Opinion ID: 195592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Scope of the Consent Decrees.

Text: Appellants' final set of arguments forces us to step outside the range of Cannons. Appellants claim that the consent decrees are overbroad both because they addressed claims that 18 were not pleaded and because they addressed claims that had been sidetracked by the CMO.
1. The Standard. concerning the scope of consent decrees, the Supreme Court explained that a court cannot lend its imprimatur to a settlement unless:
resolve a dispute within the court's subject matter jurisdiction; (2) it `come[s] within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings'; and (3) furthers the objectives upon which the complaint was based. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525-26 (1986); (citations omitted); accord Conservation Law Found. v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1993). We apply this standard to the consent decrees at issue as a means of testing appellants' twin objections. 2. Natural Resource Damages. Appellants' complain
that the decrees resolved potential claims for damages to natural resources that were never pleaded and, accordingly, were not properly before the court. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that these claims would not have surfaced at a trial, appellants' objection is fruitless. The objection calls into question only the second of the Firefighters requirements and that requirement is satisfied in this instance. Indeed, the natural resource damage claims discussed in the decrees exemplify the type of related claims envisioned by the Justices as coming within the authority of an approving court. They are claims that, though not expressly set 19 out in the pleadings, fall within their general scope.6 3. Claims Precluded Under the Case Management Order. Appellants' next complain that the consent decrees disposed of claims that could not have been litigated under the terms of the CMO, namely, potential claims by the plaintiffs against thirdparty defendants and potential claims anent trans-shipment issues. Insofar as we can tell, it is a question of first impression whether a consent decree may resolve claims that the parties were precluded from litigating under the court's own case management orders. On reflection, we believe that question must be answered affirmatively. CMOs are designed to serve a variety of pragmatic objectives. These include not only expediting and focusing the litigation, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1)-(4), but also, as the current version of the rule recognizes, facilitating settlement, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).7 We think it follows that case management is an area in which the district court has considerable discretion. Geremia v. First Nat'l Bank, 653 F.2d 6Appellants' contention to the contrary relies almost exclusively on the opinion in City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). But Exxon is easily distinguished. There, the district court refused to approve a settlement involving a non-party. See id. at 687. The court reasoned that it had no power to resolve a dispute outside its subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 687-88. The case at bar poses very different problems, bereft of jurisdictional overtones. 7We note that, in practice, these two sets of goals often go hand in hand. To hold settling parties to the strictures of a CMO, come what may, would place the two goals in tension with one another. 20 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1981). Although a CMO will ordinarily control the subsequent course of the action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e), it may be modified by subsequent order at the district court's pleasure, see Ramirez Pomales v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 839 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988), or, in the case of a final CMO, to prevent manifest injustice, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). More specifically, the trial court has very broad discretion to modify a preexisting case management order to facilitate settlements, at least in the absence of unfair prejudice. See generally 6A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 1525.1, at 253-54 (1990) (discussing district court's authority to encourage settlements). We see no unfair prejudice to appellants from the court's wise exercise of its discretion here. Once we have reached this plateau, the rest flows naturally. It is evident from the very nature of case management orders that they are not jurisdictional in effect. Thus, the first Firefighters requirement is fulfilled. And as we explain below, the second and third Firefighters requirements also are met. That the third-party and trans-shipment claims come within the general scope of the pleadings and advance the objectives of the plaintiffs' complaints cannot be gainsaid. CERCLA cost recovery actions are initiated in the hope of resolving all issues revolving around a particular Superfund site, and frequently, in the hope that resolution will take the form of a global settlement. This is consistent both with the 21 statutory design and the common good. In the words of the district court: It would have been a foolish or odd consent decree that did not incorporate within it all of the potential claims that can and could have arisen out of th[is] litigation. . . . [I]t is altogether proper, indeed, in the larger public interest for [the court] to leave no loose threads. Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that there is no per se prohibition against consent decrees that exceed the possible bounds of a decision issued directly by the trial court. Because a consent decree is animated not only by the parties' legal claims but also by the parties' consent, a court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after trial. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525. Viewed in this light, we do not think that the scope of the consent decrees exceeded the bounds of the trial court's discretion. To recapitulate, then, a CERCLA consent decree may (and, in many cases, should) sweep more broadly than would the court's judgment in the event that the litigation culminated in a full-dress trial. Because this is true, and because the consent decrees pass Firefighters muster in all respects, we reject appellants' contention that the decrees are overbroad.