Opinion ID: 821517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to provide sequestered death

Text: qualification voir dire Defendant moved for sequestration of the prospective jurors during the death qualification voir dire process. The trial court denied the motion and informed counsel that it would conduct voir dire of prospective jurors in open court. Defendant claims that the resulting death qualification process violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, trial by an impartial jury, effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable death verdict, as well as his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, to individual juror voir dire when group voir dire is not “practicable.” We repeatedly have rejected defendant‟s argument that the California or federal Constitution mandates individual sequestration of all prospective jurors during the death qualification process. (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 789 (Thomas), and cases cited.) Our decision in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 declared, pursuant to our supervisory authority over California criminal procedure, that sequestered voir dire should be conducted in capital cases in order to promote candor and reduce the possibility that prospective jurors might be influenced by the questions to and responses by other prospective jurors. (Id., at pp. 80-81.) Code of Civil Procedure section 223, adopted in 1990 as part of Proposition 115, abrogated this aspect of our decision in Hovey. The statute provides in pertinent 13 part: “Voir dire . . . shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.” Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion, or at least abused its discretion, by denying his motion for sequestered voir dire and by instead proceeding in open court under section 223. Although counsel for defendant objected generally to the court‟s ruling, asserting that prospective jurors “should not have to answer those questions in front of the rest of the jury,” counsel offered no particular reason suggesting that open court voir dire would not be practicable in this case. Each prospective juror completed a 27-page questionnaire, and copies were made for the court and the parties. After the court questioned the jurors who were seated in the jury box, the attorneys were given opportunities to question them further, and did so. Subsequently, during the continued nonsequestered voir dire, the court made it clear that counsel retained the opportunity to request in camera questioning in appropriate circumstances. Apparently, however, no such request was made. Under these circumstances, we have no basis on which to conclude that the trial court failed to exercise, or abused, its discretion when it implicitly found that open court voir dire was “practicable” and denied the motion for individual sequestered voir dire. (See People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 493-494 (Lewis); People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714.) Defendant insists that open court voir dire might have caused some of the prospective jurors, and sitting jurors, to become tainted by the voir dire process. He focuses first on Prospective Jurors C.H., A.M., and M.B., all of whom indicated strong support for the death penalty in their respective responses in their written questionnaires. As defendant observes, after being informed that service on the jury required that all must keep an open mind and follow the law, regardless of personal beliefs, each prospective juror later affirmed an ability to do just that. 14 Ultimately, after defendant‟s “for cause” challenges to these prospective jurors were denied, defendant exercised peremptory challenges to remove all three prospective jurors. He now asserts that the open court voir dire process served to “educate” all three prospective jurors concerning how to tailor their responses, or even conceal their true views, in order to avoid a successful “for cause” challenge. The People assert that “it is just as likely that the written responses were illconceived or badly written reflections of the true beliefs that surfaced on voir dire.” We agree with the People that defendant‟s objection is unduly speculative. Defendant also focuses on three jurors who ultimately sat on his case, S.T., A.Y., and H.C. He asserts they became tainted and biased against him because they were “exposed” during nonsequestered oral voir dire to the strong pro-deathpenalty opinions of various other prospective jurors. Again we agree with the People: Even assuming that such exposure amounts to cognizable injury — a very doubtful proposition — because defendant failed to challenge any of the three jurors, or even exercise an available peremptory challenge, he did not preserve this claim for appellate review.