Opinion ID: 2971749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Equal Pay Act Claims

Text: The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from paying an employee a lower wage than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To make out a prima facie case under this statute, a plaintiff must show that “an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)); accord Buntin v. Breathitt County Board of Education, 134 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1998). If a plaintiff carries the initial burden of demonstrating unequal pay for equal work, the defendant employer has the opportunity of showing that the unequal pay is justified due to one of four statutory exceptions: “(i) a seniority system, (ii) a merit system, (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The District Court ruled that Thomas failed to make out a prima facie case and that, even if she had, the Co-op established that any pay differential was based on a non-gender factor. It is undisputed that Thomas was paid a lower wage than that paid to the replacement dispatchers. Instead the parties dispute whether the male employees in the new positions and the female employees in the old positions performed equal work. Equal work “does not require that the jobs be identical,” but only that there exist “‘substantial equality of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.’” Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir. 1981). It is undisputed that the old dispatchers and their male replacements faced similar working conditions. Thus, if -8- Thomas demonstrates that the two dispatcher positions required substantially equal skill, responsibility, and effort, she has succeeded in making out a prima facie case. The Co-op contends that the new dispatchers had greater skills and responsibilities than the females they replaced. Regarding the skill differential, the Co-op asserts that the new dispatchers had greater technical proficiency evidenced by field experience and linemen’s training. Thomas contends that the inquiry should focus not on the qualifications and skills of the persons holding the job but on the skill required to do the job. But, the federal regulations indicate that experience and training are relevant to the determination of “skill” in suits under the Equal Pay Act: Where the amount or degree of skill required to perform one job is substantially greater than that required to perform another job, the equal pay standard cannot apply even though the jobs may be equal in all other respects. Skill includes consideration of such factors as experience, training, education, and ability. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a) (emphasis added). The Co-op also claims that the new dispatchers had greater levels of responsibility than the replaced dispatchers. Rather than being responsible simply for “information relay,” the new dispatchers were expected as the District Court found, “to analyze problems that occur in the field, direct linemen to the exact location of the problem, provide advice on how to restore service, and give direction as to the proper action to take.” “Responsibility” according to the federal regulations, “is concerned with the degree of accountability required in the performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a). This regulation points out that there is a difference in responsibility where one employee is called upon to “assume[s] supervisory duties” where the other does not. Id. § 1620.17(b)(1). The new dispatchers were responsible for providing guidance to personnel on the ground in a way that the former dispatchers were not. The evidence demonstrates that the job responsibilities were greater after the change in -9- position and that the new dispatchers were more skilled than the plaintiff as measured by relevant education and experience. Thus, the District Court’s ruling that the jobs were not substantially equal and thus did not call for equal pay appears correct. As Thomas failed to make out a prima facie case of an Equal Pay Act violation, we affirm the grant of summary judgment for the Co-op.