Opinion ID: 2980499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Use of Perjured Testimony

Text: Woods claims that he was denied due process because allegedly perjured testimony was presented at trial and the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision holding that this testimony did not warrant a new trial was an unreasonable application of federal law. Supreme Court precedent is clear that the “deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice” and is prohibited by the Due Process Clause. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972). A conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony must be set aside if such testimony “in any reasonable likelihood [could] have affected the judgment of the jury.” Id. at 154. This includes situations where false evidence relates to a witness’s credibility, as well as the defendant’s actual guilt. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 -9- No. 09-1071 Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, Warden (1959). Woods claims the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when it decided that the allegedly false testimony was not material to the jury’s consideration of this case. We have summarized the conjunctive, three-part test that a petitioner must satisfy to make this showing as follows: (1) “the statement was material”; (2) “the statement was actually false”; and (3) “the prosecution knew it was false.” Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 343 (6th Cir. 1998). We consider the reasonableness of the state appellate court decision based on each of these elements.
The element that was the focus of the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision is materiality. The use of perjured testimony does not require a new trial simply because the new evidence is “possibly useful to the defense.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. Rather, “[a] new trial is required if ‘the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.’” Id. (quoting Napue, 79 S.Ct. at 1178); see also Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935 (1950) (asking whether, “without [the false testimony] the jury might have reached a different conclusion”). In applying this standard, we consider how the jury’s judgment may have been affected if Kemp’s recanting testimony was accepted as true in its entirety. United States v. Bouquett, 837 F.2d 1091, 1091 (1988). The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably held Kemp’s allegedly perjured testimony was not material. If Kemp’s recanting testimony would have been offered to, and believed by, the jury in Woods’s original trial, then Kemp’s testimony would have reinforced Woods’s own testimony that he did not arrive with—and by inference was not associated with—the shooter. However, the - 10 - No. 09-1071 Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, Warden Michigan Court of Appeals determined that Woods’s and Kemp’s statements would have been contradicted by Brewington’s claim that Woods brought the shooter to the door, diminishing its effect on the jury. More importantly, Kemp’s statement that Woods was unarmed would have contradicted Woods’s own statement that he was armed, and had fired warning shots to calm Brewington down. Although the Michigan Court of Appeals overstated this conflict by incorrectly stating that Woods admitted that he shot Cecil Brewington, the central point the state appellate court was making remains intact: Kemp’s recanted testimony would have been the only testimony supporting Woods’s version of the facts, and would still conflict with Woods’s presentation in a fundamental way. Cf. Bouquett, 837 F.2d 1091 (finding recanting testimony immaterial where, even if it were accepted as true, it was unlikely to affect the jury verdict). All in all, it was reasonable for the Michigan Court of Appeals to find Kemp’s recanting testimony immaterial.
It is unclear whether Kemp’s trial-court testimony was actually false. Woods points to Napue in support of his claim for relief. See 360 U.S. at 267. There, the Supreme Court accepted that trial testimony was false because a witness stated on the trial record he was not receiving consideration for his testimony, but the prosecutor later requested a lighter sentence based on such consideration. Id. When it comes to Kemp’s testimony, we lack such a clear inference of falsity. Woods asked the Michigan Court of Appeals to believe Kemp’s evidentiary-hearing testimony over his trial testimony because he risked a significantly longer prison sentence by recanting. Although Kemp’s precarious legal situation does lend credibility to his post-conviction testimony as an admission, that credibility - 11 - No. 09-1071 Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, Warden is pitted against the suspect nature of a recanting witness’s testimony. See United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1264 (6th Cir.1991) (“recanting affidavits and witnesses are viewed with extreme suspicion”). The recanting testimony is further discredited by the time that elapsed between Kemp’s trial testimony and his recanting testimony, and the possibility that he may have received money transfers in exchange for his testimony. The state court of appeals could reasonably have concluded that Woods failed to demonstrate Kemp’s trial-court testimony was actually false.
The Michigan Court of Appeals did not assess whether the prosecutor acted knowingly in admitting this allegedly perjured testimony because that court rested its decision on immateriality. Woods claims we could imply that the prosecutor knowingly elicited false testimony because of Brewington’s inconsistent statements. This argument does not explain why the prosecutor would have known that Kemp’s testimony was false. Furthermore, “mere inconsistencies in testimony by government witnesses do not establish knowing use of false testimony.” United States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 822 (6th Cir. 1989). Likewise here, we cannot find that, simply because Brewington changed his story over the course of the litigation, the prosecutor must have known that the testimony given at Woods’s trial was false. Woods also contends that, when the State learned the testimony was allegedly perjured during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the State’s failure to correct the error at that point violated Woods’s due process rights. A violation of due process also occurs where a prosecutor “allows [false testimony] to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. Nonetheless, no such violation occurred here. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, and even now, the State could have - 12 - No. 09-1071 Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, Warden reasonably concluded that Kemp did not perjure himself at trial. Furthermore, there was no need for the State to correct any error at the evidentiary hearing because the trial court had just granted a new trial. The district court correctly concluded that the decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals merited AEDPA deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As outlined above, the decision aligns squarely within clearly established federal law standards and did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. § 2254(d)(1). Moreover, despite an incorrect summation of Woods’s statement regarding the Brewington shooting, the state appellate court’s decision was not “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.” § 2254(d)(2). On the whole, the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing does not undermine our confidence in the outcome at trial, and we affirm the district court’s decision in this regard.