Opinion ID: 478434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attorney Mistake

Text: 10 Appellant first argues that the oversight of its counsel in failing to respond to the motion constitutes excusable neglect within the meaning of 60(b)(1). However, an attorney's negligent failure to respond to a motion does not constitute excusable neglect, even if that attorney is preoccupied with other litigation. United States v. One 1978 Piper Navajo PA-31, Aircraft, 748 F.2d 316, 318-19 (5th Cir.1984); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1020 (11th Cir.1982); Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam). 11 Admittedly, this result appears to penalize innocent clients for the forgetfulness of their attorneys. However, a court possesses the inherent authority to enter a default judgment in response to an attorney's dilatory tactics. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). Accordingly, a court's refusal to vacate a default judgment entered to penalize the repeated failure to produce documents does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir.1984). Thus the district court's refusal to vacate the order is not an abuse of discretion merely because appellant was not directly responsible for the failure to respond. 12 Nonetheless, courts are chary of dismissing actions on account of attorney inadvertence in non-abusive situations. Thus, in Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 586 F.2d 382, 385-86 (5th Cir.1978), the former Fifth Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion in denying appellant's 60(b) motion where the district court had dismissed his action in order to sanction his attorney's failure to appear at a pretrial conference and to respond to interrogatories within a month. In so doing, the court emphasized that the district court should have undertaken less drastic measures to obtain compliance. See also Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 837 (D.C.Cir.1980) (improper to impute attorney's negligence to client on motion to reconsider default judgment); Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.1972) (abuse of discretion to dismiss action sua sponte absent clear record of repeated willful delay). 13 Furthermore, courts are supposed to construe liberally the requirements of Rule 60(b) when reviewing default judgments. Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Electronics Importers, Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1510-11 (11th Cir.1984); Fackelman, 564 F.2d at 735-36. This solicitude exists when reviewing any order which abridged the adversary process, whether or not it is a default judgment. Burton v. G.A.C. Finance Co., 525 F.2d 961, 962 (5th Cir.1976). For example, in Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), the district court refused to vacate a judgment it had entered against the defendant when he failed to appear at trial. The court, observing both the defendant's reliance on counsel and the good faith misunderstandings that caused counsel's failure to appear, reversed the district court, stating that the equities in such cases will militate strongly in favor of relief. Id. at 403. 14 In this case Bio-Energy's counsel did not exhibit a hostile antagonism to the adjudicatory process or engage in abusive, dilatory maneuvers. Nor is there any allegation that Bio-Energy conspired with counsel to delay the proceedings. Bio-Energy's counsel simply forgot to respond. In addition, only 34 days had lapsed from the time Solaroll filed its motion until the court entered its order. Furthermore, the court failed to inquire into appellant's silence. Unlike the order in Silas and Eskenazi, however, the February 28 order was not an extraordinary sanction entered to penalize counsel's failure to comply with a discovery request or some other pretrial order. Instead, the court was duly deciding a motion before it to which appellant's counsel had failed to respond. Such an order does not abbreviate the adversary process. Rather, it prevents a party's negligence from unduly extending that process. Although the situation here in some respects parallels that in Seven Elves, we do not find the equities so compelling that the district court's denial constitutes an abuse of discretion. 15 Furthermore, Bio-Energy has failed to establish a meritorious defense. To obtain relief under 60(b), a party must demonstrate a defense that probably would have been successful, in addition to showing excusable neglect. Seaboard Coast Line, 678 F.2d at 1020; Gulf Coast Fans, 740 F.2d at 1510-11. Even the court in Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 403, required the showing of a meritorious defense. Bio-Energy cannot satisfy this burden by asserting a general denial to Solaroll's claim. Nor can Bio-Energy satisfy this burden by showing that Solaroll would not suffer unfair prejudice if the judgment were vacated. Fackelman, 564 F.2d at 736. Instead it must make an affirmative showing of a defense that is likely to be successful. One 1978 Piper Navajo, 748 F.2d at 319. Bio-Energy has failed to make any such showing. Therefore, relief is unavailable under 60(b)(1). 16 Some courts have held that attorney error comes within the scope of 60(b)(6) even though it does not constitute excusable neglect under 60(b)(1). See, e.g., Boughner v. Secretary of H.E.W., 572 F.2d 976 (3d Cir.1978); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 35 (1964); Transport Pool Division of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking Co., 319 F.Supp. 1308 (N.D.Ga.1970). However, these cases specifically require gross neglect or other exceptional circumstances and indicate that the client was generally diligent despite its attorney's lapses. Boughner, 572 F.2d at 977-78; L.P. Steuart, 329 F.2d at 236-37; Transport Pool, 319 F.Supp. at 1311-12. Bio-Energy has demonstrated neither gross misconduct by its counsel nor its own diligence, especially considering that it received a copy of the notice. Thus these cases are inapplicable. 17 There is also a more fundamental reason why these cases are inapplicable. Although 60(b)(6) provides a residual equitable authority for vacating judgments, this Court consistently has held that 60(b)(1) and (b)(6) are mutually exclusive. Therefore, a court cannot grant relief under (b)(6) for any reason which the court could consider under (b)(1). Hall v. Alabama, 700 F.2d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859, 104 S.Ct. 183, 78 L.Ed.2d 163 (1983); Gulf Coast Building & Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 460 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir.1972). The holdings in L.P. Steuart and its progeny are at odds with this established policy. Therefore, relief is unavailable under 60(b)(6) as well.