Opinion ID: 1105999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: INTERPRETING SECTION 39.806(1)(d)(1)

Text: Section 39.806(1) provides several grounds on which the Department of Children and Families (DCF) may petition a court for the termination of a parent's parental rights. See § 39.806(1)(a)-(i), Fla. Stat. (2003). Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(d)(1), DCF may petition a court for termination of parental rights [w]hen the parent of a child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and ... [t]he period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years. § 39.806(1)(d)(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). The question before us is how properly to define the relevant periods of time that the statute instructs a court to compare. The majority makes two mistakes in its interpretation of section 39.806(1)(d)(1). First, the majority interprets the operative words of this particular subsection acontextually. In other words, the majority interprets it abstractly, without any reference to the statute as a whole or to the Legislature's expressly stated purposes and intent. This acontextual method of interpretation runs counter to our precedent, which recognizes the importance of reading statutory language in the context of its legislatively expressed purposes and with respect for legislative instructions. See, e.g., Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla.2000) (The preliminary paragraphs of chapter 760 explain its purpose and the manner in which the statute should be interpreted to effectuate that purpose.... We are guided by the Legislature's stated purpose for enacting this chapter and its directive that the Act be liberally construed in reaching our decision.). The second interpretive error by the majority is giving this subsection a strict, or narrow, construction. See Majority op. at 1052 (This construction of the provision also comports with the constitutional principle that statutes implicating constitutional rights must be `narrowly limited in their application according to the statutory language.') (quoting State v. Jackson, 650 So.2d 24, 26-27 (Fla.1995)). [8] The majority's improper reliance on the principle of strict construction is based not only on its failure to heed the Legislature's statutory instruction to interpret chapter 39 liberally, but also on its failure to situate the particular subsection at issue here within the larger constitutional framework applicable to termination of parental rights cases that we recently clarified in Florida Department of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004). I will address each of these points below.
As I have said, the majority's statutory construction is fundamentally flawed because it attempts to interpret the words of the statute acontextually. Looking at the statutory words alone  isolating them from all context and interpreting them abstractly  the majority emphasizes the Legislature's use of forward-looking phrases such as  is expected to be incarcerated,  will constitute, and  will attain, and concludes that [t]he language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) speaks only to the future regarding both the period of incarceration and the child's minority. Majority op. at 1051 (emphasis added). The language of the statute certainly is forward-looking; but it does not necessarily follow (as the majority mistakenly assumes) that the language is only forward-looking. One thing that we can say is plain about the statutory language (and that can be determined conclusively simply by applying conventional definitions to the operative words  in other words, simply by interpreting the words abstractly) is that it requires a court not to look merely at the period of time that the incarcerated parent has already served. See, e.g., In re J.D.C., 819 So.2d 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing trial court's termination order where one of the trial court's grounds for termination was that the parent had been incarcerated for a substantial period of the child's life to date). That is the import of  is expected to be incarcerated,  will constitute, and  will attain. These phrases signify the Legislature's intent that courts in termination proceedings not be confined to analyzing only the already-materialized effects of the parent's incarceration on the child. Rather, we can conclude from the statutory language that the Legislature intended that courts look to the reasonably determinable effects that a parent's incarceration will have on a child's childhood. But it does not necessarily follow that the Legislature, by signifying its intent that courts look to reasonably determinable future effects, also intended that courts look only to those future effects and ignore the period of incarceration that preceded the filing of the termination petition. [9] And more importantly for our purposes here, whether or not that was the Legislature's intent cannot be determined solely by analyzing the bare language of the subsection  as the majority unconvincingly attempts to do. Based on the words of the statute alone, interpreted acontextually, either of the competing interpretations of this section  the Second District's (which the majority accepts) or the Fourth District's (which I accept)  is reasonable. Indeed, without elaboration, both district court opinions (as well as the majority's) say that they are applying the statute's plain meaning. When this is the case, however, we must dig deeper than the majority does if legislative intent truly is our polestar. We must attempt to interpret the statutory language in context with other relevant textual expressions of purpose and intent (and statutorily expressed instructions concerning construction) so as to further the Legislature's intent and give effect to its purpose. Here, I think we can do that fairly easily. The Legislature has instructed us to give chapter 39 a liberal[] interpret [ation] and construct[ion] in conformity with [the chapter's] declared purposes. § 39.001(9), Fla. Stat. (2003). The paramount purpose of chapter 39 is to protect children. See § 39.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (listing the chapter's purposes). In this light, section 39.806(1)(d)(1) must be interpreted as liberally and broadly as the words naturally will allow so as to promote this purpose. See Joshua, 768 So.2d at 435 (We are guided by the Legislature's stated purpose for enacting this chapter and its directive that the Act be liberally construed in reaching our decision.). I do not suggest that we stretch the words of the statute (even if doing so would in some sense further a clearly defined legislative purpose), but where, as here, the cold text alone admits of two equally plausible and natural interpretations, we must choose one, and I think our judicial role requires that we choose that interpretation most consistent with the legislative pronouncement as a whole. I must stress that I fully agree with the majority that [w]hen a statute is clear, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. Majority op. at 1051 (quoting State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004)). Our disagreement stems from the fact that the majority has not (and cannot) support its plain language determination. To merely recite the words of the statute and declare the meaning plain, when it manifestly is not, is not (although it may superficially appear to be) the mark of the judicial constraint by which we must be guided when called upon to interpret and apply legislative acts. The statute we are called on to interpret provides that DCF may petition for termination [w]hen the parent of a child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and ... [t]he period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years. § 39.806(1)(d)(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added). Yes, the statute utilizes forward-looking phrases. But how can it be said, from a natural reading of the statutory language, that the statute plainly and unambiguously prohibits consideration of the period of incarceration already served at the time the petition is filed when determining the period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated? Is that period of time already served not part of the parent's expected period of incarceration? Is this what those words naturally and unambiguously mean? The majority's citation to Burris is instructive  not for the support it provides, but for the fundamental difference between the two cases; for in fact, Burris undermines the majority's position. In Burris we interpreted the robbery with a deadly weapon statute, which increased the penalty for robbery if in the course of the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon. Burris, 875 So.2d at 409 (quoting § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001)). The question was whether a defendant who had used a car (as a deadly weapon) in the course of a robbery could be convicted under section 812.13(2)(a) of carry[ing] a firearm or other deadly weapon in the course of a robbery. Burris, 875 So.2d at 410. We looked to the commonly understood or plain and ordinary meaning of carry, under which it would have been anomalous to conclude that one could carry a car in the course of a robbery. See Burris, 875 So.2d at 412 (In common parlance, automobiles carry people  people do not carry automobiles.) (quoting Burris v. State, 825 So.2d 1034, 1037 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)). We even acknowledged the importance of context when we stated that to define the verb to carry as synonymous with the verb to possess would be at odds with the meaning commonly ascribed to `carry' in the sense at issue. Burris, 875 So.2d at 412. There was no other sense of the word carry that the natural and common understanding of the word, in the context of the statute as a whole, could sustain. Burris, 875 So.2d at 412 (These sources uniformly support only one conclusion about the plain and ordinary meaning of `carry' as used in section 812.13(2)(a).). We refused to ascribe an unusual meaning to `carry' ... in order to obtain a result beyond the statute's plain language. Burris, 875 So.2d at 414 n. 2 (emphasis added). [10] Unlike the statutory language at issue in Burris, the language of section 39.806(1)(d)(1) is not plain and unambiguous on its face. Neither the interpretation I urge nor the interpretation the majority adopts could be said to ascribe an unusual meaning to the words of the statute. While I wholeheartedly endorse the principle of statutory construction employed in Burris, the fact is that it is of little help to us here, and it is inadequate to support the majority's position.
Instead of the legislatively mandated liberal construction, the majority applies a strict, or narrow, construction. [11] The only ground the majority provides for its strict construction of the statute is its mistaken belief that such a construction is constitutionally required. Majority op. at 1052. A strict construction, however, is not constitutionally required. The majority's reasoning is flawed because it fails to place this particular subsection (one of a number of alternative grounds on which DCF may petition for termination of parental rights) in the constitutional context of Florida Department of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602 (Fla.2004). In F.L., we provided the strict construction necessary to assure the constitutionality of section 39.806(1). Regardless of how broadly or narrowly we interpret section 39.806(1)(d)(1), the principles of F.L. will require that, in addition to satisfying the criterion of the subsection, DCF will also have to carry the burden of proving that there is a substantial risk of significant harm to the ... child [and] that the termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. 880 So.2d at 608. DCF will also have to satisfy the statutory burden of demonstrating that termination of parental rights is in the child's manifest best interests. Id. at 607-10 nn. 5 & 6. Like section 39.806(1)(i), which we construed in F.L., section 39.806(1)(d)(1) gets DCF through the courthouse door. Id. at 609. But no matter how wide or narrow the door, the constitutional requirements of F.L. still remain. The majority's decision today simply narrows the door provided by section 39.806(1)(d)(1). It is not, however, constitutionally required, nor is it consistent with the Legislature's expressed purposes and instructions.