Opinion ID: 524999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clearly Established Constitutional Right?

Text: 109 The individual officers are before our Court seeking qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity for government officials represents a compromise between the confliciting concerns of permitting the recovery of damages for vindication of constitutional rights caused by the abuse of public office and permitting government officers to perform discretionary functions without fear of harassing litigation. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)[.] Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (3rd Cir.1988). [W]here an official's duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken with independence and without fear of consequences. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2739, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). [T]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the law. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; see also Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir.1989). 110 I do not believe that a reasonable officer would know that a de facto city custom or policy, and his own actions manifesting the same notions, footed in stereotypes buried deeply in our culture, would violate the Constitution. No published decision in this Circuit sets forth such a theory of the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supreme Court has not spoken specifically on the subject. Qualified immunity is intended to protect individuals, when sued in their individual capacity, from personal liability when the area of law is evolving. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (If the law at the time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful); see Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565, 98 S.Ct. 855, 861, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). 111 One of the fundamental reasons for qualified immunity is to protect the individual officers' discretion unless that discretion must be reined in due to constitutional considerations. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known). The individual defendants should be granted summary judgment on McKee's section 1983 claim. Therefore, I concur in the majority's judgment dismissing the officers, in their individual capacities, with respect to plaintiff's section 1983 claim.