Opinion ID: 1460562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Marcus Miller

Text: From 1989 until 1997 Miller worked for UPS in pre-load as a boxline charger at the Akron center. In 1997, Miller transferred to a position in the North/South slide area of the Akron center where he remained until the end of March 1999. On September 24, 1998, UPS and the union held a local-level hearing regarding Miller's attendance which resulted in a one-day working suspension. UPS held another hearing on March 4, 1999 to address further alleged attendance problems. This hearing resulted in a two-day suspension. Four days later, on March 8 and 9, UPS asserted that Miller was a no-call/no-show. J.A. at 1576-77 (Miller Dep. at 269-72). UPS terminated Miller, but the union took the matter to a state panel which reinstated Miller and imposed a twenty-five day suspension. In May 1999, Miller filed discrimination charges with the OCRC/EEOC. On May 17, 1999, after the twenty-five day suspension elapsed, Miller was reassigned to the re-load shift. The reassignment interfered with his other part-time job. Miller continuously requested to be transferred back to the pre-load shift and was told that he needed to turn in paperwork to the Human Resources department. Miller alleges that other employees had transferred between shifts with no paperwork. Miller addressed his schedule conflicts with his manager, Mike Smith (Smith), who agreed that Miller could be scheduled off until he could return to the pre-load shift. On September 27, 1999, Smith told Miller that he was receiving pressure from senior management and that from then on Miller would have to call in each day. J.A. at 611 (Miller Aff. at ¶ 37). Calling in meant that an employee called UPS that day to see if he was needed. If the volume was light enough, the employee could remain off and it would not be counted against him for attendance purposes. According to Miller, similar arrangements had been worked out with white employees Tony Capporeletti and Tim Voss. Miller alleges that from September 27 through November 11, 1999, he followed the new procedures and called in each day. When Miller called in on November 11, 1999, he was told that he had been terminated. Prior to this, Miller had heard nothing from UPS which would give him reason to believe that his termination was imminent. The following day, November 12, Miller received a certified letter from UPS notifying him of his termination pursuant to Article 16 of the CBA, which covers unauthorized leave of absence. On November 16, 1999, Miller received a certified letter from UPS, dated November 5, 1999, that stated that Miller had until November 10, 1999 to call UPS and provide documentation justifying his absence. Miller grieved his termination, but the state panel upheld UPS's decision. Miller filed suit against UPS, alleging disparate treatment and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and OHIO REV.CODE §§ 4112.02(A), 4112.99. UPS filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted UPS's motion with respect to all of Miller's claims. Miller then filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied.
On appeal, Miller focuses on his termination as the crux of his [disparate treatment] claim. Pl.'s Br. at 47. The district court found that Miller failed to make a prima facie case, because he was unable to show that similarly situated white employees were treated more favorably than was Miller. Alternatively, the district court determined that even if Miller did make his prima facie case, he failed to provide evidence from which a jury could infer that UPS's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Miller was pretextual. We disagree with the district court on both counts. With respect to Miller's prima facie case, UPS failed to turn over the 1999 attendance records of Dan Paumier (Paumier). The district court acknowledged that Paumier was a white employee who, like Miller, had grieved his termination and had been reinstated by a state panel with a suspension, presumably also at the `final warning' stage. J.A. at 962-63 (Op. at 27-28). The district court also found that Paumier had missed over seventy days, compared to Miller's twenty-six. But according to the district court, because, inter alia, these days were in 2003 and 2004 as opposed to 1999 and 2000, Miller could not show that Paumier was similarly situated. In a footnote, the district court acknowledged Miller's argument that UPS failed to turn over Paumier's 1999 attendance records. According to the district court, [t]his works in [Miller]'s favor to an extent, but [Miller] has not shown that [he] further attempted to depose or get any written statement from Paumier. J.A. at 963 (Op. at 28 n. 8). Miller moved for reconsideration, arguing that the district court should have drawn an adverse inference in Miller's favor for UPS's failure to turn over Paumier's 1999 attendance records. In its order denying reconsideration, the district court restates Miller's argument, but fails to address it, instead stating that even if Miller could make a prima facie case, he failed to demonstrate evidence of pretext. We address Miller's argument directly, and conclude that the district court should have drawn an adverse inference against UPS for its failure to turn over Paumier's 1999 attendance records. See McMahan & Co., 206 F.3d at 632-33. During 1999, Paumier was similarly situated to Miller in all relevant respects. If Paumier's attendance records revealed that Paumier's attendance was similar to Miller's and that Paumier was not terminated, Miller would easily satisfy the similarly situated component of his prima facie case. Because UPS failed to turn over the records, we assume that Paumier's attendance in 1999 was similar to Miller's attendance. Accordingly, Miller has made a prima facie case of discrimination. The district court also erred in concluding that Miller had failed to produce evidence from which a jury could infer that UPS's articulated reason for terminating Miller was pretextual. The district court dismissed the suspect chronology of the letters, stating that although the long delay in getting the letter is somewhat unsettling, Miller has not produced a postmark date, and therefore has not shown that this was anything other than bureaucratic sloppiness. J.A. at 964 (Op. at 29). We are not clear to whose bureaucratic sloppiness the district court is referring: UPS or the postal service. In any event, by arriving at such a conclusion, the district court drew an improper inference that the delay in Miller's receiving the letters was not intentional on the part of UPS. Such a question is for the finder of fact to resolve. Miller need only provide evidence from which a fact finder could infer that the reason given for termination was actually pretextual. By supplying an affidavit averring that all of the letters requiring documentation arrived after the deadline for providing that documentation, Miller has met that burden. Moreover, as a factual matter, we question the district court's finding that there was no post mark presented in this case. The Joint Appendix contains a certified mail receipt bearing a post office stamp dated November 16, 1999. J.A. at 1622 (Cert. Mail Receipt). This corresponds with the date on which Miller avers he received the letter stating that he had until November 10 to supply documentation justifying his absences. J.A. at 612 (Miller Aff. at ¶ 46). Miller has pointed to evidence that UPS sent Miller the letter requesting documentation justifying his absences after it sent him his termination letter. Miller was informed of his termination on November 11; he received a certified letter informing him of his termination on November 12; but it was not until November 16 that Miller received the certified letter from UPS dated November 5, 1999 that stated that Miller had until November 10, 1999 to call UPS and provide documentation justifying his absence. A jury could reasonably infer from this sequence of events that UPS's decision to terminate Miller was not actually motivated by Miller's alleged attendance problems. UPS also argues that Miller cannot demonstrate pretext, because, even though Miller did not receive the letter requesting documentation until after he had been terminated, Miller did not provide UPS with documentation explaining his absences after he had already been terminated. In this case, whether or not Miller provided documentation explaining his absences is irrelevant to our inquiry as to whether UPS's proffered reason for terminating Miller was pretextual. On the facts of this case, it is the timing of the letters that raises the inference of pretext. When and whether Miller responded to these letters tells us nothing about UPS's motives. Accordingly, UPS's argument is without merit. Because UPS failed to turn over evidence which may have shown that a white employee similarly situated to Miller was treated more favorably than Miller, the district court should have drawn an inference in Miller's favor and found that Miller had met all of the elements of his prima facie case. Because Miller has pointed to evidence in the record from which a jury could infer that UPS's proffered reason for terminating Miller was pretextual, we conclude that the district court erred in entering summary judgment in UPS's favor with respect to Miller's disparate-treatment claim.
On appeal, Miller has focused his retaliation claim around the fact of his termination. Miller alleges that UPS terminated Miller in retaliation for his filing a discrimination claim with the OCRC/EEOC in May 1999. The district court found that Miller did not make a prima facie case of retaliation because Miller failed to show that there was a causal connection between his filing a discrimination claim with the OCRC/EEOC in May 1999 and his termination in November 1999. The district court asserted that it is hard-pressed to find temporal proximity to the adverse action Miller claims he suffers as a result-his termination six months later, in November 1999. J.A. at 966 (Op. at 31). In addition, the district court considered the theory that temporal proximity was present in that UPS put Miller on a different shift when he returned from his twenty-five day suspension in May 1999. This was the same month in which Miller filed the discrimination charges. The district court responded that Miller had failed to produce any evidence that UPS knew Miller would have a conflict when it moved him to the other shift, and further, the shift change did not impact on Miller's pay. Therefore, the district court asserted that Miller could not rely on the May shift-change to meet his causation burden. [T]emporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a causal connection for a retaliation claim. Tuttle v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir.2007). When coupled with evidence of retaliatory conduct, however, temporal proximity may establish a causal connection between protected activity and an adverse employment action. Id. In Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir.1999), we set forth that [t]he causal connection between the adverse employment action and the protected activity, here the filing of a complaint with the EEOC, may be established by demonstrating that the adverse action was taken shortly after plaintiff filed the complaint and by showing that he was treated differently from other employees. Miller alleges that when he returned to UPS from his twenty-five day suspension in May 1999, he should have been assigned to pre-load, but was instead assigned to reload. He further alleges that, despite his repeated attempts to be reassigned to pre-load, UPS failed to reassign him. We disagree with Miller. Miller has produced no evidence indicating that UPS knew that Miller would have schedule conflicts if he were assigned to reload as opposed to pre-load. Further, Miller concedes that no pre-load positions were available from the time when he returned from his suspension in May 1999 and the time at which he was terminated in November 1999. Because the temporal proximity alone is not enough to show a causal connection here, and because Miller has failed to provide sufficient additional evidence of retaliatory conduct, Miller has not met the fourth element of his prima facie case. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment on Miller's retaliation claim.