Opinion ID: 2506249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: because an illegal sentence can be corrected at any time without violating double jeopardy, judge mccleve's later determination of consecutive sentencing corrected her earlier illegal sentence

Text: ¶ 13 A district court does not violate a defendant's right to double jeopardy when it corrects an illegally imposed sentence. A court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). We have never explicitly defined an illegal sentence, though we have given examples. [4] The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, has promulgated a definition that we find appropriate. [An illegal sentence is] one which is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize. United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 14 In adopting this definition, we pause to reiterate a caution we previously stated in State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, 99 P.3d 858. In Samora, we affirmed the court of appeals' vacation of a harsher sentence that was imposed after the original sentence was found to be illegal due to infringement of the defendant's rights. Id. ¶ 1. The state argued that constitutional and statutory protections that prevent the imposition of harsher sentences were inapplicable to a defendant who has his sentence vacated pursuant to rule 22(e). Id. We disagreed and stated that `there may be circumstances under which even a corrected illegal sentence may be fundamentally unfair, [and] thus violative of due process.' Id. ¶ 20 (quoting State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991) (alterations in original)). We concluded that there are instances where an `illegal sentence' or a `sentence imposed in an illegal manner' may present ... [a] chilling effect on a defendant's basic right to appeal and the potential for vindictiveness at resentencing. Id. ¶ 25. Thus, when a district court corrects an illegal sentence, it must avoid any actions that may have a real, rather than very speculative, chilling effect on the constitutional right to appeal. Id. ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor may vindictiveness play a part in a new sentence that a defendant receives after successfully challenging an illegal sentence. Babbel, 813 P.2d at 87; see also Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 15 If a judge corrects an illegal sentence and there is no chilling effect and no evidence of vindictiveness, then double jeopardy provisions are not violated. In Babbel, we vacated the defendant's original sentences because they did not conform to the statutory punishments for the offenses for which he was convicted. 813 P.2d at 86. When harsher sentences that were in line with statutory requirements were imposed, the defendant again appealed. Id. at 87. He argued that the new sentences violated (1) Utah statutory prohibitions against harsher sentences being imposed after a direct review or collateral attack and (2) double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Id. We held that while we had vacated the original sentences, we had simply recognized in effect the clear power of the trial court to correct an illegal sentence, irrespective of [an] appeal. Id. at 88. We also held that [t]he law is well established that the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit the correction of an inadvertently illegally imposed sentence. Id. ¶ 16 In reviewing this case, we find that Judge McCleve did not follow the statutory requirement of section 76-3-401(1) to indicate in the order of judgment and commitment... if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (2008). As a result, she omit[ted] a term required to be imposed by statute. Dougherty, 106 F.3d at 1515. Mr. Yazzie's original sentence was therefore illegal. ¶ 17 As a rule, illegal sentences are void and neither create rights nor impair or affect any rights. Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88; see also State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825, 827 (1932). Additionally, because a sentence is illegal, the jurisdiction of the district court continues until a valid sentence is imposed. Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88. As a result, the district court can correct the sentence at any time, which includes before, after, and even if there is no appeal. Id. Judge McCleve's later determination, in effect, corrected the illegally imposed sentence. ¶ 18 Based on our analysis in Anderson, Judge McCleve was the correct judge to determine concurrent or consecutive sentencing and therefore her later correction of the original omission is in line with statutory and legal allowances for correcting illegal sentences. Double jeopardy is therefore not violated when a judge merely corrects an inadvertently illegally imposed sentence. Id.; see also Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947) (This Court has rejected the `doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is established, by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment altogether, because the court committed an error in passing the sentence.' (quoting In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 260, 14 S.Ct. 323, 38 L.Ed. 149 (1894))).