Opinion ID: 2528595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Attorney Fees

Text: ¶ 62 Defendants, with the exception of Venier, appeal that part of the appellate court's judgment affirming the circuit court's award of attorney fees. This claim was raised in a cross-appeal to the appellate court. Jurisdiction in this court is pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 318(a) (Ill.S.Ct. R. 318(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967)). Poindexter v. State ex rel. Department of Human Services, 229 Ill.2d 194, 205 n. 4, 321 Ill.Dec. 688, 890 N.E.2d 410 (2008) (allowance of one party's petition for leave to appeal brings before this court the other party's requests for cross-relief). ¶ 63 Because we are reversing the appellate court's judgment affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's complaints under the Act, our resolution of the attorney fee issue will not affect the parties to this case. Therefore, the issue is moot. However, we will address the issue under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine because the question is of a public nature in that any individual or legal entity in the state may be subject to the Act; the issue is likely to recur in future cases; and a definitive decision by this court will provide guidance to the lower courts in deciding which attorney fees are appropriate under the Act. See Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill.2d 398, 404-05, 350 Ill.Dec. 300, 948 N.E.2d 580 (2011). ¶ 64 Turning to the merits, Illinois follows the American rule, which prohibits prevailing parties from recovering their attorney fees from the losing party, absent express statutory or contractual provisions. Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193 Ill.2d 560, 572, 251 Ill.Dec. 141, 739 N.E.2d 1263 (2000). Accordingly, statutes which allow for such fees must be strictly construed as they are in derogation of the common law. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. State of Illinois Department of Employment Security, 131 Ill.2d 23, 49, 136 Ill.Dec. 86, 544 N.E.2d 772 (1989). Although the statute provides that [t]his Act shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes and intent fully (735 ILCS 110/30(b) (West 2008)), this statement of construction applies to the substantive provisions of the Act and not to the fee-shifting provision in section 25. This issue involves the interpretation of a statute and, thus, is subject to de novo review. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill.2d 49, 59, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). ¶ 65 Section 25 of the Act provides: The court shall award a moving party who prevails in a motion under this Act reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion. 735 ILCS 110/25 (West 2008). In an apparent misreading of the plain language of the statute, defendants contend that the phrase incurred in connection with the motion does not mean solely in connection with the motion filed under the Act. Rather, they interpret the phrase to mean that prevailing movants are entitled to attorney fees incurred in connection with the entire defense, including attacking the allegations on the face of the complaint and raising other defenses and privileges unrelated to the Act. They base their argument on the statute's definition of a motion, which includes any motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or to strike, or any other judicial pleading filed to dispose of a judicial claim. 735 ILCS 110/10 (West 2008). In our view, the language in section 25 is unambiguous and supports only one interpretation. Attorney fees incurred in connection with the motion include only those fees which can specifically be delineated as incurred in connection with the motion to dismiss filed under the Act. ¶ 66 Defendants' reliance on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), to support their position on the fee issue, is misplaced. There, the United States Supreme Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that in federal civil rights actions, `the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.' Id. at 426, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). The Court held that, where a plaintiff presents several claims for relief in the same lawsuit, and only some of the claims for relief are successful, attorney fees may be allowed for all claims involving a common core of facts or based on related legal theories. Id. at 434-35, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The fee-shifting statute in the instant case obviously differs from the statute in Hensley, in that it specifically provides that only fees incurred in connection with the motion filed under the Act are allowed to a prevailing movant. Therefore, any fees incurred which are not specifically connected to the motion to dismiss pursuant to the Act are not allowed. ¶ 67 We note further that plaintiff presents an argument in his reply brief challenging the jurisdiction of the circuit court to award fees under the statute. [3] He argues that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to dismiss his complaints and to award attorney fees to defendants when it ruled on the motions to dismiss more than 90 days after the motions were filed. See 735 ILCS 110/20(a) (West 2008) (On the filing of any motion as described in Section 15, a hearing and decision on the motion must occur within 90 days after notice of the motion is given to the respondent.). Plaintiff asserts that the circuit court's failure to comply with the 90-day requirement caused it to lose jurisdiction of the case. The argument lacks merit. Nowhere in the Act does it state that the circuit court loses jurisdiction when it fails to rule on a motion to dismiss within 90 days of its filing. There is no other support for plaintiff's conclusion that the circuit court's jurisdiction is dependent upon compliance with the 90-day time limit in the Act. Moreover, plaintiff himself was responsible for the delay in this case by filing a last-minute responsive pleading on the date of the hearing on the dismissal motions. Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's jurisdictional challenge to the circuit court's rulings.