Opinion ID: 657191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the tennessee special education statute

Text: 9 In this, and other circuits, it is settled that even if a school district complies with federal law, it may still violate the [federal] Act if it fails to satisfy more extensive state protections that may also be in place. Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 620 (6th Cir.1990); accord David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 417 (1st Cir.1985) (It is beyond cavil that the federal [IDEA] standard explicitly incorporates some of a state's substantive law) cert. denied 475 U.S. 1140, 106 S.Ct. 1790, 90 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986); Geis v. Board of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 774 F.2d 575, 581 (3d Cir.1985) ([W]e find that the incorporation of state standards is explicit in the Act.). 10 In this case, the district court applied the standard for education of the handicapped announced in Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). In Rowley, the Supreme Court held that an IEP comports with the standards of the IDEA if it is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Rowley is the so-called floor for education of the handicapped; every IEP must rise to at least this level, but states may impose a higher standard if they choose. 11 Appellant contends that the Tennessee legislature chose to impose a higher standard than the federal Act, and manifested this intent by enacting the Tennessee Special Education statute. Their contention is based upon a reading of Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 49-10-101(a)(1) (1990), which provides in pertinent part: 12 Legislative intent--Application of parts 1-6.--(a)(1) It is the policy of this state to provide, and to require school districts to provide, as an integral part of free public education, special education services sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of handicapped children. 13 (emphasis added). 14 Initially, we note that the maximizing language of Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 49-10-101(a)(1) was passed as Act of April 13, 1972, ch. 839, 1, 1972 Tenn.Pub. Acts 1523, to take effect July 1, 1972. However the federal Act, Pub.L. No. 94-142, was enacted November 29, 1975, to take effect October 1, 1977. Unless we can attribute prescience to the Tennessee legislature, it is impossible to infer an intent to expand the federal scheme simply from the enactment of this statute when the language in question predates the federal scheme. But even if the Tennessee legislature is not composed of seers capable of divining federal legislation-to-be, it is possible that the Tennessee legislature and courts indicated after the passage of the IDEA, that Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 49-10-101(a)(1) was to be interpreted to impose a higher standard than the federal Act. 15 However, there are no Tennessee state court decisions interpreting the special education statute in the manner suggested by the appellant; the only two federal district court decisions that address the issue arrive at diametrical conclusions, 1 and there is no other legislative history or administrative pronouncement which supports the appellant's position. In short, there is no hard evidence to indicate that the Tennessee legislature intended anything more than to remedy the past inadequacies of educational opportunities offered to the handicapped. 16 We acknowledge that other circuits have found state special education statutes to impose a higher standard than federal law; 2 however, we do not find such a holding to be justified in this case. 17