Opinion ID: 2536327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecutor's Remarks and Closing Argument

Text: Mosley first argues that several comments made by the prosecutor at various stages of the proceedings were improper. These comments fell into four categories: (1) comments inviting the jury to compare the worth of the victims' lives to the worth of Mosley's life; (2) comments that made Mosley's other bad acts a feature of the trial; (3) golden rule comments asking the jurors to put themselves in the victims' shoes; and (4) comments suggesting that the prosecutor's office had prescreened the case and found that the death sentence was appropriate. [10] For the following reasons, we deny this claim. Aside from one objection to an alleged golden rule comment, defense counsel did not object to most of the statements that Mosley now contests. Accordingly, as this Court has held: [F]ailing to raise a contemporaneous objection when improper closing argument comments are made waives any claim concerning such comments for appellate review. The sole exception to the general rule is where the unobjected-to comments rise to the level of fundamental error, which has been defined as error that reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. Simpson v. State, 3 So.3d 1135, 1146 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 898-99 (Fla.2000)), petition for cert. filed, No. 08-10414 (U.S. May 11, 2009). None of the unobjected-to comments that Mosley points to, whether considered individually or collectively, rise to the level of fundamental error. Additionally, while Mosley did object to one closing argument, we find that this comment does not merit reversal when considered both individually and cumulatively with any other allegedly improper comment. In the first category of allegedly improper statements which we address, Mosley claims that the prosecutor asked the jurors to weigh the comparative value of Mosley's life versus the victims' lives. We have reviewed the comments alleged to be improper and conclude that none of the comments compared the victims' lives to Mosley's life or invited the jury to place a value on the victims' lives. Therefore, there is no error, much less fundamental error, as to this subissue. In the next category of alleged errors, Mosley claims that the prosecutor improperly made his prior bad acts a feature of the case. In this regard, he points to the prosecutor's comments about the defendant driving around with other people's driver's licenses in his car and comments about the defendant's extramarital affairs when the prosecutor stated in closing argument that Mosley had girlfriends all over the place. This claim must also fail because no improper arguments were made. In fact, it was Mosley's counsel who referenced this evidence first by informing the jury in opening statement that Mosley was having three extramarital affairs as follows: [Y]es, he was having an affair, but not just one, more than one affair. He was having an affair with Lynda Wilkes. He was having an affair with Alesha Jackson and he was having an affair with Jamila Jones, unfortunately all while he was married, and that's why we talked about it because those things don't make him a murderer. The prosecutor during closing statements briefly referred to this same evidence, disputing Mosley's claim that he was leading a normal life at the time of the crime because he had girlfriends all over the place. Likewise, with regard to the driver's license, Mosley attempted to show that the person whose driver's license was found in Mosley's vehicle might have been the actual perpetrator of the crime. That theme was part of the defense argument made in closing that the police never followed up on this other possible suspect whose driver's license was found in the vehicle. This argument gave rise to the State's rebuttal argument that the police investigated this driver's license but that person had nothing to do with the case and this just showed that Mosley was driving around with other people's licenses in his car. Clearly, the State acted within permissible bounds as to both arguments. See, e.g., Walls v. State, 926 So.2d 1156, 1166 (Fla.2006) (A prosecutor's comments are not improper where they fall into the category of an `invited response' by the preceding argument of defense counsel concerning the same subject.). In the third category of allegedly improper comments, Mosley claims that the prosecutor advanced an improper golden rule argument at trial. Golden rule arguments are arguments that invite the jurors to place themselves in the victim's position during the crime and imagine the victim's suffering. See, e.g., Merck v. State, 975 So.2d 1054, 1062 (Fla.2007) (defining golden rule arguments), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 73, 172 L.Ed.2d 66 (2008); Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 812-13 (Fla.2002) (same). This Court has repeatedly held that golden rule arguments are improper. Bailey v. State, 998 So.2d 545, 555 (Fla.2008) (This Court has long prohibited golden rule arguments....). Mosley points to two comments in this category that he claims constituted golden rule arguments: PROSECUTOR: Maybe [Lynda Wilkes] wondered why they were picking up this young boy but they picked him up and began driving, and they got out to that wooded area and she must have wondered why. She must have wondered then what are we doing here, but the defendant stops the car and he's looking for something in the car. Maybe she was excited about that. She steps out of the car and then the defendant grabbed her and strangled her. And her last moments must have been DEFENSE COUNSEL: I object, Your Honor, improper argument. THE COURT: Well, go ahead, Mrs. Senterfitt. Try to stick to the facts. PROSECUTOR: She blacked out. Didn't take long. With the pressure around her throat she would have blacked out in darkness and then Jay-Quan Mosley is crying and then darkness. He's in a bag and he's trying to breathe but the bag gets closer and closer to his face. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I object. It is actually PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, that is absolutely testimony in this case. DEFENSE COUNSEL: It's improper argument, your Honor. I need a sidebar. THE COURT: It is in the evidence, Mr. Kuritz. The objection is overruled. PROSECUTOR: Dr. Arruza [the medical examiner] described how the bag got closer and closer but mercifully not long, not long for Jay-Quan. Then, ladies and gentlemen, they're in the back of the car and Lynda Wilkes' head was up at the back of that car and seeping blood. As noted in the quoted text above, defense counsel contemporaneously objected to this argument by the prosecutor. The second comment that Mosley alleges was improper came when the prosecutor argued during closing arguments as follows: From the testimony of the Medical Examiner, [Lynda Wilkes] did not go unconscious right away. Lynda Wilkes was on the ground, looking up at that man, that face, someone she trusted, knowing that she wasn't leaving Armsdale [the killing site]. She had the opportunity to contemplate her own death and he went on as the Medical Examiner told you approximately four minutes to kill someone by strangulation, much less to render them unconscious, but to kill them a tremendous amount of time and force and constant pressure and constant intent. No objection was made to this second comment and accordingly any impropriety must be analyzed under the fundamental error standard. See Brooks, 762 So.2d at 898. As to the first prosecutorial comments, while the trial court did not sustain the defendant's objection, the trial court told the prosecutor to try to stick to the facts. The prosecutor never elaborated on what the victims' last moments must have been. Instead, the first comments were directly relevant to the circumstances of the murder and Mosley's plan to lure Wilkes on the pretense of taking her to buy clothes for their son. While the momentary comments that maybe she was excited about that may appear to be speculative in isolation, taken in context they were permissible argument based on the facts of this case. As to the second set of comments, those comments were directly relevant to the HAC aggravator and had a factual basis in the testimony of both Griffin and the medical examiner. A prosecutor may make comments describing the murder where these comments are based on evidence introduced at trial and are relevant to the circumstances of the murder or relevant aggravators, so long as the prosecutor does not cross the line by inviting the jurors to place themselves in the position of the victim. See, e.g., Bailey, 998 So.2d at 555 (holding comments that encouraged jurors to visualize the actual distance between the gun and the victim, based on evidence in the record, were not improper); Rogers v. State, 957 So.2d 538, 549 (Fla.2007) (holding, in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that prosecutorial comments about the victim's murder and her last moments alive were not improper because they were based upon facts in evidence and concluding that the comments were not golden rule arguments). We therefore conclude that the arguments actually made to the jury were not golden rule arguments or improper imaginary scripts where a prosecutor speculates as to a victim's final moments. Cf. Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 421 (Fla. 1998) (determining that the prosecutor had engaged in a subtle `golden rule' argument by creating an imaginary script demonstrating that the victim was shot while pleading for his life). Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. As for the final subclaim on this issue, which we categorize as prescreening comments, we have condemned comments where the prosecutor states that the death penalty is sought only after the State Attorney's Office determines that the particular case warrants the imposition of the death penalty. In Brooks, 762 So.2d at 901, the prosecutor argued during closing, I would submit now that the State does not seek the death penalty in all first-degree murders because it's not always proper, not always appropriate. The prosecutor then described a hypothetical murder in which the State would not seek the death penalty. The defense objected to this line of argument, but the trial court overruled the objection. In Brooks, we found these comments were improper and explained that while prosecutor[s] . . . [are] undoubtedly correct in stating that the State does not seek the death penalty in all first-degree murder cases, nevertheless this true statement . . . is also irrelevant and tends to cloak the State's case with legitimacy as a bona-fide death penalty prosecution, much like an improper `vouching' argument. Brooks, 762 So.2d at 902. In this case, the prosecutor commented during voir dire as follows: We need people who can come to this courtroom with an open mind despite their preconceived notions or experiences and follow the Court's instruction with regard to the death penalty, so I'm going to ask questions in that vein with the understanding again as Judge Weatherby mentioned there's only two possible penalties if the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder, the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. First of all does everyone understand that the death penalty is not sought in every first degree murder case? (Emphasis added.) Immediately after this question, to which one prospective juror answered affirmatively, the prosecutor and prospective jurors discussed whether the jurors were for or against the death penalty and whether the death penalty automatically applied or whether there was a weighing process to determine when it applied. The second comment occurred during the penalty phase closing arguments: As His Honor told you and we have told you death is not appropriate and it's not sought in every first degree murder case but it is sought in this one, and his Honor again will go over with you aggravating circumstances and mitigation and he will tell you it's not a counting process. It's not, does the state have more aggravators or does the defense have more mitigators? It's a qualitative process, what is heavier, what means more. That's how you decide, and as we talked about this morning you will render a recommendation for each of these murders, one for Lynda Wilkes and one for Jay-Quan. (Emphasis added.) These comments come close to our prohibition against prescreening comments as to the selection process for first-degree murder cases condemned in Brooks. While we caution prosecutors to heed our admonition in Brooks, in assessing the potential impact of these comments in this case for a fundamental error analysis, we note that both comments were relatively brief and were primarily made to inform the voir dire panel and the penalty phase jury, respectively, of the process for weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors in the penalty phase. Further, the trial court properly instructed the jury on its weighing functions. Moreover, as the State pointed out during oral argument, in this case the jury in fact performed its weighing function because it recommended death only for the murder of Jay-Quan and recommended life for the murder of Lynda Wilkes. The situation currently before this Court is distinguishable from Brooks. Here, these were the only improper arguments. In reviewing these comments in their entirety, we hold that neither comment rises to the level of fundamental error. The comments did not reach[] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty or jury recommendation of death could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error, as the standard for fundamental error requires. Poole v. State, 997 So.2d 382, 390 (Fla.2008). Having analyzed each category of alleged impermissible argument and having considered those arguments, individually and collectively, we reject Mosley's claim of error.