Opinion ID: 2393191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Faust's Dubious Reasoning

Text: Then came Faust, the 1966 decision of this Court on which the majority exclusively relies and which was the basis of the Court of Appeals' decisions cited by the majority. See Maj. Op. at 413-14. The Court first reversed Faust (and a related defendant's) conviction based on an erroneous jury charge on witness credibility. See 222 Ga. at 28, 148 S.E.2d 430. The Court went on, however, to address the concluding portion of the jury charge, where after explaining the form of the verdict, the trial court instructed: So, Gentlemen, whatever your verdict may be, let it be stated in open court by your foreman after you have reached a verdict, because there are certain entries which cannot be removed from the indictment, and I am of the opinion it would be improper and maybe reversible error by the Appellate Court if I allowed you to see the indictment with these several entries hereon. Id. at 28-29, 148 S.E.2d 430. The Faust Court first explained that this charge could have conveyed to the jury the impression that the parts of the indictment that were referenced, but which the jury was not allowed to see, were unfavorable to the defendant. See id. at 29, 148 S.E.2d 430. But the Court went further, saying that advising the jury as to possible reversal by the appellate court for allowing them to see the entries could have conveyed the impression that the court itself believed the defendant would be found guilty, since only the defendant can appeal from a verdict in a criminal case. Id. The Court then noted the previous warnings against reference to the reviewing courts by court or counsel, except to cite their decisions, citing Mitchell and Bryant the only authorities cited in the opinionand concluded that the jury charge was reversible error. 222 Ga. at 29, 148 S.E.2d 430. The result of Division 2 in Faust may be correct, because the jury was told about material not in evidence that suggested additional criminal conduct by the defendant (the indictment being the document that charges a defendant with crimes). But the second part of the Court's reasoning does not hold up to scrutiny. Mitchell and Bryant did warn trial courts against reference to appellate courts, but both cases nevertheless affirmed the convictions at issue; those decisions do not support the conclusion that such references are reversible error. Even more dubious is Faust 's assertion that the trial court's reference to possible reversal by the appellate court conveyed the impression that the court itself believed the defendant would be found guilty, since only the defendant can appeal from a verdict in a criminal case.  Id. Judges know that only the defendant can appeal the verdict in a criminal case, and most lawyers probably know it too (or at least learned it at some point during their legal education); and perhaps because judges spend so much of their time dealing with each other and with lawyers, judges may think that the everyday citizens who sit on juries know it too. But I doubt that jurors untrained in the law are focused on this feature of American double jeopardy lawwhich, by the way, was not so clearly the law in 1966 when Faust was decided. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937) (holding that the federal constitution's double jeopardy and due process provisions do not preclude a state's appeal of an acquittal based on substantial legal errors made during a criminal trial), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The Faust Court did not offer any empirical support for its assumption about jurors' awareness of this legal doctrine; my own experience is that many lay people are unaware of it and some are surprised by the notion that the State does not have the same ability as the defendant to appeal a verdict. Moreover, we do not apply this assumption generally in criminal cases. If the rule that only defendants can appeal the verdict in a criminal case is something we can assume jurors already know, there would be no harm in trial courts or counsel saying it to juries. But to my knowledge, that is never done. Indeed, we might find explicit focus on this point in a criminal case, in a charge or argument for example, to be error, because it could improperly lessen the jury's sense of responsibility for a guilty verdict (if jurors know their decision to convict will be double-checked on appeal, while their decision to set free the accused criminal will be final), or because it could promote jury nullification (if jurors know they can acquit without regard to the law or the facts because the State cannot appeal). See Watkins v. State, 265 Ga.App. 54, 56, 592 S.E.2d 868 (2004) (holding that, while the jury has the de facto power of nullification, a defendant is not entitled to a nullification instruction). Finally, even assuming the Faust assumption about juror knowledge of double jeopardy law could be sustained, the Court's conclusion required another deductive leap. The trial court did not mention the defendant or directly state an opinion about her guilt; its statement could also be understood as an explanation that the court was acting to protect the jury's verdict, whatever it may be. In other words, when the trial judge said, it would be improper and maybe reversible error by the Appellate Court if I allowed you to see the indictment with these several entries, why would the jury necessarily infer that the trial judge meant because I believe the defendant is guilty and I do not want her conviction to be reversed on appeal, as opposed to because you may decide to find her guilty and I do not want your potential decision reversed on appeal? In addition, if the Faust Court truly believed that the trial court's charge expressed an opinion about the defendant's guilt, then its previous (and defensible) discussion of the prejudice arising from the court's reference to the indictment excerpts would be unnecessary, because a trial court's intimation of an opinion about guilt in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 [3] requires reversal of the conviction without regard to prejudice or harm. See Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 414, 651 S.E.2d 55 (2007).