Opinion ID: 1444172
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Heading: The State Standards Applicable To Parole And Probation Searches

Text: Among our own cases, Burgener, People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336, and Tyrell J. illustrate what a moveable feast the Fourth Amendment can be. In Burgener, an adult parolee, subject to a warrantless search condition, became the prime suspect in the police investigation of a robbery and murder at a convenience store. The search was authorized by the defendant's parole agent after the police related the circumstances leading them to believe the defendant was involved. We relied on a balancing test to find imposition of a warrantless search condition was not per se unreasonable if conducted for a purpose properly related to parole supervision. ( Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 532, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) However, in assessing the validity of the parole search, we returned to a consideration of the warrant requirement and the probable cause standard before concluding a lesser standard of reasonable suspicion would suffice. The balance thus falls heavily on the side of the governmental interest in public safety, and leads to a conclusion that the appropriate standard of reasonableness to justify a parole search is a reasonable suspicion on the part of the parole officer that the parolee is again involved in criminal activity, or has otherwise violated his parole, and that the search may turn up evidence of that activity, or that evidence of a proposed future violation by the parolee will be uncovered. That suspicion must of course be based on articulable facts which together with rational inferences from those facts warrant objectively reasonable suspicion. ( Id. at p. 535, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) In People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d 600, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336 (hereafter Bravo ), an anonymous informant told police the volume of traffic in and around the defendant's home indicated he was involved in the sale of narcotics. The defendant was an adult probationer subject to a warrantless search condition. Although police surveillance failed to confirm any suspicious activity, the officers learned the defendant was on probation and searched his residence. The search led to the seizure of cocaine, firearms and cash. The defendant challenged the search, claiming the officers' actions were unlawful because they lacked reasonable suspicion. We disagreed. An adult probationer consents to a waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison sentence. (43 Cal.3d at p. 608, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.) `[W]hen [a] defendant in order to obtain probation specifically [agrees] to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily [waives] whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.' ( Id. at p. 607, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336, quoting People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 766, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630.) We read the consent in Mason as a complete waiver of that probationer's Fourth Amendment rights, save only his right to object to harassment or searches conducted in an unreasonable manner. ( Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 607, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.) Bravo ... establishes that an adult probationer subject to a search condition may be searched by law enforcement officers having neither a search warrant nor even reasonable cause to believe their search will disclose any evidence. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 80, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519, fn. omitted.) The consent exception to the warrant requirement may not be invoked to validate the search of an adult parolee because, under the Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, parole is not a matter of choice. The Board of Prison Terms must provide a period of parole; the prisoner must accept it. (Pen. Code, § 3000 et seq.) Without choice, there can be no voluntary consent to inclusion of the search condition. (See Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 529, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) In Tyrell J., an officer on patrol during a high school football game saw Tyrell J. and two other minors, all identified as members of the U-Boys ganga group involved in a shooting incident a week earlier. Because one of the boys was wearing a heavy quilted coat in 80-degree heat, the-officer stopped the trio. The officer retrieved a large hunting knife from the youngster wearing the coat. Because Tyrell J. made several furtive adjustments to his clothing, the officer conducted a patdown search and retrieved a bag of marijuana the juvenile had partially concealed in his pants. Tyrell J. was on juvenile probation and subject to a warrantless search condition of which the officer was unaware. Because a juvenile has no right to refuse probation, we declined to apply Bravo 's advance consent rationale. The juvenile court's broad discretion is distinguishable from that exercised by adult courts and juvenile probation is not an act of leniency but a final order made in the juvenile's best interest. Since the minor has no choice, the search does not fall within the consent exception outlined in Bravo. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 81-83, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) Nevertheless, this court upheld the search. We found the circumstances surrounding the challenged search reveal[ed] [the minor's] expectation of privacy is not one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and legitimate. We conclude[d] a juvenile probationer subject to a valid search condition does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over his or her person or property. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 86, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) Unlike Burgener, which sought to calibrate precisely what level of suspicion could reasonably substitute for probable cause, Tyrell J. considered what expectation of privacy could reasonably trigger a requirement for individualized suspicion. Although Tyrell J. does not precisely answer the question presented here, in these limited circumstances, its contextual approach seems preferable to the more rigid formulations of earlier cases. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment prohibition is to `safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.' ( People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, 934, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 524, 863 P.2d 769, italics added, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930.) What is reasonable depends upon all the circumstances surrounding the search and seizure. ( New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 337-342,105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (hereafter T.L.O.). )