Opinion ID: 1016568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Isom’s letter

Text: Isom contends that the district court erred in submitting to the jury Isom’s July 9, 2003, letter, to his alibi witness, 21 Ghattan. More specifically, Isom maintains that the trial court should not have allowed into evidence the portion of the letter that reads “I am going to own a portion of Greensboro! $$$$$$$$$$” According to Isom, the dollar symbols at the end of the letter created substantial prejudice that was not outweighed by the probative value of the letter. We disagree. The district court’s evidentiary rulings are entitled to substantial deference and will be reversed only in circumstances in which there has been a clear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1992). We will find an abuse of discretion in this arena only when the district court acted “arbitrarily or irrationally.” United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993). Simply stated, we are unable to find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this letter into evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. No such circumstances are present here. In the letter, Isom includes the dates and the approximate times of each of the robberies. Immediately following this information is a statement that “I’m not worrying as long as I was 22 at work ‘it [doesn’t] matter.’” Then, just after requesting that Ghattan “bring [Isom] $70,” Isom writes “I am going to own a portion of Greensboro! $$$$$$$$$$” The letter, when considered in its entirety, and coupled with the visitation logs indicating that Ghattan had visited Isom at the jail at least four times between the time of arrest and trial, convinces us that the district court did not err in admitting the letter in its entirety. The trial court explained, “I think [‘]own a portion of Greensboro[’] could be construed to be [‘]you help me here and I am going to be rich, and therefore you might be rich, too.[’]” (J.A. at 597.) We agree. The letter in general, and the last line in particular, are relevant for the jury’s consideration as to the credibility of Ghattan’s testimony, specifically, whether he had any motive to be untruthful while testifying in this trial. While there is other evidence in the record that addresses Ghattan’s dishonest business practices, we cannot find that the letter evidence is cumulative since the other evidence is not concerned with his motive to be untruthful in this particular case. 23