Opinion ID: 1043964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to this Appeal

Text: Few facts as to Morgan's alleged losses were proffered at the April 29, 2008 hearing. Morgan testified that her available credit had fallen from $123,400 to $5,500, but she did not explain how this credit was used in the past or needed in the future. While Morgan claimed that several credit card companies closed her accounts, she did not indicate what purchases she regularly made with those cards, whether she could buy the same goods and services with her remaining credit (or cash), or the appreciation (or depreciation) of those items. We certainly do not suggest that Morgan can recover the purchase price of things she would have bought but for her loss of credit; [37] rather, we reiterate that Morgan must lay[] a sufficient foundation to allow the trier of fact to make a fair and reasonable assessment of damages. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 10. In her counter-complaint, Morgan alleged that she purchases investment homes for supplemental income, and that her negative credit history rendered her unable to purchase these homes at her previous interest rates. A lost investment opportunity may warrant damages for loss of available credit, but considerably more detail is required to enable the trier of fact, using its discretion, to make a fair and reasonable assessment of damages. Hatchel, 223 S.W.3d at 230 (citing Wilson, 444 S.W.2d at 189). Morgan also failed to address this purported loss of opportunity at the April 29, 2008 hearing. For example, she did not testify as to what interest rates she previously obtained, what profits she enjoyed (or losses she suffered) from her previous transactions, what actual opportunities to purchase she has in the current market, what profits she expected from additional purchases, and what interest rate, if any, she eventually obtained from lenders for this purpose. The trial court awarded Morgan $6800 for additional Home Equity Costs, as proposed by Morgan at the April 29, 2008 hearing. Neither the court nor Morgan offered any explanation as to how this figure had been computed, but Morgan alleged in her countercomplaint that refinancing of her property could have lowered her interest rate from an 8%, 15 year variable interest rate to a fixed 30 year, 6.25% interest rate and would have lowered her monthly mortgage payments by at least $200.00 a month for at least 15 years. Taken as true, this suggests that the trial court calculated this award on Morgan's additional costs over thirty-four months. In any event, the details alleged do provide some foundation to allow the trier of fact to make a fair and reasonable assessment of damages. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 10. The trial court further awarded Morgan an additional $500 in higher interest rates on [credit] cards, again without explanation as to how this number had been computed. Morgan alleged, however, that the APR on Morgan's Chase Visa card increased from 11.24% before the collection actions by Discover Bank, to 29.99% after the collection actions. At the hearing, Morgan testified that the Chase card had a balance of $3000 when the APR rose. While the math here is a bit fuzzy, the trial court at least had specific facts from which to determine damages. See Hatchel, 223 S.W.3d at 230 (While the amount of damages to be awarded in a given case is not controlled by fixed rules of law or mathematical formulas, Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 703, the evidence upon which a party relies to prove damages must be sufficiently certain to enable the trier of fact, using its discretion, to make a fair and reasonable assessment of damages, Wilson, 444 S.W.2d at 189.). Because we have never previously determined the requirements to prove damages for loss of consumer credit, we believe Morgan is entitled to a new hearing on this matter. We therefore remand the case to the trial court. On remand, after a new hearing, the trial court must specify which of Morgan's causes of action support any award of damages. If multiple theories allow Morgan to recover damages, the court must allow Morgan to elect her choice of remedies. See Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Tenn. 1999). The award of actual damages shall be determined in a manner consistent with this opinion.