Opinion ID: 370460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: amnesty

Text: 4 The appellants contend that the offer of amnesty by prison officials in exchange for the release of the hostages constituted a contractual agreement by which the Government was bound not to seek an indictment in this case. This argument is based primarily on an analogy to the plea-bargaining principles of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), that once an agreement is reached between the Government and an accused, the Government must maintain its obligation. The district court found, however, that this agreement was induced by duress and therefore was not binding on the Government. United States v. Gorham, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 148, 523 F.2d 1088, 1097 (D.C.Cir.1975). As the amnesty agreement had no bearing on the case other than as a complete defense to the charges, the district court excluded all evidence relating to the amnesty issue. 2 5 United States v. Gorham, supra, and its companion case, United States v. Bridgeman, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C.Cir.1975), involved an attempted escape from the D.C. jail during which a prison official was taken hostage. Through threats of violence and physical abuse, the inmates induced the official to sign an agreement promising that there would be no reprisals of any kind, nor any court action brought by him against any of the inmates involved in the escape attempt. The appellants argued that this agreement precluded the Government from prosecuting them on charges arising from the incident. The court rejected this argument finding that the agreement promised only that there would be no administrative reprisals within the prison system, not that the inmates would not be prosecuted. The court also noted: 6 This conclusion is further buttressed by elementary principles of contract law, principles underlying the decision in Santobello v. New York and its progeny which appellants urge us to follow. Had a promise that prosecution would not ensue been offered to appellants, it would have . . . been voidable because of inducement by duress, and, because bargains involving the forebearance of prosecution are contrary to public policy, it would have been Nudum pactum. 173 U.S.App.D.C. at 148, 523 F.2d at 1097. 7 The appellants seek to distinguish Gorham arguing that the trial court had before it all the necessary facts to make a determination of the issue of amnesty whereas, in the instant case, Judge Ferguson excluded all evidence of the amnesty offer before the issue of duress was properly determined. They contend that it was error for the court to make a finding of duress without hearing the testimony of Warden Grossman, whom they suggest, may have testified that the offer was not made under duress. We agree with the district court that the testimony of the two hostages supplied a sufficient basis for its finding. The evidence is clear that the prisoners intended to harm the hostages if their demands were not met. 3 8 In conclusion, it is apparent from the record that any agreement for amnesty or safe conduct between prison officials and the inmates was induced by duress and the Government was not prevented from prosecuting the defendants. 4