Opinion ID: 414196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: explaining the shift in policy

Text: 15 Since the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, these petitioners have protested hundreds of applications seeking authority to transport household goods as motor contract carriers. This is the first case, however, in which the ICC declined to consider the merits of a protest on the ground that the petitioners lacked standing. Indeed, in this very case neither the review board of the ICC nor the applicant (Bekins) hinted that the petitioners were improper protestants. Within the boundaries of its statutory mandate, the Commission is free to modify the standing requirements of protestants. We believe, however, that the ICC's failure to explain its unanticipated adjustment of protest standards in this case amounts to an abuse of discretion. See generally 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706 (reviewing court must set aside an agency action found to be an abuse of discretion). 16 Supporting its decision, the ICC stated that the petitioners failed to satisfy the statutory qualifications for protesting an application for contract carrier authority. These requirements, set forth in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10923(b)(4), state that: 17 No motor carrier of property may protest an application to provide transportation as a motor contract carrier of property filed under this section unless-- 18 (A)(i) it possesses authority to handle, in whole or in part the traffic for which authority is applied; 19 (ii) it is willing and able to provide service that meets the reasonable needs of the shippers involved; and 20 (iii) it has performed service within the scope of the application during the previous 12-month period or has, actively in good faith, solicited service within the scope of the application during such period; 21 (B) it has pending before the Commission an application filed prior in time to the application being considered for substantially the same traffic; or 22 (C) the Commission grants leave to intervene upon a showing of other interests that are not contrary to the transportation policy set forth in section 10101(a) of this title. 23 Because the petitioners did not have pending an application to serve Cutler-Williams as contract carriers, the ICC considered subsections (A) and (C) of this provision. With respect to the requirements of subsection (A), the ICC noted that the petitioners possess the authority and ability to handle the shipping needs of Cutler-Williams. However the ICC concluded that the petitioners failed to submit evidence that they had performed service for or actively solicited service from Cutler-Williams within the previous twelve months. The ICC also concluded that Bekins' application did not present novel or important issues warranting the Commission to grant the petitioners leave to intervene under the permissive intervention provision of subsection (C). 24 Standing by itself, the ICC's decision may appear to be sufficiently justified. Juxtaposed against the petitioners' previous protests, however, we are unable to discern why the ICC permitted the petitioners to protest previous contract carrier applications but not the application of Bekins to serve Cutler-Williams. The protest requirements of Sec. 10923(b)(4) existed at the times of the previous cases but were not invoked to deny the petitioners' protests. The ICC may repudiate or narrow protest standing requirements, but the Commission must explain its change of direction so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the change and judge the consistency of the revision with the ICC's statutory mandate. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808, 93 S.Ct. 2367, 2375, 37 L.Ed.2d 350 (1973); Hilt Truck Line, Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir.1977) (ICC cannot disregard its own precedent but must reasonably explain an alteration of policy.). 25 Perhaps our judgment would be different if Sec. 10923(b)(4) unambiguously mandated the ICC's decision in this case. If such were the case, we might be able to infer an explanation of the ICC's action in this case: for the first time, the Commission decided to abide by its mandate and to apply Sec. 10923(b)(4), a provision designed to eliminate frivolous appeals, 126 Cong.Rec. S7685 (daily ed. June 20, 1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon). Section 10923(b)(4), however, does not unquestionably compel the ICC's decision, and, in fact, previous statements of the Commission indicate that this case represents a change in the ICC's interpretation of the law, not a decision finally to follow the statute. 26 In 1978 the ICC revised its standards under which it would permit protests to motor carrier applications. See 43 Fed.Reg. 50908 (1978). These revisions were made to eliminate many frivolous protests and to permit more cases to be handled unopposed. Motor Carrier Application Procedures, 42 Fed.Reg. 59985, 59987 (1977). The ICC allowed protests under these regulations if the protestor evidenced a real interest in the traffic that was the subject of the application. Solicitation of the business of those shippers who supported a motor carrier's application was evidence of an interest in the proceedings that justified standing to protest. See 43 Fed.Reg. at 50909. The ICC noted, however, that solicitation of business by members of the motor carrier industry varies in its methods. The Commission stated: 27 We recognize that with certain types of carriers, direct solicitation [through personal contact] is not practical and the industry practice is to employ general advertising. For example, motor bus carriers, household goods carriers, and others similarly situated which hold themselves out to the general public will engage principally in less direct forms of solicitations, such as newspaper advertisements, brochures, yellow pages, television and radio commercials. In evaluating petitions to intervene [protest] based on solicitation, this circumstance will be taken into account. 28 Id. (emphasis added). 29 The protest standing requirements of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10923, enacted as Sec. 10 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, are similar to the regulations promulgated by the ICC in 1978. As noted above, Sec. 10923(b)(4) states that a motor carrier may not protest an application for contract carrier authority unless it possesses the authority and ability to meet the needs of the shipper involved and has performed service for or actively solicited service from the shipper within the last twelve months. The concept of solicitation, therefore, continues to play a critical role in protest standing requirements. One might have expected that the ICC also would continue to recognize that it is not practical for household goods carriers to solicit business through personal contacts, and that less direct forms of solicitation ... will be taken into account. 43 Fed.Reg. at 50909. In this case, however, without explanation the ICC decided that the petitioners had not actively solicited Cutler-Williams' business as those terms are used in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10923(b)(4)(A). 2 30 This brief history of the ICC's standing requirements demonstrates that the ICC's decision denying the petitioners standing to protest Bekins' application did not follow necessarily from the mandate of Sec. 19023(b)(4). The concept of solicitation, as employed in that section, is not self-defining. The Commission's decision, however, reveals no hint as to the type of solicitation that will suffice to warrant standing. We do not even know whether the ICC has acted arbitrarily or has repudiated its view that less direct forms of solicitations, such as newspaper advertisements ... will be taken into account. 43 Fed.Reg. at 50909. A valid interpretation of Sec. 10923(b)(4) might permit the ICC to deny standing to the petitioners in this case; however, we cannot affirm the order under review without knowing what the ICC's interpretation is.