Opinion ID: 1793829
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recordings of Appellant's Police Interviews

Text: At trial, the state introduced several incriminating statements by appellant through the testimony of police officers who had interviewed appellant during the course of their investigation. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) permits the admission of statements by a party opponent when offered against that party opponent. While testifying, the officers referred to, and at times read from, transcripts of appellant's interviews. The defense made a motion to introduce the full recordings of appellant's interviews. In opposition to that motion, the state argued that the defense could not introduce the full recordings because the statements therein were self-serving hearsay with respect to appellant, and, in any event, the full recordings were unnecessarily repetitive and time consuming. The trial court denied defense's motion. On appeal, appellant contends that the exclusion of the full recordings was prejudicial error because the recordings were the best evidence of his statements. See Minn. R. Evid. 1002. Despite appellant's assertions, a witness with first-hand knowledge of what was said in a conversation may permissibly testify as to what he heard. See Minn. R. Evid. 602. In so testifying, a witness may legitimately rely on a writing to refresh his or her memory. Minn. R. Evid. 612. A trial court has wide discretion in permitting use of memoranda [to refresh a witness's memory] and in the references that may be made thereto. Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 242 Minn. 265, 274, 65 N.W.2d 185, 191 (1954). At trial, appellant did not raise any objection to the officers' ability to remember what was said during the recorded interviews. Defense counsel had access to the interview recordings and transcripts thereof and the trial court permitted defense counsel to cross-examine the officers about any of the statements they made concerning the interviews. On appeal, appellant has not pointed to any inaccuracies in the officers' testimony or provided evidence that the testimony was in any way misleading. Accordingly, we find no error with the manner in which appellant's statements were received. Appellant also asserts that Minn. R. Evid. 106 required the trial court to admit the recordings of the interviews into evidence. This rule provides, when a    recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part    which ought in fairness to be considered. Minn. R. Evid. 106. In Mills, however, we recognized that Minn. R. Evid. 106 is not applicable unless portions of the actual recording have been introduced into evidence. Id. at 286 n. 8, 65 N.W.2d 185; see also State v. Taylor, 258 N.W.2d 615, 622 (Minn.1977). Here, the state did not introduce any part of the actual recordings into evidence. In Mills, we also recognized that the `rule of completeness' applies only when it is necessary to give the jury a full understanding of the facts and it may not be used to introduce otherwise irrelevant statements. 562 N.W.2d at 286-87. We thus held that a trial court may properly exclude self-serving portions of a recorded interview of a criminal defendant, even though it had allowed police to testify as to certain admissions the defendant made in that interview. Id. at 286. Likewise, in the present case, we hold that Rule 106 did not require the trial court to admit the entire recordings of appellant's interviews.