Opinion ID: 1584057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: constitutionality of florida's sentencing scheme

Text: Hayward has also challenged Florida's sentencing scheme as unconstitutional, making three claims: (1) imposition of the death penalty based on an eight-to-four jury recommendation is unconstitutional; (2) the standard jury instruction for premeditation is insufficient; and (3) the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), does not allow a system in which the jury may render an advisory nonunanimous verdict. We address each claim in turn. Hayward asserts that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2008), Florida's capital sentencing statute, does not authorize a bare majority advisory sentence and that a bare majority jury recommendation of death is unreliable, thereby depriving him of due process. [13] Hayward's claim has no merit for two reasons. First, section 921.141(3) makes specific reference to a sentencing recommendation by a majority of the jury, and we have previously recognized that Florida's capital sentencing statute allows the death penalty to be imposed even though the penalty-phase jury may determine by a mere majority vote whether to recommend death. State v. Steele, 921 So.2d 538, 550 (Fla.2005). Second, Hayward has provided the Court with no basis on which to find that the capital sentencing statute results in an unreliable or unconstitutional penalty. Therefore, Hayward's claim that his sentence is unconstitutionally unreliable is without merit and relief is denied on this claim. Hayward also asserts that the standard instruction for premeditated murder fails to properly inform the jury about the required premeditated design and that there must be proof of deliberation both before and at the time of the killing. At trial, without objection from Hayward, the jury was provided with the standard jury instruction for first-degree premeditated murder. Thus, this issue has not been preserved for appeal. Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 901 (Fla.2001) (Issues pertaining to jury instructions are not preserved for appellate review unless a specific objection has been voiced at trial.). However, even if the issue had been preserved, Hayward would not be entitled to relief because this Court has upheld the standard jury instructions on premeditated murder. See, e.g., Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla.1996) ([T]he standard jury instructions are sufficient to explain premeditation.); Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377 (Fla.1994) (holding that the standard first-degree murder instruction addresses all of the points discussed in McCutchen [14] and properly instructs the jury about premeditated design). Because we have previously rejected this same claim and found the standard instruction sufficiently instructs the jury as to premeditated design, this claim is without merit. As his last constitutional challenge, Hayward contends that Florida's capital sentencing scheme under section 921.141, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional based on Ring because it does not require that the finding of aggravators be made by a unanimous jury. He concedes that this Court has held the statute constitutional in the face of the same challenge but asks the Court to revisit its rulings. In this case, the trial court found in aggravation that Hayward had previously been convicted of three prior violent felonies (the 1988 second-degree murder and two armed robberies). We have repeatedly held that where a death sentence is supported by the prior violent felony aggravating factor, as is the case here, Florida's capital sentencing scheme does not violate Ring.  Peterson v. State, 2 So.3d 146, 160 (Fla.2009), petition for cert. filed, No. 09-5057 (U.S. June 25, 2009). Therefore, Hayward's challenges to Florida's capital sentencing scheme are without merit.