Opinion ID: 1276339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Would Disclosure Violate the Patients' Constitutional Right of Privacy?

Text: Plaintiff contends that the trial court's orders compelling disclosure of medical records violated the affected patients' right of privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. She cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court which describe in general terms, and in a variety of contexts, the zones of privacy for which there may be constitutional protection. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 176 (1973) (right of personal privacy in deciding on abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 514 (1965) (right of privacy in use of contraceptives). In Whalen v. Roe , the Court summarized the import of these decisions concerning rights of privacy by stating: The cases sometimes characterized as protecting privacy have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876, 51 L.Ed.2d 64, 73 (1977) (footnotes omitted). Plaintiff argues that both types of privacy interest apply to the facts in this case. She contends that the patients have an interest in preventing disclosure of their personal affairs, particularly the fact of consultation with a psychiatrist or psychologist. She contends also that if we allow such information to be disclosed to the public, persons will be inhibited from deciding to obtain mental and emotional health care. However broad the patients' constitutional privacy interest may be, that interest constitutes at most a qualified rather than an absolute privilege. The privacy interest must always be weighed against such public interests as the societal need for information, and a compelling need for information may override the privacy interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154-55, 93 S.Ct. at 727-28, 35 L.Ed.2d at 177-78; Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa 1983); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Iowa 1976). We need not here decide the precise reach of the patients' constitutional privacy right. Whatever that reach, the privacy interest must be balanced against society's interest in securing information vital to the fair and effective administration of criminal justice. The State contends that there is a compelling societal interest in investigating alleged fraudulent medicaid practices, and that specific state interest has been recognized in a number of cases. See, e.g., People v. Doe, 107 Misc.2d 605, 607-08, 435 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (1981); Doe v. Hynes, 104 Misc.2d 398, 403, 428 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814 (1980). This is a specific application of the general principle that society has a strong interest in allowing official investigators of criminal activity broad authority to conduct thorough investigations. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 344, 94 S.Ct. 613, 618, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 569 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667-68, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 33 L.Ed.2d 626, 643 (1972); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 642 (6th Cir.1983); Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d at 511-12. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 602, 97 S.Ct. at 878, 51 L.Ed.2d at 75 (interest of state in controlling dangerous drugs outweighs patients' right of privacy). In weighing the patients' privacy interest against the State's interest in obtaining a thorough investigation, we are also mindful that the privacy interest is partially protected by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(6). The records obtained pursuant to a county attorney's subpoena have a confidential status before any criminal charge is filed and may thereafter be kept confidential by court order, in accordance with the wording of that rule. We conclude that the privacy interest of the clinic's patients must yield to the State's interest in well-founded criminal charges and the fair administration of criminal justice. See Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d at 513. Consequently, the district court order compelling plaintiff to produce subpoenaed medical records did not violate constitutional rights of patients of the clinic. We therefore vacate the writ of certiorari, anticipating that the district court will promptly set a date by which plaintiff Sherry Chidester must either purge herself of contempt by delivery of the subpoenaed records or be punished for her contempt. WRIT ANNULLED.