Opinion ID: 3035595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Meaningful Consideration Review

Text: “To determine if the [district] court acted reasonably in imposing the resulting sentence, we must first be satisfied the court exercised its discretion by considering the relevant factors.” United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006). As we explained in Cooper: The record must demonstrate the trial court gave 13 meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors. The court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without merit. Nor must a court discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing. . . . On the other hand, a rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not suffice if at sentencing either the defendant or the prosecution properly raises “a ground of recognized legal merit (provided it has a factual basis)” and the court fails to address it. . . . On this issue, we disagree with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Scott, [426 F.3d 1324, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2005),] where the court held a district court’s statement that it considered both the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing is by itself sufficient for Booker purposes. Id. at 329 & n.6 (internal citations omitted); see also Grier, 475 F.3d at 571–72 (“The record must disclose meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of independent judgment, based on a weighing of the relevant 14 factors, in arriving at a final sentence.”); United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Merely reciting the § 3553(a) factors, saying that counsel’s arguments have been considered, and then declaring a sentence, are insufficient to withstand our reasonableness review.”); United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that district courts “should observe the requirement to state adequate reasons for a sentence on the record so that this court can engage in meaningful appellate review”). III. The District Court’s Explanation Requires Remand Here, the record does not indicate that the District Court considered the § 3553(a) factors at Gunter’s step three. Although the Court considered Sevilla’s role in the crime compared to that of his co-conspirators,4 it did not address Sevilla’s colorable arguments relating to his childhood and the crack/powder disparity5 other than to say that it had “considered 4 We have held that “[a]lthough § 3553(a) does not require district courts to consider sentencing disparity among codefendants, it also does not prohibit them from doing so.” Parker, 462 F.3d at 277. 5 The Supreme Court’s decision in Kimbrough v United States, U.S. , 128 S.Ct. 558, 575 (2007) — and our Court’s sequel decision in United States v. Gunter, 527 F.3d 282, 286 (3d Cir. 2008), as well as United States v. Ricks, 494 F.3d 394, 402-03 (3d Cir. 2007) — make clear that any determination at 15 all of the [§] 3553(a) factors.” Given that “a rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not suffice if at sentencing either the defendant or the prosecution properly raises a ground of recognized legal merit (provided it has a factual basis) and the court fails to address it,” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted), these omissions require remand. As in Grier, however, “[w]e do not suggest that the original sentence reflects anything less than the sound judgment of the District Judge, or that the final sentence should necessarily differ from the one previously imposed.” 475 F.3d at 572.