Opinion ID: 3064913
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Heading: Obtaining Property by Theft

Text: Section 250 of the California Vehicle Code, defining a “chop shop,” proscribes altering, destroying, etc. “any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part known to be illegally obtained by theft.” Neither § 10801 nor § 250 defines “theft,” so we take the definition from California’s general theft statute, which provides in relevant part: Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which CARRILLO-JAIME v. HOLDER 8893 has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall know- ingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. Cal. Penal Code § 484(a). In Corona-Sanchez, we held that a violation of § 484(a) does not categorically constitute a theft offense under § 1101(a)(43)(G). We so held because § 484(a) sweeps more broadly than generic theft under § 1101(a)(43)(G). Among other things, § 484(a) criminalizes aiding and abetting, which includes promotion and instigation of theft. Further, § 484(a) criminalizes theft of labor and false credit reporting, neither of which is a theft of property. 291 F.3d at 1208. But CoronaSanchez does not resolve our case. Even though § 10801 looks to § 484(a) for its definition of theft, it is much narrower than § 484(a). Section 10801 has no aiding and abetting provision. Moreover, the theft under § 10801 is limited to theft of property, indeed to a subcategory of property — “any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part.” [5] Theft of property under Cal. Penal Code § 484(a) includes “larceny, embezzlement, larceny by trick, and theft by false pretenses.” People v. Shannon, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 179 (Ct. App. 1998). “Larceny, larceny by trick, and embezzlement involve taking another’s personal property from the owner’s possession, without the owner’s consent . . . .” Id. Therefore, a conviction for any of these kinds of theft satisfies the nonconsent element in § 1101(a)(43)(G). [6] However, theft by false pretenses may be accomplished with the owner’s consent. Theft by false pretenses has three 8894 CARRILLO-JAIME v. HOLDER elements: “(1) a false pretense or representation, (2) the intent to defraud the owner of his or her property, and (3) the false pretense or representation materially influenced the owner to part with the property.” People v. Levine, 2007 WL 4248775 at  (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2007) (citing People v. Ashley, 267 P.2d 271, 279 (Cal. 1954)). “Theft by false pretenses does not require that the defendant take the property; it requires that the defendant use false pretenses to induce the other to give the property to him.” Shannon, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179. The owner must intend for the defendant “to become the unconditional and unrestricted owner” of the property for it to be theft by false pretenses. People v. Traster, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). [7] If an owner gives property to someone intending that he or she become the unconditional owner, then that person takes the property with the owner’s consent. People v. Chung, 2007 WL 1463455 at  (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 2007) (“[T]heft by false pretences [sic] involves fraudulently taking possession and obtaining title with the consent of the owner.”). Under California law, a person’s false pretenses do not necessarily vitiate the owner’s consent: On the issue of consent, from an analytic standpoint, there are two kinds of fraud: fraud in the fact and fraud in the inducement. The distinction between the two is as follows: in fraud in the fact, the victim is fraudulently induced to consent to the doing of act X; the perpetrator of the fraud, in the guise of doing act X, actually does act Y; in fraud in the induce- ment, the victim is fraudulently induced to consent to the doing of act X and the perpetrator of the fraud does commit act X. Fraud in the fact, it has been said, vitiates consent. ... On the other hand, fraud in the inducement does not vitiate consent. . . . “[T]he basic common law rule CARRILLO-JAIME v. HOLDER 8895 [is] that, unless there is statutory language to the contrary, whenever lack of consent is a necessary element of a crime, the fact that consent is obtained through misrepresentation will not supply the essential element of nonconsent.” People v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472, 478 (Ct. App. 1979) (quoting People v. Cook, 39 Cal. Rptr. 802, 804 (Ct. App. 1964)) (emphasis added, brackets in original). [8] “One can commit theft by false pretenses when he or she intentionally passes a bad check and thereby fraudulently obtains possession and title to merchandise . . . .” Chung, 2007 WL 1463455 at  15 (citations omitted). If the owner or operator of a chop shop intentionally gives the owner of a motor vehicle a bad check in exchange for the vehicle and then disassembles the vehicle in the chop shop, that constitutes a violation of § 10801. This is “fraud in the inducement” under Harris. Because “misrepresentation will not supply the essential element of nonconsent,” the owner’s consent has not been vitiated. 155 Cal. Rptr. at 478. Our decision in Randhawa v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002), is not inconsistent with the above analysis. The defendant in Randhawa had been convicted of possessing stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. Section 1708 prohibits “steal[ing], tak[ing], or abstract[ing], or by fraud or deception obtain[ing]” mail “from or out of any mail, post office, or station thereof, letter box, mail receptacle, or any mail route or other authorized depository for mail matter,” as well as possessing any mail so obtained. The question before us was whether a conviction under § 1708 categorically constituted a theft offense under § 1101(a)(43)(G). We held that it did: Our generic definition of theft offense [under § 1101(a)(43)(G)] also requires a second element, 8896 CARRILLO-JAIME v. HOLDER namely that the exercise of control be without the true owner’s consent. Again, § 1708 contains a functionally equivalent requirement because the government must show that the mail was in fact stolen; once that fact is shown, it has also been shown that there could have been no consent to the possession by the true owner. 298 F.3d at 1153-54. Despite the fact that § 1708 criminalizes taking mail by fraud or deception, we concluded under the categorical approach in Randhawa that there could have been no consent by the owner of the mail. At first blush, this conclusion may seem inconsistent with our conclusion that theft by false pretenses (a species of fraud or deception) under Cal. Veh. Code § 10801 can be accomplished with the consent of the owner. But the apparent inconsistency disappears as soon as one realizes that § 1708 deals with mail that has previously been deposited by the owner in a mail box or some other receptacle. Any fraud used to obtain the mail from the mail box or other receptacle is thus necessarily directed at someone other than the owner of the mail, and the defendant never seeks or obtains the owner’s consent. [9] We therefore conclude that one can commit theft of property by false pretenses under Cal. Penal Code § 484(a) with the consent of the owner.