Opinion ID: 2552284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty to Alleged Abusers

Text: The starting place for our analysis of the State's potential liability to Tyner is the duty the State owes, if any, to alleged child abusers. The majority cites RCW 26.44.050 and makes passing reference to chapters 13.34 RCW, 26.44 RCW, and 74.13 RCW, Majority at 1153 n.3, when it agrees with the Court of Appeals below that CPS's duty to investigate alleged physical or sexual abuse runs not only to the child victims of such abuse but also to the victims' parents accused of perpetrating the abuse. Our case law concerning the State's liability for failing to properly investigate allegations of child abuse has been hopelessly imprecise; the majority opinion today only exacerbates such imprecision. The majority fails to carefully review the statutes imposing the duty to investigate allegations of physical or sexual abuse of children on CPS. The purpose of Washington child abuse statutes is to protect the child. This duty arises out of the State's parens patriae right and responsibility to intervene to protect the child, which does not run to the parents because they are adults. In In re Welfare of Sumey, 94 Wash.2d 757, 762-63, 621 P.2d 108 (1980), we specifically noted the constitutional right of parents to raise and nurture their children; however, even that powerfully instinctive and constitutional right must yield to the State's duty to protect our children's well-being. We said: The parents' constitutional rights, however, do not afford an absolute protection against State interference with the family relationship. Although [h]istorically, the natural parent's right to custody of a child... [was considered to be] absolute, barring a showing of unfitness ... [g]rowing concern for the welfare of the child and the disappearance of the concept of the child as property has led to a gradual modification in judicial attitude. In re Becker, 87 Wash.2d 470, 477, 553 P.2d 1339 (1976). It is now well established that when parental actions or decisions seriously conflict with the physical or mental health of the child, the State has a parens patriae right and responsibility to intervene to protect the child. Sumey, 94 Wash.2d at 762, 621 P.2d 108 (alterations in original). [1] We have found the State may be civilly liable when it breaches a duty created by statute, but we have taken care to predicate that duty upon the statutory obligation created by the Legislature. McKinney v. State, 134 Wash.2d 388, 396, 950 P.2d 461 (1998). A careful review of Washington's statutory protections for children is, therefore, imperative to understanding the scope of the duty, if any, owed by the State and its officers when investigating child abuse. Protective provisions for Washington's children are found in three separate sections of Washington law. Unfortunately, the majority only quotes brief excerpts from the intent sections of these three critical statutory sequences, which is not enough to convey the precise intent of the Legislature. On closer inspection, the complete intent sections clearly delineate a legislative intent to make the interests of abused or neglected children greater than the interests of their alleged abusers. RCW 13.34.020 states: The legislature declares that the family unit is a fundamental resource of American life which should be nurtured. Toward the continuance of this principle, the legislature declares that the family unit should remain intact unless a child's right to conditions of basic nurture, health, or safety is jeopardized. When the rights of basic nurture, physical and mental health, and safety of the child and the legal rights of the parents are in conflict, the rights and safety of the child should prevail. In making reasonable efforts under this chapter, the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern. The right of a child to basic nurturing includes the right to a safe, stable, and permanent home and a speedy resolution of any proceeding under this chapter. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, RCW 26.44.010 again makes clear that the impetus behind child abuse reporting statutes is to safeguard the general welfare of the children: The Washington state legislature finds and declares: The bond between a child and his or her parent, custodian, or guardian is of paramount importance, and any intervention into the life of a child is also an intervention into the life of the parent, custodian, or guardian; however, instances of nonaccidental injury, neglect, death, sexual abuse and cruelty to children by their parents, custodians or guardians have occurred, and in the instance where a child is deprived of his or her right to conditions of minimal nurture, health, and safety, the state is justified in emergency intervention based upon verified information; and therefore the Washington state legislature hereby provides for the reporting of such cases to the appropriate public authorities. It is the intent of the legislature that, as a result of such reports, protective services shall be made available in an effort to prevent further abuses, and to safeguard the general welfare of such children [;] ... (Emphasis added.) Finally, RCW 74.13.010, which sets forth the obligation of DSHS to create an appropriate child welfare system, makes clear the State's duty runs to the children: The purpose of this chapter is to safeguard, protect and contribute to the welfare of the children of the state, through a comprehensive and coordinated program of public child welfare services providing for: Social services and facilities for children who require guidance, care, control, protection, treatment or rehabilitation; setting of standards for social services and facilities for children; cooperation with public and voluntary agencies, organizations, and citizen groups in the development and coordination of programs and activities in behalf of children; and promotion of community conditions and resources that help parents to discharge their responsibilities for the care, development and well-being of their children. (Emphasis added.) The majority has not reviewed the legislative history of these enactments; yet that history reveals an intent to focus on the welfare of child victims, rejecting the creation of a general duty to parents, which the majority now creates by judicial action. For example, in 1987 the Legislature amended RCW 13.34.020 by removing the phrase in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary and inserting the phrase unless a child's right to conditions of basic nurture, health, or safety is jeopardized. When the rights of basic nurture, physical and mental health, and safety of the child and the legal rights of the parents are in conflict, the rights and safety of the child should prevail.  Laws of 1987, ch. 524, § 2 (emphasis added). The final bill report for Second Substitute Senate Bill 5659, whose enactment followed the Eli Creekmore tragedy in Snohomish County, made this direction unambiguous: The intent language of the child abuse chapter is clarified regarding the paramount goal of CPS to protect a child's right to safety. The rights of basic nurture, mental and physical safety of a child must prevail when they conflict with the legal rights of the parents. (Emphasis added.) The Legislature again amended that statute in 1998, adding the phrase [i]n making reasonable efforts under this chapter, the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern.  Laws of 1998, ch. 314, § 1 (emphasis added). Both of these amendments clearly indicate the child's health and welfare were of primary concern to the Legislature, not the parents' interest. Despite its selected references to the statutory intent provisions in chapters 13.34 RCW, 26.44 RCW, and 74.13 RCW, the majority discerns a duty owed by the State to alleged abusers with respect to child abuse investigations. No language in any of these statutory provisions even hints at such a general duty. More troubling yet is the majority's failure to discuss the specific statutory provisions that afford parents and others suspected of child abuse and neglect due process rights with regard to CPS investigations. Beginning as early as 1985, the Legislature recognized such rights: The legislature finds parents and children often are not aware of their due process rights when agencies are investigating allegations of child abuse and neglect. The legislature reaffirms that all citizens, including parents, shall be afforded due process, that protection of children remains the priority of the legislature, and that this protection includes protecting the family unit from unnecessary disruption. To facilitate this goal, the legislature wishes to ensure that parents and children be advised in writing and orally, if feasible, of their basic rights and other specific information as set forth in this act, provided that nothing contained in this act shall cause any delay in protective custody action. Laws of 1985, ch. 183, § 1. RCW 26.44.100 was substantially amended in 1997 to add the following language: (2) The department shall notify the alleged perpetrator of the allegations of child abuse and neglect at the earliest possible point in the investigation that will not jeopardize the safety and protection of the child or the investigation process. Whenever the department completes an investigation of a child abuse or neglect report under chapter 26.44 RCW, the department shall notify the alleged perpetrator of the report and the department's investigative findings. The notice shall also advise the alleged perpetrator that: (a) A written response to the report may be provided to the department and that such response will be filed in the record following receipt by the department; (b) Information in the department's record may be considered in subsequent investigations or proceedings related to child protection of child custody; (c) There is currently information in the department's record that may be considered in determining that the person is disqualified from being licensed to provide child care, employed by a licensed child care agency, or authorized by the department to care for children; and (d) A person who has demonstrated a good-faith desire to work in a licensed agency may request an informal meeting with the department to have an opportunity to discuss and contest the information currently in the record. (3) The notification required by this section shall be made by regular mail to the person's last known address. (4) The duty of notification created by this section is subject to the ability of the department to ascertain the location of the person to be notified. The department shall exercise reasonable, good-faith efforts to ascertain the location of persons entitled to notification under this section. Laws of 1997, ch. 282, § 2. Moreover, RCW 26.44.100 was again amended in 1988 to expressly afford an alleged abuser the right to seek review of any finding of abuse. The Legislature enacted a new section, RCW 26.44.125, to articulate this right of review: (1) A person who is named as an alleged perpetrator after October 1, 1998, in a founded report of child abuse or neglect has the right to seek review and amendment of the finding as provided in this section. (2) Within twenty calendar days after receiving written notice from the department under RCW 26.44.100 that a person is named as an alleged perpetrator in a founded report of child abuse or neglect, he or she may request that the department review the finding. The request must be made in writing. If a request for review is not made as provided in this subsection, the alleged perpetrator may not further challenge the finding and shall have no right to agency review or to an adjudicative hearing or judicial review of the finding. (3) Upon receipt of a written request for review, the department shall review and, if appropriate, may amend the finding. Management level staff within the children's administration designated by the secretary shall be responsible for the review. The review must be conducted in accordance with procedures the department establishes by rule. Upon completion of the review, the department shall notify the alleged perpetrator in writing of the agency's determination. The notification must be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the person's last known address. (4) If, following agency review, the report remains founded, the person named as the alleged perpetrator in the report may request an adjudicative hearing to contest the finding. The adjudicative proceeding is governed by chapter 34.05 RCW and this section. The request for an adjudicative proceeding must be filed within thirty calendar days after receiving notice of the agency review determination. If a request for an adjudicative proceeding is not made as provided in this subsection, the alleged perpetrator may not further challenge the finding and shall have no right to agency review or to an adjudicating hearing or judicial review of the finding. (5) Reviews and hearings conducted under this section are confidential and shall not be open to the public. Information about reports, reviews, and hearing may be disclosed only in accordance with federal and state laws pertaining to child welfare records and child protective services reports. (6) The department may adopt rules to implement this section. Laws of 1998, ch. 314, § 9. What is readily apparent from this review of the Legislature's enactments is that the Legislature did not create a general duty for the State to alleged abusers with regard to child abuse investigations by DSHS and CPS. The Legislature said expressly that children's rights are paramount. It recognized the need for due process for individuals found to be abusers. But the Legislature did not establish a general duty running from the State to alleged abusers, as the majority incorrectly concludes. Our case law involving the duty of the State and its officers in child abuse investigations is largely imprecise. We have held a duty to investigate exists; the breach of such a duty can result in civil liability for the State, but not the individual caseworkers. See Babcock v. State, 116 Wash.2d 596, 620-21, 809 P.2d 143 (1991). In Babcock, the duty arose when CPS caseworkers negligently investigated abuse and the children were placed in a foster home where they were sexually abused. Yet we have also specifically held the purpose of Washington's child abuse reporting laws is to protect the children, and those laws create no rights for abusers. As we stated in State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 891, 889 P.2d 479 (1995): Even under the old negligence per se doctrine, a person can only borrow a statutory duty of care to show negligence if the harm that occurs is the type of harm that statute is designed to prevent and the person claiming it is in the class of persons the statute is designed to protect. Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wash.2d 916, 923, 578 P.2d 17 (1978). That is not the case here. The reporting statute [RCW 26.44.030] is designed to secure prompt protection and/or treatment for the victims of child abuse. The class of persons it is designed to protect is the victims, not the abusers. Thus, Warner cannot use the statute to establish negligence on the part of the State. (Emphasis added.) The majority's view cannot be reconciled with Warner's. A number of Court of Appeals cases have also discussed the duty of the State and its officers to properly investigate abuse. In Favors v. Matzke, 53 Wash.App. 789, 770 P.2d 686, review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1033, 784 P.2d 531 (1989), foster parents brought a negligence action against the State claiming CPS caseworkers owed them a duty to explain the consequences of a polygraph test administered in the course of a child abuse investigation. The Court of Appeals noted the statutory duty in a child abuse investigation was owed to the children and declined to find any duty owed by the State to the alleged abusers. In Lesley for Lesley v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 83 Wash.App. 263, 921 P.2d 1066 (1996), review denied, 131 Wash.2d 1026, 939 P.2d 216 (1997), however, the Court of Appeals found the State owed a duty based on RCW 26.44.050 to properly investigate child abuse; the court found the duty ran to alleged abusers in a case where CPS caseworkers mistook Mongolian spots, a common African-American birthmark, for bruising. See also Yonker v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 85 Wash.App. 71, 930 P.2d 958 (duty owed to alleged abuser where caseworker's allegedly negligent investigation resulted in dependency filing), review denied, 132 Wash.2d 1010, 940 P.2d 655 (1997); Gilliam v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 89 Wash.App. 569, 950 P.2d 20, review denied, 135 Wash.2d 1015, 960 P.2d 937 (1998). Unfortunately, these cases do not carefully analyze the statutory provisions previously enumerated. Moreover, Lesley 's reliance on RCW 26.44.050 is misplaced. RCW 26.44.050 merely states: Upon the receipt of a report concerning the possible occurrence of abuse or neglect, the law enforcement agency or the department of social and health services must investigate and provide the protective services section with a report in accordance with chapter 74.13 RCW, and where necessary to refer such report to the court. RCW 74.13.031(3) describes the duties of DSHS as follows: Investigate complaints of any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker that results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, or sexual abuse or exploitation, or that presents an imminent risk of serious harm, and on the basis of the findings of such investigation, offer child welfare services in relation to the problem to such parents, legal custodians, or persons serving in loco parentis, and/or bring the situation to the attention of an appropriate court, or another community agency: PROVIDED, That an investigation is not required of nonaccidental injuries which are clearly not the result of a lack of care or supervision by the child's parents, legal custodians, or persons serving in loco parentis. If the investigation reveals that a crime against a child may have been committed, the department shall notify the appropriate law enforcement agency. These statutory provisions offer scant support for the majority's view today or the Court of Appeals' opinions noted above, particularly in light of the appellate court's failure to analyze legislative intent sections in chapters 13.34 RCW, 26.44 RCW, and 74.13 RCW, and the court's failure to discuss RCW 26.44.100. The area of child abuse investigations is replete with specific statutory directives. Consistent with our holding in McKinney, the duty of the State and its officers should be predicted upon the terms of such statutes. In light of the plain statutory intent of chapters 13.34 RCW, 26.44 RCW, and 74.13 RCW, I would hold the State owes a duty to the victims of alleged physical or sexual abuse to properly investigate such abuse. The State's duty to alleged abusers is narrower and appropriately described in RCW 26.44.100 and .125. The State must advise the alleged abuser of the allegations of abuse and of any official findings. The alleged abuser must be afforded an opportunity to provide correct information and secure administrative and/or judicial review. Implicit in such a duty is the obligation of the State and its officers to act in good faith in conducting an investigation. Moreover, as this specific duty to alleged abusers arose with the 1997 enactment of amendments to RCW 26.44.100 and the enactment of RCW 26.44.125, the duty should apply to conduct occurring after the effective date of the 1997 legislation. To hold the State and its officers to a general duty to the alleged perpetrators of abuse, as the majority does, creates an extraordinarily difficult conflict for the State and its officers in light of the statutory directives. We ask CPS to be aggressive about dealing with issues of child abuse to protect the children. At the same time, we ask CPS to be sensitive to the interests of the parents, who in some instances may themselves be the perpetrators of the abuse. [2] This dual duty chills and inevitably deters a caseworker from the paramount goal of protecting children from physical abuse and neglect. We cannot reasonably ask the State and CPS to serve two masters. The paramount duty in child abuse investigations is owed to the children who are at risk. If the Legislature feels that a general duty beyond the terms of RCW 26.44.100 and .125 should be owed to alleged abusers, then the Legislature should so provide. It has not done so. We should not create such a duty by judicial fiat. [3]