Opinion ID: 1196421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Admission of Rape Victim's Prior Testimony

Text: (38a) The trial court found the victim of defendant's 1975 forcible rape was unavailable as a witness at the penalty phase and thus permitted the prosecution to read her preliminary hearing testimony to the jury. Defendant does not contest the court's ruling on unavailability of the witness but argues his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated by this procedure. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403-405 [13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926-927, 85 S.Ct. 1065] [confrontation clause applicable to states]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Although the requirement of confrontation is a fundamental component of a fair trial, a recognized `exception to the confrontation requirement [is] where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant.' ( People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 983 [232 Cal. Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180], quoting Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 722 [20 L.Ed.2d 255, 258, 88 S.Ct. 1318].) This exception is reflected in section 1291 of the Evidence Code, which provides that Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and ... [t]he party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing. (Italics added.) Although defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine rape victim Jane B. at the 1975 preliminary hearing, he claims the objective of the preliminary examination was dissimilar from that in the penalty phase of his capital trial. Quoting Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. 719, he notes: A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. ( Id. at p. 725 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260].) This difference, he claims, compels the conclusion that his interest and motive when cross-examining the rape victim in the former proceeding was not sufficiently similar to his interest and motive in the present proceeding, and that Evidence Code section 1291 is inapplicable. The Supreme Court later opined, however, that when a court determines the witness is unavailable, there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause. ( Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. at p. 725 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 100 S.Ct. 2531], the high court found the confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of preliminary hearing testimony, when the unavailable witness was actually cross-examined by the defendant in the former proceeding. (39) California law is in accord: Preliminary hearing testimony is presented in open court, in the presence of the defendant, at a time when the defendant is represented by counsel, in a proceeding in which the defendant has both the motive and the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and the testimony is reported and preserved in a formal court transcript. In these circumstances the introduction of preliminary hearing testimony at trial, when the witness is legally unavailable, does not violate either the hearsay rule ... or the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation [citations]. ( People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385, 427 [208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635]; see also People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 749, 755 [114 Cal. Rptr. 545]; People v. Benjamin (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 687, 695 [83 Cal. Rptr. 764].) (38b) In the present case, the record shows that at the 1975 preliminary hearing on the rape charge, defendant's attorney conducted a searching cross-examination of the rape victim in an attempt to discredit her. Defendant contends that had she been available, he would have attempted, on cross-examination, to develop facts demonstrating a consistent pattern in [defendant's] mental state from 1975 to the time of the 1986 homicide. It seems doubtful Jane B. would have had this type of information and in any case, such questions would apparently have been outside the scope of the direct testimony. We conclude defendant had an interest and motive at that former hearing sufficiently similar to that which he had in his penalty phase trial, namely, to discredit the witness's account of the crime. Accordingly, admission of the testimony was permissible.