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Text: Two Terms ago, in IBM, this Court considered the question whether a tax on insurance premiums paid to protect exports against loss violated the Export Clause. Distinguishing case law developed under the Commerce Clause, 517 U. S., at 850-852, and the Import-Export Clause, id., at 857-861, the Court held that the Export Clause allows no room for any federal tax, however generally applicable or nondiscriminatory, on goods in export transit. Before this Court's decision in IBM, the Government argued that the HMT, even if characterized as a "tax" rather than a "user fee," should survive constitutional review "because it applies without discrimination to exports, imports and domestic commerce alike." Reply Brief for United States 9, n. 2. Recognizing that IBM "rejected an indistinguishable contention," the Government now asserts only that HMT is "`a permissible user fee,' " Reply Brief for United States 9, n. 2, a toll within the tolerance of Export Clause precedent. Adhering to the Court's reasoning in IBM, we reject the Government's current position.

The HMT bears the indicia of a tax. Congress expressly described it as "a tax on any port use," 26 U. S. C. § 4461(a) (emphasis added), and codified the HMT as part of the Internal Revenue Code. In like vein, Congress provided that, for administrative, enforcement, and jurisdictional purposes, the HMT should be treated "as if [it] were a customs duty." §§ 4462(f)(1), (2). However, "we must regard things rather than names," Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S., at 376, in determining whether an imposition on exports ranks as a tax. The crucial question is whether the HMT is a tax on exports in operation as well as nomenclature or whether, despite the label Congress has put on it, the exaction is instead a bona fide user fee.

In arguing that the HMT constitutes a user fee, the Government relies on our decisions in United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S. 52 (1989), Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 (1978), and Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972). In those cases, this Court upheld flat and ad valorem charges as valid user fees. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S., at 62 (1[1]20442 percent ad valorem fee applied to awards certified by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal qualifies as a user fee and is not so excessive as to violate the Takings Clause); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S., at 463_x0097_ 467 (flat federal registration fee imposed annually on all civil aircraft meets genuine user fee standards and, as applied to state-owned aircraft, does not dishonor State's immunity from federal taxation); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority, 405 U. S., at 717-721 (flat charge for each passenger enplaning, levied for the maintenance of State's airport facilities, does not run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause). Those decisions involved constitutional provisions other than the Export Clause, however, and thus do not govern here.

IBM plainly stated that the Export Clause's simple, direct, unqualified prohibition on any taxes or duties distinguishes it from other constitutional limitations on governmental taxing authority. The Court there emphasized that the "text of the Export Clause . . . expressly prohibits Congress from laying any tax or duty on exports." 517 U. S., at 852; see also id. , at 861 ("[T]he Framers sought to alleviate . . . concerns [that Northern States would tax exports to the disadvantage of Southern States] by completely denying to Congress the power to tax exports at all."). Accordingly, the Court reasoned in IBM, "[o]ur decades-long struggle over the meaning of the nontextual negative command of the dormant Commerce Clause does not lead to the conclusion that our interpretation of the textual command of the Export Clause is equally fluid." Id., at 851; see also id., at 857 ("We have good reason to hesitate before adopting the analysis of our recent Import-Export Clause cases into our Export Clause jurisprudence. . . . [M]eaningful textual differences exist [between the two Clauses] and should not be overlooked."). In Sperry, moreover, we noted that the Takings Clause imposes fewer constraints on user fees than does the dormant Commerce Clause. See 493 U. S., at 61, n. 7 (analysis under Takings Clause is less "exacting" than under the dormant Commerce Clause). A fortiori, therefore, the Takings Clause is less restrictive than the Export Clause.

The guiding precedent for determining what constitutes a bona fide user fee in the Export Clause context remains our time-tested decision in Pace. Pace involved a federal excise tax on tobacco. Congress provided that the tax would not apply to tobacco intended for export. To prevent fraud, however, Congress required that tobacco the manufacturer planned to export carry a stamp indicating that intention. Each stamp cost 25 cents (later 10 cents) per package of tobacco. Congress did not limit the quantity or value of the tobacco packaged for export or the size of the stamped package; "[t]hese were unlimited, except by the discretion of the exporter or the convenience of handling." 92 U. S., at 375.

The Court upheld the charge, concluding that it was "in no sense a duty on exportation," but rather "compensation given for services [in fact] rendered." Ibid. In so ruling, the Court emphasized two characteristics of the charge: It "bore no proportion whatever to the quantity or value of the package on which [the stamp] was affixed"; and the fee was not excessive, taking into account the cost of arrangements needed both "to give to the exporter the benefit of exemption from taxation, and . . . to secure . . . against the perpetration of fraud." Ibid.

Pace establishes that, under the Export Clause, the connection between a service the Government renders and the compensation it receives for that service must be closer than is present here. Unlike the stamp charge in Pace, the HMT is determined entirely on an ad valorem basis. The value of export cargo, however, does not correlate reliably with the federal harbor services used or usable by the exporter. As the Federal Circuit noted, the extent and manner of port use depend on factors such as the size and tonnage of a vessel, the length of time it spends in port, and the services it requires, for instance, harbor dredging. See 114 F. 3d, at 1572.

In sum, if we are "to guard against . . . the imposition of a [tax] under the pretext of fixing a fee," Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S., at 376, and resist erosion of the Court's decision in IBM, we must hold that the HMT violates the Export Clause as applied to exports. This does not mean that exporters are exempt from any and all user fees designed to defray the cost of harbor development and maintenance. It does mean, however, that such a fee must fairly match the exporters' use of port services and facilities.