Opinion ID: 6112077
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As Qualified with Other Probative Evidence

Text: Even though Plaintiff has not proffered enough evidence from which a reasonable juror could find he was the plainly superior candidate, he may still prove pretext under the relative qualifications test by proving (1) he was as qualified as the successful candidates, and (2) the record contains other probative evidence of discrimination. Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 815 (6th Cir. 2011). Regarding the first element, Plaintiff has certainly proffered enough evidence to convince a jury he was as qualified as Somogyi and Zito. Defendants argue that the predominant qualification for the position was leadership experience and reiterate Somogyi’s and Zito’s prior experiences. However, as explained above, whether leadership was the main qualification, or merely one of many factors in the decision-making process, is disputed. Additionally, Defendants point to the facts that no one in the draft room thought Plaintiff was one of the top two candidates and his location in Seattle as proof he was not qualified for the Unit Leader position. Surely, Plaintiff’s application had shortcomings that Somogyi’s and Zito’s applications did not (and some strengths Somogyi and Zito did not have), but the question is not whether he was the best 3 Plaintiff has not produced enough evidence from which any reasonable juror could conclude that he had better leadership experience than Somogyi. -17- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. candidate. Instead, Plaintiff must merely create a genuine dispute as to whether he was “as qualified” as Somogyi and Zito. First, Lilly testified that Plaintiff was one of the top four candidates for the position. In fact, Lilly even agreed that Plaintiff had “the necessary qualifications and experience for the job.” (Lilly Dep., R. 49, Page ID # 914.) Additionally, she testified how difficult a time she had deciding who to hire among the four, and even her managers noticed how close the candidates’ qualifications were. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiff has proffered enough evidence from which a jury could conclude he was at least as qualified as Somogyi and Zito. Having satisfied the first element, the analysis then turns to whether the record contains other probative evidence of discrimination. In assessing the probative value of discriminatory statements, courts consider “the declarant’s position in the [employer’s] hierarchy, the purpose and content of the statement, and the temporal connection between the statement and the challenged employment action, as well as whether the statement buttresses other evidence of pretext.” Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 393 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 356). Plaintiff relies on two comments made by Robert Bowers and Terry Neumeyer. The facts present a remarkably close case, but, drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, we believe he has satisfied his burden. The first discriminatory comment on which Plaintiff’s claim is based was made by Bowers. Bowers was the National Claims and Customer Service Leader at Westfield and Lilly’s secondlevel manager. In fact, only the position of Westfield’s chief operating officer separated Bowers’ position from that of the chief executive. The district court erroneously found that Bowers was not a decisionmaker in the hiring process for the Unit Leader positions and therefore his comments offered little probative value. Not only do the parties dispute Bowers’ decisionmaker status, the -18- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. witnesses’ depositions explain that Bowers had authority to override Lilly’s hiring decision but doing so would be highly unusual. Nevertheless, we need not determine whether Bowers was a decisionmaker because this Court has “held that discriminatory remarks, even by a nondecisionmaker, can serve as probative evidence of pretext.” Risch, 581 F.3d at 393. One day during the summer of 2017, shortly after Plaintiff announced his move to Seattle but before he submitted his notice of retirement, Bowers, Plaintiff, and other employees were eating in the Westfield lunchroom.4 The conversation shifted to who would retire next and Bowers allegedly gestured toward Plaintiff and said, “this one is up.” (Aday Dep., R. 41, Page ID # 243.) Plaintiff alleges this comment is probative evidence of discrimination. Defendants first respond, and Plaintiff has admitted, that Bowers was joking. This Court has held, however, that statements may be probative evidence of discrimination even if they are made as a joke. Bartlett v. Gates, 421 F. App’x 485, 491–92 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding comments, including jokes by a decisionmaker, “provide[d] strong ‘probative evidence of pretext.’” (citing Risch, 581 F.3d at 393)). Thus, even if Defendants are correct in arguing that Bowers was joking when he made this comment, it may still operate as probative evidence of discrimination. Additionally, in Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998), we considered whether the plaintiff’s managers’ comments contributed to a “discriminatory 4 The district court mistakenly found the Bowers’ comment took place approximately one year before Plaintiff retired. However, after explaining the lunchroom conversation, Plaintiff testified: Q. When did that happen? A. That would have been probably in the summer of 2016. Q. And you believe that’s because of your age? A. Well, hang on just one second. He -- let me, of ‘17, excuse me. I apologize. The summer of 2017. Yes, I do believe it was because of my age. (Aday Dep., R. 41, Page ID ## 243–44.) -19- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. atmosphere.” We noted that evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere “may serve as circumstantial evidence of individualized discrimination directed at the plaintiff.” Id. And while a workplace atmosphere replete with discrimination is not conclusive proof that an individual plaintiff is the victim of age discrimination, a discriminatory atmosphere “‘tend[s] to add “color” to the employer’s decisionmaking processes and to the influences behind the actions taken with respect to the individual plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir. 1987)). Here, Bowers was a very senior leader at Westfield and his willingness to comment on and “joke” about a junior employee’s retirement status in the midst of that employee’s search for a new position could reasonably be interpreted as contributing to a discriminatory atmosphere at Westfield. Defendants also claim that any discriminatory animus in his lunchroom comment is negated by the fact Bowers allegedly supported Plaintiff’s job search within Westfield. Specifically, Defendants note that Bowers encouraged Plaintiff’s candidacy to at least Lilly, Hopkins, and Plaintiff. However, as Plaintiff notes, there are certainly questions of credibility surrounding how zealously Bowers advocated for Plaintiff’s future at Westfield. The Court need not address the conflicting accounts of Bowers’ commentary on Plaintiff’s future with Westfield because it does not affect the analysis. The only authority Defendants offer in support of this argument is Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2012). In Savage, the Court considered whether the plaintiff was constructively discharged from his position at a university, which he alleged had created objectively intolerable conditions. Id. at 739. The Court held that the plaintiff “had the support of his superiors and, though many members of the faculty were critical of [him], he has failed to show either that conditions were objectively intolerable or that the University intended for him to quit.” Id. at 740. Savage does not consider any form of workplace -20- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. discrimination and analyzes the plaintiff’s claims under an entirely different framework. Therefore, it provides little persuasive value here. With no authority supporting their argument, Defendants argue the fact that Bowers advocated for Plaintiff’s continued employment with Westfield negates any probative value created by his lunchroom comment. In other words, Defendants ask us to rely on a disputed fact to draw an inference against Plaintiff. Such an argument is not persuasive when deciding whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Besides the comment by Bowers, Plaintiff bolsters his evidence of discrimination by relying on a comment made by Terry Neumeyer. Neumeyer was a complex claims analyst who worked at Westfield’s home office with Bowers. Just prior to submitting his notice of retirement, Plaintiff had a conversation with Neumeyer. Plaintiff alleges Neumeyer told him that he spoke to managers about the decision not to hire Plaintiff, and that “everyone thinks it’s time for you to put up your piggies.” (Aday Dep., R. 41, Page ID # 294; EEOC Compl., R. 41-13, Page ID # 476; Neumeyer Dep., R. 51, Page ID ## 1033–34.) Neumeyer denies having spoken with management regarding the decision not to hire Plaintiff, but admits he told Plaintiff it was time to put up his “piggies.” Defendants do not dispute that Bowers spoke about Plaintiff’s future at Westfield to at least, Plaintiff, Lilly, and Hopkins. Adding in Bowers’ willingness to “joke” about Plaintiff being the next to retire in front of other employees, a reasonable juror could conclude Plaintiff’s recollection of his conversation with Neumeyer was true and that Neumeyer did speak with managers about the decision not to hire him. By themselves, neither Bowers’ nor Neumeyer’s comment would likely be sufficient to create a genuine dispute. However, considering the comments together, we believe Plaintiff has produced probative evidence of discrimination. -21- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. To be clear, a jury may wholly reject Plaintiff’s account of these events and find Defendants’ evidence more credible. At the summary judgment stage, however, courts are not to weigh the credibility of the parties’ evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.”). The question is simply whether the parties have proffered enough evidence to create a genuine dispute, such that a reasonable jury could find in the non-movant’s favor. Plaintiff has satisfied his burden.