Opinion ID: 2395107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Cause of Action for Grave Desecration and Damages Available

Text: The common law cause of action available for desecration of those graves not encompassed within West Virginia Code § 29-1-8a remains viable. The parameters of such a common law cause of action have developed in distinct contexts as this Court has addressed specific situations. A primary paradigm for a common law grave desecration cause of action emerges through an analysis of those prior cases. In Ritter v. Couch, 71 W.Va. 221, 76 S.E. 428 (1912), this Court addressed the issue of a common law action for grave desecration and recognized that an action in equity lies for desecration of a grave which has been dedicated for cemetery purposes. 71 W.Va. at 228, 76 S.E. at 430. The sanctity of a cemetery and the need for a cause of action to recover damages for desecration were succinctly observed by the Ritter Court, as follows: If relatives of blood may not defend the graves of their departed[,] who may? Always the human heart has rebelled against the invasion of the cemetery precincts; always has the human mind contemplated the grave as the last and enduring resting place after the struggles and sorrows of this world. 71 W.Va. at 227, 76 S.E. at 430. A more specific analysis was accomplished in England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W.Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920), wherein this Court held that near relatives of a decedent may maintain a cause of action for damages for desecration of a grave or body because the bodily remains are accorded a type of property right. [3] The England Court also noted that, [g]enerally, a cemetery lot in the country is a notable object and has well defined boundaries and is easily identified. 86 W.Va. at 580, 104 S.E. at 48. In syllabus point one of England, this Court held: While strictly considered there is no right of property in a dead body, nevertheless the right to bury a corpse and preserve the remains is a legal right, which in this country is regarded as a quasi right in property, the violation of which is cognizable in and may be redressed at the suit of near relatives by an action on the case against the wrongdoer. In pertinent part of syllabus point two of England, this Court explained: Whether such right of burial exists by deed or by mere license, so long as it exists and is not lawfully revoked or destroyed, it may be ... redressed and protected in our courts[.] [4] In Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 174 W.Va. 458, 327 S.E.2d 438 (1985), this Court addressed a situation in which the defendant had obtained permission to disinter and rebury certain bodies due to highway construction. The defendant was eventually accused of negligence in the handling of the bodies. In syllabus point three of Whitehair, this Court stated that [a] cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecuniary loss. Mental anguish is a sufficient basis for recovery of damages. In syllabus point three of In re Hillcrest Memorial Gardens, 146 W.Va. 337, 119 S.E.2d 753 (1961), this Court enunciated a defining characteristic of a cemetery as an area set apart, explaining as follows: A cemetery is a place where dead bodies of human beings are buried; an area of ground set apart for the burial of the dead, either by public authority or private enterprise. It includes not only lots for depositing the bodies of the dead, but also such avenues, walks and grounds as may be necessary for its use, or for shrubbery and ornamental purposes. 146 W.Va. at 338, 119 S.E.2d at 754, Syl. Pt. 3 (emphasis supplied). In Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 180 W.Va. 665, 379 S.E.2d 388 (1989), the plaintiff had sought damages for surface cracks in grave sites allegedly incurred through mine subsidence. The Bennett Court found that a cause of action will lie for the unlawful desecration of a grave site even though no disturbance of the body interred therein can be shown. 180 W.Va. at 670, 379 S.E.2d at 393. Further, the Bennett Court found that damages for mental distress may be recovered by the next of kin for the disturbance or desecration of a relative's grave. Id. at 671, 379 S.E.2d at 394. The Court rejected the contention that damages for mental distress were not available for the unlawful disturbance of a grave site where no physical disturbance of the body could be demonstrated, recognizing that family members will generally suffer mental distress if either the bodies or the grave sites are desecrated. Id. The potential for punitive damages was also discussed, and the Bennett Court applied the traditional rule that punitive damages would be available upon proof that the defendant engaged in a wilful, wanton, reckless or malicious act. Id. (internal citations omitted). This Court thereafter addressed allegations of grave desecration in connection with logging and strip mining in Concerned Loved Ones and Lot Owners Association of Beverly Hills Memorial Gardens v. Pence, 181 W.Va. 649, 383 S.E.2d 831 (1989). In Pence, this Court reiterated the established principle that a cemetery is properly characterized as a land set aside and dedicated for the specific purpose of a cemetery. The Pence Court explained that [t]he intention of the owner of the land to dedicate it for a public cemetery, together with the acceptance and use of the same by the public, or the consent and acquiescence of the owner in the long-continued use of his lands for such purpose is sufficient to evidence a proper dedication. 181 W.Va. at 654, 383 S.E.2d at 836-37 (quoting 14 Am.Jur.2d Cemeteries § 14 (1964)). The Pence Court also discussed damages potentially available to the plaintiffs, explaining that the plaintiffs may be entitled to compensatory or only nominal [damages], depending upon the nature of the harmful acts as the evidence at trial demonstrates. 181 W.Va. at 656, 383 S.E.2d at 838. The Pence Court noted as follows: It has been held that in this type of action, nominal damages at least, are awardable, and compensatory damages may be recovered if actual damage is shown. Id. As in Bennett, the Pence Court found that punitive damages may be recovered in this case if the plaintiffs can prove that the defendants' conduct was willful, wanton, reckless, or malicious. Id. The potential for recovery of damages for mental distress for the disturbance or desecration of the graves was again recognized. In its order certifying questions to this Court in the present case, the lower court accurately recognized that the gradual development of the common law of West Virginia on the issue of grave desecration has not generated precise elements of the tort, focusing instead upon the rights of a plaintiff in a specific factual scenario. In the situation of these certified questions, we are faced with a much broader request than has previously been addressed in more fact-specific inquiries. [5] As the Court of Appeals of New York aptly recognized when confronted with an issue requiring evaluation of historic development of common law regarding improper use of body parts of a deceased person, this inquiry cannot possibly yield answers with perfect congruity considering the different context in which common-law courts dealt with this subject. Although the case before us is unprecedented, the common law offers enough guidance for us to answer the question confidently. Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 827 N.Y.S.2d 96, 860 N.E.2d 713, 717 (2006). Throughout this Court's evaluation of grave desecration matters, certain intrinsic principles have emerged. A prerequisite to common law recovery has consistently been a showing that the land upon which the decedents are buried is an actual cemetery, with identifiable boundaries or limits. [6] Moreover, it must be recognized that in order to prove a claim of negligence, the defendant's violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff must be demonstrated. `Negligence is the violation of the duty of taking care under the given circumstances. It is not absolute; but is [always] relative to some circumstance of time, place, manner, or person.' Dicken v. Liverpool Salt & Coal Co., 41 W.Va. 511, 23 S.E. 582 (1895). Syl. Pt. 2, Honaker v. Mahon, 210 W.Va. 53, 552 S.E.2d 788 (2001). In delineating the elements of a common law cause of action for grave desecration, the lower court identified requirements gleaned from the common law of grave desecration as developed in this state. Upon review, this Court essentially agrees with the lower court's approach to the question regarding the elements of the common law action and alters the lower court's answers only slightly. This Court holds that the elements of a common law cause of action for grave desecration are: (1) the grave site in question must be within a publicly or privately maintained cemetery, clearly marked in a manner which will indicate its use as a cemetery, with identifiable boundaries and limits; [7] (2) dedication of the area to the purpose of providing a place of burial by the owner of the property or that the owner acquiesced in its use for burial; (3) the area was identifiable as a cemetery by its appearance prior to the defendant's entry or that the defendant had prior knowledge of the existence of the cemetery; (4) the decedent in question is interred in the cemetery by license or right; (5) the plaintiff is the next of kin of the decedent with the right to assert a claim for desecration; and (6) the defendant proximately caused, either directly or indirectly, defacement, damage, or other mistreatment of the physical area of the decedent's grave site or common areas of the cemetery in a manner that a reasonable person knows will outrage the sensibilities of others. [8] As the lower court recognized, this Court has permitted recovery where the act of desecration was committed indirectly, as in the case of mine subsidence in Bennett, wherein the coal company negligently failed to leave sufficient coal under a family cemetery to prevent subsidence. Even in Bennett, however, there was ultimately actual harm to the grave site area, in the form of cracks and holes developing in the graves within the cemetery. 180 W.Va. at 668, 379 S.E.2d at 391. Thus, this Court's action in permitting recovery for desecration committed in an indirect manner does not constitute the creation of a separate and distinct cause of action for indirect grave desecration. As the lower court observed, there is no precedent in this jurisdiction for a separate cause of action for indirect grave desecration, and this Court declines to create one at this juncture. Although a grave can certainly be subjected to grave desecration indirectly, the indirect manner of harm is an evidentiary issue encompassed within a cause of action for grave desecration, rather than a matter of pleading a separate cause of action. The cause of action remains grave desecration whether it was accomplished through direct or indirect means, and actual grave desecration is required. [9] Thus, this Court disagrees with the manner in which the lower court answered the question regarding a cause of action for indirect desecration. With regard to damages available in claims of grave desecration, this Court agrees with the answer of the lower court. Such answer is consistent with the prior pronouncements of this Court in grave desecration cases, as discussed above. Thus, the damages available in a common law cause of action for grave desecration include nominal damages; compensatory damages if actual damage has occurred; mental distress; [10] and punitive damages if the defendant's conduct is determined to be willful, wanton, reckless, or malicious.