Opinion ID: 331987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: alleged errors occurring at trial.

Text: 7 Appellant contends that certain statements made during the course of the trial require reversal of his conviction and the granting of a new trial. First, he alleges that the district court erred in admitting into evidence testimony concerning appellant's admission of a prior narcotics conviction. After testifying about the cocaine purchase he made from appellant, Agent Rochon described the conversation which followed the transaction. Rochon testified that appellant recommended using the mails, saying, 'It's the smart way of doing it. When I was younger I was stupid and they caught me flat with three ounces.' Appellant was also reported to have said (according to Rochon) that he would never go to jail again. 8 Appellant contends that the government elicited these statements in an attempt to prove prior similar crimes, and with the intent of obtaining a conviction for the crime charged in this proceeding. Given the fact that appellant's primary defense at trial was that of insanity, however, we find that Rochon's testimony was admissible to show appellant's state of mind and his knowledge that the acts he was committing were unlawful. Cf. United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1149 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1974); see generally McCormick on Evidence, § 249 at 591 (2d ed. 1972). 9 Appellant's second contention is that the district court erred in allowing into evidence the following testimony by Rochon: 10 'It began by Mr. Godkins telling me, 'I know what you are down here for, but would any of your people be interested in Mexican brown? 11 Rochon then testified that at that point appellant Godkins offered him a substance identified by appellant as 'good' Mexican brown (street parlance for heroin). Appellant argues that this testimony was introduced by the government to 'blacken' him as a heroin dealer in the eyes of the jury. In light of appellant's previously-announced intention of possibly introducing evidence to establish an entrapment defense, however, the admission of the above statement was permissible to show a willingness or predisposition to deal in prohibited narcotic substances that would serve to negate an entrapment defense. Cf. United States v. Dickens, 524 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1975). 12 The third statement made by Rochon on the stand which is argued to constitute reversible error was the observation that appellant's co-conspirator, Richard Russell (who was not tried with appellant because he was still at large), appeared to be a 'runner' for appellant. The district court's admission of this statement is argued to have been prejudicial because without it the jury might have concluded that Russell was solely culpable for the crime at issue. We cannot agree with this reasoning. While Agent Rochon was not testifying as an expert witness, he was nevertheless familiar with the circumstances surrounding the negotiations for the sale of cocaine and had firsthand knowledge and observation of the relationship between appellant and his co-conspirator. Moreover, defense counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine Rochon on his opinion in order to discredit it. In light of these considerations, we do not find the admission of Rochon's statement to be reversible error. 13 Appellant's final allegation of error at trial concerns a statement by the court during cross-examination of Rochon at a point when the government objected to a particular question by defense counsel. In response to the defense's statement that the question was designed to establish that the confidential informer was not necessarily reliable, the court stated: 14 'Well, he didn't apparently (furnish false information) in this case according to the government's case. I'll overrule that objection.' 15 Defense counsel objected to this comment by the court, and appellant now contends that the statement was highly prejudicial to his case and constituted reversible error. Appellant's argument, however, overlooks a number of important factors. First, as the government pointed out immediately after appellant's attorney objected to the court's remark, the reliability or unreliability of the informer in this case is immaterial, since it has no bearing on whether appellant did in fact commit the offenses charged. Second, the court stated only that the informer furnished reliable information in this particular instance 'according to the government's case.' The use of this latter qualifying phrase clearly indicates that the reliability of the informer, if at all relevant, had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the government had simply put on evidence to show his reliability. Finally, the court's instructions during the jury charge to ignore its comments on any of the evidence was sufficient to cure any defect which may have occurred. 16