Opinion ID: 671866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Joinder of the Fraud Counts

Text: 4 The district court allowed joinder of all the counts relating to the appellants' loan and subsidy fraud at ASCS because the transactions were part of the same series of acts or transactions within the meaning of Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b). The appellants contend that neither of them knew the other was involved with the common participant, Bagley, and knew nothing of the other's transactions. Appellants rely on United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.1977) and United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1026 (4th Cir.1976). The government urges that the case is controlled by United States v. Patterson, 455 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.1972), or, in the alternative, that there was evidence indicating that both of the appellants were aware of all of the fraudulent transactions. 5 The appellants clearly were part of the same series of transactions. As in Patterson, the schemes involved were virtually identical and a common participant, Bagley, was in charge of all transactions. Satterfield and Whitehead do not compel a different conclusion. Those cases hold only that the mere existence of a common participant, on its own, is not necessarily dispositive. In this case, the nature of the role of the common participant is important. Bagley was the ringleader in one ongoing series of transactions in which the appellants participated. 6 The appellants argue that even if the counts relating to the loan and subsidy fraud were properly joined under Rule 8(b), the district court abused its discretion in failing to sever the charges pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. The appellants have not satisfied their burden of showing clear prejudice, which is required for a finding of prejudicial joinder under Rule 14. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 845-46 (9th Cir.1994). The only prejudice alleged by the appellants, danger of guilt by association, is always inherent in joint trials and is not, on its own, grounds for severance. United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1387 (9th Cir.1993). Moreover, any prejudice was tempered by the district court's careful limiting instructions. We have found such instructions to be a crucial factor in determining whether joinder has been prejudicial, id., and have routinely upheld the denial of severance motions in cases in which such instructions have been given. United States v. Ford, 632 F.3d 1354, 1373-74 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981). Any doubt that the jury was unduly confused by joinder in this case is eliminated by the jury's decision to acquit each of the appellants on one of the counts with which they were charged. Baker, 10 F.3d at 1387 ( 'the best evidence of the jury's ability to compartmentalize the evidence is its failure to convict all defendants on all counts' ) (quoting United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1374 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988)). 7