Opinion ID: 1844186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: inconsistent triggerman theories

Text: Parker also contends that the State's inconsistent triggerman theoriesthat Cave was the shooter during Cave's trial and that Parker was the shooter during Parker'sviolated his due process rights. In Parker's most recent appeal, we concluded that in using Bryant's testimony during Cave's 1993 penalty phase to show that Cave was the shooter, the State had relied not only on inconsistent positions, which the Eleventh Circuit found permissible, see Parker, 974 F.2d at 1578, but also on inconsistent evidence. See Parker, 721 So.2d at 1151. Because this favorable evidence was suppressed by the State, we affirmed the trial court's postconviction order granting Parker a new penalty phase in order to give Parker the opportunity to present evidence of the State's inconsistent theories to the jury. See id. However, we rejected Parker's argument on cross-appeal that the suppression of this evidence undermined confidence in the outcome of the guilt phase and that under Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979), the State's use of this inconsistent evidence violated his due process rights. We concluded that Bryant's testimony went only to a determination regarding premeditated murder, and was not relevant to a finding of felony murder, which was established by the evidence. Parker, 721 So.2d at 1152. We noted: The underlying rationale in Green was that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial as to punishment because he was not allowed to introduce evidence that had been used by the State in a codefendant's trial to establish that the codefendant was the one who actually murdered the victim. Id. (emphasis supplied). Because Parker was able to present Bryant's testimony to the jury during the new penalty phase, we conclude that the State's use of inconsistent evidence during Cave's 1993 penalty phase did not violate Parker's due process rights during his de novo penalty phase.