Opinion ID: 534558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suit Against the United States and its Agencies

Text: 22 As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983), [i]t is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. See also 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3654 at 186-90 (1985). Moreover, Congress may impose conditions on the government's waiver of immunity. See, e.g., Stubbs v. United States, 620 F.2d 775, 779 (10th Cir.1980). Plaintiffs raise three arguments on appeal in an attempt to avoid the jurisdictional barrier of sovereign immunity to their requests for monetary and injunctive relief against the United States. 23 First, plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982), to recover compensatory damages. Congress waived the United States' immunity from suit in a certain class of cases when it enacted the FTCA, but Congress imposed certain conditions on this waiver. Section 2675 of the FTCA requires that administrative remedies be exhausted before suit is filed in district court. Plaintiffs contend that they did not pursue their administrative remedies because they believed doing so would be futile. However, bringing an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, imposed by Congress, which the courts have no power to waive. See Lurch v. United States, 719 F.2d 333, 335 n. 3 (10th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927, 104 S.Ct. 1710, 80 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984). The district court properly held that plaintiffs' failure to exhaust created a jurisdictional bar under the FTCA. See Colorado Flying Academy v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 874 n. 9 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182, 106 S.Ct. 2915, 91 L.Ed.2d 544 (1986). 24 Plaintiffs next argue that they may pursue their claim against the United States on the basis of a trust relationship between the United States and the Cherokee freedmen arising from their status as Cherokees. Relying on Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 103 S.Ct. 2961, plaintiffs contend that this trust relationship exempts their claims for monetary relief from the sovereign immunity barrier. In Mitchell, Quinault Indians sought damages from the United States under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982), and its counterpart for claims brought by Indian tribes, the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982). 11 The plaintiffs claimed that the United States had breached its trust duty to them by mismanaging timberlands on the Quinault Reservation. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages from the United States. To reach this result, the Court first had to determine whether the United States had consented to suit, thereby waiving its sovereign immunity. A review of the legislative history of the two Tucker Acts, and cases interpreting them, convinced the Court that the Acts constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity, so that [i]f a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act, the United States has presumptively consented to suit. 463 U.S. at 216, 103 S.Ct. at 2967. 12 25 Even assuming that plaintiffs' claims here fall within the Tucker Act, that Act would provide a waiver of sovereign immunity in the Claims Court, but not in district court. 26 The Tucker Act (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491) grants concurrent jurisdiction to the district court and the Claims Court (formerly the Court of Claims) over money claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000. For claims against the United States involving amounts greater than $10,000 founded upon the Constitution, Acts of Congress, executive regulations, or contracts, the Act vests exclusive jurisdiction with the Claims Court. 27 State of New Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d 1318, 1322 (10th Cir.1984); see also Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d 430, 433 (10th Cir.1985). 28 In this case, plaintiffs seek both monetary damages in the amount of $250,000,000, and injunctive and declaratory relief. [W]hen the 'prime objective' or 'essential purpose' of the complaining party is to obtain money from the federal government (in an amount in excess of $10,000), the Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction is triggered. Regan, 745 F.2d at 1322; see also Rogers, 766 F.2d at 434. That recovering money damages is the primary objective of plaintiffs' suit against the federal government is demonstrated both by plaintiffs' reliance upon Mitchell and by their argument to this court. Plaintiffs assert on appeal: 29 It is even more compelling to allow monetary relief in the instant case than it was in the case of United States v. Mitchell, supra. Here, appellants are not concerned with mismanagement of timber and natural resources (i.e., property rights), but rather with their right to vote (i.e., liberty interests). To limit the freedmen to merely prospective equitable remedies would be totally inadequate. 30 First, the freedmen are in no position to monitor the federal government's actions in administering the government-to-government relations between it and the Indian tribes and in carrying out its trust responsibility. 31 Second, a prospective equitable remedy does little to compensate the freedmen for the embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety and shame which accompanied their disenfranchisement from the Cherokee Nation and little to deter the federal government from breaching their trust responsibility and allowing such unlawful tribal actions in the future. For these reasons, appellants contend that the reasoning of United States v. Mitchell, supra., should be applied to the case at bar and that this court permit plaintiffs to bring suit against the United States for monetary relief. 32 Brief of Appellants at 35-36. We therefore conclude that under the Tucker Act the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against the federal government based on Mitchell.