Opinion ID: 2638571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: About the event.

Text: R.G. evaded testimony with the I don't want to talk about it response to questions directed at the core of the prosecution's case. 5 VRP at 633-36. The end of the State's direct examination is most illustrative: Q Now, [R.G.], I want to ask you one more time, and if you don't want to talk about it, just tell you me [sic]. You don't want to talk about it? A Okay. Q There's a lot of people that want to know what happened. I want you to tell us who it is was [sic] that touched you in a bad way. A I don't want to talk about it. Q Okay. Fair enough. [R.G.], I don't have any other questions. I'm done. 5 VRP at 639. Not only was the jury deprived the opportunity to hear the answer to that question, unquestionably relevant to establish Grasso's guilt or innocence, but the failure to provide a responsive answer to a question about the event undeniably violates the confrontation clause. See Clark, 139 Wash.2d at 161, 985 P.2d 377. R.G. could very easily have given an exculpatory response, one which the jury had a right to hear and rely upon, much to the prejudice of the accused. The plurality however elects to view R.G.'s testimony through a lens of make-believe as if the I don't want to talk about it exchanges never happened. It cites two reasons for doing so: (1) the prosecutor gave R.G. the alternative of testifying she did not know or could not remember the answer to the question, and (2) R.G. never testified I don't want to talk about it to any questions posed on cross-examination. Plurality at 867-868. The plurality hinges its conclusion primarily on the second factor. Id. ( Most importantly, R.G. did not answer, `I don't want to talk about it' to any of the questions posed on cross-examination. (first emphasis added)). But Rohrich undercuts this rationale. There we held the confrontation clause's indispensable component of cross-examination requires the State to elicit the damaging testimony from the witness so the defendant may cross-examine if he so chooses. Rohrich, 132 Wash.2d at 478, 939 P.2d 697 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Indeed, the defense in Rohrich elected not to cross-examine the State's witness at all, yet we still found the prosecution's failure to ask pertinent questions on direct violated the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. Id. at 474, 939 P.2d 697. Shifting the burden back to the defense to extract such damaging testimony puts the defendant in `a constitutionally impermissible Catch-22' of calling the child for direct or waiving his confrontation rights, id. at 478, 939 P.2d 697 (quoting Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 771-72 (5th Cir.1993)). Therefore that R.G. never stated I don't want to talk about it to a question on cross-examination has no bearing whatsoever on whether the prosecution properly conducted its direct examination. The second reason the plurality employs to accept the remainder of R.G.'s testimony is the prosecution's submitted alternatives that R.G. could respond by stating she did not know or could not remember the answer. Plurality at 867. The plurality states the prosecutor was careful to clarify which response R.G. intended. Id. Although I would characterize the questions as more leading than clarifying, even so, these purported alternatives certainly did not mitigate the error since the jury was deprived of hearing a substantive response in lieu of I don't want to talk about it.