Opinion ID: 1917897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver by Respondent Dawson of Right to Object to Timeliness of Appeal.

Text: The record discloses no service of a notice of entry of the trial court's order of May 21, 1964, or of the July 24, 1964, judgment on either appellant. The record does establish, however, that a copy of such order of May 21, 1964, was personally served on appellant Lloyd Coates by the sheriff of Lafayette county on May 27, 1964, and that a copy of such order was mailed to appellant Fowler properly addressed on May 27, 1964. Sec. 274.01, Stats., provides in part as follows: Except as otherwise provided the time within which a writ of error may be issued or an appeal taken to obtain a review by the supreme court of any judgment or order in any civil action or special proceeding in a court of record is limited to 3 months from service of notice of entry of such judgment or order or, if no notice is served, to 6 months from date of entry. In Cash v. Kruschke (1908), 134 Wis. 130, 113 N. W. 675, sec. 3042, Stats. 1898, was the controlling statute and provided, The time within which an appeal may be taken directly from an order is further limited to thirty days from the date of the service by either party upon the other of a copy of such order, with a written notice of the entry of the same. A notice of entry of the order appealed from had been served but not a copy of the order itself. This court held this was insufficient to trigger the thirty-day appeal period and declared (at p. 134): Service of a copy of the order was just as essential as service of a notice of the entry thereof to start the period of limitations running, . . . While this quoted language would provide strong support for holding that service of a copy of an order is not the equivalent of service of notice of entry of such order within the meaning of sec. 274.01, Stats., we find it unnecessary to decide this point here. Even if it were to be held to be the equivalent, Dawson has clearly waived the right to object to the timeliness of the appeal. This is because of his participation in the appeal by filing a brief and arguing the merits of the appeal. Sec. 269.51 (1); Guardianship of Barnes (1957), 275 Wis. 356, 82 N. W. (2d) 211.