Opinion ID: 712938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Bivens claims against the attorney defendants.

Text: 21 In Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. at 2001, the Supreme Court held that when a federal agent acting under color of his authority violates the Constitution, the agent's victim may recover damages against the agent. Such claims are the counterpart to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials who infringe plaintiffs' federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503-04, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); McSurely v. Hutchison, 823 F.2d 1002, 1005 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934, 108 S.Ct. 1107, 99 L.Ed.2d 269 (1988). In the instant case, the individual plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that the attorney defendants were federal agents and actors by virtue of their presence with the U.S. Marshals at the search, and that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The district court expressly assumed that the defendants were federal agents, but held that they could rely on qualified immunity because they did not violate any clearly established rights of the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Cagle v. Gilley, 957 F.2d 1347, 1348 (6th Cir.1992). 22 Before we reach the question of qualified immunity, however, we must first determine whether the defendant attorneys were correct in their contention that they could have no Bivens liability because they were not federal employees. In support of this contention, they rely on Wagner v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority, 772 F.2d 227, 230 (6th Cir.1985). 23 In Wagner, the majority opinion did hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the defendant with respect to a Bivens claim because the complaint did not allege that [the] defendant ... was a federal employee. Id. Before stating its holding, however, the majority opinion also interpreted Bivens to hold that [T]he victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages in a federal court. Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is not clear whether the majority intended to hold that the agent who is the defendant must be on the government payroll to be subject to Bivens liability or, as plaintiffs contend, it is sufficient, as alleged here, that he be authorized to perform a government task as a government agent or actor. We also note that in Wagner, Judge Martin concurred in the result but pointed out that the plaintiff's complaint is completely devoid of any allegation of federal action. Id. at 231 (Martin, J., concurring). Moreover, if Wagner be read to require that the person alleged to be liable under Bivens must be on the government payroll, it would conflict with an earlier decision of this court, Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Service, 521 F.2d 1392, 1393 (6th Cir.1975) (per curiam) (holding that a plaintiff stated a Bivens claim against a private party which allegedly received federal funding). 24 Lastly, as will be seen infra, in Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 159, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1828-29, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a party who is not a public official may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and yet not be entitled to qualified immunity because, if not a public official, the reason for affording qualified immunity does not exist. Applying this reasoning to the instant case, we hold that a party not a public official may be liable under Bivens, but not entitled to qualified immunity because the reason for affording qualified immunity to a public official does not apply to a government actor who is not a public official. 25 The plaintiffs in the instant case alleged that the defendant attorneys were federal agents or actors in that they acted in concert with federal marshals in executing the ex parte order. We thus hold that the plaintiffs have alleged enough facts on the issue of whether the defendants were federal agents to survive a motion to dismiss. Cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753-54, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (setting forth test for whether a private actor is subject to liability for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 26 That holding does not, as we have indicated, end the matter. While defendants who are not government employees may, as we have held, be properly sued under the Bivens doctrine, they may not enjoy qualified immunity from suit in the same manner as federal officials, who may invoke this doctrine if they did not violate any clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of the plaintiffs of which a reasonable person would have known. See, e.g., Cagle, 957 F.2d at 1348. 27 The Supreme Court has held that private defendants charged with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability for invoking state replevin, garnishment, and attachment statutes later declared unconstitutional are not entitled to qualified immunity. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 159, 112 S.Ct. at 1829. The Court reasoned that the rationale for granting qualified immunity to public officials--that they would act decisively in their jobs for the public good without fear of being sued--did not apply with equal force to private parties acting for their own ends. Id. at 167-68, 112 S.Ct. at 1833-34. 28 Because Bivens immunity generally is co-extensive with section 1983 immunity, the Wyatt case stands for the proposition that the attorney defendants, as private parties who allegedly acted as government agents in conducting this search and seizure, may not claim qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' Bivens action. Thus, the district court's holding was in error. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 504, 98 S.Ct. at 2909 (deeming it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials); F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that the scope of immunity available to a private party in a Bivens action mirrors that available to a private defendant in a section 1983 action). After Wyatt, as one sister circuit has put it, [t]he availability of qualified immunity to private persons who act under color of law is no longer an open question. It is settled. Private persons cannot assert it. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1276 (3d Cir.1994). 29 The attorney defendants do, however, retain a good faith defense to the plaintiffs' Bivens claim. The Wyatt Court expressly left open the question of whether private parties acting under color of law could raise such a defense. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169, 112 S.Ct. at 1834. When the Wyatt case returned to the Fifth Circuit on remand, that court held that private persons who act under color of law may assert a good faith defense. Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 470, 126 L.Ed.2d 421 (1993). The Third Circuit has agreed. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1276-77. Now, so do we. 30 Any good faith defense must, however, be resolved on remand and not on this Rule 12 motion to dismiss. As this court stated in conjunction with its own holding, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wyatt, that private defendants could not claim qualified immunity in section 1983 cases, A good faith defense ... is likely to be based in large part on the facts of the case, with the suit only being dismissed after trial, or on summary judgment if the defendant can show that there is no material dispute as to the facts. Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1266 (6th Cir.1988). 5 31