Opinion ID: 2379093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the texas clean air act

Text: The Texas Clean Air Act is codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 382.001-141. Its purpose is: [T]o safeguard the state's air resources from pollution by controlling or abating air pollution and emissions of air contaminants, consistent with the protection of public health, general welfare, and physical property, including the aesthetic enjoyment of air resources by the public and the maintenance of adequate visibility. Id. § 382.002. The Act confers on the Texas Air Control Board the authority to accomplish the Act's purposes through the control of air contaminants. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY Code § 382.011(b). [2] An air contaminant is defined as: [P]articulate matter, radioactive material, dust, fumes, gas, mist, smoke, vapor, or odor, including any combination of those items, produced by processes other than natural. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.003(2) (emphasis added). [3] The statute explicitly excludes emissions produced by natural processes, but does not elaborate what the legislature intended to exclude from regulation. The crux of the dispute between the parties is over the meaning of this phrase. Two court of appeals opinions have interpreted the natural processes language. Europak, Inc. v. County of Hunt, 507 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1974, no writ); Southwest Livestock and Trucking Co. v. Texas Air Control Board, 579 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Europak, the County of Hunt and the State sought to prevent the defendant from constructing and operating a horse slaughter and packing facility without first obtaining a permit from the Air Control Board. The trial court issued a temporary injunction. In the court of appeals, Europak took the position that the Act excludes all processes that occur in nature. The County and the State urged that the phrase should mean that which is natural or usual in the ordinary course of experience. The court of appeals rejected both interpretations urged by the parties as the sole test, and held that the Act embraced aspects of both. The court observed that certainly much of agri-business was intended to be subject to the Act, but declined to construe the statute to mean that all processes involving human activity to any degree are not natural processes. It defined a natural process as one that occurs in nature and is affected or controlled by human devices only to an extent normal and usual for the particular area involved. Id. at 891. The court noted that it is normal in Texas to put livestock in a pen or corral, and that a strict number criterion would not work. It ultimately upheld the trial court's injunction because, although the process which directly produces the odor may be one that occurs in nature, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that concentration of such a large number of animals into such a small area would not be normal or usual in this vicinity. Id. Thus, the court held that there was some evidence to uphold the trial court's findings of fact as against a legal sufficiency challenge. In Southwest Livestock, the Board ordered the owner of a livestock holding facility to take corrective measures to bring its operations within the Board's rules and regulations. The trial court upheld the Board's order over the defendant's contest to the court's jurisdiction. The court of appeals reviewing the trial court's judgment followed the test adopted in Europak. Southwest Livestock, 579 S.W.2d at 552. It upheld the trial court's implied finding that the concentration of cattle pens was not normal, usual, or natural for the area where the pens were located because they were located well within city limits in close proximity to urban land uses such as residences and small commercial enterprises particularly susceptible to strong odors. Id. In both Southwest Livestock and Europak, the case was tried to the trial court, and the courts of appeals upheld fact findings of the trial court. In the present case, the court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's findings: We hold that it is abnormal and unusual, without regard to location, to concentrate approximately 6,000 baby calves in 1,500 small hutches and in weaning pens. See Smith v. Padgett, 596 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Civ. App.Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The odor at the defendant's calf feeding facility was not produced by natural processes. The trial court erred in dismissing the State's petition. The Texas Clean Air Act is applicable, and the Texas Air Control Board has jurisdiction. 828 S.W.2d 303, 306. [4] Thus the court of appeals held that, regardless of the vicinity, the confinement of so many calves in such a small area was unnatural. F/R contends that the court of appeals has impermissibly substituted its view of the facts for that of the fact finder. In its reply brief, the State accepted the definition of natural processes articulated in Europak and Southwest Livestock, but argued that the issue of whether the odors from F/R's facility were the product of natural processes was a question of law decided correctly by the court of appeals. [5] At oral argument, the State went further and asked that we disapprove Europak and Southwest Livestock and give the Board jurisdiction wherever there is any human involvement with the production of an odor or other air contaminant, without regard to location. We decline the State's invitation to depart from the holdings of Europak and Southwest Livestock and adopt the holdings of these cases that location is a factor to be considered in determining whether a pollutant was produced by processes other than natural. [6] We must presume the language in Health and Safety Code section 382.003(2) excluding odors produced by natural causes from the definition of air contaminants was placed in the statute to serve some purpose. Given a literal reading the statute would exempt virtually all agricultural pursuits, and defeat the purpose of the Act. The State's interpretation of this language would extend the Board's jurisdiction to all farms, ranches, or households with pets regardless of where located, because by definition they include human involvement with natural processes. This interpretation is unwarranted in light of the Act's legislative history. [7] The definition of air contaminants in Texas Health and Safety Code section 382.003(2) was passed as part of the Clean Air Act of Texas. 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 687, § 2(A), 1965 Tex.Gen.Laws 1583. [8] The purpose of this Act was stated as protecting the State from pollution consistent with the protection of normal health, general welfare and physical property of the people, maximum employment and full industrial development of the State. Id. § 1. Odor was not included in the definition of air contaminants. [9] Id. § 2(A). The 1965 Act instructed the Board to make allowances in any rules or regulations for differences between residential and other areas of the State. Id. § 6(B). The State's alternative argument, that the test in Europak and Southwest Livestock is a question of law for the court is also problematic. The State offers no suggestion what standards the court might apply. As the court in Europak observed, a criterion based on the number of cattle would not suffice. At one end of the spectrum is a remotely located ranch with human involvement limited to fencing, feeding, and other typical ranching activities. At the other end of the spectrum is a feedlot located within city limits that clearly interferes with a neighbors' use of their property. In between, the circumstances would run the gamut, so that making an evaluation of whether emissions are produced by natural processes is an inquiry best left to the fact finder. In the case before us, the court of appeals accepted the Europak and Southwest Livestock standards, yet decided that the odors from F/R were inherently the result of processes other than natural regardless of where located. We disagree that a court could make this determination as a matter of law. There is some evidence that F/R's use is consistent with similar operations in the area. While this factor alone does not establish F/R's position as a matter of law, it nevertheless precludes the court of appeals from overturning the finding of the trial court on a legal sufficiency challenge. Accordingly, we remand this case to the court of appeals to review the State's remaining factual sufficiency points. [10] PHILLIPS, C.J., and HECHT, HIGHTOWER and CORNYN, JJ., join in the opinion and the judgment. ENOCH, J., concurs. SPECTOR, J., joined by DOGGETT and GAMMAGE, JJ., dissents.