Opinion ID: 411995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Applicable Evidentiary Standard

Text: 13 As we have already noted in Part I.B. supra, there remains in this case some confusion over the application of Day v. Mathews. This confusion is attributable in part to the Government's apparent concession of discrimination at the trial and on the first appeal, see Milton I, 645 F.2d at 1077 n. 17, and in part to our ambiguous instruction on the remand of this case, id. at 1079. On remand, although the Government made it clear for the first time that it never intended to concede any discrimination and that legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons existed to justify appellants' promotion denials, the District Court nevertheless read our opinion in Milton I as explicitly approving reliance on Day v. Mathews. Memorandum Opinion, reprinted in App. A. 9. We now write to clarify and to make it plain that, given the facts of this case, the District Court was in error in holding appellees to the stringent clear and convincing standard of proof of Day v. Mathews. 14
15 The basic allocation of burdens and order of presentations of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment has been clearly set forth by the Supreme Court: 16 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. ... Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. 17 Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ). Within this framework, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093.
18 It is only after discrimination has been proven or conceded pursuant to McDonnell Douglas/Burdine that Day v. Mathews may come into play. To apply Day before liability has been established would be contrary to the well-established principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. 19 Day v. Mathews has nothing to do with whether a defendant is guilty of discrimination, but instead focuses on the question of remedy. Day derives from Title VII principles applied in disparate impact cases in which the plaintiff class establishes liability based on some employment policy that has had the effect of discriminating against the entire class. Once the class establishes liability in such cases, a discrete remedy phase begins. Any individual class claimant may raise a presumption that he is entitled to relief upon a prima facie showing of class membership. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer to rebut that presumption in each individual case. 13 Day applies the same burden-shifting principle in the Title VII disparate treatment context. 20 Day's application of this principle simply recognizes that a plaintiff whose right to protection from discrimination has been violated still may be denied a full remedy. See Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (citing Day for the proposition that this court has recognized that the questions of statutory violation and appropriate statutory remedy are conceptually distinct). For example, if two employees are denied the same job promotion for concededly discriminatory reasons, the employer may nonetheless establish that one of the claimants is not entitled to a promotion under Day v. Mathews by offering clear and convincing evidence that there was only one job opening and that the other applicant was more qualified. Since only one of the two victims of discrimination would have been promoted but for the discrimination, the other would not be entitled to an award of the job notwithstanding the unlawful reason for the denial. Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773 n. 32, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1268 n. 32, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (evidence that no vacancies were available at the time class member applied for job relevant to whether employer has satisfied burden of proving that claimant was not in fact a victim of previous hiring discrimination). 14 21
22 In the instant case, appellants presented an extremely strong prima facie case of discrimination, but despite that showing they did not persuade the District Court that they had proved discrimination. The trial court's original decision proceeded directly to the Day inquiry without completely analyzing liability for discrimination; on remand the trial court again stopped short of concluding that appellants had proved discrimination, cryptically suggesting that they had gone beyond a prima facie case. Nor did appellees concede discrimination. While the record on the prior appeal appeared to show such a concession, the District Court did not purport to base its application of Day on admitted discrimination. Both on remand and on this appeal, moreover, appellees insisted that liability for discrimination had neither been proved nor conceded. Absent any basis for a finding of discrimination and with liability still a live issue, the District Court thus erred in holding appellees to the Day burden of clear and convincing proof. All that should have been required to rebut appellants' prima facie case was articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for appellants' nonpromotions. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093.