Opinion ID: 611597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mistrial Based on Orantes-Arriaga's Testimony

Text: 40 Arias-Villanueva argues that the district court erred in denying his mistrial and severance motions based on Orantes-Arriaga's testifying at trial. Orantes-Arriaga testified on direct examination and several times asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent on cross-examination. The district court instructed the jury that this assertion could be considered in evaluating Orantes-Arriaga's credibility. 41 Arias-Villanueva first contends that this instruction prejudiced him because the instruction enabled the jury to devalue Orantes-Arriaga's potentially exculpatory testimony. The mere possibility of such an occurrence, however, is not prejudicial. See United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 546-47 (9th Cir.1983) (citing United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, 101 S.Ct. 154, 66 L.Ed.2d 71 (1980)). Arias-Villanueva also contends that the jury interpreted his own failure to testify negatively as a result of the instruction. However, the district court gave a jury instruction to prevent such improper consideration. Judicial economy justifies reliance on the jury to follow the instructions of the court that segregate the evidence and limit the applicability of the evidence to each defendant. United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S.Ct. 262, 98 L.Ed.2d 220 (1987). The district court properly denied this motion. 42