Opinion ID: 1591177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Redaction of Statement

Text: The defendant also complains about the trial court's refusal to admit those portions of his statement reflecting his offers to take polygraph tests. One of the prosecutors read a portion of a statement given by the defendant at the time of the original investigation in which he admitted stopping two men in Montgomery County the night of the victim's disappearance, but denied going into Clarksville or stopping the victim. The trial court did not allow the prosecutor to read those portions of the same statement reflecting the defendant's repeated offers to take a polygraph test. Before this Court, the defendant asserts that this redaction violated his due process right under Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), to deny or explain the evidence relied on by the State. Hartman also argues that the redaction violates Tenn. R. Evid. 106, which sets out the rule of completeness and provides that [w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. See generally Cohen, Sheppeard & Paine, Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 106.1-106.3 (3d ed.1995). The State responds that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly rejected the defendant's contention because redacting the defendant's statement to remove his offers to take a polygraph test did not frustrate the purpose of Rule 106. We agree that the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals did not err. Initially we note that the rules of evidence do not strictly apply to capital sentencing hearings. See Sims, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2001 WL 378686. Nonetheless, we conclude that redacting the defendant's statement did not offend either the fairness concerns of Rule 106 or the due process concerns of Gardner . As we recently discussed in State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Tenn.2000), Rule 106 is designed to ensure that the trier of fact be permitted to assess related information without being misled by hearing only certain portions of evidence. As the trial court found, the defendant's statement was not distorted by redacting his offers to take a polygraph test. Those portions of the statement were at most cumulative of the defendant's statements denying involvement in the crime which were read into evidence by the prosecutor. None of the unfairness concerns which Rule 106 is designed to alleviate were present in this case. For the same reasons, the defendant was not deprived of his due process right to deny or explain the evidence. Again, the redacted statement presented to the jury included the defendant's assertions that he had nothing to do with this crime. In no way did the redaction deprive the defendant of his due process right to explain or deny the proof since his denials were included in the redacted statement that was read to the jury. In addition, as previously stated, polygraph results are inherently unreliable and inadmissible. For the same reasons, a defendant's offer to take a polygraph test is inadmissible. See, e.g., Adkins, 710 S.W.2d at 528-529 (holding that a trial court did not err by refusing to permit a defendant to introduce into evidence the portions of a statement he gave an officer in which he said he was willing to take a polygraph test). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit those portions of the defendant's statement reflecting his offers to take a polygraph test.