Opinion ID: 2200119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: presumption of sanity

Text: Feldner requested the following instruction: Where a Will is contested on the grounds that the testator did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a Will, the Testator is presumed to have been sane and to have had testamentary capacity at the time the Will was signed. The presumption substitutes for evidence of the existence of testamentary capacity and governs you in finding testamentary capacity, unless you find from credible evidence that testamentary capacity does not exist, in which event the presumption is rebutted and ceases to operate. A party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. Feldner argued that it was error for the trial court to refuse to so instruct that one who makes a will is presumed sane. John H. responded that this presumption was already a function of the burden of proof on the contestant as the trial court instructed. Therefore, John H. argued, under the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, no further instruction was called for. Part of NDCC 30.1-15-07 says: Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity, ... NDREv 301 says: A party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. The trial court instructed: The Will contestant has the burden of establishing by a greater weight of evidence that the testator suffered under an insane delusion. Since the trial court instructed that John H., as the person contesting the will, had the burden of proof, there was no error in declining to further instruct that there was a presumption of sanity. The burden of proof need not be doubly emphasized. Feldner also requested an instruction that a person has a right to will property in any manner which the person chooses so long as public policy was not violated. The instruction requested said: Any competent adult individual may make a written testamentary disposition of his or her property to take effect upon his or her death. It is the testator's right. The testator may dispose of this property as he wishes without regard to the desires of prospective beneficiaries or the views of juries or courts. If the Will disregards family ties or is unwise or is unjust, or is, for other reasons, such as the court does not approve, this does not signify that it is invalid, as long as the Will is not against public policy. It is not against public policy to disinherit a son. One who makes such a disposition is called the `testator', and the document the testator executes is called a `Will'. The trial court did not give the instruction as requested, but, as John H. pointed out, its substance was effectively given. The trial court instructed that the evidence must establish that the testator divides up his property in a way which, except for that delusion, he would not have done. This instruction allowed the jury to find, if it had been so inclined, that in his right mind John J. would have disinherited John H., even if John H. were his son. We conclude that there were no substantial errors in the trial court's instructions to the jury.