Opinion ID: 222737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Joseph Miller

Text: The government charged Joseph Miller with three counts of wire fraud and three counts of mail fraud, each related to a separate property transaction for which he acted as the loan officer. From 2001 to 2006, Miller served as a loan officer for the mortgage broker Integrity Home Mortgage, a name that seems a little ironic under the circumstances. In that position, he was responsible for compiling loan documentation on behalf of borrowers and submitting those materials to lenders. According to testimony at trial, Miller served as the loan officer for multiple home purchases arranged by co-defendants Jonathon Marchetti, Alfredo Hilado, and Larry Skrobot. In each of these transactions, Marchetti set up the sale by recruiting Hilado to serve as the buyer and sending him to Miller to obtain a loan. Skrobot provided the necessary financing for Hilado to make the purchase while Miller prepared the documentation and secured the mortgage for Hilado. Miller makes two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the evidence against him was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because testimony offered by two of his co-defendants was unreliable. Second, Miller claims that the district court erred by finding that he was involved in a single conspiracy. We disagree on both issues and affirm Miller's conviction.
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against him must show that no reasonable jury could have found his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir.2010). Under this already high standard, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Huddleston, 593 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir.2010). If any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we will uphold the conviction. United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.2011). As a preliminary matter, we note that while Miller makes general claims about the insufficiency of the evidence against him, he discusses only the evidence regarding his participation in wire fraud. By not developing any argument regarding the sufficiency of evidence to support his mail fraud conviction, he waives that argument on appeal. See United States v. Collins, 604 F.3d 481, 487 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2010). We address only Miller's wire fraud convictions and conclude that the jury could reasonably have reached its guilty verdict on the evidence presented. To establish wire fraud, the government must prove (1) that the defendant participated in a scheme to defraud; (2) with the intent to defraud; (3) and used interstate wire communications in furtherance of the fraud. See United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir.2010). Miller concedes that the two primary witnesses against himMarchetti and Hiladotestified that he directed them to submit false documents to him that he then forwarded to the lenders. Marchetti testified that he began working with Miller in 2004. He regularly used Miller as a loan officer in his Chicago-area property transactions, three of which were the subject of the wire fraud charges against Miller: 1920 Circle Court; 24 East 23rd Street; and 594 Andover Drive. Marchetti stated that Miller filled out false seller second mortgage forms for the properties at 24 East 23rd Street and 594 Andover Drive and that the two discussed creating false construction receipts for the Andover Drive property, as well. [3] Hilado also testified that Miller was the loan officer for eleven properties he managed. The jury heard that Miller told Hilado to come up with names of people who would lease from Hilado at both the East 23rd Street property and the Circle Court property, even though Miller knew that he did not plan to have any tenants, to make the loans look more secure. These false lease forms as well as the false seller second forms were admitted into evidence. The government also provided evidence that Miller's income from commissions on loans he administered rose from $38,500 in 2002 to $49,000 in 2004, to $82,000 in 2005. The gist of Miller's contention is that Marchetti's and Hilado's testimony cannot support proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because they were unreliable as witnesses. This argument invites us to disregard the standard of review and to substitute our judgment for that of the jury. We do not weigh the evidence on review or second-guess the jury's credibility determinations. See id. at 726; Tavarez, 626 F.3d at 906; United States v. Anderson, 580 F.3d 639, 646 (7th Cir.2009) (acknowledging that this court has repeatedly refused to question the credibility of witnesses when reviewing challenges to sufficiency of the evidence). We overturn a conviction based on a credibility determination only if the witnesses' testimony was incredible as a matter of law, see United States v. Carraway, 612 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir.2010), a high standard not met by the testimony here. The jury, aware of Marchetti's and Hilado's status as cooperating co-defendants and properly instructed to consider their testimony with great care, nevertheless credited the testimony they offered. We see no reason to disturb that determination. Though the evidence against Miller was not overwhelming, his conviction is supported by witness testimony, the documentary evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn from all of that evidence. His insufficiency of the evidence argument fails.
Miller also argues that the district court mistook several distinct conspiracies for a single conspiracy. Although Miller was not charged with a conspiracy, the court allowed the government to introduce statements made by co-conspirators based on a single conspiracy theory. We review the district court's single conspiracy determination for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 688 (7th Cir.2002). A single conspiracy exists if the co-conspirators joined to effectuate a common design or purpose, id., with the focus of the court's inquiry on that common purpose. The government must demonstrate that the defendant joined the agreement alleged, not just the group. See United States v. Longstreet, 567 F.3d 911, 919 (7th Cir.2009). So long as the co-conspirators embraced a common criminal objective, a single conspiracy existed even if a participant did not know all of his co-conspirators and did not participate in every aspect of the scheme. United States v. Mojica, 185 F.3d 780, 786-87 (7th Cir.1999). The evidence here was consistent with a single conspiracy theory. It showed an agreement to carry out a plan designed to generate income to the individuals involved by means of fraud. Over three years and the dozens of sales they completed, the schemers embraced this common goal, carrying out their different roles and responsibilities. Evidence of frequent and repeated transactions can support a single conspiracy theory. Cf. United States v. Blanding, 53 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir.1995). The cohorts' cooperation and coordination also indicate the same. See United States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir.2004) (trust, cooperation, and delineation of duties among participants in a common scheme overcomes any doubt that this was anything other than a single, broad conspiracy). Miller was a key player in at least six transactions, each of which furthered the broader scheme. Because the district court did not err in its single-conspiracy determination, this challenge to Miller's conviction also fails.