Opinion ID: 47372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Count

Text: “In order to obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the [g]overnment must establish the existence of three elements: (1) knowledge (of one’s possession); (2) possession of a controlled substance; and (3) intent to distribute that substance.” United States v. Wilson, 183 F.3d 1291, 1299 n.13 (11th Cir. 1999). We have noted that “[a]ll three elements can be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (11th Cir. 1989). “Evidence of surrounding circumstances can prove knowledge.” 8 United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1027 (11th Cir. 1988). “Possession may be actual or constructive, and the latter can be established by evidence showing ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises on which it is concealed.” Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d at 778. “[M]ere ownership of a vehicle containing contraband is insufficient to constitute constructive possession.” United States v. Barrera, 547 F.2d 1250, 1256 (5th Cir. 1977). “Constructive possession may be shared with others, and can be established by circumstantial or direct evidence.” Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d at 778. Appellants were also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2, which provides that “[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). In order to convict a defendant on an aiding and abetting theory, the government must prove that “the defendant (1) associated himself with the crime, (2) intended to bring it about, and (3) sought by his actions to make it succeed.” United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 742 (11th Cir. 1989). “To prove a charge of aiding and abetting possession of drugs with intent to distribute, the [g]overnment must connect the defendant to both aspects of the crime: possession and intent to distribute.” Id. Because 18 U.S.C. § 2 does not “establish a separate crime, . . . [but] merely permits one who aids and abets the 9 commission of a crime to be punished as a principal, . . . [a]n individual . . . may be indicted as a principal for the commission of a substantive crime and convicted upon evidence that he or she aided and abetted only.” United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 388 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because the evidence showed that Rodriguez purposefully drove to Stock Island to procure crack cocaine and then sold the entire amount to a confidential informant, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove his knowing possession of the drugs with the intent to distribute. In addition, because the evidence established that Stickel lent Rodriguez his car, knowing that he was going to use it to procure drugs, and took actions to make sure that the drug deal was completed, we conclude that substantial evidence supported his conviction for aiding and abetting Rodriguez’s possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.