Opinion ID: 2087608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Treatment of Pepper Spray as a Dangerous Weapon

Text: This Court examined what constitutes a dangerous or deadly weapon under section 488 in Brooks v. State, 314 Md. 585, 552 A.2d 872 (1989). We noted two approaches: the subjective test, in which a weapon is deadly or dangerous if the victim believes it to be of that character and is, therefore, intimidated by its use, and the objective test, in which to be deadly or dangerous a weapon must be inherently of that character or must be used or useable in a manner that gives it that character. Id. at 590, 552 A.2d at 875. We ultimately adopted the objective test. Id. at 600, 552 A.2d at 880. In doing so, we held that a related statute, Article 27, section 36, which prohibits the concealed wearing or carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon, or the wearing or carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon openly with intent to injure, embodied the Legislature's intent that the trier of fact determine objectively whether the facts supported that an object was used as a dangerous or deadly weapon: One aspect of context is the relationship [of the statute under consideration] to earlier and subsequent legislation.... Wynn [ v. State ], 313 Md. [533,] 539, 546 A.2d [465,] 468 [ (1988) ] (quoting Kaczorowski [ v. Mayor of Baltimore ], 309 Md. [505,] 515, 525 A.2d [628,] 632-633 [ (1987) ]). On the statute books when Chapter 457, Acts of 1927, was enacted, [creating section 488,] was the predecessor to Article 27, § 36. In 1927, that provision was Article 27, § 42, and it read thus: Every person who shall wear or carry any pistol, dirk-knife, bowie knife, slung shot, billy, sand club, metal knuckles, razor, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind whatsoever (pen knives excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any such weapon openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. This statute gives us an indication of what sort of implements the legislature believed to be dangerous or deadly weapons. It is apparent that the term encompasses only those devices that are inherently dangerous or deadly or that may be used with dangerous or deadly effect. See Walker v. State, 53 Md.App. 171, 204, 452 A.2d 1234, 1251 (1982), cert. denied, 296 Md. 63 (1983). As in the case of § 488, we have held that an unloaded pistol is covered. Wallace v. Warden, 226 Md. 670, 174 A.2d 435 (1961). So is a starter's pistol. Jackson [ v. State ], 231 Md. 591, 191 A.2d 432 [(1963) ]. But § 36 was not aimed at minimizing intimidation of victims. A victim or potential victim cannot be intimidated by the carrying of a concealed weapon. It was designed to penalize those who had in their possession, with evil intent, instruments that were likely to be used to inflict serious or deadly injury. In short, the objective approach to determining what was dangerous or deadly was embodied in this statute. It is not unreasonable to assume that the legislature that adopted what is now § 488 transported into that statute the dangerous and deadly language of old § 42, intending it to carry the same meaning as it then bore. Id. at 599-600, 552 A.2d at 879-80 (first alteration in original). Based on the previous cases concerning dangerous or deadly weapons, we developed three objective tests, only one of which need be satisfied, to determine that an object used during the commission of a robbery was a dangerous or deadly weapon: [F]or an instrument to qualify as a dangerous or deadly weapon under § 488, the instrument must be (1) designed as `anything used or designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an enemy, or as an instrument of offensive or defensive combat,' Bennett [ v. State ], 237 Md. [212,] 214-215, 205 A.2d [393,] 394 [ (1964) ]; (2) under the circumstances of the case, immediately useable to inflict serious or deadly harm ( e.g., unloaded gun or starter's pistol useable as a bludgeon); or (3) actually used in a way likely to inflict that sort of harm ( e.g., microphone cord used as a garrote). Id. at 600, 552 A.2d at 880. [2] Petitioner asks this Court to hold that pepper spray per se is not a dangerous weapon under all three of the Brooks objective tests. It is for the trial court to determine initially, as a matter of law, whether an object can be considered a deadly or dangerous weapon under any of the Brooks categories. If the trial court is satisfied that an object can fit into any of the Brooks tests, then the trier of fact is left to determine whether the criminal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, actually occurred. Some of the cases assuming the potential deadly or dangerous nature of objects, have addressed only the issue of whether the facts support the use of such weapons, and have done so in a less than complete analysis of which issues are matters of law for the court and which are purely factual matters. They have nonetheless supported the general proposition that factual matters are for the trier of fact. In arriving at the correct bottom line holdings, the language of the opinions has sometimes missed the intervening step we have described above, and further discuss, infra. The cases include: People v. Davis, 42 Cal.App.4th 806, 819, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 890, 898 (1996) (noting that certain weapons, as a matter of law, may be classified as per se deadly or dangerous for the purposes of first-degree robbery and that whether other weapons that are not weapons in the strict sense, yet may become such according to the manner of use, were used as such is a question of fact); People v. Elliott, 299 Ill.App.3d 766, 773, 234 Ill.Dec. 303, 702 N.E.2d 643, 647 (1998) (recognizing that if the trial court is unable to determine as a matter of law that an object per se is a dangerous or deadly weapon or that it per se can never be categorized as such, then the jury must decide whether the object, in that case, actually was used or usable as a deadly or dangerous weapon); Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367 Mass. 411, 416, 326 N.E.2d 710, 714 (1975) ([W]here the instrumentality is not per se harm-inducing it is a question of fact ... whether the circumstances surrounding the presence of the instrumentality suggest its latent character as dangerous.); State v. Howard, 125 N.J.Super. 39, 45, 308 A.2d 366, 369 (App.Div.1973) (holding that a straight razor is neither per se a lethal weapon or per se excluded from that categorization as a matter of law, but can be a lethal weapon if used as such under the facts of the case); State v. Bonner, 118 Ohio App.3d 815, 823, 694 N.E.2d 125, 131 (1997) (holding that a robbery while the defendant held a metal bludgeon constituted sufficient evidence as a matter of law to submit the issue to the jury of whether the bludgeon was actually used for the purposes of aggravated robbery); Beeler v. State, 334 P.2d 799, 806 (Okla. Crim.App.1959) (noting that it is for the jury to decide whether weapons that are not clearly lethal, but are capable of being so used, were actually used in a manner to produce death or great bodily harm). The issue of whether an object not dangerous or deadly per se may nevertheless be usable in a dangerous and deadly manner is a matter of law for the court to determine. The issue of whether use of the object in the particular way in which the State alleges it to have been used constitutes the commission of a crime, e.g., robbery with a deadly or dangerous weapon, is also a matter of law for the court to determine. An example of how a trial court might perform this duty could be an instruction informing the jury that if a particular object is used in a particular way, it is being used as a dangerous or deadly weapon for the purpose of whatever criminal statute or offense is at issue. The issue for the trier of fact is whether the evidence supports, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the facts alleged by the State have happened. If the objects are not susceptible of being used as deadly or dangerous weapons, or if the alleged facts, if true, do not constitute the commission of the crime charged, the trial court, upon proper motion, should dismiss or grant an acquittal of that charge. Only if the objects are, or are susceptible to being, dangerous or deadly weapons, and only if the facts alleged and the evidence in support thereof would permit, as a matter of law, a finding that the particular crime has been committed, should the jury normally be permitted to determine whether those facts did occur. In Brooks, 314 Md. at 600-01, 552 A.2d at 880, for instance, this Court held, as a matter of law, that a lightweight plastic toy gun generally may not be classified as a deadly or dangerous weapon under the tests enunciated by the Court. The spraying of pepper spray into a person's face for the purpose of facilitating a robbery of that person is, as a matter of law, the use of a dangerous and deadly weapon in the commission of robbery because pepper spray may be classified as a deadly or dangerous weapon under any of the three Brooks categories. Petitioner argues that pepper spray does not fall under the first category, instruments used or designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an enemy, or as an instrument of offensive or defensive combat, Brooks, 314 Md. at 600, 552 A.2d at 880, because pepper spray is designed to temporarily disable an attacker to provide a means of hasty escape [and] is designed not to cause serious bodily injury or death. Although this Court has never addressed whether pepper spray could fall under this first category of weapons, other jurisdictions have done so for various reasons. The great majority of these courts hold that pepper spray, as a matter of law, can be used as a dangerous weapon, including when it is used during the commission of a robbery. For instance, in People v. Norris, 236 Mich.App. 411, 600 N.W.2d 658 (1999), the defendant sprayed several employees of a jewelry store with a mixture of tear gas and pepper spray during a robbery. The employees testified to numerous maladies: extreme eye pain and irritation, burning sensations on the skin and in the nose, mouth, and lungs, and breathing difficulties. One of the victims suffered a cornea defect in both eyes.... Id. at 412-13, 600 N.W.2d at 660. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that these types of injuries were sufficient enough to classify the tear gas and pepper spray mixture as a dangerous weapon under Michigan's armed robbery statute. Id. at 418-19, 600 N.W.2d at 662-63. In United States v. Neill, 166 F.3d 943, 949-50 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1153, 119 S.Ct. 2037, 143 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1999), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that pepper spray was a dangerous weapon for the purpose of increasing a bank robbery sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines. The court noted that, under the federal guidelines, dangerous weapons are those that inflict serious bodily injury, which means extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.... Id. at 949 (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 cmt. 1(j) (1997)). The court noted that one victim testified that she choked and coughed during the attack, while her eyes and nose burned. She suffered asthma attacks for a week after the incident. Because the pepper spray caused extreme pain and prolonged impairment of the victim's lungs, the court held it was proper to increase the defendant's sentence for the use of a dangerous weapon. Id. at 950. See also Elliott, 299 Ill.App.3d at 773, 234 Ill.Dec. 303, 702 N.E.2d at 648 (holding that the use of pepper spray during a bank robbery constituted use of a dangerous weapon when the victims experienced difficulty breathing, nausea, and burning in the eyes); cf. United States v. Taylor, 135 F.3d 478, 481-82 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that bodily harm caused by the use of pepper spray on several victims was sufficient to increase the sentence under the federal guidelines); United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 278-79 (7th Cir.1994) (same). Mace and tear gas, which cause similar effects as pepper spray, [3] have also been treated as dangerous weapons in courts of other jurisdictions. In United States v. Dukovich, 11 F.3d 140 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1111, 114 S.Ct. 2112, 128 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994), the government sought a sentence enhancement under the federal guidelines because the defendant had sprayed tear gas in the air during a bank robbery. The Eleventh Circuit noted that one victim experienced eye pain and a severe headache, that the gas made everyone in the bank tear up, and that a teller was struck near her left eye, causing a severe burning sensation. Id. at 142. The court agreed that the tear gas constituted a dangerous weapon for sentencing purposes. Id. The Eighth Circuit also held in United States v. Bartolotta, 153 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S.Ct. 850, 142 L.Ed.2d 703 (1999), that the defendant's act of spraying mace on two victims during an attempted robbery of an armored car, which caused them serious bodily injury, was proved sufficiently to enhance the sentence for use of a dangerous weapon. See also United States v. Brown, 508 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir.1974) (noting that the defendant could be convicted for attempting to board an aircraft with a concealed dangerous weapon when he possessed a tear gas gun in his suitcase); State v. Johnson, 730 So.2d 1035, 1038 (La.Ct.App.1999) (affirming a conviction for armed robbery with a dangerous weapon when the defendant blinded a correctional officer with mace and took his billfold); Barrett v. State, 105 Nev. 361, 361-62, 775 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (1989) (upholding a sentence enhancement for using a deadly weapon when the defendant sprayed a robbery victim with mace); Pitts v. State, 649 P.2d 788, 791 (Okla. Crim.App.1982) (holding that a can of mace used to threaten a robbery victim was a dangerous weapon under Oklahoma's aggravated robbery statute); cf. Hartman v. State, 403 So.2d 1030, 1031 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (holding that the defendant was properly convicted of armed robbery when the weapon was a can of mace). [4] These cases indicate that pepper spray, mace, and tear gas canisters generally are designed in such a way that they may fit within the first category of Brooks. We agree with the bottom line of the cases mentioned, supra. We, however, believe that when, as a matter of law, an object or substance can be used as a deadly or dangerous weapon, the potential for bodily harm suffices, regardless of the extent of resulting harm in an actual case. For example, if a person threatens to use pepper spray or attempts to use pepper spray but misses the victim's respiratory system or eyes, striking him on the shoulder or chest, but nonetheless successfully completes the robbery, or attempts to complete it, he or she has committed robbery with a deadly or dangerous weapon, just as if the offender had committed a robbery by simply displaying a handgun, or by simply discharging a handgun, but missing the victim. Next, we consider whether pepper spray falls under the second and third Brooks categories, whether under the circumstances of the case, the weapon was immediately useable to inflict serious ... harm, or whether it was actually used in a way likely to inflict that sort of harm. 314 Md. at 600, 552 A.2d at 880. Petitioner implies that the use of pepper spray in this case was not dangerous because the victim's injuries were not permanent or protracted, i.e., the effect of the pepper spray did not cause Mr. Sparks serious physical harm. He cites Article 27, section 12(c) (1998 Cum.Supp.), which defines serious physical injury for the purposes of first-degree assault: (c) Serious physical injury. Serious physical injury means physical injury which: .... (3) Causes serious ... protracted loss of the function of any bodily member or organ; or (4) Causes serious ... protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Assuming that petitioner's reference to the definition of this statute is correct, [5] the use of the pepper spray in the case sub judice did in fact cause the victim to suffer protracted loss or impairment of his vision. Mr. Sparks testified that he was blinded by the pepper spray for several hours and experienced a burning sensation in his eyes: Q [State's Attorney]. You say he attacked you with pepper spray. What, if anything, did he do with that spray? A [Mr. Sparks]. He continued to spray me. I tried to wrestle him with my right hand, which was my free hand. My other hand had my bag and my other mail in it. Q. What, if any, part of your body did he spray? A. My eyes, and he continued to spray as we wrestled a little bit. I fell to the ground. And when I fell to the ground, he picked up a bundle of my mail and took off. Q. Now, sir, how did you know it was a spray that he used? What, if any, familiarity do you have with that kind of A. It burns on contact of the eyes. We have a similar type [of] spray that I carry at all times for dogs. .... Q. What kind of injuries did you receive, sir? A. The pepper spray just simply blinded me for several hours. I had to keep water going in them to try and clear them up. .... Q. Okay. And at the point that you're sprayed, what effect does that have on you physically? ... A. You're trying to open your eyes, but it's spraying and it's burning.... Q. Okay, so it has a temporary effect which is basically to impair your vision. A. Little more than temporary. It lasts for a while. It lasts for quite a few minutes afterwards. This testimony produced legally sufficient evidence that the pepper spray allegedly used by petitioner was used as a dangerous weapon under the second and third Brooks tests. Whether the pepper spray was actually used by the petitioner to rob Mr. Sparks depended on whether the jury believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimony of the witnesses that the defendant sprayed pepper spray on the victim and then robbed him. We note that in Davis v. State, 225 Md. 45, 168 A.2d 884 (1961), the defendants argued that the State could not prove that the handgun they used was loaded, and thus deadly, during the robbery in question. There was eyewitness testimony that they showed a handgun to the victims to intimidate them in perpetration of the robbery. We held that because the defendants made no effort to rebut the prima facie proof that the weapon used in the robbery was dangerous or deadly, the jury properly could have found that it was [so used]. Id. at 47, 168 A.2d at 885 (emphasis added). The Davis Court apparently agreed with the trial court that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to decide the issue of whether the defendants actually used the weapon to commit the robbery. Cf. Wadlow v. State, 335 Md. 122, 129, 642 A.2d 213, 216 (1994) ([R]obbery is ordinarily characterized as one offense, with the division between armed robbery and simple robbery being for the purpose of punishment, but the ... determination of the seriousness of the offense is for the trier of fact. (citation omitted)). Other courts have also reserved for the determination of the trier of fact the issue of whether an object, which is deadly or dangerous as a matter of law if used as alleged, actually was so used during the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784, 788 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 833, 116 S.Ct. 107, 133 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995); United States v. Riggins, 40 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1433 (7th Cir.1993); Gooch v. State, 652 So.2d 1189, 1191 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.), review denied, 659 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 1995); State v. Bafford, 255 Kan. 888, 897, 879 P.2d 613, 620 (1994); Norris, 236 Mich.App. at 415, 600 N.W.2d at 661; Duckworth v. State, 477 So.2d 935, 938 (Miss.1985); State v. Smallwood, 78 N.C.App. 365, 369, 337 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1985); State v. Bennett, 328 S.C. 251, 262, 493 S.E.2d 845, 851 (S.C.1997); Triplett v. State, 686 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Tex.App.1985, pet.ref'd), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939, 950 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); see also 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, § 197, at 469 (CBC 1994). The jury obviously believed that the pepper spray was actually used in the commission of a robbery under the facts of the case. We find no error in that determination. See Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 201, 246 A.2d 568, 579 (1968) ([T]he Court of Appeals does not weigh the evidence presented to the jury, but only determines its sufficiency to take a particular issue, or the entire case, to the jury. To set aside the jury's verdict we must be able to say there was no legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 948, 89 S.Ct. 1284, 22 L.Ed.2d 482 (1969); Braxton v. State, 123 Md.App. 599, 657, 720 A.2d 27, 55 (1998) (We defer to the factual findings of the jury....). As noted, supra, courts in other jurisdictions have held that pepper spray or mace was used as a dangerous weapon when the victims suffered injuries similar to those experienced by Mr. Sparks in this case.