Opinion ID: 2632907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discussion of defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that defendant had a right not to testify at the penalty phase, that the jury should draw no inferences from a failure to do so, and that the jury should not discuss the matter or allow it to influence the jury's deliberations in any way. Nevertheless, according to two juror affidavits presented by defendant in support of his new trial motion, the jury discussed defendant's failure to testify during its deliberations. Juror 5 declared: During penalty phase deliberations, several jurors, myself included, expressed the opinion that we would have liked for [defendant] to testify during the penalty phase so that we could better understand why he killed six people, and whether he was truly remorseful. Juror 12, the foreperson, declared: During the penalty phase deliberations, jurors, myself included, discussed the fact that we would like to have heard [defendant] testify during the penalty phase so that we could better know him and understand the extent of his impairment. We discussed the fact that we would have liked to have heard [defendant's] reasons for committing the crimes as we felt this was not satisfactorily answered through the testimony of defense expert witnesses. Defendant contends that by discussing his failure to testify at the penalty phase, the jury committed prejudicial misconduct. We disagree. The Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. A defendant may invoke this right at the penalty phase of a capital case, even though the risk of self-incrimination is diminished because the defendant has already been convicted. ( Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 462-463, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 124, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 757, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) The right not to testify would be vitiated if the jury could draw adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to testify. Thus, the Fifth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant, upon request, to an instruction that will minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify. ( Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 305,101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241.) Here, by violating the trial court's instruction not to discuss defendant's failure to testify, the jury committed misconduct. ( People v. Hord (1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 711, 721, 725, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 55; People v. Perez (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 893, 908, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 141.) This misconduct gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, which may be rebutted ... by a reviewing court's determination, upon examining the entire record, that there is no substantial likelihood that the complaining party suffered actual harm. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 174, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781; see People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 303, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249 [applying similar standard to allegations of juror bias]; People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 582-583, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87 (lead opn.) [same].) At the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court acknowledged that misconduct had occurred, but it ruled that defendant was not prejudiced by the juror comments on his failure to testify. In reviewing this ruling, we apply our independent judgment. ( People v. Danks, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 303, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249 [ Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct ... is a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court's independent determination.' ].) Applying that standard, we agree with the trial court here that the jury's references to defendant's failure to testify did not prejudice defendant. As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the rule prohibiting jury discussion of a defendant's failure to testify is to prevent the jury from drawing adverse inferences against the defendant, in violation of the constitutional right not to incriminate oneself. Here, the comments on defendant's failure to testify mentioned in defendant's new trial motion merely expressed regret that defendant had not testified, because such testimony might have assisted the jurors in understanding him better. In the words of the trial court: I think that wanting to hear defendants testify is natural. We do the best we can to deter jurors from speculating and from drawing negative inferences, but merely referencing that they wish he would have testified is not the same as punishing the Defendant for not testifying. It is not the same as drawing negative inferences from the absence of testimony. We conclude there is no substantial likelihood that defendant was prejudiced by the jury's brief discussion of his failure to testify at the penalty phase.