Opinion ID: 4442755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Proper Remedy Is Retrial

Text: ¶37 If we reject the People’s argument regarding inconsistency, the People ask us in the alternative to maximize the verdicts by sustaining the class-four-felony robbery conviction and erasing the class-five-felony theft-from-a-person conviction. Delgado argues that the prohibition against double jeopardy necessitates that we acquit him on both charges. Both parties miss the mark. Our jurisprudence on maximization doesn’t apply to the situation before us. And while double jeopardy in other cases might require acquittal, it doesn’t here. ¶38 The People direct us to a line of court of appeals cases that have maximized mutually exclusive guilty verdicts. See, e.g., Beatty, 80 P.3d at 853; People v. Atkins, 844 P.2d 1196, 1201–02 (Colo. App. 1992), abrogated by Candelaria, 148 P.3d at 183–84. We disagree with the divisions’ approach in those cases for several reasons. ¶39 First, the precedent on which those cases rely didn’t analyze mutually exclusive guilty verdicts. Instead, they rested on notions of lenity and duplicity, as a defendant shouldn’t be convicted of murder twice for murdering one victim 5The People do not argue that the error here was invited, and we do not address that issue. 17 and shouldn’t be convicted of a lesser offense when he’s already been convicted of the greater offense. See People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 245–47 (Colo. 1983); People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261, 1268–69 (Colo. 1983), abrogated by Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1984). ¶40 Second, the reasoning behind those court of appeals cases makes little sense in cases such as this one, where the jury effectively acquitted the defendant on one of the charges. For example, in Atkins, the defendant was charged with and convicted of first degree murder “based upon both extreme indifference murder and murder after deliberation.” 844 P.2d at 1198. As the division there discussed, “both verdicts were necessarily based upon” the defendant shooting and killing the victim. See id. at 1200–02. As a result, no matter whether the defendant committed the murder with specific intent or extreme indifference, he would still be guilty of first degree murder. See id. at 1202. ¶41 Not so here. The two crimes, robbery and theft from a person, are necessarily based upon different actions, rather than “differing characterizations that may be placed upon that conduct.” Cf. id. Moreover, they’re in fact two different crimes, whereas in cases like Atkins, the murder statute “simply outline[d] two alternative methods of committing the singular crime of first degree murder.” Id. Thus, even if we did agree that cases like Atkins properly maximized the verdicts, their rationale doesn’t reach this case. 18 ¶42 Third, because an element of each crime negates the other, it’s impossible to know what exactly the jury intended. We can’t assume that the jury intended to find Delgado guilty of the “maximized” crime when the jury effectively acquitted him of that crime through its theft-from-a-person verdict. The only finding that we can be sure of is that Delgado unlawfully took items, since that’s a requirement of both convictions. That might imply that we should “minimize” the convictions. Yet, we can’t do that either because the jury made an explicit finding through its verdict that Delgado used force. ¶43 Delgado maintains that the proper outcome is acquittal on both charges based on double jeopardy. Delgado argues that, since the jury decided beyond a reasonable doubt that the taking was committed by means other than force, he was acquitted on the robbery charge. And, additionally, since the jury decided beyond a reasonable doubt that the taking was committed by force, he was acquitted on the theft-from-a-person charge. But the jury didn’t actually acquit Delgado, so double jeopardy doesn’t come into play. Indeed, acquittal isn’t preclusive when a jury convicts on one charge and acquits on another, even if both convictions are based on the same factual circumstances. Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352, 356–57 (2016). Therefore, double jeopardy doesn’t bar retrial here. ¶44 That leaves us with one logical option: a new trial. Retrial avoids trying to peer into the minds of the jurors to determine what they could have meant by the 19 conflicting verdicts. And it also ensures that Delgado doesn’t gain a windfall from the error. This is by no means a radical remedy, as other courts have remanded for retrial when a jury finds the defendant guilty of mutually exclusive verdicts. See, e.g., Chyung, 157 A.3d at 632–33; Owens, 766 S.E.2d at 71; Speckman, 391 S.E.2d at 168. ¶45 The proper remedy for mutually exclusive verdicts is retrial.