Opinion ID: 705512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of previously undisclosed evidence

Text: 4 Calderin first contests the admission into evidence of a six-page document generated by government witness Gina Sarduy following her own arrest on cocaine trafficking charges. The document identified and contained information about individuals with whom Sarduy had conducted her illicit dealings. During the government's redirect examination of Sarduy, it became clear that although the document contained six pages, the defense had received only the first page, which did not contain information relating to Calderin. Following a conference held outside the presence of the jury, the court determined, and the parties do not contest, that although the government had indeed provided the defense with only page one of the document, the error had been inadvertent and had not involved bad faith. The court therefore decided to admit the document and offered the defense several options for dealing with the new development. These included (1) examining Sarduy outside the presence of the jury regarding the information contained in the document, (2) reopening its cross-examination, or (3) requesting a continuance to investigate the document and prepare a further cross-examination. (See February 10, 1994 Tr. at 409-428.) 1 Defense counsel rejected these options and moved instead to strike Sarduy's testimony altogether or, in the alternative, to exclude the additional five pages of the document. The court denied these motions. 5 Calderin now argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was surprised and prejudiced by the late admission of the document. We disagree. According to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500, the government's obligation to produce documents relating to the testimony of its witnesses arises only upon completion of its direct examination of those witnesses. 2 If the government elects not to comply with the Act, the trial court may either strike the implicated testimony or declare a mistrial. 18 U.S.C. 3500(d). In United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440, 447 (7th Cir.1984), we held that: 6 [W]hen the government belatedly produces pretrial statements without any motive to suppress evidence and when any prejudice resulting from the tardy production of statements is curable at trial, the government has not elect[ed] not to comply with the production requirements of the Jencks Act. Therefore, the trial court is not limited to the sanctions listed in subsection (d), but may use its discretion to fashion appropriate remedies. 7 The Wables court faced facts much like our own. The government's inadvertent failure to disclose certain Jencks Act material was discovered after the defense had completed its cross-examination of the government's witness. The court found that the opportunity to reopen cross-examination adequately remedied any possible prejudice caused by the omission. Id. at 447. As in Wables, Calderin was not prejudiced by the government's error. Calderin was offered an opportunity not only to reopen his cross-examination of Sarduy, but also to have the trial continued so that he might investigate the new evidence or prepare a new cross-examination. Calderin has failed to convince us that those measures were inadequate. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Sarduy's testimony or grant a new trial.