Opinion ID: 4508490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment - Damages

Text: Tour 18 contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Masters Members on damages and in failing to order discovery on mitigation. The district court determined “that the losses of each member equaled the value of a monthly membership [at Rose Creek] for the time the Master Membership program was improperly eliminated,” App. at 1246, and found no genuine dispute that such monthly value was $350. The district court further saw “no basis for concluding that the failure to pay to play golf elsewhere is a failure to mitigate the losses here.” App. at 1249. We agree.
Oklahoma’s general measure of contract damages is “the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby.” Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 21. Put differently, the general measure is “the amount that would place the aggrieved party in the position he would have occupied had the breach not occurred.” Sun Ridge Inv’rs, Ltd. v. Parker, 956 P.2d 876, 878 (Okla. 1998). Damages also must be “clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin,” Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 21, “in some manner other than by mere speculation, conjecture or surmise, and by reference to some definite standard,” John A. Henry & Co. v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 941 F.2d 1068, 1071 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Great W. Motor Lines v. Cozard, 417 P.2d 575, 578 (Okla. 1966)). By breaching the MMAs, Tour 18 deprived the Masters Members of fifteen months of Rose Creek membership, a time period not in dispute. Accordingly, to put 14 the Masters Members “in the position [they] would have occupied had the breach not occurred,” Parker, 956 P.2d at 878, Tour 18 must compensate them for the value of fifteen months of Rose Creek membership. “[T]he best measure of the value of [a] broken promise is the value assigned to it by the parties.” 24 Williston on Contracts § 64:3 (4th ed. 2019). Here, the parties have assigned a value to Tour 18’s broken promise of $350 per month. The Masters Members point to abundant record evidence showing Tour 18 assessed the value of a Rose Creek membership at $350 per month. First, Tour 18’s December 1, 2017, termination letter used Rose Creek’s “old family membership rate of $350 per month” to calculate that all Masters Members had “amortized out” of any reimbursement right. App. at 100. Second, Mr. Wilkerson stated in his January 2017 affidavit that “Rose Creek charges monthly dues in the amount of $350.00,” and that Tour 18 would lose $210,000 in yearly revenue if the Masters Members “are permitted to play without paying” ($350 x 12 x 50 Masters Members), App. at 1205. Third, Mr. Wilkerson repeated this admission in a February 2017 declaration supporting Tour 18’s opposition to the Masters Members’ request for injunctive relief: “Tour 18’s lost income should an injunction be granted permitting former Master Members free access to the facilities exceeds $210,000.00 per year. . . .” App. at 1235. Thus, as the district court noted, Tour 18’s “own representatives provide[d] the necessary evidence regarding the value of each membership.” App. at 1249. This evidence satisfies the Masters Members’ initial burden regarding the amount of damages. See Fox v. Transam Leasing, Inc., 839 F.3d 1209, 1218 (10th Cir. 2016) 15 (stating the moving party must make “a prima facie demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” (quotation marks omitted)). As the nonmoving party, Tour 18 was then required to come forward with evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (stating the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”). Tour 18 identifies no evidence sufficient to establish a viable alternative valuation for the Rose Creek memberships. Mr. Wilkerson’s July 2018 declaration asserting that Masters Memberships have no monthly value is, as observed by the district court, “best characterized as self-serving and an attempt to create an issue of fact where none exists.” App. at 1248; see Burns v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jackson Cty., 330 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We will disregard a contrary affidavit . . . when it constitutes an attempt to create a sham fact issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, Tour 18 argues that damages should be measured by “the cost of an alternative location to play golf” during the relevant period. Aplt. Br. at 20. This argument finds no basis in Oklahoma law.5 Moreover, it appears to be premised on a 5 Oklahoma law does contemplate using the “cost of cover” as a measure of damages in contracts for the sale of goods. Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2-712 (allowing buyer to “cover” by procuring substitute goods, then “recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with 16 misunderstanding of the distinction between direct and consequential damages. The Masters Members sought direct damages—those proximately caused by Tour 18’s failure to live up to its bargain. See 24 Williston § 64:16. The Masters Members expressly did not seek consequential damages—those flowing not “directly and immediately from the breach, but only from some of [its] consequences or results,” id.—such as costs incurred to play golf elsewhere during the termination period. See Aple. Br. at 26. As the district court stated, any consequential damages would be in addition to those awarded for the value of fifteen months of Rose Creek membership, because “regardless of whether a Master Member chose to golf at another club during the pendency of this litigation, the member was still deprived of each of the benefits of membership set forth in the [MMA].” App. at 1249. Tour 18 has not shown a genuine issue of material fact regarding the value of fifteen months of Rose Creek membership. The Masters Members proposed, and the district court applied, a “definite standard” for assessing “clearly ascertainable” damages, John A. Henry & Co., 941 F.2d at 1071. That standard was based on Tour 18’s own monthly valuation admissions. Tour 18’s contradictory, belated assertion that the memberships have no monthly value cannot create a factual dispute. And Tour 18 provides no evidence by which a jury could reach a different assessment of the value of fifteen months of Rose Creek membership. any incidental or consequential damages”). Tour 18 points to no parallel provision for services, however. 17
Finally, Tour 18 argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment without first allowing discovery on whether the Masters Members attempted to mitigate their damages. “[U]nder Oklahoma law, one is only required to take reasonable actions in mitigation of damages.” Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 189 (Okla. 1987) (citing Smith-Horton Drilling Co. v. Brooks, 182 P.2d 499, 502 (Okla. 1947)). Tour 18, as the breaching party, bears the burden of proving failure to mitigate. See Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 980 P.2d 116, 134 (Okla. 1999); Staner v. McGrath, 51 P.2d 795, 798 (Okla. 1935). Tour 18 asserts that the Masters Members could have mitigated damages by “pay[ing] to play golf” during the termination period, “either at Rose Creek or elsewhere.”6 Aplt. Reply Br. at 14–15. Tour 18 cannot meet its burden on this issue because it failed to “designate specific facts” that would allow a jury to conclude that pursuing alternate golfing arrangements would have actually mitigated the Masters Members’ damages. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Specifically, Tour 18 failed to introduce any evidence about the price of available alternatives, and Oklahoma law requires that a defendant “ascribe value to the matters offered in reduction.” Gulf Oil Corp., 980 P.2d at 134. “Failure to provide an evidentiary basis for monetarily 6 Parties generally are “not required to enter into a new contract with one who has breached the original agreement even though terms are offered which would result in avoiding the loss.” Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 773 P.2d 666, 674 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989). Cf. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 358 (“The doctrine of avoidable consequences does not, among other circumstances, require one to— . . . purchase, even for a trifle, a right that one already owns.”). 18 appraising the reductions has potential for introducing uncertainty into the jury’s ascertainment of the fact of the suggested reduction and hence interject impermissible jury speculation into the trial.” Id. Without any evidence on the costs of other local golf clubs, the record on summary judgment contains no basis for a jury to conclude that the Masters Members could have obtained cheaper alternatives. See Campfield v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 1111, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008); Coen v. SemGroup Energy Partners G.P., 310 P.3d 657, 669 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (finding that defendant’s assertions regarding plaintiff’s failure to mitigate were “based on speculation and conjecture” and therefore “insufficient to meet its burden”); see also 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 346 (“When advancing a claim that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, the defendant must prove both that a means of mitigation existed and that the proposed course of mitigation would, in fact, have resulted in a reduction of the plaintiff’s damages.”). Summary judgment on this issue was proper.