Opinion ID: 77415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ground Seven: Videotape Showing Petitioner in Prison Clothing

Text: 41 Petitioner claims the trial court violated his due process rights by allowing the jury to view a videotape of a news broadcast about Petitioner's case in which Petitioner was shown in prison garb in the custody of prison authorities. The tape was introduced during the testimony of Petitioner's cell mate, Kenneth Gallon, who testified about Petitioner's reaction when he saw the broadcast while in jail. Gallon testified that when Petitioner saw the broadcast, which featured Beasley and depicted investigators searching for the body, he mimicked shooting Beasley and telling investigators to stay away from a certain area. 42 The Florida Supreme Court addressed this claim on direct appeal: 43 We also reject Anderson's contention that he was denied a fair trial because the videotaped news report of Grantham's murder investigation viewed by the jury depicted Anderson in jail clothes. The videotape, one and one-half minutes in length, showed a single, brief glimpse of Anderson wearing prison garb. Under the circumstances, there was no constant reminder of the accused's condition, Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), to support the conclusion that Anderson was denied a fair trial. 44 Anderson, 574 So.2d at 93-94. The district court concluded the Florida Supreme Court's denial of relief as to this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See id. § 2254(d)(1). 45 Jurists of reason would not debate the correctness of the district court's conclusion. In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's presumption of innocence is undermined and his right to a fair trial violated when the state compels him to stand trial in prison or jail clothing. 425 U.S. at 504-06, 512, 96 S.Ct. at 1692-94, 1697; see also United States v. Harris, 703 F.2d 508, 509-11 (11th Cir.1983) (holding a defendant's due process rights were violated where he was compelled to wear prison clothing during jury voir dire). As we explained in United States v. Villabona-Garnica, the Supreme Court emphasized that the prison clothing was a `constant reminder of the accused's condition,' `a continuing influence throughout the trial' that presented an `unacceptable risk' of `impermissible factors coming into play' and corrupting a juror's judgment. 63 F.3d 1051, 1058 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504-05, 96 S.Ct. at 1693). The finding that the videotape contained only a single, brief glimpse of Petitioner in prison garb is presumptively correct. See id. § 2254(e)(1). Jurists of reason would not debate whether Petitioner's right to a fair trial was violated by the single, brief glimpse of Petitioner on video in prison garb. Not only was the image too brief, but it was also cumulative: the jury already knew Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of the news report because his cell mate testified to that effect. Petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to a COA with respect to this claim. 46 C. Ground Two: The State Post-Conviction Court Failed to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing on the Issue of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase 47 At the penalty phase, counsel informed the court that Petitioner did not wish to present any witnesses in mitigation. The following exchange occurred between counsel, Petitioner, and the court: 48 THE COURT: Defense ready to proceed? 49 MR. OBER: Judge, before we do, and before the jury's brought back in, I would like to put a few matters on the record with Mr. Anderson, and I would request that he be allowed to approach this bench so we can communicate with the Court. 50 THE COURT: Yes. 51 MR. OBER: Judge, at this time, I would announce to the Court and certainly allow the Court, for the limited purpose of this inquiry to address Mr. Anderson, but based on my involvement in this case and also with the assistance of Mr. Ashwell, we have uncovered many witnesses that I feel could testify in Mr. Anderson's behalf, favorably to him, during the second phase. And I would cite the names of those individuals which we have found. That would be Dr. Robert M. Berland; Williams Anderson, who is Mr. Anderson's father; Helen Anderson, his mother; David Anderson, his brother; Vickie Barber, his sister; Griffin Simmons, a sister of his; also a Joyce Wilson, a witness; and his son, Kyle Anderson. In addition to that, we have gone to the correctional institute of individuals that — of individuals in the system who know Mr. Anderson based on his past incarceration, one Chaplain William Hanawalt, Major Sammy Hill, who is a correctional officer at Zephyrhills Correctional Institute and Superintendent Ray Henderson at the Department of Corrections in Lauderhill, Florida. Additionally, there are other witnesses including employers and employees of Mr. Anderson, his friends, including Kay Bennet, who I believe could lend some assistance to Mr. Anderson during this portion of the proceeding. 52 After very great detail with him in the presence of Mr. Fuente, Mr. Ashwell, myself, and Mr. Anderson, over the portion of time that I've been involved in this, he has never wavered in his desire not to have any of these people testify during the course of this second phase proceeding. I have told him that I believe it to be in his best interest, and I'm announcing that for the record. And he has commanded me not to call these individuals because that is his desire. 53 THE COURT: You wish to question Mr. Anderson concerning what you just said Mr. Ober? 54 MR. OBER: Mr. Anderson, you heard my statement to Judge Graybill. Is there anything that you would like to add to that? Do you concur in the statements I made or do you disagree with them, or do you, at this time, want any individuals, those I mentioned or anyone else that, perhaps, we hadn't discussed, who will assist you in this second phase proceeding? 55 ANDERSON: I concur with the statements you made. 56 MR. OBER: And — 57 ANDERSON: I would rather not have any witnesses testify on my behalf that you mentioned or that could, in fact, be called. 58 THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, are you on any kind of drugs or medication that would affect your ability to understand what's going on today? 59 ANDERSON: No, sir, not at all. 60 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ober, you put it in the record. Mr. Anderson has responded. 61 Anderson, 822 So.2d at 1267-68. 62 Petitioner makes several arguments centering on the fact counsel did not state on the record what each penalty phase witness would have testified to had he or she been called. A fair reading of the petition shows he asserts that (1) the post-conviction court should have held a hearing on this claim, (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to make a complete record regarding mitigation witness testimony, and (3) he could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence because counsel did not present on the record what the mitigating evidence would have been. The district court focused on the first of these arguments and dismissed the claim for failing to state a ground for federal habeas relief. 63 It is beyond debate that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on these grounds. We have held the state court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on a petitioner's 3.850 motion is not a basis for federal habeas relief. Spradley v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1987). Therefore, insofar as Petitioner's claim is based on the state court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing, jurists of reason would not debate whether the district court properly dismissed this claim. 64 Moreover, the requirement that counsel state on the record what the mitigating evidence would be is solely a requirement of state law. In Koon v. Dugger, the Florida Supreme Court rejected a claim that counsel was unconstitutionally deficient for failing to present evidence in mitigation, concluding the defendant had instructed his counsel not to present such evidence. 619 So.2d 246, 249-50 (Fla. 1993). Out of concern with the problems inherent in a trial record that does not adequately reflect a defendant's waiver of his right to present any mitigating evidence, however, the Florida Supreme Court announced the procedure to be followed when a defendant waives the presentation of mitigating evidence: 65 [C]ounsel must inform the court on the record of the defendant's decision. Counsel must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and what that evidence would be. The court should then require the defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed these matters with him, and despite counsel's recommendation, he wishes to waive presentation of penalty phase evidence. 66 Id. at 250 (emphasis added). Although Koon requires counsel to state on the record what the evidence in mitigation would be before a defendant can waive his right to present mitigating evidence, [a] state's interpretation of its own laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since no question of a constitutional nature is involved. McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535 (11th Cir.1992). 1 Rather, Petitioner must point to a Supreme Court decision to support his argument, and he has failed to do so. Petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to a COA with respect to this claim. 67 D. Grounds III & IV: The State Post-Conviction Court Failed to Hold Evidentiary Hearings 68 In grounds three and four, respectively, Petitioner claims the state post-conviction court violated his constitutional rights by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing with respect to the State's failure to establish the corpus delicti of murder and with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the penalty phase jury instructions. The district court dismissed these claims because the failure of a state post-conviction court to conduct an evidentiary hearing is not a ground for federal habeas relief. See Spradley, 825 F.2d at 1568. 69 The district court's ruling is not debatable among jurists of reason. Moreover, Petitioner's application for a COA merely states: Petitioner incorporates and relies on all previously made arguments in support of this claim. We have rejected the practice of incorporating by reference arguments made to the district courts. Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 377 F.3d 1164, 1167 n. 4 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 327 F.3d 448, 452-53 (6th Cir.2003)). Petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to a COA with respect to these claims.