Opinion ID: 1253041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statutory Sentencing Factors

Text: Villareal-Amarillas and Gonzalez argue for the first time on appeal that the district court committed procedural error under Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597, when it failed to state an individualized assessment of the sentencing factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This contention is plainly without merit. We do not require a mechanical recitation of the § 3553(a) factors when, as here, it is clear the district court properly considered those factors. See United States v. Battiest, 553 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir.2009); United States v. Walking Eagle, 553 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir.2009); United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (8th Cir.2008). The district court explained that it imposed sentences within each defendant's guidelines range to punish the defendant, to deter others from committing similar offenses, and to protect the public from future harm, an explanation demonstrating consideration of the statutory sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). Neither defendant requested a downward departure or variance. As the Supreme Court explained in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007): [W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation. Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission's own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case before him is typical. Unless a party contests the Guidelines sentence generally under § 3553(a) ... or argues for departure, the judge normally need say no more. The judgments of the district court are affirmed.