Opinion ID: 6104581
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Precluding molestation evidence

Text: ¶41 Before trial, the State moved to preclude introduction of several categories of evidence concerning the victims and the children as irrelevant and inadmissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence 403. As pertinent here, the trial court precluded evidence that Edwards allegedly participated in molesting Daughter and possibly another child. The court explained that, though “tangibly relevant,” this evidence consisted of “vague assertions” that could not pass the Rule 403 balancing test. Specifically, the court found that “[t]hese alleged factual assertions are unfair as they are unproven, uncorroborated by any evidence, and on their surface appear to suggest an improper purpose, and could potentially elicit or suggest emotion, sympathy and horror.” We review this ruling for an abuse of discretion. See Shotwell v. Donahoe, 207 Ariz. 287, 294 ¶ 27 (2004). ¶42 The trial court did not abuse its discretion. First, the precluded evidence did not have great probative value. See State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, 324 ¶ 17 (2002) (“The greater the probative value . . . and the more significant in the case the issue to which it is addressed, the less probable that factors of prejudice or confusion can substantially outweigh the value of the evidence.” (quoting 1 Joseph M. Livermore, Robert Bartels, & Anne Holt Hameroff, Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence (formerly Udall on Evidence) § 403 at 82–83, 84–86 (4th ed. 2000))). Notably, the record does not reflect 12 STATE V. THOMPSON Opinion of the Court precisely what evidence was precluded. For example, we know neither the exact content of the evidence nor whether the evidence was testimonial or documentary. All we know is that the evidence consisted of “vague assertions” that lacked corroboration and were unproven. ¶43 Second, other evidence sufficiently demonstrated Thompson’s motive to travel to Arizona to protect the children. The court permitted Thompson to introduce evidence of Edwards’ past failure to report Daughter’s molestation, Edwards’ history of illegally using drugs, Son’s hospitalization, and Daughter’s impending trip to an unsafe location. The precluded, vague evidence would not have added much. ¶44 Conversely, admitting evidence suggesting Edwards had molested her own daughter and another child could have certainly inflamed the jury’s passions, resulting in unfair prejudice to the State’s case. Indeed, Thompson acknowledged to the trial court that evidence of Edwards’ participation in molesting Daughter “is not as essential as the other items of evidence, and may have a greater prejudicial effect under Rule 403.” On this slim record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that this unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any minimal probative value of the evidence.