Opinion ID: 3052285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: exterior ramp

Text: [1] On appeal, we are asked to decide whether 28 C.F.R. § 36.405 and ADAAG § 4.1.7 apply to barrier removal in existing facilities. By their terms, these regulations apply to “alterations;” however, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1) extends their application to readily achievable barrier removal in existing facilities. Despite this regulatory directive, the district court declined to apply § 36.405 and § 4.1.7. We reverse and remand. [2] Our analysis begins with 28 C.F.R. § 36.304, which regulates barrier removal in existing facilities of public accommodation. That section requires “[a] public accommodation [to] remove architectural barriers in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.”2 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a). The regulation goes on to specify that, “measures taken to comply with the barrier removal requirements of this section shall comply with the applicable requirements for alterations in § 36.402 and §§ 36.404-36.406. . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1) (emphasis added). If compliance under those additional regulations would not be readily achievable, “a public accommodation may take other readily achievable measures to remove the barrier that do not fully comply with the specified requirements.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(2). 2 The ADA defines readily achievable as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). Factors to consider include the costs of the project, the resources of the facility and entity, and the nature of the entity and its operations. Id. 8334 DISABILITY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT v. FOLEY ESTATES [3] In this case, we look to the regulations governing historic buildings because the Santa Barbara County Historic Landmarks Advisory Commission designated the building as a place of local historic merit. Through its plain language, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1) directs vendors to comply with 28 C.F.R. § 36.4053 when making readily achievable accommodations. Section 36.405 requires qualified historic buildings to “comply to the maximum extent feasible with [ADAAG § 4.1.7].” 28 C.F.R. § 36.405(a). Under § 4.1.7, “if the entity undertaking the alterations believes that compliance with the requirements . . . would threaten or destroy the historic significance of the building . . . the entity should consult with the State Historic Preservation Officer.” ADAAG § 4.1.7(2)(b). “If the State Historic Preservation Officer agrees that compliance with the accessibility requirements for accessible routes (exterior and interior), ramps, entrances or toilets would threaten or destroy the historical significance of the building or facility, the alternative requirements in 4.1.7(3) may be used.” Id. Under our reading, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1) requires compliance with § 36.405, which incorporates § 4.1.7(2)(b) and provides a procedure for businesses to seek alternative requirements for historic properties. [4] Our reading of 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 preserves the leniency allocated to existing facilities under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA only requires barrier removal in existing facilities “where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Section 36.304 integrates the “readily achievable” standard into both § 36.304(a) and § 36.304(d)(2). Section 36.304(a) ensures that only readily achievable barrier removal triggers the incorporation of § 36.405 and § 4.1.7, and § 36.304(d)(2) allows for partial compliance if full compliance with those regulations would not be readily achievable. Thus 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 3 Section 36.405 applies to “facilities that are eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places . . . or are designated as historic under State or local law.” DISABILITY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT v. FOLEY ESTATES 8335 incorporates § 36.405 and § 4.1.7 into the ready achievability framework, and retains the flexible standard reserved for existing facilities. Additionally, § 4.1.7 establishes a procedure for determining whether barrier removal in existing facilities will be readily achievable. According to the ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual (“ADA Manual”) § III-4.4200, “[b]arrier removal would not be considered ‘readily achievable’ if it would threaten or destroy the historic significance of a building or facility that is . . . designated as historic under State or local law.” The standard set in § 4.1.7 is identical to the standard of ready achievability proffered by the ADA Manual. This similarity between the language suggests that application of § 4.1.7 is consistent with the standard for existing historic facilities. Therefore, the procedure set forth in § 4.1.7 may be used to determine what is readily achievable in existing historic facilities. [5] For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred when it refused to apply § 36.405 and § 4.1.7 to readily achievable barrier removal in existing facilities. We acknowledge that three courts have considered historical significance as a factor for determining ready achievability without invoking 28 C.F.R. § 36.405 or ADAAG § 4.1.7.4 However, we find the explicit regulatory language to be more persuasive than the absence of discussion of these regulations in our sister circuits. Therefore, we remand to the district court to apply § 36.405 and § 4.1.7 when determining whether an exterior ramp would be readily achievable. 4 In, Gathright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006), Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd., 264 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 2001), and Speciner v. NationsBank, N.A., 215 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (D. Md. 2002), courts have considered historical significance as a factor for determining ready achievability without invoking 28 C.F.R. § 36.405 or ADAAG § 4.1.7. Notably, none of these cases rejects the application of 28 C.F.R. § 36.405 and ADAAG § 4.1.7; they simply proceed without analyzing those authorities. 8336 DISABILITY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT v. FOLEY ESTATES
At trial, the judge relied on Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. to find that DREES bore the initial burden of production for the question of ready achievability. See 264 F.3d 999, 1002 (10th Cir. 2001). As noted above, Colorado Cross failed to address § 36.405 and § 4.1.7. This omission tainted the inquiry into who bears the burden of production for the ready achievability of barrier removal in historic facilities. We reverse and remand because we find that § 4.1.7 counsels in favor of placing the burden of production on the defendant. [6] We begin by looking to § 36.405 and § 4.1.7 to allocate the burden of production. Under § 4.1.7(2)(b), “if the entity undertaking alterations believes that compliance with the requirements . . . would threaten or destroy the historic significance of the building . . . the entity should consult with the State Historic Preservation Officer.” Although this clause uses permissive language, it calls upon the party who believes that compliance would threaten the historical significance of the building to consult the appropriate agency. It does not place that burden on the party advocating for remedial measures. Thus, the language of § 4.1.7(2)(b) counsels in favor of placing the burden of production upon the defendant. [7] By placing the burden of production on the defendant, we place the burden on the party with the best access to information regarding the historical significance of the building. The defendant sought the historical designation in this case. Thus, the defendant possesses the best understanding of the circumstances under which that designation might be threatened. The defendant is also in the best position to discuss the matter with the Santa Barbara County Historic Landmarks Advisory Commission and to request an opinion on proposed methods of barrier removal. As a result, the defendant is in a better position to introduce, as part of its affirmative defense, detailed evidence and expert testimony concerning whether DISABILITY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT v. FOLEY ESTATES 8337 the historic significance of a structure would be threatened or destroyed by the proposed barrier removal plan. [8] As the dissent reasoned in Colorado Cross, “[i]f plaintiffs must all but present the court with a pre-approved construction contract for a sum certain which includes detailed plans, impact statements, engineering studies, and permits to meet their threshold burden, virtually no plaintiff could afford to bring an architectural barrier removal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).” Colorado Cross, 264 F.3d at 1011 (Lucero, J., dissenting). We need not require an ADA plaintiff to undertake such heroic measures. Congress relies on private actors, i.e., disabled individuals, to enforce the ADA by filing lawsuits. Thus plaintiffs should not be deterred from filing meritorious claims by an inappropriate allocation of the burden of production. [9] We find that the language of § 4.1.7, the access to information, and the congressional intent behind the ADA support placing the burden of production on the defendant. Thus, we reverse and remand for the district court to assign the burden of production to the defendant on the issue of whether barrier removal would threaten the historical significance of the building.