Opinion ID: 203934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Historical Legitimacy and Congressional Endorsement of Felon Disenfranchisement Law

Text: The remainder of the arguments in the majority opinion rely on Congress' sanctioning or presupposing the validity of felon disenfranchisement in various contexts, such as where (1) it has rejected proposals to outright bar felon disenfranchisement, either through the VRA or otherwise, and (2) endorsed disenfranchisement laws generally in the aftermath of the VRA. First of all, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its enactment. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170 n. 5, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). But more importantly, these arguments are entirely irrelevant to the question before us. Congressional refusal to pass categorical prohibitions on felon disenfranchisement or even its subsequent affirmation of the practice generally, is not inconsistent with Congress's clear intent to subject to scrutiny, through § 2 of the VRA,  any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way. Allen, 393 U.S. at 566-67, 89 S.Ct. 817 (emphasis added). Congress may very well have decided not to bar felon disenfranchisement wholesale (as it did by omitting it from § 4) and may even have endorsed the practice where it was motivated by and served legitimate ends. But it may have nevertheless chosen, in order to make the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment meaningful, to restrict the adoption of this qualification in those cases where it is applied in a manner which results in the denial of the right to vote on account of race. This reading of the legislative history, which is consistent with the statutory text, is far more compelling than the majority's analysis. Ultimately, the plainer the language, the more convincing contrary legislative history must be to overcome the natural purport of a statute's language. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 229, 38 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). I see a clear textual mandate, uncontradicted by any legislative history, that felon disenfranchisement laws, like all voting qualifications, may be challenged under § 2 of the VRA. If the language of law is to have any meaning at all, then surely it must prevail over the kind of speculation that is entailed in such an enterprise as th[is] court[ ] ha[s] undertaken. United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355 (4th Cir.1994). The plain language of the statute being as clear as it is, and the legislative history and purpose only bolstering that clarity, I cannot help but speculate that the majority is jumping through hoops to defeat the remedial purpose for which the provision was enacted in order to produce a result consistent with its own preference in policy. But [t]he Fifteenth Amendment empowers `Congress,' not the [c]ourt[s], to determine in the first instance what legislation is needed to enforce it. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at . And even if we question the wisdom of Congress's decision to enact a statute that permits challenging felon disenfranchisement laws, we are judges, not policy-makers. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 348 (Parker, J., dissenting). The duty of a judge is to follow the law, not to question its plain terms. Id., 449 F.3d at 368 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). I do not believe that Congress wishes us to disregard the plain language of any statute or to invent exceptions to the statutes it has created. Id. Finally, I see no constitutional issues posed by interpreting the VRA according to its language and consistent with its purpose, so as to encompass felon disenfranchisement laws. Rather, § 2 of the VRA is firmly within the scope of Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments, which includes the power to enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003). Finding challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws to be cognizable under the VRA, I have no trouble concluding that the plaintiffs have stated a claim sufficient to preclude dismissal at this early juncture. Thus, I would affirm the district court's decision on this issue. II. Ex Post Facto Clause Claim The second issue raised on appeal, a question of first impression in this circuit, is whether the retroactive application of a felon disenfranchisement provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to felons incarcerated for crimes committed prior to the provision's passage into law. The Ex Post Facto Clause bars application of a law `that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed[.]' Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)); see U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10 (No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law.). Plaintiffs, incarcerated in Massachusetts for offenses committed prior to Article 120's enactment, contend that Article 120 is unconstitutional as applied to them because it subjects them to additional punishment not provided for by the laws of the Commonwealth when they committed the acts underlying their convictions. The majority affirms the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim on grounds that the deprivation of the right to vote, as accomplished by Article 120, does not constitute punishment, and thus, falls outside the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause. I cannot agree. While disenfranchising convicted felons prospectively might be perfectly constitutional, I would hold that the disenfranchisement provision here is a punitive measure, which cannot be retroactively applied. The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U.S. 277, 320, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866). As the majority accurately explains, analysis of whether a particular enactment imposes retroactive punishment so as to implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause requires a two-part inquiry. The first part asks whether the challenged law has a civil, regulatory purpose, or whether it is intended to punish. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2002) ( citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997)). If a court finds that the law was intended to be punitive, then it constitutes punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause and would violate the clause if retroactively applied. Id. However, if the law conveys a non-punitive, regulatory purpose, the court moves to the second part of the test to ascertain whether the law is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the state's] intention to deem it civil. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). The ultimate question is whether [Article 120] is intended to be, or by its nature necessarily is, criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984). While legislative purpose is not easily discernible given the unique procedural history of Article 120's enactment by popular referendum, I nevertheless find that a close look at the provision's language and history reveals that it was intended by its proponents to be a primarily punitive measure. Moreover, even if the primary intent behind the enactment of Article 120 could not be clearly identified, [38] I would find this disenfranchisement law to be so punitive in effect that it nevertheless constitutes a criminal punishment under the second prong of Smith.