Opinion ID: 789099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnson misunderstands Garrett

Text: 6 Garrett does not require a sentencing court to engage in a colloquy with a defendant before relying on a stipulation that the drug involved in the offense was crack. Defendants regularly stipulate to facts at trial that will increase their sentence if they are found guilty. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 571, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (noting that drug defendants often enter into a stipulation before trial as to drug amounts to be used at sentencing); United States v. Wren, 363 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir.2004) (upholding upward adjustment in prosecution for conspiracy to unlawfully transport firearms in interstate commerce based on trial stipulation that defendant supplied fifty firearms to co-conspirators); United States v. Collins, 272 F.3d 984, 987-88 (7th Cir.2001) (trial stipulation to drug quantity); United States v. Benjamin, 116 F.3d 1204, 1207 (7th Cir.1997) (trial stipulation to drug type). And plea agreements routinely include stipulations of facts relevant to sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4; United States v. Cyr, 337 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir.2003) (stipulation to managerial role in drug conspiracy); Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir.2003) (drug quantity); United States v. Wallace, 276 F.3d 360, 369 (7th Cir.2002) (drug type and quantity); United States v. Bradbury, 189 F.3d 200, 201-02 (2d Cir.1999) (offense level for conspiracy to commit kidnapping increased based on defendant's stipulation that conspiracy also involved marijuana trafficking); United States v. Miller, 166 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir.1999) (selecting offense guideline based on defendant's stipulation to using electronic mail to solicit teenagers to engage in sexual activity). We have never required district judges to engage in a colloquy with defendants concerning the voluntariness of stipulations or the sentencing implications of the stipulated facts before sanctioning a sentencing court's reliance on the undisputed facts. And Garrett does not create a special rule for stipulations concerning crack. 7 The defendant in Garrett, like Johnson, was sentenced under the higher base offense level for crack after he entered a stipulation identifying the drug he distributed as cocaine base (commonly referred to as `crack'). 189 F.3d at 610. We vacated the defendant's sentence, not because of any error by the district court in accepting or applying the stipulation, but because uncertainty in the state of the law when the stipulation was signed made it impossible to determine its intended meaning. Id. at 612. Before 1993 the sentencing guidelines did not define the term cocaine base, and some courts interpreted the term to include not just crack, but all forms of cocaine base. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 980 F.2d 1375, 1378 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1227 (6th Cir.1992); United States v. Pinto, 905 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Metcalf, 898 F.2d 43, 46 (5th Cir.1990). In 1993, Congress amended the guidelines to provide that `[c]ocaine base,' for purposes of this guideline, means `crack.' U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(D); see U.S.S.G. Manual, App. C, Amend. 487. In United States v. Adams, 125 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir.1997), we held that under the amended definition the higher base offense level for cocaine base applies only to the rocklike form of cocaine known on the street as crack, and that the lower base offense level for cocaine applies to all other forms of cocaine base, as well as cocaine powder. The parties in Garrett entered their stipulation before we decided Adams; thus, we were unable to determine the stipulation's intended meaning because, as a matter of law, the distinction between crack and cocaine base for purposes of sentencing was not clear. 189 F.3d at 612. 8 Johnson, on the other hand, entered the challenged stipulation almost six years after we decided Adams. Though the language of his stipulation is virtually identical to that of the defendant in Garrett, Johnson could not have misunderstood its legal effect. As with other contracts, courts interpret stipulations according to the objective intentions of the parties. United States v. Sandles, 80 F.3d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, we do not look beyond the four corners of the agreement unless the stipulation is reasonably subject to more than one interpretation. See Washington Hosp. v. White, 889 F.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (3d Cir.1989). The phrase cocaine base (commonly known as `crack') was ambiguous until we clarified the legal definitions of cocaine base and crack in Adams. Thus, the stipulation at issue in Garrett, because it was entered without the benefit of Adams was capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, while the same stipulation signed by Johnson years after Adams is not. Because Johnson's stipulation is clear on its face, we do not look beyond its four corners. We interpret his stipulation according to the objective intention of the parties — that the drug involved in his offense was specifically cocaine base in crack form. 9 In Garrett we acknowledged that a defendant's admission that he distributed crack, as opposed to another form of cocaine, must be knowing and voluntary, 189 F.3d at 611, but we did not — as Johnson contends — fashion new procedural hurdles that a district judge must comply with before accepting a stipulation or relying on it as evidence at sentencing. And plainly we did not create a special rule for stipulations concerning crack. Rather, we merely applied the rule for waiver — a defendant does not waive his right to contest a court's application of a sentencing adjustment by admitting the existence of the adjustment's factual predicate unless his admission was knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 951 (7th Cir.2003). However, a specific dialogue with the judge is not a necessary prerequisite to a valid waiver if there is other evidence in the record demonstrating a knowing and voluntary waiver. See United States v. Agee, 83 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir.1996) (expressly rejecting argument that appeal waiver is valid only if accepted after colloquy with defendant). Thus, most waivers are effective when set out in writing and signed. United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir.1995). Because the stipulation in Garrett was facially ambiguous, it followed that we could not accept it as a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant's claim that the drug he distributed was cocaine base but not crack. But Johnson had the benefit of Adams, and we need not look further to conclude that by entering a like stipulation, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to contest application of the higher base offense level for crack.