Opinion ID: 2901150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Newly-discovered Brady violation

Text: Schneider first asserts that he should be granted a new trial based on a newly-discovered violation of the rule in 2 We have granted a motion to seal portions of the appendix filed in this case. In this section, we find it necessary to include some of the sealed information, but have revealed it in such a way as to carry out the intent and purpose of the motion to seal. 27 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). “To establish a due process violation under Brady, then, a defendant must show that: (1) evidence was suppressed; (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the suppressed evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment.” United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Schneider’s basis for his claim is that the victim testified in a deposition in his civil case that he was paid for his testimony in the criminal case— payments that were undisclosed to the defense. While ordinarily this would raise a red flag, see, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1985) (holding that there was a Brady violation when federal prosecutors withheld evidence of inducements made to witnesses to encourage them to testify against the defendant), in this case these revelations are insufficient to establish a Brady violation or other grounds for a new trial. In the victim’s deposition, the following exchange occurred: Q: Okay. Did you ever get witness vouchers from the government for testifying? A: What is witness vouchers? Q: I’m asking you. Do you know what they are? A: I was paid for testifying. Q: How did you get paid? A: Michelle, Mrs. Morgan3 went with me to the place to withdraw money. ... 3 Assistant U.S. Attorney Michelle Morgan-Kelly. 28 Q: Did she go over to the place like to cash a check and she’d give them a slip of paper, they’d give you money? A: Yes. Q: And who was the slip of paper from? A: From Michelle Morgan Kelly. [sic] App. at 2353. Schneider cannot carry his burden based on this testimony. First, he has not established that the evidence was undisclosed under Brady or that it was newly-discovered under Rule 33. The witness fees and per diem stipends that the victim was paid are required by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821. Furthermore, the payments were disclosed on the second day of trial—and two days before the victim testified—in an email from an Assistant United States Attorney to Schneider’s trial counsel, who responded that he did not intend to cross-examine the victim on it. Nor can Schneider establish that the payment of fees was favorable to the defense (the second Brady element) because the victim, an alleged crime victim, was paid via statutorily-mandated vouchers, unlike the witness in United States v. Bagley, who was paid in cash as a cooperating informant in exchange for information. 473 U.S. at 683. The District Court “[found] Schneider’s argument as to the witness vouchers baseless,” and denied the motion for a new trial on this ground. App. at 65. Therefore, we will hold that District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schneider’s motion for a new trial on this basis. 29