Opinion ID: 1172016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Faretta Motion

Text: The record includes a settled statement concerning an unreported in camera meeting between defendant and the magistrate who was to preside over defendant's preliminary examination; the meeting took place prior to the hearing. According to the settled statement, defendant told the magistrate that he wished to marry and inquired how this might be done. The magistrate responded that he did not perform inmate ceremonies but opined that another judge might be willing to do so. Defendant then indicated that, with respect to the charges filed against him, he wished to get it over with and plead guilty. The magistrate told defendant that he believed defendant may have some meritorious legal points or issues and that [he] should go ahead and talk to his attorney. Defendant said he did not wish to be represented by an attorney, and the magistrate confessed that he was unsure whether a defendant in a capital case could proceed in propria persona. The magistrate also observed that appointed counsel was a good attorney. The meeting then concluded. (1a) Defendant now claims that his desire not to be represented by counsel constituted a timely request to proceed in propria persona. Defendant asserts he was then entitled to a determination as to whether he was voluntarily and intelligently waiving his right to counsel. Because the court failed to inquire into his competency to waive counsel, defendant asserts the court committed reversible error. In Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525], the United States Supreme Court held that a State may [not] constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him ( id. at p. 807 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 566]) because the Sixth Amendment implies a right of self-representation ( id. at p. 821 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 574]). (2) However, a defendant is not absolutely entitled to represent himself. [I]n order to represent himself, the accused must `knowingly and intelligently' forego [the benefits associated with the right to counsel]. [Citations.] Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. ' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 835 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 581-582], italics added.) (1b) Here, the magistrate did not advise defendant that he was barred from proceeding in propria persona. The essence of the discussion was that defendant should first speak with his attorney about the defense of the case and should also consider the competence of his legal counsel before attempting to represent himself. In sum, we find the magistrate was simply advising defendant to further explore the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that he might make his ultimate choice with eyes open. Defendant was at all times free to proceed with his desire to plead guilty (assuming he could obtain his attorney's consent, see § 1018), or to request permission to represent himself. We find no error in the magistrate's actions.