Opinion ID: 1708663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: does a common law negligence action lie?

Text: Having concluded that a dram shop action does not lie against the Huntsville Jaycees, Inc., and Richard P. Watts, the second question must be addressed: Does an action grounded on common law negligence principles lie against either defendant? [21] Until just recently, the answer to that question would have been an easy, unequivocal `no.' For example, it was only a few years ago that the plaintiff in DeLoach urged the Alabama Supreme Court to `recognize an action for common law negligence for [dispensing] alcohol....' He argued that King v. Henkie should be cast onto the scrap heap of history because social attitudes and public policy have changed since King was decided, and ... this court should change the law to meet society's change. DeLoach v. Mayer Electric Supply Co., 378 So.2d 733, 735 (Ala.1979). The Supreme Court rejected that plea, saying tersely: `The rule expressed in King is as viable today as when first expressed.' Id. In a prescient phrase, however, Mr. Justice Bloodworth added: We do not choose, at this time, to depart from the rule expressed in King and followed by a majority of jurisdictions. Id. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Justice Bloodworth's portentous phrase may now, several years after his death, have come to pass. In Buchanan v. Merger Enterprises, Inc., 463 So.2d 121 (Ala.1984), the Alabama Supreme Court partially overruled King v. Henkie , and recognized a common law negligence action against a commercial licensee for the on-premises sale of alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated patron. The facts of the case were summarized by Mr. Justice Faulkner as follows: [A]bout 5:30 in the morning of July 29, 1981, David Slaughter entered the Checkers Lounge in Dothan after an all-night drive from Florida. He commenced drinking and continued imbibing until around noon, when he left with a waitress. Thirty minutes later he returned and remained at the lounge until around 5:00 P.M. Although Slaughter became visibly intoxicated while in the lounge, the lounge's employees continued to serve him alcoholic beverages up until the time he left. About fifteen minutes after leaving the lounge, the automobile which Slaughter was driving left the road and careened through the yard of the plaintiff's mother, killing her as she worked in her garden. Id. at 122. The son of the deceased brought suit against the corporation which did business as the `Checkers Lounge.' The action was founded on the dram shop act. Ala.Code ง 6-5-71 (1975). However, defendant had clever counsel who discovered that, in 1980, when amending the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code, the Legislature had inadvertently repealed that statute which made it unlawful for an on-premises licensee to `sell, furnish or give any beverages to any person visibly intoxicated....' Ala.Code 23-3-260(2) (1975) (repealed by Act No. 80-529, 1980 Acts of Alabama, effective Sept. 30, 1980). Hence, plaintiff could not prove one of the essential elements of the dram shop action: a sale `contrary to law.' The trial court, accordingly, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court was `faced with an anomalous situation,' `id. at 124, in which the facts were egregiously hard, but in which the trial judge had unquestionably ruled correctly. Due to the `emasculation of the dram shop statute by the passage of the new alcohol licensing act' ( id. at 123), no action arose under the statute. And yet, the court was convinced that the loophole through which defendant had squiggled was `the result of legislative oversight, not legislative wisdom'; and that the legislature had not intended to legalize the sale of alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons, to minors, and to insane persons. To the contrary, it appears to us that the legislature was very concerned with the problem of drunken driving. In the same term during which the new alcohol licensing act was passed, the legislature passed a new drunk driving law ... granting trial courts new powers to suspend driving licenses of those convicted of drunk driving upon their first conviction and providing for increased penalties and a mandatory suspension of driving privileges for second and subsequent convictions. ... The stated purpose of the new drunk driving laws was to `do a better job of helping to identify the problem drinking driver and keep him off the highways.' Commentary to ง 32-5A-191. Unless the legislature was afflicted with a collective split personality, it is difficult to believe that it intended to give taverns carte blanche authority to continue serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patrons, given its concern for drunken driving. If it had intended to do away with the dram shop statute the legislature would have repealed the statute itself, not just its teeth. Id. at 123-24 (emphasis supplied). Toothless though it might be, the Court could not `rewrite the dram shop statute. It exists, regardless of intent, as written.' Id. at 124. Therefore, the Court was forced to consider the question of whether the plaintiff might proceed under a negligence theory. A bare majority of the Court held that he could. ( Buchanan is a five-four decision.) The clearest statement of the majority's holding is found in the following extract. The recognition of a cause of action for the negligent sale of alcohol by a licensee for on-premises consumption to one who is visibly intoxicated will discourage drunk driving by discouraging the sale of alcohol to patrons who lack the self control to cease drinking when they have `had enough.' Id. at 127 (emphasis supplied). In effect, the majority held that the law imposed a duty upon licensees for on-premises consumption to refrain from continuing to sell alcohol to visibly intoxicated patrons, in order to protect a class of third persons which included plaintiff's decedent. Thus, King v. Henkie was overruled. But only just enough to allow `this plaintiff to have his day in court.' Id. at 128. The court expressly limited its holding, and its overruling of King v. Henkie , to cases involving the on-premises sale of liquor by licensed, commercial vendors. The limited nature of the majority's holding is demonstrated by the following extracts from the opinion: We recognize that the rule that there could be no common law cause of action for negligently serving alcohol, which was espoused in King, was reaffirmed in DeLoach, supra. DeLoach is, however, distinguishable from the facts presented here. It did not involve a licensed vendor. Had these facts been alleged in DeLoach, a cause of action would have been stated under the dram shop statute.... [ Id. at 127 (emphasis added).]       Finally, the defendant argues that the recognition of a common law action for negligently dispensing alcohol would allow actions to be brought against social hosts. That result does not necessarily follow. Most of the states which have recognized a common law action for negligently dispensing alcohol have restricted those actions to instances of sales by vendors. Only New Jersey, in Kelly v. Gwinnell, [96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984)], has extended liability to social hosts. There is an arguable distinction between licensed vendors and social hosts based on the governmental interest which supports the statutory requirement that commercial vendors of alcohol be licensed. An analogy to that position may be found in products liability law. The rule stated in ง 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second) does not apply for instance to a `housewife who, on one occasion, sells her neighbor a jar of jam or a pound of sugar.' Comment f to ง 402A. We hasten to point out, however, that the question of a social host's liability is not before us and we specifically decline to decide that issue. ... [ Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added).] The extremely limited scope of the Buchanan holding also is demonstrated by the majority's choice of supporting authorities. We find precedent for the proposition that legislatively created principles of dram shop liability, not fully implemented by the acts themselves, can be effectuated by a common law negligence action in the case of Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.1959). ... Id. at 124. Later in the opinion, the majority cites the following decisions as examples of instances in which `other states have ... recognized common law negligence actions under similar facts' ( id. at 127): Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983) (en banc) (allowing negligence action against commercial licensee for sale to visibly intoxicated patron); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (allowing negligence action against social host who personally and `directly serves' liquor to a visibly intoxicated guest, and `continues to do so even beyond the point at which the host knows that the guest is intoxicated, and does this knowing that the guest will shortly thereafter be operating a motor vehicle'); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584 (1983) (allowing negligence action against commercial licensee for sale to visibly intoxicated patron, with knowledge that patron will drive from the premises); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis.2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (allowing negligence action against a retail establishment for knowing sale to a minor); and, McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo.1983) (allowing negligence action against commercial vendor for knowing sale to a minor). One must ask, what does the majority's choice of authorities tell us about its decision? What do the six cases have in common? Only one ( Kelly ) involves social host liability; so that is not the point. Two ( Sorensen and McClellan ) involve minors; so that might be, but probably is not, significant. Five of the six (i.e., all but Kelly ) involve sales of liquor by commercial vendors; so that obviously is a significant common denominator. However, there is one factor which all of the cited cases share, and that is: all arose either in jurisdictions that had no dram shop statute, or under circumstances in which no dram shop act was in force and effect. For example, in Waynick, neither the Michigan nor the Illinois dram shop statute applied to the peculiar facts of that case. (See the Buchanan majority's discussion of Waynick at 124-25.) In Sorensen, the Wisconsin dram shop act had been repealed by that state's legislature in 1982 (see 350 N.W.2d at 113 and n. 8). In Ontiveros, Arizona had no dram shop act (see 667 P.2d at 211-12). In McClellan, Wyoming had no dram shop act (see 666 P.2d at 411). At the time of plaintiffs' injuries in Hutchens, North Carolina did not have a dram shop act (see 303 S.E.2d at 588). And New Jersey did not, and does not now, have a dram shop act (see Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1221). Moreover, counting the decision of our supreme court in Buchanan, the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Sorensen, and the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Hutchens, one finds that a majority of the states (twenty-seven in all) now have allowed a negligence action against commercial vendors of liquors for injuries sustained by third persons as a result of the acts of an intoxicated person. Significantly, however, the overwhelming majority of those states (22 out of 27) did not have a dram shop, or civil damage, act in force on the date the action arose. Compare the list of decisions in the `Appendix' to Sorensen v. Jarvis, 350 N.W.2d at 119-20, with 12 Am.Jr. Trials 729, Dram Shop Litigation ง 2 (1966). There can be little doubt, therefore, that the absence of a statutory, dram shop remedy has been a substantial factor influencing those courts which have extended negligence liability to commercial vendors of intoxicating liquor. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed in Kelly: Whether mentioned or not in these opinions, the very existence of a Dram Shop Act constitutes a substantial argument against expansion of the legislatively-mandated liability. Very simply, when the Legislature has spoken so specifically on the subject and has chosen to make only licensees liable, arguably the Legislature did not intend to impose the same liability on [social] hosts. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 554, 476 A.2d at 1227 (emphasis supplied). The statutory vacuum created by legislative inadvertence, in which the Buchanan majority operated, now has been filled by administrative regulations promulgated by the A.B.C. Board. Regulation 20-X-6-.02. Thus, in one sense, the Buchanan decision may be sui generis. We may never see its like again. (At least, in the absence of a similar legislative (or administrative) error.) That also is an argument against expanding the Buchanan negligence action beyond commercial vendors, to encompass defendants such as those before this Court. The majority hinted as much when they said: Most of the states which have recognized a common law action for negligently dispensing alcohol have restricted those actions to instances of sales by vendors .... There is an arguable distinction between licensed vendors and social hosts based on the governmental interest which supports the statutory requirement that commercial vendors of alcohol be licensed. Buchanan v. Merger Enterprises, Inc., supra, at 127-28 (emphasis supplied).