Opinion ID: 2052508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: did the trial court's application of sdcl 22-5-10 deprive the defendant of his due process rights and a fair trial by impermissibly shifting the burden of proving the defense of insanity?

Text: On the question of Donald's plea of insanity, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the shifting of the burden of proof of the affirmative defense of insanity to the defendant by clear and convincing evidence, as provided in SDCL 22-5-10. [5] Donald acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court, speaking in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), and more recently in Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987), has concluded that it is permissible to shift the burden of proof of insanity to the defendant because it is not an element of the offense charged. But, relying on our decision in State v. Jones, 406 N.W.2d 366 (S.D.1987), Donald urges us to declare SDCL 22-5-10 to be unconstitutional under Article VI, § 2 of our State Constitution. In Jones, we held that SDCL 23A-10A-6.1, which then provided that [t]he party asserting that a defendant is mentally incompetent to proceed [to stand trial] has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence[,] 406 N.W.2d at 367 (emphasis added), was unconstitutional under the aforementioned provision of our State Constitution. [6] Donald's reliance on Jones is totally misplaced. At issue there was the ability of a defendant to stand trial. Our decision clearly stated: Incompetency to stand trial and incapacity to commit a crime because of insanity are, of course, distinct and separate issues. 406 N.W.2d at 369. We first noted that the United States Supreme Court had not, as yet, extended the Leland rationale to competency hearings, although several federal courts had eschewed the application of Leland to such hearings. We then determined that rather than wait for a federal decision at some future time that we would review the provision in the light of our own constitution. We started with the premise that [i]t is the settled criminal law in this state that `the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution at every stage of the trial.' 406 N.W.2d at 369 (citations omitted). Since the competency of the accused to stand trial controls whether there is even going to be a trial, it necessarily follows that a competency hearing is a basic stage of the proceeding. From that premise, we concluded that the burden of proof allocation imposed by the statute when the accused's attorney moves for an incompetency hearing is incompatible with this settled South Dakota rule. We referred to the reasoning in State v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.1977), for the proposition that [w]hen the competency of the accused is put in question he may or may not have the mentality to fairly defend himself. If in fact the defendant is less than competent, however, a handicap exists which renders a fair trial impossible. 406 N.W.2d at 370. We finally decided that, because competency to stand trial is not an element of any offense, the burden on State of proving competency is only the preponderance standard. Id. While Donald may have found some language in Jones that indicated a parallel between incompetency to stand trial and insanity, we suggest that such language was illustrative only and cannot be mistaken as substantive with regard to the affirmative defense of insanity. In view of the United States Supreme Court pronouncements upholding the shifting of the affirmative defense of insanity to the defendant, coupled with the fact that a large number of state supreme courts have also so held under their respective state constitutions, we decline to find SDCL 22-5-10 to be unconstitutional under the provisions of Article VI, § 2 of our State Constitution. We affirm the trial court on this issue.