Opinion ID: 788373
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Grounds — Prosecutor's Closing Argument

Text: 68 Given the district court's apparent decision to forego the Berry analysis and grant the motion for new trial in the interest of justice, we must examine the second broad sub-category of Rule 33: whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the motion for new trial on other grounds. If the motion is based on any other grounds, the trial court is not required to consider the restrictive Berry rules. Rather, any error of sufficient magnitude to require reversal on appeal is an adequate ground for granting a new trial. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 556 (3d ed.2004). 13 As with motions based on newly discovered evidence, the grant or denial of the motion is entrusted to the sound discretion of the judge, motions for new trial are not favored, and are granted only with great caution. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d at 898 (reviewing motion for new trial based on alleged Brady violation); but see Wright, § 551 (stating that a motion for new trial based not on newly discovered evidence, but on errors or other grounds should be neither favored nor disfavored, and the question is only what the interest of justice requires.). 69 The only other ground that Wall asserts entitles him to a new trial is the prosecutor's comment on his failure to call Ristau and Hartwig to testify. Commenting on a failure to call witnesses generally is not an error, unless the comment implicates the defendant's right not to testify. See United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir.1987). Here, Wall testified on his own behalf; therefore, there was no danger that the prosecutor's comments would implicate Wall's privilege against self-incrimination. In reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial, this court has examined alleged improper remarks by the prosecution to determine whether the remarks prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the defendant. See Rasco, 123 F.3d at 228-29; United States v. Cardenas, 778 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (5th Cir.1985). In determining whether the prosecutor's remarks affected a defendant's substantial rights, the trial court should consider (1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the statements; (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instructions; and (3) the strength of the evidence of defendant's guilt. Cardenas, 778 F.2d at 1131. The district court specifically found that the prosecution did not act in bad faith. Wall did not object to the prosecution's comment. Furthermore, there was ample evidence of Wall's guilt, and the jury was instructed that the closing arguments of counsel were not evidence. 70 The magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks is the only factor that arguably weighs in Wall's favor. The district court specifically pointed out that the prosecutor commented on the failure to call witnesses moments before deliberation. Nevertheless, given the lack of bad faith on the part of the government, and given the considerable evidence of Wall's guilt, Wall failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor's remarks amounted to a miscarriage of justice. Even considering the prosecutor's comments in conjunction with Ristau's affidavit, Wall fails to satisfy the miscarriage of justice standard.