Opinion ID: 604567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Express Threat of Death

Text: 3 Eirven contends the district court erred in giving him a two-point enhancement for express threat of death under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) (1989). 4 According to the Presentence Report, Eirven shouted shoot him, shoot him to his accomplice as a security guard was chasing them. Presentence Report at 1. Eirven claims he never said these words, but the guard said he did. Appellant's Brief at 20. The district court's finding of this fact isn't clearly erroneous. See United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir.1990). 5 Eirven also argues that, even if he said shoot him, shoot him, this wasn't an express threat of death. First, he argues the enhancement shouldn't apply because the threat came after he'd gotten the money, and U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) app. note 8 states that ... 'express threat of death' ... means using the threat in order to receive money, Appellant's Brief at 20. Unfortunately for Eirven, the application note states nothing of the sort. The examples in the application note all involve demands for money, but they're only examples. Moreover, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) requires that the court apply enhancements for all acts done in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for [the] offense. 6 Eirven argues his statement wasn't an express threat of death because the security guard wasn't a victim of the robbery, a dubious proposition in any event. But even assuming the security guard wasn't a victim, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) isn't limited to threats to victims, and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) requires the court to consider threats made while fleeing. 7 U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 app. note 8 does say that enhancement is proper when the offender did things that would instill in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, significantly greater fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of robbery. But this doesn't limit the scope of section 2B3.1 to victims: It only points out that whether or not the words are threatening must be determined with reference not to a reasonable average person, but to a reasonable victim of the crime. 8 Finally, Eirven argues the threat didn't instill significantly greater fear in the guard than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of robbery. Eirven points out that the guard kept following them even after Eirven's threat, Presentence Report at 1, and that the guard had noticed that what Eirven's accomplice pretended was a gun was actually only a pen, id. But the application note 8 test doesn't depend on whether the victim was actually afraid; it depends on whether the defendant's conduct would make a reasonable person afraid. The guard's courage, and his perspicacity in noticing that Eirven's accomplice was faking the gun--which didn't preclude the accomplice's having a gun somewhere else on his person--are irrelevant to whether the threat was an express threat of death. 9