Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: legislative approval via resolution was appropriate

Text: Once it is determined that HCR 115 did not constitute legislation, we must then determine whether resolution was an appropriate method of legislative approval of the compacts. We therefore turn to our Constitution. Our Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from approving contracts, such as the compacts at issue here, by concurrent resolution. Unlike the federal constitution, our Constitution is not a grant of power to the legislature, but is a limitation upon its powers. In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich. 313, 333, 289 N.W. 493 (1939). Therefore, the legislative authority of the state can do anything which it is not prohibited from doing by the people through the Constitution of the State or the United States. Attorney General v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 538, 267 N.W. 550 (1936). This has been discussed by this Court in the past by analogizing our Legislature to the English Parliament. See Young v. City of Ann Arbor, 267 Mich. 241, 243, 255 N.W. 579 (1934), in which this Court stated: A different rule of construction applies to the Constitution of the United States than to the Constitution of a State. The Federal government is one of delegated powers, and all powers not delegated are reserved to the States or to the people. When the validity of an act of congress is challenged as unconstitutional, it is necessary to determine whether the power to enact it has been expressly or impliedly delegated to congress. The legislative power, under the Constitution of the State, is as broad, comprehensive, absolute and unlimited as that of the parliament of England, subject only to the Constitution of the United States and the restraints and limitations imposed by the people upon such power by the Constitution of the State itself. [8] Regarding any limitations in our constitution, art 4, § 22 only requires the approval of legislation by bill, but is silent regarding the approval of contracts. We have held that our Legislature has the general power to contract unless there is a constitutional limitation. Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 Pa. 240, 400 Mich. 311, 254 N.W.2d 544 (1977). It is acknowledged by all that our Constitution contains no limits on the Legislature's power to bind the state to a contract with a tribe; therefore, because nothing prohibits it from doing so, given the Legislature's residual power, we conclude that the Legislature has the discretion to approve the compacts by resolution. [9] This understanding of legislative power is well-established. Our Legislature has in the past used the resolution process to ratify amendments of the federal constitution. This Court has declared the resolution process proper in such a circumstance because the Legislature did not engage in a legislative act that enacted a law, but merely expressed its assent to the proposed amendment. Decher v. Secretary of State, 209 Mich. 565, 571, 177 N.W. 388 (1920). In the same way, the Legislature here is merely expressing its assent to the compacts through HCR 115. More importantly, because our Legislature had the discretion to approve the compacts by resolution rather than by bill, the courts cannot interfere with that legitimate exercise of legislative discretion. As this Court recognized long ago in Detroit v. Hosmer Circuit Judge, 79 Mich. 384, 387, 44 N.W. 622 (1890): It is one of the necessary and fundamental rules of law that the judicial power cannot interfere with the legitimate discretion of any other department of government. So long as they do no illegal act, and are doing business in the range of the powers committed to their exercise, no outside authority can intermeddle with them.... Therefore, this Court should not interfere with the Legislature's discretionary decision to approve the compacts by resolution.