Opinion ID: 1087102
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence offered by the State to support the jury’s guilty verdict based upon West Virginia Code § 61-8D-2 (murder of a child by a guardian by failing to supply necessary medical care).8 He asserts that the State was required to prove that he, while a custodian of Jada, maliciously and intentionally caused her death by his failure or refusal to supply Jada with necessary medical care. The Petitioner focuses upon his contention that there was insufficient “medical evidence concerning the effect of or need for medical treatment in terms of preventing or causing. . . [Jada’s] death . . . .” The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is set forth in syllabus point one of State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995): 7 The Petitioner asserts the trial court erred in allowing this evidence under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(b). We disagree and find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to admit the evidence. See State v. McGinnis, 193 W. Va.147, 159, 455 S.E.2d 516, 528 (1994) (“[W]e review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) under an abuse of discretion standard.”). 8 According to the Petitioner “[c]losely related to” this argument is his second assignment of error that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by permitting the jury to find him guilty of both second degree murder and murder of a child by failing to provide medical care because the verdicts are factually inconsistent. We readily dispense with this assignment of error. As we recognized in State v. Hall, 174 W. Va. 599, 328 S.E.2d 206 (1985), “appellate review of a claim of inconsistent verdicts is not generally available.” Id. at 603, 328 S.E.2d at 210 (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) and Dunn v. United States, 285 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)). 5 The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, in syllabus point three of Guthrie, we held: A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . Id. at 663, 461 S.E.2d at 169, Syl. Pt. 3, in part. The elements necessary to establish a conviction for murder pursuant to West Virginia Code § 61-8D-2 are set forth in the statute as follows: (a) If any parent, guardian or custodian shall maliciously and intentionally cause the death of a child under his or her care, custody or control by his or her failure or refusal to supply such child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care, then such parent, guardian or custodian shall be guilty of murder in the first degree. Id. In the present case, the State presented evidence that the Petitioner slammed 6 Jada’s head against a metal bed frame, resulting in a compound fracture to the child’s skull, among other injuries. The medical examiner testified that the child survived the injuries inflicted by the Petitioner as he testified that he could not “say for sure how long [of a] time it was she was alive after [the] injury.” Further, there was evidence that the Petitioner knew that Jada was alive after he inflicted the injury as he told Mr. Jackson: “‘I could see she was breathing and I wondered if I could save her or not or if I should try to, but then I saw the indentation on the back of her head and I knew she was ruined.’” Yet, the Petitioner failed to supply medical care to the child; rather, he simply took the child back up to her room and laid her down in front of her bed to die. Then, the Petitioner went to bed. Additionally, the State introduced in evidence other instances in which the Petitioner treated Jada roughly, including fracturing a leg, for the purpose of showing malice by the Petitioner towards the child. When the Petitioner fractured Jada’s leg, he did not tell Stephanie about the fracture. When Stephanie noticed swelling in the leg, she took the child to the hospital, where x-rays revealed a spiral tibia fracture that was about a week old. This Court finds that based upon the evidence in this case, the Petitioner failed to meet his heavy burden in proving that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction.9 Instead, we find that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution it was sufficient to support the Petitioner’s conviction of first degree murder for maliciously and intentionally causing Jada’s death while under his care, custody and control by refusing to supply the child with necessary medical care. See W. Va. Code § 61-8D-2; see also State v. Thornton, 228 W. Va. 449, 720 S.E.2d 572 (2011) (affirming mother’s conviction for neglect resulting in the death of child after finding sufficient evidence to support conviction); State v. Anderson, 228 W. Va. 58, 717 S.E.2d 245 (2011) (affirming father’s conviction for first degree murder without mercy under same statute after determining that sufficient evidence supported conviction). B. Denial of Post-Trial Renewed Motion for New Trial The Petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to order a new trial on the ground that Thomas Jackson, the Petitioner’s cell-mate, received a very favorable plea agreement from the prosecution for his testimony at trial. Prior to Mr. Jackson coming 9 Likewise, regarding the Petitioner’s four-sentence argument supporting his assignment of error that “the evidence as a whole was insufficient to base his convictions for any of the crimes,” based upon our review of the evidence used to support the Petitioner’s second degree murder conviction under West Virginia Code §61-2-1 and his conviction for death of a child by a guardian under West Virginia Code § 6-8D-2a, as set forth more fully supra in the body of this decision, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support all three of the Petitioner’s convictions. See Guthrie, 194 W. Va. at 663, 461 S.E.2d at 169, Syl Pts. 1 and 3. 7 forward about any conversation that he had with the Petitioner, Mr. Jackson had a tentative plea in place with the prosecuting attorney. See supra n.2. Months after the Petitioner’s trial, Mr. Jackson ended up pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, rather than a felony, with no agreement as to sentencing other than he was to receive credit for time served. The Petitioner contends that because the ultimate plea deal received by the witness was far more lenient than the plea agreement represented to the jury during trial the prosecutor’s alleged misrepresentation of the plea agreement during the trial was such that “manifest injustice . . . resulted through [the] prosecutor’s comments and that [the Petitioner] was prejudiced thereby.” The Petitioner relies upon cases concerning improper remarks by prosecutors in closing arguments to support his position. See Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Ocheltree, 170 W. Va. 68, 289 S.E.2d 742 (1982)(“A judgment of conviction will not be reversed because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.”); see Syl. Pt. 7, State v. England, 180 W. Va. 342, 376 S.E.2d 548 (1988)(“A prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.”); Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Sugg, 193 W. Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995)(“A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.”); see also id. at 393, 456 S.E.2d at 474, Syl. Pt. 6 (“Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecutorial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters.”). The record is clear that the jury was aware of the tentative plea agreement between the State and Mr. Jackson at the time Mr. Jackson testified during trial. The jury was also aware that Mr. Jackson knew that his plea deal could change as a result of his cooperation with the State. Accordingly, we find that there was no improper conduct by the prosecuting attorney that either clearly prejudiced the Petitioner or resulted in manifest