Opinion ID: 775852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reconciling Taking as used in Section 9 with Section 7

Text: 38 The structure of the ESA and the legislative history clearly show Congress's intent to enact one standard for taking within both Section 7(b)(4), governing the creation of Incidental Take Statements, and Section 9, imposing civil and criminal penalties for violation of the ESA. In 1982, Congress amended the ESA to include Section 7(b)(4) to resolve the conflict between Sections 7 and 9. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 15 (1982). As noted in the legislative reports, the 39 purpose of Section 7(b)(4) and the amendment to Section 7(o) is to resolve the situation in which a Federal agency or a permit or license applicant has been advised that the proposed action will not violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Act but the proposed action will result in the taking of some species incidental to that action -a clear violation of Section 9 of the Act which prohibits any taking of a species. 40 H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2826. Absent an actual or prospective taking under Section 9, there is no situation  that requires a Section 7 safe harbor provision. 41 We reject the argument that taking should be applied differently because the two sections serve different purposes. Interpreting the statutes in the manner urged by the Fish and Wildlife Service could effectively stop the proposed cattle grazing entirely. Such a broad interpretation would allow the Fish and Wildlife Service to engage in widespread land regulation even where no Section 9 liability could be imposed. This interpretation would turn the purpose behind the 1982 Amendment on its head. 42 This conclusion follows as a practical matter from the statutory scheme. Because of the potential liability imposed on federal agencies whose actions do not comply with conditions in the Incidental Take Statement, agencies regulating land are unlikely to permit nonconforming uses of their land. For this reason, as the Supreme Court has recognized, Biological Opinions exert a powerful coercive effect in shaping the policies of the federal agencies whose actions are at issue. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169 (citations omitted). Here, for example, although ACGA theoretically could choose to disregard the Incidental Take Statements without explanation, the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service, as the action agencies, must not only articulate [their] reasons for disagreement (which ordinarily requires species and habitat investigations that are not within the action agency's expertise), but . . . [they run] a substantial risk if [their] (inexpert) reasons turn out to be wrong. Id. As the Bennett Court noted, the action agency rarely, if ever, chooses to disregard the terms and conditions of an Incidental Take Statement. In fact, the Incidental Take Statement challenged in ACGA I began by stating, [t]he measures described below are non-discretionary, and must be implemented by the agency so that they become binding conditions of any grant or permit issued to the applicant . . . . As a practical matter, if ACGA's members wish to receive grazing permits, they must comply with the terms and conditions of the Incidental Take Statements. As the district court held in ACGA II, [i]f Fish and Wildlife Service could issue an Incidental Take Statement even when a taking in violation of Section 9 was not present, those engaging in legal activities would be subjected to the terms and conditions of such statements. The court finds no authority for this result nor do we. 43