Opinion ID: 6323627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: We “review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standards as the district court.” Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 620 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2012)). Judgment as a matter of law is proper if “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and . . . a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). The moving party can prevail only “i][f the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that the reviewing court believes that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a contrary verdict[.]” Poliner v. Texas Health Sys., 537 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dixon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 330 F.3d 311, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2003)). “We credit the nonmoving defendant’s evidence and ‘disregard all evidence favorable to [the plaintiff] that the jury is not required to believe.”’ Brown v. Sudduth, 675 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 631 (5th Cir. 2002)). “After a jury trial, our standard of review is ‘especially deferential.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Bryan Cnty., Okla., 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000)). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Olibas v. Barclay, 838 F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2016). 6 Case: 21-10159 Document: 00516239627 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 No. 21-10159 “The district court abuses its discretion by denying a new trial only when there is an ‘absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.’” OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. T. Wade Welch & Assocs., 841 F.3d 669, 676 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, L.L.P., 716 F.3d 867, 881 (5th Cir. 2013)). “If the evidence is legally sufficient, we must find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial.” Id. (citing Cobb v. Rowan Cos., Inc., 919 F.2d 1089, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991). We have held that it is “far easier” to show that a district court should have granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law than it is to show a district court abused its discretion by not granting a new trial. See Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1998).