Opinion ID: 2620462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Selby possesses a cognizable liberty interest in freedom from restraint that “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). We recently ruled that confinement in administrative segregation for eight years gave rise to a liberty interest, Harris v. Caruso, 465 F. App’x 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2012), and we have no difficulty holding that under the facts of this case thirteen years gives rise to a liberty interest. Cf. Heard v. Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1, 8–9 (6th Cir. 2009) (reversing summary judgment for defendants where genuine issue of material fact existed on whether indefinite confinement to administrative segregation gave rise to a liberty interest). The pivotal question is whether a jury must decide if Selby received the process due to him. We know from longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence that prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review while an inmate is confined in administrative segregation, and that the officials’ decision to continue such confinement must be supported by “some evidence.” See Harris, 465 F. App’x at 484 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983), and Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)). In Harris, due process was satisfied as a matter of law because the evidence confirmed that the inmate “received meaningful, periodic reviews” and the decision to continue indefinite confinement in administrative segregation was supported by “some evidence.” Harris, 465 F. App’x at 485 (emphasis added). That is not the situation here. Genuine issues of material fact exist on this record concerning whether Selby received meaningful periodic reviews and whether the prison officials’ decision to continue No. 13-1248 Selby v. Caruso, et al. Page 7 Selby’s confinement in administrative segregation for nearly thirteen years was supported by “some evidence.” Without question, Selby presented a very serious security risk when he was placed in administrative segregation. Even Selby admits that. Our task, however, is to determine whether the complete factual record is so one-sided that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the due process claim. We conclude that it is not. Both sides submitted conflicting affidavits about what was said and done during the thirteen years of periodic reviews. Some of the documents support Selby’s assertion that he was subject to a CFA hold, leading to a reasonable inference that the periodic reviews conducted by lower-level prison staff were perfunctory and meaningless, as Selby argues. Selby also argues that, once the CPA denies a prisoner release from segregation, the prisoner must remain in segregation a minimum of an additional six months, rendering the monthly reviews during that time a sham. On the other hand, the CFA hold may have had nothing to do with Selby’s administrative segregation status, as the defendants contend. There are other material disputes of fact, including whether Selby’s four misconduct reports over a period of ten years supplied support for the decision to retain him in administrative segregation, whether the decision to override his qualification for a lower security classification in 2010 was warranted, and whether the aging escape history justified continued restraint in administrative segregation for a period of thirteen years. The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because they are protected by qualified immunity. To overcome this defense, Selby must show (1) the violation of a constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. See Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). “When no facts are in dispute, whether an official receives qualified immunity is a question of law.” Id. But in this case, as in Dominguez, facts are in dispute, precluding summary judgment for the defendants. Id. at 550–52. “Whether a given process is meaningful for the purposes of the Due Process Clause is a question of fact.” Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 2011). In No. 13-1248 Selby v. Caruso, et al. Page 8 Williams, where an Arkansas inmate was held in administrative segregation for fourteen years, the Eighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that “there remains an unresolved fact issue on this record as to whether Williams actually received meaningful reviews, rather than sham reviews, as he contends.” Williams v. Norris, 277 F. App’x 647, 649 (8th Cir. 2008). Similarly, this record contains unresolved disputes of fact. Furthermore, since Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983), prison officials have been on notice that “administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate.” Thus, Selby may be able to show that a reasonable prison official should have known that he could not be confined in administrative segregation for pretextual reasons. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010)(noting that the contours of a constitutional right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable governmental official would understand that what he is doing violates that right). Because Selby satisfies both requirements for overcoming the qualified immunity defense, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Dominguez, 555 F.3d at 550–52 (holding that a prisoner’s right to adequate medical care was clearly established and genuine issues of material fact regarding the violation of that right precluded summary judgment). To prove liability under § 1983 at trial, Selby must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that each defendant, acting with intent, deliberate indifference, or gross negligence, deprived him of meaningful periodic reviews during his confinement in administrative segregation. See Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1350–52 (6th Cir. 1996).
We turn next to Selby’s claims concerning his religious freedom. Selby alleges in his complaint that he is a devout Christian who was deprived of the right to practice his religious beliefs through participation in group worship services while he was confined in administrative segregation. In the appellate briefs, he presented argument No. 13-1248 Selby v. Caruso, et al. Page 9 only on his RLUIPA claim, so we deem the First Amendment claim abandoned. See Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 2010). Selby’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief under RLUIPA became moot when he was released into the general prison population at MBP. See Colvin, 605 F.3d at 289; Berryman v. Granholm, 343 F. App’x 1, 4–5 (6th Cir. 2009). In addition, Selby cannot state a claim against the State of Michigan for damages under RLUIPA. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658–59 (2011); Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2009). Finally, our court has not ruled on whether RLUIPA authorizes a prisoner to pursue damages against prison officials who are sued in their individual capacities, see Heard v. Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1, 13 n.5 (6th Cir. 2009), but we need not resolve that issue here. Having carefully reviewed the RLUIPA claim, we agree with the district court’s reasons for granting summary judgment to the defendants on that claim.