Opinion ID: 2816279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts 1 and 2: First Amendment Claims

Text: We first address Anzaldua’s argument that the district court erred in finding the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. “We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to [Anzaldua], the nonmoving party.” McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2009). We will affirm “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The two prongs of our qualified immunity analysis require us to answer (1) whether the facts alleged demonstrate a violation of the employee’s constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the employee’s firing. Hemminghaus v. Missouri, 756 F.3d 1100, 1110 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865-66 (2014)). This case can be resolved solely under the first prong. “The inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983). We use the first prong to determine whether a First Amendment violation occurred. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (“[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”). The heart of this determination is the Pickering balancing test, under which we balance “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. -13- Before we reach the Pickering balancing test, though, we make two preliminary inquiries to ensure that the employee and the employer each has an interest to balance. The first inquiry is to determine “whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. “If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises.” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]f the possibility of a First Amendment claim has arisen,” then our second inquiry is to “‘ask whether [the employer] has produced evidence to indicate the speech had an adverse impact on the efficiency of the [employer’s] operations.’” Hemminghaus, 756 F.3d at 1111 (alterations in original) (quoting Lindsey v. City of Orrick, Mo., 491 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2007)). If the employer shows a sufficient adverse impact, then we proceed to the Pickering balancing test. If it does not, then the qualified immunity defense must fail. Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2000).
Anzaldua argues his Holland email was a matter of public concern because it implicated the misuse of public monies and both firefighter and public safety. The defendants respond that Anzaldua simply aired personal employment grievances. “To determine whether speech qualifies as a matter of public concern, we must examine the content, form and context of the speech, as revealed by the whole record.” Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2002). “‘When speech relates both to an employee’s private interests as well as matters of public concern, the speech is protected if it is primarily motivated by public concern.’” McCullough, 559 F.3d at 866 (quoting Altonen v. City of Minneapolis, 487 F.3d 554, 559 (8th Cir. 2007)). “If the main motivation for the speech was furthering [the employee’s] -14- ‘private interests rather than to raise issues of public concern, her speech is not protected, even if the public would have an interest in the topic of her speech.’” Altonen, 487 F.3d at 559 (quoting Bailey v. Dep’t of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514, 518 (8th Cir. 2006)). Here, we are skeptical that Anzaldua’s email was primarily motivated by public concern, especially considering that he sent the email just days after being suspended and that the email singled out Chief Farwell, with whom Anzaldua had, in the words of the district court, “an already strained relationship.” However, we need not decide whether Anzaldua’s email was primarily motivated by public concern because we believe Anzaldua’s claims fail under the Pickering balancing test. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 680 (1994) (plurality opinion) (declining to decide whether employee’s speech was on a matter of public concern where the “potential disruptiveness of the speech . . . was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value it might have had”). Thus we proceed to the next step in our inquiry.
Anzaldua argues the defendants can satisfy this step only if they present specific evidence of actual disruption. However, “‘[e]vidence of actual disruption . . . is not required in all cases.’” Bailey, 451 F.3d at 521 (alterations in original) (quoting Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1344 (8th Cir. 1993)); see also Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 1995) (“A showing of actual disruption is not always required in the balancing process under Pickering.”). This is because “‘we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.’” Hemminghaus, 756 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152). Thus “‘[w]e have consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large.’” Id. (quoting -15- Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (plurality opinion) (“Few of the examples we have discussed involve tangible, present interference with the agency’s operation. The danger in them is mostly speculative.”)). And “‘we have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public concern.’” Id. (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (plurality opinion)).3 Further, a fire department, as a public safety organization, “has a more significant interest than the typical government employer in regulating the speech activities of its employees in order ‘to promote efficiency, foster loyalty and obedience to superior officers, maintain morale, and instill public confidence’ in its ability.” Shands, 993 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1419 (8th Cir. 1983)). “‘When lives may be at stake in a fire, an espirit de corps is essential to the success of the joint endeavor.’” Id. at 1344-45 (quoting Janusaitis v. 3 We recognize some Eighth Circuit cases seem to support Anzaldua’s argument that employers must always present specific evidence of actual disruption. See, e.g., Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 882 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Where, as here, the employer has failed to demonstrate any disruption, there is no balancing to be done and the evidentiary failure is fatal to the claim of qualified immunity.”). To the extent these cases represent a split among panels in our circuit, we note that Anzaldua fails to cite, and we have failed to locate, any case supporting his argument that predates Germann v. City of Kan. City, 776 F.2d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1985) (“It is not necessary ‘for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.’” (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 )); see Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[W]hen faced with conflicting panel opinions, the earliest opinion must be followed as it should have controlled the subsequent panels that created the conflict.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, we recently observed that Supreme Court precedent places in question the soundness of the cases that suggest employers must present specific evidence of actual disruption. See Hemminghaus, 756 F.3d at 1112 n.10 (citing Waters, 511 U.S. at 673; and Connick, 461 U.S. at 152). -16- Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 1979)). Thus we give “considerable judicial deference” to the defendants’ determination that Anzaldua’s “speech had caused or would cause dissension and disruption.” Id. at 1345. Moreover, although we do not require actual evidence of disruption in all cases, it exists here. Three firefighters submitted declarations showing the disruption Anzaldua’s email caused. Lieutenant Barbarotto explained she was “shocked both by the contents of the email . . . and that [Anzaldua] would send” it. She stated the email “angered” many firefighters, who worried it would “make [them] a public laughing stock.” Two battalion chiefs similarly reported the email “shocked and irritated many firefighters in the District” and “fostered division between Anzaldua and his co-workers, and between the District firefighters and [Chief] Farwell.” Anzaldua’s email also attacked Chief Farwell personally, accusing him of shutting down pumpers, prioritizing his business over his firefighters’ safety, and violating the Fire District’s vehicle use and cell phone policies. See Bailey, 451 F.3d at 521 (“The letter accused Bailey’s superiors of fraud and legal and ethical violations. Such accusations are sufficient evidence of potential workplace disruption.”). Thus this is not a case where the Fire District had no supporting evidence of disruption or relied on its own “[m]ere allegations of disruption.” Sexton, 210 F.3d at 912; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (giving deference to supervisor’s determination of disruption because “[w]hen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate”). Viewed in light of the considerable deference we owe the Fire District’s determination of actual or potential disruption, we find the defendants satisfy this step.
We consider six interrelated factors when balancing Anzaldua’s interest in speech against the Fire District’s interest in promoting the efficient operation of the -17- fire department: (1) the need for harmony in the work place; (2) whether the government’s responsibilities require a close working relationship; (3) the time, manner, and place of the speech; (4) the context in which the dispute arose; (5) the degree of public interest in the speech; and (6) whether the speech impeded the employee’s ability to perform his or her duties. Hemminghaus, 756 F.3d at 1113-14. “[T]he Pickering balance is flexible and the weight to be given to any factor varies depending on the circumstances of the case.” Germann v. City of Kan. City, 776 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1985). Applying these factors, we agree with the district court that “the balance weighs in favor of [the] defendants.” R. Doc. 63, at 18. Of critical importance is the principle, discussed above, that we show substantial deference both to the Fire District’s determination that Anzaldua’s email “had caused or would cause dissension and disruption,” and to its “response to the actual or perceived disruption.” Shands, 993 F.2d at 1345. As noted, “‘[w]hen lives may be at stake in a fire, an espirit de corps is essential to the success of the joint endeavor.’” Id. at 1344-45 (quoting Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 26). The Fire District also worked with other nearby fire departments and needed those firefighters to trust Chief Farwell. Thus we find the district court correctly concluded “Mays and Lee reasonably believed [Anzaldua’s] speech was an attempt to undermine Farwell’s authority and had led, or would lead, to disruption in the department.” R. Doc. 63, at 18. Moreover, it is clear Anzaldua emailed Holland just days after being placed on what he claims was an unjustified suspension and that Anzaldua’s relationship with Chief Farwell had been contentious for months. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 153 (“When employee speech . . . arises from an employment dispute[,] . . . additional weight must be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office.”). Although there is no suggestion Anzaldua emailed Holland during work hours or from the fire station, see id. (finding employee’s preparing and distributing questionnaire at office supported employer’s -18- conclusion that speech would endanger office functioning), Anzaldua did go outside the chain of command when he secretly emailed a reporter. Fire District employees reacted negatively to this exposure. Further, the degree of public interest in Anzaldua’s statements was minimal. The Fire District instituted minimum manning procedures due to budget constraints and decided to run one pumper so it could operate two ambulances. There is no evidence this choice affected the Fire District’s provision of services. The Fire District was in the process of testing and purchasing new SCBAs. And neither of these issues was “at the center of public debate.” Shands, 993 F.2d at 1346. The purchase of new vehicles had been discussed at a public Board meeting, and the expired narcotics licenses similarly had been discussed a public meeting in Jefferson City. The public had even less interest in Anzaldua’s attack on Chief Farwell for making permitted use of his work vehicle and in his complaint about not being allowed union representation, which, while literally true, was misleading because he had been offered and in fact accepted the help of a union representative. Although there is no suggestion Anzaldua’s email impeded his ability to perform his duties as a paramedic and firefighter, this factor does not outweigh the others. See id. (stating that “this factor is not determinative” and finding Pickering factors favored employer even though there was no evidence employees’ job performance had been hindered). In sum, we find the Pickering factors favor the defendants and thus agree with the district court that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate Anzaldua’s First Amendment right to free speech.
We next address Anzaldua’s argument that the district court erred in denying his Rule 56(d) motion. Anzaldua argues the defendants’ qualified immunity argument depended on their assertion that he made false statements in the Holland -19- email and thus that it was essential for him to show those statements were true. He argues he was unable to prove his statements’ veracity because the case management order prevented him from conducting discovery before responding to the summary judgment motion. He suggests that if he had been allowed to depose the defendants’ witnesses and discover documents in the defendants’ possession—he requested the district court allow him an additional 4 to 5 months of discovery and 21 days on top of that to respond to the summary judgment motion—then he could have proven his statements’ truth. We review the denial of a Rule 56(d) motion for an abuse of discretion. Toben v. Bridgestone Retail Operations, LLC, 751 F.3d 888, 894 (8th Cir. 2014). Under Rule 56(d), a court may defer considering a summary judgment motion or allow time for discovery “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specific reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). However, Rule 56 “does not require trial courts to allow parties to conduct discovery before entering summary judgment.” United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Light, 766 F.2d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Thus district courts possess “wide discretion in denying” Rule 56(d) motions. Toben, 751 F.3d at 895. “[A] district court’s [Rule 56(d)] discretion is further restricted when a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity is at issue.” Jones v. City & Cnty. of Denver, Colo., 854 F.2d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). This restriction reflects the concern “that insubstantial claims against government officials be resolved prior to discovery and on summary judgment if possible.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Janis v. Biesheuvel, 428 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not simply from liability.”). It is not enough for a party to “set forth some facts she ‘hope[s] to elicit from further discovery.’” Toben, 751 F.3d at 895 (alteration in original) (quoting Cal. ex -20- rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Subs. Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998)). And “the mere assertion that evidence supporting a party’s allegation is in the opposing party’s hands is insufficient to justify a denial of a summary judgment motion on [Rule 56(d)] grounds.” Jones, 854 F.2d at 1211. Instead, the party must “show[] ‘that the facts sought exist.’” Toben, 751 F.3d at 895 (quoting Campbell, 138 F.3d at 779); see also Janis, 428 F.3d at 800 (“‘A party invoking [Rule 56(d)’s] protections must do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he cannot respond to a movant’s affidavits as otherwise required . . . and how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.’” (quoting William Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1975))). Here, we find unavailing Anzaldua’s argument that he needed additional discovery to respond to the documents and declarations the defendants submitted in support of their summary judgment motion. First, we note that Anzaldua failed to show why it was essential for the court to determine whether each of his statements was true or not. Second, we note that while the case management order did not require initial disclosures be completed until after resolution of the summary judgment motion, neither did it prohibit Anzaldua from conducting discovery. Third, even assuming the truth or falsity of Anzaldua’s statements was essential to his defense, Anzaldua fails to show he would benefit from further discovery because he cannot show facts exist that would prove the veracity of his statements in the Holland email. That is to say, he cannot state with specificity what evidence further discovery would uncover. His Rule 56(d) affidavit simply asserted that if he could depose witnesses and discover documents, then he could prove his statements were true and thus that the defendants violated his First Amendment rights. Such an unspecific assertion is insufficient under Rule 56(d). See Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1041 (8th Cir. 1997) (“‘Rule 56([d]) does not condone a fishing expedition’ where a plaintiff merely hopes to uncover some possible evidence of a constitutional violation.” (quoting Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997))), -21- abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). We find the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in denying Anzaldua’s Rule 56(d) motion.
Because the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Fire District although it failed to join the summary judgment motion. Once the district court determined no First Amendment violation had occurred, it was proper for the district court to enter summary judgment for all defendants facing identical First Amendment claims. See Madewell v. Downs, 68 F.3d 1030, 1050 (8th Cir. 1995).