Opinion ID: 1952329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Motion to Exclude Evidence

Text: The defendant contended that the trial justice abused his discretion when he admitted into evidence certain testimonial and pictorial evidence offered by the state; first, firefighter Afflerbach's testimony that upon observing an apparently frightened woman leaning out of a third-floor window on building A's east side, he guided the woman down a window ladder to safety and thereupon noticed that she displayed signs of smoke inhalation; and second, a photograph that showed the ladder extended to a third-floor window. We disagree with defendant. According to defendant, the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because it was cumulative and unduly prejudicial. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence that tends to prove or disprove a point provable in the case. Abbey Medical/Abbey Rents, Inc. v. Mignacca, 471 A.2d 189, 194 (R.I. 1984). Under Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible. Rule 403, however, qualifies 402, by providing that evidence  though relevant  may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Determinations of the relevancy of evidence offered at trial are within the sound discretion of the trial justice. Mignacca, 471 A.2d at 194. In addition, [t]he ultimate determination [under Rule 403] of the effect of    evidence is within the trial justice's discretion. State v. Grundy, 582 A.2d 1166, 1172 (R.I. 1990). Rulings on the admissibility of evidence on relevance grounds will not be considered reversible error unless we find that the trial justice abused his discretion. Mignacca, 471 A.2d at 194. To prove a charge of arson in the first degree, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a fire or explosion created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or damage to any building    which is occupied or in use for any purpose or which has been occupied or in use for any purpose during the six (6) months preceding the offense or to any other residential structure. General Laws 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-4-2, as amended by P.L. 1983, ch. 185, § 1. Clearly the contested evidence was relevant in establishing that the fire created a substantial risk of physical harm and damaged an occupied building. After review of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the contested evidence provides direct proof that the fire created a substantial risk of serious physical harm. Therefore, although the evidence may have aroused the jury's sympathy, it was highly probative. Consequently, we find no error in the trial justice's determination that the evidence was relevant and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Furthermore, the trial justice mitigated any prejudicial effect by admonishing the jury that [b]ias, prejudice, [and] sympathy    play no part in your deliberations. It would be inappropriate for you to find the defendant guilty simply    because you feel sorry for the woman that was carried down the ladder. The defendant argues alternatively that because the state failed to establish a demonstrable need to introduce the photograph, its admission into evidence was precluded by State v. Long, 488 A.2d 427 (R.I. 1985). The defendant's reliance on Long is misplaced. Long, which sets forth guidelines for introducing criminal mug shots into evidence, requires that the state have a demonstrable need for their introduction. Id. at 431. Long and its guidelines, however, simply do not apply to the introduction of photographs other than mug shots.