Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of testimony of Robert Zimmerman regarding Tabieros's post-accident employability and the possibility of mitigating damages

Text: In contrast to allowing Dr. Suyderhoud to testify regarding Tabieros's future earning capacity based upon unsupported assumptions, the circuit court disallowed in its entirety the proffered testimony of Clark's expert vocational rehabilitation counselor, Robert K. Zimmerman, Jr., regarding Tabieros's future employability within the Hawai`i job market. Clark offered Zimmerman's testimony for the dual purposes of rebutting the testimony of Dr. Suyderhoud and meeting its burden of proving that it was possible for Tabieros to mitigate his damages. Specifically, Clark tendered the following offer of proof: [Clark's counsel]: Mr Zimmerman would testify that basically ... the injuries at Matson have no significant impact upon [Tabieros's] wage earning capability. [Zimmerman] would indicate that[,] since August of 1989[,] Mr. Tabieros has been physically and psychologically able to work in his usual and customary occupation as a maintenance welder and maintenance mechanic. And testify that work in that field is generally available and wages are similar to Mr. Tabieros'[s] wages at Matson. He will say, therefore, [that] there is no significant loss of wage earning capability with regard to that injury. He will testify that[,] based upon his review[,] Mr. Tabieros is not able to return to work at Matson in any capacity. That is based upon Dr. Eliashof and Dr. Kappenberg's report. He will testify [that] Mr. Tabieros is able to return to work without any physical or psychological restrictions with an employer other than Matson. That is based upon his review of Dr. Eliashof, Dr. Kappenberg, Dr. Douglas and the [rehabilitative] records. He will testify that the most appropriate occupation for Mr. Tabieros from a vocational rehabilitation perspective would be a maintenance welder and the related field[,] which is maintenance mechanic. With regard to Mr. Tabieros'[s] position as usual and customary, he was a first class maintenance welder. Or a maintenance mechanic depending upon which record you are look[ing] at. Look[ing] at the definition from Career Kokua [of] welder [or] maintenance mechanic[,] employment as [a] welder or maintenance mechanic is generally available in the Hawaii labor market. With regard to maintenance mechanic[,] he will say that Career Kokua indicated there are approximately 2 thousand people employed in that area in the State of Hawaii. And that through job bank collecting, job bank of May 3, 1990[,] there were 46 current listings within that area of maintenance mechanic. With regard to welder[,] Career Kokua determined there were approximately 8 hundred 50 people employed in that area within the State of Hawaii[,] with many in the maintenance and service area. He will indicate that the wages provided for this employment have a wide range. That Mr. Tabieros would expect to receive at least 15 dollars an hour[,] if not the same wage he was earning at Matson. He checked with Hawaii Stevedores in May of 1990. They had hired two maintenance welders in a short time before that at the wage of 19 dollars come [sic] 42 cents an hours. He checked with other agencies where he determined that a maintenance mechanic earned between five dollars an hour and 18 dollars and 60 cents an hour. Maintenance welders earn between 9 zero six and 19 dollars 85 cents an hour. That combination welders earn between 6 fifty an hour and 20 dollars and 76 cents an hour. And general welders earn 15 dollars 28 cents and 17 dollars and 28 cents an hour. He checked Young Brothers and determined they employed maintenance welders in the area of 19 fifty to 19 dollars and 83 cents an hour. He would testify that Mr. Tabieros has the capability to work since he has both the physical and psychological capability to work in the position[,] and he will testify [that,] in his opinion[,] basically Mr. Tabieros has not suffered a wage loss[,] or [that] any impact of the injury on his wage earning capability is negligible. That's [Clark's] offer. Accordingly, Clark offered Mr. Zimmerman as an expert in the field of vocational rehabilitation... to offer an opinion as to whether or not the injury at Matson has had any significant impact upon Mr. Tabieros'[s] wage earning capability. The plaintiffs objected to Zimmerman's proffered trial testimony on the grounds that (1) he was not a qualified expert, and (2) his testimony was (a) dependant upon the hearsay declarations of others, (b) out-of-date, and (c) misleading because it did not take into account Tabieros's age, physical injury, and psychological problems. The circuit court sustained the plaintiffs' objection and excluded Zimmerman's testimony, but not for any of the foregoing reasons. Indeed, the court expressly found Zimmerman to be qualified as an expert in the field of vocational rehabilitation. Nevertheless, relying upon HRE 403, see supra note 22, the circuit court precluded Zimmerman from testifying pursuant to the following thought process: I am going to overrule plaintiff[s'] objection as to qualification. That goes to weight and effect. I believe he is qualified as an expert in the field of vocational rehab. However, I am going to sustain plaintiff[s'] objection under [HRE] 403[.] He's in no position whatsoever in his expertise to merely reiterate the opinions of others. That's one of the central issues in this case. The ability to, the capability of [Tabieros] not only to work but to find a job. On the offer of proof[,] he's indicating that he should be able to. That's not the standard. He probably will be able to find a job in Honolulu in that field. So based on that offer[,] he can't render that opinion. I will sustain plaintiff's objection under [HRE] 403 and exclude the witness from testifying. (Emphases added.) Thus, it would appear that the circuit court excluded Zimmerman's proffered testimony under HRE 403 on the basis that, insofar as it had any relevance, the testimony would merely be cumulative of, or a mere conduit for, the opinions of others. As discussed supra in section III.C.3, plaintiffs are subject to a duty to mitigate damages in either contract or tort. The burden, however, is upon the defendant to prove that mitigation is possible, and that the injured party has failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate his [or her] damages. Malani, 56 Haw. at 517, 542 P.2d at 1271 (emphasis added). It was Clark's burden, therefore, to show that it was possible, given the state of his recovery and the jobs available to someone with his skills and experience, for Tabieros to obtain gainful employment subsequent to his injury and that he had failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages by obtaining such employment. Clark had adduced testimony, through medical, psychological, and rehabilitative experts, that Tabieros had substantially recovered from his physical injuries and could, within a reasonably short period, recover from his psychological problems arising out of the accident-related injury. See supra section III.E.2. It was in this context that Clark offered Zimmerman's testimony regarding the effect of Tabieros's recovery on his future earning capacity. Zimmerman's testimony was relevant, see supra note 23, to Clark's case for at least two reasons. First, as noted, Clark bore the burden of proof on the question whether mitigation of income loss was possible. Second, and correlatively, the circuit court had permitted the plaintiffs, over Clark's objection, to adduce Dr. Suyderhoud's expert opinion  based on an assumption that the only pre-retirement work available to Tabieros would be a part-time job in a bowling pro shop  that Tabieros would in fact experience future wage losses. See supra section III.E.2. Given Clark's burden, Zimmerman's proffered testimony was highly probative of the possibility of mitigation. The fact that it did not also address Tabieros's actual efforts to find work rendered it no less relevant. Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove a fact in controversy or renders a matter in issue more or less probable .... The contention that evidence which, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a controverted fact, should be inadmissible is totally without basis in the law. It is often said that a brick is not a wall. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i at 409, 910 P.2d at 722 (quoting commentary on HRE 401) (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor would Zimmerman's testimony have been cumulative of the medical, psychological, and rehabilitative testimony discussed above, which tended to show that Tabieros was capable of gainful employment, but neither established that appropriate work was actually available nor quantified its mitigative value to Tabieros. With respect to the circuit court's apparent concern that Zimmerman would rely on the opinions of other experts in giving his testimony, we have already noted in section III.D.4.b, supra, that HRE 703 permits an expert to base an opinion or inference upon facts or data that are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and do not otherwise indicate lack of trustworthiness. It is difficult to imagine how an expert in vocational rehabilitation could reasonably determine the types of post-injury work available to a given client without relying on the opinions of the client's health care professionals regarding the client's degree of recovery. Such reasonable reliance is clearly permitted under HRE 703. A trial court may, of course, exercise supervision over the expert's testimony, pursuant to HRE 611 (1993) and 403, to ensure that the testimony is not unnecessarily duplicative or prejudicial. As distinguished from the testimony of Josephs, see supra at section III.D.4.b, and Dr. Suyderhoud, see supra at section III.E.2, however, the expert opinions upon which Zimmerman would have relied were already in evidence and had not been excluded as unreliable or prejudicial in any way. In our view, based on the record before us, the circuit court either misapprehended Clark's offer of proof regarding Zimmerman's testimony or wrongly excluded relevant evidence in a manner prejudicial to Clark's ability to seek to meet its burden of proving the possibility that Tabieros could mitigate his future wage losses. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court abused the discretion accorded by HRE 403 in rejecting Clark's offer of proof and foreclosing Zimmerman from testifying consistently therewith.