Opinion ID: 2620668
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admission of character evidence

Text: Lastly, Griffin claims the jury heard improper character evidence from Thijssen and prosecution witness Sarah Rivera. Griffin acknowledges that he did not object to any of the testimony about his character, did not request any curative instructions, and did not request a mistrial. He nonetheless argues the impermissible character evidence undermined the fairness of the trial. Where, as here, a party does not preserve an objection to the admission of evidence, we apply plain error review and the challenging party must demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 492 (11th Cir. 2011). In order for an error to affect substantial rights, the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Id. at 494 n.15 (quotation marks omitted). 9 Case: 12-15795 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 10 of 12 Griffin argues that the district court improperly admitted irrelevant, prejudicial testimony attacking his character and inappropriately allowed witnesses to ask the jury to send Griffin to jail. He claims admission of the testimony violated Federal Rules of Evidence 404, 608, and 609. Specifically, Griffin objects to Thijssen’s testimony about her anger towards him, her hope that he would not get out of jail easily, and her feeling that “whatever he gets, he deserves.” Griffin also argues that his father’s statements to Thijssen that “whatever [Griffin] gets, he deserves” and his father urging her to testify so that Griffin “can go to jail” are inadmissible. Finally, Griffin objects to Rivera’s testimony about what Thijssen had told her about Griffin, about Rivera’s changed perspective of Griffin once she saw Thijssen’s injuries, about Griffin being a “monster,” and about her belief that Griffin should be “locked up.” None of the Federal Rules of Evidence cited by Griffin apply to the testimony he belatedly objects to in this appeal. Rules 608 and 609 address character evidence that can be used to attack a witness’s credibility or character for truthfulness. Fed. R. Evid. 608 and 609. Because Griffin was not a witness, those rules do not apply here. In addition, the evidence Griffin cites is neither evidence of a general character trait, nor evidence of an unrelated crime or wrong. As a result, Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a) and 404(b) do not apply either. 10 Case: 12-15795 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 11 of 12 For this issue, Griffin’s only actual argument that goes beyond a mere reference to these Rules of Evidence is that the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. This argument is governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. Under Rule 401 evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable,” or if it “is of consequence in determining the action.” Id. 401. Rule 403 permits a court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Id. 403. The evidence Griffin identifies in his appeal was admissible under Rule 401(b) as evidence “of consequence in determining the action,” because it showed Thijssen was transported to Delaware against her will and demonstrated the revenge and intimidation benefits that Griffin allegedly received from the kidnapping. Also, Griffin argued at trial that Thijssen voluntarily traveled to Delaware and still had feelings for him, relying on evidence of their prior relationship and letters written after his arrest to support this theory. In light of this defense, the testimony Griffin identifies was relevant because it had a “tendency to make [it] more or less probable” that Thijssen’s trip with Griffin was not voluntary. Id. 401(a). Given the direct connection of this evidence to the elements of the offense, it was not plain error to find under Rule 403 that “ its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Id. 403. 11 Case: 12-15795 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 12 of 12 Finally, even if it was plain error to permit the testimony, we conclude that the error here did not affect Griffin’s substantial rights. Looking at the record as a whole, we conclude that this testimony did not have a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial. See Gamory, 635 F.3d at 494 n.15. The government presented significant evidence, other than the testimony to which Griffin now objects, to support the jury’s verdict. This evidence included Thijssen’s extensive testimony about what happened before Griffin’s arrest, as summarized above. It also included Rivera’s remaining testimony about Griffin’s statements and behavior, as well as photographs and a forensic nurse’s testimony describing Thijssen’s injuries.