Opinion ID: 451606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Merchant's Probation

Text: 10 Whether Merchant was on probation when the state officers searched his house turns on whether the state court judge stayed the entire sentencing order or only that portion imposing a jail term as a condition of probation. The district court held that Merchant had been on probation since November 14, 1980, because it found that the state judge intended to stay only the jail sentence. This issue is governed by state law. See United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.1983) (validity of state probation condition is governed by state law). 11 In its November 14 order, the state court sentenced Merchant to a three-year prison term, suspended; a three-year term of probation, effective immediately; and a six-month jail term, 2 as a condition of probation. 3 At that hearing, Merchant and his attorney protested the probation order as unduly harsh. Merchant's attorney stated, What I would like to do, you Honor, I do feel strongly about the second count so I would like to file a Notice of Appeal, if I could at this time. The trial judge responded, Yes. The sentence will be stayed pending your appeal. 12 The government contends that when Merchant's attorney referred to the second count, he was indicating his intention to appeal only the six-month jail confinement, and when the judge responded that the sentence would be stayed, he too was referring only to the jail term. In light of In re Kennick, 128 Cal.App.3d 959, 180 Cal.Rptr. 731 (1982), we disagree. 13 In Kennick, the California Court of Appeal held that a stay of execution of a judgment stays the entire judgment, unless the trial court specifies otherwise. 128 Cal.App.3d at 963. That case, like the one before us, involved whether a trial judge had stayed both probation and a jail term or only the latter. The court concluded that an intention to stay the jail term by itself cannot be assumed; there must be a specific statement of the trial court to that effect. Id. 14 We do not find any such specific statement in the record before us. The trial judge stayed the sentence; we cannot speculate that he meant to stay only the jail term. Moreover, at no time from the November 14 hearing to the date of the search was Merchant ever assigned a probation officer or required to report to one. And finally, when the state court granted the prosecution's motion for modification or clarification of Merchant's probation terms it stated that it was reinstat[ing] the probation, and not that it had been in effect all along. 15 These facts, viewed in light of Kennick, compel us to conclude that the probationary terms did not go into effect at the November 14 sentencing. The district court's conclusion to the contrary was error. 16 We next consider the effect of the state court's February 27 order. The court's stay of execution divested it of jurisdiction to modify the judgment during the pendency of the appeal, Kennick, 128 Cal.App.3d at 962, 180 Cal.Rptr. 731, but did not divest it of jurisdiction to revoke the stay of execution, Stuart v. Superior Court, 94 Cal.App.3d 182, 184-85, 156 Cal.Rptr. 289, 291 (1979). However, the court's attempt to modify the stay was ineffective because Merchant was not given adequate notice. 17 When the assistant district attorney moved for a modification or clarification of the probation terms, she notified Merchant's attorney, but did not notify Merchant. At the motion hearing, Merchant's attorney was present, but Merchant was not. No waiver of his presence appears in the record. The motion argument occurred on a Friday and the search was conducted just four days later, on Tuesday. During the interim, the assistant district attorney apparently did not make any effort to contact Merchant, and Merchant's attorney did not contact him either. Merchant had no idea that his probation had been reinstated or that he was subject to a warrantless search until the officers arrived at his door. 18 Notice is perhaps the most fundamental of due process rights. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (notice is one of the minimum requirements of due process); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502, 92 S.Ct. 582, 586, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S.Ct. 240, 242, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); see also Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864) (Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.). The principle of adequate notice is interwoven throughout our system of criminal justice. It applies at all stages of a criminal prosecution, from institution of criminal proceedings, see, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 277 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir.1960) (due process requires that an indictment be sufficiently clear to apprise accused of the crime charged), to sentencing, see, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 362, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 1206, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion) (denial of due process to sentence defendant to death on basis of presentence report he was not allowed to see). 19 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the loss of liberty entailed in a probation revocation hearing is a serious deprivation requiring that the probationer be accorded due process protections. Id. at 781-82, 93 S.Ct. at 1759. Although a probationer is not entitled to the full panoply of trial-type protections, he is entitled to a preliminary probable cause hearing and a more comprehensive final revocation hearing. Id. at 786, 93 S.Ct. at 1761. The probationer must be given notice of each hearing and an opportunity to be heard at each. Id. 20 Several other circuits have concluded, however, that Gagnon does not apply in the context of a proceeding to extend probation. These courts have held that the liberty interest at stake in an extension proceeding is less significant than in a revocation proceeding, and, therefore, a preextension hearing is not a constitutionally mandated right. See, e.g., Forgues v. United States, 636 F.2d 1125, 1127 (6th Cir.1980) (per curiam); United States v. Cornwell, 625 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066, 101 S.Ct. 794, 66 L.Ed.2d 610 (1980); United States v. Carey, 565 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir.1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953, 98 S.Ct. 1582, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978); Skipworth v. United States, 508 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir.1975). 4 21 We deal here with neither a revocation nor an extension of probation, but with what amounted to an initial imposition of probation. The liberty interests at stake here are not as significant as those involved in a revocation proceeding, for the February 27 order did not make Merchant immediately subject to incarceration. But they are considerably more significant than those involved in an extension proceeding, for Merchant was not subject to any restrictions on his liberty prior to the court's order. 22 The terms of Merchant's probation imposed substantial burdens on his fourth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The terms of probation required Merchant to submit to searches at any time, by any law enforcement officer, with or without probable cause. Such terms impose a substantial burden on a fundamental right. This was a sufficient intrusion upon Merchant's liberty to require that he be given notice. 23 We find support for our conclusion in Wheeler v. United States, 640 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.1981). There, the trial court issued an order restricting Wheeler's correspondence privileges in prison, in order to protect several trial witnesses from harassment. Wheeler was not notified that the order had been sought, was not present when the court issued the order, and was not formally notified of the order until four years after it was issued. Id. at 1118. This court concluded that the order imposed a substantial burden on Wheeler's first amendment rights, and, therefore, due process required that [u]nless the circumstances were unusually compelling, the trial court should have held a hearing, with prior notice to Wheeler, before it issued the order. Id. at 1122 (footnote omitted). 24 The government contends that because Merchant's attorney was present at the February 27 hearing, it was certainly reasonable ... to infer that [Merchant] was aware of the court's order before the search was conducted. We cannot be satisfied with inferences of notice; we must have proof of it. Merchant's counsel admits that he did not notify Merchant. Nor does the government assert that state authorities made any efforts to notify Merchant directly. 25 The right to notice under the fifth and sixth amendments is personal to the defendant. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); cf. Wheeler, 640 F.2d at 1118 & n. 3, 1122-23 (notice and hearing required before prisoner's correspondence privileges restricted even though prisoner probably was aware of restriction shortly after it was imposed). Moreover, a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all stages of a criminal proceeding against him. See Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 272-73 (9th Cir.1972). This right is protected by rule in federal courts, Fed.R.Crim.P. 43, and by statute in California, Cal.Penal Code Sec. 1043 (West 1970 & 1984 Supp.). Merchant was not present at the February 27 hearing, the record does not show any waiver, and the court did not even inquire about his absence. Notice to and the presence of Merchant's attorney does not suffice. 5 26 Finally, we find no reasons why Merchant could not have been notified of the motion or the February 27 hearing. Merchant had not absconded after the initial sentencing; the state authorities knew exactly where he was. The state could have contacted Merchant to tell him of the court's order, or could have postponed the search until it could be sure that Merchant had received notice from the court. 27 On the facts before us, we conclude that Merchant was not on probation on March 3, when the state authorities arrived to search his home. The absence of notice to Merchant renders the February 27 order a nullity.