Opinion ID: 815102
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Area

Text: The vacancy clause in the Cincinnati policy stated the mall would be deemed vacant “unless at least 31% of its total square footage [was]: 1) Rented to a lessee or sub-lessee and used by them to conduct their customary operations; or 2) Used by the building owner to conduct customary operations.” In its briefs supporting its summary judgment motion, Oakdale stated, “34,595 square feet of the mall made up the common area that was open and available to the public. This area included hallways, corridors, and toilets.” Oakdale further stated, “In total, [Oakdale] was using 36,095 square feet in conducting its customary operations”—1,500 sq. ft. of office space and 34,595 sq. ft. of common area. Oakdale also provided the district court with detailed occupancy calculations, all of which used 34,595 sq. ft. of common area. In its reply supporting summary judgment, Oakdale declared, “the appropriate amount of common area at the time the loss occurred was 34,595 square feet.” Although Oakdale repeatedly described 34,595 sq. ft. as the total common area and provided the district court with specific calculations based on that figure, Oakdale also generally asserted Globe College added several thousand square feet of hallways “not included in the previous computation.” Oakdale argued the areas would increase -6- the occupied square footage well beyond 31%, but did not provide any actual measurements or alternative calculations.2 In opposing Cincinnati’s summary judgment motion, Oakdale again repeatedly referred to 34,595 sq. ft. as the correct amount of common area and provided calculations based on that figure. Oakdale’s calculations indicated the 34,595 sq. ft. of common area included the common hallways maintained by Globe College. Oakdale again vaguely referred to thousands of feet of additional hallways not included in its calculations that put the mall “well above the occupancy requirement,” but did not provide any actual square footage or alternative calculations. Based on the figures Oakdale provided, the district court determined “[e]ven using Oakdale’s calculations for common space and office space, Oakdale has failed to establish that the mall was at least 31% occupied at the time of the theft at issue.” Oakdale claims this was error because the district court failed to include the “additional hallways of unspecified size” in the former Globe College space. We disagree. While a disagreement about the size of any additional hallways and the total common area could create a genuine dispute of material fact under different circumstances,3 we conclude the district court was entitled to rely on Oakdale’s 2 On appeal, for the first time, Oakdale asserts “those additional hallways erected by Globe College . . . measured approximately 2,293 feet,” raising the occupancy to 31.7% and putting “Oakdale in a position where it meets the insurance policy’s occupancy requirements.” Oakdale’s self-described “illustrative” measurements are not part of the record on appeal, and we must not consider them. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a); McNamara v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 570 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 2009). 3 In reviewing the record, we suspect Oakdale’s recent assertion—the Globe College hallways added thousands of additional common area square -7- specific calculations and repeated statements that the total common area was 34,595 sq. ft. See Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899-90 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claimed error based upon conflicting paragraphs in their summary judgment response because the district court could rely on the plaintiffs’ admissions). Oakdale vaguely referred to the “bonus hallways” in its briefs, but never provided a sufficient basis to support a different calculation than the one Oakdale repeatedly urged the district court to use. “It was not the District Court’s responsibility to sift through the record to see if, perhaps, there was an issue of fact.” Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009). The district court did not err in accepting Oakdale’s specific calculations of common area and deciding they were insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find the vacancy provision was met.