Opinion ID: 626931
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Preenforcement Claims

Text: Plaintiffs challenge the district court's determination that their claims for prospective relief are not ripe. The Constitution limits Article III federal courts' jurisdiction to deciding cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Ripeness is one component of the Article III case or controversy requirement. The basic rationale of the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). The ripeness inquiry contains both a constitutional and a prudential component. Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1993). We consider each in turn.
The Constitution mandates that prior to our exercise of jurisdiction there exist a constitutional `case or controversy,' that the issues presented are `definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.' Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93, 65 S.Ct. 1483, 89 L.Ed. 2072 (1945)). However, arrest is not necessarily a prerequisite for an individual to challenge the applicability of a criminal statute. When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). To bring such a preenforcement claim, we require plaintiffs to allege a genuine threat of imminent prosecution. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139 (internal quotation marks omitted). We consider: (1) whether the plaintiffs have articulated a concrete plan to violate the law in question; (2) whether the government has communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings; and (3) the history of past prosecution or enforcement under the statute. Id. In reviewing these factors, we find that they do not apply easily to the unique circumstances of Plaintiffs' claims. The genuine threat analysis presumes that no enforcement has previously occurred, and therefore ascertains the likelihood of future enforcement. In contrast, the FedEx seizure was an enforcement of the CSA against Plaintiffs, mitigating the relevance of a hypothetical future-enforcement. Nonetheless, because Plaintiffs' claims are asserted for the first time in an action for prospective relief (and not in a criminal proceeding), we consider the familiar preenforcement claim ripeness analysis, while acknowledging its strained applicability to the unusual allegations before us. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege a concrete plan to violate the CSA because the complaint does not state exactly how, where, and in what quantities Plaintiffs intend to consume marijuana, and does not specify how they intend to cultivate or acquire, store, and distribute marijuana. We disagree that the complaint must contain these factual allegations and conclude that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a concrete plan. According to Plaintiffs, they have used marijuana in violation of the CSA countless times, and plan to continue to do so. We have explained that the concrete plan element of the genuine threat inquiry is satisfied where plaintiffs had more than a `concrete plan' to violate the laws at issue because they actually did violate them on a number of occasions. Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir.2006); see also Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that challenge to validity of campaign finance laws was ripe because [p]laintiffs have gone far beyond the requirement that they articulate a concrete plan to violate the law, and instead have actually engaged in the illegal behavior at issue.). Plaintiffs allege that Mooney violates the CSA daily by consuming marijuana, and that other members of Oklevueha violate the law at semi-monthly sweats, in addition to any other usages. They further allege that Mooney and Oklevueha members have no plan to stop their consumption. Taking as true the facts alleged, Plaintiffs are currently violating and plan to continue to violate the CSA by purchasing and consuming marijuana. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' allegations satisfy the concrete plan requirement. The second component of a genuine threat is whether the government has communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings. The district court found that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged a specific threat of prosecution because the complaint lacked allegations of any threat or warning from federal authorities or that Plaintiffs intended to continue to bring in marijuana in a way likely to be noticed by federal drug authorities. The district court is correct that Plaintiffs do not allege any threat of prosecution related to Plaintiffs' marijuana consumption. Plaintiffs have never been arrested in connection with their marijuana consumption, nor has there been another seizure of their drugs in the more than two and a half years that have elapsed since the 2009 FedEx seizure. Moreover, the Government's lawyer clarified at oral argument that the seizure at issue was in a response to a call from FedEx regarding Plaintiffs' package, and was not the result of any active Government investigation. The Government's lawyer further explained that to his knowledge, neither Mooney nor Oklevueha is the target of any current investigation. Additionally, the Government's decision to destroy the marijuana seized in 2009 without further investigation may give some insight into its enforcement priorities, which at this time apparently do not include Plaintiffs. We conclude, however, that the district court's focus on future prosecution is inapposite. Plaintiffs need not allege a threat of future prosecution because the statute has already been enforced against them. When the Government seized Plaintiffs' marijuana pursuant to the CSA, a definite and concrete dispute regarding the lawfulness of that seizure came into existence. See Ry. Mail Ass'n, 326 U.S. at 93, 65 S.Ct. 1483 (stating that a justiciable case or controversy must present a definite and concrete dispute). This case is unique in that unlike most enforcements of criminal statutes, the seizure did not result in a criminal proceeding that could have afforded Plaintiffs the opportunity to assert their constitutional and statutory challenges to the enforcement of the CSA against them. But it does not follow that because this enforcement and seizure of property did not provide Plaintiffs a process in which to raise their claims, those claims are not now ripe. We require a threat of prosecution to ensure that the plaintiff challenging a statute can demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301. In this case, that injury has already occurred, thereby eliminating any concerns that Plaintiffs' fear of enforcement is purely speculative. [2] For the same reason Plaintiffs need not demonstrate a threat of future prosecution under these facts, we conclude that Plaintiffs need not establish the third prong of the genuine threat of prosecution inquiry, the history of enforcement of the statute. In other words, we need not rely on enforcement of the statute against other groups in determining whether Plaintiffs are likely to suffer a similar fate in the future, because the CSA has already been enforced against Plaintiffs through the seizure of their marijuana. This is not the kind of abstract disagreement that the ripeness doctrine prevents courts from adjudicating. Plaintiffs' stake in the legal issues is concrete rather than abstract. Colwell v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir.2009). A non-speculative case and controversy exists regarding Plaintiffs' entitlement to possess and consume marijuana for religious reasons.
The ripeness doctrine is `drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.' Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993)). The question of prudential ripeness requires us to first consider the fitness of the issues for judicial review, followed by the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Colwell, 558 F.3d at 1124. The district court held that the case is not fit for judicial review because the complaint contains no factual allegations describing how marijuana is consumed or acquired and, for all the court knows, Plaintiffs might be planning to import thousands of pounds of marijuana to sell to anyone claiming a religious need. We disagree and conclude that Plaintiffs' preenforcement claims are fit for review. Courts have regularly declined on prudential grounds to review challenges to recently promulgated laws or regulations in favor of awaiting an actual application of the new rule. See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967) (We believe that judicial appraisal of these factors is likely to stand on a much surer footing in the context of a specific application of this regulation than could be the case in the framework of the generalized challenge made here.); Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n, 538 U.S. at 812, 123 S.Ct. 2026 ([J]udicial resolution of the question presented here should await a concrete dispute about a particular concession contract.); Colwell, 558 F.3d at 1128 (If and when the parties are able to provide examples of the manner in which the HHS has used the Policy Guidance ... we will be in a better position to determine whether the 2003 Policy Guidance functions as a substantive rule or as a general statement of policy.). This is not such a case. In contrast to cases in which the courts are left to hypothesize about how the law might be applied, Plaintiffs' claims arise from an enforcement action that has already occurred. The seizure of Plaintiffs' marijuana presents a concrete factual scenario that demonstrates how the laws, as applied, infringe [Plaintiffs'] constitutional rights. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1141. We also disagree with the district court's conclusion that to present a case fit for review, Plaintiffs need to frame the scope of the injunctive relief they seek through allegations about Oklevueha's members' use, possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana. Such specific pleadings are not required to establish fitness for review, which requires only the existence of a concrete factual situation. San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir.1996). The scope of any injunctive relief to which Plaintiffs might ultimately be entitled may be determined at a later phase of the litigation. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding that justiciability must be supported with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.). Likewise, we are unpersuaded by the Government's assertion that Plaintiffs' request for prospective relief is unripe because Plaintiffs did not request an exception to the CSA from the DEA. See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.03 (Any person may apply for an exception to the application of any provision of this chapter by filing a written request with the Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, stating the reasons for such exception.). The Government argues that we should require Plaintiffs to exhaust this administrative remedy, because doing so would allow the DEA to apply its expertise to Plaintiffs' claim, possibly moot the case if the claim is granted, and help build a record for judicial review. We decline, however, to read an exhaustion requirement into RFRA where the statute contains no such condition, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4, and the Supreme Court has not imposed one. Indeed, the Supreme Court has reviewed a RFRA-based challenge to the CSA without requiring that the plaintiffs first seek a religious use exemption from the DEA. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). In so doing, it recognized that RFRA plainly contemplates that courts would recognize exceptions [to the CSA]  that is how the law works. Id. at 434, 126 S.Ct. 1211. Because this is not an abstract disagreement but rather involves the application of well-developed law (including the First Amendment right to religious freedom, RFRA and the CSA) to an existing case and controversy (the seizure of Plaintiffs' marijuana), we conclude Plaintiffs' claims are fit for review. As Plaintiffs' claims are fit for review now, we do not reach the second factor of the prudential ripeness inquiry  hardship to the parties in delaying review. Hardship serves as a counterbalance to any interest the judiciary has in delaying consideration of a case. See Colwell, 558 F.3d at 1129 ([T]his hardship is insufficient to overcome the uncertainty of the legal issue presented in the case in its current posture.); Municipality of Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1326 (9th Cir.1992) ([M]ere potential for future injury does not overcome the interest of the judiciary in delaying review. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because we can identify no interest in delaying review of Plaintiffs' claims, the hardship that would be imposed by any delay is not relevant. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs' claims should not be dismissed on prudential ripeness grounds.
We turn next to the issue of associational standing. Oklevueha may bring suit on its members' behalf when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). The district court concluded that Oklevueha does not have associational standing to seek injunctive relief because the complaint does not allege details regarding each member's use of marijuana. We disagree. First, the members of Oklevueha would have standing to sue in their own right because, according to the complaint, they all use marijuana as a regular and integral part of their religious practice. Therefore, the members are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. Id. at 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434. Second, the suit seeks to protect Oklevueha's members' use of marijuana in religious ceremonies, the administration of which Plaintiffs allege is the sole purpose of Oklevueha. Finally, the prospective relief that Plaintiffs seek does not require that individual Oklevueha members participate in this action. If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The district court's concerns about the details of injunctive relief may be addressed if the court ultimately awards Plaintiffs such a remedy. At this stage, what matters is that Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to establish Oklevueha's associational standing. Plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief arising from the Government's seizure of marijuana meet the constitutional requirements and prudential factors for ripeness, and Oklevueha has associational standing to assert the claims. The seizure of Plaintiffs' marijuana that has already occurred creates a justiciable case and controversy about Plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory entitlement to use marijuana for religious purposes. Adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims does not require that the court entangle itself in hypothetical scenarios or abstract disagreements. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' preenforcement claims. Nothing in this opinion addresses the merits of the underlying claims. We remand the claims for prospective relief to the district court to consider the merits in the first instance.