Opinion ID: 1057661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: ostein

Text: On the record currently before us, the State's case against Ostein appears somewhat weaker because, unlike Foxx, Ostein apparently made no incriminating statements at the scene. Rather, Detective Melzoni's investigative report recites that Ostein stated that he did not know anything about any drugs, guns or money. While officers recovered from Ostein's person a key to the apartment, a cell phone, and $1,750 in cash, Ostein apparently gave no explanation for his possession of these items. Certainly, mere possession of these things is not a crime. The State's case against Ostein therefore appears to rest on his presence at the apartment [9] during the search; the large amount of drugs found on the premises; the items found on Ostein's person (in conjunction with his proximity to the drugs and paraphernalia); and Foxx's statement that she let Ostein cook and sell crack from her apartment. According to the State's brief to this Court, its case against Ostein does not rely on any reports the police received from the CI prior to the search. The CI is not, therefore, a participant in or material witness to the events which resulted in the instant charges against Ostein. Ostein (through counsel) argued to the trial court that, based on Detective Melzoni's affidavit in support of the search warrant and his testimony at the hearing, the CI was in a position to show that Ostein was not guilty of possessing 300 grams or more of cocaine as charged in the indictment. Ostein claimed that the CI has knowledge that other people were in possession of drugs in that home. Indeed, Ostein asserted to the trial court that the CI was a witness to the crime in spite of the CI's absence from the scene when the police conducted the search. He also told the trial court that the only information linking him to those drugs, other than mere presence ... is this confidential informant. Ostein echoes these assertions in his brief to this Court: the CI's identity must be disclosed to him because he or she can establish that other persons were in possession of cocaine in this residence near the time of the search warrant. Ostein contends that [t]his is critical information for [his] defense, as [he] was not in possession of any drugs or paraphernalia at the time that officers entered the home, and as this home was not his residence. ... Thus, information regarding others who possessed cocaine in the home during this time frame is highly exculpatory evidence which will greatly benefit [his] defense. Even if the jury believes that [he] possessed some of the drugs in the home, the observations of the informant would at the very least provide a defense to the allegation that Ostein possessed over 300 grams, especially given the fact that the cocaine was found in all different areas of the home and on other persons. Ostein continues: Detective Melzoni's testimony established that the informant can identify one clear alternative suspect in this case, co-defendant Hailey. [10] ... The record establishes that the informant saw Hailey in that same house in possession of cocaine close in time to when the search warrant was served. This testimony, which is hearsay unless presented from the informant himself, is critical to Ostein's defense. Furthermore, only the informant can give counsel information regarding any others seen in possession of cocaine in the home near the timeframe of the search warrant. Those persons, like Hailey, would be potential alternative suspects in this case. Initially, we are constrained to note certain inaccuracies in Ostein's assertions. The only proof in the record about what was occurring in the apartment prior to the search comes from Detective Melzoni. He testified that he spoke with the CI approximately an hour before executing the warrant. At about that same time, the CI observed Mr. Ostein ... cooking cocaine, making crack cocaine, at the stove. That's the only person he saw.  Thus, the record before us refutes Ostein's claim that the CI can establish that others were in possession of the cocaine shortly before the warrant was executed. Also, Ostein asserts that the CI is the only person that can inform him about potential alternative suspects. Obviously, however, Ostein's codefendants who were present during the search are the potential alternative suspects. Ostein clearly desires the CI's assistance in attacking the sufficiency of the State's proof that he possessed all of the drugs found in the apartment. He argues that the CI's reported observations of others in possession of the drugs at some earlier date before the search will somehow protect him from being found in possession of them at the time of the search. We are not persuaded. First, as with Foxx, Ostein is being prosecuted for the crimes that the prosecution believes he was committing at the time the search warrant was executed, not at some prior point in time. The CI was not present at the relevant time. Thus, even if the CI would testify that he or she saw Haley (or others) in possession of some amount of cocaine before the police arrived, this would not defeat (or be relevant to) the State's claim that Ostein was in actual or constructive possession when the police arrived. Cf Vanderford, 980 S.W.2d at 397 (holding that disclosure of confidential informants' identities was not required where the prosecution was based on evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and not on prior purchases of illegal substances by confidential informants); United States v. Sales, 247 Fed.Appx. 730, 735 (6th Cir. 2007) (defendant not entitled to disclosure of confidential informant's identity where defendant was not charged for the events occurring during the controlled purchase made by the CI, but rather for the possession of the drugs and firearms the police located during the search of [defendant's] residence); Lewis, 40 F.3d at 1335-36 (defendant not entitled to disclosure where police arrested defendant twenty minutes after speaking with informant because informant was not present at the scene of the arrest ... and, thus, was in no position to amplify, contradict, or clear up the testimony of any government witness). Second, Ostein can, if he chooses, testify about who actually possessed the drugs. Moreover, he may have the opportunity to call one or more of his codefendants to testify on his behalf. Since they were at the scene at the time the warrant was executed, and the CI was not, their information is certainly more relevant than any the CI might have. Thus, the notion that only the CI can testify about what the remaining suspects were doing prior to the search is simply inaccurate. Finally, as to proving that someone else possessed the majority of the cocaine, Detective Melzoni's report indicates that the cocaine was found in various amounts in various places. The report recites that Haley admitted to having the drugs in the toilet. According to the report, the drugs in the toilet totaled 204 of the total 441 grams recovered during the search. Additionally, Detective Melzoni's report reflects that approximately 106 grams were found next to [codefendant] McCarrol and another 2.9 grams were found on codefendant Person's person. Ostein can therefore adduce this proof through Detective Melzoni, rendering any speculated similar testimony by the CI cumulative and unnecessary. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403 (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed... by considerations of ... needless presentation of cumulative evidence.). In sum, our close review of the record establishes that, like Foxx, Ostein has not provided any evidence that the CI was a participant in, or witness to, the crimes with which he has been charged. Moreover, he has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the CI has information relevant or helpful to his defense. Thus, Ostein is not entitled to disclosure of the CI's identity, and the trial court committed reversible error in so ruling.
In their briefs to this Court, Foxx and Ostein both claim that their constitutionally guaranteed rights to due process, to prepare and present a defense, and to a fair trial, will be violated if the prosecution does not disclose the CI's identity. We respectfully disagree.
Although Defendants have referred generally to their rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, [11] neither Foxx nor Ostein has cited to a United States Supreme Court case identifying a free-standing federal constitutional right to the disclosure of a confidential informant's identity, and we have found none. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described its decision in Roviaro as merely an exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over the federal rules of evidence and which ma[de] clear... that this Court was unwilling to impose any absolute rule requiring disclosure of an informer's identity even in formulating evidentiary rules for federal criminal trials. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309, 311, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); see also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 697, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (referring to the issue in Roviaro as one of evidentiary law). Rather, the Court in McCray referred to the informer's privilege as simply a well-established testimonial privilege, long familiar to the law of evidence, McCray, 386 U.S. at 308, 87 S.Ct. 1056, and rejected the petitioner's claim that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compelled that the informer's privilege be abolished in the context of a challenge to probable cause, id. at 312-13, 87 S.Ct. 1056; see also United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir.1992) (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses is not abrogated by the prosecution's refusal to disclose a confidential informant where the evidence upon which a defendant is convicted was secured personally by government agents who testified). It is true, of course, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that criminal prosecutions comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness, California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), and this standard of fairness requires that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has developed what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). For instance, under Brady v. Maryland, the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). And the prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence that would raise a reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt even without a specific request. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-12, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-272, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (requiring the prosecution to report to the defendant and the trial court a government witness's lies under oath); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (requiring the prosecution to reveal the contents of plea agreements with key government witnesses). The Supreme Court has referred to Roviaro as belonging to this line of decisions. See, e.g., Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528; see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (referring to Roviaro as holding that the Due Process Clause requires disclosure of an informant's identity at trial where shown to be relevant and helpful to the defense); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 646, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972) (The constitutional demands for a fair trial, implicit in the concept of due process, override the Government's desire for secrecy, whether the identity of an informer or executive privilege be involved.) (citation omitted). It has also, however, made clear that, when a defendant seeks to compel the government to provide access to a potential but otherwise unavailable witness, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the witness's anticipated information would be both material and favorable to the defense. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873, 102 S.Ct. 3440 (construing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process). A witness's anticipated testimony is material if it might affect the outcome of the trial. See id. at 868, 102 S.Ct. 3440. As set forth above, Foxx and Ostein have failed to establish that the CI in this case, who provided information upon which Detective Melzoni relied in seeking a search warrant but who was not present at the scene of (and did not participate in) the crimes charged, possesses any information that is either material or favorable to their defense. Rather, these defendants rely on vague, conclusory allegations that the CI (1) possesses information about who was doing what during the days and hours before the search warrant was executed and (2) that this information would aid them in their defense. Their mere invocation of the right to present a defense does not automatically outweigh, however, the public policies favoring the protection of confidential informants. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988); Moore, 954 F.2d at 381. If these defendants were entitled to disclosure on the record before us, it would be a rare case indeed in which an informant's identity could be kept confidential where his or her information was relied upon in obtaining a search warrant. The federal constitution does not require this result, and public policy is set firmly against these defendants' overstated position. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment that neither Foxx nor Ostein is entitled to disclosure of the CI's identity has not violated their rights under the federal constitution, and neither of them is entitled to relief on this basis.
Similarly to its federal counterpart, the Tennessee Constitution provides that no person shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8. This law of the land clause is synonymous with the `due process' provisions of the federal constitution. Willis v. Tenn. Dept. of Correction, 113 S.W.3d 706, 711 n. 4 (Tenn.2003). And like the Sixth Amendment, the Tennessee Constitution also provides that a criminal defendant has the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. In accord with the federal constitution, this provision applies only when the proposed witness is material. See Bacon v. State, 215 Tenn. 268, 385 S.W.2d 107, 109 (1964); State v. Smith, 639 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982). This Court has not previously held that either or both of these provisions necessarily entitle a criminal defendant to disclosure of a confidential informant's identity. Rather, this Court has observed that, in general, a defendant ha[s] no constitutional right to require the disclosure of [an] informant's name. Wallis, 417 S.W.2d at 784 (citing Simmons, 281 S.W.2d at 487); accord House, 44 S.W.3d at 512; see also Vanderford, 980 S.W.2d at 396. And while we can imagine circumstances in which a confidential informant's identity might be so crucial to an accused's defense that these constitutional protections would be implicated, this case does not present those circumstances. Accordingly, neither Foxx nor Ostein is entitled to relief on their claims under the Tennessee Constitution.
Foxx additionally alleges in her brief to this Court that the CI's identity must be revealed in order to preserve [her] right to effective assistance of counsel.... [12] We disagree. This Court has recognized that a lawyer may be found ineffective for failing to request disclosure where the confidential informant was a material witness to the charged crime and could testify regarding the identification of the defendant. House, 44 S.W.3d at 515-16. As set forth above, the CI in this case was neither a participant in, nor material witness to, the crimes charged in this case. Foxx is not entitled to disclosure on this basis, and her lawyer's failure to obtain the CI's name on her motion for same does not provide Foxx with a viable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.