Opinion ID: 154605
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Morales' Sentence

Text: The United States contends the district court erred in sentencing Mr. Morales pursuant to the money laundering guideline range. The United States argues 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846 (1994) required the court to sentence Mr. Morales to the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison for his conviction of conspiracy. In general, district courts have broad discretion in sentencing a defendant within the range prescribed by Congress. United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2258 and 116 S. Ct. 133 (1995). '[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.' Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046 (1996) (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992)). Although we review the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines de novo, we review the sentencing court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1444. Thus, a sentencing court's determination of the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant is reviewed for clear error. Torres, 53 F.3d at 1144. To constitute clear error, we must be convinced that the sentencing court's finding is simply not plausible or permissible in light of the -31- entire record on appeal, remembering that we are not free to substitute our judgment for that of the district judge. Id. (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846 provide for a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years for any defendant convicted of a conspiracy to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine or at least 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a), relevant conduct for sentencing purposes is assessed on the basis of: (1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity ..., all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity .... U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1995). In the case of controlled substances, a defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 comment. (n.2) (emphasis added). The government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of drugs attributable to each defendant. Torres, 53 F.3d at 1144. -32- In the instant case, the trial court determined Mr. Morales was involved in the laundering of drug profits in the amount of $831,514.37. However, the court determined the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) was inapplicable to Mr. Morales because his conduct did not establish a quantity of narcotics reasonably foreseeable to him. Hence, the court sentenced Mr. Morales pursuant to his involvement in money-laundering. The government argues the trial court erred in two respects. First, the government contends the court erroneously applied the reasonably foreseeable standard to Mr. Morales, even though Mr. Morales personally laundered drug profits generated from selling quantities of cocaine well in excess of the five kilograms necessary to invoke the mandatory minimum sentence. (Emphasis omitted.) Second, the government claims the court erred in determining Mr. Morales' conduct did not establish at least five kilograms of cocaine were reasonably foreseeable to him. We address the government's contentions in turn. We interpret the United States' first argument to be that the trial court erred by failing to determine under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) that Mr. Morales was -33- directly involved with at least five kilograms of cocaine. 11 As stated, a defendant 'is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved.' United States v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1451, 1454 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.2)). Where the sentencing court determines a defendant was directly involved in the distribution of a quantity of drugs sufficient to invoke a mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to the defendant is irrelevant. Lockhart, 37 F.3d at 1454 (trial court did not err in failing to determine whether quantity of drugs was reasonably foreseeable to defendant where defendant personally participated in transaction involving more than five kilograms of cocaine). 11 To the extent the government contends Mr. Morales was directly involved in more than five kilograms of cocaine under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) simply by virtue of his involvement in money laundering (see Ape's brief at 46), we find this contention to be without merit. Comment. 2 to U.S.S.G § 1B1.3(a) provides that a defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) for quantities of [controlled substances] with which he was directly involved. Commentary to sentencing guidelines is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with the guideline which it seeks to explain or is a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline itself. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). Here, we find comment. 2 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) to be consistent with the statute it interprets. Based upon the plain language of this commentary, we do not believe a defendant's mere involvement in money laundering is sufficient to enable a district court to conclude the defendant was directly involved with a quantity of controlled substances. The government has failed to provide the court with any authority to the contrary. -34- In United States v. Chalarca, 95 F.3d 239, 240 (2d Cir. 1996), a jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine. Although the defendant was present with his co-defendant at the scene of an attempted drug transaction involving $70,000.00 and 12 kilograms of cocaine, the district court determined the defendant was not directly involved in the drug transaction. Chalarca, 95 F.3d at 240-41. Accordingly, the court found the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) was not applicable to the defendant. Id. at 242. On appeal, the Second Circuit determined the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Because the involvement of Chalarca was not direct, ... and because Chalarca was not aware that the purpose of his trip to the scene was to purchase cocaine, ... and because he did not constructively possess drugs or actually possess them ..., he cannot be sentenced under [21 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)] for criminal activity personally undertaken. Id. at 244. The court also determined the defendant's mere presence at the scene was insufficient to establish that any particular quantity of cocaine was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Id. at 245. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the defendant's sentence. Id. at 245-46. Here, unlike Chalarca, there is no evidence Mr. Morales was ever present -35- at the scene of any illicit drug transaction. The government's evidence at trial simply established Mr. Morales was involved in the Aguirre organization as a money launderer. The government does not even argue it presented any evidence tending to show Mr. Morales was personally involved in the sale or distribution of drugs. Consequently, the district court did not err in failing to determine Mr. Morales was directly involved in the distribution of at least five kilograms of cocaine. The government also claims the district court erred in determining no quantity of drugs was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Morales. The government contends the district court should have held Mr. Morales responsible for the amount of cocaine that generated the drug profits Mr. Morales laundered. In other words, the government asserts the court should have converted the total amount of money Mr. Morales laundered ($831,514.37) into its value in cocaine to determine the quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Morales. Although the record may have permitted the district court to have undertaken such a conversion, we do not believe the trial court was obligated to do so. Rather, we believe the record supports the court's finding that no quantity of drugs was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Morales. As stated, the record -36- indicates Mr. Morales was simply a money launderer. Unlike Chalarca, where the court also determined no quantity of drugs was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, there is no evidence Mr. Morales was present at the scene of any drug transaction. In fact, the government does not even allege Mr. Morales had any knowledge of the occurrence of a single drug transaction. In light of the Supreme Court's admonition that it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence, Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046 (internal quotation marks omitted), we conclude the district court's determination that no quantity of drugs was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Morales was not clearly erroneous. Because the district court did not err in determining Mr. Morales was not directly involved in the distribution of cocaine and no quantity of cocaine was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Morales, the district court's decision to sentence Mr. Morales pursuant to the money laundering guidelines was proper and in accordance with law.