Opinion ID: 701736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 31 Nieves-Burgos argues that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to support his conviction on count four for violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) as to the firearm found in room 311.
32 In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, [o]ur task is to review the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, taken as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty as charged. United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1031 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied sub nom. Rivera v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994). We therefore resolve all credibility issues in favor of the verdict. See United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d at 100 (citation omitted). We acknowledge that a jury's determination need not be grounded in direct evidence; rather it may be based wholly on circumstantial evidence. See id. In addition, the evidence  'need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; that is, the factfinder may decide among reasonable interpretations of the evidence.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir.1993) (citation omitted)). The court must satisfy itself that the guilty verdict finds support in 'a plausible rendition of the record.'  United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1005, 122 L.Ed.2d 154 (1993)).
33 Section 924(c)(1), 18 U.S.C., makes unlawful the use of a firearm during and in relation to any Federal drug-trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). 5 A conviction under this section results in a mandatory sentence of imprisonment for a term of at least five years. See id. Nieves-Burgos was convicted of using the firearm found in room 311 during and in relation to the crime of possessing with the intent to distribute the controlled substance cocaine. 34 We examine the evidence to determine, first, appellant's possessory interest in the firearm at issue, see United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d at 102 (citing United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 953, 116 L.Ed.2d 356 (1991)) (in order to establish that a defendant 'used' a firearm for purposes of section 924(c)(1), 'the government must prove that the defendant actually or constructively possessed it' ), and, second, whether there exists some facilitative nexus between the weapon and the criminal activity. United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d 976, 983 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied sub nom. Sarraff v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2935, 124 L.Ed.2d 684 (1993). 35
36 Nieves-Burgos is alleged to have been in constructive possession of the gun found in room 311. Constructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over [a firearm], either directly or through others. United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d at 102. 37 The evidence indicates, though not overwhelmingly, that Nieves-Burgos was in constructive possession of the firearm found in room 311. The evidence supports the existence of the following facts: Nieves-Burgos rented and occupied room 311; he was a direct participant in the drug distribution scheme; the gun was found in a zippered bag, also containing $2,000 in cash, on a couch in room 311; Nieves-Burgos was less than two feet from the gun. Nieves-Burgos concedes in his brief that he clearly was in control of Room 311. A jury reasonably could infer from these facts that the cash found in the bag that contained the gun was drug trafficking proceeds, and that Nieves-Burgos, a principal in the drug trafficking scheme who concededly was in control of the room, had knowledge of what was in the bag, and, because of his proximity to the gun, had the power and intention to exercise dominion over it. 38 Clearly, there is evidence in the record that weighs against this conclusion: no witness could link the gun or the bag directly to Nieves-Burgos; the bag concealing the gun was zippered; several co-defendants were found sitting within several feet of the gun, and Gotay-Colon, who was seated on the couch, may have been closer to the gun than was Nieves-Burgos. Nonetheless, our role is not to weigh the evidence; we are merely to ensure that some evidence exists to support sufficiently the jury's determination. See United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d at 1031. Again, the evidence supports the inference that Nieves-Burgos was in constructive possession of the gun: He concedes that he clearly was in control of Room 311; he was a principal with respect to the underlying offense of possession with intent to distribute; and, he was found near--less than two feet from--the gun. 39 This result is consistent with Torres-Maldonado, in which we concluded that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that appellants Torres-Maldonado and Gotay-Colon were in constructive possession of the gun found in room 311. See United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d at 102-03. We considered to be significant the absence of evidence that either appellant was involved in the drug distribution scheme: Unlike the evidence against the other defendants ... the evidence against Torres-Maldonado and Gotay-Colon failed to establish any connection between these two defendants, on one hand, and those drug distribution transactions which appeared to involve guns, on the other. Id. at 102. Again, the evidence here shows that Nieves-Burgos was a direct participant in the drug distribution scheme. 40
41 Use, as that term applies in Sec. 924(c)(1), requires more than mere possession of a firearm, but does not require outwardly apparent utilization: [the] weapon need not be brandished, displayed or discharged. United States v. Reyes-Mercado, 22 F.3d 363, 367 (1st Cir.1994) (citations omitted). To sustain a conviction under this section for the use of a firearm, there must be shown some facilitative nexus between the weapon and the criminal activity. Id. (citations omitted). 42 We have stated that,  'the government need not prove actual possession by the defendant, only that the firearm was readily accessible for the defendant's use' and that '[p]lacing a weapon nearby to protect a drug operation comes within the definition of used ' for purposes of section 924(c). United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Abreu, 952 F.2d 1458, 1466 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 994, 112 S.Ct. 1695, 118 L.Ed.2d 406 (1992)). [W]here a drug trafficker is not carrying a gun on his person, but has one nearby, the court's critical concern is not whether the gun was 'instantly available' or 'exclusively dedicated to the narcotics trade,' but whether it was 'available for use' in connection with the narcotics trade. United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d at 983. Among the factors we examine in determining whether a gun was available for use in connection with a drug operation are the proximity of the gun to the drugs and drug proceeds and the availability of the gun to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.1994) (Drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a loaded revolver were located in close proximity to one another. [Appellant] had an apparent possessory interest in, and a significant degree of control over, the premises. On these facts, a reasonable factfinder certainly could find the requisite facilitative nexus....); United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d at 983 (Appellant was apprehended in his car, at the scene of a drug pickup, with the gun inside the car's trunk.... [W]e believe a rational jury was free to conclude that the location of the firearm--near a large sum of cash, in close proximity to live ammunition, and at a place where drugs were to be delivered--coupled with the timing--[appellant] brought the gun to the airstrip in the course of taking delivery of a sizable quantity of cocaine--supported a finding that the firearm was 'available for use' during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime.). 43 There was testimony at trial that the gun was found in room 311 in a zippered bag less than two feet from Nieves-Burgos, and that also found in the room were several quantities of cocaine, bundles of cash, and various instruments and supplies typically utilized for packaging cocaine. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the gun in room 311 was used by Nieves-Burgos to protect the drugs of which he was in possession. Although there is evidence in the record that weighs against this conclusion, the jury presumably considered all of the evidence and drew the permissible inference that the gun was used by Nieves-Burgos during and in relation to his possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of Sec. 924(c)(1). See United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir.1991) (the factfinder may decide among reasonable interpretations of the evidence).