Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mistrial and Severance Motions Related to a Statement Made by Rodriguez

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion or, in the alternative, in denying his severance motion, based on Rodriguez's testimony that, shortly after the murders, Richard Avila told him to keep cool and do nothing because defendant had recently gotten out of prison, was crazy, and would kill him.
Before trial, Richard filed a motion to sever his trial from that of Spradlin and defendant. Defendant filed a similar motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants and joined in Richard's motion. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. [46] Before Rodriguez testified for the prosecution, the trial court admonished him not to make references to several topics, including the parole status and criminal convictions of any of the defendants. Thereafter, Rodriguez testified to the events of July 31 and August 1, 1991, as set forth in the statement of facts. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Rodriguez if anyone said anything to him just before he left the North Hayes property on the morning of August 1, 1991, after Medina and Sanchez had been killed. When he said, Yes, the prosecutor asked, And tell me how that occurred. Where are you when this occurred? Rodriguez answered that he and Margarito Herrera were in the car preparing to leave when Richard approached and said, Keep cool. Keep  kick back, because  don't do nothin', `cause Johnny barely got out of prison. And he's crazy. He'll kill you. Defendant moved for a mistrial based on Rodriguez's reference to defendant having been in prison. He then clarified that he objected to the entirety of Rodriguez's statement. He argued that the prosecutor had a duty to prevent Rodriguez from testifying about improper matters, that the statement was prejudicial, and that the only remedy was to declare a mistrial. Spradlin joined in the motion, adding as an additional ground the decisions in People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265 ( Aranda ) and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 ( Bruton ). [47] The trial court found Rodriguez's entire statement was inadmissible as to defendant under Aranda/Bruton, and that the reference to prison violated the spirit of its earlier order not to mention parole and conviction status. But the court found that the reference did not prejudice defendants. With respect to the portion of Rodriguez's statement that Richard said defendant was crazy and would kill Rodriguez, the court noted that defendants had known before trial that Rodriguez had made such a statement but failed to object to its admission until after Rodriguez testified. In any event, the court believed the state of the evidence against defendant was strong, and that striking the statement and admonishing the jury not to consider it in any way would remedy the problem. In response to the trial court's finding, Richard argued Rodriguez's statement should be admitted as to him so he could argue to the jury that he attempted to help Rodriguez by warning him about defendant. He suggested the court could grant defendant's and Spradlin's motion for a mistrial, thereby effectively severing his trial from theirs, and admit Rodriguez's statement as to his case alone. He further argued that if the court denied the motions for a mistrial and to strike Rodriguez's statement, he would be denied his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation, cross-examination, and due process because he would be unable to present a defense. Accordingly, if the court intended to strike the statement altogether, Richard asked that a mistrial be granted. The trial court denied the severance and mistrial motions, finding the statement, minus the reference to prison, inadmissible against defendant but admissible to explain Richard's state of mind. The court said it would strike the reference to prison and tell the jury not to consider it for any purpose, and would tell the jury that the remaining statement, And he's crazy. He'll kill you, could be considered for the limited purpose of explaining Richard's state of mind. Defendant objected, arguing that admonishing the jury would not cure the taint and that allowing Richard to explore this area would only inflame the jury against him. He asked the court to reconsider the mistrial motion and again asked for severance. He also objected to the jury being given any further information about this by the court in terms of the cautionary instruction, admonishment, or otherwise. The court replied that, having denied the motion for a mistrial, it had to give a limiting instruction to make sure that the jury did not consider Rodriguez's statement for the truth of the matter asserted. In the presence of the jury, the trial court identified Rodriguez's statement and struck the reference to Johnny barely getting out of prison. The court told the jury to disregard that testimony and treat it as though you had never heard it. You shall not consider it for any purpose. In your deliberations you may not discuss or consider it. The court told the jury that the remainder of the statement, And he's crazy. He'll kill you, could be considered for a very limited purpose, and that is to explain the state of mind of Richard Avila, and that the jury [could] not consider those statements for their truth or as against any other defendant in this case.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his mistrial motion, thereby violating his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to due process of law, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to present a meaningful defense, and to reliable factfinding under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. A trial court should grant a motion for mistrial only when `a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged' ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 282, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3), that is, if it is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776). Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 128, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) Applying these standards, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motion. As for the portion of Rodriguez's testimony referring to defendant recently having been in prison, the court admonished the jury not to consider it for any purpose. As for the statement that defendant was crazy and would kill Rodriguez, the court admitted the evidence against Richard only, and admonished the jury to consider it for the limited purpose of explaining Richard's state of mind and not for the truth of the matter stated. We presume the jury followed the court's instructions. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Defendant also complains that the court compounded the prejudice because, in admonishing the jury, it repeated Rodriguez's objectionable testimony. We disagree. The court did not immediately rule on the mistrial motion. Until it did so, Rodriguez continued to testify for the prosecution. Thus, when the court eventually admonished the jury, to avoid confusion, it acted properly in clarifying the statement to which its admonition referred. No error occurred.
Before trial, all three defendants moved to sever their respective trials (guilt and penalty phases), or, alternatively, only their respective penalty phase trials from the others. The trial court denied the motions. After the trial court denied defendant's midtrial motion for a mistrial based on Rodriguez's testimony that Richard told him defendant had recently been freed from prison, was crazy, and would kill him, defendant renewed his mistrial and severance motions. Defendant claims that the court erred in denying his renewed severance motion. [48] As with his earlier claim regarding the mistrial motion, defendant contends the court's ruling violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Section 1098 provides in pertinent part: When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any public offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, unless the court order[s] separate trials. Our Legislature has thus expressed a preference for joint trials. ( People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 231, 250 Cal.Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25.) But the court may, in its discretion, order separate trials in the face of an incriminating confession, prejudicial association with codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony. ( People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917, 59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869, fns. omitted; see also § 1098.) We review a trial court's denial of a severance motion for abuse of discretion based on the facts as they appeared at the time the court ruled on the motion. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 167, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) If the court's joinder ruling was proper at the time it was made, a reviewing court may reverse a judgment only on a showing that joinder resulted in `gross unfairness' amounting to a denial of due process. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 162, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Even if the court abused its discretion in refusing to sever, reversal is unwarranted unless, to a reasonable probability, defendant would have received a more favorable result in a separate trial. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 41, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Defendant argues that several factors dictated severance of his trial from Richard's: the introduction of Richard's extra-judicial statement about defendant; prejudicial association with Richard, who had numerous weapons on his property; likely confusion resulting from the fact that defendant, but not Richard, was accused of shooting the victims; and the antagonistic nature of Richard's defense. As will appear, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's severance motion. This was a classic case for a joint trial: all defendants faced equivalent charges, most of the evidence was cross-admissible, and there was strong evidence against each defendant. Moreover, contrary to defendant's argument, the factors supporting severance were weak. For example, assuming Richard's extrajudicial statement about defendant incriminated defendant, it did not prejudice defendant because the court admonished the jury not to consider it for any purpose against defendant, and we presume it followed the instruction. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Undoubtedly, the evidence showed defendant was associated with Richard. That association, however, did not dictate severance, considering that the evidence also showed defendant, not Richard, actually shot the victims and was more culpable than Richard. We also reject defendant's argument that severance was necessary because Richard claimed innocence while implicating defendant. `Although several California decisions have stated that the existence of conflicting defenses may compel severance of codefendants' trials, none has found an abuse of discretion or reversed a conviction on this basis.  [Citation.] ...' `[A]lthough it appears no California case has discussed at length what constitutes an antagonistic defense [that might compel severance,] the federal courts have almost uniformly construed that doctrine very narrowly. Thus, [a]ntagonistic defenses do not per se require severance, even if the defendants are hostile or attempt to cast the blame on each other. [Citation.] Rather, to obtain severance on the ground of conflicting defenses, it must be demonstrated that the conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.' [Citations.] When, however, there exists sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not compel severance. [Citation.] ( People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 42, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Here, the prosecution presented abundant independent evidence establishing defendant's guilt. Such evidence showed that defendant had a gun; defendant expressed fear that the women would identify him to authorities if they were released; defendant rode in the car with the women; and defendant shot at least one woman and admitted doing so when he returned to the North Hayes property. Based on the foregoing evidence, the nature of defendant's and Richard's defenses did not compel severance. In sum, we find no abuse of discretion or federal constitutional error in the denial of the midtrial severance motion.