Opinion ID: 1942165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's New Argument

Text: Appellant does make one additional argument that was not made in the prior appeal. He contends that, because he is no longer seeking custody, his parental rights may not be terminated without a finding that he is an unfit parent i.e., that in these circumstances the best interest test runs afoul of the Constitution. Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in applying the best interest of the child test because it fails to promote [his opportunity] interest, through the least restrictive means available, when the parent whose rights are terminated does not seek court-ordered transfer of custody. This court considered and rejected the same argument in S.S. v. D.M., supra, 597 A.2d at 883-884. In that case, in which the trial court had granted a petition for adoption by the child's great-aunt and great-uncle, the mother of the child argued on appeal that due process required the court to adopt the `least drastic means' possible for achieving the child's best interests. Id. at 883. The mother maintained, as appellant does here, that the least drastic means would have been to allow the child to remain in the proposed adopters' custody while continuing to permit visits with her and allowing her to retain her parental rights. In rejecting this contention, we concluded that neither the Constitution nor District of Columbia case law require[d] the judge to resolve a custody dispute in terms of assuring the fewest possible restrictions on a non-custodial natural parent. Id. at 884 (footnote omitted). [30] Additionally, we held that [e]ven if another trial judge might possibly have concluded that stability for the child could have been achieved without adoption, there was no violation of [the mother's] due process rights. Id. Following S.S., we conclude that appellant's argument is without merit and has no support in either the Constitution or in our case law. While the Supreme Court has held that the rights of natural parents to bring up their children are subject to the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [31] (and hence the Fifth Amendment), these rights are not absolute, and must give way before the child's best interests. In re A.B.E., 564 A.2d 751, 755 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted). This court also has recognized that, although the District of Columbia adoption statute incorporates a preference for a fit unwed father who has grasped his constitutionally protected opportunity interest ... [t]his preference may be overridden if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed adoption is in the best interests of the child ... for that interest is the paramount consideration. [32] In re L. W., supra, 613 A.2d at 356 (citations omitted); H.R. I, supra, 581 A.2d at 1143 (per curiam). Thus, contrary to appellant's assertion, a finding of parental unfitness is not a constitutional prerequisite to granting an adoption petition notwithstanding lack of parental consent. See In re L. W., supra, 613 A.2d at 356; accord, e.g., In re P.G. 452 A.2d 1183, 1184 (D.C.1982).