Opinion ID: 777315
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: McLean's Apprendi claim

Text: 23 We recently held, following the teachings of Apprendi, that drug quantity is an element of an offense charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841. United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 663 (2d Cir.2001) ( en banc ). Where, therefore, as here, a defendant is charged in an indictment with a § 841 offense involving a specific threshold quantity of drugs, see note 4, ante, and pleads guilty, but during a plea proceeding admits only the non-quantity elements of the offense and disputes quantity, the district court may accept the plea only on the lesser-included offense of the § 841 crime involving an unspecified drug quantity. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f) (Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.); cf. United States v. Andrades, 169 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that, to comply with Rule 11(f), a district court must assure itself ... that the conduct to which the defendant admits is in fact an offense under the statutory provision under which he is pleading guilty (quoting United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1524 (2d Cir.1997))). If a plea to that lesser-included offense is accepted by the district court, then it may not impose a sentence in excess of the maximum prescribed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) for an offense involving an unspecified quantity of the drug involved in the case. See Thomas, 274 F.3d at 663. 24 In this case, McLean admitted at his plea proceeding that he (1) conspired to possess with intent to distribute and to actually distribute marijuana, and (2) possessed with intent to distribute and actually distributed marijuana on three separate occasions. He affirmatively denied, however, that the quantity of marijuana involved in these offenses exceeded 100 kilograms. Accordingly, the only crimes for which the District Court could have accepted McLean's plea were the lesser-included offenses of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute an unspecified quantity of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute and distributing an unspecified quantity of marijuana. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), see note 3, ante, the maximum term of imprisonment for each of these offenses is 60 months. 5 25 The District Court sentenced McLean to a term of imprisonment of 63 months — three more than the applicable statutory maximum — on each count, to be served concurrently, based on its own findings that McLean's offenses involved over 100 kilograms of marijuana. McLean now claims that his sentence violates the teachings of Apprendi. Because he did not object to his sentence on these grounds before the District Court, we review his claim for plain error pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Thomas, 274 F.3d at 666. 26 To obtain relief pursuant to Rule 52(b), McLean must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects his substantial rights. Id. at 667; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 27 The Government concedes — as it must, see Thomas, 274 F.3d at 667-68 — that McLean has established (1) an error (2) that is plain. It contends, however, that McLean cannot show (3) that the plain error affected his substantial rights. We agree. 28 An error affects substantial rights if it is `prejudicial' and it `affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.' Thomas, 274 F.3d at 668 (quoting United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 47 (2d Cir.1998)). Where, as here, the source of the alleged error is a supervening judicial decision that alters a settled rule of law in the circuit, we apply a modified plain error rule in which the Government bears the burden of persuasion as to whether substantial rights have been affected. United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 532 U.S. 1046, 121 S.Ct. 2016, 149 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2001); see also, e.g., United States v. Monteleone, 257 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir.2001). 6 In this case, the Government contends that, even if the District Court had recognized that the five-year statutory maximum of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) applied to each of the counts to which McLean pleaded guilty, the Court would have been required by section 5G1.2(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines to impose consecutive sentences, as necessary, to achieve the 63 month minimum term of imprisonment mandated by the Guidelines. 29 Section 5G1.2(d) of the Guidelines provides that, in imposing a sentence in a case involving multiple counts of conviction, 30 [i]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment [arrived at through application of the Guidelines], then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment. In all other respects, sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law. 31 In other words, [i]n the case of multiple counts of conviction, [section 5G1.2(d) of] the sentencing guidelines instruct[s] that if the total punishment mandated by the guidelines exceeds the statutory maximum of the most serious offense of conviction, the district court must impose consecutive terms of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve the total punishment. United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir.2001) ( en banc ) (emphasis added), cert. denied sub nom. Phifer v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 309, 151 L.Ed.2d 230 (2001). For example, suppose a defendant is convicted of three offenses, each with a statutory maximum term of five years (60 months) imprisonment. If the district court determines that the appropriate sentence under the guidelines is 156 months, [section] 5G1.2(d) requires the imposition of consecutive terms on each count of conviction until the guideline punishment is achieved. Id. 32 In this case, McLean pleaded guilty to four offenses, each with a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 60 months. The District Court determined that the appropriate sentence under the Guidelines was 63 months. Because 63 months exceeds the 60-month statutory maximum, a 63-month sentence could not be imposed on any of the four counts. In such circumstances, the Guidelines require that the total punishment, up to the statutory maximum, be imposed on each count, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b), and that the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts run consecutively but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment, id. § 5G1.2(d). Thus, for example, the 63 months of total punishment could have been accomplished by imposing sentences of 60 months on all four counts, running three of these sentences concurrently, and running three months of the sentence on the fourth count consecutively to the sentences on the other three counts. See United States v. McLeod, 251 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir.2001) Such a sentence would not have run afoul of Apprendi, because the sentence for any individual count would not have exceeded 60 months, and there is no constitutionally cognizable right to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences. United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir.2001); cf. Thomas, 274 F.3d at 663-64 (noting that the fact that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841 does not preclude a district court from considering drug quantity in determining a defendant's relevant conduct for sentencing purposes pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)). 33 We hold that, under the circumstances presented here, the Government has met its burden of demonstrating that the plain error did not affect McLean's substantial rights. 7 In so holding, we join every other circuit that has considered whether an Apprendi error affects a defendant's substantial rights where, in the absence of the error, the application of section 5G1.2(d) of the Guidelines would have resulted in the same term of imprisonment. See Angle, 254 F.3d at 518-19; United States v. Smith, 240 F.3d 927, 930 (11th Cir.2001) ( per curiam); United States v. Sturgis, 238 F.3d 956, 960-61 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 182, 151 L.Ed.2d 127 (2001); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 544-45 (6th Cir.2000), cert. denied sub nom. Linton v. United States, 532 U.S. 935, 121 S.Ct. 1389, 149 L.Ed.2d 312 (2001), and Powers v. United States, 532 U.S. 935, 121 S.Ct. 1965, 149 L.Ed.2d 759 (2001), and Hill v. United States, 532 U.S. 1023, 121 S.Ct. 1965, 149 L.Ed.2d 759 (2001), and Page v. United States, 532 U.S. 1056, 121 S.Ct. 2202, 149 L.Ed.2d 1032 (2001); 8 cf. United States v. Rivera, 282 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.2000) ( per curiam ) (holding that an Apprendi error was harmless where the defendant received a concurrent sentence on another count longer than the statutory maximum applicable to the count affected by the error).