Opinion ID: 2557538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Longtin's Pattern or Practice Claim

Text: The third certiorari issue was whether Maryland law recognizes a pattern or practice claim against a local government for unconstitutional policies and, if so, whether Longtin produced enough evidence to support such a claim. The eighth count of Longtin's complaint  titled Pattern or Practice of Improper Conduct, was directed at the then-police chief and the Criminal Investigations Division. It alleged that these parties maintained a policy of unconstitutional and unlawful detention and interrogation and that his arrest and detention were not a single isolated, accidental, or peculiar event[.] Longtin alleged, inter alia: ... The wrongful detention, denial of the right to counsel, and other rights as well as the coercion of confessions occurs so frequently that it has become an accepted manner by the [Police Department.] This is a result of Prince George's County's failure to establish effective procedures, rules, orders, guidelines, and practices to ensure that such violations do not occur and to ensure that allegations of such violations will be thoroughly investigated and appropriately punished when found to have occurred. As a result of this failure, there has been a regular pattern and practice of conduct similar to that complained of here. This pattern and practice has been manifested in other prior incidents involving officers, and employees of the Prince George's County Police Department. Longtin thus sought to hold the Police Department directly responsible for those actions. At trial, Longtin attempted to establish this pattern and practice by introducing a variety of evidence. Longtin's counsel elicited testimony from the officers regarding their questionable investigation techniques, including the makeup of the interrogation room, the guidelines for allowing suspects to sleep and eat, and violations of the rule under which an arrestee must be taken to a Commissioner within 24 hours. Longtin's counsel elicited testimony from the officers about other marathon interrogation sessions they had participated in, including the controversial interrogation of a developmentally disabled minor in 1998 who was incarcerated for ten months before charges were dropped. Longtin also introduced a Community Police Institute manual, a CID Policy Manual, and other training materials and policy documents, which contained constitutionally suspect directives. Longtin argued that the policies were motivated by a desire to lower the Department's closing rate: In 1994, these Officers only solved 49 percent of homicides. In 1999 when this and similar cases occurred where they were keeping people up all night, they were up to 70 percent. There was articles in the paper and significant pressure from the Chief for these Officers to increase their closure rate, and it led to the problem we have here today. At the close of trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor of Longtin on the pattern or practice claim. On appeal, the Defendants argued that allowing this claim to go to the jury was legal error. The Defendants argued that Article 24 of the Maryland Constitution does not, and should not, support a pattern or practice type-claim. The Defendants argue that a pattern or practice claim, or Monell claim, is a creature of federal law, and is unnecessary in the Maryland context, or inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. The Court of Special Appeals rejected this claim, stating that, given the almost uniquely expansive reach of Maryland's constitutional tort remedy, where no official or local governmental immunity is possible ... we think it highly unlikely that Article 24 contains any exemption from liability for an unconstitutional pattern or practice. Longtin, 190 Md.App. at 130-31, 988 A.2d at 40. Monell is the origin of a pattern or practice claim in federal law. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Monell concerned a claim under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by a class of female federal employees claiming that federal agencies required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence during their pregnancy. The claim had been dismissed by the Second Circuit under the Supreme Court's holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), which held that municipal corporations were not people under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and could not be sued, either directly or under a theory of respondeat superior. The Monell Court was called to re-examine Monroe, and the extent to which a municipality could be liable for constitutional violations. After a detailed analysis of legislative history, the Court overruled Monroe's holding that a municipality did not qualify as a person under Section 1983: Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers [or for] constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental custom even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels. Id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. The Court, however, confirmed that municipalities were still free from respondeat superior liability under § 1983, concluding: a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor[.] Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (emphasis in original). The Monell decision thus set a standard under which a municipality is liable under § 1983 for its employee's actions only if it `causes' [that] employee to violate another's constitutional rights. Id. In doing so, the Supreme Court shielded municipalities from liability in most cases of constitutional violations by public officials, and subjected them to liability only in that small subset of cases where the violation was caused by the municipality. In contrast, Maryland's constitution requires more of its municipalities, and accordingly this Court has declined to shield municipalities from the unconstitutional acts of its officials. See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 729 A.2d 354 (1999). In DiPino, we considered a claim brought both under § 1983 and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, a common occurrence. We acknowledged that almost all of the rights protected by the Maryland Declaration of Rights are essentially identical to those protected by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 43-44, 729 A.2d at 367-68. Although these rights are parallel, we apply our constitutional principles in a entirely different manner: One set of rules, themselves not easy to fathom, applies to the § 1983 claims... Those rules have been established by the United States Supreme Court as a matter of Federal law. A second set of rules applies to the State Constitutional claims. Notwithstanding that the Federal and State rights are essentially parallel, the rules relating to redress for violation of those rights are very different. We have consistently declined to adopt the Federal approach. Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 597 A.2d 432 (1991); Ashton v. Brown, supra, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447. Id. at 45, 729 A.2d at 368. DiPino thus made clear that the specific rules for remedying state constitutional violations will differ from the § 1983 claims. DiPino then considered an issue similar to that in Monell ; whether a municipality should be held liable through respondeat superior for the acts of its employees, and concluded: Although we have consistently applied respondeat superior liability to local governmental entities for Constitutional violations committed by their officials, we have never actually articulated the doctrine in that context. The Court of Special Appeals has looked to a footnote in Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. 662, 667-68 n. 3, 541 A.2d [1303,] 1305 n. 3 [(1988)][ [29] ] as indicating our acceptance of the doctrine. See Port Deposit v. Petetit, 113 Md.App. 401, 422-23, 688 A.2d 54, 65, cert. denied, 346 Md. 27, 694 A.2d 950 (1996 [1997]); Branch v. McGeeney, 123 Md.App. 330, 718 A.2d 631 (1998). We shall now dispel any doubt in the matter and make clear, as a matter of common law, that local governmental entities do, indeed, have respondeat superior liability for civil damages resulting from State Constitutional violations committed by their agents and employees within the scope of the employment. DiPino, 354 Md. at 51-52, 729 A.2d at 372. As the Court of Special Appeals observed, our decision to impose respondeat liability on local governments has a firm policy foundation: The State is appropriately held answerable for the acts of its officers and employees because it can avoid such misconduct by adequate training and supervision and avoid its repetition by discharging or disciplining negligent or incompetent employees. Moreover, there is no reason why the deterrent value of holding the State answerable for an actionable assault by one of its employees is warranted but the deterrent value of holding it liable for an employee's constitutional tort is not. Id. at 53, 729 A.2d at 372, ( quoting Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1142-43 (1996)). The Defendants' arguments on this issue caution that allowing a pattern or practice claim imposes burdens on local governments beyond those imposed by 42 USCA § 1983. Specifically, they argue that this direct suit would greatly expand the § 1983 liability of counties and municipalities beyond that contemplated by Congress[.] The Defendants ignore that Maryland has already greatly expand[ed] the [] liability of counties and municipalities beyond the scope of § 1983 by imposing respondeat superior liability on municipalities. In DiPino, we held that, unlike federal law, Maryland's constitution imposed an affirmative obligation to avoid constitutional violations by its employees through adequate training and supervision and by discharging or disciplining negligent or incompetent employees. Clearly, if Maryland imposes on local governments an obligation to prevent unconstitutional conduct by its employees, those same governments may not, with impunity, cause such conduct by unconstitutional polices or practices. A pattern or practice claim is merely a more egregious subset of the actions that are prohibited by Maryland constitutional law. The Defendants also argue that a pattern or practice claim would deprive the courts of its role to determine the legal question of the threshold issues [of qualified immunity.] The Defendants argue that such a claim would not provide the same procedural protections for municipalities in a state constitutional claim as they would for this same fact scenario in a § 1983 cause of action[.] This argument is based upon a faulty assumption that Maryland constitutional tort law tracks the procedure and standards of the federal Civil Rights Act. We have consistently declined to adopt the Federal approach [used in § 1983 claims.] DiPino, 354 Md. at 45, 729 A.2d at 368. We have further stated: [T]his Court has consistently held that Maryland common law qualified immunity in tort suits, for public officials performing discretionary acts, has no application in tort actions based upon alleged violations of state constitutional rights or tort actions based upon most so-called intentional torts. The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct. Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 258, 863 A.2d 297, 305 (2004) (emphasis supplied). See also Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 201, 757 A.2d 118, 140 (2000) (A state public official alleged to have violated Article 24, or any article of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is not entitled to qualified immunity.). As we clearly stated in DiPino, Maryland's constitutional protections require more from public officials and municipalities than § 1983, and the rules and procedures of applying them are divergent from the federal rules. Like the Court of Special Appeals, we find our jurisprudence rife with evidence that Article 24 provides protection to individuals against unconstitutional pattern or practices of municipalities. The Defendants further argue that even if a pattern or practice claim exists, Longtin failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding: ... over [the Defendants'] objection, the trial court allowed [Longtin] to introduce evidence of an interview and interrogation by [the officers] of a completely unrelated criminal defendant [] to show pattern or practice liability against the County. The trial court also instructed the jury not to consider this evidence for any other reason than the pattern or practice claim ... Because the jury was instructed not to consider whether the individual [Defendants] caused the deprivation of [Longtin's] constitutional right based on evidence of an interview and interrogation of a completely unrelated criminal defendant ... to show pattern or practice liability against the County, Monell -type liability could not attach to the County. The Defendants conclude that [w]ithout proving a prima facie case of a constitutional deprivation caused by the individual [Defendants,] [Longtin] failed to prove that the County itself was the moving force behind the deprivation. The Defendants' argument is unconvincing, and almost incoherent. Longtin clearly introduced evidence of unconstitutional actions committed against him. He called as witnesses his interrogating officers and elicited testimony regarding the illegal actions they took in arresting and interrogating him. He introduced evidence about the exculpatory DNA tests, and established that the officers did little, if anything, after learning he was excluded. This evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of constitutional deprivation in his case. As our intermediate appellate court explained, Longtin then introduced multitudinous evidence that his experience was not an isolated incident: [Longtin] set forth evidence through Detective Herndon that sleep deprivation was a tool of investigation that he had been trained to use. Admitted into evidence was an interview and interrogation training manual of the Prince George's County Community Police Institute that told officers they could read a suspect his rights or wait until after he admits. The manual stated that the interrogator should consider handcuffing an angry suspect to the wall and let [him] sit a while. Officers were advised to wait out a passive suspect because few people can keep it up. If a suspect is so convincing that you are starting to believe him ... [l]eave the room [and] [d]on't go back unless you re-fortify your conviction that he is guilty. Detective Kerry Jerningan testified that it was departmental policy that police did not necessarily have to take the suspect before a district court commissioner within 24 hours if the suspect was continuously providing information, and confirmed that a police training manual described Md. Rule 4-212(f)(1) as [a] Maryland procedural rule, not law that could be waived.    He introduced evidence of lengthy interrogations of other individuals (of 60 hours and 72 hours); another dubious confession and erroneous incarceration; an official police training manual urging constitutionally questionable actions with respect to the conduct of interrogations, Miranda warnings, and the right to counsel, which the individual officers appeared to have followed by the book; expert testimony regarding violations of commonly-accepted police practices, evidence of serial violations of multiple constitutional rights by a number of officers; and a blurring of the line between presumptive innocence and pre-determined guilt. Longtin, 190 Md.App. at 113-14, 132-133, 988 A.2d at 20, 29-30. The trial court properly limited the jury's consideration of this second batch of evidence to the pattern or practice claim, and not as evidence that Longtin's rights were violated. The jury was not unreasonable in concluding that this evidence demonstrated a pattern or practice of unconstitutional police conduct. Accordingly, the Defendants have failed to show any insufficiency or legal error in the evidence supporting the pattern or practice claim.