Opinion ID: 689613
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: 9-16-70 Auto larceny;

Text: 25 6. 2-13-71 Possession of marijuana, amphetamines, barbiturates, and narcotic drugs, and possession and sale of LSD. 26 The Court finds that three of these outdated convictions are evidence of similar criminal conduct, i.e. offenses involving theft and/or dishonesty, and that the last conviction also indicates other serious conduct. As far as the defendant's applicable criminal history category is concerned, these convictions are further indication that the defendant's criminal history category (1) underrepresents the seriousness of the criminal history, and (2) underrepresents the likelihood of recidivism. U.S. v. Feinman, 930 F.2d 495, 502 (6th Cir.1991). 27 Therefore, pursuant to USSG Sec. 4A1.2, comment, n. 8, the Court finds that the Sentencing Guidelines explicitly authorize the Court to base an upward departure incrementally to a level based upon these outdated convictions. Williams v. United States, [ ] 112 S.Ct. 1112 (1992). Based upon this defendant's lengthy history of crime which encompasses his entire adult life except for periods when he was incarcerated, and based upon the nine additional criminal history points that the defendant would have received had these convictions not been outdated, the Court finds that a three level incremental upward departure is reasonable under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant's appropriate guideline range is from 84 to 105 months. 28 We agree. 29 A district court should impose a sentence within the guideline range unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b). The Sentencing Commission has recognized that a defendant's criminal history category is not always an accurate reflection of his true criminal background or his propensity to commit more crimes. Consequently, the Commission included Sec. 4A1.3 which provides that if reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guidelines. 1. Standard of Review 30 We review the propriety of upward departures pursuant to a three-prong test. First, we determine de novo whether the district court correctly concluded that the case is sufficiently unusual to warrant departure. Next, we determine whether the unusual circumstances actually exist. The district court's finding of facts are reviewed for clear error. Finally, we review the actual departure for reasonableness. United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.1989). 2. Legal Basis for Upward Departure 31 The first prong of the Joan test is a question of law regarding whether the circumstances in the instant case are sufficiently unusual to warrant a departure. Id. Nidiffer argues that because the Sentencing Commission established only six criminal history categories, there is a presumption against departures above Category VI. There is no support for such a presumption. The appropriate inquiry is whether the circumstances are sufficiently unusual and not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. 32 Section 4A1.3 provides that departure may be based on reliable information that indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, see United States v. Belanger, 892 F.2d 473 (6th Cir.1989), and on information concerning ... prior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history category. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3; see United States v. Schultz, 14 F.3d 1093, 1101 (6th Cir.1994). Moreover, application note 8 under Sec. 4A1.2 also allows departure based on out-of-time convictions. Application Note 8 provides in pertinent part: 33 Applicable Time Period. Section[s] 4A1.2(d)(2) and (e) establish[ ] the time period within which prior sentences are counted.... If the court finds that a sentence imposed outside this time period is evidence of similar, or serious dissimilar, criminal conduct, the court may consider this information in determining whether an upward departure is warranted under Sec. 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category). 34 U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2, comment, app. nte. 8. Thus, the district court's determination that Nidiffer's criminal history category underrepresented the seriousness of his criminal background and also underrepresented the likelihood of additional offenses is a legally sufficient basis for upward departure. Moreover, the district court was entitled to use Nidiffer's out-of-time convictions to depart upward. 35 3. Unusual Circumstances Warranting Departure 36 The second part of our inquiry is whether the unusual circumstances existed in the instant case. Nidiffer argues that the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous and insufficient to warrant an upward departure. We disagree. 37 First, Nidiffer argues that because he had only 13 criminal history points, the absolute minimum necessary to qualify for criminal history category VI, the district court clearly erred by departing upward. To support his argument, Nidiffer cites United States v. Belanger, 892 F.2d at 475, stating this court has upheld departures above category VI only where the score greatly exceeded the number of points necessary for inclusion in Category VI. Nidiffer fails to note that had the excluded convictions been counted his criminal history points would have totaled 22, a number greatly exceeding the required 13 points, and a number that is well within the range of points where this court has upheld upward departures. See, e.g., United States v. Christoph, 904 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1041 (1991) (17 points); United States v. Bennett, 975 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1992) (21 points); United States v. Carr, 5 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.1993) (20 points). Additionally, he cites United States v. Eve where this court held that an upward departure was not warranted in that case because the sentencing guidelines adequately addressed the concerns that the district court had with Eve's criminal history. 984 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir.1993). The court in Eve did not detail the defendant's criminal history, therefore no meaningful comparison can be made. Further, in the instant case, unlike in Eve, the court found that the excluded convictions were evidence of similar and serious criminal conduct. Thus, in Eve the district court departed upward based upon the existence of the excluded convictions and not upon their similarities. Consequently, the reasoning in Eve is distinguishable. 38 As noted above, the district court observed that Nidiffer had adult convictions that would have resulted in at least nine additional criminal history points had they not been excluded by Sec. 4A1.2(e). The PSI indicated that had the convictions been counted Nidiffer would have been assessed 2 points for the 1966 larceny conviction, 3 points for the 1967 interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle conviction, 3 points for the 1971 drug convictions, 3 points for the 1972 auto larceny conviction and 1 point for the 1972 escape conviction. The inclusion of these convictions would have added 12 points to Nidiffer's criminal history points. Additionally, three of the outdated criminal convictions were evidence of similar criminal conduct and one evidence of other serious conduct. 2 Moreover, the district court noted recidivism was also a factor warranting upward departure. As Nidiffer notes, we have held that courts should depart upward based on recidivism only in rare events. Bennett, 975 F.2d at 309 (affirming district court's upward departure). We have also stated that those who had greater recidivist tendencies than normal were proper candidates for upward departures. Id. at 310. Nidiffer's repeated arrests and convictions subsequent to his release from incarceration certainly qualify him as having recidivist tendencies greater than normal. The district court did not clearly err by finding unusual circumstances in this case warranted upward departure. 39 4. The Upward Departure was Reasonable. 40 The final inquiry is whether the degree and nature of the departure was reasonable. In determining the extent of a departure above Criminal History Category VI, Sec. 4A1.3 provides: 41 Where the court determines that the extent and nature of the defendant's criminal history, taken together, are sufficient to warrant an upward departure from Criminal History Category VI, the court should structure the departure by moving incrementally down the offense level in Criminal History Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to the case. 42 See also United States v. Carr, 5 F.3d at 994 (instructing the court to follow the new incremental methodology set forth in Sec. 4A1.3). Here, determining Nidiffer's criminal history category underrepresented his criminal background and his likelihood of recidivism, the court looked to the similar and serious dissimilar excluded offenses as a measure for departure. Finding those convictions would have added 9 points to Nidiffer's criminal history, the court found that a three level incremental departure was reasonable under the facts of the case. 3 In the instant case, a three level upward departure was reasonable. 43 Nidiffer argues the district court failed to provide a reasoned basis for the extent of the departure. As recounted above, however, the court stated it relied upon the nature and number of the uncounted convictions to warrant the three level increase. Alternatively, Nidiffer contends the court erred by failing to consider the intermediate ranges. As we stated in United States v. Thomas, [n]either the Guidelines nor the law of this circuit require the district court to provide a mechanistic recitation of its rejection of intervening, lower guidelines ranges. 24 F.3d 829, 834 (6th Cir.1994). The district court's reasons for departure also support the extent of the departure. The plain language of the district court's order makes clear why the particular sentence was imposed and why lesser departures would have been inadequate. See Thomas, 24 F.3d at 835. Consequently, both arguments must fail. 44