Opinion ID: 201815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count 1: Violation of Due Process by False Allegation (Rivas).

Text: 19 Rivas offers four reasons why he should have been granted judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. Three of these go to the heart of the claim asserted against him. The fourth goes to the correctness of the district court's jury instructions. We consider the first three arguments as a group before addressing the fourth. 20 1. The Forfeited Arguments. Rivas's first three arguments are intertwined. His first plaint posits that a correctional officer's filing of a false charge against an inmate, knowing that the making of the charge will lead to an immediate deprivation of rights, does not violate due process and, therefore, fails to state a valid section 1983 claim. His second plaint takes a related, but slightly less extreme, position: he suggests that a pretrial detainee's right to be free from such fictionalized charges was not clearly established in 2002 and that, therefore, he was entitled to qualified immunity. The third plaint suggests, as a fallback, that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to sustain the allegations contained in count 1. None of these arguments was preserved below and, thus, they are forfeited. 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) permits a party to move for judgment as a matter of law at any time before submission of the case to the jury. The defendants made such a motion at the close of the plaintiff's case in chief and the trial court denied it. The defendants then proceeded to present evidence. Where, as here, a defendant moves unsuccessfully for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case in chief and then proceeds to offer evidence, he waives any right to appeal the court's denial of the motion. See Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 476 n. 5 (1st Cir.1994); Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731, 733 (1st Cir.1954). In effect, therefore, the court of appeals may review only the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence and seasonably renewed post-verdict. See Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 218, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849 (1947); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). 22 The defendants in this case neglected to make a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. That failure rendered inutile their post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and precluded ordinary appellate review of the sufficiency of the claim. See Muñiz v. Rovira, 373 F.3d 1, 5 n. 2 (1st Cir.2004) (Failure to file a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence pretermits the filing of a post-trial motion for that relief.); Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 758 (1st Cir.1994) (similar). 23 In an effort to detour around this obstacle, Rivas argues that his claim may still be reviewed for plain error. In this context, however, the plain error doctrine has very narrow contours: in the absence of a duly preserved motion for either judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, we may set aside a verdict only to prevent a clear and gross injustice of the sort that would result from enforcing a verdict for which the record reveals an absolute dearth of evidentiary support. Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir.1999); La Amiga del Pueblo, Inc. v. Robles, 937 F.2d 689, 691 (1st Cir.1991). Rivas cannot slip through this modest escape hatch because the record here is far from empty. 24 We need not tarry. On the evidence before it, the jury rationally could have found that Rivas prevaricated about the July 14 incident; that because of his animosity toward certain inmates, Rivas intended to punish the men whom he falsely accused; and that Rivas knew that his lie would cause those men to be thrown into the hole immediately. On the last point, no less a personage than Captain Dionne, the prison's chief of security, testified that any correctional officer would have known that an accusation as serious as Rivas's would lead to immediate segregation. No more was exigible to show that, as a matter of proof, the verdict did not work a clear and gross injustice. 25 Rivas is simply incorrect to suggest that relief is warranted because the plaintiff's theory of the case was bogus. A pretrial detainee has a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from punishment prior to conviction. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). While a pretrial detainee may be disciplined for a specific institutional infraction committed during the period of his detention, the discipline imposed must be roughly proportionate to the gravity of the infraction. Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir.1995). An arbitrary, or disproportionate sanction, or one that furthers no legitimate penological objective, constitutes punishment (and, thus, is proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment). See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39, 99 S.Ct. 1861. 26 Rivas cites Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949 (2d Cir.1986), and Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam), for the proposition that the filing of false charges by a correctional officer does not state a Fourteenth Amendment claim when the accused inmate is given a subsequent hearing on those charges. These cases, both of which involved convicts and not pretrial detainees, are readily distinguishable. In each of them, punishment was meted out only after an impartial disciplinary board had determined that the evidence supported a finding that the convict in question had committed the charged infraction. See Freeman, 808 F.2d at 949; Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1140. The allegedly false testimony itself did not lead directly to punishment. See, e.g., Freeman, 808 F.2d at 953 (noting that the convict suffered as a result of the finding of guilty ... and not merely because of the filing of unfounded charges). By contrast, the plaintiff in this case alleges that he suffered punishment as a direct result of Rivas's false accusation, which led to his immediate segregation and the attendant privations for a period of several weeks before the resolution of the due process hearing. 27 Rivas counters that the immediate segregation of rebellious inmates furthers the legitimate objective of ensuring security and order within a penitentiary (and, thus, that the plaintiff was not punished by the pre-hearing placement). This mischaracterizes the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff does not contend that the jail wrongfully punished him in advance of the due process hearing, but, rather, that Rivas wrongfully engineered his punishment by fabricating a serious charge knowing that the falsehood would lead to the plaintiff's immediate placement in the hole without any intervening hearing. That kind of unprincipled manipulation of legitimate prison regulations, to the detriment of a pretrial detainee, can constitute arbitrary punishment by a correctional officer, even if the response by other (unwitting) prison officials is legitimate and non-punitive. See, e.g., Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir.2004) (An intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials is sufficient to show unconstitutional pretrial punishment.). 28 Our decision in O'Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1997), is instructive on this point. There, a correctional officer relentlessly taunted a pretrial detainee whom she knew to have an anxiety disorder in order to provoke an outburst. Id. at 15. She knew that such outbursts violated prison rules and inevitably would lead to the detainee's placement in administrative segregation. Id. at 15-16. We held that the officer's intent to punish the detainee, coupled with instigative actions ... directed toward [that] end, constituted arbitrary and unreasonable punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 16. In so holding, we hastened to distinguish between the officer's culpable role and the prison's non-culpable role. See id. 29 There is no material difference between the theory on which our holding in O'Connor rested and the plaintiff's theory here. A correctional officer cannot punish a pretrial detainee through deliberate manipulation of an unwitting institutional proxy any more than he can do so by brute force. 30 Rivas's qualified immunity defense also has been forfeited. He did not raise this defense by a pretrial motion to dismiss, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), by a pretrial motion for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), or by a timely motion for judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Accordingly, this claim is reviewable, if at all, only for plain error. Chestnut v. City of Lowell, 305 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir.2002) (en banc) (per curiam). There was no error in this regard, plain or otherwise. 31 Qualified immunity protects public officials from civil liability `insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). In determining whether a public official has violated a clearly established right, a court asks (i) whether the plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (ii) whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the putative violation; and (iii) whether a reasonable officer, situated similarly to the defendant, would have understood the challenged act or omission to contravene the discerned constitutional right. Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir.2004). 32 We already have explained that the plaintiff's theory of the case limns a constitutional violation. Because O'Connor was decided before the events at issue occurred, the right to be free from arbitrary and intentional punishment at the hands of correctional officers was clearly established. See O'Connor, 117 F.3d at 16-17. And certainly, a reasonable correctional officer would have realized that fabricating false charges against a pretrial detainee with the knowledge that the fabrication would lead to immediate segregation was constitutionally impermissible. Cf. Limone, 372 F.3d at 44-45 (declaring it self-evident that those charged with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit). It follows inexorably that qualified immunity was not available to shield Rivas from liability on this count. 33 2. The Jury Instruction Claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 prescribes a method for preserving objections to jury instructions. Under this method, the trial court must inform the parties of its proposed instructions, consider requested instructions, and take objections before charging the jury. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(b). An objection lodged at that time preserves the underlying issue for appeal. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(c)(2)(A); see Baron v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Dep't, 402 F.3d 225, 235 (1st Cir.2005). 3 If, however, the court fails to proceed as contemplated by Rule 51, a party may object promptly after learning that the instruction or request will be, or has been, given or refused. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(c)(2)(B); see Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir.2004). A party's failure to adhere to the protocol specified in Rule 51 constitutes a forfeiture and limits appellate review to plain error. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(d)(2). 34 In the case at hand, the defendants raised an objection to the wording of the trial court's instructions on count 1 after they were given — but the appellate record is uninformative as to whether the court conferred with counsel and sought objections prior to charging the jury. Ordinarily, a gap in the appellate record counts against the appealing party. See Fed.R.App.P. 10(b)(1)(A), (c) (requiring an appellant to procure transcript of such parts of the proceedings ... as the appellant considers necessary or, if no transcript is available, to prepare a statement ... of the proceedings from the best available means, including the appellant's recollection); see also Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir.1987) (explaining that it is the appellant who must bear the brunt of an insufficient record on appeal). Here, however, the plaintiff does not dispute that Rivas preserved the objection, so we proceed on that assumption. 35 The district court instructed that jury in pertinent part that: [The plaintiff] contends that Mr. Rivas made ... false accusations knowing and intending that, as a result, Mr. Surprenant would be removed from his cell and transported to the Restricted Housing Unit and would be subjected to punishment there. He also contends that those consequences did occur.... To prove his claim against Mr. Rivas, Mr. Surprenant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following three elements: 36 1. Mr. Rivas falsely accused Mr. Surprenant of being part of a group that attempted to assault him and take him hostage; 37 2. Mr. Rivas made the false accusations for the purpose of subjecting Mr. Surprenant to punishment without a legitimate purpose; and 38 3. The punishment that Mr. Rivas intended did occur. 39 Rivas argues that this instruction misstates the law. Thus, our review is plenary. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 251 F.3d 251, 259 (1st Cir.2001). 40 We reject Rivas's challenge. As given, the instruction accurately depicts the elements of a claim of arbitrary punishment of a pretrial detainee through a proxy. See, e.g., O'Connor, 117 F.3d at 16. Nothing more need be said. See Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 135 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that there is no legal error when the court's instruction adequately illuminate[s] the law applicable to the controlling issues) (internal quotation marks omitted). 41