Opinion ID: 6350547
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Heading: The Indiana Statute

Text: Having clarified the proper analysis, we turn to the Indiana Statute. The INA defines “aggravated felony” to include “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). This immigration statute reaches felony convictions under the federal Controlled Substances Act or a state statute “only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 188 (2013) (citation omitted). We therefore apply the conduct-based method of the categorical approach and look to see if the Indiana Statute covers substances not prohibited under federal law. See Ruth, 966 F.3d at 646–47 (citation omitted) (applying the conduct-based method to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)’s sentencing enhancement and comparing the definitions of cocaine under Illinois and federal law). Under federal law, methamphetamine is a Schedule II or III controlled substance that includes “its salts, isomers, and salt of isomers.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812, Schedule II(c), Schedule III(a)(3). Under federal law, “isomer” of methamphetamine only refers to “the optical isomer.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(14). 8 No. 21-1201 The Indiana Statute provides that someone commits a felony when they “knowingly or intentionally deliver[] … methamphetamine, pure or adulterated.” Ind. Code § 34-48-4- 1.1(a)(1)(A). The government states—and Aguirre-Zuniga does not contest—that delivery of a controlled substance in Indiana is analogous to trafficking under federal law. Schedule II of the Indiana Code criminalizes “[m]ethamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers.” Ind. Code § 34-48-2-6(d)(2). The Indiana legislature did not define “isomer” at the time of Aguirre-Zuniga’s conviction. The sole question for this Court, therefore, is whether, at the time of Aguirre-Zuniga’s conviction, the definition of “methamphetamine” was broader under the Indiana Statute than federal law. We analyzed an Indiana statute like the one at issue here in De La Torre. The defendant there was convicted of dealing methamphetamine under § 35-48-4-2. After looking to the definition of methamphetamine in Schedule II, we held that the statute was overbroad “[b]ecause the federal definition of methamphetamine includes only its optical isomers whereas the Indiana definition includes something more than just optical isomers of methamphetamine.” 940 F.3d at 951. Aguirre-Zuniga argues that De La Torre directly applies to his case, but that is not so easily done. First, the statute in De La Torre (§ 35-48-4-2) is not the one at issue here (§ 35-48-4- 1.1). It is not a foregone conclusion that De La Torre controls. But second and more importantly, the Indiana legislature amended its criminal code in 2006 to specifically carve out methamphetamine crimes. Originally, methamphetaminedealing crimes fell under § 35-48-4-1, which criminalized the delivery of “cocaine, or a narcotic drug, or methamphetNo. 21-1201 9 amine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule I or II.” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2000). The Indiana legislature later excised methamphetamine from this statute and criminalized it under a new statute—the present Indiana Statute. See Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 151-2006, §§ 22–23 (July 1, 2006). Notably absent from the new statute is the phrase “classified in schedule I or II [of the Indiana Code],” which was present in the De La Torre statute. See 940 F.3d at 950–51 (quoting Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2(a) (2000)). Aguirre-Zuniga argues that we should nonetheless refer to Schedule II again since that is the only place in the Indiana Code that defines “methamphetamine.” Once we do so, Aguirre-Zuniga asks us to take note that the Indiana Code’s use of the term “isomer” for methamphetamine in Schedule II included optical and positional isomers at the time of his conviction, while the federal statute covers only optical isomers. Courts should read statutory provisions in the context of surroundings provisions. Util. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne, 868 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2007); see Mellouli, 575 U.S. at 809 (citation omitted) (“Statutes should be interpreted ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.’”). As noted above, the only definition in the Indiana Code regarding methamphetamine appears in Schedule II, and at the time of AguirreZuniga’s conviction, there was no reference to Schedule II and therefore no applicable definition of “isomer.” The plain language of a statute is “the best evidence” of the legislature’s intent. De La Torre, 940 F.3d at 951 (citations omitted). An “isomer” is a substance that is “[c]omposed of the same elements in the same proportions, and having the same molecular weight, but forming different substances, with different properties (owing to the different grouping or 10 No. 21-1201 arrangement of the constituent atoms).” See “Isomer” and “Isomeric,” Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford Univ. Press (2d ed. 1989), https://www.oed.com/oed2/00121969. Methamphetamine has optical and positional isomers, and methamphetamine itself exists in two isomeric forms, l-methamphetamine and d-methamphetamine, which themselves can be combined into a potential third iteration known as a “racemic mixture,” dl-methamphetamine. 3 With other drugs, the Indiana legislature criminalized only certain types of isomers in Schedule I and other parts of Schedule II. See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 35-48-2-4(d)(31) (covering Schedule I THC), 35-48-2-6(d)(1) (covering amphetamine). The definition of methamphetamine in Schedule II, however, does not have a similar limitation on the types of isomers. Because the Indiana legislature chose to limit the types of isomers defining other drugs but did not do so with methamphetamine, we must read the schedules to define methamphetamine as including at least optical and positional isomers. See De La Torre, 940 F.3d at 951 (citation omitted) (“It is a general rule of statutory construction that ‘when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and 3 Jane Carlisle Maxwell & Mary-Lynn Brecht, Methamphetamine: Here We Go Again?, 36 Addictive Behaviors 1168, 1169 (2011); Douglas A. Morris, Methamphetamine: Types, Forms, Effects, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 32 The Champion 20, 21 (2009); Nat’l Ctr. for Biotechnology Info., “PubChem Compound Summary for CID 10836, Methamphetamine,” PubChem, https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Methamphetamine; see also United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 88–89 (3d Cir. 1994), superseded by regulation, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, amend. 518, as recognized in United States v. DeJulius, 121 F.3d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1997). No. 21-1201 11 different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended.’”). Moreover, as of July 1, 2020, the Indiana Code now defines “isomer” for methamphetamine as “an optical isomer.” Ind. Code § 35-48-1-17.4(a). But at the time of Aguirre-Zuniga’s conviction, that definition did not exist. By narrowing the definition of “isomer” with this new provision, the Indiana legislature recognized that the term was broader before 2020. Cf. McCammon v. Ind. Dept. of Fin. Inst., 973 F.2d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing K. v. G., 426 N.E.2d 129, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) and Van Orman v. State, 416 N.E.2d 1301, 1305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)) (noting that Indiana recognizes the “rule of statutory construction that the amendment of a statute, absent clear intent to the contrary, raises the presumption that the legislature intended to change the law.”). The government, on the other hand, sees the Indiana legislature’s omission of the language referencing the schedules in 2006 as critical to its position. Without this language, the government argues, the Indiana Statute is merely silent as to what isomers, if any, it criminalizes. In the government’s view, because the Indiana Statute does not include an explicit reference to the schedules, the statute does not cover any isomers, so the statute is not broader than federal law. The government’s view, however, begs the question: How does Indiana law define “methamphetamine”? The government’s brief is mum on the issue. And, when asked at oral argument, the government responded that “meth means meth.” But that recursive logic does not comport with the chemistry. Methamphetamine itself is comprised of two optical isomers. If the Indiana Statute does not cover any isomers, it arguably would not reach methamphetamine itself. Such a 12 No. 21-1201 view would render the Indiana Statute impotent—a criminal statute that criminalizes nothing. The government’s position would have us drive the Indiana Statute into a no man’s land. We decline to do so. The definition of methamphetamine from Schedule II proscribes the scope of the Indiana Statute.