Opinion ID: 166395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mr. peoples's bivens claims against cca employees

Text: 47 The next step in our analysis, then, is to determine whether Mr. Peoples could bring a claim under Kansas law in Peoples I or Peoples II. We begin with Peoples I. Below, the District Court operated under the assumption that Mr. Peoples could bring a Kansas-law claim. See Peoples I, 2004 WL 74317 at  (characterizing Mr. Peoples's claim as a quintessential claim of negligence.). On appeal, neither the individual Defendants nor Mr. Peoples directly address the viability of Mr. Peoples's claim under Kansas law. Because we find the answer to this question essential to our Bivens analysis, we address the issue sua sponte and conclude that Kansas law gives rise to a negligence claim for the injury Mr. Peoples suffered from the alleged Eighth Amendment violation. 48 Under Kansas law, to recover for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, an injury, and a causal connection between the breached duty and the injury. McGee v. Chalfant, 248 Kan. 434, 806 P.2d 980, 983 (1991). Here, Mr. Peoples argues that the individual Defendants owed a duty to protect him from injuries caused by the Mexican Mafia inmates. Under Kansas law, however, absent a special relationship between the parties, one does not owe another a duty to protect against injuries caused by third parties. See William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I, 49 U. KAN. L.REV. 1037, 1065-71 (2001). 49 Such a special relationship does arise between the guards of a state-run prison and a prisoner. In Washington v. State, 17 Kan.App.2d 518, 839 P.2d 555 (1992), the Kansas Court of Appeals considered whether a prisoner-plaintiff could bring a negligence claim against the state and prison officials after a fellow prisoner stabbed him in the eye. The court held that state prison officials owe a duty of ordinary or reasonable care to safeguard a prisoner in their custody or control from attack by other prisoners. Id. at 559; 7 see also Cupples v. State, 18 Kan.App.2d 864, 861 P.2d 1360, 1369 (1993). 8 Nonetheless, the state's duty to protect inmates from foreseeable harm does not make it the insurer of the safety of a prisoner from unforeseeable harm. Cupples, 861 P.2d at 1369 (citing Washington, 839 P.2d at 559). Thus, to establish a duty to prevent injuries caused by a fellow inmate, a plaintiff must establish that the danger [to the plaintiff] was known or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have been known by a prison official. Washington, 839 P.2d at 559. Accordingly, prison officials may become[] liable in the event that damage proximately results from a failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm. Id. 50 We conclude that the duty established in Washington between a state-run prison and a prisoner would apply to a privately run prison and a prisoner as well. The first step in the Washington court's analysis was to determine if the plaintiff's claim could be brought under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA). Washington, 839 P.2d at 557-58. The KTCA provides that the state shall be liable for the acts of its employees under circumstances where [the state], if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6103(a). Because the Washington court held under the KTCA that the state owed a duty to prisoners to prevent reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by fellow inmates, by implication the court found that a private person owes the same duty. As such, we conclude that under Kansas law CCA and the individual Defendants owed a duty to Mr. Peoples to prevent reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by fellow inmates. 9 51 Finally, we do not read Malesko or prior decisions of the Court to mandate that we imply a cause of action directly from the Constitution simply because an alternative state law claim may be subject to a punitive damages cap 10 to which a federal claim is not. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has refused to imply a Bivens cause of action when there are alternative administrative remedies, even when, like a cap on punitive damages, those remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388, 103 S.Ct. 2404. Moreover, the Court has consistently held that the purpose of a Bivens claim is to deter the conduct of an individual official, and we conclude that compensatory damages plus the availability of some punitive damages further this goal. Cf. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (concluding that a claim under the FTCA is not as effective a deterrent as Bivens because no punitive damages are available in a FTCA suit). Finally, we again are reminded that Malesko explained that it had implied a Bivens claim in only two situations in the last thirty years: to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy. 534 U.S. at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515 (emphases omitted). That Mr. Peoples's alternative negligence claim under Kansas law may be subject to a cap on punitive damages is thus not a reason to imply a Bivens claim in this case. 52 Therefore, because Kansas law gives rise to a cause of action for damages for the injuries Mr. Peoples suffered as the result of the alleged deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights, we will not imply an additional cause of action directly under the Constitution in Peoples I. We therefore dismiss Mr. Peoples's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 11
53 We turn now to Mr. Peoples's three allegations of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause violations in Peoples II — namely, that he was placed in segregation without a hearing, denied access to a law library, and denied unmonitored phone calls to his attorney. With respect to the first two claims, we need not even look to state law causes of action because we agree with the District Court that Mr. Peoples's allegations, even liberally construed, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). With respect to Mr. Peoples's third due process claim, we conclude that Kansas law provides an alternative cause of action and therefore, a cause of action under Bivens will not be implied. We turn first to Mr. Peoples's claim that he was placed in segregation without a hearing, in violation of his due process rights. 54 Mr. Peoples asserts that the individual Defendants violated his due process rights as a pretrial detainee by placing him in segregation upon his arrival at CCA and keeping him in segregation for approximately thirteen months. Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished prior to a lawful conviction. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729, 731 (10th Cir.1981). 12 However, the government may subject those awaiting trial to the conditions and restrictions of incarceration so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-37, 99 S.Ct. 1861. 55 The determination of whether a condition of pretrial detention amounts to punishment turns on whether the condition is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is incident to some other legitimate government purpose. Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861. If an act by a prison official, such as placing the detainee in segregation, is done with an intent to punish, the act constitutes unconstitutional pretrial punishment. Id. Similarly, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate [governmental] goal — if it is arbitrary or purposeless — a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment. Id. at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861. On the other hand, restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting. Id. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Obviously, ensuring security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates, or both. Id. at 561, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Thus, no process is required if [a pretrial detainee] is placed in segregation not as punishment but for managerial reasons. Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir.2002). 56 According to the complaint, however, Mr. Peoples was first placed in segregation because CCA lacked bed space in the general population. As the Seventh Circuit has held, and to which we agree, if the only vacant cell left in the jail [is] in the segregation ward when a new prisoner arrive[s]; placing him in that cell would be a managerial decision . . . [in which] no [due process] hearing would be required. Id. 57 Mr. Peoples then admits that he remained in segregation due to his plot to escape from his previous pretrial detention facility, but argues that his continued segregation was intended as punishment. A detention center, however, has a legitimate interest in segregating individual inmates from the general population for nonpunitive reasons, including threat[s] to the safety and security of the institution. Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d 644, 647 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474-76, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861. A substantiated escape threat, as is found here, is a legitimate nonpunitive rationale for Mr. Peoples's continued segregation. 58 Therefore, we agree with the District Court that although Mr. Peoples alleges that his segregation was intended as a punishment, 59 [a] review of the facts plaintiff has alleged does not show that CCA and its employees intended to punish plaintiff by placing him in administrative segregation. Rather, it appears that CCA authorities acted in furtherance of legitimate penal objectives of safety and security of the institution in placing plaintiff in administrative segregation, notably, on the advice of the [Marshal Service] and based on concerns that plaintiff is an escape risk. Therefore, the court is unable to find any due process violation from plaintiff's assignment to and placement in administrative segregation. 60 Peoples II, 2004 WL 2278667 at . As such, we affirm the dismissal of this claim. 61 Next, Mr. Peoples asserts that he was denied adequate, effective and meaningful access to the courts while in pretrial detention because CCA did not provide him with a law library and because the lawyer who assisted him would only retrieve case law when a specific citation was provided. See generally Love v. Summit County, 776 F.2d 908, 912 (10th Cir.1985). [T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to . . . provid[e] prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). As the Court has made clear, detainees are entitled to meaningful, but not total or unlimited, access to the courts. Id. at 823, 97 S.Ct. 1491. Moreover, an inmate's contentions of deprivation of access to courts must show actual injury, not mere deprivation, as a constitutional prerequisite to bringing a claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). Finally, it has been noted that [t]he choice among various methods of guaranteeing access to the courts lies with prison administrators, not inmates or the courts. Arney v. Simmons, 26 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1296 (D.Kan.1998). 62 We fully adopt the District Court's analysis of Mr. Peoples's claim on this issue: 63 [Mr. Peoples] does not allege that he is being denied total access to legal assistance. [Mr. Peoples] does not claim that CCA obstructed in any way his attempt to prosecute a claim, and he admits that CCA provided him with access to a person trained in the law, Mr. Fuller, and that he consulted with Mr. Fuller and requested case law from him. [Mr. Peoples] has not alleged that he has missed court dates, been unable to make timely legal filings, been denied legal assistance to which he was entitled, or lost a case which could have been won. In fact, [Mr. Peoples] appears to have been afforded the necessary resources to file the complaint in this action and has submitted additional pleadings that contain case law citations and analysis of relevant case law. The court concludes that CCA's provision of a person trained in the law instead of a law library has afforded [Mr. Peoples] the necessary resources to prosecute his claims. The court finds that [Mr. Peoples] has failed to allege an actual injury resulting from the alleged denial of legal resources, and thus, his claim that defendants violated his due process right of access to the courts cannot withstand defendants' motion to dismiss. 64 Peoples II, 2004 WL 2278667 at  (internal citation omitted). 65 As such, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of this Fifth Amendment claim. 66 As to Mr. Peoples's third Fifth Amendment Bivens claim, the failure to provide him unmonitored calls to his attorney, we conclude that Kansas law provides him with a cause of action for damages for such conduct. Kansas law criminally prohibits third parties from unlawfully monitoring phone calls without the permission of at least one of the communicants. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4001 (eavesdropping); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4002 (breach of privacy); State v. Roudybush, 235 Kan. 834, 686 P.2d 100, 108 (1984). Moreover, in the view of the Kansas Attorney General, a violation of either criminal statute could subject one to civil liability for intrusion upon seclusion. See Kan. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 93-93 (1993). Monitoring a phone call between an inmate and his lawyer in violation of the Fifth Amendment, as Mr. Peoples alleges, falls within section 21-4002(a)(1)'s prohibition against knowingly and without lawful authority. . . [i]ntercepting, without the consent of the sender or receiver, a message by telephone. We conclude, then, that Mr. Peoples could have brought suit under Kansas law. 13 Therefore, we will not imply a Bivens claim as to this allegation.