Opinion ID: 1057396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirements of a Firearm for Reckless Endangerment

Text: ¶ 5. On appeal we review jury instructions “as a whole and not piecemeal, in order to ensure that they accurately state the law on every theory fairly put forward by the evidence.” State v. Baird , 2006 VT 86, ¶ 30, 180 Vt. 243, 908 A.2d 475 (quotations and citation omitted). The State concedes that the trial court’s jury instructions were insufficient on reckless endangerment because they did not inform the jury that reckless endangerment requires proof that a firearm is operable. We first recognized operability as an element of reckless endangerment in State v. McLaren , when we held that the Legislature intended only to prevent people from placing others in “actual danger of death or serious bodily injury, not mere apparent danger.” 135 Vt. 291, 293, 376 A.2d 34, 36 (1977), superseded by statute as discussed in State v. Messier , 2005 VT 98, ¶ 9, 178 Vt. 412, 885 A.2d 1193). Subsequent amendment of the reckless endangerment statute specifically eliminated another element required by McLaren —that the firearm be loaded—but did not address the operability requirement. Messier , 2005 VT 98, ¶¶ 7-10. Consequently, the operability requirement remains. Id . ¶ 10. Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on this requirement, we reverse defendant’s conviction for reckless endangerment.