Opinion ID: 424926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Estoppel Regarding Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: 46 The question remains whether Conrail is estopped, by its previous consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the district court over Jackson's pendent claim, from raising the preemption of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time in its post-trial motions and, now, on appeal. 47 The general rule is that subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged by a party or raised sua sponte by the court at any point in the proceedings. E.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16-19, 71 S.Ct. 534, 541-42, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir.1980); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The corollary to this rule is that subject jurisdiction otherwise lacking cannot be conferred by consent, collusion, laches, waiver, or estoppel. Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir.1980). 48 Two of the cases upon which Jackson relies are inapposite because the courts determined that they did have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); United States v. Edwards, 23 F.2d 477 (8th Cir.1927). 49 The final case relied upon by Jackson in support of his claim that Conrail is estopped from raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is DiFrischia v. New York Central Railroad, 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir.1960). In DiFrischia, the Third Circuit held that the defendant railroad was estopped from urging, twenty-three months after inception of the case, that diversity of citizenship between the parties, and therefore subject matter jurisdiction, was lacking. 50 Although the DiFrischia court does not elaborate at length as to the legal basis for its recognition of an exception to the general rule that the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Third Circuit's reference to Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 805, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950), suggests that the court viewed the determination of a party's citizenship as a question of fact and therefore distinct from the legal question whether subject matter jurisdiction was demonstrated. Estoppel was therefore applicable because it went to a question of fact rather than to the determination of jurisdiction. See Young, 179 F.2d at 73 ( 'place of residence is a question of fact and not a question of law, and that question of fact has been settled in this court'  (quoting district judge in Young )). 51 DiFrischia is not persuasive support for Jackson's contention that Conrail is estopped from raising the preemptive effect of the RLA. The issue in DiFrischia involved diversity of citizenship, not preemption by federal law. Insofar as the rationale of DiFrischia turns on the distinction between the factual question of citizenship and the legal determination regarding jurisdiction, DiFrischia is clearly inapplicable to this case. 52 Further, this court has previously held, in a case involving diversity of citizenship, that it would not extend DiFrischia beyond its specific facts. Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir.1980). In so holding, the Sadat court was in accord with the weight of authority. See C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 3522, at 50-52 & 52 n. 25 (1975) (noting that the significance of DiFrischia as general precedent is dubious, id. at 50, and that in more recent cases, the Third Circuit has either distinguished or ignored DiFrischia, id. at 52). Even if DiFrischia remains viable precedent, to apply that case's rule in the present situation, in which diversity jurisdiction is not at issue, would extend it far beyond its specific facts. Consistent with our conclusion in Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1188, we decline to do so. 53 While we in no way condone the failure of Conrail to raise earlier the dispositive question of whether subject matter jurisdiction over Jackson's pendent claim of retaliatory discharge is preempted by the RLA, this case is governed by the general rule that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the proceedings. Id. For that reason, Conrail is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue for the first time in its post-trial motions before the district court.