Opinion ID: 2023007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Failing to Merge the Assault Convictions Into the Willful Injury Conviction?

Text: Rodriquez claims that Iowa Code section 701.9 required the trial court to merge his convictions for aggravated domestic abuse assault and serious domestic abuse assault into his conviction for willful injury. We review this claim for correction of legal error. State v. Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1997). The merger doctrine in Iowa is expressed in section 701.9: No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily included in another public offense of which the person is convicted. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one offense and such verdict conflicts with this section, the court shall enter judgment of guilty of the greater of the offenses only. Iowa Code § 701.9. This court has recently stated the legal principles applicable to application of the merger doctrine: In determining whether a lesser offense is included in a greater one, we look to the elements of each and determine if the greater offense can be committed without also committing the lesser offense. If the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser offense, the lesser is included in the greater. We call this the impossibility test. The so-called elements test for included offenses is applied only as an aid in using the impossibility test and is fully subsumed in it. State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted). The court instructed the jury on the following elements of the charge of aggravated domestic abuse assault: 1. On or about the 11th day of October, 1999, the defendant either did an act which was meant to cause pain or injury, result in physical contact which was insulting or offensive, place Melinda Enriquez in fear of immediate physical contact which would have been painful, injurious, insulting or offensive to her, or displayed in a threatening manner a dangerous weapon toward Melinda Enriquez. 2. The defendant had the apparent ability to do the act. 3. At that time the defendant used or displayed a dangerous weapon or intended to cause a serious injury to Melinda Enriquez. 4. The act occurred between household members who resided together at the time of the incident. The charge of serious domestic abuse assault was submitted in a separate instruction. The second and fourth elements of serious domestic abuse assault were identical to the second and fourth elements of the charge of aggravated domestic abuse assault. The first element varied slightly; the first element for serious domestic abuse assault did not include the alternative referring to display of a weapon, found in the first element for the aggravated assault offense. The third elements of these crimes were entirely different. For the serious domestic abuse assault, the jury was required to find that [t]he defendant's act caused bodily injury to the victim. We now contrast the elements of these charges with the elements of willful injury: 1. On or about the 11th day of October, 1999, the defendant attempted to choke and repeatedly struck Melinda Enriquez. 2. The defendant specifically intended to cause a serious injury to Melinda Enriquez. 3. Melinda Enriquez sustained a bodily injury. It is at once apparent that the domestic abuse assault charges contain an element not found in the willful injury charge: The act occurred between household members who resided together at the time of the incident. Thus, it is possible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offenses. Consequently, the domestic abuse assault convictions are not necessarily included in the willful injury conviction. Because aggravated domestic abuse assault and serious domestic abuse assault are not included offenses of willful injury, the merger requirement of section 701.9 does not apply. Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering separate judgments and sentences for each conviction.