Opinion ID: 1594325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: unauthorized communication between bailiff and jurors

Text: Boykin first asserts that communication between Bailiff Sandy Friessen and jurors during the second day of jury deliberations was prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree, and affirm the trial court's finding that Boykin suffered no prejudice. The communication in question took place on Thursday, January 29, 1987, during the jury's lunch break. According to Bailiff Friessen, Janet Johnson, a juror, asked her: What happens if we can't come in with a decision? Friessen replied: Well if you can't come in with a decision, the Judge and the attorneys talk it over on how long you have been deliberating, then it's up to them whether to send you back into the juryroom and say deliberate some more or they're going to take your answer as whatever you give for an answer. I don't know when you're going to come in with a decision. My guess is if you're telling me that you're gonna come in after lunch and say you can't make a decision, I think the Judge would probably send you back into the juryroom, you know, and try to talk some more and try to come to a decision. At no time did any member of the jury indicate that they were deadlocked or having any difficulty reaching a decision, although, according to Johnson, the jurors did discuss, among themselves, what might happen if they did become deadlocked. The jury continued its deliberations, and rendered its verdict the following morning, on January 30, 1987. Boykin filed a motion for new trial based, in part, on the bailiff/juror communication. A hearing was held on February 2, 1987, whereat Bailiff Friessen testified. The hearing was continued two days later, on February 4, at which time Janet Johnson testified that she did not remember her conversation with Bailiff Friessen. Juror Johnson also testified that no attempt by any juror to communicate with the judge was frustrated by Friessen or anyone else, that no attempt to influence either her vote or the time of the verdict was made, and that there was no discussion among the jurors of Friessen's statement. After Johnson's testimony, the trial court concluded that Boykin, beyond a reasonable doubt, had suffered no prejudice. On February 9, 1987, Boykin submitted an affidavit from Anita Greenhoff, another juror, to the effect that she had overheard the exchange between Friessen and Johnson. After the prosecutor declined to offer new evidence, the trial court indicated that it was still satisfied that no prejudice had occurred, and denied Boykin's motion for new trial. State and Boykin agree that the bailiff's communication was improper (see SDCL 23A-25-5 [1] and SDCL 23A-25-8 [2] ). The standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), is controlling: In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150, 36 L.Ed. 917, 920, 921, 13 S.Ct. 50, [52-54] [ (1892) ]; Wheaton v. United States, (CA 8th S.D. [1943] ) 133 F.2d 522, 527. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451, 98 L.Ed. at 656. South Dakota case law is entirely consistent with Remmer. See State v. Swallow, 350 N.W.2d 606, 610 (S.D.1984); State v. Holt, 79 S.D. 50, 51-52, 107 N.W.2d 732, 733 (1961); State v. McCoil, 63 S.D. 649, 652, 263 N.W. 157, 158 (1935). Boykin maintains that Bailiff Friessen's remarks were in the nature of a get together instruction or Allen charge, a name derived from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) (concerning supplemental jury instructions encouraging a deadlocked jury to reach unanimous agreement). This Court disapproved the use of such supplemental instructions urging unanimity in State v. Ferguson, 84 S.D. 605, 612, 175 N.W.2d 57, 61 (1970): To assure the integrity and independence of criminal jury verdicts in the future the use of supplemental get-together instructions is not commended. The substance of Bailiff Friessen's communication, however, belies Boykin's assertion. The Kansas Supreme Court found no Allen charge coercion where [t]here is nothing in the bailiff's comments compelling the jury to reach a verdict  no implication that they must remain sitting until a verdict was reached or, in any other way, putting pressure on the jury to reach a verdict. State v. Lovely, 237 Kan. 838, 840, 703 P.2d 828, 831 (1985). Here, the bailiff told Johnson, among other things, that the judge and attorneys might decide to let them go. As in Lovely, the communication was not coercive. Johnson's testimony as to the juror's lack of difficulty during deliberation, as well as the prosecutor's cross-examination of Bailiff Friessen, effectively rebutted the presumption of prejudice. [3] As the State presented testimony explaining the improper communication, a question of fact arose for determination by the trial court as to whether the defendant suffered any prejudice. State v. Olesen, 86 S.D. 367, 373, 196 N.W.2d 362, 365 (1972). On this record, the trial court's determination that no prejudice resulted was not clearly erroneous.