Opinion ID: 1895057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant David K. Osman

Text: The facts in the Osman case are similar to those in Clappes. Like Clappes, Osman was involved in a single-car crash which occurred in Waupaca county. In the early morning hours of April 27, 1982, Waupaca county sheriff's department officer James R. Kneisler responded to a report of an accident. When he arrived at the scene of the accident, emergency medical personnel were already administering medical care to Rickie Kempf, who later died, and the defendant, David K. Osman (Osman). Both had been thrown from the car as a result of the collision. Officer Kneisler first approached Kempf, who appeared unresponsive and very seriously injured. Officer Kneisler then approached Osman and identified himself as an officer. While Osman was receiving medical attention, the officer asked him if anyone else had been in the car at the time of the crash. Osman replied that only he and Kempf had been in the car. Kneisler then asked Osman who had been driving the vehicle. Osman answered, I was driving the vehicle. No Miranda warnings were given. This was the extent of the questioning of Osman, which lasted no more than two minutes. After completing the questioning, officer Kneisler proceeded to clear the accident debris and to examine the accident scene for evidence which might aid in completion of the accident report. Officer Kneisler stated that the sole purpose of the questioning was to determine if there were any other occupants of the car who might have needed medical attention and also to ascertain who had been driving the vehicle at the time it crashed. This information was required in order to complete the accident report. He stated that at the time he was questioning Osman, he had no reason to believe that any crime had been committed. Officer Kneisler testified that, during the questioning, Osman was experiencing great physical pain but that he appeared to be rational. He testified that [Osman] had no problem understanding my questions and I had no problem understanding his responses. After completing his on-the-scene investigation, the officer went to the hospital where Osman had been moved and asked him whether he had any recollection of the circumstances of the collision. Osman responded that he did not. It was during this conversation that Kneisler first detected a very distinct odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from Osman. Kneisler issued a citation to Osman for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, and a blood sample was drawn. The blood analysis revealed that Osman's blood alcohol content by weight was 0.172 per cent. A criminal complaint was filed against Osman in May, 1982, charging him with homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle under sec. 940.09, Stats. At the motion to suppress hearing, which was held in November, 1982, the court received the testimony of Dr. Robert Peterson, who had treated Osman at the hospital immediately following his removal from the scene of the crash. Peterson stated that during his examination, the defendant was experiencing great pain and at one point lapsed into unconsciousness. However, the doctor testified that while conscious, Osman was coherent and able to answer some questions about the accident and about the pain he was experiencing. Nevertheless, Dr. Peterson testified that he was of the opinion that, based on the nature of Osman's injuries combined with his elevated blood alcohol level, the defendant would have difficulty answering questions with some reliability. In addition, he based his opinion on the fact that Osman had said during his medical examination that he could not move his leg when requested to do so, yet by the time the doctor finished the evaluation, the defendant was moving his leg. The doctor surmised that Osman's inability to move his leg was based on his inability to respond to the doctor's directive, not to any actual injury to the leg. The defendant testified that he had no recollection of the circumstances of the accident, the questioning by officer Kneisler, or of receiving emergency medical treatment at the crash site or at the hospital. In addition, he testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he did not drive the vehicle on the night of the crash. Separate suppression hearings were held, and, in each case, the motion to suppress the statements was granted. In the Clappes case, Judge Fleishauer stated that although the police did not engage in abusive tactics or improper questioning, Clappes' admissions nevertheless were involuntary because of the intoxication, great physical pain, and because of the circumstances surrounding the questioning. In the trial court's oral decision granting Clappes' motion to suppress, Judge Fleishauer stated that the circumstances were fraught with a certain type of pressure and that being primarily the medical condition of the defendant and the attempts to revive him, interspersed with attempts to interrogate him. This statement suggests that the trial court believed that the circumstances provided the requisite pressure or coercive atmosphere. Similarly, Judge Wiese ruled that Osman's statements, though also not procured via overtly improper or coercive means, were involuntary due to his physical and mental condition at the time the admissions were made, combined with the circumstances of the interrogation. Judge Wiese, in his oral suppression order, stated that, I think there is doubt that [defendant] knew what he was saying; and, therefore, it's reasonable to suppress it because it would be improper; and I base it on the defendant's own statement, the doctor's statement, the officer's statement, and the circumstances under which it was taken. After these cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the respective orders of the trial courts. In affirming the orders, the court found that the admissions were properly suppressed because they were not proved to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. In so holding, the appeals court stated that the motivating force behind an involuntary statement can be pain as well as the apprehension associated with that physical pain. It reasoned that individuals who are experiencing great physical pain, accompanied by emotional stress and/or intoxication, may reasonably conclude that the elimination of their pain may be dependent upon their cooperation with law enforcement officers seeking to question them. In other words, an individual may respond to police questioning based on the mere appearance of the police officer's power to control the availability of medical care. Because [f]ear of one's future and control by authority is a powerful inducement to cooperation with the authority, and because of the great pain the defendants were experiencing during the questioning, the court of appeals found that the only allowable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the admissions were involuntary. This subjective flight of fantasy by the court of appeals should have been grounded by the application of common sense. The appeals court saw no inconsistency between its holding and those cases which have ruled that some police coercion is required in order to justify a finding of involuntariness (e.g., Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453-54 (1971), State v. Hunt, 53 Wis. 2d 734, 740, 193 N.W.2d 858 (1972)). Although the court recognized that the police officers did not employ any physical or overbearing conduct when questioning the defendants, it found that the use by police of existing circumstances may be the equivalent of overt and forceful pressure or coercion. Thus, the court reasoned that the mere presence of police, their appearance of authority to terminate the provision of medical care, combined with the perilous surrounding circumstances which threaten the life of a helpless individual, may impermissibly pressure the individual to make a statement against his or her will. Finally, in its decision, the appeals court stated that it did not regard its holding as a blanket prohibition against police questioning of individuals while they are receiving medical treatment. Rather, because [m]inor injuries would not create circumstances which undermine the voluntariness of a statement, police may, in those cases where only minor injuries are involved, freely proceed with questioning. Because the phrase minor injuries escapes uniform definition, however, the court concluded that a case-by-case inquiry would be necessary to determine voluntariness in any given instance. Before turning to the case law on the admissibility of evidence obtained during police questioning, a discussion of the applicable standard of review is appropriate. The parties are in dispute on this issue. Both the state and defendant Osman characterize voluntariness as an ultimate constitutional fact, thereby warranting independent judicial review. Clappes, however, proposes a more deferential approach, arguing that voluntariness is purely a factual issue and, as such, the court should not upset the findings of the trial court unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. We find that a different standard of review applies to the findings of the trial court, depending upon how those facts are properly characterized. The standard of review by an appellate court of the trial court's findings of evidentiary or historical fact is that those findings will not be disturbed unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984). Therefore, disputes as to the factual circumstances surrounding the admission must be resolved in favor of the trial court. Norwood v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 343, 364, 246 N.W.2d 801 (1976), Hunt, 53 Wis. 2d at 740, State v. Verhasselt, 83 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 266 N.W.2d 342 (1978). However, questions of fact involving the application of federal constitutional principles to the facts as found must be independently reviewed by the appellate court. State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 305-06, 124 N.W.2d 47, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964), Miller v. Fenton, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S. Ct. 445, 450 (1985). As such, this court may independently review the facts in these cases to determine whether any constitutional principles have been offended. We now turn to the rules set out by the courts of this state regarding the admissibility of statements made by a defendant to police officers. In determining whether a confession was voluntarily made, the essential inquiry is whether the confession was procured via coercive means or whether it was the product of improper pressures exercised by the police. Barrera v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 269, 291, 298 N.W.2d 820 (1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 972 (1981), Grennier v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 204, 211, 234 N.W.2d 316 (1975). The presence or absence of actual coercion or improper police practices is the focus of the inquiry because it is determinative on the issue of whether the inculpatory statement was the product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice. Norwood, 74 Wis. 2d at 364. In examining whether a confession was rationally and deliberately made, it is important to determine that the defendant was not the victim of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on him by representatives of the state exceed[ed] the defendant's ability to resist. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d at 308. This determination is made, in turn, by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession. The ultimate determination of whether a confession is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances standard requires the court to balance the personal characteristics of the defendant against the pressures imposed upon him by police in order to induce him to respond to the questioning. Grennier, 70 Wis. 2d at 210. The relevant personal characteristics of the confessor include his age, his education and intelligence, his physical and emotional condition, and his prior experience with the police. These factors must be balanced against the police pressures and tactics which have been used to induce the admission, such as the length of the interrogation, any delay in arraignment, the general conditions under which the confessions took place, any excessive physical or psychological pressure brought to bear on the declarant, any inducements, threats, methods or strategies utilized by the police to compel a response, and whether the individual was informed of his right to counsel and right against self-incrimination. Barrera, 99 Wis. 2d at 291-92; Norwood, 74 Wis. 2d at 365; Grennier, 70 Wis. 2d at 210-11; Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d at 308-09; Brown v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 581, 586-88, 219 N.W.2d 373 (1974). Both Clappes and Osman concede that some coercion or pressure by the police is a necessary component of an ultimate finding of involuntariness. However, both defendants contend that, given the circumstances surrounding the questioning, only a minimal amount of pressure is required in order to reach a finding of involuntariness, and that the minimum standard has been satisfied here. Specifically, Clappes argues that the combination of factors surrounding the questioninghis poor physical condition at the time, including his intoxication, the use by officers of leading questions to elicit a response, and the questions being asked in an admittedly louder than normal voiceshould necessarily compel the court to find that the statements were not voluntarily obtained. Osman similarly argues that his physical and mental condition at the accident scene were such that any questioning of the defendant by the police at that point in time was equivalent to overt and forceful pressure or coercion. Thus, both defendants are essentially arguing that, even absent any improper coercion or practices by the police at all, the police may nevertheless be precluded from questioning individuals when they are suffering from significant mental or physical trauma that could arguably prevent them from rationally responding to police questioning. This rendition of the law results in a per se prohibition against questioning injured defendants after they are involved in accidents. We decline to adopt such a sweeping interpretation of the concept of involuntariness. While coercive police activity may arguably take subtle forms, it is stretching the concept of coercion beyond reasonable limits to conclude that the police conduct here was improper in any way. Merely asking an injured and intoxicated defendant questions for a brief period of timein both cases here, the questioning did not exceed two or three minutes in lengthis not the type of improper police activity that constitutes an impermissible, coercive police tactic. As noted by the state in its brief, both defendants were able to respond to the police questioning, and their responses were intelligible to the police who were questioning them. The questioning officers testified that both Clappes and Osman appeared to be coherent, though both were concededly in great pain. The questioning was brief and in both cases was terminated as soon as the police were able to identify the accident victims and the drivers of the cars involved in the respective accidents. No threats or promises or attempts at physical or mental coercion were made. Nor were the respective officers guilty of utilizing overbearing inquisitorial techniques. Grennier, 70 Wis. 2d at 211. It is conceded that while in the emergency room, Sergeant Morey stood over Clappes and questioned him in a voice louder than normal. It is also conceded that Sergeant Morey had to repeat several questions twice in order to elicit a response. But Morey testified that he addressed Clappes in a louder than normal tone of voice in order to ensure that Clappes could hear the questions. Clappes did not offer the testimony of any witness who might have contradicted this statement, although half a dozen hospital personnel were in the emergency room at the time. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the questioning officers' conduct was improper. Their questioning employed none of the police tactics and stratagems which would be inherently coercive, such as questioning a defendant for excessively long periods of time without breaks for food or rest, Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d at 309, Hunt, 53 Wis. 2d at 741; threatening a defendant, with physical violence or otherwise, or making him promises in exchange for his cooperation, Norwood, 74 Wis. 2d at 365, Pontow v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 135, 138, 205 N.W.2d 775 (1973); or engaging relays of interrogators to question a defendant relentlessly or conducting questioning so as to control and coerce the mind of the defendant, Phillips v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 521, 530, 139 N.W.2d 41 (1966). This court refuses to abandon the rule that in order to justify a finding of involuntariness, there must be some affirmative evidence of improper police practices deliberately used to procure a confession. Our holding is not inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances analysis laid down by this court in previous cases. While a defendant's personal characteristics are relevant, they only become determinative in the voluntariness analysis when there is something against which to balance them. The totality of the circumstances analysis requires a balancing of the personal characteristics of the defendant against the coercive or improper pressures brought to bear on him during the questioning. However, the police employed no inherently coercive tactics. Therefore, because there is no support for the proposition in Wisconsin that the amount of pressure or coerciveness required can decrease to none, a defendant's personal characteristics, while certainly relevant to our analysis, are simply not dispositive of the issue of voluntariness. If the police had employed improper or coercive tactics, our holding might be different. However, under the facts of these cases, and employing the totality of the circumstances analysis, there simply is no foundation for reaching a finding of involuntariness. Our holding that the mere existence of pain and/or intoxication is insufficient to render a statement involuntary enjoys significant support in other jurisdictions (e.g., Burwell v. Teets, 245 F.2d 154, 160-61 (9th Cir. 1957), holding that absent a showing that the defendant did not understand the questions or his responses, the court would not regard his statement as involuntary, despite the fact that he was sorely wounded, weak and exhausted, id. at 161; Dolan v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 277, 281 (Ky. 1971), rejecting defendant's claims that his mental distress, combined with the fact that he was under the influence of sedatives during the questioning, rendered him unable to make a voluntary statement, since he was not wildly irrational or unaware of what he was saying or doing; State v. Williford, 275 N.C. 575, 580, 169 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1969), finding that the confessor's adverse and painful physical condition is of little consequence unless it is so significant as to completely destroy voluntariness or the defendant's understanding of the questions; and Johnson v. Hall, 605 F.2d 577, 582 (1st Cir. 1979), ruling that the mere presence of a physical injury was inconclusive, absent physical or verbal threats on the part of the police). Most significantly, we find that a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Colorado v. Connelly,  U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986), directly supports our holding today. Connelly properly focused on the crucial element of police overreaching in deciding that a murder confession could not be involuntary simply because it was arguably motivated solely by defendant's mental condition. [4] 107 S. Ct. at 520, 522. The court held that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 107 S. Ct. at 522. Thus, this case, like Connelly, is easily distinguishable from the decision of the court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where the court did find that statements made by a defendant while receiving medical care for a serious wound were involuntary. However, the defendant in that case unambiguously articulated his wish to be left alone and at two points during the interrogation stated that he wanted to see his attorney. Nevertheless, the questioning officer pressed on until the defendant succumbed to the questioning. Under these circumstances, distinguishable from the facts here, the court found that the defendant was rendered unable to escape or resist the thrust of [the] interrogation. Id. at 399. Proof of physical pain and/or intoxication should not affect the admissibility of the evidence where there is no proof that the confessor was irrational, unable to understand the questions or his responses, otherwise incapable of giving a voluntary response, or reluctant to answer the questions posed by the authorities. Where no such proof has been offered, as in the case here, the physical pain or intoxication of the accused is only a factor that the jury may consider in weighing the evidence. People v. Rhodes, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1010, 457 N.E.2d 1300, 1307 (1983), State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 91, 115 A.2d 62, 78 (1955), Williford, 275 N.C. at 579-80, 169 S.E.2d at 855. Wisconsin is in accord, holding that objections to the admissibility of inculpatory statements based on intoxication largely affect the trustworthiness and credibility of the statements, rather than their admissibility. Verhasselt, 83 Wis. 2d at 659. The real problem with the rule articulated by the appeals court and proposed by the defendants, however, is that its potential adoption by this court could effectively result in the establishment of a per se rule of involuntariness (and inadmissibility) whenever an officer questions a defendant who is suffering from serious pain and undergoing medical treatment at the time the questioning takes place. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Cronan v. Mancusi, 444 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1003 (1971), expressed this concern as well in a similar case. The court there rejected the defendant's argument that, as a matter of law, his mental and physical condition rendered his confession involuntary. In rejecting this argument, the second circuit stated that [t]o accept that proposition would be equivalent to a holding that a wound, such as [defendant] suffered, per se renders the victim incapable of exercising reason. This hypothesis is contrary to common sense and unsupported by cases or other authorities known to us. Id. at 54. [5] The problem with the analysis of the court of appeals and defendants' attorneys is aptly illustrated by the court's discussion in State v. Parker, 55 Wis. 2d 131, 197 N.W.2d 742 (1972). Parker involved the question of whether a confession obtained from a defendant was involuntarily procured and, therefore, inadmissible. At the time the inculpatory statements were made, the defendant was bleeding from a gunshot wound and was doubled over in what appeared to be great pain while en route to a hospital in an ambulance. Police testified that they believed that defendant was suffering from a serious injury, and statements made by the defendant in the ambulance show that he, too, believed that the wound was serious, if not life-threatening. Id. at 136. As it later developed, the defendant had only sustained a minor puncture, rather than a serious wound. The Parker court held that defendant's statement was voluntary and, therefore, admissible because the motivation for the defendant's statementhis fear of deathcame from his own appraisal of his situation and not from any external source [such as police coercion or other improper police practices]. Id. at 140. The court further stated, as did the court in Cronan, that adopting the defendant's argument for inadmissibility would lead to the inevitable conclusion that as a matter of law, a confession made by one who thought his death imminent, although subject to no coercion, could not constitute a voluntary statement implicating him in the commission of crime. Id. The court refused to adopt that conclusion in Parker, and we similarly refuse to adopt it now. For the same reasons that we reject the contention that the sole existence of pain provides an aura of coercion sufficient to find the statements involuntary, we also have grave doubts about the applicability here of the appeals court's hypothesis of coercion. The appeals court surmised that each defendant's physical suffering could have caused him to make a statement against his will because he subjectively believed that prompt medical treatment was dependent upon the law enforcement officers' questioning him. The problem with both theories, as shown by the Parker case, is that they rely on the confessor's subjective perceptions of the situation, not on any improper external pressures brought to bear by the police. We find the absence of actual coercion to be dispositive in this case. See, Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. Both the court of appeals in its opinion and the attorneys for Clappes and Osman state that under their proposed analysis, police would not in fact be totally precluded from questioning an injured defendant. They argue instead that police could continue to question injured defendants when they are suffering from only minor injuries. There are numerous problems with instituting a rule which creates a distinction between serious injuries and merely minor ones. The essential problem with the serious injury/minor injury distinction is that it is, for all practical purposes, highly unworkable. Who is to make the ultimate determination that an individual is suffering from only a minor injury? Is it, as the Parker case stated, to be left to the individual defendant's own appraisal of his or her mental or physical state? Or is the determination to be made by police? If so, what makes them qualified to diagnose one injury as serious and another as merely minor? Furthermore, what is the definition of a minor injury? An individual may experience excruciating pain but only suffer from a superficial injury. The converse may also be true. The court of appeal has adopted, and on appeal defense counsel have proposed, a rule that is simply unworkable in its day-to-day application. As such, we refuse to adopt this dichotomy and continue to adhere to the general rule that involuntariness is not to be measured solely by the presence or absence of pain, whether minor or major, but rather should depend upon the presence or absence of actual coercive, improper police practices designed to overcome the resistance of a defendant. Since we find that the officers in these cases employed no inherently coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the statements at issue, we hold that the appeals court erred in affirming the trial court's suppression orders. By the Court.  The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the causes are remanded to the respective circuit courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.