Opinion ID: 4026990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 781, 799 (1997), this Court stated:

Text: [I]n the case of plain error, that is, error which vitally affects a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial, we retain the discretion to provide appellate review, although the error was unobjected to. We have explained, however, that plain error review should only be undertaken when the error is compelling, extraordinary, exceptional or fundamental to assure the defendant of fair trial. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In short, under Rich, plain error review is unavailable where a defendant fails to object as a matter of trial tactics. In this case, Givens has not requested plain error review, and has not argued that the failure to raise the issue before the verdicts became final and the circuit court discharged the jury was not a matter of trial tactics. Further, the error is neither clear nor obvious. It is mere speculation to posit that, in convicting Givens of felony murder, the jury erroneously intended to find conspiracy to commit robbery to be the requisite predicate offense. Givens did not object to the allegedly inconsistent verdicts while the jury was still present, and filed a motion to strike the convictions a little over an hour after the circuit court discharged the jury. If Givens had raised the issue of the allegedly inconsistent verdicts before the verdicts became final and the circuit court discharged the jury, the circuit court would have been able to send the jury back to resolve the alleged inconsistency. Under this scenario, Givens may have been convicted of a requisite predicate felony; thus, the existence of error is not clear and obvious. Although Givens has not sought plain error review and has not addressed any of the Rich factors—including - 50 - whether the failure to raise the issue before the verdicts became final and the circuit court discharged the jury was a matter of trial tactics—what is certain is that, in failing to raise the issue before the verdicts became final and the circuit court discharged the jury, Givens deprived the circuit court of an opportunity to have the jury resolve the alleged inconsistency and, thereby, avoided the possibility of being convicted of a requisite predicate felony. Under these circumstances, the error is not clear and obvious, and the four factors that are necessary for plain error review are not satisfied. In contrast to Maryland, some States, such as Illinois, have a different standard for plain error review. In Illinois, under Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., S. Ct. Rule 615(a), plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. See also People v. Clark, 50 N.E.3d 1120, 1133 (Ill. 2016) (“The plain error doctrine is applicable when: (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In Illinois, the plain error doctrine may apply even where the seriousness of the error is not significant. By contrast, in Maryland, the plain error doctrine may apply only if the four factors that are set forth in Rich are satisfied. Our conclusion is in conformity with Dietz, 2016 WL 3189528, at , in which the Supreme Court remarked: “Given additional concerns in criminal cases, such as attachment - 51 - of the double jeopardy bar, we do not address here whether it would be appropriate to recall a jury after discharge in a criminal case.” (Citation omitted). Obviously, by the time that a trial court discharges a jury that has acquitted a defendant, a trial court has accepted the acquittal, and thus has made the acquittal final. See Smith, 299 Md. at 168-69, 472 A.2d at 993. By that time, a double jeopardy concern would arise if the trial court recalled the jury. The holding in this case does not stand for the proposition that a trial court may discharge a jury that has acquitted a defendant of one charge and convicted the defendant of another charge, then later recall the jury to resolve an inconsistency between the acquittal and the conviction. We disagree with Givens’s contention that, in the scenario that we described above, the defendant is forced to “forfeit an acquittal.” As explained above, the defendant is the only one who can choose to object to the inconsistent verdicts. When inconsistent verdicts are rendered, the trial court may not, sua sponte, send the jury back to resolve the inconsistency, because it is the defendant who is entitled, should he or she so wish, to accept the benefit of the inconsistent acquittal. By the same token, the prosecutor may not ask to have the jury sent back to resolve the inconsistency, because it is the defendant, once again, who is entitled, should he or she so wish, to accept the benefit of the inconsistent acquittal. If the defendant chooses to object to the inconsistent verdicts, and the trial court sends the jury back to resolve the inconsistency, it is not a foregone conclusion that the jury will find the defendant guilty of both of the charges; to the contrary, the jury might acquit the defendant of both of the charges. See Price, 405 Md. at 42, 949 A.2d at 638 - 52 - (Harrell, J., concurring) (“The jury is free to resolve the inconsistency [] by returning verdict in the defendant’s favor[.]”); Tate II, 182 Md. App. at 134, 957 A.2d at 651 (“The obvious cure for an inconsistency in verdicts would be to send the jury back to resolve the inconsistency: ‘Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you can’t have it both ways. Give us two acquittals or give us two convictions.’”). Givens is also mistaken in asserting that the following language from Taha, 378 Md. at 492, 836 A.2d at 645, undermines our holding in this case: “In the absence of a rule requiring trial [court]s to resolve verdict inconsistencies prior to the release of the jury, the parties in Maryland courts should not be precluded from the raising the issue of irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts by post-judgment motion.” (Footnote omitted). In a footnote that followed this sentence, this Court stated: The dissent would advocate not reaching the central issue in this case, the very reason why we issued a writ of certiorari, because [the defendant employer] did not voice a timely objection at trial. As we have stated, however, this Court has discretion to consider issues that were not preserved.” Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 238, 786 A.2d 706, 718 (2001) (discussing Maryland Rule 8-131). Following the denial of its timely postjudgment motion, [the defendant employer] appealed the issue of irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts twice, and this Court twice issued a writ of certiorari to resolve the matter. Had the issue of irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts been waived, and it has not, we would have exercised our discretion in this case to resolve this important question of public policy and to provide guidance to the trial courts. Id. at 492 n.10, 836 A.2d at 645 n.10. In other words, in Taha, this Court expressly emphasized that, under the circumstances of that case, this Court would have exercised discretion to reach the issue of inconsistency even if the issue were not preserved. As this Court noted in Taha, “there remains a distinction between inconsistent verdicts in criminal - 53 - cases and irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts in civil matters.” Taha, id. at 488, 836 A.2d at 642 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). In Taha, this Court declined to conclude that the party that challenged the inconsistent verdicts waived the issue as to the inconsistent verdicts by failing to object, because, “[b]ased on the circumstances in th[at] case, it [wa]s procedurally fair to address the merits of [the party]’s contentions[.]” Id. at 492, 836 A.2d at 645 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The circumstances to which this Court referred included that the judgment in the plaintiff’s favor was “based on woefully insufficient evidence and at odds with the jury’s other legal conclusions.” Id. at 492, 836 A.2d at 645 (citation omitted). It is evident that this Court’s remark in Taha that parties in civil cases should not be precluded from addressing legally inconsistent verdicts in “post-judgment motions” was not intended to mean that, in criminal cases, defendants must be permitted to challenge legally inconsistent verdicts after the finality of the verdicts and the discharge of the jury. We also disagree with Givens’s contention that, in Price, 405 Md. 10, 949 A.2d 619, the circumstance that a majority of the Court did not adopt Judge Harrell’s concurring opinion is of significance. As discussed above, no issue as to preservation or waiver was before this Court in Price; and no question was presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari in Price concerning preservation or waiver. Stated otherwise, in Price, this Court answered the questions that were put to it. “[I]issues ‘[that] merely lurk in the record . . . are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents[.]’” State v. Rice, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___, No. 96, Sept. Term 2015, 2016 WL 2941118, at  n.5 (Md. May 20, 2016) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)) (ellipsis in - 54 - original).23 Although no issue as to preservation or waiver was before this Court in Price, Judge Harrell elected to address waiver for the express purpose of providing guidance to parties and courts. See Price, 405 Md. at 35, 949 A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring) (“I write separately . . . to encourage clarification of the scope of today’s holding and the proper procedure to be followed by a defendant . . . and a trial [court] in order to fashion relief from [] inconsistent verdict[s], thereby giving guidance and possibly sparing our appellate courts unnecessary appeals.”). As the Court of Special Appeals observed in Tate II, 182 Md. App. at 129, 957 A.2d at 648-49, Judge Harrell’s concurring opinion in Price “clarifies several vitally important issues that the majority opinion leaves in the dark and that could lead the unwary astray.” (Footnote omitted). And, in multiple cases after Tate II, the Court of Special Appeals adopted Part C of Judge Harrell’s concurring opinion in Price and concluded that, to preserve for review any issue as to allegedly inconsistent verdicts, a defendant in a criminal trial by jury must object to the allegedly inconsistent verdicts before the verdicts become final and the trial court discharges the jury. See Hicks, 189 Md. App. at 129, 984 A.2d at 256; Martin, 218 Md. App. at 40, 96 A.3d at 788; Henson v. State, 212 Md. App. 314, 323, 69 A.3d 26, 32, cert. denied, 434 Md. 314, 75 A.3d 319 (2013) (The defendant “failed to preserve his point for review by objecting prior to the jury’s 23 In Rice, 2016 WL 2941118, at  n.5, we inferred that, in one of this Court’s prior opinions, this Court concluded that an appeal was properly before this Court; although this Court did not expressly indicate as much in the prior opinion, “a question as to our jurisdiction to hear an appeal is hardly one that ‘lurks in the record’ when the State squarely addresses the issue in its brief.” - 55 - discharge[.]” (Citing McNeal, 426 Md. at 466, 44 A.3d at 989; Price, 405 Md. at 40, 949 A.2d at 637 (Harrell, J., concurring)). In sum, we now join the Court of Special Appeals, adopt Part C of Judge Harrell’s concurring opinion in Price, and hold that, to preserve for review any issue as to allegedly inconsistent verdicts, a defendant in a criminal trial by jury must object to the allegedly inconsistent verdicts before the verdicts are final and the trial court discharges the jury. Applying our conclusion to this case’s facts, we conclude that Givens waived any issue as to allegedly inconsistent verdicts by failing to object before the verdicts became final and the circuit court discharged the jury. Indeed, the record reveals that Givens had ample opportunity to object before the verdicts became final and the jury was discharged. Immediately after the jury’s foreperson stated the verdicts, the circuit court asked whether there were any requests. Givens’s counsel’s only response was to ask that the jury be polled. The courtroom clerk repeated the verdicts exactly as the jury’s foreperson had stated them. The courtroom clerk polled the jury by asking the jury’s foreperson “Is this your verdict?” and asking each other juror “[I]s [the foreperson]’s verdict your verdict?” Each of the twelve jurors separately responded affirmatively. The courtroom clerk properly hearkened the verdict, stating: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, h[e]arken to your verdict as the Court has recorded it.” The courtroom clerk repeated the verdicts again, then asked: “So say you all?” The jurors responded “Yes.” The circuit court thanked and discharged the jury. Immediately afterward, the circuit court, the prosecutor, and Givens’s counsel discussed matters that were related to the sentencing proceeding, and the circuit court adjourned. - 56 - Givens was convicted of the first-degree felony murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery of each of the six victims. It would have been apparent that Givens had been convicted of first-degree felony murder, but had not been convicted of an underlying felony. Yet, it was not until after the jury was discharged that Givens filed the motion to strike in the circuit court. By that time, with the jury discharged and the circuit court adjourned, it was too late for the circuit court to send the jury back to resolve the inconsistency in the verdicts—assuming that the circuit court agreed with Givens that there was an inconsistency in the verdicts. By filing the motion to strike after the verdicts became final and the circuit court discharged the jury, Givens deprived the circuit court of the opportunity to resolve any inconsistency in the verdicts. In doing so, the purpose of the preservation requirement— to give a trial court the opportunity to correct any error in the proceedings—was thwarted. See Peterson, 444 Md. at 126, 118 A.3d at 937 (“Fairness and the orderly administration of justice [are] advanced by requiring [defense] counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the [trial] court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct[,] any errors in the proceedings.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Simply stated, Givens’s post-trial motion to strike was too late. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS. - 57 - Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CT120050C Argued: May 5, 2016 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 88 September Term, 2015 DOMINIC GIVENS v. STATE OF MARYLAND Barbera, C.J. Greene Adkins McDonald Watts Hotten Battaglia, Lynne A. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Greene, J. which Adkins and Battaglia, JJ., join. Filed: August 22, 2016 I respectfully dissent. The long standing rule has been that generally a jury verdict defective in form or substance should not be accepted by the trial judge. Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945). In Heinze, this Court explained the policy behind the rule: It is essential for the prompt and efficient administration of justice to prevent defective verdicts from being entered upon the records of the court as well as to ascertain the real intention of the jury in their finding. Where a verdict is ambiguous, inconsistent, unresponsive, or otherwise defective, it is the duty of the trial judge to call the jury’s attention to the defect and to direct them to put the verdict in proper form either in the presence of the court or by returning to their consultation room for the purpose of further deliberation. 184 Md. at 617−18, 42 A.2d at 130 (see cases cited therein). I accept the majority’s premise that Mr. Givens did not object in a timely fashion to challenge the inconsistent jury verdicts. Thus, he did not properly preserve for appellate review the issue of inconsistent verdicts. Although, Mr. Givens’ counsel could have brought his concerns to the trial judge’s attention before the discharge of the jury, the trial judge should have been aware of the nature of the inconsistent verdicts and instructed the jury that it could not return inconsistent verdicts. See Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 407−08, 809 A.2d 653, 670 (2002). See also Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 21, 949 A.2d 619, 626 (2008). In addition, the court could have refused to accept the inconsistent verdicts and directed the jury to deliberate further in order for the jury to decide whether to enter either two not guilty verdicts or two guilty verdicts with respect to the felony murder count and the underlying predicate felony count(s). See Heinze, 184 Md. at 617, 42 A.2d at 130. 2 In this appeal, we should not be overly concerned about the lack of preservation. Instead, we should reach the merits of his appeal either on the basis of the “plain error” doctrine or the exercise of our discretion and the obvious prejudice to the defendant. See Md. Rules 4-325(e) and 8-131(a). It is important to note that before the imposition of the sentence in this case, defense counsel filed a motion to strike the felony murder verdict approximately one hour after the jury had been discharged on the grounds that the felony murder verdict was inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts. That motion was denied and the trial judge sentenced the defendant to life, for felony murder, and twenty years consecutive, to the life sentence, for conspiracy to commit robbery. The remaining counts were merged. Although the defendant’s motion to strike the felony murder verdict was not filed before the court discharged the jury, it was filed in sufficient time for the trial judge to take action prior to the imposition of the sentence. In my view, the trial judge, like the appellate court, has the authority to strike or set aside an invalid felony murder verdict or conviction. We declared in Price, 405 Md. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630, that “inconsistent verdicts shall no longer be allowed.” Indeed, this was a sea change with respect to inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases. This was more than an aspirational statement from the Court, it was a clear declaration of the law of Maryland going forward. The focus of the majority opinion in Price was the intolerable nature of inconsistent verdicts, and notably because they were not allowed in civil cases, it would be a travesty to continue to allow inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases. See Price, 405 Md. at 22, 949 A.2d at 625. The majority, in Price, did not discuss how Mr. Price preserved his challenge to the inconsistent verdicts or 3 what others must do in order to challenge an inconsistent verdict. Today, the majority, in this case, adopts Judge Harrell’s concurring opinion in Price as the standard for preservation: “[T]o preserve the issue of legally inconsistent verdicts for appellate review, a defendant in a criminal trial by jury must object or make known any opposition to the allegedly inconsistent verdicts before the verdicts become final and the trial court discharges the jury.” Maj. Slip Op. at 2. In McNeal v. State, 426 Md. 455, 462, 44 A.3d 982, 986 (2012), we adopted part of Judge Harrell’s concurring opinion in Price and held that legally inconsistent verdicts, as opposed to “factually” inconsistent verdicts, will not be tolerated. We did not adopt at that time Judge Harrell’s position, as reflected in his concurring opinion in Price, that a timely challenge by the defendant to an inconsistent verdict must be made before the verdict becomes final and the jury is discharged. See McNeal, 426 Md. at 466, 44 A.3d at 989. In comparing criminal jury trials to civil jury trials, in Price, we discussed our opinion in Galloway: The consistency requirements in criminal cases should not be less stringent than the standards we have applied in civil cases, and that we are unwilling to afford less protection to the jury trial rights of a criminal defendant, whose very liberty, or even his or her life, is at stake, than to a civil litigant, where, generally, it is money that is at stake. Price, 405 Md. at 27, 949 A.2d at 629 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Price, as a matter of judicial policy, we were also persuaded by the reasoning of several State Supreme Courts which had refused to permit inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases. 405 Md. at 27–29, 949 A.2d at 629–30. In DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 377 (Alaska 1970), the Supreme Court of Alaska stated that there is 4 no basis to assume . . . that inconsistent verdicts are the product of a jury’s disposition toward treating the accused leniently; nor can we see a basis for assuming that, in allowing inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal trials to stand, we run only “the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the result of compromise.” The truth is simply that we do not know, nor do we have any way of telling how many inconsistent verdicts are attributable to feelings of leniency, to compromise, or, for that matter, to outright confusion on the part of the jury. We noted that the Supreme Court of Florida pointed out that “the possibility of a wrongful conviction . . . outweighs the rationale for allowing inconsistent verdicts to stand.” Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 218, 222 (Fla. 2007). The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that “a conviction will be reversed [] in those instances where acquittal on one crime as charged to the jury is conclusive as to a necessary element of the other crime, as charged, for which the guilty verdict was rendered.” People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. 1981). It would be, in my view, an injustice to allow the conviction for felony murder to stand. Under the felony murder doctrine, a verdict of guilty on the underlying felony is an essential ingredient of the murder conviction. See Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 269, 373 A.2d 262, 267 (1977). Even assuming the sufficiency of the evidence to convict for felony murder, here, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to any of the possible predicate offenses, namely, robbery, attempted robbery, and use of a handgun. Instead, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to a related misdemeanor offense of conspiracy to commit robbery. A verdict of guilty for conspiracy to commit robbery does not and cannot support a conviction for felony murder. Clearly, the verdicts entered and the subsequent 5 convictions in this case did not result in a windfall to the defendant. Any windfall favored only the prosecution. The verdict of guilty of felony murder was invalid the moment the jury announced it in open court. Such a verdict of guilty, under the circumstances, based upon no predicate felony offense or an improper predicate offense cannot stand and does not support a rational conclusion that the jury exercised leniency toward the defendant. The verdict of felony murder appears to rest upon the jury’s erroneous belief that it could find Mr. Givens guilty of felony murder on the basis of a conspiracy to commit robbery. Thus, because Mr. Givens agreed to be involved in the events that led to the victim’s death, the jury must have blamed him for the victim’s death. Under the circumstances, the inconsistent verdict of guilty for felony murder is wrong. Appellate courts may “exercise [their] discretion to review unpreserved issues . . . where prejudicial error was found and failure to preserve the issue was not a matter of trial tactics.” State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 574, 3 A.3d 1210, 1214 (2010) (quoting Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 150, 729 A.2d 910, 919 (1999)). The majority opinion dismisses the application of the plain error doctrine to the facts of this case believing that its application “requires more than the mere circumstance that an issue pertains to substantial rights.” Maj. Slip Op. at 36. I respectfully dissent from this conclusion. Even though appellate review under the plain error doctrine is rare, its application is justified under the facts of this case. At this stage of the process, only an appellate court can remedy the obvious and serious error in this case. Accordingly, I would apply the four prongs of plain-error review and conclude that the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity [and] public reputation 6 of [the] judicial proceedings.” Rich, 415 Md. at 578, 3 A.3d at 1216 (citations omitted). Moreover, I agree with the position of the appellate court in People v. Ousley, 697 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) when it stated, in an analogous case, that the “defendant’s failure to raise the issue of the jury’s legally inconsistent verdicts at trial or in a post-trial motion does not result in a waiver of that issue because legally inconsistent verdicts present plain error, the exception to the rule of waiver.” As a result of our opinion in Price, legally inconsistent verdicts are no longer tolerated. Because of our decision in McNeal, factually inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases are tolerated. To obtain a felony murder conviction, a verdict of guilty on the underlying felony is an essential ingredient of the crime of felony murder. A misdemeanor cannot be a substitute for the underlying felony under the felony murder doctrine. Second, the jury’s legal error in rendering inconsistent verdicts of guilty of felony murder and not guilty as to any of the predicate offenses is obvious and not subject to any reasonable dispute. Third, the error affected Mr. Givens’ substantial right to a fair trial based upon the law and the facts. In other words, the verdict and ultimate invalid conviction of felonymurder affected the outcome of the court proceedings. Lastly, this Court has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to exercised—because the results “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” Rich, 415 at 578, 3 A.3d at 1216 (citations omitted). As stated previously, generally, if the jury returns a verdict that is defective in form or substance, the trial judge should not accept it. See Heinze, 184 Md. at 617, 42 A.2d at 7 130. Thus, our case law provides that the trial judge has a duty to remedy the problem with regard to inconsistent verdicts. In the present case defense counsel did not bring the matter of the inconsistent verdicts to the attention of the trial judge until after the jury was discharged. The trial judge could have addressed the matter sua sponte before discharging the jury, but did not. Nonetheless, the issue was raised below and decided by the trial court when it denied defense counsel’s motion to strike the felony murder guilty verdict. It seems to me that where the record shows plain error and prejudice to the defendant and the issue was raised below, we should review the court’s acceptance of the legally inconsistent verdict, even if the issue was not raised timely. Accordingly, on the merits, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Givens’ motion to strike the felony murder conviction. Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I respectfully dissent. Judges Adkins and Battaglia authorize me to state that they join this dissenting opinion. 8