Opinion ID: 2626490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Award of Dependency Exemption to Williams

Text: Ginn-Williams next challenges the superior court's decision to allow Williams to claim a federal tax dependency exemption for the couple's son, who lived with Ginn-Williams. She claims that this ruling violates federal law. Specifically, Ginn-Williams argues that under federal law only primary physical custodians can lawfully claim dependency exemptions. But this claim lacks merit. The federal tax code provisions that directly control this issue are 26 U.S.C. §§ 151(c) and 152(e). [9] Subsection 151(c) specifically allows an individual taxpayer to claim an additional exemption for each individual who is a dependent, as that term is defined in § 152. [10] Subsection 152(e)(1), in turn, defines a dependent to include a child of a noncustodial divorced parent who (a) is primarily supported by the income of one or both divorced parents; (b) lives with one or both of the parents for more than one-half of the year; and (c) meets the requirements of § 152(e)(2). Subsection 152(e)(2) provides that its requirements will be met for a noncustodial parent of a child if that parties' divorce decree provides that the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to any deduction allowable under section 151 for such child. [11] Here, the divorce decree issued by the superior court expressly provided that, after 2004, Williams would be entitled to receive the additional exemption allowed under § 151(c): Ms. Ginn-Williams is entitled to claim both of the children as dependents on her 2004 federal income tax return. Thereafter, Father may claim the parties' older child as a dependent so long as he is not more than 4 months in arrears on his child support obligation as of December 31 for that year. When the parties' oldest child can no longer be claimed as a dependent, the parties shall alternate claiming the parties' younger child, with Ms. Ginn-Williams to be able to claim that child first. Williams's son was thus a qualifying child who could be claimed as a dependent by his noncustodial parent under § 152(e)(1), since: (a) the child was primarily supported by the income of one or both divorced parents; (b) the child lived with one or both of his parents for more than one-half of the year; and (c) the divorce decree met the requirements of § 152(e)(2)in other words, the decree expressly allowed Williams to have the exemptions. Ginn-Williams separately claims that the dependency exemption fails to comport with Alaska law by violating AS 25.24.152. But Ginn-Williams's reliance on this provision is equally unavailing. Alaska Statute 25.24.152(a) expressly authorizes courts to grant a noncustodial parent the right to claim a child as a dependent under federal tax laws for a tax year if the noncustodial parent satisfies the requirements of federal law and was not in arrears at the end of the tax year in an amount more than four times the monthly obligation. As we have seen, Williams satisfied the requirements of federal law with respect to the disputed exemption. And the divorce decree specifically limited his right in the manner required by AS 25.24.152(a) by providing that he could claim the exemption for any given year only so long as he is not more than 4 months in arrears on his child support obligation as of December 31 for that year. Thus, in awarding the additional exemption to Williams, the superior court complied with both federal and state law.