Opinion ID: 704021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Located thereon.

Text: 17 The district court construed the 1934 statutory term located to mean something more than the level of possession, occupancy or use which might be used in different contexts to establish aboriginal title. [T]his court will not apply the same standard regarding the intensity of 'possession, occupancy, and use' required to establish aboriginal title. The Hopi Tribe's claims in this case are based on recognized title granted by the 1934 Act. Masayesva, 793 F.Supp. at 1500 (emphasis in original). 2 Although the district court required more substantial occupancy than for aboriginal title, it rejected the Navajo argument that continual physical presence was necessary. Here is the standard that the district court applied to the evidence, in order to determine which pockets of land were occupied by the Hopi tribe: 18 The Court finds that the use by Hopi Indians must be substantial and sufficiently intensive in order to create a property interest in the 1934 Reservation, though the use does not have to be for subsistence purposes. Use by a few isolated individuals, especially when away from traditional use areas of that individual's Tribe, and irregular or sporadic uses are not sufficient. However, since seasonal use is pervasive in Indian land use patterns, and indeed necessary in the harsh environment of the 1934 Reservation, substantial seasonal use is sufficient for this Court to find occupation or use of the land. 19 Id. at 1501. 20 The Hopis argue that this standard was erroneous as a matter of law, because it required more intensive use and occupancy than the aboriginal title cases ordinarily do. We assume for purposes of discussion, without deciding, that the Hopis are correct in their argument that the district court imposed a more stringent requirement than the one which has evolved in aboriginal title cases. We conclude, nevertheless, that the district court correctly construed the statutory phrase located in this statute. 21 Our use of the phrase possessed, occupied, or used in our 1980 decision was not intended to import a particular level of intensity into the level of usage which would suffice under the statutory term located. We used the terms settled and occupied as well. We did not distinguish which of these different levels of intensity were sufficient to satisfy the statutory term located, because that was not the issue we were deciding. We were resolving the question of whether the statute conferred to the Hopi tribe a half interest in the whole reservation, a half interest in the areas the tribe occupied, or an exclusive interest in the areas occupied. The district court was correct, on remand, in not reading into the phrase possessed, occupied or used a decision on the intensity of use. See United States v. Andrade-Larrios, 39 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir.1994) (noting distinction between holding and dictum). 22 The Hopis argue that the district court erred in apparently equat[ing] 'use, occupation, or possession' with the term 'located' as used in the 1934 Act. What we, and the district court, must apply is precisely that Act. Congress in 1934 used the term, located. This word was not a term of art connoting lands which people merely passed over occasionally or otherwise used to a very low level of intensity. The district court's construction was consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word. It was well designed to serve the purpose of the 1934 Act: 23 Congress recognized Hopi concern over the 1882 reservation and their villages, shrines, and grazing areas outside the 1882 reservation. The such other Indians provision was explained to the Hopis as protecting their rights to areas occupied outside the 1882 reservation. 24 Sekaquaptewa, 619 F.2d at 808. We review the district court's construction of the statute de novo, Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.1994), and conclude that it was correct and a correct implementation of this court's mandate in Sekaquaptewa. 25 We reject the Hopis' argument that located must be construed to mean the same thing as possession, occupation, or use under decisions by the Indian Claims Commission and Court of Claims. See 25 U.S.C. Secs. 70-70v (now omitted); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1505. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 160-62 (1982 ed.); William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law 228-31 (1st ed. 1981). The Indian Claims Commission was authorized, inter alia, to hear claims arising from the taking by the United States ... of lands owned or occupied by the claimant without the payment for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 70a. This provision permitted compensation for the taking of land held pursuant to aboriginal title: 26 Indian tribes that occupied and used the land to the exclusion of others (except for mere temporary excursions) had an interest denoted as a right of occupancy. This right later came to be known as original Indian title or sometimes simply as Indian title or aboriginal title. That title cannot be compromised by any other party except the federal government. [citations omitted] ... A taking by the federal government of lands held by original Indian title does not give rise to any right of compensation under the Fifth Amendment. [citation omitted] In this respect original title is to be distinguished from recognized title.... A taking of original Indian title by the federal government may ... provide the basis for a claim under the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946. 27 Canby, supra, at 223-24. See also Cohen, supra, at 491-92 (Of course, Congress can provide compensation for the taking of original Indian title [although it does not have to do so].... The Indian Claims Commission Act was a congressional program of limited retrospective compensation for extinguishment of Indian title). 28 The line of cases on which the Hopis rely to construe the phrase possession, occupation, or use began twelve years after the 1934 Act was passed. Congress could not have meant to use a meaning not yet given to a phrase it did not use, when it wrote located into the 1934 statute. Moreover, the Hopis are not litigating their aboriginal title to these lands, but rather the recognized title conferred on them by the 1934 Act. The district court in an earlier decision took note of a previous determination that Hopi usage in these areas had been insufficient to establish aboriginal title under a less stringent standard than that in the 1934 Act. Sekaquaptewa, 448 F.Supp. at 1188 (citing Hopi Tribe v. United States, 31 Ind.Cl.Comm. 16 (1973); Hopi Tribe v. United States, 23 Ind.Cl.Comm. 277 (1970)). The land described in a statute as subject to recognized title may or may not have been part of the aboriginal territory of the tribe. Canby, supra, at 226. See also 42 C.J.S. Indians Sec. 72(b) (1991) (The nature and extent of the rights and title of Indians in a reservation do not depend on aboriginal possession, but are measured by the terms of the governing act....). 29 The district court's findings of fact as to the nature, scope, and intensity of Hopi land use are reviewed for clear error. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2125, 128 L.Ed.2d 682 (1994). Application of principles of law to facts are mixed questions of law and fact. Under United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202-04 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc), we review the district court's application of law to facts for clear error where it is strictly factual, but de novo where application of law to fact requires consideration of legal principles. 30 The district court made extensive findings about the extent of non-religious but traditional activities such as gathering plants, wood for construction and fires, materials for use in tools, and so forth. Masayesva, 793 F.Supp. at 1528-30. It decided that the Hopi use of the widespread areas in which these activities took place was not so regular or extensive as to amount to the Hopis having been located there. Id. The court found that many such places were used depending on where an individual happened to be travelling, were used less often than once a year, or otherwise were not particular areas regularly used. Id. The Hopis do not contest the district court's factual findings as to the nature, extent, intensity and duration of this traditional land usage. The district court findings regarding these areas were not clearly erroneous. 31 Because we have concluded that the district court correctly construed the statutory term located, the Hopis' argument that the case should be remanded for application of a less intensive occupied or used standard is necessarily rejected. The Hopis make two arguments about location in 1934 that are not controlled by this determination: (1) the district court failed to apply the standard correctly to areas where their religious uses were located in 1934; (2) the findings on where they grazed in 1934 were clearly erroneous. 32
33 The district court rejected the Hopi claims to religious locations. 34 [T]he Hopi Tribe claims in the 1934 Reservation based on the eagle gathering activities, visiting shrines, and gathering of ceremonial plants and animals are not sufficient occupation, use and possession to establish a property interest for exclusive use or partition purposes. 35 Id. at 1528. The religious locations included places visited for religious rituals and marked with rock cairns, petroglyphs, or hidden depositories for offerings. The Hopis also had traditional areas where eagle feathers were gathered for ceremonial purposes and shrines within those areas. The court also rejected Hopi title to traditional areas for gathering fir boughs, wild tobacco, and animals for use in religious ceremonies. 36 The district court gave three reasons for this rejection. All three require consideration of legal principles and are not strictly factual, so we review de novo. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202-04. 37 First, the district court held that a 1974 statute entitling tribes to Interior Department protection of religious access obviated any claim of title: 38 Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act to the contrary, the Secretary shall make reasonable provision for the use of and right to access to identified religious shrines for the members of each tribe on the reservation of the other tribe where such use and access are for religious purposes. 39 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-20. On the basis of this statute, the district court concluded: 40 Given that access to religious shrines will be protected, the Hopi Tribe cannot persuasively argue that their presence gives the Hopi Tribe a property interest in the 1934 Reservation. 41 Masayesva, 793 F.Supp. at 1527. 42 We reject the district court's reasoning. The religious access statute was passed almost a half century after the 1934 Act. If the Hopis became entitled to property under the 1934 Act, they could not lose it because subsequent legislation added to their protection. The statute is not superfluous, even for shrines the Hopis own. For example, it protects each tribe's right to cross other tribes' land to reach its shrines, to decide who can go to the shrines, to control maintenance, and to such other protections as may be necessary for appropriate religious use. This 1974 religious access statute cannot, however, have any bearing on whether the Hopis were located at a particular shrine in 1934. If they were, they are entitled to the shrine, regardless of the terms of the 1974 statute, and even if Congress were to repeal it. 43 Second, the district court held that allowing Hopi religious use to establish a property interest would contradict Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). While we agree with the district court that a religious use does not by itself create a property interest, the property interest in the Hopi religious shrines is created by the 1934 Act, not the religious use by itself. As we said in our previous decision, one of the purposes of the 1934 Act was to protect the Hopis' rights to areas occupied outside the 1882 reservation by shrines. Sekaquaptewa, 619 F.2d at 808. Lyng and Manybeads v. United States, 730 F.Supp. 1515 (D.Ariz.1989), were First Amendment cases; this is a property rights case. If the Hopis were located, for a religious use, on certain land in 1934, then this was among the pockets occupied to which they obtained title under the 1934 Act. 44 Third, the district court held that the religious uses were not sufficiently intensive to satisfy the statutory located criterion. For example: 45 Eagle gathering occurred only once a year, with only a small number of men involved. The Hopi Tribe failed to demonstrate that a substantial number of Hopis travelled to shrines outside the immediate vicinity of the Hopi villages in the 1930's, and many of the shrines are often only known to a small number of Hopis. 46 Id. at 1528. Because this conclusion was largely legal, depending on whether annual use or use by small numbers of people, sufficed, rather than strictly factual, we review it de novo. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202-04. 47 We cannot accept that once a year use is too infrequent for a tribe to be located at a religious site. Many religious observances take place only once a year, e.g., Yom Kippur, Christmas, Easter. Nor does use by only a few people, or people of only one sex, disqualify a religious site. Many religions require that access to a holy site be limited to a designated few people and to special times. In the Jewish religion, only one man, the high priest, could enter the holiest location, and he could do that only once a year. See Leviticus 16 (only Aaron could enter the innermost shrine, and only on the tenth day of the seventh month, to make expiation for the sins of all Israelites). Many shrines, such as Mecca and the Western Wall, are holy to a religion, even though most of its adherents have never been there. Some holy sites, such as the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, are known only to a minority of adherents of the religion. Some religions, such as that of the Druse, are largely secret even from their own adherents who have not obtained a particular status within the religion. Some religions limit participation in certain rites to men, or to priests. The district court demanded a level of intensity of occupancy of Hopi holy sites which would be inconsistent with the practices of many religions. 48 We remand, so that the district court can award identifiable locations regularly and exclusively used for religious observances or activities by the Hopis to that tribe. Locations that were regularly used by both Hopis and Navajos may be determined to be subject to partition on the basis of fairness and equity. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-7(b). A religious shrine marked by a physical object or marking, such as rock cairns, petroglyphs, and hidden depositories for offerings, is an identifiable location. The district court must determine whether the eagle feather gathering and other religious hunting and gathering areas are sufficiently identifiable and subject to demarcation of boundaries so that the Hopis were located there in 1934. 49 We affirm the district court's conclusion that the evidence ... reflects that ceremonial plant gathering was sporadic and at irregular intervals and usually occurred around the vicinity [of] Moenkopi, off-reservation ... or inside the 1882 reservation. Masayesva, 793 F.Supp. at 1528. Sporadic activity at irregular intervals over a general area not subject to precise demarcation is not a place where the Hopis were located in 1934. 50 Where the Hopis can show for 1934(1) physical evidence of a shrine, such as a rock cairn or petroglyphs, or (2) regular (such as annual) religious use of a specific and identifiable area (as may be the case with eagle feather gathering), that is enough to show location. This does not imply that the Hopis are entitled to all of Hopitutskwa. The district court must use its discretion to allocate a reasonable amount of land around the shrine or regular use area to provide for its appropriate use and maintenance and reasonable access thereto. 51
52 The Hopis argue that the district court erred in its findings of fact regarding the extent of the grazing area in which the Hopis were located in 1934. This issue is purely factual, so we review for clear error. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 681. [R]eview under the 'clearly erroneous' standard is significantly deferential, requiring a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'  Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 2280, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993). 53 The district court made meticulous findings of fact, supported with detailed reference to the evidence, in its decision after the first phase of the trial to decide where the Hopis grazed their herds in 1934. Masayesva, 793 F.Supp. at 1509-26. At the end of the second phase of the case, deciding on a fair and equitable partition of the areas jointly occupied in 1934, the court refined its findings regarding 1934 occupancy. Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1397-1401. 54 The Hopis suggest that the court incorrectly mixed together the question of where they were located in 1934, with what would be a fair and equitable partition based on modern-day location. The court stated that it was distinguishing the two questions: 55 On April 27, 1992, this Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding the Hopi interest in the 1934 Reservation.... The earlier Findings generally described the areas which the Hopis had exclusively or jointly used in 1934 based on evidence presented at the trial held between October 17, 1989 and February 8, 1990 (Phase I of this proceeding). 56 This opinion will more specifically delineate the boundaries of the area which this Court found Hopis had exclusively used, and that area found to have been jointly used by the Hopis and Navajos in 1934. This Court will then partition the joint use area.... 57 Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1394. While we might draw different inferences from some evidence than did the district court, we are unable to conclude, under the applicable standard of review, that the district court clearly erred. 58 The Hopis present a careful argument for why the evidence should have compelled a different conclusion on three geographic areas. On each, however, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err. 59
60 The district court initially found that the Navajos and Hopis jointly grazed throughout the Ward Terrace area in 1934. Masayesva, 793 F.Supp. at 1517. The court subsequently amended its findings of fact to clarify what it meant by Ward Terrace. The court decided that the Hopis had not shown that an area bounded by Ward Terrace on the east, Highway 89 to Cameron on the west, and the Little Colorado River on the southwest, had been used substantially, and so excluded it from the joint use area. Id. at 1534. The court also delimited the southern boundary of Hopi use in the Ward Terrace area. Id. at 1534-35. 61 The Hopis argue that the district court erred in concluding that 129-300 cattle could not have intensively used the entire Ward Terrace and that Hopi use was therefore not sufficiently substantial to constitute location. Id. at 1535, n. 6. However, the district court explained in footnote 6 why it rejected the Hopi evidence. The court pointed to one witness' lack of specificity, the inconsistency of another witness' testimony, and the failure of proof of intensive, frequent use. The district court's findings as to Ward Terrace were not clearly erroneous. 62
63 The court found that Coal Mine Mesa was jointly used. Id. at 1524. As to Moenkopi Plateau, the court found that the evidence clearly support[ed] the Hopi claim of grazing on the western and northern portions of the Plateau. Id. at 1517. The court also found that portions of the central and southern Moenkopi Plateau were used exclusively by Hopis but that other portions were jointly used. Id. at 1521-22. Before the partition phase of the trial, the court delimited a southern boundary to the Moenkopi Plateau joint use area. Id. at 1535. 64 However, the court did not set precise boundaries to the Moenkopi Plateau and Coal Mine Mesa joint use areas until after the partition phase of the trial had ended. Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1399-1401. The Hopis argue that the boundary finally set eliminated the possibility of a contiguous Hopi reservation by creating a Hopi no-use zone between the joint use area and the 1882 Hopi reservation. They contend that there was substantial evidence that Hopis did in fact graze in the no-use zone, up to and past the borders of the 1882 Hopi Reservation. 65 The district court did not commit clear error. The court concluded that one witness's testimony was not credible. Masayesva, 793 F.Supp. at 1521, n. 106; 1535, n. 7. [D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Another witness's testimony was found not to be specific nor to establish the intensity of grazing. Id. at 1535, n. 7. Our previous determination that the 1934 Act gave the Hopis pockets of land they occupied in the 1934 reservation implicitly rejects the proposition that the areas awarded to them need be contiguous to each other or the 1882 reservation. There is no clear error. 66
67 The court initially found that Pasture Canyon was jointly used by Hopis and Navajos in 1934. Id. at 1515. It subsequently restricted the joint use area to Pasture Canyon south of the Government Pasture and refused to include any land around the canyon floor. Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1399. The court also found that Hopis did not graze their livestock north of Moenkopi Wash (except in Pasture Canyon ...). Masayesva, 93 F.Supp. at 1526. However, the court later determined that there was evidence of [two] Hopi sites north of Moenkopi Wash. Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1399 (emphasis in original). 68 The Hopis claim that there was substantial evidence that Hopis grazed livestock north of Moenkopi Wash in 1934. They also dispute the district court's conclusion that there was no evidence of Hopi grazing outside of the floor of Pasture Canyon. 69 Again, the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous. The Hopis presented evidence of some use of this area, which the district court recognized. Masayesva, 793 F.Supp. at 1526, n. 127. The court found some of the testimony implausible or contradictory. There was no clear error. 70