Opinion ID: 108556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: equal protection

Text: Because the evidence established little likelihood of improvement in petitioner's condition, he argues that commitment under § 9-1706a in his case amounted to a commitment for life. This deprived him of equal protection, he contends, because, absent the criminal charges pending against him, the State would have had to proceed under other statutes generally applicable to all other citizens: either the commitment procedures for feeble-minded persons, or those for mentally ill persons. He argues that under these other statutes (1) the decision whether to commit would have been made according to a different standard, (2) if commitment were warranted, applicable standards for release would have been more lenient, (3) if committed under § 22-1907, he could have been assigned to a special institution affording appropriate care, and (4) he would then have been entitled to certain privileges not now available to him. In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966), the Court held that a state prisoner civilly committed at the end of his prison sentence on the finding of a surrogate was denied equal protection when he was deprived of a jury trial that the State made generally available to all other persons civilly committed. Rejecting the State's argument that Baxstrom's conviction and sentence constituted adequate justification for the difference in procedures, the Court said that there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments. 383 U. S., at 111-112; see United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F. 2d 1071 (CA2), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 847 (1969). The Court also held that Baxstrom was denied equal protection by commitment to an institution maintained by the state corrections department for dangerously mentally ill persons, without a judicial determination of his dangerous propensities afforded all others so committed. If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice. This was the precise holding of the Massachusetts Court in Commonwealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 507, 254 N. E. 2d 779, 781 (1969). [4] The Baxstrom principle also has been extended to commitment following an insanity acquittal, Bolton v. Harris, 130 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 395 F. 2d 642 (1968); Cameron v. Mullen, 128 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 387 F. 2d 193 (1967); People v. Lally, 19 N. Y. 2d 27, 224 N. E. 2d 87 (1966), and to commitment in lieu of sentence following conviction as a sex offender. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972). Respondent argues, however, that because the record fails to establish affirmatively that Jackson will never improve, his commitment until sane is not really an indeterminate one. It is only temporary, pending possible change in his condition. Thus, presumably, it cannot be judged against commitments under other state statutes that are truly indeterminate. The State relies on the lack of exactitude with which psychiatry can predict the future course of mental illness, and on the Court's decision in what is claimed to be a fact situation similar to the case at hand in Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956). Were the State's factual premise that Jackson's commitment is only temporary a valid one, this might well be a different case. But the record does not support that premise. One of the doctors testified that in his view Jackson would be unable to acquire the substantially improved communication skills that would be necessary for him to participate in any defense. The prognosis for petitioner's developing such skills, he testified, appeared rather dim. In answer to a question whether Jackson would ever be able to comprehend the charges or participate in his defense, even after commitment and treatment, the doctor said, I doubt it, I don't believe so. The other psychiatrist testified that even if Jackson were able to develop such skills, he would still be unable to comprehend the proceedings or aid counsel due to his mental deficiency. The interpreter, a supervising teacher at the state school for the deaf, said that he would not be able to serve as an interpreter for Jackson or aid him in participating in a trial, and that the State had no facilities that could, after a length of time, aid Jackson in so participating. The court also heard petitioner's mother testify that Jackson already had undergone rudimentary out-patient training in communications skills from the deaf and dumb school in Indianapolis over a period of three years without noticeable success. There is nothing in the record that even points to any possibility that Jackson's present condition can be remedied at any future time. Nor does Greenwood, [5] which concerned the constitutional validity of 18 U. S. C. §§ 4244 to 4248, lend support to respondent's position. That decision, addressing the narrow constitutional issue raised by the order of commitment in the circumstances of this case, 350 U. S., at 375, upheld the Federal Government's constitutional authority to commit an individual found by the District Court to be insane, incompetent to stand trial on outstanding criminal charges, and probably dangerous to the safety of the officers, property, or other interests of the United States. The Greenwood Court construed the federal statutes to deal comprehensively with defendants who are insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial, and not merely with the problem of temporary mental disorder. 350 U. S., at 373. Though Greenwood's prospects for improvement were slim, the Court held that in the situation before us, where the District Court had made an explicit finding of dangerousness, that fact alone does not defeat federal power to make this initial commitment. 350 U. S., at 375. No issue of equal protection was raised or decided. See Petitioner's Brief, No. 460, O. T. 1955, pp. 2, 7-9. It is clear that the Government's substantive power to commit on the particular findings made in that case was the sole question there decided. 350 U. S., at 376. We note also that neither the Indiana statute nor state practice makes the likelihood of the defendant's improvement a relevant factor. The State did not seek to make any such showing, and the record clearly establishes that the chances of Jackson's ever meeting the competency standards of § 9-1706a are at best minimal, if not nonexistent. The record also rebuts any contention that the commitment could contribute to Jackson's improvement. Jackson's § 9-1706a commitment is permanent in practical effect. We therefore must turn to the question whether, because of the pendency of the criminal charges that triggered the State's invocation of § 9-1706a, Jackson was deprived of substantial rights to which he would have been entitled under either of the other two state commitment statutes. Baxstrom held that the State cannot withhold from a few the procedural protections or the substantive requirements for commitment that are available to all others. In this case commitment procedures under all three statutes appear substantially similar: notice, examination by two doctors, and a full judicial hearing at which the individual is represented by counsel and can cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence. Under each of the three statutes, the commitment determination is made by the court alone, and appellate review is available. In contrast, however, what the State must show to commit a defendant under § 9-1706a, and the circumstances under which an individual so committed may be released, are substantially different from the standards under the other two statutes. Under § 9-1706a, the State needed to show only Jackson's inability to stand trial. We are unable to say that, on the record before us, Indiana could have civilly committed him as mentally ill under § 22-1209 or committed him as feeble-minded under § 22-1907. The former requires at least (1) a showing of mental illness and (2) a showing that the individual is in need of care, treatment, training or detention. § 22-1201 (1). Whether Jackson's mental deficiency would meet the first test is unclear; neither examining physician addressed himself to this. Furthermore, it is problematical whether commitment for treatment or training would be appropriate since the record establishes that none is available for Jackson's condition at any state institution. The record also fails to establish that Jackson is in need of custodial care or detention. He has been employed at times, and there is no evidence that the care he long received at home has become inadequate. The statute appears to require an independent showing of dangerousness (requires . . . detention in the interest of the welfare of such person or . . . others . . .). Insofar as it may require such a showing, the pending criminal charges are insufficient to establish it, and no other supporting evidence was introduced. For the same reasons, we cannot say that this record would support a feeble-mindedness commitment under § 22-1907 on the ground that Jackson is unable properly to care for [himself]. [6] § 22-1801. More important, an individual committed as feeble-minded is eligible for release when his condition justifies it, § 22-1814, and an individual civilly committed as mentally ill when the superintendent or administrator shall discharge such person, or [when] cured of such illness. § 22-1223 (emphasis supplied). Thus, in either case release is appropriate when the individual no longer requires the custodial care or treatment or detention that occasioned the commitment, or when the department of mental health believes release would be in his best interests. The evidence available concerning Jackson's past employment and home care strongly suggests that under these standards he might be eligible for release at almost any time, even if he did not improve. [7] On the other hand, by the terms of his present § 9-1706a commitment, he will not be entitled to release at all, absent an unlikely substantial change for the better in his condition. [8] Baxstrom did not deal with the standard for release, but its rationale is applicable here. The harm to the individual is just as great if the State, without reasonable justification, can apply standards making his commitment a permanent one when standards generally applicable to all others afford him a substantial opportunity for early release. As we noted above, we cannot conclude that pending criminal charges provide a greater justification for different treatment than conviction and sentence. Consequently, we hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by § 22-1209 or § 22-1907, Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. [9]