Opinion ID: 2606343
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Phifer firebombing

Text: Because the trial court deferred to the first judge's cursory ruling regarding the Phifer arson, there is nothing in the record indicating the specific basis on which it was admitted. We therefore consider each of the state's proffered non-character purposes. See State v. Sardo, 112 Ariz. 509, 515, 543 P.2d 1138, 1144 (1975) (evidentiary determinations should be affirmed if legally correct on any ground). To establish identity based on other acts, `the modus operandi of and the circumstances surrounding the two crimes must be sufficiently similar' as to be like a signature. State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 27, 918 P.2d 1038, 1045, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 527, 136 L.Ed.2d 413 (1996) (citations omitted). We have trouble accepting the state's claim of striking similarities between the strangulation murder and the molotov cocktail arson. At best, there are only two likenessesboth victims were women who had angered defendant and David Lankisch may have been paid to commit the crimes. We do not agree that these are sufficient to identify defendant as an accomplice to murder. Cf. State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 290, 670 P.2d 383, 395 (1983)(striking similarities existed where both victims had stayed at hotels, were similarly hog-tied and gagged, and had personal effects and vehicles stolen). The assertion that the firebombing was part of a common scheme or plan is equally meritless. For purposes of establishing this 404(b) exception, the other act evidence must establish a particular plan of which the charged crime is a part. State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102, 106-07, 927 P.2d 762, 766-67 (1996). Mere similarity does not, by itself, prove that the conduct was part of a common scheme or plan. Id. at 107, 927 P.2d at 767. The state contends that defendant's pattern of striking back at those who angered him and his use of juveniles to commit crimes demonstrate a distinct strategy. The argument, however, is merely another way of saying that defendant acted in conformity with his prior bad acts, the very essence of what Rule 404(b) forbids. The common scheme or plan exception requires something more than mere criminal tendencies. See Morris K. Udall et al., Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 84, at 185-86 (3rd ed. 1991) ([T]he distinction [for 404(b) purposes] is between proving a specific plan embracing the charged crime and proving a general commitment to criminality. . . .); State v. Ramirez Enriquez, 153 Ariz. 431, 432-33, 737 P.2d 407, 408-09 (App.1987). Other than defendant's propensity for violence, there simply is no evidence tying these acts together as part of some over-arching criminal scheme. Cf. State v. Grainge, 186 Ariz. 55, 58, 918 P.2d 1073, 1076 (App.1996) (in prosecution for sexual offenses involving two minors, evidence of furnishing marijuana to one of them admissible as part of defendant's plan to seduce the victim). Likewise, we cannot accept the state's contention that the Phifer firebombing, as well as the Nelson car arson, show defendant's intent. Where, as here, the accused denies any involvement in the charged offense, the intent exception of 404(b) is not a proper basis for injecting prior misconduct into a proceeding. Ives, 187 Ariz. at 110, 927 P.2d at 770 (Unless there is some discernible issue as to defendant's intent (beyond the fact that the crime charged requires specific intent), the state may not introduce evidence of prior bad acts as part of some generalized need to prove intent in every case.). These acts were unrelated, isolated instances. See State v. Woody, 173 Ariz. 561, 563, 845 P.2d 487, 489 (App.1993) (Evidence of a prior crime, act, or wrong cannot be introduced to prove a defendant's mental state unless it is similar to the act for which the defendant is on trial.). Finally, the state asserts that the apartment firebombing was relevant to show defendant's control over Lankisch. We agree. In his jailhouse statement to Salerno, defendant said he gave two juveniles cocaine to commit the murder. Evidence that Lankisch had previously worked for defendant tended to identify him as one of those juveniles. Relevancy notwithstanding, however, the admitted evidence went far beyond that necessary to establish the relationship between Lankisch and defendant. Because most of the witnesses discussed the Phifer arson in the context of defendant's retaliatory character, there is a substantial risk that the jury considered this evidence for an improper purpose. See Rule 403, Ariz.R.Evid.; State v. Salazar, 181 Ariz. 87, 92, 887 P.2d 617, 622 (App.1994).