Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Statements by Prosecutor During Cross-examination of Defendant

Text: a. Defendant as poster boy for the death penalty During jury selection, an editorial in the local newspaper referred to defendant as the poster boy for the death penalty. Defendant expressed concern that the inflammatory nature of this editorial comment would bias prospective jurors against him and moved for a change of venue. The court agreed the comment was inflammatory, but denied the motion. During cross-examination of defendant at retrial, the prosecutor asked, You think it's hurt your kids that some people call you the poster boy for the death penalty? Defendant did not object to the comment until the following day, when he moved for a mistrial, arguing it amounted to prejudicially inflammatory testimony by the prosecutor in the form of a question. The court denied the motion and agreed to give a curative instruction that statements of counsel are not evidence. Defendant renews his argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct in asking the question. Defendant forfeited this claim, however, by his failure to timely object. (See People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 503.) In any event, we see no error. When a misconduct claim focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. (See People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 284 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3].) The jury here would not construe the question, reviewed in context, as particularly inflammatory. It came in the midst of a series of questions about defendant's relationship, or lack thereof, with his first wife and two children. The prosecutor asked defendant whether he valued and respected his family and established that, for the most part, defendant failed to provide them financial support and failed to hold a steady job. Defendant convinced his then pregnant wife to take part in his check-forgery schemes, and they both suffered felony convictions in 1972. He disgraced and embarrassed his parents, and had hardly seen his children in the past 20 years. The prosecutor then asked, You call yourself a parent, right? Defendant replied, I am a parent, in a tone the court later described as a bristling, sharply emphasized response, with at least a verbal exclamation point, indicating to the court that defendant obviously took some umbrage to the tone of the question. The prosecutor then asked the single question, You think it's hurt your kids that some people call you the poster boy for the death penalty? Defendant did not object, but answered, I've never heard anybody call me that to my face. The prosecutor acknowledged that he used a poor choice of words but was trying to establish that defendant was not a good father and had left his children with a legacy of shame. We agree with the trial court that the comment was not well chosen, but see no reasonable likelihood the jury would construe it in an objectionable fashion. b. Comments on defendant's sketch of a headless and handless corpse Defendant drew a sketch of a headless and handless corpse and included it in a letter he addressed to Terry Buchanan. Jail authorities intercepted the letter and delivered it to the district attorney's office. At trial, the prosecutor asked defendant if he recalled making the sketch. Defendant said he recalled writing the letter to Terry Buchanan in which he professed his innocence of the murder, but could not identify the sketch without seeing it in the context of the entire letter. The prosecutor did not offer the letter, but showed defendant the sketch and reminded him that the prosecution had taken great care not to expose Terry Buchanan to photographs of his wife's dismembered body. The prosecutor then asked, After avoiding [him] all that time you sent him that sketch, didn't you? Defendant repeated he could not identify the sketch out of the context of the letter. Before defendant could object, the prosecutor said, Maybe we can show that to Eve de Bona, see if she . . . . Eve de Bona was an artist who taught painting at San Quentin State Prison and who had testified that defendant produced many studies of faces and portraits of women and had a particular and recognizable artistic style. Because defendant refused to identify the sketch, the prosecution did not offer it into evidence. Defendant now argues the prosecutor nonetheless showed the sketch to the jurors by holding it up in their line of sight while questioning defendant. He argues this constituted prejudicial misconduct. The record does not support the claim. The record indicates only that during discussion out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel said, Then he lifted up the sketch. Did you draw that sketch? Look where he's sitting. Look where the jury is. In spite of defendant's inferences to the contrary, this record does not establish that the jurors actually ever saw the sketch. Defendant also challenges the prosecutor's sarcastic remark about Eve de Bona, arguing that it allowed the prosecutor to change evidence defendant offered in mitigation about his prison artwork into evidence in aggravation. Even if arguably inappropriate, the prosecutor's comment was not evidence, and did not constitute misconduct. c. Comments on other sketches by defendant Defendant also claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when, during defendant's cross-examination, he handed defendant more of his sketches, offered into evidence by defendant, and asked him if the sketches were basically sketches of heads of women? . . . Portraits? Defendant argues the prosecutor's questions improperly suggested to the jury that evidence of defendant's artistic talents he had offered in mitigation actually revealed an underlying morbid fascination with women's heads. He argues the prosecutor thereby improperly turned evidence in mitigation into evidence in aggravation. Defendant forfeited this claim on appeal when he failed to object at the time the prosecutor asked the complained-of questions. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 503.) In any event, the claim lacks merit. Prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence at trial, and whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide. ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 522.) The prosecutor here merely pointed to defendant's sketches and allowed the jury to draw their own inferences as to what, if anything, they revealed about defendant.