Opinion ID: 702360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rabins

Text: 7 First, Rabins argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal based upon a variance of proof between the single conspiracy charged in the indictment and evidence of multiple conspiracies presented at trial. As support for this argument, Rabins cites agreements between Brooks and several other suppliers of methamphetamine. 3 8 In order to prevail on a motion for acquittal based on a fatal variance between the single conspiracy charged and the proof offered at trial, Rabins must establish that a variance exists, and that the variance affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Anderson, 618 F.2d 487, 490 (8th Cir.1980). The question in this case is whether the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate an overall conspiracy to obtain and sell methamphetamine and that Rabins knowingly joined such conspiracy and participated in furthering its objectives. Hayes v. United States, 329 F.2d 209, 214 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980, 84 S.Ct. 1883, 12 L.Ed.2d 748 (1964). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1225 (8th Cir.1992). 9 The record is replete with evidence from which the jury could conclude that a single conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine existed which involved Brooks, Johnson, and later Rabins. Brooks and Johnson testified that they agreed to purchase and distribute methamphetamine. The government presented evidence, including telephone records and mailing receipts, demonstrating that Rabins entered into an agreement with Brooks and Johnson to supply methamphetamine. 10 In addition, the fact that Johnson had other means of obtaining methamphetamine does not support Rabins's claim that multiple conspiracies existed. As we read the record, the change in suppliers over time simply demonstrates the varied phases of one basic plan to obtain and distribute illegal drugs. See United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1342 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027, 110 S.Ct. 1472, 108 L.Ed.2d 610 (1990). The jury certainly could have drawn the same conclusions from the evidence presented. Therefore, the District Court did not err by denying Rabins's motion for judgment of acquittal.
11 Next, Rabins contends that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial based on the government's failure to disclose evidence that Johnson tested positive for methamphetamine during the period that he was under home arrest. 4 Rabins claims that the failure to disclose Johnson's test results violated his due-process rights and his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 12 First, we consider Rabins's due-process argument. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 13 There is no question that the prosecution knew that Johnson tested positive for methamphetamine prior to trial, or that the test results were somewhat favorable to the defense. Under the circumstances, the government had a duty to disclose this information. Thus, the conviction  'must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'  United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 577 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). Despite our dismay at the prosecutor's failure to reveal that Johnson may have given perjured testimony when he said he was not using drugs, 5 we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that Johnson's false testimony affected the jury's judgment. 14 We note initially that Johnson was not an exemplary witness. Johnson admitted that he had been a methamphetamine user and distributor. He was unable to remember details regarding the conspiracy. On cross-examination, Johnson admitted that he had entered into a plea agreement with the government in exchange for his testimony. Thus, the jury was given full information regarding Johnson's credibility, previous drug use, and possible bias. 15 We also note that Johnson's testimony was cumulative for the most part. Both Johnson and Brooks testified with regard to the details of the conspiracy. Because it is unlikely that presenting Johnson's test results would have affected the jury's verdict, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rabins's motion for a new trial. 16 In a related argument, Rabins maintains that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated when the government suppressed Johnson's test results. An accused's right to confrontation is violated when he is  'prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.'  United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 241, 126 L.Ed.2d 195 (1993) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435-36, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). In the past, we have recognized a Sixth Amendment violation where the positive drug test of an apparently blameless witness was withheld from the defense. United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 770 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 632, 121 L.Ed.2d 563 (1992). 17 Johnson was far from an apparently blameless witness. He admitted to drug use and distribution. He also admitted that his plea agreement called for him to plead guilty to distribution of methamphetamine. Moreover, the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine Johnson thoroughly. These facts persuade us that Rabins's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not abridged.
18 Rabins next maintains that the District Court abused its discretion by limiting FBI Agent Kenneth Moore's testimony. The Court limited the testimony 6 under Fed.R.Evid. 403, citing unfair prejudice and confusion. 19 Rule 403 grants the trial court the discretion to exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury. Fed.R.Evid. 403. We accord great deference to the District Court's application of the Rule 403 balancing test, and will reverse only if the Court committed a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 628, 631 (8th Cir.1994). After a careful review of the record, we cannot say that the Court abused its discretion in this case.
20 Finally, Rabins contends that the District Court erred by denying his supplemental motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Rabins claims that after the trial he discovered that Johnson and Brooks were supplied methamphetamine by John Brooks, Charles Brooks's nephew. He alleges that John Brooks's involvement in the conspiracy was Brady information, and failure to disclose it violated his due-process right to a fair trial and his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 21 To succeed on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the new evidence must be of such a nature that a new trial would likely produce an acquittal. United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1701, 131 L.Ed.2d 563 (1995) (citing United States v. Page-Bey, 960 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir.1992). Whether the evidence rises to this level is initially left to the discretion of the trial court, and this Court will reverse the trial court's decision only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Ibid. 22 We find no abuse of discretion, because the evidence of Charles Brooks's involvement in the conspiracy is not likely to produce an acquittal. See ibid. It is also not material, and thus Brady does not mandate a new trial in this case. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Furthermore, Rabins's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was not violated, since Rabins exercised his right to cross-examine Brooks on issues of motive and bias. Cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).