Opinion ID: 475838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weighing of Conflicting Evidence Instruction

Text: 12 Yang next asserts that the trial court's instruction on the weighing of conflicting evidence was plain error. Yang argues that by directing the jury that the final test is ... the relative convincing force of the evidence, the trial court contradicted its earlier instruction concerning the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Contradictory or confusing instructions, Yang concludes, are grounds for reversal. 13 We disagree. The trial court's latter statement did not contradict its earlier instruction. 14 First, the trial court clearly established that the challenged statement was made in a context distinct from its earlier discussion of reasonable doubt. Having concluded its definition of reasonable doubt, the trial court declared, And now we come to the question of credibility. Thus, we find it is unlikely that the jury misinterpreted the trial court's latter statement as redefining the nature of reasonable doubt. 15 Second, considered in context, the challenged statement merely asserted a truism about the importance of credibility. Rather than instructing the jury on the proper degree of belief--beyond a reasonable doubt--the challenged statement instructed the jury on the proper basis of belief--convincing force. Having remarked you're not to decide an issue by a simple process of counting the number of witnesses on the opposing side, the trial court stated the correct basis for deciding an issue:  ... the final test is not in the relative number of witnesses, but in the relative convincing force of the evidence. The point of the challenged statement is simply that beliefs should be based on the convincing force of the evidence, not the number of witnesses. We find this statement neither confusing nor objectionable.