Opinion ID: 844211
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: 1998 Amendment to Section 340.1 for the First Time Authorized Actions Against Third Party Defendants but Barred Such Actions by Plaintiffs Who Had Attained 26 Years of Age

Text: (11) We now reach the 1998 amendments that for the first time included certain third party defendants within the scope of the enlarged limitations period that was established by the 1990 amendmentsthat is, by former section 340.1, subdivision (a), providing that the time to bring an action for childhood sexual abuse may be extended until three years after the plaintiff recognized the connection between adult psychological injury and the childhood abuse (Stats. 1990, ch. 1578, § 1, p. 7550). The 1998 amendment stipulated that the limitations period of subdivision (a) applied for any of the following actions: [¶] (1) An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse. [¶] (2) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. [¶] (3) An action for liability against any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (Former § 340.1, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 1032, § 1, p. 7785.) Although the 1998 amendments now included certain third party defendants within the scope of the provision recognizing that the limitations period for child sexual abuse claims could run from the discovery that psychological injury was caused by the childhood abuse, at the same time the amendments provided a separate subdivision directing that no claim against a third party covered by subdivision (a) could be brought once the plaintiff reached the age of 26. Specifically, the 1998 amendment added a new subdivision (b), providing that [n]o action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) may be commenced on or after the plaintiff's 26th birthday. (Former § 340.1, subd. (b), added by Stats. 1998, ch. 1032, § 1, p. 7785.) [7] Finally, the amendments also declared that the 1998 enactment lengthening the limitations period for claims against third parties did not create a new theory of liability. (Former § 340.1, subd. (r), added by Stats. 1998, ch. 1032, § 1, pp. 7785, 7788.) (12) For a number of reasons, we are confident that the 1998 amendment imposed an absolute bar against instituting a lawsuit against third party defendants once the plaintiff reached the age of 26. Contrary to the suggestion of Justice Liu's dissent that undiscovered claims were not subject to the age 26 cutoff (dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 998), the 1998 amendment expressed the limit in absolute terms. It did not distinguish between discovered and undiscovered claims, but rather made plain that no third party action brought under section 340.1, subdivision (a)a provision that itself provided a limitation period that could be measured from the time of discoverymay be brought once the plaintiff reaches the age of 26. Absent from subdivision (b)'s absolute language is any reference to delayed discovery once a plaintiff with a third party claim reached age 26despite the Legislature's evident familiarity with the problem of delayed discovery in the 1990 and 1994 versions of the statute and its awareness of the need for express revival provisions. The Legislature made an obvious choice to use language for claims against third party defendants that differed markedly from the language it still used for claims against direct perpetrators. (See Moore, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 382 [An express legislative provision for circumstances which will toll a statute [of limitations] excludes, by necessary implication, all other exceptions.].) As to plaintiffs with claims against these third party defendants, the Legislature elected to toll the limitations period to age 26, but no longer. Our interpretation was shared by the court in Hightower ( Hightower, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 767; see also Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 208), and indeed, the Court of Appeal in the present case interpreted the 1998 amendments as we have done. Describing the law prior to the 2002 amendments, it observed that unlike for claims against direct perpetrators, as against third parties, ... the outside limit was age 26. [Citation.] Thus, under the prior law, any person discovering after age 26 that childhood abuse was the cause of his or her adulthood injuries was barred from suing responsible third parties. Plaintiffs' brief on the merits describes the effect of the 1998 amendments in the same way. Finally, legislative history supports the same interpretation. Attempting to strike a balance between the interests of the victims and the purpose behind the statute of limitations, the original bill was narrowed to carefully define the third party claims to which it applied and to require commencement of the action before the plaintiff's 26th birthday. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1651 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 30, 1998, p. 4, underscoring omitted; see also Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1651 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 19, 1998, pp. 1, 3, 4, 7.) Plaintiffs were 26 years of age or older on the effective date of the 1998 legislation. When the 1998 amendment went into effect, it is certain that their claims had lapsed.