Opinion ID: 2556735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The defendants appeal the grant of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on three distinct grounds. [7] First, defendants contend that the Superior Court improperly denied their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Second, defendants argue that because other remedies at law may exist, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of equitable relief was inappropriate. And third, defendants contend that the preliminary injunction fails for indefiniteness because it applies only to unknown persons and therefore is unenforceable at a contempt proceeding. [8]
The defendants argue that the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action because § 8-8-3(a)(2) vests the District Court with exclusive original jurisdiction over [a]ll actions between landlords and tenants pursuant to [G.L.1956] chapter 18 of title 34 and all other actions for possession of premises and estates    and § 8-8-3(a)(5) vests the District Court with exclusive original jurisdiction over [a]ll suits and complaints for offenses against the bylaws, ordinances, and regulations of cities and towns   . Because [s]ubject matter jurisdiction is an indispensable requisite in any judicial proceeding    [w]e review an attack on subject matter jurisdiction de novo.  Zarrella v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 824 A.2d 1249, 1256 (R.I.2003) (citing Castellucci v. Castellucci, 116 R.I. 101, 103, 352 A.2d 640, 642 (1976)). The defendants contend that the trial justice erred when he ruled that § 8-8-3(a)(2) applied only in the landlord-tenant context. They argue that the term other as used in subsection (a)(2) plainly references any and all other actions for possession of premises not involving a landlord/tenant relationship between the parties   . Moreover, defendants argue that even if this Court were to determine that the term other as used within the statute is restricted to the landlord-tenant context as the trial justice reasoned, then, in that case, subsection (a)(5) of § 8-8-3, which vests the District Court with exclusive original jurisdiction over suits and complaints for offenses against the ordinances of cities and towns, would be dispositive because the city alleges various violations of city ordinances in its complaint. We do not agree. As articulated by the hearing justice, [t]his is a case which sounds both in    nuisance and trespass. Section 8-8-3(a)(2) clearly provides that the jurisdictional grant is predicated on G.L.1956 chapter 18 of title 34, which is titled at § 34-18-1 as the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The defendants' reliance on a broad reading of the phrase other    premises and estates in § 8-8-3(a)(2) is belied by a plain reading of § 34-18-11(12), which sets forth that `[p]remises' means a dwelling unit and the structure of which it is a part and facilities and appurtenances therein and grounds, areas, and facilities held out for the use of tenants generally, or the use of which is promised to the tenant[.] As correctly observed by the hearing justice, it has not been argued by any of the parties that the encampment existed as the result of any consensual relationship between the city and the alleged trespassers. Further, the definition of premises directs that other as used in § 8-8-3(a)(2) correlates to dwelling unit[s]    held out for the use of tenants generally   . Thus, we can discern no merit to the position that § 8-8-3(a)(2) operates to divest the Superior Court of an action brought in equity for a continuing trespass. We are of the opinion that defendants' reliance on § 8-8-3(a)(5) also is misplaced because plaintiff has brought the action for relief in equity and has not sought enforcement of specific ordinances allegedly violated by inhabitants of the makeshift encampment. This reasoning is reinforced by G.L.1956 § 8-2-13, which provides: The [S]uperior [C]ourt shall, except as otherwise provided by law, have exclusive original jurisdiction of suits and proceedings of an equitable character and of statutory proceedings following the course of equity   . We have no pause in holding that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the merits of plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.