Opinion ID: 2994866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Restraint or Time, Place and

Text: Manner Restriction? MacDonald next argues that Section 10-8-330 constitutes a prior restraint on speech and thus must provide certain procedural protections, which according to MacDonald, it does not. On the other hand, the City of Chicago argues that Section 10-8-330 merely regulates the time, place and manner of speech, and as such is not a prior restraint on speech. Both parties find support in Supreme Court decisions. The City of Chicago cites Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), wherein the Court considered the constitutionality of a law requiring the issuance of a permit before marchers could occupy public ways. As the City correctly notes, the Court in Cox did not characterize that law as a prior restraint, but rather upheld the law as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner in relation to the other proper uses of streets. Id. at 576. See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). But MacDonald counters with FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), and City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), wherein the Supreme Court analyzed licensing and permit regulations as prior restraints, rather than as time, place and manner regulations. The lead opinion in Graff (an en banc case with