Opinion ID: 179514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Victims' Statements

Text: During trial, the district court allowed the government to introduce evidence of statements previously made by the murder victims. First, through the testimony of retired FBI Agent Fred C. Stofer, who had participated in the 1981 Macon bank robbery investigation, the government was allowed to introduce exhibits bearing certain teletype communications. These teletype communications, between law enforcement offices in Macon, Miami and Columbus, relate to Robert Bass's willingness to provide information concerning the Macon bank robbery. Bass did not testify in the bank robbery trial, but Agent Stofer was allowed to read the contents of one of the teletype communications into the record: [O]n this date Robert Earl Bass incarcerated at Dade County Jail under the name Robert Earl, black male, date of birth, telephonically contacted the Macon RA regarding the above matter. Bass stated that he wasor that he has information regarding this case indicating specifically that he can provide information on the weapon used not yet recovered, the current location of the getaway car, a '73 Datsun not yet recovered, registered to Bass, and that he can convince Ecolia Johnson to cooperate with Macon FBI office in this case. R. 160-8, trial tr. vol. VII, p. 123; Gov't Appx. p. 6, ex. 1K. [1] Second, the government was allowed to read into the record a sworn statement Ecolia Washington gave to police on August 27, 1981, before she testified against Henderson in the bank robbery trial: Ms. Wonsley, Question: How many times have you talked to him since you all have been here at the Law Enforcement Center? Answer: Twice on the telephone. Question: What has he said to you? Answer: Well, the first time he called me, well, you know, when Mr. Child's (sic) had told me about that you all would drop them two counts on me if I could come up with those three items, I tried to get Tommy to help me pay for my attorney some kind of way or to give me some more money, and that's why he called me, because he got my message that if he didn't give me no money, I was going to tell them. So he called me and he told me he had got my message and that he wouldn't advise me to do that. Knowing Tommy, you know, he told me he didn't believe that it was only my doing, it was me and Robert's doings and I just listened to him. Question, Mr. Tosi: Did he threaten you in any direct way; say he was going to burn down Woody's house or ribs up there or anything like that? Witness, answer: No. He justhe told me to think about it because he would do something to me if I was to do something to him. And that was it. R. 160-12, trial tr. vol. XI, pp. 100-01. Henderson contends these two statements are testimonial in nature and that their admission, without opportunity for cross-examination, was in violation of his right of confrontation. The district court admitted the statements under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(6), finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Henderson was responsible for Bass's and Washington's absence. R. 160-12, trial tr. vol. XI, pp. 2-7. Citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), Henderson argues the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine does not provide an exception to the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation. Indeed, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant have an opportunity to confront the witnesses who give testimony against him, except in cases where an exception to that right was recognized at the time of the nation's founding. Unless such an exception applies, a testimonial statement made by an absent witness is admissible only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In Giles, the Court observed that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was, at common law, not intended to permit introduction of unconfronted hearsay statements unless there was clear proof that the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the declarant's testimony by procuring his or her unavailability. Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2683-84. Because the doctrine had not been invokedeither at the time of the nation's founding or in American jurisprudence prior to 1985to obtain admission of murder victims' unconfronted statements absent a showing of such an intent to preemptively silence, the Giles Court refused to read the exception so broadly today. Hence, because Bass and Washington could not have been killed, in 1996 and 1998, respectively, to prevent them from testifying against him in the bank robbery prosecution in 1981, and because there is no evidence that Bass and Washington were killed to prevent them from testifying against him in relation to any other offense, Henderson argues the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine has no application in this case. Indeed, there is no evidence that Henderson engaged in conduct designed to prevent Bass and Washington from testifying against him. In the wake of the Giles ruling, the district court's reliance on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is seen to have been misplaced. Yet, the government contends the error does not necessarily undermine the validity of Henderson's conviction because (a) Bass's statement was not testimonial, and (b) admission of Washington's statement was harmless error. The court of appeals generally reviews all evidentiary rulingsincluding constitutional challenges to evidentiary rulingsunder the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 564 (6th Cir.2003). Evidentiary rulings relating to violations of the Confrontation Clause, however, are reviewed de novo. United States v. McGee, 529 F.3d 691, 697 (6th Cir.2008). Further, violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless error analysis. Id. Errors are deemed harmless when the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). If the court finds that the error is harmless, an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside. Id.
Even though the district court may have improperly relied on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to admit Bass's statement, and even though Henderson never had a chance to cross-examine Bass, the government contends that admission of the statement does not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment because Bass's statement is not testimonial hearsay. Indeed, Bass's offer to provide information to the FBI was introduced not to show that he provided truthful information regarding the location of the weapon and vehicle used in the bank robbery, but to show that he made the offer to assist authorities. Whether or not Bass actually possessed and provided the information he claimed to have was irrelevant to the inquiry whether Henderson retaliated against Bass for giving information to the authorities. However, the fact that Bass made such an offer to the FBI tends to show that Bass cooperated with the government in the bank robbery prosecution, thus bringing his murder within the purview of retaliation under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B). Consequently, Bass's offer to provide information to the FBI was admissible over Henderson's Confrontation Clause objection because it was not testimonial hearsay offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted, but was introduced only to establish the verbal act. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (The [Confrontation] Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.); United States v. Childs, 539 F.3d 552, 559 (6th Cir.2008) (finding statement admissible non-hearsay as it was relevant to show that the declaration was made, not the truth of the declaration); United States v. Goosby, 523 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir.2008) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation where declarant did not make statements that would be characterized as testimonial hearsay). Furthermore, the fact that the district court incorrectly relied on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine in admitting Bass's statement, as opposed to the non-hearsay rationale, is of no consequence. A decision below must be affirmed if correct for any reason, including a reason not considered by the lower court. Childs, 539 F.3d at 559 (quoting Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214, 216 (6th Cir.1985)). It follows that the district court's decision to admit Bass's statement into evidence was not reversible error.
The government acknowledges that, to the extent Washington's proffer included her account of what Henderson said to her, it should not have been admitted because it included testimonial hearsay offered to show Henderson's retaliatory animus. However, the government maintains the error was harmless, because Washington's statement that Henderson said he would do something to me if I was to do something to him was not central to the government's case and was cumulative of other more direct evidence of Henderson's retaliatory motivation. As indicated above, violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless error analysis. McGee, 529 F.3d at 697. In this context, an error may be deemed harmless if the record contains substantial evidence apart from the improperly admitted evidence so that there is no reasonable probability that the admission made a difference to the jury's verdict. See Doan v. Carter, 548 F.3d 449, 459 (6th Cir.2008); United States v. Driver, 535 F.3d 424, 428 (6th Cir.2008); McGee, 529 F.3d at 698-99. Here, to be sure, there was sufficient evidence apart from Washington's statement establishing retaliatory animus and supporting the jury's verdict. Specifically, the government points to a letter from Henderson to Washington while they were in jail awaiting trial in the bank robbery case. The letter was admitted into evidence without objection. It warned Washington not to cooperate with the police or you'll also be shortening your own life considerably. Gov't App'x p. 4, ex. 1H. This letter represents even stronger evidence of Henderson's retaliatory animus. Its admission into evidence rendered Washington's inadmissible proffer statement cumulative. In addition, multiple witnesses testified that Henderson admitted committing the murder. Ronald Beauford is a step-brother of one of Henderson's sons. He looked up to Henderson as a father figure. He testified in trial that on the day Washington was killed, Henderson told him to watch the eleven o'clock news. Seeing the report of Washington's death, he asked Henderson if that's what Henderson wanted him to see. Henderson responded, Yeah, that's how I handle business. R. 160-10, trial tr. vol. IX, p. 34. The next day Henderson explained to Beauford that he had to stalk Washington to make sure he caught her at the right time; that she had told on him for robbing a bank; that snitches deserved to die. Id. at 37-39. An inmate known as General Smith, with whom Henderson was jailed in 2001, testified that Henderson [t]alked about how his codefendants actually told on him on his bank robbery and he had killed them. R. 160-10, trial tr. vol. IX, p. 111. A second inmate, Michael Williams, testified about a similar admission made by Henderson years later. Henderson explained to Williams that real killers carry revolvers ... because the shells go with you. Id. at 177. Later, FBI Special Agent Tim Creedon testified that Henderson had purchased a .38 caliber revolver, a Smith & Wesson Model 10, in 1998 under an assumed name. Mark Hardy, a criminalist, had testified that the bullets recovered from Washington's body were .38 caliber and could have been fired by a Smith & Wesson Model 10. It thus appears that Washington's improperly admitted proffer statement was not central to the prosecution; it was merely cumulative of other evidence establishing Henderson's retaliatory motive for killing Washington. Considering the substantial evidence establishing that Henderson murdered Washington because she cooperated with the prosecution in the bank robbery case, we hold the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. McGee, 529 F.3d at 697 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431). In sum, because Bass's statement was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted and was not, therefore, testimonial hearsay; and because the admission of Washington's statement constituted harmless error, the district court's reliance on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine to admit both statements, though erroneous, does not warrant appellate relief.