Opinion ID: 618468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to RemandIneffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: Kwong argues that the BIA erred in denying his motion to remand, which was based principally on Kwong's allegation of his prior counsel's ineffective assistance. This court reviews BIA denials of motions to reopen for abuse of discretion..., but reviews purely legal questions, such as due process claims, de novo. Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). [I]neffective assistance of counsel in a deportation hearing results in a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment only when the proceeding is so fundamentally unfair that the alien is prevented from reasonably presenting her case. Id. at 899. To prevail, Kwong first must demonstrate that counsel [failed to] perform with sufficient competence. Second, [he] must show that [he was] prejudiced by [his] counsel's performance. Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Kwong argues that the BIA applied the wrong standard in judging prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel, because it stated that the evidence presented by Kwong in his motion to reopen falls far short of being sufficient to convince us that the Immigration Judge would have granted that form of relief if the evidence in question had been presented at the hearing. Kwong contends that the proper standard is whether the missing evidence may have affected the outcome of the proceedings, id. at 858-59, and that the BIA accordingly erred in assessing whether that evidence would have changed the result. We need not reach that question, however, because the initial inquiry in assessing a claim of ineffective assistance is whether the performance of counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective. Id. at 858. The BIA made it quite clear that it did not find any such deficiency; it reviewed the actions of counsel and summarized its holding by stating: In short, we find, upon the facts of this case, that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus necessarily there was not a showing by the respondent that the assistance of counsel was so ineffective as to have impinged upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing. Our review of the record convinces us that the BIA did not err in ruling that counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient, particularly in light of the facts that counsel had to work with. [6] Counsel interrogated Kwong about Kwong's fears about being returned to China and the reasons for them. Counsel presented sufficient evidence in support of Kwong's claim for withholding of removal to permit the IJ to make a reasoned decision on the merits of that claim. We conclude that there was no violation of due process. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.