Opinion ID: 2524595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was petitioner prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance?

Text: The test for prejudice that is relevant in light of the preceding is well established. In Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at pages 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, the United States Supreme Court explained that a defendant who pled guilty demonstrates prejudice caused by counsel's incompetent performance in advising him to enter the plea by establishing that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's incompetence, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted, instead, on proceeding to trial. (Accord, In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 933-934, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747; see also People v. Brown (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 537, 554, 223 Cal.Rptr. 66.) Petitioner specifically avers that, if counsel had informed him he would be deported as a consequence of his guilty pleas, he would not have pled guilty and would have elected to be tried. As he points out, we previously have recognized that a noncitizen defendant with family residing legally in the United States understandably may view immigration consequences as the only ones that could affect his calculations regarding the advisability of pleading guilty to criminal charges. ( Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 206-207, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 999 P.2d 686.) The Attorney General rightly reminds us, however, that petitioner's assertion he would not have pled guilty if given competent advice must be corroborated independently by objective evidence. ( In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 938, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747; see also U.S. v. Home (D.C.Cir.1993) 987 F.2d 833, 836.) In determining whether a defendant, with effective assistance, would have accepted [or rejected a plea] offer, pertinent factors to be considered include: whether counsel actually and accurately communicated the offer to the defendant; the advice, if any, given by counsel; the disparity between the terms of the proposed plea bargain and the probable consequences of proceeding to trial, as viewed at the time of the offer; and whether the defendant indicated he or she was amenable to negotiating a plea bargain. ( In re Alvernaz, at p. 938, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747.) Petitioner has not contended that his counsel inaccurately communicated the People's plea offer. Nor has he adduced any substantial evidence suggesting the prosecutor might ultimately have agreed to a plea that would have allowed petitioner to avoid adverse immigration consequences. While the prosecution also did not introduce evidence in this regard, the burden remains petitioner's to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his entitlement to relief. ( In re Johnson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 447, 460, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 957 P.2d 299.) In the end, petitioner pled guilty as charged; no charges were dropped. Had petitioner proceeded to trial on the drug charges against him, and had the prosecution chosen to seek maximum penalties, petitioner faced a maximum total punishment of five years and four months of incarceration. The plea bargain that petitioner reached with the district attorney burdened him with only 180 days of local incarceration and three years of probation. The choice, moreover, that petitioner would have faced at the time he was considering whether to plead, even had he been properly advised, would not have been between, on the one hand, pleading guilty and being deported and, on the other, going to trial and avoiding deportation. While it is true that by insisting on trial petitioner would for a period have retained a theoretical possibility of evading the conviction that rendered him deportable and excludable, it is equally true that a conviction following trial would have subjected him to the same immigration consequences. In determining whether or not a defendant who has pled guilty would have insisted on proceeding to trial had he received competent advice, an appellate court also may consider the probable outcome of any trial, to the extent that may be discerned. (Cf. Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 59, 106 S.Ct. 366 [probable trial outcome relevant in assessing prejudice from counsel's failure to discover exculpatory evidence or present affirmative defense]; accord, Roe v. Flores-Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 485 [120 S.Ct. at p. 1039].) Petitioner states that he has consistently maintained his innocence and asserts that the police report shows he has a triable case, but nothing in his declaration or the other evidence he offered indicates how he might have been able to avoid conviction or what specific defenses might have been available to him at trial. Nor did petitioner explain at the hearing on the order to show cause how the evidence might have exonerated him. Based upon our examination of the entire record, petitioner fails, ultimately, to persuade us that it is reasonably probable he would have forgone the distinctly favorable outcome he obtained by pleading, and instead insisted on proceeding to trial, had trial counsel not misadvised him about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. (See Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366; In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 934, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747.)