Opinion ID: 2508099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Statements and Conduct During Videotaped Reenactment of Crime

Text: Defendant orally moved to suppress his videotaped statements without stating a basis for the motion. The prosecution filed a written opposition, arguing that defendant made his statements voluntarily because the police did not engage in physical or psychological pressure when they interviewed him. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that the general nature of the motion to suppress was on the issue of voluntariness. Counsel claimed that defendant's Miranda waiver ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) was invalid because he did not specifically waive his rights to remain silent and obtain counsel. The trial court rejected the claim, finding that defendant was adequately advised of and validly waived his Miranda rights. The court then asked defense counsel about the previous general objection on the voluntariness issue, inquiring whether he wanted to make an objection for the record. Defense counsel declined and merely submitted the issue. The court ruled as follows: With respect to the video crime scene reenactment, the advisal of rights were given again by Detective Lupercio. I believe right after the advisal of rights there was a question by Detective Lupercio  or a statement to the effect, `Well, we didn't force you do to this, did we?' And the answer from both Miss Purcell and [defendant] was `no.' The Court paid particular attention to the demeanor of  this is with respect to Court's Exhibit 2, the video, the Court paid particular attention to the demeanor of Detective Lupercio, the demeanor of Miss Purcell and [defendant]. As far as the Court could tell, Detective Lupercio was not overbearing or intimidating. Miss Purcell and [defendant] were handcuffed in front, but other than that, there was no further restraints on them other than the ones that would go along with someone being in custody. The tone of [defendant's] voice on Exhibit 2 was very controlled, it was very unemotional. As [defense counsel] pointed out, there were a couple of times, particularly around the discussion of the flashlight, when Miss Purcell appeared to sob for a very brief few moments, but other than that, Miss Purcell didn't have too much show of emotion. And based on all of those considerations, the Court is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence, and in fact beyond a reasonable doubt, that the waiver of the constitutional rights, both [defendant] and Miss Purcell, were free and voluntary and they were intelligently made, and the Court will deny the motion, defense motion, to exclude [the videotape] on that basis also. On appeal, defendant appears to have abandoned the claim that his waiver was invalid because he did not specifically waive his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. Rather, he contends that his United States Constitution Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination, waive his right to counsel, and consent to the videotaped interview. He argues that: (1) the circumstances surrounding the videotaped reenactment were not conducive to a knowing and intelligent waiver, and (2) he did not receive a precise indication that he was entitled to counsel and that one would be appointed for him. We disagree.  Miranda holds that `[t]he defendant may waive effectuation' of the rights conveyed in the warnings `provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.' [Citation.] The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. [Citations.] First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the `totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. [Citations.] ( Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410.) Defendant contends that he did not voluntarily waive his rights because law enforcement held him isolated in custody for a long time without arraigning him or giving him the ability and opportunity to contact counsel. Because defendant failed to raise these claims in the trial court, he has forfeited them on appeal. ( People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 988, fn. 13, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [claim that car trip was a coercive psychological ploy designed to compel confession forfeited; the defendant failed to rely on the purportedly coercive nature of car trip in trial court].) As the Attorney General states, no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing addressing whether the duration and nature of defendant's confinement, including the car trip and the location of the interrogation, rendered defendant's confession involuntary. Nor was any showing made that defendant ever requested counsel, that his arraignment was illegally delayed, or that his admissions were the product of such a delay. ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 270, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433 [the defendant failed to make necessary showing that confessions were product of illegal delay in arraignment].) Moreover, defendant does not now dispute the trial court's factual findings regarding the general voluntariness of his videotaped statements, nor could he effectively dispute those findings. Indeed, defendant simply repeated the same admissions he had made to the police six days earlier on the day of his arrest. Under these circumstances, we will not address defendant's current claim of involuntariness for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846 [parties had no incentive to litigate involuntariness theory fully below, and trial court had no opportunity to resolve material factual disputes and make necessary factual findings].) Defendant's second claim that he was inadequately advised of his right to counsel is clearly without merit. At the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Detective Lupercio testified that he read defendant the Miranda warnings from a department-issued card. He began the videotaped interview with the following advisements: Lupercio: Ok, before we go on I'm going to read you your rights. Ok? You have the absolute right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used as evidence against you in a court of law. You have the right to consult with an attorney, to be represented by an attorney, and to have an attorney present before and during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed by the court, free of charge to represent you before and during questioning if you desire. Just answer yes or no. Do you understand the rights I have just explained to you? [Defendant]: Yes. Purcell: Yes. Lupercio: With these rights in mind are you willing to talk to me about the charges against you? [Defendant]: Yes. [Purcell]: Yes. Lupercio: For the purpose of this tape also in no way were you forced to come up here to do this video reenactment, is that correct? [Defendant]: That's correct. [Purcell]: That's correct. Defendant was told in no uncertain terms that he had the right to consult with, to be represented by, and to have an attorney present before and during questioning, and the further right to have counsel appointed if he was indigent. He never requested an attorney or indicated that he wished to end the interview. ( People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 249-250, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 949 P.2d 18.) Finally, defendant fails even to suggest what advisements should have been given. Because he was given the standard Miranda advisements, and because he stated that he understood his rights and was willing to talk with the police, defendant's claim that he was not fully advised of his right to counsel fails. ( Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 201-205, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1233, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) b. Family Members' Testimony Defendant argues that the trial court violated his United States Constitution Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by admitting the irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony of Janine's family members. The trial court admitted the testimony of Janine's father and sister, which was brief. Her father, Richard Lee, testified that, on October 24, 1990, someone called their house and asked to speak with Janine. Richard Lee related that Janine was not home and could be contacted at her grandparents' house. Janine returned home about 7:00 p.m. and drove off in her white 1988 Ford Tempo about 7:30 p.m. That was the last time Richard Lee saw his daughter. The next morning, someone from a store in Lake Elsinore called and informed him that a man had tried to cash one of Janine's checks. After receiving that information, he notified the police. Richard Lee identified the checkbook found in Janine's car  last driven by defendant  as belonging to Janine and stated that she always carried it. Janine's sister, Linda Lee, testified that she had two brothers and a sister, Janine, and that Richard Lee was their father. Linda identified Janine from an autopsy photograph. Defendant did not object to the admission of the above testimony. Consequently, his claim is forfeited on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a)); People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 896, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) In any event, the claim lacks merit. Richard Lee's identification of Janine's checkbook and car and his testimony that he learned someone had tried to cash her check the morning after her disappearance corroborated defendant's confession and were relevant to establish that defendant killed Janine to steal her money and car. His testimony relating to the call Janine received and her later departure corroborated defendant's confession that he tricked Janine into giving them a ride that night and was relevant to establish premeditation and deliberation. In addition, Richard Lee's testimony served to fill in the chronology of events from the evening of October 24, when Janine disappeared, to the following morning. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 322, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374 [testimony of victim's relatives properly admitted to fill in chronology of events].) Linda's identification was relevant to prove that Janine was a human being who had been alive before the alleged criminal act had occurred and was dead afterwards. (See People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 849, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460; see also People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 15, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748 [photograph showing bloodied, lifeless body relevant to establish murder had occurred].) [4] Finally, the testimony was not unduly prejudicial. As the Attorney General points out, the testimony was brief and factual, and the record does not reflect that either witness made any emotional outbursts. ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 374, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169 .) Thus, the trial court properly admitted the testimony of the victim's family members. c. Blood Spatter Evidence Criminalist Craig Ogino testified that blood spatter evidence showed that Janine had been sitting in an upright position in her car when she was hit on the left side of her head. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting that evidence because: (1) it was presented as if it had an aura of scientific infallibility, and (2) Ogino was not qualified to testify as an expert on blood spatter evidence. Because defendant did not object to the blood spatter testimony or to Ogino's qualification as an expert on blood spatter evidence in the trial court, defendant has forfeited both issues. ( People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 321, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) In any event, the claim fails on the merits. Regarding the first issue, defendant fails to explain how the testimony was presented with an aura of scientific infallibility, nor do we discern any such aura. (See People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1018, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [blood spatter analysis testimony does not produce an aura of scientific infallibility].) Regarding the second claim, the record amply supports Ogino's qualification as an expert in blood spatter evidence. (See Evid.Code § 720, subds. (a), (b).) The record reveals that Ogino had a bachelor of science degree in chemistry and was working towards a master's degree in criminalistics from California State University at Los Angeles. He had taken classes in forensic microscopy and bloodstain pattern interpretation taught by particular individuals or at other institutions. He was employed as a criminalist with the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department crime laboratory and had previously worked at the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office in the serology section. In addition, he taught classes in his field of expertise. Defendant complains that Ogino's expertise was not established because he failed to state that the specified classes he attended had been taught at a university or by qualified individuals, or to specify how many tests he had conducted in the past. These complaints regarding the degree of his knowledge go more to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility. ( People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 322, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) Moreover, defense counsel could have questioned Ogino on these subjects during cross-examination, but did not do so. Ogino's educational background and work experience fully qualified him to testify as an expert on blood spatter evidence. ( ibid.; People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1018-1019, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.) 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant contends the evidence, in several respects, was insufficient to support the judgment. In reviewing a criminal conviction challenged as lacking evidentiary support, `the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence  that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value  such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) The same standard of review applies to special circumstance allegations. ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if the court would have concluded otherwise. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618.) a. First degree murder conviction; robbery-murder special-circumstance finding. The prosecution tried the case under a theory that Janine's murder either was deliberate and premeditated or was perpetrated during the commission of a robbery. Defendant claims that the jury's verdict of first degree murder is not supported by sufficient evidence on either theory.