Opinion ID: 1882325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the heggs issue

Text: Although we intended to remand this case based upon the Maddox issue, we must now also address how the Heggs issue affects Latiif's claims. In Trapp v. State, 760 So.2d 924, 928 (Fla.2000), this Court identified the window period for challenges to chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, as between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997. Latiif's crime, which occurred on December 7, 1995, falls within the window period. Latiif also has alleged that his sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines could not have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines absent a departure. Importantly, the State does not dispute that the 1994 guidelines would provide for a lower maximum permissible sentence to Latiif than the 1995 guidelines provided. Generally, the relief granted to those entitled to it under Heggs is automatic resentencing under the guidelines in effect prior to the 1995 guidelines. See Trapp, 760 So.2d at 928; Heggs, 759 So.2d at 630. In this case, however, the State argues that because it reduced the main offense from a first-degree felony to the lesser included second-degree felony, there should be no automatic resentencing. In particular, the State contends that the plea agreement included the fact that the State would recommend a guideline sentence, and that recommendation came with the State's understanding that the 1995 sentencing guidelines would provide the appropriate sentencing range. Thus, the State argues that it should be given the opportunity to vacate the judgment and sentence and reinstate the original charges. This Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether there is an automatic resentencing in a Heggs remand if the original sentence is a product of a negotiated plea agreement that included a guidelines sentence. Nonetheless, since the issuance of Heggs, the Fifth District has addressed this specific situation and has determined that under these circumstances, the remedy is not an automatic resentencing; instead, the State has the option on remand of proceeding to trial on the original charges or electing to have the defendant resentenced under the 1994 guidelines. See Parker v. State, 767 So.2d 532 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); see also Capio v. State, 765 So.2d 853 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that in a Heggs claim, if the State made any sort of concession in return for the plea, the State would have the option of withdrawing from the plea agreement and taking the defendant to trial on the original charges). For example, in Parker, the defendant challenged his sentences for aggravated child abuse and child abuse, on the ground that they were unconstitutional because the Crime Control Act of 1995 was unconstitutional. Parker had received his sentences pursuant to a plea bargain, for which the State had dropped an additional count of aggravated child abuse. See id. at 533. The trial court summarily denied relief, but the Fifth District reversed, explaining that in Heggs, we found the Crime Control Act of 1995 to be unconstitutional. See id. Thus, the Fifth District reversed in order to allow the trial court to review the record and determine if the plea agreement contemplated that Parker would receive a guidelines sentence. See id. at 533-34. After reviewing the Heggs issue, the Fifth District stated: A further complication arises in this case because the sentence received was imposed as part of a plea process, part of the quid pro quo, for which the state dropped an additional count of aggravated child abuse. Thus, the remedy in this case is not an automatic resentencing. Id. at 533. Accordingly, the Fifth District determined that upon remand, if the trial court determined that guidelines considerations were part of the plea agreement, then the state shall have the option of taking Parker to trial on all of the original charges, or resentencing him under the guidelines. Id. at 534. The Second, Third, and Fourth Districts have all followed suit. See Henderson v. State, 780 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that where appellant entered into a negotiated plea to a sentence within the guidelines range, that [i]f on remand the trial court determines that Appellant is entitled to relief under Heggs, then the State must be given the option of proceeding to trial on the original charges or having Appellant resentenced under the 1994 sentencing guidelines); Vareia v. State, 777 So.2d 1168, 1168-69 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (remanding so trial court could determine if Vareia entered a negotiated plea to an indefinite sentence that exceeded the 1994 guidelines, and if she did, then the State on remand shall have the option of agreeing to a guidelines sentence under the 1994 guidelines, or withdrawing from the plea bargain and taking Vareia to trial); Buckingham v. State, 771 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (On remand, since appellant's sentence was the result of a negotiated plea [to a guidelines sentence], the State shall have the option of agreeing to a bottom of the guidelines sentence under the 1994 guidelines, or withdrawing from the plea bargain and taking appellant to trial.). We agree with the holdings of these district courts. In so doing, we adopt the rationale recently advanced by the Second District in Sidell v. State, 787 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001): [The appellant] would be entitled to Heggs relief because his sentence constitutes a departure under the 1994 guidelines. This relief is not automatic, however, because the State gave up something as part of the plea agreement. If the plea agreement is not binding upon the defendant, then it is not binding upon the state. Jolly v. State, 392 So.2d 54, 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The sentence imposed upon Latiif utilizing the 1995 guidelines was part of a quid pro quo, in which Latiif bargained with the State for the reduction of one of the charges against himspecifically, the reduction of the trafficking in cocaine charge, a first-degree felony, to possession with intent to sell, a second-degree felony. Cf. Trotter v. State, 774 So.2d 924, 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (stating that although appellant was entitled to Heggs relief, the State was not entitled to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial with reinstatement of the original charge because case did not involve a negotiated plea, but instead involved a straight-up guilty plea to the only charge contained in the information). Based upon these facts, we find that upon remand, the State should be given the option of proceeding to trial on the original charges or having Latiif resentenced under the 1994 guidelines. [2] Accordingly, we remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.