Opinion ID: 6328139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Placement in Administrative Segregation

Text: Mr. Sperry was put in administrative segregation, leading to claims involving violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 3
In asserting a violation of the First Amendment, Mr. Sperry alleges retaliation for his exercise of constitutionally protected activity. The can move for summary judgment after the completion of discovery. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6–11. 3 In the complaint, Mr. Sperry also asserted that his placement in administrative segregation had violated the Eighth Amendment and 4 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 5 district court dismissed this claim, stating that Mr. Sperry had failed to adequately plead facts showing each defendant’s substantial motivation to retaliate for protected conduct. For most of the defendants, we agree. But not for two prison employees (Lindsey Wildermuth and Andrew Lucht). A retaliation claim bears three elements: (1) identification of constitutionally protected activity, (2) conduct “that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity,” and (3) facts indicating that the conduct was intended to respond to the exercise of protected activity. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010). The complaint contains allegations that would satisfy each element. The first element involves protected activity. Mr. Sperry says that he helped other inmates in their litigation, and the defendants point out that such help isn’t constitutionally protected. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001). But Mr. Sperry also claims that he brought his own civil suit, which is constitutionally protected. Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1317–18 (10th Cir. 2010); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2006). The second element is conduct that would inhibit continued pursuit of Mr. Sperry’s civil case. In the complaint, Mr. Sperry alleged that Ms. Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. He does not reassert these claims here. 5 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 6 Wildermuth and Mr. Lucht had imposed administrative segregation, which resulted in transfer to another prison with harsher conditions. A factfinder could reasonably infer that the harsher conditions could chill a person of ordinary firmness from continued pursuit of a civil case. Gee, 627 F.3d at 1189; Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1263–64 (10th Cir. 2006). The third element involves a retaliatory motive. The defendants attribute placement in administrative segregation to a disciplinary violation. But Mr. Sperry disagrees, attributing placement in administrative segregation to retaliation. He alleges that Ms. Wildermuth and Mr. Lucht monitored the civil suit, Ms. Wildermuth issued a disciplinary report riddled with errors and refused to make corrections, and Ms. Wildermuth blamed the mistakes on a department run by Mr. Lucht. From these allegations, a factfinder could reasonably infer a retaliatory motive. We thus conclude that Mr. Sperry adequately pleaded satisfaction of each element as to Ms. Wildermuth and Mr. Lucht. But Mr. Sperry did not plausibly allege the participation of any of the other defendants in the retaliatory transfer to administrative segregation. 4 We thus reverse the dismissal of this claim only as to Ms. Wildermuth and Mr. Lucht. 5 4 The other defendants on this claim are Raymond Roberts, Johnnie Goddard, Collette Winklebauer, Rex Pryor, Phillip Patterson, Larry Hoshaw, Daniel Jackson, and James Heimgartner. 5 Mr. Sperry also alleged a conspiracy and argues on appeal that this conspiracy included his placement in administrative segregation. 6 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 7
Mr. Sperry also claims a denial of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed this claim, and we agree with this ruling. The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process only if the defendant affected a liberty or property interest. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Mr. Sperry alleges a liberty interest based on the state’s regulations governing placement in administrative segregation. But a liberty interest can arise from state regulations only when they extend the duration of confinement or impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 487 (1995). The district court properly concluded that Mr. Sperry had failed to allege facts showing that the placement in administrative segregation extended his prison confinement or constituted an “atypical and significant hardship” in comparison to the typical terms of prison confinement. Id. To determine whether the conditions were atypical and significant, the court engages in a fact-intensive assessment, considering the totality of Appellant’s Opening Br. at 5. But this argument consists only of a single sentence and is conclusory. We thus affirm the dismissal of the conspiracy claim related to the placement in administrative segregation. Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2019). 7 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 8 the circumstances. Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1012 (10th Cir. 2012). This assessment includes four factors: 1. the existence of a legitimate penological interest, 2. the extremity of the conditions, 3. the possible effect on the duration of confinement, and 4. the indeterminate nature of the placement. Est. of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007). On the first factor, Mr. Sperry pleaded a factual basis to question the legitimacy of the penological interest, for he attributed his placement in administrative segregation to petty retaliation. On the second factor, Mr. Sperry alleged various losses of privileges:  lockdown for 24 hours without human interaction,  constant lighting in the cell,  lack of visitation,  limited access to outside recreation,  limited shower access,  lack of law-library access,  lack of opportunities to participate in religious ceremonies,  lack of access to publications,  lack of mental-health programs, 8 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 9  inability to participate in work-release programs,  cuffing and connection to a dog leash upon exit from the cell,  inability to participate in fundraisers,  inability to access his JPay account,  inability to use his MP4 player, and  limited ability to purchase items from the commissary. R. at 152. We’ve regarded similar restrictions as typical and insignificant in comparison to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1014–15 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1218 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[R]estrictions on an inmate’s telephone use, property possession, visitation and recreation privileges are not different in such degree and duration as compared with the ordinary incidents of prison life.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 6 On the third factor, placement in administrative segregation doesn’t affect the duration of the sentence. Mr. Sperry complains that he couldn’t participate in rehabilitation programs or in work release, which could have hurt his chances to obtain parole at his 2020 hearing. But there’s little in 6 In non–precedential opinions, we have also concluded that similar conditions at this prison weren’t severe enough to create a liberty interest. Shields v. Cline, 829 F. App’x 321, 324 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished); Stallings v. Werholtz, 492 F. App’x 841, 845 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). 9 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 10 the complaint to assess Mr. Sperry’s chance of getting parole even if he could have participated in these programs. On the fourth factor, Mr. Sperry doesn’t allege that he was to remain in administrative segregation for an indefinite period. Given the factors as a whole, we conclude that Mr. Sperry’s “placement in administrative segregation . . . does not give rise to a liberty interest.” Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1413 (10th Cir. 1996). Because no liberty interest existed, the Fourteenth Amendment did not require due process. Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1994). So this claim was properly dismissed.