Opinion ID: 1828329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fraud Claim Against Creekside (Issue V)

Text: The Bagleys' final argument is that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for Creekside regarding the fraud claim. Creekside argues that the Bagleys' appeal on this claim was untimely. We note that the trial court initially entered a summary judgment for Creekside on May 11, 1998, and specifically stated that it was certifying that judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. The court amended its summary-judgment order on May 21, 1998, to clarify that the May 11 judgment covered only the fraud claim. On July 14, 1998, the trial court entered an Amended Order Nunc Pro Tunc, again entering a partial summary judgment for Creekside on the fraud claim, and again certifying the judgment as final. Rule 54(b) states, in pertinent part: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, ... the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. Rule 4, Ala.R.App.P., provides, in relevant part, that, in all cases in which an appeal is permitted by law ... the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.... In opposing Creekside's timeliness challenge, the Bagleys cite Brown v. Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So.2d 226 (Ala.Civ. App.1996). In Brown, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendant and certified it as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. The Court of Civil Appeals held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the plaintiff's claim. The Court of Civil Appeals went on to state: The trial court, in its order, should list the factors which it considered in reaching its decision regarding whether to certify the judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b), in order that the appellate court is better equipped to review the trial court's action.... ... Hereafter, if a trial court should fail to list the factors considered, then the case will be returned so that the trial court can list those factors. 681 So.2d at 229. In Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Tinney, 776 So.2d 753, 755 (Ala.2000), this Court expressly overruled Brown, pointing out: We held in Sho-Me [Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Jehle-Slauson Construction Co., 466 So.2d 83 (Ala.1985),] that if it is clear and obvious from the language used by the trial court in its order that the court intended to enter a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), then we will treat the order as a final judgment.... In Schneider, we further stated that [n]othing in Rule 54(b) requires findings to buttress the conclusion `that there is no just reason for delay.' All that is required is an `express determination.' 776 So.2d at 755-56. The Bagleys argue that relying on Brown they took no action to appeal said Order as under the law at that time it could not be considered a final order since the Judgment merely stated that it was `a final Summary Judgment' and that there was no just reason for delay. However, Brown provided that if the trial court failed to list the factors considered in certifying a judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), the case would be remanded for the trial court to list the factors. The approach advocated in Brown was not reasonably subject to the construction that the court's order was not a final, appealable order because it lacked certain phraseology; in order for the case properly to be remanded, rather than the appeal's just being dismissed, the judgment would have to be one that would support an appeal. In Ex parte Pritchett, 812 So.2d 1157 (Ala.2000), this Court discussed the effect of Brown and noted that after the decision in Brown, the Court of Civil Appeals routinely remanded cases that did not meet the level of specificity required by Brown. 812 So.2d at 1158. In the present case, the 42day period prescribed by Rule 4, Ala. R.App.P., for filing an appeal began to run on July 14, 1998, at the latest, the day the trial court entered its order nunc pro tunc, which, for the second time, expressly certified the partial summary judgment in favor of Creekside as to the fraud claim as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Even if Creekside had not pointed out the untimeliness of the appeal of that ruling, [i]t is the duty of this Court to take notice of the filing date of an appeal and, if finding the appeal to be untimely, to dismiss it ex mero motu. Stewart v. Younger, 375 So.2d 428 (Ala.1979). Lewis v. State, 463 So.2d 154, 155 (Ala.1985). The Bagleys' notice of appeal, filed on April 29, 2002, almost four years after the partial summary judgment was last certified as final, is untimely as to that partial summary judgment and the Bagleys' appeal from that partial judgment is dismissed. In summary, the trial court's summary judgments for Creekside and Mazda on the AEMLD claim are affirmed. To the extent the Bagleys' appeal relates to the partial summary judgment for Creekside on the fraud claim, the appeal is dismissed. The trial court's summary judgment for Creekside on the breach-of-express-warranty claim is affirmed, but is reversed as to the breach-of-implied warranty claim(s). The case is remanded for the entry of orders and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; AND CASE REMANDED. MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.