Opinion ID: 223674
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [1] There is no question that we have jurisdiction over this case to the extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Nevertheless, we previously held that we lacked jurisdiction to review the determination that a crime was particularly serious for purposes of withholding of removal. See Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001). We decided that we lacked jurisdiction over the question because § 1231 directs the Attorney General to “decide” whether there was a conviction for a particularly serious crime and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under [§§ 1151-1381] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General DELGADO v. HOLDER 11067 or the Secretary of Homeland Security.”8 We concluded that the Attorney General’s decision was discretionary within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Under Matsuk, we would be precluded from reaching Delgado’s contention that the BIA improperly treated his DUI convictions as particularly serious crimes for purposes of his application for withholding of removal, but Matsuk is no longer good law.9 [2] The government concedes Matsuk must be overruled in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010). Kucana explains that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “bar[s] court review of discretionary decisions only when Congress itself set out the Attorney General’s discretionary authority in the statute.” Id. at 837. Under Kucana, a provision is not “specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney General” unless the statute explicitly refers to the discretion of the Attorney General. See id. at 83637. The statute at issue here, § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), states that withholding of removal “does not apply . . . if the Attorney General decides that . . . the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime[,] is a danger to the community of the United States.” This provision does not explicitly vest discretion in the Attorney General. Accordingly, as the government concedes, we have jurisdiction to review such determinations.10 Because Matsuk held otherwise, we overrule it. 8 In a later case, we held that the jurisdiction-stripping provision did not apply to the determination that a crime was particularly serious for purposes of asylum. See Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2007). 9 The three-judge panel questioned Matsuk but felt constrained to follow it. See Delgado II, 563 F.3d at 871 n.12 (recognizing the dissent’s “persuasive” criticism of Matsuk); id. at 874-75, 888-89 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing Matsuk and suggesting rehearing en banc to overrule it). 10 This conclusion is in accord with the decisions of other circuits. See Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2008); Alaka v. Attorney Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 97-98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 2006). 11068 DELGADO v. HOLDER