Opinion ID: 2535415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute.

Text: ¶ 8. The courts of this state have the inherent power to dismiss a case for want of prosecution, and a trial court may dismiss a case on that basis for the sake of expediting justice and controlling its own docket. Hill v. Ramsey, 3 So.3d 120, 122 (Miss.2009) (quoting Cucos, Inc. v. McDaniel, 938 So.2d 238, 240 (Miss.2006)). However, given the severity and finality of this sanction, which strips a litigant of his opportunity to pursue his cause of action, dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is reserved for the most egregious cases. Hillman v. Weatherly, 14 So.3d 721, 726 (Miss.2009) (quoting Wallace v. Jones, 572 So.2d 371, 376 (Miss.1990)). [1] A ruling dismissing the case with prejudice on this basis will be affirmed only if there is a showing of a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, and where lesser sanctions would not serve the best interest of justice. Id. (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Days Inn of Winona, 720 So.2d 178, 181 (Miss.1998) (citing Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.1982))) (emphasis added). [C]ases `in which dismissals with prejudice have been affirmed on appeal illustrate that such a sanction is reserved for the most egregious of cases, usually cases where the requisite factors of clear delay and ineffective lesser sanctions are bolstered by the presence of at least one of the aggravating factors.' Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 720 So.2d at 181 (quoting Rogers, 669 F.2d at 320). ¶ 9. When examining a trial court's dismissal of a case for want of prosecution, this Court will affirm the trial court's findings of fact, unless the findings are manifestly wrong. Watson v. Lillard, 493 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Miss.1986). This Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a dismissal for want of prosecution unless it finds an abuse of discretion. Hill, 3 So.3d at 122 (citing McDaniel, 938 So.2d at 240 (citations omitted)). ¶ 10. Here, the trial court's order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute emphasizes the dates on which certain events occurred, including: June 21, 1996, when the underlying negligence is said to have occurred; August 17, 2001, when the complaint was filed against Reeves; June 10, 2003, when the matter was stayed due to ANLIR's receivership proceedings; December 1, 2004, when the stay was lifted; and April 10, 2007, when the motion to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute was filed. After listing those findings of fact, the trial court noted: The plaintiff had every opportunity to conduct and complete discovery from August 16, 2001[ [2] ], the date the complaint was filed, through June 10, 2003, the date this matter was Stayed. A review of the file reveals that plaintiff did not take advantage of that opportunity.... [S]ince the Stay was lifted on December 1, 2004 up to the filing of the herein motion to dismiss on April 10, 2007, this matter was not prosecuted. It has been over twelve years since the incident herein occurred. The facts and circumstances surrounding the prosecution of this matter require that the herein matter be dismissed. ¶ 11. These findings of fact are not supported by the record and are manifestly wrong. The trial court found that Barry had not conducted discovery after he filed the complaint on August 17, 2001, yet the record reveals that both parties actively participated in the discovery process by requesting, producing, and supplementing discovery until at least April 30, 2002. As for the trial court's finding that Barry failed to prosecute the case after the stay had been lifted on December 1, 2004, the trial court neglected to acknowledge that the stay was lifted in response to Barry's filing the motion to lift the stay. In addition, the trial court did not note that Barry had filed a motion for trial setting and for additional relief on September 30, 2005, a motion on which a hearing was held in November 2005. The record also included three letters sent in 2005 and 2006 in which Barry sought the aid of counsel opposite in selecting a date upon which the case could be tried. Unsuccessful in that effort, Barry sent a letter to the trial court on April 5, 2007, requesting a status conference on the case. ¶ 12. It was not until after these efforts by Barry that Reeves filed his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Thus, the trial court's failure to include these actions by Barry in its findings of fact was a very relevant omission amounting to manifest error. ¶ 13. Notwithstanding these erroneous findings of fact, it must be noted that there was some delay in the prosecution of this case. Specifically, after the parties had engaged in discovery, which the record indicates was last supplemented by Barry on April 30, 2002, a period of nine months of inactivity preceded the Tennessee court's order requiring a stay of all litigation which exposed ANLIR to financial harm. Another ten-month period of inactivity occurred between December 1, 2004, when the trial court granted Barry's motion to lift the stay and denied Barry's motion to amend his complaint, and September 30, 2005, when Barry filed the motion to set the case for trial. After Barry filed the motion to schedule a trial, the record reflects that he made several attempts to obtain a trial date through correspondence with opposing counsel, but nothing in the record suggests that counsel for Reeves responded to those efforts. After Barry sent his last letter to Reeves's lawyer on April 27, 2006, nothing occurred until April 5, 2007, when Barry sent a letter to the trial court requesting a status conference. Another period of inactivity occurred between that letter and Barry's filing a motion, on March 11, 2008, for a status conference. ¶ 14. However, the mere fact that delay occurs in the prosecution of a case is not sufficient to warrant dismissal for want of prosecution. It must be clear from the record that the delay was the result of the plaintiff's failure to prosecute the claim, rather than extrinsic factors beyond the control of the plaintiff. See M.R.C.P. 41(b). ¶ 15. In the case at hand, it is far from clear that the delay in the prosecution of this case is attributable to Barry. Indeed, each period of inactivity was interrupted by a positive action by Barry to expedite the litigation. Specifically, after the receivership had ended, Barry filed the motion to lift the stay. After the next ten-month period of inactivity, Barry filed a motion to set trial, which has not been ruled on by the trial court. The next one-year period of inactivity came to an end when Barry sent a letter to the trial court, requesting a status conference and a trial date, and another period ended by Barry's filing his motion for a status conference and a trial date. Finally, the last period of inactivity was terminated when Barry sent a letter to the Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. ¶ 16. What is clear from the record is that significant, protracted delays in the prosecution of this case were beyond Barry's control, including the near twenty-month delay attributable to ANLIR's receivership, the seventeen-month delay caused by defense counsel's failure to respond to Barry's letters, and the trial court's failure to rule on Barry's motion for a status conference. Accordingly, it cannot be said that there is a clear record establishing that Barry delayed the case's prosecution. ¶ 17. Moreover, [t]his Court has held that a case should be dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(b) only if lesser sanctions are inadequate. Hillman, 14 So.3d at 727 (citing Wilson, 4 So.3d at 343). Lesser sanctions include `fines, costs, or damages against plaintiff or his counsel, attorney disciplinary measures, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings.' Id. (quoting Miss. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Guidry, 830 So.2d 628, 633 (Miss.2002) (quoting Wallace, 572 So.2d at 377)). This Court is not likely to affirm the dismissal for failure to prosecute, unless it is clear that the trial court has considered lesser sanctions and has concluded that such sanctions would have been futile in expediting the proceedings. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 720 So.2d at 181 (citing Wallace, 572 So.2d at 377; McCloud River R.R. Co. v. Sabine River Forest Prods., Inc., 735 F.2d 879, 883 (5th Cir.1984) (trial court's order vacated for failure to consider lesser sanctions)). ¶ 18. In this case, prior to dismissing the case for failure to prosecute, the trial court had not imposed any lesser sanctions, nor had it threatened counsel for Barry with lesser sanctions, and nothing in the record suggests that the trial court considered lesser sanctions prior to dismissing the case. Thus, because there is no clear record of delay or contumacious conduct on the part of Barry, and the trial court did not consider lesser sanctions prior to its dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this case.