Opinion ID: 1505912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the parties' legal arguments

Text: In order to sort out the analyses applicable, respectively, to the petition for review and to the appeal, it is helpful first to explicate the parties' legal positions, which for the most part have been advanced to both the BAR and the Superior Court. At the heart of these cases is the BAR's dismissal of petitioner's appeal for failure to take a timely appeal of DLII's revocation order, and the Superior Court's corresponding dismissal of the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, apparently for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. [4]
Petitioner argues that he had no obligation to appeal DLII's revocation order to the BAR because that action was void (not merely voidable) for lack of authority to revoke the permit. More specifically, he states that:  Until 1969, the Director of the now-defunct Department of Licenses and Inspections (DLI) had authority to issue building permits. In addition, the DLI Director, as well as officials of the DLI Licenses and Permit Division itself, had authority to recommend revocation of a permit to the BAR and, absent an appeal to the BAR, the Director had authority to revoke the permit, all as set forth in Reorganization Order No. 55, as amended, D.C.Code, Title 1, Administration, Appendix, Part III(A)(9) & (E)(5) 183, 185 (1973); [5]  On March 7, 1969, all DLI functions were transferred to the Department of Economic Development (DED) by Commissioner's Order No. 69-96;  On July 3, 1975, DED's permit revocation authority (but not its permit issuance authority) was transferred to a newly created DHCD by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, D.C.Code, Title 1, Administration, Appendix 135-37 (Supp. V, 1978). [6] Specifically, Reorganization Plan No. 3 expressly provided, with respect to permits, that only [t]he functions relating to the issuance of licenses, permits and certificates in connection with the administration of such [building and housing] codes, [zoning] laws and regulations shall remain vested in the Director of the Department of Economic Development (emphasis added). Note 6 supra. DED was renamed the Department of Licenses, Investigations, and Inspections (DLII) in 1978 by Mayor's Order 78-42.  Thus, only DHCD, not DLII, has permit revocation authority, and has it expressly under § 109.3(1) of the Building Code, supra, administered by DHCD. Accordingly, DLII's purported revocation of petitioner's permit was a nullity. As to DHCD's revocation and enforcement actions, petitioner states that:  The sign did not violate Article 14, § 1405.2 of the Building Code, supra, and was not revocable under § 109.3(1) of that Code, supra;  Alternatively, revocation of the permit was barred by laches and estoppel;  Even if the revocation was valid, DHCD had no authority to order removal of the sign pursuant to D.C.Code § 5-513 (1981) (formerly § 5-313), which pertains solely to abatement of public nuisances; and, in any event, DHCD would not afford petitioner the required  and requested  hearing on DHCD's September 30, 1980, order to show cause why the sign should not be removed.  The BAR has jurisdiction under Organization Order No. 112, Part E(1), D.C.Code, Title 1, Administration, Appendix 140-41 (Supp. V, 1978), to entertain petitioner's appeal and to bar DHCD (formerly DED) from revoking the permit and removing the sign;  DHCD did not take final agency action to enforce the revocation order until February 5, 1982;  Petitioner's appeal of DHCD's action to the BAR on February 12, 1982, was therefore timely, since it met the ten-day filing requirement. BAR Rule 21.1(a).  The BAR accordingly erred in dismissing the appeal as untimely by reference solely to petitioner's failure to appeal the void DLII revocation order of August 29, 1980. Thus, the DHCD/BAR case should be remanded to the BAR for a hearing under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA), D.C.Code §§ 1-1501 et seq. (1981), and the Superior Court action should be stayed pending the outcome. Alternatively, the Superior Court's dismissal order should be vacated and injunctive relief granted.
In response to petitioner's DLII argument, the District asserts that DLII does have authority to revoke his sign permit because:  In 1969, all DLI functions, including its permit revocation authority under Reorganization Order No. 55, supra, were transferred to DED by Commissioner's Order No. 69-96, supra;  In 1975, neither DED's permit issuance authority nor its permit revocation authority was transferred to the newly-created DHCD by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, supra. According to the District's brief [t]he functions relating to the issuance of licenses, permits and certificates  which everyone agrees remained vested in DED  had consistently been interpreted by DLII officials as continuing [from DLI] in DED, and subsequently in DLII, the authority to revoke building permits issued by DED and DLII. (Emphasis added.) This interpretation by officials charged with the day-to-day enforcement of these regulations (supported by affidavit in the court case) is not clearly erroneous and thus may not be disturbed.  In 1978, DED was renamed DLII by Mayor's Order 78-42; thus, DLII has retained DED's permit revocation authority exercised against petitioner on August 29, 1980. [7]  Because petitioner did not take a timely appeal to the BAR, DLII's revocation of the permit is final and, as to that action, the petition for review accordingly should be dismissed for lack of contested case jurisdiction. D.C.Code §§ 1-1502(8), -1510 (1981). Similarly, the Superior Court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint challenging DLII's revocation of the permit should be affirmed because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies; [8] As to the DHCD enforcement action, the District replies that, whereas the BAR does have jurisdiction under Organization Order No. 112, supra, to review a permit revocation order, the BAR does not have jurisdiction to review a DHCD enforcement order pursuant to D.C.Code § 5-513 (1981) (formerly § 5-313). Thus, the BAR's refusal to entertain petitioner's § 5-513 argument should be affirmed. [9]
The principal issues, framed by reference to the revocation and enforcement orders, respectively, are: 1. Whether petitioner's failure to appeal DLII's revocation to the BAR (a) precludes a petition for this court's review of that issue for lack of contested case jurisdiction, and also (b) bars a Superior Court action for declaratory judgment as to DLII's revocation because of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and, if not, whether the BAR and the Superior Court erred in dismissing petitioner's challenges to the DLII and DHCD revocation orders; 2. Whether the BAR, this court, or the Superior Court has jurisdiction initially to review DHCD's alleged enforcement authority, as well as its procedures, under D.C.Code § 5-513 (1981); whether petitioner timely sought review in the appropriate forum; and whether petitioner is entitled to relief.