Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Introducing Damaging Evidence Against Defendant

Text: Defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective during the sanity phase of trial for calling certain witnesses to the stand and then eliciting damaging testimony from them, and for cross-examining prosecution witnesses and similarly eliciting damaging evidence. Defendant identifies four situations in which his counsel at the sanity phase, Donnalee Huffman, was assertedly ineffective. First, he argues the first six expert witnesses Mrs. Huffman called to the witness stand (Drs. Gardner, Owre, Tolchin, Chappell, Donaldson and Rose) all testified he was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, and two of the doctors had previously found defendant was sane. Second, he argues counsel should have redacted portions of one of the videotapes of defendant answering the VESI before playing it for the jury. Counsel videotaped defendant taking the VESI, as noted, ante, a diagnostic tool developed to help determine if a person suffers from PTSD as a result of service in the Vietnam War. Defendant was required to answer several hundred questions while his answers were videotaped. Defendant alleges counsel strayed from the list of approved questions and asked questions in which defendant incriminated himself in the crimes, revealed damaging information about himself (such as his other sex crimes), or portrayed himself in a negative light (such as his belief women existed for his sexual pleasure). Third, defendant contends that defense counsel, in her cross-examination of Dr. Francis Criswell, elicited the witness's view that defendant would pose a danger in the future. Fourth, during cross-examination of Dr. Mary Cholet, defense counsel elicited the information that defendant had committed more than the two murders at issue in the case, that defendant did not suffer from PTSD, and that he was sexually attracted to Dr. Cholet and suggested she might be one of his victims if he were not in prison. As explained, ante, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating counsel's acts or omissions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . . [¶] . . . under prevailing professional norms ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052), and that there is a `reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 357, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) An appellate court's ability to determine from the record whether an attorney has provided constitutionally deficient legal representation is in the usual case severely hampered by the absence of an explanation of an attorney's strategy. Thus, [i]f the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal. ( People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-268 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134]) ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1068-1069, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) This latter rule is particularly applicable here. The sanity phase was long and complicated. Evidence both for and against defendant was adduced. Respondent suggests many possible reasons why defense counsel acted as she did. We need not resolve those issues, however, for it is sufficient for our purposes to conclude that defendant has not carried his burden to show that counsel's conduct falls outside the wide range of competent representation. ( People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 349, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) In none of the identified instances of alleged ineffectiveness was counsel asked to state on the record the reasons for her actions. Moreover, none of the identified instances are situations in which there simply could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's actions or omissions. ( People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1069, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) Accordingly, we must reject this claim, for it is one more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding ( People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134), where the factual record can be more fully developed.