Opinion ID: 1835416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: kincaid's testimony

Text: The Fund argues that Kincaid's opinions as an expert regarding Sherard's loss of earning capacity, before and after Sherard's 1986 accident at Bethphage, were without foundation. First, we note that the Nebraska Evidence Rules do not apply to proceedings before the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court.... Neb.Evid.R. 1101(4)(d), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-1101(4)(d) (Reissue 1989); Harpham v. General Cas. Co., 232 Neb. 568, 441 N.W.2d 600 (1989). See, also, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-168 (Reissue 1988) (Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is not bound by common-law or statutory rules of evidence). Cf., Fite v. Ammco Tools, Inc., 199 Neb. 353, 258 N.W.2d 922 (1977) (Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court cannot utilize evidential standards more restrictive than the Nebraska Evidence Rules); Friedeman v. State, 215 Neb. 413, 339 N.W.2d 67 (1983) (Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may receive evidence inadmissible under the Nebraska Evidence Rules). Although the Nebraska Evidence Rules are inapplicable to proceedings in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, due process requirements may control the type of evidence in a trial of a workers' compensation case. Harpham v. General Cas. Co., supra . See, also, 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 79.80 (1989) (evidence rules based on fair play in trials). The Fund does not contend that reception of Kincaid's opinions contravenes the constitutional safeguard of due process, but contends that its foundation objections were erroneously overruled by the rehearing panel. Brief for appellant at 13. Since the Nebraska Evidence Rules were inapplicable to the rehearing in Sherard's case, we need not evaluate the Fund's objections in relation to the Nebraska Evidence Rules. Kincaid's testimony was properly before the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court for its consideration and use in disposing of the issues in Sherard's case. However, even if the Nebraska Evidence Rules were applicable, the Fund's objections were invalid. First, the Fund's objections were interposed to questions which merely sought to establish that the expert had an opinion about a particular subject. An expert's possession of an opinion can hardly be objectionable, although an expert's expression of that opinion before a fact finder may be objectionable under the Nebraska Evidence Rules. Second, an objection on the ground of insufficient foundation is a general objection. See Kennedy v. Woods, 131 Neb. 217, 267 N.W. 390 (1936). The objection `lack of foundation' is employed at trial in reference to many different situations. M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 611.9 at 528 (2d ed. 1986). If a general objection is overruled the objecting party may not complain on appeal unless: (1) The ground for exclusion was obvious without stating it, or (2) the evidence was not admissible for any purpose. Gateway Bank v. Department of Banking, 192 Neb. 109, 112, 219 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1974). In Sherard's case, the ground for exclusion is unspecified, unclear, and may have related to qualifications of an expert witness or some other aspect in the introduction of opinion evidence. Kincaid's opinions had probative value regarding a fact of consequence, namely, Sherard's disability or loss of earning capacity. There is no merit to the Fund's contention concerning Kincaid's opinions presented to the trier of fact, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court.