Opinion ID: 1242354
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Robin's Cross-Appeal

Text: In her cross-appeal, Robin contends that the superior court erred in characterizing the DTC stock as a marital asset. She argues that the DTC stock is her separate property due to alleged fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty by Jim. We disagree. The superior court concluded that there was no intent to defraud. Because the superior court did not err in finding that Robin knew what she was signing, see Part IV.A.1, supra, it also did not err in concluding that she was not defrauded. As to potential breaches of fiduciary duty, Robin correctly points out that Jim's role as a trustee and as the personal representative of Sig Wold's estate made him a fiduciary. However, even if the 1979 transfer of the DTC stock was a breach of this duty, the superior court did not err in concluding that Robin cannot successfully complain about it. As the superior court notes, a beneficiary who consents to a breach of trust generally cannot maintain an action against the trustee who breached a fiduciary duty. See Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 99.1, at 50 (4th ed. 1987) (If the trustee-beneficiary does not consent to the breach of trust, he can hold the other trustees liable. If he does consent to the breach, he cannot himself complain of it....). Because the superior court did not err in concluding that Robin knowingly consented to the November 1979 stock transfers, see Part IV.A.1, supra, we conclude that Robin may not now successfully complain that the transfer amounted to a breach of Jim's fiduciary duty. [8] Robin also argues in her cross-appeal that the DTC stock is her separate property based upon the source of funds rule. Under [the source of funds] approach, property is classified according to the classification of the funds used to purchase it: property acquired with separate funds is separate; property acquired with marital funds is marital. Property purchased on debt is classified according to the funds used to pay off the debt. Thus it is `acquired' over time. Zimin v. Zimin, 837 P.2d 118, 122 n. 6 (Alaska 1992). We have specifically declined to adopt this rule: It is one thing to hold that use of the source of funds rule in limited circumstances is not an abuse of discretion; it would be quite a leap from Zimin to hold that it must be applied in a given set of circumstances as a matter of law. We are not satisfied that such a leap would be appropriate. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 915 (Alaska 1994). In this case, the superior court did not apply the source of funds rule. Based upon Cox, we hold that this was not an abuse of discretion.