Opinion ID: 2974425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Moon’s IIED Claim

Text: Having dismissed Moon’s RICO claim, the district court proceeded to analyze whether Moon stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Michigan common law. We review a district court’s decision to exercise pendent jurisdiction for abuse of discretion, Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1983), meaning that this Court will not reverse unless the district court “relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law, or uses an erroneous legal standard.” United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 446 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). As the district court recognized, a federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff’s state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 803 (6th Cir. 1996); Gaff v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 814 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1987); Landefeld, 994 F.2d at 1182. Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the “interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation” outweigh our concern over “needlessly deciding state law 4 Although it is not germane to our disposition of Moon’s appeal, the magistrate judge that presided over Moon’s Bureau petition issued an opinion granting Moon a closed award of benefits entitling him to compensation only for the period of Oct. 24, 2000 through April 7, 2004. On April 24, 2006, during the pendency of this appeal, Michigan’s Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision. No. 05-1808 Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply et al. Page 8 issues.” Landefeld, 994 F.2d at 1182 (quoting Aschinger v. Columbus Showcase Co., 934 F.2d 1402, 1412 (6th Cir. 1991)). Contrary to the analysis of the district court, this is not such a case. Moon’s IIED claim has no bearing on his RICO claim. Moreover, although we decline to address whether Moon’s RICO claim is precluded by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b), we disagree with the district court that resolution of Moon’s IIED claim is necessary to resolve that issue. Meanwhile, Moon’s IIED claim implicates complex aspects of Michigan law. Michigan courts of appeal have handled such claims differently over the years, compare Broadus v. Ferndale Fastener Div., 269 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978), with Lisecki v. Taco Bell Rests., Inc., 389 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), and the Michigan Supreme Court has never formally recognized IIED as a cause of action. See Roberts v. Auto Owners, Inc., 374 N.W.2d 905, 913 (Mich. 1985) (Williams, C.J., concurring). Moon’s is clearly the ordinary case, where the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is improper.