Opinion ID: 74329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Drug Amount as an Element of the Offense

Text: The parties agree, as they must, that in order to obtain a conviction the Government must charge all of the elements of an offense, submit all the elements to a jury, and prove all of them beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jones v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1219 (1999). The parties also agree that the Government did not consider the number of marijuana plants an element of Appellant’s offense. Instead, while the Government clearly introduced evidence at trial regarding the number of plants involved, the district court determined the actual number of plants at sentencing. Appellant argues, based on Jones, that the number of plants constitutes an element of his offense which the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. While this Court has not yet had an opportunity to address Jones, we have clearly rejected the characterization of the amount of drugs as an element of the offense under 841. See United States v. Perez, 960 F.2d 1569, 1574-76 (11th Cir. 7 1992) (reaffirming that weight or quantity of a controlled substance does not constitute an element of the offense under § 841); United States v. Cross, 916 F.2d 622, 623 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that nature and quantity of controlled substance is a sentencing provision, not an element, applicable only after conviction under § 841(a)); United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that “nature and quantity of the controlled substance are relevant only to sentencing and do not constitute elements of a lesser included offense”). Accordingly, binding authority in this Circuit forecloses Appellant’s argument unless the Supreme Court decided otherwise in Jones. We now turn to that issue. In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court examined the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, to determine if it defined three distinct offenses or one offense with a choice of three maximum penalties. 119 S. Ct. at 1217. The Court concluded that the statute did not clearly resolve the question. It commented that two subsections provided for significantly higher penalties and relied on further facts such as injury and death “that seem quite as important as the elements in the principal paragraph.” Id. at 1219. The Court then observed that the statute was “unlike most offense-defining provisions in the federal criminal code, which genuinely stand on their own grammatical feet thanks to phrases such as ‘shall be unlawful’” and recommended examining other, similar statutes to 8 discern Congress’ intent. Id. at 1219-20. It noted that many statutes consider injury or death elements of an offense because the statutes use them to differentiate between types of offenses such as robbery and aggravated robbery. The Court then announced that while it believed the fairest reading of § 2119 would treat serous bodily harm as an element of the offense, it would resolve any doubt in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1222. In the next section of the opinion, the Court canvassed its past cases to remind courts of the principle that the Government must allege and prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot shift the burden of proof on an element to the defense. See id. at 1227-28. The Court noted that in its last Term it approved the use of recidivism as a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. See id. at 1226-27 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998)). The Court commented in a footnote that under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 119 S. Ct. at 1224 n.6. This language allows two plausible readings of Jones. First, footnote six means exactly what it says: any factor which can increase the maximum penalty for 9 an offense constitutes an element of that offense.3 Second, when a court finds a statute and its legislative history unclear,4 the court should err in favor of the defendant and consider an element of the offense any factor which increases the maximum penalty for the offense. The latter reading correctly reflects the Court’s opinion in Jones. If the Court meant to announce a rule that any factor which increases the maximum penalty counts as an element, then it would render irrelevant the detailed analysis of the statute and its legislative history discussed in the first part of the opinion. In other words, if any factor that increases the maximum penalty amounts to an element of the crime, the Court did not need to bother with determining whether or not Congress considered it an element. It seems that the Court proceeded with its analysis only because it first found Congress’ intent ambiguous. See id. at 1222. In addition, a broad rule would have sweeping implications for factors that 3 Appellant urges us to reach this result. Appellant also attempts to take a more moderate approach. He argues that we should certainly find that the amount of drugs constitutes an element of the offense when the amount leads to a dramatic increase in sentence even if we decide that weight is not an element when faced with trivial increases. 4 Assuming, of course, that courts keep in mind the separate limitation that Congress cannot shift the burden of proof on elements of the offense to defendants even if Congress clearly attempts to do so. 10 Congress has traditionally considered sentencing considerations, not elements of the crime.5 Other circuits have adopted the narrower reading of Jones. Three circuits reexamined whether the enhanced penalties based upon the type of firearm in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) constitute elements of the offense. See United States v. Eads, 191 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir.1999), petition for cert. filed, ___ S. Ct. ___ (U.S. Nov. 1, 1999) (No. 99-6907); United States v. Baldwin, 186 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___ (U.S. Nov. 29, 1999); United States v. Castillo, 179 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, ___ S. Ct. ___ (U.S. Oct. 15, 1999) (No. 99-658). The Tenth Circuit held that the enhancement did not constitute an element of the offense. It noted that the broad language in footnote six of Jones “seems to call this rationale into question” but decided that its ruling did not run afoul of Jones because of a “more reasonable reading of Jones, one that anchors its holding to its facts, i.e., the statutory provision involved.” 191 F.3d at 1213-14. The Fifth Circuit decided that, unlike Jones, the legislative history regarding § 924(c)(1) never indicated an intent to create a new offense based on the type of weapon and thus the enhancement amounted to only a sentencing factor. See 5 In fact, tradition played a central role in the Court’s decision to allow recidivism as a sentencing factor just one year earlier in Almendarez-Torres, and Jones explicitly refused to disturb that precedent. See id. at 1227. 11 Castillo, 179 F.3d at 328. The Second Circuit also took this approach. That court commented that Congress divided the statute into two sections—§ 922 “Unlawful acts” and § 924 “Penalties.” See Baldwin, 186 F.3d at 101. Similarly, Congress divided § 841 into several subsections. Subsection (a) lists “Unlawful acts” while subsection (b) enumerates “Penalties.” As we have announced in our previous cases, Congress decided that the elements of a § 841 offense do not include the weight of the drugs. This conclusion follows our latest case on the subject, United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 1999). Rutherford came after Jones, and, although it did not explicitly address the holding of Jones, it continued to rely on Williams and Cross for the proposition that the “nature of the controlled substance neither constitutes an element of the offense nor broadens the bases for conviction, but is relevant only for sentencing purposes.” 175 F.3d at 906.6