Opinion ID: 766638
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kings Dominion Park Police Corporal

Text: 59 e. Kings Dominion Park Police Officer Aside from effectively illustrating the final authority of the Sheriff of Hanover County over the special police officers, the preceding list conspicuously omitted any reference to the Manager of Loss Prevention. 60 Third, even viewing the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to Austin and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, we cannot conclude that Hester had any policymaking authority concerning arrests effected by the special police officers as a matter of custom or usage having the force of law. See Jett, 491 U.S. at 737. At trial, Austin presented no evidence that Hester had ever directed a special police officer to effect an arrest or that he had ever prevented the same. Moreover, there was no evidence that the special police officers routinely consulted Hester or obtained his approval concerning impending arrests. Nor was there any evidence that Gatewood consulted Hester or obtained his approval concerning the two arrests in the present litigation. Rather, Gatewood's testimony regarding the events preceding those arrests demonstrates that she consulted only McGhee of the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office. Furthermore, when asked whether he knew that Gatewood planned to bring additional charges against Austin, Hester testified that[Gatewood] indicated to me somewhere in that period of time . . . that [McGhee] and she had had a conversation, and the charges were being amended, yes, sir, I was aware of that. Although certainly suggesting that Gatewood kept Hester informed as to the status of Austin's case, this testimony in no way indicates that Gatewood attempted either to consult with Hester or to obtain his approval regarding her decision to bring additional charges against Austin. Put simply, there was no evidence that Hester, despite his title of Manager of Loss Prevention, in practice exercised any control over the decisions of the special police officers regarding detention and/or arrests of park guests suspected of criminal offenses in this case or any other case. Indeed, the uncontradicted testimony was to the contrary. In fact, we find no support in the record for any specific policymaking authority given to or exercised by Hester regarding matters of law enforcement. The questions simply were not asked, nor was evidence ever produced in this regard. 61 In light of the foregoing analysis, we have no basis upon which to conclude that Hester exercised final policymaking authority concerning arrests effected by the special police officers of the Park Police Department. Because Austin's position on Paramount's liability under § 1983 rests entirely upon her theory that Hester was a policymaker, we are satisfied that she failed to establish that any deprivation of her federal rights was caused by an official policy or custom of Paramount. Accordingly, we conclude that Paramount was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Austin's § 1983 claim. 8