Opinion ID: 6330598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Documents Withheld under FOIA Exemption 5

Text: ICE withheld under Exemption 5 a memo titled “ICE Ability to Use 212(a)(3)(C) Foreign Policy Charge.” The agency emphasizes that the memo was a draft, that it was not binding, and that it reflected the views of the individual author rather than the agency. ICE argues that the district court erred in holding that the ICE memo was not subject to the deliberative process privilege through Exemption 5. That exemption excludes from FOIA’s disclosure requirement “interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5. U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “By this language, Congress intended to incorporate into the FOIA all the normal civil discovery privileges,” including the deliberative process privilege. Hopkins v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1991). A record is protected 45 by the deliberative process privilege if it is (1) “predecisional, that is, prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision”; and (2) “deliberative, that is, actually related to the process by which policies are formulated.” Id. (cleaned up). “[T]he deliberative process privilege protects only those records that bear on the formulation or exercise of policy-oriented judgment.” Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 19 F.4th 177, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the agency need not point to a specific decision that it was facing for which the document was prepared—it is enough that the record is connected to “a specific decisionmaking process.” Id. at 192. It appears that ICE’s appeal with respect to the ICE memo might be moot, but the record is unclear. Although the district court concluded that the ICE memo did not fall within Exemption 5 because it was not pre-decisional, Knight II, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 345, it did not order immediate disclosure of the memo. Rather, it directed ICE to 46 “re-assess its applied exemptions” using the district court’s opinion as a guide “and disclose all responsive non-exempt materials that can reasonably be segregated from exempt materials.” Id. at 355. The record does not reveal whether or when ICE conducted the ordered segregability analysis. At oral argument, counsel for ICE stated that the agency had conducted a review and determined that no material was reasonably segregable, but it seemed that counsel might have been referring to a different memo that the district court had addressed in the same opinion. 11 While Knight now asserts that “ICE failed to disclose reasonably segregable portions of the Foreign Policy Provision Memo,” Knight Br. at 57, it did not raise that failure in the district court, nor has it filed its own cross-appeal. 11Counsel explained that the district court ordered ICE to disclose anything in the memo that was “working law. ICE did that. ICE went through, did another review, and informed the plaintiffs that nothing in [the memo] contains working law.” Oral Argument at 36:59–37:09, Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 20-3837-cv (2d. Cir. Jan. 6, 2022). But the district court discussed “working law” in the context of a different ICE memo—the so-called “Extreme Vetting Memo” that is not at issue in this appeal. See Knight II, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 344. 47 Because we cannot determine whether ICE complied with the district court’s direction to conduct a segregability analysis, we remand to the district court to allow the parties to develop the record. On remand, if it has not already done so, ICE must conduct a segregability analysis and communicate its position with respect to the ICE memo to Knight. If ICE determines that it is not obligated to produce any further portions of the ICE memo, Knight is free to challenge that determination in the district court. The district court should consider any such renewed dispute in light of our decision expounding upon the deliberative process privilege in National Resources Defense Council, 19 F.4th 177, which we decided only after the district court issued its prior ruling. Should the court have doubts about the application of Exemption 5 to the ICE memo, it may also conduct an in camera review. And, of course, either party remains free to appeal anew in the face of an adverse ruling. 48