Opinion ID: 2452141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority of the trial judge

Text: Appellant first argues that the consent decree entered in Hunt v. State of Arkansas, Number PB-C-89-406 (E.D.Ark. November 7, 1991, as amended September 24, 1992) (Consent Decree), ended the elective term of office of Chancellor Lawrence E. Dawson of the 11th West Judicial District effective December 31, 1992, and, therefore, the Chief Justice of this court was without authority to subsequently assign him to hear this case upon the recusal of the trial judges of the 20th Judicial District. Appellant does not challenge the jurisdiction of the chancery court itself over this action. Appellant concedes he raises this issue for the first time on appeal, but characterizes it as one of subject matter jurisdiction that must be reviewed. We disagree. Appellant's challenge to Chancellor Dawson's authority does not raise an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Simpson v. State, 310 Ark. 493, 837 S.W.2d 475 (1992). In Simpson , the appellant argued for the first time on appeal that the chancellor and probate judge who tried that criminal case in the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so. This court ruled that the issue presented was not one of subject matter jurisdiction, and, accordingly, refused to consider the issue because it was not preserved for appeal. This court stated: Subject matter jurisdiction, however, is determined from the pleadings, and once a proper charge is filed in circuit court, that court may exercise jurisdiction over that subject matter.... Moreover, jurisdiction is granted to a particular position, that is, to a particular court, and not to the person who fills it.... Here, the [circuit court] clearly had jurisdiction over the two rape charges and the issue raised by Simpson concerns the authority of the individual who filled that position. As was the case in Nation [v. State, 283 Ark. 250, 674 S.W.2d 939 (1984) ], that issue relates to the authority of the sitting judge and not to the jurisdiction of the circuit court. 310 Ark. 493, 499, 837 S.W.2d 475, 478 (citations omitted). Accord Bradford v. Bradford, 49 Ark.App. 32, 894 S.W.2d 616 (1995) (holding the appellant's objection to the authority of a circuit judge to hear his divorce case in chancery was waived for failure to raise it below). The present case, arguably, is distinguishable from Simpson because appellant asserts that Chancellor Dawson was not a judge at all as a result of the Consent Decree. Yet, appellant has failed to abstract the facts necessary for us to assess the effect of the Consent Decree upon Chancellor Dawson's judgeship, which determination is prerequisite to any consideration of appellant's argument on its merits. Further, the portion of the record pertinent to this issue does not reveal the assignment of Chancellor Dawson was invalid. In our recent decision, Neal v. Wilson, 321 Ark. 70, 75, 900 S.W.2d 177, 179 (1995) (per curiam), we held that, where the record reflected the challenged assignment of the trial judge was valid, the assignment gave him jurisdiction to try the case, and stated: It is the parties' or trial court's responsibility to apprise this court as to whether an assignment is necessary under Act 496. Once that assignment is made, that responsibility continues. Clearly, it is not this court's task, on its own volition, to discover or monitor whether the circumstances have changed to warrant the termination of an assignment or reassignment. On this record, appellant's first assignment of error fails.