Opinion ID: 1681779
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Develop Joseph Lundin as an Alternative Suspect

Text: Rogers first contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim that attorney Sinardi provided ineffective assistance by failing to develop and present evidence of an alternative suspect, Jonathan Lundin. We disagree. Strategic decisions are not considered deficient performance when other courses have been weighed and the decision is reasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000). Attorney Sinardi first learned of Lundin through an investigative report that detailed an interview with Mitchell Monteverdi, who was incarcerated with Rogers and Lundin during the period preceding Rogers' trial. He began by deposing Monteverdi to obtain sworn testimony of Lundin's alleged statement against interestthe bitch had to answer to me. [8] Counsel also searched Lundin's criminal record report, compared the autopsy reports of Cribbs and the victim of a murder by Lundin, [9] and unsuccessfully attempted to locate witnesses who could identify Lundin as being in the vicinity of Rogers' motel room at the time of the murder. Attorney Sinardi ultimately decided, as a matter of trial strategy, that offering such evidence was not worth the risks to Rogers' case. Monteverdi's testimony would have been extremely risky to the defense. Not only would his credibility have been easily attacked, [10] but the State could have impeached Monteverdi with his prior inconsistent statement acknowledging the existence of a jailhouse conspiracy to frame Lundin for Cribbs' murder. [11] Furthermore, the State could have introduced evidence to prove the existence of the jailhouse conspiracy. Therefore, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to develop Lundin as an alternative suspect. In addition, Rogers has failed to demonstrate prejudice that so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1104-05 (Fla.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 206, 166 L.Ed.2d 166 (2006). First, Lundin was not a viable alternative suspect. Prosecutor Goudie testified at the evidentiary hearing that she was confident Lundin was not in Florida at the time of Cribbs' murder because she was the prosecutor on Lundin's murder case and was privy to information regarding his location at the time in question. Had Rogers attempted to offer Lundin as an alternative suspect, the prosecutor would have established that Lundin could not possibly have committed this murder. Second, as noted above, the State could have impeached Monteverdi on his testimony implicating Lundin by introducing his prior inconsistent statement and offered substantive evidence of the conspiracy to frame Lundin for Cribbs' murder. Third, the evidence against Rogers was overwhelming. The State had introduced a wealth of incriminating evidence against Rogers: Cribbs was last seen leaving a bar with Rogers; a motel clerk testified that, on the day after the murder, she saw Rogers pack suitcases into Cribbs' automobile, pay for an additional night and repeatedly demand that no one go into his room; Rogers made elaborate efforts to keep hotel staff from entering his room, including writing a Do Not Disturb sign on his door; Cribbs' wallet containing Rogers' fingerprints was found in a highway rest stop outside Tallahassee; and Rogers was arrested in Kentucky while driving Cribbs' automobile, which contained the key to the motel room where Cribbs was found murdered. Even if none of the risks of presenting Lundin as an alternative suspect discussed above were present, trial counsel's rejection of this strategy would not undermine our confidence in the outcome.