Opinion ID: 1925563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Motion to Disqualify GAL

Text: Mark also filed a motion to disqualify the GAL. Essentially, Mark alleged that the GAL should be forced to withdraw because she was biased in favor of Katrina. The trial court ordered that the GAL be appointed counsel. A hearing was held on the motion, and at the end of the hearing, the motion was overruled. Subsequently, during a hearing on Mark's motion to hold the GAL in contempt, Mark orally requested the court to order the GAL to withdraw. Both motions were overruled. On appeal, Mark argues the trial court erred in overruling his motions to disqualify the GAL. We have yet to address the appropriate standard to review a trial court's decision to overrule a party's motion to disqualify a GAL. Upon due consideration, we determine that a motion to disqualify a GAL for bias or partiality is similar to a motion to recuse a judge for bias or partiality. Therefore, such a decision is initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and we will not disturb that decision absent an abuse of discretion. See Gibilisco v. Gibilisco, 263 Neb. 27, 637 N.W.2d 898 (2002) (on appeal, denial of motion to recuse trial judge for bias or partiality will be affirmed absent abuse of discretion). See, also, Wrightson v. Wrightson, 266 Ga. 493, 467 S.E.2d 578 (1996) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to disqualify GAL); State in Interest of Orgill, 636 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1981) (juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to disqualify GAL). On appeal, Mark points to certain factors as evidence of bias, including statements by various affiants that they felt the GAL was biased in favor of Katrina, and Mark's own assertion that the GAL ignored evidence presented by a variety of people that was favorable to him. We have reviewed the relevant evidence and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Mark's motion to disqualify the GAL. First, the affidavits upon which Mark relies merely state the affiants' opinions that the GAL seemed to be biased toward Katrina and uninterested in what the affiants had to say. Because the affiants were Mark's sisters and friend, it hardly constitutes an abuse of discretion for the trial court to attach appropriate weight to their opinions of bias. Moreover, Mark's assertion that the GAL ignored evidence favorable to his case is just thatan assertion. There is no evidence that the GAL purposely ignored evidence favorable to Mark's case. Mark also asserted that the GAL's failure to submit a report at the time established by the court and the GAL's failure to report Katrina's conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) to the court were also evidence of bias. But after reviewing the relevant evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Mark's motion to disqualify the GAL. The GAL learned of the DUI because of Katrina's self-reporting, and the GAL then independently investigated the circumstances, including where the children were at the time of the event, and requested a chemical dependency evaluation of Katrina. There is no evidence that the GAL's omission of the DUI was done for any nefarious purpose or the hiding of evidence that was available to both parties. Likewise, Mark has pointed to no evidence which supports his contention that the GAL report was submitted late to prejudice his case and Mark did not assign as error the trial court's decision to overrule his motion to quash the report. This entire assignment of error is without merit.