Opinion ID: 1804015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Factor (e)High position in the drug distribution hierarchy

Text: The district court also found that appellant held a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy for purposes of factor (e) presumably based on evidence that appellant supervised at least three others in drug sales and that he procured drugs in Chicago. But this is the only evidence in the record to support this conclusion. The district court noted that the defendant was if not the leader or the mastermind, at least the major partner. There is no evidence regarding appellant's proximity to a source for the drugs however, and it is possible he made several small purchases of drugs in Chicago and simply processed and repackaged them for sale in Rochester. [10] Something more than the procurement of drugs in Chicago and the supervision of three people must be shown in order to satisfy the high position factor (e) standard, however. Any conclusion as to appellant's relative rank in the distribution hierarchy based on this record would be speculation and would fall short of our requirement of substantial and compelling circumstances to justify a departure. See Rairdon, 557 N.W.2d at 326. We conclude that the record does not support findings as to the presence of factors (a) three or more separate transactions, (b) sale of quantities substantially larger than for personal use, (c) manufacture of controlled substances for use by other parties, or (e) high position in drug distribution hierarchy, and that the sentencing departure was therefore an abuse of the district court's discretion.
Appellant also argues that the major controlled substance offense factors are based upon considerations already taken into account by the legislature through its categorization of drug offenses by the quantity of drugs soldthus, argues appellant, the sentencing guideline's aggravating factors amount to a double-counting of the quantity of drugs present in a particular offense. The aggravating factors for a major controlled substance offense were established in 1981, but at that time drug offenses were not based on the quantity of the substance in the charged offense. See Minn.Stat. § 152.09 (1980); State v. Walters, 315 N.W.2d 590, 591 (Minn.1982). [11] In 1989 the legislature revised the drug sale and possession offenses to focus primarily on the quantity of drugs possessed or sold but the aggravating factors for sentencing, also based on quantity, remained unchanged. [12] See Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 3, §§ 8-12, 1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1596-1601, codified at Minn. Stat §§ 152.021-.025. While we need not reach this issue because, as noted above, the record does not support the sentencing departure, we are concerned that one or more of the departure factors at issue in this case may be duplicative of elements of the offense. For example, factor (b) sale of quantities substantially larger than for personal use, is arguably duplicative of the quantity element of the first- and second-degree drug offenses in Minn.Stat. §§ 152.021, 152.022. [13] Factor (c) relating to manufacture of controlled substances for use by others, and factor (e) applicable if defendant occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy, could also implicate the quantity of drugs involved in an offense. If so, the elements that establish the offense might also be used to justify an upward departure violating our ruling in State v. Peterson, 329 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1983). In that case we held that when aggravating factors used by the district court to support a sentencing departure were considered by the legislature in determining the severity of the offense and formed the basis for the conviction of the particular degree of offense, departure based on those aggravating factors is not proper. Id. at 60. Therefore, we take this opportunity to caution courts against using quantity to support a departure under the major controlled substance offense departure criteria when to do so duplicates an element of the offense. In summary, based on the record we hold that the substantial and compelling circumstances required to support a sentencing departure were not present in the December 7 offense and thus the departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence of 98 months to 122 months was an abuse of the district court's discretion. We remand to the district court with instructions to vacate the sentencing departure and impose the presumptive guideline sentence. [14] Reversed and remanded. [15]