Opinion ID: 2508188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: failure to seek separate trial from codefendant

Text: ISSUE (3). Whether Petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his counsel did not move to sever his trial from that of his codefendant on the grounds of antagonistic defenses. Petitioner asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorneys did not move to sever his trial from that of his codefendant, George Anthony Wilson, on the grounds of mutually antagonistic defenses. [181] He argues that evidence was introduced by Mr. Wilson's attorney, Keith MacFie, which illustrated antagonistic defenses. Petitioner cites two instances. The first was when, in response to questioning by Mr. MacFie, Keith D. Burks, who had previously testified about the events on the morning of the killing as told to him by codefendant Wilson, testified the reason he lied to police authorities was because he was scared of Petitioner. [182] The second instance was when Mr. MacFie attempted to elicit testimony from Ms. Jessica Cunningham, Petitioner's niece, that Mr. Wilson told her [Petitioner] is on a killing spree. But the trial court did not allow that testimony. [183] Petitioner relies primarily on events during closing arguments to demonstrate his claim of irreconcilable conflicting defenses in his and Mr. Wilson's cases. During closing argument in the guilt phase, Mr. Wilson's counsel stated: We have no sympathy for Cecil Davis whatsoever. The State has shown that Mrs. Couch's door was kicked in. She was grabbed. She was taken upstairs. She was violated and beaten in various portions of the house, two bedrooms and the bathroom. The State has shown through evidence against Mr. Davis that it was not a crime that just suddenly happened.... [ [184] ] .... We know what Cecil Davis was doing, he was over at Yoshiko Couch's house murdering her. But we don't know what Anthony Wilson was doing unless we take a look at the testimony of Keith Burks.[ [185] ] To prove he was prejudiced by his joint trial with codefendant Wilson, Petitioner must show that a competent attorney would have moved for severance, that the motion likely would have been granted, and that if he were tried separately there was a reasonable probability he would have been acquitted. [186] Under CrR 4.4(c)(2)(i), a trial court has broad discretion to grant a severance when it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of a defendant. [187] Separate trials are not favored in Washington because of concerns for judicial economy, [f]oremost among these concerns is the conservation of judicial resources and public funds. [188] A defendant seeking to sever trial from a codefendant has the burden of demonstrating that a joint trial would be so manifestly prejudicial as to outweigh the concern for judicial economy. [189] The mere existence of antagonism between defenses [190] or the desire of one defendant to exculpate himself by inculpating a codefendant ... is insufficient to [compel separate trials]. [191] To be entitled to severance because of antagonistic defenses, a defendant must show that the conflict is so prejudicial that defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both [defendants] are guilty. [192] Even assuming that a competent attorney would have moved to sever the trial based on antagonistic defenses, Petitioner cannot show that the trial court would have granted the motion in his case. [193] He cannot demonstrate that a joint trial would have been so manifestly prejudicial as to outweigh the concern for judicial economy. Codefendant Wilson did not offer any evidence that he was innocent and that Petitioner was responsible for the crime. Most of the finger-pointing by Mr. Wilson's counsel occurred during closing arguments. Closing arguments, however, are not evidence, and the jury was instructed that [t]he only evidence ... to consider consists of the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted into evidence. [194] Petitioner also has not shown he was prejudiced by a joint trial. If severance had been granted in this case, the evidence presented at a separate trial for Petitioner would have been the same as was presented at his joint trial. In addition, the trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction. [195] Petitioner cannot show there was a reasonable probability the result in the guilt phase of his trial would have been different if he had been tried separately.