Opinion ID: 1662286
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Heading: Immunity from Prescription

Text: Article 19, § 16 of the 1921 Constitution, in effect at the time the department's cause of action arose, states: Prescription shall not run against the State in any civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution or expressly by law. An identical provision can be found in Article 12, § 13 of the 1974 Constitution, as well as in Article 193 of the 1913 Constitution and Article 193 of the 1898 Constitution. In order to apply this constitutional immunity from prescription, it would be necessary to characterize the Department of Highways, a state agency, as the State itself. The matter is not free from doubt. In two early decisions, for example, it was held that levee districts could not claim immunity from liberative prescription because they were political corporations with a legal existence distinct from the state. Board of Commissioners v. Earle, 169 La. 565, 125 So. 619 (1929); Board of Commissioners v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929). The rationale of those decisions was that levee districts, by virtue of the fact that they were authorized to sue and be sued in their own names, were legal entities separate from the state. The same rationale was upheld in Haas v. Board of Commissioners, 206 La. 378, 19 So.2d 173 (1944), where a claim of acquisitive prescription was made against a levee district. More recently, however, this court has held that claims of acquisitive prescription against mineral rights held by levee districts were barred by virtue of the constitutional prohibition against the divestiture of mineral rights in property sold by the State, contained in Article 4, § 2 of the 1921 Constitution. Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 362 So.2d 734 (La.1978). [2] It thus appears that, insofar as levee districts are concerned, the definition of the State depends upon what is involved: acquisitive and liberative prescription may run against a levee district, but acquisitive prescription of mineral rights may not. [3] No decision has ever held that a levee district could be characterized as the State for purposes of the immunity from prescription contained in the Constitution. In terms of the present case, the foregoing decisions dealing with levee districts are not inapposite. It has been repeatedly explained that levee districts have the right to sue and be sued in their own names as entities separate from the state. See Board of Levee Commissioners v. Whitney Trust & Savings Bank, 171 La. 28, 129 So. 658 (1930). Other decisions have stressed the fact that levee districts were political corporations which, once possessed of a cause of action, were the sole parties capable of bringing suit to enforce their rights. It was declared that the State Attorney General could not bring suit in the name of the state on a cause of action vested in a levee board. See State v. Standard Oil Co., 164 La. 334, 113 So. 867 (1927); State v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 126 La. 59, 52 So. 216 (1910). Consistent with this view, it has also been held that, when the state holds title to property, prescription cannot run, notwithstanding the fact that the property is administered by a state agency. State v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 131 La. 62, 58 So. 1033 (1912). The principle that the state is immune from claims of prescription has been explained as being confined to actions brought by and in the name of the state itself. Board of Commissioners v. Toyo Kisen Kaisha, 163 La. 865, 113 So. 127 (1927). See also Opinions of the Attorney General, March 1, 1962 to March 1, 1964, pp. 237-38; April 1, 1934 to April 1, 1936, pp. 873-76. We subscribe to the following reasoning, advanced in the cases cited above: the State, for the purposes of the constitutional immunity from prescription, does not include a state agency which is a body corporate with the power to sue and be sued and which, when vested with a cause of action, is the sole party capable of asserting it. Regardless of its status as an instrumentality of the state, such an agency remains a distinct legal entity subject to claims of prescription except where the law provides otherwise. It should be noted that the Department of Highways, the party plaintiff in this suit, was abolished in 1976; its powers, functions and duties were transferred to the Department of Transportation and Development. R.S. 36:509(F). However, the legislature provided that the department would continue to exercise its responsibilities as provided by law. R.S. 36:802. Specifically, the law governing the transfer of powers provided that all lawsuits pending before the effective date of the transfer shall be continued in the name of the agency so transferred. R.S. 36:854(C). The Department of Highways, like the Department of Transportation and Development, was established as a body politic and corporate. R.S. 48:13. It was given the power to sue and be sued. R.S. 48:22. Because of this authority, the Department of Highways has been held to be a legal entity separate from the state itself: The commission, in our opinion, is a distinct legal entity from the state. [The law] makes it a body corporate, with power as such to sue and be sued. It is an agency of the state, and not the state itself, created for the purpose of executing certain duties, devolving primarily upon the state. In a general sense, in its relations to the state, it is not dissimilar to levee districts, which are bodies corporate, created for the purpose of constructing and maintaining levees, which are duties, devolving primarily upon the state.... Saint v. Allen, 172 La. 350, 360, 134 So. 246, 249 (1931). See also Department of Highways v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 209 La. 381, 25 So.2d 623 (1945). Accordingly, we hold that the Department of Highways cannot claim the constitutional immunity from prescription, since it cannot be characterized as the State for that purpose. [4]