Opinion ID: 2363409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: discount

Text: In allowing a lump sum award in this enforcement proceeding, neither the trial court nor the Court of Civil Appeals allowed a discount of the award because of an early payment of future benefits. We hold that the following provision of article 8306a of the Workers' Compensation Act requires a discount whenever an award is matured pursuant to an enforcement proceeding: In all cases when the payments of weekly compensation due an injured employee or beneficiary coming within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are accelerated by increasing the amount of compensation by correspondingly decreasing the number of weeks for which the same is to be paid, and when the liability of the insurance company is redeemed by the payment of a lump sum, by agreement of parties interested, or as a result of an order made by the Industrial Accident Board or a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and when advanced payments of compensation are made, and in all cases when compensation is paid before becoming due, discount shall be allowed for present payment at four (4%) per cent, compounded annually. The statute specifically refers to the situation present in this case i. e., when the liability of the insurance carrier is redeemed by a lump sum payment as a result of a court judgment. Although this court has not before ruled on this particular point, we have previously ruled on the applicability of another provision of article 8306a to enforcement proceedings under article 8307, section 5a. In Home Indemnity Co. v. Mosqueda, 473 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.1971), this court held that the provisions of article 8306a with respect to interest on past-due installments applied to a suit by a beneficiary to mature a death benefit award. The court did not discuss the applicability of the discount provision of the statute. No point of error was raised on that issue. Nevertheless, the result in Mosqueda is consistent with the application of the discount provision to this suit and with the rule that the various provisions within an act are to be construed together so as to give effect to each. See Black v. American Bankers Insurance Co., 478 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.1972); Wintermann v. McDonald, 129 Tex. 275, 102 S.W.2d 167 (1937). Applying the discount statute to a lump sum recovery granted in an enforcement proceeding results in no conflict with the language of article 8307, section 5a, the enforcement statute. The latter statute gives the claimant the right to mature the entire claim and to recover the full amount thereof. [6] Recovery of the full amount does not necessarily mean that a discount of the recovery so as to approximate its present value is prohibited. Plaintiffs cite Vestal v. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Harrington, 285 S.W. 1041 (Tex.Comm'n App.1926, judgmt adopted) and Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Harrington, 61 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ.App.Eastland 1933, writ dism'd by agr.), as authority for the proposition that no discount is permitted in an enforcement proceeding. Because both of these cases were decided prior to the enactment of the discount statute, we consider them inapplicable to the discount issue present in this case. In enacting the discount provision of article 8306a, the Legislature has provided a definition of a lump sum recovery of an entire claim i. e., the present value of the award computed by allowing a discount of four per cent, compounded annually. We agree with the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals as to the lump sum recovery of the beneficiaries' entire claim. We disagree, however, with its refusal to discount the recovery pursuant to the provisions of article 8306a. The record shows that the twelve per cent penalty and the attorney's fees recovered under the enforcement statute were calculated by relying on the undiscounted lump sum award. The entry of a proper judgment calls for calculations that we think could best be made by the trial court with the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the courts below are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for the entry of a judgment in accordance with this opinion. Dissenting opinion by BARROW, J., in which STEAKLEY, POPE and DANIEL, JJ., join.