Opinion ID: 1182224
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial and Police Misconduct

Text: Defendant claims that several instances of prosecutorial and police misconduct denied him a fair trial. We categorize these alleged instances of misconduct into 4 areas: (A) investigative misconduct by both the police and prosecution; (B) prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury; (C) improper contact between the prosecution and the media; and (D) trial misconduct. [2] We examine each category separately. A. Alleged Investigative Misconduct 1. Burial of Victim's Remains Defendant argues that the prosecutor, John G. Davis, III, had agreed with Stanton Bloom (before Bloom became attorney of record) that the victim's remains would not be buried until mid-June 1985 to enable a defense expert to examine the bones. At the victim's parents' request, however, the remains were buried on May 30, 1985, before Bloom could have them examined. Defendant suggests that, in allowing the victim's parents to proceed with the funeral, the prosecution failed to preserve valuable evidence and thereby denied defendant a fair trial. Contrary to defendant's argument, we believe that he was not denied a fair trial. Two experts for the defense had already examined the victim's remains before funeral arrangements were made. The prosecutor notified both Couser and Bloom of the pending burial. Couser, who was still attorney of record, chose not to seek a delay of the funeral, despite Bloom's request to do so. Thus, the defense was offered access to the evidence before the remains were buried, and, in fact, two defense experts examined the remains. Additionally, both Drs. Birkby and Keen were unable to determine the cause or exact date of death, and the record does not reflect that additional examination of the victim's remains would have yielded any evidence useful to the defense. In fact, in his motion to exhume, defendant did not present any evidence  other than Bloom's personal affidavit  indicating that further examination of the bones would have proven fruitful. We therefore conclude that defendant was not denied a fair trial by the burial of the victim's remains. 2. Police Investigation Defendant also claims that the police and prosecution failed adequately to investigate alternative theories of the case. He asserts that the prosecution did not fully investigate other supposed sightings of defendant or the possibility that some other person had kidnapped the victim. Although we will not address individually each of defendant's grievances with the investigatory process, the essence of the argument is that the prosecution singled out [defendant] and proceeded to build their case to the exclusion of other leads. As a preliminary matter, we note that our review of the record does not support defendant's claim that the prosecution singled him out. The police did in fact question, investigate, and evaluate the disparate sources of information concerning the case. Concededly, their investigation quickly narrowed its focus on defendant. This concentration, however, was engendered by the evidence pointing to him, not by an apparent desire of the police or prosecution to find a person upon whom to place the blame, regardless of that person's guilt or innocence. Nevertheless, we will reverse defendant's conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct if two conditions are satisfied: (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury's verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial. See State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 526, 703 P.2d 464, 470 (1985). We decline to find that the police or prosecution acted improperly in failing exhaustively to investigate the hundreds of reports they received from Tucson citizens claiming to possess information concerning the case. This fact, coupled with our determination that the police did not improperly single out defendant to the exclusion of equally viable suspects, leads us to conclude that no misconduct occurred in the investigation of the victim's disappearance. We are therefore unpersuaded by defendant's argument. Of course, integral to defendant's argument is the suggestion that further or more thorough investigation would have revealed defendant's innocence. However, we will not speculate on appeal about what might have been or what could have happened. We again stress that we are not the jury. We have already concluded that ample evidence existed to support the convictions. Thus, even if we were to find that the police and/or prosecution acted improperly in failing to investigate alternative theories in this case, the record does not disclose a reasonable likelihood that their misconduct could have affected the jury's verdict. For this additional reason, we reject defendant's claim. 3. The Cuckoo File Defendant takes issue with the prosecutor's reference to his file of telephone calls and letters from Tucson residents as his cuckoo file. [3] He also complains about the timeliness with which the file was disclosed to the defense. We find no merit in either claim. First, the jury did not hear the file referred to as a cuckoo file; therefore, defendant can claim no prejudice from the use of this name. Second, although criminal defendants have a due process right to disclosure, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), this right only extends to the disclosure of material evidence. Thus, although untimely disclosure may be as constitutionally reprehensible as complete nondisclosure, reversal is appropriate only when it is reasonably probable that the jury's verdict would have been different had the evidence been disclosed at a time when it would have been of value to the defense. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir.1988). The United States Supreme Court has held that [t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.). Under this standard, the file did not constitute material evidence. We therefore find no error. [4] B. Alleged Misconduct Before the Grand Jury Defendant next complains that the prosecution presented misleading information to the Grand Jury that indicted him on the murder charge. We will not consider this issue on appeal; defendant raised the argument in a special action proceeding through which he sought review of the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Both the court of appeals and this court declined to accept jurisdiction. See Arizona Court of Appeals, Division 2, 2 CA-SA 335 (jurisdiction declined Jan. 7, 1986); Arizona Supreme Court, CV-86-0085-PR (petition for review denied March 25, 1986). The issue is therefore moot. See State v. Agnew, 132 Ariz. 567, 573, 647 P.2d 1165, 1171 (App. 1982); see also United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72-73, 106 S.Ct. 938, 943, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (petit jury's guilty verdict rendered harmless any conceivable error in the grand jury's charging decision caused by alleged violation of rule 6(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570, 574-75, 627 P.2d 721, 725-26 (1981) (defendant cannot, by appeal from conviction, obtain review of matters relevant only to grand jury proceedings that had no effect on the subsequent trial). C. Alleged Prosecutorial Contact with the Media Defendant asserts that the prosecution acted improperly in releasing certain information to the press. Although we recognize the potential for serious infringement of a defendant's right to a fair trial when the prosecution engages in extrajudicial contact with the media, see, e.g., United States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626, 629-30 (4th Cir.1962), our concern in addressing alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the actual effect of the conduct on defendant's trial. [T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982); cf. State v. Hallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 37, 668 P.2d 874, 880 (1983) (Misconduct alone will not cause a reversal, but only where the defendant has been denied a fair trial as a result of the actions of counsel.). Because we hold that defendant was not denied a fair trial because of pretrial publicity, we do not address the various alleged incidents of improper contact with the media. See infra Part 15. [5] D. Alleged Trial Misconduct Defendant raises several instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct at the trial. We address each claim individually. 1. Witness's Reference to Polygraph Defendant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to warn a state's witness not to testify that he had taken a polygraph test. The prosecutor admitted failing to inform the witness, but he maintained that the omission was unintentional. In its brief, the state asserts that the witness's statement was made only after the defense counsel pressed him very hard to state precisely when he had first recalled a particular piece of information during the various interviews he had with police investigators. The state contends that defense counsel opened the door for the improper statement through his questioning, and that defendant therefore cannot claim error. See State v. Ikirt, 160 Ariz. 113, 115, 770 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1987); State v. Roberts, 144 Ariz. 572, 575-76, 698 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (App. 1985). The statement concerning the polygraph was made while defense counsel was cross-examining Jack McDonald about when he remembered defendant's telephone conversation with his mother in which McDonald testified that defendant stated, Even if I did do it, you have to help me. Defense counsel was attempting to elicit from McDonald an explanation about why he did not mention the conversation to the police until several weeks after the Kerrville arrest: MR. BLOOM: Where were you when the information came to you after you had given all the long statements to the Police? Where was it this business of information came to your mind? WITNESS: I think it was when I was taking the lie detector test. Defendant argues that the issue is not that this statement was heard by the jury, but rather that the prosecutor failed to warn the witness not to mention the polygraph. Apparently, he asserts that, regardless of lack of prejudice to defendant, the prosecutor's failure to warn the witness was improper conduct rising to the level of constitutional error. We disagree. Our concern in examining any claim of prosecutorial conduct is with the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 219, 102 S.Ct. at 947. Thus, if prosecutorial misconduct were present in this case, that misconduct would not merit reversal of defendant's conviction unless it denied him a fair trial. See, e.g., Milanovich, 303 F.2d at 630; State v. Marquez, 113 Ariz. 540, 544, 558 P.2d 692, 696 (1976) (where the reference to the [polygraph] examination does not prejudice the defendant, there is no reversible error). We find that defendant was not denied a fair trial by the reference to the polygraph. Even without addressing the possibility that defense counsel opened the door to this testimony, the reference to the polygraph and the possible reflection it had on McDonald's veracity are insufficient, when viewed in relation to the totality of the evidence presented by the state, to suggest that defendant's right to a fair trial was abrogated by the incident. Finally, any possible error was rendered harmless by the court's immediate instruction to the jury to disregard the witness's answer. See State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 141, 449 P.2d 603, 606 (1969). 2. Emotional Witness Defendant next argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct in connection with the testimony of Sam Hall, the teacher who saw defendant's car in an alley near the Homer Davis Elementary School. Hall became emotionally upset during direct examination and the prosecutor attempted to calm him. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the testimony was a staged performance and that the witness had been prompted by the prosecution. According to the defense, this prompting was illustrated by the witness's charged responses to the prosecutor's questions and his contrastingly calm testimony during cross-examination. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial. We will not reverse the trial court's ruling on this issue absent an abuse of discretion. See Hallman, 137 Ariz. at 37, 668 P.2d at 880; State v. Williams, 121 Ariz. 213, 215, 589 P.2d 456, 458 (App. 1978); see also State v. Carr, 91 Or. App. 673, 675, 756 P.2d 1263, 1264 (1988). We find no abuse. Although the record reflects that Hall became agitated during his testimony and that he perhaps was overcome with emotion, the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the effect of Hall's demeanor on the jury. See State v. Wayman, 104 Ariz. 125, 127, 449 P.2d 296, 298 (1969); State v. Chears, 231 Kan. 161, 166, 643 P.2d 154, 158 (1982). With the jury present, the trial judge discussed with Hall his emotional state and requested that he answer questions with yes or no whenever possible. In addition, the jury was instructed that it must not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice. The court's comments at the time of the incident, together with its instruction to the jury, sufficiently countered any negative impact Hall's loss of composure might have had on the jury. Further, we do not believe, given the length of the trial and the magnitude of evidence presented, that the jury was impermissibly tainted by the emotional display of one witness on the second day of trial. We therefore need not address defendant's underlying contention that the testimony was prompted or staged. 3. Testimony of Victim's Mother Defendant next argues that, by calling the victim's mother to testify in both its case-in-chief and as a rebuttal witness, the prosecution engaged in prejudicial misconduct designed to arouse sympathy from the jury. We do not believe, however, that allowing the victim's mother to testify constituted reversible error. Mary's mother was uniquely aware of her daughter's activities leading up to the kidnapping and, concerning her testimony in rebuttal, she was able to describe certain of her daughter's characteristics that conflicted with the testimony of persons who claimed to have seen the child at a local mall. Despite the potentially prejudicial effects of permitting a victim's mother to testify, we do not believe that the trial court in this case erred in allowing this probative testimony. See Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 568 (11th Cir.1983) (The trial court has broad discretion in passing on the admissibility of evidence, including testimony that may be calculated to create prejudice against or sympathy for the accused. It is for the trial court to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by possible prejudicial impact.); see also United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 738-39 (3d Cir.1989) (trial court has discretion to determine whether testimony of victim's mother is sufficiently probative to outweigh prejudicial effects); State v. Purcell, 117 Ariz. 305, 309, 572 P.2d 439, 443 (1977) (upholding trial court's decision to allow murder victim's son to testify).