Opinion ID: 2049141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of the Doctrines to the Credit Provision

Text: I agree with the majority on one point  the language of the credit provision is not reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning; it clearly and unambiguously mandates that the parties can use shares that are due from the estate pursuant to the terms of the Will. The majority essentially contends that the phrase pursuant to the terms of the Will actually means pursuant to the terms of the trust. The majority reaches this conclusion by: (1) looking at some of the terms of the Offer Document containing the credit provision; (2) determining that the credit provision is clear and unambiguous; and then (3) referring to extrinsic evidence in order to establish the parties' intentan issue concerning which the parties strenuously disagree. [20] The majority then resolves this disagreement in Karl's favor, a result that flies in the face of Young and this Court's settled jurisprudence. I also respectfully disagree with that portion of the majority opinion in which the Court declares that we believe it worthwhile to note that our interpretation of the credit provision as unambiguously allowing Karl to use as a credit his shares from Carolyn's Overall Estate is entirely consistent with the intentions of the parties in preparing the Offer Document, as reflected in the copious extrinsic evidence in the record. Thus, as support for its conclusions, the majority proceeds to consider some, but not all, of the massive and confusing record that Karl produced. The opinion wholly overlooks the fact that the other parties, and the independent coexecutor, deeply and vigorously dispute Karl's declared intent with respect to the Offer Document. Moreover, when faced with a clear and unambiguous writing, what is claimed to have been the subjective intent of the parties is of no moment. Young, 973 A.2d at 560, 560 n. 11 (recognizing that [a] court's proper role in interpreting a contract is to divine `the intent that is expressed in the language of the contract') (quoting Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 122 R.I. at 581 n. 10, 410 A.2d at 991 n. 10). [21] In this case, David, Karl, and the independent coexecutor agreed on the terms of the credit provision that was designed solely for the benefit of the brothers Haffenreffer. As reflected in the writing, each was permitted to use credits for shares that were due to them under the terms of the will. There is no other cognizable reason for them to have included the phrase pursuant to the terms of the Will. The majority's interpretation of the credit provision effectively ignores this phrase, or worse, transmutes it into the trust estate. See Andrukiewicz v. Andrukiewicz, 860 A.2d 235, 239 (R.I.2004) (noting that when ascertaining the meaning of contractual language, every word of the contract should be given meaning and effect; an interpretation that reduces certain words to the status of surplusage should be rejected). Words have meaning. The term will means will; it does not mean overall probate and trust estate. The agreed-upon language of the Offer Document is clear, and our involvement, like that of the hearing justice, should stop. We have no warrant to wade into the sea of extrinsic evidence in an effort to gauge the parties' intent. Consequently, I dissent.