Opinion ID: 2812841
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparate compensation

Text: Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, to succeed on his disparate compensation claim, Minnis must first present a prima facie case of discrimination. To do so, he must show that: (1) “he was a member of a protected class,” and (2) “he was paid less than a non-member for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.” Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2008). “An individual plaintiff claiming disparate treatment in pay under Title VII must show that his circumstances are nearly identical to those of a better-paid employee who is not a member of the protected class.” Id. at 523 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). No one disputes that Minnis is a member of a protected class. Thus, as the district court correctly noted, the only issue at the prima facie stage is whether Minnis was paid less than white employees for substantially the same job responsibilities. The district court concluded that none of the other head coaches, including Minnis’s replacement, were proper comparators. The court then held that even assuming, arguendo, that Minnis could establish that the other coaches were proper comparators, Minnis was still unable to rebut LSU’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the disparity in pay. LSU asserted the following reasons for the pay disparity: (1) Minnis did not have a competitive record that would justify merit increases, (2) Minnis’s salary was set by comparing his performance to that of other women’s tennis coaches in the SEC, and (3) Minnis’s salary was calculated based on the market for the position at the time of hiring. In response, Minnis disputed that his salary was determined based on the salaries of other SEC women’s tennis coaches. He also asserted that the disparity between his salary and those of the other coaches “was so glaring” that others “took notice.” The district court 6 Case: 14-31251 Document: 00513097916 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 No. 14-31251 determined that Minnis’s self-serving conclusions and subjective beliefs were insufficient to establish pretext. Minnis appeals the district court’s conclusion that the other head coaches were not proper comparators. We need not consider this argument because even if Minnis was able to establish a prima facie case, his claim still fails at the pretext stage. “Once a Title VII case reaches the pretext stage, the only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question regarding discrimination.” Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff “must put forward evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer articulates” and must show “that a discriminatory motive more likely motivated [the] employer’s decision . . . or that [the] employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Once LSU articulated non-discriminatory reasons for the pay disparity, the burden shifted to Minnis to rebut each of those reasons. He has not offered any evidence beyond his subjective beliefs to meet his burden. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding pretext and, accordingly, Minnis’s disparate compensation claim fails. 1 Minnis also argues that the district court erred in holding that his disparate 1 compensation claims, as they relate to his salary prior to 2011, are time-barred. Minnis contends that the district court’s holding is incorrect in light of recent amendments made to Title VII following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Though raised below, this argument was not addressed by the district court. We have already determined that Minnis’s disparate compensation claim fails. Consideration of this additional argument would not affect the outcome of this case. 7 Case: 14-31251 Document: 00513097916 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 No. 14-31251