Opinion ID: 2032355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: School District.

Text: Included in the undisputed material facts supporting the school district's motion for summary judgment are the following facts. Bitner is a public official. Miller, as secretary and business manager for the school district, learned of possible problems with certain checks relating to Wilson school. He reported his findings regarding the checks and other irregularities to superintendent Scalzo. He reported two checks, dated December 26, 1990, payable to Wilson school were presented to the bank. The bank teller stated that Bitner presented the checks, he requested cash rather than depositing the checks, and he was given cash for the checks. On advice of the school district's legal counsel, Scalzo and Miller hired Estal & Associates, P.C. to conduct a special audit of the activity account at Wilson school. The school district, Scalzo, and Miller kept confidential the results of the audit. Neither Scalzo nor Miller made any statements to anyone regarding the contents of the audit other than to school board members and the attorney for the school board. Scalzo and Miller refused to release or disclose the contents of the audit to the media or general public. Scalzo and Miller testified on matters relevant to the criminal prosecution of Bitner only in response to subpoena. The court granted summary judgment to the school district because the statements made in the course of the criminal investigation were absolutely privileged and statements made in the course of the investigation of the shortage of school funds were protected by a qualified privilege and were made without malice. Because Bitner failed to timely file his resistance to the motion for summary judgment, the court did not consider Bitner's resistance and statements of undisputed material facts with his affidavit and other exhibits attached. Although Bitner does not dispute his resistance was not timely filed, he urges the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for additional time to resist the summary judgment. In his motion for additional time, he stated no depositions had been taken and that it is necessary to take depositions before a proper resistance could be filed. He asked the court to extend the time for resistance and that he be given an opportunity to depose defendants Scalzo, Miller, Smallwood, and Kain. The school district resisted Bitner's motion. In its resistance the school district cited rule 237(f) and Midthun v. Pasternak, 420 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1988). Because Bitner's motion for additional time to resist does not set forth any affidavit or in any other fashion what specific additional factual information is necessary to enable the plaintiff to resist, the district court denied Bitner's motion. On appeal, Bitner urges Midthun was an isolated case where the relevant facts did not appear to have been in dispute. Midthun, 420 N.W.2d at 468. In 1967 Iowa revised rule 237 to include rule 237(f). Rule 237(f) comprises an out for a party who legitimately needs additional time to gather facts essential to justify its opposition when faced by a summary judgment motion. In order to obtain the benefits of this rule, a party must substantially comply with its requirements. The rule requires an affiant to state reasons why facts essential to justify a resistance cannot be presented. It is clear that under rule 237(f) it is incumbent upon the resister to set forth by affidavit the reasons why it cannot proffer evidentiary affidavits and what additional factual information is needed to resist the motion. See id.; Prior v. Rathjen, 199 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 1972). The federal courts have established basic requirements to test the sufficiency of a federal Rule 56(f) affidavit. The Eighth Circuit has stated: A party invoking its protections must do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he cannot respond to a movant's affidavits as otherwise required by Rule 56(e) and how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915, 96 S.Ct. 1116, 47 L.Ed.2d 320 (1976). See also United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1295 (7th Cir.1990); Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.1990); Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 356 (6th Cir.1989); Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., 703 F.2d 525, 527 (11th Cir.1983). To invoke Rule 56(f), the First Circuit has stated: The movant must (1) articulate a plausible basis for the belief that discoverable materials exist which would raise a trialworthy issue, and (2) demonstrate good cause for failure to have conducted the discovery earlier. Price v. General Motors Corp., 931 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir.1991) (citation omitted). In order for the affidavit for more discovery time to be sufficient, the Second Circuit has stated: Thus, a party seeking such discovery must file an affidavit explaining (1) what facts are sought and how they are to be obtained, (2) how those facts are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact, (3) what effort the affiant has made to obtain them, and (4) why the affiant was unsuccessful in those efforts. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir.1989). The Ninth Circuit stated: A Rule 56(f) motion must show how additional discovery would preclude summary judgment and why a party cannot immediately provide specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. Mackey v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir.1989). When a party opposing a motion for summary judgment files a motion requesting continuance to permit discovery, our review is for abuse of discretion. Moser v. Thorp Sales Corp., 312 N.W.2d 881, 891 (Iowa 1981). We agree that generally a nonmoving party should have the opportunity to make discovery prior to hearing and ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Miller v. Continental Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Iowa 1986); Carter v. Jernigan, 227 N.W.2d 131, 135-36 (Iowa 1975). However, there is no requirement in rule 237 that summary judgment not be entered until all discovery is completed. The failure to file a rule 237(f) affidavit is sufficient grounds to reject the claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate. See Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir.1995). Even if we ignore the fact Bitner failed to file an affidavit as required by rule 237(f), it would not be an abuse of discretion for the court to deny his request. Bitner's defamation action was filed on November 1, 1993. Extensive discovery occurred prior to the school district's filing of its motion for summary judgment on September 29, 1994. Bitner's defamation claim is based on events that occurred in December 1990 and January 1991 and upon statements made in the fall of 1991. Bitner had deposed Miller in preparation of the criminal trial in March 1992. Bitner was aware of factual circumstances relating to his conflicts with Miller and Scalzo prior to his resignation. He had a full opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the summary judgment hearing on October 28, 1994.