Opinion ID: 2508761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Efficacy Request to Charge

Text: Brandt claims the trial judge erred in denying the following request to charge: A document whose sole value is its potential use in a civil lawsuit does not have sufficient `legal efficacy' to support a forgery charge. In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial. State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct.App.2003). A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law. Id. at 318, 577 S.E.2d at 464. A jury charge which is substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal. State v. Foust, 325 S.C. 12, 479 S.E.2d 50 (1996). [T]he trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina. Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594 S.E.2d 462, 472 (2004). The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial. State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 302, 555 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2001). The substance of the law is what must be charged to the jury, not any particular verbiage. Adkins, 353 S.C. at 318-19, 577 S.E.2d at 464. A request to charge a correct statement of the law on an issue raised by the indictment and the evidence presented at trial should not be refused. State v. Austin, 299 S.C. 456, 458, 385 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1989). However, if the trial judge refuses to give a specific charge, there is no error if the charge actually given sufficiently covers the substance of the request. Id. `It is error for the trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction which states a sound principle of law when that principle applies to the case at hand, and the principle is not otherwise included in the charge.' State v. Williams, 367 S.C. 192, 195, 624 S.E.2d 443, 445 (Ct.App.2005) (quoting Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 390, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000)). If there is any evidence to support a charge, the trial court should grant the request. Williams, 367 S.C. at 195, 624 S.E.2d at 445. To warrant reversal, a trial judge's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010). A trial judge's failure to give requested jury instructions is not prejudicial error where the instructions given afford the proper test for determining the issues. Id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 583-84. An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge's decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 584. Brandt's argument is merely a continuation of his argument regarding the denial of his motion for a directed verdict on the ground the letter lacked legal efficacy. As previously discussed, we disagree with Brandt's overly-narrow construction of this term. To establish the legal efficacy of a forged document, the State was only required to show that the letter had the potential to prejudice or damage the intended victim. Furthermore, our appellate courts, as previously cited, have upheld forgery convictions where the forged document was used as evidence in a civil trial. Viewing the judge's charge as a whole, we find it sufficiently covered this element. First, the judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of forgery by using the statutory language of section 16-13-10. Secondly, the judge explained each of the elements individually. Finally, the judge charged the legal efficacy element as follows: To constitute forgery, it is [essential] that a falsely made or altered instrument [possess] some apparent legal [efficacy]; otherwise, it would have no tendency to defraud. As long as a forged instrument is the apparent foundation of legal liability, the instrument need not be complete [in] all its particulars to amount to forgery, and any writing that may defraud or prejudice another, or that, if genuine, would have legal effect and operate as the foundation of another man's liability may be the subject of forgery. It is sufficient if the forged documents, believed to be genuine, might have operated to the prejudice of another. The judge's charge accurately reflects this state's current law regarding the offense of forgery. In fact, the text of the charge tracks the language in Lee-Grigg, the case primarily relied upon by Brandt. Lee-Grigg, 374 S.C. at 402, 649 S.E.2d at 48. Thus, the judge's denial of Brandt's request to charge does not warrant reversal as the charge as a whole afforded the jury the proper test for determining the issues presented at trial.