Opinion ID: 575830
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Self-Incriminating Statements

Text: 20 Cota also contends the district court erred in not suppressing the statements she made when stopped, and later when arrested, arguing that they were made under duress and admitted into evidence in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination. 21 Cota first maintains that on June 13, 1989, she was effectively taken into custody by the officers who stopped her and took her to the Oneida Sheriff's office, and that their failure to read her her Miranda rights rendered her statements unusable at trial. The question of the voluntariness of Cota's statements is subject to de novo review by this court. We note from the outset that [o]nly questioning that reflects a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself constitutes interrogation the fruits of which may be received only after Miranda warnings have been given. United States v. Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir.1987). In making this assessment, we consider the totality of the circumstances of the agents' conduct. United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1114, 107 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1990). 22 Far from disagreeing with Judge Sifton's finding that Cota freely volunteered information and was not in custody during her six hour stay at the sheriff's station, we find the testimony of the DEA agents and Deputy Sheriff Hudson to have adequately established the consensual nature of Cota's visit. We also find it to have been reasonable for the district judge to believe that Cota's willingness to accompany the officers to the station in the first place was spurred by her own concern for the return of her seized car, rather than by the allegedly coercive environment of the stop. Not only was the initial use of guns and handcuffs necessitated by the officers' safety concerns, but the handcuffs were removed as soon as the car was examined and the perceived security threat abated. 23 Just as it was clearly Cota's choice to go to the station and wait for the agents, so was it her choice not to leave while they were asking her questions. At no time during the interview did Cota or her husband appear intimidated, or request that the questioning cease. Nor did they have their movement impaired. In fact, they were explicitly told by Agent McAleer that they were free to leave at any time. The statements made under these conditions were thus properly admitted. 24 Cota also claims that the circumstances of her arrest on November 8, 1991, were so coercive and intimidating as to render her volunteered statements inadmissable. While the factual question of whether Miranda rights were read to an apprehended suspect is the key determination to be made here, it also must be decided whether Cota's waiver of her right against self-incrimination was made knowingly and voluntarily, or if the behavior of arresting officers overbore her free, independent will. United States v. Fritz, 580 F.2d 370, 377 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed.2d 338 (1978) (citations omitted). 25 At the Pre-Trial Suppression Hearing, Agent Whipple testified that Cota was read the DEA's standard  'Advice of Rights 13-A' in English, immediately upon her arrest (Transcript, p. 68). Judge Sifton found this testimony, as later corroborated by Agent McAleer, to be persuasive. We defer to his findings, as [a]ssessments of the credibility of witnesses are the province of the district court and we are not entitled to overturn those assessments. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 972 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2858, 115 L.Ed.2d 1025, 1026 (1991). 26 There was no evidence that the manner of the arrest was made deliberately public or coercive. Nor is there any evidence to support Cota's claim that the delay occasioned by driving her back home, rather than directly to the arraigning magistrate, was excessive or intended to elicit incriminating statements. Cota volunteered the statements at her home in a manner that reflected her knowing and voluntary intent to waive her rights. As the court held in United States v. Rubio, 709 F.2d 146, 152 (2d Cir.1983), an express statement is not required to establish such a waiver. Moreover, Cota's request to call her lawyer midway through questioning indicated her awareness of her right not to respond in his absence. 27 Cota's subsequent statements in the car on the way to arraignment were also not the product of custodial interrogation. Nor were they solicited in any way. As Agent Whipple testified at trial, Cota was the one to initiate the discussion, inquiring of him why she was being arrested. In responding (and telling her of his awareness of the bank deposits she had made), Whipple did not engage in express questioning or its functional equivalent. Neither did he create an atmosphere whereby his words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Under these circumstances, where an agent supplied [the defendant] with general information regarding the crime [s]he was suspected of committing, in response to [her] own questions, voluntary statements made by a suspect who understands her rights are not prohibited. United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir.1983). Neither was a renewed reading of the Miranda warning necessary in order to render Cota's statements admissible.