Opinion ID: 867440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: independent review of death sentence

Text: ¶ 52 This court is required by statute not only to review all death sentences, but also to perform a separate, independent review of each aggravating factor found by the jury and any mitigating evidence for the purpose of determining the propriety of the death penalty: The supreme court shall review all death sentences. On review, the supreme court shall independently review the trial court's findings of aggravation and mitigation and the propriety of the death sentence.
¶ 53 Although Cromwell has not raised a question about the independent review process and the propriety of the death sentence, the statutory mandate to this court is clear: If the supreme court determines that an error was made regarding a finding of aggravation or mitigation, the supreme court shall independently determine if the mitigation the supreme court finds is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of the existing aggravation. If the supreme court finds that the mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency, the supreme court shall affirm the death sentence. If the supreme court finds that the mitigation is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency, the supreme court shall impose a life sentence pursuant to § 13-703, subsection A. A.R.S. § 13-703.04(B). This language is identical to superseded A.R.S. § 13-703.01(B), which was applicable during the time trial judges performed the entire sentencing function. Under the superseded statute, we determined that in the process of conducting this court's independent review, we consider the quality and the strength [of the aggravating and mitigating factors], not simply the number. State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 443, ¶ 60, 967 P.2d 106, 118 (1998). Because of the identical statutory language, our role in the independent review process has not been altered. We therefore proceed as before. ¶ 54 Reviewing the capital aggravators in this case is not complex. The jury found two in support of the death penalty: 1) that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner [6] (A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6)); and 2) that the victim was under the age of fifteen years (A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(9)). These aggravators were essentially uncontested. [7] ¶ 55 The record is replete with evidence of cruelty. Stephanie, the eleven-year-old victim, unquestionably suffered unspeakable mental anguish, given the medical examiner's finding that she was still alive at the time of the stabbing injuries and the sexual assault. The crimes committed by Cromwell against the child bespeak horrific cruelty. Eleven-year-old Stephanie, given her tender age, was made to suffer pre-death anguish by conduct indescribable except in the most repulsive terms. ¶ 56 In Greene, although there was but one aggravator and several mitigators, we concluded that the evidence of mitigation was nevertheless insufficient to warrant leniency and upheld the death sentence. Id. at 443-44, ¶ 60, 967 P.2d at 118-19. In reweighing the aggravators and mitigators as required by the statute, we have uniformly focused on the quality, not the quantity, of the factors. See, e.g., State v. Rogovich, 188 Ariz. 38, 45-46, 932 P.2d 794, 801-02 (1997) (holding that the quality of three aggravators outweighed the value of six mitigators and that the death penalty was appropriate). ¶ 57 The mitigating factors, consisting of Cromwell's less than adequate childhood experiences and his mental state, were remarkably weak. Weighed against the aggravating factors, the evidence of mitigation deserves inconsequential weight. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence of mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency.