Opinion ID: 2365144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiple First Degree Arson Counts for Multiple Intended Victims

Text: Handy contends that the two charges of arson in this case are multiplicitous and, therefore, violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. The State argues that under Delaware law first degree arson is a person-protecting offense and, thus, charging multiple counts of arson for multiple intended victims does not violate the multiplicity doctrine. The scope of review is plain error. [2] Handy concedes that he did not raise this question to the Superior Court. This Court has previously held, however, that a multiplicity violation may constitute plain error. [3] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution states, [No] ... person [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... [4] One of the protections the Double Jeopardy Clause provides is against multiplicity, the charging of a single offense in more than one count of an indictment. [5] Prosecutors may not manufacture additional counts of a particular crime by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units. [6] The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy protects a defendant against being prosecuted for more than one crime if a defendant commits only one unit of the crime. [7] Indeed, the crime of arson itself raises several distinct multiplicity issues. [8] When determining whether the constitutional protection against double jeopardy permits multiple counts in any particular statutory setting, courts look to the legislative intent. [9] Thus, the question here is whether the General Assembly intended that Handy be charged with only one count of arson because he started only one fire or two counts because he intended harm to two victims. The Delaware Code permits a charge of second degree arson when a defendant intentionally damages a building by starting a fire.... [10] Section 803(1) permits a charge of first degree arson upon intentionally damaging a building by fire when the defendant knows that another person not an accomplice is present in the building at the time. [11] Section 803(2) relates to intentionally damaging a building by fire when the defendant knows of circumstances which render the presence of another person not an accomplice therein a reasonable possibility. [12] The State charged Handy under Section 803(1). The wording of the statute itself does not answer the question at hand. The wording of Section 803(1) seems to require the presence of one other person, but to permit the presence of more than one, for a single count of arson. The State argues that, to exclude the possibility of multiple arson counts, the legislature could have drafted the statute to refer to the presence of another person or people, or it could have provided that the building needed to have been occupied. It is equally true, however, that the legislature could have provided one count of arson for each person present to resolve this question unambiguously in the State's favor. Although the bare wording of the statute does not answer this question, commentary to the last major revision to the arson statutes tends to indicate that the drafters of the statute did not intend for multiple counts of arson to be available solely on the basis of multiple intended victims. The statutory law against arson has gone through several revisions in Delaware. [13] The original statutory provision concerning arson prohibited willfully or maliciously burn[ing] or set[ting] on fire of any dwelling house of another. [14] A general revision to the criminal code in 1972 essentially set the crime of first degree arson into its current form, punishing intentional burning when the arsonist knows or reasonably should have known of the presence of another. [15] In the commentary to that general provision, the drafters stated, This section imposes class B felony punishment upon arson which is extremely dangerous to human life. [16] They cited an example of a case under Section 803(2): A intentionally sets fire to an apartment building at night, knowing that it is such a building and that it is not unlikely that at least some of the tenants are asleep in their beds; they characterize A as guilty of arson in the first degree. [17] The drafters who wrote this commentary based their classification of arson as a class B felony on arson's danger to human life in general, not one particular human life. Moreover, their example contemplates one charge of first degree arson based on at least some potential victims, not only one potential victim. As far back as 1874, the General Assembly classified arson as one of the offences against private property. [18] The 1972 revision changed the statute essentially to its current form, but did not change the classification of arson as a property-based crime. [19] In determining whether a legislature contemplated the charging of multiple offenses based on multiple victims, Delaware courts have considered whether the offense is one against people or against property. [20] The legislature has consistently classified arson as the latter. The State responds that first degree arson, with its special focus on the probability of harm to people, constitutes a hybrid provision that is not subject to this general rule. The wording of even that provision, however, seems to focus not on the danger to one human life in particular, but to human life in general. An analysis of the common law roots of Delaware's arson statute does not support the State's argument. Rather, it supports the argument that arson is a single crime regardless of how many human victims it threatens or claims. Arson at common law was the malicious burning of the dwelling house of another. [21] William Blackstone explained that arson itself was an offense of very great malignity, and much more pernicious to the public than simple theft: because, first, it is an offense against that right, of habitation, which is acquired by the law of nature as well as by the laws of society: next, because of the terror and confusion that necessarily attends it.... [22] Blackstone went on to explain that arson is also frequently more destructive than murder itself, of which too often the cause: Since murder, atrocious as it is, seldom extends beyond the felonious act designed; whereas fire too frequently involves in the common calamity persons unknown to the incendiary, and not intended to be hurt by him, and friends as well as enemies. [23] This explanation does not contemplate multiple charges of arson depending on how many victims are intended harm but, rather, one single, serious [24] charge based the fact that fire is inherently, and unpredictably, destructive. This Court's research has uncovered no cases that are directly on point. There are, however, three cases concerning arson multiplicity regarding statutes that elevate the degree of arson involved based on actual injury to a victim. Delaware's statute, by contrast, only looks to potential injury. In two of these three cases, courts ruled that charging multiple counts of arson for multiple victims was indeed a violation of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. [25] Lozano v. State is instructive. In that case, a defendant started a fire that killed four people and injured five. [26] He was found guilty of five counts of arson. [27] The relevant statute provided for elevation of arson to first degree if bodily injury or death is suffered by any person by reason of the commission of the offense.... [28] The Texas Third Court of Appeals held, When bodily injury or death occurs as a result of arson, the statutory offense against property remains unaffected, although the degree of the chargeable felony increases. [29] In one case, by contrast, the court found no violation of the multiplicity doctrine. [30] That case, however, was sparsely reasoned [31] and was accompanied by a vigorous and lengthy dissent. [32] We conclude that the weight of the reasoning in the case law is against charging multiple counts of arson based upon multiple victims. [33] The State's past charging practice for arson cases differs from its charging decision in this case. In an order asking for supplemental memoranda from the parties, this Court raised the issue of two cases in which there had been several victims but only one arson charge. [34] In one, Chao v. State , this Court referred to an incident as the arson notwithstanding the existence of several victims. [35] The State has made a similar charging decision in other cases. [36] The State has failed to cite any contrary cases. The State argues that its prosecutorial discretion in select past cases is beside the point. We believe, however, that charging history is relevant, but not dispositive. The logical extension of the State's argument is that, in allowing multiple counts of arson for multiple intended victims, there could be some absurd outcomes. Courts should avoid interpretations that yield mischievous or absurd results. [37] Suppose, for example, that a defendant sets a fire in a closet next to a crowded banquet hall with 500 patrons, a fire alarm sounds, all file out quietly and uneventfully, and the defendant is captured and charged. May the State charge the defendant with 500 counts of arson? At oral argument, the State admitted that its theory would at least permit such a charging decision. There is nothing in the Delaware Code to indicate that the General Assembly intended 500 charges of arson in that situation, rather than one count to reflect the inherently dangerous nature of the offense of arson. Moreover, Section 803(2) alternatively prohibits arson when a defendant knows of circumstances which render the presence of another person ... therein a reasonable possibility. The legislature cannot have intended that the State could charge an arson count based on each person whose presence at the location of the arson is a reasonable possibility. [38] The fact that the Delaware first degree arson provision focuses on the intended harm to third parties, not the actual harm, demonstrates the vulnerability of the State's argument. In Lozano, the applicable statute elevated arson to first degree if bodily injury or death is suffered by any person by reason of the commission of the offense.... [39] The Delaware statute, by contrast, requires only that the defendant either intend harm to another or know of circumstances that make another's presence a reasonable possibility. The former statute provides a limiting principle for multiple arson counts because it is easier to identify all those who suffer actual physical injury because of the fire. It may not be so easy to identify all those to whom a defendant intended harm, or those whose presence is a reasonable possibility. The State does not lack for ways to seek additional punishment for those who start fires with the intent of harming multiple victims. In this case, it charged and convicted Handy of two counts of attempted murder in the first degree, one for Goslee and one for Houston. [40] This practice in arson cases involving intended victims may be appropriate, provided the elements of all the crimes charged can be proven. [41] Furthermore, should an arsonist cause actual harm or death, substantive charges based on that harm are available. [42] Finally, the result we reach is consonant with the result in other Delaware cases on multiplicity. In Passerin v. State, [43] the defendant started a fire in a large building housing his business as well as five other businesses, each in separate units of the building. [44] Each of the units suffered extensive damage. [45] The State charged and convicted the defendant of five counts of arson. [46] The Court rejected the defendant's argument of one match, one arson, holding that the General Assembly had indeed intended to provide for multiple counts of arson under the circumstances. [47] In that case, however, the General Assembly had specifically provided that where a building consists of 2 or more units separately secured and occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building. [48] Thus, in Passerin the General Assembly had made its intent known to allow multiple counts of arson for multiple destroyed units of a building. The commentary to a 1967 proposed revision, one which the 1972 revision implemented, [49] states, It would appear desirable to penalize an apartment dweller who intentionally starts a fire and thereby recklessly burns down the apartment house, endangering and inconveniencing his fellow tenants. [50] Here, however, the probable legislative intent points in the opposite direction. In certain respects, this case is similar to our recent case of Williams v. State. [51] In that case, we confronted the question of when the State could charge multiple counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. [52] We adopted the test set forth in Rashad v. Burt [53] asking whether the possessions were sufficiently differentiated by time, location, or intended purpose.... [54] The same risk of unbounded prosecutorial discretion attends the ability to subdivide a stash of cocaine in whatever manner one sees fit as it does allowing a count of arson for every potential or intended victim.