Opinion ID: 795837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ptasznik's Age and National Origin Discrimination Claims

Text: 13 Ptasznik contends that her age and national origin were impermissible motivating factors in the hospital's decision to terminate her in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 4 Ptasznik may establish her discrimination claims using either the direct or indirect methods of proof, Scaife v. Cook County, 446 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 2006); she has failed to do so under either method. 14 First, under the direct method, Ptasznik must put forth evidence that her employer's decision to terminate her had a discriminatory motivation. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 610 (7th Cir. 2006); Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir.2005). She may do so under the direct method by providing direct evidence, such as an outright admission of discrimination, Cardoso v. Robert Bosch Corp., 427 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir.2005), or by presenting sufficient circumstantial evidence. See Jordan v. City of Gary, 396 F.3d 825, 832 (7th Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted). But such circumstantial evidence must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the termination decision. See Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1063 (7th Cir.2003) (statements regarding plaintiff's age did not form a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence sufficient to prevail under direct method where the prejudicial views were not clearly linked to termination decision). 15 Viewing the facts in her favor, we are unpersuaded that Ptasznik's evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of discrimination under the direct method. The defendants certainly do not admit discriminating against Ptasznik. And Ogunseye's comments that Ptasznik was too Polish and too old, although off-color and probably inappropriate for the workplace, nonetheless do not constitute sufficient evidence that her employer was motivated to terminate her because of her national origin or age. Jordan, 396 F.3d at 832. Ptasznik alleges that the discriminatory comments occurred approximately five times in the six months before her termination; however, because she cannot recall the dates and details of Ogunseye's statements, it is unclear from the record that the comments were proximate to her discharge. Also, terminated hospital employee Fred Burks testified during his deposition that Ogunseye told him that she wanted to hire new people for the sleep center. However, this statement is too ambiguous to infer discriminatory intent. And, even assuming Ogunseye wanted to hire younger, non-Polish employees, such a preference alone is not sufficient circumstantial evidence under the direct method of proving discrimination. See Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1058 (7th Cir. 2006) (evidence that a decisionmaker generally favored hiring minorities does not prove under the direct method that any particular decision he made was for discriminatory reasons). 16 Ptasznik also fails to survive summary judgment under the indirect method of proof set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To establish a discrimination claim by the indirect method, Ptasznik has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she performed reasonably on the job in accord with her employers' legitimate expectations, (3) despite her reasonable performance, she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her protected class were treated more favorably by the employer. Id.; Rozskowiak v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 415 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir.2005). 17 If Ptasznik's evidence is sufficient for a jury to find a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, then the burden shifts to the defendants to rebut the prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Even if Ptasznik establishes conclusively that the decision to fire her was motivated in part by discrimination, the defendants may avoid liability by demonstrating that they would have made the same decision despite the alleged unlawful motive. Gleason v. Mesirow Fin. Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir.1996)). 18 Once the defendants articulate a legitimate reason for termination, the burden then shifts back to Ptasznik to prove that the stated reason for her termination is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. A pretext . . . is a deliberate falsehood. Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir.2006); Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000) ([P]retext means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error.). The focus of a pretext inquiry is whether the employer's stated reason was honest, not whether it was accurate, wise or well-considered. Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000). Pretext is not necessarily established merely when the plaintiff demonstrates the employer's reason was mistaken. An employer's mistaken belief that the plaintiff's conduct merited termination is not unlawful, so long as the belief was honestly held. See Wade v. Lerner N.Y., Inc., 243 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir.2001) (plaintiff's age discrimination claim failed where her employer mistakenly, but honestly, believed the plaintiff had been late for work). 19 We have on several occasions upheld summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to show his or her employer's reasons for the adverse action were pretextual. For example, in Ballance v. City of Springfield, despite evidence that a similarly situated black police officer had been treated more favorably, we held that a white officer's discrimination suit could not survive summary judgment because the police chief honestly believed the officer's disciplinary problems warranted his termination. 424 F.3d 614, 621 (7th Cir.2005). Similarly, in Alexander v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Family Services, 263 F.3d 673, 687 (7th Cir.2001), where an African-American plaintiff claimed that his race motivated his termination, we concluded evidence that fellow employees had made numerous racially hostile comments did not rebut the employer's evidence that the plaintiff was terminated for insubordination and threatening coworkers. And, more analogously, in Rozskowiak v. Village of Arlington Heights, 415 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir.2005), the plaintiff's supervisor told him he would probably be losing [his] job because [he] was a stupid Polack and made other derogatory comments about his Polish ancestry. We affirmed summary judgment to the defendants, reasoning that the derogatory remarks were unrelated to the plaintiff's termination, and the plaintiff was terminated for legitimate, job-related reasons. Id. at 612. 20 Even assuming that the record creates an initial inference of national origin and age discrimination, the defendants rebutted Ptasznik's prima facie case by articulating a legitimate reason for terminating her. Namely, the hospital concluded that Ptasznik failed to document her results of the sleep study every 30-45 minutes, endangered a patient when she failed to contact appropriate medical personnel, and failed to document the reason for terminating the study. Ptasznik has failed to show St. Joseph's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing her were pretextual. To attempt to show pretext, Ptasznik maintains that hospital staff members, including Ogunseye, were aware that a computer glitch had generated inaccurate patient oxygen levels before the January 24 sleep study. Further, Ptasznik contends that she was unaware of the inaccurate computer data until after the study ended. However, in her technician impression log, Ptasznik manually recorded that the patient's oxygen levels dropped to 47% and 43% and that the patient experienced steady low desaturation. Even if we agreed with Ptasznik that she should not have been discharged for a computer glitch that was known to the hospital, the hospital has proffered other legitimate reasons for her termination that she has failed to rebut. Ptasznik has failed to explain why she did not document the reason for the early termination of the sleep study. Further, when Ptasznik was asked during her deposition why she failed to record the patient's vitals every 30-45 minutes as protocol required, she responded: I was busy with other things, and it was not absolutely necessary to put more. 5 Thus, given Ptasznik's admitted failure to follow hospital protocol in at least two other respects, summary judgment on her discrimination claims was proper. 21 By so finding, we are not condoning the alleged actions of Ptasznik's employer. Arguably, the hospital overreacted and unnecessarily fired an employee with an otherwise competent performance record. Nevertheless, it is not our role to determine the competency of or interfere in employment decisions simply where we believe an employer has made a poor choice. Federal courts have authority to correct an adverse employment action only where the employer's decision is unlawful, and not merely when the adverse action is unwise or even unfair. We do not sit as a super-personnel department with authority to review an employer's business decision as to whether someone should be fired or disciplined because of a work-rule violation. Ballance, 424 F.3d at 621. Therefore, our inquiry is limited to whether there is a material factual dispute as to whether the employer honestly believed the stated, legitimate reasons for the adverse action. Unfortunately for Ptasznik, her evidence is insufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that an impermissible factor such as her age or national origin motivated the hospital's decision to terminate her. Because she has failed to discredit the defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing her, the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment for St. Joseph Hospital and Resurrection Healthcare.