Opinion ID: 449471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delegated Authority

Text: 12 In its first consideration of an FLRA interpretation of the Civil Service Reform Act, the Supreme Court recently explained: 13 Like the National Labor Relations Board, the FLRA was intended to develop specialized expertise in its field of labor relations and to use that expertise to give content to the principles and goals set forth in the Act. Consequently, the Authority is entitled to considerable deference when it exercises its special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of federal labor relations. 14 On the other hand, the deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress. Accordingly, while reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency's enabling Act, they must not rubber-stamp ... administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute. 15 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983) (citations omitted).B. Reasoned Decision-Making 16 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983), the Supreme Court emphasized that when an agency follows a settled course, its signals that in its view by pursuing that course it is carrying out the Congressional mandate, and that by adhering to the settled path it best carries out Congressional policy. Id. at 2866. Thus, when an agency reverses its course, a court must satisfy itself that the agency knows it is changing course, has given sound reasons for the change, and has shown that the rule is consistent with the law that gives the agency its authority to act. Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 99 (D.C.Cir.1984). In addition, the agency must consider reasonably obvious alternatives and, if it rejects those alternatives, it must give reasons for the rejection, sufficient to allow for meaningful judicial review. Id. Although there is not a heightened standard of scrutiny ... the agency must explain why the original reasons for adopting the rule or policy are no longer dispositive. Brae Corp. v. United States, 740 F.2d 1023, 1038 (D.C.Cir.1984) (emphasis added). Even in the absence of cumulative experience, changed circumstances or judicial criticism, an agency is free to change course after reweighing the competing statutory policies. But such a flip-flop must be accompanied by a reasoned explanation of why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 560 F.2d 529, 532 (2d Cir.1977). 17 The Court explained in State Farm that it would not be reasonable, nor would it demonstrate fidelity to the statutory mandate, for an agency to make a change not justified by the record. 103 S.Ct. at 2866. Although recognizing that the scope of judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, a reviewing court must be certain that an agency has considered all the important aspects of the issue and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'  Id. at 2866-67. An agency will have acted arbitrarily if it has: (1) relied on factors that Congress did not want it to consider; (2) failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; (3) given an explanation for its decision that is contrary to the evidence before it; or (4) given an explanation so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to any view of the facts or to agency expertise. Id. at 2867. With these principles of review in mind, we consider the legislative history and the Authority's decision. III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 18 The labor relations of federal employees are now regulated by Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7101 et seq., which requires agencies to bargain with their employees over the conditions of employment, subject only to express statutory exceptions. Library of Congress v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1983). This appeal involves the management right to avoid mandatory bargaining over the technology, methods, and means of performing work. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7106(b)(1). An agency may elect to bargain over these matters, but it need not. The legislative history of the Labor Management Act makes clear that Sec. 7106 is a narrow exception to the right to bargain over working conditions. Congress intended Sec. 7106(a) to expand the scope of bargaining that had existed under Section 12(b)(5) of Executive Order No. 11491 and FLRC precedent. See, e.g., 124 Cong.Rec. 29198 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Ford), reprinted in Subcommittee on Postal Personnel and Modernization of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, at 954 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Legislative History ); National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 553, 559 & n. 62 (D.C.Cir.1982). Therefore, section 7106--which retains several of management's rights under the Executive Order, but also eliminates several--[is to] be read to favor collective bargaining whenever there is doubt as to the negotiability of a subject or a proposal. H.Rep. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1978), reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 690. 19 The Union and amici argue that the terms technology and methods and means of performing work in the Labor Management Act were taken from the language of Executive Order No. 11491. The Union concedes that the Authority is not precluded from altering interpretations made by its predecessor, the FLRC, but it claims that there is a clear statement by Congress that interpretations by the FLRC should be respected when the Labor Management Act parallels the Executive Order. The Union correctly contends that usually when Congress adopts a new law that incorporates sections of a prior law, it is presumed to be aware of administrative interpretations of that law and to adopt those interpretations; when Congress re-enacts a statute that has a longstanding administrative interpretation, that re-enactment may well ratify the interpretation. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). The Union also argues that Sec. 7135(b), which provides that decisions issued under Executive Order 11491 ... shall remain in full force and effect ... unless superseded by specific provisions of this chapter, reinforces the continued applicability of the Council's interpretations of the Executive Order. 20 We do not read Sec. 7135(b) to prevent the Authority, as successor to the Council, from formulating its own construction of the Act. See National Treasury Employees Union, 691 F.2d at 562-63 n. 89 ([w]e discern in this language no impediment to changed statutory interpretations by the Authority). Instead, the legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend Sec. 7135(b) to shackle the Authority, but simply to assure continuity until the Authority developed its own body of interpretive law under the new statute. See id.; Department of Defense v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140, 1163 (D.C.Cir.1981). Given the lack of controlling effect of the Council's decisions and absent more specific legislative history on the uniform requirement, we are bound by this Congressional purpose. The duty to determine the bargainable nature of issues arising under the Labor Management Act rests squarely on the shoulders of the Authority, not the courts. See National Treasury Employees Union, 691 F.2d at 561. 21 Although the Authority's determination that the uniform requirement is nonnegotiable is entitled to considerable deference because the administrative body has the expertise and the authority to apply the broad language of Sec. 7106 to questions of negotiability, the Authority's interpretation of the phrase means is not premised on an understanding of industrial complexities but instead relies on Webster. The all-important qualification put on its literal definition of means is that there be a direct and integral relationship between the means and the agency's mission. Because of this qualification, the Authority's interpretation does not conflict with the acknowledged view that Sec. 7106 creates a narrow exception to the duty to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment. Having determined that the Authority acted within its delegated authority, we next consider whether its rule is the product of reasoned decision-making. IV THE AUTHORITY'S DECISION 22 On remand the Authority found that the requirement that technicians must wear the military uniform while performing technician duties constitutes management's choice of a 'methods, and means of performing work' within the meaning of section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute. Division of Military and Naval Affairs, 15 FLRA No. 65, at 7. Quoting National Treasury Employees Union, 2 FLRA No. 30 (1979), the Authority found that a 'means' is in essence anything used to attain or make more likely the attainment of a desired end, and in the context of section 7106(b)(1), refers to 'any instrumentality, including an agent, tool, device, measure, plan, or policy used by the agency for the accomplishing or furthering of the performance of its work.'  15 FLRA No. 65, at 4. The FLRA focused on the fact that technicians performed their duties in a military framework, and noted that the legislative history shows that in addition to full-time civilian work, technicians are also bound by military obligations and duties, and are available for state or federal mobilization. See H.Rep. No. 1823, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3318, 3319. It recognized the several court decisions that had found a rational relationship between National Guard attire and its functioning as a military organization. See, e.g., Klotzbach v. Callaway, 473 F.Supp. 1337 (W.D.N.Y.1979); Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air National Guard, 437 F.Supp. 236 (W.D.Pa.1977); Bruton v. Schnipke, 404 F.Supp. 1032 (E.D.Mich.1975). Moreover, it specifically found the requirement served to foster military discipline, promote uniformity, encourage esprit de corps, increase the readiness of the military forces for early deployment and enhance identification of the National Guard as a military organization. 15 FLRA No. 65, at 6. 23 As noted, the Council had previously required a functional relationship between the wearing of a uniform and the accomplishment of the Guard's mission. See Kansas National Guard, 5 FLRC 124 (1977); State of New Mexico National Guard, 5 FLRC 146, request for reconsideration denied, 5 FLRC 336 (1977). It had made clear its view that there was no functional relationship between the day-to-day work performed by technicians and the requirement to wear military dress. See, e.g., State of Ohio Air National Guard, 6 FLRC 704 (1978). The Council had specifically rejected the Authority's rationale for finding nonnegotiability. See, e.g., Kansas National Guard. Instead, the question of attire was held to be a mandatory subject of bargaining except when there was a specific demonstration that wearing a uniform would be useful in the performance of the technician's duties such as during an organizational readiness inspection. State of Ohio Air National Guard. 24 The Union claims that the Authority abandoned without explanation the requirement of close functional relationship. It also argues that the Authority failed to consider the alternative of standard civilian attire, thereby ignoring its own requirement that the subject agency show that its objective can only be accomplished by using the particular means at issue. See, e.g., Planners, Estimators and Progressmen Association Local 8, 13 FLRA No. 81 (1983) (the Authority found the elimination of time clocks to be a mandatory bargaining issue on the ground that the agency had not shown that its goals could be achieved only by that particular means). 25 When examining an agency's about-face, the general rule, as explained above, is that such changes constitute  'danger signals' that the [Agency] may be acting inconsistently with its statutory mandate and require a  'reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.'  Office of Communications of United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1425 (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C.Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct. 2233, 29 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971)). But this principle does not fully apply here because--unlike most other agencies--the FLRA has been expressly instructed by Congress to start afresh and avoid making the mistakes of its predecessor. See AFGE v. FLRA, 716 F.2d 47, 50 (D.C.Cir.1983); Brae Corp., 740 F.2d at 1038. Hence, we cannot say that it was arbitrary and capricious for the FLRA to find that there is a direct and integral relationship between wearing a military uniform and working within a military framework, even though its administrative predecessor held a different view. 26 The Union and amici also contend that the alternative of civilian attire would serve the Guard's goals while limiting the adverse effect on employees. If this is true, the Authority's failure to address that alternative in its opinion would be arbitrary, and require a remand. See State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2866; 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7106(b)(3). It was not arbitrary for the Authority to consider it self-evident and unworthy of discussion that standard civilian attire would not foster military discipline, promote uniformity, encourage esprit de corps, increase the readiness of the military forces for early deployment and enhance identification of the National Guard as a military organization. V THE AUTHORITY'S FACT-FINDING PROCEDURES 27 We turn finally to the Union and amici's three-prong challenge to the Authority's fact-finding procedures. First, they argue that by accepting only the statements of position at its proceedings the Authority acted contrary to this Court's remand order and in violation of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(D) and 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7118(a), (b). Second, they contend that the Authority failed to make appropriate findings of fact in accordance with 5 U.S.C. Sec. 557 and 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7118(a)(8). Finally, it is their position that the Authority's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, and hence should be reversed under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706. We consider each of these arguments. 28 A. Failure to Conduct Appropriate Proceedings 29 Regarding development of the record, our previous decision required only that the Authority develop a full record appropriate for judicial review. 696 F.2d at 205. We did not specify the particular procedure to be used on remand, leaving it instead to administrative discretion. The Union and amici point to the fact that the Authority denied the Guard's request for a hearing before an ALJ. The Union further asserts that it was thereby prevented through no fault of its own from adducing additional evidence, and moves for this proceeding to be again remanded for the taking of additional, material evidence. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7123(c). It claims that had such a hearing been held it would have, for example, adduced evidence pertaining to what the job of an aircraft mechanic actually entails. Concededly, such evidence would be material, but the procedure used by the Authority in this case was similar to those it has used in resolving other negotiability disputes involving methods and means under Section 7106(b). See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union, 2 FLRA No. 30. And although the Union did not waive whatever right it had to a hearing by failing to object to the procedures followed upon remand, the fact that it did not seek such a hearing and that the General Counsel, with whom it was allied, successfully objected to a hearing supports our conclusion that the procedures used were appropriate. 30