Opinion ID: 371795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the closing date

Text: 16 The Air Force attacks as clearly erroneous the district court's finding that the refusal to change the closing date on the Training Report was arbitrary and capricious. The Air Force also argues that the finding is not only incorrect but immaterial. Brief of Appellant at 15. Appellant feels the finding is immaterial because the district court eventually held that absent an Air Force waiver, an OER could not have been filed regardless of whether the training period ended in November or February. 17 Air Force Regulation 36-10, P 8-1d(2) states that for a final report, the thru or closing date is the last day of training. See also id. PP 2-12, 7-1 (Form 475 covers periods of formal training). Johnson's last day of training was November 18, 1974, not February 3, 1975. Rather than apply the plain meaning of the words last day of training, the Air Force puts forward a specialized definition for the phrase. It contends that 'training' covers the period during which a trainee is administratively responsible to the commander's discretion . . .. Brief of Appellant at 15. Aside from lack of proof that this interpretation is one consistently applied by the Air Force, Johnson was clearly under Colonel Mobley's discretion after November 20, 1974. We do not find error in the district court's determining that the Air Force acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its refusal to change the closing date on Major Johnson's Training Report. 18 We also note that the mere holding that an OER was not automatically permissible upon changing the closing date on the Training Report does not necessarily make the court's finding immaterial. The length of training reflected in the report may have affected the weight given the Training Report by the selection board. In addition, the closing date was the reason given by the Air Force for its refusal to exercise its discretion under Air Force Regulation 36-10, Table 4-3, Rule 2, to allow Colonel Mobley to file an OER even though 120 days had not passed. The district court did not, and probably could not, substitute its discretion in deciding whether to waive the 120-day requirement. The Air Force can decide whether, at this point, an OER from Mobley is proper after 107 days of supervision. The district court decision was not clearly erroneous.