Opinion ID: 1532447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zuckerman's Exceptions Regarding the Findings of Fact.

Text: We have reviewed the record and conclude that Judge Prevas's findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Zuckerman takes exception to several factual findings, each of which we will address and overrule. Exception 1: Respondent excepts to the following findings of fact by the hearing judge: In May of 2002, Ms. Becker was rehired by the respondent who requested her job back. Since so much of that sentence ... may be susceptible to being interpreted ... that the respondent requested that Ms. Becker, a former employee whose subsequent defalcations gave rise to the instant attorney grievance proceeding, return to his employment, a factual conclusion that is diametrically opposed by the record, which clearly establishes that the course of events which led to Ms. Becker's rehiring was initiated by her written request to have her job back and not by any action on respondent's part. The trial judge's factual findings do not directly state or impliedly suggest that Mr. Zuckerman sought to rehire Ms. Becker on his own accord without any prompting by Ms. Becker. The findings clearly establish that in May of 2002, Ms. Becker asked to be rehired and that Mr. Zuckerman did rehire her. This exception is denied. Exception 2: Respondent excepts to so much of the hearing judge's quoted writing as apparently concludes that the additional interval of theft by Ms. Becker was the `result' of delay in examination of the June, 2002 bank statement. While the relatively brief additional window of time involved may have afforded Ms. Becker further opportunity to steal, her theft certainly was neither caused by or resulted from that circumstance, but was occasioned by Ms. Becker's criminal activity and intent.... The trial judge's factual findings do not indicate that Ms. Becker's theft was caused by Mr. Zuckerman's failure to timely review the June 2002 bank statement. Rather, Ms. Becker's acts went undetected for a longer period because Mr. Zuckerman did not timely review the June 2002 bank statement, which would have revealed the theft. Indeed, Judge Prevas found: The statement for the respondent's trust account arrived in his office on or about June 15, 2002. A comparison of the check stubs with the bank statement and investigation into the missing return checks from the statement would have revealed Ms. Becker's theft. However, respondent delegated that task to Stacy Kohler, another of his employees. who never reported back to him concerning the assigned task. As a result, Ms. Becker continued to steal from respondent's trust account until mid-July when an anonymous telephone call informed him that Ms. Becker was stealing from him. Upon this information becoming known to him, respondent examined the June bank statement, and detected her theft. He immediately began an intense examination of his trust account which resulted in his discovery that Ms. Becker had been stealing from the trust account. Mr. Zuckerman was responsible for oversight of his trust account, which he abrogated. In his exceptions, Mr. Zuckerman, in fact, admits that the relatively brief additional window of time involved may have afforded Ms. Becker the further opportunity to steal. Thus, this exception is denied. Exception 3: Mr. Zuckerman alleges that the hearing judge's factual findings were that there were 109 instances in which clients had negative balances in his trust account. He argues that the record does not show by clear and convincing evidence that any such negative balances existed on his account. First of all, Judge Prevas did not find that there were 109 times where the trust account had a negative balance. Rather, Judge Prevas explicitly found that A subsequent investigation by John Debone, a paralegal for the Attorney Grievance Commission, who examined respondent's trust account statements, deposit slips, and deposited items, shows that a total of 109 clients of the respondent had negative balances between 1998 and 2002. The bank statements, admitted in evidence as exhibit 10, indicate that on 109 occasions Mr. Zuckerman paid out more money on behalf of the client than he had on deposit in his trust account for that client, which is also corroborated by the testimony of Ms. Elkins, a paralegal hired by Mr. Zuckerman to review the trust account statements. An analysis of the trust account statements and the corresponding client ledgers, admitted in evidence as exhibit 6, shows that the total amount paid to Mr. Zuckerman's clients in this manner was $311,898.11. We, therefore, conclude that the hearing judge's factual findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and overrule this exception. Exception 4: Respondent vigorously excepts to the judge's characterization... `that [Zuckerman] advanced a total of $311,898.13 to his personal injury clients with checks drawn on his trust account before the funds belonging to those clients were deposited in his trust account.' Exception 6: Respondent excepts, for the same reasons heretofore stated, to any other instances where the hearing judge in the Findings makes a factual finding that an improper advance had occurred or that respondent did not properly safeguard his clients' funds or other assets, or was not concerned with doing so or otherwise acted improperly with respect to his trust account. By his own admission, Mr. Zuckerman readily acknowledges that [he paid clients with funds belonging to others] on occasions, but only where the case involved had been settled, the settlement funds received, appropriate releases executed and delivered and the client involved having been furnished a proper and fully explained settlement sheet. He disputes that in so doing, he advanced the money to clients from other clients' funds because of his entitlement theory. Judge Prevas's finding of fact that Mr. Zuckerman advanced the money to those clients whose funds were not on deposit is supported by clear and convincing evidence because the clients' funds were only available from deposited funds of other clients, so that the funds paid were on credit from the funds of others or advances. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 17 (1999) (defining advances as [t]he supplying of funds or goods on credit). Thus, we overrule both exceptions. Exception 5: Respondent excepts to the following findings of fact by the hearing judge: On March 16, 2000, [Mr. Zuckerman's] trust account had a negative balance of `$363.13.' The hearing judge then refers to testimony of Mr. Debone, [AGC's investigator], as to the subsequent transactions involving the trust account and concludes that... `[Mr. Zuckerman] spent funds belonging to these clients on other matters and did not preserve the funds for his clients.' As to the factual finding that the trust account had a negative balance, Mr. Zuckerman argues that the Petitioner initially alleged that the negative balance occurred on May 16, 2000, instead of March 16, 2000, which misled or at least misdirected [him] in preparation of his defense, because he had a ready response with respect to the date so long relied upon by Petitioner (on which no overdraft or other `negative balance' [was] disclosed on the pertinent bank statement), only to have that comfortable cushion pulled out from under him by Petitioner's shifting its ground at or shortly before the hearing below. This exception is disingenuous to the extent that Mr. Zuckerman in argument before this Court and the hearing court below, acknowledge[d] that a `-363.13' figure appear[ed] on the bank statement for the date to which Petitioner formally shifted at the hearing below.... The record indicates that in its Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Bar Counsel alleged that a negative balance of Mr. Zuckerman's trust account occurred on May 16, 2000. At the hearing, Judge Prevas allowed Bar Counsel to amend its petition to state the correct date of March 16, 2000, over Mr. Zuckerman's objection. Regardless of the date, Mr. Zuckerman admits that there was a negative balance on his trust account, and bank statements were admitted in evidence as Exhibit 13 during the hearing establishing the date on which the negative balance occurred. This exception is denied. Mr. Zuckerman's last factual exception relates to Judge Prevas's Conclusion section addressing the mitigating factors in this case. To that end, Mr. Zuckerman argues that the hearing judge's findings of mitigating factors militate strongly against any conclusion that clear and convincing evidence was produced to establish petitioner's allegations and charges. We note that the facts tending to show mitigation are used to determine the severity of the sanction and not whether the evidence adduced has established a violation of the Rules by clear and convincing evidence. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 484, 671 A.2d 463, 480 (1996). As a result, mitigation factors are not weighed in the balance of whether clear and convincing evidence was adduced to prove the allegations. This exception is denied.