Opinion ID: 835101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gift receipt restrictions

Text: ORS 244.025(1) provides that a public official may not    receive a gift or gifts exceeding $50 in value from a lobbyist. ORS 244.025(4)(a) prohibits a public official from receiving from a lobbyist payment of expenses for entertainment in any amount. ORS 244.042(1) and (2) prohibit a public official, a candidate for public office, or a member of the official's or candidate's household from receiving from a lobbyist honoraria with a value in excess of $50. For brevity's sake, we refer to those statutory limitations as restrictions on the receipt of gifts. Plaintiffs assert that the statutory restrictions on receiving gifts proscribe constitutionally protected expression. They argue that gifts, entertainment, and honoraria expenditures constitute lobbying as defined by ORS 171.725(8), [7] in that lobbying expenditures for meals, entertainment, and honoraria convey a general message of interest and appreciation in discussing legislative or administrative issues. Plaintiffs contend that this court previously has declared that lobbying is political speech protected under Article I, section 8. See Fidanque v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 328 Or. 1, 8, 969 P.2d 376 (1998) (discussing principle). Plaintiffs argue that, in this context, giving gifts constitutes lobbying because the gifts are clearly designed to attempt to influence legislative action or, at a minimum, to attempt to `obtain the good will' of a legislative official. Plaintiffs also assert that, because the statutes are directed at gifts made by persons with a legislative or administrative interest, and because the receipt of gifts is restricted only if there is some political advocacy associated with the expenditure, the statutes are directed at the content of this form of expression. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, the gift receipt restrictions fall under the first category of the Robertson framework. We turn to the merits of that claim. [8] As noted above, the statutory restrictions regulate a particular kind of conduct: the receipt of specified gifts. Receive means to take possession or delivery of (a gift)   . Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1894 (unabridged ed. 2002). The statutory restrictions are thus confined to the act of a public official, a candidate, or a relative or member of their household, in taking possession or delivery of a gift valued in excess of statutory limits. The statutory restrictions on the receipt of gifts contain five elements. First, the required time frame: the gift or gifts must be received within one calendar year. Second, the receiving party must fall in one of the four groups: (1) a public official; (2) a candidate for public office; (3) a relative of one of the foregoing persons; [9] or (4) a household member of one of the foregoing persons. Third, the party must receive a gift or gifts, that is, take possession or delivery. Fourth, the gift or gifts must have an aggregate value in excess of statutory limits. Fifth, the gift or gifts (but not honoraria) must come from a source of the kind identified by ORS 244.025(1): [A]ny single source that could reasonably be known to have a legislative or administrative interest in any governmental agency in which the public official holds, or the candidate if elected would hold, any official position or over which the public official exercises, or the candidate if elected would exercise, any authority. Honoraria must be received in connection with the official duties of either the public official or the public office for which the receiver is a candidate. In our view, the receipt of gifts restrictions are not written in terms directed to the substance of any opinion or any subject of communication, as Robertson explained that analytical principle. A public official who is subject to restrictions on the receipt of gifts can violate the restrictions without saying a word, without engaging in expressive conduct, and regardless of any opinion that he or she might hold. In Plowman, this court considered and rejected a similar free-speech challenge to a hate crime statute, stating: Persons can commit that crime without speaking a word, and holding no opinion other than their perception of the victim's characteristics. 314 Or. at 165, 838 P.2d 558. Because the receipt of gifts restrictions do not focus on the content of speech or writing, or on the expression of any opinion, we have no reason to analyze whether the restrictions fall within a well-established historical exception, id. at 163, 838 P.2d 558, or whether they restrain communications that are incompatible with a speaker's official role or responsibility. See In re Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 673 P.2d 855 (1983) (discussing incompatibility exception). Neither do the receipt of gifts restrictions focus on proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results, nor do they prohibit expression used to accomplish those forbidden results. Plaintiffs, however, relying on Fidanque, argue that the receipt of gifts by public officials is so closely bound up with lobbying communicationswhich they assert are a constitutionally protected form of expression that any restriction on the receipt of lobbyists' gifts necessarily restrains the practice of lobbying itself. More specifically, plaintiffs argue that this court should recognize gift-giving to legislators as a form of constitutionally protected expression because (1) the act of gift-giving typically is surrounded by communications about legislative business that constitute protected expression; (2) the motive behind gift-giving to legislative officials is the desire to influence governmental decisions, which reflects a key reason why the constitution's framers chose to protect expression in the constitution; and (3) any constitutional protection for political contributions should apply equally to gifts to legislative officials because they are indistinguishable from political contributions. We address each of plaintiffs' arguments, beginning with a discussion of this court's Fidanque decision. In Fidanque, two lobbyists challenged the validity of a statute that required all lobbyists to pay a biennial registration fee to the government to engage in lobbying. They contended, among other things, that the registration fee interfered with their free expression rights protected by Article I, section 8. This court recognized in Fidanque that lobbying was a profession that was essentially expressive [in] nature, 328 Or. at 8, 969 P.2d 376, and that lobbying constituted political speech. Id. at 7, 969 P.2d 376. The registration fee examined in Fidanque thus was a barrier to political expression by lobbyists. Id. at 9, 969 P.2d 376. However, in striking down the registration fee, this court did not express or imply that public officials or others are entitled to take delivery of property or other largess, free of regulation, simply because lobbyists proffer it in connection with a political communication. Nor did Fidanque express or imply that those who listen to and interact with lobbyistspublic officials and candidates for office, for examplehave a constitutional free expression right to receive gifts of property, free of governmental regulation. Although Fidanque properly recognized that lobbying the legislature is primarily expressive, id. at 7, 969 P.2d 376, that case does not aid plaintiffs here, because it did not examine specific types of lobbying activities to determine whether they involved constitutionally protected expression and, to the extent they involve expression, whether they are subject to legislative regulation. This court, however, has previously analyzed (1) whether regulated conduct should be categorized as protected expression because other free speech activity surrounds or accompanies the regulated conduct, and (2) whether the actor's motive to express a viewpoint can require the court to treat regulated conduct as protected expression. In Huffman and Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 317 Or. 445, 857 P.2d 101 (1993), the plaintiff, a logging company, brought a tort action for trespass to chattels against six persons who had participated in a demonstration against logging on a forest road. During the demonstration, the defendants, without permission, climbed on, and chained themselves to, several pieces of the plaintiff's logging equipment. While chained, the defendants made statements, sang songs, and chanted slogans to express their views about the environment. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment for compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Huffman and Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 109 Or.App. 37, 817 P.2d 1334 (1991). On review, the plaintiffs challenged the punitive damages award on free expression grounds. After describing the defendants' trespassory actions, this court stated: Although those acts undoubtedly had a communicative effect, in the sense that most purposive human activity communicates something about the frame of mind of the actor, the acts were conduct, not speech. The question becomes, then, whether defendants are nonetheless constitutionally immune from potential responsibility for punitive damages because of the message that their conduct assertedly was trying to convey, the reason for their conduct, or the fact that speech accompanied their conduct. 317 Or. at 449-50, 857 P.2d 101 (omitted). The court then turned to an analysis of other Oregon cases examining both criminal and civil laws, including the common law of torts, to determine their rationales for permitting or prohibiting punishment of conduct associated with expression. [10] The court noted that Plowman contained two lessons, both of which are pertinent to this case: The first is that a person's reason for engaging in punishable conduct does not transform conduct into expression under Article I, section 8. The second lesson is that speech accompanying punishable conduct does not transform conduct into expression under Article I, section 8. 317 Or. at 452, 857 P.2d 101 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). In Huffman, the court also observed that it had established the analytical line between successful and unsuccessful constitutional challenges to various forms of regulation of conduct by focusing on whether speech was an element of the regulation or the cause of the claimed damage. On the one hand, the court had nullified punitive damages awards in cases in which speech was an element of the tort at issue, see Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1979) (defamation), or the defendant had committed the tort only by speech, see Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981) (claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress was based solely on store security officer's statements during employee interrogation). On the other hand, the court had concluded that, in tort cases involving harm caused only in part by speech, a defendant who requests it is entitled to an instruction limiting the tortious predicate for punitive damages to conduct not protected by the free speech provision of Article I, section 8. 317 Or. at 457, 857 P.2d 101. See, e.g., Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 302 Or. 616, 733 P.2d 430 (1987) (illustrating principle). The Huffman court then turned to an application of those principles to the tort of trespass to chattels involved in that case. The court determined that the jury had been entitled to find that the defendants' trespassory activities, such as chaining themselves to the plaintiff's equipment, caused the disturbance of plaintiff's possession of its personal property, wholly apart from any motivating opinion, underlying message, or accompanying speech. The trespassory acts were, therefore, `non-expressive conduct' within the meaning of Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., supra . The message that defendants sought to convey by their conduct, the reason for their conduct, and the spoken and written words accompanying their conduct did not transform defendants' conduct into speech. 317 Or. at 458, 857 P.2d 101. The judgment for punitive damages was affirmed. Id. at 462, 857 P.2d 101. Applying the analytical model used in Huffman, we conclude that the terms of the gift receipt restrictions limit nonexpressive conductnot expression. As a general matter, the act of delivering property to a public official is nonexpressive conduct. Lobbyists may regularly convey political messages to public officials at or near the occasions of their gift giving. Lobbyists also may intend their gift-giving to communicate political support or goodwill toward the recipientsas this court has observed, most purposive human activity communicates something about the frame of mind of the actor. Huffman and Wright Logging Co., 317 Or. at 450, 857 P.2d 101. But something more is required to elevate mere purposive human activity into protected expression. To the extent that the gift receipt restrictions interfere with gift- giving by lobbyists, they impede only nonexpressive conduct. Moreover, the array of political expressions and communicative intentions that may surround the giving of gifts by lobbyists does not immunize the nonexpressive conduct of gift-giving from legislative regulation. [11] That brings us to plaintiffs' final argument, viz., that gift-giving by lobbyists to public officials is analogous to the giving of political contributions to candidates and campaigns, and that, consistent with Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or. 514, 931 P.2d 770 (1997) ( Vannatta I ), this court should declare that the giving of gifts to public officials, like campaign contributions, is constitutionally protected expression under Article I, section 8. In Vannatta I, the plaintiffs challenged various statutory measures, adopted through the initiative process, including a mandatory limit on contributions to state political candidates and campaigns. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the contributions limitations violated Article I, section 8, because campaign contributions and expenditures were constitutionally protected expression under Article I, section 8. In analyzing the plaintiffs' argument, the Vannatta I court first accepted a concession by the parties that campaign expenditures constitute protected expression. 324 Or. at 520, 931 P.2d 770. However, with regard to campaign contributions, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had held in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), that campaign contributions were a kind of expression that was less central to the core of First Amendment expression and, thus, were subject to governmental restriction, with the constitutionality of any particular restriction being determined based on a balancing of the interests involved. Vannatta I, 324 Or. at 521, 931 P.2d 770. The court described two of the reasons on which Buckley had relied for that conclusion: (i) although contributions may result in speech, that speech is by the candidate and not by the contributor; and (ii) contributions express only general support for a candidate and do not communicate the reasons for that support. Id. The court in Vannatta I then stated: Neither of those assumptions appears correct to us. In our view, a contribution is protected as an expression by the contributor, not because the contribution eventually may be used by a candidate to express a particular message. The money may never be used to promote a form of expression by the candidate; instead, it may (for example) be used to pay campaign staff or to meet other needs not tied to a particular message. However, the contribution, in and of itself, is the contributor's expression of support for the candidate or cause an act of expression that is completed by the act of giving and that depends in no way on the ultimate use to which the contribution is put. Id. at 522, 931 P.2d 770 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs, relyingnot unreasonably, in our viewon the preceding paragraph from Vannatta I, assert that any donation to a political figure, including a public official, that the donor intends as an expression of support is necessarily a form of expression protected by Article I, section 8. In our view, however, plaintiffs read the foregoing statements out of context. The statements on which plaintiffs rely are best understood if we clarify and explain them in light of the balance of the discussion in Vannatta I. First, the court's assertion in Vannatta I that a political contribution is protected expression even if it never promotes any political message was made in connection with the court's disagreement with the two assumptions, noted above, on which the United States Supreme Court had relied for its ruling in Buckley. Second, and most important in our view, the court's rationale for the holding in Vannatta I that campaign contributions are protected speech is based on the assumption by the Vannatta I court that campaign contributions are so inextricably intertwined with the candidate or the campaign's expression of its message that the two cannot be separated. In other words, the Vannatta I court assumed that restricting campaign contributions restricts a candidate's or a campaign's ability to communicate a political message. It is that assumption that underlies the court's determination that the statutory campaign contribution limitations at issue in Vannatta I violated Article I, section 8. Because that premiserestricting campaign contributions restricts the ability to communicate political messagesis in question here, two other clarifying comments are necessary. First, the court's statement in Vannatta I that campaign contributions were constitutionally protected forms of expression regardless of the ultimate use to which the contribution is put was unnecessary to the court's holding. On further reflection, we conclude that that observation was too broad and must be withdrawn. Second, because Vannatta I assumed a symbiotic relationship between the making of contributions and the candidate's or campaign's ability to communicate a political message, this court did not squarely decide in Vannatta I that, in every case, the delivery to a public official, a candidate, or a campaign of money or something of value also is constitutionally protected expression as a matter of law. The foregoing discussion undermines plaintiffs' reliance on Vannatta I. Giving a gift to a public official is not inextricably linked with a public official's ability to carry out official functions. Public officials can speak whether or not lobbyists have given them gifts, which distinguishes this case from Vannatta I and its focus on the connection between the restriction on campaign contributions and the candidate's or campaign's ability to communicate a political message. We agree with the state that the restrictions on receiving gifts withstand plaintiffs' constitutional challenge because the lobbying activity on which plaintiffs based their challengegiving gifts to public officialsis nonexpressive conduct. That determination is consistent with this court's analysis and conclusion in Huffman and Wright Logging Co., and is correct, at least in the absence of facts (which plaintiffs do not offer here) demonstrating that the state's enforcement of the restrictions has the effect of suppressing or restricting expression in a specific case. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court correctly determined that plaintiffs' challenges to the gift receipt restrictions were not well taken, and that the court therefore correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the state.