Opinion ID: 2599821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review District Attorney Disqualification

Text: We have previously addressed the disqualification of individual district attorneys and an entire district attorney's office. See People in Interest of N.R., 139 P.3d 671, 674 (Colo. 2006); Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1271 (Colo.2005); People v. C.V., 64 P.3d 272, 274 (Colo.2003); People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 880 (Colo.2001); People ex rel. Sandstrom v. Dist. Court, 884 P.2d 707, 710 (Colo. 1994). Colorado generally requires that its district attorneys prosecute criminal cases. Colo. Const. art. IV, § 1(1); Colo. Const. art. VI, § 13; § 20-1-102(1) & (3), C.R.S. (2006) (stating that the district attorney represents the people of the state of Colorado). Section 20-1-107 creates an exception to the general rule and vests a trial court with the discretion to disqualify a district attorney and appoint a special prosecutor under certain circumstances. Palomo, 31 P.3d at 882. Prior to its amendment in 2002, section 20-1-107 provided for the disqualification of a district attorney [i]f the district attorney is interested or has been employed as counsel in any case which it is his duty to prosecute or defend. § 20-1-107, C.R.S. (2001). The General Assembly amended the disqualification statute in 2002 to provide that [a] district attorney may only be disqualified in a particular case . . . upon a showing that the district attorney has a personal or financial interest or finds special circumstances that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. § 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2006). The disqualification statute is designed to ensure that district attorneys can perform their public duty as mandated by the Colorado Constitution. The legislative declaration in section 20-1-107(1) states that: the office of the district attorney was created by the state constitution and the state constitution gives to the general assembly the exclusive authority to prescribe the duties of the office of the district attorney. The general assembly finds and declares that this section is necessary to protect the independence of persons duly elected to the office of district attorney. In accordance with the constitutional provisions and the legislature's stated intent, the statute authorizes disqualification only when the district attorney has an interest in the litigation apart from his professional responsibility of upholding the law. N.R., 139 P.3d at 676 ( citing People v. Dist. Court, 189 Colo. 159, 162, 538 P.2d 887, 889 (1975)). In order to allow prosecutors to perform their professional duty to execute the laws of the State of Colorado, the statute narrowly enumerates specific circumstances where disqualification would be warranted. In several recent cases, we analyzed the statutory language in the amended version of the disqualification statute and concluded that the legislature intended to specifically define the circumstances where disqualification is proper. N.R., 139 P.3d at 674-76; People v. Chavez, 139 P.3d 649, 652-53 (Colo. 2006); People in Interest of E.L.T., 139 P.3d 685, 687 (Colo.2006); People v. Manzanares, 139 P.3d 655, 658 (Colo.2006). Because the amended version of the statute specifically states that [a] district attorney may only be disqualified upon a showing of personal interest, financial interest, or special circumstances, we concluded that in using the word `only' and defining with specificity the circumstances under which disqualification is proper, the amended version of section 20-1-107 eliminates `appearance of impropriety' as a basis for disqualification. N.R., 139 P.3d at 675 (emphasis added). Accordingly, under the current version of the statute, disqualification is proper only when: (1) the district attorney requests his or her own disqualification; (2) the district attorney has either a personal or financial interest in the prosecution; or (3) special circumstances exist that would make it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. § 20-1-107(2); N.R., 139 P.3d at 676. Because the first two situations do not exist in the present case, we now analyze whether special circumstances exist to warrant disqualification.