Opinion ID: 2533821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Patronizing a Prostituted Child

Text: We next turn to the issue of whether there was insufficient evidence to support Madden's conviction for patronizing a prostituted child pursuant to section 18-7-406, 6 C.R.S. (1999). Madden argues that this statute requires the prosecution to present evidence that he participated in some form of commercial transaction in exchange for sex with S.J. and that no such evidence was presented at trial. The People contend that the court of appeals correctly held that the elements for the crime of patronizing a prostituted child are unambiguous and do not require the prosecution to prove that the child was acting as a prostitute to convict Madden of the offense. Consequently, the prosecution submits that the evidence was sufficient to convict. We begin our analysis with a summary of the principles of statutory construction. The construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, Inc., 102 P.3d 323, 326 (Colo.2004). In construing the meaning of a statute, we are to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632, 635 (Colo.1991). To discern the legislative intent, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Mason v. People, 932 P.2d 1377, 1378 (Colo.1997). We are to give effect to every word and are not to adopt a construction that renders any term superfluous. Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280, 284 (Colo.2000). In so doing, the statute is to be construed to further the legislative intent represented by the statutory scheme. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 501 (Colo.2000). In addition, the title of a statute, although not dispositive of the legislative intent, can be useful in construing a statute. Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo.2004). Where the intended scope of a statute is ambiguous, we may look to the statute's textual context as well as the legislative history to determine the General Assembly's intent. § 2-4-203, C.R.S. (2004); Corbetta v. Albertson's, Inc., 975 P.2d 718, 721 (Colo.1999). Turning to the words of the statute in this case, a person patronizes a prostituted child if he [e]ngages in an act which is prostitution of a child or by a child. § 18-7-406, C.R.S. (2004). [9] While the statute does not define the term prostitution, the phrase prostitution by a child is statutorily defined as a child performing any act of sexual intercourse in exchange for money or anything of value. § 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. (2004). [10] The act of prostitution by a child embodies the common understanding of prostitution where someone gives money or something of value to another in exchange for sex. See Black's Law Dictionary 1259 (8th ed.2004) (defining prostitution as engaging in a sexual activity for money or its equivalent; commercialized sex.); see also § 18-7-201, C.R.S. (2004) (stating: Any person who performs ... any act of sexual intercourse ... in exchange for money or other thing of value commits prostitution). Madden's conviction, however, was based on the second phrase, prostitution of a child. (emphasis added). This phrase is statutorily defined as inducing a child to perform certain enumerated sex acts including intercourse with another through the use of coercion, threat, or intimidation or in exchange for money. § 18-7-401(7), C.R.S. (2004). [11] While this definition uses the term prostitution, the elements set forth in prostitution of a child contemplate more acts than expressly requiring the defendant to induce the victim to act as a prostitute or, in other words, paying the child to engage in sex. Thus, we must determine whether the General Assembly intended to remove the commercial aspect of prostitution when it enacted section 401(7). If we read section 401(7) without incorporating the common meaning of the term prostitution, it appears that the plain meaning of the crime of patronizing a prostituted child could apply to an individual who forces the child to engage in a sexual actsimilar to the crime of sexual assault. [12] On the other hand, if we read the statute to include the common understanding of prostitution and we incorporate that meaning into the definition of prostitution of a child, then to be convicted of patronizing a prostituted child the defendant must be engaged in a commercial activity where he either gives or receives something of value in exchange for a child engaging in sex. In other words, a person who induces a child to engage in a sexual act, in exchange for money or its equivalent commits prostitution of a child. Review of the statutory regimen reveals that the requirement that a commercial transaction occur is consistent with the sections surrounding this statute. The crime of patronizing a prostituted child and the definition of prostitution of a child are found in Part 4 of Article 7 of the Criminal Code titled Child Prostitution. Patronizing a prostituted child is part of a grouping of child prostitution offenses, all of which either expressly contemplate giving something of value in exchange for sex with a child or refer to the definitions of prostitution by a child or of a child. See, Soliciting for Child Prostitution, § 18-7-402, C.R.S (2004); Pandering of a Child, § 18-7-403, C.R.S (2004); Keeping a Place of Child Prostitution, § 18-7-404, C.R.S. (2004); Pimping of a Child, § 18-7-405, C.R.S (2004); and Inducement of Child Prostitution, § 18-7-404.5, C.R.S (2004). Implicit in the title of the crime charged, patronizing a prostituted child, is the concept that the General Assembly intended something of value to be exchanged. The common and ordinary meaning of patronize is to be a regular customer of (a store, merchant, etc.). Webster's New World College Dictionary 991 (3rd ed.1996). Absent statutory language indicating the contrary, the title of this crime implies that the General Assembly intended to punish individuals who give something of value in exchange for sex with a child. The plain and ordinary meanings for both of the terms patronizing and prostitution embrace some form of commercial transaction. Because this statute can reasonably be construed in two different ways, one which does not require a commercial transaction and one that does, we turn to the legislative history for guidance. The General Assembly created the crime of patronizing a prostituted child in 1979 when it enacted House Bill 1574. See ch. 174, sec. 1, § 18-7-401-08, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 740. This bill, sponsored by Representative Jack McCroskey and Senator Barbara Holme, replaced Part 4 of Article 7 of the Criminal Code with a new part titled Child Prostitution. [13] In addition to patronizing a prostituted child, this new Part 4 contained a number of other crimes specifically criminalizing the acts of paying for or profiting from sexual acts with a person under the age of eighteen years. Id.; see also §§ 18-7-402-405. Our review of the legislative history of House Bill 1574 indicates that by enacting the definition of prostitution of a child, the General Assembly sought to prohibit acts by individuals, commonly referred to as pimps, who in exchange for money or something of value induce or force a child to perform sex acts. In a hearing on House Bill 1574 before the Senate Committee on Health, Environment, Welfare, and Institutions, the bill's sponsor, Senator Barbara Holme, stated that this law aimed to increase the penalties for people who force or threaten or coerce children into being prostitutes. Hearings on H.B. 1574 Before the Senate Health, Environment, Welfare, and Institutions Committee, 52 General Assembly, First Regular Session (April 18, 1979) (remarks of Senator Holme). The legislative history also establishes that the overall intent behind the crime of patronizing a prostituted child and the surrounding crimes contained in House Bill 1574 was to punish those people who either profit from or pay for sex with a child. This is evidenced by the introductory remarks to the Committee on Health, Environment, Welfare, and Institutions, by the sponsor of the bill, Representative Jack McCroskey. He stated that the purpose behind the bill was to punish the people who are in the business, who make money off of child prostitution. That is, it's directed toward the panderers, the pimps, the patrons of child prostitution. Hearings on H.B. 1574 before the House Health, Environment, Welfare, and Institutions Committee, 52 General Assembly, First Regular Session (March 21, 1979) (remarks of Representative Jack McCroskey). Relying upon the General Assembly's stated purpose in passing House Bill 1574, which was to criminalize commercialized sex with children, we construe the crime of patronizing a prostituted child to incorporate the common understanding of the term prostitution into the definition of prostitution of a child. We hold that the crime of patronizing a prostituted child requires an exchange of something of value, a commercial transaction. Such a commercial transaction must occur between the patroni.e., the person having the sexual contact with the childor between the patron and the one inducing the child to participate in the sexual act, the pimp. It is precisely this exchange of something of value between the patron and either the pimp or the child that distinguishes this crime from that of sexual assault. [14] Turning to the facts of this case, our review of the record indicates that there was no evidence presented at trial that Madden attempted to give anything of value to S.J. or to any other person in exchange for sex. [15] Therefore, we reverse Madden's conviction for attempted patronizing a prostituted child.