Opinion ID: 2103431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the parsonage exemption is constitutional

Text: Section 19.2 of the Revenue Act of 1939 establishes a property tax exemption for [a]ll property used exclusively for religious purposes    and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit, including all such property owned by churches or religious institutions or denominations and used in conjunction therewith as parsonages or other housing facilities provided for ministers    their spouses, children and domestic employees, performing the duties of their vocation as ministers at such churches or religious institutions or for such religious denominations, and including the convents and monasteries where persons engaged in religious activities reside. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2.) The language referring to parsonages was added in a 1957 amendment to the statute. (1957 Ill. Laws 614.) McKenzie contends that parsonages are ineligible for property tax exemptions because they are used primarily for residential purposes, and are not used exclusively for religious purposes as required by article IX, section 6, of the Constitution. Thus, he claims that the parsonage exemption contained in section 19.2 is unconstitutional. Cases construing article IX, section 3, of the 1870 Constitution, which permitted property tax exemptions for property    used exclusively for    religious    purposes (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IX, sec. 3), are relevant in construing the limits of exemptions under article IX, section 6, of the present constitution. ( Small v. Pangle (1975), 60 Ill.2d 510, 514, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 918, 46 L.Ed.2d 245, 96 S.Ct. 257.) In arguing that the parsonage exemption contained in section 19.2 is unconstitutional, McKenzie relies on People ex rel. Thompson v. First Congregational Church (1907), 232 Ill. 158, where in holding that a property tax exemption for parsonages, enacted in 1905, was unconstitutional under article IX, section 3, of the 1870 Constitution the court observed: The parsonage in this case was used as a home for the pastor and the members of his immediate family. So far as appears from this record, it was used as a family residence and nothing more.    [T]here seems to be no ground upon which it can be successfully contended that it was used for a religious purpose   . No doubt the pastor, in the performance of his duties, necessarily requires a place for meditation, study and prayer; but ordinary living rooms, used in common by all members of his household, would seem not well adapted for such purposes. 232 Ill. 158, 162-63. The 1905 parsonage exemption declared unconstitutional in People ex rel. Thompson v. First Congregational Church authorized an exemption for [a]ll church property    exclusively used for public worship and all parsonages or residences    used by persons devoting their entire time to church work. (Emphasis added.) 232 Ill. 158, 161.) That parsonage exemption is fundamentally different from the exemption provided by section 19.2, the statute involved in this case. In providing an exemption for parsonages whether or not they were used exclusively for religious purposes, the 1905 exemption violated the venerable principle that a property tax exemption created by statute cannot be made broader than the provisions of the constitution and no property except that mentioned in [the exemption] section [of the Constitution] can be exempted by any law passed by the legislature. ( Locust Grove Cemetery Association v. Rose (1959), 16 Ill.2d 132, 137; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Miller (1908), 236 Ill. 149, 152.) In declaring the 1905 exemption unconstitutional this court embraced that principle, observing: Where a building is used primarily for religious purposes and secondarily for some secular purpose    the building would not thereby lose its character as one used for religious purposes, but where the property is used primarily for a family residence by the pastor it cannot be held that it is used exclusively for religious purposes. The legislature cannot, by its enactment, make that a religious purpose which in fact is not a religious purpose. (Emphasis added.) 232 Ill. 158, 164. The language of the current parsonage exemption, on the other hand, refers to all such property owned by churches or religious institutions    and used    as parsonages   . (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2.) The word such refers to the preceding language which allows an exemption only for property used exclusively for religious purposes. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2.) The current parsonage exemption only lists parsonages to illustrate or describe one type of property that, under appropriate circumstances, may qualify for the general religious property exemption which tracks the language of article IX, section 6, of the Constitution. Unlike the 1905 parsonage exemption the current parsonage exemption is subject to the exclusive-religious-use requirements of the Constitution and does not unlawfully enlarge the area of allowable exemptions. This interpretation of section 19.2 is consistent with this court's construction of similar exemption statutes. Section 19.7 of the Revenue Act of 1939, for example, allows a property tax exemption for [a]ll property of institutions of public charity    and all property of old people's homes. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.7.) In Methodist Old People's Home v. Korzen (1968), 39 Ill.2d 149, 156, this court construed legislation defining old people's homes as  including  a home with specified characteristics and held that it did not attempt to expand the charitable exemption beyond the limits of the Constitution: [W]e hold that the legislature did not intend to deviate from the constitutional requirement that to be exempt from taxation the property of an old peoples home must be used exclusively for charitable purposes. [The amendatory legislation] did nothing more than add language which was descriptive and illustrative of `old people's homes.' (39 Ill.2d 149, 156.) See also People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of the Winnebago Home for the Aged (1968), 40 Ill.2d 91, 100; MacMurray College v. Wright (1967), 38 Ill.2d 272, 277 (language describing property used exclusively for school purposes as including faculty housing facilities does not seek to enlarge the area of constitutionally allowable exemption). McKenzie argues that the parsonage exemption is unconstitutional even if it requires that a parsonage be used exclusively for religious purposes before it is entitled to the exemption. In support of this proposition he relies on cases dating back to 1912 in which this court has denied every application that has come before it for a religious property tax exemption on specific parsonages or analogous church property, holding in each case that such property was not used exclusively for religious purposes as required by the language of the general religious exemption first enacted in 1909. See, e.g., First Congregational Church v. Board of Review (1912), 254 Ill. 220 (parsonage); Muldoon v. Board of Review (1912), 254 Ill. 336 (parsonage); People ex rel. Carson v. Muldoon (1922), 306 Ill. 234 (monastery residence, support buildings and surrounding fields); People ex rel. Pearsall v. Methodist Episcopal Church (1924), 315 Ill. 233 (parsonage); St. John Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v. Board of Appeals (1934), 357 Ill. 69 (residence of instructor in parochial school). In essence McKenzie argues that our cases hold that a parsonage, by its very nature, can never be used exclusively for religious purposes because in every case its residential character must predominate over any other religious uses of the property. ( Cf. People ex rel. Carson v. Muldoon (1922), 306 Ill. 234, 239 (it is settled that [a parsonage] is not exempt).) Under this view the language referring to parsonages was added by the legislature to section 19-2 solely to encourage public officials to approve exemptions for parsonages, which exemptions, McKenzie claims, would violate the Constitution as it is interpreted by this court. This court has long held that property satisfies the exclusive-use requirement of the property tax exemption statutes if it is primarily used for the exempted purpose; if property is devoted, in a primary sense, to a religious purpose, the fact that it is incidentally used for secular purposes will not destroy the exemption   . ( First Congregational Church v. Board of Review (1912), 254 Ill. 220, 224.) In First Congregational Church v. Board of Review , however, the parsonage was denied an exemption even though it was used extensively for religious services and instruction and for the pastor's offices. Three justices filed a lengthy dissent in that case observing: A church building for public worship is essential to the successful carrying out of the work of the church, and a pastor or priest is also necessary for efficient work.    The evidence in this case is that the work of the church cannot be carried on efficiently without the constant care and attention of the pastor. The parsonage was paid for with contributions made by the church congregation. It was erected for the benefit it would be in promoting the work of the church and not for the benefit of the pastor. There is nothing in the constitution or statute which limits church property that may be exempted from taxation to that necessarily used for public worship. The limitation is to property exclusively or primarily provided and used for religious purposes. 254 Ill. 220, 229-31 (Farmer, J., Carter, C.J., and Vickers, J., dissenting). The extremely narrow construction of primary religious use, embraced by the cited cases, is out of step with more recent Illinois authority on tax exemptions, and these cases do not establish that parsonages may never be used exclusively  that is primarily  for religious purposes. For example, in MacMurray College v. Wright (1967), 38 Ill.2d 272, this court held that an exemption of school property will be sustained if it is established that the property is primarily used for purposes which are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment and fulfillment of educational objectives, or efficient administration, of the particular institution. (38 Ill.2d 272, 278; see also Locust Grove Cemetery Association v. Rose (1959), 16 Ill.2d 132, 139-42.) In MacMurray College, this court held that faculty and staff residences were not reasonably necessary for carrying out the school's educational purposes because it was not established that any of the faculty or staff members    were required, because of their educational duties, to live in these residences, or that they were required to or did perform any of their professional duties there. 38 Ill.2d 272, 279. Under the MacMurray standard a parsonage qualifies for an exemption if it reasonably and substantially facilitates the aims of religious worship or religious instruction because the pastor's religious duties require him to live in close proximity to the church or because the parsonage has unique facilities for religious worship and instruction or is primarily used for such purposes. Given that residence facilities have, on occasion, qualified for exemption from taxation under the school exemption (see People ex rel. Goodman v. University of Illinois Foundation (1944), 388 Ill. 363, 368 (student dormitories on university campus); Monticello Female Seminary v. People (1883), 106 Ill. 398, 400 (house occupied by superintendent of grounds at seminary); People ex rel. Pearsall v. Catholic Bishop (1924), 311 Ill. 11, 13-14 (gardener's residence, archbishop's summer home and a student dormitory at seminary); People ex rel. Hesterman v. North Central College (1929), 336 Ill. 263, 266 (student dormitories at college)), we cannot say that a parsonage could never qualify for exemption as property used exclusively for religious purposes solely because it is also used for residential purposes. (See generally Taxation: Exemption of Parsonage or Residence of Minister, Priest, Rabbi or Other Church Personnel, Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 356, 378-79 (1974).) Whether a particular parsonage may be entitled to exemption turns on the evidence showing how the parsonage is being used, but the language exempting parsonages in section 19.2 is not unconstitutional on its face.