Opinion ID: 1321335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Items 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7

Text: Item 3. Compensation to Respondents for Time Spent in Preparing for and Attending Hearings. The general rule is that, unless authorized by express statute provision, witness fees cannot be allowed and taxed for a party to the action. 20 C. J.S. Costs § 222 (1940); Hopkins v. General Electric Co., 93 F.Supp. 424 (D.Mass. 1950); Shepherd v. Morrison's Cafeteria Co., 29 Ala.App. 189, 194 So. 427 (1940); Leonard v. Bottomley, 210 Wis. 411, 245 N.W. 849 (1932); Bostrom v. Duffield, 28 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Civ.App.1930). Our statute, G.S. § 6-1 (1969), in pertinent part, provides: To either party for whom judgment is given there shall be allowed as costs his actual disbursements for fees to the officers, witnesses, and other persons entitled to receive the same. Since the right to tax costs did not exist at common law and costs are considered penal in their nature, [s]tatutes relating to costs are strictly construed. 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs § 8 (1965). However, in construing G.S. § 6-1, it is not necessary to resort to rules of construction. Clearly, the legislature did not contemplate that a party would disburse or become liable to himself for a fee when he testified as a witness for himself in his own case. Neither did it contemplate that a party would pay an officer to subpoena himself as a witness. The losing party is taxed with the costs of his adversary's witness only if the witness was subpoenaed and examined or tendered. G.S. § 6-53. Chadwick v. Insurance Co., supra; 2 McIntosh, N.C. Practice and Procedure § 2538(1) (1956). The following quotation contained in Hinton v. Scharoun Industries, Sup., 41 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (1943) is applicable to this case: The legislature never intended, I think, in allowing parties to be witnesses for themselves, to put them on a par with other witnesses in respect to witness fees, when they attend the trial to give evidence in their own favor. This would open a door to much abuse, which I should be unwilling to sanction till the legislature so commands. A fortiori, if a successful party is not entitled to have a witness fee for himself taxed against his losing adversary he is not entitled to have taxed an expert witness fee for himself. Therefore, Judge Thornburg erred in authorizing the clerk, upon retaxing the costs to allow respondent Sam S. McNeely, Jr., reasonable payment for his testimony as an expert witness. Although this error was against City, which did not appeal, public policy requires that such a practice not be initiated. Therefore, in the exercise of our supervisory powers, Art. IV, § 12(1) (1970); G.S. § 7A-32 (1969), this ruling is vacated. Respondents are entitled to recover neither the statutory compensation for witnesses nor an hourly wage or per diem for the time they expended in attending hearing securing evidence, exhibits, et cetera. In Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N.C. 96, 72 S.E.2d 21 (1952), a case in which attorney's fees were held properly allowable as costs to a plaintiff who had recovered public funds in an action the City of Burlington had refused to bring, this Court said: We are not unmindful that the power to make an allowance of counsel fees from a fund brought into court is susceptible of great abuse, and should be exercised with jealous caution.. . . [but] with the power of award being limited to items of reasonable attorney fees and expenses, so as to exclude compensation or allowance of any kind for the time and effort of the suing taxpayer, thus fixing it so the taxpayer may not capitalize on the suit, we see no real danger of abuse. (Emphasis added). Id. at 101, 72 S.E.2d at 24-25. The foregoing statement recognizes the well established rule, and the reason for it, that a party is not entitled to compensation for the time and effort he devotes to the litigation. Respondents' bills, $13,635.00 for Sam McNeely, Jr., and $2,331.00 for Margaret C. McNeely, seem to demonstrate the wisdom of the rule. Judge Thornburg properly disallowed in its entirety Item 3(b), and he erred in not disallowing Item 3(a) in its entirety. Item 4, Travel Expenses. As to this item, an allowance to respondents of $206.90 for mileage and $55.77 for meals and hotel bills expended in securing evidence and attending hearings, the exposition on Item 3 is equally applicable here. No statute authorizes the inclusion of such expenses in court costs, and Judge Thornburg properly disallowed them. Item 5, Engineering Costs and Testimony. From the entire record of this proceeding, from respondents Statement of the Case incorporated therein, and from their brief, it is quite clear that respondents incurred these costs solely for the purpose of showing (1) that public necessity and convenience did not require City to expand Alleghany Street (a thoroughfare leading to Harding High School) into four lanes; and (2) that, in any event, another plan prepared by Ralph L. Whitehead, professional engineer, was equally as good as City's and more acceptable to respondents since it would require only a 10-foot right-of-way over their land. Such evidence was irrevelant to the question before the clerk and Judge Bryson. As earlier noted the law left these matters to the judgment of City's governing body. As the Court of Appeals held, the only question properly before the clerk and Judge Bryson was whether City had followed statutory requirements before instituting the proceeding. Because City had not complied with the statutory requirements the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding must be dismissed, but it also held that the dismissal was without prejudice to City's right to condemn the property upon compliance with the applicable statutory provisions. It also specifically noted that the clerk's other findings, which Judge Bryson adopted, were irrelevant and to be treated as surplusage. As previously pointed out, under Item 1, unless specifically authorized by statute, or by an order of the court in a proper case, the cost of obtaining maps, surveys, and plats for use on trial are not allowed as taxable costs. Further, expert witness fees can be taxed against an adverse party only when the testimony of the witness examined (or tendered) was (or would have been) material and competent. Chadwick v. Insurance Co., supra; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 244 (1940). Conceding, as the clerk found, that Ralph L. Whitehead is an expert civil engineer, his testimony that his plan for widening Alleghany Street was as good as City's, was totally irrelevant to the question of City's right to condemn the property in question. The record discloses no facts which would justify taxing, as a part of the costs for which City is liable, an expert witness fee for Mr. Whitehead. If one is to be taxed, as permitted by Judge Thornburg's order, it must be taxed against respondents, whose witness he was. As against City, Item 5 must be disallowed in toto. Item 6, Legal Expenses. In this jurisdiction, in the absence of express statutory authority, attorneys' fees are not allowable as part of the court costs in civil actions. Bowman v. Comfort Chair Co., 271 N.C. 702, 157 S.E.2d 378 (1967), and cases cited therein. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578 (1952); 2 McIntosh, N.C. Practice and Procedure § 2538(2) (1956). With one exception, in eminent domain proceedings the court is authorized to tax counsel fees as a part of the costs only for an attorney appointed by the court to appeal for and protect the rights of any party in interest who is unknown or whose residence is unknown. G.S. § 40-24 (1966). It is counsel appointed under G.S. § 40-24 (1966) to which G.S. § 40-19 (1966) refers in providing that a landowner is divested of title when the condemnor pays into court the sum assessed as damages for the taking of his property, together with costs and counsel fees allowed by the court. Carolina Power & Light Company v. Creasman, 262 N.C. 390, 137 S.E.2d 497 (1964); Durham v. Davis, 171 N.C. 305, 88 S.E. 433 (1916); R. R. v. Goodwin, 110 N.C. 175, 14 S.E. 687 (1892). The one exception referred to above is contained in G.S. § 1-209.1 (1969), which provides: In all condemnation proceedings authorized by G.S. § 40-2 or by any other statute, the clerks of the superior courts are authorized to fix and tax the petitioner with a reasonable fee for respondent's attorney in cases in which the petitioner takes or submits to a voluntary nonsuit or otherwise abandons the proceeding. This section, as Judge Thornburg noted, has no application to the facts of this case. (Although not pertinent to decision here, City's brief asserts that it has proceeded with a new action, which is now pending.) The statutes cited by respondents in support of their contention that they should be allowed counsel feesG.S. § 6-21(5), G.S. § 6-21.1, G.S. § 6-21.2 (1969); G.S. § 136-114, G.S. § 136-119 (1964); G.S. § 40-19 (1966)have no application to this proceeding. Judge Thornburg correctly disallowed Item 4. Item 7, Interest on Costs. Since the greater portion of this item of $5,500.00 is interest calculated on items of disallowed costs, it could not be sustained in any event. However, it is the general rule that interest on costs properly assessed may not be allowed without statutory authority. 20 C.J.S. Costs § 190 (1940). In this State, interest on costs is expressly disallowed by statute. G.S. § 24-5 (1965), provides, inter alia, that the amount of any judgment or decree, except the costs, rendered or adjudged in any kind of action, though not on contract, shall bear interest till paid, and the judgment and decree of the court shall be rendered according to this section. The judge properly disallowed Item 7. It is obvious that from the beginning respondents have contested this proceeding upon a misapprehension of City's legal rights. They were entitled, if so advised, to require City to comply strictly with all statutory procedures. However, after having done so, on the facts disclosed, City would be entitled to reinstitute the proceeding and proceed with the condemnation as originally planned. It is a matter of regret that in a condemnation proceeding involving a 20-foot right-of-way over land, which commissioners assessed at $4,071.00 in April 1965 (according to City's brief), respondents have expended in time or money (according to their calculations) $25,538.41. However, they made a judgment decision and must abide the consequences. Judge Thornburg correctly vacated the clerk's order allowing respondents to recover from City court costs in the amount of $25,538.41, less $2.50. However, that portion of his judgment remanding the cause to the clerk for the assessment of proper costs in conformity with his order is vacated. The cause will be remanded to the clerk for the assessment of costs in accordance with this opinion. This means that of the items claimed by respondents in their petition for allowance of court costs, the clerk will tax against City only items 1 and 2, miscellaneous maps, document reproductions and ordinances ($80.44) and hearing and transcript recordings ($546.10), a total of $626.54. Respondents will pay the costs of this appeal. Modified and affirmed.