Opinion ID: 2197386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: relevancy for discovery is broader than relevancy for trial.

Text: The relators contend that we should issue a peremptory writ of mandamus against any further discovery of the facts related to Stetson's discipline, because the information is irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and inadmissible at trial. Rankin contends that Stetson's admitted unfitness to practice medicine at the time he was treating Rankin is discoverable and relevant. She argues that she would have asked different questions at his first deposition if she had known of his sexual misconduct. She also argues that further discovery of his unprofessional conduct could lead to other admissible evidence whether his medical judgment was impaired. As stated, under rule 26(b)(1), information sought through discovery must also be relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. This requirement differs significantly from the relevancy test for admission of evidence at trial: having a tendency to make the existence of any fact at issue more or less probable. [42] Moreover, under rule 26(b)(1), the inadmissibility of the information at trial is not ground for objection if the information appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Under the same language of Nebraska's rule 26, many courts have held that relevancy at the discovery stage, when the issues are not clearly defined, is construed more broadly than relevancy at trial. [43] We agree. This reasoning is consistent with our recognition that discovery rules are broadly written to permit discovery. [44] Stetson principally relies on a criminal case in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order that excluded impeachment evidence against the prosecution's expert witness. [45] The evidence would have shown that the psychiatrist was facing criminal charges related to his sexual abuse of patients when he testified that the defendant was not suffering from a mental disease when he killed two people. The defendant argued that the prosecution had opened the door on the psychiatrist's character and that the evidence was relevant to show bias and for character impeachment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected both arguments. Regarding character impeachment, the court concluded that the evidence was irrelevant to the psychiatrist's reputation for truth or veracity or his abilities as an expert witness. We note, however, that the Seventh Circuit later held in a habeas action that the evidentiary ruling violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. [46] The defendant should have been permitted to impeach the psychiatrist with evidence that he was about to lose his license and faculty position at a university, and possibly go to prison. The court reasoned that the evidence was relevant to show bias for the State, but mostly to counter the prosecutor's misleading evidence that the psychiatrist was a witness of impeccable credentials and high moral standing in the community. While we are not dealing with a Confrontation Clause issue, we find the Seventh Circuit's reasoning regarding relevancy persuasive. We have recognized that parties have a right to discover information that might impeach a witness. [47] And we have set out the purposes of the discovery process as follows: The primary purpose of the discovery process is to explore all available and properly discoverable information to narrow the fact issues in controversy so that a trial may be an efficient and economical resolution of a dispute. ... The discovery process also provides an opportunity for pretrial preparation so that a litigant may conduct an informed cross-examination. ... Moreover, pretrial discovery enables litigants to prepare for a trial without the element of an opponent's tactical surprise, a circumstance which might lead to a result based more on counsel's legal maneuvering than on the merits of the case. [48] Clearly, some of the information that Rankin seeks through discovery, i.e., the reason for Stetson's surrender of his licensure, is public information. But we cannot say at the discovery stage that she could not obtain further information that would be relevant to Stetson's credibility or a misleading characterization of him at trial. Nor can we rule out her obtaining information that would be relevant to showing his medical judgment was impaired at the time he treated Rankin. But we emphasize that we are not commenting on whether this information is admissible at trial.