Opinion ID: 195970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Maximum Gallonage Provision

Text: 22 Four Corners impugns the district court's reliance on the annual gallonage caps as the basis for finding that Four Corners lost no profits as a result of the nonrenewal. It argues that the district court was required to predict whether Mobil would have waived the caps in each successive year had the franchise not been wrongfully terminated in 1988. It points out that a Mobil manager testified that Mobil had an internal mechanism for authorizing such waivers where franchisees have renovated or expanded service stations in order to increase their gasoline sales by more than ten percent over the previous year. Consequently, Four Corners contends, were Mobil to have refused a waiver in these circumstances its action would have been arbitrary and discriminatory, in violation of PMPA. 23 Normally, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving actual damages. See, e.g., Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 816 (1st Cir.) (citing cases), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955, 109 S.Ct. 392, 102 L.Ed.2d 381 (1988). Four Corners has not suggested that a different burden allocation obtains under PMPA. Therefore, we assume that the burden of proof rested with Four Corners. A challenge to the district court's findings on the actual amount of damages sustained by a claimant presents a question of fact, which we review only for clear error. See, e.g., American Title Ins. Co. v. East West Fin. Corp., 16 F.3d 449, 461 (1st Cir.1994). 24 The record evidence did not compel a finding that Mobil would have waived the 1988-91 caps on Four Corners' gasoline purchases. Judy Schultz, district sales manager for Mobil, testified that Mobil imposed these contractual caps to protect itself from the considerable expense which would attend unpredictable or unanticipated increases in franchisee demand for on-hand gasoline supplies. She further noted that the gallonage caps automatically increased by ten percent per year. A franchisee which wanted a waiver of the cap would need to obtain prior approval from the general manager for the Mobil region, the wholesale manager, and the district sales manager. When pressed by Four Corners, however, Schultz testified that she did not know of any Mobil franchisee which had actually obtained a waiver. 25 Even assuming, arguendo, that Four Corners' burden of proof could have been sustained by showing that Mobil had an established internal mechanism for affording relief from the gallonage caps beyond the automatic ten-percent annual increase, and that Four Corners itself met the criteria for such a waiver in the years 1988-91, the Schultz testimony fell well short of such a showing. It identified no criteria, nor did it indicate that any such waiver procedure had ever been invoked, either by Mobil or a franchisee. Moreover, Four Corners proffered no independent evidence that any Mobil franchisee, let alone a franchisee in a position comparable to Four Corners', had ever requested or been granted any such extraordinary waiver. Cf., e.g., Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1438 (10th Cir.1987) (noting existence of factual dispute whether franchisor offered plaintiff less favorable terms than its other franchisees); Valentine v. Mobil Oil Corp., 614 F.Supp. 33, 39 (D.Ariz.1984) (finding no evidence that franchisor treated plaintiff differently than franchisor's other franchisees), aff'd, 789 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir.1986). Thus, there is no record evidence even suggesting that the district court finding that Four Corners would not have been granted a gallonage cap waiver constituted clear error. See Four Corners II, slip op. at 8.