Opinion ID: 794038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BIA's Refusal To Remand the Case to the IJ for Further Proceedings

Text: 20 Sanusi argues that the BIA erred in denying his motion to remand the case to the IJ for further proceedings to evaluate newly available evidence. The BIA's authority to remand a case to the IJ for further proceedings is not addressed in the INA, nor do regulations explicitly refer to motions to remand. See In re Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992) (Motions to remand are not expressly addressed by the Act or the regulations.). The BIA considers such motions differently depending on the asserted grounds. When remand is requested so that an IJ may examine newly available evidence, the BIA treats the motion as a motion to reopen. See id. (In this instance, the motion to remand is in the nature of a motion to reopen since the respondent requests additional proceedings to present evidence . . . which was not available during the initial proceedings.). 21 We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (describing when such a motion may be granted). The Executive Branch officials charged with promulgating immigration regulations and enforcing the immigration laws of the United States have demonstrated their general antipathy to motions to reopen. As the Supreme Court has explained, [m]otions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored [by the Attorney General and those enforcing the immigration laws on his behalf] for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This is especially true in a deportation proceeding, where, as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992) (citation omitted); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) ([T]he Attorney General's regulations . . . plainly disfavor motions to reopen.). 22 The BIA by no means abused its discretion in denying Sanusi's request that his case be remanded to the IJ. See Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 473 ([T]he Board ordinarily will not consider a discretionary grant of a motion to remand unless the moving party meets a `heavy burden' and presents evidence of such a nature that the Board is satisfied that if proceedings before the immigration judge were reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.). From the record before us, it does not appear that any new evidence Sanusi might have introduced would have changed the IJ's or the BIA's disposition of the case. 10 A different result on remand was especially unlikely because the IJ had already found Sanusi not to be a credible witness, and Sanusi has not proffered new evidence likely to overcome that finding or to rehabilitate his credibility. In any event, Sanusi has failed to persuade us that the BIA's refusal to remand constituted an abuse of discretion.