Opinion ID: 2346429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Policy Issue

Text: We have, in several cases, noted that statutes of limitations are designed to balance the competing interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and society. The plaintiff's interest is in having a reasonable time within which to determine whether he or she has suffered an actionable wrong and to bring suit. The defendant has an interest in enjoying repose after an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff, so as (1) not to be burdened in his or her defense by the loss of evidence and the fading of memories, and (2) to be able to plan for the future without the lingering uncertainty of potential liability. Society has an interest in judicial economy and also in having disputes resolved and wrongs redressed promptly. The term set in the statute represents the legislative judgment as to how that balance should be struck. See Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983); Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 453, 550 A.2d 1155, 1165 (1988); Lumsden, et al. v. Design Tech, 358 Md. 435, 442, 749 A.2d 796, 799 (2000). In Maryland, the general statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Although traditionally an action was deemed to accrue when the wrong complained of was committed (and the time allowed to file suit ran from that date), over the years this Court began chipping away at that approach and substituting instead, for particular kinds of cases, the discovery rulethat an action did not accrue until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong. Finally, in Poffenberger, supra, 290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680, we held that the discovery rule applied generally in all actions. See Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 334, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994). The discovery rule hinges on the concept of inquiry notice, which we described in Pennwalt Corp. as follows: [I]n simple terms, a plaintiff is only on inquiry notice, and thus the statute of limitations will begin to run, when the plaintiff has `knowledge of circumstances which would cause a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff[ ] to undertake an investigation which, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have led to knowledge of the alleged [tort].' O'Hara [v. Kovens], 305 Md. at 302, 503 A.2d at 1324. In such a situation, should the plaintiff fail to seek out the facts supporting a cause of action, it can fairly be said that the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on his rights. Pennwalt, supra, 314 Md. at 448-49, 550 A.2d at 1163. It is evident from this that the commencement of the limitations period is not postponed until the conclusion of the diligent investigation, but continues to run during that period. In O'Hara v. Kovens, supra, 305 Md. 280, 289, 503 A.2d 1313, 1317 (1986) we adopted this statement from Lutheran Hospital v. Levy, 60 Md.App. 227, 237, 482 A.2d 23, 27 (1984): Under the discovery rule as stated in Poffenberger limitations begin to run when a claimant gains knowledge sufficient to put her on inquiry. As of that date, she is charged with knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation. The beginning of limitations is not postponed until the end of an additional period deemed reasonable for making the investigation. In urging that Ms. Pappano was on inquiry notice upon or shortly after her husband's death, Chevy Chase points to (1) the importance which the Pappanos attached to having credit life insurance on Mr. Pappano's life, (2) her belief that such insurance was in force and therefore available to pay all or part of the loan, (3) the fact that she never received any evidence, following the loan closing, that the insurance was in force, and (4) her rather desperate financial straits, all of which, Chevy Chase contends, should have caused her to suspect right away that there was a problem and to commence an investigationan investigation that would have revealed in August, 1996 what her inquiry ultimately revealed in the Spring of 1997. Chevy Chase calls our attention to Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 501 A.2d 446 (1985), in which we faced the situation of a person who died of an asbestos-related disease before even being on inquiry notice that the illness that led to his death was caused by exposure to asbestos. His dependents filed a wrongful death action and his personal representative filed what we have traditionally termed a survival actionthe action the decedent could have brought had he survived. Both actions were filed more than three years after the decedent's death but, allegedly, within three years after the dependents and the personal representative first became aware that the decedent's illness and death were asbestos-related. The issue was whether the discovery rule permitted the actions to be filed more than three years after the decedent's deathwhether the dependents and the personal representative had the same amount of time as the decedent would have had: three years from discovery. We concluded that the answer was no. We declined to extend the statute with respect to the wrongful death action because the statute itself made death the trigger, and application of the discovery rule would be inconsistent with the statute. In light of the close connection between the two actions, we declined to apply the discovery rule to the survival action as well. Trimper does not govern this case. For one thing, we clearly limited the holding in that case to latent disease cases that are instituted initially as survival actions, id. at 50, 501 A.2d at 456, and this is not such a case. Ms. Pappano sued on her own behalf, not as a personal representative of her husband's estate nor as his dependent. There is a fair question whether Mr. Pappano's death, along with other circumstances existing at that time, served as a trigger to put Ms. Pappano on inquiry notice, but it would not act, on its own, as the commencement of the limitations period on her actions. Although Ms. Pappano now seems to acknowledge that she was on inquiry notice, with respect to Chevy Chase, when she was informed in the Spring of 1997 that no insurance existed, there is a fair question whether (1) she had sufficient information before then to put her on inquiry notice of that prospect, and (2) her seven-to ten-month delay in making inquiry of Chevy Chase was reasonable and, if not, what effect should be given to that delay. Some of the facts that might bear on those questions are not in the record before us and will need to be developed on remand. As we noted, the amounts shown on the monthly statements for insurance do not appear to match the amounts that would be payable based on the quoted premium rate for either single or joint insurance. We cannot tell from those amounts what insurance was in force, and, absent some additional evidence, we doubt that a jury could infer knowledge on Ms. Pappano's part based on those amounts. [3] As the party raising the statute of limitations, Chevy Chase bears the burden of establishing that the defense has merit. If it fails to produce sufficient evidence to support the defenseto show that Ms. Pappano was on inquiry notice before December 17, 1996the ruling must be against it.