Opinion ID: 2599123
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Colorado Constitution

Text: The Cities argue and the trial court agreed that the right to impose and enforce fines for the violation of municipal ordinances  a local power under the Colorado Constitution  includes the right to set and enforce traffic rules on local roads. (R. at v. III, p. 587.) The trial court ruled that this right is implicated by the statutory provisions at issue because the state legislation sets maximum fines, requires warnings in particular circumstances, and prevents cities from accessing state records if they fail to comply with section 42-4-110.5. Thus, the court concluded that these provisions interfere with the Cities' right to regulate the enforcement of speeding violations. The Cities also argue that the state legislature's attempt to dictate the maximum fines for AVIS-detected violations constitutes a direct attack on the authority of cities to conduct their municipal courts under Article XX, Section 6(c). We disagree. Article XX, Section 6(h) grants to home-rule cities the power to legislate upon, provide, regulate, conduct, and control the imposition, enforcement and collection of fines and penalties for the violation of any of the provisions of the charter, or of any ordinance adopted in pursuance of the charter. Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6(h). In addition, Article XX, Section 6(c) grants to home-rule cities the power to control the creation of municipal courts; the definition and regulation of the jurisdiction, powers and duties thereof, and the election or appointment of the officers thereof. Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6(c). It is clear that Article XX Section 6(h) provides a constitutional basis for the power of a home-rule city to collect, enforce, and impose fines and penalties for the violation of municipal laws. Moreover, Section 6(c) clearly confers on home-rule cities the power to create municipal courts and to define and regulate their jurisdiction, power, and duties. However, when the subject matter of the local regulation implicates both local and state concern, the constitution can not be read to dictate the matter at issue as one of exclusively local concern. Thus, while we have determined that it is significant that the text of the Colorado Constitution specifically commits a particular matter to state or local regulation, this alone is not dispositive. Fraternal Order of Police, 926 P.2d at 588. We have ruled that although our constitution assigns a power to home-rule municipalities in a general way, this does not necessarily mean that the matter is a strictly local issue. Cf. City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 771 (ruling that section 6(a) of the home-rule amendment  which commits the power to regulate the creation and terms of municipal employment among other things to home-rule cities  does not grant unlimited authority regarding municipal employment to home-rule cities because with respect to aspects of municipal employment that are of statewide concern, state statutes supersede inconsistent municipal provisions). Rather, our analysis has focused on the several factors discussed above. Therefore, while the constitution clearly provides home-rule cities the power to regulate their municipal courts and the power to enforce fines for the violation of local ordinances and charters, when the subject matter of the regulation implicates both state and local concerns, the constitution does not necessarily disallow all state legislation in the area of concern.