Opinion ID: 1129438
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Reinstruct on Viewing Defendant's Extrajudicial Statements With Caution

Text: (35) Defendant next contends that the court erred in failing to reinstruct, sua sponte, at the penalty phase, that a defendant's own oral admissions should be viewed with caution. (See People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 194 [121 Cal. Rptr. 111, 534 P.2d 1015].) (Such an instruction was given at the guilt phase.) The argument is without merit. At the penalty phase, defendant's sister, Lisa Morales, testified regarding defendant's family loyalty and his promise to help her if she ever needed anything. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited the fact that defendant once told her that if anyone ever hurt her, he would help her with them. In other words, according to Miss Morales, I guess [he would] hurt them the way they had hurt me. Thereafter, defense counsel called defendant's friend, Lydia Lopez, who gave similar favorable testimony regarding defendant's willingness to help his friends. As an example, Mrs. Lopez indicated that defendant, after learning that her husband was angry with her, had once remarked that if her husband ever hurt her, I don't know what I will be able to do, but indicated he would be there if anything happened. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if defendant had offered to take care of your husband. The witness replied that defendant had made no such statement, but just said he didn't know what he could do. Assuming that the oral admissions rule applies to the penalty phase, it seems apparent that defendant's remarks in these two instances cannot be characterized as admissions for purposes of the rule requiring a cautionary instruction. In neither instance was defendant acknowledging or admitting any fact particularly damaging to his position at the penalty phase; the gist of the testimony was that defendant's loyalty to his relatives and friends extended to physically defending them if they needed such defense. In light of the other evidence in the case, such testimony seems quite harmless. As we stated in Romo, supra, 14 Cal.3d at page 194, the trial court should give the cautionary instruction, sua sponte, where it is warranted by the evidence. We conclude that the evidence elicited from witnesses Morales and Lopez was insufficient to invoke that rule. (36) In a related argument, defendant observes that the jury was instructed that it might consider guilt phase evidence in deciding the penalty issue, and that the prosecutor, in his penalty phase closing arguments, relied upon some oral statements of defendant introduced at the guilt phase. Although the guilt phase jury was properly instructed to receive such statements with caution, defendant now contends that, in light of the prosecutor's subsequent use of the statements at the penalty phase, the jury should have been reinstructed on the matter. The prosecutor referred to defendant's guilt phase statements only for purposes of attempting to rebut his penalty phase evidence indicating he felt remorse for his offenses. Defendant cites no authority supporting the necessity for a sua sponte instruction under such limited circumstances. As the People point out, defendant may well have had tactical reasons for not calling the jury's attention to his statements in a special penalty phase instruction. (See People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 281.) Moreover, a reasonable jury would assume such generic instructions remained applicable at the penalty phase. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 460 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].)