Opinion ID: 51355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Text: Although the Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants the right to defend themselves, “in most criminal prosecutions defendants [can] better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-34, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2539-40 (1975). Before a defendant is allowed to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, he “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. A pretrial hearing is the ideal method for “assuring that a defendant understands the consequences of a waiver.” Kimball, 291 F.3d at 730. The factors relevant to the inquiry of whether a defendant should be allowed to represent himself at trial include: 3 1) the defendant’s age, health, and education; 2) the defendant’s contact with lawyers prior to trial; 3) the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the charges and possible defenses and penalties; 4) the defendant’s understanding of the rules of evidence, procedure and courtroom decorum; 5) the defendant’s experience in criminal trials; 6) whether standby counsel was appointed and, if so, the extent to which standby counsel aided in the trial; 7) any mistreatment or coercion of the defendant; and 8) whether the defendant was attempting to manipulate the trial. Id. at 730-31. During a Faretta inquiry, a district court is not required to “estimate what a defendant’s actual punishment under the sentencing guidelines will be,” but should “ensure that a defendant understands the risks of defending himself . . . [and] this purpose is satisfied when a defendant is aware of the maximum penalty he faces.” Id. at 732. Finally, the “purpose of a Faretta inquiry is not to determine the extent of a defendant’s legal knowledge or to determine how good of a trial advocate a defendant will be.” Id. at 731. Instead, a determination must be made about “whether [the defendant] understood that rules do exist to govern the procedure of a trial, the introduction of evidence and the behavior of advocates and to determine whether [the defendant] understood that he would be bound by those rules.” Id. In this case, Light was 31 years old, had never been treated for alcohol or drug abuse or for mental illness, possessed a GED, and completed two years of undergraduate paralegal studies. Light met with an attorney prior to the hearing 4 and turned down the magistrate’s offer to consult with another attorney about self-representation. Although Light knew little about the substance of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence, he understood that the rules existed and that they would govern his trial. Light was informed of the maximum penalty he faced if convicted, and was, therefore, aware of the risks of defending himself. Light had experience in criminal trials because he recently and successfully defended himself in two jury trials. A standby attorney was appointed for Light, was available for consultation during trial, and made arguments on Light’s behalf during the sentencing phase. There is no evidence that Light was attempting to manipulate the trial or that there was any mistreatment or coercion of Light. A review of the record, therefore, establishes that Light was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and that his choice was made with his eyes open. Accordingly, in light of all of the factors, the district court did not err in its conclusion that Light waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.