Opinion ID: 878577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions relating to negligence.

Text: The court, at Gee's request, gave a general instruction on negligence, to the effect that every person is responsible for injury to the person or property of another caused by the want of ordinary care or skill (see section 27-1-701, MCA), and further stating that negligence means want of ordinary care or skill which exists when there is a failure to do that which a reasonable and prudent person would have ordinarily done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such person under the existing circumstances would not have done. See Stocking v. Johnson Flying Service (1963), 143 Mont. 61, 387 P.2d 312; Ahlquist v. Mulvaney Realty Company (1944), 116 Mont. 6, 152 P.2d 137. Plaintiff Gee claims error in the court's refusal of two further instructions offered by him: Instruction No. 43 The manufacturer of a product that is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently made, has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, manufacture, testing and inspection of any product and in the testing and inspection of any component parts made by another so that the product may be safely used in a manner and for a purpose for which it was made. A failure to fulfill that duty is negligence. Instruction No. 44 You are instructed that a manufacturer of a product that is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently made has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, testing, and inspection and manufacture of the product so that the product may be safely used in a manner and for the purpose it was made. A failure to fulfill that duty is negligence. The District Court refused the instructions on the grounds that they were inapplicable to this case since manufacturing is not involved. The District Court was clearly correct. Gee also argues that under his theory of the case, he was entitled to further instructions delineating the various contractors' duties and especially requiring a higher standard of care than that normally chargeable to a lay person. Without these additional instructions, says Gee, it is impossible to determine if the jury applied a different or lower standard of care for the contractors. Gee argues that it would clearly be error if all the defendants were judged by the same standard of care to which the defendant Busch (the former premises owner) was held, because Gee claims a separate and higher duty of care was owed to him by the defendant contractors. In making this argument, Gee relies upon Williams v. Montana National Bank of Bozeman (1975), 167 Mont. 24, 534 P.2d 1247. In Williams, a husband sued the bank in a situation where the plaintiff's wife had signed a check to an unidentified man for $1.26. The stranger made out the check in the wife's presence, leaving room enough on the lines of the check so that later he could raise the check from $1.26 to $6,841.26. No payee's name was on the check when the wife signed it for the stranger. The stranger took the check to the bank and received payment for the raised amount. The husband sued the bank, and the court submitted the case to the jury on the theory of ordinary negligence. This Court reversed, saying that the bank was entitled to have the jury instructed upon the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to reasonable commercial standards in the processing of checks. The applicable commercial standards in the Uniform Commercial Code are not specified in Williams, but we note that section 30-4-103(3), MCA, provides that action or non-action by a bank approved by the Uniform Commercial Code or pursuant to the Federal Reserve Regulations or operating letters constitutes the exercise of ordinary care. Likewise, action or non-action by a bank consistent with clearing-house rules or with general banking usage not disapproved by the Uniform Commercial Code, constitutes ordinary care. Thus, there are specific statutes relating to customs, standards, usages and rules which must be considered in determining ordinary care used by banks in cases such as Williams. Unlike Williams, there is in this case no applicable standards which would relate by statute or regulation to the defendants, or any of them, in their duties regarding the installation of the dumbwaiter. There is no statutory or other basis that we can determine that would require that the jury be instructed to apply a higher level of care to independent contractors than to the landowner, Busch. Indeed the standard of care applicable to such entities could not be different from what the court instructed, that is, each party had the duty of exercising such ordinary care as reasonably prudent persons would exercise in the same or similar circumstances. Beyond the instructions which Gee offered, which we have set forth above and which are clearly inapplicable here, Gee offered no further instructions relating to the duty of care by any of the other defendants in their respective fields. The reason is obvious: there were no statutes or rules applicable to such manufacturers at the time of the construction here. The District Court may not be put in error on such grounds. Gee contends that the District Court gave two other instructions which he claims are error. One was Instruction No. 10: A person who sells land is not subject to liability for physical harm caused to the buyer or others while on the land after the buyer has taken possession, by any dangerous condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed at the time that the buyer took possession. Gee also objects to Instruction No. 11: A contractee-owner is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor or his servants. The owner's right to oversee that the work of various independent contractors proceeds satisfactorily imposes on the owner no duty to insure that any contractor's work is done in compliance with all the various safety codes. Gee also contends that Instruction No. 11 conflicts with the court's Instruction No. 8, which stated: Ordinarily, one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for the acts or omissions of such contractor or its employees. However, one who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of bodily harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for bodily harm proximately caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions. Court's Instruction No. 8 is by its terms limited to dangerous situations existing during the progress of the construction. There is no conflict therefore between court's Instruction No. 8 and court's Instruction No. 11. Gee's further objections to the court's Instruction No. 10, now expressed, are based upon Restatement of Torts, 2nd., §§ 410-415. In any event, however, these objections were not raised at the time of the settlement of the instructions and so may not be considered by us on appeal. Richland County v. Anderson (1955), 129 Mont. 559, 574, 291 P.2d 267, 275. Gee contends that the giving of the Instructions Nos. 10 and 11 amounted to a peremptory charge to the jury to find for the defendant Busch. We however find no error arising out of these instructions on the ground of objection given at the settlement of instructions, that the subject was covered by court's Instruction No. 8, above. The District Court did not err in overruling that objection.