Opinion ID: 1561405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ineffective AssistanceFailure to Impeach Tashoni Lamb

Text: Under this claim with multiple subparts, Floyd asserts that his counsel was ineffective for the failure to impeach witness Tashoni Lamb with regard to prior statements that she made to the police which, according to Floyd, differed from her trial testimony. During her trial testimony, Lamb stated that Floyd told her that he shot Ms. Goss because she threatened to report him to the police. On the other hand, a police report indicated that Lamb informed the police shortly after Floyd was arrested that Floyd stated he shot Ms. Goss because she made him angry. The report also referenced an earlier audiotaped interview of Lamb, in which she explained that Floyd stated he killed Ms. Goss because she was running her mouth, talking. Floyd contends that Lamb's initial statements to the police were inconsistent with her trial testimony that Floyd said he shot Ms. Goss because she was going to call the police. Floyd claims that counsel was ineffective for the failure to use Lamb's prior inconsistent statements to impeach her because the jury was allowed to hear that the sole reason for the shooting was that Ms. Goss had threatened to call the police. According to Floyd, this testimony eliminated any possibility that the shooting was done in the heat of passion and destroyed the chance for a conviction for second-degree murder. Additionally, Floyd notes that on direct appeal, this Court found that the avoid arrest aggravating factor was supported by Lamb's testimony. See Floyd, 850 So.2d at 406. Floyd further asserts that the State committed a Brady [11] violation when it failed to disclose Lamb's purportedly inconsistent statements to defense counsel and a Giglio [12] violation when it allowed Lamb to testify that Floyd admitted to shooting Ms. Goss because she had threatened to call the police. With regard to the failure to cross-examine Lamb concerning her purportedly inconsistent statements, the trial court concluded that there was absolutely no evidence presented by Mr. Floyd at the evidentiary hearing that . . . Lamb's differently worded statements were anything other than a witness recalling the same facts and using different semantics on different days. We agree. Lamb's statement that Floyd's motive for shooting Ms. Goss was because she was running her mouth could clearly have encompassed a threat by Ms. Goss that she intended to call the police because of Floyd's prior assault upon Trelane. There is no evidence that the two statements by Lamb are irreconcilably inconsistent. Indeed, an individual would not be expected to use identical words when recounting the same event on two separate occasions. Accordingly, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to impeach Lamb with regard to these two statements. [13] Floyd's Brady allegation that the State failed to advise defense counsel of the differing statements by Lamb also fails. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the State is required to disclose material information within its possession or control that is favorable to the defense. See Mordenti v. State, 894 So.2d 161, 168 (Fla. 2004). To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must demonstrate (1) that favorable evidenceeither exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) the defendant was prejudiced. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000). To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial. Smith v. State, 931 So.2d 790, 796 (Fla.2006) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 296, 119 S.Ct. 1936). At issue is whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Id. (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936). With regard to Brady's second prong, this Court has explained that [t]here is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla.1993) (citing Hegwood v. State, 575 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla. 1991); James v. State, 453 So.2d 786, 790 (Fla.1984)). As we have previously stated: Although the due diligence requirement is absent from the Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the Brady test, it continues to follow that a Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply because the evidence cannot be found to have been withheld from the defendant. Owen v. State, 986 So.2d 534, 547 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1042). Thus, evidence is not suppressed where the defendant was aware of the information. See Way, 760 So.2d at 911; see also Tompkins v. State, 872 So.2d 230, 239 (Fla.2003) (no suppression where defense was given illegible copy of police report because defense knew about report and could have requested a legible copy); Provenzano, 616 So.2d at 430 (no Brady violation where defendant could have obtained his jail records from jail officials and could have reviewed the notes of the State expert witness if he had requested them). Here, the record shows that Floyd was aware of the existence and content of the taped interview with Lamb. Indeed, the police report, which had been provided to Floyd, referred to the tape. The postconviction court correctly noted that Floyd could have requested the tape from the police had he so desired. In light of Floyd's knowledge of the tape, it could not have been suppressed. Therefore, Floyd is not entitled to relief based on this Brady claim. A Giglio violation is demonstrated when a defendant establishes that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material. See Guzman v. State, 941 So.2d 1045, 1050 (Fla.2006). Once the first two prongs are established, the false evidence is deemed material if there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury's verdict. See id. at 1050-51. Under this standard, the State has the burden to prove that false testimony was not material by demonstrating that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 1050. Floyd has failed to establish that Lamb's trial testimonyi.e., Floyd stated that he shot Ms. Goss because she threatened to report him to the policewas false. As previously discussed, Lamb's report to the police that Floyd admitted to killing Ms. Goss because she was running her mouth, talking and her trial testimony were not inherently inconsistent. Floyd has not established that Lamb's trial testimony was false or, equally significant, that the prosecutor knew it was false. Hence, Floyd has failed to demonstrate that a Giglio violation occurred. Floyd next contends that counsel was ineffective for the failure to impeach Lamb with evidence that (1) the domestic-violence charge against Lamb's boyfriend, Kenneth Davis, was nolle prossed; (2) Lamb was angry at Floyd because he failed to intervene when Davis battered her; and (3) the State threatened Lamb with prosecution for harboring Floyd if she did not testify against him. Floyd also asserts that the State committed a Brady violation when it failed to inform the defense of Davis's nolle prosequi and to provide the defense with tapes of Lamb's recorded police interview. We reject each of these claims as without merit. Floyd's ineffectiveness claim with regard to the failure to impeach Lamb based on the nolle prosequi of Kenneth Davis, and Lamb's alleged anger with Floyd, is similarly without merit. There was no evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing that the nolle prosequi of Davis was in any way related to Floyd's criminal case, or that Lamb fabricated her testimony because she was angry with Floyd. Additionally, no evidence was offered in support of the assertion that the State threatened Lamb with prosecution for harboring Floyd if she did not testify against him. Accordingly, trial counsel was not deficient for the failure to use this information to impeach Lamb's trial testimony. Further, Floyd's inability to demonstrate that the nolle prosequi was relevant impeachment evidenceother than pure speculation that Lamb might have reached an agreement with the State to testify against Floyd in exchange for the nolle prosequi of the charges against her boyfrienddefeats his Brady claim. As previously stated, there was no evidence offered during the evidentiary hearing to indicate that there was such an agreement between Lamb and the State. Accordingly, the nolle prosequi of Davis was immaterial to Lamb's testimony during the trial. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936.