Opinion ID: 2530425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Substitution of Judge Under Section 2-1001

Text: ¶ 26 In Illinois, the substitution of a judge in civil and criminal cases is governed solely by statute. See 725 ILCS 5/114-5 (West 2006); 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a) (West 2006). In civil cases, section 2-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure is divided into subsections that set forth the various grounds under which a substitution may be granted. For example, subsection (a)(1) of section 2-1001 speaks to the involvement of the judge, and identifies specific situations where a substitution of judge may be awarded by the court with or without the application of either party. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(1) (West 2006). The specific circumstances listed in this subsection include: where the judge is a party or interested in the action, or his or her testimony is material to either of the parties to the action, or he or she is related to or has been counsel for any party in regard to the matter in controversy. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(1) (West 2006). Under this provision of the statute, substitution of judge may be awarded by the court with or without the application of either party. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(1) (West 2006). This means that a judge may grant a substitution under this provision sua sponte. ¶ 27 Section 2-1001 also provides each litigant, as a matter of right, with one substitution of judge without cause. Under this provision of the statute, the application for substitution shall be made by motion. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2)(ii) (West 2006). Finally, section 2-1001 further allows a litigant a substitution of judge for cause. Under this provision of the statute, every application for such a substitution shall be made by petition. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3)(ii) (West 2006). ¶ 28 We note that both the appellate court majority opinion and that of the specially concurring justice misidentify John's request for substitution of judge for cause as a motion. See, e.g., 393 Ill. App.3d 364, 371, 332 Ill.Dec. 242, 912 N.E.2d 729, 393 Ill.App.3d at 395 (O'Malley, J., specially concurring). This court, too, has been guilty of the same imprecision, most recently in In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill.2d 519, 345 Ill.Dec. 583, 939 N.E.2d 426 (2010), and in Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Ill.2d 163, 319 Ill.Dec. 852, 886 N.E.2d 976 (2008). As noted, the statute contemplates the use of a motion when seeking substitution as a matter of right and the use of a petition for situations in which substitution for cause is sought. The inadvertent interchange of these words in substitution cases can lead to confusion since the requirements for substitution as of right differ from those for substitution for cause. In re Dominique F., 145 Ill.2d 311, 318-19, 164 Ill.Dec. 639, 583 N.E.2d 555 (1991). It is for this reason, therefore, that we take the opportunity to remind both bench and bar of the differences between the provisions of section 2-1001 and the need for care in labeling the requests for substitution brought under the various subsections of the statute. ¶ 29 With respect to subsection(a)(1), many, but not all, of the circumstances listed in it are also listed in Rule 63(C). For instance, Rule 63(C)(1)(d) mandates disqualification where the judge has an interest in the proceeding. Ill. S.Ct. R. 63(C)(1)(d) (eff. April 16, 2007). Rule 63(C)(1)(e)(i) mandates disqualification when the judge is a party to the proceeding. Ill. S.Ct. R. 63(C)(1)(e)(i). Rule 63(C)(1)(b) mandates disqualification when the judge has served as counsel for any party or may be a material witness. Ill. S.Ct. R. 63(C)(1)(b). Thus, the General Assembly has seen fit to incorporate specific portions of Rule 63 into section 2-1001, but has not seen fit to incorporate all of the rule. This, of course, is an indication of legislative intent. Certainly, if the General Assembly wanted to add all of the considerations contained in Rule 63(C) to section 2-1001(a)(3) it could have done so in subsection (a)(1) of the substitution of judge statute. ¶ 30 As noted, subsection (a)(2)(ii) of section 2-1001 directs that a litigant is entitled to one automatic substitution if the request for substitution is presented before trial or hearing begins and before the judge to whom it is presented has ruled on any substantial issue in the case. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2)(ii) (West 2006). After a substantive ruling has been made, however, subsection (a)(3) requires substitution [w]hen cause exists. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3) (West 2006). Although the statute does not define cause, Illinois courts have held that in such circumstances, actual prejudice has been required to force removal of a judge from a case, that is, either prejudicial trial conduct or personal bias. Rosewood Corp. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 57 Ill.2d 247, 311 N.E.2d 673 (1974); In re Marriage of Kozloff, 101 Ill.2d 526, 532, 79 Ill.Dec. 165, 463 N.E.2d 719 (1984); see also People v. Vance, 76 Ill.2d 171, 181, 28 Ill.Dec. 508, 390 N.E.2d 867 (1979). Moreover, in construing the term cause for purposes of a substitution once a substantial ruling has been made in a case, Illinois courts have consistently required actual prejudice to be established, not just under the current statute, but under every former version of the statute. See Ill.Rev. Stat.1983, ch. 110, ¶ 2-1001; Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 110, ¶ 503; Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 146, ¶ 1; Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 146, ¶ 1 et seq.; 3 Richard A. Michael, Illinois Practice §§ 13.3, 13.4 (1989) (collecting cases). The reason has been explained: one may not `judge shop' until he finds one in total sympathy to his cause. Any other rule would spell the immediate demise of the adversary system. American State Bank v. County of Woodford, 55 Ill.App.3d 123, 128, 13 Ill.Dec. 515, 371 N.E.2d 232 (1977). See also Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 110, ¶ 2-1001, Historical and Practice Notes, at 142-43 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (citing cases); 3 Richard A. Michael, Illinois Practice § 13.3 (1989) (noting that once a substantive ruling has been made, the need for actual prejudice to be shown is based on the desire to prevent `judge shopping' until a judge is found who is favorably disposed to the position of the litigant). ¶ 31 Judges, of course, are presumed impartial, and the burden of overcoming the presumption by showing prejudicial trial conduct or personal bias rests on the party making the charge. Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill.2d 228, 280, 269 Ill.Dec. 80, 779 N.E.2d 1115 (2002). The fact, for example, that a judge has previously ruled against a party in any particular case would not disqualify the judge from sitting in a subsequent case involving the same party. Eychaner, 202 Ill.2d at 280, 269 Ill.Dec. 80, 779 N.E.2d 1115. With respect to bias based upon a judge's conduct during a trial, we have relied upon the United States Supreme Court's description: `[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.' (Emphases in original.) Eychaner, 202 Ill.2d at 281, 269 Ill.Dec. 80, 779 N.E.2d 1115 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994)). Thus, while most bias charges stemming from conduct during trial do not support a finding of actual prejudice, there may be some cases in which the antagonism is so high that it rises to the level of actual prejudice. Indeed, this court just recently reaffirmed its reliance on Liteky in In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill.2d 519, 554-55, 345 Ill.Dec. 583, 939 N.E.2d 426 (2010). In any event, the law is clear in Illinois that when, as in this case, a substantial ruling has been made, substitution under section 2-1001(a)(3) may be granted only where the party can establish actual prejudice. ¶ 32 John argues that Illinois' actual prejudice standard is unconstitutional in light of a case alluded to earlier in this opinion, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009). There, the United States Supreme Court held that when a party contends that the failure to recuse violates due process, an objective inquiry must be made to determine not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias. Caperton, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2262. [3] John maintains that the utilization of the criteria set forth in Rule 63(C)(1) will eliminate due process concerns in petitions brought under section 2-1001(a)(3) of the Code, arguing that the standards set forth in Rule 63(C)(1) [4] will afford an additional level of protection for litigants and for the integrity of the adversarial process. That may be, but Rule 63(C)(1)'s standard for recusal is a mere appearance of impropriety, which is less strict than the one identified in Caperton. The proper constitutional inquiry, as set forth in Caperton, is whether `under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,' the interest `poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.' Caperton, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975)). Stated differently, recusal is required when the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456. ¶ 33 Under Caperton, then, a judge reviewing a for-cause challenge against another judge should assess the constitutional due process implications raised whenever substitution is sought and guard against the risk of actual bias ( id. ) by applying the Caperton standard to the facts of the case.