Opinion ID: 1837614
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due ProcessVagueness and Overbreadth

Text: Dalton claims Iowa's vehicular homicide statute offends due process, because it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, both as applied and facially. See U.S. Const. amend XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9 (due process guarantees in federal and state constitutions). As a consequence, he asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on these grounds. Because we find Dalton's underlying constitutional claims lack merit, we conclude his trial attorney did not fail to perform an essential duty and reject his ineffectiveassistance claim. See Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 811. In support of his claim Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)( a ) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, Dalton points out the statute contains words (unintentionally versus willful and wanton) which seem to give conflicting accounts of the statute's mens rea requirement. See Iowa Code § 707.6A(2)( a ). A person commits a class C felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by ...
Id. (emphasis added). Dalton further contends the statute reaches a substantial amount of protected conduct because it infringes upon Dalton's fundamental right to travel in a vehicle. In assessing the merits of the arguments underlying Dalton's ineffective-assistance claim, two important legal principles must be reiterated. First, it should be noted Dalton has the burden to negate every reasonable basis to sustain the statute. State v. McNeal, 167 N.W.2d 674, 677 (Iowa 1969). Courts must give ... any reasonable construction necessary to uphold it. State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Iowa 1996). Second, [a] defendant charged with the violation of a statute has standing to claim the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him or her. A defendant does not necessarily have standing to claim, in addition, that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to others. Id. at 463 (citations omitted). [A] facial challenge is permitted if a statute reaches `a substantial amount' of protected conduct. Id. at 464. We first consider Dalton's void-for-vagueness-as-applied claim. Although we are ... considering only [the defendant's] vague-as-applied claim, we must still examine the statute on its face. In doing so we consider whether [the defendant's] conduct clearly falls within the proscription of the statute under any construction. The fact the statute may be vague as applied to other factual scenarios is irrelevant to this analysis. Id. at 465 (citations omitted). As applied, the statute is not vague. We have previously stated the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. at 463 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983)). In Knight v. Iowa District Court, we stated: If the statute's, meaning is fairly ascertainable by reliance on generally accepted and common meaning of words used, or by reference to the dictionary, related or similar statutes, the common law or previous judicial constructions, due process is satisfied. 269 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1978). In several cases, we have made clear the mens rea requirement of Iowa's vehicular homicide statute is recklessness. See, e.g., Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 110-12 (citing, in part, Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 681) (clarifying recent cases to show the reckless driving alternative of Iowa's vehicular homicide law requires more than ordinary negligence; the State must prove the defendant engaged in conduct `fraught with a high degree of danger,' conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it). Indeed, in State v. Kolbet we upheld the statute against a due process challenge, in which the defendant contended the statute was vague because, he alleged, it failed to state a mens rea requirement. 638 N.W.2d 653, 662 (Iowa 2001). In rejecting Kolbet's argument, we held the [statute's] requirement of a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others establishes a mens rea element that is essential to a finding of guilt. Id. In the context of our cases, then, it is clear unintentional does not connote strict liability, but rather simply an accidental death, in the sense that it was not the defendant's aim or purpose; a finding that the defendant did not, in this sense, intend a death does not conflict with a mens rea requirement of recklessness. This conclusion is also supported by similar statutes and reference to the dictionary. Ex Parte Edwards, 816 So.2d 98, 107 (Ala.2001) (because there are few strict liability offenses, unintentional in the context of Alabama's vehicular homicide statute refers to all forms of mens rea except that described by the word intentional, i.e. knowingly, recklessly, and negligently); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 11 (2002) (defining, in part, accident as lack of intention). Because the statute's meaning is fairly ascertainable by reliance on generally accepted and common meaning of words used, or by reference to the dictionary ... or previous judicial constructions, due process is satisfied. Knight, 269 N.W.2d at 432. The statute plainly requires recklessness. Insofar as Dalton attempts to mount a facial challenge to the so-called reckless driving alternative to Iowa's vehicular homicide statute, the State correctly points out Dalton lacks standing to do so. Reckless operation of a motor vehicle resulting in the unintentional death of another human being does not impact a substantial amount of protected conduct, and therefore Dalton may not challenge the statute facially. See Hunter, 550 N.W.2d at 464. We have held that where conduct and not merely speech is involved, proof that a statue is overbroad`must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Iowa 1997) (quoting State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Iowa 1991)). Because the statute is plainly restricted to reckless and deadly behavior, it cannot plausibly be said to interfere with a substantial amount of protected conduct. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d at 464 (quotation and citations omitted). Dalton lacks standing to mount a facial challenge to the statute, and his trial attorney therefore cannot be faulted for failing to present a meritless claim. Id.; Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 811.