Opinion ID: 2581903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hironaka's proposed mere proximity jury instruction was unnecessary on the facts of this case.

Text: Hironaka argues that the circuit court erred in not instructing the jury that [m]ere proximity to an object, mere presence, or mere association with a person who does control an object, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of possession. Hironaka included this sentence as part of his proposed jury instruction on constructive possession, citing State v. Mundell, 8 Haw. App. 610, 822 P.2d 23 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai`i 87, 997 P.2d 13 (2000), for support. Because the circuit court's instruction on constructive possession was sufficient in light of the facts of this case, Hironaka's argument is without merit. Hironaka is correct that mere proximity to the drug, mere presence, or mere association [with] the person who does control the drug is insufficient to support a finding of possession. Mundell, 8 Haw.App. at 620, 822 P.2d at 29 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But a proper jury instruction on constructive possession precludes a finding of possession based on the defendant's mere proximity to an object, inasmuch as it instructs the jury, as did the circuit court in the present matter, that the defendant must have both the power and the intention ... to exercise dominion or control over an object, in order to find that he or she constructively possessed that object. Naturally, [i]f a person is in mere proximity to contraband, the person does not have the intention to exercise dominion or control over it. State v. Opupele, 88 Hawai`i 433, 439, 967 P.2d 265, 271 (1998). Thus, it is generally unnecessary to give a mere proximity instruction if the jury is otherwise properly instructed on the law of constructive possession. Id. (calling a mere proximity instruction superfluous to an instruction on constructive possession); see also Mundell, 8 Haw.App. at 615-16, 621, 822 P.2d at 26, 29 (holding that failure to give a mere proximity instruction did not constitute plain error because the trial court had correctly instructed the jury on constructive possession); Tran v. State, 246 Ga.App. 153, 539 S.E.2d 862, 869 (2001) (holding that trial court did not err by refusing to give instruction that constructive possession of narcotics cannot rest upon mere spatial proximity to the narcotics because the jury instructions adequately covered the principle by explaining constructive possession and that defendant could not be convicted simply on account of his presence at the crime scene); State v. Castle, 86 Wash.App. 48, 935 P.2d 656, 662-63 (1997) (holding that trial court did not err by refusing to give mere proximity instruction because it properly instructed the jury on constructive possession); State v. Huff, 64 Wash.App. 641, 826 P.2d 698, 706 (1992) (holding that trial court did not err by refusing to give mere proximity instruction because it properly instructed the jury on constructive possession). This is particularly true if mere proximity is not the defendant's theory of the case. See Maelega, 80 Hawai`i at 178-79, 907 P.2d at 764-65. In the present matter, the circuit court instructed the jury regarding constructive possession as follows: A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing for a sufficient period to have terminated his possession, either directly or through another person or persons is then in constructive possession of it. (Emphases added.) Thus, the circuit court's instruction on constructive possession clearly precluded the jury from finding that Hironaka possessed the pipe, with its methamphetamine residue, based merely on his proximity to it, because, as instructed, the jury had to find both that Hironaka knew that the pipe contained methamphetamine and that he intended to exercise dominion or control over the drug in order to find that he constructively possessed it. Moreover, the proximity of the drugs to Hironaka was not central to the case. The prosecution did not argue that Hironaka possessed the methamphetamine merely because of its proximity to him; it did not have to, because Hironaka admitted that he picked up the glass pipe twice and placed it on the seat next to him while he slept. Inasmuch as Hironaka admitted that he had the power to dispose of the pipe, the only real factual dispute between the prosecution and the defense was whether Hironaka knew the pipe he picked up and placed on the seat next to him contained methamphetamine. Hironaka's defense was that he did not know that the glass pipe contained methamphetamine. The prosecution's theory was that he did know that the pipe contained methamphetamine because he had seen his friends smoking methamphetamine from the pipe and the drug's residue was still visible in the pipe when the police found it. This not being a case that turned on the proximity of the drugs, the circuit court's jury instruction on constructive possession was not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in refusing to give a mere proximity jury instruction.