Opinion ID: 1706978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient evidence of negligence.

Text: ¶ 8. Valley Gas contends that the Plaintiffs failed to make a jury issue on negligence because they failed in the burden of proof on the elements of both breach and proximate cause. Furthermore, Valley Gas contends that the trial court erred in denying its Motion for JNOV and/or in denying its peremptory instruction, D-1. The Plaintiffs assert that they provided legally sufficient evidence of negligence and that the verdict of the jury should be affirmed. ¶ 9. When reviewing the trial court's denial of a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, this Court's scope of review is limited as follows: Where, as here, the trial judge has refused to grant a motion for JNOV, we examine all of the evidencenot just evidence which supports the non-movant's casein the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. All credible evidence tending to support the non-movant's case and all favorable inferences reasonably drawn therefrom are accepted as true and redound to the benefit of the non-mover. If the facts and inferences so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, the motion should be granted. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the jury verdict should be allowed to stand and the motion denied, and, if it has been so denied, we have no authority to reverse. C & C Trucking Co. v. Smith, 612 So.2d 1092, 1098 (Miss.1992) (citing Royal Oil Co. v. Wells, 500 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss.1986); Stubblefield v. Jesco, Inc., 464 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss. 1984); City of Jackson v. Locklar, 431 So.2d 475, 478 (Miss.1983); Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 652, 657 (Miss.1975)). Furthermore, [t]he rule in this state is that the action of the trial court upon a motion for a new trial is to be favorably considered upon appeal and supported unless manifest error appears or unless its action in sustaining the motion manifests an abuse of discretion. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hancock, 309 So.2d 867, 871 (Miss.1975). ¶ 10. In order to support a finding of liability on the part of Valley Gas, the Plaintiffs were required to prove each of the basic elements of negligence, i.e., duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages, by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hardy v. K Mart Corp., 669 So.2d 34, 37-38 (Miss.1996) (citing Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354 (Miss.1990) (citing Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491-92 (Miss.1987))). In the instant case, Valley Gas admits that it owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the inspection and repair of the subject gas line under the same or similar circumstances. Valley Gas also admits that certain damages were suffered by the Plaintiffs as a result of the subject fire. Therefore, the only questions that remain before this Court is whether the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, is sufficient to show that there was a breach of the duty owed by Valley Gas and that such breach was the proximate cause of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs. ¶ 11. A.K. Rosenhan, expert witness for the Plaintiffs, testified that Charles Reed's actions in inspecting and repairing the gas leak were not reasonably sufficient under the circumstances. Reed testified that when he arrived at the scene he repaired the blowing leak by cutting four feet of the pipe off and placing a one-inch night cap on the broken line to stop the leak. Reed further testified that he performed a bubble test or soap test to detect whether the line was still leaking around the area where the one-inch night cap was placed. Reed also testified that for fifteen minutes after capping the pipeline that he walked along the one-inch line back to the main line conducting a smell test to determine whether there were any other leaks. ¶ 12. However, Valley Gas' service procedures required the following procedure for outside gas leaks: Gas Outside. The first consideration is to be certain that the gas is not also migrating inside. Use the leak machine and your nose. If gas is found or suspected to be inside, take the action discussed under Gas Inside, above. The hazard from gas outside is fire. Persons, property and source of ignition should be removed and kept away. Reed testified that he had a leak machine, the CGI machine, with him at the scene but that he did not use it because he did not believe it was necessary. Rosenhan testified that in addition to capping the broken pipeline that a leak test with the CGI machine should have been conducted. ¶ 13. Thus, the Plaintiffs satisfied their burden to provide evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might conclude that there was a breach of the duty owed by Valley Gas for its employee's failure to perform a leak test for the detection of any underground leaks. ¶ 14. Next, the question remains of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the breach of the duty owed by Valley Gas was the proximate cause of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff's. First, the evidence in the instant case showed that on May 2, 1992, a City of Greenwood employee, Herbert Davis, accidentally hit an underground natural gas pipeline thus breaking the gas line and pulling it two feet above ground with it blowing gas. Charles Reed was contacted to come out and repair the gas line, and after performing a soap test on the capped line and a nose test along the underground portion of the broken line, Reed was satisfied that the leak was repaired and left the scene. Then, on May 4, 1992, a fire broke out in the area where the pipeline was broken and destroyed many of the residents' surrounding houses. Several residents testified that before detecting the fire that they heard a loud noise similar to the sound of thunder, a bomb going off, or a stick of dynamite exploding. Residents in the area testified that for the two days following the repair of the broken pipeline and before the start of the fire on May 4 that they smelled gas. ¶ 15. Rosenhan, expert witness for the Plaintiffs, testified that in his expert opinion the cause of the fire on May 4 was natural gas. Rosenhan testified that there was a leak over a couple of days duration that built up to a concentration that was capable of being ignited.... Any number of things can ignite a cloud of gas. But the point is that gas had to be underground to start with, to build up and it had to be concentrated at some point in somewhat of an enclosure, not out in the middle of the yard. But that is based on the physical facts that I saw, the witness statements as they've described the initiation of the fire, and the spread of the fire is all consistent with that scenario. In addition, the Plaintiffs' other expert witness in fire origin and cause, Dave Berry, Jr., testified that the fire was a result of the rapid ignition of natural gas in the area of the 318 Rear Ash. Berry stated that all of the following were taken into consideration to reach this opinion: talking to witnesses in the area, the descriptions that they gave describing the explosion, the fire, the rapid spread of it, [and] the conditions that had existed a couple of days prior to the fire. ¶ 16. Valley Gas, however, contends that the Plaintiffs' expert witnesses' opinions were nothing more than mere speculation and that they failed to remove the inference of causation from the realm of conjecture. Valley Gas bases its contention on the expert witnesses' failure to identify a source of ignition. Valley Gas also relies on positive testimony that there was no underground leak following the capping of the blowing leak and that the results of a flame pack survey conducted after the fire showed no leak. ¶ 17. Valley Gas asserts that the case sub judice is substantially similar to Rudd v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 618 So.2d 68 (Miss.1993), and that as a result, its motion for JNOV should have been sustained. In Rudd, a passenger was injured in an elevator accident and filed a personal injury action alleging negligence against Montgomery Elevator Company in its maintenance of the elevator. Rudd, 618 So.2d at 70-71. The elevator accident occurred several hours after a service call by one of Montgomery's agents. Id. at 70. The Court held that in order [t]o make a jury issue on liability ... it was incumbent upon Rudd to establish by competent evidence that Montgomery was somehow negligent in its maintenance and repair of the elevator and that this negligence caused it to malfunction that day. Id. at 72. ¶ 18. Cunningham, Rudd's expert witness, testified that the cause of the malfunction was a misalignment of a roller at the fourth floor, which would have been obvious to Hincks, Montgomery's service agent. Id. In forming this opinion, Cunningham's sole basis was a conjecture arising from inspecting the elevator a year and a half following the incident, examining the maintenance and repair tickets, and the testimony of Hincks. Id. at 73. However, Hincks gave positive testimony that the rollers were in alignment when he serviced the elevator, that the elevator operated smoothly for over half an hour inspection and continued to operate smoothly, and that he did find a misalignment at the fourth floor level the next day. Rudd, 618 So.2d at 73. The Court, however, found that there was nothing more than pure speculation that Hincks somehow missed this misalignment the previous day. Id. The Court stated that [a]gainst such conjecture was Hincks's positive testimony there was no misalignment on November 11, and the fact that the elevator continued to operate smoothly without mishap for at least another eighteen to twenty hours. Id. (citing Samuels v. Mladineo, 608 So.2d 1170 (Miss.1992)). The Court, affirming the trial court's sustaining of Montgomery's motion for JNOV, stated: It might very well be true that Hincks somehow missed seeing a misalignment of the roller on November 11, just as it might be true that Montgomery could have rendered better maintenance and repair service which would have detected and prevented whatever it was that caused the malfunction on November 11. It was incumbent upon Rudd, however, to offer something beyond pure speculation that there was negligence of this nature and that it in fact caused the malfunction. Cunningham's testimony with all reasonable inferences based thereon, carries us no further than simple speculation. Id. at 73. ¶ 19. Valley Gas contends that the case sub judice is analogous to Rudd. Valley Gas asserts that the Plaintiffs' expert witnesses' opinions are based on nothing more than speculation and conjecture arising from examinations of the grossly disturbed scene, some six days after the fire for Rosenhan; review of depositions, statements, reports, videos and photographs provided by counsel for Plaintiffs; and conversations with the Fire Marshall and witnesses. Valley Gas further asserts that there was positive testimony from Reed that a fifteen minute inspection detected no underground leak following the capping of the blowing leak. Valley Gas also contends that following the fire, a flame pack survey found no leak. ¶ 20. Plaintiffs, however, contend that the case sub judice is different from Rudd because there was evidence that Reed was negligent by not conducting a leak test with a CGI machine to detect for underground leaks which was required by Valley Gas' own maintenance procedures. Plaintiffs also assert that Valley Gas was negligent in failing to respond before the fire to the trouble ticket to kill service to the damaged line left by Reed two days before the fire. Plaintiffs assert that they submitted legally sufficient evidence of negligence and that the jury's verdict should be affirmed. ¶ 21. This Court has additionally held that negligence may be proved by circumstantial evidence where the circumstances are such as to remove the case from the realm of conjecture and place it within the field of legitimate inference. Kussman v. V & G Welding Supply, Inc., 585 So.2d 700, 703 (Miss.1991) (citing Cadillac Corp. v. Moore, 320 So.2d 361, 366 (Miss.1975)); see also Hardy, 669 So.2d at 38; Brown Oil Tools, Inc. v. Schmidt, 246 Miss. 238, 246, 148 So.2d 685, 688 (1963); Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., 206 Miss. 680, 698, 40 So.2d 582, 586 (1949). The rule regarding the proof of causation from circumstantial evidence is set forth in 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 461 which states: Proof of the necessary factual causal connection may be by either direct or circumstantial evidence, but in the event the latter is used, it must be sufficient to make plaintiff's asserted theory reasonably probable, not merely possible, and more probable than any other theory based on such evidence, and it is generally for the trier of fact to say whether circumstantial evidence meets this test. 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 461 (1989) (footnotes omitted). In addition, when inferences of negligence can be drawn from circumstantial evidence is addressed further in 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 462 which provides as follows: In the absence of direct or specific positive evidence, negligence may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances surrounding injury, if not from the fact of injury itself. However, while inferences of negligence may be drawn from circumstantial evidence, those inferences must be the only ones which reasonably could be drawn from the evidence presented, and if the circumstantial evidence presented lends itself equally to several conflicting inferences, the trier of fact is not permitted to select the inference it prefers, since to do so would be the equivalent of engaging in pure speculation about the facts. Where plaintiff in a negligence action has only presented proof that the actual cause was one of a number of possibilities, to enable an inference to be drawn that any particular cause is probable, the other causes must be eliminated. Thus, when the evidence shows that it is just as likely that accident might have occurred from causes other than defendant's negligence, the inference that his negligence was the proximate cause may not be drawn. 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 462 (1989) (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, this Court has also had occasion to observe that it is only in rare and exceptional cases that a civil case depending upon circumstantial evidence should be taken from the jury. BFGoodrich, Inc. v. Taylor, 509 So.2d 895, 904 (Miss. 1987) (citing Smith v. Estate of Gilbert, 498 So.2d 823 (Miss.1986); Douglas v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 405 So.2d 107 (Miss.1981); Cameron v. Hootsell, 229 Miss. 80, 90 So.2d 195 (1956)). ¶ 22. We find that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence on the issue of negligence for the issue to be presented to the jury. On May 2, an underground gas pipeline was pulled above ground by a City of Greenwood employee operating an excavator, and the broken pipeline was blowing gas. Valley Gas' employee, Charles Reed, sufficiently repaired the blowing leak, but he failed to follow Valley Gas' own procedures and perform a leak test to detect for any underground leaks. Residents testified that the smell of gas was in the area throughout the weekend after Reed repaired the blowing leak. Residents also testified as to hearing a loud noise comparable to a bomb or thunder before the fire began on May 4. As a result, we hold that the jury's verdict finding Valley Gas to be negligent should be affirmed and that the trial court did not err in denying Valley Gas' motion for JNOV because this Court's scope of review of a denial of a motion for JNOV requires that where there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the jury verdict should be allowed to stand and the motion denied, and, if it has been so denied, we have no authority to reverse. C & C Trucking Co., 612 So.2d at 1098 (citations omitted).