Opinion ID: 1205480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inherent Powers of the Court

Text: In State ex rel Andrews v. Superior Court, 39 Ariz. 242, 5 P.2d 192 (1931), the Arizona Supreme Court cogently addressed the subject of the inherent powers of courts as follows: The difference between the jurisdiction of courts and their inherent powers is an important one. Jurisdiction in governments like ours is conferred by the provisions of the Constitution and statutes enacted in pursuance thereof. That, however, is not true with respect to the inherent powers. These inherent powers may be defined as such powers as are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction. These powers do not depend upon constitutional grant or in any sense upon the legislative will, and are undefined and probably undefinable as to their exact extent. For instance, the power to maintain order; to secure the attendance of witnesses; to enforce process; the arrangement for a proper place and conveniences for the meeting of the courtÔÇöall these powers must in-here in every court, or the purpose of its creation fails, and such being the case, they need not be given expressly by the Constitution or statute, and cannot be taken away by the latter. There is, however, one important and indeed vital limitation on these powers. They must be such as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction, and therefore exist only when the jurisdiction to maintain which they are necessary is first established. Id. 5 P.2d at 194-95 (citations omitted). Ordinarily, NRS 2.140, a perfectly constitutional statute, would preclude the issuance of a two-justice opinion. [3] However, given the circumstances now existing in the instant case, it is apparent that the referenced statute must give way to the inherent power of this court to take whatever measures are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction. As discussed above, the dissenting justice and the two disqualified justices have, with a cooperating governor, forestalled the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction of the Nevada Supreme Court sitting on the Whitehead case. The constitutional jurisdiction of the Whitehead court is unchallenged, and derives from Art. 6,  4 of the Nevada Constitution. [4] District Court Judge Jerry Carr Whitehead invoked the original jurisdiction of the Nevada Supreme Court by filing an original writ petition in this court pursuant to Rule 40(7) of the Administrative and Procedural Rules for the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline which provides that [r]eview of interlocutory orders of the commission, which are considered either by the prosecuting officer or the respondent judge to be without or in excess of jurisdiction, may be sought by way of petition for an appropriate extraordinary writ. As detailed above, the supreme court properly accepted jurisdiction of respondent judge Whitehead's petition; and that jurisdiction remains the basis for the Whitehead panel's continuing obligation to finalize the case before it. If the Nevada Supreme Court, Whitehead panel, were to abandon its constitutional obligation to exercise its jurisdiction to achieve final closure of the case and controversy before it, the court would deprive Nevada of its constitutional right to a functioning judicial branch of government. Moreover, we would equally deprive the litigants in the Whitehead case of the only forum having the jurisdiction to decide the controversy and provide the relief to which the litigants are entitled. Therefore, in the instant case, the statute requiring the concurrence of three justices must yield to the inherent power of this court to preserve its capacity to continue the exercise of its constitutionally-based jurisdiction in the ongoing Whitehead case. The need for invoking the inherent powers of the court exists only by reason of the actions of the three justices and a cooperating governor dedicated to the demise of the Whitehead court at any and all cost. It is with the greatest and most deliberate reluctance that we resort to this extreme measure in the face of this bizarre, and entirely unique situation. However, we appear to be left with no other honorable alternatives.