Opinion ID: 1472408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Rear View Mirror and Veracity Arguments[9]

Text: Appellant argues that the prosecutor engaged in improper rebuttal argument by: (1) misstating evidence concerning whether the position of the rear view mirror in the vehicle that appellant was driving had been moved; (2) guaranteeing that, contrary to appellant's testimony, the rear view mirror had not been moved; and (3) urging the jury to conclude from these circumstances that appellant was not telling the truth when he said he was watching Aaron and Poo through the mirror. He contends that the argument was improper because it was not based on the evidence, suggested essentially that appellant was lying, and expressed the prosecutor's personal opinion. Several principles guide our disposition of these arguments. First, a prosecutor may comment on the evidence presented and make reasonable inferences based thereon. Tuckson v. United States, 364 A.2d 138, 142 (D.C.1976) (citing Mallory v. United States, 178 A.2d 918, 919 (D.C.1962)). However, `[i]t is improper for an attorney to make an argument to the jury based on facts not in evidence and not reasonably inferable from the evidence.' Russell v. United States, 701 A.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.1997) (quoting Morrison v. United States, 547 A.2d 996, 999 (D.C.1988)). Second, what constitutes an improper comment on the credibility of a testifying witness is sometimes difficult to discern, but such comments will be within the acceptable range as long as it is in the general nature of argument, and not an outright expression of opinion. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 36 (D.C.1989) (citing Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.1985) (other citations omitted; emphasis in original)). [T]he key inquiry is whether the attorney is commenting on the evidence, which he may do, or expressing a personal opinion, which is taboo. Id. at 36. With these principles in mind, we consider each of appellant's challenges to the argument.