Opinion ID: 50627
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presence at Sentencing

Text: Emerson’s initial issue on appeal is his contention that the district court’s original imposition of the four special conditions solely by way of a written judgment violated his constitutional right to be present at sentencing, such that the four conditions cannot be considered as part of his original sentence. We agree. A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at his sentencing.3 This right stems from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but is also protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when the defendant is not actually 1 United States v. Ferguson, 369 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2004). 2 United States v. Naranjo, 259 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2001). 3 United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2006). 7 confronting witnesses or evidence against him.4 It has also been codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3).5 Thus, if a written entry of judgment conflicts with an oral pronouncement at a sentencing hearing, the oral pronouncement controls and the written entry of judgment must be conformed to the oral pronouncement.6 If the differences between the two are merely ambiguities, we look to the district court’s intent to determine the actual sentence.7 We have previously held, however, that such a difference in a special condition of supervised release presents an actual conflict, not just an ambiguity, for sentencing purposes.8 Here, all four of the conditions at issue are special conditions. Thus, they present conflicts between the oral pronouncement and the written entry of judgment. Accordingly, the district court erred in imposing the four conditions in its written entry of judgment without having announced them at 4 Id. at 381. 5 Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3). 6 Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 381, 383. 7 Id. at 381. 8 United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that participation in a drug treatment program was a special condition and thus presented a conflict). 8 Emerson’s sentencing hearing. Therefore, Emerson’s original sentence must be redacted to conform to the oral pronouncement at his original sentencing hearing. The four special conditions are therefore excised from Emerson’s original sentence. Notwithstanding the fact that the original imposition of the four special conditions violated his constitutional rights, Emerson offers no valid reason why the district court could not lawfully modify his sentence at a post-incarceration hearing, as permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Thus, to the extent that any such argument might exist, Emerson has waived it.9