Opinion ID: 2544661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: issues

Text: On March 4, 1991, after both parties had presented evidence at the penalty phase, the trial court orally instructed the jury regarding the penalty determination. The court told the jurors that these instructions would be made available to them in written form for their deliberations, and it cautioned them regarding the proper use and consideration of written instructions. The jury began its deliberations immediately after receiving the oral instructions. The appellate record contains a note signed by the jury foreperson and dated March 4, 1991, requesting the jury instructions. The clerk's minutes for that date do not mention the note. The reporter's transcript does not record any discussion of the note by the court or counsel, but the clerk's transcript includes a packet of written jury instructions with a cover sheet stating Instructions given and delivered to jury during deliberations. The cover sheet has a file stamp with a date of March 11, 1991, the day on which the jury returned its penalty verdict. Based on these facts, defendant contends that the trial court violated his statutory and constitutional rights to have his trial counsel told of the jury's request for written instructions. We disagree. Because the trial court during its oral instructions had already announced its intention to give the jury written copies of the penalty instructions, the trial court did not violate any statutory or constitutional right of defendant's when it responded to the jury's note by sending the jury the written instructions without further notice to counsel. Defense counsel had an opportunity to object to the procedure, to review the written copies of the instructions, or to make any suggestions concerning the jury's consideration of the instructions. From the record's silence, we infer that counsel had no objection to the proposed procedure. The jury retired to deliberate at 3:28 p.m. on March 4, 1991, and before the daily recess at 4:50 p.m. on that day the jury foreperson sent a note asking for the written instructions. We infer from the record that the packet of instructions was then given to the jurors, as reflected by the notation on the cover sheet. Defendant relies primarily on People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981, 146 Cal.Rptr. 129, but that case is distinguishable because there the trial court provided the jury with written copies of all instructions without informing trial counsel or permitting any response. Here, by contrast, trial counsel received notice and had an opportunity to respond.
When it denied the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict of death, the trial court explained the reasons for its ruling with reference to the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors listed in section 190.3. After reciting section 190.3, factor (h) (Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication), the trial court said this: The defendant at most had mild brain damage and some drinks. None of this affects in any way the cold, calculated stabbing of Henry Michael Pedersen in the back. [¶] Moving the body to the bathtub and turning the pillow over to conceal the blood. While in the house, the defendant selected several pieces of jewelry and items of value, and calmly walked away from the home of Michael Pedersen. [¶] The court personally and independently concludes this to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, and is an aggravating factor. Defendant contends that, because section 190.3, factor (h) may only be mitigating ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 944, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277), the trial court erred in finding it to be an aggravating factor in this case. Although susceptible to the interpretation proposed by defendant, the trial court's remarks are not entirely free from ambiguity, and it is possible that what the trial court found to be aggravating was the circumstances of the crime (section 190.3, factor (a)) rather than the absence of mental impairment (section 190.3, factor (h)). In any event, even if we assume the trial court erred in the manner defendant suggests, defendant was not prejudiced by that error. We do not agree with defendant that on the evidence presented here the trial court was required to find that section 190.3, factor (h), had substantial mitigating value. The evidence was at best conflicting, and the trial court could reasonably conclude that whatever impairment defendant suffered, as a result of brain injury or intoxication, in his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, was relatively slight and insignificant. Defendant's attempt to hide the bloodstains by turning over the couch cushions and carrying the body to the bathtub indicate an appreciation that the killing was wrongful. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 990, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) The trial court properly found that the circumstances of the crime, defendant's prior felony convictions, his prior violent acts, and his age were all aggravating factors. (§ 190.3, factors (a)-(c) & (i).) Because there were these four substantial aggravating factors, and the mitigating evidence was relatively insubstantial by comparison, we conclude that the trial court's error, if any, was nonprejudicial. (See People v. Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 718, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.)
Defendant contends that various features of California's capital sentencing scheme violate the federal Constitution. As defendant acknowledges, we have previously rejected all but one of these challenges. Thus, we have held: The special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed ( People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1136, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450); section 190.3, factor (a), permitting the jury to consider the circumstances of the capital crime as an aggravating factor, is not unconstitutionally vague or imprecise ( People v. Kipp, supra, at p. 1137, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450); written jury findings or unanimity as to aggravating circumstances is not constitutionally required ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 741, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248); intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required ( ibid.); the prosecution need not prove aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt ( People v. Kipp, supra, at p. 1137, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450); the jury need not find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment ( ibid.); the jury need not be instructed that the prosecution has the burden of proof or that there is a presumption for life ( ibid.); the jury may consider prior unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b) ( People v. Kipp, supra, at p. 1138, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450); jury consideration of a defendant's prior felony convictions under section 190.3, factor (c), does not constitute double jeopardy or violate fundamental fairness ( People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 659-661, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392); and the qualifiers extreme, substantial, and reasonably in section 190.3, factors (d), (g), and (f), do not prevent jury consideration of relevant mitigating evidence ( People v. Kipp, supra, at p. 1138, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 1054-1055, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 842, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481). We are not persuaded that we should reconsider our previous rulings on these issues. Defendant makes one apparently novel claim, which is that our law is invalid because at the penalty phase the defendant may not reopen the issue of his guilt of the capital charges and may present evidence of his innocence only in support of a lingering doubt argument. He suggests that the evidence he presented during the penalty phase here might have caused the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt that robbery was the motive for his killing of Pedersen, rather than anger at a sexual advance by Pedersen or some other idiosyncratic motive. Defendant does not argue, however, that he was precluded from presenting any evidence of his innocence at the guilt phase, nor does he offer authority precluding a death penalty scheme in which the issues of guilt and penalty are determined at separate phases of the trial. We are not persuaded that our law is invalid merely because it does not permit full relitigation of innocence at the penalty phase.