Opinion ID: 1998954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Minimum Value of Thefts

Text: [¶ 12] Nelson contends that the jury instructions were erroneous because the jury should have been required to specifically find that the value of wood taken from each landowner and the mill was precisely the same as the value alleged in the indictment. Nelson also contends that the jury instruction for Count II incorrectly stated that the jury must find a theft of property valued in excess of $1000 in order to convict Nelson of Class C theft under Count II, when the statute applicable to Nelson, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 362(3)(A) (Supp.2000), instead required a minimum value of $2000. [¶ 13] We review [] jury instructions in their entirety to ensure that they informed the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary respects of the governing law. State v. Bouchard, 2005 ME 106, ¶ 28, 881 A.2d 1130, 1138 (quotation marks omitted). The court did not err in instructing the jury that the State must prove that Nelson committed theft of property with values above the statutory minimums, rather than requiring it to find the specific values alleged in the indictment. See State v. Bruzzese, 2009 ME 61, ¶ 14, 974 A.2d 311, 314 (holding that the jury had sufficient evidence to support its finding of theft of property above the minimum value required by the statute). The court did, however, commit error in its misstatement of the statutory minimum theft for Count II. [¶ 14] It appears that neither the State nor Nelson was aware of the mistake in the elements of the Count II theft charge, and neither brought the issue to the attention of the court. Because Nelson did not object specifically to the court's misstatement of the statutory minimum value of theft, the instruction is reviewed for obvious error. See M.R. Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Perry, 2006 ME 76, ¶ 14, 899 A.2d 806, 813. An erroneous definition of an essential element is obvious error if there is a reasonable possibility that an instruction correctly defining the element would have resulted in a different verdict. Perry, 2006 ME 76, ¶ 15, 899 A.2d at 813 (quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Powell, 452 A.2d 977, 978 (Me.1982) (We are not called upon to decide the likelihood of a jury result if properly instructed but whether the jury could have resolved the issue differently.). [¶ 15] Count II of the indictment charged Nelson with Class C theft by deception. The statute in effect at the time of the conduct stated that a theft offense is a Class C crime if [t]he value of the property or services is more than $2,000 but not more than $10,000. 17-A M.R.S. § 362(3)(A) (Supp.2000). [3] Because the court misstated the value element of the Count II offense as a $1000 minimum instead of $2000, [t]he court's instruction did not accurately represent the statutory definition. See Perry, 2006 ME 76, ¶ 24, 899 A.2d at 814. The State alleged a value of $6602.40 for that Count, but the jury could have chosen to believe all or only part of the testimony and evidence supporting that value, and therefore there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome on Count II would have been different with a correct instruction. See id. ¶ 25, 899 A.2d at 814. For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of conviction on Count II.