Opinion ID: 166934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing Issue.

Text: 14 Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution extends the judicial power only to `Cases' or `Controversies.' A dispute is an Article III `Case' or `Controversy' only if the plaintiff can establish what is known as `constitutional standing.' Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pinnacol Assurance, 425 F.3d 921, 926 (10th Cir.2005). Constitutional standing exists if the plaintiff: 15 show[s] [that] (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 16 Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, Congress may expand the range or scope of injuries that are cognizable for purposes of Article III standing by enacting statutes which create legal rights. Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained, Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates [constitutional] standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (stating that [t]he ... injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, and that this principle involve[s] Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law) (quotations omitted); Akins v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 101 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C.Cir.1996) ( en banc ) (Although Congress may not `create' an Article III injury that the federal judiciary would not recognize, ... Congress can create a legal right (and, typically, a cause of action to protect that right) the interference with which will create an Article III injury. (citations omitted)), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998). 17 Congress may also ... place additional restrictions on who can sue, imposing requirements of `statutory standing.' Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 425 F.3d at 926 (quotation omitted). As we recently explained, it is important to distinguish between constitutional standing and statutory standing: 18 Because constitutional standing is necessary to the court's jurisdiction, as a general rule it must be addressed before proceeding to the merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 96-97, 97 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 ... (1998).... 19 On the other hand, statutory standing need not be addressed if the court determines that the plaintiff loses on the merits anyway. 20 Id. 21 Because Robey was not actually ordered to pay any attorney's fees in the state-court foreclosure action, defendants argued in district court that Robey had not suffered any injury and therefore lacked standing to pursue his claims under the FDCPA. In its order dismissing Robey's claims under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court acknowledged the standing issue but chose not to address it, explaining that [a]lthough Plaintiff may well lack standing to bring this action ..., this Court chooses not to address this issue, given the dismissal of the FDCPA claim. Robey, 340 F.Supp.2d at 1065. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), however, the district court should have decided the standing issue first, at least as it pertains to Robey's constitutional standing for purposes of Article III. See Gold v. Local 7 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d 1307, 1309-10 (10th Cir.1998) (stating that  Steel requires that a federal court satisfy itself of subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of a claim — even when the question of the merits is the easier one and is substantively resolvable against the claim over which jurisdiction is in doubt), overruled on other grounds by Styskal v. Weld County Bd. of Comm'rs, 365 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir.2004). We therefore address the constitutional standing issue before proceeding to the merits of Robey's claims. See San Juan County, Utah v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir.2005) (Because standing implicates the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, we must address this issue before addressing the merits of [an] appeal.). In so doing, we recognize we are dealing with legal rights created by Congress under the FDCPA. Hence, the injury in fact analysis for purposes of Article III is directly linked to the question of whether Robey has suffered a cognizable statutory injury under the FDCPA. 22 We determine that Robey has suffered an injury in fact under the FDCPA and therefore has standing to pursue his challenge against defendants' request for an award of attorney's fees in the foreclosure action. As the Second Circuit explained in a case in which the plaintiff was alleging that a creditor violated the FDCPA by making an unlawful request for attorney's fees: 23 Defendants maintain that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue this claim because it is undisputed that plaintiff never paid any attorneys' fees to either UC & S or NAN, as the underlying lawsuit initiated by UC & S was settled with different counsel. Accordingly, defendants argue that plaintiff did not suffer any identifiable injury. The FDCPA provides for liability for attempting to collect an unlawful debt, however, and permits the recovery of statutory damages up to $1,000 in the absence of actual damages. Thus, courts have held that actual damages are not required for standing under the FDCPA. See, e.g., Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir.1998) ([T]he plaintiff who admittedly owes a legitimate debt has standing to sue if the Act is violated by an unprincipled debt collector.); Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir.1982) (same); cf. Gambardella v. G. Fox & Co., 716 F.2d 104, 108 n. 4 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that [i]t is well settled ... that proof of actual deception or damages is unnecessary to a recovery of statutory damages under the Truth in Lending Act). Accordingly, we join those courts and hold that the fact that plaintiff did not ever pay any attorneys' fees to NAN does not necessarily suggest that he was not injured for purposes of his FDCPA claim, if he can show that UC & S attempted to collect money in violation of the FDCPA. 24 Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 307 (2d Cir.2003); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (providing that [a] debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt) (emphasis added); Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1121 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that [defendant] violated the FDCPA because he attempted to collect an amount not permitted by [Utah] law, without addressing standing). 25 Because Robey is claiming that defendants violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect attorney's fees that were not permitted under Oklahoma law, the Second Circuit's reasoning in Miller and our decision in Johnson apply with equal force to this case. Accordingly, Robey has been injured under the terms of the FDCPA and can seek legal redress of his claims under that act. He has thus satisfied the injury in fact and other requirements of constitutional standing. 26