Opinion ID: 2971813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Regulatory Taking Claim

Text: The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The Supreme Court has recognized two categories of takings: regulatory and No. 03-4662 D.A.B.E., et al. v. City of Toledo Page 3 physical.” Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 130 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Appellants allege the former. Furthermore, their attack on the ordinance is limited to a facial challenge, which requires them to prove that the “mere enactment” of the ordinance constitutes a taking of their property. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981) (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). According to the Supreme Court, the test to be applied in considering facial challenges such as this one is “fairly straightforward.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295. Under that test, “[a] statute regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it denies an owner economically viable use of his land[].” Id. at 295-96 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-63; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501-02, 502 n.29 (1987). Sustaining such a facial challenge is a “heavy burden.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 501. The evidence presented in this case fails to establish that, on its face, the Clean Indoor Air Ordinance denies appellants “economically viable use” of their respective properties. Appellants have submitted affidavits alleging that they have lost—or fear they will lose—customers as a result of the ordinance, because smoking is an activity in which many customers wish to engage while patronizing their establishments. Even if true, however, those allegations are simply not enough to satisfy appellants’ burden of proof. In Hodel, the Supreme Court held that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act did not, on its face, effect a regulatory taking because of three features of the Act: first, it did not, “on its face, prevent beneficial use of coal-bearing lands;” second, it did not “categorically prohibit surface coal mining” but “merely regulate[d] the conditions under which such operations may be conducted;” and third, it did not “purport to regulate alternative uses to which coal-bearing lands may be put.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 296. The same factors that compelled the Court’s conclusion in Hodel apply in this case. First, there is nothing on the face of the Clean Indoor Air Ordinance that prevents the “beneficial use” of appellants’ property. To the contrary, the ordinance has absolutely no effect on any aspect of appellants’ businesses other than to restrict the areas in which appellants’ patrons may smoke.1 Second, the ordinance does not “categorically prohibit” smoking inside appellants’ establishments; it “merely regulates the conditions under which” smoking is permitted. We recognize that the construction of separate smoking lounges in most cases will require some financial investment, but an ordinance does not effect a taking merely because compliance with it “requires the expenditure of money.” Third & Catalina Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 895 P.2d 115, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). Finally, for obvious reasons, the ordinance does not “purport to regulate alternative uses” of appellants’ respective properties. Therefore, pursuant to Hodel, it is clear that appellants have failed to establish that the Clean Indoor Air Ordinance, on its face, effects a regulatory taking of their property.