Opinion ID: 1207326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether there was an abuse of discretion by the order entered.

Text: This issue has two parts: (a) the order temporarily reducing the support payments and (b) the custody order. (a) The temporary reduction. Plaintiff contends that the trial court had no factual nor legal basis for this temporary reduction. Thus, she asserts that the modification was an abuse of discretion. The trial court found that defendant's income had been reduced because of a partial crop failure. The evidence supporting this finding is undisputed. The legal basis for the temporary reduction is § 22-7-6, N.M.S.A. 1953. This section states that the court may modify and change any order in respect to the   care,    maintenance or education of said children whenever circumstances render such change proper. (b) The custody order. The trial court found that circumstances had changed materially since the entry of the decree herein. This is not the proper basis for ordering a change of custody in this case. At three prior hearings, a change in custody was denied. The orders denying a change in custody were res judicata on the issue. Kerley v. Kerley, 69 N.M. 291, 366 P.2d 141 (1961). Upon a showing of changed circumstances subsequent to the last order, custodial provisions could be modified. Tuttle v. Tuttle, 66 N.M. 134, 343 P.2d 838 (1959). At the last prior hearing, in June 1966, the trial court found there is no reason for changing the child custody arrangements. Since the reason for a change in custody is a material change of circumstances, the previous orders denying a change impliedly found that a material change had not been established. Thus, the finding in this proceeding that the circumstances had changed materially, is based on changes which occurred subsequent to the hearing in June 1966. While the finding, as made, is too broadly worded, the finding necessarily applies to the time subsequent to the last hearing. Plaintiff contends that the circumstances before the court in the current proceeding do not differ from circumstances present at the prior hearings. Thus, plaintiff asserts the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a change in custody. In support of this contention, she reviews the testimony at the prior hearings and refers to remarks made by the trial court. There is evidence of a change of circumstances since the last prior custodial hearing. On the basis of this evidence the trial court determined that a change in custody was in the best interest of the children. As stated in Ettinger v. Ettinger, supra:    Such a finding, by the trial judge who saw the parties observed their demeanor and heard the testimony of the witnesses, is entitled to great weight. No matter if our inclination might have been different from a reading of a cold record, we would not be inclined to substitute our judgment for the facts found by the trial court, based upon substantial evidence.    We are satisfied that the trial court could reasonably find as it did, in view of the evidence before it. The remarks made by the trial court were not carried forward into the findings, conclusions or the order effecting the custodial change. No statement made by the trial judge is of any binding effect except as included in the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment. Wray v. Pennington, 62 N.M. 203, 307 P.2d 536 (1956). Judicial discretion is a discretion governed by principle and regular procedure for the accomplishment of the ends of right and justice. Urzua v. Urzua, 67 N.M. 304, 355 P.2d 123 (1960). Here, the trial court temporarily reduced support payments and made custodial changes. In doing so it was governed by the applicable principles of law and followed regular procedure in making its findings of fact. The results were pursuant to judicial discretion; not in its abuse. The order of the trial court is affirmed. It is so ordered. CHAVEZ, C.J., and CARMODY, J., concur.