Opinion ID: 511830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actions for Attorney's Fees

Text: 7 The Bank argues that Jones should not be permitted to sue in federal court merely for attorney's fees. It asks us to read the Supreme Court's decision in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980), as leaving this question open. The Bank argues that Carey is distinguishable from the present case because the plaintiff in Carey had initially also sought adjudication on the merits in federal court. Lastly, the Bank claims that Jones was afforded complete relief by the agency. 8 We disagree with the Bank's reading of Carey. In Carey, the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that she was not hired because of her race. The EEOC deferred the matter to the New York State Division of Human Rights (Division). The hearing examiner awarded her back pay and ordered the employer to offer Carey employment. No attorney's fee was awarded. The employer began a series of appeals within the New York administrative and judicial system. Meanwhile, Carey filed suit in federal district court alleging discrimination and seeking remedies which included attorney's fees. At a pre-trial conference, the employer agreed that if it was denied leave to further appeal in New York's state courts, it would comply with the Division's Order. Subsequently, the employer was denied leave to appeal, and the parties agreed to dismiss all parts of the federal action except Carey's request for attorney's fees. Carey, 447 U.S. at 56-59, 100 S.Ct. at 2027-2029. The district court denied Carey's request. 458 F.Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y.1978). The Second Circuit reversed, holding that prevailing parties before state agencies could seek fees in federal court. 598 F.2d 1253, 1260 (1979). 9 The Bank is correct in arguing that there was some dispute among the Supreme Court Justices over what issue was presented in Carey. However, at least six Justices, if not eight, believed that the issue presented was whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal court may allow the prevailing party attorney's fees for legal services performed in prosecuting an employment discrimination claim in state administrative and judicial proceedings that Title VII requires federal claimants to invoke. Carey, 447 U.S. at 56, 100 S.Ct. at 2027. 8 Justice Stevens concurred separately, arguing that the question as framed by the majority was not reached because Carey had originally filed a claim seeking adjudication on the merits. Id. at 71, 100 S.Ct. at 2034-2035. 10 Relying on Justice Stevens' analysis, the Bank urges us to distinguish this matter from Carey because Jones sought only attorney's fees. This is, however, a distinction without a difference. The analysis of Title VII offered by the majority in Carey requires a decision in favor of Jones.
11 Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows courts to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties [i]n any action or proceeding   . 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) (emphasis added). In Carey, the Court concluded that the inclusion of proceedings reflected an intent to subject the losing party to an award of attorney's fees and costs that includes expenses incurred for administrative proceedings. 447 U.S. at 61. Further, Title VII uses the term proceedings to describe the state action desired under the system of deferrals, suggesting that state administrative proceedings were adequate triggers for attorney's fees. Carey, 447 U.S. at 62, 100 S.Ct. at 2030 (examining section 706(c)). In so construing the attorney's fee provision of section 706(k), the Court drew on legislative intent and its own precedent interpreting Title VII. 12 The co-author of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, explained that the award of attorney's fees under section 706(k) was designed to make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit. Senate Debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 110 Cong.Rec. 12724 (1964). The Supreme Court considered the remarks of Senator Humphrey and others when it elected to constrain the judicial discretion bestowed in section 706(k) by requiring that a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 98 S.Ct. 694, 698, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). The Court based its decision in Christiansburg on its longstanding view that Title VII must be interpreted in light of the purposes which inform Title VII. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2371, 45 L.Ed. 280 (considering the availability of back pay under section 706(g)). The Court in Albemarle concluded that Congress' purpose in vesting courts with discretionary remedies was to make possible the 'fashion[ing of] the most complete relief possible. Id. at 421, 95 S.Ct. at 2373 (quoting the analysis introduced by Senator Williams to accompany the Conference Committee Report on the 1972 Amendments, 118 Cong.Rec. 7168 (1972)). In fashioning relief, courts have not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418, 95 S.Ct. at 2372 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154, 85 S.Ct. 817, 822-823, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965)). 13 To further the dual aims of redress and deterrance, Title VII has sought to coordinate the actions of state agencies, federal agencies, state courts and federal courts in an effort to provide victims of discrimination  'complete justice' and 'necessary relief'. Albemarle, supra at 418, 95 S.Ct. at 2372. 14 Congress envisioned that Title VII's procedures and remedies would mes[h] nicely, logically, and coherently with the State and city legislation, and that remedying employment discrimination would be an area in which [t]he Federal Government and the State governments could cooperate effectively. 110 Cong.Rec. 7205 (1964) (quoting remarks of Sen. Clark). 15 Carey, 447 U.S. at 63-64, 100 S.Ct. at 2030-2031. 16 Thus, although claims may initially be deferred to state agencies, the EEOC retains concurrent jurisdiction and federal courts retain the  'ultimate authority' to secure compliance with Title VII   . Id. at 64, 100 S.Ct. at 2031 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-45, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1017-1018, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)). 9 17 The Carey majority thought it would be anomalous to deny fees to a party who prevailed before a state tribunal, while allowing fees to a party who was only partly successful in state proceedings and hence proceeded on the merits in federal court. Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2032. In support of its conclusion that a suit could be sustained in federal court solely for fees, the Court explained: 18 Title VII explicitly leaves the States free, and indeed encourages them, to exercise their regulatory power over discriminatory employment practices. Title VII merely provides a supplemental right to sue in federal court if satisfactory relief is not obtained in state forums. Sec. 706(f)(1). ONE ASPECT OF COMPLETE RELIEF IS AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, WHICH CONGRESS CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF FEDERAL GOALS. 19 Id. at 67-68, 100 S.Ct. at 2032-2033 (emphasis added).
20 While this case may differ from Carey because the plaintiff did not seek to relitigate the merits in federal court, nevertheless, all of the policy arguments in Carey and the themes which pervade Title VII interpretation command the same conclusion. 21 The award of attorney's fees is necessary to aid the bringing of meritorious claims. Here, Jones had no choice but to seek relief before a state agency. The Agency awarded her the maximum relief possible under state law, declining to consider her request for attorney's fees only because they were unavailable under state law. We find no indication that Congress intended Title VII, by its system of state deferral, to leave the execution of Title VII's goals exclusively to the judgment of state officials. Rather, as the Court in Carey reasoned, federal courts are to operate as residual guarantors of Title VII rights. This policy is so strong that the Court in Carey nearly anticipated these facts in giving an example of the reach of its reasoning. It stated: 22 For example, if state proceedings result in an injunction in favor of the complainant, but no award for backpay because state law does not authorize it, the complainant may proceed in federal court to supplement the state remedy. The state law which fails to authorize backpay has not been pre-empted. 23 Carey, 447 U.S. at 68, 100 S.Ct. at 2033. 24 In a dissent that attracted the support of two Supreme Court Justices, Judge Mulligan took a contrary view. He argued that comity concerns made fundamental the proposition that state law determine the remuneration available for legal work on state claims. 598 F.2d at 1261. This proposition, however, fails to recognize the extent to which Title VII and state law are meant to be complementary. It would be a mistake to view state proceedings as somehow separate. This victim was required to pursue relief before state agencies first. 10 In addition, Title VII was passed pursuant to congressional authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 67, 100 S.Ct. at 2032-2033 (private employer). Therefore, even if in conflict, federal law would control. Id. Here, no conflict is present because South Dakota law does not attempt to preclude awards of attorney's fees under federal law. 25 Jones was not afforded complete relief by the state Agency. Absent a separate award for attorney's fees, her damages, carefully calculated to restore her to her expected position but for the Bank's discrimination, would be divided with her counsel. (Counsel was retained with the promise of a fee equal to a proportion of money damages if recovered.) The absence of a separate award for fees would discourage victims from seeking relief or pursuing their claims to rightful conclusions. While a Title VII defendant has the right to pursue all lawful and valid claims, delay and continued proceedings pressure a victim to either forego representation or to settle quickly on the employer's terms. For this reason, attorney's fees awards are essential to the aims of Title VII.