Opinion ID: 796408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Symmetry

Text: 140 The majority argues that the work-product protection of Rule 16(a)(2) should be read symmetrically with other discovery obligations under Rule 16. The majority takes this term from Armstrong, in which the Supreme Court construed the then-current version of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) symmetrically. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462, 116 S.Ct. 1480. The defendant had sought to prove selective prosecution by the government, and had accordingly sought discovery of documents in other cases brought by the government. The defendant relied on his entitlement, under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), to documents . . . which are within the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial[.] Fed. R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(C) (1996) (emphasis added). The Court held that these documents were not discoverable, concluding that the defendant's defense, within the meaning of Rule 16(a)(1)(C), was symmetrical to the government's evidence in chief. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462, 116 S.Ct. 1480. Since the defense of selective prosecution would not be presented as responsive to the government's case in chief, information material to that defense was not discoverable at trial. 141 I agree with the majority that symmetry is relevant to the construction of Rule 16. But the majority seeks to create symmetry where none should exist. Worse, it ignores the symmetry that clearly does exist. I first respond to the majority's erroneous symmetry arguments. I then point out the symmetry that the majority ignores.
142
143 The majority argues that because physical possession is the dispositive factor in determining whether material is discoverable under the Jencks Act and Rule 16(a)(1)(E), symmetry requires that it also be the test for whether documents are excepted from discovery under the work-product protection of Rule 16(a)(2). Majority Op. at 1116. This argument ignores the plain language of Rule 16(a)(2), which protects only internal documents . . . made by the federal government. On its face, this category of documents is not coterminous with documents in the possession (Jencks Act), or possession, custody, or control (Rule 16(a)(1)(E)), of the federal government. Rather, it represents a narrower subset of them. 144 Moreover, the result of the majority's argument is absurd. Like Rule 16(a)(1)(A), the Jencks Act and Rule 16(a)(1)(E) are discovery rules requiring disclosure. By contrast, Rule 16(a)(2) is an exception to a rule requiring disclosure. Reading an exception so that its scope is identical to the rule that it modifies makes no sense. In that event, the exception entirely obliterates the rule. This is why the Supreme Court has counseled not that exceptions be read as symmetrical to rules, but rather that they be read narrowly. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455. 145
146 The majority argues that it would create an asymmetry to protect Form 302 reports made by FBI agents under Rule 16(a)(2), but not to protect similar reports created by state or local police officers. Majority Op. at 1119. This difference in treatment is, indeed, an asymmetry. But it is one clearly contemplated by the work-product protection of Rule 16(a)(2). The difference in treatment between FBI reports and state and local police reports reflects the distinction, fundamental to the work-product exception, between documents made by a party or its agent, which are protected, and documents created by a non-party, which are not. The purpose of the work-product exception—to give parties freedom and incentive to develop their own cases, see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239-40, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)—simply is not promoted by shielding from discovery materials in an attorney's possession that were prepared neither by the attorney nor his agents. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 318 F.3d at 384. 147
148 The majority ignores the obvious symmetry between Rule 16(a)(2) and the parallel provision in Rule 16(b)(2). Rule 16(a)(2) protects the work product of the government. Rule 16(b)(2) protects the work product of the defendant. In relevant part, Rule 16(a)(2) protects against the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the government or other government agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case. In relevant part, Rule 16(b)(2) protects against discovery or inspection of . . . reports, memoranda, or other documents made by the defendant, or the defendant's attorney or agent, during the case's investigation or defense[.] That Rule 16(a)(2) and Rule 16(b)(2) share nearly identical texts is consistent with the rulemakers' broader intent that Rule 16 create reciprocal discovery rights and obligations between the government and the defendant. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 advisory committee's note (1975, 1993, and 1997 Amendments). 149 Symmetry demands that if the government is allowed, under Rule 16(a)(2), to refuse to disclose any document that comes into its possession, custody, or control, regardless whether it was made by a federal agent, defendants should be afforded comparable protection from disclosure by Rule 16(b)(2). But I find it difficult to believe that either the government or the majority would support such a symmetrical reading where documents in the possession of the defense are at issue and are otherwise discoverable under Rule 16.