Opinion ID: 2052636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness, Proportionality, and the Fourth Amendment.

Text: Womack's claims in this case are grounded in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which vindicates the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. The basic question presented is whether, under all of the circumstances, the seizure and handcuffing of Womack were reasonable. We do not assess reasonableness in a vacuum. The risk to the safety of the officers might not seem very great to a judge reviewing a transcript years after the fact, but the situation may reasonably have appeared far more dangerous to an officer who had just come into contact with a suspect in an armed rape and kidnapping which occurred only hours before. The evidence must be weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Even though we, sitting in the relative calm of a court or library, may have concluded otherwise, we are bound to give deference to the officer's decision if it was reasonable under the facts as viewed by him. Arrington v. United States, 311 A.2d 838, 839 (D.C.1973). When courts are called upon to decide whether the force used by an officer to restrain a suspect was excessive, [t]he calculus of reasonableness must [also] embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments  in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving  about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). When Detective Cobel and his colleagues arrived at Ms. Steele's home and saw a suspected armed rapist and kidnapper coming downstairs, they had to act immediately, without the luxury of extended thoughtful reflection regarding the question whether it would be absolutely necessary to place the suspect in handcuffs. From the officers' perspective  not an unreasonable one  it was better to be safe than sorry. The use in the Fourth Amendment of the adjective unreasonable imports a command of proportionality to that Amendment's jurisprudence. Brown, supra, 590 A.2d at 1013. The greater the restriction on the seized individual's liberty, the more substantial the justification for such a restriction must be. A lesser intrusion, on the other hand, requires a correspondingly lesser showing. Id. We must also accord appropriate weight to the safety of the officers, as well as to their obligation to assure that a dangerous suspect does not flee. We recently adopted as our own these compelling words written by Judge Harold Leventhal: As a society, we routinely expect police officers to risk their lives in apprehending dangerous people. We should not bicker if in bringing potentially dangerous situations under control they issue commands and take precautions which reasonable men are warranted in taking. Cousart v. United States, 618 A.2d 96, 101 (D.C.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1042, 113 S.Ct. 1878, 123 L.Ed.2d 496 (1993) (quoting Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 364, 389 F.2d 305, 315 (1967) (concurring opinion)). Where the intrusion upon the suspect's liberty is comparatively minor and of brief duration, officers are not constitutionally compelled to take even a modest risk of harm.