Opinion ID: 1113751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: special education claims

Text: With regard to the Doe plaintiffs' claims, the Court emphasizes that schoolchildren with disabilities have the same constitutional right to an equitable and adequate education as all other schoolchildren in Alabama. In addition, however, the sub-class represented by John Doe asserted two additional claims unique to children with disabilities: (1) that children with disabilities are deprived of their statutory right under Ala.Code §§ 16-39-3 and 16-39A-2 to an appropriate education and special services, and (2) that the Alabama system of funding for special education is irrational and violates the due process clause of the Alabama constitution. As discussed below, the Court rules in favor of the Doe plaintiffs on both claims. The sub-class argues that Alabama law [65] entitles children with disabilities to an appropriate education. Since this is a case of first impression, the Court must decide if the statute obligates the state to educate children in special education programs appropriately. As noted earlier, the focus of the Court's examination must be on the intent of the legislature. The first step is to look at the text of the statutes. The statutes require that: Each school board [66] shall provide not less than 12 consecutive years of appropriate instruction and special services for exceptional children. Ala.Code § 16-39-3. All county and city local education agencies are required to provide free appropriate public education for all eligible children with disabilities. Ala.Code § 16-39A-2. According to the plain meaning of the statutes, children with disabilities have a right to appropriate instruction and special services. Defendants have cited no authority to the contrary. Therefore, the Court rules that Alabama statutes require the state to provide an appropriate education and special services to children with disabilities. Next, the Doe plaintiffs assert that the term appropriate defines a specified level of quality in education. Although there are no reported state court cases interpreting the term appropriate in this context, the sub-class argues that federal cases construing this word have been adopted by the state. After considering the circumstances surrounding passage of both statutes and the testimony of Dr. Kenneth Wilson, the Court agrees. Before enactment of Act 106 in 1971, a school board was permitted to exempt children with disabilities from mandatory school attendance. 1947 Ala.Acts, 676 at 517. At that time, it was common to exclude disabled school-aged children from educational requirements. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 [102 S.Ct. 3034, 3037, 73 L.Ed.2d 690] (1982). Concerned about this practice, Congress enacted a federal grant program, The Education of the Handicapped Act, to encourage the education of children denied an education. See P.L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 1204. Observing little progress in education of the handicapped, Congress later adopted The Education For All Handicapped Children Act in 1975 (the EHA). See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. [67] In order to receive federal funds available under the EHA, Alabama must have in effect a policy guaranteeing children with disabilities a free appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). To carry out this task, Alabama has adopted the language used in federal lawan appropriate education. Dr. Kenneth Wilson testified that, for the most part, state regulations mirror the language of the federal law. The Court cannot construe the Alabama statutory and regulatory language differently from the federal meaning without ignoring the clear intent of the Alabama legislature to benefit from federal aid to special education. This conclusion is bolstered by the recent adoption of the Special Education of Preschool Handicapped Children Act. See Ala. Code § 16-39A-1 to 16-39A-3. The Act expressly incorporates the federal definition of a free appropriate public education as [t]hat program as defined by federal statute under Public Law 91-230 [the original EHA], and all regulations and amendments thereto. Ala.Code § 16-39A-3(4). It is clear that the legislature intended the term appropriate in the Alabama statutes to have a meaning identical to the same language in the federal law. The next step is to examine federal law for the meaning of an appropriate education. In Rowley, the United States Supreme Court articulated a test to determine if a child is receiving an appropriate education. A child with disabilities is receiving such an education if the program is composed of specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child with disabilities. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 [102 S.Ct. at 3048]. Several of plaintiffs' witnesses, including Dr. Wayne Teague, Mr. Barry Blackwell, Dr. Martha Snell, and Dr. David Rostetter, testified that Alabama fails to meet this standard. Alabama's system of special education does not and cannot provide an appropriate education to children with disabilities. Virtually all the testimony of the sub-class' witnesses catalogued deficiencies in the state's provision of instruction and services. To reiterate only the most obvious, the Court notes Mr. Blackwell's testimony that some school systems do not offer certain programs to children with disabilities because they lack the staff qualified to teach students with some disabilities. Further, Dr. Rostetter pointed out that the problem is statewide because Alabama cannot give local school systems the support needed to hire, train, and retain qualified staff. Alabama's inability to provide any services to children with certain identified disabilities and the other deficiencies noted in the findings of facts clearly fail to meet the Rowley test. The sub-class also argues that Alabama's system of funding special education violates the due process clause of the Alabama Constitution. See Ala. Const. art. 1 §§ 6 and 13. Under the state due process clause, the funding scheme must be reasonable and bear a substantial relationship to the public need. Baldwin County Board of Health v. Baldwin County Electric Membership Corp., 355 So.2d 708, 710 (Ala.1978). The total enrollment method of funding special education is based entirely on the total number of students in regular and special education. Because the funds available per special education pupil are not tied to the cost of educating those pupils, the system penalizes school systems which try to serve all children with disabilities. As the number of special education students increases, the money per pupil decreases. The Court concludes that such a scheme is irrational and has no relationship to the public interest in appropriately educating students with disabilities. Further, the argument that a change in the system of funding to a weighted child count method moots this issue is not persuasive. The state may again alter the method of funding education if the weighted child count system is unsatisfactory. In addition, since the weighted child count system is not fully implemented and in use in Alabama, it is impossible to determine whether this method will result in a constitutional funding scheme. The public interest at stake and the rights of children with disabilities justify relief in this case. See Payne v. J.T.N., 568 So.2d 830, 831 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). The Court rules that the total enrollment method of funding special education is irrational and arbitrary in violation of the due process clause of the Alabama constitution. Governor Hunt does not argue that the Doe plaintiffs' interpretation of the Alabama statutes' definition of an appropriate education is incorrect. Instead, the defendant attacks the sub-class's method of challenging the state system of funding special education. The Governor maintains that the proper vehicle for enforcing the right to an appropriate education is by administrative remedy, or, in the alternative, by petitioning the state attorney general to file suit. For the reasons outlined below, the Court rejects both these arguments. The requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to individual children seeking relief under the federal EHA. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 [1015-16 n. 17], 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3470-71 n. 17 [82 L.Ed.2d 746] (1984). However, the sub-class advances its claim on behalf of all children with disabilities solely under Alabama statutes. The administrative actions designed to provide redress of federal rights for individual schoolchildren do not apply in a challenge to statewide funding and systemic inequities. Further, a series of individual suits could exacerbate the educational disparities by diverting already scarce resources to educate those children with the means to bring administrative actions. Finally, it is axiomatic that when, as here, the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile in attempting to remedy a systemic deficiency, an exhaustion requirement does not apply. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 [1015-16 n. 17], 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3470-71 n. 17 [82 L.Ed.2d 746] (1984). Defendant Hunt also argues that the sole remedy under state law is suit by the Alabama attorney general. Act 106 allows an exceptional child to petition the attorney general for assistance in enforcing the right to an appropriate education. See Ala.Code § 16-39-4. However, nothing in the statutes or regulations suggests that this is the exclusive method of enforcing the right to an appropriate education. The Court is unwilling to condition the exercise of that right on an enforcement mechanism that could be construed as a limitation on access to the courts. Further, Act 106 gives no indication that the assistance of the attorney general is required in order to challenge a systemic deficiency such as the entire special education funding scheme under the Alabama constitution. Therefore, the Court rules that when exhaustion of administrative remedies would clearly be futile, a class of aggrieved special education students may properly bring suit in state court to remedy systemic deficiencies in special education without the assistance of the attorney general.