Opinion ID: 1399686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the two counts charged in the Indictment are multiplicitous.

Text: Although Two Elk did not raise this objection below, he now argues on appeal that Counts I and II of the Indictment are multiplicitous. Punishment for both, he posits, would amount to two punishments for one act, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.
Two Elk asserts that this court reviews for plain error a double jeopardy challenge not raised in the district court. See United States v. Sickinger, 179 F.3d 1091, 1092-93 (8th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Uder, 98 F.3d 1039, 1045 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Merritt, 982 F.2d 305, 306-07 (8th Cir.1992)); see also United States v. Bercier, 506 F.3d 625, 633 (8th Cir.2007). The government, however, offers Eighth Circuit case law stating that [i]t is well settled that `[d]ouble jeopardy claims may not be raised for the first time on appeal.' United States v. High Elk, 442 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863-64 (8th Cir.1998)) (second alteration in original); see also United States v. Goodwin, 72 F.3d 88, 91 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Garrett, 961 F.2d 743, 748 & n. 7 (8th Cir.1992). We need not reconcile these two lines of cases because we conclude that, even if we review for plain error, there was no such error here. Under plain error review, [Two Elk] must prove that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, (3) it affects substantial rights, and (4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Brandon, 521 F.3d 1019, 1027 (8th Cir. 2008). In considering the facts underlying the allegedly multiplicitous convictions, this court accepts them in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 447 (8th Cir.2005).
The Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause [9] proscribes the imposition of [m]ultiple punishments for the same criminal offense. United States v. Roy, 408 F.3d 484, 491 (8th Cir.2005). Demonstrating that an indictment violates the double jeopardy clause requires the defendant to show that the two offenses charged are in law and fact the same offense. Id. (quotation omitted). To decide whether the offenses are the same, this court must scrutinize the statute in question to determine whether Congress intended the facts underlying each count to make up a separate unit of prosecution. Chipps, 410 F.3d at 447. This court discerns Congressional intent from the statutory language, legislative history, and statutory scheme. Id. at 448. If in doubt about that intent (because, for example, Congress's intended unit of prosecution is not clear and unambiguous), this court resolve[s] doubt ... in favor of lenity for the defendant. Id. Count I of the Indictment charged Two Elk with knowingly engaging in a sexual act, namely contact between his penis and [A.R.'s] vulva. Count II charged Two Elk with knowingly engaging in a sexual act, but this time by contact between his penis and [A.R.'s] anus. Under the aggravated sexual abuse statute, [w]hoever... knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who has not attained the age of 12 years, ... or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 30 years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (emphasis added). [T]he term `sexual act' means(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however, [sic] slight. Id. § 2246(2)(A). [10] Against this statutory backdrop, we must decide how many sex crimes ... a defendant commit[s] when he inflicts a series of distinct sexual offenses on the victim during a single incident[.] Bercier, 506 F.3d at 634. To answer this question, we must first decide whether aggravated sexual abuse under § 2241(c) is a course-of-conduct offense or a separate-act offense. Chipps, 410 F.3d at 449. Chipps involved a separate statute prohibiting simple assault and in that context stated, To determine whether this indictment is multiplicitous, [this court] must decide whether Congress intended to punish assault as a course of conduct, such that the first bit of assaultive conduct ... is of a piece with the second bit ..., or whether Congress sought to punish separately individual acts within an assaultive episode. Id. at 448. If the offense is a course-of-conduct offense, this court then applies the impulse test, treating as one offense all violations that arise from that singleness of thought, purpose or action, which may be deemed a single `impulse.' Id. at 449 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224, 73 S.Ct. 227, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952)). If the offense is a separate-act offense, however, our inquiry is at an end because there is no double jeopardy problem. We conclude that § 2241(c)'s language confirms that aggravated sexual abuse is a separate-act offense. The plain language of § 2241(c) states that a person commits aggravated sexual abuse by engag[ing] in a sexual act with another person. (Emphasis added). The statute does not say sexual act or acts, or sexual course of conduct. Each of the permutations enumerated in § 2246(2) constitutes a sexual act and they are linked in the disjunctive. It follows, then, that engaging in multiple sexual acts (as listed in § 2246(2)) would amount to multiple violations of § 2241(c) and would leave the perpetrator susceptible to multiple punishments thereunder. Unlike Chipps, this reading does not break an assaultive episode down into absurd quanta, (e.g., kicking and punching during a single incident). Thus, the simple assault charged in Chipps, see 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), can be distinguished from the sexual acts charged here under §§ 2241(c) and 2246(2). [11] In addition, the Bercier court noted that [a] number of cases have held that state court convictions for multiple sex offenses did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if, under state law, `a defendant may receive multiple punishments for numerous sex offenses rapidly committed with the sole aim of sexual gratification.' Bercier, 506 F.3d at 634 (quoting Rhoden v. Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir.1993)). The Bercier court could not find a case thoroughly addressing this question in the context of the federal sexual assault statutes, id., and Bercier itself did not resolve the issue. Nonetheless, in light of Bercier 's tone and its reference to the state decisions holding various sex acts within a single course of conduct to be separate offenses, the case provides some support for our interpretation of § 2241. The statute's language and Bercier confirm that the district court did not err and certainly did not commit plain error. As such, we do not reach Two Elk's argument that the multiplicitous count tainted the other verdict.