Opinion ID: 2110319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Action For Nuisance.

Text: The propriety of taking the case from the jury with respect to the count for nuisance, depends on whether there was evidence of an intent to abandon and an actual abandonment by the permittee of the privilege granted to erect and use the alley bridge, and, if so, whether there was evidence to support a finding that permitting the supporting beams to remain, after the wooden part had been removed, was a menace or obstruction to vehicular traffic and therefore a nuisance. It appears that in the District of Columbia the rule is that a public nuisance could not arise with respect to the alley bridge erected in accordance with the specifications of the building permit so long as the permittee continued to exercise the privilege granted by authority of law. Hewett v. Telegraph Co., 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 424 (1886). See also Neitzey v. Railroad Co., 16 D.C. (5 Mackey) 34 (1886). But when the permittee ceased to use the privilege granted and removed the wooden superstructure but not the steel supports, a different situation arose. For the owners of the buildings and their successors in title (including the defendants) did not acquire by the privilege granted a prescriptive right to continue to obstruct the alley with the steel beams after the right to use the bridge had ceased or expired as a result of its nonuser. Cf. Huebschmann v. Grand Co., 166 Md. 615, 172 Atl. 227 (1934). See also Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A.2d 830 (1954) [without a permit, no person can permanently encroach on a street for a private purpose, and all such encroachments are a nuisance]. Other than this, there was (as hereinbefore stated) at least some evidence to support an inference that a permit to remove the bridge had not been obtained as the law then required. The obtaining of a permit to remove the bridge (if it were in fact obtained) would clearly be evidence of an intention to abandon it; and the mere fact that the beams were left in place would not negative such an intention. Block v. Fisher, 103 A.2d 575 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954). Cf. Maryland & Pa. RR. Co. v. Mer.-Safe, Etc., Co., 224 Md. 34, 166 A.2d 247 (1960). That an object or condition which materially and unlawfully interferes with the free and safe enjoyment of a public street or highway constitutes a public nuisance has been recognized in the District of Columbia for many years. See Hewett v. Telegraph Co., supra. Furthermore, there are cases holding that rails, poles and other structures placed or erected in, on or above a street or highway for a particular authorized use or purpose may become a nuisance by reason of their abandonment or the discontinuance of their use. And, as a consequence of such abandonment or discontinuance, the owner of such objects or structures may incur liability for injury therefrom by permitting them to remain where they were after a discontinuance of use, depending, of course, on a duty to remove such objects or structures or take precautionary measures (if that be feasible) to guard against possible injury from them. In Citizens' Ry. & Light Co. v. Johns, 116 S.W. 62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), where the occupant of a wagon was injured when it ran into a rail protruding from an unused track that had been placed there by the defendant's predecessor with the idea of obtaining a franchise to operate a railway, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for his personal injuries. And in Reed v. Edison Elec. I. Co., 114 N.E. 289 (Mass. 1916), where the lower court had directed a verdict for the defendant, it was held on appeal that there was evidence from which it could be found that a discarded pole left on a street for ten days after it had been taken down was an obstruction and a menace to traffic and therefore a public nuisance. See also 25 Am. Jur., Highways, §§ 273, 486, and particularly the annotation in 102 A.L.R. 677, for other cases both pro and con. And cf. District of Columbia v. Dempsey, 13 App. D.C. 533 (1898) and Dobbins v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 So. 919 (Ala. 1909), which, although based on negligence instead of nuisance, also involved abandonment of use. [2] Although obviously not as complete and as satisfactory as it might have been, there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendants by permitting the steel beams (which apparently served no useful purpose) to remain for so long a time at a height of no more than approximately twelve feet had thereby created and maintained a public nuisance that was an unlawful and unreasonable obstruction of the alley in that it endangered the safety of those who were entitled or required to use it as a public thoroughfare. Whether or not the steel beams constituted a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens, is a question we need not decide in this case, for in the posture in which the case comes to us, our function is limited to deciding whether the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. For the reasons herein stated, we hold that the jury should also have been allowed to decide on proper instructions by the court whether there was a nuisance in fact. While the question of contributory negligence was not ruled on below, we may add that the evidence produced does not appear to have been sufficient to show that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Judgment reversed and case remanded for a new trial; appellees to pay the costs.