Opinion ID: 844212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Defendant's Arrest for an Unrelated Crime and of the Weapons and Pill Bottle Found in His Possession at the Time of His Arrest

Text: Defendant contends reversal is required because Detective Steven Rubino, who arrested defendant in 1991 for an unrelated crime, was permitted to testify about guns and ammunition discovered during a search of defendant's car, and because the guns and ammunition were shown to the jury. The complained-of testimony followed the examination and cross-examination of Lorraine Ripple. Defense counsel, apparently seeking to discredit Ripple, asked if investigators had ever told her defendant had given her up? Ripple responded that Detective Tarpley had told her a pill bottle with her name on it had been found in defendant's car at the time of his 1991 arrest. Counsel then asked if Ripple had told Tarpley she had been involved with defendant in other murders, eliciting her testimony that defendant had given her the .22-caliber murder weapon after Ripple told him she needed a gun to kill someone; he had given her other guns, including a MAC-11 semiautomatic pistol; her acquaintances passed guns around freely; she had traded the murder weapon for drugs; she had robbed her Mexican drug connection or connections several times; and defendant liked to brag about his crimes, including the murders he had committed. [6] On redirect, Ripple testified it was common for anyone in her circle of acquaintances who needed a gun to ask for one and to give it back later. She described a number of weapons that had been floating around, also testifying she had seen defendant with a MAC-11 semiautomatic pistol and a.22-caliber handgun that was not the gun used to kill Miller. The prosecutor then showed Ripple several firearms contained in evidence envelopes. Ripple stated that a MAC-11 and a .22-caliber handgun looked like those she had seen in defendant's possession. She identified a .38-caliber handgun as her own, saying she had used it in several robberies. Defendant did not object or seek an admonition. But as discussed previously, he moved for a mistrial after Ripple's testimony was completed. We earlier considered and rejected the argument that a mistrial should have been granted because Ripple had linked defendant to a gang and expressed her belief that her cooperation in defendant's prosecution threatened her own safety and that of her sons. As relevant here, counsel also complained that the jury had seen guns unrelated to Miller's murder, asserting jurors were likely to assume defendant had used the guns during the commission of other crimes. The court denied the motion for a mistrial and adjourned the proceedings for the day. The following morning, before the jury was called in, defense counsel expressed concern that prosecution witness Detective Steven Rubino would testify that the guns had been recovered during a search of defendant's car in connection with an unrelated crime. Counsel argued that evidence defendant had possessed weapons on another occasion was irrelevant, cumulative, unduly prejudicial, and pushed up ... against the edges of impermissible character evidence. By this time, the defense had requested a psychiatric examination of Ripple and had expressed its intent to discredit her testimony by establishing she was obsessed with defendant and had been fabricating stories about his criminal activities. The prosecutor asserted Rubino's testimony would corroborate Ripple's statements about defendant's gun possession. After further discussion, it was agreed Rubino's interaction with defendant would be referred to as a contact rather than an arrest, and Rubino would explain the guns were not linked to Miller's murder. Rubino then testified, without defense objection, that in October 1991 he was part of a multijurisdictional criminal apprehension detail that led him and approximately nine other officers to follow defendant to a parking lot where defendant's car was parked. Rubino testified he then contacted defendant. The prosecutor asked, When you contacted him, was he contacted by several deputies with guns drawn? Rubino said yes. Defendant did not object. Rubino then testified he searched defendant's car, finding a loaded MAC-11 semiautomatic pistol under the right front passenger seat, a loaded .22-caliber pistol under the driver's seat, some additional fully loaded magazines, a photograph, and a plastic vial with Lorraine Ripple's name on it. He said the.22-caliber pistol was not related to Miller's murder. After Rubino was excused and the jury was in recess, defense counsel again asked for a mistrial, complaining the detective's testimony was even more prejudicial than anticipated. The court denied the motion. (11) Evidence a defendant possessed weapons that were not used to commit a crime is inadmissible to show the defendant committed the crime. ( People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 577 [305 P.2d 1].) But here, the evidence was introduced for a different reason: to corroborate Ripple's testimony of having seen similar weapons in defendant's possession during the same general time period. Similarly, evidence police found a pill bottle with Ripple's name on it in the trunk of defendant's car corroborated Ripple's testimony that Detective Tarpley had told her about the discovery of the pill bottle when he told her defendant had given her up. That the evidence was not admissible to show defendant committed a criminal act did not prevent it from being admitted on the issue of Ripple's credibility. (12) Defendant also contends the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a): [E]vidence of a person's character ... is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. But subdivision (a)'s restriction on the use of character evidence has no application when the evidence is offered on the issue of a witness's credibility. ( People v. Stern (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 283, 297 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 479].) Indeed, subdivision (c) of Evidence Code section 1101 expressly allows the admission of evidence for that purpose. In addition, defendant's objection was that the evidence was cumulative and inflammatory. Although he asserted the evidence pushed up against the edges of Evidence Code section 1101, he did not object that it was inadmissible character evidence, thus forfeiting the claim. ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435; People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 612.) This rule has particular force here because counsel's assertion suggested a concession that the evidence did not violate Evidence Code section 1101; thus, there was no reason for the court to analyze the point. Defendant contends he was excused from the necessity of making a timely objection or request for admonition because the trial court's rulings on the objections he made both before and after Detective Rubino's testimony demonstrated that a further objection or request would have been futile. (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673].) If by this contention defendant means the court had indicated it would reject an argument that the evidence was inadmissible character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), we agree. As we have said, subdivision (a)'s restrictions on evidence have no application where, as here, the evidence relates to a witness's credibility. To the extent defendant argues the trial court's rulings excused him from objecting that the witness's statements were inflammatory, or from seeking a jury admonition on similar grounds, we do not agree. When defendant expressed concerns about the prejudicial effect of Rubino's testimony, the court responded by admonishing the prosecutor that Rubino should not speak of an arrest, with the result that the prosecutor proposed to have the witness refer to the arrest as a contact. There is no reason to assume the court would have been unresponsive to other complaints about the prejudicial nature of the evidence had defendant made a meritorious objection. Finally, evidence defendant possessed weapons at the time of his arrest in October 1991 could not have prejudiced defendant, who admitted to multiple armed robberies, including a series of armed robberies during that year. For all the above reasons, we conclude the admission of evidence of defendant's 1991 arrest and the weapons and pill bottle found in his car at the time of his arrest provides no basis for reversal.