Opinion ID: 883736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the District Court authorized to convict Black of the lesser included offense of sexual assault?

Text: Section 46-16-607(1), MCA, provides in pertinent part that a defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged... . The language of the statute is so plain as to need no interpretation. See Curtis v. Dist. Court of 21st Jud. Dist. (1994), 266 Mont. 231, 234, 879 P.2d 1164, 1166 (citation omitted). Because we assume for purposes of this case that sexual assault is a lesser included offense of sexual intercourse without consent, the statute provides clear and express authority for Black's conviction of the offense of sexual assault. Black relies on § 46-16-607(2), MCA, and the 1991 Commission Comment to the statute in making a circuitous argument regarding when lesser included offense instructions may, may not and must be given and how those issues relate to this case. Little discussion of this argument is necessary. We note first that, by its terms, § 46-16-607(2), MCA, relates only to jury trials. Questions relating to instructing the jury simply do not arise in bench trials. Thus, § 46-16-607(2), MCA, is inapplicable here. For the same reason, the Commission Comment stating in part that [t]his statute is a newly developed provision intended to regulate a jury's consideration of lesser included offenses also is inapplicable to this case involving a trial to the court. In addition, we note that the portion of the Comment on which Black relies  allowing a lesser included instruction only upon a party's request and when warranted by the evidence  appears to vary the terms of § 46-16-607(2), MCA, which provides that a lesser included offense instruction must be given upon a party's request when sufficient evidence supports the instruction. Black also argues that State v. Sheppard (1992), 253 Mont. 118, 832 P.2d 370, supports his position. Like § 46-16-607(2), MCA, Sheppard is inapplicable to this appeal from a bench trial because it addresses only questions relating to a trial court's responsibilities in instructing a jury on lesser included offenses. Those responsibilities are not relevant where the trial court is deciding questions of both law and fact pursuant to §§ 46-16-103 and 46-16-110(3), MCA, and, as a result, no instructions are given. We conclude that § 46-16-607(1), MCA, authorizes the conviction of a criminal defendant for a lesser included offense. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, we hold that the District Court was authorized to convict Black of the offense of sexual assault.