Opinion ID: 695144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Company improperly discharge employees for strike misconduct?

Text: 40 In addition to denying reinstatement to the 177 striking employees who had been permanently replaced, the Company discharged ten strikers for misconduct during the strike. The Board held that all ten discharges were discriminatory, in violation of Secs. 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. The Company now challenges the Board's decision as it relates to four of the discharges. 41 A discharge is discriminatory in violation of the Act if an antiunion animus contributed to the employer's decision to discharge [the] employee. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 395, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2471, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983). The Board may rely entirely upon circumstantial evidence, if it is substantial, to determine that a discharge was unlawful. Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 928 (D.C.Cir.1991). In this case, the Board relied upon the ALJ's finding that the Company failed to discipline nonstrikers for misconduct during the strike that was equivalent to or more serious than the misconduct of the four striking employees whom it discharged. 310 N.L.R.B. at 1291. 42 The Company does not dispute the ALJ's finding; nor does the Company make any effort to explain why it treated the striking and nonstriking employees differently. Instead, the Company argues that the Board cannot compare the severity of the various employees' misconduct because the types of misdeeds committed by the striking and nonstriking employees are not the same. According to the Company, the Board can make such comparisons without invading the province of the employer only if the striking and nonstriking employees actually committed the same offense. This limitation, however, is contrary to established Board precedent, and without support in the decision of any reviewing court. See, e.g., International Paper Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 31, 39, 1992 WL 281692 (1992) (finding Sec. 8(a)(3) violation on ground that nonstrikers' misdeeds, although different from those of discharged strikers, were of equal or greater seriousness), enf'd sub. nom. Local 14, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 4 F.3d 982 (1st Cir.1993); Champ Corp., 291 N.L.R.B. 803, 806-07, 1988 WL 214239 (1988) (accord), enf'd on other grounds, 933 F.2d 688, 700 (9th Cir.1990); Aztec Bus Lines, 289 N.L.R.B. 1021, 1027, 1988 WL 214305 (1988) (accord). We think the Board may make reasonable judgments about the seriousness of various offenses--or more properly about an employer's explanation for treating some offenses more harshly than others--without intruding upon management's right to manage. The task is analytically indistinguishable from what is required in any case involving an allegedly pretextual discharge. 43 Moreover, the Company's approach could have untoward results. For example, assume that three employees of Company X engage in misconduct during a strike; striking employees A and B are discharged for their misconduct, but nonstriking employee C is not. Further, assume that A and C commit the same offense, which is (by any reasonable measure) far more serious than the offense committed by striking employee B. Under the Company's proposed same offense rule, striker A, the more serious wrongdoer of the two striking employees, could base a discrimination claim upon the Company's failure to discharge nonstriker C, while striker B (the less serious wrongdoer) could have no such claim. That outcome seems questionable, to say the least. 44 We reject the Company's proposed test because it is contrary to precedent and likely to yield perverse outcomes. Concomitantly, we uphold the Board's determination that the four disputed discharges were in violation of Secs. 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, and we enforce the Board's order in this respect.