Opinion ID: 71719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Review of Jury Instructions

Text: We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether 6 Doris Grigsby was sentenced to five months of imprisonment on each of the four counts under which she was convicted, the terms to be served concurrently. She has not served her imprisonment term pending appeal. they misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party. United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1085 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1227, 114 S.Ct. 2724, 129 L.Ed.2d 848 (1994). Counsel's objections to proposed instructions should be sufficient to give the district court the chance to correct errors before the case goes to the jury. United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588, 594 (11th Cir.1995); see Fed.R.Crim.P. 30. A district judge's refusal to give a requested jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, because  [a] defendant is entitled to have the court instruct the jury on the theory of the defense, as long as it has some basis in the evidence and has legal support.'  United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir.1987)).7 We reverse when we are left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.'  Mark Seitman & Assocs. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 837 F.2d 1527, 1531 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting Johnson v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir.1982)). B. CITES: Implementing and Interrelating Legislation CITES, which entered into force on July 1, 1975, resulted from the recognition by the signatory countries that international cooperation is essential for the protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through international trade. CITES, 27 U.S.T. at 1090 (proclamation of 7 Furthermore, we have held: There is no need to object to a court's specific denial of a request for a jury instruction. The presentation of the request and its denial [are] sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Morris, 20 F.3d at 1114 n. 3. the contracting states). The United States and Canada are CITES signatories. CITES, 27 U.S.T. at 1346, 1349 (signatories to CITES), 50 C.F.R. § 23.4 (1992). CITES establishes a regulatory system that monitors the trade in wildlife, both flora and fauna, passing through one member country to another. United States v. Stubbs, 11 F.3d 632, 637 (6th Cir.1993). With respect to protected wildlife, such as that at issue in this case, [t]he local authorities, within the various signatory countries to CITES, must know how many animals are being exported, in order to protect the listed species from exploitation. United States v. 3,210 Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus Yacare, 636 F.Supp. 1281, 1287 (S.D.Fla.1986). CITES classifies protected species according to the extent to which they are endangered in appendices. Appendix I lists all species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade, and Appendix II includes all species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival. CITES, art. II, paras. 1, 2(a), 27 U.S.T. at 1092. Article VIII of CITES requires each signatory country to enact laws to effectuate the treaty. CITES, art. VIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1101. The African elephant, Loxodonta africana, initially protected in the United States by the Endangered Species Act of 1973,8 which, 8 The United States first implemented CITES through the Endangered Species Act of 1973. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (The purposes of [the Endangered Species Act] are to provide a ... program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate as amended, implemented CITES and utilized its appendices, was listed on CITES Appendix II on February 4, 1977, and upgraded to Appendix I in 1990. 50 C.F.R. § 23.23 (1989); 50 C.F.R. § 23.23 (1990). On October 7, 1988, Congress enacted Public Law No. 100478, a two-part wildlife conservation amendment to the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Title I is the Endangered Species Act of 1988, and Title II is the AECA. Endangered Species Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1533, 1535, 1538-1540, 1542, 1544 (1988)); AECA, Pub.L. No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2315 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538, 4201, 4203, 4211-4213, 4221-4225, 4241-4245 (1988)). Both the Endangered Species Act of 1973, which includes the birds protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, see 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4), and the AECA use the CITES appendices and seek to implement the goals of CITES. See 16 U.S.C. § 4241 (stating that the AECA supplements the Endangered Species Act of 1973). The AECA further implemented CITES with respect to the African elephant. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 4223, 4242-44. The legislative history for the AECA confirms that Congress determined that additional legislation was necessary to protect the African elephant because the CITES system for controlling ivory consumption had been insufficient to prevent lucrative, unlawful poaching, which would result in the extinction of the African elephant if the to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section[, including CITES].); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2297, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.). then-current rate of slaughter continued.9 To achieve this end and 9 In support of the original bill, which ultimately was enacted as the AECA, Congressman Beilenson, who introduced H.R. 2999, explained: Some people argue that the elephants belong to Africa, and that, ultimately, it will be up to the countries there to determine whether or not the elephant will survive. However, it has become apparent that even the best-intentioned and uncorrupted African governments are limited in their ability to control poachers because, like the drug trade, there is enormous profit to be made from ivory. For that reason, I believe very strongly that the United States, and other ivory consuming nations, can and must play a bigger role in restricting the ivory trade. In 1985, the parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species [CITES], which is the international governmental organization charged with regulating wildlife trade, took a first step toward addressing the plight of the African elephant. Together, the ivory-producing nations and the ivory-consuming nations—including the United States—agreed to a system which would limit the taking of elephants, and track individual tusks, in an effort to ensure that illegally poached ivory could not be sold on the world market. Unfortunately, this system, while well-intentioned, has been unsuccessful so far in eliminating the illegal trade because it has not been aggressively enforced by those countries, such as the United States, which import ivory. Our legislation will provide the mechanisms necessary to enforce that system at our borders, and it will encourage other ivory-consuming nations to do the same. Like gold and silver, ivory is a commodity used to hedge against inflation. As the price of ivory rises, more elephants are slaughtered. As more elephants are killed, the increased fear that the supply will run out drives the price of ivory up even more. The elephant has thus become a most unfortunate victim of a vicious upward spiral of supply and demand. In 1960, ivory sold for $2.25 per pound; the going rate is now about $68 per pound. With a single large tusk worth more than $5,000 retail on the world market, and the average per capita income at $300, an African poacher can earn much more for himself and his family by killing one elephant than by farming for 1 year, an enormously powerful incentive to kill elephants that will not to adhere to the CITES control of ivory trade, the ACEA established moratoria provisions. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4221-4225. Several ivory moratoria have been implemented in the United States pursuant to the AECA.10 The latest moratorium, relevant for this case, precluded the importation of raw and worked ivory from all ivory producing and intermediary11 countries effective June 9, 1989.12 54 Fed.Reg. disappear until we can reduce the value of ivory by cutting demand. .... The elephant simply will not survive another decade if the current rate of killing continues. As a major importer of carved ivory, we in the United States can—and indeed must—play a role in seeing that the demand for expensive ivory carvings, trinkets, and jewelry is not permitted to continue at such an uncontrolled rate, and at the expense of a truly unique and beautiful species. 134 Cong. Rec. 21,012, 21,013 (1988) (statement of Rep. Beilenson). 10 The following moratoria on raw and worked ivory imports into the United States have been implemented pursuant to the AECA: (1) on December 27, 1988, a moratorium was placed on all ivory imports from countries which are not parties to CITES, 53 Fed.Reg. 52,242 (1988); (2) on February 24, 1989, a moratorium was placed on all ivory imports from Somalia, 54 Fed.Reg. 8008 (1989); (3) on June 9, 1989, a moratorium was placed on all ivory imports from all ivory producing and intermediary countries, 54 Fed.Reg. 24,758 (1989). 11 The AECA defines a nonivory producing country, like the United States or Canada, as an  intermediary country,'  meaning a country that exports raw or worked ivory that does not originate in that country. 16 U.S.C. § 4244(6); see 54 Fed.Reg. 24,761 (1989) (stating that the United States is an intermediary nation). 12 The purpose in delaying establishing the effective date for this moratorium was to permit transit time for ivory shipments in progress between Africa and intermediary countries. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 928, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. II, at 29 (1988), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1988, at 2700, 2747 (Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, the AECA). The intent is to allow for the proverbial slow boat to China.'  24,758 (1989). Since the AECA is part of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, the federal regulations that implement and govern that statute as well as CITES also control the AECA.13 C. AECA
We review a district court's interpretation and application of a statute de novo. International Union v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 724 (11th Cir.1993). When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it controls interpretation  absent a legislative intent to the contrary. Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1084 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981)) (emphasis added). We resort to legislative history when the statutory language is unclear. United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 235, 106 S.Ct. 555, 557, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985). Our objective when interpreting a statute is to determine the drafters' intent. United States v. Castro, 829 F.2d 1038, 1049 (11th Cir.1987), modified on other grounds, 837 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.1988). Under these guiding interpretive principles, we must examine the statutory language of the AECA to determine if the district judge properly instructed the jury as to its application given the facts in this case. Regarding the prohibited importation act at issue, the AECA states: Except as provided in section 4222(e) [the sport-hunted Id. 13 Under 50 C.F.R. pt. 23, Endangered Species Convention, are the federal regulations implementing CITES. See 50 C.F.R. § 23.1(a) (1992) (The regulations in this part implement the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, TIAS 8249.). trophies exception] of this title, it is unlawful for any person -- - to import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory producing country. 16 U.S.C. § 4223(1). The AECA provides both criminal and civil penalties. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4224(a) & (b). This case was prosecuted criminally, and it is that statutory penalty provision that has caused the interpretive determination of the requisite intent: Whoever knowingly violates section 4223 of this title shall, upon conviction, be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.14 16 U.S.C. § 4224(a) (emphasis added). Although the district judge tentatively had been inclined toward defense counsel's interpretation that knowingly, as used in section 4224(a) with reference to section 4223(1) meant specific intent,15 she reverted to her original interpretation, urged by the government, of general intent.16 Thus, the district judge 14 In contrast, the AECA civil penalty provides: Whoever violates section 4223 of this title may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more than $5,000 for each such violation. 16 U.S.C. § 4224(b). 15 In leaning toward a specific intent interpretation for 16 U.S.C. § 4224(a), the district judge reasoned as follows: THE COURT: I'm tentatively inclined to think Mr. Brehm's [David Grigsby's counsel's] interpretation is correct. It is true that the word knowingly normally implies only that the act is volitional, but this statute is somewhat different from the norm in that it speaks of who[m]ever knowingly violates. It is different from what the result would be if section 4223 were to say that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly import raw ivory from any other country, et cetera. R14-938. 16 The district judge initially believed that knowingly in 16 U.S.C. § 4224(a) referred to general intent and, subsequently, instructed the jury that violation of the AECA required only general intent: In order for a defendant to be found guilty of Count Two [AECA violation], the government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. That the defendant either knowingly or fraudulently imported into the United States raw African elephant ivory. And secondly, that the importation was from a non-ivory producing country, in this case the country of Canada. The word knowingly means that an act is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident.17 returned to this view: THE COURT: And the definition of knowingly is that an act is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident. There isn't a specific intent requirement in that act. There is no requirement that the defendant's actions be done willfully; that is, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. So, the government's evidence would have to show a volitional act by the defendants. .... Knowingly normally means volitional, general intent. R14-917, 936 (emphasis added). Throughout the discussions at the charge conference and in the proposed jury instructions, knowingly is construed to mean general intent, while willfully is interpreted to mean specific intent. 17 The district judge essentially used the government's proposed Request to Charge No. 15 to instruct the jury on violation of the AECA: Title 16, United States Code, Section 4223(1) makes it unlawful to import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory producing country. In order for you to find the defendant guilty of Count Two of the indictment, the Government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: R15-1089-90. Because no federal court had addressed whether knowingly violates in section 4224(a) requires general or specific intent, the district court was persuaded by the government's analogy to the Endangered Species Act, which contains similar language.18 The Fifth Circuit and a district court in our circuit have found that general intent is sufficient to violate the Endangered Species Act. United States v. Ivey, 949 F.2d 759, 766 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819, 113 S.Ct. 64, 121 L.Ed.2d 32 (1992); United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016, 1018-20 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Billie, 667 F.Supp. 1485, 1492-93 (S.D.Fla.1987). In denying Doris Grigsby's motion for a new trial, the district judge clarified that she had adopted this rationale in determining that general intent was required for violation of the AECA: The court finds the analogy to the Endangered Species Act persuasive, and agrees with the rationale of the Fifth Circuit cases and the Billie case. The pattern of the language in § 4224(a) of the African Elephant Conservation Act (whoever knowingly violates) is identical to the language which has been interpreted not to require specific intent under the Endangered Species Act. The two acts are similar in purpose. Both criminal violations are misdemeanors. Accordingly, the court finds that the violation of § 4223(1) required only a finding of general intent and that the court properly charged the jury in this regard.
imported or brought into the United States raw African elephant ivory, Loxodonta africana; and
producing country, in this case Canada. R4-78-15 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 4223(1) & 4224(a)). 18 Under the Endangered Species Act, [a]ny person who knowingly violates any provision under that Act or any provision of any permit issued under the Act is subject to criminal prosecution. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1). R3-115-10-11. David and Doris Grigsby argue that, to be convicted under section 4224(a) of the AECA, the government must prove that the importer had specific knowledge of the AECA as well as knowledge that the specific, challenged conduct would be violative. David Grigsby sought this jury instruction in his Request to Charge No. 11: The African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4223(1) and § 4224(a), makes it a violation of criminal law to knowingly import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory producing country. In order to prove a violation of this law as alleged in Count Two of the indictment, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both of the following two elements: 1. That the defendant imported raw ivory from a country other than an ivory producing country as charged in the indictment; and 2. The defendant imported raw ivory knowing that such importation was in violation of federal law. R4-74-11 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 4223(1) & 4224(a)) (emphasis added). This request to charge, which was adopted by Doris Grigsby, was rejected by the district judge.19 R15-957, 966. 19 The district judge also specifically refused to give David Grigsby's Request to Charge No. 15, which addresses knowledge of violating the AECA: The Defendant, David Grigsby, is accused of smuggling raw ivory into the United States. It is against federal law to smuggle raw ivory into the United States. For you to find David Grigsby guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of these things beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that David Grigsby brought raw ivory into the United States. Second, that David Grigsby knew the raw ivory should have been reported to customs authorities as required by law. Similarly, Doris Grigsby proposed jury instructions explaining that knowledge that the importation was unlawful was required for conviction in Request to Charge Nos. 17 and 20: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, with respect to the charge alleging possession or concealment of smuggled goods, I charge you that the law does not make the mere receipt or concealment of smuggled goods an offense. There must be, on the part of the person receiving or concealing the goods after their importation, knowledge of their illegal importation .... It has been uniformly held that the jury was not authorized to convict unless the possession or concealment of the goods was accompanied with knowledge on the part of the possessor that they had been smuggled or imported contrary to law.'  Third, that David Grigsby, intending to avoid the United States customs laws, did not report the raw ivory to the customs authorities. R4-74-15 (citing Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions No. 68 (1988)) (emphasis added). R15-966. In discussing the knowledge/intent requirement with the district judge prior to the finalization of the jury instructions, David Grigsby's counsel explained his position: If you look at section 4223 of the Title 16 Act [AECA], that sets forth the acts themselves which are prohibited, and, of course, the charge in this case is subpart (1), which is to import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory producing country. That's the conduct that is prohibited, but then if you look at section 4224 right after that, that talks about penalties and enforcement, and subpart (a) is the criminal violation, and subpart (b) is civil. It would be our position as to David Grigsby that section 4224, subpart (a), the criminal violation, which says whoever knowingly violates section 4223, it is our position that that establishes a knowledge requirement which is a knowledge of the law itself. R14-935. Despite this explanatory background and the district judge's comments that the evidence as to David Grigsby was pretty thin and a little bit close in my mind, id. at 947, the judge did not give any instruction clearly delineating that knowledge of the AECA was required for its violation, which would demonstrate specific intent for criminal violation of the statute. R4-77-17 (quoting United States v. Sauer, 73 F. 671, 677 (W.D.Tex.1896) (emphasis added)). Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I charge you that you are not to presume the Defendants knew, or should have known, the sophisticated importation or customs laws of the United States just because they were in the taxidermist business in Canada. Id. at 20 (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234 n. 4, 93 S.Ct. 489, 491 n. 4, 34 L.Ed.2d