Opinion ID: 1952771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: legal analysis of cross-appeal

Text: ¶ 22. On November 2, 1985 (prior to the first trial of this case), the trial judge issued a partial summary judgment dismissing with prejudice the McGorys' counterclaim for punitive damages. Specifically, the trial judge held that Allstate had a legitimate or arguable reason for denying the McGorys' claim and exhibited good faith in such denial. The McGorys did not appeal the ruling on punitive damages when they appealed the initial jury verdict in this case. After the case was remanded and retried and a third trial was granted, Dorothy McGory moved to reopen the issue of punitive damages. The motion was denied. ¶ 23. Dorothy McGory now argues that she was entitled to have the issue of punitive damages submitted to the jury. She alleges that Allstate acted in bad faith by hiding evidence that the fire could have been started by children. She also contends that Allstate's attorney lied about the existence of a written report by Allstate's own investigator acknowledging that a child admitted to starting the fire. Dorothy McGory further claims that Allstate's attorney committed fraud at second trial when the attorney questioned the child as to whether Dorothy McGory's attorney told him to say that the children started the fire  when, in fact, Allstate was aware that the child had spontaneously made the statement to its own investigator several months before the second trial. (R. at 306-307). Based on this alleged bad faith and misconduct, Dorothy McGory argues that the trial judge should have reconsidered the issue of punitive damages. ¶ 24. The original ruling denying punitive damages was not raised on the first appeal in this case. The trial judge noted that the only thing that had changed since the original ruling on punitive damages was the manner in which Allstate's attorney handled the matter of the child witness. The record reflects that the McGorys were allowed to put the child witness on the stand to tell his version of how the fire started. On cross-examination, Allstate's attorney asked the child many questions, including whether Dorothy McGory's attorney had told the child that version of how the fire started. The McGorys raised no contemporaneous objection. See Ivy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 612 So.2d 1108, 1114 (Miss. 1992). Thus, Dorothy McGory is seeking redress in the form of punitive damages for conduct that she did not object to at the time, thereby allowing the trial judge an opportunity to correct the situation. Moreover, the child was on cross-examination; therefore, Allstate had a right to question his credibility. Sayles v. State, 552 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Miss. 1989); M.R.E. 611(b). Furthermore, the trial judge granted the McGorys a new trial, based, in part, on the Allstate's treatment of the minor witness. Therefore, the original summary judgment (not appealed by the McGorys at that time) should stand. ¶ 25. Dorothy McGory also asserts that she is entitled to attorney fees under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-55-5 because Allstate's conduct in this case prolonged the proceedings by necessitating the second trial after the remand of this case. Allstate won both times this case was submitted to a jury. There is no evidence that Allstate has prolonged the proceedings in this case. Therefore, Dorothy McGory's assertions to the contrary are without merit. [1]
¶ 26. Dorothy McGory argues that the nine-man verdict statute is unconstitutional because it denies minorities an effective voice on the jury. She requests that, on remand, the trial court be instructed to give a unanimous jury instruction. Because this case will not be remanded, Dorothy McGory's argument on this point is moot and will not be addressed.