Opinion ID: 3011783
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fischbein

Text: The Tuckers assert two grounds for holding that Fischbein acted with actual malice. First, the Tuckers argue that Fischbein, as a lawyer, should have known that a claim for loss of consortium may not have anything to do with damage to sexual relations. It follows, the Tuckers contend, that Fischbein was at least reckless when he told the press that Mrs. Tucker was trying to r ecover for injury to her sex life. We reject this argument. A claim for loss of consortium may concern damage to sexual relations and, with respect to the period prior to the service of the Tuckers' First Amended Complaint, there is no evidence that Fischbein was informed that Mr. Tucker's consortium claim did not refer to damage to sexual relations. Nor is there evidence from which a jury could find that Fischbein entertained serious doubts about the truthfulness of his statements at any time before the filing of the First Amended Complaint. Consequently, the record is insufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that Fischbein was guilty during this period of anything more than negligence in jumping to the conclusion that Mr. Tucker's loss-of-consortium claim related, at least in part, to sex. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731; Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971) (The deliberate choice of an interpretation, though arguably reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of `malice' under New York T imes.). The Tuckers point out that Fischbein, as the representative of Shakur's estate, had a motive for discrediting Mrs. Tucker, but 11 circumstantial evidence of Fischbein's motive alone cannot satisfy the actual malice standard. The Tuckers' second argument regar ding Fischbein, however, does have merit. As previously noted, on August 27, 1997, the Tuckers filed their First Amended Complaint, which added Fischbein as a defendant and sought millions of dollars in damages. The basis for adding Fischbein was set out in Paragraph 46, which averred that Fischbein had made false and misleading statements regar ding the claim herein, through published statements that C. Delores Tucker filed suit because of a `loss of her sex life. '  App. at 171112 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Fischbein was personally served with this complaint before his interview with Time magazine reporter Belinda Luscombe on September 12, 1997.2 Nevertheless, according to Luscombe's deposition, Fischbein told her during this interview that the Tuckers were attempting to r ecover for damage to their sexual relationship. Based on this sequence of events, we are convinced that a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that, at least as of the date of the service of the First Amended Complaint, Fischbein had actual knowledge that the Tuckers were not seeking to recover for damage to their sexual relationship. Since the First Amended Complaint alleged that Fischbein had defamed the Tuckers by stating that they were attempting to r ecover for damage to their sexual relations, a reasonable jury could certainly conclude that an attorney who read the complaint would understand that the Tuckers were not going to attempt to recover for such damage. (Indeed, it would be hard to interpret the First Amended Complaint any other way.) Fischbein states that he did not read the First Amended Complaint before speaking to Luscombe, but a r easonable jury could believe that a person who is added as a defendant in a multi-million dollar lawsuit is very likely to read the complaint shortly after receiving it in order to see _________________________________________________________________ 2. This argument does not apply to any statements made by Fischbein prior to August 27, 1997, including the comments published by the Philadelphia Daily News and the August 26 interview with Roberts of Newsweek. 12 why he or she has been sued. A reasonable jury could disbelieve Fischbein's story and find by clear and convincing evidence that Fischbein did read the First Amended Complaint before the interview. W e must therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it dismissed the Tuckers' claim against Fischbein with regard to the statements to Luscombe. The dissent disagrees with our conclusion on this point because, in the dissent's view, [t]he language of the Amended Complaint, in the context of the Tuckers' pr evious statements and actions, was insufficient to indicate a change in their attitude toward alleging a loss of sexual relations. Dissent at 24. But even if we agreed with the dissent's characterization of the Tuckers' prior statements,3 the following stark facts remain: (a) the Amended Complaint added Fischbein as a defendant and was served upon him; (b) the Amended Complaint asserted that Fischbein had defamed the Tuckers by stating thatC. Delores Tucker filed suit because of a `loss of her sex life'  (App. at 1711-12); and (c) the Amended Complaint sought millions of dollars in damages. Surely a r easonable jury could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Fischbein knew, after reading the Amended Complaint, that, whether or not the Tuckers had previously been seeking to recover for damage to their sexual relationship, they were no longer doing so.4 _________________________________________________________________ 3. The dissent seems at times to make findings of fact. For example, the dissent opines that the statements made by the Tuckers and their attorney were deliberately cagey and equivocal so that they could, if they wished, introduce evidence of impotence and sexual disfunction at trial. Dissent at 22. This amounts to a finding of fact r egarding the intent of the Tuckers and their attorney, and it is the province of the trier of fact, to make such a finding. 4. The dissent find[s] it ironic that [we] believe[ ] there could be actual malice in a statement so similar to [the following statement] attributed to Mr. Tucker in The Philadelphia T ribune (Dissent at 27): Pointedly asked how the lyrics could affect his sex life, he said, That's just a brief reference [in the lawsuit] -- a small part of it. We have to represent the situation as accurately as we can and the only way to experience it is to have it happen to you. 13