Opinion ID: 1311766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Church's Preliminary Arguments

Text: (17) The Church initially contends that all the misrepresentations of which Molko and Leal complain are privileged under Civil Code section 47 as communication[s] without malice, to a person interested therein, ... by one who is also interested.... The point is without merit. Molko and Leal concede that the misrepresentations were communications, and that the Church's intent to recruit Molko and Leal did not reflect a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, as required for a showing of malice. ( Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944 [160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58].) However, they correctly urge that the communications cannot be said to have been from one interested party to another. The Church relies on Brewer v. Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791 [197 P.2d 713], to establish that Molko and Leal were interested parties. But Brewer holds that the common interest of the members of a church in church matters is sufficient to give rise to a qualified privilege to communication between members on subjects relating to the church's interests. ( Id. at p. 796, italics added.) Here the Church has vigorously taken the position that Molko and Leal did not become Church members until after learning of the deceptions. It cannot now inconsistently claim a privilege on the theory that Molko and Leal were members at the time the deceptions occurred. The Church also contends that a statement by Leal in her deposition that certain of her harms were self-inflicted constitutes an admission of consent and therefore provides a complete defense to liability under Civil Code section 3515. This argument is also without merit. Leal's statement relates to her final few weeks with the Church, during which she sold flowers on the streets of Los Angeles from 7 a.m. until midnight for 19 of 20 consecutive days. Leal said the physical harms she experienced were self-inflicted because she was obeying the Church's doctrine of suffering to pay indemnity to God. Viewed in the light most favorable to Leal, as it must be on motion for summary judgment, her statement reflects not consent but mere submission. In any event, since the statement relates to a period of time considerably later than that during which the alleged fraud and brainwashing occurred, it cannot provide a defense to the present action.