Opinion ID: 200625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dutra's Active Control Duty

Text: 28 Stewart next argues that Dutra breached its vessel duties to him by remaining in active control over, and creating an unsafe condition in, the area where he was injured. This argument is based on vessel duties established by the Supreme Court in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 175-76, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). 29 In Morehead, we concluded that the owner of a dual capacity vessel could be held liable under § 905(b) where it breached its Scindia duties while acting in its capacity as vessel. Morehead, 97 F.3d at 615. The Scindia Court articulated three types of duties a vessel owner owed to stevedoring employees. First, shipowners have a duty to turn over the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. 1614. This duty, commonly referred to as the turnover duty, includes a duty to warn the stevedore of latent dangers that could not be discovered through the exercise of reasonable care. 30 Second, once stevedoring operations have begun, the vessel owner will be liable if it actively involves itself in the cargo operations and negligently injures a longshoreman. Id. That is, if the vessel owner maintains active control over an area or operation, the vessel is liable for any injuries it negligently inflicts incident to the area or operation. Id. 31 Finally, a shipowner has a duty to intervene to protect stevedoring workers if it acquires actual knowledge that the vessel or equipment pose a danger and the stevedore is not exercising reasonable care to protect its employees from that risk. Id. at 175-76, 101 S.Ct. 1614. 32 According to Stewart, both the area where the incident occurred and the repair activities that were taking place there were under the control of Angell, who was acting as a separate maritime agent specifically for the vessel. The presence of Angell, Stewart argues, distinguishes this case from Morehead because in that case, we noted that [t]he allegedly negligent conditions (the open hatch and the absence of warnings) were not attributable to the errors of separate maritime agents acting specifically for the vessel. Morehead, 97 F.3d at 614. Stewart therefore contends that through Angell, Dutra as vessel owner knew or should have been aware of the danger created by removing the protective railings around the hatch; Dutra is therefore liable in its capacity as vessel owner for its alleged breach of Scindia 's active control duty. 33 We decline to consider whether Dutra's actions and the presence of Angell in the engine room warrant consideration under Scindia. Stewart's contention that Dutra retained active control over the engine/hatch area is procedurally defaulted by his failure to raise the issue before the district court. The law in this circuit is crystalline: a litigant's failure to explicitly raise an issue before the district court forecloses that party from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. Boston Beer Co. Ltd. P'ship. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 180 (1st Cir.1993). In the district court, Stewart's opposition to Dutra's motion for summary judgment made only passing mention of Timothy Angell, and at no point contended that he was a separate maritime agent whose presence distinguishes this case from Morehead. Indeed, the active control argument seems to have surfaced for the first time in Stewart's briefs to this Court. 34 In his briefs before the district court, Stewart refers to Angell as a mechanic working for independent contractor, Southworth Milton. Nowhere does he make any other reference to the legal or employment status of Angell, nor does he otherwise discuss whether Angell exercised actual control over the scow or any portion thereof. These passing references do not amount to an argument that Angell was a separate maritime agent in actual control of the scow. See DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2001) (Simply noting an argument in passing without explanation is insufficient to avoid waiver.); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (appellate courts should not permit fleeting references to preserve questions on appeal). We therefore reject, as procedurally defaulted, Stewart's contention that Angell's activity aboard the scow distinguishes this case from Morehead or triggers Scindia liability in the form of a breach of the active control duty.