Opinion ID: 24837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Imminent and Substantial Endangerment to Health or Environment

Text: 57 Lastly, the district court did not err in concluding that an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment existed at both dumps. At the outset, we note that the operative word in § 6972(a)(1)(B) is may. Thus, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the waste may present such a danger. 33 See Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir. 1991) (Significantly, congress used the word 'may' to preface the standard of liability[.]), rev'd in part on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (emphasizing may in § 6972(a)(1)(B)); cf. Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs. Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1993) (contrasting the difficult standards of § 6976(b) with the far less restrictive rules governing [imminent and substantial endangerment under] § 6972(a)(1)(B)). 58 The Supreme Court has also pointed out that the phrase may present communicates another idea: It quite clearly excludes waste that no longer presents the harm contemplated by § 6972(a)(1)(B). See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486. [T]his language 'implies that there must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later.' Id. (quoting Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994)). As such, under an imminent hazard citizen suit, the endangerment must be ongoing, but the conduct that created the endangerment need not be. Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305, 1316 (2d Cir. 1993); see also U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019 (stating that the language of the provision does not require actual harm, but threatened or potential harm); United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that the RCRA was intended to apply to active human conduct and is a means to respond to disasters precipitated by earlier poor planning (emphasis added)). 59 Because the RCRA does not define imminent, the Supreme Court, as is its customary practice, see supra Part III.B.2.a (discussing meaning of contribute), looked to the plain meaning of the term: An endangerment can only be 'imminent' if it 'threaten[s] to occur immediately.' Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485 (alteration in original) (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary of English Language 1245 (2d ed. 1934)); see also Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356 (A finding of 'imminency' does not require a showing that actual harm will occur immediately so long as the risk of threatened harm is present[.]); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1982); Kara Holding, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (citing Meghrig); cf. Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (An 'imminent hazard' may be declared at any point in a chain of events which may ultimately result in harm to the public. (internal quotations and citation omitted)). The legislative history supports interpreting imminent in accordance with this plain meaning: 60 Imminence . . . applies to the nature of the threat rather than identification of the time when the endangerment initially arose. The section, therefore, may be used for events which took place at some time in the past but which continue to present a threat to the public health or the environment. 61 H.R. Comm. Print No. 96-IFC 31, at 32 (1979). And finally, an endangerment is substantial if it is serious. See U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019. 62 With this framework in place, we now examine the evidence regarding the imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the environment at each dump. 63
64 The district court did not clearly err in concluding that the Deepwood dump may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 34 See supra Part I.A. The evidence includes the following: The Deepwood dump is adjacent to residences and is partially in the flood plain of the Trinity River; the dump is easily accessible to children; the Deepwood dump twice caught fire and burned, with the resulting fumes polluting the neighborhood air; a significant fire hazard continues to exist at the dump; the State's reports reveal that there is an imminent threat of the discharge of municipal solid waste into Elam Creek, a tributary of the Trinity River, because of the massive illegal dumping; the State itself has noted that waste at the Deepwood dump may cause contamination of surface water and ground water through the leaching of contaminates from the debris by rainwater; asbestos, benzo(a)athracene, and benzene (in excess of state limits) have been detected at the Deepwood dump; and the City itself has long maintained that the Deepwood dump poses a hazard to the public health. 65
66 On appeal, the City argues that the material it dumped at the South Loop 12 dump presents no danger to health or the environment; yet, the City points to nothing in the record to support this assertion. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that the City's contributions played a role in the creation of the dangers at the South Loop 12 dump, and, as will be explained below, the record well supports this conclusion. 35 67 The district court did not clearly err in finding that the South Loop 12 dump satisfies the endangerment standard of § 6972(a)(1)(B). First, as the district court noted, the City itself had previously admitted that the South Loop 12 dump was a hazard to the public health in its present condition. Furthermore, the City's state court judgment against the owners stated that the judgment was necessary for the maintenance of the public health and environment. 68 In addition, the State's documents themselves describe the very danger of old landfills, like the South Loop 12 dump, that were established before any of the proper closure requirements were in place: As the old waste decomposes, the cover soil can settle, ground and surface water can become contaminated with leachate, and dangerous gases can form and migrate underground. 36 This meets the may present an imminent and substantial endangerment standard. Moreover, as the City failed to adhere even to the less stringent requirements in effect during the time it was dumping at the South Loop 12 dump, the dangers described in the State's plan are even more likely to materialize. 69 Therefore, the district court's finding that the City was liable under § 6972(a)(1)(B) for the Deepwood and South Loop 12 dumps was not clearly erroneous. 37