Opinion ID: 1832878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Property and Alimony Issues.

Text: In dissolution-of-marriage cases, marital property is to be divided equitably, considering the factors outlined in Iowa Code section 598.21(1). Equitable distribution depends upon the circumstances of each case. In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 2005). An equitable division is not necessarily an equal division. In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Iowa 2005). Alimony may also be awarded to a spouse in addition to the distribution of property. Alimony `is a stipend to a spouse in lieu of the other spouse's legal obligation for support.' In re Marriage of Probasco, 676 N.W.2d 179, 184 (Iowa 2004) ( quoting In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Iowa 1989)). Whether alimony is awarded depends on the particular circumstances of each case. In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 319 (Iowa 1996). Factors to be considered in awarding alimony are set forth in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1).
Ordinarily, a trial court's valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the range of permissible evidence. In re Marriage of Wiedemann, 402 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1987). In ascertaining the value of property, its owner is a competent witness to testify to its market value. Holcomb v. Hoffschneider, 297 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Iowa 1980). Although our review is de novo, we ordinarily defer to the trial court when valuations are accompanied by supporting credibility findings or corroborating evidence. In re Marriage of Vieth, 591 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Iowa Ct.App.1999). In this case, the district court accepted the valuation of $130,000 offered by Delores in her financial affidavit and in trial testimony. She testified that the figure was based upon an appraisal by a real estate agent. Lyle testified that the marital residence was worth $112,000 based upon a December 31, 2001 valuation performed by a certified appraiser. While the court of appeals held that the district court erred in valuating the house at $130,000, we find that the district court's valuation of the marital residence was within the range of the evidence and, as a result, should not be disturbed.
The second property issue is whether the trial court properly distributed marital assets and debts. The court of appeals found that the district court made a scrivener's error in its distribution table when it erroneously entered the figure $9,237 for Lyle's total liabilities and $7,952 for Lyle's net assets under the distribution plan. In fact, the numbers were transposed: the figure of $9,237 should have been entered as Lyle's net assets and $7,952 as Lyle's total liabilities. We agree with the court of appeals that this error should be corrected. When this error is corrected, the payment required by Delores to equalize the distribution of assets is reduced from $23,186 to $22,543. Both the district court and the court of appeals granted Lyle a $541 deduction for an outstanding debt to J.W. McGrath. Mr. McGrath served as Lyle's initial counsel in these dissolution proceedings. This allowance is illogical considering that Delores was not given reciprocal credit for her litigation expenses. Attorneys' fees incurred in dissolution proceedings are not marital debt. See Rodvik v. Rodvik, 151 P.3d 338, 346 (Alaska 2006). It was, therefore, error to characterize the debt to J.W. McGrath as marital debtit is Lyle's personal liability. The court, however, does have the discretion to make an award of attorneys' fees when equitable. In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 668 N.W.2d 840, 849 (Iowa 2003). Such was the case here where Delores was awarded both trial and appellate attorneys' fees. To then allow Lyle a credit for his fees would thus be inequitable. While this debt is relatively minor it does affect Delores' equalization payment. The payment required by Delores to equalize the distribution of assets is reduced from $22,543 to $22,263. With respect to the district court's distribution of credit card debt, we note that the Capital One credit card finances the Durango which Delores has been awarded. Further, the Discover credit card represents debt accumulated after the parties' separation. We see no basis for disturbing the trial court's disposition of these liabilities. While the AT & T credit card debt was marital debt, we believe it is equitable to require Delores to assume this liability as the level of debt was incurred without Lyle's knowledge and without his consent. In determining the total assets retained by each party in the property division, both Lyle and Delores received deductions for obligations owed to relatives. The net value of Lyle's assets was reduced by $7,391 as a result of loans by Lyle's sister, Leigh A. Wolf, which were incurred after the parties separated. The net value of assets retained by Delores was reduced by $6,500 as a result of a loan obtained during the course of the marriage from Delores' parents. The loan Lyle obtained from his sister is not documented by a promissory note or other debt instrument. The loan from Delores' parents is documented, but payments on the loan have not been made over the past several years. Delores claims that the trial court erred in assigning to Lyle a liability for an undocumented loan that may or may not be enforced. A similar argument, however, can be made with respect to the loan from Delores' parents. Loans from family members are not the same as indebtedness to disinterested third parties. There is nothing fundamentally unfair with the district court's treatment of these liabilities, and we decline to disturb it on appeal.
Under Iowa law, alimony is not a matter of absolute right, but depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Anliker, 694 N.W.2d at 540. Factors to be considered in awarding alimony are provided in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1). These factors include: (1) the length of the marriage, (2) the age and physical and emotional health of the parties, (3) the property distribution, (4) the educational level of the parties at the time of the marriage and at the time the dissolution action is commenced, (5) the earning capacity of the party seeking alimony, and (6) the feasibility of the party seeking alimony becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)( a )-( f ). Upon our de novo review of the record, we affirm the court of appeals' alimony award$500 per month for a period of ten years. Factors which support the increase in amount and duration of alimony include the comparative income of the parties ($46,300 vs. $18,900), the lack of upward mobility for Delores, and the nature of the property division in which Delores assumes most of the marriage's high interest liabilities. In re Marriage of Friedman, 466 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Iowa 1991) (length of marriage, disparity of earning capacity); In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 436-37 (Iowa 1981) (earning capacity, present standard of living balanced against relative need of other spouse).
The record demonstrates that both child and medical support were improperly calculated in this case. The undisputed facts are that Lyle's income is $46,300, not the $43,000 used in determining child support payments. As a result, the court of appeals correctly ordered remand to the district court for recalculation of the child support payment. In addition, on remand, the district court shall determine whether the proper level of child support has been impacted by the disposition of the joint physical care and visitation issues in this opinion. With respect to medical support, the court of appeals correctly ruled that under Iowa Court Rule 9.12, after the first $250 per child is paid by the custodial parent, the remainder of uncovered medical expenses is to be split in proportion to the parents' incomes. On remand, the district court should correct this error.
Delores seeks an award of appellate attorneys' fees. The court of appeals granted Delores $1,000 in attorneys' fees, with costs assessed to Lyle. In the exercise of discretion, we affirm the court of appeals, but do not award additional attorneys' fees and costs as a result of this further review.