Opinion ID: 2536666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Button Was Denied Due Process

Text: Button raises several theories to support his claim that the borough, the clerk, and the assembly violated his due process rights. [52] As a threshold matter, a permit applicant is entitled to due process of law in evaluation of the permit application. [53] Button's interest in obtaining a 2005 commercial tour permit was therefore protected by due process. He had a property interest in the renewal process. Button first argues that the HBC lacks sufficient standards for exercise of the clerk's discretion and the assembly's review of the manager's factual findings. We have held that [t]he adequacy of process does not depend on the advance adoption of standards. Rather, we must look to the entire set of safeguards provided in the particular proceeding. [54] In this case the entire set of safeguards, including the manager's lengthy adversarial hearing in which Button actively participated, sufficiently protected Button's due process rights. Second, Button argues that the borough's procedures were insufficient because the clerk denied the permit without notifying Button of the charges against him or allowing him to defend himself; conducted no investigation before denying the permit; had no personal knowledge of the events she relied on to deny the permit; held no hearing prior to denial; did not allow Button to respond before deciding to deny renewal; decided not to renew Button's permit a month or two before she notified Button of her intent not to renew; and denied renewal without seeking contrary information. The clerk notified Button that she intended to deny his renewal application in March 2005 but invited him to submit his application anyway so he could appeal the decision if he so chose. After Button submitted his application, the clerk sent him a detailed notice of denial enumerating the ten grounds on which it was based. The denial also informed him that he had the right to appeal her decision. Button had ample notice and opportunity to defend himself at the manager's hearing. The clerk's nonrenewal procedure therefore did not deny Button due process. [55] Finally, Button argues that the manager should have granted Button's request that the manager disqualify himself as hearing officer. Although Button does not argue that the manager was actually biased, Button argues that the manager should have disqualified himself because he had advance knowledge of [the borough's] side of the case, raising a reasonable question about the manager's impartiality, and because he cannot be both a witness and the hearing officer. Before becoming borough manager, Venables was a borough employee who received, recorded, and placed in Button's file two telephonic complaints regarding Button being stopped in the middle of the road. Also before becoming manager, Venables was present during a meeting between a citizen and the clerk, in which the citizen complained that Button was soliciting, trespassing, hawking on Chilkat Cruises property, pulling people off the dock, and stopping his bus in the middle of the road. After becoming manager and after the clerk denied the 2005 permit, but before the manager conducted the hearing, Venables had a conversation with the clerk in which she informed him of the nonrenewal but did not discuss her substantive reasons for denial with him. Although Button moved several times during the hearing to disqualify the manager and suggested that the borough might wish to call the manager as a witness, he did not call the manager as a witness or ask the borough to do so, and the borough stated that it did not intend to call the manager as a witness. On appeal to the assembly, Button argued that the manager should have been disqualified as hearing officer, but he did not request a de novo hearing or ask that the manager be called to testify before the assembly. Button did not argue before the assembly, and does not now argue, that the manager was actually biased, that the manager's factfinding was skewed, or that the manager's alleged appearance of impartiality affected the outcome of the hearing. Although he requests a hearing de novo in front of this court, he does not ask to examine the manager at that hearing. In AT & T Alascom v. Orchitt , we held: Administrative agency personnel are presumed to be honest and impartial until a party shows actual bias or prejudgment. To show hearing officer bias, a party must show that the hearing officer had a predisposition to find against a party or that the hearing officer interfered with the orderly presentation of the evidence.[ [56] ] The four incidents listed above are too minor to show actual bias or the appearance of bias. Venables was not borough manager when he received the two complaints and sat in on the meeting; and because he was not then in an adjudicative position, it was appropriate for him to receive the information. The manager's factual finding regarding Button being stopped in the roadway was supported by at least three additional complaints with which the manager was not involved. Button forfeited any right he may have had to examine the manager on the issue of bias when he failed to ask for the opportunity to examine the manager in front of the assembly. Because the available evidence is insufficient to establish actual bias or appearance of bias, and because any request to examine the manager is foreclosed, Button has failed to demonstrate actual bias or appearance of bias. We hold that Button has not demonstrated any reason requiring the manager to disqualify himself. We reach that conclusion because Button did not demonstrate actual bias or appearance of bias, because the four incidents in which Venables was minimally involved are too insignificant to reasonably call into question the manager's impartiality, and because Button failed to ask that the manager be called to testify before the assembly. Additionally, the manager issued a detailed decision explaining his reasons for upholding the clerk's denial, and his decision has been subjected to review by the assembly and to appellate review by the superior court and this court. [57] The borough's procedures therefore contain sufficient institutional safeguards against untrammeled administrative discretion such that any merger of investigative, executive, and adjudicative functions did not require the manager to disqualify himself. [58] We conclude that Button's due process rights were not violated.