Opinion ID: 1874198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State of Mind: KRE 803(3).

Text: At trial, the Commonwealth questioned Sharon McNay, Roberts's younger sister, about the circumstances under which Appellant came to reside in Roberts's home. When asked whether Roberts rented a room to Appellant, McNay testified that she did, she did not want to. The trial court sustained Appellant's objection to this statement. McNay then testified that in subsequent conversations, Roberts told her that she wanted Appellant to move out of her house. Betty Davidson, Roberts's older sister, related a conversation she had with Roberts on Saturday, April 1, 2002, in which Roberts told her that she intended to have Appellant evicted from their home. [2] Michelle Roberts, the victim's daughter, testified that when Appellant expressed interest in renting the room, Roberts told Michelle that she would not rent the room to Appellant because of his lack of money. According to Michelle, Roberts subsequently changed her mind and rented the room to Appellant, telling Michelle, I feel sorry for him, and he keeps calling. Michelle then testified that on Saturday, April 1, 2000, Roberts told her that she would go to the courthouse the following Monday morning to have Appellant evicted. That same day, when Roberts learned of the $145.00 in charges on her telephone bill, she expressed to Michelle her concern as to her ability to pay it. Michelle also mentioned a conversation that occurred later that evening in which Roberts expressed concern over her ability to manage the situation when Davidson returned home from the rehabilitation center. Michelle stated that Roberts told her on April 1 that she was going to strip the sheets off Appellant's bed and not replace them. Finally, Michelle testified that after an argument with Appellant on the night of Sunday, April 2, 2000, Roberts again expressed her intention to go to the courthouse the next day and have Appellant evicted. Each of these statements falls within KRE 803(3), the hearsay exception for statement[s] of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, ... (such as intent, plan, ... mental feeling) .... Roberts's statements of her intention to initiate eviction proceedings on Monday, April 3, 2000, cast light upon her future intentions as opposed to past events. Crowe v. Commonwealth, 38 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Ky.2001). The same analysis applies to Roberts's statement of her original intention not to rent a room to Appellant because of his lack of money, as well as the statement of her later intention to strip the sheets off of Appellant's bed. Roberts's statements to McNay that she wanted Appellant to move out of her house, and to her daughter that she was concerned about the telephone charges and the situation that would occur when Davidson returned home were also admissible under KRE 803(3). Each statement pertained to her mental or emotional state existing at the time the statement was made. See Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375, 381 (Ky.2002). Finally, Roberts's statement, I feel sorry for [Appellant], indicated a present emotion (sorrow) existing when the statement was made. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings that each of these statements fell within the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, thus those findings were not clearly erroneous. However, statements that meet the state-of-mind exception are still inadmissible unless the victim's state of mind is relevant. Blair v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Ky.2004); Bray, 68 S.W.3d at 381-82. Before trial, Appellant claimed on separate occasions both that Roberts spontaneously collapsed and that he acted in self-defense; and then at trial, Appellant presented an account that varied between self-defense and accident. Roberts's mental state was relevant to prove the increasingly strained relations between Roberts and Appellant, tending to show a motive for murder, KRE 404(b)(1), thus refuting Appellant's claims that Roberts's death was either of internal origin (sudden collapse) or accidental (unintentional strangulation). Relevancy is established by any showing of probativeness, however slight. Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 449 (Ky.1999). The trial court's finding that Roberts's state of mind was relevant was not clearly erroneous.