Opinion ID: 1435420
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Confusion and Constitutional Considerations

Text: In Edmonds, we expressed concern that offenses with a wide range of alternate means are inconsistent with the historical tradition that a jury verdict represents substantial agreement on a discrete set of facts. 80 F.3d at 818-19. However, conspiracy is a well-established exception to this historical tradition. A single conspiracy, like the conspiracy charged in the New York Indictment, can include a wide range of criminal objectives. See Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53, 63 S.Ct. 99 (Whether the object of a single agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either case that agreement which constitutes the conspiracy which the statute punishes.). One conspiratorial agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one. Id. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Jerry Smith: The clause defraud the United States merely expands the scope of the offense by including another object of a conspiracy that might not otherwise be covered by the clause any offense.... In other words, where conspiracy is the charge, the established rule is that a charge of conspiracy to commit more than one offense may be included in a single count without violating the general rule against duplicity. 891 F.2d at 712-13. Treating fraud on the United States as any other object of a conspiracy does little to enlarge the broad sweep of objectives constituting offenses against the United States. Accordingly, this interpretation of the statute does not offend historical traditions about the jury verdict or due process.