Opinion ID: 1214384
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dunlea's CSA Claim

Text: Dappen's motion to dismiss the CSA claim relied exclusively on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations had run and, therefore, that the complaint had failed to state a claim. The circuit court granted the motion on that basis alone; [5] therefore, we need not consider the other defenses raised in Dappen's answer to the complaint. [6] It is well settled that: A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle him or her to relief. Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 66 Haw. 194, 198, 658 P.2d 883, 886 (1983) (quoting Midkiff [ v. Castle & Cooke, Inc. ], 45 Haw. [409,] 414, 368 P.2d [887,] 890 [(1962) ] ); Marsland v. Pang, 5 Haw.App. 463, 474, 701 P.2d 175, 185-86, cert denied, 67 Haw. 686, 744 P.2d 781 (1985). We must therefore view a plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to him or her in order to determine whether the allegations contained therein could warrant relief under any alternate theory. Ravelo, 66 Haw. at 199, 658 P.2d at 886. For this reason, in reviewing the circuit court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint in this case, our consideration is strictly limited to the allegations of the complaint, and we must deem those allegations to be true. Au [v. Au], 63 Haw. [210,] 214, 626 P.2d [173,] 177 (1981). Baehr, 74 Haw. at 545, 852 P.2d at 52. Thus, accepting the allegations of Dunlea's complaint as true, we must decide whether it appears beyond doubt that she can prove no set of facts in support of her claim of CSA that would entitle her to relief under any theory. Although count III of the complaint alleged a cause of action under a California statute, we note that the circuit court's determination that Hawai`i law applies with respect to the statute of limitations is not challenged on appeal. Whether Hawai`i or California law applies, however, is not necessarily dispositive because the California statute appears to be a codification of the discovery rule that this court has judicially adopted. [7] Under Hawai`i law, damage to persons or property is governed by HRS § 657-7, which provides that [a]ctions for the recovery of compensation for damage for injury to persons or property shall be instituted within two years after the cause of action accrued, and not after, except as provided in section 657-13. [8] HRS § 657-7. As this court noted in Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Haw. 150, 151, 433 P.2d 220, 221 (1967), [c]learly, the determining word in the statute is `accrued.' The time of accrual of a cause of action for CSA is an issue of first impression in Hawai`i. In other contexts, however, we have employed the discovery rule, holding that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the elements giving rise to the claim. See e.g., Yoshizaki, 50 Haw. at 154, 433 P.2d at 223 (holding that cause of action does not accrue until plaintiff knew or should have known of defendant's negligence, thus, medical malpractice action brought in 1963 based upon negligent diagnosis in 1959 not barred by statute of limitations where plaintiff learned of misdiagnosis in 1961); Basque v. Yuk Lin Liau, 50 Haw. 397, 399, 441 P.2d 636, 637 (1968) (extending Yoshizaki rule to property damage and remanding for determination of when plaintiff knew or should have discovered that an actionable wrong had been committed against his property); Yamaguchi v. The Queen's Medical Center, 65 Haw. 84, 90, 648 P.2d 689, 693-94 (1982) holding that cause of action for medical malpractice accrues when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the negligent act, the damage, and the causal connection between the former and the latter (citing Jacoby v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 1 Haw.App. 519, 622 P.2d 613 (1981)); Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 598, 837 P.2d 1247, 1260 (1992) (stating that cause of action for breach of section 5(f) trust accrued when PDF discovered the breach of trust, the injury to its members, and the connection between the breach and the injury), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 1277, 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993); cf. Hays v. City and County of Honolulu, 81 Hawai`i 391, 917 P.2d 718 (1996) (holding that, where plaintiff's affidavit demonstrated that he was aware of the City's negligent act, his injury, and the causal connection between the act and the injury, discovery rule would not delay accrual of action). In this case, Dunlea alleged that it was only after she sought psychological counseling that she became aware that Dappen's acts caused her psychological injury and illness. On appeal, Dappen asserts, in his answering brief, that, because Dunlea does not contend that she repressed all memory of the abuse and her complaint makes clear that she was aware of the wrongful nature of Dappen's acts, the circuit court correctly determined that the statute of limitations began to run when Dunlea reached the age of majority and that any action commenced after 1972 was barred. In DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 242 Cal.Rptr. 368 (1987), a case relied upon by Dappen, the California Court of Appeals considered a claim by a twenty-five-year-old plaintiff (DeRose) who alleged that she had been sexually abused by her step-grandfather (Carswell) between the ages of four and eleven. The court held that the discovery rule did not apply because the allegations of the complaint leave no doubt that DeRose was actually aware long ago of the facts necessary to state a cause of action against Carswell based upon the sexual assaults. Id., 242 Cal.Rptr. at 371. The court was unpersuaded by DeRose's arguments, which were supported by psychological and sociological evidence, that psychological defense mechanisms caused by sexual abuse, particularly when incestual, prevented DeRose's recognition of the cause and extent of emotional harm. The court stated: This case ... does not require us to determine the validity of any psychological theory or to articulate general rules governing the delayed discovery doctrine's application in sexual abuse cases, id. at 370, because [the immediate harm caused by the alleged assaults gave DeRose a] right to sue at the time of the assaults. Id. at 371. The court intimated, however, that, [i]f DeRose could and did allege that she repressed her memories of the sexual assaults until one year before filing her complaint, she might be able to invoke the delayed discovery rule. Id. (footnote omitted). Initially, we note that DeRose has been superseded by Cal. C.C.P. Section 340.1. [9] See, e.g., Sellery v. Cressey, 48 Cal.App.4th 538, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 706, 711-12, as modified by 49 Cal.App.4th 54A (Cal.Ct.App.1996) (explaining that intent of legislature in enacting Section 340.1 was to reverse result reached in DeRose ). Moreover, courts that apply the discovery rule only where a plaintiff has repressed memory appear to be making a factual determination regarding the reasonableness of the plaintiff's delayed discovery of her or his claim for relief. Courts engaging in the [distinction between plaintiffs who have repressed memories and those who consciously recall the abuse] thus appear to accept that it may be reasonable for someone who represses all memory of incestuous abuse not to have discovered it earlier. These same courts, however, apparently do not accept that it may be equally reasonable for someone with serious psychological problems and childhood' memories of incestuous abuse not to have discovered the connection between the two, and thus to have delayed filing suit. Jocelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 Yale L.J. 2189, 2204 (1991). We are persuaded by the reasoning of those courts that, having considered the application of either statutory or judicially created discovery rules to claims of CSA, have determined that the issue of when a plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, that she or he was psychologically injured and that the injury was caused by CSA is a question of fact for the jury. For example, in Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis.2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis.Ct.App. 1987), the plaintiff did not deny that she had always had conscious recollection of sexual abuse by her father, or that she had reported the abuse to her mother when she was fifteen years old. She alleged, however, that, because of the psychological distress caused by the abuse and the coping mechanisms which resulted, she was unable to perceive or know the existence or nature of her psychological and emotional injuries. These manifestations continued to operate on her long after the incidents of sexual molestation had ended, preventing her from perceiving her psychological and emotional injuries and their connection to her father's earlier acts, and causing her to resist and reject any suggestions that she obtain psychological counseling or legal advice. Id., 418 N.W.2d at 25. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. The court, after reviewing the psychological effects of incestuous abuse and previous applications of the judicially adopted discovery rule, held, as a matter of law, that a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of the injury. Id., 418 N.W.2d at 26. The court went on to state: In concluding that the discovery rule is applicable, however, we do not decide the factual question of when [plaintiff] discovered or should have discovered her injuries and their cause. Since the trial court rejected the applicability of the discovery rule, this question was not answered. Thus, because genuine issues of material fact remain open, including when [plaintiff's] cause of action accrued, we reverse and remand this matter for trial. Id. at 27 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court of North Dakota reached a similar result in Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D.1989). In that case, the defendant-father appealed from a trial court's judgment awarding the plaintiff-daughter damages for CSA, arguing that the trial court erred in striking his statute of limitations defense. The trial court had ruled that, because the plaintiff-daughter had suffered `severe emotional trauma' from the sexual abuse and she was not able to fully understand or discover her cause of action during the applicable statutory time period[,] the statute of limitations was tolled until she reasonably discovered that a claim existed. Id. at 908-09. The Osland court stated that the determination of when a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered her cause of action was a fact question which, when made by the trial court, will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 909. The court further stated: The trial court found that the severe emotional trauma experienced by [the plaintiff-daughter] resulted in her being unable to fully understand or discover her cause of action during the applicable statutory limitations period. Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court's finding in this regard [was] clearly erroneous. Id. at 909. See also Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605, 607 (R.I.1991) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine the date that the [thirty-four and thirty-five year old] plaintiffs discovered, or with all due diligence should reasonably have discovered, the causal connection between the defendant's alleged acts [of incest] and the plaintiffs' alleged injuries); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F.Supp. 1512, 1523 (S.D.Ind.1990) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on CSA claim because, construing inferences in plaintiff's favor, [t]his court cannot conclude as a matter of law that [plaintiff] ascertained her injuries back in the early 1980's; whether she did or should have ascertained her injuries is a question to be resolved by the jury.). Other jurisdictions have reached the same results when interpreting statutory provisions codifying the discovery rule for CSA claims. In Sellery, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 706, the California Court of Appeals held that, under Cal. C.C.P. § 340.1, [10] a plaintiff need not allege repression of memory to delay the accrual of her or his cause of action. The trial court had granted defendants' motion for summary judgment based on its finding that the plaintiff's claims were time barred `by reason of her admitted conscious memory of torts committed as to her during her minority[.]' Id., 55 Cal.Rptr.2d at 709. The court of appeals reversed, stating: Nothing in section 340.1 requires that memories of abuse be repressed as a prerequisite to a delayed discovery claim. To the contrary, to satisfy delayed discovery plaintiff need only allege the onset of psychological injury or illness after the age of majority and that he commenced his action within three years of the time he discovered or reasonably should have discovered such psychological injury or illness was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. Id., 55 Cal.Rptr.2d at 711-12 (quoting Lent v. Doe, 40 Cal.App.4th 1177, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 389, 394 (1995)). See also Shirley v. Reif, 260 Kan. 514, 920 P.2d 405 (1996) (applying Kansas statute defining accrual of CSA cause of action as the date the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or illness was caused by CSA, and reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants because question whether plaintiffs discovered that their injuries were caused by CSA more than three years before bringing their action was issue of fact for the jury); Werre v. David, 275 Mont. 376, 913 P.2d 625 (1996) (applying statute providing that any action for CSA must be brought 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse[,] and holding that issue of when plaintiff discovered connection between her sexual abuse and mental disorders was a question of fact for the jury); L.M.S. v. N.M. and V.P., 911 S.W.2d 703 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (applying statutory codification of the discovery rule, and holding that dismissal of plaintiff's CSA claim was error because, construing the allegations favorably to plaintiff, her damage may not have been ascertainable until less than three years before filing suit). Because we agree that the issue of when Dunlea discovered, or should have discovered, that her alleged injuries were caused by Dappen's alleged actions is a question of fact for the jury, we cannot hold as a matter of law that Dunlea ascertained her alleged injuries and their causal link to Dappen's alleged actions more than two years before she asserted her claim, or that her failure to recognize her alleged injuries and the cause of those injuries sooner was unreasonable. Certainly, a reasonable jury could find that Dunlea filed suit within two years of discovering her alleged injuries and the cause of those injuries, given their nature and circumstances. We therefore hold that the motion to dismiss was wrongly granted. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court's dismissal of count III and remand this case for trial on Dunlea's CSA claim. We point out, however, that: The purpose behind extending the discovery rule to adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse is not to provide a guaranteed remedy to such plaintiffs. The purpose is to provide an opportunity for an adult who claims to have been sexually abused as a child to prove not only that she [or he] was abused and that the defendant was her [or his] abuser, but that her [or his] suffering was such that she [or he] did not and could not reasonably have discovered all the elements of her [or his] cause of action at an earlier time. Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash.2d 72, 727 P.2d 226, 237 (1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).