Opinion ID: 2546502
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appeal from Denial of Motion to Reinstate Felony Complaint

Text: As noted above, subdivision (a)(9) of section 1238 permits a People's appeal from [a]n order denying the motion of the people to reinstate the complaint or a portion thereof pursuant to Section 871.5. People v. Hanley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 340, 342, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 643, however, held that if the superior court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a section 871.5 motion, the Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that ruling because our jurisdiction derives from the superior court in these instances. We disagree. As this court recognized in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 460, 464, 171 P.2d 8: A court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, for a basic issue in any case before a tribunal is its power to act, and it must have authority to decide that question in the first instance. Because the superior court has jurisdiction to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction, it follows that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to review the superior court's determination. Accordingly, we disapprove the contrary statement in People v. Hanley, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 340, 342, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 643, and conclude that the People may appeal the superior court's denial of its motion to reinstate the felony complaint pursuant to section 871.5. Although the Court of Appeal erred in dismissing the People's appeal from the denial of its motion to reinstate the felony complaint, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the appeal lacks merit because the People may not seek review of a magistrate's determination under section 17, subdivision (b)(5) (hereafter section 17(b)(5)) that a wobbler offense is a misdemeanor, by bringing a motion to reinstate the felony complaint under section 871.5. Section 871.5 was enacted in response to our decision in People v. Peters (1978) 21 Cal.3d 749, 147 Cal.Rptr. 646, 581 P.2d 651, in which we held that a magistrate lacked the authority to dismiss a prosecution in furtherance of justice under former section 1385 and, therefore, a magistrate's order discharging a defendant following a preliminary examination, or a magistrate's purported dismissal of the prosecution, did not trigger the protection of section 1387, which bars further prosecution if an action has been twice dismissed. [6] In a footnote, this court wonder[ed] why the Legislature thought it desirable to restrict section 1387's bar to dismissals that are granted pursuant to section 1385. ( People v. Peters, supra, 21 Cal.3d 749, 751, fn. 1, 147 Cal.Rptr. 646, 581 P.2d 651.) The Legislature responded in 1980 by changing several statutes, including amending section 1385 to permit a judge or magistrate to dismiss an action in the furtherance of justice, amending section 859b [7] to require a magistrate to dismiss a felony complaint if a defendant who is in custody is not arraigned within 10 days, amending section 861 [8] to require a magistrate to dismiss a felony complaint if the preliminary examination is not completed in one session, and amending section 871 [9] to empower a magistrate to dismiss a felony complaint following a preliminary examination if the evidence is insufficient to hold the defendant to answer. (Stats.1980, ch. 938, §§ 1-3, 7, pp. 2965-2966, 2968.) In addition, the Legislature added section 871.5, which permitted the prosecution to bring a motion in superior court to reinstate the complaint if it was dismissed by the magistrate pursuant to this new statutory authority. As originally enacted, section 871.5 specifically referenced each of the statutes discussed above, stating, in pertinent part: If an action, or a portion thereof, is dismissed by a magistrate pursuant to Sections 859b, 861, 871 or 1385, the prosecutor may make a motion ... in the superior court within 10 days after the dismissal to compel the magistrate to reinstate the complaint or a portion thereof ... on the ground that, as a matter of law, the magistrate erroneously dismissed the action or a portion thereof. (Stats.1980, ch. 938, § 4, p. 2966.) Courts have resisted prosecutors' efforts to expand the reach of section 871.5 beyond its terms. In People v. Hanley, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 340, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 643, the defendant was charged by felony complaint with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood-alcohol content of .08 percent or more in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b), having suffered three prior convictions within the previous seven years. Former Vehicle Code section 23175 (Stats.1991, ch. 1091, § 160, p. 5171; now Veh.Code, § 23550), provided that a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152 with three prior convictions could be prosecuted as either a felony or a misdemeanor. Upon the defendant's motion, however, the magistrate struck one of the alleged prior convictions. A violation of Vehicle Code section 23152 with two prior convictions within the previous seven years is not a wobbler offense, but is a straight misdemeanor. (Former Veh.Code, § 23170, Stats.1988, ch. 1415, § 9, p. 4805; now Veh.Code, § 23546.) Having struck one of the alleged prior convictions, the magistrate in Hanley determined that the charged offenses were misdemeanors as a matter of law and transferred the cause to municipal court. The People moved to reinstate the felony complaint under section 871.5, the superior court denied the motion, and the People appealed. The Court of Appeal in Hanley held that the People could not seek review of the magistrate's ruling pursuant to section 871.5 because the magistrate did not act pursuant to any of the statutes specified in section 871.5. The court rejected the People's argument that the magistrate actually dismissed the felony prosecution pursuant to section 1385, which is listed in section 871.5. The court noted that Vehicle Code section 41403 permits a defendant to challenge the constitutional validity of a conviction under specified Vehicle Code sections, including section 23152, which was entered in a separate proceeding. [Citation.] ( People v. Hanley, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 340, 343, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 643.) Relying upon the fact that there was specific statutory authorization for the superior court's action striking the prior conviction allegation, the Court of Appeal concluded: We have no doubt that this was a motion pursuant to Vehicle Code section 41403, and that the magistrate, following the procedures set forth therein, dismissed the Stanislaus County conviction pursuant to that statute. ( Id. at p. 344, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 643.) The court in Hanley was not persuaded by the People's reliance upon the decision in Vlick v. Superior Court (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 992, 180 Cal.Rptr. 742. In Vlick, the prosecutor announced on the day set for the preliminary examination that he could not proceed because another magistrate had granted a motion to suppress all of the People's evidence. The case was dismissed pursuant to section 871. The People filed a motion pursuant to section 871.5 to review the rulings suppressing the evidence and dismissing the complaint. The superior court granted the People's section 871.5 motion and reinstated the complaint, ruling that the People's evidence should not be suppressed. Following a preliminary examination at which the defendant was held to answer, the defendant filed a section 995 motion arguing that, in ruling on the section 871.5 motion, the superior court did not have jurisdiction to review the order suppressing evidence, because section 1538.5 provides the exclusive and comprehensive remedy. The Court of Appeal in Vlick concluded, in language that is broader than was necessary to decide the issue before the court, that section 871.5 was intended by the Legislature to be used by the People for a superior court review of an erroneous dismissal by a magistrate arising out of the magistrate's ruling as a matter of law on any motion. ( Vlick v. Superior Court, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d 992, 998, 180 Cal. Rptr. 742.) Upon review of a dismissal pursuant to section 871, which is one of the dismissal statutes listed in section 871.5, the People could argue that the dismissal was the result of a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence that was erroneous as a matter of law. The court in Hanley correctly recognized that the decision in Vlick did not hold that section 871.5 may be expanded to permit review of orders not specified in section 871.5:  Vlick is not authority for extending section 871.5 to orders striking a prior conviction under Vehicle Code section 41403. In Vlick, ... the statutory authority to dismiss was section 871, one of the provisions enumerated in section 871.5. Vlick's broad language referring to dismissals arising out of a magistrate's decision on any motion properly before him or her goes not to the subdivision (a) enumeration of certain dismissal statutes, but to subdivision (b) which mandates that the motion to reinstate must be on grounds that the magistrate erroneously dismissed the action `as a matter of law.' ( People v. Hanley, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 340, 344, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 643.) We agree. The court in Vlick did not consider whether the People could obtain review of an order of a type that is not enumerated in section 871.5 and, of course, an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. ( Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2, 39 Cal.Rptr. 377, 393 P.2d 689.) The decision in Hanley rejected the People's contention that the Legislature intended section 871.5 to serve as a vehicle for reviewing all dismissals by magistrates, noting that the Legislature's careful enumeration of the types of dismissals that fall within the ambit of section 871.5 mandates the opposite conclusion: In our view the plain language of 871.5 evidences an intent to permit superior court review of dismissal orders by magistrates when a complaint has been dismissed pursuant to specifically enumerated statutory authority, i.e., sections 859b, 861, 871, 1008, 1381, 1381.5, 1385, 1387 or 1389. Vehicle Code section 41403 does not appear in this listing. Why should we add it? ( People v. Hanley, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 340, 345, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 643.) The Court of Appeal in Hanley ended its opinion by stating: We therefore defer to the Legislature to determine whether, in the future, a magistrate's order striking a prior under Vehicle Code section 41403 should be included within the scope of section 871.5. ( People v. Hanley, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 340, 347, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 643.) The Legislature did not take long to respond. In 1993, the Legislature amended section 871.5 to add Vehicle Code section 41403 to the list of dismissal orders that could be reviewed pursuant to section 871.5. (Stats.1993, ch. 542, § 1, p. 2743.) We reach the same conclusion in the present case as the Court of Appeal did in Hanley. The list of dismissal orders that may be reviewed pursuant to section 871.5 does not include an order under section 17(b)(5) that a wobbler offense that was charged as a felony is a misdemeanor, and we decline to add it. The People argue that the order in the present case is subject to review under section 871.5 because [a] magistrate's reduction of felony charges to misdemeanors constitutes a dismissal of the felony charges under Penal Code section 871, and section 871, as noted above, is one of the dismissal statutes enumerated in section 871.5. In support of this argument, the People rely upon the decision in People v. Superior Court (Feinstein) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503. Unlike the present case, Feinstein did not involve an order under section 17(b)(5) that a wobbler offense that was charged as a felony was a misdemeanor. In Feinstein, the People charged the defendant with two straight felony offenses: section 243.4, subdivision (a), sexual battery by restraint, and sections 236 and 237, false imprisonment by violence, menace, fraud or deceit. The magistrate concluded that the physical restraint requisite for the felonies was not established. The magistrate reduced the felony charge of sexual battery under section 243.4, subdivision (a) to misdemeanor battery under section 242 and purported to strike the portion of the second count of felony false imprisonment charging that the false imprisonment was by violence, menace, fraud or deceit, leaving that charge as a simple violation of section 236, misdemeanor false imprisonment. The magistrate ordered the charges tried in the municipal court. ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein), supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 327, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 503.) The district attorney moved in superior court pursuant to section 871.5 to reinstate the felony charges, but the superior court denied the motion, concluding that it was without jurisdiction to consider the motion because the magistrate had reduced the felony charges to misdemeanors pursuant to section 17(b)(5), which is not among the type of orders that may be reviewed under section 871.5. The Court of Appeal granted the People's petition for a writ of mandate, correctly directing the superior court to consider the section 871.5 motion, because the magistrate lacked authority under section 17(b)(5) to reduce to misdemeanors charges that were straight felonies rather than wobblers. Thus, the Court of Appeal reasoned, the magistrate's order was effectively a dismissal pursuant to section 871, which was reviewable under section 871.5. ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein), supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 331-334, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 503.) The Court of Appeal in Feinstein identified the significant issue as the ultimate effect of the order under review. Where the order precludes the prosecutor from proceeding to trial on the felony offenses originally charged, it must be construed as a dismissal within the meaning of section 871.... [T]he effect of the magistrate's order as to both counts of the complaint was to preclude the prosecution of defendant on felony charges because the evidence of the felonies was insufficient. We are satisfied that this order constitutes a dismissal within the meaning of section 871. ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein), supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 332, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503.) While the above quoted language in Feinstein is quite broad, it must be considered in light of the Court of Appeal's earlier conclusion that the magistrate's order was not authorized by section 17(b)(5). Feinstein, therefore, cannot be read, as the People argue, to hold that any order by a magistrate that has the effect of precluding the People from prosecuting a defendant on felony charges constitutes a dismissal within the meaning of section 871 and may be reviewed under section 871.5. Rather, Feinstein stands only for the rule that a magistrate's order purporting to reduce a straight felony charge to a misdemeanor is not authorized by section 17(b)(5) and, thus, constitutes a dismissal of the felony charge within the meaning of section 871. Feinstein did not involve a magistrate's order declaring a wobbler offense charged as a felony to be a misdemeanor under section 17(b)(5), and did not hold that such an order constitutes a dismissal within the meaning of section 871. This reading of the opinion in Feinstein is bolstered by an examination of Feinstein's treatment of the decision in Hanley, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 340, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 643. The court in Feinstein concluded Hanley was distinguishable because the magistrate in Hanley had acted pursuant to Vehicle Code section 41403, while in Feinstein the only statute that lies to effect a dismissal was section 871 which is, of course, one of the statutes listed in section 871.5. ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein), supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 334, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503.) The magistrate in the present case acted pursuant to a statute not enumerated in section 871.5, section 17(b)(5), thereby distinguishing the present case from Feinstein. Therefore, the superior court's denial of the People's motion to reinstate the felony complaint was appealable, but the appeal lacks merit because the magistrate's determination under section 17(b)(5) that the wobbler offenses charged as felonies were misdemeanors was not subject to review under section 871.5. We turn to the appeal from the order determining the charged offenses to be misdemeanors.