Opinion ID: 2816330
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contribution Claims Are Subject to a Three Year

Text: Statute of Limitations. CERCLA § 113 provides two express avenues for contribution: § 113(f)(1) (“during or following” specified civil actions) and § 113(f)(3)(B) (after an administrative or judicially approved settlement that resolves liability to the United States or a State). Section 113(g)(3) then provides two corresponding 3-year limitations periods for contribution actions, one beginning at the date of judgment, § 113(g)(3)(A), and one beginning at the date of settlement, § 113(g)(3)(B). . . . [T]o assert a contribution claim under § 113(f), a party must satisfy the conditions of either § 113(f)(1) or § 113(f)(3)(B). Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167. Thus, one “avenue” to a contribution claim accrues once a polluter sues or is sued under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107, and that avenue remains open while the lawsuit is unresolved. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Then the statute of limitations begins to run once that litigation settles or ends by judgment. See id.; see also id. ASARCO V. CELANESE CHEMICAL CO. 11 § 9613(g)(3). The other “avenue” to a contribution claim accrues when a person has “resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement.” Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B). ASARCO contends that the special rights conferred by CERCLA § 113(f)(2)–(3) on persons that settle liability or costs with the government suggest, when read in conjunction with the rest of the statute, that private-party settlements may not activate the statute of limitations for contribution claims. But that is not what the plain language of the statute suggests. In order for a contribution claim to accrue, one of two necessary conditions must occur: (1) a lawsuit under either CERCLA §§ 106 or 107, or (2) a judicially approved settlement with the United States or a State. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) & (f)(3)(B); see also Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166 (“There is no reason why Congress would bother to specify conditions under which a person may bring a contribution claim, and at the same time allow contribution actions absent those conditions.”). The lack of any specified statute of limitations for a contribution claim pled in the absence of either of the two necessary conditions—as would be the case for a contribution claim pled as a result of a “purely voluntary cleanup”—means that a claim absent either of the two necessary conditions is unavailable. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167. It follows, then, that any contribution claim is subject to the three-year statute of limitations. See id. 12 ASARCO V. CELANESE CHEMICAL CO. B. The Wickland Agreement Triggered the Statute of Limitations of § 9613(g)(3)(B). The statute of limitations for a contribution claim is triggered by the date upon which the judgment or settlement that underlies the claim is entered. See id. When the CERCLA §§ 106 or 107 lawsuit is over and a judgment is entered, the statute of limitations begins to run on the cause of action for contribution that accrued during the pendency of that litigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(A). When a person resolves its liability to the United States or a State through an administrative or judicially approved settlement, a right to assert a contribution claim against other PRPs also accrues. Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B). Such a settlement starts the clock on the three-year statute of limitations for the contribution claim that accrues on the basis of that settlement. Id. § 9613(g)(3)(B). ASARCO argues that only judicially approved settlements involving the United States or a State may trigger the statute of limitations under § 9613(g)(3)(B), and that private-party judicially approved settlements cannot trigger the § 9613(g)(3)(B) statute of limitations. We hold that private-party judicially approved settlements may trigger the § 9613(g)(3)(B) statute of limitations. “Statutes of limitations are intended to provide notice to defendants of a claim before the underlying evidence becomes stale.” In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008). A primary canon of statutory interpretation is that the plain language of a statute should be enforced according to its terms, in light of its context. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997); Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atl. Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1989). ASARCO V. CELANESE CHEMICAL CO. 13 When interpreting a statute, our task is to construe what Congress has enacted. We look first to the plain language of the statute, construing the provisions of the entire law, including its object and policy, to ascertain the intent of Congress. We will resort to legislative history, even where the plain language is unambiguous, where the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress meant something other than what it said. Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 877 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Thus, we examine the statute as a whole, including its purpose and various provisions.” Id. at 880. We construe the statute in context to avoid superfluities. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166 (citing Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)). If possible, we “construe a statute to give every word some operative effect.” Id. at 167 (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35–36 (1992)). “Clearly, neither a logician nor a grammarian will find comfort in the world of CERCLA. It is not our task, however, to clean up the baffling language Congress gave us . . . .” Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 883. Here, ASARCO suggests that we read into the statutory language a requirement that a judicially approved settlement include the United States or a State in order to trigger the statute of limitations at § 9613(g)(3)(B), just as the settlement bar at § 9613(f)(2) and the accrual of contribution rights under § 9613(f)(3)(B) each require that a judicially approved settlement include the United States or a State as a party. First, the plain language of the statute of limitations does not limit triggering “judicially approved settlements” to those 14 ASARCO V. CELANESE CHEMICAL CO. involving the United States or a State. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B). The triggering event for that statute of limitations at § 9613(g)(3)(B) includes judicially approved settlements involving the United States or a State, but is not limited to those types of settlements on its face. We are wary of reading such an additional condition into this statute of limitations. See City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events, Inc.-W., 614 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Transam. Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1979)). Second, our reading does not result in superfluity. The provisions cited by ASARCO in support of its position are distinct in that they confer certain rights upon parties that settle their liability with the government. These rights may encourage parties to settle with the government at an early stage, thus facilitating the cleanup efforts that CERCLA was designed to promote. See Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 884. Judicially approved settlements that do not include the United States or a State do not confer such settlement protection. Whether or not a private party “judicially approved settlement” is also a “judgment” that would trigger the statute of limitations at § 9613(g)(3)(A) does not necessarily render the provision superfluous. See id. at 881–82 (substantial overlap in definitions does not render terms superfluous). Third, interpreting the statute of limitations at § 9613(g)(3)(B) to include a trigger for private-party judicially approved settlements ensures that every word has operative effect. To do otherwise would confer a right of contribution following private-party judicially approved settlements that would never expire. ASARCO recognized that it could have filed a claim for contribution following the ASARCO V. CELANESE CHEMICAL CO. 15 entry of the Wickland Agreement. Exempting these contribution claims from the statute of limitations would subject PRPs to litigation at any time following a private party settlement, and encourage private parties to settle with each other, rather than with the government, rendering the statute of limitations for contribution actions meaningless.3