Opinion ID: 1603389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Aggravating Factors Outweighed the Mitigating Factors

Text: Hunter next challenges the trial court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Specifically, Hunter argues that the trial court assigned improper weights to the mitigating factors and improperly balanced the mitigation against the aggravating factors. Hunter's claim lacks merit. [W]eighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances is the trial judge's responsibility and it is not this Court's `function to reweigh those factors.' Bevel v. State, 983 So.2d 505, 522 (Fla.2008) (quoting Hoskins v. State, 965 So.2d 1, 19 (Fla.2007)). Moreover, the weight that the trial court ascribes to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Merck v. State, 975 So.2d 1054, 1065 (Fla.2007), petition for cert. filed, No. 07-10853 (U.S. May 9, 2008). Hunter does not identify the manner in which the trial court abused its discretion. Instead, he argues that the age mitigator must be given great weight under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), and Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568 (Fla.1999). Contrary to Hunter's argument, the United States Supreme Court did not hold in Eddings that age of the defendant is a mitigating fact that should be given a particular weight. Rather, it simply held that, [j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. 455 U.S. at 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869. And in Ramirez we simply applied the principle that when the murder is committed by a minor, the mitigating factor of age must be found and given `full weight.' 739 So.2d at 582 (emphasis removed) (quoting Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991, 1001 n. 7 (Fla.1993)). Here, the trial court did not refuse to consider Hunter's age as a mitigator. Specifically, the trial court found: The defendant was 18 years of age at the time of the murders. In addition, the defendant presented testimony of Dr. Eric Mings, Dr. Rubin Gur and Dr. Allen Berns which suggested that in addition to his age, Mr. Hunter was in the early stages of schizophrenia, perhaps even paranoid schizophrenia. Their diagnosis and conclusions were based on the core history of severe mental illness, perhaps schizophrenia, of Mr. Hunter's father and at least some treatment for mental problems on the part of his mother. These factors suggest that Mr. Hunter was much more likely than others to have a mental defect or disease. Historically he had lost a twin brother as an infant and apparently over his childhood had regularly spoken to his twin as though that person was present in his life which was reliably established. The doctors felt that he had impaired judgment and was described from time to time as a loner. This mitigator has been established and the court gives it some weight. Moreover, Hunter's reliance upon the individual concurring opinions in Coday v. State, 946 So.2d 988, 1009-26 (Fla.2006) (Quince, J., specially concurring) (Bell, J., concurring) (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 2918, 168 L.Ed.2d 249 (2007), in support of his argument that the trial court improperly weighed the mitigating evidence and balanced the aggravating factors against the mitigation, is likewise misplaced. In Coday, this Court was not presented with the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in assigning weights to the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors or engaged in improper weighing. More specifically, this Court did not hold that the age mitigator must be given great weight. Instead, we addressed whether the trial court erred in its finding that a specific mitigating circumstance was not established in the first place. 946 So.2d at 1000-05. Hunter does not argue that the trial court erred in not finding all of the mitigators he submitted but rather that the trial court failed to accord greater weight to two of the mitigating circumstances it did find, i.e., age of the defendant and defendant's level of maturity. Contrary to Hunter's assertion, the trial court engaged in the type of consideration and analysis regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances that we have previously required, which was specifically addressed by the concurring opinion in Coday upon which Hunter relies. See id. at 1014-15 (Quince, J., specially concurring) (quoting Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 419-20 (Fla.1990)). Given the above discussion, Hunter's claim regarding the trial court's weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances lacks merit.