Opinion ID: 3014614
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expungement Claims.

Text: We have never had to decide whether to endorse the right of expungement announced in Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1979), and other Circuit Courts of Appeals have expressly questioned its precedential value. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 308-09 n.13 (5th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, Williams argues that his presentence claim and prison file expungement claim are meritorious under Paine v. Baker. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit announced that, in limited circumstances, state prisoners have a federal due process right to have “prejudicial 10 During the 15 day period the magistrate set for supplementing the record, Williams neither supplemented the record, nor sought a continuance to take discovery. 11 We ordered supplemental briefing and directed the parties to address certain specified issues in addition to any other issues the parties wanted to address. 10 erroneous information expunged from their prison files.” 595 F.2d at 202. The court held: [I]n certain limited circumstances a claim of constitutional magnitude is raised where a prisoner alleges (1) that information is in his file, (2) that the information is false, and (3) that it is relied upon to a constitutionally significant degree. Id. at 201. Williams argues that he can assert Paine v. Baker expungement claims in a § 2241 habeas petition. Even if we assume arguendo that Williams can assert a Paine v. Baker expungement claim in a § 2241 habeas petition, it is nevertheless clear that he is not entitled to relief on either his presentence report claim or his prison file claim. Williams admits that “subsequent jurisprudence has required proof of an implicated liberty interest or other unconstitutional conduct in order to challenge prison procedures, including information in inmate files.” W illiams’ Br. at 25; see Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 309 n.13. His attempt to “correct” the 1985 version stems from his belief that it prejudiced him by causing him to be inappropriately classified in prison. However, federal inmates have no constitutional right to a particular classification. Moody v. Dagget, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976). Moreover, in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), the Court held that no due process protections were required upon the discretionary transfer of state prisoners to a substantially less agreeable prison, even where that transfer visited a grievous loss 11 upon the inmate. The Due Process Clause therefore does not afford Williams any right to have the 1985 version expunged from his prison files. Williams’ due process claim is similarly flawed. He claims that he was denied due process because he was not given a disciplinary hearing in connection with the murder of an inmate prior to being transferred from Memphis, or losing the aforementioned good time. He requests either a disciplinary hearing or expungement of the investigation report becuse he similarly claims that his alleged involvement in the Memphis homicide resulted in a disciplinary transfer. This claim is also meritless because a prisoner has no liberty interest in being confined at any particular prison. Olin v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976). In addition, as noted above, his transfer from Memphis was not punitive or disciplinary. Rather, the government claims, without contradiction, that he was transferred for his own protection. Accordingly, there was no due process violation.