Opinion ID: 1866200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: restriction of defense counsel's voir dire examination

Text: By these assignments attorneys for the defense contend that the trial court erred in curtailing the defense voir dire examination. The improper restriction denied the defendants a fair trial, they contend. Defense counsel Mr. Minor attempted to explore the jurors' attitudes toward a defendant who should remain silent at trial. After he had successfully questioned at least two prospective jurors in this area, the following exchange occurred: Q. Mr. O'Neal, do you think that you would want to hear from either person because of MR. INDERBITZIN: Your Honor, I would object to the form of that question. Mr. Minor is saying would you want to hear, not can you render an impartial verdict. The juror is trapped in a situation where if they say don't, they indicate they don't care what the men have to say. If they do want to hear from them, they can't respect their Fifth Amendment rights. I think the question is somewhat phrased as a catch twenty-two type of thing. I object to the form of the question. THE COURT: You might have to either rephrase the question or go into it further with the jurors. Counsel began to explore another area of questioning, but returned to the issue of defendants' silence at trial: Q. Mrs. Smith, do you think that you would want to hear some explanation of why you should find the defendant not guilty here? Some explanation from them before you could vote not guilty? A. Yes. The state again objected; the court replied: THE COURT: I will have to hear the next question to see if he goes into it further. EXAMINATION BY MR. MINOR: Q. Do I understand your answer to be that you would want to? A. Yes. Q. Do you understand the law says that you cannot require to hear something from the defendant? A. Yes. Q. Or that you cannot take the fact that he chooses not to testify to affect your judgment. You are not to infer guilt on a defendant's decision not to testify. A. Yes. Q. Do you understand that? A. Yes. Q. So, again, do you think that even though the law says, do you think you would want to hear? MR. INDERBITZEN: Your Honor, the same objection again as phrased. I understand what counsel is getting at. I don't object to that. I just have trouble with the phrasing because the question is yes or no. Either way the juror answers it appears either she is disregarding a constitutional right on one hand or not caring what he says. I don't think the question is phrased properly. THE COURT: Objection will be sustained. You may go into the area as long as you follow up with the question as to whether the juror would follow the law. Defense counsel then continued questioning concerning the right to remain silent. EXAMINATION BY MR. MINOR: Q. Mrs. Smith, you say that you want you think that you would want to hear from the defendants; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. You say you think you understand that the law does not require that they testify? A. No. I don't guess so. Q. You say you understand that? A. Yeah, understand that. The state argues that the defense was allowed to continue questioning as to the role of silence on the part of the defendants at trial; counsel was only asked to rephrase or further pursue the jurors' acceptance of the law. Even after the state's objection had been sustained, the judge permitted further discussion in the area. Defendants contend that the issue of whether the prospective jurors would infer guilt by the defendants' decision not to testify was crucial since both defendants remained silent at trial. The state, however, objected only to the phrasing of the defense question, not to its substance. Defendants contend that the defendant must be given wide latitude in examining prospective jurors in order to secure information for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges or challenges for cause. This is a well-settled principle constitutionally and jurisprudentially. La. Const., 1921, art. I, § 10; La.Const. art. I, § 17; State v. Hawkins, 376 So.2d 943 (La. 1979); State v. Holmes, 347 So.2d 221 (La. 1977); State v. Monroe, 329 So.2d 193 (La. 1975). From a review of the entire voir dire it can be readily seen that the defense attorneys were not unreasonably restricted in the questioning of prospective jurors. Additionally the defense in no way objected to the court's ruling in this matter; therefore, the error cannot be urged for the first time on appeal. La.C.Cr.P. art. 841. After the court's ruling, defense counsel continued to question jurors on the defendants' right to remain silent pursuant to the court's admonitions. These assignments therefore lack merit.