Opinion ID: 4190457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1405 (Reissue 2016) provides that “[w]here one of the parties to an action dies, or his powers as a personal representative cease, before the judgment, if the right of action survives in favor of or against his representatives or successor, the action may be revived, and proceed in their names.” And Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1406 (Reissue 2016) states: The revivor shall be, by a conditional order of the court if made in term, or by a judge thereof if made in vacation, that the action be revived in the names of the representatives or successor of the party who died, or whose powers ceased; and proceed in favor of or against them. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1407 (Reissue 2016) further provides: The order may be made on the motion of the adverse party, or of the representatives or successor of the party who died, or whose powers ceased, suggesting his death or the cessation of his powers, which, with the names and capacities of his representatives or successor, shall be stated in the order. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-322 (Reissue 2016) also provides: An action does not abate by the death or other dis- ability of a party, or by the transfer of any interest therein during its pendency, if the cause of action survives or continues. In the case of the death or other disability of a party, the court may allow the action to continue by or against his or her representative or successor in interest. In case of any other transfer of interest, the action may be continued in the name of the original party or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the action. [3,4] A pending action must be revived in the manner provided by statute; a failure to do so means that the pending action has no force and effect with respect to any entity in whose - 802 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports ANDERSON v. FINKLE Cite as 296 Neb. 797 name revivor was required.3 “‘The death of a party to a legal proceeding, where the cause of action survives, suspends the action as to decedent until someone is substituted for decedent as a party.’”4 In this case, trial was held on August 25, 2015. Anderson, the sole plaintiff in this case, died on October 2. On October 30, the personal representative was appointed in probate court. On November 30, 2015, the court entered judgment on the merits of the case. On January 29, 2016, the district court ruled on various posttrial motions, and on February 25, Finkle filed an otherwise timely notice of appeal from this judgment. Prior to the filing of that appeal, however, on January 25, the estate had filed a motion for revivor, and on March 1, the trial court revived the action in the name of the personal representative. On March 22, Finkle perfected a second appeal from the order of revivor and all underlying orders and judgments, including the trial order entered on November 30, 2015. As of the time of Anderson’s death, the only action the district court had jurisdiction to take was to revive the action in the name of the personal representative in response to a properly filed motion for revivor.5 As such, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment for Anderson and lacked jurisdiction to deny Finkle’s motion for new trial. Because the pending action was not revived, the court’s issuance of these orders following Anderson’s death had “no force and effect” as to Anderson.6 [5-7] When a court lacks jurisdiction and nonetheless enters an order, such order is void.7 Furthermore, “[a] void order is a 3 See Fox v. Nick, supra note 2. 4 Id. at 991, 660 N.W.2d at 886, quoting 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 155 (1985). 5 See, In re Conservatorship of Franke, supra note 2; Fox v. Nick, supra note 2; Street v. Smith, 75 Neb. 434, 106 N.W. 472 (1906). 6 See Fox v. Nick, supra note 2, 265 Neb. at 992, 660 N.W.2d at 886 (2003). 7 See State v. Bracey, 261 Neb. 14, 621 N.W.2d 106 (2001). - 803 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports ANDERSON v. FINKLE Cite as 296 Neb. 797 nullity which cannot constitute a judgment or final order that confers appellate jurisdiction on [a] court.”8 We have held that “the notice of appeal from a nonappealable order does not render void for lack of jurisdiction acts of the trial court taken in the interval between the filing of the notice and the dismissal of the appeal by the appellate court.”9 As discussed above, because of Anderson’s death, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment and deny Finkle’s motion for new trial. Thus, these orders were void. Finkle’s purported appeal from such orders did not confer appellate jurisdiction upon this court. Therefore, Finkle’s first appeal, filed on February 25, 2016, did not divest the district court of its jurisdiction. Order of R evivor The one action the district court was permitted to take was to revive the proceedings in the name of Anderson’s personal representative. The district court did so on March 1, 2016. Therefore, the order of revivor issued by the district court on March 1 effectively revived the matter in the name of the estate. Hence, we turn to Finkle’s second notice of appeal, filed on March 22, 2016, in which Finkle appealed the order of revivor and all underlying orders and judgments. The motion for revivor was made pursuant to § 25-1406. The district court granted the order of revivor “pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat[.] § 25-322 (and not Neb. Rev. Stat[.] § 25-1410).” [8,9] Although the order for revivor was made pursuant to § 25-322, this makes no difference in our analysis. We have held that “an order reviving an action, whether the order was entered in proceedings under § 25-322 or under [Neb. Rev. Stat.] §§ 25-1403 to 25-1420 [(Reissue 2016)], is not a final 8 In re Interest of Trey H., 281 Neb. 760, 767, 798 N.W.2d 607, 613 (2011). 9 Holste v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 256 Neb. 713, 729, 592 N.W.2d 894, 906 (1999). - 804 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports ANDERSON v. FINKLE Cite as 296 Neb. 797 order from which an appeal may immediately be taken. The order may be reviewed after final judgment in the case.”10 We have therefore held that an order reviving an action is not a final order. An appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders.11 As such, we must dismiss Finkle’s second notice of appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. In short, the district court’s judgment order and order denying the motion for new trial or to alter or amend the trial court’s order following Anderson’s death on October 2, 2015, appealed as case No. S-16-222, is void and is accordingly dismissed. Because the district court was never divested of its jurisdiction, the order of revivor remains in effect. However, we are without jurisdiction to entertain Finkle’s appeal of this order of revivor, appealed as case No. S-16-307, because it was not a final order. Therefore, case No. S-16-307 must also be dismissed.