Opinion ID: 2612680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did the court err in denying reformation?

Text: At trial, the appellant contended that there were several material provisions of the contract that were omitted from the written agreement. The first provision, according to appellant, had to do with an equal revenues concept which held that appellant would not be required to relinquish control of Old Rainbow until the revenues being derived from New Rainbow equaled those from Old Rainbow. Appellant's second assertion was that the parties intended the language other accepted oil field operations as utilized in paragraph 5 to include secondary recovery operations. In other words, appellant requested the trial court to reform the contract so that either Christmann was not entitled to control Old Rainbow since equal revenues had not yet been reached, or the 25-75% split would not be triggered until Christmann had undertaken and completed secondary recovery operations on Old Rainbow. The trial court rejected these positions and we agree with that result. Before a court may grant reformation of a written contract, the party requesting such relief must be able to establish that there was an agreement in which the parties had a meeting of the minds which was entered into prior to the written agreement, and that as a result of mutual mistake or fraud the written contract differs from the original agreement and omits certain agreed-to terms. Pfister v. Brown, Wyo., 498 P.2d 1243 (1972); Russell v. Curran, 66 Wyo. 173, 206 P.2d 1159 (1949). In the case at bar, as we have said, the contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, and was entered into only after careful negotiation had taken place. Nowhere in the agreement is there any reference to the so-called equal revenues idea nor does paragraph 5 provide, either in fact or by implication, for the undertaking of secondary recovery operations before the 25-75% share of the proceeds would go into effect. We hold that the appellant has failed to establish that the written contract did not embody the full agreement of the parties and therefore the trial court correctly denied the equitable remedy of reformation. It is hard to imagine that the parties would have intended the equal revenues concept or secondary recovery operations on Old Rainbow without including these provisions within the written language of the instrument. We will not rewrite contracts, and where a written agreement is clear and unambiguous parties must abide by the plainly stated terms. McCartney v. Malm, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1014 (1981); Quin Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Construction Company, supra. Reformation was and should have been denied.