Opinion ID: 1057783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: assisted conception statute

Text: Mason argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously harmonized the clear language of the assisted conception statute with Code § 20-49.1(B)(2). She claims that the assisted conception statute prevents all unmarried sperm donors 9 from asserting parental rights with respect to children conceived by assisted conception, whether the mother is married or unmarried and without regard to her relationship with the donor. She argues that when a statute is unambiguous, we must apply the plain meaning of that language without reference to related statutes. See Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 338, 346, 131 S.E.2d 401, 406 (1963). We disagree with Mason’s interpretation of this statute, because her argument ignores a significant provision of the assisted conception statute. Code § 20-164 states: A child whose status as a child is declared or negated by this chapter [chapter 9] is the child only of his parent or parents as determined under this chapter, Title 64.1, and, when applicable, Chapter 3.1 (§ 20-49.1 et seq.) of this title for all purposes . . . . (Emphasis added.) This explicit cross reference to Chapter 3.1 (Code § 20-49.1 et seq.) requires that the assisted conception statute be read in conjunction with Code § 20-49.1 in the circumstances presented in this case. Mason’s argument is grounded in two provisions of the assisted conception statute, Code §§ 20-157 and 20-158(A)(3). We will consider these provisions in reverse order. Code § 20-158(A)(3) provides that “[a] donor is not the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, unless the donor is the husband of the gestational mother.” It is 10 undisputed that Breit was a “donor” in an assisted conception, and that Breit was never married to Mason. Thus, Mason contends that the statute bars Breit from establishing legal parentage of L.F., regardless of their voluntary written agreement. Mason argues that Code § 20-49.1, despite being specifically referenced in the assisted conception statute, is not applicable in the present context and therefore their voluntary written agreement is a nullity. First, she contends that Code § 20-49.1 is merely a procedural vehicle by which existing parent-child relationships can be recognized, and that the statute cannot be used to create new parentage rights. We disagree. Code § 20-49.1(B) expressly provides that a parentchild relationship “may be established by” genetic testing or an acknowledgement of paternity: The parent and child relationship between a child and a man may be established by:
including blood tests, which affirm at least a ninety-eight percent probability of paternity. Such genetic test results shall have the same legal effect as a judgment entered pursuant to § 20-49.8.
and mother made under oath acknowledging paternity . . . . The acknowledgement may be rescinded by either party within sixty days from the date on which it was signed . . . . A written statement shall have the same legal effect as a judgment entered pursuant to § 20-49.8 and shall be binding and conclusive unless, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, the 11 person challenging the statement establishes that the statement resulted from fraud, duress or a material mistake of fact. 4 Code § 20-49.1 has been amended four times since its enactment, including three times since the enactment of the assisted conception statute. Yet it has consistently been titled “[h]ow parent and child relationship established.” 5 (Emphasis added.) Black’s Law Dictionary defines “establish” as “[t]o make or form; to bring about or into existence,” a definition that clearly contemplates the creation rather than the mere recognition of parentage rights. Black’s Law Dictionary 626 (9th ed. 2010). Mason next argues that allowing unmarried sperm donors such as Breit to establish parentage pursuant to Code § 2049.1(B) directly conflicts with Code § 20-158(A)(3). Code § 20-49.1(B) contains two independent and disparate provisions: (B)(1) allows paternity to be established unilaterally by scientifically reliable genetic testing, and (B)(2) allows paternity to be established by a voluntary written statement of both biological parents acknowledging paternity. We must examine these two independent sections separately. 4 Neither Mason nor Breit rescinded the acknowledgement of paternity within sixty days of signing it, and neither party asserted that the agreement resulted from fraud, duress, or a material mistake of fact. 5 See 1988 Acts chs. 866, 878; 1990 Acts ch. 836; 1992 Acts ch. 516; 1997 Acts ch. 792; 1998 Acts ch. 884. 12 Preliminarily, Code §§ 20-49.1(B) and 20-158(A)(3) clearly relate to the same subject matter: establishing legal parentage of children. As noted previously, Code § 20-49.1 is specifically referenced in the assisted conception statute, of which Code § 20-158(A)(3) is a part. We must therefore construe these linked statutes that address the same subject matter “so as to avoid repugnance and conflict between them.” City of Lynchburg v. English Constr. Co., 277 Va. 574, 584, 675 S.E.2d 197, 202 (2009). The two statutes must be read “as a consistent and harmonious whole to give effect to the overall statutory scheme.” Bowman v. Concepcion, 283 Va. 552, 563, 722 S.E.2d 260, 266 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The assisted conception statute specifically indicates that, when applicable, Code § 20-49.1 relates to the determination of parentage of children born as a result of assisted conception. Code § 20-164. This plain language cannot be ignored. See English Constr. Co., 277 Va. at 584, 675 S.E.2d at 202 (“No part of an act should be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary.”). At the same time, Code § 20-49.1 is only applicable to the extent there is no conflict between its provisions and those of the assisted conception statute. See Ragan v. Woodcroft Vill. Apts., 255 Va. 322, 325, 497 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1998). 13 Mason argues that, under Code § 20-49.1(B)(1), donors could manufacture parent-child relationships over the gestational mother’s objection through the use of genetic testing. Similarly, a gestational mother who became impregnated by a sperm donor could use Code § 20-49.1(B)(1) to force parental responsibilities on the donor, including the obligation of child support, solely by establishing a biological link. Mason asserts that the General Assembly intended to foreclose such scenarios when it enacted the assisted conception statute. We agree. Code § 20-49.1(B)(1) directly conflicts with Code § 20158(A)(3), since it allows paternity to be established solely on the basis of biological ties, which circumvents Code § 20158(A)(3)’s instruction that mere donors cannot establish parentage. Consequently, a sperm donor aided only by the results of genetic testing may not establish parentage. Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) does not present such a conflict. Executing an acknowledgement of paternity involves an assumption of rights and responsibilities well beyond biological ties. It is a voluntary agreement to establish an actual parent-child relationship that more closely approximates the status of a gestational mother’s husband rather than a third-party donor. The assisted conception statute simply did not contemplate situations where, as here, unmarried donors 14 have long-term relationships as well as biological ties that have been voluntarily acknowledged in writing pursuant to Code § 20-49.1(B)(2), and have voluntarily assumed responsibilities to their children. As previously discussed, the assisted conception statute was written specifically with married couples in mind. 6 The statute’s primary purpose is to protect cohesive family units from claims of third-party intruders who served as mere donors. But Breit is not an intruder. He is the person whom Mason originally intended to be L.F.’s parent, whom she treated as L.F.’s parent for an extended period, and whom she voluntarily acknowledged as L.F.’s parent in a writing that she intended to be legally binding. Until Mason terminated Breit’s visitation, Breit cared for, supported, and had begun to establish a parent-child relationship with L.F. Mason and Breit represented the closest thing L.F. had to a “family unit.” We agree with the Court of Appeals that the General Assembly did not intend to divest individuals of the ability to establish parentage solely due to marital status, where, as 6 The definitions listed in the assisted conception statute reiterate the statute’s emphasis on married couples. For instance, Code § 20-156 defines “[s]urrogate” as “any adult woman who agrees to bear a child carried for intended parents,” and “[i]ntended parents” is defined as “a man and a woman, married to each other, who enter into an agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which they will be the parents of any child born to the surrogate through assisted conception . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 15 here, the biological mother and sperm donor were known to each other, lived together as a couple, jointly assumed rights and responsibilities, and voluntarily executed a statutorily prescribed acknowledgement of paternity. Having determined that Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) would apply in this context notwithstanding Code § 20-158(A)(3), we turn to Mason’s next argument. Mason asserts that Code § 20-157 forecloses a conclusion that Code § 20-49.1(B)(2) applies. Code § 20-157 expressly states that the provisions of Chapter 9 control, without exception, in any related litigation: The provisions of this chapter [chapter 9] shall control, without exception, in any action brought in the courts of this Commonwealth to enforce or adjudicate any rights or responsibilities arising under this chapter. This provision requires this Court to give precedence to Code §§ 20-158(A)(3) and 20-164 when confronted with contrary arguments. However, we must also harmonize Code § 20-49.1, when applicable, due to its explicit inclusion in Code § 20164. Read in isolation, Code § 20-157 could support Mason’s argument. But we do not read statutes in isolation. As stated above, we must construe statutes “to avoid repugnance and conflict between them.” City of Lynchburg, 277 Va. at 584, 675 S.E.2d at 202. Likewise, we are bound to construe statutes in a manner that “avoid[s] any conflict with the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229, 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 16 (2009). In Virginia, it is firmly established that “[a]ll actions of the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional.” Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 240 Va. 49, 52, 392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1990). Breit contends that accepting Mason’s argument would render the assisted conception statute unconstitutional. That we cannot do, if there is any reasonable interpretation that conforms to the Constitution. See Ocean View Improvement Corp. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 205 Va. 949, 955, 140 S.E.2d 700, 704 (1965). Consequently, we must address Mason’s argument regarding Code § 20-157 in the light of two constitutional imperatives.