Opinion ID: 3059929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leave to Amend Counterclaim

Text: Brown contends the district court erred in granting the government leave to amend its counterclaim to include the tax periods in 1999.4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that before trial a district court “should freely give leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, the district court need not permit an amendment “(1) where there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment would be futile.” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). Brown’s only contention of error is her bare assertion, without legal or evidentiary support, that she was prejudiced by the government’s amendment because the statute of limitations had run on the tax assessment for the year 1999. Even assuming Brown adequately preserved and raised this issue, it lacks merit. The counterclaim amendment did not assert a new claim for relief. The uncontroverted evidence shows that the April 16, 2001 assessment against Brown 4 We review a district court’s decision to grant leave to amend a pleading for abuse of discretion. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). 6 for $30,924.16—one of the three assessments referenced in the original counterclaim as showing the penalties the government was seeking to reduce to judgment—was for trust fund recovery penalties for the tax periods ending June 30, 1999; September 30, 1999; December 31, 1999; and June 30, 2000. Thus, the government was counterclaiming for the 1999 penalties all along, though the original counterclaim failed to point it out. As the district court correctly found, Brown was not prejudiced by the counterclaim amendment because (1) it did not affect the amount due or include any new assessments or penalties, and (2) discovery had already included all the periods covered by the clarifying amendment. Moreover, because the penalties for the 1999 tax periods were included in the April 16, 2001 assessment, there was no statute of limitations violation in any event. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (stating that “the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government leave to amend its counterclaim.