Opinion ID: 865700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the blood evidence was improperly

Text: ADMITTED. ¶12. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search.” Miss. Const. art. 3 § 23. “The degree of intrusion necessary in the taking of a blood sample is sufficient to require the presence of probable cause.” McDuff v. State, 763 So. 2d 850, 854 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919-20 (1966)). ¶13. Voluntary consent to a search eliminates an officer’s need to obtain a search warrant. Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858, 863 (Miss. 1997) (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 66 S. Ct. 1256, 90 L. Ed. 1453 (1946); Jones v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 607 So. 2d Thus, this issue is procedurally barred. 6 23, 26 (Miss. 1991); Waldrop v. State, 544 So. 2d 834, 837 (Miss. 1989); Whittington v. State, 523 So. 2d 966, 973 (Miss. 1988); Hudson v. State, 475 So. 2d 156, 159 (Miss. 1985)). “[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); Jones, 607 So. 2d at 26)). ¶14. In addition to voluntary consent, a knowledgeable waiver of this right to be free from unreasonable search also is required. Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547, 549 (Miss. 1983). Irby cites the rule in Penick, which states that, for a consent to search to be valid, “it must clearly appear” that the subject “voluntarily permitted, or expressly invited and agreed to the search, being cognizant of [his] rights in the premises when the officer proposed to [him], by asking [his] permission, to make the search without a warrant.” Id. (citing Smith v. State, 133 Miss. 730, 736, 98 So. 344, 345 (1923)) (emphasis added). ¶15. In Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858, 864 (Miss. 1997), this Court held: If the defendant claims that his waiver was not knowledgeable, the burden is on him to raise the issue of lack of knowledgeable waiver. Knowledgeable waiver is defined as consent where the defendant knows that he or she has a right to refuse, being cognizant of his or her rights in the premises. Graves, 708 So. 2d at 864 (citing Jones, 607 So. 2d at 28). ¶16. “[A] trial judge enjoys a considerable amount of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Unless this judicial discretion is so abused as to be prejudicial to the accused, we will not reverse his ruling.” Graves v. State, 492 So. 2d 562, 565 (Miss. 7 1986) (citing Page v. State, 295 So. 2d 279 (Miss. 1974); Shearer v. State, 423 So. 2d 824, 826 (Miss. 1983)). ¶17. Irby’s argument as to this issue is two-fold: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the blood analysis because the nurse who drew the blood did not testify to the voluntariness of Irby’s consent; and (2) because Irby was being prepared for surgery, he was incapacitated and unable to consent knowingly to providing a blood sample.2 Accordingly, Irby maintains that testimony regarding “other substances” in Irby’s blood sample should not have been admitted. ¶18. During Stevenson’s testimony, Irby objected to the admission of the blood-analysis results, stating that “we’ve objected to the method [sic] the blood was taken, so we certainly have to object to the way these reports are now being presented to the Court for entry into evidence.” The results were admitted over Irby’s objection. Irby also objected to Ivey’s testimony that he had observed Westwood read the contents of the written consent form and had observed both Irby and Westwood sign the form. The objection to the officer’s testimony regarding written consent made at trial was that Westbrook’s testimony was necessary to establish a “chain of custody.” An objection based on failure to establish a chain of custody 2 To be clear, Irby’s blood sample was not withdrawn subject to an arrest, nor was he in custody at the time it was withdrawn. The law enforcement officer who had been at the scene had Irby’s blood withdrawn based on Irby’s oral and written consent. “Schmerber v. California, [384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966)], should put to rest any contention that taking a blood sample as a lawful incident to an arrest for driving while intoxicated violates either the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983). 8 is not an objection based on a failure to establish the voluntariness of consent. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) reads, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection .... The objection made at trial did not state with requisite specificity the basis for the objection to the admission of the testimony. An objection based on the fact that the officer could not testify to what he personally observed was properly overruled by the trial court. Ivey could testify to what he personally observed concerning Irby’s written consent to the blood test. See Miss. R. Evid. 602. ¶19. Irby cites Comby v. State, 901 So. 2d 1282, 1285-86 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), in support of his argument that it was necessary for Westbrook to testify. In Comby, the Court of Appeals noted the following regarding the facts of the case: Comby signed a consent form to have his blood drawn and tested for law enforcement purposes. To determine whether Comby's consent was valid, the trial court, outside the presence of the jury, heard testimony from the nurses who were present when Comby signed the consent form, the deputy who obtained Comby's consent, and Comby himself. Id. at 1285. In Comby, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the defendant’s consent was voluntary. Id. at 1285-86. Irby also cites the following dicta from Cutchens v. State, 310 So. 2d 273, 280 (Miss. 1975): 9 It would have been better practice to have examined into the voluntariness of the consent outside of the presence of the jury but since the evidence was sufficient to sustain the fact that Cutchens' consent was voluntarily given no prejudicial error was committed. If the evidence had shown lack of voluntary consent, a reversible error would have resulted requiring reversal and remand. Id. at 280. ¶20. While Irby objected to the testimony of Stevenson and Ivey, Irby never properly raised the validity-of-consent issue. Accordingly, the trial court never ruled on the voluntariness of Irby’s consent. The suppression of the blood sample was first raised in a motion in limine to exclude the analysis on the basis that the officer had obtained a blood sample under Mississippi Code Section 63-11-7 (Rev. 2004), a statute which allows for obtaining a blood sample for the purposes of a blood-alcohol analysis from a person “unconscious at the time of arrest or apprehension or when the test is to be administered, or is otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal . . .” and “under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-7 (Rev. 2004). According to Irby’s motion in limine, the analysis for other substances should have been suppressed because the statute at issue allows only for blood-alcohol analysis, not for the presence of other intoxicating substances. The State, however, never compelled the blood sample under Section 63-11-7, but always maintained that Irby had consented to the blood test.3 3 Defense counsel at trial stated that it was unaware at the time the motion in limine was filed that Irby had given consent; thus, defense counsel erroneously believed the blood sample to have been taken pursuant to Section 63-11-7. The record reflects that, upon learning of this consent, the defense abandoned its argument concerning Section 63-11-7, and that was why the motion in limine was never taken up by the trial court. 10 ¶21. Additional objections to Ivey’s testimony regarding the validity of Irby’s consent were not made by the defense until Ivey was later recalled to the stand after testimony by both blood analysts already had been admitted. Accordingly, Irby did not timely object to the admission of the blood-analysis evidence. For all the reasons stated above, we find that the blood-analysis evidence was properly admitted. Thus, this issue has no merit.4 II. WHETHER IRBY’S SIXTH-AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION RIGHTS WERE PROTECTED. ¶22. Irby argues that his right to cross-examine Ivey was limited by the trial judge, in violation of his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. In his brief, Irby states that the trial court sustained an objection to the defense’s line of questioning regarding the validity of Irby’s consent. This statement from Irby’s brief does not accurately reflect the actual ruling by the trial court. ¶23. Ivey testified as to the accident scene and Irby’s oral and written consent to the blood test. As previously discussed, the defense objected to this testimony on the basis that Westbrook had not been called to testify; thus, Ivey should not have been allowed to testify as to written consent. This objection was heard and argued outside the presence of the jury. The trial court overruled the defense’s objection, because Ivey had witnessed the defendant and the nurse sign the consent form and thus had personal knowledge of consent. The officer 4 Irby also argues that he suffered from diminished capacity and could not validly consent to giving a blood sample. Because the record is insufficient on this issue, we find that this contention is better suited for a motion for post-conviction relief. Wilson v. State, 21 So. 3d 572, 580 (Miss. 2009). 11 went on to testify that, after the blood sample was obtained, the vials of blood were sent to the Mississippi Crime Laboratory. When asked if the defense wished to cross-examine Ivey at that time, the defense declined to do so. Following Ivey’s testimony, the State introduced testimony, absent objection, from the defense, as to the other substances found in Irby’s blood-sample analyses. ¶24. Ivey later was recalled by the State. After a brief direct examination, Ivey was crossexamined regarding the diagram of the accident and observations of the victims after the crash. Then, defense counsel questioned Ivey regarding his actions upon arriving at the hospital. The defense began a line of questioning as to whether Ivey would have obtained the blood sample even if Irby had refused to give consent. As defense counsel began to recite for Ivey the statute pertaining to withdrawing blood for the purpose of obtaining a blood-alcohol analysis, the State objected on the basis of relevance. The Court sustained the State’s objection on the basis that the State had chosen to travel under the presumption that Irby had given valid consent to the blood sample. Defense counsel then asked whether the victims were unconscious, to which the State objected on the same basis that this question pertained to the statute, not to consent. The Court then dismissed the jury. ¶25. Outside the presence of the jury, the State argued that the fact that Irby had given oral and written consent already had been admitted into evidence in Ivey’s previous testimony. Moreover, the blood analysis from the Mississippi Crime Lab and Dr. Labay already had been admitted into evidence. Thus, according to the State, validity of consent had been 12 waived, and whether the officer had obtained the blood sample pursuant to Section 63-11-7 was irrelevant. The defense argued: We are attacking the consent. It was asked in direct and we have an opportunity to cross-examine him on that. Now, whether or not this officer had an alternate way to get exactly what he had already sought out to get, i.e., blood, in this situation is motive. That’s why we’re questioning it. We think it’s motive on whether or not he did or did not have Mr. Irby sign this form under his own consent or his own permission. It goes to . . . [the officer’s] intent . . . . The trial court ruled that defense counsel could proceed with this line of questioning only outside the presence of the jury. In doing so, the trial judge stated that the motion in limine, which sought to suppress the blood sample because it was compelled by Section 63-11-7, was filed but never argued; thus, it had been waived. Moreover, the trial court found irrelevant “whether there’s an alternate method” for compelling a blood sample, which the State had never pursued, since Irby had given his consent. ¶26. Only after the trial judge dismissed the jury did defense counsel move on from the line of questioning on whether Ivey thought he could compel a blood sample from Irby pursuant to Section 63-11-7 to a line of questioning as to whether Ivey considered the defendant to be alert and able to give consent. Ivey testified that Irby was conscious and capable of giving consent as well as informed of his right to withhold consent. We find no error on the part of the trial judge, as the trial judge properly ruled that Ivey’s “motive” or “intent” for obtaining consent from Irby was irrelevant, and evidence of it should not be presented to the jury. Additionally, as previously discussed, Irby never properly moved the trial court to make an on-the-record finding outside the presence of the jury, nor did Irby ever proffer any evidence 13 that Irby was suffering from diminished capacity to consent to the blood test. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.