Opinion ID: 1901123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The defendant first challenges the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to enter a judgment of contempt against a juvenile because the District Court, acting as the Juvenile Court, has exclusive jurisdiction of juveniles alleged to have committed juvenile crimes. 15 M.R.S.A. § 3101(1) (1980). We think that the Juvenile Code does not require that conclusion and that the policy underlying criminal contempt will not permit that conclusion. The Commentary to section 3104 concerning jurisdiction of the Juvenile Code notes that the Juvenile Code, unlike the predecessor statute, contains no provision for contempt powers. 15 M.R.S.A. § 3104, Commentary (1979). Although the Commentary concludes that the juvenile court presumably has contempt powers, the basis for the conclusion is found in the inherent contempt powers of courts of record. See 4 M.R.S.A. § 151 (1979). The conclusion is not based on any consideration of the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. The Commentary seeks to establish that the Juvenile Court should be permitted to exercise contempt powers [b]ecause the juvenile court is functionally the District Court, and does not establish that only the Juvenile Court has such contempt powers concerning juveniles. Maine authority has established that courts of record have inherent contempt power. In Re Holbrook, 133 Me. 276, 283, 177 A. 418, 420 (1935); Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Me. 550, 556 (1842); Glassman, Maine Practice, § 42.1 at 384 (1967). In addition, 4 M.R.S.A. § 114 (1979) expressly provides that the Superior Court may punish for contempt. A commonsense consideration of the policy underlying the concept of contempt of court reveals that no one court can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over contempt proceedings. Under M.R. Crim.P., Rule 42(a), [1] a court may summarily punish a criminal contempt if the conduct constituting the contempt was committed in the presence of the trial justice. This power of a court is directed toward misbehavior that brings that particular court into disrepute and that interferes with the orderly conduct of that court's business. In Re Bernard, 408 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Me.1979). The power is used only in exigent circumstances, when summary vindication of the court's dignity and authority [is] necessary. Bernard, 408 A.2d at 1282 (citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534, 45 S.Ct. 390, 394, 69 L.Ed. 767, 773 (1925)). We refuse to hold that a Superior Court justice who, in the exercise of his informed discretion, determines that a juvenile has willfully interfered with the business of the court, thereby impugning the court's dignity and authority, is without power to act. Such a holding would require removal to the District Court for a hearing, in order to acquaint that judge with the situation. That procedure would utterly emasculate the immediate punishment encompassed in a summary action for criminal contempt, which dispenses with notice and hearing. Alexander v. Sharpe, 245 A.2d 279, 282 (Me.1968); Stern v. Chandler, 153 Me. 62, 68, 134 A.2d 550, 553 (1957) (quoting Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 308, 9 S.Ct. 77, 81, 32 L.Ed. 405, 410 (1888)). Further, that holding would create the anomalous situation of requiring the District, or Juvenile, Court to vindicate an affront to, or interference with, the operation of the Superior Court, rather than permitting the impugned court to rectify the situation. See Thomas v. State, 21 Md.App. 572, 573, 578, 320 A.2d 538, 541 (1974) (ruling that only juvenile court has jurisdiction of juvenile contempt would erode the authority of the judge to conduct court proceedings in an orderly manner, strip the trial court of its right to deal with contemptuous, disruptive juvenile witnesses ... and throw open wide the door to conduct creating chaotic courtroom conditions.) We have consistently noted that this extraordinary power cannot be denied the trial judge in an appropriate case without inviting or causing such obstruction to the orderly and impartial administration of justice as would endanger the rights and safety of the entire community. Bernard, 408 A.2d at 1282; see also Alexander v. Sharpe, 245 A.2d at 282 (It has long been recognized that the power of a court to punish summarily for a contempt committed in the presence of the Court is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court and necessary for the court to possess in the exercise of all its other powers.) The beneficiary of a summary criminal contempt action is the court itself; the purpose of the penalty imposed is punishment for an affront to or disrespect of the law. Glassman, § 42.2 at 384 (quoting Stern, 153 Me. at 66, 134 A.2d at 552). The rehabilitative processes of the Juvenile Court, 15 M.R.S.A. § 3002, are unnecessary and irrelevant to vindicating the dignity of our courts. See State v. Wilson, 409 A.2d 226, 228 (Me.1979) (juvenile guilty of night hunting not in need of rehabilitative processes of the juvenile court system.)