Opinion ID: 1301652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The 1974 Divorce Judgment

Text: ¶ 101 The majority opinion concludes that LaBudde is liable for aiding and abetting an unlawful act based on LaBudde drafting Robert's 1992 will that was subsequently entered into the Florida probate proceedings. [14] The majority opinion concludes that the 20-year statute of limitations on enforceability of judgments had not run when the 1992 will was made. Its focus on the drafting of the will misses the legal principle on which this case turns. This case requires analyzing whether Robert's stipulation to make a will in favor of the adult children was enforceable as a judgment in 1974.
¶ 102 If that portion of the divorce judgment that required Robert to make a will in favor of his then adult children was rendered in excess of the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction in the divorce action, that part of the judgment is void. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 29 (instructing that a judgment is void if it is in excess of a court's subject matter jurisdiction). Contravening a void judgment is not an unlawful act because a void judgment can be lawfully ignored. Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 440, 136 N.W. 956 (1912). Accordingly, LaBudde's drafting the 1992 will contrary to a void provision in the divorce judgment does not support a claim for aiding and abetting because drafting such a will is not aiding and abetting an unlawful act. ¶ 103 It is black letter law that a judgment pronounced by a tribunal having no authority to determine the matter in issue is necessarily and incurably void, and may be shown to be so in any collateral or other proceeding in which it is drawn in question. Fischbeck v. Mielenz, 162 Wis. 12, 18, 154 N.W. 701 (1915) (quoting 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 120). As we have explained: If the court exceeded its jurisdiction of the subject matter, then the judgment is no protection whatever. It may be ignored altogether. ... The rule is elementary, that if the matter dealt with by the judgment in this case was entirely outside of the court's jurisdiction, then,... the result was not merely erroneous and so, binding on all parties which the court had jurisdiction of, and their privies, till set aside in some of the ways appointed by law, not including collateral attack, but was a usurpation and ... void in the broadest sense of the term. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440-41, 136 N.W. 956). ¶ 104 Furthermore, parties cannot create subject matter jurisdiction for a court by waiver, consent or the application of estoppel. As we explained in Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 84 Wis.2d 504, 267 N.W.2d 609 (1978), this has long been the law in Wisconsin: It is fundamental that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court by their waiver or consent. Sec. 801.04, Stats.; Gelatt v. DeDakis, 77 Wis.2d 578, 584, 254 N.W.2d 171 (1977); Joint School v. Wisconsin Rapids Ed. Asso., 70 Wis.2d 292, [296-97,] 234 N.W.2d 289 (1975); Vishnevsky v. U.S., 418 F.Supp. 698[, 699 n. 2] (E.D.Wis. 1976). Nor can subject matter jurisdiction be conferred by estoppel. Wisconsin E.R. Bd. v. Lucas, 3 Wis.2d 464, [472,] 89 N.W.2d 300 (1958); State ex rel. Gaudynski v. Pruss, 233 Wis. 600, [606,] 290 N.W. 289 (1940).... Id. at 515-16, 267 N.W.2d 609. ¶ 105 The subject matter jurisdiction of circuit courts in divorce actions is limited to the authority granted by statute. Stasey v. Miller, 168 Wis.2d 37, 48, 483 N.W.2d 221 (1992). As we have explained, the jurisdiction [of a circuit court] in divorce actions is entirely dependent on legislative authority. Id. (citing Groh v. Groh, 110 Wis.2d 117, 122, 327 N.W.2d 655 (1983)). ¶ 106 When an argument is raised that a portion of a divorce judgment is void for want of jurisdiction, all that is needed is the determination that, in fact, jurisdiction was not acquired in the proceedings that led up to the entry of the judgment. West v. West, 82 Wis.2d 158, 166, 262 N.W.2d 87 (1978). While circuit court jurisdiction is generally broad, that is not the case when a circuit court sits in a divorce proceeding. Stasey, 168 Wis.2d at 49, 483 N.W.2d 221. In divorce proceedings, the legislature has limited the court's jurisdiction to actions affecting the family, Id., which actions are specifically described in the statutes, Id. [15]
¶ 107 Recognizing when a portion of a judgment is void is particularly important in this case because if the will provision in the 1974 judgment is void, then contravening that provision is not an unlawful act. As explained above, if there is an absence of an express statutory grant of jurisdiction to the circuit court, then that portion of a judgment was made in excess of the court's subject matter jurisdiction, Id. at 57, 483 N.W.2d 221; and orders made in excess of a court's subject matter jurisdiction are void, Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440-41, 136 N.W. 956. ¶ 108 Furthermore, [j]udgments are construed at the time of their entry. Weston v. Holt, 157 Wis.2d 595, 600, 460 N.W.2d 776 (Ct.App.1990). In 1974, when the divorce judgment was entered, the Jefferson County Circuit Court sitting in the divorce proceedings had not been given jurisdiction by the legislature to order Robert to make a will in favor of the adult children. Barnes, 170 Wis.2d at 13, 486 N.W.2d 575 (concluding that a court in a divorce proceeding did not have a grant from the legislature to take an estate planning action in favor of adult children and suggesting that any remedy was for the legislature, not the courts). Barnes interpreted the same version of the Wisconsin divorce statutes as were in effect in 1974 when Ruth and Robert were divorced. ¶ 109 In Barnes, the court of appeals examined jurisdiction in regard to estate planning for adult children. The court explained that: The real issue is whether the statutes in force in 1973 allowed divorcing spouses to agree to some sort of estate planning, as part of the divorce judgment, to benefit their children. Id. at 9, 486 N.W.2d 575. In reliance on Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 67 Wis.2d 477, 227 N.W.2d 62 (1975), and ch. 247 of the 1973-74 Wisconsin Statutes, the court concluded that property division can be made only between husband and wife. Barnes, 170 Wis.2d at 10, 486 N.W.2d 575 (quoting Vaccaro, 67 Wis.2d at 483, 227 N.W.2d 62). ¶ 110 I have independently reviewed the statutes in effect in 1974 when Ruth and Robert were divorced. Chapter 247 of the 1973-74 Wisconsin Statutes contained the legislative grant of authority to circuit courts in Actions Affecting Marriage. The legislature granted jurisdiction as follows: Jurisdiction. (1) The county courts, and circuit courts, ... have jurisdiction of all actions affecting marriage and of all actions under s. 52.10.... [16] Wis. Stat. § 247.01 (1973-74). Actions affecting marriage were listed with specificity by the legislature: Actions affecting marriage. (1) Actions affecting marriage are: (a) To affirm marriage. (b) Annulment. (c) Divorce. (d) Legal separation (formerly divorce from bed and board). (e) Custody. (f) For support. (g) For alimony. (h) For property division. Wis. Stat. § 247.03 (1973-74). In regard to property division, the legislature specified that [t]he court may also finally divide and distribute the estate, both real and personal, of either party between the parties and divest and transfer the title of any thereof accordingly. Wis. Stat. § 247.26 (1973-74) (emphasis added). ¶ 111 Property division during a divorce is expressly limited to the parties to the action. The adult children were not parties to Ruth and Robert's divorce action. Therefore, there was no grant of jurisdiction to the divorce court to award the property of either party to the adult children. Barnes was correctly decided under the statutes then in effect. The majority opinion's overruling of Barnes [17] has no foundation in the statutory grant of authority to circuit courts sitting in divorce proceedings in 1974. ¶ 112 The Jefferson County Circuit Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to order Robert to will two-thirds of his property to his adult children; therefore that part of the judgment is void and of no effect, as a judgment. Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440, 136 N.W. 956. ¶ 113 One cannot be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with a judgment that has been held to be void. State v. Ramsay, 16 Wis.2d 154, 165, 114 N.W.2d 118 (1962) (citing State v. Marcus, 259 Wis. 543, 553, 49 N.W.2d 447 (1951); Seyfert v. Seyfert, 201 Wis. 223, 229, 229 N.W. 636 (1930)). On the other hand, disobedience of an order made by a court within its jurisdiction and power is a contempt, although the order may be clearly erroneous. Ramsay, 16 Wis.2d at 165, 114 N.W.2d 118 (citing Wis. Employment Relations Bd. v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 238 Wis. 379, 400, 299 N.W. 31 (1941)). Accordingly, violation of a void provision in a judgment cannot be an unlawful act. Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440, 136 N.W. 956. ¶ 114 However, the adult children must establish that LaBudde aided and abetted an unlawful act in order to meet the first element of their aiding and abetting claim. Winslow, 125 Wis.2d at 336, 371 N.W.2d 417. Because that part of the judgment requiring Robert to will the adult children two-thirds of his net estate is void as a judgment, and Robert's violation of that provision cannot be unlawful, although it has been held to be a breach of contract, the adult children have failed to state a claim for aiding and abetting as a matter of law. Accordingly, that claim should have been dismissed on the cross-motions for summary judgment. ¶ 115 The majority opinion heavily relies on Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis.2d 635, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970), to support its argument that the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court sitting in divorce proceedings may be expanded by stipulation of the parties under Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74). [18] However, the majority opinion's reliance on Bliwas is misplaced in regard to LaBudde. ¶ 116 In Bliwas, the parties entered into a post-judgment stipulation, which was incorporated into a court order, to reduce the amount of child support that Arnold Bliwas would pay for his son's support, in exchange for Arnold's agreeing to contribute to his son's educational expenses beyond the boy's twenty-first birthday. Id. at 636-37, 178 N.W.2d 35. Both parties agreed that if there had been no stipulation, the divorce court would have been without jurisdiction. Id. at 637, 178 N.W.2d 35. However, we did not conclude that the subject matter jurisdiction of the court determined whether the stipulation that was incorporated into a court order would be honored. ¶ 117 To the contrary, in reviewing the legal principles that we would apply, we affirmed the legislative jurisdictional limitation by explaining that a trial court's jurisdiction to make provisions for the care, custody, maintenance and education of children of the parties is limited to minor children. Id. (emphasis in original). We did enforce the stipulation, but not because the subject matter jurisdiction of the divorce court had been expanded by agreement of the parties. Rather, we estopped Arnold from making arguments by which to overturn the order that required him to continue to pay support for his son's educational expenses. We explained: [W]here the court disposes of the property of the parties by stipulation in a manner in which it could not have disposed of the property in an adversary proceeding, the general rule applies that a party who procures or consents to the entry of the decree is estopped to question its validity, especially where he has obtained a benefit from it. Id. at 640, 178 N.W.2d 35 (quoting 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 907, at 1030). We also relied on the reasoning of a Kansas decision to further explain: A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction and power of a court for the purpose of securing important rights from his adversary through its judgment, and, after having obtained the relief desired, repudiate the action of the court on the ground that it was without jurisdiction. Id. at 641, 178 N.W.2d 35 (quoting Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 P. 576, 578-79 (1908)). ¶ 118 And finally, we affirmed that `[t]he parties cannot by stipulation proscribe, modify or oust the court of its power to determine the disposition of property, alimony, support, custody, or other matters involved in a divorce proceeding.' Id. at 639 n. 4, 178 N.W.2d 35 (emphasis added) (quoting Miner v. Miner, 10 Wis.2d 438, 442-43, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960)). Bliwas never concluded that Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74) permitted the parties to stipulate to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the divorce court. [19] ¶ 119 Instead, Bliwas turns on the estoppel of a party. That is, Arnold Bliwas was prevented (estopped) from challenging the validity of the order in the first place. In relation to the circumstances of this case, if Robert were alive and trying to avoid an obligation to which he stipulated, Bliwas could be raised to estop Robert from arguing that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to award the parties' property to non-parties. [20] ¶ 120 However, LaBudde was not a party to the Tensfeldt divorce. He did not make a promise that he is trying to avoid. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to estop LaBudde from challenging the estate planning portions of the judgment as being void for lack of circuit court subject matter jurisdiction. [21] Stated otherwise, there is no legal impediment to LaBudde's asserting that the portion of the judgment that attempted to do estate planning for the benefit of the adult children was void from its inception. Our conclusion in Bliwas turned on the estoppel of Arnold Bliwas; here, LaBudde cannot be estopped. Therefore, Bliwas cannot be applied to preclude LaBudde's defenses to the adult children's aiding and abetting claim. ¶ 121 Furthermore, as the Florida Court of Appeals concluded, Robert's promise is enforceable as a contractual obligation that was not breached until Robert died without a will that was in accord with the stipulation. [22] Tensfeldt, 839 So.2d at 724. The adult children have been fully paid for their third-party contractual rights through the Florida proceedings. [23] ¶ 122 I recognize that appellate courts on occasion have concluded that a circuit court in a divorce action was without statutory authority to enter some portion of the judgment without explaining that that part of the judgment was void because of the restricted jurisdiction of a circuit court in a divorce action. Barnes is a good example of that. However, in Barnes, there was no need to explain that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction made that part of the divorce judgment void. All that was needed was to determine whether that part of the judgment was enforceable. ¶ 123 By contrast with Barnes, our discussion in Stasey was more complete, even though all that was needed was to determine whether the portion of the divorce judgment awarding attorney fees as between an attorney and client was in excess of the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Stasey, 168 Wis.2d at 39-40, 483 N.W.2d 221. We concluded that the divorce court had exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 57, 483 N.W.2d 221. Furthermore, we went on to explain the resulting effect on the portion of the judgment made in excess of the court's subject matter jurisdiction when we said, We have concluded that that part of the judgment awarding attorney fees is void. Id. at 61, 483 N.W.2d 221. ¶ 124 Stasey is of significance for the case now before us because here there is a need to understand why the 1974 divorce judgment is not enforceable as a judgment. Stasey helps my analysis in two major respects. First, Stasey clearly explains that the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court sitting in a divorce action is limited to the express grant of authority by the legislature. Id. at 48, 483 N.W.2d 221. Second, Stasey confirms that when a divorce court acts in excess of its subject matter jurisdiction, that portion of the judgment is void. Id. at 61, 483 N.W.2d 221. Because the violation of a void judgment is not an unlawful act, LaBudde did not aid and abet an unlawful act. Accordingly, the aiding and abetting claim against LaBudde should be dismissed.