Opinion ID: 1979104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Parties' Opposing Motions

Text: After appellants amended their complaint to alter plaintiffs and delineate two separate claims, the District filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on February 14, 2003. At the outset, the motion described the impact of the ATE System on traffic safety: Since its inauguration in August of 1999, the [ATE System] has proven a significant element in improving public safety in the District. Traffic violations at intersections with cameras have dropped more than 60 percent, and red light running fatalities were reduced from 16 to 2 in the first two years of operations. With the implementation of photo radar in high-risk areas in August of 2001, the percentage of motorists speeding has dropped by more than 65 percent. The motion described the process through which raw ATE System data was translated into charges of a moving violation: [W]here an image is recorded by system camerasand unless the image is indecipherable (e.g., no clear image of the license plate) or patently unusable (e.g., in speeding photos, more than one vehicle in the detection area)a draft [ticket] is prepared by ACS personnel for review by an MPD [Metropolitan Police Department] officer. An MPD officer reviews each draft [ticket], and decides whether the [ticket] should be issued to the vehicle owner. In support of this description, the District attached declarations by MPD Captain Kevin Keegan [5] and Matthew Hopwood, a Senior Manager at ACS. Hopwood's declaration confirmed the manner in which ACS administered the ATE System, asserting that ACS makes no determinations concerning issuance of [tickets] to vehicle owners. On the basis of the MPD officer's determination, ACS mails a ticket. Once a ticket is returned, ACS is responsible for processing the payment and sorting through [a]ll correspondence not related to payment. In the event that a ticket recipient requests a hearing or mail adjudication: . . . ACS transmits the documents submitted by the owner, together with a copy of the Notice and related logs, to DMV [Department of Motor Vehicles] for consideration and disposition. Where a hearing is requested, ACS also schedules a hearing date, based on time availabilities furnished by DMV to ACS, and advises the vehicle owner of the time and location of the hearing by mail. . . . In either adjudicative event, if the ticket is dismissed, that determination will be entered into the database by the responsible DMV hearing examiner and no further action is taken. On the other hand, if the owner is found liable, the responsible DMV hearing examiner will enter that result in the database, and the owner will be so advised. ACS does not participate in any adjudicating activities. . . . Finally, if the vehicle owner timely returns the Notice and properly identifies another individual as the driver of the vehicle at the time of the violation, ACS enters that information into the [ATE System] database, with two consequences: (a) the vehicle owner is noted as having identified a 3rd party as responsible and is no longer to be considered liable for the violation; and (b) a new [ticket] is issued to the other individual identified as the driver. In the latter case, procedures are then followed in the same fashion as if an initial [ticket] had been issued, except that the identified driver is not provided the option of designating someone else as responsible. As to the merits of the claim that the ATE System violated appellants' due process rights, the District's motion to dismiss asserted that the statutory scheme denied the appellants neither proper notice nor a pre-deprivation opportunity to be heard, as the appellants received tickets prior to any determination of liability, which permitted them to request a hearing to contest the alleged violation. Further, the District claimed, the statute did not create an irrebuttable presumption of liability with conclusive effect on adjudicative determinations by DMV hearing examiners. Finally, the motion contended that the procedural protections inherent in the ATE System were proper under the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The District also disputed the appellants' second claim that the compensation arrangement between ACS and the District violated due process. The appellant's claim was based, in large part, on an assertion that ACS examines, and on a substantial basis adjudges the validity and content of tickets. For a period up to April of 2002, ACS was compensated on a per-citation basis. Appellants asserted that these factors combined to render the process impermissibly partial towards a verdict against automobile owners. The District conceded that from March 1999-March 2002, ACS received a fee per citation ($29, later raised to $32); however, since March of 2002, ACS has received a fixed monthly fee of approximately $190,000 per month. However, the District asserted that ACS performs only ministerial, rather than adjudicative functions in the administration of the ATE System. ACS has no role in the determinations of liability. Therefore, the District argued, unlike the precedents from criminal law cited by appellants, there was no danger of a tainted process. On March 27, 2003, the appellants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on count one of their amended complaint, describing the District's ATE System as the most glaringly unconstitutional program for automated policing of traffic in the nation.