Opinion ID: 26083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Termination from the Fire Department

Text: 15 The well-known McDonnell Douglass framework applies to Title VII retaliation cases in which a plaintiff has presented only circumstantial evidence of retaliatory animus. Portis v. First Nat'l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, there is no direct evidence that Chief Ojeda terminated Montemayor from the Department for retaliatory reasons. Therefore, we apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to this case. 16 To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Montemayor must demonstrate: (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) experienced an adverse employment action following the protected activity; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Mota v. University of Texas Houston Health Science Center, 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2001). Because the causation showing at the prima facie stage is much less stringent than a but for standard, Montemayor arguably made out a prima facie case. 17 The City subsequently satisfied its burden of production by contending that Montemayor was terminated because she was a substandard cadet. At that point, any inference of discrimination disappeared and Montemayor had the burden of proving that her termination from the Fire Department would not have occurred but for her protected conduct. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001); Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996)([t]he ultimate determination in an unlawful retaliation case is whether the conduct protected by Title VII was a 'but for' cause of the adverse employment decision). 18
19 The evidence in support of the City's non-discriminatory reason is overwhelming. The Department had a policy whereby a cadet who failed three written examinations was terminated from the Academy unless Chief Ojeda, in his discretion, deemed otherwise. The City introduced as evidence (1) the written policy, (2) Chief Ojeda's testimony that the three strikes rule was the policy, and (3) other firefighter personnel testimony that this was their understanding of the policy. The written policy itself stated: 20 In courses where there is a written examination and a performance objective, both must be completed with satisfactory performance for the trainee to be evaluated as satisfactory performance for the course. Makeup of Substandard Performance 21 In those cases where a written examination is given, a makeup examination similar to the original examination will be given . . . In no instance shall a trainee be allowed to make up more than two courses of the curriculum. Should the trainee be evaluated as substandard in a third course, the trainee shall be evaluated as substandard without the benefit of a makeup. 22 In cases involving substandard performance, the Training Director shall notify the Fire Chief in writing, of the alleged substandard performance with a recommendation to the Fire Chief. The Fire Chief shall make the final decision in all cases involving termination. 23 We interpret the policy as providing a cadet with the opportunity to makeup two substandard performances on written examinations. Thus, if a cadet passes the makeup test(s), she can still receive a satisfactory grade for the course. However, if a third failure on a written examination occurs, no further make-up tests are allowed and the cadet is adjudged substandard. 24 It is undisputed that Montemayor failed three written examinations. 7 She was allowed to makeup the first two exams and passed. However, after she failed the third exam, the Department deemed her to be substandard. In accordance with Department policy, the Training Director recommended to Chief Ojeda that Montemayor be terminated. Chief Ojeda accepted the recommendation and fired her. The fact that Montemayor was adjudged a substandard cadet under the objective terms of the policy would tend to negate any possible inference of retaliation.
25 To carry her burden, Montemayor attempts to show that the legitimate, nonretaliatory justification offered by the City for Montemayor's termination was pretextual. First, she contends that the Department has misinterpreted its own policy. Second, she contends that retaliation can be inferred because Chief Ojeda, a person with prior animus against her, had the final decision as to whether she should be fired. Each of these arguments are unavailing due to lack of evidentiary support. 26
27 Montemayor claims that, under the terms of the policy, her satisfactory performance on the two makeup tests allows her to makeup her failure on the third written examination. In other words, the policy permits her to fail five written examinations before being adjudged substandard. However, nothing in the written policy or the trial testimony mandates this interpretation. The policy terms indicate that Montemayor should have been adjudged substandard and should not have been allowed to makeup the third written examination. 28
29 Chief Ojeda's testimony indicated that under no circumstances would he exercise his discretion to not terminate a cadet who failed three written exams. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Chief Ojeda consistently followed the termination recommendations of his Training Chief, and therefore would not exercise his discretion in a contrary manner. Despite this evidence, however, Montemayor contends that the jury was permitted to find Chief Ojeda's testimony and other firefighter personnel's testimony to be untruthful because it was self-serving, and therefore could properly infer that Chief Ojeda exercised his discretion in a retaliatory manner. 30 Reeves warns us not to make credibility determinations and weigh the evidence when ruling on Rule 50 motions. However, Reeves does not require us to reject the plainly obvious, i.e, the uncontroverted evidence that Montemayor was a substandard cadet. To be sure, Chief Ojeda could not exercise his discretion in a retaliatory manner. But there is no evidence to suggest that Chief Ojeda should have exercised his discretion in her favor. 8 31 The evidence demonstrates that Montemayor failed performance tests as well as the three written examinations. In a particularly important training test (the nighttime pump operation), she was unable to establish the water supply for her training team because she could not connect hoses and open a hydrant. Her poor performance during this exercise was, even by her own admission, a serious deficiency that would have been dangerous had it happened at a real fire. Finally, the record indicates that, at various times, Montemayor had difficulties turning on a power saw and was unable to open discharge valves on a pumper truck. 32 In response to the evidence that she performed poorly on skills tests, Montemayor makes two points. First, she argues that the nighttime pump operations test was rigged to make her fail. Nothing in the record supports this argument. Montemayor was given the same opportunity to pass the test as her fellow cadets. She simply failed. 33 Second, she claims that she could not start the power saw during the performance exercise because it was flooded, or out of gas, and she was stressed and overheated. However, her own testimony demonstrated that the power saw became flooded because she could not start it. Moreover, she admits that she could not start the power saw during her practice exercises. In sum, none of her contentions detract from the fact that she performed poorly during performance tests. 34 In light of the overwhelming, uncontradicted evidence that Montemayor was a substandard cadet who failed written examinations and performance tests, a reasonable jury could not conclude that she would not have been terminated but for her protected conduct. Therefore, the district court's JMOL ruling on this point is also AFFIRMED.