Opinion ID: 759223
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fees in Connection with the Second Trial

Text: 104 Gierlinger sought fees for 66.3 hours spent by Pottle in preparing for the second trial, plus 103.1 hours in conducting that trial for two weeks prior to the district court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial. The court denied fees for all of the preparation time, stating that [i]n light of the plaintiff's attorney's familiarity with the case, such are redundant and excessive. Posttrial Order at 11 n. 4. It denied all but 70 hours of the trial time, stating as follows: 105 Recognizing ... that the lack of a fee award for such time spent reduces the effective compensation rate for all the time expended on the case and acknowledging that the undersigned should have more tightly controlled the reins guiding the conduct of himself and the attorneys, but also noting that the plaintiff's attorney is not blameless for this mistrial, this Court finds that compensation for 70 hours of work for such period of time is reasonable. 106 Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). We are troubled by both rulings. 107 First, we cannot agree that it was appropriate to award no fees for trial preparation time. Despite there having been a prior trial of the case, no competent attorney would embark on a retrial without some preparation. This is especially true when there has been a lengthy interval between the two trials. Here, the first trial had concluded more than two years before the second trial began. Further, the second trial was not to have precisely the same scope as the first, for at the first trial there were nine defendants, whereas at the second there was one. While this undoubtedly simplified the issues somewhat, the elimination of eight out of nine defendants could not have simplified the case proportionately, for some of the eliminated defendants were alleged to have engaged in conduct that was set in motion by Gleason. In any event, the differences would doubtless have required some organizational effort with respect to the presentation of Gierlinger's case against Gleason. 108 We conclude that it was unquestionably reasonable for Pottle, after the two-year hiatus, to, inter alia, review the three-week transcript of the first trial, review files to refresh his recollection, organize his proposed exhibits, and prepare his witnesses. In sum, at least a significant portion of the time claimed was reasonably necessary. 109 Second, we cannot agree that it was appropriate to compensate Pottle for less than all of the time reasonably spent conducting the second trial, for the record belies the district court's rationale that Pottle bore significant responsibility for the mistrial. When the court sua sponte declared the mistrial, it initially stated that the reason was that Gierlinger was interviewed by a reporter ... with Mr. Pottle immediately present, and that resulted in a story [about the trial] in the next day's papers. (Transcript of Second Trial (Second Trial Tr.), July 28, 1994, at 40.) However, when Pottle strenuously denied having any involvement in the publicity, the court stated that it would not have to prove Pottle's involvement because the publicity was not the real reason for the mistrial. Thus, after reading the article into the record, the court stated that the publicity 110 in and of itself wouldn't justify declaring a mistrial except I noted particularly and would be prepared to prove it if necessary, except it won't be, the involvement of you, Mr. Pottle, in that. 111 But basically and beyond that and for a second reason, I think the trial has gotten completely out of hand. I blame myself to a high degree for that. We've had strong colloquys going on from time to time throughout the trial and in the presence of the jury, and the matter is out of hand, so I'm declaring a mistrial. 112 (Second Trial Tr. at 43 (emphasis added).) The court stated that the major reason for the mistrial was that I strongly feel that the case has gotten out of control and ought to be re-started, and I take a share of the blame in that myself. (Id. at 48.) The judge again attributed the mistrial to the colloquys at trial as it informed the second jury that he had ended the trial because the matter has gotten out of hand, that we have had so much argument, condemnation of Mr. Pottle from myself as the trial has gone on ... that that has ... poisoned the well.... (Second Trial Tr. at 52.) And at the third trial, the court explained to the new jury: 113 I considered that I had acted in an erroneous fashion during the trial, parading a lot of legal arguments in front of the jury, [and] I decided that that trial ought to be stopped, aborted, and I did that.... 114 (Third Trial Tr. Aug. 28, 1996, at 2.) 115 In sum, although the court initially blamed Pottle for creating the need for a mistrial, it retreated from that position, stating expressly that the publicity, even if attributable to Pottle, wouldn't justify declaring a mistrial. (Second Trial Tr. at 43.) And at no point did the court identify any misconduct whatever by Pottle at the trial. This record is insufficient to warrant the partial denial of an award of attorneys fees for the second trial on the ground that Pottle should bear significant responsibility for the mistrial. 116 On remand, the district court should award fees for the number of hours reasonably spent by Pottle in connection with preparing for and conducting the second trial. 117