Opinion ID: 1163403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 43

Heading: Prosecutor's Argument on Brett's Background.

Text: [56, 57] Brett argues the prosecutor unconstitutionally argued to the jury that the evidence of his upbringing did not extenuate or reduce Brett's moral culpability. Br. of Appellant, at 219. The court reviews allegations of improper argument under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d 176, 195, 721 P.2d 902 (1986). The defendant bears the burden of establishing both the impropriety of the prosecutor's conduct and its prejudicial effect. (Footnote omitted.) State v. Furman, 122 Wn.2d 440, 455, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993). Prosecutorial conduct does not constitute prejudicial error unless the appellate court determines there is a substantial likelihood the instances of misconduct affected the jury's verdict. State v. Evans, 96 Wn.2d 1, 5, 633 P.2d 83 (1981). Brett challenges the following statements by the prosecutor: This background information ... doesn't reduce the moral culpability that Mr. Brett must accept for his crime. Report of Proceedings vol. 18, at 96. Defense has through numerous witnesses put forward to you the fact that this defendant, Mr. Brett, is institutionalized. And the State will agree he is institutionalized. What does it have to do with the issue before you? How does that reduce his degree of moral culpability? It doesn't. Being institutionalized is interesting. It's nice to know that. But it has nothing to do with the question before you. Absolutely nothing to do with it. Report of Proceedings vol. 18, at 97. The prosecutor's arguments were based on instruction 7, which provided: A mitigating circumstance is any fact, event, information, or condition about either the offense or about the defendant which in fairness or in mercy may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or which justifies a sentence of less than death, although it does not justify or excuse the offense. (Italics ours.) Clerk's Papers, at 550. Brett does not challenge instruction 7. The defense could have argued under the instruction that reduction of moral culpability is only one method in assessing mitigating evidence. The instruction contains a disjunctive which allows a mitigating factor to be any fact, event, or condition which justifies a sentence of less than death. The defense's failure to make this argument does not render the prosecutor's argument improper or prejudicial. Brett also argues the prosecutor improperly argued the defendant was not substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect because he knew right from wrong. He asserts this argument erroneously applied the insanity standard to this mitigating factor. RCW 10.95.070(6). Brett cites to the prosecutor's statement that [t]here is absolutely no evidence in this case that Mr. Brett on December 3rd, 1991, was suffering from any type of mental disease or defect. Report of Proceedings vol. 18, at 89. The prosecutor argued further that, even if the jury inferred Brett had fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal alcohol effect, it doesn't mean anything because Dr. Ryan said people can still make choices. They still make choices, know right from wrong, and they know when they do commit a crime that they shouldn't be doing it. Report of Proceedings vol. 18, at 91. The prosecutor never expressly mentioned insanity or RCW 9A.12.010(1)(b), which provides that as a result of mental disease or defect, the mind of the actor was affected to such an extent that ... [h]e was unable to tell right from wrong .... In context, the prosecutor's statements were consistent with his argument that the mitigation evidence did not reduce the moral culpability of the defendant. The defense was free to argue that, although not reducing his moral culpability, evidence of FAS/FAE would nonetheless justif[y] a sentence of less than death .... Clerk's Papers, at 550. The prosecutor's argument was proper and the instruction to the jury was proper. There was no error.