Opinion ID: 1504762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: glover affidavit

Text: For her first point, Oglesby attacks Dr. Lawson Glover's affidavit on several grounds: (1) the amount of insulin administered to Oglesby is in dispute; (2) Dr. Glover relied on Baptist's answers to interrogatories in formulating his affidavit which included inadmissible hearsay; and (3) Dr. Glover's affidavit is conclusory. We have often summarized our standards for summary judgment review: In these cases, we need only decide if the granting of summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion left a material question of fact unanswered. Nixon v. H & C Elec. Co., 307 Ark. 154, 818 S.W.2d 251 (1991). The burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment is always the responsibility of the moving party. Cordes v. Outdoor Living Center, Inc., 301 Ark. 26, 781 S.W.2d 31 (1989). All proof submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, and any doubts and inferences must be resolved against the moving party. Lovell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 310 Ark. 791, 839 S.W.2d 222 (1992); Harvison v. Charles E. Davis & Assoc., 310 Ark. 104, 835 S.W.2d 284 (1992); Reagan v. City of Piggott, 305 Ark. 77, 805 S.W.2d 636 (1991). Our rule states, and we have acknowledged, that summary judgment is proper when a claiming party fails to show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact and when the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Ark.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104, 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 [106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265] (1986). Forrest City Machine Works v. Mosbacher; 312 Ark. 578, 583, 851 S.W.2d 443, 446 (1993); see also Birchfield v. Nationwide Insur., 317 Ark. 38, 875 S.W.2d 502 (1994); Young v. Paxton, 316 Ark. 655, 873 S.W.2d 546 (1994); Bellanca v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 316 Ark. 80, 870 S.W.2d 735 (1994); Daniels v. Colonial Insur. Co., 314 Ark. 49, 857 S.W.2d 162 (1993); Mt. Olive Water Assoc. v. City of Fayetteville, 313 Ark. 606, 856 S.W.2d 864 (1993). Applying these standards to Oglesby's points relating to the Glover Affidavit, we first examine whether Dr. Glover's reference to 20 units of insulin as the dosage constituted impermissible reliance on a fact that is in dispute. We think not. The fact that 20 units of insulin were contained in the shot is garnered from Baptist's answers to interrogatories propounded by Oglesby. We observe that Oglesby offered nothing by way of proof to place the dosage of 20 units at issue. When summary judgment motions are at issue, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, but there is nothing before us to suggest that 20 units of insulin is an erroneous fact or even that Oglesby had a theory or proof that a different dosage was administered. Furthermore, Dr. Glover's affidavit turned on the cause and effect of any amount of insulin and whether insulin in general would have produced Oglesby's symptoms. His opinion was not wedded to a fixed amount of insulin such as 20 units. We discern no factual issue arising from the Glover Affidavit on this point. Oglesby's two remaining arguments pertaining to the Glover Affidavitthat he relied on inadmissible hearsay and that his affidavit was conclusorywere not raised to the trial court. We have long held that we will not consider matters which the party has failed to raise before the trial court. Stricklin v. State, 318 Ark. 36, 883 S.W.2d 465 (1994); Bryant v. Public Service Commission, 46 Ark.App. 88, 877 S.W.2d 594 (1994); Brown v. Seeco, Inc., 316 Ark. 336, 871 S.W.2d 580 (1994); Gibson v. State, 316 Ark. 705, 875 S.W.2d 58 (1994). Accordingly, we will not weigh either argument as a basis for reversal. We hold that there is no basis for a reversal of the trial court's order of summary judgment based on the alleged deficiencies in Dr. Glover's affidavit.