Opinion ID: 2444891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The applicable New Jersey tort statute of limitations applies in this case, but because Patterson filed suit in Delaware within two years of the New Jersey accident, we must remand this matter to the Superior Court for a determination whether Patterson's injuries are sufficiently permanent to pierce New Jersey's verbal threshold, entitle[] [her] to recover damages from Armstrong, and qualify her to recover contractual UM benefits from State Farm.

Text: Allstate denied Patterson's claim for damages because it determined that Patterson could not pierce New Jersey's verbal threshold. Of course, Allstate's initial determination to reject Patterson's claim is not dispositive. A court of competent jurisdiction would have to decide the issue according to New Jersey tort law. Any court, so long as it has jurisdiction over the parties and the underlying UM claim, could decide whether Patterson could pierce New Jersey's verbal thresholda question of New Jersey tort law. In this case, either a New Jersey court in a direct claim by Patterson against Armstrong, or a Delaware court in Patterson's contract claim for damages against State Farm, could decide whether Patterson's injuries pierced New Jersey's verbal threshold, thus entitling her to recover. Several weeks after Allstate denied her claim, Patterson sued State Farm in Delaware Superior Court on April 16, 2008. In her order denying State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Superior Court judge determined, on the basis of the Kent opinion, that Patterson could recover UM benefits to the extent she could prove fault and damages. The parties stipulated to an inquisition on the issue of damages before a Superior Court Commissioner. The Superior Court Commissioner determined during the inquisition that Patterson suffered damages totaling $20,000, but she made no finding, explicitly or implicitly, either that Armstrong's negligence proximately caused Patterson's injury or that Patterson's damages were permanent and, therefore, pierced the New Jersey verbal threshold. The Commissioner did no more than what the parties asked her to do: complete the second stage analysis in part and determine the amount of damages recoverable under Delawarenot New Jerseylaw. The Superior Court judge, on February 16, 2010, entered the Commissioner's determination as a final judgment. In Spinelli, this Court held that a contract statute of limitations applied to a UM benefit claim, and the statute began to run on the date that Spinelli's insurance company first denied his request for UM benefits. [51] The majority cites Spinelli as controlling in this case and applies a three year statute of limitations. That determination is largely irrelevant because Patterson brought suit in Delaware within two years of the accident. We believe the determination in Spinelli is inapplicable to Patterson. As in Lake, this Court focused in Spinelli on the second step of the UM benefits claim analysis. The Spinelli opinion makes this very clear, by carefully explaining that there are two stages to cases like thesethe first step determination that an insured driver is legally entitled to recover damages from a tortfeasor and the second step calculation and recovery of UM benefits. [52] Ultimately, in Spinelli, this Court held only that a contract statute of limitations applies to the contractually based second step of the analysis. Because the immediate case focuses on the first step of the analysisa tort question governed by New Jersey lawit is subject to the New Jersey tort statute of limitations, which precludes personal injury claims commenced more than two years after the cause of the injury. [53] Armstrong injured Patterson on February 1, 2007. Therefore, any tort claim Patterson had against Armstrong must be commenced before February 1, 2009. This makes no difference in the present case, however, because Patterson's filing against State Farm on April 16, 2008 triggered a Delaware action which should have proceeded in two phases. First, the Delaware court must determine that Patterson could recover against Armstrong, the uninsured motorist. Second, if that entitlement is established, the court must determine the contractual amount of damages State Farm owes. Because neither the Commissioner nor the Superior Court determined, explicitly or implicitly, that Patterson's damages were sufficiently permanent to pierce New Jersey's verbal threshold, we cannot yet know whether New Jersey tort law makes Patterson legally entitled to recover damages from Armstrong. Consequently, she has not yet satisfied the condition precedent that she prove a legal entitle[ment] to recover damages from Armstrong. For these reasons, we believe the Superior Court erred as a matter of law when it denied State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a final judgment awarding Patterson UM benefits because she proved fault and damages under Delaware law. [54] The Superior Court judge should have, but did not, determine first whether Patterson's injuries pierced the New Jersey verbal threshold entitling her to recover under New Jersey law. Because we would reverse the Superior Court judgment and remand for proceedings to determine whether Patterson was legally entitled to recover damages from Armstrong under New Jersey law, we respectfully dissent.