Opinion ID: 590329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal of Jurors for Cause

Text: 10 Hendricks argues that in excusing four prospective jurors the trial judge violated his right to an impartial jury under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Specifically, Hendricks claims that it was error for the trial judge to excuse the prospective jurors for their views on capital punishment because the jurors did not clearly state their opposition to that penalty. 11 A prospective juror may not be excused for her views concerning capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror in accordance with her instructions and oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420, 105 S.Ct. 844, 850, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). A finding by the trial judge of juror bias concerning the death penalty is a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id. at 429, 105 S.Ct. at 854. The question in this case is not whether a reviewing court might disagree with the trial court's findings, but whether these findings are fairly supported by the record. Id. at 434, 105 S.Ct. at 857. 12 During voir dire, the trial judge excused certain potential jurors because, based on their responses to questions, he concluded that their opposition to the death penalty would prevent them from properly performing their duties as jurors. To each of these four prospective jurors, the prosecutor repeatedly posed the ultimate question: Would you automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence? Each of the four answered unequivocally in the affirmative. The record supports the trial judge's decision.