Opinion ID: 4584057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dutch I’s Mandate

Text: The panel’s mandate in Dutch I was specific and limited the district court’s discretion on remand: the ACCA governs Dutch’s sentencing. The panel held that the government had presented sufficient evidence to show the crimes were committed on different occasions. 753 F. App’x at 634. And it made clear that the district court was bound by this determination on remand. Id. at 635 (“We REVERSE the district court’s conclusion that the ACCA does not apply and REMAND with instructions to VACATE Dutch’s sentence and resentence him consistent with this order and judgment.”) (emphasis added). This was not a general remand on the applicability of the ACCA. The district court had no discretion to disregard the panel’s specific and limited mandate. It erred by disregarding the mandate from Dutch I. Dutch and the district court are correct on several points: we are not infallible and we do not always address an issue as fully as the district court might hope in our mandates. But the Dutch I court did not suffer from either of these infirmities. In no uncertain terms, the panel rejected Dutch’s argument that the district court relied on at resentencing. See id. at 634 (“We also reject -10- Dutch’s argument that he did not admit to aiding and abetting the bank robberies on different occasions.”). 1 Even if the prior panel had erred, the extent of a district court’s discretion on remand is not determined by our fallibility or the district court’s satisfaction with our explanation. The court’s discretion on remand is determined by the limitations expressly imposed on it by our mandate. This court need not plumb the depths and details of an issue to preclude further argument about it on remand. On those occasions, hopefully few and far between, when this court is wrong or unclear, the district courts are not in the position to engage in error correction on remand. We have processes in place to ensure parties can have errors corrected: petitions for panel rehearings, rehearings en banc, and writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Dutch pursued these processes following Dutch I to no avail. If the mandate rule means anything, it must mean that a district court cannot disregard a specific mandate on remand because it disagrees with it or thinks it insufficiently explained. 1 Though we need not reach the underlying issue here, we agree with the Dutch I panel that the government satisfied its burden of proving Dutch has three prior violent felony convictions that were committed on occasions different from one another. Regardless of whether Dutch aided and abetted the three bank robberies through a single action of aiding and abetting, the charging document and plea agreement prove he was charged with and pleaded guilty to three counts of substantive bank robbery. The documents also make clear these robberies happened on different occasions in different locations. That is enough for the government to satisfy its burden. -11- And finally, of course, the mandate rule can be tempered by exceptional circumstances. Dutch argues at least one of the exceptions to the mandate rule applies. But none do. There is no new law at issue and no new evidence has been uncovered. The third exception applies only to blatant errors by the prior sentencing court, which it may consider only if this court failed to address them. That was not the case here.