Opinion ID: 1823190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voter Disqualification

Text: Washington argues that the trial court erred in disqualifying absentee ballots under various provisions of the Alabama Code. We consider these provisions individually.
Washington first argues that the trial court disqualified over 102 voters[ [1] ] on the grounds that [the absentee ballots] were not postmarked by the date mandated by Ala.Code 1975, § 17-10-23. According to Washington, [t]his finding is not only contrary to the facts presented into evidence, but also contrary to the requirements set out in [§ 17-10-23]. In support of this contention, Washington cites testimony by the elections manager to the effect that she had retrieved some of the prospective ballots from the United States Postal Service that did not have postmarks. Washington also cited testimony by the circuit clerk of Hale County that in past elections unmetered ballots had been retrieved from the United States Post Office. Washington also argues that a strict construction of election-law requirements is contrary to Alabama policy. We are not persuaded by these arguments. Ala.Code 1975, § 17-10-23, states, in relevant part: No absentee ballot shall be opened or counted if received by the absentee election manager by mail, unless postmarked as of the date prior to the day of the election and received by mail not later than noon on the day of election. . . .  The statutory language is clear that unless ballots retrieved from the United States Post Office are postmarked no later than the day before the election, they may not be counted. Thus the trial court was correct to reject the ballots that had been retrieved from the Post Office without such postmark.
Washington also states that the trial court erred in disqualifying over 71 votes on the grounds that the identification did not comport with Ala.Code 1975, § 17-11A1(b), as further set out in Townson v. Stonicher, [933 So.2d 1062 (Ala. 2005)]. According to Washington, the elections manager failed to check the identification of those voters casting absentee ballots and to notify prospective voters of any deficiencies in their identification so they could remediate the deficiency pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 17-10A-2(c). Although Washington states that the failure to notify the voters of deficiencies in their identification was the fault of the elections manager, he provides no authority for his contention that the requirements of Ala.Code 1975, § 17-10A-2, may be set aside to remedy the elections manager's failure to notify voters of their errors in time for remediation. As a result, the trial court did not err by disqualifying those absentee votes that lacked the identification required by law.
Washington's contention that the trial court erred by disqualifying 17 votes on the basis of expert testimony indicating that the signatures on the ballots were forged is likewise misplaced. Washington asserted that his expert refuted the testimony of Hill's expert, which was accepted by the trial court, but he provides no legal authority in support of his assertion that the trial court erred in finding the testimony of Hill's expert to be more persuasive than the testimony of his expert. Because Washington offered no legal authority in support of this argument, we need not consider it. An appellate court is not required to perform legal research for a party, Spradlin v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 613 So.2d 347 (Ala.1993), or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument. Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala.1994).