Opinion ID: 653666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Villagrana's Sec. 924(c) Conviction

Text: 18 Villagrana also challenges his Sec. 924(c) conviction, but on different grounds. Under the doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), one conspirator can be held liable for the crimes of another if committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Allen, 930 F.2d 1270, 1275 (7th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted). Under this doctrine, one conspirator's possession of a firearm, in the furtherance of a drug trafficking conspiracy, may provide the basis for another conspirator's Sec. 924(c) violation. Id. (citing Ocampo, 890 F.2d at 1372; United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 548 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 2075, 104 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)). Here, Villagrana's Sec. 924(c) conviction was based on his vicarious possession of the .22 caliber revolver found in the car the Fonseca brothers occupied at the time of their arrest. 19 On appeal, Villagrana argues that the district court did not clearly instruct the jury on the government's burden of proof with regard to Pinkerton liability. We have held that a Pinkerton instruction is adequate if it focuses the jury[ ] on the conspirator's act, 'on whether it is a crime, on whether the co-conspirator's guilt of this crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and on whether it was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy in which the defendant participated.'  United States v. McKenzie, 922 F.2d 1323, 1330 (7th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 163, 116 L.Ed.2d 127 (1991). The instruction should also 'advise jurors that the government [bears] the burden of proving ... all elements of the powerful Pinkerton doctrine ... beyond a reasonable doubt.'  McKenzie, 922 F.2d at 1330 (quoting United States v. Elizondo, et al., 920 F.2d 1308, 1317 (7th Cir.1990)). 20 The written instruction received by the jury read as follows: 21 A conspirator is responsible for offenses committed by his fellow conspirators if he was a member of the conspiracy when the offense was committed and if the offense was committed in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy. 22 Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant whom you are considering is guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count One and (2) that while he was a member of the conspiracy one or more of his fellow conspirators was guilty of each of the elements of the offense charged in one of the other counts, as I have already covered those elements in earlier instructions, in the same way as though that other conspirator or conspirators was or were named as a defendant or defendants in that other count, and (3) that the offense charged in that count was committed in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy, then you should find the defendant whom you are considering guilty of that other count. 23 While conceding that this instruction otherwise properly states the requirements for Pinkerton liability, Villagrana argues that it failed to convey that the government had the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that his coconspirators, the Fonseca brothers, committed the Sec. 924(c) offense. Villagrana did not present this challenge to the district court, and consequently, we will reverse his conviction only upon a finding of plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Plain error exists when there has been such a miscarriage of justice that, but for the error, [the defendant] probably would have been acquitted. United States v. Martinez, 939 F.2d 412, 414 (7th Cir.1991). 24 We conclude that the above instruction informed the jury that, for Pinkerton liability to exist, it must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one of Villagrana's co-conspirators committed the Sec. 924(c) offense. The instruction's beyond a reasonable doubt requirement applies to three elements, one of which was that one of Villagrana's coconspirators was guilty of another charged offense, the Sec. 924(c) violation. We upheld a similar instruction in Diaz, although in that case the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement followed, as opposed to preceded, a recitation of the three substantive requirements. 864 F.2d at 549. While the government's burden may have been stated more clearly by including the beyond a reasonable doubt phrase with each specific element, the district court did not err by using that language in a prefatory phrase applying to all three elements. 25 Villagrana challenges the jury instructions on a second ground, however. Prior to giving the Pinkerton instruction, the district court gave the jury the following instruction: 26 You should not speculate why defendant Baltazar Guevera, who is named in the indictment is not currently on trial before you. Remember your sole duty is to determine whether the government proved these two defendants, Mr. Villagrana, Mr. Gasca, guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 27 Villagrana argues that this instruction and the Pinkerton instruction are mutually exclusive. That is, the jury's examination of whether a coconspirator committed a Sec. 924(c) violation beyond a reasonable doubt would conflict with its sole duty to decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt or innocence of Villagrana and Gasca. According to Villagrana, these instructions confused the jury to the point that he was denied constitutional due process, and, as a result, we must reverse his conviction. See Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129, 1137 (7th Cir.1990). 28 We read the instructions differently than Villagrana. The instruction to the jury that their sole responsibility was to decide whether the government proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, Villagrana's and Gasca's guilt merely conveyed to the jury that only those two individuals were on trial. The second instruction stated the requirements of a theory under which the government could do so. As such, these instructions were entirely consistent with each other. The district court did not err.