Opinion ID: 1442022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Stalberg.

Text: Defendant argues that it was error to admit the testimony of Dr. Stalberg, called as a rebuttal witness by the prosecution over defense objection. Dr. Stalberg had been appointed by the court at defendant's request before the first trial and had been called to the stand by the defense at the penalty phase of that trial. (See Haskett I, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 868.) At that time, Dr. Stalberg testified that defendant was mildly retarded and capable of rehabilitation. On cross-examination, he stated that defendant suffered from a compulsive sexual disorder. Also, apparently on cross-examination, the doctor testified that defendant admitted that he attacked Mrs. Gwendolyn R. and killed the two children. At the second penalty trial Dr. Stalberg was called by the prosecution as a rebuttal witness. Over defense objections, the doctor repeated the testimony about defendant's admissions. In a multipronged challenge to the admissibility of the doctor's testimony, defendant (1) argues that he received no notice of the prosecution's intent to call Dr. Stalberg, (2) invokes the attorney-client and the psychotherapist-patient privileges, (3) asserts that the admissions were involuntary, and (4) suggests that he was entitled to use immunity. Defendant did not object to the testimony in the trial court on all of these grounds. We nevertheless discuss each on its merits. We conclude that the court did not err in admitting the doctor's testimony. 1. Prior Notice. (12) Defendant's claim that he was entitled to notice of intent to call Dr. Stalberg under former section 190.3 of the 1977 penalty statute was raised in the trial court. The trial court overruled the objection on grounds that Dr. Stalberg was being called as a rebuttal witness. In arguing against this claim, the prosecutor contended that he had been sandbagged by the defense. He explained that he had not planned to call the doctor; the defense had given him reason to believe that there would be no defense evidence as to guilt at the second penalty trial and that the defense would concentrate on mitigation with background and character evidence. However, as previously noted, the defense did present alibi evidence in an attempt to raise a lingering doubt as to guilt. In view of the defense evidence and claim of alibi, the trial court properly found the doctor's testimony admissible as rebuttal. On request of defense counsel, the court expressly precluded any reference to any psychiatric aspects, limiting the questioning to the fact that the psychiatrist interviewed defendant and that defendant admitted the offenses. 2. Privilege. In the trial court, defendant invoked only the psychotherapist-patient privilege (Evid. Code, § 1010 et seq.). This privilege exists when the psychotherapist is appointed by order of the court upon the request of the lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding in order to provide the lawyer with information needed so that he or she may advise the defendant whether to enter or withdraw a plea based on insanity or to present a defense based on his or her mental or emotional condition. (Evid. Code, § 1017.) (13) The privilege was waived, however, when defendant called Dr. Stalberg to testify on his behalf at the first trial. ... Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and opportunity to claim the privilege. (Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a).) Defendant failed to object to any of the doctor's testimony at the first trial, effectively waiving the privilege. (See People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 867, 880-881 [125 Cal. Rptr. 442].) The trial court did not err in overruling the claim of privilege. On appeal, defendant invokes for the first time the attorney-client privilege (Evid. Code, §§ 952, 954) on the mistaken assumption that it has survived the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583 [268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127], discussing the differences between the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege, agreed that statements made to a psychotherapist may be made in the attorney-client relationship and, unless defendant waived the privilege or did not intend that the statements be confidential, they continued to be privileged notwithstanding the fact that they were no longer confidential at the time of trial. ( Id. at p. 621.) The defendant's statements in Clark were revealed to potential victims and were thus no longer confidential at the time of trial, but in Clark, the defendant had at no time waived the privilege. As the People argue, here defendant did waive the privilege when Dr. Stalberg was called to the stand by the defense in the first trial. 3. Voluntariness of Admissions. (14) We reject the contention that the statements were inadmissible for failure to advise pursuant to Miranda. ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].) No objection was made on Miranda grounds at either trial, precluding the claim on appeal. ( People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 236 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669]; People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1188 [264 Cal. Rptr. 852, 783 P.2d 211].) Further, the Miranda rules apply only to custodial interrogation  questioning initiated by, or at the direction of, law enforcement officers  not to questioning by a physician at the request of defense counsel. Here, defendant was represented by counsel who wanted defendant to confer with Dr. Stalberg for his own benefit, and the doctor correctly advised defendant that nothing revealed to the doctor could be used against defendant without the consent of his attorney. There was no violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. ( Estelle v. Smith (1980) 451 U.S. 454 [68 L.Ed.2d 359, 101 S.Ct. 1866], upon which defendant relies, is not apposite. There, the accused was faced, while in custody, with a court-ordered psychiatric inquiry without notice to his counsel.) (15) Defendant also urges that the statements were involuntary in the traditional sense  they were coerced by threats of the death penalty. We reject the argument on procedural grounds and on the merits. First, the doctor's interview with defendant was not state action within the meaning of the due process clause. Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167 [93 L.Ed.2d 473, 484, 107 S.Ct. 515].) Furthermore, there is no evidence of impermissible coercion in the statements made by Dr. Stalberg in seeking defendant's cooperation to the interview. Dr. Stalberg told defendant that he would be convicted for sure and that if he did not confide in the doctor, he would probably quite likely get the death penalty. Under the circumstances, keeping in mind that the examination of defendant was for the purpose of producing mitigating evidence on his behalf, we find no impropriety in the doctor's attempts to secure defendant's cooperation. 4.  Use Immunity.  (16) Defendant's final argument regarding the admissibility of the doctor's testimony is obscure. He argues that if we find the confession voluntary and not protected by privilege, we should declare a rule giving capital defendants a kind of `use immunity' consistent to that already recognized in analogous situations, that would require exclusion of a confession under the circumstances of the instant case. The crux of the argument appears to be that, inasmuch as defendant did not place his mental state at issue and did not take the stand, any incriminating statements made during the interview should not be admissible. Defendant's argument ignores the fact that it was the defense, not the prosecution, which procured Dr. Stalberg's testimony at the first trial. Defendant cites no compelling reason or authority for fashioning a new rule in this regard. We dismiss the argument for lack of any authority to support it. In sum, we find no error in the admission of the testimony of Dr. Stalberg, called by the prosecution in the second penalty trial.