Opinion ID: 1058682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Revocation of Auxiliary Use Permits

Text: In its second assignment of error the City states that the circuit court erred in construing § 11-506(A) of the City Zoning Ordinance to require, as a prerequisite to revocation of a SUP, a violation of a law having a nexus to the specific purpose of a special use permit, rather than to the overall operations to which the SUP is attached. Interpretation of a local zoning ordinance, like interpretation of a statute, is a pure question of law, subject to de novo review. Renkey v. County Bd., 272 Va. 369, 373, 634 S.E.2d 352, 355 (2006) (quoting Virginia Polytechnic Inst. v. Interactive Return Serv., 271 Va. 304, 309, 626 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006)). Zoning Ordinance § 11-506(A) states: After notice and a public hearing, the city council may revoke or suspend any special use permit approved by it upon proof that the holder of the permit has failed to comply with any law, including, without limitation, the conditions subject to which the special use permit was granted. The City first argues that the phrase any law should be given its plain meaning. Adoption of the plain meaning of this phrase would allow revocation of an SUP if its holder violated a local traffic law or federal tax statute. We decline to adopt an interpretation of this legislative enactment that would allow such incongruous results. The City apparently recognized the difficulties of applying a plain meaning construction to the phrase any law because, as expressed in its assignment of error, the City does not seek a plain meaning construction but instead asks that the phrase be construed to mean any law related to the overall operation to which an SUP is connected. This construction, however, is not consistent with the legislative intent of the ordinance. The ordinance identifies violations of conditions subject to which the special use permit was granted as grounds for revocation of the SUP. This provision reflects an intent to base the revocation of the SUP on activities connected to the SUP. The construction advanced by the City does not require any such relationship and thus is inconsistent with the expressed legislative intent. The construction adopted by the trial court, however, does maintain the relationship between the SUP and the offending actions because it requires some nexus between the law violated and the purpose of the SUP. Nevertheless, the City maintains that its suggested construction of the ordinance should be given deference under the principle that a consistent administrative construction of an ordinance should be given much weight. See, e.g., Trustees v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 273 Va. 375, 381-82, 641 S.E.2d 104, 107 (2007); Lamar Co., LLC v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 270 Va. 540, 547, 620 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2005). Nothing in this record, however, establishes that the construction advanced by the City was a consistent construction of the ordinance or one that had been applied in the past. The City identified two instances in which SUPs were revoked for violation of a law, but both involved violations of the City's zoning law, not a state or federal law. Additionally, neither of those instances appeared to address the interpretation advanced by the City herethat is, a law with a nexus to the overall operation to which the SUP is attached. Accordingly, we reject the City's contention that its interpretation of the zoning ordinance in this case is entitled to deference or great weight. We conclude that the circuit court did not err in construing the phrase any law in § 11-506(A) of the zoning ordinance as any law having a nexus to the purpose of the SUP and, therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court reversing the City's revocation of Mirant's two auxiliary SUPs. [2] Affirmed.