Opinion ID: 2639394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: alternative theories for summary judgment

Text: ¶ 42 Both defendants presented alternative arguments justifying summary judgment. Because the UHCMA issue is dispositive as to Four Corners, we need not consider any of Four Corners' alternative arguments. However, since we hold that the Randalls are not entitled to summary judgment based on governmental immunity, we must determine whether their alternative arguments would justify summary judgment. Summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). ¶ 43 As alternative justifications for summary judgment, the Randalls offer three reasons to support the district court's ruling. First, the Randalls argue that they too should be protected by the provisions of the UHCMA. Second, they claim that they acted in loco parentis to Smith and are therefore entitled to parental immunity. Finally, the Randalls argue that they owed no duty to Smith because J.B.'s acts were unforeseeable.
¶ 44 Regarding their first alternative argument, the Randalls admit that they did not argue this question before the district court, but they nevertheless argue on appeal that they are protected by the provisions of the UHCMA under the narrow and specific facts of this case. Because we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, see Treff v. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, ¶ 9 n. 4, 26 P.3d 212, summary judgment cannot rest on this argument.
¶ 45 Second, the Randalls make a cursory argument that summary judgment is appropriate because their quasi-parental relationship with foster children entitles them to rely on the doctrine of parental immunity. We have not yet recognized the doctrine of parental immunity in Utah. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 235 & n. 1 (Utah 1985). We did note, over twenty years ago, that [t]here is a clear majority trend toward limiting or abolishing this common law rule. Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980) (quotation and citation omitted). ¶ 46 In support of their argument that we should recognize the doctrine of parental immunity and that such immunity should apply to foster parents, the Randalls merely cite a few cases and provide very little analysis. A brief is inadequate when it merely contains bald citation[s] to authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). As we have repeatedly noted, we are not a depository in which [a party] may dump the burden of argument and research. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). We therefore decline to address the Randalls' parental immunity argument because it has not been adequately briefed.
¶ 47 Finally, the Randalls argue that summary judgment is otherwise appropriate because they cannot be held liable for failing to protect Smith from J.B.'s conduct since J.B.'s conduct was unforeseeable. As the Randalls point out, the overriding practical concern is whether the one causing the harm has shown him- or herself to be uniquely dangerous. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. While the Randalls claim that they did not know and had no reason to know of [J.B.]'s alleged homosexual and violent tendencies, Smith argues that Tracy Morris's affidavit establishes that the Randalls did know of J.B.'s homosexual and violent tendencies. ¶ 48 Though the district court ultimately denied their motion to strike, the Randalls argue [11] that the Morris affidavit should not be considered because it contains unfounded legal opinions and inadmissible hearsay. Smith responds that the challenged statements constitute admissible hearsay under either the excited utterance exception or the catch all provision of Utah Rules of Evidence 803(24). ¶ 49 The Randalls claim that the Morris affidavit fails to comply with rule 56(e), which requires that affidavits set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. We decline to reach the question of whether the district court properly denied the Randalls' motion to strike because they did not properly appeal that ruling. Litigants must cross-appeal or cross-petition if they wish to attack a judgment of a lower court for the purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening the rights of their opponent. State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 (Utah 1996) (citing Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538-39, 51 S.Ct. 243, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931)). The Randalls assert that they properly challenged the admissibility of the Morris affidavit before the district court, but they do not explicitly request in their briefs, nor have they properly filed an appeal requesting, that the district court's ruling be overturned. They merely assert that [t]he Morris Affidavit sets forth unfounded opinion about what Four Corners knew or should have known concerning J.B.'s violent tendencies based on inadmissible hearsay, and legal opinions about Four Corners' duty to protect Smith. This does not constitute a proper cross-appeal of the district court's ruling. See Utah R.App. P. 4(d). ¶ 50 Though a proper cross-appeal was not filed, a review of the challenged paragraphs in the Morris affidavit shows that they do not aid Smith in establishing any material facts. [A]n affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in order to show there is a genuine issue for trial. Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ¶ 54, 13 P.3d 581. See also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 533 (Utah 1993); Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). An affidavit that merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of fact. Dairy Prod. Servs., 2000 UT 81 at ¶ 54, 13 P.3d 581. See also Winter, 820 P.2d at 919; Treloggan, 699 P.2d at 748; Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Norton, 669 P.2d at 859. ¶ 51 The first three challenged paragraphs the Randalls challenge as inadmissible hearsay would fail to create any issue of material fact even if admissible. These paragraphs are irrelevant and fail to establish a genuine triable issue concerning the Randalls' negligence. The last three challenged paragraphs all contain unsubstantiated legal opinions and conclusions that cannot create an issue of fact. See Dairy Prod. Servs., 2000 UT 81 at ¶ 54, 13 P.3d 581. Therefore, these challenged paragraphs do not create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. ¶ 52 While the affidavit's contested paragraphs do not create an issue of material fact, one of the uncontested paragraphs [12] contains information that does create such an issue. In this uncontested paragraph, Morris avers that Carolyn Randall advised [her] that [J.B.] had beaten his own mother and threatened other siblings. The Randalls did not challenge this statement [13] or attempt to rebut this assertion. This clearly creates a question of whether the Randalls knew or should have known of J.B.'s violent tendencies. Because this disputed fact challenges the Randalls' assertion that Smith's injury was unforeseeable, it creates an issue of fact. Therefore, summary judgment cannot alternatively rest on this defense against Smith's negligence claims. ¶ 53 The existence of even one question of fact precludes us from granting summary judgment on these alternative arguments. Because summary judgment cannot be justified by any of the alternative arguments suggested by the Randalls, we must reverse the district court's decision.