Opinion ID: 51139
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Texas Arbitration Act

Text: In EGL’s motion to dismiss, EGL argued that even assuming the Agreement fell under the FAA’s exception for transportation workers, the arbitration provision was nonetheless valid and 3 For example, Davis stated in his affidavit that, in spite of the Agreement’s terms, he was required to work exclusively for EGL and work at least forty hours per week. The district court, however, concluded that Davis was “free to serve other carriers.” Additionally, Davis asserted that EGL required him to attend meetings twice a week at the EGL office and to keep and use EGL communications equipment. These four statements, arguably the most significant indications of control by EGL, were either contradicted or simply not addressed by the district court. 7 enforceable under the Texas General Arbitration Act (“TGAA”), Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code § 171.001, et seq. We agree. Where “an agreement contains a clause designating Texas law but does not exclude the FAA, the FAA and Texas law, including that state’s arbitration law, apply concurrently.” Freudensprung v. Offshore Technical Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 338 n.7 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, Section 7.03 of the Agreement contains a choice-oflaw provision which designates Texas law as the law governing the Agreement. Thus, because the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision does not exclude the FAA, both the TGAA and FAA apply to the contract. However, while both federal and state arbitration law may apply to a contract, these laws do not necessarily operate in harmony. Specifically, the FAA will preempt any state laws that “contradict the purpose of the FAA by ‘requir[ing] a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.’” Id. (quoting Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 362 (5th Cir. 2003)). In other words, “[f]or the FAA to preempt the [TGAA], state law must refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement that the FAA would enforce.” In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tex. 2006); see also Miller v. Pub. Storage Mgmt., Inc., 121 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The FAA preempts conflicting state antiarbitration law.”) (emphasis added). 8 Here, the FAA does not preempt the TGAA because this case presents the situation where the FAA refuses to enforce an arbitration provision (assuming for the moment that Davis meets the exception for transportation workers) that the TGAA would enforce. Under the TGAA, a written agreement to arbitrate is generally valid and enforceable with respect to controversies that exist at the time of the agreement or arise thereafter. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001. Unlike the FAA, the TGAA does not exclude a specific class of employees from its coverage. See id. § 171.002. Thus, even if Davis were an employee of EGL, he would still be subject to arbitration under the TGAA. We therefore hold that the Agreement’s arbitration provision is valid and enforceable under the TGAA, even if the Agreement is excepted from application of the FAA.