Opinion ID: 494567
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: wmata

Text: 21 Since the district court's ruling, we have decided two cases in which the scope of WMATA's waiver of sovereign immunity is carefully defined. See Sanders v. WMATA, 19 F.2d 1151 (D.C.Cir.1987); Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218 (D.C.Cir.1986). Both decisions reaffirm the vitality of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in this circuit. 22 Morris contains three essential elements. We held in Morris that the signatories of the Compact, and Congress through its legislative approval of the document, clothed WMATA with immunity from suit of the type the Supreme Court has recognized sovereigns enjoy. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-22, 54 S.Ct. 745, 747, 78 L.Ed. 1282 (1934). We also acknowledged that section 80 of the Compact waives WMATA's immunity for torts committed in the exercise of its proprietary functions, but not for WMATA's governmental conduct. Applying these principles, Morris held that WMATA's police activities are an exercise of a governmental function, and hence lie outside the scope of section 80's waiver of sovereign immunity. 23 Morris therefore requires that we affirm the district court's dismissal of all claims against WMATA relating to WMATA's police functions, including the claim under count three of negligent training of WMATA police officers. Our reasoning in Morris also requires dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim. The reports forming the basis for the criminal charge the District brought against Dant were prepared by Lawrence in the discharge of his duties as a policeman. Similarly, swearing to a criminal complaint is an integral part of the police function and, therefore, is clearly governmental. As we stated in Morris,  '[i]f the operation of a police force is not a governmental function, then a governmental function may not exist.'  781 F.2d at 220 (quoting Martin v. WMATA, 667 F.2d 435, 436 (4th Cir.1981)). 24 Our second recent decision, Sanders, interpreted section 80 as it applies to WMATA activities which, unlike police functions, are not quintessentially governmental. The activities challenged were related to WMATA's implementation of a policy requiring drug testing of bus drivers involved in traffic mishaps. In that context we held that the Compact's signatories and Congress sought to make WMATA immune from courts' 'second-guessing' through private tort suits 'the political, social, and economic judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory function.'  Sanders, 819 F.2d at 1155 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 820, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2768, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)). Thus we declined to interpret section 80 as requiring the court to distinguish between public and private sector functions in every case, a task so difficult, given the state of our society, that it would sometimes invite arbitrary judicial decision. Rather, preserving within the governmental sphere functions only governments can generally perform, we interpreted section 80 as incorporating the distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions well known when Congress approved the Compact. 25 For the purpose of preventing the second-guessing we barred in Sanders, there is no material difference between the challenge to the drug testing policy rejected in Sanders and the challenge to the design of WMATA's fare collection system that we reject here. As explained above in some detail, metrorail's fare collection system is almost completely automated. Every patron's steps through the system, from farecard machine to train platform, are subject to a complex design approved by WMATA in the exercise of its policy discretion. It might be precisely the system's automation that caused Dant injury, but section 80 of the Compact, as interpreted by Sanders, clearly requires dismissal of that part of count three alleging negligence in the design of metrorail's farecard system. 26 Count three also alleges negligence in the operation and maintenance of the farecard system. Dant's negligence theory is as follows: 27 At all times relevant to this suit defendant WMATA was aware or, through the exercise of due care, should have been aware that a negligently designed, operated and maintained fare card system frequently resulted in confusion in the minds of passengers as to the monetary value which remained on a metrorail fare card or metrorail pass which has been used for a trip within the system. 28 First Amended Complaint at 7, p 40, Dant v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 83-1063 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 1983) (Complaint) (emphasis added). 29 Design is distinct from operation and maintenance. As we interpret the claim, operation and maintenance involve ministerial rather than discretionary responsibilities and therefore are not shielded by WMATA's sovereign immunity. Accordingly, Dant may properly pursue his claim under count three, but only insofar as he can establish that the injury alleged is directly attributable to negligent maintenance and operation, and not to negligent or faulty design. 30 Finally, the district court erred in denying Dant the opportunity to bring to trial his abuse of process claim against WMATA. Count four states: 31 47. Defendants District of Columbia and WMATA sought to compel plaintiff to sign a civil release from all liability by refusing to no paper the case unless plaintiff gave said release. 32 48. Plaintiff refused to sign the said release from all civil liability. 33 49. The request by WMATA for a release from civil liability as a condition precedent to dropping all criminal charges against plaintiff was a decision made by officials and agents of WMATA, in the exercise of WMATA's proprietary function as owner and operator of the metrorail transit system. 34 Complaint at 9. 35 We interpret the quoted part of count four as a claim that agents of WMATA, in the exercise of ministerial functions, committed abuse of process for which Dant may recover in tort. See Sanders, 819 F.2d at 1154-1156. In reaching this conclusion we note that our decision in Morris is inapplicable here. The abuse of process claim, by its own terms, does not concern Dant's arrest or the decision to initiate criminal process against him. Rather, it concerns WMATA's alleged decision not to drop charges solely because Dant would not release WMATA from civil liability. That alleged decision, unlike the decision to arrest, clearly was not taken in the course of police functions.