Opinion ID: 1169839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Option Two

Text: Moreover, Option Two i.e., that HRS § 286-261(b) now confers unlimited discretion on the Director to vary the default periods enumerated in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(4) both upward and downward is equally unacceptable because it would require us to ignore the manifest thrust of the relevant legislative history, which, under the circumstances, is the only extrinsic aid available to us as an interpretive tool for ascertaining the intent of the legislature. See Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i at 19, 904 P.2d at 904. As we have seen, Act 188 endowed the Director with the clear discretion to increase the periods of administrative revocations imposed pursuant to subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), but not to decrease them. See section III.B.2.d. of this opinion, supra. Indeed, the Governor vetoed H.B. No. 1016 primarily because the global sanctions prescribed by HARDLA were not severe enough. See section III.B.2.e. of this opinion, supra. Thus, the legislative history of HRS § 286-261, discussed above, reveals a progressive ratcheting up of HARDLA's sanctions. In the face of that history, the inference that the legislaturewithout comment, for the first time ever, and contrary to the zeitgeist that motivated itintentionally liberalized HRS § 286-261(b), so as to allow the Director to impose periods of administrative revocation less severe than those enumerated in its subsections, is simply untenable.