Opinion ID: 1509476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: propriety of retrial

Text: Appellant contends that the reversal of the 1975 conviction for improper admission of defendant's confession barred reprosecution for the same offense under his right not to be placed in double jeopardy. He argues that the court of appeals found that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction when it stated, We are unable to conclude on the record before us that the State may not be able to adduce additional evidence at another trial and accordingly the cause is remanded for new trial. He also argues that the crux of the State's case in the first trial was the confession, and absent it and its fruits, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. Appellant would support his position by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). Defendant Burks was tried in federal court for bank robbery. Convicted by a jury, he appealed alleging insufficiency of the Government's case. The court of appeals agreed that the Government had not made a sufficient case to support the verdict, reversed the conviction, and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. The Supreme Court on further appeal held: the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient. . . 437 U.S. at 18, 98 S.Ct. at 2150. The Supreme Court reasoned that for purposes of determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial after reversal of a conviction, a reversal based on insufficiency of evidence is to be distinguished from a reversal for trial error. Where the holding of the appellate court is that the Government has failed to establish criminal culpability, it says that a judgment of acquittal should have been entered after which, of course, defendant could not be retried for the same offense. The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. 437 U.S. at 11, 98 S.Ct. at 2147. State v. Basham, 568 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo. banc 1978), determined: The court in Burks held that double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment, preclude the retrial of a defendant where the initial conviction is reversed solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. Neither the pronouncements in Burks v. United States, supra , nor this Court's interpretation of them in State v. Basham, supra , requires a finding that defendant's right against double jeopardy has been violated in this case. A second trial is precluded once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient. There was no such finding by the court of appeals; and as stated in State v. Basham, supra , the bar to retrial is erected only when the conviction is reversed solely for lack of sufficient evidence. A conviction reversed for trial error in the admission of evidence is not one reversed for the purpose of giving the prosecution a second opportunity to present evidence as proscribed in Burks v. United States, supra . Such may be an incidental effect, but the true purpose is to protect defendant's right to a trial as free from error as practicable: In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e. g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished. 437 U.S. at 15, 98 S.Ct. at 2149. Appellant insists that this Court must review the record of the first trial exclusive of the confession and its fruits. He argues that considering only the competent evidence on that record, this Court should find insufficient evidence as a matter of law; and under Burks v. United States, supra , reversal on that ground would bar retrial. A reexamination of the record of the first trial is unnecessary. The issue in Burks v. United States was whether a defendant may be tried a second time when a reviewing court has determined that in a prior trial the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. The Court held that a retrial under such circumstances would violate the double jeopardy clause, and that this result did not depend in any way on whether the defendant had asked for a new trial as part of his claim for relief. The Court also held that the decision in no way questioned prior holdings which allow a retrial when a conviction is reversed due to trial error. Thus, under Burks v. United States, supra , two propositions are clear: (1) if a conviction is reversed solely due to evidentiary insufficiency the double jeopardy clause requires judgment of acquittal; and (2) if a conviction is reversed solely due to trial error, then retrial is constitutionally permissible. The question remaining is whether a new trial may be ordered when questions going to trial error as well as evidentiary insufficiency have been raised on appeal. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), decided concurrently with Burks v. United States, supra , expressly left the question open. Defendant Greene's conviction was reversed by the Florida Supreme Court and the cause was remanded for a new trial, but it was not clear whether the majority of that court had based its decision on trial error or evidentiary insufficiency. The United States Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of which alternative reading was correct and expressly reserved the question of double jeopardy consequences if the reversal was because the legally competent evidence was insufficient to prove guilt. 437 U.S. at 26, n. 9, 98 S.Ct. at 2155, n. 9. Appellant's assertion, therefore, that Burks v. United States constitutionally requires judgment of acquittal in such a case is refuted by the express avoidance of that issue in Greene v. Massey, supra . When the trial court erroneously admits evidence resulting in reversal, as in the instant case, the State should not be precluded from retrial even though when such evidence is discounted there may be evidentiary insufficiency. The prosecution in proving its case is entitled to rely upon the rulings of the court and proceed accordingly. If the evidence offered by the State is received after challenge and is legally sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused, the State is not obligated to go further and adduce additional evidence that would be, for example, cumulative. Were it otherwise, the State, to be secure, would have to assume every ruling by the trial court on the evidence to be erroneous and marshall and offer every bit of relevant and competent evidence. The practical consequences of this would adversely affect the administration of justice, if for no other reason, by the time which would be required for preparation and trial of every case. This is consistent with Burks v. United States, supra , which lists among examples of trial error which do not invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause with regard to retrial, the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.ed.2d 448 (1964) held that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment did not preclude the retrial of one whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction, stating: From the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate courts would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of improprieties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably beyond the reach of further prosecution. In reality, therefore, the practice of retrial serves defendants' rights as well as society's interest. Id. at 466, 84 S.Ct. at 1589. To hold in this case that following any finding of error, the appellate court must then pause to reexamine sufficiency of the evidence could affect an appellate court's function of reviewing for error as dispassionately and disinterestedly as practicable. In short, neither Burks v. United States, supra , nor Greene v. Massey, supra , proscribes retrial of an accused following reversal of prior conviction predicated upon an incorrect ruling by the trial court as to the admission of evidence even where the discounting of the improperly received evidence resulted in evidentiary insufficiency. In accord, United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978); Morton v. State, 284 Md. 526, 397 A.2d 1385 (1979); State v. Boone, 284 Md. 1, 393 A.2d 1361 (1978); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39 (W.Va.1979); contra, Commonwealth v. Funches, 397 N.E.2d 1097 (Mass.1979); State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 994 (Utah 1979). Appellant also argues that retrial was improper because in the first trial the State relied for conviction on defendant's confession and was therefore estopped from relying on different evidence for conviction in the second. He argues that the State should be prohibited from proceeding on a different theory in a second proceeding after having taken a contradictory position in the first proceeding, citing State v. Baird, 288 Mo. 62, 231 S.W. 625 (1921). That case, inapposite here, held that in a trial where the State had offered evidence on defendant's character, the court would err if it failed to submit the issue to the jury. Such a holding, unquestioned here, does not point to error in retrying this appellant based on new or additional evidence following a reversal for an improperly admitted confession. The propriety of adducing new evidence at retrial is dealt with below.