Opinion ID: 2975281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: 9 A. Jury Taint A constitutional duty of inquiry arises when “a trial court is presented with evidence that an extrinsic influence has reached the jury which has a reasonable potential for tainting that jury.” Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 373 (6th Cir.1999), see also United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120, 124-25 (6th Cir.1995)(“When there is a credible allegation of extraneous influences, the court must investigate sufficiently to assure itself that constitutional rights of the criminal defendant have not been violated.”). During Cross’s trial, the parties received information that juror Norbert Kortes’s wife had contact with a member of Roy’s family. See Cross, 2005 WL 675836 at . The victim’s family member gave Mrs. Kortes newspaper articles about the case and Mrs. Kortes said she would share them with Mr. Kortes. Cross, the attorneys, and the judge all met in chambers to discuss the matter. The following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: Okay. Well, we have selected 14 jurors in this particular situation, and I can have Mr. Kortes brought in, and we can question him about these matters, if you wish to do that; or I can deal with it some other way, if you wish to do it. Do you have any suggestions on how you wish to proceed? MR. MIENK [defense counsel]: I would move to stipulate that he just be removed from the jury panel. MR. EVANS [prosecution]: And I have no objection to the defendant’s motion, and I would so stipulate. THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Cross, have you heard what has been set 10 forth here on the record? MS. CROSS: Yes, I have. THE COURT: And did you understand it? MS CROSS: Yes, I did. THE COURT: And you understand your attorney is moving to have this juror, Mr. Norbert Kortes, removed from the jury panel? MS. CROSS: Yes. THE COURT: And are you in agreement with that? MS. CROSS: Highly. THE COURT: Your answer is? MS CROSS: Yes. Id. at -. Pursuant to the Court’s instruction, Mr. Kortes then went into the jury room and, without speaking to any juror, got his coat and left. Id. at . On appeal to the state court, Cross argued that the trial court should have questioned the remaining jurors to determine whether there had been any taint. The state court held that Cross waived this issue by agreeing to Kortes’s removal and not seeking any other remedial action. See Cross, 2003 WL 178802, at . The state court noted that waiver was an established principle that Michigan courts regularly followed prior to Cross’s 2001 trial. See People v. Carter, 462 Mich. 206, 219, 612 N.W.2d 144 (2000) (where defense counsel “clearly expressed satisfaction” with a trial court decision, a claim of error regarding the relevant 11 matters was waived). Cross claims she did not waive the jury taint issue, but the colloquy shows otherwise. Not only did the trial judge offer to question Mr. Kortes, the judge also offered to “deal with it some other way, if you wish to do it.” In offering to deal with the possible taint “in some other way,” the trial court gave Cross the opportunity to have the jury examined for prejudice. Instead of availing herself to this, Cross and her attorney agreed to simply have Mr. Kortes removed from the jury. Cross’s actions clearly demonstrate she waived the jury taint issue and the state court relied on her waiver to deny relief. Because waiver is an adequate and independent state ground to support the state court’s decision, this Court is foreclosed from reviewing Cross’s jury taint claim. See Luberda v. Trippett, 211 F.3d 1004, 1006-07 (6th Cir.2000). In cases where a state prisoner has procedurally defaulted her federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Application of the cause and 12 prejudice test may be excused if a petitioner “presents an extraordinary case whereby a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 162 (6th Cir.1994). Cross never alleged cause with respect to the jury taint issue. She also failed to allege actual prejudice or demonstrate how a fundamental miscarriage of justice might result from the failure to consider her jury taint claim. Finally, Cross has not alleged actual innocence. Accordingly, Cross is not entitled to habeas relief on her jury taint claim. B. Ineffective Assistance To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) her counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense and deprived the defendant of a fair trial, a trial with a reliable result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). When deciding if counsel’s performance was deficient, Strickland requires that the inquiry “must be highly deferential”: A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.... [A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.... A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the 13 acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 689-90. In determining whether counsel’s performance was prejudicial, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.” Id. A court need not address the question of competence if it is easier to dispose of the claim due to a lack of prejudice. Id. at 697; Mallet v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir.2003). Cross asserts that her trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to ask for a jury taint investigation, did not object to prosecutorial misconduct, and did not seek jury instructions concerning the Petitioner’s “mere presence” or “bad acts.” The state appellate court found that trial counsel was not ineffective with respect to the jury instructions because there was no evidence that Cross was merely present while other people committed the crimes and counsel could have validly omitted a bad acts instruction out of concern that such an instruction would have drawn further attention to bad deeds such as providing her sons with illegal substances. See Cross, 2003 WL 178802  (citations omitted). The state 14 appellate court also concluded that Cross’s prosecutorial misconduct claims could not be bases for relief because they were not preserved during trial. See Cross, 2003 WL 178802 at . The state appellate court explained that the contemporaneous objection rule, which was firmly established and regularly followed with respect to prosecutorial misconduct claims at the time of Cross’s trial, required her to object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct at the time it occurred. Id. The district court correctly agreed with the state court’s reasoning about the jury instructions. See Cross, 2005 WL 675836 at . Also, the district court rightly decided that the state appellate court’s denial of the prosecutorial misconduct claims was an adequate and independent ground that foreclosed review. Id. at . Beyond these insurmountable problems, Cross’s ineffective assistance claim is doomed by the fact she makes nothing more than conclusory assertions about actual prejudice. Her conclusory assertions fall far short of showing actual prejudice. C. Sufficiency of the Evidence The Supreme Court has held that “proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required” by the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071, 15 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (citations omitted). In Jackson, the Court further explained that in order for a conviction to be supported by sufficient evidence, it must be possible for some rational trier of fact to “have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. This “standard must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law .” Id. at 324 n.16. Cross contends that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, solicitation of firstdegree murder, and first-degree premeditated murder. The state appellate court rejected her contention, stating: With regard to [her] conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy consists, in pertinent part, of a mutual agreement between two or more people to commit a criminal act. People v. Buck, 197 Mich.App. 404, 411-412; 496 N.W.2d 321 (1992), reversed in part on other grounds sub nom People v. Holcomb, 444 Mich. 853 (1993). To prove conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, it must be shown that “each conspirator had the requisite intent to commit the murder.” Id. at 412. John Benjamin testified that he and [Cross] agreed that he should approach an acquaintance and offer him money and a vehicle in return for killing the victim. Further, John Benjamin testified that he asked Gordon Dittmer to commit the murder and that [Cross] gave him a check to pay Dittmer, which constituted evidence that both John Benjamin and defendant actually had an intent to murder the victim. There was sufficient evidence to support [Cross’s] conspiracy conviction. 16 Turning to [Cross’s] conviction of solicitation of murder, the law provides that a person who aids or abets the commission of a crime may be convicted as if that person directly committed the crime. People v. Izarraras-Placante, 246 Mich.App. 490, 495; 633 N.W.2d 18 (2001). A finding that a defendant aided and abetted a crime requires evidence that (1) the crime was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or knew that the principal intended its commission when the defendant gave aid and encouragement. Id. at 495-496. Solicitation of murder consists of (1) the solicitor purposely seeking to have someone killed and (2) trying to engage someone to do the killing. People v. Sexton, 250 Mich.App. 211, 227; 646 N.W.2d 875 (2002). John Benjamin’s testimony that he promised Dittmer money and a vehicle in payment for killing the victim was sufficient to establish that John Benjamin committed the crime of solicitation of murder. His testimony that [Cross] agreed with him to ask another man to kill the victim in return for payment was sufficient to establish that she gave encouragement that assisted the solicitation and that she intended the commission of the crime. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support [Cross’s] solicitation of murder conviction. With regard to [Cross’s] murder conviction, first-degree premeditated murder consists of an intentional killing of a victim that was premeditated and deliberate. People v. Abraham, 234 Mich.App. 640, 656, 599 N.W.2d 736 (1999). The evidence that the victim died from a gunshot wound to the head, that Dittmer told two people that he shot the victim, and that he told one of them that he was supposed to be paid for the killing was sufficient evidence that Dittmer committed first-degree premeditated murder. This evidence together with that discussed above regarding [Cross] giving funds to John Benjamin to pay Dittmer for the killing, constitutes sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that [Cross] aided and abetted firstdegree premeditated murder by providing encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime and intended its commission. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support [Cross’s] first-degree murder conviction. 17 Cross, 2003 WL 178802 at -. In the instant appeal, Cross essentially argues that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution’s witnesses lacked credibility. By delivering its guilty verdicts, the jury obviously concluded that the witnesses were believable. Regardless, the district court found the state court’s analysis constituted a proper application of the Jackson standard and Cross offers nothing to show that the district court erred. 4. Cumulative Error Claim “[T]he law of this Circuit is that cumulative error claims are not cognizable on habeas because the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue.” Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 816 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir.2005)). Thus, even if any of the actions previously mentioned were errors, they are not cognizable as cumulative error and provide no basis for relief.