Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutional Right to Be Present

Text: ― ‗Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to be personally present at any proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to prevent ―interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.‖ [Citations.] Due process guarantees the right to be present at any ―stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome‖ and where the defendant‘s ―presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.‖ ‘ [Citation.] The state constitutional right to be present at trial, which is guaranteed by article I of the California Constitution, ‗ ―is generally coextensive with the federal due process right.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. 11 Defendant also mentions, but provides no independent argument regarding, an ex parte hearing held early in the pretrial period for the purpose of appointing separate counsel for witness Christine Kuretich, a housemate of Phillip and Carolyn Sanders, who was expected to be called as a prosecution witness. Defendant makes just a bare mention that an ex parte hearing was held concerning Kuretich, does not describe what happened in the hearing, and then devotes her entire briefing on the question of ex parte hearings to the set of hearings involving Phillip‘s desire not to provide discovery to defendant. The Attorney General does not mention the Kuretich hearing at all. On appeal, we assume a judgment is correct and the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating otherwise. (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881; People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 227.) Under the circumstances, we find defendant has not met her burden of showing statutory or constitutional error with regard to the Kuretich hearing. 63 Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 633.) Defendant contends that her right to due process and a fair trial required the trial court to have given her notice and an opportunity to be heard on the questions of her alleged right to discovery from Phillip. In short, she claims the trial court should not have held the hearings without her. ―Proceedings held in chambers and outside the presence of a party are generally disfavored.‖ (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1299.) Nevertheless, as a general rule, a trial court has discretion to conduct a proceeding in a defendant‘s absence ―to protect an overriding interest that favors confidentiality.‖ (Ibid.; see People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 125 [―ex parte proceedings are permissible if ‗compelling reasons justify them‘ ‖].) Unlike most instances in which a criminal defendant complains of being excluded from a hearing, the ex parte hearing in this case excluded both defendant and her attorneys. We need not decide whether the same rules apply in that situation, however, because we conclude any constitutional error was harmless. As explained, ante, the subject of the ex parte hearings now challenged concerned the letters defendant sent to Phillip Sanders in jail, and Jennifer Lee‘s ability to authenticate those letters. Defendant could not have been taken by surprise by the contents of the letters because she wrote them. She was, moreover, afforded sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Lee regarding her role as defendant‘s amanuensis. Accordingly, the exclusion of defendant and her attorneys from the hearing in question could not have prejudiced her under any standard.