Opinion ID: 9542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arbitrability of Title VII Claims

Text: Under the FAA, [a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 3 arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2. None of the parties disputes that Rojas' contract with TK for employment as a disc jockey is one involving commerce within the meaning of § 2 of the FAA. However, Rojas contends that her employment contract is excluded from the FAA's coverage. Section 1 of the FAA provides, in pertinent part: but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Arguing for a broad reading of this section, Rojas contends that because she is a worker engaged in interstate commerce, the FAA does not apply to her contract of employment. We disagree. In 1991, the Supreme Court held that an employee, who agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of his employment, was required to arbitrate a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and therefore was barred from a federal court lawsuit. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). Following Gilmer this court held that Title VII claims must likewise be arbitrated. In Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.1991), an employee sued under Title VII for discriminatory discharge. Although the employee was subject to an arbitration agreement, the district court refused to dismiss the case or to 4 compel arbitration. This court affirmed. However, the Supreme Court subsequently vacated our affirmance and remanded for further consideration in light of Gilmer, supra. Relying on Gilmer, we held that the employee's Title VII claim must be arbitrated: Because both the ADEA and Title VII are similar civil rights statutes, and both are enforced by the EEOC ... we have little trouble concluding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration. Any broad public policy arguments against such a conclusion were necessarily rejected by Gilmer. 939 F.2d at 230. While the preceding statement would appear to dispose of the issue presently before the court, we must address a distinction between the facts of the instant case and those present in both Gilmer and Alford. In Gilmer the Supreme Court noted: [I]t would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment. The FAA requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3. The record before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer's employment agreement with [his employer] contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration clause at issue in Gilmer's securities registration application, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not with [his employer].... Consequently, we leave for another day the issue [of whether § 1 excludes from the FAA all contracts of employment]. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. at 1651 n. 1. Similarly, in Alford, a case that also dealt with an arbitration clause contained in a contract between an employee and a securities exchange rather than an employer, we noted that the Supreme Court had expressly refused to address the issue now before the court. See Alford, 939 F.2d at 230 n.  (noting that courts should be mindful of the potential issue presented by the exclusionary language present in § 1 of the FAA when dealing with 5 arbitration clauses contained in employment contracts between employers and employees). Consequently, we must determine the scope of the exclusionary language present in § 1. We are not the first to address the scope of the exclusions present in § 1. In fact, numerous other courts have addressed this very issue, the majority of which have determined that the exclusionary language present in § 1 is to be narrowly construed.2 Particularly persuasive is a recent opinion from the Sixth Circuit. In Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.1995), the court, after a thorough analysis of the treatment of this issue by its sister circuits, came to the following conclusion: [T]he exclusionary clause of § 1 of the Arbitration Act should be narrowly construed to apply to employment contracts of seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad workers are. We believe this interpretation comports with the actual language of the statute and the apparent intent of the Congress which enacted it. The meaning of the phrase workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce is illustrated by the context in which it is used, particularly the two specific examples given, seamen and railroad employees, those being two classes of employees engaged in the movement of goods in commerce. 2 See Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir.1984) (§ 1 exclusion is limited to workers employed in the transportation industries or engaged in the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1160, 105 S.Ct. 912, 83 L.Ed.2d 926 (1985); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir.1972) (same); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir.1971) (same); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir.1953) (same); But see Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 310-11 (6th Cir.1991) (dicta); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1119-20 (3d Cir.1993). 6 Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 601. If Congress had intended to exclude all contracts of employment from FAA coverage, Congress could simply have used statutory language in § 1 similar to the following: ... but nothing herein contained shall apply to any contracts of employment. Congress did not do this. As another court has noted, [i]t is quite impossible to apply a broad meaning to the term commerce' in Section 1 and not rob the rest of the exclusion clause of all significance. Albert v. National Cash Register Co., 874 F.Supp. 1324, 1327 (S.D.Fla.1994). We agree with the majority of other courts which have addressed this issue and conclude that § 1 is to be given a narrow reading. Therefore, we find that the district court was correct when it determined that Rojas' employment contract was subject to the requirements of the FAA. B. Applicability of the Arbitration Clause in Question Next, Rojas argues that even if her claim is not excluded from the FAA's coverage, her claim is not within the narrow language of the arbitration clause in her contract. The clause at issue covers any action contesting the validity of this Agreement, the enforcement of its financial terms, or any other disputes. (emphasis added). Whenever the scope of an arbitration clause is in question, the court should construe the clause in favor of arbitration.... The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability. City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 527- 7 28 (5th Cir.1983) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-250, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941-42, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). Contrary to Rojas' attempt to characterize the arbitration clause as narrow, we conclude that the district court was correct when it found that any other disputes was sufficiently broad to encompass Rojas' Title VII claims. See also Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F.Supp. 1232, 1243 (D.N.J.1994) (Title VII claim encompassed by arbitration clause requiring arbitration of  any dispute ... regard[ing] the interpretation or performance of any part of this Agreement' ); DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F.Supp. 947, 950-51 (W.D.N.Y.1992) (Title VII claims encompassed by arbitration clause requiring arbitration of any dispute). C. Unconscionability of Agreement Rojas' claim that the employment agreement is an unconscionable contract of adhesion is an attack on the formation of the contract generally, not an attack on the arbitration clause itself.3 Because her claim relates to the entire agreement, rather than just the arbitration clause, the FAA requires that her claims be heard by an arbitrator. See R.M. Perez & Assoc., Inc. v. Welch, 3 In her brief, Rojas contends that her attack on the Agreement is limited to the arbitration clause. While we acknowledge that she specifically attacks the arbitration clause, she also contends that she signed the Agreement [b]ased upon the Defendant's representations ... [that the Agreement's] coverage [would] be limited to situations such as non-competition, payola, and intellectual property rights. Appellant's Brief at 18. She also attacks the agreement based upon inequality of bargaining power. Id. These assertions belie Rojas' contention that her attack is limited to the arbitration clause and they support our conclusion that her attack is directed at the entire agreement. 8 960 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir.1992).