Opinion ID: 2369385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Spontaneous Admission

Text: For his second point on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce hearsay evidence of a spontaneous statement made by Appellant to a nurse who was drawing a sample of his blood. The conversation took place at the Piggott Clinic where Appellant had been taken by officers to have samples drawn pursuant to court order. During the suppression hearing below, the nurse, Donna Ray, stated that when she was drawing blood from Appellant's arm, Appellant commented on how painless the procedure was and that he would like for her to be the one to give his lethal injection. Don Poole, one of the officers who had transported Appellant to the clinic, testified that he, too, was present when Appellant made the statement to the nurse, and that he remembered Appellant stating that if he got the lethal injection, would she (the nurse) be the one to administer it. Jerry Brogdon, the other officer who had accompanied Appellant to the clinic, testified that to the best of his recollection, Appellant stated, I did not feel a thing when she stuck the needle in my arm. When it comes time to do the lethal injection, I want her to administer the needle. Brogdon stated further that he recalled Appellant stating that, It may come to that. It may not. Appellant testified that the statement he made was one in jest, in an attempt to relieve the nurse's apparent nervousness. Appellant recalled telling the nurse that the injection was absolutely painless and that a lethal injection would not be so bad if she was the one administering it. Appellant maintained that he made the statement as a joke and that he did not believe he was going to receive a lethal injection because he was innocent of the crimes. The trial court found the statement to be an admission under A.R.E. Rule 801(d)(2) and that it was up to the jury to decide whether the statement was made seriously, indicating some guilty knowledge of the homicides, or as a joke. Appellant asserts on appeal that the statement was hearsay and was not a proper admission as provided in Rule 801(d)(2) because he never manifested his belief in the truth of the statement. The State argues that the statement was relevant as evidence of Appellant's consciousness of his guilt of the crimes and that the statement was an admission by a party opponent as provided in Rule 801(d)(2)(i). A trial court is accorded wide discretion in evidentiary rulings and will not be reversed on such rulings absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996). Relevant evidence means any evidence having the tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id. ; A.R.E. Rule 401. A trial court's ruling on relevancy is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Misskelley, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702; Dixon v. State, 311 Ark. 613, 846 S.W.2d 170 (1993). Rule 801(d)(2) provides in part that a statement is not hearsay if: [t]he statement is offered against a party and is (i) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, (ii) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, (iii) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, (iv) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (v) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. [Emphasis added.] Appellant's reliance on subsection (ii) of that rule is misplaced because the statement at issue here was made by Appellant, and therefore subsection (i) clearly applies. There can be no doubt that the statement was offered by the prosecution against Appellant and that the statement was Appellant's own words. Thus, there is no need to look beyond subsection (i) to determine whether Appellant manifested his belief in the truth of the statement, because it is evident that each subsection in Rule 801(d)(2), connected by the conjunction or, is an alternative way of demonstrating statements that are admissible as admissions by party opponents. See Woodward v. State, 16 Ark.App. 18, 696 S.W.2d 759 (1985). Furthermore, Appellant's claim that the statement was inadmissible because he was joking when he said it goes not to the admissibility of the evidence, but only to its weight, which lies within the province of the jury. Slocum v. State, 325 Ark. 38, 924 S.W.2d 237 (1996). Because we conclude that the statement was not hearsay, as it was a statement made by Appellant, its admission at trial against Appellant was not erroneous. Appellant additionally argues that the statement should have been excluded on the grounds that it was unfairly prejudicial in violation of A.R.E. Rule 403. The State argues that the statement was relevant evidence of Appellant's consciousness of his guilt in the homicides and that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Appellant offers no authority in support of his argument, and thus, we will not address it. This court has repeatedly held that where an appellant has cited no authority for his argument, we will not consider the merits of it. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 395, 921 S.W.2d 924 (1996); Hillard v. State, 321 Ark. 39, 900 S.W.2d 167 (1995); Stevens v. State, 319 Ark. 640, 893 S.W.2d 773, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 168, 133 L.Ed.2d 110 (1995). Lastly, Appellant argues that the admission of the statement violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because it compelled him to take the stand in his own defense in order to explain the statement. Again, Appellant provides no authority for this argument and, likewise, we will not address it. We note, however, that Appellant did file a notice of defense prior to trial stating that he would rely upon a defense of self-defense in the death of James Graves, which would virtually necessitate Appellant's testifying in his own behalf.