Opinion ID: 889266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The retroactivity of Goetz.

Text: ¶ 13 We next review the District Court's ruling that Reichmand was not entitled to a new trial as a result of the retroactive application of Goetz. This is a question of law, which we review de novo. Retroactivity jurisprudence in Montana is closely intertwined with federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that each state has the right to craft its own unique retroactivity jurisprudence, using federal requirements as a floor. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008). That is, the U.S. Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis for federal constitutional errors is binding upon the states when federal constitutional errors are involved. Danforth 's unequivocal grant of flexibility allows states to hand-pick retroactivity rules for application of new state rules. ¶ 14 In State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 900 P.2d 260 (1995), we chose to adopt two such rules from Griffith and Teague and applied them to our own retroactive application of new state rules. We held that the following retroactivity principles were binding on the Montana Supreme Court. First: [A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final. Id. at ¶ 21 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S.Ct. at 716). Second: [O]nce a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 300-01, 109 S.Ct. at 1070). We then held that these new rules would apply retroactively to cases still subject to final decision on direct review as of the date of the opinion. [2] Id. at ¶ 24. ¶ 15 Thus, Goetz will retroactively apply to Reichmand if the requirements established in Egelhoff are met. As Goetz clearly announces a new rule, and Reichmand's case is pending on direct review, not yet final, and thus similarly situated, we conclude that the requirements in Egelhoff are satisfied. The District Court erred in determining that Goetz was not retroactively applicable to Reichmand. We must next determine whether this error requires a reversal of Reichmand's conviction. When a trial court commits an error, the record must show that the error was prejudicial, i.e. not harmless, or we cannot reverse. MCA § 46-20-701. Thus, we will not overturn the District Court despite its incorrect conclusion that Goetz was not retroactive to Reichmand unless this error prejudiced Reichmand's right to a fair trial. ¶ 16 To determine whether an error is prejudicial, we employ the cumulative evidence test set out in State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, 306 Mont. 215, 32 P.3d 735.