Opinion ID: 660991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deputation of the BCPD Officers

Text: 31 The appellants next assert that the intercepted communications should have been suppressed by the district court because DEA failed to follow rules and regulations for properly deputizing local officers to help monitor wiretaps. 12 The normal procedure for deputizing local officers includes the DEA's submission of names to DEA headquarters and approval by the Department of Justice (DOJ). In an emergency, though, the DEA can deputize local officers without the approval of DOJ. In this instance, the appellants contend that the emergency deputations were faulty because Medina had not been delegated the authority to further delegate the performance of emergency deputations and because DEA failed to follow its own deputation procedures.
32 Congress has authorized the Attorney General of the United States (USAG) to empower DEA employees and state and local police officers to carry out certain types of law enforcement functions, including making arrests and carrying firearms. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 878. Pursuant to this power, the USAG has delegated to the DEA Administrator his power to enlist the assistance of state and local police. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 0.100(b). Furthermore, the DEA Administrator may redelegate his deputation power to his subordinates. See id. Sec. 0.104. 33 Here the appellants assert that Medina had not been delegated this authority from the DEA Administrator, John Lawn. The United States presented evidence in the form of affidavits, an internal DEA memorandum, and testimony to support its position that Lawn had given Medina this deputation authority. The memorandum, 13 which was dated October 3, 1989, provided: 34 [a]dditionally, emergency verbal approvals for deputization can now be granted by the Chief, DEA Task Force Section, thereby bypassing, for timesaving reasons, the heretofore additional step of approval from the Administrative Director of ODCETF at the Department of Justice. 35 J.A. 307. The district court found beyond any doubt whatsoever that the delegation from Lawn to Medina, who was the Chief, DEA Task Force Section, had taken place. J.A. 376. The appellants continue to assert though that this memorandum was insufficient to constitute delegation because it had not appeared in the Federal Register and came from a subordinate of the Administrator (Westrate), not the Administrator himself. Congress, through the Administrative Procedure Act generally requires that an agency publish certain information in the Federal Register, including a description of its organization, its methods, its rules of procedure, and its substantive rules. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(1). Courts have interpreted this section to require publication of matters which if not published would adversely affect a member of the public. Hogg v. United States, 428 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971) (citing legislative history); see also United States v. Fitch Oil Co., 676 F.2d 673 (Temp. Emer. Ct.App.1982); United States v. Goodman, 605 F.2d 870, 887-88 (5th Cir.1979). In both Hogg and Fitch Oil, the courts addressed whether the failure to publish internal delegations of authority adversely affected a member of the public; in both instances they held that it did not. We are in agreement with these precedents and therefore hold that DEA's failure to timely publish this delegation in the Federal Register did not have an adverse impact upon the appellants. 36 Likewise, we find without merit the appellants' suggestion that the delegation was improper because it came from a memorandum written by Westrate instead of the Administrator himself since the memorandum was obviously announcing a policy that the DEA Administrator knew of and had approved. Therefore, we find no error in the district court's determination that the DEA Administrator had delegated his authority to deputize local police officers to Medina.
37 The appellants contend that even if proper delegation to Medina occurred the DEA's failure to follow proper procedure in effectuating the deputations is cause to suppress the intercepted communications. The alleged procedural errors include (1) that no emergency existed, (2) that Medina had not been supplied the names of the local officers when he gave approval, (3) that no confirmatory paperwork was sent to DEA headquarters, (4) that no record of the approval was logged at DEA headquarters, (5) that certain follow-up forms were not submitted as required by the October 3 memorandum, (6) that no certification regarding the good standing of the BCPD officers was made, and (7) that the BCPD officers did not sign a DEA nondisclosure agreement. 38 The district court found and we agree that the DEA failed to comply with all the procedures for deputizing the BCPD officers. The evidence is clear that, contrary to DEA practice, the BCPD names were not given to Medina when he authorized their deputations; that no confirmatory paperwork was ever received by DEA headquarters; that the approval for deputization was never received at DEA headquarters as the October 3 memorandum required; that no written S/L 4 & 5's were immediately submitted as required by the October 3 memorandum; that no certificate of good standing was filed for the BCPD officers at the time of the emergency deputization; and that no nondisclosure agreement was presented to the BCPD officers in December 1989. Thus, we find no error in the district court's conclusion that the DEA did not dot all its i's or cross all its t's. 39 We furthermore agree with the district court, though, that the failure of the DEA to follow each of its internal regulations does not provide this court with grounds to suppress the tapes of the otherwise substantively valid wiretaps. The Supreme Court has clearly held that a court need not exclude evidence obtained in violation of an agency's regulations or rules where neither the Constitution nor statute require adoption of any particular procedures. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). While Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.Sec. 2510 et seq., regulates nonconsensual electronic surveillance, the appellants have offered no portion of that law which requires DEA to establish these procedural safeguards. Furthermore, we are of a similar view as the district court that even if these violations were grounds for relief that the appellants were not prejudiced by them in the least. Appellants have failed to demonstrate any prejudice to them arising out of the procedural irregularities. Similarly, they have failed to demonstrate that the integrity of the wiretap results was affected in any way by the sloppy deputations. This comports with the Supreme Court's view that suppression is required only for a failure to satisfy those Title III requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situation clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary device. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433-34 (1977). The DEA shortcomings in regard to the deputations, while inexcusable, are not direct or substantial Title III requirements as would require suppression. We therefore reject the appellants' argument that the intercepts should have been suppressed because of the faulty deputations.
40 The appellants' third argument in favor of suppressing the intercepts is that the DEA failed to properly supervise the monitoring of the wiretaps by the BCPD officers because a DEA agent was not present during approximately 25% of the intercepts. Again, the appellants assert that this violated internal DEA requirements. 41 The trial judge found that after the wiretaps began, supervision was adequate. This finding was based on evidence that Special Agent David Rivello, the supervising DEA agent for the wiretap, was on duty 117 of the 120 days that the wiretap was operational; that he was on duty each day on which defendants claimed the BCPD officers were not supervised; that Agent Rivello typically worked from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m.; that his desk was located in the monitoring room; that he and other DEA agents were always accessible by phone, pager, or radio; and that at least six other DEA agents were working within 25 yards of the monitoring room. We agree with the district court that it is not necessary for a DEA person to be physically there while the ministerial act kind of work is being done, so long as he is available, and in touch, and can make the discretionary kind of decisions that he is called on to make. J.A. 367-68. We therefore deny the appellants' challenge to the wiretaps on this grounds.