Opinion ID: 1457749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Beck's Constitutional Causes of Action

Text: We have little difficulty concluding that there was no probable cause to arrest Beck. As we have noted, Beck was arrested for threatening the officers, in violation of California Penal Code § 69. That provision may be violated by attempting to deter executive officers from their duties by threat or violence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 69 (emphasis added); see also In re M.L.B., 110 Cal.App.3d 501, 168 Cal.Rptr. 57 (1980). To assure that the statute does not violate the First Amendment by sanctioning constitutionally protected challenges to police officers' activities, see City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987), California courts adopted a narrowing construction. Under that construction, adopted as early as 1984, the statute's threat provision is applicable only to threat[s] of unlawful violence used in an attempt to deter an officer. In re Manuel G., 16 Cal.4th 805, 814-15, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880 (1997); see also Anderson, 151 Cal. App.3d 893, 895-96, 898, 199 Cal.Rptr. 150 (1984) (same). As a result of this limiting construction, the threats that have been held to violate § 69 have been unmistakably threats of violence, including `Me and my home boys are going to start killing you and your friends,' In re Manuel G, 16 Cal.4th at 819, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880; `I'm tired of you guys fucking with us, and you better watch out, we're going to start knocking you guys off,' id. ; `We'll get your house. We'll get your cars. You can't be with your family twenty-four hours a day,' In re M.L.B., 110 Cal. App.3d at 504, 168 Cal.Rptr. 57; and `I am going to kill you. This is a threat. You're dead.' People v. Hines, 15 Cal.4th 997, 1058, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388 (1997). Beck's statements bear scant resemblance to those that have been held to violate § 69. In the context of a heated discussion over zoning violations at a civic function, Beck told Chief Thouvenell that he didn't know who [he] was dealing with. At worst, if we suppose that the more profanity-laced version of Beck's comments that the officers recall is accurate, Beck may also have sworn and told the officers to back off. Regardless of the version of his statements we consider, Beck could not have been understood in context to threaten violence. In fact, both officers so declared, maintaining only that they thought he was threatening their job security. We conclude, as did the state court deciding Beck's § 995 motion, that there was no probable cause to arrest Beck for a violation of § 69, much less for a felony violation of that statute. He has therefore made the probable cause showing necessary to support both his First and Fourth Amendment causes of action. We next turn to the other requisite of the First Amendment cause of action, retaliatory motive.

We recognize that the district court did not have the opportunity to consider Hartman and, given the way it conducted the Smiddy I analysis, did not directly address the retaliation question. Although it will often be the better approach to remand in such cases for the district court to apply the appropriate standards, see In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir.2001), [t]he matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). We are comfortable resolving the Hartman retaliation issue on the facts of this case, where the new legal standard arose during the briefing of this appeal, the standard was brought to our attention by one of the parties, and, critically, the retaliation issue was extensively litigated in the district court, albeit under a somewhat different legal framework. See also Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1996) (courts may take up an issue for the first time on appeal when a change in law raises a new issue while an appeal is pending) (quotation in original omitted); Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir.1994) (Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt.) (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868). The reason the retaliation issue was litigated in the district court, including on the defendants' Smiddy I -based motion for summary judgment, is this: Under Smiddy I, proof that officials have deliberately or recklessly misled a prosecutor is sufficient to show that the prosecutor has not exercised independent judgment. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 663-64 (9th Cir.2007). As part of Beck's theory of deliberate falsehood, he argued that the officers were motivated by retaliatory animus to create a false case against him. The parties therefore litigated that question, which had first been raised in Beck's complaint. [15] Because the retaliation issue has therefore been present in the case from the start, all parties have had ample opportunity to investigate it and to bring forward evidence and legal arguments regarding it. Nor does the applicability of Hartman come as a surprise. Although Hartman was published after Beck's opening brief was due, it issued before the officers filed their answering brief. So, in addition to having addressed the retaliation issue throughout the litigation, the officers had a chance to address the Hartman frameworkas Beck did in his reply brief although they failed to do so. Further, because we are reviewing a summary judgment record, we resolve factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party and decide legal issues de novo. It therefore does not matter whether the officers might have paid more attention to rebutting retaliation had they addressed Hartman. We would still view the facts in the light most favorable to Beck. [16] In sum, the officers suffer no prejudice, see Kimes, 84 F.3d at 1126, if we consider here the same retaliation issue which the parties have already litigated in the context of the Smiddy I framework. For these reasons, and because it has already been four years since Beck's arrest and three years since this case was filed, considerations of judicial efficiency lead us to resolve the matter today. Justice would not be served by subjecting the parties to further pre-trial disputes over immunity when the matter can be clearly settled on the present summary judgment record.
Beck alleges that his arrest was retaliatory in two regards: First, he maintains that the officers arrested him in retaliation for his brusque comments to Chief Thouvenell at the bank opening party. Second, he contends that the officers's actions were the culmination of the extended dispute between Beck and Upland that began with his protests against the rubble removal contract and were in retaliation for that protest. On the summary judgment record, a rational jury could find for Beck on either theory, see Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 470, satisfying Hartman. As to the first theory: Beck presented evidence showing that he had a heated confrontation with Chief Thouvenell and Sergeant Mendenhall at the bank opening party. He could show that, in the heat of the moment, Thouvenell had told him that we should have taken care of you a long time ago. He also presented evidence from the Chamber of Commerce meeting, indicating that Thouvenell, Mendenhall, and Milhiser had been agitated over Beck's comments and that Thouvenell, in particular, had threatened that he would take legal action against Chamber members who interfered with [missing text]. Beck also could show that the police, the alleged victims of his crime, did not investigate the matter beyond making a few phone calls before going to the District Attorney to file charges and secure an arrest warrant. Further, the police report left out Thouvenell's hostile comment to Beck and reported the crime as a potential felony, rather than as a misdemeanor, suggesting that it was written to cast Beck in the worst possible light. As viewed most favorably to Beck, the facts in this regard resemble those in Duran, in which a police officer stopped and arrested a man who first exchanged a few heated words with him and who then made obscene gestures at him just before the arrest. 904 F.2d at 1374-75. In that case, we first held that probable cause for the stop was absent and then warned that it appeared that the officer stopped the plaintiff at least partly in retaliation for the insult he received from him. Id. at 1377-78. Beck's showing of a heated personal confrontation followed by a hasty arrest likewise could rationally support a finding of retaliatory animus. Even if it did not adopt the above theory based on personal retaliatory animus, a rational jury could find that the arrest was the culmination of Beck's long-running dispute with Upland over his efforts to block the rubble removal contract. Beck presented a substantial case that his protests created the tensions that led to his arrest. First, Beck could show that Chief Thouvenell himself had advised him to work out a deal with his competitor to share the contract. Second, he could demonstrate that his competitor had suggested investigating him for zoning violations after threatening that every agency in Upland would be down on top of [Beck]. Beck could present evidence that such investigations of existing nonconforming businesses were against city policy, and that, at the time of the relevant zoning changes, Upland's senior planner was not aware of one single enforcement action against an existing nonconforming use in Upland's history. Further, he could demonstrate that Chief Thouvenell and Sergeant Mendenhall were involved in the code enforcement action, and that Beck and Mendenhall had had a dispute when Mendenhall arrived to discuss the zoning problems with him. In addition to these showings, he could add the incidents we have already described, including, in particular, Chief Thouvenell's statements at the Chamber of Commerce meeting. In short, even if the jury did not believe that the police would retaliate against Beck solely because of the confrontation at the bank opening party, Beck could make out a case that the confrontation was the culmination of a longer conflict rooted in his First-Amendment-protected contract protest, and that the arrest was in retaliation for Beck's overall role in that conflict. Viewed in that light, the facts in this case closely parallel those in Hartman. The plaintiff in Hartman, Moore, made equipment used by the postal service and successfully lobbied against a policy that would have favored his competitors. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 252-54, 126 S.Ct. 1695. After he succeeded, Postal Service inspectors began to investigate him for various crimes; he was prosecuted but was cleared of all charges. Id. at 254, 126 S.Ct. 1695. Record evidence showed that the inspectors had pressured the U.S. Attorney to prosecute, had thin evidence to support their criminal allegations, and had been angered by Moore's activities. See Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871, 882-85 (D.C.Cir.2004). [17] Similarly, Beck lobbied against government action that would have favored his competitors and found himself under investigation. While Beck might or might not ultimately succeed in convincing a jury that his advocacy efforts prompted the zoning investigation that escalated into the arrest, a rational jury looking at the present record in the light most favorable to Beck could so infer. Thus, under either view of retaliatory animus, Beck has met the retaliation prong of Hartman. As we have discussed, he has also shown that probable cause was absent. He has therefore completed the Hartman showing, and his First Amendment cause of action survives.
The absence of probable cause also supports Beck's Fourth Amendment cause of action. The Smiddy I framework, however, requires more. For the reasons we have explained, we address that framework here. We need not, however, consider, as did the district court, whether the evidence Beck presented was sufficient to meet the plaintiff's Smiddy I burden of rebutting the presumption of prosecutorial independence. Smiddy I held that where invocations of privilege render relevant evidence concerning the prosecutor's decision to prosecute unavailable, no presumption of prosecutorial independence arises, and the plaintiff need not rebut it. 665 F.2d at 267-68. [18] Here, the prosecutor, Gaetano, invoked privilege to shield relevant evidence. The basis for this privilege-based limitation on the plaintiff's Smiddy I burden is the same concern that led the Supreme Court in Hartman to abjure a subjective inquiry into the prosecutor's state of mindnamely, that ascertaining that state of mind is likely to be exceedingly difficult. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264, 126 S.Ct. 1695. Where the prosecutor claims privilege regarding key factual inquiries essential to rebutting the Smiddy I presumption, it is unfair to the plaintiff to apply the presumption, and, pursuant to Smiddy I 's caveat, we may not do so. Gaetano did answer some questions with regard to his charging decision: He explained the nature of the process and said that he had not actually been ordered by Chief Thouvenell or Sergeant Mendenhall to prosecute Beck. But Gaetano twice asserted privilege when asked if he had been swayed or pressure[d] by the police in his charging decision. The answers to the questions Gaetano refused to answer are obviously central to the presumption of independent judgment that underlies Smiddy I 's causal analysis. Among the bases for overcoming the Smiddy I presumption is a showing that the district attorney was pressured or caused by the investigating officers to act contrary to his independent judgment. Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 266. With Gaetano's answers to questions directed precisely at that consideration off the table, Beck cannot be required to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption of Gaetano's independent judgment. Instead, the burden of showing that Gaetano acted independently falls on the officers. A rational jury could find that the officers had not met their burden to show that Gaetano's judgment was sufficiently independent as to amount to an intervening cause shielding them from liability. See id. at 267. The officers were the purported victims of the crime. Their own descriptions of the incident were at the core of the brief police report. Gaetano testified that he conducted no additional legal or factual investigation of his own. Even when privilege is not asserted, we have expressed concern about the application of the Smiddy I presumption where [t]he prosecutor's only information came from the police reports. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 484; Newman v. County of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir.2006); Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, in addition to the presence of police as victims and Gaetano's failure to do any additional investigation, Gaetano's decision to charge Beck's comments as a felony, as the police report suggested, and the omission of Thouvenell's comments to Beck in the police report all call the independence of Gaetano's judgment into serious question. In short, Beck has demonstrated that there was no probable cause for his arrest, and the officers have not met their burden to show that Gaetano's judgment acted as an intervening cause. We therefore hold that, on the present record, Beck's Fourth Amendment cause of action may go forward.