Opinion ID: 2994706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Woods’ Hearsay Argument

Text: Woods argues that the arrest report and the misdemeanor complaint contained inadmissible hearsay, and therefore could not properly be considered on a motion for summary judgment. The district court found that the information in these documents was credible and trustworthy under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) because they were sworn to under oath by the officers and by Flores, and because they were business records kept by the police department. Woods concedes that portions of police reports that contain information prepared by the business are admissible as business records. For example, Woods suggests that a properly authenticated police report would be admissible to show the date and time of the arrest and the date and time that the arrestee was released on bond. However, Woods notes that the business records exception does not embrace statements contained within a business record that were made by one who is not a part of the business if the embraced statements are offered for their truth. United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1999). In other words, Woods argues that statements made by third parties in an otherwise admissible business record cannot properly be admitted for their truth unless they can be shown independently to fall within a recognized hearsay exception. While we agree fully with this principle of law, we find that it is not implicated in this case and is of no help to Woods. As the district court noted, the defendants offered the statements in the arrest report and the verified criminal complaint describing the details of the alleged altercation between Woods and Flores not for their truth, but to show the effect that the statements had on the officers. Because the officers asserted the defense of qualified immunity, Woods had the burden at trial to prove that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. See Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 1998); see generally Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1995). The determination of whether an arresting officer has probable cause to arrest an alleged offender turns on whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. This inquiry, in turn, depends upon whether the facts and circumstances communicated to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable officer in holding such a belief. The defendants correctly note that so long as a reasonably credible witness or victim informs the police that someone has committed . . . a crime, the officers have probable cause to place the alleged culprit under arrest . . . Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998), and that once such a reasonably credible complaint has been made, the existence of probable cause to arrest does not depend upon the actual truth of the complaint. See Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 1998) (Probable cause does not depend on the witness turning out to have been right; it’s what the police know, not whether they know the truth that matters.). In this case, the defendants offered the information conveyed to the police by Flores and memorialized in the misdemeanor complaint and arrest report not to show that Woods had actually performed the conduct as reported in those documents, but rather to show that they had probable cause to arrest Woods based upon the information communicated to them by Flores. The district court considered the statements strictly to determine the effect that they would have upon the arresting officers when communicated to them by a presumptively reliable citizen. Thus, the district court did not run afoul of the prohibition on hearsay by considering these documents for this limited purpose.