Opinion ID: 2190118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does the arbitration agreement signed by the decedent bind the parties in a wrongful death suit?

Text: An appellate court's review of a trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo. banc 2003). Before compelling parties to arbitrate, the circuit court must determine whether the arbitration agreement bound the parties to the wrongful death suit. Finney v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 193 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Mo.App.2006). The parties do not dispute the fact that if Dorothy Lawrence were alive, she would be bound by the arbitration agreement. They also do not dispute that if Dale Lawrence's claim is derived through his mother's claim, he too would be bound by the agreement. The relevant question, then, becomes whether a suit for wrongful death can be considered derivative of any underlying tort claims that could have been brought by the deceased. The wrongful death statute under which Lawrence brings his claim, section 537.080, provides that: Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence, transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person or party who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured[.] The wrongful death act creates a new cause of action where none existed at common law and did not revive a cause of action belonging to the deceased, this Court held in O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. banc 1983) (emphasis added). The right of action thus created is neither a transmitted right nor a survival right. Id. This Court upheld the view that wrongful death is a cause of action distinct from any underlying tort claims in both Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Mo. banc 1993), and American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Ward, 774 S.W.2d 135, 136-37 (Mo. banc 1989). [3] In Finney , the court of appeals followed O'Grady, holding that [t]he wrongful death claim does not belong to the deceased or even to a decedent's estate. 193 S.W.3d at 395. Finney was factually similar to the present case. Jane Franano was admitted to a nursing home, and her granddaughter signed an arbitration agreement on behalf of Franano. Id. at 394. After Franano died, her daughter, Jan Finney, brought a wrongful death claim against the nursing home. Id. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration, and the court of appeals held that because the wrongful death claim was a separate claim that could not have been brought by the decedent, the arbitration agreement did not apply to the daughter's wrongful death suit. Id. at 395. Finney's reasoning is both consistent with this Court's precedent and applicable to the present case. The wrongful death statute and the precedent cases clearly consider wrongful death to be a cause of action separate and distinct from the underlying tort. Beverly Manor argues, however, that this Court's decision in a venue case, State ex rel. Burns v. Whittington, 219 S.W.3d 224 (Mo. banc 2007), undercuts the cases that hold wrongful death to be a separate cause of action. In Burns, the original plaintiff filed a negligence suit in St. Louis City, claiming that exposure in St. Louis County to benzene products had given him leukemia. After the negligence suit was filed, the legislature amended the venue statutes, providing that venue was located where the injury first occurred. See section 538.305, RSMo Supp.2007. The new venue statute applied only to cases filed after the date of the amendment. Id. After the venue statute was amended, the original Burns plaintiff died. His son then filed an amended petition alleging wrongful death. The defendants moved for transfer to St. Louis County, arguing that the wrongful death petition constituted a new cause of action falling under the new venue statute. Construing the venue statute, this Court held that for purposes of establishing venue, the [wrongful death] cause of action is derivative of the underlying tortious acts that caused the fatal injury, and that therefore, the wrongful death suit did not constitute a new cause of action. Burns, 219 S.W.3d at 225. This Court's decision in Burns is consistent with the venue statutes, which, as construed, prevent venue from being manipulated by the parties away from the place for trial designated in the appropriate venue statute. Although the language of Burns may seem to create ambiguity as to whether wrongful death should be considered a derivative cause of action, the Burns holding is limited to the issue of venue. There is nothing in the venue statute that purports to amend the wrongful death statute or to overturn this Court's precedents construing the wrongful death statute. Similarly, Burns does not overturn this Court's precedent holding that, substantively, wrongful death is a cause of action separate from underlying torts. In Burns, because the defendant's treatment of the deceased was the basis for both the original negligence suit and the wrongful death suit, for purposes of venue there was no difference, as both had the same connection to the original venue. Burns dealt with whether the subsequent wrongful death suit has a sufficient tie to the original venue, whereas in the present case, the question is whether one is bound by another's agreement to which one was not a party. The different issues necessitate different analyses. As the court noted in Finney , not only are the parties who may bring wrongful death distinct from those who may bring a suit for an underlying tort, but the measure of damages is also different. See Finney v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 193 S.W.3d at 395. (The damages under section 537.080 are different than the damages Decedent would have been entitled to in a personal injury action against Appellants. Under Missouri's wrongful death statute, the party or parties may receive `pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support of which those on whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived by reason of such death.' Section 537.090.). [4] Wrongful death, therefore, is a cause of action separate from the underlying torts, although it is treated differently for the purposes of venue. The arbitration agreement applies only to all persons whose claim is derived through or on behalf of [Dorothy Lawrence]. Dorothy Lawrence could not be a party to the wrongful death suit resulting from her death. A claim for wrongful death is not derivative from any claims Dorothy Lawrence might have had, and the damages are not awarded to the wrongful death plaintiffs on Dorothy Lawrence's behalf. The arbitration agreement, therefore, cannot bind parties to the wrongful death suit. Dale Lawrence, as the plaintiff in the wrongful death action, is not bound by the arbitration agreement signed by Dorothy Lawrence.