Opinion ID: 1945980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Peremptory Strike Based on Presumed Religious Affiliation and Beliefs is Unconstitutional

Text: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (as well as the equal protection doctrine embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment) prohibits the state from discriminating on the basis of suspect classifications, such as religious affiliation, which is protected by the First Amendment. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). In Batson and its progeny, the Supreme Court has recognized that the exclusion of a juror based on race, also a suspect classification, offends the equal protection rights of the excluded juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Supreme Court has extended Batson's reasoning to exclusion of jurors based on sex, which is accorded heightened scrutiny, somewhat less than the scrutiny required for exclusion based on a suspect classification. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 134, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). As the Court held in J.E.B., Today we reaffirm what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereo-types about the relative abilities of men and women. Id. at 130-131, 114 S.Ct. 1419. The same reasoning applies to exclusion based on religious affiliation. See United States v. Somerstein, 959 F.Supp. 592, 595 (E.D.N.Y.1997) ( Batson applies to religious discrimination but there must be a determination as to whether the religion of the juror is relevant to the issues of the case... only if the religion of the jurors is directly relevant to the crimes at issue, can such a [strike] be proper.); People v. Martin, 64 Cal.App.4th 378, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 147, 151 (1998) ( Batson extends to religious discrimination, but a peremptory challenge of a juror on the basis of the juror's relevant personal values is not improper even though those views may be founded in the juror's religious beliefs.); Connecticut v. Hodge, 248 Conn. 207, 726 A.2d 531, 550 (1999) (peremptory challenges based in religious affiliation are unconstitutional), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 969, 120 S.Ct. 409, 145 L.Ed.2d 319 (1999); see also North Carolina v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 445 S.E.2d 917, 923 (1994) (peremptory strike legitimate when the prosecutor inquired how religious beliefs, not affiliation, might affect ability to follow law); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir.1998) (noting the necessity to distinguish among religious affiliation, a religion's general tenets, and a specific religious belief). But see Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (refusing to extend Batson to religious affiliation [b]ecause all members of the group share the same faith by definition, it is not unjust to attribute beliefs characteristic of the faith to all [of them]); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (refusing to extend Batson to religious affiliation because religious bigotry in the use of the peremptory challenge is not as prevalent, or flagrant, or historically ingrained in the jury selection process as is race). As in J.E.B., the record in this case shows that Juror 333 was excluded, not for any substantive reason that disqualified him from the jury, but based entirely on the prosecutor's and trial court's assumption that, because of his haircut (cropped) and mode of dress (white shirt and bow tie), the young black man must be a Muslim and a follower of Louis Farrakhan, who, in the words of the prosecutor, could not be fair to the government. The prosecutor acknowledged that there was no indication on the record of Juror 333's religious affiliation, much less his beliefs. See supra note 3. Such judgment about a person's beliefs based on nothing more than supposition drawn from superficial characteristics is the kind of rank discrimination that the Supreme Court said in J.E.B. it is axiomatic violates the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection because it fails the relevant constitutional standard of whether discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection substantially furthers the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial trial. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136, 114 S.Ct. 1419. In the case of suspect classifications such as religion, the standard is even higher: the state must show a compelling interest. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon, 494 U.S. at 886 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Particularly in this case, where the prosecutor's explanations for striking Juror 333 slipped and slid between two suspect classifications, race and religion, and where religion-based discrimination based on membership in the Nation of Islam necessarily implied race as well, the trial court should have been particularly alert to the potential for unconstitutional discrimination in jury selection. Cf. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145, 114 S.Ct. 1419 (Failing to provide jurors the same protection against gender discrimination as race discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson itself. Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender can be used as a pretext for racial discrimination.). At least one of the defendants in this case was not only Black, but also Muslim. See supra note 5; cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (stating that defendant's right to equal protection is violated by purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the venire). The challenges to the prosecutor's strike were strenuously and timely pressed by defense counsel, making clear that, if left unexplored, the strike could call into question the ensuing trial. Cf. Baxter, 640 A.2d at 717 n. 3 (reiterating the importance, in cases of this kind, of alerting the judge to the issue as soon as a pattern allegedly emerges, so that a meaningful record can be made.). It is always troubling to overturn a conviction that results from a crime as serious as the one at issue here, after a significant investment of judicial, prosecutorial and defense resources. The proper course was to address the issue squarely in the trial court, by questioning the potential juror to establish, first, whether he is a member of the presumed religious group, and, if so, whether his beliefs are such that they disqualify him from serving on this particular jury. As this was not done, and a prima facie case has been made that Juror 333 was excluded based on his presumed membership in the Nation of Islam, reversal is required.