Opinion ID: 2159529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1982 Appeal.

Text: Superior also filed an appeal from its 1982 assessment. The notice of appeal was directed to  Robert DeCook, Chairman, Board of Review, Oskaloosa, Iowa; Mahaska County, Iowa. (Emphasis added.) Service of the notice of appeal was attempted to be made by delivering a copy of it to the county attorney, who endorsed the following on the notice: On this 18th day of June, 1982, the undersigned, being attorney for the Board of Review for the city of Oskaloosa, Iowa, hereby accepts service of this original notice, the Notice of Appeal together with a Petition for Appeal attached; said service having been accepted on behalf of Robert DeCook, Chairman, Board of Review, Oskaloosa, Iowa. (Emphasis added.) The district court dismissed the 1982 appeal on two grounds: (1) the county attorney was not authorized to accept service on behalf of the chairman of the board of review; and (2) the notice of appeal, and the county attorney's acknowledgment of service, incorrectly identified Robert DeCook as chairman. (DeCook and Rozenboom had switched jobs between the 1981 and 1982 appeals. As of the time the 1982 appeal was taken, Gary Rozenboom was chairman and Robert DeCook was clerk). A. Acceptance of service. Iowa Code section 441.38 provides that notice to the chairman or presiding officer of the board of review shall be served as an original notice. Here, the county attorney purported to acknowledge service of the notice on behalf of the chairman. (The board of review claims the county attorney's acknowledgment was not for the chairman, because the chairman was misnamed in the notice. We will address that question in the following division.) An attorney may accept service of notice, or waive it, if the attorney has authority to do so. Fairchild v. Plank, 189 Iowa 639, 641-44, 179 N.W. 64, 65-66 (1920) (acceptance of notice of appeal); Prince v. Griffin, 16 Iowa 552, 554 (1864) (acceptance of original notice); Hefferman v. Burt, 7 Iowa 320, 320a (1858) (authority to accept service of original notice). In the case of an appeal notice, a lawyer is presumed to be authorized to acknowledge service. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 172, 203, at 262-63, 339 (1980). In board of review proceedings, the county attorney is not only authorized to act on behalf of the board; he is in fact directed to do so. In the case of cities having an assessor, the city legal department shall represent the assessor and board of review in all litigation dealing with assessments. In the case of counties, the county attorney shall represent the assessor and board of review in all litigation dealing with assessments. Iowa Code § 441.41. The board of review argues that, even if an attorney was authorized to accept service generally, an appeal notice under section 441.38 is different. Under that statute, such a notice is a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. An attorney's acceptance of service would, in effect, be an attempt to establish subject matter jurisdiction by agreement, which he could not do. The case primarily relied on to support that proposition, however, is distinguishable. That case was Midwestern Realty Co. v. City of Des Moines, 210 Iowa 942, 231 N.W. 459 (1930), which involved an appeal from a decision of the Des Moines City Council sitting as a board of review. The notice of appeal was held to be defective, and the question arose whether an appearance of counsel had obviated the need for the notice. We held that it did not because the appearance was by an attorney for the city council, not the board of review. The board of review was the proper party, not the city, although the city council acted in the capacity of a board of review. The case did not hold that service of notice could not be made by an attorney's acknowledgment. In fact, the suggestion is to the contrary: That if an attorney representing the proper party had acknowledged service of the notice of appeal it would be sufficient. Id. at 944-45, 231 N.W. at 460. While service of notice of appeal may be distinguished from service of an original notice, we believe for our present purposes the distinction in this case is one without a meaningful difference. Whether a chairman or presiding officer of the board of review is served personally, or through an attorney authorized to accept service, should not detract from the fact that there has been notice given. We believe that is all that is required under section 441.38. In the analogous case involving appeals from district court to the supreme court, in which service of notice of appeal has been held to be jurisdictional, we have permitted acceptance of service by the appellee's attorney. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunnegan, 217 Iowa 1210, 1213, 245 N.W. 326, 327 (1932); Lundy v. City of Ames, 201 Iowa 186, 188-89, 206 N.W. 954, 955 (1926); Fairchild, 189 Iowa at 641-44, 179 N.W. at 65-66. See generally 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 172, at 262-63 (1980) (An admission of due and personal service of a notice of appeal is presumed to be authorized....); Id. § 203, at 339 (attorney for client against whom appeal is taken regarded as having authority to admit or waive service of notice). B. Errors in notice. The notice of appeal was addressed to Robert DeCook as chairman. The problem is that, while DeCook had been chairman at the time of the 1981 appeal, he was not serving as chairman at the time of the 1982 appeal. He was in fact serving as the clerk at that time. For the reasons discussed in the first division, we believe service on Robert DeCook, as clerk, would have constituted substantial compliance with section 441.38. But, what is the effect of DeCook's title being misstated in the notice? In Resthaven Cemetary, we held that failure to attach any title to the name of the person served was not fatal to the notice, and we believe a mis statement of the title should be no more egregious a deviation from the statute. See 249 N.W. 2d at 621-22. While it is true that service of notice of an appeal is a necessary prerequisite to jurisdiction under section 441.38, we see nothing in that statute, or elsewhere, to suggest jurisdiction should be sparingly recognized. Who could seriously argue that a notice directed to Robert DeCook identifying him as the chairman did not notify Robert DeCook as clerk that the appeal was pending? We find substantial compliance with regard to both the 1981 and 1982 appeals under Iowa Code section 441.38 and therefore reverse on both appeals. We remand for resolution of these appeals on their merits. REVERSED AND REMANDED.