Opinion ID: 3032094
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Witness Interviews: The Functional Analysis

Text: The claim against Longanbach and O’Brien that survived summary judgment is that “prior to the preliminary hearing and during the initial investigation of the incident . . . [they] met with Ms. Flanders and told her that in order to secure a conviction she needed to lie about what she saw on the night of the incident and about Mr. Harless’ violent past.” Like the 6478 GENZLER v. LONGANBACH district court, we understand this claim to state that as part of the initial investigation Longanbach and O’Brien coerced or encouraged Flanders to lie. [4] Witness interviews may serve either an investigative or an advocacy-related function, as may other methods of gathering or manufacturing evidence prior to trial. See KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1110-16 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that pre-trial evidence gathering intimately associated with the judicial process was protected by absolute immunity, while evidence gathering for a collateral investigation was not). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Genzler, we must decide whether Longanbach and O’Brien were engaged in an advocacy-related function “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” when they met with Flanders, or whether they were engaged in police-type investigative work. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430; see also Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1009; Broam, 320 F.3d at 1029. If the former, they are absolutely immune. If the latter, they are entitled only to qualified immunity. [5] If not done in a quasi-judicial capacity, the acquisition or manufacturing of evidence is not protected by absolute immunity. Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011 (“acquiring known false statements from a witness for use in a prosecution is . . . fabricating evidence that is unprotected by absolute immunity”). In Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the D.C. Circuit held that a prosecutor had not met his burden to show that he was entitled to absolute immunity for acts of intimidating and coercing witnesses into changing their testimony before a grand jury. The court held that such activity constitutes a misuse of investigative techniques legitimately directed at exploring whether witness testimony is truthful and complete and whether the government has acquired all incriminating evidence. It therefore GENZLER v. LONGANBACH 6479 relates to a typical police function, the collection of information to be used in a prosecution. Id. at 194 (citing Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1987)). [6] Prosecutors are, however, absolutely immune “for gathering additional evidence after probable cause is established or criminal proceedings have begun when they are performing a quasi-judicial function.” Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030 (emphasis added). As the Court in Buckley explained, [t]here is a difference between the advocate’s role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the detec- tive’s role in searching for clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand. When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a police officer, it is neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, [absolute] immunity should protect the one and not the other. 509 U.S. at 273. A prosecutor gathering evidence is more likely to be performing a quasi-judicial advocacy function when the prosecutor is “organiz[ing], evaluati[ng], and marshaling [that] evidence” in preparation for a pending trial, in contrast to the police-like activity of “acquiring evidence which might be used in a prosecution.” Barbera, 836 F.2d at 100. [7] The timing of evidence gathering is a relevant fact in determining how closely connected that conduct is to the official’s core advocacy function in the judicial process, and thus informs the inquiry into whether the official’s conduct is protected by absolute immunity. The Supreme Court has held that when a witness is being coached at or during a break in 6480 GENZLER v. LONGANBACH trial, the prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity even if he or she is instructing the witness to lie. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 431 n.33; cf. Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that prosecutors were absolutely immune for interviewing new witnesses during investigative grand jury proceedings, when the majority of other witnesses had been interviewed prior to the initiation of proceedings). Longanbach and O’Brien rely on the timing of their meetings with Flanders to argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity. They point out that their meetings with Flanders occurred after Genzler’s April 19 arrest, which Genzler concedes was based on probable cause. However, as we noted above, in Buckley, the Court was careful to state that “a determination of probable cause does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for all actions taken afterwards. Even after that determination . . . a prosecutor may engage in ‘police investigative work’ that is entitled to only qualified immunity.” Id. at 274 n.5. While interviews conducted before probable cause to arrest has been established are not protected by absolute immunity, the converse is not necessarily true. As the district court correctly observed, the courts have only “draw[n] the line in the reverse, stating that absolute immunity could not be invoked before probable cause was established.” Indeed, in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1969), we held that prosecutors who, soon after the arrest of a suspect, directed police to coerce a confession from that suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because their activity was more police-like than prosecutorial. Timing is thus a relevant, but not necessarily determinative, factor. See KRL, 384 F.3d at 1111 (citing Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 636 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1466 (3rd Cir. 1992). We also focus on whether the character of the meetings was more in the nature of quasi-judicial advocacy or police-type investigative work. GENZLER v. LONGANBACH 6481 Because Deputy District Attorney Longanbach and Investigator O’Brien were engaged in slightly different functions, we analyze separately their entitlements to absolute immunity. As all parties acknowledge, it is appropriate to focus on the functions performed by Longanbach and O’Brien, not on their titles. 2. O’Brien’s Meeting with Flanders Before April 29 [8] Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Genzler, we conclude that O’Brien was engaged in police-type investigative work, not quasi-judicial advocacy, when he met with Flanders prior to Genzler’s bail hearing on April 29, 1996. O’Brien’s report indicates that he met with Flanders “several days prior” to April 29. In her testimony during the hearing on Genzler’s 2000 motion to dismiss, Flanders estimated that this meeting took place about a week before the April 29 joint meeting with Longanbach and O’Brien. She remembered that she and O’Brien had talked for about an hour, “primarily . . . as to the identity of the person who stabbed [Harless].” Police investigations were still ongoing. At this time, the preliminary hearing at which the judge would decide whether there was probable cause to hold Genzler for trial in superior court was still over a month away. Moreover, it is a supportable conclusion from the evidence that O’Brien’s meeting with Flanders took place before the criminal complaint was filed in municipal court on April 23, 1996, and before police finished their investigation and written synthesis, which is dated April 24, 1996. See Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1465 (noting that filing of a criminal complaint is a relevant but not dispositive factor in determining whether an interview involves investigation or advocacy). [9] The written police synthesis leaves out the initial statement by Flanders to police that Harless was on top of Genzler at one point during the fight. It emphasizes Davis’s point of view, but it does not include Davis’s story that Flanders and 6482 GENZLER v. LONGANBACH Harless were walking hand-in-hand. If all factual inferences are resolved in favor of Genzler, one could conclude that O’Brien used this interview to change Flanders’s story about what she remembered and to make her story more consistent with Davis’s story. Further, the record reflects that during this period, O’Brien was engaged in other work that can only be characterized as police-type investigation. For example, he and Longanbach interviewed Scott Davis on April 25, 1996. The notes from the conversation reflect only a narrative from Davis’s point of view about the events of the stabbing. O’Brien joined police Detective Warrick in a meeting on June 3, 1996 with Sherry Logel, Genzler’s ex-girlfriend, discussing her story about giving Genzler’s knife to Blank, and Genzler’s character in general. This conversation, too, was police-type investigative work, as indicated by the nature of the information obtained and by the presence of Detective Warrick. On June 5, 1996, O’Brien interviewed Paul Ernst, another witness to the homicide, about what he had seen. Similarly, on June 28, 1996, O’Brien met again with John Belsan, who came forward with evidence about a past fight with Genzler. Again, O’Brien’s notes from this conversation reflect only Belsan’s narrative about what happened in that confrontation. That O’Brien was engaged in police-type investigative work during the time he met with Flanders supports an inference that he was also engaged in such work when he met with her. [10] We conclude from the foregoing that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that, during his first meeting with Flanders, O’Brien was, like the prosecutor in Moore, engaged in the process of acquiring or manufacturing evidence during performance of police-type investigative work, rather than engaged in quasi-judicial advocacy. At this stage of the proceedings, O’Brien is therefore unprotected by absolute immunity. [11] Absolute immunity does not protect Longanbach if he was directing this police-type investigative activity by GENZLER v. LONGANBACH 6483 O’Brien. See Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 556 (6th Cir. 1986) (“a prosecutor who assists, directs, or otherwise participates . . . in obtaining evidence prior to an indictment undoubtedly is functioning more in his investigative capacity than in his quasi-judicial capacities of deciding which suits to bring and conducting them in court”) (citation and internal quotation omitted); Robichaud, 351 F.2d at 537 (holding that prosecutors are not absolutely immune if they either “committed acts, or authoritatively directed the commission of acts, which ordinarily are related to police activity as opposed to judicial activity”); cf. Burns, 500 U.S. at 496 (prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity for act of giving legal advice to police). Longanbach cannot, however, be liable for O’Brien’s conduct on a theory of vicarious liability for any independent actions taken by O’Brien. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of NY, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (respondeat superior not available as theory of liability under § 1983). [12] There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Longanbach was actively directing O’Brien throughout his work on the Genzler case, including O’Brien’s first meeting with Flanders. For example, Flanders testified that Longanbach would give her instructions that O’Brien would then “reiterate.” Genzler also introduced a declaration from another Deputy District Attorney stating that “Jeff O’Brien does whatever Mr. Longanbach told him to do.” Because the evidence could support a conclusion that Longanbach was actively directing police-type investigative actions by O’Brien, Longanbach is also not entitled to summary judgment that he is absolutely immune for any action taken with respect to O’Brien’s meeting with Flanders before April 29. 3. Longanbach and O’Brien’s April 29 Meeting with Flanders The next question is whether Longanbach and O’Brien were engaged in police-type investigative work or quasi6484 GENZLER v. LONGANBACH judicial advocacy in their joint April 29 meeting with Flanders. We consider first the timing of the conversation. The criminal complaint had been filed by the time of Longanbach and O’Brien’s April 29 meeting with Flanders. However, just as the existence of probable cause to arrest is not conclusive, we do not view the filing of the complaint as an event after which, by definition, all actions by the prosecutor and his staff are protected by absolute immunity. The timing of the April 29 meeting does not weigh as much in favor of absolute immunity as did the timing of the search carried out pursuant to a warrant in KRL, 384 F.3d at 1111-13. In KRL, we held that a prosecutor and his investigator were entitled to absolute immunity for seeking a search warrant and carrying out a search pursuant to that warrant more than three weeks after the grand jury returned an indictment indicating that it had found sufficient evidence for the defendant to stand trial. Id. When Longanbach and O’Brien met with Flanders, the preliminary hearing at which the court would determine whether there was probable cause for Genzler to stand trial was still more than three weeks away. On April 29, officials were continuing the process of investigation into the facts that would inform whether there was such probable cause, and the precise charges on which Genzler would stand trial had yet to be determined. [13] We next consider the nature of the interview with Flanders. The Supreme Court has stated that acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the court of his [or her] role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity. Those acts must include the professional evaluation of evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentaGENZLER v. LONGANBACH 6485 tion at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been made. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added); see also Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030. In KRL, we held that “to the extent that the second search warrant sought evidence to prosecute the crimes charged in the indictment,” the prosecutors’ authorization of that warrant and an investigator’s subsequent search were protected by absolute immunity. 384 F.3d at 1112, 1118. We held that the prosecutors and the investigator were acting as advocates to the extent they were reviewing, evaluating, and ensuring the admissibility of evidence in preparation for an already pending trial. Id. [14] There is some evidence in the record that Longanbach and O’Brien were reviewing and evaluating evidence at the April 29 meeting in preparation for the preliminary hearing and trial testimony, including some testimony by Flanders describing the meeting at some of the later proceedings in Genzler’s case. However, when we resolve all ambiguity in favor of Genzler and view the evidence in the context of other evidence about ongoing investigations, we conclude that evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Longanbach and O’Brien were engaged in police-type investigative work during the meeting. The only notes in the record from the meeting were taken by O’Brien. They are captioned, “Witness Interview.” These interview notes, like notes taken of other interviews by O’Brien, record only a narrative of what Flanders reportedly said at the meeting about the events of April 17 and April 18. The notes state that “FLANDERS had told me during a conversation that took place at her residence several days earlier that she had a clearer picture in her mind of the events surrounding HARLESS’ death. She felt that she could relate them in a more organized fashion than she may have done earlier in the investigation.” Specifically, the notes state that Flanders was “distracted” by the arrival of Scott Davis, which 6486 GENZLER v. LONGANBACH is inconsistent with the initial statement Flanders made to police. The notes thus reflect that Longanbach and O’Brien were in the process of gathering information from Flanders during the meeting and possibly encouraged her to lie as part of their process. The Fifth Circuit decision in Cousin, relied on heavily by Longanbach and O’Brien, is therefore inapposite. In Cousin, the Fifth Circuit held that a declaration by a witness who was allegedly coerced and intimidated into lying “eliminate[d]” any “ambiguity” about whether the prosecutor was engaged in an investigatory or quasi-judicial function when he interviewed that witness. 325 F.3d at 633. The declaration clearly showed that when the prosecutor met with the witness, “he did so to tell [the witness] how he should testify.” Id. Here, by contrast, the interview notes show a process of police-type investigation — or, viewed in the light most favorable to Genzler, a process of manufacturing evidence while performing an police-type investigative work — not Longanbach or O’Brien acting as advocates by actively preparing Flanders for her testimony in court. See Moore, 65 F.3d at 194. [15] We therefore agree with the district court that Longanbach and O’Brien are not entitled to summary judgment that they are absolutely immune for their actions during the April 29 meeting with Flanders. 4. Summary [16] A prosecuting attorney may perform many roles, or functions. See Robichaud, 351 F.2d at 537 (citing Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Police Practices and the Law—From Arrest to Charge, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 11, 16-24 (1962)). Not all of these roles are protected by absolute immunity. See Robichaud, 351 F.2d at 537 (“The distinction between the roles may be significantly controlling.”). We recognize that the two meetings with Flanders described here were to some degree related to trial preparation, even when viewed in the light most favorGENZLER v. LONGANBACH 6487 able to Genzler. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that “[a]lmost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity was that expansive.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 495-96. We therefore remain focused on the question whether the prosecutor’s actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 487 (emphasis added) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430) . We do not read the record here, resolving all ambiguity in favor of Genzler, to indicate such a close association between Longanbach and O’Brien’s actions in their witness interviews with Flanders, on the one hand, and the judicial phase of Genzler’s criminal trial, on the other, to entitle them to summary judgment that they are absolutely immune for those actions. We therefore affirm the district court’s partial denial of summary judgment to Longanbach and O’Brien.