Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: whether evans received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Text: ś 433. The second issue raised in Evans pro se brief is whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Evans argues that trial counsel was ineffective by admitting guilt during voir dire proceedings. Defense counsel stated: And if the defendant is found guilty of those charges, and I have been up front with you and told you that he will be, the State must prove it, but that he will be found guilty of that charge or of the substantive charge of killing Beatrice Routh. I've been up front with you. After the State objected to counsel's stipulation of guilt, defense counsel explained that he was simply telling the jury up front that the State did have to meet its burden of proof, but they would reach the sentencing phase. The record reflects that these types of statements were made throughout voir dire. ś 434. Evans now claims that he was shocked by these admissions which totally abolished the defendant's right to presumption of innocence. Although Evans concedes that he agreed that such a strategy would be used during the guilt-phase, he now argues that he did not agree that such concessions would be made during voir dire. The record, however, reveals that Evans was present during each statement and did not object. [16] Evans did not object to these statements until the jury had been selected and the trial court was about to adjourn to return to Harrison County. ś 435. Moreover, this strategy was discussed in chambers while Evans was present. Prior to voir dire, trial counsel stated, I intend to tell the prospective jurors that we anticipate that we will not contest the State's contention that our client killed Beatrice Routh while in the course of a kidnapping. Evans raised no objection. Moreover, during a recess and prior to the continuation of voir dire, all parties were again present in chambers. Evans made no objection to the statements which had been made. ś 436. During voir dire of the first panel of potential jurors, the following exchange took place: MR. MARTIN: So you are automatic in your decision that if he's found guilty you willâ JUROR WILSON: He's already said he was guilty. (Laughter) ś 437. After the juror's remark, all parties again were present in chambers. Evans indicated that he needed to make a telephone call concerning a potential witness and waived his right to be present during the meeting. However, prior to Evans' departure to make the phone call, the trial judge asked if he had any problems regarding voir dire. Again, Evans made no objection. ś 438. During voir dire of the second panel, the trial court denied Evans' motion for individual voir dire due to pre-trial publicity. Evans then raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleging that he was not aware that defense counsel was going to confess guilt to the venire. Evans argues that this concession undermined the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and stated that he did not see how any juror sitting on that panel or those excused can come into this court and sit on that jury over there and have an impartial attitude as to the guilt or innocence of this defendant.... ś 439. Evans later filed a motion to proceed pro se at the sentencing phase due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Evans claimed counsel had been ineffective due to the failure to adequately seek out mitigating evidence, Evans did not allege that counsel had been ineffective due to the statements made during voir dire. Evans later withdrew this motion and agreed to proceed with counsel during the sentencing phase. Evans also indicated he wished to withdraw the ore tenus motion made at the conclusion of voir dire wherein he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from the concessions of guilt during voir dire. ś 440. When evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court uses the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1195 (Miss.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 588, 136 L.Ed.2d 517 (1996), this Court held: If an appellant is to be successful on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland, and adopted by this Court in Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468 (1984). The appellant must prove (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Stringer, 454 So.2d at 476. The burden of proving both prongs of the test is on the defendant. Id., McQuarter v. State, 574 So.2d 685, 687 (Miss.1990). Furthermore, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for the errors, the outcome of the case would have been different. Nicolaou v. State, 612 So.2d 1080, 1086 (Miss.1992); Ahmad v. State, 603 So.2d 843, 848 (Miss. 1992). ś 441. In Faraga v. State, 514 So.2d 295, 308 (Miss.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 894 (1988), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1263, 109 S.Ct. 25, 101 L.Ed.2d 976 (1988), this Court held that an attorney should not concede his client's guilt when that client had pled not guilty to the crime charged. However, this Court stated, [w]hen proof of certain facts is overwhelming, however, an attorney may find it strategically prudent to concede such facts while still denying that his client is guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. Id. Further, this Court held that [a]n attorney who, while sincerely trying to help his client, at the same time is open and honest with the jury is more likely to receive a sympathetic and open ear in his other arguments. Id. ś 442. In Faraga, this Court held that an attorney's admission that his client had been proven guilty of murder but not capital murder, was the product of a tactical decision and the best argument that could be made given the circumstances.... Id. ś 443. In Wiley v. State, 517 So.2d 1373 (Miss.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 2024, 100 L.Ed.2d 610 (1988), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1246, 109 S.Ct. 6, 101 L.Ed.2d 957 (1988), this Court was confronted with statements similar to those in the case sub judice. There, defense counsel stated during opening argument that I feel fairly certain based on the proof that the State is going to offer, that y'all are going to return a verdict of guilty. I think that the State is going to bring forth evidence that's going to convince y'all beyond a reasonable doubt that William Wiley did shoot Mr. Turner. Id. at 1382. ś 444. In Wiley, this Court held that such statements may have been trial strategy and again noted that candor at the guilt phase may help the defendant in the sentencing phase.... Id. This Court concluded that Wiley was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel. ś 445. Statements made by defense counsel in the case sub judice are extremely similar to those presented in Wiley. Here, trial strategy was to concede guilt and present evidence during the sentencing phase in mitigation of the sentence. This strategy was clearly reasonable given the prior ruling by the trial court that Evans' confessions were admissible. Defense counsel explained to the trial court that they were using this strategy because we could not plead guilty unless they wished to waive several issues for appellate review. From the record, it is apparent that the actions of defense counsel were not deficient. ś 446. Moreover, Evans cannot demonstrate prejudice as required by the second prong of the Strickland analysis. In United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991), the Court held that prejudice is presumed when defense counsel argued that no reasonable doubt existed concerning the defendant's guilt. In Swanson, the Court held that counsel's confession lessened the government's burden of proving guilt and caused a breakdown in the adversarial system such that the defendant should not be required to show prejudice. Id. at 1073 (citations omitted). ś 447. Unlike Swanson, defense counsel did not relieve the State of their burden of proof nor did counsel concede that Evans was guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, counsel merely predicted that the jury would likely find Evans guilty based on the State's proof. Prejudice is therefore not presumed. ś 448. In Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1198-99 (Miss.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 588, 136 L.Ed.2d 517 (1996), this Court held that where prejudice is not presumed, the appellant bore the burden of proving that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different but for counsel's statements. Id. (citing Nicolaou v. State, 612 So.2d at 1086; Ahmad v. State, 603 So.2d at 848.) ś 449. There was overwhelming evidence of Evans' guilt. The jury had before it three confessions wherein Evans detailed the sexual assault, strangulation, and murder of Beatrice Louise Routh. Moreover, the jury heard the testimony of Betty and Sherry Lynn Vincent, which identified Evans as the person with whom Beatrice left Jones Park on August 1, 1991. In light of the evidence presented at trial, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different but for statements made by counsel during voir dire. This issue is without merit. ś 450. In his pro se rebuttal brief, Evans, for the first time, argues that an actual conflict of interest existed between himself and defense counsel and therefore prejudice is presumed. Evans argues that his refusal to consent to the trial strategy utilized by defense counsel, i.e. the concession of guilt during voir dire, gave rise to an actual conflict of interest which is demonstrated by the Motion for Determination of the Role of Counsel filed by defense counsel. ś 451. On July 23, 1993, defense counsel filed a Motion for a Determination of the Role of Counsel In These Proceedings wherein defense counsel acknowledged that the trial court had advised Evans that he would be allowed to participate in the trial. Counsel indicated that the philosophy and tactics followed and used by counsel and the Defendant herein are not congruous and, in fact, often oppose one another. As such, counsel sought guidance from the court as to the resolution of conflicts which may arise during the course of the trial regarding such matters as the presentation of witnesses, questioning of witnesses, voir dire, and opening and closing statements. ś 452. After close review of the motion, it is apparent that defense counsel sought guidance from the trial court in the event that a conflict arose. Although it is evident that Evans and defense counsel did not agree on every aspect of trial preparation, the motion does not compel the conclusion that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest which affected his representation of Evans at trial. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court held that prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that an `actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' ( quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). Moreover, the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction on appeal. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697-98, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). ś 453. There is simply no evidence in this record to demonstrate that defense counsel did not function in a loyal and capable manner. As such, the mere possibility that Evans and defense counsel might have had a possible conflict is insufficient to impugn his conviction. ś 454. The record reveals no order entered by the trial court in response to this motion nor does the record indicate that a hearing on the motion was held. Evans, relying upon United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir.1992), argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on this motion in order to determine whether a conflict existed. However, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717-18, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the Court held that a trial court is under no duty to inquire into conflict on its own. Unless a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists the court need not initiate an inquiry. Id. at 347, 100 S.Ct. at 1717. The motion filed by defense counsel simply requested guidance on the procedures to be employed if an actual conflict between Evans and defense counsel arose. Without more, the trial court was under no duty to conduct a hearing on this motion. ś 455. Moreover, the burden lay with Evans and his defense counsel to obtain a ruling on this motion. This Court has repeatedly held that [i]t is the responsibility of the movant to obtain a ruling from the court on motions ... and failure to do so constitutes a waiver. Johnson v. State, 461 So.2d 1288, 1290 (Miss.1984); Minor v. State, 396 So.2d 1031 (Miss.1981); Martin v. State, 354 So.2d 1114 (Miss.1978); Conn v. State, 260 So.2d 471 (Miss.1972); Marr v. State, 248 Miss. 281, 159 So.2d 167 (1963); Grant v. Planters' Bank, 5 Miss. (4 How.) 326 (1840).