Opinion ID: 2393123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of Increased Penalties to Defendant

Text: Defendant's primary argument is that suspension of imposition of sentence coupled with a probation order [hereafter ISS-probation] cannot be fairly construed to constitute initial sentencing within the meaning of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-104a(b)(2). (Defendant's memorandum of points and authorities, at 1.) Thus, he argues, the proceeding on January 19, 1968, at which Judge Gasch suspended imposition of sentence after defendant's conviction of Housebreaking was not the initial sentencing on that charge, and defendant was therefore not eligible for the increased penalties of § 22-104a because he was not sentenced for Housebreaking before he committed his second felony. Defendant contends that when a judge suspends the imposition of sentence and places a defendant on probation, this does not constitute a sentencing. Defendant cites as authority the cases of Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 63 S.Ct. 1124, 87 L.Ed. 1497 (1943); Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 64 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed. 41 (1943); and Thomas v. United States, 129 A.2d 852 (D.C.Mun.App.1957). Upon reading these cases, however, the Court notes that they do not support defendant's position at all. For example, in the Korematsu case, after a finding of guilt the pronouncement of judgment was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for five years. Korematsu appealed his conviction, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Korematsu had not been formally sentenced. The Supreme Court reversed saying: It has often been said that there can be no final judgment in a criminal case prior to actual sentence, . . . and this proposition was restated in Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 165, 82 L.Ed. 204, . . . [Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.] . . . The sentence is judgment phrase has been used by this Court in dealing with cases in which the action of the trial court did not in fact subject the defendant to any form of judicial control . . . But certainly when discipline has been imposed, the defendant is entitled to review. . . . [P]robationary surveillance is the same whether or not sentence is imposed. . . . These . . . incidents of probation emphasize that a probation order is an authorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment, the probation being intended as a reforming discipline.. . . The difference to the probationer between imposition of sentence followed by probation . . . and suspension of the imposition of sentence, . . . is one of trifling degree. . . . In either case, the liberty of an individual judicially determined to have committed an offense is abridged in the public interest. . . . Here, litigation on the merits of the charge against the defendant has not only ended in a determination of guilt, but it has been followed by the institution of the disciplinary measures which the court has determined to be necessary for the protection of the public. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. at 434, 435, 63 S.Ct. at 1125. See also, Thomas v. United States, supra . Thus, for purposes of appeal, there is no difference between the actual imposition of a sentence of imprisonment following conviction of a crime and placing a defendant on probation. Nor does the Supreme Court in such a situation see more than a trifling difference between probation orders entered after imposition and suspension of sentence and those following suspension of imposition of sentence. It appears to this Court that at least for purposes of finality of judgment while the Supreme Court has not come right out and said that placing a convicted criminal on probation is a sentencing, it has said that it is the functional equivalent. Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(c), entitled Sentencing, states in subsection 2: Sentence shall thereafter be pronounced. Unless the court pronouncing a sentence otherwise provides, a sentence imposed on a defendant for conviction of an offense shall run consecutively to any other sentence imposed on such defendant for conviction of an offense. The defendant may be placed on probation unless otherwise provided by law . . . [emphasis added] Thus, according to our own Superior Court Rules, sentencing includes placing a defendant on probation. Finally, the legislative history of section 104a clearly demonstrates that the Congress intended that a probation order was to be included in the definition of initial sentencing. Section 104 authorizes the imposition, under carefully prescribed circumstances, of a sentence of imprisonment for an indeterminate number of years up to life. The sentence may be imposed only upon a person who stands convicted of a felony, and who has been twice previously convicted of a felony. Moreover, the legal test of such prior convictions is revised in section 104 as reported to make clear that the two previous felony convictions must indicate, by the relative timing of their occurrence, a return twice to serious criminal conduct after having been previously sentenced for the commission of a felony. For example, a person who is convicted on a multiple-count indictment is deemed by that fact alone, and for purposes of this provision, to have committed a single felony only. S.Rep.No. 91-538, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The House of Representatives report on the section which ultimately became § 22-104a employs the following language: Section 907A(a) [§ 22-104a] is added to the Act of March 3, 1901, and gives the sentencing judge discretion, when he deems it will serve the public interest, to impose life imprisonment upon a convicted felon who has not been deterred or rehabilitated by two previous felony sentences. This provision applies only when the offender's successive offenses have been committed after he has been sentenced for previous crimes. Only when a criminal has shown his disregard for law by at least three successive courses of felonious conduct, and thus ignored at least two opportunities to reform can this provision be utilized. H.Rep.No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Both of the reports cited above indicate that in enacting section 104a the Congress intended to provide judges with a sentencing alternative allowing them to impose additional punishment on convicted felons with two previous felony convictions. Congress was careful, however, to limit the provisions of the section to those who had ignored at least two opportunities to reform, thus eliminating its application to persons convicted on a single multiple count indictment. That the two previous opportunities to reform should include probation is evidenced in the following excerpt from a Justice Department summary of what later became section 104a which was entered into the Congressional Record by Senator Hruska and Representative Nelsen, two of the sponsors of the bill: Item (2) is new. It provides for lifetime supervision of repeating felony offenders. The sanction would apply to persons who have engaged in a third separate course of felonious conduct, undeterred by two terms of probation or imprisonment, and only in the discretion of the sentencing judge. [emphasis added] 115 Cong.Rec. 19268, 19613. Defendant's attempt to make this rather clear language appear meaningless by claiming it should be ignored because the Administration and the Congressional majority were of two different political parties is unpersuasive. Defendant falls squarely within the category of criminals to whom the section was intended to apply. He was convicted of Housebreaking on November 3, 1967, and was placed on probation after the imposition of sentence was suspended. Undeterred by this opportunity for reform, he committed another felony in January, 1970, and was convicted of Robbery and Carrying a Dangerous Weapon. He was sent to prison on those convictions, but remained undeterred and on March 20, 1975, he was convicted of the instant offense. The Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, supra , says that for purposes of finality of judgment, an order of probation is the equivalent of a prison sentence, and the same reasoning applies to the situation here. Defendant was given two clear chances to reform and for reasons known to himself chose to ignore both of them. Although, as defendant argues, criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. Rouse v. United States, 391 A.2d 790, 791 (D.C.App.1978).