Opinion ID: 494566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the Attorney General's Delegation Lawful?

Text: 19 We have no difficulty concluding that the Attorney General possessed the statutory authority to create the Office of Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra and to convey to it the investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers described in 28 C.F.R. Sec. 600.1(a) of the regulation. The statutory provisions relied upon by the Attorney General in promulgating the regulation are 5 U.S.C. Sec. 301 and 28 U.S.C. Secs. 509, 510, and 515. 29 While these provisions do not explicitly authorize the Attorney General to create an Office of Independent Counsel virtually free of ongoing supervision, we read them as accommodating the delegation at issue here. 30 20 Moreover, the Attorney General's delegation did not violate the Ethics Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 597(a), which provides: 21 Whenever a matter is in the prosecutorial jurisdiction of a[n] independent counsel or has been accepted by a[n] independent counsel under [28 U.S.C. Sec. 594(e) ], the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and all other officers and employees of the Department of Justice shall suspend all investigations and proceedings regarding such matter ... except insofar as such independent counsel agrees in writing that such investigation or proceedings may be continued by the Department of Justice. 22 The Attorney General's power of appointment extends only to the Department of Justice; hence the Office of Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra is within the Department, though free of ongoing supervision by the Attorney General. 31 Walsh has acknowledged that his signing the appointment form under the regulation constitutes an agree[ment] in writing within the meaning of Sec. 597(a). The purpose of that provision--preventing investigations by the Department of Justice which would duplicate and possibly impede the work of Independent Counsel--is preserved by the present arrangement. 23 North contends that the Attorney General's delegation of authority to the Independent Counsel violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2, which provides that the President 24 shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 25 Citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), North contends that, given the substantial authority delegated to him, the Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra is not an inferior Officer but an Officer of the United States 32 who may be appointed only by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. North raises essentially the same contention with respect to the authority given to the independent counsel under the Ethics Act. We need not decide whether the Ethics Act creates such an Officer of the United States, however, in order to conclude that the regulation does not. The crucial difference is that the Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra serves only for so long as the March 5, 1987, regulation remains in force. Subject to generally applicable procedural requirements, the Attorney General may rescind this regulation at any time, thereby abolishing the Office of Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra. 33 As a result, we must conclude that the Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra is charged with the performance of the duty of the superior [i.e., the Attorney General] for a limited time and under special and temporary conditions. United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343, 18 S.Ct. 374, 379, 42 L.Ed. 767 (1898). As such, he is not thereby transformed into the superior and permanent official, id., but rather remains an inferior Officer whom the Attorney General, as the Head[ ] of [a] Department[ ], may appoint under the express terms of the Appointments Clause. 34 See id. at 343-44, 18 S.Ct. at 879; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 508, 509-10, 25 L.Ed. 482 (1878). 35 26