Opinion ID: 1735293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Chapman's position to eliminate the dangerous condition he created while misusing the Contractor's equipment.

Text: ¶ 24. Coho argues that judgment should be rendered in its favor because the evidence proves that Chapman was in the best position to prevent his injury. This Court has held that the party in the best position to eliminate a dangerous condition should be burdened with that responsibility. Vu v. Clayton, 765 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Miss.2000) (citing Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss.1994)). In Vu, this Court stated that because reasonable jurors could not have found that either Clayton or Xuan had knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition, we find that the trial court correctly directed the verdict in their favor. Id. at 1256. This Court reasoned that the contractor with years of experience in performing attic repair work and who had actually been there numerous times was in a better position to evaluate hazards and risks than the owners who had never been in the attic. Id. ¶ 25. Here, there is no dispute that Sauls has fifty years' experience in this type of repair work. There is testimony that Chapman knew what he was doing was dangerous because he told Hoze to move out of the way. There was also testimony that when Chapman tried to free the pipe wrench with the tongs, his supervisor told him numerous times to stop. Furthermore, there is ample evidence to show that Chapman had used the pipe wrench on many occasions prior to the accident. There is also evidence that Sauls used the pipe wrench for 3½ inch tubing for fifty years. ¶ 26. However, there remains a question as to whether Coho maintained control over the premises and had a duty to supervise and give instructions to Sauls. There is contradictory testimony as to whether Coho instructed Chapman to use the pipe wrench or whether Coho should have been on the site to supervise the work and to shut it down if it saw Chapman using the pipe wrench. There was also conflicting evidence as to whether it was Coho's duty to shut down the job if it was not being done safely or if anyone at the site could shut down the operation to eliminate the dangerous condition. We find that these contradictions sufficiently created a jury question as to who was to shut down the operation to elevate the dangerous condition. We find that the trial court did not err in denying Coho's motions. ¶ 27. Coho has asserted several reasons why the trial court's denial of its motions for JNOV and directed verdicts were improper. However, this Court concludes that the contradictory evidence sufficiently created a jury question. Furthermore, according to the standard of review, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and if reasonable and fair-minded jurors might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required. There is evidence in support of the verdict when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Chapman, giving him the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. There was sufficient evidence to present a jury question. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Coho's motions for JNOV and directed verdict.
¶ 28. Motions for a new trial are made pursuant to M.R.C.P. 59. Trial courts have authority to grant a new trial, where, in the exercise of their sound discretion, they regard such a verdict as being contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. Dupree v. Plantation Pointe, L.P., 892 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 2004) (citing C & C Trucking Co. v. Smith, 612 So.2d 1092, 1099 (Miss.1992)). A denial of a request for new trial will be reversed only when it amounts to an abuse of that judge's discretion. Id. (citing Maxwell v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 513 So.2d 901, 908 (Miss.1987)). This Court should give substantial weight, deference and respect to the decision of the trial judge in matters such as this. Id. A new trial may be granted where the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or when the jury has been confused by faulty instructions, or when the jury has departed from its oath and its verdict is a result of bias, passion, and prejudice. Id. at 235 (citing Griffin v. Fletcher, 362 So.2d 594, 596 (Miss.1978)). ¶ 29. Coho argues that trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial because the verdict is contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. Coho asserts the same four arguments as above and claims that the overwhelming weight of the evidence proves that: (1) Coho did not exercise control over the work; (2) Chapman's injuries were sustained while performing work the contractor agreed to perform for Coho; (3) the evidence proves that Chapman had actual and constructive knowledge that his conduct would create the dangerous condition that led to his injuries; and (4) the evidence showed that Chapman was in the best position to eliminate the dangerous condition he created while misusing the contractor's equipment. ¶ 30. The first point is dispositive of all four arguments. There is contradictory evidence regarding the issue of control and this contradictory testimony sufficiently created a jury question. However, when looking at the weight of the evidence, it is clear that the verdict is contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. This Court discussed the issue of substantial control in Magee v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 551 So.2d 182 (Miss. 1989). In Magee, the contract provided that the contractor assume[d] full and complete responsibility for the conditions pertaining to the Work, the site of the Work or its surroundings, and all risks in connection therewith. Id. at 184. The contractor also assumed responsibility for the care and maintenance of the work until completed and accepted by the owner. Id. at 185. Moreover, the contractor also obligated itself to take all necessary precautions for the safety of its employees. Id. The contractor also maintained control over the safety of the worksite, the manner of the work and they were to supply all the tools and employees needed for the job. Id. There was also testimony from the owner's on-site inspector, stating that the contractor had control over the methods and manner in which it was done. Id. The owner would merely inspect periodically the work of the contractor's employees. Id. This Court held that the owner did not retain substantial control over the operations even though they could inspect the work. Id. at 186. ¶ 31. This Court again dealt with the issue of substantial control in Coho Resources, Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 So.2d 1 (Miss.2002). In McCarthy the contractors assumed full and complete responsibility for the conditions pertaining to the work, the site of the work, and responsibility for the care and maintenance of the work. Id. at 11. The contract in McCarthy also stated that the contractor was an independent contractor, and that Coho had no direction or control over the contractor or its employees. Id. The Court also noted that as in Magee Coho retained the right to reasonable access to the work-site. Id. However, this is where McCarthy differed from Magee. In McCarthy, Coho reserved the right of dismissal of contractor's personnel or to terminate the contract if complete safety program was not followed. Id. Furthermore, testimony revealed that Coho did maintain substantial control over the operation. Id. The contractor's employees had to follow the orders of Coho and its company man on the site and Coho also provided a step-by-step procedure that it had to follow in completing the work. Id. The contract also specified a day or hourly rate. Id. ¶ 32. Here, in the case sub judice, Coho did not maintain as much control over Sauls as it did over the independent contractor in McCarthy. The contract between Sauls and Coho stated that Sauls assumed full and complete responsibility for the conditions pertaining to the work, the site and responsibility for the care and maintenance of the work. The contract clearly stated that Sauls was an independent contractor and that Coho did not have any direction or control over Sauls. Pursuant to the contract, Sauls was to provide its own equipment and employees needed for the job. However, the contract, as in McCarthy, gave Coho the right to dismiss Sauls' personnel if the safety procedures were not followed. The contract also specified a day and hourly rate and Coho did have reasonable access to the operations. ¶ 33. If Chapman can show that the contract notwithstanding, the owner maintained substantial de facto control over those features of the work out of which the injury arose, we may have a horse of a different color. Magee, 551 So.2d at 185. The testimony at trial was contradictory as to whether Coho retained substantial control over the workover job, but the weight of the evidence shows that Coho did not retain substantial control. First of all, Chapman presented testimony that he was instructed to use the 36-inch pipe wrench. However, there was ample testimony by several witnesses that using the 36 inch pipe wrench was the standard and common practice in industry and was also Sauls' practice to use the 36-inch pipe wrench for this type of tubing. Furthermore, Chapman used the 36-inch pipe wrench on several occasions and always used it for 3½ inch tubing. There was also testimony that Coho's representative was there at the beginning of the job but was not there at the time of the accident and that Coho never instructed Sauls as to the method of the work. The only evidence that was presented to show that Coho had control was that of Chapman's expert witness, Jimmy Barber. Barber testified that in his opinion the operator's duties, based on his experience, was to be in direct control of the operation at all times and was responsible for the safety and well-being of all personnel on their location. Barber stated that Coho's representative should have discussed the operation with Sauls and should have stopped the operation when he noticed they were not using the proper backup. However, on cross-examination, he admitted that he did not know what the responsibilities were between Coho and Sauls because he never spoke to Coho. Barber further stated that this was just his opinion, based on his experience, as to what should be the owner's responsibilities. There were also several witnesses who stated that there is always a method by which any man on the rig floor can shut down the operation if it becomes unsafe or dangerous. ¶ 34. In Magee, the owner only had reasonable access to the operation and this Court concluded that this was not enough. 551 So.2d at 186-87. However, in McCarthy, this Court noted that the owner had more control. 829 So.2d at 11-13. There, the owner maintained control over the safety and could terminate the contract or dismiss the contractors personnel, they gave orders to the contractor along with a step-by-step procedure to follow and the contract also specified a day or hourly rate for the work. Id. Here, the contract did specify a day or hourly rate and Coho did have the right to dismiss Sauls' personnel or terminate the contract if the safety procedures were not followed. However, the substantial weight of the evidence was that Coho did not instruct Sauls as the manner of the job and that Coho was not there at the time of the accident. The trial judge specifically denied Coho's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that a fact issue existed as to whether Coho negligently instructed the Plaintiff to use a 36-inch pipe wrench to make repairs. There was uncontradicted testimony that Sauls' 50-year practice was to use the pipe wrench as a back up to make the repairs. Furthermore, there was also testimony that using the pipe wrench as a back up was an alternate method. ¶ 35. The fact that Coho had authority over safety and the contract specified a day or hourly rate is not substantial control. Substantial is defined as of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Black's Law Dictionary 1597 (4th ed.1968). The testimony in this case does not show that the control was substantial or of considerable value. The two facts that go towards control are not substantial when compared with the evidence that shows Coho did not retain control over the operation. The verdict was against the substantial weight of the evidence, and we find that the trial court erred in denying Coho's motion for a new trial.
¶ 36. Mississippi is a pure comparative negligence state. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-15 (Rev.2004); Blackmon v. Payne, 510 So.2d 483, 486 (Miss.1987); Evans v. Journeay, 488 So.2d 797, 799 (Miss. 1986); Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So.2d 657, 664 (Miss.1985). Under the comparative negligence doctrine, negligence is measured in terms of percentage, and any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is sought. Burton ex rel. Bradford v. Barnett, 615 So.2d 580, 582 (Miss.1993). Where negligence by both parties is concurrent and contributes to injury, recovery is not barred under such doctrine, but plaintiff's damages are diminished proportionately, even to the extent that negligence on the part of the plaintiff was ninety percent (90%) and on the part of the defendant was ten percent (10%), the plaintiff would be entitled to recover theoretically that ten percent. Id. Therefore, a plaintiff, though himself negligent, may still recover from a defendant whose negligence contributed to his injuries. Blackmon, 510 So.2d at 486. Comparative negligence thus diminishes, but does not bar recovery. Bell, 467 So.2d at 664. ¶ 37. Here the jury found Coho was fully responsible and did not apportion any fault to Chapman. Coho argues that this finding was contrary to the weight of the evidence and this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial. The right of the court to grant a new trial whenever convinced from the evidence that the jury has been partial or prejudiced, or has not responded to reason after a full hearing of the testimony, was recognized under the common law; and the duty of the court to grant a new trial in such case is so well settled that no court may refuse to exercise such power when fully convinced of its duty to do so. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So.2d 461, 465 (1952). Here, the trial judge specifically asked, after the verdict had been read, about apportioning fault to Chapman. The judge asked the jury, it is my understanding that the jury did not apportion any fault to Mr. Chapman in the case? Furthermore, after the jury had been polled and sent out, the judge stated that there's a lot of things in this verdict that the Court is not satisfied with. So, ya'll look at it yourself and see what would disturb me. Then if you want me to go through them at this time so you know what I am looking at, I'll be glad to go through them with you. There's some of the things in there that the jury considered like  where is the verdict? . . . I know they will be making a motion for a new trial. And they'll be making a motion for remittitur. So that's why I want you to consider what I am saying here. The jury didn't allow anything as far as Mr. Chapman's concern, as far as comparative negligence. And I think you all will have to agree at this point  or you'll have to look at the fact that he was negligent. I don't understand . . . (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that the trial judge acknowledged that Chapman was negligent but the jury failed to apportion any fault to Chapman. However, even after noting this on the record, the trial judge failed to grant a new trial, but instead reduced the damages that had been awarded to Chapman. ¶ 38. The verdict in this case, as to the negligence of Chapman, was substantially against the weight of the evidence. First of all, even if Chapman was instructed by Coho to use the 36-inch pipe wrench as a backup, there was ample uncontradicted testimony that it was Sauls' standard practice to use the pipe wrench as a backup. There was also testimony that using the 36-inch pipe wrench was an alternative backup in the industry. Furthermore, Chapman's own expert witness stated on cross that one of the causes of the accident was the misuse of the 36-inch pipe wrench. Chapman's own expert testified that Chapman misused the pipe wrench and the way he tried to free it was dangerous, which caused the accident. Furthermore, there was testimony that Chapman has properly used the pipe wrench on many jobs prior to this accident and had also used it several times on the day of the accident. Coho's expert witness also testified that the way Chapman was using the pipe wrench on these occasions was not a safe method. The fact that Chapman was misusing the pipe wrench in a dangerous fashion was uncontradicted. ¶ 39. The trial judge even noted that Chapman was negligent. The evidence at trial showing that Chapman was negligent was uncontradicted and his own expert testified to this fact. The failure of the jury to apportion any fault to Chapman was against the substantial weight of the evidence. The trial judge admitted that Chapman was negligent and erred in denying a new trial.
¶ 40. Coho argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury to consider Sauls' negligence in apportioning fault for Chapman's injuries. Coho claims that the trial court's refusal to include Sauls in the apportionment of fault is in direct conflict with our law. Chapman argues that even though this Court overruled Accu-Fab & Construction, Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So.2d 766 (Miss.2001), the result in this case would not change because Chapman was included in the apportionment process and the jury allocated zero fault to him. However, Chapman fails to note that the jury wanted to include Sauls in the apportionment process. The jury specifically sent a note to the judge wanting to know why Sauls could not be considered. The court responded to the jury's question and told that jury that if the jury will read the instructions that have been given by the Court, they will find an instruction that deals with the problem or the question that they've submitted to the Court. ¶ 41. In Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264, 1273 (Miss. 1999), this Court held that party in the statute swept broadly enough to bring in entities which would not or could not have been parties to a lawsuit. This Court went further to note that section 85-5-7 requires that the fault of all participants to the occurrence, including any absent tortfeasors, must be considered in the apportionment of fault. Id. (emphasis in original). This Court declared [t]his State's system of civil justice is based upon the premise that all parties to a lawsuit should be given an opportunity to present their versions of a case to a jury, and the interpretation of § 85-5-7 urged by the plaintiffs [i.e., excluding those parties not in the suit] would seriously infringe upon a defendant's rights in this regard in many cases. Id. at 1274 (emphasis added). Furthermore, this Court in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett, 841 So.2d 1107 (Miss.2003), reiterated this by holding that a party which is immune from liability, including an employer which is immune by virtue of workers' compensation law, may be assessed fault under the allocated fault statute. This Court stressed the fact that to immunize employers from fault allocation in third-party tort suits would go against the spirit of the bargain between employers and employees that underlies workers' compensation; instead, the third party would pay the employer's cost of compensation, and the employer would have the possibility of recovering in tort for his employer's fault, since that would then be allocated to the third party. This certainly would benefit employers, and to some extend plaintiffs  but third parties should not be assessed to supplement our system of workers' compensation. Id. at 1115. ¶ 42. The jury was obviously confused by the faulty instructions. We find that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to allocate fault to Sauls. Sauls, although immune from the lawsuit under the workers' compensation law, should be included in the apportionment of fault. On remand the jury shall be instructed to consider Sauls in the apportionment of fault.