Opinion ID: 1120165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's failure to except to the refusal to give a requested instruction.

Text: Plaintiff also contends that defendant's requested instructions and those given by the trial court were mutually exclusive instructions, and that defendant waived its right to assign as error the court's failure to give the requested instructions because it failed to except to the instructions given by the court on the subject of defendant's liability. Thus, according to plaintiff, assuming arguendo that the trial court should have given the requested instruction as contended by defendant, defendant, nonetheless, waived its right to assign this omission as error upon this appeal because it failed to except to the instructions given by the court on the subject of defendant's liability. ORS 17.510, which was in effect when this case was tried provides, in part, that: No statement of issues submitted to the jury pursuant to ORS 17.320 and no instruction given to a jury in the circuit court shall be subject to review upon appeal unless its error, if any, was pointed out to the judge who gave it and unless a notation of an exception was made in the circuit court. It shall be unnecessary to note an exception in the circuit court to any other ruling made.    (Emphasis added) That statute clearly requires exceptions in all cases in which parties seek review of instructions given by trial courts. We have held, however, that exceptions are not required under that statute in cases in which trial courts refuse to give requested instructions. Crow v. Junior Bootshops, 241 Or. 135, 141, 404 P.2d 789 (1965); Robbins v. Cons. Freightways, 276 Or. 127, 130, 554 P.2d 149 (1976). We note that ORS 17.510 has been repealed (1979 Or. Laws c. 284, § 199) and replaced by ORCP 59(H) which states: No statement of issues submitted to the jury pursuant to subsection C.(2) of this rule and no instruction given to a jury shall be subject to review upon appeal unless its error, if any, was pointed out to the judge who gave it and unless a notation of an exception is made immediately after the court instructs the jury. Any point of exception shall be particularly stated and taken down by the reporter or delivered in writing to the judge. It shall be unnecessary to note an exception in court to any other ruling made. All adverse rulings, including failure to give a requested instruction or a requested statement of issues, except those contained in instructions and statements of issues given, shall import an exception in favor of the party against whom the ruling was made. [4] (Emphasis added) In Holland v. Srs. of St. Joseph, Seeley, 270 Or. 129, 142, 522 P.2d 208, 526 P.2d 577 (1974), this court said that: The rule requiring an exception to an instruction as the means of preserving error is a salutary one, as the trial court by the exception is given the opportunity of correcting the alleged error and so advising the jury. In Crow v. Junior Bootshops, supra , we also held, however, (at 141, 404 P.2d at 792) that:    defendant requested, in writing, Number 11.01 of the Uniform Jury Instructions. This instruction is in essence that contributory negligence is a bar to recovery. It is not necessary to except to the court's failure to give a requested instruction. ORS 17.510 Ira v. Columbia Food Co., 226 Or. 566, 573, 360 P.2d 622, 86 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1961). Defendant assigned as error the trial court's failure to give the requested instruction.    In the instant case the requested instruction gave the court opportunity to rule on the issue. Thus, in Crow v. Junior Bootshops, supra , this court held that no exception was required to the failure to give a requested instruction which was directly contrary to an instruction given, so as to give the trial court an adequate opportunity to rule on the issue. Later, in Holland v. Srs. of St. Joseph, Seeley, supra , in referring to our previous decision in Crow we said: In Crow the effect of the requested instruction was to call the trial court's attention to the fact that the instruction given was erroneous and that contributory negligence was a defense to plaintiff's cause of action. In the instant case there was nothing in the requested instruction which clearly and directly called to the attention of the trial court that it was error to advise the jury that the physician's duty depended upon what a reasonably prudent physician would inform the patient. The rule requiring an exception to an instruction as the means of preserving error is a salutary one, as the trial court by the exception is given the opportunity of correcting the alleged error and so advising the jury. The conclusion of the court in Crow that the error was properly preserved by a requested instruction instead of an exception to the instruction given should not be further extended, and we have decided that it should not be applied in the instant case. 270 Or. at 141-42, 526 P.2d at 578. (Emphasis added) See also, Porter v. Headings, 270 Or. 281, 527 P.2d 403 (1974). The rule of Crow, as delineated in Holland, is a rule which should be carefully applied. We believe, however, that this is an appropriate case for application of that rule. In this case both defendant and plaintiff requested instructions upon the question of negligence. [5] We also note that prior to instructing the jury the trial court expressly noted that this issue had been raised. The court explained to both counsel: And thus based upon the pleadings, this court intends to instruct the jury very briefly that if all of the equipment had been returned to the plaintiff, and then this defendant is not responsible, and naturally if they find the plaintiff's equipment was not all returned to him, then the sole question is the question of how much he was damaged on the market value.  No discussion will be made about describing, telling the jury what bailment is or negligence or pilferage or theft or anything of that nature. No use clogging up the record any worse that (sic) it's clogged right now. (Emphasis added) Because defendant preserved this error by requesting an instruction that clearly and directly called to the attention of the trial court its error in failing to instruct the jury on the question of negligence, thus giving him an opportunity to correct that error, and because the trial court appeared to recognize that the question of the negligence had been raised by both parties and chose not to so instruct the jury on that question, we hold that the defendant, by requesting such an instruction under such circumstances, was entitled to appeal from the failure to give that instruction. It follows that the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the judgment of the trial court and that this case must be remanded for a new trial.