Opinion ID: 218644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Phillis’s Retaliation Claims.

Text: This case involves two species of retaliation claim—one brought under the ADEA’s retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), and one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of Phillis’s First Amendment rights. The District Court concluded that the ADEA’s retaliation provision preempts Phillis’s First Amendment claims that defendants violated her speech and petition rights by retaliating against her for filing PHRC petitions and union grievances. As the Court acknowledged, we have not yet decided this issue. And we decline to do so today. Instead, we conclude that Phillis’s constitutional claims fail because she has not demonstrated a dispute of material fact as to whether the School District may be held liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).7 In the District Court, Phillis argued that the School District demonstrated a policy of retaliation by continuing to rely on the incidents underlying the 2005 unsatisfactory evaluation even after that evaluation had been withdrawn. We do not see what this has to do with whether the School District had a policy of retaliating against teachers who file 6 We note that Phillis asserts in her brief that her evidence of retaliation also serves as indirect evidence of discrimination. For the reasons stated in the following section, we conclude as well that Phillis’s indirect evidence of retaliation is also insufficient. 7 Under Monell and its progeny, the School District is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if Phillis can show that a District employee “acted pursuant to a formal government policy or a standard operating procedure,” that actions were taken by an individual with “policy making authority,” or that “an official with authority has ratified the unconstitutional actions of a subordinate . . . .” McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir. 2005). 9 PHRC complaints or union grievances. Additionally, when asked during her deposition about “facts relating to a policy of retaliation and discrimination,” Phillis stated only that she had “seen teachers who were older in what looked to me [to be] systematically experiencing constructive discharge,” but could not remember the names of those teachers, except for one Ms. Pottiger (as to whom she offered no details). App. 657. That answer was insufficient to create a dispute of fact as to whether the School District had a policy or custom of retaliating against teachers, and was hopelessly vague even as to whether it had a policy of age discrimination.8 Finally, because Phillis has not shown the existence of a dispute of fact as to her ADEA retaliation claim, that claim also fails. To establish an ADEA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case, Fasold, 409 F.3d at 188, which the District Court concluded Phillis had done. This triggered the School District’s burden to state a “legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action,” at which time “the burden of production returns to [Phillis] to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered rationale was a pretext . . . .” Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 2009). Because the School District does not appear to contest the 8 Finally, though Phillis did not make this argument, we note that Monell liability could be established if the relevant actors—generally Kimber and Bankus—had “final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take action.” McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 369. Pennsylvania law makes clear, however, that the relevant unreviewable discretion is vested in either the school board or the superintendant. 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 11-1123 (“no unsatisfactory rating shall be valid unless approved by the district superintendent”) & 11-1127 (referring to due process procedures to which tenured teachers are entitled before they may be dismissed by the “board of school directors”). Thus, this avenue of establishing School District liability for Kimber’s and Bankus’s alleged constitutional violations is also unavailable to Phillis. 10 District Court’s conclusion that Phillis established her prima facie case, we proceed directly to analyze the District’s articulated reasons for taking the relevant adverse employment actions—placing Phillis on an ITIP in October 2005, and recommending her termination in August 2006—and whether Phillis has succeeded in showing a disputed material fact as to whether those reasons were pretextual. Regarding the ITIP, Bankus testified that the Plan was imposed primarily based on the complaints about Phillis that arose the previous school year, as well as a handful of incidents that occurred in September or early October 2005. Phillis posits that the previous year’s incidents were no longer fair game because they had been included in the procedurally unsound unsatisfactory evaluation, yet she points to nothing that supports that position. Further, while Phillis states in her unsworn declaration that at least one of the relevant incidents did not occur,9 she does not deny others. Thus, we see no basis to disturb the District Court’s conclusion that Phillis failed to show a genuine issue of material fact whether the School District’s stated reasons for placing her on the ITIP were pretextual. Likewise, the School District has satisfied its burden by giving two general reasons for terminating Phillis: that she failed to follow her supervisors’ instructions (including those contained in her ITIPs), and the two discrepancies in Phillis’s job application. Starting with the School District’s second reason, we agree that Phillis has shown that there is at least a dispute of fact whether it had actual or constructive 9 Specifically, Phillis denies that she told students that she had sent pictures of herself, wearing a bikini, to another teacher. 11 knowledge of her DUI conviction much earlier than 2006. As Phillis points out, she had submitted to the School District forms containing information about her conviction during a licensing proceeding that took place in 2002, and a reasonable factfinder could infer that School District administrators had reviewed those forms. However, we are not similarly convinced that, because Phillis’s explanation regarding her departure from Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania School District was technically correct, it could not have been a basis for her dismissal. At minimum, Phillis’s statement was misleading—we note that during litigation subsequent to Phillis’s departure from the Mechanicsburg School District, a Pennsylvania Court stated that she “received an unsatisfactory rating and was dismissed.” Phillis v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Mechanicsburg Area Sch. Dist., 617 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (emphasis added). As to the District’s reliance on Phillis’s failure to follow supervisory instructions, she asserts broadly that the various infractions that the School District claims she committed during the course of her employment were “resoundingly debunk[ed]” by her declaration. But we have already discussed why that declaration is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Beyond her general statement, Phillis specifically challenges only the School District’s decision to issue her a formal letter of reprimand for failing to post classroom rules in the manner required by school policy and her ITIP. In Phillis’s brief in our Court, she labels as “utterly absurd” the contention that she violated this rule by “posting” her class rules horizontally, on a desk, instead of adhering them to a wall or chalkboard. Appellant Br. at 35. However, we deem Phillis’s “horizontal posting” 12 argument insufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the School District was acting pretextually. Accordingly, we see no reason to overturn the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Phillis’s retaliation claim.