Opinion ID: 1454677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admissibility of Psychological Testimony

Text: Appellant's final two issues challenge the district court's evidentiary rulings which restricted the testimony of a psychologist who testified on Appellant's behalf. At the trial, Appellant claimed that he lacked the mental capacity to form the requisite specific intent necessary to maintain a first-degree murder conviction. To prove his contention, Appellant informed the district court that he intended to call a psychologist who would testify about Appellant's mental condition. The court stated that Appellant would have to lay a foundation for the psychologist's testimony by testifying himself because Appellant consulted the psychologist only for purposes of litigation, because Appellant had not pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and because the psychologist was not a witness to the crime. After the court informed Appellant of his right not to testify, Appellant took the stand and admitted killing Sonny. Appellant contends that the district court forced him to give up his right not to testify by exclusively requiring his testimony as a foundation for the psychologist's testimony. We have stated many times that making the decision to allow an expert to testify is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061 (Wyo. 1987); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981). The district court erred, however, when, before the psychologist took the stand, it determined that Appellant's testimony was necessary to establish an adequate foundation for the psychologist's testimony. Regardless of whether the district court based its directive on the relevancy requirement of W.R.E. 402, [6] the standards for expert testimony specified in W.R.E. 702 and 703, [7] or the hearsay rule, W.R.E. 802, [8] a trial judge may not rule prospectively on a party's ability to establish a proper foundation for expert testimony. We hold that the district court's error was harmless, however, because it did not prejudice Appellant's substantial rights. An error warrants reversal if it is prejudicial and if it affects an appellant's substantial rights. Otherwise, the error is harmless. Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1989). The district court's establishment of a foundation prerequisite was a harmless error for two reasons. First, because Appellant's theory of defense was that his mental condition prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent for premeditated murder and not that he did not kill Sonny, his in-court admission that he killed Sonny did not incriminate him more than he had already been incriminated. Second, the district court did not force Appellant to testify about anything other than the information the district court required as a foundation for the psychologist's testimony. Appellant could have limited the scope of the State's cross-examination. Once Appellant began testifying about Sonny's death, he opened the door for the State's inquiry into that matter. W.R.E. 611(b) provides: (b) Scope of cross-examination.  Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.[ [9] ] Several federal courts have determined that, when a defendant takes the witness stand, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to matters reasonably related to the subject matter of direct examination. Aldridge v. Marshall, 765 F.2d 63 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1062, 106 S.Ct. 810, 88 L.Ed.2d 785 (1986); United States v. Hernandez, 646 F.2d 970 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1082, 102 S.Ct. 638, 70 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3019, 65 L.Ed.2d 1118 and 447 U.S. 926, 100 S.Ct. 3020, 65 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1980). As a result, a defendant may testify in an effort to lay the foundation for the testimony of another witness without opening the door for the State to ask questions on cross-examination about the crime which the defendant is accused of committing. The witness himself, certainly if he is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155, 78 S.Ct. 622, 627, 2 L.Ed.2d 589, 72 A.L.R.2d 818 (1958). See also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971); and Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968). Appellant also contends that the district court erred when it prevented the psychologist from testifying about whether Appellant actually killed Sonny and about Appellant's motivation for claiming that he killed Sonny. At the trial, the following colloquy occurred between Appellant's attorney and the psychologist: Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Arlen Price was able to control his behavior in so far as it related to Sonny Price? A. Control his behavior. I think that he was so obsessed and that he was compelled to do what he did, and I think that had he not done it some two or three  MR. ROGERS: Objection. He's going beyond the scope of the question. THE COURT: True. Sustained. Q. Did you talk to him yesterday about whether suppose, for instance, Sonny Price was in this courtroom today and with the police all around what would he have to do? Did you talk to him about that? A. Yes. Q. And what did he tell you? A. That he would kill him right here. Q. And is that  what does that have to do with your diagnosis here? A. It's a continuation of this obsession. Total obsession takes up a lot of his daily time, and state of mind of what has been inflicted upon him now. He wants to handle it. Q. Now, you've spent a lot of time in this case examining the evidence, haven't you? A. Yes. Q. And I guess you've already testified that you've spent a great deal of time talking to the witnesses including Arlen Price; isn't that right? A. Yes. Q. Is there any doubt in your mind as to whether or not Arlen killed Sonny Price? A. None whatsoever, as far as his being there. I have talked with him at great length. I have some real reservations whether or not he actually did the crime. Q. Why is that? A. Because  MR. ROGERS: Objection, Your Honor. Invades the province of the jury. THE COURT: Sustained. In the discussion which followed, the district court reiterated the rule that a diminished capacity defense does not exist in Wyoming. The court stated that the psychologist could not testify about the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime or a defense; that the ultimate issue in that instance is left for the trier of fact. The court also expressed concern about allowing the psychologist to testify that Appellant did not kill Sonny and that Appellant had a motive for lying about the matter because such testimony would be contrary to Appellant's testimony. We first note that the district court was correct when it stated that Wyoming has not recognized a diminished capacity defense. [10] In Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 645 (Wyo. 1983), this Court affirmed the district court's decision to reject diminished capacity and irresistible impulse instructions because the legislature has set forth the standard [in Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-11-301 to -304 (1987)[ [11] ] relative to the mental condition which will constitute a defense to a criminal charge. Such standard should not be increased or decreased. That rule applies with equal force to Appellant's claim that his mental condition (obsessive/compulsive) prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent necessary to sustain a first-degree murder conviction. Appellant contends that the district court erred by preventing the psychologist from testifying as to whether he thought Appellant actually killed Sonny because that testimony embraced the ultimate issue. We have rejected the rule that an expert cannot testify on the ultimate issue in a case. Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 1983). W.R.E. 704 states: Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. W.R.E. 702 mandates that the testimony assist the trier of fact. [12] We hold, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it prevented the psychologist from testifying about whether Appellant killed Sonny. Not only would the testimony have failed to assist the jury with its decision, but that testimony would have challenged the veracity of Appellant's testimony. The psychologist attempted to say that the evidence he reviewed led him to doubt that Appellant actually killed Sonny, despite Appellant's testimony to the contrary. The combination of his understanding of the facts of the crime with his medical opinion that Appellant would be compelled to take credit for the killing led the psychologist to doubt the veracity of Appellant's testimony. In Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1200 (Wyo. 1977), we held that an expert may not testify about the veracity of a defendant's version because it assumes the function of the jury. See also Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1986). In addition, the psychologist's testimony indicating he doubted that Appellant killed Sonny did not assist the jury. While the psychologist may have been an expert for the purposes of determining an individual's mental condition, he was in no better position than the jury to decide whether Appellant actually stabbed Sonny to death. Affirmed. CARDINE, J., files a specially concurring opinion. URBIGKIT, C.J., files a dissenting opinion.