Opinion ID: 1196597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Homicide by vehicle statute is constitutional as applied in this case.

Text: Simpson's first argument on certiorari is that New Mexico's homicide by vehicle statute is unconstitutional as applied to him under the facts of this case and that the district court erred by giving jury instructions that track the requirements of the statute. Section 66-8-101, headed Homicide by vehicle; great bodily injury by vehicle[,] defines homicide by vehicle as the killing of a human being in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle and great bodily injury by vehicle as the injuring of a human being, to the extent defined in Section 30-1-12 NMSA 1978,[ [2] ] in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle. Under our Motor Vehicle Code, the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle includes driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, proscribed by NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(A) (Cum.Supp. 1993), and driving recklessly, penalized in NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-113(A) (Repl.Pamp. 1987). Simpson asserts that the vehicular homicide statute is unconstitutional because it impermissibly shifts the burden of proof from the State to the defendant. He argues that the shift occurs both because of Section 66-8-101 and because of the causation instruction the trial court gave to the jury. That instruction was based on SCRA 1986, 14-251 of our Uniform Jury Instructions (UJI Crim. 14-251), which provides: [3] For you to find the defendant guilty of homicide by vehicle, the state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of the defendant caused the death[s] of [Susan Figueroa and Brandi Silvers]. The cause of a death is an act which, in a natural and continuous chain of events, produces the death and without which the death would not have occurred. There may be more than one cause of death. If the acts of two or more persons contribute to cause death, each such act is a cause of death. Simpson argues that the statute, in combination with the causation instruction, allowed the jury to find him guilty of the charges if it found that he was either driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or driving recklessly and that his behavior was only one  possibly a relatively insignificant one  of several possible causes of the deaths and great bodily injury to the victims. The jury, so the argument goes, could have convicted him even if his fault was merely one percent of the total cause of the harm. This result, he argues, shifted the burden of proof to him because to be acquitted he had to show that he was not at fault to any extent. Defendant asserts that Mr. Simpson's intoxication and/or his reckless driving should be the sole cause of the accident and that is what should be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and therein is the key problem because that is not what happened. He suggests that other parties, including Sandoval and the City of Las Cruces, which installed and maintained the traffic signal pole struck by his car, were at least partially at fault for the accident. However, contrary to defendant's assertion, the statute and jury instruction neither shifted the burden of proof to him nor allowed the jury to convict him if he was only at fault to an immaterial extent. Rather, as the causation instruction clearly states, the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions caused the deaths and great bodily harm, in the sense that his unlawful acts, in a natural and continuous chain of events, produced the deaths and the great bodily harm. This refinement of the concept caused appearing in the instruction incorporates the notion of proximate cause and instructs the jury not to convict the defendant if he is only at fault to an insignificant extent. General principles of criminal law do not require that a defendant's conduct be the sole cause of the crime. Instead, it is only required that the result be proximately caused by, or the natural and probable consequence of, the accused's conduct. 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 26, at 124-26 (14th ed. 1978). The conduct of other parties is relevant only if it is a superseding cause that negates the defendant's conduct. See id. at 127-32; see also State v. Romero, 69 N.M. 187, 191, 365 P.2d 58, 60-61 (1961) (rules concerning contributory negligence do not apply to homicide cases based on criminal negligence in operating automobile; if defendant's negligence is found to be the cause of death, he is criminally responsible whether or not decedent's failure to use due care contributed to harm). Accordingly, we find that New Mexico's vehicular homicide statute does not unconstitutionally shift to the defendant the burden of proof and that the trial court did not err in giving jury instructions that tracked the statute.