Opinion ID: 4527475
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Relevancy” under FRE 401 and FRE 402

Text: Sumlin appeals the district court’s decision to admit Amanda Kelly’s testimony relating to the scope of her past relationship with him. He argues that the testimony was not intrinsic to the case because it showed no connection to his alleged drug dealings with Carrie Dobbins. Furthermore, Sumlin argues that the testimony should have been evaluated and found inadmissible under a Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) analysis, given that the evidence was not probative of a material issue in the case, but instead, was inadmissible character evidence. Rebutting these claims, the government advances that Kelly’s testimony related to her past use of drugs and her purchases from Sumlin was proper background evidence and inextricably intertwined with the rest of her testimony. In the alternative, the government argues that such evidence would be properly admitted even under Rule 404(b). The government has the better of the argument. We review a district court’s decision to admit testimony and other evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 414 (6th Cir. 2000); see United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 1992). “An abuse of discretion exists where the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2006); see United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir.1991). “An erroneous admission of evidence that does not affect the ‘substantial rights' of a party is considered harmless, and should be disregarded.” United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 775 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gibson v. United States, 271 F.3d 247, 254 (6th Cir.2001)). Furthermore, “[t]he standard for relevancy is extremely liberal.” United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). “‘[E]vidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence’ is relevant.” Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. No. 18-3819 United States v. Sumlin Page 11 Evid. 401). “[E]ven if a district court believes the evidence is insufficient to prove the ultimate point for which it is offered, it may not exclude the evidence if it has the slightest probative worth.” DXS, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 100 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Given these directives, we deem Amanda Kelly’s testimony about her past drug-related and personal relationship with Sumlin, to be relevant. Kelly was Carrie’s sister, Sumlin’s former client, and also his former girlfriend. Kelly testified that she saw her sister with Sumlin at her mother's residence at approximately 8:45 a.m. on March 28, 2015. Kelly also testified that Carrie had abused drugs in the past and continued to do so, and that Sumlin was a drug dealer, who had routinely delivered drugs to her at her mother’s same residence in the past. Prior to the introduction of this testimony, Sumlin’s attorney objected to the line of questioning on relevancy grounds. However, the government offered a strong foundation for the testimony’s relevance, explaining that this evidence was necessary both to contextualize the relationship between Kelly and Sumlin, and to explain how Kelly could identify “TJ” the drug dealer, as Sumlin. The government also explained that the evidence was relevant to Kelly’s motives for testifying. After Sumlin’s attorney eventually conceded that her client was a drug dealer and had had past relationships with both Carrie and Kelly,6 the district court determined that Kelly’s testimony was relevant. Nonetheless, the court also agreed to give the jury a limiting instruction as to how to consider the testimony at the beginning of Kelly’s testimony and during its jury charge. Furthermore, even if Kelly’s testimony alone would have been insufficient to prove Sumlin’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), as discussed above, this court’s “relevance threshold is very low under Rule 401, [a]nd . . . the government is permitted to build an incremental case.” Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 739. And here, simply because Kelly’s 6Prior to the district court concluding that Kelly’s testimony was relevant, the following exchange occurred between the judge and Sumlin’s defense counsel: THE COURT: What’s the defense here, Rhonda? MS. KOTNIK: For that witness or - THE COURT: In general. I mean, listened to the opening statements, but - MS. KOTNIK: The drugs that he provided are not the drugs that killed her. THE COURT: So you’re not disputing the fact that they had a relationship with a drug dealer? MS. KOTNIK: Correct. Correct. (R. 175: Trial Trans., PageID 1114–15). No. 18-3819 United States v. Sumlin Page 12 testimony may or may not prove Sumlin’s crime, “does not mean, necessarily” that the contextualizing evidence Kelly provides is irrelevant. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Kelly’s testimony.