Opinion ID: 2570814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: issue 5. hard 50 sentence: weighing aggravating and mitigating factors

Text: Next, Appleby argues the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose the hard 50 sentence. Specifically, he contends that in weighing the circumstances, the court improperly viewed some of the mitigating evidence as being a negative or aggravating factor. When reviewing the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 50 years, an appellate court reviews the sentencing court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Jones, 283 Kan. 186, 215, 151 P.3d 22 (2007); State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 144, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). Because the crime in this case occurred in June 2002, the applicable sentencing statute is K.S.A.2001 Supp. 21-4635(a), which provided in part: [I]f a defendant is convicted of the crime of capital murder and a sentence of death is not imposed, ... the court shall determine whether the defendant shall be required to serve ... for crimes committed on and after July 1, 1999, a mandatory term of imprisonment of 50 years or sentenced as otherwise provided by law. K.S.A.2001 Supp. 21-4635(b) directs the sentencing court to consider evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose a hard 50 sentence. If the court finds that one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A.2001 Supp. 21-4636 exist and that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances, the defendant shall receive the hard 50 sentence. K.S.A.2001 Supp. 21-4635(c). Here, the sentencing court found that one aggravating circumstance existed  the defendant committed the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-4636(f). As a basis for the aggravating circumstance, the court found (1) there was infliction of mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death and (2) there were continuous acts of violence before and continuing after the killing. K.S.A.2001 Supp. 21-4636(f)(3), (5). Appleby does not raise any arguments disputing these findings. At sentencing, Appleby asserted two statutory mitigating circumstances. See K.S.A. 21-4637 (Mitigating circumstances shall include, but are not limited to the listed factors.). First, he argued he was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbances at the time of the incident. K.S.A. 21-4637(b). Second, Appleby contended his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired because of his mental condition at the time of the incident. K.S.A. 21-4637(f). He also presented nonstatutory mitigating evidence that he was exposed to violence, substance abuse, lawless behavior, and abandonment during his youth. At the sentencing hearing, Appleby presented the testimony of two experts, Dr. David George Hough, a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Edward Robert Friedlander, a board-certified anatomical and clinical pathologist. Dr. Hough, who conducted psychological testing on Appleby, diagnosed him with intermittent explosive disorder, which Dr. Hough explained, is recognized as a mental disease or defect. According to Dr. Hough, such behavior is driven by uncontrolled emotion, mainly rage, and it is manifested by such correlates as hyperarousal, a collapse of thinking or cognitive mediation. Focusing on the crime in this case, Dr. Hough opined that something got kindled inside [Appleby], and what got kindled was this enormous rage that was way out of proportion to anything [A.K.] could have said or done.... The best I can tell is that this was not planned or organized or premeditated or rehearsed. Dr. Hough concluded that Appleby did not have complete control of himself during the event. Dr. Friedlander gave expert opinion testimony regarding the events in the pool pump room. He did not view the crime scene or the autopsy, but he reviewed the report of Dr. Handler, who performed the autopsy in this case, spoke with Dr. Handler, and reviewed some of Dr. Handler's microscopic slides. Dr. Friedlander testified that in his opinion, A.K. was knocked out when she fell to the ground after being struck only one or two times in the mouth. Dr. Friedlander further opined that Appleby punched both of A.K.'s eyes while she was on the ground, unconscious. And he testified that he did not see evidence of petechial hemorrhaging; thus, one could not say with certainty how long A.K. had been strangled. Appleby contends that the sentencing court did not give proper weight to his mitigating circumstances and went so far as to use the mental disorder as an aggravating circumstance against him in the balancing equation. He is specifically bothered by the court's asking at the sentencing hearing why the mental disorder was not an aggravating circumstance: If [Appleby] has intermittent explosive disorder and is prone to strong outpourings of rage and behavior far out of proportion to anything that occurs to him, why is that a reason for a lesser sentence instead of a greater sentence? Defense counsel explained immediately, however, that it would show he was not necessarily in control of his actions like the rest of us would be. The court then pointed to the jury's finding that the crime was premeditated. The court was clearly trying to understand how the two concepts could coexist. Appleby also points to this statement in the court's sentencing memorandum: To the extent that the defendant has `intermittent explosive disorder,' as testified to by Dr. George Hough, that does not suggest a need to lock the defendant up for a shorter, rather than a longer, period. But Appleby fails to look at the surrounding context. In the preceding sentences, the court states that it gave due consideration to the mitigating circumstances presented by the defense, including the evidence, affidavits, and letters submitted by the defense. Then, in the sentence on which Appleby focuses, the court's statements regarding Dr. Hough's testimony suggest that the court was looking at the evidence as presented  mitigating circumstances. In the next sentence, the court indicates that Dr. Hough's testimony failed to explain the defendant's premeditated conduct, despite ample evidence to support the jury's verdict. Nowhere did the court say or even imply that Appleby was going to receive a longer sentence due to his alleged mental defect. Appleby contends that the present case is similar to Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 882, 885 (Fla.1979), in which the Florida Supreme Court vacated the trial court's sentence of death because the trial court considered as an aggravating factor the defendant's allegedly incurable and dangerous mental illness. In addition, Appleby cites Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), which expressly left open the possibility that in a weighing state, infection of the process with an invalid aggravating factor might require invalidation of a death sentence. Both of these cases are inapplicable; in this case, the trial court considered the factor as a mitigator and did not improperly consider the factor as an aggravating circumstance. The final authority advanced by Appleby is State v. Legendre, 522 So.2d 1249 (La.App. 1988), where the defendant was convicted of second-degree battery and received 5 years of hard labor, the maximum sentence. The evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant had the necessary specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim. According to Louisiana law, maximum sentences could be justified only in cases classified as `extreme' by the factual circumstances of the offense and the apparent [dangerousness] of the defendant. Legendre, 522 So.2d at 1252. The sentencing court had evidence that the defendant was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, and Louisiana case law indicated that mental illness should be used as a mitigating circumstance. See Legendre, 522 So.2d at 1252. The Louisiana appellate court found that the trial court did not consider the defendant's mental condition a mitigating circumstance in imposing the sentence. Instead, the trial court seemed to consider it an aggravating circumstance by stating that the defendant's main problem was `his lack of insight to his illness and his refusal to take prescribed medication away from the hospital.' Legendre, 522 So.2d at 1253. The case was remanded for resentencing, the appellate court holding that when a person with a recognized, diagnosed mental illness is convicted of crimes, that condition should be considered to mitigate the type and length of sentence imposed on the offender, even if he has been ruled legally sane. Legendre, 522 So.2d at 1253. The laws in Legendre are inapplicable to the present case. Appleby essentially argues that the court failed to properly and carefully consider the mitigating evidence and, instead, focused only on evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance. But the sentencing court's comments clearly show that the court did properly consider and weigh the defendant's mitigators. In this case, the trial court simply found that the State's aggravating circumstance outweighed the defendant's mitigating circumstances. It is well established that `[w]eighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a numbers game. One aggravating circumstance can be so compelling as to outweigh several mitigating circumstances' and vice versa. [Citations omitted.] Engelhardt, 280 Kan. at 144, 119 P.3d 1148. Appleby has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.