Opinion ID: 2629946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Existence of Oral Contract Prior to July 24, 2001

Text: [¶ 57] Meima contends that the district court erred in finding that an oral contact between the parties did not exist prior to July 24, 2001. According to Meima, the record shows that the parties had a meeting of the minds and intended that an oral contract exist by May 25, 2001, the terms of which oral contract were purportedly as follows: (a) Broemmel would finance roughly $190,000.00 of the Torrington house purchase for Meima in exchange for twenty percent of the net profits of any future sales of the California properties[,] valued at over $2,500,000.00, if said properties were purchased from Mr. Kubich by either Broemmel or an assignee; (b) the Torrington house would be purchased by the Northern Commercial Trust and held in trust by Broemmel for Meima's benefit; (c) the Kubich option would be assigned to Broemmel so that he could purchase the California properties and hold clear title to them in his name subject to the agreement to split any net profits; and (d) Meima would market, develop, and sell the Baltic properties. Meima concludes that Broemmel subsequently breached this oral contract, and that the July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement is void due to a lack of additional consideration. [¶ 58] Meima's argument as to the existence, and terms, of such an oral contract is based on his own trial testimony, [29] his particular characterization of the record according to that testimony, and these resulting suppositions: (a) The record does not contain any evidence that the assignment of the Kubich option to Broemmel in May 2001 was a gift, so clearly, the conveyance was made in consideration for something. It is illogical, counter-intuitive, and against the weight of the entire record for the District Court to assume that Meima would transfer the rights to $2.5 million worth of real estate to Broemmel without having a contract in place. If there was no contract, Meima clearly would not have taken the steps necessary to secure a real estate purchase option allowing Broemmel to purchase the Baltic properties for only $140,000.00. (b) The parties must have agreed they would share in the development and sale of the Baltic properties, or why would Broemmel execute the April 29, 2001, addendum to the Torrington house purchase contract that removed all of the financing contingencies? The parties must have agreed to contract terms prior to that time, or why would Broemmel agree to provide a copy of his financing statement to the seller of the Torrington house in April 2001? Whether an oral contract exists is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 504 (Wyo.1997). The premise of Meima's argument on this issue presumes that his trial testimony was credible. The district court found that Meima's trial testimony especially lacked credibility. Issues of credibility and the weight to be given to testimony are matters to be resolved by the trier of fact and we may not substitute our judgment for that of a trial court with respect to issues concerning credibility. Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wyo.2004). See also Keever, 2003 WY 147, ¶ 14, 79 P.3d at 500. Accordingly, we need not consider this issue further.