Opinion ID: 2590670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: District court's refusal to permit Wilson possession of the photographs

Text: The State charged Wilson with the production and possession of child pornography. The actual pornographic photographs taken of the minor victim were material pieces of evidence against Wilson at trial. Wilson argues that the district court committed reversible error when it ordered that Wilson's standby counsel turn over the copies of the pictures that a previous judge permitted him to have in preparation of his defense. Wilson argues on appeal that the district court's denial of possession of the pictures violated due process and his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, citing State v. District Court ( Epperson ). [22] In Epperson, the State sought to prevent the defense from obtaining a copy of a pornographic video that was part of the discoverable evidence. [23] The State refused to copy the video for defense counsel to review with experts in preparation of a defense, arguing that Nevada's child pornography statutes, NRS 200.710 to 200.730, prohibit the reproduction of child pornography, but the State provided defense counsel access to view the video at its office. [24] This court held that [b]ecause nothing in NRS 174.235 or NRS 200.710 to 200.735 precludes child pornography from being copied for the purpose of defending criminal charges, the Epperson defendants had a right to possess a copy of the videotape to prepare for trial, provided that certain restrictions were met. [25] We conclude that this case is distinguishable from Epperson. In Epperson, the defense was able to show that it was unable to adequately prepare for trial because it was denied physical possession of the evidence before trial. Here, Wilson had access to and possession of the evidence through standby counsel right up to the start of trial. He was able to have it examined by experts in an effort to prepare for trial had he wished to do so. The district court ordered the evidence turned over only after standby counsel represented to the court that it was no longer needed to prepare Wilson's defense. The fact that it was turned over on the first day of trial, to remain with the clerk or entered into evidence as the case may warrant, did not prevent Wilson's access to the evidence provided he could demonstrate a further need for it. Furthermore, Wilson makes no argument as to how or why access, instead of possession, in any way prejudiced his ability to mount an adequate defense. Wilson does argue that Judge Leavitt abused her discretion and violated EDCR 7.12. EDCR 7.12 provides that once an application or writ for an order has been made to a judge and is pending or has been denied by that judge, the same application or motion cannot again be made to the same or a different judge. Contrary to Wilson's argument, the plain language of the rule indicates that it applies to a motion or order that is pending or denied, not to the modification of an outstanding order when the need supporting its issuance is no longer contested. Wilson bases his argument on the overriding public policy of preventing forum shopping. We conclude that Wilson's argument is unpersuasive, and the district court did not violate the rule or abuse its discretion.