Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to justify his conviction for Roll's murder and that his conviction therefore violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The standard of review is well settled: On appeal, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidencethat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid valuefrom which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) `[I]f the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness's credibility for that of the fact finder.' ( People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 103.) The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932 [251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996].) `Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) The evidence, though circumstantial, amply supported defendant's conviction for murder. Roll was killed in a deliberate manner, suggesting execution, not a robbery attempt, indicating his assailant had strong preexisting reasons for wanting him dead. Defendant had such a motive, for Koll had been the only person to identify him as a robber of the pharmacy at the preliminary examination. The only other person who the evidence showed had a motive to kill Koll, James Phillips, was at an all-day family funeral on the day of the killing. Defendant had no corroborated alibi for the time of the killing, and there was sufficient time during the noon recess for defendant to have driven from the supermarket parking lot to the pharmacy, shot Koll, and driven to his apartment and back to the supermarket lot. According to prosecution witnesses, defendant appeared unsurprised when told of Koll's death shortly after it happened and demanded an opportunity to use the washroom before taking a gunshot residue test. The killer hid his face behind a blue motorcycle helmet with a smoky bubble shield, both items defendant had owned and used in the recent past. While fleeing the scene, the killer was seen to hold one hand to the helmet as if to keep it on. Shortly after the crime, a smoky bubble shield with defendant's fingerprint on it was found in the street, along a route lying generally between the pharmacy and defendant's apartment. In addition to defendant's fingerprint, the bubble shield was linked to defendant through evidence that he had painted his helmet blue and that paint found on the snaps of the shield was the same color as, and in some physical respects similar to, paint found on a metal post near where defendant had painted the helmet. Although the .38-caliber revolver with which Koll was killed was not found, defendant possessed .38-caliber ammunition, suggesting he owned or had access to a handgun that could fire such ammunition. Perhaps most damning, the telephone number of Koll's pharmacy was written in defendant's spiral-bound notebook. Although defendant denied having written it, a prosecution handwriting expert found good indications he had, and the defense offered no other explanation for the number's presence in the notebook. Defendant notes that he and his attorney in the robbery case, Lara, testified that Koll's identification of him as one of the robbers was vulnerable to challenge at trial; he argues the evidence of motive was therefore insufficient. Nonetheless Koll did identify him at the preliminary examination and was the only witness to do so. The jury could reasonably conclude that defendant did not want to take the risk that Koll's identification would be credible to a jury. Similarly, defendant emphasizes that his fingerprints were not found at the scene of the crime and that he offered an explanation for his fingerprint on the bubble shield. But the jury was not obliged to believe that explanation and could reasonably have concluded that the bubble shield belonged to defendant. Along the same lines, the evidence was in conflict as to whether defendant was present when Prosecutor Haney told Defense Attorney Lara that Koll had been killed, giving Haney an opportunity to observe defendant's lack of a visible reaction. The jury, again, could reasonably credit Haney's recollection of this event over Lara's and defendant's. This court cannot reweigh such questions of credibility. The two cases defendant cites as similar to his, People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719 and People v. Blakeslee (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 831, 82 Cal.Rptr. 839, are readily distinguishable. In People v. Trevino , there was no evidence of a motive for murder on the part of the defendant (Rivas), who was a friend of the victim; the conviction rested entirely on an equivocal eyewitness identification and a fingerprint from the defendant in the victim's apartment, where he had previously been a guest. ( Trevino, supra, at pp. 676, 696-697, 217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719.) Here, the evidence of motive was strong, there was no innocent explanation for the presence of the pharmacy telephone number in defendant's notebook, and defendant's explanation of his fingerprint on the bubble shield was contradicted by several prosecution witnesses. In People v. Blakeslee , the evidence established only that the defendant and her brother had both quarreled with the victim, who was their mother (the brother having done so on the night of the killing), that both had access to a rifle (belonging to the brother), and that the defendant had offered police a false account of her movements (intended, she testified, to protect the brother). The evidence was thus at least as consistent with the brother's guilt as with the defendant's. ( Blakeslee, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d at pp. 837-840, 82 Cal. Rptr. 839.) Here, defendant had a virtually unique combination of motive and opportunity to kill Koll and was connected by other circumstantial evidence (the notebook and fingerprint, and ownership of a blue helmet and smoky bubble shield) to the crime. A reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstantial evidence proved defendant's guilt.