Opinion ID: 2087166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: During the State's closing argument, the Prosecutor made the following statement: Then, suddenly, Mr. Ovell  Mr. Edwards is taking a lot more interest in the radio, `How much did it cost?'; `$150.00', he said. Then he began to explain to Mr. Skinner, `I guess you haven't heard about how vicious I have become since you have been out of town. Guess you haven't heard how I have become since I walked on two murder raps.' Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. Following a discussion outside the hearing of the jury, the trial court sustained the objection, denied the motion for mistrial and gave the following admonition to the jury. Members of the jury, I believe the recall of the evidence would indicate the witness' testimony was that the defendant said, `I had beaten two raps', two raps, but no indication what the charges were in those cases. With that admonition, you are to disregard any reference, and you should recall the evidence yourselves in this case as to what was actually testified to, remembering at all times the statements of counsel are not evidence. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial in that the comment that Defendant had walked on two murder raps was not based upon any evidence before the jury, was highly prejudicial and inflammatory, and could not be cured by the admonition which was given. The denial of a motion for mistrial will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The case must be reversed only if the statement was so prejudicial as to have placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. Morgan v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 964, 967. The declaration of a mistrial is an extreme action which is warranted only when no other action can be expected to remedy the situation, Gambill v. State, (1982) Ind., 436 N.E.2d 301, 304, and, as a general rule, if the jury is admonished by the trial court to disregard a statement at trial, no reversible error will be found. Ward v. State, (1982) Ind., 438 N.E.2d 966, 967; Page v. State, (1980) Ind., 410 N.E.2d 1304, 1307. The question of whether Defendant was so prejudiced that the admonishment could not cure the error is one that must be determined by examining the facts of the particular case. The burden is on defendant to show that he was harmed and placed in grave peril by the denial of the motion. White v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 64, 77-78, 272 N.E.2d 312, 319-20. Whether a prosecutor's statement results in subjecting a defendant to grave peril is determined by the probable persuasive effect of the statement upon the jury's decision. Maldonado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492, 499, 355 N.E.2d 843, 848. In the case at bar, while recounting to the jury the Defendant's method of committing this robbery, the Prosecutor overstated the evidence. She was not, however, disclosing evidence against the Defendant, but rather was retelling what the victim had said that Defendant had done to induce him to part with his property. Although it was error for the Prosecutor to expand the victim's testimony from raps to murder raps, there is no reason for the jury to infer that the Defendant had prior murder acquittals. His statement, whether true or false, was apparently made for the sole purpose of convincing Skinner to give up his radio. Moreover, there is no indication that the Prosecutor intentionally expanded Skinner's testimony. In her opening argument she had stated that Skinner would testify that Defendant had told him that he had beat these two murder raps, and, after realizing the error, she, too, cautioned the jury as follows: Ladies and gentlemen, I will again ask you to keep in mind the purpose of a closing argument. This is merely argument, and again I will ask you on behalf of the State of Indiana to base your verdict upon the evidence as you have heard it, and nothing which either I or Mr. Wolter would say during closing argument. Under all of the circumstances of this case, we hold that the admonitions were sufficient to cure prejudice, if any, which resulted from the Prosecutor's comment. We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER, DeBRULER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.