Opinion ID: 1186299
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Larry's potential income

Text: Larry argues that the court erred in estimating Larry's potential income when calculating child support. The trial court's determination of Larry's imputed income is a factual finding which we will review under the clearly erroneous standard. See R.F. v. S.S., 928 P.2d 1194, 1196 n. 2 (Alaska 1996). A finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves us with a definite and firm conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been made. Id. Larry contends that because of his shoulder injury, he will be unable to earn the $30,000 per year that the trial court imputed to him as income. Larry claims that the trial evidence proved his disability, but was inadequate to support the court's determination. He also argues that the superior court did not adequately explain its imputed income findings. Larry asserts that Angela's opposition to reconsideration provided no evidence refuting the doctor's statements accompanying Larry's motion. Angela contends that the superior court properly explained its decision. She argues that Larry did not carry his burden of convincing the court of his limited earning capacity, and that Larry could not properly present new evidence to the court when he moved for reconsideration. The commentary to Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 states that the trial court may determine an obligor parent's potential income when calculating child support if the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. III.C. [1] The trial court determines the potential income considering the parent's work history, qualifications, and job opportunities. Id. When determining the potential income of the obligor parent, the trial court must also balance the needs of the dependent children against the needs of the obligor for a career change. See Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412, 418 (Alaska 1995); Kowalski v. Kowalski, 806 P.2d 1368, 1371 (Alaska 1991) (no relief from a child support obligation except under the most extreme circumstances (citing Houger v. Houger, 449 P.2d 766, 770 (Alaska 1969))). A noncustodial parent who voluntarily reduces his or her income should not automatically receive a corresponding reduction in his or her child support obligation. Nass, 904 P.2d at 418 (citing Pattee v. Pattee, 744 P.2d 658, 662 (Alaska 1987)). In Kowalski, for instance, we found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the obligor's earning capacity based on the finding that the obligor was voluntarily unemployed. 806 P.2d at 1372. We recognized that the noncustodial parent had the burden of establishing his earning capacity. Id. However, in Nass, we remanded because the trial court had not entered sufficiently detailed findings of fact in determining the obligor's potential income after finding that the obligor was voluntarily underemployed. 904 P.2d at 418-19. We remanded so the trial court could make findings which disclose its methodology, as well as the factual basis, for its determination of the appropriate imputed potential income. Id. at 419; cf. Adrian v. Adrian, 838 P.2d 808, 812 (Alaska 1992) (holding that trial court failed to provide raw numbers for child support calculation and may have relied too heavily on attorney's proposed findings and conclusions of law). The superior court found that Larry's imputed income for child support purposes should be $30,000. The court explained its reasoning: I think here in these facts I should find that Mr. Dunn is underemployed, significantly underemployed if he chooses not to obtain any employment.... So I'm going to find, I'm going to assess child support against Mr. Dunn as follows: I'm going to count as income ... a $30,000 a year income for being employed with his skill level at least a significant portion of the time. In other words, the Court's not saying he has to go out and get a $45,000 a year job and add that to everything else he has.... The Court's saying I'm going to assume he can do two-thirds of that.... He's clearly sitting on significant investments that really do not produce any money, and investments could produce money. He's living in a $195,000 house that he basically owns free and clear. And that's certainly something he has the choice to do if he's completely on his own. But he's brought a child into the world.... [B]ecause he has the son I think he doesn't have the same free choice to do that as he would if he had no son. The court's analysis of Larry's unemployment is reasonable because Larry was in his early fifties, had voluntarily retired, and was building houses. Larry testified that recurring shoulder pain limited his job opportunities, [2] but the evidence also established that he was able to continue building his house. At the time of the guardian ad litem 's report, Angela was unemployed and living with Glen and a teenage son from a prior marriage. The evidence was adequate to demonstrate that the needs of the child were substantial, and that there was no substantial justification for excusing the noncustodial parent from employment. Imputing income to the noncustodial parent was therefore warranted. The superior court decided that Larry's potential income would be two-thirds of his previous income of $45,000. Given the evidence, the calculation of imputed income was not arbitrary. Larry provided no quantitative trial evidence about the extent of his impairment or the income he could expect if he entered the job market. Based on the trial evidence, it was not clear error to find Larry's potential income was $30,000.