Opinion ID: 2711
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Legislative Immunity May Bar Claims for Injunctive Relief

Text: It is uncontroversial that legislative immunity may bar claims for money damages brought against state and local officials in their personal capacities. See, e.g., Almonte, 478 F.3d at 106. However, there is arguably conflicting case law on whether legislative immunity applies at all to claims for injunctive relief brought against state officials in their official capacities. Therefore, before addressing the legislative nature vel non of defendants' allegedly unlawful actions, we must address, as a threshold matter, whether legislative immunity is even available as a potential defense to plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief. Generally speaking, state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 732, 100 S.Ct. 1967. The immunity is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate Clause. [7] Id. Tracing its roots to the [p]arliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372, 71 S.Ct. 783, the doctrine of legislative immunity found early expression in state constitutional provisions antedating the Federal Constitution, see id. at 373-75, 71 S.Ct. 783 (discussing early state constitutional provisions in Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire), and was carefully preserved at the time of the Founding, id. at 376, 71 S.Ct. 783. Legislative immunity has been deemed necessary, in part, because of the recognition by courts that civil litigation, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces [legislators] to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (quoting Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975)). We first addressed whether legislative immunity may shield state officials from claims for injunctive relief (as opposed to claims for damages) in Star Distributors, Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.1980). In that case, we considered whether legislative immunity applied to bar claims seeking to enjoin members of the New York State Legislature from enforcing subpoenas that required the plaintiffs to appear before a select committee of the legislature. We noted that the Supreme Court had concluded, on the basis of the Speech and Debate Clause, that federal legislators acting within the scope of their legislative function are immune from both damage and injunction suits, Star Distributors, 613 F.2d at 6 (citing Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503, 95 S.Ct. 1813), and that state legislators were entitled to legislative immunity from suits for damages, see id. (citing Tenney, 341 U.S. at 367, 71 S.Ct. 783). We determined that, due to the shared origins and justifications of [the Speech or Debate Clause and the doctrine of legislative immunity], it was inappropriate for us to differentiate the scope of the two without good reason. Id. We relied for support on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966), in which the Court had stated that the state legislative privilege [in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is] on a parity with the similar federal privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause. See Star Distributors, 613 F.2d at 8 (quoting Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180, 86 S.Ct. 749). Accordingly, we held that state legislators, to the same extent as their federal counterparts, are immune from suit under § 1983 for injunctive relief as well as damages based on their activities within the traditional sphere of legislative activity. Id. at 9. Shortly after we decided Star Distributors, the Supreme Court similarly held that the doctrine of legislative immunity barred claims against state officials for injunctive relief, as well as for damages. In Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 719, 100 S.Ct. 1967, the Court examined whether legislative immunity barred claims for declaratory and injunctive relief brought against members of the Virginia Supreme Court for their promulgation and enforcement of the Virginia Bar Code. After concluding that the promulgation of the Bar Code by a state court was a legislative act, the United States Supreme Court held that legislative immunity barred not only plaintiff's claims for damages, but also those claims for declaratory and injunctive relief that would have forced the Supreme Court to amend or repeal the code. See id. at 733-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (reasoning that there is little doubt that if the Virginia Legislature had enacted the State Bar Code and if suit had been brought against the legislature, its committees, or members for refusing to amend the Code, the suit would be barred on the grounds of absolute legislative immunity). The Court held, however, that defendants could be sued for injunctive relief with respect to their enforcement of the Bar Code because legislative immunity would not apply to their enforcement activities. See id. at 734-37, 100 S.Ct. 1967. In explaining why the doctrine of legislative immunity was not limited to claims for damages, the Court reasoned: We have . . . recognized that state legislatures enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts, an immunity that is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate Clause, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). In Tenney, we concluded that Congress did not intend § 1983 to abrogate the common-law immunity of state legislators. Although Tenney involved an action for damages under § 1983, its holding is equally applicable to § 1983 actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. at 732-33, 100 S.Ct. 1967. The Court then cited approvingly our opinion in Star Distributors, and its holding that legislative immunity bars an action for declaratory and injunctive relief just as it bars an action for damages. Id. at 732 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (citing Star Distributors, 613 F.2d at 4); see also Colon Berrios v. Hernandez Agosto, 716 F.2d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 1983) ([T]he Supreme Court has clearly held that state legislators acting in a legislative capacity are absolutely immune from the imposition of equitable remedies in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (citing Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967). Neither our Court nor the Supreme Court has expressly questioned, much less overruled, the holdings of Star Distributors and Consumers Union. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court on two occasions has somewhat cryptically cast doubt on its holding in Consumers Union that legislative immunity may bar claims for injunctive relief as well as those for damages. In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), the Supreme Court considered whether plaintiffs who had obtained damages in an action against state employees in their personal capacities could maintain a claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against the State of Kentucky. The Court concluded that the claim for attorney's fees could not be maintained because the State of Kentucky was not a party to the suit and the remaining defendants were not, and could not be, sued for damages in their official capacities because Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred those claims. See id. at 168-71, 105 S.Ct. 3099. The Court, however, went on to explain in dicta the difference between a personal-capacity suit and an official-capacity suit, stating: When it comes to defenses to liability, an official in a personal capacity action may . . . be able to assert personal immunity defenses. . . . In an official-capacity action, these defenses are unavailable. The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (citations omitted). [8] Accordingly, under a potential reading of Graham, legislative immunity might not be available as a defense in a suit for injunctive relief against state agents in their official capacities. [9] More recently, the Supreme Court in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996), indicated in dicta that legislative immunity may not bar official-capacity claims altogether. The Court in Umbehr stated glancingly in a footnote that a local government board's asserted legislative immunity defense was moot because only official-capacity claims were before the Court and because immunity from suit under § 1983 extends to public servants only in their individual capacities. 518 U.S. at 677 n. , 116 S.Ct. 2342. The Supreme Court in Umbehr did not cite, much less address or discuss, its earlier holding in Consumers Union that legislative immunity was available to state defendants who were sued in their official capacities. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967. We too have arguably departed from the Supreme Court's holding in Consumers Union that legislative immunity applies to claims for injunctive relief, and from our own earlier holding to the same effect in Star Distributors. On three separate occasions, in cases involving suits against local government officials and entities, we have suggested that legislative immunity is a personal defense that government officials may not assert when they are sued in their official capacities. See Almonte, 478 F.3d at 106 (stating that [i]mmunity, either absolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available only when officials are sued in their individual capacities) (emphasis in original); Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that [t]he immunities Town Board members enjoy when sued personally do not extend to instances where they are sued in their official capacities); Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1992) (stating that [t]he fallacy in the town's argument on appeal lies in its assumption that the absolute legislative immunity of the town councilmen applies when the suit is brought against them in their official capacities) (emphasis in original). In Morris, we held explicitly that legislative immunity did not bar claims for injunctive relief in official-capacity suits against local government officials. See Morris, 196 F.3d at 111. We do not think that Almonte, Morris, and Goldberg are applicable here. Each of those cases involved official-capacity claims against local-level officials, rather than state officials. While legislative immunity is available to local officials who are sued in their individual capacities, see Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966, the Supreme Court has made clear that, due to the historical unavailability of various immunity defenses to local governments, those governments (or municipal corporations) are not entitled to the benefit of any immunities that might be available to local officials sued under § 1983. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) ([T]here is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither history nor policy supports a construction of § 1983 that would justify the qualified immunity accorded [defendant municipality]); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) ([U]nlike various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit  either absolute or qualifiedunder § 1983.); Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 73 (noting that the immunities historically granted other government actors in § 1983 actions had not been available to municipal corporations). The Supreme Court has never reached a similar conclusion with respect to suits against states, or against state agents in their official capacities. This may explain why we did not attempt to reconcile the holdings of Almonte, Morris, and Goldberg with our earlier holding in Star Distributors, or with the Supreme Court's similar holding in Consumers Union. Because the three cases addressing the availability of legislative immunity to municipalities did not cite or discuss, much less overrule, Star Distributors, and no decision of the Supreme Court has overruled the relevant holdings in Consumers Union or Star Distributors, we adhere to the law of the Circuit that legislative immunity may bar claims for injunctive relief against state officials. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 659 (2d Cir.2005) ([W]e are bound by our own precedent unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc. ) (internal quotation marks omitted). We adhere to this conclusion, even in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Graham and Umbehr, for two reasons. First, the Speech or Debate Clause, which has been recognized as coterminous with the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity, see Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733, 100 S.Ct. 1967, has long been applied to bar suits for both types of relief, and neither we nor the Supreme Court has had occasion to question that Clause's scope in this regard since our holding in Star Distributors. Cf. Eastland, 421 U.S at 503, 95 S.Ct. 1813 ([A] private civil action, whether for an injunction or for damages, creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation.) (emphasis added). Second, and more importantly, we are unwilling to ignore the Supreme Court's squarely-applicable precedent in Consumers Union simply because of broadly-stated dicta in Graham not specifically referring to legislative immunity, see Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099  particularly in view of its approving discussion of Consumers Union elsewhere in the opinion, see id. at 164, 105 S.Ct. 3099  or because of a footnote in Umbehr concerning the immunity of local, rather than state, officials, see Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 677 n. , 116 S.Ct. 2342. Our conclusion is supported by recent decisions of the Third and Eleventh Circuits holding that legislative immunity may bar claims for injunctive relief against state officials, see Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir.2005); Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240 (3d Cir.1998), as well as by earlier decisions of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits reaching similar conclusions, see Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir.1991) (injunctive relief against Governor of Wisconsin, acting in a legislative capacity, was barred because [l]egislators' immunity is absolute and extends to injunctive as well as to damages suits); Alia v. Michigan Supreme Ct., 906 F.2d 1100, 1102 (6th Cir.1990) (injunctive relief against Justices of Michigan Supreme Court for actions taken in their legislative capacity was barred by legislative immunity). In Scott, the Eleventh Circuit held that the claims of a plaintiff who sought injunctive relief against state legislators were barred by legislative immunity. 405 F.3d at 1255-56. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit attempted to reconcile Graham's dicta that an official-capacity defendant cannot invoke personal defenses but can only invoke official immunities applicable to the government as an entity, see Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099, with the Supreme Court's decision in Consumers Union. The Eleventh Circuit began by explaining that the reason personal defenses such as legislative immunity are generally unavailable in official capacity suits [is] because such suits are treated as suits against the underlying entity [ i.e., the state], and not against the individual. Scott, 405 F.3d at 1255. The Eleventh Circuit then noted that under Ex parte Young, official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state. Id. at 1255 (emphasis added). This led the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that the plaintiff's action seeking prospective injunctive relief against [defendants] in their official capacities was not to be treated as a[n] action against the entity, but rather, as an action against the individual legislators. Id. The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that the individual defense of legislative immunity was available for the same reason that the official defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity was not availablenamely, because the suit in question was not considered to be a suit against the state itself. Id. In Larsen, 152 F.3d at 240, the Third Circuit held that legislative immunity barred claims for injunctive relief in a suit brought by a former Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice. The plaintiff sought reinstatement to judicial office following his impeachment and removal by the State Senate. The Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Consumers Union, and on the principles embodied by the Speech or Debate Clause, to conclude that  at least in appropriate cases, legislators are entitled to immunity from claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief. Larsen, 152 F.3d at 253 (emphasis added). Without attempting to draw a line for all cases, the Third Circuit determined that the relevant question in Larsen was whether [plaintiff's] request for prospective relief from the Senators could be accorded consistent with the policies underlying legislative immunity. Id. The Third Circuit then concluded that legislative immunity applied because the plaintiff seeks reinstatementnothing less than that the individual Senators rescind their guilty vote on his impeachment. Id. at 254. It noted that [i]t is difficult to imagine a remedy that would more directly interfere with the role assigned exclusively to the Senators by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. [10] Accordingly, we adhere to our holding in Star Distributors, 613 F.2d at 8-9, and reaffirm the vitality of its teaching that claims for injunctive relief against defendant state officials, sued in their official capacities, may be barred by the doctrine of legislative immunity, notwithstanding arguably contradictory dicta in Graham and Umbehr.