Opinion ID: 184895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Resentencing after Bailey Vacatur

Text: 25 We now turn to the substance of Townsend's challenge to the reimposition of his full term of imprisonment after his § 924(c) convictions were vacated. This is not the first time we have encountered arguments regarding the proper scope of resentencing after Bailey vacatur, although this case does raise specific issues we have not previously addressed. In United States v. Rhodes, 106 F.3d 429 (D.C.Cir.1997) (Rhodes I), we vacated a § 924(c) conviction, and remanded for possible resentencing on the remaining counts, taking into account the provisions of § 2D1.1(b)(1). Id. at 433. We observed that because U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) are mutually exclusive, the otherwise mandatory enhancement was unavailable so long as the § 924(c) conviction stood. But we held that this did not entitle a defendant to escape application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement because of a § 924(c) conviction which was later vacated. We held that 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which provides that an appellate court may require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances, established statutory authority for this court to remand for resentencing on the remaining counts. Furthermore, we found no merit in appellant's arguments that resentencing on his remaining charges would violate the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses. Given the interdependence of a § 924(c) conviction and the § 2D1.1 enhancement, we noted that appellant had no legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence on the remaining drug charges, and that by challenging his § 924(c) charges, defendant brought his remaining sentences into question. Id. at 432 n. 3. 26 We addressed similar questions in United States v. Morris, 116 F.3d 501 (D.C.Cir.1997), where the § 924(c) vacatur arose not on direct appeal but, as here, in the § 2255 context. There, the district court had vacated appellants' convictions under § 924(c), and then increased the sentence on the remaining terms by imposing the two-level § 2D1.1 enhancement. This court affirmed, holding that § 2255 provided the district court statutory authority for resentencing on the remaining counts. We held that § 2255's grant of power to  'correct the sentence as may appear appropriate' ... necessarily includes the power to apply the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement at the same time as it removes the hitherto blocking § 924(c) conviction. Id. at 504. We also rejected defendants' double jeopardy and due process arguments, noting as in Rhodes I that because of the interdependence and mutual exclusivity of the § 924(c) conviction and the § 2D1.1 enhancement, there was no reasonable expectation of finality of the unchallenged sentences. Id. at 505.