Opinion ID: 2635704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The district court properly severed the criminal enforcement provisions

Text: The district court determined that the statute was unconstitutionally vague when considered as a criminal statute, but not when viewed as only a civil statute. As a result, the district court severed the portion of the statute that provided for criminal penalties. [8] Appellants argue that this was improper because the NCIAA was a ballot measure and there is no definitive way of knowing if the voters would still want the statute with the criminal portion removed. Additionally, appellants argue that the severance of the criminal provision was improper because that language is not vague, rather the statute as a whole is vague, and thus, the district court could not sever the criminal portion because that portion was not the unconstitutional part of the statute. Respondents counter that the district court properly severed the criminal penalties from the statute because the remainder of the statute stands without the offensive portion and it is clear that the voters would prefer the statute without criminal penalties as opposed to no statute at all, especially in light of the severance provision included in the NCIAA, codified as NRS 202.2483(9)(h). [9] Respondents consequently argue that because the district court concluded that the criminal portion was unconstitutional, nothing prevented it from severing that portion. Under the severance doctrine, it is the obligation of the judiciary to uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments where it is possible to strike only the unconstitutional portions. Rogers v. Heller, 117 Nev. 169, 177, 18 P.3d 1034, 1039 (2001) (quotation omitted). This court has adopted a two-part test for severability: a statute is only severable if the remaining portion of the statute, standing alone, can be given legal effect, and if the Legislature intended for the remainder of the statute to stay in effect when part of the statute is severed. [10] County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, 336-37, 550 P.2d 779, 788 (1976). Appellants argue that severance is improper because the statute was passed as a ballot measure and with no legislative history there is no way to determine whether voters would still want the statute if the criminal portions are severed. Appellants focus on this court's opinion in Rogers and primarily the dissenting opinion in Nevadans for Property Rights v. Secretary of State, 122 Nev. 894, 922-29, 141 P.3d 1235, 1253-58 (2006) (Hardesty, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), for support. Respondents counter that Rogers and Nevadans for Property Rights dealt with pre-ballot challenges to initiative petitions, unlike this case where the NCIAA has already passed the voting process and is now a statute. Thus, respondents argue, the severance provision that applies to statutes under NRS 0.020 governs. [11] Respondents also rely on Nevadans for Property Rights' majority opinion, which allowed severance, even preballot. Appellants respond by arguing that the reasoning of Rogers is stronger in this case because of the fact that this is now law and cannot be amended by the Legislature until December 2009, based on the requirement in Article 19, Section 2(3) of the Nevada Constitution that an initiative cannot be amended for three years after passage. In Rogers, this court declined to sever an initiative petition. 117 Nev. at 178, 18 P.3d at 1039-40. There, the petition sought to require that 50 percent of the projected revenue for the state be used for public education and imposed a new tax with a requirement that the new tax money be devoted solely to education. Id. at 174-75, 18 P.3d at 1037-38. The petition was ruled unconstitutional because the appropriation required was not covered by the new tax. Id. at 177, 18 P.3d at 1039. The proponents of the initiative asked the court to sever the 50-percent appropriation requirement and allow the remainder of the initiative to proceed. Id. The court rejected the argument that the initiative could be severed, even though it contained a severability clause. Id. at 177-78, 18 P.3d at 1039-40. The Rogers court held that [i]nitiative petitions must be kept substantively intact; otherwise, the people's voice would be obstructed. Id. at 177, 18 P.3d at 1039. The court continued, stating that initiative legislation is not subject to judicial tampering  the substance of an initiative petition should reflect the unadulterated will of the people and should proceed, if at all, as originally proposed and signed. Id. at 178, 18 P.3d at 1039-40. In Nevadans for Property Rights, the court concluded that severance of the initiative petition was proper. 122 Nev. at 912-13, 141 P.3d at 1247-48. Nevadans for Property Rights involved a petition dealing primarily with eminent domain, but which also contained provisions regarding property rights. The Nevadans for Property Rights court concluded that the petition violated the single-subject requirement and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 909, 141 P.3d at 1245. The court determined, however, that the provisions concerning property rights could be severed and the remainder of the provision would satisfy the single-subject requirement. Id. at 913, 141 P.3d at 1248. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that severance would still preserve the primary purpose of the petition (eminent domain), that the severability provision included in the initiative demonstrated that the voters would still want the petition without the severed portion, and that severance would preserve the people's right to enact law through the initiative process. Id. at 909-13, 141 P.3d at 1245-48. The Nevadans for Property Rights court distinguished the Rogers case, stating that the petition in Rogers was not severable because it would have gutted the initiative's central component and that [n]o other portion of the initiative could have stood in the absence of this central component. Nevadans for Prop. Rights, 122 Nev. at 913, 141 P.3d at 1247. Thus, while severance was improper in Rogers, the petition in Nevadans for Property Rights could be properly severed because the severed portion did not destroy the central purpose of the initiative and the remainder of the initiative could stand alone. Based on the Rogers and Nevadans for Property Rights holdings, especially the distinction set forth in Nevadans for Property Rights between its petition and the Rogers petition, we conclude that the district court properly severed the criminal penalty portion of the NCIAA. The portion severed was not the central component of the statute and the remainder of the statute, as explained below, can stand alone. Moreover, the NCIAA included a severability clause, which indicates that the initiative's proponents contemplated that should a constitutional challenge arise, the offending portion of the statute could be severed and the remaining portion could proceed and the smoking ban enforced. Appellants also argue that severance is only permissible if the severed portion is unconstitutional on its own, citing among other cases, Rogers, in which the court stated that severance was used to uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments where it is possible to strike only the unconstitutional portions. 117 Nev. at 177, 18 P.3d at 1039 (quotation omitted). Appellants insist that because imposing criminal penalties for violation of a smoking statute is not in and of itself unconstitutional, the criminal penalties cannot properly be severed, as severance would only be permitted if it was in fact unconstitutional to impose criminal penalties. Appellants' argument is refuted by Nevadans for Property Rights, however, in that there we severed portions of an initiative that were not unconstitutional on their own but that made the initiative unconstitutional and which, when severed, cured the initiative's unconstitutional defects. 122 Nev. 894, 141 P.3d 1235. The NCIAA falls under the Nevadans for Property Rights reasoning, in that, as explained below, the portion severed by the district court cured the statute's unconstitutional defect. Thus, the severed portion was in fact the unconstitutional portion of the statute and severance was permissible.