Opinion ID: 782360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Searcy's Contrary To Claim

Text: 22 We begin with Searcy's contention that the limitation on his ability to cross-examine Johnson and Brooks was contrary to the rule of Alford. A state court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495. 23 From the Supreme Court's decision in Alford, Searcy takes this legal proposition: [T]he right to conduct otherwise appropriate cross-examination cannot be conditioned upon proof in advance of what the cross-examination would establish. In Alford, the Supreme Court held that the trial court was wrong in precluding the defense from asking an adverse witness where he lived. The question was posed because the witness was then in federal custody, and the defendant wished to establish for the jury this basis for potential bias in favor of the government. In reversing the trial court's limitation on the defendant's cross-examination, the Court stated that [i]t is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop. Alford, 282 U.S. at 692, 51 S.Ct. 218. 24 Searcy argues that the state courts' refusal to allow him to cross-examine Brooks and Johnson regarding the informant issue without first providing a foundation for his theory of bias in advance of that cross-examination violates the rule of Alford. But the trial court did not require that Searcy prove his defense theory before he would let Searcy cross-examine them regarding a potential motivation for murdering Bowman. The trial court simply conditioned Searcy's inquiry into the informant issue on his ability to lay a sufficient factual predicate for that line of questioning, to avoid potential insinuations and innuendos, and not fair, logical inferences. (Trial Tr. at X-88.) That factual predicate was not required to come solely from the testimony of Brooks and Johnson; the trial court told defense counsel that if the two witnesses would not admit to such knowledge, I think you have to [prove] it in some other competent way. (Trial Tr. at X-88.) 25 The trial court's decision to require a sufficient factual basis for the line of questioning as a precondition to cross-examination does not run afoul of Alford. On the contrary, the Alford Court noted that a defendant need be given  reasonable latitude to conduct a  reasonable cross-examination. Alford, 282 U.S. at 692, 51 S.Ct. 218 (emphasis added). In his brief to this court, Searcy himself acknowledges that Alford applies to otherwise appropriate cross-examination. It is well established that purely conjectural or speculative cross-examination is neither reasonable nor appropriate. See, e.g., Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 243-46 (1st Cir.1999) (One well-established basis for circumscribing cross-examination is a party's inability to lay a proper evidentiary foundation for the questions he wishes to pose. (citations omitted)). 26 In this case, the Illinois state courts applied the correct rule—the state appeals court identified the importance of a defendant's right under the Confrontation Clause to cross-examine the witnesses against him, and it cited the correct authority governing the exercise of that right (as acknowledged by the district court)—yet determined that Searcy had not provided enough of a factual basis to fairly allow him to ask highly prejudicial questions. In other words, the trial court's requirement that cross-examination of Johnson and Brooks be preceded by a showing of a sufficient factual basis for the questions ensured that Searcy's line of inquiry was otherwise appropriate. We note that the Supreme Court has recognized that [t]he extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Alford, 282 U.S. at 694, 51 S.Ct. 218. Given this, we cannot say that the trial court's decision was contrary to Alford.