Opinion ID: 900041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting prior bad acts evidence involving three sexual assaults committed by moeller in 1973, 1979, and 1990?

Text: [¶ 139] I respectfully dissent as to the rationale and result of Issue One. I would affirm the trial court on this evidentiary ruling. SDCL 19-12-5 provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. [¶ 140] The trial court admitted the testimony of Moeller's attacks upon Carolyn Beshaw in 1973, Kenneth Moore in 1979 and Tracy Warner in 1990. In so doing, the trial court correctly applied the two criteria necessary to make such a decision: (1) Whether the intended purpose for offering the other acts evidence is relevant to some material issue in the case, and (2) Whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. State v. Werner, 482 N.W.2d 286, 288 (S.D.1992)(citing State v. Basker, 468 N.W.2d 413, 415 (S.D.1991)). The trial court found the evidence was relevant to show common method, plan or scheme, intent, identity, and motive and that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [¶ 141] Crucial to analysis of this issue is the standard of review. A trial court's determination to admit other acts evidence will not be overruled absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Larson 512 N.W.2d 732, 736 (S.D. 1994); State v. McDonald, 500 N.W.2d 243, 245 (S.D.1993); Werner, 482 N.W.2d at 288. An abuse of discretion has been defined by this Court as a decision which is not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence. We will not reverse a decision if `we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.' Dakota Cheese v. Taylor, 525 N.W.2d 713, 715 (S.D.1995) (citations omitted); State v. Erickson, 525 N.W.2d 703, 710 (S.D.1994). Upon review ... we must be careful not to substitute our reasoning for that of the trial court. Larson, 512 N.W.2d at 736. Thus, the question is not whether, had we been the trial judge, we would have admitted the prior bad acts evidence but whether the trial court sitting in this case abused its discretion by doing so. Id.; State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424, 426 (S.D.1986). [¶ 142] Unfortunately, the majority devotes only a single sentence to this standard upon which the entire issue hinges before proceeding into a lengthy analysis which is more appropriate to a de novo review rather than applying the abuse of discretion criteria cited above. This is most clearly established by the fact that in the entire text of this discussion, the majority devotes not a single paragraph to an analysis of the similarities between the attack on Becky and the prior bad acts. Instead, the majority focuses entirely on perceived dissimilarities and justifications not to affirm the trial court rather than balancing the facts that weigh for or against admission and applying an in-depth abuse of discretion review.