Opinion ID: 2499553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: issue 3: exclusion of evidence under rape shield statute

Text: Next, Gilliland argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence under K.S.A. 21-3525, commonly known as the Kansas rape shield statute. At trial, Gilliland sought to introduce evidence of C.E.'s history of exhibiting sexual behavior, including evidence of C.E. masturbating with dolls at a young age; humping the arm of the living room couch on a couple occasions; infringing on the personal space of others; touching both men and women in places, such as their inner thigh, that made them uncomfortable; being clingy; and grabbing the groin area of men. Gilliland argues the evidence should have been admitted because it went to the element of Gilliland's intent or lack thereof. In other words, the evidence supported the defense theory that Gilliland was unconscious at the time of the incident and it was C.E. who, of her own volition, climbed on top of Gilliland. He argues that without evidence of C.E.'s prior behavior and tendencies, his argument that she climbed on top of him was implausible. In making this argument, Gilliland not only focuses on the ultimate admissibility of the evidence, he also takes issue with the legal standard used by the trial court in ruling that the evidence was inadmissible. He essentially contends the trial court determined relevance based on whether C.E.'s statements were corroborated, instead of simply considering whether the evidence of C.E.'s previous sexual conduct was relevant. This argument questions the adequacy of the legal basis for the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence, which is a question an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 503, 186 P.3d 713 (2008) (quoting State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 47-48, 144 P.3d 647 [2006]). The legal basis for determining the admissibility of all evidence is relevance. See State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, Syl. ¶ 7, 243 P.3d 352 (2010); Reid, 286 Kan. at 507-09, 186 P.3d 713. Relevance, in addition to being the focus of general considerations regarding the admission of evidence, is the key consideration when applying the rape shield statute, K.S.A. 21-3525, which prohibits the admission of evidence of an aggravated criminal sodomy victim's previous sexual conduct with any person including the defendant[,] unless the trial court first determines the evidence to be relevant and otherwise admissible. K.S.A. 21-3525(a)(5), (b). K.S.A. 60-401(b) defines relevant evidence as evidence that is probative and material. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, Syl. ¶ 7, 243 P.3d 352. In determining whether the evidence is material, the analysis focuses on whether the fact to be proved is `a fact... [that] has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case and is in dispute.' [Citation omitted.] Reid, 286 Kan. at 505, 186 P.3d 713. Evidence is probative if it has `any tendency to prove any material fact.' State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 261, 213 P.3d 728 (2009) (quoting K.S.A. 60-401[b]). Thus, the question Gilliland raises is whether the trial court applied the correct test of determining whether C.E.'s prior behavior was material and probative and, therefore, relevant. The focus of this inquiry is on the following statements by the judge: I'm finding it real difficult to understandto find in this case that the rape shield should be penetrated. If this were an uncorroborated allegation by the victim herself, perhaps at least limited evidence with regard to the prior unfounded allegation might be relevant, but I think it's an awfully large jump from testimony of her being [a] clingy, and not only with men but with women, child [who was] obviously ... raised in an extremely dysfunctional household[. It] doesn't seem to be relevant to the issues in this case where ... there is direct corroboration of the incident itself and I think it would be unduly intrusive to the victim and not in violation of any of the defendant's due process rights to enforce the rape shield in this act [ sic ]. The Court would, at least in the present context, deny the defense's motion under 21-3525 and prohibit the introduction of any prior sexual conduct attributed to the victim. There is no mention of whether the evidence was material or probative in these conclusions. And, as Gilliland argues, when the court mentioned relevance it was tied to corroboration. According to the trial court, if the evidence had been uncorroborated it would have been relevant and because it was corroborated it was not relevant. Yet, relevance is not determined by corroboration or the lack thereof. The trial court tied two unrelated concepts together and, in doing so, failed to apply the correct standard. Nevertheless, an appellate court shall disregard all mere technical errors and irregularities which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the party complaining, where it appears upon the whole record that substantial justice has been done by the judgment. K.S.A. 60-2105; see K.S.A. 60-261 (The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.). To determine if substantial justice has been done an appellate court must determine whether the error affected the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. The degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the error did not affect the outcome will vary depending on whether the fundamental failure infringes upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If it does not, the trial court should apply K.S.A. 60-261 and determine if there is a reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. If the fundamental failure does infringe upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the trial court should apply the constitutional harmless error analysis defined in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 [87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241] (1967), in which case the error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., proves there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. ... An appellate court reviewing the second step for an injustice will review the entire record and use the same analysis, applying K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 or else Chapman, depending on the nature of the right allegedly affected. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569-70, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1594, 182 L.Ed.2d 205 (2012). Gilliland argues the Chapman harmless error standard applies because he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense. We disagree, even though the State does not dispute his assertion. The reason we do so is because Gilliland was able to present his defense. Evidence in support of the defense was presented through the testimony of Gilliland; Charlotte; Fletcher; Andrew Massey, a physician who evaluated Gilliland in 2006 regarding his epilepsy; Dr. Logan, as his expert witness; and others. Gilliland was only limited by the exclusion of some evidence relating to this defense, and that evidence was excluded based on an evidentiary ruling under the rape shield statute. `[T]he right to present a defense is subject to statutory rules and case law interpretation of the rules of evidence and procedure.' [Citation omitted.] Houston, 289 Kan. at 261, 213 P.3d 728. And, when the issue relates to the application of a rule of evidence or procedure and not to a complete denial of a defense, we conclude the harmless error standard of K.S.A. 60-2105 and K.S.A. 60-261 applies, rather than the Chapman constitutional standard. Under the harmless error standard of K.S.A. 60-2105 and K.S.A. 60-261, we must determine if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. Ward, 292 Kan. at 569-70, 256 P.3d 801; see State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 981-82, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012). The State, as the party seeking the exclusion of the evidence and therefore as the party presumably benefitting from the error, has the burden of persuading us that the error was harmless. McCullough, 293 Kan. at 983, 270 P.3d 1142. In applying this standard, we are first faced with the question of whether the evidence would have been admissible if the trial court had applied the correct standard. As an appellate court we are hampered in this assessment because our typical role is to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in determining whether evidence is probative. Reid, 286 Kan. at 509, 186 P.3d 713. Without any findings of fact or conclusions of law to review, we would have to make a de novo review of probativeness, which is outside the role of an appellate court. Rather than step outside our role, we will assume, without determining probativeness, that the evidence was admissible and assess whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the evidence had been admitted. In making this determination, it is important to place the evidence in its legal context. Legally, the evidence has little bearing. Even if C.E. had climbed on Gilliland and begged for the sexual contact, her consentas a child younger that 14has no legal bearing on guilt. Gilliland had to establish that he was unconscious and presumably incapable of participating in the charged offense; in other words, he was incapable of having oral contact with C.E.'s female genitalia. See K.S.A. 21-3501(2) (defining sodomy); K.S.A. 21-3506 (aggravated sodomy). In other words, the jury would have had to believe that C.E. chose to sit on an unconscious person's mouthCharlotte admitted at trial that she saw Gilliland's mouth line[d] up [with C.E.'s genitalia], but I mean, I can't say anything was moving or anything like that. Further, the jury would have had to conclude Gilliland did not react in anyway and that it took Charlotte pulling on his hair to bring him to consciousness. Gilliland argues the evidence of C.E.'s past behaviors would have made all of these conclusions more plausible because the jury would have believed C.E. climbed on his face of her own volition. Gilliland's argument ignores his confession to Fontanez that he was having [o]ral sex with a 12 year old. This contemporaneous admission and showing of awareness regarding what had occurred causes us to conclude it is more likely than not a jury would have found Gilliland's defense implausible even if the evidence of C.E.'s prior behaviors had been introduced. This is especially true in light of other evidence in the record. In particular, Charlotte made contemporaneous statements to Fletcher, which Fletcher repeated to Fontanez, telling him that Charlotte had said Gilliland had oral sex with C.E. In making these contemporaneous reports of the crime, Charlotte and Fletcher did not report to any law enforcement officer that they were concerned that Gilliland had suffered a seizure or that he seemed unaware of what was going on. And the officers did not observe any behavior that made them draw this conclusion. Gilliland never made such a suggestion to the interviewing officers. And, although C.E. had previously observed Gilliland during a seizure, when asked if it looked to her like Gilliland was having a seizure on the day of the incident, she replied, No. When asked if he was sleeping, C.E. replied, No. C.E.'s statements, at least in all major respects, remained consistent throughout the interview and various court proceedings. Although she was never very forthcoming with details, at trial she testified clearly to feeling Gilliland's tongue, not just his mouth, on her genitals. In light of the record as a whole, the exclusion of the evidence regarding C.E.'s past behavior was harmless. Even if the jury had heard the evidence and had believed C.E. was so troubled she would have invited the contact, there is not a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different.