Opinion ID: 3062093
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rates of Postjudgment Interest

Text: Mr. Ortega contends that the district court erred in setting the postjudgment interest rates at the contract interest rates because 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) establishes the postjudgment rate. See Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 1004 (10th Cir. 2005). He complains that the interest rate on the promissory note was 6.5% and the rate on the guaranty was 18%, whereas the applicable statutory interest rate would have been merely 0.3%. As pointed out by Wells Fargo, however, this contention was not raised below. Although Mr. Ortega requested a reduction of the amount of the award and argued in his brief in opposition to summary judgment about the interest rate Wells Fargo charged during default, he never raised § 1961(a) or challenged the postjudgment interest rate. Because Mr. Ortega failed to raise the issue in district court, we review only for plain error. See Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distribs., Inc., No. 10-6157, 2012 WL 3055566, at  (10th Cir. July 27, 2012). We will reverse only if (1) there was error, (2) the error is plain, (3) it affects substantial rights, and (4) it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at . Here, Mr. Ortega has failed to persuade us that the fourth prong of plain error has been satisfied because he does not “identify any particular injustice beyond the loss of [his] possibly meritorious claim.” Id. at . We therefore must affirm. -6-