Opinion ID: 1530103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The State's Standing

Text: Turning first to plaintiff's cross-appeal, we can find no language in our case law to support Realty's contention that the Attorney General, acting on behalf of the State of Rhode Island, lacks standing to challenge on appeal the judgment entered against it by the Superior Court. This Court has recognized that the Attorney General is vested with the authority to maintain suits seeking redress of a public wrong, except in such instances where one of the public who is injured has a distinct personal legal interest different from that of the public at large   . McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.I. 55, 62, 83 A.2d 75, 78 (1951); see also Secretary of Administration and Finance v. Attorney General, 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1975) (The Attorney General    has a common law duty to represent the public interest.); State v. Boston & M.R.R., 75 N.H. 327, 74 A. 542, 547 (1909) ([I]t is generally recognized that the Attorney General is the proper party to proceedings in equity to restrain public nuisances and kindred wrongs.); President and Fellows of Middlebury College v. Central Power Corp. of Vermont, 101 Vt. 325, 143 A. 384, 391 (1928) ([T]he state, through the Attorney General, is a proper party to maintain and defend the rights of the public   .). In this case, the locus in quo, namely North Commercial Wharf, Scott's Wharf, and the connector, are significantly incidental to commerce and tourism in the City of Newport. Because Realty seeks a judicial declaration of the private nature of the property, its cause of action thereby implicates the public's interest in the continued use and enjoyment of the land. This alone justifies the Attorney General's involvement in this litigation. Furthermore, we highlight that the state was a named defendant in Realty's original cause of action in Superior Court. General Laws 1956 § 9-24-1 provides that: Any party aggrieved by a final judgment, decree, or order of the [S]uperior [C]ourt may, within the time prescribed by applicable procedural rules, appeal to the [S]upreme [C]ourt. Irrespective of plaintiff's rationale for joining the state in its lawsuit, the unambiguous language of § 9-24-1 entitles the state to challenge the adverse judgment before this Court. To accept plaintiff's argument would impermissibly strip the state of that statutorily guaranteed right of appeal in this case. Accordingly, we deny plaintiff's cross-appeal and shall proceed to determine the issues that the state raises in its appeal.