Opinion ID: 2831572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Closing Argument Issues

Text: Thunderhawk argues that the district court erred in not granting a mistrial when the government made two objectionable statements during closing argument. A mistrial may result during closing arguments if (1) the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and (2) the remarks prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights by depriving him of a fair trial. United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 804 (8th Cir. 2008). We review the district court’s denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Burns, 432 F.3d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 2005). A. Thunderhawk argues the district court erred in denying his request for a mistrial when government counsel improperly argued that the jury could convict Thunderhawk if it found that he engaged in sexual contact with V.R.B. with the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify the sexual desire of any person. We reject this contention because the argument was not improper. The governing statute expressly states this element of the offense in the disjunctive. See 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3). Although the court’s instruction defining this element, like the indictment, stated the alternatives in the conjunctive -- “an intent to abuse, arouse, and gratify” sexual desire -- it is well established that, when the statute is phrased in the disjunctive, “an indictment charge[s] in the conjunctive to inform the accused fully of the charges,” but “proof of any one of the violations charged conjunctively in the indictment will sustain a conviction.” United States v. Urkevich, 408 F.3d 1031, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005) -6- (quotations omitted); see Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991), and cases cited. In these circumstances, Thunderhawk’s contention that the government’s closing argument ignored law of the case established by the court’s instruction is without merit. Where the evidence is sufficient to prove all statutory elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, as in this case, a jury instruction erroneously requiring additional proof is not a basis for overturning the conviction. See United States v. Inman, 558 F.3d 742, 749-50 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 916 (2009). B. Thunderhawk further argues the district court erred in denying a mistrial when government counsel improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense by stating, “the Defendant had no real case to present to you from the defense perspective. He made admissions, a confession not once, but twice.” We agree the government may not properly suggest the defendant has the burden to produce evidence. “When the defendant’s attorney offers a theory of defense, however, the government may respond by noting the absence of evidence to support that defense.” Burns, 432 F.3d at 861 (citation omitted). Here, the government commented on the strength of Thunderhawk’s intoxication defense; it did not improperly argue Thunderhawk had the burden to present evidence of his innocence. The district court instructed the jury that the government had the burden to prove all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not required to present a defense, and that counsel’s argument was not evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thunderhawk’s request for a mistrial. See id. at 861-62.