Opinion ID: 2582516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The denial of appellant's motion for substitute counsel

Text: Gallego contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to substitute new counsel. The pertinent facts follow. On August 13, 1999, Gallego submitted a pro per motion for discharge of McGuire and substitution of counsel. Gallego alleged a conflict of interest because all his [McGuire's] defen[s]e does is offer me up to the D.A. for ex[e]cution and McGuire had not filed any motions I feel he should have. Gallego also alleged a total breakdown of communications and lack of trust because McGuire had lied to him and failed to keep promises. At the hearing on August 24, 1999, Gallego argued in support of his motion for substitute counsel. He complained that he was not receiving records of the court proceedings and claimed that McGuire had broken his promise to bring in attorney Richard Cornell to help with the defense. He explained he was asking the court for any counsel other than McGuire or anyone from his office, not for a particular attorney. Gallego also maintained that he had new evidence proving his innocence which he wished to present to the court. During the hearing McGuire moved to withdraw. He explained that he had felt compelled to raise the issue of Gallego's competency early in the proceedings against Gallego's wishes and this had harmed their relationship. McGuire agreed that there had been an irremediable breakdown for any potential attorney-client relationship. McGuire also believed that he had sent Gallego all the records in the case. The court rejected Gallego's motion for substitute counsel. In Thomas v. State , this court held that a defendant's right to substitution of counsel is limited: A defendant is not entitled to reject his court-appointed counsel and request substitution of other counsel at public expense absent a showing of adequate cause for such a change. Junior v. State, 91 Nev. 439, 441, 537 P.2d 1204 (1975). The decision whether friction between counsel and client justifies appointment of new counsel is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. [20] Where a motion for new counsel is made considerably in advance of trial, the court may not summarily deny the motion but must adequately inquire into the defendant's grounds for it. [21] `A defendant cannot base a claim of inadequate representation upon his refusal to cooperate with appointed counsel. Such a doctrine would lead to absurd results.' [22] Thomas is consistent with other case law on this topic. An indigent defendant has a right to substitution only upon establishing `good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict which [could] lead . . . to an apparently unjust verdict.' The mere loss of confidence in his appointed counsel does not establish `good cause.' [23] Good cause is not determined solely according to the subjective standard of what the defendant perceives. While loss of trust is certainly a factor in assessing good cause, a defendant seeking substitution of assigned counsel must nevertheless afford the court with legitimate reasons for the lack of confidence. [24] Attorney-client conflicts justify the grant of a substitution motion only when counsel and defendant are so at odds as to prevent presentation of an adequate defense. [25] Here, Gallego undoubtedly lacked confidence and trust in his counsel and often refused to work with them. (It was not an absolute breakdown in the relationship, however. Gallego was able to meet and consult with counsel during the penalty phase although he still disagreed with them.) But Gallego never provided legitimate reasons for his lack of confidence in his counsel. Although he claimed that McGuire had a conflict of interest, he provided no evidence that McGuire's loyalty was in any way compromised. Gallego apparently based this claim on his contention that McGuire's defense would offer him up for execution. This amounted to a disagreement between Gallego and McGuire over trial strategy, not a conflict of interest. This disagreement was not good cause for substitution of counsel: McGuire's strategy was reasonable while Gallego's strategy was ill-conceived and largely impermissible. Gallego wanted to dispute his culpability and blame Charlene Williams for the murders and even call her as a witness. He wanted to present evidence that she was a violent, intimidating lesbian who had sex by force; that she was a liar; and that she had made a plea agreement and was no longer serving prison time for her crimes. Further, Gallego wanted to present evidence that the original trial prosecutor and others had written and profited from a book on Gallego's crimes. He also wanted to present a statement from his deceased mother and testimony by his brother, his cousin, and a former employer as mitigating evidence. McGuire's strategy was to present evidence that Gallego had endured severe physical and emotional abuse as a childincluding at the hands of his motherand that he suffered from mental disabilities and had abused drugs. McGuire also informed the jury that Williams actively participated in the crimes, lied to authorities various times, and received a plea bargain and was now free, but he did not call Williams because he considered her a hostile witness who would have provided damaging testimony against Gallego. McGuire expressed doubt that the jury would find it relevant that people connected to Gallego's case had written a book about it. And McGuire had attempted to locate various mitigation witnesses, but many could not be found, and others did not want to testify. We conclude that McGuire's strategy was reasonable, while much of the evidence which Gallego wished to present was not even admissible. A court may exclude proffered mitigating evidence as irrelevant if it does not bear on the defendant's character, his prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. [26] Evidence presented in mitigation must be relevant to the offense, the defendant, or the victim. [27] Gallego's claim that McGuire broke a promise to have attorney Richard Cornell join the defense team is somewhat understandable, but groundless. In November 1998, McGuire applied for the district court's approval to employ Cornell to assist in the case because the federal court's deadline for resentencing was so short and Cornell had represented Gallego for eleven years. The court originally ordered the employment. However, McGuire did not oppose the State's request to rescind the order after the federal court granted a six-month extension of time for the resentencing. Gallego has offered no other specific basis for his claims that McGuire lied to him and broke promises made to him. Nor has he specified any motions which McGuire refused to file. We conclude that the district court adequately inquired into Gallego's grounds for moving to substitute counsel, that Gallego proffered no legitimate reason for his lack of confidence and trust in his counsel, that his counsel represented him ably, and that the attorney-client conflict here did not prevent the presentation of an adequate defense or result in an apparently unjust verdict. Therefore, the court acted within its sound discretion in refusing to appoint substitute counsel.