Opinion ID: 2586077
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Contacting

Text: The protective order of November 28, 2003, directed that Cooper not be in the physical presence of Hora, and that he refrain from contacting or otherwise communicating with her either directly or indirectly. Under AS 11.56.740(a)(1) in order to commit the crime of violating a protective order the protective order must contain a provision listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(1)-(7). Although this statute read literally only requires a violation of a provision of the protective order without specifying that the provision must be one listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(1)-(7), the section implies that only a violation of a provision listed in subsection .100(c)(1)-(7) may constitute the crime of violating a protective order. [15] Otherwise, there would be no reason to specify, as subsection .740(a)(1) does, particular provisions of subsection .100(c) that the protective order must contain. [16] This is significant in this case because the prohibition that Cooper not be in the physical presence of Hora is not a provision listed in subsection .100(c)(1)-(7). This does not mean that the in-the-presence prohibition is unauthorized. Under AS 18.66.100(c)(16) a court in framing a protective order may order other relief the court determines necessary to protect the petitioner or any household member. An order issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(16) may be enforceable by contempt, and possibly other means, but violation of such an order does not amount to the crime of violating a protective order as that crime is defined in AS 11.56.740(a)(1). The protective order's prohibition on Cooper contacting or otherwise communicating with Hora is a provision listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(2). Thus if Cooper contacted Hora with the requisite mental state he committed the crime of violating a protective order. This crime, as we have seen, is a crime involving domestic violence. As such, it would have been grounds for granting the petition for a long-term protective order under AS 18.66.100(b). Hora takes issue with Judge Gleason's conclusion that Cooper did not violate the no-contacting order in two respects. She contends first that contacting as used in AS 18.66.100(c)(2) should be construed to encompass appearing within the sight of the protected person. Second, she contends that Judge Gleason erroneously found that Cooper had to intentionally place himself where he could be seen by Hora, and that only knowing behavior is required by AS 11.56.740(a)(1). We reject Hora's first point. As to the second point, we agree that only knowing contacting is required but conclude that the error was harmless because there was no conduct that amounted to contacting within the meaning of AS 18.66.100(c)(2).
Hora's argument is that the statute defining the crime of stalking defines nonconsensual contact as including appearing within the sight of a protected person. She contends that this definition of contact should apply to the contacting prohibition listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(2). Although this is not an implausible argument, we reject it for the following reasons. Contacting, as a verb, means in common usage physically touching or communicating. [17] The stalking statute's use of the term, in conjunction with nonconsensual, to include merely appearing within the sight of another person goes beyond the meaning of contact in normal usage. Words in statutes are to be construed in accordance with their normal usage unless there is some indication that a special meaning is intended. [18] In the present case the context in which contacting is used in AS 18.66.100(c)(2) argues in favor of adhering to the normal meaning. The statute's inclusion of the phrase or otherwise communicating immediately after contacting strongly suggests that nonphysical contact must involve some element of direct or indirect communication and does not merely mean coming within view. Further, the special and considerably broader meaning of nonconsensual contact in the stalking statute is not, as there used, all that is needed for a crime to take place. The contact must also be repeated, so that it is a course of conduct, and it must place the protected person in fear. The need for these additional requirements to make stalking a crime argues against a construction that makes merely appearing in the sight of a protected person, without more, a crime. [19]
As noted, Hora takes issue with Judge Gleason's conclusion that Cooper's conduct had to be intentional, rather than merely knowing. The difference between the two concepts is that a person acts `intentionally' with respect to a result . . . when the person's conscious objective is to cause that result. . . . [20] By contrast, a person acts knowingly when he knows that a particular result will occur even if his objective is not to cause that result. [21] Hora's argument on this point is that [t]he plain language of the statute requires proof of the following elements: (1) the perpetrator acted knowingly with respect to his conduct; (2) the perpetrator knew of the existence of the protective order; and (3) the perpetrator recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct was prohibited by the order. Since the word intentionally does not appear in AS 11.56.740, there is no requirement that the perpetrator act intentionally. We agree with this formulation. But our rejection of Hora's argument that an act of contacting within the meaning of AS 18.66.100(c)(2) occurred means that this point is moot. Cooper's mental state would only be relevant if conduct amounting to contacting occurred. There is no evidence that the momentary eye contact that Judge Gleason found to have occurred had communicative content. Thus, contacting did not take place. [22]