Opinion ID: 177560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Booker's Testimony

Text: After Bell rested his defense, the government sought to introduce rebuttal testimony from the recipient of the letter, Bell's halfway house roommate Booker. At sidebar, the government explained that Booker would testify that Bell directed him to testify about Hydroxycut and loans. It also proffered that Booker would testify that Bell solicited him to cook crack cocaine. Bell objected to Booker taking the stand. The government explained that Booker's testimony would speak directly to their defense that Mr. Bell isall he does is loan money and use Hydroxycut pills, and this cuts right toactually, it corroborates Mr. Dorenzo and cuts right against their defense in this particular case. Tr. 124, Sept. 15, 2009; see also id. at 125-26. The district court accepted this characterization and overruled Bell's objections. The court explained: Mr. Bell was writing Mr. Booker. He was saying remember we did this, we did this, we did this. It adds a lot of weight to the letter and the letter was intended to show, when Mr. Booker testifies, in fact we were not talking just about Hydroxycut, we're talking about cooking crack cocaine. So I think it is admissible for that purpose. Sure, it shows propensity, but it shows something else independently, which I think is highly relevant to Mr. Bell's guilt or innocence and it's not going to be prejudicial. Tr. 127, Sept. 15, 2009. Booker took the stand and told the jury that Bell solicited him, both to cook five kilograms of cocaine and to testify. Bell contends that Booker's testimony about the solicitation to cook five kilograms of crack was not proper rebuttal evidence but instead was overly prejudicial propensity evidence that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for admitting. He also asserts that Booker's testimony about cooking cocaine was impermissible extrinsic evidence of his (Bell's) character for untruthfulness. See Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). We review the admission of rebuttal evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Grintjes, 237 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir.2001). Because Bell did not object to the testimony on Rule 608(b) grounds at trial, however, we review any Rule 608(b) rulings only for plain error. See Swan, 486 F.3d at 264; see also Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). The proper uses of rebuttal evidence include the contradiction, impeachment, or defusion of the impact of the evidence offered by an adverse party. Grintjes, 237 F.3d at 879. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Booker's testimony would accomplish those ends. Bell's theory of the case was that he was merely providing Dorenzo with diet pills and a loan and that Dorenzo set him up by telling the police that Bell gave him cocaine. Bell advanced this theory not only with his own testimony, see Tr. 72, Sept. 15, 2009 (I got a giving heart, man, and I was helping different guys there because I had money and stuff like that.), but also by calling witnesses who testified that Bell loaned them money while they were in the halfway house. Booker's testimony that Bell's good deeds, like bringing food and other items to struggling halfway house inmates, were undertaken with ulterior motives vitiated the giving heart aspect of the defense. Booker's testimony both defused the impact of and contradicted Bell's evidence. It also impeached the witnesses who testified on his behalf. See Grintjes, 237 F.3d at 879. The evidence was properly admitted as rebuttal evidence. Bell contends, however, that even if the testimony was proper rebuttal, it should have been excluded because it was propensity evidence that did nothing more than invite the jury to infer that he was a large-scale drug dealer and was acting as such when he met Dorenzo at the Wal-Mart. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). He further asserts that the government's stated purpose for the evidenceto damage his credibilitywas disingenuous, and that the mere fact that the jury heard testimony about such a large quantity of drugs unduly prejudiced him. It is black-letter law that the government cannot introduce evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts to show [his] propensity to commit the charged crime. United States v. Ciesiolka, 614 F.3d 347, 355 (7th Cir.2010). To comply with Rule 404(b), however, all the government need show is a purpose other than to establish the defendant's propensity to commit crimes. United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1301, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010). One purpose that is recognized despite its absence from Rule 404(b)'s nonexclusive list is to attack the credibility of a witness' testimony by means other than attacking the witness' general character for truthfulness. Serafinn v. Local 722, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir.2010). The focus of inquiry should be on whether the prior-crimes evidence is relevant (other than to show propensity, which may be relevant to guilt, but is impermissible as evidence) to an issue in the case, and, if so, whether the probative weight of the evidence is nevertheless substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect or by its propensity to confuse or mislead the jury. Edwards, 581 F.3d at 608. Here, the government asserted that Booker's testimony was relevant to impeach Bell. While the government did not articulate a separate theory of relevancy for Booker's testimony about the quantity of cocaine Bell asked him to cook, it is evident from the trial transcript that the government was eliciting the information to enhance Booker's credibility, thereby increasing the impeaching power of his testimony. The five-kilogram quantity to which Booker testified corroborated Booker's testimony that Bell asked him to cook the cocaine and made it more probable that Bell would come by to discuss the deal in person, under the guise of bringing Booker items like CDs. The evidence was not introduced as propensity evidence, the quantity was mentioned only once, and, to mitigate any potential danger that the jury would make any inappropriate inferences, the district court delivered a limiting instruction at the close of trial. See United States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir.2008) ([W]e assume that limiting instructions are effective in reducing or eliminating unfair prejudice.). The district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Bell's other acts objection, and it adequately, if somewhat inarticulately, explained its reasons for allowing Booker's testimony. It likewise did not plainly err by failing to exclude the testimony pursuant to Rule 608(b). Booker's quantity testimony was not introduced as a specific instance of conduct, nor was it introduced as extrinsic evidence to prove or disprove the testimony of Bell or any other witness; it merely rounded out Booker's story. The district court's failure to exclude the testimony on Rule 608(b) grounds was not an error, let alone a plain or obvious one.