Opinion ID: 2401547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the case against the woodfields

Text: Plaintiffs Bauman assign as an error the lower court's construction of Maryland Rules 413 a 2 and 413 a 4 with respect to allowing defendants Woodfield to read into evidence in their case parts of plaintiffs' pretrial depositions and, further, to disallowing plaintiffs' counsel to read other portions of those depositions so as to complete the context thereof. Near the end of the case of the Woodfields, their counsel moved to read into evidence selected portions of the pretrial depositions of Leonard and Carl Bauman under Rule 413 a 2. The offering was made on the basis that the plaintiffs were adverse parties to these defendants and that the evidence was suggestive evidence in support of the defense. When certain portions of the depositions were read, the plaintiffs objected on the ground that they were repetitious. In some instances the court sustained their objections. The plaintiffs did not then nor thereafter request that counsel for the defendants Woodfield read any other parts of the depositions which they claimed were relevant to the parts introduced, nor did they suggest to the lower court any parts which they contended were relevant. After the parts of the depositions were read the Woodfields rested their case. Plaintiffs then attempted to offer in rebuttal the deposition of Leonard Bauman as evidence under Rule 413 a 4 on the theory that since the plaintiffs' depositions were offered by the defendants, the plaintiffs, being adverse parties, should have the right to read other portions of the depositions into evidence to complete the context. This was denied by the lower court. Counsel for the plaintiffs then called Leonard Bauman to testify in rebuttal. Rule 413 a 2 states, in essence, that at the trial or upon the hearing of a motion, any part or all of a deposition of a party, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. Adverse party as used in this rule means a party to an action on the opposite side of an issue raised by the pleadings. In this case, the Woodfields, as indicated by the pleadings, were on the opposite side of the Baumans. Any purpose as used in the rule does not mean that the use of the deposition is limited to purposes of impeachment or contradiction. Billmeyer v. State, Use of Whiteman, 192 Md. 419, 64 A.2d 755, and does not mean that the rules of evidence may be ignored. When the two sections of the rule are read together, it necessarily follows that there must be a legitimate purpose in the use of the deposition as there must be a lawful purpose in the offering of other evidence. Martin v. Arundel Corp., 216 Md. 184, 194, 140 A.2d 146. Rule 413 a 2 is very similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (d) (2). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (d) (2) an adverse party is permitted to use a party's deposition for any purpose, and this provision permits the party to introduce, as part of his substantive proof, the deposition of his adversary, notwithstanding the latter has already testified at trial. Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Engineering Co., 300 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.1962); cert. den. 371 U.S. 911, 9 L.Ed.2d 170; reh. den. 371 U.S. 959, 9 L.Ed.2d 507. Thus, the admission in evidence of portions of a party's deposition after he had testified on direct and cross-examination would be in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (d) (2) subject to the trial court's right to exclude such parts as might be unnecessarily repetitious in relation to the witness' testimony on the stand. Merchants Motor Freight v. Downing, 227 F.2d 247 (8th Cir.1955). See also 23 Am.Jur., 2d, Depositions and Discovery, Section 106. Under Maryland Rule 413 a 2 defendant may put plaintiff's deposition in evidence as part of the defendant's case, so far as the deposition is admissible and relevant. The record shows that the parts of the plaintiffs' depositions read dealt in the main with the Baumans' previous experience with tractors. In light of this evidence and for the reasons as stated above, we hold that the lower court committed no error in allowing defendants to read portions of the plaintiffs' depositions into evidence. Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 306-10, 221 A.2d 342. There is no doubt that under Rule 413 a 4 the party reading the adverse party's deposition may be required by the adverse party to read all relevant parts of the deposition to continue the context. Thomas v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 226 Md. 456, 174 A.2d 181. The adverse party must request that the party be required to read parts relevant to those read in order to continue the context or must suggest to the trial court those parts to be read. See Kuenne v. Kuenne, 219 Md. 101, 148 A.2d 448. Plaintiffs Bauman did neither. However, we need not decide for the purpose of this case whether or not the court below committed error in not permitting counsel for the plaintiffs to read plaintiffs' depositions in rebuttal since the plaintiffs called, without objection, Leonard Bauman to testify in his own behalf in rebuttal. Thus plaintiffs had full opportunity to elicit any testimony to explain, modify or clarify a claimed admission, contradiction or inconsistency in the testimony introduced from the prior depositions. Under these circumstances the error, if any, was harmless. Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. at 310-11; Maszczenski v. Myers, 212 Md. 346, 129 A.2d 109. At the close of the case, appellants submitted fourteen written prayers to the court below. They claim that each prayer was discussed in the judge's chambers. However, no record was made of the conversations and discussion which took place in the chambers as it was the normal procedure in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County not to do so. The trial judge rejected all of the appellants' prayers, but indicated at that time that he would cover six out of the fourteen prayers in his instructions to the jury. The rest of appellants' prayers, which were not to be included in the court's instructions to the jury, were so marked and filed with the original proceedings. At the conclusion of the court's instructions to the jury, counsel for appellants excepted to the court's failure to give certain prayers, but counsel referred to them by number only and failed to state the substance of the prayers excepted to and also failed to state any specific grounds for his exceptions. The following is an illustrative part of the dialogue between the trial judge and appellant's counsel on this matter: Mr. Brown: We except to the Court's failure to give the plaintiff's proffered Prayer No. 1, plaintiff's proffered Prayer No. 2. The Court: This means nothing. You have nothing in evidence. You are just giving it to me. Mr. Brown: To shorten down the plaintiff's Prayer No. 1 previously exhibited to the Court, would that clarify that? The Court: I'll help you get the record. Mr. Brown: The plaintiff's Prayer No. 2, previously exhibited to the Court. The Court: Go ahead. I'll help you straighten it out. Is there any key item? You be sure and say so. Mr. Brown: Plaintiff excepts to the Court's failure to give the plaintiff's proffered Prayer No. 4. Did you give this prayer written down?   . It is obvious that the counsel for appellants gave no more informative statement of the grounds of the exceptions than mere references to the numbers of the instructions which the appellants contend should have been given. It has often been held that this is not a sufficient compliance with Rule 554 d to permit review of the instructions. Shafer v. Bull, 233 Md. 68, 194 A.2d 788; Belt's Wharf v. Internat. Corp., 213 Md. 585, 132 A.2d 588; Balto. & Ohio R. Co. v. State, 169 Md. 345, 181 Atl. 830. Appellants attempt to excuse their failure to refer to substantive parts of the instructions and to give grounds for exceptions thereto by claiming reliance on the trial court's offer of aid to get the record straight. But there is no evidence that appellants followed up this offer. Rule 554 d places the duty upon a party to have his exceptions to instructions and the reasons therefor entered in the record since it is provided that opportunity shall be given to make the objection in open court    Rule 554 d. Appellants had the opportunity to make exceptions and to state the substance thereof and the grounds therefor in open court, but failed to do so. They also failed to take advantage of the trial court's offer of assistance in this matter. Since there is nothing in the record, other than numerical references to requested instructions, to indicate which portions of the instructions given or omitted they excepted to and grounds therefor, this Court has nothing upon which it may base its review. Balto. & Ohio R. Co. v. State, supra; Rules 554 e and 885. Appellants made a general exception to the instructions of the trial court on the ground that the instructions seemed to be more slanted toward the defendant in what little bit of reference was made of the facts. We hold that [t]his is merely a general objection to the whole charge, without any specifications as to the particular parts. Of course, the exception must state distinctly the portion of the charge to which the objection is made. Maszczenski v. Myers, 212 Md. 346, 356, 129 A.2d 109. In that case, appellant contended that the trial court committed error in its charge to the jury because the very tenor of the Court's charge in general was prejudicial to the plaintiff's cause. Appellants specifically excepted to the trial court's instructions regarding the operator's manual for the tractor. Appellants contended that the trial court erred in instructing that the provisions in the manual relating to dangerous conditions were not to be considered as expert knowledge as coming from the Woodfields, but only as a publication of the Ford Motor Company. We hold that the court's instruction in this regard was not reversible error. The plaintiffs had the benefit of the admission into evidence of certain portions of the manual. Expert witnesses testified that the parts of the manual which were introduced were reliable as an authority on the subject of the conditions under which a tractor becomes inherently dangerous. The parts were considered as a reliable source of information coming from the Ford Motor Company and not from the Woodfields. Although as dealers in goods manufactured by another, the information contained in the manual was imputed to the Woodfields, Restatement, Second, Torts, Section 401, the manual was not their sole source of knowledge concerning tractors. Their knowledge in this field also came from their experience in and practice of this type of business. Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in refusing to allow per diem and ad damnum arguments. It was pointed out in Jimmy's Cab v. Isennock, 225 Md. 1, 169 A.2d 425, that it is not an unusual practice in this state to allow the pleadings, including the declaration containing the ad damnum clause, to be taken to the jury room. See Rule 558. However, where the court, within its discretion, does not allow pleadings to be taken to the jury room and where counsel either intentionally or unintentionally mentions the ad damnum in his opening or closing argument to the jury, the trial court should point out to the jury that counsel's argument is not to be considered as evidence and that the jury must base its verdict on the evidence presented at the trial and on the law. See also Nicholson v. Blanchette, 239 Md. 168, 210 A.2d 732. It is permissible for counsel to use a per diem argument in his opening or closing statement to the jury. However, when used, this argument should be accompanied by instructions to the jury that the argument is not evidence and that the jury must determine the proper verdict from the evidence presented at the trial and on the law. The trial judge may make such instructions upon request or sua sponte if he thinks proper. Where the per diem argument is made for the first time in closing, the opposing counsel should be allowed a reasonable time to rebut it. Simco Sales v. Schweigman, 237 Md. 180, 205 A.2d 245; Eastern Shore P.S.C. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 177 A.2d 701; Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661. See also Lebow, Etc. v. Reichel, 231 Md. 421, 190 A.2d 642. Since it is only permissible for counsel to use a per diem argument the trial court did not err in disallowing such argument. Judgments affirmed, appellants to pay the costs.