Opinion ID: 767812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 7 Although neither Petitioners nor the INS challenge the jurisdiction of either the district court or this court, this court must address this predicate question before proceeding to the merits of these appeals. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997). 8 On September 30, 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 (1996). IIRIRA made comprehensive changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). As a result of the enactment of IIRIRA, no fewer than three versions of the INA may govern the jurisdictional question before this court. Generally, the permanent provisions of IIRIRA apply only to removal proceedings commenced after April 1, 1997, IIRIRA's effective date. See IIRIRA § 309(a), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-625. Exclusion proceedings against Ho were commenced prior to IIRIRA's April 1, 1997 general effective date. Deportation proceedings against Nguyen were also commenced prior to April 1, 1997. Arguably, therefore, the permanent provisions of IIRIRA do not govern judicial review of the § 2241 habeas petitions filed by Ho and Nguyen. At least one Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has concluded that the effective-date provisions of IIRIRA are ambiguous and has held that the permanent provisions of IIRIRA govern judicial review of habeas corpus petitions filed by aliens against whom removal proceedings had commenced prior to April 1, 1997 but who had also received final removal orders before that date. See Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 287 & 286 n.7 (5th Cir.1999). Because both Ho and Nguyen received final removal orders before April 1, 1997, 3 the permanent provisions of IIRIRA thus may apply. 9 IIRIRA also contains transitional rules applicable to removal proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997, in which deportation orders became administratively final after October 30, 1996. See IIRIRA § 309(c)(4), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-626. Because Ho's removal order became final before October 30, 1996, the transitional rules do not apply to his petition. Removal proceedings against Nguyen, however, commenced prior to April 1, 1997, and his deportation order became final after October 30, 1996. The transitional rules, thus, may govern judicial review of Nguyen's habeas petition. We need not and do not decide which version of the INA applies because neither the permanent, transitional, nor pre-IIRIRA provisions of the INA bar judicial review of the claims brought by Ho and Nguyen in their § 2241 habeas petitions. 10 Before IIRIRA, district courts had jurisdiction over § 2241 habeas petitions like those brought by Petitioners. See Galaviz-Median v. Wooten, 27 F.2d 487, 491-92 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that district courts have jurisdiction over habeas petitions in which a petitioner in INS detention raises constitutional due process claims). Additionally, assuming, without deciding, that IIRIRA's transitional rules apply to Nguyen, the district court had jurisdiction over Nguyen's § 2241 habeas petition. See Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that IIRIRA's transitional rules do not eliminate or alter traditional habeas review available under § 2241). Therefore, to the extent either the pre-IIRIRA provisions of the INA or the transitional provisions of IIRIRA apply, the district court had jurisdiction over the § 2241 habeas petitions filed by Ho and Nguyen. 11 This court has never addressed the question of whether the permanent provisions of IIRIRA divest the federal courts of jurisdiction over § 2241 habeas petitions. Two permanent provisions may impact the cases at bar. INA § 242(g), as amended by IIRIRA § 306(a)(2) and codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), bars judicial review of the Attorney General's discretionary decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Section 1252(g) applies without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings . . . . IIRIRA § 306(c)(1), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-612. Therefore, notwithstanding the general, effective-date provision of IIRIRA, § 1252(g) applies to both Ho and Nguyen. The Supreme Court, however, has recently interpreted § 1252(g) to preclude judicial review of only the three discrete, discretionary acts specifically delineated in the statute. See Reno v. Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 943-45 (1999). Neither Ho nor Nguyen has asked this court to review the Attorney General's decision to commence proceedings against him, her decision to adjudicate his case, or her decision to execute the removal order. Thus, § 1252(g) does not preclude judicial review of either Petitioner's habeas petition. See Jurado-Gutierrez, 190 F.3d at 1144-45 (holding that § 1252(g) does not bar judicial review of § 2241 habeas petitions that challenge final removal orders); Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the decision to continue to detain a removable alien does not implicate § 1252(g)). 12 If applicable, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), a permanent provision added to the INA by IIRIRA § 306(a)(2), also significantly limits judicial review of immigration matters. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides: 13 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title. 14 Even if this permanent provision applies to Ho and/or Nguyen, a question this court does not decide, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar judicial review of the issues before this court. Neither Ho nor Nguyen challenges one of the discretionary decisions made by the Attorney General for which judicial review is barred by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Cf. Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427, 434 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of the Attorney General's discretionary decision to transfer an alien from one correctional facility to another). Both Petitioners, instead, challenge the statutory and constitutional authority for their continued detention. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of discretionary decisions. It does not bar judicial review of § 2241 habeas petitions, like those before this court, which challenge the validity and constitutionality of the statutes authorizing the continued detention of removable aliens. Cf. Parra, 172 F.2d at 957 (concluding that 8 U.S.C. §1226(e) bars judicial review of challenges to operational decisions, rather than to the legislation establishing the framework for those decisions.). 4 Petitioners' claims clearly fall outside the jurisdictional bars of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1252(g) but squarely within 8 U.S.C. § 2241. Therefore, this court has jurisdiction.