Opinion ID: 2077155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: compulsory process claims

Text: The defendant next claims that the state violated his federal and state constitutional rights to compulsory process by failing to give him notice that it had released Stevenson from his subpoena, thus rendering Stevenson unavailable to testify at trial when he then left the jurisdiction for a vacation. The record reveals the following additional facts and procedural history relevant to these claims. On Thursday, April 19, 2007, after the state had rested its case, the trial court denied the defendant's oral motion for a judgment of acquittal and asked the defendant if he was ready to proceed with his case. Defense counsel responded that he had several witnesses to call, but that only one, J, was ready at that time. Defense counsel stated his intention to call numerous teachers from the victim's school, but advised the court that he was unable to have subpoenas served on them because of a school vacation during the week of the trial. He also stated that he had expected the state's presentation of its case-in-chief to last longer, because the state's witness list included several police officers, namely, Wisnie, Barbara Alenckis and Stevenson, that it had not called to testify. Defense counsel then asked the trial court to permit him to call J to testify that day, and then continue the proceedings until Monday, April 23, to allow him time to subpoena the police officers to testify then, and have the teachers subpoenaed to testify the next day, Tuesday, April 24. After learning that the defendant's proposed continuance would pose scheduling problems for several jurors, the trial court continued the case, over the state's objection, to the following Thursday, April 26. Subsequently, on Tuesday, April 24, defense counsel requested an opportunity to speak with the trial court, which convened a hearing for that afternoon. Defense counsel then advised the court that he had learned that, at some point on the preceding Thursday, April 19, the state had released Stevenson from his subpoena. [21] Defense counsel stated that, when his subpoenas were served on the police officers on Friday, April 20, he was advised that Stevenson had left for a vacation and would not return until Monday, April 30. Defense counsel then requested information from the prosecutor concerning when she had released Stevenson from his subpoena, and also asked for permission to argue that Stevenson, who was crucial to the defendant's case, was a missing witness pursuant to State v. Malave, 250 Conn. 722, 739-40, 737 A.2d 442 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170, 120 S.Ct. 1195, 145 L.Ed.2d 1099 (2000). [22] After responding to the trial court's questions for defense counsel about the legal basis for his assertion that the state was obligated to notify him prior to releasing Stevenson from the subpoena, [23] defense counsel made a comprehensive offer of proof regarding Stevenson's expected testimony, noting that Stevenson had taken oral and written statements from both the defendant and the victim, and could testify further about the defendant's cooperation during the course of the investigation. The trial court then adjourned the proceedings without ruling on the defendant's request. Subsequently, on April 27, which was the last day of evidence, the defendant reiterated his request, which the trial court had rejected the day before, to offer into evidence his written statement, which Stevenson had taken on May 5, 2006. [24] The trial court permitted the defendant to make an offer of proof and to mark a copy of his statement for identification, although it had concluded the day before that the defendant's statement was inadmissible under the evidentiary rule set forth in State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 254, 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S.Ct. 1455, 79 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). [25] See also footnote 24 of this opinion. Defense counsel then argued that the state's strategic decision not to introduce the teachers' testimony, as well as its decision not to elicit the testimony of the police officers in conjunction with its reliance on the Stepney rule, as incorporated into § 8-3(1)(A) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, constituted prosecutorial impropriety. In response, the state argued that it could not present its case through statements without subjecting its witnesses, including the victim, to cross-examination, and that it was under the same constraints as a defense in that regard. The state further argued that it had provided all exculpatory matter to the defense earlier in the proceedings. The trial court concluded that it did not find any evidence of prosecutorial impropriety. [26] After the trial court canvassed the defendant concerning his decision not to testify on his own behalf, and discussed the jury charge with the parties, defense counsel then asked the trial court about the scope to which it would permit argument with respect to the state's failure to present certain witnesses. The prosecutor argued, however, that it was concerned about having to prove a negative, in that the jury did not hear about what investigation may or may not have been done or wasn't done. In response, the defendant argued that it was a tactical decision [the prosecutor] made that the court says is not prosecutorial impropriety. . . . [The prosecutor] can't have her cake and eat it too. [The prosecutor] released the witnesses and I tried to present them as best I can, and I don't believe I don't have the temerity to ask the court to continue this trial [ until ] Monday to havebecause. . . Stevenson will be here . . . and it looks like from the court's rulings, most of what he did is already into evidence, although the issue of the statement of the defendant is not in evidence, but it is in evidence through other witnesses. Just like the saliva sample can be testified to . . . as being done voluntarily because that's in evidence through some of the witnesses . . . it's a situation the state has created. . . . (Emphasis added.) The trial court permitted the defendant to argue a lack of evidence, but not to suggest that the state was hiding or [c]oncealing evidence, and emphasized further that the defendant could not argue that the state had an obligation to produce a certain witness, or argue . . . because the state didn't bring in certain witnesses, that, as defense counsel stated, they're hiding something. [27] The parties then proceeded to give their summations. Following the jury's verdict, the defendant renewed this claim in a written motion for a new trial as a federal due process violation, contending that the prosecutor's actions were unethical and resulted in the trial court depriving him of his right to a fair trial.