Opinion ID: 71204
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cooper’s Transfer to Harvey

Text: Regarding Cooper’s transfer to Harvey, Cooper asserts solely that the increased commuting time—25 minutes each way—makes the transfer an adverse employment action. We disagree.3 “[A]n employment action that ‘does not affect job duties, compensation, or benefits’ is not an adverse employment action.” Pegram, 361 F.3d at 282 (quoting Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003)). “[A]n employment transfer may qualify as an ‘adverse employment action if the change makes the job objectively worse.’” Id. at 283 (quoting Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC., 277 F.3d 757, 770 (5th Cir. 2001). A purely 3 The district court dismissed Cooper’s Title VII race discrimination claims concerning his transfer to Harvey as barred because Cooper’s EEOC charge addressing those claims was untimely filed. The district court did analyze Cooper’s adverse employment action claims under § 1981, noting that the Title VII framework was equivalent. Cooper does not challenge the dismissal of his Title VII race discrimination claims concerning his transfer to Harvey, and accordingly, we do not review the district court’s dismissal of those claims. However, we do evaluate, as the district court did, Cooper’s § 1981 claims concerning his transfer to Harvey. 7 Case: 09-30864 Document: 00511032014 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/22/2010 No. 09-30864 lateral transfer is not an adverse employment action; however, a transfer that is the “equivalent of a demotion” is an adverse employment action. Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 2007). A transfer can be the equivalent of a demotion where the new position is “‘objectively worse—such as being less prestigious or less interesting or providing less room for advancement.’” Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir. 1999)). “[T]he focus is on the objective qualities of the positions, rather than an employee’s subjective preference for one position over another. That subjective preference, alone, is an insufficient basis for finding an adverse employment action.” Hunt, 277 at 771 n.8. Cooper’s transfer from New Orleans to Harvey was not an adverse employment action. Cooper had the same title and benefits in Harvey as he did in New Orleans. Though a longer commute may have been inconvenient for Cooper, we cannot say that the new position was objectively worse such that it was the equivalent of a demotion. See Johnson v. TCB Constr. Co., 334 F. App’x 666, 671 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough the new job site was 30 or 35 minutes from [Plaintiff’s] home, there is no evidence . . . that [the Plaintiff’s] new commute was unreasonable.” (citing Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998) (commute time increase from 5–7 to 30–40 minutes did not constitute an adverse employment action)); Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that change in employment assignment that, inter alia, increased on-the-job commuting time was not an adverse employment action); see also Gray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 895, 904 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (“[A]n assignment to a position which has equal compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment—but which requires a longer commute—does not constitute an adverse employment 8 Case: 09-30864 Document: 00511032014 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/22/2010 No. 09-30864 action.”).4 Because Cooper’s transfer to Harvey was not an adverse employment action, we conclude that Cooper failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination regarding his transfer to Harvey and thus summary judgment in favor of UPS on that claim was appropriate.