Opinion ID: 663141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony regarding Clark's involvement in incidents of public drunkenness and peace disturbance.

Text: 33 At trial, Clark's ex-wife testified that Clark had been involved in several episodes of public drunkenness and peace disturbance. 5 Clark's trial counsel did not raise an objection to this evidence. However, even if Clark's trial counsel committed an error by failing to object, that error did not influence the outcome of the case. The impact of the testimony on this point was negligible. Because the failure to object to testimony regarding public drunkenness and peace disturbance was, at most, harmless error, it did not render the assistance of Clark's trial counsel unreasonable under the first prong of the Strickland test. 34 Because Clark has made an insufficient showing with regard to the performance component of the two-prong Strickland test, we need not address the prejudice component of that test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069-70. 35 B. The refusal to consider new evidence of another claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 36 The record shows that Clark did not present additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during his state post-conviction proceeding. 6 The district court held, and Clark does not contest, that as such, Clark is procedurally barred from presenting the additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to a federal court. We agree. See Stokes v. Armontrout, 851 F.2d 1085, 1092 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 823, 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989). 37 Clark may, however, overcome the procedural bar by showing cause for his failure to present the additional claims to the state courts, and actual prejudice resulting from the failure. Id. Clark argues, correctly, that sufficient cause may generally be established by proving that the procedural default in state court was due to ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Id. However, in Coleman v. Thompson, U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the United States Supreme Court stated: There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings. Coleman, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2566 (citations omitted). In light of the Coleman decision, we hold that Clark can not demonstrate cause for his failure to present the additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at his state post-conviction proceeding by proving that that procedural defect was due to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in that proceeding.