Opinion ID: 683061
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timing of Hearing

Text: 16 First, Canez asserts that he should have had a full hearing before his dismissal on August 10, 1990. The Local Constitution provides for such a hearing in Article XII. We agree with the district court that we must defer to the General Executive Board's finding that the emergency action of the Executive Board was permissible under the Local Constitution. See Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Martino, 867 F.2d 500, 511 (9th Cir.1989) (courts should be highly deferential to a union's interpretation of its own governing documents). 17 Next Appellant argues that he was entitled to a full hearing on the charges within thirty days of his dismissal. The General Executive Board agreed that Canez's full hearing came later than it should have. (E.R. 16, p 10). The Board also found, however, that [b]ecause Canez was removed from office for misconduct, he suffered no injury by the Executive Board's failure to provide him a hearing on disciplinary charges within a reasonable period after his removal on August 8. (E.R. 16, p 19). 18 The question whether constitutional due process rights have been violated is not a results-oriented inquiry. Union members are entitled to due process whether or not they are guilty. Canez's rights under the Local Constitution were violated when he did not receive his hearing on time, even though he had been dismissed for misconduct. In some situations, the timing of a hearing could prove critical to a plaintiff. In this case, however, Canez has failed to suggest any kind of specific prejudice. We therefore agree with the district court that this issue does not need to be tried because Canez has failed to present any evidence to show that he suffered any harm.