Opinion ID: 2459998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Action Against Shelter

Text: Appellant makes an identical argument with regard to his claim for breach of implied contract against Shelter. Appellant asserts that his action against Shelter is one based upon a contract implied in law, as opposed to one implied in fact, because Shelter did not fulfill its statutory duty by making underinsured motorist coverage available to him. Without reaching the issue of whether the action against Shelter is barred by the statute of limitations, we affirm the trial court's ruling on the basis that Appellant did not present proof of a material element of his claim. At the time that Appellant obtained his insurance policy with Shelter, section 23-89-209(a) provided in pertinent part: Every insurer writing automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicles in this state shall make underinsured motorist coverage available to the named insured[.] To sustain his action against Shelter, Appellant must prove that Shelter failed to fulfill its duty under section 23-89-209 to make underinsured motorist coverage available to him at the time he took out his policy with Shelter. It is the act of failing to inform an insured about the availability of underinsured motorist coverage that triggers the trial court's implying such coverage by operation of law. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Irvin, 309 Ark. 331, 831 S.W.2d 135 (1992); see also Colonia Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 325 Ark. 300, 924 S.W.2d 808 (1996). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that Shelter did not fulfill its duty to make such coverage available to him pursuant to section 23-89-209. In fact, Appellant conceded in his deposition that Shelter did comply with the statutory requirements. When asked by Shelter's counsel if he had previously known about the existence of underinsured motorist insurance, Appellant indicated that he was aware of that type of coverage, but that Bledsoe had told him about it anyway. Thus, Appellant has admitted that Shelter fulfilled its statutory duty by informing him of the existence and availability of underinsured motorist coverage. This court has recognized that summary judgment is proper when an appellant fails to present proof of a material element of his claim. Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 Ark. 228, 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992). We have recently held that where a plaintiff makes a pivotal admission that goes to the heart of the case, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Sublett v. Hipps, 330 Ark. 58, 65, 952 S.W.2d 140, 144 (1997). Accordingly, because Appellant's own words contradict the very basis of his claim against Shelter, we conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that Shelter was entitled to summary judgment. We will affirm the ruling of the trial court if it reached the right result, even though it may have been for a different reason. Nettleton Sch. Dist. v. Owens, 329 Ark. 367, 948 S.W.2d 94 (1997). Affirmed.