Opinion ID: 1163421
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Witness Unavailability

Text: Martha Trinidad, the daughter of Gonzales's girlfriend, testified at the first trial. Before the second trial, the prosecution personally served both Martha and her mother on Martha's behalf. However, Martha ran away from home, and neither the state nor her family could find her. The police questioned Martha's mother about her whereabouts, but her mother could only tell them where she usually hung out. The police looked for her but could not find her. Because of her unavailability, the court admitted her former testimony at the second trial. Gonzales argues that he was denied the right to cross-examine and confront a witness. Gonzales first argues that the state failed to make a good-faith effort to secure Martha Trinidad's presence at trial, and thus Martha was not unavailable under Rule 804(a)(5), Ariz.R.Evid. Gonzales claims that the state knew that Martha had a history of running away and should have tried to hold her in some manner. He argues that, at the very least, the state should have done more than simply drive by places where Martha hung out. Most good-faith efforts challenges involve unserved witnesses who cannot be located. But here, Martha and her mother were personally served. While nothing in Rule 804 suggests that service of a subpoena is a per se showing of good-faith efforts, we have said that the true issue is whether the state made a good-faith effort to locate the witness so that he or she could be put under subpoena. State v. Edwards, 136 Ariz. 177, 182, 665 P.2d 59, 64 (1983) (citing State v. Pereda, 111 Ariz. 344, 345, 529 P.2d 695, 696 (1974) (If a witness cannot be served by subpoena, it then becomes a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether a sufficient effort has been made to place the witness under subpoena.)). Service of process and the efforts made to locate Martha upon learning that she was missing satisfy the unavailability requirement of the rule. Gonzales also argues that even if Martha was unavailable, her testimony was nevertheless unreliable because the jury was denied the opportunity to observe her demeanor and tone. But that would be true of all non-videotaped former testimony. That argument has long been rejected, and we need not revisit it here. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244, 15 S.Ct. 337, 340, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). Moreover, the reliability of Martha's testimony is established without further inquiry because former testimony is a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355, 112 S.Ct. 736, 743 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992).