Opinion ID: 3194674
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Social worker Larry Cameron

Text: a. Richko’s factual allegations about Cameron’s ability to access information in the MH-WIN system are not blatantly contradicted by the record Because Cameron appeals from the denial of summary judgment, he must concede the version of the facts most favorable to Richko. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995). But Cameron contends that Richko made “blatantly and demonstrably false” No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 11 misrepresentations regarding material facts that, in view of Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), should not be considered for the purpose of summary judgment. See id. at 380 (noting that a version of the material facts that “is blatantly contradicted by the record” should not be credited). Cameron specifically argues that Richko misrepresented to the district court that Cameron could have accessed Gillespie’s specific treatment information in the MH-WIN system. Richko alleged that Cameron “admit[ted] that if he had examined the MH-WIN encounters, he could have determined the extent of Gillespie’s former treatments, diagnoses, and outpatient care.” But Cameron maintains that the deposition shows only that he “did not consult any other information in the MHWIN system, because he did not need to do so in order to complete the mental status examination.” The specific deposition testimony at issue is as follows: ATTORNEY: Based on your understanding of the MH-WIN System, are you able to access previous treatment information about a consumer? CAMERON: No previous treatment information. ... ATTORNEY:Are you able to access information regarding diagnosis? CAMERON: Yes. ATTORNEY:And are you able to access information regarding risk assessment? CAMERON: No. ATTORNEY:Are you able to access information regarding any service, mental health service that a consumer received? CAMERON: Yes. ... ATTORNEY: Once you took the mental status examination and Mr. Gillespie had indicated to you that he was diagnosed bipolar, were you able to confirm that through the MH-WIN System? CAMERON: Yeah, I did not access that information at the time. ATTORNEY: Okay. So you did not confirm through the MH-WIN System Mr. Gillespie’s indication to you that he was previously diagnosed as bipolar? CAMERON: No. ... ATTORNEY: If [Gillespie] was diagnosed as being schizophrenic would that be something that you could have accessed in the MH-WIN System? CAMERON: Yes. By code, yes. No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 12 ATTORNEY: Are you familiar with the code for pycho-schizophrenia? CAMERON: Yes, I am. This deposition testimony does not “blatantly contradict[]” or “utterly discredit[]” Richko’s allegations. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Richko’s argument is based on Cameron’s own admission that he was able to access previous diagnoses and prior mental-health and substance-abuse services by a corresponding code. Cameron also stated that he never attempted to use the “incident” portion of the MH-WIN system, thereby raising a factual question of whether he was unable to access incident reports or simply chose not to do so. And although Cameron testified that he could not access detailed treatment information, Richko notes that Cameron explicitly conceded that he could access, among other things, Gillespie’s prior diagnoses, mental-health services, and substance-abuse services—and possibly incident reports. Richko also presented evidence in the form of a MH-WIN chart, which suggests that Cameron could access at least some treatment information in the MH-WIN system. The MHWIN chart lists a series of “encounters” by date, and includes links to “view,” “print claim,” and “view full detail.” Based on this information, a factfinder could reasonably infer that Cameron could have further investigated the “full detail” of Gillespie’s mental-health issues in the MHWIN system to determine whether he posed a substantial risk to other inmates and thus should have been recommended for single-cell placement. b. A reasonable juror could find that Cameron was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Horvath because he was aware of Gillespie’s significant mental history, failed to investigate it further, and failed to recommend that Gillespie be housed alone Cameron next argues that, even if his decision not to house Gillespie alone led to the attack, it does not prove that Cameron had the requisite mental state to establish deliberate indifference. But Richko need not show that Cameron acted with the “very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Liability can instead be established simply by showing that the correctional officer “refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.” Id. at 843 n.8. No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 13 That is precisely the issue here. The record includes facts that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Richko, reveal that Cameron (1) was aware of Gillespie’s self-reported history of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, (2) was aware that Gillespie had not taken his medication for these conditions for six days, (3) knew that Gillespie had been arrested the day before for attempted assault with a dangerous weapon, (4) knew that Gillespie had been hospitalized six times for his mental illnesses, and (5) discovered through the MH-WIN system that Gillespie had 2,334 prior encounters with mental-health services and/or providers over the past 11 years (equating to approximately 212 encounters per year since he was 11 years old). So even if one assumes for the sake of argument that Cameron could not have accessed information regarding individual incidents in the MH-WIN system, a reasonable juror could nevertheless conclude that the information that was available to Cameron was enough to show that Cameron was aware that Gillespie posed a substantial risk of violence to others and that Cameron was deliberately indifferent to that risk. The district court therefore properly denied Cameron’s motion for summary judgment based on his claim of qualified immunity.