Opinion ID: 553255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The December Hearing

Text: 4 At the December hearing, Elias testified that one evening in January of 1987, two uniformed guerrillas, carrying machine guns and wearing handkerchiefs to conceal their faces, approached the house where he and his parents lived. They identified themselves as guerrillas, and attempted to persuade him to join their ranks. Elias refused to join, despite their insistence. They told him to think it [over] well and said that they would be back. The petitioner, afraid that the guerrillas would come back and take him, fled Guatemala approximately two months later. 3 He was eighteen at the time. 5 The record before the IJ at the hearing included, in addition to Elias' testimony, an advisory letter from the State Department regarding Elias' application. The letter said in relevant part: 6 The applicant alleges fear of persecution because of civil conflict that afflicts parts of Guatemala and has caused various hardships and dangers, including forced recruitment by opposing armed forces.... Persons who flee their homelands due to national armed conflicts in which they are random victims of violence, intimidation, or recruitment are not generally classifiable as refugees under U.S. law. 7 This opinion is based on our analysis of country conditions and other relevant factors, plus an evaluation of the specific information provided in the application. 8 Administrative Record at 86 (emphasis added). 9 The petitioner, of course, does not agree with the State Department's ultimate legal conclusion, but he asserts that the first sentence in the quotation constitutes a recognition by the State Department that both sides in Guatemala's civil war engage in forced recruitment. The INS argues that the sentence merely restates the petitioner's allegations. 10 We review the Board's factual findings under the substantial evidence standard and reverse if the BIA's findings are not substantially reasonable. Artiga Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir.1987). 11 Both the face of the letter and the other evidence in the record convince us that the Service's interpretation of the letter is not supported by substantial evidence. The emphasized portion of the letter explicitly says that the State Department independently analyzed country conditions. Moreover, the State Department, in saying that opposing armed forces engage in forced recruitment, could not have been merely restating the petitioner's allegations, because nothing in the portion of the petitioner's asylum application reviewed by the State Department alleged forced recruitment by either side in the civil war, let alone both sides. When read in the context of the record as a whole, the letter supports the petitioner's claim that the guerrillas engage in forced recruitment. 4 12 We now consider whether Elias' encounter with the guerrillas, coupled with the fact that the guerrillas engage in forced recruitment, entitles him to eligibility for asylum or withholding of deportation. 13 To obtain withholding of deportation, a person must show that, if deported to his home country, it is more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Sec. 243(h), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253(h); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984). To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must show that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of at least one of those same five bases. INA Sec. 208(a), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1158(a); INA Sec. 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(42)(A). A well-founded fear is a fear that is both genuine and objectively reasonable. To be objectively reasonable, there must be some reasonable possibility of persecution, but persecution does not have to be more likely than not. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1222, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). 14 The reasonable possibility standard derives from the Seventh Circuit's test for determining well-founded fear enunciated in Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir.1984) (Sometimes, however, the applicant's own testimony will be all that is available regarding past persecution or the reasonable possibility of persecution.). In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1217, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987), the Supreme Court noted that the reasonable possibility standard was a moderate interpretation of Section 208(a)'s well-founded fear requirement. Subsequent Ninth Circuit case law has consistently expressed the risk of persecution that must be demonstrated in order to fulfill the objective requirement of well-founded fear as a reasonable possibility. See, e.g., Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir.1990) (To qualify for political asylum, the alien must show that ... persecution is a 'reasonable possibility.' ); Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir.1990) (To be objectively reasonable, there must be some reasonable possibility of persecution ..., but persecution does not have to be more likely than not.); Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1987) ([S]o long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir.1985) (The objective component is satisfied if persecution is, in fact, a 'reasonable possibility.' ). 15 To demonstrate a reasonable possibility of persecution under this circuit's law, an applicant must present  'specific facts' through objective evidence to prove 'good reason' to fear future persecution. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.1985) (quoting Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir.1984)), aff'd, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). This evidentiary burden is met by presenting evidence that is either documentary in nature or, in its absence, testimony that is credible, persuasive, and refers to 'specific facts that give rise to an inference that the applicant has been or has a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution.'  Id.; see also De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1990) (The objective component requires a showing, by credible, direct and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear that the petitioner faces persecution.). Like the reasonable possibility standard, this evidentiary standard derives from the Seventh Circuit's test for determining well-founded fear enunciated in Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d at 574. While the reasonable possibility standard defines the risk of persecution that satisfies the objective component of well-founded fear, the credible, direct and specific evidence standard mandates the type of evidence that must be proffered to establish it. 16 We note that while the two-pronged formulation of the well-founded fear test, requiring both a subjective component (fear) and an objective component (a reasonability possibility of persecution), is the proper test to be applied in this circuit, other formulations of the well-founded fear test may not be inconsistent with this formulation. Thus, in Canas Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567 (9th Cir.1990), this circuit upheld the use of the reasonable person test set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1565, 94 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987), as applied by the BIA in that case, because the BIA's analysis conformed with this circuit's formulation. First, the BIA determined that the applicant's fear was subjectively genuine. 910 F.2d at 571. Second, it determined that there was an objectively valid reason for the fear, and, thus, a reasonable possibility of persecution. 5 Id. 17 The reasonable possibility of persecution to be established by the applicant need not come from the government in order for the alien to obtain relief; it can come from an entity which the government is unwilling or unable to control. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1981). Because nongovernmental groups lack legitimate authority to conscript persons into their armies, their acts of conscription are tantamount to kidnapping and constitute persecution. 6 Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir.1988); see also Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723. The persecution is properly categorized as on account of political opinion, because the person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the persecutor and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out the kidnapping is political. Arteaga, 836 F.2d at 1232 n. 8; see also Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir.1989); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir.1984) (Because [alien] refused to join [guerrillas'] cause, the guerrillas are likely to consider him a political opponent). 18 An alien need not actually have suffered persecution in order to qualify for withholding of deportation or asylum. A threat of persecution can be enough. Indeed, with regard to withholding of deportation, the statute expressly speaks in terms of the threat to the alien's life or freedom. INA Sec. 243(h). The threat can be an explicit verbal threat or a threat that is implicit from the circumstances. Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723. The key question is whether there is reason to take the threat seriously. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285. If it is more likely than not that the threat will be carried out, the petitioner is entitled to withholding of deportation. If there is a reasonable possibility that it will be carried out, the petitioner is eligible for asylum. In determining the likelihood that the alien will be persecuted, we examine the guerrillas' will or ability to carry out the threat, not simply whether threats were made. Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th Cir.1988); Arteaga, 836 F.2d at 1232-33. 19 In Rodriguez-Rivera, the court faced a peculiar factual situation. The applicant, Rodriguez-Rivera, knew and worked with Salvador, the person chiefly responsible for the threats against him. 848 F.2d at 1000. Salvador died shortly after Rodriguez-Rivera fled the country. Salvador was a guerrilla, but, according to Rodriguez-Rivera's testimony, he threatened only that  'he' (Salvador) would kill Rodriguez-Rivera. Id. at 1006. Salvador did not state or imply that the guerrillas would kill Rodriguez-Rivera, that they had any interest in him, or that they even knew who he was or where he lived; Salvador stated only that he personally wanted to kill Rodriguez-Rivera. Thus, the BIA in that case reasonably could conclude that when Salvador died, the threat he personally presented died with him. Indeed, the court stated that the fact that Salvador is now dead is the most significant factor supporting the BIA's determination. Id. Obviously, the testimony countering the ordinary inference that Salvador, as a guerrilla, was threatening Rodriguez-Rivera in order to carry out the goals of the guerrillas (as opposed to his own personal goals) was crucial to the outcome of that case. If the guerrillas had been aware of Rodriguez-Rivera's availability as a potential recruit, they could easily have assigned someone other than Salvador to do the dirty work, and the threat would have continued to be serious. 20 With regard to the two men who accompanied Salvador when he made a second threat against Rodriguez-Rivera, there was absolutely no evidence in the record suggesting that those men knew who Rodriguez-Rivera was or where he lived. In light of the statements made by Salvador while he and the two men were threatening Rodriguez-Rivera, it was not unreasonable to infer that the men's only interest in Rodriguez-Rivera was to assist Salvador in his personal vendetta. Neither the men's words, their conduct, nor the circumstances surrounding their encounter with Rodriguez-Rivera suggested that the guerrillas as a group had an interest in killing, kidnapping, or otherwise persecuting Rodriguez-Rivera. The BIA could thus reasonably conclude 7 that when Salvador died, the two men did not have the ability to persecute Rodriguez-Rivera, because they did not know who he was or where he lived, and that they did not have the will to persecute him, because their only reason to bother him was to assist Salvador, who had died. 21 In Arteaga, the alien was confronted at his house by a group of guerrillas who tried to induce him to join their cause. After he refused, they said to him: Even if you don't come, we'll get you. Arteaga, 836 F.2d at 1228. In Arteaga, unlike in Rodriguez-Rivera, there was no evidence contradicting the common sense inference that the threat was from the guerrillas as a group and not just from the particular individuals assembled at his house. 22 The court stated in Arteaga that a specific verbal threat by the guerrillas directed at an individual whose identity and residence are known to the guerrillas is sufficient to create a well-founded fear. 836 F.2d at 1233. In Rodriguez-Rivera, 848 F.2d at 1006, the court observed that this statement in Arteaga had to be qualified by the holding in Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285-86, that the group making the threat had to have the will or ability to carry it out. This observation was unremarkable because the Arteaga court itself qualified the statement in the same way. Arteaga, 836 F.2d at 1232 (citing Bolanos-Hernandez ). 23 After making its observation, the Rodriguez-Rivera court then said that the entire discussion of the eligibility for asylum in Arteaga was dicta[.] Rodriguez-Rivera, 848 F.2d at 1006. The Rodriguez-Rivera court did not say that Arteaga 's analysis of asylum was incorrect. To the extent that Rodriguez-Rivera implied Arteaga was incorrect, that implication would itself be dicta, for nothing in Rodriguez-Rivera 's holding was inconsistent with Arteaga 's discussion of eligibility for asylum. In any event, the reasoning in the two cases can be reconciled; both Arteaga and Rodriguez-Rivera followed Bolanos-Hernandez. 24 Rodriguez-Rivera, Arteaga, and Bolanos-Hernandez together stand for the proposition that when a member of a group which engages in violence makes a threat, and there is no evidence that the member has only personal motives for making the threat, the reasonable inference is that the group is responsible for the threat and that the will or ability of the group should be examined to determine if it is reasonable to take the threat seriously. 25 Examining the facts in light of these authorities, we conclude that Elias established eligibility for asylum at the December hearing but that he did not establish entitlement to withholding of deportation. There is no dispute that Elias' fear of persecution was genuine and that he thus satisfied the subjective test for eligibility for asylum. He testified credibly that he feared the guerrillas would return and take him against his will. The dispute is over whether he satisfied the objective test and showed there was a reasonable possibility that the guerrillas would forcibly recruit him. 26 The Board's crucial error was its conclusion that the Guatemalan guerrillas do not engage in forced recruitment. For the reasons stated above, the State Department letter was proof that the guerrillas do engage in forced recruitment. The Board's error colored its analysis of the circumstances surrounding the guerrillas' encounter with Elias. After the guerrillas failed in their attempt to persuade Elias to join voluntarily, they told him to think it [over] well and that they would be back. Because the Board believed that the guerrillas did not engage in forced recruitment, it did not think it reasonable for Elias to interpret the guerrillas' statements to constitute a threat of persecution. But in light of the guerrillas' practice of using force to recruit people, it certainly was reasonable for a person in Elias' situation to take the statements as threats. See Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d at 723-24 (focus is on whether it was reasonable for the alien to perceive the circumstances as threatening). Moreover, the men who attempted to recruit him carried machine guns and wore masks, lending further credence to Elias' belief that he was being threatened. 8 27 We now consider whether the guerrillas had the will and ability to persecute Elias. The fact that the guerrillas engaged in forced recruitment is proof that they had the will to persecute Elias. That Elias was not harmed in the two-month period during which he was preparing to leave the country is relevant, but as we said in Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 871-72 (9th Cir.1990), the fact that some time passed without harm has only marginal probative value. Rivas and the cases it cited as support for that proposition found that the alien had established a clear probability of persecution despite short periods without harm. In addition to having the will to persecute Elias, the guerrillas had the ability to persecute him because they knew where he lived and who he was. 28 Finally, the threat to Elias was for political as opposed to personal reasons; the Board did not suggest that the individual guerrillas who appeared at his door had a personal quarrel with Elias, and in any event, there was no evidence to rebut the common sense inference that the guerrillas were interested in recruiting Elias to further the group 's political goals. There was thus a reasonable possibility, based on the evidence presented at the December hearing, that the guerrillas would return and take Elias by force, thereby persecuting him on account of political opinion. The Board's conclusion that Elias was ineligible for asylum was not substantially reasonable. See Artiga Turcios. 29 The Board, however, was substantially reasonable in concluding that Elias failed to prove the clear probability of persecution necessary to obtain withholding of deportation. Elias did not present evidence suggesting that forced recruitment by the Guatemalan guerrillas occurred with such frequency that it would be more likely than not that Elias would be forcibly recruited. 9 Nor did he present evidence that members of his family or other persons whom he knew were the victims of forced recruitment. Cf. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1280 (petitioner's friends had been killed after receiving threats by Salvadoran guerrillas; entitlement to withholding of deportation established). Either kind of evidence would have strengthened his case. Nonetheless, the fact that the Guatemalan guerrillas use forced recruitment with sufficient frequency for the State Department to have taken notice and that they had once approached Elias masked and armed and had promised to return, demonstrates that there was a reasonable possibility that the guerrillas would return and take Elias. 10