Opinion ID: 30029
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Direct Discharge

Text: Bradford also claims that GB&L directly discharged her fortyeight hours after she engaged in protected activity. A direct termination constitutes an adverse employment action under our circuit precedent. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997). However, here, the evidence does not demonstrate -Page 8- that GB&L directly discharged Bradford. Rather, the uncontested evidence demonstrates that Bradford unilaterally resigned and that she never retracted this resignation. Bradford’s resignation letter clearly states that “by the advice of [her] physician,” she was resigning “[d]ue to continuing health problems” and the need to “cut down” on her hours. During her employ at GB&L, Bradford underwent several surgeries to remedy health-related problems. As a result, Bradford was required to miss fifty-seven work days in 1997 and thirty-seven and one-half work days in 1998. Bradford admits that at the time she was allegedly directly discharged by Bucek, she had already accepted a part-time job with another law firm that allowed her to work less hours. She also admits that she never retracted her resignation letter, nor did she tell GB&L that her physician had not, in fact, advised her to resign from a full-time position. Thus, GB&L would have no reason to doubt that Bradford was, in fact, still exercising her decision to resign from a full-time position at GB&L (for a part-time position already offered to her by another law firm) due to health problems even after making disclosures to Bucek regarding Arnold. In her letter, Bradford states that she had “enjoyed working [at GB&L] and hope[d] the firm w[ould] keep [her] in mind for any contract positions or temporary assignments that may arise.” That both Bradford and Bucek understood that Bradford had somehow retracted her resignation after making allegations of harassment to -Page 9- Bucek and that the firm then directly discharged her forty-eight hours later is further belied by Bradford’s own deposition testimony. Bradford’s own testimony reflects that after resigning and complaining to Bucek, Bucek responded by stating that: [S]hareholders were going to meet, she [Bucek] would talk to them; that she didn’t see any problem with me working there, you know, on a contract basis or temporary assignments; that they would move me to some other part of the firm; and that Gregg Weinberg wanted to talk to me and that he would be talking with me that day. Rec. at 213. This testimony clearly demonstrates that all involved, including Bradford, gave full effect to Bradford’s resignation from her full time position. The only future relationship (following the completion of Bradford’s last two-weeks with GB&L) envisioned was that of possible contract or temporary employment, as dictated by the resignation letter. That Bucek responded to Bradford’s emotional state two days later by allowing her to simply serve out the remainder of her two-weeks with GB&L at home on paid leave is not evidence of a direct discharge in retaliation for protected conduct. Under her direct discharge theory, Bradford’s retaliation claim thus fails because she cannot demonstrate that GB&L took adverse employment action against her. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing adverse employment actions).