Opinion ID: 406593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of the Individual Police Officers

Text: 12
13 Appellant maintains that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Detectives Carrig and Greene, the two police officers involved in the May 25, 1978 incident, on the ground that appellant failed to present any evidence of a physical assault and battery. Certain language in the District Court's written opinions does, at first blush, support appellant's contention. Specifically, the District Court stated in its April 30, 1980 and January 29, 1981 opinions that verbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a cause of action under section 1983, 13 citing, inter alia, Johnson v. Glick for the proposition that liability under that statute depends upon a showing of physical assault and battery. See R.E. 18-19, 29. Although we agree with appellant's contention that the District Court misinterpreted Johnson v. Glick, see Part II.B. infra, we do not believe that its decision rested on that misinterpretation. On the contrary, reading the court's opinions in their entirety, it is clear that the District Court decision is based upon appellant's failure to produce evidence of any conceivable violation. 14 The court granted summary judgment to Detective Carrig because appellant failed to produce any evidence to contradict the affidavit in which Carrig denied that any assault and battery, verbal abuse, or entry without permission occurred during the May 25, 1978 interview. In its April 30, 1980 memorandum opinion, the court expressly stated that appellant's failure to present any evidence to the contrary of Carrig's sworn denials leads this court to grant the motion (for summary judgment) as to the May 25 interview. R.E. 19. Similarly, the District Court's January 29, 1981 opinion makes it clear that the court granted summary judgment to District of Columbia Detective Greene regarding the May 25, 1978 incident because of appellant's total failure to raise any specific factual issues, and the fact that the undisputed facts do not support (appellant's) claim of constitutional violation .... R.E. 29. Thus, we conclude that the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment to the officers was not based on an erroneous construction of the requirements for establishing a constitutional claim under section 1983. 15 We also uphold the District Court's conclusion that appellant failed to raise any issues of fact material to his claims that the police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights during the May 25, 1978 interview. Under Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., when a party has properly pleaded and supported a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading .... Local Rule 1-9(h) of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia further requires a party opposing summary judgment to file a concise 'statement of genuine issues' setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated, and shall include therein references to the parts of the record relied on to support such statement. 14 Appellant clearly did not comply with these rules. 15 In opposing the motion for summary judgment filed by the Arlington County police officers, appellant generally argued that disputed factual issues remained but did not specifically controvert any of the denials in Detective Carrig's affidavit. Nor did he cite any record evidence, relying instead on the complaint itself. See Record, Entry No. 58. In opposing the motion for summary judgment filed by the District of Columbia defendants, appellant did submit a statement of genuine factual issues. In that statement, however, he did not set forth specific, material facts, but simply asserted, without citing evidence in the record, that there was a disputed issue as to the nature and extent of Defendant Greene's involvement in the May 25, 1978, incident and whether such conduct amounted to an assault or battery. Record, Entry No. 93. 16 Given this record, we hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that appellant failed to raise any specific factual issues concerning the May 25, 1978 incident or in granting summary judgment to appellees Carrig and Greene for that reason. 17 16
17 The District Court granted summary judgment to Montgomery County police officer Booth and District of Columbia Detective Greene as to the claims concerning the June 9, 1978 search because it found, based essentially on Booth's affidavit, that the officers had reasonably executed the search warrant. 18 Appellant argues, as he did with respect to the District Court's rulings concerning the May 25, 1978 incident, that this decision was based upon the mistaken view that Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973), requires proof of physical assault and battery to establish a claim under section 1983. We must agree. A close examination of the language of the District Court's January 29, 1981 decision indicates that the court applied this erroneous legal standard in granting summary judgment. In holding that appellant raised no factual issue as to whether Booth had reasonably executed the search warrant, the court stated: 18 Ordinarily, reasonableness of conduct is a question of fact, for the jury. However, the essential facts (i.e., what transpired during the search) are not in dispute. Based on those undisputed facts, even as set out in plaintiff's own deposition, the court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of producing some evidence to support this claim and hence has failed to make out a jury question. This follows from Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), which stands for the proposition that a section 1983 claim requires actual physical assault and battery. There is no such evidence in this case. 19 R.E. 26-27 (emphasis added). 19 This language makes it clear that the District Court viewed evidence of assault and battery as a prerequisite to establishing a claim that the search warrant was unreasonably executed. 20 20 Contrary to the District Court's reading, Johnson v. Glick does not stand for the general proposition that physical assault and battery is an essential element of any constitutional claim under section 1983. The opinion in Johnson, which involved a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim under section 1983 against the prison warden and a correction officer, does make it clear that section 1983 is not coterminous with the common law of tort. Acts that may constitute a common law assault or battery are not necessarily constitutional violations actionable under section 1983. 481 F.2d at 1033. Johnson does not suggest, however, that evidence of assault and battery is a requisite of every constitutional claim under section 1983. It requires no citation of authority to state with certainty that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights can be violated without an assault or battery. If this were not so, a warrantless search wholly unsupported by probable cause would not transgress the Fourth Amendment provided there was no physical interference with an individual. 21 Nor does a claim that police violated the Fourth Amendment in executing a valid search warrant depend on a showing of assault and battery. The conduct of police officers in executing a search warrant is always subject to judicial review as to its reasonableness, Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1694, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979), and officers may be held liable under section 1983 for executing a warrant in an unreasonable manner. Duncan v. Barnes, 592 F.2d 1336, 1338 (5th Cir. 1979). 21 Whether a search is unreasonable by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), must be determined by the particular facts of the case, including the scope of the search authorized by the warrant. It is a longstanding requirement( ) that the officers remain on the premises only so long as is reasonably necessary to conduct the search and that they avoid unnecessary damage to the premises .... 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.10, at 161 (1978). See also Clifton v. Robinson, 500 F.Supp. 30, 35 (E.D.Pa.1980) (even prisoners, whose prison cells can be searched without probable cause, may be able to establish a Fourth Amendment violation by showing that their personal property was unnecessarily damaged or destroyed during a search or that their cells were subjected to purposeful and unnecessary disruption); Brown v. Hilton, 492 F.Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.J.1980). This is not to suggest that destruction of property necessarily violates the Fourth Amendment. We recognize that officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1694, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979). The touchstone, however, is reasonableness; destruction of property that is not reasonably necessary to effectively execute a search warrant may violate the Fourth Amendment. 22 The District Court's decision to grant summary judgment to Detectives Booth and Greene was based not on appellant's failure to present any evidence to show that the June 9 search transgressed these general standards of reasonableness, but on appellant's failure to present evidence of physical assault and battery. Because the District Court used an erroneous legal standard, we reverse its grant of summary judgment to appellees Booth and Greene with respect to appellant's claims concerning the June 9, 1978 search. On remand, if Booth and Greene renew their motions for summary judgment, the District Court should determine whether there are any genuine factual issues concerning the reasonableness of their execution of the search warrant on June 9, 1978. The court should bear in mind appellant's obligation, assuming that appellees' motions are properly filed and supported, to identify those issues and to point to supporting evidence in the record. 22 23