Opinion ID: 1852164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicability of the Work-Product Doctrine to the Statement of a Witness

Text: Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part, with respect to materials developed in the course of preparing for a trial: (3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) [`Trial Preparation: Experts'] of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. Green relies upon Sims v. Knollwood Park Hospital, 511 So.2d 154 (Ala.1987), a case in which the defendant objected to the production of an incident report on the basis that it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and that the plaintiff had made no showing of undue hardship. In Sims, this Court, reversing the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's discovery motion, stated: A case analogous to the instant situation arose in Assured Investors Life Ins. Co. v. National Union Associates, Inc., 362 So.2d 228 (Ala.1978). In that case, civil litigants sought to discover a transcript of a statement made by a person whose activities were being investigated by the district attorney's office. The district attorney's office opposed discovery of the document on the ground that it was the `work product' of that office. In deciding against that position, this Court stated, at 232: `The work product argument is inapplicable because: ` The written statement of a witness, whether prepared by him and later delivered to the attorney, or drafted by the attorney and adopted by the witness, is not properly considered the `work product' of an attorney. It records the mental impressions and observations of the witness himself and not those of the attorney.  Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D.Ohio 1953), citing, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947).' 511 So.2d at 156-57 (emphasis added). The railroads distinguish Sims by pointing out that the document in question in that case was an incident report prepared by a nurse operating independently of counsel and that this Court in Sims held that production of the report was appropriate because the defendant hospital did not sufficiently establish that the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation. This Court stated: The defendant's own description of the need for such `incident reports,' moreover, is revealing, for it states that `[t]his document is prepared when an incident occurs at the hospital which might result in some legal action.' That is to say, while `incidents' that in someone's opinion might result in legal action may not in themselves be routine, it is the routine of the hospital to make an `incident report' when such incidents do occur. Of course, such a speculation as to possible litigation is not enough to cloak those reports with the protection given an attorney's work product. Sims, 511 So.2d at 157. The railroads correctly characterize the foregoing statement in Sims, refusing to recognize a witness's statement as constituting work product, as dicta. Moreover, Assured Investors Life Insurance Co. v. National Union Associates, Inc., 362 So.2d 228 (Ala.1978), the authority relied upon in Sims for the foregoing statement, is an incorrect statement of the law, which this Court has sufficiently disregarded over the years so as to lead to the conclusion that it has been overruled sub silentio. This Court's reliance in Assured Investors Life Insurance Co. on Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D.Ohio 1953), for the proposition that a witness's statement is not work product is unsound. While the court in Scourtes grounded its holding with a citation to Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), the conclusion that a witness's statement taken by an attorney is not work product in fact conflicts with Hickman. An authoritative treatise dealing with the comparable federal rule, Rule 26(b)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., criticizes Scourtes and similar cases as follows: A few cases held that statements of witnesses taken by an attorney were not work product since they record the mental impressions and observations of the witness himself and not those of the attorney. [Footnote citing, among other authorities, Scourtes, omitted]. Those cases could not be reconciled with the Hickman decision itself, in which discovery was denied of statements of this type, and the great bulk of authority was that statements of witnesses taken by an attorney were work product. [Footnote omitted]. 8 C. Wright, A. Miller & R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2024, at 357-58 (1994) (emphasis added). Of course, the involvement of an attorney as the person taking the statement is not a prerequisite to the qualification of the statement as work product, because Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., extends its protection to activities of a party's representative and expands on that term with illustrative references to a party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent. Our recent cases have recognized that a witness's statement taken in anticipation of litigation is protected by Rule 26(b)(3). See, e.g., Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., 746 So.2d 960, 963 (Ala.1999); Ex parte Howell, 704 So.2d 479 (Ala.1997); Ex parte Stephens, 676 So.2d 1307, 1312 (Ala.1996), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Henry, 770 So.2d 76 (Ala.2000); and Ex parte Royal Globe Ins. Co., 428 So.2d 634, 636 (Ala.1983). Other courts have reached a conclusion similar to the one we reached in Assured Investors Life Insurance Co. See, e.g., State v. Zwicker, 151 N.H. 179, 191, 855 A.2d 415, 426 (2004): While it is certainly true that work product may be found in an investigator's report, a witness statement, whether prepared by the witness or by an attorney or an agent of an attorney, should not automatically be considered work product if it records the observations of the witness rather than mental impressions, conclusions or legal theories of the attorney or investigator. (Citing State v. Chagnon, 139 N.H. 671, 675-76, 662 A.2d 944, 948 (1995).) Professors Wright, Miller, and Marcus acknowledged and rejected the opposing view as follows: Powerful arguments have been made that all statements of witnesses should be routinely discoverable. To the extent that such statements might sometimes be admissible in evidence, allowing access would recognize, as Hickman [v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)] did, that `it seems clear and long has been recognized that discovery should provide a party access to anything that is evidence in his case.' But in such circumstances it would also seem that a showing of need could be made. Wholesale access to all witness statements taken by a party could impinge important work-product protections. Surely an interrogatory asking a party to identify all persons interviewed would contravene work product. Yet automatic disclosure of witness statements would require revelation of the identities of all witnesses from whom the attorney decided to take a statement, thereby intruding into the heart of attorney trial preparation. At a minimum, then, requiring a party to turn over witness statements should focus on specified witnesses, and the existing need approach would ordinarily provide a suitable method for dealing with such circumstances.  8 Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2028 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The recorded statement of the conductor taken by the claims agent for the railroads can be treated as protected work product, assuming other applicable criteria, as discussed below, are satisfied. We hereby expressly overrule anything to the contrary in Sims and Assured Investors Life Insurance Co.