Opinion ID: 177029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Language and Context

Text: The statutory language at issue reads as follows: `[A]dversary adjudication' means (i) an adjudication under section 554 of th[e APA] in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise, but excludes an adjudication for the purpose of establishing or fixing a rate or for the purpose of granting or renewing a license.  5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (emphasis added). The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and the inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether statutory language is sufficiently plain or not is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843 (internal citations omitted). The most natural reading of the EAJA text favors interpreting the purpose of an adjudication to be defined by the objective nature of the agency action in question, rather than the subjective motives of the challenging party. In the absence of statutory language directing otherwise, the purpose of an adjudicative proceeding is presumed to remain the same throughout the duration of its administrative life, regardless of the motives of an interested party challenging the decision on appeal. This presumption is supported by both the plain meaning of the text and its statutory context. Merriam-Webster defines purpose as something set up as an object or end to be attained. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1011 (11th ed.2004). The more natural reading of whether an adjudication is for the purpose of granting or renewing a license looks to what the end result of the adjudication ultimately will be, which in this case is the renewal or non-renewal of a grazing permit. While Western Watersheds may have been inspired to challenge BLM's grazing permit decisions by its interest in enforcing environmental protection laws, it nonetheless pursued its goals within the context of permitting renewal proceedings. Furthermore, because consideration of environmental factors is embedded in BLM's permitting process, a challenge to a grazing permit on environmental grounds still falls naturally within the parameters of an adjudication whose purpose is to grant or deny a permit or permit renewal. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4160.2, 4180.2. Although Western Watersheds insists its objective in bringing the appeal was not to obtain or renew a license for itself, the EAJA nowhere speaks in terms of whether a party is seeking to obtain a license, but rather whether the agency is considering a grant of a license. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i). Western Watersheds attempts to bolster its argument by inserting a word in the EAJA license exception that is simply not there: only those administrative adjudications brought `for the purpose of granting or renewing a license.' That Western Watersheds must insert the term brought in order to effect its desired construction of the text illustrates that the plain meaning of the language does not support reading the adjudicative purpose from the perspective of the challenging party. The language chosen by Congress to describe the purpose of an adjudication refers to the nature of the agency action rather than the individual party's reasons for bringing the appeal. The specific context of the statute also supports the Appeals Board's reading. When Congress limited the kinds of adjudications for which attorneys' fees are recoverable under the EAJA, it relied on a well-recognized distinction under the APA between applications for a license and adjudications in which an agency seeks the withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or annulment of a license. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c). Thus, by the time the EAJA was passed, renewals fell into the licensing category and not the modification category. This long-standing distinction is reflected in the model regulations developed by the Administrative Conference of the United States, tasked by Congress with advising all federal agencies in consistently interpreting and applying the EAJA, and in the Department of the Interior's regulations. See Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act ( Implementation Guidelines ), 46 Fed.Reg. 15,895, 15,896 (Mar. 10, 1981); 43 C.F.R. § 4.603. The distinction also finds support in the cases cited by the Appeals Board and lends support to the claim that the structure of the EAJA excludes attorneys' fees recovery when the underlying proceeding is one whose purpose is renewal, rather than modification, of a license. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Callaway, 530 F.2d 625, 634-35 (5th Cir.1976); Hamlin Testing Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 357 F.2d 632, 638 (6th Cir.1966). Finally, while we are under no obligation to defer to the Appeals Board's interpretation of the EAJA, see Amer. Pac. Concrete Pipe Co. v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1986), we note that its conclusion is consistent with the Appeals Board's previous administrative decisions, which similarly rely on this distinction in determining when fees are available. [2] Western Watersheds, on the other hand, offers no persuasive authority compelling its preferred conclusion. The two cases it cites that interpret the EAJA license exception stand only for the proposition that when a party challenges a renewal or grant of a permit for himself, such a challenge is excepted from EAJA fee shifting. See Bullwinkel v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 787 F.2d 254, 256-57 (7th Cir.1986); Nakamura v. Heinrich, 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 119, 121 (1993). These cases hardly help Western Watersheds. Demonstrating that a court will find the license exception applicable in these cases does not lead to the conclusion that a court would have ruled differently had a party not seeking the permit for itself (like Western Watersheds, here) been the one to challenge the decision. In fact, it seems the decisions Western Watersheds cites actually looked to the nature of the license or permit itself, not the challenging party's intent. See Bullwinkel, 787 F.2d at 256-57; Nakamura, 17 Ct. Int'l Trade at 120-21. In other words, Western Watersheds' cases offer little, if any, support for its argument.