Opinion ID: 2967845
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nature of an Alford Plea

Text: Finally, Reid contends that counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to ensure that he understood the nature of an Alford plea.11 The district court held a hearing on this portion of the ineffec11 In connection with this claim, Reid argues that one of his attorneys misrepresented his experience with capital cases and was in fact not qualified to serve as lead counsel in a capital case. Even accepting Reid’s allegations as true, the fact remains that, for the reasons explained in the text, counsel were not constitutionally defective. REID v. TRUE 17 tive assistance claim. During the hearing, Reid testified that trial counsel urged him to make the Alford plea, telling him that the worst sentence he could receive under such a plea would be life without parole and that he might even be eligible for geriatric parole. J.A. 395. Reid further asserted that counsel failed to explain to him that an Alford plea was a guilty plea and that counsel told him he would be ineligible for the death penalty under such a plea. This testimony was contradicted by one of Reid’s attorneys,12 who testified that he and his co-counsel explained the nature of an Alford plea to Reid and members of his family.13 Reid offered additional evidence of counsel’s ineffectiveness in a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), filed on the day he filed a notice of appeal from the ruling of the district court. The new evidence consisted of an order of the disciplinary board of the Virginia state bar directing the attorney to change his status to disabled. This ruling was based, in part, on misrepresentations by the attorney that were related to Reid’s case. The district court denied the motion to vacate, Reid appealed, and that appeal was consolidated with this proceeding. It is not clear whether Reid’s motion was a proper Rule 60(b) motion or, rather, should have been treated as an application for leave, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b) (West Supp. 2003), to file a second or successive habeas application. See United States v. Winestock, ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 1949822, at  & n.6 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2003). Regardless of how the motion is construed, however, Reid is not entitled to relief. 12 Reid’s other attorney did not testify at the hearing. 13 Reid contends that counsel’s testimony could not possibly be true because counsel himself did not understand the nature of an Alford plea. In support of this contention, Reid points to the fact that following the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, counsel moved to strike the robbery charge on the basis that it was not supported by sufficient evidence. Reid argues that counsel should have known that the motion was improper because the trial court had already accepted Reid’s guilty plea to the robbery charge. Counsel testified, however, that he made the motion because he felt there was nothing to lose by doing so. Additionally, it is worth noting that the impropriety of the motion was not immediately apparent to the trial court. See Transcript, Dec. 4, 1997, at 219 (responding to prosecution’s objection to motion to strike, Well, I think they can still make a motion and the Court will rule on that motion . . . .). 18 REID v. TRUE The attorney’s testimony was corroborated by a letter written by the attorney and signed by Reid shortly before his plea. In pertinent part, the letter stated: We have . . . advised you that you have a right to enter a plea of not guilty, guilty, no contest or enter [an] Alford plea. . . . [Y]ou understand by pleading guilty, no contest or Alford plea you may lose significant rights to appeal and your right to a jury trial. . . . We have all fully discussed how to proceed with this case and [we] have advised you we believe it is best to enter an Alford Plea wherein you do not admit guilt but concede the Commonwealth has enough evidence against you for a conviction. We are therefore going to enter an Alford plea and present evidence on your behalf in mitigation of the offenses to hopefully avoid a death sentence. Supp. App. to State’s Br. 65-66. Moreover, during his plea colloquy Reid informed the judge that he understood the charges against him and his plea options and that he had decided for [him]self to enter an Alford plea. Id. at 3. Reid also responded affirmatively to the question of whether he understood that he could receive the death penalty. Based on the foregoing evidence, the district court found that Reid’s counsel had adequately explained to him the nature of an Alford plea and its consequences, and the court discredited Reid’s contrary testimony. These findings are not clearly erroneous. And, in light of these findings, this aspect of Reid’s challenge to counsel’s effectiveness must fail.