Opinion ID: 3066150
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Heading: Conspiracy to Commit Robbery

Text: We have not previously considered whether conspiracy to commit robbery is a violent felony.2 We have, however, 2 We recently held that a Nevada conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary is not an aggravated felony under the immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U). United States v. Garcia-Santana, ___ F.3d ___, No. 12-10471 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2014). Garcia-Santana does not govern this case because the INA’s aggravated UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER 9 determined that conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of the firearm sentencing enhancement in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).3 See United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993). In Mendez, we explained that a conspiracy “‘increases the chances that the planned crime will be committed”’ because a conspiracy “‘provides a focal point for collective criminal action.’” Id. at 1491 (quoting United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 404 (2d Cir. 1985)). Due to this heightened risk of harm, a “conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is a ‘crime of violence’ under the substantial risk definition of § 924(c)(3)(B) or its equivalent.”4 Id. at 1492. In other words, “conspiracy to rob felony definition substantially differs from the ACCA’s definition of a “violent felony.” See Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2300–01 (2009). Unlike the ACCA, the INA defines “aggravated felony” to specifically include a “conspiracy to commit” one of its listed offenses, among which is “burglary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U). In GarciaSantana, therefore, the question presented was whether “conspiracy”—as used in the INA—requires proof of an overt act; we held that it does. See Garcia-Santana, slip op. at 3. Here, by contrast, we must decide whether a Nevada conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery, even though it does not require an overt act, nonetheless “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(B)(ii). 3 The firearm sentencing enhancement provision provides that “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence . . .be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 4 The provision referenced in Mendez—18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)— defines crime of violence for the purposes of the firearm sentencing enhancement provision that was at issue in that case. It states that “the term ‘crime of violence’ means an offense that is a felony and . . . by its 10 UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER in violation of [the Hobbs Act] ‘by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used in the course of committing the offense,’” and is thus a crime of violence. Mendez, 992 F.2d at 1491 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)). Cognizant of this binding precedent,5 we consider whether conspiracy to commit robbery under Nevada law is a “violent felony” as that term is defined in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The first question under Park is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of conspiracy to commit robbery under Nevada law ordinarily “present[] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Park, 649 F.3d at 1177–78 (quoting James, 550 U.S. at 208) (brackets in the original). Because Mendez established that conspiracy to commit robbery “categorically creates a substantial risk that physical force may be used,” Mendez, 992 F.2d at 1492, we must answer in the affirmative. nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). 5 As Judge Bybee points out, the circuits are split over whether conspiracy to commit a violent felony is itself a violent felony. See Concurrence at 28–29 (Bybee, J., concurring). Given that split, we recognize that Mendez may not survive the Supreme Court’s quartet of ACCA cases. But, at the least, Mendez is not “clearly irreconcilable” with the Supreme Court’s precedent, so we are bound to apply Mendez until it is expressly overruled by an en banc panel of this court. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER 11 Admittedly, Mendez differs from this case in two respects. First, Mendez involved conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, whereas here, Chandler was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 199.480, 200.380. The Hobbs Act penalizes “[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays or affects commerce . . . by robbery . . . or conspires so to do.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Act then defines robbery as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). And conspiracy under federal law occurs “[i]f two or more persons conspire [ ] to commit any offense against the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 371; see also United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 692 (1975) (“[T]he essence of conspiracy is agreement.”). Nevada also defines conspiracy as “an agreement between two or more persons for an unlawful purpose.” Nunnery v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 186 P.3d 886, 888 (Nev. 2008) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.480(1). And, under Nevada law, robbery is “the unlawful taking of personal property from the person of another, or in the person’s presence, against his or her will, by means of force or violence or fear of injury.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.380(1). Thus, federal law and Nevada law both effectively define conspiracy to commit robbery as an agreement between two or more persons to unlawfully take property from another person against his or her will. Because federal law is substantially similar to Nevada law, the first distinction between Mendez and this case is insignificant. 12 UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER Second, Mendez differs from this case because it involved 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which subjects individuals who use a firearm in the course of a “crime of violence” to an additional five years’ imprisonment. The statute defines a crime of violence as any offense “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). By contrast, Chandler appeals a sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which subjects individuals who have three previous convictions for “violent felonies” to a minimum of fifteen-years imprisonment. A violent felony is an offense that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. Both statutes are similar because they apply to crimes that involve a serious or substantial risk that physical force will occur during the course of the offense. The major difference between these two statutes is that the ACCA only applies to seriously dangerous crimes that are similar to the enumerated offenses, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) applies to all substantially dangerous offenses. In light of this difference, Mendez is not helpful when analyzing the second prong of the Park framework. Nevertheless, because Mendez uses the substantial risk of injury test, which is similar to the serious risk of injury test that we consider here, it still applies to our analysis of the first prong.6 6 Indeed, “substantial” is defined as important, essential, “not seeming or imaginary.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (2002). Similarly, “serious” is defined as “[g]rave in disposition, appearance, or manner: not light.” Id. UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER 13 Accordingly, despite the differences between Mendez and this case, we are bound by Mendez to conclude that “conspiracy to rob . . . ‘by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used in the course of committing the offense.’” Mendez, 992 F.2d at 1491 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)); see also United States v. Gore, 636 F.3d 728, 738 (5th Cir. 2011) (“An agreement to commit aggravated robbery presents a serious potential risk of injury.”); United States v. Turner, 501 F.3d 59, 67 (1st Cir. 2007). 2. Risk of injury roughly similar to the enumerated offenses in the ACCA Because we previously determined that robbery in Nevada involves a serious risk of physical force, we must now answer the more difficult question: whether conspiracy to commit robbery in Nevada is “‘roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed’ to those offenses enumerated at the beginning of the residual clause.” Spencer, 724 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Park, 649 F.3d at 1178). Under Mendez, a conspiracy to commit a violent crime creates the same risk of harm as the violent crime itself. 992 F.2d at 1492. So, if robbery in Nevada is “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed” to burglary, arson, or extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), then conspiracy to commit robbery is also comparable to the enumerated offenses. Here, robbery as defined by Nevada is most similar to extortion and burglary. 14 UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER The Supreme Court has defined extortion as “obtaining something of value from another with his consent[7] induced by the wrongful use of force, fear, or threats.” Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We previously determined that a Nevada state conviction for robbery is a crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because “Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.380 . . . satisf[ies] the generic definition of extortion.” See United States v. Harris, 572 F.3d 1065, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). The real danger of burglary, like robbery, is “the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation” with the victim or an intervener. James, 550 U.S. at 203. Indeed, robbery, like burglary, “is dangerous because it can end in confrontation leading to violence.” Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2273. In fact, the risk posed by robbery may actually be greater than the risk posed by burglary because robbery requires a taking from a person, against his or her will, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, whereas burglary may be completed without any human interaction. See United States v. Davis, 487 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2007) (“To commit robbery, an individual must interact with the victim in order to cause bodily injury or place the victim in fear of it.”). 7 Nevada’s definition of robbery differs from extortion because the taking of property there must be “against the will” of the victim. But as Professor LaFave has explained, this difference is not significant because “both crimes equally require that the defendant’s threats induce the victim to give up his property, something which he would not otherwise have done.” 3 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 20.4(b) (2d ed. 2003). UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER 15 Accordingly, we conclude that robbery poses risks similar to extortion and burglary. As such, conspiracy to commit robbery in Nevada is also similar, in kind and degree of risk posed, to extortion and burglary. See Gore, 636 F.3d at 741 (“We are satisfied that conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, in the ordinary case, presents a serious risk of injury similar in kind and degree to the enumerated offenses.”). 3. Conclusion A Nevada conviction for robbery is a violent felony because it creates a serious risk of harm that is comparable to the risk posed by burglary. And because after Mendez, “the § 924(e) analysis of a prior conspiracy conviction is governed by the substantive offense that was the object of the conspiracy,” United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2009), conspiracy to commit robbery, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 199.480, 200.380, is also a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. See also United States v. White, 571 F.3d 365, 370, 372 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he essential conduct underlying the Conspiracy Offense is categorically violent . . . [and] [t]he Conspiracy Offense cannot be divorced from its violent objective—robbery with a deadly weapon.”).