Opinion ID: 2085086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State v. Ramsey

Text: Mr. Ramsey, who testified during the suppression hearing but did not testify at trial, conceded at sentencing that he had indeed been in possession of the drugs seized by Officer Torbit, but told the Circuit Court that he was a user who stole them from where they had been stashed by a seller. During the sentencing proceeding, it is clear that the Circuit Court treated Mr. Ramsey with respect, and expressed sympathy for Mr. Ramsey's addiction. The majority, however, agrees with Mr. Ramsey's argument that he was denied a fair trial as a result of judicial bias that began during a pre-trial suppression hearing, continued during voir dire and examination of witnesses and culminated during the course of instructing the jury. Defense counsel's opening statement covers five pages of the trial transcript, two and one half pages of which were taken up by the story of the Emperor's New Clothes. Defense counsel's closing argument covers six and one half pages, during which she argued that (1) Officer Torbit exhibited a convenient memory, and (2) the Officer's testimony was not corroborated by any video footage from the police department's surveillance cameras that recorded activity at the locations where he claimed that he had observed Mr. Ramsey. At no point, however, did defense counsel argue that the State's evidence was consistent with the statement Mr. Ramsey made at sentencing. The record shows that the Circuit Court would not permit Officer Torbit to give nonresponsive answers to defense counsel's questions. For example, the following transpired during Officer Torbit's cross-examination: Q. Okay. Then finally you say that Mr. Ramsey had the bag prior to stopping him in the 1800 block of Pennsylvania? A. Exact, yes. Q, Okay. And there are also cameras in the 1800-block of Pennsylvania, is that correct? A. Cameras don't cover everything. They just cover certain parts of the block  THE COURT: Officer     THE COURT: ... Just answer her question. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. THE COURT: The question was I think are there cameras in the 18  THE WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: All right. And the answer is yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The 1800-block of Pennsylvania?    THE WITNESS: Yes. Taking action to prohibit a State's witness from giving non-responsive answers during cross-examination is the antithesis of hostility toward the defendant or defense counsel. Rather than infer hostility toward defense counsel from the Circuit Court's decision to impanel the jury before holding the suppression hearing, we should compliment the Circuit Court for its efficiency. The court's time is a valuable public commodity, and the only reasonable inference that can be drawn in this case is the inference that the Circuit Court wanted to have a jury ready to begin the trial at 9:30 a.m. on the following morning. As to what occurred during jury selection, the Circuit Court did not reseat the juror whose striking the Circuit Court found to be racially biased. From my review of the record, that finding was not clearly erroneous, and the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in raising the Batson issue sua sponte. Although Mr. Ramsey complains about what occurred during Officer Torbit's direct examination and Dr. Majid's redirect examination, the record shows that defense counsel did not object to any of the Court's questions. Defense counsel did, however, preserve for our review the issue of whether the Circuit Court erred or abused its discretion when it stated to the jury: Ladies and gentlemen, most lawyers, good lawyers, talk to their witnesses.... Most lawyers talk to a witness before they put them on the stand.... It's perfectly appropriate for any lawyer to talk to any witness before they put them on the witness stand, and to review their testimony with them. It's absolutely appropriate. In State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 571 A.2d 1227 (1990), this Court stated: Attorneys have not only the right but also the duty to fully investigate the case and to interview persons who may be witnesses. A prudent attorney will, whenever possible, meet with the witnesses he or she intends to call. Id. at 170, 571 A.2d at 1234. In United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated: Thorough preparation demands that an attorney interview and prepare witnesses before they testify. No competent lawyer would call a witness without appropriate and thorough pre-trial interviews and discussion. In fact, more than one lawyer has been punished, found ineffective, or even disbarred for incompetent representation that included failure to prepare or interview witnesses. United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.1983) (defense counsel ineffective for failing to interview witnesses); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir.1974) (same); In re Warmington, 212 Wis.2d 657, 668, 568 N.W.2d 641 (Wis.1997) (lawyer disbarred for, among other things, failing to supervise the preparation of an expert witness); In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 847 P.2d 94, 96 (Ariz.1993) (failure to interview witnesses cited among reasons for suspending attorney). Id. at 319. When the cross-examination of a witness insinuates that the witness' testimony was impermissibly influenced by the direct examiner, it is appropriate for the trial judge to instruct the jury about the lawyer's duty to meet with the witnesses who will be called to testify. [1] From my review of the record, I am persuaded that defense counsel's cross-examination of Officer Torbit opened the door to this instruction. As to Mr. Ramsey's complaint about the additional language in the Circuit Court's credibility instruction, (1) everything added to MPJI Cr 3.10 is a correct statement of the law, and (2) on the basis of defense counsel's cross-examination of Officer Torbit, the decision to include the additional language did not constitute an unfairly prejudicial abuse of discretion. For the reasons stated above, I would hold that Mr. Ramsey is not entitled to a new trial.