Opinion ID: 2087167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: The Missing Ballots

Text: Williams next argues that McDunn's election contest must fail because no full recount was conducted. While the trial court ordered that all ballots be recounted, the ballots for eight precincts could not be located. Thus, Williams suggests, in the absence of a full recount, no court, including this one, can determine that the true electoral count is different from that originally announced. We disagree. Section 763 of the Election Code provides concerning recounts: If the grounds alleged [in the petition] are sufficient in law, the court shall proceed in a summary manner and may hear evidence, examine the returns, recount the ballots and make such orders and enter such judgment as justice may require. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 763.) The law has long been: The returns of the election officials are prima facie evidence of the result of the election. The ballots, however, are the original evidence of the votes cast. In an election contest, the court may accept the ballots cast at the election as better evidence of the result than the election returns if those ballots have been properly preserved. [Citations.] ( Pullen v. Mulligan (1990), 138 Ill.2d 21, 72, 149 Ill.Dec. 215, 561 N.E.2d 585.) Moreover: Where the evidence shows that both the judges of election and the custodian of the ballots have failed, properly to perform their duties, neither the returns of the judges nor the ballots will prevail over the other, but the result must be determined from a consideration of the returns and the ballots, with all the attending facts and circumstances. [Citations.] Talbott v. Thompson (1932), 350 Ill. 86, 93, 182 N.E. 784. In the instant case, the ballots from eight precincts could not be located. However, pursuant to section 763, the trial court counted the ballots that were located, accepting them as original evidence, and then determined that the returns from those eight precincts were prima facie evidence of the votes cast for those precincts. This was in accordance with the law, which is clear that while the ballots are original evidence, the official results are prima facie evidence of the votes cast. Where the original ballots cannot be deemed trustworthy, or as here, are missing, the official results are the best evidence. Williams argues, however, that unlike the cases cited, the ballots here are completely missing. Thus, Williams believes, no opportunity existed to tamper with the missing ballots, and no procedure exists to determine whether they were uninitialled or defective. The evidence in question, Williams concludes, does not reveal that the missing ballots were validly cast in McDunn's favor and, therefore, she cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she received a plurality of the initialled ballots under her theory of the case. However, the fact that the ballots for 8 out of 2,911 precincts could not be located does not mean McDunn's contest must fail. The missing ballots only affect the facts and circumstances of the recount. Moreover, while relying on uninitialled ballots, McDunn's theory of the case is that she received more votes than Williams in the primary. Williams further relies on Hennessy v. Porch (1910), 247 Ill. 388, 93 N.E. 290, where this court held that when the court undertakes to re-count them, all the ballots will be counted and the results declared according to their legal effect. ( Hennessy, 247 Ill. at 390, 93 N.E. 290.) Hennessy, however, did not involve the facts present in this case, namely the eight missing precincts. Rather, Hennessy involved a situation where all the ballots were accounted for and thus able to be recounted.