Opinion ID: 1890630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3 provides:

Text: In any case in which the Division of Youth and Family Services accepts a child in care or custody, including placement, the division shall not be required to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the child with a parent if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that: a. The parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment; b. The parent has been convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter of a child; aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring or soliciting to commit murder, aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter of a child; committing or attempting to commit an assault that resulted, or could have resulted, in significant bodily injury to a child; or committing a similarly serious criminal act which resulted, or could have resulted, in the death of or significant bodily injury to a child; or c. The rights of the parent to another of the parent's children have been involuntarily terminated. When determining whether reasonable efforts are required to reunify the child with the parent, the health and safety of the child and the child's need for permanency shall be of paramount concern to the court. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the division from providing reasonable efforts to reunify the family, if the division determines that family reunification is in the child's best interests. A permanency plan for the child may be established at the same hearing at which the court determines that reasonable efforts are not required to reunify the child with the parent, if the hearing meets all of the requirements of a permanency hearing pursuant to [ N.J.S.A. 30:4C-61.2]. [ N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3] That statute, along with several others, was enacted to enable New Jersey to qualify for the continued federal funding of its child protection system, after ASFA ( Pub.L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)) became law. The overarching goals of ASFA have been described as follows: First, under current law, States must engage in reasonable efforts to help families that have abused or neglected their children. Some observers have argued that uncertainty about the reasonable efforts standard sometimes delays State action in making children available for adoption. In response to this problem, the bill requires States to define aggravated circumstances in State law, such as child torture or sexual abuse, that would permit the State to bypass the Federal reasonable efforts criterion and move more expeditiously to terminate parental rights and make a child available for adoption. In addition, States would not be required to reunite families in cases where a parent has murdered another child or lost their parental rights to a sibling. Second, the bill provides States with a $4,000 ($6,000 for special needs children) incentive payment for each adoption above the number of adoptions during the previous year. Third, in the case of children under age 10 who have been in foster care for at least 18 of the past 24 months, the bill requires States to move toward terminating parental rights under most circumstances. Taken together, these provisions and associated provisions of the Committee bill can be expected to produce a substantial increase in adoptions in the years ahead. [ H.R. Rep. 105-77, at 7 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 2739-40.] In short, ASFA provides that in determining whether to make reasonable efforts to reunify children with their parents, health and safety are the paramount concerns, 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(A), and that reasonable efforts to reunite children with their parents shall not be required ... if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that (i) the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse)[.] 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). As noted, the Appellate Division in this case articulated a standard for establishing whether a parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11, thus justifying waiver of the requirement of efforts toward family reunification. We restate that standard here: [A]ggravated circumstances embodies the concept that the nature of the abuse or neglect must be so severe or repetitive that to attempt reunification would jeopardize and compromise the safety of the child, and would place the child in a position of an unreasonable risk to be reabused. Moreover, any circumstances that increase the severity of the abuse or neglect, or add to its injurious consequences, equates to aggravated circumstances. Whether couched as severe child abuse or neglect, serious child abuse or neglect, or severe physical injury of a singular, chronic, recurrent, or repetitive nature, where the circumstances created by the parent's conduct create an unacceptably high risk to the health, safety and welfare of the child, they are aggravated to the extent that the child welfare agency, here DYFS, may bypass reasonable efforts of reunification. [ A.R.G., supra, 361 N.J.Super. at 77, 824 A. 2d 213.] We note that in ruling, the Appellate Division resorted to a detailed history of ASFA and drew on the efforts of other jurisdictions to define aggravated circumstances. In a scholarly and thoughtful opinion, Judge Fall, writing for the Court, culled from those sources the standard to which we have adverted. We are satisfied that that standard faithfully carries out, as specifically as is possible, the aims of the statute and describes the circumstances that can be deemed sufficiently aggravated to make family reunification efforts unnecessary. We therefore affirm the Appellate Division with respect to that standard. We add only this. As Judge Fall observed, that the notion of aggravated circumstances is not amenable to a rigid definition. Each case must be decided on its facts. Likewise, each determination must involve separate lines of inquiry. The first is whether the alleged conduct, in fact, took place. If not, the inquiry will end. If the conduct did occur, the next issue is whether it was severe or repetitive. If the answer is no, then family reunification efforts are required. If the answer is yes, the court then must determine whether reunification would jeopardize and compromise the safety and welfare of the child. That inquiry in turn has two prongsthe first is whether the abuse was of such a nature that standing alone, it compels the conclusion that reunification should not be required. Judge Fall adverted to that prong when he stated: [W]here the parental conduct is particularly heinous or abhorrent to society, involving savage, brutal, or repetitive beatings, torture, or sexual abuse, the conduct may also be said to constitute aggravated circumstances. [ A.R.G., supra, 361 N.J.Super. at 77, 824 A. 2d 213.] In that situation, the abusive parent's future remedial efforts would be of no consequence. The acts complained of, by their very nature are, so unnatural or depraved that the fundamental bond that is the basis of the reunification notion is deemed to be irremediably undermined. However, there is another class of cases adverted to both by Judge Fall and Judge Eichen, that requires inquiry beyond the mere conduct of the parent. Examples are abandonment, corporal punishment that does not result in permanent injury, serious neglect and mental abuse, to name a few, which may or may not have irremediably undermined the parent-child relationship and may or may not support the conclusion that reuniting the family will place the child at risk. In those cases, the court may consider whether to admit expert testimony about the conduct and its relationship to the parent-child bond along with an assessment of whether the parents' remedial efforts are sufficient to eliminate an unreasonable risk of re-abuse. It is the result of all of those inquiries that will determine whether reunification efforts are required. In light of the fact that the trial court did not have the benefit of the Appellate Division's standard or our further elucidation of it, we remand the case to that court for consideration of the issue of aggravated circumstances, de novo.