Opinion ID: 808266
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ALJ’s Analysis of the Medical Evidence

Text: Claimant argues first that the ALJ misapplied the law because he failed to “explain[] the weight he assigned to [the] opinion[s] [of Drs. Gordon and Kampschaefer],” Aplt. Opening Br. at 20 (citing Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1223 (10th Cir. 2004), which holds that “[i]f an ALJ intends to rely on a nontreating physician or examiner’s opinion, he must explain the weight he is giving to it.”). There are two circumstances that give context to the above holding and easily distinguish Hamlin from Claimant’s case. In Hamlin, the opinion of a non-examining physician was in conflict with the medical opinions of the claimant’s treating physicians. In Claimant’s case, there are no conflicting medical opinions. Most important, the ALJ in Hamlin failed to discuss or even cite the opinion of the non-treating physician (or any other evidence for that matter) in formulating the - 13 - claimant’s RFC. In this case, the ALJ cited and discussed both reports in formulating Claimant’s RFC. The next argument is that the ALJ should have ignored Dr. Kampschaefer’s opinion entirely because there was a conflict between the limitations she listed in the Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF) and the limitations she found in the MRFCA. In the PRTF, Dr. Kampschaefer found that Strickland has moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. In the MRFCA, Dr. Kampschaefer found no such limitations. Strickland faults the ALJ for “fail[ing] to note the inconsistency[.]” Aplt. Opening Br. at 22. Setting aside the different purposes served by the two forms, because the ALJ found that Claimant had a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace, we perceive no error. In a related vein, Claimant says that the ALJ should have rejected Dr. Kampschaefer’s opinions because she “ignored nearly all of the evidence contained in the [Grand Lake] therapy records in completing . . . [the MRFCA], relying almost exclusively on the report of [Dr. Gordon].” Id. at 22. This assertion is wrong. To be sure, Dr. Kampschaefer did not mention every detail in the notes from the Grand Lake group therapy sessions, such as the fact that Strickland sometimes had “body odor” and “us[ed] expletives to express herself.” Id. But Dr. Kampschaefer did consider Claimant’s history of anger, irritability, depression, legal problems, violent and abusive personal relationships, and histrionic personality traits, just to mention a few, in formulating the MRFCA. Moreover, the ALJ was not - 14 - in a position to second-guess Dr. Kampschaefer. We have repeatedly stressed that an ALJ may not interpose his own judgment over a physician with respect to medical findings. Lax, 489 F.3d at 1089; Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1022 (10th Cir. 1996). The next group of arguments advanced by Claimant concern her GAF scores. When Claimant began outpatient treatment at Grand Lakes in mid-2004, the counselors noted that her GAF was 42, and had been as high as 52 during the previous year. When Claimant was let go from Grand Lake in January 2007 as a result of her failure to attend therapy sessions, the social worker who closed the file estimated Claimant’s GAF at 38, with a high of 42 during the previous year. In his decision, the ALJ noted that Claimant received a GAF score of 65 from Dr. Gordon when he examined her in October 2006. The ALJ did not specifically mention the earlier GAF scores from Grand Lake in his decision. Claimant’s argument is two-fold. First, Claimant argues that according to the VE’s testimony, “she was disabled from at least June 2004 through January 2007, and should have been considered for a closed period of disability.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 26. We do not address the issue because this one-sentence statement does not adequately develop the argument. See Rule 28 (a)(9)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires the opening brief to identify “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” See also Krauser, 638 F.3d at 1326. - 15 - Next, Claimant argues that the ALJ ignored the testimony elicited by Claimant’s lawyer from the VE that an individual with “a prolonged low GAF score between 38 and 43 . . . would not be able to sustain work.”5 Aplt. Opening Br. at 25. Claimant’s lawyer made this identical argument in a case that we decided more than a month before he filed his opening brief in this case. Luttrell v. Astrue, 453 F. App’x 786, 791-92 (10th Cir. 2011). In Luttrell, we explained why it was not necessary for the ALJ to specifically mention or adopt every GAF score in his decision. Claimant never cites Luttrell and never explains why the result should be different in this case. In any event, we rejected this argument in Luttrell, and we reject it again in this case.