Opinion ID: 2271619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Assault with Intent to Kill While Armed (AWIKWA)

Text: Appellants challenge several of their AWIKWA convictions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill. To prove AWIKWA, the government had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellants]: (1) made an assault on [the complainant]; and (2) did so with specific intent to kill; (3) while armed. Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 148 (D.C.1999) (citation omitted). Evidence that there was animosity between the accused and the victim and that the accused targeted the weapon at a particularly vulnerable area of the body is sufficient evidence for a jury to find all of the elements of AWIKWA. See Tolbert v. United States, 905 A.2d 186, 189 (D.C. 2006) (involving a stabbing in the abdomen and chest). Appellants Chávez and Morales were convicted of AWIKWA of Angel Reyes by shooting him in the stomach on August 26, 2001. Morales also was convicted of AWIKWA as to victim Romeo Quinteros during the same incident. As noted earlier, Chávez cites the lack of evidence that he was at the party that was the scene of these shootings. Morales emphasizes that the evidence showed that Reyes was a friend and not a member of Mara R, and that Quinteros was a friend of Reyes, facts that show that Morales would not have intended to kill Reyes. However, the government's evidence was that Quinteros antagonized some VL members at the party by flashing a Mara R hand sign and a knife; that VL member Salvador Cabezas told some VL members at the party, including appellant Morales, that Quinteros had cut Cabezas's hand; that VL member Jose Aguila told his friends that he was going to do something to Quinteros; and that when Aguila subsequently fired at Quinteros's car, he also hit Reyes, who was seated in the car. We agree with the government that the evidence supported an inference that Aguila had a specific intent to kill both Quinteros and, under a theory of transferred intent (about which the jury was instructed), Reyes. See Ruffin, 642 A.2d at 1298 (explaining that a defendant can be convicted of murder or assault with intent to kill of bystander victims even where the defendant has been convicted of murder or assault with intent to kill against the intended victim, and that where the means employed to commit the crime against a primary victim [ e.g., a hail of gunfire] create a zone of harm around that victim, the factfinder can reasonably infer that the defendant intended that harm to all who are in the anticipated zone.) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Having found appellants guilty of conspiracy to assault Mara R and STC gang members, the jury could reasonably conclude that the shooting of Quinteros and Reyes was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. That conclusion permitted the jury to convict appellants Chávez and Morales of AWIKWA of Reyes and Quinteros on a theory of co-conspirator liability, even though the government presented no evidence that Chávez was present at the scene of the shooting and no evidence that Morales participated in the shooting. Appellants Chávez and Morales also were convicted of AWIKWA as to STC member Osmin Bonilla and Jose Reyes-Mendoza on September 20, 2002. Bonilla  who, as noted earlier, was in the company of first-degree-murder victim Gonzalez when Gonzalez was shot  testified that he was shot at by a group of VL members (including Chávez and Morales) as he attempted to flee the scene, but was not hit. Appellants argue that there was no evidence that they intended to kill Bonilla. However, Bonilla testified not just that he was in the zone of danger of gunfire aimed at Gonzalez, but also that VL members pointed their guns at him and shot at him six times. We agree with the government that the evidence permitted the jury to infer that appellants shifted their focus and formed an intent to kill Bonilla after Gonzalez was shot dead. Cf. McCrae, 980 A.2d at 1090 (holding that there was sufficient evidence to convict McCrae for AWIKWA with respect to plainclothes officer who arrived on the scene where McCrae and five other gunmen went with the intent to shoot anyone they saw there). Appellants' argument as to Reyes-Mendoza is that no witness testified to an assault involving him. However, Bonilla testified that Serrucho also was shot at once or twice during this incident, and the government represents (and appellants have not disputed) that the prosecution's trial exhibits identify Serrucho as the nickname of Reyes-Mendoza. Appellants Chávez and Morales next challenge their AWIKWA convictions as to victims Roque Lopez (an STC member) and Brian Barger, a Washington Post reporter, who the evidence showed was driving his car in front of Lopez's car on October 27, 2002, when two cars carrying VL members made a U-turn to follow Lopez and began shooting at Lopez's car. Government witnesses Lopez, Barger and Javier Morales described the incident. No one testified that appellant Morales was on the scene, and he therefore argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction as to these victims. However, from our review of the record we are satisfied that the evidence permitted the jury to convict appellant Morales of AWIKWA of Lopez and Barger on the basis of co-conspirator liability and transferred intent. See Gordon, 783 A.2d at 582; Ruffin, 642 A.2d at 1298. Anaya testified that appellant Chávez told him that he was the one who shot at Lopez. Chávez argues, however, that the testimony about the circumstances of the shooting ( e.g., about a traffic jam on Sixteenth Street at night) makes no sense. He also contends that the testimony about eight to nine shots having been fired at Lopez's car, with only one of the shots hitting the car, undermined the government's case, since the government portrayed Chávez as an experienced shooter. Chávez also urges that the evidence shows recklessness at most, not intent to kill. We reject these arguments because (1) it was up to the jury to determine the credibility of the testimony, and (2) if believed by the jury, the testimony was more than ample to prove that Chávez shot at Lopez, whom VL members had followed, with the intent to kill him (an intent transferable to Barger). All three appellants argue that the evidence was insufficient to convict them of AWIKWA of victims Hernandez and Pineda. Like second-degree-murder victim Lazo, Hernandez and Pineda were on the field at Roosevelt High School on October 29, 2002, when VL members opened fire on STC members. As already described, the government's evidence was that appellant Morales was one of the VL drivers who stayed with his car while appellants Chávez and Castillo went onto the field with guns. Urquilla testified that Chávez shot at Hernandez (and then shot and killed Lazo). Witnesses testified that Pineda was pursued by three or four shooters, one of whom was a man wearing a red jersey that a surveillance videotape showed was Chávez. This evidence sufficed to support Chávez's AWIKWA convictions. Cf. Kidd v. United States, 940 A.2d 118, 128 n. 12 (D.C.2007) (Carrying a gun to the scene of the murder . . . suggests that the defendant arrived on the scene with a preconceived plan to kill.) (citation omitted). Although Castillo's gun jammed and there was no evidence that Morales shot at anyone during the incident at Roosevelt, the evidence permitted the jury to convict both of AWIKWA as to Pineda and Hernandez as aiders and abettors or on the basis of co-conspirator liability. [14] Morales challenges his AWIKWA conviction as to victim Norwin Garcia on August 16, 2001. Garcia, a member of La Raza, testified that he was on a porch when a car carrying VL members, including appellants Chávez and Morales, drove up and Chávez began shooting. Morales contends that the jury verdicts were contradictory, because (1) Garcia testified that appellant Chávez and another man (VL member Cabrito) were the shooters and that Morales was only the driver, but (2) the jury convicted Morales of AWIKWA as to Garcia (and of ADW as to co-victims Diaz and Lopez) while (3) it acquitted Chávez of AWIKWA as to Garcia (convicting him only of ADW as to all three victims). Leaving aside the issue of whether a true contradiction could provide a basis for disturbing the jury verdict, we see no contradiction here. For one thing, there was testimony from Lopez that he saw Morales shoot (and thus that Morales was not merely the driver), and the jury was free to credit his testimony. In addition, the evidence suggests a reason why the jury may have convicted Chávez of the lesser offense as to Garcia. Chávez testified that he began shooting only after one of the victims approached the VL car wielding a machete and that he shot toward that individual's hand so he dropped the machete. Morales offered no such explanation, and, although Anaya testified that Morales did not shoot, Anaya also testified that Morales passed a gun to Cabrito even before any aggression began. Thus, the evidence permitted the jury to find Morales guilty of AWIKWA (victim Garcia) as either a principal or an aider and abettor.