Opinion ID: 204284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remarks in Closing Argument

Text: In his closing argument, counsel for the plaintiff challenged the authenticity of McDonald's July 24th CAM request e-mail. He stated: Plaintiff's Counsel: I would suggest to you that they put that e-mail up there that supposedly got written by Rowland. [6] And I would suggest to you that you should think about, not conclude but think about the possibility that that document didn't get created till after Cathleen Schandelmeier got fired. Defense Counsel: Objection, your honor. Court: Overruled. Plaintiff's Counsel: And I'll tell you why you should think about it this way. Because it's contradicted by this document. It just doesn't make any sense that the last straw about discharge is out there as we've got to like discharge her and fire her and turn right over this other document two weeks earlier or a week earlier saying we've already decided to fire her. They can't have it both ways. And the other document, let's face reality. Even if it is a legit document, which I strongly suggest to you that it's not, they didn't do anything about it. The July 24th e-mail was produced to Schandelmeier during discovery. She did not seek the electronically-stored version of the e-mail. She did not object to the authenticity of the e-mail during the pretrial conference or at any other stage in the litigation. At trial, the e-mail was introduced to the jury as a joint exhibit. The Park District argues that plaintiff's counsel crossed the line from zealous advocacy to prejudicial error by suggesting to the jury that McDonald's July 24th e-mail was created after Schandelmeier was fired. Schandelmeier concedes that she had no evidence to support her counsel's insinuation. She consented to the admission of the e-mail as a joint exhibit, and she did not present any evidence to refute McDonald's testimony that she created and sent the e-mail on July 24, 2006. Instead, she contends that her counsel was free to question the legitimacy of the e-mail, even though it was admitted as a joint exhibit, so long as the argument presented was based on evidence admitted at trial. Pl. Reply Br. 36, citing Jones v. Lincoln Electric Co., 188 F.3d 709, 731 (7th Cir.1999). Because the parties presented conflicting timelines of the decision-making process, Schandelmeier argues, her counsel's closing argument was well within the bounds. Was counsel's suggestion that the July 24th e-mail had been fabricated proper? No. Should the Park District's objection been sustained? Yes. Although different witnesses told different versions of the decisionmaking process, none of the witnesses even hinted that the July 24th e-mail had been fabricated. No evidence put before the jury supported that inference. A suggestion that an opposing partyand, by extension, its counselhas put forth falsified evidence is very different from (and much more serious than) a contention that one witness's version of events has a better factual foundation and thus is more likely to be true than another witness's version of the same events, or that one document is inconsistent with another. Contrary to Schandelmeier's description of her counsel's argument, what the jury heard in closing argument was not founded upon and justified by inconsistent testimony presented by the Park District in connection with the alleged creation and intent of that e-mail. Pl. Reply Br. 39. It was a baseless argument created from whole cloth by plaintiff's counsel, regarding an exhibit that plaintiff had stipulated was authentic and admissible. The argument was improper, and the Park District's objection should have been sustained. But the inappropriate suggestion that the e-mail was fabricated did not rise to a level of error that made it an abuse of discretion to deny the motion for a new trial. We have stated repeatedly that improper comments during closing argument rarely amount to reversible error. E.g., Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir.2008), citing Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir.1997). We presume that curative instructions to the jury mitigate harm that may otherwise result from improper comments during sometimes heated closing argument. See Soltys, 520 F.3d at 744, citing Jones, 188 F.3d at 732. Here, the jury was instructed that closing arguments by counsel were not evidence: The lawyers' opening statements and closing arguments to you are not evidence. Their purpose is to discuss the issues and the evidence. If the evidence as you remember it differs from what the lawyers said, your memory is what counts. Again, we presume that juries follow the instructions they are given. See Chlopek, 499 F.3d at 702. There is no indication that this jury was unwilling or unable to follow the court's instruction not to treat closing argument as evidence. Although plaintiff's counsel's commentary regarding the July 24th e-mail was improper, it was not so unfairly prejudicial as to require a new trial.