Opinion ID: 1713173
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the court erred by rewriting the parties' property agreement which was a valid, unambiguous contract

Text: ¶ 14. A divorce agreement is no different from any other contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character. East v. East, 493 So.2d 927, 931-32 (Miss.1986). Similarly, in Bell v. Bell, 572 So.2d 841, 844 (Miss.1990), we held that when parties in a divorce proceeding have reached an agreement that a chancery court has approved, we will enforce it, absent fraud or overreaching, and we take a dim view of efforts to modify it just as we do when persons seek relief from improvident contracts. ¶ 15. In this case, Herb and Leigh entered into a court-approved contract regarding the disposition of their marital property, including the former marital residence and the mortgage payment associated with such property. No evidence of fraud or overreaching exists.
¶ 16. A court is obligated to enforce a contract executed by legally competent parties where the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. Merchants & Farmers Bank v. State ex rel. Moore, 651 So.2d 1060, 1061 (Miss. 1995). As stated in Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 697 So.2d 400, 404 (Miss.1997), the parties are bound by the language of the contract where a contract is unambiguous. The mere fact that the parties disagree about the meaning of a provision of a contract does not make the contract ambiguous as a matter of law. Id. ¶ 17. When a contract is clear and unambiguous, this Court is not concerned with what the parties may have meant or intended but rather what they said, for the language employed in a contract is the surest guide to what was intended. Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 252 (Miss.1985). When this Court interprets a contract, we look to the contract for its meaning, not what a party thereto may have thought it meant. The standard is objective, measured by the language of the contract, not by the subjective intent or belief of a party which conflicts with meaning ascertained by the objective standard. Landry v. Moody Grishman Agency, Inc., 254 Miss. 363, 375, 181 So.2d 134, 139 (1965). We are concerned with what the contracting parties have said to each other, not some secret thought of one [that was] not communicated to the other. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Patterson Enters., Ltd., 627 So.2d 261, 263 (Miss.1993). ¶ 18. In this case, the divorce agreement has a specific clause which states that this is the whole and only Agreement between the parties and shall not be modified or varied by parol evidence. Leigh and Herb differ not on what the agreement says, but the applicable tax consequences of the agreement. Leigh testified that she thought the mortgage payments would not be taxable to her, and Herb testified that he never discussed the subject with anyone. Both parties agree that they never discussed the tax consequences of the divorce agreement with each other or an attorney. In the proceeding below, the lower court agreed that the contract was clear and unambiguous when it sustained Herb's motion to exclude any extrinsic evidence about the divorce agreement. With that in mind, it was error for the lower court to modify the agreement based upon its own imputed intent of the parties.