Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Grand Jury Testimony of Gwen Farmer

Text: Next at issue is whether the appellant was denied a fair trial because the trial court refused to either admit the grand jury testimony of Gwen Farmer or grant a postponement to allow the defense to locate her. We are unable to conclude that the trial court erred under the facts herein presented. At the outset we note that the transcript of the grand jury testimony was not marked for identification and does not appear in the record. A portion of it, however, was read to the trial court outside the hearing of the jury. Farmer had testified before the Federal Grand Jury on May 20, 1983 that Kelly had not driven her car on the night of April 28, 1983. She testified that she had had her car at work during the day and at approximately 5:00 had gone to Kelly's mother's house. Appellant proffered that Farmer would testify consistently with her grand jury testimony and contradict the State's witnesses on material points relating to the use of her car. Appellant contends that Farmer's Federal Grand Jury testimony should have been admitted below since the testimony was relevant, given under oath, bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness, and Farmer was unavailable. The State, however, contends that the transcript of Farmer's testimony did not qualify for admission as former testimony since that testimony, given during an early, exploratory phase of the investigation, was not elicited with the same motivation that would attend cross-examination by the State prosecutor had Ms. Farmer testified at trial. The general rule surrounding the admissibility of former testimony requires that such testimony must have been given by a witness under oath, presently unavailable, and in a proceeding addressed to substantially the same issues as in the current proceeding. Further, there must have been reasonable opportunity and similar motivation on the prior occasion for cross-examination of the declarant by the party against whom the testimony is now being offered. Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 214-15, 383 A.2d 1097, 1100 (1978); C. McCormick, Evidence § 255-258 (2d ed. 1972). See Commonwealth v. Meech, 380 Mass. 490, 403 N.E.2d 1174, 1177-78 (1980). Likewise, for former testimony to be admitted at a subsequent trial, there must exist a substantial identity of parties and issues. Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md. 546, 556, 39 A.2d 546, 552 (1944). We do not believe the general rule is satisfied where, as here, Grandison offers the Federal Grand Jury testimony against the State in a subsequent independent criminal proceeding since the State was not a party to nor did it participate in the federal proceedings [20] and thus was not in the position of a cross-examiner at the federal proceedings. Further, the United States' Attorneys, while investigating the matters of the Warren House, would not have been aware of all the facts that developed subsequent to that proceeding. They were in no position to examine Farmer to the extent they would have been able to had these facts been known to them, as they were to the State here. In light of this and the absence of an opportunity for the State to cross-examine Farmer, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit her Federal Grand Jury testimony. In our view, this testimony lacked the persuasive assurances of trustworthiness essential to any hearsay exception. In addition, Grandison at trial sought to introduce Farmer's testimony under former Maryland Rule 740h 1(d). [21] The trial court responded, stating in part, Now, the whole thing boils down to whether [the transcript of the grand jury proceeding] is a deposition or not. It is not.       As I understand the rule, it doesn't apply to this type of situation. I am going to deny your [Grandison's] motion. The trial judge did not err. Former Rule 740 unequivocally refers to the admissibility and substantive use of depositions. Since the rule was clearly inapplicable it could not serve as the basis for the admission of the transcript of Farmer's Federal Grand Jury testimony. Finally, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a continuance to appellant so as to allow appellant the opportunity to secure Farmer's presence for trial. The matter was within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse prejudicial to the defendant. Jackson v. State, 288 Md. 191, 194, 416 A.2d 278, 281 (1980). In light of the fact that Farmer's presence could not be guaranteed by the appellant and since the case was otherwise ready for the jury, there was no pressing reason for the trial court to further delay submission of the case to the jury.