Opinion ID: 3053475
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Do “Special Factors” Exist Here Warranting a

Text: Finding of Implicit Preemption? [15] Both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized that even where Congress fails to explicitly declare a remedy to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution or to provide a remedy that is as effective a remedy for a constitutional tort, a Bivens action may still be preBecause § 7316(a)(1) mentions “malpractice or negligence,” and § 233(a) does not, the Second Circuit held that § 233(a)’s reach extended to constitutional torts as well. 222 F.3d at 108. The Second Circuit did not mention the presence of the term “malpractice” in § 233(a)’s title, perhaps overlooked, since that title does not appear in the United States Code. At any rate, we believe that Supreme Court did not find that omission to be a critical difference in Carlson, citing the two statutes, one right after the other, as both standing for the proposition that the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for “malpractice by certain Government health personnel.” 446 U.S. at 20. 14016 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD cluded. As Carlson noted, a Bivens action will not lie “when defendants demonstrate ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’ ” 446 U.S. at 18 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). “The presence of a deliberately crafted statutory remedial system is one ‘special factor’ that precludes a Bivens remedy.” Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1997). PHS Defendant Cmdr. Henneford and the United States contend that, even if § 233(a) is not an explicit substitution of the FTCA for Bivens, it nonetheless constitutes a “deliberately crafted statutory remedial system,” id., [Henneford Br. at 31] such that we ought to find that the FTCA impliedly displaces Bivens for suits against PHS officers and employees. Neither Cmdr. Henneford nor any other PHS Defendant appears to have raised any argument based on the presence of “special factors” before the district court. [See Dk. # 19 (Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction); # 42 (Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction)] “Generally, in order for an argument to be considered on appeal, the argument must have been raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it.” A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. County of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 1996).23 [16] In any case, we reject this argument as well. First, while the Supreme Court and this court have subsequently found various other remedial schemes to be “special factors” precluding Bivens relief, see, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425; Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1989), those decisions have not overruled Carlson’s square holding that there are no special factors that preclude a Bivens action in a case whose facts and posture mirror this one. 446 U.S. at 19 (holding that “the case involves no special factors counseling hesi23 For this reason, we will not pass on Cmdr. Henneford’s assertion in his opening brief that the complaint does not aver sufficient facts to establish his personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14017 tation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress”). As noted earlier, here, as in Carlson, we have an individual who has died, allegedly due to the deliberate indifference of the federal officials charged with his health and safety. As in Carlson, the decedent’s survivors bring a Bivens action premised on violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, and the officials argue that no Bivens remedy is available. Because the present case is functionally identical to Carlson, Carlson’s holding that no special factors preclude Bivens relief is binding on this court.24 [17] Second, “Chilicky and Kotarski hold that courts should not create a Bivens remedy where the complexity of a federal program, including a comprehensive remedial scheme, shows that Congress has considered the universe of harms that could be committed in the program’s administration and has provided what Congress believes to be adequate remedies.” Adams, 355 F.3d at 1185. The FTCA is not such a scheme, for the simple reason that it does not provide remedies that Congress believes to be adequate: It provides the remedies that individual states believe to be adequate remedies for common law torts. Congress did not “deliberately craft” “a comprehensive remedial scheme” when it adopted the FTCA’s remedies; rather, it delegated the underlying remedies to state legislatures and courts. We do not believe that Congress intended to delegate to the states the mechanism by which violations of federally established rights are remedied. As noted above, the remedies we and the Supreme Court have held to preclude Bivens were deliberately crafted by Congress and applied uniformly throughout the republic. We are aware of no case holding a remedial scheme that is entirely parasitic on state law to be a substitute for a Bivens remedy. Instead, the Supreme Court has announced its skepticism regarding any such remedial scheme: “The question whether [an] action for violations by federal officials of federal constitutional 24 For the same reason, our decision does not extend Bivens into a new context. Cf. Commercial Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001). 14018 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD rights should be left to the vagaries of the laws of the several States admits of only a negative answer in the absence of a contrary congressional resolution.” Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23. Accordingly, the statutory remedies provided in the FTCA do not constitute a comprehensive remedial scheme and cannot serve as a “special factor” precluding Bivens relief.25