Opinion ID: 3056658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Agent Bryant’s Testimony

Text: Mallety first argues that “the frequency and extent of Agent Bryant’s impermissible expert opinion . . . usurped that analytical and deliberative function of the jury.” Mallety identifies several instances in which Agent Bryant allegedly “beyond merely interpreting drug jargon, drug code words or the inner working of a drug organization” with reference to the recorded conversations and testified regarding the “ultimate issue” of Mallety’s participation in a drug conspiracy. Specifically, Mallety cites Agent Bryant’s testimony (1) that the numerical references in the recorded conversations referred to ounces of cocaine; (2) that 8 Case: 11-12804 Date Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 9 of 18 Mallety participated in a drug-running organization led by Hull and Jones; and (3) interpreting the communications in the four recorded conversations described above. Mallety claims that this testimony deprived him of a fair trial as to Count 1. Notably, Mallety concedes that we review this issue for plain error because he did not object to Agent Bryant’s testimony at trial.3 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits expert testimony if “specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). “[W]e have recognized the well established rule that an experienced narcotics agent may testify as an expert to help a jury understand the significance of certain conduct or methods of operation unique to the drug distribution business.” United States v. Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown, 872 F.2d 385, 392 (11th Cir. 1989). Such testimony “is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Fed. R. 3 This Court reviews for plain error issues not raised below. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007). Under plain-error review, there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id. at 1276. If these three prongs are met, this Court may exercise its discretion to notice the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. For an error to be plain, it must be obvious or clear under current law. United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1207 (11th Cir. 2005). For an error to affect substantial rights, “in most cases it means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993). 9 Case: 11-12804 Date Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 10 of 18 Evid. 704(a); see United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1977).4 However, we have recognized that “[a]lthough courts often approve of testimony interpreting drug code words, such expert testimony may unfairly provide the government with an additional summation by having the expert interpret the evidence, and may come dangerously close to invading the province of the jury.” Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1335–36. Given the extensive recordings and the length of Agent Bryant’s investigation, Mallety has not shown that the district court plainly erred by failing to exclude any of Agent Bryant’s testimony. First, the district court did not err by permitting Agent Bryant to give her opinion as to the meaning of specific terms, such as numbers, that Mallety and others used in the recorded conversations. An expert witness may testify to the meaning of specific terms used in recorded conversations. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1336 (holding that the district court did not err by admitting an expert law enforcement officer’s testimony that the codes and jargon heard in the defendant’s recorded conversations referred to drug trafficking); Brown, 872 F.2d at 392 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting an expert FBI agent’s testimony that code words heard 4 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 10 Case: 11-12804 Date Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 11 of 18 in the defendants’ recorded conversations referred to cocaine sales). Agent Bryant’s testimony with respect to the meaning of the numbers in the recorded conversations is materially indistinguishable from the expert testimony regarding specific terms in Emmanuel and Brown. Next, the district court did not plainly err by permitting Agent Bryant to testify that Hull and Jones “were working in partnership and leading the organization, where they were obtaining cocaine from Houston . . . . [and] were utilizing [Mallety] to transport the cocaine from Houston to Pensacola.” As an initial matter, we note that Agent Bryant’s testimony did not comment on the “ultimate issue” of whether Mallety knowingly joined a particular drug conspiracy. A conviction for conspiracy requires proof “that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005). Agent Bryant merely testified to her informed, factual observation that Hull and Jones were “utilizing [Mallety] to transport the cocaine,” not that Mallety had the requisite knowledge or volition to sustain a conspiracy conviction. To the extent a jury might arguably infer from that testimony first that Mallety must have known what he was transporting and then second that Mallety must have knowingly agreed to be part of a conspiracy, we cannot say 11 Case: 11-12804 Date Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 12 of 18 any error was plain to the district court at the time of trial, which is required to meet the second prong of the plain error test. Finally, Mallety is correct that Agent Bryant at times interpreted not just specific terms but the meanings of the recorded conversations as a whole. However, permitting this testimony was not plain error because, in light of the volume and nature of the evidence showing Mallety conspired to distribute and possess cocaine, Agent Bryant’s testimony did not affect Mallety’s substantial rights. See id. at 1336. The evidence against Mallety included the testimony of numerous coconspirators, including Mallety’s own son, and recorded conversations between Mallety and the codefendants, in which Mallety himself discussed cocaine and described in clear terms both driving from Texas to Florida and his efforts to avoid the police and federal agents. Terry Dunning testified that when he and Mallety discussed various numbers over the phone, they were referring to ounces of cocaine. In addition, the district court properly instructed the jury, without objection from Mallety, that it was free to accept or reject Agent Bryant’s expert testimony. The instruction read: a person having special training or experience in [a] specialized matter is permitted to . . . state an opinion about that matter. Merely because such a witness has expressed an opinion, however, does not mean that you must accept the opinion, the same as with any other witness. It’s up to you to decide on whether or not to rely upon the testimony and 12 Case: 11-12804 Date Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 13 of 18 the opinion. “A jury is presumed to follow the instructions given to it by the district judge.” United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005). In sum, Agent Bryant’s testimony as to the meaning of the conversations was not essential to Mallety’s conviction. See Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1336 (concluding that defendant’s substantial rights were not affected by police officer’s interpretation of recorded conversations because, in light of the substantial evidence, “the jury could have easily interpreted the recorded conversations as involving drugs based on other evidence in the case, including actual seizures or drugs and drug money and testimony from coconspirators”). Accordingly, Mallety has failed to show that any error “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993).