Opinion ID: 1845177
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Heading: Is a Deferred Sentence an Iowa Code Subsection 321.281(2) Offense Permitting Enhanced Punishment?

Text: At the center of the controversy in this appeal are Iowa Code subsections 321.281(1) and 321.281(2)(c). Subsection 321.281(1) defines the OWI crime and specifies the elements identified in division I. Subsection 321.281(2) provides: A person convicted of a violation of this section, upon conviction or a plea of guilty, is guilty of .... (c) A class D felony for a third offense and each subsequent offense. The State points out that this defendant on December 29, 1981, pled guilty to OWI and received a deferred judgment. It argues a conviction may have different meanings within different contexts, State v. Ege, 274 N.W.2d 350, 355 (Iowa 1979), and in this context should encompass only a determination of guilt, represented by a guilty plea. The language of subsection 321.281(2), it urges, equates a conviction with a guilty plea, as does the language that establishes the six-year cutoff for prior convictions (No conviction for, or plea of guilty to, a violation of this section....). See § 321.281(2)(c). Defendant contends we settled this issue in State v. Barlow, 242 Iowa 714, 719, 46 N.W.2d 725, 728 (1951), where we said the prior offenses that enhanced the punishment under Iowa Code section 321.281 (1950) were synonymous with convictions or judgments obtained in prior actions. Cf. State v. Finnegan, 244 Iowa 166, 170-71, 55 N.W.2d 223, 225 (1952). We agree that a deferred judgment in a prior prosecution does not qualify under this definition. Although section 321.281 has been amended several times since Barlow, it has retained a scheme of escalating punishments based on the number of defendant's prior OWI offenses. The legislature's unwillingness to change this language in light of our Barlow interpretation suggests legislative approval of that holding. [W]hen this court has interpreted a statute in a particular way and the legislature has thereafter left it unchanged, it is presumed that the legislature acquiesced in that interpretation, Ege, 274 N.W.2d at 355 (citation omitted); State v. Dunham, 232 N.W.2d 475, 476 (Iowa 1975). We thus agree with trial court's basic holding that a deferred sentence is not an Iowa Code subsection 321.281(2)(c) offense for the purposes of imposing enhanced punishment. This view is reinforced by application of the rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly, with doubts being resolved in favor of the accused. City of Cedar Falls v. Flett, 330 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Iowa 1983); State v. Williams, 315 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Iowa 1982). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in conformance with this opinion. Costs are taxed one-half to each party. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTION.