Opinion ID: 10013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Entitlement to Safety-Valve Departure.

Text: 73 Stewart argues that she is entitled to a sentence less than the statutory minimum sentence under § 5C1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, sometimes referred to as the safety-valve amendment. Section 5C1.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) provide that a defendant may receive less than a statutory minimum sentence if the defendant's guideline imprisonment range falls below the statutory minimum 4 and the defendant meets five criteria. The district court found that Stewart did not meet the fifth criterion and she challenges the requirement as unconstitutional as applied in this case. 74 U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5) states in pertinent part: 75 (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence that the defendant has concerning the offense or the offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan ... 76 Stewart's request for a sentence under § 5C1.2 was denied a because she did not identify the other participants in the methamphetamine operations. 77 Stewart argues, without authority, that § 5C1.2(5) is unconstitutional as applied because it subjects her to cruel and unusual punishment and involuntary servitude. To meet the requirement, she argues she must subject herself and her family to violent retaliation by the people she is required to identify and forces her to work as an informant for the Government. The claim lacks merit. 78 While this Circuit has not before addressed these challenges to § 5C1.2, we have addressed similar challenges to § 3E1.1 which allows a reduction in a defendant's offense level for acceptance of responsibility. In United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112, 109 S.Ct. 3172, 104 L.Ed.2d 1033 and cert. denied sub nom. Chambless v. United States, 493 U.S. 1001, 110 S.Ct. 560, 107 L.Ed.2d 555 (1989), the defendant challenged the constitutionality of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 because it encourages defendants to forego a jury trial in return for a lesser sentence. The court answered, [t]he fact that a more lenient sentence is imposed on a contrite defendant does not establish a corollary that those who elect to stand trial are penalized. White, 869 F.2d at 826. 79 This position was strengthened in United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.1990) (statutorily overruled in part on other grounds) in our response to another challenge to § 3E1.1. In Mourning, the defendant was denied an acceptance of responsibility decrease in his offense level because he did not accept responsibility for relevant conduct. The Court ruled that a defendant must accept responsibility for all relevant conduct and that § 3E1.1 was not unconstitutional. 80 'To hold the acceptance of responsibility provision unconstitutional would be to say that defendants who express genuine remorse for their actions can never be rewarded at sentencing' ... [S]hould the defendant choose not to accept responsibility for all of his relevant criminal conduct, nothing happens. No increase in punishment occurs. The previously calculated guideline range remains constant ... To the extent the defendant wishes to avail himself of this provision, any dilemma he faces in assessing his criminal conduct is one of his own making. 81 Mourning, 914 F.2d at 707 (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980)). 82 The same reasoning applies to Stewart's challenge to § 5C1.2. The fact that a more lenient sentence is imposed on a defendant who gives authorities all of the information possessed by the defendant does not compel that defendant to risk his or his family's lives nor does it compel a defendant to work for the Government. Stewart can refuse the option and receive the statutory sentence under the regular sentencing scheme. 83 AFFIRMED.