Opinion ID: 2646730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Counterclaims of Little Fish

Text: Little Fish brought three counterclaims against the Estate with respect to certain loans allegedly made by Alice Cutler to Michael Ronis, and Cutler subsequently assigned to Little Fish. The Estate makes two arguments with respect to these Loans on appeal. First, the Estate argues that such loans did not exist, and therefore could not be assigned. Second, with respect to the Amsterdam Loan and the Gabriela’s Loan, the Estate argues that the counterclaims were time-barred.
With respect to the Estate’s first argument on appeal, we are being asked to review whether in fact such loans actually existed, and our review of the district court’s finding that they did is for clear error. See Bessemer Trust Co., 618 F.3d at 85; U.S. Titan, Inc., v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The determination of whether there was a meeting of the minds sufficient to constitute a contract is one of fact.”). We can find no clear error in the district court’s finding that these loans were actually made to Michael Ronis, and are now owed to Little Fish. B. The Statute of Limitations Bars Counterclaims Made on the Amsterdam and Gabriela’s Loans With respect to the Estate’s second argument on appeal, the parties are largely in agreement. The parties agree that: (1) no payments were made on Amsterdam Loan after July 2003, and no payments were made on the Gabriela’s Loan after July 2002; (2) that this action was commenced on April 21, 2010; and (3) that this action is governed by New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules § 213(2), which provides for a six-year statute of limitations on these counterclaims. The parties further agree that these claims are thus time-barred, unless these obligations were revived by New York General Obligations Law § 17-101. This provision states that “the only competent evidence of a new or continuing contract” is “a writing signed by a party charged thereby,” and that absent this evidence a party cannot “take an action out of the operation of the provisions of limitations of time for commencing actions under the civil practice law and rules.” “A district court’s legal conclusions, including its interpretation and application 3 of a statute of limitations, are . . . reviewed de novo.” City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MBIS, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 2011). The district court in this case did not discuss the applicability of the statute of limitations. However, our review of the record indicates that there was no evidence in the record of a writing signed by Michael Ronis which would sufficiently restart the Estate’s obligations under the loans, and Little Fish points us to none on appeal. As such, we find Little Fish’s counterclaims with respect to the Amsterdam Loan and the Gabriela’s Loan are barred by New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules § 213(2) and New York General Obligations Law § 17-101. Accordingly, with respect to the counterclaims, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED in part. Because the counterclaims formed part of certain set-offs regarding amounts owed by Little Fish to the Estate, we REMAND this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this decision. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4