Opinion ID: 621864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did Nigg's Prior Convictions Qualify as Three Violent Felonies?

Text: Nigg next argues that the district judge erred when determining that the government met its burden of proof to establish the existence of three prior violent felonies to warrant application of the ACCA. In support of this claim, Nigg makes two basic sub-arguments. First, Nigg argues that his three prior felony convictionsall based on armed robberies that occurred within a six-day windowshould not be viewed as three separate episodes. Rather, they should be viewed as a single episode because each robbery was part and parcel of a single crime spree. To reiterate, under the ACCA, the violent felonies at issue must be committed on occasions different from one another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). To determine whether the felonies were committed on different occasions, the operative test analyzes whether the crimes were committed sequentially or simultaneously. United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1021 (7th Cir.1994) ( en banc ) (defendant committed three separate violent felonies under the ACCA when he broke into three separate businesses located in a strip mall within thirty-five minutes); United States v. Thomas, 280 F.3d 1149, 1159 (7th Cir.2002) (robberies were committed on different occasions because they occurred on different dates and involved different victims). In sum, [c]ases interpreting the ACCA clearly uphold the minimum fifteen-year sentence enhancement for criminals who commit separate crimes against different individuals while on a spree, within a short period of time, provided that the perpetrator had the opportunity to cease and desist from his criminal actions at any time. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d at 1020. Using this standard, Nigg's crimes were obviously committed in a sequential fashion, as it is physically impossible for one person to commit three armed robberies simultaneously at three different locations against three different victims on three different dates. In this sense, Nigg's circumstances are easily distinguishable from the cases on which he relies. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 278-79 (5th Cir.2006) (court could not determine as a matter of law that the burglaries occurred on different occasions where there was evidence that defendant and his friend entered two different buildings simultaneously). Nigg next contends that his prior convictions for armed robbery with a gun do not constitute violent felonies under the ACCA. Specifically, the ACCA defines a violent felony as follows: any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that... (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.] 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The crux of Nigg's argument is that because Dennis Oberheim was the leader of the crime spree, the nature and extent of Nigg's involvement is unclear, and it would be speculative to classify his prior convictions as violent felonies without additional judicial fact-finding. This argument rests on a faulty premise: that the classification of the conviction isn't all that important. To the contrary, we employ a categorical approach when determining whether a crime is a violent felony. United States v. Fife, 624 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir.2010); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (In determining whether this crime is a violent felony, we consider the offense generically, that is to say, we examine it in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.). Under this approach, we first identify the offense involved and then focus on the particular elements of the statutory offense, without consideration of the underlying facts of the individual case. Fife, 624 F.3d at 445. But some statutes may be violated in several different ways, such as a statute which creates more than one crime or one that defines one crime with multiple enumerated modes of commission. Id. (citations omitted). And, at times, the statute may be violated in a way that does not constitute a violent felony under the ACCA. Id. When this situation arises, it becomes critical to determine precisely which offense is involved within that statutory scheme. Id. Under these conditions, courts may employ a more searching `modified categorical approach' to determine the statutory offense at issue. Id. This modified approach allows a court to review a limited universe of documents, such as the charging document, the plea agreement, or the transcript of the colloquy between the judge and the defendant. Id. Even under the modified approach, however, the inquiry must remain an objective one, focused on the offense itself, not the individual's actions. Id. Here, we need not venture into the modified categorical approach. In 1976, Arizona defined robbery as the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 13-641 (1956). And if the robbery was committed by a person armed with a gun, it was punished with a minimum prison term determined by whether it was a first, second, or subsequent offense. ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 13-643(B) (1956). Moreover, by 1976, Arizona had abolished the distinction between accomplices before-the-fact and principals, treating all persons concerned in the commission of a crime as principals. ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. §§ 13-138 to 140 (1956). Nigg's only colorable argument is that the last disjunctive phrase of the Arizona robbery statute, or fear, does not necessarily involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. However, we have squarely rejected similar arguments in the past. See United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 680-81 (7th Cir.1997) (attempted unarmed robbery under Michigan law qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA; under Michigan law, the element of putting in fear means threatening the use of physical force against the person of another); see also Thomas, 280 F.3d at 1159 (robbery by intimidation under Georgia law qualified as a violent felony); United States v. Dickerson, 901 F.2d 579, 584 (7th Cir.1990) (robbery under Illinois law qualified as a violent felony). More importantly, this argument ignores the fact that Nigg was convicted of three counts of armed robbery with a gun. Introducing a gun into a robbery necessarily creates a fear of physical injury to the victim. See United States v. Taylor, 179 Fed.Appx. 957, 961 (7th Cir.2006) (The two armed robberies are unquestionably `violent felonies' under Section 924(e)(1)....). So far as the record and the Arizona statutes are concerned, Nigg directly committed each of the armed robberies. Without further belaboring the point, suffice it to say that armed robbery with a gun clearly fits the bill for a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).