Opinion ID: 2208616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination Regarding the Stepdaughter's Abortion

Text: [¶ 21] Tremblay next challenges the Superior Court's ruling that prevented him from cross-examining the stepdaughter regarding her abortion. [¶ 22] In November 2000, the stepdaughter told a caseworker from the Department of Human Services (DHS) that, in July 2000, she aborted a fetus resulting from a sexual relationship with a former boyfriend. She also told the caseworker that she had never become pregnant by Tremblay. At trial, however, the stepdaughter contradicted her previous statement to the caseworker and she testified that she had in fact become pregnant by Tremblay. [¶ 23] Tremblay sought to admit evidence of the abortion and the attendant circumstances to impeach the stepdaughter's credibility. He argued, and reasserts on appeal, that the July 2000 abortion would have occurred too late in the pregnancy for him to be the father if, as the stepdaughter alleged, the couple's last sexual encounter was in April 2000. He further asserts that cross-examination on the abortion issue was particularly relevant because the prosecution offered no physical evidence implicating Tremblay. Impeaching the stepdaughter's credibility was, therefore, vital to his defense. [8] [¶ 24] We review the trial court's ruling limiting the scope of cross-examination for abuse of discretion. State v. Nason, 498 A.2d 252, 255 (Me.1985). Despite the trial court's significant discretion, however, it must not deprive a party of a reasonable opportunity to elicit impeaching testimony. Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 611.2 at 303 (2000 ed.) (hereinafter Field & Murray at ___). We will uphold a trial court's ruling unless it has clearly interfered with a defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. White, 456 A.2d 13, 15 (Me.1983). [¶ 25] The court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in preventing Tremblay from cross-examining the stepdaughter regarding her abortion. Neither the stepdaughter's abortion, nor conclusive evidence that Tremblay impregnated the stepdaughter was probative of whether Tremblay committed gross sexual assault. Cf. State v. Stoddard, 1997 ME 114, ¶ 15, 696 A.2d 423, 427 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the defendant's willingness to take a blood test after his release from police custody because the test had limited probative value regarding his intoxication at the time of the accident). [¶ 26] Although, as Tremblay asserts, the jury's verdict depended largely on whether the jury believed Tremblay or the stepdaughter, the court gave Tremblay a reasonable opportunity to expose the jury to inconsistencies in the stepdaughter's testimony and flaws in her credibility. See Field & Murray at 303. After testifying that Tremblay was, in fact, the source of her pregnancy, the court allowed a line of questioning into the stepdaughter's sexual activity and the circumstances surrounding the pregnancy. [¶ 27] During this questioning, the stepdaughter admitted beginning a sexual relationship with another man after her last alleged sexual encounter with Tremblay in April 2000. She also testified telling a clinician at a July 2000 medical appointment that her last menstrual period was unsure/end of May. Finally, she acknowledged making the previous statement to a DHS caseworker that Tremblay was not the father of the aborted fetus. The attempted cross-examination into the abortion was, therefore, cumulative of evidence in the record undermining the stepdaughter's credibility. See State v. DiPietro, 420 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Me.1980) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by restricting the defendant from cross-examining the prosecution's chief witness regarding his hostility for the defendant). Accordingly, the court acted within the bounds of its discretion. [¶ 28] Tremblay's additional contentions are without merit and, therefore, we decline to address them. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.