Opinion ID: 405374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deere's Remaining Claims

Text: 36 Deere's remaining claims are essentially subsumed in the disposition heretofore made. It is noted, however, that the district court did not err by allowing Roy Carter to testify regarding the worth of the repossessed equipment. This is true even if the standard to be applied under the reserve account cause of action is commercial reasonableness. Section 75-9-507(2) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, which is relied upon by Deere, states: 37 The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. 38 (emphasis added). 39 This language clearly reveals that Mississippi recognizes price, at least in some cases, to be a factor in determining commercial reasonableness. Therefore, if it is determined on remand that Deere was not a de facto trustee of the reserve account and, as a result, was governed by the terms of the contracts and the U.C.C., price cannot be the determinative factor, but it may be one factor. 40 Finally, this Court acknowledges Deere's complaint that the district court continually recognized objections to the admission of evidence as well taken or valid, but would overrule those objections anyway. Without determining whether such conduct resulted in cumulative prejudice, this Court determines that such an approach to valid objections to the admission of evidence is unnecessary and should be avoided on retrial.