Opinion ID: 6500711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. Jewkes’ Right to Remain Silent

Text: [¶10] We turn first to Ms. Jewkes’ contention that the district court’s reliance on her refusal to take a breath test infringed upon her rights against self-incrimination and against warrantless searches. When a person drives under the influence and a death results, the law does not clearly provide the driver with a right to refuse a breath test. Wyoming Statutes provide: If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a peace officer to submit to a chemical test designated by the agency employing the peace officer as provided in subsection (a) of this section, none shall be given except in cases where serious bodily injury or death has resulted or upon issuance of a search warrant. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(d) (LexisNexis 2021) (emphasis added). We have held that the introduction of evidence that the defendant refused to take a blood alcohol test does not violate the defendant’s state or federal constitutional rights against self-incrimination, Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶¶ 29–30, 199 P.3d 1052, 1060 (Wyo. 2009), nor does it violate the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Arellano, 413 P.3d 807, at –5 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (unpublished table decision). Here, the district court’s consideration of Ms. Jewkes’ refusal to submit to a breath test does not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law. [¶11] Next, Ms. Jewkes argues that the district court improperly punished her for exercising her constitutional right to remain silent. The district court cited several points it considered “noteworthy” in sentencing. First, when questioned by Trooper Johnson, Ms. Jewkes “refused to answer any questions.” Later, at the hospital in Jackson, when “Trooper Kiel attempted to interview [her, she] refused to answer questions.” Finally, after her mother released her iPhone to the trooper, Ms. Jewkes “refused to provide [her] PIN number to the trooper.” [¶12] The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination “is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.” Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467–68, 5 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1875–76, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Wyoming Constitution provides, “No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case[.]” Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11. We have “clearly and unequivocally held that pursuant to [these] constitutional provision[s], an individual’s ‘constitutional right to silence exists at all times—before arrest, at arrest, and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it. The right is self-executing.’” Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 18, 75 P.3d 1016, 1023 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390–91 (Wyo. 1995)). [¶13] In United States v. Cabrera, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the sentencing court plainly erred when it considered the defendant’s failure to testify. There, the defendant was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. United States v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801, 804 (6th Cir. 2016). The defendant’s theory of the case was that audio tapes of his purchase of the firearm had been altered. The defendant did not testify at trial. Id. at 805–06. At sentencing the defendant faced imprisonment from fifty-one to sixty-three months. Id. at 806–07. The district court imposed the maximum sentence, explaining, You never put yourself on the record either at the trial or in support of your request for an expert to have these tapes viewed. . . . I view that as an incredibly cynical attempt to game the whole system here. . . . [A] sentence at the high end of your range is necessary for that reason. Id. at 807, 810 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit held “[t]hat statement admits of only one reasonable interpretation: [The] sentencing judge punished [the defendant] for not testifying in support of his audio-tape tampering claim. That is an impermissible sentencing factor” and constitutes plain error. Id. at 810. The Court stated: In finding a plain error here, we emphasize that “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.” McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 437 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, [1060,] 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990)). And “[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, [2488,] 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, [668,] 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)). Just so here. By relying on [the defendant’s] silence at trial as a sentencing factor, the district judge . . . burdened a fundamental constitutional right. 6 Our conclusion that the district judge violated a bedrock protection of the Fifth Amendment is not “subject to reasonable dispute.” Puckett [v. United States,] 556 U.S. [129,] 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423[, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009)]. By purporting to sentence [the defendant] at the top of his guidelines range because he “never put [him]self on the record,” the district judge effectively punished [the defendant] for exercising his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. That error was plain: it clearly and obviously violated one of [his] fundamental constitutional rights. Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 812. [¶14] Here the district court, in listing the factors it considered in sentencing, stated that Ms. Jewkes’ exercise of her right to silence was “noteworthy.” As in Cabrera, this leads to the firm conclusion that Ms. Jewkes was penalized at least in part for exercising her right against self-incrimination. [¶15] The State contends that the district court did not punish Ms. Jewkes for exercising her constitutional right to remain silent; rather, it considered cooperation with authorities and remorse, which were appropriate sentencing factors. We have repeatedly recognized that a “defendant’s cooperation with authorities and remorse for his actions are appropriate factors to be considered when imposing” sentences. See, e.g., Deeds v. State, 2014 WY 124, ¶ 22, 335 P.3d 473, 479–80 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Noller v. State, 2010 WY 30, ¶ 13, 226 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2010)); Kovach v. State, 2013 WY 46, ¶ 114, 299 P.3d 97, 128– 29 (Wyo. 2013). Conversely, it is fundamental that an individual’s exercise of a constitutional right cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing. See Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 804; McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 437 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990)); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 1981, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (“Under our constitutional system it would be impermissible for the sentencing authority to mete out higher sentences . . . as punishment for those who successfully exercised their right[s.]”). [¶16] The district court’s remarks were not directed at remorse, or any other factor related to cooperation. The district court sentenced Ms. Jewkes in part because she “refused to answer questions” on the scene and later at the hospital, effectively punishing Ms. Jewkes for exercising her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. “Courts simply may not punish defendants for the exercise of constitutional rights.” Guinn v. State, 2009 WY 15, ¶ 7, 201 P.3d 423, 424 (Wyo. 2009) (citations omitted). The district court’s reliance 7 on Ms. Jewkes’ exercise of her constitutional rights as an aggravating factor in sentencing violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.