Opinion ID: 1452969
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timeliness of Garcia's Fourth Superseding Indictment

Text: In 2000, the district court dismissed Garcia's fourth superseding indictment, concluding that it impermissibly expanded the original indictment and was thus time-barred. In 2001, a panel of this Court reversed the district court, holding that the fourth superseding indictment did not materially broaden the charges already pending against Garcia and on that basis concluding that the fourth superseding indictment related back to the timely filing of the second superseding indictment. See Garcia, 268 F.3d at 416. Garcia was thereafter tried and convicted on the charges in the fourth superseding indictment. Garcia now attempts to challenge the conclusion we reached over five years ago when we affirmed the timeliness of the fourth superseding indictment. The law-of-the-case doctrine expresses the routine practice of courts to refuse to reopen what has been decided. United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988)). That doctrine, however, does not limit a court's power to hear a dispute. Id. Put differently, [a] court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Id. Because there are no extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration of this issue, we rely upon the law-of-the-case doctrine and decline to reevaluate our prior decision affirming the timeliness of Garcia's fourth superseding indictment.