Opinion ID: 493256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mississippi Homestead Exemption

Text: 18 Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 85-3-21 (1986) provides: 19 Every citizen of this state, male or female, being a householder shall be entitled to hold exempt from seizure or sale ... the land and buildings owned and occupied as a residence by him, or her, but the quantity of land shall not exceed one hundred sixty (160) acres nor the value thereof ... the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000). 20 See also Pickle v. Pickle, 476 So.2d 32, 34 (Miss.1985) (the citizen/householder may claim homestead if he owns and occupies land as residence); 40 Am.Jur.2d Homestead Sec. 52 (1968). As set out above, Joyce owned a half interest in the house and the two thirty-seven acre tracts. Her property was worth $53,031.25. 21 With the conveyances set aside, Owen owned the sixty-nine acre lot plus a half interest in the two smaller tracts and the house. Joyce argues that the conveyances to her should be upheld to the extent of Owen's homestead allowance or $30,000. Under Mississippi law, Owen could convey his homestead to Joyce regardless of his intention toward creditors. Howell v. General K Corp., 229 Miss. 687, 91 So.2d 831, 835 (1957), modified on other grounds, 229 Miss. 687, 93 So.2d 175 (1957); 40 Am.Jur.2d Homestead Sec. 63 (1968). The obvious reason for this rule is that the conveyance of a homestead, up to $30,000, does not defraud creditors, because the homestead is exempt from creditors irrespective of the conveyance. 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraudulent Conveyances Sec. 104 (1968). 22 The district court held, however, that Owen abandoned his homestead rights in the Madison County property when he moved to Jackson in October 1980. As set out above, one may claim the homestead exemption only in property owned and occupied as a residence. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 85-3-21; Kimbrough v. Powell, 143 Miss. 498, 108 So. 498 (1926) (must own and reside on property to claim homestead); Chrismand v. Mauldin, 130 Miss. 259, 94 So. 1 (1922). Moreover, Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 85-3-43 (1973) provides: 23 Whenever the debtor shall cease to reside on his homestead, it shall be liable to his debts, unless his removal be temporary, by reason of some casualty or necessity, and with the purpose of speedily reoccupying it as soon as the cause of his absence can be removed. 24 If Owen voluntarily left the property without the intent to return, he abandoned his homestead rights. See Etheridge v. Webb, 210 Miss. 729, 50 So.2d 603, 610 (1951); Merchants National Bank v. Southeastern Fire Insurance Co., 751 F.2d 771, 777 (5th Cir.1985) (applying Mississippi law). 25 At a bankruptcy court hearing in May 1983, over two-and-one-half years after leaving Madison County and moving to Jackson, Owen testified that he hoped he and Joyce could mend their marriage and get back together. He also testified, however, that since 1980 he had visited his mother and Joyce but had not lived at the Madison County property. We affirm the district court's finding that Owen had abandoned his homestead rights in the Madison County property by April 1981, when he conveyed his interest to Joyce. Thus, Owen had no homestead in Madison County to convey to Joyce in April 1981. 26 Joyce also points out that spouses have special rights under the homestead laws. Specifically, she claims that she may keep from Owen's creditors (1) her interest in the Madison County property plus (2) $30,000--the exemption she alleges Owen could have claimed had he not abandoned the homestead. Joyce cites Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 89-1-29 and Chapman v. White Sewing Machine Co., 77 Miss. 438, 28 So. 735 (1900). We review the law on which Joyce relies, but we conclude that her theory lacks merit. 27 Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 89-1-29 provides: A conveyance, mortgage, deed of trust, or other incumbrance upon a homestead exempted from execution shall not be valid or binding unless signed by the spouse of the owner if the owner be married and living with the spouse. Under this section, one spouse clearly can veto a conveyance of the homestead by the other spouse. See Hughes v. Hahn, 209 Miss. 293, 46 So.2d 587, 590 (1950) (wife has veto power but no interest in the homestead); Philan v. Turner, 195 Miss. 172, 13 So.2d 819, 821 (1943); Thompson v. Dyess, 218 Miss. 770, 67 So.2d 721 (1953); Hudson v. Bank of Leaksville, 249 So.2d 371 (Miss.1971). In fact, a conveyance made without both spouses' consent is void. Welborne v. Lowe, 504 So.2d 205, 207 (Miss.1987); but see Biggs v. Roberts, 237 Miss. 406, 115 So.2d 151, 152 (1959) (holding that Mrs. Roberts could devise her half interest in the homestead property because the property owned by Mr. Roberts greatly exceeded that which was owned by [Mrs. Roberts]). Section 89-1-29 applies when the spouses are married and living together on the homestead. A spouse who is forced off of the homestead, however, retains the Sec. 89-1-29 veto power. See Philan, 13 So.2d at 821 (wife driven from homestead by abusive husband retained the right to veto conveyance); Robbins v. Berry, 213 Miss. 744, 57 So.2d 576, 579 (1952) (wife left homestead because of husband's cruelty). 28 In Chapman, a husband and wife each owned a half interest in their homestead property, and the husband's sole creditors sought to execute on his half interest. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the creditors could get only the husband's half interest minus the full amount of the statutory homestead exemption, then $3,000. The court reasoned that if Mr. Chapman had owned the entire homestead, he would have been able to keep $3,000 from creditors and that his exemption should not be reduced just because Mrs. Chapman owned half the property. 29 Joyce concedes that if Owen had not abandoned the homestead, she would keep her interest in the property, and Owen would keep $30,000 of his interest exempt from his creditors. Now she wants to assert the alleged homestead exemption because Owen had abandoned it. 30 It is clear that if Joyce had consented to Owen's abandonment, then Owen would be free to convey or encumber his interest in the 143 acres. In Merchants National Bank, Judge Jolly explained: 31 When a husband removes himself from homestead property without any intent to return and his wife consents, the homestead is abandoned, notwithstanding the wife's continued residence on the land. [If the] homestead had been abandoned when the [property became encumbered], the encumberance would be effective as to [the husband's] portion of the property. 32 751 F.2d at 777 (emphasis added). See also Lewis v. Ladner, 177 Miss. 473, 172 So. 312 (1937) (expressly reserving the question of what would happen if the wife had not consented to the marital separation and the husband's leaving); Lindsey v. Holly, 105 Miss. 740, 63 So. 222 (1913). 7 33 We need not decide what rights, if any, Joyce retained under Sec. 89-1-29 after Owen's abandonment. Owen did not convey his interest in the property, nor did he encumber it with a deed of trust or mortgage. Moreover, after his abandonment, Owen could not claim an exemption in his former homestead. In fact, Owen, for all that is known in this case, may have acquired a new homestead, in which he may claim a $30,000 exemption from creditors. Clearly, Owen may not claim two homestead exemptions. See 40 C.J.S. Homesteads Sec. 13. Joyce, by asserting the alleged exemption that Owen abandoned, in effect claims two exemptions for herself in the Madison County property: one out of Owen's interest and another out of her own interest. We illustrate the fallacy of this view with an example. 8 Imagine that Joyce's creditors sought to execute on her interest in the 143 acres at the same time that Owen's creditors sought to execute on his interest. Joyce claims that Owen's creditors could get Owen's interest in the property minus $30,000 and that her creditors could get her interest in the property minus $30,000. That is, Joyce claims that she could keep $60,000, or two exemptions in the one homestead. 34 Chapman did not go so far. Moreover, Joyce concedes that each homestead has only one exemption. The Temples claimed all 143 acres as their homestead, and they may claim only one exemption in this property, which the district court allowed Joyce. 35 Finally, the evidence showed that First Federal Savings & Loan held a mortgage on one of the thirty-seven acre tracts. Joyce testified that before and after the conveyances, she made the mortgage payments for the lot and also paid the property taxes for all three lots. We need not decide whether Joyce made mortgage or tax payments that benefited Owen or Owen's creditors or whether Joyce, in addition to her legal half interest in the house and two smaller lots, also has an equitable interest in part of the Madison County property. She did not raise these claims in the bankruptcy court.