Opinion ID: 788090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The consolidation of Valentine-Johnson's claims

Text: 27 Valentine-Johnson contends that the district court erred in dismissing her termination claim on the basis that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with the MSPB. She argues that she relied to her detriment on the MSPB AJ's representations that she could have her complete case — i.e., her termination, discrimination, and retaliation claims — heard in district court, whereas the MSPB could purportedly hear only her termination claim. The doctrine of judicial estoppel, she further posits, should bar the Air Force from contending that the district court had no jurisdiction over Valentine-Johnson's termination claim when the agency had previously maintained before the MSPB that only the district court had jurisdiction over all of her claims. 28 Resolution of this issue requires that we attempt to loosen the jurisdictional Gordian knot formed when Title VII and civil service administrative claims are interlaced. Sloan v. West, 140 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir.1998). Valentine-Johnson initially filed a mixed case appeal with the MSPB on February 1, 1995. On the appeal form she designated the appeal as a mixed case and specified that she was contesting her removal, which she alleged was also an instance of illegal discrimination [and] reprisal. 29 At the same time, however, Valentine-Johnson had various outstanding EEO claims, which covered allegations of sex and race discrimination, reprisal, and sexual harassment based on the incidents described in Part I.A. above. Because all of her EEO claims were filed before she was terminated, they did not include her termination claim. But they did include other personnel actions taken by the Air Force, such as the change in her supervisors, her negative performance ratings, and the performance improvement conferences. 30 The Air Force filed a motion to dismiss with the EEOC, pointing out that Valentine-Johnson had already filed a mixed case appeal with the MSPB. It also argued that because all of her EEO claims were intertwined with her termination, they should be heard by the MSPB. According to the EEOC ALJ, Valentine-Johnson appeared to believe that she had legitimate EEO claims that were not connected with her termination. The EEOC ALJ was concerned, however, that Valentine-Johnson did not adequately understand her election of remedies, so the ALJ deferred ruling on the EEO claims in order to give Valentine-Johnson time to make an informed decision. As noted above, the EEOC ALJ stated at a prehearing conference on March 6, 1995 that Valentine-Johnson could (1) fragment her claims, pursuing her EEO claims that arose prior to her termination with the EEOC and then take up her mixed case appeal with the MSPB at a later time, (2) file a mixed case appeal with the MSPB immediately, or (3) file a mixed case complaint with the Air Force's EEO office. If Valentine-Johnson had chosen either option (2) or option (3), she could have consolidated her outstanding EEO claims with her mixed case, which, in hindsight, would have been the best approach. 31 Valentine-Johnson instead chose the first option — the immediate pursuit of her outstanding EEO claims with the EEOC, with the understanding that she would file a mixed case appeal, combining her discrimination, retaliation, and termination claims with the MSPB at a later date. Initially, however, she did not appear to fully understand the implications of her choice. Although the letters are not in the record, the EEOC ALJ noted that Valentine-Johnson wrote a series of letters to the Air Force indicating her belief that her termination claim could still be heard by the EEOC. The Air Force sought clarification from the ALJ, who subsequently reiterated Valentine-Johnson's options in a formal order in December of 1995. Valentine-Johnson responded by reaffirming her original election. 32 The procedural difficulty started after the EEOC rendered its final decision on her non-mixed (meaning discrimination claims that predated her termination) EEO complaints, finding no discrimination, reprisal, or sexual harassment. Valentine-Johnson then received and acted upon her right-to-sue letter by filing a complaint in district court. Her complaint, however, requested relief that was related to her termination, i.e., reinstatement and payment of back wages and benefits. This was improper because the EEOC had not heard or rendered a decision on Valentine-Johnson's termination claim. The suit was also contrary to the parties' settlement agreement, which specified that after the EEOC decision, she would refile her mixed case appeal with the MSPB. 33 Roy Johnson, acting as his wife's personal representative, then refiled her appeal with the MSPB. One section of the appeal contained the following caption: The Discrimination Issues are Filed in U.S. District Court. Perhaps Valentine-Johnson meant that only her EEO claims that predated her termination were being heard in district court, but that she still intended the MSPB to hear her discrimination and retaliation claims related to being terminated (her mixed claims). The appeal to the MSPB does not support that interpretation, however, because discrimination is not mentioned as a basis for her wrongful termination. Rather, the appeal implies that Valentine-Johnson sought to prove that she was a competent employee who was not given sufficient guidance about how to perform her job and was unfairly evaluated. In effect then, Valentine-Johnson's filings in district court and with the MSPB suggested that she intended to pursue a stand-alone termination claim (i.e., without a discrimination component) with the MSPB and to have her mixed termination claim (i.e., with a discrimination component) heard in district court. This was directly contrary to the parties' agreed-upon election of remedies, which was to have Valentine-Johnson's mixed termination claim heard before the MSPB. 34 The Air Force subsequently filed a motion to dismiss with the MSPB, pointing out that Valentine-Johnson was raising her termination claim in the district court, so that the MSPB should dismiss her appeal related to her termination for lack of jurisdiction. For support, the Air Force relied on a rule established by the Federal Circuit in Connor v. United States Postal Service, 15 F.3d 1063, 1066 (Fed.Cir.1994), to the effect that where the filing of a complaint in the district court precedes the filing of an appeal with the MSPB, the MSPB has no jurisdiction over the case. See also Leahy v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 251 F.3d 170, 2000 WL 1810021 (Fed.Cir. Dec.11, 2000) (unpublished) (same). Because the sequence of Valentine-Johnson's filings was similar to those in Connor and Leahy, the Air Force argued that the MSPB should dismiss her appeal for lack of jurisdiction so that the mixed case could be heard in district court. 35 The MSPB AJ subscribed to the thrust of the Air Force's argument. In an order summarizing the telephonic status conference held on March 1, 2002, the MSPB AJ made the following comments: 36 I originally advised the parties that it was my intention to dismiss the appeal without prejudice because the appellant had filed a law suit in the U.S. district court that included removal as an issue. The agency subsequently requested me to dismiss the appeal with prejudice, i.e., without the right for it to be refiled with the Board, because of the court case. 37 During the conference, the parties confirmed that the removal remained an issue in the District Court case, which is scheduled for trial in October. I nevertheless did not grant the agency's motion to dismiss the appeal. I gave the appellant until March 15, 2002, to advise me if she wished to proceed with the Board appeal of her removal without consideration of her affirmative defenses of discrimination and retaliation for EEO activity. 38 (Emphasis added.) 39 The MSPB AJ did not grant the Air Force's motion. But there was a common understanding among the parties that Valentine-Johnson's termination claim and her discrimination/retaliation claims were before the district court, even though the district court did not have original jurisdiction over Valentine-Johnson's termination claim. The MSPB AJ reaffirmed this understanding in a subsequent telephone conversation with Valentine-Johnson. When Valentine-Johnson called the AJ about dropping the district court case, the MSPB AJ provided the following advice: 40 I returned her call to tell her that the Board had jurisdiction over only the removal [termination] action and would not adjudicate her other claims of discrimination. If she withdraws her civil action completely, there would be no further review of her allegations of discrimination with regard to agency actions other than her removal. I also told appellant that she could terminate the case presently before me by withdrawing her appeal to the Board, which would terminate her administrative remedy and allow her complete case to proceed in court. 41 (Emphasis added.) 42 This guidance from the MSPB AJ was erroneous. Had Valentine-Johnson followed her own instinct by dismissing her district court case without prejudice, she could have consolidated her discrimination and retaliation claims with her termination claim in a mixed case appeal before the MSPB, as specified in the parties' settlement agreement. From the very beginning, moreover, Valentine-Johnson maintained that her termination was motivated by discrimination based on race and sex, and by reprisal. On the other hand, there is no question that Valentine-Johnson contributed to the confusion by filing a district court complaint that included her termination claim, and by filing a MSPB appeal that did not reference her discrimination claims. 43 Based on the MSPB AJ's explanation — a position that the Air Force also supported — Valentine-Johnson had two options: (1) to pursue her termination appeal before the MSPB without reference to any discriminatory or retaliatory acts, or (2) to pursue her complete case in the district court. Valentine-Johnson, unsurprisingly, chose the latter. 44 Once in the district court, the Air Force made a 180-degree change in its position, arguing that because Valentine-Johnson had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with the MSPB regarding her termination claim, this claim could not be heard in the district court. The Air Force relies principally on McAdams v. Reno, 64 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir.1995), where the court interpreted the federal regulation on election of remedies as requiring exhaustion in the chosen forum. In McAdams, the plaintiff filed a mixed case appeal with the MSPB, but later abandoned her discrimination claims in that forum and sought to have them heard instead in a separate district court action. Having chosen that option [to proceed before the MSPB], the McAdams court held that she was required to exhaust her claims in [the MSPB] before filing a civil action. Id. at 1142; see also Economou v. Caldera, 286 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that Economou's filing of his first formal petition with the MSPB designated the MSPB as the administrative forum in which Economou was bound to exhaust his claims.) 45 The Ninth Circuit, in Bankston v. White, 345 F.3d 768 (9th Cir.2003), pointed out that the result in McAdams was actually dictated by Title VII's exhaustion-of-remedies requirements, and suggested that exhaustion is not an absolute requirement for other types of claims. Id. at 771 (noting that McAdams relied on Title VII's exhaustion requirement and did not require the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies for his ADEA claim). McAdams, moreover, is not precisely on point in the present case because Valentine-Johnson did exhaust her initial EEO discrimination and retaliation claims through the EEOC process; it is her termination claim before the MSPB that she failed to exhaust. 46 Requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing suit in district court is, however, a generally accepted principle. See, e.g., Ayrault v. Pena, 60 F.3d 346, 349 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that the plaintiff's failure to file a claim with the MSPB meant that she had not exhausted her administrative remedies, which waives a right to judicial review); Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762, 772 (9th Cir.1991) (The law requires an aggrieved federal employee to elect one exclusive administrative remedy and to exhaust whatever remedy he chooses.); German v. Pena, 88 F.Supp.2d 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y.2000) ([A] claimant must exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to bringing his action in the federal courts.) Because Valentine-Johnson admittedly did not exhaust her administrative remedies with the MSPB, the district court's determination that it could not hear her termination claim has presumptive legal support. 47 In our view, however, the special factual circumstances of this case and applicable principles of equity require that Valentine-Johnson's termination claim be heard in the district court. Valentine-Johnson persuasively argues that judicial estoppel prevents the Air Force from changing its position regarding the district court's review of her termination claim. Judicial estoppel generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (quotation marks omitted). In order to invoke judicial estoppel, Valentine-Johnson must show that the Air Force took a contrary position under oath in a prior proceeding and that the prior position was accepted by the court. Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir.1990). 48 The Air Force does not dispute that it filed a motion to dismiss the MSPB appeal on the basis that Valentine-Johnson's termination claim should be heard in the district court. Once in the district court, the Air Force promptly reversed course and sought to block the court's review of the termination claim. Although the MSPB AJ did not grant the Air Force's motion, the AJ originally advised the parties that it was my intention to dismiss [the MSPB] appeal without prejudice because the appellant had filed a law suit in the U.S. district court that included her removal as an issue. The AJ also appeared to accept the Air Force's position when, in a telephone conversation with Valentine-Johnson, the AJ explained that if Valentine-Johnson withdrew her appeal before the MSPB, that would allow her complete case to proceed in court. 49 Although the Air Force did not testify under oath, the agency did present[] to the court ... a ... written motion ... certifying that to the best of [its] knowledge... the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein [we]re warranted by existing law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b). We believe that the Air Force's written filing, combined with arguing the merits of its motion in a conference with the MSPB AJ, may be fairly analogized to taking a position under oath for the purposes of judicial estoppel. See Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 30-31 (1st Cir.2004) (noting that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court in its discretion and that the amorphous nature of judicial estoppel suggests that the appropriate standard of review should be abuse of discretion, which is both deferential and flexible); Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.2002) (noting that the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may be invoked are not reducible to any general formulation of principle and that there are no inflexible or exhaustive prerequisites for determining the applicability of the doctrine). 50 Similarly, we recognize that the AJ did not explicitly grant the Air Force's motion, but as a practical matter the AJ adopted and indeed advanced the Air Force's position to the detriment of Valentine-Johnson. In the interest of preventing the Air Force from abusing the judicial process through cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposite to suit an exigency of the moment, Teledyne, 911 F.2d at 1218, we conclude that judicial estoppel is applicable as one of two reasons that Valentine-Johnson may present her termination claim in the district court. 51 The other reason why Valentine-Johnson is entitled to have her termination claims heard in the district court is the misleading advice that she received from the MSPB AJ. In the present case, Valentine-Johnson clearly relied on the MSPB AJ's representation that the only place where she could have all of her claims heard was in the district court. Valentine-Johnson telephoned the AJ because she wanted to dismiss her court case and proceed solely before the MSPB. Having all of her claims consolidated before the MSPB would have been consistent with the parties' settlement agreement and was also the correct procedural route by regulation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302. Instead, the AJ discouraged Valentine-Johnson from pursuing her mixed case appeal through the MSPB by telling her that the MSPB could not hear her discrimination claims, which was inaccurate as a matter of law. 52 We note that at least two courts have rejected a plaintiff's claim to equitable relief based on erroneous advice from the government. See McAdams, 64 F.3d at 1143 (holding that the plaintiff's receipt of incorrect information from the DOJ and the EEOC did not create a right to sue in federal court); Williams v. Munoz, 106 F.Supp.2d 40, 44 (D.D.C.2000) (holding that misinformation from an ALJ is not enough to support waiver of the exhaustion requirement). In McAdams, however, the court relied in part on the fact that the plaintiff could not establish reliance on the erroneous advice. See also Ferry v. Hayden, 954 F.2d 658, 661-62 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that for the plaintiff to successfully invoke equitable estoppel based on government-supplied misinformation, the plaintiff must show detrimental reliance). And in Williams the court noted that plaintiff's reliance claim was undermined by the fact that she was represented by counsel. 53 Valentine-Johnson, by contrast, can clearly show reliance and was, at critical times, proceeding without the benefit of legal counsel. Moreover, [s]he plainly made a good faith effort to comply with administrative procedures, and such effort is something this Court should consider in determining whether a party has exhausted administrative remedies. Premier Electronics Lab. v. Aston, 686 F.Supp. 815 (N.D.Cal.1988). We therefore conclude that the erroneous advice from the MSPB AJ is an additional factor that weighs in favor of having Valentine-Johnson's complete case heard in the district court. 54 Although the district court will not have an administrative record from the MSPB to review, this court has previously rejected the argument that nondiscrimination claims must always be reviewed on an administrative record. Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 472 (6th Cir. 2003). In fact, [p]arallel proceedings in the district court and the MSPB are contemplated by [the relevant statute]. Evono v. Reno, 216 F.3d 1105, 1110 (D.C.Cir. 2000). The statutory scheme provides that a district court may independently review claims without the benefit of a final decision from the MSPB. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(e)(1)(B) (permitting a plaintiff to seek relief in district court if the MSPB does not issue its opinion within 120 days). 55 In the present case, Valentine-Johnson's discrimination and retaliation claims were dismissed by the district court because she could not show — in the absence of her termination claim — that she suffered an adverse employment action. Her termination claim was subsequently dismissed because she was found not to have exhausted her administrative remedies before the MSPB. We conclude that this outcome is inequitable and unjust because of the unique confluence of the following factors: (1) the parties' settlement agreement specified that Valentine-Johnson had the option to have all of her claims eventually consolidated before the MSPB; (2) the MSPB AJ gave Valentine-Johnson erroneous advice, upon which Valentine-Johnson relied to her detriment; (3) the Air Force abused the judicial process with its shifting jurisdictional arguments; and (4) Valentine-Johnson was, at critical times, proceeding pro se, and making her best effort to have all of her claims heard. 56 Under the above circumstances, we will reverse the dismissal by the district court of Valentine-Johnson's discrimination, retaliation, and termination claims and remand the case for a new hearing that will allow her to present all of those claims before the court. At the same time, we want to make clear that by so holding we are not suggesting that plaintiffs under normal circumstances are free to ignore the statutory procedures for mixed cases as set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a). Nor do we endorse routinely bypassing the exhaustion of administrative remedies before the MSPB. 57