Opinion ID: 2635288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Kansas Consumer Protection Act

Text: Because the legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted, the analysis must begin with a review of the relevant provisions of the KCPA. K.S.A. 50-623 provides in relevant part that the KCPA shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: (a) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing consumer transactions; [and] (b) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable practices. K.S.A. 50-624 broadly defines the terms consumer, supplier, and consumer transaction. A [c]onsumer is defined as an individual . . . who seeks or acquires property or services for personal, family, household, business or agricultural purposes. K.S.A. 50-624(b). A [s]upplier is defined as a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, seller, lessor, assignor, or other person who, in the ordinary course of business, solicits, engages in or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not dealing directly with the consumer. K.S.A. 50-624(j). The term [c]onsumer transaction means a sale, lease, assignment or other disposition for value of property or services within this state . . . to a consumer; or a solicitation by a supplier with respect to any of these dispositions. K.S.A. 50-624(c). The term [s]ervices includes [w]ork, labor and other personal services and any other act performed for a consumer by a supplier. K.S.A. 50-624(i)(1), (3). The plain language of the KCPA is broad enough to encompass the providing of medical care and treatment services within a physician-patient relationship. A physician is, in the ordinary course of business, a seller or supplier of services. See K.S.A. 50-624(j). A patient is a consumer of those services for personal, family, or business purposes. See K.S.A. 50-624(b). The sale of those services is a consumer transaction. See K.S.A. 50-624(c). Nothing in the KCPA explicitly excludes physicians or other professionals from the scope of its coverage. See, e.g., Moore v. Bird Engineering Co., 273 Kan. 2, 10-13, 41 P.3d 755 (2002) (KCPA applies to professional engineer who sells engineering services to consumer; engineer is a supplier and the sale of services is consumer transaction within scope of KCPA). Furthermore, the KCPA does specifically exclude certain other persons and transactions from its scope. For example, insurance contracts regulated under state law are specifically excluded from the definition of consumer transactions. K.S.A. 50-624(c). The term supplier does not include any bank, trust company or lending institution which is subject to state or federal regulation with regard to disposition of repossessed collateral by such bank, trust company or lending institution. K.S.A. 50-624(j). Also, the KCPA does not apply to a publisher, broadcaster, printer or other person engaged in the dissemination of information or the reproduction of printed or pictorial matter so far as the information or matter has been disseminated or reproduced on behalf of others without actual knowledge that it violated the Kansas consumer protection act. K.S.A. 50-635. This shows that the legislature knows how to exclude certain categories of persons and transactions from the KCPA's coverage and could have done so with regard to physicians if it so intended. Williamson cites various Kansas cases for the premise that professionals of all kinds are covered by the KCPA. See, e.g., Moore, 273 Kan. at 10-13, 41 P.3d 755 (KCPA applies to professional engineer who sells engineering services to a consumer); Hoffman v. Haug, 242 Kan. 867, 752 P.2d 124 (1988) (sale of house to purchaser through real estate agent is consumer transaction covered by KCPA; purchaser fits definition of consumer and real estate agent fits definition of supplier). However, not all of the cases cited by Williamson stand for the proposition she advances. For example, Williamson cites Roy v. Young, 278 Kan. 244, 93 P.3d 712 (2004), for the premise that attorneys are subject to the KCPA. In Roy, plaintiff sued his attorney and law firm alleging legal malpractice and violations of the KCPA. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's claims were time barred. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding that his malpractice claim was time barred, but he made no argument with regard to the court's decision that his KCPA claim was time barred. Thus, this court concluded he had abandoned any issue as to the KCPA claim. 278 Kan. at 248, 93 P.3d 712. The issue of whether the KCPA applies to claims against attorneys was not decided by the court in Roy. Williamson also cites State ex rel. Stovall v. Martinez, 27 Kan.App.2d 9, 996 P.2d 371, rev. denied 269 Kan. 941 (2000), for the premise that insurance claims consultants are subject to the KCPA. In that case, the attorney general alleged that the defendant, an insurance claims consultant, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and that his representations to consumers regarding his qualifications violated the KCPA. It is questionable whether an insurance claims consultant who engages in the unauthorized practice of law can be considered a professional; thus, this case is of little value in determining whether the KCPA is applicable to professionals generally. Additionally, Williamson contends that this court has applied the KCPA to physicians in three cases: State ex rel. Stovall v. DVM Enterprises, Inc., 275 Kan. 243, 62 P.3d 653 (2003); State ex rel. Stovall v. Alivio, 275 Kan. 169, 61 P.3d 687 (2003); and State ex rel. Stovall v. ConfiMed.com, 272 Kan. 1313, 38 P.3d 707 (2002). All three of these cases involved actions brought by the attorney general under the KCPA against physicians and companies that sold prescription drugs over the Internet without a physical examination of the patient. In none of the cases did the defendants argue that the KCPA did not apply to the providing of care or treatment within a physician-patient relationship. In both ConfiMed.com and DVM Enterprises, the issue was whether the defendants' conduct was unconscionable under the KCPA; this court found it was not. DVM Enterprises, 275 Kan. at 251-52, 255, 62 P.3d 653; ConfiMed.com, 272 Kan. at 1322-24, 38 P.3d 707. In Alivio, the issues on appeal were related to the defendant doctor's attempt to set aside a default judgment. See 275 Kan. at 172, 61 P.3d 687. None of the three cases directly addressed the issue presented in this case. Williamson's citation of Moore, 273 Kan. 2, 41 P.3d 755, is more germane. In Moore, the plaintiff hired the defendant, an engineer, to design a bridge to be built on the plaintiff's residential property. After the plaintiff sued, the district court found against the defendant for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, negligence, and violations of the KCPA. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment as to the KCPA violations, finding that there was no intent to deceive on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals' holding, and the defendant cross-petitioned for review, questioning the application of the KCPA to professional engineering services. In analyzing whether the KCPA applied, this court first noted that K.S.A. 50-623 calls for the KCPA to be construed liberally to streamline the law of consumer transactions and to protect consumers from unscrupulous suppliers. 273 Kan. at 10, 41 P.3d 755. The Moore court then cited the KCPA's definitions of consumer, supplier, consumer transaction, and its very broad definition of services. 273 Kan. at 10-11, 41 P.3d 755. The court found that the plaintiff was a consumeran individual who sought services for personal purposes, and that the defendant was a suppliera person who engaged in consumer transactions in the ordinary course of business. 273 Kan. at 11, 41 P.3d 755. The defendant's sale of engineering services, i.e., the work in designing the bridge for the plaintiff, constituted a consumer transaction. This court noted the comfortable fit between the facts of the case and the statutory definitions of the KCPA. 273 Kan. at 11, 41 P.3d 755. The defendant argued that, notwithstanding the apparent comfortable fit of the facts within the statutory framework of the KCPA, the KCPA was not intended to cover professional services. In support, the defendant cited Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J.Super. 56, 607 A.2d 1339 (1992), a New Jersey case which held that state's Consumer Fraud Act was not intended to apply to an attorney's professional services. The Moore court distinguished Vort, stating: The New Jersey court distinguished the legal profession on the basis that it is regulated exclusively by the state Supreme Court. 257 N.J.Super. at 62[, 607 A.2d 1339]. Historically, attorneys were held to be exempt from liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act. That exemption was known as the `learned profession' exemption. The learned profession[s] originally included only lawyers, medical doctors, and clergy. See The Learned Profession Exemption of the North Carolina Deceptive Trade Act: The Wrong Bright Line? 15 Campbell L.Rev. 223, 250-51 (1993). However, the application of the KCPA to the legal profession is not before us. The narrow issue before this court is whether the engineering services rendered in the present case are covered by the KCPA. We make no determination here as to application of the KCPA to other professional services. (Emphasis added.) 273 Kan. at 12, 41 P.3d 755. Dr. Amrani offers several arguments as to why the KCPA would apply to engineers but should not be applied to physicians. These arguments include: cases from other jurisdictions in which it is concluded that those states' consumer protection statutes do not apply to actions against physicians when medical treatment is the gravamen of the suit; prior cases in this jurisdiction rejecting contract or fraud as the theoretical bases for professional liability suits; and the legislature's intent to create an alternative statutory scheme for medical malpractice suits. We will discuss each of these arguments