Opinion ID: 2453491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The district court's order declining to set aside the default

Text: The family court denied Landreth's motion to set aside the default and entered default judgment against Landreth, finding that Malik had offered Landreth numerous opportunities to answer but that her delay warranted the entry of a default judgment. However, in its order, the court did not discuss whether Landreth received proper notice of Malik's intent to seek default under RPC 3.5A and this court's decision in Rowland. Although it is undisputed that Malik first served Landreth with notice on December 14, 2006, the court did not address the additional extensions of time Malik granted Landreth after the initial December 14 notice or Malik's failure to send Landreth a second notice after granting the additional extensions. Our reasoning in Rowland that an attorney should determine the opposing party's intent to proceed in a lawsuit before seeking defaultapplies equally to subsequent and additional extensions of time to file responsive pleadings as it does to initial grants of extensions. RPC 3.5A and Rowland require a party to determine its opponent's intent to respond before requesting a default. Malik failed to do so in this case. Although he admitted that he granted further time for Landreth to file an answer after serving her with a notice of intent to seek default, Malik failed to provide her with a subsequent notice of intent to seek default before filing a request for default from the district court. Therefore, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying Landreth's motion to set aside the default under NRCP 55(c).