Opinion ID: 687584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Flaws in the Concurrence's Sole-Cause Test

Text: 40 As already noted, the dilemma posed in this case arises because the concurring opinion is founded on a construction of section 502 that is wrong as a matter of law. The concurrence held that a work stoppage is not protected by section 502 unless workplace health and safety conditions, even if abnormally dangerous, are the sole cause of the walkout. NLRB Decision, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1368. 41 The concurrence's sole-cause test is purportedly drawn from language in the Supreme Court's Gateway Coal decision, which stated that a work stoppage called solely to protect employees from immediate danger is authorized by Sec. 502. But the concurrence reads too much into the Court's language. To say that a strike called solely to protect employees from immediate danger is authorized by Sec. 502, is not the same as saying that a strike is not protected by Sec. 502 unless the sole reason for it is to protect employees from immediate danger. The fatal problem with the concurrence's reliance on the cited language from Gateway Coal is that the concurring opinion completely fails to acknowledge the different contexts involved in Gateway Coal and this case. Gateway Coal involved an employee strike that occurred while an implied no-strike obligation was still in effect. 414 U.S. at 373, 380-87, 94 S.Ct. at 634-35, 638-41 (finding that contractual agreement to submit disagreements to binding arbitration included disputes over safety and thus gave rise to implied obligation not to strike over such disputes). Here, however, the bargaining unit employees ceased working after the collective bargaining agreement had expired, so there was no no-strike obligation in effect. The sole-cause test cannot reasonably be applied in both of these situations, for this would lead to absurd results. 42 For example, in a situation where a union contract has expired and employees may lawfully engage in an economic strike, the sole-cause test would have the effect of precluding application of section 502 where employees strike because they want higher wages and because fires break out at their work stations whenever they attempt to operate their equipment. Because it could always be said that the employees' concern for their safety was mixed with desires for a better economic package, the sole-cause test would preclude such a walkout from the protections of section 502. This is a ridiculous result, however, because there could be no doubt in this hypothetical that the employees were protesting abnormally dangerous conditions--that they also desired better wages is irrelevant. 43 The concurrence states that if the union simply informs the employer that the work stoppage will terminate upon the correction of the abnormally dangerous conditions, this would satisfy the sole-cause test at least prima facie. See NLRB Decision, 311 N.L.R.B. at 1369. However, the concurrence's position is hopelessly shortsighted: the federal labor laws give employees the right to engage in lawful economic strikes upon expiration of the parties' agreement. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157 (1988); see generally NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-18, 82 S.Ct. 1099, 1102-04, 8 L.Ed.2d 298 (1962). Employees cannot be made to promise to return to work from a lawful economic strike in order to prove the legitimacy of their concern over the unsafe conditions. Accordingly, in cases such as this, the sole-cause rule would clearly achieve results contrary to federal labor policy. 6