Opinion ID: 1822646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Assignment of Error A: Admission of Jeff Haley's Testimony

Text: Lotter assigns, restated, that the district court erred when it refused to receive and consider the testimony of Haley regarding statements of Nissen under § 27-804(2)(c) and the decision in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), and its progeny. Haley's deposition was offered into evidence at the evidentiary hearing as substantive evidence pursuant to the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, § 27-804(2)(c). The State objected on grounds of hearsay, relevancy, and foundation. The district court held that Haley's deposition testimony regarding statements made to him by Nissen was inadmissible hearsay that did not fall within § 27-804(2)(c). Section 27-804 provides: (2) Subject to the provisions of [Neb. Rev.Stat. § ] 27-403 [(Reissue 1995)], the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: . . . . (c) A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. (Emphasis supplied.) The district court found that Nissen was unavailable due to his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege and that the statements made by Nissen to Haley was against Nissen's penal interest. Nevertheless, it held that the statements were inadmissible under the last sentence of § 27-804(2)(c) because there were no corroborating circumstances clearly indicating their trustworthiness. This court has not previously addressed the nature of the corroborating circumstances which would be required to clearly indicate the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement under § 27-804(2)(c). However, in State v. Craig, 192 Neb. 347, 349, 220 N.W.2d 241, 243 (1974), we noted that the possibility of fabrication of such a statement, perhaps by a confederate who has nothing to lose, would seem to require care in the admission of such evidence. The district court defined corroborating circumstance in this context as any separate operative facts, direct or circumstantial that substantiate the trustworthiness of the facts contained in the hearsay statement and are not purely collateral facts dealing with credibility generally. In this regard, the district court examined the testimony offered at Lotter's trial and found nothing to corroborate Nissen's purported statements to Haley. The court also examined Lotter's trial testimony and the general evidence relating to Nissen's credibility and concluded that no corroborating circumstances were present. While we agree that it was proper to consider the trial evidence in determining whether there were corroborating circumstances which would indicate the trustworthiness of Nissen's subsequent hearsay statements to Haley, we conclude that the circumstances under which the proffered statements against penal interest were made are also pertinent to this inquiry. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process requires that a criminal defendant be permitted to offer, in his defense, the hearsay statements of a third party confessing to the crime with which the defendant was charged where the statements were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. In assessing the reliability of the inculpatory hearsay statements at issue, the Court considered the circumstances in which they were made, i.e., spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred and further considered the fact that the inculpatory statements were corroborated by some other evidence in the case. Id. Other courts interpreting language similar or identical to § 27-804(2)(c) have held that in addition to independent corroborating evidence, a court may look to the circumstances surrounding the making of the inculpatory hearsay statement by a third party, including such factors as spontaneity, relationship between the accused and the declarant, whether the statement was subsequently repudiated, whether or not it was in fact against the penal interests of the declarant, and whether the declarant had a motive to falsify. See, U.S. v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135 (7th Cir.1993); Wilkerson v. State, 139 Md.App. 557, 776 A.2d 685 (2001); State v. Wardrett, 145 N.C.App. 409, 551 S.E.2d 214 (2001). We conclude that in determining whether there are corroborating circumstances which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused pursuant to § 27-804(2)(c), a court should examine all circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, as well as any other evidence which either supports or undermines its veracity. Even when considered under this broader test, however, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that there were no corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated the trustworthiness of Nissen's purported hearsay statements to Haley, his cellmate. The enhanced credibility normally given to a statement which incriminates the declarant is attenuated in this case by the fact that at the time he is alleged to have made the statements to Haley, Nissen was serving life sentences for the crimes for which both he and Lotter had been found guilty and convicted. The statements were apparently prompted by published accounts describing his and Lotter's respective roles in committing the crimes. Nissen's purported statements to his cellmate Haley, himself a convicted felon, were inconsistent with Nissen's sworn testimony at Lotter's trial. They are also inconsistent with Lotter's sworn trial testimony that he was not present when the murders were committed and had no knowledge of the crimes. Nissen's statements to Haley could represent the truth. It is at least equally possible, however, that they are fabrications by a convicted felon with little or nothing to lose for the purpose of exaggerating his involvement in the crimes for the benefit of his cellmate, or to provide his former confederate with a contrived basis for seeking to avoid the death penalty. Because there are no circumstances which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of Nissen's statements to Haley, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the statements were inadmissible under § 27-804(2)(c). In addition to his statutory argument, Lotter contends that under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), he had a due process right to present Nissen's statements to Haley. As we have noted, Chambers held that due process may require admission of a third party's statements against penal interest exculpating the accused where the statements were made under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. Since Chambers, many states, including Nebraska, have codified the exculpatory penal interest exception. The requirement in § 27-804(2)(c) that there be corroborating circumstances which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the proferred hearsay is substantially identical to the Chambers requirement of considerable assurance of ... reliability. See 410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. 1038. For this reason, we conclude that the due process analysis is encompassed within the statutory analysis and that Lotter's due process rights are protected by the statute and need not be examined independently.