Opinion ID: 1864278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the indeterminate sentencing act

Text: If the judge chooses to impose a term of years less than life, the sentence must be an indeterminate sentence, as stated in the indeterminate sentencing act: In all cases where the maximum sentence in the discretion of the court may be imprisonment for life or any number or term of years, the court may impose a sentence for life or may impose a sentence for any term of years. If the sentence imposed by the court is for any term of years, the court shall fix both the minimum and the maximum of that sentence in terms of years or fraction thereof, and sentences so imposed shall be considered indeterminate sentences. The court shall not impose a sentence in which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment with a minimum for a term of years included in the same sentence. [MCL 769.9(2); MSA 28.1081(2).] In People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 689-690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972), this Court found that a sentence is not indeterminate if there is not a significant interval between the minimum and the maximum sentence. Tanner had pled guilty of manslaughter and had been sentenced to a term of from 179 to 180 months in prison. This Court found such a sentence not to be lawful, explaining: Though the question comes to us couched in terms of abuse of discretion, it clearly involves, and we address ourselves to, the purely legal proposition of whether defendant's sentence is in fact indeterminate as contemplated by the provisions of MCL 769.8 and 769.9; MSA 28.1080 and 28.1081.    Having before us a plethora of cases involving sentences with a period of but 30 days between minimum and maximum, we are constrained to observe that though technically providing some period, though brief, within which the correction authorities may exercise the discretion vested in them by the Legislature, such sentences fail to comply with the clear intent and purpose of the indeterminate sentence act.    Thus, turning to the precise proposition involved, we are convinced that 30 days is not a sufficient interval of time to guarantee that the corrections authorities will be able to exercise their jurisdiction or judgment with any practicality. The net effect of such severe judicial limitation on indeterminate sentencing is to frustrate the intended effect of indeterminate sentencing. Convinced as we are, that a sentence with too short an interval between minimum and maximum is not indeterminate, we hold that any sentence which provides for a minimum exceeding two-thirds of the maximum is improper as failing to comply with the indeterminate sentence act. [ Id. at 688, 689-690.] In the present case, the entire interval between the defendant's minimum sentence and his maximum sentence is certain to occur after his death. Even more clearly than Tanner, we therefore have before us a sentence that is not indeterminate. [14] The Legislature has authorized only that a person convicted of second-degree murder be sentenced to life in prison or to an indeterminate term of years. The Legislature has not authorized that such a person be, in effect, sentenced to a flat term of years.