Opinion ID: 745332
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Limitation on the Major Life Activities

Text: 46 Second, even if asymptomatic HIV infection were an impairment, Runnebaum must prove that asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits one or more of the major life activities. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A). The term major life activity is not defined in the statute. See Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105 (citing Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir.1994)). We therefore must construe it in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2053-54, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). 47 Webster's defines major as [d]emanding great attention or concern, Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 718 (1988); and, as greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1363 (1986). These definitions suggest that an activity qualifies under the statutory definition as one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA if it is relatively more significant or important than other life activities. Conversely, the definitions suggest that a life activity that is relatively less significant than other life activities does not qualify as one of the ADA's major life activities, and therefore does not trigger the statute's definition of disability, regardless of the magnitude of the limitation caused by the given impairment. 48 Although a determination of disability under the statute calls for an individualized inquiry into whether the plaintiff is disabled, see Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59-60, the statutory language--with its reference to the major life activities--implies that a corresponding case-by-case inquiry into the connection between the plaintiff and the major life activity is not necessary. For example, working is one of the major life activities of the ADA, see Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1844, 137 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1997), even though working may not be of particular significance or importance to a given plaintiff. Thus, courts need only consider whether the impairment at issue substantially limits the plaintiff's ability to perform one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA, not whether the particular activity that is substantially limited is important to him. Cf. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941 (suggesting that whether a particular activity is one of the major life activities under the statute is not a subjective inquiry). 49 Amici cite procreation and intimate sexual relations as the major life activities that are substantially limited by Runnebaum's asymptomatic HIV infection. They do not explain why the activity of engaging in intimate sexual relations is one of the major life activities contemplated by the statute, but contend that procreation is properly viewed as a 'major life activity,' since it is 'one of the most fundamental of human activities.'  (EEOC Br. at 17 (quotation omitted); accord Whitman-Walker Br. at 19-20.) We agree that procreation is a fundamental human activity, but are not certain that it is one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA. 8 Compare Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that procreation is not one of the major life activities under the ADA); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir.1996) (unpublished), aff'g 881 F.Supp. 240, 243 (E.D.La.1995) (same), with Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941 (concluding that although the question is very close, procreation is a major life activity); McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir.1992) (assuming without deciding that reproduction is one of the major life activities under the Rehabilitation Act). Furthermore, we are not convinced that engaging in intimate sexual relations falls within the statutory rubric of the major life activities. 50 Assuming, however, that procreation and intimate sexual relations are major life activities protected by the ADA, Runnebaum must still prove that asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits his ability to procreate or engage in intimate sexual relations. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A). Amici contend that Runnebaum's HIV infection, even if asymptomatic, substantially limits ... procreation and intimate sexual relations ... because of concerns that the offspring or partner will be infected with the virus. (EEOC Br. at 10; accord Whitman-Walker Br. at 19-21.) As support for this proposition, Amici cite to a memorandum prepared by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. Issued September 27, 1988, the memorandum discusses the application of identical provisions of the Rehabilitation Act to asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals. See Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President (Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) No. 641 at 405:4-7 [hereinafter Kmiec Memorandum]. The memorandum, however, is more limited than Amici claim. Rather than definitively interpreting the statute, it attempts to predict how courts will resolve the question of whether asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits one or more of the major life activities, and speculates that at least some courts would find that asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits procreation and intimate personal relations. (Kmiec Memorandum at 405:6.) 51 Specifically, the memorandum suggests that some courts will find that asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits procreation because asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals will forego having children because of the fear of what the infection will do to one's child. (Kmiec Memorandum at 405:7.) The memorandum also predicts that some courts can be expected to find a limitation of a major life activity in the fact that an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual's intimate relations are also likely to be affected by HIV infection. Id. In sum, the memorandum posits that some courts will find that asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits procreation and intimate sexual relations because asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals will choose to forego having children and engaging in intimate relationships because of their contagiousness. 52 The memorandum equivocates, however, recognizing that finding a limitation of life activities based on the asymptomatic individual's response to his knowledge of his infection is not fully persuasive since it depends upon the conscience and good sense of the person infected. Id. The ADA's statutory language requires that the impairment substantially limit one or more of the major life activities. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A). In the case of asymptomatic HIV infection, however, the memorandum acknowledges that it is the conscience or normative judgment of the particular infected person, not the impairment, that substantially limits procreation and intimate sexual relations. (Kmiec Memorandum at 405:7 (emphasis added).) As the memorandum confesses, there is nothing inherent in the infection which actually prevents either procreation or intimate relations. Id. 53 Although conceding that asymptomatic HIV infection does not prevent either procreation or intimate relations, the memorandum nevertheless postulates that in any case where the evidence indicates that the plaintiff HIV-infected individual has in fact changed his or her behavior--as, for example, where the plaintiff represents that procreation has been foregone--the court might well find a limitation of major life activity. Id. Thus, the memorandum qualifies its prediction that at least some courts will find asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits procreation or intimate sexual relations, and bases its prediction on the notion that a person's reaction to his impairment may serve to create a statutory disability. Moreover, the memorandum suggests, courts may choose to pass over such factual questions ... [and find] a life activity limitation based on the reaction of others to the infection. Id. The memorandum therefore bases its prediction that some courts will find that asymptomatic HIV infection is an actual disability on both the actual disability and perceived disability prongs of the statutory definition. (Kmiec Memorandum at 405:6.) 54 We hold that asymptomatic HIV does not substantially limit procreation or intimate sexual relations for purposes of the ADA. As the Kmiec Memorandum recognizes, nothing inherent in the infection actually prevents either procreation or intimate relations. Asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals are able to, and indeed do, procreate and engage in sexual intimacies. We recognize that as a behavioral matter, asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals may refrain from having children or engaging in sexual relations because of concerns that the offspring or partner will be infected with the virus. (EEOC Br. at 10; accord Whitman-Walker Br. at 19-21.) But as a physical matter, nothing inherent in the virus substantially limits procreation or intimate sexual relations. The statutory language is plain: the impairment in question, not the individual's reaction to the impairment, must substantially limit[ ] one or more of the major life activities of such individual. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A). This language requires a causal nexus between the physical effect of the impairment and one of the major life activities. For example, a paralyzed individual's paralysis is what substantially limits his ability to walk, and a deaf person's deafness is what substantially limits his ability to hear. In the case of asymptomatic HIV infection, however, an individual's reaction to the knowledge of his infection--not the infection itself--is what, if anything, substantially limits procreation and intimate sexual relations. Thus, under the statutory definition, asymptomatic HIV infection is not a disability. 55 Even if the statute permitted a finding that asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits procreation and intimate sexual relations because of a person's response to the knowledge of his infection, there is no evidence in the record that Runnebaum, because of his infection, forewent having children or engaging in intimate sexual relations. Nothing in the record indicates that Runnebaum refrained from having children out of fear that he would pass the virus on to his child. Indeed, nothing in the record so much as suggests that Runnebaum was at all interested in fathering a child. Moreover, the record makes clear that Runnebaum's ability to engage in intimate sexual relations was not substantially limited by his HIV infection; the record shows that he concealed his HIV infection from his lover. Ergo, Runnebaum's HIV infection, if an impairment, does not substantially limit one or more of the major life activities under § 12102(2)(A). 56