Opinion ID: 6109557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: alleged postconviction relief phase errors

Text: In his postconviction motion, Mr. McFadden claimed the circuit court erred in limiting his ability to inquire into whether Juror Williams intentionally lied during voir dire when he said he did not recognize Mr. McFadden. In preparing Mr. McFadden's appeal, appellate counsel learned Juror Williams had served on the venire panel of one of Mr. McFadden's unrelated previous assault cases but was not chosen as a juror. On direct appeal, Mr. McFadden alleged Juror Williams' failure to disclose he had been on the venire panel was intentional and not simply a result of a faded memory. This Court rejected the claim because the record contained no factual basis to support the claim the nondisclosure was intentional. McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 417-19 . In preparing his postconviction motion, Mr. McFadden's motion counsel attempted to correct his deficiency of proof on direct appeal by moving for permission to contact all 170 venire members to ask them if Juror Williams told them he knew Mr. McFadden. St. Louis County local rule 53.3 provides in pertinent part: Petit jurors shall not be required to provide any information concerning any action of the petit jury, unless ordered to do so by the Court.... If an attorney or party receives evidence of misconduct by a petit juror, the attorney or party shall inform the Court and the Court may conduct an investigation to establish the accuracy of the misconduct allegations. Judge Goldman, over objection, granted the motion in part, ruling he would examine Juror Williams and another randomly selected person who actually served as a juror. Judge Goldman did so in September 2013, in chambers and on the record. Juror Williams repeatedly stated he did not remember Mr. McFadden from the prior assault case. The randomly chosen other juror, who had been sitting next to Juror Williams during trial, testified she did not hear anything to suggest Juror Williams remembered Mr. McFadden from being on the venire or otherwise. Motion counsel did not renew his request to question all 170 venire members but did again request permission to question all the jurors who sat on the jury, even the individuals who were the alternates. Judge Goldman denied counsel's request for additional inquiry. In May 2014, while the postconviction motion was still pending but after interviewing the two jurors, Judge Goldman recused himself from further postconviction proceedings because he realized he often talked about pending cases not assigned to him with one of the local prosecutors, and it was this prosecutor who tried Mr. McFadden's underlying death penalty case. Although Judge Goldman did not recall the prosecutor discussing Mr. McFadden's case with him, since it was possible that had occurred Judge Goldman recused himself out of an abundance of caution because this was such a serious case. The case was reassigned to Judge Dolan. Counsel renewed the motion to contact  additional jurors. Judge Dolan overruled the motion. The case later was reassigned to Judge DePriest, who overruled yet another motion to interview additional jurors. Judge DePriest held a further evidentiary hearing but did not permit counsel to call further jurors for questioning at that hearing. He then overruled Mr. McFadden's postconviction motion.
Mr. McFadden asserts all three judges clearly erred in denying his counsel's request to question all members of the jury. He argues this alleged error violated his Eighth Amendment rights but does not explain how a discovery ruling in a postconviction proceeding, even if incorrect, could violate his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, nor does he cite any authority for such a proposition. This Court does not address it further. Mr. McFadden also argues the failure to question additional jurors hindered his ability to show Juror Williams was biased and his presence on the jury violated Mr. McFadden's due process right to a fair and impartial jury. There is no inherent right to contact and interview jurors. Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636 , 643 (Mo. banc 2008) . Rather, [c]ourts have discretionary power to grant permission for contact with jurors after a trial. Id. (citation omitted). In Strong, this Court found no error in a motion court's denial of any juror contact when the defendant requested to contact jurors to investigate and prove claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and juror misconduct because there was no reasonable cause to believe, from actual factual allegations, that defendant's rights had been violated. Id . In State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171 , 183 (Mo. banc 1998) , this Court affirmed the motion court's order permitting juror contact but limiting the issues about which jurors could be questioned. In this instance, Mr. McFadden's counsel sought to find out whether Juror Williams remembered Mr. McFadden from the earlier assault case even though Juror Williams did not sit on the jury in the assault case and did not raise his hand when asked during voir dire in the instant case whether he recognized Mr. McFadden. Counsel had no specific reason to believe Juror Williams lied in stating he did not recognize Mr. McFadden but thought it did not sound likely. Judge Goldman, therefore, allowed questioning of Juror Williams and another juror. Nothing in the initial inquiry of these two jurors suggested the nondisclosure was intentional rather than simply a result of faded memory. Juror Williams repeatedly denied recognizing or remembering Mr. McFadden: THE COURT: Do you remember being asked if you recognized Vincent McFadden? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you did not respond to that as recognizing him; is that right? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: Yeah, I didn't know him. THE COURT: Okay. Do you remember being asked if you had acquired any information about Mr. McFadden from any source? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And again, you did not respond to that? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: Correct. THE COURT: At any time, Mr. Williams, from the beginning of the trial with the jury selection until the verdicts of guilty and verdict with the sentence, do you recall knowing Mr. McFadden from before the trial? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: No, sir.  THE COURT: About three years before that trial, or slightly before three years, were you on a jury selection and not selected as a juror on an assault first-degree case or assault case? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: I don't remember. THE COURT: Okay. Coming before just for the jury selection where they asked you questions, do you recall doing that about three years before that? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: I believe so. It's been so long ago I don't remember. THE COURT: Okay. During the trial of Mr. McFadden on the-the trial the trial that you were on where you reached a verdict, the murder case, during that trial did you ever recall Mr. McFadden from the jury selection process that happened about three years before? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: No. .... THE COURT: Mr. Williams, did you tell anyone during the murder first degree trial that you had been exposed to Vincent McFadden in the past? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: No. THE COURT: Okay. So you never said anything. Did you recognize him from the past? [JUROR] WILLIAMS: No, I never-I don't know him at all. The randomly selected juror confirmed Juror Williams did nothing to indicate he recalled Mr. McFadden: THE COURT: Okay. [Juror], did you become aware at any time during the trial of any juror recalling knowing Mr. McFadden or recognizing Mr. McFadden from before the trial? [JUROR]: No. THE COURT: Okay. Do you recall juror No. 3, a man named [Juror] Williams? [JUROR]: Not specifically, no. THE COURT: Okay. Did you overhear any juror discussing previous knowledge of Mr. McFadden at any time while you were here during the course of the trial? [JUROR]: No. Although Judge Goldman may have had the discretion to allow additional juror questioning, motion counsel identified nothing which indicated that other jurors would have had different information and that the failure to allow other jurors to be questioned was an abuse of discretion. Mr. McFadden has failed to show why examining the rest of the jurors was anything other than a fishing expedition. Cf. Concerned Citizens for Crystal City v. City of Crystal City, 334 S.W.3d 519 , 523 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (concluding the provisions of discovery were neither designed nor intended for untrammeled use of a factual dragnet or fishing expedition) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the absence of proof of intentional nondisclosure,  'a new trial is not warranted unless prejudice resulted from the nondisclosure that may have influenced the jury's verdict.'  McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 418 , quoting, St. Louis Univ. v. Geary, 321 S.W.3d 282 , 295 (Mo. banc 2009). No basis for finding prejudice has been shown.
Next, Mr. McFadden contends, once Judge Goldman recused himself, all his prior questioning of Juror Williams and the other juror should have been disregarded as a nullity. As a result, he says he was denied due process, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, U.S. Const. Amends. VIII and XIV when Judges Dolan and DePriest relied on Judge Goldman's questioning.  Mr. McFadden fails to explain how the failure to allow additional questioning of a particular witness at a postconviction hearing could be cruel and unusual punishment; it is not punishment at all. The death penalty was imposed in his underlying trial, not during his postconviction proceedings. This argument is rejected. Similarly, to the extent Mr. McFadden argues he had a due process right to a postconviction hearing, Missouri law is well-settled: Individuals convicted of state crimes have 'no federal constitutional right to a state post-conviction proceeding'  in the first instance. Price, 422 S.W.3d at 296 , quoting, Smith v. State, 887 S.W.2d 601 , 602 (Mo. banc 1994). Any such right to a postconviction proceeding exists only by statute or this Court's rules, and the United States Supreme Court has stated we are unwilling to accept [ ] that when a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions, the Federal Constitution dictates the exact form such assistance must assume. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 559, 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) . Mr. McFadden is correct, however, that once a defendant has been granted a postconviction hearing by statute or rule, he has a right to an unbiased judge. Due process concerns permit any litigant to remove a biased judge. Thomas v. State, 808 S.W.2d 364 , 367 (Mo. banc 1991) . But here, Mr. McFadden has failed to show Judge Goldman was biased or was affected by any extrajudicial information. Rule 2-2.11(A) provides, A judge shall recuse himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including situations when the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party ... or knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding that would preclude the judge from being fair and impartial. It is presumed that a judge acts with honesty and integrity and will not undertake to preside in a trial in which the judge cannot be impartial. Smulls v. State, 10 S.W.3d 497 , 499 (Mo. banc 2000) (citation omitted). This presumption can be overcome and disqualification is required if a reasonable person would find an appearance of impropriety and doubt the impartiality of the court, but there must be a factual context that gives meaning to the kind of bias that requires disqualification of a judge. Id., citing Haynes v. State, 937 S.W.2d 199 , 203 (Mo. banc 1996). Smulls noted: Specifically, a disqualifying bias or prejudice is one that has an extrajudicial source and results in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from the judge's participation in a case. In cases requiring recusal, the common thread is either a fact from which prejudgment of some evidentiary issue in the case by the judge may be inferred or facts indicating the judge considered some evidence properly in the case for an illegitimate purpose. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). This standard was applied in Martin v. State, 526 S.W.3d 169 , 187 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) , to hold merely talking with a party ex parte does not provide a basis for recusal. In Martin , the State had an ex parte contact with the judge, but the defendant failed to present any objective facts revealing any extrajudicial information that came to [the judge's] attention or any aspect of [the judge's] ruling on the Rule 29.15 Motion that could be attributed to reliance on extrajudicial information. Id. In contrast is Anderson v. State, 402 S.W.3d 86 , 92 (Mo. banc 2013) , in which a motion court made multiple on-the-record references to the judge's out-of-court conversations with the foreperson of the jury  in Anderson's trial about subjects implicated in Anderson's postconviction motion. The record also revealed the motion court gave counsel a magazine article, which the court procured on its own, implicating the credibility of Anderson's mental health expert. Id. at 93 . This Court held the content of the conversations and the magazine article were clearly extrajudicial, and [b]ased on the motion court's statements throughout the proceedings on the Rule 29.15 motion, a reasonable person would have factual grounds to believe the motion court relied on its conversations with the jury foreperson, the [ ] article or both in deciding the issues in the case. Id. at 94 . This Court, therefore, held the motion court judge should have been disqualified from the case. Id. Similarly, in Smulls , this Court held a motion court judge from St. Louis County abused his discretion in failing to appoint another judge to determine whether he must be disqualified from the case when the judge in the original trial testified he had discussions with every judge on the St. Louis County bench ... regarding the claim of racial bias [in the trial], and  'everybody' that he talked to about the charges of racial bias, based on their knowledge of the [original] opinion of this Court, expressed views that were not in agreement with what the opinion said. 10 S.W.3d at 504 . This Court held, the original trial judge's deposition provides a factual basis for a reasonable person to question the nature and extent of [the motion court judge's] previously expressed opinions on the issue of [ ] alleged racial bias. Id. Here, Judge Goldman did not recuse himself because he believed he had been exposed to extrajudicial information about Mr. McFadden. To the contrary, he denied recalling he received any extrajudicial information about Mr. McFadden. Judge Goldman recused himself simply because he thought that [the prosecutor] may have talked to me about it, even though I really didn't remember anything about him talking to me about it. But he did talk to me about cases occasionally. So I thought in just an abundance of caution, because this was such a serious case, I didn't want that to be a factor in it. Mr. McFadden offered no contrary evidence. The only other witness on this issue, the prosecutor, also did not recall specifically discussing Mr. McFadden's case with Judge Goldman. He simply speculated in his deposition that he often discussed cases with Judge Goldman and so I may very well have discussed any one of those cases with the Judge in terms of telling him what the facts were, or that I had a murder case pending. He stated, I probably very well talked to Judge Goldman about the facts of the case, back in '07 and '08. And then after the trial, what some of the highlights were. But he made clear: I don't have any specific memory of any specific conversations with Judge Goldman about any of [the McFadden] cases. Rather, he stated, I don't have any specific recollection of it, but it is very well possible that I probably did. Furthermore, Mr. McFadden does not suggest Judge Goldman and the prosecutor discussed Juror Williams or anything to do with the jurors or the prior assault trial. This is key, for whether Juror Williams intentionally failed to say he had sat on the earlier jury venire is the only issue Mr. McFadden alleges was affected by Judge Goldman's early involvement in the postconviction process prior to his recusal. Mr. McFadden does not explain how this could have been affected by unremembered facts that might or might not have been stated about his prior trial. Finally, [a]n ex parte contact is not in and of itself sufficient to permit a  reasonable person to infer the existence of disqualifying bias emanating from an extrajudicial source and resulting in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what a judge learned from participation in the case. Martin, 526 S.W.3d at 187 , citing, Haynes, 937 S.W.2d at 202 . Even if Judge Goldman and the prosecutor discussed Mr. McFadden's case in a now-forgotten conversation not involving Juror Williams, in the absence of any showing that Judge Goldman's examination of Juror Williams or the other juror biased or affected the later independent rulings by two other judges, no basis for a new postconviction hearing on the issue of further jury questioning has been shown. It was not Judge Goldman but Judge DePriest who overruled Mr. McFadden's postconviction motion. The record shows neither he nor Judge Dolan relied on Judge Goldman's evaluation of the credibility of Juror Williams and the other juror. Rather, they independently concluded further juror questioning was not necessary after reviewing the testimony given by the jurors. 4 Judge DePriest found: After review of the testimony of the two (2) jurors, this court finds the inquiry to be sufficient to investigate possible juror bias on the part of [Juror] Williams. Further inquiry of all potential jurors is unnecessary given [Juror] Williams disclosures which indicate an unintentional nondisclosure as a result of a faded memory due to the passage of more than three (3) years. It was within Judge DePriest's discretion to reach this finding based on his independent review of the record, and Mr. McFadden presented no other witnesses or evidence supporting a contrary finding. Indeed, he does not indicate anything Judge Goldman did not ask these jurors that some other judge would or should have asked.