Opinion ID: 164075
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: All current collective bargaining agreements to which [the Union] is a party;

Text: 35 4. The following records generated between January 1, 1998 and the present relating to Jerry Griffith, John Buntin, Wesley Stillsmoking, Floyd Woods, and/or Derrick Haggard: 36 a. Records of the payment of dues and other financial contributions to the [IU or Union]. 37 b. Records of the payment of pension and other retirement benefits made by the [IU or Union]. 38 c. Records of referrals for work to any employer through any hiring hall or other referral system operated by [the Union]. 39 d. Records of work performed for any employer. 40 e. All letters, memoranda, notes and reports relating to the activities or status of such persons as members of the [IU or Union]. 41 4. [sic] All minutes of meetings of the membership of [the Union] from January 1, 1998, to present. 42 5. All minutes of meetings of any committee of [the Union] from January 1, 1998, to the present. 43 6. All resolutions passed by [the Union] from January 1, 1998 to the present. 44 7. All manuals or other instructional material relating to means and methods to organize employees for the purpose of collective bargaining including so-called salting initiatives. 45 8. All newsletters and other publications of general distribution to the membership of the [IU and Union] from January 1, 1997, to the present. 46 9. Documents and other material generated by, or for, John Norman relating to his schedule of work and duties as an employee of [the Union], including, but not limited to, calendars, time slips, appointment books for the period of March 23, 1998, to April 3, 1998. 47 10. All written reports or notes of any oral reports submitted by John Norman between January 1, 1998, to the present in his capacity as an employee of [the Union]. 48 11. All letters written or received by [the Union], notes, memoranda or other material referring to or relating to Interstate Building, Inc. 49 Before the ALJ, Interstate argued that it needed these documents to support its affirmative defense to the Union's allegations. Specifically, Interstate sought to demonstrate that the Union representatives aspired to strip Interstate's employees and thereby damage Interstate's business. The Union objected to production of these documents on relevancy and confidentiality grounds. 50 The ALJ revoked all the document requests except for numbers 9 and 10, finding the requests too speculative in nature and that it was a fishing expedition type of subpoena or at best, an attempt at pretrial discovery, which is not allowed by the Board. The ALJ alternatively justified the revocation by stating that the requested materials were not relevant or material to any issue bearing on [Interstate's] conduct in this case dealing with its interaction with the job applicants, but appeared instead to be a collateral attack on the Union's salting program. Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that the likelihood of it producing any information that would tend to relate to any material fact in dispute is so remote that it is an unjustified burden on the parties and the procedures of the Board. 51 Initially, we reject the ALJ's conclusion that the requested documents were irrelevant. The ALJ's own discussion of the documents belies this conclusion. The ALJ found that [Interstate's] request would appear to be a collateral attack on the Union's organizing practice or `salting' program. Although we are uncertain what the ALJ meant by collateral attack, the ALJ correctly concluded that Interstate sought the documents in order to determine the nature of the Union's salting initiative, namely, whether Interstate was engaging in activity unprotected under the NLRA. The ALJ also allowed Interstate to question the General Counsel's witnesses concerning the requested documents, further undermining his relevancy conclusion. We agree with Interstate that if questions about a particular subject are relevant to the issues then documents relating to that same subject matter must likewise be relevant. Finally, we also agree with Interstate that the ALJ's alternative justification — that the document requests were overly burdensome and constituted a fishing expedition — is in tension with his relevance conclusion. The protection afforded by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2), which prohibits overly burdensome discovery, presupposes that the materials are relevant. 52 Our determination that the ALJ's stated grounds for revoking the subpoena were inconsistent does not, however, conclude our analysis. If the ALJ based his decision on two reasons, one correct (insufficient particularity) and one incorrect (irrelevance), we would hesitate to find an abuse of discretion. Thus, while it is true that some of the evidence sought may well have been relevant to Interstate's affirmative defense, we must also consider whether the ALJ was correct in concluding that the subpoena, taken as a whole, constituted a fishing expedition. See Drukker Communications, 700 F.2d at 732 (stating that more generalized `fishing expeditions' for helpful evidence ... have uniformly been rejected); J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 223, 231 (5th Cir.1973) (fact that Board's files may have contained relevant evidence did not entitle company to a wholesale fishing expedition into the Board's files); but cf. EEOC v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 310 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir.2002) (finding in context of EEOC charge that even some requests we previously considered to be administrative `fishing expeditions' are often permitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); NLRB v. Bakersfield Californian, 128 F.3d 1339, 1340 (9th Cir.1997) (reversing district court's holding that section 11(1) does not authorize the Board to engage in fishing expeditions at the expense of the newspaper's legitimate business interest); EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir.1974) (noting that some subpoenas which we have previously considered to be administrative `fishing expeditions' are often permitted). 53 Our review of the subpoena suggests that some of Interstate's requests were indeed overly broad; clearly, Interstate did not tailor its discovery request as closely as it could have. We are not, however, convinced that the requests were so overbroad so as to constitute a wholesale fishing expedition meriting revocation in almost every particular. We therefore find that the ALJ abused his discretion in summarily revoking the bulk of the subpoena. B. Prejudice 54 Demonstrating that the ALJ abused his discretion in revoking the subpoena does not, however, entitle Interstate to relief. Interstate must also demonstrate that the ALJ's abuse of discretion placed a prejudicial barrier in the way of [its] ability to present its case. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 1146, 1154 (D.C.Cir.2000); see NLRB v. Cent. Okla. Milk Producers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cir.1960) (There can be no cause for reversal [based on revocation of a subpoena] in the absence of some proof of resulting prejudice.). We conclude that Interstate failed to make a sufficient showing of prejudice with respect to the termination of Norman and the refusal to hire the May 12 applicants. 1. Prejudice with respect to the Norman termination claim 55 Regarding Norman's termination, Interstate received the requests numbered 9 and 10. These documents included all materials generated by, or for, John Norman relating to his schedule of work and duties as an employee of the Union, including, but not limited to, calenders, time slips, appointment books for the period of March 23, 1998, to April 3, 1998, and all written reports or notes of any oral reports submitted by John Norman between January 1, 1998, to the time of the hearing generated in Norman's capacity as an employee of the Union. Interstate concedes that documents contained in numbers 9 and 10 are not in issue. Included in these documents was Norman's written report, in which he recited his March 30, 1998, conversation with Harry Young. In this report, Norman stated that he told Young that Hopper would not be back, that I signed him to the Union, I told him that was my job. 56 Furthermore, at the hearing, Norman testified that he induced Hopper to leave Interstate, and Norman's testimony was confirmed by the testimony of Hopper. As such, we cannot see how the ALJ's revocation prejudiced Interstate's ability to assert an affirmative defense concerning Norman's allegedly unprotected activity. For this reason, we find that Interstate was not prejudiced by the ALJ's revocation of the subpoena as it related to the Norman termination violation. 2. Prejudice with respect to the refusal-to-hire claim 57 We conclude, for several reasons, that Interstate failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to the ALJ's conclusion that Interstate's refusal to hire the May 12 applicants violated the NLRA. 58 As an initial matter, we agree with Interstate that, in circumstances not well-defined by the caselaw, employee 3 misconduct might rise to the level of a disabling conflict, which in turn can justify a company's termination of, or refusal to hire, union employees. See, e.g., Contractors' Labor Pool, Inc. v. NLRB, 323 F.3d 1051, 1060 (D.C.Cir.2003); Casino Ready Mix, Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.3d 1190 (D.C.Cir.2003). Thus, Interstate could have taken the position that the May 12 applicants intended to engage in a sabotage campaign in order to run Interstate out of business, and that this disabling conflict constituted its motivation for refusing to hire them. But prevailing on this theory would have required Interstate to show that it would have refused to hire the May 12 applicants for this reason alone, i.e., even in the absence of anti-union animus. Ready Mixed Concrete, 81 F.3d at 1550 (emphasis added). 59 Interstate fails by a wide margin to provide the necessary support for this argument. Before the ALJ, and before this court on appeal, Interstate relied on its policy of dealing directly with job applications to justify its refusal to hire the May 12 applicants. According to Interstate's own brief, [i]t is apparent from the overall record that [Interstate's] only reason for refusing to hire the four individuals was their insistence on dealing with [Interstate] through a collective bargaining representative. (emphasis added). We cannot reconcile this statement with Interstate's prejudice argument on appeal, which appears to be as follows: (1) Interstate's other or true motivation for its refusal to hire the applicants was the sabotage campaign in which Interstate argues the May 12 applicants intended to engage; (2) the ALJ, by revoking the bulk of the subpoena, deprived Interstate of documents that might have demonstrated the existence of such a disabling conflict; (3) Interstate was thereby prevented from advancing its other or true motivation because of the resulting absence of documentary support; and (4) this obstacle to the presentation of its affirmative defense constitutes prejudice requiring us to deny enforcement of the Board's order. 60 We reject this argument for two reasons. First, denying Interstate access to the documents at issue did not prevent the company from explaining its true motivation for refusing to hire the May 12 applicants. Presumably, it was and remains the ultimate authority on its own motivation and could have articulated it absent documentary support from the Union's files. The revocation at most temporarily deprived Interstate of documents that might have provided evidence supporting the reasonableness of that other or true motivation; and, as we note below, even this possible deprivation was mitigated by the ALJ's curative statement that he would entertain additional document requests should the relevance of the documents become apparent during examination. 4 Second, the tension between the two positions Interstate advances makes it highly unlikely that the ALJ would have concluded that either justification rebutted the General Counsel's prima facie showing of anti-union animus. 5 Cf. NLRB v. Dillon Stores, 643 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.1981) (finding that the employer's proffer of a flimsy or unsupported explanation may affirmatively suggest that the employer has seized upon a pretext to mask an antiunion motivation). 61 Moreover, the record is replete with evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that Interstate refused to hire the May 12 applicants based on simple anti-union animus, rather than concern about a sabotage campaign. 6 Indeed, Interstate points to no evidence in the record that would support a finding that its motivation for the refusal to hire was its belief that the May 12 applicants intended to engage in a sabotage campaign. Thus, even if the requested documents could have substantiated the reasonableness of Interstate's ostensible motivation, Interstate would have to first point to evidence that this was, in fact, its motivation. Insofar as Interstate has failed to do anything of the kind, we cannot conclude that the ALJ's error prejudiced Interstate. Ready Mixed Concrete, 81 F.3d at 1553 ([O]ur review is limited to ascertaining whether substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusion that [the company] did not carry its burden. It is not for [the company] to prove that it ` could have discharged [the employee for his actions], but whether it would have done so regardless of [his] union activities. ') (emphasis added). 62 Finally, the ALJ allowed Interstate to question Union members about the existence of the requested documents and the information, if any, that the documents contained. Further, the ALJ specifically informed Interstate that it could renew its request at a later point: 63 If some things come up during the examination of the witness that would tend to indicate the presence of documents that are relevant to some issue that will be decided here, then I will entertain any subsequent motion by [Interstate] for the production of those documents. 64 NLRB Order, at 7. Despite this offer, Interstate made no further requests for the production of documents. Instead, it emphasized that its sole motivation in refusing to hire the May 12 applicants was its firm policy of dealing directly with job applicants as opposed to their representatives. 3. Conclusion 65 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Interstate failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the ALJ's revocation of its subpoena. 66 III. Whether Substantial Evidence Supported the NLRB's Conclusion that Interstate's Termination of John Norman Violated the NLRA. 67 We next consider the NLRB's conclusion that Interstate violated section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA by terminating John Norman's employment. In its July 31, 2001, order, the NLRB adopted the ALJ's ruling, wherein the ALJ concluded that Norman was fired because [Interstate] would not put up with Norman's organizing efforts ... [and Interstate] has failed to persuasively show that Norman would have been terminated even in the absence of his union activities. NLRB Order, at 10 (emphasis added). 68 On appeal, Interstate raises two principal challenges to the NLRB's conclusion. First, Interstate contends that it discharged Norman because he requested a wage increase, conduct which Interstate contends is not protected under the NLRA. Second, Interstate argues that it discharged Norman for inducing Richard Hopper to leave Interstate's employment, conduct which Interstate again contends is not protected under the NLRA. We consider each contention in turn. 69 With respect to the former, the ALJ rejected Interstate's contention that Norman's request for a pay raise constituted its true motivation for its discharge. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that substantial evidence supports this finding. 70 First, although Harry Young fired Norman immediately after Norman requested a pay raise, Young's comments to Norman did not focus on the pay-raise request; rather, as the ALJ noted, Young clearly express[ed] his irritation with Norman by commenting that Norman would just organize any new [worker] (and induce him to leave as Hopper did). Id. at 9-10. In other words, Norman's organizing efforts, rather than his request for a pay raise, appear to have been Young's primary concern. 71 Second, as the ALJ noted, Interstate had initially refused to hire Norman on February 23, 2001, based on his position as a union organizer. 7 In addition, Interstate contemporaneously engaged in numerous other unfair labor practices, including its unlawful interrogation of employees and its imposition of more onerous working conditions on those affiliated with the Union. The ALJ properly considered Interstate's contemporaneous unfair labor practices, MJ Metal Prods., 267 F.3d at 1065, and we agree that these acts support a finding of anti-union animus on the part on Interstate. 72 Third, before the ALJ, Interstate advanced pretextual explanations for Norman's departure, arguing that Norman quit and suggesting that Interstate fired Norman based on his poor work-attendance record. NLRB Order, at 9. As we have previously noted, the NLRB may properly consider the credibility of [the company's] explanation of the reasons for the discharge, MJ Metal Prods., 267 F.3d at 1065, and a flimsy or unsupported explanation may affirmatively suggest that the employer has seized upon a pretext to mask an anti-union motivation, NLRB v. Dillon Stores, Division of Dillon Cos., Inc., 643 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.1981). 73 We next consider Interstate's alternative justification for its termination of Norman: the fact that Norman induced Richard Hopper to join the union and leave Interstate's employment. 8 For purposes of argument only, we assume, as Interstate contends, that the ALJ concluded that Interstate terminated Norman based in part on the fact that he induced Richard Hopper to leave Interstate's employment. 9 We further assume, as Interstate suggests, that Norman's conduct in inducing Hopper to leave Interstate's employment was separable from his other, protected organizing efforts, and that Interstate therefore could have terminated Norman on this basis without violating the NLRA. 74 But even making these two assumptions, we must still conclude that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding of a violation. As we noted in Ready Mixed Concrete, [i]t is not [sufficient] for [Interstate] to prove that it could have discharged [Norman for his actions], but whether it would have done so regardless of [his] union activities.  81 F.3d at 1553 (quoting Presbyterian/St. Luke's Med. Center v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468, 1480 (10th Cir.1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second emphasis added). Thus, even assuming that Norman's inducing Hopper to leave precipitated Interstate's termination of Norman in part—making this a mixed motive, 10 or even a disabling conflict 11 case — we agree with the ALJ that Interstate failed to persuasively show that Norman would have been terminated even in the absence of his union activities. NLRB Order, at 10. 75 In sum, substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that the General Counsel for the Board proved a prima facie case of unlawful discriminatory discharge, and that [Interstate] did not meet its burden of showing that [Norman] would have been discharged in the absence of his protected union activity. Miera v. NLRB, 982 F.2d 441, 446 (10th Cir.1992). Accordingly, the NLRB is entitled to enforcement of this portion of its July 31, 2001, order. 76 IV. Whether Substantial Evidence Supported the NLRB's Conclusion that Interstate's Refusal to Hire the May 12 Applicants Violated the NLRA. 77 Substantial evidence clearly supports the Board's conclusion that Interstate violated the Act when it refused to hire the four May 12 applicants. The elements of a refusal-to-hire violation are as follows: 78 To establish a discriminatory refusal to hire, the General Counsel must, under the allocation of burdens set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 1612, 71 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982), first show the following at the hearing on the merits: (1) that the respondent was hiring, or had concrete plans to hire, at the time of the alleged unlawful conduct; (2) that the applicants had experience or training relevant to the announced or generally known requirements of the positions for hire, or in the alternative, that the employer has not adhered uniformly to such requirements, or that the requirement were themselves pretextual or were applied as a pretext for discrimination; and (3) that antiunion animus contributed to the decision not to hire the applicants. Once this is established, the burden will shift to the respondent to show that it would not have hired the applicants even in the absence of their union activity or affiliation. 79 FES (a Division of Thermo Power), 2000 WL 627640, at  (footnotes omitted). The Board agreed with the ALJ that (1) the General Counsel carried its burden of proof as to the elements of the requisite prima facie case, and (2) Interstate failed to establish that it would not have hired the applicants absent their affiliation with the Union. 80 The Board cited ample evidence supporting its conclusion that the General Counsel had carried its burden as to each element of its prima facie case. As to the first element, the Board noted the following: (1) Interstate had advertised its need for ironworkers; (2) Interstate stipulated that it hired 59 ironworkers between February 23 and September 15; and (3) Interstate continued to hire employees after refusing to hire the May 12 applicants. As to the second element, the Board noted that (1) the record establishes that the four applicants were experienced journeyman ironworkers, and (2) Interstate did not contend that the applicants were not qualified. And as to the third element, the Board noted Young's hostile reaction to the applicants' attempts to submit their applications. It found especially pertinent Young's questioning of the applicants as to their union status and his statement that they should file another goddamn complaint. 81 Once the General Counsel has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the company to demonstrate that it would not have hired the applicants absent their union affiliation or activities. Id.; Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1980 WL 12312 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 1612, 71 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982). Substantial evidence clearly supports the Board's conclusion that Interstate failed to carry this burden. 82 According to Interstate, [t]he basis for the Company's refusal to consider the employment applications submitted by five (5)[sic] individuals on May 10[sic] was that they sought to be represented by Union official John Hunter [sic] during the application process. Respondent Br. at 25. While it is true that Napier sent the Union a letter articulating its firm policy of dealing directly with job applicants rather than with representatives, the existence of such a policy does not render the Board's conclusion — that the proffered explanation was pretextual — incapable of satisfying a reasonable factfinder. See MJ Metal Products, 267 F.3d at 1065. Quite the contrary. 83 As the ALJ pointed out, evidence of Interstate's anti-union animus was plentiful. 12 We note that it included several violations of the NLRA that Interstate does not challenge before this court, but which the ALJ and the Board properly considered as circumstantial evidence of the employment decision at issue. Id. (The NLRB may consider factors such as the employer's knowledge of the employee's union activities, the employer's commission of other unfair labor practices, the timing of the employer's action, and the credibility of its explanation of the reasons for the discharge.) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as we have already discussed, the contemporaneous circumstances of Interstate's refusal to accept the written applications strongly supports an inference that the refusal was motivated by anti-union animus: Young interrogated the applicants about their union status, and in refusing to accept their written applications told them to file another goddamn complaint. Moreover, in response to Buntin's direct question about the newspaper advertisement inviting applications, Interstate provided the applicants with a false explanation for its refusal to accept the written applications, i.e., that it was not hiring. See NLRB v. Dillon Stores, 643 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.1987) (proffer of false reason supports inference that true reason is anti-union animus). 84 Under the applicable standard of review, the Board's conclusion need only constitute a plausible inference from the evidence. MJ Metal Products, 267 F.3d at 1065. Interstate's stated policy of dealing directly with applicants fails, by a wide margin, to render implausible the Board's conclusion that anti-union animus motivated its refusal to consider the May 12 applicants. Accordingly, the NLRB is entitled to enforcement of this aspect of its July 31, 2001, order.