Opinion ID: 785877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The state court's decision involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court Precedent

Text: 21 The Michigan Court of Appeals's entire discussion of Ketchings's Fifth Amendment claim is contained in the following paragraph: 22 Defendant's next claim of error on appeal is that the trial court improperly took defendant's failure to admit guilt into account at sentencing. We disagree. A sentencing court cannot, in whole or in part, base its sentence on a defendant's refusal to admit guilt. People v. Yennior, 399 Mich. 892, 282 N.W.2d 920 (1977). See also People v. Adams, 430 Mich. 679, 687, n. 6, 425 N.W.2d 437 (1988). However, evidence of a lack of remorse may be considered in determining an individual's potential for rehabilitation. People v. Wesley, 428 Mich. 708, 711, 411 N.W.2d 159 (1987) (opinion of Archer, J.). As previously explained by this Court in People v. Calabro, 166 Mich.App. 389, 396, 419 N.W.2d 791 (1988), [A] defendant's lack of remorse may be considered by a court in imposing sentence. It is undeniable that when a defendant is remorseful, it is urged in mitigation by him or on his behalf, and it is healthful to ventilate the process from both perspectives rather than to sanction the use in amelioration while condemning it in aggravation. See also People v. Houston, 448 Mich. 312, 323, 532 N.W.2d 508 (1995). In this case, it is clear from our review of the full comments made by the sentencing judge that the court was merely addressing the factor of remorsefulness in the context of defendant's rehabilitative potential and avoidance of responsibility for his actions. There is no indication in the record that defendant's sentence was improperly influenced by his failure to admit guilt or that the court was attempting to punish defendant for exercising his constitutional right to maintain his innocence. Wesley, supra; People v. Stewart (On Remand), 219 Mich.App. 38, 44, 555 N.W.2d 715 (1996); People v. Drayton, 168 Mich.App. 174, 178, 423 N.W.2d 606 (1988). We therefore find no error. 23 People v. Ketchings, 1999 WL 33437836, at  7 (Mich.App., Aug.20, 1999). 24 The Supreme Court has held that a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right `to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence.' Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)). This guarantee extends to the sentencing phase of the trial. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328-29, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999) (In accordance with the text of the Fifth Amendment, we must accord the privilege the same protection in the sentencing phase of `any criminal case' as that which is due in the trial phase of the same case.). 25 In its brief, the state does not dispute ... that a petitioner retains the privilege against compelled self-incrimination through the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings. The state instead argues that the trial court never attempted to get Ketchings to admit his guilt. Indeed, the Michigan Court of Appeals found no indication in the record that defendant's sentence was improperly influenced by his failure to admit guilt or that the court was attempting to punish defendant for exercising his constitutional right to maintain his innocence. Ketchings, 1999 WL 33437836 at  7. 26 A state court's findings of fact are binding in a federal habeas proceeding unless they are rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The record in this case provides such clear and convincing evidence. An objective review of the transcript makes clear that the sentencing judge was not, as the Michigan Court of Appeals found, merely addressing the factor of remorsefulness in the context of defendant's rehabilitative potential.... Ketchings, 1999 WL 33437836 at  7. To the contrary, the relevant portion of the sentencing-hearing transcript reads as follows: 27 THE COURT: The first thing I have to say is that you indicate to the Court that you're not guilty. And as your lawyer will tell you and I'll tell you one of the things the Judge considers in sentencing, in determining what the sentence should be is whether a person can be rehabilitated. But if you don't think you did anything wrong to start with and you don't accept what a jury says — 28 DEFENDANT KETCHINGS: But — 29 THE COURT: I'm just giving you my thinking now. Can I talk? I didn't interrupt you. 30 DEFENDANT KETCHINGS: I understand. 31 THE COURT: How can you be rehabilitated? How can you ask me to put you back in the community? How do I know you're not going to go back out and do something else like this and say, hey, judge, I didn't do it. I wasn't part of it. 32 We have and I don't know if you're ever heard me say this, but the jury system, you, know, sometimes I like it and sometimes I don't. But we're one of the very few countries in the world that has a jury, a judge of their peers. They're people like you. They judge you. And I'm sort of upset that you don't acknowledge that you did something wrong at this point. 33 . . . . 34 You see, to me, young people like you the key to rehabilitating is say, hey, I did something wrong. I'm sorry, man. I was in the car, it went over and shot an innocent child along with other people. 35 . . . . 36 All right. It's an awesome power of a judge to sentence somebody.... And it's a heavy responsibility and it's not what I particularly like, but it has to be done and it has to be done to punish and protect society, to rehabilitate you which is why I said the statement I did in the beginning. One of the issues we discussed here is can you be rehabilitated? And you can't be rehabilitated if you say you didn't do anything. You were here for this trial. 37 As the district court found, the [sentencing] judge referred negatively directly and indirectly to [Ketchings's] continued assertion of his belief in his innocence and implied that [Ketchings] would be sentenced more leniently if he accepted the jury's verdict, that is, if he gave up his Fifth Amendment privilege to ... refuse to admit guilt. Further contradicting the Michigan Court of Appeals's characterization that the sentencing judge was concerned only with Ketchings's lack of remorse and not with his unwillingness to admit guilt is the fact that Ketchings made a lengthy statement expressing his remorse immediately prior to the sentencing judge's comments quoted above. The relevant portion of the sentencing-hearing transcript reads as follows: 38 THE COURT: Okay. We've heard from everybody except you, Mr. Ketchings. Is there anything you want to tell me before the Court imposes sentence? 39 DEFENDANT KETCHINGS: Yes. I do have remorse for the family. I do like to apologize for the things that had happened and I am truly sorry. But I still feel that I'm not guilty of this crime that I've been charged with.... And the prosecutor, she don't know me. She really don't. She can't even see what type of character I am in the world. It's just a bad situation that did happen. I didn't, you know — 40 THE COURT: Don't use that expression. 41 DEFENDANT KETCHINGS: I'm sorry. 42 Everybody saying I'm just this awful person that I'm really not. And I'm quite sure if she knew me in the world, she would be part of the persons who said I was always a true friend to her and to the victim's family. And I feel that giving me 20, 40 years of incarceration that's not going to bring the family members back or to pay back with my heart. And I can't feel how the family members feel for losing their child, but I can sympathize because I would hate for that to happen to my son. And I can only imagine how they feel. I know that she's truly upset, you know. 43 When this crime happened, my son was just born three days prior to this case. And I was very truly upset, you know, to find out what had happened. And I just looked at my son, and, you know, tears came from my eyes. And I do, really do feel in my heart that I'm truly sorry for the family members at what happened. And, you know, I do have a strong family background even though I made some wrong decisions in my life, you know. And my parents always taught me to be respectful to others, you. 44 But, you know, I just can't say nothing more. I'm truly sorry. 45 The fact that the sentencing judge criticized Ketchings for his failure to admit guilt even after he made the above-quoted remarks clearly contradicts the Michigan Court of Appeals's finding that the sentencing judge concerned himself only with remorsefulness and not with the admission of guilt. In sum, whether evaluated as an unreasonable application of [] clearly established Federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or as an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), the Michigan Court of Appeal's opinion does not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 46 The state, as a final point, raises the possibility that on remand a sentence of 40 to 80 years for second-degree murder might again be imposed based on other factors. That outcome, although possible, is far from certain in light of the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines. In addition, such a possibility does not affect the appropriateness of resentencing before another judge as the remedy for the Fifth Amendment violation that occurred in this case.