Opinion ID: 1516176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Zenilman's expert medical testimony.

Text: We now turn to Dr. Zenilman's expert medical testimony. Dr. Roques identified Dr. Zenilman as his expert medical witness on July 15, 2005. [26] Dr. Roques disclosed that Dr. Zenilman had standard of care opinions related to Dr. Roques's involvement and causation opinions related to Sammons's theory that Gail died from sepsis. [27] On October 27, 2005, Sammons agreed to dismiss Dr. Roques from the case. On October 28, 2005, DFES's counsel informed Sammons's counsel that he planned to call Dr. Zenilman at trial. Sammons cancelled Dr. Zenilman's deposition that was scheduled for November 2, 2005. DFES's counsel called Sammons's counsel to verify that Sammons's counsel did, indeed, wish to cancel the deposition. On November 3, 2005, DFES's counsel sent Sammons's counsel a letter informing him that Dr. Zenilman would testify on December 14, 2005, and further explained Dr. Zenilman's opinion. [28] DFES contends that they elaborated upon Dr. Zenilman's opinion in their letter because Sammons cancelled Dr. Zenilman's deposition and DFES wanted to avoid an argument that Sammons did not have the benefit of understanding the specifics of Dr. Zenilman's causation opinion, which Sammons might have gained had she chosen to go forward with the deposition. Sammons contends, however, that DFES's letter contained new opinions and those opinions went beyond the scope of the initial opinions Dr. Roques had disclosed in his expert witness discovery response. On November 9, 2005, Sammons moved to preclude Dr. Zenilman from testifying on behalf of DFES, Family Practice, or Dr. Sobel contending that none of these defendants had identified Dr. Zenilman as an expert and that he, therefore, should not be permitted to testify on their behalf at trial. The trial judge denied the motion stating: The bottom line position that I have is that I believe the defendants should be allowed to call Dr. Zenilman for these reasons: One, the practice in New Castle County Superior Court, as I understand it, is that it is not uncommon for defendants to potentially rely on other experts. And I think plaintiffs were sufficiently on notice of that. I've heard their arguments to the contrary. Secondly, the opportunity for the deposition was right then and there available and Dr. Zenilman, as chief of infectious diseases at Johns Hopkins, obviously has an extremely busy schedule and it will be hard to schedule if the deposition was canceled. I think that although there is a claim that Saint Francisthere was never a claim by plaintiffs against St. Francis that St. Francis caused the death. That's not sufficient for me to bar the testimony of Mr. Zenilman. I do think that the letter that [DFES's counsel] sent summarizing the further opinions of Dr. Zenilman are not beyond the scope of what Dr. Zenilman's conclusion or opinion was with respect to the causation of death, that she died of aspiration of her own vomit rather than sepsis. The trial judge distinguished this case from Russell v. K-Mart [29] noting that the pretrial expert disclosure noted in K-Mart stated that the expert would testify for Plaintiffs in this case. His CV is attached. The subject matter on which he will testify are [sic] contained in the records that have already been supplied to [defense] counsel. The trial judge denied Sammons's motion to preclude Dr. Zenilman's testimony because DFES's expert disclosure regarding Dr. Zenilman was much more specific than the expert disclosure in K-Mart. We agree that Sammons had fair and sufficient notice that Dr. Roques was going to use Dr. Zenilman as an expert and for what purposes because Dr. Roques filed his expert disclosure on July 15, 2005, and was a party to the case up until October 27, 2005. DFES notified Sammons that they would be using Dr. Zenilman as an expert on October 28, 2005. Dr. Roques, Dr. Sobel, and Family Practice all reserved the right to use the other's experts. DFES asserted the right to call any witness properly identified by any other party. [30] We can infer from the record, as could Sammons's counsel, that DFES did not disclose Dr. Zenilman as their expert at the outset of the trial because Dr. Roques planned to call him. Then, when Dr. Roques was no longer a party to the case, DFES's counsel timely informed Sammons of his intention to use Dr. Zenilman as an expert before the date Sammons had scheduled Dr. Zenilman's deposition. Further, the information in DFES's November 3, 2005 letter did not improperly expand the scope of Dr. Zenilman's opinion. Rather, DFES's counsel provided Sammons with an expanded explanation of the scope of Dr. Zenilman's opinion in light of the fact that Sammons had chosen not to depose him. Although Sammons asserts that cause of death was not an issue with regard to St. Francis and Dr. Roques, Dr. Roques's expert discovery response did state that Dr. Zenilman would offer an opinion relating to cause of death, which was a significant issue in the case. [31] Therefore, Sammons had sufficient notice that Dr. Zenilman would, if asked, offer an expert opinion on causation. We hold that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion when he denied Sammons's motion. 2. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by permitting DFES's counsel to refer to Sammons's settlement with Christiana Care during his opening statement and closing argument. Sammons argues that the trial judge abused her discretion when she allowed DFES's counsel to refer to Sammons's settlement with Christiana Care during opening statement and closing argument. Sammons argues that DFES's statements were improper and prejudicial because they were made to persuade the jury that all liability lay with the settling defendants. In her words, Sammons alleges that the comments were an attempt to shift blame and infer that Christiana Care, not DFES, Dr. Sobel, or Family Practice, was liable. Sammons argues that counsel's interjection of comments on her settlement with Christiana Care denied her right to a fair trial under D.R.E. 408 and violated the standard set forth in Alexander v. Cahill, [32] thereby entitling her to a new trial. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. [33] D.R.E. 408 provides: Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. [34] The two principles underlying Rule 408 are: 1) the evidence of compromise is irrelevant since the offer may be motivated by a desire to terminate the litigation rather than from any concession of weakness of position; and 2) public policy favors compromise in settlement of disputes. [35] When evidence is offered for another purpose, however, Rule 408 does not require exclusion of settlement related evidence. [36] In Brown, we found the trial judge's instruction to the jury about why a settling defendant was no longer part of the case was not improper; in fact, the purpose of the instruction was to avoid jury confusion and speculation about the alignment of the parties. [37] In Alexander, we discussed the need for the trial judge or the parties themselves to disclose to the jury the fact that a third party defendant had settled to avoid confusion. [38] When considering whether to discuss settlements in the presence of the jury, the trial judge should carefully exercise his discretion and balance the probative value of the evidence for a permissible purpose against the prejudicial effect and risk the evidence will be used for an improper purpose. [39] The trial judge, however, must be more skeptical of the party's purpose when a party seeks to admit evidence disclosing the facts of a settlement. [40] In Alexander, the plaintiff, a passenger in a school bus, was injured in a multicar accident. [41] The trial judge allowed defendant's counsel to ask plaintiff on crossexamination whether she and her husband had reached a settlement against certain third-party defendants. [42] We found that D.R.E. 408 barred this testimony because counsel asked the question for the purpose of persuading the jury that the persons to blame for the accident had already admitted liability, raising the question that the plaintiff's claim against [the remaining defendant] might be invalid . . . by suggesting that the [plaintiff] had already been guaranteed some payment toward damages, rather than asking the question to clarify the alignment of the parties. [43] In the present case, the trial judge properly allowed DFES's counsel to make remarks explaining that Christiana Care had settled during his opening statement and closing argument. In fact, statements regarding settlement were specifically discussed in a pre-trial conference. As the trial judge noted: [T]hey are allowed to do that under Alexander versus Cahill. What they are not allowed to do is ask the terms of the settlement or were you paid or anything like that . . . It would be just inconceivable that a jury couldn't be informed of [settling defendants] that, otherwise they are not going to have any understanding as to why they are not here. DFES's counsel, unlike defendant's counsel in Alexander, made statements conforming to the parties' pre-trial understanding. Sammons refers to the following during DFES's opening statement: You're going to hear in this case about the different responsibilities of different people within the Christiana Care system, who has the responsibility to do what. And basically when the orders are written, they are taken off by the nursing staff and the nursing staff has the responsibility to carry them out unless they have some problem, in which case they go back to the doctor. Well, in this case for the most part that simply didn't get done. But the failure of the nursing staff is subsumed within the claim that the plaintiff brought against Christiana Care, which has been settled. Sammons also refers to the following from DFES's closing argument: And there is a third possible mistake and we can't tell from the records, but it doesn't seem like anybody was attending for Ms. Sammons at the time she became sick and threw up. And if you believe that the mechanical asphyxia thing, as ugly as that is to think about, is what happened, maybe something could have been done had they been attending to her. But Christiana Care has settled. They're not here. That's their responsibility. In Alexander, the defendant's statements during cross examination were improperly admitted and were contrary to the parties' pre-trial agreement that the third party settlement would only be mentioned during opening statements and in the judge's final instructions. [44] DFES's counsel did not reveal any amount of settlement and counsel used the statements to help the jury understand the alignment of the parties and to determine pro rata fault, if applicable. DFES's statements did not suggest that Sammons's claim against DFES may be invalid or that the jury should disregard DFES's wrongdoing simply because Sammons's might, inferentially have received some damages from a settlement with Christiana Care. As in Brown, any prejudicial effect the statements may have had was outweighed by the ample testimony presented to the jury during trial and the jury instructions given by the trial judge. The trial judge instructed the jury that Christiana Care had settled but specifically charged the jury to find whether DFES was medically negligent; whether either or any of the defendants remaining in the case were negligent; and, whether their negligence caused Gail's death. Although Christiana Care had settled, the trial judge instructed the jury that they must determine whether Doctors for Emergency Services, Edward Sobel D.O., Family Practice Associates, P.A., as well as, Christiana Care Health Services and St. Francis Hospital or all of them were negligent and whether that negligence was the proximate cause of Gail's death. The trial judge acted within her discretion when she permitted DFES's counsel to refer to the settlement as he did in his opening statement and closing argument. Accordingly, we affirm. 3. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by precluding Sammons from displaying Gail's photograph to the jury. Sammons argues that the trial judge abused her discretion when she refused to admit Gail's photograph because it was relevant and probative of identity. At trial, Sammons's counsel argued for admission of the photograph to show the jury that Gail was a person and that she existed. The trial judge refused to admit the photograph because it was not relevant, reasoning that the jury would not need to see a picture of Gail to understand that she was a person who existed. The standard of review for evidentiary issues on appeal is abuse of discretion. [45] In the present case, there was no dispute at trial that Gail was a deceased person who was once alive. The photograph was not unique and did not shed any light on any material issue in the case. Therefore, the photograph had no independent relevance. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion by refusing to admit the photograph into evidence, and accordingly we affirm that ruling. 4. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by precluding Sammons from impeaching a DFES expert by using DFES's 2004 sepsis policy. Sammons argues that the trial judge abused her discretion by not permitting Sammons to impeach DFES's expert and fact witnesses with DFES's 2004 sepsis policy. Sammons contends that she should have been permitted to impeach DFES's witness, Dr. Rosenblaum, [46] with the 2004 DFES policy because his testimony that Gail was not suffering from sepsis on January 4, 2002, contradicted the 2004 policy containing a protocol for diagnosing sepsis in emergency room patients. Initially, the trial judge refused to allow Sammons to impeach Dr. Rosenblaum with the 2004 policy because Sammons had not disclosed that policy in the pretrial stipulation. Later, the trial judge clarified her ruling by stating that it was not a proper basis for impeachment because impeachment is used to demonstrate dishonesty. Sammons contends that the trial judge abused her discretion and misapplied the law regarding impeachment. The standard of review for evidentiary issues on appeal is abuse of discretion. [47] The trial judge has discretion to determine which modes of impeachment may be used. [48] In general, impeachment can be conducted by showing the existence of bias, a prior inconsistent statement, untruthful or dishonest character, or defective ability to observe, remember, or recount the matter about which the witness testifies. [49] A witness may be impeached on cross-examination or by other evidence contradicting the witness as to a material matter or establishing some other ground for impeachment. [50] When impeachment evidence is offered to show bias, competency, or contradiction, the admissibility of that evidence is controlled by DRE 402 and 403. [51] Under D.R.E. 402 [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this State. [52] D.R.E. 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. [53] The record reflects that DFES's sepsis policy did not exist until two years after Gail's death. Therefore, it could not be used to impeach or contradict Dr. Rosenblaum's testimony because the 2004 protocol neither formalized nor purported to formalize the standard of care at the time that Dr. Rosenblaum examined Gail in 2002. If Sammons had provided a witness that established that the 2004 sepsis policy was consistent with the applicable standard of care for diagnosing sepsis when Dr. Rosenblaum examined Gail in 2002, then it may have qualified as a material matter with which Sammons might have contradicted his testimony. But because science and medicine evolve over time and the record discloses no information in that regard, the protocol for diagnosis of sepsis may have been different in 2002 than in 2004. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by refusing to permit Sammons to impeach Dr. Rosenblaum with the 2004 sepsis policy. Accordingly, we affirm that ruling. 5. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by precluding Sammons's expert, Dr. Haines, from explaining his unavailability at trial during his videotaped trial testimony. Sammons argues that the trial judge abused her discretion by excluding Dr. Haines's testimony explaining why he was not available for trial. We review for abuse of discretion. [54] It is customary practice for the trial judge to tell the jury that a witness is unavailable for trial and that the reason for the witness's unavailability is not relevant. Sammons offered Haines's testimony by videotape at trial because he unexpectedly was called to active military duty two months before trial. The trial judge would not permit Sammons to explain that military duty caused Haines's absence. Instead, the trial judge gave a general explanation regarding witness unavailability. In weighing the relevance of the reason he could not appear against the possible sympathy that reason might draw to Sammons, the trial judge opted for a general explanation. After considering the record, we conclude that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion. Sammons suffered no unfair prejudice from being denied the opportunity to tell the jury that military duty prevented Dr. Haines's from appearing at trial. Accordingly, we affirm. 6. The trial judge properly exercised her discretion when she permitted the father of an attorney associated with the firm representing Dr. Roques's to remain on the jury. Sammons contends that the trial judge erred by failing (1) to dismiss or question a juror after learning that a juror was the father of an associate in the law firm representing Dr. Roques; and, (2) to give Sammons's proposed voir dire. A decision not to discharge a juror following voir dire into an incident will not be overturned without a showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion by the [trial judge]. [55] The standard preliminary questions for the jury venire for Superior Court civil trials include the following questions: Do you know anything about this case through personal knowledge, discussion with anyone, the news media, or any other source? . . . The plaintiff is represented by ____, of the law firm ____. The defendant is represented by ____, of the law firm ____ . . . Do you know the attorneys in this case or any other attorney or employee in their firms? . . . Do you have any bias or prejudice either for or against the plaintiff or the defendant? [56] Under 10 Del. C. § 4511(c), [a] person who is not disqualified may be excluded from jury service by the Court only upon a finding that such person would be unable to render impartial jury service or would be likely to disrupt or otherwise adversely affect the proceedings. [57] Sammons dismissed Dr. Roques from the case on October 27, 2005. Therefore, his attorneys were not involved at the time of jury selection. An attorney who worked for the law firm who had represented Dr. Roques [58] wrote a letter to the trial judge two days into the trial advising her that he believed that his father was a member of the jury. [59] The attorney informed the trial judge that he and his father had never discussed the case, that his father did not know anything about the case, and that his father did not know about either his or his firm's involvement in the case. On December 14, 2005, the trial judge met with the parties to discuss the issue, and Sammons requested that the trial judge remove the attorney's father from the jury. The trial judge decided to keep the father on the jury because there was no evidence that he knew anything about the case or about his son's involvement in the case. The trial judge had asked the jury the standard voir dire questions, as well as specialized questions that counsel proposed at jury selection. At the time of jury selection, Dr. Roques was not a defendant in the case, and therefore neither he, the attorneys, nor the firm representing him were mentioned in the preliminary questions to the jury venire. The attorney's father gave no positive response to any of the questions asked of the venire. The trial judge noted that the name of the firm had not been mentioned at all during jury selection, and she stated that she would instruct the parties to avoid mentioning the firm during trial. We hold that the trial judge's finding that the juror's ability to render an impartial verdict had not been compromised does not amount to an abuse of discretion. The trial judge was within her discretion to permit the juror to stay on the jury because there was no evidence of partiality or bias toward any party. Accordingly, we affirm. 7. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by giving the jury a curative instruction concerning statements made by Sammons's counsel during closing rebuttal argument. Sammons argues that the trial judge abused her discretion by giving the jury a curative instruction concerning statements made by Sammons's counsel during rebuttal closing. Sammons contends that the trial judge's curative instruction was improper because Sammons's rebuttal closing statements were fully supported by the record. Therefore, Sammons argues that she is entitled to a new trial. The standard of review on appeal of a trial judge's decision to give a curative instruction is abuse of discretion. [60] To establish abuse of discretion the appellants must show that the improper comment was `significantly prejudicial so as to deny them a fair trial.' [61] In civil trials, [a]ny effort [by counsel] to mislead the jury or appeal to its bias or prejudice is inappropriate and, where objection is made, the trial court is obliged to act firmly with curative instructions even where no objection is forthcoming until after summations. [62] The timing and nature of curative instructions to the jury is a matter for the trial judge, who, after having presided over the entire trial, is in a better position to determine whether a curative instruction should be given. [63] Here, the alleged improper statement by Sammons's counsel during closing rebuttal closing was as follows: You know what else you didn't hear Doctors for Emergency Services talk about? Did you hear them once talk about the board. Once? Did they mention the board, the board that has the patients' name on it and shows her taken to the floor. If it's not their patient, why would [sic] it come off as soon as family practice residents came? Because it is their patient. The patient is still in the emergency room and they're supposed to care for the patient. After an objection by DFES's counsel, the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard Sammons's counsel's argument on this issue by stating: Ladies and Gentleman of the Jury during [Sammons's counsel's] rebuttal closing argument he made reference to the fact that the name on the board in the emergency department  as long as her name, the patient's name remained there that the care remained the responsibility of the emergency physicians, and there was no evidence to suggest that that's how the transfer occurs or that the board itself in any way suggests or in any way is instrumental in making the change from the emergency room doctor's care to the primary care doctors, so [sic] you should disregard that comment. After reviewing the record, we see no testimony or evidence either consistent with counsel's statement or the inference he wished the jury to draw from his statement. The trial judge's curative instruction, based on her recollection of the evidence, was intended to prevent the jury from drawing an inference inconsistent with the record. We are satisfied with the trial judge's curative instruction to the jury. Sammons has not convinced us, through her briefs or otherwise, that the trial judge's curative instruction to the jury so inaccurately represented the record that it unfairly prejudiced her and constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm. 8. The trial judge did not err by refusing Sammons's request for jury instructions on cross claims and did not abuse her discretion when she responded to juror questions. Sammons argues that the trial judge erred when she denied Sammons's request for instructions regarding DFES, Dr. Sobel, and Family Practice's cross claims. Sammons also argues that the trial judge provided incorrect responses to two questions posed by the jury during its deliberations. The standard of review for a denial of a requested jury instruction is de novo.  [64] While some inaccuracies and inaptness in statements are to be expected in any [jury] charge, this court will reverse if the alleged deficiency in the jury instructions undermined the jury's ability to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict. [65] A trial court's charge to the jury will not serve as grounds for reversible error if it is `reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices and standards of verbal communication.' [66] We will examine the jury instructions as a whole to make this evaluation. [67] On request of the jury after submission of the cause, a trial court has power in open court to give additional instructions. [68] A trial court acts in its discretion when deciding to give the jury a supplemental instruction. [69] We first will determine whether the trial judge erred by denying Sammons' request for jury instructions. Sammons requested that the trial judge instruct the jury about the bases for the cross claims. The trial judge denied her request and reasoned that it would unnecessarily confuse the jury because the jury did not need to know the specific details about the cross claims. The trial judge was satisfied that when the jury completed a verdict sheet allowing for apportionment of negligence they would understand the cross claims in issue. [70] The trial judge's final instructions explained that Christiana Care and St. Francis had settled with Sammons before the trial. The trial judge stated, the parties who remain in this case, that is, Doctors for Emergency Services, Dr. Sobel, and Family Practice Associates, have asserted a cross claim against the settling defendants asserting that their negligence was the proximate cause of Gail Sammons' [sic] death. Then the trial judge further instructed the jury regarding apportionment of damages and the verdict form. After consideration of the trial judge's ruling and the jury instructions as a whole, we find that the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury about the bases of the cross claims did not constitute reversible error. The trial judge adequately instructed the jury regarding the cross claims so that they could make a reasoned and informed decision in the case without confusing the jury by overburdening them with unnecessary information. We now determine whether the trial judge abused her discretion by responding to the jury's questions as she did. During deliberation, the jury sent out a note with questions. One of the questions was: are we to determine if sepsis caused Gail's death or if medical negligence caused her death? The trial judge met with the parties to discuss counsels' proposed responses to the question and then gave the jury the following answer: the Plaintiff's theory against these defendants is that the death was caused by sepsis that these defendants failed to diagnose. If you decide that the patient did not die of sepsis, then you must find these defendants not negligent. Sammons contends that the jury could decide whether the defendants' medical negligence on any theory caused Gail's death and that it would have been consistent with Sammons's theory of the case for the jury to find the defendants liable for any negligence proximately causing her death and that they were not limited to the theory that failure to diagnose sepsis proximately caused Gail's death. The jury's question indicated that they may have been confused about whether they were limited to a theory that sepsis caused Gail's death or if they could find for the plaintiff if they found any other medical negligence by the remaining defendants caused her death. Put another way, could DFES, Family Practice, and Dr. Sobel be found liable even if the jury did not find that Gail died as a result of the defendants' failure to diagnose sepsis? The trial judge gave an adequate answer to the jury's question based on Sammons's theory of the case from the beginning. Sammons had to allege and prove a theory establishing a standard of care and a deviation from that standard of care that caused Gail's death. [71] Sammons's theory of the case throughout the entire trial was that DFES, Family Practice, and Dr. Sobel were liable because they failed to diagnose sepsis and that the defendants' failure to diagnose that condition resulted in Gail's death. Therefore, DFES, Family Practice, and Dr. Sobel could only be liable if the jury found that Gail died because of their failure to diagnose sepsis. The trial judge's instruction was consistent with Sammons's theory throughout the entire case and consistent with the mandate of 18 Del. C. § 6853(e). [72] Sammons cannot utilize a catchall category of medical malpractice; Sammons put the defendants on notice of her theory of the case. She offered expert medical testimony to support that theory. It was on that theory alone that the jury could find negligence and causation sufficient to establish liability. The trial judge properly exercised her discretion by focusing the jury on Sammons's theory of the case, and she gave an adequate response to the jury's question. The jury also asked a question regarding whether DFES was responsible for a patient during the patient's entire stay in the emergency room. After hearing arguments from counsel, the trial judge decided to instruct the jury to rely on its own recollection of the evidence. She also reminded the jury that arguments of counsel are not evidence in this case. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion because her response was intuitively accurate and complied with the pattern jury instructions. [73] Accordingly, we affirm. 9. The trial judge abused her discretion by entering an order of dismissal under Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) sua sponte. We review the trial judge's order dismissing the case under Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) sua sponte for abuse of discretion. [74] Rule 60(b) contemplates relief only upon a party's motion by permitting a party to seek relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. [75] Rule 60(b) however, does not limit the power of a Court . . . to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the Court. [76] Thus, although Rule 60(b) contemplates relief only upon a party's motion, a trial judge may provide relief under Rule 60(b) sua sponte when there is fraud upon the court. [77] For a trial judge to provide relief from a final judgment on the ground that a party committed fraud upon the court, a heavy burden must be met. [78] Ultimately, there must be a showing of `the most egregious conduct involving a corruption of the judicial process itself.' [79] In the present case, the trial judge dismissed the case against DFES under Rule 60(b) sua sponte. Therefore, the trial judge's order of dismissal was permissible only if there was fraud upon the court. Although the trial judge found that Sammons's affidavit of merit did not comply with 18 Del. C. § 6853, the trial judge made no factual findings that Sammons committed fraud upon the court by presenting the affidavit of merit. The trial judge, in her January 18, 2006 letter opinion, indicated that she wanted to schedule a hearing to hear evidence on Sammons's counsel's efforts to comply with § 6853, and to determine to what extent Dr. Munoz, if any, was responsible for misleading Sammons's counsel or the court. The trial judge, however, did not conduct that hearing. Furthermore, the original trial judge had previously reviewed Sammons's affidavit of merit and concluded that the affidavit complied with § 6853. Under these circumstances, Sammons's presentation of her affidavit of merit cannot be said to be egregious conduct involving a corruption of the judicial process itself at this stage of the proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that the trial judge abused her discretion when she dismissed the case under Rule 60(b) sua sponte; at the time she dismissed the case, she had no record evidence of fraud on the court that would permit DFES to seek relief following the jury's final judgment without a motion, a hearing, and the admission of evidence that established fraud. Accordingly, we vacate the trial judge's order dismissing the case and remand with instructions to reinstate the judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED in part.