Opinion ID: 1831963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: lack of final order on coffman contribution claim

Text: Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to settle jurisdictional issues presented by a case. [4] In this case, Todco argues that Cerny's assignment of error with respect to a jury trial on the Coffman contribution claim is not properly presented on appeal, because it was not part of the partial summary judgment that the district court certified for appeal under § 25-1315(1). Our inquiry into jurisdiction, however, is broader than Todco's argument. An appellate court, on its own motion, may examine and determine whether jurisdiction is lacking as the result of a procedural defect which prevents acquisition of appellate jurisdiction. [5] The procedural posture of this case presents several issues arising under § 25-1315(1). Section 25-1315(1) provides that [w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Section 25-1315 permits a judgment to become final only under the limited circumstances set forth in the statute. [6] By its terms, § 25-1315(1) is implicated only where multiple causes of action are presented or multiple parties are involved, and a final judgment is entered as to one of the parties or causes of action. [7] The term final judgment as used in § 25-1315(1) is the functional equivalent of a final order within the meaning of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1995). Thus, a final order is a prerequisite to an appellate court's obtaining jurisdiction of an appeal initiated pursuant to § 25-1315(1). [8] With the enactment of § 25-1315(1), one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a final order within the meaning of § 25-1902 as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. [9] In other words, to be appealable, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of § 25-1902 and, additionally, where implicated, § 25-1315(1). [10] Neither Cerny's assignment of error with respect to the denial of a jury trial on the Coffman contribution claim nor Todco's cross-appeal with respect to the denial of its motion for summary judgment on the Coffman contribution claim is properly appealable pursuant to §§ 25-1902 and 25-1315(1). The district court did not enter a final judgment, i.e., final order, with respect to the Coffman contribution claim. The district court's order directing final judgment pursuant to § 25-1315(1) expressly directed that the summary judgments previously entered herein should be considered final judgments, but did not direct a final judgment with respect to the Coffman contribution claim. [11] Nor could it have done so. A denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order, not a final order, and therefore not appealable. [12] The court's denial of a jury trial did not determine the action and prevent a judgment, was not made during a special proceeding, and was not made on summary application in an action after judgment had been rendered. [13] Nor do the issues raised on appeal with respect to the Coffman contribution claim bear directly on the correctness of the claims against which a final judgment was directed. [14] In short, because no final order was entered on the Coffman contribution claim as required by § 25-1902, the court could not have directed a final judgment as to that claim within the meaning of § 25-1315(1), and no issue bearing on that claim is before us in this appeal.