Opinion ID: 1702843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting instruction d-4.

Text: ¶ 20. Along with others, instruction D-4 was given to the jury over the objection of the State. Instruction D-4 reads as follows: In arriving at your verdict in this case you must not indulge in suspicion, speculation, conjecture or guesswork. You can only act upon the testimony and evidence introduced before you upon the witness stand. Where there is a controverted issue of material fact, and the testimony and evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the State's contention in regard to that issue of material fact is true, then you must find that fact in favor of Lash Deon Rogers. ¶ 21. The State contends that this instruction is equivalent to the two-theory instruction commonly given in a circumstantial evidence case and that this particular case was not a circumstantial evidence case. The two-theory instruction commonly given in circumstantial evidence cases states: The Court instructs the jury that if there may be a fact or circumstance in this cause susceptible of two interpretations, one favorable and the other unfavorable to [Defendant], when the jury has considered such fact or circumstance with all other evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation, then you, the jury, must resolve such doubt in favor of [Defendant], and place upon such fact or circumstance the interpretation most favorable to [Defendant]. Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1140 (Miss.1992). This instruction is the so-called two-theory instruction which we have said should be granted only in a case based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Kitchens v. State, 300 So.2d 922, 926 (Miss.1974) (citing Coward v. State, 223 Miss. 538, 78 So.2d 605 (1955)). It is only in entirely circumstantial evidence cases that such an instruction is required. Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss.1988); Boches v. State, 506 So.2d 254, 260 (Miss.1987); Clark v. State, 503 So.2d 277, 278-79 (Miss.1987); Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266, 267 (Miss.1985); Henderson v. State, 453 So.2d 708, 709-10 (Miss.1984); Johnson v. State, 347 So.2d 358, 360 (Miss.1977). ¶ 22. Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266, 268 (Miss.1985) discusses the difference between circumstantial and direct evidence, as follows: What is circumstantial evidence? The least inadequate definition we can provide is that circumstantial evidence is evidence which, without going directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to a logical inference that such fact does exist. Conversely, eye witness testimony is thought of as direct evidence. A circumstantial evidence case (for the purposes of granting a two-theory instruction) is one in which there is neither an eyewitness nor a confession to the crime. Mangum v. State, 762 So.2d 337, 344 (Miss.2000) (citing Stringfellow v. State, 595 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Miss.1992)). See also Randolph v. State, ___ So.2d ___, ___, 2002 WL 31619070,  (Miss. 2002) (Carlson, J., concurring). ¶ 23. Here, two witnesses for the State stated that they saw the drug sale. Two witnesses for Rogers claimed it did not happen. Thus, the case at hand is clearly based on direct, not circumstantial, evidence; and therefore, the two-theory instruction should not be given. ¶ 24. This presents the question of whether the instruction given is equivalent to the two-theory instruction. The State goes to great lengths to compare the two instructions and establish their semblance. The State points out that D-4 says controverted issue of material fact and the two-theory instruction says fact or circumstance... susceptible of two interpretations. D-4 goes on to say where evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the State's contention in regard to that issue of material fact is true while the two theory instruction says where there is a reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation. D-4 states you [the jury] must find that fact in favor of [defendant]. The two-theory instruction says you, the jury, must resolve such doubt in favor of [defendant] and place upon such fact or circumstance the interpretation most favorable to [defendant]. ¶ 25. In contrast, Rogers argues that the two instructions do appear to be alike, but the D-4 instruction fails to include the last sentence which states, to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, and is therefore not an instruction of circumstantial evidence at all. This argument is flawed. The point that Rogers overlooks is that the sentence he argues was left out and therefore precludes any error by the trial court is no part of a two-theory instruction. In Montgomery v. State, 515 So.2d 845, 849 (Miss. 1987), we stated that [i]n the ordinary criminal prosecution, the State must prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In circumstantial evidence cases, however, we say that the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. Jones v. State, 797 So.2d 922, 928-29 (Miss.2001), clarifies this point by stating the trial court in this case did grant the typical circumstantial evidence instruction. However, in addition to giving instruction on circumstantial evidence, the trial court must grant a two-theory instruction.... ¶ 26. Rogers's argument focuses on D-4's failure to include all the elements of a circumstantial evidence instruction. However, this is not what the State is asserting. The State asserts that D-4 is identical to a two-theory instruction also given in circumstantial evidence cases, a totally separate instruction from the circumstantial evidence instruction. [2] Although two separate instructions, the rules for when they are appropriately given apply to both. This Court has held that the circumstantial evidence instruction has no place in direct evidence cases. The instruction should not be given where guilt does not rest entirely on circumstantial evidence, Montgomery v. State, 515 So.2d 845, 850 (Miss.1987); Harmon v. State, 453 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1984); Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601, 606 (Miss.1980); Weathers v. State, 237 So.2d 441, 443 (Miss.1970); Coward v. State, 223 Miss. 538, 78 So.2d 605, 610 (1955); Yarbrough v. State, 202 Miss. 820, 32 So.2d 436, 440 (1947). ¶ 27. In light of these facts and authorities, we conclude that the instruction given was equivalent to a two-theory instruction and, therefore, should not have been given in this case since it was a direct evidence case.