Opinion ID: 2633655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Apprendi's Inapplicability to Consecutive Terms of Imprisonment

Text: On appeal, Kahapea argues that the circuit court's imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment contravenes the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi on the basis that consecutive sentences are analogous to the enhancement of sentencing and, therefore, cannot be legally imposed in the absence of aggravating facts expressly alleged in the charging instrument and found by the jury to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In its answering brief, the prosecution counters that [j]udicial factfinding does not, on its own, violate the [s]ixth [a]mendment.... Apprendi applies to situations where the sentence is alleged to have exceeded the statutory maximum ... for a particular offense[,] not the aggregate effect that results when sentences for convictions on multiple counts are ordered to be served consecutively. (Emphases omitted.) (Citing HRS §§ 706-668.5 and 708-830.5(1)(a), see supra notes 3 and 8.) In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348; see also 3 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 526 & n. 58 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp.2005). Admittedly, stacking Kahapea's multiple sentences together has the effect of enhancing the length of his incarceration beyond ten years, the statutory maximum for one first-degree theft, see HRS § 706-660, supra note 8. Nevertheless, none of Kahapea's five individual terms of imprisonment exceeded the statutory maximum. This court suggested in Rivera that the logic of the Apprendi rule did not apply to consecutive term sentencing: In the present matter, the circuit court had the discretion under HRS § 706-668.5 to sentence Rivera to serve two consecutive five-year indeterminate maximum terms of imprisonment for his convictions of class C felonies in Counts I and II because multiple terms of imprisonment [were] imposed on [him] at the same time. Again, the circuit court would have been required to consider the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606[, see supra note 9] including the need to protect the public contained in HRS § 706-606(2)(c)when determining whether to impose consecutive or concurrent terms of imprisonment. [B]y the plain language of HRS § 706-668.5(2)although subject, pursuant to HRS § 706-668.5(1), to presumptively concurrent sentencing in connection with multiple prison terms imposed at the same time[] the sentencing court [is] obligated to consider the factors set forth in [HRS §] 706-606 when determining whether multiple indeterminate prison terms were to run concurrently or consecutively. .... ... [T]he fact that HRS § 706-606 is incorporated by reference into HRS § 706-668.5 has profound significance. Bearing in mind that all indeterminate (including consecutive) prison terms are inherently incapacitative, the legislative sentencing philosophy permeating HRS ch. 706 in general and HRS § 706-606 in particular dictates that discretionary consecutive prison sentences, pursuant to HRS § 706-668.5, may properly be imposed only if the penal objectives sought to be achieved include retribution ( i.e., just des[s]erts) and deterrence. [ State v.] Gaylord , 78 Hawai`i [127, 149-]50, 890 P.2d [1167, 1189-]90 [(1993)] . . . . Had the circuit court sentenced Rivera to consecutive terms of imprisonment in Counts I and II, the effect would have been a ten-year indeterminate maximum term of imprisonment, a term equal to the two concurrent ten-year extended terms of imprisonment that the circuit court actually imposed in this case. It defies logic that the circuit court could, consistent with Blakely, legitimately impose the same ten-year sentence, comprised of two consecutive five-year indeterminate maximum terms, under ordinary sentencing principles, but run afoul of Blakely by imposing concurrent ten-year extended terms of imprisonment based on the finding of prior or multiple concurrent convictions. Rivera, 106 Hawai`i at 163-64, 102 P.3d at 1061-62 (some citations omitted) (some emphases and ellipses added and some in original) (some brackets added, some omitted, and some in original). Confronting analogous situations, other jurisdictions, including several federal circuits, have aphoristically dismissed the proposition that either Blakely or Apprendi proscribes consecutive term sentencing, and this court does likewise. See, e.g., United States v. Pressley, 345 F.3d 1205, 1213 (11th Cir.2003); United States v. Harrison, 340 F.3d 497, 500 (8th Cir.2003); United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir.2003); United States v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1242-43 (10th Cir.2002); United States v. Sua, 307 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Diaz, 296 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc); United States v. McWaine, 290 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir.2002); United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 570-71 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc); United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 401-02 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Feola, 275 F.3d 216, 220 & n. 1 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Parolin, 239 F.3d 922, 929-30 (7th Cir.2001); United States ex rel. Thomas v. Hinsley, 379 F.Supp.2d 924, 925 (N.D.Ill.2005); Wright v. State, 46 P.3d 395, 398 (Alaska Ct.App.2002); Hall v. State, 823 So.2d 757, 764 (Fla.2002); People v. Wagener, 196 Ill.2d 269, 256 Ill.Dec. 550, 752 N.E.2d 430, 441-42 (2001) ([S]entences which run consecutively to each other are not transmuted thereby into a single sentence. Because consecutive sentences remain discrete, a determination that sentences are to be served consecutively cannot run afoul of Apprendi, which only addresses sentences for individual crimes.); State v. Rannow, 703 N.W.2d 575, 581 (Minn. Ct.App.2005) (citing State v. Senske, 692 N.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Minn.Ct.App.2005)); State v. Higgins, 149 N.H. 290, 821 A.2d 964, 975-76 (2003); State v. Abdullah, 372 N.J.Super. 252, 858 A.2d 19, 39 (Ct.App.Div.2004), aff'd, rev'd on other grounds, 184 N.J. 497, 878 A.2d 746, 756 & n. 6, 757 (2005); People v. Murray, 5 Misc.3d 636, 785 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2004); State v. Lowery, 160 Ohio App.3d 138, 826 N.E.2d 340, 355 (2005); State v. Cubias, 155 Wash.2d 549, 120 P.3d 929, 932 (2005), followed by State v. Louis, 155 Wash.2d 563, 120 P.3d 936, 940 (2005). In the present matter, Kahapea was convicted by the jury of five first-degree thefts, for each of which he was sentenced to ten years' incarceration. Pursuant to HRS §§ 706-660 and 706-668.5, five ten-year terms running consecutively is the statutory maximum; hence, Kahapea's sentence did not deprive him of his right to a jury trial as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi and Blakely.