Opinion ID: 2566260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: remedy for failure to pay

Text: ¶ 14 A remedy for failure to pay is found in 85 O.S.2001, § 42. [2] The Legislature has included a remedy within the Workers' Compensation Act for post-judgment acts, such as when a failure to pay occurs after an award has been ordered. Title 85 O.S.2001, § 42, provides that the certified copy of the Workers' Compensation award shall have the same force and be subject to the same law as judgments of the district court. Accordingly, whatever law applies to the district courts for collection of judgments also applies to the collection of awards originating from the Workers' Compensation courts. When a copy of the certification order is filed in the offices of any court clerk and county clerk, and is entered on the judgment docket, the certified unpaid award acquires by force of statute the efficacy of a district court judgment, transforming an unpaid award in default into an enforceable district court adjudication by clothing the obligor's compensation liability with the attributes of a district court judgment. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Welch, 1988 OK 121 ¶ 9, 764 P.2d 191, 195. When filed in the district court, the certification affords a legal vehicle for enforcement proceedings to be conducted in that forum. Lee Way Motor Freight, 1988 OK 121 ¶ 10, 764 P.2d at 195. ¶ 15 That award bears interest at the rate of eighteen percent per year from the date it was ordered paid by the Workers' Compensation Court until the date of satisfaction. Upon the filing of a certified copy of the award, a writ of execution issues, process is executed and costs taxed, as in the case of writs of execution on judgments of courts of record. All remedies available to judgment creditors are available to the injured employee. Bishop v. Wilson Quality Homes, 1999 OK 60, ¶ 6, 986 P.2d 512, 514. ¶ 16 In the Plaintiff's Response Brief, DeAnda complains that the remedy is inadequate to compensate an employee when an insurer fails to pay the ordered award, or fails to pay timely. DeAnda asserts that the insurance industry routinely ignores orders of the Workers' Compensation Court, knowing that nothing will happen as a result of their non-compliance. To support this generalization DeAnda cites Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 1992 OK 34, 828 P.2d 431. If Goodwin is the evidence of general noncompliance with the remedy provided in the statutes, it must fail. ¶ 17 Goodwin assumed, for the purpose of deciding the issue before the Court, that a workers' compensation insurance company could be liable in tort for a bad faith refusal to pay an employee's workers' compensation award. Goodwin, 1992 OK 34, ¶ 1, 828 P.2d at 431-432. The Court held that the facts in the case did not support an action for bad faith. Goodwin, 1992 OK 34, ¶ 1, 828 P.2d at 431-432. There is no support in the record for the allegation that workers' compensation insurance companies routinely ignore court ordered relief. ¶ 18 The purpose of the Act is to fully define the rights of the parties and to wholly compensate an injured worker. The Legislature intended to lessen the adversarial nature of the process. Injecting the tort of bad faith into this legislative scheme would threaten the balance created by the Legislature. The Act provides a balance so employees may be compensated for work-related injuries and employers may stay in business and continue to pay those benefits. ¶ 19 The Legislature makes policy decisions in setting the remedies available to an employee in the Workers' Compensation Act. It fixes certain factors in the calculation of awards to achieve exact and uniform results. Mudge Oil Co. v. Wagnon, 1943 OK 354, ¶ 8, 145 P.2d 185, 186. The defendants correctly observe that DeAnda is not so much concerned with the absence of remedies as with the adequacy of the remedies. The adequacy of the remedies found in the Workers' Compensation Act remains with the Legislature. To rule otherwise would be an improper invasion of the constitutionally-mandated balance of power. Okla. Const., art. 5, § 1. [3] Adding a common law tort as a remedy is as much an invasion of the remedies provided by the Legislature as an attempt to alter the schedule of compensation found at 85 O.S. 2001, § 22. We would be substituting our policies for their policies. That is not within the Court's jurisdiction. ¶ 20 The statute sets out a post-judgment remedy for a post-judgment act. Section 42 explicitly includes the insurance carrier. Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature intended for an insurance carrier's post-judgment failure to pay fall within the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act.