Opinion ID: 169726
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of Beckstead's former girlfriend's apartment

Text: The district court denied Beckstead's motion to suppress the evidence officers found when they searched Morris' apartment, holding that Beckstead lacked standing to challenge that search. On appeal, however, Beckstead does not even address his standing to challenge this search until his reply brief. [6] It is our general rule . . . that arguments and issues presented at such a late stage are waived. . . . [T]he reasons for our rule are two-fold: First, to allow an appellant to raise new arguments at this juncture would be manifestly unfair to the appellee who, under our rules, has no opportunity for a written response. Secondly, it would also be unfair to the court itself, which, without the benefit of a response from appellee to an appellant's late-blooming argument, would run the risk of an improvident or ill-advised opinion, given our dependence as an Article III court on the adversarial process for sharpening the issues for decision. Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1250-51 (10th Cir.2007) (quotations, alterations omitted); see also Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir.2000) (noting this court ordinarily does not permit appellant to raise new issues for the first time in his reply brief because it robs the appellee of the opportunity to demonstrate that the record does not support an appellant's factual assertions and to present an analysis of the pertinent legal precedent that may compel a contrary result). By failing to address this issue until his reply brief, Beckstead has waived it. [7] See United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1377-78 (10th Cir.1997) (affirming district court's decision to deny suppression motion because appellant did not dispute on appeal district court's conclusion that he lacked standing to challenge the search at issue). And because [i]t is fundamental law that a person desiring to have evidence suppressed must first show that he has standing to object to the search, we need not further address his challenges to the constitutionality of the search of his former girlfriend's apartment. United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir.1994); see also Cantley, 130 F.3d at 1377-78. Even if we were to address the merits of the district court's standing determination, however, it would not warrant relief. A person has standing only to challenge the violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Ladeaux, 454 F.3d 1107, 1112 (10th Cir.2006). Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and, therefore, a defendant cannot claim a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights based only on the introduction of evidence procured through an illegal search and seizure of a third person's property or premises. United States v. DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). The relevant question presented here is whether Beckstead manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable. United States v. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 1206, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). It is Beckstead's burden of demonstrating that he had a personal Fourth Amendment interest that was implicated by the search. . . . United States v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir.2000). The district court concluded that Beckstead did not have standing to object to the search of the apartment. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error, and the court's legal conclusions de novo. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d at 1208. Beckstead argues that he met his burden of proof in light of the evidence presented at the pretrial suppression hearing that one of the two officers who approached Morris' apartment to investigate the anonymous tip about the methamphetamine lab saw Beckstead leave that apartment, and because officers found Beckstead's driver's license in the apartment. In addition, there was evidence that Beckstead's co-defendant James told officers that Beckstead had brought the methamphetamine lab to Morris' apartment the previous night, and James referred to Beckstead as Morris' boyfriend. That evidence is insufficient for Beckstead to establish that the officers' search of Morris' apartment implicated Beckstead's Fourth Amendment rights. At most, this evidence established only that Beckstead had previously been to Morris' apartment. But there is no indication he was living there or had spent an occasional night there. Cf. Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir.2006) (holding individuals who were living in residence when a nonconsensual search occurred had reasonable expectation of privacy there); United States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173, 1176 & n. 1 (10th Cir.2004) (noting that overnight guests and even social guests who do stay overnight have reasonable expectation of privacy, but a person present at another's home to conduct a business transaction does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy), modified on other grounds by United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 542, 166 L.Ed.2d 401 (2006). Even Beckstead's leaving the methamphetamine lab there is insufficient to establish that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in Morris' apartment, let alone an expectation that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable. See United States v. Zermeno, 66 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that mere fact that [the defendant] stored contraband at the . . . residence is insufficient to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy there). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Beckstead's suppression motion. [8]