Opinion ID: 2094603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: post-judgment petition

Text: Prior to oral argument in defendant's direct appeal of his conviction and death sentence, defendant filed with the circuit court a post-judgment petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1401). At the hearing on the petition, the following additional evidence was presented. Subsequent to defendant's trial, appellate defense attorney Peter Rotskoff and witness Deborah Rienbolt spoke on the phone and met personally a number of times. These conversations were initially at the request of Rotskoff, but some of the later conversations were initiated by Rienbolt. On January 4, 1989, at the Peoria Correctional Center, Rienbolt and Rotskoff met and, Rotskoff testified, Rienbolt told him that defendant did not stab either Dyke or Karen Rhoads. She also told him that: (1) defendant was not at the crime scene at the time of the murders, although he may have been there at some point; (2) a man named James Slifer was present, and that a woman named Cheryl Costa had involvement in the murders; (3) someone at the courthouse was involved in the murders; and (4) none of her prior statements were close to the truth. After Rienbolt was transferred to the Dwight Correctional Center, Rotskoff and she had further correspondence. Rotskoff met her on January 13, 1989, and Rienbolt signed an affidavit stating that defendant did not stab Dyke or Karen Rhoads and that she had told this to the authorities prior to defendant's trial. She also stated that only Herbert Whitlock stabbed Dyke and Karen Rhoads, and that he was the only one who came to her house and returned the knife on the morning following the crime. Phone records submitted at the hearing indicated that Rienbolt had initiated some of the above correspondence with Rotskoff. At the post-trial proceeding, Rienbolt denied all the statements she made to Rotskoff, and further testified that she did not look at the affidavit prior to signing it. Beatrice Stanley, a notary public, testified that Rienbolt signed the affidavit a second time in front of her (it had already been signed when Stanley got to the room), and that Rienbolt did not object, or appear nervous or threatened when she signed the affidavit. Stanley also said that Rotskoff was the only other person there and that he seemed friendly. A number of witnesses testified that they had previous conversations with Rienbolt after defendant's trial and that she had made statements such as: many were involved and there was more to it; and I told them Randy [defendant] didn't do it, that Herbert Whitlock was the one that did it. Additionally, Rienbolt testified that she told the State's Attorney that she would not testify at defendant's trial unless she received a time credit. However, she also said that she made that threat to the State's Attorney for leverage in her own case, but that she intended on testifying against defendant and Whitlock all along. When Rienbolt was sentenced (after defendant's original trial), she was given a time credit, without objection from the State's Attorney. Defendant submitted a written statement made on November 28, 1988, by Darrell Herrington, and alleged that he committed perjury at the original trial when he implicated defendant in the murders. He additionally alleged that Herrington's statement provides the basis for various aspects of police misconduct. The circumstances of Herrington's statement are important. He met defendant's trial attorney, S. John Muller, and Rotskoff at Muller's office on November 28, 1988. According to Herrington's testimony at the hearing, he spoke with defendant's attorney for an hour and was offered assistance in regaining his driver's license. He said that the attorney also assured him that he did not need an attorney, and Herrington then made a reported statement. Although video and audio tape equipment was available, the attorney had Herrington's statement taken by a court reporter. The statement is replete with off-the-record conversations and also leading questions. After she finished recording Herrington's statement, the court reporter refused to sign an affidavit saying that defendant's attorneys did not speak with Herrington during the off-the-record conversations. In the reported statement, Herrington had recanted some of his trial testimony. At the section 2-1401 hearing, Herrington reaffirmed the truth of the testimony he gave at defendant's trial. He also said that at his November 28, 1988, statement, he began to give the attorneys answers that he thought they wanted to hear. Defendant then presented other witnesses, who described themselves as friends of defendant, to testify to remarks Herrington made that are consistent with his November 28 statement. Defendant also alleged that Ferlin Lester Wells, who testified at defendant's original trial concerning conversations he had with defendant while the two were incarcerated at the Edgar County jail, lied at the original trial. Two other witnesses testified that when Wells went back to the prison after defendant's trial, he told them that he lied at defendant's trial. The two witnesses were shown to have questionable reputations for truth and veracity, although neither claimed to personally know, or be friendly with, the defendant. Wells further testified that his testimony at the original trial was truthful. He said that he had hoped that his cooperation would be taken into consideration with his own pending charges, but that no offer of leniency or plea bargain was given him in exchange for his testimony. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court found that defendant failed to meet his burden under section 2-1401, that the testimony upon which his conviction was based was not clearly and convincingly false. Thus, he was not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that his original trial was based on false evidence. In regards to the post-trial petition, defendant argues that, in light of the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a new trial. The purpose of a section 2-1401 petition is to bring forth facts which, had they been known at the time of trial, would have prevented entry of the judgment. ( People v. Sanchez (1989), 131 Ill.2d 417, 419, 137 Ill.Dec. 629, 546 N.E.2d 574.) Furthermore, [a]lthough the petition is usually characterized as a civil remedy, its remedial powers extend to criminal cases. ( Sanchez, 131 Ill.2d at 420, 137 Ill.Dec. 629, 546 N.E.2d 574.) The appropriate standard of review for the denial of a petition is whether the trial court abused its discretion. ( Sanchez, 131 Ill.2d at 420, 137 Ill. Dec. 629, 546 N.E.2d 574.) Defendant argues that since Rienbolt, Herrington, and Wells clearly committed perjury at the original trial, his section 2-1401 petition should have been granted. This court has noted that Section 72 [the predecessor to section 2-1401] provides a basis for obtaining relief from a judgment based upon perjured testimony   . People v. Jennings (1971), 48 Ill.2d 295, 298, 269 N.E.2d 474. Much of defendant's argument concerns Rienbolt's and Herrington's recantations of trial testimony. Rienbolt's recantation was made in an affidavit and Herrington's was made in a reported statement. In regards to recantations this court has long held that they are inherently unreliable. Recantation by a witness of his testimony on a trial does not necessarily entitle a defendant to a new trial. Recanting testimony is regarded as very unreliable, and a court will usually deny a new trial based on that ground where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true. Especially is this true where the recantation relied on involves a confession of perjury. The recanting testimony of witnesses will not ordinarily be regarded as sufficient ground for a new trial except in extraordinary and unusual cases. (33 A.L.R. p. 550, note.) The affidavit of a recanting witness is not entitled to so much weight as to justify the conclusion that the evidence given by him was corrupt and willfully false. The conclusion of the jury would rather warrant the presumption that his testimony was truthful and his affidavit false. Those experienced in the administration of criminal law well know the untrustworthy character of recanting testimony. People v. Marquis (1931), 344 Ill. 261, 265, 176 N.E. 314. See also People v. Bickham (1974), 23 Ill. App.3d 1074, 1078, 320 N.E.2d 478; People v. Bushey (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 285, 289, 120 Ill.Dec. 708, 524 N.E.2d 738. In People v. Ellison (1980), 89 Ill.App.3d 1, 44 Ill.Dec. 381, 411 N.E.2d 350, the defendant argued that a new trial was necessary due to a witness' having recanted her testimony. The victim/witness testified at the original trial that defendant had raped her. In a post-trial deposition, the victim said that the defendant, in fact, did not rape her. However, at the evidentiary hearing on the defendant's petition, the victim/witness testified that her original trial testimony was the correct statement of fact. After noting that recantations are inherently unreliable, that no representative of the State's Attorney's office was present at the victim/witness' deposition, and that the trial court was in the best position to determine what the truth was (as it could observe the witness' demeanor), the court held that there clearly was not an abuse of discretion in the trial court's denying defendant's petition for a new trial. 89 Ill.App.3d at 9, 44 Ill.Dec. 381, 411 N.E.2d 350. All three of the witnesses that defendant alleges perjured themselves at his trial were present at his section 2-1401 hearing. All three of the witnesses stated that they testified truthfully at defendant's original trial. As has been noted, Rienbolt and Herrington made recantations of their trial testimony in sworn, post-trial statements. However, the conditions in which the recantations were made were less than ideal; thus the trial court had discretion to decide how much weight to give to the recanted testimony. This court cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's section 2-1401 petition. Witness Herrington's statements were all made as answers to leading questions, and the record was replete with off-the-record conversations. Notably, the court stenographer refused to sign an affidavit saying that defense attorneys did not speak with Herrington during the off-the-record conversations. Additionally, both Rienbolt's and Herrington's statements are suspect because neither witness was represented by counsel at the time and a representative of the State's Attorney's office was not present when the statements were made. Thus, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was no sufficient new evidence to justify a new trial. Defendant also argues that even if the evidence of alleged recantations is not sufficient to entitle him to a new trial, the new evidence should at least entitle him to a new sentencing hearing. Defendant relies on a discussion in Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162, 181, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1761, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 153, where the Court noted that, in a capital case, one of the benefits of having the same jury that determines guilt determine the penalty is that the jury may consider residual or whimsical doubt as to guilt in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. This reasoning has been criticized, as the Court has noted that the Lockhart opinion: stands for    the simple truism that where `States are willing to go to allow defendants to capitalize on residual doubts,` such doubts will inure to the defendant's benefit. Lockhart, supra [476 U.S.] at 181 [106 S.Ct. at 1769]. Lockhart did not endorse capital sentencing schemes which permit such use of `residual doubts,' let alone suggest that capital defendants have a right to demand jury consideration of `residual doubts' in the sentencing phase. (Emphasis in original.) Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988), 487 U.S. 164, 173, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2326-27, 101 L.Ed.2d 155, 165. Under the death penalty statute, evidence is admissible at the death sentence hearing that would not ordinarily be admissible during the guilt phase of the trial. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(e); People v. Hall (1986), 114 Ill.2d 376, 416, 102 Ill.Dec. 322, 499 N.E.2d 1335.) The factors controlling the admissibility of evidence    are relevance and reliability, and the determination of admissibility rests in the discretion of the trial court. ( Hall, 114 Ill.2d at 416-17, 102 Ill.Dec. 322, 499 N.E.2d 1335.) As has already been noted, at the section 2-1401 hearing, the trial court did not find that the evidence of Rienbolt's and Herrington's recantations was reliable. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a new sentencing hearing. Defendant also contends that he is entitled to a new trial, or an evidentiary hearing, because prosecution witness Darrell Herrington was, several months prior to defendant's original trial, hypnotized to probe his knowledge of the Rhoadses' murders. Herrington had made statements to the police on September 21 and November 24, 1986 (one day prior to being hypnotized), regarding the Rhoadses' murders. At trial some of his testimony was similar to his September statement and some of his testimony was similar to his November statement to the police. In People v. Zayas (1989), 131 Ill.2d 284, 137 Ill.Dec. 568, 546 N.E.2d 513, the court held that [t]he proponent of prehypnotic recall    will bear the burden of establishing that the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness is based solely upon that witness' independent, prehypnotic recall. (131 Ill.2d at 297, 137 Ill.Dec. 568, 546 N.E.2d 513.) The court also noted that a witness other than the defendant himself may not offer testimony to the extent that it is enhanced through hypnosis. Zayas, 131 Ill.2d at 286, 137 Ill.Dec. 568, 546 N.E.2d 513. Prior to the court's Zayas decision, the court decided People v. Wilson (1987), 116 Ill.2d 29, 106 Ill.Dec. 771, 506 N.E.2d 571, where it held that the the proponent of the [post-hypnotic] testimony should establish the nature and extent of the witness' prehypnotic recall. (116 Ill.2d at 48-49, 106 Ill.Dec. 771, 506 N.E.2d 571.) In regards to Herrington's testimony, defendant did not contemporaneously object at trial, or object in his post-trial motion for a new trial. Therefore, defendant has waived the issue on appeal. People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.