Opinion ID: 1652032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to provide an incorrect definition of malice aforethought to the jury during closing argument.

Text: ¶ 16. During the defendant's closing argument, District Attorney Bilbo Mitchell objected to the defense attorney's comment that Carter had no time to develop malice aforethought and stated to the court, It doesn't take any time at all to form malice aforethought. And the Supreme Court has ruled that. Later, Assistant District Attorney Greg Malta argued the following: [M]alice aforethought is the legal term for the intent to kill. That's all it is. It is the intent to kill. And you can formulate the intent to kill as quickly as you can think. So it doesn't take any time to develop malice aforethought, so it's not a good argument for you to consider. ¶ 17. On appeal, Carter asserts that the trial judge should have clarified the State's definition of malice aforethought for the jury, because it was a clear misstatement of the law. The State's position is that the trial court cannot be held in error on this issue, because Carter never raised the matter at trial. Carter failed to object to either of these comments during closing argument or to request an instruction from the court for the jury to disregard the comments. As a result, she is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal. Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452, 454 (Miss.1997). ¶ 18. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, the district attorney's comments during closing argument were not necessarily a misstatement of the law. Although this Court has held that malice aforethought, or deliberate design, may not be formed at the instant of the murder, it may be formed very quickly. Strong v. State, 600 So.2d 199, 202 (Miss.1992); Tran v. State, 681 So.2d 514, 516 (Miss.1996). The prosecutor's comments that it takes no time at all to form malice aforethought could be taken as meaning simply that the intent may be formed swiftly. Furthermore, we have held that in a case where the manslaughter instruction was not warranted by the evidence, no reversible error occurred by granting an at the moment deliberate design instruction. Catchings v. State, 684 So.2d 591, 595 (Miss. 1996). The real problem with the at the moment deliberate design instruction is that it rules out manslaughter, and is in hopeless conflict with the manslaughter conviction. Id. ( quoting Windham v. State, 520 So.2d 123, 126 (Miss.1987)). Where, as here, the evidence did not support a finding of manslaughter, an erroneous at the moment deliberate design/malice aforethought instruction does not amount to reversible error. We hold that the trial court's failure to clarify the definition of malice aforethought did not amount to manifest injustice and therefore does not require reversal. Dedeaux v. State, 630 So.2d 30, 33 (Miss.1993).