Opinion ID: 781953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Work-For-Hire Status

Text: 10 The Act provides that copyright ownership vests initially in the author or authors of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). However, if the work is made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author..., and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all the rights in the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). Section 101 of the Act defines a work made for hire as: 11 (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use ... as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, ... if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. 12 17 U.S.C. § 101. The parties agree that Warren was not an employee of MTM, but MTM contends that the agreements signed by the parties illustrate an express agreement that the works in question were specially commissioned as works for hire. 4 We agree. 13 The Act confers work-for-hire status on a work where the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The first agreement, signed on February 25, 1982, states that MTM contracted to employ Warren to render services to [MTM] for the television pilot photoplay now entitled `Remington Steele.' It also is clear that the parties agreed that MTM would own all right, title and interest in and to [Warren's] services and the results and proceeds thereof, and all other rights granted to [MTM] in [the Music Employment Agreement] to the same extent as if ... [MTM were] the employer of [Warren]. The Music Employment Agreement provided: 14 As [Warren's] employer for hire, [MTM] shall own in perpetuity, throughout the universe, solely and exclusively, all rights of every kind and character, in the musical material and all other results and proceeds of the services rendered by [Warren] hereunder and [MTM] shall be deemed the author thereof for all purposes. 15 The parties later executed contracts almost identical to these first agreements in June 1984, July 1985, and November 1986. As the district court noted, these subsequent contracts are even more explicit in defining the compositions as works for hire. Letters that Warren signed accompanying the later Music Employment Agreements provided: It is understood and agreed that you are supplying [your] services to us as our employee for hire ... [and] [w]e shall own all right, title and interest in and to [your] services and the results and proceeds thereof, as works made for hire. The Music Employment Agreements executed in conjunction with these letters further provided that: 16 [MTM] shall own in perpetuity, ... solely and exclusively, ... all rights of every kind and character, in the musical material and all other results and proceeds of the service rendered by [Warren] hereunder and [MTM] shall be deemed the author thereof for all purposes, to the same extent as if [MTM] were [Warren]'s employer for hire. 5 17 That the agreements did not use the talismanic words specially ordered or commissioned matters not, for there is no requirement, either in the Act or the caselaw, that work-for-hire contracts include any specific wording. In fact, in Playboy Enterprises v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.1995), the Second Circuit held that legends stamped on checks were writings sufficient to evidence a work-for-hire relationship where the legend read: By endorsement, payee: acknowledges payment in full for services rendered on a work-made-for-hire basis in connection with the Work named on the face of this check, and confirms ownership by Playboy Enterprises, Inc. of all right, title and interest (except physical possession), including all rights of copyright, in and to the Work. Id. at 560. The agreements at issue in the instant case are more explicit than the brief statement that was before the Second Circuit. 18 By the same token, that the contracts were entitled Music Employment Agreement and not Work-For-Hire Agreement is not conclusive, as nothing in the Act or our caselaw indicates that an agreement's title is a dispositive factor in determining whether a work-for-hire relationship exists. In this case, not only did the contracts internally designate the compositions as works made for hire, they provided that MTM shall be deemed the author thereof for all purposes. This is consistent with a work-for-hire relationship under the Act, which provides that the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 19 That the works were created at the behest of MTM is conclusively demonstrated by the plain language of the contracts. The contracts specified that Warren was, among other things, to compose an original musical score ... mak[ing] such revisions in the musical material as [MTM] may require, and clearly indicate that such composing was to be done for the sole purpose of the Remington Steele program. The contracts also provide that [MTM]'s judgment shall be final in all matters, including matters involving artistic and creative matters, and that Warren's services would be rendered in such manner as [MTM] may direct, under the instructions and control, in accordance with the ideas of and at the times and places required by the duly authorized representative of [MTM]. 20 Warren argues that the use of royalties as a form of compensation demonstrates that this was not a work-for-hire arrangement. While we have not addressed this specific question, the Second Circuit held in Playboy that where the creator of a work receives royalties as payment, that method of payment generally weighs against finding a work-for-hire relationship. 53 F.3d at 555. However, Playboy clearly held that this factor was not conclusive. In addition to noting that the presence of royalties only generally weighs against a work-for-hire relationship, Playboy cites Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972), for the proposition that [t]he absence of a fixed salary ... is never conclusive. 53 F.3d at 555. Further, the payment of royalties was only one form of compensation given to Warren under the contracts. Warren was also given a fixed sum payable upon completion. That some royalties were agreed upon in addition to this sum is not sufficient to overcome the great weight of the contractual evidence indicating a work-for-hire relationship. 6 21 Warren further argues that it was not his intent to enter into a work-for-hire relationship when he signed the employment agreements. While California law permits consideration of parol evidence to explain the meaning of the terms of a contract even when the meaning appears unambiguous, Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 826(9th Cir.2001), the evidence Warren seeks to admit does not explain the contract so much as attempt to contradict it. Warren's protestations thus do not undermine the explicit and unambiguous contract that establishes his compositions as works made for hire. Because the works were made for hire, Warren retains no rights of authorship and lacks standing to sue for infringement as a legal owner of the copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 501(b).