Opinion ID: 145306
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Roofing Limitation Endorsement

Text: If we were to find Continental's notice adequate and allow Continental to proceed with its suit, Continental would do so in its capacity as a judgment creditor. Under Section 3420, the creditor's rights are no greater or less than those of the insured debtor, and recovery cannot exceed the policy limits. McCormick, 878 F.2d at 29. [T]he injured party steps into the shoes of the tortfeasor and can assert any right of the tortfeasor-insured against the insurance company. Lang, 787 N.Y.S.2d 211, 820 N.E.2d at 858. Therefore, we must determine whether Wodraska could recover against Atlantic under its policy. It could not, because the casualty that occurred was specifically excluded from coverage under that policy. The parties disagree about whether the RLE barred coverage of the fire. The RLE provides: [W]e do not cover claims, loss, costs or expense arising out of ... property damage as a result of any operations involving any hot tar, wand, torch or heat applications or membrane roofing. Atlantic argues that while it would suffice [to exclude coverage] to have any operations involving a torch or membrane roof, here the operations involved both, so the RLE plainly applies to bar coverage of the fire. Continental argues that the RLE does not bar coverage for two reasons. First, the act of opening the adhesivethe act that Continental claims caused the firedid not constitute a roofing operation that the RLE excluded. Second, the RLE bars only claims arising from hot applications of membrane roofs, and Wodraska was using a cold application procedure. New York law treats an insurance policy as a contract and construes it in accordance with general contract principles. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 265 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir.2001). [T]he initial question for the court on a motion for summary judgment with respect to a contract claim is whether the contract is unambiguous with respect to the question disputed by the parties. Law Debenture Trust Co. of New York v. Maverick Tube Corp., 595 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether the contract is unambiguous is a question of law for the court. Id. Ambiguity exists if the contract terms could suggest more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When interpreting a contract, the intention of the parties should control ... [, and] the best evidence of intent is the contract itself; if an agreement is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face, it must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms. Hatalmud v. Spellings, 505 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The RLE is not ambiguous on the question of whether it excludes coverage of the fire. The RLE's use of the disjunctive any operations involving any hot tar, wand, torch or heat applications or membrane roofingindicates that it excludes coverage of losses arising out of any operations involving ... any torch or any operations involving ... membrane roofing. The operations at issue here involved both a torch and membrane roofing. Wodraska was hired to apply a new EPDM membrane roof, and when its employees were applying that roof, they started the fire, in part, by using a torch. The fire resulting from the operations therefore falls squarely within the RLE's exclusionary terms. Continental fails to show either that the RLE does not apply or that it is ambiguous. Continental claims the RLE bars coverage only of `operations' wherein the insured is actually in the process of applying the membrane roofing. Because opening the can of adhesive was not a specific membrane-roofing application act, but rather a discrete task related to the supply of materials, Continental argues the RLE does not apply. We reject such a narrow reading of the RLE. The RLE uses broad language to bar coverage for any losses resulting from any operations involving ... membrane roofing. We have consistently interpreted the term involve broadly. [9] As such, opening the can of adhesive to use it in applying membrane roofing clearly counts as an operation[ ] involving membrane roofing. Continental also argues that the RLE bars claims arising only from hot applications of membrane roofs. Because there is no comma between applications and or membrane roofing, Continental says both applications and membrane roofing are modified by the preceding list of wordshot tar, wand, torch, and heat. This interpretation fails. Although a comma between applications and or membrane roofing might underscore the disjunctive effect of or, it is not necessary. Continental essentially argues that the lack of comma compels us to read the RLE to bar coverage for losses resulting from any operations involving any hot tar, wand, torch or heat applications of membrane roofing despite the fact that the RLE bars coverage for losses resulting from any operations involving any hot tar, wand, torch or heat applications or membrane roofing. Moreover, the syntax of Continental's interpretation is awkward at best, requiring us to read hot tar, wand, torch or heat, which are nouns, as adjectives modifying applications or membrane roofing. In short, Continental's reading would impermissibly ignore the plain meaning of the RLE's terms. Accordingly, because the RLE effectively precludes coverage for any operations involving ... any torch as well as for any operations involving ... membrane roofing, and the operations that started the fire involved both a torch and membrane roofing, losses arising out of the fire were not within Wodraska's liability coverage.