Opinion ID: 3011662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the stb's jurisdiction on remand

Text: Norfolk, as intervenor on behalf of the STB, raises a different argument, going to the STB's jurisdiction on remand. Norfolk suggests that, because it has abandoned the Enola Branch, the STB no longer would have jurisdiction on remand to make any deter minations as to the historic status of the line as a whole or to impose mitigation conditions on any non-bridge property. It argues that any decision vacating the STB's original identification decision and remanding the case to the STB would be futile because, beyond the bridges already identified, the STB would be without the power to impose any historic conditions on the abandoned line as a whole.9 It is true, generally, that once a carrier abandons a rail line, the line no longer is part of the national transportation system and the STB's jurisdiction terminates. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5-6 n.3 (1990). Unless the STB attaches post-abandonment conditions to a certificate of abandonment or exemption, such as requir ements under S 106, the authorization of abandonment ends the Board's regulatory mission and its jurisdiction. See id.; Hayfield N. R.R. Co., Inc. v. Chicago & Northwestern T ransp. Co., 474 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1984). The determination of whether a railroad has abandoned a line hinges on the railroad's objective intent to cease permanently or indefinitely all _________________________________________________________________ 9. Norfolk raises the issue of the STB's jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. In opposing FAST's motion to r eopen before the STB, Norfolk never suggested that the STB was without jurisdiction to expand the scope of the historical condition on the rail line. Yet if the STB would have had jurisdiction to expand the historical condition in the 1997 Order, it is not clear why the STB would lack jurisdiction to do the same on remand from our determination that the 1997 Order declining to reopen was in error. 21 transportation service on the line. See Birt v. Surface Transp. Bd., 90 F.3d 580, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Abandonment is considered consummated when the rail line is fully abandoned. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Sur face Transp. Bd., 93 F.3d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We reject Norfolk's argument because there has been no STB finding that Norfolk consummated abandonment of the rail line as an entire property. Following the 1990 Order, Conrail removed all remnants of the railr oad line from the property, including all tracks, ties, rails, signage, and equipment. According to Norfolk, it has been more than ten years since there was activity on the pr operty, more than eight years since there was railroad equipment on the property, and more than seven years since Conrail attempted to negotiate converting the rail into a trail. But the historical eligibility of the line as a whole does not require the presence of the tracks and other railroad equipment. The historically eligible property, as found by the Keeper and urged by FAST, is the rail line itself, including the trail and all of the bridges. The issue is whether Norfolk has abandoned, sold, or otherwise disposed of any portion of that property, a point on which the record is silent. If, on remand, the STB concludes that Norfolk has disposed of some portion of the line, the STB will be without power to expand the historical condition to cover that property already sold. But the STB otherwise does have the power to expand the historical condition to cover all property not abandoned and to r equire Norfolk to preserve the status quo and not to sell or otherwise disturb or dispose of the rail line pending proper completion of the S 106 process.