Opinion ID: 788799
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Taking of Property or Exercise of Control Over Property

Text: 14 We concluded in Corona-Sanchez that § 484(a) of the California Penal Code proscribes conduct that falls outside the categorical definition of a theft offense, in part because the statute allows a conviction for theft when the defendant has neither taken, nor exercised control over, the property. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1208. We noted that § 484(a) prohibits the theft of labor and the solicitation of false credit reporting. See id. at 1207-08. In contrast, the definition of grand theft in § 487(c) proscribes only the taking of property and therefore excludes the theft of labor and the solicitation of false credit reporting. Cal.Penal Code § 487(c) (West 2003) (When the property is taken from the person of another.); see Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1208. Thus, setting aside aiding and abetting liability, the conduct prohibited by § 487(c) falls within the generic definition of theft offense because § 487(c) requires a taking of property or an exercise of control over property. See Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1205. 15 At the same time, however, we also reasoned in Corona-Sanchez that a defendant could be convicted of violating § 484(a) for aiding and abetting a theft and noted that aiding and abetting liability in California is quite broad, extending even to promotion and instigation. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1208. We explained that, because a conviction under § 484(a) could be based on an aiding and abetting theory, it would not be apparent from reference to the statute of conviction alone to discern whether or not the criminal act was embraced within the generic definition of theft offense. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1208. 16 Here, just as a defendant can be convicted of the substantive offense of theft under § 484(a) for merely aiding and abetting a theft, it appears that a defendant also can be convicted of the substantive offense of grand theft person under § 487(c) based on an aiding and abetting theory. See People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318, 1325-26 (1984) (en banc) (holding that defendant is liable under aiding and abetting theory if he act[ed] with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense); People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 602 (1990) (discussing jury instructions explaining aiding and abetting theory on which grand theft conviction could be based). See also People v. Mitchell, 183 Cal.App.3d 325, 228 Cal.Rptr. 286, 291 (1986) (concluding that sufficient evidence supported conviction for robbery based on aiding and abetting liability). Therefore, as with § 484(a), it would not be apparent from the reference to § 487(c) alone whether or not the criminal act was embraced within the generic definition of theft offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). See Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1208. Because a defendant can be convicted of a substantive violation of § 487(c) based on an aiding and abetting theory alone, some of the conduct proscribed by § 487(c) falls outside the generic definition of theft offense. We therefore conclude that grand theft under § 487(c) of the California Penal Code does not facially qualify as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(G) under the categorical approach.