Opinion ID: 530543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: USFL's Entitlement to an Award of Attorney's Fees

Text: 12 Section 4 of the Clayton Act states, in pertinent part, that any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 15(a) (emphasis added). It is clear from the plain meaning of section 4 that an injury is all that is required for an award of attorney's fees. An award of attorney's fees to the injured party is mandatory. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415 & n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 694, 697 & n. 5 (1978); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 261, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1623, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc., 635 F.2d 118, 130 (2d Cir.1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 556, 102 S.Ct. 1935, 72 L.Ed.2d 330 (1982). In the instant case, the jury found that the NFL's monopolization of the United States major league professional football market injured the USFL. An injury having been found, the awarding of attorney's fees to the USFL was compulsory. 13 The award of only nominal damages to the USFL does not affect its right to attorney's fees. As we noted in our earlier opinion in this case, the award of nominal damages in antitrust cases is not suspect. United States Football League, 842 F.2d at 1377. Even where only nominal damages are recovered, attorney's fees awards have been given. See, e.g., Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1210 (1st Cir.1987); Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836, 95 S.Ct. 64, 42 L.Ed.2d 63 (1974). That the USFL only received nominal damages is relevant in determining the amount of fees allowed and may be a factor used in reducing a fee award, but it does not affect the entitlement to an award. See Home Placement Serv., 819 F.2d at 1210. 14 As the First Circuit has stated, the purpose behind mandatory attorney's fees in antitrust cases is to encourage private prosecution of antitrust violations by insulating plaintiffs' treble damage recoveries from the expense of legal fees. Id. What is important is encouraging the detection and cessation of anticompetitive behavior, not the amount of damages found. Because of the importance of the policy of encouraging private parties to bring antitrust actions, recovery of their reasonable attorney's fees must be sustained regardless of the amount of damages awarded. 15 In an attempt to circumvent the mandatory awarding of attorney's fees, the NFL contends that the district court erred in not applying the prevailing party standard in determining whether a party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The NFL, relying on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), argues that only prevailing parties are entitled to attorney's fees and that a party is a prevailing party only if it  'succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit [it] sought in bringing suit.'  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)); See also Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School District, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) (reaffirming Hensley approach). The NFL asserts that because the USFL was unsuccessful on many of its claims, it has not succeeded on significant issues in the litigation, has not achieved the benefits it sought in bringing suit and therefore is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. We disagree. We reach the same conclusion as the district court that the use of the Hensley prevailing party analysis is not warranted in this case. 16 First, there is no requirement in section 4 of the Clayton Act that an antitrust plaintiff be a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees. The term prevailing party appears nowhere in section 4 of the Clayton Act. All that is required is an injury. See supra. As stated supra, an injury was found, therefore the award of attorney's fees was automatic. 17 Second, Hensley involved the award of attorney's fees under The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1982), which provides, in pertinent part, that the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. (emphasis added). Interestingly, the legislative history of section 1988 indicates that Congress intended that the amount of fees awarded under [section 1988] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases. S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5908, 5913; see also McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 129 (2d Cir.1983). However, Congress did not utilize the mandatory awarding of fees scheme found in section 4 of the Clayton Act, but instead adopted a discretionary standard. Because Hensley concerns the discretionary award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, rather than the mandatory ordering of attorney's fees awards under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 15(a), it is of limited applicability. Given the clear language of section 4 of the Clayton Act, an award of attorney's fees was justified. 2 18 The NFL also claims the USFL is not entitled to attorney's fees because the USFL failed to offer proof of damages in support of the claim on which it prevailed. Although the USFL's damages evidence, elicited through the testimony of Dr. Nina W. Cornell, focused primarily on damages resulting from the NFL's monopolization of television contracts with the three major networks, the USFL did offer it and it may have affected the jury's finding of general antitrust damages. As the district court stated in an earlier opinion, the jury's rejection of plaintiffs' television-related Section 1 claims does not mean that the jury could not have properly considered some of the NFL's television-related conduct to have been anticompetitive. United States Football League, 644 F.Supp. at 1058. The court explained that the jury was allowed to consider defendants' television-related behavior ... as probative of the 'purpose and character' of the remainder of NFL conduct under the jury's scrutiny. Id. at n. 15 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670-71 n. 3, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 1593-94 n. 3, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965)). As the district court held in a recent opinion, [t]he USFL's damages proof, while relating solely to television, did seek generally to establish damages from the unlawful monopolization of professional football. It cannot be said that such proof had no effect on the jury's finding of injury. United States Football League, 704 F.Supp. at 480. The court went on to state that it cannot be said that the television evidence was completely distinct, either factually or legally, from the broad monopolization claim that plaintiff prevailed upon. Id. at 480-81. The district court's determination was correct. 19 Neither this Court nor the district court can know for certain what evidence influenced the jury's decision. It is at least plausible that the evidence of the damages from television-related conduct influenced the jury's finding of generalized monopolization damages. The jury did find an injury, which led to a finding of damages, albeit only $1.00. However, a finding of an injury is all that is required for an award of attorney's fees for an antitrust violation. 20 In sum, we agree with the district court's conclusion that [t]he award of counsel fees itself is ... a non-issue. Id. at 480.