Opinion ID: 1784260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether retroactive application is constitutionally permissible in this case

Text: The second prong of the inquiry requires us to consider whether the Legislature acted within constitutionally acceptable parameters by eliminating the County's right to recover for costs it already expended: A retrospective provision of a legislative act is not necessarily invalid. It is so only in those cases wherein vested rights are adversely affected or destroyed or when a new obligation or duty is created or imposed, or an additional disability is established, on connection with transactions or considerations previously had or expiated. McCord v. Smith, 43 So.2d 704, 708-09 (Fla.1949); cf. Laforet, 658 So.2d at 61. Generally, due process considerations prevent the State from retroactively abolishing vested rights. See Knowles, 402 So.2d at 1158. Thus, retroactive abolition of substantive vested rights is prohibited by constitutional due process considerations. See Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So.2d 658, 665-66 (Fla.1982). The plaintiff in this case, however, is a political subdivision of the State that brought an action under the authority of its county code to recover costs and impose a penalty. The Florida Constitution declares that Dade County's home rule powers are explicitly subject to the supremacy of general state law: (6) Nothing in this section [defining Dade County's home rule power] shall be construed to limit or restrict the power of the Legislature to enact general laws which shall relate to Dade County and any other one or more counties of the state of Florida or to any municipality in Dade County and any other one or more municipalities of the State of Florida relating to county or municipal affairs and all such general laws shall apply to Dade County and to all municipalities therein to the same extent as if this section had not been adopted and such general laws shall supersede any part or portion of the home rule charter provided for herein in conflict therewith and shall supersede any provision of any ordinance enacted pursuant to said charter and in conflict therewith, and shall supersede any provision of any charter of any municipality in Dade County in conflict therewith. Art. VIII, § 11(6), Fla. Const. (1885) (Home Rule Amendment); see art. VIII, § 6(e), Fla. Const. (1968) (incorporating article VIII, section 11, Florida Constitution (1885)). The Florida Constitution and general laws are supreme in Metropolitan Dade County, except as expressly provided in the Home Rule Amendment. Art. VIII, § 11(9), Fla. Const. (1885). The Home Rule Amendment must be strictly construed to maintain such supremacy. Metropolitan Dade County v. City of Miami, 396 So.2d 144, 148 (Fla.1980). Consequently, whenever any doubt exists as to the extent of a power attempted to be exercised which may affect the operation of a state statute, the doubt is to be resolved against the ordinance and in favor of the statute. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So.2d 661, 668 (Fla.1972); see Dade County v. Acme Specialty Corp., 292 So.2d 378, 378 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (County ordinances under [the] Home Rule Charter are to be treated the same as municipal ordinances.); Dade County Code § 24-2 (declaration that County Code must not be construed as superseding or conflicting with any state environmental laws). Charter counties such as Metropolitan Dade County thus have no power to enforce regulatory ordinances which conflict with state law, unless the county's power to regulate that field is specifically authorized in the Home Rule Amendment. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. City of Miami, 396 So.2d 144, 148 (Fla. 1980); Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla.1962); Sun Harbor Homeowners Ass'n v. Broward County Dep't of Natural Resource Protection, 700 So.2d 178, 180-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Whenever the legislature acts to supersede a local government's authority to enforce its ordinances, the effect is immediate and applies to both future and pending proceedings and present and past offenses. See State ex rel. Baker v. McCarthy, 122 Fla. 749, 166 So. 280 (1936) (subsequent conflicting state law renders prior ordinance void to extent of direct conflict); Sun Harbor, 700 So.2d at 180; see also Board of County Comm'rs v. Wilson, 386 So.2d 556, 561 (Fla.1980) (electors' rights under County's Home Rule Charter were ineffective and superseded by a subsequent conflicting general law). If political subdivisions were able to continue actions to enforce ordinances that conflict with general law, the political subdivisions would have the power to frustrate the ability of the Legislature to set policies for the state. See McCarthy, 166 So. at 282. To the extent that the Legislature intended to comprehensively regulate the statewide problem of drycleaning contamination, the Legislature has the authority to prevent local government from acting contrary to that intent. Thus, the Dade County Code authorizing the action against defendants is in conflict with the Act in an area not specifically reserved to the County in the Home Rule Amendment. We conclude that after the defendants became immunized under the Act, the County no longer had the power to bring an action under the provisions of its County Code to recover the costs it expended in cleaning the dry cleaning contamination or to compel the defendants to clean the contamination. Without making any sweeping statements concerning the distinction between the constitutional rights possessed by political subdivisions of the state as opposed to private persons, it is the duty of this Court to enforce the constitutional limitations placed on the powers of political subdivisions. Cf. Neu v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 462 So.2d 821, 825 (Fla.1985). While not dispositive of the legal issues, we point out in this case that defendants expended hundreds of thousands of dollars to attempt to eliminate the dry cleaning contamination. Defendants further contest that they would even be responsible for the additional monies the County seeks to recover for connecting the adjacent neighborhood to the public water supply. We also note that the County did not seek to recover these costs or pursue a lawsuit against these entities until after chapter 376 was enacted. Lastly, we note that the County had an opportunity to appeal the DEP's determination of eligibility, but did not do so. Compare Metropolitan Dade County v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 714 So.2d 512, 513-14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (County appealed DEP determination that another entity was eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Contamination Cleanup Program). However, as conceded by the defendants, we emphasize that a different result might well be reached if these immunity provisions were applied to abrogate the cause of action of a private plaintiff rather than a government entity's cause of action. See Rupp, 417 So.2d at 665-66. A statute may be applied to one class of cases, even though it may violate the Constitution when applied to another class of cases, without necessarily destroy[ing] the statute. In re Seven Barrels of Wine, 79 Fla. 1, 17, 83 So. 627, 632 (1920).