Opinion ID: 2222296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction Given Sua Sponte

Text: Mitchell argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the limited purpose of exhibits 14, 15, 16 and 17. Mitchell asserts that this was error because the instruction was given sua sponte, and because the instruction was confusing and contradictory. Exhibits 14, 15, 16 and 17 were not included in the record on appeal. While failing to include exhibits may waive an issue, here it does not. Mitchell does not contest the substantive issue of whether these exhibits are hearsay. Mitchell's claim of error focuses on whether the trial court may give this instruction on these exhibits sua sponte. This issue does not demand an examination of the exhibits. The instruction at issue informed the jury that these exhibits, police investigatory files and grand jury testimony, should not be considered as proof of any of the facts contained in the exhibits. The court instructed the jury that the exhibits could be deemed as proof only of the defendant's possession of the items. Mitchell relies on the legal principle that when no limiting instruction is tendered, and the trial court gives none, the evidence received by the jury may be considered for all purposes, citing Grove v. State (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 1122. That principle, though, provides only partial guidance concerning a trial court's decision to give sua sponte a limiting instruction on hearsay exhibits. The full answer is provided by Hudgins v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 1087. Action taken sua sponte does not automatically constitute advocacy by the court. A court is not required to allow improper procedures regardless of the absence of objections. Id. at 1090. We find that it was appropriate for the court to act sua sponte.