Opinion ID: 1720633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant first asserts its motion to dismiss should have been sustained and trial court erred in holding to the contrary.

Text: At the outset this necessitates some reference to relevant rules of pleading. A timely motion to dismiss should be sustained where the challenged pleading fails to state a claim on which any relief asked can be allowed. Grounds of a motion to dismiss a pleading because it does not state a cause of action must be based on the contents of the pleading assailed. Facts not so appearing, except those of which judicial notice must be taken, are to be ignored. And it is essential such a motion specify wherein the pleading attacked is claimed to be insufficient. While a motion to dismiss admits the truth of all well pleaded, issuable and relevant facts, it does not admit mere conclusions of fact or law not supported by allegations of ultimate facts. This means a pleader must allege ultimate facts. He cannot plead legal conclusions alone. A good pleading consists of statements of ultimate facts and when so stated the pleader has a right to state conclusions based upon those facts. The prayer of a petition must always be examined to determine what constitutes the subject matter of litigation for judicial purposes, and generally the relief to be afforded is accordingly limited. Where a doubtful pleading is directly attacked by motion before issue is joined or in the answer as permitted by rule 72, Rules of Civil Procedure, it will be resolved against the pleader. If, however, the petition does allege ultimate facts upon which plaintiff might recover and states a claim under which evidence may be introduced in support thereof, or if attack is delayed, the petition should be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with doubts resolved in his favor and the allegations accepted as true. In support of the foregoing see Gradischnig v. Polk County Board of Supervisors, Iowa, 164 N.W.2d 104, opinion filed January 14, 1969; Gardner v. City of Charles City, 259 Iowa 506, 508, 144 N.W. 2d 915; and Halvorson v. City of Decorah, 258 Iowa 314, 319, 138 N.W.2d 856. See also True v. Larimore, 255 Iowa 451, 456-457, 123 N.W.2d 5, and Anthes v. Anthes, 255 Iowa 497, 503-505, 122 N.W.2d 255.