Opinion ID: 198940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantially limiting impairment

Text: 17 In contending that she qualifies for ADA protection under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A), Santiago argues that her ear problems, principally the temporary right-ear hearing loss, substantially limited her major life activities of hearing, speaking, and working. Whether an impairment substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities is determined in a three-step analysis. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). First, we consider whether Santiago's ear problems constituted a physical impairment. Second, we identify the life activities upon which Santiago relies -- hearing, speaking, and working -- and determine whether they constitute major life activities under the ADA. Third, tying the two statutory phrases together, we ask whether the impairment substantially limited one or more of the activities found to amount to major life activities. See id. 18 Read most favorably to Santiago, her evidence satisfies the first two requirements of this analysis. Her ear problems were an impairment under the relevant EEOC definitions, being a physiological disorder or condition affecting special sense organs. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)(1). And the three activities claimed to have been impaired -- hearing, speaking, and working -- are all explicitly recognized as major life activities under EEOC regulations. See id. §§ 1630.2(i); see also Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999) (activities listed in EEOC regulations are treated as major life activities per se, rather than as major life activities only to the extent that they are shown to affect a particular ADA plaintiff). 2 19 Where Santiago's claim encounters difficulty is at the third and final step of the analysis: her ear impairment was not shown to have substantially interfered with her performance of any of the identified major life activities. EEOC regulations define substantially limits as: 20 (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or 21 (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 22 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1). Among the relevant considerations are (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; (3) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. See id. §§ 1630.2(j)(2).
23 Santiago has not provided evidence sufficient to demonstrate that her claimed impairment substantially interfered with hearing or speaking. The Supreme Court recently emphasized that a court must determine on a case-by-case basis whether an individual has offered sufficient evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of [her] own experience . . . is substantial. Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2169. As the EEOC regulations instruct, we examine the evidence of the duration, severity, and long-term impact of Santiago's alleged limitations. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2). 24 As for duration, it is undisputed that Santiago's auditory problems were temporary and that her hearing is now normal. Beginning in November, 1995, Santiago underwent subjective tests. These reflected a hearing loss in her right ear. 3 By November, 1997, objective tests showed that her hearing was normal in both ears and there is no evidence of hearing loss beyond that time. Hence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, at most, Santiago experienced moderate to severe hearing loss in one ear for approximately two years. 25 It is true, as the district court acknowledged, that the temporary nature of an impairment does not necessarily preclude it from constituting a disability under the ADA: 26 Although short-term, temporary restrictions generally are not substantially limiting, an impairment does not necessarily have to be permanent to rise to the level of a disability. Some conditions may be long-term or potentially long-term, in that their duration is indefinite and unknowable or is expected to be at least several months. Such conditions, if severe, may constitute disabilities. 27 Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual, Interpretations (CCH) §§ 902.4, ¶¶ 6884, p. 5319 (1995)) (emphasis supplied). 28 It is debatable whether Santiago's treating physicians considered her ear-related impairment to be permanent, long-term or potentially long-term. For example, in March, 1996, Dr. Gonzaalez recommended that Santiago not fly until her condition improved, and Dr. Murphy stated that Santiago should be temporarily removed from flying duties until her condition stabilized. 29 Even assuming that Santiago's impairment was potentially long-term, however, there is no evidence that the temporary diminution in her right-ear hearing had a severe impact on her functional ability to hear. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i). The record at most supports a possible finding that Santiago's hearing loss was moderate to severe in one ear only. An audiological evaluation summary dated March 3, 1997, states that Counseling [was] provided relative to impairments associated with the unilateral hearing loss, namely, the inability to perform sound localization, and difficulty with speech discrimination in noisy environments. No evidence, however, identifies the overall functional degree of loss suffered by Santiago. See Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2169 (fact that plaintiff suffered monocular vision was, without more, insufficient to establish disability). Nor is there evidence that the hearing loss actually affected Santiago's activities in some specific way. See Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 52 (5th Cir. 1997) (where plaintiff offered no evidence that he is unable to engage in any usual activity because of blindness in one eye, major life activity of seeing is not substantially limited). Given her normal hearing in one ear and the existence of some residual hearing in the other, there is insufficient basis, without more, for assuming a substantial loss in overall hearing ability. In short, Santiago has not adduced sufficient evidence that, compared to the average person in the general population, she was significantly restricted in her hearing. See Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2168-69; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1). 30 The same is even more true with regard to the major life activity of speaking. The record contains at most some evidence suggesting that Santiago's tone of voice may have been affected by her impairment. This is inadequate, without more and in light of the record discussed supra, for a reasonable jury to conclude that her impairment substantially limited her speaking. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 1998) (where there was no evidence that disorder affected plaintiff's ability to communicate generally, there was no substantial interference with her ability to speak). Moreover, Santiago points to no evidence of the actual or expected long-term impact of her temporary hearing impairment. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(iii). 31 In sum, under the fact-specific analysis of the duration, severity, and long-term impact of Santiago's hearing impairment mandated by the ADA, see Katz, 87 F.3d at 32, we conclude that it cannot be reasonably construed to have substantially limited her major life activities of hearing and speaking. 4
32 Similarly, Santiago did not adduce sufficient evidence that her impairment substantially limited the major life activity of working. EEOC regulations provide that this activity is substantially limited only where an individual is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998). The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in working, including the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the] geographical area [reasonably accessible to the individual], from which the individual is also disqualified. Id. §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). 33 Hence, to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, Santiago must be precluded from more than a particular job. See Murphy v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 (1999); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Her temporary hearing loss, however, was not shown to have interfered at all in carrying out the duties of a flight attendant. Even if her impairment were defined more broadly -- i.e., as a condition precluding flight on non-pressurized airplanes -- there is no evidence of how many jobs call for this ability, or that she was precluded from any class of jobs. Moreover, the record indicates that Santiago was qualified for various ground positions at American Eagle, including receptionist, payroll clerk, and operational manager. Indeed, Santiago has successfully continued her employment at American Eagle, and earns a higher salary than she did as a flight attendant. As a matter of law, therefore, Santiago did not establish that her impairment substantially limited her ability to work. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138-39. 34 Without evidence that Santiago's impairment substantially limited any of the three claimed major life activities, the district court correctly concluded that her claim could not survive summary judgment. Absent a disability . . . no obligations are triggered for the employer. Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15. 5