Opinion ID: 2049354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First considered is defendant's claim regarding intolerable governmental participation in the criminal enterprise here involved.

Text: More specifically, it is contended trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict predicated upon what is, as aforesaid, sometimes denominated entrapment as a matter of law. This terminology is to us, in part, misleading. Therefore we shall, when appropriate, here refer to it as a take-back entrapment. Illustratively, Overmann contends he received LSD from Waterman, a government informer, and resold the same contraband to Ernst, a government agent then working in concert with Waterman. It is thus evident defendant does not invoke the usual entrapment defense. In support of his position defendant cites: United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 905-906 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Mahoney, 355 F.Supp. 418, 423, 426-427 (E.D.La.1973); United States v. Chisum, 312 F.Supp. 1307, 1312 (C.D.Cal. 1970); State v. McKinney, 108 Ariz. 436, 501 P.2d 378, 381 (1972); People v. Strong, 21 Ill.2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1961); State v. Sainz, 84 N.M. 259, 501 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1972); Lynn v. State, 505 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Okl.Cr.App.1973). See also United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161, 162-164 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hayes, 477 F.2d 868, 872-873 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rodriguez, 474 F.2d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dillet, 265 F.Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y.1966); United States v. Silva, 180 F.Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y.1959); State v. Boccelli, 105 Ariz. 495, 467 P.2d 740 (1970); People v. Dollen, 53 Ill.2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879, 881-882 (1972); People v. Carmichael, 80 Ill.App.2d 293, 225 N.E.2d 458 (1967); State v. Weinzerl, 495 S.W.2d 137, 140-142 (Mo.Ct.App.1973). Under the theory espoused in Oquendo and Bueno, both supra, if an accused produces evidence disclosing (1) the government, through an agent or informer, supplied drugs to defendant, and (2) the government, through an agent or informer, later reappropriates any of those drugs from the accused, then a take-back entrapment is shown. Under those circumstances the State must come forth with evidence which contradicts either of the above two elements. In event the State fails to so do then an accused is entitled to a dismissal as a matter of law. If, however, the State does produce evidence sufficient to create a fact issue as to a takeback entrapment the case should be accordingly submitted to the jury. See United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d at 164; United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d at 906. On the issue at hand defendant, as previously stated, testified (1) he bought 100 LSD pills from informer Waterman for $100 about three weeks prior to the sale upon which he now stands charged; (2) he received a desperate sounding phone call from Waterman who then offered to buy back the drugs previously sold to defendant; (3) in course of that call Waterman stated something like you got to give me back my dope; (4) upon arrival at defendant's apartment Waterman negotiated with defendant, finally offering $2 per tab; and (5) as a result thereof defendant resold 50 tabs of the same LSD for $100 to Michael Ernst, the Illinois special agent. Carolyn Gray, testifying for defendant, stated that after a visit by Waterman to the apartment occupied by her and defendant some three weeks prior to time of the sale here involved, she observed a packet containing orange tabs in a bedroom where defendant and Waterman had previously visited. On the other hand Officer Ernst testified he was present when Waterman called defendant to arrange the instantly involved purchase and there was then no discussion as to a buy-back of the same LSD which had been previously sold by Waterman to defendant. Furthermore, the evidence discloses defendant (1) had other customers to whom he could sell LSD; (2) was using two or three tabs each day during the three week interval after his purchase from Waterman; (3) within that time frequently gave LSD to his friends; and (4) had just lost a large quantity of drugs to another individual who had stolen them. Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the foregoing served to create a jury issue as to whether the LSD purchased by Officer Ernst from defendant was the same LSD previously sold by informant Waterman to defendant. See State v. Pardock, 215 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1974); State v. McPherson, 171 N. W.2d 870, 871 (Iowa 1969). In other words the second element of a take-back entrapment defense, as heretofore interpreted, was rebutted. Consequently, trial court did not err in overruling defendant's directed verdict motion.