Opinion ID: 1239196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: fernandez's other claims

Text: ¶ 50 As noted above, orders of restitution are within the discretion of the circuit court, and because it is dispositive of the other claims Fernandez makes, we revisit the standard of review before addressing Fernandez's additional claims. Reviewing a calculation of restitution involves a question of whether the circuit court misused its discretionary authority. Boffer, 158 Wis.2d at 658, 462 N.W.2d 906. This court may reverse a discretionary decision if the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts. See Behnke, 203 Wis.2d 43, 553 N.W.2d 265; Rogers, 196 Wis.2d 817, 539 N.W.2d 897. ¶ 51 Fernandez argues that the circuit court had no authority under the statute to consider claims submitted by Dalka and CNR after the time of sentencing or, in the alternative, that for equitable reasons those claims should not have been considered. ¶ 52 The State counters that there is no language in the statute that requires victim claims to be submitted before sentencing. The State also argues that where restitution was held open, there is no expectation of finality and thus no equitable grounds for denying the claims. ¶ 53 While Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c) provides the right for a defendant to dispute claims of losses, it does not set any explicit deadlines for victims' claims. Recognizing the unique nature of the restitution process, the statute imposes only limited duties on district attorneys, requiring them to attempt to obtain from the victim prior to sentencing information pertaining to the factor specified [as to the amount of loss suffered], [29] and on a court, requiring the court to inquire of the district attorney as to any claims for restitution from any victims. ¶ 54 There is no language in the statute that prohibits the consideration of claims presented before the restitution hearing occurred, which is when Dalka's and CNR's claims were presented. Where, as here, Fernandez had notice of Dalka's injuries (and therefore of those of his insurer, CNR) because Fernandez knew that Dalka had been hurt, there was no expectation of finality at a sentencing hearing when restitution was ordered in an amount to be determined. Even if Fernandez somehow was unaware of the injuries on the night of the crash, the complaint included information on Dalka's being taken by ambulance to the hospital and being told by a doctor that he had torn ligaments in his left knee. ¶ 55 The circuit court's first scheduling of the restitution hearing was entirely in accord with the statute, which provides that at sentencing the court can [a]djourn the sentencing proceeding for up to 60 days pending resolution of the amount of restitution by the court, referee or arbitrator. Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c)2. Both the first and second hearing dates were approved by trial counsel; it was at the defendant's request that the hearing was adjourned, and it was with counsel's acquiescence that the January 10, 2006, hearing was scheduled. ¶ 56 When the court of appeals addressed the timelines in the restitution statute in State v. Perry, 181 Wis.2d 43, 510 N.W.2d 722 (Ct.App.1993), it held that the timelines in the statute are directory rather than mandatory: It is important to note that our conclusion that the sixty-day time period in sec. 973.20(13)(c)2, Stats., is directory should not be read to imply that the provision is merely discretionary or permissive. The legislature intended that the time limit be followed, despite its intent that the defendant not avoid his or her obligation to pay restitution. Our determination that the provision is directory simply reflects that the legislature did not intend that the court be required in all cases to vacate the restitution order for a violation of the statutory time limitation. Id. at 56-57, 510 N.W.2d 722. ¶ 57 The Perry court noted that restitution hearings might be barred in some circumstances if they fell outside the statutory time period of sixty days; that would be true if it would result in an injury or wrong. Id. at 57, 510 N.W.2d 722. We concur with the reasoning of the Perry court that given the tenor of the statute and the broad discretion granted to the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(c) and (d), [30] the statute's timelines are directory. Fernandez has shown no injury from the fact that the restitution hearing was held outside of the time period considering that the delay of the restitution hearing was done at his own request for the purpose of allowing him to validate a claim of restitution. The circuit court explicitly noted that it made the decision to permit the restitution hearing to be adjourned in fairness. It is clear from the record that the delay in scheduling the requested adjournment was caused by understandable court calendaring issues, and it is equally clear that Fernandez was not injured by the delay he sought here, except that when he asked for the additional time, he opened the door for additional claims to be submitted before the hearing concluded. ¶ 58 In light of the open-ended language of the statute and the court of appeals' holding in Perry, there is no error at least where the claims are made before the hearing is concluded and restitution is ordered, as the claims were here. Fernandez cannot show, under the statute or under the case law, that the trial court erred in considering claims made before the restitution order was entered. ¶ 59 Fernandez additionally argues that the lack of advance written notice of the Dalka and CNR claims violated his due process rights. In response, the State contends that Fernandez's due process rights were protected by the statute, which provides for an opportunity to be heard, personally or through counsel, to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses called by other parties. Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(d). ¶ 60 We agree with the State. The statute leaves it to the court to conduct the proceeding so as to do substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law and may waive the rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence.... Id. The statute explicitly notes that [d]iscovery is not available except for good cause shown.... Id. Here, Fernandez was given the opportunity to have counsel challenge the claims presented and to cross-examine the witnesses. Given the aims of the restitution statuteto balance the needs of the victim to recover losses without complicated legal barriers against the needs of the defendant to ascertain the validity of the claimsthe legislature clearly elected to give the circuit court a great deal of discretion in conducting a restitution hearing. We should not impose arbitrary deadlines where the legislature has not done so and where the defendant had a full opportunity to challenge the claims. ¶ 61 Fernandez says the court erred by ordering full restitution to two insurance companies because a court is authorized to do so only where justice requires. Fernandez says that justice does not require a man who washes dishes for a living to reimburse insurance companies worth billions of dollars. The State points out that restitution is a discretionary decision of the circuit court and that the statute permits restitution to insurance companies. [31] ¶ 62 It is within the court's discretion to award restitution to insurers. Evidence was submitted as to the costs which both insurers had borne for the victims. [32] The circuit court appears to have applied the correct legal standard and to have arrived at a logical interpretation of the facts in ordering restitution from Fernandez. The defendant's ability to pay was clearly considered by the circuit court. Such an award should not be reversed. There is no evidence that the court applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts when it decided justice required reimbursing an insurer who has compensated a victim for a loss.