Opinion ID: 787685
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obstruction-of-Justice Counts

Text: 79 The evidence relating to the obstruction of justice was the same evidence that was used to support the convictions for conspiracy to obstruct justice. Thus, the evidence against Fortunato with respect to the obstruction-of-justice count concerning Michael is also legally insufficient. Polito's obstruction-of-justice convictions were premised on a Pinkerton theory of liability, as were Fortunato's and Polito's convictions with respect to the grand jury testimony of Giuseppe. As discussed above, in Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who does not directly commit a substantive offense may nevertheless be liable if the commission of the offense by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant as a consequence of their criminal agreement. Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 101 n. 3 (2d Cir.2003). Thus, under Pinkerton, a defendant may be found guilty on a substantive count without specific evidence that he committed the act charged if it is clear that the offense had been committed, that it had been committed in the furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy, and that the defendant was a member of that conspiracy. United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1208 (2d Cir.1975). 80 As discussed above, the evidence that Cerasulo and Fortunato specifically intended to influence the testimony of their respective relatives was legally insufficient with respect to the conspiracy to obstruct justice; thus neither Polito's nor Fortunato's obstruction-of-justice convictions can be sustained under a Pinkerton theory of liability. 81 2. Conspiracy to Make False Statements and Making False Statements 82 It is a crime to make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement[s] or representation[s] to an FBI agent. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); see Ballistrea, 101 F.3d at 834. 83 a. False-Statement Conspiracy 84 We find that there would be legally sufficient evidence, had all of that evidence been properly admitted, to satisfy the elements of a conspiracy on the part of Polito and Fortunato to make false statements, as alleged in Count IV. First, Imbrieco's plea allocution established the existence of an agreement among the defendants in 1994 to make false statements to the FBI. As alluded to above, although Imbrieco's plea allocution was improperly admitted, we must consider it as having been properly admitted for the purpose of assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. 20 And second, Cerasulo testified that, in 2001, when he was questioned by FBI agents when they served a grand jury subpoena on Giuseppe, Cerasulo denied having been involved in the Shootings. This testimony would be legally sufficient to establish an overt act in furtherance of the false-statement conspiracy. For the reasons set forth above, however, see discussion infra Part I, we vacate the false-statement-conspiracy convictions under Count IV, on the ground that Imbrieco's plea allocution was improperly admitted, and remand for a new trial on these charges. 85 b. False-Statement Counts 86 Count V charged Polito and Fortunato with making false statements under a Pinkerton theory of liability, for the false statements made by Cerasulo to the FBI in 2001 when he denied having been involved in the Shootings. Here, a rational juror could not have concluded that Polito and Fortunato could have reasonably foreseen when they entered into their false-statement conspiracy in 1994 that Cerasulo, as a natural or necessary consequence of their agreement, would make a false statement to an FBI agent in the course of a federal grand jury investigation that was convened six years later. As we explained in United States v. Jordan, 927 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir.1991), Pinkerton did not create a broad principle of vicarious liability that imposes criminal responsibility upon every co-conspirator for whatever substantive offenses any of their confederates commit. Accordingly, because Pinkerton liability does not lie with respect to Cerasulo's false statements to the FBI, we reverse the convictions relating to the false-statement offenses charged in Count V. 87 Finally, with respect to Count VI, the defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence relating to their liability for Fortunato's false statements to the FBI. Instead, they argue that we should vacate Count VI and remand for a new trial due to the prejudicial spillover from the evidence admitted with respect to the counts that we have reversed on appeal. We agree. 88 We look to the totality of the circumstances to assess prejudicial spillover of evidence. United States v. Naiman, 211 F.3d 40, 50 (2d Cir.2000). Specifically we examine: 1) whether the evidence on the [reversed] counts was inflammatory and tended to incite or arouse the jury to convict the defendant[s] on the remaining counts; 2) whether the evidence on the [reversed] counts was similar to or distinct from that required to prove the remaining counts; and 3) the strength of the [G]overnment's case on the remaining counts. Id. Here, we conclude that our reversal of the RICO and VCAR convictions also requires that we vacate Fortunato's false-statement conviction given the enormous amount of prejudicial spillover evidence admitted to prove the RICO enterprise and its extensive criminal activities. United States v. Tellier, 83 F.3d 578, 581-82 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fortunato's false-statement conviction involved a single statement to which all but a tiny sliver of the evidence admitted on the RICO charges [was] irrelevant. Id. at 582. Thus, it cannot be denied that the spillover prejudice with respect to Count VI was significant. Accordingly, we vacate the convictions relating to Count VI and remand for a new trial on that count. 21 89