Opinion ID: 623364
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of the Search and Arrest

Text: The Fourth Amendment protects the public from unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const. amend. IV, including unreasonable investigatory stop[s] or detentions, United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010). Because a routine traffic stop is `more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest,' the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), guide this Court's determination as to the reasonableness of a traffic stop. Kitchell, 653 F.3d at 1216 (quoting United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir.2001) (A traffic stop, however brief, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ...). Under the Fourth Amendment, the determination of whether an investigatory detention is constitutional entails a two-step analysis: the detention is reasonable if it is (1) `justified at its inception' and (2) `reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004)). A traffic stop is [justified at its inception] ... if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995) (en banc). [A] traffic stop may be expanded beyond its original purpose if during the initial stop the detaining officer acquires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, that is to say the officer must acquire a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity, Kitchell, 653 F.3d at 1217-18 (quoting White, 584 F.3d at 949) (internal quotation marks omitted), or, on the other hand, if the initial detention has become a consensual encounter, Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1349. In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we must look to the totality of the circumstances, rather than assessing each factor or piece of evidence in isolation, United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 1068 (10th Cir.2010); [n]o one factor is determinative, United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (10th Cir.2007). When making our assessment, deference is to be accorded a law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions, United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir.1997), and we need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct, United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [W]e consider the reasonableness of an officer's actions using an `objective standard.' United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 519 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir.2008)). Under this objective standard, we ask whether `the facts available' to the detaining officer, at the time, warranted an officer of `reasonable caution' in believing `the action taken was appropriate.' Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Because an investigatory detention must be justified at its inception, DeJear, 552 F.3d at 1200, we must first pinpoint the moment when Mr. McGehee was seized. The parties agree that the traffic stop constituted the initial seizure, and commenced at the point when Officer Holloway turned on his emergency equipment and walked up to the vehicle to interact with the driver. We are content to proceed in our analysis on the basis of the parties' agreement on this matter. Although Mr. McGehee does not dispute that at one point the vehicle was parked illegally, he nevertheless contends that there was no legal basis to conduct a traffic stop on conduct which had already been corrected. Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. Because the Lexus was no longer parked illegally by the time Officer Holloway arrived at the driver's-side window, Mr. McGehee reasons that there was no further basis for the stop. This argument lacks merit. It is well-settled that [a]n initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment... if based on an observed traffic violation. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1348. Moreover, it is also permissible where an officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring. Id. (emphasis added). Mr. McGehee points to no cases lending direct support to his argument that subsequent corrective conduct alters or negates the ability of law enforcement to issue citations for offenses that already have been committed. He relies only upon cases where we have held that police may not detain an individual based upon a suspicion that the person has committed a traffic offense, when actually the purported offense is not a state-law violationi.e., where the officer has committed a mistake of law. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that there was no basis to support a traffic stop where one instance of crossing into an emergency lane was not a violation of Utah law). Here, Officer Holloway made no mistake of lawthe Lexus in which Mr. McGehee was sitting was illegally parked, and the officer was entitled to conduct a traffic stop in order to issue a citation. Accordingly, the initial stop was valid. Mr. McGehee also suggests that [t]he officers expanded the stop beyond its original purpose without the prerequisite suspicion of additional criminal activity. Aplt. Opening Br. at 14. He reasons that, after Officer Holloway obtained his identification information, and discovered that there were no active warrants outstanding, he should have issued a traffic citation and allowed the parties to proceed. Id. As noted, however, a longer detention is permissible where, inter alia, the detaining officer acquires reasonable suspicion of [further] criminal activity. Kitchell, 653 F.3d at 1217-18 (quoting White, 584 F.3d at 949) (internal quotation marks omitted). To begin, we note that Officer Holloway encountered the vehicle in which Mr. McGehee was an occupant in front of a residence known to be associated with drug-trafficking. Officer Holloway was not obliged to ignore this fact in interacting with the vehicle's occupants regarding the traffic violation and, in combination with other suspicious factors, this fact objectively supported Officer's Holloway's belief that the occupants were engaged in criminal conduct. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. (citation omitted)); accord United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir.2005). As for other suspicious factors, notably, Mr. McGehee pays little attention to the fact that Officer Holloway immediately smelled PCP upon arriving at the driver's-side window of the vehicle. PCP emits [a] very distinct odor. R., Vol. 2, at 11. Based on Officer Holloway's on-the-job experience and trainingincluding having made roughly ten to [fifteen] actual arrests in crimes involving PCP, id. he knew immediately upon making contact with the driver that PCP was probably inside the vehicle. At that point, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is beyond peradventure that Officer Holloway had reasonable, articulable suspicion that further criminal conduct was occurring. See United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir.1999) (Deputy Justice had[] ... reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring based upon the PCP smell emanating from [the defendant's] bag.); see also United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that detection of the odor of PCP emanating from [the defendant's] person gave the officers the authority to detain [him] temporarily to determine his identity). Indeed, Officer Holloway may well have had probable cause to believe that a narcotics offense was being committed. See, e.g., United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (An officer's detection of the smell of drugs, such as methamphetamine, in a car is entitled to substantial weight in the probable cause analysis and can be an independently sufficient basis for probable cause.) (collecting cases); United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir.1991) (noting that, much more than reasonable suspicion, the smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage). However, we need not definitively decide that point. What is clear is that Officer Holloway was justified in expanding the scope of the initial encounter to ascertain whether the vehicle's occupants were engaging in criminal conduct relating to narcotics. Shortly after smelling the PCP, Officer Holloway noticed in plain view a vanilla-extract bottle lodged in the driver's-side door. R., Vol. 2, at 22. Based on his experience, he recognized this as a container in which PCP is commonly stored. At that juncture, even if it was not present before, there was probable cause to search the vehicle for controlled substances. See United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 690 (10th Cir.2002) ([I]f an officer has lawfully observed an object of incriminating character in plain view in a vehicle, that observation, either alone or in combination with additional facts, has been held sufficient to allow the officer to conduct a probable cause search of the vehicle.); see also United States v. Oliver, 363 F.3d 1061, 1068 (10th Cir.2004) (collecting cases); cf. United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725-26 (10th Cir.1992) (concluding that there was probable cause to seize and search a package believed to contain cocaine although the package was opaque and its contents not readily visible because the incriminating character of the package was immediately apparent to the veteran police officer). Moreover, at least when coupled with his plain-view observation shortly thereafter of Mr. McGehee kicking a ... handgun underneath the seat with [the] right heel of his foot, R., Vol. 2, at 25, the factual circumstances provided sufficient probable cause for Officer Holloway to arrest Mr. McGehee. That is, this information provided Officer Holloway with facts and circumstances... that would lead a reasonable person to believe that an offense ha[d] been or [was] being committed by [Mr. McGehee]. United States v. Brooks, 438 F.3d 1231, 1241 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 792 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In many instances, as here, an officer may reasonably conclude, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that illegal drugs discovered in a vehicle in close proximity to a defendant in the vehicle are jointly or constructively possessed by that defendant and the other vehicle occupants. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (concluding that there was probable cause to arrest a defendant where, notably, there were [f]ive plastic glassine baggies of cocaine... behind the back-seat armrest ... accessible to all three men riding in the vehicle and [u]pon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine); United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir.2000) (concluding that the government established the necessary nexus between the driver of the jointly occupied vehicle and the narcotics and, more specifically, noting that [t]he observance of drugs in plain view is a compelling circumstance from which knowledge may be inferred); cf. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that defendant's proximity to the drugs would be insufficient evidence [of possession], when considered in isolation, ... [b]ut when considered with the rest of the evidence presented, his close proximity to the drugs is probative (emphases added)). Mr. McGehee's furtive efforts to conceal the firearm could meaningfully contribute to an officer's reasonable conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that Mr. McGehee was engaged in criminal conduct. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) ([D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest.); United States v. McCarty, 862 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir.1988) (concluding that there was probable cause to believe that [defendant] was a convicted felon who possessed a firearm and observing that his furtive gesture when he was stopped, reinforced the reasonableness of the officers' belief that [he] had committed or was committing a crime); United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309, 1312 (8th Cir.1980) (holding that there was probable cause to arrest defendant and that defendant's furtive movement and his contemporaneous facial expression provided support for that result); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(d), at 351 (2004) (Observation of what reasonably appear to be furtive gestures is a factor which may properly be taken into account in determining whether probable cause exists.). More specifically, on these facts, Mr. McGehee's furtive conduct involving firearms would have meaningfully contributed to probable cause to believe that Mr. McGehee was committing a narcotics-related offense. Officer Holloway already had a legally sound basis for believing that there were narcotics in the vehicle. And, we have long recognized the close association between firearms and drug-trafficking. See, e.g., Winder, 557 F.3d at 1138 (suggesting that firearms are commonly regarded as tools of the drug trade (citing United States v. Burkley, 513 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.2008))); see also United States v. Vanover, 630 F.3d 1108, 1118 (8th Cir.2011) (noting that drug dealers commonly use firearms for intimidation and protection). Finally, the evidence found on Mr. McGehee's person was obtained properly pursuant to a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338-39, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). In sum, at no point from the initial stop through the time of Mr. McGehee's arrest was the Fourth Amendment violated. For that reason, the district court properly denied Mr. McGehee's motion to suppress.