Opinion ID: 161303
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eckert's Arrest and Pattern of Discrimination

Text: 23 Appellants contend the decision to arrest Eckert rather than Ballard was a miscarriage of Colorado's mandatory arrest law, Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-6-803.6 (1)(1994). Under the law, when an officer determines there is probable cause of domestic violence, the officer shall, without undue delay, arrest the person suspected of its commission. Id. The law also establishes standards to be considered by an arresting officer: 24
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28 Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-6-803.6 (2). 29 Appellants contend the arrest of Eckert was erroneous considering the circumstances at the time of the officers' arrival: Ballard admitted to prior arrests for domestic violence; Eckert claimed Ballard had injured her earlier that morning and on previous occasions; restraining orders had been issued against Ballard on prior occasions; and Eckert claimed to have acted in self-defense. The officers' failure to arrest Ballard worked to deny Eckert and her son the equal protection afforded by the Colorado mandatory arrest statute, according to Appellants. 30 However, this is not a case where police failed to enforce the law- -suspecting Eckert of domestic violence, they took her into custody. 2 Therefore, the question arises whether the police had probable cause to arrest Eckert. An arresting officer's determination of probable cause is reviewed de novo by an appellate court. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996). Here, although the evidence is far from unequivocal, we agree with the district court's assessment that the SPD had probable cause to arrest Eckert: all three officers at the scene noticed Ballard's bloody mouth and shirt, as well as abrasions on Eckert's right hand. Ballard stated Eckert had punched him, a conclusion not disputed by Eckert at the time. I said if Tuxie got hit, then I must have hit him. (Depo. of Linda Eckert, App. to Appellants' Br. at 360.) 31 Colorado law does not assign any particular weight or hierarchy to the factors to be considered by arresting officers. Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge of facts that would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. United States v. Bruce, 78 F.3d 1506, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation omitted). Despite the evidence cited by Appellants, Officers Stremel, Silas and Sergeant Palacios were justified in believing Eckert had assaulted Ballard. Colorado law mandates action in domestic violence situations, and such action was taken. Appellants cannot support an equal protection claim that Defendants customarily discriminate against domestic violence victims as a class based on the events of October 4, 1994. 32 Nor can such a claim be maintained based on Eckert's subsequent dealings with the SPD. Eckert contends that over eight months following her arrest, she and her son were subjected to threats and property damage at the hands of Ballard, and her complaints were stalled, put off, or just plain ignored by the SPD. (Appellants' Br. at 18.) 33 Eckert argues Appellees were required to act on her complaints, and their failure to do so worked to deprive her of equal protection. Eckert points the state statute which, in addition to physical force and threats, defines domestic violence as any other crime against a person or against property . . . when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment, intimidation or revenge. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-800.3(1). 34 In such cases, under the statute [w]hen a peace officer determines that there is probable cause to believe that a crime or offense involving domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3(1), has been committed, the officer shall, without undue delay, arrest the person suspected of its commission. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.6 (1). The Colorado mandatory arrest law applies with equal force to such crimes, according to Appellants, and therefore the SPD's failure to arrest Ballard based on Eckert's complaints was an unconstitutional deprivation. 35 Similarly, Appellants contend the SPD was constitutionally compelled to arrest Ballard based on Eckert's claims that he violated the temporary restraining order she obtained on January 25, 1995, and the permanent restraining order she received on February 6, 1995. A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has information amounting to probable cause that (I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a restraining order. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5 (3)(b). 36 Both of these mandatory arrest provisions require as a prerequisite that an officer establish probable cause. Appellants' cursory assertions to the contrary, examination of the circumstances reveals the decision not to arrest Ballard was well within the officers' discretion. Part of an officer's assessment of the totality of circumstances in a probable cause determination is the credibility of witnesses. Cf. Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998). Eckert's allegations, by themselves, were insufficient to mandate an arrest, and based on previous events and an assessment of Eckert's veracity, the SPD officers decided probable cause was not present. See Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding Wisconsin mandatory arrest law did not remove officer's discretion in first determining probable cause). The SPD's assessment was ratified by the district attorney's decision not to pursue charges against Ballard.