Opinion ID: 1389370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Emotional Injury Is Compensable

Text: The relevant Wyoming statute provides as follows: `Injury' means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging, and includes damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance and death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer, incurred while at work in places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. (Emphasis added.) Section 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977. The trial court found that the appellants' claims were for psychic injuries when the judge said: It seems to me that the balance we have to strike here is that if they're covered, if they could get benefits under the Act, then the employer has immunity. And it seems to me that that definition is just so broad, any detrimental harm to a human organism, or whatever that  short of aging, I think that encompasses psychic injuries. It is well established that mental disorders are compensable under the various worker's compensation acts of the country. The Annotation at 97 A.L.R.3d 161 collects cases in which mental disorders have been held to be compensable. In Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 131 Cal. App.3d 308, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1982), the plaintiff was employed at a bakery in an Albertson's store. She had problems getting along with her supervisor, who threatened to get rid of her, and told her `[y]ou better get your butt in high gear because there's nothing here to sell.' The plaintiff in that case claimed she was `so embarrassed that [she] just wanted to die,' and that she was forced to take tranquilizers to compensate for her depression and other psychological factors. This is Ms. Bell's claim in the case at bar. The court, in Albertson's, held that the claims were compensable.    `... In order to find a physical industrial injury, a single identifiable traumatic experience need not be shown. [Citations.] The disabling injury may be the result of the cumulative effect of each day's stresses and strains. [Citation.] We perceive no logical basis for a different requirement for a psychoneurotic injury. To one experiencing it, such an injury is as real and disabling as a physical injury.'    ( Callahan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 85 Cal. App.3d 621, 628, fn.3, 149 Cal.Rptr 647.) 182 Cal. Rptr. at 307. In Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 72 Wis.2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976), the plaintiff suffered a nervous breakdown which she attributed to the heavy workload in the workplace together with the fact that her supervisor was    negative, brusque, and belittling, especially to women, and that he challenged and belittled any decision [the plaintiff] would make. 240 N.W.2d at 131. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the injury was compensable, so long as the plaintiff's mental disturbances were caused by the stress and strains of her employment. In Carter v. General Motors Corporation, 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960), the plaintiff was working as a machine operator in a General Motors plant. When he attempted to follow proper procedures in doing his job, he fell behind. When he took shortcuts, he violated procedures at the plant, and was berated by his supervisor. As a result of all this, he claimed he suffered a disabling psychosis. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the injury was compensable. See also Todd v. Goostree, Mo. App., 493 S.W.2d 411 (1973); for mental injury resulting from overwork, Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 119 Ariz. 51, 579 P.2d 555 (1978); for shock resulting from having found the plaintiff's supervisor's body after he had committed suicide, Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 330 N.E.2d 603 (1975); and for disability resulting from stress associated with a demotion, Korter v. EBI Companies, Inc., 46 Or. App. 43, 610 P.2d 312 (1980). These above-cited cases holding mental injury to be compensable under worker's compensation laws are consistent with the holding of this court on the subject. In Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, Wyo., 678 P.2d 874 (1984), we held that nontraumatically caused mental injury was compensable under certain work conditions. We noted with approval that Larson in 1B Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 42.20, has delineated three types of psychic injury: (1) a mental stimulus which causes a physical injury; (2) a physical trauma which causes a nervous injury; and (3) a mental stimulus which causes a nervous injury. In the case at bar, the appellants charge that they received both a physical trauma (touching) which caused a nervous injury (category (2) of Larson, supra) and a mental stimulus which caused a nervous injury (category (3) of Larson, supra). In Consolidated Freightways, we addressed a set of facts which contemplated category (3) of Larson, supra, i.e., a mental stimulus which causes a nervous injury. In holding this category of nontraumatically caused psychic injury to be compensable, we said that it must have resulted from a situation of greater dimension than the day-to-day mental stresses and tensions which all employees must experience, citing Wisconsin Supreme Court authority from Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Health Relations, supra, and School District # 1, Village of Brown Deer v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974). We went on to cite other states' authority, all holding that nontraumatically induced mental injury is compensable according to the distinctions which are described in the opinions cited at 678 P.2d at 877. We then held, in Consolidated Freightways, that the facts of that case supported a finding that the nontraumatically induced injury resulted from a situation of greater dimensions than the worker's day-to-day mental stresses and tensions that were a part of his daily work life and therefore his injury was compensable. In similar fashion, the verbal abuse and offensive manners of appellants' supervisor created an employment condition characterized by pressures and tensions beyond those usually experienced by employees. Under our holding in Consolidated Freightways, the psychological injuries resulting from such unusual employment strain qualify for compensation under the state Worker's Compensation Act. With respect to category (2) of Larson, supra, we can find no reason to accept concepts which argue that a physical trauma which causes a nervous injury should not be regarded as compensable while holding, in Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, supra, that a mental stimulus which causes a nervous injury is compensable (category (3) of Larson, supra). Larson says of category (2), supra, physical trauma causing nervous injury: Conversely, when there has been a physical accident or trauma, and claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria, or hysterical paralysis, it is now uniformly held that the full disability including the effects of the neurosis is compensable. Dozens of cases, involving almost every conceivable kind of neurotic, psychotic, depressive, or hysterical symptom, functional overlay, or personality disorder, have accepted this rule. [3] Larson, supra, § 42.22.