Opinion ID: 888872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Substantial Similarity

Text: ¶ 48 Evenflo broadly asserts that [i]t is generally improper in a products liability case to admit evidence regarding a product model other than the one at issue. The three out-of-jurisdiction cases that Evenflo cites do not support its sweeping assertion. The courts in each case excluded evidence of different product models due to lack of similarity. ¶ 49 For example, in Brock v. Caterpillar, Inc., 94 F.3d 220 (6th Cir.1996), Brock's expert testified that the Caterpillar D9H bulldozer's brake system was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Brock, 94 F.3d at 224. The trial court permitted the expert to base his opinion on a comparison with the allegedly improved braking system of the newer and much larger model D10. Brock, 94 F.3d at 224-25. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had committed prejudicial error on the grounds that the comparison between the two models at most was tenuously relevant. Brock, 94 F.3d at 225. ¶ 50 The court recognized that evidence of product failures of substantial similarity would be relevant and admissible. Brock, 94 F.3d at 224. The court highlighted the substantial differences between the Caterpillar model D9H and the model D10. Brock, 94 F.3d at 224-26. The court noted that there were a large number of changes in character, size, style, and technological advancement between the manufacture design of the D9H ... and that of the D10 some years later. Brock, 94 F.3d at 225. The court emphasized that Caterpillar had not manufactured the D10's allegedly superior braking system until well after the accident involving the D9H. Brock, 94 F.3d at 225. ¶ 51 The court in McBurney Law Ser., Inc. v. Apex, Inc., 771 A.2d 911 (R.I.2001), determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it refused to permit the plaintiffs to cross-examine a defense witness concerning test reports regarding two toaster products manufactured by the defendants different from the model at issue. McBurney, 771 A.2d at 912. The plaintiffs intended to use the reports to impeach the assertions of the defense's expert witness, made in response to plaintiffs' own questions, that these other models could not produce a relatively large fire. McBurney, 771 A.2d at 911. The court cited the fact that the toasters were different models with features that varied from those in the toaster that the plaintiffs claimed had ignited the building fire. McBurney, 771 A.2d at 911-12. ¶ 52 Evenflo also points to Blevins v. New Holland North America, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d 952, 960-61 (W.D.Va.2001), in which the court granted the defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior accidents involving a different model hay baler than the model of baler at issue. The plaintiff sought to introduce the evidence in order to establish that New Holland had notice that baler operators tend to leave the operator's position without stopping the machine. Blevins, 128 F.Supp.2d at 960. The court earlier had granted summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff's breach of warranty claim, leaving for trial the claims based on negligence. Blevins, 128 F.Supp.2d at 954. Montana's strict liability law, as we discussed, involves concepts that fundamentally are different than those that are relevant to negligence law. See ¶¶ 37-39. ¶ 53 Montana law generally allows evidence of similar incidents in product liability cases when the dispute involves similar products. See Preston v. Montana Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court, Gallatin County, 282 Mont. 200, 936 P.2d 814 (1997). Preston suffered a head injury caused by an allegedly defective pneumatic roofing nailer. Preston, 282 Mont. at 202, 936 P.2d at 815. The district court denied Preston's attempt to seek discovery about various different product models that used the same allegedly faulty design. Preston filed a writ of supervisory control. Preston, 282 Mont. at 202-03, 936 P.2d at 815-16. ¶ 54 This Court reversed the district court's decision. The Court emphasized that this Court previously had recognized that evidence of other injuries caused by similar products is relevant and admissible. Preston, 282 Mont. at 207, 936 P.2d at 818 (citing Kuiper, 207 Mont. at 56, 673 P.2d at 1219; Krueger v. General Motors Corp., 240 Mont. 266, 274, 783 P.2d 1340, 1346 (1989)). The Court noted that a plaintiff in a product liability action must prove that the manufacturer sold the product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to a user. Preston, 282 Mont. at 209, 936 P.2d at 819 (citing § 27-1-719(2), MCA). The Court recognized that evidence of injuries caused by similar models would be relevant to both the `defect' and the `danger.' Preston, 282 Mont. at 209, 936 P.2d at 819. ¶ 55 The Court further noted that in order to prevail on punitive damages, Preston would have to prove that the defendant had acted with indifference to the high probability of injury to the plaintiff. Preston, 282 Mont. at 209, 936 P.2d at 819 (citing § 27-1-221(2), MCA). Evidence of injuries caused by similar models would be relevant to proving punitive damages as the existence of similar injuries tends to demonstrate the manufacturer's knowledge of the `high probability of injury.' Preston, 282 Mont. at 209, 936 P.2d at 819. The Court added that information of similar injuries caused by other models of nailers ... would be relevant to the issues of whether the design was unreasonably dangerous, whether [the manufacturer] was aware of the danger, and whether [the manufacturer] was aware of a viable, alternative design. Preston, 282 Mont. at 209, 936 P.2d at 819. ¶ 56 Evenflo insists that courts routinely exclude evidence regarding the recall of different models, especially where the recall involved a different defect. Evenflo again points solely to out-of-jurisdiction cases that fail to support its broad proposition. In Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (8th Cir.1988), the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision to allow the plaintiff to introduce extensive evidence concerning the Remington model 600 rifle in a product liability action that involved the Remington model 700 rifle. The court acknowledged that the model 600 evidence would have been relevant if the model 600 had been substantially similar in design and manufacture to the model 700 with respect to the design defect at issue. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1109. The court emphasized numerous differences between the two models with respect to the design defect at issue, however, and determined that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing substantial similarity. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1109. ¶ 57 The other cases cited by Evenflo emphasize the dissimilarity between product models or involve facts and procedural postures easily distinguishable from the Malcolms' case. See Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 410 F.Supp.2d 869 (D.N.D.2006) (recall evidence not admissible where the recalls involved different and dissimilar models, different defects, and contrasting purposes for the recall); Jordan v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.Supp. 72 (E.D.La.1985) (evidence of recall campaign not relevant where the recall dealt with a different model year and a distinctly different defect). The Malcolms, by contrast, introduced evidence that the model 206 and 207 were substantially similar with respect to the defects at issue. The evidence included the Malcolms' expert D'Aulerio's testimony that the OMW model 206 and 207 were identical with respect to the open belt hook design and the lack of EPS padding. Evenflo representative Kiser admitted that the seatbelt hook design was pretty close to absolutely identical. Kiser also admitted that a risk existed that the belt hooks could fail and allow the seat to slip off the seatbelt of any OMW models, including the 207. ¶ 58 The District Court acted within its discretion when it determined that the model 206 and model 207 were substantially similar with respect to the design defects alleged by the Malcolms. Sunburst, ¶ 74. The substantial similarity between the two models dictates that evidence regarding the model 206 would be relevant to whether Evenflo had sold the model 207 to the Malcolms in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to a user. Section 27-1-719(2), MCA. Evidence of cracks, shearing of belt hooks, and FMVSS 213 test failures of the model 206 would be relevant to both the `defect' and the `danger.' Preston, 282 Mont. at 209, 936 P.2d at 819. The District Court acted within its discretion when it decided that evidence regarding the model 206 constituted relevant evidence in determining Evenflo's liability for compensatory damages. Sunburst, ¶ 74. ¶ 59 The District Court also determined that evidence of Evenflo's actions surrounding the 1995 recall would be relevant for the purpose of the Malcolms' punitive damages claim. Evenflo repeatedly argues that evidence of the 1995 recall of the OMW model 206 should be inadmissible as the Malcolms' alleged defect in the model 207 differ[s] from the problem that prompted the Model 206's recall. Evenflo claims that cracking in some shells constituted the sole basis for the 1995 recall of the model 206. Evenflo claims that the Malcolms incorrectly imply that the Model 206 was recalled because of its open belt hook design. If the belt hook design had triggered the recall, NHTSA never would have allowed Evenflo to sell the Model 207. Evenflo argues that [t]he proof is in the pudding. Unlike the Model 206, the Model 207 complies with FMVSS 213a fact the jury never heard. ¶ 60 Evenflo's argument disregards the Malcolms' evidence that the model 206 contained the same defects as the model 207. See ¶ 57. Evenflo represented to NHTSA and consumers that cracking in some shells and a cut and pinch hazard constituted the sole reason for the recall of the model 206. The Malcolms presented evidence, however, that Evenflo knew from test results and test videotapes that the breaking apart of the seat in the area of the vehicle seat belt path and the resulting loss of restraint of the child seat constituted the true hazard of the model 206. Evenflo ignores the fact that this incomplete representation to NHTSA formed a major basis of the Malcolms' punitive damages claim. ¶ 61 The District Court noted in its order denying Evenflo's motion for a new trial that Evenflo had used evidence of its cooperation and interaction with the NHTSA in connection with its 1995 consumer corrective action involving the OMW model 206 to argue against liability for punitive damages. The District Court correctly observed that the Malcolms had used this same evidence to show ... how Evenflo lied to NHTSA, the public and even Jessi Malcolm about how badly the [OMW] was breaking apart, and the true ejection hazards posed to children riding in safety seats with open belt hooks. The court further determined that Evenflo's so-called `fix' incorporated into the model 207 did nothing to eliminate the ejection hazard posed by the open belt hook design. ¶ 62 Evenflo claims that [t]he Malcolm case is the only case involving an allegation that the belt hook of a Model 207 broke and caused death or serious injury to a child. It is also the only known case of a child being ejected from a vehicle while in a Model 207. Evenflo's claim ignores the reports that it received of OMW model 207 belt hooks breaking off, releasing from the vehicle seat belt, with the baby and seat bouncing around in the passenger compartment. See ¶¶ 14-16. Evenflo made the same assertion in its cross-examination of D'Aulerio. D'Aulerio replied that it was a miracle that the babies involved in the other accidents had not been injured. ¶ 63 Evenflo's conduct surrounding the testing and recall of the model 206 constituted relevant evidence regarding Evenflo's state of mind with respect to its sale of the model 207. Sunburst, ¶ 81. Evenflo's state of mind represented a key element in determining whether Evenflo had acted with actual fraud or actual malice. Sunburst, ¶ 81; § 27-1-221, MCA. The District Court acted within its discretion when it determined that evidence surrounding the recall and testing of the OMW model 206 was relevant for the purposes of determining punitive damages. Sunburst, ¶ 74. ¶ 64 Did the District Court abuse its discretion by applying unfairly its FMVSS 213 evidentiary ruling with respect to compensatory damages? ¶ 65 Evenflo argues that the District Court abused its discretion by applying its FMVSS 213 rulings in a one-sided manner. Evenflo points to the court's rulings that allowed the Malcolms to present evidence regarding the OMW's test failures, the recall of the model 206 due to noncompliance with FMVSS 213, and the alternative tunnel design's perfect FMVSS 213 test success. Evenflo contends that fairness dictates that the court should have allowed Evenflo to inform the jury that the model 207 had passed FMVSS 213, which distinguished it from its recalled predecessor Model 206.