Opinion ID: 2248973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: federal and state regulations

Text: As we have noted, both the Labor Department and the Department have promulgated regulations which interpret PRUCOL. Three regulations are principally at issue. In Unemployment Insurance Letter No. 1-86 (October 28, 1985), 51 Fed.Reg. 29713, the Labor Department stated that it would treat parolees and refugees as being PRUCOL, as well as those who after a review of their particular circumstances under INS statutory or regulatory procedures have been granted a status which allows them to remain in the United States for an indefinite period of time. (Emphasis added.) However, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1-86 was promulgated well before the passage of IRCA. Therefore, we believe it can shed little light on whether IRCA-eligible aliens were PRUCOL after IRCA's effective date. In contrast, in Unemployment Insurance Letter No. 1-86, Change 1 (Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration Feb. 16, 1989) (unpublished), the Labor Department did address the question of whether aliens who apply for amnesty under IRCA become PRUCOL. The Labor Department here concluded that because there remains a possibility that an alien in the legalization process could be deported should he fail to meet IRCA's legalization requirements (see 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b) (1988)), IRCA legalized aliens may never receive benefits under PRUCOL status. The Labor Department took this position even though INS's own statistics show that over 92% of all aliens granted lawful temporary status under IRCA are successful in obtaining lawful permanent resident status. Provisional Legalization Application Statistics, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (Statistics Division, Office of Plans and Analysis Dec. 23,1990). Finally, in apparent response to Unemployment Insurance Letter No. 1-86, Change 1, the Department amended its regulations, effective June 29, 1989, to preclude an alien from claiming PRUCOL status unless the individual or group or class member [can] show that the [INS] has provided written notification that he may remain in the United States for an indefinite period of time. 13 Ill.Reg. 11502, 11505-06 (1989). Although we recognize that courts have given substantial weight to interpretations of statutes made by those agencies charged with their enforcement, an agency's interpretation of statutory language is not binding on the courts. ( Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. State of Illinois Department of Employment Security (1989), 131 Ill.2d 23, 34, 136 Ill.Dec. 86, 544 N.E.2d 772.) The appellate court correctly noted that the deference accorded an agency's interpretation of a statute does not displace judicial analysis. (207 Ill.App.3d at 808, 152 Ill.Dec. 717, 566 N.E.2d 404; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781 n. 9, 81 L.Ed.2d 694, 703 n. 9 (courts are the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent).) Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has specifically held that Labor Department letters may be relied on as agency interpretations of the statutes to which some deference may be accorded[;] however, `the courts have the reserve of power to substitute their own judgment on all questions of statutory interpretation.` Cosby v. Ward (7th Cir.1988), 843 F.2d 967, 981 (quoting Doe v. Reivitz (7th Cir.1987), 830 F.2d 1441, 1447, quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7:11, at 55 (1979)). We are, therefore, faced with the question of whether the Labor Department's Unemployment Insurance Regulation No. 1-86, Change 1, and the Department's parallel regulation, found at 13 Ill.Reg. 11502, 11505-06 (1989), comport with the proper meaning of PRUCOL as intended by Congress and, therefore, by the General Assembly.