Opinion ID: 1900995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interrogatories to School Board Members.

Text: We next turn to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering the board members to answer an interrogatory propounded by the teacher. The district court is only authorized to intervene in a teacher termination proceeding when a witness fails to comply with a subpoena. Iowa Code § 279.16(3). There is no additional authority for the district court to order a witness to respond to interrogatories. See id. Furthermore, the district court's authority to resolve disputes over the refusal of a witness to comply with a subpoena does not imply authority to order discovery through interrogatories. See In re Melodie L., 591 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Iowa 1999) (holding that, when a court exercises judicial authority pursuant to a statute, such authority must be expressly provided or exist by plain implication. . . . [The exercised authority] must be necessary and essential to carry out the purposes of the statute. (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion to resolve witness disputes by ordering discovery not permitted under the statute. See Bousman, 630 N.W.2d at 796. Yet, this conclusion does not mean a teacher in a termination proceeding is not protected from claims of bias or prejudice. Our law establishes a presumption that board members acting as adjudicators are objective. Bd. of Dirs. of Fairfield Community Sch. Dist. v. Justmann, 476 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Iowa 1991). This general presumption of objectivity prevails against assertions of bias and prejudice absent direct, compelling evidence to the contrary. Id. The presumption may be overcome by evidence that a fair hearing before the board is not possible due to such circumstances as prejudgment voting or when board members act as investigators in the absence of a subsequent evidentiary hearing. See Wedergren v. Bd. of Dirs., 307 N.W.2d 12, 17-18 (Iowa 1981); Keith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 262 N.W.2d 249, 258-61 (Iowa 1978). Although chapter 279 does not provide a procedure by which a teacher may raise claims of bias or prejudice, school board members are quasi-judicial officers when exercising their statutory duty to adjudicate teacher-termination proceedings. Courtright v. Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 203 Iowa 26, 30, 212 N.W. 368, 370 (1927). Generally, presiding judges and judicial officers are immune from testifying. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.605 (prohibiting presiding judges from testifying as witnesses); see also State v. Gardner, 661 N.W.2d 116, 117-18 (Iowa 2003) (This rule [prohibiting judges from testifying] is violated whenever the judge functions as a witness, even though the judge may not actually take the stand to testify.). By analogy, the same rule of quasi-judicial immunity would apply to written questions propounded to board members acting as quasi-judicial officers: as with testimony, interrogatories involve answers to questions under oath. Board members, like judges, must generally be immune from providing any form of testimony at hearings. Nevertheless, this immunity does not prevent claims of board member bias or prejudice from being raised and addressed. Board members are subject to `the common-law rule of disqualification applicable to judges.' Keith, 262 N.W.2d at 261 (quoting 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 63 (now substantially found at 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 38 (2004))) (further holding common-law rule `extends to every tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions'). We have generally described this rule as follows: Any board member who harbors prejudice or predilection should recuse himself or herself. Board members possessing personal knowledge must place it aside or, if they are unable to do so, themselves step aside. The board must be mindful that the decision turns on its own finding of the presence or absence of qualifications and not on the recommendation of an administrator or prior employeralthough these may of course be received and considered. Bishop v. Keystone Area Educ. Agency No. 1, 275 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Iowa 1979). As with judges, recusal by board members will depend on the remoteness of the interest and the extent or degree of the interest. See State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Iowa 1994). Yet, the process does not rest entirely with the adjudicator. In the event board members do not disqualify themselves on their own, a party is permitted to raise the issue by motion on the record. See State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1976). This record provides a means for judicial review of the claim of bias or prejudice. The recusal and disqualification process reveals teachers are adequately protected from fears of bias or prejudice by board members just as litigants in civil proceedings are protected from fears of judicial bias or prejudice. These procedures justify the school board's general immunity from testifying or answering interrogatories, protect teachers from bias and prejudice, and support the limited role of the district court when intervening in termination proceedings.