Opinion ID: 789273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Causal connection between Moorer's perceived disability and his termination

Text: 66 We further hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Moorer satisfied his ultimate burden of proving that Baptist terminated Moorer because of his perceived disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As noted above, there was significant evidence that at least some of the reasons for Moorer's termination were pretextual. See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1185-86 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that the plaintiff's burden in an ADA case is to prove that the employer's explanation is a pretext for unlawful discrimination). There also was significant evidence that Moorer's alcoholism, which Baptist erroneously perceived to be a substantially limiting impairment, actually motivated his termination. 67 We disagree with Baptist's contention that the district court failed to require Moorer to satisfy his burden of showing pretext. The district court made its pretext findings primarily in its discussion of whether Baptist regarded Moorer as disabled, which, in light of Ross, was proper. The district court then relied on those findings to support its conclusion that Moorer was fired because of his disability. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's finding of disability discrimination.