Opinion ID: 792744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hankton's Leadership Role in the Offense

Text: 40 Hankton next claims that it was clear error for the district court to determine that he was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity pursuant to § 3B1.1(a) of the Guidelines. Specifically, he claims that notwithstanding evidence that he held a high rank in the MCs, his role in that organization did not make him a leader or organizer in a drug distribution offense. Hankton stresses that his rank in the MCs alone did not translate into leadership responsibility, much less control over the gang's drug distribution activities. Said differently, Hankton takes issue with the sentencing judge's focus on his leadership conduct which he claims is unrelated to the underlying crime of distribution of a controlled substance. We disagree. 41 The district court's determination concerning a defendant's role in the offense is a finding of fact, subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal, United States v. Brown, 900 F.2d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir.1990), and this remains the case post- Booker. See Parra, 402 F.3d at 762. Section 3B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines is applicable where the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). This court has previously made clear that the control exerted by a defendant may either be direct or indirect in nature. See United States v. Barnes, 117 F.3d 328, 337 (7th Cir.1997). As such, the defendant must have exercised some degree of control over others involved in the commission of the offense or he must have been responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying out the crime. Id. (quoting United States v. Carson, 9 F.3d 576, 584 (7th Cir.1993)); see United States v. Reneslacis, 349 F.3d 412, 417 (7th Cir.2003). Some of the factors for a sentencing court to consider when determining whether a defendant held a leadership role under § 3B1.1 include: the defendant's (1) exercise of decision-making authority; (2) participation in committing the offense; (3) recruitment of accomplices; (4) degree of participation in planning or organizing the criminal activity; (5) degree of control or authority exercised over others involved in the criminal activity; and (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity. United States v. Falcon, 347 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir.2001)). 42 At Hankton's sentencing, the judge enumerated a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that Hankton was a leader or organizer of a criminal activity—here the distribution of crack cocaine—within the meaning of § 3B1.1(a). For example, although the judge recognized that Hankton was not the sole and only leader of the organization, he did exercise control . . . . [and] power . . . . [t]he telephone calls clearly establish that . . . . [t]hey show his concern for the organization itself, its image. In addition, the court referenced evidence presented by the government which illustrated Hankton's role in the murder of Annette Williams, see supra pp. 7-8, when stating that Hankton exercised authority over persons, certainly well more than five or ten. However, Hankton claims that rather than directing its remarks to Mr. Hankton's conduct as it related to the actual offence, i.e., drug distribution, the court dwelled on Mr. Hankton's gang activities. This statement is nothing more than a self-serving red herring. 43 While it may be true that the sentencing judge primarily focused on Hankton's gang activities, there was good reason for doing so. The evidence presented at sentencing did not separate Hankton's activities into two distinct categories of: (1) gang activities; and (2) drug activities. Indeed, it would be antithetical to consider these to be mutually exclusive endeavors. Instead, all of the evidence presented—as well as commonsense—suggest that, in fact, Hankton's gang activities were intimately, related to and intertwined with, his drug distribution activities. In fact, both Agent Darin and Jammah Olden testified that the gang's sole source of revenues was from the sale of illegal drugs. Also, information from the wiretaps demonstrated that Hankton used his position in the gang to facilitate his drug transactions, collect money for himself and protect the gang's drug dealing territory. See supra p. 7-9. What's more, Hankton's role as leader and organizer is rather persuasively illustrated by the fact that he had the power within the MCs organization to order the brutal beating and murder of one of the gang's members, Annette Williams. See id. The fact that Williams' murder appeared to involve a dispute over drug money, as opposed to drugs, would not preclude the sentencing judge from inferring that the incident was related to the MCs drug activities or from concluding that Hankton exerted the same authority over the gang's drug activities as he did over ordering beatings or murder. After all, a sentencing court in making its sentencing determination must draw inferences from a variety of data, including the defendant's demeanor and information in the [presentence report], in order to reach [its] conclusion. See United States v. Frazier, 213 F.3d 409, 417 (7th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Fones, 51 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir.1995)). 44 Thus, because Hankton was a leader of the MCs, and because the gang was primarily concerned with dealing illegal drugs, it was entirely reasonable and logical for the sentencing judge to infer that Hankton's role as leader of the gang was related to his distribution of crack cocaine. 28