Opinion ID: 2514226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unanimity with respect to continuing offenses

Text: Apao argues on appeal that a specific unanimity instruction was required under State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 928 P.2d 843 (1996). In Arceo, this court held that, when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count . . .  any one of which could support a conviction thereunder  and the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless one or both or the following occurs: (1) at or before the close of its case-in-chief, the prosecution is required to elect the specific act upon which it is relying to establish the conduct element of the charged offense; or (2) the trial court gives the jury a specific unanimity instruction, i.e., an instruction that advises the jury that all twelve of its members must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75. As we have previously explained, the Arceo decision dealt with a situation in which the prosecution had adduced evidence regarding independent incidents, during each of which the defendant engaged in conduct that could constitute the offense charged, and each of which could have been, but were not, charged as separate offenses. [ Arceo, 84 Hawai`i] at 21-22, 928 P.2d at 863-64. Inasmuch as these independent instances of culpable conduct were submitted to the jury in a single count that charged but one offense, we held that a specific unanimity instruction was necessary to ensure that each juror convicted the defendant on the basis of the same incident of culpable conduct. Id. at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i at 208, 998 P.2d at 488. In Arceo, this court also defined a continuing offense as a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy, or an offense which continues day by day, or a breach of the criminal law, not terminated by a single act or fact, but subsisting for a definite period and intended to cover or apply to successive similar obligations or occurrences. Put differently, the test to determine whether a defendant intended to commit more than one offense in the course of a criminal episode is whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct intents. If there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, there is but one offense. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 18, 928 P.2d at 860 (internal citations and brackets omitted). In construing the phrase continuing offense, we also noted that the parameters of continuing offenses are circumscribed by HRS §§ 701-108(4) (1995), 701-109(1)(e) (1993), and 701-118(4). [6] Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 18, 928 P.2d at 860. As stated previously, the ICA, in the case before us, concluded that any continuing course of prohibited conduct conceived of can be broken down into a number of discrete culpable acts and, thus, even assuming an offense is a continuing offense, a specific unanimity instruction is still required. Apao, 95 Hawai`i at 363, 22 P.3d at 1010. This statement of law, however, not only contradicts the ICA's opinion in Kealoha, see supra note 5, filed two weeks after Apao, but is also contrary to this court's opinions in Arceo, Valentine, and State v. Rapoza, 95 Hawai`i 321, 22 P.3d 968 (2001). In Arceo, we explained that construing. . . [an offense] as simultaneously constituting [a] continuing and distinct offense[ ] would inevitably generate the very evils rendered unlawful by [the rule established in State v.] Modica[, 58 Haw. 249, 567 P.2d 420 (1977).] [7] See Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 22, 928 P.2d at 864. To allow the prosecution to elect whether to charge a Defendant with multiple acts or one continuous offense violates the defendant's rights to due process and equal protection because the same acts committed under the same circumstances could, by virtue of the prosecution's charging option or whim, be punishable as either a single offense or as multiple offenses, even though the proof essential to either result would be exactly the same. Id. Based on that principle alone, we believe the conduct of a defendant can either represent separate and distinct culpable acts or an uninterrupted continuous course of conduct, but not both. In Arceo, because the definition of sexual assault precluded the consideration of separate acts of penetration as a continuing course of conduct, [8] we held that separate and distinct culpable acts were alleged and, thus, unanimity was required. 84 Hawai`i at 30-33, 928 P.2d at 872-75. In contrast, we held in Valentine that a specific unanimity instruction was not required because the defendant's acts of reaching for, clasping of, and tugging on an officer's firearm constituted only a single episode between Valentine and the police officer and was, therefore, a continuing course of conduct. 93 Hawai`i at 208-09, 998 P.2d at 488-89. Moreover, as we later pointed out in Rapoza, the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm, of which Valentine was convicted . . . [is not] defined in such a manner as to preclude the prosecution from proving that the requisite conduct element was committed by a series of acts constituting a continuous course of conduct. Rapoza, 95 Hawai`i at 329, 22 P.3d at 976. Likewise, in Rapoza, we explained that the definition of the offenses of attempted second degree murder, attempted first or second degree assault, or first degree reckless endangering, as to which Rapoza was tried, did not preclude the prosecution from proving that the requisite conduct element was committed by a series of acts constituting a continuous course of conduct. Id. Accordingly, we held that Rapoza's multiple discharges of the firearm constituted a single continuous offense as to each complainant. In so holding, we explained that the danger present in Arceo  i.e., jury confusion regarding the facts constituting the conduct element of an offense  does not arise where the prosecution alleges that the defendant committed but one offense, adduces evidence that the defendant engaged in a series of acts constituting a continuous course of conduct, and argues that the requisite conduct element is satisfied by the defendant's continuous conduct, albeit that the defendant's continuous course of conduct may be divisible into conceptually distinct motor activity. Id. Unanimity was, therefore, not required. Finally, in Kealoha, the relevant offense was a violation of HRS § 712-1240, which prohibits the manufacturing of a dangerous drug. The ICA noted that, by its nature, manufacturing of a dangerous drug may be a single continuous offense. The general character of manufacturing connotes a continuing process of various steps or stages. In its ordinary sense, manufacture is the process or operation of making goods or any material produced by hand, by machinery or by other agency. Kealoha, 95 Hawai`i at 376, 22 P.3d at 1023. Thus, the ICA held that manufacturing under HRS § 712-1241(1)(d) may be proved as a continuing offense. The evidence in Kealoha demonstrated that the manufacturing of methamphetamine occurred at the same place and for a continuous period of time preceding the arrest. The prosecutor did not portray the defendant's conduct as comprising separate and distinct culpable acts of manufacturing methamphetamine nor emphasize any specific conduct upon which the jury could find from the evidence that [the defendant] committed a single charged offense on two or more distinct occasions. See id. at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75 (citations omitted). Hence, the ICA correctly determined that a specific unanimity instruction was not required. Based on the foregoing, we hold that Apao's conduct can either represent separate and distinct culpable acts or an uninterrupted continuous course of conduct, but not both. We also hold that a specific unanimity instruction is not required if (1) the offense is not defined in such a manner as to preclude it from being proved as a continuous offense and (2) the prosecution alleges, adduces evidence of, and argues that the defendant's actions constituted a continuous course of conduct. See Rapoza, 95 Hawai`i at 329-330, 22 P.3d at 976-977. Accordingly, the ICA erred in holding that a specific unanimity instruction is required even if the offenses charged were continuing offenses. Consequently, we next examine the relevant statutes and the evidence at trial to determine whether the offenses in this case were continuing offenses.