Opinion ID: 376723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whitehead Impeachment Material

Text: 15 Shortly before the defense rested, Appellant Whitehead's counsel informed the court that because of the circumstances that have occurred during the course of this trial . . . we feel compelled to put Mr. Whitehead on the stand and have him testify. Defense counsel requested an advance ruling from the court, before making a final decision on whether Whitehead would take the stand, on the admissibility of evidence concerning Whitehead's 1975 suspension from practice from the Virginia State Bar for conduct involving deceit or misrepresentation. 8 Whitehead contended that neither the fact that he had been suspended, nor the document containing the disciplinary tribunal's decision, was admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence for purposes of impeaching his credibility. Counsel represented that if the district court ruled that Whitehead could not be impeached on the basis of his suspension from the Virginia bar, he would testify in the case. The district court ruled that Whitehead could be cross-examined about his suspension under FRE 608(b) 9 as a specific instance of conduct . . . probative of truthfulness, and that if Whitehead testified about the suspension, the document evidencing it could be introduced. 16 Whitehead's counsel never stated unequivocally that a ruling permitting cross-examination about the suspension, as distinguished from admission of the document, would cause Whitehead to decide not to testify. 10 Even after the court's ruling, defense counsel's response was limited to the request, (w) ell, could we have a little time to consult with our client and see what . . . . Thereafter, Whitehead decided not to take the stand. He has never made a proffer of what his testimony would have been. 17 Whitehead now contends that the district court's ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to testify as a witness on his own behalf, and was, per se, reversible error. We disagree. Although we reject the government's argument that Whitehead, by deciding not to testify and thus subject himself to the potential impeachment, has waived any objection to the district court's ruling, we hold that the district court's ruling that Whitehead might be cross-examined about the suspension was correct. Although we think that the ruling that the suspension document was also admissible was incorrect, we think that the error was harmless. 18 Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, disbarment or suspension of an attorney was uniformly considered to be a proper subject for impeachment. See, e. g., McCormick on Evidence, § 43 at 86 (1972 ed.); United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945). Since the enactment of the rules, two courts of appeals have considered this issue or related questions and have held that the witness may be asked about the disciplinary action as well as the underlying misdeed. See United States v. Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1968) (policemen may be interrogated about their disciplinary record in order to show possible bias); United States v. Bright, 588 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1979) (character witness for a defendant lawyer may be cross-examined about disciplinary action against the lawyer). Thus, we think that the discretionary right given to the trial judge by FRE 608(b) includes the right to permit a defendant, who is a lawyer, testifying in his own behalf to be cross-examined about the basis for a suspension order as well as the proceedings themselves. 19 Conversely, if such a witness either admits or denies the suspension, we do not think that the documents relating to it are admissible. FRE 608(b) quite clearly states that specific instances of conduct for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility of a witness may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. The anticipatory ruling of the district court that the suspension document was admissible was erroneous. The error, however, was harmless. Whitehead nowhere stated or even suggested that he was willing to testify even if he could be cross-examined about the suspension, so long as the suspension document was excluded. Thus, we must read the record to show that Whitehead declined to testify, at least in part, because he could be cross-examined about the suspension; and this, we have concluded, is not in the eyes of the law a valid reason. A further declination for a legally valid reason adds nothing to the case.