Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Venue Motion

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motions to change venue or transfer his case to another judicial district within Los Angeles County due to prejudicial pretrial publicity and courthouse bias. [18] We disagree. A change of venue must be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. `Whether raised on petition for writ of mandate or on appeal from a judgment of conviction, the reviewing court must independently examine the record and determine de novo whether a fair trial is or was obtainable.' [Citation.] `The de novo standard of review applies to our consideration of the five relevant factors: (1) nature and gravity of the offense; (2) nature and extent of the media coverage; (3) size of the community; (4) community status of the defendant; and (5) prominence of the victim.' [Citation.] ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 744, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754, quoting People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1236-1237, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) Defendant brought three motions to change venue or transfer. Each was denied. We perceive no error. Only the first factor weighs in favor of granting the motion, but the nature and the gravity of the offense, standing alone, is not dispositive. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 905, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Nor, contrary to defendant's claim, does the second factor weigh in favor of the motion because we conclude the publicity was neither extensive nor prejudicial. In his pretrial motion, defendant cited 18 newspaper articles about his case that had appeared between November 22, 1993 and June 9, 1994. [19] Except for a letter to the editor, all the articles were news stories. Five reported the circumstances of defendant's arrest and the victim's death and two reported her funeral. The remaining articles reported developments in the case as it moved through the legal system. Defendant's trial did not commence until November 1994, more than a year after most of the articles had appeared, and about six months after publication of the last one. Any potential prejudice from the media coverage was attenuated by the passage of time. ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 744, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) Moreover, 18 articles over a 12-month period can hardly be characterized as extensive (cf. People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1275 [51, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118 newspaper stories and 24 television stories in an 11-month period]), nor, contrary to defendant's claim, was the coverage biased or inflammatory simply because it recounted the inherently disturbing circumstances of this case and the victim's family's grief at her murder. Moreover, the fact that prospective jurors may have been exposed to pretrial publicity about the case does not necessarily require a change of venue. ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 527, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) `It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 853, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906, quoting People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 750, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) Here, all of the jurors and alternate jurors who had any knowledge of the case stated they could set aside this knowledge and decide the case on the law and evidence received at trial. In this connection, it should be observed that defendant failed to use all his peremptory challenges when he accepted the jury, thus indicating that the jurors were fair and that the defense itself so concluded. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 180, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 46, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Defendant also cites three newspapers articles that appeared during his trial that were the basis of renewed motions for change of venue on December 5 and December 7, 1993. His December 5 motion was based on a newspaper article that had appeared four days earlier, while jury selection was still in process, titled Child-Murder Case Inflames Emotions. The trial court included questions about this article and determined that the prospective jurors had not been exposed to it. Defendant's December 7 motion was brought after two newspaper articles implicated defendant in a plot to kill prosecution witnesses. The trial court questioned the jurors about the article and again determined that none of them had been exposed to it. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly denied defendant's renewed motions. [20] None of the remaining relevant factors support a change of venue in this case. As to community size, the San Fernando Valley, from which the jury pool was drawn, contains over a million inhabitants and is far more populous than many counties. Therefore, the size of the community does not support a change in venue. ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 449, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968.) Defendant asserts that the victim and her family occupied positions of prominence and popularity, but the victim became known only because she was a murder victim, not because of any preexisting status. (See People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 852, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) Defendant also points out that the victim's mother was a legal secretary and her fiancé was a criminal defense lawyer who were known in the Van Nuys legal community, but nothing in the record suggests these factors had any effect on the jury pool. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 906, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Finally, despite defendant's attempt to depict himself as an outsider because of his recent immigrant status, and the victim of ethnic bias because of his Iranian origin, there was no evidence of unusual local hostility to such persons, such that a change of venue would likely produce a less biased panel. Nor was the pretrial publicity calculated to excite local prejudices in this regard. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 179, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; cf. People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1129, 259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146 [pretrial publicity focused on defendant's race and his status as an outsider to the community in contrast to victim's ties to the community].) To the extent, moreover, that defendant asserts some racial or ethnic animus was at work among the jurors, his claim is belied by his failure to have exercised all his peremptory challenges. In the absence of some explanation for counsel's failure to utilize his remaining peremptory challenges, or any objection to the jury as finally composed, we conclude that counsel's inaction signifies his recognition that the jury as selected was fair and impartial. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 854, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions for change of venue or transfer.