Opinion ID: 6323354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Government Actors

Text: With regard to whether his attackers were government actors, Mr. Singh points out that the Board cited to a case that is no longer good law, Matter of A-B- (A-B- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). After the Board’s decision in this case, the Attorney General clarified A-B- I, see Matter of A-B- (A-B- II), 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021), and then subsequently vacated both A-B- I and A-B- II, see Matter of A-B- (A-B- III), 28 I. & N. Dec. 307, 307 (A.G. 2021). But Mr. Singh makes only bare assertions that the overruling requires remand; he fails to show how it may have affected his case. Notably, the Board cited A-B- I as a “see also” cite after citing the 8 Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 9 well-established (and unchanged) rule in this circuit that “the persecution must have been imposed by the government or by groups which the government is unwilling or unable to control,” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Singh also disputes the IJ’s conclusion that the attackers were “rogue elements who support the [Badal] party,” id. at 90, asserting that the IJ misinterpreted the term “miscreant” in the documentary evidence, id. at 299, as being synonymous with “rogue,” when it is not. This argument essentially asks us to substitute our judgment for that of the agency, which we will not do. See Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2001). Mr. Singh’s position boils down to proposing that when a member of the same political party as the ruling government attacks a member of a rival party, the attack must be considered to be sponsored or condoned by the government. We disagree that a reasonable adjudicator would always be compelled reach that conclusion. Mr. Singh further argues that the police’s refusal to take a report from him establishes that the government condoned and perhaps aided the attack. But again, this court’s review is for substantial evidence, not de novo, and we do not reweigh the evidence. The Board considered the fact that the police did not take Mr. Singh’s report, but was not persuaded by it. We cannot conclude that every reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find government involvement in these circumstances. Cf. Granada-Rubio v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (stating that petitioner’s testimony that the police sometimes did not help was insufficient to support a claim that the government acquiesced to torture). 9 Appellate Case: 21-9553 Document: 010110657084 Date Filed: 03/15/2022 Page: 10