Opinion ID: 785862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Virgin Islands Statutory Scheme Prior to 1998

Text: 22 Section 462, on its face, is self-executing. If the putative father acts to acknowledge his paternity in a certain manner, the child is deemed to be legitimate without the necessity of a judicial proceeding. That this literal reading was the intended one is confirmed by the legislative history of § 462 and the Virgin Islands case law. 23 The Revision Note for § 462 in the Virgin Islands Code indicated that § 462 was based upon § 230 of the Civil Code of California, which has since been repealed. See 1975 Cal. Repealed Stat. 1244 § 8, at 3196. The Virgin Islands Territorial Court has recognized this history and has interpreted § 462 by reference to cases interpreting the California statute. See In re Williams, 16 V.I. 529, 532-33 (V.I.Terr.Ct.1979) (Section 462 is based on and is virtually identical to section 230 of the Civil Code of California.... Consequently, the court turns to the cases interpreting the California statute because in the Virgin Islands the language of a Virgin Islands statute which has been taken from the statutes of another jurisdiction is to be construed to mean what the highest court of the jurisdiction from which it was taken had, prior to its enactment in the Virgin Islands, construed it to mean.) (footnote omitted). 24 California's Court of Appeal has explained the purpose behind § 230 as follows: 25 Thus, section 230, in providing that the father of an illegitimate child adopts his offspring by publicly acknowledging it as his own, uses the term adopts in the sense of legitimates and the effect of the father's act ... is to change the status and capacity of an illegitimate child to the status and capacity of a child born in Lawful wedlock. In re Navarro, [175 P.2d 896, 898 (1946)]; Blythe v. Ayres, [31 P. 915, 916 (Cal.1892)]. 26 The purpose of the code section is to permit the father to make reparation to the child by taking it into his home without the publicity which would be incidental to a judicial proceeding of adoption. As stated by the code commissioners, the publicity of a judicial proceeding (see [Cal.] Civil Code, § 221 et seq.) would brand the child with the very stigma from which a repentant father would desire to save it. 27 Darwin v. Ganger, 174 Cal.App.2d 63, 344 P.2d 353, 358 (1959). According to Darwin, California therefore provided for two methods of legitimation: judicial proceedings under one section of the California Civil Code or a course of conduct under § 230. Id. 28 The Virgin Islands had a similar legislative scheme. As recognized in In re Baby Girl Lake, 33 V.I. 66 (V.I.Terr.Ct.1995): 29 In the Virgin Islands, an illegitimate child can be legitimized in four ways: by public acknowledgment of the child by the father (V.I.Code Ann. tit. 16, § 462 (1964)); by the father signing a notarized affidavit acknowledging paternity (V.I.Code Ann. tit. 19, § 832 (1976)); by a court order establishing paternity upon the petition of the mother or the father (V.I.Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 291-303 (1964 & Supp.1995)); or by the marriage of the parents (V.I.Code Ann. tit. 16, § 461 (1964)). 30 Id. at -. 31 In 1998, the Virgin Islands legislature repealed 16 V.I.C. §§ 461, 462. See 1998 V.I. Sess. Laws 6228 § 18, at 318. But the very scheme discussed in Darwin, whereby an individual could be legitimated through judicial paternity proceedings or through a course of conduct by the putative father (saving both the parent and child from the publicity of a judicial proceeding) was present in the Virgin Islands with respect to 16 V.I.C. §§ 291-303 and 16 V.I.C. § 462, respectively, before the 1998 changes by the Virgin Islands legislature. 32 Darwin therefore suggests that it was no accident that California's § 230 (or the Virgin Islands's § 462) made no mention of judicial proceedings being necessary to procure any right under that statute. Section 462 provided a means by which a child will be deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth once a certain course of conduct had been met by the putative father. 33 We think it clear that if § 462 had not been repealed and Tyler were able to establish that Francis acknowledged her in the required manner, she would be deemed his legitimate child and would participate as such in the distribution of intestate assets under 15 V.I.C. § 84. 34 Contrary to the suggestion of the Territorial Court, the Paternity Statute would not have foreclosed Tyler because § 462 and paternity proceedings under Title 16, Chapter 11 of the Virgin Islands Code were alternative remedies prior to 1998. 35 Contrary to the suggestion of the Appellate Division, 15 V.I.C. § 84(13) would not have foreclosed Tyler because that subsection applies only to an illegitimate child. Other portions of § 84 prescribe the inheritance rights of legitimate children, including a child who must be deemed for all purposes legitimate under § 462. As the California Supreme Court has explained with respect to their analogous statute, § 230, and a California probate statute providing for distribution to illegitimates, the two sections provide alternate methods by which a person may become the heir of his father. In re Garcia's Estate, 34 Cal.2d 419, 210 P.2d 841, 842 (Ca.1949). A child who is `deemed for all purposes legitimate' cannot be regarded as still illegitimate for some purposes, and a child who has become legitimate can no longer be regarded as an `illegitimate child.' Id. The independence of § 462 from the paternity proceedings authorized by § 295 and referenced in § 84(13) is reflected in the Virgin Islands case law. While § 462 was self-executing and legitimation thereunder came solely as a result of the conduct of the father, the Virgin Islands courts found implicit authority in that section for judicial proceedings seeking a declaration that legitimation had indeed occurred. Such proceedings were regarded by the Virgin Islands courts, however, to be a remedy distinct from paternity proceedings. In In re Estate of Moolenaar, 24 V.I. 234 (V.I.Terr.Ct.1989), for example, the petitioner sought to share in the intestate distribution of her putative father's assets. She asked that the court adjudicate the paternity of her putative father so that she might share under § 84(13) and, alternatively, that the estate administrator be ordered to acknowledge her earlier legitimation under § 462. The court read § 84(13) and the then-current paternity statute as depriving it of jurisdiction to adjudicate the paternity of a putative father after his death. This conclusion did not, however, dispose of the petitioner's § 462 claim, which the court disposed of on its merits: 36 A careful analysis of § 462 indicates that for legitimation by acknowledgment, as this section is headed, to take place, or for legitimation from the time of birth of the child to take place, as stated in the body of the section, the decedent, during his lifetime, must have acknowledged said child as his own by doing all of three things: (a) he must have publicly acknowledged it as his natural child; (b) he must have received it as his natural child, with the consent of his wife, if married, into his family; and (c) he must have otherwise treated claimant as if claimant was a legitimate child. 37