Opinion ID: 2570573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior conviction aggravating circumstance

Text: Leonard raises two claims challenging the use of his prior murder conviction as an aggravating circumstance. We reject these contentions. [19] First, Leonard asserts that the prior conviction could not be used as an aggravating circumstance under the former provisions of NRS 200.033(2) because he had not been convicted of the prior offense at the time he committed the instant offense. Leonard notes that NRS 200.033(2) was amended in 1997 to clarify that a prior conviction need not have been entered at the time of the current offense, as long as it has been entered at any time before the penalty hearing on the instant offense. See 1997 Nev.Stat., ch. 356, § 1, at 1293. Thus, he alleges an ex post facto violation. Leonard's claims lack merit because even prior to both the 1997 amendments and commission of the instant offense this court had interpreted NRS 200.033(2) to allow for the use of convictions that had been entered prior to the penalty phase. Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 865, 784 P.2d 956, 960 (1989); Gallego v. State, 101 Nev. 782, 792-93, 711 P.2d 856, 863-64 (1985), rev'd on other grounds by Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.1997); see also Calambro v. State, 114 Nev. 106, 109-10, 952 P.2d 946, 948 (1998). Second, Leonard claims that his prior conviction for murder is constitutionally infirm. This claim also lacks merit. Thus far, the prior conviction has been upheld.