Opinion ID: 1945963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions about Consideration and Weighing of the Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to explicitly instruct the jury that, if the jury as a whole did not unanimously find the depravity-of-mind aggravating factor, no one juror could consider that factor in balancing the remaining felony-murder factor and the mitigating factors. Defendant also claims that the trial court erred by using the term random in describing the murder within the framework of the depravity-of-mind factor. Specifically, defendant argues that random in that context was a vague term and thus impermissible. The State disagrees. The State asserts that the trial judge clearly and properly instructed the jury that it had to find the proposed aggravating factors unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, and to then weigh only those aggravating factors it found against the mitigating factors to determine the appropriate penalty. Before examining the jury instructions, we first recount the relevant procedural history. The State proffered two aggravating factors: the 3c(4)(c) depravity-of-mind factor and the 3c(4)(g) felony-murder factor. The jury unanimously found that the felony-murder factor was proved, but rejected the depravity-of-mind factor. The jury voted eleven to one in favor of finding the depravity-of-mind factor. However, the one juror's no vote served as the jury's rejection of that factor. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 159, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988). Because the jury rejected the depravity-of-mind factor, it was authorized to balance only the felony-murder factor against the mitigating factors to determine the appropriate punishment. Ibid. At the start of the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: And if an aggravating factor has already been proven, and you heard the evidence of mitigating factors, you're to take that evidence of mitigating factors, take that evidence proving the aggravating factor, and you're to weigh them together, and make a qualitative judgment about whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors or not. If you unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors do outweigh the mitigating factors, then the penalty should be death. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the court delivered to the jury its final instructions, addressing the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors: As a general proposition you know aggravating factors are those which would tend towards imposing the death penalty, and mitigating factors are those which would tend towards the sentence of imprisonment. The factors have to do with the circumstances of the crime and the personal traits, qualities and background of the defendant. Your task is not merely to decide the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. That's an important part of your task. But really the more complicated part of your task probably will be to evaluate those factors, if you find them toto exist on both sides of theof the evaluation, to evaluate them and to make a unique, individualized judgment about the appropriateness either of the death penalty or imprisonment, acts of punishment for thisthis defendant. Now, aggravating factors are tightly controlled as to what can be an aggravating factor. There's a rather short statutory list of aggravating factors. And the [S]tate, in this case, has alleged that two of them are present. So those two aggravating factors, which we'll discuss in some detail, are the only two which can be considered in this penalty phase. The jury can't think of other aggravating factors that it believes might be appropriate. You can't do that. You're limited to the two which the [S]tate has claimed exist. So you have to focus, when you get to aggravating factors, on whether either or both of them, aggravating factors, exist. The fact that some of us might think that perhaps another factor could have been applied here, there or the other place, aan aggravating factor, that's irrelevant. Two have been claimed. And that is what you are limited to in deciding whether an aggravating factor is present. The burden of proof in the penalty phasethe burden of proofthe first burden of proof that the State has is to show, by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more aggravating factors exist. The second burden of proof that the [S]tate has, if it passes that first one, is to show by evidence, beyond a [reasonable] doubt, that the aggravating factor or factors proven to exist outweigh the mitigating factor or factors. Now, the State has the burden of proving the exist[e]nce of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The court proceeded to define proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then directed the jury's attention to the verdict sheet and stressed that, to consider whether the death penalty was appropriate, the jury first had to find unanimously that at least one of the two alleged aggravating factors was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the court stated: [A]s part of that concept that the imposition of the death penalty is unusual and rare, the [S]tate is required not just to if the death penalty is to be imposed, it's notit's required not just to prove that there is a knowing and purposeful murder. That has already been proven in this case. But in addition to that, it has to show that there is one of a limited number of aggravating factors in addition to the murder which make it appropriate to impose the death penalty in a case. So proving an aggravating factor is absolutely indispensable to the possibility that a death penalty might actually be imposed. Turning to the depravity-of-mind aggravating factor, the court informed the jury in part: Now, if you find that the murder was random, entirely pointless and senseless, if you find that unanimously, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shouldyou should say that this aggravating factor is present.