Opinion ID: 2966492
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limit

Text: An evenhanded cap or limit uniformly burdens both in-state and out-of-state interests. See, e.g., Chambers Medical Technologies of S.C. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the dormant Commerce Clause allows a state to impose an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage landfilled with hazardous waste when it curtail[s] volume from all sources. Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 345. South Carolina contends that its reduction of the statutory authorization of 135,000 tons per year to _________________________________________________________________ 19 South Carolina merely presents a series of affidavits that describe its hazardous waste program; the amount of wastes buried in state, broken down by in-state and out-of-state wastes; and similar statistics. 21 120,000 tons and then 110,000 tons is an evenhanded neutral limit that does not burden interstate commerce any more than intrastate commerce.20 The limit South Carolina seeks to have upheld, however, is not as evenhanded and neutral as the state would have the court believe. The limit does not have the same effect on in-state as out-of-state wastes because the limit can be lifted upon certification that it is necessary to protect South Carolina's citizens, S.C. Code Ann.§ 44-5660(a)(3)(A) (Law Co-op Supp. 1995), or that the entire statutory authorization of buried waste during the relevant 12-month period was generated in South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann.§ 44-56-60(a)(3)(B) (Law Co-op Supp. 1995). The same exceptions are not granted to outof-state interests. The Supreme Court has declared that [t]he commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 511 U.S. ___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2215-16 (1994) (citing Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 147 (1978)). Here, the exception favors in-state interests over out-of-state interests. Thus, the overall limit is not facially neutral, but rather discriminatory and, therefore, subject to the same per se test applied to the other discriminatory provisions of Act 590. The limit fails to survive such scrutiny for the same reasons that the floors and ceilings in Act 590 failed.21 _________________________________________________________________ 20 South Carolina also contends that we expressly excluded the overall limit as one of the items properly enjoined in our previous opinion addressing the preliminary injunction. HWTC, 945 F.2d at 787 n.9. While we referenced the statutory section containing the limit in our list of sections to be enjoined, we specifically referred to another subsection. Today, however, for the reasons set forth below, we clarify that the limit is included as one of the items that violates the Commerce Clause. 21 Even if the limit were nondiscriminatory, it would not be severable. State law governs the severability of a state statute. Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 1074 (1990). Thus, in determining whether the overall limit can be severed, we turn to South Carolina law. Under South Carolina law,[t]he test for sever22