Opinion ID: 1085232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The history of this case, before us for a second time, is by now well documented. See, e.g., Lovell v. Duffey, 629 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1790 (2012). We therefore assume some familiarity with the facts and issues presented, and we summarize accordingly.
In 2003, an Ohio grand jury indicted Joy Lovell on one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs, one count of aggravated possession of drugs, and one count of permitting drug abuse. The aggravated trafficking charge carried a mandatory prison sentence. Prior to trial, the State offered Lovell a plea bargain in which she would agree to plead guilty to a lesser charge, punishable by probation, as an alternative to prison time. She rejected the offer under ambiguous circumstances. Lovell says she did so because she believed a guilty verdict would similarly result in nothing more than probation; the State says she did so only because she believed she was innocent and did not want to forfeit her vehicle, which was a condition of the plea bargain. Lovell proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted her of aggravated drug trafficking and permitting drug abuse. The former offense triggered a mandatory sentence of between one and five years in prison. At her sentencing hearing, the state trial court explained this to Lovell’s apparent surprise. During the sentencing colloquy, Lovell stated three times that she was unaware of the mandatory prison term. Her attorney countered that they had discussed the matter before trial. -2- No. 12-4152 Lovell v. Duffey After sentencing, Lovell obtained different counsel and filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that her trial counsel had not informed her that one of the offenses carried a mandatory prison sentence. The state trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which Lovell testified to the same effect. She explained her understanding of the plea bargain—that it allowed her to plead guilty to a lesser charge, for which probation remained possible, but also required her to forfeit her vehicle, something she did not want to do for a number of reasons. Lovell maintained that her trial counsel “never, ever mentioned jail time at all or prison.” Not wanting to give up her car and apparently unaware of a possible mandatory prison term, she rejected the offer. Instead, she said she proceeded to trial on the belief that she “would [still] be eligible for probation” even if found guilty. Lovell says she would have made a different decision had she been fully informed at the time. Four years later, in conjunction with her petition for federal habeas relief, Lovell submitted a supporting certificate from the judge who presided at trial. The judge averred that “Lovell expressed complete surprise about the mandatory prison requirement” and exhibited a demeanor “consistent with someone who was shocked and surprised.” The judge also averred that he would have been inclined to sentence Lovell to probation had she accepted the plea bargain.
The state court denied Lovell’s motion for a new trial. On direct review, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction and the denial of her motion for a new trial in summary fashion, holding that she “did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel.” The Supreme Court of Ohio denied discretionary review for want of a substantial constitutional question. Lovell also filed a state post-conviction petition while her appeal was pending, based on the same claim and the same -3- No. 12-4152 Lovell v. Duffey evidence. The trial court dismissed her petition because the Ohio Court of Appeals had already rejected her claim on direct appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, concluding that her post-conviction petition was barred by Ohio’s res judicata doctrine. In 2007, Lovell filed a federal petition for habeas corpus, again raising her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level. The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which “new and additional evidence” was introduced. It was then that Lovell presented the trial judge’s certificate. She also testified in support of her claim, as did her husband. The State countered with testimony from her trial counsel and evidence that Lovell had filed a civil malpractice claim against him but voluntarily dismissed it without explanation. The State also suggested that a manilla folder belonging to her trial counsel with handwritten notations regarding the mandatory prison sentence proved that he had provided such information to Lovell. After considering all of the evidence, the district court sided with Lovell. Accordingly, the court granted her habeas petition, finding that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in denying her claim. A divided panel of this Court reversed on appeal. Lovell v. Duffey, 629 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2011). The panel weighed the effect of the additional evidence introduced at the district court’s evidentiary hearing. Unlike the district court, however, the panel considered the evidence supporting the decision of the state appellate court to be “at least as strong as the evidence to the contrary.” Id. at 597. Looking to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the panel concluded that the state court had not unreasonably applied Strickland on such a close set of facts. The panel noted its belief that -4- No. 12-4152 Lovell v. Duffey the state court’s decision was “correct,” but even if it was “arguably wrong,” there was no justification to find the court’s result unreasonable. Id. at 598. Lovell filed a petition for certiorari. While her petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), which limits federal habeas review of statecourt decisions to the record that was before the relevant state court at the time. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, vacated this Court’s judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of the new decision. Lovell v. Duffey, 132 S. Ct. 1790 (2012). We then remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of Pinholster. Lovell v. Duffey, 469 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2012).
The district court denied Lovell’s habeas petition on remand, the definitive difference being that the court this time declined to consider the trial judge’s certificate in accordance with Pinholster’s command to limit review to the record before the state court at the time of its decision. The district court found that the remaining evidence “support[ed] a reasonable inference that Lovell decided to go to trial in the hope that she would be found innocent” and that she rejected the plea because she did not want to give up her car, not because she was under the mistaken impression that she would be eligible for probation in any event. Lovell’s testimony to the contrary proved insufficient to overcome the highly deferential standard imposed by AEDPA. Under § 2254(d)(2), the district court concluded that the state court reasonably determined that “Lovell was informed about the risk of rejecting the offered plea.” Accordingly, the court also concluded that under § 2254(d)(1), it could not find that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland in -5- No. 12-4152 Lovell v. Duffey rejecting her ineffective assistance claim. Lovell now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in deferring to the state appellate court’s factual determination and that the district court should have received and considered the trial judge’s certificate despite the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pinholster.