Opinion ID: 2274864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Three aggravating factors based on identical facts

Text: The jury found three of the aggravating factors spelled out in Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 413 (d): that the victim was a law enforcement officer who was murdered while in the performance of his duties; that the defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an escape from or an attempt to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest or detention of or by an officer or guard of a correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer; and that the defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery. It is argued: It is obvious that three aggravating factors were being urged from a single fact pattern. The practical effect of this is that in virtually every instance involving the murder of a police officer there will be two or three aggravating factors simply because it is unlikely that a police officer will be shot during the performance of his duties unless the shooter is attempting to evade arrest for some other crime. To allow such a procedure defeats the purpose of separate aggravating factors, which is to provide the possibility of enhanced punishment on the basis of discrete instances of specified conduct. (footnote omitted). Calhoun cites State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 538, 250 N.W.2d 867, 874 (1977), for the proposition that it is not reasonable to construe the definitions in such a manner as to make them overlap and make the same identical facts constitute two aggravating circumstances. He also asserts, citing Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1979), that it has been held that where a murder is committed in the course of a robbery where money is taken only one of the two aggravating factors of murder in the course of robbery and murders for pecuniary [gain] may be applied. From this it is asserted: The evidence in this case arguably showed that the murder in this case was committed under circumstances which permitted the possibility of enhancement of the punishment from life imprisonment to death. However, there was no basis for permitting the pyramiding of aggravating factors based on precisely the same act. Such a procedure increases the chance of imposition of capital punishment without showing conduct any more dangerous or antisocial than would be present for a single aggravating factor. The statement attributed to Clark is correct. The statement attributed to Rust is likewise correct but it is of interest to note the next succeeding paragraph: We believe the Legislature intended by each definition to convey a different concept, at least to the extent that some added different and important element, e.g., motive or purpose, is included in each separate definition even though some fact or facts in a particular case may pertain to more than one of the definitions, e.g., pecuniary gain may be the result. 197 Neb. at 538. As the State argues, the protection of police officers is a valid societal objective. This is promoted by the first aggravating circumstance in this case. As to the second aggravating factor, that of committing a murder in furtherance of an escape, it can be seen that this could apply to the murder of a civilian just as easily as to the murder of a police officer. In fact, that is precisely the situation which existed in Rust. By the same token, the murder of a police officer is not necessarily limited to an escape situation. An individual might be on the prowl with the objective of shooting down a police officer because of a past actual or fancied grievance or, as the State suggests, a roof top sniper, selecting randomly, could make a police officer a victim. The added element here is the conduct of attempting to escape apprehension, which justifies the use of both aggravating factors. The third aggravating factor, murder committed during the commission of a robbery, does not need a law enforcement officer as a victim. It likewise does not need to be committed during an escape from lawful custody. The General Assembly through this aggravating factor seeks to deter a robbery. An example of overlapping aggravating factors is found in State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979). There the statutory (e) (4) factor was that [t]he capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000 (e) (4) (1980). The (e) (7) factor was that the felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. Id. § 15A-2000 (e) (7). These have more of a similarity than do the factors at issue in the case at bar. In that instance the court said: In submitting the issue under (e) (4), the court reviewed the evidence tending to show that on the night in question while defendant, Lois, Charles and Collins were on Rural Paved Road 2007 in Cumberland County, that Collins was shot and received some cuts to his body; that defendant and Charles then made statements to the effect that they did not want to be arrested for anything; and that they therefore proposed to take Collins to Robeson County so that he could not tell on them. The court then instructed the jury that if they found those to be the facts beyond a reasonable doubt, and believed that to be an aggravating circumstance, then they should answer the issue `yes'. In submitting the issue under (e) (7), the trial court reviewed substantially the same evidence. The court then instructed the jury that if they found those to be the facts beyond a reasonable doubt and believed that to be an aggravating circumstance, then they should answer the issue `yes'. We think the submission of the two issues on the same evidence was improper. This amounted to an unnecessary duplication of the circumstances enumerated in the statute, resulting in an automatic cumulation of aggravating circumstances against the defendant. 298 N.C. at 28-29. The court went on to say in that case: We do not intend to imply that the aggravating circumstances enumerated in G.S. 15A-2000 (e) can never overlap or that more than one of them can never arise from a single incident. We realize that in some cases the same evidence will support inferences from which the jury might find that more than one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances is present. This duality will normally occur where the defendant's motive is being examined rather than where the state relies upon a specific factual element of aggravation. 298 N.C. at 30. In its determination of facts the jury might well have found that there was no attempt to apprehend and therefore no escape from apprehension. Moreover, the General Assembly was entitled to make the legislative judgment as to capital punishment that such facts could and should be considered as aggravating factors. It was not error to submit each aggravating factor to the jury for consideration.