Opinion ID: 7620882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Personal Representatives' Cross-Appeal

Text: As mentioned above, the personal representatives filed a notice of cross-appeal in the circuit court. No filing fee was paid, and the notice was not transmitted to this Court. Instead, the existence of a notice of appeal was not recognized until the record on appeal was completed and sent to this Court. The clerk of this Court, noting that this Court had never received notice of the cross-appeal, that the personal representatives had designated their brief to this Court solely as the Brief of the Appellees, and that they had failed to identify themselves as cross-appellants, 7 issued a show-cause order directing the parties to brief the issue whether we should disregard the purported cross-appeal based on the personal representatives' failure to prosecute. In their response, the personal representatives acknowledge that their notice of appeal was due on December 23, 2016. See Rule 4(a)(2), Ala. R. App. P. (If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any  other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days (two weeks) of the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this rule ....). According to the personal representatives, on December 22, 2016, they mailed their notice of appeal to the circuit clerk. However, out of an abundance of caution, on December 23, 2016, they also hand-delivered a copy to the circuit clerk for filing. Neither submission, however, included a filing fee. Exhibits attached to the personal representatives' response reflect that the circuit clerk signed -but did not stamp-the notice as filed on December 23, 2016. The stamped date on the corresponding Docketing Statement is illegible. The case-action summary maintained by the circuit clerk reflects that the notice of appeal was scann[ed] on December 28, 2016, but filed 12/23/2016. It is undisputed that the personal representatives never paid the corresponding filing fee until May 1, 2017-after the issue was raised by this Court's clerk. The personal representatives nonetheless maintain that the daughters are not prejudiced by allowing the cross-appeal to proceed because, they say, the daughters both had notice of, and responded to, the sole issue raised by the cross-appeal that was included in their brief in the daughters' appeal. They further argue, citing Schmieding Produce Co. v. Cagle , 529 So.2d 243 (Ala. 1988), that their initial failure to pay the filing fee amounts to a nonjurisdictional defect that may be corrected and does not prevent appellate review. Under the present circumstances, we agree. As the parties note, in identical circumstances in Cagle , we observed: As was noted previously, Cagle claims to have raised this issue by way of a cross-appeal. An examination of the record, however, reveals that, although notice of this appeal was filed by Cagle in the trial court, this notice of appeal was not transmitted to this Court as prescribed in Rule 12, Ala. R. App. P., nor was the docket fee paid for the appeal. Therefore, although the appeal was taken at the time the notice of appeal was filed in the trial court (invoking this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 3(a)(1) and 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.; see Finch v. Finch , 468 So.2d 151 (Ala. 1985) ), the appeal was never actually docketed in this Court. Accordingly, this cross-appeal is subject to dismissal under Rule 2(a)(2)(D), Ala. R. App. P., because the failure to pay the docket fee and to otherwise assure the docketing of the appeal constitutes a failure 'to comply substantially with these rules.' Id. We choose, however, to overlook this non-jurisdictional defect and to treat the cross-appeal as though it were properly before us, even though it clearly is not. See Rule 2(b), Ala. R. App. P. Our decision to do so is based on the facts that the argument advanced on the cross-appeal is meritless and that no legitimate purpose could be served by further delaying our decision . Delay would be unavoidable, because dismissal pursuant to Rule 2(a)(2)(D) for failure to comply with the rules is not absolute, as is a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, the Court must generally allow the defaulting party an opportunity to correct the defect. We cannot, however, justify in this case the waste of time and energy that would be necessitated by a strict application of this rule, when it is clear that the cross-appeal would have no merit were it properly before us . Accordingly, we will ignore the docketing requirements in this case and will consider the issue raised in the cross-appeal-whether the trial court properly  directed a verdict foreclosing Cagle's claims of fraud and misrepresentation. 529 So.2d at 249 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Here, as in Cagle , the claim raised in the cross-appeal is meritless; in order to conserve judicial resources and bring this matter closer to a final resolution, we will, as in Cagle , treat the personal representatives' cross-appeal as though it were properly before us. The crux of the personal representatives' claim in their cross-appeal is that the circuit court's nearly $450,000 award of fees and costs allegedly failed to account for factors that, the personal representatives maintain, justified an enhanced fee in the amount of $641,083.50. (Personal representatives' brief, at p. 34.) Specifically, they contend that the circuit court's award compensated them solely for actual billed and paid fees and costs incurred by [them] but failed to consider the fact that the amounts expended had been paid over a 10-year span and other allegedly applicable factors identified by this Court in Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A. , 530 So.2d 740 (Ala. 1988), and Peebles v. Miley , 439 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1983), which, the personal representatives argue, support their enhanced-fee request. As we observed in Wehle II , § 43-2-849, Ala. Code 1975, provides that the personal representatives are entitled  'to receive from the estate necessary expenses and disbursements , including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees incurred .'  195 So.3d at 943-44 (emphasis added). As set out in the circuit court's November 2, 2016, order, the daughters conceded that the personal representatives were due to be reimbursed in the amount of the fees they actually incurred, and the circuit court, as directed in Wehle II , evaluated and ultimately approved the reasonableness of the claimed fee by tak[ing] into account all of the factors outlined by [this Court] in ... [ Peebles ] ... and Van Schaack . The personal representatives argue that the circuit court nonetheless erred in failing to enhance the award of fees and costs by adding interest because the amounts for which they were being reimbursed were expended over time. Notably, however, the personal representatives do not point to a factor from either Peebles or Van Schaack mandating the increased fee amount they sought below. 8 More importantly, they do not provide caselaw supporting their contention that interest may be added to an award of fees and costs pursuant to § 43-2-849. Instead, they cite Nelson v. AmSouth Bank, N.A. , 622 So.2d 894 (Ala. 1993), in which the trial court erred in failing to award interest in connection with its entry of a summary judgment for the plaintiff on her claims seeking to recover half of the proceeds of a bank account in which she owned a joint interest, as well as interest, costs, and attorney fees, as prayed for in the complaint. 622 So.2d at 896 . That case appears distinguishable in that it did not involve an award pursuant to § 43-2-849. In addition, the personal representatives' reliance on § 8-8-10, Ala. Code 1975, is similarly misplaced because that Code section, by its explicit terms, applies to [j]udgments for the payment of money, other than costs, if based upon a contract action . (Emphasis added.) Section § 8-8-1, Ala. Code 1975, is likewise inapposite because it establishes the maximum rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things in action except by written contract. In any event, the personal representatives' argument suggesting that they  are entitled to the interest claimed is not persuasive. We remanded in Wehle II to permit the circuit court to conduct a hearing and to receive evidence substantiating the $383,437.31 in fees and costs the personal representatives claimed. 195 So.3d at 946 . Because the personal representatives have failed to demonstrate that the circuit court erred in awarding only the fees the personal representatives demonstrated that they actually incurred, we hereby affirm that portion of the circuit court's judgment. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Main, Wise, Bryan, and Sellers, JJ., concur.