Opinion ID: 883980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying defendant's motion to exclude evidence relating to defendant's prior acts?

Text: In reviewing evidentiary rulings of the district court, we determine whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Gollehon (1993), 262 Mont. 293, 301, 864 P.2d 1257, 1263. The determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Stringer (1995), 271 Mont. 367, 374, 897 P.2d 1063, 1067; Gollehon, 864 P.2d at 1263. In filling out his State Fund claim, Monaco stated that he had not made any prior claims. As the State correctly notes, it was required to establish the existence of the prior claims in order to show that Monaco's statement was false and, therefore, that Monaco committed theft by deception. Monaco asserts that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to exclude evidence relating to allegedly fraudulent workers' compensation claims he filed in Florida and Wyoming. Monaco argues that the court, in allowing evidence that he filed prior claims and excluding all evidence of the details of the claims unless he attempted to explain them away, left the door open for the remaining Florida and Wyoming evidence to become admissible if [Monaco] attempted to cross examine.... According to Monaco, the court's ruling had the effect of denying him his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination. Monaco argues that if he were to cross-examine witnesses regarding the filing of the Florida and Wyoming claims, then, through the State's anticipated rebuttal, specific details of those claims would be before the jury. The State counters that the District Court properly limited the evidence to the filing of the Florida and Wyoming claims either as part of the corpus delicti of the charge of theft by deception or, alternatively, as evidence of other acts under Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid. Further, the State asserts that if Monaco opened the door to the substance of the prior claims the State would be allowed to refute that testimony. We agree. In State v. Hage (1993), 258 Mont. 498, 506, 853 P.2d 1251, 1256, this Court noted that the State is entitled to present the entire corpus delicti of the crime charged, including matters closely related to the offense and explanatory of the crime. Establishing the fact that Monaco had previously filed claims in Florida and Wyoming was essential to show that Monaco lied to State Fund when he stated that he had not filed prior claims. Therefore, the evidence of previous claims having been filed was properly admitted as part of the corpus delicti of the crime of fraud by deception; accordingly, we need not address Monaco's argument that the evidence should have been excluded as other crimes evidence under Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid., State v. Matt (1991), 249 Mont. 136, 814 P.2d 52, and State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957. We hold that the evidence was admissible as part of the corpus delicti and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monaco's motion to exclude evidence of the prior claims. Affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and NELSON, TRIEWEILER and ERDMANN, JJ., concur.