Opinion ID: 2642703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the plain language of the pcra allows a

Text: DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE TO BE BASED ON BOTH PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE EVIDENCE AND NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE ¶40 Part 4 of the PCRA21 contemplates a two-stage process for 19 State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 20, 144 P.3d 1096 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 21 Ms. Brown filed her petition for factual innocence in 2009, but the parties and the post-conviction court have all relied on the 2010 version of the PCRA up to this point in the proceedings. The 2010 amendments did not materially alter the language at issue in this (continued...) 12 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 Opinion of the Court establishing factual innocence. Section 78B-9-402 sets forth what a petitioner must do at the first stage to receive an evidentiary hearing on her petition for factual innocence.22 If the petitioner meets her threshold burden under section 402, a post-conviction court turns to the second stage of the process, which is outlined in section 78B-9- 404. That provision sets forth how the evidentiary hearing is to proceed and gives direction to courts on how to determine factual innocence.23 The parties’ arguments on appeal center on what role newly discovered evidence must play in this process. ¶41 In its Memorandum Decision, the post-conviction court recognized that the plain language of section 404 does not require a finding of factual innocence to be based on newly discovered evidence. The court determined, however, that given the emphasis on newly discovered evidence at the pleading stage of a factual innocence claim under section 402, “[i]t would be peculiar if a similar evidentiary basis did not apply during the hearing stage.” It thus concluded that “it may base its determination of factual innocence either upon newly discovered evidence alone or a combination of evidence—as long as the newly discovered material evidence provides at least part of that basis.” ¶42 The State maintains that the post-conviction court erred when it determined that newly discovered evidence need only provide a part of the basis for a determination of factual innocence. The State argues that, “[w]hen properly read, the PCRA’s factual innocence part requires that newly discovered evidence establish 21 (...continued) case. So to maintain consistency, we also rely on the 2010 version unless otherwise noted. 22 See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-402 (stating that “[a] person . . . may petition the district court . . . for a hearing to establish that the person is factually innocent” and setting forth the threshold requirements). We stress that the sufficiency of Ms. Brown’s petition is not at issue on this appeal. We consider section 402 only to place section 404 in proper context. But given that Ms. Brown did not include the evidence provided by Mr. Carlsen and Mr. Hall in her petition for factual innocence, there is a question whether her petition should have been granted in this case. As the postconviction court noted, however, the State never challenged whether Ms. Brown’s evidentiary hearing should go forward. 23 See generally id. § 78B-9-404. 13 BROWN v. STATE Opinion of the Court factual innocence, not merely play some part in the determination.” The State thus contends that the newly discovered evidence must be “the pivotal transformative evidence” in the court’s factual innocence determination. ¶43 As an initial matter, the State does not dispute that Mr. Carlsen’s testimony is “newly discovered evidence,” as that term is defined in the PCRA.24 Due to issues of credibility, however, the court determined that Mr. Carlsen’s testimony was entitled only “to some weight” and that his testimony did not “independently establish by clear and convincing evidence that Lael was alive at a time when the State argued he must have been dead.” The court found, however, that Mr. Carlsen’s testimony, as newly discovered evidence, “constitutes some evidence in support” of its factual innocence finding. The issue for us, therefore, is to determine whether newly discovered evidence must be the “pivotal” or “transformative” evidence in support of factual innocence or whether it need only provide some basis for the court’s ultimate decision. ¶44 This issue presents a question of statutory interpretation. “Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.”25 In so doing, “we look first to its plain language and presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.”26 Although “statutory text may not be plain when read in isolation, [it] may become so in light of its linguistic, structural, and 24 See id. § 78B-9-401.5(3) (“‘Newly discovered material evidence’ means evidence that was not available to the petitioner at trial or during the resolution on the merits by the trial court of any motion to withdraw a guilty plea or motion for new trial and which is relevant to the determination of the issue of factual innocence . . . .”). Ms. Brown disputes the post-conviction court’s determination that Mr. Hall’s testimony is not newly discovered evidence. Because the State agrees, however, that Mr. Carlsen’s testimony is newly discovered, and because we affirm the post-conviction court’s conclusion that a determination of factual innocence can be based on a combination of old and new evidence, we do not reach this argument. 25 State v. J.M.S. (In re J.M.S.), 2011 UT 75, ¶ 13, 280 P.3d 410. 26 Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, ¶ 27, 251 P.3d 810 (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 Opinion of the Court statutory context.”27 Thus, “our interpretation of a statute requires that each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.”28 Finally, “[i]f the language of the statute yields a plain meaning that does not lead to an absurd result, the analysis ends.”29 ¶45 We conclude that the plain language of the PCRA allows a court to base its determination of factual innocence on all available evidence—both old and new. Beginning with stage one, section 402, entitled “Petition for determination of factual innocence—Sufficient allegations—Notification of victim,” sets forth threshold requirements a petitioner must meet to receive an evidentiary hearing.30 Section 402 states that “[t]he petition shall contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the petitioner, and shall aver, with supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that . . . newly discovered material evidence exists that, if credible, establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent.”31 ¶46 Section 402 directs the court to view the petitioner’s averment of newly discovered evidence “with all the other evidence” to determine whether the petitioner has met the threshold requirements for a hearing.32 Based on the plain language of section 402, it is clear that, in order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must allege that newly discovered evidence exists that establishes factual innocence. And the court, in order to grant the petition for an evidentiary hearing, must determine that the newly discovered evidence, when viewed with all the other evidence, demonstrates factual innocence. Accordingly, section 402 requires a 27 Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 465 (internal quotation marks omitted). 28 Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, ¶ 9, 234 P.3d 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). 29 Carranza v. United States, 2011 UT 80, ¶ 8, 267 P.3d 912. 30 See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-402(1) (“A person . . . may petition the district court . . . for a hearing to establish that the person is factually innocent . . . .”). 31 Id. § 78B-9-402(2)(a). The newly discovered material evidence must also “establish[] innocence” and be more than “impeachment evidence” or “cumulative of evidence that was known.” Id. § 78B-9- 402(2)(a)(ii)–(iv). 32 Id. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(v), -402(2)(b) (emphasis added). 15 BROWN v. STATE Opinion of the Court threshold showing of newly discovered evidence that a petitioner must meet in order to receive an evidentiary hearing. ¶47 We note that at the petition stage, the court is in no position to assess credibility. Section 402 requires the petitioner to assert factual innocence under oath and to include “supporting affidavits or other credible documents,” but beyond this requirement, the petitioner need only allege newly discovered evidence that—“if credible”—“establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent.”33 Thus, section 402 limits the court to the content of the petition and requires it to assume the new evidence is credible. ¶48 We also note that, even at the petition stage, the plain language of section 402 undercuts the State’s argument that newly discovered evidence must be “the pivotal, transformative evidence” in the court’s determination of factual innocence. Section 402 explicitly directs the court to view the new evidence “with all the other evidence.”34 Nowhere does it state that the newly discovered evidence alone must be determinative. Therefore, even section 402 contemplates that it will require a combination of new and old evidence to establish factual innocence. ¶49 Once a petitioner makes the threshold showing of newly discovered evidence and the court grants the petition for an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner moves to the second stage of the process, which is set forth in section 78B-9-404. Section 404 is entitled “Hearing upon petition—Procedures—Court determination of factual innocence.” It places the burden on the petitioner to “establish the petitioner’s factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.”35 In determining whether the petitioner has met the burden of establishing factual innocence, “the court shall consider, in addition to the evidence presented at the hearing under this part, the record of the original criminal case and at any postconviction proceedings in the case.”36 ¶50 Section 404 clearly contemplates that the court will consider the full universe of evidence available in the case. It even provides that “[t]he court may consider: (a) evidence that was suppressed or 33 Id. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(i). 34 Id. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(v). 35 Id. § 78B-9-404(1)(b). 36 Id. § 78B-9-404(3) (emphasis added). 16 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 Opinion of the Court would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and (b) hearsay evidence.”37 Importantly, section 404 never uses the phrase “newly discovered evidence.” Nor does it provide any direction on how much weight to place on any one type of evidence. Again, nowhere does it state that newly discovered evidence alone must be determinative. Instead, the plain language of section 404 provides only one clear directive: a court shall base its determination of factual innocence on a consideration of “all the evidence”—old and new.38 ¶51 The State argues, however, that section 404 merely establishes what evidence is admissible at the factual innocence hearing. It does not, the State contends, override the requirement in section 402 that newly discovered evidence must establish factual innocence. But section 404’s plain language indicates that the legislature intended the section to provide direction to courts on how to determine a claim of factual innocence, not just to set forth what evidence is admissible. For example, it is only by looking to section 404 that we discover the evidentiary standard and a party’s burden for establishing a claim of factual innocence.39 Moreover, the title of section 404 is “Court determination of factual innocence.”40 Therefore, section 404 governs a court’s ultimate determination of factual innocence, not section 402. ¶52 Common sense supports our conclusions that section 404 controls a court’s ultimate determination of factual innocence and that a court may base its determination on all the available evidence. Indeed, it would be strange to direct a court to consider “all the evidence” but then limit its decision to only the pivotal new evidence, especially without giving the court any guidance on how to determine whether a given piece of evidence is, in fact, pivotal. There is no reason to direct a court to “consider” evidence if that evidence cannot play a significant role in the court’s ultimate decision.41 Furthermore, it is not workable to require courts to 37 Id. § 78B-9-404(2). 38 Id. § 78B-9-404(4). 39 See id. § 78B-9-404(1)(b), (4) (providing that “[t]he burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner’s factual innocence” and directing the court to determine factual innocence by “clear and convincing evidence”). 40 Id. § 78B-9-404. 41 See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 279 (1988) (continued...) 17 BROWN v. STATE Opinion of the Court identify particular evidence as pivotal. A court could be faced with two pieces of evidence: one developed at the original trial and a second at the factual innocence hearing. Either one alone could be meaningless, but both taken together could be significant. We therefore decline the State’s invitation to require courts to base their decisions exclusively on newly discovered pivotal or transformative evidence. ¶53 Finally, the State contends that “[i]f a factual innocence determination could be based on previously presented evidence, a post-conviction court could improperly substitute its judgment for the jury’s.” As discussed above, however, the State concedes that Mr. Carlsen’s testimony is newly discovered evidence. Thus, we are not faced with the issue of whether a court could base its decision of factual innocence solely on previously available evidence. We recognize only that, under the plain language of the PCRA, previously available evidence can play a significant role in the court’s ultimate decision of factual innocence. Because this plain reading of the statute is in no way unreasonable, our analysis ends.42 But we are also confident that the high threshold showing of new evidence in section 402, when strictly applied,43 will ensure that newly discovered evidence plays a role in a court’s determination of factual innocence under section 404. ¶54 We therefore hold that, under the plain language of the PCRA, the post-conviction court did not err in concluding that a determination of factual innocence can be based on a combination of newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence. II. BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY CHALLENGE THE POST-CONVICTION COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS, WE AFFIRM THE COURT’S DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE ¶55 After the March 7 hearing, the post-conviction court made two critical factual findings in reaching its ultimate determination of factual innocence. First, the court found “by clear and convincing 41 (...continued) (defining “consider” as “to think about carefully,” especially “with regard to taking some action”). 42 Carranza, 2011 UT 80, ¶ 8; LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 135. 43 See supra ¶ 40 n.22. 18 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 Opinion of the Court evidence that Lael Brown was alive Saturday afternoon on November 6, 1993.” Second, the court found “by clear and convincing evidence that [Ms. Brown’s] whereabouts from Saturday afternoon on November 6th to the early morning hours of Sunday, November 7th, have been firmly established.” Based on these two findings, the court “determine[d] by clear and convincing evidence that [Ms. Brown] did not engage in the conduct for which she was convicted and is, therefore, factually innocent of the aggravated murder of Lael Brown.” ¶56 The State contends that the post-conviction court misapplied the standard for factual innocence. The State argues that “a reasonable juror could hear all of [Ms. Brown’s] evidence, including [Mr.] Hall’s testimony, and still find [Ms. Brown] guilty.” This, the State claims, is because “the post-conviction court’s conclusion . . . is not the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. A juror could reasonably weigh the evidence differently.” Specifically, the State argues that (1) evidence exists that contradicts Hall’s testimony; (2) while Brown’s motive to murder Lael was disputed at trial, she now admits to forging Lael’s checks; and (3) it is possible that Ms. Brown murdered Lael at a time other than Saturday morning. Therefore, the State maintains that Ms. Brown failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she did not engage in the conduct for which she was charged. ¶57 The State also argues that our deferential clear error standard of review does not apply to the post-conviction court’s ultimate determination of factual innocence. In so arguing, it concedes that it “is not challenging any of the post-conviction court’s factual findings.” The State instead contends that the ultimate determination of factual innocence is a mixed question of fact and law and that, once we apply this standard, the post-conviction court’s determination deserves little, if any, deference. ¶58 We conclude that, while the ultimate determination of factual innocence may be a mixed question of fact and law, this point is inconsequential in light of the State’s explicit acknowledgment that the post-conviction court’s factual findings are accurate. Because the State declined to challenge the court’s factual findings as clearly erroneous, we accept the findings as true and therefore must conclude that Ms. Brown has established her factual innocence. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court. ¶59 We have stated that “[s]tandards of review should allocate discretion between the trial and appellate courts in a way that takes account of the relative capabilities of each level of the court 19 BROWN v. STATE Opinion of the Court system.”44 “[A]n appellate court reviews a trial court’s conclusions of law for correctness because a single trial judge is in an inferior position to determine what the legal content of [a legal concept] should be.”45 Conversely, “[b]ecause a trial court is in a better position to judg[e] credibility and resolv[e] evidentiary conflicts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error.”46 ¶60 In this case, the post-conviction court made two findings that were purely factual: (1) Lael was alive Saturday afternoon on November 6, and (2) Ms. Brown firmly established her whereabouts between Saturday afternoon and the remaining time the murder could have occurred.47 Furthermore, the court reached these findings only after judging credibility and resolving evidentiary conflicts. For example, the court weighed Mr. Carlsen’s credibility, found that Mr. Hall testified truthfully, and specifically considered “the manner in which [Ms. Brown] testified and her demeanor on the witness stand.” The court also discounted the testimony of Lael’s son, Mike, due to admitted memory problems and placed less weight on hearsay evidence offered by the State. And the court considered and discounted the State’s evidence suggesting a time of death earlier than 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 6. Because the court’s findings are purely factual and based on credibility judgments and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts, we apply the deferential clear error standard on appeal. ¶61 Yet the State declines to undertake a clear error analysis on this appeal “because [it] is not challenging any of the post-conviction court’s factual findings.” [State’s Reply Brief, 16 (emphasis added).] Thus, the State has explicitly acknowledged that it does not challenge any of the post-conviction court’s factual findings. Chief among these are that (1) Lael was alive as of Saturday afternoon; and 44 State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 19, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted). 45 Id. ¶ 20 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 46 Id. (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 47 See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (“Factual questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind.”). 20 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 Opinion of the Court (2) Ms. Brown firmly established her whereabouts during the period in which Mr. Brown must have been murdered. While the State admits these two central facts, it nevertheless argues that the application of these facts to the legal standard for establishing factual innocence constitutes a mixed question of fact and law. ¶62 Given this concession, the State’s position on this issue is confusing. On the one hand, the State clearly concedes the postconviction court’s factual findings that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon and that Ms. Brown firmly established her whereabouts for the remaining time period during which the murder could have occurred. But on the other hand, the State attacks the underlying evidence on which the court relied in making these factual findings by exhaustively listing other credible evidence that would allow a juror to still find Ms. Brown guilty.48 ¶63 In offering these two inconsistent positions, the State appears to mistake findings of fact with evidence. We readily recognize the existence of evidence in this case that calls into question the postconviction court’s factual findings. And we agree with the State that the court’s ultimate decision of factual innocence “is not the only 48 For example, the State points out that (1) “[n]one of the waitresses who worked at Angie’s on that Saturday recalled seeing Lael that day”; (2) “[t]he man that [Mr.] Hall allegedly saw with Lael has never come forward to confirm that he was with Lael on that Saturday afternoon”; (3) “Lael did not answer numerous phone calls from his granddaughter and ex-wife on Saturday, even though his ex-wife routinely called on Saturday mornings”; (4) “Lael’s truck was in his driveway from at least 10:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.”; (5) “Lael’s neighbor . . . was outside during that time and never saw Lael come or go or follow his usual practice of puttering around his yard”; (6) “Lael never returned on Saturday to complete the plumbing repairs, despite his promise to do so”; (7) Lael never picked up Ms. Brown’s soup, so he would have had to step over it twice on his way to and from Angie’s Restaurant if Mr. Hall’s testimony was accurate; (8) it is still undisputed that Ms. Brown had access to Lael’s house; (9) Ms. Brown now admits to forging Lael’s checks; (10) Ms. Brown’s son’s testimony at trial that he saw Lael write a check to his mother is now false; (11) there is evidence that Lael discovered Ms. Brown’s forgeries before his death; (12) the missing bank records from Lael’s house still implicate only Ms. Brown; and (13) Ms. Brown still could have committed the murder later in the day on Saturday, November 6. [State’s Brief, 48-54.] 21 BROWN v. STATE Opinion of the Court reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence.” [State’s Brief, 49.] But in light of the State’s concession that the court’s factual findings are accurate, the mere existence of contradictory, underlying evidence is of no consequence. It is precisely because the court had to judge credibility and resolve conflicting evidence that we now grant deference to its factual findings. In our court system, district courts are better positioned to make these findings.49 We therefore decline, as an appellate court, to scrutinize the post-conviction court’s factual findings where the State has explicitly acknowledged their accuracy. ¶64 Given our conclusion relating to the State’s concession, there is no merit to the State’s claim that the post-conviction court misapplied the standard for factual innocence. It is true that the post-conviction court ultimately applied a legal concept. This concept required Ms. Brown to show by clear and convincing evidence that she did not “engage in the conduct for which [she] was convicted.”50 But it is nevertheless true that the post-conviction court found that Lael must have been murdered at a time when Ms. Brown had an established alibi. Once these facts are accepted, as they must be in light of the State’s concession, they lead inevitably to the conclusion that Ms. Brown did not murder Lael and is factually innocent. ¶65 The dissent criticizes our reliance on the State’s concession, however, as overly broad and unfair.51 It argues that in the context of the overall briefing, the State meant to concede only “pure” facts, not “hybrid” facts—a distinction the dissent admits is invalid.52 The dissent contends that the two critical findings discussed above regarding the time of Lael’s death and Ms. Brown’s whereabouts were challenged by the State on appeal as “hybrid” facts and thus do not fall within the State’s concession.53 The dissent would therefore review the post-conviction court’s factual findings under a clear 49 Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 20. 50 UTAH CODE § 78B-9-401.5(2)(a) (defining factual innocence); see also Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204 (Utah 1949) (stating that clear and convincing evidence “carries with it, not only the power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact it purports to prove, but has the element of clinching such truth or correctness”). 51 Infra ¶¶ 77–78. 52 Infra ¶¶ 94–95, 99. 53 Infra ¶ 95. 22 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 Opinion of the Court error standard and reverse.54 While the dissent presents an analysis that is thoughtful and worthy of careful consideration, we respectfully disagree with it for a number of reasons. ¶66 First, the way in which the State has briefed its case is wholly consistent with its explicit concession that it is not challenging the post-conviction court’s factual findings. It makes no attempt to meet its burden on appeal to demonstrate that the factual findings—whether “pure” or “hybrid”—are clearly erroneous.55 The State instead openly insists that a clear error analysis is unnecessary, which can only be true, of course, if the facts are not at issue. Moreover, the State does not even purport to marshal the evidence.56 It merely, though exhaustively, lists the evidence it claims contradicts the evidence relied on by the post-conviction court in making its finding of factual innocence.57 But it makes no effort to assume the role of devil’s advocate and marshal the evidence in support of the court’s factual findings,58 which, again, is consistent with its assertion that it is not challenging the court’s factual findings. ¶67 This is not a case where a party is simply unaware of its burden on appeal. Indeed, the State repeatedly cites the correct standard, including the duty to marshal the evidence, to us in its briefing. [State’s Brief, 2; State’s Reply Brief, 13–14.] Whether or not the State’s failure to argue clear error was grounded on a distinction 54 Infra ¶ 119. 55 See In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (discussing a party’s burden when challenging a factual finding). 56 We stress that we do not “fault the State for a failure to marshal” the evidence. Infra ¶ 101. We merely note that its failure to do so is consistent with its position that it is not challenging the postconviction court’s factual findings on appeal. 57 Supra ¶ 62 & n.49. 58 See United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ¶ 26, 140 P.3d 1200. The dissent recommends that we “abandon this principle” of requiring parties to assume the role of devil’s advocate when marshaling the evidence. Infra ¶ 106. But regardless of any merit that argument may have going forward, for purposes of this case, our marshaling standard unquestionably governs any challenge by the State of factual findings on appeal, and the State is, of course, well aware of that requirement. [State’s Reply Brief, 14.] 23 BROWN v. STATE Opinion of the Court between “hybrid” and “pure” facts, it remains the case that the State, based on its concession, failed to carry its burden on appeal.59 Thus, we conclude that the overall context of the State’s briefing supports our decision in this case.60 59 See In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 (stating that the court must “rely heavily on the presumption of correctness that attends [factual] findings” when a party fails to carry its burden to demonstrate clear error). The dissent acknowledges that the State has failed to present a clear error analysis. See infra ¶ 111 (“The State should . . . have framed [its] argument in terms of the applicable standard of appellate review. It should have asserted that there was ‘clear error’ in not concluding that Ms. Brown had failed to remove all ‘serious or substantial doubt’ as to her factual innocence.”). It nevertheless deems this a “rhetorical deficiency” and concludes that the State “effectively challenges” the post-conviction court’s factual findings “on that basis.” Infra ¶¶ 100, 108. The dissent thus characterizes the State’s approach in a way the State itself has expressly rejected. The State’s claim that the clear error standard does not apply on appeal was in direct response to Ms. Brown’s application of the clear error standard in her brief. [See Brown’s Brief, 42; State’s Reply Brief, 15.] Ms. Brown analyzed each of the post-conviction court’s factual findings, including the two key findings regarding Lael’s time of death and Ms. Brown’s whereabouts, using a clear error analysis. [Brown’s Brief, 42–48.] In so doing, Ms. Brown explicitly pointed out that the State had employed the wrong standard of review—a “reasonable juror” standard—for challenging factual findings in its opening brief. [Brown’s Brief, 47.] One would expect, therefore, that if the State is indeed challenging the facts, as the dissent maintains it is, it would have disputed Ms. Brown’s contention that it applied the wrong standard of review. But instead, the State concedes in its reply brief that it is not challenging the facts. [State’s Reply Brief, 16.] Thus, in attempting to excuse the State’s “rhetorical deficiency,” the dissent ignores the explanation the State itself gives for its approach: it means only to argue that the court erred in its application of the factual innocence standard, even accepting the court’s factual findings. [State’s Brief, 47–49]; see also supra ¶ 56. 60 We therefore disagree with the dissent that we are misconstruing a “single”sentence in the State’s overall briefing. See infra ¶¶ 72, 79. As the dissent recognizes, the concession appears in a section of the State’s reply brief in which it contests Ms. Brown’s application of (continued...) 24 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 Opinion of the Court (...continued) the clear error standard of review. Infra ¶ 89. The full paragraph in which the State conceded the post-conviction court’s factual findings reads as follows: Applicable standard of review. [Ms. Brown] first argues that the applicable standard of review is clear error. But that standard applies only when a court reviews purely factual questions. The clear error standard does not apply in this case, because the State is not challenging any of the post-conviction court’s factual findings. Rather, the State challenges only the court’s legal conclusions based on its factual findings. [State’s Reply Brief, 15–16.] It is difficult to see how the State could have stated more clearly that it is not challenging the underlying factual findings in this case. And, as discussed above, the State briefed its argument consistent with this concession by not engaging in a clear error analysis. We also disagree that the State’s arguments in its reply brief or elsewhere diminish or clarify the scope of its concession. Infra ¶¶ 91–92. We openly recognize that the State presents us with evidence that contradicts the post-conviction court’s factual findings. See supra ¶¶ 62–63 & n.49. But we believe the dissent misapprehends the State’s apparent tactic in doing so. The State is not—as it concedes—seeking to overturn the court’s factual findings under a clear error analysis. It instead attempts to show that, in light of the contradictory evidence, the court erred in concluding that the factual innocence standard had been met, even accepting the unchallenged factual findings. [State’s Brief, 47–49.] This is because, according to the State, “a reasonable juror” could disagree with the court, [State’s Brief, 48], or the court’s decision “is not the only reasonable conclusion” given the evidence, [State’s Brief, 49]. The “confusion” we expressed on this point earlier in this opinion, supra ¶ 62, does not relate to the scope of the State’s concession, as the dissent seems to suggest, see infra ¶ 88. Rather, we were simply expressing confusion as to why the State would undertake such a strategy. See supra ¶¶ 63–64. At this juncture in the process, it is not our role to determine what a reasonable juror would conclude as to the facts or whether there are other reasonable factual conclusions in light of the evidence. Our role is limited: we decide only whether the court committed clear error in making the (continued...) 25 BROWN v. STATE Opinion of the Court ¶68 Second, we disagree with the dissent’s construction of the State’s concession as running only to so-called “pure”facts.61 Any confusion as to the scope of the concession was cleared up by the State itself when it stated, immediately after its concession, that it “challenges only the court’s legal conclusions based on its factual findings.” [State’s Reply Brief, 16 (emphasis added).] This statement clearly concedes all factual findings, whether “pure” or “hybrid,” by placing only the post-conviction court’s “legal conclusions” at issue on appeal. Surely the State did not mistakenly assume the court’s key factual findings as to the time of Lael’s death and Ms. Brown’s whereabouts to be legal conclusions.62 ¶69 Although the State has declined to challenge the postconviction court’s factual findings for clear error, the dissent has done so in an able and vigorous way.63 While we do not reach this issue given our reliance on the State’s concession, we nevertheless express disagreement with how the dissent has approached its analysis. The dissent proposes that, by “pure” factual findings, the State simply meant findings as to witness credibility at the postconviction hearings; and that, by “hybrid” findings, the State meant those findings implicating evidence from the first trial.64 Both Mr. Hall and Ms. Brown testified for the first time at the postconviction hearings,65 and the court made specific credibility findings as to each.66 Thus, these findings would presumably qualify as unchallenged “pure” facts under the dissent’s approach. The dissent seems to disregard, however, the post-conviction court’s (...continued) factual findings that it made. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 20; see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 580–81 (1985). 61 Infra ¶ 98. 62 But see infra ¶ 90 (arguing that “[i]n context, it is impossible to read [the State’s concession] fairly to encompass the ‘key’ determinations of the timing of Mr. Brown’s death and the whereabouts of Ms. Brown”). 63 Infra ¶ 119–28. But see In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 (recognizing that “the burden of overturning factual findings is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts” (emphasis added)). 64 Infra ¶¶ 89–90. 65 Supra ¶¶ 21, 34. 66 Supra ¶¶ 27, 34. 26 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 Opinion of the Court credibility findings in its clear error analysis. Instead, the dissent repeatedly dismisses Ms. Brown’s account of her whereabouts as “subjective” and “self-serving” without acknowledging the unchallenged finding that Ms. Brown testified credibly.67 So even if we were to accept the dissent’s hypothesis that the State’s concession runs only to so-called “pure” facts, we would still have to address the difficult question of how the post-conviction court’s determination is clearly erroneous when it is conceded to be based on credible evidence.68 67 Infra ¶¶ 126, 127. We do not mean to suggest that the court’s credibility findings could not be found to be clearly erroneous if properly challenged. But the State, as the dissent recognizes, concedes their accuracy. Their accuracy is therefore not at issue in this case. 68 See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶¶ 72–73, 99 P.3d 801 (stating that district court’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous, even in light of “plausible evidence” to the contrary, where it was based on credible evidence); see also Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575 (noting that factual findings “based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses” are afforded “even greater deference . . . for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said”). The dissent also argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred, even accepting its credibility findings, because Ms. Brown’s “account of her whereabouts . . . does not at all rule herself out as Lael Brown’s murderer.” Infra ¶ 115. This is because “even according to Ms. Brown’s own evidence, she was at the scene of the crime at a time when the murder may have been committed.” Infra ¶ 114. Even were we to reach this issue, which we do not, we think there is a serious question as to whether the court clearly erred in this regard. The evidence is not at all clear that Ms. Brown’s account of her whereabouts placed her at the scene of the crime at a time the murder was committed. She certainly does admit, however, to taking soup to Lael’s house on Saturday, November 6. According to the court’s account of the record, she delivered the soup sometime between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. Mr. Hall originally stated that he saw Lael alive at 2:30 p.m. but then testified at the factual innocence hearing that it was closer to 1:00 p.m. Thus, depending on how we view the evidence, there is at least a very narrow window, 2:30 p.m. (continued...) 27 BROWN v. STATE Opinion of the Court ¶70 Regardless of whether Ms. Brown’s alibi is the “weakest [the dissent has] heard of,”69 the mere fact that an alibi is self-serving (they always are) or that it is offered by a boyfriend or a son does (...continued) to 3:00 p.m., and at most an hour window, 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., during which Ms. Brown placed herself at Lael’s house at a time when Lael might possibly have been there. We therefore agree with the dissent that there is potentially some room to doubt the court’s finding that Ms. Brown firmly established her whereabouts, even accepting the court’s credibility findings. But the clear and convincing evidence standard, by its very nature, tolerates some doubt. We have stated that “a burden of proof is an expression of society’s tolerance for error in a particular realm of the law.” Essential Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay, 2011 UT 71, ¶ 21, 270 P.3d 430. Clear and convincing evidence is an “intermediate standard of proof” that “implies something more than the usual requirement of a preponderance . . . of the evidence; and something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have characterized this standard as requiring the “existence of facts that make a conclusion very highly probable.” Id. ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, and given the unchallenged credibility findings, it is not a foregone conclusion that the court clearly erred in determining that Ms. Brown established her whereabouts. The State has never presented any evidence that the murder occurred during the relevant hour of 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Further, the court specifically recognized that Ms. Brown “may have been alone during a portion of the afternoon on Saturday” but discounted this fact because “evidence was presented suggesting that Lael was not killed during this time frame.” Specifically, Lael’s neighbor, Kimberly Standridge, testified at trial that she did not hear any gunshots Saturday afternoon and that, if there were any, she would have heard them because she was working in her yard during the relevant time. The court also relied on Dr. Grey’s time of death estimate based on the physical evidence, which “strongly suggest[ed] that Lael was likely killed around 9:00 p.m.,” not Saturday afternoon. In our view, given this contrary evidence, the question is still open as to whether the court clearly erred in discounting the doubt identified by the dissent. 69 Infra ¶ 75. 28 Cite as: 2013 UT 42