Opinion ID: 852730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Blakely and Aggravating Factors

Text: The trial court judge found four aggravating factors: (1) Williams' criminal history; (2) Williams' likelihood to commit another offense; (3) Williams' need for rehabilitation that could best be provided by a penalty facility; and (4) Williams' behavior once caught with the drugs. On this basis it ordered the felony sentences to be served consecutively and enhanced the felony counts above the presumptive. We examine these aggravating circumstances in turn.
A sentence may be enhanced on the basis of prior convictions, consistent with the Sixth Amendment. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.2005). While a single aggravating circumstance may justify enhancing a sentence, the existence of any one aggravator does not automatically justify a maximum sentence; judges must consider the weight warranted by each aggravator. Morgan v. State, 829 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ind.2005). The significance of a criminal history `varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.' Id. (quoting Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 n. 4 (Ind.1999)). In Morgan, to illustrate this point, we hypothesized that a conviction for theft, six years prior to a conviction for class B burglary, probably would not warrant the maximum burglary sentence, but a maximum sentence for theft might be supported by a prior conviction for class B burglary. 829 N.E.2d at 15-16. The criminal history on which the trial court's action rested consisted of one juvenile adjudication and one adult felony. Under Indiana's criminal code, juvenile adjudications reflecting a history of criminal behavior may be considered an aggravating circumstance. Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 410 (Ind.1987). We have recently concluded that the existence of such an aggravator may be noted by a sentencing court without the intervention of a jury. Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 321, No. 49S02-0505-CR-207 (Ind. Dec. 13, 2005). Thus, Williams' 1994 juvenile adjudication for burglary, a class C felony if committed by an adult, was properly considered. It was likewise proper to give aggravating weight to Williams' 1997 adult conviction for possession of cocaine as a class D felony.
The trial court's second and third aggravating factors (likelihood to re-offend and need for rehabilitation) spring from a single source: the fact of the prior convictions. This single fact cannot be used as three separate aggravators. While there has been some tendency to sanction these aggravators on grounds that they derive from a defendant's prior criminal history, [2] we have held that such statements are more properly characterized as legitimate observations about the weight to be given to facts .... Morgan, 829 N.E.2d at 17. They do not serve as separate aggravators, at least absent a jury determination. Id. at 17-18.
A trial court may only enhance a sentence based on those facts that are established in one of several ways: 1) as a fact of prior conviction; 2) by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; 3) when admitted by a defendant; and 4) in the course of a guilty plea where the defendant has waived Apprendi rights and stipulated to certain facts or consented to judicial factfinding. Trusley v. State, 829 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind.2005). In the instant case, Officer Torres testified that Williams led officers on a chase where speeds reached 45 to 50 miles per hour, several traffic signals were ignored, and Williams almost caused a couple of accidents. (Tr. at 58.) Citing this testimony, the trial court found that [Williams'] blatant disregard for the safety of the citizens of this county must be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (Tr. at 257-58.) Since a finding of blatant disregard is a judicial statement, to be a proper aggravator, it must rest on some permissible fact. None of the facts cited are permissible under Trusley. [3]