Opinion ID: 2100511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Quashing of Subpoenas.

Text: Appellant claims that the trial court erred in quashing the subpoenas issued to representatives of the Fayette County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office and the Kentucky Attorney General's Office, arguing that quashing these subpoenas denied him the opportunity to bring the ten audiotapes within the possession of the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office before the court for its review to determine whether the records were properly withheld. Because Appellant was clearly not entitled to such records under the Open Records Act, we hold that the trial court properly quashed the subpoenas. [R]ecords or information compiled and maintained by county attorneys or Commonwealth's attorneys pertaining to criminal investigations or criminal litigation shall be exempted from the provisions of KRS 61.870 to 61.884 and shall remain exempted after enforcement action, including litigation, is completed or a decision is made to take no action. KRS 61.878(1)(h) (emphasis added). We interpreted this Open Records Act exemption in Skaggs v. Redford, 844 S.W.2d 389 (Ky.1992): [T]he exemptions in the Open Records Act should be construed in a manner sufficiently broad to protect a legitimate state interest, and ... the state's interest in prosecuting the appellant is not terminated until his sentence has been carried out. The Office of the Commonwealth of [sic] Attorney and the Office of Attorney General, together, represent the state's prosecutorial function in this case.... We agree with the appellee that the records fall within the provisions of [then] KRS 61.878(1)(g), and as such they are public records exempted under this provision [until] after enforcement action is completed. Id. at 390. These principles apply equally to all records in the litigation files of the Commonwealth's Attorney, regardless of origin. A criminal defendant has ample opportunity to examine the Commonwealth's litigation files before trial. RCr 7.24(2). Appellant cannot use the provisions of the Open Records Act to subvert these rules of discovery. See KRS 447.154. As we stated in Skaggs , we disagree that [this result] represents a fundamental unfairness, because the judicial rules of practice and procedure that apply to this case ... require the Commonwealth to make discovery of all information to which the defendant is legitimately entitled during the prosecution of the action. Skaggs, 844 S.W.2d at 391. Accordingly, a subpoena requiring representatives from the Attorney General's Office and the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office to appear at an Open Records Act hearing and produce records in the possession of the Commonwealth's Attorney contravened KRS 61.878(1)(h) and Skaggs . Appellant claims that the subpoenas would have served a second purpose at the hearing by allowing him to introduce evidence that: 1) the subpoenaed individuals had wrongfully interfered with Appellant's open records requests; and 2) that the ten audiotapes in the Commonwealth's Attorney's possession had been wrongfully transferred from the LFUCG to the Commonwealth's Attorney for the purpose of placing them under the Skaggs exemption. As stated above, the LFUCG contacted the Attorney General's office and the Commonwealth's Attorney's office after receiving Appellant's June 2000 request. Individuals from those offices advised the LFUCG to deny the request. Appellant claims that this incident constituted wrongful interference with his requests. This allegation is not at all relevant to Appellant's primary claims for relief, i.e., that additional records exist that he has not received, and that the LFUCG willfully violated the Open Records Act. In light of the LFUCG's July 14, 2000, reconsideration of its denial of Appellant's request, Appellant suffered no harm from these contacts. Further, there is nothing facially improper about representatives of public agencies communicating with one another about open records requests. We decline Appellant's invitation to infer bad faith on the part of these public agencies. Finally, there is no merit to Appellant's notion that he could have presented evidence to show that ten audiotapes were wrongfully transferred from the LFUCG's possession to the Commonwealth's Attorney's office. Appellant claims that the audiotapes were placed in the custody of the Commonwealth's Attorney only after he began making requests for Earley homicide investigation records. Yet, by Appellant's counsel's own admission, the Commonwealth's Attorney's office provided Appellant with open file discovery at his 1991 trial and furnished him with an inventory of the records in its possession, which included the audiotapes in question. This unrefuted evidence belies Appellant's claim that the LFUCG placed the tapes in the Commonwealth's Attorney's possession to protect them from disclosure under the Open Records Act. Because Appellant's remaining contentions are meritless, the trial court correctly quashed the subpoenas. [3]