Opinion ID: 1155733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: guilt and special circumstances issues

Text: (1a) Defendant contends his federal and state constitutional rights to a jury drawn from the vicinage were violated by the trial court's policy of excusing all prospective jurors claiming hardship caused by residing more than an hour and a half from the Mendocino County courthouse in Ukiah. (See Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 4.5(d)(2).) In defendant's view, he was entitled to jurors from the immediate vicinity of the crime scene. We reject defendant's argument. First, as the People observe, defendant made no vicinage challenge to his jury; his only objection to the court's excusal rulings was that they prevented getting jurors from all over the county, an objection which failed to invoke defendant's present crime scene/vicinage argument. (See former § 1060.) In any event, defendant was not denied his vicinage right. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.... Included in this constitutional guarantee is the right to a trial by a jury residing in the vicinage, applicable in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 96 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 457-458, 90 S.Ct. 1893]; Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713, 721-724 [263 Cal. Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547] [ Hernandez ].) We have held, however, that for purposes of Sixth Amendment challenges to prosecutions in California courts, the boundaries of the vicinage are coterminous with the boundaries of the county. ( Hernandez, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 729, fn. omitted.) Thus, our decision in Hernandez is dispositive of defendant's federal constitutional claim, for he does not assert that the jurors in his case were drawn from outside the county wherein the murders were committed. Defendant contends that ex post facto or due process principles would preclude application of Hernandez to his case, which was tried before Hernandez was decided. Had defendant raised a vicinage challenge at time of trial, based on pre- Hernandez law, the foregoing issue would be squarely raised. But as we have seen, no such challenge was presented. Defendant also asserts a violation of his right under the state Constitution to a jury drawn from the vicinage. (2) Although the California Constitution does not contain an explicit vicinage requirement, it nonetheless does provide an independent guarantee of the right to a jury drawn from the vicinage. (See Hernandez, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 721; People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 935 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]; People v. Powell (1891) 87 Cal. 348 [25 P. 481].) (1b) However, for purposes of state constitutional challenges to the proper selection of jurors in criminal trials in state courts, the boundaries of the vicinage are also coterminous with the boundaries of the county. ( People v. Powell, supra, 87 Cal. at pp. 354-357.) Thus, our decision in Powell is dispositive of defendant's state constitutional claim. We note defendant has asked that we take judicial notice of the contents of a standard map of Mendocino County. Although such a countywide map is a proper subject of judicial notice (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a)), this evidence is unnecessary in light of our conclusion that vicinage covers the entire county.
(3a) Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying a requested three-day continuance to establish the underrepresentation of various minority groups on the panel of prospective jurors. The request for continuance was made near the completion of the jury selection process and was denied on the ground defendant failed to use reasonable diligence in marshalling the evidence supporting the motion. We find no abuse of discretion. The gist of defendant's claim was that Blacks and Hispanics (among other identified groups) were potentially underrepresented by reason of the trial court's liberal hardship excusal policy, and that a continuance was needed to allow defendant's expert, Dr. Bronson, additional time to evaluate the statistical data extracted from the jury questionnaires. Dr. Bronson opined in his declaration that although he could not confidently assert that any unconstitutional underrepresentation occurred, the limited data I have examined does tend to support that conclusion. Dr. Bronson observed that although only 51 percent of White venirepersons he had examined thus far had been excused, 75 percent of minority venirepersons had been excused. The trial court, noting that defendant had access to the jury questionnaires for three weeks prior to the motion, denied the continuance request as untimely. Defendant now asserts the trial court erred because no meaningful analysis of the data was feasible until the voir dire process had nearly run its course, and prospective jurors were either excused or accepted. As defendant observes, examination of the questionnaires alone could not resolve the question whether the court was exercising improper criteria in excusing prospective jurors, and whether such criteria produced a jury unrepresentative of the community. (4) The People respond by citing the well-settled rule that the trial courts possess broad discretion to grant or deny continuances, and the defendant must show he exercised due diligence in preparing for trial. ( People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 844 [248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894].) (3b) Here, the record indicates that defendant failed to deliver the jury questionnaires to Dr. Bronson until one day prior to the hearing on defendant's motion to quash the panel. These questionnaires would have disclosed the racial background of each responding juror and, combined with the court's excusal practices to that point, possibly could have afforded some support for defendant's motion to quash. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's continuance request as untimely. Assuming for purposes of argument that the request was timely, it seems clear any such error was harmless. At most, a continuance might have allowed defendant's expert to present statistical evidence that the court's allegedly liberal hardship excusal practices may have resulted in excluding a disproportionate number of Blacks and Hispanics. But defendant failed, and continues to fail, to set forth any basis for concluding that such underrepresentation resulted from some improper feature of the court's excusal practices. Statistical underrepresentation of minority groups resulting from race-neutral excusal practices does not amount to systematic exclusion necessary to support a representative cross-section claim. (See People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1160 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315], People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 492-493 [273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 524 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 546 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].) (5) As we stated in Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 492-493, By basing his motion to quash on the expert statistical evidence ..., defendant sought to show a statistical disparity occurred over time and was thus the result of a `systematic exclusion' of Hispanics. As we recently explained in Bell, supra, however, such a showing is insufficient, standing alone, to make out a prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation. When, as here, `a county's jury selection criteria are neutral with respect to race, ethnicity, sex, and religion, more is required to shift the burden to the People. The defendant must identify some aspect of the manner in which those criteria are being applied that is: (1) the probable cause of the disparity, and (2) constitutionally impermissible.' ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 524.) Evidence that `race/class neutral jury selection processes may nonetheless operate to permit the de facto exclusion of a higher percentage of a particular class of jurors than would result from a random draw' is insufficient to make out a prima facie case. ( Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 546, italics in original.) (3c) In the absence of any evidence that the trial court's excusal policies were improperly applied in a more lenient manner on behalf of minority venirepersons, defendant's motion to quash lacked merit. Accordingly, the court properly denied a continuance to pursue the motion on this basis. No suggestion is made that a continuance would have developed such evidence.
Defendant contends the warrantless seizure by federal authorities of his property from an open storage trailer violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, and that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the items seized. The following facts were elicited at the pretrial hearing on defendant's motion to suppress under section 1538.5: On April 5, 1984, defendant and his girlfriend of six months, Londa Lynn, were arrested in a carnival trailer in Odessa, Texas. The following day, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent Billy Kirkwood obtained the release of Lynn, and accompanied her to the carnival grounds. Lynn took Kirkwood to a second trailer in which carnival employees stored many of their personal belongings. As a carnival employee, Lynn had access to the open storage trailer. Lynn entered the storage trailer alone and retrieved her belongings as well as those of defendant. Lynn handed Kirkwood defendant's property and indicated to him that she planned to return home to Tennessee without further contact with defendant. According to Kirkwood, he accepted custody of defendant's property for safekeeping purposes only, rather than to search for evidence. He testified that he was informed the carnival was leaving town on the day of the seizure, and that he did not examine the property before sending it to the FBI office in Eugene, Oregon. Among the items seized was a green duffel bag, with 888 or BBB printed in black ink on the exterior. When the printing was magnified and examined under fluorescent lights, investigators found victim Benjamin Shaffer's initials, BFS, in red ink beneath the black printing. At trial, the duffel bag was identified as belonging to Shaffer. Defendant moved to suppress the foregoing evidence, arguing that no exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless seizure of his property, and noting that the officer failed to ask him where he wanted his belongings to be stored. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, ruling that Lynn had the authority to enter the trailer and deliver defendant's belongings to the officers. The court further held the seizure was proper to safeguard defendant's property and secure it as possible evidence. (6) On appeal, the People suggest the seizure was proper for a variety of reasons, including (1) Lynn's consent thereto, (2) the need to safeguard defendant's property, and (3) defendant's lack of standing to complain. Defendant contends that the seizure cannot be upheld on any of the foregoing theories. First, the People failed to raise the third party consent theory below, and therefore defendant had no occasion to attempt to rebut it with evidence or argument showing Lynn's consent was legally insufficient. (See Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 640 [108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33].) Although some evidence was elicited on the issue, it does not appear the issue was as fully developed as it would have been had the People formally pressed a consent theory. Additionally, on this record it is uncertain whether Lynn, as defendant's girlfriend, had authority to consent to such a seizure. Second, although the issue of safekeeping was indeed litigated, forming a basis for the trial court's denial of defendant's suppression motion, it is questionable whether we would sustain that ruling on appeal. The record indicates that although the seizing officer indicated the property would be held for safekeeping, it was not inventoried at the police station but was merely shipped to the FBI agency in Oregon. Cases sustaining inventory or safekeeping seizures generally require some kind of standardized or established inventory procedure apparently lacking in this case. (See Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 5-7 [109 L.Ed.2d 1, 7-8, 110 S.Ct. 1632]; Illinois v. LaFayette (1983) 462 U.S. 640, 646-648 [77 L.Ed.2d 65, 71-72, 103 S.Ct. 2605].) Additionally, although some exigency existed because the carnival was being moved on the day of the seizure, the People failed to show that a warrant could not have been obtained before that time. ( United States v. Howard (9th Cir.1987) 828 F.2d 552, 555.) Third, although the People did assert defendant's lack of standing to object to the seizure, the trial court overruled the objection before defendant had attempted to elicit evidence and argument on the subject. According to defendant, it would be unfair to resolve the issue on appeal in light of the incomplete record resulting from the trial court's ruling that defendant had standing. Defendant, however, fails to suggest what evidence could have been offered to demonstrate his standing to object to the seizure of property belonging to, and stolen from, the victim in this case. (See Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 134 [58 L.Ed.2d 387, 394-395, 99 S.Ct. 421]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 885-890 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].) It is simply inconceivable that defendant could have established a basis for claiming a legitimate possessory interest in the Shaffer duffel bag. In any event, any improper admission of the evidence in question was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of all the other evidence presented at trial. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) As previously indicated, defendant's accomplice, Lanora Johnson, testified in detail regarding his central role in the Shaffer murders. Her testimony was itself strongly corroborated by Terry Brown, a former friend of defendant. According to Brown, after a day of drinking, he went to a bar in South Lake Tahoe where he drank beer and met defendant whom he had invited to join him. Defendant admitted to Brown during this meeting that he had killed two people named Shaffer, and described the shootings in detail. The defense attempted to impeach Brown by establishing that he related his statement to the police only after he had been arrested for armed robbery. Brown denied, however, that he gave his statement or subsequent testimony in the hope of receiving a more lenient sentence. According to Brown, whose testimony was not contradicted by defendant in this regard, Brown had already negotiated a five-year prison sentence when he volunteered information regarding defendant's statement, and no further leniency was granted to him. In addition, circumstantial evidence (other than the green duffel bag at issue) tied defendant to the Shaffer murders, including a close ballistic match of a gun at one time owned by defendant with the bullets recovered from the crime scene. There was also considerable evidence suggesting that defendant attempted to forge the Shaffers' names on various credit card transaction slips and traveler's checks, although the People's handwriting expert could not conclusively state that defendant had signed these items. In light of the entire record, we conclude that any error in admitting evidence of Benjamin Shaffer's duffel bag was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(7) Defendant contends the prosecutor in his closing arguments misstated the legal effect of the immunity agreement with Lanora Johnson. The agreement required Johnson to testify fully regarding her knowledge of defendant's involvement in the charged offenses. The agreement immunized Johnson from prosecution based on her answers or evidence arising therefrom, but provided that she could be prosecuted for any perjury or contempt in answering or failing to answer the prosecutor's questions. Defense counsel attempted to impeach Johnson's testimony by stressing her motivation to assist the People, and assure immunity from prosecution, by implicating defendant. In response, in closing arguments, the prosecutor stressed that (1) Johnson accepted the immunity agreement prior to her initial testimony before the grand jury; (2) under the agreement, Johnson could have simply said ... the defendant is not the one [who committed the offenses], and thereafter could have walked out of here a free person; and (3) Johnson had a free reign [ sic ] if she wanted to let him completely off the hook. Defense counsel objected to the foregoing argument, observing that if Johnson had tried to retract her earlier statements implicating defendant, the prosecutor undoubtedly would have rescinded the immunity agreement. The court overruled the objection. As previously indicated, defendant contends the prosecutor's argument was legally incorrect and tended to undermine the defense theory that Johnson was testifying against defendant under the compulsion or strong incentive of an immunity agreement. Defendant observes that Johnson could not simply walk away after exonerating defendant, because any such attempt would be wholly inconsistent with her prior statements implicating him, and she would undoubtedly be charged with perjury and risk losing immunity. Although defendant does not challenge the validity of the immunity agreement itself (see, e.g., People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 768-771 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419]), he suggests the prosecutor's argument defeated his right to confront and cross-examine Johnson. In our view, defendant reads too much into the prosecutor's remarks. Viewed in context, the prosecutor was simply noting that the agreement did not compel Johnson to testify against defendant but merely required her to tell the truth, whether or not favorable to defendant, and that she would not lose her immunity if she truthfully exonerated defendant. As the prosecutor stated, she could have said that if that was the case. (Italics added.) Although it is possible a juror might have misinterpreted the prosecutor's remarks, we find no reasonable likelihood such confusion occurred. (See People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) Defendant previously had full opportunity to explore, in cross-examination or argument, the precise nature of the immunity agreement and Johnson's obligations and motivations thereunder.
(8) Defendant argues the court erred in failing to provide the jury with written instructions at both the guilt and penalty phases, thereby denying defendant his right under the state and federal Constitutions to due process, an informed jury, and a reliable determination of guilt and penalty. We discuss the penalty phase issue in a subsequent part of this opinion. (See post, p. 723.) As for the guilt phase, prior to deliberations the trial court indicated to the jury that it preferred not to give written instructions. Instead, the court asked the jury to listen to the oral instructions and inform the court if it had any questions the court could answer. The court noted that its reading of the instructions would require about an hour and 15 minutes. Defense counsel failed to object to the foregoing procedure or request that written instructions be provided. Accordingly, the People contend defendant cannot raise the point on appeal. (See People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal. App.3d 422, 432-433 [193 Cal. Rptr. 711].) Defendant responds that by reason of the court's announcement of its preference, a request or objection would have been futile. We disagree. Assuming the court's statement to the jury amounted to a ruling, no reason appears why defendant should be excused from objecting thereto. In any event, even assuming defendant has not waived the point, he would not prevail. In reviewing claims of error of the kind involved here, our main inquiry is whether the court abused its broad discretion in failing to provide written instructions. (See People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 943-945 [258 Cal. Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330]; People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 640 [51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 414 P.2d 882]; see also § 1093, subd. (f) [requiring court to give written instructions to jurors upon their request therefor].) Defendant urges us to reconsider Sheldon, pointing to our mistaken assumption regarding the content of the various studies on jury comprehension of oral instructions. We had stated in Sheldon that it does not appear these studies took into account the possibility of a rereading of the instructions. ( People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 944.) According to defendant, one of the studies cited to us in that case did include the option of asking for further instructions.... It is unclear whether giving further instructions would include rereading ones already given. But assuming defendant is correct, any mistake in Sheldon seems harmless and entirely collateral to our holding confirming the court's broad discretion to withhold written instructions in a capital case. The jury took only one day to reach its guilty verdict. No questions were raised regarding any of the instructions, and no request for rereading instructions was made. Thus, the record contains no evidence indicating the jury was confused or misled by the oral instructions given. (See People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 944-945.) We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to provide the jury with written guilt phase instructions.