Opinion ID: 1572783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cherry Decision

Text: Nixon first argues that this Court's interpretation of section 921.137 in Cherry, which requires a defendant to have an IQ score of 70 or below, violates Atkins. [4] Nixon asserts that because the Supreme Court noted in Atkins that the consensus in the scientific community recognizes an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, states are only permitted to establish procedures to determine whether a capital defendant's IQ is 75 or below on a standardized intelligence test. Nixon's claim is without merit. [5] In Atkins, the Supreme Court recognized that various sources and research differ on who should be classified as mentally retarded. Accordingly, the Court left to the states the task of setting specific rules in their statutes. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright[, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed. 2d 335 (1986)] with regard to insanity, `we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.') (citations omitted). This State in section 921.137(1) defines subaverage general intellectual functioning as performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. We have consistently interpreted this definition to require a defendant seeking exemption from execution to establish he has an IQ of 70 or below. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 329 (Fla.2007) ([U]nder the plain language of the statute, `significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning' correlates with an IQ of 70 or below.); Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190, 1201 (Fla.2005) (finding that to be exempt from execution under Atkins, a defendant must establish that he has an IQ of 70 or below). Nixon further asserts that our interpretation of section 921.137 in Cherry creates an irrebuttable presumption that no one with an IQ over 70 is mentally retarded. Nixon claims that we created an irrebuttable presumption because once we concluded that Cherry's IQ score was 72 our inquiry terminated, i.e., we did not consider the two other prongs of the mental retardation determination. See Cherry, 959 So.2d at 714. We have consistently interpreted section 921.137(1) as providing that a defendant may establish mental retardation by demonstrating all three of the following factors: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the condition before age eighteen. See, e.g., Jones, 966 So.2d at 325; Johnston, 960 So.2d at 761. Thus, the lack of proof on any one of these components of mental retardation would result in the defendant not being found to suffer from mental retardation. Nixon further asserts that our interpretation of section 921.137(1) does not provide constitutionally adequate procedures to determine mental retardation. More specifically, Nixon claims that in Cherry, we interpreted section 921.137(1) to create fact-finding procedures that preclude a defendant from presenting relevant material. Nothing in Cherry or section 921.137 precludes a defendant from presenting any evidence that is germane to the issues involved in a mental retardation claim. Section 921.137(1) and rule 3.203 provide defendants with notice of the type of evidence that is relevant to the issues and that will be considered by a trial court. In addition defendants are given an opportunity to present any relevant evidence to the court. This procedure was followed in this case. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a final order that thoroughly explained its decision, finding that Nixon had not established that he should be excluded from the death penalty by reason of mental retardation. The trial court informed Nixon of his opportunity to present his case, provided an evidentiary hearing, determined Nixon's mental retardation claim on the basis of the examinations performed by two psychiatrists, and provided Nixon with an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to the report and testimony of the court-appointed expert. We find that Nixon was included in the truth-seeking process and had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence relevant to his mental retardation claim and to challenge the state-appointed psychiatrist's opinions. Because the statute, rule, and caselaw outline adequate procedures for the presentation of mental retardation claims, Nixon is not entitled to relief on this issue. Nixon further contends that this Court's definition of mental retardation violates both the United States and Florida Constitutions because the definition of mental retardation in section 921.137, as construed in Cherry, is inconsistent with the constitutional bar on the execution of mentally retarded persons. In Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 326 (Fla.2007), we found that Florida's definition of mental retardation is consistent with the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic criteria for mental retardation. [6] Moreover, in Atkins, the Supreme Court noted that the statutory definitions of mental retardation throughout the country are not identical to the one outlined in Atkins but generally conform to the clinical definitions set forth in the case. See 536 U.S. at 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Florida's statutory definition of mental retardation is not identical but conforms to the one outlined in Atkins. See id. at 309 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242; § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). Nixon's claim involving the definition of mental retardation is also without merit.