Opinion ID: 1386737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel During the Penalty Phase of the Proceedings

Text: Fautenberry's primary argumentto which he devoted most of his time at oral argumentis that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his proceedings. An ineffective-assistance claim has two components: (1) counsel's performance must have been deficient, and (2) counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, id., as measured by prevailing professional norms. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish deficient performance, the habeas petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard, of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. When evaluating counsel's performance, we must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Fautenberry contends that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance by: (1) failing to communicate meaningfully with him, (2) failing to conduct a reasonable investigation for mitigating evidence, and (3) failing to retain reasonable and necessary experts. The state court rejected this claim, relying primarily on Fautenberry's refusal to cooperate. We address Fautenberry's three allegations in turn. First, Fautenberry contends, that his counsel failed to communicate meaningfully with him. The Sixth Amendment, however, protects the criminal defendant's right to adversarial process; that is, to have counsel[,] acting in the role of advocate[,] . . . require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (quotation marks and citations omitted). [T]he appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such. If counsel is a reasonably effective advocate, he meets constitutional standards irrespective of his client's evaluation of his performance. It is for this reason that we attach no weight to either respondent's expression of satisfaction with counsel's performance at the time of his trial, or to his later expression of dissatisfaction. Id. at 657 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (citations omitted). Thus, at its root, the ineffective-assistance analysis is based on an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The record shows that any communication problems between Fautenberry and his attorneys were the result of Fautenberry's own determined refusal to communicate, not a lack of availability of, or effort by, counsel. The record contains abundant evidence indicating that Fautenberry independently resolved not to communicate or cooperate with anyone, including his lawyers. Fautenberry's former girlfriend, Ms. Priest-Herndon, testified that Fautenberry told her of his tactical decision not to communicate with his attorneys because he thought that was his best way to beat this thing. As the district court aptly noted, Fautenberry has not cited, and the court is not aware of, any Supreme Court case holding that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to persuade a recalcitrant client to do that which he . . . refused to do. We find nothing objectively unreasonable in these attorneys' inability to communicate meaningfully with Fautenberry, who steadfastly refused to communicate with them. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the [accused's] own statements or actions.). The evidence proffered to demonstrate that counsel had failed to communicate with Fautenberry is wholly unpersuasive. Fautenberry relies heavily upon statements in the medical notes recorded during his pretrial incarceration, in which he said, I just want to be treated like a human being, and I[ am] as good as dead now. When considered in their proper context, these statements, contrary to Fautenberry's contention, do not demonstrate a dysfunctional attorney-client relationship. Instead, they display Fautenberry's despondency because of the situation at handhe had been incarcerated for six months awaiting trial for a murder that he had already (on at least three occasions) confessed to committing. Fautenberry also relies on the affidavit of Dr. Susan D. Shorr, a mitigation specialist who assisted his attorneys during their preparation for the sentencing hearing, in which she opined that Fautenberry became uncooperative and noncommunicative only [a]s a result of the breakdown of the relationship between . . . Fautenberry and his attorneys. This unsubstantiated statement contradicts Ms. Priest-Herndon's testimony that Fautenberry had told her of his independent, tactical decision not to communicate with his lawyers, but it substantiates all other accounts that Fautenberry, in fact, refused to communicate. Fautenberry's attempts to blame his counsel for his own recalcitrance and unwillingness to communicate do not demonstrate that counsel were deficient in failing to communicate meaningfully with Fautenberry. Second, Fautenberry argues that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by failing to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation that would have discovered his organic brain damage. [2] Fautenberry contends that further investigation would have revealed his past head injuries and alerted his attorneys to the likelihood that he had permanent brain damage. We conclude, contrary to Fautenberry's assertion, that counsel did in fact conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation. Defense counsel interviewed and procured extensive testimony from lay witnesses, including Louise Corcoran (a close family friend) and Ms. Priest-Herndon (Fautenberry's former girlfriend). These women testified regarding Fautenberry's unstable family environment and emotionally abusive upbringing. Defense counsel also garnered the assistance of numerous experts, including Dr. Nancy Schmidtgoessling and Dr. James Tanley. In fact, counsel hired Dr, Tanley for the express purpose of conducting a neuropsychological examinationthe most effective means possible of determining whether Fautenberry had a brain impairment. But Fautenberry refused to submit to the examination. Counsels' inability to discover or establish organic brain damage is directly attributable to Fautenberry's refusal to cooperate, rather than any insufficiency in the investigation. Had Fautenberry not impeded Dr. Tanley's examination, the doctor presumably would have discovered, verified, and revealed any such brain damage. We will not find counsel deficient simply because they did not succeed in discovering his brain damage or pursue unspecified, alternate avenues (which may or may not have revealed the brain damage). In light of the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Darden, 477 U.S. at 186, 106 S.Ct. 2464, Fautenberry's attorneys conducted a sufficient and reasonable mitigation investigation under the circumstances Fautenberry created. Third, Fautenberry contends that his counsel failed to retain reasonable and necessary experts, asserting that neither Dr. Schmidtgoessling nor Dr. Tanley provided him with a reasonable level of assistance. We find this argument baseless. Dr. Tanley provided as much assistance as was possible under the circumstances: He attempted to examine Fautenberry to determine whether he suffered from a brain impairment, but Fautenberry refused to participate in the examination. Thus, any deficiencies in Dr. Tanley's assistance were the result of Fautenberry's admitted refusal to cooperate, rather than any shortcoming of Dr. Tanley or any flaw in his work. We conclude as well that any alleged defect in Dr. Schmidtgoessling's assistance cannot be attributed to counsel. Fautenberry argues that Dr. Schmidtgoessling misdiagnosed his mental condition when she concluded that he did not suffer from organic brain damage. Even if we assume that Dr. Schmidtgoessling did misdiagnose Fautenberry, [3] [a] licensed practitioner is generally held to be competent, unless counsel has good reason to believe to the contrary. Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 772 (6th Cir.2006). Fautenberry has not shown that counsel had good reason to believe that Dr. Schmidtgoessling was incompetent, and we conclude that it was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely upon the doctor's opinions and conclusions. See Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 531, 555 (6th Cir.2001) (holding, in a case where there was no evidence that [the expert] was incompetent[] or that [the petitioner's] lawyers had any reason to question [the expert's] professional qualifications, that it was objectively reasonable for . . . trial counsel to rely upon [the expert's] diagnosis). Under these circumstances, any inadequacies in Dr. Schmidtgoessling's expert assistanceassuming there were anycannot be the basis for a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim. Accordingly, we find no deficiency in counsels' performance. Even if Fautenberry could show that his counsels' performance was deficient, he has not established that he was prejudiced by that performance. The prejudice prong requires the petitioner to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Darden, 477 U.S. at 184, 106 S.Ct. 2464. When a [petitioner] challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We thus reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence, which, in this case, includes the mitigation evidence that was omitted because of counsel's alleged deficiencies. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). A petitioner does not establish the prejudice element where he shows only that his counsel failed to present cumulative mitigation evidence, that is, evidence already presented to the jury. Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 410 (6th Cir.2006). Rather, to establish prejudice, the new evidence that a habeas petitioner presents must differ in a substantial way in strength and subject matterfrom the evidence actually presented at sentencing. Clark v. Mitchell, 425 F.3d 270, 286 (6th Cir.2005). Fautenberry argues that he was prejudiced because, due to counsel's alleged deficiencies, the jury did not hear evidence about (1) his personal struggle with, and his family's history of, depression, (2) the connection between his abusive childhood and the commission of these murders, (3) his head injuries and resulting organic brain damage, and (4) the sexual aspects of the murders he committed. But, Corcoran and Priest-Herndon testified extensively regarding Fautenberry's rough upbringing, his difficult family life, his poor relationships with the father figures in his life, his mother's constant struggle with depression, and his longing for acceptance. After hearing this testimony, as well as all the other mitigating evidence, the three-judge panel concluded that the mitigating factors included: (1) Fautenberry's past history; (2) his abuse[ ] as a child; (3) the rage of his childhood; (4) his abuse of drugs and alcohol; and (5) his low self-esteem and rejection. The omitted mitigation evidence of Fautenberry's depression, his family's history of depression, and his abusive childhood mirrors the evidence actually presented at the sentencing hearing, and therefore its omission cannot be held to have prejudiced his mitigation defense. See Broom, 441 F.3d at 410. Furthermore, the three-judge panel had already heard some evidence about the sexual nature of the murders. At the guilt phase, the prosecutor had informed the court that prior to Fautenberry's murder of Farmer in New Jersey, Fautenberry agreed to have sex with him in exchange for money. See Gillard v. Mitchell, 445 F.3d 883, 896 (6th Cir.2006) (stating that the sentencer was privy to evidence introduced during the guilt phase of trial and that counsel need not reintroduce it during the sentencing hearing). Thus, the court was aware that at least one of Fautenberry's murders contained a sexual element, and, to the extent that Fautenberry relies upon this already-disclosed evidence, we find that it is cumulative and insufficient to establish prejudice. Inclusion of the non-cumulative evidence (i.e., evidence of organic brain damage and the sexual nature of some of the murders)which purportedly would have explained his impulsive and violent nature, inability to tolerate frustration, and sexual confusiondoes not create a reasonable probability that . . . the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Furthermore, we question whether evidence of the sexual nature of the murders is even mitigating. The three judge panel might just as well have viewed Fautenberry's apparent strategy of preying on gay victims as an aggravating factor. Nor do the side-effects of organic brain damage significantly mitigate Fautenberry's actions. According to Fautenberry's medical reports, [b]rain impairment of the sort . . . apparent in . . . Fautenberry's case can . . . cause serious problems in such areas of day-to-day functioning as impulse control[,] modulation of affect[,] planning[,] problem-solving[,] and the capacity to tolerate frustration. It is highly unlikely that this sort of evidence would have altered the three-judge panel's decision to impose the death sentence for Fautenberry's murder of Daron, which they found was contemplated and calculatinga conclusion that is not at all mitigated or reduced by the traits associated with or the side effects of organic brain disorder. In short, when we aggregate all the mitigating evidence, including Fautenberry's brain disorder and the sexual nature of the crimes (to the extent that those are even mitigating), and reweigh this evidence against the aggravating factors, we find that these mitigating factors pale before the simple fact that [Fautenberry's] actions were plotted, vicious, persistent[,] and utterly callous, which was the finding of the three-judge panel. Accordingly, even if trial counsel rendered deficient performance, we find that those deficiencies did not prejudice Fautenberry. [4]