Opinion ID: 1708366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the settlement negotiations

Text: Lack of consideration is an affirmative defense. The party advancing it must plead it in his answer, as Daniel did here. Where the instrument in controversy contains a statement or recital of consideration, it creates a rebuttable presumption that consideration actually existed. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 73. See also, Dabbs v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp., 339 F. Supp. 654, 664 (N.D.Miss. 1972). The general rule is that this presumption is established even by such expressions as for value, for good and sufficient consideration, for value received or, as in the present case, for valuable consideration. Frank v. Irgins, 27 Minn. 43, 6 N.W. 380, 380 (1880); Estate of Weinsaft, 647 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. App. 1983); Gover v. Empire Bank, 574 S.W.2d 464, 468-64 (Mo. App. 1978). This presumption, however, does not disable the defendant from putting on proof designed to show that the consideration was not actually paid or bargained for. Restatement 2d of Contracts § 71, Comment (b) (1979). See also, e.g., Upper Avenue National Bank of Chicago v. First Arlington National Bank of Arlington Heights, 81 Ill. App.3d 208, 36 Ill.Dec. 525, 527, 400 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (1980); Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N.Y. 517, 20 N.E. 352, 353 (1889). The rebuttal must be made by a clear preponderance of the evidence. Gershon v. Ashkanazie, 239 Mo. App. 1012, 199 S.W.2d 38, 40 (1947). The resolution of any conflict in the testimony is for the trier of fact. In the present case, a great deal of Daniel's brief is devoted to showing that The Snowdoun Association was aligned with Daniel during the negotiations leading to the settlement of Daniel's will case. The point seems to be that, Snowdoun's interests being what they were, Snowdoun naturally would have taken whatever actions it did take regardless of whether Daniel had offered them anything. Thus Daniel's offer of a gift could not have been made to Snowdoun in order to secure Snowdoun's intervention because Snowdoun would have intervened anyway. It is generally held that for consideration to be valid, it must have been bargained for  some sort of reciprocal inducement must be involved. But the modern view is that where consideration is bargained for, it need not, in itself induce the promise. Restatement, (2d) of Contracts § 81 (1979). As Corbin says: [It is not necessary] that consideration should be the sole inducement or motivating cause of the promise or even that it shall be the prevailing or chief inducement. It must be enough of an inducement that it is in fact bargained for. Corbin, supra, § 118. In support of his position Daniel points to numerous oral admissions at trial that Snowdoun had little to offer Daniel and to various writings indicating Snowdoun's relatively disadvantaged position, especially the letter from Snowdoun's lawyer describing Snowdoun as a supplicant seeking a handout. Snowdoun on the other hand, points to Billups' testimony that Snowdoun could do a lot for Mr. Daniel, and to such items as a letter to Billups from Daniel's attorney stating that the responsibility of concluding settlement with these opposing litigants obviously devolves upon the Snowdoun board, and another letter to Snowdoun's attorney exhorting Snowdoun to begin to assume the responsibility of supporting Thompson Daniel in his struggle against the church and the college. Daniel says he merely offered encouragement and appreciation as a result of Snowdoun's mediation in his behalf; Snowdoun asserts that it intervened as a result of Daniel's encouragement. The record will bear either interpretation. That being the case, deference to the chancellor's findings is in order. His opinion was that for whatever leverage, to effect a settlement, the participation of Snowdoun was recognized by Daniel to be essential. Their alliance was sought and was given. On appeal, this Court will not overturn a chancellor's finding of fact unless he is manifestly wrong. McElhaney v. City of Horn Lake, 501 So.2d 401 (Miss. 1987); Deveraux v. Devereaux, 493 So.2d 1310 (Miss. 1986); Voss v. Stewart, 420 So.2d 761 (Miss. 1982). We can reach no such conclusion on this record. There remains the question of the Battenburg tablecloth. Here, the evidence showed nothing more than that the tablecloth was on the premises at the time Daniel left and shortly thereafter and it subsequently disappeared. There is not one scintilla of evidence that Daniel removed it. There being no evidence to support the chancellor's ruling, he was clearly wrong, and must be reversed. For the foregoing reasons, the chancellor's decree is affirmed as to specific performance of the agreement, but reversed as to the order to account for the tablecloth. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. PRATHER, J., not participating.