Opinion ID: 781942
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent Engineering Reports

Text: 23 The district court did not err in granting McEuin's pretrial motion to exclude independent engineering reports as inadmissable hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 802, 901. Crown engineers allegedly solicited and relied upon reports by outside engineers. These engineers, however, were not provided as expert witnesses, and therefore, the reports could not be authenticated under FED. R. EVID. 901. Crown suggested that the court receive the evidence with a limiting instruction to the jury, stating that the reports could not be used to resolve the issue of defect but could be used to determine Dunlap's state of mind when designing the 30RC. Although Crown indicated that it was inclined to agree with the court's analysis that the reports were inadmissible as to the strict liability claims, Crown continues to claim on appeal that the reports are admissible as to both the strict liability and punitive damages claim. 24 The district court decided to exclude the reports on two grounds. First, the court ruled that the reports were hearsay. Second, the court stated that those documents and reports would come in, albeit for the state of mind of Crown; however, the actual impact, as viewed by the jury, would be such that I don't believe they could, in fact, limit the use of those reports for consideration with respect to possible punitive damages. 25 Federal Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay evidence is not admissible. Hearsay is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see also Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.2001). The district court's hearsay ruling properly applies to Crown's attempt to use independent reports as evidence that the design of the 30RC was not defective (i.e., against plaintiff's liability claim). However, the hearsay ruling does not apply to McEuin's punitive damages claim, because, as the court recognized, the reports would be relevant to reveal Crown's state of mind. Rule 803 provides for a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, and Crown's attempted limited use of the independent engineering reports clearly satisfies that exception. 26 A district court's decision to exclude or admit evidence under FRE 403 is reviewed with `considerable deference.' United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1166(9th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999)); United States v. Easter, 66 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir.1993), for the proposition that [t]he district judge is given wide latitude in determining the admissibility of evidence under this standard.). Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. FED. R. EVID. 403. In order to exclude the independent reports from use to refute plaintiff's punitive damages claim, the court had to determine that their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice as provided by Rule 403. Crown requested the district court to admit the independent safety reports with a limiting instruction admonishing the jury to consider them only within the context of Crown's state of mind and not with regard to its liability inquiry. The court again offered a compromise similar to the one which it struck with regard to the exclusion of the military specifications, stating that defense witnesses could testify that Crown retained independent consultants and relied upon their reports but could not testify as to the contents of those reports. We do not find that the court abused its discretion in excluding the engineer reports. 27 Even if the district court erred in excluding the independent engineer reports, Crown has failed to prove that it suffered prejudice. The jury received a substantial amount of evidence regarding the background information recommending a door that Crown relied upon when designing the forklift including ANSI standards, OSHA Regulations and Commentary, as well as testimony by Crown's designer Dunlap that he had consulted experts, received reports from them, and relied on their advice. The jury also heard testimony that an ANSI committee twice rejected a recommendation that doors become a requirement on stand-up forklifts. Although the excluded reports would have provided more evidence of the content of the materials Dunlap considered, the excluded evidence does not add anything to the background materials presented to the jury. Moreover, it is clear that the jury believed that Dunlap distorted data and other evidence for the purpose of limiting Crown's liability, including investigating tip-over and off-the-dock accidents while ignoring accidents such as McEuin's, although the latter were much more numerous. Expert reports commissioned by Crown and recommending against doors weighed against the distorted data likely would have done little to dissuade the jury from this belief. Therefore, we cannot conclude that excluding the engineer reports more probably than not tainted the jury's verdict. Tennison, 244 F.3d at 688.