Opinion ID: 161306
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Violation Prison Flooding

Text: 7 Mr. DeSpain claims the conditions during an incident of prison flooding were so egregious as to violate his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. To prevail on a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish that (1) the condition complained of is 'sufficiently serious' to implicate constitutional protection, and (2) prison officials acted with 'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302-03 (1991)). In order to satisfy the first requirement, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. With regard to the second requirement, the Supreme Court has explained that deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but] something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm will result. Id. at 835. The Court defined this deliberate indifference standard as equal to recklessness, in which a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware. Id. at 836-37. We apply this standard to the prison flooding situation described by Mr. DeSpain. 8 Nearly every material fact related to the flooding incident is hotly contested, but in reviewing a grant of summary judgment we consider the material facts as they were alleged by the non-moving party, Mr. DeSpain. Those facts show that Mr. DeSpain was one of several prisoners classified as potentially disruptive who were transferred to administrative segregation after another prisoner was murdered in March 1994. Rec., vol. III, doc. 111, exh. V (DeSpain Aff.), 2-3. 1 Several days later, angry at the prison's delay in explaining the transfer, a number of the segregated prisoners plugged their toilets with styrofoam cups and then flushed, resulting in water overflows that left the unit standing in approximately four inches of water. Id. 9-10; doc. 112 (DeSpain Aff.), 11. The prison shut off water to the toilet system to prevent further flooding and sent guards with video cameras to document the flood. Doc. 111, exh. V, 11, 13. The tier janitor was ordered to clean the mess, but he refused and quit his job. Id. 12. 9 The flooding occurred at approximately 11:30 p.m. on March 28, and the cell unit was ultimately cleaned on the morning of March 30. Id. 9, 24, 25. The toilet system remained off for most of this thirty-six-hour period but was turned on once at around 5:30 p.m. on March 29 so that prisoners could flush their toilets. Id. 21. Mr. DeSpain was exposed to the stench of sitting urine in his toilet and attempted to cover the toilet with a plastic bag, which provided little remedy. Id. 28. Wishing to avoid the same problem, many prisoners eschewed the toilets altogether and urinated through the bars of their cells into the standing water in the walkways. Id. 15, 17; doc. 112, 18. Mr. DeSpain describes hearing prisoners urinate into the water and seeing feces floating amidst other debris in the water near his cell. Doc. 112 19, 23. 10 The prisoners were served breakfast on the morning of March 29, with officers rolling the food cart through the urine-mixed water. Id. 20. The cart's ground clearance was roughly the same as the water depth, making it difficult to avoid contact between the food and the contaminated water. Id. Food trays were not picked up after lunch service, and at future meals the officers merely kicked the trays out of their way, adding uneaten and partially eaten food to the standing water. Doc. 111, exh. V, 18-19. At supper service, the officers began wearing rubber boots to protect themselves from the mess. Id. 20, 22. 11 Repulsed by the conditions and fearful of food contamination, Mr. DeSpain avoided eating during the course of the flood. Id. 26. He spent nearly the entire period confined to [his] bed in [his] cell as if it was an island because it was the only dry area in [his] cell. Id. 27. During lunch service on March 29, he asked a guard if he might clean the tier and his own cell, and the guard responded that no one was to clean, by orders of [Associate Warden] Ron Ruettgers. Doc. 112, 26-27. Mr. DeSpain describes hearing similar requests from other prisoners, who received the same response. Id. 36. Finally, at mid-morning on March 30, Ron Ruettgers announced there would be no canteen privileges until the tier was clean. Doc. 111, exh. V, 24. Prisoners responded by [y]elling obscenities and also that they had been trying to clean it for Two Days. Id. Two prisoners were asked to clean the tier, and they did so immediately. Id. 25. 12 Mr. DeSpain began to suffer psychological distress in the aftermath of the flooding situation. Doc. 112, 99-123. Prison psychiatrists diagnosed him with anxiety and prescribed an anti-anxiety medication. Id. 100. He remained on the medication for several months and eventually replaced the drug therapy with religious techniques for mental discipline. Id. He alleges that his anxiety continues to the present day. Id. 119. 2 13 Sufficiently Serious Conditions 14 The first requirement is that the conditions complained of must be sufficiently serious to implicate constitutional rights. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment 'does not mandate comfortable prisons,' and conditions imposed may be 'restrictive and even harsh.' Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). In order to satisfy this prong of the Farmer test, a prisoner must show that conditions were more than uncomfortable, and instead rose to the level of conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 15 The standard described in Farmer reflects a balance between judicial respect for the exigencies of running a prison, see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351, and the broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). See also Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1405 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The analysis should not be based on a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351. At the same time, Eighth Amendment protections draw [their] meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, a lofty standard. Id. at 346. This requires that prison officials provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety. Craig v. Eberley, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310). 16 An inquiry into conditions of confinement by necessity relies on the particular facts of each situation; the circumstances, nature, and duration of the challenged conditions must be carefully considered. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.2d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). While no single factor controls the outcome of these cases, the length of exposure to the conditions is often of prime importance. For example, [a] filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 'grue' might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978). We have held that a situation involving filthy cells, poor lighting, inadequate ventilation or air cooling, and unappetizing food simply [did] not rise to the level of a constitutional violation where prisoners were exposed to the conditions for only forty-eight hours. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1312 (listing cases in which a few days spent in unsanitary conditions did not violate the Eighth Amendment). In general, the severity and duration of deprivations are inversely proportional, so that minor deprivations suffered for short periods would not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, while substantial deprivations of shelter, food, drinking water, and sanitation may meet the standard despite a shorter duration. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.2d at 732; see also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (the length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases). 17 Because the flooding conditions described by Mr. DeSpain lasted only thirty-six hours, he must allege significant deprivations in order to state a successful conditions of confinement claim. Accepting his portrayal of the flooding conditions, we hold that he has done so. The gravamen of Mr. DeSpain's complaint is that the lack of access to working toilets led to his exposure to other inmates' urine and feces via the standing water and also to close confinement with the odor of his own accumulated urine. While there is no doubt that toilets can be unavailable for some period of time without violating the Eighth Amendment, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.2d at 733, exposure to human waste carries particular weight in the conditions calculus. See McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding sufficiently serious conditions of confinement where inmate in feces-covered cell for three days); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.2d at 733; Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990) (courts have been especially cautious about condoning conditions that include an inmate's proximity to human waste); Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 458 N.E.2d 702, 705-06 (Mass. 1983) (listing cases showing an intolerance for confinement which requires persons to live in close proximity to their own human waste and that of others). Exposure to human waste, like few other conditions of confinement, evokes both the health concerns emphasized in Farmer and the more general standards of dignity embodied in the Eighth Amendment. See McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1991) (unquestionably a health hazard to live in filthy water contaminated with human waste); Fruit, 905 F.2d at 1150-51 (common sense that unprotected contact with human waste could cause disease); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989) (three days in cell with feces smeared on walls not within civilized standards, humanity, and decency); LaReau v. MacDougal, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2nd Cir. 1972) (Causing a man to live, eat, and perhaps sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too debasing and degrading to be permitted.). Accordingly, the conditions described by Mr. DeSpain meet the first prong of the Farmer test. Official Knowledge of Conditions 18 The second, subjective portion of the Farmer test requires that prison officials show deliberate indifference to the existence of any risk inherent in exposure to the challenged conditions. As the Supreme Court explained this requirement: 19 [A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. 20 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This awareness requirement exists because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment in a manner that violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 844. On the other hand, a plaintiff need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate, as long as the official should have understood the possibility that harm might ensue. Id. at 842. The test requires both knowledge and disregard of possible risks, a mens rea on a par with criminal recklessness. Id. at 836. If an official is aware of the potential for harm but takes reasonable efforts to avoid or alleviate that harm, he bears no liability under this standard. Farmer. 511 U.S. at 844; MacKay v. Farnsworth, 48 F.3d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1995). 21 Whether an official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk and ignored that risk is a question of fact. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove another person's actual state of mind, whether an official had knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id.; Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 809-10 (10th Cir. 1999). Although, in general [i]t is not enough to establish that the official should have known of the risk of harm, Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310 (emphasis added), in some cases a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 22 In considering Mr. DeSpain's claims, the district court noted the challenged conditions arose in the context of a disturbance in a prison and accordingly applied a higher standard requiring that he show officials acted maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Rec., vol. III, doc. 134 at 6. This standard was developed in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). Whitley involved a claim of cruel and unusual punishment brought by a prisoner who was shot accidentally while prison officials attempted to restore order during an inmate rebellion. Although the widespread uprising had already ended, a guard was still held hostage, [one inmate] was armed and threatening, several other inmates were armed with homemade clubs, numerous inmates remained outside their cells, and the cellblock remained in control of the inmates. The situation remained dangerous and volatile. Id. at 322-23. The Supreme Court reasoned that in the context of a prison disturbance, the deliberate indifference standard does not adequately reflect officials' need to balance competing considerations of general health and safety and the more acute threats to inmates and staff presented by the disturbance itself, nor does it convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance. Id. at 320. The Court concluded that [w]hen the ever-present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration ripens into actual unrest and conflict, id. at 321 (citation omitted), the proper question is whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, id. at 320-21 (internal quotation omitted). 23 On first analysis, Whitley's malicious and sadistic standard, which considers the excessive use of physical force by prison officials in response to disturbances, would not appear relevant to Mr. DeSpain's conditions of confinement claim. The very high state of mind required by that standard does not apply to prison conditions cases. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. Instead, conditions of confinement claims require only a showing of deliberate indifference. Id.; MacKay, 48 F.3d at 493. At the same time, when the conditions of confinement exist in conjunction with a prison riot, the balancing considerations described in Whitley generally are present. Officials securing an unsafe situation cannot be expected to provide the same level of comfort demanded under normal circumstances. Thus the Ninth Circuit has found that the exigent circumstances faced by prison officials during a riot require use of the higher Whitley standard. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.2d at 734. As soon as the inmates are secure and present no further danger to prison staff, the public, or each other, however, there is no longer a need for officials to make split-second, life-and-death decisions. Id. Without this time pressure and need to balance competing safety considerations, the standard in the aftermath of a disturbance immediately reverts back to Farmer's deliberate indifference. Id. 24 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. DeSpain, as we must at this juncture, it is by no means clear that there was an ongoing threat to safety during the prison flooding. While Mr. DeSpain admits that the prisoners were often unruly during the period in question, shouting threats and obscenities at the guards, they remained locked in their cells. A janitor was ordered to clean immediately after the flooding, and prison guards regularly entered the unit to serve meals as well as to videotape the conditions, belying defendants' assertion that taking measures to relieve the situation would have been unsafe under the circumstances. Thus, Mr. DeSpain's claims should have been considered under the deliberate indifference standard. 25 While Mr. DeSpain originally brought claims against a variety of prison officials, he appeals the grant of summary judgment regarding the flooding only as it relates to his claim against Associate Warden Ron Ruettgers, who was in charge of the administrative segregation unit during the incidents in question. We thus view the evidence presented to determine whether it stated sufficient allegations of deliberate indifference on the part of Mr. Ruettgers. Mr. DeSpain describes only one direct link to Mr. Ruettgers' control of the prison's response to the flooding, the guard's assertion that no one was allowed to clean by orders of Ron Ruettgers. Rec., vol. III, doc. 111, exh. V, 18. He also alleges the rubber boots worn by guards were issued by Mr. Ruettgers. Id., doc. 112, 42. Moreover, the guards reported to Mr. Ruettgers, and it appears they were well aware of conditions related to the flooding. Mr. DeSpain describes inmates asking the guards how they felt about walking in piss water, and the guards began wearing rubber boots soon after. It is also common sense to expect there would be waste management problems if inmates were left for thirty-six hours with a single toilet flush. Considering Mr. Ruettgers' responsibility for the cell block, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that he did not show deliberate indifference to the health risks presented by the flooding and lack of sanitation. 26 Mr. DeSpain has proffered sufficient facts to show that the cell block flooding led to deprivations serious enough to implicate Eighth Amendment protections and that Associate Warden Ruettgers may have shown deliberate indifference to the health risks inherent in the conditions. While defendants challenge Mr. DeSpain's allegations of the severity of the situation and of Mr. Ruettger's knowledge, those factual disputes must be left to the province of an appropriate factfinder. This claim should not have been dismissed on summary judgment.