Opinion ID: 2076670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Journey's Account Statute

Text: In order to claim the saving power of the Journey's Account Statute, a plaintiff must have filed his original cause of action timely. Ware v. Waterman (1969), 146 Ind. App. 237, 253 N.E.2d 708. Moreover, the decision ending the original action must not have been on the merits. Good, 56 Ind. App. at 567, 103 N.E. at 674. Finally, the plaintiff must meet the conditions set forth in the Journey's Account Statute. As for the timeliness requirement, Suzanne's claim must be distinguished from those of her parents. Medical malpractice actions must be filed within two [2] years from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect except that a minor under the full age of six [6] years shall have until his eighth birthday in which to file. Ind. Code § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns 1983 Repl.). Suzanne was born on January 3, 1975. The statute of limitations bars her parents' claim because they failed to file by January 3, 1977. The parents' claim was not part of the original Illinois suit and was not added until August 5, 1985, the time the Indiana suit began. Donna and Charles Vesolowski's claims do not meet the timeliness requirement of the Journey's Account Statute and thus cannot be saved by it. Suzanne's original claim, however, was timely. She filed in Illinois on October 21, 1980, more than two years before her eighth birthday. Suzanne is also qualified to invoke the Journey's Account Statute because the trial court dismissed her original suit on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the merits. The final question is whether Suzanne meets one of the four statutory conditions. The Journey's Account Statute applies when any of these four situations occurs: 1) the plaintiff fails from any cause except negligence in the prosecution; 2) the action abated; 3) the action is defeated by the death of a party; or 4) judgment is arrested or reversed on appeal. Dr. Repay argues that Suzanne's failure to refile in Indiana after the dismissal of her suit in Illinois amounts to negligence in the prosecution of the first action. While this may be so, Suzanne's initial action still qualifies under the second condition in the Journey's Account Statute. Under the rules of procedure in vogue when the Journey's Account Statute was adopted, a defendant properly questioned jurisdiction by filing a plea of abatement. See Eel River Railroad Co. v. State (1896), 143 Ind. 231, 42 N.E. 617. An abatement is the overthrow or destruction of an action. In this case, the Illinois trial court quashed the summons in the first action because it had no jurisdiction over Dr. Repay. It abated Suzanne's action within the meaning of the Journey's Account Statute. Because Suzanne meets the second statutory condition, the Journey's Account Statute saves Suzanne's claim. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The trial court's entry of dismissal against Donna and Charles Vesolowski is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate Suzanne's claim. DeBRULER, GIVAN, PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur.