Opinion ID: 814004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contract Dispute

Text: The court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Threadgill v. Prudential Sec. Grp., Inc., 145 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate “‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros. Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (later re-worded and re-numbered as present Rule 56(a)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence of a genuine 3 Case: 12-30368 Document: 00512089390 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 No. 12-30368 dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)!(B). Furthermore, “[a] mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury.” Int’l Therapeutics, Inc. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 721 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374–75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds, Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 336–39 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
Worldwide alleges that it entered into an oral contract with CCMSI which entitled it to a 26% share of the total interest CCMSI had in its municipal contract with the City. Even assuming that such a fee-sharing agreement did exist, the most Worldwide would be entitled to receive is 26% of CCMSI’s total interest in the municipal contract. According to CCMSI’s undisputed figures, Worldwide received more than 26% of the total interest in the municipal contract fee for the years in question. Therefore, without more evidence, it is unclear to what extent Worldwide claims any damages. The district court was correct in determining that Worldwide’s unsupported assertions that it has not received the entirety of their 26% share, without more, do not survive summary judgment. Furthermore, exactly what Worldwide claims to be the total interest of the municipal contract, from which Worldwide claims its 26% share, is everchanging. For the first time on appeal, and citing only its expert witness’s account, Worldwide argues that, in addition to 26% of any fees paid by the City, it is entitled to 26% of any amount “[the City] reimbursed CCMSI for costs and expenses . . . .”1 Yet, Worldwide offers no evidence showing what 1 Even within its latest brief, Worldwide is not entirely consistent in its assertions of what it is owed. At one point, referring to its expert-witness affidavit, Worldwide claims it “was owed 26% of the amount that the [City] reimbursed CCMSI for its costs and expenses[,]” while later arguing that all they seek is its “26% share of CCMSI’s contract fee, exclusive of the expenses.” 4 Case: 12-30368 Document: 00512089390 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 No. 12-30368 reimbursements, if any, CCMSI received from the City, nor does it offer evidence that Worldwide was not compensated for those amounts. Without more, this latest suggestion of entitlement to reimbursed costs and expenses does not amount to more than a “mere scintilla of evidence,” as is required. For its part, CCMSI denies the existence of an oral fee-sharing agreement altogether. In its effort to prove the existence of the alleged fee-sharing contract that could entitle Worldwide to any additional payment, Worldwide submitted affidavits of both its sole shareholder and an expert witness regarding the existence of the alleged contract. The district court found the affidavits did not satisfy Worldwide’s burden of proof absent corroborating evidence. Though we need not reach the issue given our conclusion that Worldwide was paid all it would be entitled to under any such agreement, in an abundance of caution, we find for CCMSI on this issue as well. Under Louisiana law, contracts in excess of $500 “must be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1846. The party seeking to enforce performance bears the burden of proving the existence of the contract by a preponderance of the evidence. B.M. Albrecht Elec., Inc. v. Griffin, 413 So.2d 246, 247 (La. Ct. App. 1982). The trier of fact has great latitude in what to accept as corroborating evidence. Id. On appeal, in addition to its affidavits, Worldwide offers the argument that CCMSI’s admission of having paid Worldwide at least 26% of its total interest in the municipal contract is corroborating evidence of a fee-sharing agreement. However, this merely proves that Worldwide was compensated at least 26% of CCMSI’s total interest in the municipal contract, not that a fee-sharing contract existed. Therefore, by failing to offer sufficient corroborating evidence of an oral contract, Worldwide has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of an oral fee-sharing contract with CCMSI. 5 Case: 12-30368 Document: 00512089390 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 No. 12-30368 To the extent that Worldwide urges a breach-of-contract claim against CCMSI for wrongfully terminating its services because it was unlicensed, the claim also does not survive summary judgment. Worldwide argues that by providing services to a municipality, a state exemption statute exempts the company from meeting Louisiana State licensing requirements. Worldwide points to the affidavit of Pat Englade with the Louisiana Board of Private Investigative Examiners (LBPIE), which had ordered Worldwide to cease and desist its investigative operations. The LBPIE affidavit states that the “action is considered closed until the agreement between his employer and CCMSI is produced and the services provided are evaluated pursuant to the exemption statute.” Worldwide, however, has offered no evidence that it meets the requirements of any exemption statute, and thus, this claim does not survive summary judgment.