Opinion ID: 1058768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Poolservice's Demurrer

Text: Baker argues the trial court erred in sustaining Poolservice's demurrer because the amended motion for judgment pled claims against Poolservice for breaching two legal duties: (1) a duty not to create or exacerbate a risk of physical harm in the course of making repairs to the spa and (2) a duty to make use of the company's superior knowledge to warn the homeowners about that risk. Baker contends Poolservice breached the former duty when it repaired the pump system in the spa, thereby increas[ing] the risk of suction entrapment and consequent physical injury beyond the level of risk that existed before the repairs were made. Citing § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, [4] Baker contends a repairman who makes [a] requested repair[,] but whose work nevertheless creates or exacerbates a dangerous condition is liable for injuries that result from the dangerous condition. Baker posits that because Poolservice knew that a fully-functioning pump would increase the risk of suction entrapment in the spa, it breached its duty not [to] make repairs that it knew would increase the risk of entrapment. Baker claims that Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d 358 (1979), in which the Court applied § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, [5] recognizes that a repairman is subject to liability for physical injuries resulting from knowingly return[ing] property to its owner in a dangerous condition [without] warn[ing] the owner about that condition. Baker also claims that under Hegwood v. Virginia Natural Gas, Inc., 256 Va. 362, 505 S.E.2d 372 (1998), Poolservice had a legal duty to warn the occupants of the premises of the known dangerous defect, the risk of suction entrapment. Poolservice responds that the trial court did not err in sustaining its demurrer because Poolservice had none of the duties Baker alleged. Poolservice contends its repairs did nothing beyond returning the spa to its normal operating condition and did not alter the product to make it more dangerous [or] increase the risk of harm. Poolservice distinguishes the case at bar from the principle espoused in § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, because unlike situations where repair work created a dangerous condition, Poolservice's repairs merely restored the spa to its original and intended operating condition. Poolservice likewise asserts that it did not create the dangerous condition because any danger from the functioning spa existed long before Poolservice ever serviced it. Poolservice also argues the duty Baker seeks to impose on repairmen to warn individuals of product defects would transform the repairer into the insurer of products manufactured by others[,] a position which has no support under Virginia law. And it asserts that Featherall and § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are inapplicable because the repairs performed by Poolservice did not render the product dangerous and Featherall applied § 388 only in the context of the manufacturer of a product. Poolservice distinguishes Hegwood based on the utility work involving an inherently dangerous substance, as compared to the variety of services on pools and spas that it, as a maintenance company, provides. We agree with Poolservice. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of facts alleged in pleadings, not the strength of proof. Glazebrook v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 554, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003) (citations omitted). We are thus called upon to determine whether the amended motion for judgment alleged sufficient facts to constitute a foundation in law for the judgment sought. Hubbard v. Dresser, Inc., 271 Va. 117, 122, 624 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2006). On appeal, we undertake this review using a de novo standard, accepting as true all facts properly pleaded in the bill of complaint and all reasonable and fair inferences that may be drawn from those facts. Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 554, 587 S.E.2d at 591. Virginia law does not impose upon Poolservice the legal duties Baker alleged in his amended motion for judgment. While no decision has been cited by the parties or located by this Court determining the extent to which § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts may be applicable as a matter of Virginia law, it is clear that even if the doctrine there set forth were deemed to be applicable in the Commonwealth, it would not apply to the situation presented in the case at bar. Baker admits that Poolservice was not negligent in performing the repairs on the spa. Poolservice did precisely what the homeowners hired it to do: return the spa to its normal, working condition. Poolservice thus did not create an unsafe condition through its repairs because any allegedly unsafe condition existed when the spa operated as intended, and had been present since the spa was manufactured and installed. Returning the spa to its normal, working condition is not a basis of liability for a repairman absent a specific undertaking to do otherwise, which is wholly absent in this case. Baker's reliance on Featherall and § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to argue Poolservice owed a duty to warn is similarly misplaced. In Featherall, we applied § 388 in the context of a manufacturer's duty to warn of latent defects in a product. 219 Va. at 962, 252 S.E.2d at 366. We observed [t]he duty to warn stems from the view that the manufacturer should have superior knowledge of his product. Id. This principle has no application in this case because Poolservice was not the manufacturer of the spa or any of its component parts. Nor was it hired to perform any work associated with the drain cover. The principle espoused in Hegwood is also distinguishable from the legal duty Baker seeks to impose on Poolservice. In Hegwood, a gas utility worker restored the gas supply to a home, checked the gas-fired appliances throughout the house, and shut off supply to two appliances that were not working properly. Even though the repairman warned the resident of the unsafe condition and placed warning tags on the appliances to prevent them from being turned on, one or both of the appliances were turned on by an unidentified individual, causing carbon monoxide poisoning. Hegwood, 256 Va. at 365-66, 505 S.E.2d at 374-75. The Court held: [W]hen a company has actual knowledge of a dangerous defect in a customer's equipment or appliance, it has a duty to exercise reasonable care to shut off the service to such equipment or appliance. The company also has a duty to warn the occupants of the premises of the known dangerous defect. Id. at 369, 505 S.E.2d at 377 (citations omitted). Unlike the repair work provided by Poolservice, the utility serviceman's check of the gas-fired appliances in Hegwood was a general safety check performed as part of the utility's resumption of services supplying natural gas, an inherently dangerous substance, to the resident. The warning given by the serviceman was part of a duty the utility assumed in the performance of the general safety check. In contrast, the spa owner requested Poolservice only to perform seasonal maintenance and did not hire Poolservice to perform a general safety check of the spa, or to perform any work on the drain cover. Poolservice competently performed the requested repair work and returned the spa to its normal functioning capacity and was under no duty to warn of any potential dangers unrelated to its specific undertaking. Poolservice assumed no duties outside the parameters of those for which it had been contracted. Baker's amended motion for judgment thus failed to allege any cognizable theory under which Poolservice had any duty that could create liability for Virginia's death. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sustaining Poolservice's demurrer.