Opinion ID: 77679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues currently still on appeal

Text: 5 Before we proceed with our review, we note several developments that have affected the issues on appeal and the manner in which we will structure our analysis. 6
7 After the appellant filed this appeal, the City adopted comprehensive amendments to its noise ordinance that have mooted at least one of the five claims on appeal. 3 In count IV of their complaint, the plaintiffs challenged the City's authority to vest special masters with the power to adjudicate alleged violations of County ordinances such as the County noise ordinance at issue here. The plaintiffs argued that section 162.03, Florida Statutes, only allowed the City to designate enforcement methods and penalties to be imposed for violation of ordinances adopted by the municipality. Since the City had never formally adopted the County noise ordinance as its own, the plaintiffs maintained that the County's ordinance violated Florida law. Accordingly, they asked the court to declare that sections 30-1(b) and 30-2 of the City Code, which established an alternate code enforcement system that vested special masters with the authority to enforce City and County ordinances alike, were null and void and to enjoin their use. 8 After L.C. filed this appeal on May 3, 2005, the City repealed its own noise ordinance and formally adopted the County noise ordinance in its place. Since the County noise ordinance is now officially a municipal ordinance, the City may enforce compliance by the methods specified in sections 30-1(b) and 30-2 of its Code without violating Florida Statutes. The City has corrected the constitutional infirmity that allegedly plagued these sections of its Code. At oral argument on the motions for summary judgment the plaintiffs conceded that the City could cure the constitutional infirmity in its alternate code enforcement provisions if it adopted the County ordinance. 4 9 A change in statute will not always moot a constitutional claim, however. If a litigant asserts damages from the application of a constitutionally defective statute, he may be able to pursue his constitutional challenge notwithstanding later legislative changes that would appear to address his complaint. See Naturist Soc., Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir.1992); see also CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir.2006). Damage claims can save a § 1983 claim from mootness, 5 but only where such claims allege compensatory damages or nominal damages for violations of procedural due process. See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), which notes that the basic purpose of damages under § 1983 is compensatory and that absent proof of actual injury, courts can only award nominal damages. See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), which endorses nominal damages awards in § 1983 actions only to vindicate certain absolute rights such as the right to procedural due process. Although count VI of L.C.'s complaint requested damages in connection with count IV, it did not allege any facts that would connect its damage claim to a City enforcement proceeding under sections 30-1(b) or 30-2. 6 10 The record indicates that the City never actually applied this section of its Code against L.C. It never held a hearing on L.C.'s citations. L.C. does not dispute this fact, and acknowledged it once more for the record during oral argument before this Court. L.C. appears to have based its claim for damages on the threat that the City might prosecute it for violations of the County noise ordinance. Plaintiffs cannot bring prospective damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however. See Tanner Advertising Group v. Fayette County, 451 F.3d 777, 786 (11th Cir.2006), where this Court held that facial challenges regarding prospective harm cannot give rise to the remedy of damages. See also Adler v. Duval County School Board, 112 F.3d 1475, 1478 (11th Cir.1997) (noting that appellants' claim for money damages continued to present a controversy because it did not depend upon any threat of future harm). 11 Likewise, although the plaintiffs alleged in count V of the Complaint that sections 30-1(b) and 30-2 of the City Code violated their rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, they do not allege a procedural due process claim. The Complaint states that these sections of the City Code violate due process concerns to the extent that they adopt the County noise ordinance, which they allege is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Thus, the plaintiffs frame count V in terms of substantive due process, not procedural due process. However, as we have noted, only damage claims predicated on violations of procedural due process are compensable under § 1983. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042. Accordingly, L.C.'s damage claim, count VI, will not save its constitutional claim against the City from mootness and both claims must fail. 12
13 The record indicates that the City withdrew all of the Notices of Violation that gave rise to this Complaint during negotiations over a possible pre-trial settlement in May of 2004. Defendant City of Miami Beach's Response To Order To Show Cause, May 5, 2002, at 2. The plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 24, 2003, challenging the citations that the City issued between November 2001 and February 2002. They appended a list of the citations to the Complaint as Exhibit A. The City continued to cite L.C. for violating the County noise ordinance after February 2002, however. Yet, L.C. never amended its complaint to include these additional citations. 14 From May 2002 through April 2003, the City cited L.C. for thirteen additional violations of the County noise ordinance, and in August of 2003, it scheduled a hearing to suspend L.C.'s business license on account of these newly alleged violations. 136 Collins Avenue, L.C. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, March 29, 2004, Composite Exhibit 2. The City scheduled the license suspension hearing for September 11, 2003. On September 8, 2003, L.C. filed for a temporary injunction in the circuit court for Dade County to halt the scheduled licensing proceeding. The circuit court issued a temporary injunction on October 30, 2003. 15 Thereafter, the City rescheduled a special master hearing on the violations for April 22, 2004. This hearing never took place, however. When the parties filed their Joint Pre-Trial Stipulation of the Facts on May 4, 2004, they stated that on or about April 27, 2004 the City had closed the Notices of Violation for all thirteen citations issued between May 2002 and April 2003 and withdrawn the scheduled special master proceedings. Joint Pretrial Stipulation by DA Mortgage, 136 Collins Avenue, City of Miami Beach, Miami-Dade County, May 5, 2004, Part V, ¶ 9, note. According to the parties, the only Notice of Violation concerning section 21-28 of the County Code that remained open at this point was one issued to L.C. on March 22, 2004. Id. 16 The parties make no reference to this citation in their appellate briefs and the record offers no more information on the status of this notice. The City simply maintains that it has withdrawn all citations that it issued to L.C. pursuant to the County noise ordinance. L.C. asserts in its reply brief that one citation— CE05001965—remains open, but concedes in a footnote that based [u]pon information and belief, the open violation is a duplicate of 1[sic] City closed. Appellant's Reply Brief, September 14, 2006, at 1 n.2. The appellant directs this Court to addendum 2 of its reply brief, which consists of a print-out from the search engine on the City Code Compliance database. The search was executed on September 8, 2006, according to the print-out. It shows that CE05001965, which was issued on January 31, 2005, was still OPEN as of September 8, 2006. Id. at addendum 2. 17 Yet addendum 3 of the same appellate brief, which provides a copy of an email from the Assistant City Manager to City Code Compliance personnel, states that noise violation notice CE05001965 issued 1/31/05 has been closed. Id. at addendum 3. It also states that the special master's office has been informed that no further action is required. Id. The City Manager's email predates the print-out from the City Code Compliance database by several weeks. Id. 18 The parties did not clear up the dispute during oral argument. The City insisted that all Notices of Violations issued pursuant to the County noise ordinance had been closed, and if not, that it was the City's intent to withdraw them. The appellant insisted that one notice remained open and that they had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the County noise ordinance based on this one outstanding notice. 19 Since the record is unclear, we proceed with this analysis on the arguable assumption that the City issued L.C. one Notice of Violation with respect to the County noise ordinance that still remains open. 7 20
21 Although L.C. argues in its appellate brief that it is challenging the constitutionality of the County noise ordinance either facially or as applied, Appellant's Initial Brief, at 1, we examine the plaintiff's cause of action for what it actually is, not for what the plaintiff would have it be. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110, 115 S.Ct. 898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995). Thus, we note at the outset, that neither the City nor the County has ever prosecuted L.C. for violating this ordinance. The County has never even threatened to prosecute L.C. with a noise violation. This fact is not in dispute and L.C. conceded it again during oral argument on its appeal. Nor has L.C. alleged that the ordinance operates to discriminate against nightclubs as opposed to other businesses or residents. Indeed, the Complaint states that [p]laintiffs are challenging the statute as facially unconstitutional and asks the court to invalidate the ordinance. 22 As this Court noted in United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir.2000), [a] facial challenge, as distinguished from an as-applied challenge, seeks to invalidate a statute or regulation itself. And, when a plaintiff mounts a facial challenge to a statute or regulation, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the law could never be applied in a constitutional manner. Jacobs v. The Florida Bar, 50 F.3d 901, 906 n. 20 (11th Cir.1995). This is because a party who asserts a facial challenge to a statute is seeking not only to vindicate his own rights, but also those of others who may be adversely impacted by the statute. Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1331 n. 12 (11th Cir.2001) (citing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n. 22, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999)). 23 Where plaintiffs challenge the validity of a statute because they seek to vindicate their own rights, however, the challenge is as-applied. Jacobs, 50 F.3d at 906. The only as-applied challenge alleged in the Complaint was a due process challenge to certain sections of the City Code which authorized the use of special masters for enforcing code compliance (count IV). As we discussed above, this particular constitutional claim is now moot. Thus, at present, L.C.'s sole challenge to the constitutionality of the County noise ordinance is a facial challenge. L.C. presents three arguments for finding the ordinance unconstitutional on its face: 1) that it is not content-neutral or if so, that it does not contain permissible time, place and manner restrictions on speech; 2) that it is overly broad; or 3) that it is vague. 24
25 Finally, we note that the substantive due process violation alleged against the City in count V of the Complaint must fail if we find that the appellant's facial challenge to the County noise ordinance, which is alleged in count II of the Complaint, lacks merit. Similarly, count III of the Complaint, which alleges damages arising out of the constitutional claim in count II, must also fail if we find that the appellant's facial challenge to the County noise ordinance lacks merit. Thus, we proceed to a discussion of the facts and an analysis of counts II, and III against the County and count V against the City. These are the only issues remaining before us on appeal. And, we note that our analysis of the merits of L.C.'s facial challenge to the County noise ordinance, count II of the Complaint, will be dispositive of the other two claims.