Opinion ID: 849272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Private Roads Act

Text: Review of the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Blank v. Dep't of Corrections, 462 Mich. 103, 112, 611 N.W.2d 530 (2000). A statute is presumed constitutional, unless its unconstitutionality is readily apparent. Id. Over the years, the Court of Appeals has struggled with whether the private roads act is constitutional. In 1975, the first panel to consider the question found the act repugnant to Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2. White Pine Hunting Club v. Schalkofski, 65 Mich.App. 147, 149, 237 N.W.2d 223 (1975). Specifically, White Pine Hunting Club found no public purpose justifying the taking authorized by the act. Seventeen years later, another panel declined to follow White Pine Hunting Club, and found the act constitutional. Bieker v. Suttons Bay Twp. Supervisor, 197 Mich. App. 628, 630, 496 N.W.2d 398 (1992). Bieker said that a public use was embodied in the statute. Id. at 632, 496 N.W.2d 398. Specifically, the Court expressed concern about the depressed value of landlocked property and concluded that providing access to land is beneficial to the community as a whole. Id. Judge Shepherd concurred, but wrote separately to express his view that the private roads act had nothing to do with the taking by a public authority of property for a public purpose. Id. at 633, 496 N.W.2d 398. Instead, he opined that the act authorized a permissible limitation on the private use of land. The next panel to consider the act's constitutionality disagreed with Bieker, but found itself constrained to follow it. McKeigan v. Grass Lake Twp. Supervisor (McKeigan I), Docket No. 195437, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 8, 1998, vacated May 20, 1998, printed at 229 Mich.App. 801, 587 N.W.2d 505 (1998). A special panel was convened to resolve the conflict between McKeigan I and Bieker. McKeighan v. Grass Lake Twp. Supervisor, 234 Mich.App. 194, 196, 593 N.W.2d 605 (1999) (McKeighan II) . [3] McKeighan II upheld the constitutionality of the act. Id. at 209, 593 N.W.2d 605. It determined that the act had its origins in the state's power to reasonably regulate property usage, rather than its power of eminent domain. Id. The Court also compared the limitation it imposed on property to a common-law easement by necessity. Id. at 201-202, 593 N.W.2d 605. McKeighan II concluded that the Taking Clause of Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2 is neither implicated nor offended by the act. Id. at 210, 593 N.W.2d 605. One member of the panel dissented. He felt that the analogy to a common-law easement by necessity was inappropriate. Id. at 215, 593 N.W.2d 605. He agreed that the private roads act did not emanate from the state's power of eminent domain. The land was not taken for public use, but for private use. Id., citing 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 1.11, p. 1-7. However, he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the act did not implicate the Taking Clause. Id. at 215-216, 593 N.W.2d 605. He would have found the private roads act repugnant to Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2. Id. at 217, 593 N.W.2d 605. [4] A state may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process. U.S. Const., Am. XIV. The state's power to take private property is called its power of eminent domain or condemnation. 2 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law, § 24.1, p. 1102 (2d ed.). It is without question that the private roads act authorizes a taking. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987). In Nollan, the plaintiffs owned beachfront property in California. They wished to tear down an existing home and replace it with a larger one. Id. at 828, 107 S.Ct. 3141. Because the property was on the seacoast, a California statute required the Nollans first to obtain a permit from the Coastal Commission. Id. The commission agreed to grant the permit only if the Nollans allowed the public an easement over their property, thereby facilitating public access to a nearby public beach. Id. In analyzing whether the terms of the permit constituted a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution, the United States Supreme Court held: In Loretto [v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982)] we observed that where governmental action results in a permanent physical occupation of the property, by the government itself or others, see 458 U.S., at 432-433, n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3164, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner, id. at 434-435, 102 S.Ct. 3164. We think a permanent physical occupation has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may be continuously traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises. [ Id. at 831-832, 107 S.Ct. 3141.] Similarly, the private roads act gives individuals a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro over another's property. It thus allows a permanent physical occupation of private property by means of government action. This is a taking. Nollan, supra at 832, 107 S.Ct. 3141. [5] The next question is whether the taking authorized by the private roads act is constitutionally permissible. Private property may not be taken for a private purpose. Shizas v. Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 50, 52 N.W.2d 589 (1952). Plaintiffs argue that the takings that the private roads act enables are those for a public not a private purpose. They point to the Court of Appeals decision in McKeighan II, supra, for support of their position. Whatever public interest the act serves, plaintiffs are primarily benefitted by it. In Poletown Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Detroit, [6] this Court set forth the analysis used when a taking benefits both private entities and the public: The power of eminent domain is restricted to furthering public uses and purposes and is not to be exercised without substantial proof that the public is primarily to be benefitted. Where, as here, the condemnation power is exercised in a way that benefits specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being advanced. Such public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear and significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature. [ Id. at 634-635, 304 N.W.2d 455.] Hence, the question becomes whether the public interest advanced here, access to landlocked property, is the predominant interest advanced. We find that it is not. We are unconvinced that the public is the predominant interest served by the private roads act. The very language of the act reveals that it is concerned with private roads having, presumably, a private not a public benefit. Also, the act does not require the state to compensate the landowner, but, rather, the private person petitioning for the private road. MCL 229.3; MSA 9.283 and M.C.L. § 229.5; MSA 9.285. The private roads act uses the state's power of eminent domain to convey an interest in land from one private person to another. The Court of Appeals has opined that the private roads act merely supplements the already existing law of private easements. McKeighan II, supra at 208-209, 593 N.W.2d 605. However, the McKeighan II dissent accurately remarked that there is a difference between easements by necessity and the interest created by operation of the private roads act: As noted in Judge Holbrook, Sr.'s dissent in White Pine Hunting Club [supra at 151-152, 237 N.W.2d 223], the analytical basis for enforcing a common-law easement by necessity is the assumption that the parties who have originally created the landlocked parcel intended that the owner of the landlocked parcel have access to the land over the other's parcel. Accordingly, with a common-law easement by necessity, all the court is really doing is enforcing the original intent of the parties. Id. at 152, 237 N.W.2d 223. [McKeighan II, supra at 214-215, 593 N.W.2d 605 (Talbot, P.J., dissenting).] An implied easement also arises only when the land on which the easement is sought was once part of the same parcel that is now landlocked. 1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law, § 6.9, p. 199 (2d ed.). Missing from the private roads act is some conduct by the party whose land is burdened or his predecessor, indicating assent to the burden imposed. The McKeighan II dissent took the position that the private roads act does not involve the state's power of eminent domain. We note that the act does not impose a limitation on land use that benefits the community as a whole. Instead, it gives one party an interest in land the party could not otherwise obtain. By eliminating the landowner's right to exclude others from his property, the act conveys an interest in private property from one private owner to another. The taking authorized by the act appears merely to be an attempt by a private entity to use the state's powers to acquire what it could not get through arm's length negotiations with defendants. Lansing v. Edward Rose Realty, 192 Mich.App. 551, 558, 481 N.W.2d 795 (1992), aff'd. 442 Mich. 626, 502 N.W.2d 638 (1993) (analyzing a proposed taking under a city ordinance governing cable television service). The result more closely resembles a taking of private property than a limitation on it. [7] Consequently, we agree with the Court of Appeals panel in McKeigan I, supra at 808, 587 N.W.2d 505. [T]he primary benefit under the private roads act inures to the landlocked private landowner seeking to open a private road on the property of another.... [A]ny benefit to the public at large is purely incidental and far too attenuated to support a constitutional taking of private property. We find that the private roads act is unconstitutional, because it authorizes a taking of private property for a predominantly private purpose. We reverse the Court of Appeals decision in this case and reinstate the ruling of the trial court for defendants. Bieker and McKeighan II are overruled.