Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusal of Prospective Jurors Because of Views on the Death Penalty

Text: (43) Defendant contends that the trial court erred under the impartial-jury guaranty of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16, of the California Constitution when it excused eight prospective jurors because of their unfavorable views on the death penalty: Mary Anne Sayler, Helen Marie Charles, Richard A. Paroli, Curry R. Jackson, Sr., Marina E. Christman, Barbara J. Lee, Robert Hopkins, and Clementene McMillan. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, the United States Supreme Court implied that a prospective juror could not be excused for cause without violating a defendant's federal constitutional right to an impartial jury unless, as relevant here, he made it unmistakably clear that he would  automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before [the juror].... ( Id. at p. 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785], italics in original.) In Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], the court clarif[ied] Witherspoon and declared that the proper standard was whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852].) On this point, Witt followed the teaching of Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38, and in fact quoted from that opinion at page 45 of 448 U.S. [65 L.Ed.2d at page 589]. In People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250], we adopted the Witt standard as the test for determining whether a defendant's state constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated by an excusal for cause. As stated, defendant claims the trial court erred by excusing for cause prospective jurors Sayler, Charles, Paroli, Jackson, Christman, Lee, Hopkins, and McMillan. At individual sequestered voir dire, the People challenged each of the foregoing persons for actual bias arising from his or her scruples against capital punishment. Defendant presented opposition, expressly or impliedly. The court sustained the challenges. The issue of excusal was litigated in light of Witherspoon and its reading of the impartial-jury guaranty of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant made reference to the California Constitution  albeit only in a general manner  when he presented his opposition to the People's challenges to each of the prospective jurors in question save Sayler. There was no error. The trial court impliedly determined that each of the prospective jurors in question had views on the death penalty that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror. The standard of review is substantial evidence. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1262.) Under that standard, each of the court's determinations is sound. The record contains more than substantial evidence in support. Sayler stated she would not vote for death under any circumstances. Charles made assertions to the same effect. Paroli repeatedly said he would not and could not impose the ultimate sanction. Johnson said the same. Christman made it plain by the end of her voir dire that she could not consider death. Lee declared her unwillingness and inability to vote to take a life throughout her examination. So too did Hopkins. McMillan did as well. That the court did not make its determinations in light of Witt does not deprive them of validity. Defendant argues to the contrary. He maintains that we should adhere to the Witherspoon standard. But as a matter of federal constitutional law we cannot, and as a matter of state constitutional law we will not. Defendant then maintains that the Witt standard may not, or should not, be applied when as here the excusal in question antedates the opinion from which the test derives. In People v. Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d at page 192, and People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 418, footnote 16 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221], we concluded that such an assertion is without merit. We adhere to that conclusion in this case. Defendant urges in substance that the Witt standard was unforeseeable at the time of voir dire in this case and hence that its use now does violence to principles of due process of law and fundamental fairness that are of federal and state constitutional dimension. But as noted above, Witt followed the teaching of Adams. And Adams was decided in 1980, almost three years before voir dire below. [13] It might perhaps be argued that the Witt standard was not foreseeable as the test for determining whether a defendant's state constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated by an excusal for cause. But any such unforeseeability cannot be deemed significant here. Finally, defendant maintains that the trial court's excusal of prospective juror Sayler for cause is not supported by a record that can be deemed legally sufficient. He urges that the People's examination of Sayler was improper and inherently likely to lead to an unreliable response. We disagree. The court's ruling was indeed supported by a legally sufficient record. Moreover, nothing in the People's examination was improper. [14]