Opinion ID: 2424301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Collective Bargaining

Text: The MdTA charges also that the purported contract was a collective bargaining agreement that was noncompliant with relevant law. The MdTA points out that Md.Code (1993, 2009 Repl.Vol., 2010 Supp.), State Personnel and Pensions (S.P.P.), § 3-503(a) defines collective bargaining as includ[ing] all matters relating to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and that the FOP concedes freely that the Agreement concerned a benefit of employmenttake-home vehicles. As the Agreement involves matters associated with collective bargaining, the MdTA posits that the parties should have complied with, but did not, Title 3 of the S.P.P., which governs the process of collective bargaining. The MdTA suggests a number of statutory preconditions, required before any agreement involving matters of collective bargainingthat is, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employmentbecomes enforceable. They include (1) the employees have the right to bargain collectively, (2) the employees elected an exclusive representative, (3) the election was certified by the State Labor Relations Board, (4) the agreement was reduced to a memorandum of understanding signed by the Governor or his/her designee, and (5) the agreement was ratified by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. The FOP concedes that the Agreement did not comport with the collective bargaining statute, arguing instead that compliance was unnecessary. [T]he Agreement is not a collective bargaining agreement, but rather a simple contract, according to the FOP. The MdTA is assuming that collective bargaining is the sole manner in which to contract; however, [n]othing in the statute or [caselaw] excludes the ability to enter into a simple contract absent the availability of collective bargaining. The Court of Special Appeals held that the Agreement was not subject to the [preconditions/] requirements related to collective bargaining agreements. Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 187, 5 A.3d at 1210. The intermediate appellate court devoted over twenty pages of its opinion to a detailed examination of nine opinions of this Court. Md. Trans. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 185-208, 5 A.3d at 1209-23. It relied, however, in large part upon a few key statements in McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 701 A.2d 99 (1997); see Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md. App. at 203-04, 5 A.3d at 1220. In McCulloch, we reiterated that, `absent express legislative authority, a government agency cannot enter into binding arbitration or binding collective bargaining agreements establishing wages, hours, pension rights, or working conditions for public employees.' McCulloch, 347 Md. at 275-76, 701 A.2d at 100 (quoting Office and Prof'l Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. Mass Transit Admin., 295 Md. 88, 97, 453 A.2d 1191, 1195 (1982)). [T]he purpose of the rule, we continued, is `to insure that a governmental agency does not, without authority, abdicate or bargain away its statutory discretion.' McCulloch, 347 Md. at 276, 701 A.2d at 100 (quoting Montgomery County Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 311 Md. 303, 313, 534 A.2d 980, 984-85 (1987)). Therefore, not all collective bargaining agreements to which the State or a governmental agency is a party require prior express legislative approval.... McCulloch, 347 Md. at 275, 701 A.2d at 100. [I]t is only those that contain a binding arbitration clause or are otherwise binding upon and enforceable against the State. Id. (citations omitted). Without stating as much, the Court of Special Appeals seemed to reach two alternate conclusions. First, it decided that the Legislature authorized expressly the MdTA to enter into collective bargaining agreements. See Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 204, 5 A.3d at 1220 ([T]he Agreement [does not] violate the agency's enabling legislation by purporting to arrogate to the MdTA power that it does not have. (citation omitted)). The intermediate appellate court recognized that, in 2006, the General Assembly had not granted expressly the MdTA or its employees the right to bargain collectively. It concluded, however, that, by virtue of its plenary authority over its own budget, the MdTA occupies the same position as the Governor and General Assembly in McCulloch  and, as such, possesse[d] the discretionary authority to ... enter into an agreement with its employees, [like the present one].... Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 207, 5 A.3d at 1222. In so holding, the intermediate appellate panel leaned heavily upon the following analysis: [T]he agency is empowered to make any contracts and agreements necessary or incidental to the exercise of its powers and performance of its duties. [Transp., § 4-205(c)(1)]. The statutory scheme by which the MdTA exists also grants plenary authority to the agency over its own finances. It funds its operations out of the toll revenues that it collects, and those revenues are not subject to supervision or regulation by any instrumentality, agency, or unit of State or local government. [Transp., § 4-312(c)(1)]. And, unlike most agencies of State government, the MdTA has the independent authority to employ and fix the compensation of ... any ... employees that it considers necessary to exercise its powers and perform its duties. [Transp., § 4-205(d)(1)]. Like all other expenditures of the agency, compensation of its employees comes from the agency's toll revenues. See [Transp., § 4-205(d)(2)]. As we indicated, the Court of Appeals reviewed the predecessor scheme in Wyatt v. State Roads Commission [, 175 Md. 258, 1 A.2d 619 (1938)] and upheld the agency's fiscal structure, determining that the agency's funds were not moneys of the State subject to control by the Comptroller and Treasurer. The MdTA's budget is merely reported to the General Assembly. See [Transp., §§ 4-205(d)(1), 4-210]; see also 70 Op. Att'y Gen. 229 (1985). Neither the Governor nor the General Assembly exercises ultimate discretion over the agency's operational expenditures or the compensation of its employees. [ But see Transp., § 4-203(a) (The [MdTA] is entitled to the staff provided in the State budget.).] Moreover, when the MdTA entered into the Agreement, it did not incur a debt against the treasury of the State. Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 204-05, 5 A.3d at 1220-21 (footnote omitted). Earlier in its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals mentioned also that the MdTA enjoys a `catch-all' grant of authority, empowering it to `do anything else necessary or convenient to carry out the powers granted' to it by statute. Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 141, 5 A.3d at 1183-84 (quoting Trans., § 4-205(g)). Second, the intermediate appellate court decided, seemingly in the alternative, that explicit legislative authorization was unnecessary. See McCulloch, 347 Md. at 275, 701 A.2d at 100 ([N]ot all collective bargaining agreements to which the State or a governmental agency is a party require prior express legislative approval; it is only those that contain a binding arbitration clause or are otherwise binding upon and enforceable against the State. (citations omitted)). Thus, the Agreement here did not bargain away the MdTA's statutory discretion, or attempt to delegate to a third party the discretion of the MdTA or any other State body. Indeed, the Agreement does not delegate any decision making power to an arbitrator or any other third party.... [T]he only obligation the Agreement placed on the [MdTA] was to fund and implement the [THV] program. The Agreement was signed by the [MdTA's] Executive Secretary and was subsequently ratified unanimously by the [MdTA]. The Agreement presents no danger of any party, other than the MdTA itself, controlling the [MdTA's] purse strings. Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 203-04, 5 A.3d at 1220 (footnote omitted). We granted the MdTA's petition for writ of certiorari, Maryland Transportation Authority v. Maryland Transportation Authority Police Lodge #34 of the Fraternal Order of Police, 417 Md. 500, 10 A.3d 1180 (2011).