Opinion ID: 4563581
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The 1976 Amendment and Statements Made

Text: “Under Penalty of Perjury” The Government offers an alternative argument that requires still more history. Recall that before 1976 the language of § 1546(a) applied only to false statements made “under oath” because, at that time, administrative necessity required applicants to appear in person to sign documents under oath.17 In 1976, Congress again amended § 1546(a) to add an option to sign documents “under penalty of perjury.” Pub. L. No. 94-550, 90 Stat. 2534, 2535 (1976) (“1976 Amendment”). The 1976 Amendment changed § 1546(a) “by inserting immediately after ‘under oath’ the following: ‘, or as permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, knowingly subscribes as true[.]’” Id. This, the Government argues, served to “make clear that the offense extends to [an oral] false statement under oath as well as in writing.” (Response Br. at 23.) Clear it is not. For one thing, new language added to a statute ordinarily ought not be read to alter the meaning of the statute’s existing and unchanged text. Scalia & Garner, supra at 78 (explaining that under the fixed-meaning canon “[w]ords must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted”).18 “After all, if judges could freely invest old 17 See, e.g., Kansas, supra, at 21 (“The formal application is filled out only when the alien presents himself [to the Consulate] with his documents and evidence.”). 18 The Government suggests that we look to legislative history for support (Govt. Supp. Br. at 15–16), but doing so “would risk failing to take account of legislative compromises essential to the law’s passage and, in that way, thwart rather 24 statutory terms with new meanings, we would risk amending legislation outside the single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure the Constitution commands.” New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 539 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). So while the 1976 Amendment added a new, alternative method for attestation, nothing suggests that we are free to change the ordinary understanding of the untouched portion of the text. The Government responds to all of this with necessity, urging an atextual reading of § 1546(a) that reaches oral statements because to hold otherwise “would permit a defendant to escape Section 1546(a) culpability for lying under oath to immigration officials about the contents of required immigration documents,” which the Government characterizes as a “perverted result” that “should be avoided.” (Response Br. at 21.) That plea deserves a response. First, “[i]t is not our role to second-guess Congress’ decision,” or reimagine its words as we think appropriate. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 361 (2019). Lest we forget, “[t]he place to make new legislation, or address unwanted consequences of old legislation, lies in Congress.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753. And that is for reasons as old as our nation: “Congress alone has the institutional competence, democratic legitimacy, and (most importantly) constitutional authority to revise statutes[.]” Wis. Cent., 138 S. Ct. at 2074. Second, the than honor the effectuation of congressional intent.” New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). So we “must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253– 54 (1992). 25 Government asks for an interpretation of § 1546(a) so novel that it concedes it is aware of no decision of any court applying the meaning it seeks. (See Oral Arg. Tr. at 32.) That is more likely explained by the natural reading of the statute than coincidence. Finally, what, precisely, is “perverted” about a result that holds one branch of the Government to the limits imposed by another equal branch? Not the egregious facts of this case. None, including the jury that weighed impartially the mountain of evidence marshalled against Jabateh, would view his conduct as anything less than monstrous. But none, including the Government, can argue that glancing away from the limited authority given by the people will produce a sounder, fairer, and stronger union. To the contrary, “all powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial alike, can be abused or perverted.” Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 105, 137 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). It is our job, under Article III of the Constitution, to enforce that solemn duty in cases both easy and hard, filled with facts both bland and nauseating. For all these reasons, the text, context, and history of § 1546(a) show that the best reading of the statute applies only to material, false statements made in a document under oath or under penalty of perjury, not false statements made orally under oath about that document. See Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2020) (describing the conduct outlined in § 1546 as “immigration-document fraud”).19 19 In supplemental briefing, the Government argues for the first time that even if Jabateh’s conviction under § 1546(a) 26 B. Reviewing Jabateh’s Convictions Under § 1546(a) For Plain Error Having reached the best ordinary reading of § 1546(a), we consider whether Jabateh’s convictions under Counts One and Two may stand. Recall that Jabateh did not raise this issue before the District Court. As a result, our review is defined by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), and we may only reverse if the erroneous interpretation of § 1546(a) is “plain.” United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). And under well-established principles, the error here is not. 1. The Doctrine of Plain Error We ground our analysis in history. The plain error doctrine allows courts to notice and correct, at their discretion, does not stand based on his oral statements, he is still “‘punishable as a principal’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)” because he “caused” an immigration officer “to make the answers on his behalf on the document.” (Govt. Supp. Br. at 7.) Section 2(b) provides “[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(b). But the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]o uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial offends the most basic notions of due process.” Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979). Even if the evidence is clear that Jabateh caused an immigration officer to include false answers in the immigration form, as the Government now contends, it is long past the time for the Government to add charges to its indictment. 27 errors raised for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court has long recognized judicial authority to address “a plain error [that] was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to defendants[.]” Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896); see also Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 221–22 (1905). In United States v. Atkinson, the Supreme Court clarified that the doctrine protects the integrity of judicial proceedings where an unnoticed error threatens to “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936). Less than a decade later, Rule 52(b) codified Atkinson’s definition of plain error. See Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 52; accord Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. Olano articulated the four-prong inquiry for analyzing errors under Rule 52(b) and the plain error doctrine. Courts may provide remedies only if (1) there is an “error[,]” (2) the error is “plain[,]” and (3) the plain error “affect[s] substantial rights.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732–34; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997). Meeting all three allows a court to “correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citing Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160). Still, “Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory.” Id. at 735. And the result is a high bar for reversing plain errors because a “plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy the Atkinson standard, for otherwise the discretion afforded by Rule 52(b) would be illusory.” Id. at 736–37. Here, our interpretation of § 1546(a) does not meet the stringent test of Rule 52(b) because, applying our prior 28 decisions, the issue is not sufficiently “plain” to warrant reversal. 2. Defining What Errors are “Plain” Under Rule 52(b) The term “‘[p]lain’ is synonymous with ‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious.’” Id. at 734 (citations omitted). While courts sometimes speak of statutes as either “clear” or “ambiguous,” the fault lines among possible meanings are rarely so sharp. That is why, whatever the label, “‘a reviewing court employs all of the traditional tools of construction’” to “‘reach a conclusion about the best interpretation,’ thereby resolving any perceived ambiguity.” Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 788 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment)). While that task is not difficult, the process of interpretation may require more or less rummaging in the “toolbox” to “seiz[e] everything from which aid can be derived[.]” Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 n.8 (2016) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)). And the deeper that interpretive inquiry, the less obvious, at least at the outset, the answer. It is generally true that “lack of precedent alone will not prevent us from finding plain error.” United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2013); see, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371, 379 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Although the continuing nature of the conduct criminalized by the . . . statute is a matter of first impression for this Court, we hold that the District Court's error was plain.”); see also United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1047 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he fact that this court rarely finds plain error in [matters of first impression] 29 does not mean that such a conclusion is never warranted.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But for relief under the stringent Olano standard, novel questions still must be capable of measurement against “some other ‘absolutely clear’ legal norm[.]” United States v. Nwoye, 663 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 275 (2013) (“[W]hether the law of [a] circuit initially was unclear . . . . [is] likely to be particularly difficult to resolve where what is at issue is a matter of legal degree, not kind.”); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Seighman, 966 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2020). 3. Jabateh’s Novel Argument does not Produce Plain Error Taken together, the novel question of whether § 1546(a) is best read to include oral statements is not an interpretative exercise that falls within the exacting limits of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). First, it cannot be said that the meaning of § 1546(a) was “clear” as we normally understand clarity in legal interpretation, for the meaning of § 1546(a) was unsettled both at Jabateh’s trial and throughout this appeal. Henderson, 568 U.S. at 275; see also United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that, in plain error review, “‘plain’ simply means ‘clear’”) (citation omitted). Second, as all parties agree, there is no instance of any other court considering the ordinary meaning of § 1546(a). Vanterpool, 767 F.3d at 163. Nor is there any controlling or persuasively clear “legal norm” on the meaning of the provision. Stinson, 734 F.3d at 184; Nwoye, 663 F.3d at 466. At bottom, Jabateh’s challenge presents a new issue of interpretation, where only a close interpretative inquiry reveals the best reading of § 1546(a). That, under controlling decisions 30 of Federal Rule 52(b), is not a clear, plain error. We do not doubt that “[f]ew constitutional principles are more firmly established than a defendant’s right to be heard on the specific charges of which he is accused.” Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979). But the limits on our review prescribed by the Supreme Court in Rule 52(b) under the authority provided by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, bind our review. As a result, we cannot disturb Jabateh’s conviction.20 C. Ample Evidence Supports Jabateh’s Convictions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 Jabateh argues that his perjury convictions should also be reversed because the evidence submitted at trial failed to prove a false statement. Again, as Jabateh failed to move for a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence, we review his claim for plain error. United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 547 (3d Cir. 2002). We thus “review the argument only for a manifest miscarriage of justice—the record must be devoid of evidence of guilt or the evidence must be so tenuous that a conviction is shocking.” United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Such an error requires a 20 Jabateh asks this Court to employ the “rule of lenity” to find in his favor “if there were some doubt about the meaning” of § 1546. (Opening Br. at 29.) Having arrived at the best ordinary meaning of the statute, we find that the rule of lenity has no application here. See United States v. Johnman, 948 F.3d 612, 620 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the rule of lenity “may be applied only where we are left with ‘grievous ambiguity’ after applying all other traditional tools of statutory interpretation”) (citation omitted). 31 defendant to establish that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in even permitting the jury to deliberate.” Id. So “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). Counts Three and Four charged Jabateh with perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1). As usual, the text governs. Section 1621(1) provides that an individual is guilty of perjury if, after “tak[ing] an oath before a competent tribunal [or] officer . . . that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true,” the individual “willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1). Distilled to its elements, the Government must show that Jabateh 1) willfully 2) made a false statement 3) under oath 4) before a tribunal or officer 5) about a material matter. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). The record shows that the Government amply carried its burden. 1. Count Three Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Resident or Adjust Status, asked Jabateh whether he had “ever engaged in genocide, or otherwise ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the killing of any person because of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion[.]” (App. at 84.) Jabateh responded “No” on the form. (App. at 84.) Count Three charged that Jabateh committed perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 during his 2011 Interview when, under oath, he falsely affirmed the truth of this response. 32 Jabateh argues that the Government never established that these killings occurred “because of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion.” (Opening Br. at 30–31.) The evidence presented tells a different story. To start, witnesses recounted in graphic detail the rampant violence perpetrated by Jabateh, personally or under his orders, for factional political affiliation. Hawa Gonoie testified that at just thirteen years old she witnessed Jabateh order his men to kill and mutilate a suspected spy. Janghai Barclay testified that she watched Jabateh declare a captured young man a traitor with no more than a glance and order his execution. Kafumba Konneh testified that he watched Jabateh order executions of suspected spies and NPFL prisoners of war more than once. Or take the evidence that Jabateh and his fighters targeted victims solely based on ethnic and religious differences. After the ULIMO split along tribal lines, with Mandingo fighters forming ULIMO-K and Krahn fighters forming ULIMO-J, Jabateh and his ULIMO-K fighters targeted, tortured, and killed members of the Krahn tribe. Martha Togba testified that she observed Mandingo ULIMO- K fighters disarming non-Mandingo fighters at Zero Guard Post while chanting and wearing headbands proclaiming “No more Jesus, only Allah.” (App. at 450.) A few days later, Jabateh brutally beat, shot, stabbed, and killed Ms. Togba’s pregnant sister, Tina, and left her body in the street to rot; all because she was in a relationship with a Krahn ULIMO-J commander. Candidly, Jabateh does not deny his role in these atrocities. Instead, he argues his actions resulted from “a general atmosphere of cruelty and violence in the context of a 33 civil war seemingly waged without rules or restraint.” (Opening Br. at 31.) Even if “there were no clean hands” in the Liberian civil war (App. at 619), and even if multiple factions committed religiously, ethnically or politically motivated violence, they are of no possible relevance to Jabateh’s convictions. There was sufficient evidence presented for a rational trier of fact to have found that Jabateh committed perjury. 2. Jabateh Gained Immigration Benefits by Fraud or Willful Misrepresentation Remember that during the 2011 Interview immigration officials asked Jabateh whether he had, “by fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact, ever sought to procure, or procured, a visa, other documentation, entry into the U.S., or any immigration benefit,” a question identical to that shown on his Form I-485. (App. at 84, 637.) Jabateh orally reaffirmed that his response was “no.” That, says the Government in Count Four of the indictment, is perjury in violation of § 1621 because Jabateh gained asylum by lying in his Asylum Application and again during 1999 Interview. That is correct. Begin with Jabateh’s submissions in support of his application for asylum. In his attached personal statement, Jabateh stated that between 1992 and 1995 he served as an “intelligence officer” and later as a “security section liaison” with the ULIMO. (App. at 144–45.) The evidence shows otherwise, with several witnesses testifying that Jabateh never served in security, but as a commander and an active combatant in the ULIMO-K. Jabateh argues that his “inadequately detailed personal statement” was “[b]ut a simple failure to volunteer additional 34 information” and insufficient to establish fraud or willful misrepresentation. (Opening Br. at 34–35.) But this is no simple oversight or innocuous omission. He not only failed to disclose his role as a combatant, he affirmatively misrepresented the scope of that role. Jabateh painted himself as a peaceful figure that actively “protect[ed] Mandingo and Krahn people from being murdered and massacred” and assisted with United Nations and ECOMOG disarmament efforts. (App. at 144–45.) The testimony of seventeen witnesses to his violence brought forth the truth. These misrepresentations no doubt led Jabateh to be granted asylum. Nancy Vanlue, the asylum officer who conducted the 1999 Interview, testified that, had she known Jabateh misrepresented his positions in ULIMO, he would have been barred from obtaining asylum as a persecutor. And Jabateh’s misrepresentations did not end with his asylum application and personal statement. In the 1999 Interview, he denied having “ever committed a crime” or even “harm[ing] anyone else.” (App. at 74, 166, 570–71.) Jabateh now claims on appeal that these questions “are too vague and ambiguous to support a conviction.” (Opening Br. at 37 (quoting App. at 74).) Yet “[c]hallenges to the clarity of a question” that arise in perjury cases, such as the challenge raised by Jabateh, “are typically left to the jury, which has the responsibility of determining whether the defendant understood the question to be confusing or subject to many interpretations.” United States v. Hird, 913 F.3d 332, 346 (3d Cir. 2019). That means we “will not disturb a jury’s determination that a response under oath constitutes perjury unless it is entirely unreasonable to expect that the defendant understood the question posed to him.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, we are “focused on 35 glaring instances of vagueness or double-speak by the examiner at the time of questioning (rather than artful post-hoc interpretations of the questions) that—by the lights of any reasonable fact-finder—would mislead or confuse a witness into making a response that later becomes the basis of a perjury conviction.” Id. at 347–48. That standard makes quick work of this claim. For it was not “entirely unreasonable” for the jury to have expected Jabateh to have understood these simple questions. Id. at 346. Vanlue’s testimony, for example, shows that Jabateh understood what it means to commit a crime or cause harm. Vanlue recalled that during his asylum interview Jabateh described being beaten, and his wife raped, because of his Mandingo tribal affiliation. Gallingly, he cited these acts as the basis for his asylum claim. The jury could conclude Jabateh knew right from wrong. Likewise, as already painfully recounted, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational finding that Jabateh’s entire military career was defined by violent crime. Logically, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Jabateh gained asylum by lying about his crimes. And from there it is a small step to conclude that Jabateh perjured himself during his 2011 Interview by affirming under oath statements “which he d[id] not believe to be true.” 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1). For all those reasons, we find no plain error in Jabateh’s conviction under Count Four. 36 D. The District Court was Not Required to Merge Jabateh’s Immigration Fraud and Perjury Convictions For the first time on appeal, Jabateh argues that Counts One and Three charged the “same offense.” Likewise, Counts Two and Four. We disagree. “The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses[,] or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 71 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying Blockburger’s “same-elements” test). To prove a violation of § 1546(a), the Government needed to show that Jabateh 1) “knowingly” 2) “under oath” 3) made “any false statement” 4) “with respect to a material fact” 5) in a “document required by the immigration laws or regulations.” 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). By contrast, to prove a violation of § 1621(1), the Government needed to establish that Jabateh 1) “willfully” 2) made a false statement 3) under oath 4) before a tribunal or officer 5) about “any material matter.” 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1). Comparing these two statutes reveals at least two key differences. First, § 1546(a) requires proof that the “false statement” was in a “document required by the immigration laws or regulations.” Section 1621(1) contains no such element. Second, § 1546(a) and § 1621(1) require different states of mind. Section 1546(a) requires proof of a “knowingly” false statement, while § 1621(1) requires proof the defendant acted “willfully.” Cf. United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing “knowingly” as 37 “a reduced mens rea” as compared to “willfully”) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 914–15 (3d Cir. 1975) (“Congress chose to provide different mens rea elements: Unlike the general perjury statute, § 1623 requires that a false statement be made ‘knowingly,’ rather than ‘willfully.’”). As each statute requires the Government to establish at least one element that is not required by the other statute, there is no plain error in declining to merge the counts. E. Jabateh’s Consecutive Sentence is not Plain Error Jabateh challenges his thirty-year aggregate sentence, arguing that the District Court’s 26-level departure and imposition of the maximum sentence on each count running consecutively was procedurally unreasonable. Once again, as Jabateh failed to raise his objections before the District Court, we review the procedural reasonableness of his sentence for plain error.21 Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 764 (2020) (“Errors ‘not brought to the court’s attention’ . . . are subject to review only insofar as they are ‘plain.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 52(b)). He does not meet that rigorous test. We have explained that “District Courts engage in a three step process when imposing a sentence, the first being that the defendant’s guideline range is calculated.” United States v. Stevenson, 832 F.3d 412, 431 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal 21 Although Jabateh first argued we review his sentence for an abuse of discretion (Opening Br. at 46), he conceded at oral argument that he was “up against plain error” (Oral Arg. Tr. at 52). We agree with that revised position, as Jabateh has not pointed to where he objected to an above-Guidelines sentence. Nor can we locate any objection in the record. 38 quotation marks and citation omitted). And “[t]he [District] Court [is] required to make this determination before moving on to consider any departure motions (step two) and the § 3553(a) factors (step three)[.]” Id. Jabateh argues that the District Court committed procedural errors by 1) imposing an unjustified upward departure; 2) imposing consecutive sentences; and 3) basing Jabateh’s sentence on a material misapprehension of fact. 1. The District Court’s Upward Departure or Variance The District Court departed 26 levels to impose a total sentence of 360 months, comprising consecutively-running sentences of 120 months’ imprisonment on each of Counts One and Two (violations of § 1546(a)) and sixty months’ imprisonment on each of Counts Three and Four (violations of § 1621).22 That represented the statutory maximum for each count of conviction. The District Court based its sentence on two alternative grounds: 1) “an upward departure because of the seriousness of [Jabateh’s] immigration offenses, pursuant 22 Jabateh does not challenge the District Court’s initial calculation of the advisory Guideline range of fifteen months’ to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. Rather, he challenges the 26-level upward departure, which led to an adjusted Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment. (App. at 11.) The District Court then imposed the combined statutory maximum of 360 months for all four counts. (App. at 11.) See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (statutory maximum of ten years for the first and second offense under this section); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (statutory maximum of five years). 39 to Guidelines § 5K2.0”; and 2) “an upward variance from the Guidelines, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553[.]” (App. at 26–27.) Under § 5K2.0, a “sentencing court may depart from the applicable guideline range if . . . the court finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance[.]” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(1). The District Court calculated the initial Guidelines range using the 2010 Sentencing Guidelines, which did “not take into consideration the significant aggravating circumstances—the serious human rights offenses—the defendant concealed when he committed the instant offense[s].” (PSR ¶ 108.) As the District Court’s exhaustive sentencing memorandum explained, Jabateh’s “criminal actions f[e]ll well outside the heartland of all Guidelines provisions related to immigration fraud and perjury.” (App. at 35; see also PSR ¶¶ 108, 110 (observing that “[a]fter considering the history and characteristics of the defendant, the Court may consider a sentence outside the advisory guideline system”).) Although the District Court addressed and considered Jabateh’s conduct in Liberia, the sentence was ultimately based on the seriousness of his lies and their effect on the asylum and immigration process. As to Jabateh’s immigration fraud, the District Court reasoned that “[i]n lying to INS about his crimes and seeking sanctuary as a persecuted refugee, [Jabateh] stood the persecutor bar and, indeed, the asylum system itself, on its head.” (App. at 33.) And as to perjury, the District Court emphasized that the “heartland of Guidelines § 2J1.3 is far removed from the kind of perjury [Jabateh] committed here: perjury that undermines the foundations of our immigration and asylum system.” (App. at 35.) 40 These conclusions are neither irrational nor novel. To the contrary, they mirror decisions in similar cases imposing statutory maximum sentences for similar offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming concurrent, statutory-maximum sentences for immigration fraud convictions arising from defendant’s concealment of her role in the Rwandan genocide); United States v. Worku, 800 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2015) (affirming significant upward departure and 22-year sentence for immigration fraud conviction arising from concealment of defendant’s human rights abuses in Ethiopia). For those reasons, there is no plain error. The Court’s sentencing memorandum leaves no doubt that its rationale for Jabateh’s substantive sentence, and for running the sentences consecutively, are the same. United States v. Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 346 (6th Cir. 2012). 2. The Imposition of Consecutive Sentences “Judges have long been understood to have discretion to select whether the sentences they impose will run concurrently or consecutively with respect to [the] sentences that they impose[.]” Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236 (2012); accord United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2019). To exercise this discretion, a district court, “in determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” 18 U.S.C. § 3584. Here, the District Court appropriately weighed the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). While the Guidelines advise that “[a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together,” 41 U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, they readily acknowledge a district court’s authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.2(d), 5G1.3(b). “If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d). This was case here. Consecutive sentences implemented the District Court’s adjusted Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment, reduced to the statutory maximum of 360 months. Given the latitude afforded to sentencing courts to select concurrent or consecutive sentences, and the Guidelines’ directive that sentences “shall run consecutively to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment,” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d), the sentences here are not plainly erroneous. 3. The Sentence was Not Based on a Material Misapprehension of Fact Finally, Jabateh argues that his sentence must be vacated because the District Court stated Jabateh had committed or participated in genocide.23 But the Court did not 23 A defendant is guilty of “genocide” when, with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group . . . (1) kills members of that group; (2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group; (3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar 42 justify the sentence based on the possible legal significance of Jabateh’s actions. Rather, the sentence stemmed from “the egregiousness of [Jabateh’s] lies and their effect on our immigration system,” and the fact that the “lies allowed [him] to impugn the integrity of our asylum process for almost twenty years.” (App. at 38.) Over and over, the District Court explained its decision hinged on the gravity of Jabateh’s concealment of his “commission of every conceivable war crime” and “countless human rights offenses.” (App. at 32; App. at 28 (“I thus imposed an upward departure because of the seriousness of Defendant’s lies, separate and apart from the horror of the crimes themselves.”) (emphasis added).) So there is no plain error in considering Jabateh’s participation in genocidal acts, among the multitude of human rights atrocities established in the record, to fashion a reasonable sentence.24 techniques; (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part; (5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or (6) transfers by force the children of the group to another group[.] 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a). 24 Even assuming the District Court considered Jabateh’s role in genocide, there would be no misapprehension of fact constituting plain error. (See App. at 14–24, 26, 32 (noting efforts to “eliminate Krahn rivals”), 1391–93, 1394 (“The trial has overwhelmingly showed that the defendant committed these acts purely, purely because of ethnic enmity, political enmity, or religious enmity.”).) Jabateh’s denials of 43