Opinion ID: 2192493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: recomputation of payroll fractions

Text: In their first point, Taxpayers argue that the payroll fractions they submitted to the DED for tax years 1991-1993 were approved by the DED, were not appealed, and, therefore, became final in accordance with section 135.250.6, RSMo Supp.1992. The director does not contest that the DED decision is final pursuant to that section. Instead, the director argues because he has the authority to properly determine the amount of tax benefits available to Taxpayers under section 135.250.2, such authority necessitates that he be able to require the DED to recompute a certification when audits reveal that the original certification was flawed. Furthermore, the director argues that Taxpayers had the opportunity to file a protest from the DED's recertification and even to appeal the recertification to the AHC, but they chose not to do so. Finally, the director asserts that the director has the authority to correct the error overlooked by the DED since Taxpayers gave an ultimately erroneous compensation factor in their EZM calculations. The director's arguments on this point are unpersuasive. Once Taxpayers failed to appeal the certification of the DED in accordance with section 135.250, RSMo Supp.1992, that certification became final. The word final must be given its ordinary meaning, as every word of a statute is presumed meaningful. [4] Furthermore, contrary to his suggestion, the director has no implied right to review the final decision of the DED. Section 135.250.1 provides that the DED shall prescribe the method for submitting applications for enterprise zone tax credits, shall determine the exemption allowed, and shall certify to the director that the taxpayer has satisfied all requirements and is eligible to claim the credits and exemption. The director's contention that he has implied authority to review the final decision of the DED goes too far. When construing statutes, it is this Court's primary aim to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used and to give effect to that intent. [5] Administrative agencies have only those powers expressly conferred or reasonably implied by statute. [6] Section 135.250.2 states the following: The director of revenue shall determine the amount of the taxpayer's refund, as allowed in section 135.245, if any, and shall notify the taxpayer in writing of any amount to be refunded. The director of revenue may, subject to the requirements of section 536.021, RSMo, prescribe rules and regulations necessary to process the credits allowed in sections 135.225 and 135.235 and the exemption allowed in section 135.220 and the refund allowed following certification of eligibility by the director (of economic development). Given the language of the statute, it is not proper to infer broad power by the director to require amended certifications from the DED. Section 135.250.1 clearly provides that the DED shall certify the eligibility for exemptions and credits and establishes that the DED must certify eligibility before the director may make any refund. Section 135.250 does not expressly confer power to the director sufficient to require the DED to reconsider its decision consistent with the director's findings. Nor can one reasonably infer such power from the statute. Had the legislature intended to grant the director power to appeal a final determination, it would have done so explicitly or with such language that reasonably infers such a legislative grant. Instead, the language used in section 135.250 establishes and clearly divides those powers granted to the director and those assigned to the DED. The director's assertion that he must have the power to correct erroneous interpretations of the DED also lacks merit. The finality of a decision by an administrative body, like that of a judicial body, does not depend on the correctness of that decision. [7] Finally, the failure to seek review of the DED's recertification from either DED or the AHC is inconsequential. Because the DED's first determination became final with the expiration of the appeals period under section 135.250, RSMo, the DED's recertification was a nullity. Moreover, because the recertification was void, the AHC would only have jurisdiction as necessary to determine the recertification's invalidity and to dismiss this point of the appeal. [8] To the extent the AHC's decision grants the director power to seek recertification from the DED, its decision is reversed.