Opinion ID: 2611437
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: discussion of davis and wood

Text: The State argues initially that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis overruled our decision in Wood, relied upon by the court of appeals. We disagree.
In State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993), defendant Lance Conway Wood appealed his conviction of murder in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated kidnaping in connection with the murder of Gordon Church in November 1988. Michael Archuleta was also involved in the murder. Shortly after the murder, Wood contacted his parole officer and informed him that Archuleta had killed someone. Wood met with his parole officer and other police officers later that day and recounted his version of the events surrounding the murder. Id. at 76. The next morning, Wood directed law enforcement officials to the scene of the murder and to Church's body. After some time at the murder scene, a police officer, Captain Robert Dekker, drove Wood to a spot under a freeway overpass. Id. at 81. Dekker then gave Wood his Miranda warnings, intending to interview Wood in relation to the murder. As soon as Dekker concluded the warnings, Wood wondered aloud whether he should consult an attorney regarding protective custody. In an effort to clarify Wood's meaning, Dekker asked whether Wood wanted an attorney for questioning purposes right now. Wood said that he did not and that he wanted to talk to Dekker. Dekker proceeded to interview and take a statement from him. Id. At trial, Wood challenged the introduction of the statement given to Dekker on the ground that his statement regarding consulting an attorney amounted to a request for counsel, barring any further questioning by Dekker. Id. at 82. This court held that Wood's reference to an attorney did not amount to an invocation of his right to counsel and that Wood had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of that right. Id. at 83. We held that Wood's reference to an attorney accompanied by his statement regarding protective custody at least made it unclear whether he was invoking his constitutional right to counsel. Id. This court then went on to hold: [W]hen a defendant makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for an attorney, questioning with respect to the subject matter of the investigation must immediately stop, and any further questioning must be limited to clarifying the request. If the defendant then makes clear that he or she desires to have counsel present, further questioning is prohibited. Id. at 85. This court determined that Dekker had complied with this rule, and held that the trial court was correct in not granting Wood's motion to suppress. Id.
In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), defendant Robert L. Davis, a member of the United States Navy, was convicted of murder in connection with the beating death of Keith Shackleford in October 1988. Approximately a month following the beating, Davis was interviewed in connection with the murder at the office of the Naval Investigative Service. Prior to any questioning, [a]s required by military law, the agents advised [Davis] that he was a suspect in the killing, that he was not required to make a statement, that any statement could be used against him at a trial by court-martial, and that he was entitled to speak with an attorney and have an attorney present during questioning. Id. at 454, 114 S.Ct. at 2352-53. Davis waived those rights both orally and in writing. About an hour and a half later, Davis said, Maybe I should talk to a lawyer. The agents stopped questioning Davis about the murder and focused on determining if he in fact wanted a lawyer before questioning resumed. Davis responded that he was not asking for a lawyer and that he did not want a lawyer. After a break, the agents reminded Davis of his rights and then continued questioning him. Approximately an hour later, Davis announced, I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else, whereupon, the interrogation ceased. At his court-martial proceeding, Davis moved to suppress his statements made during the interview. However, the military judge denied the motion. Id. at 455, 114 S.Ct. at 2353. The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed, holding that Davis's reference to an attorney was ambiguous and that the agents properly clarified his statement before proceeding with the interview. Id. at 456, 114 S.Ct. at 2353-54. The United States Supreme Court affirmed but took the opportunity to discuss whether and when an officer must cease questioning a suspect and clarify a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal reference to a Miranda right. In briefly recounting the development of the prophylactic Miranda rules, the Court stated: If a suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him. But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation. Id. at 458, 114 S.Ct. at 2354-55 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, the Court held that if the suspect is not reasonably clear in his reference to an attorney, officers are not required to stop questioning or focus on clarifying the suspect's statement. The Court stated that the suspect must unambiguously request counsel, and if his statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, then the officers are not required to stop questioning the suspect. Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. The Court then explicitly held that after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. Id. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356.
The State now argues that Wood was overruled by Davis and that law enforcement officers are no longer required to clarify a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal reference to Miranda rights in either a pre- or a postwaiver scenario. However, the State reads Davis too broadly. The Court in Davis made clear that its holding applied only to a suspect's attempt to reinvoke his Miranda rights  after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the same. Id. (emphasis added). While recognizing that its clear assertion rule might disadvantage some suspects, the Davis Court stated: [T]he primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. ... A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted. Although [ Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981),] provides an additional protection  if a suspect subsequently requests an attorney, questioning must cease  it is one that must be affirmatively invoked by the suspect. Id. at 460-61 (emphasis added). Plainly, the Court in Davis did not intend its holding to extend to prewaiver scenarios, and we see no reason to so extend it. The questions of waiver of Miranda rights and of postwaiver invocation of those rights are entirely separate. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, 494, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). Regarding initial waiver of those rights, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a heavy burden rests on law enforcement officers to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. Wood 's requirement that an officer faced with an ambiguous response to the officer's reading of a suspect's Miranda rights limit his questioning to clarifying the suspect's response is entirely consistent with this heavy burden. See Wood, 868 P.2d at 85. However, once a suspect has clearly, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, Davis places the requirement of clarity with respect to postwaiver invocation of those rights on the suspect. As the majority in Davis describes it, the suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. Davis 's holding did not address the prewaiver scenario, and therefore Wood 's prewaiver clarification requirement is not inconsistent with Davis. Thus, we decline to disrupt established precedent unnecessarily, and we hold that Davis did not overrule Wood. Although our holding in Wood may appear broad enough to cover both pre- and postwaiver scenarios, 868 P.2d at 85, the factual circumstances at issue in that case clearly relate to the question of Wood's initial waiver of his Miranda rights. 868 P.2d at 83. In any event, to the extent that Wood may be read more broadly than Davis, we are constrained to follow Davis. In determining the content and scope of Miranda -based protections, we have looked to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court rather than to the Constitution of Utah. In State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996), we stated: [T]his Court has never specifically held that Miranda -type warnings are required under the Utah Constitution. Thus, to the extent that [ Wood ] and other cases state that [ Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983),] afforded broader protections than those available under United States Supreme Court decisions applying Miranda law, we disavow those statements. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 n. 2 (citations omitted). Therefore, in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Davis, and in light of our statement in Mirquet, the requirement in Wood that an officer limit his questioning to clarifying a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement must be limited to prewaiver scenarios.