Opinion ID: 3031007
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits: An

Text: Untimely Administrative Appeal Does Not Satisfy the PLRA’s Exhaustion Requirement Confronted with similar situations, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits interpreted the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement as requiring a timely grievance by a prisoner at the administraNGO v. WOODFORD 3601 tive level before the prisoner initiates a federal cause of action. See Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2004); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 949 (2002). Both circuits feared that prisoners would purposely avoid administrative deadlines, thereby undermining the PLRA’s objective of offering prisons the first opportunity to resolve a prisoner’s complaint. See Ross, 365 F.3d at 1186; Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023-24. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit concluded that without some doctrine akin to procedural default, prisoners could “ ‘exhaust’ state remedies by spurning them.” Id. Thus, in the Seventh Circuit, “procedural default also means failure to exhaust one’s remedies.” Id. at 1024. But see Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230 (distinguishing the two concepts). An inmate’s failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies, regardless of the merits of his grievance, bars the inmate from bringing a subsequent federal suit. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1024 (“Failure to do what the state requires bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983.”). To hold otherwise, according to the Seventh Circuit, would leave the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement “without any oomph.” Id. at 1025. The Third Circuit likewise concluded that the PLRA contains a procedural bar rule, emphasizing that its policy goals would be best served by requiring prisoners to file timely grievances with prisons before launching a § 1983 action. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We believe that Congress’s policy objectives will be served by interpreting § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement to include a procedural default component.”). But the Spruill court had some qualms about its holding. It found “neither position entirely satisfactory,” and acknowledged that “an exhaustion rule can (though need not) be fairly read to include a procedural default component.” Id. at 229-30. As explained below, the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits’ arguments do not convince us, primarily because we 3602 NGO v. WOODFORD think their heavy reliance on the need for a procedural bar similar to that found in the habeas context is misplaced.