Opinion ID: 1829773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: influence

Text: In the typical case where the appellants plead the existence of a confidential relationship and the automatic presumption of undue influence, the influencer is the beneficiary under a will, the grantee of a deed or a donee of an inter vivos gift. Miner v. Bertasi, 530 So.2d 168 (Miss. 1988); Estate of McRae, 522 So.2d 731 (Miss. 1988); Sacco v. Gordon, 515 So.2d 906 (Miss. 1987); Costello v. Hall, 506 So.2d 293 (Miss. 1987); Will of Polk, 497 So.2d 815 (Miss. 1986); McDowell v. Pennington, 394 So.2d 323 (Miss. 1981); Genna v. Harrington, 254 So.2d 525 (Miss. 1971). However, the facts in the case sub judice are quite different. In the case at bar, the appellants are asking this Court to extend the doctrine of confidential relationship and undue influence which is applicable to certain devisees, beneficiaries and donees to all instances in which attorneys serve as an executor for an estate and collect a fee for their services. This same question was before this Court in Sacco v. Gordon , and we declined to extend the doctrine for each and every case which challenges the actions of an estate attorney or executor. Sacco v. Gordon, 515 So.2d 906 (Miss. 1987). Nor can we agree with Sacco's argument that the executor of an estate and the attorney for that estate are in such relationships with the beneficiary of the estate that the presumption of undue influence arises, as a matter of law, in transactions between such persons. Sacco, 515 So.2d at 909. Therefore, rather than defining the relationships under which confidential relationship and the presumption of undue influence arises, this Court's approach has always been to evaluate each case on its factual merits in search of something more than merely a legal or domestic relationship between the parties to the transaction. Costello v. Hall, 506 So.2d 293, 298 (Miss. 1987). Fiduciary or confidential relationships may arise in legal, moral, domestic or in a personal context where there is overmastering influence on the one side or weakness, dependence, or trust, on the other. Miner v. Bertasi, 530 So.2d 168, 170 (Miss. 1988). Further, there is a presumption of undue influence which arises from a confidential relationship. Matter of the Estate of Vick, 557 So.2d 760, 769 (Miss. 1989); Harris v. Bradley, 539 So.2d 1040, 1041-42 (Miss. 1989); Matter of Will of Adams, 529 So.2d 611, 614-15 (Miss. 1988); Angle v. Estate of Angle, 519 So.2d 883, 884-85 (Miss. 1988). Chancellor Patterson found that a close confidential fiduciary relationship existed between Mrs. Elma B. McCaffrey and Davis T. Fortenberry during the period that the estate was open prior to the death of Mrs. McCaffrey. Our review of a chancellor's findings is well settled and very familiar. This Court will not disturb the findings of a Chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the Chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Bowers Window and Door Co., Inc. v. Dearman, 549 So.2d 1309 (Miss. 1989) citing Bullard v. Morris, 547 So.2d 789, 791 (Miss. 1989); Gibson v. Manuel, 534 So.2d 199, 204 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So.2d 947, 956 (Miss. 1988); Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So.2d 657, 661 (Miss. 1985); Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So.2d 705, 707-08 (Miss. 1983). We find that the record clearly supports the chancellor's finding that Fortenberry was Mrs. McCaffrey's trusted friend, confidant, personal attorney and business advisor in addition to being her son-in-law. There is no question that Fortenberry stood in a confidential relationship to Mrs. McCaffrey, and the chancellor correctly so ruled. Since the presumption of undue influence was established, the burden was on Fortenberry to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing proof. Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183 (Miss. 1987); Murray v. Laird, 446 So.2d 575 (Miss. 1984); McDowell v. Pennington, 394 So.2d 323 (Miss. 1981). This Court announced a three-pronged test for determining when a grantee/beneficiary has overcome this presumption of undue influence. Thus, our law may be summarized to state that when the circumstances give rise to a presumption of undue influence, then the burden of going forward with the proof shifts to the grantee/beneficiary to prove by clear and convincing evidence of: (1) Good faith on the part of the grantee/beneficiary; (2) Grantor's full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences; and (3) Advice of (a) competent person, (b) disconnected from the grantee and (c) devoted wholly to the grantor/testator's interest. Murray v. Laird, 446 So.2d 575, 578 (Miss. 1984). The third prong of the Murray test was modified in Mullins v. Ratcliff . The independent advice prong of Murray has been read too strictly. Considering the heavy burden placed upon one seeking to overcome the presumption of undue influence, we find it necessary to redefine the third prong of the Murray test. This we do to the end that the power our law vests in property owners to make bona fide inter vivos gifts not be practically thwarted by often impossible evidentiary encumbrances. We declare that the appropriate third prong of the test is a requirement that the grantee/beneficiary prove by clear and convincing evidence that the grantor/testator exhibited independent consent and action. Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1193 (Miss. 1987); see also Marsalis v. Lehmann, 566 So.2d 217, 219 (Miss. 1990).