Opinion ID: 3033727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preiser, Heck, and their Progeny

Text: [2] The Court, like this circuit, has attempted to “harmoniz[e] the broad language of § 1983, a general statute, with the specific federal habeas corpus statute.” Id. at 491 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); Docken, 393 F.3d at 1030-31 & n.6 (surveying “the line between § 1983 and habeas” and concluding that “the remedies are not always mutually exclusive”). These efforts began in Preiser, where the Court held that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. They continued in Heck, where the Court enunciated what has become known as the “favorable termination” requirement: Where a prisoner’s OSBORNE v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 12667 § 1983 action, if successful, “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction or sentence, it must be dismissed “unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Docken, 393 F.3d at 1027-28. And they were refined, in the wake of Heck, in cases most commonly involving prisoner challenges to state disciplinary and parole procedures. See Docken, 393 F.3d at 1028 (chronicling cases). [3] Most recently, the Court in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242 (2005), reviewed Preiser, Heck, and their progeny, and explained that: These cases, taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Id. at 1248. Dotson thus erases any doubt that Heck applies both to actions for money damages and to those, like this one, for injunctive relief, and clarifies that Heck provides the relevant test to determine whether § 1983 is a permissible avenue of relief for Osborne.