Opinion ID: 2590332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the question of damages remains in dispute and must be resolved by the trier of fact

Text: ¶ 12 In an action for fraud damages are rooted in the natural and probable consequences of the acts charged, not by the stand-alone fact that fraud was perpetrated. [22] To avoid summary judgment Buyers must advance proof from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer not only a deception, but detriment suffered because of the deception's occurrence. Buyers have satisfied that requirement here. ¶ 13 The common law, which remains in force unless a legislative enactment expressly states otherwise, [23] provides the elements of actionable fraud: [24] 1) a false material misrepresentation, 2) made as a positive assertion which is either known to be false or is made recklessly without knowledge of the truth, 3) with the intention that it be acted upon, and 4) which is relied on by the other party to his (or her) own detriment. [25] Fraud is never presumed and each of its elements must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. [26] Though correctly recognizing a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Buyers were deceived by appellees' misrepresentations, COCA erred in affirming summary judgment based upon a perceived lack of damages. Buyers have presented evidentiary materials sufficient to tender a disputed issue of fact with respect to damages. ¶ 14 The material controversy hinges upon the true nature of the bargain struck by Buyers in purchasing Sellers' home. In support of their claim for damages, Buyers correctly advance the benefit of the bargain doctrine. This rule of recovery, adopted in Oklahoma as a measure of damages in fraud cases, allows a plaintiff to recover the difference between the actual value received and the value the defrauded party would have received had the value actually been as represented. [27] In today's case, Buyers, while affirming their contract despite the misrepresentation, seek to recover the benefit of the bargain to which they believe they are entitled. ¶ 15 Buyers desire to obtain that value for which they in fact were bargaining when they purchased Sellers' home. No single, clear, and undisputed answer to this question can be drawn from the parties' evidentiary substitutes found in the record. Resolution of this uncertainty is a task that must fall upon the trier of fact. In short, based upon the record no one can properly conclude that damages remain unprovable as a matter of law. ¶ 16 Buyers claim they bargained for a house containing 2890 square feet, to be obtained for a price ($145,000) calculated at an agreed-upon amount ($50) per square foot. In receiving instead a house appraised as having only 2187 square feet, Buyers argue they have been damaged to the extent the square footage received by them falls short of the square footage represented to them  a gap of 703 square feet, almost 25% less than advertised. Looking to the asserted measure of the house's purchase price  $50 per square foot  Buyers compute the amount of their injury at $35,150  the value of the missing 703 square feet which were represented by Broker, Realtor, and Sellers, were paid for by Buyers at $50 per square foot, but not thereafter received. ¶ 17 Appellees dispute Buyers' characterization of a bargain driven by square footage. Rather, appellees claim Buyers simply bargained for a home valued at and purchased for $145,000, not a home with 2890 square feet valued at $50 per square foot. Appellees argue that a house's size is but one of numerous factors taken into consideration when deciding whether to purchase a home. Appellees urge that Buyers' specific emphasis on square footage cannot be sufficiently demonstrated to support a finding of damages. More importantly, appellees attach overriding significance to the fact that, despite the diminished size appraisal of 2187 square feet, the later appraised value of the home ($146,697) nevertheless exceeded the purchase price. For this reason appellees assert that far from suffering injury, Buyers have in fact received more than was represented to them. ¶ 18 The question of damages cannot be resolved based upon the estimations of value contained in the mortgage appraisal alone. An appraisal can give only an approximate value that is perceived by its author. Appraisals merely offer scenarios suggesting what a thing might be worth, not infallible indicia of fixed categorical worth. The precise value of the thing in litigation must be determined by the trier of fact. The jury is the sole and final arbiter. Because any appraisal that antedates the jury's verdict is but an item of evidence, the increased home value indicated by the mortgage appraisal, though probative of damages, is not dispositive of the issues. Neither are the appraisals of square footage in themselves conclusive evidence of damage. Buyers need not explicitly controvert the mortgage appraisal's value estimate to raise a conflicting inference as to damages. Inconsistent appraisals of square footage define this litigation. The fact that two conflicting appraisals emanate from the same source  Grace, a professional appraiser  only clouds the issues to be considered. ¶ 19 The existence of significantly disparate appraisals of size raises a reasonable inference that appraisals of value might be similarly inconsistent, especially since no real certainty exists about the house's actual size, which will be linked inextricably to its value. Summary judgment is proper only when undisputed material facts support but a single inference that favors a movant's quest for relief. [28] Amid a barrage of warring appraisals of size, appellees may not rely on a single assessment of value taken from a source that has only contributed to the uncertainty to prove Buyers have suffered no detriment. ¶ 20 The fact that Buyers purchased a house advertised as double the size of their former home raises a sufficient countervailing inference suggesting Buyers were at least in some part motivated to purchase Sellers' home because of its greater size. The extent to which this motivation possibly drove towards or even defined the bargain struck by Buyers and Sellers cannot be discerned from the record alone. The question must be resolved by the trier of fact. ¶ 21 In our review of summary process this court must assess all facts and inferences raised by a motion for summary judgment in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. [29] The record offers no evidentiary materials compelling enough to leave but a single inference in Sellers' favor. [30] It is not for this court to opine on the relative merits of the parties' arguments on damages or to speculate on their eventual fate upon trial. We hold simply that because neither party has presented evidentiary materials sufficient to place the damages question beyond dispute, summary relief is inappropriate here. B.