Opinion ID: 1156488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions for Psychiatric Evaluation

Text: In a pretrial motion filed pursuant to Code || 19.2-169.1 and -169.5, Pruett asked the trial court to order a psychiatric evaluation at state expense to determine whether his actions during the time of the alleged offense may have been affected by mental disease or defect. The court appointed Dr. Thomas K. Tsao to evaluate Pruett concerning [his] mental state at the time of the offenses, including whether he may have had a significant disease or defect which rendered him insane at the time of the offenses, and his competency to understand the nature of these proceedings. After Dr. Tsao submitted his report, [2] defense counsel moved the court to appoint another psychiatrist to evaluate Pruett on the issue of his sanity and ability to withstand trial. Counsel's sole basis for this motion was that Dr. Tsao's evaluation took only about one hour's time and, hence, was inadequate. The court denied the motion. Then, approximately one month before trial, Pruett made another motion for the appointment of a psychiatrist. This time, defense counsel told the trial court that Pruett only recently had informed counsel of his wartime experiences in Viet Nam. Counsel admitted that Pruett had told Dr. Tsao of his Viet Nam experiences, but counsel asserted that because Dr. Tsao was of oriental nationality, he would be prejudiced against Pruett for the things Pruett had done in Viet Nam. Counsel told the court that the defense desired an evaluation of Pruett by a psychiatrist recognized as an authority in the phenomenon . . . known in psychiatric circles as delayed stress syndrome and that Dr. Tsao was not such an authority. Pruett took the witness stand briefly to tell the court that he served with the Army in Viet Nam for about a year. Pruett said he was a cook on a transport vessel that went up and down the coast, but that he was also a soldier every other day, serving on shore duty and engaging in combat. The trial court denied Pruett's motion. Pruett maintains that this was error, that the denial of his second evaluation in effect prevented [him] from developing facts in mitigation of the offense as is authorized in the capital sentencing statute, Va. Code | 19.2-264.4(B). Furthermore, Pruett says, the General Assembly, in response to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), [3] has enacted Code | 19.2-264.3:1, entitled Expert assistance when defendant's mental condition relevant to capital sentencing. Pruett quotes a portion of this section which states in Paragraph (A) that, on motion of counsel for an indigent in a capital murder case, a trial court shall: [A]ppoint one or more qualified mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and to assist the defense in the preparation and presentation of information concerning the defendant's history, character, or mental condition, including . . . (iii) whether there are any other factors in mitigation relating to the history or character of the defendant or the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense. Pruett does not argue that the foregoing section actually required the trial court to appoint a second psychiatrist to evaluate him but that the one or more language authorized the court to make such an appointment in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of his motion, Pruett maintains, was an abuse of discretion. We do not think the trial court abused its discretion. We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court's appointment of Dr. Tsao provided Pruett all that he was constitutionally or statutorily entitled to. The order appointing Dr. Tsao specifically directed that he was to include in his report any . . . mitigating circumstances. The order also directed the doctor to assist in evaluation, preparation and presentation of the defense as necessary. This language was inclusive enough to require Dr. Tsao's assistance in the penalty stage of the trial. The trial court made a specific finding that Dr. Tsao was a competent physician, based upon the court's prior experience with Dr. Tsao on other instances. Pruett told Dr. Tsao about his wartime experiences in Viet Nam, and there is nothing in the record except defense counsel's argument even hinting that the doctor would not have given an unbiased opinion concerning those experiences, even though he was, by Pruett's description, of oriental nationality. The fact that Pruett may not have received from Dr. Tsao the opinion he wanted is completely immaterial. Pruett does not have a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83; Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 107, 334 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1985). Put another way, Pruett has no right to shop around at state expense until he finds a doctor who will give him the opinion he wants. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 350 n.7 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Turner v. Murray, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 1683 (1986).