Opinion ID: 4467031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Willful Blindness Jury Instruction.

Text: The government had the burden to prove that Fletcher “knowingly” received and distributed child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Over Fletcher’s objection, the district court included the “willful blindness” jury instruction in Section 7.04 of the Eighth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions (2017): -8- You may find that the defendant acted knowingly if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant believed there was a high probability that the images he received or possessed and then advertised or distributed were images of child pornography and that he took deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. Knowledge may be inferred if the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. A willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts. You may not find the defendant acted “knowingly” if you find he was merely negligent, careless, or mistaken as to the fact that the images he received or possessed and then advertised or distributed were images of child pornography. You may not find the defendant acted knowingly if you find that the defendant actually believed that he did not receive, possess, advertise, or distribute images of child pornography, as applicable to each count. On appeal, Fletcher argues the district court abused its discretion in giving this instruction for two reasons. We review a challenge to a jury instruction for abuse of discretion and consider whether any error was harmless. United States v. Trejo, 831 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2016). First, Fletcher argues, without supporting authority, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), categorically bars use of a willful blindness instruction in § 2252 prosecutions. X-Citement held that the “knowingly” mens rea requirement “extends both to the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age of the performers.” Id. at 78. A willful blindness instruction, Fletcher contends, “essentially negates the requirement of conscious and deliberate involvement with child pornography.” We disagree. A willful blindness instruction does not negate or improperly diminish the government’s burden to prove knowing receipt or distribution. Rather, “a willful blindness instruction is one way in which a jury can permissibly find that a defendant acted knowingly.” United States -9- v. Figueroa-Lugo, 793 F.3d 179, 192 (1st Cir. 2015). And here, the district court adequately addressed any risk the jury would convict on a lesser mens rea standard by instructing that it may not convict if Fletcher “was merely negligent, careless, or mistaken as to the fact that the images he received or possessed and then advertised or distributed were images of child pornography.” See United States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 947 n.3 (8th Cir. 2004). Second, Fletcher argues the district court lacked an evidentiary basis to give the willful blindness instruction. A willful blindness instruction should not be given “if the evidence in a case points solely to either actual knowledge or no knowledge of the facts in question.” United States v. Hernandez-Mendoza, 600 F.3d 971, 979 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1257 (2011). Here, Fletcher argues, the government requested a willful blindness instruction, but its theory of the case, as emphasized at closing argument, was Fletcher’s actual knowledge of the child pornography on his computers and available in his shared BitTorrent folder, whereas Fletcher’s defense was no knowledge of the child pornography despite incriminating statements that were coerced by Agent Larsen. After considerable argument, the district court ruled that it would give the deliberate ignorance instruction. Fletcher’s defense was that he did not knowingly download child pornography. But he testified that, after discovering and deleting child pornography in materials he downloaded (such as Lolita Series images), he continued or resumed mass downloading without examining what he downloaded and continued to use search terms likely to return child pornography like the Lolita Series and “naturalist.” This testimony supported an inference that he deliberately closed his eyes to the high probability he would continue to receive and distribute child pornography through his BitTorrent download/shared folder. See United States v. Florez, 368 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004). In evaluating the district court’s decision to give this instruction, “we view the evidence and any reasonable inference from that evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. -10- Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 939 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). There was no abuse of discretion.