Opinion ID: 849089
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The continued detention of the defendant after marijuana was found on Holder

Text: The majority next presents the question whether the defendant was further properly stopped after marijuana was found on Holder. After Holder was searched and detained, the police asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle. At that point, he was clearly detained. The officers testified that the defendant was asked to get out of the car so that a patdown search for drugs and weapons could be conducted. Thus, once the officers asked the defendant to leave the car so that he could be searched, their inquiry moved beyond the realm of merely stopping a person to inquire whether the person is willing to answer questions and into the realm of searches and seizures subject to the constraints of Terry. An officer may initiate an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry when he can articulate a reasonable basis for suspecting that the particular individual detained has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Further, an officer may conduct a frisk, a form of limited weapons search, when he has reason to believe that the person suspected of a crime is presently armed and dangerous. However, the officer's ability to investigate the circumstances of a crime on the basis of reasonable suspicion are limited. Full blown searches and seizures must be based on probable cause. Dickerson, supra at 378, 113 S.Ct. 2130. According to the majority, after the marijuana was found, the police properly detained defendant for the purpose of conducting a limited search for weapons on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Maj. op. at 877. In the majority's view, there was suspicion because the defendant was the passenger in a vehicle in which criminal activity was discovered, drugs were found on Holder, the officer was told that Holder and the defendant had been together all evening, and Holder yelled to the defendant not to say anything. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the fact that the officer testified that experience taught him that people with drugs often have weapons, the majority finds the requisite level of reasonable suspicion for a patdown. Ultimately, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the patdown in this case is sustainable under Terry. Thus, I join the majority's holding that the stop and frisk were constitutionally permissible. However, because I believe that the majority jumps too readily from an officer's ability to make investigative inquiries to his ability to stop and frisk, I feel compelled to offer a somewhat more extended analysis than that offered by the majority. The majority bolsters its finding of reasonable suspicion primarily by pointing out that the defendant was and had been in the company of Holder, that Holder was in possession of marijuana, that Holder yelled to the defendant upon being arrested, and that the detaining officer testified that weapons often accompany drugs. Yet, the majority fails to clarify that the defendant could not be stopped and frisked merely on the basis that he was associated with Holder. Rather, the circumstances had to indicate that the defendant himself was articulably and reasonably suspected of criminal wrongdoing, and suspected of being armed and dangerous. In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected an argument that a person may be stopped and frisked simply for being in an area where drugs are found. There, the police had a warrant to search a bar and bartender for heroin. Ybarra was one of the patrons in the bar when the police arrived to perform the search. They conducted a protective patdown of Ybarra and the other patrons in the bar. In the process, the police seized a cigarette pack from Ybarra and found packets of heroin inside. The Court held that the evidence was subject to suppression on the grounds that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a patdown search of Ybarra simply because he was in an area where a drug search was occurring pursuant to a warrant. [3] In the instant case, the defendant was patted down on the basis of the officer's testimony that his experience taught him that people who have drugs often also have weapons. When the defendant was patted down, the police knew that Holder was in possession of an illegal substance, not that the defendant was in possession of an illegal substance. [4] The majority's analysis comes dangerously close to doing exactly what Ybarra prohibits-allowing a frisk of a person simply because that person is in propinquity with another reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity. While I agree that the police officers were justified in conducting a patdown under the specific facts of this case, I believe that we must take great care not to cross the threshold established in Ybarra. It cannot be summarily concluded that the defendant himself could reasonably be suspected of engaging in criminal wrongdoing simply because of his association with Holder. In order to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, it must be shown not only that the officers had reason to suspect criminal wrongdoing, it must also be established that the officers had a reasonably articulable basis for suspecting that the defendant perpetuated the wrongdoing. Terry, supra . To the extent that the majority opinion could be read as overlooking the particularity requirement inherent in a reasonable suspicion inquiry, I disagree with it. [5] There is no bright-line test for determining whether articulable and particularized reasonable suspicion exists under the circumstances of an individual case. However, this Court has discussed the concept in some detail. In Shabaz, the Court held that no reasonable suspicion existed where a defendant was stopped because he was observed stuffing a paper bag under his clothing while leaving an apartment complex in a high crime area, and because he took off running when officers observing him slowed their unmarked police car to a stop. Id. at 60, 378 N.W.2d 451. In reaching the conclusion that reasonable suspicion was lacking under the circumstances, Justice Ryan, now judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, stated for the Court, The police were not investigating a recently committed crime in the area which may have been linked to the defendant, nor was he known to the officers as a suspect in a crime. There was no visible contraband on the defendant's person; the officers could only guess at the contents of the paper bag. The defendant's flight from plain-clothes pursuers in an unmarked car was at most ambiguous and at least understandable. at 64-65, 378 N.W.2d 451.] While this quotation from Shabaz certainly makes it clear that Terry searches must be carefully scrutinized, I believe that in applying Terry, Shabaz also implicitly raised a distinction between situations in which an officer comes upon a person unknown to him and situations in which an officer is detaining specific individuals in association with the investigation of a particular crime. The officers in this case were in the area investigating a trespass. Further, once marijuana was found on Holder, the officers were validly investigating another crime. Once Holder yelled to the defendant not to tell the officers a f-ing thing, the officers had a basis for suspecting that the defendant had information pertaining to the crime presently being investigated. Though it is true that the defendant had done nothing to indicate that he himself was in possession of drugs, the officers had an objective reason for suspecting that the defendant might have been involved in criminal wrongdoing. Moreover, the detaining officer's testimony that he feared for his safety when taken together with the fact that the tension in the situation had escalated when marijuana was found on Holder, objectively justified the officer's belief that the defendant posed a threat of being presently armed and dangerous. Thus, I believe that this case can more closely be analogized to Terry than to Ybarra. The circumstances of this case reveal a situation where the particular individuals were being investigated in association with the suspected commission of particular violations, rather than merely a situation where the defendant happened to be in an area where other crimes were suspected of being committed. Therefore, I would conclude that this case meets the threshold established by Terry and justified a limited weapons patdown.