Opinion ID: 793355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Common to Both the Age and the Disability Discrimination Claims

Text: 37
38 We have noted that [i]nstructions ... explain[ing] the subtleties of the McDonnell Douglas framework are generally inappropriate when jurors are being asked to determine whether intentional discrimination has occurred. Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., 191 F.3d 344, 347 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1999). Sometimes, elements of the framework may be given as part of the instructions, but judges should present them in a manner that is free of legalistic jargon. Id. 39 The New Jersey courts agree, and have held, that the McDonnell Douglas test should not generally be laid out because the prima facie case and the shifting burdens confuse lawyers and judges, much less juries, who do not have the benefit of extensive study of the law on the subject. Mogull v. Commercial Real Estate, 162 N.J. 449, 744 A.2d 1186, 1199 (2000). New Jersey's Supreme Court recently approved Model Jury Charges that remove from the jury's consideration the issues of whether the plaintiff and the defendant have met the first and second stages, respectively, of the McDonnell Douglas test, supporting instead their consideration by motion for judgment at the end of the plaintiff's case. New Jersey Model Jury Charges, Introductory Note to the Court, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/charges/civil/221.htm. 40 Even though a district court should not generally include language on the burden shifting analysis or require a jury to decide whether a prima facie case has been established, these, by themselves, are insufficient to vacate a judgment. In Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, we concluded that harmless error in parts of a jury charge that do not prejudice the complaining party are not grounds to order a new trial. 207 F.3d 207, 221-22 (3d Cir.2000). In Armstrong's case, the District Court did use legal jargon to describe the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, required the jury to consider whether Armstrong established a prima facie case of age or disability discrimination, and instructed that the jury had to determine whether the Hospital's suggested reason for its actions was not a pretext. 16 Nonetheless, we believe each instruction contained an explanation that a reasonable juror could likely understand. As a result, though the District Court should not have instructed the jury on the entire McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis and should have avoided sporadic use of legalese, these were harmless errors. 41
42 Armstrong claims that the District Court erred by failing to instruct the jury that establishing his prima facie case gives rise to an inference or rebuttable presumption of discrimination. An instruction should have appeared, he asserts, that stated that the establishment of a prima facie case may give rise to an inference of discrimination if the jury disbelieves the employer's explanation for its discharge decision. Smith v. Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir.1998). However, the exclusion of the instruction was harmless because the jurors never reached the point where they would have been permitted to infer discrimination for either of Armstrong's discrimination claims because: (1) as to Armstrong's age discrimination claim, the jury believed the Defendants' explanation for the discharge decision; and (2) as to Armstrong's disability discrimination claim, the jury found that Armstrong did not establish his prima facie case. 43
44 Armstrong argues that the use of language in the interrogatories such as pretext, and requiring the jurors to answer interrogatories related to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and whether a legitimate reason for discharge was proven, confused them. Although the word pretext was used in two interrogatories, 17 the corresponding instructions, as noted, contained an explanation that a reasonable juror could likely understand. Further, Armstrong's claim is incorrect that the jury should not have been asked to decide whether the Defendants' legitimate business reason was pretext. There existed genuine factual disputes in this regard, and the Judge appropriately presented this question for the jury. 45 Armstrong also argues that the focus on his discharge in the interrogatories, as the adverse employment action at issue, was improper because his claims focused not on the discharge occurring a year after he had gone out on disability, but on the events that he alleges forced him to leave the Hospital's employ. However, Armstrong offers no evidence to suggest that the jury was confused about the use of the term discharge. The entire case revolved around the events leading up to Armstrong's leaving work, and there is no reason to believe that the jury considered the subsequent discharge to be a separate event. 46