Opinion ID: 71523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Prove the Underlying IAC at Sentencing Claim

Text: In denying his Rule 59(e) motion, the district court found that even if Williams overcame the procedural default on his IAC at sentencing claim, he had not demonstrated entitlement to relief on the merits, and we note that the district court did not err. Williams alleges a Sixth Amendment IAC claim at sentencing, but has failed to satisfy his burden under Strickland v. Washington, which held that in order to demonstrate IAC, [f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and second, that any deficiencies in counsel's performance [were] prejudicial to the defense. Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To prove prejudice, Williams must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different; in other words Williams must demonstrate a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Because Williams challenges his death sentence, we must ask whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Williams has not carried his burden. The district court noted that although the additional mitigating evidence presented at his federal habeas evidentiary hearing was much more detailed, it added little substance to the evidence presented at trial, and we agree with this assessment. At sentencing, the jury heard evidence regarding Williams's alleged cognitive deficiencies, including his high school IQ test which landed him in the borderline range and testimony that Williams was slow, but not mentally retarded. Williams's federal evidentiary hearing resulted in the same, albeit more detailed, picture of Williams as an individual who demonstrated adaptive deficiencies that one could attribute either to cognitive or behavioral abnormalities. See Carty v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 244, 264 (5th Cir.2009) (noting that the petitioner's disagreement with her trial counsel's preparation of mitigation witnesses boils down to a matter of degreesshe wanted these witnesses to testify in greater detail about similar events and traits, and holding that the petitioner had not shown any deficiency related to her proffer of cumulative evidence). When compared with the evidence introduced by the State at Williams's trial including evidence that Williams stole a car at gunpoint nine days before the murder, accosted the female owner of the car, and participated in at least one other shootingwe cannot say Williams's counsel's alleged deficiency undermines our confidence in Williams's sentence. Williams has thus failed to demonstrate his counsel's performance at trial was constitutionally deficient.
Williams argues that the district court erred when it denied his Rule 60(b) motion, which alleged that the State did not serve him with copies of the SDTs the State requested, in violation of Rule 45(b)(1). Williams argued that based on the violations, the district court should have vacated its denial of his petition for habeas corpus, and ordered the State to (1) provide Williams with copies of all the SDTs; (2) provide Williams with copies of the documents produced by the SDTs; (3) file a list of all the SDTs with the court; and (4) allow Williams additional time to supplement his motion with briefing on prejudice after the State complied with Williams's request. Although the district court agreed that discovery violations had occurred, it concluded that Williams had not demonstrated entitlement to post-judgment relief under Rule 60, and later denied Williams's request for a COA on its denial. Rule 60(b) enumerates several bases for granting post-judgment relief, two of which Williams asserts justify granting his motion. Specifically, Williams argues that the State's failure to serve him justifies relief under Rule 60(b)(3), which provides relief for fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party, or Rule 60(b)(6), which provides relief for any other reason that justifies relief. As a threshold matter, we find that because Williams's Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court's resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, the motion does not assert a claim that forces us to construe the motion as a second or successive habeas petition. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532, 125 S.Ct. 2641. Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction to consider the motion. Rule 45(b)(1) mandates that if a subpoena commands the production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things or the inspection of premises before trial, then before it is served, a notice must be served on each party. The State does not dispute that it failed to serve Williams with its SDTs in compliance with the rule, but argues that its violation does not rise to the level of misconduct justifying relief from judgment. The district court agreed with this assessment, and so do we. To justify granting relief under Rule 60(b)(3), Williams must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that the adverse party engaged in fraud or other misconduct, and (2) that this misconduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting his case. Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 641 (5th Cir.2005). We have held that Rule 60(b)(3) `is aimed at judgments which were unfairly obtained, not at those which are factually incorrect.' Id. (quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir.1978)). Rule 60(b)(6) has a similarly high burden. Although we have described Rule 60(b)(6) as `a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case when relief is not warranted by the preceding clauses,' id. at 642 (quoting Harrell v. DCS Equip. Leasing Corp., 951 F.2d 1453, 1458 (5th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)), we have noted that `[r]elief under this section is granted only if extraordinary circumstances are present.' Id. (quoting Am. Totalisator Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 3 F.3d 810, 815 (5th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). `[T]he decision to grant or deny relief under Rule 60(b) lies within the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed only for abuse of that discretion.' Id. at 638, 396 F.3d 632 (quoting Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 995 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc) (citations omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant Williams's motion based on Rule 60(b)(3). Although the State candidly admits its failure to comply with Rule 45(b)(1), Williams has not demonstrated how the violation prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case at his Atkins evidentiary hearing. He speculates that the SDTs may have turned up additional favorable information that the State kept from him, but the State reports that it has now sent Williams copies of the missing SDTs, most of which requested Williams's own personal records or correspondence. [16] The State sought information and documents that Williams had equalif not greateraccess to than the State. Williams has not convinced us, by clear and convincing evidence, that the discovery violations prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case. [17] Likewise, Williams has not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Although we have no guidance as to what may constitute an extraordinary circumstance, the Supreme Court has held that a change in law after a court issues a final judgment does not qualify, see Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 536, 125 S.Ct. 2641, and our district courts have held that failure to consider certain extrinsic evidence, Am. Guar., & Liab. Ins. v. Hoeffner, No. H-08-1181, 2009 WL 1011176, at  (S.D.Tex. Apr. 15, 2009), the inability to timely file a habeas petition, Jones v. Quarterman, No. H-02-3963, 2008 WL 276383, at  (S.D.Tex. Jan. 29, 2008), and ineffective assistance of counsel, Wells v. United States, No. 3:07-CV-1152-G, 2007 WL 2192487, at  (N.D.Tex. July 27, 2007), will not suffice either. Williams has not advanced any extraordinary circumstance rising to the level of those previously rejected, and the district court did not err by denying his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Reasonable jurists would not debate this conclusion, and we thus deny Williams's request for a COA.