Opinion ID: 8938355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 66III The ParticulaR Claims of Louisiana.

Text: Louisiana’s claims, like those of Texas, are based on the contention that it had a three-league maritime boundary which existed “at the time” it was admitted to the Union, and must be judged by the same standards. The Act of Congress admitting the State to the Union in 1812 107a described the new State’s boundaries as follows: “beginning at the mouth of the river Sabine; thence, by a line to be drawn along the middle of said river, including all islands to the thirty-second degree of latitude; thence, due north, to the northernmost part of the thirty-third degree of north latitude; thence, along the said parallel of latitude, to the river Mississippi; thence, down the said river, to the river Iberville; and from thence, along the middle of the said river, and lakes Maurepas and Ponchartrain, to the gulf of Mexico; thence, bounded by the said gulf, to the place of beginning, including all islands within three leagues of the coast (Emphasis added.) Louisiana claims that the concluding clause “including all islands within three leagues of the coast” should be read to mean that Congress fixed as the State’s seaward boundary a line three leagues from its coast, and that such a reading is supported both by the State’s preadmission history and by subsequent events. The Government, on the other hand, insists that the phrase includes only the islands themselves lying within three leagues of the coast, and not all waters within that distance as well. 108  1. The Act of Admission on Its Face. The language of the Act itself appears clearly to support the Government’s position. The boundary line is-drawn down the middle of the river Iberville “to the gulf of Mexico,” not into it for any distance. The State is thence to be bounded “by the said gulf,” not by a line located three leagues out in the Gulf, “to the place of beginning,” which is described as “at the mouth of the river Sabine,” not somewhere beyond the mouth in the Gulf. (Emphasis added.) And while “all islands” within  three leagues of the coast were to be included, there is no suggestion that all waters within three leagues were to be embraced as well. In short, the language of the Act evidently contemplated no territorial sea whatever. Similar language was employed in the Treaty of Paris of September 3, 1783, by which Great Britain recognized the independence of the United States. 109 After describing the boundary of the United States from the mouth of the St. Croix River in the Bay of Fundy to the mouth of the St. Mary’s River between Georgia and Florida, the parties added: “comprehending all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States . . . .” In the light of Jefferson’s observation, only 10 years later, that national claims to control of the sea beyond approximately 20 miles from the coast had not theretofore been generally recognized among maritime powers; 110 his accompanying proposal that a three-mile limit should be placed upon the extent of territorial waters; 111 and subsequent American and British policy in this regard, see note 54, supra, it is hardly conceivable that this provision of the Treaty was intended to establish United States territorial jurisdiction over all waters lying within 20 leagues (60 miles) of the shore. 112 No reason appears for reading  the Louisiana statute differently. The conclusion that language claiming all islands within a certain distance of the coast is not meant to claim all the marginal sea to that distance is further confirmed by the Act defining the boundaries of Georgia, 113 which claims three miles of marginal sea but all islands within 20 leagues of the coast. That Act provides: “along the middle of [the St. Mary’s] river to the Atlantic Ocean, and extending therein three English miles from low-water mark; thence running in a northeasterly direction and following the direction of the Atlantic coast to a point opposite the mouth, or inlet, of said Savannah River; and from thence to the mouth or inlet of said Savannah River, to the place of beginning; including all the lands, waters, islands, and jurisdictional rights within said limits, and also all the islands within 20 marine leagues of the seacoast.” Nothing in the case of Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, tends toward a contrary construction. The Court there held that an Act of Congress designating as an Indian reservation “the body of lands known as Annette Islands” included the intervening and surrounding waters and submerged lands, which were inland waters admittedly under the control of the United States, whether actually part of the reservation or not. The Court, construing the statute in light of the Indians’ historic use of these waters as fishing grounds, merely concluded that Congress intended to include in the area reserved the waters and water bed, as well as the islands, referring to both “as a single body of lands.” Id., 89. The construction here contended for by Louisiana would,  in contrast, sweep within the State’s jurisdiction waters and submerged lands which bear no proximate relation to any islands, and which would otherwise be part of the high seas. Louisiana also contends, relying on United States v. Texas, 162 U. S. 1; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, that this Court has already determined that its boundary includes three leagues of marginal sea. The Texas case, however, involved only the question whether Greer County, in the northwest part of the State, was properly a part of Texas. And even if that case had effectively established a three-league maritime boundary for Texas, which quite evidently it did not, that would not establish a similar boundary for Louisiana. The Mississippi case involved only the issue of the boundary between Louisiana and Mississippi. Louisiana relies on the holding of the Court that because the eastern boundary of Louisiana was a water boundary along the middle of the river Iberville, extending to the Gulf, it went on to include a deep-water sailing channel in the Gulf adjacent to Mississippi. It also relies on a rough map included in the Court’s opinion showing a line drawn all the way around the State’s coast at some distance in the Gulf. There is, however, no indication whatever that the line so indicated bore any relation to the three-league provision in the Louisiana Act of Admission. Furthermore, if there could be any doubt that only the portion of the water boundary adjacent to Mississippi was considered by the Court, it is dispelled by the Court’s statement that “Questions as to the breadth of the maritime belt or the extent of the sway of the riparian States require no special consideration here. The facts render such discussion unnecessary.” Id., 52. See also United States v. California, supra, at 37.  2. Preadmission History. Preliminarily, it should be observed that in light of what has already been said, pp. 24-30, ante, Louisiana's pre-admission history is relevant in this case only to the extent that it aids in construing the Louisiana Act of Admission. The thrust of the State's argument on this score is that the boundaries fixed by the Act of Admission comprised the entire area acquired by the United States from France through the Louisiana Purchase, effected by the Treaty of Paris in 1803; that the extent of this area traces back, through cessions by France to Spain in 1762 and Spain to France in 1800, to what was first claimed by France in 1682; and that such area originally extended some 120 miles into the Gulf of Mexico, and in any case, by virtue of other events, at least three leagues into the Gulf. For reasons now to be discussed we think that this historical thesis is not borne out by any of the documents or events on which Louisiana relies, but that to the contrary what has been shown us leads to the conclusion that Louisiana’s preadmission territory, consistently with the Act of Admission, stopped at its coast and did not embrace any marginal sea. 1. The area which includes the present State of Louisiana was first claimed for France by La Salle in 1682, extending southward “as far as [the Mississippi’s] . . . mouth in the sea, or gulf of Mexico, about the twenty-seventh degree of the elevation of the North Pole . . . .” 114 It is apparent from the face of La Salle’s proclamation that it was the mouth of the Mississippi which defined  the southerly limit of his claim. His expression of belief that the river mouth was at “about” the 27th parallel does not indicate an intent to claim to that parallel, which is in fact some 120 miles south of the Mississippi’s mouth. In any event, the procés-verbal of Jacques de la Metairie, notary of the La Salle expedition, 115 shows that the proclamation was issued after the mouth of the Mississippi had been reached and the party had returned upstream only far enough to find solid ground for the erection of a monument, and that La Salle then thought, mistakenly in fact, that they were at about the 27th parallel. Other documents also indicate that the river mouth defined the extent of the claim and that the territory included no marginal sea whatever. 116 2. By a secret Treaty executed at Fontainebleau on November 3, 1762, France ceded to Spain “all the country known under the name of Louisiana, as well as New Orleans and the island in which the place stands.” 117 By the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso, signed October 1, 1800, Spain retroceded the “colony and province of Louisiana” to France. 118 Certainly there is nothing on the face of  either of these Treaties to indicate that France or Spain claimed any territorial sea. 3. Louisiana argues, however, that certain treaties between France, Spain, and other nations evidence such an intent. Four of these treaties concern the right of the French to fish within certain distances of the coasts of the British possessions in North America, varying from three to 30 leagues. The relevant portions do not relate to French or Spanish territory at all. 119 In another, Great Britain undertook not to permit its subjects to navigate or fish within 10 leagues of coasts occupied by Spain “in the Pacific Ocean, or in the South Seas,” so as to prevent illicit trade with Spanish settlements. 120 The Treaty does not relate to the area in question, and, far from being an assertion of a territorial claim by Spain, imposed an obligation of a limited nature on Great Britain alone. The same reasoning applies to another of these treaties, the Treaty between Spain and Tripoli, signed September 10, 1794, prohibiting the capture of any vessel within 10 leagues from coasts of the dominions of Spain. 121 Reliance is also placed on an ordinance promulgated by Philip II of Spain in October 1565, asserting rights within the visual horizon of the coasts of Spain and its possessions. 122 It may be questioned whether this ordinance  even constituted an assertion of territorial jurisdiction as it is known today, especially in view of the fact that the concept of the territorial sea did not arise in international law until after this country achieved its independence. See United States v. California, supra, 32-33. Even if it did, the ordinance can hardly be taken as applying to a territory not acquired by Spain until 200 years later or as affecting the construction of the Act admitting Louisiana to the Union 250 years later. 123 4. By the Treaty of Paris, signed April 30,1803, France ceded to the United States the Louisiana Territory with all its rights and appurtenances “as fully and in the same manner as they have been acquired by the French Republic, in virtue of the above-mentioned treaty [Treaty of San Ildefonso, Oct. 1,1800], concluded with his Catholic Majesty,” including “the adjacent islands belonging to Louisiana.” 124 To show that the Act admitting Louisiana to the Union must be construed as referring directly to this Treaty, Louisiana relies on Article III of the Treaty, which required the United States to admit “the ceded territory” to statehood as soon as possible. But since the historic documents to which our attention has been called fail to show that the ceded territory included any territorial sea, taking the Treaty as defining the scope of the Act of Admission only confirms the view that Louisiana’s maritime boundary was fixed at, and not somewhere in, the Gulf of Mexico.  5. Louisiana also asserts that about the time of its admission, the United States was claiming three leagues of territorial waters in the Gulf, and that the Act of Admission was framed with reference to that claim. However, from the great variety of documentation presented by the parties, the most that could possibly be said is that the United States, contrary to the Government’s contention, had not unequivocally asserted the applicability of the three-mile limit in the Gulf of Mexico. Assuming, as the defendants have here argued, that it would have been reasonable under international law for the United States to claim three leagues of territorial waters in the Gulf had it so chosen, we nevertheless cannot conclude that Congress meant to define Louisiana’s boundaries by reference to a rule which was the subject of so much difference among nations and which had never been adopted by this country. The terms of the Act of Admission seem to point so strongly to the contrary that it would require much more convincing evidence than this to persuade us that the construction advanced by Louisiana is correct. Furthermore, it is significant that only a few years later, Congress admitted Mississippi and Alabama to the Union, describing their boundaries as including all islands within six leagues of the shore. See pp. 81, 82, post. If the three-league provision in Louisiana’s Act of Admission was intended to reflect a policy of claiming three leagues of territorial waters, it is difficult to understand why Congress, so shortly thereafter, should have incorporated a six-league limit in an otherwise identical provision. 3. Postadmission Events. To the extent that Louisiana’s reliance on postadmission events is for the purpose of showing that the United States established' a three-league “national boundary” in the Gulf, they cannot help her case, for reasons previously discussed. Ante, pp. 30-36. We need not decide whether the United States ever claimed three leagues of  territorial waters along the entire Gulf coast, which could in a sense be said to constitute a national boundary, or whether, if it did, Louisiana would have been entitled to extend its own boundary to that distance. Under the Submerged Lands Act, Louisiana’s boundary must be measured at the time of her admission, unless a subsequent change was approved by Congress. If the Act of Admission fixed the boundary at the shore, neither action by Congress fixing greater boundaries for other States nor Executive policy on the extent of territorial waters could constitute Congressional approval of a maritime boundary for Louisiana. Louisiana, however, insists that certain of these events subsequent to admission must be considered in construing the Act of Admission. 1. We are urged to infer that since, as the Court today holds, three-league boundaries were fixed for Texas (ante, p. 64) and Florida (post, p. 121), and since, after Texas’ admission, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo fixed the starting point of the boundary between the United States and Mexico at three leagues in the Gulf, Congress must have meant to treat Louisiana equally. The inference must be based primarily on the existence of the Texas and Florida boundaries, for the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo relates only to the boundary between Texas and Mexico, and tends to prove nothing more than the existence of a three-league boundary for Texas. In view of the fact that shortly after Louisiana’s admission, Congress fixed maritime boundaries for Mississippi and Alabama which, even on Louisiana’s construction, would be different than three leagues, we can discern no consistent Congressional policy toward the maritime boundaries of the Gulf States at the time of Louisiana’s admission, even if the much later actions with respect to Texas and Florida could be thought to have established such a policy. Cf. Louisiana v. Mississippi, supra, at 41. It would require clear evidence that such a policy was operative at the time  Congress passed the Act admitting Louisiana to overcome language in that Act which points so strongly against the construction urged by Louisiana. Nor does the concept of equal footing require such a construction. While the ownership of certain lands within state boundaries has been held to be an inseparable attribute of the political sovereignty guaranteed equally to all States, see United States v. Texas, 339 U. S., at 716, the geographic extent of those boundaries, and thus of the lands owned, clearly has nothing to do with political equality. A fortiori this is true in the case of maritime boundaries beyond low-water mark, since, except as granted by Congress, the States do not own the lands beneath the marginal seas. See United States v. California, supra; Alabama v. Texas, supra. 2. Certain treaties successively entered into from 1819 to 1838 by the United States with Spain, Mexico, and the Republic of Texas establishing the boundary between Texas and the United States are relied on as indicating that the State and Federal Governments thought that Congress had fixed a three-league maritime boundary for Louisiana. 125 Louisiana contends that the treaties fixed the beginning of the international boundary at a point three leagues from land, and that therefore the southwestern corner of Louisiana as well as the southeastern corner of Texas must have been regarded as extending seaward to that distance. Whether or not such reasoning is valid, the language of the treaties refutes the premise that the international boundary began three leagues from land. Both the 1819 and the 1828 treaties recited that “[t]he boundary line between the two countries, west of  the Mississippi, shall begin on the Gulph of Mexico, at the mouth of the river Sabine, in the sea . . . The Treaty of 1838 referred to the Treaty of 1828, and provided for a survey of “that portion of the said boundary which extends from the mouth of the Sabine, where that river enters the Gulph of Mexico, to the Red river.” 126 3. In its answer to the original complaint, Louisiana alleged certain acts of sovereignty over the marginal sea and seabed and the acquiescence of the Federal Government therein. 127 Although it has now abandoned its earlier contention that these acts establish its title by prescription and estoppel apart from the Submerged Lands Act, it now urges that they indicate a subsequent practical construction of Louisiana's Act of Admission. Taking these facts as proved, they do not have the effect urged by Louisiana. They indicate only that until the 1930’s, the Federal Government may have believed that lands beneath the marginal sea belonged to the States. There is no allegation that the geographical extent of Louisiana’s assertions, assuming that such assertions were made beyond three miles, was drawn in question, or that the question of Louisiana’s boundary was considered. Some of the acts alleged constituted police power meas  ures which a State can enforce against its citizens beyond its boundaries. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69. As to acts touching the development of the submerged lands themselves, the United States would have had no reason to object to activity beyond Louisiana’s boundary, since not until 1945 did the Federal Government assert any rights in the Continental Shelf for itself. If any of the other acts alleged conflicted with this Nation’s policy toward territorial waters, objection would have lain regardless of the location of the State’s boundary, and lack of objection is therefore, for the purposes of this case, inconclusive. 4. Finally, Louisiana relies on a 1954 statute of its own establishing the State’s boundary at three leagues seaward of the line between inland and open waters. Act 33 of 1954, La. Rev. Stat. 49:1. It is said that in so legislating Louisiana followed the coastline as defined in regulations promulgated by the Commandant of the Coast Guard, pursuant to the Federal Act of February 19, 1895, 28 Stat. 672, 33 U. S. C. § 151, and that because of this, and also on considerations of convenience and certainty, this state enactment should be accepted as establishing Louisiana’s coast. We think the consideration of this contention should be postponed to a later stage of this case. We decide now only that Louisiana is entitled to submerged-land rights to a distance no greater than three geographical miles from its coastlines, wherever those lines may ultimately be shown to be.