Opinion ID: 1182362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiffs' Right to Jury Trial

Text: (1) If there were equitable issues in this case which were properly triable by the court, and if the resolution of those issues left nothing remaining to be tried by the jury with respect to plaintiffs' first cause of action, then the court had the authority to treat the jury's verdict and findings as advisory only. (See Stearns v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 244 Cal. App.2d 696, 725-726 [53 Cal. Rptr. 482, 21 A.L.R.3d 164], and cases cited at p. 671, infra.) From the foregoing analysis of the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, it seems evident that plaintiffs originally sought both equitable and legal relief based upon Gibraltar's alleged conduct. (2) An action to set aside a trust deed foreclosure is an equitable action and one in which the plaintiff ordinarily would have no right to jury trial. ( Rablin v. Greiner, 4 Cal.2d 255, 257 [48 P.2d 696]; Estudillo v. Security Loan etc. Co., 158 Cal. 66, 71 [109 P. 884]; see Py v. Pleitner, 70 Cal. App.2d 576, 579 [161 P.2d 393].) (3) On the other hand, a suit to recover damages for fraud or breach of contract is an action at law in which a right to jury trial ordinarily exists. ( Hutchason v. Marks, 54 Cal. App.2d 113 [128 P.2d 573] [fraud]; Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 512, 517 [36 P.2d 635, 95 A.L.R. 990] [fraud]; Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d 438, 461-462 [326 P.2d 484] [breach of contract]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 592 [breach of contract].) At trial, however, plaintiffs made an election of remedies in order to secure a trial by jury. In response to the trial court's statement of intention to proceed with the equitable issues, plaintiffs' counsel voluntarily waived any right to set aside the foreclosure sale, stating that plaintiffs were going to proceed on purely a question of law having to do with damages under the various causes of action in their complaint. Clearly, plaintiffs' counsel appreciated the substantial risk that if the court tried the equitable issues first, plaintiffs might forfeit their right to a jury trial altogether. (4) It is well established that, in a case involving both legal and equitable issues, the trial court may proceed to try the equitable issues first, without a jury (or, as here, with an advisory jury), and that if the court's determination of those issues is also dispositive of the legal issues, nothing further remains to be tried by a jury. ( Connell v. Bowes, 19 Cal.2d 870, 872 [123 P.2d 456]; Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App.2d 592, 609 [53 Cal. Rptr. 25]; Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 181 Cal. App.2d 289, 295 [5 Cal. Rptr. 263].) Thus, plaintiffs' tactic in seeking damages only was aimed at removing the equitable issues from the case. Plaintiffs did not, however, simply dismiss their first cause of action. Instead, under the assumption that the factual allegations of the first cause of action were sufficient to justify an award of damages for violation of Gibraltar's oral promise to postpone the sale, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their third (fraud) and fourth (breach of contract) causes of action. As plaintiffs' counsel stated to the court ... that [the first cause of action], of necessity, includes the fourth cause of action for breach of an oral agreement not to foreclose. It is of necessity included in the first cause of action. This dismissal of the third and fourth causes of action occurred at the end of trial, after all the evidence had been received. (5, 6) Thus, when the smoke created by plaintiffs' various maneuvers had finally cleared, plaintiffs were left with (1) a cause of action for damages for conversion, and (2) a cause of action for damages for breach of the oral promise to postpone the sale. As the relief sought in both causes of action was damages, and as the legal or equitable nature of a cause of action ordinarily is determined by the mode of relief to be afforded ( Philpott v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.2d 512, 516; Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App.2d 906, 911-912 [42 Cal. Rptr. 366]), plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. Gibraltar contends, however, that plaintiffs' first cause of action invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a doctrine which employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced. (See Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 70 Cal.2d 240, 249-250 [74 Cal. Rptr. 398, 449 P.2d 462]; Healy v. Brewster, 59 Cal.2d 455, 463 [30 Cal. Rptr. 129, 380 P.2d 817]; Rest. Contracts, § 90.) [1] Under Gibraltar's view of the case, the trial court properly treated the issue of promissory estoppel as an equitable one for its consideration and, having found against plaintiffs on that issue, nothing in plaintiffs' first cause of action remained to be tried by a jury. (7a) It is true that in their first cause of action and throughout the trial, plaintiffs appeared to rely almost exclusively upon a promissory estoppel theory, namely, that Gibraltar made a promise to postpone the sale, that plaintiffs relied thereon to their detriment, being misled and lulled into a course of inaction, and that it would be unjust to allow Gibraltar to avoid its promise. Yet the pleadings and proof did not, of course, rule out a more traditional theory of recovery, namely, ordinary breach of contract. As mentioned above, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is used to provide a substitute for the consideration which ordinarily is required to create an enforceable promise. (8) This court has recently pointed out that The purpose of this doctrine is to make a promise binding, under certain circumstances, without consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given in exchange. If the promisee's performance was requested at the time the promisor made his promise and that performance was bargained for, the doctrine is inapplicable. ( Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., supra, 70 Cal.2d 240, 249.) Plaintiffs' first cause of action, liberally construed, contains sufficient allegations to make total reliance upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel unnecessary, for plaintiffs alleged that Gibraltar promised to postpone the sale if plaintiffs procured a responsible prospective purchaser for the property. Plaintiffs' alleged procurement of such a purchaser could be found to constitute the bargained-for performance necessary to support Gibraltar's promise, without application of the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel. [2] Gibraltar contends, however, that an oral promise to postpone a foreclosure sale would be unenforceable under Civil Code section 1698, and that accordingly plaintiffs had no cause of action, legal or equitable, arising out of a breach of that promise. Section 1698 provides that A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and not otherwise. (7b) We have held that if there exists sufficient consideration for an oral modification agreement, then full performance by the promisee alone would suffice to render the agreement executed within the meaning of section 1698. ( D.L. Godbey & Sons Const. Co. v. Deane, 39 Cal.2d 429, 432 [246 P.2d 946]; see Healy v. Brewster, 251 Cal. App.2d 541, 551 [59 Cal. Rptr. 752]; Weber v. Jorgensen, 16 Cal. App.3d 74, 80-82 [93 Cal. Rptr. 668].) (9) In the absence of consideration, a gratuitous oral promise to postpone a sale of property pursuant to the terms of a trust deed ordinarily would be unenforceable under section 1698. ( Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., 15 Cal. App.3d 112, 121 [92 Cal. Rptr. 851].) (7c) Plaintiffs' alleged procurement of a responsible, prospective purchaser at Gibraltar's request would constitute good consideration for Gibraltar's promise, since such procurement was not originally part of the bargain between plaintiffs and Gibraltar, and constituted both detriment to plaintiffs (through the expenditure of time and energy negotiating with possible purchasers) and benefit to Gibraltar (through the potential substitution of a solvent purchaser in place of plaintiffs, rendering foreclosure unnecessary). Such detriment and benefit each would constitute good consideration for a promise in this state. (Civ. Code, § 1605; see Corbin, Contracts, § 192, at pp. 180-181; Rest. Contracts, § 84, subd. (c); House v. Lala, 214 Cal. App.2d 238, 243 [29 Cal. Rptr. 450]; Anchor Cas. Co. v. Surety Bond Sav. & Loan Assn., 204 Cal. App.2d 175, 181-182 [22 Cal. Rptr. 278].) [3] Therefore, unlike the cases relied upon by Gibraltar, [4] resolution of the instant case did not depend entirely upon the application of equitable principles; the doctrine of promissory estoppel was only one of two alternative theories of recovery. [5] Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury determination of the issues raised in both their first and second causes of action. Accordingly, the trial court erred in treating the jury's special findings and verdict as advisory only and in entering its own findings, conclusions and judgment thereon. Plaintiffs' motion for entry of judgment on the jury's verdict (Code Civ. Proc., § 664) and subsequent motion to set aside the judgment entered by the trial court ( id., § 663) should have been granted. The judgment is reversed and the trial court instructed to enter a new judgment in plaintiffs' favor on the general verdict of the jury. [6] As the cause must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings with respect to the reinstated judgment, Gibraltar's cross-appeal from the $14,000 judgment on plaintiffs' conversion cause of action is dismissed without prejudice.