Opinion ID: 1191667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Application of Our Abuse of Discretion Test

Text: Applying this test to the case at bar, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hinkson's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of the Miller affidavit (which averred Swisher was never awarded any of the medals he claimed, that he was injured in a private motor vehicle accident in Washington state, and that the purported Replacement DD-214 form Swisher produced on the stand was forged) and the Woodring affidavit (which averred Col. Woodring never signed the letter in Swisher's file that Swisher provided Keeley when seeking veterans benefits, and that Col. Woodring never signed Swisher's purported Replacement DD-214 form, which Swisher produced on the witness stand). First, we look to whether the district court identified the correct legal standard. Here, the district court accurately identified the correct five-part legal test outlined in United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th Cir.2005), to analyze Hinkson's motion for a new trial brought on the basis of newly discovered evidence. [24] The Harrington test requires a party seeking a new trial to prove each of the following: (1) the evidence is newly discovered; (2) the defendant was diligent in seeking the evidence; (3) the evidence is material to the issues at trial; (4) the evidence is not (a) cumulative or (b) merely impeaching; and (5) the evidence indicates the defendant would probably be acquitted in a new trial. Id. Second, because the Harrington test is essentially factual, requiring considerations that are founded on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct, rather than requiring consideration of abstract legal principles, McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202, we look to whether the district court's findings of fact, and its application of those findings of fact to the Harrington factors, were illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record. Under the initial step of the Harrington test, the district court found the Miller and Woodring affidavits did not contain newly discovered evidence because the substance of the affidavits was simply not newly discovered. The district court found that the information contained in the Miller and Woodring affidavits, while newly written, did not provide any new information that was not already considered and rejected from evidentiary admission by the court: the affidavits merely supported the previously proffered evidence that Swisher's purported Replacement DD-214 form was phoney and that he had not earned any medals. The district court's determination the proffered affidavit evidence was not newly discovered was logical and plausible, based on the facts in the record. Thus, the court's conclusion did not constitute a clearly erroneous factual finding nor an abuse of discretion. Second, the district court found Hinkson's counsel was not diligent in seeking the purported newly discovered evidence, as required by the second Harrington step, because, before his re-opened cross-examination of Swisher at trial on January 14, 2005, counsel told the court he had been investigating Swisher's military record for quite some time. In fact, three months before trial, the same counsel had represented Hinkson in a civil action in which Hinkson and Swisher were bitter adversaries, and had deposed Swisher. At his deposition, Swisher claimed battlefield injuries from grenade explosions and that he was born in 1937, putting him at age 13-16 during the 1950-53 Korean War. [25] (The government also disclosed Swisher's grand jury testimony a week before trial, in which Swisher made the same claims.) Yet, counsel still did not procure the Miller and Woodring affidavits (much less Miller and Woodring's presence as witnesses) until February 24 and 27, more than a month after the first cross-examination of Swisher and nearly four months after suspicions first should have been raised by Swisher's deposition testimony in the civil action. Nor did Hinkson's counsel request a continuance during trial to seek out the proof contained in the Miller and Woodring affidavits, which was precisely the evidence the district court said might help it understand Swisher's true military record. Based on these facts, the district court's finding that Hinkson's attorney did not exercise due diligence in seeking authoritative evidence of Swisher's true military past was logical, plausible, and based on inferences drawn from the facts in the record. Thus, it was not a clearly erroneous finding nor an abuse of discretion. [26] Third, the district court found the Woodring and Miller affidavits were not material to the case in any event, as required by the next Harrington step, because they related evidence that would be inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The district court found the probative value of the evidence described in the Miller and Woodring affidavits was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, and waste of time. After all, the material point was whether Swisher told Hinkson he had killed men in battle, not whether he had actually done so; the relevancy was to whether Hinkson offered Swisher money to kill three targets of Hinkson's ire. [27] The district court concluded that substantial time waste and confusion would result from proof of authentication and explanation of the documents, and all for a tangential issue unrelated to the factual issues to be resolved by the jury. This conclusion, which rests within the traditional powers given to trial judges to conduct trials, was based on plausible inferences from facts in the record, especially given the district court's advantage in determining how to run its courtroom efficiently. Thus, it was not a clearly erroneous finding nor an abuse of the court's discretion. Fourth, as discussed above, the district court found the Miller and Woodring affidavits offered no new information beyond that which had already been proffered for admission into evidence but rejected as inadmissiblethat Swisher had not won any decorations during the Korean War and that his purported Replacement DD-214 was bogus. For that reason, the district court concluded the information in the claimed newly discovered evidence was cumulative of information proffered during trial. Thus, the court found a new trial unnecessary under the fourth Harrington step, which requires the newly discovered evidence not be cumulative. The only new fact revealed by the Miller and Woodring affidavits was that the Woodring signature on the Swisher-produced Replacement DD-214 form was a forgery. However, Hinkson's attorney had already proffered evidence that such Replacement DD-214 form was a forgery, in the form of the Tolbert and Dowling letters. Accordingly, the district court's conclusion that, based on the facts in the record, the information contained in the Miller and Woodring affidavits was cumulative of information in previously proffered evidence, was not illogical or implausible. Further, the district court found the evidence served no purpose other than to impeach Swisher, which also doomed Hinkson's new trial motion under the fourth step of the Harrington test. Hinkson contends Swisher was a critical witness for the government's case, so any impeachment of his credibility would have undermined the government's entire case. But, even if Hinkson's contention were not post-hoc speculation, it does not change the fact that evidentiary admission of the extrinsic Miller and Woodring affidavits would serve no purpose other than to impeach Swisher's testimony as to his military record rather than his testimony as to Hinkson's solicitations. It is not material whether Swisher's wearing of a miniature Purple Heart when he testified constituted a statement regarding his military service, because the Miller and Woodring affidavits would serve only to impeach that statement, and thus still not constitute evidence that Swisher did not portray himself as a grizzled combat killer to Hinkson or that Hinkson did not solicit Swisher to kill the three targeted individuals. Thus, the district court's finding that the newly discovered evidence served only to impeach Swisher's testimony was logical, plausible, and based entirely on the facts in the record. Consequently, it was not a clearly erroneous finding nor an abuse of discretion. Finally, the district court found that because the government's theory of the case was simply that Hinkson believed Swisher was a battlefield veteran, and not that Swisher actually was one, the evidence described in the Woodring and Miller affidavits did not make it probable the jury would acquit on retrial, as required by the fifth step of the Harrington test. At most, the affidavits related evidence that Swisher was a liar with regard to his military past. But extrinsic evidence that someone lied about a particular event in his pastsuch as the extent of his military serviceis, as discussed, excludable under Rule 403. So, what effect on a jury could excluded evidence have? None. Thus, the district court's finding that the newly discovered evidence was not likely to change the result in a re-trial was logical based on its evidentiary ruling and its plausible interpretation of the facts in the record. [28] Therefore, it was not a clearly erroneous finding nor an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the district court (1) identified the correct legal standard to analyze Hinkson's motion for a new trial, and (2) the court's findings of fact, and its application of those findings of fact to the correct legal standard, were not illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hinkson's new trial motion.