Opinion ID: 1777929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: respondents' contentions

Text: The respondents, in an excellent brief supporting the order of transfer, make these points: After the Court in Jefferson County transferred the suit to Tuscaloosa County, the suit remained pending in Tuscaloosa County for approximately five months. During this time, [the defendants in the instant action] never filed any pleading, engaged in any discovery, or took any action whatsoever in the suit. The record reveals that the only action that occurred in Tuscaloosa County was the Court's dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution.       In this case, every action except termination occurred in Jefferson County. Only the ministerial act of dismissal connects the case with Tuscaloosa County, and although termination was essential to the tort, the acts of malice from which the tort arises occurred in Jefferson County. Consequently, the tort occurred in Jefferson County, and venue is proper there.       Finally, Shuttlesworth contends that Rule 82(d) [ARCP], which requires that a transferred action be treated as if originally filed in the new county, means that [the original] actions in Jefferson County can be construed to have occurred in Tuscaloosa County. The rule, however, is clearly a procedural one to guide courts in the administration of transferred cases. The rule could not possibly affect the substantive question of where the act of malicious prosecution took place.