Opinion ID: 392028
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Denial of Immediate Reinstatement

Text: 157 Pursuant to his finding that the company's unfair labor practices had prolonged and converted the strike, the ALJ found that 158 the ... persons named in paragraph 20 of the complaint for whom the Union unconditionally applied for reinstatement, and to whom the Respondent on March 25, 1977, refused reinstatement, are unfair labor practice strikers, and that by refusing reinstatement to them the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 159 The basic issue is whether the strike was an economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike at the time the permanent striker replacements were hired. There is no dispute that the strike began as an economic strike in support of the union's wage and other contract demands. Therefore the question is whether the strike was converted to an unfair labor practice strike by the employer's subsequent conduct, and if so, when.
160 DB1[094][121-123] The distinction between economic and unfair labor strikers determines reinstatement rights: 161 It is settled that an employer may refuse to reinstate economic strikers if in the interim he has taken on permanent replacements. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46, (58 S.Ct. 904, 910-911, 82 L.Ed. 1381). It is equally settled that employees striking in protest of an employer's unfair labor practices are entitled, absent some contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, to unconditional reinstatement, with back pay, even if replacements for them have been made. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (76 S.Ct. 349, 355, 100 L.Ed. 309). 162 NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50-51, 93 S.Ct. 74, 76-77, 34 L.Ed.2d 201 (1972). Economic strikers, upon unconditional request, are entitled to reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions unless the employer has legitimate and substantial business justifications for denying the request, and having hired permanent replacements is a legally sufficient justification. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378-79, 88 S.Ct. 543, 545-546, 19 L.Ed.2d 614 (1967). However, such economic strikers do have a right to preferential rehiring when the departure of permanent replacements creates vacancies. Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920, 90 S.Ct. 928, 25 L.Ed.2d 100 (1970). See NLRB v. Crimptex, Inc., 517 F.2d 501, 504 (1st Cir. 1975); American Machinery Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321, 1328 (5th Cir. 1970). 163 We have already held, in part V, supra, that the strike was not converted on April 12 by the wage increase. In addition, in light of the ALJ's finding that the strike was thereafter prolonged by the Respondent's unfair labor practices both at and away from the bargaining table, we have examined the record for evidence bearing on the question whether any of the three subsequent unfair labor practices which we have sustained might have prolonged and thereby converted the strike at a later date. Our review of the record with respect to the failure to bargain with respect to SGR, the supervisor misconduct, and the failure to disclose all of the required information, as noted in parts VI, VII, and VIII, supra, discloses no basis for an inference that any of these violations of the Act had any material effect on the nature, motivation, or length of the strike. 164 The fundamental stumbling block, from the prestrike negotiations in March 1976 to the reinstatement request in late March, 1977, was wages and to a lesser extent the duration of the agreement. The parties never came close to agreement on the wage issue, and there is no indication that either party's adherence to its economic demands was caused by anything other than (d)eep conviction, firmly held, that their position was valid under the circumstances. NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., supra, 275 F.2d at 231. Walter Dolbow's television statement in February 1977 that we (are) on strike for more money is one indication that it was the union's strong belief that its members were underpaid that kept the strikers on the picket lines for nearly a full year. To be sure, the union was bitterly unhappy with the company's bargaining positions and proposals, as reflected both by heated exchanges at certain bargaining sessions and the union's filing nine unfair labor practice charges over the course of the strike. It would be to disregard the realities of modern-day collective bargaining, however, not to recognize that in some instances an unfair labor practice charge may be more of a bargaining stratagem than a credible indication that the Act has in fact been violated. Moreover, as discussed above, it is simply not the case that whenever in the course of a strike an employer commits an act that is found to constitute an unfair labor practice the strike is thereby transformed into an unfair labor practice strike. Some showing of prolongation and causation is required to support a finding of conversion. 165 It might be argued that in light of our holding regarding the effect of the wage increase and our reversal of certain unfair labor practice findings, the appropriate course would be for us to remand this case to the Board for a determination whether any of the three surviving unfair labor practices converted the strike. However, for several reasons we conclude that a remand is inappropriate. First, as noted above, we find the record so devoid of any evidence to support a finding of conversion that a remand would likely be pointless. Our holding that the ALJ's finding that the strike was prolonged (after April 12) by Respondent's unfair labor practices ... is not supported by substantial evidence disposes of the matter. Second, the parties, the court, and the public have a strong interest in the prompt, accurate, fair and final disposition of labor cases. The events in question took place over four years ago. A remand and the inevitable return to this court for another review would prolong the controversy still longer, without any indication that a more appropriate adjudication would be achieved. Rather, under these circumstances, we agree with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that remand would merely give the Board another bite at the proverbial cherry, and ... piecemeal litigation would result. NLRB v. Colonial Haven Nursing Home, Inc., 542 F.2d 691, 711 (7th Cir. 1976) (on petition for rehearing). Therefore, in the interests of finality, we decline to remand for further findings on the conversion issue and deny enforcement of those portions of the Board's remedial order which depend on the finding of conversion. 166 A. Reinstatement Rights of Economic Strikers 167 Because we hold that the strikers were economic strikers throughout the duration of the strike, we must consider their rights as economic strikers upon the request for reinstatement made on March 25, 1977. Since the ALJ proceeded under the assumption that the strikers were at all relevant times unfair labor practice strikers, he did not reach this issue. However, because the law is clear on the issue and because the company appears to have acted consistently with the law applicable to economic strikers, we find no need to remand on this issue. See Colonial Haven, supra, 542 F.2d at 707-11 (declining in equitable discretion to remand on the same issue under similar circumstances). 168 A threshold issue is whether, as the company contends, the reinstatement request was in fact conditional. The company bases this contention on the union's March 8 letter unconditional(ly) applying for immediate reinstatement of 22 named strikers, including David Bates, and the Union's March 11 letter clarifying that unconditional reinstatement, as a group was requested. By letter of March 21, the company informed the union that by reason of Bates' strike misconduct, it was terminating him, and that Mr. Bates is the only one of the twenty-two that the company takes the position that it will refuse reinstatement because of strike misconduct. 46 The company now argues that the inclusion of Bates, in a group request, makes the request conditional. Rejecting this contention, the ALJ explained in a footnote: 169 The Respondent has argued that the Union's offer of reinstatement is conditional because the list of strikers' names includes that of David Bates. I find no merit to this contention. At no time did the Union ever state that none of the strikers would return to work unless all of those listed in its March 8 offer were returned. Furthermore, no such implication can be drawn from the Union's letter protesting the Company's desire to conduct individual interviews of the strikers before deciding whether or not to reinstate them. 170 For substantially the reasons stated, we agree with the ALJ that the request was intended by the union to be, and was as a matter of law, unconditional. The employer has the burden of showing that the offer to return was not unconditional. NLRB v. Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498, 505 (10th Cir. 1973). The company has not met that burden. Indeed, in view of the fact that it failed to raise its contention regarding Bates and conditionality during the exchange of correspondence concerning the reinstatement request, the company's argument has more the appearance of a post-hoc rationalization than a serious legal contention. 47 The positions and actions of the parties make clear that the real controversy was not over the conditionality of the reinstatement request, but rather over whether the strikers were economic or unfair labor practice strikers, in light of the differing reinstatement rights afforded those two categories. 171 We have held above that the strikers were economic strikers at all relevant times. As such, (t)he strikers ... run the risk that they may be permanently replaced while the strike is underway, and the fact that such replacements are on the job provides an adequate justification for an employer's refusal of reinstatement. NLRB v. Crimptex, Inc., supra, 517 F.2d at 504. Here, the union took that risk, and all the SGG strikers were permanently replaced before the reinstatement request. However, under Fleetwood Trailer and Laidlaw, supra, the strikers have the right to be rehired before others are hired when the departure of their replacements creates vacancies, unless, in the words of § 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (defining employee), a striker has obtained ... other regular and substantially equivalent employment. See Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1972). 172 The company, relying on its belief that the strikers were economic strikers, acted consistently with these requirements. It did not refuse reinstatement to any of the strikers except Bates, and his termination was found to be for good cause. With respect to all the other strikers, the company in its final letter to the union on March 25, 1977, stated that upon proper application, the Company will reinstate those strikers who so desire when openings occur under the dictates of the law ... for economic strikers .... The record shows, and the ALJ noted, that pursuant to this offer the company reinstated strikers Earl Curtis on March 21, 1977, George Light in July, 1977, and Henry Ward on October 3, 1977. 48 The uncontradicted testimony of company witnesses Edward Tribou and Andrew Soule indicated that when positions opened, SGG recalled those strikers whom they considered the best men, irrespective of seniority, whom management believed were not already working elsewhere, 49 and that no other positions had become available. 173 There is no claim before us that the company has reinstated strikers in a discriminatory manner, or that it otherwise employed unlawful criteria in choosing who to reinstate when a position became available or has failed to act in good faith. Nor is there any contention that the company has terminated its reinstatement offer or failed to keep it open for a reasonable time. 50 Therefore we hold that, on the record before us, petitioners did not violate § 8(a)(3) of the Act by refusing immediate reinstatement to the strikers as a group, and we deny enforcement of the portion of the Board's order that requires immediate reinstatement with backpay of twenty named strikers and the dismissal of their replacements.