Opinion ID: 216209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Oral Affidavit for Search Warrant

Text: Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists when given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The Fourth Amendment is violated when a facially valid search warrant contains deliberate or reckless omissions of facts that tend to mislead. United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir.1985). A plaintiff can survive summary judgment on a defendant's claim of qualified immunity only if the plaintiff can both establish a substantial showing of a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard and establish that, without the dishonestly included or omitted information, the magistrate would not have issued the warrant. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 789 (9th Cir.1995) (second emphasis added). Garcia's primary allegation is that by misrepresenting and/or omitting material information in the application for the search warrant about Plunkett's extensive criminal record, the Officers had engaged in actionable judicial deception. The omission Garcia characterizes as a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth was the failure to flesh out Plunkett's status as a multiple felony offender a potential three striker. In the first place, there is no evidence as acknowledged by the district court that Cardwood was aware of Plunkett's record other than the fact that Plunkett was in jail for theft, a fact which the Officers did provide to the judge. In the second, it has long been clear beyond doubt to anyone in the criminal justice system that the word of a jailhouse informant aloneany jailhouse informantis suspect and ordinarily requires corroboration before it can be accepted as probable cause. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (This Court has long recognized the `serious questions of credibility' informers pose.). Jailhouse informants can always be presumed to be looking for consideration in return for their information. The precise details of an informant's problems with the law, however, are not normally necessary to alert a judge to this glaring and well-known fact, especially in the case of an informant who was in jail on theft charges. Theft, the crime for which Plunkett was in jail, is a quintessential crime of dishonesty and moral turpitude. This fact, plus Plunkett's status, was sufficient to alert the judge to his suspect and shaky character. Also, a judge evaluating a request for a search warrant is not a potted plant. The judge was free to ask questions, and had he wanted to know more about Plunkett, he was free to inquire, as judges most frequently do. This process is not a one way street. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 n. 14, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (Although there are assertions that some magistrates become rubber stamps for the police and others may be unable effectively to screen police conduct, ... we are not convinced that this is a problem of major proportions.). Had the judge inquired about Plunkett's record and been told he had none, this would be a different case, but here, nothing of the sort happened. Calling this alleged omission regarding Plunkett's criminal record and possible expectations in return for his information a falsehood or anything of the sort is simply exaggerated rhetoric. Moreover, examining the Officers' application leaves us with the firm belief that the search warrant still would have issued on the basis of the information presented to Judge Dougherty even if it had contained the omissions about which Garcia complains, as well as the details of Plunkett's prior convictions, which were mostly for drug offenses. All Plunkett's complete record could have done would be to confirm what Judge Dougherty clearly knew: caveat emptor.