Opinion ID: 2341473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: It Is Unclear Whether Davis Accords With The Whitton Test.

Text: The dispositive language in the Davis opinion is as follows: While Davis' violation of both statutes resulted from a single course of action, the offenses differ markedly in the conduct that they prohibit and in the specific social interests that they seek to preserve. Davis' double jeopardy rights were not infringed by the entry of separate convictions and sentences on these charges. See State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Alaska 1986).[ [8] ] Davis thus cited State v. Dunlop rather than Whitton. But Dunlop decided a separate question. The question in Dunlop was whether one or multiple crimes were committed when a defendant by a single act injured or killed two or more people. In Dunlop we concluded that in an earlier case, Thessen v. State, [9] we had erred in applying Whitton to multiple violations of a single statute. [10] Although Dunlop clarified that the Whitton test does not apply where one statute has been violated by a single course of conduct that results in multiple deaths or injuries, the Dunlop court made it clear that Whitton would otherwise continue to apply. [11] Further, the Davis opinion takes the form of a categorical ruling that possession of illegal drugs and maintaining a dwelling used for keeping illegal drugs are always separate crimes. But Whitton requires a comparison of the different statutes  as they apply to the facts of the case, to determine whether there were involved differences in intent or conduct. [12] If case-specific differences in intent or conduct are found to exist, then such differences must be evaluated in light of the basic interests of society to be vindicated or protected.... [13] If the court finds that such differences in intent or conduct are significant or substantial in relation to the social interests involved, multiple sentences may be imposed, but if there are no such differences or if they are insignificant or insubstantial, only one conviction can be imposed. [14] It does not appear from the text of the Davis decision that a comparison was made between the intent or conduct involved in the different statutes as applied to the facts of the case. It is also not evident that the legislative history underlying the maintaining subsection of AS 11.71.040 was consulted to determine the social interests sought to be protected. Finally, the court of appeals recognized in its Rofkar opinion the possibility that under some circumstances, Alaska's double jeopardy clause might be violated if a defendant receives separate convictions for possessing drugs and for maintaining a dwelling or building to keep those same drugs. [15] The recognition of this possibility seems inconsistent with the use of the Davis case as categorical contrary precedent.