Opinion ID: 1226985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: under the facts presented, the allegations in the petition are sufficient to set forth a cause of action for termination of parental rights as to a.d.b.

Text: The mother argues that she was denied due process [7] because the amended petition failed to give her notice of the statutory grounds the State relied upon for termination of her parental rights. The State asserts that the petition was sufficient to advise the mother of the reasons for which termination was sought and that the mother was put on notice of the norms she must achieve to avoid termination by the court imposed standards provided during judicial review of A.D.B.'s deprived status. Because we find the allegations in the petition were sufficient to apprise the mother that her rights to A.D.B. were in jeopardy and to inform her of the grounds for termination, we need not address the issue of the role the court imposed standards played in advising the mother of her rights. [8] Petitions filed in juvenile proceedings are governed by 10 O.S.Supp. 1990 § 1103(B). [9] The statute provides that if termination of parental rights is sought, it must be stated in the petition and summons. [10] We find Matter of Daniel, 591 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Okla. 1979) instructive in our quest to determine the sufficiency of the petition filed in the instant cause. [11] The parents in Daniel, like the mother here, challenged the sufficiency of a petition filed in a juvenile proceeding. The State alleged in Daniel that: 1) the children were residing in a children's home; 2) the parents had been unable to provide proper and necessary care; 3) the whereabouts of the father was unknown and that the mother was in a mental institution; and 4) the children be adjudicated dependent and placed in temporary custody of the children's home. Noting that we were dealing with a dependency adjudication rather than with a termination proceeding, we held that the facts alleged in the petition were sufficient to set forth a cause of action for dependency. Here, the amended petition alleged that: 1) A.D.B. was in the custody of her maternal aunt; 2) she had been adjudged a deprived child on April 15, 1985 in accordance with stipulations agreed to by the mother; 3) A.D.B. be made a ward of the court as a deprived child; and 4) the mother's rights be terminated. The allegations in the petition are almost identical to those found sufficient in Daniel. Additionally, when the mother here entered her stipulation in the cause to have A.D.B. adjudicated as a deprived child, she recognized that she was unable to provide A.D.B. with proper parental care and guardianship  a statutorily provided definition for a deprived child. [12] We recognize that an essential element of due process is the right to know the grounds upon which a right may be affected. [13] Here, the State prayed that A.D.B. be declared a deprived child and the mother's rights be terminated. [14] The petition contained an allegation that A.D.B. was deprived as stipulated to by the mother in the adjudicatory stage. [15] Termination could be sanctioned only on a finding that the mother failed to correct the very conditions which led to the adjudication of A.D.B. [16] Under the facts presented, the allegations in the petition are sufficient to set forth a cause of action for termination of the mother's parental rights to A.D.B.