Opinion ID: 1622307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in denying Julie's motion for relief from judgment.

Text: ¶ 14. The standard of review for the denial of a motion for relief from judgment is abuse of discretion. Davis v. Nationwide Recovery Serv., 797 So.2d 929, 930 (Miss.2001) (citing Montgomery v. Montgomery, 759 So.2d 1238, 1240 (Miss. 2000)). Consideration of a motion based on Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) generally requires that a `balance... be struck between granting a litigant a hearing on the merits with the need and desire to achieve finality.' City of Jackson v. Jackson Oaks L.P., 860 So.2d 309, 311-12 (Miss.2003) (quoting Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 451 So.2d 219, 221 (Miss. 1984)). Rule 60(b) motions should be denied where they are merely an attempt to relitigate the case. Jackson Oaks L.P., 860 So.2d at 312 (citing Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So.2d 377, 388 (Miss. 1987)). ¶ 15. In August 2002, the trial court granted McBride's motion for partial summary judgment on Julie's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. This Court affirmed the trial court's decision in Mabus I, finding that Julie had failed to prove that a fiduciary relationship had existed between her and McBride. Mabus I, 884 So.2d at 760-61. On remand from Mabus I, Julie filed a motion for relief from judgment, or in the alternative, motion to dismiss and for other relief, requesting that the trial court reinstate her breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. Julie argued that the trial court based its decision on false affidavits submitted by Ray [5] and McBride, [6] and an inaccurate transcript [7] of the taped meeting. The trial court held that even if Julie's allegations were true, request for Rule 60(b) relief was time-barred because she had knowledge of any false or inaccurate statements prior to the trial court's 2002 ruling, but did not seek relief from the judgment until July 2006. ¶ 16. Julie now argues that her claim for breach of fiduciary duty should be reinstated, because Ray and McBride perpetrated a fraud to obtain partial summary judgment. She submits that a partial summary judgment is interlocutory and may be modified. She further contends that because McBride remains a party to the action, he would not be prejudiced by having the claim reinstated. ¶ 17. We find Julie's arguments to be without merit. The trial court certified its 2002 order as final under Rule 54(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Miss. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Additionally, Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a motion for relief from judgment based upon fraud or misrepresentation may not be brought more than six months after the judgment or order is entered. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). ¶ 18. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Julie's motion for relief from judgment.