Opinion ID: 1893251
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Heading: The Grosses

Text: The Grosses were awarded $16,000 damage for temporary and permanent injury to their two quarters of land. Further, they were awarded $25,000 damage for pollution and contamination of their domestic water well and permanent injury thereto. Again, the circuit judge personally viewed the premises and the well. As regards damages awarded to both Nelson and the Grosses, the trial court entered a conclusion of law that the breaching of the dam resulted in unreasonable injury to plaintiffs' lands and was the proximate cause of injury thereto. LaFleur v. Kolda, 22 N.W.2d 741. There is no doubt that flood water containing feedlot waste and effluent polluted two quarters of land owned by John and Ben Gross. The evidence clearly reflects that from the time of the inundation, said pollution existed upon the land until May 1980 in a frozen state. The trial court found that the Grosses encountered severe weed infestation on their land and had to fence off one area of pasture land because of a severe cocklebur infestation which developed after the flooding waters subsided. The general infestation, caused by this massive inundation of foul water and feedlot waste, required the Grosses to spray part of their land to control the weed growth, but they testified that this was of no avail. As indicated in the facts portion of this opinion, the Grosses complained that there were many vaccine bottles, old jugs, posts, manure, and other debris which remained on their lands after the flooding waters had dissipated. All of this constitutes damage to the Grosses' property and is attributable to a wrong done unto them. John and Ben Gross testified as to the diminishment in value of their land per acre; Ben Gross testifying that the two quarters had been diminished in value by $100 per acre; John Gross placed the diminishment at $80 to $100 per acre. Had the trial court accepted these figures in toto, the damage award would have reached a figure of $32,000 for the 320 acres. It is noted that the damage award to the Gross land was one-half of this amount. As to the proof of value, the rule is clear that [t]he owner of property either real or personal is qualified to express his opinion of the value of the property by reason of his status as owner.... The weight to be accorded such testimony is for the [trier of fact]. Hannahs v. Noah, 83 S.D. 296, 301-02, 158 N.W.2d 678, 681 (1968); Fredrick v. Dreyer, 257 N.W.2d 835 (S.D.1977). Thus, the testimony of the Grosses as regards the value of their property was competent evidence. As in the Nelson case, the Grosses saw fit to prove up damage based upon diminution in value of the property. The Grosses did not maintain that there was a permanent injury to land which totally destroyed its value but asserted that there was permanent injury to land which caused a diminishment in its value. Essentially, all plaintiffs, by testifying to a diminishment in value of land, were testifying to the difference in the value of the property immediately before the flood and the value following its aftermath. Given these facts, we cannot fault such a proof on damages. It was a mode of proof which was not absolutely certain but reasonably certain and avoided a total speculative base. It was competent evidence. There is no one measure of damages so flexible it will fairly compensate for all injury to real property. Ward v. LaCreek Elec. Ass'n, 83 S.D. 584, 591, 163 N.W.2d 344, 348 (1968). It might have been preferable to have had him state his opinion as to the value of the pasture land before the fire and its value afterward, instead of stating the difference between the value before and after [diminishment]; but his answer had the same effect. In substance, it amounted to the same thing, and a court should look to the substance. Houston & T.C.R. Co. v. Ellis, 111 Tex. 15, 18, 224 S.W. 471, 471 (1920) (bracketed material supplied). We note the language in Kressly v. Theberge, 79 S.D. 386, 388-89, 112 N.W.2d 232, 233 (1961), quoting Schankin v. Buskirk, 354 Mich. 490, 497, 93 N.W.2d 293, 297 (1958): The law does not require impossibilities; and can not [sic], therefore, require a higher degree of certainty than the nature of the case admits. And we can see no good reason for requiring any higher degree of certainty in respect to the amount of damages, than in respect to any other branch of the cause. [The trier of fact is] allowed to act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof. And when, from the nature of the case, the amount of the damages can not [sic] be estimated with certainty, or only a part of them can be estimated, we can see no objection to placing before the jury all the facts and circumstances of the case, having any tendency to show damages, or their probable amount; so as to enable them to make the most intelligible and probable estimate which the nature of the case will permit. This should, of course be done with such instructions and advice from the court as the circumstances of the case may require and as may tend to prevent the allowance of such as may be merely possible, or too remote or fanciful in their character to be safely considered as the result of the injury. In Kressly, we reversed a $2,000 verdict for injury to land because there was no evidence of before and after damages or any independent value of the damage to trees and underbrush. Here, we have explicit damage testimony. This Court has recognized the propriety of jury instructions measuring damages by the difference between the value of the property before and after the injury in case of permanent injury to, or partial taking of, real property. Ward v. LaCreek Elec. Ass'n, 83 S.D. at 591, 163 N.W.2d at 348. An award of damages in Ward was reversed because there was damage to a house but there was no damage to the realty; thus, a diminution approach was held improper. In the event of a partial destruction of pasture or grassland, the Iowa Supreme Court has held the measure of damages to be the difference immediately before and immediately after. Pascal v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 160 Iowa 484, 141 N.W. 920 (1913). It would appear only just that where there is an injury to land and that injury encompasses detriment to crops in the future, the injured party is entitled to a further recovery other than the original injury (in this case, the flood). As an example, turf and roots could be injured by a fire or a flood for years to come. Damage to real estate has been held to be permanent when it is of such a character and existing under such circumstances that it will be presumed to continue indefinitely, Worden v. Bielenberg, 119 Minn. 330, 332, 138 N.W. 314, 315 (1912); when it is irremediable, Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Kerns, 164 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir.1947); when it inconveniences the owner in its right and accustomed use, and requires time and expense to restore the land to its former condition, Howell v. City of Dothan, 234 Ala. 158, 163, 174 So. 624, 629 (1937); when it will remain even though the cause has been abated, Mikol v. Vlahopoulos, 86 Ariz. 93, 94, 340 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1959); without it being perpetual, Lone Star Gas Co. v. Hutton, 58 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.Com.App.1933). Obviously, damages to realty are permanent where the act producing the injury to real estate reduces its productivity. Weeds destroy grass and curtail an animal husbandry and farming operation. The infestation of the property with noxious weeds would certainly, we think, materially injure the rights of the owner of the land. Lytle v. Payette-Oregon Slope Irr. Dist., 175 Or. 276, 288, 152 P.2d 934, 939 (1944). When the usual consequence of the injury to the land is to cause it to be less productive, the damages are usually measured by the diminution of the value of the land. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Denton, 288 S.W. 476, 477 (Tex.Civ.App.1926). Apparently, defendants would argue that the weight of the testimony by the Grosses is so light or incredible that the award of $16,000 in temporary and permanent damage is reversible. We do not agree. Due to pollution and contamination of their domestic water well and permanent injury thereto, the Grosses were awarded $25,000. Certainly a well, which is contaminated to such extent that its water is unfit for human consumption, has sustained a permanent injury. Essentially, defendants attack the sufficiency of the evidence upon which to predicate an award of $25,000 for contamination of the well. They insist that the well damage is not supported by proper findings of fact and insist that the finding of fact thereon is clearly erroneous. In light of the principles reannounced in this decision, we cannot agree. It is fundamental to a conclusion on the well damage to recognize that all of the testimony of John and Ben Gross on their domestic well stands uncontradicted. Twenty years of well monitoring exhibited that the water level in the well was stable prior to the flooding. Testimony established the quality of the well was excellent. Their uncontradicted testimony establishes that the Gross family had used this particular well for consumptive purposes since homesteading this family unit early in the century; that this was the only well used for that period of time for consumptive purposes; that the water in the well turned brown, smelled bad, was putrid, and could not be consumed as drinking water. With the purchase of a water purifier to treat the well water, the water could be used in cooking. This is money damage. Destroying a rural family well is destroying the most vital support of family existence. Any ranch or farm, to be a living and working unit, must have a decent well. Ben Gross now purchases drinking water, according to his uncontradicted testimony, from a nearby town. Again, this is money damage and not just emotional damage suggested by the minority view. There is some testimony in the record that John Gross, occasionally, has partaken of purified water drawn from the polluted well. There was unrefuted testimony from John and Ben Gross that they were unable to dig another well due to the geology of the immediate area. John referred specifically to this as a phenomena. These opinions were buttressed by history, for their father had tried to locate water for a well on several occasions during the 1920's, but was unsuccessful. Their testimony stands unrefuted that there was no other water to be located on this particular place for a family well. There is no dispute that the water in the well became unclear and bad smelling shortly after the flood upon the Gross land. For the defendants to argue that the well is unaffected or that the evidence is insufficient, is simply flailing facts which were tried below and personally observed by the circuit judge. Credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony, as well as the weight of the evidence, is for the trial court. Scott v. Wagner, 274 N.W.2d 266 (S.D.1979). Furthermore, in a court trial, [u]pon review, the evidence and inferences therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable to uphold the verdict [judgment] and, if there is competent and substantial evidence to support the verdict [judgment], it must be upheld. Dougherty v. Beckman, 347 N.W.2d 587, 590 (S.D.1984) (bracketed material supplied). We decline to set aside the award of $25,000 damage for pollution and contamination of this domestic water well to a rural family on the state of this record. An application of SDCL 21-1-1 and SDCL 21-1-3 justifies a conclusion that the entire damage award to the Grosses was for a loss and harm suffered and which was reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in its entirety. FOSHEIM, C.J., and DUNN, Retired Justice, concur. WOLLMAN and MORGAN, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.