Opinion ID: 2341261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Measure of Damages Based on Saggy's Return on February 1, 1962.

Text: Appellants contend that the measure of damages delineated in the order of Judge Liss of February 20, 1970, and incorporated, in substance, in Judge Jones' charge to the jury was erroneous. They further contend that Sagner's damages should have been measured according to the rules of restitution. These contentions are, at least in part, based upon the subsidiary assertion that in replevin actions the right to possession and entitlement to damages are distinct remedies. As authority for this proposition appellants cite Koch, et al. v. Mack International Motor Truck Corp., 201 Md. 562, 572, 95 A.2d 105, 110 (1953) and Burnett v. Bealmear, 79 Md. 36, 40, 28 A. 898, 899 (1894). It is to be noted that in each of these cases the property sought to be replevied had already been returned to the party entitled to possession. In Burnett v. Bealmear, supra , this Court said: As the property had been delivered to the plaintiff, it would have been an error to give him a verdict for its appraised value,   . The proper verdict for the plaintiff, when he is entitled to it, is merely for damages for the detention of the goods. This may be seen by examining the approved precedents. 1 Evans' Harris 508. It is said in Hoskins v. Robins, 2 Wms. Saund. 320, note 1: `The plaintiff obtained a verdict, and he is only entitled to damages for the wrongful taking and costs, but not to the value of the goods taken, as he is in trespass, for they were delivered to him when replevied.' To the same effect is Koch et al. v. Mack International Motor Truck Corp., supra . Maryland Rule BQ44 a provides that When filed with the bond, the declaration shall allege that the defendant unjustly detains the property, and shall claim the return of said property plus damages for its detention. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from these decisions and from the Maryland Rule is that the plaintiff in a replevin action is entitled to damages for the detention of the goods for which replevin is sought. This rule is supported by other authorities. 46 Am. Jur. Replevin, sec. 142: The rule is well settled that where property has a value on account of the use to which it may be put, as distinguished from its value for sale or consumption, the successful party is entitled to recover as damages for its detention the value of such use during the time that the property was wrongfully detained. Thus, where the property detained consists of horses, tools, implements of trade etc., the general rule is that the party deprived of possession is entitled to the reasonable value of the use during the period of wrongful detention. [See also  79 A.L.R.2d 733; Drinkhouse v. VanNess, 260 P. 869 (Cal., 1927), which involved replevin of a stud horse.] The theory that Sagner is entitled merely to restitution and not to damages for detention is based upon the faulty premise that appellants retained possession first as stakeholders and, after February 1, 1962, under a judgment or decree of court. Appellants asserted that restitution was the correct measure of damages in one of the preliminary arguments before Judge Liss, who ruled against them. However, they did not request that Judge Jones charge the jury on this theory. The contention that they were stakeholders from February 1, 1962, until May 22, 1963, was made for the first time in their brief in this case. They were not stakeholders. At most they were bailees, and the bailment was terminated on February 1, 1962. Sagner v. Glenangus Farms, Inc., supra . Although, in their bill for declaratory judgment, they requested a temporary order enjoining Sagner from removing the horse, this relief was never pursued and no such order was ever signed. Thus between February 1, 1962, and May 22, 1963, the date on which Judge James Cullen signed the decree in the declaratory judgment case, no judgment, decree or order of any kind had been issued in the declaratory judgment proceedings, let alone a judgment, decree or order which required or authorized appellants to retain possession of Saggy. By Judge Cullen's decree neither appellant was required or specifically authorized to retain possession of the stallion. That decree merely held that the syndication agreement was a valid and subsisting agreement between the parties; that the clause, which this Court on appeal held gave Sagner the right to cancel such agreement, did not mean that all thirty-two shares had to be subscribed for and purchased by persons other than Sagner prior to February 1, 1962; and that all other terms and provisions of such agreement were valid and binding upon the parties. In the cases cited by appellants to support their contention that Sagner's recovery of damages should be limited by the rules of restitution, the act of the person asked to respond in damages dated from and was based upon a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction. For example, in Johnson v. Robertson, 34 Md. 165, 172-3 (1871), it was noted that whatever had been done by the defendant had been done under and in strict execution of the decree appealed from, which was a decree of sale in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. Likewise, in Redwood Hotel, Inc. v. Korbien, 197 Md. 514, 80 A.2d 28 (1951), restitution was requested by petition filed in the equity case in which the petitioner had surrendered a hotel pursuant to a permanent injunction, which was later vacated. Finally, the distinction between a tort action for damages and a quasi-contractual action for restitution is stated by Prosser, Law of Torts, sec. 94, pp. 644-5 (3rd ed. 1964), to be as follows: The ordinary delictual action for a tort usually is not concerned with restitution, since it seeks to compensate the injured person for his loss, irrespective of the receipt of anything by the defendant. Even those tort actions which demand the return of specific property, such as replevin or ejectment, are in theory, at least, seeking to restore the plaintiff to his prior position, although they may often have the incidental effect of giving him the benefit of the increased value of the property. Restitution in quasi-contract, on the other hand, looks to what the defendant has received which in good conscience should belong to the plaintiff; and this may be either more or less than the amount of the plaintiff's actual loss. (Emphasis supplied). The trial court applied the correct measure of damages; retention of possession of Saggy by Appellants on and after February 1, 1962, was illegal and was not made lawful by Judge Cullen's decree. By electing to retain possession of the stallion after the date of such decree they gambled that Judge Cullen's decision was correct, and, with the reversal by this Court, they lost their bet.