Opinion ID: 1057653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Limits on Warrantless, Suspicionless Searches of Parolees

Text: Samson generated a dissent which expressed concerns about a regime of suspicionless searches, conducted pursuant to a blanket grant of discretion untethered by any procedural safeguards, by law enforcement personnel who have no special interest in the welfare of the parolee or probationer. Samson, 547 U.S. at 857, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority responded by observing that [t]he concern that California's suspicionless search system gives officers unbridled discretion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms that arouse strong resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to reintegrate into productive society, is belied by California's prohibition on `arbitrary, capricious or harassing' searches. Samson, 547 U.S. at 856, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (citing People v. Reyes, 19 Cal.4th 743, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445, 450, 451 (1998); People v. Bravo, 43 Cal.3d 600, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336, 342 (1987); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3067(d) (West 2000)). While the terms arbitrary, capricious, and harassing are not easily defined, the California Supreme Court considers (1) that a parole search could become constitutionally `unreasonable' if made too often, or at an unreasonable hour, or if unreasonably prolonged or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the searching officer, Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 451 (quoting People v. Clower, 16 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1741, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 38 (1993)); (2) that it is arbitrary and capricious when the motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by personal animosity toward the parolee, id. (citing In re Anthony S., 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1004, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 214 (1992)); and (3) that an unrestricted search of a probationer or parolee by law enforcement officers at their whim or caprice is a form of harassment, id. (citing People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1062, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1973)). See also People v. Smith, 172 Cal.App.4th 1354, 92 Cal. Rptr.3d 106, 112 (2009) (recognizing that [w]hether a [parole] search is arbitrary, capricious, or harassing turns on its purpose); McCullough, 6 P.3d at 782 (observing that examples of an abusive search include searches conducted at an unreasonable hour, searches that are unreasonably prolonged, or frequent and repeated searches that are intended only to harass). A suspicionless search of a parolee would also be constitutionally suspect if the law enforcement officer conducted it without knowing that the person searched was a parolee subject to warrantless and suspicionless searches. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 856 n. 5, 126 S.Ct. 2193. While we agree that these are appropriate factors to consider when reviewing whether a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional, we also recognize that a suspicionless search could be characterized as arbitrary. See Black's Law Dictionary 112 (8th ed. 2004) (1. Depending on individual discretion....). A search of this type is not necessarily unreasonable, however. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances surrounding a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee must be examined to determine whether the search is constitutionally unreasonable. For example, a pattern of repetitive searches while the parolee is at work or asleep would be unreasonable. Searches intended to cause the parolee some harm would be unreasonable. A search conducted out of personal animosity would be unreasonable. Indeed, there may be other situations where a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee is unreasonable. A suspicionless search of a parolee subject to a warrantless search condition, and which is conducted out of valid law enforcement concerns, is not unreasonable. [11]