Opinion ID: 1125632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 265 Ala. at 688, 93 So.2d at 767.

Text: The policy behind this statute and our interpretation of it is consistent with what this Court has previously held regarding the effect of a licensing statute. In Sun Insurance Office of London v. Mitchell, 186 Ala. 420, 65 So. 143 (1914), this Court held that a certificate of the secretary of state showing that Myers was a duly appointed agent of Sun Insurance prima facie established the general agency of Myers for Sun Insurance. This Court went on to say that, although the company could limit the agent's general authority and the limitation would be binding between principal and agent and upon all third persons with notice of the limitation, it would not be binding upon third persons who dealt with the agent without notice of it. In the present case, there is no evidence whatsoever that Talladega had notice of the limitation which CIC attempted to place upon Lucas' authority. CIC argues that Sun has no application to this case because the question there concerned the authority of an agent to issue fire insurance, not surety bonds. A similar argument was made in Parsons v. Federal Realty Corp., 105 Fla. 105, 143 So. 912, 88 A.L.R. 275 (1931). There, the Florida Supreme Court held that the maxim that sureties are favored in the law has no application to sureties for hire. Further, the court found that there was no sound reason for not treating a surety company the same as an insurance company with regard to the authority of agents. We agree. Moreover, Parsons cited Sun for a proposition identical with our holding in the case at bar: And where a state license has been applied for by a surety company, naming a particular person as its agent, with no restrictions on the agency stated in the application, a power of attorney restricting the authority of agent is ineffectual against one dealing with the agent without notice or knowledge of the restrictions.