Opinion ID: 564919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the exceptions to the procedural default doctrine

Text: 21 There are two exceptions to the procedural default bar. A federal court may still review the merits of Johnson's claim, despite the procedural bar, if Johnson can establish that he meets one of these exceptions. First, a procedural default may be ignored by a federal court if the petitioner can show both cause for the default and prejudice attributable thereto. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2644, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The Supreme Court has created a narrow second exception: in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649.
22 We begin our analysis by examining whether Johnson has demonstrated cause to excuse his procedural default. Johnson asserts that he instructed his lawyers who were handling the state post-conviction proceeding to raise all possible grounds for relief, including any potential ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 15 Johnson argues that the failure of his attorneys to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim within the two-year limit imposed by rule 3.850, despite his instructions to do so, constitutes cause for his procedural default. Johnson does not tell us what standard should be applied to determine when post-conviction attorney error will amount to cause. Instead, he argues that in a situation where a prisoner specifically advises his counsel regarding what steps to take in pursuing a habeas corpus petition, and counsel fails to heed those instructions, we should not hold the prisoner to any decisions of his attorney that result in a procedural default. 23 After this case was briefed and argued, however, the Supreme Court decided precisely this issue adversely to Johnson. In Coleman v. Thompson, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the Court held: [t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings. Id., at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2566 (citations omitted). The Court went on to conclude that because errors of post-conviction counsel cannot be constitutionally ineffective, a petitioner must 'bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default.'  Id. (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 2645). Thus, because Johnson had no constitutional right to counsel during his post-conviction proceedings, his attorneys' errors during those proceedings cannot constitute cause to excuse his procedural default. Because Johnson has failed to establish one element of the cause and prejudice exception, he cannot show the exception applies. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1575 n. 43 (1982). To obtain review of his ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel claim, then, Johnson must establish that the second exception to the procedural default doctrine applies. 24
25 In certain extraordinary circumstances, a federal court has the equitable power to consider an issue notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96, 106 S.Ct. at 2649. A federal court may do so where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649. In addition, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the concept of 'actual' as opposed to 'legal' innocence does not translate easily into the context of an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital offense, has concluded that one may be actually innocent of the death penalty. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2668, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). The actually innocent exception is alternatively known as the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. Johnson argues that even if we decide he has not established cause for his failure to abide by Florida's procedural rules, the facts of this case demand that we invoke this second exception to the procedural default doctrine. He asserts that but for the procedural bar, his sentence of death would be vacated in favor of a sentence of life imprisonment. Therefore, according to Johnson, we must exercise our equitable powers and consider his claim on the merits in order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The State counters that this is not an appropriate case for the invocation of the second exception to the procedural default doctrine and that to do so would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent. 26 It has been years since the Supreme Court's delineation of the actually innocent exception to the procedural default doctrine. In the context of the sentencing phase of a capital trial, however, we still have no workable definition of the exception, either from the Supreme Court or this court. A workable definition is essential to our jurisprudence because we are often faced with procedurally-defaulted claims, and many petitioners claim they meet this second exception. It is crucial that we know when to apply the exception, so as to limit our interference with the states' criminal justice systems and promote finality while simultaneously recognizing the truly extraordinary case in which a petitioner's claim must be reviewed despite a procedural bar in order to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 16 27 The panel attempted to define the actually innocent exception. We reject that definition, however, for reasons which will become apparent. First we must delve a bit deeper into Johnson's allegations regarding why the exception applies here. Next we must describe the panel's holding that those allegations, if true, establish the need to invoke the actually innocent exception and the panel's proposed definition of when a petitioner is actually innocent of the death penalty. Finally, we must propose a workable definition of this exception. In so doing, we will describe why the panel's proposed definition is unacceptable. 28
29 Johnson alleges his attorneys at sentencing and his court-appointed psychologist failed to conduct a competent investigation of his psychological state. Had they done so, he asserts, they would have discovered psychological problems resulting from a long history of drug abuse and addiction. Johnson contends such an investigation would have enabled sentencing counsel to demonstrate the existence of three statutory mitigating factors, which would have precluded the jury override. 17 30 The testimony presented by Johnson's counsel at the sentencing hearing before the advisory jury consisted of the following. A prison official from Tennessee, who had previously been called by the State, was recalled. He testified regarding Johnson's medium security classification in the Tennessee prison system before his escape from that system. 18 Next, sentencing counsel called a local religious leader to testify regarding the morality of the death penalty. The State objected and the judge sustained the objection and refused to allow the witness to testify. 19 Sentencing counsel's principal witness, court-appointed psychologist Ronald Yarbrough, was then called. 31 Yarbrough had interviewed Johnson the night before for about two and one-half hours. 20 During the interview he conducted several psychological tests, and he later analyzed the results of those tests. 21 From this information, Yarbrough testified, he could draw some strong hypotheses regarding Johnson's behavior in various situations. 22 The psychologist testified that Johnson had a high average range of intelligence and an extremely high level of commonsense, but that if Johnson didn't want to apply himself to a task, he wouldn't. 23 Yarbrough believed Johnson to be in contact with reality, and not schizophrenic or psychotic. 24 He found no evidence of organic brain damage, 25 that Johnson probably had problems with authority figures, 26 that he had a good relationship with his family, 27 and that Johnson perceived himself as cool and was probably perceived as a leader within his peer group. 28 Finally, Yarbrough opined that Johnson's ability to think and make decisions deteriorates dramatically in stressful situations, that in extremely demanding emotional situation[§ Johnson] breaks down his normal mode of thinking, ... decision making ... [and] responding, 29 but that there was nothing to indicate that on the day of the crime Johnson did not appreciate the criminality of his conduct. 30 32 The next witness was Johnson's sister, who testified regarding Johnson's disadvantaged background. 31 Johnson's sister also testified that whatever happened to Johnson would have an effect on her; 32 the final witness, Johnson's daughter, testified to the same effect. 33 The advisory jury and sentencing judge were also of course free to consider the fact that Johnson did not initiate the gun battle, and were free to consider Johnson's counsels' argument at the advisory sentencing hearing (and at the second sentencing hearing before the trial judge) that Johnson's decision to shoot the pharmacist was the product of, among other things, his extreme emotional disturbance after being shot at by Moulton. 33 Johnson's sentencing counsel made an effort to exclude evidence regarding the details of Johnson's past and his record of violent crime. Counsel made a motion in limine to exclude such evidence, including evidence of Johnson's recent attempted escape from prison. 34 Also, counsel stated that he wished to foreclose impeachment by not relying on character evidence; 35 thus testimony from Johnson's sister was limited to showing his background, not his character. 34 Johnson now claims that Yarbrough's psychological evaluation was seriously flawed by sentencing counsel's failure to instruct Yarbrough to ask Johnson about his long history of drug abuse (and by implication, Yarbrough's failure to ask Johnson about any history of drug abuse and Johnson's failure to mention that history to Yarbrough during the interview) as well as the failure to conduct any further investigation regarding Johnson's psychological state during the month between the advisory jury hearing and the final sentencing hearing before the trial judge. 35 Attached to Johnson's second federal habeas petition is an affidavit in which Yarbrough indicates that when he testified he was unaware of Johnson's drug problem or the role that problem played in the murder and robbery. After examining affidavits of friends and family members regarding the severity of Johnson's drug addiction, as well as the affidavit of Dr. Peter Macaluso, an addictionologist who interviewed Johnson, Yarbrough's opinion of Johnson's psychological state is now different. He now believes that at the time of the murder Johnson was under the influence of a totally controlling, extreme drug addiction, 36 and that Johnson's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his behavior or to conform to the requirements of law were [sic] substantially impaired. 37 Also attached to the petition are the affidavits of two doctors (including Dr. Macaluso) who interviewed Johnson in 1988. Their conclusion is similar to that of Yarbrough, that is, that at the time of the murder Johnson was consumed by an overwhelming desire to obtain drugs to feed his drug habit.
36 Johnson argues, and the panel majority agreed, that if these more recent psychological evaluations are true, they demonstrate that Yarbrough's preliminary conclusions as testified to in the advisory jury sentencing hearing were inaccurate. The panel majority concluded that 37 [t]his evidence, if true, suggests the existence of three statutory mitigating circumstances under Florida law. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(6)(b) (The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.); Sec. 921.141(6)(e) (The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.); Sec. 921.141(6)(f) (The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.). 38 Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 462. The panel majority was of the opinion that were this case before us unencumbered with concerns of procedural default, we think it is clear that the proffered evidence would support a conclusion that Johnson was prejudiced by his sentencing counsel's failure to develop and present this evidence during sentencing before the trial judge. Id. The majority concluded that there is a high degree of certainty that the sentencing court would not have overridden the jury verdict, id., and that under the Tedder standard, there is a high degree of certainty that the Florida Supreme Court would not have permitted such an override had the evidence now before us been timely presented. Id. at 463. 39 The panel majority considered the meaning of the actually innocent exception. It proposed the following test: 40 [I]n order to establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, [a petitioner] must prove that as a result of the alleged constitutional error the sentencing body's deliberative process was affected to such a degree that its ultimate conclusions are probably factually in error. In most cases, we envision that this will necessitate proof that as a result of the alleged constitutional error (1) the sentencing body was under a misperception as to the factual background of either the offender or the offense, and (2) but for those factual misperceptions held by the sentencing body, the petitioner probably would not have received a sentence of death. 41 Id. at 468-69 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 38 42 The panel majority noted that one method of meeting the actually innocent exception is to establish that absent an alleged constitutional violation, the sentencing body would not have found any aggravating factors. The majority declined to hold, however, that a petitioner must establish that the constitutional error implicates all of the existing aggravating factors before a federal court should entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim. Id. at 469 (emphasis in original). 43 Applying its newly-developed test to Johnson's case, the panel majority held that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to prevent a potential fundamental miscarriage of justice. Johnson, the majority decided, has proffered evidence which if true would establish that he was probably actually innocent of the death sentence. Id. at 477. The dissenting judge offered quite a different view of what it means to be actually innocent of the death penalty, a view with which we agree. 39 44
45 The Supreme Court's treatment of the relationship between sentencing discretion, the death penalty, and the Eighth Amendment has resulted in an almost perfect jurisprudential circle. 40 Prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), many states authorized the death penalty for any defendant found guilty of what we reluctantly refer to as simple murder. The death penalty was not mandatory; the jury or other sentencing authority had unlimited discretion to grant the defendant mercy and impose life imprisonment rather than the death penalty. The Supreme Court unequivocally denounced such discretion in Furman, concluding that unguided sentencing led to the discriminatory, arbitrary, and capricious imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In short, the Court found no merit in discretion. 46 At least thirty states enacted new death penalty statutes in response to Furman 's concern for unguided discretion. One group of states interpreted Furman to require the removal of all discretion in the capital sentencing context. These states passed laws that mandated the death penalty for certain statutorily defined crimes. The other group of states opted to provide guided discretion in the sentencing process by listing certain statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances. These latter states undertook to confine the sentencing body's discretion within the statutory factors. 47 The Supreme Court reviewed these two distinct types of statutes during the same term in 1976 and struck down mandatory death penalty statutes, 41 but upheld statutes that provided for discretion. 42 Limited discretion, according to the Court, was both consistent with, and necessary to, the constitutional requirement of an individualized evaluation of the death penalty's appropriateness. So began the arc back toward discretion. The Furman Court announced a retreat from discretion in capital sentencing; in Woodson, Roberts, Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek, that retreat arched backward toward a constitutional appreciation of discretion. 48 In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the Court did not merely tolerate discretion, but mandated it! Death penalty statutes following Furman had apparently confined the exercise of discretion at both ends. These statutes generally required the sentencing authority to consider certain statutorily specified aggravating circumstances and statutorily specified mitigating circumstances found to accompany the murder. The trial court in Lockett had apparently concluded that to allow consideration of claimed mitigating circumstances not in the statute would authorize the type of unbridled discretion condemned in Furman. The Supreme Court held, however, that the Constitution requires states to afford the sentencing authority the discretion to consider any circumstances claimed to be mitigating, whether encompassed in the statute or not. Thus, the Court constitutionally imposed unbridled discretion in the grant of mercy. It appeared, however, that the Court may have left the consideration of aggravating circumstances to those prescribed in the various state statutes. 49 The Court then dropped the other shoe. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), the Court revealed its appreciation of the fact that a defendant is guilty of a murder for which the death penalty could be imposed where it is found that the murder was accompanied by one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances. Thus, the capital crime is not murder; it may be called aggravated murder or capital murder. Once convicted of such a crime, not only can unlimited mitigating circumstances as per Lockett be shown, but the state can prove facts in aggravation of the capital crime, whether listed as statutory aggravating circumstances or not. 50
51 Prior to Furman, the sentencing authority in a murder case had unfettered discretion to consider virtually anything asserted in mitigation. Lockett re-established that practice. Prior to Furman, the sentencer in a capital case could consider anything, in its unfettered discretion, in aggravation. Barclay and Zant have re-established this practice so long as at least one statutory aggravating circumstance accompanies the murder. In practical terms, the Court has reinvigorated discretion in capital sentencing in order to guarantee an individualized sentencing process. 52 Engineers and surveyors use the phrase failure to close to express the idea that one has measured from a known reference point to certain unknown points without returning to the original reference point. This expression aptly describes the historical progression of death penalty jurisprudence. Shortly after Lockett, we noted the inherent tension between the Court's aspiration for individualized sentencing and objective standards. Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511, 1521 (11th Cir.1983). Justice Scalia has recently denounced this tension as internally contradictory. Walton v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, ----, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3051-52, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 43 53 The Court seems to have resolved the tension by making one full turn on a coil spring or a spiral staircase of case law. The Court has returned the law largely to its pre-Furman state but has ratcheted the doctrine up one step from its starting point. Prior to Furman, simple murder was a capital crime. Today the level of criminal conduct for a capital crime has been raised; a defendant must commit the new crime of capital murder or aggravated murder in order to be eligible for the death penalty. This new crime is defined as murder accompanied by one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances. The sentencing authority may not impose the death penalty for simple murder. The essential point of this development in the law, at least with regard to Johnson's claim of actual innocence, is that when the prosecution has proved that the defendant committed aggravated murder, the sentencing authority has very broad discretion to sentence the defendant either to life imprisonment or the death penalty. 54 Because Johnson's proposed showing of factual error does not cast doubt on his guilt of a crime for which the sentencing authority in his case could impose the death penalty (i.e., murder accompanied by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance), he has not made a colorable showing of actual innocence. Therefore, Johnson is not entitled to a review on the merits of his defaulted constitutional claim. 55
56 The Supreme Court has not told us what it means to be actually innocent of the death penalty. In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), a majority of the Court held that where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default. 44 This statement expresses a fundamental tenet of our administration of criminal law: an innocent person ... in custody or in jeopardy of the execution of a death sentence [must have unlimited opportunities] to repair to a court of justice for relief. Gunn v. Newsome, 881 F.2d 949, 966 (11th Cir.) (Hill, J., dissenting), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 542, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). 57 In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986), the Court acknowledged the difficulties in translating the concept of innocence from the guilt phase of a capital trial to the sentencing context. The Smith Court also reiterated that, even in the sentencing context, courts must continue to distinguish between actual, as distinct from legal, innocence. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537, 106 S.Ct. at 2666. A more recent majority of the Court expressly reaffirmed that the actual innocence test limits a federal habeas court's authority to reach the merits of defaulted claims for which a petitioner cannot demonstrate cause. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 1217-18 n. 6, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989). 58 In both Smith and Adams, as in the present case, the Court considered allegations that constitutional errors led to factual inaccuracies in the sentencing process. In Smith the Court considered the importance under the actual innocence standard of certain highly prejudicial statements made by the defendant to his court-appointed psychiatrist. The trial court admitted these statements at Smith's sentencing in violation of Smith's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Like Johnson, Smith had defaulted on these claims. The Court found that the alleged error did not concern a factual inaccuracy in the sentencing process since the inadmissible evidence was both probative and reliable. 59 The panel majority attempted to distinguish Smith by noting that Johnson's allegations of error do in fact involve claims of factual inaccuracies. Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 467-68. 45 The panel majority ignored the critical role that the alleged constitutional error in Smith played ... in the determination that death [was] an appropriate penalty; that error, in fact, made the difference between life and death in the jury's consideration of [Smith's] fate. Id. 477 U.S. at 539, 106 S.Ct. at 2669 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court assumed that Smith was legally innocent--that if the trial court had properly suppressed his statements the sentencing body probably would have imposed life imprisonment rather that the death penalty. The Court nevertheless held that the claim was unrelated to [actual] innocence. Id. at 539, 106 S.Ct. at 2668. The sentencing body in Smith would have remained free, even if the trial court had excluded Smith's statements, to impose the death penalty; thus Smith's claim of error did not implicate his actual innocence of the death penalty. 60 In other words, although factual inaccuracy in the guilt or sentencing context may well be necessary to a claim of actual innocence, factual inaccuracy is not sufficient unless the inaccuracy demonstrates, at least colorably, that the petitioner is actually innocent, or ineligible for, either an adjudication of guilt or the sentence imposed. If prejudicial factual inaccuracy alone is enough to warrant review of a defaulted claim, then the actual innocence standard is meaningless. 61 Dugger v. Adams also illustrates this point. In that case, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim that an alleged Caldwell error established a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). The petitioner asserted that the trial judge violated the Eighth Amendment when he mistakenly advised the jury that its sentencing recommendation was merely advisory. The statements purportedly misled the jury regarding its role in the capital sentencing process under Florida law. The Adams majority acquiesced in the view (expressed in Justice Blackmun's dissent) that the alleged Caldwell error did not concern merely the [erroneous] inclusion or exclusion of particular evidence; the error was global in scope and pervasive in its tendency to influence the jury's recommendation. Adams, 489 U.S. at 423, 109 S.Ct. at 1224 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rather than refute the dissent's characterization of the facts, the majority instead expressly rejected the idea that a fundamental miscarriage of justice results whenever 'there is a substantial claim that the constitutional violation undermined the accuracy of the sentencing decision.'  Id. at 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1217-18 n. 6 (quoting Blackmun, J., dissenting, id. at 415, 109 S.Ct. at 1219 n. 4). Because, as in the case at hand, the sentencing body was free to impose the death penalty despite the alleged error--regardless of whether it would have done so in the absence of the error--the claim did not implicate Adams's actual innocence of the death penalty. 62 As we have previously noted, the Supreme Court has not expressly defined actual innocence in the context of the death sentence. Id. at 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1217-18 n. 6. In the guilt phase of a trial, a defendant is innocent of the crime if, under the alleged facts, he or she is not eligible for an adjudication of guilt. Actual eligibility and legal eligibility are distinct; a defendant is innocent of a crime only if he is ineligible for an adjudication of guilt--either by virtue of a (correct or incorrect) finding of innocence, or through objective facts that prove that a guilty verdict was wrong because the defendant did not commit each and every element of the crime charged. 63 A properly convicted defendant's claim to innocence in the sentencing context is likewise tied to eligibility. A convicted defendant is eligible for any punishment within the discretion the legislature accords the sentencing body. One cannot say that the defendant is innocent of the sentence imposed if the defendant actually committed the necessary acts that would make him eligible for the particular punishment chosen. Even if the guilty defendant can demonstrate that a constitutional error led to a factual inaccuracy--which in turn prejudiced the outcome of the sentencing body's deliberative process--the defendant is not innocent of the sentence imposed. 64 The somewhat narrower scope of innocence in the sentencing phase of a trial, as compared to the guilt phase, results from the unique role that discretion plays in sentencing. The discretionary nature of sentencing necessarily reduces the objective criteria by which a court may determine that a particular sentence is wrong or unauthorized. Only under very limited circumstances is a court competent to determine that a defendant is ineligible for a particular sentence despite the sentencing body's decision to the contrary. In the guilt phase of a trial, innocence and guilt have an objective existence that a court may under certain circumstances discern--either at trial or in a collateral proceeding. The petitioner may assert new facts (or improperly excluded facts) with regard to guilt, and a court may determine that, given those facts, a finding of guilt was unauthorized. 65 At sentencing, by contrast, there are few elements necessary for a particular sentence. A showing that an erroneous factual premise probably influenced the sentencing body does not necessarily mean that the defendant is innocent or ineligible for the sentence imposed. Only under very limited circumstances may a court determine that a factual showing demonstrates the defendant's ineligibility for the sentence imposed in light of purportedly inaccurate or incomplete facts. The sentenced defendant must demonstrate not merely that the error affected the sentencing outcome, but that the error resulted in a sentencing outcome for which the defendant is not eligible by virtue of his conduct. 66 In the capital sentencing context, the defendant becomes eligible for the death sentence only if the sentencing body correctly finds that he has committed a crime for which the sentencing body could, in its discretion, sentence him to death. Thus, a petitioner may make a colorable showing that he is actually innocent of the death penalty by presenting evidence that an alleged constitutional error implicates all of the aggravating factors found to be present by the sentencing body. That is, but for the alleged constitutional error, the sentencing body could not have found any aggravating factors and thus the petitioner was ineligible for the death penalty. In other words, the petitioner must show that absent the alleged constitutional error, the jury would have lacked the discretion to impose the death penalty; that is, that he is ineligible for the death penalty. 46 67
68 The panel majority attempted to articulate a test to determine whether a constitutional error has skewed a sentencing body's deliberative process ... to such a degree that its ultimate conclusions are probably factually in error. Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 468 (emphasis omitted). Asking the wrong question necessarily begets the wrong answer. When a defendant is eligible for the death penalty (by virtue of having committed first-degree murder accompanied by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance), it is nearly impossible to determine that the sentencing body's ultimate conclusion that imprisonment is more appropriate than the death penalty (or vice versa ) is correct or accurate, or incorrect or inaccurate. 69 The nature of the question asked by the panel majority illustrates its misinterpretation of the actual or factual innocence standard. Although factual errors can undermine the factual premises from which the sentencing body reaches its ultimate conclusion, one can never say that the ultimately discretionary choice by the sentencing body is factually in error. Other than in the context of a general proportionality review, a court lacks objective criteria by which to divine that it is factually incorrect to sentence a particular death-eligible defendant to death, or to life imprisonment instead. So long as the jury could have imposed the death penalty, there can be no correct or incorrect sentencing outcome. 70 It is, however, possible to determine that a constitutional error led to a factual error, and that the factual error probably influenced the sentencing body to select the death penalty. In fact, courts often define prejudicial error in just this fashion. It is within Congress' power to enable federal courts to review these errors in habeas proceedings, regardless of a litigant's procedural default or of an abuse of the writ. The Supreme Court has interpreted habeas jurisdictional statutes to require, in such defaulted or abusive cases, more than prejudicial error. The Court reached this conclusion in light of certain expressions of congressional intent and a serious concern for comity and finality. 71 The panel majority attempted to distinguish its test from the ordinary test for prejudice. The majority was correct that the Supreme Court has admonished courts to apply the test for actual innocence in light of all probative evidence, including evidence that was admitted (or excluded) as a result of constitutional error. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 n. 17, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (citing Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 538, 106 S.Ct. at 2668. We recognize that the panel majority applied its test in light of all probative evidence. Our concern is that the panel majority's test seeks to answer the wrong question. The panel majority's test asks whether, but for a factual misimpression with regard to aggravation or mitigation, the sentencing body probably would have exercised its discretion in a different manner. The Supreme Court has made clear that the question is whether, in light of all probative evidence, including evidence that was or was not admitted as a result of the alleged constitutional error, the petitioner has made a colorable showing that he has suffered a conviction or received a punishment that the adjudicator of guilt or the sentencing body was not free to impose under the actual facts. 72 In answering what is a wrong and an unanswerable question, the panel majority propose a test that equates correctness or accuracy of sentence with a deliberative process free from factual errors that affect the exercise of discretion. According to the panel majority, if the petitioner makes a colorable showing of the following, he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim--regardless of an unexcused procedural default or an abuse of the writ: 73 (1) the sentencing body was under a misperception as to the factual background of either the offender or the offense, and 74 (2) but for those factual misperceptions held by the sentencing body, the petitioner probably would not have received a sentence of death. 75 Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 468-69. 76 The panel majority's test has only a slight bearing on the petitioner's innocence of the sentence imposed. It instead looks to the purity of the deliberative process and grants relief for errors that probably affected the outcome. The panel majority held that a petitioner is guilty of the death penalty only if the process by which he received that sentence is absolutely free from any omissions or presentations of fact that probably influenced the sentencing body's exercise of discretion. Conversely, a petitioner is actually innocent of the death penalty, according to the panel majority, if any factual error with regard to aggravation or mitigation probably influenced the deliberative process. In short, the panel majority sets forth a roughly accurate description of the standard for evaluating the significance of a timely raised allegation of constitutional error in connection with the sentencing process. 47 77 Aside from being wrong, the panel majority's test is an undesirable one for several reasons. The test is fundamentally offensive to both comity and finality. It requires a federal court to review the merits of a claim whenever an alleged constitutional error probably influenced the sentencing body to impose the death penalty even though a claim is procedurally defaulted, constitutes an abuse of the writ, or is barred under both doctrines. Thus, the panel majority's test abolishes the distinction between a petitioner's first federal habeas petition and all subsequent such petitions. It matters not, under the panel majority's test, that a petitioner is filing his second, third, fourth, or even tenth federal habeas petition. If he can make out a colorable claim of actual prejudice, he is entitled to have the merits of his claim reviewed. Were this Johnson's first federal habeas petition, he would have to allege and prove both that the performance of his counsel at sentencing was deficient, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under the panel majority's test, Johnson need prove no more even though his claim is procedurally defaulted or abusive or both. 78 The test creates the necessity of holding an evidentiary hearing for the first time in federal court on a claim the petitioner should have presented to a state court long ago. Were we to remand this case, as the panel majority held we should, a federal district court would hear evidence a state court never had the opportunity to hear and evaluate. The panel majority's assertion that its test is reserved for extraordinary cases is of little comfort. This case demonstrates that the panel majority's test turn[s] the case in which an error results in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the 'extraordinary case,' ... into an all too ordinary one. Adams, 489 U.S. at 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1217-18 n. 6. Johnson's claim is a common one. He claims that his counsel did a poor job--they could have done better, and if they had, he probably would not have received the death penalty. We are faced with similar claims in many capital cases. Thus, the panel majority's test would require evidentiary hearings in many not-so-extraordinary cases. 79 Lastly, the panel majority's test encourages and rewards sandbagging. Johnson's habeas counsel admitted they filed first in federal court because they believed they could always go back to state court later. In part, the procedural default doctrine is designed to prevent such practices. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The panel majority's test allows petitioners to circumvent the procedural default doctrine and the policy against intentionally withholding claims all too easily. 80
81 The excluded evidence does not implicate any of the four aggravating factors found by the trial judge and upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida. Johnson, therefore, was convicted of murder accompanied by at least one aggravating factor. Further, the introduction of the now proffered evidence would not have deprived the sentencing judge of the discretion to impose the death penalty. The panel majority uncritically accepted Johnson's claim that the proffered evidence, if true, would have been considered a mitigating factor by the advisory jury and trial judge. We disagree. There is a very real possibility that both the jury and the judge might not have accepted the drug compulsion theory as a mitigating factor, but instead would have considered Johnson's propensity toward violent crime--whether or not the product of a drug addiction--as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. Even if the evidence would have established the existence of statutory mitigating circumstances, however, we nevertheless conclude that Johnson has not satisfied the actually innocent exception to the procedural default doctrine. In other words, Johnson has not shown that the trial judge was not free to sentence Johnson to death. We hold that Johnson has not made a colorable showing that he is actually innocent of the death penalty and we should not, therefore, exercise our discretion to review the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim.