Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Other Crime Testimony by Mark Reiley

Text: ¶ 133. Mark Reiley was prepared to testify that while he was guarding Byron De La Beckwith in the hospital ward at Louisiana's Angola State Penitentiary in 1979, Beckwith admitted to killing Medgar Evers. Prior to Mr. Reiley's testimony, the defense objected to any mention being made of the circumstances of Beckwith's alleged confession, because the five-member jury conviction for which Beckwith was incarcerated at Angola had subsequently been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court and had been vacated. The trial judge ruled that Mr. Reiley could testify as to where his conversation with Beckwith took place, but not as to aspects of Beckwith's confinement. During his testimony, Mr. Reiley stated that while a sergeant at Angola State Penitentiary, he was assigned to guard Bryon De La Beckwith at the prison ward of Earl K. Long Hospital. ¶ 134. Beckwith argues that the admission of this testimony was error because under Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 1019, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972), prior void convictions may not be used for impeachment purposes. See also Signer v. State, 536 So.2d 10, 12 (Miss. 1988) (finding that admission for impeachment purposes of prior conviction that had been set aside violated Mississippi Rule of Evidence 609(c)). Beckwith also contends the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), which prohibits the admission of other crimes, wrongs or acts to prove a person's character in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. ¶ 135. In Loper, cited by Beckwith, the U.S. Supreme Court phrased the issue as follows: Does the use of prior, void convictions for impeachment purposes deprive a criminal defendant of due process of law where their use might well have influenced the outcome of the case? Loper, 405 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 1018. In that case, the defendant was charged with statutory rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter. In finding the admission of the prior void convictions to be error, the Supreme Court noted that the issue of innocence or guilt turned entirely on whether the jury would believe the testimony of an 8-year-old girl or that of [the defendant]. And the sole purpose for which the prior convictions were permitted to be used was to destroy the credibility of [the defendant's] testimony in the eyes of the jury. Id. at 482, 92 S.Ct. at 1019. ¶ 136. In the case sub judice, Mr. Reiley's testimony regarding the circumstances of his relationship with Beckwith was not introduced for impeachment purposes, nor was it so vital to the central issue in the case as to have influenced the outcome of the case. Loper is therefore inapplicable. Regarding Rule 404(b), it is true that evidence of other crimes is generally not admissible against an accused. Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1345 (Miss. 1977). Although there are certain recognized exceptions to the rule, the use of Mr. Reiley's testimony in this instance does not appear to fall within any of the exceptions. See Gray, 351 So.2d at 1345. The question remains, however, whether the trial judge's abuse of discretion in admitting this testimony was prejudicial to Beckwith. Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1137 (1992). ¶ 137. In Parker, we ruled that because the improper other crimes evidence was of a different type than that with which the defendant was currently charged, the prejudicial effect, if any, was minimal, and thus the trial court's abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence did not necessitate a reversal. Parker, 606 So.2d at 1137. Later, in Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235, 1248 (Miss. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 1990, 131 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995) we stated: This is not a case where the other crimes evidence is similar or identical to the crime with which the defendant is currently charged, thereby making it likely that the jury would find him guilty this time simply because he had done it before. Consequently, the risk of unfair prejudice is minimal. Furthermore, in Duplantis, [n]o details of the other crimes were offered. 644 So.2d at 1246. ¶ 138. In the case sub judice, Mr. Reiley made no reference to the details of the crime for which Beckwith was incarcerated. Mr. Reiley merely explained his duties at the prison in order to give the jury a rational and coherent picture of his relationship with Beckwith and the circumstances of Beckwith's confession. We do not feel the jury was more likely to convict based on this testimony, the primary effect of which was not to show that Beckwith had committed another crime, but rather was to lay the foundation for much more incriminating evidence, i.e., a confession. Although trial courts generally should avoid admitting testimony which alludes to other crimes committed by the defendant, we find that the trial court's failure to do so in this instance did not amount to reversible error.