Opinion ID: 1832834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of the Administrative Search.

Text: A. General principles regarding administrative searches. The Supreme Court, in G.M. Leasing Corp., held that a warrantless intrusion into an area protected by the Fourth Amendment was not justified merely because the search was conducted to enforce tax laws. The Court assumed the tax assessments and levies were proper, and the facts necessarily establish[ed] probable cause to believe that assets held by petitioner were properly subject to seizure in satisfaction of the assessments. Id. at 351, 97 S.Ct. at 628, 50 L.Ed.2d at 542-43. The Court held, however, that the federal statute allowing seizure of property to satisfy tax obligations by distraint and seizure by any means does not refer to warrantless intrusions into privacy. Id. at 357, 97 S.Ct. at 631, 50 L.Ed.2d at 546. It stated: The respondents urge that the history of the common law in England and the laws in several States prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights support the view that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to cover intrusions into privacy in the enforcement of the tax laws. We do not find in the cited materials anything approaching the clear evidence that would be required to create so great an exception to the Fourth Amendment's protections against warrantless intrusions into privacy. Id. at 355, 97 S.Ct. at 630, 50 L.Ed.2d at 545. In answer to the government's argument in G.M. Leasing Corp. that Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), required a different result, the Court stated: We do not find in Boyd any direct holding that the warrant protections of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to invasions of privacy in furtherance of tax collection. Insofar as language in Boyd might be read so to state, we decline to follow those dicta into rejection of the basic governing principle that has shaped Fourth Amendment law. Id. at 356, 97 S.Ct. at 630, 50 L.Ed.2d at 546. G.M. Leasing Corp. drew a clear line between seizures from areas protected by the Fourth Amendment, such as homes, and seizures from public areas, such as streets. It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area or seizable by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer. Id. at 354, 97 S.Ct. at 629-30, 50 L.Ed.2d at 545. Adams is also analogous to the present case in that, during the search of the defendant's home pursuant to an administrative distress warrant to seize property for drug taxes, officers found illegal drugs. The Indiana statute, like Iowa's section 453B.9, provided that all assessments for taxes due were considered jeopardy assessments. See Ind. Stat. 6-7-3-13 (An assessment for the tax due under this chapter is considered a jeopardy assessment. The department shall demand immediate payment and take action to collect the tax due as provided by [statute].). In Adams the court held that a search pursuant to this section, in which the assessment was deemed per se to be a jeopardy assessment, was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, because the law gave officers boundless discretion to intrude upon the privacy of the home, and noted that there was nothing in the record to suggest the defendant was about to abscond, hide assets, or destroy documents. Adams, 762 N.E.2d at 744. Adams, relying on the principle of fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun, held that evidence seized during the administrative search was inadmissible at the criminal trial because the administrative search that yielded the evidence was unreasonable. Adams, 762 N.E.2d at 745. G.M. Leasing Corp. and Adams are distinguishable from the present case in that those cases did not involve searches based on court-ordered warrants. G.M. Leasing Corp. involved a search of a premises under the authority of a federal tax collection statute. Adams involved a search of a home under the authority of a state tax collection warrant. While these cases are distinguishable, they are significant because they illustrate the solicitude of courts for Fourth Amendment rights in the face of sweeping tax collection statutes. Moreover, if the administrative search warrant in this case was invalid, as we later conclude it was, the warrant must be disregarded in assessing the Fourth Amendment intrusion. B. The issuance of the administrative search warrant. Iowa Code section 808.14 provides the statutory basis for administrative search warrants: The courts and other appropriate agencies of the judicial branch of the government of this state may issue administrative search warrants, in accordance with the statutory and common law requirements for the issuance of such warrants, to all governmental agencies or bodies expressly or impliedly provided with statutory or constitutional home rule authority for inspections to the extent necessary for the agency or body to carry out such authority, to be executed or otherwise carried out by an officer or employee of the agency or body. Obviously, neither this statute, nor the Fourth Amendment, grant carte blanche authority to courts to issue administrative search warrants. Section 808.14 requires that administrative search warrants be issued in accordance with the statutory and common law requirements for the issuance of such warrants. The Fourth Amendment requires that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied before an administrative search may be conducted. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 723, 107 S.Ct. at 1500, 94 L.Ed.2d at 726. The problem in this case is that Iowa Code section 453B.9, on its face, makes all drug tax assessments jeopardy assessments, thereby opening the door to the issuance of administrative search warrants without the necessity of showing jeopardy and without any reasonable legislative or administrative protections in place as required by the Fourth Amendment. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 723, 107 S.Ct. at 1500, 94 L.Ed.2d at 726. As previously discussed, the application for the administrative search warrant did not even claim the assessment was in jeopardy, and the court that issued the warrant made no such finding. In fact, under section 453B.9, no such showing or finding is required; drug tax cases are automatically put on the fast track for collection proceedings, including searches.