Opinion ID: 196194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Flight by Codefendant

Text: 17 Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Prada voluntarily absented himself from the final two days of trial. Rullan moved for a mistrial, claiming that his codefendant's flight might prompt a jury inference that both defendants were guilty. The district court directed that the trial proceed against both defendants. See Crosby v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 748, 752-753, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993); Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b). 18 Rullan asserts three claims of error. First, he says, the district court mistakenly believed Rullan might avoid retrial on double jeopardy grounds if a mistrial were declared. Second, a limiting instruction could not prevent a jury inference that both defendants were guilty because Prada absconded during trial. Third, the instruction given by the court was over extensive in content and prejudicial. We review the two latter claims for manifest abuse of discretion. Pierro, 32 F.3d at 617. 19 First, Rullan correctly asserts that double jeopardy does not bar retrial where a mistrial is ordered at the request of the defendant. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 957 F.2d 18, 21-22 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 105, 121 L.Ed.2d 64 (1992). The district court nonetheless correctly predicated its denial of Rullan's motion for mistrial on the ground that Prada's voluntary failure to appear, in and of itself, did not necessarily mean that the joint trial could not proceed with Prada in absentia. See Crosby, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 752 (treating voluntary failure to appear, after trial begins, as waiver of right to be tried in person); Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b). 20 On the other hand, treating the motion for mistrial as a de facto motion for severance by a non-absconding codefendant, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, we review its denial under the plain error standard, since severance was never broached before the district court. See United States v. Palow, 777 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1052, 106 S.Ct. 1277, 89 L.Ed.2d 585 (1986). Viewed in this light, Rullan's motion rests exclusively on the conclusory assertion that the jury could have inferred that he was guilty because his codefendant absconded. We see no compelling rational force in the suggestion that Rullan, who did not flee, must have been tainted with the same brush as the absconding Prada. 21 Moreover, Rullan's conclusory claim runs counter to the longstanding presumption that jurors normally follow the instructions given them by the trial court. See United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1781, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The district court firmly instructed the jury that Prada's disappearance was immaterial to the verdict on Rullan. The record further reflects that the jury understood. 22 THE COURT: The absence of defendant Prada from trial is no way attributable [sic] to the other defendant on trial. And may not be considered by you in determining the guilt or innocence of defendant Rullan. You may use this only as to defendant Prada itself. [sic] Is that clear? Let the record show that the jury has assented. 23 We therefore reject the conclusory contention that no jury instruction could protect Rullan against an inference of guilt arising from his codefendant's voluntary flight. See United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1067 (6th Cir.1993) (any adverse effect upon nonfleeing defendant neutralized by a cautionary instruction that each defendant's case was to be considered separately and, further, that [codefendant's] flight could not be used as evidence against anyone but him), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1071, 127 L.Ed.2d 389 (1994); cf. United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 877 (10th Cir.) (upholding denial of severance, in part because trial court twice instructed jury that it should not construe the absence of [codefendant] as evidence of guilt of either [the defendant or the codefendant]), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 972, 112 S.Ct. 450, 116 L.Ed.2d 467 (1991). 2 III