Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Give Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof Instructions

Text: Defendant contends that the California death penalty statute is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution inasmuch as it fails to provide the jury with instructions on the burden of proof and standard of proof for finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination. We have repeatedly rejected such an argument. Unlike the determination of guilt, `the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual' [citation] and thus `not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.' ( People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 81, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) We have therefore rejected arguments that the imposition of a reasonable doubt standard on the jury's finding of aggravating factors, or the finding that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh mitigating ones, is constitutionally required. ( Id. at pp. 80-81, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) For much the same reason, we have concluded that neither the prosecution nor the defense has the burden of proof during the penalty phase. ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 890, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) We decline to revisit these decisions. Nor do we agree with defendant that, in the absence of a specific instruction, the jury is likely to believe that it is bound by the reasonable doubt instruction given during the guilt phase in deciding whether evidence can count in defendant's favor as mitigating. On the contrary, because the trial court instructed specifically that the reasonable doubt standard applied (partially erroneously) to aggravating factors, and mentioned nothing about mitigating factors, the reasonable juror would infer that no such reasonable doubt standard applied to mitigating factors. Defendant further contends that as a matter of statutory construction section 190.3 should be interpreted as implicitly incorporating Evidence Code section 115, which provides in part: Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant also claims that section 190.3 should also be read to include Evidence Code section 500, which states that [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting. These two provisions, he argues, place the burden on the prosecution to prove aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase. There is no reason to believe that section 190.3 was intended to incorporate Evidence Code section 115. Indeed, the final paragraph of section 190.3 makes clear the sui generis nature of the jury's penalty phase determination: After having heard and received all the evidence, and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Because section 190.3 describes a process of sentencing determination that is basically incompatible with burden of proof quantification (see People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 81, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129), it is most reasonable to infer that section 190.3 either is simply outside the scope of Evidence Code section 115, which was not intended to apply to such sentencing matters, or else fits within the latter statute's otherwise provided by law exception. The same would be the case with the relationship between section 190.3 and Evidence Code section 500.