Opinion ID: 199581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims of Discrimination

Text: 11 Sullivan argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Raytheon on his claims of disability and age discrimination and retaliation. We review the district court's entry of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Sullivan. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only if 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and 'the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)).
12 To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under chapter 151B of Massachusetts law, Sullivan must demonstrate that he is a qualified handicapped person. See August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1992); Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 678 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Mass. 1997). Chapter 151B defines this term as a handicapped person who is capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job, or who would be capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job with reasonable accommodation to his handicap. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 1(16). Thus, Sullivan must demonstrate that he is capable of performing, with or without reasonable accommodation, the essential functions of the position of security guard at Raytheon. 13 As the district court noted in its written memorandum and order, Sullivan has continually and consistently claimed that he was totally disabled. In a 1994 deposition, Sullivan stated that he believed he was totally disabled from March 1992 (when Raytheon terminated his employment) to the present time. In another deposition six years later, Sullivan stated that his condition had stayed the same or worsened since his 1994 deposition. Sullivan also represented that he was disabled in applications for social security disability insurance and workers' compensation benefits. Additionally, he stated on his tax returns for the years 1995 through 1998 that his occupation was disabled. 14 These claims of disability do not necessarily preclude Sullivan's ability to argue now that he is capable of performing his job with reasonable accommodation. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 797 (1999) (holding that pursuit of benefits under Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) does not automatically estop the recipient from pursuing an ADA claim). However, to defeat Raytheon's motion for summary judgment, Sullivan must explain why the representations of total disability he has made in the past are consistent with his current claim that he could perform the essential functions of a security guard at Raytheon with reasonable accommodation. See id. at 798 (To survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she could 'perform the essential functions' of her previous job, at least with 'reasonable accommodation.'). Sullivan has offered no evidence to explain this discrepancy. Accordingly, Sullivan has not demonstrated that he is a qualified handicapped person for purposes of chapter 151B, and summary judgment in favor of Raytheon was proper. See August, 981 F.2d at 584 (Having conceded that he was totally disabled at all relevant times, [the plaintiff] cannot now establish that he was a 'qualified handicapped person' and thus cannot make the prima facie case required to prevail on his claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, § 4(16).). Compare D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting the reasoning of August where the plaintiff never claimed to have been totally disabled during the time she requested her accommodation, and demonstrated her ability to work with the accommodation she requested). 15 Sullivan also contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because Raytheon did not engage in an interactive process with Sullivan to determine an appropriate accommodation that would allow him to return to his position as a security guard. As Raytheon points out, the ADA's interpretive regulations may require an employer 'to initiate an informal, interactive process' with the individual seeking accommodation. Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). However, there is no such requirement under Massachusetts law in chapter 151B. Moreover, even if Raytheon were required to have engaged Sullivan in such an interactive process, we found in Soto-Ocasio that an interactive process is not necessary where, as here, no reasonable trier of fact could have found that the employee was capable of performing the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, for which he was seeking reinstatement. See id. Because Sullivan has presented no evidence to indicate that he was capable of returning to work as a security guard, even with a reasonable accommodation, Raytheon was not required to engage with him in an interactive process.
16 Sullivan also appeals the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Raytheon on his claim of age discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1B). 3 Sullivan alleged in his complaint that he was more than forty years old at the time Raytheon refused to reinstate him and that Raytheon hired younger persons to fill positions for which Sullivan was qualified to fill. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under this statute, Sullivan must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he was a member of the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position in question; (3) he was denied the position; and (4) his employer sought to fill the position by hiring a younger individual with qualifications similar to those of the plaintiff. Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 327-28 (1st Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted). As we have explained in our discussion of his claim for disability discrimination, Sullivan failed to show that he was qualified for the position he sought at Raytheon. Accordingly, he cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, and the district court properly entered judgment in favor of Raytheon.
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18 Sullivan further claims that Raytheon violated his rights under chapter 151B, § 4(4) 4 by engaging in retaliatory discrimination in not reinstating him after he filed a charge of discrimination with the MCAD. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Sullivan had to show that: (1) he engaged in conduct protected under Massachusetts or federal law; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action. McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 309 (1st Cir. 1998). Sullivan's claim falters on the third prong of this test. He has not demonstrated a causal connection between his protected conduct - filing a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination in October 1996--and Raytheon's refusal to reinstate him to his position as a security guard in July 1996. Indeed, Sullivan concedes this chronology in the facts section of his brief when he states: When Sullivan was not given disability benefits, and was not reinstated to a suitable position at Raytheon, he filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination on October 9, 1996. Because Sullivan's protected action - filing a charge of discrimination - occurred after the adverse employment action, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Raytheon on the retaliation claim. 19
20 Sullivan also claims that the district court should not have dismissed his claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B. 5 Section 75B bars discrimination against qualified handicapped workers exercising their rights under the workers' compensation law, which includes procedures for filing claims for injuries, receiving payments, and determining re-employment. Fant v. New England Power Serv. Co., 239 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2001). The district court found that this state law claim was preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185. 6 We agree. 21 Section 301 [of the LMRA] completely preempts a state law claim, 'if the resolution of [the] state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement.' Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988)). With respect to the Massachusetts workers' compensation statute, the protections of § 75B are subordinate to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement between Sullivan's union and Raytheon. Fant, 239 F.3d at 14. See also Magerer, 912 F.2d at 529 ([S]uch claims [under section 75B] are, by the express terms of the statute, subject to the terms of any applicable collective bargaining agreement.). The statute provides: In the event that any right set forth in this section is inconsistent with an applicable collective bargaining agreement, such agreement shall prevail. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B(3). We have said that this language 22 makes clear that to the extent that the collective bargaining agreement provides standards to govern the conduct underlying plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim, the claim will be governed by the standards of the agreement, rather than by the standards of ch. 152 § 75B. And to that extent, claims under section 75B will require interpretation of the agreement and, therefore, will be preempted by Section 301. 23 Magerer, 912 F.2d at 529. We need not find explicitly that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here is inconsistent with section 75B to find Sullivan's claim under that statute preempted. See Fant, 239 F.3d at 16. In similar circumstances, we have found claims under section 75B preempted not because the collective bargaining agreement is inconsistent with the state claims asserted, but because it may be so and requires interpretation. Martin v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 105 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Fant, 239 F.3d at 16 (finding retaliation claim brought under section 75B preempted by the LMRA). 24 Here, the collective bargaining agreement between Raytheon and the Union contained a management rights clause providing that the management and control of the Company's business and operations, working force and plant, as well as the direction, supervision and assignment of duties of the Guards, is vested exclusively in the management of the Company. This broad grant of supervisory discretion to Raytheon could conflict with the provisions of section 75B that place limits on Raytheon's ability to refuse to reinstate employees after they have filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Because we would have to interpret the agreement to determine whether this clause conflicts with section 75B, Sullivan's claim is preempted. See Martin, 105 F.3d at 43-44 (finding claim under chapter 75B preempted because of a potential conflict with the management rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement); Magerer, 912 F.2d at 530 (finding that management rights clause could be construed to govern the conduct underlying plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim). Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that Sullivan's section 75B claim was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. 25 We have recognized that this outcome - finding a claim under chapter 75B preempted because of a potential conflict with the management rights clause in a collective bargaining agreement - seems faintly troubling. Martin, 105 F.3d at 44. However, the union may bargain to avoid this outcome in the future: 26 If all else fails, the union is free to negotiate language that eliminates this issue the next time it renews its labor agreement. . . . All that it would take to prevent preemption is an explicit provision stating that nothing in the agreement is intended to create management rights inconsistent with any workers' rights under sections 75A and 75B. 27 Id. Moreover, even if we found that Sullivan's claim under chapter 75B was not preempted, no rational fact finder could infer a discriminatory animus on Raytheon's part because Raytheon refused to reinstate him more than two years after Sullivan filed for workers' compensation. See Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that period of nine months suggests the absence of a causal connection between the statutorily protected conduct and the adverse employment action).