Opinion ID: 394829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Instruction on Malice

Text: 37 The claim that the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof to Kearney in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights is based on the following malice instruction given to the jury: 38 In determining whether a wrongful act is done with malice you may infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of acts performed. (JA 974-975). 39 This contention involves the court's recent decision in United States v. Frady, 636 F.2d 506 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 3142, 69 L.Ed.2d 994 (1981). However, Frady involved an instruction that was claimed to create a presumption of malice and therefore impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and constituted plain error. The malice instruction here is not defective in that particular. The statement you may infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of acts performed merely permits the inference to be drawn by the jury and does not compel a presumption. 40 This is even clearer when we note the admonitions that surrounded the single sentence of the instructions that appellant claims was improper: 41 Malice may be either express or implied. An expressed malice exists where the unlawful killing of another is in pursuance of a wrongful act or an unlawful purpose without legal excuse. Implied malice is such as may be inferred from the circumstances of the killing, as, for example, where the killing is caused by the intentional use of a fatal weapon or a force without circumstances serving to mitigate or justify the act, or when an act which imports danger to another is done so recklessly or wantonly as to manifest depravity of mind and disregard of human life. 42 In determining whether a wrongful act is done with malice, you may infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of acts performed. 43 If a person uses a deadly weapon in killing another, malice may be inferred from his use of such weapon, in the absence (of ) any explanation, explanatory facts or mitigation, mitigating circumstances. You are not required to infer malice from the use of such weapon, but you may do so if you deem it appropriate, deem it proper. (Tr. 974-975). (Emphasis added). 44 When the charge is read in context, and instructions must be read in their entirety, see Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 114 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977); United States v. Martin, 475 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C.Cir.1973), it becomes clear that the trial court did not use presumptive language. It was clearly stated that the jury may infer malice from circumstances only if there are no mitigating circumstances that negate such inference. The full instruction on malice as given at the trial, thus does not differ materially from the current standard instruction. 8 This instruction conforms to our decisions in United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451 (D.C.Cir.1970); and Green v. United States (Green I), 405 F.2d 1368 (D.C.Cir.1968) which was not overruled by Frady.