Opinion ID: 45968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Humphrey is an employer for purposes of the FMLA

Text: 27 Relying on Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir.2000), abrogated by Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953(2003), Humphrey contends that this circuit does not permit suits against public officials under the FMLA. Specifically, Humphrey relies on footnote 65 of the Kazmier decision stating that [t]he claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it is clear that the State of Louisiana is the real party in interest. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 533 n. 65. Humphrey's reliance on Kazmier is misplaced. 28 As a general rule the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against officers in their individual capacities. Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 687 n. 7 (5th Cir.1999); Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 458 (5th Cir.1992). Nevertheless, where the state is the real and substantial party in interest, the Eleventh Amendment may bar the suit. See Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir.2000); Pendergrass v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n, 144 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir.1998). 29 Humphrey contends that in Kazmier we stated our unwillingness to hold public officials liable under the FMLA. This proves too much. The application of the [Eleventh] [A]mendment to suits against state officials in their individual capacity depends on the circumstances. Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir.2001). Consequently, the Kazmier panel's conclusion that the state was the real party in interest must be limited to the facts of that case. Cf. Luder, 253 F.3d at 1024-25 (explaining that the state would be required to pay damages to the 145 plaintiffs and concluding that casting the suit, brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as one against the officers in their individual capacities was a transparent[ ] effort at an end run around the Eleventh Amendment). Moreover, we have previously recognized the general rule that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials in their individual capacities. Hudson, 174 F.3d at 687 n. 7; Martin, 973 F.2d at 458. When panel opinions appear to conflict, we are bound to follow the earlier opinion. H&D Tire & Automotive-Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, even if Kazmier could bear the weight Humphrey intends for it to carry, we would not be bound. Humphrey's reliance on Kazmier is misguided and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the instant suit. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that public employees may be sued in their individual capacities under the FMLA; thus, we turn to Humphrey's contention that she is not an employer for purposes of the FMLA. 30 Humphrey argues that employees of public agencies may not be held personally liable under the FMLA as employers. We have not had occasion to consider this question; however, several our sister circuits, as well as various district courts, have done so. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a public official is not an employer for purposes of the FMLA when sued in her individual capacity, but the Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. Compare Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 832 (6th Cir. 2003), and Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 687 (11th Cir.1999), with Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir.2002). The district courts are similarly divided on this question; however, it appears that a majority have concluded that public employees may be liable in their individual capacities under the FMLA. See Cantley v. Simmons, 179 F.Supp.2d 654, 656 (S.D.W.Va.2002) (While some district courts have decided otherwise, the majority of district courts have concluded that public employee supervisors can be sued individually under the FMLA.). Compare Sheaffer v. County of Chatham, 337 F.Supp.2d 709, 728-29 (M.D.N.C.2004) (holding that public employees can be liable under the FMLA), and Morrow v. Putnam, 142 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1273 (D.Nev. 2001) (same), with Keene v. Rinaldi, 127 F.Supp.2d 770, 776 (M.D.N.C.2000) (holding that public officials are not liable in their individual capacities under the FMLA). 31 We begin our analysis with the text of the statute. Doe v. KPMG, LLP, 398 F.3d 686, 688 (5th Cir.2005). The FMLA provides, in relevant part: 32 The term employer— 33 (i) means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year; 34 (ii) includes— 35 (I) any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer; and 36 (II) any successor in interest of an employer; 37 (iii) includes any public agency, as defined in section 203(x) of this title; and 38 (iv) includes the Government Accountability Office and the Library of Congress. 39 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A). The statute plainly includes in the definition of employer any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). The statute further includes public agencies as employers. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(iii). Therefore, if a public employee acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer, he satisfies the definition of employer under the FMLA, and therefore, may be subject to liability in his individual capacity. Accord Darby, 287 F.3d at 681. 40 The Sixth Circuit rejected this interpretation in Mitchell, holding that the FMLA's individual liability provision does not extend to public agencies. 343 F.3d at 832. The court offered three reasons for its conclusion: First, Section 2611(4)(A) segregates the provision imposing individual liability from the public agency provision. Second, an interpretation that commingles the individual liability provision with the public agency provision renders certain provisions of the statute superfluous and results in several oddities. Finally, as evidenced by other provisions of the statute, the FMLA distinguishes its definition of employer from that provided in the [Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203] by separating the individual liability and public agency provisions. 41 Id. at 832. We address each argument in turn. 42 The Sixth Circuit concluded that  the section defining `employer,' 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A), explicitly separates the individual liability provision and public agency provision into two distinct clauses. Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 829. The court reasoned 43 Notwithstanding this repeated and consistent use of the em dash, Section 2611(4)(A) lacks any punctuation demonstrating an inter-relationship between clauses (ii)-(iv). Indeed, the separation of otherwise related concepts (i.e., what the term employer includes) into distinctly enumerated clauses compels an interpretation that treats each clause in an independent manner. This is particularly the case in light of clause (ii)'s inclusion of an em dash preceding the individual liability provision and successor in interest provision. 44 Id. at 830. We respectfully disagree. Congress's use of the word and following clause (iii) suggests that there is some relationship between clauses (i)-(iv). Accord Hewett v. Willingboro Bd. of Educ., 421 F.Supp.2d 814, 819 (D.N.J.2006) (In any event, in light of Section 2611(4)(A)'s use of the inclusive term `and' linking clauses (i)-(iv), the Court does not agree with Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 829-30, that Congress intended those provisions to be mutually exclusive.). Additionally, following the Mitchell court's own reasoning that the em dash denotes an inter-relationship, Congress's use of the em dash following the term employer indicates a relationship between clauses such that employer `means what is provided for in subparagraph (i) and includes what is provided for in subparagraphs (ii), (iii), and (iv).' Sheaffer, 337 F.Supp.2d at 728 (quoting Morrow, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1273). 45 The Mitchell court also concluded the commingling of clauses (i)-(iv) into the term `employer' yields an interpretation that renders other provisions of the statute superfluous, as well as creates several oddities. Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 830. Specifically, the Mitchell court reasoned that the commingling of clause (i) and (ii) with the public agency provision renders superfluous Section 2611(4)(B). See id. at 831. Title 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(B) provides that [f]or purposes of subparagraph (A)(iii), a public agency shall be considered to be a person engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce. The court further noted that a public agency does not have to meet the 50 employee requirement to be considered an employer under the statute. Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 831 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a)). We do not find these arguments persuasive. 46 As the Morrow court recognized, 47 [w]hile this statute becomes recursive when applied to supervisory personnel, because the definition of employer refers back to the word employer itself, there is no reason to assume that the term employer in subparagraph 4(A)(ii) means anything other than what Congress defined it to mean in the various definitions of paragraph 4(A). 48 142 F.Supp.2d at 1272-73. Contrary to the Mitchell court's reasoning, section 2611(4)(B) is not superfluous under this reading, it relieves plaintiffs of the burden of proving that a public agency is engaged in commerce. See Hewett, 421 F.Supp.2d at 820. The most straight forward reading of the text compels the conclusion that a public employee may be held individually liable under the FMLA. 49 Finally, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that [a] definition of employer that incorporates the individual liability provision and public agency provision into a single clause is substantially similar to, if not identical, to the FLSA's definition of employer and that Congress would have expressly adopted the FLSA's definition of employer if it intended the definitions to be identical. Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 831. We disagree. 50 The definition of employer under the FMLA is very similar to the definition of employer under the FLSA. The FLSA includes within the definition of employer any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Accordingly, several courts have concluded that the term employer should be interpreted the same under both statutes. See, e.g., Wascura, 169 F.3d at 685-86 ([T]he FMLA's definition of `employer' is more similar to, actually it is materially identical with, the definition of `employer' used in the Fair Labor Standards Act (`FLSA'), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).); Cantley, 179 F.Supp.2d at 657-58 (Another factor courts have considered when determining whether individual liability exists is the similarity between the statutory definitions of `employer' under the FMLA and the FLSA.). 51 Additionally, the Code of Federal Regulations provides: Employers covered by FMLA also include any person acting, directly or indirectly, in the interest of a covered employer to any of the employees of the employer, any successor in interest of a covered employer, and any public agency. 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a). This is virtually the same as the definition provided in the FLSA except that the FMLA definition includes successors in interest and does not reference labor organizations. See Hewett, 421 F.Supp.2d at 821 (rejecting the Mitchell court's argument regarding Congress's failure to reference the FLSA in the FMLA's definition of employer and noting it would have been curious for the FMLA to have incorporated the FLSA's definition of `employer,' as that definition makes explicit reference to `labor organizations'). Further the Code of Federal Regulations also explains: 52 An employer includes any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer to any of the employer's employees. The definition of employer in section 3(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(d), similarly includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. As under the FLSA, individuals such as corporate officers acting in the interest of an employer are individually liable for any violations of the requirements of FMLA. 53 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d). Accordingly, we agree with the Wascura court that [t]he fact that Congress, in drafting the FMLA, chose to make the definition of `employer' materially identical to that in the FLSA means that decisions interpreting the FLSA offer the best guidance for construing the term `employer' as it is used in the FMLA. Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686. We have previously held that a sheriff is an employer for purposes of the FLSA. Lee v. Coahoma County, Miss., 937 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir.1991), amended by 37 F.3d 1068 (5th Cir.1993). Therefore our conclusion that plain language of the FMLA permits public employees to be held individually liable is consistent with our holding in Lee. Cf. Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686 (Thus, Welch [ v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir.1995),] establishes as the law of this circuit that a public official sued in his individual capacity is not an `employer' subject to individual liability under the FLSA. Because `employer' is defined the same way in the FMLA and FLSA, Welch controls this case.). Consequently, the district court did not err in holding that Humphrey may be liable as an employer under the FMLA. We turn now to Humphrey's contention that the district court erred in concluding she was not entitled to qualified immunity. 54