Opinion ID: 1781467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application in Jones

Text: The claimed error in the consolidated case of Jones was the admission of collateral crime evidence over the defendant's objection, which was overruled. The State concedes that neither party addressed the applicability of section 924.051(7), the enactment of which postdated the crime. On appeal to the First District, the State relied on DiGuilio to argue that the admission of the collateral crime evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, collateral crime evidence is presumptively harmful. See Czubak, 570 So.2d at 928. It is clear that Lee requires the application of DiGuilio to the improper admission of collateral crime evidence. Based on the foregoing, we quash Jones. We remand to the district court for further consideration in light of this opinion. It is so ordered. HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I dissent from answering the certified question in the negative. I dissent from quashing the decision of the First District in Jones v. State, 715 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). I concur in approving the result in Goodwin v. State, 721 So.2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). I begin from the perspective of the following hallmark principles which have long guided this Court in issues concerning the giving of effect to legislative enactments. 1. [W]hen reasonably possible and consistent with legislative intent, we must give preference to a construction which will give effect to the statute over another construction which would defeat it. Schultz v. State, 361 So.2d 416, 419 (Fla.1978). 2. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutory language cannot be construed so as to render it potentially meaningless. Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991, 1001 (Fla.1993). 3. [T]his Court is eminently qualified to give Florida statutes a narrowing construction to comply with our state and federal constitutions. In fact, it is our duty to save Florida statutes from the constitutional dustbin whenever possible. We have done so regularly and with statutes that required far more rewriting than the present sections. Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929, 934 (Fla.1998) (footnotes omitted). 4. The authority of the legislature to enact harmless error statutes is unquestioned. Contraposed to this legislative authority, the courts may establish the rule that certain errors always violate the right to a fair trial and are, thus, per se reversible. To do so, however, we are obligated to perform a reasoned analysis which shows that this is true, and that, for constitutional reasons, we must override the legislative decision. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1134 (Fla.1986) (footnote omitted). 5. [W]e believe that the legislature may implement this constitutional right and place reasonable conditions upon it so long as they do not thwart the litigants' legitimate appellate rights. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So.2d 773, 774 (Fla.1996). Applying the foregoing sound principles of this Court, I conclude that there is a distinction, as recognized by the federal courts and virtually every other state court, between constitutional error and nonconstitutional error. This Court's decision in DiGuilio addresses constitutional error and is in accord with the United States Supreme Court decisions in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), as to the analysis to be applied to constitutional error on direct appeal. However, as to nonconstitutional error, DiGuilio should not be held to be controlling in light of the legislative enactment of section 924.051(7), Florida Statutes. This statute can easily be given its plainly intended effect by giving to it a narrowing construction of pertaining only to nonconstitutional error. The plainly intended effect of the statute in respect to nonconstitutional error is to place the burden upon the party claiming error to demonstrate that the error was prejudicial, with prejudice being defined in accord with Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). The Kotteakos test for harmless error is whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. This is considered to be a less onerous standard for determining that error was harmless than the Chapman standard adopted in DiGuilio, which is to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Giving to this statute its plainly intended effect in respect to nonconstitutional error would be consistent with the federal courts as the standard to be applied in reviewing nonconstitutional error and as to the other state courts in respect to the burden of demonstrating harmful error. In Brecht, the Court said that the Kotteakos standard, had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, was grounded in the federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111, which is only applied to claims of nonconstitutional error. It said that Chapman 's harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is applied to claims of constitutional error. 507 U.S. at 630-31, 113 S.Ct. 1710. The Court in United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986), applied the less stringent Kotteakos harmless error standard to a case of misjoinder. It explained that the joinder standards under the federal criminal rules were not themselves of constitutional magnitude. 474 U.S. at 446, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725. Hence, it held that misjoinder affects substantial rights only if it results in actual prejudice. Id. at 449, 106 S.Ct. 725. Later, in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 346-347, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990), the Court agreed with the circuit court's determination that a less stringent standard than the harmless error rule articulated in Chapman applied because the error was merely evidentiary and not constitutional in nature. 493 U.S. at 346, 354, 110 S.Ct. 668. The trial court in Dowling admitted testimony over the defendant's claim that it was barred by collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the evidence was only barred by the common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, the government was not constitutionally barred from using the contested testimony. 493 U.S. at 350, 110 S.Ct. 668. See also United States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 290 (3d Cir.1986). In People v. Mateo, 453 Mich. 203, 551 N.W.2d 891 (1996), the Supreme Court of Michigan was confronted with this exact question. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the legislative harmless error statute was not a usurpation of the court's authority and that courts are not to analyze nonconstitutional error for harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no reason Florida should not recognize this view. Many courts have explicitly found, as the statute in this case requires, that the burden should be on the defendant to show prejudicial or harmful error on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo.1986) (Because the defendant does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights ... the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice.); State v. McKnight, 47 Conn.App. 664, 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1998) (When a trial error ... does not involve a constitutional violation the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error.); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga.App. 266, 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1986) (The burden is on the party claiming error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error results in a miscarriage of justice or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right, an appellate court will not reverse.); State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 674 P.2d 1029 (1983) (An appellant has the burden to show prejudicial error.... [E]rror will be deemed harmless if an appellate court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction.); Edwards v. State, 479 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind.1985) (The appellant always has the burden to show affirmatively that the alleged error was prejudicial.); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 384 Mass. 390, 425 N.E.2d 294, 296 (1981) (The burden is on the defendant to show prejudice.); State v. Hicks, 333 N.C. 467, 428 S.E.2d 167, 174 (1993) (for errors other than those arising under the Federal Constitution, the defendant has the burden of establishing prejudice by showing that `there is a reasonable possibility ... a different result would have been reached at the trial [absent the error]'); Harrall v. State, 674 P.2d 581 (Okla.Crim.App.1984) ([T]he burden is on the appellant to establish the fact that he was prejudiced in his substantial rights by the commission of error.); State v. Fender, 358 N.W.2d 248, 254 (S.D.1984) (Appellant must affirmatively show prejudicial error. A showing of prejudicial error requires a showing from the record that under the evidence the jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict if the alleged error had not occurred.); Wilson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex.App.1982) (It is encumbent [sic] upon the appellant to show harm or prejudice when he alleges error.); State v. Bushey, 147 Vt. 140, 513 A.2d 1177, 1182 (1986) ([D]efendant bears the burden of showing prejudicial error.); Dotson v. State, 712 P.2d 365, 366 (Wyo.1986) (Error which does not affect substantial rights is regarded as harmless and `shall be disregarded' on appeal.... Appellant must show prejudice and has the burden of establishing that prejudice.). I reject the majority's analysis, which renders section 924.051(7), in reality, a nullity, although stopping short of holding the statute unconstitutional. What the majority does is directly contrary to the reasoning in DiGuilio that the Court is bound to honor the authority of the legislature to enact harmless error statutes which will only be overridden by the Court for constitutional reasons. I reject the majority's premise that to distinguish between constitutional errors and nonconstitutional errors is too difficult a task for Florida's appellate courts. If this analysis can be successfully performed by the federal courts and the appellate courts of other states, our courts clearly have the capability. The majority relies upon this Court's 1988 decision in State v. Lee, 531 So.2d 133 (Fla.1988), which I find to be clearly not determinative of the present issue. First, Lee did not differentiate between constitutional and nonconstitutional error. It was plainly not an issue discussed. Second, Lee was prior to the 1996 act which results in the need for an opinion in this case. Third, Lee was decided before the important decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Brecht (making clear the distinction between constitutional error and nonconstitutional error for purposes of the application of the Chapman and Kotteakos tests) and Dowling. I reject the analysis in the majority opinion which states, We interpret section 924.051(7) as a reaffirmation of the important principle that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that an error occurred in the trial court, which was preserved by proper objection. Majority op. at 17. That interpretation either ignores or gives hollow effect to the plain language of the section, which is has the burden of demonstrating that prejudicial error occurred in the trial court. Obviously, it is patently erroneous to substitute preserved for prejudicial. I adopt the analysis of Judge Klein in his concurring opinion in Goodwin in the Fourth District: I fully agree with the majority opinion and am writing only to explain more fully why we are not citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986), as authority to determine whether the error is harmless, but rather section 924.051(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), which provides: In a direct appeal or a collateral proceeding, the party challenging the judgment or order of the trial court has the burden of demonstrating that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court. A conviction or sentence may not be reversed absent an express finding that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), harmless error statutes were adopted by the states, as well as Congress, in the early part of this century, as a reaction to widespread dissatisfaction with appellate courts routinely reversing criminal convictions. The Kotteakos court quoted a 1925 article suggesting that appellate courts towered above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of technicality. Id. at 759, 66 S.Ct. at 1245. In Kotteakos the Court, in addressing the federal harmless error statute, was careful not to ascribe any burden to one side or the other, although it noted that the legislative history reflected that Congress intended for the burden to be on the appellants for technical errors, but on beneficiaries of the errors for substantive ones. Id. at 765, 66 S.Ct. at 1248. The most important federal decision pertinent to this analysis is Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), because federal constitutional rights are often implicated in criminal cases, and also because DiGuilio is based on Chapman. In Chapman the issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether a state prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to testify, a violation of the Fifth Amendment, could be harmless error. The Court held in Chapman that although some constitutional violations are per se reversible, such as the denial of the right to counsel, there are constitutional errors which can be harmless if the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The Court held that the comment on the defendant's silence in Chapman was of the type that could be harmless, but under the facts it did not pass the harmless error test enunciated in Chapman and therefore required a new trial. Significantly, after announcing the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test for federal constitutional error in Chapman, the Court observed that appellate courts do not ordinarily have the original task of applying such a test. 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The Chapman Court also noted that every state had a harmless error statute or rule and that they serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. Chapman, along with the fact that the federal constitution does not require states to grant appeals to criminal defendants, leads me to conclude that the burden established by section 924.051(7) is permissible under federal law except where there is a federal constitutional violation, in which case the Chapman standard controls. This brings us to DiGuilio. Shortly before DiGuilio, the Florida Supreme Court concluded in State v. Murray, 443 So.2d 955 (Fla.1984), that the appropriate test for determining whether error is prejudicial or harmless was the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. In Murray, however, the error was not one which violated the defendant's rights under the federal constitution. As a result of confusion between Murray and other Florida Supreme Court decisions, the fifth district in DiGuilio certified a question of great public importance as to whether a comment on the right to silence, a constitutional violation, was per se reversible error. At the time DiGuilio was decided section 924.051(7) was not in effect; however, we then had, and still have, section 924.33, which provided: No judgment shall be reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion, after an examination of all the appeal papers, that error was committed that injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. It shall not be presumed that error injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. The DiGuilio court observed: Section 924.33 respects the constitutional right to a fair trial free of harmful error but directs appellate courts not to apply a standard of review which requires that trials be free of harmless errors. The authority of the legislature to enact harmless error statutes is unquestioned. Contraposed to this legislative authority, the courts may establish the rule that certain errors always violate the right to a fair trial and are, thus, per se reversible. To do so, however, we are obligated to perform a reasoned analysis which shows that this is true, and that, for constitutional reasons, we must override the legislative decision. (footnote omitted). The DiGuilio court then went on to adopt, for constitutional errors, the same standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman, setting it out as follows: The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1135. Returning to section 924.051(7), which puts the burden of demonstrating prejudice on the defendant, I note that when the Florida Supreme Court implemented other portions of the Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996, of which section 924.051(7) is a part, it expressed the belief that the legislature could place reasonable conditions upon [the right of appeal provided by the Florida Constitution] so long as they do not thwart the litigants' legitimate appellate rights. Amendments to Fla. R.App. P., 685 So.2d 773, 774 (Fla.1996). Finally, it is at least worth mentioning that just as civil judgments are presumed correct on appeal, so are criminal convictions. Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla.1975). In light of that presumption, as well as the deference given the legislature regarding harmless error statutes by both the Chapman and DiGuilio courts, I agree that section 924.051(7), and not the standard established in DiGuilio for constitutional error, is the harmless error test to apply here. Goodwin, 721 So.2d at 729-31 (Klein, J., concurring specially) (footnotes omitted). I would also adopt the following from Judge Klein's opinion in Mason v. State, 719 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998): Although we concluded in Goodwin that our supreme court in DiGuilio was only deciding when constitutional error can be harmless, we believe that the general thoughts expressed by the court are still significant in helping us to determine whether nonconstitutional error is harmful under § 924,051(7), which took effect in 1996. In that regard, one sentence in the above quote bears repeating: The focus is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact. 491 So.2d at 1139. It is important, when determining the effect of an error on the fact finder, to keep in mind that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Accordingly, even where the defendant in a criminal case has the burden of demonstrating the prejudicial effect of the error, that burden will be easier to carry than the burden on an appellant in a civil case in which the burden of proof in the trial court is lighter, i.e., preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. Judge Klein does what we stated in Schultz in 1952 that it was our duty to do: give preference to a construction which will give effect to the statute.