Opinion ID: 2974231
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Inquire of a Juror

Text: Several weeks after the jury convicted Lloyd, the district judge received a letter from John K. Limoli, an attorney in Cincinnati, reporting that Limoli had spoken with one of the jurors from Lloyd’s trial. The letter described the conversation as follows: The reason I am writing is that Mr. Gonzalez also told me that he did not vote his mind as a juror. He said he did not believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty but finally voted for guilt because he could no longer stand the pressure from the other jurors. Mr. Gonzalez further stated that there was one other holdout juror who felt as he did but who also buckled under the pressure of another, rather belligerent juror, who had resorted to name calling. (JA 37.) The district court distributed this letter to the prosecutor and defense counsel. Lloyd filed a motion requesting permission to inquire of Juror Gonzales regarding whether he was subjected to any extraneous influence during the jury deliberations. The district court denied the motion on the basis that the information in the letter did not contain any indication of extraneous information or influence. Lloyd asserts that the denial of his motion was an abuse of discretion. “When possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judge’s attention he has a duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the sixth amendment.” United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir. 1985). The trial judge’s decision regarding the measures necessary to make this determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g., id.; United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120, 125 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d No. 04-4014 United States v. Lloyd Page 7 865, 880 (6th Cir. 1994). “A trial court’s refusal to permit an evidentiary hearing may constitute abuse of discretion when the alleged jury misconduct involves extrinsic influences.” Shackelford, 777, F.2d at 1145; see also Rigsby, 45 F.3d at 124-25. However, refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing is not an abuse of discretion where there is no credible allegation of extraneous influence or information. See Rigsby, 45 F.3d at 125; Griffith, 17 F.3d at 881; Shackelford, 777 F.2d at 1145. This principle flows from the common law rule that a juror is not competent to question his own verdict and its concomitant exception that the only aspect of deliberations a juror may testify about is whether deliberations were influenced by extraneous influence or information. This common law rule and its exception are codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) which states: Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Lloyd acknowledges the limitations Rule 606(b) places on the scope of any post-verdict inquiry of jurors. Consequently, Lloyd confines his argument to the exception and argues that since there was evidence that Juror Gonzales did not “vote his mind,” the trial court should have permitted inquiry into whether this was the result of any extraneous influence or pressure. This argument ignores the fact that Limoli’s letter clearly states that the pressure under which Gonzales (and allegedly one other juror) buckled was “pressure from the other jurors.” This statement negates any conjecture that it was external coercion which prevented Gonzales from voting his mind. Since there was no credible evidence of extraneous information or influence, Lloyd’s argument fails. The district court’s denial of his motion to question Gonzales was not an abuse of discretion.