Opinion ID: 3020940
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (1) The court, in imposing sentence on a person

Text: convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of this title, shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property. (2) The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate-- (A) section . . . 1341 [mail fraud] . . . of this title, affecting a financial institution . . . .” 10 In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 981 states, “§ 981. Civil forfeiture (a)(1) The following property is subject to forfeiture to the United States: (C) Any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of . . . any offense constituting “specified unlawful 14 as a prerequisite to forfeiture for mail fraud crimes. Banks contends that 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) does not authorize such forfeiture because 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A) provides for criminal forfeiture only in specific circumstances of mail fraud (i.e., mail fraud perpetrated against financial institutions) and no such circumstances are present here. Banks Br. at 48. As support for his argument, Banks cites to a district court opinion, United States v. Croce, 345 F. Supp.2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (“Croce II”), in which that court stated, “18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A) is a specific statutory provision made for criminal forfeiture upon conviction of mail fraud . . . so [28 U.S.C.] § 2461(c) does not authorize us to order criminal forfeiture of mail fraud proceeds.” Id. at 496; see also id. at n.9. Thus, we must resolve whether 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) authorizes criminal forfeiture of mail fraud proceeds that are not the result of mail fraud perpetrated against a financial institution. To interpret the statute, we begin with its plain language. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2005). Ascribing plain meaning to the words of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), criminal forfeiture is not permitted unless (1) a substantive provision exists for civil forfeiture of the criminal proceeds at issue; and (2) there is no specific statutory provision that permits criminal forfeiture of such proceeds. Thus, we read the statute, enacted eight years after Congress last amended 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2), as a “bridge” or “gap-filler” between civil and criminal forfeiture, in that it permits criminal forfeiture when no criminal forfeiture provision applies to the crime charged against a particular defendant but civil forfeiture for that charged crime is nonetheless authorized. Accordingly, under our reading, § 2461(c) permits criminal forfeiture for general mail fraud because (1) 18 activity” (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.” Section 1956(c)(7) of Title 18 in turn references the offenses identified in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which list of offenses includes mail fraud without any limitation to mail fraud perpetrated against financial institutions. 15 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) authorizes civil forfeiture for general mail fraud; and (2) no statutory provision specifically authorizes criminal forfeiture for general mail fraud.11 See United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp.2d 267, 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (construing § 2461(c) as “a broad ‘gap-filler’” that enables criminal forfeiture when civil forfeiture is permitted). The district court in Croce II, on which case Banks relies, took a different, more restrictive view of § 2461(c). That court concluded that by drafting 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A) to permit criminal forfeiture only for mail fraud carried out against financial institutions, Congress had concluded that criminal forfeiture for mail fraud was “only appropriate when the mail fraud affected a financial institution.” 345 F. Supp.2d at 496 n.9. In that court’s view, “[i]t seems highly unlikely that, in passing the broad language of § 2461(c), Congress intended to silently remove the limitations on criminal forfeiture in mail fraud cases that it had carefully inserted into § 982(a)(2)(A).” Id. Although Croce II presents a plausible construction of the statute, we are not persuaded. Section 2461(c) authorizes criminal forfeiture where “a forfeiture is authorized in connection with a violation of an Act of Congress,” which Act in this case is the civil forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981. Section 981 in turn permits forfeiture of proceeds from the crimes identified in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). Section 1956(c)(7) in turn includes the list of crimes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which list of crimes includes “mail fraud,” not only mail fraud “affecting a financial institution.” Accordingly, we read the plain language of § 2461(c), by virtue of 11 Thus, § 2461(c) would not by itself enable criminal forfeiture proceeds from mail fraud against financial institutions, because a statutory provision for criminal forfeiture of proceeds from that kind of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A), already exists. See United States v. Thompson, 2002 WL 31667859, at  (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002) (disallowing criminal forfeiture of drug crime proceeds under § 2461(c) because charged drug crime had associated statutory provision for criminal forfeiture upon conviction). 16 the chain of cross-references leading to § 1956(c)(7) and § 1961(1), to explicitly permit criminal forfeiture for general mail fraud, not just for mail fraud against financial institutions. See United States v. Lebed, 2005 WL 2495843, at  (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2005) (concluding that “by virtue of the cross reference from the civil forfeiture statute to the money laundering statute (§ 1956(c)(7)) and its cross reference to the RICO statute [§ 1961(1), listing crimes including general mail fraud], criminal forfeiture may now be invoked for general instances of mail and wire fraud, since these crimes do not contain any specific statutory provisions for criminal forfeiture.”). Were we to conclude otherwise, we would be ignoring § 2461(c)’s cross-reference to a list of crimes that includes general mail fraud, and we are mindful that “[i]t is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). In sum, we reject Croce II and read the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) as permitting criminal forfeiture of proceeds from general mail fraud because a statutory provision – 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(C) – permits civil forfeiture of such proceeds and no criminal forfeiture provision applies to general mail fraud. Accord Lebed, 2005 WL 2495843, at -8; Schlesinger, 396 F.Supp. 2d at 275 (“[U]nder the plain terms of sec. 2461(c), criminal forfeiture for mail and wire fraud is permitted.”). To the extent that the text of the statute is ambiguous, our conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history of CAFRA and § 2461. Before Congress enacted CAFRA in 2000, if a forfeiture statute did not authorize a mode of recovery, that statute was deemed to authorize civil forfeiture only. Congress then enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) to extend the availability of criminal forfeiture to certain enumerated crimes that lacked an associated criminal forfeiture provision, observing: “[I]t makes sense to extend the availability of forfeiture to these other crimes. Rather then simply making civil forfeiture available for all federal crimes, some of which do not generate criminal proceeds, [CAFRA] would amend 17 sections 981(a)(1) and 982(a)(2) of title 18 to extend proceeds forfeiture (both civil and criminal) to the crimes enumerated in the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).” H.R. Rep. 105-358, at  (1997); see also id. (“H.R. 1965 would amend section 2461 of title 28 to give the government the option of pursuing criminal forfeiture as an alternative to civil forfeiture if civil forfeiture is otherwise authorized.”). Thus, Congress intended to expand the availability of criminal forfeiture to the comprehensive list of crimes referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), which list includes general mail fraud, not only mail fraud perpetrated against a financial institution. The intent to provide for criminal forfeiture in general mail fraud cases is further demonstrated by Congress’s decision in 2000 to amend the civil forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981, by striking the language “affecting financial institutions” for mail and wire fraud crimes and inserting language permitting civil forfeiture for the crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). See Pub. L. 106-185, at § 20 (2000). In our view, Congress’s expansion of the crimes for which civil forfeiture is available taken in conjunction with its decision to enact 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), which broadened the range of crimes for which criminal forfeiture was available, can only be viewed as intent to make criminal forfeiture essentially coextensive with civil forfeiture. Accordingly, we conclude the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) provides additional support for our reading of the statute and our ultimate conclusion that the District Court had statutory authority to issue the in personam criminal forfeiture judgment.