Opinion ID: 46216
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pope’s Arguments on Appeal

Text: As noted, the district court held that “the good faith exception applies to the... search warrant,” i.e., a reasonably well-trained officer would not have known that the information provided in Baird’s affidavit was stale, given the state district judge’s authorization. In its conclusions of law, the district court noted the exceptional circumstances in which the good faith exception does not apply, including, i. when the magistrate or state judge issues a warrant in reliance on a deliberately false affidavit; ii. when the magistrate or state judge abandons his or her judicial role and fails to perform in a neutral and detached fashion; iii. when the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render an officer’s belief in it unreasonable; and 9 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 10 Id.; accord United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2003). 11 Leon, 468 U.S. at 918. 7 iv. when the warrant is so facially deficient that it fails to particularize the place to be searched or the items to be seized.12 On appeal, Pope contends that both the first and third of these exceptions to the good faith exception should apply in this case. She argues that Baird’s affidavit was “recklessly false” because (1) he failed to disclose to the state district judge that the “real purpose” for seeking the warrant was to find evidence of a meth lab, and (2) no well-trained officer reasonably would believe that probable cause existed —— based on a ten-dollar prescriptiondrug purchase —— to seize any of the items listed in the search warrant. She also argues that the affidavit on which the first search warrant was based was “bare bones,” i.e., “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render an officer’s belief in it unreasonable.”