Opinion ID: 1869923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: aggravated offense for purposes of sora and lifetime parole supervision

Text: [4] SORA is a civil regulatory scheme intended by the Legislature to protect the public from the danger posed by sex offenders. [8] SORA applies to any person who pleads guilty or is found guilty of certain offenses listed in § 29-4003(1). Included in that list are sexual assault of a child in the third degree [9] ; first degree sexual assault of a child [10] ; and attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit an offense listed in § 29-4003(1)(a). [11] SORA includes a general requirement that persons convicted of these offenses must register with the sheriff of the county in which he or she resides [12] during any period of supervised release, probation, or parole and for a period of ten years after the date of discharge from probation, parole, or supervised release or release from incarceration, whichever date is most recent. [13] Certain sex offenders, including those who commit an aggravated offense, are subject to a lifetime registration requirement. The lifetime community supervision requirement of § 83-174.03 incorporates and mirrors the lifetime registration requirement of SORA. [14] A defendant who commits an aggravated offense as defined by SORA shall, upon completion of his or her term of incarceration or release from civil commitment, be supervised in the community by the Office of Parole Administration for the remainder of his or her life. [15] SORA defines an aggravated offense as any registrable offense under section 29-4003 which involves the penetration of (i) a victim age twelve years or more through the use of force or the threat of serious violence or (ii) a victim under the age of twelve years. [16] The question presented in this appeal is whether, as Hamilton contends, a court may look only to the statutory elements of the offense in making the aggravated offense determination or whether, as the State argues, a court may consider facts in the record regarding the manner in which the offense was committed. In Mastne, the Court of Appeals held that only the elements of the offense could be considered in determining whether it was an aggravated offense under SORA. In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the language of § 29-4005(2) with that of § 29-4005(3)(a), which subjects a sex offender determined to be a sexually violent predator to, inter alia, a lifetime registration requirement. The statute provides in relevant part: (2) A person required to register under section 29-4003 shall be required to register under the act for the rest of his or her life if the offense creating the obligation to register is an aggravated offense, if the person has a prior conviction for a registrable offense, or if the person is required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his or her life under the laws of another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States. A sentencing court shall make that fact part of the sentencing order. (3)(a) When sentencing a person for a registrable offense under section 29-4003, a court may also determine if the person is a sexually violent predator. When making its determination the court shall consider information contained in the presentence report and the recommendation of experts in the behavior and treatment of sex offenders, victims' rights advocates, and representatives of law enforcement agencies. [17] The Court of Appeals found the difference in the language used in § 29-4005(2) and (3)(a) to be significant. It reasoned that the language used by the Legislature in § 29-4005(3)(a) made it clear that the court was to make a factual determination of whether an offender was a sexually violent predator. The Mastne court reasoned that by omitting language similar to the second sentence of § 29-4005(3)(a) from § 29-4005(2), the Legislature made it equally clear that it did not intend for the sentencing court to make a factual finding or determination regarding whether or not an offense is `an aggravated offense.' [18] We do not find the meaning of § 29-4005(2) to be quite so clear. The second sentence of that subsection refers to the existence of an aggravated offense or other grounds for lifetime registration as a fact which is to be made a part of the sentencing order. This suggests that some factfinding is necessary, and we have stated that the statute require[s] the court, as part of the sentence, to determine if the defendant committed an aggravated offense. [19] Had the Legislature intended that the fact of penetration for purposes of an aggravated offense determination should be derived solely from the elements of the offense, it could have used specific language to that effect. For example, the Legislature has enacted a statute providing that an offender may be required to submit to a human immunodeficiency virus antibody or antigen test if he or she has been convicted of certain specified offenses or any other offense under Nebraska law when sexual contact or sexual penetration is an element of the offense. [20] We conclude that § 29-4005(2) is ambiguous as to whether the sentencing court may make a factual finding in determining that the offense committed by a particular defendant under § 29-4005(4)(a) involves the penetration of ... a victim under the age of twelve years for purposes of determining the existence of an aggravated offense under SORA. Accordingly, the statute is open to construction. [5-7] When construing a statute, an appellate court must look to the statute's purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it. [21] If possible, an appellate court will try to avoid a statutory construction which would lead to an absurd result. [22] Statutes relating to the same subject matter will be construed so as to maintain a sensible and consistent scheme, giving effect to every provision. [23] In enacting SORA, the Legislature made findings that sex offenders present a high risk to commit repeat offenses and that the efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, conduct investigations, and quickly apprehend sex offenders are impaired by the lack of available information about individuals who have pleaded guilty to or have been found guilty of sex offenses and who live, work, or attend school in their jurisdiction. [24] The Legislature further found that state policy should assist efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect their communities by requiring registration of sex offenders. [25] By imposing a 10-year registration requirement for some sex offenders but a lifetime registration requirement for others, including those who commit aggravated offenses, the Legislature clearly intended to provide enhanced assistance to law enforcement and protection to the public with respect to sex offenders who commit aggravated offenses. [26] That intention would be frustrated if a person who had in fact sexually penetrated a victim under the age of 12 years would be exempted from the lifetime registration requirement simply by pleading to a lesser offense which does not involve the element of penetration. We agree with the Court of Appeals that § 29-4005(2) and (3)(a) should be read together, because both relate to a lifetime registration requirement for certain sex offenders. However, contrary to the reasoning of Mastne, we discern a consistency in the two statutory provisions. The use of the word fact in the second sentence of § 29-4005(2) read in conjunction with the word also in the first sentence of § 29-4005(3)(a) indicate a legislative intent that there be a factual determination by the sentencing judge under both statutory provisions. Applying the reasoning of Mastne to § 29-4005(2) would, in our view, lead to an absurd result. Sexual penetration is an element in only three of the registrable offenses currently listed in § 29-4003: first degree sexual assault, [27] first degree sexual assault on a child, [28] and incest of a minor. [29] None of these include an element of use of force or the threat of serious violence, [30] and thus, applying the reasoning of Mastne, only first degree sexual assault of a child as currently defined in § 28-319.01 would meet all requirements for an aggravated offense under § 29-4005(4)(a). However, § 28-319.01 was first enacted in 2006. [31] Prior to that time, the offense of sexual assault of a child did not include penetration as an element. [32] Thus, in 2002, when the Legislature amended SORA to provide a lifetime registration requirement for those committing aggravated offenses, [33] there were no existing offenses with elements strictly corresponding to the definition of an aggravated offense in § 29-4005(4)(a)(ii). This indicates that the Legislature intended the existence of an aggravated offense to be determined on the basis of actual facts, not statutory elements. [8] We therefore conclude that under SORA, a sentencing judge need not consider only the elements of an offense in determining whether an aggravated offense as defined in § 29-4005(4)(a) has been committed. Instead, the court may make this determination based upon information contained in the record, including the factual basis for a plea-based conviction and information contained in the presentence report. To the extent that Mastne holds otherwise, it is disapproved. [9] In this case, the factual basis received at the time of Hamilton's pleas and the information included in the presentence investigation report supports the finding of the district court that Hamilton committed aggravated offenses which subject him to the lifetime registration requirement of SORA.