Opinion ID: 1378445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: If a procedure for collective bargaining and for the determination of wages for city firemen or policemen in the event of an impasse is a matter of substance, rather than procedure, the provisions of this statute are irreconcilable with the city's freedom to choose its own political form.

Text: Even assuming, but by no means conceding, that a procedure for collective bargaining and for the determination of wages for city firemen and policemen in the event of an impasse is not a statute addressed to a concern of the state with the   procedures of local agencies, the imposition upon a city of the procedure provided by this state statute would be irreconcilable with its freedom to choose its own political form. The majority holds that the procedure provided by this statute is not irreconcilable with the freedom of this city to choose its own political form for the following reasons: (a) PECBA does not deal with the structure of local government. (97) This case involves structure and procedures of state government, not local government. (99)    [T]he political forms and procedures by which a city decides matters which remain within its legislative purview is unchanged. 99. (Emphasis added) See also 99. (b) This is so because an ultimate decision under PECBA is made by a process of arbitration provided and conducted by ERB, an agency of the state.    The statute    assumes that the arbitrator works [for] the state in the implementation of state policy (98) and because PECBA provides for certain decision-making arrangements at the state level as an implementive device for its primary substantive objectives of the state. 99. (Emphasis added) (c) There is a distinction between a state statute which provides that programs for city employes are to be administered by a state-mandated local board and a statute which, as in this case, provides for administration of such a program by a state board. 97. It does not follow from the single fact that PECBA does not deal with the structure of local government and that PECBA makes no organic change to the political form of local government that this statute, which requires arbitration of disputes between a city and its employees, is not a statute which is irreconcilable with the local community's freedom to choose its own political form, as the majority would conclude. For the same reasons, that conclusion does not follow from the finding by the majority that the political forms and procedures by which a city decides matters which remain within its [the city's] legislative purview are unchanged. With respect to the statement by the majority that an arbitrator who acts under the provisions of this statute is an agent of the state, it would appear, upon examination of ORS 243.746, that the arbitrator is not an agent of the state, but is a person who, in most cases, would be selected by the parties themselves (the city and union) to act as a neutral person on behalf of both parties. [15] The further statement by the majority that the city has admitted that such an arbitrator is an agent of the state is at the least misleading, if not untrue, when that alleged admission by the city is read in context. [16] But even if the arbitrator is an agent of the state, it does not follow that the provisions of the statute, which strip from the city and its city manager the powers conferred by the city charter, are not irreconcilable with its freedom to choose its own political form. The further statement by the majority that the decision-making arrangements provided by PECBA at the state level are an implementive device for its primary substantive objectives of the state, although perhaps material upon the question whether this statute is substantive, instead of procedural, is immaterial to the question whether, if substantive, its provisions are inconsistent with the freedom of the city to choose its own political form. In LaGrande/Astoria I this court said that the central object of the Home Rule Amendments is to:    allow the people of the locality to decide upon the organization of their government and the scope of its powers under its charter without having to obtain statutory authorization from the legislature   . 281 Or. at 142, 576 P.2d 1204. (Emphasis added) In LaGrande/Astoria II this court said that:    the limitation expressed in article XI, section 2, should not be read to hinge on whether a city chooses to place a particular policy into its charter or into some other form of enactment pursuant to its charter   . 284 Or. at 177-78, 586 P.2d 765. (Emphasis added) [17] As for the distinction by the majority between statutes which provide for programs for city employees to be administered by a state-mandated local board and statutes which provide for such programs to be administered by a state board, any such distinction is no more controlling upon the question whether the statute is inconsistent with the freedom of the city to choose its own political form than upon the question whether the statute is substantive rather than procedural, as previously discussed. [18] To illustrate, take a simple hypothetical case: The charter of a small eastern Oregon incorporated city with a population under 500 (of which there are many) [19] provides for a mayor, recorder, treasurer, police chief and fire chief, and confers upon the city council the power to enact ordinances setting the salaries of each of these city officials. The police chief is the city's only police officer. The fire chief is the only paid fireman and is the head of a non-paid volunteer fire department. It would seem to be obvious that for the fire chief and police chief to demand not only collective bargaining for an increase in salary, but compulsory arbitration in an effort to secure salaries higher than those provided by such an ordinance, would be irreconcilable with the local community's freedom to choose its own organization of local government and the scope of its powers. [20] Finally, and as contended by the city, in LaGrande/Astoria I this court said that the 1906 municipal home-rule amendments are concerned with the structural and organizational arrangements for the exercise of local self-government, with the power of local voters to enact and amend their    municipal charters and to employ the initiative and referendum for `local, special [or] municipal legislation.' (281 Or. at 142-43, 576 P.2d 1204); Roseburg's provision for resolving by popular vote certain impasses between the city's administration and the city's firefighters concerns the structural and organizational arrangements for the exercise of local self-government, and to intrude an arbitrator into the resolution of such an impasse would modify, contrary to local preferences, the structural and organizational arrangements for the exercise of local self-government. [21]