Opinion ID: 1350499
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Relating to Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: Defendant makes three claims relating to misconduct on the part of the prosecutor. In closing argument, which was long and vigorous, the prosecutor first reviewed the evidence and its application to the sentencing factors and then, after defense counsel had given the opening part of their argument, spoke in rebuttal. The theme of the prosecutor's argument, repeated time and again, was that death was the appropriate penalty because the evidence in aggravation was overwhelming and the evidence in mitigation virtually nonexistent. (13) Defendant first complains of a comment by the prosecutor relating to an instruction pursuant to factor (i) of section 190.3  The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. [2] The remark in question was as follows. The defendant's age: You know, I think it's fair to assume that the reason that factor is in there and what is meant by that is other things being equal, the younger the person, the more extenuating the crime.... The older he is and the more he's done and the more chances he's had and the more he's shown a disinclination to reform or change, the more the age factor counts against him. [¶] And we are dealing here with a guy who is 41, who's had lots of chances, who's had lots of opportunities, and whose attitude is, as he expressed in the letter, the next time out, if he would have had a next time out, he's not going to try to do it right. [¶] So that factor is certainly a minus for him. Defendant claims that the prosecutor's comment constituted a misstatement of the law: factor (i), he asserts, was intended to be a factor in mitigation and not a factor in aggravation. He is incorrect. In People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052], we held that the word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. ( Id. at p. 302.) We further declared that either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. ( Ibid. ) It is plain that under Lucky the prosecutor's remark was not improper. Defendant also complains of several comments by the prosecutor to the effect that He doesn't have the slightest remorse for anything he's done. (14) A prosecutor, however, may properly argue that remorse  which is universally held to be evidence in mitigation  is lacking in a particular capital case. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 771 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250] [decided under relevantly similar 1977 death penalty law].) (15) Finally, defendant claims the court erred by denying a motion for mistrial he made in response to a comment by the prosecutor. While reviewing the evidence the prosecutor discussed the testimony of one Lonnie Chatman, a prison acquaintance called by the defense at the penalty phase to corroborate defendant's story about the so-called deposition he assertedly wanted Jodi W. to sign. The gravamen of the prosecutor's remarks was to the effect that Chatman's tale was unworthy of belief and indeed intentionally false: Chatman had a motive to lie  to help a prison acquaintance and thwart the prosecution  and told a story that was inconsistent with itself and with other evidence. Speaking on the inconsistencies and their cause, the prosecutor made the comment under challenge: So obviously what happened, [defense investigators] shopped around, found somebody who was willing to come in and lie, but they didn't get his story straight enough.... Defense counsel objected, the court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to proceed, and the prosecutor soon ended his discussion of Chatman's testimony and continued his review of the evidence. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's comment. Although the prosecutor denied he meant to imply that the defense intentionally presented perjured testimony, the court determined that the comment was improper. Impliedly concluding that an admonition would cure the harm, the court decided to deliver such a statement, directed defense counsel to provide a draft, and denied the motion for mistrial. Subsequently, at the request of defense counsel, the court told the jury that the comment in question might have been subject to an inference that the defense countenanced false testimony, but You are admonished that no such inference was intended by the prosecution. You are further admonished that the defense has not in any way so conducted itself. You are the sole judges of the credibility of all witnesses who testify in this case. Counsel may argue to you the issue of the credibility of any witness. Immediately after the admonition the prosecutor renounced the implication of his comment, saying, I didn't mean to suggest that anyone connected with the defense suggested that he lie or encouraged him to do so or knowingly promote[d] his false testimony, and I am sure that no one connected with the defense did do that or would do that. We turn now to defendant's claim that the court erred by denying his motion for mistrial. In reviewing rulings on such motions, we apply the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. (See People v. Superior Court ( Thomas ) (1967) 67 Cal.2d 929, 932 [64 Cal. Rptr. 327, 434 P.2d 623, 25 A.L.R.3d 1143].) Under that standard, we find no error. We recognize, as did the trial court, that the prosecutor's comment was improper. (See, e.g., People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 847 [97 Cal. Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564].) We cannot conclude, however, that an admonition was incapable of curing any ensuing harm. Whereas the prosecutor's argument was long, the comment was brief and went to a matter that was relatively insignificant in the determination of the issue of penalty. And contrary to defendant's claim, the admonition given was sufficient to prevent the harm.