Opinion ID: 2169460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Specific Instances of Conduct

Text: The defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial justice erred in excluding evidence of specific incidents in which Mrs. Senerchia had exhibited aggressive or violent behavior over the course of the eight years before her death. [7] The defendant had proffered that evidence in support of his affirmative defense that he had acted in self-defense. Specifically, defendant had sought to introduce thirty-seven police reports created between January of 1992 and July of 2000, which reports documented the numerous instances when the Cranston Police were called to Mrs. Senerchia's home to investigate disturbances involving her. The defendant contends that these reports would have demonstrated Mrs. Senerchia's tendency to become combative or aggressive when intoxicated. The defendant urges us to reverse our holding in State v. Dellay, 687 A.2d 435, 438-39 (R.I.1996), in which we held that prior specific violent acts of a victim, of which a defendant was unaware at the time of his or her encounter with the victim, are inadmissible under Rules 404(a)(2) and 405(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. In support of his position that our holding in that case should be reversed, defendant contends that our later decision in State v. Ventre, 811 A.2d 1178 (R.I.2002), should be read as constituting a departure from the holding in Dellay. We disagree with this contention, and we now expressly indicate our continued adherence to our holding in Dellay. In Dellay, 687 A.2d at 438, the defendant, who was appealing a second-degree murder conviction, argued that certain prior specific violent acts of the victim should have been admitted to support his defense of self-defense, even though the defendant was unaware of those acts at the time of the encounter with the victim. [8] The defendant in that case contended that the violent character of a victim was an essential element of the defense of self-defense and that, therefore, Rules 404(a)(2) and 405(b) should have been read together in such a way as to permit the introduction of prior violent acts irrespective of whether or not the defendant was aware of them at the time of the alleged criminal act. [9] In rejecting this argument, we held that the existence of a violent character on the part of the victim is not an essential element of the defense of self-defense in this jurisdiction. Dellay, 687 A.2d at 438. In so holding, this Court relied upon the well-settled principle of Rhode Island law that a defendant who asserts the defense of self-defense is not required to demonstrate that the victim was the initial aggressor. Id. Because we held that the defense of self-defense does not require a showing that the victim had a violent character, we stated that evidence of the victim's character is appropriately limited to reputation or opinion testimony and that evidence of specific prior acts of violence by the victim are admissible only if the defendant had been aware of them at the time of the encounter with the victim. Id. at 438, 439. The defendant contends that our decision in Ventre, 811 A.2d at 1182, indicates a departure from our earlier holding in Dellay. We disagree with this contention. It is true that in Ventre we held that a trial justice's exclusion of evidence of the prior violent acts of the victim constituted reversible error. It is highly significant, however, that the defendant in that case had asserted that he was aware of those acts at the time of his encounter with the victim. In holding that such evidence should have been admitted, we emphasized that [k]nowing that one of his assailants not only was frequently involved in violent altercations, but had also committed the act of murder, would unquestionably contribute to the reasonableness of defendant's fear. Ventre, 811 A.2d at 1182. We are convinced that our holdings in Dellay and Ventre, which are factually distinguishable, are not materially at odds with each another. We have in no way retreated from our position that, in self-defense cases, evidence of prior specific acts of violence by the victim of which a defendant was unaware is inadmissible, whereas evidence of such acts of which a defendant was aware is admissible to show the reasonableness of defendant's fear. Our more recent decisions in State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992 (R.I.2005), and State v. Garcia, 883 A.2d 1131 (R.I.2005), further demonstrate the baselessness of defendant's contention that this Court has changed its position with respect to the admissibility of evidence of prior acts of violence committed by a victim. Those decisions quite clearly indicate that this Court has deliberately continued to adhere to the holding in Dellay. When, in Hallenbeck, the defendant requested that this Court reconsider its position concerning the admission of a victim's prior violent acts irrespective of defendant's knowledge of same at the time of the fatal altercation, we reiterated the well-established rule that admission of [a victim's] entire criminal record is, truly, an effort to disparage the victim's general character and is not probative of the defendant's apprehensive state of mind. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d at 1015 (quoting State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1086 n. 11 (R.I.1981)). We reiterated our adherence to the principles enunciated in Dellay even more emphatically in Garcia, 883 A.2d at 1136. In that case, when faced with a similar argument raised by the defendant, we quite bluntly stated that [u]nder no set of circumstances will evidence of specific acts of conduct be admissible to prove that a victim acted in conformity on a particular occasion or to establish that the victim was the aggressor. Id. In reaching our holding that the trial justice had properly excluded the proffered evidence in Garcia, we stated that [e]vidence of previous specific acts of the victim is admissible only if the defendant was aware of the conduct at the time of the confrontation. Id. In that case, we characterized the requirement that a defendant show that he or she had prior knowledge of a victim's prior acts as being a strict condition precedent for the admission of such evidence. Id. The defendant in the present case has presented no compelling reason for us to deviate from our earlier decisions with respect to this issue. Consequently, we decline to repudiate our holding in Dellay. Indeed, we take this occasion to quote with approval (as we did in Dellay ) the following language from this Court's opinion in State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079 (R.I.1981): [A] defendant who asserts the defense of self-defense is    entitled to adduce relevant evidence of specific acts of violence perpetrated by the victim against third parties, provided however, that the defendant was aware of these acts at the time of his encounter with the victim. Id. at 1085 (emphasis added). [10] The defendant argues in the alternative that the specific prior acts of violence committed by Mrs. Senerchia and referenced in the thirty-seven police reports which he sought to introduce should have been admitted, pursuant to Rule 406 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, [11] as evidence of a habit on the part of Mrs. Senerchia of becoming drunk and verbally and physically aggressive. This argument is without merit. This Court will not overturn a trial justice's ruling on an evidentiary matter unless that ruling constitutes an abuse of the justice's discretion that prejudices the complaining party. Dellay, 687 A.2d at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, defendant attempted to introduce at trial thirty-seven police reports documenting encounters between Mrs. Senerchia and the police in an effort to demonstrate that she had exhibited a continuing course of conduct of becoming drunk and verbally and physically aggressive. However, at trial, defense counsel could cite only five instances involving physical violence on the part of Mrs. Senerchia. Nevertheless, defendant maintains on appeal that the reports still point[ed] to the combative nature of Mrs. Senerchia enough to show that she [had] a pattern of being combative. In rejecting defendant's contention, the trial justice expressly made reference to the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 406 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (the text of which rule is identical to Rule 406 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence), wherein habit is defined as being one's regular response to a repeated specific situation. The trial justice concluded that five incidents out of thirty-seven that the defendant has cited hardly rise to the level of semiautomatic conduct when Mrs. Senerchia was intoxicated. We agree with the trial justice that, although the police reports may have demonstrated that Mrs. Senerchia became intoxicated on several occasions, they do not demonstrate that she had a habit of becoming violent when drunk. Consequently, we hold that the police reports were properly excluded. B