Opinion ID: 1113494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Separability

Text: Civil Code article 1493, as amended, which purports to extinguish forced heirship for competent persons 23 years of age or older at the time of their decedent's death, is the product of two legislated laws, viz., Act No. 788 of 1989 and Act No. 147 of 1990. In the trial court, the Appellees challenged both laws as an unconstitutional redefinition and abolishment of forced heirship. The trial court in its written reasons agreed and clearly indicated in its opinion that both laws violated the state constitution. In its judgment, however, the trial court simply declared unconstitutional the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1493 defining forced heirship. For the reasons assigned in this opinion, both legislative acts are unconstitutional because they purport to redefine forced heirs in a way that abolishes or renders wholly ineffective forced heirship. Accordingly, we will amend the trial court's judgment to declare unconstitutional Act No. 788 of 1989 and Act No. 147 of 1990, as well as the version of Civil Code article 1493 which resulted from those Acts. In doing so, we have examined all of the provisions of the multipartite legislative acts to determine whether any part should be upheld as being separable from the invalid provisions. To be capable of separate enforcement, the valid portion of an enactment must be independent of the invalid portion and must form a complete act within itself. The law enforced after separation must be reasonable in light of the act as originally drafted. The test is whether the legislature would have passed the statute had it been presented with the invalid features removed. State v. Johnson, 343 So.2d 705 (La.1977). A further inquiry which courts make in determining legislative intent in regard to the separability of statutes is into the dominant or main purpose of the enactment. Where the purpose of the statute is defeated by the invalidity of part of the act, the entire act is void. Conversely, when the general object of the act can be achieved without the invalid part, the act will be upheld. State v. Johnson, id.; Roy v. Edwards, 294 So.2d 507 (La.1974); Gaudet v. Economical Super Market, 237 La. 1082, 112 So.2d 720 (1959); Pollitt v. Connick, 596 F.Supp. 261 (E.D.La. 1984); 2 Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 44.04, (Sands 4th ed., 1986) (citing copious authorities). Applying these precepts, we conclude that both the 1989 and 1990 legislative acts must be declared unconstitutional in their entirety. The constitutionally flawed part of each act is the threshold provision which amends Civil Code article 1493 to redefine forced heirs as children under twenty-three years or of any age who are incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates. It is self-evident that the legislature would have passed few, if any, of the other parts of the acts but for the amendment to Article 1493 redefining forced heirs. The related provisions are concerned mainly with altering other existing articles to accommodate the new definition and with remedial measures for interpreting testaments executed prior to the final enactment of that unconstitutional definition. Furthermore, the invalidity of the redefinition of forced heirship clearly defeats the dominant or main purpose of both acts. Although Act No. 147 of 1990 included provisions of possible independent merit that would have repealed obsolete civil code articles pertaining to illegitimate children, these measures obviously were not major goals sought by the legislation. Therefore, the general object of neither act can be achieved without the invalid part that renders forced heirship wholly ineffective. Accordingly, the 1989 and 1990 acts are void. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court is amended so as to declare unconstitutional Act No. 788 of 1989, Act No. 147 of 1990, and Civil Code article 1493 as amended by those Acts. As amended, the trial court judgment is affirmed. AMENDED AND AFFIRMED. WATSON, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, Section 3. MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.