Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Secure Psychiatric Witnesses

Text: Shelton makes the related argument that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to secure psychiatric witnesses and to conduct a psychiatric report. In support of his claim, Shelton provides the Court with two psychiatric reports from Jeffrey Janofsy, M.D., and David Schretlen, Ph.D. Shelton must prove that counsel acted objectively unreasonably in failing to order psychiatric evaluations and that Shelton suffered resulting prejudice. We find on this record that trial counsel acted in a professionally reasonable manner in failing to call expert psychiatric witnesses and to conduct a psychiatric report. Furthermore, we find that Shelton suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's alleged deficiency. Shelton argues that his situation is analogous to that in the case of State v. Wright, in which the Superior Court, after viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the legal representation at the penalty phase, ruled that the almost complete lack of investigation into Wright's mental, school, and family history ... in addition to [counsel's] lack of strategy in presenting mitigation evidence in the penalty phase, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. [218] In Wright, the court held that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance because counsel's summation was easily interpreted as a plea for sympathy and lasted less than five minutes. [219] Moreover, counsel's summation contained only a brief reference to Wright's hardship as a youth and the entire penalty hearing lasted less than one hour. [220] The defense presented two witnesses, the defendant's mother and girlfriend. [221] Defense counsel, in a brief summation, made a plea for mercy, and referred to the defendant's having been born to an unwed mother, his poverty, his failing in school, and his introduction to drugs by older children in the neighborhood. [222] Shelton's situation is distinguishable. Shelton made it clear to counsel and the court that he would control and limit the mitigating evidence that would be presented on his behalf. He informed the trial court that he had deliberated his decision for months. Defense counsel was ready, willing and able to present a compelling case in favor of a mitigated sentence. Shelton's penalty hearing lasted five days. During that time, as well as at the trial, Shelton behaved rationally and intelligently and instructed the court that he was sane for purposes of his decisionmaking. [223] Never once did Shelton indicate to counsel or the court that he desired, or would permit, a psychiatric evaluation. Thus, aware of Shelton's strategy, defense counsel had no duty to order psychiatric evaluations or to prepare psychiatric witnesses for the penalty hearing. [224] We hold that counsel behaved in an objectively reasonable manner in not securing an expert psychiatric witnesses and in not obtaining a psychiatric evaluation for the penalty hearing. Accordingly, we need not consider whether counsel's alleged deficiency caused Shelton prejudice. [225] Nevertheless, the psychiatric reports proffered by Shelton do not constitute conclusive proof that, but for defense counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The reports indicate no sign of cognitive impairment. They show that Shelton is of low average intelligence whose mental abilities are consistent with his IQ. According to Dr. Schretlen, individuals with Shelton's profile frequently are careless and irresponsible. [226] In addition, Shelton's impulsivity, antagonism and irresponsibility may be personality traits stemming from his childhood. [227] Both Dr. Schretlen and Dr. Janofsky noted that Shelton's parents were alcoholics and that his father physically abused his mother and siblings. Dr. Janofsky recounted Shelton's difficulty in school, his juvenile and adult criminal history, and his substance abuse. Dr. Janofsky's examination of Shelton revealed no intent or plan of suicide or threats to others; no signs of hallucinations; no thought disorder or delusions; and no obsessions, compulsions or phobias. [228] Dr. Janofsky concluded that there was no evidence of a major mental illness and that Shelton had been raised in a severely abusive environment. [229] Neither Dr. Schretlen nor Dr. Janofsky discovered any mental illness or disease. As expected, both psychiatrists opined that Shelton suffered from behavioral and personality problems such as anger, irritability, carelessness, irresponsibility, conformity, etc. Nevertheless, the mitigating value of such diagnoses is slight, if any. Accordingly, Shelton has not shown the requisite prejudice under Strickland as to defense counsel's failure to secure expert psychiatric witnesses or psychiatric evaluations.
Shelton contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion in dismissing his motion for postconviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. According to Shelton, all issues raised by the defendant require a fact-finding hearing. [230] Shelton appears to be arguing that a postconviction evidentiary hearing should be required in all capital cases. We review the Superior Court's denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion. [231] Questions of law are reviewed de novo. [232] In a postconviction proceeding, the decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is a determination made by the trial court. [233] As we stated in Outten, While the decision to hold an evidentiary hearing in a postconviction proceeding is within the discretion of the Superior Court, in capital cases, holding such an evidentiary hearing should be the norm, not the exception. [234] If, however, it appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, then summary disposition of the motion is appropriate. [235] Given the trial judge's extensive familiarity with the background of this case, we are unable to conclude that he abused his discretion in determining that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary.
The Superior Court carefully considered Shelton's allegations, treating such claim with the gravity that it deserved in a capital case. In its extraordinarily detailed 187-page Opinion of December 22, 1997, the Court correctly determined that each of Shelton's claims was either procedurally barred or without merit. Shelton has failed to demonstrate any error of law or abuse of discretion requiring reversal. Thus, we affirm the Superior Court's decision denying Shelton's request for postconviction relief and reinstating Shelton's capital sentence. We remand to the trial court for the purpose of setting a new execution date.