Opinion ID: 853613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination Regarding Prior Battery

Text: Prior to trial, Jackson filed a request for notice of any proposed Rule 404(b) evidence. The State responded by announcing its intention to introduce evidence that Jackson had been arrested for committing a battery on Debbie in August 1996. Jackson filed a motion in limine, requesting that the evidence be excluded. The trial court concluded that, given Jackson's contention that the killing was accidental, the evidence was relevant to prove motive. The trial court nevertheless ruled that the evidence should be excluded under Evidence Rule 403 because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. The trial court then stated that, although the State would not be allowed to use the evidence in its case-in-chief, the evidence could have some rebuttal value and the issue might need to be revisited. On direct examination, Jackson testified to his love for Debbie throughout their twenty-one years of marriage, and to his love for her on the day he shot her. On cross-examination, the State asked him if had also loved his wife on March 3, 1996. [2] Defense counsel objected, and at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the State argued that evidence of the battery was admissible to rebut Jackson's contention that he had always loved his wife. The trial court agreed that the statement by the defendant that he loved his wife every day of their marriage calls in the question of that relationship so I will overrule the objection. Jackson challenges admission of that evidence. Under Evidence Rule 404(b), [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith . . . . [but] may, however, be admissible [to prove] motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . . In order to admit 404(b) evidence, the court must (1) determine that the evidence is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act, and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403. Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ind.1999); Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222-23 (Ind.1997). This balancing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Byers, 709 N.E.2d at 1026-27; Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 223. In addition, otherwise inadmissible evidence may become admissible where the defendant opens the door to questioning on that evidence. See Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 76, 383 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1978). Jackson cites Gilliam, in which this Court held that the evidence relied upon to `open the door' must leave the trier of fact with a false or misleading impression of the facts related. 270 Ind. at 76-77, 383 N.E.2d at 301. According to Jackson, because there was other evidence that demonstrated that Jackson's marriage to Debbie was not always peaceful, and because he merely professed his love for Debbie, the jury was not left with a false impression that they did not have marital conflicts, and evidence of the battery was inadmissible. The trial court acted well within its discretion in making the pretrial determination that although the battery was relevant to establish motive, the prejudice from admitting the battery outweighed its probative value. It was also well within the discretion of the trial court to determine that the unfair prejudice to Jackson did not substantially outweigh the relevance of the battery and allow this evidence as cross-examination on the point of Jackson's professed love for his wife. Although it was clear that the Jacksons' marriage was imperfect, cross-examination on the battery was nevertheless relevant to rebut the suggestion, or the false impression, that Jackson would not knowingly or intentionally harm someone he loved. [3]