Opinion ID: 185896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discretionary Functions vs. Ministerial Functions

Text: 20 WMATA is the product of an interstate compact entered into by Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia. Watters v. WMATA, 295 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2002). We have frequently recognized that, `[a]s a quasi-governmental entity created by its signatory parties, WMATA is entitled to share the sovereign immunity of those parties with respect to common law tort actions.' Beatty v. WMATA, 860 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (quoting Heffez v. WMATA, 569 F.Supp. 1551, 1552 (D.D.C.1983)). We have also acknowledged, however, that section 80 of the WMATA Compact provides a limited waiver of WMATA's sovereign immunity for torts `committed in the conduct of any proprietary function,' but not for torts occurring `in the performance of a governmental function.' Beebe v. WMATA, 129 F.3d 1283, 1287 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (quoting D.C.CODE ANN.§ 9-1107.01(80)). Unless the limited waiver of immunity applies, the district court lacks jurisdiction to enter a judgment against [WMATA]. Watters, 295 F.3d at 39-40. 21 Because the distinction between proprietary and governmental functions has created a `quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations,' Beatty, 860 F.2d at 1126 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65, 76 S.Ct. 122, 124-25, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955)), we have interpreted section 80 as incorporating the distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions, a dichotomy set forth in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Dant v. District of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C.Cir.1987). Given that [o]nly those activities considered `discretionary' are shielded by sovereign immunity, Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1216 (D.C.Cir.1997), WMATA's immunity turns on whether the [challenged] activity is `discretionary' or `ministerial,' Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1287. 8 22 To determine whether a WMATA activity is discretionary, and thus shielded by sovereign immunity, we apply a two-part test culled from the FTCA's discretionary function jurisprudence. 9 See id. First, we ask whether any `statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.' Id. (quoting Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 1273, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991))). If a course of action is so prescribed, sovereign immunity does not bar suits based on an employee's failure to follow the prescribed course of conduct. Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1217. If the governing statutes or regulations leave room for the exercise of discretion, however, we ask a second question: whether the exercise of discretion is `grounded in social, economic, or political goals.' Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Cope, 45 F.3d at 448 (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323, 111 S.Ct. at 1273-74)). If the exercise of discretion is so grounded, and hence susceptible to policy judgment, Cope, 45 F.3d at 448, the activity is `governmental,' thus falling within section 80's retention of sovereign immunity, Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1287. 23