Opinion ID: 1693750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Victim's Past Sexual Behavior

Text: Nebraska's rape shield law, § 28-321(2), provides in part that evidence of a sexual assault victim's past sexual behavior shall not be admissible unless such evidence is (a) [e]vidence of past sexual behavior with persons other than the defendant, offered by the defendant upon the issue whether the defendant was or was not, with respect to the victim, the source of any physical evidence, including but not limited to, semen, injury, blood, saliva, and hair; or (b) evidence of past sexual behavior with the defendant when such evidence is offered by the defendant on the issue of whether the victim consented to the sexual behavior upon which the sexual assault is alleged if it is first established to the court that such activity shows such a relation to the conduct involved in the case and tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim as to be relevant to the issue of consent. The purpose of the rape shield law is to protect sexual assault victims from grueling cross-examination concerning their previous sexual behavior, which often elicits evidence of questionable relevance to the case being tried. State v. Earl, supra ; State v. Schenck, 222 Neb. 523, 384 N.W.2d 642 (1986); State v. Hopkins, 221 Neb. 367, 377 N.W.2d 110 (1985). Under this statute, evidence of a complainant's prior sexual behavior is inadmissible unless it tends to prove one of the two explicitly stated exceptions; i.e., source of physical evidence or consent. State v. Earl, supra . We agree with the determination of the district court that the evidence which Sanchez sought to present at trial regarding A.S.' past sexual behavior does not fit within either of these exceptions. Sanchez does not seriously dispute this determination but argues that the evidence is nevertheless admissible because its exclusion would violate his rights to confrontation and compulsory process pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution. The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused hall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... Article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of accusation, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. This court has not decided a case in which evidence inadmissible under § 28-321 was found to be admissible on constitutional grounds. Although this theory of admissibility was argued in State v. Earl, 252 Neb. 127, 560 N.W.2d 491 (1997), we did not reach the constitutional issue because we concluded that the defendant did not adduce evidence of sufficient relevance, i.e., evidence establishing that [the victim] had prior knowledge of the same kind of sexual activities of which the defendant is accused. Id. at 134, 560 N.W.2d at 497. In Earl, the defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault of a 6-year-old boy. The specific acts alleged to constitute the assault included fondling and fellatio. He sought to introduce evidence that prior to the alleged assault, the victim and his 5-year-old female cousin, who herself had been a victim of sexual assault, had been observed `playing husband and wife' and pretending to have sex while they were totally nude. Id. at 135, 560 N.W.2d at 497. The defendant argued that this evidence was relevant to establish an alternative source of the victim's sexual knowledge in order to rebut the inference that a child of tender years could not possess the explicit sexual knowledge he had, but for the alleged assault. In rejecting this argument, we reasoned that even if this conduct between the children had occurred, it could not have provided the victim with knowledge of the specific conduct involved in the alleged assault. We concluded that the evidence of the victim's prior sexual behavior did not fall within the statutory exceptions provided for in § 28-321 and that it was not so relevant and probative that Earl's constitutional right to present it would be triggered. State v. Earl, 252 Neb. at 135, 560 N.W.2d at 497. Sanchez interprets this language as suggesting that there may well be instances where evidence of prior sexual behavior is so relevant and so probative that it triggers a defendant's constitutional right to present it, regardless of whether it meets either criterion provided in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-321. Brief for appellant at 8. From this premise, he argues that evidence concerning A.S.' conduct with her boyfriend should have been admitted for the purpose of showing that the conduct attributed to Sanchez had, in fact, been committed by another male. Brief for appellant at 5. In this regard, he relies upon Com. v. Spiewak, 533 Pa. 1, 617 A.2d 696 (1992), in which the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting his 15-year-old stepdaughter. He admitted having sexual relations with the victim after she reached the age of 16. The prosecution established that the victim had confided to her boyfriend that she had experienced oral intercourse with an older man prior to her 16th birthday, and, in her trial testimony, she identified that person as the defendant, describing the act in specific detail. Relying upon Pennsylvania's rape shield law, the trial court precluded the defendant from cross-examining the witness with her previous sworn testimony that she had similar sexual contact with a different older man prior to her 16th birthday. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the district court's decision based upon its conclusion that excluding the evidence abridged the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. It reasoned that once the prosecution offered evidence which raised an inference that the complainant had a single sexual contact with an older man prior to her 16th birthday, the defendant had a basic constitutional right to establish, on cross-examination, that she had previously and under oath identified that person as someone other than himself. Id. Sanchez also relies on People v. Hill, 289 Ill.App.3d 859, 864, 683 N.E.2d 188, 192, 225 Ill.Dec. 244, 248 (1997), in which the court stated that under proper circumstances, evidence of a child witness's prior sexual conduct is admissible to rebut the inferences that flow from a display of unique sexual knowledge, notwithstanding the Illinois rape shield law. However, the court also stated that the prior sexual conduct must be sufficiently similar to defendant's alleged conduct to provide a relevant basis for its admission. It must engage the sae sexual acts embodied in the child's testimony. Id. The court concluded that while the 6-year-old female victim clearly possessed age-inappropriate knowledge concerning the specific sexual act with which the defendant was charged, evidence that the victim had previously reported similar contact with a young boy was properly excluded because it was lacking in detail and could not fully rebut the inference that the child's knowledge was derived from the defendant. Id. We find Sanchez' authority on this issue distinguishable and his arguments unpersuasive. Assuming, without deciding, that there may be circumstances in which the accused's constitutional right to confrontation would require admission of evidence concerning a victim's prior sexual behavior which would be inadmissible under the rape shield law, no such circumstances exist here. This is not a case where the victim displays sexual knowledge inappropriate for her age. The conduct which A.S. attributed to her teenage boyfriend differed significantly from that which she attributed to Sanchez in that it did not involve penetration. The fact that she disclosed both incidents to a sister in the same conversation does not lead to an inference that one incident occurred and the other did not. It is clear from the offer of proof that A.S. described two separate and distinct incidents, distinguishing the boyfriend's touching from Sanchez' alleged penetration. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the boyfriend's conduct.