Opinion ID: 4530356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conduct of Livingston Parties’ Counsel 13

Text: The Livingston Parties take issue with the District Court’s denial of their request for a new trial based on the 12 The Livingston Parties also argue that AFS cannot bring a misappropriation claim because it “did not stand to incur a loss if the trade secrets were misappropriated[.]” Livingston Parties Reply Br. at 9. That argument, raised for the first time in a reply brief, is forfeited. Haberle v. Borough of Nazareth, 936 F.3d 138, 141 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019). 13 The District Court denied the Livingston Parties’ motion for a new trial made pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(B), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(3), and 60(b)(6). We review that denial for abuse of discretion. See Lazaridis v. 21 conduct of their lead trial counsel, Mr. Morin. Shortly following the entry of judgment against them, the Livingston Parties discovered that Morin had failed to gain formal authorization to practice before the District Court and also had failed to submit any post-trial proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. According to the Livingston Parties, the first failure amounted to a fraud on the Court and the second to “excusable neglect,” both of which should entitle them to a new trial. The District Court addressed those arguments in full and properly rejected them. First, the Livingston Parties complain that Morin represented them at trial despite never being admitted pro hac vice, thereby violating the District Court’s Local Rules and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. In so complaining, however, they fail to address – in fact, they simply ignore – our precedent regarding the application of local rules. “[A] district court can depart from the strictures of its own local procedural rules where (1) it has a sound rationale for doing so, and (2) so doing does not unfairly prejudice a party who has relied on the local rule to his detriment.” United States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. & Accessories, 200 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court had a sound Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (Rule 59); Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rule 60). “[A] court abuses its discretion when its ruling is founded on an error of law or a misapplication of law to the facts.” Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 780 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 22 rationale for overlooking Morin’s technical non-compliance: it already had sufficient information to determine whether he should be admitted to practice pro hac vice, and it did not wish to further delay a case that was ready for trial and had taken four years to get to that point. Moreover, the District Court correctly explained that the Livingston Parties could not have relied to their detriment on the District Court’s Local Rules regarding pro hac vice admissions because the “essential purpose” of those rules is to assist the Court, not to “protect an interest of the parties.” Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 380–81. Under the circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the Livingston Parties’ request to grant the extraordinary relief of a new trial, particularly since Morin’s non-compliance with the District Court’s Local Rules was essentially technical, not substantive, in nature. Everyone in the case, including the Livingston Parties, knew of Morin’s role in the litigation and accepted it. 14 Still pressing the point, however, the Livingston Parties say that Morin perpetrated a fraud on the District Court and on them by misleading the Court about the discipline he was subject to in New York, by failing to advise them of his disciplinary history and inability to practice before the Court, 14 At least through the trial, the Livingston Parties seem to have been satisfied. They fail to identify a single thing Morin did or failed to do during the trial itself that prejudiced them. Cf. Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 371–72 (noting that Morin “zealously represented” the Livingston Parties at trial, made a “well stated” Rule 52(c) motion on their behalf and contributed to the case being “well tried[.]”). 23 and by “using Pennsylvania licensed attorneys who were never known by the Livingston Parties to have entered an appearance on their behalf.” Livingston Parties Opening Br. at 28. As for the first and third of those assertions, the record is plainly to the contrary. The District Court pointed out that Morin had disclosed his suspension from practicing law in New York, and that there was a pending motion for his reinstatement in that jurisdiction. Those disclosures were accurate in all relevant respects and were not misleading. And it is certainly not believable that the Livingston Parties were unaware that other attorneys at Morin’s firm had entered appearances on their behalf. Those other attorneys were present and assisted during depositions, pretrial proceedings, and trial, and they had signed the Livingston Parties’ pretrial pleadings and motions. Regarding the Livingston Parties’ contention that Morin defrauded them by not disclosing his disciplinary status, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Morin did not commit a fraud. The Court determined that his conduct was, by all appearances, based on a “mistaken but good faith belief that reinstatement in New York would be a routine matter[.]” Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 375. Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by declining to grant the Livingston Parties a new trial based on their own counsel’s purported failure to fully disclose his disciplinary history to them. The Livingston Parties bear the responsibility for knowing who represents them. It does not matter that Morin was chosen by their insurer. We do not minimize the seriousness of Morin’s failure to file post-trial submissions to summarize the Livingston Parties’ legal positions. But any harm those parties suffered from the absence of those submissions was mitigated by the 24 Court’s awareness of the arguments they say should have been advanced. Indeed, the arguments had largely been advanced in one form or another over the course of the drawn-out proceedings. As the District Court noted, a detailed pretrial submission was filed and “raised many of the arguments that the Livingston defendants now claim, through new counsel, that Attorney Morin failed to present to the court.” PostJudgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 376 n.6. And, of course, the parties’ positions on various issues were evident through the course of trial. The District Court expressly disclaimed that Morin’s failure to file a post-trial submission altered the outcome of this case, and the Court’s extensive efforts to independently assess the merits of AFS’s claims and anticipate and address the Livingston Parties’ well-known arguments, despite the lack of post-trial briefing from those parties, is apparent on the face of both the Court’s Post-Trial and PostJudgment Opinions. For example, rather than simply adopt positions advocated by AFS, the Court after careful analysis declined to find that the Livingston Parties’ involvement in trade secret misappropriation was willful or malicious, or that Aufiero was liable to AFS for punitive damages. Finally, the Livingston Parties maintain that Morin’s failure to file post-trial briefing constitutes “excusable neglect” entitling them to a new trial. The District Court, consistent with our precedent, faithfully balanced the four relevant factors established by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), 15 for determining whether excusable neglect 15 The four factors are: “the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including 25 warrants setting aside a final judgment. It explained why the balance in this case fell decidedly against doing so. Specifically, the Court found that AFS would endure considerable prejudice by having to retry the case, because even a timely post-trial submission from Morin would not have changed the outcome of the case. Moreover, a new trial would constitute a “disruption to efficient judicial administration,” given the substantial time and resources the Court had already dedicated to the matter. Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 377. The Court also found that the failure to submit posttrial briefing was not “excusable,” notwithstanding the personal difficulties Morin was dealing with at the time, because, among other reasons, the Livingston Parties had several other attorneys listed as counsel of record, all of whom whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Id. at 395. As the District Court noted, because it independently reached and assessed the merits of this case, irrespective of the lack of posttrial briefing from the Livingston Parties, there is an argument to be made that Morin’s failure to file post-trial briefing does not implicate the “excusable neglect” standard contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Because we agree with the District Court that the Livingston Parties are not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1), even assuming it applies, we do not reach the question of whether a party can claim excusable neglect when a district court independently adjudicates an issue on the merits, notwithstanding that party’s failure to make a relevant filing. 26 could have and should have been aware of the post-trial briefing deadline. 16 Id. at 377–78. We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s analysis, all of which is well supported by the record and consistent with governing legal principles. While problems associated with Morin’s representation of the Livingston Parties may give rise to claims in another tribunal, the Court here acted well within its discretion in determining that any flaws in the representation did not entitle the Livingston Parties to the extraordinary relief of a new trial.