Opinion ID: 1814233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A New Trial

Text: ¶ 29. In his motion for a new trial, Pierce asserts that the trial court committed prejudicial error in ruling on numerous evidentiary matters concerning Cook's claim of alienation of affection. Moreover, Pierce asserts that Cook's counsel made statements in front of the jury which unduly prejudiced the jury and which should have entitled Pierce to a mistrial. Thus, Pierce claims that the trial court's final judgment entered consistent with the jury verdict should be set aside as to Cook's claim of alienation of affection, and Pierce should be granted a new trial on that claim. ¶ 30. This Court's standard of review of a denial of a post-trial motion for a new trial is abuse of discretion. White, 932 So.2d at 33 (citing White v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 905 So.2d 506, 510-11 (Miss.2004)). See also Green v. Grant, 641 So.2d 1203, 1207 (Miss.1994). ¶ 31. This Court's standard of review when considering a trial judge's admission or exclusion of evidence is likewise one of abuse of discretion. Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 13 (Miss.2000). Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court `will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party.' Id. (quoting Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113 (Miss.1999)). See also In re Estate of Mask, 703 So.2d 852, 859 (Miss. 1997); Terrain Enters., Inc. v. Mockbee, 654 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Miss.1995). ¶ 32. Thus, to support his argument for a new trial, Pierce asserts the trial court committed four errors which cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial: (1) the trial court refused to allow Pierce to offer evidence relating to Cook's move to California; (2) the trial court prohibited Pierce from putting on evidence relating to the rate of return on investment presented by Cook's accountant-expert; (3) the trial court refused to allow Pierce to offer testimony relating to a tape-recorded message from Pierce to Cook; and (4) the trial court prohibited Pierce from questioning Cook about the title to the marital home. Furthermore, Pierce asserts that while each error committed by the trial court may be harmless in and of itself, the cumulative effect of these errors deprived Pierce of a fair trial.
¶ 33. Pierce contends that Cook presented evidence that he is no longer able to see his children as a result of Pierce; however, Pierce was prohibited from cross-examining Cook about the fact that he chose to move to California. Pierce asserts that he was not allowed to question Cook as to why he visits his children only three times a year; why Cook almost always returns the children early; or why Cook sold his home in Madison to move to California. Pierce cites Bland v. Hill, 735 So.2d 414, 419 (Miss.1999), for the proposition that this Court has held that in alienation-of-affection cases, the defendant must show that the alienation was caused by other factors, even the plaintiff's own conduct. Based on Bland, Pierce contends that he should have been allowed to show the jury Cook's own actions and/or inactions with regard to parenting his children. Pierce avers that because he was prohibited from showing Cook's own actions and/or inactions, he was deprived of a fair trial and was unduly prejudiced. ¶ 34. On the other hand, Cook argues that Pierce has mischaracterized the trial court's rulings. Pierce was given wide latitude to question Cook about his relationship with his children before the adulterous affair between Pierce and Kathleen. However, Pierce also attempted to question Cook regarding his relationship with his children after the adulterous affair, on such matters as how Cook's sale of his Madison home and his move to California affected his relationship with his children. ¶ 35. We agree with Pierce that this Court has held that defendants in alienation cases must be allowed to attempt to prove that they were not the cause of the plaintiff's divorce, but Pierce was given ample opportunity to cross-examine Cook about his marriage with Kathleen. Bland, 735 So.2d at 419. Additionally, Pierce was permitted to cross-examine Cook as to his relationship with the children before the adulterous affair. In fact, Pierce was permitted to question Cook as to his relationship with his children even after the divorce. During Pierce's cross-examination of Cook, the following occurred: Q. Well, since January of 2006, how many times have you been back to Mississippi to visit your three children? [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: Object to relevance. THE COURT: Overruled. A. I believe twice. Q. And when were those two times, since January of this year? A. One was in February for Ernie's birthday around the 14th; and I believe the other time was sometime in March, I want to say. Q. Now, you have the right under the property settlement and custody agreement to visit your children every other weekend. [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: Your Honor, we're going to object to any testimony out of the judgment of divorce or the property settlement and object to the relevance as to when he has a right to visit his children. THE COURT: Sustained MR. PIERCE: Your Honor THE COURT: The objection is sustained. The testimony about which Pierce complains today was irrelevant to the matter at hand and was properly denied by the trial court inasmuch as this evidence concerned Cook's conduct long after the commencement of the adulterous affair between Pierce and Kathleen.
¶ 36. Next, Pierce complains that he was not able to establish the rate of return on investments because he was prohibited from discovering the total values of Cook's trust [2] before and after the divorce. During direct examination, Raleigh Cutrer, Cook's expert accountant, testified to the rate of return as follows: Q. . . . Now, as a result of having to pull money out of the trust, I don't believe you've factored in any of the loss that he would receive in loss of interest. Is that correct? A. That is correct. Q. And is there any way for you to give me an approximate, or have you been able to calculate a value, or an amount for the loss of income that he suffered as a result of having to pull out all of these funds from the trust account? A. Yes. What we looked at is that from the yearwe looked at his trust fund account and his personal account. He has a personal account at the brokerage house. And we looked at both of them or one that account grew to from 2000 to 2004. And roughlyand realizing that period was probably one of the worst periods from an investment standpoint you could really probably look at, excluding 2004, it still grew a total of about thirteen percent. Not thirteen percent a year, but a total of thirteen percent. So if you extrapolate that to $500,000, that would add an additional 65,000 roughly of value to the 500,000. Q. All right. So another 65,000 that he lost as a result of having to withdraw these funds. A. Right. That's just the 2004. If you look at 2005, where the yield was much better, probably somewhere in the neighborhood of almost close to ten percent growth; you know, that would increase that amount probably another $50,000 or so. Q. Another 50? A. Fifty. Q. So from 65,000 to 115,000? A. Yes. . . . On cross-examination, Pierce attempted to question Cutrer as to the amounts held in trust before and after the divorce. This testimony was sustained by the trial court. Specifically, Pierce asked: Q. What is the value of each of those trusts? [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: Object to relevance, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. What's Mr. Cook's total net worth? [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: Objection to relevance, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. [ATTORNEY FOR PIERCE]: Your Honor, they've already opened the door with asking and so forth the percentageso far as asking the percentage of increase over the value of his assets. They have asked the question numerous times about how much the trust was worth before this money was withdrawn and now how much it is worth afterward. I ought to be able to inquire as to, one, what the value was at the date of marriage, what the date of thewell, date of establishment, date of marriage and date other further benchmarks along the way. [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: Your Honor, may I be heard? THE COURT: Put the jury in the jury room. (THE JURY DEPARTED TO THE JURY ROOM) THE COURT: I hadn't heard anything about the value of that trust brought out on direct. [ATTORNEY FOR PIERCE]: Your Honor, they were talking aboutI don't know which card it was here but they were talking about howthe witness testified how much the trust had gained in value and had lost in valueI mean, lost perspective value by the fact that the money was taken out. THE COURT: No. What they asked was: based on what was taken out. [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: By those THE COURT: How much was lost because of the amount that was taken out, not the interest on the entire trust. [ATTORNEY FOR PIERCE]: Well, Your Honor, he used as a barometer to gauge and determine this fact the percentage return of investment, if I'm not mistaken, of the trust. THE COURT: Yeah. [ATTORNEY FOR PIERCE]: And I believe one of the trusts he had not taken something out of was used as a barometer. I maythe witness may be able to better answer that; but they determined that there was a percentage growth by which they backed into this, is the way I understood it. THE COURT: Well, the money that wasthis money that was taken out of that trust would have earned that same amount, and that's why he used that barometer. [ATTORNEY FOR PIERCE]: Well, I know, Your Honor. That's why I want to go back and find out what was the base amount from which he calculated it. [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: But there's THE COURT: Well, it [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: It's irrelevant. THE COURT: It does not matter. He's testified that's how he did it. It doesn't matter how much money was in that trust; the way I see it. I don't see how you could look at it any other way. I mean, it doesn't matter if it's worth 100 million dollars or $10,000. He testified as to what the loss was on what was drawn out of it. And the best barometer he could use was what the trust earned. Because you couldn't go get somebody else's trust and say, Well, that one earned twenty-eight percent or five percent, so that's what this one would be. He used the best barometer he could use. So it doesn't matter how much is in there. He's showing his loss. Based on Cutrer's testimony, the trial court determined that it was not necessary for Pierce to cross-examination Cutrer on the actual money in the trust. Cutrer based the rate of return of the money withdrawn on the trust account according to the actual rate of return Cook received on the trust. Therefore, from the record before us, we find that the trial court did not err in sustaining as irrelevant testimony pertaining to the actual amount of the trust.
¶ 37. Third, Pierce contends that the trial court refused to allow Pierce to testify concerning the comments he made about Cook's stepfather in a phone message [3] Pierce left on Cook's birthday. Pierce claims that while he admittedly referred to Cook's father during the message, he was really speaking of Cook's stepfather. Additionally, Pierce claims that he was prohibited from questioning Dorothy Sprayberry, Cook's mother, as to whether it would be unusual for someone to refer to her husband as Cook's father. A reference to Pierce's testimony reveals that Pierce's contention lacks merit. Q. Okay. Now, theyearly onit's been a long weekI think it was the first thing Tuesday, they played a tape where you mentioned something about Mr. Cook's father, who we have now learned was deceased. Were you referring to his deceased father or were you referring to another individual? A. I was not referring to his deceased father. Q. And who were you referring to? A. As his mother testified yesterday, she has remarried. She's been remarried since he was in college, or just got out of college. And the man she was remarried to, Frank, has been in Mr. Cook's lifevirtually, I think, his entire life. Because henow, he's his stepfather. [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: Objection, Your Honor. We already discussed this yesterday. [ATTORNEY FOR PIERCE]: Your Honor, he's The Court: He can testify that he's his stepfather. [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: I have no problem with that. A. But he used tohe's been in his life longer than that; because he used to be his uncle. [ATTORNEY FOR COOK]: Your Honor The Court: Mr. Lingle. [ATTORNEY FOR PIERCE]: Yes, sir; [ATTORNEY FOR PIERCE]: May I continue, Your Honor? The Court: Yes, sir. Q: Mr. Pierce, it's suffice to say, that you didn't mean his deceased father, you meant his stepfather. Is that correct? A. Absolutely. ¶ 38. Thus, because Pierce was allowed to testify that he was referring to Cook's stepfather and not Cook's deceased father, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Pierce's counsel to question Sprayberry about whether it would be unusual for someone to refer to her current husband as Cook's father.
¶ 39. Lastly, Pierce asserts the trial court erred in prohibiting him from cross-examining Cook as to why the marital home of Cook and Kathleen was titled in the name of Cook's trust instead of in the names of Cook and Kathleen as individuals. Pierce contends that he should have been allowed to show the jury that Cook's total and complete financial control of Kathleen was the reason she chose to divorce him, not because of Pierce's conduct. Bland, 735 So.2d at 418-19. ¶ 40. On the other hand, Cook admits that Pierce had the right to prove that he did not cause the subject divorce, but Cook asserts that the trial court has the ultimate determination as to the admissibility of evidence and its relevance. As explained supra, the standard of review governing the admissibility of evidence is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Whitten, 799 So.2d at 13. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in prohibiting Pierce from questioning Cook about the title to the marital home.