Opinion ID: 2559391
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fitness as a Condition of Reinstatement

Text: We also agree with the minority of the Board who would have imposed a fitness requirement as a condition of Daniel's reinstatement, because there is clear and convincing evidence of serious doubt about Daniel's continuing fitness to practice law. See Cater, 887 A.2d at 24. We first note that the Board, in imposing a one-year suspension, cited three cases in which it found that the sanction imposed was more appropriate to this matter than the sixty days recommended by the Hearing Committee. The Board failed to note, however, that in all three of the cited cases, In re Powell, 898 A.2d 365 (D.C. 2006), In re Wright, 885 A.2d 315 (D.C. 2005), and In re Brown, 851 A.2d 1278 (D.C.2004), the Board not only imposed a one-year suspension but also added a requirement that the respondent demonstrate fitness as a condition of reinstatement. Second, the Board did not specifically consider the factors cited in Cater (the  Roundtree Factors) that determine whether there is serious doubt about an attorney's fitness. These factors are `(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the misconduct; (3) the attorney's conduct since discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the attorney's present character; and (5) the attorney's present qualifications and competence to practice law.' Cater, 887 A.2d at 21 (quoting In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985)). The nature of the misconduct reveals that Daniel is comfortable acting dishonestly, and the circumstances show dishonest behavior over a number of years in activities both related specifically to the practice of law and to his responsibilities as a citizen. As to the second factor, Daniel continues to deny any misconduct in spite of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The recitation of his earlier submission that he is remorseful and regretful that he engaged in improper conduct impugning the integrity of the legal profession is difficult to believe when he continues to argue that he did not violate the purpose or the spirit of Rule 1.15, that he did not engage in dishonest conduct, and that his letter to the IRS, although not entirely honest, was not entirely dishonest either. Turning to the third factor, Daniel has not provided the court with evidence that he has righted any of his wrongs, specifically including resolution of outstanding tax deficiencies with the IRS. We have no doubt that if and when Daniel seeks reinstatement, his status with the IRS will be a relevant consideration. See In re Courtois, 931 A.2d 1015, 1016 (D.C.2007) (attorney seeking reinstatement following disbarment for tax evasion showed that he had reached an offer-in-compromise with the IRS). We note that Daniel will have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he has the moral qualifications, competency, and learning in law required for readmission. D.C. Bar R. XI § 16(d)(1)(a). In applying that rule, the court will consider the third Roundtree factor, whether an attorney has taken steps since the discipline was imposed to remedy past wrongs. See Courtois, 931 A.2d at 1015 (quotation marks omitted).