Opinion ID: 2639484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Horton's Cross-Appeal

Text: Horton first claims in his cross-appeal that no reasonable person could have found Horton was at maximum cure and, therefore, the jury verdict should be reversed. Specifically, Horton alleges that there was no evidence to support the jury's decision that Horton had reached maximum cure. We will reverse the jury's finding only if the evidence is so clearly to the contrary that `reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment.' [90] Maintenance and cure is a doctrine that applies to seamen injured while in the service of the ship. [91] Maintenance is a sum for living expenses during the period of treatment and convalescence, and cure pays for medical expenses. An injured seaman is entitled to cure until the seaman is at maximum cure, meaning the point at which no improvement in the seaman's medical condition is to be reasonably expected. [92] Cure is limited to curative, as opposed to palliative, medical treatment. [93] Considering the high standard applicable to the jury's determination and the testimony before the court, reasonable persons could differ as to whether Horton had reached maximum cure. Horton's own orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Vasileff, testified that he would not recommend any further medical treatment for Horton: Q: The last time you saw him, would you have recommended any further treatment for the leg or ankle? A: No. Q: Or notleg or the foot, excuse me. A: No. Q: Okay. And why is that? A: Well, it wasthe fracture was healing, theI thought we probably did what we could. Now, in terms of the nerve pain, certainly, that could haveyou know, you could investigate that further to see if something could be done. Dr. Brown, who treats Horton's diabetes, [94] testified that Horton has chronic pain and depression. Dr. Brown is not a psychiatrist however. Dr. Craig, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified that chronic pain treatment is geared toward helping people learn how to cope with the discomfort. He then added, there's nothing magical about pain programs that's going to make the discomfort just go away.... In other words, the expert witnesses did suggest stabilizing treatments, but it is questionable whether Horton's pain or depression would improve or could be cured over time. We conclude that reasonable persons could differ as to whether Horton had reached maximum cure and therefore we will not overturn the jury verdict.
Horton's second claim is that the trial court improperly reduced the jury award for cure by deducting the medical bills already paid by MSS. Essentially, Horton argues that there is no evidence that MSS actually paid any of Horton's medical bills and that whether MSS is entitled to an offset is a jury question. This argument has little merit. MSS and Horton stipulated to Horton's medical bills. The jury awarded the entire amount, less the expenses for diabetes since the jury found that condition to be unrelated to Horton's injuries. During the trial, Horton attempted to introduce evidence of medical bills paid by MSS but was prevented from doing so by the trial court. [95] After the trial, MSS moved to reduce the jury award for cure by $122,030.76, the amount paid by MSS for medical bills arising from Horton's injuries. The trial court observed that there was no dispute that the bills had been paid: There is no factual dispute between the parties regarding the sum paid nor is there dispute that the $122,030.76 was paid on behalf of the defendant for medical expenses arising out of plaintiff's injuries.... [T]here are no factual issues to be resolved. Both agreed that the issue to be decided here is simply a legal one. .... There is no legitimate dispute here. The plaintiff had a total of $186,000 in medical/cure expenses. The defendant paid $122,030.76 of those expenses. The defendant should be given credit for those payments. We agree with the trial court and reject Horton's argument that he should get what amounts to a double recovery of medical expenses.
Horton claims that he is entitled to enhancement of prejudgment and postjudgment interest because MSS failed to achieve a verdict more favorable to it than Horton's offer of judgment made under the former Alaska Rule 68. MSS counters that prejudgment interest enhancement is not available because it conflicts with federal law and that statutory provisions for prejudgment interest do not provide for postjudgment interest. This issue presents a question of law to which we apply our independent judgment. [96]
Before trial, Horton made an offer of judgment for $950,000 plus costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees. The jury ultimately awarded Horton $175,000 in past damages and $1,155,000 in future damages as well as ten percent interest on his past losses. Horton claimed entitlement to an enhancement based on the former Alaska Civil Rule 68 that provided that if the judgment rendered was not more favorable to the offeree than the offer, the prejudgment interest accrued would be increased by five percent as specified in the former AS 09.30.065. [97] The trial court initially added the enhancement, increasing prejudgment interest to fifteen percent per year and postjudgment interest to 12.545%. The trial court later revised that decision and determined that Horton would receive ten percent prejudgment and 7.545% postjudgment interest; the trial court removed the five percent enhancement from both interest rates. It is the removal of the enhancement that Horton now appeals. Because Horton made an offer for judgment for $950,000 and was ultimately awarded more than $1,300,000, he should qualify for the enhancement. However, whether the enhancement applies depends upon whether the trial court characterizes Horton's damages award as a Jones Act or unseaworthiness award. We have established that Horton is not entitled to prejudgment interest on his Jones Act claim. Consequently, he cannot receive an enhancement of prejudgment interest if his award is characterized as a Jones Act award. [98] However, if the trial court characterizes Horton's damages award as an unseaworthiness award, he is entitled to an enhancement of prejudgment interest. [99]
Horton also argues that postjudgment interest should have accrued at 10.5% under the former AS 09.30.070(a) and that he is entitled to an enhancement of that interest as well. MSS maintains that the statute and Rule 68 do not apply to postjudgment interest at all and thus neither does the enhancement. The trial court awarded postjudgment interest at the rate of 7.545%. At the time this action was filed, the former version of AS 09.30.070(a), the statute providing for interest on judgments, provided that [t]he rate of interest on judgments and decrees for the payment of money is 10.5 percent a year. It appears that the parties presented the new version of AS 09.30.070(a) to the trial court, and accordingly the trial court may have calculated the interest at three percentage points above the 12th Federal Reserve District discount rate in effect as required by the new version of AS 09.30.070(a). Perhaps this explains why the trial court specified a rate of 7.545%. However, the statute in effect at the time this case was filed provides that interest is to be set at 10.5%. Further, the new statute provides that it applies to all causes of action accruing on or after August 7, 1997, thus clearly implying that it was not meant to apply to causes of action accruing before that date. [100] The trial court's use of the wrong statute to calculate postjudgment interest constitutes plain error, and we reverse and remand to correct the judgment and set the interest rate at 10.5 percent. Horton, however, is not entitled to an enhancement of postjudgment interest. Horton argues that the enhancement applies to postjudgment interest because the former version of AS 09.30.065 only generally refers to judgment and the interest rate and is not explicitly limited to prejudgment interest. However, as MSS points out, AS 09.30.065 also refers to the interest awarded under AS 09.30.070 and accrued up to the date judgment is entered.  (Emphasis added.) We have interpreted this provision as referring only to prejudgment interest. [101] In addition, the purpose of the enhancement was to encourage settlement and discourage protracted litigation on less meritorious claims; accordingly, the penalty of the enhancement should only apply to the period before judgment. Therefore, Horton is entitled to an enhancement of prejudgment interest only; the enhancement provision does not apply to postjudgment interest. [102]