Opinion ID: 268040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sham Arrest

Text: 33 Appellant says that his arrest for drinking in public was a sham to cover for a narcotics search and hence the twenty-eight capsules of heroin-hydrochloride mixture found on his person should have been suppressed at his trial for Harrison Act violations. 34 The record lends some support to his contention. He was arrested by a narcotics squad officer in plain clothes, who testified that he was on watch for narcotics activity, in a high narcotics density area; he neither looked for persons drinking in public nor ordinarily arrested persons committing that offense in his presence; from the moment that he saw appellant walking on V Street he suspected narcotics activity, and therefore followed appellant; he recognized appellant as a prior narcotics offender before arresting him for the misdemeanor. Appellant stated, without contradiction, that other men in the alley were drinking, but were not even approached by the officer. 35 On the other hand, there is support for the view that the arrest was not a sham. Appellant violated a city ordinance in the immediate presence of a police officer, who would have committed a misdemeanor had he failed to arrest. D.C.Code 4-143. Upon the officer's inquiry, appellant stated he was carrying a weapon. When the officer halted appellant from reaching for it and looked for himself, he discovered the narcotics. Neither appellant's illegal behavior nor his reaction when asked about weapons is in any way attributable to the officer. 36 A defendant is not foreclosed from questioning the motives behind a legal arrest which leads to the discovery of evidence of other crimes. Notwithstanding such statutes as D.C.Code 4-143, police exercise substantial discretion in arresting persons for commission of minor offenses such as drinking in public. 1 When a minor misdemeanor statute is enforced only as a gamble for detecting a larger crime, this discretion is abused. 2 To discourage such gambles, the evidence thus obtained is excluded. 3 Thus in McKnight v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 183 F.2d 977 (1950), the defendant was legally arrested for lottery violations. However, the police 'purposely refrained from arresting him in the street,' as they might have, so as to be able to conduct a search of the premises they expected to enter. The fruits of this search were excluded. In White v United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 271 F.2d 829 (1959), defendant was arrested in New York for vagrancy and the police used the occasion, as they conceded to be their practice, to search for narcotics. We assumed the legality of the arrest, but excluded the evidence obtained there because the 'search    in truth was not incidental to an arrest, but    in fact the arrest was incidental to (the) search.' (Id. 106 U.S.App.D.C. at 248, 271 F.2d at 831.) See also Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961). 37 Although the present case is close on the sham arrest issue, the record does not justify reversal. Much of the force of the contention that appellant's arrest was 'merely' for drinking in public would have been destroyed had it been clearly established that other men in the alley were drinking. It would appear that defense counsel was aware of this, yet the officer, who admitted that others were there, was never asked-- and did not say-- if they were drinking. Appellant's version of the arrest, although it generally coincided with that of the officer, could be disbelieved on this point. The issue was one for inference to be drawn by the fact-finder based upon credibility and demeanor. For that reason alone, I would sustain the ruling below.