Opinion ID: 1175478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: contentions as to prison sentences

Text: Defendant claims errors in the prison sentences imposed for his crimes other than murder. As already explained, two of these were crimes against Jean Prendergast: assault with intent to commit murder (former ง 217; count two) and assault with a deadly weapon and by means likely to produce great bodily injury (ง 245, subd. (a); count three). Four were offenses committed against Karen: rape by force and threats (former ง 261, subds. 2, 3; count four), assault with intent to murder (former ง 217; count five), assault with a deadly weapon and by means likely to produce great bodily injury (ง 245, subd. (a); count six), and robbery (ง 211; count seven). Count eight was burglary of the Neidig-Prendergast residence (ง 459). Defendant was sentenced to the upper term on all seven of these counts, but execution of the sentences on counts three, six, and eight was stayed under section 654, and parts of the sentences on counts five and seven were stayed in accordance with section 1170.1. It was ordered that defendant serve a consecutive full term on count two (as the principal term under ง 1170.1), consecutive subordinate terms (i.e, one-third of each middle term) on counts five and seven, and a full consecutive term on count four (rape). Three-year enhancements were added to count two for infliction of great bodily injury (ง 12022.7) and to count four for personal use of a deadly weapon (ง 12022.3), and an additional three-year enhancement was imposed for the prior imprisonment for a violent felony (ง 667.5, subd. (a)). The stayed sentences also included enhancements. A. Failure to Explain Full Consecutive Sentence for Rape (38a) Defendant contends that since a full consecutive sentence was imposed on count two (assault with intent to murder Prendergast) as the principal term under section 1170.1, it was error to impose a separate consecutive sentence, consisting of the full upper term of eight years plus a three-year enhancement for use of a deadly weapon (ง 12022.3), on count four (forcible rape). Section 667.6, subdivision (c) (hereafter ง 667.6(c)) provides, however, that [i]n lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of enumerated sex offenses, including forcible rape as charged in count four. (39) The trial court correctly rejected defense counsel's argument that section 667.6(c) does not apply to a defendant being sentenced for only one of the enumerated sex offenses. ( People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585 [250 Cal. Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].) (38b) There is merit, however, in defendant's contention that the sentence must be set aside because the court failed to give reasons for invoking section 667.6(c). In People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335 [193 Cal. Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686], the trial court imposed a middle base term for kidnapping plus full consecutive six-year sentences on each of three convictions of sex offenses enumerated in section 667.6(c), reciting reasons appropriate to a decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent terms under section 1170.1 but failing to explain why the court chose to sentence under section 667.6(c). We remanded for resentencing, holding that separate reasons must be given for that choice, which should be based on the criteria provided in California Rules of Court, rule 425 and related rules promulgated under section 1170.3. [4] (34 Cal.3d at pp. 347-349.) Here, resentencing is necessitated by the lack of the separate statement of reasons required by Belmontes for imposing a separate full consecutive sentence on count four under section 667.6(c). B. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences on Counts Five and Seven (Assault and Robbery of Karen) in Light of Section 654 (40a) Defendant contends that under section 654, which prohibits multiple punishment for the same act or omission, he cannot be sentenced for both the assault with intent to murder Karen (count five) and the robbery of the same victim (count seven). (41) Section 654 does not preclude multiple convictions but only multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. (See People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625 [105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905].) ( People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 885 [135 Cal. Rptr. 654, 558 P.2d 552].) (42) The proscription against double punishment in section 654 is applicable where there is a course of conduct which ... comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute.... The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one. ( People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 376 [82 Cal. Rptr. 357, 461 P.2d 637, 37 A.L.R.3d 1398].) The defendant's intent and objective are factual questions for the trial court; [to permit multiple punishments,] there must be evidence to support a finding the defendant formed a separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced. [Citation.] ( People v. Adams (1982) 137 Cal. App.3d 346, 355 [187 Cal. Rptr. 505].) (40b) There is ample evidence to support the trial court's implicit finding that defendant's intent and objective in assaulting Karen, by stabbing her, was separate from, rather than incidental to, his intent and objective in committing the robbery. Prior to the assault, defendant had essentially completed the robbery by compelling Karen to assist and not interfere with his gathering the valuables and preparing for flight. Ms. Neidig then entered the kitchen, and defendant killed her with the shotgun. He next ordered Karen to lie down and stabbed her in the back. The trial court could properly conclude that defendant committed the assault with the intent and objective of preventing the victim from sounding the alarm about the murder, and that this intent and this objective were separate from, not incidental to, the robbery. ( People v. Ford (1966) 65 Cal.2d 41, 47-49 [52 Cal. Rptr. 228, 416 P.2d 132]; In re Chapman (1954) 43 Cal.2d 385, 388-390 [273 P.2d 817]; see People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, fn. 12.) C. Improper Reliance on Same Facts for Different Sentencing Purposes (43) (1) Same Facts Used for Upper Terms and Consecutive Terms. Rule 425 lists the following among the factors justifying consecutive sentences under section 1170.1: that the crimes were predominantly independent of each other (rule 425(a)(1)), involved separate acts of violence (rule 425(a)(2)), or involved multiple victims (rule 425(a)(4)); and [a]ny circumstances in aggravation or mitigation (rule 425(b)). Circumstances in aggravation and in mitigation, used in setting upper or lower terms (rule 405(d), (e)), are listed in rules 421 and 423. A trial court may not use the same fact to impose both an upper term and a consecutive sentence. (ง 1170, subd. (b) [forbidding dual use of a fact to impose both an upper term and an enhancement under Section ... 1170.1 ...]; rule 441; People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233 [207 Cal. Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; People v. Ratcliffe (1981) 124 Cal. App.3d 808, 821 [177 Cal. Rptr. 627]; People v. Lawson (1980) 107 Cal. App.3d 748 [165 Cal. Rptr. 764].) The present trial court's stated reasons for imposing consecutive sentences on defendant were that the crimes involved multiple victims, and that the court considered circumstances in aggravation and mitigation. While the crimes were committed closely in period of time and proximity, the crimes basically involved separate acts of violence. The court's reliance on the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation for the imposition of consecutive sentences was improper because those circumstances were also relied on for imposing the upper terms. (44a) (2) Prior Felony Conviction Used for Upper Term on Every Count and Also to Impose Enhancement for Conviction of a Prior Violent Felony. Section 667.5, subdivision (a), provides generally that a separate three-year term shall be imposed if the defendant is convicted of any violent felony and also has served a prior prison term for a violent felony. Each of defendant's convictions on counts two through eight constituted a violent felony since that term includes both forcible rape and any felony in which the defendant has been found under section 12022.7 to have inflicted great bodily injury. (ง 667.5, subds. (c)(3), (c)(8).) Because defendant had served a prior prison term for the forcible rape of Linda D., he was sentenced to an additional three years under section 667.5. The trial court relied on that same prior prison term, including the fact that defendant was still on parole under that term at the time of the present crimes, in selecting the upper terms on counts two through eight. Defendant contends, and we agree, that the court thus violated rule 441(c), which provides: A fact used to enhance the defendant's prison sentence may not be used to impose the upper term. (45) Rule 421(b)(3), which lists prior prison terms whether or not charged or chargeable as an enhancement under section 667.5 as an aggravating factor supporting an upper term, makes clear that an additional sentence under section 667.5 is an enhancement under the sentencing rules. The mandatory nature of such an enhancement, though immunizing it from being stricken under rule 441(b), does not preclude applicability of the rest of the sentencing rules. (See People v. Bejarano (1981) 114 Cal. App.3d 693, 706 [173 Cal. Rptr. 71].) (44b) Rule 441(c)'s prohibition of dual use of facts applied to the sentencing of defendant on count four under section 667.6(c) ( People v. Reeder (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 900, 919-921 [200 Cal. Rptr. 479]; see People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d 335, 346-348) as well as to the sentencing on the other counts (ง 1170, subd. (b); People v. Calhoun (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 731 [178 Cal. Rptr. 396]; People v. Jardine (1981) 116 Cal. App.3d 907, 923-924 [172 Cal. Rptr. 408]). (46) There is no merit, however, in defendant's alternative contention that the instructions and argument allowing and urging the jury to rely on defendant's prior felony conviction as an aggravating factor in reaching their death penalty verdict (ง 190.3, factor (c)), and the court's reliance on that factor in denying modification of the penalty verdict (ง 190.4, subd. (e)), precluded a prison sentence enhancement based on the prior prison term. The same fact may be relied on both as an aggravating factor in determining whether to impose the death penalty and as an enhancement of a prison sentence which is imposed for another crime and is to be served in the event the death penalty is not carried out. (3) Great Bodily Injury Relied on for Both the Upper Term and the Enhancement in Count Two. In sentencing on count two (assault with intent to murder Ms. Prendergast), the trial court added a three-year enhancement under section 12022.7, applicable to [a]ny person who, with the intent to inflict such injury, personally inflicts great bodily injury ... unless [such] infliction ... is an element of the offense of which he is convicted. In selecting the upper term, the trial court cited as aggravation, that the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness and callousness, thereby using a fact charged and found as an enhancement to impose the upper term (rule 441(b)). Rule 441(b) provides that such a fact may be used to impose the upper term, but that if it is, the additional term of imprisonment prescribed for that fact as an enhancement shall be stricken. The use of the fact to impose the upper term is an adequate reason for striking the additional term of imprisonment. It is not necessary for us to order the enhancement stricken pursuant to this rule because, as shall be explained, the case must be remanded in any event for resentencing on counts two through eight, and it is not certain that the new sentence will include an upper term based on a fact charged and found as an enhancement. (47) (4) Enhancing Sentence on Count Four (Rape) for Personal Use of a Deadly Weapon While Also Citing, as Justification for the Upper Term, a Great Threat of Bodily Harm When the Threat May Have Consisted Solely of Keeping the Weapon Within Reach. The sentence on count four (rape) was enhanced three years for personal use of a deadly weapon (ง 12022.3). In choosing the upper term on count four, the court said: The crime involved great violence, a great threat of bodily harm and a high degree of viciousness and callousness; the victim was particularly vulnerable. Defendant contends that this constituted an improper dual use of facts because the only evidence supporting either the great threat of bodily harm as an upper-term factor or the weapon-use enhancement was that defendant placed the knife where it was within his reach during the act. In People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 1003 [184 Cal. Rptr. 483], certain defendants were convicted of attempted robbery, involving personal use of a firearm (ง 12022.5), on evidence they had taken property at gunpoint. ( Id. at pp. 1010-1012.) The court imposed upper terms, citing as one of two aggravating factors, great violence/threat of great bodily harm (rule 421(a)(1)), and added two years for the firearm use enhancement. ( Id. at pp. 1012, 1026.) The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing, holding that the quoted aggravated factor was impermissible under rule 441(c) (prohibiting dual use of a fact for an enhancement and an upper term) because the evidence conclusively showed that it was only the presence of firearms that justified the finding of a threat of great bodily harm. ( Id. at p. 1028. Accord: People v. Calhoun, supra, 125 Cal. App.3d 731, 734; People v. Roberson (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 890, 893 [146 Cal. Rptr. 777].) Here, it is not clear that the threat of great bodily harm depended on the presence of the knife since such a threat might be inferred from the evidence that the victim felt at defendant's mercy because of his superior bodily strength. On remand, the trial court should avoid any reliance on the same fact (e.g., defendant's use of the knife) for both an upper term and an enhancement. D. Necessity for Resentencing (48) Improper dual use of the same fact for imposition of both an upper term and a consecutive term or other enhancement does not necessitate resentencing if [i]t is not reasonably probable that a more favorable sentence would have been imposed in the absence of the error. ( People v. Avalos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 217, 233.) (49) But in the present case, resentencing is required for another reason, i.e., the trial court's failure to give reasons for imposing a full consecutive term on count four under section 667.6(c). ( People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d 335, 349.) Should the court decide to resentence on count four under section 1170.1 rather than section 667.6(c), sentences on other counts might be affected. Moreover, all of the sentences on counts two through eight were subjects of the trial court's erroneous dual reliance on the same fact or facts. Under these circumstances, the trial court should resentence defendant on all those counts.