Opinion ID: 1203017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nicholson Produced Sufficient Evidence of a Discriminatory Motive To Survive Summary Judgment

Text: At the third step of the McDonnell Douglas scheme, the plaintiff must show that the articulated reason is pretextual either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. at 1124(internal quotation marks omitted). To avoid summary judgment at this step, however, the plaintiff must only demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding pretext. The amount of evidence required to do so is minimal. We have held that very little evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer's motive; any indication of discriminatory motive may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a fact-finder. When the evidence, direct or circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell Douglas presumption, a factual question will almost always exist with respect to any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 (9th Cir.2004) (alterations omitted) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Nicholson has met her minimal burden at step three. First, irregularities in Nicholson's disciplinary proceedings provide some evidence that Cape Air had a discriminatory motive. The disciplinary panel conducted a cursory investigation, and Nicholson introduced evidence that Cape Air actively procured letters complaining about Nicholson from other pilots. According to one pilot, Price demanded that he prepare a derogatory letter about Nicholson. [4] In her affidavit, Nicholson also notes various departures by Cape Air from the procedures established in its employee handbook. However, Nicholson failed to introduce that handbook into evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1) requires the attachment of any document referred to in an affidavit. Lacking [the required] documentation, Nicholson's claims regarding the employee handbook are nothing more than an . . . argument lacking evidentiary support. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir.1993). [5] Cape Air's knowledge, however, of the rumors about Nicholson and Price and of her prior relationship with White does provide additional evidence that her employer, in Nicholson's words, wanted to remove an object of sexual competition, and therefore, discord, from the pilot group on Guam. This inference is bolstered in particular by the fact that the Action Form initially prohibited Nicholson from flying Cessna 402s in the Pacific region, including Guam, notwithstanding her acknowledged ability to fly such single-pilot planes safely. It is also supported by White's alleged statement, a week after Nicholson was terminated, that she would still have [her] job if [they] were still together, as well as by Cape Air's silence upon being informed of White's comment. Finally, the evidence introduced by Nicholson to establish her prima facie case also provides evidence of pretext. [A] disparate treatment plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting his prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of the employer's proffered reasons. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). In this case, Cape Air's failure to treat Nicholson in the same manner that it treated similarly deficient male pilots provides some evidence that Cape Air disciplined her because of her sex and not because of her alleged CRM deficiencies. So, too, do the sex-related remarks, such as the complaint that Nicholson had a machismo attitude; the captain's concern about flying with her because of a prior sexual relationship; and the removal of her from a flight by that same captain, who expressed concern about whether his work problems with her were related to that earlier relationship. In employment discrimination cases brought under the McDonnell Douglas framework, [w]e require very little evidence to survive summary judgment precisely because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiryone that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder, upon a full record. Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Comty. College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111(9th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Nicholson introduced the minimal evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cape Air suspended her because of her sex, the district court's grant of summary judgment to Cape Air was improper.