Opinion ID: 2575840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Referral to the ODC Requires Sufficient Facts

Text: Canon 3(D)(2) of the Revised Code of Judicial Conduct provides: A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Hawai`i Rules of Professional Conduct [(HRPC)] should take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the [HRPC] that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority [ i.e., the ODC]. In so doing, [e]thics complaints submitted to ODC must contain sufficient facts to enable ODC to conduct a thorough investigation. Akinaka v. Disciplinary Bd., 91 Hawai`i 51, 56 n. 6, 979 P.2d 1077, 1082 n. 6 (1999). As previously stated, our responsibility to specify the basis for granting or denying a request for attorneys' fees, in whole or in part, is no different than those of trial judges. See Price, 107 Hawai`i at 113, 111 P.3d at 8. The reason is obvious  it not only gives the parties and their attorneys an understanding of the basis for the court's ruling, but facilitates review on appeal. It is important to note, however, that, when concurrently referring a matter that involves a ruling on a request for attorneys' fees to the ODC, I recognize that the ODC's review is not for the purpose of determining the correctness of the fees awarded. The focus of the ODC's inquiry is whether counsel's conduct and the fees charged comport with the requirements of the HRPC. Obviously, one of the facts to be considered by the ODC in its investigation of this matter will be the significant reduction imposed by this court in awarding fees to the prevailing party. The majority's conclusory statement that $23,515.70 in attorneys' fees is reasonable, but the total amount requested ($139,121.16) is not, without any explanation, forces the ODC to speculate as to the grounds upon which this court deemed a significant portion of the requested fees to be unreasonable. Those grounds, discussed supra in sections I.A. and I.B., provide the underlying support for the ultimate award of attorneys' fees in this case. Consistent with the general principle espoused in State v. Mata, 71 Haw. 319, 325, 789 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1990) (stating that [w]e cannot pass in these proceedings on whether or not the matters referred to [ODC] involved unprofessional conduct), the explanation provided in support of significant reduction in attorneys fees are not to be construed as a commentary or opinion as to whether the conduct of counsel or the fees charged in this case violated the HRPC and, therefore, requires discipline. Clearly, the duty to investigate and make a recommendation to this court regarding discipline, if any, lies solely with the ODC. Providing an explanation of the reasons underlying this court's substantial reduction of the requested fees that, in turn, also provides insight as to the basis for the ODC referral, is no different an approach than that taken by this court in prior cases. Whenever this court has made a referral to the ODC, it has provided some explanation for the referral, including citation to the HRPC, as well as a detailed description of the background of the case, often quoting from transcripts, pleadings, and exhibits contained in the record on appeal. Moreover, the explanations have also included the kinds of conclusions regarding counsel's conduct that the majority characterizes as problematic explanations. See majority op. at 226 n. 14, 131 P.3d at 509 n. 14. It is important to keep in mind that, in many instances, the explanations and conclusions  although providing insight for a referral to ODC  were discussed in the context of resolving the merits of the appeal itself. For example, in State v. Tafoya, 91 Hawai`i 261, 982 P.2d 890, (1999), we provided numerous excerpts of defendant's trial testimony, see id. at 264-66, 982 P.2d at 893-95, regarding his prior convictions and evidence of his membership in a youth gang or unconvicted arrests that were intentionally introduced to bolster the subjective reasonableness of defendant's self-defense argument. Id. at 267, 982 P.2d at 896. This court concluded that, [w]hile some information about [defendant's] upbringing may have been relevant to his subjective reaction to violence, a laundry list of prior violent acts, arrests, and prior convictions was plainly unwarranted and unjustifiable. Id. at 268, 982 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added). We noted that, [b]ecause trial counsel's action may warrant disciplinary action, we refer this case to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Accord Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai`i 225, 230, 909 P.2d 553, 558 (1995) (Where attorney's actions [did] not comport with the precepts embodied in the [Hawai`i Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC)], we are compelled to refer the supreme court record in this case, as we must pursuant to the Revised Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(D)(2) (1992), to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for its review and appropriate action. (Footnote omitted.)). See also HRPC Rule 1.1 (A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.). Id. at 268 n. 6, 982 P.2d at 897 n. 6. See also Lester v. Rapp, 85 Hawai`i 238, 242, 942 P.2d 502, 506 (1997) (quoting excerpts from court hearing and concluding that record clearly demonstrates that [defendant-attorney] misrepresented the facts to the court, as well as citing Hawai`i Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4); 7-102(A)(3), (5) and (7) (emphasis added)). In Lee v. Aiu, 85 Hawai`i 19, 936 P.2d 655 (1997), this court, in affirming the defendant-attorney's liability to plaintiff on the tortious interference with contractual relations claim, stated, it appears from the record in this case that [defendant-attorney] engaged in conduct that may not comport with the HRPC. Id. at 35, 936 P.2d at 671. In referring the matter to the ODC, we specifically cited HRPC Rule 1.2(a) (stating that a lawyer shall abide by client's decision whether to accept a settlement offer), HRPC Rules 1.8(a) and (j) (dealing with conflicts of interest such as entering into a business transaction with a client or acquiring a proprietary interest in a matter the lawyer is handling for the client), and HRPC 8.4 (regarding dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). The majority maintains that the approach it has taken in this case is no different than that taken in Lee v. Aiu, 85 Hawai`i 19, 35, 936 P.2d 655, 671 (1997). In Lee, we referred the record to ODC for its review without an explanation of specific misconduct, other than noting that counsel may have engaged in conduct that did not comport with the HRPC. Majority op. at 225, 131 P.3d at 508. The majority, however, overlooks the fact that this court, in Lee, provided a detailed description of the actions of the defendant-attorney in tortiously interfering with the contractual relations between the plaintiff and the co-defendant in that case, including the fact that, in opining that the defendant-attorney engaged in conduct that may not comport with the HRPC, id., this court cited to three possible HRPC violations, specifically citing HRPC Rules 1.2 (scope of representation), 1.8 (conflict of interest, prohibited transactions), and 8.4 (misconduct). [7] Thus, the lack-of-explanation-approach taken in this case by the majority is contrary to, not consistent with, the approach taken in Lee. In cases where the possible HRPC violations did not occur at the trial level, but on appeal, we have similarly provided the ODC with the requisite explanation to allow it to conduct a meaningful investigation. For example, in AIG Hawai`i Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 82 Hawai`i 453, 923 P.2d 395, as amended, (1996),  the third in a series of appeals  defense counsel were referred to ODC for continuing to prosecute the first appeal that had been rendered moot because the parties had settled ten days after filing the notice of appeal. Unaware that the case had settled, the court issued its decision, including a lengthy dissenting opinion, in the first appeal. The existence of the settlement was discovered a year later, when the defense appealed their unsuccessful motion to rescind the settlement agreement. Because the referral to the ODC was not based upon events that occurred at the trial level that would be demonstrated in transcripts, exhibits, pleadings, and the like, we met our responsibility to provide sufficient information, as required by Akinaka, by providing a detailed background and discussion of the case, including citations to the HRPC Rules 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions) and 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal). See also Bettencourt, 80 Hawai`i at 229, 909 P.2d at 557 (providing examples of counsel's running sarcastic commentary, carried on in footnotes throughout the opening brief, explaining that [t]his kind of incivility is demeaning to the legal profession and should not be tolerated,  (emphasis added) and citing HRPC preamble and Rule 1.1). Thus, consistent with the past practices of this court, the explanation in sections I.A. and I.B. of this concurrence similarly provides the grounds upon which this court based its substantial reduction of the requested fees, which, in turn, provides some insight as to the reasoning that prompted this court to refer this matter to the ODC for investigation.