Opinion ID: 2335393
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Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Huntington v. Attrill

Text: In Huntington, Huntington obtained a judgment against Attrill in New York based on a statutory provision imposing joint and several liability on the officers of a corporation for the debts of the corporation itself if the officer made any materially false representation in a certificate, report, or public notice. Id. at 660-62, 13 S.Ct. 224. Huntington then brought a bill in Maryland state court seeking to have the New York judgment enforced in Maryland. Id. at 660-61, 13 S.Ct. 224. Attrill demurred to the bill on the grounds that Huntington's claim was for recovery of a penalty against Attrill arising under a statute of the state of New York, and because it did not state a case which entitled the plaintiff to any relief in a court of equity in the State of Maryland. Id. at 663, 13 S.Ct. 224. The circuit court of Baltimore overruled the demurrer, and the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and dismissed the bill on the grounds that liability imposed by section 21 of the statute of New York . . . was intended as a punishment for doing any of the forbidden acts, and was, therefore, ... a penalty which could not be enforced in the state of Maryland. Id. Huntington then sought a writ of error in the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the Maryland court unconstitutionally denied full faith and credit to the New York judgment. Id. at 665, 13 S.Ct. 224. After determining that the question of whether full faith and credit was denied to the New York judgment in Maryland was a federal question, the Huntington Court stated that in order to determine this question, it will be necessary, in the first place, to consider the true scope and meaning of the fundamental maxim of international law stated by Chief Justice Marshall in the fewest possible words: `The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.' Id. at 666, 13 S.Ct. 224 (citing The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123, 10 Wheat. 66, 6 L.Ed. 268 (1825)). The Huntington court then determined that [t]he question whether a statute of one state, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law, in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act. Id. at 673-74, 13 S.Ct. 224. In analyzing whether the penal exception applies in this case, we must first resolve whether the penal analysis and exception in Huntington is dictum. Dictum is not controlling. Argentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga, 125 Nev. 527, 536, 216 P.3d 779, 785 (2009); Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 117 Nev. 273, 282, 21 P.3d 16, 22 (2001). A statement in a case is dictum when it is `unnecessary to a determination of the questions involved.' Argentena Consol., 125 Nev. at 536, 216 P.3d at 785 (quoting St. James Village, Inc. v. Cunningham, 125 Nev. 211, 216, 210 P.3d 190, 193 (2009)). We conclude that the statement in Huntington regarding the penal exception does not constitute dictum because it was necessary to determine the questions involved. While it has been indicated that this analysis is dictum, we disagree. See Enforcement by One State of Penal Statutes of Another, 26 Harv. L.Rev. 172 n. 1 (1912) (stating that the penal exception discussion in Huntington was  dictum, since the case only decided that a judgment on such a statute must be given full faith and credit under the constitution); Kersting v. Hardgrove, 24 N.J. Misc. 243, 48 A.2d 309, 310 (N.J.Cir.Ct.1946) (stating that courts of one sovereignty will not enforce the penal laws of a foreign sovereignty is oft repeated dictum that goes back to Huntington and the maxim of international law that `[t]he courts of no country execute the penal laws of another' (quoting The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123, 10 Wheat. 66, 6 L.Ed. 268 (1825))). As stated by the United States District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia, the only issue before the Court in Huntington was the meaning of the terms `penal' and `penalty' in the context of the international law doctrine that penal laws of one jurisdiction will not be enforced in a foreign jurisdiction. Fisher v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 243 F.Supp.2d 538, 543 (E.D.Va.2003). [5] The Huntington Court clearly stated that [i]n order to determine this question [of whether full faith and credit was denied], it will be necessary, in the first place, to consider the true scope and meaning of the fundamental maxim of international law . . .: `The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.' Huntington, 146 U.S. at 666, 13 S.Ct. 224 (quoting The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 123). The Huntington Court later concluded its decision on the fact that the statute under which that judgment was recovered was not, for the reasons already stated at length, a penal law in the international sense. Id. at 686, 13 S.Ct. 224. After Huntington was decided, the United States Supreme Court impliedly questioned the penal exception in Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220 (1935), when it intimate[d] no opinion whether a suit upon a judgment for an obligation created by a penal law, in the international sense, ... is within the jurisdiction of the federal district courts (citation omitted). However, the Court then reiterated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister States enforce a foreign penal judgment for a second time in Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229, 90 S.Ct. 1963, 26 L.Ed.2d 578 (1970) (citing Huntington, 146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224). The Court noted that until the obligation to extradite matures, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require California to enforce the North Carolina penal judgment in any way. Id. at 229 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1963; see also Philadelphia v. Austin, 86 N.J. 55, 429 A.2d 568, 572 (1981) (stating that the United States Supreme Court has continued to recognize the vitality of the penal exception (citing Nelson, 399 U.S. at 229, 90 S.Ct. 1963)). [6] Furthermore, numerous courts have recognized the viability of Huntington 's penal exception. See, e.g., Schaefer v. H.B. Green Transportation Line, 232 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir.1956) (It is generally recognized that penalties fixed by state laws are not [enforceable] in federal courts or even in other State courts.); People v. Laino, 32 Cal.4th 878, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 723, 87 P.3d 27, 34 (2004) (recognizing Huntington 's penal exception and determining that [i]f California need not give full faith and credit to penal judgments of another state, then it is free to determine under its own laws whether defendant's Arizona plea constitutes a conviction for purposes of the three strikes law); Wellman v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 107 A. 396, 398-400 (1919) (recognizing that Huntington 's penal exception applies to criminal laws and to penalties arising from municipal laws and concluding that the law at issue was not penal). Accordingly, we conclude that the Huntington penal analysis is not dictum. Oakland further asserts that Huntington was effectively superseded by the passage of time and UEFJA, as recognized by Rosenstein, 103 Nev. at 573, 747 P.2d at 232. Oakland contends that according to Rosenstein, the only defenses to the UEFJA are not applicable here because the defenses are limited to those that a judgment debtor can constitutionally raise under the full faith and credit clause and which are directed to the validity of the foreign judgment. Id. We reject Oakland's argument because we conclude that Huntington 's penal exception is an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as it removes the judgment from the scope of the clause altogether. Because the California judgment is not one entitled to full faith and credit, it does not fall under Nevada's UEFJA. See NRS 17.340 (stating, in relevant part, that unless the context otherwise requires, `foreign judgment' means any judgment of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state (emphasis added)); see also Farmers & Merchants Trust Company v. Madeira, 261 Cal.App.2d 503, 68 Cal.Rptr. 184, 188 (1968) (If the judgment is a penal judgment it is not enforceable in this state under either the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution or as a matter of comity.); S.H. v. Adm'r of Golden Valley Health Ctr., 386 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (while not deciding the merits of the case, recognizing that [t]he full faith and credit clause . . . does not require a state to enforce the penal judgment of another state); MGM Desert Inn, Inc. v. Holz, 104 N.C.App. 717, 411 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1991) (`One exception to the full faith and credit rule is a penal judgment; a state need not enforce the penal judgment of another state.' (quoting FMS Management Systems v. Thomas, 65 N.C.App. 561, 309 S.E.2d 697, 699-700 (1983))); Russo v. Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tex.App.2003) (recognizing that penal judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit as they are among the recognized exceptions to the full faith and credit requirements). Thus, not all judgments are entitled to full faith and credit under Nevada's UEFJA, as recognized by Rosenstein, and these exceptions include the applicable penal exception in this case. [7] Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the Huntington penal exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause is valid and binding law. Because we conclude that penal laws are exempted from the requirements of full faith and credit in Nevada, we next turn to the determination of whether the California judgment in this case was penal in nature. [8]