Opinion ID: 6494892
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: International Fidelity’s Liability for the Judgment

Text: International Fidelity briefly presents two arguments as to why the forfeiture judgments are not enforceable against it. First, International Fidelity interprets the forfeiture judgments to have been entered against it, and argues that if HRS § 804-51 does not require that it be issued notice, then the entry of judgment against it violates due process. Alternatively, if Peppers or Fisher are the “sureties on the bond” who received notice and against whom judgment was issued, then the forfeiture judgments are enforceable only against Peppers or Fisher and should be “deemed void as against International [as a second surety]” because International was not given adequate notice. As to International Fidelity’s first argument, International is mistaken regarding against which party judgment was entered. The “surety on the bond” to whom notice was issued regarding the forfeiture judgments is the same “surety on the bond” against whom judgment was entered pursuant to HRS § 804-51, namely, Peppers or Fisher. Again, the statute states: Whenever the court, in any criminal cause, forfeits any bond or recognizance given in a criminal cause, the court shall immediately enter up judgment in favor of the State and against the principal or principals and surety or sureties on the bond, jointly and severally, for the full amount of the penalty thereof, and shall cause execution to issue thereon immediately after the expiration of thirty days from the date that notice is given via personal service or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the surety or sureties on the bond, of the entry of the judgment in favor of the State.... HRS § 804-51 (emphasis added). With minor exceptions, 18 the language used in the forfeiture judgments in Nelson, Teruya, Cabigon, and Nakamura was as follows: The above-entitled ease having come ... before the ... Judge of the above-entitled court, on [said date], and the Defendant having failed to appear or to be present on the said date, and the Court, upon motion of the State of Hawaii, having on said date ordered and declared the forfeiture of the bail bond filed and posted in this case, executed by said Defendant, as principal, and INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY (FREEDOM BAIL ROND), through its agent and attorney in fact, IDA PEPPERS, as surety, in the sum of ..., NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing order, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the State of Hawaii does have and recovers from the principal and the surety above named, jointly and severally, the sum of ..., and that execution issue herein according to law. (Emphasis added.) The language used in Ferraris, Berry, Muña, and Luna was: The above-entitled case having come ... before the ... Judge of the above-entitled court, on [said date], and the Defendant having failed to appear or to be present on the said date, and the Court, upon motion of the State of Hawai[‘]i, having on said date ordered and declared the forfeiture of the bail bond filed and posted in this case, executed by said Defendant, as principal, and INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY, through its agent and attorney in fact, IDA PEPPERS (FREEDOM BAIL BOND), as surety, in the sum of ..., NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing order, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the State of Hawai[‘]i does have and recovers from the principal and the surety above named, jointly and severally, the sum of ..., and that execution issue herein according to law. (Emphasis added.) 19 It is perhaps unclear from the text of the judgments whether International, instead of Peppers or Fisher, was identified as the “surety” against which the judgments were entered. “As surety” can be interpreted to modify “International Fidelity Insurance Company” despite the long intervening clause. Alternatively, “as surety” might be viewed to modify the preceding noun, “Ida Peppers,” “Ida Peppers (Freedom Bail Bond),” or “Charles Fisher,” as the case may be. “The general rule is that, like any other written instrument, a court order must ‘be construed reasonably and as a whole so as to give effect to the intention of the court.’ ” Wohlschlegel v. Uhlmann-Kihei, Inc., 4 Haw.App. 123, 130, 662 P.2d 606, 611 (1983) (citing Smith v. Smith, 56 Haw. 295, 301, 636 P.2d 1109, 1114 (1975)). “ ‘Moreover, we must give effect not only to that which is expressed but also to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied by the judgment or decree.’ ” Id. (quoting Ahuna v. Dep’t of Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 333-34, 640 P.2d 1161, 1166 (1982)). Applying these rules of interpretation, we construe the forfeiture judgments as having been entered in compliance with HRS § 804-51, i.e., entered against the defendant and either Peppers or Fisher, whomever was the “surety on the bond.” International asserts in its alternative argument that nothing in HRS § 804-51 permits the judgment to be enforced against it “as a second surety on the bonds” because it failed to receive notice of the judgments. International therefore concludes that “the judgments should be deemed void against International and only enforceable against the Bondspersons.” As a preliminary matter, International does not provide support for its assertion that it failed to receive notice of the judgments, which, in any event, is not supported by the record. The circuit court had concluded that International Fidelity “independently received notice from the Judiciary of the forfeiture judgment in each of these cases” through the Judiciary’s letters to International. On certiorari to this court, International did not contest the ICA’s decision to decline “reaching] International Fidelity’s challenge to the circuit court’s alternative holding, that the letters sent by the Judiciary to International Fidelity were sufficient notice [to International],” Nelson, 139 Hawai'i at 164 n.13, 384 P.3d at 940 n.13, and otherwise failed to assert the circuit court’s underlying findings of fact and conclusions of law were error. Thus, these findings of fact 20 and conclusions of law remain intact. Moreover, as discussed supra Part IV.C., based on the statutorily mandated incorporation of the text of HRS § 804-61 into each bail bond, International was well aware that notice of forfeiture would be given to the “surety on the bond,” i.e., to Peppers or Fisher, and therefore the notice that was provided to Peppers or Fisher was reasonably calculated to apprise International Fidelity of the bail forfeiture judgments. In sum, International received notice of the forfeiture judgments by the foregoing means and cannot now evade its obligations as the issuer (through licensed insurance producers, such as Peppers or Fisher) of the surety bonds that secured the defendants’ bail bonds. In other words, the defendants’ bail bonds were guaranteed by International Fidelity’s contracts to insure. The forfeiture judgments, therefore, have effect as to International, the surety insurer, insofar as the judgments may support any payment demands or causes of action the State may have against International. Y. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ICA’s October 26, 2016 Judgment on Appeal, filed pursuant to its September 29, 2016 opinion, affirming the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s October 31, 2012 “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying International Fidelity Insurance Company’s Consolidated Motions to Set Aside Judgment Entered Against International Fidelity Insurance Company.”