Opinion ID: 1897530
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Place

Text: In 1965, the Court held that places of public accommodation were not limited to those enumerated in the statute. Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 44 N.J. 480, 486, 210 A. 2d 208 (1965) (then N.J.S.A. 18:25-5( l )). At that time, the statutory definition used the word include to preface a list of specific places of public accommodation. See id. at 485, 210 A. 2d 208. We reasoned that the Legislature's choice of the word include indicated that the places expressly mentioned were merely illustrative of the accommodations the Legislature intended to be within the scope of the statute. Other accommodations, similar in nature to those enumerated, were also intended to be covered. Id. at 486, 210 A. 2d 208. Less than a year later, the Legislature amended the LAD to expressly state that `a place of public accommodation' shall include, but not be limited to  the various examples identified, L. 1966, c. 17 (emphasis added), thereby reaffirming our broad construction of the statutory language. [5] Later, the word place became a further source of legal dispute. In National Organization of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 67 N.J. 320, 338 A. 2d 198 (1974), we affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division holding that: [t]he statutory noun `place' ... is a term of convenience, not of limitation[,] ... employed to reflect the fact that public accommodations are commonly provided at fixed `places.' 127 N.J.Super. 522, 531, 318 A. 2d 33 (App.Div.1974). The defendant in Little League was a chartered baseball league that excluded girls between the ages of eight and twelve years from participation in its programs. The league contended that it did not come within the meaning of the statute, primarily because it [was] a membership organization which does not operate from any fixed parcel of real estate in New Jersey of which it had exclusive possession by ownership or lease. Id. at 530, 318 A. 2d 33. The court rejected that narrow view of place: The place of public accommodation in the case of Little League is obviously the ball field at which tryouts are arranged, instructions given, practices held and games played. The statutory accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges at the place of public accommodation is the entire agglomeration of the arrangements which Little League and its local chartered leagues make and the facilities they provide for the playing of baseball by the children. [ Id. at 531, 318 A. 2d 33 (citations omitted).] In New Jersey, place has been more than a fixed location since 1974. As Boy Scouts correctly observes, other jurisdictions interpreting their antidiscrimination laws have found place to be a limiting factor encompassing only a fixed location. See, e. g., Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F. 2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir.) (holding that Boy Scouts is not place of public accommodation under Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 because Congress when enacting § 2000a(b) never intended to include membership organizations that do not maintain a close connection to a structural facility within the meaning of `place of public accommodation'), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 602, 126 L.Ed. 2d 567 (1993); United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P. 2d 1008, 1011 (Alaska 1983) (stating that the word `place'....would not encompass a service organization lacking a fixed geographical situs); United States Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A. 2d 1379, 1381 (D.C.1981) (disagreeing with lower court's conclusion that it is not necessary that there be a building ... in order to categorize an existing entity as a place of public accommodation); United States Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 427 N.W. 2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1988) (stating that United States Jaycees is not a `place' within our definition of `public accommodation'); United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 391 Mass. 594, 463 N.E. 2d 1151, 1156 (1984) (finding that Massachusetts antidiscrimination law does not apply to [a] membership organization, since such an organization does not fall within the commonly accepted definition of `place'). We observe that not all jurisdictions have interpreted place so narrowly. The New York Court of Appeals has held that a place of public accommodation need not be a fixed location, it is the place where petitioners do what they do, including the place where petitioners' meetings and activities occur. United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y. 2d 401, 465 N.Y.S. 2d 871, 452 N.E. 2d 1199, 1204 (1983). The Supreme Court of Minnesota has also approved a flexible construction of the term place. In United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W. 2d 764, 773 (Minn.1981), the Minnesota court agreed with the Little League premise that a `place of public accommodation'... is less a matter of whether the organization operates on a permanent site, and more a matter of whether the organization engages in activities in places to which an unselected public is given an open invitation. Despite numerous additions and modifications to the LAD in the twentyfour years since Little League was decided, the New Jersey Legislature has not enacted a limiting definition of place. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 116, 584 A. 2d 190 (1991) (stating that [t]he Legislature's failure to modify a judicial determination, while not dispositive, is some evidence of legislative support for the judicial construction of a statute .... [especially when] the Legislature has amended [the] statute several times without altering the judicial construction). We decline now to construe place so as to include only membership associations that are connected to a particular geographic location or facility. As the Appellate Division has so aptly pointed out, [t]o have the LAD's reach turn on the definition of `place' is irrational because `places do not discriminate; people who own and operate places do.' Dale, supra, 308 N.J.Super. at 533, 706 A. 2d 270 (quoting Welsh, supra, 993 F. 2d at 1282 (Cummings, J., dissenting)). A membership association, like Boy Scouts, may be a place of public accommodation even if the accommodation is provided at a moving situs. Little League, supra, 127 N.J.Super. at 531, 318 A. 2d 33. In this case it is readily apparent that the various locations where Boy Scout troops meet fulfill the LAD place requirement.