Opinion ID: 2623235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Give Informant Cautionary Instruction

Text: Saenz contends that the trial court erred in failing to give a cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of Saldana. Saenz did not request such an instruction at trial. No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he or she objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he or she objects and the grounds of his or her objection, unless the instruction or the failure to give the instruction is clearly erroneous. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 22-3414(3). Instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced that there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the trial error had not occurred. State v. Henry, 263 Kan. 118, 131, 947 P.2d 1020 (1997). Saenz urges this court to adopt the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals' restrictions on jailhouse informant testimony. In Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. 2000), the Oklahoma court determined that the reliability of jailhouse informant testimony can be determined by requiring courts to take a closer look at the quality of the evidence, mandating disclosure of evidence of possible deals and issuing a cautionary jury instruction if questionable practices arise. The Oklahoma court was concerned about reliability problems with jailhouse informants, who often elicit or create statements from the defendant with the expectation of some benefit. 993 P.2d at 783. The Dodd court recognized that the Constitution of the United States prohibits a jailhouse informant from testifying to a defendant's statements when the informant works for the government and deliberately elicits or coerces statements related to a crime for which an accused has been indicted. However, the Dodd court concluded that there are reliability problems in all informant statements. Whether the informant was already working for the State or whether he or she anticipated some future benefit from eliciting incriminating statements on his or her own initiative, the informant's initial motivation is the same. The court stated that while the state action affected by such a government/informant relationship triggers careful constitutional scrutiny, it permits equally insidious reliability problems to escape attention [of the jury]. 933 P.2d at 783-84. The Dodd court adopted a procedure to ensure the prosecution completely disclosed all relevant information concerning an informant-witness' credibility that defense counsel would be prepared to cross-examine the witness: At least ten days before trial, the state is required to disclose in discovery: (1) the complete criminal history of the informant; (2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or may make in the future to the informant; (3) the specific statements made by the defendant and the time, place, and manner of their disclosure; (4) all other cases in which the informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, whether the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or statement; (5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony or statement, and if so, a transcript or copy of such recantation; and (6) any other information relevant to the informant's credibility. 993 P.2d at 784. This court recently examined the circumstances under which an informant instruction should be given in State v. Kuykendall, 264 Kan. 647, 957 P.2d 1112 (1998). In that case, a friend of the defendant, in the hope of influencing an unrelated case, offered to trade information that the defendant had told him regarding a murder if the State would inform federal authorities of his cooperation. The Kuykendall court noted that an informant acts as an undisclosed agent for the State when he or she acts to obtain evidence against the defendant in exchange for benefits from the State. The court stated that a jury should be instructed to consider with caution the testimony of such an informant. 264 Kan. at 654. Because Kuykendall's friend had not been requested to act as an agent for the State to obtain evidence against the defendant, the Kuykendall court held that the paid informant cautionary instruction was not required. The paid informant cautionary instruction, PIK Crim.3d 52.18-A, complies with the constitutional prohibition against using the testimony of a witness who acts on behalf of the State in eliciting evidence from the defendant in exchange for receiving benefits from the State. Here, because Saldana did not act as an agent to obtain evidence against Saenz, a paid informant cautionary instruction was not required.