Opinion ID: 1696386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hypothetical questions asked of expert.

Text: Of the experts who testified for plaintiffs, Dr. Leo C. Peters' testimony was most damaging to Jewell. He is an associate professor in mechanical engineering at Iowa State University. His doctorate dissertation related to gas flow. Dr. Peters' background included experience in setting up laboratory experiments to conduct various tests and to observe resulting phenomena. In preparation for his contemplated testimony this witness set up an experiment employing black pipes of the same dimension as used in the Carroll furnace gas supply system, a similar burner apparatus, a drip-leg and a gas supply under the pressure called for by the Armstrong furnace factory instructions. Dr. Peters placed leaves and papers in the solenoid valve as used in the experiment and observed the various flames caused by the leaking gas in areas of the manifold not designed as combustion locations. Blackened areas indicated similar unusual flames had occurred in the Carroll furnace. This witness injected small bits of leaves and papers into the test system and observed their migration through the piping. Velocity of gas flow and the orientation of the leaf to that flow largely determined the rate of movement. Movement was obtained in all particles. All particles placed in the experimental apparatus on the supply source side of the drip-leg were trapped by it. Principles formulated based on this phenomena permitted Dr. Peters to draw the conclusion (testified to over objection) that any leaf particle in the piping on the supply side of the drip-leg would have been blown out the open drip-leg during installation if, as Jewell's employees testified, they used air pressure in the bulk tank to blow the line to that point. One employee testified the practice was not to blow out but to visually inspect the short length of black pipe leading from the drip-leg into the solenoid for foreign materials. No one testified this step was taken in the Carroll gas supply installation. A leaf segment in that pipe length, occasionally moving in the gas flow, had an unobstructed ultimate access to the solenoid. Dr. Peters was asked if he had opinions on various facets of the case, based on an assumed set of facts and on the phenomena observed in his tests and experiments and not upon the specific test results. Jewell asserts objections to these questions were erroneously overruled. The only objections which were not too general or thereafter clearly cured were grounded on failure to show all conditions in the laboratory tests were identical to the conditions in the Carroll gas supply and furnace installation. It is this ground Jewell most vigorously argues in an excellent brief. It is generally agreed experimental evidence is admissible if it is of such nature that it tends to aid the jury deliberations. 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 825, pp. 914-16. Application of the abstract rule that evidence of experiments is admissible only when the experiment is shown to have been made under essentially the same conditions must necessarily vary with the particular circumstances of each case. Scott v. Homesteaders, 149 Iowa 541, 545-48, 129 N.W. 310, 311-12 (1910). In certain situations evidence has been admitted despite a failure to show similarity of conditions in several particulars. See Althof v. Benson, 259 Iowa 1254, 147 N.W.2d 875 (1967); Brooke v. Chicago, Etc., Ry. Co., 81 Iowa 504, 47 N. W. 74 (1890). Admission of such testimony is a matter peculiarly within the discretion of trial court. Hackman v. Beckwith, 245 Iowa 791, 804, 64 N.W.2d 275, 283 (1954). Under the circumstances presented here, we believe the applicable rule is expressed in McCormick on Evidence § 202, pp. 486-87 (2d ed. 1972): It seems also that experiments designed to show the general traits and capacities of materials involved in the controversy are often admitted in evidence without confining the experiments to the conditions surrounding the litigated situation.    Further, where proponent makes no claim to have reenacted or simulated the whole or a substantial part of the original happening, recent decisions have distinguished these limited-purpose experiments, and have adapted the similarity requirement accordingly. The question, as always, is whether the evidence will assist the jury without confusing them. See Millers' Nat. Ins. Co., Chicago, Ill. v. Wichita Flour M. Co., 257 F.2d 93 (10 Cir. 1958); Grant v. Younker Bros., 244 Iowa 958, 58 N.W.2d 834 (1953); Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill.App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964); Johnson v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 9 Ill.App.2d 340, 132 N.E.2d 678 (1956); Current v. Columbia Gas of Kentucky, 383 S.W.2d 139 (Ky.1964); Council v. Duprel, 250 Miss. 269, 165 So.2d 134 (1964); 3 Jones on Evidence § 15.8, pp. 25-27 (6th ed. 1972). Here the limited purposes of the tests were carefully explained. Dr. Peters based his opinions in part on principles developed from certain demonstrated phenomena, not on the results of any specific tests. Under these circumstances we do not find such a clear showing of abuse of trial court's discretion as would require a reversal. See Fisher, Inc. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1973); Rasmussen v. Thilges, 174 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Iowa 1970); Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., supra.