Opinion ID: 2973896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)

Text: 3 Appellants conceded below that summary judgment was appropriate on their common-law fraud and civil conspiracy claims. Appellants have not pursued on appeal their loss of property claims related to the CPD police patrol officer positions they were not offered. Accordingly, these claims are not before us on appeal. 8 We review the factual findings of the district court for clear error, see Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 410 (6th Cir. 1993), and its legal conclusions, including whether summary judgment is appropriate, de novo, see Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. College, 314 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56(c), a fact is material only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Whether a factual issue is genuine requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2004). As the moving parties, the City defendants bear the initial burden of showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact to litigate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court reviews the evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Appellants as the nonmoving parties. Zambetti, 314 F.3d at 255 (citation omitted). Appellants must show, however, more than a “mere . . . scintilla of evidence” to defeat summary judgment; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find” in their favor. Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Moreover, if the City defendants carry their burden of proof, the burden then shifts to Appellants to “produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact” to be resolved by the fact-finder. Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995). B. Race-Based Classifications Must Survive Strict Judicial Scrutiny Appellants state that they do not question the constitutionality of the City’s race-based hiring plan – embodied in the original consent decree and the ACD – as it was applied prior to 1993. They 9 insist instead that their claims arise from application of the ACD in 1993-1994. Yet, if the City’s affirmative action plan was unconstitutional as originally implemented and amended, it is hard to fathom how it could be constitutional in 1993-1994. Conversely, if the plan was constitutional in 1977 and 1984, this would be some support for finding it constitutional as it applied in 1993-1994 (given its automatic sunset provision). Moreover, Appellants repeatedly attack the reasoning and factual record which underpin the original consent decree and the ACD. Thus, while focusing on the ACD as it applied in 1993-1994, we also address issues touching squarely on the basic constitutionality of the original consent decree and ACD. We review the CPD’s hiring decisions, based in part on race, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986). “The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.” Trihealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, the fundamental right of Appellants “to be treated with equal dignity and respect” by a public employer without reference to their race was implicated by the City’s temporary race-based hiring plan. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). Given this fundamental right of equal protection, it is now beyond question that all racial preferences instituted by a government actor – even those actions sanctioned, like here, under a consent decree – must pass strict judicial scrutiny. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94; United Black Firefighters Ass’n v. City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999, 1008 (6th Cir. 1992). The race of the 4 The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 10 challengers to a government’s preference system has no bearing on our analysis: “any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224; see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 (“[T]he level of scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.”) (citations omitted). To satisfy strict scrutiny, a race-based remedial plan must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling governmental purpose or interest. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987). Although a high standard to meet, “[s]trict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237). “When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.” Id. at 327. C. Burdens of Proof Where a race-based remedy is subject to strict judicial scrutiny, as here, the party defending the remedy bears the initial burden of demonstrating “a strong basis in evidence” that a compelling governmental interest exists which justifies the remedy. Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-92, 500). This burden has also been referred to as the “convincing evidence” standard. Wygand, 476 U.S. at 277; United Black Firefighters, 976 F.2d at 1009-10. If the defending party meets its initial burden, then the burden shifts to the party challenging the remedy to prove its unconstitutionality. Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir. 1994); Brunet, 1 F.3d at 404-05; see also Wygant, 476 U.S. 11 at 277-78.5 D. Compelling Governmental Interest As we have previously observed, “[t]here is no question that remedying the effects of past discrimination constitutes a compelling governmental interest.” Associated Gen. Contractors, 214 F.3d at 735 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 503; United Black Firefighters, 976 F.2d at 1010-11). Societal discrimination alone is insufficient, though – the City defendants must make “some showing of prior discrimination” on their part to justify the “limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination.” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (recognizing a compelling interest in a government’s effort to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible). Thus, if the City defendants come forward with a strong basis in evidence of past discrimination in the hiring policies or practices of the CPD, they will have met their initial burden. 5 There is some dispute on whether the government should instead bear the ultimate burden to prove the constitutionality of its affirmative action plan in all cases. See, e.g., Concrete Workers of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 540 U.S. 1027 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari) (stating that government should bear ultimate burden of proving constitutionality of race-based affirmative action plan); Bass v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1116 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that “Supreme Court precedent governing equal protection claims places the burden on a defendant to prove that an affirmative action plan satisfies strict scrutiny”); Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 404 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that city had to “prove” it had a compelling interest and that the remedy was narrowly tailored). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gratz v. Bollinger appears to lend support to this position, at least in the education context. 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (“To withstand our strict scrutiny analysis, respondents must demonstrate that the University’s use of race in its current admissions program employs ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’”) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227). Even if the ultimate burden of proof were to be placed on the City defendants, we find that they have provided sufficient evidence to meet this burden. Thus, we leave to another day the question of whether parties challenging a remedial race-based plan bear the ultimate burden of proof (as do most parties challenging government action) or rather that burden should be placed on the government-defendants given the important equal protection issues involved. 12 Establishing a strong basis in evidence is not an easy burden to meet. “The only cases found to present the necessary ‘compelling interest’ sufficient to ‘justif[y] a narrowly tailored race-based remedy’ are those that expose . . . ‘pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct.’” Associated Gen. Contractors, 214 F.3d at 737 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237). “[A]n amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry” is not enough. Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 499). To begin, the City’s own admission of its history of discriminating against minorities in CPD hiring – a position it fought against in litigation for a number of years – is persuasive evidence of “pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct.” This is not a case in which a government body makes a finding that societal discrimination affects a particular industry, such as in Croson and Adarand. Nor is this a case in which a government body expressly maintains that it did not engage in unlawful racial discrimination. See, e.g., Aiken, 37 F.3d at 1158. This is a case, rather, in which a governmental defendant admits its own culpability – against its own interests at the time – in past racial discrimination. These are critical distinctions. See Vogel, 959 F.2d at 600 (recognizing distinction between affirmative action plans based on generalized discrimination in an industry versus discrimination by a city in hiring its own police force). The City’s admission was not simply made in a newspaper article, press release, or in some other voluntary, public forum, but in a consent decree approved by and entered as a judgment of the district court. A race-based hiring plan embodied in a consent decree “stands somewhere in between a voluntary affirmative action program (as in Wygant) and a remedial plan that a court has imposed after making a formal finding of intentional discrimination (as in United States v. Paradise . . . ), for a consent decree is a hybrid that has ‘attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees.’” Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448, 1459 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 478 U.S. 13 at 519). On the one hand, as a form of “contract founded on the agreement of the parties, . . . [i]t should be construed to preserve the position for which the parties bargained.” Vogel, 959 F.2d at 598 (citations omitted). On the other hand, as a form of judgment, “[w]hile the entry of an affirmative action consent decree does not guarantee that the decree serves a remedial purpose . . . , the heightened judicial oversight inherent in a properly entered decree helps attain that end.” Donaghy, 933 F.2d at 1459. Here, both aspects – contractual and judicial – weigh in favor of giving real effect to the City’s admission of past discrimination. A party can also demonstrate a strong basis in evidence by showing that a court made a finding of past discrimination. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 289; see also Boston Police Superior Officers Fed’n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that a “strong basis” in evidence can be based on a “contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past discrimination by a court or other competent body”) (citation omitted). As recounted above, the district court made several findings of discrimination prior to 1977 against the City. During its review of the consent decree in 1977, the district court concluded that the record supported the City’s admission of a history of race discrimination within the CPD. It subsequently reaffirmed this position by entering the ACD as a judgment of the court in 1984. A review of the statistical evidence also supports the City’s admission and the district court’s findings of discrimination. While evidence of “mere statistical disparities” is not enough by itself to show a compelling interest, Associated Gen. Contractors, 214 F.3d at 736 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-02), a prima facie case of discrimination can be made where “a gross disparity exists between the expected percentage of minorities selected [for hire] and the actual percentage of minorities selected [for hire],” United Black Firefighters, 976 F.2d at 1011 (emphasis added); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (plurality op., O’Connor, J.) (explaining that a prima facie case of 14 discrimination can arise “[w]here there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime contractors”); Aiken, 37 F.3d at 1163 (“It is settled that appropriate statistical evidence setting forth a prima facie case of discrimination is sufficient to provide a strong basis in evidence to support a public employer[’s] affirmative action plan.”) (internal quotations omitted; emphasis in original); Vogel, 959 F.2d at 599 (“Evidence of wide statistical disparities . . . may justify an affirmative action policy adopted by a public employer.”) (citation omitted). The record is replete with gross statistical disparities between the treatment of minorities and non-minorities by the CPD. For example, the district court found that in the 1970s, minorities constituted 23% of those taking the entrance examination, but represented 64% of those who failed. Minorities had a failure rate of 26.3% compared to a rate of 4.5% for non-minorities. Shield Club, 370 F. Supp. at 253. Throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, the percentage of minorities in the CPD officer force tracked below – often quite significantly – the level of minorities in the general population, the percentage of examination takers who were minorities, and the percentage of examination passers who were minorities. This court has found that similar disparities supported a finding of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Vogel, 959 F.2d at 600. Appellants cite to this court’s decision in Middleton for support of their position that the statistical disparities do not warrant a finding of compelling interest. That case is distinguishable on a number of important points. First, as the court noted at the very beginning of its analysis, the City of Flint’s plan was not presented as part of a motion for a judicially approved consent decree, but rather was voluntarily conceived as part of the normal political process. Middleton, 92 F.3d at 401. Thus, there was no heightened judicial review of the plan before its implementation nor any 15 prior judicial findings of discrimination. The city relied upon general population statistics rather than also considering the relevant labor pool. Id. at 406-08. The court was further concerned about several serious deficiencies in the city’s expert statistical analysis. Id. None of these shortfalls exist here.6 Appellants also argue that even if there was a compelling interest justifying the race-based remedy in 1977 and 1984, surely there was no such interest in 1993 and 1994. As evidence, they point to the convergence of the CPD’s minority police force percentage to the 33% target. Yet, in determining whether the governmental body had a compelling interest, a reviewing court should focus on the evidence of discrimination existing at the time the body enacted the race-based remedy. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996) (holding that “the institution that makes the racial distinction must have had a strong basis in evidence to conclude that remedial action was necessary, before it embarks on an affirmative-action program.”) (internal quotation omitted, emphasis in original); In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 350-51 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting same). This and other courts have “considered evidence of prior discrimination occurring years before” enactment of a race-based remedy, sometimes finding the evidence convincing, see, e.g., Vogel, 959 F.2d at 600 (considering evidence of discrimination nine years before affirmative action plan instituted; upheld plan), Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 453 (1st Cir. 1991) (considering evidence of discrimination ten years before affirmative action plan instituted; upheld plan), and other times finding it 6 This court’s decision in Long v. City of Saginaw is likewise distinguishable. In that case, we reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment to city officials over an amendment to the city’s race-based hiring plan for its police department. 911 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1990). We found that there was no compelling interest for the plan because, in part, there had never been a complaint of discrimination lodged against the city, nor had there been any adjudication or formal findings of discrimination against the city in its hiring of officers. Id. at 1197. Without some record of discrimination, we concluded that the city’s admission against interest was insufficient by itself to justify the remedial measures. Id. at 1198. The city’s statistical evidence also suffered from numerous defects which are not present here. Id. at 1199-200. 16 unconvincing, see, e.g., Brunet, 1 F.3d at 409 (finding evidence of discrimination 14 years before enactment of affirmative action plan “too remote”). Here, the historical and contemporaneous evidence of discrimination in the 1970s and 1980s provided the Shield Club parties and the district court with a strong basis in evidence for the necessity of the original consent decree in 1977 and its amendment in 1984. Finally, a valid race-based remedy is not limited to alleviating the current practice of racial discrimination, but can also address the “lingering effects” of such discrimination. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237; see also Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 456-57 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts should consider whether “lingering effects of past discrimination still necessitate a raceconscious remedy”) (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 169-70; Police Ass’n of New Orleans v. Cannatella, 100 F.3d 1159, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1996)). This is necessarily the case in which the racebased remedy extends beyond the immediate moment into the future, when presumably the practice of discrimination has halted, but its effects are still felt. As discussed in more detail infra Sections II.E.2 and 4, the vestiges of racial discrimination had not been sufficiently relieved by 1992 and therefore the City defendants remained bound by the terms of the ACD. Thus, with the admission by the City of past racial discrimination, supported by the findings of the district court and a review of the statistical evidence, the City defendants have shown convincing evidence of a compelling interest in increasing the number of qualified minorities among the CPD’s ranks. We now turn to determine whether the City defendants crafted a measured, narrow remedy designed to attain that end. E. Narrowly Tailored Remedy As explained by the Supreme Court, “[t]he purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is 17 to ensure that ‘the means chosen “fit” th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). There is no single “best” remedy – courts and other government bodies enjoy some discretion in remedying racial discrimination. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 185 (“While a remedy must be narrowly tailored, that requirement does not operate to remove all discretion from the District Court in its construction of a remedial decree.”); Donaghy, 933 F.2d at 1461 (noting that “there is no universal answer to the problem of remedying racial discrimination” and that trial courts have sound discretion in fashioning remedy). Yet, as the district court in the Shield Club case succinctly noted, “[o]nly tough choices, each freighted with some weakness and the risk of individual or group inequities” face the body charged with remedying past discrimination. Shield Club, 370 F. Supp. at 254. In determining whether the City’s race-based remedial measure was narrowly tailored, the court must look to the following factors: “the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.” Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (citation omitted). These are not elements – the ACD need not satisfy each and every item to survive strict scrutiny. See Ashton v. City of Memphis, 49 F. Supp.2d 1051, 1056 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). Rather, after reviewing the ACD in light of all the factors, the court must be satisfied that the remedy is narrowly tailored to meet its remedial purpose. See id. Moreover, the fact that the ACD was reviewed and approved by the district court weighs in favor of finding that it was narrowly tailored. See Donaghy, 933 F.2d at 1459 (finding relevant the “heightened judicial oversight” of the affirmative action plan in determining whether it was narrowly tailored). 18 1. Necessity for the Race-Based Remedy and Efficacy of Alternative Remedies To determine whether the CPD’s race-based hiring plan was necessary, it is important to consider first the goal of the plan. The parties in the Shield Club lawsuits (by agreeing to the consent decree) and the district court (by entering the decree as a judgment) intended to ameliorate the effects of the City’s past racial discrimination against African-Americans and Hispanics by temporarily increasing the number of these minorities hired as police patrol officers. Accordingly, the plan was appropriately focused on only the group of minorities proven to have been subjected to discriminatory practices. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506-07 (explaining that remedy must be “linked to identified discrimination” and not suffer from “gross overinclusiveness”). Appellants argue, however, that application of the remedial plan in 1993-1994 was not necessary for two reasons. First, Appellants argue that its application was not necessary in light of the City’s use of job-validated examinations and screening procedures for a number of years prior to 1993-1994. They also assert that the CPD hired “substantially more than the number of minorities between 1985 and 1992 than required by the terms” of the ACD. Given this, Appellants maintain, the plan was unnecessary in 1993-1994 to eradicate any remaining vestiges of discrimination. Both arguments fail on close examination. A job-validated examination “identifies those skills important to a particular job and tests those skills.” Brunet, 1 F.3d at 394. The use of validated, non-discriminatory hiring procedures can, under certain circumstances, be an acceptable alternative to race-based relief. See Aiken, 37 F.3d at 1164. For example, when a governmental body makes decisions based solely on the rank-order results from a job-validated examination, the race of the examination taker will not factor into the hiring decision. Over time, the effects of past discrimination should eventually dissolve away as the effects of the meritocracy begin to dominate. 19 In this case, however, the job-validated examinations and screening procedures were not effectively remedying the effects of past discrimination at the time the City entered the ACD. Although the patrol officer examination was validated in 1974, by 1984 the City’s proportion of minority officers had only reached 20.8%. The 3:4 hiring ratio simply sped up the City’s progress towards achieving its goal of a police workforce made up of 33% minority officers. The Supreme Court has held that hiring ratios are permissible as a means to regulate the speed of progress towards fulfilling a race-based plan’s goal. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 179-80.7 In support of its second argument, Appellants point out that the City hired an average of 84.6 police patrol officers per year during the 1985-1992 period, exceeding the ACD’s annual minimum of 70 officers. By application of the 3:4 hiring ratio, this meant that the CPD hired more minorities (on average) than it would have if it had hired only 70 officers per year during that period. Thus, according to Appellants, there was no need for the remedial measures in 1993-1994. As recognized by the district court, however, there is no basis in the ACD for this calculation. Appellants contest here the interpretation of the ACD, rather than its constitutionality. Although they have standing to challenge the ACD’s constitutionality, Rutherford, 137 F.3d at 911, as non-parties to the decree, they do not have standing to enforce their understanding of its terms, Aiken, 37 F.3d at 1167-68; Vogel, 959 F.2d at 598. The City defendants were bound to follow the terms of the ACD, not some hypothetical plan now suggested by the Appellants. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of The United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (“It is beyond question that obedience to judicial orders is an important 7 We also point out that the that the CPD did not hire police patrol officers based purely on their examination score rankings – it had a measure of discretion in choosing candidates by operation of the 1:3 rule. Thus, there is no guarantee that use of a validated examination alone would have ameliorated the past effects of racial discrimination in the workforce. 20 public policy. An injunction issued by a court acting within its jurisdiction must be obeyed until the injunction is vacated or withdrawn.”) (citation omitted)). Moreover, a brief review of Appellants’ argument shows that it is without merit. The CPD continued to operate under the ACD in 1993-1994 because it failed to hire 70 officers in two different years during the initial 8-year period. Appellants are correct that, even with this two-year shortfall, the average number of officers hired per year exceeded 70. Thus, under their argument, the fact that the consent decree extended the 3:4 hiring ratio for two years even though the average hires exceeded 70 per year shows that the decree was not narrowly tailored. Other than pointing to the average annual-hire figure, Appellants do not show how the 70officer minimum rule somehow violates the constitution. In fact, had the ACD included a rule consistent with Appellant’s position – i.e., that the average number of hires per year should control – such a rule could have plausibly extended the race-based hiring plan well beyond the original expiration date, thus making the ACD more, not less, susceptible to attack on “narrowly tailored” grounds.8,9 8 To illustrate, assume 75 police officers were hired each year from 1985 to 1991; however, in 1992, assume the City placed a freeze on all officer hiring for one year. Also assume that from 1993 forward, the CPD again hired 75 officers per year. Under the ACD, the 3:4 hiring ratio would have been extended for one year. Under a rule in which the average must be 70 in the final year for the decree to expire, however, it would take 15 years, beginning in 1985, for the average to reach 70. 9