Opinion ID: 1281880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Derived From Statements to Police Officer.

Text: The trial court excluded defendant's statements to the police officer on the ground that they were obtained as a result of custodial interrogation without advice of Miranda rights and after defendant asserted his right to counsel. The state did not appeal this issue. The admission of evidence derived from these statements, however, is at issue. Defendant contends that his keys and all the physical evidence seized from his room were derived from this Miranda -violative confession and should have been suppressed as tainted fruits of that prior illegality, citing Wong Sun v. United States, supra . Defendant raises no claim under the Oregon Constitution. We acknowledge that recent United States Supreme Court cases have emphasized that the Miranda warning requirements are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution, but are merely prophylactic measures to ensure that the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected. In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), a 5-4 decision by Justice Rehnquist, the Court adopted a public safety exception to the Miranda warning requirements, grounded on the belief that when a threat to public safety exists, the need for answers to questions outweighs the need for Miranda warnings. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), a 6-3 decision authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court stated in dictum that evidence which is the fruit of a Miranda violation need not be suppressed under a derivative evidence analysis. The actual holding in Elstad, a successive interrogation case, however, is considerably narrower. We conclude that these two cases are inapplicable because the instant case involves two separate, but related, illegalities: (1) custodial interrogation without advice of Miranda rights, and (2) continued questioning after defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. While we hesitate to speculate about the degree of continuing vitality of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that in custodial interrogation, if an accused requests counsel, questioning must cease until an attorney is present. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). A valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation cannot be shown by the fact that a defendant responded to further questioning. The accused must initiate further conversation with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884. The facts in the instant case do not support the conclusion that defendant waived his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Neither did he initiate further communication with the police. The questioning of a suspect in custody after he has asserted his right to counsel is a Fifth Amendment violation, and the doctrine of Wong Sun applies. We do not think that Quarles's public safety exception to Miranda warning requirements extends to a constitutional violation. We find Elstad inapposite for the same reason. [15] Defendant is correct that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would apply to taint all the physical evidence, including the victim's body, seized from defendant's room, because all were derived from an unconstitutional custodial interrogation, unless admissible on some independent ground.