Opinion ID: 1790179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Remittitur Issue

Text: Because of this Court's holding, supra, that the bad-faith-offer-to-settle claim was barred by the survival statute, we conclude that the issue of remittitur is moot. Section 12-22-71, Ala.Code 1975, allows this Court to grant a remittitur when the case should be reversed because the judgment of the lower court is excessive and ... there is no other ground of reversal. (Emphasis added.) In the case of Sarber v. Hollon, 265 Ala. 323, 91 So.2d 229 (1956), this Court held that even when a verdict is excessive, it is inappropriate to reduce the amount when the judgment is being reversed for another cause. Therefore, without regard to the merits of the excessiveness claim, we hold that remittitur is not appropriate in this case because the judgment of the trial court is reversed by this Court's decision. In summary, we conclude that the claim of bad faith regarding Georgia Casualty's offer to settle for $7,500 at the time it considered the claim worth $10,000 did not survive Mr. White's death, and, therefore, that the trial court should not have sent this count to the jury. Because the jury returned a general verdict, we must decide whether the case is to be returned to the trial court or whether we, the reviewing court, can presume that the jury found only on the valid count. In Aspinwall v. Gowens, 405 So.2d 134 (Ala.1981), this Court held: [I]f a complaint has more than one count and the defendant believes that the evidence is not sufficient to support one or more of those counts, he must challenge this by motion for directed verdict, specifying the count which is not supported by evidence and detailing with specificity the grounds upon which the particular count is not supported by the evidence. If this is not done and all counts go to the jury and a general verdict is returned, the court will presume that the verdict was returned on a valid count. 405 So.2d at 138. In American General Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Lyles, 540 So.2d 696 (Ala.1988), we explained the holding of Aspinwall as follows: Where a trial court denies a defendant's motion for directed verdict on a count that is not supported by the evidence, a reviewing court may not presume that the jury returned its general verdict on a count that is supported by the evidence. 540 So.2d at 700. The inference is that, if the trial court is presented with the argument that the reviewing court eventually reverses on, then the presumption of Aspinwall will not apply and the case will be remanded for trial on the valid count. We hold that this is the situation presented by the facts of this case. Specifically, Georgia Casualty filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings; it filed a letter brief; and it presented the issue in its answer to the amendments alleging bad faith, contending that the bad faith claims did not survive Mr. White's death. After the jury returned a general verdict for $2,000,000 in favor of Mr. White's estate, Georgia Casualty again presented the issue to the trial court in its motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, motion for new trial, or, in the alternative, motion for remittitur and request for hearing. Because the trial court was presented with the opportunity to rule squarely on the issue of whether the claims survived Mr. White's death and because the trial court failed to hold that the bad-faith-offer-to-settle claim did not survive Mr. White's death, as this Court has held, we cannot presume that the jury verdict is based upon the valid claim of bad faith refusal to pay. Therefore, we hold that the jury's general verdict cannot be presumed to be based on the valid count (the count alleging bad faith refusal to pay), when both counts were given to the jury after the trial judge had been informed of the infirmity of the invalid count, i.e., the bad-faith-offer-to-settle claim. Thus, we remand this case with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment for the defendant Georgia Casualty on the bad-faith-offer-to-settle claim and to order a new trial, in accordance with this opinion, on the issue of bad faith refusal to pay. We pretermit discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence, because of our holding regarding the survival issue. The trial court's judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES, ADAMS, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. MADDOX, J., dissents.