Opinion ID: 6344086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant’s Other Arguments

Text: In addition to arguing that the trial court abused its discretion, appellant raises three other contentions. First, he asserts that once the court dismissed the fee petitions without prejudice—or, at the very least, when he voluntarily withdrew them—it lost authority to rule on the sanctions matter. If valid, that contention would mean that the court also lacks authority to consider the issue on remand, making it pointless for us to send the case back. We have quoted the Supreme Court in observing that “the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. . . . Such a determination may be made [even] after the principal suit has been terminated.” Hipps v. Cabrera, 170 A.3d 199, 205 n.8 (D.C. 2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990)). Thus, we discern no procedural infirmity in remanding the sanctions determination even though the underlying fee petitions are no longer pending. As for appellant’s remaining two arguments, our disposition obviates the need to address them. These contentions attack the nature of the court’s sanctions: appellant asserts, first, that the court lacked authority to penalize him by denying his fee petitions with prejudice and, second, that the court failed to warn him of the 13 possibility of such a penalty, thereby offending due process. By reversing the court’s sanction and remanding the case, our order allays any harm that resulted from these alleged errors. Consequently, we do not consider them.