Opinion ID: 770389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Questions by Jurors

Text: 13 Defendants allege error in the district court's decision to allow jurors to question witnesses during the trial. While this court has not previously addressed this issue, we agree with other United States Courts of Appeals that, while allowing jurors to ask questions during criminal trials is permissible and best left to the discretion of the trial judge, the routine practice of juror questioning should be discouraged. Nonetheless, we discern no abuse of discretion in this case. 14 There are a number of dangers inherent in allowing juror questions: jurors can find themselves removed from their appropriate role as neutral fact-finders; jurors may prematurely evaluate the evidence and adopt a particular position as to the weight of that evidence before considering all the facts; the pace of trial may be delayed; there is a certain awkwardness for lawyers wishing to object to juror-inspired questions; and there is a risk of undermining litigation strategies. See United States v.Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing cases). In light of jurors' lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence, a juror question may be improper or prejudicial. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussing a case in which juror questions were posed within the hearing of other jurors). When a court declines to ask a question, the questioning juror may feel that her pursuit of truth has been thwarted by rules she does not understand. See id. Concern has also been expressed over a risk that a sense of camaraderie among jurors may lead them to attach more significance to questions propounded by fellow jurors than those posed by counsel. See id. at 516-17. 15 On the other hand, there are benefits to allowing questions by jurors: not only may such questions result in more attentive jurors, but juror questions may advance the search for truth by alleviating uncertainties in the jurors' minds, clearing up confusion, or alerting attorneys to points that bear further elaboration. See United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992). 16 Defendants maintain that the court abused its discretion by allowing juror questions because the facts of this case were not sufficiently complex to warrant jury questioning and, even if such questioning was appropriate, the court did not properly implement prophylactic measures. We will address each argument in turn.
17 Defendants first contend that juror questioning should be reserved for complex cases, and maintain that their case was not sufficiently complex. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a case should present sufficiently extraordinary or compelling circumstances to justify questioning of witnesses. See Ajmal, 67 F.3d at 14; see also Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1006 (relying on factual complexity of case as factor in conclusion that trial court did not err in allowing juror questioning). Ajmal found an abuse of discretion in a district court's decision to invite juror questioning when such questioning was not necessitated by the factual intricacies of th[e] banal drug conspiracy and was not prompted by the urging of the jurors themselves. Id. at 14-15. The court was not swayed by the fact that the district court followed procedures previously set out by the Second Circuit for juror questioning because such measures alone cannot purge the harm caused by the extensive juror questioning in the case at hand. Id. at 15 (To hold otherwise would sanction juror questioning of witnesses in any circumstance, so long as appropriate prophylactic measures are adopted. We cannot accept such a proposition.). Defendants in the present case point out that the government's evidence involved only eyewitness recollection, testimony concerning conversations with defendants, and simple forensic reports; defendants simply presented an alibi defense. 18 The government has not suggested the case was complex. Instead, the government appears to argue that the important question is whether the questioning prejudiced a party in a way that affected the outcome of the litigation. See United States v. Gray, 897 F.2d 1428, 1429 (8th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Bascope-Zurita, 68 F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 1995) (focusing on absence of argument by defendant that he was prejudiced by questioning; not raising or addressing question of complexity of case involving cocaine conspiracy). 19 Although this court has not addressed the propriety of juror questioning, we have evaluated the practice of questioning by judges. In that context, we have indicated that a trial judge may be warranted in asking questions in a trial for three reasons: (1) for clarification in a lengthy, complex trial; (2) for clarification if the attorneys are unprepared or obstreperous, or if the facts are becoming muddled and neither side is succeeding at attempts toclear them up; and (3) if a witness is difficult, if a witness' testimony is unbelievable and counsel fails to adequately probe, or if the witness becomes inadvertently confused. See United States v. Slone, 833 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1987). While there are risks in the jurors' perception of judge-initiated questions, such questions may be appropriate to get to the truth of the matter. Complexity is only one reason why a judge might reasonably pose questions to a witness. The rationale behind allowing questions by judges also operates in the context of questions by jurors, albeit with greater possible risks. 1 20 While juror questioning should be a rare practice, there will be occasions when a district court may determine that the potential benefits to allowing such questions will outweigh the risks. Even cases that could not be described as complex may occasionally warrant questions by jurors, although we think that the balance of risks to benefits is more likely to weigh in favor of juror questions in complex cases. 21 With respect to complexity, defendants have argued only that juror questions should be reserved for complex cases. As the above discussion reveals, while the complexity of a case should be one consideration, an absence of complexity should not render juror questioning per se reversible error.
22 Defendants next argue that the court did not implement adequate safeguards to address the risks inherent in juror questioning. Examples of prophylactic measures can be found in Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005-06, which suggests that: (1) counsel should be alerted to the court's intention to allow juror questioning at the earliest practicable time and given an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the practice; (2) the jury should be instructed that questions are to be reserved for important points, that the rules of evidence may frequently require the court to eschew certain questions, and that no implication should be drawn if a juror-inspired question withers on the vine; (3) the court should include a prophylactic instruction in its final charge to the jury; and (4) a screening mechanism should be set in place, such as having the jurors write down their questions and pass them to a judge, followed by a sidebar at which the judge would rule on attorneys' objections. 23 Defendants maintain that because the record does not reveal that counsel learned of the court's intention to allow jurors to ask questions until the first day of trial, defense counsel had no time to object to the court's anticipated use of juror questions or contemplate changes to trial strategies. Defendants have failed to explain, however, why they could not object to juror questions on the first day of trial or how the juror questions may have undermined their trial strategy. See Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1007. In general, however, we think that a court should attempt to balance the risks and benefits of juror questions before trial and, when the balance weighs in favor of such questions, inform counsel as soon as possible. 2 24 Defendants also argue that the court did not properly inform the jurors ofthe purpose of their questioning or explain that they should limit their questions to important points, not draw any inferences from unasked questions, and only ask questions seeking clarification rather than attempting to investigate a matter further. The judge in the present case instructed jurors that they could ask a question if a witness finished testifying and the jurors had some substantial question in their minds. She also advised jurors that she would pose to witnesses only appropriate questions from jurors, and that questions she did not pose could not be asked for technical/legal reasons. In the court's preliminary and final instructions, jurors were admonished that, when the court sustained an objection to a question, they were to ignore the question and not guess at its answer. Therefore, the court did substantially address the concerns raised by defendants. 25 According to defendants, the court did not mention juror questions in final jury instructions. Yet there is no indication in the record that defendants requested such an instruction. In light of the court's final instructions that jurors were to ignore questions for which objections had been sustained and that evidence consists only of sworn testimony, exhibits, and stipulations, we are unable to say any lack of an instruction specifically addressing juror questions amounted to plain error. 26 Finally, defendants maintain that the court improperly solicited questions from jurors by asking if the jurors had questions for each and every witness about to leave the stand. While the court's conduct in this regard did not amount to reversible error in this case, routine soliciting of questions could risk reversal under other circumstances. Cf. United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 449 (2d Cir. 1996) (disapproving of the court's inviting juror questions as each witness was about to leave the stand). 27 We note that the court did implement a screening process by having jurors write down their questions, which were then discussed and ruled upon at sidebar. In addition to keeping the jurors from learning of and thinking about questions that were not asked, such a process lessened any risk of alienation because the jurors whose questions were not asked did not know who asserted that the question was improper. 28 The above discussion reveals the standards we think a court should follow when considering juror questioning. Allowing juror questions should not become a routine practice, but should occur only rarely after the district court has determined that such questions are warranted. In exercising their discretion, trial judges must weigh the potential benefits of juror questioning against the possible risks and, if the balance favors juror questions, employ measures to minimize the risks. When a court decides to allow juror questions, counsel should be promptly informed. At the beginning of the trial, jurors should be instructed that they will be allowed to submit questions, limited to important points, and informed of the manner by which they may do so. The court should explain that, if the jurors do submit questions, some proposed questions may not be asked because they are prohibited by the rules of evidence, or may be rephrased to comply with the rules. The jurors should be informed that a questioning juror should not draw any conclusions from the rephrasing of or failure to ask a proposed question. Jurors should submit their questions in writing without disclosing the content to other jurors. The court and the attorneys should then review the questions away from the jurors' hearing, at which time the attorneys should be allowed an opportunity to present any objections. The court may modify a question if necessary. When the court determines that a juror question should be asked, it is the judge who should pose the question to the witness. 29 We also think it would be wise for a district court to consider several additionalissues. The court should consider whether it wishes to allow counsel an opportunity to re-question a witness after a juror question has been posed. See DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515 n.1 (noting that counsel were given the opportunity to re-question each witness after all inquiries from the jury were resolved). The prudence of allowing such re-questioning will depend on the circumstances of each case. Furthermore, while jurors generally should not be allowed to submit questions until the end of a witness' testimony, a court may occasionally determine that questions properly could be posed in the midst of testimony, such as when a witness testifies at great length on a number of topics, or when a witness is testifying as to a technically complex matter. Finally, a court should consider whether final instructions should specifically address juror questions. 30 Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion in allowing juror questioning. Nor do we find an abuse of discretion in the court's implementation of measures to minimize the potential risks of allowing such questions. We have reviewed the juror questions cited by defendants and find nothing improper in the questions that were posed by the court; nor do we find reason for concern in the questions that were proposed, but not asked.