Opinion ID: 885764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due process and fundamental rights

Text: ¶ 41 Under Article II, Section 17, the Montana Constitution provides that No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. ¶ 42 As a starting point, it is safe to say that in purportedly protecting the due process rights of an individual subject to an involuntary commitment proceedingwhereby counsel typically has less than 24 hours to prepare for a hearing on a State petition that seeks to sever or infringe upon the individual's relations with family, friends, physicians, and employment for three months or longer [6] our legal system of judges, lawyers, and clinicians has seemingly lost its way in vigilantly protecting the fundamental rights of such individuals. See In re Mental Health of L.C.B. (1992), 253 Mont. 1, 7, 830 P.2d 1299, 1303 (stating that courts must safeguard the due process rights of the individual involved at every stage of the proceedings); In re J.B. (1985), 217 Mont. 504, 511, 705 P.2d 598, 603 (stating that the discharge of judicial responsibility includes rigorous application of statutory mandates) (Morrison, J., dissenting). ¶ 43 In the case sub judice, for example, the public defender appointed to represent K.G.F. had, from the close of the initial appearance to the commencement of the commitment hearing, at best four or five working hoursamidst his usual case load of criminal mattersto prepare for what can only be described as a perfunctory process that lasted minutes. ¶ 44 Our Legislature has, however, expressly provided that an individual who may be suffering from a mental disorder and who, as a result, may be involuntarily committed must be afforded care and treatment that fully respects that person's dignity and personal integrity. See § 53-21-101(1), MCA. Once admitted to a mental health facility, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a patient has the right to privacy and dignity, under § 53-21-142(1), MCA. These legislative mandates, in turn, invoke fundamental rights under our state constitution. ¶ 45 Respect for a person's dignity invokes Article II, Section 4, under this state's constitution, which provides that dignity of the human being is inviolable. See Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, ¶ 72, 296 Mont. 361, ¶ 72, 989 P.2d 364, ¶ 72 (stating that [r]espect for the dignity of each individuala fundamental right, protected by Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitutiondemands that people have for themselves the moral right and moral responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives and the intrinsic value of life in general, answering to their own consciences and convictions). ¶ 46 One example of respect for a patient-respondent's dignity, as provided by the Legislature under Title 53, Chapter 21, is the requirement that the person has a right to be dressed in the person's own clothes at any hearing held pursuant to this part. See § 53-21-115(10), MCA. Implicit under Title 53, Chapter 21, is also the notion that the hearing shall be conducted in court, not in a mental health facility, which enhances the dignity afforded to the individual. See §§ 53-21-115(2) and 116, MCA (respondent has the right to be present in any hearing or trial); § 53-21-119(2), MCA (affording respondent the right to waive presence at hearing and indicating an alternative location for a hearing in surroundings familiar to the respondent may be appropriate). [7] ¶ 47 In Armstrong, this Court identified an individual's medical decisions affecting bodily integrity as a fundamental right under the personal autonomy component of the constitutional right to privacy set out in Article II, Section 10, of the Montana Constitution. See Armstrong, ¶ 39. Respect for a patient-respondent's medical-decision personal autonomy has likewise been expressed by our Legislature under § 53-21-115(11) and (12), MCA, which provide that a person has the right to either refuse or voluntarily take medications prior to any hearing, and the right to be examined by a professional person of the respondent's choice, under §§ 53-21-115(9) and 53-21-124(3), MCA. ¶ 48 That these fundamental constitutional rights are at issue during all phases of the involuntary commitment process, including prior to a hearing when counsel is either appointed or obtained, is self evident. Thus, we agree that the [q]uality counsel provides the most likely wayperhaps the only likely way to ensure the due process protection of dignity and privacy interests in cases such as the one at bar. See Perlin, at 47. ¶ 49 Therefore, in reviewing the procedural circumstances set forth here for whether K.G.F. was afforded effective assistance of counsel, we must address the obvious systemic failure of the involuntary civil commitment hearing process itself. In doing so, we emphasize that what follows is not meant as a per se indictment of the individual counsel here or appointed counsel in these matters in general; nor is it a tacit censure of the individual professionals involved, who undoubtedly have sound therapeutic objectives in mind. Rather, our aim is on the failure of the system as a whole, one that through the ordinary course of the efficient administration of a legal process threatens to supplant an individual's due process rights that serve to safeguard the fundamental liberty interests discussed thus far. ¶ 50 Accordingly, while we may draw from the collective jurisprudence of both federal and other state's decisions and statutes, as well as an array of thoughtful commentary by scholars and practitioners, we must nevertheless articulate a guiding standard that comports with Montana's unique constitutional and statutory framework, one that protects the fundamental rights of individuals whose liberty is placed at issue by State action.