Opinion ID: 2248048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legality of Defendant's Detention

Text: Defendant first argues that the confession was the product of an illegal arrest and was made without the required Miranda warnings. The State argues, in effect, that defendant voluntarily cooperated with the police, and at the time of his admission, defendant was not in custody. Therefore, the State maintains, neither the admission nor the subsequent confession resulted from an illegal arrest, and Miranda warnings were not required. Prior to proceeding with our examination of the facts in this case, we note the propriety of our consideration of the testimony adduced at trial as well as at the suppression hearing. People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 36, 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223. Testimony adduced at the defendant's suppression hearing established that on January 15, 1989, Detectives Lou Tessmann and Donald Meadie appeared at defendant's home and asked defendant to accompany them to the Waukegan police station. Defendant agreed. Defendant entered the back seat of the police car, without being handcuffed, and was driven to the station. Once at the station, defendant was taken to an interview room, given Miranda warnings and questioned. Following the questioning, defendant was transported by the detectives to St. Therese Hospital where hair and blood samples were taken. After leaving St. Therese, the detectives stopped and permitted defendant to purchase cigarettes. Defendant was then transported back to his home. At no time was defendant told that he was free to leave. Subsequently, on the morning of January 19, Tessmann and Meadie appeared, again, at defendant's home and requested that defendant accompany them to the police station. According to the detectives' testimony, prior to being transported to the station, defendant requested, and was allowed, to brush his teeth and comb his hair. Defendant rode, without being handcuffed, in the back seat of an unmarked police car. The back doors of the car were not locked and were equipped with handles. Defendant was not told that he did not have to accompany the detectives to the police station. Once at the station, defendant was taken to an interview room, where, from about 9:30 a.m. until 11:30 a.m., he was questioned. Miranda warnings were not given. While at the station, defendant offered to take a polygraph examination to prove the truthfulness of responses he had made to the detectives. At about 11:30 a.m., arrangements were made for such an examination to be administered at the offices of John Reid and Associates in Chicago. Defendant was transported from the Waukegan police department to the John Reid offices by the interrogating detectives. While en route to John Reid, the detectives purchased food and cigarettes for defendant. The food was purchased at the drive-thru window at a McDonald's. The record does not state from where the cigarettes where purchased. In any event, prior to arriving at John Reid, defendant did not leave the vehicle. The drive from Waukegan to John Reid took about two hours. The detectives and defendant arrived at John Reid at about 2 p.m. Upon arriving, defendant sat in an unsecured waiting area while the detectives met with Michael Masokas and John Reid, the polygraph examiners. Defendant waited alone in the unsecured area for about 30 minutes. In their meeting with the polygraph examiners, the detectives informed Masokas and Reid that defendant was a suspect in the murder of his grandmother and that the purpose of the polygraph examination was to determine whether he had been involved. Prior to interviewing defendant, Masokas reviewed documents which had been provided him by the detectives. He then conducted a general interview with defendant and from that point,    moved into an interview, at which time the questions were pertaining to [defendant's] grandmother's death. The initial interview lasted about one hour. Masokas did not give defendant Miranda warnings, nor did he tell defendant that he was free to leave. Following the general interview, defendant was taken to another room, where Masokas administered the polygraph examination. Defendant was not given Miranda warnings nor was he told that he was free to leave prior to the examination. For purposes of the exam, defendant was questioned concerning the murder of his grandmother. After the polygraph examination, defendant was taken back to the first interview room. Masokas subsequently joined defendant and conversed with him concerning the results of the polygraph examination. During this post-polygraph conversation, Masokas told defendant that the door was unlocked and that he could leave at any time. During the post-polygraph discussion, defendant admitted to Masokas that he had killed his grandmother. Masokas then summoned Detective Tessmann. Tessmann entered the room, gave defendant Miranda warnings, then took defendant's verbatim statement. After taking the statement, Detectives Tessmann and Meadie placed defendant under arrest, handcuffed him, and transported him back to the Waukegan police station. Maria Yantz, defendant's maternal grandmother, testified that on the morning of January 19, the detectives came to her home and asked to speak with defendant. She went to defendant's bedroom, awakened him and told him that the detectives wanted to speak with him. According to Yantz, the detectives told defendant that he had to go with them to the police station for questioning. Defendant told the detectives that he had to shower first. The detectives would not permit defendant to shower, telling him that he had to go right away. When defendant went to the basement to put on clothing, he was accompanied by one of the detectives. On cross-examination, the State questioned Yantz concerning an earlier statement which she had given to the State's Attorney. In her earlier statement, Yantz had stated that the police asked defendant to go to the police station and that he went voluntarily. Defendant's testimony at trial concerning the events of January 19 essentially corroborated the testimony of Maria Yantz. Following the close of the evidence at the suppression hearing, the trial court found that, prior to defendant's admission to Masokas, there was no probable cause to arrest him. The court also determined that at the time of defendant's admission, he had been subjected to interrogation. However, the court determined that prior to making the admission, defendant was not in custody and, therefore, his subsequent confession was not tainted by an illegal arrest. We begin our analysis with an examination of the nature of defendant's detention. Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill.Const.1970, art. I, § 6.) A seizure, for fourth amendment purposes, is synonymous with an arrest. Absent probable cause or a warrant based thereon, an arrest is violative of the fourth amendment protections. See Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824. It is not disputed that, prior to defendant's admission, there was no probable cause for his arrest. Thus, if prior to making the admission, defendant was illegally detained, such illegality would infect the admission and possibly taint defendant's subsequent confession. See Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; People v. Holveck (1990), 141 Ill.2d 84, 152 Ill.Dec. 237, 565 N.E.2d 919. A person has been arrested when his freedom of movement has been restrained by means of physical force or a show of authority. ( United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 508.) The relevant inquiry in determining whether a suspect has been arrested is whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he was not free to leave. ( People v. Eddmonds (1984), 101 Ill.2d 44, 61, 77 Ill.Dec. 724, 461 N.E.2d 347; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d at 509.) Additional factors considered in a determination of whether an arrest has occurred include the intent of the officer and the understanding of the suspect ( People v. Wipfler (1977), 68 Ill.2d 158, 165, 11 Ill.Dec. 262, 368 N.E.2d 870) and whether the suspect was told that he was free to leave or that he was under arrest ( People v. Holveck (1990), 141 Ill.2d 84, 95, 152 Ill.Dec. 237, 565 N.E.2d 919; citing People v. Townes (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 850, 853, 50 Ill.Dec. 496, 419 N.E.2d 604). We first address the State's argument that defendant was specifically informed by Masokas that he was free to leave. We do not question the fact that Masokas told defendant that he was free to leave. However, given the context of the conversation in which the advice, by itself, was given, we are not persuaded that this advice would have been perceived by defendant as an indication that he was actually free to leave. It is significant that defendant was not so advised until the post-polygraph interview, at a time when, as the record reveals, Masokas was accusing defendant of having committed the offense, admonishing him of the importance of being truthful, and asking defendant to explain his failure on the polygraph exam. It seems to us that the advice was merely part of Masokas' interrogation technique, without any regard for the protection of defendant's fourth amendment rights. Had Masokas' advice been given during the general interview, or even prior to administering the polygraph examination, we could then value it as a factor favorable to a finding that defendant was not under arrest. The State next argues that defendant was left unguarded in the John Reid office for a period of 30 minutes. Further, the State argues, public transportation was accessible within a two-minute walk from the Reid offices. We are not persuaded that the accessibility of public transportation, in this case, necessarily supports a conclusion that defendant was not under arrest. However, in our assessment of the detectives' intent, we find the total lack of security or restraint of defendant while he was in the John Reid waiting area to be significant. This fact strongly supports a determination that defendant was not under arrest. Further, during defendant's pre-confession detention, none of the procedures which are normally associated with an arrest occurred. Notably, following his confession to Tessmann, defendant was, for the first time, handcuffed. Defendant relies upon Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, to support his claim of illegal arrest. In Dunaway, the defendant was picked up from a neighbor's home, taken, involuntarily, to the police station, and after being given Miranda warnings, questioned. Although the defendant was not told that he was under arrest, had he attempted to leave, he would have been physically restrained. The court held that defendant's detention amounted to an arrest. Dunaway is distinguishable from this case. The testimony adduced at defendant's suppression hearing was that defendant voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the police station. He was not given Miranda warnings, a circumstance which might be perceived by a suspect as an indication that he is under arrest. Additionally, unlike in Dunaway, there was no testimony to indicate whether, had defendant attempted to leave, he would have been restrained. We also find People v. Townes (1982), 91 Ill.2d 32, 61 Ill.Dec. 614, 435 N.E.2d 103, another case upon which defendant relies, distinguishable. In Townes, the defendant was subjected to interrogation for a period of more than 12 hours. During the interrogation, the defendant was consistently read his Miranda rights. The Townes court held that the 12 hours of interrogation to which the defendant was subjected exceeded permissible constitutional bounds. In contrast, in this case, defendant was subjected to interrogation for a period of 2½ to 3 hours. Defendant then offered to submit to a polygraph examination, which resulted in continued interrogation. Thus, unlike in Townes, here defendant's offer prolonged the interrogation. Additionally, unlike in Townes, Miranda warnings were not given to defendant until after his initial admission of culpability. After considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that a reasonable person in defendant's shoes would not have believed that he was under arrest. Thus, we conclude that defendant's statements were not taken in violation of his fourth amendment rights. Having determined that defendant was not under arrest for fourth amendment purposes, we must yet address the question of whether he was, nonetheless, in custody for Miranda purposes. Incriminating statements which have been obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, are inadmissible at trial. A suspect's entitlement to Miranda warnings is triggered when he is subjected to custodial interrogation, or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. ( Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706; see also People v. Lucas (1989), 132 Ill.2d 399, 417, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003.) We note that, in this case, Miranda warnings were given prior to Tessmann's taking of defendant's confession. In determining whether an interrogation is custodial, courts consider several factors, including: (1) the time and place of the confrontation; (2) the number of police officers present; (3) the presence or absence of family or friends; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure, such as physical restraint, the show of weapons or force, booking or fingerprinting; and (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of the interrogation. See People v. Brown (1990), 136 Ill.2d 116, 124-25, 143 Ill.Dec. 281, 554 N.E.2d 216; Lucas, 132 Ill.2d at 417, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003. We note that both Brown and Lucas, relying on Wipfler, 68 Ill.2d 158, 11 Ill.Dec. 262, 368 N.E.2d 870, have grafted an objective test onto the traditional fifth amendment analysis of custody. We find it helpful to point out that Wipfler applied the reasonable person standard in the context of its fourth amendment analysis covering the issue of arrest. Both Lucas and Brown, however, involved an analysis of custody in the context of the fifth amendment. That notwithstanding, we continue to agree with the appropriateness of the reasonable person test as a consideration in the determination of custody for fifth amendment purposes. Thus, applying Brown and Lucas, after weighing the traditional factors, as recited above, the court must make an objective determination as to what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would perceive if he were in defendant's position. Brown, 136 Ill.2d at 125, 143 Ill.Dec. 281, 554 N.E.2d 216; Lucas, 132 Ill.2d at 417-18, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003. Initially, we note that defendant's visit to the police station was not initiated by him; two detectives arrived at defendant's home and requested that he dress and accompany them to the station. Defendant was not given the option to be questioned at his home or to report to the police station at a later time, after he had showered and dressed. Additionally, as we have stated, we find the advice to defendant by Masokas, concerning defendant's freedom to leave, questionable. However, while we do not view the foregoing facts favorably, they do not necessarily compel a finding of custody. In our assessment, we find additional factors to be of equal significance. First, although Maria Yantz testified that defendant was required to go to the police station, she nonetheless stated that defendant went voluntarily. Moreover, the trial court expressly stated that it did not place much credence in her testimony. Further, we note that, while at the Waukegan station, defendant was questioned by the two detectives, and while at John Reid, only Masokas questioned defendant. Additionally, defendant was not handcuffed at any time during the interrogation and was otherwise unrestrained during the times that he was being transported by the detectives. Finally, as we have previously stated, none of the procedures normally associated with a formal arrest procedure occurred here. We believe that these facts support a finding that the degree of coerciveness, generally associated with interrogation, was diminished. Defendant argues that once he was at the polygraph examiners' office (John Reid), which is about 25 miles from his home in Waukegan, defendant was dependent on the detectives for transportation home. In that regard, we consider that defendant offered to submit to the polygraph examination. There is no evidence that he was compelled to do so. Defendant next argues that one of the most significant factors which indicates that he would have reasonably believed that he was in custody was his prior relationship with Tessmann. Defendant had previously been charged with, and was incarcerated for, resisting arrest by Tessmann. At the time of the questioning concerning the instant offense, defendant was on supervised release for the resisting arrest offense. Defendant asserts that, in light of these facts, he would not have believed that he was free to refuse to accompany the detectives to the station. We agree with defendant that his previous encounter with Detective Tessmann would tend to have an effect on his belief regarding his right to refuse to accompany the detectives to the station, as well as his belief concerning his freedom to leave. However, defendant testified that the detectives told him that they wanted to question him. They did not announce that defendant was under arrest. Further, there is no indication that defendant was induced to accompany the detectives to the station against his will. Thus, even though defendant's prior experience with the detectives may have influenced his cooperative conduct, we believe that his decision to accompany the detectives was, nonetheless, voluntary. Additionally, while a defendant's subjective belief, like in the context of an arrest (see Wipfler, 68 Ill.2d at 166, 11 Ill.Dec. 262, 368 N.E.2d 870; Redd, 135 Ill.2d at 284, 142 Ill.Dec. 802, 553 N.E.2d 316), is a legitimate consideration, the test for custody is what a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe. Moreover, it was defendant's testimony that he was not certain whether he could leave, and not that he believed he could not leave. Finally, since the detectives' expressed purpose for the polygraph examination was to determine whether defendant was involved in the murder, it appears that defendant was the focus of the investigation. Nevertheless, it was the detectives' testimony that other suspects were being investigated as well as defendant. Additionally, the fact that defendant may have been a suspect in the investigation does not automatically render his detention custodial. Viewed objectively, the facts here could reasonably support the trial court's finding that defendant was not in custody at the time of his admission. We find no Miranda violation. In sum, defendant's detention did not amount to an arrest. Further, defendant was not in custody during the time of the interrogation. Since he was not in custody, Miranda warnings were not required. Thus, defendant's admission and subsequent confession were not tainted by any fourth or fifth amendment violations and properly gave rise to probable cause for his arrest. On this record, we cannot say that the trial court's findings were manifestly erroneous.