Opinion ID: 785283
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of the Right of Appeal Must Be Considered and Intelligent

Text: 29 The government argues that Pallares is barred from collaterally attacking the lawfulness of his underlying deportation because he failed to exhaust his administrative and judicial remedies. Pallares responds that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to exhaust them. 30 In a criminal prosecution under § 1326, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires a meaningful opportunity for judicial review of the underlying deportation. U.S. v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). An alien is barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1) from collaterally attacking his underlying removal order if he validly waived the right to appeal that order during the deportation proceedings. U.S. v. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir.2001). However, where a waiver of the right to appeal a removal order is not considered and intelligent, an alien has been deprived of his right to that appeal and thus to a meaningful opportunity for judicial review. See United States v. Leon-Paz, 340 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.2003). Effective deprivation of an alien's administrative appeal serves to deprive him of the opportunity for judicial review as well. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 840, 107 S.Ct. 2148 (Because the waivers of their rights to appeal were not considered or intelligent, respondents were deprived of judicial review of their deportation proceeding.). 31 Here, Pallares' waiver of his right to appeal his removal order was not considered and intelligent because the IJ erroneously informed him that he was not eligible for relief from deportation on account of his 1999 state misdemeanor Annoy/Molest conviction, Cal.Penal Code § 647.6(a). Where `the record contains an inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation,' but the IJ fails to `advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue,' we do not consider an alien's waiver of his right to appeal his deportation order to be `considered and intelligent.' Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted). For example, in Leon-Paz, after the IJ erroneously advised the alien that he was not eligible for relief under § 212(c) of the former INA, the alien expressly declined to appeal the IJ's order of removal. 340 F.3d at 1004, 1007. We held that the alien's due process rights had nevertheless been violated because of the IJ's erroneous advice. See id. at 1007. Specifically, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), which was issued after the IJ's Leon-Paz ruling, adopted a rule which made it clear that Leon Paz had, indeed, been eligible for relief at the time of his 1997 hearing. Id. at 1006. We then decided that the IJ's pre- St. Cyr advice to the contrary had deprived petitioner of judicial review in violation of due process, and that petitioner's waiver of his right to appeal the IJ's decision had not been considered and intelligent. Id. at 1004-07. 32 Similarly, here, Pallares was eligible for relief from deportation under the successor provision to § 212(c), as we discuss more fully infra at Part A(2), but the IJ erroneously advised him to the contrary. She believed, incorrectly, that the conviction under the state Annoy/Molest misdemeanor statute, Cal.Penal Code § 647.6(a), constituted a conviction of the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), for purposes of deportation law. Because the IJ erred when she told Pallares that no relief was available, Pallares' failure to exhaust his administrative remedies cannot bar collateral review of his deportation proceeding. See Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1183-84. For the same reason, Pallares' waiver of his right to appeal was not considered and intelligent and deprived [him] of his right to judicial review under § 1326(d)(2). See Leon-Paz, 340 F.3d at 1005 (citation omitted). 33 Moreover, there is an additional, independent reason why Pallares is excused from meeting the exhaustion requirement of § 1326(d)(1): the colloquy between the IJ and Pallares at the time an appeal was discussed reveals that, even aside from the erroneous advice given Pallares by the IJ, Pallares' waiver of his right to appeal was not considered and intelligent. See, e.g., U.S. v. Zarate-Martinez, 133 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that immigration judge's individual conversation with petitioner, in which the judge asked simply, do you understand your rights? and petitioner responded yes, did not qualify as an express or implied `voluntary and intelligent' waiver of right to appeal). 5 For a waiver to be valid, the government must establish by clear and convincing evidence, Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir.1997), that the waiver is considered and intelligent. U.S. v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 753-54 (9th Cir.1993)(en banc); see also U.S. v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 985 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.1993)(finding a due process violation where immigration judge failed to inquire whether right to appeal was knowingly and voluntarily waived). 34 In several cases, courts have concluded that an IJ's failure to explore the issue adequately with the petitioner precluded a purported waiver from being considered and intelligent. In Mendoza-Lopez, for example, the Supreme Court determined that a waiver was not considered and intelligent where aliens were not represented by legal counsel at the hearing and were not adequately advised of the consequences of the choices they were forced to make: 35 Both defendants had been continuously present in the United States for a period exceeding seven years at the time of the deportation hearing. They were therefore eligible for suspension of deportation. The IJ did not adequately inform the defendants about this alternative relief, as is required by 8 C.F.R. 242.17(2). The defendants did not understand the consequences of the choices they were forced to make[.] 36 781 F.2d 111, 113 (8th Cir.1985), aff'd by, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987) (The IJ permitted waivers of the right to appeal that were not the result of considered judgments by the respondents, and failed to advise respondents properly of their eligibility to apply for suspension of deportation.). 37 Similarly, in U.S. v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 753 (9th Cir.1993)(en banc), this court found that an alien's waiver cannot be considered and intelligent even though the IJ thoroughly explained the right to appeal at a group hearing because, in addressing the group as a whole through an interpreter, the IJ failed to solicit separate responses from each individual facing removal. The Court made it plain that the fact that petitioner knew what an appeal was was insufficient. It also noted that the IJ's actions may have conveyed the message that the petitions would not benefit from an appeal. Id. at 754. 38 Here, the government has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to establish Pallares' intentional relinquishment of the right to appeal. Like the respondent in Mendoza-Lopez, Pallares was unrepresented by counsel; he also relied on an interpreter to understand the proceedings. In this context, the IJ's brief explanation regarding Pallares' right to appeal fell far short of the detailed description offered in Lopez-Vasquez (which was found nevertheless to be insufficient in light of the circumstances). 39 Even more important, the exchange raises some of the same concerns that prompted this Court, in Lopez-Vasquez, to determine that, despite the IJ's specific, and thorough explanation of his rights, petitioner's waiver could not be deemed considered and intelligent. Although it appears that Pallares knew what an appeal was, the record strongly suggests that his decision not to invoke that right was not considered and intelligent — and it is that latter element that, under Lopez-Vasquez, determines whether Pallares' failure to appeal is fatal to his claim. Indeed, in contrast to the cases in which waivers have been found to be considered and intelligent, Pallares did not at any time respond in the affirmative regarding his wish to forego an appeal. Instead, Pallares' reply — It would be better if I leave my children, that's fine — conveys significant confusion about what the appeals process would have entailed, and what the competing consequences of appeal and waiver might have meant for him and his family in practical terms. Further, the IJ's failure to follow-up after Pallares' cryptic statement—like the IJ's comments in Lopez-Vasquez — may have conveyed the message that [Pallares] should accept [his] deportation and not appeal, despite his evident desire to vindicate his rights. Finally, as evidenced by the exchange, the driving force behind Pallares' plaintiff reply—if your honor would give me the opportunity to leave OR I would fight this for my children who need me — was the fact of his detention and the effect of that detention upon his family. In this context, the IJ's failure to offer him even a few moments to actually consider his right to appeal, not to mention time to consult an attorney, supports our conclusion that we cannot fairly deem Pallares' waiver considered or intelligent. Given all the circumstances, we are not free to presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights, Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1936); instead we conclude that Pallares' statements do not qualify as a considered and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal. 40 In sum, for both of the reasons we have discussed, Pallares' waiver of his right to appeal the underlying removal order was procedurally defective for purposes of § 1326(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement. For the same reasons, we hold that Pallares was deprived of a meaningful opportunity for judicial review. See § 1326(d)(2). 41