Opinion ID: 777088
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct

Text: 65 In McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, the Supreme Court held that a party moving for a new trial based on juror nondisclosure or misstatements must satisfy a two-part test. First, the party must show that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire.  Id. Second, the party must show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Id. Both prongs must be met before a new trial may be obtained. See id. 66 In its Opinion and Order denying a new trial, the District Court focused on four instances of nondisclosure by juror Baker: his questionnaire response that no one in his family had been convicted of a crime; his failure at voir dire to disclose his outside contact with a third party; his failure to disclose his brother's drug use; and his failure to inform the court that Robert Baker is his brother. In their briefs to this Court, however, the defendants focus exclusively on Baker's failure to disclose his outside contact. Accordingly, we decline to address the other instances of nondisclosure. See United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 121 (2d Cir.2000) (Ordinarily, failure to include an argument in the appellate brief waives the argument on appeal.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143, 121 S.Ct. 1077, 148 L.Ed.2d 954 (2001); Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.) (Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001, 119 S.Ct. 511, 142 L.Ed.2d 424 (1998). 3 67 Focusing solely on Baker's omissions and misstatements regarding his outside contact, we find it unnecessary to determine whether, under McDonough 's prong one, Baker dishonestly answered questions at voir dire, because we hold that the District Court did not exceed its allowable discretion in finding that those omissions and misstatements did not satisfy McDonough 's prong two. McDonough 's second prong requires that a party moving for a new trial show that the correct answer to a question at voir dire would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. See 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845. The district court then must determine if it would have granted the hypothetical challenge. Cf. United States v. Shaoul, 41 F.3d 811, 816 (2d Cir.1994) (noting that under second prong of McDonough, a defendant must have a basis for arguing that the district court is required to sustain his challenge for cause). We review this determination for abuse of discretion. Cf. Rivas, 94 F.3d at 807 (denial of new trial reviewed for abuse of discretion); United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118-19 n. 4 (2d Cir.) (district court's rulings on challenges for cause reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 952, 93 S.Ct. 298, 34 L.Ed.2d 224 (1972). 68 The District Court found — and we agree — that none of the grounds for a successful challenge for cause existed here. Challenges for cause are generally based on actual bias, implied bias, or inferable bias. See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1065, 118 S.Ct. 1399, 140 L.Ed.2d 657 (1998). Actual bias is bias in fact. See id. Implied bias, by contrast, is bias presumed as a matter of law. See id. at 45. Finally, inferred bias is available when actual or implied bias does not apply. See id. at 46-47. Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias. Id. at 47. 69 A district court's determination regarding actual bias is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Morales, 185 F.3d 74, 84 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1010, 120 S.Ct. 1282, 146 L.Ed.2d 229 (2000); United States v. Abrams, 137 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 821, 119 S.Ct. 63, 142 L.Ed.2d 49 (1998). The district court, which `observ[es] the jury on a day to day basis ... is in the best position to sense the atmosphere of the courtroom as no appellate court can on a printed record.' Abrams, 137 F.3d at 708 (quoting United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 144 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 1833, 64 L.Ed.2d 260 (1980)). Based on its evaluation of the testimony at trial and the post-trial evidentiary hearing, the District Court here found no actual bias. The court credited Baker's testimony and also noted that the outcome of the trial demonstrated that all the jurors, including Baker, fairly considered the evidence. The court found that Baker learned nothing of substance about the case from his conversation with a third party. 4 We will not overturn such findings absent clear error, and we see no such error here. See Torres, 128 F.3d at 44 ([A] finding of actual bias is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province. (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (Given the special capacity of the trial judge to evaluate actual bias on the part of prospective jurors, that judge's determination in this regard is accorded great deference, since an appellate court [cannot] easily second-guess the conclusions of the decisionmaker who heard and observed the witnesses. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 70 It is unclear whether our affirmance of the District Court's findings regarding actual bias ends our inquiry, or whether a post-trial allegation of jury partiality may alternatively be proven by implied or inferred bias. See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940 ([T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.). But see McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57, 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias). We need not answer that question, however, for we agree with the District Court that neither implied nor inferred bias was present here. 71 Implied bias does not depend on determinations of demeanor and credibility, but rather is bias presumed as a matter of law. See Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (In contrast to the inquiry for actual bias, which focuses on whether the record at voir dire supports a finding that the juror was in fact partial, the issue for implied bias is whether an average person in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.). Drawing on Justice O'Connor's admonition that implied bias should be reserved for extreme situations, Smith, 455 U.S. at 222, 102 S.Ct. 940 (O'Connor, J., concurring), we have cautioned that automatically presumed bias deals mainly with jurors who are related to the parties or who were victims of the alleged crime itself. Torres, 128 F.3d at 45. On this basis, the District Court refused to find implied bias because it found the issues affecting juror Baker to be insufficiently drastic. Juror Baker was, after all, neither related to a party nor a victim of the defendants' crimes. Accordingly, in light of our reminder to limit findings of implied bias to extreme situations, the District Court properly refused to find implied bias. See id. at 46 ([T]he situations in which a trial judge must find implied bias are strictly limited and must be truly `exceptional'.. . .). 72 Finally, a finding of inferred bias is, by definition, within the discretion of the trial court. As with actual bias, the judge's determination [of inferred bias] must be grounded in facts developed at voir dire. Id. at 47. Thus, a district court's evaluation of the juror's impartiality is accorded deference. Here, the District Court refused to infer bias based on its assessment of the evidence. Because we see no error in the court's findings, we decline to overturn that ruling. 73 In short, we cannot say that the District Court erred in finding no bias that would have supported a challenge for cause. See Ploof, 464 F.2d at 118-19 n. 4 (There are few aspects of a jury trial where we would be less inclined to disturb a trial judge's exercise of discretion, absent clear abuse, than in ruling on challenges for cause in the empanelling of a jury.). Thus, we affirm the District Court's denial of defendants' motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. 74 Our holding does not conflict with this Court's decision in United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.1989) ( Colombo I ). In Colombo I, we held that deliberate lies by a juror — lies which reflected partiality on the juror's part — satisfied the McDonough test and warranted a new trial. Colombo I did not eliminate the second prong of the McDonough test. It simply held that a lie which simultaneously demonstrates both dishonesty and partiality on the part of the juror will satisfy both prongs of the test. That is, in Colombo I, it was not simply that the lies in question were deliberate, but that the deliberateness of the particular lies evidenced partiality. See id. at 151 (noting that juror's motive in lying was to prevent defense counsel from acting on information the juror believed might lead to her dismissal from the case). This case, however, can be distinguished from Colombo I, for the reasons articulated in United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 68-70 (2d Cir.1993). In Langford, we held that Colombo I did not establish a per se rule requiring a new trial whenever an intentionally false answer is discovered. Rather, we emphasized that McDonough establishes a multi-part test in which a juror's dishonesty is among the factors to be considered in the ultimate determination of bias and that an analysis of bias is required even if the juror's erroneous response was deliberate. Here, as in Langford, we have made the ultimate determination of whether the juror was impartial and have found no bias that would have supported a challenge for cause under the second prong of McDonough. Accordingly, the present case, like Langford, is significantly different from Colombo I with respect to the determination of the juror's bias.