Opinion ID: 1754908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Points of Error Relating Solely to Glenn

Text: 1. The Motion for Continuance In point of error 2(A), Glenn asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. Glenn has Crohn's disease. On May 9, 1994, the first day of trial, he became ill. Before voir dire began, his attorney, Burta Raborn, asked the trial court's permission for Glenn to see his doctor. Raborn told the trial court: Well, I'm not suggesting a continuance at this time at all, Judge. I have told my clientI want to be very candid with the CourtI have told my client that I am prepared to try the case. I think its within his interest to try the case; and I think it is imperative that he be available to me to try the case. I said, I probably could get through voir dire without him today if necessary, but that he needs to get himself in shape if he can to assist me during the trial.... The trial court told the jury panel only that Glenn was excused from voir dire. The jury was selected that day. The following day, Raborn informed the trial court that Glenn was extremely ill, had been admitted to the hospital, and would be undergoing tests to determine the seriousness of his condition. The trial court told the jury that Glenn was ill and would not be in court that day. After the attorneys made their opening statements, Helen was called to the stand to testify. The third day of trial, before Helen's testimony continued, Raborn told the trial court that, after talking to Glenn's doctor, I personally have reached the conclusion that I'm not going to have Mr. Vickery available to me for the trial of this case. Not only is he not available to me, he's apparently on some sort of drug I.V.'s and I can't talk to him. Raborn said she was getting an affidavit from Glenn's doctor, and would be moving for a continuance. She stated: [W]e have had long depositions. Everybody may be ready to go forwards [sic] on depositions. I don't know. I'm just trying to tell everybody what the situation is and what I'm going to do as soon as I have Dr. Schwartz's affidavit. And, quite frankly, whatever happens happens. It's out of my control. Helen was then recalled to the stand to continue direct examination. After the noon recess, Raborn filed Glenn's motion for continuance. The grounds for continuance were: Defendant's presence at trial ... is essential for his attorneys to adequately represent him in this matter. Further, Defendant will be gravely prejudiced if this trial is allowed to proceed without his presence and [his absence] will in all likelihood deprive Defendant of the opportunity to receive a fair and equitable verdict. The motion was supported by the affidavit of Glenn's physician, Dr. Jim Schmaltz, who diagnosed Glenn's condition as an exacerbation or flare up of his Crohn's colitis. Dr. Schmaltz stated that it would be life threatening for Glenn to leave the hospital, that his current medicationa morphine dripcaused heavy sedation and inability to provide clarity of thought and that medical treatment would be necessary for a week and a half to two weeks. Raborn argued to the court that she needed Glenn at trial for the purpose of assisting in his defense and for purposes of testifying. She specifically argued that although Glenn had been deposed, the depositions had not been taken with the expectation that Glenn would not be available for trial. The trial court denied the motion for continuance. A continuance shall not be granted except for sufficient cause, supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by operation of law. TEX.R. CIV. P. 251. If the ground of a motion for continuance is the want of testimony, the party applying therefor shall make affidavit that such testimony is material, showing the materiality thereof, and that he has used due diligence to procure such testimony.... TEX.R. CIV. P. 252. We will not disturb a trial court's denial of a motion for continuance unless the trial court has committed a clear abuse of discretion. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex.1986); Levinthal v. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, P.A., 902 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). The mere absence of a party does not entitle him to a continuance. Humphrey v. Ahlschlager, 778 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. App.Dallas 1989, no writ); Brown v. Brown, 599 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex.Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1980, no writ). The absent party must show that he had a reasonable excuse for not being present, and that he was prejudiced by his absence. Green v. State, 589 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. Civ.App.Tyler 1979, no writ); Erback v. Donald, 170 S.W.2d 289, 291-92 (Tex.Civ. App.Fort Worth 1943, no writ). A reasonable excuse for not being present does not require reversal if no prejudice is shown. Green, 589 S.W.2d at 163; Erback, 170 S.W.2d at 291-92. If the ground of the motion is the necessity of the testimony of an absent party, the movant must show, among other things, that the testimony is material and what is expected to be proved by the testimony. Brown, 599 S.W.2d at 137; see also Doyle v. Doyle, 482 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex. Civ.App.Beaumont 1972, no writ) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance when motion stated only that defendant was in jail but did not identify matters to which he would testify). Here, Glenn's motion asserts without additional explanation that his presence at trial was essential for his attorneys to adequately represent him. Raborn argued to the trial court that Glenn's presence was necessary to assist in his defense and for purposes of testifying. She did not state why his presence was necessary to assist in his defense, she did not identify the matters to which he would testify, and she did not state why his deposition testimony was insufficient. Glenn asserts on appeal that his depositions were taken as a means of discovery, not as a means of preserving testimony. However, in the absence of any explanation as to why his deposition testimony was inadequate, or what he would have testified to at trial had a continuance been granted, he has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his absence from the trial. Glenn relies on Burke v. Scott, 410 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Burke is distinguishable. In Burke, the defendant had been in ill health for some time. Because his appearance at trial was uncertain, counsel for both parties agreed to take the defendant's deposition, but he became too ill to complete the deposition. 410 S.W.2d at 828. He was hospitalized, too ill to even confer with his lawyer in preparation for trial. Id. at 829. T.A. Bollinger, the only other person who could assist the defendant's lawyer, suffered a heart attack the day before trial. The defendant's motion for continuance set out the facts to which he and Bollinger would testify at trial. Id. The court of appeals held that a continuance should have been granted either under rule 251, because the defendant was physically and mentally unable to undertake his defense, or under rule 252, for want of testimony. Id. Here, however, Glenn had been deposed; indeed, Raborn, Glenn's attorney, stated that the parties might go forward on the depositions. Further, the record does not reflect the facts to which Glenn would have testified, or why his deposition was inadequate. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Glenn's motion for continuance. We overrule Glenn's point of error 2(A). 2. Allyn Hoaglund's Testimony In point of error 2(D), Glenn asserts the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of Allyn Hoaglund for the reason the same was part of settlement discussions, a violation of TEX.R. CIV. EVID. 408, and more prejudicial than probative, especially when erroneously presented as a violation of disciplinary rules. Allyn Hoaglund, an attorney, had been Helen's friend since childhood. He also had worked for Glenn's law firm. Hoaglund testified that Glenn asked him to relay some information to Helen to see if she was interested. Glenn told Hoaglund he was willing to abide by the terms of the handwritten agreement he and Helen had signed on June 18, 1992, and would pay Helen an additional $400,000. Hoaglund contacted Helen and indicated he wanted to talk to her about Glenn's proposal. Helen agreed. At the direction of her attorneys and unbeknownst to Hoaglund, Helen tape-recorded their two conversations on November 6, 1992. In these conversations, Hoaglund relayed Glenn's offer to abide by the June 18 agreement and to give Helen an additional $400,000. Hoaglund also told Helen that Glenn was threatening stuff that he was going to do if the situation was not resolved. That stuff included having Helen indicted on a trumped-up burglary charge and filing some contempt thing apparently concerning their daughter. Hoaglund also told Helen that Glenn had indicated he was going to countersue Helen, and that heHoaglundsuspected that Glenn was going to sue Helen and her attorneys for tortiously interfering with his law practice. Hoaglund also told Helen that Glenn was a crazy ... son of a bitch who would go to this [sic] death bed and not let anybody know where that million dollars in gold is.... He may go to the Cayman islands. He may go to Canada. The gold will never be found. Hoaglund told Helen she could not trust Glenn. The tapes of the conversations were played to the jury. Glenn objected at trial, and argues on appeal, that the conversations were settlement negotiations and were therefore inadmissible. The rules of evidence provide: Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not admissible to prove liability for, or invalidity of, the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice or interest of a witness or a party, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. TEX.R. CIV. EVID. 408. Glenn asserts Hoaglund's conversations with Helen were proper settlement negotiations and therefore inadmissible. Rule 408 does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for a purpose other than to prove liability for, or invalidity of, a claim or its amount. Helen's seventh amended petition, the live pleading when the parties went to trial, contained a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on these conversations and Glenn's alleged threats against her. Helen offered evidence of these conversations in support of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; her counsel argued that Glenn's threats caused her great anguish and concern. It is something that is very definitely part of the cause of action in this case. Glenn's only authority for his assertion that this evidence is inadmissible is his citation to rule 408, and his only argument is that it is inadmissible because the conversations constituted settlement negotiations. Glenn has not demonstrated that the evidence was inadmissible. We overrule Glenn's point of error 2(D). 3. Prejudicial, Incurable Jury Argument In point of error six, Glenn asserts the trial court erred in overruling his objections to prejudicial and/or incurable comments and/or argument regarding the absence of Glenn and witness Janet Brewer. [14] Glenn objected to the following statement made in closing argument by Krist, Helen's counsel: I am going to suggest something to you folks. I am going to suggest to you that Glenn Vickery didn't have the courage to face his wife about the true reasons that he wanted the divorce. And he doesn't have the courage to face this jury. Glenn's counsel objected that Krist had violated his own motion in limine. [15] The trial court overruled the objection. Glenn asserts this statement is so highly prejudicial that it requires reversal. To obtain reversal of a judgment on the basis of improper jury argument, an appellant must prove (1) an error, (2) that was not invited or provoked, (3) that was preserved by proper trial predicate, such as an objection, a motion to instruct, or a motion for mistrial, (4) that was not curable by an instruction, by prompt withdrawal of the statement, or by a reprimand by the judge, and (5) the argument by its nature, degree, and extent, constituted reversibly harmful error. Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 859 S.W.2d 382, 388 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We must determine if the probability that the improper argument caused harm is greater than the probability that the verdict was based on proper proceedings and evidence. Id. at 388-89. The improper argument must be evaluated in light of the whole case, beginning with voir dire and ending with closing argument. Id. at 389. In this case, the jury had been told Glenn was sick and unable to attend trial, but due to Krist's motion in limine, the jury had not been told Glenn was so ill that he had been hospitalized. Krist then violated his own motion in limine by arguing Glenn did not have the courage to face Helen in the courtroom. We hold the trial court erred by overruling Glenn's objection to Krist's argument. Nevertheless, we conclude the error was harmless. We have reviewed the entire record. The complained-of statement was an isolated comment, in a lengthy closing argument. The evidence presented to the jury, much of which is detailed elsewhere in this opinion, fills 10 volumes. We believe there is very little probability that this comment, egregious though it was, could have affected the outcome of this case. Glenn also complains of Krist's comments about Janet Brewer. After noting Brewer was absent from court in violation of the court's subpoena, Krist stated: She is the woman that [sic] knows where the gold is.[ [16] ] She is the woman that knows the true value of Glenn Vickery's estate. .... I think the least we can do is give Mrs. VickeryMrs. Helen Vickery the benefit of the doubt on the assets that we've discovered, the 15.4 million. I feel that's why Janet Brewer is not here in order to avoid having to perjure her own self in violation of this Court's subpoena. She was the one who kept the records of the gold. She was the, quote, business manager. She hasn't shown to this day. Mr. Weinberg [Richards' counsel] is talking about learning things from what's not said as well as what is said. You can learn things about people who avoidnot only avoid subpoenas, but violate subpoenas. Glenn's counsel did not object to these statements. To preserve error on curable argument, counsel must object and request an instruction to disregard. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Puckett, 822 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Objection is not required in the case of incurable argument, which is defined as argument so inflammatory that its harmful or prejudicial nature cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard. Id. On appeal Glenn asserts the argument was so highly prejudicial that objection was unnecessary to preserve error. He asserts there was no evidence that Brewer knew where the gold was, and no evidence to support Krist's assertion that he believed Brewer violated the subpoena in order to avoid committing perjury. We do not believe the argument was so inflammatory that its harmful or prejudicial nature could not have been cured by an instruction to disregard. We overrule Glenn's point of error six. 4. The Bill of Review and Division of Property In Glenn's points of error seven and eight, he complains the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that the division of the marital estate was the result of extrinsic fraud unmixed with any negligence on Helen's part. In points nine and 10, he asserts the trial court did not make a just and right division of property and abused its discretion in dividing the community estate. In point 11, he asserts the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the division of property. In point of error 12, he asserts the trial court erred in entering a judgment that awarded: damages in excess of a just and right division of property; prejudgment interest; damages for mental anguish; and punitive damages. A. The bill of review A bill of review is a separate suit in equity, brought to set aside a judgment in the same court in an earlier suit, when the judgment in the earlier suit is final, not reviewable by appeal or by writ of error, and does not appear to be void on the face of the record. Law v. Law, 792 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). Courts do not look on bills of review with favor. Id. The grounds upon which petitions for bill of review are granted are narrow and restricted. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.1984); Bakali v. Bakali, 830 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex.App.Dallas 1992, no writ). To be entitled to a bill of review, the petitioner must allege and prove: (1) a meritorious defense to the earlier cause of action (2) that she was prevented from making by fraud, accident, or mistake of the opposite party (3) that is unmixed with any fault or negligence of her own. Bakali, 830 S.W.2d at 255; Law, 792 S.W.2d at 153. In relation to attacks on final judgments, fraud is classified as either extrinsic or intrinsic. Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312. Only extrinsic fraud will entitle a petitioner to bill of review relief. Id. Extrinsic fraud denies a losing litigant the opportunity to fully litigate her rights or defenses upon trial. Id. It is conduct that prevents a real trial upon the issues involved. Id. at 313. It requires proof of some deception practiced by the adverse party, collateral to the issues in the case, that prevents the petitioner from fully presenting her claim or defense in the underlying action. Bakali, 830 S.W.2d at 255; see Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312. Intrinsic fraud is inherent in the matter considered and determined in the trial, where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein. Id. at 313. Intrinsic fraud includes false testimony, fraudulent instruments, and any matter actually presented to and considered by the court in rendering the judgment assailed. Id.; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 911 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1995, writ denied). Helen testified Glenn duped her into getting the divorce by persuading her that it was necessary to protect the family's assets [17] and that the couple would reunite after the malpractice suit threat had passed. Glenn hired Richards and had Richards file a petition in Helen's name and his answer and counterclaim. Although Helen knew a divorce petition would be filed, she did not know Glenn filed a counterclaim against her. Glenn asserts that his alleged misrepresentationsthat the divorce was to protect assets and that they would reunite after the malpractice suit threat had passedcannot as a matter of law rise to the level of extrinsic fraud. The essence of Helen's claim, however, is she was duped into not contesting the divorce because she believed it was to be a sham divorcein other words, Glenn's misrepresentations prevented her from fully presenting her claim or defense in the underlying action. The supreme court has held that a fiduciary's concealment of material facts, used to induce an agreed or uncontested judgment, that prevents a party from presenting his legal right at trial, constitutes extrinsic fraud. Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 313. Helen asserts Glenn concealed from her his real reason for wanting a divorce, as well as the fact that June Wright offered to settle her malpractice suit for policy limits before Helen signed the divorce decree. We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a finding of extrinsic fraud. Glenn further asserts Helen did not show she was without fault or negligence. He notes, among other things, that Helen was a legal assistant, claims she did not read the divorce decree before signing it, and admits she never called or wrote to Richards. Glenn further asserts any negligence of Richards is imputed to Helen; specifically, he asserts Richards was negligent in filing the divorce petition without speaking to Helen, not informing Helen of her legal rights, not filing an inventory, and not telling Helen when they were going to court. Helen testified she relied on Glenn and her attorney, Richards. Glenn was not only Helen's husband; he was also an attorney. We cannot say Helen's reliance on these two attorneys, both of whom were fiduciaries with respect to Helen, was negligence. We also agree with Helen that Richards' acts should not be imputed to Helen. Richards filed the divorce petition and Glenn's answer and counterclaim at Glenn's direction. It would be inappropriate to reward Glenn for actions taken by Richards at his own behest. B. Alternate basis for judgment The trial court's judgment provides in part that the Bill of Review is granted and the marital estate of the parties shall be divided as of November 22, 1991, on the following basis, which the Court alternatively adjudges is identical to the division the Court alternatively makes of property to be undivided [sic] in the November 22, 1991 Decree of Divorce and the May 12, 1992 Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment in accordance with Article 3.91(a)[ [18] ] of the Family Code. The order then divides the marital estate, awarding Helen 58 percent of the estate and awarding Glenn 42 percent. Helen notes that Glenn challenges only the bill of review, and not the alternative basis for judgment. Thus, she argues, Glenn's challenge to the bill of review is immaterial and the judgment must be affirmed on the basis of this independent ground. If a judgment rests on more than one ground, the party aggrieved by the judgment must assign error as to each such ground or risk having the judgment affirmed on the ground to which no error was assigned. Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Orr, 730 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Tex.App.Austin 1987, no writ). Here, the trial court divided the marital estate pursuant to granting the bill of review and alternatively as a division of property undivided by the divorce decree or judgment nunc pro tunc. We agree with Helen that because Glenn did not challenge the alternative reason given by the trial court for dividing the marital estate, Glenn's challenge to the finding on the bill of review is immaterial. We overrule Glenn's points of error seven and eight. C. Division of property In points nine and 10, Glenn asserts the trial court did not make a just and right division of property and abused its discretion in dividing the community estate. In point 11, he asserts the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the division of property. On June 3, 1994, the trial court signed two documents: a division of marital estate and an order dividing the marital estate. [19] The division of marital estate listed the assets of the estate and the values assigned to each asset. The order listed those assets awarded to each party, along with the dollar value of each, and provided that Helen received 58 percent of the marital estate and that Glenn received 42 percent. The final judgment listed the assets awarded to each party, and included a description of the property awarded. We will refer to these documents collectively as the 1994 judgment. Glenn asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the values assigned to the property in the 1994 judgment. Helen asserts that because Glenn has not challenged the trial court's alternative division of property found to be undivided by the divorce decree and nunc pro tunc judgment, [20] the 1994 judgment should be affirmed. In points of error seven and eight, we declined to address Glenn's points of error relating to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding that Glenn committed fraud because Glenn failed to challenge the alternative reason given by the trial court for dividing the marital estate. However, we believe that it is appropriate to address Glenn's points of error nine, 10, and 11, in which he complains that the trial court did not make a just and right division of the property. Even under TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.91 (Vernon 1993), which the trial court gave as its alternative basis for judgment, it must divide the marital property in a manner that is just and right. Therefore, Glenn's points of error relating to whether the division was just and right are properly before the Court. The original decree and nunc pro tunc decree awarded Helen the following: The residence and contents of the house in West University; Clothing, jewelry and personal effects in her possession or subject to her control; Money in any account in Helen's name; Any retirement benefits or other benefits existing by reason of Helen's employment; Any stocks, bonds, or securities in Helen's name; All life insurance policies in Helen's name; and A 1955 Pontiac. The decree and nunc pro tunc decree awarded Glenn the following: The residence and contents of the house in Liberty County (Moss Hill); Clothing, jewelry and personal effects in his possession or subject to his control; Money in any account in Glenn's name; Any retirement benefits or other benefits existing by reason of Glenn's employment; Any stocks, bonds, or securities in Glenn's name; All life insurance policies in Glenn's name; and Glenn's law practice. As previously noted, the divorce decree was deliberately vague with respect to many of the Vickerys' assets. Specifically not identified in the decree were, among other things, an annuity that paid approximately $35,000 a month (payable to Helen and Glenn), Pepsico stock, gold coins, treasury bills, a promissory note (the Rockwall note), and a collection of antique cars. After the divorce, in addition to the items specified in the decree, Helen received $500,000 in treasury bills, the Pepsico stock, and a 1990 Suburban. Glenn kept $1,000,000 in treasury bills. Until August 1992, Glenn gave Helen one-half of the monthly annuity check. The award of assets in the 1994 judgment and the award of assets in the original divorce decree and nunc pro tunc decree are, in many respects, identical. The 1994 judgment, however, awarded some of the assets unspecified in the original divorce decree that had been divided by the parties after the divorce, and awarded previously unspecified and undivided assets. Helen again received the West University house and contents, personal effects, bank accounts, retirement benefits, the Pontiac, stocks, and life insurance. The 1994 judgment also awarded Helen those previously unspecified assets she had already received: the Suburban, the Pepsico stock, and the treasury bills. Additionally, the 1994 judgment awarded Helen the annuity. Under the 1994 judgment, Glenn again was awarded the Moss Hill property and contents, personal effects, bank accounts, retirement benefits, stocks, life insurance, and his law practice. The 1994 judgment also awarded those previously unspecified assets Glenn had already received: the antique cars (and other collectibles), and $1,000,000 in treasury bills. The 1994 judgment then awarded Glenn: all cases pending in his law office; the Rockwall note; annuity payments paid between December 1, 1991, and August 31, 1992; and [a]ll gold of the parties which the Court finds exclusively in the custody and control of Glenn W. Vickery in the amount of $992,000.00. Glenn argues, first, that the trial court erred in awarding to Glenn his separate estate, Moss Hill Ranch, rather than confirming such as his separate property. [21] In his reply brief, Glenn argues that under this Court's decision in McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied), the trial court clearly abused its discretion. In McElwee, the trial court mischaracterized community property as the wife's separate property. 911 S.W.2d at 189. We noted a trial court has broad discretion in making a just and right division of the community estate, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of discretion. Id. We further noted an appellate court may not render a new division of property; only a trial court may make a division of community property. Id. at 189. With respect to mischaracterized property, we stated: If the trial court mischaracterizes community property as separate property, then the property does not get divided as part of the community estate. If the mischaracterized property has value that would have affected the trial court's just and right division, then the mischaracterization is harmful and requires the appellate court to remand the entire community estate to the trial court for a just and right division of the properly characterized community. If, on the other hand, the mischaracterized property had only a de minimis effect on the trial court's just and right division, then the trial court's error is not an abuse of discretion. Id. (first emphasis added). The trial court stated it had awarded the wife approximately 61 percent of the community estate. However, counting the mischaracterized property, the wife actually received approximately 64 percent of the community estate. Id. at 190. Had this Court not remanded the case to the trial court, we would have effectively awarded a new division of the community estate64 percent to the wife, rather than 61 percent. We therefore reversed and remanded, holding: when a mischaracterization has more than a mere de minimis effect upon the trial court's division, the appellate court must remand the community estate to the trial court for a just and right division based upon the correct characterization of the property. Id. Helen responds that (1) Moss Hill was not mischaracterized, and (2) even if it was mischaracterized, the error was harmless. We will address each argument. On June 3, 1994, the trial court signed a document entitled DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY. In this document, Moss Hill was valued as follows: Moss Hill Ranch 1) House and 1 acre $575,000.00 2) Land202 acres $126,500.00 3) Machinery, cattle, equipment & autos $450,000.00 The total value assigned to Moss Hill was then included in the NET COMMUNITY ASSETS. On June 7, 1994, the trial court signed a final judgment, in which it divided the parties' marital estate, in the same manner reflected in the June 3 order. Again, Moss Hill was included in the division and was awarded to Glenn. The Texas Supreme Court has held that the phrase estate of the parties refers only to community property. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tex.1982). These two documents show that, although the parties, including Helen, acknowledged that Moss Hill was Glenn's separate property, the trial court nonetheless mischaracterized it as community property. Nevertheless, we believe that error in mischaracterizing Moss Hill was harmless. Helen's sworn inventory, which is evidence under Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659, 671 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied), showed that Glenn purchased Moss Hill before the marriage for $66,000. He paid $2,500 down; the remaining $63,500 was paid out of community funds. The evidence showed that $1,359,910 in community funds were subsequently expended on improvements to Moss Hill. Despite more than 1.3 million dollars in improvements, the property was only valued at $701,500 at the time of the divorce in 1994. Under the inception-of-title doctrine, Moss Hill is Glenn's separate property. See Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). The trial court could not divest Glenn of his separate property. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.1977). In fact, Glenn was awarded Moss Hill as his sole and separate property in the 1994 judgment. However, even though Moss Hill is Glenn's separate property, the community estate has a reimbursement claim for any community funds used to discharge the purchase money obligation. Rogers v. Rogers, 754 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). Therefore, the community was entitled to be reimbursed for the $63,500 that the community spent toward paying off the purchase money note. The community also has a reimbursement claim for the enhanced valued of separate property, which is determined by the difference between the fair market value before and after any improvements made by the community during the marriage. Anderson v. Gilliland, 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex.1985); Rogers, 754 S.W.2d at 236. In this case, Moss Hill was valued at $66,000 (the purchase price) before any community funds were expended on it. Of this $66,000, the community was entitled to be reimbursed for $63,500, the balance it paid on the note. After the community spent over 1.3 million dollars on the property, its value had only increased to $701,500. In fact, the house, a community improvement, accounts for $575,000 of the $701,500. The trial court apparently concluded that most or all of Moss Hill's increased value was attributable to the more that 1.3 million dollars in improvements made by the community. Nevertheless, the community is not entitled to recover the total amounts it expended on Moss Hill; it may only recover the enhanced value. Anderson, 684 S.W.2d at 675. Under the 1994 judgment, Glenn was not divested of his separate property. Instead, the property was awarded to him, along with a credit for the separate fund that he paid as a down payment on the property. By included the remaining value of Moss Hill in the property division, the trial court implicitly recognized the extent of the community investment in Moss Hill and effectively divided the community reimbursement claim between the parties. The trial court never put a specific value on the amount of the reimbursement claim, and Glenn does not contend that any such implied value of that claim was excessive. Even if the trial court determined that all of the increased value, to $701,500, was due to community expenditures, then giving Helen reimbursement for that amount would not be excessive, given the undisputed evidence that $1,423,410 in community funds was spent to purchase and improve Moss Hill ($63,500 purchase money + $1,359,910 improvements = $1,423,410). Although the court mischaracterized Moss Hill as community property, we conclude, absent findings of fact and conclusions of law to the contrary, that such mischaracterization did not affect the trial court's division. We overrule Glenn's points of error nine and 10. In point of error 11, Glenn contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's division of property. In support of this point of error, Glenn argues (1) the trial court erred by considering Helen's sworn inventory as evidence of the value of the community property; (2) there is no evidence to support the valuation of Moss Hill Ranch as community property; (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support finding that the gold coins were in Glenn's possession; and (4) community liabilities were erroneously excluded from the valuation of the estate. First, Glenn argues the trial court erred by considering Helen's sworn inventory as evidence and, absent such evidence, there is no evidence to support the values reached by the trial court in the property division. We disagree. In Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d at 671, this Court held that when performing a division of marital property, the trial court could take judicial notice of a party's sworn inventory, which was filed and included in the papers before the trial court and referred to by the trial judge. The record in this case shows Helen's inventory was filed on May 27, 1995, and the trial court referred to the inventory at the hearing on May 31, 1995. Therefore, the trial court properly considered Helen's inventory as evidence. Second, Glenn argues there was no evidence to support the inclusion of Moss Hill Ranch in the valuation of the community estate, because Moss Hill Ranch is Glenn's separate property. We have already addressed this argument in response to Glenn's points of error nine and 10. Helen's sworn inventory was evidence that the community had contributed all but approximately $3000 toward the purchase price and improvement of Moss Hill. The value of Moss Hill, minus Glenn's $3000 initial payment, was properly considered by the trial court in dividing the property. Third, Glenn argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the award to Glenn of all gold of the parties which the Court finds exclusively in the custody and control of GLENN VICKERY, in the amount of $992,000. Glenn argues he was not in possession of the gold at the time of the property division. Glenn testified in his deposition that Helen had taken $800,000 to $900,000 in gold and such was either being held by Helen or her family. However, the bank's safety deposit records show no one other than Glenn and Janet Brewer had ever signed in to access the box where the gold was stored. This evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show Glenn possessed the gold. Finally, Glenn argues the trial court erred by excluding certain liabilities from the division of property. Specifically, Glenn contends the $3,821,371.89 in tort damages awarded to Helen should have been considered as a liability charged against the community. We cannot agree the tort damages assessed against Glenn should be a community liability. To so hold would be to make Helen responsible for half of the tort damages awarded to her because of Glenn's tortious conduct. Glenn has cited no authority to compel such a holding. We overrule Glenn's point of error 11. D. Entry of judgment In point of error 12, Glenn contends the trial court erred by entering a judgment beyond a just and right division of the property because it included (1) an award for mental anguish, (2) punitive damages, and (3) prejudgment interest on Helen's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claim. Glenn argues that by electing to proceed on a bill of review, Helen is only entitled to a just and right division of the property and cannot recover any tort damages. In this case, the jury found Glenn had committed fraud and breached his fiduciary duty toward Helen and awarded her $6,700,000 for loss of marital property and $1,300,000 for mental anguish. The jury also found Helen was entitled to a bill of review to set aside the prior division of property and the trial court made a new division of property. Helen elected to recover her share of the marital property and not to take her tort damages for loss of marital property, since those damages would effectively duplicate what she was getting under the trial court's just and right division. Glenn contends that by electing to recover her share of the marital property under the bill of review, she forfeited not only her damages for loss of marital property, but also all of her remaining tort damages, including the award for mental anguish. We will address each of the contested awards separately. 1. Mental anguish Glenn argues the doctrine of election of remedies bars Helen's recovery of actual damages for mental anguish. He contends that by electing to recover her marital property under the bill of review, she forfeited her right to recover any of her tort damages, including mental anguish. The election of remedies doctrine bars relief only when (1) one has made an informed choice (2) between two or more remedies, rights, or states of facts (3) which are so inconsistent as to (4) constitute manifest injustice. Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. 1980) The purpose of the election of remedies doctrine is to prevent double recovery for a single wrong. Green Oaks, Ltd. v. Cannan, 749 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex.App. San Antonio 1987), writ denied per curiam, 758 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.1988). A plaintiff is entitled to one satisfaction for sustained injuries. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.1991). The one satisfaction rule applies to prevent a plaintiff from obtaining more than one recovery for the same injury. Id. If a jury verdict contains more than one acceptable measure of damages, a plaintiff may be forced to elect prior to judgment the recovery he wants by waiving the surplus jury findings on damages. Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466-67 (Tex.1985). In Green Oaks, Ltd., 749 S.W.2d at 129-30, the plaintiff sought to void an illegal foreclosure and monetary damages caused as a result of the foreclosure. The plaintiff was successful in having the foreclosure declared void. Id. The defendant contended that by voiding the sale the plaintiff had elected his remedy and was precluded from seeking money damages. Id. at 131. The court held that no election of remedies was required because there was no inconsistency between allowing a plaintiff to recover a title taken wrongfully and for the damages suffered while the property was wrongfully held. Id. In this case, there is no double recovery. Helen recovered her marital property under the bill of review. In doing so, she forfeited her right to recover the $6,700,000 jury award for the loss of her marital property. [22] Allowing Helen to recover her marital property is not inconsistent with allowing her to recover for mental anguish she suffered as a result of Glenn's actions. The judgment does not contain a duplicative award for actual damages. The trial court did not err by allowing Helen to recover for mental anguish. 2. Punitive damages Second, Glenn argues Helen is not entitled to recover punitive damages because the judgment does not include any actual damages based upon fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. We disagree. Although Helen chose to recover her marital property in lieu of an award under her fraud claim for the loss of her marital property, she was also awarded mental anguish damages on her fraud claim. Mental anguish damages are actual damages. Thus, there was an award of actual damages upon which to base an award of punitive damages. The trial court did not err by awarding Helen exemplary damages on her fraud claim. 3. Prejudgment interest The trial court awarded Helen $1,521,371.89 in prejudgment interest. This amount of prejudgment interest was calculated and awarded based on the $6,700,000 jury verdict for loss of marital property as a result of Glenn's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. However, Helen chose not to receive the $6,700,000 for the loss of her marital property. Instead, she elected to recover her portion of the marital property after a new division of the property under the bill of review. Glenn argues that by choosing to recover her marital property rather than damages, Helen is precluded from seeking prejudgment interest. The term interest encompasses two distinct forms of compensation; interest as interest and interest as damages. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 551-52 (Tex.1985). Interest as interest is compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use or detention of money. Id. Interest as damages is compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of the judgment. Id. It is the second of these categories that is present in this case. In Cavnar, the supreme court discussed the rationale behind an award of prejudgment interest. The primary objective of awarding damages in civil actions has always been to compensate the injured plaintiff, rather than to punish the defendant. A law that denies recovery of prejudgment interest frustrates this goal. If a judgment provides plaintiffs only the amount of damages sustained at the time of the incident, plaintiffs are not fully compensated. They have been denied the opportunity to invest and earn interest on the amount of damages between the time of the occurrence and the time of judgment. 696 S.W.2d at 552 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Glenn argues that because Helen chose to redivide the property under the equitable bill of review she must forego the prejudgment interest, which was calculated based upon the money damages that she chose not to recover. Thus, the issue is whether Helen waived her right to recover prejudgment interest by choosing the equitable bill of review. While there are no cases involving prejudgment interest on this issue, there are several punitive damages cases that we find similar. In Consolidated Texas Financial v. Shearer, 739 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd), the homeowners sued the defendant for wrongful foreclosure. They sought alternate remedies: (1) a declaration that the trustee sale was null and void, or (2) damages for the fair market value of their equity interest in their home. Id. at 478. The jury found in favor of the homeowners and awarded them $36,288 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 479. In lieu of the $36,288, the homeowners chose to accept the equitable relief of declaring the trustee sale null and void; however, they requested the court to also grant them the $20,000 in punitive damages. Id. The defendants argued that by electing equitable relief, the homeowners were prohibited from collecting the punitive damages, which were derived from the actual damage award. Id. The court held that even though the homeowners chose equitable relief, they could collect the punitive damages. Id. at 480. The purposes served by awarding punitives (punishing the defendants) would be served, and there was a finding of actual damages, even though the homeowners elected not to recover them. Id., see also Nabours v. Longview Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 700 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. 1985) (exemplary damages available even though action involves equitable relief if there is also finding of actual damages); Fillion v. Troy, 656 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (punitive damages available when equitable relief granted). We find these cases analogous to this situation. Prejudgment interest, like punitive damages, is derivative of actual damages. Bayou Terrace Inv. Corp. v. Lyles, 881 S.W.2d 810, 816 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). We do not believe that Helen must forego her derivative damages merely because she elected to recover under the equitable cause of action as opposed to taking the actual damages. The record contains a finding of actual damages. Thus, the prejudgment interest was readily ascertainable. The purposes behind allowing prejudgment interest would be served by allowing Helen to recover it. She would not get a double recovery, but compensation for the loss of the use of her property. Accordingly, we overrule Glenn's point of error 12.