Opinion ID: 2567159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Improper Victim Impact Testimony Was Admitted

Text: [¶ 14] Jensen contends that irrelevant victim impact testimony and argument occurred throughout the trial, tainting the proceedings against him. In his opening statement, the prosecutor described S.O. as a very frantic frightened 4-year-old boy who was crying and screaming when the police arrived in response to Spears' 911 call. Then, in her testimony, [3] Spears recounted her emotional state, as well as S.O.'s: A: He started yanking on [S.O.'s] arm and telling me that he wasn't going anywhere, and that he wasn't letting us leave, and he is just completely irrational. I was scared. Q: Okay. You were scared, you say? A: Uh-huh. Q: Okay. What was [S.O.] doing while this took place? A: Crying, screaming. Q: Okay. Was [S.O.] saying anything? .... A: He didn't say much but, no, Mommy, Daddy. Q: Say that again, please. I didn't hear. A: I remember him saying no. I remember him saying, Mommy, Daddy. I don't remember him saying anything else. I remember him crying a lot. .... Q: Okay. And what kind of a motion did he make? A: A stabbing motion towards us. Q: Could you pick up the knife and demonstrate the motion he made, please? A: (Indicating.) Q: Okay. How did you feel then, Kate? A: I was terrified. I thought  I thought I was going to die. I thought my son was going to die. .... Q: Yes. Was [S.O.] exhibiting any signs of fear or emotion when you were on the deck? A: Yeah, he was crying. Q: Okay. When did he first start crying? A: In the bathroom. Q: Okay. When did he stop? A: When I took him to the grandmother's. The investigating officer described Spears as shaking, visibly upset, and crying, with S.O. in her arms clinging on to her neck. The officer noted that the demeanor of Spears and S.O. improved once officers were on the scene. During closing argument, the prosecutor commented: As [police officer Hannigan] approached [Spears], he notices she's crying. She's clinging to her child. Her child has his arms around her neck grasping back. The child is crying. Mother is crying. Officer Hanningan asks, What's going on? Mother says, I've just escaped from my apartment. Child says, My dad tried to hurt me and then he cut himself. Jensen argues that the elements of the charged crimes had nothing to do with the emotional state of Spears or S.O., and this testimony was used to stir up sympathy for them, depriving him of his right to a fair trial. [¶ 15] There was no objection, so Jensen must demonstrate plain error: The plain error doctrine requires us to make this series of findings: (1) The record must clearly present the incident, (2) appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way, and (3) that appellant was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him. Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, ¶ 32, 100 P.3d 1270, ¶ 32 (Wyo.2004) (citing Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 24, 29 P.3d 76, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2001)). [¶ 16] We apply the following principles when analyzing the admissibility of victim impact evidence: The evidence must be relevant to be admissible. W.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. W.R.E. 401. In criminal cases, [e]vidence is always relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the crime charged. Gomez v. State, 2003 WY 58, ¶ 6, 68 P.3d 1177, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2003) (quoting Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo.1993)). Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. W.R.E. 403. Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, ¶ 26, 80 P.3d 191, ¶ 26 (Wyo.2003). The testimony of victims of a crime describing how it affected their lives after the crime is irrelevant with respect to issues before a jury. Moore, ¶ 27 (citing Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1010-11 (Wyo.1989)). [¶ 17] In this case, the testimony of Spears and the investigating officer was clearly relevant. Jensen was charged with a count of aggravated assault against Spears and S.O. respectively. The jury was instructed on the elements of aggravated assault. [4] 1. On or about July 20, 2003; 2. In Campbell County, Wyoming; 3. The Defendant, Zachary Dwight Fiske Jensen; 4. Threatened to use a drawn deadly weapon 5. on [Kate Spears and S.O.]; 6. When not reasonably necessary in defense of the Defendant's person, property or abode to prevent serious bodily injury to another. We have held that the statutory phrase threatens to use that is embodied in element four of the instructions to the jury requires proof of an actual threat of physical injury during the act of employing a deadly weapon. Miller v. State, 2003 WY 55, ¶ 24, 67 P.3d 1191, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2003); see also Lowseth v. State, 875 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo.1994) and Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Wyo.1987). Spears' testimony that she was scared and terrified for her life and that of her son while Jensen was making stabbing motions with the knife goes towards proving that they were threatened by his actions. Furthermore, Jensen's theory of the case was that Spears was lying about the confrontation and that he had never threatened Spears or S.O., only himself. The testimony regarding the emotional state of Spears and S.O. during and in the immediate aftermath of the assault tends to disprove the assertion that Spears' accusations were calculated. The testimony did not tend to establish the impact of this crime on Spears' or S.O.'s lives because it was restricted to their emotional states and reactions at the time of the assault and in the immediate aftermath when the police contacted Spears at the convenience store in response to her 911 call minutes later. Jensen cannot make the final two showings  that there was a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and that he was denied a substantial right materially prejudicing him  required to demonstrate plain error. The testimony was relevant and admissible, and no error occurred in its admission.