Opinion ID: 372467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Field v. Brown

Text: 10 Appellant Field, who retired from the Navy in August, 1968, began working in December 1973 for Metro Machine Corporation, a company based in Norfolk, Virginia that is primarily engaged in repairing Navy ships. Field served as the point of contact for contractual matters and inquiries by the Navy. In that capacity he received Navy job orders, responded to Navy inquiries regarding the performance of contracts, prepared price quotations and presented them to the negotiating agent for the Navy, and signed formal Navy bids, proposals, and job orders. 11 On September 11, 1974, at his employer's request, Field wrote to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy (JAGN) for advice concerning his compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 281, the statute that proscribes retired regular officers from representing persons in the sale of materials to the government under certain circumstances. The Judge Advocate General's Office responded on October 1 that Field's case was being turned over to other authorities for investigation with a view to resolving the possible penal and civil liabilities, if any, which you may have incurred as a result of your employment. The letter also advised appellant Field that further communication with the JAGN office presumably would not be in your best interests at this time. 12 On October 29, 1974 the Navy directly contacted Metro Machine by letter, advising it that Navy personnel would not be permitted to discuss sales matters with Field. Field's employer thereafter excused him from job assignments involving the Navy. 13 Two days later, on October 31, 1974, Field filed a complaint alleging that § 281 was fatally vague, constituted a bill of attainder, had been effectively repealed by other recent legislation, and unconstitutionally restricted his purported property right to earn a livelihood. He also maintained that Directive 5500.7 and DD Form 1357 violated his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831, by confronting him with the choice of filing the form and risking the use of its contents against him in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 281, or not filing it and risking a court-martial under 10 U.S.C. § 892 for failing to comply with a military regulation. Field later moved to amend his complaint to include claims that § 281 is unconstitutionally discriminatory because it proscribes the activities of retired regular officers, but not those of retired reservists, and that DD Form 1357 violated the Privacy Act. 14 In an order dated April 7, 1976, the District Court granted appellees' motion to dismiss Field's allegations that 18 U.S.C. § 281 constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of the alleged right to freely choose and earn one's living. The Court at the same time rejected Field's argument that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates between regular and reserve officers and that the statute is impermissibly vague. 5 Later, however, the Court ruled in favor of appellant by finding that DD Form 1357 asked for information that would force Field to incriminate himself under 18 U.S.C. § 281. The Court accordingly enjoined the Navy from demanding Field's compliance with the form to the extent that it requires (Field) to submit information concerning his private employment which may tend to incriminate him . . . . See Order of August 26, 1976. 15 Shortly thereafter, on September 9, 1976, Field requested the District Court to amend its August 26 Order to hold that DD Form 1357 violated the Privacy Act. The Government never responded to Field's motion and on November 12 the Court treated it as conceded. 6 16 On January 1, 1977, the Defense Department published a new DD Form 1357 providing for Privacy Act disclosure and an explanation of possible consequences of a failure to complete the form. 7 On September 28, 1977, Field moved the Court to require appellees to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. He contended that DOD Directive 5500.7 and the new DD Form 1357 continued to violate the Court's orders of August 26 and November 12, 1976. The District Court denied the motion explaining that it fail(ed) to state any ground for the contempt order (Field) seeks. Field has appealed from this ruling, and from the District Court's April 7, 1976 Memorandum and Order, which dismissed his claims that § 281 unconstitutionally interfered with his purported right to earn a livelihood and discriminated between regulars and reserves.