Opinion ID: 859461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Withholding Order

Text: ¶25. Reasor argues that the chancellor’s fifty-five-percent withholding order is oppressive and contrary to law. Because Jordan no longer had custody of their child, Reasor claims that his wages cannot be garnished more than twenty-five percent. Conversely, Jordan contends that the law supports a fifty-five-percent withholding, and the chancellor did not err. ¶26. Mississippi Code Section 85-3-4 addresses the execution of garnishments. In pertinent part, Section 85-3-4 limits most garnishments to twenty-five percent of disposable income.10 Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4(2)(a)(i) (Rev. 2011). But the statute makes an 10 Section 85-3-4(2)(a)(i-ii) provides that: (2) After the passage of the period of thirty (30) days described in subsection (1) of this section, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings (as defined by section 1672(b) of Title 15, United States Code Annotated) of an individual that may be levied by attachment, execution or garnishment shall be: (a) In the case of earnings for any workweek, the lesser amount of either, 10 exception for judgments for the support of another person – for example, a child-support order.11 Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4(3)(a)(i). Under that circumstance, the maximum withholding ranges from fifty-five to sixty-five percent of disposable income. Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4(3)(b).12 (i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of his disposable earnings for that week, or (ii) The amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty (30) times the federal minimum hourly wage (prescribed by section 206 (a)(1) of Title 29, United States Code Annotated) in effect at the time the earnings are payable; . . . . Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4(2)(a)(i-ii) (Rev. 2011). 11 Section 85-3-4(3)(a)(i) provides that: The restrictions of subsection (1) and (2) of this section do not apply in the case of: (i) Any order for the support of any person issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or in accordance with an administrative procedure, which is established by state law, which affords substantial due process, and which is subject to judicial review . . . . Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4(3)(a)(i) (Rev. 2011). 12 Section 85-3-4(3)(b)(i-iii) allows for an increase in withholding to enforce an order of support for another person: (b) Except as provided in subparagraph (b)(iii) of this subsection (3), the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subject to garnishment to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not exceed: (i) Where such individual is supporting his spouse or dependent child (other than a spouse or child with respect to whose support such order is used), fifty percent (50%) of such individual's disposable earnings for that week; and (ii) Where such individual is not supporting such a spouse or dependent child described in subparagraph (b)(i) of this subsection (3), sixty percent (60%) of 11 ¶27. The Court has addressed this issue previously in Sorrell v. Borner, 593 So. 2d 986 (Miss. 1992). In Sorrell, the parents divorced, the mother was awarded custody, and the father was ordered to pay child support. Id. at 986. Later, the father sought a change in custody. Id. In response, the mother filed a counterclaim for past-due child support. Id. The chancellor awarded the father custody but held him in arrears, entering a judgment in favor of the mother for back child support. Id. The mother obtained a sixty-five percent garnishment on the father’s wages. Id. at 988. Aggrieved, the father filed a petition to modify the order (by offsetting his arrearage by the mother’s child-support obligation), and the chancellor denied his petition. Id. at 986-87. ¶28. On appeal, the father challenged the order, arguing that the garnishment should have been limited to twenty-five percent. Id. at 988. Although the father failed to attack the garnishment in his pleadings, the Court noted that the father made an oral objection at the hearing. Id. at 989. Reviewing the applicable statutes, the Court determined that: The judgment awarded was for past due child-support, but [the mother] no such individual's disposable earnings for that week; (iii) With respect to the disposable earnings of any individual for that workweek, the fifty percent (50%) specified in subparagraph (b)(i) of this subsection (3) shall be deemed to be fifty-five percent (55%) and the sixty percent (60%) specified in subparagraph (b)(ii) of this subsection (3) shall be deemed to be sixty-five percent (65%), if and to the extent that such earnings are subject to garnishment to enforce a support order with respect to a period which is prior to the period of twelve (12) weeks which ends with the beginning of such workweek. Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-4(3)(b)(i-iii) (Rev. 2011). 12 longer had custody of the children. In our opinion, the legislature did not contemplate the exception language to be used in this situation, and [we] are of the opinion that the restriction listed in § 85-3-4(2)(a) should apply to the garnishment here. Id. at 988. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the chancellor’s judgment. Id. at 988-89. ¶29. Applying the Court’s reasoning in Sorrell, the withholding restriction in Section 85-3- 4(2)(a)(i) should apply to Reasor as well. Like Sorrell, Reasor complained about the amount of the garnishment during his hearing. Also, when the judgment was awarded for past-due child support, Jordan no longer had custody of the child. Thus, the chancellor erred by ordering a fifty-five-percent withholding. Instead, the garnishment should have been limited to twenty-five percent of Reasor’s disposable income. Accordingly, we vacate the order and remand for a proper determination of withholding.