Opinion ID: 1193843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: unavailability of witness and the admissibility of videotaped testimony

Text: ¶ 10 Before addressing the major issues on appeal, we note that in his brief to this court Thomas contends that the trial court violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution by admitting a videotape of C.M.'s out-of-court interview into evidence. His constitutional argument contains only one citation to supporting authority, several assertions, and little analysis. ¶ 11 `[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.' State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 Ill.App.3d 1087, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ill.App.Ct. 1981)) (other citations omitted). Furthermore, [i]t is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see also State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 414 (Utah 1993); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). ¶ 12 When determining whether a party has adequately briefed an issue, this court looks to rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). This rule prescribes that arguments in an appellant's brief shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). ¶ 13 As another court has stated: The brief of appellant should contain the points relied upon ... and these points should be supported by authorities.... If the questions involved in a case are of sufficient importance to justify asking this court to decide them, they are worthy of the careful consideration of counsel presenting them.... It is the duty of attorneys practicing in this court to present to the court the authorities supporting their views and to assist the court in reaching a correct conclusion. In re Estate of Kunz, 7 Ill.App.3d 760, 288 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ill.App.Ct.1972) (quoting Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 147 N.E. 659 (1925)). We agree. As this court has said in the past, [i]t is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state constitutional questions. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). Thomas's brief contains no substantive examination of his contention. There is only superficial citation of authority and cursory legal analysis; his argument is hurried at best  perfunctory and slap-dash at worst. For these reasons, we decline to address this issue.
¶ 14 We turn now to Thomas's contention that the trial court admitted the videotape of C.M.'s out-of-court interview into evidence without first properly determining her unavailability. In order to admit such an interview into evidence, the trial court must comply with the requirements set forth under section 76-5-411 of the Utah Code, which provides: (1) Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, a child victim's out-of-court statement regarding sexual abuse of that child is admissible as evidence although it does not qualify under an existing hearsay exception, if: (a) the child is available to testify in court or under Rule 15.5(2) or (3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) if the child is not available to testify in court or under Rule 15.5(2) or (3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, there is other corroborative evidence of the abuse; or (c) the statement qualifies for admission under Rule 15.5(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. (2) Prior to admission of any statement into evidence under this section, the judge shall determine whether the interest of justice will best be served by admission of that statement. In making this determination the judge shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse, the relationship of the child to the offender, and the reliability of the assertion and of the child. (3) A statement admitted under this section shall be made available to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or proceeding, to provide him with an opportunity to prepare to meet it. (4) For purposes of this section, a child is a person under the age of 14 years. The trial court must also comply with the requirements that the child is available to testify and to be cross-examined at trial, either in person or as provided by Subsection (2) or (3), or the court determines that the child is unavailable as a witness to testify at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence. For purposes of this subsection unavailable includes a determination, based on medical or psychological evidence or expert testimony, that the child would suffer serious emotional or mental strain if required to testify at trial. Utah R.Crim. P. 15.5(1)(h). Thomas concedes that the Court considered all the requirements except for the one contained in rule 15.5(1)(h), concerning the availability of the child victim. Specifically, Thomas objects to the admission of the videotaped testimony on the ground that the court did not base its unavailability ruling on medical or psychological evidence or expert testimony, but merely upon the court's observation of the witness. ¶ 15 While it is true that rule 15.5(1)(h) specifies a court may use medical or psychological evidence or expert testimony to determine availability, rule 15.5(1)(h) also specifies an additional determination under the Utah Rules of Evidence. Thus, rather than limiting the definition of unavailability, rule 15.5(1)(h) on its face expands the definition to include the definitions of unavailability set forth under rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Because of this expansive language, trial courts are allowed a wider discretion in finding a witness unavailable under rule 15.5(1)(h). Trial courts are not limited to using medical or psychological evidence or expert testimony except in those cases when a determination of potential strain to the witness is necessary. The trial court based its determination of C.M.'s unavailability upon rule 15.5(1)(h)'s reference to the Utah Rules of Evidence. Thus, we find that the trial court properly interpreted the plain language of the rule. ¶ 16 However, Thomas further contends that even if such expert testimony or evidence were unnecessary in this case, the trial court still erred in finding C.M. unavailable. To support his argument, he relies upon our decision in State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862 (Utah 1993). In that case, we were not persuaded by the appellant's argument that a child was unavailable because of her `total failure of recollection at trial' ... [and] that children, even if present at trial, might be found unavailable... because of their lack of maturity. Id. at 873. Thomas argues that the trial court based its ruling on these same points, namely, lack of memory and immaturity. He interprets Seale to hold that mere non-responsiveness, at least the level tolerated by the trial court in the instant case, is not enough to find unavailability. ¶ 17 Our decision in Seale is inapposite to the instant case. Seale dealt with an eleven-year-old child witness who responded to questioning relevant to the alleged abuse with I don't remember; the instant case deals with a six-year-old witness who would not verbally respond even to that degree. The trial court in Seale was at least able to evince responses sufficient to question the witness's memory or responsiveness; here, the trial court was unable even to reach the point where memory could be questioned. ¶ 18 Thomas is correct in pointing out that Seale held that children, even if present, may [not] be found to be constitutionally unavailable any more readily than adults. Id. However, this passage in Seale is not an absolute prohibition on a court basing a finding of unavailability on a lack of maturity; in Seale, we pointed out that a finding that children were generally unavailable due to lack of maturity was at odds with language in State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989) (opinion of Zimmerman, J.). In Webb, the trial judge neither took the opportunity to interview the child nor heard any expert testimony as to the child's capability to testify. Justice Zimmerman wrote: It is not enough to make some general assumptions about all children of this age; the trial court must determine whether this particular child is constitutionally unavailable. Id. at 1114 (emphasis added). Justice Zimmerman, referring to a statute declaring all victims of child abuse to be competent witnesses regardless of age, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-410, further stated that it is hard to understand how the trial court could find all children of the age of the alleged victim incompetent to testify and, for that reason, unavailable. Webb, 779 P.2d at 1114 n. 7 (emphasis added). We agree with these statements; all children of a certain age cannot and should not be found unavailable on the basis of age in the absence of specific findings by the trial court as to the individual child's inability to testify because of immaturity. See Seale, 853 P.2d at 873. In the instant case, the record contains specific findings as to C.M.'s inability to testify. The judge personally questioned C.M. and repeatedly voiced his concerns about C.M.'s inability to testify. ¶ 19 As we indicated above, rule 15.5(1)(h) does not limit unavailability to dependency upon medical or psychological evidence or expert testimony, but also allows a determination of unavailability under rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which reads in pertinent part: (a) Definition of unavailability. Unavailability as a witness includes situations in which the declarant: (1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or (3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. Utah R. Evid. 804(a). While we recognize that neither age nor ability to testify is specifically delineated as a basis for unavailability under rule 804, we note that the language of the rule is that `[u]navailability as a witness' includes situations.... Id. (emphasis added). Rule 804 does not limit the situations in which a witness may be found unavailable. Rather, it lists common instances in which unavailability may occur. See Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law art. 8, at 75 (1996). ¶ 20 Trial courts have a broad discretion in matters dealing with the proceedings in general and with witnesses in particular because from their position they are able to assess special information, such as nonverbal cues, which is difficult  not impossible  for reviewing courts to glean from the record. We stress, however, that this discretion does not extend to allowing trial courts to unreservedly entertain and unhesitatingly accept all claims of witness unavailability. While we find the rule 804 definition to be nonexclusive, significant caution should be shown in finding additional circumstances warranting a grant of unavailability. ¶ 21 In the instant case, the trial judge used a variety of direct questions designed to put C.M. at ease and to test her memory and cognitive ability. He asked her questions about the courtroom and various items of clothing (including her dress, his robe, and a police officer's uniform). He asked her specific questions about her school, her pets, and her doll and other toys. To all of these questions, C.M. occasionally responded with either one-or two-word answers, but usually just nodded her head, both in the affirmative and in the negative, or gave no response at all. The judge even allowed C.M. to sit on her mother's lap on the witness stand in an attempt to elicit a substantive reply. It is difficult to determine from the record the amount of time the judge spent waiting for a reply to his questions; it is impossible to gauge C.M.'s nonverbal responses or body language. The judge, however, had all of this information at hand and spent a considerable amount of time explaining his concerns and reasoning to the attorneys involved. ¶ 22 In light of the foregoing analysis, we find no error on the part of the trial court in exercising its discretion and ruling that C.M. was unavailable on these bases. The unavailability ruling was not made hastily or uninformedly; after considerable effort and concern, the court came to a reasonable conclusion based upon facts uniquely in its purview. Accordingly, the videotaped out-of-court testimony was properly admitted into evidence pursuant to rule 15.5 and section 76-5-411.