Opinion ID: 155998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 11 Before considering Copeland's claims, we must first determine the threshold jurisdictional issue of whether her May 9 Notice of Appeal triggers appellate jurisdiction or was fatally premature. 12 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) provides that [a] notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry. The Supreme Court in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., 498 U.S. 269, 111 S.Ct. 648, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991), held that Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal filed from certain nonfinal decisions to serve as an effective notice from a subsequently entered final judgment. Id. at 274, 111 S.Ct. at 652. In allowing a premature notice of appeal to mature and thereafter trigger appellate jurisdiction, the Court explained: 13 Added to the Federal Rules in 1979, Rule 4(a)(2) was intended to codify a general practice in the courts of appeals of deeming certain premature notices of appeal effective. 14 .... 15 ... Under Rule 4(a)(2), a premature notice of appeal does not ripen until judgment is entered. Once judgment is entered, the Rule treats the premature notice of appeal as filed after such entry. Thus, even if a bench ruling in a given case were not final within the meaning of § 1291, Rule 4(a)(2) would not render that ruling appealable in contravention of § 1291. Rather, it permits a premature notice of appeal from that bench ruling to relate forward to judgment and serve as an effective notice of appeal from the final judgment. 16 .... 17 ... Rule 4(a)(2) was intended to protect the unskilled litigant who files a notice of appeal from a decision that he reasonably but mistakenly believes to be a final judgment, while failing to file a notice of appeal from the actual final judgment. 18 This is not to say that Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal from a clearly interlocutory decision--such as a discovery ruling or a sanction order under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--to serve as a notice of appeal from the final judgment. A belief that such a decision is a final judgment would not be reasonable. In our view, Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a district court announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment. In these instances, a litigant's confusion is understandable, and permitting the notice of appeal to become effective when judgment is entered does not catch the appellee by surprise. Little would be accomplished by prohibiting the court of appeals from reaching the merits of such an appeal. 19 Id. at 273-76, 111 S.Ct. at 651-53. 20 The rationale and holding of FirsTier warrant a similar result in the present case. Copeland could reasonably have mistaken the April 12 Memorandum and Order (Order) as a final decision. The Order was not a clearly interlocutory decision. It effectively resolved the case, disposing of all the issues which Copeland raised below and now appeals. The Order identified the $244,814.30 subject to SRS' subrogation right and rejected each of Copeland's arguments for reducing SRS' subrogation share or assessing SRS a 40% attorney fee. 21 FirsTier requires this court to determine whether the Order would have been appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment. A decision is appealable only if it is final, meaning it leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). This court stated in Albright v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, 59 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir.1995): 22 [T]he touchstone of a final order is a decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain. 23 .... 24 ... [However,] an order is final even if it does not reduce the damages to a sum certain if the order sufficiently disposes of the factual and legal issues and any unresolved issues are sufficiently ministerial that there would be no likelihood of further appeal. That is, when the amount of damages awarded pursuant to a judgment on liability speaks for itself, we can assume jurisdiction under an exception to the final order doctrine; however, if calculating damages would be complicated and the possible subject of a separate and future appeal, then we cannot assume appellate jurisdiction.... 25 Id. at 1092-93 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 (emphasis added) and Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 936 (3d Cir.1994)) (citations and footnotes omitted). The Albright court determined it did not have jurisdiction because the calculations not completed in the appealed order were not likely to be ... ministerial and uncontroversial. Id. at 1093. Rather, they were likely to be complicated and disputed. Id. The court acknowledged, however, that there may be cases in which the lack of a sum certain will not preclude appellate review. Id. at 1094. The case at bar is one such case. The April 12 Order spoke for itself, disposed of the factual and legal issues, and left only uncomplicated, undisputed, ministerial tasks to the subsequent Journal Entry. This court thus has jurisdiction.