Opinion ID: 626146
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Solicitation Clause

Text: We next address the solicitation clause, which bars judges and candidates from personally solicit[ing] or accept[ing] campaign contributions other than as authorized by Rules 4.2 and 4.4. 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4.1(A)(6). As noted above, Rules 4.2 and 4.4 allow candidates to solicit funds through a campaign committee, although the committee is not to disclose the identity of contributors to the candidate. Id. at Canon 4.2(B)(1) & 4.4(B)(3). Moreover, Rule 4.2 permits a candidate to make a general request for campaign contributions when speaking to an audience of 20 or more people, and to personally solicit campaign contributions from members of the judge's family, from a person with whom the judge has an intimate relationship, or from judges over whom the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority. Id. at Canon 4.2(B)(3)(a) & (B)(3)(c). Wersal contends the solicitation clause is not narrowly tailored to further Minnesota's interests in impartiality because it is not the solicitation, but the receipt of contributions that poses a risk to impartiality. Because the clause is not concerned with contributions, but with solicitation, Wersal argues it is barely tailored to Minnesota's interests in impartiality. Moreover, Wersal asserts information about who contributed to a judge's campaign is readily available via the Internet, and thus a ban on personal solicitation fails to further Minnesota's interests. To the extent the clause serves an interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety, Wersal argues recusal is once again a less restrictive alternative. Finally, Wersal challenges Minnesota's decision to permit solicitations to groups of 20 or more people, which he claims demonstrates either underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness. In considering Minnesota's old solicitation clause in White II, we began our analysis by recognizing, [k]eeping candidates, who may be elected judges, from directly soliciting money from individuals who may come before them certainly addresses a compelling state interest in impartiality as to parties to a particular case. 416 F.3d at 765. However, we determined it was unlikely a judicial candidate would be biased in favor of or against a litigant based on a contribution to the candidate's campaign, because the Code provided such contributions would be made to the candidate's committee, and the committee was barred from disclosing those who did or did not contribute to the committee. Id. Accordingly, we concluded the contested portions of the solicitation clausethose dealing with a candidate's signature or solicitations to large groupswere barely tailored to Minnesota's interests in impartiality due to the candidate's inability to decipher the source of funds in response to a solicitation in either circumstance. Id. at 765-66. As the district court correctly observed, our conclusion in White II was largely predicated on the distinction between the large group solicitation and signature bans challenged in White II, and personal solicitation, which is challenged in the present case. [11] Namely, unlike the challenged portions in White II, direct personal solicitation creates a situation where potential contributors must choose to either contribute to the candidate, or decline to contribute, with a resulting risk of retribution. See In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 351 (Me.2003) (If a contribution is made, a judge might subsequently be accused of favoring the contributor in court. If a contribution is declined, a judge might be accused of punishing a contributor in court.). In either scenario, the candidate is more likely to decipher whether the potential donor chooses to make a contribution, which gives rise to a greater risk of a quid pro quo. See Br. of Former Governor & Chief Justices as Amici Curiae 3 ([T]here is no way to have meaningful campaign solicitations where a candidate can freely solicit contributions in one-on-one meetings with prospective donors without a substantial likelihood of learning, at least in many instances, the outcome of the `ask.'). In Siefert, the Seventh Circuit similarly recognized the cumulative effect of the scenario posed above: A contribution given directly to a judge, in response to a judge's personal solicitation of that contribution, carries with it both a greater potential for a quid pro quo and a greater appearance of a quid pro quo than a contribution given to the judge's campaign committee at the request of someone other than the judge, or in response to a mass mailing sent above the judge's signature. 608 F.3d at 989. Specifically, [a] direct solicitation closely links the quidavoiding the judge's future disfavorto the quo the contribution. Id. We must emphasize once more Minnesota's separate interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety. Regardless of whether a potential donor chooses to make a contributionand whether a candidate ultimately learns of the donor's choice the appearance of impartiality is attenuated. See id. at 989-90 (We do not mean to suggest that judges who directly solicit contributions are necessarily behaving inappropriately, but the appearance of and potential for impropriety is significantly greater when judges directly solicit contributions than when they raise money by other means.). Even if judges were able to refrain from favoring donors, the mere possibility that judges' decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributions is likely to undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary. White I, 536 U.S. at 790, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, `[i]nsulating the judge from such direct solicitation eliminates the appearance (at least) of impropriety and, to that extent, preserves the judiciary's reputation for integrity.' Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Penn., 944 F.2d 137, 145 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548, 802 P.2d 31, 40 (1990)). Additionally, as we highlighted in White II, unlike the judicial codes in some states, Minnesota's Code prevents a candidate from knowing the identity of contributors or even non-contributors[.] 416 F.3d at 766. This feature serves to distinguish this case from others where the candidate was permitted to learn the identity of the contributors, and thus Wersal's argument finds little support by relying on these cases. See, e.g., Carey, 614 F.3d at 205 (The clause . . . does not bar the candidate from learning how individuals responded to the committee's solicitations. That omission suggests that the only interest at play is the impolitic interpersonal dynamics of a candidate's request for money, not the more corrosive reality of who gives and how much.); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2002) (Successful candidates will feel beholden to the people who helped them get elected regardless of who did the soliciting of support.). [12] We find Wersal's counter-argument that candidates may learn the identity of donors through the Internet unavailing. As Minnesota points out, this is true regarding a number of provisions of the Code. For instance, a judge could independently investigate the facts of a case through the Internet, despite the Code's prohibition against this activity. See 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2.9(C) (A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.). Simply because a judge or candidate may decide to violate the Code's proscriptions is not a testament to their unconstitutionality. For the foregoing reasons, the ask is precisely the speech Minnesota must regulate to maintain its interest in impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 990 ([T]he personal solicitation itself presents the greatest danger to impartiality and its appearance.); see also Bauer, 620 F.3d at 710 (upholding the constitutionality of a personal solicitation clause due to the potential for actual or perceived mutual back scratching). We turn last to Wersal's renewed suggestion that recusal is a less restrictive means of preventing bias. Although we did not address recusal in White II in the context of solicitation, we are persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's analysis on the issue. In Siefert, the court concluded there was no less restrictive means available, because of the fact that judicial campaigns are often largely funded by lawyers, many of whom will appear before the candidate who wins, and thus [i]t would be unworkable for judges to recuse themselves in every case that involved a lawyer whom they had previously solicited for a contribution. 608 F.3d at 990. We are also mindful of the recent Supreme Court decision in Caperton, where the Court held the Due Process Clause required a judge to recuse himself in an appeal involving a corporation whose chief executive officer spent over $2.5 million in support of the judge during his election, whether or not actual bias exist[ed] or [could] be proved. 129 S.Ct. at 2257-58, 2265. Although the Court stressed the extreme nature of the facts leading to the recusal, we find Caperton illustrative of the unworkability of recusal in the present case. Namely, recusal serves as an after-the-fact remedy that is insufficient to cure the damage to the appearance of impartiality fashioned by personal solicitation, which is by and large complete at the time of the ask. At the very least, by the time the Due Process Clause requires recusal of a judge, the appearance of impartiality has already been impaired. In sum, we conclude recusal would not be a workable remedy to prevent bias or, in particular, the appearance of bias stemming from personal solicitations. We therefore hold the solicitation clause is narrowly tailored to serve Minnesota's interests in preserving impartiality and preserving the appearance of impartiality.