Opinion ID: 2833603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Text: Identifies a Problem In Womer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court encountered a situation substantially similar to the one we face today. There, a plaintiff initiated a medical malpractice suit only months after the COM regime began and, within 5 In state court, a judgment of non pros “effectively constitutes a dismissal of the cause without prejudice,” so long as the statute of limitations has not expired. Stroud v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (E.D. Pa. 2008); see also Haefner v. Sprague, 494 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 6 The note accompanying the Rule described another condition, that the prothonotary could not enter a judgment if a COM had been filed late, but before the defendant had sought dismissal. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.6(a) note (West 2003). 8 sixty days, served the defendant with an expert report from a doctor that stated the claim was meritorious. 908 A.2d at 273. The plaintiff or his counsel did not, however, actually file a COM. Id. Accordingly, as soon as the sixty-day deadline passed, the defendant filed a praecipe to dismiss the claim, and the prothonotary entered a judgment of non pros. Id. As here, the statute of limitations had run, and thus a presumptively meritorious claim came to a precipitous end. Id. at 274. Two days after the filing of the praecipe, the plaintiff sought to reopen his case, arguing that, among other things, his failure to submit the COM was a result of his counsel’s “oversight or mistake.” Id. at 273. Included with that filing was a COM that his lawyer had written the previous day. The motion was denied, but on appeal the Superior Court reversed the trial court and reinstated the case. Womer v. Hilliker, 860 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (unpublished table decision). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then granted allocatur and reversed the Superior Court, terminating the plaintiff’s claim. In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the consequence of failing to comply with the COM requirement was a harsh one—the lawsuit’s demise. 908 A.2d at 276. Thus, because the Court “always understood that procedural rules are not ends in themselves, and that the rigid application of [Pennsylvania] rules does not always serve the interests of fairness and justice,” it adopted two equitable exceptions to the requirement: substantial compliance and justifiable excuse. Id. at 276, 279.7 The 7 Both exceptions have their origin in other parts of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure: substantial 9 Court found, however, that neither exception was met in that case because the plaintiff’s counsel “did not [timely] file a COM, even one that was defective.” Id. at 277. As a result, while the plaintiff had a presumptively meritorious complaint supported by an expert report, and despite his attachment of the COM two days after receiving notice of the deficiency, his case was terminated. Justice Baer, joined by Justice Castille, dissented, citing a number of cases for the proposition that “the courts of [Pennsylvania] have historically been loathe to put a litigant out of court on a potential meritorious claim for missing a filing deadline due to lawyer oversight,” and observing “there is also ample law in Pennsylvania abhorring the practice of entering a snap judgment in response to such a mistake.” Id. at 282-83 (Baer, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that dismissal was in error because “within hours of being put on notice that he mistakenly did not meet all the technical requirements of the rule, [the plaintiff] moved to rectify that mistake and supplied the technically missing COM.” Id. at 282. Justice Baer’s rationale quickly transitioned from dissent to rule, as it became the backbone of a significant change to the COM regime. Specifically, in 2008, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended the Rules of Civil Procedure to add additional conditions precedent to a defendant’s dismissal of a case.8 As a result of those changes, compliance in Rule 126 and justifiable excuse in Rule 3051. See id. at 276, 279. 8 The amendments changed the previous Rule 1042.6 into Rule 1042.7, and the substance of the note from 2003, 10 a Pennsylvania malpractice defendant now may dismiss an action only if four conditions are met: (1) there is not a pending motion (a) for a determination that a COM is unnecessary in the first place or (b) seeking to extend the time to file a COM; (2) a COM was not filed before dismissal was sought; (3) the defendant has attached proof that he served notice of the deficiency upon the plaintiff; and, as is relevant here, (4) thirty days has elapsed between the notice of deficiency and the defendant’s attempt to terminate the action. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.7(a)(1)-(4).9 The purpose of the changes to Rules 1042.6 and 1042.7 was to, among other things, “address concerns that the . . . rules . . . provide[d] for the entry of a judgment of non pros where there has been no notice of intent to enter such a judgment.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.6 explanatory cmt. (2008). Justice Baer reflected upon the change in a later opinion: While my personal sentiments did not carry the day in Womer, the injustice sought to be that no dismissal could be entered if a COM had been filed, was added as Rule 1042.7(a)(2). 9 The Rules further specify two circumstances under which an action may be dismissed even without providing notice to a plaintiff, neither of which pertains to this case. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.6(b) (stating that a judgment of non pros may be entered without notice (1) if a court has granted an extension of time to file and the plaintiff still failed to comply, or (2) if the court has denied a motion to extend the time to file). 11 remedied was accomplished via a subsequent amendment to the civil procedural rules requiring a defendant to give a plaintiff a thirtyday written notice of intention to file a praecipe for a judgment of non pros for failure to file a COM. Once notice was provided, the amended rules afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to seek a determination by the court as to the necessity of filing a COM. Thus, the harsh consequence arising from a plaintiff’s failure to file a COM was ameliorated with a fair rule of process. Anderson v. McAfoos, 57 A.3d 1141, 1154 (Pa. 2012) (Baer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted); see also KeelJohnson v. Amsbaugh, No. 07-200, 2009 WL 648970, at  (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2009) (explaining that the new rules “severely limit[] the availability of non pros by permitting judgment only after ample notice to plaintiffs”). In sum, Rule 1042.7 was specifically intended to codify Justice Baer’s dissenting view in Womer and to prevent the exact situation that confronts us today. That is, were this case in state court, Schmigel’s claim would not have been dismissed because his attorney filed the COM as soon as he was notified of the deficiency and well within the thirtyday window for cure. We now must decide whether that condition precedent to dismissal applies equally to malpractice actions filed in federal court.