Opinion ID: 2996634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII—Hostile Environment

Text: With respect to Dr. Hildebrandt’s hostile work environment claim, we believe that Morgan requires that we conclude that the district court erred in limiting its review of her claim to acts occurring after July 10, 1997. Under Morgan, “[a] hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’ ” Morgan, 122 S. Ct. at 2074. Consequently, “[p]rovided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” Id. Because Dr. Hildebrandt alleges several acts as part of her hostile work environment claim that arose after July 10, 1997, she can reach beyond the limitations period to bring forth evidence of facts prior to that time that contributed to the hostile environment. However, a court of appeals can affirm a district court’s grant of summary judgment on any ground that finds support in the record. See Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 709 (7th Cir. 2000). As explained in greater detail below, we do not believe that Dr. Hildebrandt has set forth a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment, and we affirm the district court’s judgment on that basis.
“An employer violates Title VII when discrimination based on sex . . . create[s] a hostile or abusive work environment.” Adusumilli v. City of Chi., 164 F.3d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 27 “Workplace harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable.” Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 13 and citations omitted). “Harassment is not limited to acts 13 We note, at the outset, that none of the allegedly discriminatory actions that occurred after July 10, 1997, standing alone, constitute actionable adverse employment actions. We review these allegations briefly. Dr. Hildebrandt first maintains that, in 1998, Mr. Little advised Dr. Hildebrandt that she would be subjected to quarterly evaluations, but did not have the same requirements for the male program administrators. All that Dr. Hildebrandt alleges is that Mr. Little “advised” her that she would be subject to quarterly or mid-year evaluations. Appellant’s Br. at 15. The defendants admitted in their answer to the complaint that Mr. Little had so “advised.” R.1 at ¶¶ 37-38; R.4 at ¶¶ 37-38; R.44 at ¶¶ 37-38. However, the record appears to be devoid of any evidence indicating that Dr. Hildebrandt was ever subjected to a quarterly or mid-year evaluation. Second, Dr. Hildebrandt points to two other aspects of her review process that she believes were discriminatory—the fact that David Gillespie sat in on her evaluations after 1998 and that her male coworkers were evaluated only by Mr. Little and that, during her 1998 performance evaluation, Mr. Little recommended that she travel less, apparently explaining that she might spend more time with her family. Under our case law, it is clear that the above acts do not constitute an adverse employment action. We have defined an adverse employment action as “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly dimin- (continued...) 28 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 13 (...continued) ished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Markel, 276 F.3d at 911 (finding that being “denied ‘better’ equipment, the ability to travel and make presentations, and removed from certain accounts that caused her not to receive bonuses” did not constitute adverse employment actions). Adverse employment actions do not include inconveniences or minor events that “make[] an employee unhappy.” Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). By contrast, “an employee must show that ‘material harm has resulted from . . . the challenged actions.’ ” Traylor, 295 F.3d at 788 (quoting Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 692 (7th Cir. 2001)). Turning to Dr. Hildebrandt’s allegations, we cannot conclude that the alleged discriminatory actions constitute adverse employment actions. The fact that Gillespie sat in on the evaluations and that Mr. Little advised Dr. Hildebrandt that she would have extra performance evaluations (there is no evidence he ever implemented this advisement), particularly when she received favorable evaluations under these conditions, cannot constitute an adverse employment action. Certainly there may be situations when a difference in the frequency and quality of evaluations may constitute an adverse employment action, see, e.g., Hernandez v. Hill Country Tel. Cooperative, 849 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding discrimination on the basis of race when, among other inequities, the plaintiff was limited to annual raises and the other employees received pay raises on a semi-annual basis); however, this is not such a case. Furthermore, we note that beginning with her annual performance evaluation in 1998, Dr. Hildebrandt was given the same performance evaluation of “accomplished” and the same percentage raise as her male coworkers. See Defendant’s Ex.38. (continued...) Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 29 of sexual desire, but rather is a broad term which encompasses all forms of conduct that unreasonably interfere with an individual’s work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Yet, “not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII.” Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361. Thus, “[t]o prevail on a hostile environment claim, the plaintiff must show that the work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile.” Haugerud, 259 F.3d at 692-93. “An objectively hostile environment is one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,” and a court “must consider all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Finally, and significantly in this case, the harassment must have “occurred because of the sex of the complainant, thus we ask whether she was exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex [were] not exposed.” Haugerud, 259 F.3d at 692. We now shall examine Dr. Hildebrandt’s primary factual allegations in light of our hostile work environment case 13 (...continued) Consequently, Dr. Hildebrandt did not suffer a material harm as a result of the alleged actions. 30 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 14 law. 14 Dr. Hildebrandt also alleges multiple acts of discrimination that we do not discuss in the body of the opinion. By way of example only, Dr. Hildebrandt argues (1) that Gillespie once removed a reference to the fact she had a Ph.D. from one urban forestry program; (2) that the IDNR telephone directories for a time omitted listings for various urban forestry programs; (3) that Sester had a full-time secretary, but that the other three (herself and two men) shared the services of Ms. Brown and the clerical staff; (4) that Ms. Brown and Mr. Little made stylistic changes to her letters without her consent, such as that Mr. Little changed the wording of a letter Dr. Hildebrandt wrote from “Illinois Department of Natural Resources” to “we,” R.80 Supplemental Aff. of Hildebrandt at ¶ 17; Dr. Hildebrandt was so upset at this change by her supervisor—because it was her “opinion that a more formal identifier be used for the Department”—that she discussed it with Mr. Pequignot, who agreed with Mr. Little, see id.; (5) that she was denied computer equipment; Dr. Hildebrandt always had a computer, though initially she had a 286, and was later given a 386, which is the same computer the other program administrators were given, see Hildebrandt Dep. 62-65; (6) that Ms. Brown and others who accompanied Dr. Hildebrandt to conferences refused to help Dr. Hildebrandt in setting up and taking down displays, see Hildebrandt Dep. 103-06; (7) that Dr. Hildebrandt was treated disrespectfully by Ms. Brown and staff workers, particularly that they treated her coldly while treating the men more warmly. With respect to this last allegation, Dr. Hildebrandt does not give any specific examples of either the cold or the warm treatment, except that she was yelled at by staff on a particular occasion; however, the record indicates that Sester also had altercations with his secretary, Robin Blue, see Hildebrandt Dep. at 57; Sester Dep. at 108; Defendant’s Ex.8A (Little Dep.) at 170 (explaining that Sester had “major blowups” with staff). (continued...) Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 31 First, Dr. Hildebrandt argues that she was subject to “[o]ne or two off-color remarks made in her presence.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. Dr. Hildebrandt does not elaborate on those remarks, but the record indicates that there were two distasteful jokes made by coworkers, neither of which were directed at or told to Dr. Hildebrandt—she only overheard them. We have recognized that “simple teasing” and “offhand comments” generally “will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “second-hand harassment,” that is, comments not directed to the plaintiff, do not have the same impact as “harassment directed at the plaintiff.” Id. at 362. Second, Dr. Hildebrandt argues that Mr. Little required Dr. Hildebrandt “to submit monthly goals,” while her male 14 (...continued) Although we do not dispute that such incidents, if properly supported in the record and if affecting the plaintiff disproportionately in comparison to her male counterparts, may contribute to a hostile work environment, neither of these requirements is satisfied here. Apart from the complete lack of citation to the record for any of these assertions, Dr. Hildebrandt has failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to this treatment on the basis of her sex. The record simply does not support a conclusion that male program administrators were treated more favorably on these matters. In fact, Dr. Hildebrandt admits that for several of the alleged harassing acts (the signing of letters by Ms. Brown and the sharing of secretaries), men and women were treated the same. Consequently, because many of these allegations are not supported by proper citation to the record and because Dr. Hildebrandt has not shown that she was treated differently from her male coworkers with respect to these events, we do not consider these events in assessing Dr. Hildebrandt’s claim of a hostile work environment. 32 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 counterparts were not subject to the same requirement. Appellant’s Br. at 10. The record does not support this contention. Mr. Little explained in his deposition that each of the program administrators was required to submit monthly accomplishment statements. Each program administrator had his own way of doing so; some filed very informal monthly statements. See Defendant’s Ex.8B at 35354. Dr. Hildebrandt argues that she additionally was required to state her future goals as well as her accomplishments. She brought as evidence of this requirement two such monthly goal statements that she had submitted to Mr. Little in 1993. Plaintiff’s Exs.198 & 199. At most, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Hildebrandt, the record indicates that Dr. Hildebrandt had the extra burden of including her future “goals” in her monthly statement of accomplishments, although the statement itself was a requirement for all program administrators, male and female. See Defendant’s Ex.8B at 354. Third, Dr. Hildebrandt noted that Mr. Little advised Dr. Hildebrandt that she would be subject to quarterly reviews after 1998, but, apparently, did not similarly advise the male program administrators. See R.1 at ¶¶ 37-38; R.44 at ¶¶ 3738. Fourth, Dr. Hildebrandt notes that Gillespie sat in on her evaluations after 1998 and that her male coworkers were evaluated only by Mr. Little. Fifth, Dr. Hildebrandt alleges that she was not allowed to communicate directly with district foresters, but instead was forced to communicate with them through Gillespie and that the male program administrators were not subject to the same requirement. However, the evidence demonstrates that the male program administrators were required to speak through Gillespie on specified projects with the district foresters. See R.80 Supplemental Aff. of Hildebrandt Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 33 at ¶ 54. At most, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Hildebrandt, she was required to go through Gillespie on more projects than were the men, but the men were also required to do so, at least on occasion. Dr. Hildebrandt has failed to show that these acts constitute an objectively hostile work environment. “Harassment, in the context of Title VII, involves conduct that unreasonably interferes with a person’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” Ngeunjuntr v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 146 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). The enumerated acts alleged by Dr. Hildebrandt at most inconvenienced her, and there is no evidence that any of them “unreasonably interfere[d]” with her work. Id. In addition to the allegations just analyzed, Dr. Hildebrandt makes several general allegations of unequal treatment. She claims that Ms. Brown and Mr. Little bottlenecked her work and that Ms. Brown gave Dr. 15 Hildebrandt’s work lower priority; that “the level of her staff support since 1991 has been diminished by over 16 50%”; and that she was not allowed to work with interns 17 as extensively as the men. However, these “[b]are allegations not supported by specific facts are insufficient in 15 In her deposition, Dr. Hildebrandt stated that she has generally observed that it takes longer for the support staff to complete her work than it does to complete work for the men, but again, she brings forth no specific instances of such. See Hildebrandt Dep. at 58-59. 16 We were unable to find this statistic in the record or any factual support for it. 17 The record shows that Dr. Hildebrandt did have interns work for her from time to time. Dr. Hildebrandt has failed to bring forth any specific evidence of what interns were available to Urban Forestry or the other programs or of the procedure for hiring and assigning interns. 34 Nos. 01-3064 & 01-3690 opposing a motion for summary judgment.” Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989); Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, will not suffice.”).