Opinion ID: 2344927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invocation of Witness Fear

Text: Appellants contend that the trial court erred by allowing the government to argue in closing that Slade testified differently at trial than he did at the grand jury because appellants were present at trial. Appellants argue that this was an improper invocation of witness fear by the prosecutor. When comments by the prosecutor are allegedly improper, we review to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed legal error by allowing them. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989). If improper comments were allowed, reversal is required unless we can say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. Murray v. United States, 855 A.2d 1126, 1134 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). While Appleton objected to the prosecutor's closing argument during trial, Ford did not, so the government and Ford agree that his claim is reviewed for plain error. See Clayborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 968 (D.C.2000); Thacker v. United States, 599 A.2d 52, 59 (D.C.1991). Slade changed his story between the grand jury and the trial, especially in regard to his identification of Appleton. Slade also admitted that he did not want to testify at the trial. In the closing argument, the government suggested that Slade's reluctance to testify and changed story were understandable because: He's 19 years old, and he's having to come to court to sit in a room and testify about the man  the men who shot him, about James Chester Appleton and Derrick Ford. And he's got to sit on that witness stand, not very far away from those same men who shot him and left him there on February 24, 2005. [E]vidence concerning a witness's fear tends to be prejudicial because it suggests the witness fears reprisal at the hands of the defendant or his associates if [] he testifies. Simpson v. United States, 877 A.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C.2005) (citations omitted). Such evidence appeals to the passions of the jury and may cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the rule of law. Murray, supra, 855 A.2d at 1132 (citations omitted). Absent a factual basis for such a comment by the prosecutor, our case law has been strict in stating that suggestions of fear are forbidden. Simpson, supra, 877 A.2d at 1048. Evidence concerning the fear of a witness, however, may be admissible where the witness has given conflicting statements. Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1184 (D.C.1999). Although the prosecutor's statement may suggest that Slade was afraid of appellants, it was a more subtle allusion to witness fear than prosecutorial statements that have been found improper in the past. In Simpson, supra, a witness named Harold Hymes-Brown testified that he saw the defendant shoot at the victim, but he was impeached with statements he had previously made to the defendant's Public Defender Service investigators, in which he said he was elsewhere at the time of the shooting. 877 A.2d at 1047. The prosecution explained Hymes's inconsistencies in the closing argument: Think about it from Mr. Hymes's perspective. This is a 17-year-old man, . . . he is approached by this man. . . . What do you think [Hymes] is going to tell him? Yeah, I saw that man you represent murder somebody. I am going to put myself out here so that now you can tell him and everyone that you will know what I said? No. . . . Why wouldn't he want to tell Mr. Simpson's lawyer and investigator what he really saw? Maybe he might have been a little afraid. Id. at 1048. The court held that this argument was improper because it suggested, almost expressly, that Hymes had lied to the defense investigator out of fear of Simpson. . . . Given the way the prosecutor expressed it, no possible source of Hymes's fear other than Simpson was readily inferable by the jury. Id. In Murray, supra, the defendants argued in closing argument that several witnesses who were admittedly reluctant to testify may have been pressured by the police to falsely incriminate the defendants. 855 A.2d at 1131. In rebuttal, the prosecution asked: Is it reasonable to assume that these people [the witnesses] were scared, that these people did not want to testify because they're scared and if that is reasonable to assume, who would they be scared of? If they're scared of coming into this courtroom, if they don't want to come into this courtroom and take that stand in front of these three people because they're scared, then who are they scared of? Those three people. Right? Why else would they be reluctant? Id. One witness had testified that he had been threatened and beaten by the defendants, and the court stated that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that [he] was still frightened of appellants. . . . Id. at 1132. As to the other two witnesses, however, there was no evidence which allowed a fair inference that they were afraid of or had reason to fear the appellants, and one had testified that she was reluctant to testify because the appellants were like family to her. Id. at 1133. Sweeping them into the category of witnesses who were afraid of appellants was therefore a plain case of introducing unsubstantiated fear of . . . reprisal from [the] defendants, thereby inviting conviction based on [the jury's] aversion [to such intimidation]. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a prosecutor acted improperly when he stated that a witness was afraid to testify although the record did not support that the witness was actually afraid. Gordon v. United States, 783 A.2d 575, 589-90 (D.C.2001). Appellants also rely on cases that involve admission of witness testimony regarding fear. The testimony found to be inadmissible in these cases specifically mentioned the witness's fear. For example, the direct examination of one government witness who was reluctant to testify in a manner consistent with her grand jury testimony proceeded as follows: Q: You don't really want to say what you saw in front of these people; do you? A: Lord of mercy. What do you think, Oliver? . . . Q: [W]hy is it that you don't want to say the things that you saw? A: Let's trade places then, then you will know why. What I have been crying about all week? So stupid. You know why. I live right down the street from these people. I am scared for my life. Id. at 585. The court, which found that this testimony was improper, noted that it was extremely emotional testimony that was without relevance to the specific charges faced by the appellants in this case. Id. at 588. In Mercer, supra, the court found that various testimony elicited from witnesses was improperly admitted, including a statement that a witness was not happy about testifying [b]ecause [she] could leave here today and y'all might never see [her] again. 724 A.2d at 1186. It was also improper for the prosecutor to ask witnesses about people standing at the back of the courtroom who were from the same neighborhood as the defendants, because it suggests that because these imposing figures in the back of the courtroom were somehow connected to [defendants], [defendants] must need their presence to intimidate witnesses because they are guilty. Id. at 1187. The prosecutor's statement in this case is not nearly as prejudicial or suggestive as the comments that have been found improper in previous cases. In fact, the comments made here are very similar to comments found proper in Simpson, supra, in which the prosecutor stated in the closing argument that when a witness testified at trial, he didn't want to tell what he saw or heard from this man [Simpson]. Because this man, unlike in the grand jury, this man wasn't there. 877 A.2d at 1048. The court noted that this comment was merely a recognition of the possibility that, in this particular case, confrontation might not produce the more credible testimony. . . . [T]he comment merely stated the obvious to the jurors and constituted a reasonable inference from the evidence. The jury was presented with two conflicting accounts, both under oath, and each admitted as substantive evidence. Under the particular circumstances of this case, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to allow the prosecutor to suggest that [the witness's] prior testimony should be considered more reliable, in part because it was given outside the presence of the defendant. Id. at 1049-50 (citations, internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). Here, the prosecutor did not say that Slade was afraid of appellants. He presented an explanation of why Slade changed his story by noting that appellants were not present at the grand jury and were present at the trial. Our case law on improper invocations of witness fear does not forbid this type of statement. Common sense tells us that in certain circumstances, face-to-face confrontation between the witness and defendant may have the effect of inhibiting the truth from emerging. Id. at 1049. The prosecutor's statement was nothing more than a reasonable inference which a basis in the record. Thus, the trial court did not err in permitting the government to make this statement.