Opinion ID: 1791862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overview of Retroactivity Analysis

Text: It is clear that new law announced by this Court or the United States Supreme Court applies to all non-final criminal cases  that is, to all cases involving convictions for which an appellate court mandate has not yet issued. See Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.1992) (holding that any decision of this Court announcing a new rule of law ... must be given retrospective application by the courts of this state in every case pending on direct review or not yet final), limited by Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1008 n. 4 (Fla.1994) (reading Smith to mean that new points of law established by this Court shall be deemed retrospective with respect to all non-final cases unless this Court says otherwise). Whether newly announced rules of law apply to cases that already were final at the time of the announcement is a different question. We have recognized that once a conviction has been upheld on appeal, the State acquires a strong interest in finality: The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated. It has long been recognized that, for several reasons, litigation must, at some point, come to an end. In terms of the availability of judicial resources, cases must eventually become final simply to allow effective appellate review of other cases. There is no evidence that subsequent collateral review is generally better than contemporaneous appellate review for ensuring that a conviction or sentence is just. Moreover, an absence of finality casts a cloud of tentativeness over the criminal justice system, benefiting neither the person convicted nor society as a whole. Witt, 387 So.2d at 925; see also United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) (noting that [i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures). To override the State's interest in finality every time a new rule is decided would ... destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state ... beyond any tolerable limit. Witt, 387 So.2d at 929-30. Thus, when deciding whether a decision containing new law applies retroactively, the fundamental consideration is the balancing of the need for decisional finality against the concern for fairness and uniformity in individual cases. State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1995). The United States Supreme Court first established standards for retroactivity in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). Linkletter considered the retroactivity of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), which applied the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states. In determining whether Mapp applied retroactively, the Court adopted a three-part test that considered (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (b) the extent of reliance on the prior rule, and (c) the effect that retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice. Id. at 636-40, 85 S.Ct. 1731. Under that test, the Court decided that Mapp would apply only to subsequent trials. Id. Two years later, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), the Court again applied the three Linkletter factors, cementing their status as the controlling federal test. We incorporated Linkletter into our own retroactivity analysis in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d at 925. Witt held that a change in the law does not apply retroactively in Florida  unless the change: (a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. Id. at 931. We explained that a development of fundamental significance is one that place[s] beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties, or alternatively is of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall and Linkletter.  Id. at 929. By permitting the retroactive application of new rules only in these limited circumstances, we declare[d] our adherence to the limited role for postconviction relief proceedings, even in death penalty cases. Id. at 927. Nine years after we decided Witt, the United States Supreme Court began to turn away from Linkletter. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). While acknowledging that new rules of constitutional law should apply to every case pending on direct appeal, the Teague plurality concluded that they should not apply retroactively to postconviction cases unless (1) they place conduct beyond the power of the government to proscribe, or (2) they announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure that is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. Less than a year later, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), the Court adopted Teague's retroactivity analysis as its majority view. Applying the test for retroactivity under Teague, the United States Supreme Court recently held in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), that Ring does not apply retroactively for purposes of federal law. But Summerlin does not control our decision. As courts in other states have noted, state courts are not bound by Teague in determining the retroactivity of decisions. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (acknowledging that [s]tates are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires); Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463, 470 (2002) (noting that [w]e may choose to provide broader retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure than Teague and its progeny require); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517 (S.D.1990) (noting that states may decide how to provide access to state postconviction relief). We continue to apply our longstanding Witt analysis, which provides more expansive retroactivity standards than those adopted in Teague. We nevertheless conclude that, even under Witt, Ring does not apply retroactively.