Jose on behalf of Maria, who lived in the stash house owned by Haro. The Government asserts in response that because the rental payments were for the property used as the stash house they were “involved in” the offense. The Government further notes that, although Haro stated that she usually received $300 to $500 as a commission for a laundered load, she also admitted to receiving up to $1800 to $2000 at a time “on a rare occasion” and she never deposited those funds in the bank. In light of the rental payments’ direct link to the stash house that facilitated the money laundering conspiracy, and the large amounts of cash Haro admitted having received for her role in the conspiracy, it was not clear error for the district court to find that the entire $13,908 seized from Haro’s home were involved in the offense and thus forfeitable. 12 Case: 17-40539 Document: 00514683708 Page: 13 Date Filed: 10/16/2018 No. 17-40539 3. Excessive Fine Under the Eighth Amendment Haro contends that the forfeiture judgment is grossly disproportional to the gravity and scope of her criminal conduct in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines. An in personam, criminal forfeiture is a form of monetary punishment subject to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines. 3 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558–59 (1993). And the Supreme Court has specifically applied it in the context of in personam forfeiture of currency under § 982(a)(1). See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998). In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court held that “a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” 524 U.S. at 334. There, the Court concluded that the criminal forfeiture of the entire sum of $357,144 the defendant had failed to report when leaving the United States would be constitutionally excessive. Id. at 337. In so concluding, the Court considered the defendant’s “minimal level of culpability,” the fact that his violation was unrelated to any other illegal activities, that the forfeiture exceeded by “many orders of magnitude” the $5,000 maximum fine provided by the Guidelines, and the minimal level of harm the defendant caused. See id. at 338–40. 3 The Government argues that, under United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2005), the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to forfeiture of the corpus of the crime, especially when it also constitutes drug proceeds. However, Betancourt stands for the proposition that forfeiture of the proceeds (or the fruits) of unlawful conduct is not a punishment subject to the Eighth Amendment. See 422 F.3d at 250 (citing United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Forfeiture of proceeds cannot be considered punishment, and thus, subject to the excessive fines clause, as it simply parts the owner from the fruits of the criminal activity.”)). The forfeiture order in this case, however, was not limited to proceeds of the unlawful activity but instead included the laundered funds themselves (the corpus). An in personam, criminal forfeiture of the corpus is punitive and therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558– 59; Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328. 13 Case: 17-40539 Document: 00514683708 Page: 14 Date Filed: 10/16/2018 No. 17-40539 Haro maintains that the $1.825 million forfeiture order here is excessive under Bajakajian because it is more than three times the $500,000 statutory maximum fine and because she lacks the resources to pay the amount of the forfeiture. However, the statutory maximum fine was actually $500,000 or twice the property involved in the transaction, see § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (h), which for Haro would have been well over $3 million based on the district court’s estimate of the funds she assisted in laundering. The $1.825 million forfeiture was therefore below the statutory maximum fine and less than six times greater than the recommended Guidelines maximum of $350,000. By contrast, in Bajakajian, the forfeiture amount was seventy times the amount of the maximum fine authorized by the Guidelines. See 524 U.S. at 340. Moreover, Haro’s offense was substantially more serious than the offense at issue in Bajakajian. In contrast to the one-time currency reporting offense in Bajakajian, Haro participated in a two-year conspiracy to launder drug proceeds. In light of these factors, we conclude that the forfeiture judgment was not constitutionally excessive. 4