Opinion ID: 3010427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appropriateness of the Community

Text: Service Sanction As previously noted, the district court employed its inherent powers to sanction Esso and Goldman Antonetti. A threshold question, then, might be whether the court's resort to the inherent powers, in lieu of the rule-based and statute-based sanctions -- e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, and 37, or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 -- was appropriate.13 We need not _________________________________________________________________ 13. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), the Supreme Court discussed at length the inherent powers of a court to sanction and their 27 reach this question, however. As we shall discuss more fully below, the court had no authority under its inherent powers to impose the type of sanction it did. We are here reviewing a pure question of law; therefore, our standard of review is plenary. See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1184 (3d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter PIRG]. The permissible scope of inherent powers is somewhat unclear; we have earlier observed that the notion of inherent power has been described as nebulous, and its bounds `shadowy.'  Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted). However, courts under their inherent powers have developed a wide range of tools to promote efficiency in their courtrooms and to achieve justice in their results. Id. at 564. The Supreme Court has furnished us with at least a partial list of a court's inherent powers. Employing its inherent powers, a court can control admission to its bar, discipline attorneys, punish for contempt, vacate its own judgment upon a finding of fraud, bar a criminal defendant from a courtroom for disruptive behavior, dismiss a suit on forum non conveniens grounds or for failure to prosecute, and assess attorney's fees. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991). In addition to those mentioned by the Supreme Court, other inherent powers include the power to fine, to disqualify counsel, to preclude claims or defenses, and to limit a litigant's future access to the courts. See Joseph, supra § 28, at 440-47; see also Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 73 n.10 (3d Cir. 1994) (listing the inherent powers available to a court). With these many bows in their sanctioning quivers, courts _________________________________________________________________ relationship to rule-based and statute-based powers to sanction, e.g., Rule 11, Rule 16, Rule 37, and § 1927. To oversimplify somewhat, the Court held that the existence of rule-based or statute-based powers does not preclude a court's employing its inherent powers. See id. at 46-51. The Court observed, but apparently did not require, that normally a court should look first to those rule-based or statute-based powers before turning to its inherent powers, reserving the inherent powers for instances in which the rule-based or statute-based powers are not up to the task. See id. at 50. 28 have frequently invoked their inherent powers to regulate the conduct of the members of the bar as well as to provide tools for docket management. Eash, 757 at 561. Notwithstanding the variety of tools available to a court under its inherent powers, we believe that an order directing a party to the litigation to remit funds to a third party is outside the scope of a court's inherent powers. We begin our analysis by noting that [b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. That inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls makes this exercise of restraint and discretion even more important. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45 (emphasis added). Whether creation of the Community Service Sanction Account before us here is appropriately within the scope of a court's inherent powers turns on the source of a court's inherent powers. The Supreme Court discussed the genesis and nature of inherent powers in Chambers. Inherent powers derive from the very nature of courts of justice. See id. at 42. Necessarily incident to the act of creating courts is the act of imbuing these institutions with certain indispensable powers to  `manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.'  Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). Inherent powers are sometimes described, in other words, as those necessary to the exercise of all others. Id. (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). In Eash, we described the source of inherent powers in slightly different words. We suggested that inherent powers fall into three distinct categories: powers arising from Article III, powers arising from the nature of the court, and powers arising from historical notions of the courts of equity. See Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-64.14 _________________________________________________________________ 14. Because Eash's categorization scheme was intended largely as a means of explaining the relationship between inherent judicial powers 29 No matter where one places their origin, it is clear that the power exercised in this case cannot be derived from a court's inherent powers. The district court's actions are essentially legislative in nature. Although we recognize that the line between a judicial act and legislative act is difficult to fix with certainty, see, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-408 (1989); see also Clinton v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ___, No. 95-1853, 1997 WL 273679, at  (U.S. Sup. Ct. May 27, 1997) (Of course the lines between the powers of the three branches are not always neatly defined.), the district court's sanction here falls on the legislative side of whatever line we may draw. The court ordered the reallocation of resources from private entities to an agency of the public sector not a party in the case.15 It _________________________________________________________________ and legislatively granted judicial powers, and because it is not necessary to tackle the difficult question of that relationship, see supra n.12, we have no occasion to revisit this categorization here. See also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47 n.12 (describing Eash's categorization scheme and concluding that discussion of it is unnecessary). 15. We have addressed a similar question in the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1984). In that case, we rejected a district court's conditioning probation on the donation of $100,000 to charity. We held that the power of the court to place a defendant on probation arose from the probation statute, not from inherent powers. See id. at 961. We further held that the probation statute did not give courts the power to condition probation on the donation of money to a charity. See id. at 963-64. This decision was consistent with the decisions of other circuits addressing the same issue. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1546-51 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 650-53 (4th Cir. 1984). Although decided on facts somewhat analogous to those presented here, these cases provide little guidance. They do not discuss the scope of a court's inherent powers except to note that the power to suspend a criminal sentence and impose probation is not a power inherent in the courts. Rather, the focus of these cases is on whether the statutory grant of power to impose probation allows the courts to condition probation on a payment of charity. Here, by contrast, we know that the power to sanction is inherent in the courts. We are thus concerned with the scope of inherent, not statutory, powers. Therefore, that a district court cannot condition probation on the payment of charity does not control whether a district court can require the payment of charity as a sanction. Put differently, the existence of a limit on a court's statutory powers does not necessarily mean that there is a corresponding limit on a court's inherent powers. 30 chose from whom the resources would be taken and to whom the resources would redound, without regard to the anatomy of the case before it. In so doing, the court ventured well beyond the case and controversy before it.16 We do not find persuasive the argument that a court's inherent powers include the wielding of what is essentially a legislative power. We believe that it is not in the nature of courts of justice normally to engage in the redistribution of wealth to parties outside of the litigation. We find nothing in Article III that allows for such a power. Further, we do not believe that such a power is necessary for the efficient functioning of a court. Fines made payable to the court would do just as well in ensuring that parties do not interfere with that functioning. From the standpoint of the sanctioned party, the disciplining effect of a fine made payable to the court is no different from the disciplining effect of a sanction made payable to some third party; the sanctioned party is out of pocket the same amount either way. Finally, we have been directed to no historical evidence demonstrating that courts of equity had this power, and given that the inherent powers must be exercised with restraint, we see no reason to permit this power now. As our discussion makes clear, the court redistributed a portion of the wealth in the Virgin Islands, not from one party in the litigation to another, but from one party in the litigation to another party of the court's choosing. We acknowledge that this reallocation occurred under the aegis of a sanctions proceedings; however, we may not be _________________________________________________________________ 16. In the context of administrative law, commentators have drawn the line between legislative and adjudicative functions by referring to the factual evidence on which the relevant government body relies in making its decision. See 2 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 9.2, at 7-8 (3d ed. 1994). [L]egislative facts are the general facts that help a government institution decide questions of law, policy, and discretion. Id. These are facts that concern more than just an individual. See id. Here, the court had to rely on facts outside of those provided it by the parties to determine that the Virgin Islands prison system was an appropriate recipient of funding. In that sense, the court was searching for legislative facts. It was, in that same sense, engaging in a nonadjudicatory function. 31 prevented from looking beyond mere labels to the underlying reality of the particular exercise of governmental power. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393. The reality in this case involved the exercise of legislative power. We appreciate the sense of outrage that motivated the district court's decision to impose the community service sanction. The contamination of the Tutu aquifer was tragic, and the delay in determining responsibility for that contamination is doubtless frustrating. The community service sanction, at least on its face, is attractive because it seeks to punish those who have caused, at least in part, that delay and assist those who might have been harmed by the contamination. In that sense, the district court's actions were admirable. However, a court does not always do well by doing good. Though we applaud the district court's motives, we are constrained to find fault with its remedy.17 In sum, we hold that the district court's inherent powers can not support the imposition of the community service sanction.18 _________________________________________________________________ 17. Our conclusion that the creation of the Community Service Sanction Account was beyond the powers of the district court is bolstered by our canvass of the law of our sister circuits. We are unaware of any court of appeals that has imposed this type of community service sanction. Nor do we find helpful the sources to which the district court cites for support of its proposed sanction. The district court could cite only to a law review article. See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions , 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141 (1983). The article itself cited to two district court criminal cases in which, the article claimed, the courts imposed monetary sanctions directed to a community service project. See United States v. Olin Corp., Crim. No. 78-30, slip op. (D. Conn. June 1, 1978); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976). We find no support in those cases for imposing such a sanction here. The opinions themselves do not discuss the sanctions at all, though the law review article claims that the monetary sanctions were imposed as conditions for probation or nonprosecution. We cannot say for certain because of the lack of discussion by each of the courts on the matter, but we suspect that the courts' actions would be impermissible under the (old) probation statute. See supra note 15. 18. Moreover, we have serious doubts that one could plausibly argue that Congress provided the courts -- by statute or by rule -- the power 32