Opinion ID: 1575240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The General Prohibition Applies to All Members of the Judiciary.

Text: Canon 2 of the Code plainly says that a judicial officer may properly lend the prestige of the judge's office to advance the public interest in the administration of justice[,] but a judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others.... Closely related is Canon 4 D(3), which permits a judicial officer to serve as an officer, director, etc., of a business entity, unless that business entity, among other things, is likely to be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or ... [is] likely to be engaged frequently in adversary proceedings in the court of which the judge is a member .... Canon 4 D(3)(a)(ii)-(iii). Banks and other financial institutions are frequent litigants at all levels of the courts of this Commonwealth. And the Canons make no distinction related to the court on which the judicial officer serves. So it would appear beyond dispute that district, circuit (including family court), and appellate judicial officers are all prohibited from serving as officers, directors, etc., for financial institutions. [2] Of course, we do not believe that any of our conscientious judicial officers across the Commonwealth intentionally lends the prestige of office to the financial institutions on whose boards they serve. But we agree with the Committee's general conclusion that judicial officers are prohibited by the Canons from serving as directors or advisors of financial institutions because those judicial officers' service does unquestionably lend the prestige of the judicial offices to those financial institutions. So we decline to disturb JE-118's conclusion that the Canons contain a general prohibition against judicial officers serving as advisors, directors, and the like on behalf of financial institutions. Judge Walson seems to accept the existence of that general prohibition; but he argues that family court judges  and, as we understand his point, only family court judges  should be exempt from that general prohibition. We disagree. As Judge Walson notes in his motion for review, financial institutions themselves are not likely to be frequent litigators in family court. But we consider a special exception for family court judges improper for two reasons. First, although not themselves parties, financial institutions will frequently have some interest in the outcome of family court proceedings by virtue of being the repositories of the funds or the holders of debt of the family court litigants. [3] Second, and more importantly, adopting Judge Walson's position would require us to engage in an impermissible and arbitrary division of the offices of circuit judge and family court judge. Section 109 of our Kentucky Constitution states, in relevant part, that [t]he judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be divided into ... a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court.... And a circuit court division designated as a family court shall retain the general jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and shall have additional jurisdiction as may be provided by the General Assembly. Ky. Const. § 112(6). So, in simple terms, family court judges are circuit judges. And as we recently noted, [c]onstitutionally speaking, Kentucky has but one circuit court and all circuit judges are members of that court and enjoy equal capacity to act throughout the state. Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Ky.2008). There is no constitutional basis, therefore, to treat family court judges differently from other circuit court judges. Judge Walson's argument asks us to divide the indivisible. The constitutional provisions referenced in this opinion plainly lead to a conclusion that there is also no basis under the Code for us to adopt an arbitrary distinction between circuit judges exercising general jurisdiction and circuit judges exercising family court jurisdiction. Canon 4 D(3)(a)(iii) prohibits a judicial officer from serving as an officer, director, etc., for any business entity likely to be engaged frequently in adversary proceedings in the court of which the judge is a member.... Family court judges are members of the circuit court, and it is indisputable that financial institutions are frequent litigants in circuit court. So the contention that family court judges  and only family court judges  may serve the interests of financial institutions is contrary to both Kentucky's Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Committee concluded that it was unable to ascertain any purpose to an Advisory Board other than to lend the judge's name to enhance the prestige of the institution to enable it to draw more business. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Judge Walson takes issue with this conclusion, arguing that it stems from either a lack of understanding, consideration, or imagination. We agree that the Committee appears to have used unfortunately broad language in this section of its opinion. It is certainly possible that a judicial officer's education, training, or previous practice or employment experience could make the judicial officer well qualified to serve as an advisor or director for a financial institution. But Judge Walson has not cited to anything specific, apart from his own personal experience, to support his presumption that judicial officers are invariably chosen to serve financial institutions for reasons that have nothing to do with the high offices they hold. Although we do not embrace the broad language used by the Committee, we must reluctantly agree with its conclusion that, at least sometimes, judicial officers are placed on bank boards primarily because they are judicial officers who are popularly elected in the community from which the financial institution draws its customer base. Although our focus must primarily be upon Kentucky law, we have also examined authority in other state judicial systems for guidance. Unfortunately, there are few reported decisions on this subject. But our conclusion that service as a judicial officer generally precludes simultaneous service as a director or similar officer of a financial institution is in accord with decisions from both the Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel [4] and the Supreme Court of Louisiana. [5] Finally, we are compelled to note that adoption of Judge Walson's arguments would permit judicial officers to serve the interests of typically for-profit financial institutions while, by contrast, judicial officers are prohibited by JE-117 from serving as a member of the board of trustees of a public university. [6] It is unnecessary in this opinion to expound on the reasons underlying JE-117, and we intend no criticism of that decision. Instead, we merely point out that adoption of Judge Walson's arguments would lead to a seemingly incongruous juxtaposition between what a judicial officer (or at least a family court judge) could permissibly do on behalf of a presumably for-profit financial institution with what a judicial officer may not do on behalf of a non-profit public university. That juxtaposition seems illogical and arbitrary and, potentially, could undermine the public's confidence and trust in the judiciary.