Opinion ID: 166399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possibly Improper Comments

Text: 93 Mr. Thornburg complains of other prosecutorial comments that are at least arguably improper. We will address them individually before considering whether their cumulative impact demands reversal. 94
95 Mr. Thornburg contends that in final argument the prosecutor (1) improperly vouched for state witnesses by claiming that Donnie Scott, Teresa Burgess, and Teresa Embrey (codefendant Embrey's sister-in-law) had no reason to lie, Tr. IV at 105-107; and (2) accused Ruby Davis of perjury when he said: 96 Let's talk about the Embreys and Ruby Davis. What motive does she have to get up here and lie to you? When she first talks to OSBI she never sees Richard Thornburg out there. Never at all. She sticks to the story about Mr. Embrey coming home and falling off the couch. 97 Second interview she never sees Mr. Thornburg there. . . . Second interview she throws in he was a big boy. I told him to stay away from those people. 98 What is she not saying in that statement? Yet, she comes in here in front of you and testifies, commits perjury on the stand, lies to you and says she never said those things. She said she was never asked. What motive does she have to testify? Her boyfriend, Roger Embrey, her friend Richard Thornburg. 99 Id. at 107-08 (emphasis added). 100 Argument or evidence is impermissible vouching only if the jury could reasonably believe that the prosecutor is indicating a personal belief in the witness' credibility, either through explicit personal assurances of the witness' veracity or by implicitly indicating that information not presented to the jury supports the witness' testimony. United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 680 (10th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, an attack on a witness's veracity is improper only in similar circumstances. Thus, it is not improper for a prosecutor to direct the jury's attention to evidence that tends to enhance or diminish a witness's credibility. 101 Here, the prosecutor's statements appeared to be based on the evidence. Nothing at trial suggested any reason why Scott, Teresa Embrey, or Burgess would want to injure Mr. Thornburg. Also, the attack on Ms. Davis was explicitly based on her prior inconsistent statements to police officers. 102 Moreover, the prosecutor never indicated to the jury that he knew something more about the witness's credibility than could be deduced from the evidence at trial. Hence, this does not appear to be a case of improper vouching. Even if, in an (over)abundance of caution, we might say that the prosecutor stepped over the line, see United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1276 (10th Cir.2000) (assuming prosecutor's characterization of case as case about perjury, defense witness's testimony as lies, and argument that state witness [had] no reason to lie was improper vouching but deciding that any error was harmless), we would still be hard-pressed to find any substantial unfair prejudice. 103
104 Mr. Thornburg contends that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that the Andersons tried to influence the testimony of Jatone Kennedy, victim Smith's girlfriend. Kennedy testified that Smith went to get her purse from Scott's house about 4 a.m. on the 28th and that she never saw him again. On direct examination the prosecutor asked: 105 Q. Ma'am, has anybody approached you in this case about your testimony? 106 A. No. 107 Q. Nobody has? 108 A. I think in the beginning there were some people that tried to convince me to say things differently than — I mean, nobody — 109 Q. Nobody twisted your arm. A. Right 110 Q. Who approached you, ma'am, about this case? 111 A. Corky [Mrs.] Anderson. 112 Tr. II at 216. In contrast to Huber, Kennedy had uttered no prior inconsistent statement. 113 Mr. Thornburg further complains that the prosecutor stated in closing: 114 [Mr. Huber] also told you Corky Anderson tries to influence his testimony, Corky and Glenn. And first she lied and gave a story that Glenn went home with them. . . . Why are you creating alibis? Why do you have to create a situation if you haven't done anything wrong? Tr. IV at 103. 115 We agree with Mr. Thornburg that it may have been improper for the prosecutor to elicit Mrs. Anderson's attempt to influence Kennedy or to argue that Anderson's attempt to create an alibi was evidence of Mr. Thornburg's guilt. 116 The state makes no real attempt to justify the conduct. Nevertheless, the real damage to Mr. Thornburg's alibi defense came from the testimony of government witnesses regarding the events at the time of the murder, not evidence regarding the Andersons' apparently feeble attempts to influence witnesses. 117
118 Mr. Thornburg also complains that during the guilt phase the prosecutor argued that the jury had a moral and civic duty to convict: 119 Justice is in your hands. Your decision here affects the lives of not only this defendant but other people in the community. We've shown you overwhelming evidence of why Mr. Thornburg would want to kill Mr. Poteet, why maybe he would want to kill Jimmy Scott, his motive, waited the night before, the next morning, his statements to Richard Goss when he was arrested. 120 Does that sound like meek, little, mild statements the testimony you heard from Mr. Thornburg up here? I will suggest to you that was the true Mr. Thornburg. With all the cuss words you can't prove it. He didn't say I'm innocent. What are you talking about? He said, you can't prove it. Folks, we have proven it. It's right here in front of you right now. 121 We talked about it in voir dire. We asked the question about passing judgment on somebody else. And that's a hard thing to do. Each of you in voir dire told us you could pass judgment. We've proven our case to you. We've shown it to you. 122 We've woven it together. Every little piece has fallen right in line. We've shown our case to you, said this is what we've got, this is the evidence. 123 One of you just got through reading a book before you came on here, When Justice Prevailed. Folks, justice must prevail in this case. Like I said, you're the ones that decide it. You are the justice in Grady County right now. You're the ones that make the legal decisions. 124 Justice must run in this case for three victims, for Donnie Scott. Mr. Thornburg has got to be told what he did was wrong. Not only was it wrong, this was terrible, folks. 125 One of you said about mass murder. One of the problems in our society is mass murder, violence, drugs, guns. This is a mass murder. This is three helpless people who were gunned down, kidnapped tortured, burned alive and left dead in a house. 126 Tr. IV at 112-113 (emphasis added). It is improper for a prosecutor to suggest that a jury has a civic duty to convict. See Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1247 (10th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 909, 124 S.Ct. 1615, 158 L.Ed.2d 255 (2004). In a decision handed down during World War II, the Supreme Court warned that the prosecutor's references to the war constituted an appeal wholly irrelevant to any facts or issues in the case, and could have jeopardized the verdict had the Court not reversed on another ground. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943). But here the prosecutor's comments were firmly rooted in the facts of the case. We see little, if any, impropriety. See Spears, 343 F.3d at 1247 (statement that justice cries out for [conviction] did not render trial fundamentally unfair); Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1022 (10th Cir.2002) (prosecutor's comment that jury could only do justice . . . by bringing in a verdict of death did not render trial fundamentally unfair), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 833, 124 S.Ct. 80, 157 L.Ed.2d 60 (2003). 127
128 Mr. Thornburg complains of prosecution comments about the defense's punishment-phase expert, Dr. Philip Murphy, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Murphy testified that excessive drinking and other injuries caused Mr. Thornburg's organic brain damage that led to blackouts during which he would lose consciousness. Dr. Murphy performed 11 tests and a clinical interview to assess Mr. Thornburg. In his closing argument at the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecutor said: (1) You heard Dr. Murphy. He spent 15 minutes looking at him and he said he's brain damaged? Tr. IV at 200; and (2) Dr. Murphy says that Richard Thornburg, as long as he's not drinking and in these blackouts, he's not a dangerous man. This is, of course, from his 15 minutes upstairs in jail. Tr. IV at 203-04. But nowhere in the record is there evidence about the amount of time Dr. Murphy spent with Mr. Thornburg. A prosecutor is allowed to comment on the evidence and draw inferences therefrom, but he may not speculate or refer to evidence never presented to the jury. See Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d at 1020-21 (criticizing prosecutor for mischaracterizing evidence and suggesting that defendant had committed other murders when such facts were not in evidence). The prosecutor's 15-minute comments were improper. 129 On the other hand, defense counsel never objected to these statements. Also, the judge instructed the jury that it should consider only the evidence introduced at trial, that the attorneys' statements and arguments are not evidence, and that the jury bore the responsibility of determining the credibility of each witness. Such instructions may minimize the impact of a prosecutor's misstatements. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (jury instructions that their decision was to be made on the basis of the evidence alone, and that the arguments of counsel were not evidence helped remedy prosecutor's improper closing argument). 130
131 Mr. Thornburg contends that the sentencing stage of his trial was fundamentally unfair because in his sentencing-stage closing the prosecutor (1) injected his personal opinion on the appropriate sentence and (2) misled the jury about sentencing alternatives. The prosecutor said: 132 And you must give independent consideration to each and every one of the murder convictions because every one of those individuals in there was a separate life, and that is they never deserved to die in the manner in which they died. 133 And we can't change that. But I can and you can give them at least individual consideration with the understanding that the man who murdered them, the man who led, the man who created this and the man who was out seeking for revenge that night, that he receive the punishment that is just under the statutes, under the law and most important in this case, as we discussed at the very beginning. 134 . . . 135 And we told you what the law is. That's merely the charges we file against somebody. But that's not easy. There's nothing easy about it. You know, we all try to be moral people, we think about trying to do good for our community, our society. 136 When we file a piece of paper, we're asking you to sentence this person to death. We're asking you to return a verdict allowing the State to execute Mr. Thornburg. So basically we're asking you the State for the authority to do that. There's nothing easy about that. We're talking about life and death. Nothing easy at all. 137 . . . 138 Justice, folks, cries for the death penalty in this case like no other case. Justice cries for the death penalty. There is no other reasonable verdict, nothing. Nothing can come close. 139 Talk about the sword of mercy. It's above Judge Winchester. The sword there. You live by the sword, you die by the sword, folks. We're asking you to return a verdict now of guilty which you already have. The maximum punishment is on everything. 140 If you really don't want Mr. Thornburg back on your streets ever again, then the only proper punishment is death. We're asking you to sentence Mr. Thornburg to that. It should not be a difficult decision. I know it is. We're talking about killing somebody. You're authorizing the State to kill somebody. But there is no other just verdict. This is justice. 141 Tr. IV at 195-96, 201-02, 205-06. Mr. Thornburg contends that these comments imposed the prosecutor's personal views upon the jury. It is improper for a prosecutor to inject his personal opinion on the propriety of the death sentence. It is also impermissible for a prosecutor to suggest that he or some other authority, not the jury, [is] the final or true arbiter of . . . punishment. Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1343 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). As stated in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), [T]he uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role. But a prosecutor is entitled to argue that under the facts and law, capital punishment is appropriate. See United States v. Ainesworth, 716 F.2d 769, 771 (10th Cir.1983) (distinguishing improper argument that prosecutor believes accused is guilty of crime or stating facts not in evidence from proper commentary that on the basis of the evidence in the case, it is his belief that the defendant is guilty). Here, the prosecutor did not suggest the existence of facts not in evidence, nor did he suggest that anyone other than the jury was responsible for fixing the appropriate sentence. On the other hand, his comments on the appropriateness of the death penalty could be taken as his personal view. We will assume that the comments crossed the line. 142 More troubling is the prosecutor's comment that did cross the line. In the last quoted paragraph he said, If you really don't want Mr. Thornburg back on your streets ever again, then the only proper punishment is death. Tr. IV at 205. This statement could mislead the jury about possible punishment alternatives, suggesting that he could be released from jail at some point if not sentenced to death. The State may not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never will be released if given a sentence other than death. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (jury should have been instructed on possibility of life without parole); see also Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (requiring Simmons instruction when prosecution presented evidence showing defendant's probability of future dangerousness). 143 Nevertheless, the trial judge remedied this error when he instructed the jury: Even if you find that the aggravating circumstance outweigh(s) the mitigating circumstance, you may impose a sentence of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for life without parole. Instr. 12 St. Ct. Rec. Vol. 3 at 504. Thus, the jury knew that it could keep Mr. Thornburg off the streets without imposing the death penalty. See Kelly, 534 U.S. at 257 n. 8, 122 S.Ct. 726 (jury instruction on parole ineligibility could cure problem raised by prosecutor's argument). 144
145 Most troubling is Mr. Thornburg's contention that the prosecutor invoked sympathy for the victims during the guilt-phase closing argument: 146 Look at Donnie Scott. He's got a good job now. He's obviously off drugs. Who's to say he can't lead a very, very productive life? Who's to say Mr. Poteet, Mr. Shepard couldn't have done the exact same thing? 147 You know, is Mr. Thornburg today in Court, there's no question about that. Our legal system says this is his day in Court. But this is also our three victims' day in Court. This is Mr. Shepard's, Mr. Poteet and Mr. Smith. 148 . . . 149 Folks, we have three victims here who are not here today. Mr. Shepard, Mr. Smith and Mr. Poteet, they can't get up here and tell you on the witness stand how Mr. Thornburg slaughtered them. Shot them and left them to burn alive in the house. They can't get up here to tell us that. They're never going to be here. They're never going to testify. They're never going to be with their families for holidays, Christmases. 150 And you've got families here. This is also their day in Court, too, not just this defendant. 151 Tr. IV at 111-12. The prosecutor's comments that the victims may have led productive lives, could not testify at trial, and would never be with their families on holidays were irrelevant to proving Mr. Thornburg guilty of their murders. See Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 991 (10th Cir.2002) (victim-impact statements improper in guilt stage). 152 Notwithstanding their clear irrelevance to Mr. Thornburg's guilt, however, the prosecutor's appeal was already implicit in the evidence. The jury knew that there were three men murdered, that they were shot and left in a burning house, and that they could not appear in court to testify. And because the evidence had shown all three victims to be drug and alcohol abusers, the prosecutor's speculation on their possible productive lives was most likely an attempt to avoid any jury nullification based on the victims' own reprehensibility. While condemning such comments during the guilt phase, we can doubt their inflammatory impact.