Opinion ID: 561245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Criminal Jurisdiction

Text: 19 Appellants contend that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Counts One and Two, which charged violations of criminal provisions within RCRA, Sec. 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928(d)(1) and (2). 6 Appellants rely on the RCRA provision which allows the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to authorize a state to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program under RCRA Subtitle C, Sec. 3006, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6926. 7 They argue that Rhode Island's authorized state program 8 displaced the federal program, leaving no federal crime and ousting the federal court of jurisdiction. Appellants emphasize the statutory language which authorizes the state to carry out its program in lieu of the federal program, and to issue and enforce permits. Appellants argue that, after state program approval, permits issued by the state are to be criminally as well as civilly enforced by the state alone, under EPA-scrutinized state law. They note that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6926(e), whenever the state fails to administer and enforce a state program in accordance with federal standards, the state authorization may be withdrawn and a federal program reinstated. 20 The linchpin of appellants' argument is that the term program in Sec. 6926 incorporates the exclusive responsibility to enforce criminal provisions penalizing the disposal of hazardous wastes. See Wyckoff Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 796 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.1986) (rejecting argument that Congress intended to revoke EPA's power to issue orders under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3013 when state program is in effect). Appellants urge that criminal enforcement logically falls within the meaning of program just as do the regulatory and permitting provisions which are, with certain explicit reservations, generally part of the federal program that is displaced (not merely supplemented) by authorized state programs. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 264.1(f) (1990) (exempting persons who treat, store or dispose of a hazardous waste in a state with an approved RCRA hazardous waste program from the scope of Part 264 federal regulations); 42 U.S.C. Secs. 6925, 6927 (providing alternatively for EPA issuance of permits and inspections where state programs have not been authorized, or state issuance of permits and inspections where state programs have been authorized). 21 We find no merit in the above contention. The language of the challenged federal criminal provision, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928(d), does not limit prosecutions thereunder to those who deal with facilities lacking a federal permit. The statute criminalizes Any person who acts without, or in respect to facilities lacking, a permit under this subchapter. A permit under this subchapter is one issued by the Administrator of the EPA or by an authorized state. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6925. 22 That Sec. 6928(d), and companion federal criminal provisions, are meant to apply within states having authorized programs is amply supported by the legislative history. Prior to the 1984 RCRA Amendments--when, as today, RCRA provided for state programs which, when federally approved, would be carried out in lieu of the federal program, and which authorized the state to issue and enforce permits--the federal penal statute preceding Sec. 6928(d) was worded so as to apply in so many words to violations both of federal and state permitting programs. Thus, the earlier version provided: 23 Any person who knowingly-- 24 (1) transports any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under section 3005 of this title (or section 3006 of this title in case of a State program), ... 25 shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $25,000 for each day of violation, or to imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both. 26 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-580, Sec. 3008(d)(1), 90 Stat. 2795, 2812; 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928(d)(1). The 1984 amendments increased the applicable criminal penalties and simply substituted under this subchapter for the references to the specific subsections under which permits, federal and state, may be granted. 9 The new language, without a permit under this subchapter, subsumed both state and federal permits, as both types are provided for within this subchapter. The latter did not, therefore, in any way narrow the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. Nor did the legislative record hint at any intention by Congress to narrow the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. To the contrary, Congress manifested its desire to retain a strong federal presence. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 98-1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., October 3, 1984 at 110, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5681; S.Rep. No. 98-284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., October 28, 1983 at 45 (The Federal government's ability to obtain criminal penalties against generators and other persons who knowingly cause the transportation of hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility is essential to the regulatory scheme.) Had Congress intended to impose a hitherto unknown limitation upon the scope of its laws criminalizing permit violations, its intentions would surely have been manifested; for example, Sec. 6928(d) would have been reworded to indicate that it applied only to persons in states lacking an authorized state program. 27 Appellants' reliance upon Congressional reports discussing state takeover and enforcement of the RCRA hazardous waste program is misplaced. These reports, like the statute itself, simply do not focus upon whether program was intended to carry with it the exclusive right to engage in criminal enforcement. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 94-1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, pt. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6238, 6262 (It is the Committee's intention that the States are to have primary enforcement authority and if at anytime (sic) a State wishes to take over the hazardous waste program it is permitted to do so, provided that the State laws meet the Federal minimum requirements for both administering and enforcing the law.) (Emphasis supplied). 28 Appellants contend there is significance in the absence from the federal criminal statute of the notice requirement found in RCRA civil enforcement Sec. 3008(a). Section 3008(a) authorizes the Administrator of EPA to bring a civil action in United States district court for RCRA violations, and specifically provides, 29 [i]n the case of a violation of any requirement of this subchapter where such violation occurs in a State which is authorized to carry out a hazardous waste program under section 3006 of this title, the Administrator shall give notice to the State in which such violation has occurred prior to issuing an order or commencing a civil action under this section. 30 RCRA Sec. 3008(a)(2). In Sec. 3008(d), there is no specific reference to alternative enforcement by state or federal authorities or to notice in the case of federal enforcement in RCRA-authorized states. Appellants argue that federal criminal enforcement would warrant notice to the authorized state to a greater extent than civil enforcement, and that the absence of such a notice provision for criminal cases indicates that Congress intended no federal criminal enforcement in authorized states. It is apparent from the legislative history, however, that Sec. 6928(a) is directed at obtaining rapid compliance, and notice prior to federal intervention is therefore significant for reasons not applicable to criminal enforcement, which is directed toward after-the-fact penalties. See S.Rep. No. 96-172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5019, 5022 (1980 Senate Report) (This section also amends section 3008 to authorize the Administrator to act against violations before a 30-day period has elapsed. This provision is aimed at stopping so-called 'midnight dumping' which may not continue at any location for more than 30 days, and to seek penalties for single occurrences, rather than just continuing offenses.). The statutory differences, therefore, can be explained on grounds having nothing to do with a purported cancellation of federal criminal jurisdiction.