Opinion ID: 673830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Additional Evidentiary Issues

Text: 39 We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under a deferential standard: abuse of discretion. Layne, 973 F.2d at 1421-22. [A]bsent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, the district court's ruling will be affirmed. Id. The defendants allege the following evidentiary errors: the admission of (1) Western Union records, (2) hearsay statements, (3) evidence of prior drug trafficking, and (4) photographs. 14
40 The district court permitted the government to admit Western Union money transfer applications (MTAs), along with other Western Union records, for the purpose of proving the money laundering counts. The defendants 15 challenge the admission of the MTAs as a business record because the forms were filled out partially by nonemployees and thus were untrustworthy. The government responds that the business record exception to the hearsay rule, see Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), does not require that the record be filled out by an employee of the business. We disagree with the government's characterization of the business record rule, but we nevertheless affirm the ruling of the district court. 41 If the source of the information ... [is] an outsider to the chain producing [the] ... business record, rule 803(6) by itself does not permit admission of the information provided by the outsider. Grogg v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 841 F.2d 210, 214 (8th Cir.1988) (emphasis added). Because [i]f ... the supplier of the information does not act in the regular course [of business], an essential link is broken; the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the information itself, and the fact that it may be recorded with scrupulous accuracy is of no avail. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), advisory committee note. The MTA requires senders to fill out their name, address, telephone number, the amount of money, and the name of the individual to whom the money is to be sent. After the sender fills out this preliminary information, the Western Union agent then completes the remainder of the form. 42 Because the senders, identified as Scott, Skeete, Harris, and Butler, frequently used aliases on the MTAs, the government offered expert testimony, lay testimony, eyewitness identification, and handwriting exemplars to establish that the defendants were the actual senders of the MTAs. The government established an adequate foundation, see Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(1)-(3), upon which the jury might find that the signatures were those of defendants Scott, Skeete, Harris, and Butler. See United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir.) (Rule 901 requires that the district court admit evidence if  'sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification' ) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 574, 88 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985). 43 As the admission of a party-opponent, that portion of the Western Union MTAs allegedly completed by the defendants themselves was not hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2) (admissions of party-opponents are not hearsay). Thus, the remainder of the Western Union MTAs, as business records prepared in the regular course of business, present no hearsay problem. See Grogg, 841 F.2d at 214. Such a case as we have here, where the business record is in part completed by a party/defendant, does not present the hearsay problems of a business record completed by or with information supplied by a nonparty/nonemployee. Cf. Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 271 (5th Cir.1991) (Double hearsay in the context of a business record exists when the record is prepared by an employee with information supplied by another person.). We find the MTAs presented no hearsay problem and were properly admitted into evidence by the district court.
44 Scott contends the district court committed reversible error by allowing Keith Johnson to testify that his wife told him Scott supplied her with cocaine. The district court admitted this testimony conditionally pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). The rule states: 45 (d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-- 46 .... 47 The statement is offered against a party and is ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 48 Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Scott argues that the government failed to satisfy its burden of proving that Joanie Johnson was one of Scott's coconspirators and thus the statement was inadmissible hearsay. 49 To admit Joanie Johnson's statements pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the government must have established by a preponderance of the evidence that Joanie Johnson was a coconspirator. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). We hold that the government satisfied this burden. Keith Johnson testified that his wife helped him in, and was equally knowledgeable about, his Omaha business and that she knew and did business with Scott. This testimony alone was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Joanie Johnson was one of Scott's coconspirators. 50
51 The district court allowed the government to offer testimony showing that Scott, Skeete, and Cleveland Johnson were involved in drug trafficking during time periods outside the scope of the conspiracy. Scott, Skeete, and Cleveland Johnson argue the district court erred when it permitted this testimony to be admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The district court allowed this evidence to be admitted--accompanied by a cautionary instruction--for the limited purpose of finding intent, knowledge or absence of mistake. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The district court admitted the evidence, not to prove propensity which is prohibited by Rule 404(b), but rather for purposes explicitly allowed by Rule 404(b). We do not find the admission of this evidence to have been an abuse of discretion.
52 During the direct examination of several of the government's witnesses, the witnesses were shown different types of photographs of the defendants: mug shots, 8 X 10 photographs, and photographs obtained during various searches showing the defendants together, sometimes with cash, guns, pagers, and cellular phones. The defendants contend that the photographs were improperly admitted because they were not relevant, were not properly authenticated, were more prejudicial than probative, or were overly cumulative. 53 The defendants failed to object to the admission of the mug shots. We thus review the mug shot claim under the plain error standard. United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 361, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). The government argues that the mug shots were properly admitted because they were an essential link between a particular set of fingerprints and a particular defendant. Moreover, the government did not mention the mug shots after their initial introduction into evidence. In light of the particular need for the mug shots and the circumscribed manner of their introduction, we refuse to invoke the plain error rule. See id. at 1298. 54 In support of the admission of the photographs, the government argues that the photographs either showed an association between the defendants and the instruments of drug trafficking or helped the jury to identify the individual defendants. 16 [W]e must give substantial deference to the district court's decision on the admissibility of evidence, and we will not find error unless the district court clearly abused its discretion. May v. Arkansas Forestry Comm'n, 993 F.2d 632, 637 (8th Cir.1993). After examining these photographs, we find no abuse of discretion. 55