Opinion ID: 2613499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appropriateness of mandamus as a remedy

Text: Defendant asserts that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy, because the state can appeal from the judgment in the underlying case and thereby has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. LeVasseur v. Merten, 297 Or. 577, 579-80, 686 P.2d 366 (1984) (ordinarily mandamus will not lie if there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of the law). [5] Appellate review is governed by statute. Henry and Henry, 301 Or. 185, 188, 721 P.2d 430 (1986). Under ORS 138.060(5), the state has a right to appeal a sentence as provided in ORS 138.222. ORS 138.222 provides that appellate courts may not review certain sentences. ORS 138.222(2) provides in part: On appeal from a judgment of conviction entered for a felony committed on or after November 1, 1989, the appellate court shall not review: (a) Any sentence that is within the presumptive sentence prescribed by the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. Relator argues that ORS 138.222(2)(a) applies and that it precludes appellate review of the issues presented. ORS 138.222(2) further provides that the appellate court shall not review: (e) Except as authorized in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, any other issue related to sentencing. Subsection (3) relates to departure sentences, which are not involved here. Subsection (4)(a) states that the appellate court may review a claim that    [t]he sentencing court failed to comply with requirements of law in imposing or failing to impose a sentence. Defendant argues that ORS 138.222(4)(a) authorizes review of the state's claims on appeal in State v. Vanzant. The parties' arguments require us to engage in a two-step inquiry. The first step is to determine whether the court is being asked to review [a]ny sentence that is within the presumptive sentence prescribed by the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commissionthat is, whether ORS 138.222(2)(a) applies. If the answer is yes, the second step is to determine whether review under ORS 138.222(4)(a) is available nonetheless. We turn first to the meaning of ORS 138.222(2)(a). ORS 137.651 to 137.671 provide for the establishment and functioning of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission (Commission), which is referred to in the statute that we are interpreting. The Commission's authority includes rule-making. ORS 137.673. ORS 137.669 provides that the felony sentencing guidelines adopted by the Commission and approved by the legislature shall control the sentences for all crimes committed after the effective date of such guidelines. Except as provided in ORS 137.671, the incarcerative guidelines and any other guidelines so designated by the commission shall be mandatory and constitute presumptive sentences.  (Emphasis added.) ORS 137.671 provides: (1) The court may impose a sentence outside the presumptive sentence or sentence range made presumptive under ORS 137.669 for a specific offense if it finds there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying a deviation from the presumptive sentence. (2) Whenever the court imposes a sentence outside the presumptive sentence it shall set forth the reasons for its decision in the manner required by rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. (Emphasis added.) The statutes do not define the term presumptive sentence. The Commission has, however, defined that term by rule: `Presumptive Sentence' means the sentence provided in a grid block for an offender classified in that grid block by the combined effect of the crime seriousness ranking of the current crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history. OAR 253-03-001(16). `Grid Block' means a box on the grid formed by the intersection of the crime seriousness ranking of a current crime of conviction and an offender's criminal history classification. OAR 253-03-001(10). `Grid' means the Sentencing Guidelines Grid set forth [as an appendix to the Commission's rules.] OAR 253-003-001(9). From the relevant statutes and from the Commission's rules, it is clear that a presumptive sentence does not mean a statutorily mandated term of imprisonment that does or may apply to a particular conviction. ORS 137.637 provides: When a determinate sentence of imprisonment is required or authorized by statute, the sentence imposed shall be the determinate sentence or the sentence as provided by the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, whichever is longer. (Emphasis added.) As explained above, it is only the latter type of sentence, not the former, that can be the presumptive sentence as that term is used in the statute. ORS 137.669, ORS 137.671. Echoing the provisions of ORS 137.637, OAR 253-09-001 provides in part: (1) If a mandatory prison sentence is required or authorized by statute, the sentence imposed shall be that determinate sentence or the sentence under these rules whichever is longer. (2) If the provisions of ORS 137.635 [providing mandatory determinate sentences for certain specified felony convictions], require the imprisonment of an offender for whom the grid provides presumptive probation, the offender shall be imprisoned for a duration determined as follows: [listing months of imprisonment for offenses classified in various grid blocks.] See also State v. Jones, 315 Or. 225, 231, 844 P.2d 188 (1992) (a sentence is a `mandatory minimum sentence' if it is statutorily required). The felony sentencing guidelines thus contain a means to harmonize potential conflicts between the presumptive sentence and a longer, statutorily mandated term of imprisonment. That being so, the enactment or operation of a statutorily mandated term of imprisonment does not erase the applicability of the felony sentencing guidelines as a whole and does not alter the meaning of the term presumptive sentence, which is expressly defined by rule. Nothing in Measure 11 interferes with that reconciliation of the presumptive sentence, prescribed by the felony sentencing guidelines, with a statutorily mandated term of imprisonment. For example, ORS 137.700(1) provides that [t]he court may impose a greater sentence [than the specified minimum] if otherwise permitted by law. With respect to each offense listed in ORS 137.700(2), except murder, the minimum sentence prescribed by ORS 137.700 is significantly less than the maximum sentence already prescribed for that offense by ORS 161.605. [6] Here, for example, the minimum prison sentence prescribed by ORS 137.700(2)(e) for Vanzant's conviction is 75 months, while the maximum prison sentence allowed by law for that conviction is 10 years (120 months), ORS 161.605(2). Although the statutorily mandated term of imprisonment likely will exceed the presumptive sentence prescribed by the felony sentencing guidelines in most cases, (1) that will not necessarily be true in all cases and (2) the sentencing court may use the criteria for departure sentences in the guidelines to impose a sentence greater than the statutorily mandated minimum, even when the offense is listed in ORS 137.700(2). Defendant's argument may be read to suggest that Measure 11 impliedly repealed the sentencing guidelines for all covered crimes, so that it is a legal impossibility to impose a presumptive sentence with respect to a Measure 11 crime. We disagree. The doctrine of implied repeal of statutes is that when the legislature enacts a subsequent statute which is repugnant to or in conflict with a prior statute, but contains no language expressly repealing the prior statute, the prior statute is impliedly repealed. State v. Shumway, 291 Or. 153, 160, 630 P.2d 796 (1981). See also Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or. 462, 481, 220 P.2d 493, 221 P.2d 575 (1950) (If earlier and later statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, then the earlier must yield to the later by implied repeal. (citations omitted)). Repeal by implication is not favored. State ex rel. Med. Pear Co. v. Fowler, 207 Or. 182, 195, 295 P.2d 167 (1956). It must be established by `plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy.' Shumway, 291 Or. at 162, 630 P.2d 796 (quoting Messick v. Duby, 86 Or. 366, 371, 168 P. 628 (1917)). We have explained above how the sentencing guidelines and Measure 11 can be harmonized to give effect to both. In that circumstance, no implied repeal has occurred. From the text and context of ORS 138.222(2)(a), we conclude that the phrase [a]ny sentence that is within the presumptive sentence prescribed by the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, found in that statute, refers only to the sentence provided in a grid block for an offender classified in that grid block by the combined effect of the crime seriousness ranking of the current crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history. OAR 253-03-001(16). By definition, then, [a]ny sentence that is within the presumptive sentence prescribed by the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission refers to a specified number of months of incarceration for a conviction that has been placed in the proper grid block. Defendant placed Vanzant's conviction into grid block 8-H of the felony sentencing guidelines and imposed a 20-month sentence. It is undisputed that Vanzant's conviction properly falls into grid block 8-H; that the presumptive sentence provided for a conviction in grid block 8-H is 19 to 20 months; that the 20-month sentence thereby is within that presumptive sentence; and that Vanzant's conviction is subject to the felony sentencing guidelines as well as to ORS 137.700. That being so, Vanzant's sentence of 20 months is a sentence that is within the presumptive sentence prescribed by the felony sentencing guidelines, within the meaning of ORS 138.222(2)(a). The only remaining issue under ORS 138.222(2)(a) is whether relator is seeking appellate review of that sentence. What relator calls into question here is the number of months of incarceration to which Vanzant has been sentenced, even though his conviction has been placed in the proper grid block. What relator seeks is a different sentence that is not within the presumptive sentence, for a conviction that has been placed in the proper grid block. Thus, from the text of ORS 138.222(2)(a), relator is seeking review of a sentence that is within the presumptive sentence prescribed by the felony sentencing guidelines. Context supports the foregoing reading. ORS 138.222(3) provides for the limited bases on which a challenge is available [i]n any appeal from a judgment of conviction imposing a sentence that departs from the presumptive sentence. That section reinforces the conclusion that no such bases are available in an appeal from a judgment of conviction imposing a presumptive sentence. ORS 138.222(4)(b) allows the appellate court to review a claim that [t]he sentencing court erred in ranking the crime seriousness classification of the current crime or in determining the appropriate classification of a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication for criminal history purposes. That section reinforces the conclusion that appellate review is not available to challenge a presumptive sentence when a conviction is placed in the proper grid block. If text and context leave any doubt as to the intended scope of the limitation of review of a sentence that is within the presumptive sentence prescribed by the felony sentencing guidelines, legislative history quiets that doubt. In his statement on the Senate floor, which preceded the passage of the sentencing guidelines bill that included ORS 138.222, Senator Springer explained that the drafters worked very closely to limit those circumstances in which an appeal may be taken. Tape Recording, Senate Floor Debate, June 15, 1989, Tape 184, Side A. Senator Springer noted that 30 to 35 percent of the Court of Appeals' substantial workload then involved sentencing-related criminal cases and that the drafters intended to be sensitive to that workload. Ibid. To that end, we provide that the court will not review    if the sentence is within the presumptive sentence provided by the rules. Ibid. Senator Springer then discussed the other situations in which there would be no review, followed by a discussion of those areas in which we would permit an appeal. Ibid. As to those areas, the Court of Appeals is going to be looking just at a few issues, none of which included the kind of situation presented here. Ibid. Specifically with regard to the state's right to seek appellate review, Senator Springer said in part: And another important measure I want to point out, just in closing on this section, is you'll find that, for the first time, the state is given the opportunity to appeal the sentence if they feel that the judge has made an error in finding, perhaps a mitigation or departure with which the state may disagree. Ibid. There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the state could appeal a presumptive sentence in any circumstance. The purpose of ORS 138.222, as revealed in the legislative history, was to curtail appellate review and reduce the number of appeals. With respect to those cases in which the trial court imposed a presumptive sentence on a conviction that was placed in the proper grid block, the stated intention was that appellate review would not be available. There was no suggestion that the reason for imposing the presumptive sentence, or the reason for not imposing a different (higher or lower) sentence, would matter. After examining text, context, and legislative history, we conclude that relator is seeking review of Vanzant's sentence, which is a sentence that is within the presumptive sentence prescribed by the felony sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, the limitation on appellate review contained in ORS 138.222(2)(a) applies. We therefore turn to the second step of the inquiry: whether ORS 138.222(4)(a) nonetheless permits review of the issues presented. In State v. Adams, 315 Or. 359, 365-67, 847 P.2d 397 (1993), this court held that  ORS 138.222 (3) and (4) are exceptions only to ORS 138.222(2)(e)  but not to ORS 138.222(2)(a) to (d). (Emphasis added.) The court based that holding primarily on the wording, context, and structure of the statute. Ibid. As we have concluded, relator's petition asks for review of the number of months of incarceration to which Vanzant has been sentenced under the presumptive-sentence portion of the felony sentencing guidelines, which is the precise subject covered by ORS 138.222(2)(a), not an other issue covered by ORS 138.222(2)(e). That being so, ORS 138.222(4)(a) is not available. In response to that line of reasoning, defendant argues, first, that a criminal defendant could challenge on direct appeal a decision to impose a Measure 11 sentence as being unconstitutional. For example, had defendant imposed a 75-month sentence instead of a 20-month sentence, he asserts, Vanzant could have appealed and had his constitutional claims reviewed. That proposition is correct, because such a sentence is not a presumptive sentence as to which ORS 138.222(2)(a) precludes appellate review. However, that proposition does not demonstrate that appellate review is available when a court imposes a lesser, presumptive sentence. The fact that a statute may grant a comparative advantage to criminal defendants does not detract from the statute's clear meaning. Defendant next points out that the state filed a notice of appeal in State v. Vanzant. That is so, but a litigant's prudence proves nothing about the meaning of the statutes governing appellate review. Finally, defendant contends that Adams does not apply, because the criminal defendant in Adams had stipulated to a departure sentence, whereas Vanzant stipulated to nothing. (Boldface deleted.) Defendant misses the key point of Adams. It is true that Adams concerned unreviewability under ORS 138.222(2)(d), governing stipulated sentences, while the present case concerns unreviewability under ORS 138.222(2)(a), governing presumptive sentences. Nonetheless, the central underpinning of this court's holding in Adams was that the exceptions found in subsections (3) and (4) of ORS 138.122 are exceptions only to ORS 138.222(2)(e) but not to the enumerated situations found in ORS 138.222(2)(a) to (d). Adams, 315 Or. at 365-67, 847 P.2d 397. When this court interprets a statute, that interpretation becomes a part of the statute as if written therein. State v. King, 316 Or. 437, 445, 852 P.2d 190 (1993). [7] That principle applies even when the statute operates in a new factual setting. In summary, relator has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. We exercise our discretion to proceed in mandamus.