Opinion ID: 1057414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “Jurisdictional” vs. “Claim-Processing”

Text: Distinction and Our Inquiry The majority is correct, of course, in noting that the Supreme Court has created a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling applies to suits against the United States. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990).1 But that presumption is not universally applicable. As the majority admits, it has no application to certain kinds of “more absolute” statutes of limitations. See John R. Sand 1 In Irwin, the petitioner was fired from his job by the Veterans’ Administration (“VA”). See id. at 90. He filed a complaint with the VA, alleging that it had unlawfully discharged him on the basis of race and physical disability. See id. at 91. The VA dismissed the complaint, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) affirmed that decision. See id. The petitioner had the right to file a civil action in district court but was required to do so within 30 days of the EEOC’s affirmance. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)). The petitioner filed a complaint in district court 44 days after his attorney’s office received the EEOC’s notice, which was only 29 days after the date on which he claimed to have received the notice. See id. The district court held that the limitations period began when the attorney’s office received the notice and granted the VA’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that compliance with § 2000e-16(c)’s time limit was a jurisdictional requirement. See id. The Supreme Court held that § 2000e-16(c)’s time limit was not jurisdictional; instead, the Court held that “the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.” Id. at 95–96. Because the principles of equitable tolling did “not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect,” however, the Court affirmed the dismissal. See id. at 96. WONG V. BEEBE 61 & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008).2 These “more absolute” statutes “seek not so much to protect a defendant’s case-specific interest in timeliness as to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity, or promoting judicial efficiency.” Id. at 133. The Court has described the time limits in such statutes of limitations as “jurisdictional.” See id. at 134. The majority believes the distinction between these “more absolute” or “jurisdictional” statutes, to which courts cannot create exceptions based on equitable considerations, and mere “claim-processing rules,” to which Irwin’s rebuttable presumption applies, is “critical for present purposes.” See Op. at 8–9. The majority calls § 2401(b) a “quintessential claim-processing rule,” see Op. at 18, but calling something 2 In John R. Sand & Gravel, the petitioner filed an action in the Court of Federal Claims, asserting that various Environmental Protection Agency activities on land it leased for mining purposes amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its leasehold rights. See id. at 132. The Government initially asserted that the claims were untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2501, which provides that “[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2501). The Government later conceded that certain claims were timely, and subsequently won on the merits. See id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the action was untimely filed and should have been dismissed for that reason. See id. at 133. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that compliance with § 2501’s time limit is a jurisdictional requirement. See id. at 138–39. As noted below, the Court also explained the difference between jurisdictional statutes of limitations and those to which Irwin’s presumption can be applied. See id. at 133–34. 62 WONG V. BEEBE a name does not change its nature.3 And the critical question is not whether we characterize § 2401(b) as a “quintessential claim-processing rule,” see Op. at 18, but whether Congress mandated that its prescribed time limit be jurisdictional, see Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) (noting that “Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to a rule that [courts] would prefer to call a claim-processing rule.”).4 To make this determination, the court must “look to see if there is any clear indication that Congress wanted the rule to be jurisdictional.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And, to find such a “clear indication,” we must examine the statute’s “text, 3 The majority ignores the simple truth contained in the aphorism ascribed, perhaps apocryphally, to Abraham Lincoln: “If you call a tail a leg, how many legs has a dog? Five? No, calling a tail a leg don’t make it a leg.” 4 In Henderson, the petitioner, a veteran of the Korean War who had been given a 100-percent disability rating for paranoid shizophrenia, filed a claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) for supplemental benefits based on his need for in-home care. See id. at 1201. The VA regional office and Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the petitioner’s claim. See id. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court, but he missed the 120-day filing deadline by 15 days. See id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a)). The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, treating compliance with the 120-day deadline as a jurisdictional requirement. See id. at 1202. The Federal Circuit affirmed. See id. Because § 7266(a) “provide[d] no clear indication that Congress wanted the provision to be treated as having jurisdictional attributes,” the Supreme Court reversed and held that the 120-day limitation period was not jurisdictional. Id. at 1205–06. WONG V. BEEBE 63 context and relevant historical treatment.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010).5