Opinion ID: 180412
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence

Text: Stewart argues that the district court's engaging in factfinding violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights and his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. According to Stewart, the court's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed assault with intent to commit murder should not have contributed to the court's departure from the Guidelines sentencing range for armed bank robbery. Claims of improper judicial factfinding are reviewed de novo. United States v. Roberge, 565 F.3d 1005, 1012 (6th Cir.2009). In making this argument, Stewart misstates the law concerning the permissibility of judicial factfinding in sentencing decisions. The Supreme Court decided in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and its progeny that judges may find facts by a preponderance of the evidence so long as the resulting sentence does not increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum sentence allowed by the jury's verdict. See id., 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Provided that the sentence imposed is within the statutorily prescribed range justified by the jury's verdict, the possibility that the judicially found facts might also constitute another separate offense is not per se a basis for objection. United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 512, 516-17 (6th Cir.2008) (approving the district court's determination that the defendant participated in an uncharged armed robbery because judges may find facts by a preponderance of the evidence so long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense found by the jury). The district court in the present case did not exceed the maximum sentence allowed under Stewart's four counts of conviction. It thus properly found facts that influenced its sentencing decision.