Opinion ID: 165831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rubbermaid's Appeal

Text: 10 Most of the issues raised in Rubbermaid's appeal challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict in Ms. Praseuth's favor. 1 Specifically, Rubbermaid challenges the district court's denial of Rubbermaid's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Praseuth's ADA claims. We review de novo a grant or denial of judgment as a matter of law. Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817, 116 S.Ct. 74, 133 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995). To overturn a denial, we must conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it point but one way, in favor of the moving party. Id. 11 The elements of a cause of action under the ADA are stated in Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 168 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.1999). 12 The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual with a disability is one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Therefore, to establish a viable claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she has a disability; (2) she is qualified for the position; and (3) her employer discriminated against her because of her disability. 13 Id. at 1230. Title 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) provides, in pertinent part, that: The term `disability' means, with respect to an individual — (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual. Rubbermaid argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict with respect to many of these elements. 14 Rubbermaid's first argument is that there is insufficient evidence to support a determination that Ms. Praseuth was a qualified individual with a disability because there is insufficient evidence that she is substantially limited in the major life activities of working or performing manual tasks. 15 When the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase substantially limited requires, at a minimum, that plaintiff be unable to work in a broad class of jobs. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). Plaintiff's expert witness, Wilbur Swearingin, testified, on the basis of his evaluation of Ms. Praseuth's occupational abilities, that her potential occupational base was substantially reduced by her impairments. His testimony on this point was detailed and was supported by his description of the workplace ramifications of Ms. Praseuth's condition. This testimony, if credited by the jury, would clearly support a finding that Ms. Praseuth's ITP precluded her from performing a very substantial array of the jobs for which she would otherwise have been qualified. Thus, we find ample evidence from which the jury could have found that, given the effects of Ms. Praseuth's ITP, she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the evidence concerning Ms. Praseuth's inability to perform manual tasks. 16 Rubbermaid's next main argument is that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Ms. Praseuth could perform the essential functions of her job, specifically, knife-use or position rotation. 17 As described by Rubbermaid, the company's position rotation policy required employees to work in 50% of the positions on the production line. Employees were required to move to a different position every hour. There was testimony that the policy was implemented in an effort to limit repetitive motion injuries and that it was successful in accomplishing that laudable goal. The policy also allowed rotation into and out of the most physically demanding positions, thus, it had the additional benefit of dividing the burden of the more physical jobs among the production workers. 18 There was evidence from which the jury could have found that Ms. Praseuth was able to comply with this position rotation policy, even without accommodation. There was evidence that 50% of the positions on the production line did not require knife-use so that she could have rotated into the necessary number of positions. For example, there was testimony that on at least one occasion [t]here were very few people using knives, [l]ike only one person in the [work] cell would be using a trimmer, a knife.... There was also evidence that on a particular day when one witness was observing activity in the plant, if there were four people working in a cell, then only one of them was using a knife while the other three were performing other duties not using a knife. There was evidence that this witness saw no cells where over half of the employees used a knife at the same time. There was evidence that there might be three or four positions on a particular machine which did not require knife-use, for example, one position might use a knife or hammer to remove the product from the flashing after it came out of the mold, another position might stick on a label, another might hook on the lid, another might put the product in a packing box, and another might carry the packed box to be organized for shipping and receiving. 19 There was also testimony from an experienced Rubbermaid operations manager that, depending on the product being produced, anywhere from 47.5% of the machines to 71.25% of the machines in the production line did not require knife-use. There was also evidence that the safety supervisor stated that about 60% of the positions on the production line did not require a knife. 20 There was testimony that despite her restrictions against knife-use, Ms. Praseuth worked on machine nos. 104, 109, 110 and that she might have also worked on machine nos. 118, 119, 105, 107, as well as additional machines, and that she may have also performed re-work and cleaning duties. There was evidence that for the five— or six-year period during which Ms. Praseuth actually worked on the production line without rotating, her inability to rotate to certain positions never kept her supervisor from meeting the company's operating goals or objectives. 21 Rubbermaid's human resources manager testified that if, during a test walk-around, Ms. Praseuth had been given the opportunity to show she could work 50% of the positions, there was a possibility that on some days she would have been able to meet the 50% requirement. There was testimony that the results of an employee's 50% walk-around test could vary, depending on what machines were running and which products were being manufactured on any given day. 22 Recognizing that our review begins and ends with a determination of whether there was evidence from which a jury could reasonably have found in favor of Ms. Praseuth on this fact-bound issue, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have determined that knife-use was not required in 50% or more of the positions on the production line, and that Ms. Praseuth could have, therefore, rotated into 50% of the positions. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that despite the limitations on her knife-use, Ms. Praseuth was qualified for the job because she could perform the job's essential functions, including rotation, even without accommodation. 23 Rubbermaid's third major argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence is that there is no evidence that the company could have reasonably accommodated Ms. Praseuth's disability. Having determined that there was evidence showing that Ms. Praseuth was qualified for the job in question even without accommodation, it is unnecessary to review the evidence regarding reasonable accommodations. However, we note that there was evidence that Ms. Praseuth could have used a hammer with a scraper instead of a knife in some of the positions which did require knife-use. For example, Ms. Praseuth testified that she used a hammer and scraper from 1993 to 1996. Other witnesses testified that hammers could sometimes be used instead of knives. 24 Finally, Rubbermaid challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the damage award. 25 Ms. Praseuth's W-2 form for 1998 showed an annual salary of $23,524. Rubbermaid's human resources manager testified that annual benefits are the equivalent of 40% of an employee's salary. This evidence brings the value of Ms. Praseuth's annual salary package, as of 1998, to nearly $33,000. As Rubbermaid has waived any objections to the jury's determination of lost front pay, see n. 1, supra, we presume that the $200,000 includes damages for both back pay and front pay. With that presumption, the amount of the award is well supported by the evidence. 26 Rubbermaid also argues, almost in passing, that the award is improper because Ms. Praseuth failed to mitigate her damages. The argument centers on Rubbermaid's interpretation of the evidence concerning Ms. Praseuth's future earnings prospects—in terms of what she could realistically have expected to have earned (i.e., the gross earnings loss) and what she could and should have earned (i.e., the reduction resulting from application of the duty to mitigate). The evidence of Ms. Praseuth's efforts by way of mitigation of damages (evidence that she applied for several jobs, searched classified job advertisements, and made monthly visits to the Kansas Job Services Offices) was sufficient to preclude interference with the jury's determination, with the aid of the trial court's instruction on mitigation, of the amount of her compensatory damages. 27 Rubbermaid argues that the jury improperly awarded $50,000 for emotional pain and mental anguish. Ms. Praseuth testified that she experienced a variety of depressive symptoms including an inability to eat and sleep, and that she had thoughts of suicide. Joseph Westermeyer, M.D., a psychiatrist, testified that Ms. Praseuth suffered from a major depressive disorder which caused her to lose sleep and have suicidal thoughts. We find substantial evidence to support Ms. Praseuth's $50,000 award for emotional pain and mental anguish. See, Baty v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1244 (10th Cir.1999) (damages for mental anguish upheld based on plaintiff's assertions and psychological expert's testimony).
28 Rubbermaid also contends that the district court erred when it refused to admit applications and other documents relating to Ms. Praseuth's claims for short-term and long-term disability insurance and Social Security disability benefits. Rubbermaid argues that exclusion of this evidence was error because, in the excluded documents, Ms. Praseuth stated that she was totally disabled and unable to work. Rubbermaid sought to introduce these documents to show Ms. Praseuth's inability to perform the essential functions of her job and her ability to mitigate her damages by seeking disability benefits, as well as to cast doubt on her credibility given the asserted inconsistencies among her various statements and testimony. 29 The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and the trial court's decision is not reversed except for an abuse of discretion. Hinds v. General Motors, 988 F.2d 1039, 1049 (10th Cir.1993). Even if there is an error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, this court will not set aside a jury verdict unless the error prejudicially affects a substantial right of a party. Id. The effect on the jury is only prejudicial if it can be reasonably concluded that the admission or exclusion made a difference. Id. 30 Ms. Praseuth responds to Rubbermaid's contentions by noting that some of the documents were actually presented to the jury through Rubbermaid's exhibits. She also argues that Social Security disability claims and the disability discrimination claims raised under the ADA and the Kansas Act are of a fundamentally different nature. Ms. Praseuth cites Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems, 526 U.S. 795, 803, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999), an ADA case which considered the effect of the plaintiff's statements made in disability filings on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Rubbermaid responds to these arguments by stating that most of the documents were not admitted at trial and by arguing that Cleveland does not mandate exclusion of the documents in question. 31 While we agree with Rubbermaid that Cleveland does not mandate exclusion of the disability documents at trial, we also conclude that Cleveland does not necessarily mandate their admission. We recognize, as the district court did, that given the different types of disabilities relevant in various contexts, the documents in question might have created jury confusion, at least in the circumstances of this case, so that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude them. We also conclude that no showing has been made that admission of the documents would have resulted in a different verdict. For both of these reasons, we conclude that excluding the documents was not error.