Opinion ID: 1896234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The APRA Exemptions

Text: Even if we were to deem New England Gas to be an aggrieved party and this case not to be moot, we would affirm the commission's order. Our standard of review in PUC matters is strictly prescribed by § 39-5-3, which directs that [a]n order or judgment of the commission made in the exercise of administrative discretion shall not be reversed unless the commission exceeded its authority or acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably. Clearly, the determination of whether these particular responses to data requests should be protected from public disclosure was within the discretionary authority of the commission. In this case, not only did all three commissioners agree that the responses to the data requests did not fall under any of the exemptions to the APRA, but also the majority found that the public's interest in receiving the information outweighed New England Gas's interest in not disclosing it. [6] We agree. The policy underlying the APRA is to facilitate  public access to governmental records which pertain to the policy making functions of public bodies   . Section 38-2-1. The PUC employs this policy when entertaining arguments that information submitted to it in rate cases should remain confidential. Rule 1.2(g)(1) provides that [a]ny claim of privilege shall be governed by the policy underlying the Access to Public Records Act, with the burden of proof resting on the party claiming the privilege. In accord with the APRA's policy favoring disclosure, we previously remarked, the exemptions listed in the APRA are to be construed narrowly, `so as to further the legislative purpose of facilitating public access to governmental records.' Providence Journal Co., 616 A.2d at 1136 (quoting Hydron Laboratories, Inc., 492 A.2d at 139). The commission considered New England Gas's request to keep the responses to data requests confidential in light of the APRA policy and the concomitant directive to construe the APRA exemptions narrowly. In its Report and Order, the commission rejected New England Gas's invitation to construe the APRA exemptions broadly. The commission explicitly considered the APRA policy in applying the exemptions and found that the New England Gas responses did not qualify. We cannot find anything illegal, arbitrary, or unreasonable in its decision. New England Gas argues that its data responses are exempt from public disclosure as commercial or financial information obtained from a person, firm, or corporation which is of a privileged or confidential nature pursuant to § 38-2-2(4)(i)(B). We previously have defined as confidential any financial or commercial information whose disclosure would be likely either `(1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.' Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Center Authority, 774 A.2d 40, 47 (R.I.2001) (quoting National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.Cir.1974)). The first prong of the inquiry is unavailing to New England Gas. Within the context of a rate hearing case pending before it, the commission may obtain the information through its subpoena power under G.L.1956 § 39-1-13. With respect to the competitive injury prong, the commission found no authority for the proposition that a labor union can be in competition with its own company. Again, we find nothing illegal, arbitrary, or unreasonable in the commission's finding. New England Gas further asserts that commercial or financial information provided on a voluntary basis is confidential for the purposes of exemption if it is of a kind that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained. Providence Journal Co., 774 A.2d at 47 (quoting Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C.Cir.1992) (en banc)). The commission did not address this issue in its Report and Order. Again, however, within the context of a rate hearing case pending before the PUC, information provided in response to the commission's data requests cannot fairly be deemed to have been provided on a voluntary basis. Subsection 38-2-2(4)(i)(E) exempts [a]ny records which would not be available by law or rule of court to an opposing party in litigation. New England Gas, however, does not cite any law or rule of court that would prohibit the discovery of such information in appropriate litigation. Moreover, New England Gas failed to seek a protective order under Rule 1.18(e) of the PUC Rules of Practice and Procedure. [7] The commission was not acting illegally, arbitrarily or unreasonably in ruling that this exemption did not apply. New England Gas further contends that the responses are exempt as [r]eports and statements of strategy or negotiation involving labor negotiations or collective bargaining under § 38-2-2(4)(i)(H). Although we acknowledge that the word strategy may be interpreted broadly to encompass the implementation of a plan concerning labor negotiations within the context of § 38-2-2(4)(i)(H), we do not believe that the commission committed error by refusing to adopt such an interpretation in this case. We also recognize that, in an appropriate circumstance, expenses incurred during the course of a labor dispute may be construed as part and parcel of the implementation of a strategy. That is not the case here, however. The information that New England Gas sought to be protected reflects the financial effects of the strategy, not its implementation. Although the argument can be made, and indeed one commissioner agreed, that such information ought to be protected from public disclosure under the balancing test because the damage to New England Gas outweighed the interest of the public in disclosure while the labor dispute was pending, the information does not squarely fall within § 38-2-2(4)(i)(H). On a previous occasion when a company attempted to keep financial reports from public disclosure, we remarked that a party seeking to have a document come within a specific exemption set forth in § 38-2-2 must carry a heavy burden of proof. Charlesgate Nursing Center v. Bordeleau, 568 A.2d 775, 778 (R.I.1990). New England Gas enjoyed its full complement of procedural safeguards in front of the Public Utilities Commission. The company argued its case for keeping the requested information from the public, but was unsuccessful. The commission considered the applicability of the APRA exemptions and found that the exemptions did not apply to the company's responses to the data requests. The commission presented its reasons for its findings and applied the policies of the APRA pursuant to its Rules of Practice. See Rule 1.2(g). The commission's findings are reasonable in light of the evidence presented. We see no ground on which to find that the commission exceeded its authority or acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably. In Charlesgate Nursing Center, 568 A.2d at 776, a nursing home involved in a labor dispute sought to keep from public disclosure a report detailing payroll and tax information, wage and salary expenses, a depreciation schedule, a statement of operations, an interest and indebtedness schedule; and a balance sheet showing a statement of the facility's financial condition compared to the previous year. We affirmed the Superior Court's judgment that the report was not exempt under the APRA because the General Assembly has presumably determined in its wisdom that the benefits of making such information public not weigh the disadvantage that may accrue to those who have a subjective desire to keep the material private and confidential. Id. at 778. (Emphasis added.) Here, the commission explicitly weighed New England Gas's privacy interests in keeping the responses confidential against the public's interest in disclosure according to the balancing test in Providence Journal Co., 577 A.2d at 663. The commission weighed the interests as follows: In this case, the information contained in data responses 4-06 and 4-05 relate to how much and in what manner ratepayer funds are being expended by [New England Gas] during the work stoppage. Because [New England Gas] is a public utility regulated by this Commission, the public needs and deserves to know how ratepayer funds are being expended. This interest outweighs [New England Gas's] speculative argument that the release of the cost information contained in these data responses will somehow impact the negotiations between [New England Gas] and [the union]. We find no fault with the commission's reasoning, which is now even more compelling in light of the fact that the labor dispute has ended. In its petition, New England Gas argues that the balancing test should prohibit disclosing its financial information to the union because disclosure could be damaging to New England Gas's future negotiations. The commission is correct to call this argument speculative. Moreover, we agree with the commission that the public's need to know how a utility company spends ratepayer money during a labor dispute greatly outweighs the potential harm to the company vis-á-vis a labor dispute. The strong interest of the public, and ratepayers in particular, in knowing what impact the costs a public utility incurs in a labor dispute may have on its rate filing is unassailable.