Opinion ID: 2346585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Import of CEO's Letter of Violation

Text: [¶ 19] We turn then to the effect of the CEO's notice of violation. The District Court ultimately concluded that the doctrine of res judicata required it to accept the CEO's interpretation of the ordinance. This legal conclusion is subject to de novo review. Bissias v. Koulovatos, 2000 ME 189, ¶ 6, 761 A.2d 47, 49. We agree with the District Court. [¶ 20] The doctrine of res judicata prevents the relitigation of claims that were tried or could have been tried `between the same parties or their privies ... in an earlier suit on the same cause of action.' [4] Town of Ogunquit v. Cliff House & Motels, Inc., 2000 ME 169, ¶ 10, 759 A.2d 731, 735 (quoting Blance v. Alley, 1997 ME 125, ¶ 4, 697 A.2d 828, 829) (emphasis added). An administrative proceeding that includes the essential elements of adjudication is given the same preclusive effect as an adjudication in court. Cliff House & Motels, 2000 ME 169, ¶ 11, 759 A.2d at 735; Town of Freeport v. Greenlaw, 602 A.2d 1156, 1160 (Me.1992). [¶ 21] If a party does not challenge an administrative order through an available appeal that contains the essential elements of adjudication, the failure to do so may have preclusive effect upon any subsequent litigation on identical issues and claims dealt with in the administrative order. Maines v. Sec'y of State, 493 A.2d 326, 329-30 (Me.1985). [5] In this context, adequate notice of the proceeding and of the risk of failing to appear are essential elements for preclusion. [6] See Greenlaw, 602 A.2d at 1160-61; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) cmt. d (1982). In other words, adequate notice of the opportunity to appeal to the Board and of the consequences of failing to appeal will trigger the protections of the Board's procedure, which include the other essential elements of adjudication, whether or not the party actually appeals and receives those essential elements. [¶ 22] In Greenlaw, we discussed what the notice from a CEO to a landowner regarding the landowner's right to an administrative appeal of the CEO's order must, at a minimum, contain. [The] order... should refer to the provisions of the ordinance allegedly being violated, inform the violator of the right to dispute the order and how that right is exercised by appeal, and specify the consequences of the failure to appeal. Greenlaw, 602 A.2d at 1161. These requirements recognize that, because a CEO's letter of violation can become binding on subsequent actions involving the same issues, it must meet the highest standard of judicial scrutiny. [¶ 23] In this case, the letter from the CEO satisfied these notice requirements. The CEO's letter notified Jenness that she was personally in violation of the ordinance because she was the owner of the property and she had knowledge of the restaurant being operated as a barroom. The letter stated, Your continuance to allow these violations to exist, makes you a willing party to / in the violations and equally responsible. It further stated: Having knowledge of a violation and allowing it to continue, you become a party to the violation. The letter informed Jenness of the nature of the alleged violation, it identified the property on which the violation had occurred, the existence of a nonpermitted use on that property, the section of the ordinance that had been violated, the authority for the CEO's actions, and it provided copies of the relevant provisions of the statute and ordinance. Because the CEO held Jenness responsible for Weeks's violation, he also included a copy of the notice of violation sent to Weeks. In addition to the right of appeal, the CEO informed Jenness that she could avoid being sanctioned for the violation by requiring Weeks to cease operating the barroom and altering the building to its former state. [7] Any reasonable person reading this letter would understand the nature of the violation being alleged. [8] [¶ 24] For purposes of res judicata, this particular notice withstands our high degree of scrutiny such that we find it triggered the adjudicatory procedures of the Board of Appeals and all resulting protections. Similar to our conclusion in Maines, we find that Jenness has presented no basis for relief from a final judgment. [She is] bound by [her] own deliberate choice to permit the decision of the [CEO] to become final. Maines, 493 A.2d at 330. [¶ 25] Since Jenness was given notice of her right and opportunity to appeal the CEO's decision to the Board, she is precluded from rearguing the interpretation of the ordinance through concepts of administrative res judicata, and she cannot, in the District Court, collaterally attack the CEO's finding. The District Court did not err in its amended judgment by concluding that Jenness was bound by the CEO's construction of the ordinance because she never appealed the CEO's letter of violation to the Zoning Board of Appeals. [9] She was properly precluded from arguing a different construction of the ordinance, which could have been an issue for the Board of Appeals had she exercised her right of appeal. [¶ 26] Regarding the Town's cross-appeal challenging the amount of attorney fees and fines awarded against Jenness, we find no error in the court's judgment. See Town of Freeport v. Ocean Farms of Maine, Inc., 633 A.2d 396, 399-400 (Me. 1993); Town of Ogunquit v. McGarva, 570 A.2d 320, 321 (Me.1990). The matter shall be remanded to the District Court for consideration of the Town's request for attorney fees on appeal. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. Remanded to the District Court for consideration of the Town's request for attorney fees on appeal.