Opinion ID: 1590214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged improper admission into evidence of Walker's statement.

Text: Walker contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted the videotaped statement he made at Thweatt's house. According to Walker, because the record does not establish that the State had probable cause to arrest him and the State did not produce evidence of probable cause at the suppression hearing, his arrest was unlawful and his videotaped statement made subsequent to his arrest was inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree. The record indicates that on June 22, 23, and 27, 2000, while Walker was being detained by the Etowah County Sheriff's Department, Houston County law-enforcement officers questioned Walker about Thweatt's murder. The record also indicates that on June 28, 2000, the Etowah County Sheriff's Department released Walker into the custody of Houston. County law-enforcement officers, who transported Walker from Etowah County to the Houston County jail. While Walker was being transported, the Houston County law-enforcement officers and Walker stopped at the scene of the murder, and Walker made a videotaped statement detailing facts about the murder. Walker was indicted on September 1, 2000, for capital murder for the killing of Thweatt. The record does not indicate that Walker requested a preliminary hearing between June 28, 2000, and September 1, 2000. On October 28, 2002, Walker filed a motion to dismiss or remand the indictment. In his motion, Walker alleged various defects in the indictment, but he did not allege that the indictment was not supported, by probable cause. The trial court denied the motion without conducting a hearing. Additionally, on October 28, 2002, Walker filed a motion to suppress his statement made to the Houston County law-enforcement officers because, he said, among other grounds, it was obtained subsequent to an arrest not supported by probable cause. Specifically, he stated that [he] was seized and interrogated on less than probable cause, in violation of [his] Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Walker's motion to suppress did not contain any facts supporting his allegation, nor did he attach an affidavit containing supporting facts. On February 19, 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing on Walker's motion to suppress. The State presented evidence concerning the voluntariness of Walker's statement but did not present evidence concerning probable cause to support Walker's arrest. At the hearing, Walker did not pursue his allegation that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. Although his counsel actively participated in the hearing and cross-examined the State's witnesses, Walker's counsel did not argue to the trial court that Walker's arrest was not supported by probable cause. Additionally, he did not ask the trial court to reconsider its denial of his motion to suppress in light of his allegation that his arrest was unlawful; he did not object at trial on this ground when his statement was admitted; he did not present this objection in his motion for a new trial; and he did not present this objection to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Thus, the record on its face establishes that at the suppression hearing, at trial, and on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Walker, by his silence, abandoned this allegation and waived his objection to the admission of his statement on this ground. See Burks v. State, 600 So.2d 374, 381 (Ala. Crim.App.1991) (It appears that the issue of probable cause for arrest was never raised or litigated at trial and is not preserved for review by this Court.). Walker's waiver of the alleged error, however, does not preclude our review because Walker was indicted for capital murder and was sentenced to death, see Rule 39(a)(2)(D), Ala. R.App. P. Walker's waiver, however, weighs heavily against a finding of plain error. `The standard of review in reviewing a claim under the plain-error doctrine is stricter than the standard used in reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial court or on appeal. As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the plain-error doctrine applies only if the error is particularly egregious and if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Ex parte Price, 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1809, 143 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1999); Burgess v. State, 723 So.2d 742 (Ala.Cr. App.1997), aff'd, 723 So.2d 770 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1360, 143 L.Ed.2d 521 (1999); Johnson v. State, 620 So.2d 679, 701 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), rev'd on other grounds, 620 So.2d 709 (Ala.1993), on remand, 620 So.2d 714 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 905, 114 S.Ct. 285, 126 L.Ed.2d 235 (1993).'  Hall v. State, 820 So.2d 113, 121-22 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 820 So.2d 152 (Ala.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1966, 152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002). `The narrowness of the plain error rule is a reflection of the importance, indeed necessity, of the contemporaneous objection rule to which it is an exception. . . . `The contemporaneous objection rule . . . promotes the salutary interest of making the trial the main event. Failure to enforce it `tends to detract from the perception of the trial of a criminal case . . . as a decisive and portentous event.' Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). Moreover, requiring timely objections allows the trial courts to develop a full record on the issue, consider the matter, and correct any error before substantial judicial resources are wasted on appeal and then in an unnecessary retrial. See United States v. Sorondo, 845 F.2d 945, 948-49 (11th Cir.1988). A full record and, a prior decision in the district court are essential ingredients to our substantive review of the issuesthey flesh out an issue in a way the parties' briefs may not. ``In the absence of plain error . . . it is not our place as an appellate court to second guess the litigants before us and grant them relief they did not request, pursuant to legal theories they did not outline, based on facts they did not relate.' Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1481 n. 12 (11th Cir.1997). Because the contemporaneous objection rule is essential to the integrity and efficiency of our judicial process, we have stressed that `the plain error test is difficult to meet.' United States v. King, 73 F.3d 1564, 1572 (11th Cir.1996); accord, e.g., United States v. Sorondo, 845 F.2d at 948-49; United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 n. 4 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). ` United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir.1998). `While the plain error doctrine lessens the blow of a rigid application of the contemporaneous objection requirement, it is to be used sparingly, since the unwarranted extension of the exacting definition of plain error would skew the rule's careful balancing of the need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against the insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed. Reviewing courts are not to use the plain error doctrine to consider trial court errors not meriting appellate review absent timely objection. `5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 767, p. 437 (1995). See also Ex parte Woodall, 730 So.2d 652, 657 (Ala.1998) (the plain-error exception is to be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result) (internal quotes and citations omitted [in Thomas]). `One of the factors for the reviewing court to consider in its determination of whether an alleged error constitutes plain error is whether a proper and timely objection at trial would have cured the error or would have enabled the trial court to prevent injustice. 5 Am.Jur.2d, supra, at § 774, p. 443-45 (footnotes omitted). [T]he doctrine [of plain error] is less likely to be applied where the error could have been readily corrected by an objection at trial, or where such an objection may have led the government to introduce additional evidence on the issue. Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 27.5(d), p. 1160 (2nd ed.1992). See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 825 (5th Cir.) ([The plain-error rule] will not be used to allow counsel for the defendant to gamble first on acquittal and then, upon conviction, to raise on appeal any matters which could have been easily remedied at trial.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847, 100 S.Ct. 93, 62 L.Ed.2d 60 (1979). See also Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 386, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (preservation-of-error requirements enable a trial court to correct any instructional mistakes before the jury retires and in that way help to avoid the burdens of an unnecessary retrial). . . . '  Thomas v. State, 824 So.2d 1, 14-15 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). Clark v. State, 896 So.2d 584, 622-24 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (final bracketed language added). Under the principles of the plain-error doctrine set forth in Clark, the fact that Walker, in his motion to suppress, made a bare allegation that his arrest was not supported by probable cause and then failed to pursue his objection to the statement on that basis at the suppression hearing, at trial, and in subsequent pleadings weighs heavily against a finding of plain error. In light of the facts in this case, we reject the assertion that once Walker made this allegation in his motion to suppress, he had no additional burden in presenting this issue to the trial court at the suppression hearing. Walker's allegation in his motion contained no supporting facts to establish that Walker had been arrested without probable cause. Therefore, it was an allegation based on speculation and conjecture. The trial court conducted a hearing, at which Walker could have pursued this legal theory, objected to the State's alleged lack of evidence of probable cause to arrest, presented evidence to support his allegation, and argued that the lack of evidence required that his statement be suppressed. Walker, however, remained silent; he did not pursue this issue in the trial court; and he did not allow the trial court the opportunity to prevent the alleged injustice. See Adams v. State, 585 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.1991) (Matters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, since review on appeal applies only to rulings by the trial court.). Cf. Coulliette v. State, 857 So.2d 793, 795 (Ala.2003) (holding that because a specific argument raised on appeal was not presented at suppression hearing, `[t]he motion [to suppress] did not give the trial court notice of the specific issues [the defendant] . . . raise[d] in his [appellate] brief. . . . Therefore, the trial court did not have the opportunity to rectify these alleged errors. . . . [The defendant's] motion was not sufficient to preserve the issues presented by [him] in his brief.' (quoting Acree v. State, 673 So.2d 855, 856 (Ala. Crim.App.1995))). Walker's silence and abandonment of this ground in the trial court essentially allowed Walker to `gamble first on acquittal and then, upon conviction, to raise on appeal [an issue] which could have been easily remedied at trial.' Clark, 896 So.2d at 624 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 825 (5th Cir.1979)). This fact weighs heavily against Walker. In defining plain error, this Court has adopted principles established by the United States Supreme Court in applying the federal plain-error rule. In Ex parte Womack, 435 So.2d 766, 769 (Ala.1983), this Court, following those principles, stated: `Plain error only arises if the error is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.' In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that for an error to constitute plain error the error must be plain and must affect the defendant's substantial rights. The United States Supreme Court explained: [The plain-error rule] defines a single category of forfeited-but-reversible error. Although it is possible to read the Rule in the disjunctive, as creating two separate categories`plain errors' and `defects affecting substantial rights' that reading is surely wrong. See [ United States v.] Young , 470 U.S. [1], at 15, n. 12 [(1985)] (declining to adopt disjunctive reading). As we explained in Young, the phrase `error or defect' is more simply read as `error.' Ibid. The forfeited error `may be noticed' only if it is `plain' and `affect[s] substantial rights.' More precisely, a court of appeals may correct the error (either vacating for a new trial, or reversing outright) only if it meets these criteria. . . . The first limitation on appellate authority under [the plain-error rule] is that there indeed be an `error.' Deviation from a legal rule is `error' unless the rule has been waived. For example, a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty in conformity with the requirements of Rule 11[, Fed. R.Crim.P.,] cannot have his conviction vacated by court of appeals on the grounds that he ought to have had a trial. Because the right to trial is waivable, and because the defendant who enters a valid guilty plea waives that right, his conviction without a trial is not `error.' Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the `intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.' . . . Whether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant's choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. . . . Mere forfeiture, as opposed to waiver, does not extinguish an `error' under [the plain-error rule]. Although in theory it could be argued that `[i]f the question was not presented to the trial court no error was committed by the trial court, hence there is nothing to review,' . . . this is not the theory that [the plain-error rule] adopts. If a legal rule was violated during the district court proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an `error' within the meaning of [the plain-error rule] despite the absence of a timely objection. The second limitation on appellate authority under [the plain-error rule] is that the error be `plain.' `Plain' is synonymous with `clear' or, equivalently, `obvious.' The third and final limitation on appellate authority under [the plain-error rule] is that the plain error `affec[t] substantial rights.' This is the same language employed in [the harmless-error rule], and in most cases it means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the . . . court proceedings. . . . When the defendant has made a timely objection to an error and [the harmless-error rule] applies, a court of appeals normally engages in a specific analysis of the district court recorda so-called `harmless error' inquiryto determine whether the error was prejudicial. [The plain-error rule] normally requires the same kind of inquiry, with one important difference: It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial. See Young, supra, 470 U.S., at 17, n. 14 (`[F]ederal courts have consistently interpreted the plain-error doctrine as requiring an appellate court to find that the claimed error . . . had [a] prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations'). This burden shifting is dictated by a subtle but important difference in language between the two parts of Rule 52: While [the harmless-error rule] precludes error correction only if the error `does not affect substantial rights' (emphasis added), [the plain-error rule] authorizes no remedy unless the error does `affec[t] substantial rights.' 507 U.S. at 731-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Thus, to find plain error, this Court must conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Walker's videotaped statement because the statement was made subsequent to an arrest not supported by probable cause, that the error is obvious on the face of the record, and that the error affected his substantial rights. In George v. State, 717 So.2d 827, 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), rev'd on other grounds, 717 So.2d 844 (Ala.1996), the Court of Criminal Appeals confronted facts similar to those in this case, stating: The appellant contends that the trial court erred when it received into evidence certain items seized as a result of the appellant's arrest without first requiring the state to prove the legality of the appellant's arrest. The appellant did not challenge the validity of his arrest at trial. Thus, we must evaluate this contention under the plain error doctrine. Rule 45A, Ala. R.App. P.; Haney [v. State, 603 So.2d 368 (Ala. Crim.App.1991)]. Both the indictment and the arrest warrant are contained in the record. `On the question of probable cause, it is well established that the indictment itself, together with proof that the defendant is the one named in it, is prima facie evidence of probable cause.' Roynica v. State, 54 Ala.App. 436, 441, 309 So.2d 475, 478-79 (1974), cert. denied, 293 Ala. 772, 309 So.2d 485 (Ala.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858, 96 S.Ct. 111, 46 L.Ed.2d 85 (1975), quoting United States v. Mayer, 22 F.2d 827 (D.C.1927). There is no evidence in the record to support a finding that the appellant's arrest was in any way unlawful. The trial court did not err. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Walker's videotaped statement into evidence. Although the record does not contain a copy of the arrest warrant as did the record in George, it does, contain a copy of the indictment and evidence indicating that Walker is the person named in the indictment. Thus, at the time the trial court conducted the hearing on Walker's motion to suppress, the indictment provided prima facie evidence of probable cause that Walker had committed the offense charged. Although the probable cause supporting the indictment against Walker does not establish probable cause to support Walker's arrest, see Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960), the issuance of the indictment established that there was evidence of probable cause to support the charge against Walker. Consequently, Walker had an obligation to present the trial court with more than a mere allegation that there was no probable cause to support his arrest to warrant further inquiry and suppression of the statement. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) (recognizing that the initial burden is upon the party seeking suppression of the evidence to go forward with specific facts demonstrating that the evidence is tainted). Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that Walker's arrest was not supported by probable cause or that the evidence Walker sought to suppress was gotten illegally. In light of these facts and in light of Walker's failure to pursue his contention at the hearing, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Walker's videotaped statement without requiring the State to present additional evidence of probable cause. Additionally, the alleged error is not plain because plain error must be obvious on the face of the record. A silent record, that is a record that on its face contains no evidence to support the alleged error, does not establish an obvious error. Our precedent holds that the record must at least present an inference of error before an appellate court will hold that reversible error occurred. For example, in Ex parte Watkins, 509 So.2d 1074 (Ala. 1987), this Court conducted a plain-error review of an alleged violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (addressing a constitutional violation with regard to discrimination in jury selection). We stated: Because this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, the defendant has requested that we review the record under our plain error rule, Rule 39(k), Ala. R.App. P., and remand for further proceedings, as we did in [Ex parte] Jackson, [516 So.2d 768 (Ala.1986)]. However, we have carefully reviewed the record in this respect and we cannot find any plain error. Although the record does show that the defendant is black and the victim was white, it does not show that the state exercised any of its peremptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors from the venire. The record as a whole simply does not raise an inference that the state was engaged in the practice of purposeful discrimination. Under the plain error rule this Court will `notice any plain error or defect in the proceeding under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights of the petitioner.' (Emphasis added.) Rule 39(k), supra. The defendant cannot successfully argue that error is plain in the record when there is no indication in the record that the act upon which error is predicated ever occurred (i.e., the state's use of its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks). In both Jackson and [Ex parte] Godbolt [, 546 So.2d 991 (Ala. 1987),] the records were sufficient to show that prima facie cases of purposeful discrimination could be made by the defendants; therefore, those cases were remanded for determinations on the issue under the guidelines set out in Batson.  509 So.2d at 1076-77 (second emphasis added). Thus, the Watkins Court established that when nothing in the record supports the bare allegation that a constitutional violation occurred, a court cannot find plain error. See also White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), aff'd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991) (holding that a Batson claim could not be addressed on appeal when the record did not even raise the inference of unconstitutional jury selection). Cf. Brooks v. State, 929 So.2d 491 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that an ambiguous or silent record will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). In another analogous situation, this Court held that a bare allegation in a motion was sufficient to notice error and warrant further review only because the record affirmatively reflected the alleged error. In Ex parte Jefferson, 749 So.2d 406 (Ala.1999), this Court addressed Jefferson's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, made in his motion for a new trial. Jefferson pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. He filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. His motion did not set forth any facts supporting his claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that because the motion for a new trial raised only a general claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim was not properly presented to the trial court or preserved for appellate review. In his petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, Jefferson contended that facts in the record supported his motion and, therefore, that he was not required to make a more specific assertion. See Hill v. State, 675 So.2d 484 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (holding that when the grounds stated in the motion for a new trial are evident in the record a hearing is warranted even though the motion is not supported by affidavits or other extrinsic evidence). Jefferson argued that the record on its face established that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the substance found in his possession was a controlled substance and allowing him to plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance, because the toxicology report, which was in the record, indicated that the substance found in his possession was not a controlled substance. This Court held that because the record on appeal affirmatively reflected that Jefferson's trial counsel's performance had been deficient, there was no need for a more specific allegation in his motion; the issue was properly preserved for appellate review; and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in not remanding the case for a hearing on Jefferson's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the principles set forth in Watkins and Jefferson to a plain-error review conducted in Turner v. State, 924 So.2d 737 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), in which a capital-murder defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted into evidence his post-arrest statement to law enforcement because, he said, the statement was the fruit of the poisonous tree. According to Turner, his statement was a consequence of his allegedly illegal arrest. Because Turner had not challenged the legality of his arrest or the admission of his statement at trial, the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the record for plain error. The court noted that because Turner did not object at trial, the record did not set forth the facts surrounding his arrest, and nothing in the record offered any suggestion of illegality. Therefore, the court held that because the record on its face did not support a finding that Turner's arrest was not supported by probable cause, the court could not find plain error with regard to the admission of Turner's statement made subsequent to the arrest. 924 So.2d at 757-58. Essentially, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that because the alleged error was not obvious on the face of the record, it did not rise to the level of plain error. The alleged error Walker asserts is not obvious and, therefore, cannot be plain error. The record before us, like the records in Watkins and Turner, does not suggest any illegality with regard to Walker's arrest. Additionally, unlike the record in Jefferson, which affirmatively supported the alleged error, nothing in this record affirmatively suggests that Walker was arrested on less than probable cause. In light of the sparsity of the record with regard to the facts surrounding Walker's arrest, Walker's alleged error is not obvious on the face of the record and, therefore, does not rise to the level of plain error. Cf. Ex parte Meeks, 434 So.2d 844 (Ala.1983) (providing an example of an obvious error when the suppression hearing contained testimony directed toward probable cause to arrest the defendant, but the testimony did not establish probable cause). Likewise, we do not find plain error because the record does not establish that the alleged error adversely affected Walker's substantial rights. See Olano, supra. For us to hold that the videotaped statement was improperly admitted and that its improper admission affected or probably affected Walker's trial, the record had to establish that Walker's arrest was not supported by probable cause. Walker's contention of plain error in this regard is supported only by speculation from a silent record, and speculation will not support a finding of prejudice. Additionally, because the record does not suggest any illegality with regard to Walker's arrest, we cannot conclude the alleged error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of this proceeding. See Ex parte Price, 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala.1998). Indeed, the inability to establish prejudicethe miscarriage of justiceis the reason that claims involving lack of probable cause to support an arrest that are not litigated at trial are often presented as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). No plain error exists with regard to the admission of Walker's videotaped statement.