Opinion ID: 169352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attorney-Fee Request

Text: 40 Attorney fees in civil-rights litigation may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which states that a court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. On February 4, 2005, Plaintiffs' counsel filed in district court an amended motion seeking reimbursement under § 1988 for attorney fees and expenses incurred in two activities: (1) pursuit of the original fee request, and (2) post-Degree monitoring and compliance efforts. The district court's award with respect to the first activity is not challenged on appeal. 41 With respect to the monitoring and enforcement activities, counsel sought approximately $96,000. At a March 1, 2005, hearing before the magistrate judge on the fee request, Plaintiffs' lead attorney Louis Bullock testified that his firm had mostly . . . been responding to specific events which have been raised by officers where we believe there was a clear violation of the Consent Decree and that it was clear that the plaintiffs have a role in monitoring and enforcing the Decree. Aplee. Supp. App. at 135. Plaintiffs should get attorney fees, he said, because [t]he law in this circuit is that plaintiffs counsel in class actions have an obligation to monitor and enforce consent decrees. Id. He continued, [T]here's a clear legal obligation . . . to respond to the claims of individual class members who were treated in violation of the decree. Id. at 135-36. When asked whether these individual claims related to the original decree, he replied, You're only there because you won. Id. at 136. In response to the City's argument that it was inappropriate to seek compensation for raising individual compliance claims, Mr. Bullock testified that many of the things in the Consent Decree . . . are only demonstrated . . . in the treatment of an individual officer. Id. at 143. He noted in particular that retaliation and discrimination in specialty assignments were actions directed against individuals. In his view the existence of the Independent Auditor did not alter this duty, because even where there is a monitoring or some type of a court process, . . . plaintiffs' counsel will continue to have their independent obligation to enforce the decree. Id. at 145. On cross-examination he conceded that he could have negotiated in the Decree a provision for payment of attorney fees incurred in monitoring compliance, and that the Decree lacked such a provision, but he reiterated that even without it Plaintiffs had a monitoring role. He pointed out that there was no reason for Plaintiffs to be given copies of reports and documents if they were not in some way to be involved in monitoring the Decree. 42 The magistrate judge recommended that the request be denied under the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc., v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). He stated, [H]owever useful the actions taken by Plaintiffs' counsel in monitoring and seeking compliance with the Consent Decree may have been, since those activities did not produce an order or other decree in Plaintiff's [sic] favor, applying Buckhannon, the Court sees those activities as falling outside the terms of [42 U.S.C.] § 1988. R. Vol. VI at 646. Although acknowledging that this result might seem unfair because the Consent Decree set up a procedure whereby Plaintiffs are required to present disputes concerning compliance to a Committee established by the Decree, the Decree did not place Plaintiffs in charge of assuring compliance, and no provision provide[d] for the payment of any fees related to Plaintiffs' monitoring activities. Id. at 647, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation regarding post-Degree monitoring and Plaintiffs timely appealed.