Opinion ID: 2760889
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: discovery violation issues

Text: Appellant next claims that he was deprived of a fair trial because the Commonwealth failed to make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence contained in (1) the medical report prepared by Alicia Cook in connection with her physical examination of Helen; and (2) Helen's prior statements that Appellant had raped her on multiple occasions. 8 Appellant frames this issue as violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under Brady and its progeny, a defendant's due process rights are violated when the prosecution fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense, regardless of the prosecution's good or bad faith. Id. at 87; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Impeachment evidence is included within the scope of exculpatory evidence that is subject to Brady. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). However, the disclosure requirement applies only to those cases in which the government possesses information that the defense does not. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Ky. 2002). Further, Brady applies only to the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.' Id., (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103) (emphasis added). In other words, Brady and its progeny address situations in which a defendant goes through a trial unaware of the availability of exculpatory information withheld by the prosecution. Here however, Appellant became aware of Cook's report and the victim's prior inconsistent statement either before or during his trial, and so Brady is not directly implicated. Instead, RCr 7.24 is the controlling authority which will guide our review of the issues presented in this argument. This rule broadly requires, among other things, the prosecution to provide a defendant with disclosure of information in its possession which is material to his defense. RCr 7.24(9) provides the remedy: 9 If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may direct such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as may be just under the circumstances. [A] trial court generally has broad discretion under RCr 7.24(9) to impose an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation. Jones v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Ky. 2007). With these principles in mind we now address the two areas of alleged discovery violations raised by Appellant.
In connection with the rape investigation, Cook examined Helen and prepared a report that was subject to the trial court's pre-trial discovery order. Despite earlier claims of the Commonwealth that no medical report existed, one week before the trial, defense counsel was given a copy of Cook's three-page report. 6 The late disclosure prompted Appellant to move to suppress the report and to prohibit Cook from testifying. To resolve the pending motion, and apparently to ascertain the tenor of Cook's anticipated testimony, on the second day of trial the court allowed the parties to examine Cook outside the presence of the jury. It was at that point that Cook revealed a fact she had omitted from the written report: the victim's hymen was intact and undamaged, although other indications of vaginal trauma were present. Cook agreed that her observations were consistent with 6 The Commonwealth asserts that it was unaware of the report's existence until a week before the trial at which time it promptly supplied the report to defense counsel. 10 Helen's claim of being raped once. Cook further admitted that the intact hymen made it possible that Helen was a virgin and unlikely that she had been raped on multiple occasions as she claimed at trial. After Cook's in camera testimony, the Commonwealth elected not to call her as a witness. Appellant promptly withdrew his objection to Cook's testimony and instead elected to call her as a witness for the defense. He now argues that these late disclosures prevented him: 1) from getting his own expert on the possibility of rape despite the intact hymen; 2) from examining the jury on the subject during the voir dire stage; and 3) discussing those facts in his opening statement. Instead, defense counsel was left between a rock and hard place: he could ask for a mistrial and a continuance to better prepare a defense based upon the recent disclosure, which would further prolong Appellant's pretrial incarceration; or, he could make the best of the evidentiary turn by using the newly discovered information to his best advantage. Appellant chose the latter. We appreciate the difficult and stressful challenges that trial attorneys face in even the best of circumstances, and we recognize the difficulties presented when sudden disclosures change the evidentiary landscape. When late disclosures are caused by an opposing party, whether from excusable neglect or deliberate deception, we must be attentive to remedy any injustice that results. But, by parsing out the particulars of Appellant's argument, we come to the conclusion that no violation occurred here. 11 The central point of Appellant's claim is that he was prejudiced because he was not told prior to trial that the physical examination of the victim disclosed an intact hymen. There is, however, no indication that the Commonwealth was aware of the fact any sooner than Appellant. The Commonwealth claims that it, too, was caught off-guard when, on the second day of the trial, Cook first mentioned it. The Commonwealth's sudden decision not to call Cook as its witness tends to support that claim of ignorance. The rules for discovery in criminal cases do not require the Commonwealth to disclose information it does not have. RCr 7.24. To establish a due process violation based upon a failure to disclose exculpatory information, it must be shown that the prosecutor, in good faith or bad, knew of the evidence and failed to disclose it. Nunley v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Ky. 2013). The prosecution was under no obligation or affirmative duty to acquire that information. Appellant's claim that he was prejudiced by a late disclosure of the medical report is unavailing because the exculpatory evidence he complains about was not in the written report. Having the report sooner would not have prevented the dilemma he faced at trial. In summary, we find no grounds upon which Cook's testimony or the late disclosure of her medical report would warrant reversal. Under the circumstances before us, we are simply unable to discern any error in the trial court's rulings relating to the medical report or to Cook's testimony. 12
As previously noted, Helen made conflicting statements about the number of times Appellant had raped her. She told the 911 operator that it happened' like three times. On several other occasions before trial, including in her grand jury testimony, she said Appellant had raped her only one time. At trial, she testified that Appellant had raped her so many times in fact that she lost count. At trial, the Commonwealth conceded that it had known for several weeks prior to trial that Helen had made numerous inconsistent statements about the number of times Appellant had raped her. Based upon the failure to disclose that information prior to trial, Appellant moved for a mistrial. The trial court agreed that the prosecution should have disclosed that information, but it nevertheless denied Appellant's motion. The trial court reasoned that Appellant was aware of Helen's statement to the 911 dispatcher and therefore was on notice prior to trial that the victim had previously claimed that Appellant had raped her more than one time. We agree with the trial court. Under the present circumstances, where Appellant was aware of and was able to impeach the witness on her inconsistent statements, the failure of the Commonwealth to disclose all of the known occasions upon which the victim made similar inconsistent claims did not result in a manifest necessity for a mistrial. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 386, 402 (Ky. 2010) (A party must make a clear showing of manifest necessity for a mistrial, and we review a trial court's denial of a 13 motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion). Appellant was able at trial to impeach the victim's testimony by cross-examining her upon her multiple prior inconsistent statements that there had been only one sexual assault. A manifest necessity occurs only when the error is of such character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way [except by grant of a mistrial]. Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1996). While the Commonwealth's failure to disclose all of the known occasions upon which the victim made inconsistent statements relevant to the crime was a violation of RCr 7.24, the error did not result in the level of prejudice required to establish a manifest necessity to terminate the proceedings. In summary, we are unpersuaded that the delayed production of the medical examination report and the victim's inconsistent statement were errors such as would require the reversal of Appellant's conviction and sentence. V. EXCLUSION OF JUVENILE COURT PETITION AGAINST VICTIM DID NOT DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by prohibiting him from introducing into evidence a juvenile court petition relating to Helen that was filed by her mother. The petition charged that Helen was beyond control of her parents because she was not following the rules of household and was attempting to date an eighteen-year old boy against her parents' will. The trial court ruled that the juvenile court pleading could not be introduced into 14 evidence because it was hearsay. On appeal, Appellant frames this argument as a denial of his right to present a defense. The defense that Appellant sought to present was that Helen had fabricated the allegations against him as retaliation for his disapproval of her desire to date an older boy. The juvenile court petition asserted that [Helen] will not obey the household rules, said juvenile has been communicating with over 18 years old [sic]; social workers have been investigated [sic] said case and requested that the family file beyond control. Appellant wanted to introduce the report to corroborate his claim that the victim had, indeed, been dating an older boy, thereby lending credence to his theory about her motive to lie about being raped. There is no doubt that the petition is an out-of-court statement that Appellant sought to use as evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted in the petition. The statement was clearly hearsay. KRE 801(c). Under the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution, an accused has a right to present a complete and meaningful defense. Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 624-25 (Ky., 2010). An exclusion of evidence will almost invariably be declared unconstitutional when it significantly undermine[s] fundamental elements of the defendant's defense. Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 206-07 (Ky. 2003) (citation and internal quotation omitted). But the right to present a defense does not abrogate the rules of evidence. [T]he defendant's interest in the challenged evidence must be weighed against the interest the evidentiary rule is meant to serve, and only if application of the rule would be arbitrary in the particular case or 15 disproportionate to the state's legitimate interest must the rule bow to the defendant's right. McPherson v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 207, 214 (Ky. 2012) (citations omitted); Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63, 85-86 (Ky. 2013). In weighing Appellant's evidentiary interest in the juvenile court pleading against the jurisprudential interests served by the hearsay rule, we are satisfied that the trial court's application of the hearsay rule was neither arbitrary, nor was it disproportionate to the state's legitimate interest in the enforcement of this most basic and fundamental rule of evidence. Moreover, since the evidentiary content of the juvenile court document that Appellant wanted to introduce consisted entirely of statements made by Helen's mother, Appellant could have simply called her as a witness and examined her on the subject, thereby obtaining the same evidence in a manner that was consistent with, not in derogation of, our rules of evidence. In the alternative, Appellant now asserts for the first time, that the evidence was admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for business and/or public records exception. See Combs v. Stortz, 276 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Ky. App. 2009) (KRE 803(6), (8), and (10) provide hearsay exceptions for records which are maintained by businesses and public agencies. Those rules require that minimal foundation be laid for the introduction of such records when self-authenticated under KRE 902.) Appellant failed to assert this ground for admissibility at trial, and so may not raise this theory for the first time on appeal. See Kennedy v. 16 Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976) (overruled on other grounds by Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321 (Ky. 2010)). Moreover, Helen's brother testified that Helen had animosity toward Appellant because of his opposition to her boyfriend, and that she had threatened to have Appellant put in jail if she was not allowed to date. Furthermore, a juvenile court worker testified that the beyond-parental-control petition had been filed. Consequently, we are satisfied that Appellant was not deprived of the opportunity to present his defense.