Opinion ID: 473028
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sole Cause as a Substantive Defense

Text: 23 Appellants next contend that recent Texas Supreme Court decisions eliminate any consideration by the jury of sole cause in a suit implicating products liability law, and thus any submission of sole cause in any form is substantive error because sole cause is no longer substantively available in these cases. In First International Bank in San Antonio v. Roper Corp., 686 S.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Tex.1985), appellants' primary authority for this proposition, the Texas Supreme Court held that the submission of a sole cause instruction in a case tried only on products strict liability in tort was reversible error. In Roper, the court stated that a sole cause instruction, such as the one here, places an undue emphasis on the ... [third party's] negligence when the jury was considering the existence of a [product] defect and its relationship to the injurious event, id. at 604, and improperly single[s] out and highlight[s] third-party conduct. Id. at 605. 24 When a sole cause instruction is submitted in a suit involving both negligence and products liability, however, it is uncertain whether Texas courts would consider the submission erroneous. See J. Sales, Product Liability Law in Texas, p 3.04 at 262, esp. n. 247 (1985). In Gross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 695 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.1983), a case decided prior to Roper, we held that a sole cause instruction was not reversible error. The Texas Supreme Court in Roper explicitly distinguished our decision in Gross on the grounds that the plaintiff in Gross asserted a negligence cause of action as well as actions in products liability. The present case is grounded solely in products liability. 686 S.W.2d at 605. Despite its opportunity to expressly disavow our decision in Gross, the Texas Supreme Court did not do so. In this case, both negligence and strict product liability were asserted and submitted to the jury. Thus we find it unnecessary to reevaluate our holding in Gross. 25 Moreover, and wholly apart from whether this suit is grounded in negligence or strict products liability, we determine that sole cause is still a valid substantive concept in Texas. Although concededly it is error in Texas courts to give a sole cause instruction in a suit grounded in strict products liability, see Roper, 686 S.W.2d at 605, the instruction is not error because sole cause is not available on substantive grounds, but rather because the Texas courts view such excess instructions as harmful surplusage. In Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex.1984) (holding that an instruction to the effect that a manufacturer is not an insurer nor guarantees a perfect product is error), a predecessor to Roper, the Texas Supreme Court held that [t]he jury need not and should not be burdened with surplus instructions. (Emphasis added.) That court continued, stating, We explicitly approve the Pattern Jury Charge issue and instruction for design defect cases, and disapprove the addition of any other instructions in such cases, however correctly they may state the law.... Id. (emphasis added). In Roper, the Texas Supreme Court extended its holding in Acord on these surplus yet substantively correct instructions to specifically include sole cause, holding it to be surplusage of the type against which we warned in Acord. 686 S.W.2d at 604. Consequently, we find that sole cause instructions are excluded in Texas courts on nonsubstantive grounds, namely, their perceived tendency to confuse a jury or overemphasize one aspect of the case, or comment on the evidence. Id. at 604-05. Additionally, we note that in Roper the substantive validity of sole cause was not questioned. Id. at 603 (Neither party to this suit questions the correctness of the instruction as a definition of 'sole cause.' ). No claim is made that sole cause is now substantively obsolete, like charitable immunity, or contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery. 26 In Texas, both negligence and products strict liability suits require causation, although cause in a products strict liability action does not have to be foreseeable to be considered a producing cause. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex.1977), overruled in other respects, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex.1984); see Sales, supra, p 3.04 at p. 260, esp. n. 227. It must necessarily follow that if another person or event solely caused an injury to a plaintiff, then regardless of whether there is negligence on the part of the defendant or its product is defective, a plaintiff cannot meet his prima facie case--for the defendant's actions did not in fact cause the plaintiff's injury. 2 Consequently, we find that sole cause is viable under Texas substantive law.