Opinion ID: 2994260
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Consent to Search

Text: Denberg asserts that the search of his home was unlawful and that the evidence seized should therefore be suppressed because Ward did not have authority to consent to a search of the premises because she did not, in fact, live there./3 Although the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits searches and seizures performed without a warrant, there is an exception when someone with actual or apparent authority consents to the search or seizure. United States v. Aghedo, 159 F.3d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1998). [T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over [the] premises . . . is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); see also United States v. Rosario, 962 F.2d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court explained in Matlock that common authority rests . . . on the mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7. Furthermore, [u]nder the Fourth Amendment, consent to a search may be obtained [from] any person who has common authority over the property. United States v. Booker, 981 F.2d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 1992). Additionally, the government has the burden of establishing that Ward had the required common authority to consent to a search. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). The district court did not commit clear error in determining that Ward had actual authority to consent to the search by the officers because, contrary to Denberg’s contentions, we are convinced that there is sufficient evidence in the record that Ward lived in the home. Initially, Ward told officers she lived on the premises and she signed a sworn affidavit on the morning of February 23, 1998, stating that she lived at 29203 U.S. 33 in Elkhart, Indiana. Additionally, Ward’s driver’s license indicated that 29203 U.S. 33 was her legal residence. Furthermore, Ward received mail and bills at the 29203 U.S. 33 residence. Ward also paid rent, along with Denberg, at times for the 29203 U.S. 33 home. Her clothing, two children, the children’s toys, her diary, as well as her cat were all in the home on February 23, 1998. See Aghedo, 159 F.3d at 310 (storage of clothing can be relevant to the question of actual authority). Not only did Ward tell the police that she lived at the home, but Denberg initially informed police officers that he and Ward had been living together since June or July 1997 and that they had been living at the 29203 U.S. 33 residence since August 1997. It is interesting to note that when the police informed Denberg that Ward would give them consent to search the residence, Denberg did not object. See id. (The failure to object to a party giving consent undercuts any later assertion that the party did not have adequate authority to give consent.); United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). Given the information previously referred to herein, we agree with the trial judge that Ward had actual authority to consent to the search of the residence at 29203 U.S. 33, and hold that he did not commit clear error in denying the motion to suppress./4