Opinion ID: 1189110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Proposition 8 Return to M'Naghten

Text: (1b) If the use of the conjunctive and in section 25(b) is not a draftsman's error, a defendant must now establish both that he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong. (4) We recognize the basic principle of statutory and constitutional construction which mandates that courts, in construing a measure, not undertake to rewrite its unambiguous language. ( In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339, 348 [158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 599 P.2d 656].) That rule is not applied, however, when it appears clear that a word has been erroneously used, and a judicial correction will best carry out the intent of the adopting body. ( Pepper v. Board of Directors (1958) 162 Cal. App.2d 1, 4 [327 P.2d 928].) The inadvertent use of and where the purpose or intent of a statute seems clearly to require or is a familiar example of a drafting error which may properly be rectified by judicial construction. (See, e.g., People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 755-756 [209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; Bianco v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 584, 587 [150 P.2d 806]; People v. Butler (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d Supp. 6, 8 [146 Cal. Rptr. 856]; Abbey v. Board of Directors (1922) 58 Cal. App. 757, 760 [209 P. 709].) (1c) Whether the use of and in section 25(b) is, in fact, a drafting error can only be determined by reference to the purpose of the section and the intent of the electorate in adopting it. The ballot summaries and arguments are not helpful. The Attorney General's summary of Proposition 8 advises only that the measure included a provision regarding ... proof of insanity. (Official title and summary, Prop. 8, Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) p. 32.) The analysis of the Legislative Analyst quotes the conjunctive language and states only that the provision could increase the difficulty of proving that a person is not guilty by reason of insanity. ( Id., at p. 55.) No reference to the insanity provision appears in the arguments for or against Proposition 8. ( Id., at pp. 34-35.) These omissions are not without significance, however. As we noted earlier, the insanity defense reflects a fundamental legal principle common to the jurisprudence of this country and to the common law of England [6] that criminal sanctions are imposed only on persons who act with wrongful intent in the commission of a malum in se offense. (See Morissette v. United States, supra, 342 U.S. 246, 250-251 [96 L.Ed. 288, 293-294].) Since 1850 the disjunctive M'Naghten test of insanity has been accepted as the rule by which the minimum cognitive function which constitutes wrongful intent will be measured in this state. As such it is itself among the fundamental principles of our criminal law. Had it been the intent of the drafters of Proposition 8 or of the electorate which adopted it both to abrogate the more expansive ALI- Drew test and to abandon that prior fundamental principle of culpability for crime, we would anticipate that this intent would be expressed in some more obvious manner than the substitution of a single conjunctive in a lengthy initiative provision. (Cf. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 734 [180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, 30 A.L.R.4th 1161], cert. den., 459 U.S. 958 [74 L.Ed.2d 111, 103 S.Ct. 129]; Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 364-365 [110 Cal. Rptr. 353, 515 P.2d 297]; In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 215 [90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992]; Interinsurance Exchange v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 142, 152 [23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 373 P.2d 640].) Applying section 25(b) as a conjunctive test of insanity would erase that fundamental principle. It would return the law to that which preceded M'Naghten, a test known variously as the wild beast test and as the good and evil test under which an accused could be found insane only if he was totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast.... ( Rex v. Arnold (1724) 16 Howell St. Tr. 695, 765.) [7] We find nothing in the language of Proposition 8, or in any other source from which the intent of the electorate may be divined which indicates that such a fundamental, far-reaching change in the law of insanity as that was intended. [8] In People v. Horn (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 1014, 1029-1031 [205 Cal. Rptr. 119], the Court of Appeal considered the absence of any indicia of intent to accomplish more than restoration of the California version of the M'Naghten test and found the use of the traditional, century old phraseology of M'Naghten persuasive evidence of an intent to return to that test, notwithstanding the apparently inadvertent use of the conjunctive and. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeal in Horn that section 25(b) reinstated the M'Naghten test as it was applied in California prior to Drew as the test of legal insanity in criminal prosecutions in this state. [9]
(2b) Although the People agree that the purpose of section 25(b) was to return the test of legal insanity in California to the pre-ALI- Drew version of the M'Naghten test, they argue that reversal of this judgment is not required because both prongs of that test are actually the same. The findings of the trial judge in this case illustrate the fallacy inherent in this argument. It is true that a person who is unaware of the nature and quality of his act by definition cannot know that the act is wrong. In this circumstance the nature and quality prong subsumes the right and wrong prong. [10] The reverse does not necessarily follow, however. The expert testimony in this case supported the findings of the trial court that this defendant was aware of the nature and quality of his homicidal act. He knew that he was committing an act of strangulation that would, and was intended to, kill a human being. He was not able to comprehend that the act was wrong because his mental illness caused him to believe that the act was not only morally justified but was expected of him. He believed that the homicide was right. The People argue further that section 25(b) was intended to clarify the meaning of the right/wrong prong of the California M'Naghten test by establishing that the wrong which the defendant must comprehend is a legal, rather than a moral wrong. Under this formulation this defendant, who was able to recognize that his act was unlawful, would not escape criminal responsibility even though he believed his act was commanded by God. We fail to see the manner in which section 25(b) conveys this clarification of the M'Naghten test. Moreover, even assuming the validity of this argument, reversal here would be necessary. The trial court did not find that appellant was able to comprehend that his act was considered unlawful or wrong even though it was commanded by God. That theory does not appear to have been put forth by the People at trial. [11] Neither appellant, nor the trial court addressed the question of ability to comprehend legal right or wrong. In any event, past decisions do not support the People's argument that under the California version of the M'Naghten test a defendant who could comprehend that his act was unlawful could not be legally insane. That was certainly not the understanding at the time of the adoption of the Penal Code of 1872. The notes accompanying section 26 of that enactment refer to People v. Coffman, supra, 24 Cal. 230, which, as we have observed, is the case in which the M'Naghten test was recognized as being applicable in this state. The Coffman opinion, in addition to stating the test, considered the standard of proof, quoting as it did so: Mansfield, Chief Justice, in Billingham's case, 1 Collinson on Lunacy, 636 ...: `To support such a defense, (insanity,) it ought to be proved ... that the person was incapable of judging between right and wrong; ... that at the time he committed the act he did not consider that murder was a crime against the laws of God and nature. ...' (24 Cal. at p. 236, italics added.) No such restriction on the availability of the insanity defense was reflected by the standard instruction on insanity, CALJIC No. 4.00, prior to Drew. That instruction did not make a distinction between moral wrong and legal wrong, advising the jury only that if the defendant was not capable of understanding that his act was wrong, he should be found insane. [12] Nor is the limitation urged by the People stated in People v. Kelly, supra, 10 Cal.3d 565, our last pre- Drew application of the M'Naghten test. There we stated: Insanity, under the California M'Naghten test, denotes a mental condition which renders a person incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in relation to that act. ( People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 801 [40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959].) ( People v. Kelly, supra, 10 Cal.3d 565, 574.) We did not suggest that such a limitation was relevant to the evidence and findings in that case where the trial court had determined that the defendant `was not capable of understanding that her act was wrong.' ( Ibid. ) The concept of wrong was not limited to legal wrong in People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795 [40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959]. There this court explained that the California version of the M'Naghten test had been liberalized by holding that knowing in the sense of being able to verbalize the concepts of right and wrong was insufficient to establish legal sanity. Rather, the defendant must know in a broader sense  he must appreciate or understand these concepts. Tracing the evolution of the California test we summarized the cases from which the then applicable instruction had been derived, stating: (See, e.g., People v. Willard (1907) 150 Cal. 543, 554 [83 P. 124] [`if he understands the nature and character of his action and its consequences']; People v. Harris (1914) 169 Cal. 53, 61 [145 P. 520] [`having mental capacity to know and understand the nature and character of the act he was committing'] People v. Oxnam (1915) 170 Cal. 211, 213 [149 Cal. Rptr. 165] [`If appellant ... had sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the character and quality of his act, knew and understood that it was a violation of the rights of another ..., if he had the capacity thus to appreciate the character and comprehend the possible consequence of his act']; People v. Morisawa (1919) 180 Cal. 148, 150 [179 P. 888] [`if the defendant ... did not appreciate the act he was committing']; People v. Gilberg (1925) 197 Cal. 306, 314 [3] [240 P. 1000] [`he appreciated the nature and the quality of the act']; People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 351 [20] [202 P.2d 53] [`to know the nature of his act and appreciate that it was wrongful and could subject him to punishment']....) ( People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 800-801.) In none of these cases is it suggested that a defendant whose mental illness caused him to believe that his act was morally correct could not be found insane if he understood that the act was unlawful. Cases subsequent to Coffman accept inability to appreciate moral wrong as a component of the California test of legal insanity. (See, e.g., People v. McCarthy (1896) 115 Cal. 255, 263 [46 P. 1073], approving as a correct statement of the law an instruction that insanity did not encompass moral perversion of a defendant who knew that the deed is a criminal act, and wrong in itself; People v. Gilberg, supra, 197 Cal. 306, 314, rejecting moral perversion as an acceptable test because a defendant might commit serious crimes and know at the time that the deed is a criminal act, and wrong in itself, and yet escape punishment.) Thus, although it has long been held that moral insanity, arising from a perverted moral sense and brought on by mental illness, is not legal insanity (see People v. Nash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 36, 45 [338 P.2d 416]; People v. Kerrigan (1887) 73 Cal. 222, 224 [14 P. 849]), our cases repeatedly distinguish awareness that an act is wrong from knowledge of its legal effect, i.e., that it is unlawful. (See People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 801; People v. Coleman, supra, 20 Cal.2d 399, 409; People v. French (1939) 12 Cal.2d 720, 730 [87 P.2d 1014]; People v. Sloper, supra, 198 Cal. 238, 245; People v. Willard (1907) 150 Cal. 543, 554 [89 P. 124]; People v. Kerrigan, supra, 73 Cal. 222, 225 [If the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the nature of her act; if she knew and understood that she was violating the rights of another by an act which was in itself wrong, and which was prohibited by the law, and the commission of which would entail punishment upon herself,  ... she is responsible to the law ... regardless of any perversion of the moral senses, however, great ...].) The rule that a defendant must know what he is doing is wrong and criminal has been recognized as the accepted formulation since the first decision in this state ( People v. M'Donell, 47 Cal. 134) and has been followed consistently.... ( People v. Daughterty (1953) 40 Cal.2d 876, 893-894 [256 P.2d 911], noting that the rule had been approved again in People v. Wells, supra, 33 Cal.2d 330, 349-350.) Affirming the judgment in People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 734 [7 Cal. Rptr. 901, 355 P.2d 645], we applied this test and concluded that the expert testimony could be understood as meaning that the defendant did recognize that his conduct did not accord with social standards of right and legal standards of justification. (See also People v. Sloper (1926) 198 Cal. 238, 248 [244 P. 362]; People v. Koehn, supra, 207 Cal. 605, 612; People v. Reid, supra, 193 Cal. 491, 496; People v. Bundy, supra, 168 Cal. 777, 779.) The applicability of the insanity defense to a person whose mental illness is the cause of an insane delusion such as that suffered by defendant, if that delusion rendered him incapable of appreciating that his act was wrong, was made clear in People v. Hubert (1897) 119 Cal. 216 [51 P. 329]. There the trial court had instructed that defendant `was laboring under insane delusions which so permeated his reason as to incapacitate him from knowing the difference between right and wrong, as to the acts charged in the information, and his relations with the deceased, and her actions, motives, and intentions toward him, and that he acted in pursuance of such delusions.' (119 Cal. at p. 220.) Although we concluded that the court had erred in this and other instructions on insanity which took from the jury the factual issues as to the existence of the delusions, no question was raised as to the applicability of the M'Naghten insanity test to insane delusions which render the individual incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. [13] This understanding of the M'Naghten test was further affirmed in People v. Willard, supra, 150 Cal. 543, 554, where this court explained: That insanity may be available as a defense to a crime charged, it must appear that the defendant, when the act was committed, was so deranged and diseased mentally that he was not conscious of the wrongful nature of the act committed. If he has reasoning capacity sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act he is doing, knowledge and consciousness that what he is doing is wrong and criminal and will subject him to punishment, he must be held responsible for his conduct. Although he may be labouring under partial insanity,  as, for instance, suffering from some insane delusion or hallucination,  still if he understands the nature and character of his action and its consequences,  if he has knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and that if he does the act he will do wrong, such partial insanity or the existence of such delusion or hallucination is not sufficient to relieve him from responsibility for his criminal acts. Our appreciation of the nature of mental illness has developed greatly since Hubert and Willard were decided, and the medical community now characterizes some delusional mental illness such as that suffered by defendant as a schizophrenic disorder, [14] rather than monomania or partial insanity. The rule expressed in these cases has not changed, however. If the mental illness is manifested in delusions which render the individual incapable either of knowing the nature and character of his act, or of understanding that it is wrong, he is legally insane under the California formulation of the M'Naghten test. Respondent cites no decisional authority of this state for the argument that the right/wrong prong of the California M'Naghten test of insanity does not encompass awareness, or lack thereof, that the defendant's act was inherently, or morally wrong. Reliance is placed instead on a single out-of-state case, Chase v. State (Alaska 1962) 369 P.2d 997, 1003, overruled on another point in Fields v. State (Alaska 1971) 487 P.2d 831, 836 [65 A.L.R.3d 680]. Manifestly, we cannot infer that a 20-year-old decision of the Alaska Supreme Court prompted the drafters of Proposition 8 to believe that the law of California required clarification. [15] The decision in that case in no way supports a conclusion that the electorate believed such clarification to be necessary or understood the test of legal insanity to be established by section 25(b) would permit a defendant to be found sane who because of mental illness believed that God commanded and expected him to kill another human being and that therefore the killing was morally justified and was not wrong. Courts in a number of jurisdictions which have considered the question have come to the conclusion as we do, that a defendant who is incapable of understanding that his act is morally wrong is not criminally liable merely because he knows the act is unlawful. (See, e.g., People v. Wood (1962) 12 N.Y.2d 69, 76 [236 N.Y.S.2d 44, 187 N.E.2d 116]; People v. Schmidt (1915) 216 N.Y. 324, 338-340 [110 N.E. 945]; State v. Kirkham (1958) 7 Utah 2d 108, 110 [319 P.2d 859]; cf. State v. Allen (1957) 231 S.C. 391, 398 [98 S.Ed.2d 826]; State v. Carrigan (1919) 93 N.J.L. 268, 273 [108 A. 315].) Justice Cardozo, in an opinion for the New York Court of Appeal, eloquently expressed the underlying philosophy: In the light of all these precedents, it is impossible, we think, to say that there is any decisive adjudication which limits the word `wrong' in the statutory definition to legal as opposed to moral wrong.... The interpretation placed upon the statute by the trial judge may be tested by its consequences. A mother kills her infant child to whom she has been devotedly attached. She knows the nature and quality of the act; she knows that the law condemns it; but she is inspired by an insane delusion that God has appeared to her and ordained the sacrifice. It seems a mockery to say that, within the meaning of the statute, she knows that the act is wrong. If the definition propounded by the trial judge is right, it would be the duty of a jury to hold her responsible for the crime. We find nothing either in the history of the rule, or in its reason or purpose, or in judicial exposition of its meaning, to justify a conclusion so abhorrent.... [¶] Knowledge that an act is forbidden by law will in most cases permit the inference of knowledge that, according to the accepted standards of mankind, it is also condemned as an offense against good morals. Obedience to the law is itself a moral duty. If, however, there is an insane delusion that God has appeared to the defendant and ordained the commission of a crime, we think it cannot be said of the offender that he knows the act to be wrong. ( People v. Schmidt (1915) 216 N.Y. 324, 338-340 [110 N.E. 945, 949-950], italics added.) [16] The trial court found, on clearly sufficient evidence, that defendant could not distinguish right and wrong with regard to his act. No further hearing on the issue of sanity at the time of the act is required. The judgment is reversed and the superior court is directed to enter a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity and to proceed thereafter pursuant to section 1026.