Opinion ID: 169513
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stay of TON's Claims

Text: Dismissal of an action pending primary jurisdiction referral is appropriate when the parties will not be prejudiced or unfairly disadvantaged. Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268-269, 113 S.Ct. 1213; United States v. Mich. Nat. Corp., 419 U.S. 1, 5, 95 S.Ct. 10, 42 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (per curiam) (Dismissal rather than a stay has been approved where there is assurance that no party is prejudiced thereby.); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 577, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952) (determining dismissal was appropriate where case involved only questions within the scope of agency jurisdiction, judicial review of an agency order would be available, and similar suit could be easily initiated later). Where, for example, the relief sought is an injunction or declaratory judgment, dismissal may be appropriate. See, e.g., Far East Conference, 342 U.S. at 577, 72 S.Ct. 492. Where damages are sought and the relevant statute of limitations might preclude relief, however, a stay is likely to be preferable. See Carnation Co. v. Pac. West-bound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 223, 86 S.Ct. 781, 15 L.Ed.2d 709 (1966) (distinguishing treble-damages relief sought by instant plaintiff with injunctive relief sought by Far East Conference plaintiffs and explaining a treble-damage action for past conduct cannot be easily reinstituted at a later time and may face a statute-of limitations bar). Additionally, where further judicial proceedings are contemplated, the court should ordinarily retain jurisdiction by staying the proceedings. Davel Commc'ns, 460 F.3d at 1091; accord Crystal Clear Commc'ns, 415 F.3d at 1178 n. 6 (stating a stay is usual course of action in antitrust cases). Finally, where pending FCC actions may affect the outcome of a plaintiff's federal court litigation, this court has previously assumed a stay is appropriate. Mical Commc'ns, 1 F.3d at 1040 (raising primary jurisdiction sua sponte and ordering district court to stay case pending issuance of FCC ruling); see also Davel Commc'ns, Inc. v. Qwest Corp ., No. C03-3680P, slip op. at 6 (W.D.Wash. Jan. 29, 2007) (unpublished) (concluding, upon remand from the Ninth Circuit, the possibility of further judicial proceedings following FCC resolution of threshold issue warranted a stay). In this case, TON alleges two potential bases for prejudice. First, because § 415(b) creates a two-year statute of limitations for damage actions before the FCC, TON contends it may be precluded from refiling its complaint before the Commission. TON asserts the statute of limitations began to run in April 2002 when Qwest filed its NST-compliant rates. Accord Davel Commc'ns, 460 F.3d at 1091-93 (observing that, under Davel's interpretation of the Waiver/Refund Order, Davel's right to reimbursement came into existence only upon Qwest's filing of NST-compliant rates and, therefore, its cause of action only began to accrue when Qwest failed to pay the reimbursements). TON's limitations period, therefore, would have expired in April 2004. Second, TON alleges that § 207, which functions as an election-of-forum provision, gave it the right to file suit either in federal district court or before the FCC, but not in both fora. It contends its decision to file in federal court may foreclose it from seeking subsequent relief before the Commission. Qwest fails to respond directly to TON's assertions. Instead, Qwest contends: 1) the decrease in its rates was caused by the FCC's revisions to the NST in the 2002 New Services Test Order and, therefore, there is no evidence that its pre-2002 rates were unreasonable or discriminatory; 2) TON's interpretation of the Waiver/Refund Order is misguided and does not entitle TON to refunds or damages; and 3) any claim that Qwest's rates became unlawful on April 15, 1997, or May 19, 1997, when Qwest failed to file new tariffs or cost studies, would have been time-barred after April or May 1999 and, therefore, are already precluded by the statute of limitations. [21] As to whether TON will be prejudiced by dismissal, Qwest says only that TON should have filed its claims with the state commissions charged with determining NST compliance rather than filing in federal court and, thus, any resulting prejudice is of TON's own making. It also claims that because the FCC is currently considering the same issues in several existing proceedings, TON may well get the relief it seeks without further judicial action. Because dismissal might result in a § 415(b) statute-of-limitations bar to TON's claims under the Waiver/Refund Order and because § 207's election-of-forum provision might prevent TON from seeking agency relief, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing, rather than staying, TON's suit. Qwest expressly declined to waive a statute-of-limitations defense before the district court and again before this court. Although it seems logical that the statute of limitations in § 415(b) would be tolled during the pendency of TON's federal court litigation, neither party has called the court's attention to any such tolling provision or related case law, nor has the court located any on its own. To the contrary, other courts have suggested the limitations period would not be tolled. Cf. Brown, 277 F.3d at 1173 (stating district court should stay claim during primary jurisdiction referral because statute of limitations under § 415 had run); Davel Commc'ns, No. C03-3680P, slip op. at 6 (recognizing risk that statute of limitations may run pending FCC's interpretation of Waiver/Refund Order). Because it appears TON may be unfairly disadvantaged by dismissal, this court concludes the district court abused its discretion by dismissing TON's complaint. Additionally, TON asserts that § 207 entitles it to proceed in federal court, that the district court's ruling essentially denied it a federal forum, and that there is a risk, under the plain language of § 207, that it will be precluded from refiling its dismissed complaint before the Commission. Courts have consistently recognized § 207 as an election-of-remedies provision such that once an election is made by either filing a complaint with the FCC or filing a complaint in federal court, a party may not thereafter file a complaint on the same issues in the alternative forum, regardless of the status of the complaint. Premiere Network Servs., Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 440 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir.2006) (citing cases). Contrary to Qwest's assertion that TON should have known it was required to file its claims before the state commissions rather than in federal court, § 207 has clearly been construed not to require exhaustion of administrative remedies. See, e.g., Brown, 277 F.3d at 1173; APCC Servs., Inc. v. Worldcom, Inc., 305 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.2001). Even if, as Qwest asserts, the Commission did instruct parties to challenge an LEC's compliance with the FCC's filing requirements before state regulators, Qwest does not explain how this direction divests the court of jurisdiction under § 207 or bars TON from taking advantage of the choice Congress provided to it under § 207. Because Qwest has engaged only in unsupported argument to the contrary, we conclude that TON's arguments regarding the nature of § 207 provide an additional reason for staying TON's claims. Finally, contrary to the statement in its brief that TON may well get the relief it seeks, Qwest conceded to the district court that predicting whether TON would benefit from a positive resolution of the FCC's pending matters was like trying to look into a crystal ball. Qwest admitted the FCC could issue very limited orders in the matters currently pending before it which might not entitle TON to relief. Furthermore, at oral argument before this court, Qwest conceded that, although it believed dismissal was appropriate, it did not strongly oppose a stay.