Opinion ID: 167729
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: M iscarriage of Justice

Text: There are at least four situations in which a miscarriage of justice may occur: (1) the district court relied upon an impermissible factor such as race, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel in the negotiation of the waiver renders it invalid, (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) the waiver is otherw ise unlawful. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. Clearly, the first three situations are not at issue here— the district court did not rely on an impermissible factor, there is no claim defense counsel was ineffective in negotiating the waiver, 9 and 9 Bailey was represented by Larry Speer during the negotiation of the plea agreement and at the change of plea hearing. Sentencing was set for April 29, 2004; Mr. Speer failed to appear. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On May 3, 2004, current counsel was appointed to represent Bailey. Subsequently, Mr. Speer was held in contempt. Despite Mr. Speer’s failure to appear for sentencing, there is no indication that his previous representation of Bailey, including the negotiation of the plea agreement, was ineffective. Indeed, at the change of plea hearing, in response to the court, Bailey stated he was satisfied with the services of his attorney and believed Speer had done all he could to counsel and assist him in the matter. -12- Bailey’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. 10 Thus, the only issue under the miscarriage of justice prong is whether Bailey’s waiver was “otherwise unlawful.” “For a waiver to be otherwise unlawful, the error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, as that test was employed in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).” United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). Bailey argues that to enforce the w aiver and deny him his day in court would be a miscarriage of justice because a successful appeal would reduce his sentence by at least eighty-five percent. He contends that absent the district court’s sentencing errors, he would only have been exposed to a guideline range of twelve to eighteen months. The essence of Bailey’s complaint is that although he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), he was punished for manufacturing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, both of which were initially alleged against him in the 10 “‘[S]tatutory maximum’ under the Hahn miscarriage of justice inquiry refers to the statute of conviction,” not as the term is defined by Blakely (see supra n.5). United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, the penalty provision to which Bailey pled was 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), which carries a ten year maximum term of imprisonment. Bailey’s sentence does not exceed that maximum. In fact, although Bailey’s guideline range was 135 to 168 months imprisonment, his statute of conviction limited his sentence to 120 months. -13- criminal complaint but later dismissed. However, by pleading guilty to violating § 922(g)(3), Bailey avoided the statutory maximum of twenty years imprisonment for the manufacturing of methamphetamine 11 and the consecutive mandatory minimum five-year term of imprisonment required for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 12 He also received the benefit of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Therefore, we cannot conclude that enforcement of the waiver in this case— where Bailey, the Government and society at large have all benefitted— would result in a miscarriage of justice. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1318 (“[W]e generally enforce plea agreements and their concomitant waivers of appellate rights . . . because public policy strongly supports such waivers as they benefit defendants, the government, and society at large.”). Based on the above, we conclude Bailey’s w aiver of appellate rights is enforceable with respect to his arguments that the district court misapplied the guidelines and there was insufficient evidence supporting the enhancements to his 11 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) provides a maximum term of twenty years imprisonment for the manufacturing of an indeterminate amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 12 The criminal complaint sought to penalize Bailey for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). This subsection requires a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years if the firearm was brandished. However, even if the firearm was not brandished, Bailey was facing a consecutive five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment had he been convicted under the criminal complaint. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). -14- sentence. Therefore, we dismiss his appeal as to these arguments. However, because his waiver does not extend to his Blakely/Booker argument, we turn to it now .