Opinion ID: 2722149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence Regarding Other Contractors

Text: Reed argues the district court erred in allowing testimony regarding what procedures contractors other than Malone were using when working overhead on the same project. We accord the district court “wide discretion in admitting and excluding evidence, and its decision will not be disturbed unless there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Weitz Co. v. MacKenzie House, LLC, 665 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). “To warrant reversal, such a prejudicial abuse of discretion must also affect the substantial rights of a party.” Id. (quotation omitted). During the trial, there was testimony other contractors also worked above employees without barricades or protective devices below during the course of the -16- Simmons project. Reed objected to the evidence as inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person’s character to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformance with the character.” Id. The district court disagreed with Reed’s characterization, noting the evidence did not concern a prior act. Rather, the testimony described acts done by other contractors doing similar work at the same worksite, in the course of the same project, and under the alleged control and/or direction of the same project manager, Gilbert. Assuming arguendo the evidence was 404(b) evidence, the court nonetheless found the evidence admissible to show Gilbert had knowledge of what safety measures other contractors at the worksite were taking when their employees were working above other workers. Rule 404(b) does not prohibit the admission of such evidence if it is “admissible for [a permissible] purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. Malone argued Gilbert had a duty to ensure a safe worksite, which it breached. The district court ruled evidence that Gilbert had knowledge of the practices of other contractors besides Malone was admissible to show Gilbert knew those other contractors took no safety precautions when their employees were working above other workers. The court found such evidence tended to show Gilbert was negligent in performing its supervisory duties, which included ensuring the provision of adequate preventive safety measures. Because the jury was asked to consider not only whether Reed or Malone were negligent, but also whether Gilbert was negligent, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.