Opinion ID: 1991907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to obtain psychiatric counseling

Text: Appellant argues that trial counsel's failure to obtain pre-trial psychiatric counseling for him resulted in him giving an interview with a reporter because he needed to talk with someone. Appellant contends that this omission by counsel in failing to anticipate the events as they occurred compromised his defense. It is undisputed that Appellant wanted to talk about the shootings. In fact, Appellant, without being questioned by the police, told one of the arresting officers, You tell them that you got the right man. I'm the one that killed them son of a bitches. Baze, supra, at 820. Appellant later gave two interviews to a news reporter, providing a detailed account of the killing of the two police officers. On direct appeal, this Court rejected Appellant's claim that the statements he made to the reporter should have been suppressed. Id. Appellant now seeks to relitigate the admissibility of statements by arguing that a multi-disciplinary team of trained professionals might have dissuaded him from talking to the reporters. Again, we disagree. Assuming arguendo that Appellant's talkativeness would have been sated by psychiatric intervention, the fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally required. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2447, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). An attorney is not legally ineffective simply because his client disregards his advice. Appellant's conscious decision to ignore counsel's advice and to speak with law enforcement authorities and news people following arrest and without the presence of counsel is not a reflection on the adequacy of his legal representation, but rather, perhaps, an indication that even the most effective representation may be of little use to such an individual. The Sixth Amendment protection requires that counsel be effective, not that counsel be heeded. Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1244 (2nd Cir.1993).