Opinion ID: 2513015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Alberto and Gabriel deny that the government presented sufficient evidence against them to find each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus review de novo whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Rodríguez-Berríos, 573 F.3d 55, 65-66 (1st Cir.2009). We do not weigh evidence or make credibility judgments, but rather must uphold any verdict that is supported by a plausible rendition of the record. United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 31-32 (1st Cir.2008) (citation omitted).
Alberto and Gabriel were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 371. [8] To support a conviction under a conspiracy charge, the government must show that a defendant had both the intent to agree to commit a crime, and the intent that the crime be completed. United States v. Escobar-de Jesús, 187 F.3d 148, 175 (1st Cir.1999). A sustainable conspiracy conviction requires direct or circumstantial evidence which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and one or more coconspirators intended to agree and ... to commit the substantive criminal offense which was the object of their unlawful agreement. United States v. Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 212 (1st Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prosecution need only show knowledge of the basic agreement, with an intent to commit the underlying substantive offense. The requisite knowledge and intent can be proven through circumstantial evidence, including inferences from acts committed by the defendant that furthered the conspiracy's purposes. United States v. García-Pastrana, 584 F.3d 351, 377 (1st Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Defendants argue that the government presented no evidence of an agreement or specific plan to carjack the victim, and thus cannot maintain a conspiracy conviction. We do not agree. The evidence presented at trial shows a well-orchestrated plot to carjack and kidnap the victim, which bespeaks a prior agreement. First, there was testimony that Alberto and Gabriel lived two houses away from Pérez, a fact that would allow the jury to reasonably infer that they were aware of Pérez's dealings and movements. There was also testimony that the last place Pérez stopped his car before the carjacking was a pharmacy on a secluded country road with lots of surrounding cover and vegetation. Moreover, the carjacking occurred on a bolita day, when one familiar with Pérez's dealings could infer that he was likely to have significant amounts of cash in the car. Finally, the presence of the revolver and the handcuffs used to subdue Pérez could also reasonably lead to an inference of defendants' forethought in executing their heist. See United States v. Pérez-González, 445 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that jury could reasonably infer existence of conspiracy to break into and vandalize a naval base when defendants brought sledgehammers and wire cutters to nearby celebration and acted in a coordinated fashion). Therefore, since the carjacking seems to have been perpetrated at a specifically opportune time, in a conveniently secluded place, using the tools necessary to pull off the operation, a reasonable jury would have legally sufficient evidence to find that defendants Alberto and Gabriel planned the crime in advance and possessed the requisite intent to support a conviction for conspiracy.
The elements of a carjacking resulting in death are (1) taking or attempted taking from the person or presence of another; (2) a motor vehicle transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce; (3) through the use of force, violence, or by intimidation; (4) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm; (5) that results in death. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3); United States v. García-Álvarez, 541 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir.2008). Defendants argue that the government also failed to show any of these elements, save the second, beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, we disagree. To take a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another requires, at a minimum, proximity to the vehicle and the ability to influence the space encompassing the vehicle.... United States v. Savarese, 385 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2004). In the carjacking context, courts have required the victim to have both a degree of physical proximity to the vehicle and an ability to control or immediately obtain access to the vehicle. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted). This is not to say, however, that the government must prove that the victim was inside of the vehicle. In Savarese, we recognized with approval that other circuits have held that the presence requirement of the carjacking statute was satisfied when the victim or victims were inside a building and the stolen vehicle was parked outside the building. Id. Defendants contend that there is no evidence on the record that shows they took the car from the person or presence of Pérez. José's testimony that Alberto characterized the taking as having been accomplished policeman style, defendants argue, was not sufficient, as it required the jury to guess the phrase's meaning without further development by the government. However, since there was evidence presented showing that Pérez had been driving his usual bolita route in the morning and that later in the afternoon the car was driven in an unusual manner by a person other than Pérez, the jury was entitled to conclude that defendants abducted Pérez while he was driving his bolita route. Given this evidence as well as the testimony that Pérez was transported in his vehicle to José's house, a reasonable jury could have also concluded that Pérez was either in his car at the time of the carjacking or sufficiently nearby. In either case, the government met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to this element of § 2119(3). The second element of the statute, requiring that the vehicle to be taken by force and violence or by intimidation, does not present as great an evidentiary barrier. 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that an empty threat, or intimidating bluff is enough. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). In arguing that the government presented insufficient proof of this element, defendants argue along similar lines as abovenamely, that testimony that the car was obtained policeman style is too vague to support a jury finding on the matter. We disagree. José explained that he understood the phrase policeman style to mean that they stopped the car ... with the weapon, and they said, this is the police. This was a reasonable interpretation of the phrase which the jury was entitled to credit. Having further evidence of the presence of a handgun from José's testimony, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the carjacking was performed at gunpoint. Finally, there was also evidence presented that Pérez was forcibly restrained during the incident, given the fact that he was handcuffed in the back seat of his own vehicle. A jury was entitled to conclude that Pérez was abducted through the use of force, violence, or intimidation. The last disputed element of the carjacking offense is the intent element, which requires that a vehicle be taken with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. 18 U.S.C. § 2119. It is well-settled that the statute does not refer to a carjacking which merely happens to result in death. United States v. Matos-Quiñones, 456 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.2006) ([T]his statute is not a felony murder analog. Even if death results, the statute requires intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the statute requires that the defendant possessed either actual or conditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm to the carjacking victim. In Holloway, the Supreme Court explained that [t]he intent requirement of sec. 2119 is satisfied when the Government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car (or, alternatively, if unnecessary to steal the car). 526 U.S. at 12, 119 S.Ct. 966. Even if the defendant did not intend to kill the driver, the intent element is satisfied if the defendant was willing to kill the driver to effect the theft of the car. The parenthetical at the end of the quotation implies that the Court saw a distinction between killing for its own sake and willingness to kill to effect the theft, and that it deemed both circumstances as meeting the intent standard of § 2119. This actual or conditional intent must be formed at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile.... Id.; see also United States v. Evans-García, 322 F.3d 110, 114 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir.2000) ([T]he mental state required by the statute ... is measured at the moment that the defendant demands or takes control of the vehicle.). Defendants argue that the government presented no evidence to show that they had formed either an actual or conditional intent to kill or seriously injure Pérez at the moment the carjacking occurred. The only evidence on this point, they contend, points to precisely the opposite conclusionthat defendants meant to rob Pérez and ended up killing him after the carjacking, when he became difficult. [10] We considered very similar facts in Matos-Quiñones. In that case, the defendants took the victim's car keys and forced him, at gunpoint, to lie down in the rear of the vehicle, while they drove away. [11] Later, after discovering that the victim was a sailor, defendants decided to kill him. Matos-Quiñones, 456 F.3d at 16. They stopped in a secluded area; then, after a struggle prompted by an escape attempt, defendants shot the victim in the back of the head, killing him. Id. at 16-17. Thus, in Matos-Quiñones, we were faced with a situation in which a carjacker stole a car, held the owner hostage, and later killed him. These circumstances raised the question of whether the moment of the carjacking, at which point the actual or conditional intent must manifest, could be extended from the initial taking to a later period in time by virtue of holding the victim hostage. We did not decide this issue in Matos-Quiñones, however, because the defendants pleaded guilty. Likewise, we do not see the need to decide it presently, as we believe that in this case a reasonable jury had enough evidence to conclude that defendants possessed either actual or conditional intent to cause the death of Pérez, or to inflict upon him serious bodily harm, at the moment they took his vehicle. The evidence on the record, taken as a whole, supports the inference that defendants intended or were willing to seriously injure or kill Pérez when they committed the carjacking. For one, there was evidence presented that defendants used a handgun to abduct Pérez. It is true that this fact alone would not support a finding of actual or conditional intent. See Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11-12 n. 13, 119 S.Ct. 966 ([W]e have found no case of a conviction of assault with intent to kill or murder, upon proof only of the leveling of a gun or pistol.) (internal quotations omitted). That is not, however, the full extent of the evidence presented to the jury on this issue. There was also testimony that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Alberto and Gabriel abducted Pérez while he was in his own vehicle. Additionally, there was testimony that Pérez was restrained with handcuffs when he arrived at José's house. Finally, Pérez's cries for help during his attempted escape [12] lead to the inference that he felt his life was threatened. This conclusion is reasonable, given defendants' displays of violence during the ordeal, and their ultimate act of asphyxiating Pérez. [13] Taken in conjunction, and viewing ambiguities in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence could plausibly lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Alberto and Gabriel were at least willing to seriously injure, if not kill Pérez, at the moment of the carjacking given the evidence that defendants used a revolver, put Pérez in handcuffs, and placed him in his own car, were willing to and did use violence to prevent his escape, and then did actually kill him after an extended period of holding him hostage. Cf. United States v. Lebrón-Cepeda, 324 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir.2003) (per curiam) (holding that conditional intent to kill could be inferred from fact that defendant placed a gun against the victim's head and threatened him, even though the actual killing occurred at a later time). We therefore hold that sufficient evidence was presented to allow a reasonable jury to find that the government satisfied its burden of proving the intent element of § 2119(3).