Opinion ID: 52838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Lesser Included Offense Instruction Claim

Text: Reed seeks a COA for his claim that the trial court violated his due process rights by denying his requested jury instruction on first-degree, non-capital murder as a lesser included offense. Reed founds this claim on Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), where the Supreme Court struck down as a violation of due process an Alabama law barring trial judges from giving lesser included offense instructions in capital cases. Beck held that the jury must be permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a noncapital offense `in every case' in which `the evidence would have supported such a verdict.' Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (quoting Beck, 447 U.S. at 643, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382). Thus,  Beck held that due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such instruction. Id. at 611, 100 S.Ct. 2382. This court has held that  Beck 's holding applies when the state trial court refuses a lesser included offense instruction. Cordova v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 764, 767 (5th Cir.1988). We explained that the source of that refusal, whether by operation of state law or refusal by the state trial court judge, is immaterial. Id. at 767 n. 2. [8] In applying Beck's mandate, we adopted the federal standard, that a lesser included offense instruction should be given `if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.' Id. (quoting Hopper, 456 U.S. at 612, 102 S.Ct. 2049). We explained that the federal standard . . . is equivalent to the Beck standard that a lesser included instruction must be given when the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Id. We concluded that in a capital case, the jury must be allowed to consider a lesser included noncapital offense if the jury could rationally acquit on the capital crime and convict for the noncapital crime. Id. Reed was convicted under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2), which at the time stated that a person committed capital murder who intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit one of several enumerated felonies, including robbery and aggravated rape. [9] Reed was convicted of murder while in the course of committing and attempting to commit robbery and in the course of attempting to commit aggravated rape. As its language makes clear, § 19.03(a)(2) applies only when the killing was both intentional and committed in the course of committing or attempting to commit a specified felony. Under § 19.03(a)(2), unlike under the felony murder doctrine, the felony does not supply the requisite mens rea; rather, there must be an independent intent to take a life. See Lamb v. State, 680 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The Texas courts have defined in the course of committing an offense under § 19.03(a)(2) as conduct occurring in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the offense. Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim.App.1993) (citing Riles v. State, 595 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)). The courts have stated, with respect to robbery, that [e]vidence is sufficient to support a capital murder conviction if it shows an intent to obtain or maintain control of property which was formed before or contemporaneously with the murder. Id. They have further stated that proof of a robbery committed as an `afterthought' and unrelated to a murder would not suffice to prove capital murder. O'Pry v. State, 642 S.W.2d 748, 762 (Tex. Crim.App.1982). Presumably, these principles apply to rape as well. Reed sought a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of first-degree murder. Under Texas law, first-degree murder is committed when the accused intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. TEX. PEN.CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974). The trial court denied Reed's request. Reed objected to the trial court's decision in his direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Stating its inquiry as whether there is evidence in the record from which a jury could rationally find a defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense, the Texas court denied Reed's claim. The court noted that rather than denying commission of robbery or sexual assault, Reed swore that he did not commit any of the actions of which he was accused. The court declared that there was no evidence admitted to prove either that appellant did not intend to commit the robbery and the aggravated rape, or to show that they did not occur. The court concluded, [w]e find there was no evidence at trial that tended to establish appellant was guilty only of murder, so that a rational trier of fact could have reached that conclusion. In Reed's federal habeas proceedings, the district court held that Reed had failed to show that the Texas court's legal analysis resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court further held that Reed failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that the CCA's fact findings were correct. The district court therefore denied Reed's habeas claim as well as his request for a COA. In his habeas petition, Reed challenged the Texas court's fact-finding regarding the nature of the evidence presented at his trial. As stated earlier, when state court fact-finding is at issue, the federal habeas court must assess whether the state court decision is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Leal, 428 F.3d at 548. The state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness and the petitioner may overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. Leal, 428 F.3d at 548 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). We believe that reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court erred by concluding that Reed had not overcome the presumption in favor of the state court's fact-finding. We find that Reed has pointed to evidence tending to show that Wadle's murder was not committed in the course of attempted robbery or attempted aggravated rape. Reed notes that Wadle's autopsy indicated no evidence of trauma to the victim's genitalia, internally or externally. Other than the victim's nudity, the only evidence of an intent by Reed to commit rape came from McLean, whose testimony was questionable. Reed therefore proposes that a rational jury could have found Reed guilty of murder, but not rape or attempted rape. Reed also argues that a rational jury could have concluded that Reed committed murder, but not in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. He notes that the court of appeals, in affirming the trial court's refusal to give his requested instruction, pointed to Pursley's testimony that Reed had robbed her and that Wadle's purse was lying on the couch with its contents spilled when Pursley entered the apartment. Reed argues that to move from this evidence to the conclusion that he committed murder in the course of committing a robbery requires an inference by the jury. Reed relies on Cordova, where we held that the Texas court had erred by refusing a lesser included offense instruction. There, the state presented circumstantial evidence that the defendant was guilty of robbery as a party  the defendant was the leader of the gang, he did the talking, and he robbed another victim  and argued that this evidence showed that the defendant had a prior agreement to rob the decedent. 838 F.2d at 769. We responded that [t]he problem is that the jury could reject that inference. Id. Reed proposes that Cordova holds that where the jury was required to draw an inference of an intent to commit robbery, the evidence was such that the jury might rationally have rejected the inference. Reed may be taking Cordova too far. Cordova does not state that in any case where the jury must draw any kind of inference, a lesser included offense instruction is required. Rather, the court repeatedly emphasized that the evidence of an agreement to rob in that case was circumstantial and ambiguous. Id. at 770. Harmonizing Cordova with our earlier caselaw interpreting Beck, we can conclude that if a rational jury could reject the inference that the murder was in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony in question, then the defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction. Thus interpreted, however, Cordova still lends support to Reed's position. If Reed is correct that the evidence against him reached a level of ambiguity that a rational jury might reject the inference that he committed murder in the course of committing robbery or attempted robbery, then Cordova supports Reed's conclusion that a lesser included offense instruction was warranted. To the extent that the state court, in denying Reed's appeal, relied on the fact that Reed did not specifically argue at trial that he committed murder but not murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery or aggravated rape and did not present evidence to that effect, we hold that reasonable jurists could debate whether this reliance was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court's and this court's precedent does not clearly indicate that a defendant who denies any involvement in the crime of which he is accused is not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction. While the defendant in Beck did admit to robbery, while denying the murder charge against him, this fact was not essential to the Court's reasoning or holding. Beck holds that the jury must be permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a noncapital offense in every case in which the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Hopper, 456 U.S. at 610, 102 S.Ct. 2049. Thus, Beck focuses on the trial evidence, not the defendant's theories. Moreover, Beck does not state that the evidence must be supplied by the defendant to warrant consideration. Our decision in Cordova is consistent with the conclusion that a defendant who protests his complete innocence may receive a lesser included offense instruction. In Cordova, we held that the defendant was wrongfully denied a lesser included offense instruction without any discussion of the theories or evidence that the defendant presented at trial. Allowing a lesser included offense instruction where the evidence provided by the prosecution permits it is also consistent with the normal allocation of burdens in a criminal trial. A contrary approach, which would require the defendant to admit to the commission of crime to obtain the benefit of the lesser included offense instruction, could raise serious due process concerns. [10] Because reasonable jurists could debate whether the state court decision is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts and whether the state court decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, we grant Reed a COA on this claim.