Opinion ID: 2996210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: vwpp

Text: 3 The VWPP allows visitors from certain countries to enter the United States without a visa if they meet certain qualifications, such as the alien possesses a “round-trip 3 When originally instituted, the VWPP was a “pilot” program; it since has been made a permanent program and has been renamed the “Visa Waiver Program.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1187. Additionally, because the program was instituted prior to the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), it employed the terminology of “deportation” as opposed to “removal.” See id. However, because Ms. Wigglesworth entered the country pursuant to the program when it was still in its “pilot” stage and prior to the passage of IIRIRA, we maintain the acronym VWPP and the term “deportation.” 8 No. 02-1209 transportation ticket” and “has been determined not to represent a threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(5) & (7) (1993). In return for being admitted pursuant to this streamlined procedure, the alien must waive certain rights, see Itaeva v. INS, 314 F.3d 1238, 1239 (10th Cir. 2003); specifically the VWPP provides: (b) Waiver of rights An alien may not be provided a waiver under the pilot program unless the alien has waived any right—
immigration officer’s determination as to the admissibility of the alien at the port of entry into the United States, or (2) to contest, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, any action for deportation against the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b) (1993). Prior to being admitted to this country, Ms. Wigglesworth signed a Swedish-language version of form I-790, which contained an explicit waiver as well as a certification that the signor had read and understood the form. Thus, there is no question that Ms. Wigglesworth waived her rights to “contest” her deportation. Furthermore, there is no question that both in the terminated proceedings before the IJ, as well as in this court, Ms. Wigglesworth seeks to contest her deportation on a basis other than asylum; specifically, she seeks relief by way of suspension of deportation. As two of our sister circuits already have determined, such a challenge is specifically forbidden by the language of the statute. See Itaeva, 314 F.3d at 1242; Nose v. Attorney Gen., 993 F.2d 75, 80 (5th Cir. 1993). No. 02-1209 9 Because Ms. Wigglesworth waived her right to contest her deportation except on the basis of asylum, she has waived her right to contest the INS’ disposition of her application for suspension of deportation or the termination of her 4 deportation hearing. 4 We do not believe that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Itaeva v. INS, 314 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2003), supports the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of appeals in a case such as the one before us. In that case, the petitioner was subject to deportation pursuant to the VWPP; however, as in the present case, the INS instituted deportation proceedings against her as opposed to simply deporting her pursuant to the VWPP. Not only was a full hearing held before an IJ, who determined that suspension of deportation was not available, but also the BIA affirmed and issued a final order of deportation. When Itaeva appealed to the Tenth Circuit, that court rejected the INS’ argument that the court lacked jurisdiction based on § 1187(b)(2). It stated: “As noted above, under the transitional rules which apply here, this court has subject matter jurisdiction to review a final order of deportation. If Congress had intended to deprive us of jurisdiction over a VWP visitor’s § 1187(b)(2) claim (regarding deportation) it could have specified that the alien had waived the right to appeal as it did in § 1187(b)(1) (regarding admissibility at port of entry).” Id. at 1241. We believe this language has to be read in the context of the situation before the court, that is, that the INS had instituted proceedings, that the proceedings had concluded before the IJ, that the decision of the IJ had been appealed and that the BIA had issued a final order of deportation. Therefore, for cases which were prosecuted and culminated in a final order of deportation, Itaeva holds that § 1187(b)(2) does not supersede other provisions of the immigration laws that channel appeals of final deportation orders to the courts of appeals. In essence, the INS waives the petitioner’s VWPP “waiver” (continued...) 10 No. 02-1209
Ms. Wigglesworth also presents a constitutional challenge to the VWPP. Specifically, she argues that “it violates [her] rights to due process by depriving her of a hearing where she has not knowingly or intelligently waived such hearing on her right to remain in the [United States].” Petitioner’s Br. at 19. We must determine whether this claim is properly before us.
This court has acknowledged that, when judicial review is otherwise foreclosed by statute, jurisdiction remains in this court to raise substantial constitutional questions. 4 (...continued) when it prosecutes deportations to the stage of a final order of deportation. If we read the Tenth Circuit’s opinion too narrowly and, indeed, it interprets § 1187(b)(2) as allowing all VWPP deportees to seek review in the courts of appeals, we respectfully disagree with this conclusion. We believe that the language of § 1187(b)(2) applies to any challenge (“contest”) to an alien’s deportation, regardless of whether that challenge is directed to an administrative agency or a court of appeals. There is no language in the statute to suggest that “contest” should be limited to administrative adjudications. Indeed such a reading would frustrate the statutory purpose of streamlining both the admission and deportation of those entering the country under the VWPP. Finally, such an interpretation would be difficult to administer in light of the general prohibition against presenting arguments on appeal that have not first been presented to the agency with the authority to determine the claim. See, e.g., Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d 1054, 1062 (7th Cir. 2000). No. 02-1209 11 See, e.g., Singh v. Reno, 182 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1999). In Singh, we reiterated our holding in LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998): As we explained in LaGuerre, direct review in the courts of appeals remains an option for aliens wishing to challenge their deportation on constitutional grounds. Thus, “judicial review is curtailed as Congress intended, but enough of a safety valve is left to enable judicial correction of bizarre miscarriages of justice.” Singh, 182 F.3d at 509 (quoting LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1040). As we noted, this “safety valve” exists in instances in which “judicial review is curtailed.” We must evaluate, therefore, whether Ms. Wigglesworth had a means of challenging the deportation order issued by the INS under the VWPP. Although the record is unclear exactly as to when the INS determined that Ms. Wigglesworth was deportable and issued a final order of deportation pursuant to the VWPP, it made this determination at least prior to the date that she was taken into custody for purposes of deportation, February 17, 1993. Consequently, we look to the judicial review provisions in effect at that time, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, to determine what means were available to Ms. 5 Wigglesworth to challenge her deportation order. 5 The same law applies if we were to consider the BIA’s order of December 27, 2001, affirming the IJ’s termination of proceedings, as the final order of deportation. For aliens who were placed in deportation proceedings before April 1, 1997, and whose final orders of deportation were entered more than 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (continued...) 12 No. 02-1209
In general, the former § 1105a sets forth the judicial review procedures only for “final orders of deportation” issued pursuant to administrative procedures contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), specifically an administrative hearing before an IJ and an appeal to the BIA. However, a determination that an individual was deportable under the VWPP was a determination made by the district director of the INS—outside of the typical proceedings before an IJ. Indeed, the regulations implementing the VWPP make clear that the determination is made without referral of the alien to immigration proceedings: (c) Determination of deportability. An alien who has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 217 of the Act and of this part who is determined by an immigration officer to be depor- table from the United States under one or more of the deportation grounds listed in section 241 of the Act shall be removed from the United States to his or her country of nationality or last residence. Such removal for deportation shall be determined by the 5 (...continued) (“IIRIRA”), October 30, 1996, the transitional rules established by IIRIRA apply. The transitional rules provide for judicial review as it existed before IIRIRA was passed, subject to certain exceptions. (One of those exceptions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) could apply to Ms. Wigglesworth. That provision will be discussed infra at Part II.B.). Here, Ms. Wigglesworth was placed in a deportation proceeding prior to the passage of IIRIRA, and the termination of those proceedings was affirmed by the BIA on December 27, 2001. Therefore, we would look to preIIRIRA law, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, to determine the proper method for her to raise a constitutional challenge to her proceedings. No. 02-1209 13 district director who has jurisdiction over the place where the alien is found, and shall be effected without referral of the alien to an immigration judge for a deter- mination of deportability, except that an alien admitted as a Visa Waiver Pilot Program visitor who applies for asylum in the United States must be referred to an immigration judge for a determination of deportablity. 8 C.F.R. § 217.4 (1993) (emphasis added). The former § 1105a, however, acknowledged the possibility that an individual could be under the threat of deportation from an order that did not originate through proceedings before an IJ. The statute therefore provided that the procedure set forth therein was “the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation made . . . pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 1252(b) . . . except that—. . . (10). . . any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1993) (emphasis added). Therefore, under the former § 1105a(a)(10), aliens held pursuant to any order of deportation, regardless of how or from whom the order issued, could employ habeas 6 as a means of challenging the deportation. Because the determination that Ms. Wigglesworth was deportable was not made through deportation proceedings before an IJ pursuant to § 1252(b), her remedy for purposes of challenging that order was through a writ of habeas corpus as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10). 6 Indeed, Ms. Wigglesworth invoked § 1105a(a)(10) when she brought the habeas petition to challenge her detention in 1993. See A.R. 392. 14 No. 02-1209
Ms. Wigglesworth recognizes the possibility that a district court, as opposed to a court of appeals, is the proper forum to air her constitutional challenge. She therefore urges this court to transfer her petition to a district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 if we conclude that she has raised her arguments in the wrong forum. Section 1631 states: Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred. 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Although § 1631 is not cast in discretionary terms (“the court shall . . . transfer”), this court has stated that “there is no reason to raise false hopes and waste judicial resources by transferring a case that is clearly doomed . . . .” Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 1999). A court is authorized to consider the consequences of transfer before deciding whether to transfer; that is implicit in the statute’s grant of authority to make such a decision, and implies in turn that the court can take a peek at the merits, since whether or not the No. 02-1209 15 suit has any possible merit bears significantly on whether the court should transfer or dismiss it. Id. at 610-11 (internal citation omitted). We, therefore, “take a peek” at the merits of Ms. Wigglesworth’s constitutional claim to see if transferring to the district court is “in the interest of justice.” Ms. Wigglesworth argues that the VWPP violates her rights to due process of law and points to cases from the Supreme Court and this court that establish that aliens— even those who have entered this country illegally—have the right to a fair hearing prior to being deported. Because this right to a fair hearing is a constitutional right, she continues, any waiver of that right has to be knowing and voluntary. She further maintains that, when she waived her right to a hearing before an IJ, her waiver was not knowingly made. Consequently, in her view, the VWPP, as applied to these circumstances, violates her rights to due process. Ms. Wigglesworth points to Nose in support of her argument. In Nose, the Fifth Circuit considered the validity of Nose’s waiver pursuant to the VWPP. It began its analysis by observing that “[g]enerally, even aliens who have entered the United States unlawfully are assured the protection[] of the fifth amendment due process clause, including the right to a hearing before an immigration judge before being deported.” Id. at 78-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, it continued, “[a]lthough due process rights may be waived, such a waiver must be made knowingly and voluntarily.” Id. at 79 (internal citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit then looked to three primary factors to determine whether Nose’s waiver had been made knowingly: “(1) the party’s background and experience; (2) the clarity of the written waiver agreement; and (3) whether the party was repre16 No. 02-1209 sented by or consulted with an attorney.” Id. Applying these factors, the Fifth Circuit rejected the due process argument because Nose was highly educated, the written waiver was very clear and Nose had consulted with counsel prior to entering the country through the VWPP. See id. at 80. Ms. Wigglesworth argues that the standards set forth in Nose should be applied to evaluate her waiver and, under those standards, this court cannot conclude that her waiver was knowingly made. We disagree. Assuming that the knowing and voluntary standard applies to Ms. Wigglesworth’s waiver, we do not believe that the Nose factors suggest that Ms. Wigglesworth’s waiver was constitutionally infirm. Ms. Wigglesworth had a high school education, had owned her own business and had traveled extensively earlier in her life. As well, the waiver form was exceptionally clear that, in signing the form, Ms. Wigglesworth was waiving her rights to a hearing before an IJ, an administrative appeal to the BIA and judicial review of the administrative decision. Even in the absence of 7 consultation with an attorney, we do not believe that these factors call into question the validity of Ms. Wigglesworth’s waiver. Ms. Wigglesworth’s claim also fails for another reason. This court has held that, in order to prevail on a due process claim, the alien must establish prejudice resulting from the violation. See Roman v. INS, 233 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir. 2000). When deportation proceedings were commenced against Ms. Wigglesworth, however, she conceded 7 As noted above, Ms. Wigglesworth did receive advice from an immigration consulting service prior to departing for Sweden; however, neither the credentials of the consultant nor the precise nature of the advice given are contained in the record. No. 02-1209 17 deportability. Ms. Wigglesworth’s complaint, therefore, is not a lack of due process with respect to the determination of deportability, but the fact that she was not afforded the opportunity to present, or receive a determination concerning, her application for discretionary relief. However, when Ms. Wigglesworth entered pursuant to the VWPP, she not only waived her right to a deportation hearing, she also waived any rights that she had to apply for non-asylum forms of relief from deportation. See Nose, 993 F.3d at 80; Itaeva, 314 F.3d at 1242. Essentially, Ms. Wigglesworth’s complaint is that she never was warned that her entry and waiver under the VWPP would preclude her from applying for and obtaining discretionary relief. We cannot accept this submission. The waiver language contained on the form is sufficiently clear in informing the alien that asylum is the only available avenue to changing one’s status if admitted under the VWPP. Because we do not believe that Ms. Wigglesworth can prevail on her constitutional challenges to the VWPP, we do not believe that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this appeal to the district court for consideration on 8 habeas review.