Opinion ID: 1308043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Having established the procedural posture of this case, we turn to an analysis of the State's petition. The State petitions this court for an extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the district court to vacate its order suspending Husney's sentence and to reinstate the original sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The State argues that under the established law of this jurisdiction, once Husney began to serve his sentence, the district court was without authority to suspend or modify that sentence. Given the particular factual setting presented in this case, we disagree. The State's position is based in large part upon a perceived incongruity in Nevada law pertaining to sentencing. The State argues that a sentencing court is prohibited by statute from suspending a sentence once a defendant has actually begun to serve that sentence. The State's position is based in part upon NRS 176.185(4), which provides, in pertinent part: The court shall not suspend the execution of a sentence of imprisonment after the defendant has begun to serve it. [3] The State maintains that this language establishes that once a defendant has commenced serving his sentence, the district court is totally without jurisdiction to suspend or modify it. See, e.g., Miller v. Hayes, 95 Nev. 927, 604 P.2d 117 (1979); State v. District Court, 85 Nev. 485, 457 P.2d 217 (1969). This court has recognized, however, that a sentencing court may under certain circumstances entertain a motion to vacate or modify its orders and judgments. In the seminal case of Warden v. Peters, 83 Nev. 298, 429 P.2d 549 (1967), we addressed the issue of whether a trial court has the power to set aside a judgment of conviction after a plea of guilty and commencement of sentence. We held: We deem the procedural label to be of little importance. The fact remains that courts which make a mistake in rendering a judgment which works to the extreme detriment of the defendant will not allow it to stand uncorrected. In a situation such as this, where, as discussed below, the court has inherent power to reconsider a judgment for good cause shown, we hold that such an issue may be raised by a motion to vacate judgment ... . 83 Nev. at 301, 429 P.2d 549 (emphasis added); see also State v. District Court, 85 Nev. at 488, 457 P.2d 217. Warden v. Peters has never been overruled, and has been cited in several recent cases. See State v. Clark, 90 Nev. 144, 146, 520 P.2d 1361 (1974); Miller v. Hayes, 95 Nev. at 931, 604 P.2d 117; Sheriff v. Blasko, 98 Nev. 327, 647 P.2d 371 (1982). Accordingly, despite the State's reliance on NRS 176.185(4), it is clear that when the sentencing court makes a mistake in rendering a judgment which works to the extreme detriment of the defendant, the district court has jurisdiction to vacate or modify the suspect sentence or judgment. [4] The district court's inherent authority to correct a judgment or sentence founded on mistake is in accord with the constitutional considerations underlying the sentencing process. The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that where a defendant is sentenced on the basis of materially untrue assumptions concerning his criminal record, [the] result, whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due process of law. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). Further, the cases clearly establish that constitutionally violative materially untrue assumptions concerning a criminal record may arise either as a result of a sentencing judge's correct perception of inaccurate or false information, or a sentencing judge's incorrect perception or misapprehension of otherwise accurate or true information. See United States v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707, 710-712 (3rd Cir.1967); United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2nd Cir.1970). The latter situation is illustrated by Crowe v. State, 86 S.D. 264, 194 N.W.2d 234 (1972), in which the sentencing judge misread an otherwise accurate F.B.I. report and sentenced the defendant while under the mistaken assumption that he had suffered four rape convictions. In fact, the F.B.I. report clearly indicated that the defendant had suffered only one conviction for rape. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing, finding the defendant's due process rights had been violated as the result of the sentencing judge's subjective misapprehension of the report. Id. at 246; see also United States v. Myers, 374 F.2d at 710-712 (sentencing judge misread criminal record and sentenced defendant while under mistaken assumption he had suffered three prior convictions for strong arm robbery); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.1971) (sentencing judge's reliance upon presentence investigation report predicated on limited factual basis amounts to due process violation). In light of this authority, it is clear that a sentencing judge's misapprehension of a defendant's criminal record may result in a violation of the defendant's right to due process of law. When this potential due process violation is considered in conjunction with the district court's inherent authority to correct sentences founded on mistakes which work to the extreme detriment of the defendant, it is equally clear that the district court has authority to correct or modify a sentence which is the result of the sentencing judge's misapprehension of a defendant's criminal record. It must be noted, however, that not every mistake or error which occurs during sentencing gives rise to a due process violation. The cases implicitly recognize this point; a due process violation arises only when the errors result in materially untrue assumptions about a defendant's record. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. at 741, 68 S.Ct. at 1255. This parallels the basis of the district court's inherent authority to correct sentences based on mistake; the court has jurisdiction to vacate or modify the defective sentence when a mistake works to the extreme detriment of the defendant. Warden v. Peters, 83 Nev. at 301, 429 P.2d 549. We believe that these considerations represent an appropriate jurisdictional limit to the correction or modification of a defective sentence by a district court. Accordingly, we hold that if a sentencing court pronounces sentence within statutory limits, the court will have jurisdiction to modify, suspend or otherwise correct that sentence if it is based upon materially untrue assumptions or mistakes which work to the extreme detriment of the defendant. [5]