Opinion ID: 2977179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: intentional infliction of emotion distress

Text: After dismissing the plaintiffs’ RICO claims, the district court proceeded to address their state-law IIED claims, even though a federal court should typically decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s state-law claims after dismissing the plaintiff’s federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The district court addressed these claims because it mistakenly believed that “the resolution of Plaintiffs’ IIED claims is necessary to the Court’s determination of whether the WDCA reverse-preempts Plaintiffs’ RICO claims under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.” Brown, F. Supp. 2d at 813. As is clear from our analysis above, the resolution of plaintiffs’ IIED claims has no bearing on the reverse-preemption issue, which turns on the purpose of the WDCA and on RICO’s effect on the WDCA. Because in this case the “‘interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation’” did not trump the interest in “‘needlessly deciding state law issues,’” the district court abused its discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction to decide the plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993)). Despite the district court’s error in addressing the plaintiffs’ IIED claims, because we are reversing the dismissal of plaintiffs’ federal RICO claims, we will proceed to review the district court’s decision dismissing the IIED claims. In construing questions of state law, a federal court must apply state law in accordance with the controlling decisions of the highest court of the state. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1999). “The Michigan Supreme Court has never formally recognized IIED as a cause of action.” Moon, 465 F.3d at 728 (citing Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905, 913 (Mich. 1985)); see also Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Mich. 2000) (Weaver, C.J., concurring). Assuming such a claim does exist, a plaintiff must show the following elements to establish an IIED claim: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Roberts, 374 N.W.2d at 908 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Michigan Supreme Court has described “extreme and outrageous conduct” as follows: It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by “malice”, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” Id. at 908-09 (internal quotation marks omitted). No. 05-2089 Brown et al. v. Cassens Transport Co. et al. Page 13 In applying this standard, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a no-fault insurer’s “failure . . . to facilitate the filing of a replacement services claim, a delay of at most six months in responding to the claim as filed, and the denial of benefits owed” was insufficient to meet the standard for outrageous conduct. Id. at 911. In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted that “[t]here is no indication that [the insurer] set out to harass these plaintiffs, nor does the evidence disclose a course of conduct that may fairly be characterized as so outrageous in character . . . as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ IIED claims because, like the defendant’s conduct in Roberts, the plaintiffs’ allegations of defendants’ fraudulent denial of worker’s compensation benefits are not “so outrageous in character . . . as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Id. Decisions of the Michigan Court of Appeals confirm this conclusion. That court has explained that the “wrongful, bad faith termination of benefits, by itself, is not sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Atkinson v. Farley, 431 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). Even the wrongful denial of worker’s compensation benefits “to further some ulterior motive of the defendants,” as the plaintiffs here allege, is insufficiently outrageous to support an IIED claim under Michigan law. Lisecki v. Taco Bell Rests., Inc., 389 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); accord Hajciar v. Crawford & Co., 369 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).7 For these reasons, dismissal of the plaintiffs’ IIED claims was proper.