Opinion ID: 1036744
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Drug Trafficking Charges

Text: To prove a drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government is obliged to show that a conspiracy existed and that a particular defendant agreed to participate in it, intending to commit the underlying substantive offense. United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because neither can seriously contend that a drug conspiracy did not exist at Piñero, both defendants attack the evidence demonstrating their agreement to participate in the drug-selling operation there. Specifically, they argue that the testimony of the government's key witnesses, co-conspirators Nuñez-Rivera and Villafañe, was too conclusory and unreliable for a reasonable factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Díaz-Correa and Carrasquillo-Ocasio were involved in the drug trafficking conspiracy and drug distribution activities at Piñero. We discuss Díaz-Correa's sufficiency challenge before turning to Carrasquillo-Ocasio's.
Díaz-Correa offers three interrelated arguments in support of his sufficiency challenge. First, he argues that because no physical evidence offered at trial linked him to the Piñero conspiracy, the testimony of two co-conspirators is per se insufficient to support a conviction. Second, he argues that even if a conviction could in some instances be supported by co- -7- conspirator testimony, Nuñez-Rivera and Villafañe's testimony was insufficient in his case to establish that he participated in the Piñero conspiracy. Finally, he argues that even if the coconspirators' testimony taken at face value would be sufficient to support his conviction, their testimony was not credible. Díaz-Correa's argument that the testimony of co-conspirators, standing alone, is never sufficient to support a conviction is foreclosed by our case law. We have previously upheld drug conspiracy and aiding and abetting convictions where the evidence tying the defendant to the conspiracy was provided primarily by the testimony of a single co-conspirator who became a paid government informant. See United States v. González-Vázquez, 219 F.3d 37, 4041, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2000); see also United States v. FernándezHernández, 652 F.3d 56, 67-68 (1st Cir. 2011). Indeed, we have consistently reaffirmed that [a] conviction may be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a confidential informant 'so long as the testimony is not incredible or insubstantial on its face.' González-Vázquez, 219 F.3d at 46 (quoting United States v. Ciocca, 106 F.3d 1079, 1084 (1st Cir. 1997)). Díaz-Correa's second argument –- that Villafañe and NuñezRivera's testimony amounts to vague generalizations –- is equally unavailing. During their testimony, both Nuñez-Rivera and Villafañe demonstrated a detailed knowledge of the Piñero drug conspiracy. For example, when shown photographs of several co- -8- conspirators, Nuñez-Rivera knew their names, their roles in the conspiracy, where they worked, and what drugs they supplied. He testified as to the shift schedule for pushers working at the drug point and the general flow of operations at Piñero, including which times of day, days of the week, and days of the month were usually busy and which ones were slow. For her part, Villafañe testified as to how she would hide weapons and drugs for the conspiracy in her home. She also described meetings she attended with the organization's leaders and could identify which co-conspirators were in charge of the money, of cooking the crack cocaine, and of packaging and weighing the drugs. The testimony of the two witnesses as to Díaz-Correa's specific role in the conspiracy was likewise more than sufficiently detailed to sustain his conviction. In particular, both NuñezRivera and Villafañe described Díaz-Correa's rise to power in 2008. Ismael Heredia, the organization's incarcerated leader, became dissatisfied with his former drug point administrator and determined to replace him with Díaz-Correa. Nuñez-Rivera testified that Díaz-Correa frequently came to Piñero in person to administer his drug point, and that once he had established himself as the administrator of the Piñero drug point, he began to operate the drug point in a similar manner to his predecessor, including hosting organizational meetings at a place called La Selva. This testimony was also confirmed in part by recorded conversations -9- between Villafañe and Heredia, during which they discussed DíazCorrea. Credibility is a question for the jury, which on appeal must be resolved in favor of the government. See United States v. Ayala-García, 574 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2009). Although Díaz-Correa attempts to save his argument for evidentiary insufficiency by pointing to a few minor inconsistencies between Nuñez-Rivera and Villafañe's testimony, such minor inconsistencies in otherwise lengthy and corroborated testimony will not undermine the witness' credibility. See United States v. Rodriguez, 457 F.3d 109, 119 (1st Cir. 2006).
In an echo of Díaz-Correa's argument, Carrasquillo-Ocasio asserts that Nuñez-Rivera's testimony against him amounted to nothing more than vague generalizations. But, again, the record reveals that Nuñez-Rivera gave detailed testimony based on his personal experiences selling drugs with Carrasquillo-Ocasio. Nuñez-Rivera could recall the specific timing of the shifts he worked with Carrasquillo-Ocasio and what drugs they sold. When shown a map of the Piñero complex, Nuñez-Rivera pointed out the exact locations where he and Carrasquillo-Ocasio sold drugs together. Nuñez-Rivera recalled Carrasquillo-Ocasio's promotion to a runner, and he described the process Carrasquillo-Ocasio would use when delivering the cocaine to the drug point and when -10- collecting the cash revenues at the end of the shifts and delivering them to the organization's leaders. This testimony was consistent with Villafañe's testimony that she personally delivered cash to Carrasquillo-Ocasio which he in turn delivered to the drug point's leaders. In short, Nuñez-Rivera and Villafañe's testimony was not incredible or insubstantial on its face, Ciocca, 106 F.3d at 1084, and was more than enough to enable a reasonable factfinder to determine Carrasquillo-Ocasio's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. Díaz-Correa's Conviction under Section 924(o) Díaz-Correa's argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) is similarly unpersuasive. Where a defendant is charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) the jury [does] not even need to find that [the defendant] himself ever used or possessed a firearm in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. It would be sufficient to find that he was part of an agreement to do so. United States v. Flores de Jesús, 569 F.3d 8, 30 n.14 (1st Cir. 2009). As previously discussed, there was more than sufficient evidence in this case that Díaz-Correa was a leader of the drug conspiracy at Piñero. Thus, to sustain a conviction under section 924(o), the government need only show that Díaz-Correa was part of an agreement to use firearms in furtherance of the Piñero organization's interests. At trial, the government offered testimony and real evidence -11- demonstrating that firearms were used regularly in furtherance of the Piñero drug conspiracy. Firearms and ammunition which had been seized from members of the Piñero drug trafficking operation were entered into evidence, including a Romarm/Cugir Rifle, a Sig Sauer pistol, a Colt revolver, a Glock pistol, and a Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver. Many of these weapons were seized from sellers operating at Piñero during a single raid. Villafañe's and Nuñez-Rivera's testimony also established that guns were a regular part of the operation of the Piñero drug conspiracy. For example, Villafañe testified that she stored guns on behalf of the organization and she testified that certain coconspirators always carried guns while at Piñero. Nuñez-Rivera also testified that he had seen Díaz-Correa himself carry guns while administering the drug point. According to Nuñez-Rivera, when Díaz-Correa was promoted to administrator at the drug point: A: [Manuel]1 let us know that the housing project no longer was Ismael's, that it was his. And he was – he wanted no fucking around with his stuff. Q: Sir, was Manuel armed that day? A: Yes .... Q: Did Manuel carry firearms aside from that day? A: Yes. You could not see it, but you could notice the bulge in his waist and also Darren's. Q: Aside from seeing the bulge, did you ever see a firearm? A: Yes. Once in a car Manuel and Darren were counting 1 During his testimony, Nuñez-Rivera referred to Díaz-Correa by his nickname, Manuel. -12- some money and I approached and asked him for $10. Q: What type of firearm did you see? A: He had a Beretta on top of his right thigh inside the car. Nuñez-Rivera and Villafañe's testimony and the real evidence offered at trial provided more than enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Díaz-Correa had agreed with other leaders of the organization to use firearms to promote their drug-trafficking operation. B. Prosecutor's Misconduct During Closing Argument Díaz-Correa argues that the prosecutor's conduct during closing argument was so inflammatory that it amounted to misconduct. We briefly review the events at closing argument before discussing the propriety of the prosecutor's actions. In his closing argument, counsel for Díaz-Correa suggested that the bulge that Nuñez-Rivera testified he had seen in DíazCorrea's waistband at Piñero was not necessarily the Beretta that Nuñez-Rivera saw later in Díaz-Correa's lap. Defense counsel suggested that the bulge could have been created by another object, such as a cell phone. To respond to this suggestion during her rebuttal, the prosecuting attorney went to the evidence table and selected a pistol that had been entered into evidence. The pistol she selected was not a Beretta, and there was no evidence or allegation that it had ever been owned or carried by Díaz-Correa. Nevertheless, the prosecuting attorney held the gun in front of the -13- jury and said: And let's talk about the bulge. You heard an argument that the bulge in the waist cover [was] a cell phone. Consider this, compare this cell phone with this pistol. And use your common sense. Counsel for Díaz-Correa objected, and the district court agreed that the prosecutor's use of the gun was inappropriate, particularly given that the firearm selected was not the Beretta Díaz-Correa allegedly possessed. The district court then instructed the jury not [to] consider the pistol that was shown, but allowed the prosecutor to make her point that a cell phone was unlikely to cause the bulge seen by Nuñez-Rivera. The term prosecutorial misconduct covers a broad swath of improper conduct by the state's attorney that may impair an accused's constitutional rights to a fair trial, such as commenting on an accused's decision to remain silent, witness vouching, and introducing inadmissible evidence through cross-examination. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1976) (holding that it is improper for prosecutor to comment on accused's post-arrest silence); United States v. Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing improper witness vouching); United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing improper introduction of hearsay evidence through artful cross-examination and collecting cases). In the closing argument context, a prosecutor's remarks or actions are improper where they serve no purpose other than to inflame the passions and prejudices of the -14- jury, and to interject issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused. Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are particularly sensitive to inappropriate conduct during rebuttal, when the improper remarks [are] among the last words spoken to the jury by the trial attorneys. Ayala-García, 574 F.3d at 20 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, defendant's counsel makes a timely objection to the prosecutor's conduct, we review de novo whether the remarks amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 16. The prosecutor's actions in this case are an example of prosecutorial misconduct. Under these circumstances, taking a gun from the evidence table and brandishing it before the jury during rebuttal is obviously inflammatory. It should have been evident to the prosecutor that she should have broached with the judge the idea of presenting the gun to the jury in this provocative manner, thereby allowing the defense to register its objection. The court would have proscribed or modified the demonstration and the ensuing problems could have easily been avoided. Given that the gun used in the demonstration was not even the one allegedly owned or used by Díaz-Correa, a fact that the prosecutor knew, the prosecutor's behavior is all the more troubling. It is also troubling that this demonstration was unnecessary. As the district court suggested, the prosecutor could have made her -15- point that a cell phone was too small to create the bulge just as easily by displaying the cell phone without the gun and asking the jury to use its common sense. Moreover, even without NuñezRivera's testimony that he had seen a bulge in Díaz-Correa's waistband, there was more than enough evidence for the jury to conclude that Díaz-Correa had conspired to use guns in furtherance of the Piñero drug operation. Indeed, shortly after his testimony about the bulge, Nuñez-Rivera testified that he had seen the Beretta in Díaz-Correa's possession on another occasion. It is important for a prosecutor to know when the potential costs of an argument to the jury or a demonstration far outweigh the need for it. Here, an impulsive and unnecessary decision by a prosecutor risked undermining all of the hard work of a seventeen-day jury trial, which was itself the product of a multi-year investigation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that where the record, viewed in the aggregate, presents overwhelming evidence establishing [the defendant's] guilt . . . we are compelled to conclude that the prosecutor's improper remarks did not 'so poison the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected.' United States v. Andújar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 107 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d at 59 ([W]e are mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that we not set guilty persons free simply to punish prosecutorial misconduct.); United States v. -16- Auch, 187 F.3d 125, 133 (1st Cir. 1999) ([W]e heed the Supreme Court's admonition against letting the guilty go free to punish prosecutorial misconduct.) (citing United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 506-507 (1983)). In this case, we are convinced that the evidence was so overwhelmingly on the government's side that the jury would have convicted regardless of the prosecutor's misguided demonstration. As such, the prosecutor's error was harmless, and we affirm the conviction.