Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficiency of Evidence as to Remaining Allegations of Misconduct

Text: The foregoing determinations resolve defendant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial with respect to these four allegations of juror misconduct without further consideration of the prosecutor's conduct or the procedures utilized by the court. (61a) The representations relating to the Burns letter and his sentence of life without possibility of parole do implicate juror impropriety, however; we must examine their factual and legal context more critically. If substantiated, these claims raise a possibility the jury considered evidence not received in the course of defendant's trial. Evidence obtained by jurors from sources other than in court is misconduct and constitutes grounds for a new trial if the defendant has been prejudiced thereby. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 2.) ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1156.) The trial court must nevertheless examine the proffered basis for the new trial motion and determine whether credible and admissible evidence substantiates the underlying allegations. In this case, defendant offered to submit the unsworn statement of Juror Whitfield and the affidavit of a defense investigator recounting her statement to him. Under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in according little, if any, credence to assertions the declarant was unwilling to verify. (See People v. Scott (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 301, 307, 309 [180 Cal. Rptr. 891]; People v. Brown (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 476, 479 [132 Cal. Rptr. 217]; see also People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 206, fn. 3 [155 Cal. Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91]; People v. Guthaus (1962) 208 Cal. App.2d 785, 792 [25 Cal. Rptr. 735].) Furthermore, [i]t is settled ... that `a jury verdict may not be impeached by hearsay affidavits.' [Citations.] ( People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1318-1319.) The record thus contains no competent evidence the jury considered matters not introduced at defendant's trial; the court thus properly denied the motion for lack of evidentiary support. Our recent decision in People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395 [272 Cal. Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260], does not alter this conclusion. In Hedgecock, we held that it is within the discretion of a trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth or falsity of allegations of jury misconduct, and to permit the parties to call jurors to testify at such a hearing. [Footnote omitted.] ( Id., at p. 419.) This holding is, nonetheless, qualified by our discussion of the rationale in its factual context. Defendant Hedgecock's motion for a new trial was supported by affidavits implicating juror misconduct; the prosecution submitted counteraffidavits denying any impropriety occurred. Believing it lacked authority to do so, the trial court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the conflicts. ( People v. Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 411-414.) Since section 1181 does not expressly preclude in court questioning of jurors, we concluded the court improperly failed to exercise its discretion to determine whether this procedure was appropriate under the circumstances. (62) We stress[ed], however, that the defendant is not entitled to such a hearing as a matter of right. Rather, such a hearing should be held only when the trial court, in its discretion, concludes that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of fact. ( People v. Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 415-416.) Nor did we mandate examination of jurors in every instance of alleged misfeasance. The hearing should not be used as a `fishing expedition' to search for possible misconduct, but should be held only when the defense has come forward with evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred. Even upon such a showing, an evidentiary hearing will generally be unnecessary unless the parties' evidence presents a material conflict that can only be resolved at such a hearing. [30] ( Id., at p. 419.) (61b) Here, the trial court was confronted not with conflicting evidence but one juror disinclined, for whatever reason, to aver under penalty of perjury statements she assertedly had made to a defense investigator. [31] Moreover, the representations of counsel did not suggest a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct ha[d] occurred. ( People v. Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 419.) Without some elaboration of the context in which the reference to the Burns letter and sentence arose, the court had no basis for concluding the jury actually considered evidence not received at defendant's trial. (See also People v. Lee (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 749, 755 [113 Cal. Rptr. 641].) Accordingly, the circumstances of this case did not raise any of the concerns at issue in Hedgecock, [32] nor did the facts before the court compel an exercise of its discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing. [33] For several reasons, we decline to extend the holding in Hedgecock to situations in which the defendant merely seeks to place unsworn statements under oath by calling upon reluctant jurors to reiterate those statements from the witness stand. First, we find no constitutional, statutory, or decisional imperative supporting such an extension. (63) A criminal defendant has neither a guaranty of posttrial access to jurors nor a right to question them about their guilt or penalty verdict. Indeed, following what we may infer is a common practice, the court in this case informed the jury they were under no obligation to speak with counsel at the conclusion of the trial. (See, e.g., People v. Scott, supra, 129 Cal. App.3d at p. 308.) That decision rests with the individual juror according to his or her inclination, which the defendant may not attempt to qualify. Second, requiring testimony under such circumstances is tantamount to the type of fishing expedition condemned in Hedgecock. Either a juror is willing to come forward and, at least on a preliminary basis, sign an affidavit or not. Unless the reticence results from impermissible interference by the court or prosecutor, the reasons therefor should not be subject to further inquiry. (See, e.g., People v. Atkins (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 15, 23-28 [249 Cal. Rptr. 863], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 322 [270 Cal. Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643]; cf. In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 30-32 [241 Cal. Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374] [prosecutor may not engage in activity that renders willing defense witness unwilling to testify].) By analogy to Evidence Code section 1150, these mental processes must remain equally inviolate. (See also In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 398 [220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260].) Finally, the Court of Appeal in People v. Scott, supra , aptly identified one of the inherent dangers posed by evidentiary hearings at which jurors are examined concerning their deliberations: To grant this kind of power to the losing attorney would open the door to harassment of jurors and ... ultimately damage the jury process and the administration of justice. (129 Cal. App.3d at p. 308.) In the civil context, we have also recognized that permitting counsel for the losing party to interrogate unwilling trial jurors touches the integrity of our venerable jury process.... [O]nce aware that after sitting through a lengthy trial he himself may be placed on trial, only the most courageous prospective juror will not seek excuse from service. ( Linhart v. Nelson (1976) 18 Cal.3d 641, 644-645 [134 Cal. Rptr. 813, 557 P.2d 104] [finding new trial motion in civil cases be must made upon affidavit only (Code Civ. Proc., § 658)].) (61c) Although in Hedgecock we permitted a limited right to examination under specified circumstances, the justifiable concern for juror prerogatives cautions against an extension of that rule to the instant facts. Moreover, jurors might well completely refuse to talk with defense counsel or investigators if they anticipated being called into court for subsequently declining to acknowledge their statements under oath. The untoward result of potentially foreclosing any possibility of uncovering misconduct militates against applying Hedgecock in a broader factual context. We should also refrain from formulating any rule that would tend to inhibit or restrict the free exchange of ideas during the jury's deliberations. ( People v. Elkins (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 632, 638 [176 Cal. Rptr. 729]; cf. Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).) To the extent jurors might seek to guard against intrusive posttrial inquiry by counsel or the court, thorough and penetrating discussion of the merits of the case might suffer. Defendant argues unpersuasively that he did confront impermissible interference with his access to the jurors, thereby preventing him from making an evidentiary showing sufficient either to support his new trial motion or at least to justify a hearing under Hedgecock. As to the court's actions, we find no impropriety. A trial court has inherent as well as statutory discretion to control the proceedings to ensure the efficacious administration of justice. (See, e.g., § 1044; Evid. Code, § 765; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 734; Cooper v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 291, 301-302 [10 Cal. Rptr. 842, 359 P.2d 274].) The proper exercise of such discretion does not require the defense be allowed unqualified access to the jury after the conclusion of the trial. Indeed, by statute jurors now have an absolute right to decline any efforts to probe the particulars of their deliberations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (a), added by Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, § 2; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 [right of privacy]; People v. Atkins, supra, 203 Cal. App.3d at p. 27; Rules Prof. Conduct of State Bar, former rule 7106(D) [now rule 5-320(D)] [counsel may not harass or embarrass jurors by questioning after trial].) Accordingly, after being apprised of juror anxiety resulting from contacts by defense investigators, the court did not overstep its authority in directing that all further communication would be through the court clerk unless jurors were already agreeable. In this manner, the court actually preserved defendant's interests by providing a mechanism whereby the jurors could be relieved of their apprehensions if they were otherwise inclined to discuss the proceedings with defense investigators. (See also People v. Atkins, supra, 203 Cal. App.3d at p. 26.) As for the allegedly inflammatory actions of the prosecutor in speaking with the press, the record does not establish any connection between the prosecutor's conduct and juror reluctance to communicate with the defense. (64) We note in passing that, unless the prosecutor engages in some form of direct interference with a juror clearly desirous of speaking with the defense on matters that would provide grounds for a new trial, posttrial activities are generally not subject to any constitutional restraint. (Cf. In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31 [to establish violation of constitutional compulsory-process right, defendant must demonstrate causal link between the [prosecutor's] misconduct and his inability to present witnesses on his own behalf].) Defendant alludes to his own First Amendment right to communicate with jurors; we find no basis for denying the prosecution similar freedom to express an opinion concerning the trial proceedings. (See Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 [29 L.Ed.2d 284, 91 S.Ct. 1780].) Furthermore, since defendant enjoyed no right of access to the jurors, we find his reliance on the Sixth Amendment guaranties of right to counsel and a fair jury trial as well as his reference to due process unconvincing in this context.