Opinion ID: 2395107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Next of Kin Possessing Right of Recovery Under Common Law

Text: This Court has consistently specified that the next of kin are entitled to recover damages in a common law cause of action for grave desecration. See Pence, 181 W.Va. at 656, 383 S.E.2d at 838; Bennett, 180 W.Va. at 671, 379 S.E.2d at 394. In Whitehair, this Court stated as follows: [T]he cause of action ordinarily belongs to the party with the right to possession of the body ... provided that he or she was living with the decedent at the time of death ... and has not waived his or her right.... If the spouse is deceased, the cause of action passes to the next of kin, in order of relation established by the statute governing intestate succession. 174 W.Va. at 463, 327 S.E.2d at 443-44 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). West Virginia Code § 42-1-1 (1995) (Repl. Vol.2010), et seq., governs intestate succession and will provide a framework for a determination of the next of kin entitled to recovery in grave desecration claims. However, as the lower court and the parties to the underlying action have emphasized, the individuals entitled to recovery in a grave desecration case must necessarily be limited in some fashion, rather than requiring an exhaustive search of all living relatives and permitting every living descendant of the decedent to maintain or join a cause of action. This single cause of action principle was explained by this Court in Warner v. Hedrick, 147 W.Va. 262, 126 S.E.2d 371 (1962). In Warner, this Court held that damage to an automobile, damages sustained by Mr. Warner for loss of consortium, and damages for medical expenses incurred as a result of injuries sustained by Mrs. Warner in an automobile accident were the result of a single wrongful act of the defendant and were to be claimed and recovered in one action. The Court explained the concept of a single cause of action rule, as follows: The Courts in a substantial majority of jurisdictions consistently have held that a single wrongful act causing damage to the property and injury to the person of one individual gives rise to only one cause of action against the wrongdoer. 147 W.Va. at 265, 126 S.E.2d at 373. The Warner Court further held that the well established single cause of action rule is supported by logic and is well founded in reason. It accurately manifests the principle that a cause of action inheres in the causative aspect of a breach of legal duty, the wrongful act itself, and not in the various forms of injury which flow therefrom. Id. at 268, 126 S.E.2d at 374. It is authoritatively said, and we agree, that the existence of only one cause of action benefits both plaintiff and defendant. It frees the plaintiff of delay and burdensome expense and relieves the defendant of the injustice of being subjected to more than one suit for a single tort. Furthermore, the rule is in harmony with public policy and the tendency toward simplicity and directness in the determination of controversial rights and the elimination of multiplicity of suits. Id. at 268, 126 S.E.2d at 374-75. Although this Court has not taken the opportunity to apply this single wrongful act concept to a claim of grave desecration, other courts have utilized this principle in explanation for limiting the number of claims available in a grave desecration case. In North East Coal Co. v. Pickelsimer, 253 Ky. 11, 68 S.W.2d 760 (1934), for instance, the court held that [i]t is universally agreed that the right of action of the `next of kin' is a family right, and daughters and sons or brothers and sisters may maintain one action and not a separate action by each one of them. 68 S.W.2d at 763. Similarly, in Holleman v. Elmwood Cemetery Corp., 295 Ala. 267, 327 So.2d 716 (1976), the Alabama court found that all persons who occupy the same degree of kinship to the decedent should join in the same suit. To require otherwise would subject the defendant to numerous suits by different parties for the same cause of action which should be settled in one suit. 327 So.2d at 720. In Hogan v. Woodward Iron Co., 263 Ala. 513, 83 So.2d 248 (1955), the court held that [i]n the event of damage to the grave of a deceased person, the right of action, if any, accrues first to the surviving spouse, unless, of course, there are special circumstances.... If there is no surviving spouse the right is in the next of kin in the order of their relation to the deceased. 83 So.2d at 249. Rule 17(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Additionally, Rule 19 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure requires the joinder of certain persons in the subject litigation. [11] Recognizing these procedural rules in the context of grave desecration cases, the Alabama court in Rhodes Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, 586 So.2d 866 (Ala.1991), explained that the cause of action belonged to the surviving spouse unless that person was deceased. 586 So.2d at 868. The court explained: when there is no surviving spouse ... the right to bring an action for the desecration of a grave vests in the next of kin in the order of their relation to the deceased; and that all individuals occupying the same degree of kin should join in the action so as not to subject the defendant to the risk of a multitude of different actions. Id. (citations omitted). Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court agrees with the answer to the certified question provided by the lower court on the issue of those entitled to recover and holds that the next of kin who possess the right to recover in a common law cause of action for grave desecration shall be the decedent's surviving spouse or, if such spouse is deceased, the person or persons of closest and equal degree of kinship in the order provided by West Virginia Code § 42-1-1, et seq.