Opinion ID: 839160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the standard of review of statutory interpretations by administrative agencies

Text: The majority borrows its conclusion that an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to respectful consideration from this Court's decision in Boyer-Campbell Co v. Fry . [3] It suggests that this standard of review cannot exist by any other name. It specifically rejects other decisions of the Court in which the standard of review was to defer to agency interpretations, to accord them great weight, or to review their reasonableness. [4] Yet, the Court in Boyer-Campbell used these very terms interchangeably. It said: Legislative resolutions are not law, although they are entitled to respectful consideration, ... and the construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.  However, these are not binding on the courts, and [w]hile not controlling, the practical construction given to doubtful or obscure laws in their administration by public officers and departments with a duty to perform under them is taken note of by the courts as an aiding element to be given weight in construing such laws and is sometimes deferred to when not in conflict with the indicated spirit and purpose of the legislature. [ [5] ] The Court concluded in Boyer-Campbell that the interpretation of the general sales tax act made by the state board of administration was reasonable and sensible. [6] Boyer-Campbell does not stand for the proposition that the standard of review of agency decisions should be known by one name only. Nor does the fact that, over the years, the Court has used various terms to denote the proper standard of review indicate that it has been inconsistently applied. As the majority acknowledges, regardless of the language used, this Court's decisions ... made clear that the plain language of the statute was the controlling legal consideration. [7] The actual name given to the standard of review has negligible outcome-determinative effect, [8] as long as the standard is properly applied. There is nothing shocking about the Court deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency administers and that falls within its particularized expertise. Deference is simply another name for respectful consideration. [9] Under a properly applied standard of review, an agency's statutory interpretation is entitled to deference when it comports with the Legislature's intent as expressed in the plain language of the statute. Of importance is not what the Court calls the standard of review, but how it applies it.