Opinion ID: 2270462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF KRS 218A.1432(1)(b).

Text: Appellant contends that KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal .... Martin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 38, 59 (2003) ( quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954)). However, the void-for-vagueness doctrine only requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. ( quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). See also Caretenders, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 83, 87 (1991). Further, where a statute does not implicate First Amendment values, [a] vagueness challenge ... cannot be aimed at the statute on its face but must be limited to the application of the statute to the particular conduct charged. United States v. Evans, 318 F.3d 1011, 1016 (10th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted); see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857-58, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (Vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.). Obviously, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not implicate the First Amendment. Nevertheless, because of the volume of convictions and appeals emanating from the application of this statute, we choose to address the issue directly rather than on a case-by-case, as-applied basis. Appellant's primary claim of vagueness relates to the fact that the statute criminalizes the possession of otherwise innocent household items, all of which except anhydrous ammonia can be purchased at almost any retail department store. The Commonwealth's expert testified that even anhydrous ammonia can be purchased at a welding supply or farm supply store or at a commercial refrigeration outlet without any requirement that the seller even keep a record of the sale. The argument might have more merit if we interpreted the statute as permitting a conviction for the possession of any, rather than all, of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. As we noted in Commonwealth v. Hayward, supra , there is no reason other than the manufacture of methamphetamine for having a combination of pseudoephedrine, lye, rock salt, iodine crystals, red phosphorus, toluene, sulfuric acid, and hydrochloric acid in one place. 49 S.W.3d at 676. The same is true with respect to the chemicals and equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine by the ephedrine reduction method. Regardless, a Missouri Court of Appeals recently upheld the constitutionality of a statute making it unlawful to possess chemicals listed in [related subsection of statute] ... with the intent to manufacture ... a controlled substance, because the requirement of scienter cured any uncertainty as to the nature of the conduct proscribed. State v. Condict, 65 S.W.3d 6, 17 (Mo.Ct.App.2001) ( construing Mo.Rev.Stat. § 195.420). Appellant points out that our statute, unlike Missouri's, does not identify which chemicals or equipment it is unlawful to possess under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b). In fact, the statute proscribes possession of any combination of chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine by any method. As noted in Part III of this opinion, supra, the evidence in this case indicates that there are at least three methods by which methamphetamine can be manufactured, each requiring possession of a different combination of chemicals and equipment. To require the statute to specify all of the possible combinations of chemicals and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine would be pointless and would make the statute unwieldy. Caretenders, supra, at 88. It would also preclude extension of the statute's proscription to new manufacturing methods if and as they are discovered. As noted in Hayward, supra , it is unlikely that anyone would possess the right combination by coincidence, 49 S.W.3d at 676, and the requirement that the defendant possess all of the chemicals or all of the equipment constituting the right combination virtually eliminates the possibility of arbitrary or subjective enforcement. Finally, as with the statute that was construed in State v. Condict, supra , the additional requirement that the possession be with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine cures any uncertainty as to the nature of the conduct proscribed. We conclude that KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) is not unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, Appellant's conviction is reversed and this case is remanded to the Pulaski Circuit Court for a new trial in accordance with the content of this opinion. COOPER, GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, and STUMBO, J.J., concur. KELLER, J., concurs except as to Part IV(B), to which he dissents by separate opinion. LAMBERT, C.J., concurs except as to Parts III and IV(A), to which he dissents by separate opinion, which WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins.