Opinion ID: 1896884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Justification and Accident Defenses

Text: Perkins' third claim is that the Superior Court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of accident and self-defense with respect to all counts of the indictment. At trial, the Superior Court gave an accident defense instruction only as to the first two counts, Murder First Degree and PFDCF. In contrast, the Superior Court gave choice of evils and justification (self-defense) instructions as to the charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, but not as to the fourth count, which charged Perkins with Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited. This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court's denial of a requested jury instruction. [23] The test is whether the jury instruction correctly states the law and is not so confusing or inaccurate as to undermine the jury's ability to reach a verdict. [24] A trial court's jury instruction is not a ground for reversal if it is reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices and standards of verbal communication. [25] The Superior Court correctly denied Perkins' request for a self-defense instruction with respect to the charges of First Degree Murder and PFDCF. As we have noted, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense only if there is evidence sufficient to establish each element of that defense. [26] Under 11 Del. C. § 464(c), deadly force is justifiable if the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect the defendant against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat. [27] But, to be entitled to an instruction on self-defense the defendant must present some credible evidence supporting [the] defense. . . . [28] [T]he evidence presented by a defendant seeking a self-defense instruction will be deemed `credible' for purposes of 11 Del. C. § 303(a) where the defendant's rendition of events, if taken as true, would entitle him to the instruction. [29] Here, even if Perkins' rendition of the events were taken as true, the evidence would not support a defense of self-defense. At trial, Perkins testified that: (1) once he was in control of the gun he thought Hawkins would just run away; (2) once he broke loose from Hawkins, he (Perkins) tried to run away; and (3) the gun went off accidentally. Perkins never testified that he believed his own life was in danger or that he needed to defend himself by using deadly force. Given the absence of evidentiary support required for a self-defense instruction, the Superior Court did not err in denying Perkins' request for that instruction. The Superior Court also properly denied Perkins' request for an accident defense instruction with respect to the charge of PDWPP. Even taking Perkins' account of the events as true, the evidence showed that Perkins purposely took the gun out of Hawkins' possession while defending himself. The evidence was, therefore, insufficient to support an accident instruction on the possession of a deadly weapon charge. Finally, the Superior Court properly denied Perkins' request for self-defense and accident instructions on the charge of Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited. The evidence consists of police testimony that a box of .38 caliber ammunition was found in Perkins' apartment, and that Perkins' fingerprint was found on that box of ammunition. [30] No reasonable view of that evidence supported an instruction on an accident or a justification defense. Accordingly, we find no merit in Perkins' third claim of error.