Opinion ID: 1799487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: violations of right to counsel

Text: ¶ 37. Dr. Wong next argues that the circuit court should not have granted summary judgment on his claim that he was denied his right to counsel during the revocation proceeding, in violation of his rights under Article 3, § 25 of the Mississippi Constitution. Dr. Wong unsuccessfully requested the presence of counsel at the hearing before the Judicial Review Committee of the Hospital, and now argues that he was entitled to have counsel present since his access to subsequent judicial review was so severely limited in scope. He further argues that he was constitutionally entitled to counsel since the Hospital committees were acting in a quasi-judicial role, in that they were compiling a record and making factual determinations which would be entitled to certain deference in subsequent judicial review. ¶ 38. The circuit court was correct in concluding that Dr. Wong was not entitled to counsel. Obviously, this revocation proceeding was not a criminal prosecution. Art. 3, § 25, of the Mississippi Constitution is the only other constitutional source for a right to counsel, and it reads as follows: No person shall be debarred from prosecuting or defending any civil cause for or against him or herself, before any tribunal in the state, by him or herself, or counsel, or both. This Court has construed this provision in just a few cases since its adoption in 1890. In Saxon v. Harvey, 223 So.2d 620, 623 (Miss. 1969), we noted that this provision guaranteed any person the right to represent himself or herself in any court in any civil cause. In Paxton v. LaBarre, 253 So.2d 248 (Miss. 1971), we relied upon this provision in part to reverse a lower court's entry of default judgment against a party to a lawsuit when the party had been present in court, although without counsel. In Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Veal, 354 So.2d 239, 252 (Miss. 1977), Presiding Justice Smith noted in his dissenting opinion that Article 3, § 25 meant that [E]very person against whom a suit is brought is entitled to defend it without exposing himself to punishment for so doing in the event he does not prevail. (This case did not ultimately turn upon an interpretation of this constitutional provision). ¶ 39. In Mississippi State Probation and Parole Bd. v. Howell, 330 So.2d 565 (Miss. 1976), we rejected an appellant's argument that Article 3, § 25 guaranteed her the right to be represented by counsel in her parole revocation hearing. We held that the parole revocation hearing was an administrative proceeding, not a civil cause within the meaning of the provision, and that it therefore was not attended by any constitutional guarantee of counsel. [5] ¶ 40. Although it is never squarely addressed, one of the consistent themes throughout these cases is the fact that the tribunals in question were not only tribunals in the State, as expressly required by the provision, but were also tribunals of the State. The problem with Dr. Wong's argument in the instant case is that the tribunal which revoked his privileges was not a tribunal of the State. We therefore hold that this provision did not apply to him. We further hold that Article 3, § 25 applies only to prosecutions and defenses in tribunals of the state. ¶ 41. Thus, Dr. Wong is not entitled to any counsel under this constitutional provision, and the adverse summary judgment on this claim was proper.