Opinion ID: 2196160
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suppression of the Pretrial Statements

Text: Defendant argues on cross-appeal that, even if the circuit court applied the correct burden of proof, the circuit court should have suppressed his two pretrial statements because the State did not sufficiently prove he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights prior to giving the statements. Defendant contends he lacked the mental capacity to understand the Miranda warnings he received, and thus he could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. We initially note that the appellate court did not decide this issue. The circuit court, however, resolved this issue in the State's favor, the parties fully briefed and argued the issue, and a decision by us on the issue would serve the interest of judicial economy. Consequently, we will consider the issue for review. Geary v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. (1989), 129 Ill.2d 389, 408. As we have already indicated, for a defendant's confession to be admitted at trial, the State must first prove the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. ( Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 479, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724, 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 1630.) To establish a valid waiver, the State cannot simply rely on proof that the defendant received the Miranda warnings or gave a confession. ( Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.) In determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the defendant and the details of the interrogation, without any one circumstance or factor controlling. ( People v. Turner (1973), 56 Ill.2d 201, 205-07; People v. Rogers (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 374, 380; see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 226, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047.) Miranda is not a ritual of words to be recited by rote according to didactic niceties. What Miranda does require is meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which he can comprehend and on which he can knowingly act.    The crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his rights. It is, of course, always open to an accused to subjectively deny that he understood the precautionary warning and advice with respect to the assistance of counsel. When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing,    it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning. ( Coyote v. United States (10th Cir.1967), 380 F.2d 305, 308.) We stated in Turner, 56 Ill.2d at 205-06: The purpose of advising an accused of his rights is to enable him to make an intelligent decision, and to understand the consequences of that decision, and the fact that the advice was iterated and reiterated, and that he said he understood it, is of little consequence unless the defendant was possessed of the intelligence to understand the admonition.    In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S.Ct. 1019, the Supreme Court said: `A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' This court has long recognized that the mental capacity of a defendant must be taken into consideration in determining whether his actions were voluntary [citation] and while mental deficiency, of itself, does not render a confession involuntary [citation] it is a factor which must be considered in the totality of the circumstances under which the right to counsel was waived or a statement or confession made. See People v. Simmons (1975), 60 Ill.2d 173, 179-181. The Supreme Court has similarly held: [T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.       The totality approach permits  indeed, it mandates  inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-72. The State must fulfill its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Clark, 114 Ill.2d at 457; People v. Harper (1967), 36 Ill.2d 398, 402.) In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, a reviewing court's analysis is limited; we must determine whether the circuit court's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d at 521. After hearing all of the evidence, the circuit court stated: The matter was set on for [defendant's] motion to suppress certain statements. The motion to suppress was predicated on the defendant's lack of sufficient intelligence to understand the Miranda Warnings that were given to him.          [W]e have had testimony from a psychologist employed by the Board of Education who said that it's doubtful that a person with an I.Q. in the mid 70's, what [defendant] is testified to have, with a fourth or at best a fifth grade achievement, would probably not understand the admonitions given to him. The subject of I.Q. and level of intelligence or level of attainment has been considered by the Appellate Court in a number of cases.    In those cases, what is instructive is that measurements are to be considered along with other facts and circumstances that are apparent to the Court in determining whether or not the defendant did understand the admonitions given to him. In this case, I have the advantage of not only hearing the testimony of the doctor, but of hearing the defendant's testimony, Darryl Reid in court. The Court had the opportunity to observe his responses to questions, not only heard the responses but was able to see their effect. I can say that probably [defendant] is not the brightest young man of his age in the City of Chicago today. That being said, looking at the circumstances and the interrogation which is not seriously refuted here, the defendant was admonished numbers of times regarding his rights. The statement was read to him and present during most of these proceedings was the defendant's mother who he was permitted to consult with from time to time outside the presence of the other officers. I believe that the defendant sufficiently understood the proceedings that were taking place around him to be fully advised of his procedural rights pursuant to the Court's holdings in Miranda. Accordingly, the motion to suppress is denied. Defendant asserts he did not knowingly and understandingly waive his rights for several reasons. First, Hahn's testimony revealed defendant had the reading and comprehension skills of an eight-year-old and could not understand the Miranda warnings. Defendant argues that Cartwright's testimony did not contradict Hahn's conclusions. Cartwright admitted a child such as defendant would attempt to conceal his lack of knowledge out of embarrassment. Defendant contends Cartwright's tests failed to show whether he could understand the Miranda warnings. The TONI is a completely nonverbal test which, according to Cartwright's testimony, is not indicative of defendant's ability to understand the meanings of words. The other two tests given by Cartwright only tested defendant's pronunciation of words and his understanding of paragraph meaning. Although defendant scored at the sixth grade level on the latter test, the test was not timed and defendant spent more than the standard amount of time on it. Defendant also points out that Cartwright never testified as to whether defendant was capable of understanding the Miranda warnings. Other factors buttressed defendant's inability to understand the Miranda warnings. Defendant lacked prior experience with the criminal justice system and therefore was unaware of his rights. Defendant had never worked and had always lived at home with his family. Defendant points out that reiteration of the standard Miranda warnings, on which the circuit court in the case at bar relied, did not aid defendant when his intellectual deficiency prevented him from understanding the warnings. The circuit court also relied on the presence of defendant's mother during the questioning. Defendant notes his mother was not an attorney, and the record fails to reflect that she attempted to explain the Miranda rights to him. Thus, defendant contends his mother did not help him understand his constitutional rights. Defendant does not deny that he received the standard Miranda warnings more than once. Defendant also does not deny he told the police and DeOca he understood those rights. Despite these circumstances, defendant argues he was nevertheless incapable of understanding the rights as explained to him. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the circuit court's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant was advised of his rights more than one time. He was advised of his rights both orally and in writing. Defendant had opportunities to tell authorities he did not understand the rights read to him. Defendant originally told the police and the assistant State's Attorney he understood the rights read to him. He gave both oral and written waivers of his rights. Only at the suppression hearing did defendant state he failed to understand those rights. DeOca, who had experience working with juveniles, testified she did not observe anything unusual about defendant or his actions. Hahn never met or spoke with defendant, and thus never discussed the Miranda rights with him. Defendant testified he understood the meaning of lawyer, silent, can, will, used, against, and present, which are key words in the Miranda warnings. Although defendant's mother was not an attorney, she was present during defendant's questioning and defendant had an opportunity to speak with her outside the presence of the police and assistant State's Attorney. Thus, if defendant had a question concerning his rights, he could have expressed his concerns to his mother. In this way, defendant's risk of embarrassment was reduced. While Hahn's testimony and defendant's lack of criminal experience are factors in defendant's favor, it is the circuit court's responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and to consider and weigh each of the factors. The circuit court heard defendant's testimony and observed defendant's demeanor on the stand. The record clearly indicates the circuit court considered all of the relevant circumstances in the case at bar. Courts have upheld the denial of the suppression of a defendant's statements under circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. (See People v. Racanelli (1985), 132 Ill. App.3d 124; People v. Clements (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 1001.) We find the cases defendant cites for support, including Turner, 56 Ill.2d at 201, People v. Redmon (1984), 127 Ill. App.3d 342, and People v. Baker (1973), 9 Ill. App.3d 654, distinguishable. Consequently, the circuit court's decision to deny defendant's motions to suppress his pretrial statements was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.