Opinion ID: 2967991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Authority under Section 252(e)(6)

Text: The PSC interpreted the language of the Verizon-MCI contract under Maryland contract law and concluded that when the parties agreed to reciprocal compensation for local traffic, they agreed to reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic. The PSC found that a telephone call to an ISP was a local call and had always been treated as a local call by the parties, by the PSC, and by the FCC. If Verizon did not intend to include ISP-bound calls in the contract for reciprocal compensation, the PSC reasoned, it should have excluded ISP-bound calls from the definition of local calls because it was an accepted VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS 37 industry custom at the time of the agreement to treat ISP-bound calls as local calls. When Verizon challenged this interpretation in the district court, the court concluded that the issue was a garden-variety contract issue governed by Maryland law and that review of the PSC’s order in this regard must proceed from the Commission to State court, not to federal court, consistent with the overall regulatory scheme of the 1996 Act described above. I agree with the district court, and I base my conclusion on two propositions: (1) the misinterpretation claim does not fall within the scope of 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6), and therefore federal jurisdiction is not authorized by that provision; and (2) apart from § 252(e)(6), a contract interpretation claim for an interconnection agreement, even though entered into under the mandate of the 1996 Act, does not arise under federal law, as that phrase is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. I address the first point in this Part III, and the second in Part IV. Verizon contends that its complaint falls within the scope of § 252(e)(6) and that therefore it has stated a federal claim cognizable by a federal district court under both that section and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (conferring federal-question jurisdiction). While Verizon acknowledges that the express language of § 252(e)(6) limits federal court review under that section to State commission determinations to approve or reject interconnection agreements, see 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(1), (6), Verizon argues that § 252(e)(6) impliedly confers authority on federal courts to review State commission decisions interpreting and enforcing such agreements. Thus, it claims that when a State commission misinterprets the language of a negotiated interconnection agreement that it had earlier approved, the State commission, in misinterpreting the interconnection agreement, makes a determination as used in § 252, which may be reviewed in federal court pursuant to § 252(e)(6). For support, Verizon relies on decisions from other circuits and an FCC order that in turn relied on other circuits’ decisions, even though we have concluded otherwise, holding that the language of § 252(e)(6) does not authorize review of State commission determinations interpreting and enforcing interconnection agreements. See Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 648 (2002). 38 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS In reviewing our decision, the Supreme Court in Verizon left open this issue on the scope of § 252(e)(6). But the Court did observe that the State commission determination at issue in this case is neither the approval or disapproval of a negotiated agreement nor the approval or disapproval of a statement of generally available terms, as specified in § 252. 535 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added). In response to Verizon’s argument that a determination on the interpretation and enforcement of an interconnection agreement is implicitly encompass[ed] in § 252, the Court stated that that is a question we need not decide. Id. at 641-42. It limited its holding on review to concluding that § 252 did not divest the district court of jurisdiction under § 1331 to review the PSC’s order for compliance with federal law. Id. at 642. For the reasons we gave in Bell Atlantic-Maryland, I thus adhere to the plain meaning of the text of § 252(e)(6) and conclude that, except for the limited determinations covered by § 252(e)(6), review of State commission orders are left to review by State courts — an avenue explicitly left in place by the 1996 Act. Section 252(e)(6) of Title 47 provides in relevant part: In any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section [§ 252], any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the [interconnection] agreement . . . meets the requirements of section 251 and this section [§ 252]. Because it is clear that this section provides for direct federal court review of State commission determination[s] made under this section [§ 252], we need only identify what determinations a State commission is authorized to make under § 252 to ascertain the scope of § 252(e)(6)’s review provision. Section 251 of Title 47 lifts monopolistic barriers against insurgent or competing telecommunications carriers by mandating interconnection agreements among local carriers and by imposing a duty on carriers to agree to terms that promote seamless service to consumers. Section 251 also directs the FCC to promulgate regulations to impleVERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS 39 ment the section, at the same time commanding it to preserve State regulations that are consistent with § 251. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(3). Section 252, entitled Procedures for negotiation, arbitration, and approval of agreements, creates the procedural framework for implementing the commands of § 251. Section 252 defines two separate courses leading to the formation of interconnection agreements — one by negotiation and the other by compulsory arbitration. Agreements arrived at through negotiation must be submitted to the State commission, which shall approve or reject the agreement, with written findings as to any deficiencies. Id. § 252(e)(1); see id. § 252(a). But the State commission may only reject a negotiated agreement if it finds either that (1) the agreement discriminates against a nonparty telecommunications carrier or that (2) the agreement is not consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Id. § 252(e)(2)(A). Section 252(e) also permits State commissions to impose State-law requirements in their reviews of interconnection agreements. See id. § 252(e)(3). Any party aggrieved by a State commission’s determination approving or rejecting a negotiated agreement may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to test the agreement against the requirements of §§ 251 and 252. Id. § 252(e)(6). And § 252(e)(4) makes this limited federal review exclusive, stating that [n]o State court shall have jurisdiction to review the action of a State commission in approving or rejecting an agreement under this section [§ 252]. If an agreement cannot be reached through negotiation under § 252(a), a party may petition the State commission for compulsory arbitration, setting forth the specific issues upon which agreement cannot be reached. The State commission is directed to arbitrate and resolve the disputed issues, including those raised in the response to the arbitration petition. See id. § 252(b)(4). In conducting the arbitration, the State commission is required (1) to ensure compliance with § 251, (2) to establish rates for interconnection services according to standards in § 252(d), and (3) to provide a schedule for implementation of the interconnection agreement. See id. § 252(c). Once the disputed issues are thus resolved through compulsory arbitration, the entire agreement is submitted to the State commission for approval or rejection. But unlike an agreement (or portions of an agreement) reached through negotiation, where the grounds for rejection by the 40 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS State commission are limited to discrimination and inconsistency with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, an arbitrated agreement is reviewed by the State commission for compliance with the more comprehensive requirements of § 251 (establishing multiple interconnection requirements) and § 252(d) (establishing pricing standards). That is, arbitrated portions of an agreement are reviewed for compliance with § 252(c)’s standards for arbitrating open terms. See id. § 252(e)(2)(B). Finally, as with the State commission’s determination approving or rejecting a negotiated agreement, any party aggrieved by the State commission’s determination approving or rejecting an arbitrated agreement may bring an action in an appropriate federal district court, again to determine whether the agreement . . . meets the requirements of §§ 251 and 252. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6). In sum, § 252(e)(6)’s provision for review of State commission determination[s] under this section extends only to determinations to approve or reject negotiated or arbitrated interconnection agreements. The 1996 Act is silent with respect to the administration and enforcement of such approved interconnection agreements. Given the division of responsibility for local telecommunications regulation made under the 1996 Act, including the requirement of § 601(c)(1) (47 U.S.C. § 152 note) that federal responsibility be expressly provided for, this silence indicates that States are left with the responsibility of reviewing their own commissions’ decisions administering and enforcing interconnection agreements. The States’ authority to enforce interconnection agreements stems from the division of responsibility under the 1934 Act, the residual authority under the 1996 Act, and the States’ general authority to enforce binding agreements. Because that enforcement authority does not derive from § 252, a State commission’s interpretation or enforcement of an interconnection agreement is not performed under § 252. Consequently, § 252(e)(6)’s review provision does not apply to State commission decisions enforcing interconnection agreements. In this case, Verizon challenges the PSC’s order interpreting and enforcing interconnection agreements that the PSC previously approved. Verizon does not now challenge any determination made by the PSC under § 252 to approve the agreements. The PSC’s authority to interpret and enforce agreements derives from preexisting VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS 41 3 Maryland law left in place by the 1996 Act. Because the PSC’s order was not a determination under § 252, Verizon’s challenge to that order does not fall within the scope of federal jurisdiction conferred by § 252(e)(6). For the same reason, Verizon may not rely on that section to assert federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. In support of its position, Verizon points out that the six other circuits to have addressed the source of State commissions’ authority to enforce interconnection agreements have concluded that it is § 252 that grants such authority and therefore that such enforcement determinations are reviewable in federal court under § 252(e)(6). Further, Verizon also points out that the FCC has construed § 252 to include the enforcement of interconnection agreements among State commission responsibilities under the 1996 Act. See In the Matter of Starpower Communications, LLC Petition for Preemption of Jurisdiction of the Virginia State Corp. Comm’n Pursuant to Section 252(e)(5) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd. 11,277 (2000) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (Starpower Communications). To begin with, it is certainly not the number of opinions from other circuits that merits our attention, but rather the persuasiveness of their reasoning. Respectfully, I conclude that none of those opinions has adequately considered the text of the 1996 Act and its relationship to the 1934 Act. Those deficiencies remain, no matter how often the opinions cite one another as persuasive authority. In concluding that State commissions’ authority to enforce interconnection agreements derives from § 252, these other circuits rely almost exclusively on one or both of the following arguments: (1) 3 Maryland law appears to confer to the PSC the authority to enforce interconnection agreements, see Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. Cos. § 2- 113(a)(1)(ii) (The Commission shall . . . enforce compliance with the requirements of law by public service companies . . . .); id. § 2- 112(b)(2) (The Commission has the implied and incidental powers needed or proper to carry out its functions under this article); id. § 2- 112(c) (The powers of the Commission shall be construed liberally). Whether Maryland law does in fact confer such authority to the PSC is not before us. I assume that the PSC did have authority under State law to enforce the interconnection agreements for purposes of my analysis. 42 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS inherent in State commission authority to approve or reject agreements under § 252 is the authority to interpret and enforce those agreements; and (2) the FCC has concluded that State commission responsibilities under § 252 include enforcement of agreements, and that interpretation merits deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Neither argument, however, withstands close analysis. The first argument (inherent authority) was initially articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 804 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (emphasis added), where the court stated, We believe that the state commissions’ plenary authority to accept or reject [interconnection] agreements necessarily carries with it the authority to enforce the provisions of agreements that the state commissions have approved. Although that statement was the extent of the court’s analysis of the issue and the statement appeared in a section of analysis that the Supreme Court later held was not ripe for review, AT&T, 525 U.S. at 386, five circuits have cited Iowa Utilities Board and adopted the same or a substantially similar statement without providing any further analysis. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (common sense reading);4 S.W. Bell 4 The Eleventh Circuit also finds support for its position in the contrasting language used in §§ 252(e)(4) and (e)(6). It finds instructive that Congress referred to determination[s] in (e)(6)’s grant of federal review, yet (e)(4) abrogated State court jurisdiction to reviewing state court actions approving or rejecting agreements under § 252. According to the court, use of the word ‘determination’ in section 252(e)(6) rather than a specific reference to the approval or rejection of agreements leads us to believe that Congress did not intend to limit state commissions’ authority to the mere approval and rejection of agreements. BellSouth, 317 F.3d at 1277. But § 252(e)(6) is a procedural provision referring to review of State commission determinations made pursuant to authority enumerated elsewhere in § 252, and [o]ne can hardly conclude . . . that because the ‘approve or reject’ language is found in sections 252(e)(1) and 252(e)(4) but not section 252(e)(6), this somehow means that state commissions must undertake additional responsibilities besides that which is expressly enumerated in section 252(e)(1). Id. at 1300 n.27 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS 43 Tel. Co. v. Brooks Fiber Communications of Okl., Inc., 235 F.3d 493, 496-97 (10th Cir. 2000) (necessarily implies); S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Connect Communications Corp., 225 F.3d 942, 946 & n.1 (8th Cir. 2000) (address[ing] the matter anew given the Supreme Court’s partial reversal of Iowa Utilities Board, then concluding that § 252 necessarily includes the power to enforce [an] interconnection agreement, citing the Fifth Circuit citing Iowa Utilities Board); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 338 (7th Cir. 2000) (necessarily includes); S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 208 F.3d 475, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2000) (necessarily carries with it). Finding implied authority, however, conflicts directly with § 601(c)(1) of the 1996 Act: This Act and the amendments made by the Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or Amendments. 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (emphasis added). In the Fifth Circuit’s opinion (subsequently cited as support in the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ opinions), the court expressed concern that [u]nder such a narrow construction, [State] commission jurisdiction would not extend to interpreting or enforcing a previously approved contract. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 208 F.3d at 479. In rejecting that perceived outcome, the court noted that the FCC plainly expects State commissions to enforce previously approved interconnection agreements. Id. at 480 (citing the 1999 ISP Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3703-04, ¶¶ 21, 22, 24, vacated and remanded on other grounds, Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The Fifth Circuit clearly did not contemplate the possibility that State commissions could have authority to enforce interconnection agreements based on residual authority left to the states under the 1996 Act — i.e., the interpretation of the 1996 and 1934 Acts advanced in Part I of this opinion and elsewhere. In fact, none of the circuits considering the source of State commission (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). Further, the Eleventh Circuit makes this argument in the context of its discussion of the FCC’s Starpower Communications decision and Chevron deference, see id. at 1277 (emphasis added) (It is reasonable to read the grant of authority in 252(e) as encompassing the interpretation of agreements, not just their approval or rejection), and I conclude that Chevron deference is not due, see infra. 44 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS authority address, let alone refute, the view that the source of that authority stems from the States’ residual authority under the 1996 Act.5 Under this interpretation, State commissions would have authority to enforce interconnection agreements. Therefore, one can avoid the strained construction of § 252 as necessarily implying State commissions’ authority to enforce interconnection agreements by recognizing the source of such authority in previously established State law. The more fundamental problem with these opinions’ conclusory statements that § 252 authority to enforce interconnection agreements necessarily follows from § 252 authority to approve or reject them is that the contention is clearly false. Logic certainly does not require that the power to make enforcement decisions be conferred by the same statutory provision authorizing approval or rejection determinations, nor that approval and enforcement authority be vested in the same governmental entity. Under its commerce power, Congress could have completely preempted State regulation of local telecommunications participation. Cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982). Congress could have vested approval and enforcement authority with the FCC, or Congress could have split authority between the FCC and the federal courts. And, provided it was not commandeering State agencies, Congress could have vested authority to approve and enforce agreements with State public utility commissions or, for that matter, with State boards of cosmetology. Or, as the 1996 Act in fact provides, State commissions could have been invested with authority to approve or reject interconnection agreements, while leaving for the States the decision whether to vest enforcement authority with State commissions or with State trial courts directly (or elsewhere). Thus, although vesting enforcement authority in the same governmental entity that approves interconnection agreements (or conferring such 5 For example, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis noted that [w]hile the arguments of the [appellees] appear to reject the proposition that the state commissions’ power to enforce federally-mandated interconnection agreements comes from § 252, they suggest no likely alternative. Arkansas law alone cannot be the source. Connect Communications, 225 F.3d at 946. In answer, it is State law plus residual authority under the 1996 Act that constitute the sources of State commission authority to enforce interconnection agreements. VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS 45 authority by the same statutory provisions) might be one obvious approach, it is certainly not an inevitable or necessary arrangement, nor one that necessarily follows in a logical sense from vesting approval authority in State commissions through § 252. To the contrary, when considering Congress’ purpose of retaining in the overall regulatory scheme the resources and expertise of State commissions and their reviewing courts, it would be more logical to leave authority to administer and enforce local service contracts in State commissions and courts under preestablished State law. This would leave State commissions to function in their traditional role of administering and enforcing agreements relating to local telephone service, while retaining for federal review only decisions governing the formation of interconnection agreements. The other justification for the conclusion that it is § 252 that vests State commissions with enforcement authority is that the FCC has so concluded and that its decision merits Chevron deference. Five other circuits make this argument. See Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 323 F.3d 348, 356 (6th Cir. 2003); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc); S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Brooks Fiber Communications of Okl., Inc., 235 F.3d 493, 497 (10th Cir. 2000); S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Connect Communications Corp., 225 F.3d 942, 946-47 (8th Cir. 2000); S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 208 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 573 (7th Cir. 1999) ([T]he [Illinois Commerce] Commission was doing what it is charged with doing in the [1996] Act and in the FCC ruling [i.e., 1999 ISP Ruling]. It was determining what the parties intended under the [interconnection] agreements). But, as with the inherent authority argument, this argument lacks analysis and is unpersuasive for several reasons. In its 2000 opinion in Starpower Communications, the FCC addressed a request for preemption of the Virginia State Corporation Commission, which declined jurisdiction over a reciprocal compensation dispute concerning the interpretation of an interconnection agreement. 15 FCC Rcd. at 11,277-78, ¶¶ 1, 4. Under § 252(e)(5), the FCC must preempt a State commission’s jurisdiction over a matter if the State commission fails to carry out its responsibility under § 252. 46 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS In the course of its opinion, the FCC concluded that the interpretation and enforcement of previously approved interconnection agreements are within State commissions’ § 252 responsibilities. Id. at 11,279-80, ¶ 6. The entirety of the FCC’s analysis is as follows: In reaching this conclusion, we find federal court precedent to be instructive. Specifically, at least two federal courts of appeal have held that inherent in state commissions’ express authority to mediate, arbitrate, and approve interconnection agreements under section 252 is the authority to interpret and enforce previously approved agreements. These court opinions implicitly recognize that, due to its role in the approval process, a state commission is well-suited to address disputes arising from interconnection agreements. Id. (footnote omitted). The two circuit court opinions cited by the FCC as instructive are Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 208 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2000), and Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 179 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 1999). As an initial matter, the FCC’s statement that State commissions are well suited to enforce interconnection agreements given the State commissions’ role in the approval process does not advance the ball. It must be conceded that both before and after enactment of the 1996 Act, State commissions have been not only well-suited to address disputes relating to local service agreements, they have done so and continue to do so. State commissions would be equally well suited to enforce interconnection agreements whether the source of that authority is the 1996 Act or residual authority under the 1996 Act (i.e., stemming from the 1934 Act), and the FCC’s observation adds nothing to the argument that it is § 252 of the 1996 Act that confers such authority. Further, not only does Starpower Communications fail to analyze the text of § 252 for itself, it also adopts the inherent-authority view based on the strength of two circuit court opinions that themselves failed to analyze § 252. The Seventh Circuit made only scattered references supporting such a view in a case only indirectly raising the issue, see Ill. Bell, 179 F.3d at 573-74, and the Fifth Circuit, as disVERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS 47 cussed above, stated its conclusory view without contemplating the possibility that residual authority under the 1996 Act vested States with enforcement authority, see Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 208 F.3d at 479-80. Those decisions were also based, in part, on deference to the FCC’s 1999 ISP Ruling, in which the FCC indicated in dictum that it expected that State commissions would resolve interconnection disputes. 14 FCC Rcd. at 3703-06, ¶¶ 21, 22, 24, 26; Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 208 F.3d at 480; Ill. Bell, 179 F.3d at 572-74. The 1999 ISP Ruling, however, was later vacated by the D.C. Circuit. See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 6-9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating based on the FCC’s failure to explain why the analysis the FCC used to determine that ISP calls are jurisdictionally mixed was appropriate under the 1996 Act or FCC regulations). Further, the 1999 ISP Ruling revealed only an expectation that State commissions would enforce interconnection agreements, and in only one passing reference did the FCC link that expectation to § 252. See 14 FCC Rcd. at 3705-06, ¶ 26 (In the absence of a federal rule [addressing reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic], state commissions . . . have had to fulfill their statutory obligation under section 252 to resolve interconnection disputes between incumbent LECs and CLECs). In short, Chevron deference is not due to the FCC’s conclusion in Starpower Communications when it was reached without analyzing § 252 and when it is only based on the persuasiveness of two circuit court opinions that themselves did not analyze § 252 and that relied in part on dicta in a vacated 1999 FCC ruling that also did not analyze § 252. In addition, Chevron deference is not required when the ultimate question is about federal jurisdiction. Analogous to our obligation to inquire sua sponte whenever federal jurisdiction is in doubt, see Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977), a federal court must interpret statutory grants of jurisdiction for itself. See Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Chevron does not apply to statutes that . . . confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. It is well established that ‘[i]nterpreting statutes granting jurisdiction to Article III courts is exclusively the province of the courts’ (quoting Ramey v. Bowsher, 9 F.3d 133, 136 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1993))); see also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., 48 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2003) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (explaining why Starpower Communications does not merit Chevron deference); Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding deference to an INS construction of a jurisdictional statute inappropriate because the determination of our jurisdiction is exclusively for the court to decide). Finally, Chevron deference is not applicable unless the statute construed by the agency is silent or ambiguous. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Section 252 is not ambiguous. It confers authority on State public commissions to make specific determinations, and those determinations are reviewable in federal court. Otherwise the 1996 Act leaves State commissions the authority they had under the 1934 Act, including the authority to resolve disputes under telecommunications agreements. Because the 1996 Act does not explicitly confer authority on State commissions to interpret and enforce previously approved interconnection agreements, § 601(c)(1) of the 1996 Act mandates that the 1934 Act’s allocation of such authority to the States remain unmodified. Thus, State law remains the source of State commission authority to enforce local telecommunications agreements and of State court authority to review them. There is no ambiguity. Section 252 has nothing to do with the allocation of enforcement authority for disputes over interconnection agreements. And if I needed to reach Chevron’s step two — whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible reading of the statute — I would conclude that the FCC’s interpretation is not a permissible reading of the statute. In fact, Starpower Communications does not qualify as a reading of the statute at all. The FCC simply cited two circuit court opinions, which themselves failed to analyze § 252, and simply stated ipse dixit that State commissions have inherent authority to enforce interconnection agreements based on their approval authority — contrary to § 601(c)(1)’s requirement of express modification of existing law. Although it might be a reasonable alternative to vest State commissions with enforcement authority, that conclusion is not a reasonable interpretation of § 252. See also BellSouth, 317 F.3d at 1305 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (I do not think the Chevron Court intended that litigants be able to ‘launder’ circuit court opinions through federal agencies and thereby make those opinions binding on other circuits, even if the agency offers no analysis of its own (footnotes omitted)). VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS 49 In addition to concluding that State commission enforcement decisions are not determinations that are reviewable in federal court under § 252(e)(6), I also conclude that Verizon’s complaint does not properly invoke § 252 because, when it challenges the PSC’s misinterpretation of Verizon’s negotiated agreement, it is not contending that the agreement fails to meet the requirements of §§ 251 and 252, which is the defined scope of § 252(e)(6). A plain reading of § 252(e)(6) indicates a limited scope of review. The relevant portion reads in full: In any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 of this title and this section. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) (emphasis added). That is, even if a State commission enforcement decision could be included as a § 252 determination, § 252(e)(6) provides for federal court review to determine whether the agreement as construed by the State commission violates the requirements of §§ 251 and 252. Section 252(e)(6) does not, in other words, encompass other challenges to a State commission interpretation — such as a claim that a State commission improperly applied State contract law in interpreting the agreement. The First and Seventh Circuits have adopted this straightforward reading of the text. See P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd. of Puerto Rico, 189 F.3d 1, 13-15 (1st Cir. 1999); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 183 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 1999), reh’g on other grounds, 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed sub nom. Mathias v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 535 U.S. 682 (2002). Concluding that [s]ection 252(e)(6) does not confer authority on federal courts to review the actions of state commissions for compliance with state law, the First Circuit noted that [i]f Congress intended federal courts’ review to encompass any kind of alleged legal flaw in a state commission’s determination, then there would have been little need to include the language ‘meets the 50 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS requirements of section 251 . . . and [section 252].’6 P.R. Tel., 189 F.3d at 13, 14 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6)) (alterations in original). After discussing how the 1996 Act exemplifies a cooperative federalism, the court observed that [i]t would be ‘surpassing strange’ to preserve state authority in this fashion and then to put federal courts in the position of overruling a state agency on a pure issue of state law. Id. at 14-15 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999)). The First Circuit acknowledged that it is perfectly conceivable that a State commission interpretation of an interconnection agreement based on State law could conflict with § 251 or § 252, and, if so, that decision would be reviewable in federal court. Id. at 15. The Seventh Circuit also interprets the language of § 252(e)(6) to mean what it says. Under § 252(e)(6), the Court has held, federal courts may review a state commission’s actions with respect to an agreement only for compliance with the requirements of § 251 and § 252 of the Telecommunications Act, and not for compliance with state law. MCI, 183 F.3d at 564; see also Ill. Bell, 179 F.3d at 571. In contrast, [a] decision ‘interpreting’ an agreement contrary to its terms creates a different kind of problem — one under the law of contracts, and therefore one for which a state forum can supply a remedy. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., No. 98-3150, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20635, at  (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 1999) (unpublished amendment to Ill. Bell, 179 F.3d at 574). Verizon critiques the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the scope of review under § 252(e)(6) (and simply ignores the First Circuit’s interpretation) by insisting that the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have rejected the Seventh Circuit’s view.7 The Eighth 6 The First Circuit also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under § 252(e)(6) because there was an insufficient nexus between the State Board’s order and the interconnection agreement, concluding that the order was therefore not a determination under § 252. P.R. Tel., 189 F.3d at 9-13. The court’s analysis of the scope of review represented an alternative ground for finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction. 7 Verizon also unpersuasively suggests that the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Illinois Bell is of dubious authority even in that circuit because of the plain implication of scattered language in a later decision that addressed an entirely different question (i.e., State commission immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000). VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS 51 Circuit, however, concluded that jurisdiction was proper because the claim alleged violations of federal law, and the court even stated that [w]ith regard to purely state law issues, the state commissions may have the final say. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Connect Communications Corp., 225 F.3d 942, 948 (8th Cir. 2000). And the Tenth Circuit, although observing that it would be a waste of judicial resources to limit the court’s consideration to federal issues only, concluded that the district court could review State law issues through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Brooks Fiber Communications of Okla., Inc., 235 F.3d 493, 498 (10th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit offered no analysis at all, simply declaring that it would review de novo a State commission’s interpretation of an interconnection agreement for compliance with federal law and would consider all other issues under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard. See US West Communications v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 1999). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits acknowledged the issue but in the end concluded without analysis that § 252(e)(6) grants federal courts jurisdiction to review commission determinations for compliance with State law. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged a circuit split, described the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ competing views, and then simply stated that [w]e find [the Ninth Circuit’s] approach appropriate. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 208 F.3d 475, 48182 (5th Cir. 2000). The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that § 252(e)(6) allows for federal court review for compliance with §§ 251 and 252, and then, after concluding that a State commission’s interpretation of an interconnection agreement is a § 252 determination, the court drew the following conclusion without analysis: Given that federal courts may review state commission determinations, we join our sister circuits and hold that federal courts have jurisdiction under Section 252 to review state commission interpretations for compliance with state law. Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 323 F.3d 348, 356-57 (6th Cir. 2003). Neither Verizon nor the opinions it cites offers any legitimate reason why the scope of federal-court review under § 252(e)(6) is broader than as plainly defined in the text. Thus, I agree with the First and Seventh Circuits that the scope of review under § 252(e)(6) is limited to compliance with §§ 251 and 252. This construction is yet 52 VERIZON MARYLAND v. GLOBAL NAPS another reason to conclude that a § 252 determination refers to State commissions’ approval or rejection decisions — which are subject to §§ 251 and 252 — not to enforcement decisions that raise State law issues. In short, Verizon seeks review of the Maryland Public Service Commission’s decision that allegedly misinterprets, under State contract law, the language of a negotiated agreement. This claim does not concern a § 252 determination, and therefore the decision is not reviewable in federal court under § 252(e)(6). Moreover, in alleging that the PSC misinterpreted the terms of the negotiated agreement, Verizon does not contend that this misinterpretation violates § 251 or § 252. Accordingly, for this reason also, its claim does not fall within the scope of review permitted under § 252(e)(6). The district court correctly concluded that the misinterpretation claim is not a federal claim for which federal jurisdiction under § 252(e)(6) is available. Of course, under this construction of § 252, Maryland State courts remain available to review the PSC’s orders, as Verizon recognized when it pursued this course the first time it sought review of the PSC’s interpretation of its interconnection agreement.