Opinion ID: 809233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Herring’s Good Faith Exception

Text: The government admits that the APA was aware of the order and its effect. However, the government next argues that the APA believed in good faith that it took appropriate action by emailing the court and notifying the judge of its intent to disregard the order. In addition, the government argues that because the arresting officers were told that the APA had the authority to execute a warrantless arrest and search, it was reasonable for the parole officers to follow the directions of their supervisors. For these reasons, the government reasons that it is entitled to the good faith exception and that the evidence, therefore, is not subject to the exclusionary rule. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137. In regards to the arresting officers, the government’s argument might hold more weight in the context of a civil action, since those officers arguably would be entitled to qualified immunity. The arresting officers likely would have no cause to know whether the order provided to them by Defendant and Kim was legally effective, or whether, for instance, it had been superceded or rescinded by subsequent court order. Especially when compared against directions issued by their own department, we agree that it was reasonable for the arresting officers to execute the search and the arrest, even though they were notified on scene that they had no authority to do so. The same consideration, however, cannot be extended to the APA Superintendent, its Chief, its legal counsel, and the other supervisors who played a hand in issuing the Violator-at-Large 12 No. 11-3446 Notice. These supervisors were fully aware that they had been ordered, in no uncertain terms, to release Defendant from the APA’s supervision. In fact, the record indicates that disputed order was discussed at various levels of the departmental hierarchy, before the APA arrived at the solution to email the sentencing judge directly. The government now attempts to explain this tactic by arguing that the APA believed it could not have entered an appearance in a case in which it was not a party. That argument is not well received. The order clearly and specifically called upon the APA to release Defendant from supervision, and there were official legal avenues available by which the APA could have obtained a hearing before the court. The APA’s awareness of the binding court order, its deliberate decision to disregard the order, and its failure to inform the executing officers of the full facts, means that “the exclusionary rule [remains] in play,” regardless of whether the arresting officers would be extended Herring’s exception. See United States v. PinedaBuenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 776 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010) (refusing to extend the good faith exception where the law enforcement agency issuing a search warrant failed to inform the executing officers of the correct apartment numbers that were covered under the warrant’s scope). Comparing Herring to the instant case, it is clear that the government is not entitled to the good faith exception. Herring emphasizes that suppression remains the appropriate recourse where necessary to “deter wrongful police conduct.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 137. The violation committed by the APA here was not the result of “clerical error” or “isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest.” Id. at 135, 142. Rather, the APA knew that the order remained in effect, and they purposefully ignored it. Herring does not absolve such flagrantly wrongful conduct. 13 No. 11-3446