Opinion ID: 1160049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Evidence Code Section 669.5 to Initiative Measures

Text: In 1980, the Legislature adopted Evidence Code section 669.5, which establishes a presumption that growth limitation ordinances adversely affect regional housing needs and places the burden of proof on the city or county to show that the ordinance is necessary to promote public health, safety, and welfare. (2) It is clear from section 1 of Assembly Bill No. 3252 (which added § 669.5 to the Evidence Code) that the Legislature intended to shift the burden of proof to the proponents of growth control legislation as a matter of public policy in order to counteract unjustified limitations on the supply of local housing sufficient to meet the municipality's share of regional housing needs. In enacting section 669.5, the Legislature stated that an adequate supply of housing is necessary for the health, safety, and public welfare of all Californians. The Legislature further finds and declares that local government ordinances which severely restrict the number of housing units which may be constructed have an effect on the supply of housing within the region, may exacerbate the housing market conditions in surrounding jurisdictions, and may limit access to affordable housing within the jurisdiction and in the region. While the Legislature recognizes that, in certain instances, the public health, safety, and welfare warrant enactment of such ordinances, increasing public need for adequate housing requires that local governments properly establish the need for such ordinances and balance the need for such ordinances against the need for new housing opportunities. (Stats. 1980, ch. 1144, § 1, p. 3703.) (3a) The controversy here between the parties concerning section 669.5 centers around the term governing body in subdivision (a), and the reference in subdivision (d) to matters adopted by initiative. While subdivision (a) states that the statute's provisions apply to ordinances enacted by the governing body of a city, county, or city and county ..., subdivision (d) expressly exempts certain initiative measures adopted prior to the effective date (Jan. 1, 1981) of section 669.5. City contends that because section 669.5 contains the term governing body and because there is no ambiguity in this term, the plain meaning should be ascribed to the term. The term governing body excludes the electorate. (See Reidman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383, 387 [18 P.2d 947].) (4a) If the language is clear, there can be no room for interpretation; effect must be given to the plain meaning of the words. ( Teachers Management & Inv. Corp. v. City of Santa Cruz (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d 438, 446 [134 Cal. Rptr. 523].) (3b) BIA, on the other hand, argues that the words governing body cannot be considered by themselves, but must be analyzed within the context of the entire statute. The question is not whether the words governing body are ambiguous but whether section 669.5 itself is unclear. (4b) [T]he `intention of the legislature will be determined so far as possible from the language of its statutes, read as a whole, and if the words of an enactment, given their ordinary and popular signification, are reasonably free from ambiguity and uncertainty, the courts will look no further to ascertain its meaning.' [Citation.] ( Pepper v. Board of Directors (1958) 162 Cal. App.2d 1, 4 [327 P.2d 928].) Legislative intent must be gleaned from the whole act rather than from isolated words. ( Marrujo v. Hunt (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 972, 977 [138 Cal. Rptr. 220].) (3c) Ambiguity does exist within section 669.5. The language of section 669.5, subdivision (a), appears to limit the provisions of subdivision (b) to ordinances enacted by the governing body of a city, county, or city and county.... But subdivision (d), which states that [t]his section shall not apply to a voter approved ordinance adopted by referendum or initiative prior to the effective date of this section ... implies that section 669.5 is applicable to initiative measures adopted after the effective date. If section 669.5, subdivision (a), truly is taken literally, all initiative measures are excluded and there would be no need for subdivision (d) excluding a portion of initiative measures. Although City makes an argument that subdivision (d) might have been added merely out of an abundance of caution, that argument seems too weak to clear up the statutory ambiguity. Given the ambiguity and the conflict in section 669.5, we must look beyond the language of the provision to determine legislative intent. ( In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 590 [128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371].) (4c) The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 51 [210 Cal. Rptr. 781, 694 P.2d 1153].) (3d) The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 3252 indicates that the Legislature had at one time considered, but later rejected, the possibility of making all initiatives exempt from application of the statute. In its original form, as introduced on March 12, 1980, the language of the bill read in part:  Any ordinance enacted by a city, county, or city and county which directly limits, by number.... (Italics added.) The term governing body is missing from this original version, and there is no express reference to initiative measures. On April 30, 1980, the Assembly approved amendments to Assembly Bill No. 3252, and the amended version read: Any ordinance enacted by the governing body of a city, county, or city and county, except an ordinance enacted pursuant to the provisions of an initiative measure approved by the voters of such city, county, or city and county which directly limits, by number.... (Italics added.) This version clearly would have excluded all initiative measures from the application of section 669.5. In addition, the wording of this version indicates that the Legislature must have assumed that measures enacted by a governing body included initiatives adopted by the electorate, since initiatives were exempted from the reach of the statute within the same sentence. The final version of section 669.5 recommended by a conference committee resolving differences between the versions of the bill in the Senate and the Assembly, suggested that the language exempting all initiatives be deleted and instead that present subdivision (d) be adopted. As recommended, the Legislature deleted the language exempting all initiative measures and added subdivision (d), exempting only those initiative measures adopted before the effective date of the statute. The Court of Appeal recently faced this same issue in Lee v. City of Monterey Park (1985) 173 Cal. App.3d 798 [219 Cal. Rptr. 309]. After analyzing the history of Assembly Bill No. 3252, that court concluded: This summary of the legislative history makes it abundantly clear that the Legislature at one time intended to exclude all initiative measures but ultimately decided that only specific measures should be excluded. While a persuasive argument can be made that when a city council adopts an ordinance it may more easily meet the burden of proof imposed by Evidence Code section 669.5 since it has a record of the hearings it may have conducted and evidence it may have received, whereas an initiative passed by the voters does not involve the same process of evidence gathering, such concerns were presumably considered by the Legislature when it decided not to exclude all initiative measures. Whether the burden of proof in such cases should be shifted to a city is a policy decision that has been made by the Legislature. (P. 807.) We agree with that court's holding that the legislative history indicates that section 669.5 applies to initiative measures adopted after the effective date of the statute. Concluding that section 669.5 does not apply to initiative measures would render subdivision (d) meaningless. (5) The cases do not suggest that an unreasonable or implausible construction may be given to a statute to avoid consideration of potential constitutional problems. The construction must be consistent with statutory language and purpose. (See In re Kay, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 942.) (3e) The present Court of Appeal's interpretation of section 669.5 is inconsistent with the statutory language and with the purpose of the statute, which is to support the public policy favoring construction of affordable housing. Since initiative measures amount to approximately one-half of the growth limitation ordinances passed in California (State of Cal., Office of Planning and Research, The Growth Revolt: Aftershock of Proposition 13 (Aug. 1980) p. 1), to exempt initiative measures from section 669.5 would be a major impediment to accomplishing the purpose of the law.