Opinion ID: 2310758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Goldie Charlotte

Text: Kiser sought to have Charlotte testify concerning two events where Kiser was mistaken for one of his relatives. During voir dire, Charlotte testified that, on one occasion, she was a passenger in an automobile driven by Kiser when a Dover police officer stopped the vehicle. Charlotte stated that the officer insisted that Kiser was his brother, Lamar Kiser. According to Charlotte, Kiser informed the police that he was Lamont Kiser and the officer responded that he believed he was Lamar Kiser. Charlotte specifically stated that the officer said that [Lamont] was Lamar Kiser. They claimed they knew him. Then, in response to the trial judge's question whether Charlotte heard the officer say anything she stated They called him Lamar ... he told him he was Lamar Kiser, because he knew him. Charlotte testified that she and Kiser were detained for some time while the officer verified, through conferring with another officer and looking at photographs, that Kiser was not his brother Lamar. Finally, Charlotte stated that the car was insured, registered and that the tags were in order. The second incident of misidentification testified to by Charlotte involved the Delaware State Police at Troop 3, the same agency that arrested Kiser on the charges brought against him in the present case. Charlotte stated that she had to go to Troop 3 to inform the police that it was one of Kiser's cousins, and not Kiser, that the police were searching for in connection with a particular investigation. The trial court ruled that Charlotte's testimony concerning the stop was inadmissible because there was no foundation to establish the officer's basis for the misidentification. On this ground, the court concluded that the testimony was not relevant. Specifically, the court stated: We don't know what precipitated the stop, whether it was a driver's license tag that was in the computer or whether it was the police officer just observing them. I don't recall the police officer saying `I know who you are, I have seen you, you are Lamar', I don't recall that testimony. In addition, the trial court ruled that Charlotte's testimony regarding the second incident of misidentification was not relevant because it was unclear as to why the police were searching for Kiser. The court held that to the extent the testimony regarding either incident was relevant, it would be outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury and the issues. It is evident the trial court did not accurately recall the testimony concerning the stop and the State so concedes. The record indicates that Charlotte specifically stated that the officer stopped the vehicle because he believed the driver was Lamar Kiser. Contrary to the trial court's comments, there were sufficient factual grounds for determining the basis for the stop. The evidence of misidentification on that occasion had probative value in this case because it makes it more probable that the police could have mistaken Kiser for someone else. Furthermore, the testimony regarding the mixup with Troop 3 should have been admitted because it shows that law enforcement officials had mistaken him for one of his relatives in the past. [3] In connection with the other evidence of misidentification, this testimony makes it more probable, however slight the level of probability, that Kiser was misidentified in this case. It is not necessary, as the State claims, that the misidentification evidence relate to instances where the officers in the present case mistook Kiser for someone else. It is sufficient if the evidence establishes that the fact sought to be proven, here the claim of misidentification, is more probable when supported by the proffered evidence than it would be without it. See 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 185 (5th ed.1999). To be sure, the strength of probability that this evidence of prior misidentification supports a claim of present misidentification is arguable but that contention affects the weight not the admissibility of the disputed testimony. Finally, we find that Charlotte's testimony should not have been excluded under DRE 403. In the first instance, it appears the trial judge applied the wrong standard when he ruled the testimony was inadmissable because it was outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury and the issues. Rule 403 requires the probative value of relevant evidence to be substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. Moreover, because Kiser's defense was based on his claim of misidentification, relevant misidentification evidence is highly probative of a material issue in the case. Where misidentification is the sole defense at trial, excluding relevant evidence pertaining to misidentification constitutes an abuse of discretion. Thus, we conclude the Superior Court erred in refusing to permit this testimony.