Opinion ID: 2023205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutor's Cross-Examination of Defendant Concerning His Postarrest Silence.

Text: A. Should this cross-examination have been permitted? The basis for defendant's argument in the district court and in this court is that this questioning was improper because it diluted his Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination that was expressly confirmed in the Miranda warning he received. A similar claim was successfully advanced in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Doyle involved two defendants who each testified at trial that he had been framed. During cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired as to why they had not told the police their story following arrest. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment guaranty against self-incrimination prohibits impeachment on the basis of a criminal defendant's silence after receipt of Miranda warnings. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d at 96. In commenting on the attempted use of postarrest silence in circumstances in which the accused had received Miranda warnings, the Court stated: In such circumstances, it [is] fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Id. The court of appeals held that the challenged testimony fell within the Doyle proscription. The State, on further review, urges that Doyle does not prohibit cross-examination designed to show that a defendant told the police a substantially different story than that which was told to the jury. It urges that such impeachment by prior inconsistent statement is authorized in the Court's post- Doyle decision in Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980). Anderson involved a defendant arrested for murder after he was discovered in the victim's automobile. The defendant was given Miranda warnings before he told the police detective that he had stolen the car from a location about two miles from the bus station. At trial defendant testified he had stolen the car from a parking lot directly across the street from the bus station. On cross-examination, he was questioned about the inconsistency between his postarrest statements and trial testimony. Defendant sought to overturn his conviction through federal habeas corpus on the theory that this cross-examination was prohibited by Doyle. The Court, although reaffirming Doyle, held that it does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408, 100 S.Ct. at 2182, 65 L.Ed.2d at 226. The Court concluded [s]uch questioning makes no unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. Id. In Bass v. Nix, 909 F.2d 297 (8th Cir.1990), the federal court attempted to reconcile the Doyle decision with the Anderson decision and concluded that the fact there is some conversation with the police does not necessarily bring a case within the Anderson doctrine unless the conversation pertains to the suspect's role in the offense or offers an exculpatory story or alibi. Bass, 909 F.2d at 301. That was not the situation in the present case. We agree with the court of appeals that the present case is governed by the proscription laid down in Doyle. The challenged cross-examination cannot be viewed as mere inquiry into prior inconsistent statements. We say that for two reasons. First, any claim that the challenged cross-examination was part of an effort to impeach defendant by the use of prior inconsistent statements is completely negated by the fact that the alleged inconsistent statements were never offered in evidence for the jury to hear. As a result, the impeachment on which the State relies is a phantom impeachment that never occurred. Second, because the parties have argued this issue based on the contents of the recorded portion of defendant's interrogation, which is in the record only as an exhibit relevant to a suppression hearing, we have, like the court of appeals, listened to the tape and conclude that it is noticeably lacking in any comment by defendant on how Rundall's death occurred or defendant's role in it. The State contends that the recorded interview shows that Metz asked the investigating officers about Rundall's condition and also mentioned that he had popped someone. A suspect does not waive his right to remain silent by asking the officers a question. Id. at 301. The statement that he had popped someone was in no way inconsistent with his trial testimony. There was simply nothing in the police interview relied on by the State that gave it any basis for impeaching defendant's trial testimony based on inconsistent statements made in that interview. The prosecutor's question in the present case was designed and so functioned to impeach Metz's trial testimony by reference to his postarrest silence and nothing else. The State did not advise the jury of any prior inconsistent statement, and in the record before us, none has been shown to exist. B. The State's claim of harmless error. We are unable to accept the State's contention that any error from permitting an improper impeachment of defendant by commenting on his postarrest silence was harmless. The court of appeals concluded that, because the issue is being raised on direct appeal, the harmless-error standard for constitutional deprivation laid down in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is the standard to be utilized in the present case. We agree. Although the State requests that we apply the standard applied in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987), that case establishes the less-demanding standard of prejudice to be applied in collateral attacks based on Doyle violations. It implicitly recognizes that the Chapman standard applies in direct appeals of Doyle violations. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66, 107 S.Ct. at 3109, 97 L.Ed.2d at 630. Moreover, the finding of harmless error in Greer was based on a factual situation in which the offending testimony had been stricken by the court and the jury instructed to disregard it. Id. Under the standard established in Chapman, error of constitutional dimension must be shown to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710-11. In the present case, the error, which is of constitutional dimension, allowed an improper contradiction of facts that constituted the heart and core of defendant's defense. The improper matter that the court allowed would surely have cast doubt in the jurors' minds as to defendant's claims of justification and absence of malice and intent to kill. The court of appeals was correct in concluding that the error was not harmless.