Opinion ID: 6494576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Appearance of Impropriety Created by the Ex Parte Communications with the Chairman and the Board’s Refusal to Disclose the Ex Parte Communications Require Vacatur and Further Discovery

Text: The potential prejudice to the proceedings caused by the Chairman’s ex parte communications and the Board’s subsequent refusal to grant Kilakila’s requests for disclosure constitute an appearance of impropriety sufficient to require that the Board’s decision to grant the 2012 permit be vacated with instructions to the Board to grant Kilkila’s discovery request for ex parte communications. Few situations “ ‘more severely threaten trust in the judicial process than the perception that a litigant never had a chance’ due to ‘some identifiable potential bias.’” Mauna Kea, 136 Hawai'i at 390, 363 P.3d at 238 (citation omitted). Thus, “justice can perform its high function in the best way only if it satisfies the appearance of justice.” Id. at 389, 363 P.3d at 237 (citation omitted). In other words, “justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done[.]” Sifagaloa v. Bd. of Trs. Of Emps. Ret. Sys., 74 Haw. 181, 190, 840 P.2d 367, 371 (1992). In the case of administrative agencies that perform adjudicative duties, such as the Board in this case, agencies must likewise demonstrate an appearance of justice and refrain from an appearance of impropriety. See Sussel, 71 Haw. at 109, 784 P.2d at 871 (explaining there is “no reason why an administrative adjudicator should be allowed to sit with impunity in a case where the circumstances fairly give rise to an appearance of impropriety and reasonably cast suspicion on his impartiality”). Appearance of impropriety means “conduct that reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, would perceive as materially impairing the judge’s independence, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to fulfill the duties of judicial office.” HRCJC Terminology. The determination of whether an appearance of impropriety exists is “an objective one, based not on the beliefs of the petitioner or [adjudicator], but on the assessment of a reasonable impartial onlooker apprised of all the facts.” Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 122, 9 P.3d at 434 (citation omitted)(alteration in original). In other words, “[t]he test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired[.]” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Au, 107 Hawai'i 327, 338, 113 P.3d 203, 214 (2005) (citation omitted). The action taken by the Board in response to Jacobson’s single ex parte contact with a representative of a party is an instructive insight as to the need to permit discovery and remand this ease to the Board to allow Kilakila to address the appearance of impropriety. The single ex parte email communication between Jacobson and counsel for UHIfA created an appearance of impropriety sufficient to warrant Jacobson’s discharge and invalidation of his decision. The ex parte communication by Jacobson to UHIfA was not related to the substance of the conservation district use permit; its purpose was to discover whether ex parte communication with the hearing officer had been initiated by UHIfA. In contrast, the number of ex parte communications with the Chairman far outnumber the single communication between UHIfA and Jacobson. The known ex parte communications with the Chairman involved one, and possibly two, meetings with the Governor’s office and the senator’s offices, at least two personal conversations with the Governor’s office and the senator’s office, and at least one email; all communications were with government officials who supported UHIfA’s application. The impropriety of healing officer Jacobson contacting a party one time to discuss whether it encouraged public officials to engage in ex parte communication created an appearance of partiality so significant as to warrant dismissal of the hearing officer and the striking of his decision. The multiple undisclosed ex parte communications with the Chairman in addition to the one involving hearing officer Jacobsen warrant a remand to the Board to permit discovery of evidence of ex parte communications and determine the safeguards necessary to ensure the propriety of the next contested case hearing. The degree to which the undisclosed ex parte communications give rise to an appearance of impropriety is also reflected in the decision of the Board to deny the requests for disclosure of documentary evidence of ex parte communications. The D.C. Circuit in PATCO II emphasized the importance of disclosing ex parte communications to prevent the appearance of impropriety: The disclosure of ex parte communications serves two distinct interests. Disclosure is important in its own right to prevent the appearance of impropriety from secret communications in a proceeding that is required to be decided on the record. Disclosure is also important as an instrument of fair decisionmaking; only if a party knows the arguments presented to a deci-sionmaker can the party respond effectively and ensure that its position is fairly considered. When these interests of openness and opportunity for response are threatened by an ex parte communication, the communication must be disclosed. It matters not whether the communication comes from someone other than a formal party or if the communication is clothed in the guise of a procedural inquiry. PATCO II, 685 F.2d at 563 (emphases added). In this case, the Board refused to provide any disclosure of documentary evidence; and in its only attempt to address undisclosed ex parte communication the Board gave an inaccurate initial explanation of its March 21, 2012 meeting followed by one that was not persuasive. 37 The Board’s denial of discovery and its characterization of the purpose of the March 21, 2012 meeting could lead a reasonable onlooker to determine that the Board’s “ability to carry out [its adjudicative] responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence [was] impaired.” Au, 107 Hawai'i at 338, 113 P.3d at 214 (citation omitted). In addition to the Board’s initial inaccurate justification for the ex parte meeting, the Board’s reasoning in denying Kilakila’s requests for disclosure 38 could lead a reasonable person to question the impartiality of the Board in this case. Three reasons underlie the Board’s refusal: 39 (1) Kilakila failed to establish that the Board’s actions were improper; (2) Kilakila’s request was overly broad; and (3) even if the Board’s actions were improper, they were cleansed by the appointment of a new hearing officer. Each of these reasons lacks merit. First, the Board contended Kilakila failed to provide sufficient evidence of ex parte communications to constitute an appearance of impropriety by the Board. A court can require “significant evidence of wrongdoing before allowing [a plaintiff] to conduct extra-record discovery,” but it “cannot require them to come forward with conclusive evidence of political improprieties at a point when they are seeking to discover the extent of those improprieties.” Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbitt, 961 F.Supp. 1276, 1281 (W.D. Wis. 1997). The Board rejected Kilakila’s motion for disclosure despite Kilak-ila’s specific demonstration of undisclosed ex parte communications: the declaration from the hearing officer that he had experienced political pressure; emails disclosing the March 21, 2012 ex parte meeting involving the Governor’s chief of staff, the senator’s chief of staff, the Board Chairman, and the Attorney General; and emails between the senator’s chief of staff and the UHIfA associate director, as well as between the senator’s chief of staff and the Governor’s chief of staff. Despite this panoply of evidence of ex parte communications, the Board continuously refused to disclose any documentation of its ex parte communications, including an email from the Chairman’s office, obtained by Kilakila from the Governor’s office, in which the Chairman’s office confirms he will attend the ex parte meeting on March 21, 2012. Rather than recognizing the growing appearance of impropriety, the Board refused Kilakila’s requests by characterizing the evidence it received from Kilakila as mere evidence of permissible ex parte communications. Second, contrary to the Board’s position that Kilakila’s request for disclosure was overly broad, 40 Kilakila’s motion for disclosure did provide a time frame and context for the requested disclosure. Kilakila provided a time frame by limiting its request to communications related to the ATST project. This limitation inherently sets a time frame from UHIfA’s CDUA submission in 2010 to the filing of Kilakila’s first motion for disclosure. Kilakila also provided a context for the disclosure. In support of its requests for disclosure, Kilakila provided memoranda and documentation recounting specific examples of undisclosed ex parte communications that included the Chairman of the Board and influential government officials acting with UHI-fA. The Board’s denial of Kilakila’s request as overly broad and speculative stands in contrast to the Governor’s ready release of documents in response to Kilakila’s request for “[a]ll emails, memoranda and correspondence that mention or relate to the Advanced Technology Solar Telescope (ATST) created after December 1, 2010 that were received or generated by anyone in the Governor’s office.” In other words, the Governor’s release of records encompassed documents involving the same time frame as documents requested from the Board, yet which the Board characterized as overbroad. Third, in denying Kilakila’s request for production of documents from the Board, the Board reasoned that no disclosure is necessary because it “remedied” the situation by replacing the first hearing officer with a second hearing officer: [A]ny prejudice that may have occurred as a result of communications with the former hearing officer has been remedied by the Board’s discharge and replacement of the hearing officer. However, there is no accompanying guidance in the Board’s order as to how the replacement of Jacobson would remedy improper ex parte communications with the Board. Further, in making the decision to replace Jacobson, the Board held a hearing on March 23, 2012 but refused to create a record of the hearing. In preventing any record of the proceedings to be made, the Board acted in direct contravention of its rules. HAR § 13-1-32(d) (2009) (“The presiding officer shall provide that a verbatim record of the evidence presented at any hearing is taken unless waived by all the parties.” (Emphases added)). Under the circumstances of this case wherein evidence of ex parte communications between the Board and government officials favoring the ATST conservation district use permit was produced and a reasonable request for disclosure was made, the Board’s denial of disclosure of its undisclosed ex parte communications cannot redound to its benefit. As noted by the California Supreme Court “because the [agency] has refiised to make copies of the reports of [the] hearing part of the record, ... whether their contents are as innocuous as the [agency] portrays them to be is impossible to determine.” Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 40 Cal.4th 1, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 585, 145 P.3d 462, 472 (2006); see also Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 54 (“[W]here, as here, an agency justifies its actions by reference only to information in the public file while failing to disclose the substance of other relevant information that has been presented to it, a reviewing court cannot presume that the agency has acted properly[.]”). This lack of disclosure, in part, led the California Supreme Court to reverse the agency’s order. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 585, 145 P.3d at 472. Here, although the Board had an opportunity to demonstrate through disclosure the extent of the communications with the decision-makers, it refused to do so. The evidence of proven ex parte communications and the Board’s unwillingness to allow access to documents demonstrating the extent of undisclosed ex pai’te communications compels the conclusion that the decision-making process suffers an appearance of impropriety. Remand for further discovery is thus necessary to determine whether additional documentation of ex parte communication exists and to craft a commensurate remedy if necessary for a subsequent hearing. The concurrence raises the issue that Kilakila was aware of the ex parte meeting and of the communications between the Chairman and the governmental interests, yet did not request that the Chairman be disqualified. Concurrence at 410, 382 P.3d at 222. As Kilakila stated in its response to Minute Order No. 14 rega h Jacobson, “[g]iven that neither Kilakila ‘0 Haleakala nor this Board has a complete understanding of what happened here, Kilakila ‘0 Haleakala cannot expect to know what the full remedy would be at least until full disclosure is made.” Kilakila never received full disclosure from the Board despite repeated requests to the Board. Further discovery was necessary to apprise Ki-lakila of the extent of undisclosed ex parte communications with the Board from the Governor’s office, the Senator’s office, or the UHIfA. Only after a full understanding of the extent of ex parte communication would Kilakila be equipped to request an appropriate remedy, including disqualification of the Chairman or a request for an additional hearing to counter any information provided to the Board ex parte.