Opinion ID: 419685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Subpoena Decisions

Text: 10 Canova had subpoenaed records of the California Employment Development Department concerning both employees' efforts to seek interim employment during the backpay period. The Employment Development Department petitioned the Board to revoke the subpoena and the Board complied. In attempting to support its contention that Phillips was permanently disabled throughout the backpay period, Canova had also subpoenaed Phillips and requested that he produce all documents relating to the hearings on his workers' compensation disability claims. In cross-examination Canova's counsel learned that Phillips had been deposed for that hearing but did not have a copy of the deposition. Canova requested a subpoena allowing Canova to obtain a copy from the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board or, in the alternative, requested that the record be kept open until the deposition could be obtained. The ALJ refused both requests. 11
12 The Employment Development Department petitioned to have the subpoena of its records revoked on the basis of a statutory privilege contained in Cal.Unemp.Ins.Code Secs. 1094, 2111 (Deering 1983). 2 California has a policy of keeping the records confidential to ensure truthful reporting on the part of the employee. Canova contends that the Board's revocation of the subpoena at the instance of the Employment Development Department deprived it of evidence relevant to whether Phillips and Davis sought interim employment. 13 The Board's decisions regarding enforcement of subpoenas are discretionary. NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir.1978). In exercising that discretion, however, the Board must comply as far as is practicable with the rules of evidence applicable in federal courts. Thus, unless the special characteristics of an administrative hearing require otherwise, the Board may revoke a subpoena only if to do so would be proper in federal district court. General Engineering, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367, 374 (9th Cir.1965). Such revocation generally requires a valid evidentiary objection to the material sought under the subpoena. NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union, 374 F.2d 974, 980 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913, 88 S.Ct. 239, 19 L.Ed.2d 261 (1967). 14 This case is governed by NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.1978), wherein this court upheld the revocation of a subpoena for California unemployment and disability records. The state agency subject to the subpoena had invoked the same statutory privilege under litigation in the present case. This court held that the claimed privilege may constitute a valid reason for the Board to revoke or decline to enforce a subpoena. 578 F.2d at 1310. The Adrian Belt court also found that the subpoenaed material was of minimal probative value and that the employers were not prejudiced by their inability to obtain the records. Id. 15 The Board acted within its discretionary power in revoking the subpoena. It did so pursuant to the same statutory privilege deemed in Adrian Belt to be a proper basis for revocation. 3 Further, the Board found, as in Adrian Belt, that the material would have been of small probative value and that Canova was not significantly prejudiced by the revocation. 16 Canova sought to use the records as evidence of lack of diligence in seeking interim employment. As the Board determined, however, those records would only show what efforts the employees actually reported to the Employment Development Department and not necessarily what was actually done. This evidence would have had its most significant value in impeaching the testimony of the employees concerning their efforts in seeking employment. Canova had in its possession Board compliance documents and statements made by the employees concerning the job searches that contained evidence analogous to the Employment Development Department reports. Given Canova's opportunity to cross-examine Phillips and Davis on the basis of these materials, Canova was not prejudiced by the revocation. 17
18 When Canova found Phillips did not have the deposition taken during the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board proceeding, Phillips' attorney in that proceeding was contacted. The attorney was able to produce ten pages or roughly twenty percent of that deposition. These pages were given to Canova's counsel. Canova's counsel stated that these pages contained relevant material and indicated that the entire deposition would be very probative on the issue of Phillips' disability. Counsel did not, however, make any use at the hearing of the pages produced. 19 Canova requested a subpoena to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to obtain the deposition. The ALJ refused. The National Labor Relations Board contends that whether to issue a subpoena is a discretionary decision. We find no authority for such a contention. Section 161(1) of the Labor-Management Relations Act and the regulations promulgated to clarify procedures under that section give the ALJ or Board discretion in revoking subpoenas but do not provide for discretion in issuing subpoenas. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 161(1) (1976). The regulations provide that a subpoena request during a hearing should be made to the ALJ who shall issue the subpoena. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 102.31(a) (1982). This language indicates that the ALJ must issue a subpoena upon request. See Lewis v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 10, 14, 78 S.Ct. 1029, 1031, 2 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1958). Refusal to issue a subpoena may not, however, be grounds for refusing to enforce a Board order if the action was not prejudicial to the requesting party. NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union, 374 F.2d at 982 n. 10; NLRB v. Central Oklahoma Milk Producers Association, 285 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cir.1960). 20 The ALJ based his refusal to issue a subpoena to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board on three grounds tending to show that Canova would not be prejudiced by the refusal. First, both the ALJ and Canova's counsel assumed that the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board would assert the same statutory privilege asserted by the Employment Development Department. It appears that the statutory privilege and prohibition against disclosure apply to disability records as well as unemployment records. See Adrian Belt, 578 F.2d at 1310; Richards v. Superior Court, 258 Cal.App.2d 635, 65 Cal.Rptr. 917, 919-20 (1968). Therefore, the ALJ may have issued the subpoena only to revoke it once the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board petitioned for revocation on the basis of privilege. Second, the deposition was one Phillips had given in the disability proceeding. It would contain only Phillips' knowledge concerning his physical condition. Although this information would be relevant to disability, it is not necessarily probative of Phillips' actual condition. Third, Phillips had already testified and been cross-examined extensively about his condition and Canova had presented expert testimony through Dr. Reiswig on Phillips' condition. Canova also had another doctor's report from which to work. Further, Canova's counsel had a part of the deposition, which he stated was relevant, but made no use of that portion in cross-examining Phillips. 21 We note that Canova and its workers' compensation insurance carrier were parties to the proceeding on Phillips' Workers' Compensation proceeding in which the deposition was taken. If Canova did not have a copy of Phillips' deposition, it should have requested the deposition from its carrier or the carrier's counsel. This course would not have placed the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board in the difficult position of balancing its statutory duty against the mandate of an NLRB subpoena. Although the ALJ should have issued the subpoena and awaited a petition to revoke, we hold that Canova was not prejudiced by the failure to issue the subpoena; thus we will not refuse enforcement of the Board's order on that basis. 4 II. Phillips' Permanent Disability Award 22 O.D. Phillips suffered three job-related back injuries in 1975 while employed by Canova. In 1977, Phillips filed workers' compensation claims for the 1975 injuries. The California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board awarded Phillips $5770.25 in permanent disability compensation. Canova contends that this amount should be deducted from Phillips' backpay award. 23 The issue of whether Phillips' permanent disability award should be deducted from his backpay award is one of law and thus outside the provisions of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(e) & (f) (1976) requiring deference to Board determinations. This court may freely review determinations of issues of law by the Board. See NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Service, 589 F.2d 1014, 1019 n. 8 (9th Cir.1979). 24 The Board has ruled that only those workers' compensation awards that are identifiable as compensation for lost wages during the backpay period may be deducted from a backpay award. American Manufacturing Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 520, 523 (1967). An award which is reparation for permanent physical injury, however, is not compensation for loss of wages during a particular period and is not deductible. Id. Canova does not dispute this recitation of the law, but argues that Phillips' award was for both lost earnings and physical injury. 25 The California Supreme Court has ruled that the primary purpose of the California permanent disability compensation is to compensate diminished ability to compete in the labor market. Mercier v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 16 Cal.3d 711, 129 Cal.Rptr. 161, 164, 548 P.2d 361, 364 (1976). In Russell v. Bankers Life Co., 46 Cal.App.3d 405, 120 Cal.Rptr. 627, 633-34 (1975), the court addressed the distinction between permanent and temporary disability payments: 26 temporary disability payments are a substitute for lost wages during the temporary disability period, while permanent disability is for permanent bodily impairment and is designed to indemnify for the insured employee's impairment of future earning capacity or diminished ability to compete in the open labor market. 27 120 Cal.Rptr. at 634 (citations omitted). 28 Because the California courts do not consider awards under the California permanent disability scheme as payment for past lost wages, we agree with the Board that Phillips' award for his permanent disability should not be deducted from his backpay recovery.