Opinion ID: 2453721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issue 1. federal preemption

Text: First, Kanza argues that the district court erred in finding that the Trails Act, specifically 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), does not preempt K.S.A. 58-3212 of the KRTA. Kanza takes two approaches to this argument. In one approach, Kanza argues that the KRTA is preempted because the federal government has traditionally regulated railroad rights-of-way and because the KRTA impermissibly conflicts with the Trails Act. In the other approach, which is an argument stated in the alternative, Kanza argues that the KRTA is preempted because it impermissibly discriminates against interim recreational trails in railbanked rights-of-way (rail-trails). In making this argument, Kanza melds a Supremacy Clause (Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution) argument with an argument that the KRTA violates the Commerce Clause (Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution) because it places requirements on rail-trails but does not place such requirements on any other category of recreational trail. Neither of Kanza's approaches is persuasive.