Opinion ID: 1386894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review on the Merits

Text: (3) Our principal concerns in State Bar disciplinary proceedings are always the protection of the public, the preservation of confidence in the legal profession, and the maintenance of the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. ( Young v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1204, 1215 [270 Cal. Rptr. 315, 791 P.2d 994].) Though we exercise our independent judgment in determining the discipline to be imposed on an attorney for disciplinary violations ( Greenbaum v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 543, 550 [237 Cal. Rptr. 168, 736 P.2d 754]), we accord the findings and recommendations of the State Bar great weight in determining the appropriate disciplinary sanctions. ( In re Basinger (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1348, 1358 [249 Cal. Rptr. 110, 756 P.2d 833].) Petitioner submits his declaration, which asserts that his clients' grievances were the result of their own actions  not petitioner's conduct. (4) We have repeatedly asserted our reluctance to consider evidence that has not been presented in State Bar proceedings. `[T]his court hesitates to rely upon any documentary evidence that is extrinsic to the record of the proceedings before the State Bar.' [Citations.] `Such evidence is virtually impossible to evaluate in the absence of cross-examination....' ( Bercovich v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 116, 126 [266 Cal. Rptr. 341, 785 P.2d 889], italics in original; see also Lydon v. State Bar (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1181, 1187 [248 Cal. Rptr. 830, 756 P.2d 217]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 663 [238 Cal. Rptr. 394, 738 P.2d 740].) In the absence of cross-examination, we are unable to evaluate petitioner's own, self-serving, out-of-court statements. ( Lydon v. State Bar, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1187.) Accordingly, we decline petitioner's invitation to consider his declaration as it relates to the substantive State Bar charges and limit our review to the facts described in the record. (5) In this case, the State Bar recommends that we discipline petitioner for: withdrawing from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his clients in the Hubbard, Fields, and Bilson matters; willfully failing to perform services in a competent manner in the Hubbard, Bilson, and Rhodes matters; willfully failing to respond to a client's status inquiries or keep his client reasonably informed of significant developments in the Hubbard, Fields, Bilson, and Rhodes matters; and withdrawing from employment without promptly refunding an unearned advanced fee in the Fields, Bilson, and Rhodes matters. It is beyond question that petitioner's alleged acts of misconduct warrant discipline: We have considered abandonment of clients and retention of unearned fees as serious misconduct warranting periods of actual suspension.... ( Matthew v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 784, 791 [263 Cal. Rptr. 660, 781 P.2d 952].) A summary review of cases involving client abandonment and retention of unearned fees supports this assertion. In Lester v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 547 [131 Cal. Rptr. 225, 551 P.2d 841], four instances in which the attorney retained unearned fees resulted in the attorney's six-month actual suspension from practice. In Smith v. State Bar (1985) 38 Cal.3d 525 [213 Cal. Rptr. 236, 698 P.2d 139], an attorney was found to have abandoned one client (resulting in the issuance of a contempt order against the client) and retained the unearned fees of another; for his misconduct, we imposed thirty days' actual suspension. In Stuart v. State Bar (1985) 40 Cal.3d 838 [221 Cal. Rptr. 557, 710 P.2d 357], an attorney who had been privately reproved in a different matter eight years before was actually suspended for thirty days for one instance of client abandonment (resulting in the dismissal of that client's case). In light of this precedent, the discipline recommended by the State Bar may appear lenient. [6] We note, however, the hearing judge's obvious concern about the adequacy of the case presented by the State Bar in petitioner's absence. In the Hubbard matter the hearing judge found the State Bar's assertions about petitioner's misconduct insufficiently supported by evidence and was therefore unable to conclude that petitioner had refused to refund advanced fees or had abandoned his client. In the Fields matter there was no finding of prejudice to the client, and the decision notes that Fields might well have been jailed earlier than he would likely otherwise have been but for petitioner's actions on Fields's behalf. In the Bilson matter the hearing judge was skeptical that petitioner went to the trouble of showing up at Bilson's hearing and then did absolutely nothing, as the State Bar suggests. [7] Only in the Rhodes matter did the hearing judge not articulate serious misgivings about the adequacy of the evidence presented against petitioner. While the ultimate responsibility for imposing disciplinary sanctions upon attorneys falls to this court, we have repeatedly emphasized our reliance on factual findings made by hearing judges. We generally give more weight to the factual findings of the hearing panel since it has a better opportunity to observe the testimony of various witnesses. ( In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 264-265 [261 Cal. Rptr. 59, 776 P.2d 1021]; see also Hartford v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1139, 1149 [270 Cal. Rptr. 12, 791 P.2d 598]; Dixon v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 728, 736 [187 Cal. Rptr. 30, 653 P.2d 321].) In this instance, the hearing judge's recommendation followed his finding that the State Bar had failed to establish several of the acts of misconduct that it alleged petitioner had committed. In no case was significant prejudice to a client established; it is clear from the record that  with the exception of Kendell Rhodes  the clients' unreturned fees were nominal. In sum, we find that on the facts that we have adopted, the hearing judge's recommendations state appropriate disciplinary sanctions for petitioner's misconduct. The object of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and the courts, and to preserve confidence in the legal profession. ( Young v. State Bar, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1215.) We find this objective sufficiently served by imposition of the discipline recommended by the hearing department. Further, in light of his treatment with the appropriate medication and the assurances of his employer that his clients will be protected in the event of a relapse, [8] we see no need to impose additional disciplinary sanctions as a prophylactic measure.