Opinion ID: 1762353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: royalty issues (1990-june 1998)

Text: We now address the Commissioner's conclusion that [n]othing substantively was done to resolve the royalty issue between [1990] and June 1998 when the respondent resigned from [the] practice of law. [16] The fallacy with this conclusion is that it assumes that by compelling the resolution of the royalty issue involved, the defendants would have been successful, and therefore, they would have received their escrow amounts earlier. Such an assumption easily ignores any interplay the expiration of the statute of limitations may have had in the resolution of this matter. Of course, it is easy to make such a call now without any real world risks to expectant or hopeful clients. For example, Adams' complaint filed April 30, 1985, alleged in part: 12. That the plaintiff derived title to the property in question by virtue of a deed . . . from Delorce Hall to Burtis G. Adams . . . a copy of which is attached hereto and labeled plaintiffs exhibit III. . . . . 14. That the defendants derived title to the property in question herein in part by virtue of a deed of conveyance from Jeff Wysor to Bruce Wampler and Delorce C. Hall, dated September 10, 1937. . . . 15. That the deed previously referred to above . . . created tenants in common. 16. That the plaintiff and the defendants are tenants in common with plaintiff owning an undivided one-half interest. . . . (Emphasis added). The initial escrow deposit was $11,000, yet the amount paid to the defendants for the previous year, 1984, was $59,073.66. This amount too was at risk, even ignoring the fact that following the filing of Adams' complaint, the defendant's lessee, Wampler Brothers, also filed a cross-claim against them for the full amounts wrongfully paid. Moreover, assuming that pushing for a quick resolution of the $11,000 royalty issue was the best legal approach at the time begs the question as to why this simple matter wasn't undertaken by Will Collins upon the payment of his retainer in 1991, or by anybody else in the subsequent years for that matter. As Marilyn Hurst testified to, why were so many other attorneys in the area afraid to take this case during those years? It is an answer we'll probably never know, as who really owned the coal and the disputed royalties was never determined not in the original court case, nor in this disciplinary matter. Being a court of law without the facts before us, we are not entitled to speculate as to who did really own the coal and royalties involved in the underlying action. [17] We only know that once later counsel was securedfollowing the expiration of the statute of limitationsthe defendant's successors received disbursement of the full escrow amounts with interest and without having ever paid the respondent, Craft, for any attorney's fees or escrow handling charges. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interest of the client and with zeal and advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has a professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. SCR 3.130-1.3, Comment 1. In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues. . . . SCR 3.130-1.2, Comment 1. As to Craft, [i]f an attorney is under a duty imposed by law, then the attorney is required to comply with the law. Where prior actions of the client or the circumstances of the representation place the attorney in the position of a surety, then the attorney's conduct must comply with the law of surety. If a dispute should arise between the client and the third party, concerning a properly asserted claim, then the attorney shall protect the funds and property until the dispute is settled or until ordered to distribute the funds or property. Kentucky Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. KBA E-383 (1995) (citing Unigard Insurance Company v. Tremont, 37 Conn.Supp. 596, 430 A.2d 30 (1981) (holding that attorney converted funds by disbursing to client in disregard of plaintiff's known claims)) (emphasis added). [18] An attorney may not do anything which will injuriously affect a former client in any matter in which the attorney formally represented the client. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 48 (2006).