Opinion ID: 884925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 19 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it prohibited Seal from introducing Dr. Cocozzo's expert testimony into evidence? ¶ 20 In Seal's list of expert witnesses filed on March 2, 1998, Dr. Cocozzo was included as an expert medical witness. As stated previously, however, this list did not include the required Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P., information. It stated only Dr. Cocozzo's name, address and qualifications. In a supplement to his expert witness list, Seal added that Dr. Cocozzo's position is that the standard of care for pain management was not met in this matter, and that the controlled substances prescribed by Dr. D.G.H. were excessive. This did not comply with the District Court's order and Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P., either. Seal did not state the substance of the facts and opinions to which Dr. Cocozzo would testify or a summary of the grounds for Dr. Cocozzo's opinion. In addition, the supplement was not timely filed and served. Although Seal subsequently served more information about Dr. Cocozzo's proposed testimony, he did not file it with the District Court. As a result of these violations, the District Court prohibited Seal from introducing Dr. Cocozzo's expert testimony into evidence. ¶ 21 Dr. D.G.H. takes the position that Seal's failure to file an expert witness disclosure in compliance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P., violated the express terms of the District Court's scheduling order and therefore warrants the Rule 16(f), M.R.Civ.P., sanction the District Court imposed upon Seal. ¶ 22 Pursuant to Rule 16(f), M.R.Civ.P., a party can be sanctioned if he or she fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order. In reference to Rule 16(f), M.R.Civ.P., Rule 37(b)(2)(B), M.R.Civ.P., allows a court to refuse[] to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibit[ ] that party from introducing designated matters in evidence. We regard with favor such sanctions for failure to comply with the rules of discovery. See McKenzie v. Scheeler (1997), 285 Mont. 500, 506, 949 P.2d 1168, 1171-72; Huffine v. Boylan (1989), 239 Mont. 515, 517, 782 P.2d 77, 78 (citing Owen v. F.A. Buttrey, Co. (1981), 192 Mont. 274, 279-80, 627 P.2d 1233, 1236). The purpose of these sanctions is to deter parties from being unresponsive to the judicial process regardless of the intent, or lack thereof, behind such unresponsiveness. See McKenzie, 285 Mont. at 508, 949 P.2d at 1172. ¶ 23 In his defense, Seal argues that notwithstanding the District Court's reference to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P., in its scheduling order, this rule places a burden on the opposing party to ask questions about an expert witness's opinion foundation when the party is dissatisfied with the prior disclosures. In making this argument, however, Seal ignores the fact that the District Court's scheduling order required him to provide such information. ¶ 24 Seal also defends against the Rule 16(f), M.R.Civ.P., sanction by arguing that he did not intend to cause a delay or to deny Dr. D.G.H. adequate time to prepare his case. He contends that much of the time he used to prepare his expert witness list was needed to locate Dr. Cocozzo out of state and for Dr. Cocozzo to review the available records and piece together the treatment rendered to LaRell Seal. This process, he says, was complicated by the absence of Dr. D.G.H.'s records and Dr. Cocozzo's own busy schedule. Furthermore, Seal argues that any delay he caused did not prejudice Dr. D.G.H. because Dr. D.G.H. had adequate time to depose Dr. Cocozzo or to submit interrogatories regarding Dr. Cocozzo's proposed testimony. Seal adds that the District Court never issued an order against him to compel discovery. He even attempts to demonstrate his own good faith by asserting that he paid Dr. Cocozzo's fees prior to Dr. Cocozzo reviewing the records. Based on these arguments, Seal contends that excluding Dr. Cocozzo's testimony penalized him unreasonably. ¶ 25 Seal cites Smith v. Butte-Silver Bow County (1996), 276 Mont. 329, 916 P.2d 91, in which we remanded a district court's sanction of a dismissal of an action with prejudice because it was too severe a sanction for the offending party's noncompliance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P. In Smith, 276 Mont. at 339-40, 916 P.2d at 97, we concluded that the extent of the consequences imposed by the district court did not relate to the extent and nature of the actual discovery abuse and the extent of the prejudice to the opposing party which resulted therefrom. Our decision in Smith, however, relied on the fact that the offending party provided enough information about his proposed expert testimony that the prejudice he caused to the opposing party was relatively limited. Furthermore, the district court in Smith stated in a previous order that the sanction for noncompliance with Rule 26, M.R.Civ.P., would be to reopen the party's expert witness depositions, not to dismiss the case. In the case sub judice, Seal provided less information about his proposed expert testimony and caused greater prejudice to the opposing party. Also, the District Court did not threaten a lesser sanction for his noncompliance. Thus, we distinguish our holding in Smith from the facts here. In the instant case, Seal failed to comply with the District Court's scheduling order despite having been given substantial time to prepare his expert witness list. In so doing, Seal caused prejudice to Dr. D.G.H. by not allowing him ample time or information to rebut Dr. Cocozzo's opinion. Short of dismissing the case for Seal's discovery abuse, the District Court prohibited Dr. Cocozzo's testimony. We agree that this was an appropriate sanction. ¶ 26 In cases involving a failure to comply with a scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16(f), M.R.Civ.P., we have stated that the proper standard of review is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. See McKenzie, 285 Mont. at 507, 949 P.2d at 1172. This is because the trial judge is in the best position to know whether parties are disregarding the rights of opposing parties in the course of litigation and which sanctions for such conduct are most appropriate. McKenzie, 285 Mont. at 506, 949 P.2d at 1172; Smith, 276 Mont. at 332, 916 P.2d at 93. Here, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.