Opinion ID: 2217099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Special Verdicts in Entrapment Cases

Text: On oral argument in this court, Bartkowski argued that the trial court committed plain error (Obvious Error under Rule 52(b), NDRCrimP) in failing to require that the jury return a special verdict on the entrapment defense as provided in Rule 31(e)(4), NDRCrimP. Ordinarily, the touchstones for an effective appeal on any proper issue are: (1) that the matter has been appropriately raised in the trial court so that the trial court can intelligently rule on it, and (2) that there be a valid appeal from the judgment. State v. Haakenson, 213 N.W.2d 394, 399 (N.D.1973). Here, Bartkowski did not raise the matter of a special verdict on his entrapment defense in the trial court, but he is correct in saying that Rule 52(b), nevertheless, permits this court to consider obvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights which were not raised in the trial court. That leads us to the question: Does the absence of a special verdict in a case where entrapment has been raised as a defense deprive a defendant of a fundamental right? The American Law Institute, Proposed Final Draft (April 1, 1930), in a Commentary to § 349 (later renumbered as § 337 which is referred to in the Explanatory Note to Rule 31 of the NDRCrimP), states: At common law the jury could bring in a special verdict in any criminal case. `And such public or open verdict may be either general, guilty or not guilty; or special, setting forth all the circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the court, whether, for instance, on the facts stated, it be murder, manslaughter, or no crime at all. This is where they doubt the determination of the law, and therefore choose to leave it to the determination of the court; though they have an unquestionable right of determining upon all the circumstances, and finding a general verdict, if they think proper so to hazard a breach of their oaths.' 4 Bl. Comm. 361. In the explanatory note to Rule 52 is found the following: Subdivision (b) provides that obvious errors affecting substantial rights may be noticed even though they were not brought to the attention of the court. But the power to notice obvious error, whether at the request of counsel or on the court's own motion, is one the courts should exercise cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. The power should be exercised only where a serious injustice has been done to the defendant. [See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 856, pages 372-374 (1969).] [Emphasis added.] Rule 31(e), NDRCrimP, is apparently unique to North Dakota. It provides: (e) Special Verdicts. (1) Whenever the defendant interposes the defense of insanity and evidence thereof is given at the trial, the jury, if it finds him not guilty on that ground, shall declare that fact in their verdict. (2) Whenever the defendant interposes the defense that he has been formerly convicted or acquitted of the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein, or once in jeopardy, and evidence thereof is given at the trial, the jury, if it so finds, shall declare that fact in their verdict. (3) Whenever the defendant is charged with treason or conspiracy to commit treason and more than one overt act is charged, the jury, before returning a verdict of guilty, must return a special verdict with respect to each overt act charged. (4) Whenever the defendant interposes any other defense which cannot be reflected in a general verdict, and evidence thereof is given at the trial, the jury, if it so finds, shall declare that fact in their verdict. Although a significant part of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure parallels the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 31(e) does not. Federal Rule 31(e), as amended April 24, 1972, effective October 1, 1972, provides: (e) Criminal Forfeiture. If the indictment or the information alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any. Special verdicts in federal courts, other than in cases involving criminal forfeiture, are rare but not unknown. Chief Judge Aldrich of the United States Court of Appeals, discussed special verdicts in United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), and, at 181, quoted from G. Clementson, Special Verdicts and Special Findings by Juries, 49 (1905), as follows: `It is one of the most essential features of the right of trial by jury that no jury should be compelled to find any but a general verdict in criminal cases, and the removal of this safeguard would violate its design and destroy its spirit.' It is thus an anomaly that Bartkowski should argue that the failure to require a special verdict affected his substantial rights and, therefore, constituted obvious error. Rule 31(e), NDRCrimP, has not heretofore been the subject of any appeal to this court. Section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution, which involves civil and criminal trials for libel, specifies in part: and the jury shall have the same power of giving a general verdict as in other cases. [Emphasis added.] That may create a fundamental right to a general verdict but it cannot be said that it creates a fundamental right in a special verdict. In State v. Tolley, 23 N.D. 284, 136 N.W. 784, 788 (1912), this court said: all that was intended by the use of the language quoted was to vest in the jury in such cases the right to render a general verdict. The source note to Rule 31(e), NDRCrimP, refers us to The American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure, Official Draft, § 337 (1930), which provides: Section 337. Verdict may be general or special. The jurors may in all cases render either a general or a special verdict. It appears that § 29-22-17, NDCC, which was superseded by Rule 31, NDRCrimP, and which defined a special verdict as one by which the jurors find the facts only and present a conclusion of fact, leaving nothing for the court but to draw conclusions of law upon them, would make a special verdict on an entrapment defense no more special than a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. In order that a special verdict be considered or even permitted by the provisions of Rule 31(e)(4), it is necessary that the particular defense (entrapment here) cannot be reflected in a general verdict. Here, where the only defense raised was entrapment, a general verdict of not guilty would clearly reflect that the jury found entrapment, and a general verdict of guilty would clearly reflect that the jury found no entrapment. We express no view as to the consequences should a jury choose to return a special verdict, as it apparently could under common law without being directed to do so by the trial court. See generally, 76 Am.Jur.2d Trial, § 1178, and 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1293 and 1399. The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to require the destruction of the drugs that were made a part of the record in this case. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, SAND and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur.