Opinion ID: 1889069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actions During the Statutory Period Providing Rights to the Tenant.

Text: When they decided to sell the house, the sellers transmitted an offer of sale to Coburn on June 25, 1999. During the 30-day period following receipt of this notice, Coburn did not make a clear expression of interest in order to exercise her right to purchase the property under the Act. During the 60-day period following the expiration of the 30-day initial period, Coburn also made no effort to negotiate a contract of sale, and Coburn did not even tender a tardy proposed contract. This period expired without this tenant exercising any of her statutory rights whatsoever. On September 16, 1999, plaintiff Robert E. Heggestad and the owners entered into a contract for the sale of the house. Under this contract, the owners agreed to sell the property to Heggestad subject to certain contingencies. Those contingencies included the rights of tenants under the District of Columbia Code. Pursuant to D.C.Code § 45-1637, the owners gave Coburn a 15-day window of time within which to exercise her right of first refusal, specifically to allow her to match the contract that had been executed with Heggestad. Without question, the owners sent Coburn a bona fide Notice of her right of first refusal. They sent the Notice on October 6, 1999. According to the undisputed trial testimony of the listing agent (Jonathan Taylor), the Notice was sent by three different methods. It was transmitted to Coburn by certified mail, hand-delivery, as well as regular first class mail. He testified that the contract had been fully ratified by all parties at the time that the Notice was sent. This point is not disputed. It is also not disputed that the copy of the contract that was sent to Coburn did include the signature of the plaintiff, although the plaintiff's name was not printed on the face of the contract. In her trial testimony, Coburn admitted that she read the entire contract as soon as she received it. During the 15-day period within which Coburn could have matched the plaintiff's contract, she failed to do so. It is undisputed that during this period she made no demands of any kind on the owners, i.e. no demands for further information, no demands for clarification, etc. She made no inquiries of the owners during this period. She made no offers of any kind with respect to any potential purchase of the house. She also made no requests for any extension of time, regardless of whether she knew that the Code did not provide for this option.