Opinion ID: 1708888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: summary judgment regarding independent fire.

Text: Nunley contends the issue of Merrill's actual or apparent authority is a material issue of fact that should be resolved by trial on the merits, not by summary judgment. Nunley also argues that the special notice mailed to him on January 7, 1985, by Independent Fire created an issue of fact as to Independent Fire's knowledge that Nunley's policy had been issued. The case of Resolute Insurance Co. v. State, 290 So.2d 599 (Miss. 1974), is closely on point and is virtually indistinguishable from the instant case. In that case, the son of a deceased agent for Resolute Insurance Company came into possession of various numbered, blank powers of attorney which he used to make bail bonds for four persons who were arrested and incarcerated. The deceased agent's son procured the release of the four prisoners, and upon the subsequent failure of the principals to appear as required by the bond, forfeiture on the bonds was sought. The insurance company sought to vacate the judgment on the grounds that the bonds had not been executed with the knowledge, consent and authority of the insurance company. However, final judgment was taken on the bonds, and the insurance company appealed. This Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying the insurance company's petition to vacate the judgment on the bond. This Court found the following uncontradicted facts regarding the question of agency: The John Wilson who called and arranged for the release of the prisoners was the son of a former agent of Resolute Insurance Company. The elder John Wilson died in August of 1971, and soon after his death an attorney from Resolute Insurance Company was sent to Augusta, Georgia, to gather all papers and documents pertaining to Resolute Insurance Company. Evidently, the four powers of attorney and qualifying power of attorney were acquired by the son, John Wilson, without the knowledge of Resolute. The son was never an agent for Resolute, nor was he ever a licensed bondsman in Georgia or in Mississippi. [Emphasis added]       It is evident from the testimony in this case that John S. Wilson, Jr., was not the agent of Resolute Insurance Company at the time he signed the bonds and filed the power of attorney ... 290 So.2d at 601. In the instant case, Barbara Merrill never filed a certificate of authority for Independent Fire and therefore was not a licensed agent. The policy forms in her office had been in the possession of the previous owners who were licensed agents. Independent Fire also sent a representative to gather the policy forms which could not be found. Accordingly, the lack of an agency relationship between Merrill and Independent Fire is obvious. Nunley contends there remains a material issue of fact as to whether Merrill had apparent authority. The Resolute Court dealt with the issue of apparent authority simply by stating: A good deal of authority has been cited on the law of agency in this case as to the apparent authority of any agent, none of which is applicable since no agent or agency is involved herein. 290 So.2d at 603. Since there is no agency relationship between Merrill and Independent Fire, this Court also need not consider Merrill's apparent authority. Nunley next charges that Independent Fire should be estopped from denying that they issued the policy since they obtained a benefit from the issuance of the policy. This Court likewise dealt with this issue in the Resolute case, where we stated: We must bear in mind that the record in this case shows conclusively that the insurance company had no knowledge that the son of their deceased agent had obtained possession of the various powers of attorney furnished his father by the insurance company. Nunley attempts to show Independent Fire had knowledge of the facts by pointing to the special notice sent by Independent Fire to Nunley in January of 1985. It should be noted that when this notice was sent, Independent Fire had denied any liability and affidavits had been filed stating Independent Fire had no knowledge of the policy issuance. Based on the affidavits of Vice President Smith that Independent Fire received no premium for the policy, we find that the lower court justifiably relied on the explanation of Independent Fire concerning the special notice. There is nothing in this record to suggest this special notice was anything more than Independent Fire deposed it was. Merrill obviously knew she had no contract with Independent Fire, or she would not have been scurrying about on April 2 attempting to secure coverage with Vanguard. Based on the documentary evidence, affidavits, and depositions submitted by Independent Fire, we conclude that no material issue of fact existed since it was undisputed that Merrill was never an agent of Independent Fire when she purportedly issued the policy.