Opinion ID: 706016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Possession

Text: 47 We review de novo whether the jury instructions adequately covered the defendant's proffered defense. United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.1994). Here, Joseph Perez contends that the trial court inadequately defined possession. This is a question of law, and because Joseph Perez objected to the instruction at trial, we review the adequacy of the jury instruction de novo. 48 Joseph Perez argues that the trial court instructed the jury on knowledge rather than on possession, and thereby failed to define possession for the jury. The trial court however, gave the jury the instruction on possession exactly as it appears in the Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit Sec. 3.16. 8 49 Although a trial court's use of a model jury instruction does not necessarily preclude a finding of error, we have not found any reason, thus far, to reject the model instruction on possession. United States v. Warren, 984 F.2d 325, 327 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 280 (9th Cir.1990). 50 In Terry, 911 F.2d at 280, the district court instructed the jury that possession required merely that a person hav[e] the power to control the thing. We held that this instruction amounted to reversible error because it allowed the defendant's conviction to be based on mere accessibility without knowledge or actual dominion or control. Id. We explained that the instruction provided in the Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit Sec. 3.16 adequately defined the necessary elements of possession. Id. 51 Unlike the trial court in Terry, the trial court in the instant case gave the model instruction on possession. Joseph-SER 91. Given that this court, in Terry, found the model instruction on possession adequate, Joseph Perez's argument that the trial court inadequately defined possession for the jury is not persuasive. 52 Joseph Perez also maintains that the prosecutor, in rebuttal argument, misstated the law by arguing that joint occupancy of a residence proves possession of the items found inside the residence. Joint occupancy of a residence does not by itself prove possession of contraband found inside the residence. United States v. Frushon, 10 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Delgado v. United States, 327 F.2d 641, 642 (9th Cir.1964)), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2175, 128 L.Ed.2d 895 (1994). But, contrary to Joseph Perez's allegations, the prosecutor did not argue that, because Joseph Perez and Paulino jointly occupied the residence, Joseph Perez possessed the firearm found inside it. Rather, the prosecutor stated that the issue was whether they exercised control over [the firearm]. The prosecutor argued that Joseph Perez both knew of the presence of the Caspian Arms .38 and had physical control over it because it was under his right thigh when the police executed the search of his residence. Thus, it was unnecessary for the trial court to instruct the jury, in addition to the model instruction on possession, that joint occupancy by itself does not prove possession. 53 We conclude that the trial court did not err in giving the jury the model instruction on possession. 54