Opinion ID: 1201220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Testimony of Lieutenant Ray Wood

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting some of the testimony of Lieutenant Ray Wood of the Cumberland County Sheriff's Office. Defendant argues that the testimony was inadmissible lay opinion testimony received in violation of his right to due process and a fair trial. Defendant's objections at trial were not based on constitutional grounds, and as a consequence, these claims are not reviewable on appeal and defendant does not contend plain error. See N.C. R.App. P. 10(b); id. 10(c)(4); see also State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 16, 653 S.E.2d 126, 136 (2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2857, 174 L.Ed.2d 601 (2009). While we decline to review defendant's constitutional arguments, we will address his assertion that the testimony was inadmissible lay opinion testimony. Rule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (2007). The State never tendered Wood as an expert witness, but informed the trial court that it would offer his testimony regarding his personal observations and as a lay opinion consistent with Rule 701. We review the trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion, looking to whether the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988) (citation omitted). In our review, we consider not whether we might disagree with the trial court, but whether the trial court's actions are fairly supported by the record. State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 302, 643 S.E.2d 909, 911 (2007) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 434, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the five instances about which defendant complains, as the testimony was either not opinion testimony or was admissible as a lay opinion. First, defendant asserts the trial court erred in overruling his objection to Wood's testimony that the white crystal powdery-type substance found on the vehicle in which the victims were discovered looked like as far as the size and how it was distributed over the vehicle, is taking your car into a car wash and the car wash mechanism spraying the suds ... and the car not being rinsed. That's what it looked like. Here, Wood was not offering his opinion that defendant attempted to wash the vehicle without rinsing it, but was explaining his observations about the size and distribution of the spots found on the vehicle. Thus, this testimony was not opinion testimony. Second, defendant argues the trial court erred in permitting Wood to testify that it was his opinion that the victims were not shot in the vehicle in which their bodies were found. This opinion was based upon Wood's observations that there was no pooling of blood in or around the vehicle, no shell casings found in the car or around the car, very little blood spatter in the vehicle, and no holes or projectiles found in the vehicle or outside the vehicle. Thus, Wood's opinion was rationally based on his perception. Additionally, the location of the murders was a key issue linking defendant to the crime. Wood's opinion whether the victims were murdered in the location where the vehicle was found or were killed inside the vehicle was helpful to the determination of a fact of the case and was thus admissible under Rule 701. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection. Third, defendant objected to Wood's testimony that it was his opinion that Leavy had been winched in the vehicle by the use of the rope found inside the vehicle. Wood's testimony was based upon his perception of blood patterns, the location of the vehicle, and the positioning of and tension on the rope on the seat and Leavy's hands. Moreover, his opinion was helpful in determining how defendant, acting alone, would have been able to move Leavy's large body from defendant's residence to the vehicle. Accordingly, the testimony was admissible lay opinion testimony, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. Fourth, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Wood to testify that a blanket seized from defendant's home was the same type blanket as that covering one of the decedents. Defendant did not object to this testimony at trial and has not argued in his brief that admission of this evidence amounts to plain error. Accordingly, we will not review this contention. See N.C. R.App. P. 10(c)(4). Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing Wood to testify that it was his opinion that the victims were dragged through the grass at defendant's residence. This testimony was based upon Wood's observations at defendant's residence and his experience in luminol testing. Additionally, this testimony was helpful to the determination of how the victims' bodies may have been moved from defendant's residence into the vehicle and ultimately to the place where they were discovered. The testimony was admissible. Defendant's assignments of error are overruled.