Opinion ID: 2516617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether a State Employee Acted Within the Scope of His Employment is Properly Resolved on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) Motion

Text: Gallagher argues that the trial court improperly decided the factual issue of whether Zakely made the allegedly defamatory comments during the scope of his employment on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss instead of waiting to resolve the issue at trial. Under the CGIA, a state employee who commits an act or omission while performing within the scope of his employment is immune from liability that sounds in tort or that could sound in tort unless the tort is one of six exceptions enumerated in section 24-10-106, 7 C.R.S. (2002) [5] or unless the state employee's actions were willful and wanton. § 24-10-118, 7 C.R.S. (2002). Gallagher argues that our decision in Brace mandates that, like the question of whether the defendant's acts were willful and wanton, whether the acts occurred within the scope of employment is a question of qualified immunity that must be resolved at trial. In Brace, we distinguished between qualified and sovereign immunity. Brace, 919 P.2d at 245-46. For state law claims under the CGIA, when a public employee enjoys qualified immunity, the immunity is only a defense to liability and does not bar suit entirely. [6] Id. In contrast, sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional question, an absolute bar to suit, and prevents the court from maintaining subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. Id.; see also § 24-10-118. In Brace, we held that when a plaintiff asserts that the defendant public employee's actions were willful and wanton, the issue is one of qualified immunity. Id. at 246. Therefore, because qualified immunity is not a bar to suit, the trial court may not decide the issue on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as it may with a question of sovereign immunity. After the operative facts of Brace occurred and before we reached our ultimate decision, the legislature amended the CGIA statute to require that a plaintiff must plead with a specific factual basis that a public employee acted willfully and wantonly, and the failure to so plead shall result dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [7] Sections 24-10-110(5)(a) and (b) provide: (5)(a) In any action in which allegations are made that an act or omission of a public employee was willful and wanton, the specific factual basis of such allegations shall be stated in the complaint. (b) Failure to plead the factual basis of an allegation that an act or omission of a public employee was willful and wanton shall result in dismissal of the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, ch. 172, Colo. Sess. Laws (1992) (codified as amended at § 24-10-110(5)(a) and (b), 7 C.R.S. (2002)). At the same time, the general assembly provided that if a public employee raises the issue of sovereign immunity, then the court shall permit discovery on this issue only, and the court's decision on this issue shall be a final judgment subject to interlocutory appeal: (2.5) If a public employee raises the issue of sovereign immunity prior to or after the commencement of discovery, the court shall suspend discovery; except that any discovery necessary to decide the issue of sovereign immunity shall be allowed to proceed, and the court shall decide such issue on motion. The court's decision on such motion shall be a final judgment and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal. Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, ch. 172, Colo. Sess. Laws (1992) (codified as amended at § 24-10-118(2.5), 7 C.R.S. (2002)). When these two changes are considered together, we conclude as follows. First, the legislature foreshadowed our holding in Brace that an allegation of willful and wanton conduct does not raise a jurisdictional matter under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), but rather a claim to be determined at trial and not pre-trial, assuming sufficiency of the pleadings. Second, if a public employee asserts the defense of sovereign immunity, then this question shall be treated pre-trial and its resolution subject to interlocutory appeal. The procedure for determining whether a public employee may assert sovereign immunity is entirely different from that set forth for the determination of whether the employee acted willfully and wantonly. Clearly, for an employee to claim sovereign immunity and the benefit of this pretrial procedure, she must be acting within the scope of her employment. The legislature's directive to treat the determination of a public employee's sovereign immunity as a pre-trial matter is consistent with the policy behind the CGIA that led us to conclude that our legislature views governmental immunity as necessary for good government. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 453 (Colo.2001). Governmental immunity is also necessary to protect the public against unlimited liability and excessive fiscal burdens. Walton, 968 P.2d at 643. See also section 24-10-102, 7 C.R.S. (2001) (the state and its political subdivisions provide essential public services and functions and that unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provision of such essential public services and functions.). Such a required pre-trial decision permits the court to decide early whether the case is a dispute between private parties or one which involves the government. In this way, in some cases, the government is spared unneeded litigation expense. The above analysis indicates that, contrary to Gallagher's assertion, the factual inquiries of whether an employee acted willfully and wantonly and whether the employee acted within the scope of employment are not analogous. Because whether the employee acted within the scope of his employment is a basic prerequisite for immunity, we are persuaded that the question is jurisdictional and is one of sovereign, not qualified, immunity. Therefore, we hold that it is procedurally proper for a trial court to decide the question of scope of employment on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. When the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction regarding scope of employment is raised before the trial court, the same considerations discussed above regarding Gallagher's timeliness in filing his notice of claim apply to this question as well. The trial court is the finder of fact on the question of sovereign immunity. Therefore, the court should hold an evidentiary hearing and may permit limited discovery to resolve any disputed issues of fact. Here, Gallagher sued Zakely individually, not in his public capacity, for the tort of defamation. Zakely argues that he was acting within the scope of his employment at the time he made the allegedly defamatory comment. Defamation is a state claim that is not one of the six enumerated exceptions to tort immunity set forth in the CGIA. Gallagher did not allege that Zakely was acting willfully and wantonly when he made the allegedly defamatory comments. Therefore, if Zakely was acting within the scope of his employment, he would be immune under the CGIA, and the defamation claim against him would be barred. Given the above statutory interpretation and policy discussion, we hold that the trial court properly decided this issue pretrial pursuant to Zakely's C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, as with the arguments regarding Gallagher's whistleblower claims, there remain disputed issues of fact. The parties' briefs to this court extensively argue the facts surrounding Zakely's comment. Furthermore, the trial court's order is unclear as to how it decided that Zakely was acting within the scope of his employment at the time he made the allegedly defamatory comment. Hence, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court with directions to return the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Zakely was acting within the scope of his employment when he made the allegedly defamatory comments.