Opinion ID: 1957350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether glasper's trial counsel was inadequate and ineffective.

Text: ¶ 38. Glasper claims that his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to file critical motions, failed to subject the State's case to a meaningful adversarial setting, and failed to investigate all of the information relating to his innocence, thus depriving him of a fair trial as guaranteed under our state and federal constitutions. In addressing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the familiar standard established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We have had numerous occasions in the past to address similar claims and apply the Strickland criteria. We recently stated: The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... .... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. (citation omitted) ... A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Defense counsel is presumed competent. Id. Then, to determine the second prong of prejudice to the defense, the standard is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). This means a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id.       There is no constitutional right then to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant just has right to have competent counsel). Puckett v. State, 879 So.2d 920, 935-36 (Miss.2004) (quoting from Brown v. State, 798 So.2d 481, 493-94 (Miss.2001)). ¶ 39. Applying the Strickland criteria as we discussed in Puckett, we now consider Glasper's claims of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Glasper asserts that [i]t appears that [he] did not receive a timely initial appearance, and that his trial attorney should have therefore filed a motion to dismiss, or at the very least, a motion for Glasper to be released from incarceration. Glasper also asserts that the failure to provide a timely initial appearance should have been argued by his trial counsel to the trial court as an additional ground on which to suppress the confessions. Additionally, Glasper claims that the trial record does not reflect that his trial counsel filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thus, Glasper alleges that his trial counsel's failure to file these critical motions resulted in his trial counsel's rendering ineffective assistance. In his claim that his trial counsel did not subject the State to an adversarial setting, Glasper again asserts that his lawyer (1) failed to inform the trial court of Glasper's not receiving a timely initial appearance to the trial court's attention, (2) failed to question witnesses about inconsistencies in their out-of-court statements as compared to their in-court testimony, and (3) failed to learn the facts surrounding Glasper's arrest on the voyeurism charge. Finally, Glasper asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective due to his failure to investigate to the extent necessary to learn the names and whereabouts of potential witnesses who would have been beneficial to Glasper's case. ¶ 40. We first note that while Glasper refers us to Strickland and various decisions from this Court for the appropriate criteria we are to consider in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Glasper has wholly failed to cite to us a single case to support his specific claims of ineffectiveness of his trial counsel by allegedly failing to file critical motions, failing to invoke the adversarial process, and failing to investigate. Our cases are legion where we have stated that the failure to cite authority in support of an argument eliminates our obligation to review the issue. Byrom v. State, 863 So.2d 836, 863 (Miss.2003) (citing Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452, 487 (Miss.2001), and Williams v. State, 708 So.2d 1358, 1362-63 (Miss.1998)). Thus this issue is procedurally barred; however, procedural bar notwithstanding, we briefly discuss Glasper's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Succinctly stated, they are wholly without merit. We have already discussed in Issue III, supra, the initial appearance issue. Suffice it to state here that since Glasper confessed to these crimes within twenty-four hours of his arrest, well within the 48-hour period specified in URCCC 6.03, it is highly unlikely that the trial court would have given any serious consideration to suppressing these confessions because of the fact that Glasper had not been provided an initial appearance prior to his confessions. Also, given the nature of the charges, the possibility of pre-trial bail was most likely non-existent, and there was certainly no basis for the granting of a motion to dismiss. ¶ 41. While we acknowledge that the most experienced criminal defense attorney is not incapable of rendering ineffective assistance in any particular case, we note here that Glasper had a very experienced criminal defense attorney whose performance in this case is well beyond the realm of ineffectiveness. Glasper's trial attorney, inter alia (1) filed in excess of twenty pre-trial motions; (2) vigorously attacked the confessions via a motion to suppress, resulting in a lengthy suppression hearing; (3) effectively cross-examined the State's witnesses, including the expert witnesses; (4) made appropriate objections during the trial; (5) submitted proper jury instructions, objected to certain jury instructions submitted by the State, and suggested revisions to some of the State's proposed instructions; and, (6) made effective closing arguments in both phases of the trial. We likewise cannot overlook the obvious  the impassioned plea of Glasper's trial attorney during the closing arguments of the sentencing phase of the trial most likely saved Glasper's life. After deliberating on the sentence as to the capital murder conviction, the jury returned a verdict which stated, We, the jury, are unable to agree unanimously on punishment on Count I. After the reading of the verdict in open court, the trial judge inquired of the jury, Is this a unanimous verdict? The jury members responded in unison, [y]es. ¶ 42. Likewise, we have thoroughly examined the record for any indication that Glasper's trial attorney failed to subject the State to an adversarial setting, as asserted by Glasper, and we are simply unable to find anything in the record to undergird this assertion. Glasper also alleges numerous instances of his trial counsel's failure to take further action to investigate facts, seek out witnesses, and uncover inconsistencies in witness statements. We can best address these assertions by again stating that there is nothing in Strickland, or any of our decisions, which states that a criminal defendant is entitled to a lawyer who will try a perfect case and commit no error. While we have not discussed here each and every allegation of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, as set out by Glasper, we have considered them and find them to be without merit. All of this having been said, we find that Glasper has wholly failed to convince us that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Without question, Glasper has failed to demonstrate that his trial attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of his case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This issue is without merit.