Opinion ID: 2979014
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Gun Statement

Text: Thomas asserts that he was in custody when he made the statement to Martin that the gun was his. He argues that the statement should have been suppressed because he had not yet been Mirandized. Specifically, he claims that he was already in custody because, after Lenz detected the marijuana odor emanating from the vehicle, Lenz told Gardner and Thomas to exit the vehicle and separated them in order to get more information for the citation from Thomas. Thomas claims that Martin’s statement, “Well, that changes things, buddy,” marks the point in time when the nature of the stop changed from investigative detention to an arrest, especially since the officers knew Thomas was a convicted felon. Moreover, although Martin directed his question regarding the gun to both, as Lenz had stated, Gardner and Thomas were separated. Finally, he claims the earlier reference to “buddy” was clearly directed to him. The Fifth Amendment states that a defendant cannot be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that a suspect subject to custodial interrogation must be given notice of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. To ensure compliance with this rule, incriminating statements elicited during custodial interrogation prior to Miranda warnings cannot be admitted at trial. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam). However, this rule only applies “where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law -6- enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 494. In determining whether a suspect is in custodial interrogation, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). The “ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). This court also considers the following factors: (1) the purpose of the questioning; (2) whether the place of the questioning was hostile or coercive; (3) the length of the questioning; and (4) other indicia of custody such as whether the suspect was informed at the time that the questioning was voluntary or that the suspect was free to leave or to request the officers to do so; whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; and whether the suspect initiated contact with the police or voluntarily admitted the officers to the residence and acquiesced to their requests to answer some questions. United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1998). Thomas argues that he was “in custody” when Martin stated “Well, that changes things, buddy”, and then asked the question “Whose gun is this?” without first giving a Miranda warning. At the suppression hearing, Lenz stated that he did not take Thomas into custody until Thomas claimed that the weapon was his. Thomas testified that, when Martin found the gun, Martin told Sanders and Lenz to detain Thomas, but that the two officers hesitated to handcuff him because he had been so cooperative. Thomas then stated: “So they asked me – the black detective asked, he said, is this your gun, looking at me. And I was like, yes, sir, that’s my gun. And he just shot on, started doing paperwork, told them to detain me.” So Thomas’s own testimony establishes that -7- Thomas was not handcuffed until he made the statement.1 Thus, the question becomes whether he was merely under investigative detention or was actually in custody prior to being handcuffed, and when he made the incriminating statement. We agree with the district court’s determination that Thomas was not under arrest. First and foremost, for the reasons discussed above, Thomas was the subject of a lawful Terry stop. Thomas’s contention that he did not feel free to leave is immaterial. “The very nature of a Terry stop means that a detainee is not free to leave during the investigation, yet is not entitled to Miranda rights.” United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-41). In other words, during a Terry stop, “[t]he officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, “[a]lthough the ‘felt free to leave’ inquiry may be factor for consideration . . . the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Prior to the time he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, Thomas was not physically restrained. In fact, while in the car, he leaned over the seats and grabbed the marijuana baggie. Although required to exit the car, he and Gardner walked freely to the back of the vehicle. As the district court also found, only one brief question was asked, and the purpose of the question was to determine who owned the firearm. Because possession of a firearm is not 1 Even if he had been handcuffed, this fact would not automatically convert the detention to an arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that “the use of handcuffs [does not] exceed the bounds of a Terry stop, so long as the circumstances warrant that precaution”). -8- necessarily a crime, the question was merely investigatory. And, as the district court also found, the place of questioning was neither hostile nor coercive. The questioning took place outside, in a public space, with several onlookers passing by. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (stating that a single police officer’s questions to detainee and request that detainee perform a simple balancing test in a location visible to passing motorists was not the functional equivalent of a formal arrest). As the district court held, the video showed a pleasant discussion between Gardner, Thomas, and the officers while the investigation was taking place. More importantly, Thomas himself testified that he volunteered the answer. He specifically stated that he “stepped up for the pistol” because he was worried about Gardner’s job and custody of her children. In sum, when viewed in totality, it is clear that Thomas was merely subject to investigative detention at the time that he answered Martin’s question and therefore was not yet entitled to Miranda warnings. The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. In any event, a careful review of the video reveals that Thomas was asked whether he had any prior felony convictions before the “buddy” statement was made. As noted, the video does not capture Martin’s question about ownership. However, as the Government argues, it is plausible that Martin found the gun, the officers asked Thomas about his prior convictions, and then one of them made the “buddy” comment. This sequence of events would explain why the officers asked Thomas about his criminal history, because Thomas had already admitted the gun was his. Again, though, the “buddy”statement does not undermine the district court’s finding that when Martin asked the gun question, the environment was not coercive and that Thomas himself volunteered the statement.