Opinion ID: 1743425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: BIC contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdicti.e., a preverdict judgment as a matter of law (see Rule 50(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.). When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, this Court uses the same standard the trial court initially used in granting or denying the motion. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala.1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has presented substantial evidence to allow the factual issue to be submitted to the jury for resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). See also § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975, and West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). A motion for a judgment as a matter of law is properly denied where there exists any conflict in the evidence for consideration by the jury. Cloverleaf Plaza, Inc. v. Cooper & Co., 565 So.2d 1147, 1149 (Ala.1990). In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a [judgment as a matter of law], this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences from that evidence as the jury would have been free to draw. Daniels v. East Alabama Paving, Inc., 740 So.2d 1033, 1037 (Ala.1999).
BIC argues that the evidence concerning the instrumentality that caused the fire was extremely confusing. Cassandra Formby, Cunningham's next-door neighbor, was the first person to view the scene after the fire. She said she saw a burned box of matches, aerosol cans, [2] and lighters in Cunningham's bedroom. Cunningham testified that she had no idea how the fire started, although she had told the medical team at the hospital that the fire was caused by matches. Franklin Williams, Cunningham's brother, was living with her at the time of the fire. He testified that he had no idea what had caused the fire but that he was told by Cunningham or Mrs. Williams that the fire was caused by an exploding aerosol can. Franklin Williams also said that, on the day of the fire, he had left a lighter on the dresser in Cunningham's bedroom. Dontavious's deposition was read at the trial; when asked in his deposition how the fire had started, Dontavious replied, I had a cigarette lighter. Then, when asked what he was doing with the lighter, he stated, I was lighting the curtains. Dontavious, who was three years old at the time of the fire, was not asked about use of an aerosol can at the time of the fire. We conclude that the record, while it is in conflict regarding the presence of a lighter, was sufficient to justify the trial court's rejection of BIC's argument that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient for the factfinder to determine that a lighter had caused the fire.
BIC also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that a BIC lighter was involved. The only witnesses who testified at trial with certainty as to the presence of BIC lighters at the scene were Cunningham and Franklin Williams. Franklin Williams testified at trial that he generally bought BIC lighters, and at a later point in his testimony he stated that he bought only BIC lighters. Throughout the case and until three weeks before trial, some seven years after the accident, Franklin Williams's deposition testimony and Cunningham's deposition testimony were rather specific as to the color of the BIC lighter they said was present on the occasion of the fire. Franklin Williams testified by deposition that he had had only one lighter; that it was a black BIC lighter; and that he had left it on Cunningham's dresser on the morning of the fire. Cunningham testified by deposition that there was only one black BIC lighter in the house, saying it was the only lighter we had. Three weeks before the trial, in response to a request for admissions, Williams, as guardian, asserted that the lighter that caused the fire was a black or blue BIC lighter. The state fire marshal's report plainly stated that a yellow/orange ... refillable lighter had been recovered from the fire scene. While the lighter had been in the possession of the fire marshal at the time of the fire marshal's investigation, its whereabouts were unknown by the time the action was commenced two years later. At trial, the investigating officer for the Talladega Fire Department testified that he found a yellow lighter that was similar to a BIC lighter or a brand of another manufacturer, but he could not say it was a BIC lighter, merely stating that it was similar to a BIC lighter. When asked to identify a BIC lighter from a group of lighters, he selected a lighter manufactured by another company. Fire department officials testified that firefighters found either a red or a yellow lighter at the fire scene. Cunningham and Franklin Williams testified that they had brought numerous lighters of various colors to the apartment in the months before the fire. Formby, the next-door neighbor, testified that she saw lighters of various colors, including yellow, black, and red, at the fire scene, but she never identified the lighters as BIC lighters. Hence, according to Formby's testimony, there were lighters other than a single black lighter at the fire scene. BIC points out that the testimony of Mr. Williams and Cunningham is the only evidence that links its lighters to the scene; that that evidence is inherently unreliable, by reason of the fact that those witnesses changed their testimony from that given in their depositions; and, therefore, that the trial court should have directed a verdict in its favor. We cannot say that the change in the witnesses' testimony regarding the color of the lighter is so critical as to authorize a directed verdict based on an analogy to the trial court's authority to enter a summary judgment even though there exists an apparent genuine issue of material fact, if that issue is created by a witness's affidavit that contradicts, without explanation, that witness's deposition. See Couch v. Woody Anderson Ford, Inc., 558 So.2d 888 (Ala.1989). Formby's testimony that at the fire scene she saw lighters of various colors, when coupled with Franklin Williams's testimony that he bought lighters of several colors in the months preceding the fire and that he bought only BIC lighters, constitutes evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that a BIC lighter was involved; the jury could have concluded this independently of the contradicted portion of the depositions of Franklin Williams and Cunningham dealing with the color of the lighter. The jury could have concluded that Dontavious started the fire with a BIC lighter other than the black BIC lighter on the dresser. The trial court properly rejected BIC's argument that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to present substantial evidence indicating that a BIC lighter had been involved in the fire.
BIC's final ground offered in support of its motion for a directed verdict is that the evidence was insufficient to show that an enhanced child-resistant feature on BIC lighters would have prevented this incident. When moving for a directed verdict in the trial court, BIC stated: There's not been a shred of evidence on whether the newer lighter they're claiming should have been on the market would have stopped the fire, prevented the accident. This Court considered the liability of a manufacturer of cigarette lighters in Bean v. BIC Corp., 597 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992) (BIC I) , where this Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer because (1) the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the manufacturer had a duty to offer the public a child-resistant lighter; (2) the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the danger posed by the lighter was open and obvious; and (3) the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the warnings on the lighter and its packaging were adequate. The same parties returned in BIC Corp. v. Bean, 669 So.2d 840 (Ala.1995) ( BIC II ), after a trial and the entry of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In BIC I, this Court described the scope of a manufacturer's legal duty as being dependent upon two factors: (1) the foreseeability of the danger; and (2) the feasibility of an alternative design that averts that danger. Id. at 1352. (Emphasis added.) See also Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So.2d 411, 418 (Ala.1994), where this Court stated that, under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, the plaintiff must prove that a safer, practical, alternative design was available to the manufacturer ... that ... would have ... eliminated or in some way reduced the plaintiff's injuries. BIC first began manufacturing lighters with child-resistant features in 1991 or 1992. According to the testimony of BIC's experts, teaching a child to use a lighter through instruction, as opposed to the child's learning through nonverbal demonstration or observation, presents significant problems in designing and developing more child-resistant lighters. Once a child is taught to roll and press so as to ignite the lighter, the operation of BIC model 7 with an enhanced child-resistant feature becomes relatively simple, for it requires only that the user engage a latch before beginning the roll-and-press ignition step. In other words, the roll-and-press ignition step is the more difficult function to master and, once that step is learned through instruction, the engagement of the latch, a comparatively simple step that requires no special timing or coordination, enables the user to ignite the lighter. BIC contends that its evidence indicated that a child-resistant feature is ineffective once a child has been taught to ignite a roll-and-press lighter, and that that evidence was never rebutted. BIC, relying upon BIC I, contends that the record contains no substantial evidence indicating that the alternative design would have prevented the incident involved in this case such evidence, BIC says, is an essential factor on which a manufacturer's duty is dependent. However, Dontavious denied that he had been taught to use a lighter. If the jury accepted his testimony, any inadequacy in the plaintiff's expert testimony, limited to the feasibility of a child-resistant lighter in the hands of a child who had not been taught to use a lighter, becomes immaterial. We conclude that the trial court properly rejected BIC's argument that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the basis that the plaintiffs evidence of the feasibility of an alternative design was insufficient.