Opinion ID: 778184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Healthcare's Post-Trial Motion for a New Trial

Text: 57 We review a denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. See Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 911 (2d Cir.1997). Healthcare's post-trial application requested, in the alternative, a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that there was an error in the trial court's charge. Upon granting Healthcare's Rule 50 motion, the district court also denied Healthcare's Rule 59 motion for a new trial. 29 Upon appeal, Healthcare urges this Court to grant a new trial rather than reinstate the jury verdict in favor of New England. 58 We have already determined that the jury charges were correct and that the evidence at trial supported the jury's determinations in favor of New England. We find, having reviewed the entire record below, including several statements by the district court about the legal sufficiency of the evidence, that it would be inappropriate now to order a new trial. See generally Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 691 (2d Cir.1983) (The circumstances ordinarily recognized as supporting a new trial are that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice, i.e., that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages awarded were excessive, or that for stated reasons the trial was not fair to the moving party. None of these circumstances were found by the trial judge, and in our search of the record we have found no evidence of any reason which would warrant the grant of a new trial.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We note again that the district court couldn't think of a combination of circumstances which could cause a bigger verdict and a more certain verdict than the verdict for the Weinstocks in this case. (Tr. at 2218-19). See Larabee v. M M & L Int'l Corp., 896 F.2d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir.1990) ([A]lthough our review would have been aided by the specific findings required by Rule 50(c), we conclude that a remand for such findings is not necessary for purposes of our decision.). 59 Nor was Healthcare prejudiced in this litigation by the district court's references to clear liability. The court specifically disavowed a clear liability theory of the case during the charge conference and in its jury charges: The New York Pattern Jury Instructions ... make[ ] no mention whatsoever of ... clear liability.... Every court which [has] addressed the bad faith analysis since Pavia has cited the probability of success on the issue of liability as one aspect of the multifactor balancing test. (Tr. at 1998-99). New York law — as embodied in Pavia, Smith, Pinto, and the PJI — informs as to the appropriate multifactor test for bad faith. In determining whether the defendant Healthcare acted in bad faith in deciding not to settle [the] Weinstocks' claim, you will consider... all of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the decisions were made. (Tr. at 2177). That, we find, is precisely what the jury did.