Opinion ID: 1998222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Power

Text: The City is a home rule unit of local government under the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The `concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the 1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter the relationship which previously existed between the local and State government.' City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill.2d 101, 107, 51 Ill.Dec. 688, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981), quoting Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill.2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972); accord Triple A Services, Inc. v. Rice, 131 Ill.2d 217, 230, 137 Ill.Dec. 53, 545 N.E.2d 706 (1989). Article VII, section 6(a), of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part: Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt. Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6(a). As a result of section 6(a), Chicago draws its power to regulate for the protection of public safety directly from the constitution. This power does not depend on any grant of authority by the General Assembly, as was the case prior to 1970. Triple A Services, 131 Ill.2d at 230, 137 Ill.Dec. 53, 545 N.E.2d 706. Section 6(a) gives home rule units the broadest powers possible. Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill.2d 164, 174, 180 Ill.Dec. 77, 606 N.E.2d 1154 (1992). Section 6(i) provides: Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive. Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6(i). Also, section 6(m) provides that [p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally. Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6(m). As a result of these constitutional provisions, [h]ome rule units thus have the same powers as the sovereign, except where such powers are limited by the General Assembly. Triple A Services, 131 Ill.2d at 230, 137 Ill.Dec. 53, 545 N.E.2d 706. Defendant agrees with the City that it has the power to define the offense of assault against the elderly. However, defendant contends that the City's home rule power is limited to defining that offense and does not extend to prescribing a mandatory minimum punishment. This contention lacks merit. Inherent in defining a crime is prescribing a penalty. A crime consists of two parts: prohibited conduct and a penalty for an infraction. In other words, a prescribed penalty is as necessary to constitute a crime as its definition. A statute that prohibits conduct without a penalty is a nullity. People v. Graf, 93 Ill.App.2d 43, 48, 50, 235 N.E.2d 886 (1968); accord 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(d), at 12-13 (1986); 1 W. Burdick, The Law of Crime § 70, at 69-70 (1946). Article VII, section 6(d)(2), of the Illinois Constitution specifically provides that [a] home rule unit does not have the power    (2) to define and provide for the punishment of a felony. Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6(d)(2). The Committee on Local Government of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention explained that this provision specifically withholds from home-rule units the power to define and punish felonies, but leaves them free to impose fines and jail sentences for less serious offenses. 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1602 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings). Additionally, article VII, section 6(e), specifically provides that [a] home rule unit shall have only the power that the General Assembly may provide by law (1) to punish by imprisonment for more than six months. Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6(e). It would seem that implicit in the Constitutional limitation, taken together with the grant of power in the last sentence of Subsection 6(a), is the power of home rule units, without statutory authority, to punish by imprisonment for less than six months. Ill.Ann.Stat., 1970 Const., art. VII, § 6(e), Constitutional Commentary, at 515 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Implicit in the power of a home rule unit to establish a term of incarceration for less than six months is the power to establish a mandatory minimum term. Unquestionably, the nature, character, and extent of the penalties for a particular criminal offense are matters for the legislature, which may describe definite terms of imprisonment or fix the minimum and maximum limits thereof ( People v. Smith, 14 Ill.2d 95, 97, 150 N.E.2d 815 (1958)), notwithstanding a court's finding that a penalty is unwise or absurd. People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 457, 160 N.E. 836 (1927). Based on these principles, this court has regularly upheld various statutes that prescribe mandatory minimum sentences. See People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 119 Ill.2d 331, 336, 116 Ill.Dec. 226, 518 N.E.2d 1047 (1988); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill.2d 537, 542-44, 48 Ill.Dec. 228, 416 N.E.2d 259 (1981). Since the legislature is so empowered, then a home rule municipality has the same power. We note that this case does not involve local regulation of a state institution. See, e.g., Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill.2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975) (court system). Also, the possibility that different home rule units may adopt similar ordinances with differing mandatory minimum sentences should be of no concern. The grant of home rule powers contemplates that different communities which perceive a problem differently may adopt different measures to address the problem, provided that the legislature has taken no affirmative steps to circumscribe the measures that may be taken and that the measures taken are reasonable. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill.2d 483, 504-05, 83 Ill.Dec. 308, 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984).