Opinion ID: 1249167
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Majority's Holding is Unsupported by Authority

Text: These considerations have prompted other state courts to reject the view of today's majority and that of the United States Supreme Court's plurality in Arizona v. Youngblood . See, e.g., Thorne v. Department of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 n. 9 (Alaska 1989) (We have construed the Alaska Constitution's due process clause to not require a showing of bad faith.); Lolly v. Delaware, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992) (rejecting bad faith as a grounds for Willits -type instruction); Hammond v. Delaware, 569 A.2d 81, 86-87 (Del. 1989) (We remain convinced that fundamental fairness, as an element of due process, requires the State's failure to preserve evidence that could be favorable to the defendant `[to] be evaluated in the context of the entire record.') (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)); Hawaii v. Matafeo, 71 Haw. 183, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (1990) (In certain circumstances, regardless of good or bad faith, the State may lose or destroy material evidence which is `so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair' without it.) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 61, 109 S.Ct. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring)); Idaho v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252, 265-67, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 277, 107 L.Ed.2d 258 (1989); Henderson, 582 N.E.2d at 497 (The rule under the due process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution is stricter than that stated in the Youngblood opinion... . The fact that the police did not act in bad faith when they negligently lost the potentially exculpatory evidence cannot in fairness be dispositive of the issue.); New Hampshire v. Smagula, 133 N.H. 600, 578 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1990) (applying a different test under the state constitution); New York v. Ramos, 147 A.D.2d 718, 538 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1989). The error in the majority's logic becomes apparent when one considers its espousal of the Willits instruction. [24] See generally Willits, 96 Ariz. at 186-91, 393 P.2d at 275-79. The majority concludes that an instruction permitting the jury to infer that the evidence would have been exculpatory cures the problem, no matter how significant the lost evidence. This, of course, is an assumption for which no empirical evidence exists. In fact, considerable evidence suggests the contrary. See generally Joseph M. Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 Ariz.L.Rev. 27 (1984); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 Neb.L.Rev. 71 (1990). In any event, the majority fails to explain why it is permissible for the jury to infer that the evidence might have been exculpatory but impermissible for the trial judge to do so as a matter of law under appropriate facts.