Opinion ID: 1099694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying j.a. tucker's motion for summary judgment and motion for directed verdict.

Text: ¶ 11. Section 69-13-111 of the Mississippi Code Annotated provides: The owners of livestock which through their owner's negligence are found on federal or state designated paved highways or highway rights-of-way shall be subject to any damages as a result of wrecks, loss of life or bodily injury as a result of said livestock being on the above designated highways. The burden shall be on the owner of any such livestock to prove lack of negligence.... Miss.Code Ann. § 69-13-111 (2001). Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states that the summary judgment motion shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing.... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56(c). The ten-day notice requirement is held to be strictly applied, and generally a motion for summary judgment cannot be entertained once a jury is empaneled. See Pope v. Schroeder, 512 So.2d 905 (Miss.1987). The ten-day rule was not violated in this case because the motion was served eleven days before trial. ¶ 12. In interpreting § 69-13-111, this Court has stated that the language of the statute expressly creates a presumption that the owner of stray livestock is negligent in his confinement of the animal. Carpenter v. Nobile, 620 So.2d 961, 963 (Miss.1993). However, the plaintiffs in this case never sought to have Tucker found liable under § 69-13-111. Instead, they sought to have him found liable under the common law rules of negligence. ¶ 13. Generally, [t]he owner or keeper of a domestic animal is charged with knowledge of the natural propensities of animals of the particular class to which this animal belongs, and, if these propensities are of the kind that might cause injury he must exercise the care necessary to prevent such injuries as may be anticipated. 4 Am.Jur.2d Animals § 102, at 439 (1995) (footnote omitted). Further, [t]he rules as to liability for injuries inflicted by domestic animals apply, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, to persons who keep or harbor animals upon their premises with notice of their vicious disposition, whether they own them or not. Id. § 105, at 442 (footnote omitted). Also, liability will not attach to persons who do not have control over the animal, and landowners, such as landlords who do not have control over the animal will not be held liable for injuries caused by it. Id. at 443 (footnote omitted). If there had been a lease or license signed in this case, then Tucker definitely would not be liable because, as stated by the Texas Court of Appeals, when the lessor has no control over the premises, the lessor has no liability for injuries stemming from leased premises within the control of the tenant. Levesque v. Wilkens, 57 S.W.3d 499, 505 (Tex.Ct.App.2001). ¶ 14. In interpreting statutes, courts should not extend statutory liability beyond that which is clearly indicated by express terms or by necessary implication from the language used. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 303, 32 So.2d 138, 139 (1947). The rule is that legislation creating a liability where no liability existed at common law should be construed most favorably to the person or entity subjected to the liability, and against the claimant for damages. Id. There was common law liability for owners and keepers of livestock in Mississippi prior to the passage of the statute that has become § 69-13-111. See Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Gordon, 184 Miss. 885, 186 So. 631 (1939). ¶ 15. Mississippi has no cases that deal with the issue of the liability of a non-lessor landowner for the damages caused by livestock on its land. Section 69-13-111 does not create a new basis for liability; it creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. There was no new theory of liability created by this statute. The language of the statute makes it clear that only the owner of the cattle is subject to the presumption of liability. It does not say that only the owner of cattle can be held liable for damages. Therefore, whether a non-owner, who had an interest in and control over the land or livestock on it, is liable is a negligence question that should go to the jury. ¶ 16. In this case, there was testimony to the effect that both Tucker and McMillan exercised control over the offending bull; and therefore, the jury's finding that both were liable is within the evidence presented. Since Tucker's liability was alleged to exist under a negligence theory, at no time could the court switch the burden of proof on the issue of liability to the defense, as it could with McMillan. Instead, Salinas had to meet his burden. Jury Instruction 6 clearly states the standard of finding Tucker liable under the non-owner/keeper standard. See Gordon, 186 So. at 631. ¶ 17. Therefore, since Tucker was tried under a negligence theory of liability and at no time was the burden of proof shifted to him, he was not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that § 69-13-111 only applied to owners of runaway livestock. Since there existed several issues of material fact on which reasonable jurors could differ, the trial court was correct in denying Tucker's motion for summary judgment.