Opinion ID: 16540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Responsible Persons & the Scope of CERCLA Liability

Text: 27 The first issue for decision is whether Uniroyal sufficiently established that the defendants are responsible persons under § 9607(a)(1) of the statute. On appeal, the defendants allege that Uniroyal failed to carry that burden because there is no evidence of waste disposal in this case. According to the defendants, the disposal of a hazardous waste is an inherent and unavoidable requirement for bringing a claim under § 9607(a)(1). We disagree. 28 The starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330, 98 S.Ct. 2370, 57 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978) (citations and quotations omitted). When that language is plain we must abide by it; we may depart from its meaning only to avoid a result so bizarre that Congress 'could not have intended' it. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191, 111 S.Ct. 599, 112 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)). Accordingly, [i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court ... must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 29 In § 9607(a), a disposal requirement is contained in three of the four classes of responsible persons, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(2)-(4). But that requirement is not present in the first class. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1); California v. Blech, 976 F.2d 525, 526-27 (9th Cir.1992) (acknowledging lack of disposal requirement). Unlike the three other classes of responsible persons, where the word disposal is expressly employed in the statutory text, § 9607(a)(1) simply holds liable the [present] owner and operator of a vessel or a facility. Id. There is not the slightest reference in that section to a disposal. 9 30 The defendants acknowledge that the text of § 9607(a)(1) does not expressly contain a disposal requirement, but assert that we must infer one nonetheless because Congress intended CERCLA to apply only to inactive or abandoned waste sites. That intent, the defendants allege, is reflected in the overall statutory scheme of CERCLA, in the legislative history of the statute, and in case law. The basic thrust of their argument is that we would be frustrating the expressed intent of Congress by allowing the imposition of CERCLA liability in this case. We review each purported source of this alleged intent in turn.
31 The defendants allege that it is a mistake to read § 9607(a)(1) in isolation. They insist that when it is viewed in conjunction with CERCLA as a whole, it becomes evident that Congress wanted to confine liability under the statute to cases that involved waste disposal sites. We disagree. CERCLA's core provisions suggest, quite to the contrary, that through the statute Congress sought to address hazardous releases generally, not just disposals at hazardous waste sites. 32 Section 9601(9) is the provision in CERCLA that defines the term facility. It is a crucial provision because CERCLA liability cannot be imposed unless the site in question constitutes a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); see also Licciardi, 111 F.3d at 398 (listing facility as the first element of the prima facie case). Therefore, the manner in which Congress chose to define the term provides critical insight into the intended scope of the statute. 33 In examining the contours of § 9601(9), it is apparent that facility is defined in the broadest possible terms, encompassing far more than traditional waste sites. It expressly includes buildings, pipelines, motor vehicles, rolling stock, wells, and aircraft. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A). In addition, sites that do not otherwise satisfy the definition are swept within its purview by a catch-all phrase that applies to any site or area where a hazardous substance ... otherwise comes to be located. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B). That expansive definition is strong evidence that Congress did not intend to limit CERCLA to waste disposal sites. 34 Other key CERCLA provisions reflect the same intent. To impose liability under the statute, a plaintiff must also prove that there was a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance. Under § 9601(22), the term release is defined as follows: 35 (22) The term release means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant).... 36 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (emphasis added). 10 The acts listed in that definition reach well beyond the mere act of disposal, effectively reaching any means by which a hazardous substance finds its way into the environment. That point is reinforced, we think, by the fact that the word disposing is expressly listed in the definition as only one of many different acts that qualify as a release under § 9601(22). 37 Similarly, the definition of hazardous substance in § 9601(14) covers far more than mere waste material. That provision states: 38 (14) The term hazardous substance means (A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act ..., (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, ... and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas). 39 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). 11 Notice that in this definition hazardous waste is expressly made a subset of hazardous substances generally, a strong indication that waste disposal is not the only possible basis for CERCLA liability. Furthermore, in defining the term hazardous substance Congress specifically excluded oil and natural gas. We must assume that if Congress wanted to exclude all useful substances it would have done so in like fashion. Finally, we note that § 9601(14) covers a staggering array of hazardous substances; pursuant to subsection (B) of § 9601(14), the EPA has designated over 700 hazardous substances. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1998). It is telling indeed that some of those substances are listed in their generic chemical names, whereas others are more specifically described as waste products. 40 To accept the defendants' claim that CERCLA applies only to waste disposal sites, this Court would have to ignore the broadly stated definition of facility. We also would have to accept the notion that, in the context of this case, there is no meaningful difference between a release and a disposal, or a hazardous substance and a hazardous waste, even though Congress chose separate and differing definitions for those terms. We cannot embrace such a tortured construction of the statute without clear legislative history indicating that Congress intended to restrict CERCLA to hazardous waste sites.
41 The defendants contend that the legislative history of CERCLA demonstrates that the only legislative aim of the statute is the clean up of waste disposal sites. Uniroyal vigorously refutes that assertion. It insists that although CERCLA found its beginnings in the problems associated with toxic waste sites, the statute emerged from the legislative process as a broad remedial measure designed to address releases of hazardous substances generally. Uniroyal's contention rings true. 42 In the late 1970s the threat posed by toxic waste sites was brought to the forefront of public awareness by the well-publicized disasters at Love Canal and Valley of the Drums. S.Rep. 96-848, at 96 (1980); 125 CONG.REC. S7695 (1980). Congress responded in 1980 by passing CERCLA, a compromise measure that was hastily enacted in the final days of the lame-duck session of the 96th Congress. See generally, Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability (Superfund) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM.J.ENV.L. 1 (1982) (summarizing and analyzing CERCLA's legislative history) (hereinafter Grad). Due to its hurried passage, it is widely recognized that many of CERCLA's provisions lack clarity and conciseness. A multitude of courts have roundly criticized the statute as vague, contradictory, and lacking a useful legislative history. See, e.g., HRW Sys., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F.Supp. 318, 327 (D.Md.1993) (the legislative history of CERCLA gives more insight into the 'Alice-in-Wonderland'-like nature of the evolution of this particular statute than it does helpful hints on the intent of the legislature); Rhodes v. County of Darlington, 833 F.Supp. 1163, 1174 (D.S.C.1992) (CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently 'for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage.' ) (quoting Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir.1988)); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 716 F.Supp. 676, 681 n. 6 (D.Mass.1989) (complaining of the difficulty of being left compassless on the trackless wastes of CERCLA); United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D.Pa.1983) (noting that the legislative history of CERCLA is unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements). We too have bemoaned the sparse and often contradictory legislative history that led to the enactment of CERCLA. See Amoco Oil Co., 889 F.2d at 667 (stating that CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history, quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H.1985)). 43 Here, however, the legislative history of CERCLA is remarkably clear with respect to the core legislative purposes behind the passage of the statute. In its final version CERCLA was a compromise among three competing bills then under consideration by Congress: House of Representatives Bill 85 (H.R. 85), House of Representatives Bill 7020 (H.R. 7020), and Senate Bill 1480 (S. 1480). Grad, supra, at 1; THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY xiii (Helen C. Needham & Mark Henefee eds., 1982) (hereinafter Superfund). H.R. 85 was entitled the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, and was introduced into the House of Representatives on January 15, 1979. Grad, supra, at 3. As its name suggests, H.R. 85 targeted oil pollution by establishing a comprehensive system of liability and compensation for oil-spill damage and clean-up costs. Id. at 3-4. 44 H.R. 7020 was introduced by Congressman Florio on April 2, 1980. Id. at 4. Entitled the Hazardous Waste Containment Act, the bill was intended to regulate inactive waste sites by establishing reporting, monitoring and clean-up schemes. Id. This bill, by its terms, applied only to hazardous waste sites, and did not purport to address all hazardous releases. Id. at 5. 45 S. 1480, the third and final bill, was introduced in the Senate on July 11, 1979 by Senators Muskie, Stafford, Chafee, Randolph, and Monyihan. Id. at 6. This bill, entitled the Environmental Emergency Response Act, was by far the broadest and most ambitious of the three competing measures. Id. at 6-7. In contrast to H.R. 7020, S. 1480 covered all releases of hazardous chemicals into the environment, not merely spills or discharges from abandoned waste disposal sites. 125 CONG.REC. S9173 (1979) (comments of Senator Culver, co-sponsor of S. 1480). 46 H.R. 85 and H.R. 7020 passed the House and were reported to the Senate. However, by the fall of 1980 it was apparent that none of the three bills would be passed. Superfund, supra, at xviii. Thus, on November 24, 1980, with the 96th Congress coming to an imminent close, Senators Stafford and Randolph introduced an amendment, known as the Stafford-Randolph Compromise, striking all the provisions of H.R. 7020 and inserting the compromise into the eviscerated measure. Superfund, supra, at xviii. 47 In addressing the Senate, Senator Randolph compared the new bill with H.R. 7020 and H.R. 85. He explained that H.R. 7020 was considered too narrow because it addressed only hazardous waste sites while H.R. 85, with its focus on oil spills and hazardous substances on navigable waters, was also insufficient. Senator Randolph explained: 48 But let me say something that Senator Stafford and I feel strongly about. It is the scope of the response provided in our amendment. We maintain that H.R. 7020 which deals only with abandoned hazardous waste sites is too narrow. We believe that coverage of spills of oil and hazardous substances into navigable water, as embodied in H.R. 85 is also not enough. The problem is bigger than the singular scope presented in each of those bills. The problem encompasses both waste sites and spills and leaks of chemicals into the environment--and that is what we must address here. We would neglect our duties to deal with only half a problem. The compromise, while greatly pared from its original version, must and does at least address the scope of the problem that this Nation faces.... 49