Opinion ID: 1801948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged improper exercise of peremptory challenges

Text: During jury selection, defendant made two motions under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], contesting the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove three African-American prospective jurors from the panel. As to each motion, the trial court expressly found no prima facie case had been established, but allowed the prosecutor to place her reasons for each challenge on the record. The jury that tried defendant included no African-American jurors. Defendant now contends that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans from the jury violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258.) We conclude no violation occurred.
Following the exercise of challenges for cause, 60 prospective jurors remained in the jury venire, four of whom were African-American. Twelve of the 60 were randomly selected to sit in the jury box. Prospective Juror No. 045921, an African-American man, was among the 12 initially selected. The court and counsel for both parties questioned the 12 prospective jurors, and the parties commenced exercising peremptory challenges. After the prosecution and the defense each had exercised one peremptory challenge, Prospective Juror No. 042519, an African-American woman, was called to the jury box. The prosecutor used her next peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror No. 042519. After the defense had used one more challenge, the prosecutor used her third peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror No. 045921. After each side had exercised five peremptory challenges, defendant made his first Wheeler motion. [13] Defense counsel pointed out that the prosecutor had dismissed the only two African-American prospective jurors who had been called to the jury box. The prosecutor countered that other African-Americans remained among the prospective jurors not yet called. The court stated it was not satisfied that a prima facie case had been established, but invited the prosecutor to make whatever record you wish to make. The prosecutor explained that Prospective Juror No. 042519 had stated on her questionnaire that she's Islamic, that she does not sit in judgment, however since the questionnaire she changed her mind. Because of that, I feel that there is a very good chance that she could, between now and the time that the case is over, change her mind back and say that she cannot or does not sit in judgment on anyone. [¶] She was also arrested for welfare fraud, and I have feelings that she would not be a fair juror to the People. Prospective Juror No. 045921, the prosecutor explained, on his questionnaire wrote down he does not believe in the death penalty but he could vote for it. The prosecutor concluded, It had nothing to do with either's race. It has to do with their feelings on the death penalty. I do not feel that this is subject to Wheeler. When the selection process resumed, the prosecutor accepted the jury after exercising a total of 15 peremptory challenges. Defendant, however, exercised a challenge. After the prosecutor and the defense had each challenged one more prospective juror, Prospective Juror No. 045787, an African-American woman, was called to the jury box. The prosecutor used her next challenge to excuse Prospective Juror No. 045787. Following voir dire of the replacement, both sides accepted the panel, and the jury was sworn. Two alternate jurors were chosen and sworn shortly after each side had exercised one more peremptory challenge. After the jurors had been released for the day, defendant renewed his Wheeler motion. Defendant pointed out that Prospective Juror No. 045787 was African-American, and noted that the prosecution had challenged all three African-American prospective jurors who had been called to sit on the jury. The court again stated it was not prepared to find a prima facie case, noting that one African-American prospective juror had not been called. Nonetheless, the court again invited the prosecutor to make a record ... for purposes of review. The prosecutor explained she had excused Prospective Juror No. 045787 because, [o]n her questionnaire and during the time that she was interviewed, [Prospective Juror No. 045787] said that the police were unkind to her brother. She knows three people that were falsely accused of crimes, and in the questionnaire, she said that she could not sit in judgment. She was not God. And then when she got in the courtroom she could sit in judgment, ... but I cannot imagine that this woman would continue with one decision that she could keep for any length of time, because in a period of a week, she changed her mind from not being able to sit in judgment and not being God, to being able to sit in judgment of her fellow man. The prosecutor also noted that there was another African-American woman in the audience whom she had no intention of kicking. After the trial court ascertained defense counsel had nothing to add, the Wheeler motion was not discussed again.
(7) It is well settled that `[a] prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group biasthat is, bias against members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar groundsviolates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. [Citations.] Such a practice also violates the defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Citations.]' ( People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 898 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 200 P.3d 898]; see also Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258.) When a defendant asserts at trial that the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes violates the federal Constitution, the following procedures and standards apply. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide ... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' [Citation.] ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 125 S.Ct. 2410], fn. omitted; see also Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 476-477 [170 L.Ed.2d 175, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207]; Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 239 [162 L.Ed.2d 196, 125 S.Ct. 2317].) The identical three-step procedure applies when the challenge is brought under the California Constitution. ( People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 136 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 186 P.3d 437].) Here, we assume without deciding that defendant established a prima facie case by pointing out that the prosecutor used three of the 18 peremptory challenges she exercised to strike all of the African-American prospective jurors called to the jury box, resulting in no African-Americans serving on defendant's jury. (See People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 137; People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1106 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4] [assuming prima facie case established where prosecutor used five of 15 peremptory challenges to excuse the only African-Americans called to the box], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11]; see also Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 164, 173 [inference of discrimination, sufficient to satisfy Batson 's prima facie standard, arose where prosecutor in interracial murder case used three of 12 peremptory challenges to remove all eligible African-American prospective jurors from a pool of 43, resulting in an all' White jury].) Because the prosecutor explained her dismissals at the court's invitation, we proceed to the second and third steps of the Batson/Wheeler analysis. (See People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 137; People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1106.) We conclude the prosecutor's stated nondiscriminatory reasons for excusing Prospective Jurors Nos. 045921, 042519, and 045787 were amply supported. ( People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1106.) Preliminarily, we note that `[T]he critical question in determining whether [a party] has proved purposeful discrimination at step three is the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's justification for his peremptory strike.' ( Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 338-339 [154 L.Ed.2d 931, 123 S.Ct. 1029].) The credibility of a prosecutor's stated reasons [for exercising a peremptory challenge] `can be measured by, among other factors ... how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.' ( Id. at p. 339.) ( People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 900.) (8) Defendant contends the prosecutor's reasons for excusing Prospective Juror No. 045921 were not plausible, and that her pretextual explanation for her challenge to Prospective Juror No. 045921 calls into doubt the legitimacy and credibility of her proffered reasons for excusing Prospective Jurors Nos. 042519 and 045787 as well. We disagree. The prosecutor excused Prospective Juror No. 045921 because he wrote on his questionnaire that he did not believe in the death penalty. The prosecutor's reason was both credible and based on a permissible race-neutral factor. On his questionnaire, when asked to describe his feelings about the death penalty, Prospective Juror No. 045921 wrote flatly, I don't believe in it. Although he also indicated that he might be able to vote to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case, the prosecutor reasonably could have believed that he would be reluctant to impose it because he did not believe in it. We previously have recognized that a prospective juror's scruples regarding the death penalty are reasonably related to trial strategy (see Miller-El v. Cockrell, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 339) and are a legitimate race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 472; accord, People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 139-140.) Defendant argues Prospective Juror No. 045921's attitude toward the death penalty was not unfavorable to the prosecution. Prospective Juror No. 045921 wrote on his questionnaire that he had served as a military police officer in the Air Force, had no complaints about the criminal justice system, and did not know anyone who had been falsely accused of a crime. Further, Prospective Juror No. 045921 had himself been, or knew someone else who had been, a crime victim. Prospective Juror No. 045921 also wrote he did not feel the death penalty was wrong for any religious, moral or ethical reason and had no belief as to whether the death penalty was imposed too often or too seldom. But none of these responses was inherently in conflict with ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 474) the prosecutor's assessment that Prospective Juror No. 045921 might be reluctant to vote for the death penalty because he did not believe in it. Defendant also points out that during voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 045921 said that although he did not believe in the death penalty, he could impose it if the law required it because if I'm going to participate in the system, you have to play by all of the rules. However, after the prosecutor explained that the law does not tell you how to vote .... [¶] The law says you listen to everything and then you make the choice yourself, Prospective Juror No. 045921 began to express concern about the risk of error in the trial process. For example, he said, I need more to go along with the death [penalty] because my thought is we all make mistakes, and if you go to the death penalty, I'm not willing to put my representation [ sic ] and say this is absolute. It has to be. And then somewhere down the line something comes up, and you know what? We didn't know that at the time. It is too late then and to me, that is a waste. When asked whether he would be more inclined to vote for life without the possibility of parole because some day there might be a mistake, he commented, you have to be sure enough that I'm willing to put somebody's life in danger. Asked the same question again, he responded yes. On this record, the prosecutor reasonably could have believed that Prospective Juror No. 045921 would not be a favorable juror for the prosecution in this case, in which all the evidence of guilt was circumstantial. Because substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the prosecutor's reason for excusing Prospective Juror No. 045921 was credible and race neutral, the legitimacy of the prosecutor's reasons for excusing Prospective Jurors Nos. 042519 and 045787 is not called into doubt. Nonetheless, having examined the prosecutor's justifications for those excusals, we find them amply supported as well. As noted above, the prosecutor stated that she excused Prospective Juror No. 042519 in part because she had changed her mind about whether she could sit in judgment of another person and in part because she had been arrested for welfare fraud. The record supports the credibility of these reasons. On her questionnaire, when asked whether she had any moral or religious beliefs that would affect her ability to sit in judgment of another person as a trial juror, she wrote, My religion is that of Islam. I don't sit in judgment of others. On voir dire, however, Prospective Juror No. 042519 stated she could imagine herself voting for the death penalty as a juror. Prospective Juror No. 042519 also repudiated other statements she had made in her questionnaire, including that she did not believe in the death penalty, that the death penalty was wrong, and that she could never vote for the death penalty regardless of the facts of the case. When asked why she had changed her mind, she explained, I got to thinking about so many things going on that if a personif I done something, I should be punished and that's the way I feel about life. If I am guilty, why not punish me because everybody should know right from wrong. Under the circumstances, the prosecutor reasonably could have been concerned that Prospective Juror No. 042519 was subject to changing her mind and, when pressed, would revert to the views she stated in her questionnaire. (9) Moreover, on her questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 042519 wrote that she had been arrested for welfare fraud. A prospective juror's negative experience with the criminal justice system, including arrest, is a legitimate, race-neutral reason for excusing the juror. ( People v. Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 140; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 442 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790].) As noted above, the prosecutor said she excused Prospective Juror No. 045787 because she indicated that police had been unkind to her brother; she knew people who had been falsely accused of crimes; and, like Prospective Juror No. 042519, she had changed her mind about whether she could sit in judgment. The record supports these reasons. On her questionnaire, when asked to describe her feelings about the way law enforcement handled the arrest of someone close to her, Prospective Juror No. 045787 wrote Policeunkind. She also wrote that she believed her ex-husband, brother and son all had been falsely accused of crimes. Finally, on her questionnaire, in response to a question whether she had any moral or religious beliefs that would affect you[r] ability to sit in judgment of another person as a trial juror, she wrote I'm not God. When questioned on voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 045787 consistently indicated that although it was possible that she could vote to impose the death penalty, it would be very difficult for her to do so. In response to a question from the court, she said, [C]ertain people are put here to do certain things, and judging another person is not mine. She then clarified that she was willing to decide whether someone was telling the truth, but was uncomfortable with telling somebody that we have to take your life. After the court had fully explained the trial process, she conceded it was possible she could vote for the death penalty, but repeated it would be hard to tell[] someone that I have to take your life. Finally, when the prosecutor asked Prospective Juror No. 045787 about the I'm not God statement on her questionnaire, she explained, It depends on the circumstances, or whatever, but I still feel like God is the one that is supposed to judge. He is the judge ... [¶] ... [therefore] when it comes to taking somebody's life, it would be hard. The record thus provides ample support for the prosecutor's concern that Prospective Juror No. 045787 would not be a favorable juror for the prosecution. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's failure to question Prospective Jurors Nos. 042519 and 045787 about the matters later used to justify her challenges for cause demonstrates that the reasons were pretextual. (See Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 246, 250, fn. 8 [a party's failure to engage in meaningful voir dire on a topic the party says is important can suggest the stated reason is pretextual].) Here, although the prosecutor did not question Prospective Jurors Nos. 042519 and 045787 about their negative experiences with the justice system, she did engage them extensively on the topic that apparently concerned her most: their ability, because of their religious views, to sit in judgment of others and to impose the death penalty. The prosecutor even unsuccessfully challenged Prospective Juror No. 045787 for cause. Under the circumstances, the prosecutor's failure to question the prospective jurors about each and every area of articulated concern does not undermine the conclusion that her stated race-neutral reasons for excusing these prospective jurors were genuine and not pretextual. [14]