Opinion ID: 151874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Why the Sentence Must be Vacated and Remanded

Text: Irey's sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. As I explained in part II.E, supra, a district court abuses its discretion in imposing a sentence when it follows improper procedures, bases its decision on an incorrect interpretation of law or clearly erroneous factfindings, or when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the court committed a clear error of judgment in making its sentencing decision. The Government objected to Irey's sentence on substantive reasonableness grounds, and I would vacate Irey's sentence on those grounds: the sentence imposed cannot be reconciled with the district judge's factfindings on § 3553(a)(2)(A). [77] When making his findings on § 3553(a)(1), the judge remarked that when considering the nature and circumstances of the offense, the crime r[ose] to the top in terms of seriousness and that the seriousness of the offense ... did not mitigate in favor of any leniency. On (a)(2), after explaining why the need for specific deterrence counseled a sentence of no more than 15 years' imprisonment based on Irey's pedophilia, age, and family ties, the court turned to the sentencing purpose of punishment, (a)(2)(A). The entirety of the court's discussion on (A) was as follows: It comes down to my view of what promotes respect for the law and what provides just punishment. I think that a 30-year sentence, given the personal factors that I have touched upon is greater than necessary to accomplish the statutory objectives. On the other hand, in light of the seriousness of the crimes, I think a sentence above the mandatory minimum is called for. ( Id. at 61.) [78] The inquiry a court should conduct on (a)(2)(A) involves three steps: (1) making findings regarding the seriousness of the offense, the need to promote respect for the rule of law, and the need for just punishment; (2) weighing the three considerations against each other; and (3) making findings on the sentence needed to meet the § 3553(a)(2)(A) purpose. [79] The district court, in making its (a)(2)(A) findings, failed to follow these three steps. While it mentioned the need to promote[ ] respect for the law and provide[] just punishment, it made no intelligible findings on these inquiries and gave no indication that it had considered facts crucial to any determination of the need for just punishment and the need to promote respect for the law (for example, the sentences other offenders received). [80] Similarly, although the court stated here that the seriousness of the offense called for a sentence above the mandatory minimum, it made no specific findings on the seriousness of the offense when conducting the (a)(2)(A) inquiry. I do know, however, what the court would find on the seriousness of offense from what it said during the (a)(1) inquiry. There, it found that the offense was horrific, rises to the very top in terms of seriousness, and that in terms of the ... seriousness of [the offense], the long-standing, long-term engagement in it certainly does not mitigate [sic] in favor of any leniency. Therefore, all I know about the district court's findings on (a)(2)(A) is that it found the offense to be very serious. It is inconceivable that the judge's finding on seriousness of the offense alone would translate into a sentence at the bottom half of the statutory sentencing range of 15 to 30 years, let alone a sentence only two and a half years above the statutory minimum. The court, in conducting its (a)(2)(A) inquiry, may have concluded that the three relevant considerations were in tensionwith the seriousness of the offense counseling a sentence at or near the top of the statutory range, but, for example, with Irey's impaired volition and advanced age decreasing the need for just punishment and respect for the law. If this were the case, the evidence in the record could support a sentence of 17.5 years, [81] but it is not our province to make this explanation for the judge. Without making intelligible findings on just punishment and respect for law, and without explicitly weighing the three inquiries and reaching a conclusion on how they bore on the (a)(2)(A) need, I simply cannot say on appellate review that the sentence imposed was supported by the district court's factfindings. All I have is the district court's finding on the seriousness of the offense, and I know that it cannot be reconciled with the sentence imposed. No rational judge could have sentenced Irey to 17.5 years based on the only intelligible findingthat seriousness rose to the top for this horrific crime. [82] I would therefore vacate Irey's sentence on the ground that it is not supported by the district court's findings, as I am able to understand them. [83] I would remand Irey's sentence to the district court so that the district court can make (a)(2) findings and resentence Irey accordinglyrather than making our own (a)(2) findings to determine whether the sentence is reasonable. To do so, we would have to step out of our role as a reviewing court and assume the role of resentencer. As I now explain, this is precisely the error the court makes today. IV. The Court's Approach Today, the court needlessly assumes the role of resentencer. In so doing, it cements this circuit's answer to a question that continues to vex the nation's courts of appeals: after Booker, what does appellate review of sentences for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard mean? [84] The correct answer, as I demonstrate in parts III and IV, supra, is to apply classic abuse of discretion review. The court's answer is shocking: a simple objection that a sentence is unreasonable grants a disappointed party the functional equivalent of a new sentencing hearing before the court of appeals. The court considers evidence and arguments never offered to the district court, makes new findings, reweighs the § 3553(a) factors, and concludes as a matter of law that William Irey must be sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. In the process, the court does immense and immeasurable institutional damage. Part A sets out the court's approach; Part B explains the harm that it causes.