Opinion ID: 729769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Role of Motive in Constitutional Doctrine

Text: 13 Before addressing Lubavitch's specific claims of retaliation and viewpoint discrimination, a few words are appropriate to consider exactly when and why the motives of government actors are relevant in constitutional analysis. Both parties in this case seem to assume that if the Building Authority Board was motivated by an intent to retaliate against Lubavitch or to discriminate against religious viewpoints then ipso facto the Board violated the Constitution. This leap from nefarious motive to constitutional violation, however, is by no means an automatic one under constitutional case law. 14 Motive is, of course, relevant to a number of constitutional claims. In Equal Protection Clause analysis, for example, courts often must inquire into the motives of legislators or other government actors. 3 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) (voting district violates Constitution if race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without the district); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (prosecutor's peremptory challenges are unconstitutional if based solely on purposeful racial discrimination). Similarly, cases under the Establishment Clause or the Bill of Attainder Clauses 4 may require courts to query the subjective intentions of legislators for possible illicit motives. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (legislature's actual purpose to promote religion invalidates statute); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1946) (circumstances of bill's passage showed that its purpose was to punish particular individuals). 15 The relevance of motive in these instances of constitutional adjudication does not, however, allow the inductive conclusion that a universal, all-purpose cause of action exists whenever a plaintiff can allege an unconstitutional motive. In a Free Speech Clause case, for example, the Supreme Court went so far as to say that it is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). Although that statement may be hyperbole, one constitutional commentator has concluded that, rather than focusing on motive, most descriptive analyses of First Amendment law, as well as most normative discussions . . . have considered the permissibility of governmental regulation of speech by focusing on the effects of a given regulation. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 413 (1996); cf. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904) (The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.). 16 Even in the Equal Protection Clause context, the Supreme Court has occasionally been reluctant to question legislative and administrative motive. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the City of Jackson, Mississippi had decided to close its public swimming pools rather than desegregate them under court order. The Supreme Court, faced with facts obviously analogous to the case we now consider, explicitly declined to inquire into the city council's motives for closing the pools. Id. at 224-26. The Court upheld the closings because the petitioners had shown no state action affecting blacks differently from whites. Id. at 225. 17 A number of factors explain this reluctance to probe the motives of legislators and administrators. For starters, the text of the Constitution prohibits many government actions but makes no mention of governmental mentes reae (i.e., guilty minds). The First Amendment, for example, forbids Congress and (through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause) the States from making laws abridging the freedom of speech -- a far different proposition than prohibiting the intent to abridge such freedom. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Just as we would never uphold a law with unconstitutional effect because its enactors were benignly motivated, an illicit intent behind an otherwise valid government action indicates nothing more than a failed attempt to violate the Constitution. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 23. 18 Beyond these theoretical objections to investigating motive, practical considerations also suggest caution. Government actions may be taken for a multiplicity of reasons, and any number of people may be involved in authorizing the action. Doubting the propriety of judicial searches for corrupt motives, Chief Justice Marshall thus asked: 19 Must it be direct corruption, or would interest or undue influence of any kind be sufficient? Must the vitiating cause operate on a majority, or on what number of the members? Would the act be null, whatever might be the wish of the nation, or would its obligation or nullity depend upon the public sentiment? 20 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810). Moreover, once a court finds an illicit motive, may the legislature or administrative body ever take the same action again without the imputation of improper intent? The Court in O'Brien declined to strike down a law allegedly tainted by improper motive in part because Congress could then re-enact the law in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it. 391 U.S. at 384; see generally John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1212-17 (1970). 21 In short, the relevance of motive to constitutional adjudication varies by context. No automatic cause of action exists whenever allegations of unconstitutional intent can be made, but courts will investigate motive when precedent, text, and prudential considerations suggest it necessary in order to give full effect to the constitutional provision at issue.