Opinion ID: 2823835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law of Voluntariness with Respect to Consensual Searches

Text: Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution protect the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Hopkins, 870 P.2d 478, 480 (Colo. 1994). The right generally prohibits warrantless searches of a personâs property. Id. Nevertheless, a warrantless search is constitutionally justified when it is conducted pursuant to voluntary consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973); People v. Drake, 785 P.2d 1257, 1265 (Colo. 1990). Consent is voluntary if it is âthe product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.â Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225; accord, e.g., Licea, 918 P.2d at 1112.Â Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Conversely, a consensual search is involuntary when police overbear the consenting partyâs will and critically impair the partyâs âcapacity for self-determination.â Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225. Thus, a consensual search is involuntary if it is ââthe result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or any other form of undue influence exercised [by the police] against the defendant.ââ Magallanes-Aragon, 948 P.2d at 531 (quoting People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984)). Undue influence includes promises, threats, and intrusive or threatening police conduct. See People v. Johnson, 865 P.2d 836, 845 (Colo. 1994). In sum, the key concern is whether the policeâs intrusive conduct âcritically impaired the defendantâs judgment.â Magallanes-Aragon, 948 P.2d at 531 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228â29; Capps v. People, 162 Colo. 323, 327, 426 P.2d 189, 191 (1967)).
Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth stated that the determination of whether the police overbore a defendantâs will and rendered his consent involuntary is based on the totality of the circumstances. 412 U.S. at 226. The Supreme Court rejected the notion that voluntariness hinges on a defendantâs understanding that he may refuse consent to a search. Id. at 234, 248â49. Rather, the Supreme Court reasoned that, while the defendantâs knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor in the determination, it is not âa prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.â Id. at 249. Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Eight years later, we adopted the rationale from Schneckloth in Helm. Helm, 633 P.2d at 1073, 1076â77 (concerning the suppression of evidence from a roadside sobrietyÂ test and a blood alcohol test). The lower courts in that case reasoned that the defendantâs consent was involuntary unless he gave consent intelligently and with information from the officer about his right to refuse. Id. at 1075. We reversed and, citing Schneckloth, stated that courts must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine voluntariness; a defendantâs knowledge of the right to refuse is only a factor in that determination. Id. at 1076; see also Licea, 918 P.2d at 1111â13 (stating that voluntary consent is determined based on the totality of the circumstances, and there is a âdifference between a voluntary act and an act that is done knowingly and intelligentlyâ). Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In addition to clarifying that voluntary consent need not be given with knowledge of the right to refuse, in Helm we articulated important factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis, namely: the age, education, and intelligence of the defendant; the duration, location, and circumstances of the search; the consenting personâs state of mind; and anything else that could have affected the defendantâs free and unconstrained choice in consenting to the search. 633 P.2d at 1077; see also People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1984). We also reasoned that police officers do not have an affirmative duty to warn parties of their right to refuse consent because other evidence may adequately demonstrate voluntary consent. 633 P.2d at 1077. Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Later, in People v. Castro, 159 P.3d 597, 600 (Colo. 2007), we expressed that a language barrier between police officers and the defendant is relevant to the totality of the circumstances analysis. In Castro, the trial court suppressed cocaine evidence found in the defendantâs car because it could not determine whether the defendant spokeÂ sufficient English to validly consent. Id. at 598â99. We reversed because the evidence showed that the defendant spoke English well enough to communicate with the officers and validly consent to the search. Id. at 600â01. The record demonstrated that the defendant responded appropriately to the officersâ questions, and critically, the record contained no evidence of police coercion. Id.
Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Our determination in Magallanes-Aragon is particularly instructive. In that case, the trial court suppressed marijuana evidence recovered from a car based on the defendantâs consent to search because the defendant âwas educated in Mexico and did not believe that he had a right to refuse to consent to the search.â 948 P.2d at 530, 532. Its findings showed that it focused exclusively on the defendantâs âsubjective characteristics and perceptions.â Id. at 532. Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â On appeal, we concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard. Id. at 532â33. Like the lower courts in Helm and Licea, the trial court in Magallanes-Aragon incorrectly focused on the defendantâs âsubjective characteristics and perceptionsâ and âfailed to adequately consider whether there was objective evidence of overbearing, intrusive, coercive or deceptive behavior by the police.â Id. at 532. We emphasized that âthere is a distinction between a voluntary act and an act done knowingly and intelligentlyâ and that â[n]either an intelligent consent nor knowledge of the right to refuse to consent [is] essential to a voluntary consent.â Id. at 532 (citing Licea, 918 P.2d at 1113; Helm, 633 P.2d at 1076). Rather, the court firstÂ considers evidence of police coercion and the defendantâs subjective characteristics. Id. Â at 531. It then applies an objective test that takes into account the totality of the circumstances and determines âwhether the police conduct could reasonably have appeared to the defendant to be coercive.â Id. Critical to the analysis is âthe impact of overbearing, coercive, or deceptive police conduct on a person with the knowledge and particular characteristics of the defendant.â Id. at 533. The impact of the policeâs conduct must not overbear the defendantâs will. Id. at 530. We also specified that the analysis is an objective assessment of police actions, not an inquiry into the policeâs subjective belief in the appropriateness of their actions. Id. at 533. Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard and failed to make findings surrounding the consent to search, such as resolving disputed testimony in the record, we reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. 2 Id. at 532â33, 534. Further, we instructed the trial court to apply the correct legal standardâwhether, under the totality of the circumstances, the policeâs conduct overbore the defendantâs exercise of free will because it was sufficiently coercive or deceptive to a person with his characteristics in his circumstances. Id. at 534.
Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Subsequently, the General Assembly passed section 16-3-310. The trial court relied on this statute to find that Munoz-Gutierrezâs oral consent was invalid. Section 16-3-310 directs a peace officer to provide an oral advisement prior to conducting aÂ consensual search of a personâs vehicle. Paragraph (b) of subsection 16-3-310(1) states two factors that the officer should articulate prior to the consensual search of a vehicle: (1) the person subject to the search is asked to give voluntary consent, and (2) the person has the right to refuse the request. 3 Furthermore, subsection (3) clarifies that â[i]f a defendant moves to suppress any evidence obtained in the course of the search, the court shall consider the failure to comply with the requirements of this section as a factor in determining the voluntariness of the consent.â Â§ 16-3-310(3) (emphasis added). A complete reading of the statute therefore demonstrates that an officerâs articulation of the two enumerated factors is only part of the totality of the circumstances analysis. Hence, the failure to specifically instruct a defendant that consent must be voluntary and that he can refuse the request to search is not determinative.