Opinion ID: 2255082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Conclusory Allegations

Text: Nonfactual and nonspecific assertions which merely amount to conclusions are insufficient to require a hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. People v. Burt, 205 Ill.2d 28, 35-36, 275 Ill.Dec. 477, 792 N.E.2d 1250 (2001); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 381, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). See also Torres, 228 Ill.2d at 394, 320 Ill.Dec. 874, 888 N.E.2d 91 (reviewing summary dismissal of postconviction petition and noting that at this stage, nonfactual and nonspecific assertions are insufficient to require further proceedings). A pro se petitioner is required to provide only a limited amount of detail in his postconviction petition. Torres, 228 Ill.2d at 394, 320 Ill.Dec. 874, 888 N.E.2d 91. However, petitioner's conclusory allegations that he didn't know exactly what was happening at his trial, that he was unable to think, and that he could not talk or question anything are descriptive, but lack specific factual content. He does not provide a single example of something that he failed to understand or that he would have questioned. He offers no evidence regarding his demeanor or that he acted irrationally at trial ( People v. Johnson, 183 Ill.2d 176, 194, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996 (1998)), thus negating one of the three factors identified in Eddmonds. There are absolutely no specific factual allegations supporting his claim that he was actually confused during his bench trial. Thus, he has failed to identify a question of fact regarding his fitness to stand trial that is open to argument, dispute, or question. It is noteworthy that when petitioner briefly raised the question of a fitness hearing at his sentencing hearing, it was because some people had told him that because he was taking medication, he might not have had to go to trial. He did not suggest at that time that the medication affected him at trial, only that he would find out if he could have avoided trial. Not until he prepared his postconviction petition did he begin to assert that the medications affected him adversely. Indeed, in his statement at sentencing, he credited his improved mood and outlook to the medications that he now says made him unable to think, and he stated that he needed to continue taking them to remain on an even keel. After our decision in Hodges, the appellate court affirmed the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition in People v. Miller, 393 Ill.App.3d 629, 640, 332 Ill.Dec. 727, 913 N.E.2d 659 (2009), on the basis that the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were conclusory and as such fail[ed] to give rise to a gist of a constitutional claim. The petitioner's allegations were insufficient to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland even at this first stage of review because they were subjective and self-serving. Miller, 393 Ill.App.3d at 634, 332 Ill.Dec. 727, 913 N.E.2d 659. The appellate court also noted that Hodges, while redefining the term frivolous and patently without merit, did not overrule any of the cases cited in support of the opinion. Miller, 393 Ill. App.3d at 630 n. 1, 332 Ill.Dec. 727, 913 N.E.2d 659. See also People v. Swamynathan, 385 Ill.App.3d 434, 441, 324 Ill.Dec. 174, 895 N.E.2d 669 (2008) (affirming summary dismissal of postconviction petition where he offered nothing but conclusory and unsupported assertions that he was not `mentally competent to enter a plea'; he had not been `of sound mind'; and he had been suffering from `a complete mental breakdown'). In the present case, as in Miller and Swamynathan, the postconviction petitioner has made only conclusory assertions that he was prejudiced by counsel's allegedly deficient performance. An arguable question of prejudice is not raised by the bare assertion that he did not understand the proceedings and absent any specific claim that he would have done anything differently at trial. The majority states that a requirement of nonconclusory factual content is inconsistent with the requirement that the allegations in a postconviction petition be liberally construed. 236 Ill.2d at 193, 337 Ill.Dec. at 908, 923 N.E.2d at 759. It is not. Liberal construction does not require that the court frame allegations that might have been made to strengthen the claim asserted. Rather, it requires that we accept the factual allegations as true, so long as they `can be corroborated and are objective in nature' Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 10, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204, quoting People v. Delton, 227 Ill.2d 247, 254-55, 317 Ill.Dec. 636, 882 N.E.2d 516 (2008). Petitioner's allegations that he wanted to die and that he was taking psychotropic medications, taken as true, are not sufficient to raise an arguable question regarding his fitness to stand trial. Similarly, his conclusory allegations that he was unable to understand everything and that he was slow to react in [his] mind, no matter how liberally construed, are entirely subjective and lack any specific content. Thus, petitioner has not raised an arguable question of fact regarding the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.