Opinion ID: 887870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Breach of Written Contract Claim

Text: ¶18 In its order granting summary judgment in favor of Frampton, the District Court determined that Judge Johnson referred, and V.M. brought, the Gallagher case to Frampton “individually,” not to the Firm generally, and that Phelps “had no role in the origination of the case or client.” The court further determined that allocation of the Gallagher fee was addressed and governed by the Agreement, that the Gallagher fee was a fee “earned,” and that Frampton was entitled to retain the amount of the Gallagher fee that exceeded his required contribution to the partnership pool (less the 45% to which Hileman was entitled). In addition, the court concluded that “any claim for breach of [the Agreement] must be with [the Firm]. As Phelps has reached a settlement with [the Firm], 9 this part of the claim is moot.” Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Frampton on Count I. ¶19 On appeal, Phelps challenges the District Court’s reasoning on a number of grounds. For instance, Phelps asserts that the language of the Agreement is “ambiguous” with respect to how the Gallagher fee should have been allocated, thus creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the partners’ intent; that Frampton did not “earn” the Gallagher fee as that term is used in the Agreement; that Frampton would not have become involved in the Gallagher case “but for” his relationship with the Firm and Phelps’s “key role” in preserving and maintaining the Firm’s relationship with the City of Whitefish; and that the Gallagher fee was “unique in the history of [the Firm]” and, thus, was “not the type of fee contemplated by or addressed in [the Agreement].” ¶20 Yet, all of these arguments pertain to the correctness of the allocation of the Gallagher fee, which was paid directly to the Firm and was then allocated through the Firm. Indeed, the substance of Phelps’s breach of written contract claim is that the Firm misallocated the fee. As alleged in his complaint: [The Gallagher fee] should have been allocated to the Hedman Firm partnership and been included in the calculation of the partnership’s net profits. Accordingly, Phelps is entitled to 20% of the fee wrongfully retained by Frampton in breach of the Agreement. Although Phelps has attempted throughout this litigation to portray the supposed “breach of written contract” as one perpetrated by Frampton, the allegations comprising Phelps’s breach of written contract claim do not identify an obligation under the Agreement and a corresponding breach of that obligation by Frampton. Rather, Phelps has consistently 10 relied on provisions of the Agreement which, if his interpretations are correct, the Firm allegedly breached. ¶21 Phelps argues that because he specifically reserved his claims against Frampton when he settled with Hileman and released the Firm, he may now pursue a breach of written contract claim against Frampton. However, this argument misses the point, which is that Phelps’s breach of written contract claim—as that claim is framed in his complaint—is, in essence, one against the Firm, not Frampton. Phelps also quotes the following language from § 35-10-409(2), MCA: “A partner may maintain an action against the partnership or another partner for legal or equitable relief . . . .” But this language merely establishes that Phelps may maintain an action against Frampton, not that Phelps has, in fact, done so. ¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Phelps’s claim for breach of written contract is directed at acts or omissions of the Firm. In this regard, we note that Phelps is now barred by the release he entered into with the Firm from bringing any claims against the Firm related to the allocation of the Gallagher fee. Although Phelps specifically reserved his claims against Frampton, Phelps may not employ Frampton as a stand-in defendant on a claim that is, in substance, against the Firm. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Frampton on the Breach of Written Contract claim.