Opinion ID: 2517296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prospective juror Elliott

Text: The State advanced the following purported race-neutral justification for its challenge of prospective juror Elliott: Elliott . . . seemed easily sidetracked. She told a number of stories . . . she had multiple concerns as far as her modeling career and her nursing career and . . . parents. . . . Diomampo argues that the State mischaracterized Elliott as someone who was easily sidetracked and that there was no evidence to support such a claim. [25] Rather, he claims that Elliott was rational, coherent, and thoughtful. We conclude that Diomampo's argument is without merit. Under the second prong of Batson, the reason for a peremptory challenge need not be persuasive or even plausible. [26] The State justified its challenge of Elliott on her statement that she had to care for her parents. This explanation is at least plausible, if not persuasive. The State could have, under the second prong of Batson, suspected but lacked the ability to prove that Elliott was preoccupied and unfocused. Accordingly, the State's race-neutral justifications with respect to Elliott embody precisely the type of issues that peremptory challenges are provided to combat, and the district court properly overruled the Batson challenge as to Elliott. We conclude that the two Batson violations identified above require reversal and remand for a new trial as a matter of law. Post-Miranda silence Diomampo argues that Officer Wojcik commented on his post-Miranda silence in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [27] He also asserts that the comment constituted harmful error because the case against him was marginal at best and, therefore, the comment about his silence could have made the difference as to whether he was convicted. We recently held in Gaxiola v. State that the prosecution is forbidden at trial to comment upon an accused's election to remain silent following his arrest and after he has been advised of his rights. [28] However, a mere passing reference to post- Miranda silence without more, does not mandate an automatic reversal. [29] In reviewing claims of nonstructural, constitutional error, we must determine whether the district court erred, and if so, we must reverse unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., reversal is unwarranted if we conclude `without reservation that the verdict would have been the same in the absence of error.' [30] Accordingly, we `will not reverse a conviction when the state comments on post-arrest silence if the comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' [31] We therefore review Diomampo's claim to determine whether any error occurred and, if so, whether it was harmless in nature. We conclude that, when considered in the context of the full record generated at trial, the State's questions and comments at trial regarding Diomampo's post- Miranda silence were more than mere passing reference[s] [32] and were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecutor asked two questions of Officer Wojcik regarding Diomampo's silence. The first question, which asked whether Diomampo understood his rights, called attention to the fact that Diomampo had the right to remain silent. The second question, which asked whether Diomampo said anything after being read his Miranda rights, focused upon the fact that Diomampo remained silent thereafter. We conclude that the jury could have drawn improper conclusions about Diomampo's silence based on the prosecutor's questions and the officer's answer and the failure of the district court to strike the testimony from the record or provide a limiting instruction to the jury. While Officer Wojcik's testimony on this subject was quite brief, Officer Gabron also commented during his separate trial testimony that Diomampo refused to speak to them any further after he was read his Miranda rights. This, unfortunately, reinforced any inappropriate meaning that could have been drawn from Officer Wojcik's testimony concerning Diomampo's silence. Accordingly, because Diomampo was not the owner of the vehicle and the trafficking level of contraband was found under the passenger seat of that vehicle, and because the State's theory of criminal liability was not based upon his direct physical possession of the contraband at the time it was discovered by police, we cannot conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For this further reason, the judgment of conviction must be reversed and this matter remanded for a new trial. Evidence of prior bad acts Diomampo contends that the State improperly introduced several instances of prior bad acts in violation of NRS 48.045(2). In this, he argues that the State improperly suggested, through the questioning of Officer Wojcik, that methamphetamine users `normally' support their habit by robbing and burglarizing people and that Diomampo appeared to be driving while under the influence of a controlled substance. He also claims that the prosecutor improperly admitted evidence of the narcotics kit and scale found on Diomampo's person. According to Diomampo, the district court, in admitting the alleged prior bad act evidence without a separate hearing to determine admissibility, violated his due process rights to a fair trial. [33] Specifically, he claims that the alleged prior bad act evidence was more prejudicial than probative, especially given the fact that it was not accompanied by limiting instructions. [34] The State, in response, asserts that because Diomampo failed to object to the alleged prior bad act testimony at trial he failed to preserve the issue for review on appeal. [35] NRS 48.045(2), which governs the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. [Such evidence] may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Because prior bad act evidence forces the accused to defend himself against vague and unsubstantiated charges and may result in a conviction because the jury believes the defendant to be a bad person, it is commonly reversible error to use uncharged bad acts to show criminal propensity. [36] However, as we held in Braunstein v. State , [t]he trial court's determination to admit or exclude evidence of prior bad acts is a decision within its discretionary authority and is to be given great deference. It will not be reversed absent manifest error. [37] Under Petrocelli v. State, [38] in order to admit evidence of prior bad acts, the district court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury and determine that: (1) the incident is relevant to the crime charged; (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [39] Nevertheless, failure to conduct a Petrocelli hearing is not reversible error when the record is sufficient to establish that the evidence is admissible under the test outlined above or the trial result would have been the same had the trial court excluded the evidence. [40] We review claims of nonconstitutional error under NRS 178.598 to determine if the error `had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' [41] In addition, generally, unobjected to errors are not preserved for appellate review. [42] Nonetheless, this court has the discretion to address an error if it was plain and affected the defendant's substantial rights. In conducting plain error review, we must examine whether there was error, whether the error was plain or clear, and whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Additionally, the burden is on the defendant to show actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. [43] While the State correctly observed that Diomampo failed to object or seek a curative instruction from the trial court concerning the evidence that methamphetamine users have certain propensities, we conclude that this claim upon appeal is subject to a plain error analysis and that the record below demonstrates plain error. [44] Specifically, admitting Officer Wojcik's testimony that methamphetamine users normally support their habits by committing robberies affected Diomampo's substantial rights because it permitted the jury to draw inferences about Diomampo's character and his conforming propensity to commit other crimes. In addition, this testimony was not prior bad act evidence admissible as an exception to the prohibitions in NRS 48.045(2) concerning character evidence. And, given that Diomampo was not the owner of the vehicle that he was driving and no confirmed methamphetamine was found on his person, Officer Wojcik's testimony likely had a substantial and injurious effect on the outcome of the case. Accordingly, the district court committed reversible error in admitting the portion of Officer Wojcik's testimony that related to the practices of methamphetamine users. With regard to the evidence of Diomampo's impairment, we conclude that Diomampo did lodge a timely objection to that evidence, and therefore we review this claim on its merits. We conclude that Officer Wojcik's testimony that Diomampo appeared to be impaired upon being stopped by officers was admissible on the question of intent to possess and that failure to conduct a hearing, as per Petrocelli, does not in and of itself compel reversal in this case. As to Diomampo's claim of error concerning the narcotics kit and the scale, we conclude that Diomampo waived this claim of error on appeal and plain error review is inappropriate. We further conclude that this evidence would have been admissible in any event, notwithstanding the lack of a hearing under Petrocelli, because the kit and scale were relevant to the question of intent, were established by clear and convincing evidence, and their probative value clearly outweighed any considerations of unfair prejudice. [45] Warrantless vehicle search Diomampo argues that police lacked sufficient justification under the Fourth Amendment to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, incident to the arrest, for weapons or to inventory its contents. [46] More specifically, he claims that his vehicle was impounded in violation of LVMPD policy because the arresting officers did not attempt to contact the vehicle's registered owner. Diomampo also asserts that the officers merely prepared a tow sheet that failed to provide a complete list of the items recovered from the vehicle. [47] As we held in Weintraub v. State, [an] inventory search must be carried out pursuant to standardized official department procedures and must be administered in good faith in order to pass constitutional muster. [48] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that an inventory search is per se reasonable, and accordingly constitutional, when it complies with police department policies. [49] In addition, in Nevada, under certain circumstances, police officers may actually have an obligation to conduct an inventory search. [50] Nonetheless, the `inventory search must not be a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.' [51] We conclude that the inventory search of Diomampo's vehicle was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. According to LVMPD policy, officers must have at least one valid cause for impounding and, subsequently, conducting an inventory search of a vehicle. In this, LVMPD policy provides cause to impound a vehicle [w]hen ownership and rightful possession by the driver is in doubt or [w]hen an abandoned vehicle causes an immediate threat to other motorists by its location or cargo, immediately after citing the vehicle. Both considerations justify an inventory search of the vehicle here. First, the inventory search was justified because neither Diomampo nor Olsen were the registered owner of the vehicle or had a valid driver's license. Second, as in Collins v. State, the impound and subsequent inventory search were reasonable because the vehicle was parked in an unsecured location, obstructing traffic. [52] Beyond that, contrary to Diomampo's claims, there is no requirement that police contact the registered owner of the vehicle prior to conducting an inventory search under either of these policies. In short, failure to notify the vehicle owner does not negate the validity of an inventory search conducted thereunder. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Diomampo's motion to suppress evidence. Sufficiency of the evidence Diomampo argues that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence in this case to sustain his conviction. Specifically, he claims that no methamphetamine was found on his person and the district court judge indicated uncertainty over whether [the] jury was going to convict. We conclude that Diomampo's argument is without merit. We have held that `[i]nsufficiency of the evidence occurs where the prosecution has not produced a minimum threshold of evidence upon which a conviction may be based.' [53] In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the critical question is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [54] In addition, `[w]here there is substantial evidence to support a verdict in a criminal case . . . the reviewing court will not disturb the verdict nor set aside the judgment.' [55] Here, the officers found drug paraphernalia on Diomampo's person and methamphetamine in the vehicle he was driving pursuant to a lawful inventory search. The district court judge's speculation as to whether Diomampo would be convicted does not in any respect demonstrate the insufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, apart from the errors identified above, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Diomampo's conviction.