Opinion ID: 78596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Serve McNealy

Text: Richardson argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim under Rule 4(m) for the failure to timely serve McNealy. Richardson contends that, because he was a pro se prisoner-litigant proceeding IFP, the court-appointed process server was responsible for effecting service on McNealy. The sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to serve under Rule 4(m) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir.2009). Under this standard, we affirm unless [we] find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard. Id. Under Rule 4(m), the district court must dismiss the action without prejudice ... or order that service be made within a specific time if the defendant has not been served within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). The court must extend the time for service, however, if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure. Id. When a court grants a litigant leave to proceed IFP, the officers of the court must issue and serve all process. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). [T]he failure of the United States Marshal to effectuate service on behalf of an in forma pauperis plaintiff through no fault of that plaintiff constitutes `good cause' for the plaintiff's failure to effect timely service within the meaning of Rule 4(m). Rance, 583 F.3d at 1288. Thus, to determine whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to extend the time for service, we must determine whether Richardson was at fault for failing to provide an up-to-date address for McNealy. We have no binding authority stating whether a pro se prisoner-litigant proceeding IFP is at fault when he cannot provide the current address of a prison guard to the court-appointed service agent. In Rance, we reversed a Rule 4(m) dismissal when [n]othing in the record indicate[d] that [the plaintiff] share[d] in the Marshal's fault for failure to effectuate service. Id. at 1288. In Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1094 (11th Cir.1990), we reasoned that a pro se prisoner-litigant proceeding IFP was not at fault when he had acted reasonably. [G]iven that he was incarcerated and unrepresented, so that neither he nor legal counsel acting on his behalf was able to check the case file at the courthouse to determine the status of service, id. at 1095-96, we concluded that the prisoner-litigant was not at fault when he request[ed] service upon the appropriate defendant and attempt[ed] to remedy any apparent service defects of which [he] ha[d] knowledge. Id. (quoting Rochon v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987)). In a case with nearly identical facts, the Seventh Circuit held that when the district court instructs the Marshal to serve papers on behalf of a prisoner, the prisoner need furnish no more than the information necessary to identify the defendant. Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir.1990). [2] The court reasoned that [p]rison guards do not want prisoners to have their home addresses, and the Bureau of Prisons is reluctant to tell prisoners even the current place of employment of their former guards. This is a sensible precaution, for prisoners aggrieved by guards' conduct may resort to extra-legal weapons after release if they do not deem the results of the litigation satisfactory .... Because the Marshals Service is part of the Department of Justice, 28 U.S.C. § 561, it should have ready access to the necessary information. Id. at 602. In a subsequent decision, the Seventh Circuit applied Sellers to a pro se prisoner proceeding IFP in a state prison: The present cases involve state prisoners, not federal prisoners, but the distinction is irrelevant. Sellers is grounded in the belief that use of marshals to effect service alleviates two concerns that pervade prisoner litigation, state or federal: 1) the security risks inherent in providing the addresses of prison employees to prisoners; and 2) the reality that prisoners often get the runaround when they attempt to obtain information through governmental channels and needless attendant delays in litigating a case result. Graham v. Satkoski, 51 F.3d 710, 713 (7th Cir.1995). The Graham court vacated the district court's Rule 4(m) dismissal and remanded the case for a determination whether the Marshal service could have obtained the new addresses of the prison-guard defendants with reasonable effort. If so, their failure to do so would automatically have constituted good cause under Rule 4(m). We find this reasoning persuasive. It is unreasonable to expect incarcerated and unrepresented prisoner-litigants to provide the current addresses of prison-guard defendants who no longer work at the prison. Thus, we conclude that, as long as the court-appointed agent can locate the prison-guard defendant with reasonable effort, prisoner-litigants who provide enough information to identify the prison-guard defendant have established good cause for Rule 4(m) purposes. We therefore vacate the district court's dismissal of Richardson's claim against McNealy and remand to the district court for a determination whether McNealy can be located with reasonable effort. If so, McNealy must be served; otherwise, the district court properly dismissed Richardson's claim against McNealy.