Opinion ID: 323055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH OF SECTION 201(g) AS APPLIED TO AN ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIAL

Text: 59 At the outset it is important to distinguish among three quite different matters: (1) the constitutional challenge to section 201(g) itself, which we discuss herein; (2) the distinctions to be drawn between the bribery section 201(c)(1) and gratuity section 201(g), which we have covered in Parts II and III; and (3) the clarity and correctness of the District Judge's instructions to the jury, which we analyze in Part V. For, even if sections (c)(1) and (g) appeared overlapping and duplicitous as applied to the facts of particular case, this would be no ground for declaring one or both to be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, so long as each intelligibly defined an offense. Nor, even if the trial judge faltered in his effort to distinguish for the jury the essential elements making for guilt under one section, guilt under the other section, or innocence under both, would this establish any constitutional infirmity in the statute. 60 There is no doubt that when Congress enacted section 201(g) in 1962 it intended the section should apply to its own members. 34 The entire statute, 18 U.S.C. 201, entitled 'Bribery of public officials and witnesses,' begins in section 201(a) by stating public official' means Member of Congress, . . .' In United States v. Brewster, 35 in holding that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution did not bar the enforcement of section 201(g), the Supreme Court stated: 61 To sustain a conviction it is necessary to show that (Brewster) solicited, received, or agreed to receive, money with knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act. Inquiry into the legislative performance itself is not necessary; evidence of the Member's knowledge of the alleged briber's illicit reasons for paying the money is sufficient to carry the case to the jury. 36 62 We cannot agree with defendant's contention that 'as applied to the fund-raising activities of an elected political office-holder, the terms of 201(g) are hopelessly and unconstitutionally vague, . . .' 37 It is here in his argument that the defendant seeks to profit by confusing (1) the absence in the gratuity section of the bribery section's requirement of an intent 'corruptly' to accept the funds, with (2) the absence of any criminal intent at all in the gratuity section. To the contrary, the gratuity section does require a criminal intent, expressed by the language 'otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty . . . for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him' (Comparative Clauses 'A' and 'C'). 63 Not only must the criminal intent defined by section (g) be proved, but also the prosecution must prove that the legislator accepted the thing of value 'for himself.' Thus, if a legislator knew that a contribution was being given for an official act, received the contribution and knowingly applied it to his own uses, the intent requirement of the illegal gratuity section (g) would be met. 64 Manifestly, then, the language of section 201(g), as authoritatively interpreted by the Surpeme Court in its Brewster decision, 'give(s) the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.' 38 The section's standards are sufficiently explicit to prevent delegation of 'basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.' 39 Hence, section 201(g) is not impermissibly vague even under the standards applied to statutes governing the conduct of average citizens. That 201(g) is directed at the conduct of public officials, who should exercise extraordinary caution to avoid acts potentially violative of their public trust, makes us even more reluctant to accept the argument that the section is vague. 40 65 The defendant further argues that section 201(g) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it reaches legitimate campaign contributions, which arguably can be characterized as the sort of political, associational activity protected by the First Amendment. 41 To the contrary, however, a public official's acceptance of a thing of value unrelated to the performance of any official act and all bona fide contributions directed to a lawfully conducted campaign committee or other person or entity are not prohibited by 201(g). What is outlawed is only the knowing and purposeful receipt by a public official of a payment, made in consideration of an official act, for himself. Congress has an indisputable interest in proscribing such conduct as a means for preserving the integrity of governmental operations. This interest supersedes any conceivable First Amendment value related to such conduct. 66 Nor does the defendant strengthen his constitutional argument by conjuring up hypothetical problems which may yet arise in the peripheral areas of the law's coverage. What we are concerned with is the application of the statute to the evidence in Brewster's case before us. As long as section 201(g) can be applied constitutionally to Brewster's particular conduct, we can rely on 'the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.' 42 67 Clearly the record supports the conclusion that application of section 201(g) to Brewster does not violate any constitutional safeguard. By crediting the prosecution's version of events, the jury could have found, first, that Senator Brewster received sums of money from Anderson, not out of general support based on his past record or insubstantial hopes for the future, but in well-founded consideration for his forthcoming official action on specific proposed or pending postal rate legislation. Second, the record evidence sustains the inference that Brewster had 'knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act.' Third, the jury could have found that Brewster personally received the money and applied it for his personal use. The Government's evidence thus indicates that the defendant engaged in conduct which falls squarely within the prohibitions of section 201(g), and we reiterate that Congress has the power to punish such conduct without breaching any barriers posed by the First Amendment. 68 Finally, this is not a situation in which we will permit a defendant whose conduct may constitutionally be proscribed to attack the statute under which he was convicted on the ground that it is overbroad on its face. The language of the Supreme Court in its recent Parker v. Levy 43 decision is pertinent here: 69 This Court has . . . repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its face where there were a substantial number of situations to which it might be validly applied. Thus, even if there are marginal applications in which a statute would infringe on First Amendment values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if the 'remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct . . ..' United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-581, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). And the Court recognized in Broadrick (v. Oklahoma) that 'where conduct and not merely speech is involved' the overbreadth must 'not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' 44 70 In prohibiting personal gifts that could unduly affect a public official's performance of his duties, section 201(g) manifestly 'covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct.' The hypothetical cases in which 201(g) might conceivably infringe on First Amendment rights are at best 'marginal.' Finally, since the statute proscribes conduct and not merely speech, any insubstantial degree of overbreadth cannot condemn it in the face of its 'plainly legitimate sweep.' Therefore, we cannot hold that section 201(g) is overbroad on its face. 71 For the reasons stated above, the unlawful gratuity statute withstands the defendant's argument that it is vague and overbroad.