Opinion ID: 1247709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Litigative Court Costs.

Text: The area of costs is a nebulous topic as found with reference within many statutes which include the word costs as never expressly defined. Additionally, this court has never considered this subject of the relative relation of rules of court in regard to the definition of allowable costs as related to the statutory provisions which provide that costs may be awarded. [13] This confusion is clouded in this case because in addition, a pretrial offer by Marathon and Dixon of judgment in accordance with W.R.C.P. 68 was made of $10,000 to include all costs accrued to offer date. That offer was not accepted and the case proceeded to trial resulting in the recovery of only the $4,500 in compensatory damages and $3,000 in punitive damages. In post-trial proceedings, both parties filed their bills of costs and each objected to what the other had submitted. Following hearing, the court awarded Hashimoto in final judgment his costs incurred to date of offer of judgment. [14] Consequently, to determine if the court abused its discretion in award of costs, it is necessary again to consider for disposition of the cross appeal what is properly included by case law and precedent to come within the term allowable costs. Clearly within the confines of definition terms, the determination of allowable costs to be taxed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(d) is within the discretion of the trial court. Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1985). See also Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986), and for criminal cases, Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1987) and Note, The Assessment and Collection of the Costs of a Criminal Prosecution in Wyoming, 13 Wyo.L.J. 178 (1959). By their cross appeal, Marathon and Dixon claim discretional error by the court in four items: a. Discovery deposition costs awarded to Hashimoto for the deposition of co-defendant Morgan whose case was settled before trial. The amount involved if allocated from a joint bill would total $203.50; b. Reduced witness fees for Dr. Sandeen, Marathon's and Dixon's medical witness, as ultimately approved on an hourly rate of $250 but applied only to the time of testimony and not show up and wait time resulting in the billed total of $750 to be reduced by $221 to an award of $529; c. Pretrial consultation time between Marathon's and Dixon's counsel and the medical witness of $50; and d. Pretrial consultation by both counsel and Dr. Peter W. Beall as another medical witness of $45.50. Consequently at issue in this cross appeal is allowed costs to Hashimoto of $203.50 and disallowed costs to Marathon and Dixon of $316.50, as totalling $520. We will not yield to temptation by the broad scope of issue argument by litigants or the plethora of Wyoming case law touching on awardable costs to expand consideration for this opinion beyond the subject presented: 1. Discovery deposition costs of witnesses whose depositions were not used at trial but for whom the discovery was determined by the trial court to be reasonably necessary for case preparation; and 2. Witness fees of expert witnesses as allowable for trial time appearance only and excluding show up time and pretrial conference sessions with counsel. Among the myriad of Wyoming piecemeal cases, [15] we would apply Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361; State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1985); and Duffy, 708 P.2d 433 as controlling. [16] Applying current precedent to the specifics involved here as avoiding the generalized confusion obviously existent, it is directly concluded that: 1. Award of costs including subpoena, reporter and witness fees for discovery deposition is discretionary with the trial court as coming within the criteria of reasonably required for trial preparation. Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361; Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1; 2. Expert witness fees as determined by the court to be reasonable in amount should include actual time for testimony and do not include charges of the experts for pretrial conferences or time during the trial session while waiting to actually testify. In the absence of a defining rule or a controlling statute, it should be recognized that we do not deny the right to charge daily witness costs pursuant to W.S. 1-14-102 for witnesses who are attending court or deposition sessions under subpoena even though on particular days they may not testify. We limit the expert witness provision provided here to a higher hourly rate to be assessable against the opposing party only for the time that the expert may actually testify as the court may, in its discretion, limit the amount of the award by that restriction. [17] Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1. Cf. Kaess, 748 P.2d 698 and Weaver, 715 P.2d 1361. Consequently, we affirm the exercise of discretion by the trial court in award of costs from which the cross appeal was taken.