Opinion ID: 1801687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Negligence Liability for the Officers' Preshooting Conduct.

Text: As noted above, although applying collateral estoppel to the issue of the officers' alleged negligence in using deadly force, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs could pursue a negligence claim on the theory that [the officers'] conduct leading up to the shooting, including the high-speed pursuit, foot chase, and release of a pursuit dog created an unreasonable risk of harm to themselves and Hernandez. It reasoned that neither the jury's special verdict nor the trial court's [posttrial] finding [regarding Sanchez] addressed the question whether the officers were negligent in creating a situation in which it was reasonable for them to use deadly force. Plaintiffs agree with the Court of Appeal, arguing (1) evidence that the officers acted negligently in their conduct leading up to the shooting was not relevant to the determination in the federal proceeding that the shooting was reasonable, and (2) the officers' alleged preshooting negligence was not adjudicated in the federal proceedings. Defendants, of course, argue otherwise; they contend that, because the federal court and jury applied a totality-of-circumstances test, their findings that the use of deadly force was reasonable necessarily included the officers' preshooting conduct. In other words, defendants claim, the federal court and jury found that the officers acted reasonably from the initial contact with Hernandez through the ultimate use of deadly force. Defendants also argue that, under California statutes and case law, there is no separate negligence-type duty arising from tactical decisions leading up to the use of force and a peace officer's objectively reasonable use of force is a bar to tort liability. Based on the record, we cannot agree with defendants' claim that the federal court and jury made a finding as to the reasonableness of all of the officers' preshooting conduct. Although the federal court broadly instructed the jury to consider the totality of the circumstancesand thus, the jury necessarily considered the evidence regarding the officers' preshooting conductthe court also instructed that plaintiffs' claim involved deadly force and that [t]he use of deadly force is only justified when a reasonable law enforcement officer would reasonably believe that there was an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others at the time the force was used. Based on this instruction, the jury's finding that the officers (other than Sanchez) did not violate Hernandez's Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force implies no more than a finding that the shooting itself was reasonable because, under the circumstances, the officers reasonably believed Hernandez presented an immediate threat to either their own or someone else's safety. Likewise, in granting Sanchez's posttrial motion, the federal court found only that his use of deadly force was reasonable because he had an objectively reasonable belief Hernandez posed a threat of serious harm. Thus, as the Court of Appeal correctly held, neither the jury nor the federal court made a finding as to whether all of the officers preshooting conduct was itself independently reasonable, i.e., not negligent. [12] (5) Nevertheless, we agree with defendants that, in light of the finding that the shooting was reasonable, liability in this case may not be based on the officers' alleged preshooting negligence. The starting point for our conclusion is the validity of the initial detention. Based on the conceded fact that the Thunderbird was being illegally operated at night without lights (Veh. Code, §§ 280, 24250, 24400), Officer Cooper was legally justified in attempting to detain both of the car's occupants and asking them to exit the car. (See Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 819 [135 L.Ed.2d 89, 116 S.Ct. 1769] [car stop is reasonable where officers have probable cause to believe driver violated the vehicle code]; People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 892 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528] [officer making a traffic stop may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, order the driver and passengers to exit a car].) When Hernandez, in response to Cooper's request that he exit the car, moved into the driver's seat and drove off with the headlights unilluminated, Cooper had reasonable cause to believe Hernandez had committed two public offenses: (1) driving during darkness without lighted headlamps (Veh. Code, §§ 280, 24250, 24400); and (2) willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Allen (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985-987 [167 Cal.Rptr. 502]). (6) Because Cooper had probable cause to arrest Hernandez, under both statutes and case law, Cooper was not obliged simply to let Hernandez go. Long ago, we explained that an officer with probable cause to make an arrest `is not bound to put off the arrest until a more favorable time' and is `under no obligation to retire in order to avoid a conflict.' ( People v. Hardwick (1928) 204 Cal. 582, 587 [269 P. 427] ( Hardwick ).) Instead, an officer may `press forward and make the arrest, using all the force [reasonably] necessary to accomplish that purpose.' ( Id. at p. 588; see also Hooper v. City of Chula Vista (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 442, 453 [260 Cal.Rptr. 495] [police officer has a duty to the community to carry out his or her obligation to promote law-abiding, orderly conduct, including, where necessary, to detain and arrest suspected perpetrators of offenses].) Consistent with these principles, Penal Code section 835a provides that a peace officer with reasonable cause to make an arrest may use reasonable force to effect the arrest and need not retreat or desist from his efforts [to make an arrest] by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested. Thus, California law expressly authorized Cooper to pursue Hernandez and to use reasonable force to make an arrest. Indeed, in their brief, plaintiffs concede that they may not base negligence liability on the officers' decision to engage in the pursuit. [13] They argue, however, that they may base liability on the officer's subsequent execution of their decision, i.e., the actual  operation  of the pursuit, including the use of high-speed automobile maneuvering. (7) However, on the conceded facts here, California law provides otherwise. Under Vehicle Code section 17004, the individual officers may not be held civilly liable for Hernandez's death based on the manner in which they operated their vehicles during the chase, even assuming they acted without due care. [14] (See Cruz v. Briseno (2000) 22 Cal.4th 568, 572-573 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 715, 994 P.2d 986].) (8) Under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b), because the individual officers are immune, Pomona, as their employer, is also immune unless some statute provides otherwise. [15] In Brummett v. County of Sacramento (1978) 21 Cal.3d 880, 883-886 [148 Cal.Rptr. 361, 582 P.2d 952], we held that, with respect to police vehicular chases, an exception to the general rule of a public employer's derivative immunity exists under Vehicle Code section 17001, which provides: A public entity is liable for death or injury to person . . . proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity acting within the scope of his employment. However, as a matter of law, this section is inapplicable on the conceded facts here, because Hernandez's death was not caused by a negligent or wrongful act in the operation of [a] motor vehicle ( ibid. ) as we have construed that phrase. To meet this statutory requirement, it is not sufficient that a motor vehicle somehow be involved in the series of events that results in the injury. ( Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 923 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, 911 P.2d 496].) Instead, the vehicle must be in a `state of being at work' or `in the . . . exercise of some specific function' by performing work or producing effects at the time and place the injury is inflicted.  ( Chilcote v. San Bernardino County (1933) 218 Cal. 444, 445 [23 P.2d 748], italics added [construing predecessor of Veh. Code, § 17001, Civ. Code, former § 1714 1/2].) As a matter of law, that statutory requirement has not been met in the case now before us, because the conceded facts are that the shooting occurred well after the police stopped and exited their cars and chased Hernandez on foot. Accordingly, neither the individual officers nor Pomona may be held civilly liable for Hernandez's death based on the manner in which the officers conducted the vehicular pursuit. Insofar as plaintiffs rely on the officers' conduct during the foot pursuit, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that, notwithstanding the findings in federal court, they can amend their complaint to state a negligence claim. [16] During oral argument, in explaining the basis for the preshooting negligence claim, plaintiffs' counsel placed primary emphasis on the following circumstances: (1) Cooper, without seeing a weapon, screamed that Hernandez had a gun and told Sanchez to shoot Hernandez; and (2) according to one witness, Hernandez raised up his shirt to expose his waistline and yelled to Cooper that he was unarmed. However, the federal jury's verdict in Cooper's favor collaterally estops plaintiffs from pursuing this theory of negligence. The jurors who returned that verdict knew of these circumstances and nevertheless necessarily found (given the jury instructions) that, in light of the facts known to Cooper, his belief that Hernandez posed an immediate threat to safety was reasonable. Given this finding, plaintiffs are estopped from premising negligence liability on the theory that Cooper's belief was unreasonable. Nor may plaintiffs base negligence liability on the preshooting acts they identify in their brief: chasing [Hernandez] into a darkened parking lot and the use and release of a vicious dog. Regarding the former, it was, of course, Hernandez, as part of his illegal flight from the officers, who chose where to run; the officers merely followed his chosen path of attempted escape. As we have already explained, the officers were not obliged simply to let Hernandez go; they were authorized to press forward in an attempt to make an arrest, using reasonably necessary force. ( Hardwick, supra, 204 Cal. at p. 587; Pen. Code, § 835a.) Plaintiffs therefore may not premise negligence liability on the fact that the officers followed Hernandez as he ran into a darkened parking lot. (9) Regarding the use and release of a police dog, given the conceded facts here, we find no basis for negligence liability as a matter of law. Those conceded facts are that Officer Luna, in the K-9 unit, participated in the vehicle pursuit as Hernandez led the officers on the high-speed chase, and released the dog during the subsequent foot pursuit only in response to Cooper's report that Hernandez had brandished a firearm. In other words, when Luna released the dog, he had personal knowledge that Hernandez was determined to escape, he had personal knowledge that Hernandez was willing to endanger his own life and the lives of the officers and the public in order to achieve this end, and he had reason to believe that Hernandez was threatening the officers with a firearm. On these conceded facts, no reasonable juror could find that Luna acted unreasonably in releasing the dog. (Cf. People v. Rivera (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1007-1008 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 785] ( Rivera ) [release and use of police dog reasonable where officer knew suspect was fleeing and, based on report that suspect was armed, reasonably feared for his safety].) Therefore, as a matter of law, Luna was not negligent in releasing the dog. [17] (Cf. Gray v. Brinkerhoff (1953) 41 Cal.2d 180, 183 [258 P.2d 834] [question of defendant's negligence may be determined as a matter of law where reasonable jurors can draw but one conclusion from the evidence presented].) Thus, on the conceded facts here, we find no basis for a preshooting negligence claim. [18]