Opinion ID: 764877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Proceedings Before the Commission

Text: 23 Finnigan filed a complaint at the Commission asserting that the Intervenors 1 were importing the ESQUIRE systems in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1994) (Section 337) because these systems infringed, inter alia, its '884 patent. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (prescribing that importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent is an unlawful trade practice). In response, the Commission instituted an investigation on February 20, 1997, see Certain Ion Trap Mass Spectrometers and Components Thereof; Notice of Investigation, 62 Fed.Reg. 8774 (1996), which culminated in a 309-page Initial Determination in which the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended that the Commission conclude that Section 337 had not been violated. As relevant here, the ALJ determined that claims 1-4, 8, 12, 14, and 17 were not literally infringed 2 and that claims 1-4 and 8 were anticipated and therefore invalid under § 102(b). These determinations were adopted by the Commission. 3 24 The ALJ's noninfringement determination followed from his conclusion that the claims did not cover the resonance ejection technique practiced by the Bruker device. Much of the ALJ's discussion of claim construction focused on the interpretation of the term unstable, which appears in independent claims 1 and 8. The ALJ found it significant that the specification makes use of the terms 'stable' and 'unstable' with specific reference to the curves of the [Mathieu] stability diagram.... Initial Determination at 26. The ALJ also found significant the specification's discussion of the prior art, which, like the Bruker device, involved applying a voltage pulse between the end caps to eject trapped stable ions, see '884 patent, col. 2, ll. 1-10: 25 It is clear that for the purpose of the '884 patent the patentee made a distinction between the inventive mode of operation which relies on the 'scanning parameters' (U, V,, and r subo ) and the prior art mode of operation which ejects 'stable' ions by applying a voltage pulse between the end caps. 26 Initial Determination at 25-26. The ALJ concluded that the '884 patent uses the terms 'stable' and 'unstable' to refer respectively[ ] to ions that are 'trapped' (stable) or untrappable (unstable), according to the theory set forth in the ... Mathieu stability diagram to the exclusion of resonance ejection techniques that involve application of a supplementary voltage to the end caps to eject otherwise stable, trapped ions. 4 See id. at 30, 45. Accordingly, the ALJ held claims 1-4, 8, 12, 14, and 17 not infringed. See id. at 162. 27 The ALJ found claims 1-4 and 8 to be anticipated for two reasons. First, he found that the subject matter of those claims was disclosed in an article written by Keith B. Jefferts. The ion trap used by Jefferts is depicted in Figure 2 of that article: 28 NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE 29 Aside from the schematic disclosure of Trap Drive Voltages in Figure 2, the Jefferts article contains no disclosure concerning how ions are ejected from the trap--i.e., by nonresonance ejection (which the parties agree would anticipate the claims) or by resonance ejection (which would not anticipate). Although the article is thus unclear on this crucial point, the ALJ found that the testimony developed at the hearing established that[,] especially to one skilled in the art, there is no doubt that mass selective instability [i.e., nonresonance ejection], rather than resonant ejection, is the method disclosed in the Jefferts article. Initial Determination at 67-68. In support of that finding, the ALJ relied on the testimony of Jefferts and on his conclusion that there is no indication in the Jefferts article of an AC voltage supplied to the end caps for resonan[ce] ejection. Id. at 68. He therefore concluded that the ejection technique must involve variation of the trap parameters as required by the claims in dispute. 5 30 The second reason that the ALJ found the claims anticipated was Jefferts' asserted prior public use of the claimed invention. The primary basis for the ALJ's conclusion concerning prior use was Jefferts' testimony. In response to Finnigan's argument that this testimony was insufficient absent other corroborating evidence to invalidate the claims, the ALJ noted that Jefferts' credibility did not appear to be open to any serious question because he was not an interested party. See id. at 74. The ALJ also found many of the details of Jefferts' work to be recorded in the 1968 article, which the ALJ characterized as not inconsistent with his testimony. See id. After separately finding Jefferts' use to be sufficiently public, see id. at 75-78, the ALJ concluded that the evidence was clear and convincing that claims 1-4 and 8 were invalid, see id. at 78-79. 31 Finnigan appealed the Commission's determination to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (1994).