Opinion ID: 165818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Cantu's Detention

Text: 17 Having determined that the search warrant for Mr. Cantu's car issued on a showing of probable cause based on facts in existence and known to police officers at the time Mr. Cantu was initially stopped, it follows that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle at the time of the initial detention. Without question, the officers could have immediately searched the vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 381, 104 S.Ct. 1852, 80 L.Ed.2d 381 (1984) (per curiam) ([P]olice officers who have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road may search it without obtaining a warrant.); United States v. Oliver, 363 F.3d 1061, 1068 (10th Cir.2004). Instead, they chose to detain Mr. Cantu for a period of two-and-one-half hours while they obtained a search warrant. Mr. Cantu complains that this detention was unreasonable. 18 We believe the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001), is dispositive here. In McArthur, police officers were informed by the wife of the defendant that he was in possession of drugs. Id. at 329, 121 S.Ct. 946. After the defendant refused consent to search his home, police officers detained him on the front porch for two hours while they obtained a search warrant. Id. Upon execution of the warrant, police officers discovered a small amount of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. The defendant challenged his detention as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A nearly unanimous Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding the detention reasonable for the following reasons: 1) police had probable cause to believe contraband was in the home; 2) police had good reason to fear that the defendant might destroy the evidence; 3) officers balanced law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy by neither searching the trailer nor arresting the defendant while obtaining the warrant; 4) the restraint was only imposed for a limited period of time, i.e., two hours. Id. at 331-32, 121 S.Ct. 946. 19 Reasons similar to those relied on by the Supreme Court attend this case. As we have previously determined, the police officers had probable cause to believe that Mr. Cantu's vehicle contained illegal narcotics. Moreover, given the inherent mobility of automobiles, the officers had every reason to believe that Mr. Cantu might flee with the drugs and destroy or conceal them were he not detained. We also believe the officers properly balanced law enforcement and private interests in this case. In contrast to an individual's expectation of privacy in his own home, a diminished expectation inheres with automobiles. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); United States v. Arzaga, 9 F.3d 91, 94 (10th Cir.1993). By seeking a warrant, even when they might have proceeded to search the vehicle without one, the officers evidenced the utmost respect for Mr. Cantu's privacy. Finally, we do not believe the two-and-one-half hour detention in this case was unreasonable. Nothing in the record indicates that the officers failed to act diligently in pursuing and obtaining the warrant. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332, 121 S.Ct. 946. Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Cantu's detention was reasonable. 20 Mr. Cantu's reliance on United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) is misplaced. In Place, Drug Enforcement Administration agents seized an airline passenger's luggage on reasonable suspicion that the bags contained narcotics. Id. at 698-99, 103 S.Ct. 2637. The agents detained the passenger and his luggage for 90 minutes before a trained dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, and subsequently held the luggage for a period exceeding 48 hours before obtaining a search warrant. Id. at 699, 103 S.Ct. 2637. Executing the warrant, the agents discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine in one of the bags. Id. The Court first held that seizure of property based on reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope. Id. at 706, 103 S.Ct. 2637. On the facts of the case, however, the Court held that the 90-minute detention was unreasonable. Id. at 709-710, 103 S.Ct. 2637. 21 Mr. Cantu's case is readily distinguished from Place. The seizure involved here was based not on reasonable suspicion, but on probable cause. As both Place and McArthur make clear, the distinction is significant. Although not expressly stated in the opinion, it is apparent that the dog sniff in Place, combined with previous observations, provided the agents with probable cause to believe the luggage contained narcotics. The rule in Place did not flow from the over 48 hours that passed between the dog sniff and issuance of a warrant. Rather, the Court confined its reasonableness determination to the 90-minute detention preceding the dog sniff, during which time the officers were acting on reasonable suspicion alone. Id. Thus, McArthur, and not Place, leads us to the conclusion that Mr. Cantu's detention was reasonable. 2 22 We find no error in the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.