Opinion ID: 2324309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Confrontation Clause Claims

Text: Appellants present three other claims under the Confrontation Clause. First, appellant Griffin complains that the trial court restricted his cross-examination of Fisher with regard to steroid abuse and psychiatric treatment in 2000. The complaint is without merit. In response to Griffin's questions on cross, Fisher denied using steroids or other drugs; denied feeling the mental effects of chronic steroid abuse or being on psychotropic drugs when he spoke with the police; and denied being treated for mental health problems at that time. Fisher's subsequent health problems were explored as well, and Griffin made no proffer that the witness was withholding relevant information. Griffin plainly was allowed sufficient leeway to satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by curtailing further questioning about the witness's supposed steroid use and psychiatric treatment in order to avoid harassment and end repetitive interrogation of marginal relevance at best. [20] Griffin also claims he was denied his right of confrontation when the prosecution introduced Michael Smith's autopsy report without calling the medical examiner who wrote it. [21] (The authoring examiner being unavailable, the Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia testified in her stead.) But Griffin did not object to the admission of the autopsy report, and his claim therefore is subject to the rigors of plain error review. [22] It does not survive that scrutiny. We need not decide whether the autopsy report constituted testimonial hearsay (the only kind of hearsay to which the Confrontation Clause applies); even if it did, we cannot conclude that the putative error in its admission prejudiced Griffin's defense or that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. [23] Finally, Diggs argues that his conviction for carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL) must be reversed because, over his objection, the court allowed the government to introduce a certificate of no license without testimony from its preparer. The government concedes that this was a Confrontation Clause violation that cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [24] Accordingly, we reverse Diggs's CPWL conviction. [25]