Opinion ID: 1123296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: authority of agent.

Text: It is the contention of counsel for appellants that the devisees of Alvy Dixon are bound by the action of G.R. McConnell because of ostensible or apparent authority which McConnell had in inserting the name of Rosemary Dixon in the deed. They cite a number of cases. We do not find that any of them are in point. It would be useless to attempt to review them. We do not think it is necessary herein to critically examine the cases on agency which are very numerous and sometimes confusing. It is said that an agent's authority is either express, implied or ostensible. There was no express authority for McConnell's action in inserting the name of Rosemary Dixon in the deed in question. So the authority must be either implied or ostensible. It is stated in 2 C.J.S. 1205, Section 96: Apparent or ostensible authority is such power as a principal holds his agent out as possessing or permits him to exercise under such circumstances as to preclude a denial of its existence; it is at times confused with implied authority, although distinguishable on the basis that the latter rests on actual authority, the former on estoppel. In 2 C.J.S. 1211 it is stated: The doctrine of apparent authority rests upon principles of estoppel, or in the nature of an estoppel, forbidding one to deny to the prejudice of those he has misled the consequences of an appearance of power which he produced. In 2 C.J. 573 (see also 3 C.J.S. Sect. 23 142 and pocket part in which there is a misprint of nor for or) it is said as follows: For the acts of the agent within the scope of the authority which he holds the agent out as having, or knowingly permits him to assume, the principal is made responsible, because to permit him to dispute the authority of the agent in such case would be to enable him to commit a fraud upon innocent persons. There is no evidence in this case that Alvy Dixon ever held out McConnell as having the authority in question here or that he ever knowingly permitted him to assume it. And as we have heretofore shown, Mrs. Dixon has not been defrauded, at least in a legal sense. She paid nothing for the deed; she lost nothing; she parted with nothing substantial. So she could not have changed her position to her detriment. The real question here is whether or not she should be enriched by permitting the deed to stand, to the detriment of the children of Alvy Dixon. Nor do we believe that McConnell had implied authority to do what he did by reason of being the advisor, or legal advisor, of Alvy Dixon for a great many years. There is a vast distinction between an attorney advising a client to do certain things and doing them himself. It is stated in 2 C.J.S. 1229, in speaking of implied authority of an agent, as follows: The powers incident to that expressly conferred do not extend in any instance beyond what is usual or necessary as ordinary administrative powers appurtenant thereto.    and an act which is adverse to the interests of the principal and not contemplated to benefit him, being obviously not such as is necessary or usual in the proper accomplishment of the objects of the agency, is clearly outside the authority. And it has been held that implied authority of an attorney does not extend to depriving his client of any substantial rights, but that the authority to do so must be special. Falkenstein vs. Gibson, 108 N.J. Eq. 251, 154 Atl. 876, 76 A.L.R. 1457 and annotation thereto; Dickerson vs. Hodges, 43 N.J. Eq. 45, 10 Atl. 111; Hallow vs. Hallow, 200 App. Div. 642, 193 N.Y.S. 460. No special authority has been shown herein. So it is said that to authorize a conveyance of real estate  a situation close to that in the case at bar  a power of attorney must be plain in its terms. It does not include the power to make a gift. 21 R.C.L. 884, 886, Sections 57 and 58; 2 Am. Juris. 116, Section 145; Baldwin vs. Loesel, 333 Pa. 26, 3 Atl.2d 389. To change the grantee in a deed is not usual; for an agent to take away one-half or more of the property from an intended grantee, and give it to another, is neither a usual or an ordinary act. So we are unable to see how the rule of implied authority applies in this case. Howsoever that may be, the arguments of counsel for the appellants are made on the assumption that McConnell was instructed to procure the title to the land in the name of Alvy Dixon and that this was a secret instruction. The assumption is wrong. Mr. McConnell did not negotiate the sale of the land to Alvy Dixon. Some of his own testimony would seem to indicate that he did but as rightly understood must be confined to the matters actually entrusted to him, namely the examination of the abstract of title and to see that all the papers were in proper shape and the negotiations already concluded brought to ultimate fulfilment. The purchase of the property by Alvy Dixon was actually negotiated for him by his son Lloyd E. Dixon. The Keystone Cattle Company in addition to owning the Murray Ranch also owned the so-called Judson tract of land and wanted to sell both tracts together. The negotiations for both of these tracts were carried on by one John B. Carter on behalf of the cattle company and by Lloyd E. Dixon for himself and his father. On December 7, 1940 Carter wrote to Lloyd E. Dixon in part as follows: Of course we are expecting you to take the Judson at $20,000. Please let me know right away what your father thinks about $27,000 for the Murray. On December 12, 1940 Lloyd E. Dixon wrote to John B. Carter in part as follows: I talked the proposition over with father and we agree to buy, if you will take these payments. We would like the Murray for Alvy Dixon at $27,000. The Judson to Lloyd E. Dixon and Susan M. Dixon, $20,000. On December 16, 1940 John B. Carter answered in part as follows: Your letter of the 12th instant relating to the purchase of the Murray tract by Alvy Dixon at $27,000 and the purchase of the Judson tract by yourself and wife at $20,000 is received. Your letter has been shown to some of the other owners of this property and the terms and price for the Murray tract is alright. The price for the Judson tract of $20,000 is satisfactory. If the above terms for the purchase are satisfactory, please let me know at once, and oblige. On January 7, 1941 John B. Carter wrote in part: Your letter of December 26, 1940 concerning the purchase of the Judson and Murray tracts of land in your state, owned by the Keystone Cattle Company of this place is received. You state that you accept our proposition for the purchase of the Judson tract at $20,000. You further state that you accept our proposition for the sale of the Murray tract to your father, Alvy Dixon, at $27,000. Upon the receipt of this letter, I wish you would write me, agreeing to the propositions above stated, so that we may carry the same into execution. On January 19, 1941 Lloyd E. Dixon wrote to Carter in part as follows: With reference to your letter dated January 7, 1941 we will agree to your proposition as you have it set forth, that is, `You state that you accept our proposition for the purchase of the Judson tract at $20,000. You further state that you accept our proposition for the sale of the Murray tract to your father, Alvy Dixon, at $27,000 payments to be one-half in cash and the balance in four equal annual payments with 5% interest.' You can send the abstracts to McCullough and Corthell, at Laramie, with instructions that when they are brought down to date, they will be sent to Mr. McConnell. Pursuant to these negotiations the Keystone Cattle Company made and executed a warranty deed with Alvy Dixon as the grantee to the Murray tract on April 29, 1941 acknowledged partly on April 29, 1941 and partly on May 2, 1941. It is thus seen that the negotiations carried on by Lloyd E. Dixon resulted in a complete and detailed contract, including the fact that Alvy Dixon was the purchaser of the Murray Ranch. All that was done thereafter was merely to carry it to fulfilment. Counsel for appellants say that these letters above mentioned are merely hearsay. We think not. Lloyd E. Dixon's testimony is to the effect that he was his father's agent in negotiating the sale, for he testified that the correspondence above mentioned was the correspondence in regard to a transaction my father and I had with the Keystone Cattle Company in relation to buying the Murray Ranch and the Judson Ranch. The relationship of father and son makes the supposition that Alvy Dixon knew of the foregoing negotiations not unreasonable. He himself had commenced them at his home at Arlington with the owners of the property in the fall of 1940. He and Lloyd E. Dixon went to the office of McConnell in December, 1940 and discussed the purchase of the property involved herein in his name. Mrs. Dixon testified that her husband, in the spring of 1941, was alarmed at being sued for not completing the contract. This could only mean that he knew of the completed contract negotiated by Lloyd E. Dixon on his behalf. And that would seem to preclude any inference that ostensible or implied authority was given to some one else, namely to McConnell, to change what Lloyd E. Dixon had done. If anyone whatever had the authority to insert the name of Rosemary Dixon in the deed, it would have been Lloyd E. Dixon, and not G.R. McConnell. The latter was the attorney for Alvy Dixon. He had been for many years. But to attend to legal matters, and change the grantees in a deed are two different matters. He testified that: I had no general instructions to go ahead without request from him (Alvy Dixon), but I took care of whatever business that he came to see me about. At the time of the foregoing negotiations, Alvy Dixon was 78 years of age. If the change in the deed in question herein had been legally made so as to make the grantees tenants in the entirety, it would have been at best but a few years that Rosemary Dixon or her children, would have become the sole owners of the property, to the exclusion of the children of Alvy Dixon. It would seem to be but good common sense that authority to make the change made in the case at bar should be rather explicit, and not be gathered from the mere fact that the person who made it was the legal advisor of the original grantee in the deed, or for that matter, the legal advisor of all the members of the family. Complaint is made that McConnell did not inform Mrs. Dixon that he had no right to insert her name in the deed. No authority is cited that it was his duty to do so. Besides, McConnell testified that, while he did not in so many words tell her that he had no power to insert her name, he virtually did so. He stated: She knew what the instructions were and she knew the deed came through in Dixon's name pursuant to the contract. The burden to show the extent of the authority of McConnell was on Mrs. Dixon. 3 C.J.S. 257. Furthermore, considering the matter from the pure standpoint of justness she has no right to complain. As we have heretofore shown she lost no legal rights; she parted with nothing substantial. The court, in holding that her name was inserted wrongfully, merely prevented her from obtaining an unjust enrichment.