Opinion ID: 411288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Panel Majority

Text: 75 The panel majority attempted to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of Chapman and Decoster by imposing upon the petitioner the burden of showing that but for his counsel's ineffectiveness his trial, but not necessarily its outcome, would have been altered in a way helpful to him. Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d at 902. We are now convinced that this standard does not represent a significant improvement upon the Chapman standard. A decision of the Supreme Court handed down shortly after the publication of the panel opinion discussed the practical effect of a prejudice standard similar to the panel majority's standard. In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal the defendant claimed that the government violated his rights under the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment by deporting individuals who would have offered testimony in his defense. The court of appeals overturned his conviction after the defendant made a showing that the witnesses' expected testimony was of conceivable benefit to the defendant. The Supreme Court characterized this test as a virtual per se rule: 76 Given the vagaries of a typical jury trial, it would be a bold statement indeed to say that the testimony of any missing witness could not have conceivably benefited the defense. To us, the number of situations which will satisfy this test is limited only by the imaginations of judges or defense counsel. 77 458 U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 3446 (footnote omitted). 78 We believe it is equally true given the vagaries of a typical jury trial that virtually any new piece of favorable evidence produced by a petitioner at a habeas hearing may be helpful to him. We therefore reject the test of the panel majority.