Opinion ID: 461572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plaintiff's Failure to Produce Direct Evidence

Text: 14 Appellant contends that the District Court failed properly to apply the principles announced in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). She points out that the District Court found that she had made out a prima facie case, which included proof sufficient to permit the District Court to easily draw an inference that Dr. Smith and Ms. Grant were involved in a sexual relationship that was a substantial factor in the latter's promotion. Ms. King also points out that the trial court found defendants' proffered rationale for promoting Ms. Grant, that she was better qualified, to be clearly pretextual. 598 F.Supp. at 68. With the case in this posture, Ms. King argues, the District Court was required under Burdine to enter judgment in her favor. We agree. 15 Burdine makes it absolutely clear that a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination and who discredits the defendants' rebuttal should prevail, even if he or she has offered no direct evidence of discrimination. 16 In Burdine, the Supreme Court elaborated on the model of shifting burdens of production set forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The burden of establishing the elements of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence belongs to the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94. By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a Title VII action creates a rebuttable 'presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against' [her]. To rebut this presumption, 'the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.' In other words, the defendant must 'produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.'  Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714, 103 S.Ct. at 1481 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-95). Throughout the case, plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. Following the defendants' nondiscriminatory explanation in rebuttal to the prima facie case, the plaintiff 17 must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 18 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 (emphasis added); see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715-16, 103 S.Ct. at 1482-83. 19 In this case, the District Court explicitly found that the defendants had not carried their minimal burden of producing an explanation for the allegedly discriminatory conduct. Ms. King had made out a prima facie case of intentional discrimination and had shown that the evidence presented on the plaintiff's direct case was sufficient for an inference to be drawn that some kind of sexual relationship between Dr. Smith and Grant was a substantial factor in Grant's promotion. 598 F.Supp. at 67. Having determined that Ms. King had discredited the defendants' explanation, the trial court was required to grant judgment in her favor. In other words, Ms. King should have prevailed because the defendants never rebutted the  'presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against' [her]. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714, 103 S.Ct. at 1481 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54, 101 S.Ct. at 1094). It matters not that the plaintiff's vehicle of proof was indirect, rather than direct evidence. The Court in Burdine expressly stated that a plaintiff may carry her ultimate burden either directly ... or indirectly, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 (emphasis added); that is to say, by direct or indirect evidence. 2 20 Thus, the mandate of Burdine is clear: a district court may not require direct evidence of intentional discrimination as opposed to indirect evidence that carries the burden of persuasion by discrediting the defendants' rebuttal. Moreover, a district court may not require direct evidence of intentional discrimination as opposed to circumstantial evidence thereof. 3 Insistence upon direct instead of circumstantial evidence would create insurmountable problems of proof for plaintiffs in discrimination cases. 4 The District Court therefore improperly required the plaintiff to produce direct evidence of sex discrimination in this case. 5 21