Opinion ID: 1573384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to perform an essential duty. The instruction in question read as follows:

Text: The term operate, as used in these instructions means to have the immediate, actual physical control over the operating mechanisms of a motor vehicle that is in motion or has its engine running and may include minimal acts of control or activation of mechanical aspects of the vehicle. A person is operating a motor vehicle, as that phrase is used in these instructions, when the person is in a position to have present or potential capability to activate or direct the movements of the vehicle regardless of whether the person is exercising that capability at the time of the alleged offense. (Emphasis added.) Hopkins' counsel stated to the district court that although he did not like the instruction, it was a correct statement of the law. Hopkins correctly points out that the italicized portion of the instruction was not at the time and is not now a correct statement of the law. It is true that in State v. Weaver, 405 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Iowa 1987), we approved an instruction worded exactly like that here. The instruction in Weaver was based upon a uniform instruction, and we said we were reluctant to disapprove uniform instructions. Id. However, that case is inapplicable as far as the facts here are concerned: Hopkins was found sitting in her car behind the wheel but her car was not moving and the car engine was not running. By contrast, in Weaver, the police found the defendant sitting in his pickup truck with the engine running and the lights on. The defendant in Weaver claimed that the vehicle was inoperable because the gearbox was locked in the neutral position. Id. at 853. Accordingly, the defendant argued that the district court should have modified the instruction by instructing the jury that the definition [of operating] includes the fact that the operating mechanisms must be able to cause such motor vehicle to move in a lateral direction either forward or backward. Id. at 855. We thought the district court was correct in rejecting the defendant's suggestion. Id. We did so relying on our prior case law holding that there need not be vehicle movement nor capability of vehicle movement as long as the person was in actual physical control of a car that had its engine running or that was moving. Id. After Weaver, the uniform jury instruction committee relying on Weaver changed the instruction to read: The term operate means the immediate, actual physical control over a motor vehicle that is in motion and/or has its engine running. II Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 2500.6 (1988); see also, Iowa Code section 321.1(48) (` Operator ' or ` driver ' means every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway.). Our case law following Weaver has relied on the revised instruction. See, e.g., Munson, 513 N.W.2d at 724-25. In Munson, an officer found a motorist asleep in his car with the radio on and the engine not running. The key was in the ignition. Id. at 723. We held that as a matter of law the officer had no reasonable grounds to believe the motorist was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated and therefore had no basis to invoke the implied consent provisions of Iowa Code section 321J.6. Because such reasonable grounds were lacking, we held that under Iowa Code section 321J.12 the Iowa Department of Transportation had no authority to revoke the motorist's drivers license for failing a chemical test. Id. at 725. In Munson, the department argued that a person is operating a vehicle if in a position to have the present or potential capability to activate or direct the movement of a vehicle, the same conceptwe notedthat was in the Weaver instruction. Id. at 724. The police officer in Munson testified the key was in the ignition, the radio was on, and after the motorist awoke the motorist turned the ignition off. Id. The department argued these facts were sufficient to support a finding that the motorist operated his vehicle while in the parking lot where the car was parked. Id. Rejecting this argument, we said: The current uniform instruction provides the term `operate' means the immediate, actual physical control over a motor vehicle that is in motion and/or has its engine running. II Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 2500.6 (1988). We approve this definition requiring either the vehicle be in motion or its engine be running. Id. at 724-25. Thus, we rejected any notion that a person is operating a motor vehicle if in a position to have the present or potential capacity to activate or direct the movement of the vehicle. Hopkins is correct in asserting the instruction given was erroneous because it incorporated this concept. Hopkins' counsel was therefore incorrect when he said the instruction reflected the correct statement of the law. A defendant has the right to representation that is within the normal range of competency. State v. Rice, 543 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Iowa 1996). Such competency includes being familiar with the current state of the law. See State v. Schoelerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 71-72 (Iowa 1982). Without question, counsel here did not know that we had rejected the notion that operating a vehicle includes having the present or potential capacity to activate or direct the movement of a vehicle. As a result, he failed to preserve error for our review regarding the instruction. Thus, counsel failed to perform an essential duty, the first prong a defendant must prove to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. That, however, does not end our inquiry. Hopkins must also prove prejudice, the second prong for establishing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. B. Prejudice. As mentioned, the State had to prove that Hopkins operated her car and did so while she was intoxicated. Under the law, to prove operated, the State had to establish Hopkins' car was either moving or its engine was running. In division II of this opinion we sketched out evidence from which we think the jury could easily infer that Hopkins had operated her car while she was intoxicated. Given this evidence, we think there is no reasonable probability the result would have been different even had the district court correctly instructed on the definition of operate. Thus, we conclude Hopkins has failed to prove the prejudice prong of her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and for that reason the claim fails.