Opinion ID: 4020402
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attendance and Travel Time

Text: Defendants claim that “[a] key feature of counsel’s excessive billing is duplicative attendance and travel for court proceedings.” Defendants’ OB at 23. Defendants argue that Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 20 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 Plaintiffs did not demonstrate the need for so many attorneys, mostly senior attorneys with high rates, who were not arguing, and faults the district court for not explaining why it approved these hours. Defendants also complain that counsel billed excessive travel, particularly out-of-state travel. Defendants offer the following examples in support of their argument. First, they complain that too many attorneys billed for telephone conferences, highlighting numerous occasions when the number of attorneys who billed for a conference exceed the number of attorneys who actually spoke at the conference.5 Defendants also complain about the hours billed for attendance at oral arguments. They emphasize the sheer number of hours billed, the discrepancy between the number of attorneys appearing at oral argument and the number of attorneys who actually argued, and the number of attorneys who billed for travel. First, they assert that the hours billed for the June 27, 2012 oral argument, which addressed the Decree’s validity and SEIU Local 1 scheduling, were excessive. Counsel charged for eight attorneys to participate, but only three Plaintiffs’ attorneys handled the proceedings: Leonard and Gentry argued the merits, and Chisolm addressed SEIU Local 1 logistics. They collectively billed 90 hours for argument-related travel, preparation, and attendance for June 26 and 27 and 70 hours on the day of argument. At least four attorneys billed travel. Second, Defendants object to the 100+ hours billed for the July 30, 2012 oral argument concerning the SEIU Local 1 preliminary injunction motion and NEOCH motion to modify. Plaintiffs charged attendance for ten attorneys, even though only Chisolm and Leonard spoke. Between July 29 and 30, ten of these attorneys billed 100+ hours for hearing related activities.6 Third, Defendants contend that counsel billed excessive hours for the October 1, 2012 telephonic oral argument in this court. Leonard argued. Six attorneys billed for participation, five from Altshuler Berzon. Leonard billed 60 hours of argument preparation from 5 Defendants point out that thirteen attorneys billed for attendance at the May 9, 2012 telephone conference, although only four spoke on behalf of Plaintiffs; eleven attorneys billed for attendance at the follow-up telephone conference the next day, May 10, 2012, although only Gentry and Berzon spoke for Plaintiffs; and seven attorneys billed for the May 16, 2012, scheduling conference, but only Gentry and Berzon spoke. 6 This included the travel for three Altshuler Berzon attorneys from San Francisco to Columbus and Attorney Donita Judge from New Jersey on behalf of ODP. Defendants highlight Berzon’s billing because he did not argue the motions—Leonard did—and she billed 40 hours in preparation from July 25-28. Berzon billed 24.5 hours on July 29-30 for hearing-related time, exclusive of expenses. Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 21 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 September 25 to 30. Berzon also billed 21 hours from September 24 to 30. Fourth, Defendants challenge the hours billed in connection with oral argument in the district court on July 12, 2013, regarding the extension of the Decree. Plaintiffs charged for four attorneys to attend (travel for three) and a total of 80+ argument-related hours. The district court did not conduct an atomized line-item analysis of the hours allocated to telephone conferences and oral arguments. However, the court found that Plaintiffs had presented “extensive and detailed documentation of their hours,” which contained “sufficient detail and probative value to enable” the court to make the factual determinations that “the hours recorded were actually and reasonably expended in this action.” Sept. 29, 2014 Op., at 6. It reiterated that “although multiple attorneys worked on these cases,” that was “no[t] inherently unreasonable,” and that “[t]he time records submitted in these cases” were sufficiently detailed and established proper billing judgment. Id. at 8-9. In light of Plaintiffs’ extensive documentation, the court found that Defendants’ conclusory allegations that fees were unwarranted did not establish that there was error. Id. at 9. Multiple-lawyer litigation is common and not inherently unreasonable. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 661 (7th Cir. 2007); ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 432 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Coulter, 805 F.2d at 152 (remarking that “multiple representation can be productive,” but “there is also the danger of duplication, a waste of resources which is difficult to measure”). At the same time, Hensley made clear that in assessing hours “reasonably expended,” the district court should evaluate whether the case is “overstaffed.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The district court did just that. Its “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award” is easily supported by the record. Id. at 437. Given the extremely expedited pace in the few short months before the 2012 presidential election and complexity of the litigation, the need for multiple attorneys to handle the various legal and factual facets of the two cases is obvious. In early May 2012, the litigation was quickly taking shape, so multiple attorneys’ attendance at telephonic conferences ensured that members of the team were fully and efficiently informed. Furthermore, Plaintiffs were represented by different counsel, and those counsel were required by local rule to attend all such proceedings. See S.D. Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 22 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 Ohio Civ. R. 83.4(a) (“[I]n all actions filed in . . . this Court, all parties . . . must be represented at all times by a ‘trial attorney’ . . . . The trial attorney shall attend all hearings, conferences, and the trial itself unless excused by the Court from doing so.”). The same is true for the hearings. Take, for example, the July 30, 2012 hearing on the SEIU Local 1 preliminary injunction motion and the NEOCH motion to modify the Decree. This was a critical hearing, as the district court’s Plenary Opinion and Order reflects. Counsel of record—Donita Judge for OOC, Donald McTigue for ODP, Michael Hunter for SEIU 1199 in NEOCH and the union plaintiffs in SEIU Local 1 as well as Subodh Chandra and Caroline Gentry for NEOCH—, were required to be present. In addition to client representation, other attorneys present at the hearing made specific contributions to the issues to be presented: Leonard conducted substantive legal work in both cases; Chisolm conducted substantive work in SEIU Local 1; Berzon provided substantive and strategic guidance; Chandra, Gentry, and McTigue had knowledge of the NEOCH case history and substantive work on the pending motions; and Miller and Harshman performed work on the evidence presented in both cases. Given the importance of this hearing, complexity of the issues, and the number of parties involved in the two cases, the number of counsel present does not seem unreasonable. In any event, the district court was there and in a far better spot to assess whether the number of counsel was necessary. Moreover, in the face of Plaintiffs’ very detailed billing records ‘“conclusory allegations that the award was excessive and that . . . counsel employed poor billing judgment . . . do not suffice to establish that there was error . . . , particularly in light of the statements of the district court [explaining the award] and our standard of review.’” Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 553 (quoting Perotti v. Seiter, 935 F.2d 761, 764 (6th Cir. 1991)). As the district court found, Plaintiffs presented detailed billing records as well as Declarations explaining the nature of the work performed. Like the records in Imwalle, the itemized billing records for each entry specify the date that the time was billed, the individual billing the time, and a brief explanation of the specific task completed. See id. at 553. Plaintiffs’ counsel was “not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended,” as long as the general subject matter was Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 23 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 identified. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12.7 When read in conjunction with the timeline of the litigation, the billing records support the district court’s determination that the hours charged were reasonably expended. See Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 554. The district court’s ruling that Plaintiffs’ requested fees for travel to and from the court for various oral arguments was therefore proper. See, e.g., Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that travel time is fully compensable); Perotti, 935 F.2d at 764 (noting that “matters of this sort are within the discretion given the district court”).