Opinion ID: 23919
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Order Denying Post-Verdict Access to Juror Information

Text: 31 The News Media assert that there is no compelling reason justifying continued secrecy about the jurors. In particular, they submit that the district court's reason for not releasing jurors' names and addresses - its promise of confidentiality - is insufficient, and the severe restriction on the News Media's ability to contact jurors is not narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the administration of justice. Since the judicial system is presumptively open, access to information about jurors cannot be denied absent extraordinary circumstances. We disagree with this characterization of the court's reasoning, the News Media's interpretation of the scope of the court's order, and their reading of caselaw. 32 Tensions between First Amendment rights and the right of an accused to trial by an impartial jury frequently develop in a sensational case like this. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 551, 96 S.Ct. at 2799. While a denial of access to confidential court information may hamper newsgathering, this burden is thought to be incidental when strong governmental interests are involved. Gurney, 558 F.2d at 1209. Ensuring that jurors are entitled to privacy and protection against harassment, even after their jury duty has ended, qualifies as such an interest in this circuit. United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.3d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983); Express News, 695 F.2d at 810; Gurney, 558 F.2d at 1210 n.12 ([T]he judge was following a well-established practice when he refused to publicly release the jury list, which included the names, addresses, and other personal information about the jurors. Such protection of the privacy of the jurors was clearly permissible, and certainly appropriate in a trial which attracted public attention as this one did.). 17 The judge's power to prevent harassment and protect juror privacy does not cease when the case ends. Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1117; see also United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 120 (5th Cir. 1987)([A]lthough post-trial restrictions on news gathering must be narrowly tailored, the jurors are entitled to privacy and protection from harassment even after completing their duties.). 33 The News Media preliminarily complain that the district court did not issue findings that support continued juror anonymity. Specific findings are not required in this circuit where the reasons for the court's decision are obvious and compelling. In a case where a district court placed restrictions on proposed interviews with discharged jurors, this court stated that there was no need for the district court judge to hold hearings 18 before issuing such an order, especially in a highly publicized case. Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1117. A federal judge is not the mere moderator of a jury trial; he is its governor for the purpose of insuring its proper conduct. Id. The trial court has broad discretion, 'based on law and on his own and common experience,' over aspects of the trial concerning the 'handling of jurors,' e.g. sequestration, juror access to information, and 'harassment of jurors. Edwards, 823 F.2d at 116 (quoting Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1117); see also Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1209 (Within this discretion, therefore, the district judge can place restrictions on parties, jurors, lawyers, and others involved with the proceedings despite the fact that such restrictions might affect First Amendment considerations.). The district court's order maintaining a level of post-verdict juror anonymity must be placed in context. It rests on an earlier promise of anonymity, which itself was grounded in well-documented threats by the media and the defendants to jurors' privacy and independence. The drumbeat of publicity surrounding the Edwards prosecutions continues to this day. Requiring the court to recite such details and repeat obvious facts would be a meaningless exercise. 19 34 Turning to the scope of the court's order, the News Media overlook that this court refused, in Harrelson, to hold that a district judge abused his discretion by banning repeated requests for post-trial juror interviews where jurors expressed a desire not to be interviewed. Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1118. There is little practical difference between the Harrelson order and the district court's order in the instant case. Here, the district judge polled the jurors before releasing them from service to ask whether they wished to have their names made public. None desired to waive anonymity. The judge informed the jurors that if anyone later wanted to have his identity released, he could do so. Both orders, though slightly different in mechanism, have the same effect; they protect the jurors from unwanted harassment. As this court has observed: 35 [c]ommon sense tells us that a juror who has once indicated a desire to be let alone and to put the matter of his jury service behind him by declining to be interviewed regarding it is unlikely to change his mind; and if he does, he is always free to initiate an interview. The court's order does no more than forbid nagging him into doing so. 36 Id. at 1118. Moreover, the district court's order does not ban all media interaction with the jurors, it just allows the jurors to signal their willingness to submit to media contact. 20 Significantly, at least one juror was interviewed following the conclusion of the trial. 37 The News Media rely principally on this court's decision, In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982), to challenge the district court's post-verdict order limiting jury contact. In Express-News, we vacated a district court rule that categorically forbade interviews of any juror concerning the deliberations or the jury verdict, except by leave of court granted upon good cause shown. Id. at 807. Such a restriction could not be imposed on newsgathering unless it is narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the administration of justice. 695 F.2d at 810. 38 Express-News marks only the beginning of this court's series of cases on post-verdict access to jurors, however. Recently, this court upheld an order limiting access to jurors. See United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1997). There, the judge instructed the jurors that they had no obligation to speak to anyone about the case. In addition, she instructed that absent a special order by me, no juror may be interviewed by anyone concerning the deliberations of the jury. I also instruct you that the lawyers and the parties are not to attempt to question you without an order from me. The order was held sufficiently narrow because it applied only to interviews with the jurors themselves and only concerning their deliberations, but did not apply to the verdict itself. Id. at 269. The order did not foreclose questions about a juror's general reactions, id., nor did it prevent jurors from speaking out on their own initiative. Id. Also in contrast to Express-News, the order did not impose restrictions on post-verdict interviews and then condition those restrictions by requiring those who would speak freely to justify special treatment by carrying the burden of showing good cause. Id. at 270 (quoting Express-News, 695 F.2d at 810). That the order was unlimited in time was not in itself dispositive, because we previously upheld similar restrictions in Harrelson, supra. Likewise, the fact that the order applied equally to jurors willing to speak and to those desiring privacy was not decisive. Cleveland was distinguishable from Express News because it attracted a great deal of media coverage. Id. 39 The district court's order denying the request for juror identifying information and questionnaires in this case is analogous to the order upheld in Cleveland. The order is sufficiently narrow. It has no requirement for a showing of good cause for conducting post-verdict interviews. It merely states that the court will not release juror information without the juror's consent. The judge affirmatively asked the jurors whether they wished to relinquish their privacy. 21 Any juror may, at any time, voluntarily decide to relinquish his confidentiality. The only restriction placed on such interviews is the court's instruction that jurors may not be interviewed concerning juror deliberations absent a special order from the judge. This is consistent with our understanding that [c]ompelling governmental interest[s] in the integrity of jury deliberation require that the privacy of such deliberations and communications dealing with time be preserved. Gurney, 558 F.2d at 1210-11. 40 According to this circuit's established caselaw, protecting jurors from post-verdict harassment and invasions of privacy is a legitimate concern. The measures used by the district court, while at the outer limit of permissible restrictions, were narrowly tailored to prevent real threats to the administration of justice, not just in this case but in the subsequent related prosecutions. If jurors voluntarily waive their anonymity and consent to interviews on matters other than jury deliberations, so be it. They need not become unwilling pawns in the frenzied media battle over these cases. 41 The News Media finally contend that they do not desire simply juror interviews but the basic information revealed by the jurors' names, addresses and still-confidential questionnaires. Juror anonymity, in other words, should have ceased when the trial ended. No caselaw requires this result, and the question appears closely tied to the rationale for initially convening an anonymous jury, an order they did not appeal. Threats of intimidation and harassment do not necessarily end with the conclusion of trial. In these prosecutions, several post-verdict motions have assailed jurors' conduct; without continuing anonymity, jurors would remain vulnerable to abuse by those acting for the defendants. There may be cases where a district court would abuse its discretion by refusing to revoke an order of juror anonymity post-trial, but this is not one of them.