Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Challenge to Prospective Juror V.H.

Text: V.H., 34 years old at the time of trial and married with three children, was a high school graduate and worked as a civilian warehouse worker for the United States Marine Corps. Her brother was awaiting trial on a robbery charge. Regarding the solution to the violent crime problem, she wrote: We need to seek God! Her hobbies and interests were softball, and doing anything and everything I can do to please God! Asked whether she held religious or moral feelings that might interfere in judging another, she did not check yes or no, but wrote: I believe that God will do the judging in the end. But I also believe that everyone should have a fair treatment. Her general feeling about the death penalty was that she would pray and believe that the Lord would direct me in the right way; her feelings were tied to the biblical admonitions thou shalt not kill and vengeance is mine, saith the Lord. Regarding whether her feelings about the death penalty were strong, she wrote: Well I just believe in the word of God and I know that it's true. She felt obliged to accept her religious organization's views, but did not think they were in conflict with the law. On question No. 84 (automatic death penalty for intentional murder) she would have to pray strongly on this matter, though without prayer my answer would have to be yes. On voir dire, V.H. reiterated that she held strong religious beliefs and that she would seek guidance from her faith as well as from the court in making a decision. On further questioning by the court, she affirmed that she could set aside her religious views and make a decision based on the evidence and the law if so instructed. In response to a similar question from the prosecutor, however, she answered: To be honest with you, I really don't want to decide anybody's life or death. The court denied the prosecutor's challenge for cause, immediately after which the prosecutor excused V.H. by peremptory challenge. At the Wheeler/Batson hearing, the prosecutor noted he had unsuccessfully challenged V.H. for cause and explained that while she had said she could be fair and listen to the evidence, she told me honestly that she could not judge a person, and could not judge a person whether to give them life or death. She has a brother awaiting trial for a robbery. She indicated she would like to be present for that trial. She had very strong religious beliefs, which I felt after reading her questionnaire and talking to her would get in the way of her ability to be a juror and conduct herself as a juror should in a death penalty case. Ruling on the motion, the court found, with respect to V.H.: I had noted from her answers in the questionnaire that she is an extremely religious person to the point where she may not be able to come to a decision based on the evidence and the law. And may, in fact, seek divine guidance. And although her answers to this Court's questions and to counsel's questions technically avoided a challenge for cause, I think there is certainly sufficient reason based on factors other than race to challenge her in the exercise of a peremptory challenge. (15) Defendant faults the trial court for not assessing and considering the prosecutor's second reason for excusing V.H., that she wanted to attend her brother's upcoming trial. Defendant observes that while the prosecutor's questions to V.H. suggested she would have trouble serving and also attending her brother's trial, her answers suggested the opposite: she did not know when his case would come to trial and was not planning to attend every day in any event. Defendant argues the prosecutor's fabrication of a problem suggests his given reasons were pretextual. But the record does not necessarily establish fabrication. The juror did say that she wanted to attend her brother's trial whenever she could, and regardless of when that trial was scheduled, her interest in it could have raised a concern on the prosecutor's part about her sympathy for the defense or hostility toward the prosecution. Further, the defendant's burden at the third stage of a Wheeler/Batson hearing is to show the prosecutor excused prospective jurors for discriminatory reasons ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 612-613), not merely that some of the nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the prosecutor are not supported by the record. In assessing the prosecutor's credibility, the trial court may, but is not required to, give weight to the fact that he or she has offered some reasons that do not withstand analysis. Defendant compares the prosecutor's questioning of V.H. with his failure to question a White juror, Juror No. 6, who also indicated he would follow a religious principle in deciding penalty. The two panelists' questionnaire answers, however, are not comparable. Juror No. 6 checked no when asked whether he had any religious or moral feeling that would make it difficult for him to judge another and did not explain further. He did not refer to religion in any of his responses. To question No. 77 (What is the view, if any, of your religious organization concerning the death penalty?) he answered: People since the beginning were put to death for unforgivable crimes. On question No. 79 (If this view is in conflict with the law, would you follow the law?) he checked no. As defendant acknowledges, Juror No. 6's questionnaire responses were generally pro death penalty. That the prosecutor did not see a need to probe Juror No. 6's understanding of his religious organization's views, which clearly would not prevent him from reaching a death verdict, sheds no light on the prosecutor's treatment of V.H. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror V.H. for the nonracial reason that her religious beliefs might prevent her from reaching verdicts in this case and, especially, from reaching a death verdict.