Opinion ID: 1933187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motion to suppress evidence seized from automobile

Text: In the early morning of March 4, 1990, police interviewed several eyewitnesses to the shooting of Logan. On the basis of information obtained from these sources, the police quickly discovered that Martinez was the individual involved in the shooting. After Flores informed police that he knew where Martinez lived, Detective Stephen Springer accompanied Flores to Martinez's house in South Providence. Detective Springer testified that he and Flores drove to 88 Ontario Street, where Flores pointed out a multifamily dwelling. Flores also identified an automobile parked in back of the house as the one he had seen Martinez drive on previous occasions. The vehicle was a gray Ford Tempo bearing Rhode Island registration No. EZ 318. Several hours later the Providence police returned to the address with a warrant for Martinez's arrest, but Martinez was not at home. Later that morning Sergeant Raymond Owens was on patrol when he heard a radio broadcast instructing officers to be on the lookout for the gray Ford Tempo. Soon thereafter Sergeant Owens spotted the car at a Providence gas station. Owens testified that he saw a man and a woman walking away from the car toward the gas station. Sergeant Owens called for assistance and apprehended the individuals as they exited from the gas station. The two were identified as Martinez and his wife, Idalia Martinez (Idalia). Martinez was placed under arrest, and both he and his wife were transported to the Providence police station. The gray Ford Tempo, which was registered to Idalia, was towed to the police station. Detective William Carroll prepared an affidavit and obtained a warrant to search the vehicle. Additionally Idalia signed a consent form, permitting the police to search her automobile. Detective Carroll searched the car and found a loaded handgun under the front passenger seat. Forensic experts concluded that the bullets recovered from Logan's body had been fired from the gun seized in Idalia's car. Martinez filed a pretrial motion to suppress all the evidence seized from the search of his wife's automobile. The trial justice denied Martinez's motion, finding that Martinez did not have standing to challenge the search. Additionally, although recognizing that Idalia's consent was not essential for the execution of the search warrant, the trial justice implied that Idalia's voluntary consent to the search of her own automobile constituted independent justification for the search. On appeal Martinez contends that the trial justice erred in finding that Martinez did not have standing to challenge the search. Martinez claims that he presented sufficient evidence to warrant a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Martinez further argues that the police lacked probable cause to search the automobile because eyewitnesses had provided police with the description of an entirely different vehicle. Finally Martinez asserts that the search of the car cannot be upheld on the basis of Idalia's consent because (1) the trial justice never made a finding concerning the voluntariness of her consent and (2) Martinez presented competent evidence negating a finding of consent. After reviewing the trial record, we find that the trial justice was correct in denying Martinez's motion. Even if we assume, without deciding, that defendant had standing to challenge the search and that the police lacked probable cause, we find that the search was permissible on the basis of Idalia's consent. Although the trial justice stated that it was not necessary to make a ruling on Idalia's consent to the search, he did make a finding that there [was] no force and coercion with respect to her consent. Moreover, we need not rely on the ruling of the trial justice to justify our decision. It is well settled that this court may affirm a trial justice's ruling on grounds different from those upon which he or she relied. State v. Ellis, 619 A.2d 418, 426 (R.I. 1993). This court is mindful that the state bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that consent is given freely and voluntarily. State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1374 (R.I. 1984). Our review of the trial record leads us to conclude that the state satisfied this burden. Detective Carroll testified that he, along with Detective Springer, fully explained to Idalia that they wished to search her automobile. They informed her that any evidence found as a result of this search would be used against Martinez. She freely signed the consent form without any force, coercion, or promises by the police. Furthermore Idalia admitted that no one forced her to make a statement or to sign the consent forms. Although she testified that she signed the forms because she was frightened the police would detain her further, she conceded that the police informed her that nothing would happen to her so long as she told the truth. Idalia acknowledged that the police had treated her well while she was at the station. In light of the foregoing testimony we find that Idalia's consent to the search was given freely and voluntarily. Such consent provided independent justification for the search of her car. Accordingly we affirm the trial justice's denial of Martinez's motion to suppress.