Opinion ID: 1846529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Physical Injury Requirement

Text: Historically our cases have required a physical injury to allow recovery for emotional distress. See, e.g., Zell v. Meek, 665 So.2d 1048, 1053 n. 7 (Fla.1995) (noting that in International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148 (1893), our earliest case involving negligent infliction of emotional distress, we required proof of a concomitant physical injury as a safeguard); R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So.2d 360, 362, 364 (Fla.1995) (holding that damages for emotional harm as a result of a misdiagnosis cannot be recovered without a showing of some physical injury, because intangible, mental injuries are insufficient to meet the physical injury required under the impact rule); Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 468 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla.1985) (refusing to allow recovery for psychological trauma resulting from witnessing a parent's death because of the requirement that a discernible and demonstrable physical injury must flow from the accident before a cause of action exists); Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc., 107 So.2d 609, 611-12 (Fla.1958) (allowing plaintiff to recover for an electrical shock because she could not logically be said to have escaped all injury except to the emotions); Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc. v. Macurda, 93 So.2d 860, 861 (Fla.1957) (affirming an award to plaintiffs who found worms in their spinach and suffered from vomiting, abdominal pains, and diarrhea, and acknowledging the rule that damages for mental distress will not be awarded absent physical injury); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950) (This court is committed to the rule, and we re-affirm it herein, that there can be no recovery for mental pain and anguish unconnected with physical injury in an action arising out of the negligent breach of a contract whereby simple negligence is involved.). During the past decade, we have consistently included the physical injury requirement as part of our standard definition of the impact rule, which is that before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact.  Humana, 652 So.2d at 362 (quoting Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So.2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)); S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Welker, 908 So.2d 317, 320 (Fla.2005) (The impact rule . . . requires that `before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact.') (quoting Humana ); Rowell v. Holt, 850 So.2d 474, 477-78 (Fla.2003) (The rule requires that `before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered must flow from physical injuries sustained in an impact.') (quoting Humana ); Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So.2d 348, 355 (Fla.2002) (The `impact rule' requires that a plaintiff seeking to recover emotional distress damages in a negligence action prove that `the emotional distress . . . flow[s] from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact [upon his person].') (quoting Humana ); Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So.2d 1234, 1237 (Fla.2001) ([T]he impact rule requires that before a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress, she must demonstrate that the emotional stress suffered flowed from injuries sustained in an impact.) (citing Humana ); Time Ins. Co. v. Burger, 712 So.2d 389, 393 (Fla.1998) ([T]his Court established the impact rule, which holds that in the absence of a discernible physical injury a person cannot recover compensatory damages for mental distress or psychiatric injury.); see also Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So.2d 705, 707 (Fla.1997) ([T]he impact rule requires that before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional stress suffered must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact.) (citing Humana ). Thus, this very Court has cited this formulation of the rule no fewer than seven times in the last twelve years. Our decisions have clearly and repeatedly stated the rule as requiring both impact and injury. Therefore, contrary to Chief Justice Lewis's contention that I would rewrite over one hundred years of Florida law, specially concurring op. at 854, it is the majority that ignores repeated statements of this Court, some as recent as 2005. [11] As some of our opinions note, there are good reasons behind the rule. The purpose of requiring both an impact and a physical injury is to ensure the authenticity of claims for emotional distress. See Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade County Pub. Health Trust, 651 So.2d 673, 674 (Fla. 1995). The concern, as we have stated it, is that allowing recovery for purely emotional distress, without any physical injury, would open the floodgates for fictitious or speculative claims. Rowell, 850 So.2d at 478; Humana, 652 So.2d at 363. The impact rule limits recovery to those cases where we have the greatest confidence that real injury has occurred, and does so in a predictable and administrable manner. As we have emphasized, however, the reasons for the rule extend even further: [T]here is more underlying the impact doctrine than simply problems of proof, fraudulent claims, and excessive litigation. The impact doctrine gives practical recognition to the thought that not every injury which one person may by his negligence inflict upon another should be compensated in money damages. There must be some level of harm which one should absorb without recompense as the price he pays for living in an organized society. Gonzalez, 651 So.2d at 675 (quoting Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So.2d 466, 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (Reed, C.J., dissenting), quashed, 291 So.2d 593 (Fla.1974)). Other states, too, have required a physical injury or manifestation. See, e.g., Hinsberger v. State, 53 P.3d 568, 571 (Alaska 2002); Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Church, 162 Ariz. 269, 782 P.2d 1162, 1165 (1989); FMC Corp. v. Helton, 360 Ark. 465, 202 S.W.3d 490 (2005); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Delaware, 581 A.2d 288, 293 (Del.1989); Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 583, 533 S.E.2d 82, 84 (2000); Hathaway v. Krumery, 110 Idaho 515, 716 P.2d 1287 (1986); Clark v. Estate of Rice, 653 N.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Iowa 2002); Grube v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 256 Kan. 519, 886 P.2d 845, 848 (1994); Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Ky.2002); Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728, 732-34 (1979); Rodriguez v. Cambridge Hous. Auth., 443 Mass. 697, 823 N.E.2d 1249, 1253-54 (2005); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 473 Mich. 63, 701 N.W.2d 684, 692 (2005); Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.2005); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So.2d 1, 4-5 (Miss. 2007); Palmer v. Nan King Rest., Inc., 147 N.H. 681, 798 A.2d 583, 586 (2002); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590, 591-92 (1975); Doner v. Ed Adams Contracting, Inc., 208 A.D.2d 1072, 617 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y.App.Div.1994); Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 819 (N.D. 1998); Ellington v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Tulsa, Inc., 717 P.2d 109, 110-11 (Okla. 1986); Simons v. Beard, 188 Or.App. 370, 72 P.3d 96, 99 (2003); Rustvold v. Taylor, 171 Or.App. 128, 14 P.3d 675 (2000); Houston v. Texaco, Inc., 371 Pa.Super. 399, 538 A.2d 502, 504 (1988); Perrotti v. Gonicberg, 877 A.2d 631, 637-38 (R.I.2005); Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465, 466-67 (1985); Wright v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Cent. S. Dakota, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 1987); Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670, 674 n. 1 (1990); [12] Courts retain the physical injury requirement because mental anguish without physical consequences is so temporary, so evanescent, and so relatively harmless that the task of compensating for it would unduly burden defendants and the courts. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (1982). In fact, Justice Pariente has conceded at least until todaythat the physical injury requirement remains the majority rule. See Gracey, 837 So.2d at 358 n. 15 (Pariente, J., concurring) (quoting Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Fear of Disease Cases, 28 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1, 39 (1992)); see also Gonzalez, 651 So.2d at 674 (Although the majority of jurisdictions do not require physical impact, they nevertheless still require a physical injury for recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress.); Humana, 652 So.2d at 365 (noting that a more reasonable rule emerged that now is recognized in more than thirty states, which does not require impact but requires actual injury) (Kogan, J., specially concurring); Clark, 653 N.W.2d at 170 (stating that most other jurisdictions . . . have refused to recognize an independent claim for emotional distress based on negligence without some physical harm); Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 202 (Wyo.2003) (stating that most jurisdictions still require proof of a physical manifestation of emotional distress). As we noted in Gonzalez, even commentators acknowledge that `cases will obviously be infrequent in which `mental disturbance,' not so severe as to cause physical harm, will clearly be a serious wrong worthy of redress and sufficiently attested by the circumstances of the case.' 651 So.2d at 676 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54, at 362 (5th ed.1984)).