Opinion ID: 2634847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the exemptions in section 76-10-915 are affirmative defenses

Text: ¶ 47 We further reverse the district court in regard to its requirement that the Summit Water appellants amend their pleadings to assert specifically that the anticompetitive activities alleged were not authorized or directed by state law. The structure of the Utah Antitrust Act, together with federal antitrust caselaw, make clear that the exemptions in Utah Code section 76-10-915(1)(f) are to be pleaded by a defendant as an affirmative defense. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) (In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... any ... matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.). Section 76-10-915 states that other provisions of the Antitrust Act must not be construed to prohibit the activities that it lists, including the activities of a municipality to the extent authorized or directed by state law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-915(1)(f). The County appellees argue that this language distinguishes the antitrust exemptions from a proper affirmative defense because in the case of the exemptions, [t]he cause of action never arises in the first instance. We do not agree that there is a meaningful distinction in that regard between the exemptions listed in section 76-10-915 and other affirmative defenses. There is no legitimate cause of action against an individual who kills another in self-defense, for example, but a murder defendant is nevertheless required to assert self-defense as an affirmative defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (2003); State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981). ¶ 48 The line of federal Supreme Court cases since City of Lafayette indicates that the municipality exemption is regarded as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1344 (indicating that the municipality exemption was asserted by the defendants in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); id. at 372, 111 S.Ct. 1344 (referring to the doctrine at issue as the Parker [ v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943)] defense). Moreover, as the County appellees concede, the burden is on the municipality to demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy to displace competition. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 40, 105 S.Ct. 1713. It would make little logical sense to require plaintiffs to specifically plead a matter in the negative that the defendants would then be required to prove to the contrary in order to prevail against the plaintiffs on that ground.