Opinion ID: 765236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Existing Caselaw

Text: 19 This court has not yet explicitly addressed how district courts should determine whether a prior offense is similar to the Listed Offenses in § 4A1.2(c). We have previously ruled on whether specific crimes are similar, but without articulating a standard by which to make the comparison. See United States v. Ortega, 94 F.3d 764, 769-70 (2d Cir. 1996) (unlawful mischief not similar to any Listed Offense); cf. United States v. Patasnik, 89 F.3d 63, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1996)(issuing a bad check under state law is same offense as Listed Offense of insufficient funds check). 20 Other circuits, however, have articulated tests for making the similarity comparison. Not surprisingly, the inherent conflict between the Guidelines general directive that misdemeanor and petty offense crimes should count toward criminal history and its specific directive that the Listed Offenses, and others similar to them, should not count has led to considerable variation in interpretation of §4A1.2(c). Some courts read similar broadly; we refer to their interpretation as the multifactor approach. Others read similar narrowly; we refer to their method as the elements approach. And the approach of some courts is more difficult to characterize. 21 The Fifth Circuit is the creator and lead proponent of the multifactor approach. This method, initially outlined in Hardeman, directs the district court to take a 22 common sense approach which relies on all possible factors of similarity, including a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses, the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment, the elements of the offense, the level of culpability involved, and the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. 23 933 F.2d at 281 (emphasis supplied). As the Fifth Circuit explained, this method allows the district court to screen out past conduct which is of such minor significance that it is not relevant to the goals of sentencing. Id. This non-exhaustive list of factors is intended to help the district court take into account the relative severity of a prior offense as well as the degree to which it indicates the likelihood of future criminal behavior. United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 193 (5th Cir. 1993). 24 The First, Third, and Fourth Circuits subscribe to a more limited approach to the determination of similarity. These circuits endorse an interpretation of similar that focuses on the degree of commonality between the elements or substance of the conduct underlying the Listed Offenses and the conduct underlying potentially similar offenses. See United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 853-55 (4th Cir. 1997) (crime of selling alcohol to a minor is not similar to the Listed Offenses because the crime does not share common elements with any of the listed offenses); United States v. Elmore, 108 F.3d 23, 26-27 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant's argument that his prior convictions for harassment, assault and possession of drug paraphernalia are similar to the Listed Offense of disorderly conduct); Unger, 915 F.2d at 762-63 (court should look to the conduct underlying defendant's three juvenile adjudications to determine whether they were status offenses such as those listed under § 4A1.2(c)(2)). 25 Of the remaining circuits, the Ninth has articulated the applicable test in two different ways. See United States v. Sandoval, 152 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1998). The first was adopted in United States v. Martinez (Clyde), 905 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1990). There, the court analyzed the offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c)(2) and concluded that they are excluded . . . because they are of such minor significance to the goals of sentencing that inclusion would more likely distort than improve the [sentencing] process. Martinez (Clyde), 905 F.2d at 253 (citation omitted). The court found that the Listed Offenses as a group offer no basis for predicting future significant criminal activity by the defendant; the conduct they involve is not uniformly criminalized, and when it is, the penalty is usually light. Id. (footnote omitted). Therefore, the court held, similarity should be determined by analyzing unlisted offenses to assess the degree to which they shared the general characteristics found among Listed Offenses. The court concluded that defendant's prior conviction for public indecency was not similar to the Listed Offenses because it is universally regarded as culpable and is relevant for assessing the potential for future criminal conduct. Id. at 254. 26 Judge Wallace concurred in Martinez (Clyde), but objected to the test adopted by the court. He suggested instead that the inquiry should focus on whether the activity underlying an offender's prior offense is similar to the activity underlying the Listed Offenses, 905 F.2d at 255, and concluded that public indecency is not similar to the (c)(2) Listed Offenses because one of the elements of public indecency, sexual conduct, is not an element of any of the Listed Offenses. Id. at 255-57. A Ninth Circuit panel adopted Judge Wallace's approach in United States v. Martinez (Carlos), 69 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1995), holding that [t]he inquiry into whether [an unlisted offense] is 'similar' to a section 4A1.2(c)(2) listed offense must focus on whether the activity underlying [the unlisted offense] is similar to the activities underlying the listed offenses. Id. However, the Martinez (Carlos) panel adopted the new test without abandoning the original test. 4 Thus in Sandoval, 152 F.3d at 1192, the court simply noted that the Circuit has taken two different approaches to determining similarity and concluded that defendant's prior conviction was not similar to the Listed Offenses under either. 27 In the Seventh Circuit, an early interpretation of § 4A1.2(c) by Judge Posner succinctly summarized the goal of the similarity inquiry -- to determine whether an unlisted offense was categorically more serious than the Listed Offenses. United States v. Caputo, 978 F.2d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 1992) (using a false driver's license is categorically more serious than, and therefore, not similar to, driving without a license or giving false information to a police officer). In a later case, the court noted that the Hardeman factors were a helpful device for making the comparison described in Caputo. Booker, 71 F.3d at 689. However, the Seventh Circuit has stated in two recent opinions that it has not adopted a formal analysis for determining the similarity of offenses under § 4A1.2(c). See United States v. Boyd, 146 F.3d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1997) (prior decisions of the circuit do not mandat[e] any type of formal analysis)(citing Booker, 71 F.3d 685, and Caputo, 978 F.2d 972). Yet, although in theory the Seventh Circuit has not formally adopted a particular test, in practice it allows use of the multifactor test, since it has not limited the inquiry only to the elements approach. See Boyd, 146 F.3d at 501-02 (considering whether unlisted offense involves an element of indifference to society, the purpose of the law and the location of the offense in the statutory code). 28 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have applied § 4A1.2(c) without formally articulating a test, see, e.g. United States v. Horton, 158 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Norman, 129 F.3d 1393 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cox, 934 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wilson, 927 F.2d 1188 (11th Cir. 1991) and without explicitly commenting on the tests used by other circuits. And the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Mitchell, 941 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1991), held that similar is to be given its normal or dictionary meaning. However, it too did not comment on the tests described above.