Opinion ID: 6499100
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim 4 – Excessive sentence

Text: Mr. Hamilton’s sentences are within the statutory maximums, but he alleged in Claim 4 that they are excessive. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment “prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crimes committed.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). “But outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003) (brackets and quotations omitted). “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quotations omitted); see also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24 (recognizing that “[t]he proportionality principles in our cases distilled in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence [in Harmelin] guide our application of the Eighth Amendment”). The OCCA upheld the sentences. The district court held that Mr. Hamilton failed to show that the OCCA’s rejection of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. On appeal, Mr. Hamilton again argues that his sentences are excessive. But he fails to show that reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that the OCCA’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Solem or any other clearly established Supreme Court law. We deny a COA on Claim 4. 11 Appellate Case: 21-5027 Document: 010110708541 Date Filed: 07/11/2022 Page: 12 d. Claim 5 – Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel Claim 5 alleged that Mr. Hamilton’s appellate counsel was ineffective.
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, id. at 692. The deficient performance prong requires a defendant to show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The prejudice prong requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A court may address the Strickland’s two elements in any order and need not address both if it concludes the defendant has failed to satisfy either one. See id. at 697. A court reviews ineffective assistance claims with “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (quotations omitted). As Strickland noted, “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,” and “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Id. Further, the federal courts must review the OCCA’s resolution of Mr. Hamilton’s ineffective assistance claims “through AEDPA’s deferential lens.” Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); see also Lockett 12 Appellate Case: 21-5027 Document: 010110708541 Date Filed: 07/11/2022 Page: 13 v. Trammell, 711 F.3d 1218, 1248 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e review [the OCCA’s] analysis [of ineffective assistance of counsel claims] under the considerable deference required by Strickland itself—in addition to AEDPA deference.”). “[I]n evaluating an argument that appellate counsel performed deficiently in failing to raise an issue on appeal, this court typically examines the merits of the omitted issue. If the omitted issue is meritless, its omission will not constitute deficient performance.” Davis v. Sharp, 943 F.3d 1290, 1299 (10th Cir. 2019) (brackets, footnote, citation, and quotations omitted).
Mr. Hamilton asserted in his post-conviction petition that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective and in failing to raise a Brady claim. 2 1) Failure to argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel To support his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, Mr. Hamilton argued that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the facts of the case, to prepare for trial, to make the technical evidence clear to the jury, and to present exculpatory evidence. He also claimed that trial counsel’s advice not to testify at trial was deficient. 2 Mr. Hamilton also alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue “Fundamental Error occurring at Trial which denied Petitioner a Fair Trial under the Equal Protection clause that resulted in a Wrongful Conviction was a ‘Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice’.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 37. We cannot identify, much less evaluate, the “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). We therefore do not consider this argument as a basis for issuing a COA. 13 Appellate Case: 21-5027 Document: 010110708541 Date Filed: 07/11/2022 Page: 14 The OCCA found no merit to this claim. Neither did the federal district court. It said, “The Court has reviewed the entire trial transcript and finds Hamilton’s trial counsel objectively did not err. He raised appropriate objections, filed pre-trial motions, and effectively cross-examined the state’s witnesses.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 865. The district court also noted that Mr. Hamilton, after advisement by the trial court, knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. The court concluded that the OCCA’s ruling was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Before this court, Mr. Hamilton reargues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to raise on direct appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective. He has not shown, however, that the OCCA’s evaluation of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Thus, reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s ruling that the OCCA’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. See Davis v. Sharp, 943 F.3d at 1299. 2) Failure to raise a Brady claim Mr. Hamilton claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective in not arguing that the prosecution failed to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense—namely, “child pornography downloaded by detectives and preserved to a DVD/CD-ROM.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 35. Under Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. The elements of a Brady claim are “(1) the prosecutor suppressed the evidence; (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the accused, either 14 Appellate Case: 21-5027 Document: 010110708541 Date Filed: 07/11/2022 Page: 15 because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; and (3) prejudice ensued because the suppressed evidence was material.” Simpson, 912 F.3d at 569. The state post-conviction court held that Mr. Hamilton had failed to show that the prosecution suppressed the CD or that the CD was exculpatory. The OCCA agreed. The federal district court likewise recognized that “[t]he trial record is sufficient to demonstrate that no evidence was improperly withheld from the defense.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 856. Before this court, Mr. Hamilton contests the state courts’ determination that the CD was not exculpatory. But he ignores their and the federal district court’s conclusion that the prosecution did not suppress the CD within the meaning of Brady. Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s decision that the OCCA’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. See Davis v. Sharp, 943 F.3d at 1299.