Opinion ID: 1706978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the plaintiffs failed to offer legally sufficient evidence on the elements of and damages claimed for emotional distress.

Text: ¶ 30. Valley Gas contends that the Plaintiffs failed to offer legally sufficient evidence in order to recover damages for mental anguish. Valley Gas contends that at most its conduct was simple negligence and that an award of damages for emotional distress or mental anguish required a showing of some physical manifestation of emotional distress or medically cognizable emotional distress to support an award of damages. As a result, Valley Gas contends that the court erred by granting Instructions P-27A and P-30 because the evidence did not support the granting of such instructions. ¶ 31. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to award damages for emotional distress or mental anguish and that the jury's verdict should be upheld. The Plaintiffs contend that, under current caselaw, they were not required to prove an outward manifestation of mental anguish as long as the mental anguish is a natural and reasonably foreseeable consequence of the wrongful act. ¶ 32. In Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v. Ferguson, this Court stated that where appellants question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict in favor of the appellees: The applicable standard of review may be found in Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Miss.1992), which states that this Court should consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, [we are] required to reverse and render. On the other hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 659 (Miss.1995) (quoting Munford, Inc., 597 So.2d at 1284). ¶ 33. This Court has held that [m]ental anguish is a nebulous concept ... and requires substantial proof for recovery. Morrison v. Means, 680 So.2d 803, 805 (Miss. 1996). In Morrison, the Court discussed the standard for recovery for mental anguish as follows: This Court has held that recovery for mental anguish can be allowable even when there is no presence of a physical injury. Where there is something about the defendant's conduct which evokes outrage or revulsion, done intentionallyor even unintentionally yet the results being reasonably foreseeableCourts can in certain circumstances comfortably assess damages for mental and emotional stress, even though there has been no physical injury. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898, 902 (Miss.1981). Stated another way, the standard is whether defendant's behavior is malicious, intentional, willful, wanton, grossly careless, indifferent or reckless. Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 659 (Miss. 1995). If there is outrageous conduct, no injury is required for recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress or mental anguish. Id. If the case of ordinary garden variety negligence, the plaintiff must prove some sort of injury, whether it be physical or mental. See Wirtz v. Switzer, 586 So.2d 775, 784 (Miss.1991); and Devers, 405 So.2d at 902. If the conduct is not malicious, intentional or outrageous, there must be some sort of demonstrative harm, and said harm must have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Strickland v. Rossini, 589 So.2d 1268, 1275 (Miss.1991). Morrison, 680 So.2d at 806. Thus, in order to determine what level of proof that the Plaintiffs were required to meet, what type of conduct occurred between Valley Gas and the Plaintiffs must first be reviewed. Id. ¶ 34. Valley Gas asserts that at most that its conduct would be nothing more than simple negligence. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that Valley Gas' conduct at the least amounted to gross negligence, outrageous conduct, and/or reckless and wanton disregard for the safety of others. However, we find that a review of the conduct between Valley Gas and the Plaintiffs shows that Valley Gas' conduct could not have exceeded the level of simple negligence. ¶ 35. The evidence in the instant case shows that an underground pipeline was damaged by a City of Greenwood employee in which the pipeline was pulled above ground with a blowing leak. Valley Gas' service representative, Charles Reed, was contacted, and Reed responded to the accident scene within fifteen minutes. Upon his arrival, Reed capped the blowing leak and performed a soap test to determine whether gas was still leaking from the broken line. Then, Reed walked along the damaged line for fifteen minutes performing a nose test in an effort to detect any other underground leaks. However, Reed did not conduct a underground leak test employing the use of a leak machine as required by Valley Gas' maintenance procedures. ¶ 36. While Reed, with over twenty-five years of work experience with Valley Gas, believed that the nose test was sufficient and was all that was required for that type of leak, the jury found that Reed breached his duty by failing to conduct an underground leak test with a leak machine, but such conduct can not be said to amount to anything beyond the ordinary garden variety of negligence. We hold that Valley Gas' conduct simply does not rise to the level of `malicious, intentional, willful, wanton, grossly careless, indifferent or reckless.' Morrison, 680 So.2d at 806 (quoting Leaf River, 662 So.2d at 659). Therefore, without culpable conduct higher than the ordinary garden variety of negligence present, the Plaintiffs, in order to recover for emotional distress or mental anguish, had to show some sort of demonstrative harm, and said harm must have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Morrison, 680 So.2d at 806 ( citing Strickland v. Rossini, 589 So.2d 1268, 1275 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 37. The Plaintiffs presented the following testimony with regard to emotional distress or mental anguish of each individual plaintiff. Plaintiff Mamie Duren testified that she was nervous and sick during the course of the fire and that losing everything she owned made her feel real bad and sad. Plaintiff Nancy Walker said that she could not describe the feeling she experienced, but it was a bad feeling. Plaintiff Annie Fair testified that the fire scared me to death and that she felt bad as a result of losing her things. Plaintiff Tracee Stanley testified that she was sad because we had just moved in and I was wondering where I was going to go from there, me and my children. Ollie Aldridge, daughter of Plaintiff Sherman Aldridge, testified that the fire had a bad effect on him because it was just like he was in another world and stuff like that. He just didn't act like himself. He didn't want to go home with any of my brothers or nothing. He just wanted to be with me, so I just kept him with me ... [his mental condition] was a lot better then but now its worse. Plaintiff Glenn testified that when she saw the fire she was upset and hurt. Plaintiff Karo Loggins testified that the experience made him feel bad and that the loss was just pain. ¶ 38. However, Plaintiff Earthlena Davis testified that she was scared of the fire and had to be taken to the hospital following the fire because of an already existing bad heart and nerves. Plaintiff Henrietta Billingsley, although deceased before trial, testified in her deposition that she went to her doctor after the fire because it made [her] real nervous and she couldn't sleep at all ... I could see that blaze all through the night. Her doctor gave her a prescription for her nerves. Finally, Plaintiff Nora Corder had to be taken to the hospital for smoke inhalation as a result of the fire. Corder also testified that it was a terrible feeling to watch her house burning. ¶ 39. This Court has consistently held that where a defendant's conduct constitutes nothing more than simple negligence and the plaintiff fails to produce any proof of an injury that the plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to warrant the recovery for emotional distress or mental anguish. See Morrison, 680 So.2d at 807 (stating that plaintiff failed to present enough evidence to support recovery for mental anguish where only evidence was a loss of sleep and bad feelings); Strickland, 589 So.2d at 1275-76 (holding evidence insufficient to support recovery for mental anguish where only evidence presented was that plaintiff was depressed, very upset, and not able to sleep); see also Devers, 405 So.2d at 901-02 (holding that plaintiff not entitled to recovery for mental anguish where plaintiff suffered no physical injury, developed no sickness, and no medically cognizable mental injury). Therefore, we find, and Valley Gas concedes, that the only plaintiffs that presented sufficient evidence to even make a jury issue as to whether damages for mental anguish should be given were Plaintiffs Davis, Billingsley, and Corder, for they were the only plaintiffs to present evidence of a possible injury and not just feelings of depression. ¶ 40. Furthermore, Valley Gas contends that the trial court erred by granting Instructions P-27A and P-30. This Court has stated that in order `[t]o be entitled to a jury instruction, the proponent must show that the proposed jury instruction is supported by the evidence and the instruction is the correct statement of the law.' West v. Sanders Clinic for Women, P.A., 661 So.2d 714, 721 (Miss.1995) (quoting Turner v. Temple, 602 So.2d 817, 823 (Miss.1992); Copeland v. City of Jackson, 548 So.2d 970, 973 (Miss. 1989)). ¶ 41. The trial court granted Instruction P-27A which provided the following: Should you find for the Plaintiffs in this case, you are instructed by the Court that in awarding such damages, if any, as you deem reasonable to the plaintiff(s), you may consider mental pain and anguish such as is shown by a preponderance of the evidence for the plaintiff(s) who sustained no bodily or physical injury only if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a) The results of the conduct of the defendant and/or its employees and agents were reasonably foreseeable; and (b) The conduct of the defendant and/or its employees and agents evokes outrage or revulsion. As apparent from the above discussion regarding the conduct of Valley Gas and its employees, this instruction should not have been given because the evidence at trial did not support a finding that Valley Gas' conduct evoked outrage or revulsion, and therefore, the trial court erred by granting Instruction P-27A. ¶ 42. The trial court additionally granted Instruction P-30 which provides as follows: Should you find for the Plaintiffs in this case, you are instructed by the Court that in awarding such damages, if any, as you deem reasonable to the plaintiff(s), you may consider mental pain and anguish such as is shown by a preponderance of the evidence for the plaintiff(s) who sustained bodily or physical injury. Additionally, supported by the discussion above, we hold that the trial court correctly granted this instruction to the jury because there was sufficient evidence that Plaintiffs Davis, Billingsley, and Corder may have suffered some sort of bodily or physical injury as a result of the fire. ¶ 43. As a result, we find that the jury's verdict awarding damages for mental anguish as to all Plaintiffs, with the exception of Plaintiffs Davis, Billingsley, and Corder, was unsupported by any sufficient evidence. We affirm the jury's verdict as to Plaintiffs Davis, Billingsley, and Corder as being supported by sufficient evidence, and since the trial court erred in granting Instruction P-27A, we reverse and remand for a new trial as to damages only for the remaining Plaintiffs, i.e., Plaintiffs Duren, Aldridge, Fair, Glenn, Prayer, Stanley, Loggings, and the Walkers.