Opinion ID: 2976914
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction of Manley’s Prior Crimes

Text: As his first charge of deficient performance, Manley points to his attorney’s extensive inquiry into his prior criminal record and his failure to object to the prosecution’s similar line of questioning. We are of the view that defense counsel’s decision to probe into Manley’s criminal history does not qualify as unreasonable professional conduct. The subject of Manley’s criminal history arose three times during the course of the trial. One of the initial questions Manley’s defense counsel asked Manley was about his criminal history: 2 Given our ultimate finding that trial counsel’s performance did not prejudice Manley’s defense, we note that we could proceed without discussing deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed”). Nevertheless, we choose to examine both components of the two-pronged test. - 10 - Q: At what age did you run into bad trouble? A: Right before I turned sixteen . . . . Q: Earlier than age sixteen were you in trouble in juvenile court? A: I think I had one incident, yes. Q: Okay. What were the felony charges that you had at age sixteen? A: Two aggravated assaults. Q: All right. And there was some testimony this morning – what were they about? A: Basically I was running with the wrong crowd at that time and got caught up. Q: Okay. Somebody get shot then? A: Yes, two individuals. Q: And what were their names? A: Kelly Shurelds and Napoleon Shurelds. Q: All right. So am I correct, you then spent from age sixteen until when in our penal system here in the state of Ohio, til what age? A: I got out four days before I turned twenty-five. (JA 1057-58.) On cross-examination, the prosecution inquired further into the details of Manley’s criminal record. Specifically, the prosecutor asked Manley whether, similar to the injury in the instant case, Manley shot one of the victims in the back. The prosecutor also asked Manley if the weapon involved in his prior crimes was a .45 caliber pistol, the same type of weapon involved in the instant shooting. Later in the trial, defense counsel questioned Joe Pea about his knowledge of Manley’s prior convictions. Pea stated that Manley was involved in a shooting incident when he was sixteen, for which was incarcerated for seven to eight years. On cross-examination, Pea answered affirmatively when the prosecutor asked whether Manley’s juvenile record involved him shooting two people. Pea further confirmed that, at the time of trial, Manley had only been out of prison for a little over a year. The subject of Manley’s criminal history arose a third time when Andre Manley testified as a witness for the defense. On cross-examination, Andre responded affirmatively when the prosecutor - 11 - asked him whether Manley’s prior conviction involved him shooting a man in the back twice and shooting another person. Defense counsel objected to both questions, but these were the only objections on record to the prosecutor’s inquiry into the details of Manley’s criminal history. In its opinion, the district court noted that having the defendant bring to light past convictions was a common trial tactic but took issue with the level of detail to which the jury became privy as a result of this testimony. According to the court, defense counsel acted deficiently by both adducing and failing to object to the prosecutor adducing information about the type of weapon used in the prior shooting, the same caliber handgun used in Glover’s killing. We disagree. Notwithstanding the unfavorable nature of the information elicited about his prior crimes and the similarities with respect to the instant crime—both shootings and both involving the same type of weapon—the rules of evidence permitted the prosecutor to inquire into such details. The evidence of Manley’s criminal history was admissible pursuant to Ohio Rule of Evidence 404(B). This rule provides in pertinent part: [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. Ohio R. Evid. 404(B). As the trial judge explained in overruling defense counsel’s objection to the testimony about the similarity of the weapon Manley used in his prior convictions and the weapon used in the instant shooting, this evidence is arguably admissible to show absence of mistake. Admittedly, the fact that the prior incidents occurred nine years ago, when Manley was only sixteen, - 12 - weakens their probative value with respect to absence of mistake. Nevertheless, it does not rise to the level of constitutional deficiency for the defense counsel to have introduced this evidence. b. Decision to Call Detective Guidera as a Defense Witness While Manley’s first charge of ineffective assistance is unavailing, his second charge stands apart. We are of the view that defense counsel’s decision to call Guidera as a witness constituted deficient performance under Strickland because it bolstered the testimony provided by witnesses for the prosecution and relayed to the jury additional testimony corroborating the prosecution’s version of the facts. Upon calling Guidera as a witness, Manley’s attorney proceeded to question Guidera about his interviews with several eyewitnesses to the shooting. Three of the individuals referred to by Guidera—Jamie Wilson, Titus Brown, and Ron Dillingham—all appeared at trial as witnesses for the prosecution. Defense counsel, however, also questioned Guidera about his interviews with several other eyewitnesses who did not testify, including Tierre Scales, Gary Jackson, and Aaron Porter. Likewise, defense counsel also inquired about “any other individuals who you may have talked to that I haven’t asked you about.” (JA 887, 889.) Guidera never testified to the size or makeup of this group of unnamed, other witnesses. In specific, Manley’s attorney commenced his direct examination of Guidera by questioning him about his conversations with Wilson. Guidera admitted that Wilson had provided two inconsistent accounts of the events leading up to the shooting. When Wilson first talked to Guidera at the hospital after Glover arrived for treatment, Wilson omitted a key detail, namely that he was present at the scene of the shooting. During their second conversation, however, Wilson admitted to observing the shooting directly. Although the record is unclear as to why Manley’s attorney was - 13 - unable to impeach Wilson on cross-examination during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, presumably the strategy behind this line of questioning was to cast Wilson as unreliable and undermine his credibility as a witness for the prosecution by pointing out the two conflicting stories he provided to authorities. The mere fact that defense counsel conducted this series of questions with a strategy in mind, however, does not end the analysis. We “cannot stop there, for we must also assess if this strategy was itself constitutionally deficient.” Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 704 (6th Cir. 2000). As this Court has previously recognized, “the label ‘strategy’ is not a blanket justification for conduct which otherwise amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Lovett v. Foltz, 884 F.2d 579, at  (per curiam) (unpublished). “[E]ven deliberate trial tactics may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if they fall ‘outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.’” Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted). While challenging Wilson’s credibility as a witness was admittedly sound trial strategy, which, as we have noted, presumably could have been accomplished fully on cross-examination, defense counsel’s subsequent questioning of Guidera when he called him as a defense witness exceeded any constitutionally protected strategy. Specifically, defense counsel’s direct examination proved particularly damaging because he prompted Guidera to testify about the alleged statements of several eyewitnesses who corroborated the prosecution’s version of the shooting. For example, defense counsel inquired about Guidera’s conversations with Titus Brown, who had also testified previously as a witness for the prosecution. Guidera recalled what Brown had told him about the shooting: - 14 - He stated that a black pickup truck that he knows as owned by . . . Manley come driving up. He said he saw . . . Manley in the passenger side, the window down . . . He saw Steve Glover walk up to the truck; start having a conversation with . . . Manley. He said the conversation basically consisted of Steve was wanting to end any kind of problems that they were having. He wanted to settle any kind of disputes. While they were just talking at that time Tierre Manley pulled out a gun and shot him, shot Steve. (JA 882-83.) This recounting of events stands in direct contradiction to Manley’s version of the facts, because it suggests that Manley never exited his truck and instead delivered the fatal bullets from the inside of his vehicle. Thus, this testimony ultimately corroborates the prosecution’s version of the facts. Notwithstanding the fact that the jury already heard this testimony directly from the mouth of Brown earlier in the trial when Brown was called as a prosecution witness, the effect of Guidera’s repetition was to bolster the credibility of a state witness and call into question Manley’s own characterization of the facts. After questioning Guidera about his conversation with Brown, defense counsel questioned Guidera about statements made by “any other individuals who you may have talked to that I haven’t asked you about,” including Tierre Scales, Gary Jackson, and Aaron Porter whom the prosecution did not call as witnesses. (JA 887.) For example, defense counsel asked Guidera whether, according to all the eyewitnesses with whom he spoke, “[Manley is] the only one they saw having a gun,” to which Guidera responded affirmatively. (Id.) Likewise, Guidera testified that all the eyewitnesses with whom he spoke stated “after Steven Glover was shot[,] he fell to the ground . . . Manley was in his pickup truck[,] and it took off. As it was taking off down the road several people said that they heard other gunshots farther down the road.” (JA 887-88.) - 15 - These statements undercut Manley’s version of the events, that Manley exited his truck and was confronted by Glover and Elliott who were armed with handguns. Instead, these statements confirmed earlier testimony that Manley remained in his truck throughout the shooting and fired the gun that killed Glover. While the jury heard similar testimony during the prosecution’s case-inchief, Guidera’s testimony was damaging because it represented the collective recollections of an unknown number of individuals he interviewed while investigating the case. Thus, the result of Guidera’s testimony was to bolster the prosecution’s version of the shooting. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 288-91 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that defense counsel acted deficiently because his inquiry of an expert witness “directly contradicted the sole defense theory that [the defendant] lacked the requisite intent to commit murder” and because his “two critical errors . . . bolstered the State’s case and made [the defendant’s] explanation of the events seem less likely”) Moreover, by calling Guidera as a witness, defense counsel paved the way for the prosecution to elicit similarly injurious testimony on cross-examination and failed to object on numerous occasions to seemingly objectionable questions asked by the prosecution. For instance, the prosecution questioned Guidera about his interview with Gary Jackson, an eyewitness to the shooting who did not testify at trial. Specifically, the prosecutor inquired of Guidera, “did [Jackson] tell you he saw who was shooting?” (JA 896.) Guidera replied, “he stated the shots were coming from the pickup truck.” (Id.) This testimony had a particularly deleterious influence on Manley’s case because Guidera identified Jackson as a “good acquaintance” of Manley. (JA 610.) As a friend of Manley, Jackson’s account of the events was therefore likely to carry considerable weight with the jury because he would be less likely to corroborate the prosecution’s version of the events if not true. - 16 - Similarly, the prosecution asked Guidera if, based on all the interviews he conducted with eyewitnesses, whether he received “any statements that said that [Manley] ever got out of the truck?” Guidera responded, “no.” (JA 897.) The prosecution continued, “did you get any statements at all from anybody that said that Steven Glover had a gun?” Guidera again replied in the negative. Thus, in addition to multiplying the number of witnesses against his own client, defense counsel, through his botched examination of Guidera, allowed the prosecution to do the same. That defense counsel acted deficiently in his examination of Guidera is further underscored by an analogous decision of this Court in Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d at 269. In that case, an attorney for a capital defendant elected to call an expert witness during the culpability phase of the trial to demonstrate that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state for conviction. Combs, 205 F.3d at 287. On cross-examination, the expert testified that, in his opinion, although the defendant was intoxicated on the day of the events, he nevertheless acted intentionally and purposefully. Id. This Court reviewed the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as part of the defendant’s habeas petition and concluded that “[a]lthough Combs’s counsel’s decision to present [the expert’s] testimony may be considered a strategic one, it was a decision made without undertaking a full investigation.” Id. at 288. The Court further opined, [the expert’s] opinion regarding whether Combs lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes was crucial to the defense theory; defense counsel’s failure to have questioned Fisher in this regard prior to trial is inexcusable. Defense counsel should have known Fisher’s opinion on this ultimate issue and should have prepared accordingly. Id. Thus, the Court ultimately determined that “[r]egardless of whether [the defendant’s] counsel should have known or instead actually knew [the expert’s] opinion regarding [the defendant’s] intent - 17 - . . . counsel’s decision to put him on the stand was objectively unreasonable” under Strickland. Id. As in Combs, the decision by Manley’s lawyer to call Guidera as a witness was objectively unreasonable. Guidera’s testimony about the countless eyewitnesses who corroborated the prosecution’s version of the facts suggests that defense counsel decided to call Guidera as a witness “without undertaking a full investigation.” See id. Just as the defense attorney in Combs should have known the expert witness’s actual opinion about the defendant’s mental state, Manley’s lawyer should have known that Guidera would testify that the countless individuals he interviewed “had the same conclusion” that Manley remained in his truck and that the bullets emanated from a gun possessed by Manley. (JA 898.) Defense counsel had a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary[,]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, and thus his “failure to have questioned [Guidera] in this regard prior to trial is inexcusable.” Combs, 205 F.3d at 288. Coupled with defense counsel’s failure to object to seemingly objectionable questions asked by the prosecutor during his cross-examination of Guidera, we are of the view that Manley’s attorney exhibited deficient lawyering.