Opinion ID: 859665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erred in failing to grant adams’

Text: MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF A SPEEDY TRIAL. The police arrested Adams on August 19, 1992. On February 15, 1993, the next term of court, Adams was reindicted after the State discovered that the violation occurred within 1,500 feet of a school. Adams had also been indicted for a similar crime which occurred on July 2, 1992. Because both indictments could not be tried in the same term of court, the State decided to proceed with the July 2 offense and continue the instant case until the next term of court. Adams made no objection to the continuance. Adams was convicted of the July 2 offense and incarcerated. The instant case was scheduled to proceed in August of 1993; however Adams decided to change attorneys. His new attorney, Kevin Null, filed a motion for a continuance, and the case was again continued until the next term of court in February 1994. On February 14, 1994, Adams’ attorney filed a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. The motion was denied. The trial took place on February 28, 1994. Adams now claims that the lower court erred in failing to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of a formal indictment, or information, or where there is restraint imposed by an arrest. Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d 671, 674 (Miss. 1990); Lightsey v. State, 493 So. 2d 375, 378 (Miss. 1986). Adams’ right to a speedy trial attached at the time of the indictment, August of 1992. In order to determine whether Adams’ right to a speedy trial was violated, we must utilize the balancing test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The Barker case set out four factors that a court must consider in making a speedy trial analysis: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id.; see also Jaco v. State, 574 So. 2d 625, 630 (Miss. 1990).
In Mississippi, a delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial. Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989) (citations omitted). The delay between Adams’ arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial since it was over eighteen months long. Accordingly, we must examine the other Barker factors.
As the trial court recognized in overruling the motion to dismiss, the case was not tried during the August 1992 term since the indictment was returned during that term. Additionally, Adams made no motion to be tried during the August 1992 term. Since the State found new evidence against Adams, the State decided to reindict him during the next term of court in February, 1993. At this time, Adams was also under indictment for an additional similar charge. Because both cases could not be tried in the same term of court, the instant case was set for trial during the next term of court, August of 1993. Adams then asked for a continuance until February of 1994. Adams claims that the reindictment was a deliberate attempt to delay the trial. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial for tactical advantage is weighed heavily against the State. However, more neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded courts are not weighed as heavily against the State. See, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; State v. Magnusen, 646 So. 2d 1275, 1281-82 (Miss. 1994). Here, the State’s subsequent discovery of the proximity of the sale to the school was merely a negligent oversight and should not be weighed heavily against the State. Adams v. State, 583 So. 2d 165, 169 (Miss. 1991). Further, six months of the delay is attributable to Adams, since he requested the final continuance. Wiley v. State, 582 So. 2d 1008, 1011-12 (Miss. 1991); Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d 671, 674 (Miss. 1990). The trial court found that the delay had been the result of Adams’ own conduct and for good cause. If the trial court’s finding of fact that the delay was the result of good cause is supported by substantial credible evidence, this Court will not disturb that ruling on appeal. Folk v. State, 576 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Miss. 1991). A finding of good cause is a finding of ultimate fact. Id. Since there was substantial evidence supporting this finding, we will not second guess the trial court. Since the bulk of the delay was caused by neutral reasons, this factor weighs only slightly in favor of Adams.
Adams did not file a motion for speedy trial until January 1, 1994, during the delay caused by his requested continuance. Furthermore, the motion for a speedy trial was filed right before the term of court during which the case was scheduled to be tried. Adams had no right to an immediate trial at the very moment at which he suddenly decided that he wanted it--during the delay caused by his requested continuance. Adams v. State, 583 So. 2d 165, 169 (Miss. 1991). At the time he filed his motion, there was no way to try the case any more quickly than it was set because the court was not in term. Adams filed a motion to dismiss in February, less than one month before trial. A motion to dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial is not equivalent to a demand for a speedy trial. Perry v. State, 637 So. 2d 871, 876 (Miss. 1994); Adams, 583 So. 2d at 170. Because of the time and manner in which he asserted his right to speedy trial, we must weigh this factor against Adams.
Adams must show some prejudice in order to prove a constitutional speedy trial violation. Magnusen, 646 So. 2d at 1284. Prejudice encompasses interference with a defendant’s liberty and actual prejudice in defending his case. Id. During the majority of the delay, Adams was incarcerated on another conviction, and therefore, he was not deprived of his liberty as a result of the State’s failure to bring him to trial sooner. Further, Adams has failed to show any prejudice in defending his case. Since there was only a presumptive showing of prejudice, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the State. Id. After balancing the Barker factors, this Court finds that Adams’ right to a speedy trial was not violated. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING CROSS-EXAMINATION OF STIRLING GATES. Stirling Gates, a confidential informant, was asked on cross-examination, You testified that you had worked for four years as an undercover informant for the Task Force. How did you become involved with the Task Force? The State objected, arguing that the reason Gates became involved with the Task Force was irrelevant to Adams’ trial on the cocaine charge. Outside of the jury’s presence, the defense proffered the information he wished to elicit from Gates, which consisted of a charge of embezzlement for which Gates had never been convicted. The defense argued that Gates became involved with the task force because his previous employer had told Gates that he would drop the embezzlement charge if Gates would become a confidential informant. The defense asserted that this testimony was admissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 608(b) for purposes of attacking Gates’ credibility. In other words, the theft was a specific instance of conduct other than a conviction which was probative of Gates’ untruthfulness. After hearing both arguments, the trial court ruled that the prejudicial effect of the evidence would outweigh any probative value. Under Rule 608(b), the trial court has the discretionary authority to permit cross-examination as to a witness’ specific acts of misconduct if the misconduct bears upon the witness’ character for truthfulness. M.R.E. 608(b); Brent v. State, 632 So. 2d 936, 944 (Miss. 1994). Admission of evidence of past conduct poses special hazards and danger, and should only be admitted when it is necessary to do so to ‘ascertain the truth,’ and unfair prejudice is not imposed, especially upon the accused. Brent, 632 So. 2d at 945. The trial court found that the evidence of past misconduct was inadmissible since it was so remote in time and totally irrelevant to the instant case. Since the trial court acted entirely within his discretion under Rule 608(b), we refuse to disturb his ruling on the matter.