Opinion ID: 545485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: time barred claims

Text: 18 Appellants allege that appellees were aware of their injuries and the cause of those injuries several years prior to filing suit; thus the applicable statute of limitations barred their claims. They contend that as a matter of law the statute of limitations was triggered the moment that plaintiffs had the idea that their injuries were work related, and, therefore, the district court erred in denying appellants request for Summary Judgment and its motion for directed verdict.
19 Appellants allege that as a matter of law, the action was time barred. Article 1868 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code provides for a one year statute of limitations which commences on the date the aggrieved party had knowledge of the tort. 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 5298. However, the one year term does not start to run from the occurrence of the negligent act or damage, but from the moment the damages is known. Barreto Peat, Inc. v. Luis Ayala Sucrs., Inc., 896 F.2d 656, 658 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Rivera Encarnacion v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico., 113 D.P.R. 383, 385 (1982)). The issue here is the parties' opposing views as to when the damage became known by plaintiffs as being caused by defendant. 20 The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that the statute of limitations starts to run on the date that plaintiff becomes aware of the injury and the person who caused it. Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 115 D.P.R. 232, 247 (1984). In Colon Prieto, the Court dealt with the statute of limitations issue in a medical malpractice insurance claim. In that case, defendant alleged the action was time barred because plaintiff knew or had an idea of the cause of the injury. 21 In Colon Prieto plaintiff developed an infection in his tongue after a visit to his dental surgeon. Subsequently, he visited the dentist again to inquire as to this condition, suspecting something had gone wrong. He was informed by the dentist that the sore had been self inflicted. After an unsuccessful treatment, he visited another dental surgeon who informed him that his injury was caused by a surgical instrument. In view of these facts the Court established that in order to file an action the victim must know who caused it. Despite plaintiff's suspicions, it was at this point that plaintiff became aware of who and what had caused the damage. This interpretation, it was ruled, was required in situations where the negligent perpetrator benefits from the ignorance or trust of the injured. Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 115 D.P.R. 232. 22 The record shows that although appellees may have had the idea that their condition was work related, all employment and official sources such as Parke Davis, the State Insurance Fund physicians, as well as the Industrial Commission of Puerto Rico, informed them that their condition was not work-related. 2 23 In the instant case, appellees visited State Insurance Fund physicians who reported that their condition and complaints had no relationship with working with hormones. There is also evidence that their efforts before the Industrial Commission, the appropriate administrative agency that handles worker's compensation cases, proved fruitless. The Commission also found that the employees specific complaints were not related to estrogen contamination. The facts further demonstrate that plaintiffs' lack of awareness was not due to their own negligence, carelessness, or lack of diligence, cf. Rivera Encarnacion v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico., 113 D.P.R. at 385, and finally, that Parke Davis was ultimately responsible of employee safety. 24 Upon review, we find that the jury was properly instructed on the application for the statute of limitations, that jury interrogatories were properly submitted and that the district court in so doing applied the law properly. Furthermore, the record shows that no objections were made to this effect. Because we find no error of law we review the jury's findings to see if they were supported by the evidence. 25 The determination of when appellees had knowledge of both the injury and its connection with the act of defendant, Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (9th Cir.1980), is a question of fact. Cf. Id. As such, it was for the jury to determine when plaintiffs appellees could be charged with having sufficient knowledge to trigger the statute of limitations. Although, allegations of errors of law are reviewed de novo, jury findings are findings of fact, and findings of fact cannot be set aside unless the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. 26 After examining the record we find that it supports the factual findings. While there is evidence that shows appellees had an idea or suspected that their condition was work related some time prior to filing suit, there is also evidence that appellees became aware of the actual cause of their injury within the statutory period. Because, the record supports the jury's finding, Borras v. Sea Land Service, 586 F.2d at 885, we will not disturb its decision.
27 Upon motion for summary judgment, the district court must view all facts and reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to a material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co. Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir.1987); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56. In the instant case, the district court found that there was an issue as to when the appellees became aware that their condition resulted from estrogen contamination. The affidavits filed by the appellees stated that plaintiffs were never told that they could be affected physically or mentally from exposure to the active ingredients used in the manufacture of oral contraceptives. To the contrary, they were always told that their condition was not related to estrogen exposure. Since knowledge of the cause of their injury is required to file suit, Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 115 D.P.R. at 247, appellee's affidavits evidence a genuine issue as to a material fact. Thus, the district court committed no error in denying appellants' request for summary judgment.
28 For the same reasons underlying their summary judgment claim, appellants next claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding in reference to the statute of limitations issue and that the district court therefore erred in denying appellants motion for directed verdict. 29 The standard of review for a motion for directed verdict is similar to that applied to a request for summary judgment. It is well settled that upon the consideration of a motion for directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, giving him the benefit of every favorable inference that may be fairly drawn therefrom. Borras v. Sea Land Service, 586 F.2d 881, 885 (1st Cir.1978), quoted in Valedon Martinez v. Hospital Presbiteriano, 806 F.2d 1128, 1134 (1986). If fair minded persons could draw different inferences then the matter is for the jury. Id. Upon review, we find that the record provides an adequate evidentiary basis for the district court's decision to submit the matter to the jury.