Opinion ID: 1281019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the award of attorney's fees proper?

Text: Murphy argues first that fees should not be awarded against him because he is a public interest litigant. [8] See Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State, 665 P.2d 544, 552-54 (Alaska 1983). The superior court implicitly rejected this argument by awarding fees against him. We affirm the superior court's award of $3,500 in attorney's fees. It is an abuse of discretion to award attorney's fees against a public interest litigant. Id. at 553. A party must satisfy four criteria to be deemed a public interest litigant: (1) Is the case designed to effectuate strong public policies? (2) If the plaintiff succeeds will numerous people receive benefits from the lawsuit? (3) Can only a private party have been expected to bring the suit? (4) Would the purported public interest litigant have sufficient economic incentive to file suit even if the action involved only narrow issues lacking general importance? Id. We will review the superior court's evaluation of the litigant's public interest status under the abuse of discretion standard. Citizens for the Preservation of the Kenai River v. Sheffield, 758 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1988). Assuming that Murphy satisfies the first three criteria, we are of the view that it was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to find that he was not a public interest litigant because of the fourth criterion. If Murphy were entitled to good time reductions, he could potentially have been released about 77 hours earlier. [9] Since this time would be on weekends, it would not conflict with his regular job. Thus, it is likely that his compensatory damages would have been quite small. [10] Murphy also sought punitive damages in an unspecified amount. He now claims that these damages would have been at the most in the low four figures. Accordingly, it might appear that Murphy lacked sufficient economic incentive to bring this lawsuit. However, in our view there are at least two reasons to conclude that the superior court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion on the ground of adequate economic incentive. First, it is reasonable to assume that a court might award large punitive damages in favor of a plaintiff who was held in prison illegally for 77 hours. Second, Murphy brought his action in the superior court. At the time he filed his complaint, actions for damages of less than $25,000 could not be filed in the superior court, but had to be filed in the district court. [11] Former AS 22.15.030(a)(1),.030(b), ch. 17, § 3, SLA 1985; AS 22.10.020(a). We assume that the action was properly filed, in which case Murphy must have been seeking damages greater than $25,000. This would clearly give him adequate economic incentive to bring the action without regard to the public interest. Murphy next argues that the $3,500 fee award was unreasonable because it was out of proportion to the amount of money in controversy. We hold the award was not an abuse of discretion for the following reasons. First, as discussed above, there was potentially a significant amount of money at stake in regard to the punitive damages claim. Second, the City had an important policy to uphold with ramifications beyond the instant case. Finally, the amount of damages and the importance of policies underlying the case are not determinative of the reasonableness of the fees. Civil Rule 82(a)(2) provides: In actions where the money judgment is not an accurate criteria [sic] for determining the fee to be allowed to the prevailing side, the court shall award a fee commensurate with the amount and value of legal services rendered. The City sought over $5,000 in actual fees for 58.5 hours of attorney time. The court awarded partial fees of $3,500. Murphy does not contend that the attorneys billed too many hours or charged too high an hourly rate. Under these circumstances, the fees were not unreasonable and the award was not an abuse of discretion. [12] AFFIRMED.