Opinion ID: 199094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Downward Departure for Rosengard

Text: 40 Rosengard received a two-level downward departure because the court found such a departure was needed to provide a rough proportionality amongst the various sentences for all the participants so that this sentence, dictated by the guidelines, is not out of sync . . . with the other sentences, some of which have been arrived at by departures as well for other reasons. Rosengard now argues that the district court did not depart far enough because he was less culpable than other defendants who received downward departures. 41 We have no jurisdiction to review the extent of a departure merely because the affected defendant is dissatisfied with the quantification of the district court's generosity. United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Fisher, 3 F.3d 456, 464 (1st Cir. 1993) (no jurisdiction to hear claim that defendant was entitled to greater downward departure because his sentence was excessive in light of the amount of time given to co-defendant). The government also notes that any downward departure based solely on the perceived need to equalize sentencing outcomes for similarly situated co-defendants is unlawful. United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 153 (1st Cir. 1998). As the government has not cross-appealed, this issue is not before us. See United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 43-44(1st Cir. 2000).