Opinion ID: 795132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffective Assistance in Counseling Hoffman Regarding the Plea Offer

Text: 54 Finally, Hoffman claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process. On this claim, we conclude that Hoffman did receive ineffective assistance of counsel when Wellman advised him to reject the plea agreement offered by the prosecution. 6
55 On February 6, 1989, the Owyhee County prosecutor proposed that Hoffman plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for an agreement by the State not to pursue the death penalty against Hoffman during sentencing. The offer was set to expire on February 16, 1989. Wellman advised Hoffman to reject the plea agreement. 56 Wellman based his advice on our en banc decision in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d at 1029-39, filed on December 22, 1988, about six weeks before the plea offer was tendered. In Adamson, we held that Arizona's death penalty scheme was unconstitutional because it permitted sentencing facts to be found by the judge, and not the jury. See id. at 1023. Wellman noted the similarities between the Arizona statute found unconstitutional in Adamson and the Idaho death penalty statute. See Idaho Code § 19-2515 (1989). Based on Adamson, he advised Hoffman that he was unlikely to receive the death penalty because it was only a matter of time before Idaho's death penalty scheme would also be, in his view, found unconstitutional. 57 On January 9, 1989, before the prosecutor tendered the plea offer to Hoffman on February 6, 1989, the State of Arizona had already signaled its unhappiness with our ruling in Adamson by petitioning for rehearing. On February 1, 1989, this court stayed the mandate in Adamson pending the Supreme Court's disposition of the State's anticipated petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. When Hoffman let the prosecutor's offer lapse on February 16, 1989, the State had not yet filed a petition for certiorari in Adamson, but it was a virtual guarantee that the State would do so. 58 On February 2, 1989, four days before the prosecutor tendered the plea offer, the Supreme Court of Arizona filed its decision in State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P.2d 1017 (1989), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), in which it reaffirmed its earlier view that jury sentencing was not constitutionally required in death penalty cases, directly contrary to our decision in Adamson. See Walton, 769 P.2d at 1030. Thus, on February 16, 1989, when Hoffman let the prosecutor's offer lapse, there was a clear and direct conflict between the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Walton and our decision in Adamson. The State of Arizona had already clearly signaled its intention to appeal our decision in Adamson, and it was not hard to guess that the defendant in Walton would do the same. 59 Indeed, certiorari was sought in both cases. In October 1989, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Walton, holding in abeyance the petition in Adamson. See Walton v. Arizona, 493 U.S. 808, 110 S.Ct. 49, 107 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989). On June 27, 1990, the Supreme Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Walton, thereby directly upholding the constitutionality of Arizona's judge-sentencing scheme in capital cases, and implicitly upholding the comparable Idaho scheme. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). 7 Then, on June 28, 1990, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari in Adamson. See Lewis v. Adamson, 497 U.S. 1031, 110 S.Ct. 3287, 111 L.Ed.2d 795 (1990). 60 We do not fault Wellman for failing to predict the outcome of these divergent opinions. We do not expect counsel to be prescient about the direction the law will take. See Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a lawyer is not ineffective for failing to anticipate a decision in a later case); Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir.1972) (Clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective representation.). 61 Nor was it unreasonable for Wellman to draw a connection from the Arizona death penalty scheme to the Idaho scheme. The same fault that the Ninth Circuit identified in Arizona death penalty law was present in Idaho's law: both permitted the sentencing judge to sentence a defendant to death based on the judge's own factual findings. In short, then, Idaho's statute and Arizona's statute were materially indistinguishable. See Charboneau, 774 P.2d at 316-17 (declining to adopt Adamson even though the court found no material difference between Idaho's scheme and Arizona's scheme). Indeed, several of Wellman's colleagues in the Idaho state bar argued in Idaho state courts that Idaho's statute was unconstitutional under Adamson. See, e.g., id.; State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197, 206-07 (1989). Thus, Wellman was not unreasonable in drawing a connection between our decision in Adamson and Hoffman's case. 62 We nonetheless find that Wellman's representation of Hoffman during the plea bargaining stage was deficient for two reasons: first, Wellman based his advice on incomplete research, and second, Wellman recommended that his client risk much in exchange for very little. 63 The first problem is that Wellman based his advice solely on a reading of Adamson and not on an understanding of the general landscape in which that case arose. Wellman testified that he had read Idaho Supreme Court capital cases, and therefore he must have known that the Idaho state courts had considered and consistently rejected claims similar to Adamson. See State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202, 1208 (1985); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463, 473-74 (1983), rev'd in part, Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396, 398-99 (1983). With minimal research, he would have discovered that a pair of cases was well on its way to the Idaho Supreme Court that would challenge the continuing viability of these Idaho Supreme Court cases in light of our holding in Adamson. See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989); Charboneau, 774 P.2d at 315-17 (reaffirming Creech, decided April 4, 1989, less than two months after Hoffman rejected the plea agreement). 64 Had Wellman researched Arizona law, he would have discovered that on February 2, 1989, after Adamson, but before Hoffman rejected the plea offer, the Arizona Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty scheme. See Walton, 769 P.2d at 1030-31. A judge who concurred in Walton recognized that the decision might set up a conflict between Arizona law and Supreme Court precedent and cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in Adamson. See id. at 1039 (Feldman, V.C.J., concurring). With the state of the law in turmoil both in Arizona and in Idaho, and with conflicts between this court and the state supreme courts of both states, a reasonable attorney would have recognized the substantial risk of advising a client to reject a plea agreement. Because Wellman possessed a deficient understanding of the law, he led Hoffman to believe that his sentence would be the same whether he accepted the plea bargain or was convicted at trial. Such advice was constitutionally deficient. See Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 403-04 (2d Cir.1999); Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664, 666-68 (3d Cir.1998). 65 If there was a high probability that Hoffman was not going to receive the death penalty, Wellman might have been reasonable in considering our decision in Adamson as an additional reason to reject the plea agreement. But Hoffman's chance of receiving the death penalty was not minimal, a fact that counsel vastly underestimated and that made counsel's failure to investigate Adamson more disastrous. Under the plea agreement, Hoffman would have given up his right to challenge the first-degree murder charge based on aider and abetter liability. But Wellman admitted that his central strategy at trial — that Hoffman was less culpable than other participants in the murder, especially Wages — could also support a first-degree murder charge. Thus, Wellman advised his client to go to trial and risk the death penalty even though there was a good possibility that the guilt phase of trial would result in a first-degree murder charge, the same outcome as the plea agreement. This was a huge risk in light of the potential downside, that is, that the court could impose the death penalty. In contrast, under the plea agreement, Wellman could have argued his client's lesser culpability at sentencing while ensuring that Hoffman would not receive a death sentence. 8 Considering the magnitude of the gamble that Wellman was advocating, Wellman's failure to fully research the landscape surrounding Adamson constituted deficient performance. 66 We certainly do not mean to imply that counsel is ineffective in relying on our precedent or in arguing for a reasonable extension of this court's decisions. In this case, however, counsel advised Hoffman to give up the certainty of avoiding the death penalty so that he could go to trial, a risky proposition with a substantial downside. More importantly, he offered this flawed advice without conducting reasonable research into the legal landscape. We therefore conclude that Wellman's legal representation of Hoffman during the plea bargaining stage was not objectively reasonable.
67 As stated above, deficient performance by counsel is not a sufficient basis to reverse. Hoffman must also show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. Hoffman must show that there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea agreement had he received accurate advice from his attorney. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003); Cullen, 194 F.3d at 403; Wanatee v. Ault, 259 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir.2001). We hold that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had counsel acted competently. 68 Wellman testified that Hoffman had a compliant personality, and would frequently defer to Wellman's decision-making. Wellman testified that, throughout the process, Hoffman would say Well, Bill, you are the lawyer, you know, you know more about it than I do. Coulter also testified that Hoffman would frequently defer to their decisions about how the defense ought to be managed. This strongly suggests that, had Wellman fully presented Hoffman's options and told Hoffman that he was giving up very little in exchange for the security of the death penalty being off the table, Hoffman probably would have gone along with Wellman's suggestion and would have accepted the plea agreement. 69 The State argues that, regardless of Wellman's advice, Hoffman would not have taken the plea agreement because Hoffman wanted the State to prove the charges against him. The State points to Wellman's testimony: 70 I would describe [Hoffman as being] of the old school. He was not ... going to snitch on anybody, he was not going to turn on anybody. And if the State charged him, then they needed to prove it. 71 The State's argument pulls Wellman's testimony out of context. In the next sentence, Wellman admitted that he did not know whether Hoffman had insisted on going to trial in any previous criminal proceeding. He then explained that Hoffman was surprised that he was indicted, because he perceived himself as being out of the circle of those responsible for Williams's murder, i.e., Holmes and Wages. As such, Wellman explained, he needed to see the evidence that the State had in order to satisfy his mind or convince him[self] that the State had a case against him. 72 When read in this light, Hoffman's desire to have the State prove its case was not a principled stand against accepting a plea agreement. Rather, Hoffman's misunderstanding of aiding and abetting liability led him to believe that the State was not likely to prove a first-degree murder charge against him. Had Hoffman been presented with an accurate evaluation (1) of the very real possibility of receiving the death penalty at the end of the penalty phase; (2) of the very real chance that the Idaho death penalty scheme would be upheld; and (3) of the almost nonexistent chance that if he had gone to trial he could have achieved anything better than the result promised in the plea agreement, there is more than a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea. Therefore, we find that Hoffman suffered prejudice because of his counsel's inadequate performance.
73 Because we find that Hoffman was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, we must determine the proper remedy. A habeas remedy should put the defendant back in the position he would have been in if the Sixth Amendment violation had not occurred. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir.1994) (as amended). Where a defendant is deprived of the opportunity to make a reasoned decision about a proffered plea agreement, the proper remedy is reinstatement of the offer of the plea agreement. See id. at 1468-69; see also Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1056-57. 74 Accordingly, we order the district court to direct the State to release Hoffman unless, within a reasonable time from the date of this opinion, the State offers Hoffman a plea agreement with the same material terms offered in the original plea agreement. Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1057.