Opinion ID: 1650180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Were the Department's Findings Supported by Credible Evidence?

Text: [12-14] The scope of judicial review of the Department's findings is whether there is any credible evidence in the record sufficient to support the findings made by the Department. [5] R. T. Madden, Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 43 Wis. 2d 528, 547, 169 N.W.2d 73 (1969); Kohler Co. v. ILHR Dept., 81 Wis.2d 11, 24, 259 N.W.2d 695 (1977); Pfister & Vogel Tanning v. ILHR Dept., 86 Wis.2d 522, 525, 273 N.W.2d 293 (1979). For evidence to be credible, it must be evidentiary in nature and not a conclusion of law. It also must not be so discredited by other evidence that a court could find it incredible as a matter of law. The Department's findings must be upheld even though they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. R. T. Madden, Inc., supra, at 447-448. The credible evidence test has been applied consistently by the courts in worker's compensation cases and thus becomes part of the statute by interpretation. Kohler Co., supra, at 24. Valadzic v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 92 Wis. 2d at 593-594. Mr. Goranson challenges two findings of the Department. The first is the finding that the applicant broke the window to his room, crawled out onto the window ledge, and jumped. . . . The second challenged finding is that the applicant's injury arose out of a cause solely personal to him. [15] A disinterested witness heard the sound of breaking glass and saw Mr. Goranson climbing out the window. The witness did not see anyone pushing or any indication that Mr. Goranson was being pushed. He was also observed standing on the ledge momentarily and then he was seen jumping off the ledge. From the position of the chair, with its broken arm, the Department could have inferred that the chair was used to break the window. The determination as to who broke the window is not a key factor in this case. Mr. Goranson testified that he did not know how the window was broken but that the hole in the glass was there when he went through it. Though not supported by credible evidence, the erroneous finding that Mr. Goranson broke the window, does not require reversal. The determinative question is whether the finding that the applicant's injury did not arise out of his employment is supported by credible evidence. [16] The statutory phrase arises out of his employment is not synonymous with the phrase caused by the employment. In interpreting the meaning of this statutory language the positional risk doctrine is applied. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 5 Wis.2d 247, 254, 92 N.W.2d 824 (1958); Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 266 Wis. 81, 86-87, 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954). The definition of the positional risk doctrine can be stated as follows: [A]ccidents arise out of employment if the conditions or obligations of the employment create a zone of special danger out of which the accident causing the injury arose. Stated another way, an accident arises out of employment when by reason of employment the employee is present at a place where he is injured through the agency of a third person, an outside force, or the conditions of special danger. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 5 Wis.2d at 254; see, Allied Mfg., Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 45 Wis.2d 563, 173 N.W.2d 690 (1970). However, an employee may still step outside of the employment relationship even in situations where the positional risk doctrine might otherwise apply. The employee may have, for the time being, completely disassociated himself from the employment relation. An employee may wilfully do a wrongful act for purposes entirely foreign to his employment, and while so acting take himself without the scope of his employment. . . . Such a departure . . . measured in terms of time and space, may be very slight. Peterman v. Industrial Comm., 228 Wis. 352, 358, 280 N.W. 379 (1938), quoted with approval in Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 266 Wis. at 87. [17] From the physical evidence and the testimony presented to the Department, there is credible evidence to support the finding of the Department that the injuries arose out of a cause solely personal to the employee and did not arise out of the employment relationship. There is evidence, admittedly much of it circumstantial, that Mr. Goranson voluntarily allowed someone into the room. That evidence included: (1) the two different brands of cigarettes found in the ashtray in the room; (2) Mr. Goranson's admissions to the police officers that a woman was with him in the room; (3) the room was locked at all times when the door was closed and there was no sign of forced entry; (4) nothing in the room was disturbed other than the chair and there was no indication that anything was taken from the room. There is also evidence from numerous witnesses that an argument ensued and that for reasons known only to Mr. Goranson he crawled out of the window, stood on the ledge, and jumped. [18] The credibility of a witness and the persuasiveness of the testimony rendered are for the Department to determine. Massachusetts B. & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 8 Wis.2d 606, 610, 99 N.W.2d 809 (1959). Given the vague details, the inconsistent statements given by Mr. Goranson, and the physical evidence which contradicted his testimony, the Department acted reasonably in discounting Mr. Goranson's testimony. Even if there was an assault on Mr. Goranson, if that assault was entirely personal, he is not entitled to recover. . . . [i]t is particularly important to keep constantly in mind that the motivation of the assault, . . . must not be `personal vengeance stemming from contact with the employee outside the employment.' When it is clear that the origin of the assault was purely private and personal, and that the employment contributed nothing to the episode, whether by engendering or exacerbating the quarrel or facilitating the assault, the assault should be held noncompensable even in states fully accepting the positional risk test. . . . A. Larson, The Positional-Risk Doctrine In Workmen's Compensation, 1973 Duke L.J. 761, 796. Consideration of the entire record before the Department demonstrates that there was credible evidence to show that if Mr. Goranson was assaulted, the assault was entirely personal to him, and thus noncompensable. Mr. Goranson attempts to compare this case with the California Supreme Court's decision in Wiseman v. Industrial Accident Comm., 46 Cal.2d 570, 297 P.2d 649 (1956). In that case the travelling employee died in a hotel fire while with a woman who was not his wife. Because the risk of fire was no greater or less by having the woman present it was held that recovery would not be denied. That case stands solely for the proposition that in the absence of a direct connection between the employee's unlawful and immoral purpose and the risk, the existence of such purpose cannot justify the conclusion that the connection between the injury and the employment is so remote from the employment that it did not arise from the employment. The important distinction between the case at bar and Wiseman is that in the present case, there is a direct link between the presence of a woman and the injury sustained by the employee. The situation in which Mr. Goranson found himself was not one which was created by the risk of staying at the hotel. The Department is supported by credible evidence in its conclusion that Mr. Goranson deliberately acted to place himself in a position where he sustained an injury which was not a risk incidental to his employment relationship with the Whitie's Transportation Company as a bus driver. By the Court.  Judgment affirmed.