Opinion ID: 1239698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements of the deceased Floyd Brown.

Text: The defendant claims that it was error to admit certain statements made by the deceased, Floyd Brown, in which he identified Edward Phifer as the person who had shot him. Over the objections of defense counsel that any statements of the deceased were inadmissible hearsay, the court allowed several witnesses to testify that Floyd Brown identified Edward Phifer as the man who shot him: (1) An aunt of Annie Ruth Brown testified that when she heard shots she ran out the back door of her home toward her niece's house; she saw Floyd lying face down, with one foot still in the car. She testified that she said Floyd, Floyd. The deceased responded by saying Gen, I'm shot. Geneva Brown testified that she then said: You shot, too? and Floyd Brown responded Yes. She then testified that she asked him if he knew who shot him and that Floyd said: Ed Phifer shot Ann and me. (2) Geneva Brown's husband also testified that he came to the scene of the shooting shortly after his wife and testified that in response to the question of who shot him, Floyd Brown stated that Ed Phifer did. (3) A patrolman for the city of Milwaukee police department testified that he had accompanied the decedent to the hospital in the police ambulance. He testified that he asked him if he knew who had done this to him and that Floyd Brown said: I was shot by Edward Phifer. (4) Another police officer testified that several hours later he interviewed both victims at the hospital and that both gave him Edward Phifer's name. This officer also testified that he showed Floyd Brown five photographs and asked Mr. Brown to look through them and if he could identify the man who shot him he should inform the officer. The police officer testified that Floyd Brown looked through the photographs and when he came to the picture of Edward Phifer he handed the officer that photograph. The trial court originally admitted the statements of Floyd Brown as dying declarations. In its decision on motions for a new trial, the court indicated it also felt the statements were admissible as excited utterances. The statements testified to in the first three incidents listed above were admissible as excited utterances. This court has several times quoted with approval Rule 512 of the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence as properly stating the law in Wisconsin as regards the admission of statements as part of the res gestae. [8] This rule is now codified in the Wisconsin Code of Evidence as sec. 908.03 (1) and (2). Evidence of a hearsay statement is admissible if the statement was made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the statement narrates or describes or explains, or immediately thereafter, or while the declarant was under the stress of a nervous excitement caused by the perception of the event or condition which the statement narrates or describes or explains. The second type of declaration is generally referred to as an excited utterance. In State v. Smith [9] this court stated that the usual question for the trial judge is whether the statement was in terms of time so related to an exciting event as to be trustworthy. In Wilder v. Classified Risk Ins. Co. [10] the standard was expressed more forcefully: . . . It must be shown that the statement was made so spontaneously or under such psychological or physical pressure or excitement that the rational mind could not interpose itself between the spontaneous statement or utterance stimulated by the event and the event itself. The psychological basis for the res gestae exception is that people instinctively tell the truth but when they have time to stop and think they may lie. In Cossette v. Lepp [11] a witness testified that he found the declarant slumped on the stairs and asked what had happened. The declarant replied that he tripped and fell. The declarant's son and his doctor stated that he repeated this explanation later at the hospital. This court held the first statement admissible as an excited utterance. The court felt it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that due to the injuries received in the fall the declarant was under the stress of nervous excitement when he made his statement to the first person to come to his aid. However, it was felt that the later statements to the son and doctor were too separated in time from the event to be admissible. Cossette is very similar to the situation before us now. Here, the declarant was found sprawled on the ground shortly after he was shot. Floyd Brown told the first person who came to his aid that he had been shot and in response to the question of who shot him he named Edward Phifer as the gunman. In the Cossette Case the explanation came in response to a question also but this did not bar its admissibility. McCormick states: . . . Evidence that the statement was self-serving or made in response to an inquiry, while not justification for automatic exclusion, is an indication that the statement was the result of reflective thought, and where the time interval permitted such thought these factors might swing the balance in favor of exclusion. [12] Here the shock of the event must have been as great or greater than the fall and injury in Cossette. The time interval between the shooting was short enough to allow the admission of the statements made to Geneva Brown, her husband, and the ambulance attendant. The statement to the ambulance attendant came ten or fifteen minutes after the shooting; however, the declarant had just been removed from his position on the pavement and was for the first time receiving some medical aid. The shock of the event was great enough to make it reasonable that at that time the declarant was still in an excited state. The later identification at the hospital, described as the fourth incident above, is not admissible as an excited utterance. We do not reach the question of whether that statement was admissible as a dying declaration, since in any event that identification is merely cumulative and, therefore, its admission, even if error, would not be prejudicial. By the Court. Judgment and order affirmed.