Opinion ID: 1315571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: opposition to grant of en banc review

Text: The panel assigned to this case pursuant to Sixth Circuit rules has considered carefully the materials filed on behalf of both sides in this dispute and has issued an order staying the temporary restraining order improperly entered by the district court. The motion for hearing en banc filed by the Ohio Republican Party and Larry Wolpert (collectively ORP) at this time is nothing more than a blatant attempt of ORP to overturn the duly authorized panel's decision to stay the district court's order that required the Secretary of State to likely violate both the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). By granting this motion and reinstating the district court's TRO, the majority of this court acts contrary to our own precedent, fails to follow the Supreme Court's precedent, and creates a new circuit split. The Secretary should not be required by various federal judges to violate those federal statutes, nor should she be required to reconfigure and reprogram the state's computers and practices this close to an election. Because the granting of en banc hearing and the simultaneous reinstatement of the district court's temporary restraining order will throw the election process in Ohio into total chaos, I dissent. On October 10, 2008, the Sixth Circuit panel stayed the district court's temporary restraining order. In our opinion, we explained our reasoning and concluded as follows: It is clear that the district court's four specific orders insert the federal court into the delicate balance struck by HAVA. We have expressed our concern that under established law ORP does not have a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(i). Assuming ORP has the right to bring such an action, we believe that the Secretary is likely to succeed on the merits of the issue of the proper interpretation of HAVA; HAVA does not mandate that the Secretary undertake the particularized matching required by the district court's TRO. Further, the irreparable harm caused by the district court's TRO is significant. With less than a month until the election, and less than two weeks until the beginning of counting absentee ballots, the Secretary cannot be required to undertake the extensive reprogramming and other changes to the election mechanics without complete disruption of the electoral process in Ohio. The irreparable harm to the voting public caused by the district court's order is equally clear. Finally, the intrusion into the state's processes by the federal courts with the ensuing confusion regarding the applicable process weighs heavily against the district court's order. As the Supreme Court wrote in Purcell, Given the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, our action today shall of necessity allow the election to proceed without an injunction altering the state's established practice. Purcell [v. Gonzalez ], 549 U.S. [1,] 8, [127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1] [2006]. We hereby stay the district court's TRO.... Sixth Circuit panel opinion of October 10, 2009 at 11-12. ORP asserts that hearing this case initially en banc and bypassing the duly assigned panel (or rehearing en banc) is appropriate because of the importance of the issues presented and the press of time. The time pressures in this case are entirely caused by ORP's last-minute challenges to the procedures initiated by the Secretary of State's office before the current Secretary began her position in 2007. While the Secretary's procedures have been known and in effect for a considerable time, ORP waited to file its suit in the district court until September 26, 2008, and did not file its motion for this temporary restraining order until October 5, 2008. If ORP had truly wanted to have review of the methods and procedures used by the Secretary, it should have brought its action much earlier. More importantly, the NVRA specifically requires that any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters must be completed at least 90 days prior to a federal election. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). HAVA provides for removing voters in accordance with the NVRA, and the latter does not permit registered voters to be removed based on computer matching. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(2)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6. Thus ORP has brought its action too late to obtain its requested relief; ORP's claimed press of time is both self-created and self-defeating. The press of time is not a valid basis for obtaining hearing en banc in this case. The other reason asserted by ORP for hearing en banc is that the case is an extraordinary case, involving the integrity of the election for President of the United States ... in a state vital to both candidates' chances at victory. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allow hearing or rehearing en banc where the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each of which must be concisely stated.  Fed. R.App. P. 35(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Yet ORP completely fails to comply with the requirements of this Rule: it has not specified in its motion for hearing en banc ANY specific question of exceptional importance. ORP's utter failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure suggests that its effort to obtain hearing en banc concerning this temporary restraining order is based on ORP's dissatisfaction with the panel's composition or with the merits of the decision of the duly assigned Sixth Circuit panel to stay the previous temporary restraining order issued by the district judge in this case. ORP is simply trying to get a different result by having a different forum within the Sixth Circuit. In summary, a hearing en banc in this case is wholly unwarranted and entirely unjustified. Granting a hearing en banc on this flawed motion and in light of the circumstances of this litigation is unsound intellectually and without any valid justification. Any lawyer reading the plaintiffs/appellees' motion for initial hearing en banc or its renewed motion can see that substantively it is baseless and procedurally it violates the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. [1] I dissent from the majority's rash and meritless decision to grant en banc review and to reinstate the district court's TRO.