Opinion ID: 1749529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 44

Heading: Massaro v. United States

Text: Under Nebraska law, in order to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where appellate counsel is different from trial counsel, a defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the record, or the issue will be procedurally barred on postconviction review. State v. Gales, 269 Neb. 443, 694 N.W.2d 124 (2005), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 449, 163 L.Ed.2d 341. Molina argues that this rule should be overruled and replaced with the discretionary rule of Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003). Initially, we note that this case is a direct appeal from Molina's convictions and sentences, not a postconviction action in which an issue not raised on direct appeal may be procedurally barred. While the issue of a procedural bar might be presented in a postconviction action filed by Molina, in the present case, any discussion would be entirely academic, and it is not the function of an appellate court to render advisory opinions. See State v. Rust, 223 Neb. 150, 388 N.W.2d 483 (1986). Furthermore, we recently rejected an identical argument in State v. Marshall, 269 Neb. 56, 61-62, 690 N.W.2d 593, 600-01 (2005), stating: We begin by addressing [the defendant's] argument that Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003), eliminates any procedural bar resulting from the failure of appellate counsel to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. Massaro was a federal postconviction proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) in which the prisoner alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A federal appeals court had affirmed the dismissal of the action on the ground of procedural default, due to the fact that Massaro was represented on direct appeal by new counsel who did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court acknowledged the general federal rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice, noting that this procedural-default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement, but, rather, a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law's important interest in the finality of judgments. 538 U.S. at 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690. Resolving a conflict among the federal courts of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court held that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255. 538 U.S. at 509, 123 S.Ct. 1690. The Massaro Court noted that a growing majority of state courts follow the rule adopted by its holding. 538 U.S. at 508, 123 S.Ct. 1690. This court, however, has not adopted the rule. We do not interpret Massaro as requiring that we do so, inasmuch as the Court specifically acknowledged that procedural default rules are not constitutional requirements. The general procedural default rule we have long applied in postconviction proceedings under Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004 (Reissue 1995) holds that a motion for postconviction relief cannot be used to secure review of issues which were or could have been litigated on direct appeal. State v. Perry, 268 Neb. 179, 681 N.W.2d 729 (2004); State v. Lotter, 266 Neb. 245, 664 N.W.2d 892 (2003). Thus, a motion for postconviction relief asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel is procedurally barred where a defendant was represented by a different attorney on direct appeal than at trial and the alleged deficiencies in trial counsel's performance were known or apparent from the record. State v. Al-Zubaidy, 263 Neb. 595, 641 N.W.2d 362 (2002); State v. Suggs, 259 Neb. 733, 613 N.W.2d 8 (2000); State v. Williams, 259 Neb. 234, 609 N.W.2d 313 (2000). The rule we reaffirmed in Marshall, supra, is not simply a matter of policy, but grounded in the Nebraska Postconviction Act. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-3003 (Reissue 1995) provides in part that [t]he remedy provided by sections 29-3001 to 29-3004 is cumulative and is not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy existing in the courts of this state. The phrase any other remedy encompasses a direct appeal when the issue raised in the postconviction proceeding can be raised in the direct appeal. See State v. Williams, 181 Neb. 692, 150 N.W.2d 260 (1967). From that principle is derived the rule that a motion for postconviction relief cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or to secure a further review of issues already litigated on direct appeal or which were known to the defendant and counsel at the time of the trial and which were capable of being raised, but were not raised, in the defendant's direct appeal. See State v. Whitmore, 238 Neb. 125, 469 N.W.2d 527 (1991). Thus, we stated in Whitmore, supra, that the purpose of affording postconviction relief is not to permit the defendant endless appeals on matters already decided. Rather, the purpose is to correct errors of constitutional proportion which could not otherwise be raised on direct appeal, such as ineffectiveness of counsel who brought the direct appeal. Id. We concluded that this principle applied where new appellate counsel could have raised the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. In short, our recent rejection of the Massaro standard is not simply a policy determination made by this court, but the consequence of well-established reasoning based in the language of the Nebraska Postconviction Act. In any event, the question of which issues might be procedurally barred in a postconviction action is not before us in the present proceeding. We decline Molina's invitation to reconsider our decision in State v. Marshall, 269 Neb. 56, 690 N.W.2d 593 (2005).