Opinion ID: 2617569
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the alaska constitution and the statutory framework

Text: The Alaska Constitution delegates to the Alaska State Legislature (Legislature) the allocation of power between boards and commissioners. The head of each principal department shall be a single executive unless otherwise provided by law. Alaska Const. art. III, § 25 (emphasis added). When a board or commission is at the head of a principal department ... its members shall be appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the legislature.... Alaska Const. art. III, § 26. Although Elim concedes that the Legislature has complete authority to allocate power within the departments, it nonetheless argues that there is a preference for strong department heads. It contends that those who drafted the Alaska Constitution left the matter to the legislature to resolve, but within the context of an overall preference to establish strong departmental heads to administer programs. This preference is not supported by proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention. [6] Although the proposal at the Constitutional Convention placing all regulatory and administrative power over fish and game in a board was defeated, the result was not to place the department head in a position of authority over this board. In reviewing debate at a constitutional convention, as with any other law-making body, it is imperative to keep issues separate. Although Elim provides a variety of quotations from delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention to demonstrate that the framers preferred strong department heads to boards, these quotations are used out of context and come from debates regarding different issues. Also, not one is an excerpt of a discussion regarding how much authority commissioners would have in relation to boards or commissions. Elim quoted Delegate McCutcheon as saying, We are a group of citizenry here who are, by and large, tired of rule by board. It may have been necessary in a protection in past years in order to eliminate too much influence from an absentee governor, or one appointed by absentees, in dominating our Territorial affairs. We have created boards for the purpose of getting away from Washington, D.C., and controlling our own affairs, but when we can elect our own governor, he sets up his upper cabinet and operates the government in conjunction with the legislative branch... . [I] am absolutely opposed, predicated on experience and analysis of this thing, that we strike this particular thing. This statement was made in opposition to an amendment that would have deleted the requirement in article III, section 26 that the appointment of an executive officer of a principal department be subject to the approval of the governor. 3 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention (PACC) 2249 (Jan. 16, 1956). McCutcheon made the quoted declaration because he wanted to ensure that the responsibility for the departments being established was affixed to the governor. Delegate McNealy's comments, also quoted by Elim to demonstrate the intent of the framers, relate to a wholly different issue. Elim quotes Delegate McNealy: Delegate McNealy accordingly forcefully argued against mandating the commission form of government on the ground that it should be left to the legislature to decide if they want to set up one commission, well and good, or if they feel it is necessary to set up two commissions under it, or under a principal department head, or however they care to do this... . However, Delegate McNealy's comments do not support Elim's position that the framers intended the Commissioner to be more powerful than the Board. Delegate McNealy's comments were made in opposition to a proposal, adopted in article III, section 22, authorizing the Legislature to establish regulatory and quasi-judicial agencies. 4 PACC 2508 (Jan. 18, 1956). He was concerned about combining rulemaking and enforcement powers in the same body. All that Delegate McNealy's comments reveal is that the framers intended to leave the structure of the department to the Legislature. Thus, Elim's argument that while the constitutional convention delegates did not expressly reject the use of a board, they remained concerned that any such board should be placed within a principal department with a head who would be accountable directly to the governor is unpersuasive. The discretion granted to the Legislature by article III, section 25 of the Alaska Constitution, belies the argument that the Alaska Constitution evidences an overall preference for strong department heads and, implicitly, for weak boards and commissions. See 3 PACC 2203-11 (Jan. 14, 1956); 3 PACC 2249-52 (Jan. 16, 1956); 4 PACC 2502-22 (Jan. 18, 1956). The authors of the Alaska Constitution explicitly chose to leave the structure of the department to the Legislature. Thus, the answer to the question before us lies not in an analysis of constitutional debate, but rather in the statutory framework.