Opinion ID: 2553473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: prosecutorial misstatement

Text: Appellant makes two arguments in support of his claim of error. First, appellant argues prosecutorial misstatement, contending that the trial court committed non-harmless error when it failed to grant a mistrial based on the government's representing in opening statement that evidence adverse to the defense would be introduced and then choosing not to offer that evidence. The decision whether to grant a motion for a mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 283 (D.C.2007). Our review is therefore for abuse of discretion. Najafi v. United States, 886 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C. 2005). We will reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial only where it appears irrational, unreasonable, or so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. United States, 779 A.2d 297, 302 (D.C.2001) (internal citations omitted). Appellant argues that the prosecutor's statement in this case warranted a mistrial because [t]he jury was . . . made aware of the Kenilworth Avenue story without the prosecutor ever having to put on evidence, subject to cross-examination and other defense challenges, about the statement. When the defense seeks reversal on the basis of a remark made by a prosecutor, a two-pronged inquiry is made. We must first consider whether the challenged remark was improper. Munn v. United States, 703 A.2d 1239, 1241 (D.C. 1997). Even if it was, a new trial is required only when the defendant suffered substantial prejudice as a result. Id. (internal citations omitted). We conclude that appellant's claim fails because he cannot show substantial prejudice from the remark. We have stated that an opening statement consisting of an objective summary of evidence which the prosecution reasonably expected to introduce, although at variance with the evidence actually introduced at trial, need not be cause for reversal. Augburn v. United States, 514 A.2d 452, 454 (D.C.1986) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [T]he law does not require that opening trial statements be completely supported by evidence introduced during the trial. Such a rule, rigidly enforced, would effectively eliminate opening remarks and deprive the jury of a very useful outline of the trial. Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C.1985) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 361 A.2d 199, 200 (D.C. 1976)). [T]he failure to sustain all opening remarks during the trial is not automatically ground for a new trial. The decision is discretionary and is for the trial judge. Robinson, 361 A.2d at 200 (quoting Mares v. United States, 409 F.2d 1083, 1085 (10th Cir.1968)). In Owens, the defendants were charged with assault with intent to commit armed robbery. 497 A.2d at 1088-89. The evidence showed the defendants approached the complaining witness in an alley with pistols at their sides and said, This is it, and, referring to the pistol, you know what it is. Id. at 1089. During the prosecutor's opening statement, he mischaracterized the words as You know what this is? Give it up! Id. at 1091. He qualified his statement by saying, words to that effect. Id. We determined that there was no reversible error because, following standards established in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969), (1) the remark was made in opening statement and not during the trial, (2) the jury was instructed that opening statements are not evidence, (3) the instruction did not require the jurors to perform mental gymnasticssuch as would be required if a jury were asked to consider a confession as evidence against only one codefendant and not against the other, and (4) the remark was not touted to the jury as critical. Owens, 497 A.2d at 1092 (citing Frazier, 394 U.S. at 735-36, 89 S.Ct. 1420). [6] In Frazier itself, the Supreme Court considered a misstatement by a prosecutor about testimony a codefendant would provide. 394 U.S. at 733, 89 S.Ct. 1420. The codefendant invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. Id. at 734, 89 S.Ct. 1420. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall observed that the prosecutor's statement took only a few minutes to recite and was sandwiched between a summary of petitioner's own confession and a description of the circumstantial evidence the State would introduce. Id. at 733, 89 S.Ct. 1420. Using the analysis we later quoted in deciding Owens, the Court rejected the appellant's claim that the usual instruction that statements from counsel are not evidence was insufficient to guard against any prejudice the statement created. Id. at 735, 89 S.Ct. 1420. Frazier and Owens are controlling here, where the misstatement was confined to opening, it was not touted to the jury as critical, and a general instruction that opening statements are not evidence was givennot once but three times. We may presume that the jury understood and followed the court's instructions. Ginyard v. United States, 816 A.2d 21, 30 (D.C. 2003); Hall v. United States, 84 U.S.App. D.C. 209, 211, 171 F.2d 347, 349, (1948); see also Frazier, 394 U.S. at 736, 89 S.Ct. 1420 (it does not seem at all remarkable to assume that the jury will ordinarily be able to limit its consideration to the evidence introduced during the trial). This is particularly true when, as here, there was nothing to suggest that the jury did not comprehend and respect the admonitions of the trial court. Ginyard, 816 A.2d at 30. As in Frazier, the erroneous statement here made up a very small portion of the prosecutor's opening remarks, and it was similarly sandwiched between more substantive evidence. [7] Further, the statement was not touted as critical: the government did not attempt to relate this statement explicitly to the defense's anticipated theory of self-defense, merely stating it as one of many facts the government anticipated it would produce. Based on an application of the Frazier factors, appellant cannot show the prosecutor's statement caused him substantial prejudice. [8] See Munn, 703 A.2d at 1241; Owens, 497 A.2d at 1092. Under these circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial. [9]