Opinion ID: 2669076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: gaillard’s remaining federal claims

Text: The district court, however, erred in denying summary judgment to Officer Commins as to Gaillard’s (1) procedural due process, (2) free speech, and (3) substantive due process claims. Only the substantive due-process claim merits discussion. The Supreme Court has held that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S. Ct. at 1871. Thus, Gaillard’s claim that Officer Commins violated the Constitution by using his 5 We also note that Officer Commins’s police department has explicitly adopted Garner as its rule for the use of deadly force. Officer Commins was aware of this rule and conceded in his deposition that deadly force was not warranted in this case. Officer Commins explained that he did not intend to use deadly force and that the collision was an accident. As noted earlier, a jury will have to decide whether the collision was an accident or an intentional use of force to apprehend the fleeing Gaillard. 14 Case: 13-11442 Date Filed: 04/07/2014 Page: 15 of 17 vehicle to seize Gaillard is cognizable only under the Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis set forth above. The district court reasoned, however, that a substantive due process claim could lie as an alternative theory of recovery. This, according to the district court, would be viable if the jury concluded that Officer Commins intentionally struck Gaillard not to arrest him—but to harm him unrelated to the legitimate objective of arresting Gaillard. While this theory may have legal merit in the abstract, see Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1720 (1998), no evidence here would allow a jury to conclude that Officer Commins intended to hit Gaillard only to hurt him—totally unrelated to effecting an arrest. Plaintiff Gaillard has not pointed us to record evidence from which a jury could find, or even infer, that Officer Commins acted with such sinister purpose. 6