Opinion ID: 2680019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Assessment of Mendoza-Martinez Factors

Text: [¶45] The Does argue that a conviction-based scheme is inherently punitive and that the Legislature should implement a risk-assessment scheme. However, “[i]t is not our role to ask whether the Legislature could achieve its goals through alternative means.” Id. ¶ 56. Our task is to determine whether the punitive effects of SORNA of 1999 overcome the Legislature’s civil intent by the clearest proof. See Cosgro, 2008 ME 64, ¶ 2, 945 A.2d 1221. [¶46] Our ex post facto analysis in Letalien was informed and driven in significant part by the fact that registration was part of Letalien’s criminal sentence. See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 60-61, 985 A.2d 4. Indeed, “the purpose of the ex post facto prohibition is rightfully considered to be at its apex when a 22 law’s retroactive application is more punitive than the punishment that was actually imposed against an offender as part of a sentence.” Id. ¶ 61. By definition, it was punitive to increase Letalien’s sentence retroactively. Further, it was the cumulative effect of a combination of factors that produced a finding that the statute was unconstitutional in Letalien. That is simply not the case here, where registration was not part of the Does’ sentences and where some of the most significant concerns we had in Letalien have been remedied by the Legislature. [¶47] In our present discussion of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we conclude that only factor five—whether the statute applies to behavior that is already a crime—weighs in favor of finding SORNA of 1999 punitive. [¶48] The first Mendoza-Martinez factor, which is whether the statute imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, looms large in our conclusion that the statute is nonpunitive overall. Title 34-A M.R.S. § 11222 significantly reduced the burden on individuals subject to the registry. We disagree with the Does’ argument that requiring lifetime registration is a significant restraint in and of itself. Regardless of the length of time an individual is subject to the registry, reporting to have his registration information verified in person every five years is a minimal burden, as is reporting in writing no more frequently than quarterly. [¶49] Additionally, factor six, regarding the important and rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose—providing truthful information in 23 furtherance of public safety—underscores our conclusion that the statute is nonpunitive. See Haskell, 2001 ME 154, ¶ 9, 784 A.2d 4 (“[T]he Supreme Court has intimated, in other cases, that the most significant question under the effects stage of the analysis is whether the law, ‘while perhaps having certain punitive aspects, serve[s] important nonpunitive goals.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996))). [¶50] Factor four, whether the statute promotes traditional aims of punishment, and factor seven, whether the statute is excessive in relation to the alternate purpose, are found to be neutral; accordingly, they do not weigh heavily in our analysis. [¶51] After considering all of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we conclude that SORNA of 1999 is nonpunitive. As such, it does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions.