Opinion ID: 167696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the Post-Removal Hearing on the Gomeses' Claim for Damages

Text: 43 As we have noted, the district court concluded that it was not required to fully decide the issue of whether emergency circumstances existed to justify Rebekah's removal. Aplts' App. at 942. The court did state that it believed that the defendants have adequately established that Rebekah faced an immediate threat, especially in light of the state court's conclusion that she did. Id. at 941-42. 3 However, the court concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on an alternative ground. 44 In particular, the court observed that the state had provided an adequate post-removal hearing and that the Gomeses did not challenge the state judge's decision that Rebekah remain in state custody. As a result, it concluded, the Gomeses could not prevail on their due process challenge to the pre-hearing removal. We agree with the Gomeses that the district court erred in relying on Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), for this conclusion. 45 In Carey, the Supreme Court held that when a procedural due process violation occurs and adverse action results, damages for injuries caused by the adverse action may not be recovered if the defendant can prove the action would have been taken even absent the violation. See id. at 260, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (stating that in such a case, the failure to accord procedural due process could not properly be viewed as the cause of the [adverse action]). Significantly, however, the Court also concluded that a plaintiff may recover nominal damages and actual damages arising not from the deprivation of liberty or property but from the denial of procedural due process itself. As to the latter category of damages, the Court emphasized that the plaintiff is still required to prove causation: 46 In sum, then, although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983, we hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused. 47 Id. at 264, 98 S.Ct. 1042; see also McClure v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 228 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that [i]n a proper case, however, a plaintiff may recover such damages by `producing evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by the denial of procedural due process itself' (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 263, 98 S.Ct. 1042)). 48 Here, the Gomeses have not contested the state judge's finding that the removal of Rebekah was justified. 4 Moreover, they have not sought nominal damages. Accordingly, they may only recover damages arising from the denial of due process itself. On this issue, the district court stated that the only damage [the Gomeses] claim to have suffered is the emotional damage that resulted from [Rebekah's] removal. Aplts' App. at 940. 49 In our view, the district court read the Gomeses' allegations too narrowly. We acknowledge that the line drawn by the Supreme Court in Carey — between (a) damages arising from the deprivation of liberty or property and (b) damages arising from the denial of procedural due process itself — may be a fine one. Moreover, in many instances, plaintiffs may offer the same evidence to support both classes of damages claims. 50 Nevertheless, the Gomeses have alleged that they have suffered damages from the denial of procedural due process itself (and thus recoverable under Carey ). In particular, Rebekah Gomes's mother, Shauna Gomes, answered a deposition question about the damages that she had suffered as follows: 51 Q: Could you describe those [damages] for me, please. I understand you've talked about pain and anguish earlier, so is there anything in addition . . . that you've suffered? 52 A: Yes. It's—I compare it to being attacked by a terrorist. I mean they come in and take something that is of most value to you, and I was able to get that thing back. 53 However, it's always there. . . . I wonder when they're going to strike again. I wonder what could happen. I have no control over it, they could come at any time. It doesn't depend upon my actions. 54 I've had dreams . . . from the trauma I went through, . . . when my child gets hurt with an accident or something, it just makes me sick to my stomach to have to take him in to the doctor. Who knows what might happen? 55 Aplts' App. at 783-84. 56 Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Gomeses, this testimony concerns, in part, the manner in which Rebekah was removed (i.e., without prior notice and a hearing), and not merely the fact that she was removed. Ms. Gomes's statement that they could come at any time and her analogy to being attacked by a terrorist concern damages for the violation of procedural due process itself; her testimony addresses both the lack of notice and the randomness with which the Gomeses experienced the removal. 57 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the post-removal hearing and the findings by the state-court judge precluded the Gomeses from seeking damages for their due process claim. 5