Opinion ID: 1230281
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Sue Under the MMBA

Text: (3a) The County's statutory argument is premised on what it considers the lack of an express right to sue under the MMBA. Its argument begins with our statement in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. City of Gridley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 191, 197 [193 Cal. Rptr. 518, 666 P.2d 960] (hereafter City of Gridley ), that the MMBA furnishes only a `sketchy and frequently vague framework of employer-employee relations for California's local government agencies.' [Citation.] A product of political compromise, the provisions of the act are confusing, and, at times, contradictory. From there, the County points to the lack of any stated right to sue under the MMBA, and concludes that the Legislature deliberately left important provisions of the Act to court interpretation, including any provisions for enforcement. Such an argument fundamentally misconstrues the statutory protections afforded by the MMBA. As we stated in City of Gridley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at page 198: Notwithstanding its otherwise `sketchy' provisions, the act contains strong protection for the rights of public employees to join and participate in the activities of employee organizations, and for the rights of those organizations to represent employees' interests with public agencies. Thus, in spite of the fact that the language of the MMBA, read literally, can be construed to provide no more than a rather general legislative blessing for collective bargaining at the local governmental level without clear delineation of policy or means for its implementation (Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts (1972) 23 Hastings L.J. 719, 761), we have consistently held that the Legislature intended in the MMBA to impose substantive duties, and confer substantive, enforceable rights, on public employers and employees. (See City of Gridley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 202 [local government agencies may not adopt labor relations regulations in conflict with provision of the MMBA]; Glendale City Employees Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale, supra, 15 Cal.3d 328, 337-338 [memorandum of understanding between public employer and employees negotiated under the MMBA is enforceable and binds the discretion of city council].) That being the case, the County's assertion that the MMBA contains no express right to sue is irrelevant. The Legislature, in order to create a right to sue under the MMBA, need not have included language concerning the right to sue within the act itself. It was enough for the Legislature to endow the public employers and employees with substantive rights and duties which limited public employers' discretion, and then to allow employees to enforce their rights by means of traditional mandamus, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 declares that a writ may be issued by any court ... to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.... (4a) The availability of writ relief to compel a public agency to perform an act prescribed by law has long been recognized. (See, e.g., Berkeley Sch. Dist. v. City of Berkeley (1956) 141 Cal. App.2d 841, 849 [297 P.2d 710] [mandamus appropriate against city auditor to compel release of fund to schools pursuant to city charter provision].) (5) What is required to obtain writ relief is a showing by a petitioner of (1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent ...; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty.... ( Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court (1962) 208 Cal. App.2d 803, 813-814 [25 Cal. Rptr. 798], citations omitted.) (4b) Mandamus is available to compel a public agency's performance or correct an agency's abuse of discretion whether the action being compelled or corrected can itself be characterized as ministerial or legislative Thus, we held that an ordinance passed by a city council imposing a certain salary adjustment, usually a legislative act, was an abuse of the city council's discretion because it violated a previously enacted agreement with an employee association, and was therefore subject to challenge via writ of mandate. ( Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale, supra, 15 Cal.3d 328, 343-345.) (3b) The MMBA, at Government Code section 3505, created a clear and present duty on the part of the County to meet and confer with the Association in good faith on the fixing of the Association members' salary and other conditions of employment, and created in Association members the corresponding beneficial right to meet and confer. (See, e.g., Holliday v. City of Modesto (1991) 229 Cal. App.3d 528, 540 [280 Cal. Rptr. 206]; Social Services Union v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 279, 285 [271 Cal. Rptr. 494]; American Federation of State etc. Employees v. City of Santa Clara (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 1006, 1009-1010 [207 Cal. Rptr. 57].) If, as the Association alleges, there has been a violation of that duty, then a writ of mandate will be available to remedy the violation. (4c) The County cites no authority for the proposition that, once the Legislature has created a duty in a public agency, a court may limit, on public policy grounds, the availability of a writ of mandate to enforce that duty. It appears elementary that courts may not frustrate the creation of a statutory duty by refusing to enforce it through the normal judicial means. What public policy reasons there are against enforcement of a statutory duty are reasons against the creation of the duty ab initio, and should be addressed to the Legislature. On the contrary, when the Legislature creates a public duty but wishes to limit the use of a writ of mandate to enforce it, it has done so affirmatively. Thus, in other public employment legislation, where the Legislature has created the Public Employment Relations Board as the principal means of enforcing the statutory duties and rights of employers and employees, it has under certain limited instances circumscribed writ relief. In these various labor relations statutes, the availability of a writ of mandate to review a Public Employment Relations Board determination of a bargaining unit's composition is limited to two circumstances: (1) instances in which the board, upon petition, agrees that the case is one of special importance, or (2) cases in which a party raises the issue of the bargaining unit's composition as a defense to an unfair labor practice charge. (See Gov. Code, §§ 3520, subd. (a), 3542, subd. (a), 3564, subd. (a).) Thus, the Legislature knew how to circumscribe the availability of writ review, and did so for labor relations statutes that rely primarily on administrative, nonjudicial enforcement. No such administrative enforcement exists in the MMBA, and no such limitation of writ review can be found in the statute. (3c) The case law in this state is indeed unanimous that a writ of mandate lies for an employee association to challenge a public employer's breach of its duty under the MMBA. (See Vernon Fire Fighters v. City of Vernon (1980) 107 Cal. App.3d 802, 810 [165 Cal. Rptr. 908]; see also San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. Board of Supervisors (1992) 3 Cal. App.4th 1482 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 176]; Social Services Union v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 222 Cal. App.3d 279; American Federation of State etc. Employees v. City of Santa Clara, supra, 160 Cal. App.3d 1006; Public Employees of Riverside County, Inc. v. County of Riverside (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d 882 [142 Cal. Rptr. 521].) The County cites no contrary authority. [2] Nor do we find persuasive the County's attempt to analogize limitations on the right to sue with limitations on the right of public employees to strike. In support of the proposition that the extent of a public employee's enforcement rights under the MMBA depends very much on the type of work he or she performs, the County cites City of Santa Ana v. Santa Ana Police Benevolent Assn. (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1568 [255 Cal. Rptr. 688], in which it was held that police were prohibited from engaging in a strike or slowdown. Therefore, the County reasons, just as there are circumstances in which one traditional method of enforcing employee rights  the right to strike  may be limited, so the right to sue may be limited in some circumstances when the suit would gravely interfere with the functioning of county government. Under closer scrutiny, however, the analogy falls apart. In County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Assn. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 564 [214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 699 P.2d 835], we abrogated the common law doctrine that prohibited public employee strikes. In doing so, we acknowledged that the MMBA was silent on the question of public employee strikes, leaving the matter shrouded in ambiguity. ( Id. at p. 573.) We found the traditional common law rule without basis in modern labor law, particularly in light of the MMBA and other public employment relations statutes, and in effect created a new common law rule: [S]trikes by public employees are not unlawful at common law unless or until it is clearly demonstrated that such a strike creates a substantial and imminent threat to the health or safety of the public. ( Id. at p. 586.) In the case of City of Santa Ana v. Santa Ana Police Benevolent Assn., supra, 207 Cal. App.3d at pages 1572-1573, the court merely applied this new common law rule and found that a police strike or sickout did pose a danger to public health and safety. The availability of the writ of mandate remedy in this case, on the other hand, is statutory, and is unambiguous. Unlike the right of public employees to strike, their right of access to courts has not been seriously questioned. As a statutory right, it is for the Legislature to delineate. There is therefore no room for a common law limitation on the right to writ relief. We conclude that the MMBA inherently provides the Association with a right to bring a mandamus action against the County for breach of its duty to bargain in good faith, and that there are no statutory or common law grounds for limiting that right.