Opinion ID: 2607312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reimbursement of Attorney's Fees

Text: Taylor argues he should not have been required to reimburse White Pine County for the cost of his defense because (1) the legislature did not intend that the granting of probation could be contingent upon the reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred by the State in defending Taylor; and (2) contrary to the holding in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), strongly suggesting that a statute requiring reimbursement is valid only if reimbursement is made contingent on ability to pay, the district court failed to determine Taylor's ability to pay. Taylor notes that the district court was aware that he was unemployed, had made less than $8,000.00 in 1993, and would have significant attorney's fees because of the suppression motion. The State, in turn, directs this court's attention to NRS 176.1853 as authority for conditioning probation on reimbursement of attorney's fees. NRS 176.1853 provides, in relevant part: 1. In issuing an order granting probation, the court may fix the terms and conditions thereof, including a requirement for restitution.... The State also emphasizes that the same safeguards applicable to the Oregon recoupment statute, that was upheld by the Supreme Court in Fuller, are applicable in Nevada. Specifically, NRS 178.3975 provides that 2. The court shall not order a defendant to make [a reimbursement of attorney fees] unless the defendant is or will be able to do so. In determining the amount and method of payment, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment will impose. 3. A defendant who has been ordered to pay expenses of his defense and who is not willfully or without good cause in default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court which ordered the payment for remission of the payment or of any unpaid portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due or modify the method of payment. Finally, the State notes that the district court was aware of Taylor's age, level of education, earnings for 1993, and vocation. Taylor had been employed as a house painter for approximately seven years and had made approximately $8,000.00 in 1993, despite the fact that he was incarcerated for four and one-half months of that year. [4] Taking into consideration Taylor's financial circumstances, the district court reduced the fine imposed from $2,000.00 to $500.00 and gave Taylor the entire four-year probationary period to pay. Likewise, Taylor was given the entire four years to repay attorney's fees. After the district court was informed that the fees could be relatively significant (later determined to be $3,600.00), the district court informed Taylor that probation terms are modifiable; and if the submitted fees were excessive, the district court would reduce them to a reasonable amount. We conclude that NRS 176.1853 and NRS 178.3975 grant district courts discretion to condition probation on the repayment of attorney's fees. NRS 176.1853 contains a general bestowal of discretion to fix the terms and conditions [of probation.] Furthermore, NRS 178.3975 provides that a court may order a defendant to pay all or any part of the expenses incurred by the county, city or state in providing the defendant with an attorney.... In addition, we conclude that the spirit of Fuller has been satisfied in the present case. The Fuller court was confronted with an Oregon statute authorizing recoupment of attorney's fees paid by the State. On the issue of whether the Oregon statute denied indigent defendants their constitutional right to counsel, the Court commented: Oregon's system for providing counsel quite clearly does not deprive any defendant of the legal assistance necessary to [be heard by counsel]. As the State Court of Appeals observed in this case, an indigent is entitled to free counsel when he needs it  that is, during every stage of the criminal proceedings against him. The fact that an indigent who accepts state-appointed legal representation knows that he might someday be required to repay the costs of these services in no way affects his eligibility to obtain counsel. The Oregon statute is carefully designed to insure that only those who actually become capable of repaying the State will ever be obliged to do so. Those who remain indigent or for whom repayment would work manifest hardship are forever exempt from any obligation to pay. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 52-53 (emphasis added). Taylor's contention that recoupment must be conditioned on ability to pay is therefore correct, but the statutory safeguards written into Oregon's recoupment statute are likewise present in NRS 178.3975. Moreover, the facts available to the district court support the district court's finding that Taylor would be able to reimburse White Pine County for the cost of his defense. In addition, Taylor may at any time petition the district court for relief from his reimbursement obligation.