Opinion ID: 2345721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Substantial Or Significant Possibility Standard

Text: The postconviction court did not stop there; it also analyzed Arrington's claim under a substantial possibility standard. [3] It rejected Arrington's claim under this standard: The DNA test results clearly do not prove actual innocence standing alone. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts a new trial should be granted if the newly discovered evidence is material. That is, whether there is a substantial or significant possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have been affected by the newly discovered evidence.    The DNA testing proves conclusively that the victim's blood was not found on Petitioner's sweatpants. However, Petitioner's involvement in the fight itself was never seriously questioned. The blood evidence was in no way key to placing Petitioner at the scene of the crime. There is an actual threshold question of whether Petitioner was even wearing the same sweatpants on the night of the murder, as he was when arrested days later. No one actually identified the sweatpants produced at trial as those worn by Petitioner on the night of the murder although witnesses described clothing that matched their general description. Petitioner was wearing the sweatpants when he was arrested in the District of Columbia two days after the party, and it was this clothing that was tested. Moreover, the forensic chemist testified that the blood found on Petitioner's sweatpants was consistent with the blood type of the victim in this particular case, or any other individual with the same blood type.  On cross-examination, Mr. Heurich admitted he was only testifying that the blood on the sweatpants was consistent with the victim's blood and he was not testifying that the blood at issue matched the victim's blood. Further, the 1994 crime laboratory reports admitted into evidence merely indicate that the blood on the sweatpants was consistent with the victim's blood. The State did not even mention the blood evidence in its closing argument. The Court finds that the evidentiary value of the blood evidence was minimal given the totality of the evidence in this case. It certainly does not affirmatively exclude the Petitioner as the individual who stabbed Simmons; nor does it give rise to a reasonable inference that would establish his innocence. The Court cannot find that admission of the blood evidence at trial raises the substantial possibility that the outcome would have been different. The multiple eyewitness accounts are sufficient to validate the conviction even in light of the new DNA evidence. Two witnesses testified to seeing the actual stabbing, one witness testified to seeing Petitioner holding a knife immediately before the stabbing, and two witnesses testified to hearing Petitioner shout he had stabbed the victim. All of these witnesses were subject to vigorous cross-examination by defense counsel. The jury is charged with judging the credibility of witnesses and determining what weight to give to any inconsistencies. (Bold emphasis added, italics in original, footnote omitted.)