Opinion ID: 1756742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of prior attempt

Text: Ark.Code Ann. § 16-97-103(6) provides that evidence relevant to sentencing by either the court or the jury may include [e]vidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The term aggravation has been well-defined in Black's Law Dictionary 712 (6th ed. 1990): any circumstance attending the commission of a crime ... which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences, but which is above and beyond the essential constituents of the crime ... itself. The State maintains in its brief that the testimony regarding the prior attempt demonstrated that Hill knew Ms. Ardman, that he knew at times she carried significant amounts of cash, that he had previously seen her car, and that he had planned and intended to rob her at an opportune time. Clearly, this evidence meets the definition of aggravation. Taking a common sense approach, we agree with the State's assertion that, in the absence of such evidence, the jury would be at a significant disadvantage in fulfilling its function if it were deprived of vital information concerning the circumstances of the crime and thus could not possibly determine an appropriate sentence. This rationale closely resembles the United States Supreme Court's discussion in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), which included the following observations: So long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information as possible when it makes the sentencing decision. 501 U.S. at 821, 111 S.Ct. at 2606. We, too, have suggested that the State should not be precluded from introducing relevant evidence at a sentencing proceeding in the absence of prejudice. In Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362, 730 S.W.2d 230 (1987), we stated that: We are unaware of any reason why the State should be precluded from introducing additional relevant evidence on remand at a resentencing trial, especially when appellant's guilt already has been established and when appellant has in no manner shown or demonstrated prejudice from the admission of such evidence. During sentencing, Hill testified that he had been to Ms. Ardman's house approximately three times in as many weeks and that he already knew where he was going. Thus, it is difficult to agree that he was prejudiced by Ms. Ardman's testimony. The trial court has wide discretion in admitting evidence of other crimes or wrongs, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Haynes v. State, 309 Ark. 583, 832 S.W.2d 479 (1992); Price v. State, 268 Ark. 535, 597 S.W.2d 598 (1980). In sum, we find no such abuse and conclude that the testimony regarding the prior robbery attempt was properly admitted as an aggravating circumstance under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103(6).