Opinion ID: 1641998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness of Abandonment

Text: The defendant has raised other issues in this appeal based in whole or in part upon the contention that the trial court erred in construing the term abandonment as used in sec. 943.23 (2), Stats., as requiring a voluntary relinquishment of possession of the vehicle. [4] This court recently summarized the rules to be applied when we are called upon to construe the terms of a criminal statute in the following manner: We are cognizant that any penal statute must be construed strictly in favor of the defendant, E.g., State v. Schaller, 70 Wis. 2d 107, 110, 233 N.W.2d 416 (1975); State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis. 2d 609, 619, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966); State v. Wrobel, 24 Wis. 2d 270, 275, 128 N.W.2d 629 (1964). A statute must be construed, however, in light of its manifest object, the evil sought to be remedied. `Although we recognize the general rule relied upon by the defendants as stated in State v. Schaller, 70 Wis. 2d 107, 233 N.W.2d 416 (1975), that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused, it is equally true that this rule of construction does not mean that only the narrowest possible construction must be adopted in disregard of the purpose of the statute.' State v. Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d 68, 80, 267 N.W.2d 216 (1978). State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 239, 240, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982). Later in that same opinion we noted: In construing a statute, the entire section and related sections are to be considered in its construction or interpretation. State v. Phillips, 99 Wis. 2d 46, 50, 298 N.W. 2d 239 (Ct. Ap. 1980). Furthermore, a statute should be construed to give effect to its leading idea, and the and the entire statute should be brought into harmony with the statute's purpose. Pella Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hartland Richmond Town Insurance Co., 26 Wis. 2d 29, 41, 132 N.W.2d 225 (1965). Id. at 244. Sec. 943.23 (2), Stats., refers only to the penalty imposed for the crime of operating a vehicle without the owner's consent where the violator abandons a vehicle without damage within twenty-four hours of taking the vehicle. The Legislative Reference Bureau note cited earlier in this opinion clearly states that this lesser penalty was enacted by the legislature to allow prosecutors greater flexibility in charging the crime under circumstances which do not warrant a felony charge. [5] Circumstances warranting only a misdemeanor charge include the case where a person so frequently takes another's vehicle for a joyride not intending to permanently deprive the owner of possession and without reflecting on the serious nature of his acts. This application of the misdemeanor provision differs considerably from that which would result under the construction of the term abandons advocated by the defendant. Under the defendant's construction of the term abandons, any person operating a vehicle without the owner's consent who had the foresight to leave the vehicle when his apprehension and arrest appeared imminent would fall under the lesser misdemeanor penalty although he had no intention of relinquishing possession of the vehicle if not for his imminent apprehension. Such a result is clearly contrary to the intent of the statute. Certainly, if, after a chase and after being ordered to pull over to the side of the road, the driver steps out of the vehicle and hands the keys over to the law enforcement officer, it would be ludicrous for the defendant to argue that a party has abandoned a vehicle. Although the defendant in the case at bar had not been apprehended by the police at the time he left the truck along the roadside, there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish that the defendant knew that a squad car had passed the truck and had identified the truck and because of this knowledge, the defendant immediately departed from the vehicle, thereby, hopefully, avoiding apprehension. [2] Logically, fear of apprehension is always part of the motivation for abandoning a stolen vehicle, but that fear does not necessarliy make the abandonment involuntary. We conclude that the trial court did not err in its construction of the term abandons because that construction advances the statutory objective of providing lesser penalties for those who choose to terminate the unauthorized use of another's vehicle while imposing greater penalties upon those whose nonconsensual use of the vehicle would not have been terminated but for the fact of their imminent apprehension. Since we hold that the trial court did not err in construing the term abandons as requiring voluntary relinquishment of possession, we reject the defendant's contention that the trial court misstated the law in instructing the jury that the term abandonment requires that a person desert or relinquish voluntarily the possession. [6] While the trial court might have elaborated more fully on the meaning of the term voluntary, it is well-established that a trial court has wide discretion in issuing jury instructions. State v. Clausen, supra at 240. In this case we find no abuse of that discretion.