Opinion ID: 799396
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of Judicial Review

Text: Our discussion will be brief because the history of judicial review of VA decisionmaking is a short one. Congress established the VA in 1930. Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 863, § 1, 46 Stat. 1016, 1016. Three years later, Congress prohibited judicial review of the VA's benefits decisions. Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (All decisions rendered by the Administrator under ... this title, or the regulations issued pursuant thereto, shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review ... any such decision.); see also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 587, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934) (construing the statute to remove the possibility of judicial relief). Congress has consistently precluded judicial review of veterans' benefits determinations thereafter. Larrabee ex rel. Jones v. Derwinski, 968 F.2d 1497, 1499 (2d Cir.1992). Over time, however, exceptions to the preclusion provision began to appear. This development occurred most notably in the D.C. Circuit, see, e.g., Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469, 472-73 (D.C.Cir.1967), where a procession of decisions ... `significantly narrow[ed] the preclusion statute' and limited its application to bar review of challenges related to initial filing of claims. Larrabee ex rel. Jones, 968 F.2d at 1500 (quoting Note, Judicial Review of Allegedly Ultra Vires Actions of the Veterans' Administration: Does 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) Preclude Review?, 55 Fordham L.Rev. 579, 596 (1987) (alteration in original)). In response to the D.C. Circuit's fairly tortured construction of the jurisdictional limitation, in 1970 Congress reemphasized its clear intent that the exemption from judicial review ... be all inclusive, and it amended the statute to provide that except for certain contractual benefits, the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be unreviewable. H.R.Rep. No. 91-1166 at 10 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3723, 3730-31. The result was 38 U.S.C. § 211, [9] the precursor to § 511, which we construe here. Four years later, the Supreme Court interpreted § 211 in the context of an equal protection challenge to statutes related to veterans' benefits. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974). The Supreme Court held that § 211 precluded only review of decisions that arise in the administration by the Veterans' Administration of a statute providing benefits for veterans. Id. at 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160 (emphasis added). Declaring that construing § 211 to eliminate all federal court review of constitutional challenges to veterans' benefits legislation would raise serious questions concerning the constitutionality of § 211, and invoking the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the Court construed § 211 to allow federal court review of a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute itself. Id. at 366-67, 94 S.Ct. 1160. The Robison Court therefore concluded that district courts had jurisdiction to consider a direct facial challenge to statutes affecting veterans' benefits. Id. at 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160. Fourteen years after deciding Robison, the Supreme Court revisited the jurisdictional limitations of § 211 in Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988). There, the Court held that § 211 did not bar federal courts from reviewing whether the VA's regulations conflicted with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which requires that federal programs not discriminate against handicapped individuals solely because of their handicap. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 545, 108 S.Ct. 1372. Section 211(a), the Court said, insulates from review decisions of law and fact ... made in interpreting or applying a particular provision of that statute to a particular set of facts. Id. at 543, 108 S.Ct. 1372. The Court noted that the VA had no special expertise in assessing the validity of its regulations against a later passed statute of general application. Id. at 544, 108 S.Ct. 1372. The Court doubted that permitting federal court review would interfere with the VA or burden the agency with expensive and time-consuming litigation. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court invited the VA to seek[ ] appropriate relief from Congress if experience proves otherwise. Id. at 544-45, 108 S.Ct. 1372.