Opinion ID: 4419745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Joseph Krell’s Application

Text: Joseph Krell, a former ironworker in Wisconsin, applied for disability benefits due to problems with his knee. His ap‐ plication was denied initially and on reconsideration. He then requested a hearing before an ALJ. In October 2014, Krell was notified that the ALJ had sched‐ uled his hearing in December 2014. The notice stated that a vocational expert would testify at the hearing. It also stated that Krell had the right to request a subpoena for documents or testimony “that you reasonably need to present your case fully.” If Krell wished to obtain a subpoena, he could write to the ALJ and describe:  “What documents you need and/or who the wit‐ nesses are;  The location of the documents or witnesses;  The important facts you expect the document or witness to prove; and  Why you cannot prove these facts without a sub‐ poena.” 4 No. 18‐1100 See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (describing how to obtain a sub‐ poena). Before the hearing, Krell’s counsel wrote to the ALJ re‐ questing a subpoena that would require the vocational expert to produce at the hearing “certain documents upon which the expert may rely in forming opinions during the course of the hearing.” The requested documents were extensive and in‐ cluded statistics, reports, surveys, summaries, work product, and more. Counsel also requested a description of the meth‐ odologies used by publishers or compilers of the statistics upon which the expert planned to rely. Counsel noted that he could not adequately cross‐examine the vocational expert if the expert did not bring these materials to the hearing. Among other objections, counsel objected to the expert testi‐ fying without producing reliable supporting data, and asked that the ALJ notify him in advance of the hearing if he be‐ lieved the request was overbroad or burdensome. The ALJ did not respond to the subpoena request before the hearing. At the hearing, the ALJ denied the subpoena request, rea‐ soning that the request was deficient because it had not spec‐ ified what the documents would show and why these facts could not be shown without a subpoena. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d). Counsel reiterated that he needed the materials the vocational expert would rely on at the hearing so that he could adequately cross‐examine the expert about them. The ALJ told counsel that if he took issue with the vocational ex‐ pert’s testimony, he could challenge it on a post‐hearing basis. The ALJ proceeded with the hearing, allowing the voca‐ tional expert to testify by phone. The ALJ provided the expert with a hypothetical residual functional capacity mirroring his assessment of Krell’s abilities. In response, the expert testified No. 18‐1100 5 that Krell could work as a mail clerk, unskilled inspector, or retail clerk, per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In the expert’s estimation, these positions together made up 73,000 jobs in Wisconsin. During cross‐examination, the vocational expert stated that to determine available job numbers, he relied on the oc‐ cupational projections for the state of Wisconsin, produced by the Department of Workforce Development in 2014. Counsel asked that the expert provide page numbers and codes for the Wisconsin projections, which the expert did for the mail clerk position. When he did not immediately find this information for the inspector position, counsel responded “Okay” and ended his cross‐examination. Despite the ALJ’s invitation to do so, Krell made no post‐hearing submission challenging the expert’s testimony. The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that Krell was disabled and entitled to benefits, but only as of March 2014 (due to his advancing age), rather than July 2011, as Krell had claimed. Based on the vocational expert’s testi‐ mony, the ALJ concluded that up to March 2014, Krell was able to perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The ALJ noted that the expert was “thor‐ oughly examine[d]” and “unimpeached.” The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, end‐ ing Krell’s pathway within the Administration. Krell then successfully appealed to the district court, with a magistrate judge presiding by consent. Krell’s subpoena request, the magistrate judge explained, had stated what facts the re‐ quested documents would show. And although the request had not stated expressly why a subpoena was necessary, it was clear that counsel could not adequately cross‐examine 6 No. 18‐1100 the vocational expert without prior access to his underlying sources. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ had erred in denying Krell’s request for a subpoena. The Commissioner appeals.