Opinion ID: 1191871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of the Prior Shooting Incident

Text: {26} Martinez contends that, under Rule 11-404(B) NMRA 1999 and Rule 11-403 NMRA 1999, the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the prior shooting incident involving Marvin Sandoval. In its answer brief, the State argued that Martinez's statements to police regarding the prior shooting were admissible to provide context to the jury concerning the reasons police began to suspect Martinez's involvement in the killings. In addition, the State argued that the evidence was properly admitted because, due to Martinez's inconsistent answers to police about firing his gun at Sandoval's car and the fact that the same gun was used to kill Jaramillo and Morgan, the statements demonstrated a consciousness of guilt. The State abandoned these claims at oral argument, conceding that the admission of the evidence was erroneous, and focused its position, instead, on the claim that the error was harmless. Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals has previously discussed, see State v. Maes, 100 N.M. 78, 80-81, 665 P.2d 1169, 1171-72 (Ct.App.1983), appellate courts in New Mexico are not bound by the Attorney General's concession of an issue in a criminal appeal. See State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140. As a result, we independently assess, under Rule 11-404(B) and Rule 11-403, the trial court's admission of evidence of the prior shooting. {27} Rule 11-404(B) provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added). The list of permissible uses of evidence of other wrongs in Rule 11-404(B) is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and evidence of other wrongs may be admissible on alternative relevant bases so long as it is not admitted to prove conformity with character. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 1997-NMCA-084, ¶ 13, 123 N.M. 667, 944 P.2d 896 (New Mexico case law has generally regarded Rule 11-404(B) as being inclusive rather than exclusive....), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446, 942 P.2d 189 (1997). {28} The State asserted in its brief-in-chief that the evidence of the prior shooting incident was admissible to show the jury the basis for initial police suspicion of Martinez's involvement in the killings. We have not previously recognized the basis for police suspicion of a defendant as a relevant non-character use of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 11-404(B), and we decline to do so in this case. See United State v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir.1990) (concluding that evidence demonstrating the basis for initial police suspicion is irrelevant to a determination of guilt). {29} The State also contended that the evidence of the prior shooting incident demonstrated a consciousness of guilt that is admissible under Rule 11-404(B). We agree. This Court has previously recognized the relevance and admissibility of evidence demonstrating a consciousness of guilt. State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535, 541, 624 P.2d 44, 50 (1981) (Evidence of flight or an aborted plan of flight is admissible and relevant because it tends to show consciousness of guilt.). In addition, the Court of Appeals has previously recognized that consciousness of guilt, like intent or motive, constitutes a permissible use of other acts or wrongs under Rule 11-404(B). State v. Ruiz, 119 N.M. 515, 519, 892 P.2d 962, 966 (Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence of a battery was admissible under Rule 11-404(B) because the State used the evidence to demonstrate that the defendant was doing things consistent with admitting his guilt); cf. Skiver v. State, 336 Ark. 86, 983 S.W.2d 931, 938 (1999) (stating that when evidence of prior bad acts reflects a consciousness of guilt, it has independent relevance under [the Arkansas equivalent of Rule 11-404(B)]). {30} In this case, Martinez originally told police that Marvin Sandoval had shot at him but that he had not returned fire. Martinez changed his story after the police informed him that a bullet was found in Marvin Sandoval's tire shortly after the incident. A change in a defendant's story to the police may constitute evidence of a consciousness of guilt. See State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667, 674, 712 P.2d 13, 20 (Ct.App.1985) (stating that an attempt to deceive the police shows a consciousness of guilt that is admissible in the State's case in chief); State v. Carter, 196 Conn. 36, 490 A.2d 1000, 1006 (1985) (concluding that a defendant's changes in his statements to the police evidenced a consciousness of his own guilt). [I]t remains within a trial court's discretion to admit evidence of a Defendant's prior acts under Rule 11-404(B) when the State shows that such evidence is relevant to a material issue other than conformity with character. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 51. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the evidence of the prior shooting incident was admissible under Rule 11-404(B), and we must next determine whether the trial court properly applied Rule 11-403. {31} Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.... Rule 11-403. The trial court is vested with great discretion in applying Rule [11-403], and it will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 726, 819 P.2d 673, 676 (1991). Reviewing both probative value and the danger of unfair prejudice, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Martinez's contradictory statements to the police regarding his involvement in the shooting incident with Marvin Sandoval. {32} As outlined above, there was a great deal of evidence of Martinez's involvement in the killings in this case. However, Martinez denied having a shotgun and denied shooting, or agreeing to shoot, any of the victims. The State attempted to impeach Martinez's denial of involvement by introducing evidence indicating a consciousness of guilt. For example, when confronted with charges of murdering Jaramillo and Aponte, Martinez asked why he was being charged with two counts of murder and told Detective Schaller, I never killed April [Jaramillo]. Martinez also told his cousin to recant his statement to police that Cuellar had bragged about the killings. Finally, the State introduced another change in story during Martinez's interview tending to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt: before telling the police that he gave his .25 caliber gun to Cuellar, Martinez initially told police that he gave it to someone else prior to the night of the killings. Thus, the evidence of Martinez's initial denial of firing back at Marvin Sandoval assisted the State in demonstrating a pattern of Martinez's behavior indicating a consciousness of guilt. {33} In addition, the police were able to link the bullets responsible for the deaths of Jaramillo and Morgan with the bullet removed from Marvin Sandoval's tire as a result of the prior shooting incident. Thus, the jury could reasonably infer from Martinez's original denial of involvement in the exchange of gunfire with Marvin Sandoval that he was attempting to conceal from police his possession of the .25 caliber gun. {34} Martinez argues that the evidence of the prior shooting incident had little probative value because he was willing to stipulate at trial that he had the .25 caliber gun prior to the shootings. However, Martinez did not agree to stipulate to changing his story to the police. Martinez's stipulation would have deprived the jury of a permissible inference of a consciousness of guilt. In any event, the State was not bound to present its case to the jury through abstract stipulations. Cf. State v. Sarracino, 1998-NMSC-022, ¶¶ 21-22, 125 N.M. 511, 964 P.2d 72 (concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in allowing testimony despite the defendant's willingness to stipulate to its anticipated content); State v. Tave, 1996-NMCA-056, ¶ 15, 122 N.M. 29, 919 P.2d 1094 (refusing to require the State to accept a defendant's stipulation to his status as a felon in lieu of testimony establishing that fact). Based on these circumstances, we believe that the evidence of Martinez's change in story regarding the prior shooting incident had significant probative value in demonstrating a consciousness of guilt. {35} Additionally, we believe that the trial court did not act unreasonably in concluding that the evidence of the prior shooting did not present a sufficient danger of unfair prejudice to substantially outweigh its probative value. Although the prior shooting incident could have had the impermissible effect of making the jury believe that Martinez had a propensity to fire guns at other people, we believe several facts from Martinez's trial mitigate any potentially unfair prejudice. First, the nature of the prior shooting incident, in which Martinez fired at another after being fired upon, could be interpreted as an act of self-defense by the jury and was, thus, less likely to contribute to the jury's verdict. Additionally, the State introduced independent evidence that Martinez owned and routinely carried guns and that he distributed drugs for Gonzales on a regular basis, as well as evidence that Martinez demanded drug money from Aponte on the night of the killings while holding a shotgun. The trial court may have reasonably concluded that this other evidence would have a much greater potential for suggesting a violent character in comparison with the evidence of the prior shooting incident involving Marvin Sandoval and that, therefore, the evidence of the prior shooting did not present a substantial danger of unfair prejudice. Cf. State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 26, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209 (concluding that the erroneous admission of a prior violent act did not constitute harmless error because there was little or no other evidence purporting to show Defendant as a violent character). Thus, we do not believe that the trial court's decision to admit Martinez's statements to police about his involvement in the prior shooting incident can be characterized as contrary to logic and reason. State v. Lucero, 118 N.M. 696, 702, 884 P.2d 1175, 1181 (Ct.App.1994). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. [3]