Opinion ID: 163905
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Heading: Was the warrantless blood test justified under Schmerber v. California?

Text: 56 It is undisputed that, at the instruction of Officers Porter and Roye, a nurse employed by Defendant Columbia Lea Regional Hospital administered a blood test to Mr. Marshall without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral magistrate. Mr. Marshall contends that this violated [t]he right of the people, protected by the Fourth Amendment as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. State actors administering a blood test without warrant or consent may be subject to suit under § 1983. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1207 (10th Cir.2003). 57 It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside the home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable unless the police can show both probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances. United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1242 & n. 3 (10th Cir.2002) (Probable cause accompanied by exigent circumstances will excuse the absence of a warrant.); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (Absent exigent circumstances, [the] threshold may not be reasonably crossed without a warrant.); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). In Schmerber, the Court held that intrusions into the body deserve at least as much protection as is afforded to intrusions into the home. 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions of the human body are concerned.). It follows that a warrantless blood test, performed without consent, is presumptively unreasonable unless the state actors involved had probable cause and exigent circumstances sufficient to justify it. 58 In this case, we assume, as the district court held, that Mr. Marshall's mixed performance on the field sobriety tests provided probable cause for the blood test. The harder question is whether there were exigent circumstances. This requires careful consideration of the legal and factual context, in light of the purposes of the exigent circumstances doctrine. [T]he scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the search from the warrant requirement. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973). Although the opinion did not use the terminology of exigent circumstances, Schmerber is the governing precedent regarding the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine to warrantless blood tests. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (describing Schmerber as involving exigent circumstances); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (same). 59 The defendant in Schmerber was hospitalized after an automobile accident that resulted in serious injuries to himself and a passenger. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Based on various symptoms of drunkenness, including the smell of alcohol on his breath, police arrested him for driving under the influence. Id. at 768-69, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Although ultimately prosecuted for a misdemeanor, he was subject to prosecution for a felony because of the injury to the passenger. Id. at 768 n. 12, 86 S.Ct. 1826. At the instructions of the police, but over the defendant's objection and without a warrant, medical personnel at the hospital administered a blood test, which produced evidence of his intoxication. Id. at 758-59, 86 S.Ct. 1826. 60 The Court held that the warrantless blood test did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court opened its discussion noting that bodily intrusions, such as blood tests, affect the interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects no less than searches of dwellings. Id. at 769, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and the importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great. Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Court noted, however, that under the special facts of the case, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant before the blood alcohol level had diminished. Id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Because the police might reasonably have believed that ... the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence, the Court held that the warrantless search comported with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Court specifically limited its holding to the facts before it: 61 [W]e reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That we today [h]old that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits ... intrusions under other conditions. 62 Id. at 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826. 63 The district court upheld the warrantless blood test in this case on analogy to Schmerber. As in Schmerber, police had probable cause to suspect Mr. Marshall of the crime of driving under the influence, and as in Schmerber, the delay necessary to obtain a warrant under the circumstances threatened destruction of the evidence. Marshall at 10, App. at 375. 64 Mr. Marshall's brief can be liberally construed to argue that Schmerber is distinguishable in at least one important respect: state law does not authorize New Mexico police to compel a blood test in a misdemeanor case involving no physical injury, even with a warrant. When a crime is not important enough to justify a warranted search, it is not important enough to justify an exigent circumstances search. Under the facts of Schmerber — a serious accident with the potential of a felony prosecution — state law authorized police to procure a warrant for a blood test, and if time and circumstances had permitted, the police could have done so. It was only the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, which created the emergency, which justified the warrantless search. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826. By contrast, in this case no warrant was available by law for a test of Mr. Marshall's blood. 65 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111(A) (Michie 1998) 9 provides in relevant part: 66 If a person under arrest for violation of an offense enumerated in the Motor Vehicle Code ... refuses upon request of a law enforcement officer to submit to chemical tests designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in section 66-8-107 NMSA 1978, none shall be administered except when a municipal judge, magistrate or district judge issues a search warrant authorizing chemical tests as provided in section 66-8-107 NMSA 1978 upon his finding in a law enforcement officer's written affidavit that there is probable cause to believe that the person has driven a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, thereby causing the death or great bodily injury of another person, or there is probable cause to believe that the person has committed a felony while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance and that chemical tests as provided in section 66-8-107 NMSA 1978 will produce material evidence in a felony prosecution. 67 The statute describes two scenarios under which a magistrate can issue a warrant for chemical tests, including a blood test: (i) upon probable cause to believe that a person has driven while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance and has thereby caused the death or great bodily injury of another person; and (ii) upon probable cause to believe that the person has committed a felony while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance and that chemical tests will produce material evidence in a felony prosecution. Under New Mexico law, the driver's license of a person arrested for driving under the influence may be revoked if he refuses to submit to a chemical test. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111(B). But if the subject refuses to submit to the test, the statute expressly forbids the police from administering it without a warrant. Id. § 66-8-111(A). 68 Reading the facts in the record in the manner most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, we infer that no search warrant could lawfully have been obtained to compel a test of Mr. Marshall's blood. Because there is no evidence that Mr. Marshall caused death or great bodily injury, or even an accident, the first scenario clearly does not apply. Nor was a warrant authorized under the second scenario. Under New Mexico law, a first conviction of driving under the influence of a controlled substance is a petty misdemeanor. See id. § 66-8-102(E) 10 (prescribing no more than 90 days' imprisonment and/or a $500 fine for first offense); id. § 31-1-2(L) (categorizing crimes with sentences of less than six months as petty misdemeanors). Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Marshall had a prior conviction for driving under the influence. 11 Nor could Mr. Marshall's alleged drug possession justify a warrant for a blood test. New Mexico Statutes § 30-31-23(B)(2) provides that possession of less than eight ounces of marijuana is not a felony. Even assuming that Officer Porter's vague references to a green leafy substance on the front seat of Mr. Marshall's truck established probable cause for an arrest for possession of marijuana, which the district court specifically rejected, Marshall at 6, App. at 371 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)), it certainly did not establish probable cause for arrest for the possession of the eight ounces required for a felony. 69 We can reasonably infer from the evidence, therefore, that Officer Porter would not have been able to obtain a search warrant under the circumstances of this case, even if he had time to do so. Because the exigent circumstances in Schmerber were based entirely on the emergency circumstances created by the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, it follows that Schmerber is distinguishable. It would be strange to hold that a police officer may obtain a blood sample on the basis of exigent circumstances without a warrant, when he could not have lawfully conducted the same search with a warrant. The rationale for the exigent circumstances doctrine is to avoid the loss of evidence due to the time required for obtaining a warrant — not to enable police to obtain evidence in cases of alleged violations too trivial to support a warrant. 70 This conclusion in no way conflicts with this Court's long line of cases holding that violations of state law by state officials in the course of state law enforcement activities do not create actionable Fourth Amendment claims. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir.1999) (It is, however, well established in this circuit that in federal prosecutions the test of reasonableness in relation to the Fourth Amendment protected rights must be determined by Federal law even though the police actions are those of state police officers.) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Price, 75 F.3d 1440, 1443-44 (10th Cir.1996) (same). Our point is not that the Hobbs Defendants are subject to liability under § 1983 for violation of the New Mexico statute, but rather that the New Mexico statute determines whether the exigent circumstances recognized in Schmerber are present here. 71 The Supreme Court has instructed that under the doctrine of exigent circumstances, the lawfulness of a search is determined by balancing privacy concerns against those of law enforcement. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331, 121 S.Ct. 946. Exigent circumstances, in the context of a search by state officials for evidence of a state offense, is measured in part by the relative importance given by state law to the evidence sought through the warrantless search. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750-51, 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (finding no exigent circumstances on the basis of minimal state interest as expressed through classification of offense under state law); Howard v. Dickerson, 34 F.3d 978, 982 (10th Cir.1994) (same); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1369 (8th Cir.1985) (same); see also United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222, 1229-1231 (10th Cir.2003). 72 Welsh provides an illustration of this principle. There, the defendant's car swerved off the road, coming to a stop in an open field. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742, 104 S.Ct. 2091. A witness, noticing the car driving erratically, contacted the police, but by the time they arrived defendant Welsh had walked away from the scene. Id. By checking the vehicle identification number, police were able to identify the car as belonging to Welsh, and proceeded to his home without first obtaining a warrant. Id. Police entered his home and took him to the station house to administer a breathalyzer test. Id. at 743, 104 S.Ct. 2091. Welsh refused to take the test and as a result was charged and convicted in two separate, but related, proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test and the second relating to driving while intoxicated. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the convictions, ruling that the warrantless arrest was justified under the doctrine of exigent circumstances. Id. at 747-48, 104 S.Ct. 2091. 73 The Supreme Court reversed both convictions. Although the government argued that the need to preserve the evidence of Welsh's blood alcohol level created exigent circumstances, the Court held that preservation of evidence did not justify a warrantless in-home arrest if the offense for which probable cause was said to exist is relatively minor. Id. at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091. In determining the gravity of the underlying offense, the Court looked to the substantive state law, finding that it is the best indication of the State's interest. Id. at 751, 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. In that case, the offense which Welsh was suspected to have committed was a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense, for which no imprisonment is possible. Id. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. The Court concluded that [g]iven this expression of the State's interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while police obtained a warrant. Id. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. The Court did not specify how serious a crime must be under state law to justify application of the exigent circumstances doctrine, though it cited with apparent approval a state supreme court decision adopting a rule holding that misdemeanors are excluded. Id. at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (quoting State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 440, 461 A.2d 963, 970 (1983)); see also United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, at 1271 n. 4 (10th Cir.1988). 74 Similarly, this Court has held that [t]o determine the existence of an exigency, a court must consider the gravity of the offense. Howard, 34 F.3d at 982; see also Flowers, 336 F.3d at 1229-31. As in Welsh, this Court in both Howard and Flowers considered state law relevant in determining whether a particular alleged crime was serious enough to support a warrantless arrest under the exigent circumstances doctrine. We see no reason why a similar analysis would not be applicable to the exigent circumstances doctrine as applied to warrantless searches as well as warrantless arrests. See William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations — Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. Kan. L.Rev. 439, 450 (1990) (Most judicial and scholarly discussions of warrantless fourth amendment entries predicated on alleged exigencies do not distinguish between entries to search and entries to seize or arrest.); see also id. at 457-58. 75 New Mexico's statutes clearly signal the State's limited interest in coerced testing of the blood of a motorist charged with a petty misdemeanor. More significantly, New Mexico's determination regarding the absence of exigency is clearly displayed by the fact that New Mexico law does not grant a magistrate authority to issue a warrant for this search. If a state does not permit obtaining evidence from the bloodstream, even under the protection of a warrant based on probable cause, it perforce demonstrates minimal interest in the evidence to be obtained by the search. State actors then cannot turn around and seek shelter under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753-54, 104 S.Ct. 2091. 76 This approach is assumed within Schmerber itself. After noting that warrants are generally required absent specific emergency circumstances, Schmerber held that The officer in the present case... might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of the evidence. 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). Implicit in this holding is that exigent circumstances exist only when a warrant would be available but for the shortage of time. That is not true in this case.