Opinion ID: 1587732
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitution and Prior Case Law

Text: ¶ 25 Article XII, Section 1 states that amendments may be submitted to the people in such manner . . . as the legislature shall prescribe. Thus, the constitution assigns considerable authority and discretion to the legislature in the way it submits amendments to the people for a vote. Our inquiry is whether the legislature in the formation of the question acted reasonably and within their constitutional grant of authority and discretion. Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis.2d at 604, 317 N.W.2d 420. ¶ 26 This is not to say the legislature's discretion is without limit. The constitution is clear that the people must be able to vote for or against each amendment if more than one amendment be submitted. Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1 (emphasis added). On its face, this language does not prohibit a single constitutional amendment from being complex or multifaceted, or from containing a variety of specific prescriptions and proscriptions. The constitutional text suggests that the separate amendment rule is implicated only when the substance of an amendment cannot be said to constitute a single amendment. ¶ 27 Our case law affirms this understanding. This court has examined whether a constitutional amendment violates the separate amendment rule on three prior occasions. Each merits discussion. ¶ 28 This court first encountered a separate amendment rule challenge in State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318, 11 N.W. 785 (1882). In that case, the constitutional amendment contained four distinct propositions: (1) members of the Assembly would serve two-year terms instead of one-year terms, and be elected from single districts; (2) senators would serve four-year terms instead of two-year terms, and be elected alternately in odd and even numbered districts every two years; (3) the legislature would meet no more than once every two years; and (4) legislative salaries would increase to $500. Id. at 326, 11 N.W. 785. ¶ 29 We rejected as absurd the contention that each distinct proposition must be submitted separately. Such an approach would make amending the constitution unduly difficult, especially for complex issues or when an overall change might be impossible to effectuate if the voters could choose to adopt certain parts of the proposed amendment and not others. Id. at 335-36, 11 N.W. 785. ¶ 30 Instead, we construed the separate amendment rule to require separate votes on amendments which have different objects and purposes in view. Id. at 336, 11 N.W. 785. As such, we stated the following test: In order to constitute more than one amendment, the propositions submitted must relate to more than one subject, and have at least two distinct and separate purposes not dependent upon or connected with each other. Id. ¶ 31 Applying this test to the facts of the case then before us, we concluded that all of the propositions related to the purpose of changing from annual to biennial sessions of the legislature. Id. Most interesting and relevant to McConkey's claim was our discussion of the legislative pay raise. This proposition was less intimately and necessarily connected with the change to biennial sessions, yet it was clearly connected with it. Id. at 337, 11 N.W. 785. We explained that it was proper to increase the pay of legislators because of the increased duties and service required by the amendment. Id. Though the legislature certainly could have submitted the propositions as separate amendments, it did not need to do so because the constitution grants the legislature discretion in this area. Id. As long as there is one general purpose, and the items are connected with that purpose, the legislature has great latitude as to how it drafts amendments. Id. ¶ 32 Our opinion went further and discussed other amendments that had been adopted. Article IV, Section 31 (since amended twice), for example, prohibited the legislature from passing special or private laws in nine different circumstances, and required the legislature to enact general laws for anything not prohibited by the amendment. Id. at 337-38, 11 N.W. 785. We noted that this amendment was far more open to challenge than the change from an annual to biennial legislature, but no one thought to challenge its validity. Id. Even so, we stated that the amendment constituted a single amendment. Id. at 338, 11 N.W. 785. The general purpose of the amendment was to restrict the power of the legislature in the matter of enacting special and private laws. Id. Again we stated that while each of the specifically prohibited types of private or special laws could have been submitted separately, the legislature had the discretion to submit them together. Id. In fact, all of the seven amendments that had been adopted up to that point were subject to similar objections, we explained, but all were acceptable because they had one general purpose in view. Id. at 339, 11 N.W. 785. All of the propositions in each were connected with and intended to carry into effect the one general purpose. Id. ¶ 33 We addressed the separate amendment rule again (among other issues) in State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953). In that case, a constitutional amendment approved by the people made the following changes: (1) State Senate districts were to be created taking land area and population into account, not just population; (2) military personnel and Indians not taxed, who were previously not counted in creating Senate and Assembly districts, were now to be counted; (3) Assembly districts were to be created using town, village, and ward lines, where previously they were to include county, precinct, town, and ward lines; and (4) Assembly districts no longer needed to fall entirely within a single Senate district. Id. at 653-54, 60 N.W.2d 416. The referendum question submitted to voters asked: Shall sections 3, 4 and 5 of article IV of the constitution be amended so that the legislature shall apportion, along town, village or ward lines, the senate districts on the basis of area and population and the assembly districts according to population? Id. at 651, 60 N.W.2d 416. ¶ 34 The Attorney General argued that the amendment followed the requirements announced in Hudd because all of the provisions were necessary, or at least convenient and proper, for the accomplishment of the main purpose of taking area as well as population into account in apportioning Senate districts. Id. at 656, 60 N.W.2d 416. The Thomson court accepted without discussion [8] that the main purpose was to take area as well as population into account in apportioning Senate districts, but concluded that two of the propositions did not support this general purpose. Id. The changes to the Assembly districts eliminated the previous requirement that Assembly districts were to contain whole counties, a drastic, revolutionary alteration to the current constitutional scheme. Id. Relying on Hudd, we held that this change had no bearing on the main purpose of the proposed amendment, . . . nor does it tend to effect or carry out that purpose. Id. Similarly, we held that the counting of untaxed Indians and military personnel was also not a detail of a main purpose to consider area in senate districts. Id. at 657, 60 N.W.2d 416. Therefore, we concluded that the amendment was adopted in violation of the separate amendment rule. Id. at 660, 60 N.W.2d 416. [9] ¶ 35 The most recent case challenging an amendment under the separate amendment rule is Milwaukee Alliance v. Elections Bd., 106 Wis.2d 593, 317 N.W.2d 420 (1982). In that case, the amendment contained a series of changes to Article I, Section 8 permitting courts to deny or revoke bail for certain accused persons, and allowing courts to set conditions for releasebail among themfor the purposes of assuring the accused person's appearance in court, protecting the community, or preventing intimidation of witnesses. Id. at 602, 317 N.W.2d 420. The changes included both general statements of a court's power, as well as specific conditions tied to certain crimes. Id. at 601, 317 N.W.2d 420. ¶ 36 In that case, the issue was whether the legislature in the formation of the question acted reasonably and within their constitutional grant of authority and discretion. Id. at 604, 317 N.W.2d 420. Citing Hudd, we asserted, It is within the discretion of the legislature to submit several distinct propositions as one amendment if they relate to the same subject matter and are designed to accomplish one general purpose. Id. at 604-05, 317 N.W.2d 420. ¶ 37 We explained that the purpose of the amendment was to change the constitutional provision from the limited concept of bail to the concept of `conditional release.' [10] Id. at 607, 317 N.W.2d 420. We concluded that the anti-monetary bail and conditional release provisions did not need to be submitted separately because defeat of one of the propositions would have destroyed the overall purpose of the amendment. [11] Id. The Hudd standard was again keythe legislature may submit multiple propositions within one proposed amendment so long as those propositions tend to effect and carry out one general purpose and are connected with one subject. Id.