Opinion ID: 1300866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equipment or Machinery

Text: The plaintiffs contend the Broan fan is properly classified under the statute of repose's exception for actions against the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or machinery installed upon real property. See Minn.Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(d). The plaintiffs bear the burden of showing the exception applies, and any exception to the statutes of limitation should be used only in exceptional circumstances [.] State Farm, 718 N.W.2d. at 886 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). The district court correctly noted both Minnesota legislative history and Minnesota courts have provided little guidance or clarity as to the meaning of equipment or machinery and what such a term of art might encompass. The Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted the following reasoning from the Virginia Supreme Court: We conclude that the General Assembly intended to perpetuate a distinction between, on one hand, those who furnish ordinary building materials, which are incorporated into construction work outside the control of their manufacturers or suppliers, at the direction of architects, designers, and contractors, and, on the other hand, those who furnish machinery or equipment. Unlike ordinary building materials, machinery and equipment are subject to close quality control at the factory and may be made subject to independent manufacturer's warranties, voidable if the equipment is not installed and used in strict compliance with the manufacturer's instructions. Materialmen in the latter category have means of protecting themselves which are not available to the former. Cape Henry, 331 S.E.2d at 480 (adopted by Red Wing Motel Investors, 552 N.W.2d at 297 & n. 2) (emphasis added). As the district court noted, classifying the bathroom fan represents a difficult task under this explanation. [5] On one hand, the fan clearly is not an ordinary building material such as a nail, a screw, or a window. Additionally, the fan is subject to close quality control at the factory and may be covered by independent manufacturer's warranties. These factors indicate the fan qualifies as equipment or machinery. On the other hand, as the district court discussed, ventilation fans are commonly incorporated into the structure of buildings, particularly interior bathrooms, and are necessary to avoid the build-up of mildew or rust. Further, the fan in this case was required under Minnesota building codes. More significantly, such fans are incorporated into construction work outside the control of their manufacturers or suppliers, at the direction of architects, designers, and contractors. These factors indicate the fan is ordinary building material. See Red Wing Motel Investors, 552 N.W.2d at 297 (quoting Cape Henry, 331 S.E.2d at 480). We must attempt to forecast how the Minnesota Supreme Court would decide this issue. See Kovarik, 108 F.3d at 964. The district court did so by drawing inferences from Minnesota cases dealing with analogous items. The available precedent is limited, but provides some guidance. First, items integrally incorporated as part of a building structure, such as a fire sprinkler system, are considered ordinary building materials. See Red Wing Motel Investors, 552 N.W.2d at 297 (fire sprinkler system); Lietz v. NSP Co., 2005 WL 44905, at ,  (Minn.Ct.App. Jan.11, 2005) (unpublished) (utility pole anchor), aff'd, 718 N.W.2d 865, 869-73 (Minn.2006); Twinco Romax Auto. Warehouse, Inc. v. Olson Gen. Contractors, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn.Ct.App.2002) (roof joist); Murphy v. Hank's Specialties, Inc., 1998 WL 422256, at  (Minn.Ct.App. July 28, 1998) (unpublished) (carpeting). Second, items considered equipment or machinery are typically large scale items, which are not integral to or incorporated into the building, and could exist separately from the building structure. See Fluck v. Jacobson Mach. Works, Inc., 1999 WL 153789, at  (Minn.Ct.App. March 23, 1999) (unpublished) (seed mixer); Wilson v. AM. Int'l 1993 WL 724814, at -5 & n. 7 (D.Minn. Apr.26, 1993) (concluding a printing press was not an improvement to real property, noting the equipment or machinery exception was not in effect at the time of the plaintiffs injury); Ritter v. Abbey-Etna Mach. Co., 483 N.W.2d 91, 93-4 & n. 2 (Minn.Ct.App.1992) (same for steel tube production mill). The district court properly found Minnesota courts would most likely consider the Broan bathroom fan ordinary building material. [6] The plaintiffs accurately argue that courts should not look solely to whether an item is a stand-alone piece of equipment, as opposed to whether the item is attached or incorporated into the building structure. Stand-alone items will rarely fit under the initial statute of repose to begin with, because they are typically not an improvement to real property. See Minn.Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a). There would be no point in the Minnesota Legislature carving out an exception for such items. However, we do not hold that an item must be capable of standing alone in order to qualify as equipment or machinery. According to the Minnesota courts, this stand alone capability is only a factor for consideration. Integrity asks the Court to provide a clear standard for defining what items should be considered ordinary building materials and what items should be considered equipment or machinery under the statute. This inquiry fails to recognize it is not the place of this court to attempt to define Minnesota's law, or refine the Minnesota courts' methodology for analyzing the Minnesota statute. Rather, we must apply Minnesota's law as we predict the Minnesota courts would. See Kovarik, 108 F.3d at 964. The facts of this case present a close issue. In light of the statute's plain language and Minnesota's case law, the code-required interior bathroom ventilation fan is more analogous to the items Minnesota courts have found to be ordinary building materials. The plaintiffs bear the burden of showing the exception applies, and any exception to the statutes of limitation should be used only in exceptional circumstances [.] State Farm, 718 N.W.2d. at 886 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, we conclude the plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to demonstrate the subject fan is equipment or machinery exempt from the statute of repose.