Opinion ID: 2617796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Representative Jury Cross-section of Community.

Text: (1) In California, the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally and independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution ( Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 530 [42 L.Ed.2d 690, 698, 95 S.Ct. 692]) and by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748].) Representative cross-section analysis developed as a response to the pernicious practice of eliminating identifiable groups from the jury pool, thus preventing them from being considered as petit jurors. (See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364-368 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 586-590, 99 S.Ct. 664]; Ballard v. United States (1946) 329 U.S. 187, 193-194 [91 L.Ed. 181, 185-186, 67 S.Ct. 261] [women]; Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, 419 U.S. at p. 530 [42 L.Ed.2d at p. 698]; Peters v. Kiff (1972) 407 U.S. 493, 503-504 [33 L.Ed.2d 83, 94-95, 92 S.Ct. 2163] [Blacks]; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217, 220 [90 L.Ed. 1181, 1184-1185, 66 S.Ct. 984, 166 A.L.R. 1412] [wage earners]; Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 84-85 [86 L.Ed. 680, 706-707, 62 S.Ct. 457] [women not members of League of Women Voters]; People v. White (1954) 43 Cal.2d 740, 749 [278 P.2d 9] [blue-collar workers].) Petit juries selected from these pools lacked the broad spectrum of attitudes and beliefs shared by members of the excluded groups. (2) It is well settled that no litigant has the right to a jury that mirrors the demographic composition of the population, or necessarily includes members of his own group, or indeed is composed of any particular individuals. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277; People v. White, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 749; People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [86 P.2d 92].) What the representative cross-section requirement does mean, however, is that a litigant is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277.) [5] Defendant argues that his right to a jury panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is abridged by the jury selection procedures in Los Angeles County. Defendant cites the testimony of Raymond Arce ( ante, pp. 739-740) that Blacks comprise 11.4 percent of the county-wide, juror-eligible population. Defendant did not argue that the jurors called in his case were not representative of the juror-eligible Black population of the West District, which Arce testified averaged 5.6 percent in the three months preceding defendant's trial. In fact, Blacks comprised 8.6 percent of the jurors appearing for defendant's case. (3) Under Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. 357, in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. ( Id. at p. 364 [58 L.Ed.2d at p. 587]; People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 50 [201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433].) We are not concerned with the first prong of the Duren test for the People concede that Blacks are a cognizable, distinctive group for purposes of fair cross-section analysis. ( People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, 51; Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 20, fn. 45 [168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301].) (4a) To meet the second prong of the Duren test, defendant must show that Blacks were underrepresented in jury venires in relation to the number of such persons in the community. Before this court can evaluate the statistical showing of underrepresentation made by defendant, however, we must first determine what community the jury venire must fairly represent. It is here that we confront the central issue of this case. Defendant argues that community is defined as the entire county. The People argue that community means the judicial district. As noted, the Court of Appeal rejected both definitions, preferring instead a provocative compromise that defines community as that area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse. [6] Inasmuch as the basis for the decision of the Court of Appeal has been eliminated, no purpose is served by an extended discussion of the propriety of using the 20-mile-radius community in determining the population for cross-section analysis. [7] We turn, instead, to the arguments of the People and defendant who, respectively, propose the judicial district and county. We conclude that the judicial district best serves the constitutional and statutory considerations at issue in the determination of the appropriate community for cross-section analysis as well as the practical problems posed by a far-flung megapolis  Los Angeles County. (5) County as Community. [8] Defendant contends that the relevant community is the county. In O'Hare v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 86 [233 Cal. Rptr. 332, 729 P.2d 766], we addressed the issue whether the Sixth Amendment entitled a defendant to a venire drawn from, and representative of, the entire county. We squarely held that it does not. O'Hare was to be tried on a felony charge in the North County Branch of the San Diego Superior Court, which drew its jurors from an area limited by the boundaries of the North County Municipal Court Judicial District. O'Hare complained that the limited venire contained a significantly lower percentage of jury-eligible Blacks than did the county as a whole. We held that the constitutional cross-section requirement is a procedural and not a substantive requirement ( O'Hare, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 100) and found no constitutional limitation on the government's power to define the community against which the demographics of the venire is measured. The drafters of the Sixth Amendment intended there should be no limitation on the legislative power to define the boundaries of the federal district from which jurors in criminal trials are drawn. (See Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 96 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 458, 90 S.Ct. 1893].) Most significantly, as stated in O'Hare, the federal courts have approved the constitutionality of juries drawn from subdivisions of districts against challenges that the venire did not match the demographics of the districtwide community. ( United States v. Gottfried (2d Cir.1948) 165 F.2d 360, 364; United States v. Florence (4th Cir.1972) 456 F.2d 46, 49.) Based on the foregoing authorities, we concluded in O'Hare that the Sixth Amendment imposes no limitation on the legislative definition of community for the cross-section requirement: What the Sixth Amendment does guarantee to every defendant, regardless of his personal characteristics, is a jury drawn from a venire from which no member of the local community was arbitrarily or unnecessarily excluded. (43 Cal.3d at p. 101.) Albeit in another context, in People v. Harris , Justice Mosk noted the balkanized nature of Los Angeles County and the significant deceptiveness of the use of countywide statistical data. (36 Cal.3d at p. 73.) Our code uses the term `area served by the court' (Code Civ. Proc., § 197), not the county in which the court is situated. It takes only a cursory knowledge of the demography of Southern California to realize that Long Beach courts serve an area completely distinct in population characteristics from the totality of Los Angeles County.... Figures for the entire County of Los Angeles are not only irrelevant but in this instance significantly deceptive.