Opinion ID: 353818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Issues Related to the Conspiracy Count

Text: 103 1. The Court's Charge: All defendants, with the exception of Foster, allege that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the consequences of finding multiple conspiracies and in improperly charging that you must find a single conspiracy. Objections to the court's charge were timely made. T. 2738, 2745. We hold that these assignments of error are without merit. 104 Some cases have held that an instruction informing the jury that it could find the defendants guilty on the basis of multiple conspiracies helps to minimize the danger of transferring guilt. See, e. g., United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969). Such an instruction is necessary only when the indictment charges a single conspiracy and, at trial, the possibility of a variance appears. Id. at 746. Here, there was no variance. The court had no duty to instruct on multiple conspiracies. 105 As appellants point out, the trial court gave the following instruction on the single conspiracy question: 106 Now I point out to you that this indictment alleges but one conspiracy. You can find only the existence of one conspiracy, and you must find that the defendants were each a member of the same conspiracy. We are talking about one conspiracy. T. 2728-29. 107 Read out of context, this passage seems to instruct the jury that it must find, as a matter of law, that each defendant was a member of a single conspiracy. It is elementary, however, that the correctness of a charge is measured not by an isolated remark but by the charge as a whole. United States v. Rouse, 452 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1971). Reading the charge in this case as a whole, it is clear that the trial judge did not usurp the jury's function. At several points throughout the charge, the judge used language to the effect, in order to find the defendants guilty, you must find . . . . Often, however, the judge omitted those prefatory words and stated simply, you must find . . ..  The contested conspiracy instruction came at the end of the court's charge, shortly after the judge, in summation, stated, So it is that there are four essential elements that you must find. Then, eight times in three paragraphs, the judge instructed the jury as to what it must find. The charge was not a model of precision. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the jury understood the words you must find in the context intended by the trial judge and made apparent by the charge in its entirety. 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence: 108 ( a) As to William Foster : Although the only issue raised by defendant Foster is the sufficiency of the evidence against him, we find this contention to be without merit and undeserving of protracted discussion. As we read Foster's brief, his arguments address the credibility, not the sufficiency of the evidence. Decisions regarding credibility are for the jury and are not to be made by an appellate court. United States v. Grimm, 568 F.2d 1136, 1138 (5th Cir. 1978); Walker v. United States, 301 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1972). 109 (b) As to James Elliott : The evidence relevant to James Elliott as we view the record, was not sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that he conspired with the other five defendants to violate the RICO statute. Accordingly, his conviction under Count One must be reversed. 110 We recognize that once a conspiracy is shown to exist, slight evidence is all that is required to connect a particular defendant with the conspiracy. United States v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Reynolds, 511 F.2d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 1975). 111 The proof, however, must be individual and personal and the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each member of the conspiracy had the deliberate, knowing, and specific intent to join the conspiracy. Mere association with conspirators or knowledge of the illegal activity is not sufficient. United States v. Falcone, 1940, 311 U.S. 205, 210-11, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128; United States v. Miller, 5 Cir., 1974, 500 F.2d 751, 764; United States v. Morado, 5 Cir., 1972, 454 F.2d 167, 175; Roberts v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 1216, 1220; Causey v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 352 F.2d 203, 206. 112 Prince, supra, 515 F.2d at 567. 113 Where the government, as here, relies mainly upon circumstantial evidence to establish a defendant's guilt, we test the sufficiency of the evidence by asking whether the jury might reasonably have concluded that the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt. Roberts v. United States, 416 F.2d 1216, 1220 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. United States v. White, 569 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1978) for alternate statements of the test. 114 Viewed in a light most favorable to the government, the evidence against Elliott proved the following:(1) Early in the spring of 1971, Joe Fuchs gave Elliott a bottle of 500 amphetamine capsules without a prescription. 115 (2) Shortly thereafter, Elliott negotiated a deal with Fuchs for Joe Breland to build an enclosed porch and for Fuchs to repay Elliott and Breland with amphetamine pills. During the next year, Fuchs delivered the pills in installments of 400. 116 (3) In April, 1972, Elliott, apparently as a favor for J. C., either sold or gave to Fuchs a 50 pound piece of stolen Hormel meat. 117 (4) In May, 1973, Elliott, serving as a juror in the trial of Rudolph Flanders for possession of meat from the same stolen shipment, held out for acquittal, causing a mistrial. No evidence was presented that Elliott had been contacted in advance about how he would vote in the Flanders case, although J. C. had told others that he felt Elliott would cooperate. 118 (5) In January, 1976, Elliott encouraged Fuchs to lie to a federal grand jury about how he acquired the stolen meat given to him by Elliott in 1972. 119 This evidence could not be taken to support, to the exclusion of all other reasonable hypotheses, a conclusion by the jury that Elliott agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. At best, this evidence discloses that Elliott used a close friend, Joe Fuchs, as a personal source of amphetamines and that he became peripherally involved in a stolen meat deal, an involvement he later attempted to conceal. The government failed to prove that Elliott's amphetamine transactions with Fuchs were in any way connected with the affairs of the enterprise. The Hormel meat, on the other hand, undeniably was acquired as a result of enterprise activity, but Elliott's cooperation with J. C. Hawkins in disposing of a small portion of the meat is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Elliott knowingly and intentionally joined the broad conspiracy to violate RICO. Elliott's acts are equally consistent with the hypothesis that he conspired with J. C. and Fuchs for the limited purpose of aiding in the distribution of stolen meat, an offense with which he was not charged in this case. Under this hypothesis, Elliott agreed to participate in the affairs of the enterprise, but not through a pattern of racketeering activity, hence, not in violation of the Act. Similarly, Elliott's two subsequent attempts to cover up the facts in the Hormel meat case are subject to two interpretations: (1) as possible overt acts in furtherance of an agreement to participate in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, or (2) as efforts at concealment undertaken after the object of his more limited conspiracy with J. C. and Fuchs had been accomplished, on the theory that every conspiracy will inevitably be followed by actions taken to cover the conspirators' traces. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 402, 77 S.Ct. 963, 972, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). To allow these predictable acts of concealment to be construed as independent evidence that Elliott agreed to conduct a pattern of racketeering activity would unjustifiably broaden the already pervasive scope of the RICO statute. We hold, then, that the more reasonable conclusion dictated by these facts is that, while Elliott may have conspired to distribute stolen meat, the jury could not reasonably conclude that he conspired to violate RICO. 120 As in Roberts v. United States, supra, we hold that the inference of Elliott's guilt was not a reasonable one for the jury to entertain and that (r)easonable hypotheses of innocence were not excluded. United States v. Black, 497 F.2d 1039, 1041 (5th Cir. 1974). We are convinced that Elliott associated with the wrong people and was convicted because of guilt by association only. Roberts, supra, 416 F.2d at 1221. We thus reverse his conviction under Count One.