Opinion ID: 1374241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: victim impact evidence as aggravating circumstance

Text: Humphries next argues that he was entitled under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(B) (Supp.1995) and the Due Process Clause to notice by the prosecution that the State planned to introduce victim impact testimony. We disagree, finding no right to notice under section 16-3-20 and no violation of Humphries's due process or Eighth Amendment rights. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(B) provides that at the sentencing phase of a capital trial, [o]nly such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant in writing prior to the trial shall be admissible. The statute then lists certain aggravating factors requiring notice. Victim impact evidence is not listed as such a factor and presumptively, therefore, does not require notice. We have recognized, however, that under limited circumstances, the notice requirement of section 16-3-20(B) applies to evidence not specifically enumerated in the statute and introduced by the prosecution during the sentencing phase. See State v. Riddle (Riddle I), 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d 138 (1987) (per curiam). In Riddle I, the prosecution introduced the defendant's juvenile record without having given the defendant notice of its intent to do so. We found that the prosecution's failure to give notice of its intent to introduce the juvenile record violated section 16-3-20(B), reasoning a defendant in a capital case should have a fair and complete opportunity to respond to facts enhancing the likelihood the jury would recommend a death sentence. Id. at 237, 353 S.E.2d at 141. Because the defendant in that case had no genuine access to the documentary evidence introduced against him, we found, among other things, that the prosecution should have informed him of its intent to introduce his juvenile record. Id. Unlike the juvenile records in Riddle I, victim impact evidence is not uniquely within the State's control. Capital defendants are as free as the State to gather information relating to the characteristics of the murder victim, and, therefore, generally have a fair and complete opportunity to respond to the State's factual allegations. This kind of evidence rarely creates the same risk that the defendant will be sentenced to death on the basis of information he has no opportunity to explain or deny. In this case the defendant had a full opportunity to investigate victim impact, and, in fact, did so. Well before trial, defense counsel hired a private investigator who thoroughly investigated Dickie Smith's background, uncovering information about Smith's temper, his use of alcohol, and his prior marriage. The defense was perfectly free to cross examine the State's witnesses and to present rebuttal testimony; it had gathered the information necessary for effective rebuttal testimony. For whatever reason, the defense elected not to cross examine the State's witnesses or to present rebuttal testimony. It strains belief, however, for the defendant now to suggest that the prosecution's failure to provide him with notice of intent to introduce victim impact evidence somehow deprived him of an opportunity to respond to such evidence. Absent an indication the prosecution has improperly prevented the defendant from pursuing investigations related to the victim, we do not think the lack of notice of victim impact evidence implicates the policy and due process considerations underlying section 16-3-20 and due process. We find no statutory or constitutional violation, and we see no way in which Humphries was prejudiced by the lack of notice. Furthermore, many courts have found victim impact is neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance, but simply relevant evidence that the jury may consider in determining an appropriate penalty. See State v. Maxwell, 647 So.2d 871 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.) (although victim impact evidence informs the jury of the particular harm caused by the defendant, it is neither aggravating nor mitigating), aff'd, 657 So.2d 1157 (Fla.1995); Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 637 A.2d 117 (finding that although victim impact evidence is relevant consideration in sentencing scheme, it is not aggravating circumstance), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 109, 130 L.Ed.2d 56 (1994). We concur with this view, which removes victim impact entirely from the statute's notice requirement. Humphries also argues the amount of victim impact evidence presented was excessive, and the prosecution's use of that evidence during closing arguments was inappropriate and prejudicial. These issues were not preserved. Before and during trial, defense counsel objected to the victim impact evidence only on the basis that the defendant had not received prior notice that it would be introduced. Defense counsel made no contemporaneous objections relating to the amount of victim impact evidence or to the way in which it was used. Accordingly, the Court need not reach these issues. See State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377, 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994) (a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve issues for appellate review), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1136, 130 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1995). In any case, the victim impact evidence comprised only twenty pages of testimony out of a total of two-hundred seventy-one pages of penalty phase testimony. Twenty pages of testimony gives only a brief glimpse into the life Humphries chose to extinguish, and we hardly think that meager amount of testimony excessive.