Opinion ID: 1436710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presumption of Reviewability.

Text: As the Supreme Court explained, almost a century ago, in American Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 23 S.Ct. 33, 47 L.Ed. 90 (1902), courts must have power in a proper proceeding to grant relief. Otherwise, the individual is left to the absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and administrative officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law and is in violation of the rights of the individual. Id. at 110, 23 S.Ct. at 39 (emphasis added); see also Abdullah v. Roach, 668 A.2d 801, 807 n. 9 (D.C.1995) (quoting McAnnulty ). Accordingly, [t]he actions of government agencies are normally presumed to be subject to judicial review unless [the legislature] has precluded review or a court would have no law to apply to test the legality of the agency's actions. Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 398 (D.C.1991) (quoting Carlin v. McKean, 262 U.S.App.D.C. 212, 214, 823 F.2d 620, 622 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046, 108 S.Ct. 784, 98 L.Ed.2d 870 (1988)). As Judge Ferren has written, [t]he strong presumption favoring judicial review of agency action reflects a recognition that review is essential to promoting agency responsiveness to legislative mandates.... [U]nreviewability gives the executive a standing invitation to disregard... statutory requirements .... People's Counsel v. Public Serv. Comm'n of the District of Columbia, 474 A.2d 1274, 1278 n. 2 (D.C.1984) (concurring opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [3] [O]nly upon a showing of `clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (citations omitted). The authority of courts to grant relief from unlawful agency action existed at common law, and it was merely reinforced (and not created) by the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1994), and similar local enactments. See Abbott Labs., supra, 387 U.S. at 140, 87 S.Ct. at 1511. The presumption of reviewability is not the product of enacted law, it is common law. 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.1, at 254 (2d ed. 1984); see also Abdullah, supra, 668 A.2d at 807-08 (citing DAVIS). There are two principal exceptions to the presumption of judicial reviewability. First, the legislature may commit the challenged action entirely to agency discretion. Second, it may preclude review, explicitly or implicitly, by statute. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1654, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). Neither of these exceptions applies here. A legislative intention to commit an action entirely to agency discretion  a very narrow exception to the governing presumption  may properly be inferred only in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820-21, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [4] In this case, the statute requires the Mayor to provide collection services, see D.C.Code § 6-3407(d), and the Mayor's acts or omissions can readily be evaluated by reference to that obligation. Furthermore, nothing in the DCRL explicitly or implicitly precludes judicial review. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413, 97 S.Ct. 2428, 2433-34, 53 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977) (requiring a clear showing of preclusion); Simpson, supra, 597 A.2d at 398. The presumption thus stands unrebutted. We have held that the Superior Court may entertain claims for equitable relief from allegedly unlawful action by public officials pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-921(a)(6) (1995), which vests that court with jurisdiction over any civil action or other matter, at law or in equity, brought in the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1159-60 (D.C.1991), and authorities there cited; Abdullah, supra, 668 A.2d at 807. The availability of review by this court of agency decisions in contested cases  those in which trial-type proceedings are required at the agency level  does not preclude judicial review in other matters, because [a]ny party aggrieved by an agency's decision may initiate an appropriate equitable action in the Superior Court to seek redress. Capitol Hill Restoration Soc'y v. Moore, 410 A.2d 184, 188 (D.C.1979).