Opinion ID: 3010563
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mixed Motive under Price Waterhouse.

Text: When an employee shows by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the [employment] decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J. concurring), the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that even if discrimination was a motivating factor in the discharge, it would have made the same decision absent the discriminatory animus. Id. at 244-46; Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1994). As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse: Stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotional decisions were based on 1. For the purposes of summary judgment, whether Price Waterhouse or McDonnell Douglas-Burdine governs is not directly relevant. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court must simply determine whether there is sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to whether the employer relied upon an illegitimate criterion in making its employment decision. For the sake of clarity, however, we will address the evidence in this case under both analytical frameworks. 9 legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff's burden in this regard . . . . What is required is . . . direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision. Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (citation omitted). The Civil Rights Act of 1992 modified Price Waterhouse, making it unlawful for an illegitimate criterion to be a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors may also have motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Accordingly, when an employee presents evidence that a decisionmaker relied upon an illegitimate criterion, summary judgment for the employer is rarely, if ever, appropriate. Weldon, 767 F.2d at 797; Hankins, 829 F.2d at 440. A plaintiff who makes such a case in resisting the defendant's motion for summary judgment does not need the help of McDonnell Douglas to resist the motion. He walks as it were without crutches. For he has presented enough evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment under the general test for the grant of such a motion . . . Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 1990). As we have recognized, [w]hen direct evidence is available, problems of proof are no different than in other civil cases. Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 896. The issue becomes whether or not the employer did in fact rely upon the illegitimate criterion, which is precisely the sort of question which must be left to the jury. Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 10 1990). As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed, When confronted with an action where there are two alleged motives for the dismissal, one legitimate and the other illegitimate, and there exists more than a modicum of evidence in support of the illegitimate motive, we conclude that the law is generally better served by having such cases examined in the crucible of a contested hearing. A trial becomes appropriate to evaluate whether the employer is attempting to avoid liability based on an illegitimate motive by simply supplying a legitimate one at the summary judgment phase. Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc., 909 F.2d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1990). Typically, what is commonly understood as direct evidence is not available because the decisionmaker is unlikely to admit that he fired an employee because of age or sex. Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 1994). Employers are rarely so cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel file, `fired due to age,' or to inform a dismissed employee candidly that he is too old for the job. Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985). Consequently, circumstantial evidence `tied directly to the alleged discriminatory animus' is sufficient to constitute direct evidence justifying a burden-shifting instruction. Id. (quoting Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Companies, 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992)). If, however, the plaintiff's nonstatistical evidence is directly tied to the forbidden animus, for example policy documents or statements of persons involved in the decisionmaking process that reflect a discriminatory or retaliatory animus of the type complained of 11 in the suit, that plaintiff is entitled to a burden shifting instruction. Id. (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182) (emphasis added). The term direct evidence, therefore, is an unfortunate misnomer. Id. In other words, to come within the Price Waterhouse framework, the evidence presented by the plaintiff need only reflect a discriminatory animus on the part of a person involved in the decisionmaking process. Id.; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 778. Keller provided evidence that reflects a discriminatory animus on the part of a person involved in the decisionmaking process. Keller testified that during the first meeting in which he was ever criticized about his job performance, Ryan specifically stated that [i]f you are getting to old for the job, maybe you should hire one or two young bankers.2 Ryan's statement that Keller may be getting too old to do his job is sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus under Price Waterhouse.3 First, as CEO of the company, Ryan is clearly 2. Credit Alliance argues that because the too old comment does not appear in Keller's contemporaneous notes, it should be disregarded. While this is certainly a powerful argument for a jury, Credit Alliance's argument goes to the weight of the evidence, and is a question for the finder of fact. Shager, 913 F.2d at 402 ([T]he task of disambiguating ambiguous utterances is for trial, not for summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment the ambiguities in a witness's testimony must be resolved against the moving party.). 3. The district court did not address Keller's claim that this comment is sufficient as direct evidence of discrimination or that it supports an inference of discrimination. Instead, the court does not appear to have focused upon the inferences and presumption that the nonmoving party is entitled to, and simply accepted Credit Alliance's interpretation of the statement as authorizing Keller to hire additional staff. See Keller, slip op. at 4. 12 a decisionmaker, and in this case has admitted that he was the principal decisionmaker in firing Keller. Second, it seems rather obvious that Ryan's suggestion that Keller may be getting too old to properly perform his job and that he hire younger bankers could reflect discriminatory animus toward Keller's age. Such a comment, if true, is by no means shrouded in ambiguity, and there is no evidence to suggest that it was stated facetiously. In addition, the comment was made during a conversation about Keller's performance. According to Keller, the comment was made at the meeting in which he was first informed that his performance was considered unsatisfactory. We can only conclude, therefore, that it was related to the decisionmaking process itself. Ryan himself admits (in fact argues) that he was critical of Keller's performance at the time this alleged comment was made. Finally, Ryan decided to fire Keller only a few months later. The age related comment, therefore, is probative of the factors considered in Ryan's decision to terminate Keller. See Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165 (holding that comments about the company not keeping employees on until they reached sixty-five could not be considered stray remarks for the purposes of summary judgment); Shager, 913 F.2d at 402 (holding that comments including These older people don't much like or much care for us baby boomers, but there isn't much they can do about it, constituted direct evidence at the summary judgment phase). Credit Alliance argues that this statement is simply a stray remark, and is therefore not direct evidence of 13 discrimination. The thrust of its argument is that this was the only age related remark Keller could recall. A single comment, however, is not necessarily a stray remark merely because it was only uttered on one occasion. If the single comment is made by a decisionmaker and reflects a discriminatory animus toward the plaintiff in the decisionmaking process, it might well constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (The critical inquiry . . . is whether [the illegitimate criterion] was a factor in the employment decision . . .). Unlike hostile environment claims, Price Waterhouse considers only the nature and probative value of the alleged discriminatory comment, and not the frequency with which it was stated, because an employer's [r]eliance on [illegal] factors is exactly what the threat of Title VII liability was meant to deter. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As discussed above, the alleged age-related remark in this case was made by the principal decisionmaker during his critique of Keller's work performance, and could be interpreted as reflecting a negative attitude toward his age. Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165 (holding that potentially age related comments made by the supervisor who decided to terminate the plaintiff were sufficient direct evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment). As we have stated, since discriminatory comments by an executive connected with the decisionmaking process will often be the plaintiff's strongest circumstantial evidence of discrimination, they are highly relevant . . . Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1995). Because 14 Keller presented circumstantial evidence which could allow a jury to conclude that Ryan relied on an illegitimate criterion in making his employment decision, summary judgment was inappropriate. Given this evidence, Credit Alliance's proffered legitimate reason for discharging Keller simply creates a material issue of fact, rather than demonstrating the absence of one.