Opinion ID: 2393195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: State's Motions were Untimely

Text: South Carolina Code section 5-3-270 (2004) provides: When the limits of a municipality are ordered extended, no contest thereabout shall be allowed unless the person interested therein files, within sixty days after the result has been published or declared, with both the clerk of the municipality and the clerk of court of the county in which the municipality is located, a notice of his intention to contest the extension, nor unless, within ninety days from the time the result has been published or declared an action is begun and the original summons and complaint filed with the clerk of court of the county in which the municipality is located. Here, the ordinance was adopted on April 25, 2006, after two readings by the Town Council. Section 5-3-270 clearly provides that the limitation period runs from the publication or declaration of the result of the annexation. Thus, though the Attorney General asserts the State did not learn of the annexation until July 2, 2007, the State's motionswhich were filed on July 16, 2007 and October 1, 2007 were untimely. In essence, the State requests that the Court create a discovery rule for purposes of the section 5-3-270 limitations period. We decline to do so under the facts presented. [7] On balance, while we recognize the State's lack of actual notice of the annexation, we assign greater importance to the policy of finality of an annexation, with its attendant consequences. We believe this policy is reflected in the abbreviated statute of limitations in section 5-3-270. See State ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 339 S.C. 8, 16-21, 528 S.E.2d 408, 412-14 (2000) (holding the State is subject to the statute of limitations when bringing a quo warranto action to challenge an annexation); Hite v. Town of West Columbia, 220 S.C. 59, 64-66, 66 S.E.2d 427, 429-30 (1951) (holding the sixty-day limit on notice of intent to contest an annexation and ninety-day limit on filing a challenge are not unreasonable and arbitrary and are not a denial of due process). The State argues, however, that its motions should relate back to the timely action by the Private Party Appellants. We have carefully reviewed the record and find that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's motions. See Intown Properties Mgmt., Inc. v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 271 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir.2001) (Thus, assuming that Intown is the real party in interest in the Transcontinental action, with standing and claims that have not been waived, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit Intown to join its insurer's suit as a party plaintiff, not by intervening under Rule 24, but by a combination of Rules 15 and 17[, Fed.R.Civ.P.]); Berkeley Electric Coop., Inc. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 302 S.C. 186, 189, 394 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1990) (In reviewing the granting or denial of a Rule 24(a)(2) motion, we must determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion.).