Opinion ID: 887551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Self-Government Exception

Text: ¶ 32 The second Montana exception recognizes inherent tribal authority to exercise civil adjudicative jurisdiction with respect to conduct that threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457, 117 S.Ct. at 1415 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 33 In Strate, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a tribal court retained the authority to adjudicate a nonmember's personal injury suit which arose from a car accident on a state highway running through a reservation. The Court held that the conduct at issue did not qualify under Montana's second exception, stating: Undoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana 's second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-58, 117 S.Ct. at 1415. In conjunction with this holding, Strate provided critical guidance for understanding Montana's second exception, stating: Read in isolation, the Montana rule's second exception can be misperceived. Key to its proper application, however, is the Court's preface: Indian tribes retain their inherent power to punish tribal offenders, to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. . . . But a tribe's inherent power does not reach beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.  Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 117 S.Ct. at 1416 (emphasis added) (citation and alterations omitted). [9] Immediately thereafter, the Court concluded: Neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway accident at issue is needed to preserve the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 117 S.Ct. at 1416 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 34 TTC claims, in conclusory fashion, that tribal jurisdiction is necessary to control CSKT's internal relations. However, TTC does not identify any internal tribal relation that would in fact be controlled by tribal adjudicative jurisdiction in this case, nor can we ascertain one. ¶ 35 TTC does not argue that tribal jurisdiction in this case is necessary to protect tribal self-government. We observe, however, that the alleged tortious conduct here could surely endanger all in the vicinity of TTC, which may include CSKT members and the general public, similar to the careless driving identified in Strate. This certainly implicates CSKT's interest in preserving the safety of its members. Moreover, the health or welfare of the tribe clause in Montana's second exception, if read in isolation, would seem to be applicable here. However, in following the High Court's lead along the path marked by Montana, we can not equate this particular tribal interest in membership safety with the interest in protecting tribal self-governmenti.e., the right of [CSKT] to make [its] own laws and be ruled by them. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 117 S.Ct. at 1416. [10] To do so would dramatically broaden the scope of Montana's second exception and thereby, as noted in Strate, 520 U.S. at 458, 117 S.Ct. at 1415, severely shrink Montana's general rule. ¶ 36 As noted above, the ownership status of land involved in a suit is a factor in determining a tribe's need to protect self-government or control internal relations. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359-60, 121 S.Ct. at 2310. Once the ownership status of the land at issue is established, a court may then consider the interplay between the land, the conduct at issue, and tribal self-government. See Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170, 1172, 1182 (9th Cir.2005) (identifying the land at issue as tribal trust land and then determining whether there existed any encroachment upon the land or damage thereto, and whether use of the land had been interfered with). Here, rather than discussing the ownership status of Montana Highway 212, where this tort claim arose, [11] or the ownership status of TTC's premises, where the conduct at issue occurred, TTC merely asserts, repeatedly and fervently, that it is located entirely within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation; that it operates its business exclusively within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation; and that the transaction at issue took place on the Reservation. ¶ 37 However, these assertions do not address the relevant land issuei.e., ownership status of the land implicated in the suit. As noted in Hicks, the ownership of lands on an Indian reservation may reside with the tribes, with tribal members, and even with nonmembers, among others. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383, 121 S.Ct at 2322 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.). Thus, it avails TTC nothing to establish that lands involved are located within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation. As TTC fails to present any relevant argument as to how the ownership status of the land involved in this suit may factor into an analysis under the second Montana exception, we will not address the issue further. ¶ 38 Pursuant to Strate, we must recognize that CSKT's adjudicative jurisdiction does not reach beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 117 S.Ct. at 1416 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The conduct at issue hereTTC's alleged negligence in serving alcoholic beverages to Zempel and failing to prevent Moore from attempting to drive him homewhile potentially dangerous to individual tribal members, does not pose a threat to CSKT's self-government. Thus, tribal adjudicative jurisdiction over this action is not necessary to preserve CSKT's right to make its own laws and be ruled by them. As such, we hold that CSKT's inherent sovereignty does not encompass adjudicative jurisdiction over this suit pursuant to Montana's second exception.