Opinion ID: 2051176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Besco's Authority

Text: The State charged Fenske with burglary under the first alternative of our burglary statute, entering an occupied structure not open to the public without right, license or privilege to do so. See Iowa Code § 713.1; see also State v. Dible, 538 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1995) (recognizing different charging alternatives available under burglary statute); accord State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Iowa 1993). The State specified this alternative in the trial information and the jury instructions required the jury to find [t]he defendant did not have permission or authority to enter the residence. (Emphasis added.) Two other charging alternatives are available under section 713.1remaining in an occupied structure after it is closed to the public or after the person's right, license or privilege to do so has expired and breaking into an occupied structure. All of the alternatives also require a showing of intent to commit a felony, assault or theft inside the structure. See Iowa Code § 713.1. The record clearly indicates that at trial the State proceeded under the theory that it was Besco as the temporary occupant of the house, not Creamer as the usual resident of the house, who had authority to grant Fenske the right, license or privilege to enter the home. The court of appeals concluded the jury verdict could not be sustained because [i]t was within Creamer's, not Besco's, authority to issue ... permission to enter the home. Although the court of appeals does not cite legal authority for this conclusion, the issue is one that must be reconciled based on the facts of the case, not by reference to legal principles. See 3 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 319, at 238-39 (15th ed. 1995) (Permission to enter is legally significant only if given by the owner or occupant, or by a person with authority to do so.); see also State v. Johnson, 266 Kan. 322, 970 P.2d 990, 995 (Kan.1998) (concluding occupant of house had authority to permit entry into home based on facts and circumstances of case). Creamer testified she left Besco in charge of the house; however, she also testified she gave Fenske permission to enter the house, and approved of his entry on the evening in question. Creamer testified as follows: DEFENSE COUNSEL: On the night of this incident or any other night when you were gone, did Stan Fenske have permission as far as you were concerned to enter the residence? A. Yes. It went along with the tasks that I askedthe favor that I askedhim to do. Creamer further testified: DEFENSE COUNSEL: How often while you were still in town would Stan [Fenske] and/or his wife come over to the house? A. Probably three or four times a week. Q. And how would they enter the house? A. Maybe knock, open the door, kind of walk in, hello, what are you doing, is anybody there? Creamer further testified that she asked another friend to take care of the yard while she was away. From this testimony, it appears that Creamer did not relinquish all authority to control access to the home to Besco by leaving Besco in charge. The State's theory that Besco had sole authority to determine who could enter the house was clearly not established by sufficient evidence. Moreover, the State charged Fenske under only the first charging alternative of our burglary statuteentering an occupied structure without right, license or privilege. Creamer's testimony established Fenske's entry into the home on the night in question was proper. Although Besco subsequently asked him to leave, which she may have had the right to do as a guest left in charge of the home, Fenske's failure to leave at that time does not violate the entering alternative of our burglary statute. At most, Fenske's failure to leave in response to Besco's request violates the second charging alternative of the burglary statuteremaining in an occupied structure after the person's right, license or privilege to be there has expired. Fenske was not charged under this alternative and therefore cannot be properly convicted of this arguably unlawful conduct. Furthermore, Fenske's commission of two assaults while he was inside the home does not vitiate the initial consent to enter granted by Creamer. Felonious intent and entry without consent are two separate elements which must be proven by the State under our burglary statute. See Iowa Code § 713.1; State v. King, 344 N.W.2d 562, 563 (Iowa App.1983) (finding State failed to establish element of entry without consent despite fight which occurred after defendant's presence in the home for a period of time; elements of entry without consent and felonious intent considered separately); accord State v. Harper, 246 Kan. 14, 785 P.2d 1341, 1348-49 (1990) (under burglary statute, entry without authority and entry to commit felony or theft are two separate elements, both of which must be proven to establish burglary; burglary does not arise out of every entry when a crime is later committed). I conclude, as did the court of appeals, that no rational jury could find Fenske guilty of burglary under the alternative chargedentering an occupied structure without right, license or privilege. Therefore, Fenske has established the requisite prejudice to satisfy the second prong of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.