Opinion ID: 2679032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Tapia Error

Text: In Tapia v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 prohibits federal courts from considering a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing or lengthening a prison sentence. __ U.S. at 9 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 10 of 17 __, 131 S. Ct. at 2389. This court has not decided whether Tapia applies in the context of resentencing upon the revocation of supervised release. But we agree with our sister circuits and today hold that it does. See United States v. Lifshitz, 714 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 2013); Bennett, 698 F.3d at 197; United States v. Mendiola, 696 F.3d 1033, 1041–42 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Taylor, 679 F.3d 1005, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2011). In doing so, we recognize that Tapia abrogates our holding in United States v. Brown, where we stated that “a court may consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing a specific incarcerative term following revocation of supervised release.” 224 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000). Tapia made clear that prison is not to be viewed by sentencing judges as rehabilitative. And that holds true whether a person is initially being sent to prison or being sent back to prison after a period of supervised release. With this in mind, we address Vandergrift’s final argument. Vandergrift argues that during his sentencing hearing, the district court improperly considered Vandergrift’s need for rehabilitation when it sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment. See Tapia, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2388–89. As discussed, because Vandergrift failed to object to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence below, we review for plain error. 10 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 11 of 17 Some courts, in the context of supervised release, have found Tapia error only where a district court specifically tailored the length of a defendant’s sentence to meet some rehabilitative need. In Lifshitz, for example, the Second Circuit found no Tapia error where [t]he sentencing colloquy demonstrate[d] that the district court’s primary considerations in sentencing Lifshitz were “promoting respect for the law and protecting the public from further crimes of this defendant.” While the district court also considered Lifshitz’s need for medical care, there is no indication in the record that the district court based the length of Lifshitz’s sentence on his need for treatment. 714 F.3d at 150. (emphasis added). Applying a similar understanding of Tapia, the Tenth Circuit found Tapia error when a district court relied on rehabilitative factors to set the length of a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 769 (6th Cir. 2013) (vacating and remanding where “[t]he record in [the] case permits no conclusion but that the length of [the defendant’s] prison sentence was fixed to promote his rehabilitation”). Others have found Tapia error where rehabilitation was the “dominant” factor in the sentencing calculus. In United States v. Garza, the Fifth Circuit found Tapia error where “[t]he record ma[de] clear that [the defendant’s] rehabilitative needs were the dominant factor in the court’s mind” when it sentenced the defendant to 24 months’ imprisonment. 706 F.3d at 662. Likewise in United States v. Replogle, the Eighth Circuit found that because “[d]eterrence, respect for 11 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 12 of 17 the law, and protection of the public were the dominant factors in the district court’s [sentencing] analysis,” the defendant’s sentence did not run afoul of Tapia. 678 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2012). Turning to Vandergrift’s case, we find that there was Tapia error because the district court considered an improper § 3553(a) factor when it sentenced Vandergrift: rehabilitation. See Bennett, 698 F.3d at 200; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. This amounts to procedural error. We decline to limit Tapia to situations where the district court either 1) specifically tailors the length of a defendant’s sentence to permit completion of a rehabilitation program or 2) makes rehabilitation the “dominant” factor in the sentencing court’s calculus. Instead, we hold that Tapia error occurs where the district court considers rehabilitation when crafting a sentence of imprisonment. Our holding—that a district court errs when it considers rehabilitation when imposing or lengthening a sentence of imprisonment—is faithful to Tapia’s reasoning. In Tapia, the Supreme Court emphasized “that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” Tapia, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2388 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explicitly stated that when a court is determining whether to impose or lengthen a sentence of imprisonment it “should consider the specified rationales of punishment except for rehabilitation, which it should acknowledge as an unsuitable justification for a 12 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 13 of 17 prison term.” Id. (first emphasis added). From this language and rationale, it is clear that Tapia prohibits any consideration of rehabilitation when determining whether to impose or lengthen a sentence of imprisonment. Our holding is also consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent. In United States v. Mogel, we noted that “[r]ehabilitative considerations have been declared irrelevant for purposes of deciding whether or not to impose a prison sentence and, if so, what prison sentence to impose.” 956 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1992). We stated almost the same in United States v. Vautier: “[T]he need for medical care may not be considered in fixing the length of imprisonment, but may be considered in fixing the terms of the sentence other than incarceration.” 144 F.3d 756, 762 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Harris, 990 F.2d 594, 596–97 (11th Cir. 1993)). Because it is impermissible to consider rehabilitation, a court errs by relying on or considering rehabilitation in any way when sentencing a defendant to prison. As with any other instance where a court considers an impermissible sentencing factor, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1371–72 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) (finding error where district court considered impermissible factors when crafting the defendant’s sentence), considering rehabilitation is error. This is true regardless of how dominant the error was in the court’s analysis and regardless of whether we can tell with 13 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 14 of 17 certainty that the court relied on rehabilitation because the sentence was tailored to a rehabilitation program. Errors need not be severe or obvious to be errors. Accordingly, in light of Tapia and our own Circuit precedent, we find that the district court erred when it sentenced Vandergrift to prison because it considered rehabilitation when doing so. 5 The sentencing transcript highlights the district court’s consideration of rehabilitation in imposing Vandergrift’s sentence. The court began by stating that it was to “consider all the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.” It continued: “I’ve also got to consider what’s best for the defendant as a factor in the equation.” It noted that “it’s difficult to decide what really is best for the defendant in this case,” and that “vocational training for a period of time in the prison system not only would benefit the public, or could, at least more that not having that, but could also help save the defendant’s life.” The court then handed down Vandergrift’s 24month sentence: “So having considered all of these . . . and I do find that a reasonable sentence in this case is going to be 24 months in prison, the maximum under the statute . . . .” In concluding the sentencing hearing, the court once again stated that “the sentence is being imposed in excess of the guidelines at 24 months . . . for the benefit of the defendant.” 5 In so holding we recognize that our opinion is consistent with only the Fourth Circuit. See Bennett, 698 F.3d at 200. We believe our sister Circuits have taken an unnecessarily narrow view of Tapia for the reasons discussed throughout. 14 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 15 of 17 Here the district court did exactly what Tapia and our precedent instruct district courts not to do—it considered rehabilitation when crafting Vandergrift’s sentence of imprisonment. As detailed above, the sentencing transcript demonstrates that the district court considered how prison would benefit Vandergrift and how incarceration might save his life when it imposed the 24month sentence. Such considerations are improper and amount to procedural error. We recognize, though, that Tapia does not prohibit a district court from discussing rehabilitation during a sentencing hearing. To be sure, “[a] court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs[,] . . . [and] a court properly may address a person who is about to begin a prison term about these important matters.” Tapia, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2392; see United States v. Lucas, 670 F.3d 784, 795 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding no Tapia error where the district court, after imposing the defendant’s sentence, stated that the 210-month sentence would “provide the opportunity for rehabilitative programs”). But that is not what happened here. Here, prison’s rehabilitative benefits were considered in the course of deciding whether or not Vandergrift should be sentenced to prison at all. And in the course of making that prison term 24 months long, the district court stated that it needed “to consider what’s best for the defendant” and that “the sentence [was] being imposed . . . for the benefit of the defendant.” Such considerations are in 15 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 16 of 17 direct violation of Tapia. See Tapia, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2388; United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 282 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[w]hen a judge imposes prison, he may wisely believe that it will have rehabilitative benefits, but those benefits cannot be the reason for imposing it”). But our analysis does not stop here. Vandergrift has carried his burden on the first step of our plain-error analysis: he has demonstrated an error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S. Ct. at 1777. To succeed, he must further demonstrate that the error is plain and that it affected his substantial rights. See id. at 734, 113 S. Ct. at 1777–78. We assume for the sake of argument that the error is plain and we turn to whether Vandergrift has shown that it affected his substantial rights. See id. He has not. In order for an error to have affected substantial rights, it “must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id., 113 S. Ct. at 1778. “Normally . . . the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’ prong . . . .” Id. at 735, 113 S. Ct. at 1778. Vandergrift has failed to show that his sentence would have been different but for the court’s consideration of rehabilitation. The sentencing transcript reflects that Vandergrift’s “rehabilitative needs clearly constituted only a minor fragment of the court’s reasoning.” Bennett, 698 F.3d at 201. The court’s primary considerations were for the safety of the public and deterring others from similar conduct. Indeed, 16 Case: 12-13154 Date Filed: 06/18/2014 Page: 17 of 17 the court emphasized its concern that Vandergrift continued to possess photographs that he had taken of young boys about whom he had sexually fantasized. It was Vandergrift’s violations and the court’s concern for the public “that drove the district court’s sentencing decision.” See id. at 200. For these reasons, despite our finding of Tapia error, the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. 17