Opinion ID: 1709217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was simpson entitled to an instruction further defining the term reasonable doubt?

Text: The trial court refused the defendant's proffered instruction D-11: The Court instructs the jury that the doctrine of reasonable doubt is an essential substantial part of the law of the land, and that it is binding upon the jury in this case; and under law, it is the duty of the jury to consider all of the testimony in the case fairly and impartially in reaching their verdict; and if after such fair and impartial consideration of the testimony in the case, the minds of the jury are left in a state of uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant, and there arises out of the evidence or from the want of evidence, a reasonable doubt of the existence of a single material fact upon which the guilt of the defendant depends, then it is the law, that it is the duty of the jury in such case, to give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and to find him `not guilty' as charged in the indictment. The appellant, in his brief, asserts that the term reasonable doubt was used in the instructions given as only a passing unimportant term. The record shows that the term reasonable doubt was used in the following instructions which were given to the jury: C-2, on the burden of proof, C-3, on proof of every material element of the crime, S-1, on the elements of murder, S-2, on the difference between murder and manslaughter, and D-28, on self-defense. When Instruction D-11 was proffered by the defendant, the following exchange took place: BY MR. BOWEN [Prosecutor]: Object to it, your Honor. It's an attempt to define reasonable doubt. BY JUDGE WICKER: I am going to refuse it on the ground of repetition. I think the Court's instruction is sufficient to advise the jury about doubt. Refused as being repetitious. In the above-referenced instructions, the term reasonable doubt appeared, but was never qualified to the extent of D-11. The State's position is that the language in D-11 goes too far beyond mere mention of the phrase reasonable doubt and, instead, impermissibly defines the term. Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1348 (Miss. 1977); Pittman v. State, 350 So.2d 67, 71 (Miss. 1977). However Instruction D-11 is substantially the same as the following instruction, sanctioned in Wilcher v. State, 455 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1984): The Court instructs the Jury that under the law, the terms `reasonable doubt' as used by the Court in instructions to juries as the law in the trial of cases, is a sacred and substantial right of this Defendant, Bobby Glen Wilcher, charged with this crime, given and guaranteed unto him by the law of the land, and that such reasonable doubt may arise from the testimony, or the lack of testimony, and that under the law, it is the sworn duty of the jury, and each member thereof, that is [sic] there is a reasonable doubt in the mind of any member of this jury as to the guilt of the Defendant, it is your sworn duty to return a verdict of `Not Guilty.' [Emphasis theirs] Id. at 734-35. The difference in the two instructions which the State complains of is the language in D-11, if after such fair and impartial consideration of the testimony in the case, the minds of the jury are left in a state of uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant... . . The State asserts that this language amounts to a definition of reasonable doubt. The language of Pittman which the Court held constituted a definition of reasonable doubt told the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt did not mean beyond all possible doubt but meant a doubt based on reason and common sense. 350 So.2d at 71. In Pittman, the instruction attempted to qualify the term doubt by telling the jurors what was reasonable. In this case, the defendant merely sought to tell the jurors that if they were in a state of uncertainty after the presentation of the evidence, that uncertainty constituted reasonable doubt. There is an inherent difference between the two instructions. However, we find that the jury was adequately instructed on reasonable doubt, and the refusal to give D-11 was not reversible error.