Opinion ID: 3003806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment Proper on Retaliation Claims

Text: Scruggs contests the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in Garst’s favor on her retaliation claims. She maintains that Garst retaliated against her for complaining about how she had been treated at the company, and that it did so in two ways: first by eliminating her position, and second by declining to hire her for the Research Assistant position at the Brookston facility that became open after the company’s restructuring. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletic Dep’t, 510 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials before the court demonstrate “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2009). Title VII forbids an employer from discriminating against an employee who has “opposed any practice” No. 07-2266 9 made unlawful by Title VII or who “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Scruggs can prove retaliation under either the direct or indirect method. See Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2008). Under the direct method, a plaintiff must present evidence that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a causal connection exists between them. Id. A plaintiff proceeding under the indirect method establishes a prima facie case by establishing the same first two elements, as well as that: (3) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee who did not engage in statutorily protected activity. Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009); Kodl v. Bd. of Ed., School Dist. 45, Villa Park, 490 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff succeeds in passing this initial hurdle, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Stephens, 569 F.3d at 787; Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 408 (7th Cir. 2008). If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant’s proferred reason was pretextual to avoid the entry of summary judgment against it. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736. “[A]n employee’s failure to cast doubt on an employer’s nonretaliatory explanation” means a claim fails under either the direct or indirect method. Id. at 736 n.6. 10 No. 07-2266 The prima facie case and pretext analyses often overlap, so we have said that we can proceed directly to the pretext inquiry if the defendant offers a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Adelman-Reyes v. St. Xavier Univ., 500 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2007). Garst gave legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, namely that Scruggs’s position was eliminated as part of a company restructuring and that it selected someone else for a new position because that person was better qualified. So we proceed to the pretext analysis. Pretext includes “more than just faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the employer; it is ‘lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.’ ” Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736 (quoting Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that pretext is “a deliberate falsehood”). If the employer honestly believed the reason it proffers for its employment decision, the reason was not pretextual. Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736. We begin with Scruggs’s claim that Garst retaliated against her by eliminating her position as a Research Technician. According to the company, it eliminated the Research Technician position as part of a company-wide restructuring after Syngenta purchased Garst. We agree with Garst that the evidence in the record does not create an issue for trial as to whether this reason was a pretext for retaliating against her. Significantly, the record reflects that the company made its decision to eliminate Research Technician positions before Scruggs filed her first EEOC charge on December 3, 2004. Syngenta No. 07-2266 11 bought a majority interest in Garst in September 2004. It then restructured soft wheat research at locations around the country to make its operations more efficient. The decision to eliminate the Research Technician role was made as part of the restructuring, not out of retaliation against one employee. Although Scruggs maintains that Garst did not make the decision until after she had filed her EEOC charge in December 2004, the evidence in the record reflects that the company made the decision before then and that Worrall visited Brookston in November 2004 to communicate the restructuring decision to Brookston employees. Even if Scruggs did not learn of the decision until later (she maintains she did not receive a voice mail that Worrall says he left for her regarding the restructuring), she was away from the office on an extended medical leave in November 2004. The evidence to which she points does not create an issue for trial. She directs us to certain pages in Beazer’s deposition testimony, for example, but they only indicate that when Worrall told Beazer that Beazer had to leave the Brookston facility, Worrall did not say why the company was making the change or whose idea it was. They do not suggest that the company-wide restructuring decision took place after December 2004. Scruggs also argues that Garst did not hire her for the restructured Research Assistant position because she had filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC. Scruggs filed her first discrimination charge with the EEOC in December 2004, and the company made the decision to select another person for the Research Assistant position on April 25, 2005. Garst maintains that it chose a more 12 No. 07-2266 qualified candidate for the Research Assistant position, which is a legitimate explanation. See Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921, 924 (7th Cir. 2004). The question is whether it is a pretext for retaliation. The Research Assistant position required a Bachelor of Science degree in agronomy or a related field, or an acceptable combination of education and experience, including “at least two years of practical experience in plant breeding and genetics in wheat.” Scruggs does not have a college degree and did not have any practical experience in genetics. Glover, the person Garst selected for the position, has a Bachelor of Science degree in agronomy. In addition, he had years of experience relevant to the position. He was the incumbent in the role, having served as the Research Assistant/ Specialist at the Brookston facility for many years before the restructuring. He was also the person in charge of test plots at multiple other locations—experience that Fogleman believed would be very valuable to the soft wheat breeding team he would be managing at Brookston. That an internal memorandum in the spring of 2004 discussed the possibility of eliminating Glover’s position and keeping the one Scruggs held does not cast doubt on the company’s assertion that it selected Glover because he was better qualified to serve as the Research Assistant. When Syngenta purchased Garst, it decided to eliminate the Research Technician position, not the Research Assistant position. It is logical that the company would select the person with experience in the Research Assistant position. Scruggs has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that the company’s explanaNo. 07-2266 13 tion was a pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate.