Opinion ID: 2640130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was moler-lewis a representative of the client?

Text: ¶ 9 Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(4) defines a representative of the client as one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal matter. Whether Moler-Lewis qualified as such a representative depends, in part, on whether the Molers qualified as clients. The Sellers contend that the Molers could not have been clients as that term is used in the definitional subsection (a)(4) because client in that subsection is limited to corporate entities and other legally recognized entities that must act through human beings to conduct their affairs. In support of this argument, the Sellers point to the advisory committee note to rule 504: The committee revised the proposed rule . . . to address the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United States as to when communications involving representatives of a corporation are protected by privilege. (Citation omitted.) They argue that because the rule was revised in response to Upjohn, which resolved the issue of who may represent a corporate entity, only corporations, and not natural persons, can have representatives. [4] The Sellers urge us to adopt a rule restricting to corporations and other business entities the right to have representatives with whom communications might be confidential. ¶ 10 We disagree with the Sellers' reasoning as to the meaning of the term client in rule 504. In our view, the term client as used throughout the rule refers not just to corporations or other business entities, but to natural persons as well. Indeed, client is specifically defined in subsection (a)(1) to include a person. ¶ 11 Further, the fact that this rule was revised in response to the Upjohn case does not lead to the conclusion that client in rule 504(b) should be read to exclude individuals. In Upjohn, the United States Supreme Court held that low-level and mid-level employeesnot just those in the control group could potentially be protected by the attorney-client privilege. [5] While this holding defines the potential scope of the federal privilege in the corporate context, it does not purport to limit the term representative of a client to that context. The Sellers would read client as used in the first line of subsection (b) to be different from the same term as used subsequently in the same subsection and throughout the rule. That is, in the first line of subsection (b), under the Sellers' interpretation, client refers only to corporate entities, but in every other usage throughout the rule, client includes natural persons as well. Such a reading is contrary to the plain language of the rule and without justification. The plain language of the rule, which explicitly defines client to include a person, leads us to reject the inference the Sellers draw from the Upjohn case. ¶ 12 We recognize that some jurisdictions have adopted the contrary rule that only corporate clients or similar entities may have representatives. [6] We also recognize the concern that allowing individuals to have representatives could extend the privilege to a limitless number of third parties, potentially subverting the truth-finding function of courts. But in our view, this concern is adequately addressed by the language of the rule, which carefully limits a representative to one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal matter. Because the rule so limits who may be a representative, our holding will not unduly expand the privilege. ¶ 13 Moreover, from a policy perspective, we find it salutary that natural persons should be afforded the same level of protection when communicating with their representatives as corporations now enjoy. In many cases, an individual's need to consult with an advisor regarding the facilitation of legal services may be every bit as acute as the need of a corporation to do so, often more so. ¶ 14 In this case, however, the district court found that such protection did not extend to the Molers because Moler-Lewis did not qualify as their representative. The district court drew this conclusion because Moler-Lewis was not retained to give legal advice and her services were not essential to [the Molers'] representation. In so concluding, the district court imposed a requirement not found in rule 504. In order to resolve whether Moler-Lewis was a representative of the client, the district court need make only the following factual determination: Was Moler-Lewis one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal matter? Because the district court applied the wrong standard, it did not make the findings necessary for us to conduct a review using the correct standard. Therefore, we remand for the district court to make factual determinations and apply the correct standard to resolve whether Moler-Lewis qualified as the Molers' representative.