Opinion ID: 2639394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the utah health care malpractice act

Text: ¶ 29 Smith's second main argument on appeal is that the district court erred in basing summary judgment on his failure to comply with the requirements of the UHCMA. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 to -17 (2002). According to Smith, the UHCMA does not apply to the facts of this case because Smith's injuries did not arise out of the rendering of health care. Instead, Smith argues that they arose out of Four Corners' negligent provision of foster care services. Four Corners responds [10] that the allegations in Smith's complaint state a cause of action for health care malpractice. ¶ 30 According to its own provisions, the purpose of the UHCMA is to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated. Id. § 78-14-2. To this end, the statute only applies to malpractice actions against health care providers. Malpractice actions are defined as any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based on alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider. Id. § 78-14-3(15) (emphasis added). For Four Corners to rely on the UHCMA, it must show that it is a health care provider, and that Smith's injury arose out of or related to its provision of health care. ¶ 31 Four Corners asserts that it acted as a health care provider, furnishing mental health services to Smith at the time of Smith's injury. Smith does not deny this assertion. Therefore, the only question we are concerned with is whether Smith's injury was related to or arose out of the provision of mental health care. Smith argues that his injury did not result from medical malpractice but that it arose out of Four Corners' provision of foster care services. He contends that he is not seeking to hold Four Corners responsible for J.B.'s actions. Rather, he is attempting to hold Four Corners liable for failing to protect him from J.B.'s actions. He argues that in providing foster care services, Four Corners negligently supervised J.B., himself and the Randalls. He claims that this negligent supervision resulted in his injuries. ¶ 32 In support of his argument that his injuries arose out of Four Corners' provision of foster care services rather than its provision of mental health services, Smith presents two want ads that purportedly show that Four Corners actively recruited foster parents. Though he provided these advertisements during oral argument before the district court, they were not included in the certified record on appeal. Four Corners argues that the want ads were not in evidence before the district court and that they should not be considered for the first time on appeal. ¶ 33 Despite Four Corners' argument, it is apparent from the district court record that the want ads were presented to the district court. However, the want ads were not included in the record on appeal. According to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the record on appeal only consists of the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court certified and transmitted to the appellate court. Utah R.App. P. 11. When the certified record is incomplete, rule 11 establishes a procedure for supplementing the record when necessary. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct.App.1991). We have noted, however, that a motion under Rule 11(h) is appropriate only when the record must be augmented because of an omission or exclusion, or a dispute as to the accuracy of reporting. Olson, 815 P.2d at 1359 (citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 478-79 & n. 17 (Utah 1990)). In this case, neither party has brought a rule 11(h) motion to include the two want ads in the record on appeal. ¶ 34 Even if we were to include the want ads in the record on appeal, they lack evidentiary value. No information was submitted with the want ads to indicate how these ads specifically relate to this case. One want ad is barely legible and contains no information concerning the date of its publication or even the name of the publication or newspaper in which it was found. The other want ad appears to be a list of several different want ads that appeared in several publications between June 30, 1991, and December 23, 1991. Without any information linking them with the provision of foster care services by Four Corners at the time Smith received his injuries, it is unclear what relevance these ads have to this case. Without such information, these want ads have no relevant bearing on what type of services Four Corners was providing to Smith at the time of his injury, and they can have no effect on the outcome of this decision. ¶ 35 Moreover, even if we otherwise adopt Smith's position that Four Corners provided him foster care services, we would not be able to conclude that Smith's injury arose solely, or even mostly, out of Four Corners' foster care provider role. Smith's complaint claims that Four Corners knew, had reason to know, or should have known that [J.B.] possessed a violent character, and demonstrated homosexual tendencies. He alleges that Four Corners should be held liable for several reasons, including the following: failing to provide adequate caseworker services to himself and J.B., failing to supervise the preparation and implementation of Smith's treatment plan, and failing to inform the Randalls and Smith of J.B.'s dangerous characteristics. These allegations all arise out of Four Corners' provision of mental health services. ¶ 36 In addition, the uncontested relevant facts show that Smith's claim clearly arises out of Four Corners' role as a health care provider both to Smith and to J.B. In its response to interrogatories, Four Corners explained that it had an open outpatient clinical case with Smith to treat his diagnosed mental health problems at the time he received his injury. It also admitted that, prior to this injury, it had provided mental health care to Smith at the Child and Adolescent Residential Treatment Home. Smith's allegations that Four Corners failed to adequately provide caseworker services and to prepare and implement his mental health treatment plan all relate to Four Corners' role as a mental health care provider. Additionally, the reason Four Corners became involved in providing Smith foster care services arose out of its provision of mental health care to Smith. Because Smith's own allegations arise out of the fact that Four Corners provided mental health services directly to him, Smith was required to follow the procedural requirements of the UHCMA. ¶ 37 Before a malpractice action may be brought against a health care provider, the statute requires that certain procedural steps be taken. Such protections include notice of intent to commence an action, [Utah Code Ann.] § 78-14-8, a prelitigation panel review, id. § 78-14-12(2), and an abbreviated statute of limitations[,] [i]d. § 78-14-4(1). Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). See also Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992) (same); Carter v. Milford Valley Mem'l Hosp., 2000 UT App 21, ¶ 13, 996 P.2d 1076 (same). If Smith failed to follow any of these procedures, Four Corners was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Platts, 947 P.2d at 661. ¶ 38 Four Corners admits that a notice of intent to file a claim dated August 12, 1994, was addressed to it and to the State, but it points out that Smith did not file a lawsuit until November 1998; thus it argues that Smith's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Section 78-14-4 establishes a two year statute of limitations that begins to run from the time the patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1). Even if we assume that the two-year statute of limitations began to run as late as August 12, 1994, the date on which he filed a notice of intent to file a claim, the statute should have expired long before Smith filed his complaint on November 28, 1998. Normally, Smith's failure to comply with the statute of limitations by not filing a claim within two years of the discovery of his injury would bar him from pursuing his claim. See Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52, ¶ 13, 26 P.3d 227. However, contrary to the language still contained in section 78-14-4(2), the statute of limitations did not begin to run during Smith's minority. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (2002) (tolling statute of limitations with respect to minors for most causes of action until a minor reaches the age of majority); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 589 (Utah 1993) (holding the language of section 78-14-4(2) unconstitutional and tolling the two-year statute of limitations until the age of majority). Therefore, Smith timely filed his claim. ¶ 39 Nevertheless, even though Smith timely filed his claim, he still had to comply with the other statutory requirements by properly addressing a notice of intent to file a claim to Four Corners as required by section 78-14-8 and requesting a prelitigation panel review within sixty days of serving his notice of intent to file a claim on Four Corners as required by section 78-14-12(2)(a). Four Corners provided evidence that Smith failed to provide a notice of intent to file a claim and to request a prelitigation panel review. Unless Smith rebutted or overcame this evidence, Smith's complaint must be considered improper and the grant of summary judgment appropriate. ¶ 40 Once the moving party has presented sufficient evidence to support the claim for judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence creating an issue of material fact. According to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, [a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B). A party opposing the motion is required only to show that there is a material issue of fact. Affidavits and depositions submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be used only to determine whether a material issue of fact exists. Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993). Therefore, when the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present or would be at trial. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citing Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 269, 351 P.2d 624, 636-37 (1960)). ¶ 41 Although Smith provided some evidence that he served a notice of intent to file a claim on Four Corners on August 12, 1994, we question whether this document properly complies with section 78-14-8. We need not address this concern, however, because Smith did not provide any evidence to contradict or rebut the properly supported fact in Four Corners' motion for summary judgment that he did not request a prelitigation panel review. Because Smith failed to show that he had requested a prelitigation panel, he is barred from pursuing his claim, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(1)(c), and summary judgment was appropriate on this theory.