Opinion ID: 3168557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competency-Based Stay of Habeas Proceedings

Text: We begin our analysis by addressing Mr. Ryder’s challenge to the denial of his request for a competency-based stay of his habeas proceedings. Mr. Ryder argues the district court erred in concluding he was competent on the date the statute of limitations ran on his habeas petition, in focusing on that date as the only relevant time for assessing competency, and in determining that none of his habeas claims would substantially benefit from his assistance. “[T]he decision to grant a stay, like the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing, is generally left to the sound discretion of district courts.” Ryan v. Gonzales, --- U.S. ---, 133 S. Ct. 696, 708 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). District courts maintain 15 this authority in the context of habeas proceedings subject to AEDPA, id., but AEDPA does “circumscribe their discretion.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005). A stay of habeas proceedings “must therefore be compatible with AEDPA’s purposes,” including its goal of “reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court recently addressed the propriety of a competency-based stay of habeas proceedings. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696. In Gonzales, the Court reviewed the conclusion reached by two appellate courts, the Ninth and the Sixth Circuits, that habeas petitioners have a statutory right to be competent during habeas proceedings and that a petitioner’s incompetence necessitates a stay of habeas proceedings. Id. at 700–02. On certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled, first, that no such statutory right exists. It thus rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), which grants a habeas petitioner seeking review of a death sentence a right to counsel, and the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which establishes procedures for determining a federal criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial. Id. at 702–07. The Court next considered whether a district court may exercise its equitable powers to issue a stay of habeas proceedings in light of a petitioner’s incompetence. Id. at 707–08. The Court observed that, despite the absence of a statutory right to competency in habeas proceedings, district courts retain the “authority to issue stays, where such a stay would be a proper exercise of discretion.” Id. at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court declined to determine “the precise contours” of this 16 equitable authority, it instead described the “outer limits” of a district court’s discretion to grant a competency-based stay of habeas proceedings. Id. These outer limits instruct that where a habeas petitioner raises claims that are either “record based”—i.e., were adjudicated on the merits in state court—or are “resolvable as a matter of law,” a district court abuses its discretion in granting a request for a competency-based stay. Id. The Court reasoned that a habeas petitioner’s competent participation is not necessary when the petitioner raises only claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court because AEDPA limits the review of such claims to “the record that was before the state court.” Id. (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor is the petitioner’s participation necessary when he raises legal challenges because such challenges do not depend on the petitioner’s knowledge or comprehension. Id.. Therefore, “any evidence that a petitioner might have would be inadmissible.” Id. The Court also suggested that an unexhausted but procedurally barred claim would not benefit from petitioner’s assistance and therefore would not provide a sufficient basis for granting a competency-based stay. Id. at 709. Finally, the Court concluded that even if a habeas petitioner raises claims that are neither exhausted nor procedurally defaulted, “an indefinite stay would be inappropriate” because such a stay would undermine AEDPA’s interest in finality. Id. Therefore, “[i]f a district court concludes that the petitioner’s claim could substantially benefit from the petitioner’s assistance, the district court should take into account the likelihood that the petitioner will regain competence in the foreseeable future.” Id. If the result of such an assessment is “no reasonable hope” that the petitioner will regain competency, “a stay is 17 inappropriate and merely frustrates the State’s attempts to defend its presumptively valid judgment.” Id. Guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales, we must determine whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Ryder’s request for a competencybased stay. As the following discussion shows, even if the district court erred in deeming Mr. Ryder competent at the time he filed his habeas petition, the court was within its discretion in denying his request for a stay because all of his claims fall outside the outer limits of the district court’s discretion.
In his habeas petition, Mr. Ryder raised eleven claims for habeas relief. On appeal, he argues at least two of these claims would benefit from his assistance. Specifically, he relies on habeas claims one and two, the same two claims for which we granted a COA. These claims assert: (1) Mr. Ryder was incompetent to stand trial, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of competency prior to trial, the retrospective competency hearing violated his due process rights, and appellate counsel was ineffective at the retrospective competency hearing; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to timely raise the issue of competency and by inadequately presenting Mr. Ryder’s mitigation case.6 Mr. Ryder contends these claims depend in large part on facts outside 6 Mr. Ryder has not expressly relied on his other nine habeas claims in requesting a competency-based stay. Our review of these claims demonstrates that none provide a sufficient basis for granting a stay. Of the nine additional claims, the OCCA adjudicated seven on the merits, either on direct appeal or through postconviction proceedings. See Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Trammell, No. CIV-05-0024JHP-KEW, 2013 WL 5603851, at , , –36, 38 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 11, 2013). 18 the record, namely, facts regarding his communications and interactions with trial and appellate counsel, his understanding of the various mental health experts’ reports, and whether he knew of additional mitigation information. But the OCCA adjudicated the merits7 of these claims either on direct appeal or postconviction review. Ryder v. State, No. PCD-2002-257, slip. op. at 3–15 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2004); Ryder v. State, 83 P.3d 856, 875–78 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). They are therefore subject to the limitations 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes on the habeas record such that “any evidence [Mr. Ryder] might have would be inadmissible.” Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. at 708. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ryder’s request for a competency-based stay. Habeas review of these claims is therefore limited to the record that was before the state court, and any additional evidence a competent Mr. Ryder might possess would be inadmissible. With respect to the remaining two habeas claims, the first asserts that Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional. Id. at . But Mr. Ryder has not suggested that facts exist outside the record that would differentiate his challenge from those which the Supreme Court rejected in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015). The second remaining claim argues Mr. Ryder is incompetent to be executed, Ryder, 2013 WL 5603851, at , which Mr. Ryder acknowledges is not ripe for review, see Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945–48 (2007) (explaining that a claim of incompetency to be executed is not ripe until an execution date has been set). We are therefore satisfied that none of these claims would benefit from Mr. Ryder’s competent assistance. 7 As we explain more fully below, the OCCA was less than thorough in its analysis of Mr. Ryder’s first habeas claim. See infra Part III.B.1. But it nonetheless disposed of the claim on the merits, and therefore our review is limited to the record that was before the OCCA. See Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Since we have an adjudication on the merits, we must consider what it means to defer to a decision which does not articulate a reasoned application of federal law to determined facts. We conclude . . . that we owe deference to the state court’s result, even if its reasoning is not expressly stated.”). 19