Opinion ID: 2514220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in a Marriage Context

Text: [¶ 20] The husband claims that the wife's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim should have been dismissed because this court has not recognized the tort in a marital context. Although Wyoming has abrogated interspousal immunity and has adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we have not had the opportunity to address whether the tort is available in a marital context. Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Wyo.1987); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo.1986). When this court adopted the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress cause of action, we adopted the definition provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1065. To recover under an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous and that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional harm. Anderson v. Solvay Minerals, Inc., 3 P.3d 236, 241 (Wyo.2000). [¶ 21] Courts and legislatures have historically tried to remain uninvolved in regulating behavior within a marriage in an effort to preserve domestic harmony. Meredith L. Taylor, Comment, North Carolina's Recognition of Tort Liability for the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress During Marriage, 32 Wake Forest L.Rev. 1261, 1267 (1997). Recently, however, courts have begun to acknowledge claims for civil relief in the marital context, reasoning that a tort claim may provide a better remedy than a divorce action does. Id. Indeed, judicial recognition of emotional distress claims in the context of marriages has been described as a national trend. Id. [¶ 22] Those who oppose recognizing civil relief among married persons worry that (1) it will open the floodgates to a host of frivolous litigation; (2) because married persons share an intensely personal and intimate relationship, when discord arises, it is inevitable they will suffer emotional distress, often severe; and (3) the inquiry into whether a spouse's conduct is extreme and outrageous constitutes too great an intrusion into the marital relationship. [¶ 23] We acknowledge and have seriously contemplated these concerns. In many marriages, and undoubtedly in most troubled marriages, a high level of emotional antagonism exists between the spouses, and it is likely that volatile circumstances will often be perceived as extreme and outrageous. We have questioned whether legal intrusion into behavior which occurs within a marriage is appropriate and whether legal relief in addition to a divorce is justified for an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim in light of this fact. We conclude they are. Emotional distress is as real and tormenting as physical pain, and psychological well-being deserves as much legal protection as physical well-being. Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Me.1993). Although the preservation of marital harmony is a respectable goal, behavior which is truly outrageous and results in severe emotional distress should not be protected in some sort of misguided attempt to promote marital peace. Id. [¶ 24] In coming to this decision, we also identified the responsibility to guard against frivolous litigation. Only situations involving atrocious and outrageous behavior should be compensated; conduct which is merely insulting or offensive should not. Taylor, supra, at 1264. [M]ost marriages do not include conduct that will support an action for emotional distress. While most marriages ending in divorce see their share of insults, indignities, threats, annoyances and petty oppressions as well as transient and trivial mental anguish, the Restatement expressly excludes such things from forming the basis for liability. Bradley A. Case, Note, Turning Marital Misery into Financial Fortune: Assertion of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims by Divorcing Spouses, 33 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 101, 115 (1994). [¶ 25] We emphasize that a high standard for recovery shall exist and direct trial courts to be especially cautious when handling such claims. The focus of such claims must be on the element of outrageousness, and the scrutiny must be stringent enough so that the social good which comes from recognizing the tort in a marital setting will not be undermined by an invasive flood of meritless litigation. Henriksen, 622 A.2d at 1139. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was so extreme and outrageous that it exceeded all possible bounds of decency. Restatement, supra, § 46 cmt. d. In addition: It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Id., at cmt. h. Accordingly, we intend for motions for summary judgment to be carefully considered in an effort to protect defendants from the possibility of long and intrusive trials on frivolous claims. Henriksen, 622 A.2d at 1139-40. [¶ 26] We are convinced that extreme and outrageous conduct by one spouse which results in severe emotional distress to the other spouse should not be ignored by virtue of the marriage of the victim to the aggressor and hold that such behavior can create an independent cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In making this decision, we set the threshold of outrageousness high in hopes it will adequately defend against a flood of frivolous litigation.
[¶ 27] The wife complains that the trial court's decision to hear the tort issues along with the divorce issues deprived her of her right to have a jury decide her tort claims. Relying on W.R.C.P. 38(a), the husband replies that the wife was not entitled to a jury trial because her action did not exclusively involve the recovery of money. [¶ 28] A civil action in tort is fundamentally different from a divorce proceeding. Henriksen, 622 A.2d at 1141. The issues involved in each are entirely distinct, and the procedure involved in divorce actions, which are purely equitable, makes joining tort claims impracticable. Id. The purpose of a tort action is to redress a legal wrong in damages; that of a divorce action is to sever the marital relationship between the parties, and where appropriate, to fix the parties' respective rights and obligations with regard to alimony and support, and to divide the marital estate. Id. (quoting Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (1988) (citations omitted)). [¶ 29] A most basic procedural difference between tort and divorce actions is the right to a jury trial in tort actions. [D]ivorce actions will become unduly complicated in their trial and disposition if torts can be or must be litigated in the same action. A divorce action is highly equitable in nature, whereas the trial of a tort claim is at law and may well involve, as in this case, a request for a trial by jury. The administration of justice will be better served by keeping the proceedings separate. Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602, 604 (Colo.Ct.App.1988) (quoting Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah 1983)). Moreover, joining the actions risks unacceptable delays: Resolution of tort claims may necessarily involve numerous witnesses and other parties such as joint tortfeasors and insurance carriers whose interests are at stake. Consequently, requiring joinder of tort claims in a divorce action could unduly lengthen the period of time before a spouse could obtain a divorce and result in such adverse consequences as delayed child custody and support determinations. Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis.2d 347, 421 N.W.2d 505, 508 (1988) (quoting Stuart v. Stuart, 140 Wis.2d 455, 410 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Ct.App. 1987)). [¶ 30] The goal to promote judicial economy should not be sought at the expense of fair and proper consideration of the parties' issues. Jurors, many of whom are themselves married, are in the best possible position to determine what behavior between spouses is `atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,' [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)], and what behavior is within the `ebb and flow' of married life. Henriksen, 622 A.2d at 1139.
[¶ 31] Because our holding precludes tort issues from being joined with marital dissolution issues, we feel compelled to address how the doctrine of res judicata affects this situation. The doctrine of res judicata prohibits the relitigation of claims upon which there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a court of competent jurisdiction. RKS v. SDM by TY (Paternity of SDM), 882 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Wyo. 1994). Res judicata can be described generally as that rule which precludes the presentation by parties or those in privity with them of the same claim that was resolved by an earlier judgment. Id. Res judicata avoids inconsistent decisions, limits parties to one opportunity to try their cases on the merits, and prevents the legal system from becoming unmanageable. Id. The criteria used to determine res judicata's applicability to a situation are: (1) the parties were identical; (2) the subject matter was identical; (3) the issues were the same and related to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons were identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them. Newell v. Trumper, 765 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Swasso [v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division], 751 P.2d [887,] 890 [(Wyo.1988)]). Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d 960, 964 (Wyo. 1996). [¶ 32] Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in a prior action is conclusive and bars all subsequent actions between the same parties, or their privies, as to all matters which were or might have been litigated in the prior action. State, Department of Family Services v. PAJ, 934 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Wyo.1997). Before res judicata will act as a bar to subsequent claims, the claims in the subsequent action must be identical to those in the first proceeding. Osborn, 909 P.2d at 964. We, therefore, must analyze the two types of actions involved in this case. [¶ 33] As we stated above, the purpose of a divorce is to dissolve a marriage, which includes consideration by a judge of issues such as child custody, child support, and alimony. A tort action is brought to recover compensation for injuries suffered as a result of a civil wrong and is normally decided by a jury. Henriksen, 622 A.2d at 1141. These types of actions are fundamentally different, and the issues involved in each are completely unrelated. Id. Consequently, the requisite identical subject matter for the doctrine to bar the subsequent action does not exist. The fact that Wyoming allows fault to be considered in divorce proceedings does not convince us otherwise. Section 20-2-114. The two actions simply do not involve the same claim. [¶ 34] We conclude that the efficient administration of divorce actions requires their separation from actions at law and such separation of the claims will not trigger the res judicata doctrine. The wife's tort claims were improperly joined with the divorce action. We reverse the trial court's decision to join the causes of action together in one proceeding and remand for a determination by a jury.