Opinion ID: 2095030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Final Administrative Decision

Text: We do not agree with petitioner's claim that his administrative remedies continued all the way through the resolution of his petition for judicial review in the circuit court and his subsequent appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and his claim that he was required to follow through with petitioning for judicial review in the circuit court and appealing that court's decision to the intermediate appellate court before filing his instant tort action for wrongful termination. This Court has had the opportunity to examine the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the context of administrative decisions and appeals under the Education Article, as well as under other types of administrative actions, and we have never said, or meant to say, that an exhaustion of administrative remedies in cases such as the one sub judice does not occur until after a final decision has been made in the judicial forum as opposed to a final decision in the administrative forum. In Board of Education for Dorchester County v. Hubbard, supra , this Court explained that a circuit court improperly resolved issues concerning the arbitrability of classification of teacher certificates and class sizes before the aggrieved teachers pursued and exhausted their administrative remedies before the State Board. Specifically, we considered whether the decision should initially be made through the statutory administrative process culminating in a decision by the State Board of Education. Hubbard, 305 Md. at 785, 506 A.2d at 630 (emphasis added). That we found that the administrative process available to the aggrieved teachers culminated with a decision by the State Board would appear to strongly, if not conclusively, indicate that such a decision is tantamount to an exhaustion of administrative remedies. Perhaps even more on point in Hubbard, we stated that the teachers [may be given] an opportunity to exhaust their administrative remedies and obtain a final decision from the State Board of Education. [16] If the decision of the State Board is adverse to the teachers, and if they seek judicial review, the judicial review actions could then be consolidated with the instant cases. Id. at 792-93, 506 A.2d at 634 (alteration added) (emphasis added) (footnote added) (citing Offutt v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 285 Md. 557, 404 A.2d 281 (1979)); see also Fosler v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., 376 Md. 118, 138, 829 A.2d 271, 283 (2003) (where homeowners were required to exhaust administrative remedies before the Home Improvement Commission, because the Commission had primary jurisdiction, we held that the circuit court should stay [an independent] declaratory judgment action pending a final decision by the Home Improvement Commission) (alteration added) (emphasis added); Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E. Church, 375 Md. 59, 76, 825 A.2d 388, 398 (2003) (holding, in the context of a zoning decision, that [t]here could be no exhaustion of administrative remedies until there was a Board of Appeals' decision finally approving or disapproving Bethel's development plan) (emphasis added). In McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 606, 552 A.2d 881, 883 (1989) we held that an inmate who sought damages for personal injuries resulting from a correctional officer's alleged tortious conduct must file a complaint with and exhaust his [administrative] remedies before the [Inmate Grievance] Commission prior to bringing a common law tort action.  (alterations added) (emphasis added). But, we went on to acknowledge that although he was required to exhaust his administrative remedy, before receiving an adjudication on the merits of his tort action, we do not believe that a dismissal of the tort action was the preferable order.... [I]t is appropriate for the trial court to retain, for a reasonable period of time, jurisdiction over the independent judicial action pending invocation and exhaustion of the administrative procedures. Id. at 613, 552 A.2d at 886 (emphasis added); see also Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 18, 511 A.2d 1079, 1088 (1986) (where the administrative agency has primary jurisdiction, [o]nce the administrative procedures are exhausted, the trial court may proceed; the plaintiff whose case is meritorious may be entitled to whatever relief is available under either the independent judicial action or the administrative/judicial review remedy ) (emphasis added). In summary, in cases where the administrative remedy is primary, and there are alternative independent judicial remedies available, the alternate judicial remedy may not be resolved (although the action can be brought and stayed) prior to the exhaustion of the administrative remedy, i.e., the final agency determination. It is from no later than this point that the limitation period begins to run. [17] While in primary jurisdiction cases, the alternate judicial action may, in some circumstances, be filed before the final administrative determination, under the circumstances of this case it was required to be filed no later than three years from that the point in time when the final administrative decision was made. In accordance with this Court's opinion in Hubbard, it appears that May 28, 1998, the day the State Board issued its final [18] decision in regard to the propriety of petitioner's dismissal, was the date on which petitioner can be said to have finally exhausted his administrative remedies. Because petitioner claims that the Circuit Court erred in holding that the three-year statute of limitations began to run on this date, thereby barring his February 8, 2002 complaint, we shall examine whether the Circuit Court's conclusion was correct.