Opinion ID: 1795142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Alleged Violation of Appellant's Constitutional Rights

Text: Appellant's contention concerning violation of his constitutional rights has several prongs. First, he contends that he did not sign a waiver of rights until after he had already made an oral statement to Bob Salmons in the presence of the police officers, and that the prosecution failed to show that the statement made to Salmons was made pursuant to a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and of the right to counsel. In advancing this argument, appellant seeks to brush aside important evidence going to show that appellant did knowingly and voluntarily waive these rights. From the very first moment that the police officers met with appellant, they attempted to read a Miranda warning to him, but were interrupted in doing so by appellant himself. Furthermore, at that first meeting, appellant insisted that a tape recorder not be used, and that request was immediately honored. Still further, when requested to give a statement, appellant evidenced a knowledge of his right to be silent because he refused to make a statement and indicated that he would consider doing so only if he were removed from the hospital premises. When the officers returned later that evening to take appellant from the hospital, they then again took out the Miranda card and did at that time complete a reading of the Miranda warning. Immediately after that, appellant took the initiative in asking for his friend, Bob Salmons, and when Salmons arrived appellant proceeded to loosen the flood gates of his memory without any urging from anyone. The trial court could fairly deduce from this sequence of events that appellant fully appreciated his constitutional rights to be silent, that he effectively used those rights as a lever to get himself removed from the hospital premises and to obtain the presence of his trusted friend, and that he then intelligently and understandingly decided to use his rights no further, but rather to make a clean breast of all the facts. State v. Alewine, 474 S.W.2d 848 (Mo.1971). Appellant also complains that he asked for permission to contact a lawyer but that a hospital staff member refused to allow him to do so. This contention rests solely upon the testimony of appellant himself and is inconsistent with his declination to take advantage of later offers to permit him to consult with counsel if he desired to do so. It was well within the authority of the trial court to refuse to credit the testimony in question by the appellant. Finally, appellant argues that when appellant declined to give a statement when first so requested at the hospital, that was an indication that he did not want to be questioned at all and the interrogation should then have ceased completely. The facts are not quite so simple. Appellant did not flatly refuse to answer questions, but rather he said that he would not do so at least until he was removed from the hospital premises. Once he was removed from the premises, his statement poured out voluntarily without even the necessity of the prod of questioning. The authorities cited by appellant with respect to this point are readily distinguishable. The judgment is affirmed. MORGAN, HOLMAN, HENLEY and FINCH, JJ., concur. BARDGETT, J., concurs in separate concurring opinion filed. SEILER, C. J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed. BARDGETT, Judge (concurring). I concur in the principal opinion and desire to state my reasons for so doing. State v. Ayers, 470 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. banc 1971) was decided before this case was tried. The instant case was tried in May 1973 and was on a charge of murder in the first degree. The court gave a conventional first-degree-murder instruction but did not give a conventional second-degree-murder instruction nor a manslaughter instruction. Appellant complains of the refusal to give a manslaughter instruction. In State v. Johnson, 505 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1974), the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree under a conventional first-degree-murder instruction. The case was based upon circumstantial evidence. On appeal the defendant complained of the failure of the court to give a conventional murder second-degree instruction. The point was sustained and the case reversed and remanded for new trial but in so doing the opinion said that, This is not a case in which, under the evidence, the accused is guilty of murder in the first degree or is entitled to be acquitted. See, for example, State v. Crow, 486 S.W.2d 248 (Mo.1972); State v. Terry, 472 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. banc 1971). Thus, it is seen by State v. Johnson, supra , that at the time the instant case was tried, it was still the view of this court that it was not error to fail to instruct on murder second in direct-evidence cases if the case was of the Crow or Terry type. State v. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. banc 1975), was a circumstantial-evidence second-degree-murder case in which the court did instruct on manslaughter. This court affirmed citing, inter alia, State v. Johnson, supra . Stapleton also discussed the role provocation plays in second-degree-murder cases and held that there need not be evidence of provocation in order to support an instruction on manslaughter. In my opinion, Johnson and Stapleton stand for the proposition that in circumstantial-evidence-murder cases the trial court must submit on the lesser conventional homicide instructions. In State v. Clough, 327 Mo. 700, 38 S.W.2d 36 (1931), State v. Smith, 445 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.1969), State v. Hubbard, 484 S.W.2d 224 (Mo.1972), State v. Jackson, 496 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1973), and State v. Patterson, 484 S.W.2d 278 (Mo.1972), the court decided the issue of whether it was error to refuse to give a manslaughter instruction in a second-degree-murder prosecution by considering whether there was evidence of a sudden unexpected assault, encounter, or provocation tending to excite the passion beyond control. In my opinion, Stapleton held that the lack of evidence of provocation does not warrant a refusal to give a manslaughter instruction and to that extent inferentially overruled holdings to the contrary in earlier cases and, therefore, I do not agree that Clough controls the issue of the manslaughter instruction in the instant case. State v. Stapleton, supra, at 299. In my opinion, the decision in the instant case is controlled by State v. Johnson, supra . Johnson described the factual situation in which the court was required to give a lesser homicide instruction (murder in the second degree) and the situation described therein was a circumstantial-evidence case. Stapleton followed Johnson and was also a circumstantial-evidence case. The instant case is a direct-evidence case and is not specifically included within the holdings of Johnson or Stapleton . I also do not believe the court should generally give retroactive effect to changes in the MAI-CR instructions and specifically would not do so here. To adopt a policy of giving retroactive effect to changes in instructions would seriously impede meritorious advancements in the procedural law of this state because of the predictable concern over invalidating convictions which were supported by the evidence, as this one is, under proper submission as of the time the case was tried. I, therefore, concur.