Opinion ID: 2109069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Charge of Assault With a Dangerous Weapon

Text: Finally, defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon. He contended that under our pre- Jackson definition of assault with a dangerous weapon, such a charge clearly could not be sustained by the evidence presented. In State v. Jackson, 752 A.2d 5, 9-10 (R.I.2000), we promulgated a new definition of the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon. Adopting the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17-18, 106 S.Ct. 1677, 1678, 90 L.Ed.2d 15, 18 (1986), we stated that we shall presume that an unloaded but operable gun possesses a per se `present ability to carry the offer [to do corporal injury to another] into effect.' Jackson, 752 A.2d at 10 (quoting State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I.1988)). (Alterations in original.) However, as defendant correctly points out, our holding in Jackson was prospective. Jackson, 752 A.2d at 9. As such, the prior standard, articulated in Jeremiah, 546 A.2d at 186-87, is applicable to defendant's case, which was tried in December 1998. In Jeremiah, 546 A.2d at 186-87, we defined assault with a dangerous weapon as any unlawful offer to do corporal injury to another under such circumstances as may create a reasonable apprehension of immediate injury unless the person so threatened takes action or inaction to avoid it, coupled with a present ability to carry the offer into effect. Thus, under the applicable standard, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had a present ability to inflict harm upon Henry. Applying that standard in State v. Andrade, 657 A.2d 538, 543 (R.I.1995), we affirmed a conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon, notwithstanding the state's failure to produce a weapon at trial. We concluded in Andrade that the present ability to inflict harm, like any other element of a criminal offense, could be proven by circumstantial evidence or by inference alone. Id. In reviewing a trial justice's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we use the same standard as that applied by the trial justice, upholding the denial if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with a defendant's guilt, weagree that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Andrade, 657 A.2d at 542; see also Jackson, 752 A.2d at 8. Henry testified that when he was seven years old  an age at which he could reasonably be presumed to have had the capacity to recognize a gun  he was shown a weapon that appeared to be a gun. When asked what it looked like, he responded, I mean, it looked like a gun, I mean, looked like a gun, and later added, It looked like a  not like a big rifle, you know, it looked like a handgun, something like that. On cross-examination, he testified that the gun was small and black. Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to the state and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in a manner consistent with guilt, we conclude that the state demonstrated that the defendant had a present ability to inflict harm sufficient to sustain the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, applying the applicable standard to the facts presented, we conclude that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon.