Opinion ID: 4442755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mutually Exclusive Guilty Verdicts

Text: ¶14 This court has not yet directly confronted how to analyze mutually exclusive guilty verdicts. We made it clear in Frye that it isn’t necessary for a guilty verdict and a not-guilty verdict to be consistent. See 898 P.2d at 571 (holding that 6 “consistency in [guilty and not-guilty] verdicts is unnecessary”). But as the parties and division below note, in Frye, we at least suggested how cases such as the one before us now might be handled. See id. at 569 n.13 (observing that “courts are generally uniform in their agreement” that mutually exclusive guilty verdicts “should not be sustained”). ¶15 The facts of Frye, though disturbing, are straightforward. Ronald Frye raped the victim, referred to as Doe, while pointing a gun at her head. Id. at 561. Frye was charged with first degree burglary, second degree burglary, sexual assault in the first degree, and menacing with a deadly weapon. Id. at 560–61. Before the jury deliberated, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of second degree sexual assault. Id. at 564. The jury ultimately found Frye guilty of that offense and menacing with a deadly weapon, which implied that Frye was not guilty of first degree sexual assault. Id. ¶16 The problem was that sexual assault in the first degree and menacing with a deadly weapon included similar elements. Sexual assault in the first degree required causing the submission of the victim “through the actual application of physical force, physical violence, or . . . by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, [or] extreme pain.” Id. at 563. Menacing with a deadly weapon required placing the victim in “fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” Id. We concluded 7 “that only by a most strained analysis could the two guilty verdicts be held to be consistent.” Id. at 565. If the jury had believed that Frye used a gun to cause Doe’s submission, it would logically have found him guilty of first degree sexual assault. Therefore, a verdict of not guilty of first degree sexual assault but guilty of second degree sexual assault suggests that the jury found that Frye did not use a gun to cause Doe to submit. Such a finding would be at odds with the guilty verdict for menacing with a deadly weapon because there is no evidence that Frye used the gun other than in the course of the sexual assault. Id. (citation omitted). To find consistency in the two verdicts, we noted that we would have had to determine that the jury didn’t believe Doe’s testimony that Frye used a gun during the commission of the sexual assault, but did believe that Frye used it at some other point. See id. at 566. We rejected such an “implausible explanation” and concluded that the verdicts were inconsistent. Id. Despite this, we followed the federal rule and allowed both verdicts to stand so long as the evidence supported both convictions because it was impossible to determine why the jury convicted on one count and acquitted on the other. Id. at 570–71. ¶17 The People argue that we should analyze the inconsistency here the same way. But Frye arose in a different setting: inconsistent guilty and not-guilty verdicts, not mutually exclusive guilty verdicts. See id. at 564–66. In fact, we stated explicitly that Frye was not a case where a defendant had been convicted of two crimes, certain elements of which are mutually exclusive. See id. at 569 n.13. 8 Instead, we noted a “general agreement” that legally and logically inconsistent guilty verdicts “should not be sustained.” Id. ¶18 This dicta has taken root. We have at least alluded to it in a subsequent opinion, see Candelaria v. People, 148 P.3d 178, 183 (Colo. 2006), and the court of appeals has applied it, see, e.g., People v. Weare, 155 P.3d 527, 529 (Colo. App. 2006). Moreover, a majority of other states still apply the same or a similar rule. See, e.g., State v. Chyung, 157 A.3d 628, 636, 643 (Conn. 2017) (holding that convictions of reckless manslaughter and specific intent murder were inconsistent and thus had to be vacated); State v. Owens, 766 S.E.2d 66, 71 (Ga. 2014) (concluding that felony murder and felony involuntary manslaughter were mutually exclusive and remanding for a new trial); Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 921 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Mass. 2010) (remarking that Massachusetts sets aside mutually exclusive verdicts); State v. Speckman, 391 S.E.2d 165, 167–68 (N.C. 1990) (reasoning that convictions for embezzlement and false pretenses were “mutually exclusive” and required a new trial). ¶19 Still, the People contend that in Frye we simply conducted a factual analysis to assess whether two verdicts are irreconcilable. They ask us to do the same here. Because Delgado allegedly knocked R.B. unconscious before he took R.B.’s personal belongings, the People contend that the jury could have reasonably concluded that there was both a theft from a person and a robbery. But, because 9 both parties agree that there was only one taking, this seems, at best, implausible. We would have to assume that the jury believed that Delgado knocking R.B. unconscious was somehow the robbery, and the taking of R.B.’s items was the theft. Yet, the robbery could not have occurred without the taking, and the theft could not have occurred through the use of force. And, in any event, this would be exactly the type of “speculation into a jury’s thought processes that courts generally eschew.” Frye, 898 P.2d at 566. So, the People’s argument fails on its own terms. ¶20 Moreover, Frye suggests an elemental approach to evaluating whether the remaining guilty verdicts are irreconcilable. There, we stated that, for mutually exclusive guilty verdicts, “where the existence of an element of one of the crimes negates the existence of a necessary element of the other crime . . . [,] the verdicts are legally and logically inconsistent and should not be sustained.” Id. at 569 n.13 (emphases added). ¶21 But why, exactly, is it that mutually exclusive guilty verdicts aren’t permitted? The answer lies in a defendant’s right to have each element of a crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶22 The prosecution’s responsibility to prove each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt is embedded within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process protections and the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial 10 by jury. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) (“[T]he jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). ¶23 When a defendant is convicted of crimes featuring elements that are mutually exclusive, the defendant hasn’t been convicted of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. There’s an explicit finding of doubt in the contradictory element. Delgado can’t have been convicted of each element of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt when robbery explicitly requires that he use force, which he was specifically found not to have used. ¶24 But couldn’t the same be said for inconsistent guilty and not-guilty verdicts—an inconsistency that both this court and the Supreme Court have permitted? See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69 (1984); Frye, 898 P.2d at 571. We think not. ¶25 Take Powell, for example. There, the defendant was acquitted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, but he was convicted of using a telephone to possess and distribute the same. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 59–60. These findings were clearly inconsistent, but the Supreme Court let them stand, see id. at 69, because the verdicts could have been the result of “mistake, compromise, or lenity,” see id. 11 at 65. In other words, “[t]he most that can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 63 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)). ¶26 Not so with mutually exclusive verdicts. We know the People failed to meet their burden on both charges, because the jury explicitly found that they failed to meet their burden. A guilty verdict is a specific finding, encompassing all the elements of the crime. An acquittal isn’t. In other words, while an acquittal has various explanations, a guilty verdict has but one. ¶27 So, due process prevents a defendant from being convicted of crimes with mutually exclusive elements. But to analyze whether the verdicts are mutually exclusive, we need to look to the elements of both crimes that the state alleged. First, theft from a person: “Theft from the person of another by means other than the use of force, threat, or intimidation is a class 5 felony without regard to the value of the thing taken.” § 18-4-401(5), C.R.S. (2019) (emphasis added). Now, robbery: “A person who knowingly takes anything of value from the person or presence of 12 another by the use of force, threats, or intimidation commits robbery.” § 18-4-301(1),