Opinion ID: 1773489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Jury Instructions on Intent

Text: For her second point, Riggs contends that the jury instruction given on the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect was misleading because it instructs the jury not to consider the evidence of her mental defect or disease until after it determines that the State has met its burden of proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. She urges that evidence of mental disease or defect should be considered by the jury at the time it considers criminal intent as an element of the crime of murder. She concedes that this court has already decided this issue unfavorably to her in Westbrook v. State, 274 Ark. 309, 624 S.W.2d 433 (1981), and in Robinson v. State, 269 Ark. 90, 598 S.W.2d 421 (1980). She argues, nonetheless, that this court should overrule those decisions. She points to approximately eleven other jurisdictions that require juries to be instructed that evidence of mental disease or defect may be considered by the jury at the time of determining the requisite intent to commit the murder and argues that Arkansas should join those jurisdictions. Her final claim is that with the correct instruction, the jury could very well have convicted her of first- or second-degree murder or even manslaughter, because there was abundant evidence of her depression which drove her to do what she did. We decline to overrule our existing precedent on this point. First, Riggs has offered no persuasive authority for why our precedent should be overturned. See McGhee v. State, 334 Ark. 543, 975 S.W.2d 834 (1998); Sanders v. County of Sebastian, 324 Ark. 433, 922 S.W.2d 334 (1996). Second, we do not agree that the instructions given were violative of due process. The instructions read by the trial court include instructions on the law relating to capital murder, first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter. Each instruction included the level of criminal intent necessary to commit those crimes. The instructions also advised that the State must prove the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was then instructed that Riggs was not responsible for her crime if, as a result of mental disease or defect, she lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or to conform it to the requirements of law. To be successful, Riggs must prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. But the trial court reiterated at this point of its instructions that it was the State that had the burden of proving criminal intent for the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Riggs would have preferred that the trial court give her two non-AMCI proffered instructions which read: Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect may be considered by you along with all the other facts and circumstances of the case in determining whether the defendant had the required mental state or intent for the crime charged or a lesser offense. Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible to prove whether he had the kind of culpable mental state required for commission of the offense charged. But, again, giving these instructions would have simply run counter to our existing caselaw. We conclude that the instructions which, first, advised the jury that the State had the burden of proving every element of the criminal offense (including all elements of the lesser included offenses) beyond a reasonable doubt and, second, stated that she could prove her defense that she suffered from mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence did not prejudice Riggs or deprive her of due process of law. We affirm the trial court's ruling in this regard.