Opinion ID: 895405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Medical-Malpractice Lawsuit

Text: Following Ronnie's death, Margaret brought this suit both individually and on behalf of Ronnie's estate (collectively, Young) against Dr. Thota and NTCC (collectively, Dr. Thota). [1] Young alleged that Dr. Thota was negligent by: (1) failing to obtain Ronnie's complete medical history; (2) failing to heed Ronnie's underlying medical conditions, which may have exacerbated his risk of potential complications; (3) failing to properly locate Ronnie's femoral artery during the catheterization procedure and lacerating his right iliac artery instead; (4) failing to discover the iliac artery tear before discharging Ronnie from the hospital; and (5) failing to diagnose and treat the artery tear. Young sought damages for Ronnie's pain and suffering and mental anguish, medical expenses, physical disfigurement, and lost earnings. Additionally, Young sought damages for Margaret's loss of consortium and loss of household services. In his answer, Dr. Thota generally denied all of Young's claims and, alternatively, claimed that Ronnie's injuries were the result of an unavoidable accident, a new and independent cause, or pre-existing or subsequent medical conditions. Dr. Thota's answer also contended that Ronnie's injuries were partially the result of Ronnie's own negligence and included a counterclaim against Young for contribution due to Young's alleged failure to mitigate his damages. The case proceeded to a week-long jury trial. At the charge conference, both parties raised several objections and argued over the proper questions and instructions that the trial court should submit to the jury. Young's theory of liability rested on the claim that Dr. Thota breached the standard of care by puncturing Ronnie's iliac artery instead of the femoral artery, resulting in the extensive bleeding and concomitant injuries that Ronnie suffered. In contrast, Dr. Thota's theory of the case considered Ronnie's injury to be the extensive bleed. Accordingly, Dr. Thota alleged that Ronnie was negligent in failing to return to the hospital at the first sign of pain, which would have substantially alleviated Ronnie's resulting health problems. Dr. Thota averred that the negligence, if any, resulted from the concurrent actions of both parties, which made this a contributory negligence issue rather than a mitigation-of-damages issue. At the charge conference, Young objected to the inclusion of the definitions of negligence, ordinary care, and proximate cause in reference to Ronnie, arguing that contributory negligence was not supported by the evidence and that any delay on Ronnie's part in seeking medical treatment was a mitigation-of-damages issue. The trial court overruled Young's objection and included a question on Ronnie's contributory negligence in the charge. Additionally, the trial court overruled Young's objections to the inclusion of instructions on new and independent cause and unavoidable accident. Neither party advised the trial court that the charge might contain a Casteel problem, which arises when a broad-form charge mixes valid and invalid theories of liability, making it impossible for the appellate courts to determine if the jury answered the liability question based on an invalid theory, nor did either party request separate submissions for the negligence of Dr. Thota and Young. See Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 388-89. Instead, Young's objections rested on the argument that there was no evidence to support the inclusion of the disputed jury charge items in the broad-form question. The charge included one broad-form submission as to the single theory of liability  negligence  and additional questions regarding apportionment and calculation of damages. Question 1 addressed both parties' liability and stated: Did the negligence, if any, of those named below, proximately cause the injury in question, if any? Negligence, when used with respect to the conduct of Venkat Thota, M.D., means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a cardiologist of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a cardiologist of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances. Ordinary care, when used with respect to the conduct of Venkat Thota, M.D., means that degree of care that a cardiologist of ordinary prudence would use under the same or similar circumstances. Proximate Cause, when used with respect to the conduct of Venkat Thota, M.D., means that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new and independent cause, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a cardiologist using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event. New and independent cause, when used with respect to the conduct of Venkat Thota, M.D., means the act or omission of a separate and independent agency, not reasonably foreseeable by a cardiologist exercising ordinary care, that destroys the causal connection, if any, between the act or omission inquired about and the injury in question and thereby becomes the immediate cause of such injury. Negligence, when used with respect to the conduct of [Ronnie] Young means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances. Ordinary care, when used with respect to the conduct of [Ronnie] Young means that degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence would use under the same or similar circumstances. Proximate cause, when used with respect to the conduct of [Ronnie] Young means that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event. An injury may be an unavoidable accident, that is, an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it. Answer Yes or No. Venkat Thota, M.D.: ___ [Ronnie] Young: ___ If you have answered Yes to Question 1 for both of those named in Question 1, then answer Question 2. Otherwise do not answer Question 2. If you have answered Yes to Question 1 only as to Mr. Young, then do not answer Questions 2, 3, or 4. If you have answered Yes to Question 1 only as to Dr. Thota, then answer Questions 3 and 4. Question 2 conditionally asked about Dr. Thota's and Ronnie's comparative negligence, and Questions 3 and 4 concerned the amount of damages owed for Ronnie's and Margaret's injuries. The jury answered Question 1 with a No as to Dr. Thota's negligence and a Yes as to Ronnie's negligence. On July 18, 2005, the trial court entered final judgment that Young take nothing. Young filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court had erred in overruling Young's objections to the jury charge and that the jury's findings were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence or based on insufficient evidence. The trial court denied Young's motion for new trial, and Young timely appealed.