Opinion ID: 3167601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denial of defendants’ qualified immunity

Text: While Defendants assert two merits arguments in addition to arguing that the district court erred when it denied them qualified immunity, we are without jurisdiction to hear these arguments based on the interlocutory posture of this case. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 43. 4 Instead, we may only review the qualified immunity holding of the district court. Because the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations on qualified immunity and because Defendants failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, we review the district court’s holding on qualified immunity for plain error. See Starns, 524 F.3d at 617. We hold that the district court did not plainly err when it denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity. “To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, this court engages in a two-pronged analysis, inquiring (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the defendant’s behavior was objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the time the conduct occurred.” Hampton, 480 F.3d at 363. Under this inquiry, “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the defendant official is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015). To satisfy the first prong, a plaintiff must “allege ‘the deprivation of an actual constitutional [or statutory] right.’” Hampton, 480 F.3d at 363 (alterations in original) (quoting Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2002)). To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must show that the “right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would 4 In addition to arguing that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity, Defendants argue on appeal that Owens failed to establish a claim of false imprisonment and that any obligation to provide Owens with good time credits was extinguished once he was re-incarcerated. As we mention above, we are without jurisdiction to consider these merits arguments on an interlocutory appeal. 7 Case: 15-30331 Document: 00513331182 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/06/2016 No. 15-30331 have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)). In this inquiry, “[t]he dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of [the] particular conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). While this does “not require a case directly on point, . . . existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (quoting al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741); see also id. (emphasizing that the clearly established law prong is not defined “at a high level of generality”). The district court did not plainly err in denying qualified immunity because it was not error to deny qualified immunity and, in any event, any error was not plain. Owens satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry when he alleged that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the denial of his early release because Defendants failed to calculate his good time credits retroactively from the date of his sentencing. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is violated where a prisoner remains incarcerated after the legal authority to hold him has expired. See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980). And a prisoner’s due process rights extend to good time credits where the State has “provided a statutory right to good time.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); see id. (“[T]he prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment ‘liberty’ to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.”). Moreover, a Louisiana appellate court decision previously held that an inmate in Owens’ circumstances was wrongly deprived of double good time credits when the DPSC failed to calculate good time credits retroactively from the date of sentencing. See Cox, 612 So. 2d at 160. 8 Case: 15-30331 Document: 00513331182 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/06/2016 No. 15-30331 Owens also satisfied the second prong of qualified immunity, as it was clearly established by 1992 that good time credits should be calculated retroactively to the date of sentencing. On December 23, 1992, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals in Cox clearly held that inmates who were sentenced after July 1, 1982—like Owens—were entitled to double good time credit retroactive to the date of their sentencing. Cox, 612 So. 2d at 159–60. As the state habeas court in Owens recognized, the Cox decision, by its own terms, was sufficient to alert Defendants that Owens should have received double good time credit retroactive from the date of sentencing. Owens, 965 So. 2d at 889. However, Defendants failed to apply the holding of Cox when Owens was issued approval forms in 1997 and 2003 that did not apply good time credits retroactive from the date of sentencing. Defendants’ conduct was therefore objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. While Defendants argue that the law was not clearly established, they fail to show that the district court erred on this point. Defendants first argue that Cox did not address habitual offenders and that they believed Owens was a habitual offender who was sentenced under a statute that prohibited diminution of sentence altogether. This argument is unpersuasive. The Owens decision held that Cox was directly applicable to Owens, Owens, 965 So. 2d at 889–90, and Defendants’ previous conduct shows that they did not consider Owens ineligible for diminution of sentence. 5 Defendants next argue that the right was not clearly established based on an unpublished case from our circuit, Nelson v. Stalder, No. 01-30323, 2002 WL 243382 (5th Cir. Jan. 25, 2002) (per curiam). In Nelson, this court held that an inmate did not have a clearly established right to receive credit for time 5While Defendants now argue that they previously believed Owens was ineligible for diminution of his sentence, the record indicates otherwise as Defendants gave Owens election forms to receive good time credit on three separate occasions in 1992, 1997, and 2003. 9 Case: 15-30331 Document: 00513331182 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/06/2016 No. 15-30331 served because the error did not exist until the inmate filed suit in state court and the state court identified the error. Id. at . However, the status of the law at the time of the alleged violation in Nelson was markedly different from the present case. The plaintiff in Nelson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations after a state court found that the plaintiff was entitled to additional credit for time served and that prison officials had incorrectly calculated the plaintiff’s term of incarceration. Id. at . But the state court in Nelson reached its holding while noting that it could find no cases directly on point to support its holding. By contrast, prior to Owens’ state habeas action, Cox clearly established that Owens should have received retroactive double good time credit, and Cox was issued before prison officials incorrectly calculated Owens’ good time credit in 1997 and 2003. Nelson is therefore inapposite. 6