Opinion ID: 2643674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioner’s assignments of error

Text: Petitioner asserts three assignments of error, which have a great deal of overlap. First, petitioner asserts that the evidence “of Mr. Ellington” was irrelevant under the circuit court’s pretrial orders and was unfairly prejudicial. As part of that alleged error, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred by overruling petitioner’s repeated objections to Mr. Ellington’s testimony. In its second assignment of error, petitioner contends that the circuit court compounded its erroneous rulings related to Mr. Ellington’s testimony by admitting Mr. Ellington’s unqualified, speculative memorandum as documentary evidence. Finally, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred in denying petitioner’s motion for a new trial, based on the erroneous rulings on the evidence related to Mr. Ellington and the unfairly prejudicial, surprise testimony of Respondent Mr. Daugherty, each orchestrated by counsel for respondents and exploited throughout the trial, including in closing argument. During Mr. Ellington’s testimony, the circuit court allowed the admission of an undated memorandum authored by Mr. Ellington. That memorandum states, in relevant part, that “[i]f the power line to be constructed through [respondents’] property . . . follows the path that 2 [respondents] showed [him that day], then any future expansion of their poultry operation would be prohibited by the power line right of way. Poor performance due to any electrical or controller issues could result in the termination of [the contract between Pilgrim’s Pride and respondents.]” Petitioner claims that counsel for respondents consistently represented, both before and at the outset of trial, that Mr. Ellington would testify that respondents could not expand their chicken farming operations due to the installation of the line. On the first day of trial, the circuit court ruled that Mr. Ellington could testify, despite petitioner’s contention that the testimony would be a waste of time, would potentially confuse the jury, and would unfairly prejudice petitioner by inviting an additional award reflecting a loss of a particular business that had not been evacuated. Petitioner argues that Mr. Ellington was not an expert qualified to address the impact of the line. Petitioner contends that the memorandum drafted by Mr. Ellington was inadmissible and was not material evidence in its own right. Petitioner, therefore, contends that it was materially prejudiced by the erroneous introduction of this unqualified, speculative memorandum. Petitioner also asserts that counsel for respondents elicited inadmissible testimony about electrical problems in the existing poultry houses, in violation of the pre-trial rulings of the circuit court. Petitioner objected to such testimony, and the circuit court sustained that objection. During cross-examination, petitioner asked Mr. Daugherty to admit that his chicken barns had remained in full and successful operation since energization, just as he had in pretrial discovery responses verified under oath. He also testified that while chickens are in the four buildings, there are a lot of problems, so he was not raising the chickens in the same way he raised them previously. When asked why those problems had not been disclosed during discovery, Mr. Daugherty testified that for the preceding four or five years every time I call something in, “they’ll get back to me.” They never do. . . . I have not been paid one red cent for damages, for land, or nothing on this property and how long have you all used it? . . . If I can’t use those poultry houses, I guarantee [$500,000 to $600,000 is] probably all I can get [for the property if sold]. The circuit court called counsel to the bench when it determined that Mr. Daugherty was getting into issues related to electromagnetic damages, which were specifically excluded by the circuit court prior to trial, and put a stop to the testimony. Mr. Daugherty admitted that there were chickens in the four poultry buildings and that there had been chickens there since the time the line was energized. Mr. Daugherty testified that if someone wanted to purchase his farm, the buyer would first have to go to the poultry company and prove to them that they could grow chickens. The company would go to the property to inspect the buildings before allowing the buyers to put chickens in. He further testified that it was unlikely that anyone would be interested in purchasing the land unless they could get a contract to keep operating the barns that are there. Petitioner complains about an answer volunteered by Mr. Daugherty regarding whether he had electrical problems on his property, as the circuit court previously ruled that Mr. Daugherty was not allowed to testify to either electromagnetic field issues or electrical problems with respect to the operation of his farm. In responses to interrogatories, respondents recited instances in which there was damage to the electrical system in his home and in the chicken barns. He also testified as to the effects of the construction of the project on his property, loss of trees, damage to the 3 fences, and the shocking effect created in his pasture field under the lines, particularly the impact on his horse business. He also testified regarding the potential harm to the poultry operation from helicopters used to trim the right-of-way. During Mr. Ellington’s testimony, counsel for respondents inquired about the memorandum Mr. Ellington kept in his file as part of his business records and moved that the document be admitted. When asked if it had any objection to the admission of that document, petitioner objected, stating that the memorandum was contrary to the circuit court’s pre-trial ruling. Respondents disagreed, and the circuit court stated that the last sentence of the memorandum was contrary to its pre-trial ruling. Counsel for respondents argued that the last sentence did not really impact what was discussed outside of the jury’s presence. The circuit court then overruled the objection, stating that it would allow the admission of the memorandum because it goes to the question of what respondents could do under the power line. The circuit court also noted that petitioner could address the memorandum on cross-examination. Mr. Ellington testified that “corporate” reviewed the memorandum before it was sent to an individual at Allegheny Power. The West Virginia Rules of Evidence and the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure allocate significant discretion to the trial court in making evidentiary and procedural rulings. . . . Absent a few exceptions, this Court will review evidentiary and procedural rulings of the circuit court under an abuse of discretion standard. Syl. Pt. 1, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d 788 (1995). Further, “‘[w]hen a case involving conflicting testimony and circumstances has been fairly tried, under proper instructions, the verdict of the jury will not be set aside unless plainly contrary to the weight of the evidence or without sufficient evidence to support it.’ Syl. Pt. 4, Laslo v. Griffith, 143 W.Va. 469, 102 S.E.2d 894 (1958).” Syl. Pt. 1, Wilkinson v. Bowser, 199 W.Va. 92, 483 S.E.2d 92 (1996). Mr. Ellington was not designated as an expert witness in respondents’ pre-trial disclosures, and he was not qualified as an expert during trial. During the hearing on the respective motions for new trial, the circuit court stated that it had listened to Mr. Ellington’s testimony and did not believe, based on the cross-examination, that the landowner got much helpful testimony from him. The circuit court also pointed to Mr. Ellington’s testimony that the information in the memorandum was just a basic statement as to termination of any poultry grower, rather than specific to respondents. During the trial, Mr. Ellington’s testimony was relatively short. On direct examination, he testified as to his role with Pilgrim’s Pride, his knowledge of respondents’ property, the memorandum at issue, and the potential for the expansion of the poultry houses both before and after the installation and energization of the line. During cross-examination, petitioner did not question Mr. Ellington directly about the memorandum, instead focusing on issues related to the expansion of respondents’ poultry growing operation. The circuit court and the jury heard all of Mr. Ellington’s testimony, and the jury considered both the testimony and the memorandum. The jury determined Mr. Ellington’s credibility and the weight to be afforded his testimony. Based on the record before this Court, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Mr. Ellington to testify in this 4 limited manner or in finding that the memorandum was admissible. In addition, we find that petitioner has failed to meet the onerous burden necessary to set aside a jury’s verdict relative to Mr. Ellington’s testimony. Similarly, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Mr. Daugherty to testify regarding both the use of respondents’ property and the problems experienced on the property since the energization of the line. During direct examination, Mr. Daugherty testified as to his personal experience being shocked by an electrical charge and problems in the poultry houses. When he testified that motors in the poultry houses had run backward since the line was energized, petitioner’s objection on that point was sustained. Counsel for respondents immediately changed to a different line of questioning. Our review of the record does not reveal conduct on the part of respondents’ counsel that ran afoul of the circuit court’s pre-trial ruling related to the electromagnetic issues in the poultry houses. Therefore, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for new trial.