Opinion ID: 884059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying Loh's motion to suppress her incriminating statements?

Text: Loh argues that her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law were violated when the District Court admitted her allegedly involuntary and coerced statements. The State contends that following a hearing pursuant to § 46-13-301, MCA, the District Court correctly denied Loh's motion to suppress after finding that Loh was highly intelligent, understood her rights, and voluntarily made the statements admitting that the marijuana was hers. We review a district court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress an admission or a confession to determine whether the findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Hermes (Mont.1995), 904 P.2d 587, 588-89 (citing Kaluza, 865 P.2d at 264). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if this Court has a definite or firm conviction that the district court committed a mistake. Hermes, 904 P.2d at 589 (citing State v. Bower (1992), 254 Mont. 1, 7, 833 P.2d 1106, 1110). Pursuant to § 46-13-301, MCA, a defendant may move to suppress a confession or admission on the ground that it was given involuntarily. The prosecution has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession or admission was voluntary. Section 46-13-301, MCA. The voluntariness of a confession or admission is a factual question which must take into account the totality of the circumstances. State v. Mayes (1992), 251 Mont. 358, 376, 825 P.2d 1196, 1208 (citing State v. Allies (1979), 186 Mont. 99, 606 P.2d 1043). The totality of the circumstances includes the following factors, among others: the defendant's age and level of education; the interrogation technique used by the police; whether the defendant was advised of his or her Miranda rights; the defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system and police interrogation; the defendant's background and experience; and the defendant's demeanor, coherence, articulateness, and capacity to make full use of his or her faculties. Hermes, 904 P.2d at 589; State v. Shaver (1988), 233 Mont. 438, 444, 760 P.2d 1230, 1233. Moreover, a confession or admission extracted by any sort of threat or violence, by the exertion of any improper influence, or by any direct or implied promises, however slight, has the potential for being involuntary. State v. Phelps (1985), 215 Mont. 217, 224, 696 P.2d 447, 451. In Hermes, for example, the defendant had little formal education, was unaware of his Miranda rights, lived in an isolated area in a house without electricity, and had never been charged with a crime or interrogated by the police prior to this occasion. Thus, we held that the circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession rendered his confession involuntary. Hermes, 904 P.2d at 589. Additionally, the police did not inform the defendant of his Miranda rights, used guilt assumption interrogation techniques, and barked questions at the defendant. Hermes, 904 P.2d at 589. Similarly, in State v. Grey (Mont.1995), 907 P.2d 951, 956, we held that the totality of the circumstances of police deception and failure to give adequate Miranda warnings rendered the defendant's confession involuntary. In Grey, the police used impermissible procedures to procure the defendant's confession by making false statements to the defendant after singling him out for investigation and by following a procedure of advising him of his Miranda rights in a fashion that likely ensured he would not exercise them. Grey, 907 P.2d at 955. In State v. Beach (1985), 217 Mont. 132, 151, 705 P.2d 94, 107, we held that the totality of the circumstances supported the district court's finding that the state proved the statements made by the defendant were voluntary. In Beach, we noted that the presence of timely and complete Miranda warnings supported voluntariness. Beach, 705 P.2d at 106. Moreover, there was no evidence that the defendant possessed less than average intelligence or that he was incapable of understanding the Miranda warnings. The officers that interrogated the defendant testified that he appeared calm and coherent; the questioning sessions were not long, arduous, or designed to take advantage of the defendant's situation or fatigue; and the officers made no threats of harm or promises. Beach, 705 P.2d at 106. In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances supports the District Court's finding that the State met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Loh's incriminating statements were voluntary. Loh was timely advised of her Miranda rights when she arrived at her home. Officer Voelker testified that Loh was again advised of her Miranda rights at the police station. The officers testified that Loh was relaxed, did not appear to have trouble understanding English, and appeared to understand her rights. The District Court found that Loh was one of the most intelligent, insightful and articulate witnesses to testify in [his] court. Loh testified that the officers were friendly and did not outwardly use words to coerce her, (although she also stated that they did mislead her by saying that they had a search warrant and would tear the house apart if she did not tell them what was going on). Officer Voelker denied threatening Loh with getting a search warrant or telling her he had a search warrant. In addition, the questioning sessions were not long, arduous, or designed to take advantage of Loh's situation or fatigue. While we have repeatedly held that lying to a defendant or misleading the defendant is not acceptable, ( see Grey, 907 P.2d at 955), the totality of the circumstances in this case, supports the finding that Loh voluntarily stated that she knew that she had marijuana in her house. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that its denial of Loh's motion to suppress her incriminating statements must be affirmed.