Opinion ID: 2680031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶19] “When a defendant in a criminal case challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of guilt, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder could rationally find 5 This statute was recently amended to provide that the imposition of the assessment may not be waived. See P.L. 2011, ch. 628, § 1 (effective Aug. 30, 2012) (codified at 5 M.R.S. § 3360-I (2012)). 11 every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Haag, 2012 ME 94, ¶ 17, 48 A.3d 207 (quotation marks omitted). “As the fact-finder, the jury is permitted to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial.” Id. For instance, “intent can be inferred from the evidence.” State v. Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 21, 957 A.2d 80. We will vacate a judgment entered upon a jury verdict “only where no trier of fact rationally could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Haag, 2012 ME 94, ¶ 17, 48 A.3d 207 (quotation marks omitted). [¶20] A person commits the Class B crime of theft by deception if “[t]he person obtains or exercises control over property of another as a result of deception and with intent to deprive the other person of the property,” 17-A M.R.S. § 354(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added), and the property is worth more than $10,000, id. § 354(1)(B)(1). “A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when it is the person’s conscious object to cause such a result.” 17-A M.R.S. § 35(1)(A) (2012). [¶21] Two definitions of deception could apply based on the evidence presented here. First, deception occurs when a person intentionally “[c]reates or reinforces an impression that is false and that the person does not believe to be true, including false impressions as to identity, law, value, knowledge, opinion, intention or other state of mind.” 17-A M.R.S. § 354(2)(A) (2012). Alternatively, 12 deception occurs when a person intentionally “[f]ails to correct an impression that is false and that the person does not believe to be true and that . . . [t]he person had previously created or reinforced.” 17-A M.R.S. § 354(2)(B)(1) (2012). [¶22] Here, the State offered evidence that Woodard exercised control over funds that belonged to Maine beverage distributors by intentionally creating the false impression that the beverage containers that he delivered in exchange for those funds had been sold to consumers in Maine. See id. §§ 35(1)(A), 354(1)(A), (2)(A). The State offered circumstantial evidence that, in taking these actions, Woodard did not believe that the containers had originally been sold as full beverage containers to consumers in Maine, with a five-cent deposit collected from the consumer. See id. § 354(2)(A). Specifically, Woodard was aware that Reed was from New Hampshire and delivered containers after hours; he was in contact with Reed by telephone soon after Reed’s bottle delivery was interrupted by law enforcement; he knew that Prybot was from Massachusetts and that Prybot delivered large numbers of containers for redemption without being questioned about their origins; and he understood from signs and cards that the Department of Agriculture required him to post and hand out at Green Bee that containers not sold in Maine were not eligible for redemption. [¶23] Although the trial record does not contain direct evidence that each of the thousands of redeemed containers was from a beverage that was purchased by 13 the consumer outside of Maine, “[a] conviction based on circumstantial evidence is not . . . any less conclusive” of a defendant’s guilt. State v. Deering, 1998 ME 23, ¶ 13, 706 A.2d 582. “A factfinder may draw all reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence, and it is not necessary for the factfinder to eliminate any possible alternative explanation of the evidence . . . .” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Instead, “the question is whether such alternative is sufficiently credible in light of the entire record that it necessarily raises a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a jury to rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Woodard knew the containers were not from beverages sold to consumers in Maine and (2) Woodard nonetheless submitted the containers to distributors, creating the impression that they were from Maine, in order to obtain eight to eight-and-one-half cents per container. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)(A), 354(1)(A), (2)(A). He did not at any time correct this false impression. See 17-A M.R.S. § 354(2)(B). [¶24] Finally, the State offered direct and circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that the funds accepted by Woodard from the distributors for the out-of-state containers exceeded $10,000 in value. See id. § 354(1)(B)(1). Even using the lower three-cent-per-container charge for handling fees, evidence of checks issued to Reed and Prybot from Green Bee could have persuaded the jury of redemptions generating a total of $10,099.68 in refunds and handling fees. The 14 circumstantial evidence was, therefore, sufficient for a jury to rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that Green Bee had redeemed enough out-of-state bottles to have received and taken control of more than $10,000 from distributors. See id. [¶25] There was competent evidence in the record from which a jury could rationally find each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. §§ 35(1)(A), 354(1)(A), (1)(B)(1), (2)(A); Haag, 2012 ME 94, ¶ 17, 48 A.3d 207. Accordingly, we will affirm Woodard’s conviction unless some other defect in the proceedings requires us to vacate the judgment. B. Evidence of Acts Outside the Time Range Stated in the Indictment [¶26] Woodard argues that, although the indictment charged that he had committed theft “[f]rom on or about April 4, 2008, to on or about February 18, 2010,” the State’s evidence concerned events that occurred primarily in March 2010. [¶27] “Proof of the commission of [an] offense on any date within the statute of limitations, regardless of the date alleged in the indictment, is not a material variance from the indictment, unless it prejudices the defendant.” State v. Standring, 2008 ME 188, ¶ 14, 960 A.2d 1210; see also State v. St. Pierre, 1997 ME 107, ¶ 14, 693 A.2d 1137 (explaining that the State need not prove that alleged criminal conduct occurred on a specific date if time is not an element of the crime). 15 Prejudice is avoided as long as the indictment is “sufficiently specific to enable the preparation of a defense and to protect the defendant against further jeopardy for the same offense.” Standring, 2008 ME 188, ¶ 14, 960 A.2d 1210. If heightened specificity has not been obtained through a request for a bill of particulars, “a time variance between the allegation in the indictment and the proof at trial is not fatal to a criminal conviction.” Id. [¶28] Here, the one-month variance in the approximate end date of the charged conduct did not prejudice Woodard, who had notice that he was charged with theft that was ongoing over a period of about two years. Furthermore, the evidence regarding the March 2010 events was relevant and admissible as circumstantial evidence that Woodard committed the charged crime through an ongoing scheme of accepting out-of-state bottles for redemption. See M.R. Evid. 401, 402, 404(b); State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 18, 892 A.2d 447 (stating that evidence is admissible notwithstanding Rule 404(b) “to show lack of accident, design, motive, knowledge, plan, scheme, and identity” because such evidence is not offered to show action in conformity with a character trait). [¶29] That Woodard was not also charged with attempted theft by deception, see 17-A M.R.S. §§ 152, 354 (2012), for his role in the March 2010 bottle delivery, which was interrupted by Trahan and local police, does not change this outcome. Evidence of Woodard’s conduct at that time served to demonstrate 16 the nature of his ongoing arrangement with Reed and was therefore probative and admissible regarding the charged crime. See Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 18, 892 A.2d 447.6 C. Admission of Photographs of Prybot’s Barn [¶30] Woodard contends that the photographs of Prybot’s barn should not have been admitted because Woodard was unable to cross-examine Prybot fully about whether he or his father was responsible for setting up the sorting station in the Prybot barn. Woodard contends that these photos were part of the evidence used to indict Prybot’s father, who died before he could be tried, and that Woodard and the State agreed before trial that Prybot’s father would not be mentioned. [¶31] We do not review claims of error that result from a party’s choice of trial strategy. State v. Rega, 2005 ME 5, ¶ 17, 863 A.2d 917. Although Woodard complains that he was constrained by the agreement that he and the State struck, which required both parties not to mention Prybot’s father, we will not, on appeal, relieve him of the consequences of that agreement. Furthermore, because the State based its case on evidence of checks that were issued to Prybot—not his father— cross-examination regarding whether Prybot acted alone is largely irrelevant. See M.R. Evid. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to 6 We are unpersuaded by Woodard’s additional agreement that the evidence was inadmissible because its probative value was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and we do not discuss this issue. See M.R. Evid. 403. 17 make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” (emphasis added)). D. Prosecutorial Misconduct [¶32] Woodard next argues that the prosecutor’s demand of the jury to “send a message to those who would fraudulently redeem bottles in large quantities from away” gave rise to an obvious error or defect because the jury was asked to convict for a reason other than Woodard’s guilt. [¶33] When the defense does not object to a prosecutor’s comments in closing, we will vacate the resulting judgment only if any improper conduct gave rise to obvious error. See M.R. Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 35, 58 A.3d 1032. “To demonstrate obvious error, the defendant must show that there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 35, 58 A.3d 1032 (quotation marks omitted). To establish that the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, the defendant has a significant burden of demonstrating “a reasonable probability that [the prosecutor’s statement] affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶¶ 37-38. “Even if these three conditions are met, we will set aside a jury’s verdict only if we conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. ¶ 35 (quotation marks omitted). 18 [¶34] Although we have not previously had occasion to opine on the propriety of a prosecutor asking a jury to “send a message,” we have long criticized prosecutors’ appeals to public perception or other social issues that go beyond the evidence produced at trial. See id. ¶ 40 (stating that a prosecutor’s “efforts must be tempered by a level of ethical precision that avoids overreaching and prevents the fact-finder from convicting a person on the basis of something other than evidence presented during trial”); State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63, 66, 68 A. 454 (1907) (requiring that a prosecutor’s comments be “strictly confined to the domain of facts in evidence”). The jury’s function is to decide the case on the evidence before it in accordance with the law as instructed by the trial judge. Accordingly, a “prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function § 3-5.8(d) (1993); see also United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that “it should be beyond question that . . . arguments urging a jury to act in any capacity other than as the impartial arbiter of the facts in the case before it are improper”). Within our constitutional framework, it is not the role of a jury in a criminal case to send messages about matters of public concern, even though that may be the effect of a verdict in some instances. Jurors should not be invited to 19 arrive at a verdict for any reason other than their evaluation of the evidence of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. [¶35] As the Maine Jury Instruction Manual more particularly provides, “Arguments to juries urging them to ‘send a message’ or other similar invitations to consider possible consequences of their verdict outside the parameters of the record of the case are improper.” Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual, § 5-7 at 5-15 (4th ed. 2012); see Dolloff, 2012 ME 130 ¶¶ 67-73, 58 A.3d 1032 (criticizing the prosecutor’s “do justice” argument); see also Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d 720, 724 (Fla. 1996) (criticizing “message to the community” arguments in death penalty sentencing proceedings as “an obvious appeal to the emotions and fears of the jurors” (quotation marks omitted)); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 113-19 (Pa. 2004) (vacating a sentence because the prosecutor argued to the jury, “there are messages to be sent” on the streets by imposing the death penalty—a plea to an “external irrelevancy” that is prejudicial per se in the context of death penalty sentencing). [¶36] In view of these longstanding legal principles, the first two prongs of the obvious error analysis have been met. The prosecutor’s tactic in this case of asking the jury to “send a message” amounted to (1) error that is (2) plain. Nevertheless, addressing the third prong of the obvious error analysis, we conclude that Woodard has failed to meet his significant burden of demonstrating a 20 reasonable probability that the error was sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the proceeding, thereby affecting his substantial rights. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 37-38, 58 A.3d 1032. The State presented a strong case against Woodard, and the prosecutor’s appeal to the jury to “send a message” was mentioned only briefly and was not a focus of the prosecutor’s closing arguments. Furthermore, the court instructed the jurors in Woodard’s trial that they were not to consider the attorneys’ arguments as evidence. [¶37] Viewing the error in relation to the trial as a whole, the error was not “sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶ 37 (quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Stover, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24777, at -30 (S.D.W.V. 2012) (holding that an unpreserved claim of error arising from a prosecutor’s statement, in an otherwise relatively strong case, that the jury should “send a message” did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights); People v. Gallegos, 260 P.3d 15, 27-28 (Colo. App. 2010) (holding that, although it is improper for a prosecutor to ask a jury to find a defendant guilty to “send a message to the community,” the statement was not so egregious in the context of the trial as to require that the conviction be vacated); People v. Desantiago, 850 N.E.2d 866, 873-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (affirming a conviction on plain error review despite the prosecutor’s argument encouraging the jury to “send a 21 message,” in part because the court instructed the jury that the closing arguments were not evidence). [¶38] Because we conclude that Woodard failed to demonstrate that the prosecutorial misconduct affected his substantial rights, we do not address the fourth prong of the obvious error analysis: whether the error seriously affected the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 35, 58 A.3d 1032. E. Jury Instructions [¶39] Woodard argues that the court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury that, to find him guilty, it had to find he had been knowingly deceitful— not ignorant or negligently unaware—when processing the out-of-state containers. [¶40] “We review the denial of a requested jury instruction for prejudicial error, and will vacate a judgment on this basis only when the denied instruction (1) stated the law correctly; (2) was generated by the evidence in the case; (3) was not misleading or confusing; and (4) was not sufficiently covered in the instructions the court gave.” State v. Ouellette, 2012 ME 11, ¶ 7, 37 A.3d 921 (quotation marks omitted). [¶41] Regarding the mens rea for theft by deception, the court stated clearly: Deception occurs when a person intentionally, that is has the conscious purpose or object to do so, intentionally creates or reinforces an impression which is false and which that person does not 22 believe to be true or fails to correct an impression which is false and which a person does not believe to be true and which that person previously created or reinforced. These instructions sufficiently explained the state of mind that a person must possess to be convicted of theft by deception. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)(A), 354(1)(A), (2)(A), (2)(B)(1). The instructions were adequate to inform the jury that it could not convict Woodard upon a finding that Woodard processed the out-of-state containers through mere negligence or ignorance. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: Richard D. Grundy, Esq., Lynnfield, Massachusetts, and Neil Jamieson, Esq., Prescott, Jamieson, Nelson & Murphy, Portland, for appellant Thomas Woodard William J. Schneider, Attorney General, and Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine At oral argument: Richard D. Grundy, Esq., for appellant Thomas Woodard Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Maine York County Superior Court docket number CR-2011-405 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY