Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues Pertaining to First Penalty Trial and Proceedings Prior to Penalty Retrial

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to make sufficient inquiry into whether there existed legal necessity to declare a mistrial after the jury reached an impasse during the first penalty phase, and further erred in concluding the jury was deadlocked. Defendant additionally contends he did not consent to the mistrial, thereby rendering the penalty retrial a violation of his state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The Attorney General argues the defense impliedly consented to the mistrial and that, in any event, the trial court acted within its discretion in declaring the mistrial. As will appear, we agree legal necessity supported the trial court's action. The issue arose in the following context. About 2:00 p.m. on Friday, August 21, 1987, after closing arguments by counsel and instructions by Judge Sterry Fagan, who had presided over the evidentiary portion of the trial, the jury retired to deliberate as to the penalty. At 3:30 p.m., Judge Fagan excused the jury for the weekend, directing it to return the following Monday, August 24. The jury resumed deliberations that Monday morning, with Judge Eugene Long rather than Judge Fagan presiding. The jury took lunch from 12:00 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. and then resumed deliberations. At 4:00 p.m., the jury indicated it had reached a partial verdict; apparently without notifying counsel, Judge Long ordered the partial verdict sealed, excused the jury, and directed it to return the following morning. Jury deliberations resumed on Tuesday, August 25, with Judge Long again presiding. Sometime that morning, the foreperson of the jury sent the court a note advising that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision regarding the penalty of life in prison or death in Count II. After receiving the note, Judge Long called counsel for both sides into his chambers and asked for suggestions on how to proceed. Defense counsel suggested the court bring the jurors into the courtroom and ask them individually if any further deliberations would be productive. Mr. Carbaugh, a deputy district attorney standing in for the trial prosecutor questioned whether, given the length and complexity of the case, any inquiry was necessary at that point. Defense counsel reiterated his suggestion that the court determine whether the jury was deadlocked or whether further deliberations would be productive and proposed that, if the foreperson indicated they would not be productive, the jurors be polled on that point. Carbaugh agreed and suggested the jury additionally be asked about the number of ballots taken and the numeric breakdown of the various ballots. Defense counsel assented. Judge Long then asked: Assuming that you are satisfied after inquiry that they have taken enough polls and that they all unanimously agree that they are deadlocked and no further deliberations or assistance of the court by way of any further instructions or re-reading of the testimony, then what do you suggest, taking the verdict on [count] I and declare a mistrial as to [count] II? Carbaugh said he would probably want to be heard. . . . [¶] I'll simply wait and ask to approach side bar on that issue. The court noted it would be glad to hear what Carbaugh had to say, adding: Assuming we all agree that no further Carbaugh spoke: Then the procedure the court suggested is proper. The court clarified: Take the verdict on Count I and declare a mistrial on Count II and excuse the jury? Defense counsel and Carbaugh each assented. The court then called the jury into the courtroom, read aloud the jury's note, and asked whether the jury felt the court could do anything to assist it in further deliberations toward arriving at a verdict on count II. The foreperson answered in the negative. The court polled the jurors individually, asking whether each felt that with further deliberations they might arrive at a verdict on count II. All said no. Noting that the jury had been deliberating since Friday afternoon, the court asked how many ballots had been taken as to count II. The foreperson answered: [B]etween eight and ten. The court asked: Without telling me as to guilty or not guilty [ sic ], just the numerical count, has it changed much? The foreperson responded: No, it hasn't. The court probed further: What is it, again, without telling me the penalty, whichever way it was, the death or life, the numerical count, without telling me which was which, is it 6/6, 11/1, 10/2? The foreperson responded: It was 10/2 in one instance and ... 8/4. The court asked: Which was which, as you concluded? [¶] Where do you stand? The foreperson replied: The first, 10/2, was with regards to death; the 8/4 was regards to life. The court and counsel then conferred at sidebar. Carbaugh observed that the foreperson had not really answered the court's question as to where the jury stood as of the last ballot and suggested they get an answer to that question. The court said: I gather it stayed pretty much the same.... He said, apparently, they voted 10 to 2 for deathwe don't know which wayand 8 to 4 for life. Carbaugh argued: I don't care about death or life. I'm concerned about which way, away from the 8 to. 4 or away from the 10 to 2, and I think that's probably counsel's inquiry. Defense counsel agreed. The court asked what purpose further inquiry would serve. Carbaugh responded: To find out if there is some movement. The court said: They said, `No.' They have had eight to ten ballots. Carbaugh alluded to the interest in conserving judicial resources by avoiding another two-month trial if possible, and noted: [Apparently, there has been some movement. [¶] Again, we don't know which way, away from a verdict or towards a verdict. After the court again noted the balloting hasn't changed much, 10 to 2, 8 to 4, Carbaugh observed: Two votes. That's actually a fair change, considering the short period of time. Defense counsel said: One gets the impression they were 10 to 2 for death at one point and now 8 to 4 for life. The court noted: I'm just concerned about what may come blurting out. [¶] I get the impression they are deadlocked. Nevertheless, the court expressed willingness to send the jury back for further deliberations. Carbaugh said: That's agreeable, Defense counsel said: It's not agreeable with me, but that's why you are a judge and I'm an advocate. [¶] ... I think they are hung and they are not going any place. At defense counsel's suggestion, the court then asked the foreperson to elaborate on the numerical splits in the balloting that he previously had referred to. He responded: We went through the procedure and we carried on the discussion regarding the death penalty decision and were working with the death penalty decision by itself and took several ballots in regards to the death penalty, and I would say it was approximately six or eight ballots in that regard, and the numbers came out approximately the same. The court interjected: What you told me was 10 to 2. The foreperson continued: Then we decided, `Well, maybe it would be of some benefit to discuss life imprisonment,' and we took other ballots after more deliberations in that regard, and the ballots regarding that penalty came out approximately the same, 8 to 4. [¶] It was 7 to 5 at one time, 8 to 4the numbers were along those lines, yes, and the 8 to 4the last two ballots, as a matter of fact. The court asked: And the 10 to 2 was the last ballot on the several balloting as to death? The foreperson replied: That was about the last two or three, yes. The court then declared itself satisfied that further deliberations could not possibly lead to a verdict on count II. Accordingly, it took the verdict on count I, polled the jury as to that count, declared a mistrial as to count II, and discharged the jury. The federal and state Constitutions protect persons against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. (U.S. Const, 5th Amend.; Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 [applying 5th Amend. to states through 14th Amend, due process clause]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Retrial after discharge of a jury without manifest (in federal terminology) or legal necessity violates the protections afforded under both charters. Jury deadlock constitutes necessity for declaration of a mistrial and permits retrial of the defendant. ( United States v. Perez (1824) 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165; Paulson v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 1, 5, 22 Cal.Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641.) This principle is codified in section 1140, which prohibits discharge of the jury after the case is submitted to it until it has rendered a verdict, unless by consent of both parties or it appears there is no reasonable probability the jury can agree, and section 1141, which permits retrial under such circumstances. (See People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 300, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832; see also § 1160 [permitting the jury, in a trial of multiple charges, to return a verdict on the charge or charges on which they agree and permitting retrial of the charges on which they do not agree].) The determination whether there is a reasonable probability of agreement rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, based on consideration of all the factors before it. ( People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 546, 125 Cal.Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229.) The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in finding no reasonable possibility the jury could reach a verdict on count II. The jury so advised the trial court by written note; in open court, the foreperson confirmed that the jurors had considered and rejected the possibility that rereading of testimony or further instructions could assist them in reaching a verdict; after eight to 10 ballots taken over the course of some seven hours 40 minutes' deliberation spanning three days, the jury remained divided as to the penalty on count II; and each juror, when individually polled, expressed the view that further deliberations would not enable the jury to come to a verdict on that count. The record simply does not support an inference that a reasonable possibility existed that the jury could have arrived at a verdict if told to deliberate further. Defendant contends that because the duration of the jury's deliberations was not long for a capital case involving complex issues, and because some jurors apparently changed their votes during the course of the deliberations, the trial court had an obligation to question the jury further regarding the evident movement of the votes before declaring a mistrial. Defendant also observes that during the more than seven hours of deliberations preceding the mistrial declaration, the jury presumably discussed and reached a verdict on count I, the Ferguson murder count; thus, precisely how much time it spent discussing count II, the Perez murder count, is Unknown. While defendant acknowledges the period of deliberations is not determinative ( In re Chapman (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 806, 816, 134 Cal.Rptr. 760), he argues the trial court erred in concluding that the jury had deliberated sufficiently on count II. We disagree. Although apparently some members of the juryprecisely how many was unclearhad changed their votes over the course of deliberations, none indicated in response to the court's questioning that there was any prospect of achieving a unanimous verdict. Each affirmed there was nothing the court could do to assist them in arriving at a verdict. Under these circumstances, that an order to deliberate further would have resulted in a verdict is sheer speculation, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the Attorney General's argument that defense counsel impliedly consented to the mistrial declaration.
As noted, for reasons not disclosed on the record, Judge Fagan, who had presided over defendant's trial, was absent from court on Monday and Tuesday, August 24 and 25, 1987, while the first jury was deliberating on penalty. Without objection from either side, Judge Long substituted for Judge Fagan during those two days. On Monday, August 24, the jury returned a partial verdict, which Judge Long ordered sealed; he then excused the jury and directed it to return the following day at 9:30 a.m. Jury deliberations resumed the next day, August 25, with Judge Long presiding. That morning, after the jury announced itself unable to reach a verdict regarding the penalty for the Perez murder, and following discussion with counsel and questioning of the foreman and other jurors, Judge Long declared a mistrial on the Perez count and entered the jury's verdict of life imprisonment on the Ferguson count. Judge Long then set the matter of the Perez count for pretrial conference and trial setting on September 14, 1987. On the latter date, Judge Fagan resumed presiding over the proceedings. Defendant contends that section 1053, which permits the midtrial substitution of judges in criminal cases, [13] violates his federal constitutional right to a fair trial, and that the retrial of penalty, following the assertedly improper substitution and Judge Long's declaration of a mistrial, violated his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Defendant also contends that the substitution of Judge Long violated section 1053 in any event because no showing was made that Judge Fagan was unable to proceed, as required by the statute. We conclude that defendant failed to preserve these contentions, but even if we were to address their merits, he has not established entitlement to relief. By way of background, we explained in People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 828, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204, that [t]he notion that the federal right to jury trial is violated by the midtrial substitution of a judge has its origin in a 1915 federal case, Freeman v. United States (2d Cir. 1915) 227 Fed. 732. That case held that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury entitled a criminal defendant to 12 jurors, as well as a judge, `all of whom must remain identical from the beginning [of trial] to the end.' (Id., at p. 759.) Recently, in People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1211 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159], we mentioned Freeman and more recent authorities (Randel v. Beto (5th Cir.1965) 354 F.2d 496, 500 and fn. 5; 2 Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal 2d (1982) § 392, pp. 402-403) as providing `abstract support' for the proposition that the right to jury trial includes a trial before a single trial judge. But we concluded in Espinoza that the essential purpose of the Sixth Amendment jury trial guaranteepreventing `oppression by the Government' is served by `the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment' of laypersons [citations] at a trial presided over by a neutral judicial officer (Espinoza, at p. 829, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204) and was not implicated by the midtrial substitution of another superior court judge for the original trial judge, which was compelled by the latter's serious illness and inability to continue with the trial. (Ibid.) Defendant acknowledges our holding in People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 829, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204, that midtrial substitution of judges does not implicate the right to jury trial, but he contends section 1053 is nevertheless unconstitutional because it lacks certain procedural safeguards to protect his right to a fair trial. Specifically, he argues it violates the fair trial guarantee by failing to permit substitution only in extraordinary circumstances involving the judge's genuine inability to preside, and only after the substituting judge has certified on the record that he or she has familiarized himself or herself with the prior proceedings. According to defendant, and not controverted by the Attorney General, California is the only jurisdiction, state or federal, that permits midtrial substitution of judges without the consent of the defendant and without such safeguards. Defendant notes that in Espinoza, the record established both that the original judge was unable (due to serious illness) to proceed with the trial and that the substitute judge familiarized himself with the record of proceedings; hence, he argues, Espinoza cannot be read as dispensing with those conditions. Defendant further urges that the asserted constitutional violation is a structural error, reversible per se (see Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302), but that if we determine a harmless error standard applies, he was prejudiced by Judge Long's erroneous declaration of a mistrial and his subsequent reprosecution. At the threshold, the Attorney General argues defendant forfeited the contention by failing to challenge the constitutionality of section 1053 below. Defendant responds that we may entertain a constitutional challenge to a statute for the first time on appeal and should do so here because the enforcement of a penal statute is involved [citation], the asserted error fundamentally affects the validity of the judgment [citation], or important issues of public policy are at issue [citation]. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512; see also People v. Blanco (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1167, 1172-1173, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 [whether to address the constitutionality of a statute for the first time on appeal is a discretionary determination for the reviewing court].) We need not address defendant's constitutional challenge here. Contrary to defendant's argument, the improper substitution of a judge, unlike a biased adjudicator, does not appear to be the type of error that cannot be qualitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 308-309, 111 S.Ct. 1246.) Accordingly, under the applicable harmless error standard (see Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824), defendant would not be entitled to relief because any possible error in the substitution of Judge Long was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Long made no evidentiary or instructional rulings that would have required familiarity with the particulars of the case and, contrary to defendant's argument, we have found no error in his declaration of a mistrial on penalty as to the Perez murder count. Turning to defendant's contention that the substitution of Judge Long for Judge Fagan violated section 1053 because the record does not reflect that Judge Fagan was unable to preside (see People v. Truman (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1816, 1825-1827, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 [error to substitute another judge so that presiding judge could attend to supervisorial duties]), we conclude defendant forfeited the contention by not objecting below. (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) This case perfectly exemplifies the basis for the forfeiture doctrine, for, had defendant objected, either the record would reflect why Judge Fagan was unable to preside or Judge Fagan would in fact have presided. Were the rule otherwise, defendants would be discouraged from making timely objections since, if the ultimate judgment were unfavorable, the defendant `would receive a second bite at the apple....' [Citation.] (Id. at p. 887, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) We therefore need not address the question of what kind of inability to preside satisfies section 1053. Even had the contention been preserved for appeal, for the reasons discussed above in connection with defendant's related constitutional claim, any possible error was nonprejudicial.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the prosecutor to seek separate penalty verdicts for each of the two murder victims, Ferguson and Perez, and that retrial of the penalty phase as to the Perez count undermined the reliability of the death verdict and violated the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. A brief procedural recitation will place this claim in perspective. Before the start of the first trial, defendant unsuccessfully moved to strike one of the two multiplemurder special-circumstance allegations (the only such allegations against defendant), citing People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 67, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433, which held that only one such special circumstance is properly alleged when multiple murders are charged; he also asked that the jury be directed to render only one penalty verdict, asserting that two penalty verdicts would, in effect, punish him twice for one capital offense, in violation of the state and federal Constitutions. During the guilt phase jury instruction conference, defendant reiterated his argument that only one multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation was proper, and he unsuccessfully objected to the court's giving the jury two special circumstance verdict forms. During the penalty phase jury instruction conference, defendant unsuccessfully renewed his objection to giving the jury penalty verdict forms for each murder conviction. After the trial court declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the penalty for the Perez murder conviction, defendant entered a plea of once in jeopardy and unsuccessfully moved to bar retrial on the ground that relitigation of the issue of penalty would violate the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Defendant then sought a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeal, claiming that a penalty retrial was barred by the federal and state Constitutions because the trial court had erred in allowing multiple special circumstances and multiple penalty verdicts. The Court of Appeal denied the writ, and this court denied review. Although he acknowledges we previously have approved the use of multiple penalty verdicts in cases involving only the multiple-murder special circumstance (see, e.g., People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 197, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862), defendant first contends that because he could be given only a single sentence of either life without parole or death for a single multiple-murder capital offense, only one verdict was proper in his case. Defendant's premise is faulty: His two murder convictions constituted two capital offenses, not one, regardless of the circumstance that only one multiple-murder special-circumstance finding may be had. Contrary to defendant's argument, Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699 does not hold otherwise. In that case, the defendant contended the trial court erred in denying severance of two murder charges, and this court, on a petition for writ of mandate, held the possibility of prejudice inherent in joinder of the charges warranted severance. Defendant relies on our comment in Williams that since one of the charged offenses is a capital offense, we had to analyze the severance issue with a greater degree of scrutiny than is normally applicable in a noncapital case. (Id. at p. 454, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699.) Defendant reads too much into the comment, which appears simply to have been an allusion to one of the factors courts consider in analyzing severance claims (see id. at p. 452, 204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699), but in any event cannot reasonably be interpreted as signifying that two charged murders together constitute one capital murder for which only one death verdict may be had. Nor is this court's disapproval in People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 67, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433, of the practice of alleging two multiple-murder special-circumstances in a double murder case (on the basis that doing so would improperly inflate[] the risk that the jury will arbitrarily impose the death penalty) inconsistent with permitting separate penalty verdicts for each of, the murders. The language of section 190.2 further supports the use of separate verdicts in this situation: The statute provides that the multiplemurder special circumstance applies to multiple murders, even if one is only in the second degree, yet the death penalty can be imposed only for a first degree murder conviction. Thus, the two murders do not merge into one capital crime, as defendant seems to argue. In sum, defendant's argument lacks merit. Because we reject defendant's premise that his two murder convictions together constituted but one capital crime, it follows the retrial of the penalty phase for the Perez murder conviction, after the first jury was unable to reach a verdict, did not violate principles of double jeopardy under either the state or the federal Constitution. Defendant's additional contention, that the penalty retrial violated the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the first jury's determination that life imprisonment was the appropriate verdict, likewise lacks merit because the first jury did not reach a determination as to the penalty for the Perez murder conviction.
After the first trial ended and before the penalty retrial began, defendant made four unsuccessful motions for self-representation under Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. On appeal, he contends the denial of the motions constituted reversible error. The Attorney General argues the motions were untimely and therefore were properly denied. Some procedural detail will place the Faretta issue in context. On August 25, 1987, after the jury returned a verdict of life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Calvin Ferguson, the trial court declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict for the murder of Vicente Perez. Defendant's case was continued to September 14, 1987. On September 14, defense counsel requested a continuance, and, after some unresolved discussion of whether defendant was willing to wait until the conclusion of the penalty retrial to be sentenced on the noncapital counts, the matter was put over. On October 6, 1987, the trial court (Judge Fagan) heard and denied defendant's motion to bar proceedings on the ground of collateral estoppel, after which defense counsel stated that defendant wished to address the court. Defendant asked for a new trial, a complete new trial. That would require a pro per status. And I would like to ask for Mr. Torelli's assistance as counsel. Defendant asserted, among other things: I will prepare my case to where I have some defense. Not one word was said in my defense of the reason why I have become a murderer. Judge Fagan denied defendant's request for a new trial, indicated he would give defendant a written petition to proceed in propria persona to fill out, and stated he would appoint Dr. Blake Skrdla under Evidence Code section 730 to interview defendant and report on whether he had the mental capacity to represent himself. The judge then continued the matter. On November 2, 1987, Judge Fagan resumed proceedings on defendant's request for self-representation, noting he had received a letter from Dr. Skrdla that expressed the opinion that, although defendant understood the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings and could cooperate with counsel if he chose to do so, his mental problems would prevent him from preparing and conducting his defense in a rational manner. Judge Fagan again continued the matter pending research on the legal standard applicable to Faretta motions. [14] On November 24, 1987, after considering the authority cited by the prosecutor, Judge Fagan denied the motion, concluding defendant lacked the mental capacity to represent himself and was self-destructive. Defendant made a second motion to represent himself in a hearing before Judge Fagan on January 5, 1988. When the judge asked if he had any new circumstances on which to base the motion, defendant cited equal protection principles, called his attorney a court-appointed puppet who fails the legal requirements of counsel, but who is really a wash-out, living on welfare payments from the court disguised as legal fees, and complained about a snitch, who he contended had been monitoring his movements in jail for the last two years. Defense counsel commented that the prosecutor had acknowledged a jailhouse informant had been previously involved in the case but would not be used at trial. Judge Fagan denied the motion for the reasons he had cited in denying the first motion. Defendant made a third motion for self-representation in a hearing before Judge Sheldon on May 2, 1988. Noting Judge Fagan had previously denied a Faretta motion by defendant, Judge Sheldon denied the motion without prejudice to a renewed motion showing a change of circumstances. Finally, defendant made a fourth motion for self-representation in a hearing on May 24, 1988, before Judge Nott, who ultimately presided over defendant's penalty retrial. Judge. Nott asked defendant if he would be ready to start the trial that day; defendant answered affirmatively. Asked if he had anything to add, defendant discoursed on morality and the meaning of priestcraft and carpe diem. Judge Nott denied defendant's motion for self-representation, noting that two other judges had already heard and denied the motion, and independently finding defendant incompetent to represent himself based on Dr. Skrdla's report and defendant's pro. per. petition. As noted, defendant contends the denial of his motions for self-representation violated his rights under Faretta. ... Faretta holds that the Sixth Amendment grants an accused personally the right to present a defense and thus to represent himself upon a timely and unequivocal request. (People v. Marshall [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [1,] 20-21[, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262].) The right to self-representation obtains in capital cases as in other criminal cases (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127], and may be asserted by any defendant competent to stand trial one's technical legal knowledge, as such, being irrelevant to the question whether he knowingly and voluntarily exercises the right (Godinez v. Moran[, supra,] 509 U.S. [at pp.] 399-400[, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321] ...; People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 943-944 [196 Cal.Rptr. 339, 671 P.2d 843])). (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 908, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494.) The stated basis for the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for self-representationhis supposed mental incapacity not amounting to incompetency to stand trialtherefore was invalid. This conclusion does not end the matter, however, because the timeliness of one's assertion of Faretta rights is critical. [15] In People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 [137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187], this court held that, `in order to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial' (Id. at pp. 127-128[, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187].) `However, once a defendant has chosen to proceed to trial represented by counsel, demands by such defendant that he be permitted to discharge his attorney and assume the defense himself shall be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.' (Id. at p. 128[, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187]; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1220[, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 193-194, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) Because the phases of a capital trial are stages of a unitary trial, not distinct trials, we have held a motion made after the guilt phase verdicts have been returned is untimely. (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 194-195, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781; see also People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1006-1007, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) None of the cases in which we have considered a motion for self-representation made between the guilt and penalty phases of a unitary capital trial, however, involved a motion made after the guilt phase had ended in a mistrial, when the retrial would take place before a different jury. The rationale behind the rule giving the trial court the discretion to deny an untimely Faretta motion to avoid disruption of an ongoing trial thus is not implicated in this case. Jury selection in the penalty retrial did not actually commence until seven months after defendant's first motion for self-representation. Under these circumstances, defendant's motion was timely, and the trial court had no discretion to deny it. We therefore must reverse the penalty judgment. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to address defendant's further argument that the trial court had no discretion to deny his second, third and fourth motions for self-representation. In light of this conclusion, we need not address defendant's remaining claims pertaining to his penalty retrial.