Opinion ID: 2186005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Freeman's motion for a new trial.

Text: Freeman argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial because the jury awarded inadequate damages under the influence of passion or prejudice. Alternatively, Freeman asserts the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. SDCL 15-6-59(a)(5) and (6) provide: A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes: . . . . . (5) Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice; (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision or that it is against law[.] As noted earlier, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Freeman in the amount of $100,000. Marcia received nothing on her loss of consortium claim. [2] The jury found Berg and City to each be fifty percent at fault. Freeman settled with Berg prior to trial for $100,000, and the jury was advised of this settlement; however, the jury did not know the amount of the settlement. Under SDCL 15-8-17, a release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor (Berg) reduces the claim against the other tort-feasor (City) in the amount of the consideration paid for the release ($100,000). Accordingly, City was assessed only costs. Whether a new trial should be granted is left to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and this court will not disturb the trial court's decision absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Kusser v. Feller, 453 N.W.2d 619, 621 (S.D.1990); Stoltz v. Stonecypher, 336 N.W.2d 654, 657 (S.D.1983); Thormahlen v. Foos, 83 S.D. 558, 564, 163 N.W.2d 350, 353 (1968); Johnson v. Olson, 71 S.D. 486, 493, 26 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1947).
Ordinarily, we leave the question of whether damages awarded by the jury were the result of passion or prejudice to the trial court. Id.; Simmons v. City of Sioux Falls, 374 N.W.2d 631, 632 (S.D. 1985). In addition, a trial court may not grant a new trial merely because it believes the verdict is smaller than it should be. Kusser, supra ; Itzen v. Wilsey, 440 N.W.2d 312 (S.D.1989). In tort actions involving personal injuries the amount of damages is peculiarly a question for the jury. Stoltz, 336 N.W.2d at 657; Kusser, supra . Freeman contends that since the amount of medical bills ($129,771.03) was stipulated to, that Freeman is entitled to at least that amount. However, the jury was properly instructed to fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate [Freeman] for any of the following elements of loss or harm suffered[.] City never stipulated that the medical bills incurred by Freeman were reasonable. City stipulated that the amount of the medical bills was reasonable and necessary for the treatment rendered.  This saved Freeman from having to prove each and every bill. It did not eliminate the need to prove that the treatment was in fact necessary. In fact, there was testimony that the efforts to save Freeman's leg were the result of his personal choice and were perhaps not the most reasonable or practical choice. On the final day of trial, one of the jurors left a note on the court reporter's table which stated: Are we allowed to know the amount of the settlement to Freeman from the accident that has already been settled? If not, are we allowed to know if it was enough to take care of Freeman's past and future medical bills? The trial court advised counsel of the existence of the note; however, apparently with the consent of counsel, the jury was never told the amount of the settlement. During deliberations, the jury sent out a note stating: If the city was 50% at fault, would it be 50% of the dollar amount listed for settlement? In response to this note, the trial court instructed the jury that it must rely upon the instructions as given. Freeman argues that the jury disregarded the instructions and did not find the total damages suffered by Freeman. However, when reviewing the trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Kusser, supra . In this case, the jury was also properly instructed that it could reduce Freeman's award of damages if Freeman was himself contributorily negligent. From reviewing the verdict form, there is no way for this court to know how the jury arrived at the $100,000 figure. Mere assertions of what the jury may have concluded are insufficient to show prejudice. Duncan v. Pennington County H.A., 283 N.W.2d 546, 553 (S.D.1979); Dwyer v. Christensen, 77 S.D. 381, 92 N.W.2d 199 (1958). Under such circumstances we have indicated that if a verdict is susceptible to more than one construction, the construction which sustains the verdict must be applied. Bankwest, Inc. v. Valentine, 451 N.W.2d 732, 736 (S.D.1990); Fjerstad v. Sioux Valley Hospital, 291 N.W.2d 786, 788 (S.D.1980); Baker v. Jewell, 77 S.D. 573, 580, 96 N.W.2d 299, 304 (1959). Because the jury may have reduced the damages to account for contributory negligence by Freeman, or may have concluded that the stipulated medical bills were not reasonable, we must affirm the trial court's decision to deny a new trial based upon inadequate damages.
A new trial should not be granted on the basis of insufficient evidence unless the finding of the jury on a question of fact is `unreasonable, arbitrary, and unsupported by the evidence.' Kusser, supra (quoting Lewis v. Storms, 290 N.W.2d 494, 497 (S.D. 1980)). We reiterate, there was evidence of contributory negligence. If the jury chose to accept this evidence, then the jury was within its province in reducing Freeman's damages in proportion to his contributory negligence. See Kusser, supra ; Stoltz, supra . Additionally, there was evidence that the medical bills were not reasonably incurred. Based on the evidence presented at trial, we cannot conclude that the jury's findings were so unreasonable, arbitrary, and unsupported by the evidence that the trial court clearly abused it discretion in failing to award a new trial. [3] Id. Freeman's counsel has not argued that the jury was improperly instructed on this issue. However, we believe an instruction similar to the one in Degen v. Bayman would have been helpful to the jury: If you find for the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant, you must award to each of the Plaintiffs the total amount of damages which they sustained by reason of the accident. You may not make any deduction whatsoever therefrom by reason of the settlement as you have not been instructed concerning what amount was paid by [settling party] to the Plaintiffs in connection therewith. 90 S.D. 400, 404, 241 N.W.2d 703, 705 (1976). Freeman did not propose or request this instruction and, as a result, there is no question concerning the instruction on appeal. Carlson v. First Nat. Bank, 429 N.W.2d 463, 465 (S.D.1988); State v. White Mountain, 332 N.W.2d 726 (S.D.1983); State v. Halverson, 87 S.D. 110, 203 N.W.2d 421 (1973). We encourage trial courts and counsel to consider such an instruction in the future when presented with the situation where one joint-tort-feasor settles prior to trial. Affirmed. SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur. WUEST and HENDERSON, JJ., dissent.