Opinion ID: 147686
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pleading Standards for Pro Se Litigants

Text: In his opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, McAlpine attached a notarized document purporting to show that McAlpine’s father had transferred all of HCC’s stock to him. McAlpine stated that HCC had dissolved and therefore the airplane distributed to him as the sole shareholder. McAlpine did not establish HCC’s dissolution by affidavit or any other competent evidence. In crafting its order, the district court accepted the purported stock transfer, but disregarded the claimed dissolution of HCC. Because the evidence showed that, at most, McAlpine was the sole shareholder of a close corporation, the district court held that McAlpine did not have standing to sue on HCC’s behalf. McAlpine contends that because he did not have counsel, the district court should have considered his statements concerning HCC’s dissolution as proper summary judgment evidence. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, “an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; 4 Case: 09-10407 Document: 00511129562 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/02/2010 No. 09-10407 rather, its response must—by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule—set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)(2). McAlpine argues that, because a party signing a brief certifies that “the factual allegations [made therein] have evidentiary support,” id. 11(b)(3), a pro se party’s brief, to the extent it sets out facts made on personal knowledge, should be considered an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. We have previously held that “[a]lthough pro se litigants are not held to the same standards of compliance with formal or technical pleading rules applied to attorneys, we have never allowed such litigants to oppose summary judgments by the use of unsworn materials.” Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Contrary to McAlpine’s contention, a Rule 11 signature does not swear to the truth of facts in a submission to the court, but only to the belief that they have or will have, after investigation, evidentiary support. F ED. R. C IV. P. 11(b)(3). An affidavit must set out facts, made on personal knowledge, “that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)(1). Signing a pleading or brief is different from swearing to an affidavit. McAlpine relies upon Lewis v. Thigpen, 767 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1985), to support his argument that the rules of procedure should be relaxed for a pro se litigant. In Lewis, a pro se prisoner failed to timely request a jury trial in a damages suit. Id. at 256. Our consideration of the litigant’s failure to request a jury trial in a timely manner depended upon the discretionary function of the district court implicit in Rule 39(b), and we ultimately remanded for a determination of whether the pro se litigant was truly ignorant of his obligation to request a jury trial. Id. at 258–60. The discretion afforded to the district court in Lewis under Rule 39(b) is not present here. Under Rule 56(e)(2), an opposing party “may not” rely on allegations in its own pleadings and “must” set out “specific facts” in affidavits or the supplemental materials described in Rule 5 Case: 09-10407 Document: 00511129562 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/02/2010 No. 09-10407 56(e)(1). Statements made in McAlpine’s responsive pleadings to a motion for summary judgment could not establish a genuine issue of fact. The district court did not err by holding McAlpine to the requirements of Rule 56.