Opinion ID: 1229173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Trial court's refusal to give requested jury instructions

Text: The final issue raised by the defendant is the trial court's refusal to give the defendant's requested jury instruction stating that Lawrence Graham and Curtis Cassey were accessories before the fact. [15] The defendant emphasizes the importance of Graham's and Cassey's testimony to the State's case and opines that [t]he importance of the instructions would have been to notify the jury that great care and caution should be given to their testimony because of their role as an accessory and/or accomplice. According to the defendant, the proffered instruction was a correct statement of the law, was not covered in any other charge given the jury, and concerned a material issue so that its refusal constitutes reversible error. Citing State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994); State v. Satterfield, 193 W.Va. 503, 457 S.E.2d 440 (1995); and State v. Crabtree, 198 W.Va. 620, 482 S.E.2d 605 (1996). This Court has stated, A trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction is reversible error only if: (1) the instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) it is not substantially covered in the charge actually given to the jury; and (3) it concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impairs a defendant's ability to effectively present a given defense. Syllabus Point 11, State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994). Further, a trial court can refuse an instruction not raised by sufficient evidence. State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. at 181, 451 S.E.2d at 747 (citation omitted). Whether facts are sufficient to justify the delivery of a particular instruction is reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. In criminal cases where a conviction results, the evidence and any reasonable inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Syllabus Point 12, Id. The trial court refused to give the proffered instructions because it found that there was insufficient evidence that Graham and Cassey were accomplices to the crime. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to give the instruction. An essential element of the crime of accessory before the fact is knowledge. State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905, 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975). While an accessory before the fact, need not necessarily have intended the particular crime committed by the principal; an accessory is liable for any criminal act which, in the ordinary course of things, was the natural or probable consequence of the crime that he procured, advised or commanded, although such consequence may not have been intended by him. State v. Loveless, 139 W.Va. 454, 463-464, 80 S.E.2d 442, 448 (1954) (quoting, in part, a jury instruction held to be not erroneous). Cassey's testimony indicates that he sold morphine to the defendant indirectly through Graham, who testified that he sold the morphine to the defendant because he knew the defendant did pain drugs like [morphine]. Graham also testified that he witnessed the defendant inject himself with the morphine he purchased from Graham. While Cassey and Graham obviously knew that the defendant was purchasing the morphine in order to inject himself with it, there is no evidence they possessed the requisite knowledge that the defendant was going to deliver the morphine to another person in violation of W.Va. Code § 60A-4-401 (1983). Accordingly, we are unable to find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the proffered instructions.