Opinion ID: 682433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Nuzzo's Sentence

Text: 41 The last issue to be considered is Sam Nuzzo's claim that the district court erred in computing his offense level. Specifically, he raises three perceived errors. 42 First, Nuzzo contends the court erred in determining the base offense level for his RICO conviction. Because the proper application of the Guidelines is a question of law, the trial court's computation is reviewed de novo. United States v. Gaines, 7 F.3d 101, 103 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Hayes, 5 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir.1993). Nuzzo, convicted on the racketeering count, was found by the jury to have committed predicate acts Nos. 27 and 55, both of which charged the collection of an illegal debt by extortionate means. Guidelines Sec. 2E1.1, applicable to racketeering acts, provides for a base offense level of nineteen or the level appropriate to the substantive crime involved in the conspiracy, whichever is greater. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2E1.1(a). Nuzzo contends that because his predicate acts were closer to running an illegal gambling business (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955), than extortion (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951), his base offense level under Sec. 2E1.1(a) should be that applicable to illegal gambling per Sec. 2E3.1--which would be twelve. Unfortunately the Defendant (and the Government as evidenced by its brief) simply misconceives the command of Sec. 2E1.1(a), which, as the comments to that section explain, establishes a mandatory minimum offense level of 19--a floor under which the base offense level may not be set no matter what the offense level may be for the predicate acts associated with the RICO violation. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2E1.1 cmt., n. 3 (If the offense level for the underlying racketeering activity is less than the alternative minimum level specified (i.e., 19), the alternative minimum base offense level is to be used.). See United States v. Ford, 21 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir.1994) (noting Sec. 2E3.1's level nineteen floor). Even assuming the Defendant is correct in his belief that the predicate acts are more analogous to gambling than extortion (which is a big assumption), his base offense level under Sec. 2E1.1(a) would still be nineteen. All he could possibly hope to accomplish by selecting a different offense to which to tie his predicate act is to increase the base offense level--not to lower it below nineteen. The district court was thus correct in starting with a base offense level of nineteen. 43 Second, Defendant contests the district court's finding that Nuzzo played a managerial role in the offense and the associated increase, per Guidelines Sec. 3B1.1(a), of his base offense level by three levels. The Guidelines direct the court to increase the offense level by three levels if the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.... U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(b). Nuzzo specifically challenges the district court's determination that the predicate act for which he received the enhancement, the collection of an illegal debt by extortionate means, involved five or more persons as required by Sec. 3B1.1(b). The district court's determination of Nuzzo's role in the offense, and the number of people involved in the offense, is a factual finding reversed only if clearly erroneous. Schweihs, 971 F.2d at 1317; United States v. McKenzie, 922 F.2d 1323, 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 163, 116 L.Ed.2d 127 (1991). Evidence offered at trial indicated Nuzzo dispatched two gentlemen, named Bob and Bingo, to collect a gambling debt from an extortionee named Graczyk. Evidence further indicated Nuzzo worked with the conspiracy's leaders, Zizzo and Morgano, to organize gambling oversight activities in northern Indiana. An upward adjustment under Sec. 3B1.1 applies to those defendants whose relative responsibility for the crime is greater than their cohorts, United States v. Vargas, 16 F.3d 155, 160 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Skinner, 986 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir.1993), and is generally warranted if the defendant exercised authority or control over other members of the crime. Vargas, 16 F.3d at 160; United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir.1991). Here the evidence amply indicated both Nuzzo's authority over other members of the enterprise and his greater relative responsibility for the criminal acts. As for the exact number of individuals involved, participant is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1 cmt., n. 1. Evidence clearly indicated many individuals (and at least five), both indicted and unindicted, were involved in the overall racketeering conspiracy. Defendant's focus on whether five or more individuals participated in the particular collections of debt recited in the predicate acts is misplaced. Section 3B1.1(b) applies if the criminal activity involved five or more people, a phrase broad enough to include the entire racketeering conspiracy rather than the particular predicate act alone. See Schweihs, 971 F.2d at 1318 (focusing on entire offense, not just individual acts of extortionate conduct, in determining number of participants). Based on this evidence, the district court's decision was not clearly erroneous and the three level increase was appropriate. So agrees the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides that [i]n assessing whether an organization is 'otherwise extensive,' all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1 cmt., n. 2. Thus, Nuzzo's attempt to narrowly focus the Sec. 3B1.1 inquiry on the number of persons involved in the specific act of extorting Graczyk is simply misplaced, and the district court's decision to enhance his sentence was not clearly erroneous. 44 Lastly, Nuzzo argues the district court should have grouped together his pre-Guidelines conviction for operating a gambling business, Count 4 of the indictment, with predicate act No. 57 to arrive at his RICO sentence. Section 3D1.2 of the Guidelines provides that [a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single group, U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.2, because [s]ome offenses that may be charged in multiple-count indictments are so closely intertwined with other offenses that conviction for them ordinarily would not warrant increasing the guidelines range. U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. D, intro. cmt. Counts involve substantially the same harm if part of a common scheme or plan, U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.2(b), or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such behavior, id. Sec. 3D1.2(d). A defendant, of course, hopes to group together as many counts as possible to avoid the possible incremental increase in a sentence associated with loss, harm, or other bad effects stemming from related, but ungrouped counts of conviction. See United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 496-97 (7th Cir.1989). Perhaps extortion (predicate act No. 57) and gambling (Count 4) are, under this Guideline provision, closely related and otherwise involve substantially the same harm to require grouping. Not every offense, however, is subject to this grouping procedure and some, in fact, are specifically excluded. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.2(d) (listing offenses included and excluded from grouping); United States v. Bruder, 945 F.2d 167, 170 (7th Cir.1991). One such offense explicitly excluded from the grouping procedure of Sec. 3D1.2 is that covered by Sec. 2B3.2 of the Guidelines--extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951. Because predicate act No. 57 did indeed involve extortionate conduct, and was subject to sentencing under Sec. 2B3.2, it therefore cannot be grouped with other offenses. Thus, the district court properly refrained from grouping together predicate act No. 57 with any other count and the Defendant, in arguing to the contrary, again simply misreads the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines.