Opinion ID: 2807421
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There Was Insufficient Evidence of a Motiva-

Text: tion to Combine Eriksen with Bridgestone to Produce the Claimed Invention The motivation to combine prior-art references is a question of fact, reviewable only for clear error. See Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The district court found a motivation to combine Eriksen and Bridgestone, noting “both Eriksen and Bridgestone offer nearly identical solutions,” to “the same problem” of “repairing deflated tires with air and/or 14 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. sealing liquids.” Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary Judgment of Damages and Invalidity at 10 (citing Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (This court has “consistently stated that courts may find a motivation to combine prior art references in the nature of the problem to be solved, and that [t]his form of motivation to combine evidence is particularly relevant with simpler mechanical technologies.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Based on its erroneous interpretation of claim scope, the district court erred in determining that Sealant and AMI “‘demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teaching[s] of [Eriksen and Bridgestone] to achieve the claimed invention.’” Order Granting Post-Trial Motions at 23 (quoting In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (emphasis added). Even if a skilled artisan would be motivated to combine the two references, as the district court found, this would not produce the claimed invention because neither Bridgestone nor Eriksen teach the use of “an additional hose [] cooperating with” the tire. For these reasons, the district court erred in granting summary judgment that the asserted claims of the ’110 patent would have been obvious. While we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment of obviousness with respect to the asserted claims of the ’110 patent, Sealant has not had an opportunity to make a case for invalidity in light of this court’s claim construction. A remand is therefore required. IV. The ’581 Patent Is Invalid and the District Court Erred in Denying Judgment as a Matter of Law When reviewing a denial of JMOL, this court applies the standard of review according to the law of the regional SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 15 circuit, in this case the Ninth Circuit. See Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit “reviews de novo an order granting or denying JMOL,” and will reverse a denial of JMOL where “‘the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 1291 (quoting Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). Sealant and AMI argue substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that TEK failed to prove the prior art disclosed both the receptacle and port of independent claim 27. Sealant Br. 17–18. Claim 27 of the ’581 patent recites: A tire repair device, comprising: a housing; an air compressor disposed within said housing; an air flow path from said air compressor adapted to be connected to a tire; a receptacle formed in said housing in communica- tion with said air flow path; and a port disposed in said receptacle in communi- cation with said air flow path adapted to sealingly receive a bottle of tire sealant, wherein when said air compressor is activated and a bottle of tire sealant is received in said re- ceptacle, air from said air compressor is forced into the bottle and pushes tire sealant out of the bottle, into said receptacle, into said air flow path, and into the tire. ’581 patent col. 9 l. 58–col. 10 l. 5 (emphases added). The specification indicates port 40 (fig.3) is located at the base of cap 48 (figs.1 & 3) in receptacle 14 (fig.1). See 16 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. ’581 patent figs.1, 3. Figure 5, reproduced below, illustrates “a sectional view of the receptacle port of [Figure 3].” Id. col. 3 ll. 63–64. ’581 patent figs.1, 3, 5. U.S. Patent Application Publication 2004/0173282 A1 (the “’282 publication”) discloses both the receptacle and port elements of claim 27 of the ’581 patent. See ’581 patent col. 9 ll. 63–67. Figure 4 of the ’282 publication illustrates “screw socket 18,” ’282 publication ¶ 18 (see J.A. 2363, 2365), into which the “container [of sealant] 4” is inserted, id. ¶¶ 15, 18. The “screw socket” of the ’282 publication is a “port” within the meaning of the ’282 patent. See Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. TEK Global, S.R.L., No 11-cv-0074-PSG, at 10–12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) (“Claim Construction Order”) (J.A. 25.1–25.31). AMI’s SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 17 expert Dr. King conceded this during trial, stating “socket 18 . . . meets the court’s definition of a port in the claim construction order.” J.A. 4381; see also id. (Question: “You just testified screw socket 18 is a port . . . .” Answer: “That’s correct.”). The port of claim 27 of the ’581 patent is therefore disclosed in the form of screw socket 18 of the ’282 publication. ’282 publication fig.4. However, Dr. King opined screw socket 18 does not meet the requirements of the claim element because it is not disposed in a receptacle. J.A. 4381. He stated the ’282 publication did not disclose a receptacle “because there’s not a wall [around the port],” i.e., around screw socket 18. J.A. 4384. However, claim 27 does not recite a “wall,” and the district court construed “receptacle formed in said housing” according to its ordinary meaning. Claim Construction Order at 7. The district court explained that “[t]he word ‘receptacle’ connotes depth” and a PHOSITA would understand the term to mean “something that receives or contains something.” Id. No reasonable juror could conclude that the unnumbered hole in the housing in Figure 4 of the ’282 publication, which contains the screw socket, does not possess depth. See J.A. 4385 (Dr. King: “[The ’282 publication] has a hole that the socket 18 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. goes in.”). This indicates the ’282 publication discloses both the port and the receptacle as claimed in the ’581 patent. See Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he conclusion of anticipation is dictated by the testimony of [the patent owner’s] own witnesses and the documentary evidence that was presented to the jury.”). The district court, however, found “a genuine dispute exists whether [the ’282 publication] discloses ‘a receptacle formed in the housing,’” as required by claim 27 of the ’581 patent, citing the argument of Sealant and AMI that “the hole in the housing [of the ’282 publication] does not perform the function of sealingly receiving the container of sealant,” and that “only the screw socket identified as 18 does.” Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary Judg- ment of Damages and Invalidity at 20–21 (capitalization omitted). However, claim 27 states “a port disposed in said receptacle . . . [is] adapted to sealingly receive a bottle of tire sealant.” ’581 patent col. 9 ll. 65–66 (emphasis added). Claim 27 does not require the receptacle to sealingly receive the bottle of sealant, except to the extent the port, which is in the receptacle, does so. See id. col. 9 l. 63–col. 10 l. 5. Because claim 27 of the ’581 patent is anticipated by the ’282 publication, the district court’s finding of no anticipation is reversed and the jury’s infringement verdict and damages award, as well as the district court’s order permanently enjoining TEK from infringing the ’581 patent, are vacated. 2 With one exception, Sealant and AMI do not separately argue the validity of claims other than claim 27, so this 2 Because we vacate the jury’s damages award, the parties’ dispute over how the award was calculated is moot. SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 19 court will not separately consider them. See Sud-Chemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Techs., Inc., 554 F.3d 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining to consider the independent validity of certain claims where the appellant did not separately argue they were patentable). The one exception is claim 42, which recites: A tire repair device, comprising: a housing; an air compressor within said housing; an air flow path from said air compressor adapted to be connected to a tire; and a reservoir formed in said housing in communica- tion with said air flow path adapted to receive tire sealant, wherein when said air compressor is activated and tire sealant is received in said reservoir, air from said air compressor is forced into said reservoir and pushes tire sealant out of said reservoir, into said air flow path, and into the tire. ’581 patent col. 11 ll. 29–41 (emphasis added). When asked “[w]hat difference, if any, existed between the claimed invention [of the ’581 patent] and the prior art,” the jury stated only “[t]he two piece system (receptacle and port).” J.A. 28. Claim 42 recites neither a receptacle nor a port. See ’581 patent col. 11 ll. 29–41. Nevertheless, the district court denied TEK’s motion for JMOL that claim 42 was anticipated, reasoning that “testimony from both parties’ experts [that none of the prior art disclosed a reservoir] constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict on anticipation.” Order Re TEK’s Motions for Summary Judgment of Damages and Invalidity at 23. However, in light of the expert testimony and the disclosure of the ’282 publica20 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. tion, no reasonable juror could conclude the ’282 publication fails to disclose a reservoir. The district court construed “reservoir” to mean “cavity where sealant collects separate from the container.” Claim Construction Order at 12. The ’282 publication discloses “a cavity 25 . . . from where the air passes between the inner walls of the cavity 25 and the outer walls of the connector pipe 19 down to the continuation of the compressed air duct 21.” ’282 publication ¶ 19. See J.A. 4099 (Dr. Kazerooni: “Once you put a cap in there, there’s a cavity.”). As described in the ’581 patent, a user can “pour[] tire sealant into reservoir 215, replace[] the cap on orifice 214, and activate[] switch 18 to turn on the air compressor.” ’581 patent col. 7 ll. 36–38. Nothing in the record suggests the cavity of the ’282 publication could not receive sealant in a similar manner, such as by applying sealant to the inside of the cap prior to inserting it into the socket. Figure 3 (below) illustrates cavity 25, which includes the triangular region between connector pipe 19 and plug 22 as well as the space between the inner walls of plug 22 and the outer walls of the connector pipe 19. ’282 publication fig.3. SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. 21 Although the cavity disclosed in the ’282 publication may be small, AMI’s expert Dr. King indicated there is no minimum size for the cavity in order for it to constitute a reservoir. See J.A. 4345 (agreeing that “even one milliliter [of sealant flowing out of the container] would be a sufficient amount to have a reservoir”). The ’282 publication therefore anticipates claim 42 of the ’581 patent. The district court’s denial of JMOL as to claim 42 is thus also reversed, and the jury’s infringement verdict and damages award, and the district courts’ injunction as to claim 42, are also vacated. V. Sealant and AMI’s Request for Attorney Fees Is Denied “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. Applying this court’s precedent in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the district court denied Sealant and AMI’s motion for attorney fees. Sealant and AMI argue the district court’s denial of its motion for attorney fees should be vacated and remanded because the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), has rendered the standard applied by the district court no longer valid. The Court in Octane Fitness “reject[ed] the Federal Circuit’s requirement that patent litigants establish their entitlement to fees under § 285 by clear and convincing evidence,” thereby overruling Brooks Furniture. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758. It also rejected this court’s requirement that a case may be deemed exceptional under § 285 only “when there has been some material inappropriate conduct, or when the litigation is both brought in subjective bad faith and objectively baseless.” Id. at 1752 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 22 SEALANT SYS. INT’L, INC. v. TEK GLOBAL, S.R.L. However, Octane Fitness did not alter the requirement that attorney fees may be awarded “to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. Because this court holds AMI’s ’581 patent invalid, and reverses summary judgment of invalidity with respect to TEK’s ’110 patent, Sealant and AMI are no longer “prevailing parties” for purposes of § 285. See SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“To be the prevailing party, we require: (1) that the party received at least some relief on the merits, and (2) [t]hat relief must materially alter the legal relationship between the parties by modifying one party’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the opposing party.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court’s denial of Sealant’s attorney fees request, predicated on the now vacated judgment, is therefore affirmed.