Opinion ID: 8704056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disability Discrimination (Count II)

Text: Along with her failure to accommodate claim, Hancock also asserts that the Hospital discriminated against her on account of her disability when she was terminated from WHC. This type of disability discrimination claim under the ADA is subject to the familiar three-part burden-shift test announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA by showing that she: “(1) had a disability; (2) was qualified for the position with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability.” Swanks v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir.1999). If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts back to the employer to articulate a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action,” leaving the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that the employer’s proffered justification was not the true reason, but a pretext for discrimination. Id. (citing Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (en banc)). In determining whether Hancock’s termination-based disability claim should survive summary judgment, the Court must first address a significant, threshold factual dispute between the parties — precisely when Hancock’s employment was actually terminated. On the one hand, Hancock contends that she was terminated on December 21, 2007, immediately after she presented her supervisors with updated medical restrictions, including her triage limitations. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 21-26). WHC, on the other hand, maintains that Hancock was simply placed on a leave of absence on December 21, 2007, insisting that it was not until June 10, 2008 — after Hancock failed to submit updated medical documentation regarding that supposed leave of absence — that her employment was ultimately terminated. (Def.’s Mem. at 12-16). In seeking summary judgment, WHC urges the Court to reject Hancock’s version of events as speculative and “fully at odds with the facts.” (Def.’s Reply at 2). It is true that speculation and conjecture are insufficient to avoid summary judgment, see, e.g., Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993), but these are not appropriate labels for the evidence Hancock identifies here. Rather, Hancock relies on a December 21st email message from Ms. Russell directing Hancock to “clean out [her] locker, [and] turn in [her] headset, badge, and locker key before leaving....” (Pl.’s Stmt, at ¶29). Hancock also testified that, after Ms. Russell and Ms. Nesmith instructed her to file for long-term disability, she was expressly told that she would “no longer work here after today [December 21st] in this office.” (Id.). From these facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that Hancock was terminated on December 21, 2007. WHC also responds that, when these facts are viewed in context and alongside Hancock’s apparent application for disability benefits, no reasonable jury could possibly conclude that Hancock was terminated in December 2007. (Def.’s Reply at 13-14). But WHC’s evidence on this point is superficial, at best. First, while WHC implies that only current WHC employees are eligible to receive disability benefits under its plan, there is no evidence of this in the record, and the Court will not make this leap on WHC’s behalf. Even if the Court were to find that Hancock applied for and/or received disability benefits, as WHC argues, this does not mean that she was necessarily a WHC employee at the time. See, e.g., DeLisle v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 558 F.3d 440 (6th Cir.2009); Bard v. Boston Shipping Ass’n, 471 F.3d 229 (1st Cir.2006). Second, WHC asserts that Hancock “applied] for medical leave on December 28, 2007,” (Def.’s Mem. at 7), but this assertion did not appear in WHC’s statement of undisputed facts and was not supported by any evidence. At a minimum, the Court would expect to have received a copy of the leave of absence form that Hancock supposedly completed and signed, but WHC provided no such documentation. In short, WHC’s flimsy evidentiary proffer falls far short of the requisite showing of undisputed‘facts necessary for summary judgment. From there, upon crediting Hancock’s assertion that she was terminated on December 21, 2007 — as the Court must at this stage, see, e.g., Steele, 535 F.3d at 692 — the Court finds that Hancock has also raised a triable issue of fact as to whether WHC’s decision was discriminatory. Under Hancock’s theory, just one day after providing her supervisors with updated work restrictions, WHC refused to accommodate those restrictions and discharged her employment with the Hospital. Moreover, Hancock testified that, in communicating that decision during a meeting on December 21st, her supervisors stated: You’re going to need all the money you can get, so you need to work out through the rest of the day because you will no longer work here after today in this office.... If you leave now, we’re going to say that you abandoned your job. So you need to go fill out those papers because you are disabled, you have a limp.... (Dkt. No. 22-4 at Ex. 2, Hancock Dep. at 88:7-14). Faced with this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that Hancock was discriminatorily terminated in December 2007 due to her disability. WHC presents no argument to the contrary. Instead, the Hospital devotes the bulk of its briefing on this issue to explaining how its termination of Hancock’s employment in June 2008 was based on legitimate, nondiseriminatory reasons — namely, her failure to properly respond to WHC’s requests for additional medical information regarding her ability to return to work. (See Def.’s Mem. at 12-16; Def.’s Reply at 11-14). But those contentions are altogether immaterial to WHC’s actions in December 2007. To the extent that a jury ultimately credits WHC’s timeline over Hancock’s, WHC’s arguments might well carry the day. At the summary judgment stage, however, WHC has failed to establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Hancock’s version of events. 8 Because disputed issues of material fact surround Hancock’s disability discrimination claim, the Court denies WHC’s motion as to Count II.