Opinion ID: 1295684
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Heading: Contractual Will

Text: The question presented in this appeal is whether the Grahams' 1962 will is a mutual will. A mutual will (more transparently referred to as a contractual will) exists only when there is evidence sufficient to show a binding agreement as to disposal of the property of the makers in a certain way. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Turpin, 252 Iowa 603, 608, 106 N.W.2d 637, 640 (1960); see also Duhme v. Duhme, 260 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Iowa 1977); In re Estate of Chapman, 239 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Iowa 1976); In re Estate of Ryder, 219 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1974). Evidence is sufficient only if it is clear and convincing. See Ryder, 219 N.W.2d at 554 ([T]he executor had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the instrument was intended to be [a] mutual will....); accord Sawyer v. Sawyer, 261 Iowa 112, 118, 152 N.W.2d 605, 609 (1967) (clear and satisfactory evidence); In re Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa 790, 799, 89 N.W.2d 337, 342 (1958) (clear, satisfactory and convincing). A mere preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient. Ramthun, 249 Iowa at 799, 89 N.W.2d at 342. A more exacting quantum of proof is required because of the serious and far-reaching consequences of such an agreement, which may have the effect of preventing the surviving spouse from altering his or her estate plan to suit intervening changes in circumstances ... that may render provisions of the contractual wills inappropriate or unfair, so much so that the deceased spouse, had he or she lived, would have desired or sanctioned appropriate changes in the testamentary provisions. Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213, 1218 (2d Cir.1972). A mutual will is in essence a contract as to irrevocability. See Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 252 Iowa at 610, 106 N.W.2d at 641. Whether a given will is a contractual will can be a difficult matter to decide. A history of shifting legal definitions and standards have not helped matters. As a noted commentator once remarked, [t]he contractual will in Iowa is a thicket of perplexity upon whose thorns the supreme court has frequently found itself impaled. N. William Hines, Freedom of Testation and the Iowa Probate Code, 49 Iowa L.Rev. 724, 738 (1964). Fortunately, the present state of the law is now relatively clear and settled. Matters were helped on January 1, 1964 when the Iowa Probate Code became effective. See Iowa Code ch. 633 (2001); see also id. §§ 633.1 (short title), 633.2 (effective date). In order to avoid the complexities and uncertainties of litigation involving [contractual] wills, [section] 633.270 was enacted. 1 Sheldon F. Kurtz, Kurtz on Iowa Estates § 4.52, at 216 (3d ed.1995) [hereinafter Kurtz]. That section of the probate code expressly provides that in Iowa [n]o will shall be construed to be contractual or mutual, unless in such will the testator shall expressly state the intent that such will shall be so construed. Iowa Code § 633.270. In other words, extrinsic evidence of testator intent is not permitted; the evidence must be found within the four corners of the will itself. Chapman, 239 N.W.2d at 871 (when the probate code applies, the evidence to establish a mutual will must be found in the instrument itself); In re Estate of Prehoda, 309 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Iowa Ct.App.1981); see, e.g., Floerchinger v. Williams, 260 Iowa 53, 56-60, 148 N.W.2d 410, 412-14 (1967) (considering only text of will itself and not extrinsic evidence). [3] The reason for the rule is clear: [t]hose who desire mutual wills are required to say so since theirs is the unusual rather than the usual intent. Floerchinger, 260 Iowa at 58, 148 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting bar committee comment). Although the Grahams' 1962 will was executed before the effective date of the probate code, the parties agree the provisions of the probate code apply to the present dispute. The rights of beneficiaries under a contractual will do not accrue or vest until one of the testators dies. Id. at 59-60, 148 N.W.2d at 412-14; see Iowa Code § 633.2(2) (enactment of probate code shall not impair any accrued or vested right). Because John died after the effective date of the probate code, section 633.270 applies to this case. Compare Floerchinger, 260 Iowa at 59-60, 148 N.W.2d at 412-14 (section 633.270 applied to will executed in 1963 because testator died after the effective date of probate code), with Sawyer, 261 Iowa at 119, 152 N.W.2d at 610 (same section did not apply when one testator died before effective date). The district court ruled the 1962 will was not a contractual will. The court focused upon the preamble to the will, which stated: We, the undersigned, John R. Graham and Helen E. Graham ... mutually agree, each in consideration of the promise and act of the other, to revoke all wills by us heretofore made, and to dispose of our property in the manner hereinafter set forth; and we do make, publish and declare the following as our joint and several wills .... (Emphasis added.) Although the district court recognized the phrases mutually agree and each in consideration of the promise and act of the other supported the conclusion that the parties intended their joint will to be contractual, the court seized upon the fact that the parties referred to the document as their joint and several wills. The court pointed out several is commonly defined as separate, exclusive, or relating separately to each individual involved. The court ruled [t]his language represents the most specific... indication of the parties' intent regarding the mutual or individual character of the instrument and, as a consequence, concluded the 1962 will was not contractual. The court contrasted the language in the Grahams' will with that in the preamble to a contractual will in another case which referred to the testators'joint and mutual wills. See Chapman, 239 N.W.2d at 872-73 (emphasis added). We disagree with the district court's conclusion; the Grahams' 1962 will is clearly a contractual will. The most specific indication of the testators' intent can be found in their use of the phrases mutually agree and each in consideration of the promise and act of the other. In the former phrase the Grahams specifically stated their mutual intent; in the latter they expressly recorded for posterity that their joint will was the product of consideration, insofar as each made certain promises in the will to the other. The 1962 will revoked all prior wills and provided for the full disposition of the survivor's property. Each testator promised that if he or she survived the other, he or she would dispose of the property in equal shares to their three daughters; put differently, each testator promised to forbear from changing the terms of their joint will after the other spouse died. [T]he mutual promises alone of [married testators] to dispose of their jointly owned property in a manner satisfactory to each of them is good consideration.... Id. at 872 (concluding the spouse who died first got what he wanted, i.e., the contractual assurance that, if he should die first, his property would go according to his wishes); see also Kurtz § 4.52, at 213 (The consideration for the contract is generally the reciprocal disposition in each will but it may also be the forbearance of each to dispose of his property in another manner.). Clear and convincing evidence of the Grahams' intent to form a contractual will is plainly found within the four corners of their joint will. Cf. Prehoda, 309 N.W.2d at 520 (finding contractual will where testators agreed the survivor would dispose of a single asset in a certain way). Where, as here, the will itself states there is an agreement the evidence of, or facts of the agreement, appears on the face of the will. We cannot disregard it. In re Estate of Logan, 253 Iowa 1211, 1216, 115 N.W.2d 701, 705 (1962). The defendants rejoin that the reference in the preamble to the will as the testators'joint and several wills mandates a contrary conclusion. We do not agree. The fact that the parties declared the document to be their `several will' as well as their `joint will' does not necessarily negate an intention to enter into a binding contractual relationship. In re Estate of Richardson, 11 Wash.App. 758, 525 P.2d 816, 818 (1974). [4] The defendants overemphasize the use of this one word; when construing a will, a court must look at the intent of the parties as expressed in the entire document. In ascertaining the intent of the testator, which is the guiding light in will interpretation, we rely primarily on the language contained in the will; however, the substance and intent, rather than the words, are to control. To ascertain the substance and intent we examine the entire will .... Russell v. Johnston, 327 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1982). [E]ach part should be considered in relation to every other part and all provisions given effect unless clearly in conflict with some positive rule of law. Logan, 253 Iowa at 1217, 115 N.W.2d at 705. The plain effect of the defendants' interpretation is to completely discard the use of the phrases mutually agree and each in consideration of the promise and act of the other. No part of the will, however, should be discarded without sound reason. Id. Fortunately, a more reasonable and harmonious interpretation of the word several is readily available. The term several has a number of meanings depending upon the context in which it is used. In the present case, several is paired with joint. A joint will, of course, is defined as a single testamentary instrument constituting the wills of two or more persons, jointly executed. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 252 Iowa at 607, 106 N.W.2d at 639. We have also pointed out that a joint will is in effect the separate will of each maker, and generally may be separately probated on the death of each. Id. When read in context of the entire document, we think the use of joint and several in the 1962 will must mean the will, to be probated on the death of each testator, comprises the intentions of John and Helen together and individually. Not surprisingly, support for this interpretation of the phrase joint and several can be found in the law of contracts. Copromisors are liable `jointly' if all of them have promised the entire performance which is the subject of the contract. 12 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 36:1, at 610 (4th ed.1999). When a `several' obligation is entered into by two or more parties in one instrument, it is the same as though each has executed separate instruments.... [E]ach is bound separately for the performance which he or she promises, and is not bound jointly with anyone else. Id. at 611, 106 N.W.2d 637. A joint and several contract is a contract with each promisor and a joint contract with all, so that parties having a joint and several obligation are bound jointly as one party, and also severally as separate parties at the same time. Id. at 611-12, 106 N.W.2d 637. In the context of the Grahams' will, then, several means personal, individual, or separate but not noncontractual or nonmutual. See id.; see also Healey v. Story, 3 Exch. 2, 3 (1848) (severally is equivalent to personally); cf. Young v. Bierschenk, 199 Iowa 309, 311, 201 N.W. 591, 594 (1925) (referring to a joint and several contract as a contract that binds each promisor personally to the full amount of the contract); Bayers v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 52 Iowa 478, 478, 3 N.W. 522, 522 (1879) (same); Linder v. Lake, 6 Iowa 164, 168 (1858) (A joint obligation and right, may co-exist with a several obligation, or right; for there may arise from the same contract, one joint duty to all, and also several joint duties to each of the parties. (Citation omitted.)). A joint and several will thus binds each testator jointly and personally to its provisions. The Grahams' statement in the 1962 will that the will was their joint and several wills does not trump other language in the will that unequivocally evidences its contractual nature. While Iowa Code section 633.270 requires such intent to be expressly stated within the four corners of the will, it does not mandate use of certain magic words. Nor does it proscribe any words. We have previously declared a will with language nearly identical to this will's language to be a contractual will. In Logan, we were asked to decide, inter alia, whether a will that contained the phrase mutually agree each in consideration of the promise and act of the other in its preamble was a contractual will. 253 Iowa at 1212, 115 N.W.2d at 702-03. The testators in Logan also declared the will to be their joint and several wills. 253 Iowa at 1213, 115 N.W.2d at 703. Although we did not discuss the import of this latter phrase, we nonetheless held the will was a contractual will. [5] Id. at 1216, 115 N.W.2d at 704-05. We also note the reports of decisions from other jurisdictions contain contractual wills that employ the self-identifying phrase joint and several wills or similar language. See, e.g., Ill. Masonic Children's Home v. Flynn, 109 Ill.App.3d 744, 65 Ill.Dec. 334, 441 N.E.2d 126, 128-29 (1982); Wilke v. Thomas, 295 S.W.2d 283, 283 (Tex.Civ.App.1956); Sipple v. Zimmerman, 39 Wis.2d 481, 159 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Wis.1968); Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763, 763 (Wis.1924). Because we hold the 1962 will is a contractual will, we need not consider the circumstances surrounding the execution of the codicil and agreement in 1987 as further evidence that the 1962 will was contractual.