Opinion ID: 836008
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nature of Potential Penalty

Text: The state argues that, historically, the law has viewed in rem forfeiture as a civil, rather than a criminal, action. We agree that there is strong support for that view, although the evidence is not entirely one way. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681-90, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2090-95, 40 L.Ed.2d 452, 466-71 (1974) (tracing federal view that in rem forfeitures, as opposed to deodand forfeitures, only pertain to property and treat guilt or innocence of the property owner as irrelevant); but compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 533-35, 29 L.Ed. 746, 752 (1886) (holding that proceeding to forfeit of fraudulently imported goods was quasicriminal and therefore sufficient to implicate prohibition on compulsory self-incrimination). Even if the evidence regarding the historical view of in rem forfeiture is not entirely unequivocal, it is clear that forfeiture is not an infamous penalty, the potential for which, like imprisonment, automatically marks a proceeding as criminal in nature. Neither does it appear that there are any grounds for claiming that forfeiture under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, is inconsistent with, or excessive in relation to, the statute's civil purpose. We already have noted that the forfeiture statute announces several remedial purposes, e.g., to render drug manufacture and trafficking activities unprofitable by confiscating the proceeds, to render those activities more difficult by confiscating tools and other property that facilitate the activities, and to provide resources to governments that enforce drug trafficking laws. Defendants do not deny that those purposes exist, but argue that the forfeiture scheme is unrelated to those purposes. They contend that the forfeiture of their home was personally staggering and that it is impossible to justify their $60,000 loss as necessary to cover the state's investigative and prosecutorial costs or in terms of some other nonpunitive purpose. That is the point at which defendants' procedural choices during the forfeiture proceeding become relevant. As we have shown, the statutory scheme on its face expresses a legislative intent to keep its sanctions within constitutional bounds and provides a mitigation mechanism that purports to serve that intent. To the extent that defendants' argument focuses on any alleged excessiveness of their own $60,000 loss, it is an as applied argument and foreclosed by their failure to intervene in the forfeiture proceeding and seek mitigation. We cannot presume that, if defendants had made the kind of showing in mitigation that they statutorily were entitled to make, the final outcome would have been disproportionate. To the extent that defendants are suggesting that the entire statutory scheme is excessiveand that is their burdenwe are not persuaded. Depending on the circumstances, forfeiture of an entire house or any other property that is a subject of Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, may be justified fully in terms of the remedial purposes of removing the tools of a drug manufacturer's or trafficker's trade and of confiscating profits. Moreover, the clear purpose and effect of the mitigation procedure set out at Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 699, section 13, is to ensure that forfeitures are not excessive in relation to those purposes. Although defendants in this case did not avail themselves of that procedure, its availability precludes any claim that the statute on its face provides for sanctions that cannot be justified in terms of civil purposes.