Opinion ID: 2453513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vagueness Challenge to Village Zoning Law Section E

Text: The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. xiv. Among the most fundamental protections of due process is the principle that `[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of ... statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.' Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287, 82 S.Ct. 275, 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961) (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939)). Supreme Court precedent recognizes two independent grounds upon which a statute's language may be so vague as to deny due process of law. First, a law violates due process if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). Animating this first vagueness ground is the constitutional principle that individuals should receive fair notice or warning when the state has prohibited specific behavior or acts. Thibodeau v. Portuondo, 486 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.2007); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) (The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or warning.). Second, a law is unconstitutionally vague if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480. Statutes must provide explicit standards for those who apply them to avoid resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). In reviewing the ordinance's language for vagueness, we are relegated... to the words of the ordinance itself, to the interpretations the court below has given to analogous statutes, and, perhaps to some degree, to the interpretation of the statute given by those charged with enforcing it. Id. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
The relevant inquiry under the first vagueness ground is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. Rubin v. Garvin, 544 F.3d 461, 467 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294. Rather, regulations may embody flexibility and reasonable depth, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and satisfy due process as long as a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the conditions the regulations are meant to address and the objectives the regulations are meant to achieve, has fair warning of what the regulations require, Rock of Ages Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 170 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.1999). Section E's plain language prohibits the building of structures over two stories tall or four and one-half feet above the easterly side of River Road. Additionally, section E states that its purpose is to regulate building height in order to preserve views of the Hudson River. While section E affords a reasonable person adequate notice of what it generally prohibits (e.g., three-story buildings will be in violation), it is remarkably unclear with respect to how the four and a half foot limitation is defined. In this latter regard, nowhere does the ordinance describe from what adjacent elevation point on River Road the height of a building must be measured to determine the building's compliance with section E's height restriction. Consequently, this shortcoming not only fails to give specific notice of how a permit applicant should design his site plan so that the proposed building complies with that restriction, but it also fails to provide an objective standard that the Village itself can apply in determining the project's compliance once an application has been submitted and thereafter when an approved project has been built.
The second ground for determining unconstitutional vaguenesswhether the ordinance fails to provide explicit standards for those who apply [it], Thibodeau, 486 F.3d at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted)involves an inquiry into whether: (1) the [the ordinance] as a general matter provides sufficiently clear standards to eliminate the risk of arbitrary enforcement; or (2) even in the absence of such standards, the conduct at issue falls within the core of the [ordinance's] prohibition, so that the enforcement before the court was not the result of the unfettered latitude that law enforcement officers and factfinders might have in other, hypothetical applications of the [ordinance]. Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 494 (2d Cir.2006). We hold that because section E makes no mention of where on River Road elevation is to be measured, the ordinance provides no standard that can be objectively applied to determine if the conduct at issue in this casethe construction of Cunney's housecomplies with the ordinance's restrictions. Although section E has a stated purpose of preserving the remaining views of the Hudson River from River Road, that alone does not provide sufficient guidance to otherwise save the ordinance from the risk of arbitrary enforcement. Cf. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) (What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminancy of precisely what that fact is. Thus, we have struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant's conduct was `annoying' or `indecent'wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.). As we have noted, [i]n addition to [an ordinance's] plain meaning and stated purpose, courts should determine whether [the ordinance] provides sufficiently clear enforcement standards by analyzing `perhaps to some degree... the interpretation of the [ordinance] given by those charged with enforcing it.' VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 192 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294). Here, the Village Defendants' various interpretations of section E's measurement requirements serve only to reinforce our view that the ordinance's vagueness authorizes arbitrary enforcement. Collazuol, the Village engineer, interpreted section E in two distinct ways. In July 2007, Collazuol relied on the high point of pavement as the single elevation point on River Road adjacent to the property from which he measured the height of the house in concluding that it complied with section E. [3] Responding to complaints from Village residents about the height of Cunney's house, Collazuol then made two additional compliance determinations in October and December 2007. He undertook both of those determinations by measuring the height of the house not from the high point of pavement, which he had originally used, but from the five measurement stations Atzl included in the revised site plan. In his October 2007 letter to the Village, Collazuol appears to have concluded, based on corrected road elevation levels at the five measurement stations, that Cunney's house was still in compliance with section E. In December, however, Collazuol, relying on yet a different set of corrected road elevation measurements, concluded in his third and final compliance determination that the height of Cunney's house violated section E. Relying solely on this last determination, Knizeski, the Village building inspector, denied Cunney's application for a CO. There is no question on the record before us that Collazuol, and consequently Knizeski, subjectively interpreted section E's requirements by applying inconsistent methodologies to measure whether Cunney's house complied with the ordinance. Not only do the actions of the Village engineer and Village building inspector demonstrate that the ordinance's vagueness authorizes arbitrary enforcement, but the actions of the ZBA members themselves do as well. At Cunney's 2006 variance hearing, three of five members of the ZBA offered their own interpretations of where on River Road an applicant should measure the height of the house. In particular, ZBA member Wolzien suggested that any given point above River Road can be used as an elevation point from which to measure the height of the house. ZBA member Kaliff stated that the ordinance was written to protect the views of the community along River Road and thus required elevation to be measured at the lowest point of the road. To the extent that his view that any given point above River Road can be used as the elevation point from which to measure meant any point chosen by the Board, that view itself indicates that the ordinance's vagueness authorizes arbitrary enforcement. Also, ZBA Chairperson Chamberlin-Hellman concurred with Kaliff's position opining that the ordinance should be interpreted to require measurement from the lowest point along River Road to the highest point of the house in order to require the maximum [possible] variance. Notwithstanding this lack of consensus, the ZBA concluded in 2008 that section E was not ambiguous with respect to the manner in which building height is measured in the R-10 Zoning District. In arriving at this decision, however, the ZBA declined to address the question placed squarely before it by Cunney and his engineer at the design stage of the projectfrom what adjacent point or points on River Road the ordinance required the height of the house to be measured. For these reasons, we agree with the district court that the Village's actionsits measurement procedure at the Propertyand its own admissions [by ZBA members], demonstrate that no explicit standards exist regarding the method with which to measure from the easterly side of River Road. Thus, [section E] could encourage potentially arbitrary or ad hoc enforcement. Cunney, 675 F.Supp.2d at 400.
We recognize that [w]here a[n ordinance] provides insufficient general guidance, an as-applied vagueness challenge may nonetheless fail if the [ordinance's] meaning has a clear core. Farrell, 449 F.3d at 493; Brache v. Cnty. of Westchester, 658 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1981) ([I]f a statute has a core meaning that can reasonably be understood, then it may validly be applied to conduct within the core meaning.); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 577-78, 94 S.Ct. 1242 (noting that there are statutes that by their terms ... apply without question to certain activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain, and that such a statute may not be vague as applied to hard-core violator[s]... whatever its implications for those engaged in different conduct). Where the ordinance has a clear core, the inquiry will involve determining whether the conduct at issue falls so squarely in the core of what is prohibited by the [ordinance] that there is no substantial concern about arbitrary enforcement because no reasonable enforcing officer could doubt the [ordinance's] application in the circumstances. Farrell, 449 F.3d at 494. Applying these standards, we hold that the ordinance as applied to the design and construction of Cunney's house is not saved by resort to a clear core. That is, the height of Cunney's house does not fall within the core of section E's prohibition because, under a reasonable interpretation of the ordinance, Cunney's house, as built, does comply with section E. The district court dismissed Cunney's void-for-vagueness claim because, in its view, the application of section E to Cunney's property fell within the ordinance's core goal. The court interpreted section E's core goalto preserve as nearly as practicable the remaining views o[f] the Hudson River from River Road, Grand View, N.Y. Zoning Law, ch. IX, § E (1999)to require: the shortest distance from any point on River Road to the Hudson River [to] be free of any view-obstructing structures that exceed the height requirements. For example, if a home has both a 100-yard frontage on River Road and an identical 100-yard frontage on the Hudson, an infinite amount of points can be used to measure the height. The measurement, in order to achieve its goal, must evaluate whether any structure between that arbitrary point and the Hudson violates the regulation. This can only be achieved if the line from point A on the road, and point B on the Hudson, is a straight line and the angle at measurement corresponds with the shortest distance between the two points. Cunney, 675 F.Supp.2d at 400. Because Collazuol's final compliance determination revealed that Cunney's house fell squarely within section E's proscribed heightparticularly at station 0 + 62 which contained the point on River Road closest to the house in questionthe district court concluded that the house's height markedly destroy[ed] the views of the Hudson River from River Road. Id. at 401. We disagree with this conclusion because we do not see how section E's imprecise core meaningthe preservation of river viewstranslates into the precise construct laid out by the district court. While there is no question that the ordinance could have been drafted to do exactly what the district court suggests, or could have been interpreted by the ZBA to call for this result, the ZBA refused to provide such guidance, and the ordinance's statement of core purpose is not so explicitly demanding. To begin with, we agree that section E's core is clear to the extent that its purpose is to preserve Village views of the Hudson River. The question then becomes whether the height of Cunney's house falls so squarely within section E's core prohibitionthe building of houses the height of which is more than four and one-half feet above River Road and destroying the views of the Hudson River that no substantial concern about arbitrary enforcement exists because no reasonable enforcing officer could doubt the ordinance's application in these circumstances. See Farrell, 449 F.3d at 494. Based on the record before us, because a reasonable enforcement officer could find that Cunney's house does comply with the ordinance, we conclude that the height of Cunney's house does not constitute a hard-core violation of section E, and thus does not fit squarely within the ordinance's core prohibition. See Goguen, 415 U.S. at 577-78, 94 S.Ct. 1242. Our review of the record gives us substantial concern that the ordinance was arbitrarily applied to Cunney's property. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of this claim. First, as discussed above, Collazuol, Knizeski, and three members of the ZBA each offered permissible interpretations of section E's vague guidance defining the point on River Road adjacent to the property from which the height of the house should be measured, and two of them opined on how the measurement should be taken. Second, because River Road's elevation above the river fluctuates by some six feet along the boundary of the Cunney propertyfrom approximately 30 feet in the south to 24 feet in the norththe application of these interpretations to Cunney's property would undoubtedly lead to divergent results. Third, it is undisputed that, as ZBA member Kaliff stated, even if 5 feet were taken off the top of the house there would not be a better view of the River. Taken together, the undisputed facts of this case also demonstrate that a reasonable enforcement officer could interpret section E as permitting the height of the house to be measured from River Road's high point of pavement along the shared boundary with the Cunney property. [4] We find such a case in point specifically presented in the record. The Village engineer, Collazuol, following the discovery of the site plan data errors, apparently resolved in his third and final compliance determination that the road's high point of pavement was at least 29.25 feet above the Hudson River. Measuring from this elevation point on River Road to the high point of the roof line, he found that Cunney's house exceeded section E's height restriction by a maximum of three inches. There is no questionespecially given Collazuol's earlier determination of typical building tolerances and de minimis violationsthat a reasonable enforcement officer, even one zealously preserving river views, would nonetheless find a three inch overage to be de minimis. Nor is there anything in the ordinance that precludes the use of a high point on River Road adjacent to the property as the elevation point from which to determine the relative height of the house. In fact, in July 2007 Collazuol himself relied solely on the high point of pavement on the easterly side of River Road in determining the height of Cunney's house to be what he later articulated as effectively in compliance with section E. Applying this perfectly reasonable methodology, it is without question, on the record before us, that Cunney's house could be considered to be in compliance with section E. Given our determination, it cannot be said that the height of Cunney's house falls so squarely within the core of section E's prohibition as to allay our substantial concerns regarding the risk of arbitrary enforcement. We therefore hold that because section E's terms provided the Village enforcement officers with unfettered latitude in making compliance determinations regarding Cunney's property, see Farrell, 449 F.3d at 494, section E, as applied here, is unconstitutionally vague.