Opinion ID: 1910245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning and Scope of the Third Beach Easement

Text: [¶ 14] NSS argues that the language of the Third Beach easement is ambiguous, and that the proper construction of the easement is a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, NSS contends, the trial court should have admitted and considered extrinsic evidence of Patten's intent in creating the easement, which it argues is a genuine issue of material fact. See Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 1999 ME 112, ¶ 30, 736 A.2d 241, 250 (concluding that when the language of a deed is ambiguous, courts may admit extrinsic evidence to ascertain the objectively manifested intention of the parties). Accordingly, NSS argues that the trial court erred in granting the Trust's motion for a summary judgment on NSS's complaint. We disagree. [¶ 15] The trial court did not err in determining that the plain, unambiguous language of the Third Beach easement does not encompass the right to access the beach by boat. Rather, the plain language unambiguously limits the scope of the easement to swimming and sunbathing, which cannot be read to include a right to access the beach by boat. Nor can it be said, given the existence of a pathway that leads to the beach, that boat access is incidental or necessary to the proper enjoyment of the Third Beach easement. See Mill Pond Condo. Ass'n v. Manalio, 2006 ME 135, ¶ 6, 910 A.2d 392, 395 (providing that the holder of an easement can exercise only the rights granted therein, including those rights incidental or necessary to the proper enjoyment of the easement). Additionally, easement holders remain able to alternatively access the beach by anchoring the boat outside the swim area line and wading in. Because the meaning of the Third Beach easement is unambiguous, the trial court did not err by considering only the four corners of the deed and refusing to consider extrinsic evidence of Patten's intent in drafting the easement.
[¶ 16] The Trust argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a summary judgment on the Trust's counterclaim seeking to limit the scope of the Third Beach easement to a strict construction of swimming and sunbathing. Specifically, the Trust argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by construing too broadly the terms swimming and sunbathing to include walking the beach, reading a book, collecting shells, picnicking, and playing Frisbee or beach volleyball, as activities incidental or necessary to the proper enjoyment of the easement. [¶ 17] We vacate the trial court's judgment on the Trust's motion for a summary judgment on its own counterclaim, but do so for reasons distinct from those advanced by the Trust. The determination of the activities incidental or necessary to the proper enjoyment of an easement is a question of fact. See, e.g., Poire v. Manchester, 506 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Me. 1986) (holding that the issue of whether the actual use of an easement was proper and reasonable is a question of fact); Beckwith v. Rossi, 157 Me. 532, 541, 175 A.2d 732, 738 (1961). In Beckwith, the holder of a profit a prendre, reserving the right to take gravel or granite from the real property of another, arranged to have holes drilled into the property in search of the ore. Id. at 533-34, 175 A.2d at 734. Although the holes were filled, the property owner brought suit for trespass, claiming that the act of drilling was beyond the scope of the easement. Id. We vacated the trial court's judgment granting the holder's motion for a summary judgment, concluding that the issue of what was reasonable for the proper exercise of a profit a prendre was an issue of fact, not law. Id. at 541, 175 A.2d at 738. In doing so, we noted the similarities between profits and easements. Id. at 536-37, 175 A.2d at 735-36. We determined that where the record reflects a dispute as to what constitutes a proper exercise of the profit, summary judgment for either party [is] not in order. Id. at 541, 175 A.2d at 738. [¶ 18] In this case, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Third Beach easement includes incidental and necessary activities such as picnicking, or playing volleyball or Frisbee. The question of which, if any, activities are encompassed within the easement is a factual one that requires an evidentiary hearing. The record likewise reflects that there is a factual dispute between the parties as to what activities are incidental or necessary. Accordingly, here, as in Beckwith, summary judgment is inappropriate.