Opinion ID: 2559630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A More Nuanced Look at the Evolution of the Federal Law of Post-Arrest, Post-Miranda Silence

Text: In United States v. Hale, supra , noting the importance of th[e] question to the administration of justice, the Supreme Court dealt with whether a defendant can be cross-examined about his silence during police interrogation [post-arrest and post-Miranda ].... Hale, 422 U.S. at 173, 95 S.Ct. at 2135, 45 L.Ed.2d at 103. In Hale, the defendant was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia of robbery. At his trial, the prosecutor asked the [defendant] why he had not given the police his alibi when he was questioned shortly after his arrest. Hale, 422 U.S. at 172, 95 S.Ct. at 2134, 2135, 45 L.Ed.2d at 102. The Supreme Court, relying not on constitutional principles, but on its general supervisory powers over the federal (and District of Columbia) courts, explained that admitting such post-arrest, post- Miranda silence was error because the probative value of [defendant]'s pretrial silence in this case was outweighed by the prejudicial impact of admitting it into evidence. Hale, 422 U.S. at 173, 95 S.Ct. at 2135, 45 L.Ed.2d at 103. Because the Supreme Court in Hale disposed of the case on evidentiary grounds, it did not address the question of whether admitting evidence of the silence would be unconstitutional. See id. It would be less than a year, however, before the Supreme Court would decide whether impeachment use of a defendant's post-arrest silence violates any provision of the Constitution.... Doyle, 426 U.S. at 615, 96 S.Ct. at 2244, 49 L.Ed.2d at 97. In Doyle, co-defendants were convicted of selling marijuana to a police informant. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611, 96 S.Ct. at 2241, 49 L.Ed.2d at 94. At trial, they claimed that the informant framed them, and that it was the informant who sold the marijuana to them. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 612-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2242, 49 L.Ed.2d at 95. On cross-examination, the prosecution, in an attempt to undercut this explanation, asked each [defendant]... why he had not told the frameup story to [the police officer] when he arrested [them]. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 613, 96 S.Ct. at 2242, 49 L.Ed.2d at 95. In holding that the use of the post-arrest silence violated the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court explained that, because every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617, 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2244, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d at 97, 98. Putting the first dent in the hard-and-fast rule on non-admissibility, however, the Supreme Court, in a footnote, emphasized that: It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. at 2246 n. 11, 49 L.Ed.2d at 99 n. 11; [8] see People v. Rehbein, 74 Ill.2d 435, 24 Ill.Dec. 835, 386 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1978) (referring to this footnote as an exception to the strict ban on reference to silence). In United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988), the Supreme Court provided another exception to the blanket rule of inadmissibility of post-arrest, post- Miranda silence. In Robinson, a defendant was convicted in a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee of two counts of mail fraud. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 26, 108 S.Ct. at 866, 99 L.Ed.2d at 27. During closing argument, Robinson's counsel urged that the Government had not allowed [the defendant] to explain his side of the story. Id. In responding to this assertion, during rebuttal, the prosecutor informed the jury that Robinson could have taken the stand and explained it to you[.] Id. The Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional error at all because the prosecutorial comment did not treat the defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt, but instead referred to the possibility of testifying as one of several opportunities which the defendant was afforded, contrary to the statement of his counsel, to explain his side of the case. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 30, 32, 108 S.Ct. at 867, 869, 99 L.Ed.2d at 30, 31. The Supreme Court continued: [W]here... the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel, we think there is no violation of the privilege. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in Doyle, the Supreme Court established what has been labeled the fair response doctrine. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lettau, 604 Pa. 437, 986 A.2d 114, 120 n. 7 (2009).