Opinion ID: 746407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Under the United States Constitution

Text: 8 Mr. Snyder brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants, while acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution. We therefore consider whether Murray City's denial of Mr. Snyder's request to deliver his proposed prayer during the reverence portion of a city council meeting violated his rights under the Free Exercise, Establishment, or Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution. 9 In his briefs, Mr. Snyder relies upon case law interpreting the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Since he did not allege a violation of his right to free speech, however, we need not consider the arguments raised under that body of law.
10 The first questions in any free exercise claim are whether the plaintiff's beliefs are religious in nature, and whether those religious beliefs are sincerely held. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185, 85 S.Ct. 850, 863-64, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965). Only beliefs which are religious in nature are protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Nevertheless, religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1430, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). 11 Although Mr. Snyder swore out affidavits attesting to his sincerity, the district court held that he was not sincere in the beliefs espoused in his proposed prayer. The district court reached this conclusion based upon the text of Mr. Snyder's prayer, which the court found to contain political instead of religious content, and on Mr. Snyder's deposition testimony that he was unsure of his religious beliefs. The inquiry into the sincerity of a free-exercise plaintiff's religious beliefs is almost exclusively a credibility assessment, see Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186, 85 S.Ct. at 864; Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1526 (10th Cir.1991), and therefore the issue of sincerity can rarely be determined on summary judgment. This may well be, however, one of those very rare cases in which the plaintiff's beliefs are so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation that they are not entitled to First Amendment protection. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715, 101 S.Ct. at 1431. 12 Regardless, we need not decide whether Mr. Snyder's beliefs are religious in nature nor whether they are sincerely held. Nor need we address Mr. Snyder's argument that summary judgment was inappropriate. Even assuming that Mr. Snyder is possessed of sincerely held religious beliefs, as articulated in his proposed prayer, we find that Mr. Snyder's claim is not cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause. In fact, Mr. Snyder's arguments evince a fundamental misconception about the rights bestowed by the Clause. 13 The Free Exercise Clause is one of the Bill of Rights's thou shall not prohibitions against certain government actions. The Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). To protect the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1599, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from impermissibly burdening an individual's free exercise of religion. However, [t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2152, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986). 14 The Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee any person the right to pray whenever and wherever he chooses. Nor does the Clause guarantee a person the right to speak during portions of public meetings set aside for devotional or invocational purposes. Suggestion to the contrary is inconsistent with both common sense and constitutional doctrine. Cf. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2564, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) ([T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.). We find no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
15 Mr. Snyder claims that Murray City's denial of his request to speak at the reverence portion of its city council meeting violated the Establishment Clause. This argument also misapprehends the protections afforded by that Clause. The Establishment Clause assures that the government will not favor a particular religion, nor religion over nonreligion. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 2491, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994). Like the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause is a prohibition against certain government actions. The Establishment Clause does not give any individual the right to establish his religion by guaranteeing an opportunity to pray during public meetings, and certainly does not require Murray City to permit all comers to speak during the reverence portion of its city council meetings. 16 In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of opening governmental meetings with prayers. The Court observed that the opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country. Id. at 786, 103 S.Ct. at 3333. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not ... an 'establishment' of religion or a step toward establishment.... Id. at 792, 103 S.Ct. at 3336. 17 Mr. Snyder does not argue that Murray City's practice of opening its city council meetings with prayer violates the Establishment Clause. Marsh appears to foreclose such an argument. Instead, Mr. Snyder argues that Murray City violated the Establishment Clause by permitting others to pray, yet denying him the same opportunity. Marsh suggests that a governmental body's practices in selecting persons to deliver prayers at public meetings may violate the Establishment Clause if the selections are the product of impermissible motives. Id. at 793, 103 S.Ct. at 3337. The record in this matter is devoid of evidence suggesting that Murray City had impermissible motives either in extending invitations to speak, or in denying Mr. Snyder's request. 3 Similarly absent is any suggestion that Murray City used the reverence portion of its city council meetings to advance a particular faith or to disparage any faith or belief. See id. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. at 3337-38. In contrast, Mr. Snyder's prayer itself disparages those who believe in the propriety of public prayer. Clearly, the content of Mr. Snyder's prayer is in conflict with the City's legitimate objectives in presenting such prayers. Marsh controls the issue before us, and we find no violation of the Establishment Clause.
18 Because Mr. Snyder's First Amendment claims are without merit, his claim under the Federal Due Process Clause also fails. It is beyond argument that process is due only when the government terminates a protected interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Mr. Snyder was not deprived of any protected interest and therefore he had no entitlement to any sort of process.