Opinion ID: 852620
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Penalty Phase of Trial

Text: During the penalty phase of trial the prosecutor made several remarks that Cooper contends focused not on the charged aggravator and how that aggravator outweighed any mitigating factors, but rather (1) focused on uncharged aggravating factors and (2) encouraged the jury to return a sentence of life without parole on Cooper's character: that he was an unworthy breadwinner, an unworthy son, unworthy father, and, especially, an unworthy boy friend. Appellant's Br. at 18. A sentence of life without parole is subject to the same statutory standards and requirements as the death penalty. Dumas, 803 N.E.2d at 1120; Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 936 (Ind.1998). Under the death penalty statute, following the completion of the guilt-determination phase of the trial and the rendering of the jury's verdict, the trial court reconvenes the jury for the penalty phase. Brown, 783 N.E.2d at 1127. As with a death sentence, the jury may recommend . . . life imprisonment without parole only if it finds: (1) the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) exists; and (2) any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(e), ( l ). Once the jury deliberates and has made its recommendation, the jury is dismissed and the trial court enters an appropriate order at a later sentencing hearing. [3] In this case the State sought life without parole based on the (b)(9)(c) aggravator: that Cooper intentionally killed Selena while the defendant was on probation after receiving a sentence for the commission of a felony. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(9)(c). The underlying felony that qualified Cooper for a life sentence was resisting law enforcement as a Class D felony. The statute provides in relevant part, [a] person who knowingly or intentionally. . . flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means . . . identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop; commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor . . . . I.C. § 35-44-3-3. The offense is elevated to a Class D felony if it is committed with the use of a vehicle. As set forth in the Facts section of this opinion, several months before the killing in this case, Cooper led police on a highspeed chase after a physical altercation with Selena. The State incorporated into the penalty phase of trial all of the evidence, testimony, [and] cross examination introduced during the guilt phase. Tr. at 1083. After then introducing documentary evidence concerning Cooper's conviction, sentence, and probation for resisting law enforcement, and testimony identifying Cooper as the person named in the documents, the State rested. The defense called Cooper's father to the stand. His testimony revealed that the then thirty-five-year-old Cooper was raised in a middle-class family and followed in his father's footsteps by operating a successful tax preparation business. The elder Cooper also testified that a sentence of life without parole would create a hardship on his own family as well as Cooper's three minor children. The defense then rested. The State's opening phase of closing remarks was rather straightforward. The deputy prosecutor essentially recounted the evidence introduced during the guilt phase of trial, argued that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper intentionally killed Selena and that he did so while on probation for a felony. Id. at 1119-26. During his closing remarks defense counsel argued that Cooper had no significant history of criminal conduct, was acting under extreme stress, and that a life sentence would pose a hardship on Cooper's children. Id. at 1126-32. Among other things, during the rebuttal phase of its closing remarks, the State encouraged the jury on several occasions to consider Cooper's character in reaching its decision: [W]hen you are making this decision, you may consider all the evidence introduced during the first phase of the trial together with all the evidence introduced during this phase of the trial in determining your recommendation. You have got to look back over the last four days when you are judging that man's character. You have got to look at what he did as a human being when these events occurred. . . . [T]here are three things about the Defendant that you can consider. His age . . . . You can consider his character. . . his mental state, his life, his background and/or any aspect of the offense itself and the Defendant's involvement in it which any one of you believes weighs against or for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Now, when you talk about the character of this man seated over here, I want you to think about his actions. . . . This was a man who worked a few months out of the year and the rest of the time he sponged off of women that he was dating, three different women. This is the kind of man that borrowed money from women, borrowed money from his parents, that was seeing three women at the same time, making them all believe that they were the only one, living back and forth between two of them. . . . [Y]ou have to consider the Defendant's character and when you do that you should be able to come to no other conclusion than the aggravating circumstance in this case, that he was on probation for a felony when he committed this crime outweighs any mitigation that you could ever find if you even find there are any mitigating circumstances in this case. Tr. at 1132-34, 1135, 1137. We make several observations. First the State's assertion that there are three things about the Defendant that you can consider. His age . . . . You can consider his character . . . his mental state, his life, his background and/or any aspect of the offense itself and the Defendant's involvement in it which any one of you believes weighs against or for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is an incorrect statement of the law. It is true that the enumerated aggravating factors set forth in the general felony sentencing statute do not limit the matters that the [trial] court may consider in determining the sentence. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(d) (2004). Nor do the criteria for sentencing in the general statute, including the nature and circumstances of the crime committed or the person's . . . character and condition, I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2), (3) (2004), limit the matters a court may consider in determining a non-capital sentence. Indeed the statutory criteria for sentencing in non-capital cases are not exclusive. Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ind.2000). But we have held when the death sentence is sought, courts must. . . limit the aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration to those specified in the death penalty statute. Pope v. State, 737 N.E.2d 374, 383 (Ind.2000) (quoting Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 955 (Ind.1994)). The same is true for a sentence of life without parole. Pope, 737 N.E.2d at 383. And these limitations apply equally to a jury in the penalty phase of trial. In this case, the charged aggravator is that Cooper was on probation after receiving a sentence for the commission of a felony. Neither the circumstances of the crime (any aspect of the offense itself), the defendant's condition (his mental state, his life, his background), nor his character is a proper consideration in determining whether a death sentence or life without parole should be imposed. Second, and in a related vein, it is simply not the case that in deciding whether to return a verdict of life imprisonment, a jury may consider,  any aspect of the offense itself and the Defendant's involvement in it which any one of you believes weighs against or for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  (Emphases added). Rather, the jury's weighing responsibility is strictly proscribed. Specifically, the jury is limited to determining whether the State's alleged aggravating factor or factors is outweighed by the defendant's proffered mitigating factors. [4] Here, in closing argument counsel for Cooper essentially argued that the evidence supported three mitigating factors: (1) that Cooper had no significant history of criminal conduct, see I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(1); (2) Cooper was acting under extreme mental and emotional stress at the time of the murder, see § I.C. XX-XX-X-X(c)(2); and (3) a life sentence would pose a hardship on Cooper's children, see I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(8). The jury's obligation was to determine whether the State's alleged aggravator  that Cooper was on probation for a felony  outweighed Cooper's proffered mitigating circumstances. [A]ny aspect of the [murder] offense itself and the Defendant's involvement in it was simply not relevant to the jury's consideration. This too was an incorrect statement of the law. Taken in isolation the deputy prosecutor's misstatement of the law would likely be of little consequence. And that is especially so where, as here, the trial court properly instructed the jury. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 650 N.E.2d 705, 711 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (Although the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the law, the comments were cured by the trial court's jury instructions.). But the comments here were not solely misstatements of law. The unmistakable theme woven through the deputy prosecutor's rebuttal remarks was that Cooper deserved life without parole because he was an unsavory character. Just as [i]t is misconduct for a prosecutor to request the jury to convict a defendant for any reason other than his guilt, Coleman, 750 N.E.2d at 375, it is also misconduct for a prosecutor to request a jury to return a death penalty or life without parole recommendation for anything other than that the mitigating factors are outweighed by the aggravating factor or factors. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9. And as can be seen in Part I, the deputy prosecutors' underlying theme began the day before in the State's closing remarks during the guilt phase of trial. But in neither phase did Cooper object to the deputy prosecutors' statements. So, the question remains whether the remarks were so prejudicial to Cooper's rights as to make a fair trial impossible. That is, was the resulting harm or potential for harm substantial? See Benson, 762 N.E.2d at 756. Unlike the guilt phase of trial where Cooper presented a highly untenable claim  self-defense in light of evidence that Selena was shot from behind  here the claim is much more plausible. Without the drumbeat repetition assailing Cooper's character, the jury may very well have concluded that violating probation for resisting law enforcement is not so serious an aggravator as to outweigh the claim that Cooper had no prior history of criminal conduct and that a life sentence would pose a hardship on his three minor children. We are persuaded that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's remarks hampered the jury's ability to decide dispassionately whether Cooper should receive a term of years rather than life without parole. He was thus denied a fair trial. We therefore vacate Cooper's sentence and remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.