Opinion ID: 480579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the bribery indictments

Text: 11 The indictments filed in this case followed the phrasing of an earlier statute by alleging that Garrett had committed bribery by: 12 intentionally and knowingly offering, conferring and agreeing to confer benefits, namely: money, on Don Evans, a public servant, namely: an investigator for the Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney's Office, with intent to influence the said Don Evans in a specific performance of his official duties, namely: to fail and to omit to conduct investigations into the defendant's illegal gambling activities and to warn defendant of investigations and raid by law enforcement agencies, in violation of said Don Evans [sic] official duties. (Emphasis added.)The current bribery statute defines bribery as intentionally or knowingly offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision ... to violate a duty imposed by law. Tex.Penal Code Ann. Sec. 36.02 (Vernon Supp.1986). Thus, Garrett contends that the indictment was fundamentally defective under Texas law because it included the with intent to influence language in lieu of the essential element as consideration for. The state, on the other hand, argues that it matters not whether the word consideration was used in the indictment, since when read as a whole, the indictment encompasses this element. 13 When determining the sufficiency of a Texas indictment, one should begin with the premise articulated in article 21.03 of the Texas Code Crim.Proc.Ann.: Everything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved. Going one step further, [a]n indictment or information must by direct and positive averments allege all the constituent elements of the offense sought to be charged. Nothing must be left to inference or intendment. Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (en banc) (cites omitted). But, article 21.17 of the Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. provides: words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to use other words conveying the same meaning or which include the sense of the statutory words. 14 The first step that must be considered is whether the as consideration for language is an essential element of the offense. An en banc Court of Criminal Appeals has held that it is. McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132, 135-36, 139 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Being an essential element but not having been included in the indictment, the next step is to determine whether the consideration element is supplied in the indictment by other words conveying the same meaning when the indictment is viewed as a whole. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that a benefit as consideration for includes a bilateral arrangement--in effect an illegal contract to exchange a benefit as consideration for the performance of an official function. Id. at 136. The state argues, of course, that the indictment encompasses this bilateral arrangement: that Garrett intentionally offered or conferred a benefit (money) on a public servant so that the public servant would refrain from investigating Garrett's illegal gambling activities. 15 The state's argument is convincing at first glance. It appears, however, that the Texas Legislature intentionally replaced with intent to influence with any benefit as consideration for in order to avoid application of the bribery sanction to situations where gifts are given in mere hope of influence, without any agreement by the donee. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Reprint-Proposed Official Draft, Sec. 240.1 (May 4, 1962) (cited and quoted in McCallum, 686 S.W.2d at 135). See also the legislative bill analysis of Senate Bill 127 of the 64th Leg., 1975, (cited and quoted in McCallum 686 S.W.2d at 135) which addresses the amendments to the bribery statute: (use [of] the term 'as consideration for' in lieu of 'intent to influence' [was] to emphasize the bargain aspect of the bribery....). As McCallum concludes, the change in language was intended to stiffen the requirements for a bribery conviction. McCallum, 686 S.W.2d at 134-35, 139. 16 As a result, the indictments in this case, based solely on prior law, cannot be construed in such a way that the allegations would be considered sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. We cannot reconcile the language in the indictments that Garrett had the intent to influence the assistant district attorney with the requirement of the modified statute that such an intent bore fruition in a bilateral arrangement. The remaining allegations do not salvage the indictment by establishing such a bilateral arrangement. At most, they expand on Garrett's motivation. 17 For these reasons, the district court's judgment is REVERSED and the writ of habeas corpus GRANTED. 6