Opinion ID: 1619439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: necessity of taking

Text: [8] The question whether it is necessary to take particular property for public use has been held to be inherently a matter for the legislature. . . . `[T]he necessity, expediency, or propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain, and the extent and manner of its exercise, are questions of general policy, and belong to the legislative department of the government.' Winans, supra, 85 Wis. at 39. [7] The legislature of course may delegate the power of eminent domain, Winans, supra, 85 Wis. at 39, and usually does so. [9] In determining necessity neither the legislature nor its delegate is limited to takings that are absolutely or indispensably necessary. Necessary in this context has been construed to mean reasonably necessary, reasonably requisite and proper for the accomplishment of the public purpose for which the property is sought; necessary does not mean absolutely imperative. Klump v. Cybulski, 274 Wis. 604, 614, 81 N.W.2d 42 (1957); Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Racine, 200 Wis. 170, 175, 227 N.W. 859 (1929). [10] Notwithstanding its legislative character, the determination of necessity by the legislature or by its delegate is not completely immune from review. There is a limit beyond which the legislature (or its delegate) cannot go, and the issue of necessity is one that the court can review in an owner's action under sec. 32.06 (5), Stats. However, the scope of review is narrow. Our decisions establish that a court will not disturb a determination of necessity in the absence of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of discretion; the determination of the necessity of taking will be upheld if there is reasonable ground to support it. Mr. Chief Justice CURRIE, writing for the court in Banach v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis.2d 320, 327, 328, 143 N.W.2d 13 (1966), put the matter as follows: While determination of necessity of taking made by the body authorized by the legislature to make it is not beyond the pale of judicial review, such review operates within very narrow limits. In Swenson v. Milwaukee County [ supra this opinion] this court quoted with approval a statement from American Jurisprudence that courts normally will not disturb such a determination in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion. This court has held that the determination made of the necessity of taking is beyond question if there is any reasonable ground to support it. In Klump v. Cybulski, supra , the court said a legislative determination of necessity is beyond question by any court if there is reasonable ground to support it, and added: Where, as here, the application is for a right of way for an electric line, 'the petitioner shall determine the necessity.' Sec. 32.07 (2), Stats. . . . The right to locate the power line is given to the Power Company and the location cannot be challenged unless that right is arbitrarily or oppressively exercised. . . . A court will not interfere with the choice unless necessary to prevent an abuse of discretion by an attempted taking in utter disregard of necessity for it. . . . . . . Judicial interference . . . would at most be warranted only by a convincing showing that the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not made in good faith. 274 Wis. at 612. [8] In Herro v. Natural Resources Board, 53 Wis.2d 157, 170, 192 N.W.2d 104, 227 N.W.2d 456 (1971), this court stated its power of review as follows: `. . . The expediency of constructing a particular public improvement and the extent of the public necessity therefor are clearly not judicial questions; but it is obvious that, if property is taken in ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a use that is not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts.' 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, sec. 4.11. While the standard of review of the determination of necessity has been thus defined, its application within the owners' actions in this case presents certain conceptual difficulties resulting from the procedural provisions of ch. 32, Stats. Where the determination of necessity is assigned by sec. 32.07 to the condemning authority there is no problem; the condemnor will have made its determination of necessity before serving the jurisdictional offer, and such determination may be subject to judicial review in an action brought thereafter under sec. 32.06 (5). However, in other cases the determination of necessity is assigned by sec. 32.07 to the judge, and as we have pointed out, this determination need not have been made as of the time an owner's action is brought under sec. 32.06(5). The owner's action is clearly not intended to be a review of proceedings before the judge. Where necessity is to be determined by a judge, the circuit court in a sec. 32.06(5) action thus may be presented with something of a dilemma. It cannot determine necessity, for that is a legislative question which may not be resolved by judicial means absent statutory authority, and sec. 32.07 commits that question to the judge acting under sec. 32.06(7), not to the court under sec. 32.06(5). Nor can the court review the judge's determination of necessity, because that determination may not yet have been made; and even if it has, the proceedings under sec. 32.06(5) are not a review of the determination made by the judge. Thus it appears at first blush that the circuit court is armed with a standard of review but is without a determination to which the standard may be applied. This problem is inherent in the statutes. However, it is a problem more of form than substance. We do not find in ch. 32 an intent to inhibit the owner's right to judicial review of condemnations in cases where the determination of necessity is assigned to the judge under sec. 32.07, Stats. Nor do we believe that the legislature intended the scope of review available under sec. 32.06 (5) to differ in such cases from the standard applied where the condemnor determines necessity. Whether the formal determination of necessity is made by the condemnor or by the judge, the condemnor, as delegatee of the power of eminent domain, is under a duty to attempt the exercise of this power only under legally proper circumstances. In either case the condemnor is obligated to exercise its judgment such that condemnation is not initiated unless the property sought is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of a valid public purpose. As a practical matter, the condemnor's invoking the power of eminent domain constitutes an implicit decision that the taking is necessary for a public purpose, and this decision is reviewable in an owner's action under sec. 32.06(5), Stats. The question on such review is whether the condemnor has reasonable ground for the decision to seek condemnation, or whether that decision constituted fraud, bad faith or a gross abuse of discretion. We are of the opinion that this result best harmonizes the procedural framework established by statute with settled principles regarding the legislative and judicial functions in respect of the power of eminent domain. [9]
The owners here do not dispute that condemnation properly may be sought for public use in the reasonably foreseeable future [10] as well as for a use that is immediate. They claim, however, that the Power Company's future needs for electrical energy are insufficient to justify building the Tyrone facility and that the decision to condemn for construction of the facility is therefore so lacking in necessity as to be without reasonable basis and an abuse of discretion. Because of the substantial delay between the decision to build a power plant of the size here involved and the time at which it can be placed in service, power companies must necessarily base their decisions to build new facilities upon projections of demand running a number of years into the future. In this case Northern States Power introduced projections showing that by 1985 it will have a shortage in both generating capacity and energy production capability. [11] The testimony indicated that the latter deficiency is here the more serious, as a result of the fact that much of the Company's present generating capacity is in the form of peak load facilities. As explained at the trial, peak load units tend to have relatively high fuel costs and are designed to be operated primarily during periods of peak electrical demand, while base load facilities use low cost fuels and are generally operated on a twenty-four hour per day basis. Peak load units thus operate at lower sustained availabilities than base load units. The Power Company's evidence tended to show that by 1985, when the first Tyrone unit is scheduled for operation, there will be a substantial need for additional base load energy production capability. The Tyrone units are base load facilities intended by the company to meet this need. We are of the opinion that a reasonable ground exists for the Power Company's decision to construct additional base load capacity. It is true that the first Tyrone unit to come in service will more than make up for shortages predicted then to exist. However, utilities must possess considerable discretion in determining the size of units to be built. We do not think the amount of excess capacity that may result in 1985 from construction of the first Tyrone unit was shown to be of such magnitude as to be unreasonable. The completion date for the second unit to be constructed at the Tyrone site is now said by Northern States Power to be indefinite. [12] The owners rely heavily upon this as indicating the lack of any reasonable need to condemn their lands. We think that it was not improper for the Power Company to condemn on the basis of a twounit complex notwithstanding indefinite timing as to the second unit. This is so because the evidence tended to show that the amount of land required for a twounit facility is not substantially greater than that needed for a single unit. The evidence indicated that a principal determinant of the land area needed is the size of the exclusion area. At this point it suffices to say that the exclusion area is a kind of buffer zone that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires be maintained around a nuclear reactor. The area is described by a radius about the reactor calculated in accordance with guidelines promulgated by the NRC. [13] According to undisputed testimony at the trial, where two independent reactors are involved, as here, the exclusion area for the two is found by determining it for each reactor on an independent basis, which results in a circle centered on each reactor, and then laying in common tangents to flatten the sides. In the case at bar, the exclusion area for each reactor was calculated to be a circle with radius of .913 mile, and the two reactors are to be located 440 feet apart. The exclusion area for the two reactors, then, is the area that would be produced by splitting a circle 1.826 miles in diameter in half, moving the semicircles apart 440 feet, and filling in the thin rectangle between them. Thus, the undisputed evidence establishes that the additional land area called for by the planned second unit is small in comparison to the total area needed and that locating the units together will result in a large saving of land over what would ultimately be required if the Power Company limited the Tyrone facility to a single reactor and located a second unit elsewhere at a later date. It is only the need for the second reactor that is indefinite at this time. We think that the Power Company's conduct in planning and condemning on the basis of a two-reactor facility cannot be said to be a gross abuse of discretion. The owners' objections based upon an asserted lack of necessity for the Tyrone Energy Park as a whole cannot be sustained.
Assuming that the Power Company has a right to condemn for the proposed facility, the owners claim that there is nevertheless no need for taking any interest in their land outside the exclusion area and that an easement is all that may be condemned as to lands within. In Czarnik v. Sampson Enterprises, Inc., 46 Wis.2d 541, 175 N.W.2d 487 (1970), it was said: [T]he general rule is that only such an estate in the property sought to be acquired may be taken as is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the proceeding is brought. In Klump v. Cybulski, supra, 274 Wis. at 613, the court said: . . . the company could take the fee title if it needed it. No reason is apparent why it could not take any interest less than that, as to which there is reasonable basis for a determination of necessity. The matter was put as follows at 26 Am. Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, sec. 133: In the absence of any definition of the estate which the grantee of the power is authorized to acquire or any limitations in the granting statute, no more property can be taken than the public use requires; this rule applies both to the amount of property and the estate or interest in such property to be acquired by the public. [14] It is admitted that under current plans no building, transmission line or other physical structure would be located on the Bauer and Falkner lands. A small corner of the Falkner property and a much larger part of the Bauer property fall within the exclusion area. The owners do not dispute here that the Company may condemn some interest in this property, but they claim an easement is enough. The Company contends, and the trial court found, that the Company needed complete control over the exclusion area, and that a fee interest was therefore appropriate. Exclusion area is defined by NRC regulation at 10 CFR, sec. 100.3 (a): `Exclusion area' means that area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. This area may be traversed by a highway, railroad, or waterway, provided these are not so close to the facility as to interfere with normal operations of the facility and provided appropriate and effective arrangements are made to control traffic on the highway, railroad, or waterway, in case of emergency, to protect the public health and safety. Residence within the exclusion area shall normally be prohibited. In any event, residents shall be subject to ready removal in case of necessity. Activities unrelated to operation of the reactor may be permitted in an exclusion area under appropriate limitations, provided that no significant hazards to the public health and safety will result. Neither the Bauers nor the Falkners reside within the exclusion area. Bauer testified that such part of his land as is within the exclusion area is used for growing hay and corn. Francis Falkner, a son of the Falkners who own the other land in question, testified that the part of it within the exclusion area is woods, used for no purpose other than gathering timber and so on. The trial court's basis for concluding that a fee interest rather than an easement was necessary within the exclusion area was some ambiguous testimony by Mr. Bauer to the effect that he would not voluntarily allow the Power Company to determine all activities within the area. The implication is that had Mr. Bauer evinced a more cooperative attitude on the witness stand a different result might have followed. We are of the opinion that the trial court rested its decision on an inadequate basis. The quantum of estate taken by the condemnor should not turn on the stated willingness of one owner to accede to the condemnor's unspecified future demands. Mr. Bauer was not the only owner of the property, and in any case, a mere statement by the owners that they would evacuate on demand is no guarantee that they would do so in fact. Nor could such a statement be expected to have any effect upon other persons who might be on the property at any given time with or without the owner's consent. Furthermore, if the owners' stated intent were controlling, every time the fee interest changed hands the utility would have to examine the new owners to learn their intentions and institute new proceedings to take the fee if their answers proved unfavorable. Nevertheless, we think the trial court's conclusion that an easement is insufficient should be sustained, but on a different basis. In the unlikely event that a serious nuclear accident occurred, the danger nearby might be extreme. Assuming that all persons on the land would comply with an order to evacuate, there still remains the problem of transmitting the order to them, and the question whether they could then leave quickly enough to avoid the danger which prompted issuance of the order. We think that the degree of control over the exclusion area contemplated by the regulation is such to make a fee interest therein appropriate. As evidence that an easement is sufficient the owners point out that 10 CFR sec. 100.3 (a) allows a fair amount of activity to go on within an exclusion area. However, these provisions follow the general requirement that the reactor licensee have the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. We have not found any administrative or judicial interpretation of this regulation. We think that under a reasonable construction of the rule, those of its provisions which permit certain activities in an exclusion area are not intended to detract from the utility's need for authority to determine all activities therein; the permitted activities are enumerated to identify what the utility may allow to be done within the area in the exercise of its authority. It is arguable that an easement literally complying with the requirement that the Power Company be given the authority to determine all activities in the exclusion area would leave so little right in the owners as to approach a fee title in the company. We conclude that as to the lands within the exclusion area the Power Company has a large measure of discretion in determining the area and estate of land it needs, and if it chose to fulfill the requirements of the federal regulation by acquiring the entire exclusion area in fee we cannot say that this discretion has been abused. As to lands outside the exclusion area, the only justification the Power Company offers is the detrimental effect thereon of operation of its cooling towers. The Company asserts that noise from the cooling tower fans and moisture released from the towers may result in complaints, and in claims that this was in effect a total taking of the property. Avoidance of such complaints and claims is offered as a reasonable basis for the taking. Francis J. Kripps. Northern States' Vice President of Power Supply, testified as to the adverse effects of cooling towers. He stated that the noise they produce would be a disturbance to people living or working nearby. The noise is from a large motor-driven fan in each cell of the towers, which pulls air through the cell and ejects it from the top. He testified that he has heard the noise from the towers at the Prairie Island (Minnesota) plant, that the noise drops off in intensity as one gets away from the tower, and that on a quiet night it would be a matter of two miles before one could not hear the noise at all. Kripps said the towers planned for the Tyrone facility could be compared to those at Prairie Island, but that you must necessarily make allowances for the difference in size of the towers. The Tyrone towers are to be approximately twice as large as those at Prairie Island. Kripps also testified as to the effect of moisture evaporating from the towers. About 650,000 gallons of water would evaporate per hour with one unit operating at full rated output. Kripps said that this moisture in some cases comes back down in the form of excess moisture other than would normally be in the atmosphere. During some conditions, this moisture actually freezes onto trees or structures or plants. He described a further effect: [T]hese droplets of moisture carry with them solids or salts and they deposit on the trees or buildings or plants on which the droplets fall. As to the range of the moisture effects, Kripps testified that at the Prairie Island plant he observed a vapor plume that arises from the towers and, under certain wind conditions, is carried back to the ground in the direction the wind is blowing. He testified that the plume does not extend to the same distance as the noise is audible. In his observations of the Prairie Island facility the plume disappeared within about a half mile of the tower, but approximately twice as much water will evaporate from the towers at the Tyrone plant. Kripps was then permitted to testify as to his opinion of the effects upon the Bauer and Falkner properties of the noise and moisture. Kripps' opinion was based upon his personal knowledge of the lands in question and the planned facility and his close observation of four other plants employing cooling towers, over the period since 1949. Kripps stated his opinion as follows: The effects will be an excessive amount of moisture on the property, on the trees, crops, buildings, under conditions of cold weather this will appear as ice formations. There will also be a certain amount of solids or salts deposited as this moisture is carried onto these properties, and there will be in my opinion an excessive amount of noise on particularly the Bauer property. [11] Although Kripps' testimony may be subject to challengeespecially as to the more remote sections of both the propertiesthe owners did not produce any contradictory evidence, and nothing in the record would render Kripps' testimony incredible as a matter of law. The probability of serious adverse effects upon the owners' property was sufficiently established to provide reasonable ground for the taking. The owners' contentions attacking necessity for condemnation of their lands cannot be sustained.