Opinion ID: 1411045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State v. Podger

Text: On 1 September 1998, respondent had an ex parte meeting with Jay Wesley Covington and William Charles Fleming, Jr., attorneys for the defendant, concerning State v. Kenneth Arthur Podger, Durham County file no. 98 CR 05350, in which the defendant was charged with DWI in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1. At the hearing before the Commission, Fleming testified that after explaining the facts of the Podger case to respondent,  Covington asked respondent if he would be willing to hear the DWI trial two days later. Covington then told respondent that he wanted to obtain a careless and reckless plea for the defendant. Fleming testified that Covington said he was charging [the defendant] a huge fee in the case, and that if [respondent] found [the defendant] guilty of careless and reckless, that a substantial portion of that fee would flow through to the appropriate political campaigns. Respondent then agreed to reduce the charge and find the defendant guilty of careless and reckless driving, indicating to Fleming there was a predetermined outcome. On 3 September 1998, while respondent was presiding over domestic violence court, Covington appeared in respondent's courtroom with his associate, Fleming; the defendant; and the charging officer, Terry P. Cullinan. Fleming testified that Covington asked to approach the bench and then said, I just wanted to remind you that we're to do the Podger trial today, and you're going to find him guilty of careless and reckless. You're going to fine him $1,000. You're going to give him community service and probation. Assistant District Attorney Brian T. Beasley then arrived in the courtroom. Subsequently, respondent, Covington, Fleming, the defendant, Beasley, and Cullinan left the courtroom and moved into the hallway. Once in the hallway, with no court clerk present, Covington recited the facts of the case, as he had two days prior, and then asked respondent for a conviction of careless and reckless driving. Fleming testified that respondent then asked Beasley if the State agreed with the facts recited by Covington. When Beasley responded affirmatively, respondent stated, Well, in that case, I'll find [the defendant] guilty of careless and reckless, fine him $1,000, give him probation, community service. Respondent testified before the Commission that Covington approached him in the hallway on 1 September 1998 and indicated he needed some help in a DWI case. Covington was looking to obtain a careless and reckless driving plea. Respondent indicated that he did not take Covington seriously and that he did not remember Covington mentioning a huge fee. However, respondent agreed to hear the Podger matter on 3 September 1998, as he was the resident traffic court judge that week. Respondent testified that on 3 September 1998 Covington approached respondent during a mid-morning break. Respondent asked Covington some questions about the Podger case and about the defendant's record. Covington stated that the defendant had a prior DWI conviction from 1994 in which the defendant had blown a .08. Respondent indicated that he would agree to careless and reckless driving only with consent of the State. Around noon on 3 September, Beasley and Covington approached respondent, and Covington indicated that there was a plea agreement. Respondent asked them to step into the hallway so he could assess the plea because there was noise in the courtroom. Respondent did not believe the court clerk's presence was required. Once in the hallway, Covington informed respondent that the defendant had blown a .15 in the case at issue. When respondent asked Beasley and Cullinan if they consented to the plea, both responded in the affirmative. Respondent then imposed a standard careless and reckless judgment. Respondent subsequently learned that the defendant had another prior DWI conviction in addition to the one Covington mentioned and that the prior DWI mentioned by Covington was actually in 1993 when the legal limit was .10. Thereafter, respondent testified that he filed a sua sponte motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1021(c) to vacate the judgment because he felt critical facts had been misrepresented to him or omitted. Although respondent believed that he had the authority to enter the plea out of court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-191, he apologized for taking the plea in the hallway, acknowledged there was a pall cast on the administration of justice, and stated he would never do anything other than bond reductions outside of the courtroom. The Commission alleges respondent violated Canons 2A, 3A(1), and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 2A provides: A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality  of the judiciary. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A, 2000 Ann. R. 274 (Lexis). Canon 3A(1) provides: A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(1), 2000 Ann. R. 276 (Lexis). Lastly, Canon 3A(4) provides: A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(4), 2000 Ann. R. 276 (Lexis). Censure or removal of a judge is governed by N.C.G.S. § 7A-376, which provides: Upon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court may censure or remove any judge for willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. N.C.G.S. § 7A-376 (1999) (emphasis added); see also In re Renfer, 347 N.C. 382, 384, 493 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1997). Section 7A-377 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides the procedure the Commission utilizes in recommending censure or removal of a justice or judge. N.C.G.S. § 7A-377 (1999). In the instant case, the Commission found that respondent's actions constituted willful misconduct and were prejudicial to the administration of justice such that they brought the judicial office into disrepute. We have stated that [w]ilful misconduct in office is improper and wrong conduct of a judge acting in his official capacity done intentionally, knowingly and, generally, in bad faith. It is more than a mere error of judgment or an act of negligence. In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 305, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1976). A specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority constitutes bad faith. Nowell, 293 N.C. at 248, 237 S.E.2d at 255. In addition, we have defined [c]onduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute ... as `conduct which a judge undertakes in good faith but which nevertheless would appear to an objective observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial office.' Edens, 290 N.C. at 305, 226 S.E.2d at 9 (quoting Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 284, 515 P.2d 1, 9, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 209 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932, 94 S.Ct. 2643, 41 L.Ed.2d 235 (1974)). Wilful misconduct in office of necessity is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. Nowell, 293 N.C. at 248, 237 S.E.2d at 255 (emphasis omitted). After carefully reviewing the evidence in this case, we conclude that respondent's actions in both the Debraeckeleer and Podger cases constituted willful misconduct and were prejudicial to the administration of justice such that they brought the judicial office into disrepute. As to the Debraeckeleer matter, it is clear that respondent knowingly convicted the defendant of careless and reckless driving when the defendant had not been charged with that offense. The evidence provided by Beasley, along with the testimony of Chief Judge Titus, also convinces us that respondent should have known that careless and reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of DWI. Additional support for this conclusion is garnered from our recent pronouncement on this very issue. See In re Martin, 333 N.C. 242, 245, 424 S.E.2d 118, 119-20 (1993) (where this Court held, [c]onvicting defendants of reckless driving when they were charged with [DWI] were acts which respondent knew to be improper and ultra vires, or beyond the powers of his office). As respondent's conduct in the Debraeckeleer case was unquestionably wilful misconduct, we must also conclude  that his action was prejudicial to the administration of justice such that the judicial office was brought into disrepute. Nowell, 293 N.C. at 248, 237 S.E.2d at 255. Regarding the Podger incident, it is important to note that criminal cases should be heard in open court, as they are the public's business. See id. at 249, 237 S.E.2d at 255; Edens, 290 N.C. at 306, 226 S.E.2d at 9-10. In Edens, this Court determined that the respondent's removal of a criminal case outside the courtroom when court was not in session improperly removed the proceeding from the public domain where it belonged and made it instead a private matter. Edens, 290 N.C. at 306, 226 S.E.2d at 10. In the Podger case, respondent acknowledges that taking the guilty plea in the hallway cast [a] pall upon the administration of justice. We agree. At least since the Nowell case was published over twenty years ago, members of our judiciary have been on notice that conducting court business outside of open court will not be condoned. We are convinced that respondent should have known his action in taking the disposition of this case outside of the courtroom was improper and amounted to willful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the judicial office. Moreover, respondent knew or had reason to know that it was improper to dispose of a DWI charge by convicting the defendant of careless and reckless driving. See Martin, 333 N.C. at 245, 424 S.E.2d at 119-20. Judges especially must be vigilant to act within the bounds of their judicial power. Id. at 245, 424 S.E.2d at 120. We have previously stated that [e]ach judge and attorney in the courts of our State has a duty to uphold the legal process. Neither complacency nor the search for efficiency should obscure that responsibility. In re Tucker, 348 N.C. 677, 681, 501 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1998). As we recognized in Nowell, [t]he power of the district court over the lives and everyday affairs of our citizens makes it imperative that the district court judges of the State not only be fully capable but also dedicated to carrying out their official responsibilities in accordance with the law and established standards of judicial conduct. Nowell, 293 N.C. at 252, 237 S.E.2d at 257. The conduct of respondent unquestionably warrants censure. Respondent overstepped his authority, engaged in misconduct, and brought disrepute to the judiciary of our State. We will not condone this conduct. It is deserving of our harshest criticism. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that respondent's actions constitute conduct in violation of Canons 2A, 3A(1), and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. Therefore, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and 7A-377 and Rule 3 of the Rules for Supreme Court Review of Recommendations of the Judicial Standards Commission, it is ordered that respondent, Craig B. Brown, be and he is hereby, censured for willful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. Done by Order of the Court in Conference, this the 4th day of May, 2000. /s/ Freeman, J. Freeman, J. For the Court