Opinion ID: 1924896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue A: Did the court err by allowing testimony as to Child Abuse Syndrome?

Text: The defendant claims that three of the state's witnesses testified as to child abuse syndrome. Therapist Brenda Chance, pediatrician Dr. Julia Sherwood, and social worker Debbie Graham all testified over defendant's timely objection. The question is whether the witnesses testified as to a syndrome, or whether they were merely describing common behaviors of child abuse victims. While the defendant objects to the testimony of all three of the state's expert witnesses, he concentrates on Chance's testimony. Most of Chance's testimony is repetitious and can best be illustrated by the following: BY [STATE]: Ms. Chance, can you tell me whether or not in the course of your experience you've observed situations where there's preferential treatment towards one sibling over another for abuse purposes? BY MS. CHANCE: Yes. Q. And what, if anything, did you observe in this set of circumstances? A. This particular child appeared to have been chosen as the lover for the  for the  perpetrator and that offerings of gifts and threats were made in order to perpetuate that the perpetrator's needs would be met through the child. Q. Through this child. Do you mean Chad Hall? A. Yes. Q. Ms. Chance, all this behavior that you have described in the course of this interview, can you tell us whether or not there is a term for situations in which a child exhibits this kind of behavior? Are you familiar with any kind of syndromes? BY MR. WADDLE: Objection to leading. BY THE COURT: Overruled. A. It's  it's consistent with a child who has been caught up in  I  I don't know if it's called syndrome, but a  a child abuse pattern of  of being, this particular child, in a sadistic sexual child abuse situation. Q. Can you tell us, in the course of your experience, whether or not the behavior that you observed throughout your treatment of Chad Hall would be consistent with a child who was subjected to chronic sodomy? A. It is. Both Hall and the State rely heavily on the cases of Hosford v. State, 560 So.2d 163 (Miss. 1990) and Goodson v. State, 566 So.2d 1142 (Miss. 1990). These two cases are the most illustrative of the status of our law on the admission of evidence in sex abuse cases. The defendant argues that both Hosford and Goodson forbid syndrome testimony and that Chance impermissibly testified about it. The syndrome to which the Court in both Hosford and Goodson refers is described as Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). John Myers, et al, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb.L.R. 1, 66-71 (1989). CSAAS was developed by Dr. Roland Summit to provide a common language for professionals working to protect sexually abused children. Myers at 67. However, this theory was not meant to be used as a diagnostic device to show that abuse had, in fact, occurred. Id. at 67. Thus, any attempt to show that a child had been abused because he exhibits some signals of CSAAS is an improper usage of Dr. Summit's theory. There appears to be some confusion between what is syndrome testimony and what is simply a description of common characteristics of sexually abused children. This Court in Hosford expressed doubt that any such syndrome existed and that courts should be reluctant to allow expert testimony on this issue. The Court relied on the Myers article for this proposition. See Myers, at 69. However, immediately following that quote in Myers, is the following: Presence in a young child of behaviors observed in sexually abused children is sometimes probative of abuse. Expert testimony explaining such behaviors can assist the jury in understanding the evidence and determining facts in issue. Such evidence should be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice or confusion of the jury. Such testimony should rarely be prejudicial, and the evidence is not so arcane or ambiguous as to confuse the fact finder. When considering the theory of expert testimony discussed in this subsection, it is vitally important to avoid the confusion engendered by reference to syndromes. When expert testimony describing behaviors seen in sexually abused children is offered as substantive evidence of abuse, the expert is not describing a syndrome. The expert is certainly not describing Summit's child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. At the present time, experts have not achieved consensus on the existence of a psychological syndrome that can detect child sexual abuse. Use of the word syndrome leads only to confusion, and to unwarranted and unworkable comparisons to battered child syndrome. The best course is to avoid any mention of syndromes. Id. at 69. Other sections of the Myers article support the idea that while testimony as to CSAAS is improper, testimony by an expert as to certain behavior common to sexually abused children is proper. See Myers, at 8, 13, 51, 62-64, 65. The expert testimony in this case was offered as substantive evidence of abuse and was not describing a syndrome. The State used the word syndrome in its direct questioning of Chance, but the witness quickly discounted the use of any such term and instead described what she found to be common behaviors of sexually abused children. The testimony of Sherwood is similar to Chance's. The decision to hold admissible the expert testimony describing Chad Hall's behavior as common with that of a sexually abused child is within the trial judge's discretion absent an abuse of that discretion. Wade, 583 So.2d at 967; Lewis, 573 So.2d at 722. The facts support his decision and it is, therefore, upheld.