Opinion ID: 774531
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery/Evidentiary Hearing

Text: 20 We review a district court's limitation on the scope of discovery for an abuse of discretion. See28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2);Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1993). A district court may, in the context of a habeas proceeding, permit discovery, provided that the habeas petitioner presents specific allegations showing reason to believe that the facts, if fully developed, may lead the district court to believe that federal habeas relief is appropriate. See Rule 6(a) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Courts; Lynott v. Story, 929 F.2d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 1991). We review a district court's decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Mitchell v. Rees, 114 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 1997).
21 On November 18, 1997, Lott filed with the district court a motion for leave to conduct discovery, which the district court granted in part on March 18, 1998, except insofar as it sought leave to allow Lott to take the depositions of his previous counsel. The district court ordered the parties to complete discovery by May 15, 1998. Lott also requested an evidentiary hearing. In response to this request, the district court ordered him to brief for the court the reasons for his entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Briefing was to be completed by April 27, 1998. On April 23, 1998, after having already submitted some briefing on the issue, Lott requested an additional three weeks to file a supplemental brief on the same issue, so that he could include information within the brief that had been gained as a result of discovery. The district court granted Lott's request. 22 One month later, on May 22, 1998, after having completed the discovery permitted by the court, Lott filed an unopposed motion to compel discovery and to modify the scheduling order, because a City of Cleveland Police Department records custodian had failed to appear at a scheduled records deposition. Lott sought testimony from the custodian concerning documents of investigation and analysis of fingerprints, documents or video or audio recordings relating to physical descriptions of the suspect, or any documents from the prosecutor's files relating to fingerprints or witness identification of the suspect or documentation of a decision to withhold such information from [Lott], which Lott believed to be in the possession of the City of Cleveland Police Department. The court never ruled on the motion, and on March 25, 1999, both parties filed a joint motion for a status conference to resolve the discovery dispute. 23 On March 31, 1999, the district court denied Lott's motion because: (1) Lott sought to extend an already expired deadline (and one which had previously been extended), thus rendering the motion untimely; (2) Lott's counsel failed to certify that his informal, good-faith efforts to resolve the dispute had been unsuccessful; (3) Lott's counsel never attempted to address the dispute by resort to a telephone conference, as required by Local Rule 37.1; and (4) a review of the motion revealed that it was unnecessary, in light of the City of Cleveland's explanation, after it had conducted a thorough search, that the requested documents were not within its possession. The district court also denied the parties' joint motion for a status conference and Lott's request for an evidentiary hearing. On April 14, 1999, Lott filed a motion to alter or amend the district court's judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, which the district court denied on August 26, 1999. 2 24
25 Lott contends that the district court, in denying his motion to compel discovery, erroneously found: (1) that the motion was untimely, and (2) that the motion did not contain a certification from counsel stating that good-faith efforts to resolve the discovery dispute had been unsuccessful. In point of fact, Lott argues, the motion, which was the first and only one that had been filed, had been filed consistent with local discovery rules and did contain a good-faith certification from counsel.In light of the foregoing, and because the district court found that Lott had demonstrated good cause to conduct discovery, Lott contends that he was entitled to have his motion granted, and that the district court's failure to do so was error. SeeBracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 901 (1997); Lynott, 929 F.2d at 232. 26 It appears that the district court's conclusion that Lott's motion was deficient rested in part on erroneous factual determinations. First, as to the question of timeliness, our review of the record suggests that, while it is true that Lott's motion sought to extend a deadline that had already expired, the deadline had not been previously extended, as the district court suggested. Moreover, while the district court correctly concluded that a motion to compel discovery must be filed within ten days of the discovery cut-off date, see N.D. Ohio R. 37.1, Lott in fact did comply with this rule, filing his motion on May 22, 1998, seven days after the May 15, 1998, discovery deadline. Second, it is undisputed that Lott's counsel attached to Lott's motion a letter to the prosecutor detailing counsel's difficulty in obtaining records from the City of Cleveland Police Department. We see no reason why such a letter would not qualify as the requisite good-faith certification from counsel. Despite these seemingly erroneous factual determinations, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Lott's motion. The remaining considerations on which the district court's denial was based -- Lott's failure to resort to the requisite telephone conference and the City of Cleveland Police Department's denial that it possessed the documents -- provided a sufficient basis for the district court to conclude that denial was appropriate. 27
28 As already discussed, the district court permitted Lott three weeks after the completion of discovery to file a supplemental brief outlining the reasons for his entitlement to an evidentiary hearing under AEDPA. Lott had already argued unsuccessfully that AEDPA did not change the legal standard for granting an evidentiary hearing. 3 The district court refused to allow him the opportunity to submit a supplemental brief on the issue, which he contends would have included exculpatory evidence obtained during the federal discovery process; such evidence would have related to Mr. Lott's Brady, identification, ineffective assistance of counsel, and cause of death claims. 29 Lott now argues that the district court's refusal to permit additional briefing, and an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in that briefing, was error. Such a hearing, according to Lott, would have resolved material factual disputes, including those regarding (i) the cause and prejudice excusing any procedural default that the Court deemed to exist; and (ii) the merits of his claims (including the identification, ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady, and cause of death claims). He also suggests that if the district court had granted his motion to compel discovery, discussed supra, he could have included with the supplemental brief documents obtained from the City of Cleveland Police Department. 30 Respondent emphasizes Lott's contradictory positions that, on the one hand, AEDPA's enactment had no effect on the question whether he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and, on the other, that the district court abused its discretion by denying him the opportunity to brief the impact AEDPA had on his entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. Respondent also suggests that Lott's claim is fatally flawed because he fails to discuss how the district court's denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing prejudiced him; in the absence of such a discussion, Lott cannot demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. On the question of the district court's refusal to permit Lott to append additional discovery materials to his brief, Respondent again argues that Lott has failed to show how this denial prejudiced him; in any event, Respondent notes, the district court reviewed the disputed materials when it evaluated Lott's motion to alter or amend the judgment and concluded that they had no impact on its decisions concerning either Lott's entitlement to additional discovery and an evidentiary hearing, or the underlying merits of any of his claims. 31 While Respondent notes correctly that Lott has taken inherently contradictory positions, we presume that Lott is making alternative arguments, which he is permitted to do. Lott's first argument -- that his right to an evidentiary hearing is not governed by AEDPA -- is incorrect as a matter of law. Where a habeas petitioner has filed his petition after the effective date of AEDPA (April 24, 1996), section 2254(e)(2) of AEDPA provides the relevant standard for determining whether he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326-27, 337. Lott filed his habeas petition on February 3, 1997. Section 2254(e)(2) provides: 32 (e)(2)If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that - 33 (A)the claim relies on - 34 (i)a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 35 (ii)a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 36 (B)the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 37 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2). 38 Lott's second argument, that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing, is also without merit. The district court concluded that Lott was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he was unable to explain when and how he obtained the police notes which purportedly contain a misidentification by McGrath, and ha[d] presented no other evidence to suggest the existence of a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Neither in his motion to alter or amend the judgment nor in his brief for purposes of this appeal did Lott address: (1) when and how he obtained the new factual information; (2) why that information could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; (3) whether the facts underlying the claim would establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the omission of these facts at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found Lott guilty; and, (4)as suggested by Respondent, how the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing prejudiced him. 4 In light of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion.