Opinion ID: 2352048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of statewide initiative petitions is conferred upon this court by way of Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution. Amendment 7 states that [t]he sufficiency of all State-wide petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the Secretary of State, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the State, which shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all such causes. Ark. Const. amend. 7. On September 10, 2002, the Secretary of State certified that the initiative petition met all the requirements of Amendment 7. Following such a certification by the Secretary of State, Amendment 7 clearly confers original and exclusive jurisdiction upon this court to review the Secretary of State's decision as to the sufficiency of the petition. Nonetheless, the respondent argues that with the enactment of Act 877 in 1999, codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 7-9-501 et seq. (Repl.2000), the General Assembly has provided for a constitutional initiative and referendum procedure that effectively strips the court of jurisdiction until such a time as the Secretary of State makes a determination of legal sufficiency following a written request for such a determination pursuant to Act 877. By contending that Act 877 is mandatory, the respondent essentially suggests that the original jurisdiction conferred upon this court by Amendment 7 may be restricted by legislative enactment. In other words, the respondent submits that in order to invoke this court's jurisdiction after the Secretary of State has certified an initiative petition pursuant to Amendment 7, a taxpayer and voter must first submit a written petition to the Secretary of State under Act 877 requesting a determination of legal sufficiency before this court may review the sufficiency of any statewide initiative petition. Under the respondent's interpretation of Act 877 and this court's decision in Stilley v. Priest, 341 Ark. 329, 16 S.W.3d 251(2000) ( Stilley II ), the General Assembly would be allowed to change the provisions of Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitutionclearly an impermissible exercise of legislative authority. We decline to construe Act 877 so as to render it unconstitutional. All doubts pertaining to a statute in question are resolved in favor of constitutionality. Skelton v. Skelton, 339 Ark. 227, 5 S.W.3d 2 (1999); Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991). Where a constitutional construction is possible, we are compelled to uphold the validity of the statute under attack. Skelton, supra . Thus, in upholding the constitutionality of Act 877 to the extent that it allows this court to take jurisdiction prior to the gathering of signatures, we stated in Stilley II : We have come to the conclusion that both Scott v. McCuen, supra and Finn v. McCuen, supra , were wrongly decided with respect to the jurisdiction of this court. We first observe that while Amendment 7 does contemplate filing the initiative petition with the requisite signatures with the Secretary of State for a sufficiency determination, at no point does it preclude an earlier review of the text of the popular name and ballot title or the validity of the proposed amendment. On the contrary, Amendment 7 specifically provides that laws may be enacted to facilitate its operation. An early resolution of a contest to the content of a popular name and ballot title and the validity of the initiative would certainly facilitate the process for legislative enactments by the people. Stilley II, 341 Ark. at 334, 16 S.W.3d at 254 (emphasis added). By holding that Amendment 7 does not preclude an earlier review of the Secretary of State's sufficiency determination, this court did not interpret Act 877 to restrict our original jurisdiction to the confines of the Act. Indeed, it is one thing to state that an earlier review is not precluded by the constitution and quite another to uphold the constitutionality of a legislative enactment requiring early review of the text of a popular name and ballot title. Act 877's stated purpose is to provide for the timely and expeditious review of the legal sufficiency of initiative petitions by the Supreme Court. Ark.Code Ann. § 7-9-501 (Repl.2000). In Stilley II , we held that the operation of Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution was facilitated by Act 877 in that it allowed the court to review the legal sufficiency of an initiative petition prior to the gathering of signatures. Stilley II, supra . Act 877 also states that it is intended to provide a process to timely review the legal sufficiency of a measure in a manner which avoids voter confusion and frustration which occur when measures are stricken from the ballot on the eve of an election on the measure. Ark.Code Ann. § 7-9-502 (Repl.2000). The respondent contends any holding that would only make the procedures in Act 877 mandatory for ballot-title review prior to the gathering of signatures would be inconsistent with our concerns about last-minute challenges. On the contrary, requiring a challenger to petition the Secretary of State for a legal-sufficiency determination under Act 877 after the initiative has been certified as meeting the requirements of Amendment 7 would in fact hinder expeditious review. Instead, it would promote review by this court in the final hour, the exact scenario this court has been trying to avoid. See Roberts v. Priest, 334 Ark. 503, 975 S.W.2d 850 (1998) ( Roberts I) ; Scott v. Priest, 326 Ark. 328, 932 S.W.2d 746 (1996); Page v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 342, 884 S.W.2d 951 (1994). Under the reasoning advanced by the respondent, our review of a sufficiency challenge submitted after signatures have been gathered could be delayed by as much as thirty days. See Ark.Code Ann. § 7-9-503(a)(b) (Repl.2000)(providing the Secretary of State thirty days to review the petition). This court has steadfastly adhered to the policy of reviewing ballot titles earlier rather than later. See Roberts I, supra ; Scott v. Priest, supra ; Page v. McCuen, supra . Forcing an additional review by the Secretary of State does nothing to facilitate early review; quite to the contrary, it promotes late review. In fact, in oral argument, ALERT conceded that if this court dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction today, APPLES could theoretically have the petition reviewed by the Secretary of State tomorrow, and then refile an original action in this court on the same day. Our review would thus be postponed beyond the eleventh hour. Moreover, as to the timeliness of an action challenging an early determination of sufficiency under Act 877, we stated in Roberts v. Priest that Act 280 of 1989, which required such challenges to be filed within forty-five days of publication, had been superseded by Act 877 and that Act 877 contains no time limitation for challenges to sufficiency determinations by the Secretary of State. Roberts v. Priest, 341 Ark. 813, 826, 20 S.W.3d 376, 383 ( Roberts II ). Accordingly, while Act 877 can provide this court with jurisdiction prior to the gathering of signatures, it does not operate as a time bar to prevent this court from reviewing a sufficiency determination after signatures have been gathered and the Secretary of State has certified the initiative for placement on the ballot. Prior to Act 877, this court's jurisdiction attached pursuant to Amendment 7 after the Secretary of State certified the sufficiency of the popular name, ballot title, and signatures on an initiative petition. See Finn v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 418, 798 S.W.2d 34 (1990); Scott v. McCuen, 289 Ark. 41, 709 S.W.2d 77 (1986). In Stilley II , we held that Act 877 provides a manner in which this court may constitutionally review the legal sufficiency of a ballot title prior to the collection of signatures. Stilley II, 341 Ark. 329, 16 S.W.3d 251. Contrary to the respondent's contention that Stilley v. Priest, 340 Ark. 259, 12 S.W.3d 189 (2000) ( per curiam ) ( Stilley I ) is controlling, the requirements of Act 877 are only mandated when, as in Stilley I , review is sought prior to the gathering of signatures. Stilley I, supra . In Stilley II we overruled Finn and Scott to the extent that they prevent[ed] a review of the text of a popular name and ballot title and the validity of the proposed measure prefatory to the gathering of signatures. 341 Ark. at 337, 16 S.W.3d at 256-57 (emphasis added). The Stilley I and Stilley II cases both involved a challenge to the popular name and ballot title prior to the gathering of signatures. Similarly, Roberts II involved a pre-signature sufficiency challenge under Act 877. 341 Ark. at 826, 20 S.W.3d at 383. In this trilogy of cases, however, we have never suggested that Amendment 7 no longer confers original and exclusive jurisdiction upon this court once the Secretary of State certifies that the initiative has met the requirements of Amendment 7 for placement on the ballot. More importantly, the plain language of Act 877 supports our holding that compliance with Act 877 is discretionary and not mandatory: Any Arkansas taxpayer and voter may submit a written petition to the Secretary of State requesting the determination of legal sufficiency of statewide initiative petitions. Ark.Code Ann. § 7-9-503(a)(1) (Repl.2000) (emphasis added). We decline to adopt the reasoning that either Act 877 or our holdings in Stilley I and Stilley II stripped this court of original jurisdiction until such time as the Secretary of State makes a legal sufficiency determination following a written request pursuant to the Act. A challenger may seek to have the sufficiency of an initiative petition reviewed by this court either prior to the collection of signatures under Act 877, or after signatures have been gathered and the Secretary of State has certified the initiative petition pursuant to Amendment 7. The early-review alternative available under Act 877 applies to all initiative petitions submitted to the Attorney General after March 25, 1999. Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-506(b) (Repl.2000). Act 877 merely provides a procedure whereby a taxpayer and voter may seek an early review of a ballot title's legal sufficiency prior to the gathering of signatures; that is, it is discretionary. Accordingly, we reaffirm that this court has original and exclusive jurisdiction after the Secretary of State certifies that an initiative petition has met the signature requirements and the requirements of Amendment 7.