Opinion ID: 1192055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of attorney fees to petitioner-appellant

Text: It is clear, under this Court's prior decisions and the language of I.C. § 12-121, that the award of attorney fees pursuant to the terms of that section is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge based on the record before the trial court, and that to overturn the determination of the trial court on appeal requires a conclusion by the appellate court that the trial court abused its discretion. Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 647 P.2d 311 (Ct.App.), review denied (1982). In this case, the only possible theory upon which a defense to the request by Stueve could be based, would be proof that the information he sought was not for a proper purpose. This record is silent as to any evidence of impropriety of purpose or intent on the part of Stueve. The trial court specifically held otherwise, stating: There has been not one shred of evidence revealed here that this particular individual, Mr. Stueve, is not acting in good faith consistent with what he says in his letter of August 29, as the reason why he desires the information. And his testimony here today gives evidence of a further proper purpose, and that is to use the information in an effort to petition the State government for consideration of what in his view are necessary enactments to correct what are in his view policies, procedures, or methods of doing business of the corporation that he believes are improper. And I don't think we need to discuss too much about the rights of citizens in this country to petition their government. That's obviously a proper purpose. And it seems to be that the information that he is seeking is legitimately related to that end, and that it is a proper purpose. Tr. p. 106: 12-107:4. The record being silent as to any basis in fact or law for the denial of Stueve's requests by Northern Lights, we must look to the other issues raised in this action to determine whether the award of attorney fees is appropriate. The issue of the applicability of I.C. § 30-1-52 to nonprofit corporations was not previously addressed by this Court. Although this issue was not raised by Northern Lights until after Stueve had filed suit, it was a legal defense reasonably asserted. We cannot hold that the trial court's denial of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. We affirm the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandate and denial of attorney fees, and reverse on the issue of application of I.C. § 30-1-52. We remand to the district court for action consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal awarded to appellant. BAKES, C.J., and BISTLINE, JOHNSON and BOYLE, JJ., concur.