Opinion ID: 1122777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: History and purpose of the 1978 initiative.

Text: In construing an initiative measure, the California courts have often referred to the analysis and arguments in the voters' pamphlet as an aid to ascertaining the intention of the framers and the electorate. [11] ( Carter v. Com. on Qualifications, etc. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 179, 185 [93 P.2d 140]; see White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775, fn. 11 [120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222] and cases there cited.) In the present instance, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst of the 1978 death penalty initiative (Prop. 7 Nov. 1978 ballot) merely reiterates an abridged version of the initiative, and extends no assistance as to the meaning of any ambiguous terms. The argument advanced by the proponents, however, offers some clues. The 1978 initiative repealed provisions of the 1977 act requiring physical presence and a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing before the jury could find a felony murder special circumstance. (4), (3b) The deletion of an express statutory provision implies an intent to change the substantive law (see, e.g., Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 231-232 [273 P.2d 5]); the repeal of language requiring that the defendant act with the intent to cause death (former § 190.2, subd. (b)) thus implies a purpose to permit a special circumstance finding without proof of intent. The ballot arguments, however, communicated a contrary purpose. The proponents' initial argument referred obliquely to eliminating the physical presence requirement, but made no reference to eliminating the intent to kill requirement. [12] Their argument in rebuttal strongly implied that the initiative, in subdivision (b), retained an intent to kill requirement. The opponents of the initiative charged that Proposition 7 could be construed to impose the death penalty for an unintended killing. They claimed that a man or woman could be sentenced to die for lending another person a screwdriver to use in a burglary, if the other person accidentally killed someone during the burglary. Even if the man or woman was not present during the burglary, had no intention that anyone be killed or hurt, in fact urged the burglar not to take a weapon along, they could still be sentenced to die. In rebuttal to that charge, the proponents responded: ALRIGHT, LET'S TALK ABOUT FALSE ADVERTISING. [¶] The opposition maintains if someone were to lend a screwdriver to his neighbor and the neighbor used it to commit a murder, the poor lender could get the death penalty, even though `he had NO INTENTION that anyone be killed.' [¶] Please turn back and read Section 6b [now § 190.2, subd. (b)].... It says that the person must have INTENTIONALLY aided in the commission of a murder to be subject to the death penalty under this initiative. This rebuttal is our best evidence of the intent of the drafters and the voters. In the hypothetical case it discusses, the poor lender had intentionally aided in the commission of a burglary, a section 189 felony. Thus, in proclaiming that the term intentionally aiding ... in the commission of murder in subdivision (b) bars imposition of the death penalty upon the lender, the proponents are necessarily construing that term to require an intent to kill, not merely an intent to commit the underlying felony. In short, it apparently was the intent of the framers  an intent which they emphatically communicated to the voters  that an accomplice would face the death penalty only if he intentionally aided a killing. The hypothetical case focused on the liability of the accomplice; the unfortunate other person who accidentally killed someone during a burglary received only the briefest mention. The rebuttal, however, expressly derived its intentionality requirement from section 6b of the initiative, and if the voter turned for clarification to the specific language of that section, he would have found that it was not limited to accomplices but applied to [e]very person including the actual killer. The adoption of a law to permit infliction of the death penalty upon an accidental killer would be a momentous step, raising grave moral questions. Nothing in the ballot arguments suggested that the framers intended to take such a step; certainly nothing communicated any such intention to the voters. [13] We conclude that the history of the initiative, as well as its wording, supports a construction limiting the felony murder special circumstances to persons who intend to kill or aid in a killing.