Opinion ID: 6928543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Later Hearsay Statements

Text: In admitting the girls’ statements to the CPS caseworker, the trial court found indicia of reliability because (1) more than one person was present when the statements were made; (2) some responses were spontaneous; (3) neither girl had a motive to lie and they had relationships of trust with the adults. It noted that leading questions had been asked of B.A. but concluded that direct questions are sometimes appropriate for difficult child witnesses and that the girl’s answers were consistent with her other spontaneous statements. The district court agreed with these findings. Although we are troubled by the use of leading questions, 9 this does not necessarily render B.A.’s responses untrustworthy. See United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 100 n. 2 (9th Cir.1992); Myers, supra, § 4.5 at 229-39. The consistency of the girl’s statements with her earlier statements is the critical reliability factor here. We conclude that it provided a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.
These statements had a low level of reliability because, when allegedly made, several adults had already questioned the girls. But we agree with the district court that any error in admitting the statements was harmless because the evidence was “insignificant in impact when compared to the initial disclosures of the girls, and did not add anything new.”
In admitting this hearsay evidence, the trial court found indicia of reliability because (1) B.A. had no motive to lie; (2) she had the character for truthfulness; and (3) the statements were “basically spontaneous.” The district court made similar findings. The spontaneity of the statements is questionable. They occurred some five months after B.A.’s initial disclosure and after many interviews.. We are not persuaded by the district court’s reasoning that attention surrounding the earlier allegations had faded. Among other things, B.A. had been seeing a therapist and doubtless was asked about the earlier events, even if indirectly. But again the critical factor is the consistency of the statements with B.A.’s earlier allegations. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that it provided an adequate sign of reliability. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Amicus argues that “a criminal defendant cannot be convicted on the basis of hearsay alone.” Even if hearsay can pass the admissibility threshold, says Professor Nesson, it is inherently deficient, without other corroborating evidence, for reaching a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We decline to address this argument because it is raised for the first time'on appeal and not by the Swans. Although they challenged properly the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court by a motion to dismiss at the close of the evidence, they did not raise this issue in their habeas petition. Generally, we do not. consider on appeal an issue raised only by an amicus. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1581 n. 9 (9th Cir.1986) (amicus may not frame the issues for appeal); Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 862 (9th Cir.1982) (same). Discretionary exceptions exist where a party attempts to raise the issue by reference to the amicus brief. See United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.1991); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1106 n. 27 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987). And we have reached the issue where it involves a jurisdictional question or touches upon an issue of federalism or comity that could be considered sua sponte. See Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir.1992) (federalism and comity), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1050, 122 L.Ed.2d 358 (1993); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry, 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir.1982) (jurisdiction); Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 411-12 (9th Cir.1980) (same), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). 10 The Swans did not adopt amicus’ argument by reference in their brief and none of the other exceptions apply. The issue has been waived. 11 BRADY VIOLATION The Swans contend that the state violated their due process rights when it suppressed evidence that Conradi, the daycare worker who was the key reporting witness, had been sexually abused. The district court rejected this contention without a hearing. It found no evidence that the state knew Conradi had been sexually abused, and concluded that this was not a material fact of exculpatory value. During a pretrial deposition, defense counsel asked Conradi whether she had ever been abused. The prosecutor advised her not to answer unless relevancy could be shown. No attempt was made either to show relevancy or to require an answer to the question. The Swans argue that the prosecutor’s advice demonstrates that the state knew of Conra-di’s past victimization or, at least, that the court should have granted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prosecutor knew, but did not disclose, that she. had been abused. The Swans were entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if they alleged facts that, if proved, would entitle them to relief and if they did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the state court. See Greyson v. Kellam, 937 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir.1991). We review for an abuse of discretion the decision to deny an evidentiary hearing. Id. The government must disclose evidence favorable to a defendant and maté-rial to either guilt or punishment. United States v. Streit, 962 F.2d 894, 900 (9th Cir.) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674, 106 S.Ct. 3375, 3379, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 431, 121 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). Evidence is “material” only if a reasonable probability exists that, had it been disclosed, the'result would have been different. United States v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1008, 110 S.Ct. 1308, 108 L.Ed.2d 484 (1990). Evidence undermining the credibility of a government witness must be disclosed when the reliability of the witness may be determinative of the 'defendant’s guilt or innocence. United States v. Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1458 (9th Cir.1993). The defense learned of the abuse from a post-trial interview of Conradi conducted by a defense investigator posing as a journalist. In the interview, Conradi said that she saw abuse everywhere in her neighborhood. She also claimed to have called Child Protective Services and “turned in at least 20 kids,” who were abusing other children. Although information about Conradi’s abuse was not before the jury, it heard similar evidence undermining her credibility. She testified that her own children had been sexually abused and that she took a seminar to learn more about the subject, in part, because of their experience. During cross-examination, she admitted that she saw evidence of abuse “everywhere.” On redirect, she clarified the statement by saying that she meant that child sexual abuse can be found in all social strata. Both defense attorneys argued in closing that she was predisposed to find sexual abuse because of her personal experience with it. The jury knew that Conradi’s children were sexually abused and heard argument that she was biased as a result. But apparently it credited her testimony. There is no reasonable likelihood that additional evidence of Conradi’s own abuse would have altered the verdict. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE Almost five years after the trial, Dr. Richard Soderstrom conducted a routine gynecological examination of B.A. The Swans argue that his findings, that she had a normal, intact hymen and that her introital opening (the opening into the vagina) could not previously have been 1 to 1.2 centimeters, constitutes newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial. They add that the evidence presented at trial regarding this issue was false and they were denied due process. Newly discovered evidence is a ground for federal habeas corpus relief only when it bears on the constitutionality of an applicant’s conviction, Herrera v. Collins, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), and would “ ‘probably produce an acquittal,’ ” Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1523 (9th Cir.1990) (inner quotation omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1275, 117 L.Ed.2d 501 (1992). We agree with the state that this new evidence is insignificant. The Swans were convicted of the statutory rape of R.T. even though physical evidence of sexual abuse as to her was nonexistent. The convictions were based upon the evidence of oral sex, 12 which was substantially the same for B.A. as for R.T. True, the jury may have convicted the Swans of raping B.A. based upon the physical evidence, but convicted them of raping R.T. because her out-of-court statements paralleled those of B.A. But even under this unlikely scenario, evidence about the intact hymen probably would not have produced an acquittal. Nurse Practitioner Theodore Ritter said that when he examined B.A. he did not notice the presence or absence of the hymen. He said, however, that ordinarily an examiner cannot see into the vagina due to the presence of the hymen, but that he was able to see into B.A.’s vagina. He estimated that her introital opening was 1 to 1.2 centimeters, though he did not measure it. Another state witness, Dr. Carol Jenny, testified that Ritter’s observations meant only that Ritter could see through the hymenal opening, and that an accurate measurement of the vaginal introitus is obtainable only with a measuring device, which Ritter did not use. Dr. Lawrence Parris also testified for the state. He said that he examined B.A. and found no evidence of physical injury to her genitalia. He also said that he did not notice the presence or absence of a hymen. Contrary to the Swans’ contentions, the newly discovered evidence does not contradict materially the evidence presented at trial. At most, it could have been used to impeach Ritter’s testimony concerning the size of the introital opening. It does not demonstrate that the state’s evidence was false. It was merely equivocal. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL The Swans argue that their trial attorneys’ failure to discover that the state’s medical evidence regarding B.A. was false constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. They must show deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-66, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In light of our conclusion that the new medical evidence would not with reasonable likelihood have altered the result, the Swans cannot show prejudice. Their ineffective assistance claim fails. AFFIRMED.