Opinion ID: 6536853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Garcia , Its Application in Fry's and Allen's Cases, and Stare Decisis

Text: {213} Garcia construed Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) as limiting the pool of comparison cases to those in which a defendant was convicted under the same aggravating circumstance(s) and then received either the death penalty or life imprisonment Garcia , 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . The Majority takes issue with this, but I fail to see how this construction is flawed or unworkable. Two points are offered in defense of Garcia . {214} First, Section 31-20A-4 is closely related to Georgia's death-penalty statute. Ruth Musgrave Silver, Constitutionality of the New Mexico Capital Punishment Statute , 11 N.M. L. Rev. 269 , 286 (1981). Georgia's statute requires that the state supreme court obtain and preserve records of all capital cases in which the death penalty was imposed after January 1, 1970 so that similar cases may be compared. Id. The CFSA does not include a similar requirement. Why did our Legislature not include in the CFSA a comparable provision? It must be because our Legislature did not intend this Court to engage in the type of searching inquiry the Majority now claims Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) requires. {215} Second, Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) states that the inquiry into the excessiveness or disproportionality of a death sentence is one evaluated with respect to the penalty imposed in similar cases and must take into account both the crime and the defendant. The manner in which the statute uses the words cases and crime is suggestive. {216} Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) 's use of these two words confirms that the Legislature clearly understood they have distinct and different meanings. See Norman J. Singer and Shambie Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:6 (7th ed. 2014). A murder case is a specific iteration of murder involving a specific set of facts. This is distinct from murder as a crime, a concept that would encompass a wide array of different types of murder cases. Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) 's use of the phrase similar cases suggests that the pool of cases for comparison should be comprised of a limited number of cases closely mirroring the murder for which a defendant received the death sentence. Garcia does just this.
{217} Review of how Garcia was applied in Fry's and Allen's direct appeals shows that Garcia sensibly construed the statutory language. Fry's death sentence was compared with six cases. These cases involved the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping-the aggravating factor that made Fry death eligible. Four of the comparison cases were death sentences: Allen , 2000-NMSC-002 , 128 N.M. 482 , 994 P.2d 728 ; Clark , 1999-NMSC-035 , 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 ; Guzman , 1984-NMSC-016 , 100 N.M. 756 , 676 P.2d 1321 ; Gilbert , 1983-NMSC-083 , 100 N.M. 392 , 671 P.2d 640 . Two of the comparison cases were life sentences: McGuire , 1990-NMSC-067 , 110 N.M. 304 , 795 P.2d 996 and Hutchinson , 1983-NMSC-029 , 99 N.M. 616 , 661 P.2d 1315 . This Court was persuaded that the extremely violent nature of Fry's criminal acts, in conjunction with the horror his victim likely suffered in the process of the murder, amply supported the conclusion that Fry's death sentence was not comparatively disproportionate. Fry's criminal acts were sufficiently similar to other cases where juries imposed death sentences and sufficiently deplorable to distinguish it from those cases where life sentences were imposed. See Fry , 2006-NMSC-001 , ¶ 44, 138 N.M. 700 , 126 P.3d 516 . {218} In Allen , the Court relied on the comparative proportionality analysis in Clark given the similarities between Clark's and Allen's crimes. In Clark , this Court identified two cases where defendants received death sentences for murders involving the aggravating factors of kidnapping and murder of a witness-  Guzman , 1984-NMSC-016 , 100 N.M. 756 , 676 P.2d 1321 and Gilbert , 1983-NMSC-083 , 100 N.M. 392 , 671 P.2d 640 -and two cases where the defendants received life sentences for murders involving these same aggravating circumstances- McGuire , 1990-NMSC-067 , 110 N.M. 304 , 795 P.2d 996 and Hutchinson , 1983-NMSC-029 , 99 N.M. 616 , 661 P.2d 1315 . Clark , 1999-NMSC-035 , ¶ 79, 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 . Clark also received a death sentence for a murder involving these aggravating circumstances. Id. ¶¶ 78, 82. The aggravating factors of kidnapping and murder of a witness, along with the fact that Allen's victim was a child, satisfied this Court that Allen's crime was more equivalent to murders where a death sentence was imposed. Allen , 2000-NMSC-002 , ¶ 111, 128 N.M. 482 , 994 P.2d 728 . {219} There is nothing wrong or inadequate about the Court's analysis in either case. In both instances, the Court paid appropriate deference to the respective jury determinations while simultaneously examining death and life sentences in similar cases.
{220} The principle of stare decisis is at its zenith when this Court is asked to reconsider the meaning of statutes where the previous interpretation was accepted by our Legislature. United States v. Lane , 474 U.S. 438 , 460 n.1, 106 S.Ct. 725 , 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986). Once litigants draw this Court into the realm of statutory construction and require us to decide the meaning of statutory language, it is thereafter the province of the Legislature to decide whether the particular meaning adopted by the Judiciary is the one actually intended by the Legislature. Shepard v. United States , 544 U.S. 13 , 23, 125 S.Ct. 1254 , 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). To short-circuit this process undoes that which the Legislature has embraced. These principles have unique significance here. {221} Garcia has been challenged over the years and this Court has repeatedly declined to reconsider the comparative proportionality methodology adopted there. See Fry , 2006-NMSC-001 , ¶ 45, 138 N.M. 700 , 126 P.3d 516 ; Allen , 2000-NMSC-002 , ¶ 111, 128 N.M. 482 , 994 P.2d 728 ; Clark , 1999-NMSC-035 , ¶ 73, 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 . In addition, Garcia was an opinion that elicited a dissenting voice. Thus, the Legislature surely understood that this Court did not unanimously agree that the language under consideration in Garcia had only one possible meaning. Lastly, the question under consideration in Garcia is not some obscure point of law relevant only to a niche area of practice. It concerns matters of the greatest possible significance and to which the public at large pays considerable attention. {222} For these reasons, there can be no doubt that the Legislature was aware of the debate surrounding Garcia and was perfectly capable of overturning our construction of its words if they believed our construction lacking in some respect. It did not, and this failure to act has unquestionable significance. The Legislature embraced Garcia . The Majority rejects this conclusion, but for reasons that do not withstand scrutiny. {223} The Majority states that the Legislature's intent in adopting Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) is clear from its history, and our application of Garcia has not fulfilled that purpose. Maj. Op. ¶ 81. They cite authority stating that legislative inactivity cannot ratify a clearly erroneous interpretation of a statute. Maj. Op. ¶ 82. That the Majority is certain that Garcia was wrongly decided does nothing to change the fact that this Court has consistently affirmed Garcia for decades. The suggestion that legislative acquiescence has no force here because it was always plain to see that Garcia was wrongly decided strains credulity.