Opinion ID: 580823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: procedural problems

Text: 11 Review of this case is complicated by docket omissions and unusual procedures employed by the district court. Defendants-appellants represent that three days after the complaint was filed on August 2, 1989, the district court conducted a hearing on Brown's request for temporary injunctive relief. There is no transcript of this hearing in the record submitted to this court. Defendants-appellants state that the district court directed that they either lift the moratorium or be subjected to an injunction accomplishing that result. Defendants-appellants explain that the moratorium was lifted subsequent to the district court's direction and that court was so advised. 4 12 The docket shows that Chief Judge Wilbur D. Owens, Jr. sent a Memorandum to Counsel on his letterhead stationery on October 10, 1989. This memorandum, addressed to Brown's counsel with copies to defendants' counsel and the city attorney, directs the counsel to prepare a delineated discovery order. Chief Judge Owens admonishes the counsel that [i]f the court does not receive a proposed Rule 16(b) and Rule 26(f) combined order within thirty (30) days, the court will direct all of you to appear in Macon for a conference preparatory to the court['s] fashioning and entering such orders. The discovery order was entered by Chief Judge Owens on January 2, 1990. 13 Thereafter, full discovery, including depositions of all the individual defendants-appellants comprising the Board of Commissioners, ensued. The joint pretrial order was filed on November 7, 1990. Among the issues for trial, defendants-appellants list: Whether the individual county commissioners are entitled to absolute immunity in this case. Defendants-appellants include the following caveat concerning trial in the joint pretrial order: 14 Defendants contend that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as to all of Plaintiff's claims. Defendants therefore do not agree that there is any issue for determination by the jury in this action. Defendants only agree that the issues listed below have been framed by the pleadings. Plaintiff, however, asserts that Defendants' contentions that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law are erroneous. 15 The next docket entry available to this reviewing court is the individual defendants-appellants' motion to dismiss on the basis of absolute immunity. Therein, defendants-appellants contend that their unanimous vote passing the moratorium on issuing mobile home permits in a specified area of Crawford County was an exercise of their legislative decisionmaking authority. They additionally incorporate by reference their legal arguments and citation of authorities contained in their pretrial brief, filed contemporaneously with their motion to dismiss. Without explanation and stating that it had carefully considered the motion, the district court denied defendants-appellants' motion to dismiss. The individual defendants-appellants appealed that ruling. 16 Because defendants-appellants' motion to dismiss at issue in this case followed extensive discovery and the district court's pretrial order, this court at oral argument inquired into counsel's reason for filing a motion to dismiss at that stage of the proceedings rather than a summary judgment motion, the expected motion following discovery. Counsel for defendants-appellants informed the court that the district court had not permitted the filing of their requested summary judgment motion, based upon a local procedure in that court. Consequently and alternatively, the motion to dismiss was filed because defendants-appellants believed that there was a valid legal basis for dismissing the action against them. 17 Baffled by the district court's denial of a right accorded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to file a summary judgment motion, the panel requested supplemental briefs providing and explaining the local procedure that prevented defendants-appellants from filing a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In response, counsel provided to this court JUDGES FITZPATRICK'S AND OWENS' PROCEDURES AND POLICIES FOR CIVIL CASES, 5 dated January, 1987. Currently effective, these Procedures and Policies include the following procedure for filing motions for summary judgment: 18 Motions for Summary Judgment. As the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit regularly demonstrate, rarely can it be said without fear of contradiction that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Because of this the filing of motions for summary judgment is frequently a waste of your time, opposing counsel's time, our clerk's time, and the court's time--not to mention the expense of each party and the taxpayers. To assist you in avoiding the filing of summary judgment motions that have no possible merit, the court requests that before filing such a motion you advise the court and opposing counsel in person (call the judge for an appointment) or by letter if you desire to file such motion and your factual and legal reasons, succinctly stated, for believing you will prevail on the motion. Opposing counsel can then respond in person or by letter and the court can suggest whether or not the case seems to be appropriate for summary judgment. This is not intended to prohibit your filing such motions; it is only intended to facilitate your doing so. 19 In considering the filing of a summary judgment motion, prepare to include proposed findings of undisputed material facts (with reference to source of facts) and conclusions of law in your motion. This will be required. 6 20 Counsel also supplied this court with their letters to Chief Judge Owens concerning filing a summary judgment motion in this case in compliance with the local procedure. After reviewing the facts and applicable law, counsel for defendants-appellants asserts that the individual commissioners are entitled to absolute immunity in this case as they were acting in their legislative capacity in passing the moratorium. In response, Brown's counsel concludes that a motion for summary judgment is inappropriate on the issue of absolute immunity. Following receipt of counsels' letters regarding filing a summary judgment motion, Chief Judge Owens informed counsel in a one-sentence letter that I do not believe this is a case that should be decided on motion for summary judgment. Until this court's request, these letters were not part of the record in this case. 7 21 Ostensibly, the local procedure purports to facilitate and not to prohibit the filing of summary judgment motions. It appears, however, that the district judges utilizing this procedure in the Middle District of Georgia effectively are precluding parties from filing summary judgment motions, as in this case. In their supplemental brief, defendants-appellants state that the clerk's office in the Macon Division of the Middle District of Georgia will not accept a motion for summary judgment for filing unless it has been approved by the judge. 22 Under Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each district court is authorized to make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. 8 (emphasis added). See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 150-51, 93 S.Ct. 2448, 2449, 37 L.Ed.2d 522 (1973). District courts are not required to adopt local rules, but they must not circumvent the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by implementing local rules or procedures which do not afford parties rights that they are accorded under the Federal Rules. See Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir.1991) ([L]ocal court rules ... cannot conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Acts of Congress, and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court.); Coady v. Aguadilla Terminal Inc., 456 F.2d 677, 678 (1st Cir.1972) ([A] local rule cannot be applied if it is contrary to a federal statute or rule. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965))). 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 makes no allowance for a preliminary procedure by the district court for reviewing, with the potential of denying, a party's prospective summary judgment motion. Essentially, the local summary judgment procedure that has been used in the Middle District of Georgia constitutes advance screening. Under Rule 56, a party is entitled to make a summary judgment motion, which the district court then may decide. 9 Indeed, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted may be converted into a summary judgment motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). 24 The opportunity to move for summary judgment is being denied to practitioners in the Middle District of Georgia as a consequence of the local procedure utilized by these district judges. Because the local procedure for filing a summary judgment motion in the Middle District of Georgia violates litigating parties' procedural and substantive rights under Rule 56, we find it to be invalid and direct that it cease forthwith. 10 See Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir.1983) (In addition to concluding that the subject local rule was not inconsistent with any federal law or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court specifically found that no party's substantive rights were changed.); cf. Jasinski v. Showboat Operating Co., 644 F.2d 1277, 1279-82 (9th Cir.1981) (The court reversed a grant of summary judgment, where the opposing party filed a timely motion for oral argument, and the district court ruled without allowing oral argument in violation of its local rule and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, resulting in prejudice to the opposing party by not affording it the opportunity to present significant constitutional arguments.). Effective immediately, parties in the Middle District of Georgia may file summary judgment motions in accordance with Rule 56 without submitting to the former, local preliminary review procedure. 25 This court is greatly disturbed by the district court's pressing this case through discovery and preparing it for trial, when a valid, absolute immunity defense existed. 11 By prolonging this case, the district court failed to serve the purported goals of its local procedure of saving the parties as well as the court time and expense. This case should not have been prepared for trial; moreover, it should not have undergone discovery. 12 In the interest of judicial economy and to refrain from further defeating the purpose of the absolute immunity defense in this case, we will address the motion to dismiss before us as if it had been filed at the appropriate time, despite full discovery. 13