Opinion ID: 2630572
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Purpose Behind the Same Position Language

Text: ¶ 90 Chief Justice Durham argues that the plain meaning of the same position language requires the restoration of both the defendant and the State to the same circumstances that existed prior to the faulty trial. After thus interpreting rule 24(d), however, she later states in a footnote, If the defendant testifies at retrial, however, he may be impeached by the use of statements made at the allocution. If the drafters of rule 24(d) indeed intended that the parties be returned to the circumstances that prevailed before the first trial, it would follow that the prosecution could not use the allocution statement for any purpose, since the statement did not exist before the first trial. Based on this qualification, however, it appears that Chief Justice Durham's same position language is not as absolute as she suggests. ¶ 91 Additionally, although case law on the same position language extends back to the nineteenth century in numerous jurisdictions, the lead opinion cites no cases, nor are we aware of any, applying the same position language to return the parties to the same position in terms of evidence. Indeed, Chief Justice Durham's interpretation is untenable in light of the purpose behind the same position language and the historical development of the rule containing it. ¶ 92 Contrary to Chief Justice Durham's conclusion, it appears certain that the drafters of the same position language intended it to protect the interests of the State, not the accused. Under nineteenth century common law, it was widely held that an appeal of a conviction did not constitute a waiver of the accused's double jeopardy rights. See, e.g., Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 530-31, 533-34, 26 S.Ct. 121, 50 L.Ed. 292 (1905). Under this common law rule, an accused who was granted a new trial could be retried only for the crime for which he or she was convicted. Id. at 531, 26 S.Ct. 121. The accused could not be retried for any other crimes for which he or she was placed in jeopardy, but not convicted, at the first trial. Id. In short, the common law placed the accused in a different position than he or she was in at the first trial in terms of double jeopardy. ¶ 93 To override this common law rule and permit the accused to be prosecuted for the same offenses as at the first trial, several states in the nineteenth century passed legislation that conditioned the awarding of a new trial on the accused being returned to the same position he or she was in prior to the first trial. Id. (noting that the same position language in state statutes was intended to act as a waiver of a defendant's right to claim that a second prosecution following a reversal violates double jeopardy); see also United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 858 (2d Cir.1965) (noting that legislation containing the same position language had been passed in response to the common law rule and authoriz[ed] reprosecution on the greater degree charged if the conviction on the lesser degree is reversed); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 83 Ky. 1, 3, 6 (1884) (holding that pursuant to the legislature's prerogative to prescribe ... the terms upon which one who has been convicted of a lesser included offense may have a new trial, the legislature could authorize retrial on the greater offense by prescribing that the `granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had,' quoting Ky.Crim.Code § 270, thereby allowing retrial of the accused on the greater offense for which the accused was acquitted). [5] ¶ 94 Because Utah codified the same position language contemporaneously with other states that codified the exact same language, its drafters very likely had the same purpose: to ensure the State had the same flexibility as it had at the first trial in terms of charging and prosecuting the accused. This purpose had nothing to do with the exclusion of evidence, as far as I can see. [6] Indeed, evidentiary issues were specifically addressed by another clause, which provided that `all the testimony must be produced anew' at the new trial. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 442, 7 S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887) (quoting 1878 Utah Laws § 317). Since evidentiary issues were specifically addressed by another clause, it is unlikely the drafters intended the same position language to also address evidentiary issues.