Opinion ID: 2743041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: I. Evaluation of Ability to Work Ms. Pryce-Dawes argues that the ALJ failed to comply with the district court’s remand order because the ALJ did not consider all of her impairments or articulate a reasonable basis for denying her SSI benefits. She contends that the hypothetical relied on by the ALJ did not mention her limitations concerning concentration, persistence, or pace, even though the ALJ found, based on the Exhibit 8F PRT, that she had moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace. We reject these arguments and conclude that the ALJ complied with the district court’s remand order. A PRT consists of four categories of limitations used to assess the severity of mental impairments at steps two and three. In Exhibit 8F, the state medical expert -4- indicated, among other things, that Ms. Pryce-Dawes had moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace. He also stated that an RFC assessment was needed. Exhibit 9F is the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (MRFCA) he prepared on the same day he prepared the PRT. The MRFCA is a more detailed assessment of the PRT categories and is used to assess RFC at steps four and five. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at  (July 2, 1996); see also Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1069 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that PRT merely provides summary of functions that are itemized in more detailed mental RFC assessment); Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 512 (ALJ’s decision recognizing that PRT and MRFCA “are meant to be considered together because they explain and clarify each other”). In the MRFCA, the state medical expert indicated that Ms. Pryce-Dawes had marked limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions and in her ability to interact appropriately with the general public. He also indicated that she had no other significant limitations in her functioning. When presented with a hypothetical containing the limitations broadly described in the PRT, the VE testified that Ms. Pryce-Dawes would be unable to work. But when he was presented with a hypothetical containing the more detailed limitations described in the MRFCA, the VE testified that she would be able to work. Because the PRT and MRFCA are to be considered together and the MRFCA sets out the RFC limitations, the ALJ explained that the VE’s response to the hypothetical containing the MRFCA limitations was entitled to greater weight than -5- the VE’s response to the hypothetical containing only the PRT’s limitations. The ALJ correctly explained that the VE could not rely solely on the PRT and ignore the expert’s explanation in the MRFCA of what the PRT statements meant. We conclude that the ALJ properly explained why he gave greater weight to the VE’s response incorporating the more detailed limitations set forth in the MRFCA. Contrary to Ms. Pryce-Dawes’ argument, the ALJ properly considered all of her impairments in light of the detailed assessment in the MRFCA. Her appellate contentions effectively amount to an argument that we should reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. II. Credibility Ms. Pryce-Dawes argues that the ALJ failed to perform a proper credibility determination. The Commissioner counters that we should apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the credibility issue was finally decided in the second district-court decision, but Ms. Pryce-Dawes did not appeal that decision. We agree. After issuing the second decision affirming the ALJ’s credibility findings and remanding solely for consideration of Exhibit 8F, the court entered judgment under sentence four of § 405(g). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The court shall have power to enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” (emphasis added)). The sentence-four partial affirmance and partial remand terminated the litigation. See McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493, 496 n.1 -6- (10th Cir. 2006). Ms. Pryce-Dawes therefore could have appealed from the court’s affirmance of the ALJ’s credibility findings, despite the remand for further proceedings. See Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1998) (holding that remand under sentence four is final judgment that may be appealed); see also Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 514 (directing in district court’s sentence-four remand order that appeal be to Tenth Circuit). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the credibility issue cannot be re-litigated in this third lawsuit. See United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1508 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that collateral estoppel applies when (1) identical issue was presented in prior action; (2) prior action was decided on merits; (3) party opposing imposition of collateral estoppel was party in prior action; and (4) that party had full and fair opportunity to litigate issue in prior action). Because Ms. Pryce-Dawes had an opportunity to appeal from the second district court order, but she did not do so, we conclude that she is foreclosed from challenging the credibility determination. Ms. Pryce-Dawes, however, counters that collateral estoppel should not apply because the third ALJ’s decision was not identical to his second decision in all respects but the remand directive. She points out that the third decision did not consider her obesity, added new paragraphs, and changed other paragraphs. While this is true, the ALJ did not change his ultimate credibility determination. Nor was -7- he directed to re-consider credibility. Thus, as stated above, we conclude that collateral estoppel precludes review of the credibility issue.1