Opinion ID: 491574
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether a favorable psychiatrist could have been found with reasonable diligence

Text: 24 The district court stated that counsel for the respondent conceded that a psychiatrist such as Dr. Dorothy Lewis, who testified in Mr. Elledge's defense during the evidentiary hearing before this Court, could have been located in 1977 to testify during the sentencing proceeding.... 12 This led the court to conclude that counsel's performance fell below the standard set out in Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 744-45 (11th Cir.1985). 13 The court went on to conclude, however, that even had counsel produced such a witness the death sentence nevertheless would have been imposed. Consequently, Elledge was not prejudiced; counsel was not ineffective under Strickland; and the sixth amendment was not violated. 25 Although the district court's conclusion that the sixth amendment had not been violated is correct, the analytic framework the court used to determine that a favorable witness could have been located was inaccurate. The record reveals that the State's counsel merely acknowledged that Dr. Lewis was extant in 1977 and had formulated her clinical theories at that time. The State never conceded that a reasonably diligent investigation would have uncovered either Dr. Lewis or a similar expert who would have testified favorably at Elledge's sentencing. 26 Specifically, the district court concluded that, in 1977, counsel could have located Dr. Lewis. The test, however, is not simply whether counsel could have located a witness similar to the one eventually produced. Instead, the court must determine whether it is reasonably likely that a reasonable attorney, operating under the circumstances of the case and acting in a reasonably professional manner, would have located such a witness. 14 27 In other words, Strickland requires only that counsel conduct a reasonable investigation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 1066. To prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced. If such a result was not reasonably probable, the petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate. Merely proving that someone--years later--located an expert who will testify favorably is irrelevant unless the petitioner, the eventual expert, counsel or some other person can establish a reasonable likelihood that a similar expert could have been found at the pertinent time by an ordinarily competent attorney using reasonably diligent effort. 15 28 In deciding whether a petitioner has met this burden a court must look to all the circumstances of the case and consider all the evidence presented. 16 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. In Elledge's case, he has made no showing that it was reasonably probable that an ordinary, reasonable lawyer, operating under the time and monetary constraints Elledge's counsel faced and using reasonable diligence, would have discovered a psychiatrist who would have testified as did Dr. Lewis. 17 Accordingly, Elledge cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate his mental condition and produce a favorable expert witness. 29