Opinion ID: 2276759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Batson Challenges (Strong's point 4)

Text: Strong next raises two Batson [6] challenges. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disallow the state's peremptory challenges of African-American venirepersons Bobo and Stevenson and in allowing the state to use only six of its nine peremptory challenges.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a party may not exercise a per-emptory challenge to remove a potential juror solely on the basis of the juror's gender, ethnic origin, or race. State v. Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Mo. banc 2002). There are three steps in a Batson , or race-based, challenge. Id. First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with respect to the specific venireperson struck by the state and identify the cognizable racial group to which that person belongs. Id. Second, the state must supply a reasonably specific and clear race-neutral explanation for the challenged strike. Id. Finally, if the state provides an acceptable reason for the strike, then the defendant must demonstrate that the state's proffered reasons were merely pretextual and that the strike was racially motivated. Id. There are four factors to consider in determining pretext. Id. at 469-70. The first factor is the presence of similarly situated white jurors who were not struck. Id. at 469. This factor is not conclusive but is crucial in determining pretext. Id. The second factor is the degree of logical relevance between the proffered explanation and the case to be tried. Id. The third factor is the prosecutor's credibility based on his or her demeanor or statements during voir dire and the court's past experiences with that prosecutor. Id. The final factor is the demeanor of the excluded venireperson. Id. at 470. In determining pretext, the trial court should consider the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, and the standard of review is for clear error. Id.
Strong alleges the prosecutor's peremptory strike of venireperson Bobo was pretextual. The prosecutor claimed he struck Bobo primarily because he is the assistant dean of Covenant Seminary, because he had a cousin who was convicted of murder and was incarcerated for that crime, and because Bobo was not as strong on the death penalty as the prosecutor would have preferred. Strong argued that the prosecutor overlooked a similarly employed white venireperson, Bobo's cousin in jail was a distant relative, and Bobo had responded previously that he could impose the death sentence. In permitting the prosecutor's strike, the trial court stated the most important reason articulated was Bobo's job as an assistant dean at an institution teaching individuals to go into religious training. Strong argued that venireperson McCabe was similarly situated to Bobo because McCabe had retired from teaching at a parochial school. As the trial court found, however, teaching students at a private high school differs from training individuals for a religious vocation. Moreover, the fact that Bobo had a cousin in jail for murder differentiated him from McCabe. When asked whether he was so far removed from [his cousin's conviction] that [he didn't] know whether or not the sentence [his cousin] received was considered fair or not fair, Bobo initially responded, Well, of course his mother believes that he was set up. The trial court did not commit clear error in permitting the prosecutor's peremptory strike predicated in part on this ground. Strong attempts in his brief to argue that the dismissal of a juror on the ground that a religious person would be less likely to impose the death penalty violates Article I, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution. [7] Strong failed to raise this claim before the trial court, and it is not preserved for appellate review. See State v. Chambers, 891 S.W.2d 93, 103-04 (Mo. banc 1994). Neither has Strong demonstrated plain error. See Rule 30.20. The trial court did not clearly err in permitting the prosecutor's peremptory strike of venireperson Bobo.
When Strong raised his Batson challenge as to venireperson Stevenson, the prosecutor responded that he struck her because she seemed particularly unhappy about sequestration, she was particularly weak on the death sentence, she doesn't have young children, and she mentioned church and religion. The prosecutor also noted that Stevenson had a brother in prison but that didn't seem to be too much of a problem at all for her. Because no discriminatory intent was inherent in the prosecutor's initial explanation, the challenge moved to the third step. See Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 468. As to the prosecutor's claim that he struck venireperson Stevenson because she had no young children, Strong attempted to show pretext by arguing that three similarly situated white jurors were not struck. The prosecutor distinguished these jurors from Stevenson. He said one of them was a young teacher who works with children. Two of the other venirepersons had served previously on a jury, were strong on the death penalty, and had no hesitation in imposing it. Other factors for these jurors, according to the prosecutor, outweighed the fact that they did not have minor children. The trial court stated that whether a juror had young children was an extremely important factor because the trial involved the alleged murder of a two-year-old child. Strong next claims that the prosecutor's explanation for striking Stevenson because she was particularly unhappy about sequestration was pretextual because no record was made of her body language or facial expressions when they were observed. The trial court, however, noted that Stevenson displayed physical disdain regarding sequestration. Strong never argued, during voir dire or in his appellate brief, that these observations were faulty. The trial court's acceptance of this reason was not clearly erroneous. See State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 384 (Mo. banc 1994). Strong next contends that striking Stevenson because she mentioned church and religion and stated that one of the members of [her] church is a manager for the Division of Family Services was pretextual. The prosecutor stated that Stevenson's religious beliefs possibly indicated another reason she may very well be weak on the death penalty. Strong argues in his brief that the prosecutor violated equal protection by predicating [his] excuse upon her religious affiliation. At trial, however, Strong never raised this argument and instead chose to oppose the prosecutor's statement that Stevenson was not strong on the death penalty. A constitutional argument must be raised before the trial court or it is waived. See Chambers, 891 S.W.2d at 103-04. Furthermore, Strong has not established that this was plain error. See Rule 30.20. Strong next claims the prosecutor's decision to strike Stevenson because she was particularly weak on the death sentence was pretextual. The record reflects that Stevenson was asked whether she would be able to consider both forms of punishment, namely life in prison and the death penalty. She responded: I think it's circumstantial, too. You can't make a decision without hearing the facts, so my opinion, if the facts say so, then I wouldn't have a problem with it. But if the facts don't say it, I cannot go that route. In a followup question, Stevenson said she would be able to consider both forms of punishment equally. The record reveals that venirepersons Vance and Neal, whose responses were similar to Stevenson's, served on the jury. But venirepersons Pirrone and Teson, who were peremptorily stricken for reasons not revealed by the record, replied similarly to Stevenson and stated that their decision to impose the death penalty would depend on the circumstances. In other words, the record is ambiguous with respect to this justification by the prosecutor. The prosecutor enunciated several reasons why he exercised a peremptory strike for Stevenson. Although some of the justifications are stronger than others, the totality of the circumstances establishes that the trial court did not clearly err by allowing the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of venireperson Stevenson. See Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 470.
Strong next alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the state to use only six of its nine peremptory challenges. The trial court noted in the record that this effectively eliminated the last three potential jurors, who were all Caucasian. The trial court committed no error by striking the jurors at the bottom of the list in this manner. See State v. Elder, 901 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Mo.App.1995) (no error because, after prosecutor declined to exercise remaining peremptory strike, trial court removed surplus venireperson from list).