Opinion ID: 619103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dalton's Motions for Acquittal or a New Trial

Text: Dalton first argues that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress, and therefore granted him a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, because Perez's and Williams's trial testimony conclusively established that the [NOPD]'s version of the events surrounding the stop and searches [on February 19, 2008] w[as] rife with inconsistencies and simply cannot be trusted. Br. of Dalton Bennett at 30. The inconsistencies in testimony Dalton points to involve credibility determinations made by the district court during the suppression hearing or by the jury during trial. [6] Such inconsistencies are not conclusive proof that one version of events must be credited over another, and do not overcome our deferential standard of review of credibility determinations. See United States v. Valentine, 401 F.3d 609, 614 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming the denial of a motion for acquittal based on an officer's inconsistent testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial because [t]he district court was able to observe the demeanor of the witness at the suppression hearing and trial and thus was in a unique position to gauge credibility). Dalton next argues that the district court should have granted his motion for acquittal because it is now crystal clear that the government suppressed highly probative evidence of [Moore]'s history of writing false police reports and then lying about it to the FBI. Br. of Dalton Bennett at 32. Dalton claims that had the defense known what the government knew at the time of the suppression hearing and at the time of the trial, the defense could have more aggressively impeached the already tainted credibility of government witnesses. Id. at 33-34. When a defendant seeks a new trial on the basis of a Brady violation, he must show that (1) the prosecution did not disclose the evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence was material. Davis, 609 F.3d at 696 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence is material if, had it been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability the result would have been differentthat is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Moore's subsequent indictment for lying to the FBI is not material because its disclosure would probably not have changed the result of Dalton's trial. First, at the time of Dalton's suppression hearing, Moore had not yet even made the false statement to the FBI for which he was later indicted. It is therefore unclear how Dalton could have used false statements that had not yet occurred to impeach Moore at the suppression hearing. Further, Perez corroborated Moore's testimony at the suppression hearing, and therefore it is likely that the district court would still have denied Dalton's motion to suppress. Moreover, because Moore did not testify at trial and likely would have exercised his right to avoid self-incrimination had he had been called to testify, the outcome of the trial would probably not have been different had Dalton and the other Defendants known that the FBI was currently investigating Moore for filing false police reports. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Dalton's motion for acquittal or a new trial.