Opinion ID: 3011640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Court Collateral Proceedings

Text: On May 11, 1993, Duncan filed a pro se post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. Attorney Connie Bentley McGhee filed a supplemental letter brief in support of the petition on January 6, 1995, and represented Duncan at his PCR hearing on January 25, 1995. The primary bases of Duncan's petition were ineffective assistance of counsel and his attorney's conflict of interest. Duncan, Roberts, and Alvin Norman (Alvin), Norman's brother, all testified at the hearing. Roberts stated that he was a sole practitioner when Duncan hired him and during Duncan's trial. However, he acknowledged that he had entered into a partnership with Pedicini by the time he began preparing Duncan's appeal. As to fees, he testified that his division of Duncan's bail with Pedicini was not contingent on either attor ney's performance. Roberts also claimed he had made a full disclosure to Duncan regarding his impending partnership and that Duncan had not objected to it, although Roberts conceded that he had not obtained a written or on-therecord waiver of conflict from Duncan. As to his trial strategy, Roberts said that it was to portray Norman as the killer, stated that Pedicini never asked him to alter his defense of Duncan, and asserted that he did not change his tactics to benefit himself, Pedicini, or Norman. 6 Roberts acknowledged that he had considered calling as a witness Alvin Norman, who had heard Nor man confess to shooting Holmes. Roberts explained that he decided not to call Alvin because he believed Alvin's testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and because Alvin could put an Uzi in Duncan's hands at the scene. Even after Duncan's PCR lawyer pointed out that Roberts had conceded at trial that Duncan had a gun, Roberts maintained that his judgment at the time of trial was that Alvin's testimony would be more hurtful than helpful to Duncan's case. Alvin then testified, and stated that although he had not been present when Holmes was shot, both Nor man and Duncan had told him about the incident shortly ther eafter. Alvin reportedly learned from Nor man that Duncan had hidden behind the apartment door with a gun, but that Norman had shot Holmes. Duncan, on the other hand, told Alvin that he had been talking to Henderson and Holmes when Norman burst out from behind the door and chased the two down the stairs, and then Duncan had decided to follow them. Alvin asserted that he passed his infor mation on to Roberts because he wanted to set the r ecord straight when Norman did not tell the truth. Alvin stated that he was subpoenaed as a witness and sat in the hall during Duncan's trial, expecting to testify, but that Roberts eventually decided not to use him, telling him that he would not be a credible witness because the jury would think that Duncan had put him up to testifying. Duncan then testified at the PCR hearing, and disavowed any intent to kill either Henderson or Holmes. He r eported that Roberts had initially stated that Alvin would be vital to [his] defense, 6T at 54, but infor med him later that Alvin's testimony was not necessary. Duncan also asserted that he had asked Roberts to call Douglas Sher man as a witness but did not recall why Roberts failed to do so. He denied any knowledge of Roberts' and Pedicini's fee agreement but claimed that he had no pr oblem with some of his bail being used to pay Norman's lawyer and that he had intended for any of the money left over after his own defense to be used for this purpose. Duncan insisted he had no knowledge of the attorneys' partnership until seeing Roberts' affiliation on his appeal brief. 7 The trial court denied Duncan's PCR petition on January 26, 1995. The court concluded there was no actual conflict because it credited Roberts' testimony and found that Pedicini and Roberts had not become partners until after Duncan's trial. The Appellate Division reversed. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, it held that Roberts had been, or had held himself out to be, Pedicini's partner at the time of Duncan's trial, and also found Roberts' reasons for failing to call Alvin as a witness werenot supportable. App. Div. Op. at 7. While the court acknowledged that Roberts may have declined to use Alvin's testimony pursuant to some reasonable strategy, it held that it was constrained by New Jersey Supreme Court pr ecedent to resolve all doubts in favor of giving [Duncan] a new trial. Id. at 8. However, a differ ent panel of the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Norman's PCR petition, finding that Pedicini was not Roberts' partner and had no conflict of interest at the time of Norman's trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted (and consolidated its consideration of) the State's petition for certification regarding the reversal of Duncan's conviction, Duncan's cross-petition, Norman's petition concerning the denial of PCR relief in his case, and the New Jersey Public Defender's motion to enter the case as amicus curiae. On July 8, 1997, the Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgments in both Duncan's and Norman's cases. See State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 697 A.2d 511 (1997).2 The Court noted that its rulings provide for br oader protection against conflicts of inter est as a matter of New Jersey constitutional law than is provided under the federal constitution. Under the New Jersey constitution, a per se conflict arises if a private attorney, or one associated with that attorney, is involved in simultaneous dual representations of co-defendants; pr ejudice will be presumed unless there has been a valid waiver. Absent such joint representation, defendant must show a great likelihood of prejudice to establish constitutionally defective representation. Id. at 25, 697 A.2d at 520. _________________________________________________________________ 2. With respect to Norman, the Court found Duncan's payment of Pedicini's fees created a conflict of inter est for Norman's attorney, and ordered a new trial. 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the trial court finding that Pedicini and Roberts were not partners prior to or during the respective trials of Norman and Duncan was supported by substantial credible evidence and was entitled to deference. The Court noted that Roberts had represented Norman at his arraignment only because Pedicini was trying a case in federal court, but stated that Nor man's arraignment was pro forma, lasted no more than a minute or two, and involved no discussion of the case other than an acknowledgment that Norman received a copy of the indictment and discovery, waiver of reading of the indictment, and entry of a plea of not guilty. The Court held that Roberts was merely filling in at the arraignment and did not engage in the type of representation of Norman that gives rise to a per se conflict. See id. at 27-28, 697 A.2d at 522. The Court also held it would not expand its per se conflict rule to cases where attorneys represent codefendants while the attorneys are conducting partnership negotiations. See id. at 29, 697 A.2d at 522-23. The Court then found that Roberts' representation of Duncan was not impaired by either a potential or an actual conflict of interest that prejudiced Duncan. The Court further held that because Duncan failed to object to the trial court's jury instructions at trial or on direct appeal, he could only challenge them in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. It then found that Roberts' failur e to object to the erroneous accomplice-liability instruction was not unreasonable and did not prejudice Duncan's trial. It remanded the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of Duncan's remaining inef fective assistance of counsel claims. On remand, the Appellate Division consider ed and rejected Duncan's remaining claims. Duncan again petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for certification, which the Court denied on May 21, 1998. See State v. Duncan, 154 N.J. 608, 713 A.2d 499 (1998).