Opinion ID: 2455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: An Overview of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Text: In this case, there are several intersecting issues. The first question is whether defendants Brunnock, Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor may assert judicial or quasi-judicial immunity as a defense. The second question, assuming immunity applies, pertains to the scope of that immunity. Finally, as to each of the defendants and claims pled in this case, there is the question of whether federal or state law on immunity governs. The defendants' briefsand, to be sure, some of the cases in this areaeither blur, or do not recognize, these distinctions. Gross is asserting federal and state law claims against state officials. The doctrine of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity is, in the main, a creation of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to federal claims and thus a federal law doctrine. The cases support employing the federal defense of quasi-judicial immunity as against federal claims. However, Gross had also pled state law claims against state defendants. Connecticut has adopted tests for judicial and quasi-judicial immunity that are nearly identical to the federal law tests. However, the state law doctrine is conceptually distinct from the federal law doctrine. With regard to the state law claims, we recognize the uncertainty regarding the state law doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity and certify questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court as to the availability of immunity. Normally, we would apply federal law to the federal claims and simply decide them. However, in this case, the federal test involves applying the so-called Cleavinger factors. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985). These factorswhich inquire into the nature of the actor in the judicial system, the existence of safeguards, the role of precedent, and so on implicate unsettled questions of state law. Therefore, we ask the Connecticut Supreme Court for its guidance as to those factors. After the court responds, we will make the ultimate determination, as a matter of federal law, of whether immunity applies.
Defendant Brunnock asserts the defense of judicial immunity, while defendants Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor assert the defense of quasi-judicial immunity. The first, threshold question is whether these defendants may assert these defenses at all. The cases indicate that the federal common law on judicial immunities applies even to state officials when they are sued in federal court on federal claims. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (§ 1983 action against local police officers and judges); Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 997, 118 S.Ct. 562, 139 L.Ed.2d 402 (1997) (§ 1983 action against New York town justice). We apply this federal test even when the substantive inquiry involves state law. See Tucker, 118 F.3d at 932 (noting that whether the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction turned on New York law regarding the scope of the judge's jurisdiction); Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 76 (2d Cir.2005) (noting, in a § 1983 action against state judges, that courts look to state law to determine whether [the judges] acted within their jurisdiction and ... as to whether they acted ... in their judicial capacities, and then applying the federal law test for judicial immunity). As we describe below, we may apply settled federal law to dispose of the question of judicial immunity as to Brunnock with regard to federal claims. In this case, federal jurisdiction over the state-law claims against Brunnock were based on diversity jurisdiction. Diversity of citizenship cases, though brought pursuant to federal subject matter jurisdiction, are decided on the basis of state substantive law. Krauss v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 643 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1981). Therefore, as to those claims, we look to Connecticut law to determine if judges enjoy immunity and, if so, under what circumstances. Connecticut has a doctrine of judicial immunity, which is, in all respects relevant here, identical to the federal test. See Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 170, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 828 A.2d 549 (2003); Leseberg v. O'Grady, 115 Conn.App. 18, 22, 971 A.2d 86 (2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991)). Therefore, because Connecticut law is clear as to judicial immunity, we may decide that question as well. As to the remaining defendants, the issue is closer. Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor are asserting not judicial immunity, but quasi-judicial immunity. In this context, the U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a functional test that is binding on this court on matters of federal law. See Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201-02, 106 S.Ct. 496 (explaining that quasi-judicial immunity is determined by a functional approach, in light of several enumerated factors); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (describing the functional approach). We clarify now that the federal law on quasi-judicial immunity applies to state officials sued in federal court on federal claims. Courts have so held in the context of judicial immunity. Cf. Pierson, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288; Tucker, 118 F.3d 930. Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity are both absolute immunities. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (noting that both are absolute immunities); but see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that, historically, quasi-judicial immunity was more akin to what we now call `qualified,' rather than absolute, immunity). We discern no reason to treat them differently with regard to choice of law questions. Thus, federal law on quasi-judicial immunity, and specifically, the functional approach specified in Cleavinger, applies to Gross's federal claims against Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor. However, again because our jurisdiction over state claims is grounded in diversity of citizenship, state substantive law applies to Gross's state-law claims against Donovan and Newman. [6] See, e.g., Bonime v. Avaya, Inc., 547 F.3d 497, 501 n. 4 (2d Cir.2008). Once again, we look to Connecticut law to determine if conservators and court-appointed attorneys for conservatees are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity, and, if so, under what circumstances. Connecticut law, like federal law, employs a functional approach to quasi-judicial immunity. See Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533, 542-43, 877 A.2d 773 (2005) (employing a test derived from Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894). Carrubba involved state claims (emotional distress and malpractice) against a court-appointed counsel for a minor child. Id. at 536, 877 A.2d 773. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that Butz involved claims brought under federal law pursuant to § 1983. See id. at 542. However, the Carrubba court did not suggest that the test should be any different when state law claims were at issue, as they were in that case. See id. (stating that it was adopting the Supreme Court's test for quasi-judicial immunity to determine whether attorneys appointed as counsel for minor children should be accorded absolute immunity under [Connecticut] state common law). Thus, in the normal course, to determine whether quasi-judicial immunity extends to Donovan and Newman, we would simply apply Cleavinger to test the validity of the quasi-judicial immunity defense to the federal law claims and the similar Carrubba functional analysis in connection with the state law claims. However, in this particular case and on these facts, both analyses intersect unsettled questions of state law. First, as to the quasi-judicial immunity defense regarding state law claims: no Connecticut case squarely addresses whether conservators and court-appointed attorneys for conservatees may enjoy quasi-judicial immunity. The most analogous case pertains only to attorneys appointed as counsel for minor children, see Carrubba, 274 Conn. 533, 877 A.2d 773, and it is not sufficiently similar to this case for us to determine with confidence what state law on this point is. Therefore, we certify questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court so that it may decide whether conservators and court-appointed attorneys for conservatees may assert quasi-judicial immunity as to state claims, and the scope of any such immunity, as a matter of state law. The state court's pronouncement as to those questions will be final. As to the quasi-judicial immunity defense to the federal law claims, Cleavinger instructs courts to analyze various factors, described infra, in determining whether quasi-judicial immunity applies. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201-02, 106 S.Ct. 496. In this case, these factors intersect with the nature and function of the Connecticut probate court system. Although we could analyze those factors and simply decide the immunity question as a matter of federal law, we deem it the more prudent course to allow the Connecticut Supreme Court to speak to the issue first. In deciding the federal immunity question, we would apply the Cleavinger factors, which we detail infra. We respectfully request that the Connecticut Supreme Court discuss these factors in light of the role played by conservators, attorneys, and nursing homes. We will decide, after receiving the Connecticut Supreme Court's guidance, the federal law immunity questions. In so doing, we do not intend to suggest that judicial immunity always turns on state law. Indeed, the common law doctrine predates even our government. See Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized judicial immunity for over one hundred years, see Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871), as have federal courts around the country, see, e.g., Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1989), including our own, see Tucker, 118 F.3d 930, when addressing federal civil rights claims. Nevertheless, application of Cleavinger in this case directly implicates the role and function of conservators, attorneys, and nursing homes in the Connecticut probate court system and Connecticut public policy, matters that the Connecticut Supreme Court is better equipped to speak to. If, based on the Connecticut Supreme Court's guidance as to the Cleavinger factors, we conclude that the quasi-judicial immunity defense is not available to Donovan, Newman, or Grove Manor, as a matter of federal law, then we need not decide the precise outer bounds of immunity. However, if we ultimately conclude that the immunity defense is available to any of the defendants under federal law, we will have to determine the circumstances under which immunity is defeated. Even judicial immunity, which provides judges with very broad protection, may be overcome if the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or if he is not acting in his judicial capacity. See, e.g., Tucker, 118 F.3d at 933 (citing cases). It may be the case that quasi-judicial immunity may similarly be overcome: for example, if the plaintiff alleges that the actions a defendant took were discretionary (as opposed to in strict compliance with court orders), undertaken in bad faith, intentional torts, etc. No case in our Circuit spells out the circumstances under which quasi-judicial immunity may be surmounted. If such immunity exists in this case, we will undertake to decide this second-order question. If it does not, then Gross's lawsuit may proceed in the normal course. The nature of this second step can be illustrated with an example from Donovan's brief. Donovan argues that the actions she tookselling Gross's property, maintaining a bank account with him, changing the locks on his house, etc. were proper and within the scope of the duties that a conservator typically carries out. However, these arguments do not go to whether a conservator has immunity (step one). They go to whether Gross's complaint, assuming there is immunity, alleges sufficient facts to overcome it. It may, or it may not (we do not decide that question now), but it is a distinct question from whether quasi-judicial immunity even extends to these kinds of defendants. Of course, it should go without saying that Donovan (or any defendant) cannot, at this stage, argue that certain actions (such as placing Gross in the locked ward of the nursing home, restricting his access to his children, and forcibly returning him to Grove Manor from a New York hospital) were for his own protection. At this stage, we must construe all facts in the light most favorable to Gross. A defendant may not bootstrap an argument that she should not be liable on the merits into an argument that she is protected by absolute immunity. We cannot resolve factual disputes in the defendants' favor at this stage to conclude that they are absolutely immune from suit. [7] With this background in mind, we analyze the judicial and quasi-judicial immunity questions as to Brunnock, Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor.