Opinion ID: 662165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Raquel Harris appeal--92-10675

Text: 8 Raquel Harris claims that the court erred in empaneling dual juries, one for her case, and another for the Calles and Marvin Harris cases. But she cannot prevail on her claim without showing specific prejudice to her constitutional, statutory, or procedural rights. United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1169 (9th Cir.1973); see also Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1304-05 (9th Cir.1993). The only prejudice she argues is the introduction against Marvin Harris of the realtors' testimony that Marvin was shopping (alone) for expensive houses. When Raquel asked for a sidebar, the judge refused, but treated the request as an objection and admonished the jury that the evidence could be used only against Marvin, not Raquel. If there was error in allowing Raquel's jury to be present for this testimony, it was cured by the limiting instruction. United States v. Laykin, 886 F.2d 1534, 1544 (9th Cir.1989). 9 Raquel did not object below to the permissive inference instruction to which she now takes exception. The instruction was unnecessary and, with the benefit of hindsight, mistaken. United States v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294, 299 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc). Nevertheless, the instruction was not as bad as the one in Rubio-Villareal. In Rubio-Villareal, the jury was invited to infer knowledge from nothing but the two facts that the cocaine was concealed in the body of the vehicle, and the defendant was driving. In Raquel Harris's case, the inference was invited from the fact of driving a car containing contraband, as well as all other evidence in this case. The error if any was not plain, cf. United States v. Williams, 990 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.1993). Rubio-Villareal had not yet come down when the case at bar was tried, so any error was not clear or obvious under current law. United States v. Olano, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993). Also, Raquel had the benefit of the additional paragraph saying that she, being just a passenger and not the driver, could not be convicted upon such an inference unless there was additional evidence connecting her to the cocaine. 10 Raquel also claims that the court erroneously limited the cross examination of her daughter-in-law Elizabeth, who had agreed to testify in exchange for immunity, government money and relocation. Raquel established in her cross-examination that she and Elizabeth had had a family argument of such magnitude that they did not speak to each other for two years, but the judge would not allow her to inquire into the causes of the argument. Raquel had already demonstrated bias, and the additional cross examination would have added nothing but motive. The trial court could properly keep it out. Bias was already so well established that this limitation of cross was within the trial judge's discretion. United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir.1991). A fortiori we find no abridgment of Raquel's constitutional right of confrontation. United States v. Vergas, 933 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir.1991).