Opinion ID: 900877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Extreme and Outrageous Conduct by Common Carrier

Text: [¶ 10.] Harris contends both that Jackrabbit committed the tort of IIED and that this tort is altered by the fact that Jackrabbit is a common carrier. Although he conceded to the circuit court that the traditional elements of IIED are not changed when applied against a common carrier, he contends that Jackrabbit owed a greater duty of care to its passengers because conduct that may not be outrageous or reckless if done by a member of the public in general may very well be outrageous and reckless if done by a common carrier to a passenger. Harris cites no authority for this proposition. We think these arguments confuse the elements of two different torts: IIED and gross insult. [¶ 11.] We begin by examining the tort of IIED. The tort is proved by establishing that the defendant (1) by extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) acted intentionally or recklessly to cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, (3) which conduct in fact caused the plaintiff severe distress, and (4) the plaintiff suffered an extreme, disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct. Henry v. Henry, 2000 SD 4, ¶ 6, 604 N.W.2d 285, 288. The question whether the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous is initially for the trial court. Richardson v. East River Elec. Power Coop., 531 N.W.2d 23, 27 (S.D.1995). Comment d to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) explains that recovery is permissible only where the actor's conduct was extreme and outrageous. Proof under this tort must exceed a rigorous benchmark. The conduct necessary to form intentional infliction of emotional distress must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. See Stene v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1998 SD 95, ¶ 32, 583 N.W.2d 399, 404; Tibke v. McDougall, 479 N.W.2d 898, 906-07 (S.D.1992). Liability for this tort will not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d. [¶ 12.] On the other hand, the tort of gross insult is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 48 (1965). To establish the claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the plaintiff was a patron using a common carrier's facilities; (2) the plaintiff received gross insults from the carrier's servant, acting in the scope of employment; and (3) the gross insults must be reasonably deemed to be offensive. Id. The comments provide further explanation. Any public utility may of course be liable for the infliction of severe emotional distress by extreme and outrageous conduct, under the rule stated in § 46. The rule stated in this Section goes further and makes such a defendant liable for conduct which falls short of extreme outrage, but is merely insulting. Id. at cmt. c (emphasis added). Of course, the rule in § 48 does not extend to mere trivialities; however, the obvious condition of the plaintiff must . . . be taken into account in determining whether the conduct is grossly insulting. . . . [4] Id. [¶ 13.] Ample case law in other jurisdictions supports § 48's special rule for common carriers. Bricks v. Metro Ambulance Serv., Inc., 177 Ga.App. 62, 338 S.E.2d 438, 443 (1985); Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of America, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983). Insults amounting to less than extreme outrage are actionable only when the defendant enjoys a special relationship to the plaintiff that compels a higher than normal duty of care, as when the defendant is a common carrier, innkeeper, or public utility. . . . Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076, n. 21 (D.C.App. 1980); Haser v. Pape, 77 N.D. 36, 39 N.W.2d 578, 581 (N.D.1949). [¶ 14.] The key difference between the torts of IIED and gross insult is that IIED, per § 46, covers extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] severe emotional distress, whereas § 48 covers gross insults that reasonably offend a common carrier's patrons. The question, then, becomes which tort did Harris plead? [¶ 15.] Count Two of Harris' amended complaint is captioned IIED. The pertinent passages from the complaint (with emphases added) are as follows: 13. Defendant's agents recklessly provided no assistance to Plaintiff, leaving him, in his injured state, to fend for himself in an unfamiliar town at night. 19. The Defendant, holding itself out as a public transport company, had a duty to use the highest degree of care to establish and implement procedures to effectively meet passengers' medical, transportation and other needs in the event of a foreseeable emergency such as a collision. 20. Defendant failed in that duty, resulting in Plaintiff's emotional injuries. 21. The Defendant's utter indifference to Plaintiff's requests for help, and Defendant's complete failure to offer any kind of assistance whatsoever at any point in time after the accident . . . constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct. 22. The Defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct caused the Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.. . . 23. The Defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct caused the Plaintiff to suffer an extreme disabling emotional response. . . . 24. Plaintiff has undergone pain and suffering both of body and of mind as a result of Defendant's negligence. [¶ 16.] Aside from the irrelevant mention of negligence, Harris's amended complaint speaks explicitly and unequivocally of extreme and outrageous conduct and not of gross insults. Nonetheless, the complaint does speak of the higher duty of care that a common carrier owes its passengers and does allege that Jackrabbit breached that duty. Under our liberal pleading rules, this would perhaps be sufficient to allege the tort of gross insult. However, in his appellate brief, Harris asserts that this higher duty of care has a bearing upon establishment of the elements of IIED. Nowhere in his brief does Harris even mention § 48, nor does he direct us to any cases that would support a claim that Jackrabbit committed the tort of gross insult. Thus Harris's cause of action cannot be understood otherwise than as a claim of IIED, which allows for no common-carrier exception. [¶ 17.] For Harris to prevail on his IIED claim, the conduct of Jackrabbit personnel would have to be extreme and outrageous, committed intentionally or recklessly, in order to satisfy the first and second elements of that tort. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Harris, we consider the following: (a) Harris's obvious condition (his injury, his minority status, and his age) and (b) the onerousness, under the circumstances, (i) of responding to his request to call for an ambulance, (ii) of providing him transportation back to the Sioux City bus station, and (iii) of giving him free passage back to his home. The question is whether the conduct of Jackrabbit's personnel (particularly that of driver Biever) was an extreme outrage. [¶ 18.] It is true, as Professors Prosser and Keeton explain, that one basis on which extreme outrage can be found is the defendant's knowledge that the plaintiff is especially sensitive, susceptible and vulnerable to injury through mental distress at the particular conduct. The Law of Torts, Ch. 2, § 12, 62 (5th ed 1984). Nonetheless, even taking into account Harris's injured condition, we cannot say that this conduct was so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Tibke, 479 N.W.2d at 907. It was inconsiderate behavior, perhaps even callous indifference, but it was not an extreme outrage. It follows that the circuit court, correctly finding no reason to depart from the standard formulation of the elements of IIED, required Harris to bear the appropriate burden of proof. [¶ 19.] Affirmed. [¶ 20.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, and ZINTER, Justices, and AMUNDSON, Retired Justice, concur.