Opinion ID: 1876886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Recommendation of Sanction

Text: Finally, the Committee argues that there are relevant factors the special judge failed to address in his findings upon recommendation of the appropriate sanction for Dunklin. When Model Rules have been violated by either serious or lesser misconduct, a penalty phase proceeds where the defendant attorney and the Director are allowed to present evidence and arguments regarding aggravating and mitigating factors to assist in determining the appropriate sanction. Newman, supra ; Price, supra ; Hollingsworth, supra . Aggravating factors developed by the American Bar Association Joint Committee on Professional Standards and adopted by this court in Wilson v. Neal, 332 Ark. 148, 964 S.W.2d 199 (1998), are: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with [the] rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge [the] wrongful nature of [the] conduct; (h) vulnerability of [the] victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; (j) indifference to making restitution; (k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances. Mitigating factors include: (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify [the] consequences of [the] misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to [the] disciplinary board or cooperative attitude towards [the] proceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical disability; (i) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse when: (1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely. (j) delay in [the] disciplinary proceedings; (k) impositions of other penalties or sanctions; ( l ) remorse; (m) remoteness of prior offenses. Id. at 163-64, 964 S.W.2d at 207 (quoting Model Standards For Imposing Lawyer Sanctions §§ 9.22 and 9.32 (1992)). As for aggravating factors, Judge Lessenberry concluded that there appeared to be a pattern of abuse of Dunklin's IOLTA account, and that Dunklin regularly made payments of cash to himself from his account. Also noted was that Dunklin had a prior reprimand for failing to appeal a client's conviction in federal court. As for mitigating factors, Judge Lessenberry noted that Dunklin submitted evidence regarding his good work for the community, including Dunklin's serving on the Crime Reparations Board and the Board of Trustees for the University of the Ozarks. The special judge also noted that an annual award for crime victim service was created in Dunklin's name. Judge Lessenberry found that Dunklin had experienced an extremely difficult divorce that did not end upon the filing of a decree in 1997. In addition, the special judge noted that, in 1998, Dunklin lost his house in a fire. And, finally, he determined that Dunklin's infractions did not result from dishonest or selfish motives, and that Dunklin had genuine remorse for his actions. In addition to any other considerations permitted by these Procedures, a panel of the Committee, in imposing any sanctions, shall consider: A. The nature and degree of the misconduct for which the lawyer is being sanctioned. B. The seriousness and circumstances surrounding the misconduct. C. The loss or damage to clients. D. The damage to the profession. E. The assurance that those who seek legal services in the future will be protected from the type of misconduct found. F. The profit to the lawyer. G. The avoidance of repetition. H. Whether the misconduct was deliberate, intentional or negligent. I. The deterrent effect on others. J. The maintenance of respect for the legal profession. K. The conduct of the lawyer during the course of the Committee action. L. The lawyer's prior disciplinary record, to include warnings. M. Matters offered by the lawyer in mitigation or extenuation except that a claim of disability or impairment resulting from the use of alcohol or drugs may not be considered unless the lawyer demonstrates that he or she is successfully pursuing in good faith a program of recovery. See Procedures, Section 19. The Committee argues that, although the special judge's recommendation was within the prescribed range of sanctions, and the judge specifically stated that he used the Section 19 factors in reaching his decision, the special judge failed to address certain other factors in his findings. First, the Committee contends that the special judge failed to address the loss or damage to the client. The Committee states that First Magnus relied upon the assurances made by Dunklin that its money interest had been protected and, as a result, it wired $80,001.51 into Dunklin's IOLTA Trust Account, only to see its security interest in the property disappear as other lenders were able to obtain priority over the unsecured interest of First Magnus. The Committee further states that, while First Magnus has obtained a judgment against Dunklin, it is still owed $80,001.51, plus interest, to date. We first note that First Magnus was not, as the Committee admits, one of Dunklin's clients. Nevertheless, it is clear that the special judge recognized the loss sustained by First Magnus. The special judge specifically found that First Magnus . . . was vulnerable [due] to the failure of its closing agents to cause the filing of documents. Second, the Committee states that the special judge failed to consider that Dunklin's actions damaged the legal profession since the complaining party was from Arizona and the reputations of those currently engaged in the legal profession in Arkansas have been damaged to some degree a result of the conduct of [Dunklin]. The Committee offers no evidence regarding the Arizona public's general opinion of Arkansas attorneys. Further, there is no evidence that the special judge failed to consider any of the factors set out in Section 19; rather, he declined to make written findings as to each factor he considered. It appears that the Committee believes that, pursuant to Section 19, the special judge is required to make written findings regarding each factor. There is no such requirement in the rule. We now turn to the specific sanction recommended in this case. Section 17 of the Procedures divides violations of the Model Rules into two separate categories of misconduct: serious misconduct and lesser misconduct. Procedures 17(B) and (C). Serious misconduct warrants a sanction of terminating or restricting a lawyer's license to practice law, whereas the lesser misconduct does not. Price, 360 Ark. at 114, 200 S.W.3d at 427. Conduct will be considered serious misconduct if any of the following considerations set forth in Section 17(B) apply: (1) The misconduct involves the misappropriation of funds; (2) The misconduct results in or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client or other person; (3) The misconduct involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation by the lawyer; (4) The misconduct is part of a pattern of similar misconduct; (5) The lawyer's prior record of public sanctions demonstrates a substantial disregard of the lawyer's professional duties and responsibilities; or (6) The misconduct constitutes a Serious Crime as defined in these Procedures. The special judge noted that there appeared to be a pattern of abuse of Dunklin's IOLTA, and that Dunklin had a prior disciplinary action which resulted in a reprimand. Based on these findings, the special judge clearly concluded that Dunklin's conduct constituted serious misconduct, which is grounds for one or more of the following sanctions: disbarment, suspension, interim suspension, reprimand, caution, warning, or probation. See Procedures, Section 17(D). The special judge recommended that Dunklin's law license be suspended for three years, see Procedures, Section 17(D)(2), and that his law license not be reinstated until and unless the judgment entered in Magnus v. Dunklin, No. CV 2000-8954 be satisfied in full. See Procedures, Section 18(C). Based on our review, we conclude that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are not clearly erroneous. We accept Judge Lessenberry's report and recommendation for sanction. GLAZE, J., dissents. DANIELSON, J., not participating.