Opinion ID: 1678072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the shankses effectuated a timely appeal from the mayor's action

Text: ¶ 16. Alternatively, the City contends that if the Mayor's veto is indeed appealable, then the Shankses are not entitled to judicial review because they did not effectuate a timely appeal. The City maintains that the Mayor's veto became final on June 27, 1994, the date it was delivered to the city clerk. The City notes that the Shankses did not file their notice of appeal and bill of exceptions until August 12, far in excess of the ten-day period allowed under the statute. ¶ 17. The Shankses, however, argue that the veto did not become final until August 2, 1994, the date the Board proceeded to ratify the Veto of the Mayor as aforesaid by adopting the `consent agenda' whereon the matter of the Mayor's Veto and Statement of Objections to the prior action of the Board with respect to said Rezoning was placed prior to said regular meeting of the Board. They argue that because the Board retains the power to override the veto, the veto is not final until the Board either accepts the veto, which it did in this case, or votes to override it. According to the Shanks, their appeal was timely, as the Board voted to accept the veto on August 2. ¶ 18. The statute provides that a party must appeal within ten (10) days from the date of adjournment at which session the board of supervisors or municipal authorities rendered such judgment or decision.... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (1972). [3] In the instant case, the mayor's veto does not fit neatly within the language of the statute, as it did not come at a session of the municipal authorities. However, we find that the veto became final following the Board's August 2, 1994 session at which it accepted the veto and refused to override it. ¶ 19. The statute's ten (10) day time limit in which to appeal the decision of a Board is both mandatory and jurisdictional.... Where an appeal is not perfected within the statutory time constraints no jurisdiction is conferred on the appellate court; and the untimely action should be dismissed. Newell v. Jones County, 731 So.2d 580, 582 (Miss.1999). There is no case law addressing the point in time at which a mayoral veto becomes final for purposes of appeal. However, there are a number of cases which discuss the statutory ten day period in which a party may appeal actions taken by municipal authorities in other contexts. ¶ 20. In Sanford v. Board of Supervisors, 421 So.2d 488, 489 (Miss.1982), fifty-two people filed a petition with the Covington County Board of Supervisors seeking to have a road constructed connecting the property of one of the petitioners with an existing public road. The Board entered an order appointing a committee to lay out and mark said road and report their proceedings in writing to the Board at its next meeting.... Id. A landowner across whose land the proposed road would be built appealed to the circuit court which recognized a crucial feature of the case in stating that he questioned `whether the order appointing the Committee would be a final order' subject to an appeal. Id. On appeal to this Court, we held that the appeal was premature, as [t]here can be no valid appeal until there has been a judgment disposing of the case.... A final judgment has been defined by this Court as a judgment adjudicating the merits of the controversy which settles all the issues as to all the parties. Id. ¶ 21. Similarly, in Garrard v. City of Ocean Springs, 672 So.2d at 737, the Mayor and Board voted on February 20, 1990, to turn over the American Legion Hut to the Parks Commission. The minutes of the meeting were approved at a City Council meeting on March 6, 1990. Id. Several individuals filed a bill of exceptions against the City of Ocean Springs on October 22, 1991. Id. The Jackson County Circuit Court dismissed, though the grounds for its decision were unclear. Id. at 738. In holding that the Board's action became final when it approved the motion to transfer the property to the Parks Commission, this Court explained that [w]e are of the opinion that any act of a county or municipality leaving a party aggrieved is appealable under § 11-51-75 where ... all issues of the controversy are finally disposed of by Order of the City Council. (quoting South Cent. Turf, Inc., 526 So.2d at 561). ¶ 22. These decisions focus on the finality of a municipal authority's action. In the instant case, the Mayor's veto became final when the Board declined to override it at its August 2, 1994 meeting. Until then, the veto was subject to override. At the Board's August 2 meeting, the Mayor's Statement of Objections was placed on the consent agenda which was voted on and accepted unanimously by the Board. The following appears in the minutes of the meeting: At this time, Mayor Hawkins addressed Alderman Dunn for discussion regarding the veto of Mr. Williams Shanks' rezoning applications, # 94008, # 94009, and # 94010. Alderman Dunn stated that he felt the City is inconsistent on rezoning applications and that he did not want to set an unhealthy precedent. Mr. Shanks attended the meeting and presented photos of properties surrounding the land involved in these rezoning applications. Mayor Hawkins asked Alderman Dunn if he would like to make a motion to override her veto of these rezoning applications. He stated that he would not. ¶ 23. Other cases discussing when the ten day period within which to appeal an action of a municipal authority begins to run include City of Oxford v. Inman, 405 So.2d 111, 114 (Miss.1981) (the filing of the bill of exceptions on June 13, 1980 was timely because the rezoning ordinance did not become effective until written, signed, and formally adopted on June 3, 1980....); South Cent. Turf, Inc., 526 So.2d at 563 (the City of Jackson was without authority to reconsider the matter which it had already finally decided on April 8, 1986, when the Mayor signed the minutes of the April 1 meeting thereby giving effect to the Council's decision to award the contract to E-Z-Go.); J.H. Parker Constr. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 721 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss.Ct.App.1998) ([t]he ten day period did not commence until April 11 when the City executed the contract with Lampkin Construction.). ¶ 24. The mayor's veto became final for purposes of perfecting an appeal under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (1972) on August 2, 1994 when it was accepted by the Board. Consequently, the Shankses timely effectuated an appeal on August 12. This assignment of error is without merit.