Opinion ID: 788712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Resisting Arrest Evidence and Jury Instruction

Text: 22 Wright next complains that the admission of his resistance to arrest and accompanying battery on a law enforcement officer unduly prejudiced his case and had no probative value to the charge of possession of a firearm. Wright further contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider his resistance as consciousness of guilt. As to the admission of the resistance and battery evidence, the district court has a wide latitude to determine the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb the court's judgment absent a clear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 987 (11th Cir.1997). This Court will only reverse an evidentiary ruling when it has affected a defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir.2003). 23 Although Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, it also true that 24 [e]vidence of criminal activity other than the charged offense is not extrinsic under Rule 404(b) if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. 25 United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Ramsdale, 61 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir.1995)). Moreover, [e]vidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context ... is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime ... to complete the story of the crime for the jury. McLean, 138 F.3d at 1403 (quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.1985)). Here, evidence of Wright's actions prior to the discovery of the firearm gives the jury the body of the story, not just the ending. Such evidence was inextricably intertwined with the charged offense. 26 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 dictates that evidence should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403, however, is an extraordinary remedy ... which should be used sparingly since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence. United States v. Fallen, 256 F.3d 1082, 1091 (11th Cir.2001). The nature of the government's evidence against a defendant is meant to be prejudicial, for if all evidence were favorable, there would be no trial. Therefore, we must ask not whether the evidence itself is prejudicial, but rather whether its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. (citing United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir.1992)). Consequently, the balancing test prescribed by Rule 403 militates in favor of admissibility. See Dodds, 347 F.3d at 897. 27 Here, the possession of a firearm charge did not encompass the resisting arrest or battery counts, nor did it involve the charge of driving under the influence. Nonetheless, evidence of those events contributed to the understanding of the situation as whole. The erratic driving led Officer Knox to stop Wright. Knox's assessment of Wright's intoxication gave him to cause to arrest Wright. The series of events culminated in Wright's violent struggle with Knox, and ultimately the discovery of the firearm. If the jury had merely heard evidence of the last event — the discovery of the firearm — the jury would be relegated to its own, and possibly incorrect, assumptions about the events prior to officers finding the weapon. The probative value of this evidence is demonstrated by the need to put a cohesive sequence of the crime before the jury. Likewise, evidence of resisting arrest is probative of Wright's consciousness of guilt. United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.1982). This Court has held that evidence of resistance to arrest and flight is admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt and thereby guilt. United States v. DeParias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1454 (11th Cir.1986) (overruled on other grounds). Therefore, we find that the evidence of Wright's resistance to arrest and the accompanying battery on a law enforcement officer is relevant to proving the charged offense. 28 Wright also complains about the court's charge on his resistance to the officers. We review a district court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Guerra, 293 F.3d 1279, 1290 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1141, 123 S.Ct. 934, 154 L.Ed.2d 837 (2003). Error in jury instructions does not constitute grounds for reversal unless there is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the defendant's substantial rights. See Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir.1999); Fed.R.Evid. 103(a). A defendant must specifically and timely object at trial to claimed errors, see Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1); errors claimed initially on appeal do not warrant reversal unless they constitute `plain error' amounting to a miscarriage of justice seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding. United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1493 n. 1 (11th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)). The purpose of such a strict rule is to inform the trial judge of possible errors so that he may have an opportunity to correct them. Hawkins, 905 F.2d at 1493, n. 1 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although Wright objected to the resisting arrest instruction, the argument advanced at trial, that the instruction was not a pattern jury instruction, is not the argument he advances on appeal. In order to preserve an objection to jury instructions for appellate review, a party must object before the jury retired, stating distinctly the specific grounds for the objection. United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (11th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). Wright failed to do so, and consequently, we review this assignment of error under the plain error standard of review. United States v. Solomon, 856 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 1352, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989). 29 The complete text of the challenged jury instruction is as follows: 30 The conduct of a person at the time of his arrest is not, of course, sufficient in itself to establish the guilt of that person, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by the jury in light of all the other evidence in the case in determining the guilt or innocence of that person. 31 You should consider that there may be reasons for the conduct by the Defendant that are fully consistent with innocence. 32 A feeling of guilt does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of a crime. If you determine that the conduct of the Defendant showed a consciousness of guilt on the Defendant's part, the weight, if any, to be attached to that evidence is also a matter exclusively for you as a jury to determine. 33 In formulating the instruction, the district court relied on the language and framework of a jury instruction related to flight — an instruction we upheld in United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1327-28 (11th Cir.1982). In Borders, we agreed with other circuits that universally accepted a defendant's flight, escape, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct as admissible evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself. Id . at 1324-25 (listing cases allowing evidence of flight) (emphasis added). In the instant case, the district court decided that the jury could draw a similar inference from Wright's resistance to arrest. We are not ignorant to the fact that evidence of flight and resistance to arrest do not amount to identical conduct; however, we have implied that the two are analogous. Borders, 693 F.2d at 1324. 34 The analysis of the district court's instruction, however, does not end there. In United States v. Myers, the former Fifth Circuit set out four inferences that must be drawn from the defendant's behavior in order for evidence of flight to be logically and legally relevant to show consciousness of guilt: 35 The probative value of flight evidence depends upon the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant's behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged. 36 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir.1977). The Fifth Circuit further stated that, to admit flight evidence, the government must make certain that each link in the chain of inferences that concludes with a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged is sturdily supported. Id. Ultimately, the Myers court found the flight instruction to be erroneous because the record did not support the allegations of flight. Specifically, an FBI agent testified that at the time of the defendant's arrest he believed the suspects were beginning to flee at the time of his arrival. Id. 1048-49. The FBI agent's testimony could not support the flight charge because the agent had previously testified that he was not aware that anyone had attempted to flee. Id. Additionally, the crime in question, a robbery, had occurred two months prior to the defendant's arrest and alleged flight attempt. Id. Finally, the appellate court did not accept that another potential instance of flight, which occurred three weeks after the robbery, supported the jury instruction because the evidence did not demonstrate intentional flight immediately after the commission of a crime or after [accusation] of a crime. Id. at 1050. 37 As Myers points out, flight is an admission by conduct. Id. at 1049. The same might be said of resisting arrest in Wright's case. In this case, the chain of inferences must move: (1) from Wright's behavior to the resistance; (2) from the resistance to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the firearm possession; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the firearm possession to actual guilt for that crime. The inference drawn at step three, however, presents a quandary for the government. Myers recognized that evidence of flight or related conduct, such as resisting arrest, is only marginally probative as to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Myers, 550 F.2d at 1049. 38 Wright's consciousness of guilt at the time of the arrest could stem from either his possession of the firearm or driving under the influence. The evidence could go either way, and here the jury found against Wright. The jury is not obligated to give more credence to defense witnesses. See United States v. Bleckley, 475 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir.1973). While there is not an abundance of direct evidence supporting the trial court's instruction that the conduct of a defendant at the time of his arrest may be relevant to guilt, neither is such evidence absent. As we have already discussed, Wright's conduct supported the admission of resisting arrest as evidence, and we believe that it could sustain a jury instruction on the consciousness of guilt. It is for the jury to infer whether his guilt sprang from the weapon possession or the DUI charge. Indeed, the comment lights out could have been made in hindsight, after police informed Wright of the gun's presence, but it is equally probable that Wright made the comment knowing the gun had always been there. 39 Reviewing the evidence concerning Wright's resistance to arrest, we see no defects that would render the instruction erroneous. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) (superceded by statute), Wright's resistance could sufficiently establish his consciousness of guilt as to the possession of the gun. For example, his comment of lights out and the accompanying pistol-like gesture support the inference that Wright knew the weapon was in the car and planned to use it. Moreover, unlike the situation in Myers, Wright's resistance came immediately after Officer Knox asked Wright to place his hands behind his back. These factors permit the instruction on resistance to let the jury determine its significance and qualitative value, if any. Borders, 693 F.2d at 1327. 40 We find that Wright failed to establish plain error in the jury instruction. To meet this stringent standard, Wright needed to prove that the instruction was an incorrect statement of the law and [that] it was probably responsible for an incorrect verdict, leading to substantial injustice. Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Pate v. Seaboard R.R., Inc., 819 F.2d 1074, 1082-83 (11th Cir.1987)). Wright has not demonstrated that the instruction misled the jury or left it to speculate as to an essential point of law. Noga, 168 F.3d at 1294.