Opinion ID: 158852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bivens Jurisdiction

Text: 22 1. Congressional intent. A Bivens action may be available to remedy a violation of the Due Process Clause, see, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979), but is available only when there are no 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,' no explicit statutory prohibition against the relief sought, and no exclusive statutory alternative remedy. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988) (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 245). We must therefore review the immigration statutes to determine whether a Bivens class action is available in cases like the one at bar. 23 Section 1252 indicates a legislative intent to limit review of immigration decisions in federal district courts. Prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, judicial review of immigration decisions, including final orders, could occur either in a federal circuit court of appeals or in a federal district court. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 210, 215-16 (1968) (holding that language found in 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1961) giving circuit courts of appeal exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders was expressly limited to orders made in the course of deportation proceedings or to direct challenges of the deportation order itself, and stating that in all other cases, an alien's remedies would lie first in an action brought in an appropriate district court); Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1579-80 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that district courts had jurisdiction to review certain final decisions not associated with deportation proceedings and final orders of deportation under the general jurisdictional grant formerly contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1988)); 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1988) (providing that any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation could obtain review by habeas corpus proceedings). In enacting IIRIRA, Congress drastically reduced the review available in the district courts with the intent of protecting the Executive's discretion from the courts, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 119 S. Ct. 936, 945 (1999) [hereinafter AADC], in a streamlined process, in which issues of law and fact are not subject to separate rounds of litigation, id. at 944. IIRIRA repealed § 1105a and replaced it with new § 1252. 24 The new judicial review statute significantly limited statutory habeas jurisdiction in the district courts. See § 1252(e)(2) (1996) (providing for limited habeas review only of exclusion determinations made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)). Congress also deleted language that limited exclusive jurisdiction in the circuit courts of appeal to review of only those orders arising pursuant to deportation proceedings. Cf. § 1105a(a)(1) (1986) (repealed) with § 1252(a)(1) (1999). It broadened the scope of exclusive review in the circuit courts of appeal to include all questions of law and fact arising from any action or proceeding brought to remove an alien. See § 1252(b)(9) (1999). Congress further amended § 1329 to provide for district court jurisdiction only in cases brought by the United States. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 381(a). Finally, Congress added subsections that preclude direct review by any court of certain discretionary decisions made by the Attorney General. See § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); §1252(g); § 1226(e); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); § 1158 (b)(2)(D); see also Saccoh v. INS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 406, 408-09 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (dismissing cause of action for lack of jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions under § 1252(g) and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). 25 2. Whether review of the actions taken by the Attorney General is encompassed within the immigration statutes such that a Bivens action is precluded by statute. The Attorney General is mandated to arrange for appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1). The Attorney General's discretionary power to transfer aliens from one locale to another, as she deems appropriate, arises from this language. 6 See Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting former statute now codified as § 1231(g)); Sasso v. Milhollan, 735 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (accord). As mentioned above, § 1252(f) forecloses jurisdiction to grant class-wide injunctive relief to restrain operation of §§ 1221-31 by any court other than the Supreme Court. It is therefore apparent that a district court has no jurisdiction to restrain the Attorney General's power to transfer aliens to appropriate facilities by granting injunctive relief in a Bivens class action suit. See Schweiker, 427 U.S. at 421 (Bivens action unavailable if there is an explicit statutory prohibition against the relief sought). Appellants' argument that § 1252(f) is not applicable because the right to counsel is not found in §§ 1221-31 is unavailing. 26 Further, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that no court has jurisdiction to review any decision or action the Attorney General has discretion to make under this subchapter except for the granting of relief under section 1158(a). [T]his subchapter, which is subchapter II of Chapter 12 of Title 8, covers §§ 1151-1378, including § 1231. Unless there is some reason we should not give literal meaning to this language, it also appears that a Bivens action was not available to appellants because of this specific statutory bar to district court review. 27 3. Redundancy. Although not raised by appellants, we are aware of the principle that a court should not adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836 (1988). In determining the application and scope of § 1252(g), the court in AADC addressed redundancy, comparing § 1252(g) with § 1252(b)(9), which it found to be a broad zipper clause applying to all immigration decisions. 119 S. Ct. at 943. We have conducted a similar analysis. 28 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is not redundant of § 1252(g) because that subsection applies only to bar review of discrete discretionary decisions in transitional cases. See id. It does not render superfluous § 1226(e) (which bars judicial review of the Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of [§ 1226]) because the bars to review address different types of discretionary judgment. Even if the two statutes provide some overlap, that redundancy may be reasonably explained because, before IIRIRA, the predecessor statute expressly provided for judicial review of decisions made under that section. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1988) (amended and recodified, in pertinent part, as § 1226(e)); Gornicka v. INS, 681 F.2d 501, 505-06 (7th Cir. 1982). Thus it was reasonable for Congress to expressly withdraw jurisdiction to judicial review in the specific statute rather than to simply delete the provision and rely on the provisions in new § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to bar review. 29 Two other provisions in the immigration statutes bar judicial review of discretionary decisions. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1) authorizes the Attorney General, in her discretion, to allow an alien voluntarily to depart the United States in lieu of undergoing removal proceedings. Section 1229c(f) bars review by any court of the denial of a request for an order of voluntary departure under [§ 1229c(b)], which at first blush appears to apply to the Attorney General's decision to allow departure. We note, however, that the Attorney General's discretion to permit voluntary departure under § 1229c(b) is specifically conditioned upon the entry of a separate order granting voluntary departure by an immigration judge who must find four conditions to exist before the order may be granted. See § 1229c(b)(1). Thus, the bar in § 1229c(f) appears to bar review of the immigration judge's order and not to bar review of the Attorney General's subsequent decision to allow the alien to depart voluntarily pursuant to that order. Interpreted in that manner, the two sections are complementary and not redundant. 30 There are also separate limitations to review of the Attorney General's discretionary decisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1158, but these provisions are not superfluous because § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) expressly excepts the granting of relief under § 1158 from the bar provided in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 31 We conclude that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not render superfluous other jurisdictional statutes and limits direct review of discretionary decisions and actions related to the custody and detention of aliens who have already been determined to be deportable in a final order. Because the discretionary decision to transfer aliens from one facility to another and the correlative discretionary decision to grant or deny relief from such a transfer is a decision . . . under this subchapter, judicial review of that decision is expressly barred by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Cf. Chavez v. United States INS, 55 F.Supp.2d 555 (W.D. La.1999) (concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to review challenges to discretionary decisions in alien's habeas action absent a challenge to the constitutionality of INS proceedings); Edoo v. Kaplinger, 47 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (W.D. La. 1999) (accord) (stating that [i]t seems well established that the Constitution has not historically required judicial review of merely discretionary decisions, and citing Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997)). Because IIRIRA expressly precludes both the remedy requested and direct review of the discretionary decisions at issue, the district court had no jurisdiction to entertain a Bivens class action requesting such review and remedy. 32