Opinion ID: 761518
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Appropriate Probable Cause Inquiry

Text: 16 Before we proceed any further, we feel compelled to delineate exactly what Meehan's § 1983 malicious prosecution claims consist of, in order to more easily undertake the proper probable cause inquiry. The district court stated that an element of Meehan's malicious prosecution cause of action was that there was no probable cause to initiate the criminal charge against Meehan, but what the court purported to find was that it had been conclusively determined that defendants had probable cause to arrest Meehan. August 20, 1997 Memorandum and Order, at 16, 18. For the following reasons, we believe that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the defendants had probable cause to initiate the criminal charge against Meehan, not whether they had probable cause to arrest him. 17 From Meehan's arguments throughout this litigation, it is clear that he attempts to raise dual malicious prosecution claims based upon two events: (1) his arrest; and (2) his prosecution. As early as his opposition to the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, Meehan argued that his malicious prosecution causes of action were based upon the malicious arrest and prosecution by defendants. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at 10. In his second amended complaint, Meehan continued with these dual bases for his malicious prosecution claims, repeatedly arguing that defendants arrested and charged Meehan without probable cause and that [t]he arrest and prosecution violated his constitutional rights. Second Amended Complaint, pp 88-91. In his brief on appeal, Meehan argues that: 18 [a]n arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution, and the Application for Criminal Complaint and the Complaint itself is the issuance of criminal process and the institution of criminal proceedings. Pomeroy drafted and executed the Application for the Criminal Complaint, thereby instituting this criminal process knowing he had no probable cause. Appellant's Br. at 34. Meehan continues: 19 Rogers clearly instituted or instigated this criminal process with the arrest without probable cause. Rogers knew that Meehan had no cocaine on him at both times when Meehan was searched. Accordingly, there was absolutely no probable cause to arrest and charge Meehan with any crime. 20 Appellant's Br. at 37. 21 However, Meehan may not bring a malicious prosecution claim based upon his arrest because his arrest does not constitute the initiation of proceedings against Meehan. We have previously noted that the lines between malicious prosecution and false arrest have become blurred, to the extent that a malicious prosecution claim may be predicated on an arrest made pursuant to a warrant that was issued without probable cause. See Calero-Colon, 68 F.3d at 3-4. In the present case, however, Meehan's arrest was not made pursuant to an arrest warrant. 3 Meehan cites no authority for the proposition that a malicious prosecution cause of action may be based upon a warrantless arrest. As we noted in Calero-Colon: 22 [t]he critical inquiry that distinguishes malicious prosecution from false arrest in the present context is whether the arrests were made pursuant to a warrant. As a general rule, an unlawful arrest pursuant to a warrant will be more closely analogous to the common law tort of malicious prosecution. An arrest warrant constitutes legal process, and it is the tort of malicious prosecution that permits damages for confinement pursuant to legal process. On the other hand, wrongful warrantless arrests typically resemble the tort of false arrest. 23 Id. at 4 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). Meehan cannot base a malicious prosecution claim on his warrantless arrest, because it did not constitute legal process. Consequently, we examine only Meehan's malicious prosecution claims based upon the institution of criminal charges against him. Because the absence of probable cause element is concerned with whether the defendants had probable cause to take the challenged action, and because the challenged action here is prosecution, not arrest, the proper inquiry is whether there was probable cause to institute criminal charges against Meehan. 24