Opinion ID: 1730618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Details

Text: The defendant argues that the state failed to lay a proper foundation for impeaching Lytle, by showing surprise or hostility. The state knew that he would not confirm from the stand that part of his statement to the police about having seen Bowman stab a person. The old rule about impeachment of one's own witness is inappropriate, in view of the statute. Inconsistent statements are available as substantive evidence, and may be used just as soon as the inconsistency appears from the testimony. The only necessary foundation is the inquiry as to whether the witness made the statement, [6] and whether the statement is true. Any requirement of additional foundation would dilute the effect of the statute. The defendant also complains about the use of the videotape, after Lytle admitted making the statements. Inasmuch as the statement constitutes substantive evidence, the jury should have it in the best form for judging its credibility. Lytle, furthermore, claimed that he had been pressured and abused by the interrogating officer, and the tape better enabled the jury to resolve this claim. See, State v. Foster, 700 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Mo. banc 1985). The defendant is entitled to protection against unnecessary and duplicative bolstering, State v. Seever, 733 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. banc 1987), but this record demonstrates no abuse of discretion. This is not the place to resolve all of the problems about inconsistent extrajudicial statements as substantive evidence. California v. Green mentions the possible situation in which the witness may not be effectively cross-examined because of lack of memory. 399 U.S. at 170, 90 S.Ct. at 1941. Here the defendant simply said that he lied to the officer under coercive conditions. We can also conceive of a situation in which the only evidence against a defendant might be found in an extrajudicial statement of another suspect. See State v. Granberry, supra, 491 S.W.2d at 533, Finch, Ch.J. concurring. See also Blackmar,  The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence How Will They Affect the Trial of Cases,  27 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 17 (1970). A trial judge undoubtedly possesses his usual discretion to exclude evidence which seems wholly unsubstantial or speculative. Here, however, there is ample evidence that the defendant participated in the burglary and assisted in carrying out the loot. He had a weapon in his car, which he brought to the scene. On the following day he told the sister of one of his companions that homicide (meaning perhaps the officers of the homicide bureau) was up the street and that he had to get rid of the stuff. Lytle's statement to the police was distinctly against his own interest, because it showed that the stabbing occurred after he had become a willing participant in the burglary, and established his guilt on a felony murder charge. We conclude that, under the statute, the jury could decide whether Lytle was telling the truth in his videotaped statement, or whether his testimony in court was true. This holding may be a hard dose for lawyers trained in the old tradition to swallow, but it represents a choice made by the legislature with ample support among evidence scholars. The state may not persuade us that there is a basis for finding guilt of first degree murder, or of armed criminal action, apart from Lytle's extrajudicial statements, but, by reason of the statute, there was a case for the jury and the court did not err in overruling the motion for judgment of acquittal.