Opinion ID: 2570814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Imminent Questioning/Equivocal Assertion

Text: This approach is similar to that followed by the trial court in this case and in past decisions of this court where the context of a statement regarding an attorney has been analyzed to view whether an objective law enforcement officer would understand there had been an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights. For example, in State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 201 P.3d 673 (2009), when considering facts very similar to those in Aubuchont, 147 N.H. 142, 784 A.2d 1170  the case cited by the trial court  this court recently held a defendant did not assert his Fifth Amendment rights when he yelled to his companions while being arrested that they should call a lawyer. Although we did not consider the question of whether interrogation must be imminent, we did conclude the factual context revealed the defendant was directing his comments toward his companions, not police, and was not clearly and unambiguously asserting his right to counsel. Gant, 288 Kan. at 81, 201 P.3d 673; see Walker, 276 Kan. at 945, 80 P.3d 1132; Morris, 255 Kan. at 976-81, 880 P.2d 1244. Now, we explicitly recognize what was implicit in many of our prior decisions: The timing as well as the content and context of a reference to counsel may help determine whether there has been an unambiguous assertion of the right to have the assistance of an attorney in dealing with a custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers. This is the approach adopted by the trial court. In reaching the conclusion that the context in this case created ambiguity, the trial court made several findings that are supported by substantial competent evidence. Specifically, the trial court found that Appleby was aware he was being arrested by Connecticut authorities and was being charged for crimes committed in Connecticut. Further, Appleby had not been subjected to interrogation at that point in time about anything, in either the Connecticut or the Kansas case, and no one had indicated to him that his arrest was in any way connected the murder of A.K. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (recognizing `routine booking question' exception which exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the `biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.' Moreover, Detective Jewiss had informed Appleby that he would not be questioning him and that someone else would be talking to him about the case. At that point in time, Appleby only knew of the Connecticut case. Hence, when Appleby asked whether he would have a chance to talk to an attorney, he knew he was not going to be questioned by Detective Jewiss. At that point in time, interrogation was clearly not imminent or impending. It was not until minutes before the custodial interrogation with the Kansas detectives that Appleby was asked by Detective Jewiss if he would talk to some people about an unrelated matter. The trial court concluded that at that time: Appleby undoubtedly believed that matter to be the [A.K.] murder investigation. Yet Appleby agreed without hesitation to speak to the detectives. Then Appleby was given his Miranda rights, which he clearly waived. He never asked about an attorney again. Thus, when questioning was imminent  when Appleby was approached for interrogation  he clearly waived his right to counsel. We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court that Appleby's references to an attorney during the book-in process on the Connecticut charges did not constitute a clear and unambiguous assertion of his Fifth Amendment right as protected by Miranda. The trial court did not err in denying Appleby's motion to suppress his custodial statements made to the Kansas detectives.