Opinion ID: 1308987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the superior court err in its instructions pertaining to wells' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?

Text: Local 959 argues that the trial court erred by ruling that, as a matter of law, a threat to one's life is outrageous conduct, thus removing from the jury's consideration the question whether its conduct was outrageous. Given this determination the jury was instructed that it need only find two elements proven by Wells to award damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Those elements were: (1) That defendant Teamsters Local 959 threatened plaintiff's life and (2) that the threat was a proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. Local 959 agrees that a court must determine whether the severity of the emotional distress and the conduct of the offending party warrant an instruction on intentional infliction of emotional distress. But it argues that here the court in effect gave Wells a directed verdict on a key element of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Local 959 argues that the instruction constitutes plain error. It additionally argues that the instruction on the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress erroneously ignored another element  that Local 959 acted in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional distress would follow (i.e., foreseeability). Wells responds that any failure to include specific reference to outrageous conduct in the jury instructions was effectively cured by another of the trial court's instructions which defined severe emotional distress at the damage stage as emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to endure it. Wells contends that foreseeability is not a matter of the tortfeasor's subjective intent, but rather involves an objective determination. He also argues that it is inconceivable that the jury could award $300,000 in punitive damages against Local 959 and not find its threat extreme and outrageous. In Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985), we adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965), which provides: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. Thus, the elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) the conduct is extreme and outrageous, (2) the conduct is intentional or reckless, (3) the conduct causes emotional distress, and (4) the distress is severe. [13] As we previously noted, the superior court refused to submit to the jury the question whether the conduct of Local 959 was outrageous as well as whether Local 959 acted in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional distress would follow. If reasonable jurors could differ as to whether the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated either outrageous conduct or foreseeability then the superior court was required to submit either or both of these questions to the jury for resolution. In response to Local 959's objections to the court's instructions on the emotional distress claim the superior court stated in part: [I]f we don't have a cause of action on behalf of someone whose life is directly threatened by someone else, then I think we're back into the middle ages. ... . I find as a matter of law that making a threat to take someone's life is, as a matter of law, outrageous conduct which is sufficient basis on which to find and award for severe emotional distress, and that I therefore need not instruct the jury ... on the question of outrageous conduct. We agree with the superior court's analysis and affirm its conclusion that there was no issue as to outrageous conduct to submit to the jury. [14] We further hold that the superior court did not err in not requiring the jury to find that the conduct of Local 959 carried with it a high probability that it would result in severe emotional distress. Whether emotional distress is reasonably foreseeable is determined by the objective standard of what a reasonably prudent person should foresee. Wells contends that it is clear that any reasonable person in a civilized society should foresee the reasonable probability that severe emotional distress would occur from a threat on another's life. [15] We agree with Wells' position and thus hold that the superior court did not err in deciding the foreseeability of severe emotional distress issue as a matter of law. [16]