Opinion ID: 2336032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Framing the issue

Text: In Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute we established that commitment-order appeals based on assertions of insufficient evidence are moot if the commitment period has passed, subject to the public interest exception. [8] Because Joan's post-release appeal from the superior court's commitment order is based on an assertion of insufficient evidence and neither Joan nor the State discussed mootness in their original briefs, we ordered supplemental briefing on that issue. In her supplemental briefing, Joan suggests we should overrule Wetherhorn because it mistakenly focused on release from commitment, rather than vacating the commitment order, as the relief sought in a commitment-order appeal. She also argues the public interest exception to mootness applies because [u]nless this court reviews commitment orders for sufficiency of the evidence, the masters and trial court judges hearing these cases will have no standards by which to measure the cases before them. Finally, she argues that we should adopt the collateral consequences exception to mootness in commitment-order appeals. The State responds that Wetherhorn mandates dismissal of Joan's appeal as moot because: (1) the public interest exception to mootness does not apply; and (2) Joan has not established any actual collateral consequences resulting from her commitment order. We ordered oral argument on the mootness question, directing that the parties be prepared to discuss the authority and appropriateness of issuing a vacatur order to remedy possible collateral consequences arising from an otherwise-moot commitment order. [9]