Opinion ID: 4539739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: C.R.C.P. 54(b) Certifications

Text: ¶26 C.R.C.P. 54(b) provides, in pertinent part: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 13 only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. ¶27 To determine whether to issue a C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification, a court must engage in a three-step process and conclude that: (1) the decision certified constitutes a ruling on an entire claim for relief; (2) the decision certified is final in terms of the ultimate disposition of an individual claim; and (3) there is no just reason for delay in the entry of final judgment on the claim. Lytle v. Kite, 728 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. 1986). In deciding whether just reasons exist to delay an appeal of an individual final judgment, a court must consider both the interests of judicial administration and the equities involved. Id. at 309. ¶28 We review the first two prongs of the above-described test de novo, but the third prong—whether there is no just reason for delay—“is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Id. at 308. “Once the concerns of sound judicial administration have been met, the discretionary judgment of the district court should be given substantial deference, ‘for that court is the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with the justifiable reasons for delay.’” Id. at 309 (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980); additional internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court will conclude that a trial court abused its discretion in certifying a judgment as final under C.R.C.P. 54(b) only when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on an erroneous view of the law. Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43, ¶ 25, 395 P.3d 1217, 1223. 14 ¶29 With respect to the certification of the order granting PFWD’s motion for partial summary judgment, Jacobs contends that the certification was improper because PFWD’s counterclaim for rescission of the Inclusion Agreement is still at issue, as is the remainder of his declaratory judgment claim. Jacobs argues that because the court’s partial summary judgment order resolved the interpretation and application of only one section of the Inclusion Agreement, the court’s certification of that order will result in separate appeals over different parts of the agreement, contrary to C.R.C.P. 54(b)’s purpose of avoiding “piecemeal” litigation. See Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Colo. 1982) (“The purpose of requiring that an entire claim for relief be finally adjudicated before Rule 54(b) certification is proper is to avoid the dissipation of judicial resources through piecemeal appeals.”). ¶30 The water court rejected this argument, finding that the partial summary judgment ruling, when coupled with the summary judgment for the Engineers, adjudicated Jacobs’s claims against PFWD in their entirety and ultimately disposed of them. The court further found that PFWD’s counterclaim is “independent of the other claims of the parties in this case, stands on its own, and can be prosecuted independent of the other claims.” And the court found that there was no just reason for delay because finalization would (1) assist in resolving the potential for conflicting jurisdiction between this case and the stayed 15 proceeding in the El Paso County District Court, (2) allow for the resolution of the identical claims in that court, and (3) prevent a collateral attack on jurisdiction over the counterclaim in the water court. ¶31 In our view, each of these findings and conclusions was amply supported by the record and reflected a proper exercise of the water court’s discretion. The remaining allegations in Jacobs’s declaratory judgment motion and of PFWD’s counterclaim concern Jacobs’s alleged failure to subdivide the property at the appropriate time, and all of those allegations are wholly independent of the claims regarding the meaning of paragraph 8 of the Inclusion Agreement. Moreover, the partial summary judgment order completely disposed of Jacobs’s breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims regarding the meaning of paragraph 8 of the Inclusion Agreement. And sound judicial administration and the equities of this case favored certification because certification would permit resolution of the stayed, identical proceeding in the El Paso County District Court on issue preclusion grounds, while avoiding a collateral attack on the water court’s jurisdiction. See Lytle, 728 P.2d at 309; see also Foster v. Plock, 2017 CO 39, ¶ 13, 394 P.3d 1119, 1123 (noting the elements of issue preclusion). Accordingly, we conclude that the water court properly certified the order granting partial summary judgment in PFWD’s favor under C.R.C.P. 54(b). 16 ¶32 With respect to the certification of the order granting the Engineers’ motion for summary judgment, it is undisputed that that order fully resolved all claims in this case involving the Engineers. Jacobs contends, however, that the water court abused its discretion in certifying this order because certification of the partial summary judgment in PFWD’s favor was improper and the substantive issues regarding the Engineers’ claims and the claims involving PFWD are so intertwined that certification of the summary judgment order in the Engineers’ favor was therefore also improper. We are not convinced. ¶33 As we understand Jacobs’s argument, it is premised on his view that the certification of the partial summary judgment order in PFWD’s favor was improper. We, however, have already rejected that premise. Accordingly, Jacobs’s challenge to the C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification of the order granting summary judgment for the Engineers likewise fails. ¶34 We are not persuaded otherwise by Jacobs’s apparent view that in certifying the judgment here, the water court did not make sufficient findings to establish that there was no just reason for delay. Although it might have been preferable for the water court to set forth its reasoning more precisely in its certification order, the record makes clear that the court discerned no just reason for delay because it viewed the Engineers’ claims and the claims involving PFWD as separately justiciable. For example, in its order granting the Engineers’ motion for a 17 preliminary injunction, the water court noted that private contracts do not relieve the Engineers of their statutory duty to administer, distribute, and regulate waters of the state. See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 97 (Colo. 1996) (noting that the provisions of a decree do not prevent the State Engineer’s office from taking additional action to fulfill its statutory duty to protect downstream users and that compliance with contractually imposed standards does not necessarily relieve a contracting party of its duty to comply with statutory requirements). The court thus concluded, “Because the Engineers do not administer water rights based on agreements like the Inclusion Agreement the Defendants have offered as their sole defense, the meaning of the Inclusion Agreement is not relevant as to whether [Jacobs] violated the valid Order of the Division Engineer.” ¶35 Although the water court did not reiterate this reasoning in its C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification order, the record amply reflects the court’s position, which it maintained throughout this case, and this reasoning supports the court’s finding that there was no just reason for delay in the certification of the Engineers’ order. ¶36 For these reasons, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to certify, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b), the court’s order granting summary judgment for the Engineers. 18 ¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal is properly before us, and we turn next to Jacobs’s arguments on the merits.