Opinion ID: 2606343
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Choitz firebombing

Text: During grand jury proceedings, Kelly Choitz testified to her belief that defendant firebombed her car after she had confronted him about being a bad influence on the Lankisch siblings. There was no other evidence of defendant's involvement, and he was never charged with the crime. At trial, the prosecutor argued for admission of a statement defendant made to Don Porterfield in response to having been accused of burning the vehicle. Defendant allegedly said, I don't do chickenshit stuff like that, if I have something out for someone I kill them. The trial judge admitted the remark as a statement of intent, see Rule 803(3), Ariz. R.Evid., basing his ruling on State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) ( Mincey I ); State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 636 P.2d 637 (1981) ( Mincey II ); and State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 687 P.2d 1180 (1984) ( Mincey III ). Rufus Junior Mincey was convicted of second-degree murder for killing an undercover narcotics officer. This court affirmed the admission of comments, made several weeks before the crime, that he wanted to cut down a shotgun in case he ever get hassled by pigs and would use the weapon to kill a pig if they get in my way. Mincey III, 141 Ariz. at 435, 687 P.2d at 1190. Because the statements referred to a specific class of persons (police) of which the victim was a member, this court found that they were relevant to establish defendant's intent to take the life of another. Mincey I, 115 Ariz. at 481, 566 P.2d at 282; Mincey III, 141 Ariz. at 435, 687 P.2d at 1190. Here, defendant argued that because the statement had nothing to do with the victim, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Rule 403, Ariz.R.Evid. Believing defendant's objection really goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the statement, the court observed that defendant's remark was no different than one in which a person accused of murdering a spouse has said, I'm angry at my spouse and I want to kill her. This suggests that the judge missed the point of defendant's objection, and the record does not indicate whether he considered anything other than relevance in admitting the statement. See State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 125, 817 P.2d 488, 492 (1991) (encouraging explicit Rule 403 weighing). Ordinarily, a general threat to do harm, not expressly directed at the victim, has little probative value unless it is connected in some way to the charged offense. 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 204, at 44 (1991). We agree with the state that the victim here was within an identifiable category of personsthose who crossed defendant. However, the remark encompassed such a broad spectrum of individuals that its worth was highly questionable. See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 593, 858 P.2d 1152, 1196 (1993) (statement about a large group not overwhelmingly probative). We must also consider the circumstances under which the statement was made in assessing its probative value. Unlike in Mincey, where the accused anticipated police infiltration of his drug operation, the instant comment was more akin to generalized puffing or bragging. Although the remark may have been marginally relevant to identify defendant as the culprit, we believe the risk was too great that the jury would improperly consider it as evidence of his bad character.