Opinion ID: 1785231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count IIStatements Concerning Judge Dillard.

Text: A. Controlling constitutional principles. Because sanctioning an attorney for statements he has made implicates the First Amendment, we begin with a discussion of the constitutional limitations that impact our consideration of this charge. Initially, we note that attorneys may be sanctioned for impugning the integrity of a judge or the court only if their statements are false; truth is an absolute defense. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 215, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, 132-33 (1964)). In general, even a false statement is protected by the First Amendment unless made with actual malice, which requires knowledge that [the statement] was false or . . . reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 706 (1964) (holding First Amendment protects speech regarding a public official unless made with actual malice). The reckless disregard prong of the New York Times test requires more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2696, 105 L.Ed.2d 562, 589 (1989). There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication [or] . . . that the defendant actually had a high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity. Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 266-67 (1968)). The Supreme Court has not applied the New York Times test to attorney disciplinary proceedings based on an attorney's criticism of a judge. It appears a majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue has concluded the interests protected by the disciplinary system call for a test less stringent than the New York Times standard. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437 n. 12; In re Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 838 N.E.2d 1197, 1212-13 (2005); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 793 N.E.2d 425, 431 (2003). Courts in these jurisdictions have held that in disciplining an attorney for criticizing a judge, the standard is whether the attorney had an objectively reasonable basis for making the statements. Cobb, 838 N.E.2d at 1212. Interestingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has cited Iowa as one of the jurisdictions that apply an objective standard for malice rather than the subjective New York Times test. Id. (citing In re Citation of Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1976)). This court did not discuss the New York Times test in Frerichs, but we did consider the attorney respondent's argument that he did not intend by his statements to allege the commission of any illegal actions on the part of the court. Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d at 767. This court rejected any relevancy of the attorney's subjective intent, stating: We do not believe respondent can avoid the impact of his assertions on the basis of his subjective intent. The [Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers] was not promulgated for the private intentions or feelings of judges or lawyers but to protect the integrity of, and public confidence in, our system of justice. Respondent's assertions should be judged with a view to their likely effect on the public's belief in the integrity of the court as an institution. The effect of the respondent's remarks on the public's belief is in no way related to his subjective intent. Neither does respondent's subjective intent relate to the question of whether his remarks were knowingly made. Respondent, as we have seen, expressly acknowledged his charges were not made in haste or without appropriate consideration. Id. It appears the present case is the first in which we have expressly considered the appropriate standard to apply in determining whether statements and accusations made by an attorney regarding a judicial officer enjoy constitutional protection. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d 376, 380-81 (Iowa 2001) (considering impact of First Amendment on attorney's out-of-court statements regarding matters in litigation); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Wherry, 569 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 1997) (discussing limitations placed on regulation of attorney advertising by First Amendment). But see Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Iowa 1996) (noting First Amendment test in case involving criticism of judge, but without any discussion of its applicability). In reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, we find the rationale for using an objective standard in lieu of the New York Times test was convincingly expressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Disciplinary Action Against Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313 (Minn.1990), a case frequently cited for the proposition that an objective test should be used in attorney disciplinary proceedings. The Minnesota court said in that case: This court certifies attorneys for practice to protect the public and the administration of justice. That certification implies that the individual admitted to practice law exhibits a sound capacity for judgment. Where an attorney criticizes the bench and bar, the issue is not simply whether the criticized individual has been harmed, but rather whether the criticism impugning the integrity of judge or legal officer adversely affects the administration of justice and adversely reflects on the accuser's capacity for sound judgment. An attorney who makes critical statements regarding judges and legal officers with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity and who brings frivolous actions against members of the bench and bar exhibits a lack of judgment that conflicts with his or her position as an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. . . . . Because of the interest in protecting the public, the administration of justice and the profession, a purely subjective standard is inappropriate. The standard applied must reflect that level of competence, of sense of responsibility to the legal system, of understanding of legal rights and of legal procedures to be used only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others, that is essential to the character of an attorney practicing in Minnesota. Thus, we hold that the standard must be an objective one dependent on what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his professional functions, would do in the same or similar circumstances. Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 322 (quoting Minn. R. Prof'l Conduct, Preamble). As another court has noted, an objective malice standard strikes a constitutionally permissible balance between an attorney's right to criticize the judiciary and the public's interest in preserving confidence in the judicial system: Lawyers may freely voice criticisms supported by a reasonable factual basis even if they turn out to be mistaken. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. We are persuaded by the rationale given in support of applying an objective standard in cases involving criticism of judicial officers. Therefore, we will employ that standard in considering whether Weaver's statements concerning Judge Dillard are sanctionable. In deciding whether Weaver's statements are protected by the First Amendment, we must also be aware of the constitutional limits on the type of speech that may be the subject of discipline. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2704, 111 L.Ed.2d 1, 16 (1990) (considering this issue in the context of a defamation action brought against a newspaper and its reporter). Although statements of opinion are not automatically protected by the First Amendment, a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection. Id. at 18, 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2705, 2706, 111 L.Ed.2d at 17-18. In addition, statements that cannot `reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual, such as rhetorical hyperbole, will also be protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2706, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19 (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 108 S.Ct. 876, 879, 99 L.Ed.2d 41, 48 (1988)). But if the statement, even when couched as opinion, implies the assertion of an objectively verifiable event, susceptible of being proved true or false, only the limited protection provided by the malice requirement is demanded by the First Amendment. Id. at 21-22, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19-20. As applied to the case before us, these authorities require that we first decide whether Weaver's statements are sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. Id. at 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19. If so, the next step is to determine the truth or falsity of these statements. If we find Weaver's statements were false, we must then decide whether Weaver had an objectively reasonable basis for making the statements. Cobb, 838 N.E.2d at 1212. If we conclude Weaver's statements are not entitled to First Amendment protection, we may proceed to a determination of whether his statements violated our Code of Professional Responsibility. We will discuss each statement separately. B. Statement Regarding Cancellation of the Hearing to Reconsider Sentence. 1. Type of statement. As noted above, Weaver stated to a newspaper reporter that Judge Dillard canceled the hearing scheduled on Weaver's motion to reconsider sentence in response to receiving Weaver's treatment records. We think this assertionthe judge cancelled the hearing in response to receiving Weaver's medical records is capable of being proved true or false. Therefore, it is the type of statement that does not enjoy full constitutional protection. 2. Falsity of statement. In his order of May 31, Judge Dillard expressly stated he was canceling the hearing [f]or the reason that the Defendant [Weaver] has filed a Notice of Appeal in this matter, which, in fact, Weaver had done. Judge Dillard's subsequent order of June 1 amplified this reason: The Defendant's appeal of the judgment and sentence of the court and his posting of the appeal bond has stayed the execution of the sentence. The Defendant's rejection of the court's judgment makes it impossible for the court to evaluate the rehabilitative effect of the sentence. The judge's announced reason for canceling the hearing was entirely consistent with the court's May 6 order scheduling the hearing, in which the judge stated: [T]he court believes that the Defendant's sentence should commence and that any reconsideration of sentence would be based, in part, upon the progress of the Defendant in the treatment program pursuant to Iowa Code section 904.513. At the hearing on the Board's complaint, Weaver was specifically asked why he believed Judge Dillard canceled the hearing in response to the treatment records. He answered, I don't know. I know that he did. I don't know why. Weaver then acknowledged that the only evidence he had to support his assertion was timing: the treatment records had been provided to the court in the last half of May, and on May 31, Judge Dillard canceled the hearing to reconsider Weaver's sentence. Weaver suggested that the records disrupt[ed] the reasoning that [Judge Dillard] gave on April 18th for the sentence pronounced. Weaver also admitted, however, that the timing of these events could be a mere coincidence rather than a cause-effect sequence. Based on our review of the record, we are convinced the Board has met its burden to prove Weaver's statement that the judge canceled the June 3 hearing because the judge had received Weaver's treatment records was false. The reason given in the judge's orders with respect to the cancellation of the hearing was entirely consistent with the judge's earlier statement that he wanted Weaver to commence his sentence before any reconsideration of that sentence. In addition, we find unpersuasive Weaver's argument that the judge was motivated to cancel the hearing because the records in some way undermined the reasons the judge had given for the selected sentence. Judge Dillard was aware at the time of sentencing that Weaver had successfully completed treatment through MARC. By the time Judge Dillard scheduled the June 3 hearing, which he did on May 6, 2005, Weaver's successful treatment at MARC had already been documented in the court file. [3] The records the judge subsequently received later in May merely confirmed what the judge already knew and what was already contained in the record. Consequently, if in fact the MARC records undermined the judge's sentencing decision, that fact existed at the time the judge set the hearing. The only circumstance that changed between May 6, when the hearing was set, and May 31, when it was cancelled, was the judge's awareness that Weaver had filed a notice of appeal. The sequence of events simply does not support Weaver's contention that the filing of the MARC records prompted the cancellation of the hearing. 3. Existence of objectively reasonable basis for making the statement. Weaver admitted that prior to his interview by the newspaper reporter he had seen the court's May 31 order canceling the hearing, as well as the court's June 1 order denying Weaver's motion to reconsider the cancellation of the hearing. If there had been any question in Weaver's mind after the May 31 order as to why the notice of appeal would cause the judge to cancel the hearing, that question was answered by the judge's second order. Consequently, it should have been apparent to a reasonable attorney having the information known to Weaver at the time Weaver spoke to the reporter that Judge Dillard did not cancel the hearing on Weaver's motion to reconsider because the judge had received Weaver's treatment records. To the contrary, the judge was clear in his May 6 order that he set the hearing far enough in the future to allow implementation of sentence commencement of the treatment programand an evaluation of Weaver's progress in the program prior to the court's reconsideration of the sentence. The judge's June 1 order was similarly clear: Because Weaver had appealed, sentence had been stayed, Weaver had not begun the treatment program, there was no way the judge could consider the rehabilitative effect of the program, and hence, there was no purpose in having the hearing. As we have discussed, Weaver has not suggested a credible basis for his view that the judge cancelled the hearing for a reason other than that stated in the judge's orders. We conclude Weaver did not have an objectively reasonable basis for his statement that Judge Dillard cancelled the hearing as a result of receiving Weaver's treatment records. Consequently, Weaver acted in reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of his statement and thereby forfeited the protection of the First Amendment. 4. Ethical violation. Among other violations, the Commission concluded Weaver's statement with respect to cancellation of the hearing was a misrepresentation of fact in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). We have held that a [n]egligent misrepresentation does not violate DR 1-102(A)(4). Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Iowa 2004); accord Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 1979) (stating the rule is not violated by acts resulting from `haste' or `oversight'). Proof of an intent to deceive is required. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d at 553. Intent to deceive can be shown by an attorney's reckless disregard for the truth, as well as by actual knowledge of falsity. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2002). Thus, to prove a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), the Board must establish (1) that Weaver's statement was not true, and (2) that he made the statement with actual knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard for whether the statement was true or not. We have already determined that Weaver's statement was false. Based on our review of the record, we are also convinced Weaver either knowingly or recklessly misrepresented the judge's reason for canceling the hearing. At the time Weaver commented on the judge's decision to cancel the hearing, Weaver was upset that the judge would not reconsider his sentence unless he had served some portion of it. In an attempt to characterize himself as the victim of unfair treatment by the court, he publicly claimed the judge had cancelled the hearing upon receipt of Weaver's records, implying the judge wanted to avoid a hearing on Weaver's sentence because the records would have shown the sentence was not justified. In addition, Weaver did not make this statement in haste. To the contrary, he testified that he carefully thought about what he wanted to say to the reporter, as [i]t was very important for himWeaverto communicate to the public. We believe the Board has proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Weaver intended to deceive the reporter and the public in making this statement, or at the least acted in reckless disregard for whether his statement was true or not. We hold, therefore, that Weaver violated DR 1-102(A)(4). C. Statement Regarding Judge Dillard's Reason for Sentencing Weaver to the Department of Corrections. 1. Type of statement. As noted above, when Weaver was interviewed by the Muscatine Journal reporter, Weaver stated Judge Dillard was not being honest about the reasons why he committed me to the Department of Corrections, a statement repeated in the newspaper article. We think this statement `is an articulation of an objectively verifiable event.' Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 20 (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986)). In Milkovich, the court considered a newspaper article, entitled Maple beat the law with the `big lie.' Id. at 4, 110 S.Ct. at 2698, 111 L.Ed.2d at 8. The article discussed a court decision overturning the disqualification of the Maple Heights High School wrestling team from the state tournament. Id. In the article, the reporter stated, among other things, `Anyone who attended the meet . . . knows in his heart that [wrestling coach] Milkovich and [superintendent] Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth. But they got away with it.' Id. at 5, 110 S.Ct. at 2698, 111 L.Ed.2d at 9 (quoting Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App.3d 20, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1321-22 (1989)). In the subsequent defamation suit brought by Milkovich, an Ohio trial court granted the defendants a summary judgment in part on the grounds that the article constituted an `opinion' protected from the reach of state defamation law by the First Amendment. Id. at 3, 110 S.Ct. at 2698, 111 L.Ed.2d at 8. The Supreme Court reversed with the following analysis: The dispositive question in the present case then becomes whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the [newspaper article] imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. We think this question must be answered in the affirmative. As the Ohio Supreme Court itself observed: [T]he clear impact in some nine sentences and a caption is that [Milkovich] `lied at the hearing after . . . having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.' This is not the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining that petitioner committed the crime of perjury. Nor does the general tenor of the article negate this impression. Id. at 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19 (quoting Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707). The facts in Milkovich can be helpfully contrasted to the facts in Yagman. In the latter case, Yagman, an attorney, wrote a letter critical of one Judge Keller in which he stated, in part: It is an understatement to characterize the Judge as the worst judge in the central district. It would be fairer to say that he is ignorant, dishonest, ill-tempered, and a bully, and probably is one of the worst judges in the United States. 55 F.3d at 1434 n. 4. Yagman was subsequently disciplined by a federal district court for alleging that the judge was dishonest. Id. at 1440. On appeal, the circuit court reversed, concluding that when considered in context, Yagman's statement cannot reasonably be interpreted as accusing Judge Keller of criminal misconduct: The term dishonest was one in a string of colorful adjectives Yagman used to convey the low esteem in which he held Judge Keller. The other terms he usedignorant, ill-tempered, buffoon, sub-standard human, right-wing fanatic, a bully, one of the worst judges in the United States all speak to competence and temperament rather than corruption; together they convey nothing more substantive than Yagman's contempt for Judge Keller. Viewed in context of these lusty and imaginative expression[s], the word dishonest cannot reasonably be construed as suggesting that Judge Keller had committed specific illegal acts. Yagman's remarks are thus statements of rhetorical hyperbole, incapable of being proved true or false. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We think the facts of the present case more closely line up with those in Milkovich than with those in Yagman. Weaver was reported as having said I can't speculate about the reasons why he did this, . . . [b]ut he's not being honest about the reasons why he committed me to the Department of Corrections. [T]he clear impact of this statement is that Judge Dillard gave false reasons for the sentence he imposed. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19. Paraphrasing the Supreme Court, Weaver's statement is not the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that [Weaver] was seriously maintaining that [the judge had not been honest]. Id. Moreover, it was not an expression of opinion; it was a specific statement about specific wrongdoing by the judge, capable of being proved true or false. Nor do we think Weaver's statement is protected simply because he prefaced it with the remark that he couldn't speculate on the reasons why [the judge] did this. This remark did not transform Weaver's statement that the judge had not been honest into a protected opinion; it simply left the reader at liberty to assume that Weaver knew more than he was saying. Cf. Veilleux v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 115 (1st Cir.2000) (Whether an opinion is protected hyperbole depends primarily upon whether a reasonable person would not interpret it as providing actual facts about the described individual.); Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1439 (discussing distinction between opinion statements based on assumed or expressly stated facts, and those based on implied, undisclosed facts and stating that when [r]eaders of [the] statement will reasonably understand the author to be implying that he knows facts supporting his view, the statement can be the subject of discipline). We conclude, therefore, that Weaver's statement does not enjoy full constitutional protection and can properly be the subject of discipline. 2. Falsity of statement. To determine the truth or falsity of Weaver's statement, it is necessary to more closely examine the circumstances leading up to it. When Judge Dillard scheduled the sentencing hearing, he ordered Weaver to complete an alcohol evaluation. At the sentencing hearing, Weaver offered his 2003 evaluation at Rush as compliance with the court's order. This evaluation was attached to the presentence report prepared by the Department of Correctional Services. Although the presentence report included no other medical records, Weaver stated to the court that he had no additions or corrections to make to the presentence report other than some minor corrections to some financial information. Pursuant to the parties' plea agreement, the State recommended a sentence of 180 days in jail, with all but seven days suspended; a fine of $1500, plus costs and surcharge; and evaluation and treatment for substance abuse, if deemed appropriate by the court. Weaver's attorney asked the court to approve the plea agreement and requested that the court give Weaver credit against his jail time for his inpatient treatment after his arrest for second-offense OWI. Neither party presented any evidence, although given the opportunity to do so. Weaver was offered his right of allocution, which he exercised to detail the treatment he had received for his alcoholism and depression, as well as the efforts that he had taken to remain abstinent after the completion of his most recent inpatient treatment. He suggested to the court that jail would not be a significant consequence to him and that he had already undertaken sufficient rehabilitative measures. The court then questioned Weaver extensively concerning the various treatment programs he had completed and also inquired about his relapses. Weaver acknowledged that he had been in denial of his problem for a long time, and that he had not always agreed that he needed treatment. Judge Dillard asked Weaver whether his current abstinence might not be just another chapter in a book of treatment followed by relapse. Weaver assured the judge that this time he had a very different sense of well-being. Judge Dillard then discussed his sentencing considerations, stating his two primary concerns were protection of the community and [Weaver's] rehabilitation. The judge expressly rejected the need for punishment and stated that the notion that Weaver should be held especially accountable because he was a judge at the time of his offense was not a legitimate consideration for sentencing. Judge Dillard noted, however, that Weaver's judicial position did have some relevance in that it provided Weaver with information that should have alerted him to the seriousness of his condition and the options available to him to address that condition. The judge observed that, notwithstanding Weaver's knowledge about the danger of drinking and driving and the fact that he was jeopardizing his career by such conduct, Weaver was unable to overcome his addiction. Judge Dillard expressed doubt that Weaver really had his addiction under control: I think that alcohol is a tremendously debilitating addiction and that because of the length of time that you've been drinking as much as you have over the years as reported in the [presentence] report, that it's beyond your will power to deal with this subject, at least I'm not convinced that you can control it. The judge then announced his decision. He expressly rejected the option of prison or the county jail, noting incarceration is merely punitive and accomplishes nothing other than abstinence. Invoking section 904.513 (the OWI continuum-of-treatment sentencing option), the judge sentenced Weaver to the Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term not to exceed two years and ordered that he be placed at an appropriate alcohol treatment correctional facility. Judge Dillard noted that, upon Weaver's achievement of the maximum benefits from the program, [Weaver] would be released on parole, which in the judge's view would occur in a significantly shorter period of time than for the standard person given the number of treatment programs in which Weaver had already participated. Judge Dillard summarized his thinking, stating: But I think that another go around of intensive treatment is appropriate, and that's the setting that I think is the best available that we can monitor and control. Weaver immediately requested that the court leave the record open so he could provide the judge with his records from MARC. Weaver stated his belief that the facility providing treatment for the Department of Corrections is the same facility that conducts the MARC program. He further asserted that he would have produced witnesses had he anticipated the court would have any concerns and that he considered the sentence punitive. In response, Judge Dillard stated that he was open to reconsideration, noting this is a sentence that can be reconsidered. Nonetheless, he refused to do so at that time, stating, I'm not going to change my mind today on the sentence. Judge Dillard further noted that Weaver would have to file a motion to reconsider. The parties then agreed on a mittimus date of May 6. As previously noted, Weaver subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, but the hearing on that motion was cancelled after Weaver's sentence was stayed upon his filing of a notice of appeal. Weaver was then interviewed by a journalist who reported that Weaver stated Judge Dillard was not being honest about the reasons why he committed me to the Department of Corrections. At the hearing before the Grievance Commission, Weaver was asked by the Board's counsel to explain in what way Judge Dillard was not honest about the reasons for the sentence that was imposed. Weaver's answer was far from concise, rambling for five pages of the transcript. Omitting repetitive and nonresponsive material, we quote Weaver's answer: The primary objective that the Court identifies for the term of sentencing is to provide for my rehabilitation and to protect members of the public. I took that to be a consideration that the judge was concerned about my long-term recovery. Unfortunately, the judge, as do many persons, equate[s] treatment with recovery. . . . [T]reatment and recovery are not identical concepts. Therefore, my view was that his primary objective was recovery. There's also a part of the transcript . . . in which the judge and I specifically discuss the various components of the OWI treatment facility. And those two components . . . [were] the treatment component and the vocational antisocial component. . . . I asked the judge if he felt it was necessary that I be involved in [the vocational antisocial] component, and he indicated that he did not. So at that time on April 18th I considered that there were  the two primary objectives were recovery, protection of the public, with the caveat that I did not, in view of the Court, need those rehabilitative services. We fail to find in this testimony any clue of an alleged falsity in Judge Dillard's announced reasons for sentencing Weaver to the Department of Corrections. After Weaver's testimony, Judge Dillard testified that hethe judgesensed at the sentencing hearing that Weaver was attempting to manipulate the sentencing process. Weaver now seizes on this testimony, claiming it reveals a significant reason for the sentence that Judge Dillard did not disclose at the sentencing hearing. The judge's perception of Weaver as manipulative cannot be divorced, however, from one of the announced reasons for the sentencethe need for treatment. Judge Dillard testified: But the strongest impression that I had that has stuck with me throughout and without reading that transcript again was that Mr. Weaver was trying to control the sentencing. He was trying, in my view, to manipulate the entire process to avoid any incarceration, to avoid being put under control of someone else. And to me that is a classic alcoholic characteristic. (Emphasis added.) The judge also testified that Weaver's controlling personality led the judge to believe that court-ordered treatment, supervised by the Department of Corrections, as opposed to voluntary treatment controlled by Weaver, would be advisable. Thus, Judge Dillard's testimony that he viewed Weaver as manipulative was not an independent reason for the sentence. It merely supported the judge's belief that another round of treatment under state supervisionwould be prudent to determine, as Judge Dillard stated at sentencing, whether in fact [the treatment] has taken. After a careful review of the record, we are persuaded by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Weaver's statement that Judge Dillard was not being honest about why he sentenced Weaver to the Department of Corrections was false. Judge Dillard had serious doubts that Weaver was sufficiently rehabilitated such that he would not once again drink and drive. As the judge stated when explaining his sentence, I'm concerned about this being the last time James Weaver is before a court for any reason, but certainly for operating while intoxicated. We conclude Judge Dillard honestly stated his reasons for sentencing Weaver to the Department of Corrections. Weaver's contrary accusation was false. 3. Existence of objectively reasonable basis for making the statement. We have failed to discover in the record any objectively reasonable basis for Weaver's assertion that Judge Dillard was not honest in stating his reasons for the sentence. Weaver's own testimony belies a factual basis for his statement. When asked at the disciplinary hearing to explain his decision to speak with a reporter, Weaver testified [i]t was very important for him to communicate to the public regarding the general impression left by the judge from his sentence that [Weaver] was not fully participating in a treatment program. He explained: The [newspaper] reporting was that the judge concluded that I continued to be in need of substance abuse treatment. I felt that the comments that appeared in the paper suggested that my prior representations in a public setting were not truthful in the sense that I continued to need further treatment. Therefore, I felt inclined, when the judge issued this ruling and it became public, to make a comment that it was my feeling that treatment was not the primary focus of his sentence, which I was convinced of then and I remain convinced of today. [4] We agree with the finding of the Commission as to Weaver's true motivation in talking to the press: As clearly reflected in his testimony, [Weaver] was concerned about how previous newspaper articles had characterized Judge Dillard's sentencing order. Quite simply, [Weaver] felt that he was the recipient of some bad press, and he went on a public relations offensive. In order to counter an article that questioned his honesty, [Weaver] questioned Judge Dillard's honesty. Weaver acted on the basis of his anger when he said Judge Dillard was dishonest, not because there was any basis to believe that the judge had not stated the true reasons for Weaver's sentence. See In re Pyle, 283 Kan. 807, 156 P.3d 1231, 1247 (2007) (holding attorney's criticism of members of disciplinary board was not protected by the First Amendment: There is a line between just and unjust criticism. Respondent crossed it. This is evident from his plainly selfish motive. He displayed no desire to improve the disciplinary system, only to excuse its focus on him.). We conclude Weaver did not have an objectively reasonable basis for his statement that Judge Dillard was not honest when he stated his reasons for sentencing Weaver to the Department of Corrections. Therefore, Weaver's conduct reflects a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of his statement. Accordingly, this statement is not protected speech. Our decision in this matter should not be construed as implying that a lawyer may be sanctioned merely for challenging or criticizing judicial acts. Judicial outcomes may be controversial and are often subject to robust public comment. Although it is well established that the speech of lawyers may be curtailed in order to avoid improper influence on pending cases, particularly when a jury is involved, or to otherwise prevent obstruction of justice, we recognize that the First Amendment generally protects lawyers who engage in fair commentary and expression of opinion regarding the state of the law. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 627-28, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 1378-79, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473, 1478-79 (1959) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Further, the mere assertion by a dissenting judge or by academics that a court commits an honest error is not the basis for ethical sanctions. W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 305, 331-32 (2001). In this case, however, Weaver did not simply disagree with Judge Dillard's reasoning or factual premises or argue that Judge Dillard's decision was inconsistent with precedent, improperly balanced the interests involved, or was contrary to history, tradition, and common sense. Moreover, unlike in Yagman, Weaver did not claim he was expressing an opinion that Judge Dillard was intellectually dishonest, in the sense that Judge Dillard's sentencing decision might have been based upon an unstated premise or hidden bias. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441. Instead, Weaver accused a judge of a specific act of dishonesty which he characterized at the hearing before the Commission as a knowing concealment of the judge's reasons for sentencing him. He was utterly unable to provide a reasonable basis for this charge at the hearing. Under these facts, we conclude that the First Amendment does not protect Weaver from being sanctioned for professional misconduct. 4. Ethical violation. Having determined Weaver falsely accused Judge Dillard of being dishonest in stating his reasons for the sentence imposed, we now consider whether this conduct violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. We conclude Weaver's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(5), which prohibits an attorney from engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. [5] As we have observed in the past, [f]alse accusations against judges harm the courts as institutions. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hurd, 360 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Iowa 1984). By falsely accusing Judge Dillard of not being honest concerning his sentencing decision, Weaver implied there was some improper or sinister motivation underlying the judge's decision. See Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d at 767 (noting attorney's statements attributed to the court sinister, deceitful and unlawful motives and purposes). That Weaver's statement could be so interpreted is clearly illustrated by the reporter's headline: Bias on the bench. Ongoing court battle pits judge against retired judge as Weaver makes allegations of personal bias, dishonesty against presiding judge. Clearly, Weaver's statement left the impression that courts do not do justice, but rather make decisions for undisclosed and improper reasons. When the public loses confidence in the integrity of the courts, the administration of justice is prejudiced. See Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 277 Conn. 218, 890 A.2d 509, 521 (2006) (holding attorney's disparaging statements regarding judge violated rule prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); Pyle, 156 P.3d at 1247 (stating the administration of justice rule seeks to protect the justice system in general from prejudice, not only a single trial or adjudicatory proceeding); Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 324 (holding statements impugning integrity of judge prejudiced the administration of justice). Thus, Weaver engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5).