Opinion ID: 2221881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Operator and Proximate Cause.

Text: The Board first claims the definition of an operator under the Tank Fund Act should not only include those having control of or responsibility for the underground storage tank, but the ability to control the underground storage tank. Thus, it claims Shell remained an operator of the underground storage tank after it assigned its lease in 1973 because it retained the ability to control the operation of the underground storage tank by refusing to sell Shell gasoline to the Shell jobber for distribution to the dealer, and retained the right to debrand the station. The Board further claims proximate causation is not required in an action against an owner or operator. We have recently addressed both issues in Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Board v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359 (Iowa 2000) ( Mobil I ) (defining operator), and Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Board v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 2000) ( Shell II ) (imposing proximate cause requirement). Based on the same reasoning set forth in those opinions, we conclude the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the definition of an operator or in imposing a proximate cause requirement.