Opinion ID: 2015081
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Counsel's Representation at Sentencing

Text: Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present significant and readily available evidence in mitigation of the death penalty. According to defendant, defense counsel's cursory and incomplete evaluation of his case for sentencing purposes resulted in part because counsel strongly believed that the trial court was not going to impose the death sentence. Irrespective of the cause of counsel's failings, defendant concludes, the result of the inadequate preparation for capital sentencing was highly prejudicial because it left the court with the mistaken impression, as emphasized by the court's remark, that there was not a single mitigating factor to preclude imposition of death. This finding by the court led directly to its holding that it was dutybound to impose the ultimate penalty. Initially, I note that the majority opinion does not address defendant's contention that his attorneys' failure to investigate and present mitigation at the sentencing hearing was based, at least in part, on their erroneous interpretation of the judge's signal that he would not impose the death penalty. If true, the defense attorneys' alleged shortcomings at sentencing cannot be ascribed to proper trial strategy. See, e.g., People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 168-71, 213 Ill.Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995) (trial counsel's decision not to present mitigation testimony, based at least in part on counsel's belief that mitigation testimony would not influence sentencing judge, could not be justified as legitimate strategy). Adequate preparation for the aggravation and mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing is a crucial aspect of defense counsel's duties, as prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance at capital sentencing is likely to be fatal. After examining the record I believe that defendant has made a strong preliminary showing of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital prosecution and should be granted an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his claims. Among the numerous exhibits attached to the post-conviction petition is the affidavit of the clinical psychologist who tested defendant and found him to be within the borderline mentally retarded range of intellectual ability. Other evidence reveals defendant's history of serious psychological, physical, and developmental problems beginning in childhood; the resulting difficulties he faced at school; and an extensive family history of alcohol and drug abuse coupled with the family's extreme denial of such problems. None of this material was presented or considered at defendant's sentencing hearing. In fact, the mitigation witnesses who testified denied or downplayed the existence of defendant's impairments and his family's dysfunctions. According to defendant, his trial counsel failed to interview him in depth to elicit material evidence in mitigation. Her first meeting with him was 55 days after his incarceration, and she visited him in jail approximately four times within 15 months. Defendant argues that his counsel failed to seek out certain family members and others having knowledge of his background; failed to obtain school and medical records to help evaluate his mental and physical condition; failed to order a current psychological examination; and failed to obtain a professional evaluation of defendant's substance abuse and its effect on his functioning. Instead, counsel called defendant's mother and a few other family members and friends to testify in mitigation as to his good character, but failed to adequately prepare the witnesses. This lack of adequate preparation led to the witnesses' misguided and inaccurate portrayal of defendant's history and family life, which in turn invited the prosecutor's argument that the evidence of good family background was actually aggravating, rather than mitigating, in nature. Defendant further charges that his counsel failed to investigate and present evidence relating to his rehabilitation potential and capacity for a positive adjustment to the structured environment of prison. He concludes that if the materials in the post-conviction petition had been presented at the sentencing hearing, the outcome likely would have differed and the death penalty would not have been imposed. The majority opinion describes or quotes portions of the mitigation evidence proffered as part of the post-conviction petition and expressly acknowledges numerous supporting reports and affidavits bearing on the mitigation issues. After making this observation, however, the majority inexplicably pronounces, without analysis, that [t]he gulf is relatively slight between what the trial judge knew from his reading of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing with respect to defendant's intellectual and development deficits and his and his family's drug and alcohol abuse and what defendant alleges in this regard in his amended post-conviction petition. As a result, there is no reasonable probability that, had counsel provided this information to the court and focused upon it at the sentencing hearing, the court would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors    did not warrant the imposition of the death penalty. 173 Ill.2d at 112, 219 Ill.Dec. at 5, 670 N.E.2d at 683. I cannot join in such a comparison of the materials presented in the post-conviction petition with the pro forma presentence investigation report. The former contains extensive school and medical records, affidavits, and other material from outside sources, while the presentence report consists almost entirely of the self-reported statements of defendant, with little or no corroboration or elaboration by others. For example, under the heading Physical and Mental Health, the brief entry in the presentence investigation report relates defendant's statement that his third-grade teacher recommended he see a psychiatrist, and that he saw some doctor weekly during third and fourth grade, but that defendant has no idea why he was seeing this doctor and doesn't remember what the doctors[`]s name was. The defendant also stated to the presentence interviewer that he was placed in slow learner classes since the fifth grade but, again, had no idea why. In contrast to these vague, uncorroborated statements attributed to defendant in the presentence investigation report, the amended post-conviction petition offers significant factually detailed and verified exhibits. These include school-initiated reports and referrals relating to defendant's mental deficits, physical problems, and behavioral disorders detected as early as his initial foray into the public school system, in the first grade. According to a 1972 report from the Chicago school system, Bureau of Mentally Handicapped Children, defendant entered first grade with below-average skills, suffered from a vision deficit, and was referred to the school psychologist for examination because he talked to himself in class, made funny noises, fell out of his chair, and needed constant help to focus his attention on classroom matters. He also was referred for medical examination and found to have an eye condition called strabismus (inability to aim one or both eyes), which required surgery. Defendant's IQ tested at 86 in this initial examination, indicating a slow average rate of mental growth and the school psychologist made certain recommendations, concluding that [w]arm praise for small efforts will help this child. Defendant was referred to Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center for vision, physical, and neurological testing. In a 1973 report from the medical center, an interviewer was unable to complete her evaluation of the child's developmental status because of his inability to concentrate during testing. The report notes that the boy's mother expressed surprise at her son's inattentiveness and claimed his behavior at home was different. The Michael Reese Hospital report noted that the boy seem[ed] to have a great deal of potential if provided with direction and successful experiences and recommended that defendant receive learning disabled services from the school system. However, he did not immediately receive such services and had to repeat the third grade. He also spent five years in social adjustment classes before finally being placed in classes for the educable mentally handicapped in 1978. In a January 1980 school examination, defendant's IQ had slipped to 70, indicating a slow rate of mental growth. The report noted that defendant's vision and hearing problems had not been corrected and further stated that defendant appeared to be a very worried and insecure boy who [was] readily overwhelmed by tasks and needed much encouragement. Emotionally, he was viewed as a highly dependent youngster with very low self-esteem who requires much support and reassurance. Defendant's grades while in school were poor and he dropped out of high school in his second year. The post-conviction materials also contain a lengthy affidavit from Dr. Louis Hemmerich, the clinical psychologist who examined and tested defendant at the behest of post-conviction counsel. Dr. Hemmerich's affidavit enumerates the large number of records and affidavits he reviewed in addition to his testing of and interviews with defendant, which lasted six hours. He found that defendant's full score IQ was 77, indicating a borderline mentally retarded range of intellectual ability which placed him at the sixth percentile when compared to others of the same age range. Defendant also demonstrated significant impairments in his commonsense judgment and abstract verbal reasoning. Dr. Hemmerich concluded that defendant was dependent upon others, wanting their approval, and had adopted his family's coping style of denial, which stemmed from substantial use and abuse of alcohol and drugs. Dr. Hemmerich also concluded that rehabilitation was certainly possible for defendant, who exhibited remorse and guilt. The doctor further concluded that defendant would adjust well to the structured environment of prison. As the record in the instant case demonstrates, the majority errs in implying that the cursory presentencing investigation report provided the trial court with adequate and credible information respecting defendant's mental and physical health and social development. To characterize as relatively slight the gulf between what is contained in the presentence report and what is revealed in the numerous exhibits attached to the post-conviction petition is comparable to equating a blurred snapshot with a full-length documentary film. I would conclude on the basis of the materials contained in the post-conviction petition and under Illinois law that defendant did not receive the individualized sentencing determination that the Constitution requires. [Citation.] People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 195-96, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992). In Perez, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on a portion of the defendant's allegations but denied post-conviction relief. On appeal, this court reversed the post-conviction judgment and vacated the defendant's death sentence, holding that a new sentencing hearing was constitutionally required because defendant's trial counsel had failed to investigate and provide evidence of mitigation. Such evidence included school records reflecting the defendant's mental deficiency and evidence that the defendant was abandoned by his family as a teenager. As in the case at bar, in Perez there existed reports from school psychologists indicating a history of low scholastic aptitude, as measured by low IQ scores, and behavioral problems in the classroom. This court in Perez cited with approval a line of Federal cases in which counsels' failure to investigate and present defendants' mental histories was found to fall below objective standards of reasonableness and constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Perez, 148 Ill.2d at 190, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984 (citing, inter alia, Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.1991), Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir.1991), and Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642 (11th Cir.1988)). In Aiken, similar to the case at bar, the defendant and his accomplices had committed a series of armed robberies in one day, and then killed a victim during another armed robbery. The defendant had an extensive criminal history and was sentenced to death upon his conviction of murder in the course of armed robbery. However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel had failed to obtain and present evidence of defendant's borderline retardation, failure in school, and tendency to be easily led. Aiken, 935 F.2d at 859. In light of the persuasive force of such decisions as Aiken, Perez, and the other cases cited above, the decision of the majority in the case at bar is difficult to comprehend. The majority, citing the second prong of Strickland, simplistically seizes upon the circuit court's statement that the result of the sentencing hearing would not have differed even if the mitigation evidence had been presented. In so doing, however, the majority fails to consider as true the well-pleaded allegations supporting defendant's constitutional cause of action and thereby fails to apply settled principles of our post-conviction law. See, e.g., People v. Caballero, 126 Ill.2d 248, 259, 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 533 N.E.2d 1089 (1989). The majority offers no decisional authority to justify its rejection of defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance by his attorneys' failure to investigate and present the mitigation evidence. Indeed, the majority makes no attempt to justify the defense attorneys' failings as proper strategy but instead finds a lack of prejudice resulting from counsel's failings. As previously discussed, the majority's belief that the presentence report adequately apprised the court of the defendant's background is simply unsupportable. Accordingly, the majority's mechanical application of Strickland rings hollow. See People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill.2d 1, 25, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170 (1989) (the sentencing authority in a capital case may not refuse to consider    relevant mitigating evidence concerning the offender or the circumstances of the offense). In Ruiz, this court held that the defendant's unchallenged and unheard allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence, required an evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction petition because on the record before this court the Strickland standard could not be meaningfully applied. I find it especially disturbing, under the facts of this case, that the majority so readily embraces the circuit court's supposition that the mitigation evidence would not have been sufficient to preclude the death penalty. My review of the record indicates that there is much to militate against imposition of the death penalty. The circumstances surrounding the attempted armed robbery and homicide do not appear unusually egregious or indicative of wanton cruelty. The trial testimony indicates that Bracy was shot after he swung or threw a bottle at defendant. Bracy's companion, who testified against defendant, was not shot. It would not have been unreasonable to infer from these facts that defendant might simply have panicked or felt unreasonably threatened at the sudden movement from Bracy. Although the State implied that the slaying was an execution, the mere fact that more than one shot was fired does not support the State's characterization in light of the other facts. Moreover, case precedent demonstrates that, although the nature of the crime may be considered in aggravation, even heinous crimes do not obviate the need for an evidentiary hearing when trial counsel fails to investigate and present mitigation evidence at sentencing. See, e.g., People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 171, 213 Ill.Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995) (rejecting State's argument that the defendant failed to establish prejudice resulting from counsel's ineffective assistance, even where the heinous nature of the multiple murders for which defendant was convicted is not an inconsiderable aggravating factor). See also People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill.2d 148, 204 Ill.Dec. 147, 641 N.E.2d 371 (1994) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where, even though counsel had introduced into evidence at sentencing 50 letters in support of defendant, post-conviction affidavits of family members and friends were of such significance that evidence relating thereto should have been presented at sentencing). The comparatively shorter prison sentences defendant's two accomplices received further indicates that defendant suffered prejudice from the performance of his counsel at sentencing. Thompson and Howard, the two other participants in the attempted armed robbery and murder of Bracy, pleaded guilty and thus were criminally responsible for the same crimes as defendant. Like defendant, Thompson and Howard were charged with and identified as participants in the three other armed robberies that occurred on November 3, 1986. Thompson and defendant were further identified at defendant's sentencing hearing as being involved in a November 1, 1986, shooting incident in which a mailman was wounded. Notwithstanding this shared history of a recent spree of similar offenses, Thompson and Howard each received only 35 years in prison (the maximum, unextended period of imprisonment for murder was 40 years), as compared with a sentence of death for defendant. Moreover, according to the record, Thompson had a criminal history that included two prior felony convictions, while defendant had one prior criminal conviction, a 1984 robbery (in which Thompson also participated). Finally, although the three armed robberies of November 3, 1986, created a great risk of harm, none of them resulted in killings of any victims. For these reasons, the mitigation evidence presented in the instant post-conviction petition attains critical importance to defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. To summarize, taking the well-pleaded allegations of the post-conviction petition as true, the specific circumstances of the instant case simply do not justify the majority's ruling that the outcome would not have differed if the court had considered the evidence in mitigation. Defendant was 19 years old at the time of the commission of the homicide, borderline mentally retarded, and had a documented history of physical disabilities, profound mental deficits, and developmental problems, along with a history of familial substance abuse and denial. Not only did his counsel fail to assemble and present this critical evidence to the court during sentencing, but the mitigation witnesses who did testify characterized defendant's development and family history in terms starkly contradicting the actual circumstances. Defendant's mother denied that defendant was using drugs or alcohol and denied that he had had severe problems or even bad grades in school. Although the several mitigation witnesses testified that defendant had not displayed any violent tendencies and was a helpful and trustworthy person around them, these witnesses also denied that defendant abused drugs or alcohol. As a result of their apparent attempt to paint a more wholesome picture of defendant's background, the witnesses actually contradicted defendant's own statements regarding his substance abuse in the presentence report. Given the substantial evidence in mitigation that was not presented, solely due to the defense attorneys' failure to investigate, defendant's sentencing hearing was not a true adversarial proceeding of the type required by the sixth amendment. Therefore, I strongly dissent from my colleagues' refusal to grant defendant an evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The result of the majority's decision is to permit execution of this defendant despite serious constitutional flaws in defendant's prosecution, particularly the sentencing hearing.