Opinion ID: 1919219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motel Project of Cragin

Text: Applying the statute as interpreted by Michaud and Swain to Cragin's motel project, I would conclude that the Superior Court erred in determining that the motel project was a subdivision. Although the motel will be a building, Cragin's motel guests will be transient and their connection to the motel rooms tenuous. See Michaud, 444 A.2d at 42. There will be no splitting off of a sufficient real estate interest to constitute a division of land within the meaning of section 4956(1). I am mindful that many of our municipalities have not heretofore required condominium and apartment developments to secure approval as subdivisions under section 4956(1) and that our trial courts have in some cases upheld those municipal decisions. Section 4956(4) prohibits any sale, lease, or conveyance for consideration of any subdivision not municipally approved as a subdivision. To prevent uncertainty as to existing structures, I would follow the precedent of the court set forth in Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 1001-02 (Me.1982); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 640 (Me.1979), and Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269, 1274 (Me.1976). Accordingly, I would apply this interpretation of section 4956(1) to the litigants in this case but otherwise only to those applicants who have not to date taken substantial steps in reliance on final approval of their applications under other applicable land use statutes and ordinances. I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court as to the motel project of defendant Cragin and affirm the judgment as to the condominium project of defendant Baldwin and the apartment building projects of defendants Baldwin and DiPalma.