Opinion ID: 624707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Collateral Estoppel Applies in Immigration Proceedings

Text: It is beyond dispute that the doctrine of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) applies to an administrative agency's determination of certain issues of law or fact involving the same alien in removal proceedings. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (doctrine applies even when the agency reopens a removal proceeding for new evidence); Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 57 (BIA 1984) (doctrine conclusively establishes the ultimate facts of a subsequent deportation proceeding and precludes reconsideration of issues of law resolved by the prior judgmentabsent a change in the controlling law). Collateral estoppel applies to a question, issue, or fact when four conditions are met: (1) the issue at stake was identical in both proceedings; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the prior proceedings; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessary to decide the merits. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1992). We conclude that the BIA erred by rehashing the historical facts and its findings of law as applied to the 2003 and 2004 incidents of violence that formed the basis of its 2005 decision to grant deferral. We hold that the Government is conclusively barred from re-litigating the following findings: the attacks in 2003 and 2004 constituted torture as that term is defined by the CAT based upon the injuries suffered by the Archbishop and other family members; the acts of violence were intended to punish or intimidate the religious and political beliefs of the Archbishop due to his prominent role in criticizing the Nigerian government, opposing Sharia law, and converting Muslims to Christianity; the attackers were Islamic extremists; the past attacks threatened Oyeniran's safety by virtue of his father's activities, the family relationship, and the culture of Nigeria; and the government of Nigeria was either involved or acquiesced in the prior attacks. These issues were actually litigated in 2005 and the findings were necessarily determined in the prior proceeding to grant Oyeniran CAT relief in 2005. United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir.1979). The Government had a fair opportunity to litigate the circumstances of the 2003 and 2004 attacks at the first hearing. The Government specifically attacked the evidence in that very proceeding, for example, by cross examining the witnesses and challenging the weight of the evidence. All of the weaknesses mentioned by the BIA in 2009 were evident when Oyeniran first offered the evidence in 2005. The Government argues that the 2009 decision is justified by the Archbishop's testimony, as he did not appear in the 2005 proceedings. We disagree. The introduction of new evidence on a matter previously resolved is not an exception to collateral estoppel. Ramon-Sepulveda, 824 F.2d at 750-51; see Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358, 1359 (9th Cir.2007) (Res judicata bars the government from bringing a second case based on evidence ... that it could have presented in the first case.); 18 Moore's Fed. Practice § 132.02[2][c], [d] (3d ed. 2010) (distinguishing evidence of changed circumstances from evidence that is historical in nature). Moreover, the BIA's flip-flop on past issues is unsupported and arbitrary because the additional evidence introduced during the 2009 hearing was stronger than the evidence presented in 2005. In 2005, Oyeniran's testimony about the violence was hearsay, but in 2009 the Archbishop testified as a percipient witness to the attacks. The Archbishop corroborated that the attacks had been committed by Islamic extremists who would harm his children. He testified that the attackers in 2003 wore distinctive Sharia police uniforms. He introduced another police report confirming that the attackers in 2004 had come to eliminate his children. Additionally, the violence prompted the Archbishop's church to hire security protection against Islamic Terrorists. In all, the Archbishop's testimony reinforced and was fundamentally consistent with the evidence supporting his son's earlier application for CAT protection. We are not persuaded by the Government's argument that the 2009 hearing involved a different claim that was not identical to the 2005 claim. Instead, we find a clear identity on the issue of the nature of the 2003 and 2004 attacks. The ramifications of those past events were plainly resolved in Oyeniran's favor in the prior CAT proceeding. Nor do the new facts explain the BIA's complete reversal of its view of past events. In sum, this case is a textbook example that repose is justified on the sound and obvious principle of judicial policy that a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on an issue identical in substance to the one he subsequently seeks to raise. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991).