Opinion ID: 2999523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5

Text: Along with the Board of Trustees of Purdue University, the Plaintiff sued Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3), and 1986. In its motion for summary judgment, the Defendant challenges the Plaintiff’s claims against these Does as no longer proper at this stage of the litigation. The Defendant relies on Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997), which noted that “[t]he use of fictitious names is disfavored, and the judge has 4 Also, in his Statement of Genuine Issues and Material Facts, the Plaintiff states that “when Utesch came up for promotion, the Campus Committee voted 6-0 against the tenure of Utesch. In spite the negative votes, Utesch was granted tenure.” Id. at 21. The Plaintiff cites page 43 of Utesch’s deposition in support of this assertion. The Court has reviewed this page but is unable to determine whether the committee was recommending against Dr. Utesch’s tenure or whether it was giving a general negative opinion on Dr. Utesch in its capacity as the peer review committee. Moreover, the Plaintiff asserts that Professor S.C. was accused of plagiarism and refers the Court to Confidential Exhibit 16. This exhibit contains a letter from an English professor at IPFW, who reviewed a draft of S.C’s research article. In the letter, the English professor is expressing her frustration about S.C.’s continual failure to attribute the sources upon which she based her article. This letter is not a formal accusation of plagiarism. Moreover, it is unknown whether S.C. ever submitted the article for publication and whether she corrected the attribution problems. Without this information, and especially without any evidence that the university’s administration knew that S.C. published a plagiarized article, the Court finds the Plaintiff’s characterization of S.C. as a “plagiarist” overbroad. 23 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 24 of 44 an independent duty to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify such a departure from the normal method of proceeding in federal courts.” Further, the Defendant argues that now it would be too late to substitute Does 1 through 5 because any claims against other parties are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Plaintiff has not responded to the Defendant’s contentions and seems to have conceded that he cannot proceed against Does 1 through 5. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims against Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are denied as a matter of law. E. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1985(3), and 1986 Claims (1) Defendant’s Immunity The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1985(3), and 1986 claims are barred because, as an arm of the state, it is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The Plaintiff responds that the Defendant is not a State agency and thus is not immune from suit under §§ 1981, 1985(3), and 1986. He submits that finding of immunity is a fact sensitive inquiry and that the Defendant has not established IPFW’s general legal status. Finally, the Plaintiff suggests that the Defendant is not protected by immunity because, among other things, it was sued for injunctive relief. “The jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment protects the state and its agencies; it does not shield political subdivisions.” Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1987). Whether a state university is like a state agency or like a political subdivision depends on the specific facts of the case. The courts especially consider the extent of the university’s financial autonomy from the state: “the extend of state funding, the state’s oversight and control of the 24 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 25 of 44 university’s fiscal affairs, the university’s ability independently to raise funds, whether the state taxes the university, and whether a judgment against the university would result in the state increasing its appropriations to the university.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has previously held that “Purdue is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. at 846. IPFW is not its own entity but a regional campus of Purdue and IU. It is completely controlled by Purdue, which has full power, authority, and responsibility to manage and operate IPFW for the benefit of Purdue and IU. Purdue is responsible for IPFW’s business operations, including its fiscal management and control. IPFW’s chancellor is appointed and employed by Purdue (with the approval of IU) and reports to the Purdue president. Purdue appoints and employs all administrative officers, faculty, and staff members. Finally, Purdue charges and collects all tuition and fees related to IPFW. As this case itself exemplifies, a suit against IPFW is really a suit against Purdue. (See Pl.’s Mot. Amend Caption, September 9, 2004, Docket Entry 16 (stating that, in accordance with Ind. Code 20-12-36-4, the proper defendant in this case is the Board of Trustees of Purdue University, not IPFW)). Yet, as noted above, Purdue is immune from damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Kashani, 813 F.2d at 845. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claims for damages under §§ 1981, 1985(3), and 1986 are barred. However, Purdue is not immune from suit for injunctive relief, which the Plaintiff has requested in his Complaint. Kashani, 813 F.2d at 848 (“[A] suit for prospective injunctive relief is not deemed a suit against the state and thus is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). Therefore, the Court must examine whether the Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 25 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 26 of 44 1985(3) and 1986.5 (2) Plaintiff’s Claims for Injunctive Relief under §§ 1985(3) and 1986 The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant conspired with S.S. and V.H to deprive him of equal protection of the law as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986. The Defendant argues that no conspiracy was possible in this case because all the actors belong to the same corporation, and a corporation cannot conspire with itself. Section 1985(3), although not a source of substantive rights, is a remedial statute that prohibits conspiracies to deprive a person of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal laws: [i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The courts have identified four elements necessary to make out a valid case under § 1985(3): (1) a conspiracy; (2) a purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to his person or property or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Quinones v. Szorc, 771 F.2d 289, 291 n.1 (7th Cir.1985) (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983)). In this case, the Plaintiff is unable to satisfy the first element, that is, to show that the 5 Since the Plaintiff has also alleged Title VII claims, which are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Nanda v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 303 F.3d 817, 831 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e hold that the 1972 Act validly abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title VII disparate treatment claims.”), the Court will not separately consider the Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as both Title VII and § 1981 employ the same analysis. See Alexander v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs., 263 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2001). 26 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 27 of 44 Defendant conspired with others to deprive him of equal protection of the law. To be a conspirator, the Defendant would have to have a co-conspirator or co-conspirators with whom to conspire. In a corporate conspiracy, co-conspirators must be outside of the corporation. See Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[I]ntra-corporate discussions lie outside [§] 1985(3)’s domain.”). Yet, all persons accused of conspiring against the Plaintiff—Chancellor Wartell, Dr. Hannah, Dr. Utesch, as well as S.S. and V.H—worked for the Defendant at the time of the alleged conspiracy. In passing, the Plaintiff states that Travis’s intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine would not apply here, because the Defendant’s employees have been motivated solely by personal bias. Cf. Hartman v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. 508, 4 F.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply where persons are motivated solely by personal bias). The Plaintiff does not expound on the facts that would establish that the Defendant’s employees’ choice not to reappoint him was motivated solely on the grounds of their personal racial animus against him. He does state, although without any specific evidence, that V.H. was inspired to injure him by strong dislike for him because she received a “B” in his class rather than an “A.” But in any case, a dislike of a teacher because of a bad grade is not equivalent to a personal racial bias. As to the remaining persons, the Plaintiff has failed to establish that they were motivated solely by their racial animus so that the Defendant’s interests in maintaining quality education program played no interest at all in their decisions. See id. (where the plaintiff has not shown that the accused employees’ actions were not at all motivated by the defendant’s interests in its education success, the court cannot conclude that the employees’ acted solely out of personal bias against the plaintiff, and thus outside of the scope of their employment). Accordingly, the Court cannot find that any alleged agreement among the Defendant’s employees to harm the Plaintiff constituted a conspiracy 27 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 28 of 44 within the meaning of § 1985(3). Since the Plaintiff is unable to establish the first element under § 1985(3), the Court need not proceed any further.6 Similarly the Court does not have to address § the 1986 claim, which to be actionable, requires a violation under § 1985: Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1986. F. Title VII Claim The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for discrimination on account of race and national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., which prohibits such discrimination: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2. The Plaintiff concedes that he has no direct evidence of discrimination but argues that he can overcome the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment through the indirect, burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas framework. 6 Nor could the Plaintiff establish that the Defendant deprived him of equal protections of law (the second requirement of the test). As explained below, the Plaintiff’s claim that he was not-reappointed because of discriminatory reasons fails as a matter of law. 7 Initially, the Plaintiff also accused the Defendant of retaliation against him for exercising his rights under Title VII. The Defendant moved the Court to dismiss the claim as one that exceeds the scope of the Plaintiff’s EEOC charge. The Plaintiff has not responded to the Defendant’s arguments and appears to have conceded this claim. Accordingly, the Court will award summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on the Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim. 28 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 29 of 44 The Defendant insists that the Plaintiff can neither establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas nor show that the Defendant’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for his suspension and eventual termination—that the Plaintiff engaged in improper conduct— was merely a pretext for discrimination. (1) McDonnel Douglas Test The Plaintiff has chosen the McDonnell Douglas indirect method to show that the Defendant’s decision to not renew a teaching offer was motivated by a prohibited animus. Under this approach, he must first establish a prima facie case of race and national origin discrimination. To do that, he “must demonstrate that: “(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) his performance met his employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated others not in his protected class received more favorable treatment.” Brummett v. Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc., 414 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2005). If she succeeds in establishing the prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to offer a permissible, noninvidious reason for the alleged discrimination. If the defendant meets this production burden, the plaintiff may then rebut that evidence by showing that the employer’ reasons are a pretext for discrimination or that the decision was tainted by impermissible, race-based motives. “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “Pretext is more than a mistake on the part of the employer; it is a phony excuse.” Hudson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir. 2004). If pretext is demonstrated, the case must go to trial. See Olsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 267 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2001). The Plaintiff has established without difficulty the first and third prongs of the prima facie 29 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 30 of 44 case: he is an African-American from Ghana and he has not been reappointed for the 2004–2005 academic year. However, the second and fourth elements—whether similarly situated others not in his protected class received more favorable treatment that he did and whether his performance met the Defendant’s legitimate expectations—require careful analysis, especially, since they are closely intertwined with the pretext analysis. The Court will consider them together with the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant’s reasons for firing him were pretextual. See Olsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 267 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2001) (where prima facie analysis would overlap substantially with the question of pretext, the court may address the two together). (a) Similarly Situated Employees Returning to the prima facie case, the Plaintiff may not prevail against the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because he has failed to designate evidence of similarly situated comparators who were treated more favorably than he was. To establish that employees not in the protected class were treated more favorably, the Plaintiff must show that those employees were similarly situated with respect to “performance, qualifications and conduct,” Snipes v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 291 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2002), and that “the relevant aspects of [their] employment situation were nearly identical to [the] alleged comparator[s].” Nunnery v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1131 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Such a showing normally entails establishing that ‘the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.’” Snipes, 291 F.3d at 463 (quoting Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617–18 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir. 2002) (to meet his burden the plaintiff must 30 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 31 of 44 demonstrate that there is someone directly comparable to him in all material respects). In addition, the Plaintiff must establish that the similarly situated employees were treated more favorably at the time of the alleged discrimination against him. Jordan v. City of Gary, 396 F.3d 825, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). During his deposition, the Plaintiff identified seventeen current and former IPFW employees that he claims were similarly situated to him but were treated more favorably than he. However, the similarities of which the Plaintiff speaks relate only to his ability to teach, write, and research. The Plaintiff has not shown similarities as to the status of these individuals or any detrimental conduct, similar to his own, that they were accused of. For example, the Plaintiff believes that the tenured faculty members—Utesch, Cochren, Cothern, Nichols, Murphey, Hickey—are directly comparable to him, but that, unlike him, they were allowed to advance in their academic careers. The Plaintiff is mistaken in three respects: First, at the time of the alleged discrimination against the Plaintiff, the tenured faculty members, by the virtue of their tenure, were not directly comparable to the Plaintiff in all material respects. The Plaintiff was not a tenured professor and was subject to different standards than the tenured ones. Second, the advancement of these tenured members did not take place at the same time that the Plaintiff was not reappointed. Finally, the Plaintiff has not presented evidence that the tenured professors were accused of engaging in inappropriate conduct with students. As to the remaining eleven employees, the Plaintiff provides no specifics, aside from the fact that Dr. Hickey believed that the Plaintiff’s research was comparable to Burg’s, Agnes’s, and Choi’s. The Plaintiff asks the Court to disregard the students’ allegations against him as frivolous and compare him to others only as to his academic abilities. The Court has no right to pick and choose what it wants to compare; rather it is the Plaintiff’s burden to show that he and the proffered 31 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 32 of 44 comparators are similar in all material respects. This he has failed to do. Furthermore, the subject matter of the complaint, that a teacher abused his position of authority, is grave, not frivolous. The Plaintiff also claims that one of the comparators was accused of plagiarism, but, as noted above, fails to provide any evidence of that. (See supra at 23 n.4.) Finally, the Plaintiff has failed to explain when and how the remaining eleven employees were treated more favorably than he. (b) Pretext The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff was not reappointed for the 2004–2005 academic year because he was not meeting its legitimate expectations: Dr. Hannah reviewed both Dean Wiener’s recommendation for reappointment and Dr. Utesch’s recommendation for nonreappointment, and decided that the accusations about the Defendant’s inappropriate behavior outweighed the positive aspects of his employment.8 In response, the Plaintiff offers a two-paragraph rebuttal insisting that the Defendant’s stated reasons have no basis in fact. He maintains that the allegations against him were unverifiable and unsubstantiated, and that the Court can infer from the falsity of the Defendant’s explanation that it is dissembling its discriminatory purpose. The Court disagrees. The Plaintiff has failed to present enough evidence to cast the shadow of pretext on the Defendant’s explanation why he was not reappointed. It is not sufficient for the Plaintiff to show that some or all of the students’ allegations about the Plaintiff’s inappropriate behavior were made up by those students. It is also insufficient for the Plaintiff to show that previous recommendations from Dr. Utesch praised his abilities and zeal for teaching, and that some faculty members, as well as 8 This assertion also goes to the Defendant’s claim that the Plaintiff was not performing his job satisfactorily. 32 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 33 of 44 many students, perceived him as an excellent teacher. Cf. Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 329 (7th Cir. 2002) (“In most cases, when a district court evaluates the question of whether an employee was meeting an employer’s legitimate employment expectations, the issue is not the employee’s past performance but ‘whether the employee was performing well at the time of [his] termination.’” (citation omitted)); Dey v. Colt Const. & Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Our cases also give little weight to statements by supervisors or co-workers that generally corroborate a plaintiff's own perception of satisfactory job performance.”). Rather, he must show that Dr. Hannah, the person who made the ultimate decision not to reappoint the Plaintiff, or Dr. Utesch who passed the complaints on to her, made up the students’ allegations, did not truly believe them, or found them insignificant. In a word, the Plaintiff must establish that Dr. Hannah’s and Dr. Utesch’s reasons for the Plaintiff’s non-reappointment were merely made up to cover up their discriminatory reasons. Yet, the evidence points to the contrary. Even Dean Wiener’s recommendation for reappointment was not without some hesitation. She recognized some of the Plaintiff’s flaws but believed that his research skills, publications, and his verbal commitment for improvement outweighed them. She was also confident that the Plaintiff was going to correct his interactions with the students during the coming months. Dr. Utesch, on the other hand, noted that the student complaints had become more serious over the past year, compromising all positive aspects of the Plaintiff’s work: “female students report inappropriate comments about their appearance,” and “[t]he trust and respect of students has been diminished by misuse of power.” (Hannah Dep., Ex. 15.) Dr. Hannan, faced with contradicting recommendations from her subordinates, met with Dean Wiener and Dr. Utesch to discuss their recommendations and reviewed all available documents. She even made sure that Dr. Utesch consulted with Judy Dilorio, IPFW’s Affirmative 33 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 34 of 44 Action Officer and James Ferguson, IPFW’s Human Resources Services Director, to insure that all procedures were followed. Then, after considering both sides, she decided against the Plaintiff’s reappointment, citing the students’ complaints of ineffective teaching and a lack of professionalism, “which have increased over this past year despite verbal and written warnings and efforts at assistance.” Id. After the Plaintiff asked Dr. Hannah for a more detailed explanation for her reasons not to reappoint him, she sent him a letter. In the letter, she reiterated her earlier comments and further expanded on her rationale. She noted some of his unprofessional behavior in and out of class and his stated biases against homosexuals. Dr. Hannah also noted the positive reports about the Plaintiff, but did not think that they compensated for the Plaintiff’s faults. The Plaintiff challenges his non-reappointment only by calling into question the reliability of the students’ complaints and by referring to his previous positive evaluations. The Plaintiff, who bears the burden to show pretext, does not provide the Court with a reason to believe that Dr. Hannah or Dr. Utesch simply made up the stories of the students’ complaints, by themselves or in collaboration with the students. He refers to Dr. Utesch ’s conversation with S.S. and V.H. at the racquet club as indication of conspiracy, but he is unable to supply any basis for this claim.9 Further, he states that V.H. hated the Plaintiff because she received a “B” in his class: “[she] set out a plot to malign him. Utesch and S.S. got on board and set out a course that has resulted in the utter destruction of [the Plaintiff’s] career in academia.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 9). Again, the Plaintiff does not single out any part of the record to support these allegations. Finally, the Plaintiff points to Blakemore’s report as a document that exonerates him of S.S.’s and V.H.’s allegations. However, 9 S.S.’s testified during her deposition that she approached Dr. Utesch with a friend because she was “very upset about it and it was scary to bring—to say what he said.” (S.S.’s Dep. at 16). 34 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 35 of 44 such assertion is a stretch. In her report, Blakemore did note that some students she interviewed were very supportive of the Plaintiff and had no complaints against him at all. Yet, there were also those who corroborated the complainants’ allegations. She wrote: “On balance . . . the majority of students to whom I spoke provided examples of experiences that were consistent with [S.S.’s] and [V.H.’s] complaints. . . . I can say . . . that many of the students and former students to whom I spoke found several aspects of his behavior inappropriate, and that their accounts were startlingly consistent.” (Pf.’s Ex. 25 at 2.) Blakemore also stated that she would like to express her utmost respect toward [S.S. and V.H.] for their courage coming forward with their complaints. I spoke to several other students who believed that they had been harmed by [the Plaintiff], but were afraid to speak, lest their future careers be harmed. I spoke to former students who said that they had wanted to report their concerns about his behavior once they left the university, but they never had, and that they felt distressed and guilty that they had not. Hence the university should applaud those who are willing to come forward with a serious complaint at possible risk to themselves, particularly when they are taking the risk partly for the good of others. (Id. at 3.) Regarding S.S.’s complaints, Blakemore concluded that, although they were brought too late procedurally, they confirmed a pattern of hostile educational environment the Plaintiff created: Because many events reported by [S.S.] took place outside the 120-day limit, and although plausible, the telephone calls cannot be verified, I find it very difficult to conclude that [S.S.] was specifically the victim of harassment. However, most of her reported experiences are very consistent with those of others, and can be seen as part of a pattern which leads me to conclude that [the Plaintiff] has created a hostile educational environment for students in the Counselor Education Program at IPFW. (Id.) Regarding V.H.’s complaints, Blakemore determined that four out of the ten accusations were consistent with the overall responses from the persons interviewed: (1) excessive discussion 35 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 36 of 44 of sexuality in class; (2) discussing performance of other students by name, generally in derogatory fashion; (3) denigrating students’ performance publicly; and (4) fear of the Plaintiff, and what he might to do to harm the students academically or professionally. (Id. at 9.) This lead Blakemore to find that the Plaintiff “has violated the Purdue University antiharassment policy,” (Id.) and to recommend that the Plaintiff “be immediately removed from his teaching and practicum supervision responsibilities, and from any supervisory contact with students in the School of Education at IPFW.” (Id. at 10.) Since the Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that Dr. Hannah and Dr. Utesch manufactured claims against him, he has not rebutted the Defendant’s stated reasons for his termination. Furthermore, Dr. Utesch’s remarks about minorities do not prove pretext. As the Defendant points out, Dr. Utesch’s remarks were not sweeping general statements about minorities. Rather, the statements were about specific applicants or a group of applicants who wrote poorly or whose performance was otherwise inferior. Dr. Utesch complained about these individuals and stated his belief that they should not be admitted to the School of Education just because they were minorities. As such, even if considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the statements do not support an inference that Dr. Utesch or Dr. Hannah made their recommendations to not reappoint the Plaintiff for any improper reason. Similarly, Dr. Utesch’s undated statement that “minority students, particularly females, are uncomfortable to deal with because they are quick to invoke the notions of a lawsuit” is too obscure to demonstrate pretext in the Defendant’s stated reason for the Plaintiff’s non-reappointment. Cf. Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2001) (a supervisor’s undated statement about older employees, “Bob, you know how hard it is to sell these guys and they just don’t look like they work as hard,” was too obscure to express prejudice on the basis of age). 36 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 37 of 44 What is more, even if questionable, Dr. Utesch’s statements must be considered in light of his recommendation to the search committee to consider the Plaintiff for a teaching position at the School of Education. When Dr. Utesch recommended the Plaintiff to the committee, as the Department Chair, he knew that the Plaintiff would be working toward a tenure with the school. He could have bypassed him then but did not. Since he was instrumental in both hiring and firing the Plaintiff, an inference against discrimination on his part, even if limited, exists. See E.E.O.C. v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir.1996) (“The same hirer/firer inference has strong presumptive value.”); but cf Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the same-actor inference is unlikely to be dispositive in very many cases because the hiring and firing supervisor “might be unaware of his own stereotypical views of African-Americans at the time of hiring). Importantly, the Plaintiff has not produced any evidence suggesting Dr. Hannah’s racial animus. After meeting with both Dean Wiener and Dr. Utesch and after reviewing available documentation, she exercised the final decision making authority not to reappoint the Plaintiff. She also made sure that Dr. Utesch consulted with Dilorio, IPFW’s Affirmative Action Officer, to insure that proper procedures were followed. Dr. Hannah did not believe that the Plaintiff’s research and productivity compensated for his flaws, and the Plaintiff has not been able to shown anything that would contradict that. The Court will not second guess Dr. Hannah’s legitimate business reason and will not assume the role of a super personnel department. See Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Above all, we are mindful that courts do not sit as super personnel departments, second-guessing an employer’s facially legitimate business decisions.”). The evidence before the Court does not suggest a pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot 37 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 38 of 44 prevail on his Title VII claim. G. State Law Claims Along with the federal claims, the Plaintiff has alleged four causes of action under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA): intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and wrongful termination. The Defendant argues that such claims are improper because the Plaintiff did not provide a timely tort claims notice as required by the Act. The Plaintiff disagrees and maintains that he “substantially complied” with the ITCA. Each of the Plaintiff’s four claims is subject to ITCA’s procedural and substantive requirements. See Bienz v. Bloom, 674 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ([O]ur supreme court has held that the Act applies to all torts.”). Compliance with the ITCA is a prerequisite to pursuing a tort claim against a state university, such as the Defendant, regardless of whether suit is filed in state or federal court. One of ITCA’s requirements is to give notice of tort claims to the defendant’s government body, in this case the Defendant itself, within 180 days after the alleged losses occur. See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8(a); § 34-6-2-110(7); see also Kelly v. City of Michigan City, 300 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff who failed to file tort claims notice within 180 days of the alleged violation).10 “The purpose of the notice is to provide an opportunity for [the defendant] to investigate, determine liability and prepare a defense to the tort claim.” Orem v. Ivy Tech State College, 711 N.E.2d 864, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). According to the 10 It is important to note that “the notice of claims under Ind. Code 34-13-3-8 regarding a political subdivision or municipal corporation is not affected by its status as a state agency for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. This is illustrious in cases where universities and colleges are arms of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity but for purposes of notice are considered political subdivisions or municipal corporations.” Kelley v. City of Michigan City, 300 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (citing Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 544 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. 1989); and Van Valkenburg v. Warner, 602 N.E.2d 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). 38 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 39 of 44 explicit language of the ITCA, a plaintiff’s state claims accrue when the alleged losses occur. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8(a).“Whether a party has complied with the notice requirements of the Act is a question of law to be determined by the court.” Orem, 711 N.E.2d at 869. In this case, the Plaintiff received a notice of non-reappointment from Chancellor Wartell on April 3, 2003. The notice stated that the Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendant would expire on May 12, 2004. The Plaintiff then requested that Dr. Hannah provide a detailed explanation as to why he was not reappointed. Dr. Hannah responded to his request on May 15, 2003. Next, the Plaintiff initiated a grievance process and participated in Chancellor Wartell’s investigation into the students’ complaints against him. The investigation concluded on June 30, 2003, and, in August 2003, the Plaintiff was instructed to conduct his research outside the university campus. On May 12, 2004, the Plaintiff’s employment with IPFW ended. On October 5, 2004, the Plaintiff sent a notice to the Defendant’s governing body regarding his tort claims under ITCA. The Plaintiff asserts that his losses as a result of the Defendant’s tortious acts did not occur until May 12, 2004, when he was terminated from the school. Accordingly, he argues that the torts claim notice was timely so long as it was sent before November 9, 2004, that is, within 180 days after May 12, 2004. Such assertion is inconsistent with two of the Plaintiff’s four claims: intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiff cannot sincerely maintain that his losses, as a result of the Defendant’s alleged intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress, did not occur until May 12, 2004. His own testimony demonstrates that he was upset as soon as he was accused of sexually harassing his students and informed that his contract would not be renewed. This happened on April 3, 2003, and the matter was finally settled around August 2003. The Plaintiff’s claims regarding the infliction of emotional distress do not concern the loss of income, which he did not suffer until May 12, 2004, but the loss of emotional 39 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 40 of 44 stability, which allegedly began a year earlier. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s October 5, 2004, tort notice regarding those two claims was late. In contrast, the notice regarding the Plaintiff’s negligent supervision and wrongful termination claims was timely. Under these claim, one of the Plaintiff’s losses—the loss of employment—occurred on May 12, 2004. Therefore, a notice regarding these claims filed on October 5, 2004, fell within 180 days of the Plaintiff’s alleged losses, as required by the ITCA. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff may not proceed to trial on these claims because they fail on their merits. The first two claims, even if they were not procedurally barred, would have also failed on their merits, as the Court will now explain. (1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress In Count V of the Complaint, the Plaintiff states that the Defendant’s decision to not reappoint him was “in wanton disregard of the rights and feelings of Plaintiff and constitutes despicable conduct.” (Pf.’s Comp. at 14.) The Defendant moved for summary judgment on this claim, arguing that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. The Plaintiff insists that the totality of the circumstances in this case reveals the contrary. In Indiana, to maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous behavior and caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.” Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46)). Conduct is extreme and outrageous only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one 40 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 41 of 44 in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted). The Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that he indeed suffered severe emotional distress as a result of his non-reappointment or the accusations brought against him. He vaguely refers to his outburst during a deposition, which, according to him, demonstrates the trauma he suffered. Besides that uncited reference, he presents no facts that would allow the Court to conclude that he has endured significant emotional pain. But more importantly, the Defendant’s decision to not reappoint him was not extreme or outrageous. As explained above, the Plaintiff was accused of inappropriate behavior with his students and of unsatisfactory teaching, which resulted in eventual termination of his employment. IPFW initiated an investigation and interviewed numerous people. The investigator concluded that the students’ allegations against the Plaintiff were credible and that the Plaintiff violated the university’s antiharassment policy. In light of these facts, the Defendant’s decision to prohibit the Plaintiff from attaining a tenure is not the kind of action that makes one cry, “Outrage!” Cf. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Ind. App. 2002) (Here, [the plaintiff’s] claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law because [the defendant’s] act of firing him pursuant to its disciplinary policy does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.”). (2) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress In Count VI of the Complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant negligently inflicted emotional distress upon him when it terminated him as a result of false sexual harassment accusations. He claims that he sustained the kind of emotional trauma that is normally expected to 41 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 42 of 44 occur in a reasonable person who has been discharged under the same circumstances. The Defendant insists that the Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of the purported emotional trauma. To recover under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress, “a plaintiff must satisfy the ‘impact rule.’” Joganic, 776 N.E.2d at 1263. Before 1991, under the impact rule, a plaintiff had to show that the impact caused him physical injury. However, Indiana Supreme Court, in Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind.1991), reduced the physical injury requirement to “emotional trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person.” Id. at 456. “The modified impact rule maintains the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that he or she suffered a direct physical impact. However, now, the impact need not cause a physical injury to the plaintiff and the emotional trauma suffered by the plaintiff need not result from a physical injury caused by the impact.” Joganic, 776 N.E.2d at 1263. “[T]he direct impact is properly understood as being ‘physical’ in nature. Id. (citing Ross v. Cheema, 716 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ind.1999)). The Plaintiff has failed to evince that he sustained a direct physical impact during his termination from the university or, as explained in the previous section, that he suffered a serious emotional trauma. Accordingly, his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress must fail. (3) Negligent Supervision In Count VII of the Complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant “negligently failed to train its supervisors and administrative personnel regarding nondiscriminatory practices as required by the laws of the State of Indiana and the United States.” (Pf.’s Comp. at 15.) In its motion for summary judgment, the Defendant argues that, as a governmental entity it is statutorily immune from claims for negligent hiring and supervision because such claims fall within the discretionary 42 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 43 of 44 function of governmental entities. The Plaintiff responds that the Defendant’s decision not to reappoint him is not protected by statutory immunity because it did not constitute a policy consideration. In this latter argument, the Plaintiff reveals some confusion as against whom he brings his negligent supervision claim. His claim is against the Defendant for negligent supervision, that is, for its failure to properly train its supervisors regarding fair employment practices, not against Dr. Utesch, Dr. Hannah, and Chancellor Wartell for negligently terminating him. Therefore, in evaluating the Plaintiff’s claim, the Court will consider the Defendant’s responsibility to properly train its supervisors, not their actual conduct. Although governmental agencies may be liable under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, no such liability exists for “the performance of any discretionary function.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7). However, the Court need not decide whether the immunity applies to the Defendant, for even if it does not, the Plaintiff has not presented any facts that would raise a triable issue of fact as to his negligent supervision claim. The Plaintiff neglects to point out what the Defendant did or did not do that constituted negligent supervision of Dr. Utesch, Dr. Hannah, and Chancellor Wartell. Without evidence of the Defendant’s underlying offense, all considerations of immunity are moot. At the summary judgment junction, the Plaintiff may not rely only on the bare assertions of his pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994) (once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings; instead, “the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial”). Accordingly, regardless of whether statutory immunity applies to the Defendant, the Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim 43 case 1:04-cv-00224-TLS-RBC document 67 filed 11/09/2005 page 44 of 44 must fail. (4) Wrongful Termination In Count VIII of the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully terminated when he voiced his concerns about racial disparity in the university’s admissions to the Counselor Education Program. The Defendant moved for summary judgment on this claim, and the Plaintiff has not disputed its contentions. Accordingly, the Court will enter summary judgement for the Defendant regarding the Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. See Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 550 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that unsupported and undeveloped arguments and claims are waived).