Opinion ID: 2460096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Equivalent of Acquittal

Text: In the first of these arguments, Roberts suggests that even if jeopardy did not attach, the district court's order was the equivalent of acquittal because the district court resolved factual questions regarding the chemical makeup of the drug that Roberts possessed. A similar argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Serfass, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055. In Serfass, the Court considered whether a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment was an appealable order. The Court first explained that under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970), which defined federal appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the government had a right to appeal so long as further prosecution would not be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 387, 95 S.Ct. 1055. Hence, the federal statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006), expressly states the limitation that this court has imposed on Kansas appellate jurisdiction through case law. See Crozier, 225 Kan. at 122, 587 P.2d 331; Gustin, 212 Kan. at 480, 510 P.2d 1290. Using the bright line of whether jeopardy had attached, the Serfass Court held the government could appeal the order because Serfass had not been put to trial before a trier of facts. The Court noted Serfass had not waived his right to a jury trial and, at the time of the motion hearing, the district court did not have jurisdiction to do more than grant or deny the motion to dismiss; it did not have jurisdiction to determine whether Serfass was innocent or guilty. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 389, 95 S.Ct. 1055. The Supreme Court then considered Serfass' argument that the ruling was based on evidentiary facts outside of the indictment and was the `functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits' and `constructively jeopardy had attached.' Serfass, 420 U.S. at 390, 95 S.Ct. 1055. The Court explained the argument further, stating: The argument is grounded on two basic and interrelated premises. First, petitioner argues that the Court has admonished against the use of `technicalities' in interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause, and he contends that the normal rule as to the attachment of jeopardy is merely a pre-sumption which is rebuttable in cases where an analysis of the respective interests of the Government and the accused indicates that the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause would be frustrated by further prosecution. [Citation omitted.] Second, petitioner maintains that the disposition of his motion to dismiss the indictment was, in the circumstances of this case, the `functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits,' and he concludes that the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause would in fact be frustrated by further prosecution. [Citation omitted.] Serfass, 420 U.S. at 390, 95 S.Ct. 1055. The Court rejected both premises and the argument, explaining: It is true that we have disparaged `rigid, mechanical' rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. [Citation omitted.] However, we also observed in that case that `the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.' [Citation omitted.] Implicit in the latter statement is the premise that the `constitutional policies underpinning the Fifth Amendment's guarantee' are not implicated before that point in the proceedings at which `jeopardy attaches.' [Citation omitted.] As we have noted above, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach until a defendant is `put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.' [Citation omitted.] This is by no means a mere technicality, nor is it a `rigid, mechanical' rule. It is, of course, like most legal rules, an attempt to impart content to an abstraction. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 390-91, 95 S.Ct. 1055. The Court further explained that if a motion to dismiss is granted before trial the defendant is not `subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction' and an appeal by the United States would not mean that the prosecutor would have the opportunity `to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after having failed with the first.' [Citations omitted.] Serfass, 420 U.S. at 391, 95 S.Ct. 1055. According to the Supreme Court, the second premise that the motion to dismiss was the `functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits,' and [Serfass'] conclusion that the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause would be frustrated by further prosecution in his case need not, in light of the conclusion we reach above, long detain us. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 392, 95 S.Ct. 1055. The Court recognized the focus in case law on whether there was an `acquittal' but then stated: [T]he language of cases in which we have held that there can be no appeal from, or further prosecution after, an `acquittal' cannot be divorced from the procedural context in which the action so characterized was taken. [Citation omitted.] The word itself has no talismanic quality for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Compare United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88[, 37 S.Ct. 68, 69, 61 L.Ed. 161] (1916), with United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 78[, 31 S.Ct. 209, 55 L.Ed. 99] (1911), and United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 236-237[, 48 S.Ct. 486, 72 L.Ed. 862] (1928). In particular, it has no significance in this context unless jeopardy has once attached and an accused has been subjected to the risk of conviction. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 392, 95 S.Ct. 1055. Finally, the Court distinguished its prior decision in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972), in which the Court held that an appeal does not lie from a decision that rests, not upon the sufficiency of the indictment alone, but upon extraneous facts. If an indictment is dismissed as a result of a stipulated fact or the showing of evidentiary facts outside the indictment, which facts would constitute a defense on the merits at trial, no appeal is available. [Citation omitted.] Brewster, 408 U.S. at 506, 92 S.Ct. 2531. Although Brewster supported Serfass' (and Roberts') argument, the Serfass Court rejected its application, noting that Brewster was based on a prior version of the federal statute and was not concerned with the constitutional question of whether double jeopardy would bar the appeal. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 393, 95 S.Ct. 1055. Under the applicable statute regarding federal criminal appeals, the Court concluded jeopardy must also have attached before the State's appeal would be barred. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 393, 95 S.Ct. 1055 (accused must suffer jeopardy before suffering double jeopardy). This conclusion undercuts Roberts' argument, which essentially asserts that meeting the first prong of the definition of acquittal is sufficient to bar an appeal. Like the revised federal statute applied in Serfass, the Kansas prohibition against the appeal of a judgment of acquittal is based on double jeopardy considerations. Consequently, the order must meet the second prong as well or there is no bar to the State's appeal. That does not mean that the first factora determination of the sufficiency of the evidenceis irrelevant, however. As the Supreme Court reiterated after the Serfass decision: [A] defendant is acquitted only when `the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' Scott, 437 U.S. at 97, 98 S.Ct. 2187 (quoting Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349). Hence, an order entered midtrial i.e., after jeopardy has attachedis not a judgment of acquittal if it is not based on a finding that the evidence is insufficient.