Opinion ID: 2321578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Error Affect Appellants' Substantial Rights?

Text: The Supreme Court has explained that the standard phrased as `error that affects substantial rights,' ... has... been taken to mean error with a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). The measure is, similar[] to the Kotteakos formulation in requiring the showing of a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (quotation omitted). However, unlike in cases of preserved error where the government bears the burden of showing that trial error was harmless, under plain error review, it is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see Kidd v. United States, 940 A.2d 118, 127 (D.C.2007) (noting that appellant failed to satisfy third prong of plain error test because [g]iven the government's proof ... there was no reasonable probability that the incorrect aiding and abetting instruction had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of [appellant's] trial.). In short, appellants must show that they likely would not have been convicted of first-degree murder absent the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction. In assessing the impact of the erroneous jury instruction in this case, it is important to remember that none of the appellants inflicted the fatal stab wound and, indeed, there is no evidence at all that any of them had knives or stabbed Helm. The evidence was that they chased, beat and kicked Helm, as part of the group of those who stabbed him. Therefore, the government's sole theory of appellants' liability for murder was as aiders and abettors. [61] The prosecutor emphasized this theory to the jury explaining that it was based on assisting or helping the actual killers. [62] Aiding and abetting liability for murder requires a principal who committed the killing, Tyree v. United States, 942 A.2d 629, 636-37 (D.C.2008); here, the principals appear to have been Velásquez and Ventura, who were not codefendants in this case. The prosecutor specifically told the jurors that so long as they found that the principals had acted with premeditation and deliberation, they could find appellants guilty as aiders and abettors: Now some of you are saying, well, are you saying that for each and every one of these guys, we have to conclude that this is premeditated and deliberate? Now remember we've told you all along that our theory of the case is that these men are aiding and abetting. So all you have to do is conclude that the principals in this case, the guys who actually put the knives in Mr. Helm, Catinga [Velásquez] and Douglas [Ventura], that they premeditated and deliberated. (emphasis added.) On this record, we have no difficulty in concluding that the instructional error affected appellants' substantial rights.