Opinion ID: 1519183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Wal-Mart moved for a directed verdict at the close of the appellees' case and then again at the close of all the evidence. Both motions were denied. Wal-Mart then moved for a new trial after the jury verdict and alternatively requested other postjudgment relief as well. That motion was never decided. In the directed verdict motions and motion for a new trial and other post-judgment relief, questions about the sufficiency of the evidence were raised. In addressing the sufficiency issue we must first view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought and give that evidence the highest probative value, taking into account all reasonable inferences that can be derived from it. Boykin v. Mr. Tidy Car Wash, Inc., 294 Ark. 182, 741 S.W.2d 270 (1987). A motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when the evidence viewed is so insubstantial as to require the jury's verdict for the party to be set aside. Id.; see also Green v. Gowen, 279 Ark. 382, 652 S.W.2d 624 (1983). A motion for a directed verdict should be denied only when there is a conflict in the evidence, or when the evidence is such that fair minded people might reach different conclusions. Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 282 Ark. 443, 669 S.W.2d 460 (1984). Under those circumstances a jury question is presented and a directed verdict is inappropriate. Id. It is not this court's province to try (or retry) issues of fact. Instead, this court examines the record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Norman Polk, 242 Ark. 422, 414 S.W.2d 849 (1967). Substantial evidence is defined as that which is of sufficient force and character that it will compel a conclusion one way or another. It must force or induce the mind to pass beyond a suspicion or conjecture. Kinco, Inc. v. Schueck Steel, Inc., 283 Ark. 72, 76, 671 S.W.2d 178, 181 (1984). We have previously described the proof necessary for a plaintiff to prevail in a slip and fall case. The plaintiff must prove: ... either (1) that the presence of a substance upon the floor was the result of the negligence on the part of the appellee or (2) that the substance has been on the floor for such a length of time that the appellee's employees knew or reasonably should have known of its presence and failed to use ordinary care to remove it. Dye v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 300 Ark. 197, 198, 777 S.W.2d 861, 862 (1989). Wal-Mart vehemently argues that there was no proof of a foreign substance on the floor due to its negligence and further no proof that a substance, if any, remained on the floor for a length of time to evidence its failure to use ordinary care. Wal-Mart cites two other cases in support of its argument/.M Mulligan's Grille, Inc. v. Aultman, 300 Ark. 544, 780 S.W.2d 554 (1989); and Skaggs Companies, Inc. v. White, 289 Ark. 434, 711 S.W.2d 819 (1986). Both cases are distinguishable. In Aultman there was no proof of any foreign substance presented to the jury. In White the plaintiff did testify about a mystery substance on the floor, but there was no testimony of what the substance was or how it got there. Moreover, in Dye v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra , there was no testimony by the plaintiff that there was any substance on the floor at the time and place she fell. Testimony was presented at trial to support the Keltons' claim. It was raining on the day in question. Water was on the Wal-Mart floor between the counter and the exit door. Wal-Mart employees entered the store through this door. There were foot tracks through the water on the floor. One witness felt a water drop hit her face. Another saw that a tile was missing in the ceiling. The water was still there when the Keltons returned. No incident report was completed by Wal-Mart personnel. No investigation was done by Wal-Mart until five months later. Though some of this testimony was contradicted by Wal-Mart witnesses, it collectively constitutes substantial evidence. The jury could readily infer that water had collected inside the building on the floor for an undue period of time and failure to wipe the floor clean or warn of its presence was a breach of ordinary care and, therefore, negligence. We have examined the record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict, as we are required to do. See B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Polk, 242 Ark. 422, 414 S.W.2d 849 (1967). Based on the evidence presented to the jury, we cannot say as a matter of law that the jury erred.