Opinion ID: 204313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Case Law Employing the Identical or Nearly Identical Standard

Text: After Playboy Enterprises, we again employed the identical or nearly identical formulation in Thane International, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.2002). In Thane, we grappled with the issue whether Thane's use of OrbiTrek diluted Trek's trademarked name. In considering the Identity of the Marks, the court gave a more thorough explanation for its adoption of the identical or nearly identical standard: We begin from the recently-established requirement that for a dilution claim to succeed, the mark used by the alleged diluter must be identical, or nearly identical, to the protected mark. Playboy Enterprises, 279 F.3d at 805. Such a requirement comports with the statutory language, the four-part dilution test derived from that language outlined in Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir.1998) and Avery Dennison [ Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.1999)],[ [4] ] and with the statute's legislative history and purposes. The statute establishes that the junior user, to be liable for dilution, must use a mark or trade name . . . after the mark has become famous. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). As articulated in Panavision and Avery Dennison, the test for dilution similarly provides that to make out an antidilution cause of action, a plaintiff must show that  its mark is famous and the defendant is making commercial use of the mark in commerce. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 874 (emphasis added); see Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324; see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir.2002) (`Dilution' refers to the `whittling away of the value of a trademark' when it's used to identify different products.) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). These locutions indicate that the defendant must use essentially the same mark, not just a similar one. Id. at 905 (emphasis in first paragraph added). Thus, Thane tied the requirement for identity or near identity to the language of the then-governing FTDA and to the tests that we had developed in interpreting the FTDA. In adopting this standard, we also were persuaded by the legislative history of the FTDA and by the McCarthy treatise's explanation of the nature of a dilution claim. The legislative history, although not definitive on the issue, suggest[ed] that the marks must be identical or close thereto. Id. Specifically, the Senate Report had given the following examples of dilution: Kodak being used for pianos and Buick being used for aspirin. Id. at 906 (citing S.Rep. No. 100-515, at 7 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5583). Furthermore, referencing the McCarthy treatise, we observed that a dilution claim alleges a form of appropriation. Id. We continued: Appropriation implies the adoption of the mark itself, not the use of a similar mark. As discussed previously, infringement is designed to protect against consumer confusion about the source of a product that may arise, inter alia, because a company uses a similar mark. Dilution, on the other hand, protects the distinctiveness of a particular mark whether or not the products compete or consumer confusion exists. § 1127. Because dilution and likelihood of confusion tests are directed at different actions, it does not make sense to import the relatively subjective similarity of the marks test from the likelihood of confusion context into the dilution context. See 4 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 24:90.2 (4th ed.2001). Id. Finally, we observed, other courts similarly had adopted an identical or nearly identical requirement. Indeed, Playboy Enterprises had borrowed this standard from the Eighth Circuit's decision in Luigino's, and other circuits had employed equally stringent standards for similarity. Thus, although the identical or nearly identical standard had its roots in pre-FTDA state dilution law, we determined in Thane that our adoption of the standard was rooted in the language of the FTDA, the legislative history and purpose of that statute, our prior interpretations of the FTDA, and the policies we believed were embodied in that statute.