Opinion ID: 1670476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Custody Under Axsom

Text: [9] To assist in the circumstantial custody inquiry, we find it helpful to employ a six-factor test [10] which was originally devised by the Eighth Circuit in U.S. v. Axsom. [11] As set forth in Axsom, [12] the six factors are as follows: (1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to [leave], or that the suspect was not considered under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions; (4) whether strong[-]arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning. [10] The first three factors of the Axsom test are regarded as mitigating factorsthat is, their presence suggests the encounter was noncustodial in nature. [13] In contrast, the latter three factors are considered aggravating factors; their presence increases the likelihood that a reasonable person would regard the encounter as custodial. [14] Our review of the record in light of these six factors leads us to conclude that Tyler's encounter with officers at OCHS was noncustodial in nature. There is no dispute regarding the first mitigating factor. Tyler himself conceded at trial that both Milone and Nordby informed him that he was not under arrest. The evidence also supports the second mitigating factorwhether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning. When discussing this factor, courts look for traditional hallmarks of a degree of restraint associated with a formal arrest. [15] For example, in evaluating the presence of this factor in the case before it, the Axsom [16] court observed that the suspect was not handcuffed. Similarly, an officer's physical contact with the suspectsuch as grabbing or blocking the suspect to prevent or encumber movementmight also preclude a finding that the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement. [17] There is no evidence that Tyler was handcuffed or physically restrained in any manner during questioning. While the door to the interrogation room was closed, there is no evidence that the door was locked to prevent Tyler from getting outside. Nor is there evidence that officers tried to physically block Tyler from leaving the interview room. In fact, the record shows that Tyler was closest to the doorhe was positioned between it and the officers questioning him. Under our precedent, the mere fact that the questioning took place in an unlocked room is not enough to suggest that Tyler's freedom was restrained. In State v. Mata, [18] we concluded that there was no evidence of restrictions placed on [Raymond] Mata's movement during questioning even though Mata was questioned by a pair of officers in an unlocked room at the police station. All of the above supports the conclusion that Tyler's freedom was not restrained during his encounter with officers. The third mitigating factorwhether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questionspresents a more difficult issue. It is clear that Tyler did not initiate contact with authorities. By all accounts, school security guards located Tyler in class, requested his presence at the school administration building, and escorted him there. However, the fact that a suspect was escorted to the interrogation by authorities does not automatically preclude a finding that the suspect voluntarily acquiesced in the interrogation. In Mata, officers found Mata at the home of an acquaintance and eventually drove him to the police station for questioning. Nonetheless, we held that Mata voluntarily acquiesced in the questioning because he agreed to speak with officers after being told at the police station that he could leave at any time. [19] [11] The record contains contradictory testimony regarding whether Tyler was advised that he could leave at any time. Tyler maintains that he was never told he was free to leave, while Milone testified that Tyler was so advised. The trial court credited Milone's version of the facts. Although we review the record de novo, we may give weight to the trial court's resolution of such inconsistencies. [20] Tyler does not offer any reasons why we should depart from the trial court's resolution of this contradictory testimony. We therefore adopt the trial court's finding that Tyler was told he could leave if he wanted. At the suppression hearing, Tyler admitted that he agreed to speak with the officers. Because he did so after being advised that he was not required to stay, we conclude that Tyler, like Mata, `voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions.' [21] [12] The first aggravating factorand the fourth Axsom factor overallasks whether strong-arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning. The record suggests that they were not. Milone and Nordby were dressed in plain clothes and did not have their firearms drawn. Nor did the officers employ any deceptive stratagems. Instead, the officers merely confronted Tyler with the fact that the Internet posting in question had been traced to his family's computer. Tyler confessed when confronted with that simple fact. Tyler maintains that the officers threatened to send him to juvenile detention if he did not cooperate, but Milone denied this allegation. The juvenile court specifically credited Milone's testimony over Tyler's on this issue. Once again, we see no reason to reject the trial court's determination in that regard. The first aggravating factor is not present in this case. The record also fails to support the third aggravating factorwhether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of questioning. All parties agree that Tyler was permitted to return to class at the conclusion of the questioning. A legitimate question remains, however, as to whether the second aggravating factorwhether the questioning took place in a police-dominated atmosphereis present. Ordinarily, this factor is triggered by questioning which takes place at a police station house. [22] Tyler was questioned in an office in the administrative area of the school. At least one court has indicated that such a context does not qualify as police dominated for Miranda purposes. [23] On the other hand, questioning which takes place behind closed doors in a small, windowless office can be distinguished from environments that are generally not considered police dominated, such as questioning in a suspect's own home [24] or outdoors in a public place. [25] We need not definitively resolve this issue, however, because the circumstances show that Tyler was not in custody even if we assume the questioning occurred in a police-dominated atmosphere. Such an assumption would result in a single aggravating factor, yet the record reveals that all three of Axsom's mitigating factors are present on this record. In that respect, this case is identical to the situation in Mata. [26] Like Mata, Tyler acquiesced in the questioning despite being led to the interrogation by authorities. Neither Tyler nor Mata was restrained during the interrogation, and both individuals were advised that they were not under arrest. No deceptive stratagems or strong-arm tactics were employed in either case. Finally, Mata and Tyler were allowed to leave at the conclusion of questioning. We concluded that Mata's interrogation was not custodial despite the fact that the interrogation took place in an undeniably police-dominated atmosphere. The similarity between this case and Mata confirms that Tyler's interrogation was also noncustodial even if it, too, took place in a police-dominated atmosphere.