Opinion ID: 76255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Benitez Is an Inadmissible Alien

Text: 26 Because the status of the alien affects the issues herein, we begin by confirming Benitez's alien status. Although Benitez has been present physically in the United States for more than 20 years, we readily conclude that Benitez never formally has been admitted and remains an inadmissable alien. 27 As mentioned above, Benitez arrived in the United States as part of the Mariel boat-lift, was stopped at the border, and paroled into this country. He was paroled because Congress has recognized that it is often necessary to permit arriving aliens, such as Benitez, to make a temporary, unofficial entry into the United States pending the resolution of their applications. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215, 73 S.Ct. 625; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (alien who does not appear to examining immigration officer to be entitled to land may be detained for further inquiry); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (granting authority to the Attorney General to parole aliens seeking admission into the United States, but providing that parole does not constitute an admission of the alien). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rejected claims that the parole or detention of an unadmitted alien has any effect on the alien's status under the law. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958). 17 Because an alien's legal status is not altered by detention or parole, it is clear that Benitez is, and remains, an inadmissable alien and is similar to any other alien who has not gained entry and is stopped at this country's border. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 969-70 (11th Cir.1984) ( en banc ). 28 Any discussion of Benitez's rights in the immigration context must also start with the fundamental difference in the legal status of (1) unadmitted aliens and (2) resident aliens who have effected entry into the United States, whether illegally or legally. This critical difference not only was recognized in Zadvydas, but has been a hallmark of immigration law for more than a hundred years. For example, in Leng May Ma, the Supreme Court emphasized that our immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission... and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality. 357 U.S. at 187, 78 S.Ct. 1072. The Supreme Court continued that [i]n the latter instance the Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are merely `on the threshold of initial entry.' Id. (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, 73 S.Ct. 625). 29 The Supreme Court further has explained that aliens seeking admission, such as Benitez, have no constitutional rights regarding their applications for admission. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) ([A]n alien seeking admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.... [H]owever, once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953) (`excludable' aliens ... are not within the protection of the Fifth Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2103 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for an alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores.).