Opinion ID: 4150139
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The error affected Vazquez-Hernandez’s

Text: substantial rights The lack of a jury instruction regarding freedom from official restraint affected Vazquez-Hernandez’s substantial rights. An error affects substantial rights if there is “a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010). In determining the likelihood that an erroneous instruction affected the outcome of a trial, “[w]e review the jury instructions as a whole, not only the erroneous instructions. We may also examine the arguments made by the parties.” United States v. Garrido, 713 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Moreover, where a jury instruction permits a conviction on either of two alternative theories, one of which is later found to be unconstitutional, the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable probability that the jury convicted the defendant on the invalid theory. Id. Here, the government advanced two theories of guilt at summation. The district court’s instructions permitted the jury to convict Vazquez-Hernandez on either of those theories. Specifically, the government argued that the jury could convict Vazquez-Hernandez if it found that “he had the purpose of illegally reentering the United States, whether it was to make a little money from his window washing business or to scout for traffickers or flee north in the southbound lanes.” Thus, the prosecution indicated that either entry into the pre-inspection area with the intent to wash windows and then return to Mexico, or entry with the intent to move into the United States past the points of UNITED STATES V. VAZQUEZ-HERNANDEZ 13 inspection, would constitute an “entry” within the meaning of the intent element of the crime. Our case law clearly does not support the first of those theories. First, the official restraint doctrine was intended to safeguard the presence of uninspected immigrants in precisely the type of area in to which Vazquez-Hernandez entered and where he remained. The freedom from official restraint requirement addresses the practical concern that failing to require such a finding would lead to the criminalization of individuals who arrive at a port of entry but have not yet had an opportunity to apply for inspection. See Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d at 1160 (“[T]he official restraint doctrine is a practical necessity . . . . We doubt that Congress intended to make criminals out of persons who, for any number of reasons, approach immigration officials at the border.”); United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197 (3rd Cir. 1954) (explaining that because “in a literal and physical sense a person coming from abroad enters the United States whenever he reaches land, water or air space within the territorial limits of this nation,” “freedom from official restraint must be added to physical presence before entry is accomplished”) (cited with approval in Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d at 1160). The pre-inspection area at the Mariposa port of entry thus serves this function of allowing uninspected foreign nationals to assemble to accomplish a lawful entry. Second, an alien is not free from official restraint when he is in an area that is subject to constant government surveillance. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d at 1165; United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute on other grounds, P.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, as stated in United States v. GonzalezTorres, 309 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Continuous 14 UNITED STATES V. VAZQUEZ-HERNANDEZ surveillance by immigration authorities can be sufficient to place an alien under official restraint” for the purposes of applying the definition of entry to the crime of illegally bringing an alien into the United States). Here, the government’s witnesses testified that the pre-inspection area was subject to surveillance by hundreds of cameras, with small blind spots, and was surrounded on all sides either by walls or law enforcement agents. The only time that Vazquez-Hernandez was not under direct camera surveillance was when Border Patrol Agents Erfert and Thomas were approaching him, with knowledge of his location. Such a minor gap in surveillance is not sufficient to break an officer’s “continuous observation” necessary to establish official restraint. United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 309 F.3d 594, 599 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that where Border Patrol agent observed a defendant from the moment he crossed the border, knew the trail on which the defendant and others were walking, and only lost sight of him “for a number of seconds,” the defendant was under constant surveillance and therefore not free from official restraint). Moreover, Vazquez-Hernandez’s attempt to evade arrest by running from the agents is not sufficient to deem him free from official restraint, because he was either subject to camera surveillance or within the officer’s sight, or both, at the time he ran. See Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d at 1163– 65 (finding no freedom from official restraint, and thus no entry under § 1326, when alien was subject to surveillance from the moment he crossed the border, even though he immediately ran away from an agent and “gave chase” rather than surrender to arrest). Finally, the touchstone to determining whether a defendant is free from official restraint is whether the defendant was free to “go at large and at will within the UNITED STATES V. VAZQUEZ-HERNANDEZ 15 United States.” Id. at 1164 (quoting Ex parte Chow Chok, 151 F. 627, 630 (N.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 163 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1908)); see Gonzalez-Torres, 309 F.3d at 598. There is no doubt in this case that Vazquez-Hernandez was not free to travel at will beyond the points of inspection. The area was largely walled off from U.S. territory not subject to such surveillance and monitored by Border Patrol agents who attempted to stop individuals from proceeding into the United States without inspection. Therefore, given this evidence on the conditions of the pre-inspection area, no rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Vazquez-Hernandez was free from official restraint in this area, or that he intended to be by entering it. Accordingly, the jury could not properly have sustained a conviction on this theory if it had been adequately instructed. As we explain later, see pp. 18–20, the evidence that Vazquez-Hernandez intended to flee northward rather than stay in the pre-inspection area was exceedingly weak. Also, the jury’s question to the judge indicated that its focus was on the first prosecution theory, concerning defendant’s simple presence in the pre-inspection area. If the jury was focusing on the second theory, that the defendant intended to jump the fence and run north across the border, it would not have asked about intent to stay in the United States. It is therefore reasonably likely that the jury found that VazquezHernandez only intended to enter the pre-inspection area, and, in reaching its verdict, relied on the alternative theory advanced by the prosecution and permitted by the inadequate jury instruction that Vazquez-Hernandez could be convicted with this more limited intent. In fact, the evidence did not establish that by intending to enter the pre-inspection area, Vazquez-Hernandez intended to enter free from official restraint, as would be required to convict him on that theory. Accordingly, there is a reasonable probability the erroneous 16 UNITED STATES V. VAZQUEZ-HERNANDEZ instruction, which permitted the jury to rely on a theory it should have discarded, impacted the outcome of the trial. Thus, the error affected Vazquez-Hernandez’s substantial rights.