Opinion ID: 1293641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Failure to Prove Prior Convictions Under the Habitual Criminal Act

Text: At sentencing, the State submitted certified copies of a journal entry from a North Carolina case where Robert H. Lackey, Jr. pled guilty to the felony crime of assault with intent to commit rape in November 1970 and a journal entry from a Florida case where Robert H. Lackey, Jr. pled guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual battery in February 1977. The Florida journal entry contained fingerprints; however, no evidence was presented that the fingerprints matched those of the defendant. The defense objected to the admission of the journal entries on the grounds that they failed to meet the proper form and failed to identify that the person named in the journal entries was in fact the defendant. The court asked if the defendant was contesting that he was the same person named in the journal entries and defense counsel responded, He is. Regarding identity, the State responded that the defense did not give any notice that it intended to object to identity during the presentence investigation and cited State v. Baker, 237 Kan. 54-55, 697 P.2d 1267 (1985), for the proposition that a properly authenticated journal entry of prior conviction for a person with the same name is sufficient. The district court overruled the objections and admitted the journal entries. The defendant's rape conviction carried a minimum term of 5 to 15 years and a maximum prison term of 20 years to life. K.S.A. 21-3502(2) (Ensley 1981); K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 21-4501(b). Utilizing the prior convictions, the court tripled the defendant's minimum sentence from 15 to 45 years, giving him an enhanced sentence of 45 years to life as a habitual criminal under K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 21-4504(b). On appeal, the defendant argues the district court erred by invoking the HCA to triple his sentence for rape when the State failed to prove that he was the same person who received the prior convictions. Whether a criminal sentence is illegal is a question of law, and an appellate court has unlimited review of questions of law. State v. Walker, 277 Kan. 849, Syl. ¶ 1, 89 P.3d 920 (2004). It is a fundamental rule that a person convicted of a crime is given the sentence in effect when the crime was committed, including any applicable Habitual Criminal Act penalties. Walker, 277 Kan. 849, Syl. ¶ 2. K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 21-4504 provided in relevant part: (b) If a defendant is convicted of a felony a third or subsequent time, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant as follows, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney: (1) The court shall fix a minimum sentence of not less than the greatest nor more than three times the greatest minimum sentence authorized by K.S.A. 21-4501 and amendments thereto, for the crime for which the defendant is convicted; and (2) the court may fix a maximum sentence of not less than the least nor more than three times the greatest maximum sentence provided by K.S.A. 21-4501 and amendments thereto, for the crime. . . . . (e) A judgment may be rendered pursuant to this section only after the court finds from competent evidence the fact of former convictions for felony committed by the prisoner, in or out of the state. The defendant argues the State failed to meet its burden of producing competent evidence of the contested prior convictions under the HCA. He relies on cases in which the appellate courts disapproved of proof of prior convictions under the HCA by Federal Bureau of Investigation and Kansas Bureau of Investigation rap sheets and a statement made to a court services officer. See Tuscano v. State, 206 Kan. 260, 264-67, 478 P.2d 213 (1970); State v. Taylor, 198 Kan. 290, 299-300, 424 P.2d 612 (1967); State v. Hicks, 11 Kan. App. 2d 76, 86-88, 714 P.2d 105 (1986). However, those cases are distinguishable from the present case in which certified copies of the two journal entries were submitted to the court. The issue boils down to whether the defendant's name on the journal entries was sufficient to prove identity when he contested the fact that he was the same person named in the journal entries without providing any supporting evidence. It is a well-established rule that identity of name is prima facie evidence of identity of person, and it devolves upon those who deny the identity to overcome the presumption by proof. Bayha v. Mumford, 58 Kan. 445, 446, 49 Pac. 601 (1897). Generally, proof of prior felony convictions to invoke the Habitual Criminal Act [K.S.A. 21-4504] is made by using certified or authenticated copies of journal entries of convictions from other states or counties. This is the best possible evidence of a prior felony conviction . . . . State v. Maggard, 16 Kan. App. 2d 743, 753, 829 P.2d 591, rev. denied 251 Kan. 941 (1992).  Absent a denial of identity or rebuttal evidence, proof beyond the identity of the name in the document is not required for admission of the evidence. State v. Cippola, 202 Kan. 624, 629, 451 P.2d 199, cert. denied 396 U.S. 967 (1969). (Emphasis added.) State v. Greever, 19 Kan. App. 2d 893, 900, 878 P.2d 838 (1994). However, the Cippola court went on to state that the better practice dictates that where the question of the identity of the defendant on trial is raised with respect to prior convictions of similar offenses under K.S.A. 60-455, the State should offer evidence showing that the defendant is the same person who was previously convicted. 202 Kan. at 629-30. The State's reliance upon Baker at the trial court level for the proposition that certified copies of prior convictions are sufficient to prove a defendant's prior convictions was misplaced, as we limited its holding to situations where a defendant does not contest identity: While defendant objected to the evidence introduced by the State on technical grounds, he did not then contend that he is not the same person named in the Shawnee County journal entry by which the State introduced competent evidence of a prior felony conviction of the accused; he did not dispute or refute the evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant had a prior felony conviction. Baker, 237 Kan. at 55. Likewise, the State's reliance upon Greever, presents a similar problem. In Greever, the defendant argued the journal entries of conviction alone were not sufficient evidence to prove that Greever had committed the prior crimes where he did not concede the issue of identity. The court noted that Greever did not deny he was the same person named in the journal entries, that his attorney noted that Greever had committed the offenses, and that his attorney only argued that the State had not proved that he was the same defendant as listed in the journal entries. The Court of Appeals concluded that [g]iven the similarity in names, the admissions by Greever's counsel, the lack of denial of identity, and the failure to provide any rebuttal evidence as to identity, admission of these journal entries as evidence of prior convictions was not an abuse of judicial discretion. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 901. In State v. Maggard, 24 Kan. App. 2d 868, 877-79, 953 P.3d 1379, rev. denied 264 Kan. 823 (1998) ( Maggard II ), on subsequent appeal, the Court of Appeals relied upon Greever in finding certified and authenticated copies of complaints and journal entries were sufficient to prove criminal history under the HCA where defense counsel merely asserted evidence was insufficient to establish identity rather than denying identity; presented no rebuttal evidence to overcome the presumption of similar names in the journal entries; and corroborating evidence existed in the presentence report. Baker, Greever, and Maggard II are thus all distinguishable from this case where the defendant specifically denied being the same person identified in the journal entries of the prior convictions. While not directly on point, State v. Staven, 19 Kan. App. 2d 916, 881 P.2d 573 (1994), provides better guidance on this issue. In Staven, the Court of Appeals found that the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), see K.S.A. 21-4724(c)(4), requires the State to prove prior convictions by at least as much as was required to be proven under the HCA; [a] certified or attested copy of a journal entry of conviction is sufficient proof of a prior offense unless the defendant denies he or she is the same person named in the prior felony journal entry.  (Emphasis added.) 19 Kan. App. 2d at 918. Although the State had proven the prior convictions by certified journal entries, the court found that Staven's counsel had raised the issue of identity with respect to the prior convictions by stating: `I think there's certainly a question as to whether we're talking about the same person.' 19 Kan. App. 2d at 919. See also State v. Presha, 27 Kan. App. 2d 645, 646-47, 8 P.3d 14, rev. denied 269 Kan. 939 (2000) (Generally, prior felony convictions to invoke the HCA are proven by certified or authenticated copies of the journal entries of conviction. . . . However, if the defendant disputes identity, the State may have to produce additional evidence.  [Emphasis added.]); State v. Hankins, 19 Kan. App. 2d 1036, 1049, 880 P.2d 271 (1994) (Under the Habitual Criminal Act, a certified or attested copy of a journal entry of conviction constituted sufficient proof of a prior offense in the event a defendant did not deny identity.  [Emphasis added.]). The State acknowledges that defense counsel briefly stated the defendant was contesting identity but argues that the two certified journal entries were sufficient competent evidence to prove the prior convictions because the defendant offered no rebuttal evidence. This argument fails for three reasons. First, our previously discussed case law provides that certified journal entries are sufficient to prove prior convictions absent a denial of identity or rebuttal evidence. Our use of the term or rather than and demonstrates that the defendant need not do both in order to require the State to provide more evidence. Second, the State is seeking to shift the burden of proof to the defendant when [d]ue process requires that the State prove the existence of prior convictions in every essential particular, unless admitted by the defendant, before the prior convictions can be used to enhance the sentence. State v. Jones, 272 Kan. 674, 677, 35 P.3d 887 (2001). Finally, as in Staven, while concisely stated, defense counsel indicated that the defendant was contesting that he was the same person named in the journal entries. The Staven court found defense counsel's brief statement about identity with no mention of rebuttal evidence sufficient to contest identity. In this case, the defendant contested that he was the same person named in the out-of-state journal entries, but the State presented no corroborating evidence to support its contention. Although the Florida journal entry contained identifying fingerprints, the State did not present testimony that the fingerprints contained in the documents matched the defendant in this case. The defendant did not have the burden to put forth rebuttal evidence regarding his challenge to identity. As such, competent evidence did not support a finding that the defendant had prior convictions to enhance his sentence under the HCA. The defendant's sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing.