Opinion ID: 1129443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Penalty Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Text: We next turn to the allegations of penalty phase ineffectiveness. Morris asserts that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase in holding discussions with the trial court outside of his presence and without a waiver from him. [12] A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all `crucial stages of his trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.' Orme v. State, 896 So.2d 725, 738 (Fla.2005) (quoting Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360 (Fla.1986)). However, this right does not confer upon the defendant the right to be present at every conference at which a matter pertinent to the case is discussed, or even at every conference with the trial judge at which a matter relative to the case is discussed. Orme, 896 So.2d at 738 (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 732 F.2d 846, 848 (11th Cir.1984)). Accordingly, this constitutional right does not extend to bench conferences involving purely legal matters because a defendant's presence at such conferences would be of no assistance to counsel. Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d 637, 647 (Fla.2000); see also Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So.2d 100, 105 (Fla.1994) ([A] defendant has no constitutional right to be present at the bench during conferences that involve purely legal matters.). In this case, Morris cannot meet the prejudice prong of Strickland. We have repeatedly rejected claims of ineffective assistance resulting from a defendant's absence during a bench conference when the defendant has failed to show that anything was discussed at the conference that required the defendant's consultation. See, e.g., Orme, 896 So.2d at 738 (concluding that defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from his absence because he has not shown that anything discussed during the bench conferences required his consultation); Vining v. State, 827 So.2d 201, 218 (Fla.2002) (determining that defendant has not shown that any matter discussed during these bench conferences required his consultation nor has he demonstrated any prejudice from his absence); Hardwick, 648 So.2d at 105 (concluding ineffective assistance claim was meritless because defendant has not shown nor attempted to show that any matter was determined at these conferences that required his consultation). In this case, even if trial counsel was deficient in holding a bench conference with the trial judge outside of Morris's presence and without a waiver by him, Morris has not established that anything was discussed during this conference that required his consultation. Nor has he established that the conference involved anything but purely legal matters to which his constitutional right to be present does not extend. Thus, we conclude that Morris has failed to demonstrate under Strickland that he was prejudiced by counsel's conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief as to this claim.
Morris also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase in failing to inform him of his right to testify. Morris asserts that although he testified in the guilt phase, neither the trial judge nor trial counsel explained to him that he could testify in the penalty phase. Morris contends that by failing to advise him of his right to testify, trial counsel unilaterally waived Morris's right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A criminal defendant's right to testify is a fundamental right under both the Florida and United States Constitutions. See Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So.2d 4, 8 (Fla.1993). This right is personal to the defendant and cannot be waived either by the trial court or by defense counsel. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir.1992). In order to waive this right, a defendant must make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Deaton, 635 So.2d at 8. However, the right to testify does not fall within the category of fundamental rights which must be waived on the record by the defendant himself. Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So.2d 403, 410-11 (Fla.1988); see also Davis, 875 So.2d at 368. This Court has determined that the trial court is not obligated to specifically inform the defendant of the right to testify at trial. See Occhicone v. State, 570 So.2d 902, 905 (Fla.1990); Torres-Arboledo, 524 So.2d at 411 n. 2. Unlike the trial court, defense counsel does have an obligation to inform the defendant of his or her right to testify. In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance based upon trial counsel's failure to inform a defendant of the right to testify, both the deficiency and prejudice prongs of Strickland must be satisfied. See Monlyn v. State, 894 So.2d 832, 837 (Fla.2004) (requiring defendant claiming ineffective assistance from failure to advise him of right to testify to satisfy both prongs of Strickland ); Oisorio v. State, 676 So.2d 1363, 1364-65 (Fla. 1996) (same). In Teague, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated on the importance of trial counsel's obligation to inform the defendant of his or her right to testify: Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify or not to testify, the strategic implications of each choice, and that it is ultimately for the defendant himself to decide. This advice is crucial because there can be no effective waiver of a fundamental constitutional right unless there is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (emphasis added). Moreover, if counsel believes that it would be unwise for the defendant to testify, counsel may, and indeed should, advise the client in the strongest possible terms not to testify. The defendant can then make the choice of whether to take the stand with the advice of competent counsel. 953 F.2d at 1533 (footnotes omitted) (parallel citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit further explained that [w]here the defendant claims a violation of his right to testify by defense counsel, the essence of the claim is that the action or inaction of the attorney deprived the defendant of the ability to choose whether or not to testify in his own behalf. In other words, by not protecting the defendant's right to testify, defense counsel's performance fell below the constitutional minimum, thereby violating the first prong of the Strickland test. For example, ... if defense counsel never informed the defendant of the right to testify, and that the ultimate decision belongs to the defendant, counsel would have neglected the vital professional responsibility of ensuring that the defendant's right to testify is protected and that any waiver of that right is knowing and voluntary. Under such circumstances, defense counsel has not acted `within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,' and the defendant clearly has not received reasonably effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970)). Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534 (parallel citations omitted). During the evidentiary hearing on this claim, trial counsel Dimmig and Howardene Garrett testified that they had pretrial discussions with Morris concerning whether he would testify at trial. Dimmig testified that during these discussions he advised Morris of his right to testify but that he was unsure whether Morris understood that this meant he had a right to testify at both the guilt and penalty phases. Garrett was unable to recall whether she discussed with Morris his right to testify at the penalty phase of his trial. Morris testified at the evidentiary hearing that although he recalled Garrett asking him whether he wanted to testify during the guilt phase, neither Garrett nor Dimmig advised him of his right to testify in both phases of his trial. We need not determine whether there was deficient performance because we conclude that any failure to advise Morris that he had the right to testify during the penalty phase does not undermine our confidence in the death sentence and thus did not prejudice Morris. During the penalty phase, Garrett presented the testimony of twelve witnesses who collectively testified as to the circumstances of Morris's upbringing, including that Morris's mother was young when Morris was born and that she used drugs and made him steal. There was also testimony concerning the physical and psychological abuse Morris suffered and witnessed as a child. Further, these witnesses testified regarding Morris's educational background, his abuse of drugs, and the role he has played in his family's life as an adult. In addition to these witnesses, Garrett presented the testimony of Dr. Dee who testified regarding Morris's childhood and how it affected him, Morris's abuse of drugs, his diagnosis as having an ulcer as a youth, and his IQ level. At the evidentiary hearing, Morris did not dispute the testimony of any of these witnesses or offer any other evidence beyond that presented during the penalty phase. When asked what his testimony would have been had he testified at the penalty phase, Morris responded, I would have answered whatever questions they asked me. Morris stated that he would have also testified as to his upbringing, how he felt when his mother made him steal, and how he came to be diagnosed with ulcers. Morris further stated that he would have reaffirmed his innocence. It is questionable whether the jury would have found Morris's testimony credible, especially as to his protestations of innocence. Garrett testified at the evidentiary hearing that she considered the fact that the jury did not believe Morris's guilt-phase testimony in determining not to call him to testify in the penalty phase. Based on Morris's diminished credibility and the fact that his testimony would have been cumulative to the extensive mitigation evidence presented at the penalty phase, we conclude that any failure by trial counsel to inform Morris of his right to testify in the penalty phase does not undermine this Court's confidence in the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief as to this claim.
As to his next issue on appeal, Morris asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to request that the jury be instructed on two statutory mitigating circumstances  that the murder was committed while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999), and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See § 921.141(6)(e), Fla. Stat. (1999). Morris contends that counsel's conduct prejudiced him because the trial judge found one of these statutory mitigating factors, substantially impaired capacity, based on Dr. Dee's testimony at the Spencer [13] hearing. We point out that Morris is not attacking the wisdom of trial counsel's presentation of mitigating evidence but only whether jury instructions should have been requested. To address his claim, we must determine whether there was evidence presented to the jury that would have supported the requested jury instructions. This Court recently rejected a claim of penalty-phase ineffectiveness in counsel's failure to request instructions on the same two statutory mitigators at issue here. See Cole v. State, 841 So.2d 409 (Fla.2003). In Cole, we affirmed the trial court's conclusion that counsel was not ineffective because the psychologist did not render an opinion during the penalty phase concerning whether the two statutory mitigators applied to the murder for which the defendant was on trial. See id. at 420. The reasoning of Cole applies here. In this case, Dr. Dee testified at trial that he met with Morris eight times and that in addition to interviewing Morris, he also interviewed several of Morris's family members. Dr. Dee testified that he reviewed all relevant records, including medical records and school records, and that he administered the revised version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test. Based on Dr. Dee's testimony, Morris's performance on this test was 82, which fell in the low end of the low average range at the 12th percentile. In other words, Morris scored above twelve percent of the general adult population but below approximately eighty-eight percent of this population. Dr. Dee characterized Morris's IQ level as borderline to dull normal. Dr. Dee explained that persons with this IQ level process information and make decisions slower than other individuals and that their decision-making is less useful and less accurate. Dr. Dee opined that Morris's school records suggest that Morris had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as a child. However, Dr. Dee stated that although Morris was placed in educable mentally retarded classes, he was not mentally retarded as that term is used by clinicians. Dr. Dee noted that Morris was an alcoholic but had ceased this activity when he developed an ulcer in his teenage years. Finally, Dr. Dee testified that after Morris stopped drinking alcohol, he began abusing various controlled substances, including marijuana, powdered cocaine, free base cocaine, and rock cocaine. Although Dr. Dee discussed at trial how Morris's background affected him as a child, Dr. Dee did not discuss whether Morris's IQ level, ADHD, or drug abuse affected him as an adult. More importantly, Dr. Dee did not render an opinion at trial as to whether either of these factors was likely to have affected Morris at the time he committed the murder in this case. Dr. Dee testified at trial that when he discussed Morris's decision-making and information processing skills on direct examination, he was trying to demonstrate the practical effect of Morris's IQ level on his everyday life and was not rendering an opinion as to Morris's decision to commit the murder in this case or his ability to make a decision to commit a crime generally. Thus, there was no evidence presented to the jury during the penalty phase that Morris's IQ level, ADHD, or drug abuse affected his behavior before or during the time that he committed the murder. Nor was there any evidence presented to the jury at the penalty phase that Morris had any brain damage. As a result, the jury did not hear any evidence to support a finding that either statutory mitigator existed. Rather, Dr. Dee testified at the Spencer hearing that he found evidence of frontal lobe damage, which is associated with increased impulsivity and an inability to control one's behavior. Dr. Dee stated that Morris's use of drugs tends to exacerbate his brain damage and that Morris's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired at the time the offense was committed. Dr. Dee did not testify either to the jury in the penalty phase or in the Spencer hearing concerning whether Morris was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense. Because no testimony as to either statutory mitigator was presented to the jury during the penalty phase, if counsel had requested an instruction on these mitigating circumstances it likely would have been denied by the trial court. Therefore, we conclude that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to request jury instructions on statutory mitigation. See Cole, 841 So.2d at 420-21 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim of failure to request jury instruction on statutory mitigators where there was no evidence presented at trial to support the mitigators). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief as to this claim.