Opinion ID: 684820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reading of absent witness's prior testimony

Text: 5 Abedi argues that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the testimony of Mr. Omar Selitey during the first trial was read into the record of the second trial. Confrontation Clause violations are reviewed de novo based on the facts found by the federal magistrate, unless the magistrate's findings are clearly erroneous. Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.1993). 6 The admission of hearsay is not a violation of the Confrontation Clause if the declarant is unavailable and the declaration bears adequate indicia of reliability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). No independent inquiry into reliability is necessary when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987). The prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule is firmly established. See Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). Thus the Confrontation Clause was not violated if the prosecution demonstrated that Selitey was unavailable as a witness at the second trial. In this context, unavailability means that the witness cannot be produced despite the prosecution's good faith efforts. United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir.1984); see also Fed.R.Evid. 804(a)(5). 7 Selitey was in Jordan at the time of the second trial. No treaty between the United States and Jordan allowed Selitey to be subpoenaed from Jordan. The situation is analogous to that in Mancusi, where the witness was a permanent resident of Sweden: 8 Upon discovering that [the witness] resided in a foreign nation, the State of Tennessee, so far as this record shows, was powerless to compel his attendance at the second trial, either through its own process or through established procedures depending on the voluntary assistance of another government. We therefore hold that ... a federal habeas court was not warranted in upsetting the determination of the state trial court as to [the witness'] unavailability. 9 Id. at 212-13. The Court then went on to find sufficient indicia of reliability in the prior testimony because the prior proceeding was a trial of a serious felony on the merits, conducted in a court of record before a jury, rather than before a magistrate and because the defendant was represented by counsel who could and did effectively cross-examine prosecution witnesses. Id. at 213-14. Identical indicia surrounded Selitey's prior trial testimony. 10 Although the prosecution had no means to compel Selitey's return to the United States, it took several steps to persuade Selitey to return and sought to facilitate his doing so. An investigator made several phone calls to Selitey to attempt to persuade him to return. When Selitey told the investigator that he was in the Jordanian military and would not be allowed to leave the country, the investigator attempted through diplomatic channels to secure leave for Selitey. After the trial court ruled that Selitey was unavailable and his prior testimony could be read to the jury, the investigator travelled to Jordan to persuade Selitey to return and/or to persuade the Jordanian authorities to make Selitey available. The investigator met with Selitey, who was dressed in civilian clothes, in the presence of a Jordanian army major. The major stated that Selitey was about to undergo some military training from which he could not be released. 1 11 Once the witness was in Jordan, therefore, it is clear that the prosecution did all that was required under Mancusi, Ohio v. Roberts, and United States v. Johnson to secure the witness' presence and demonstrate unavailability. 12 Abedi argues that the prosecutor should have taken steps to prevent Selitey from leaving the United States in the first place. However, the prosecution had no reason to doubt Selitey's intention to return to testify at the second trial. Previously, Selitey had travelled voluntarily from Louisiana, where he was a graduate student, to California to appear at the first trial and both preliminary examinations. Prior to his departure for Jordan, Selitey advised the District Attorney's office that he had completed the academic year, that he was returning to Jordan for a visit, and that he would be returning to the United States to testify and to complete his education. Selitey had already spent nine months in jail awaiting trial for the murder for which Abedi was subsequently tried and convicted. Under these circumstances, the prosecution was not required to seek to detain the witness to prevent him from leaving the country. 13 Abedi points out that the prosecution, well in advance of trial, had reason to believe that Selitey would be unavailable, yet the prosecution did not inform the defense of the possibility until the eve of trial. This oversight does not, however, turn the use of Selitey's prior testimony into a Confrontation Clause violation. 14 In conclusion, the trial court correctly determined that Selitey was unavailable despite the prosecution's good faith efforts to secure his presence at the second trial. The reading of his prior testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 15