Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Salameh's Summation

Text: 71 We find no prejudice to Abouhalima arising from Salameh's summation.  '[M]utually antagonistic' or 'irreconcilable' defenses may be so prejudicial in some circumstances as to mandate severance. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. 933. In order to make a showing of mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses, the defendant must make a factual demonstration that acceptance of one party's defense would tend to preclude the acquittal of [the] other. United States v. Smith, 788 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 765 (7th Cir.1985). However, [m]utually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se. Moreover, Rule 14 does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39, 113 S.Ct. 933; see, e.g., id. at 540-41, 113 S.Ct. 933 (where two co-defendants both claim they are innocent and each accuses the other of the crime, district court did not err in denying motion for severance). The risk of prejudice will vary with the facts in each case ... [and w]hen the risk of prejudice is high, a district court is more likely to determine that separate trials are necessary, but, as [the Supreme Court] indicated in Richardson v. Marsh, less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. Id. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933.  '[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.'  Id. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933 (citation omitted). 72 Throughout the trial in this case, all four defendants challenged the government's case without attempting to accuse one another. Unlike Abouhalima, during summation Salameh abandoned his trial strategy of disputing that a bomb had caused the explosion and argued that he was nothing more that an unwitting dupe of Yousef, who had masterminded the bombing. While the defense asserted by Salameh was, in the end, inconsistent with Abouhalima's defense, at no time did Salameh argue or suggest that Abouhalima was involved in the bombing, or directly contradict Abouhalima's defense strategy. Salameh and Abouhalima both claimed to be innocent of the charges and neither's claim of innocence required the jury to find the other guilty. 73 Consequently, because there was nothing directly antagonistic between the two defense theories so as to create mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses, we perceive no ground for reversal based on the court's denial of severance. Furthermore, any possible prejudice was eliminated by the district court's repeated admonitions to the jury that each defendant's guilt had to be separately and individually considered. 3 See, e.g., Hernandez, 85 F.3d at 1029-30 (rejecting claim of prejudicial spillover where the district court instructed the jury that it was required to consider the evidence against each defendant individually for each count); United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir.1982) (same). 74 Moreover, to the extent that Salameh's summation may have undermined Abouhalima's defense by indirectly linking him to Yousef, any possible prejudice was cured by the district court's jury instruction that [m]ere association with other people that you found are members of the conspiracy is not enough for you to find a person to be a member ... [even] a person who has knowledge of a conspiracy and all of its ramifications and does nothing about it is not a co-conspirator.... [It's] got to be an intentional joining of the conspiracy. In light of this instruction, we find no error.