Opinion ID: 1860956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issue #4: did the actions of the trial court indicate a bias against the defendant and deny him the right to a trial by jury in an impartial forum?

Text: The defendant cites several examples which he contends show judicial bias against him. First, the judge allowed the prosecutor to call Assistant District Attorney Frank Crivello as a witness for the state. Crivello, who prepared the criminal complaint in this case, was called to testify about an error in the complaint. The complaint stated that Gregory Nauertz (the victim) heard Gregory A. Nauertz say `hit him and kill him' to the other gentleman. Crivello said that there were problems with the automatic dictating equipment that day, and that the complaint should have read heard Gregory A. Frankovis say `hit him and kill him' to the other gentleman. [12] In Peterson v. Warren, 31 Wis.2d 547, 568, 143 N.W.2d 560 (1966), the court said, The practice of permitting an attorney involved in the case to testify on behalf of his client is generally frowned on by the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association and by this court. However, the attorney is competent and the policy against his testifying while remaining in the case as an attorney for one of the parties, is not absolute and the trial court may, within its discretion, permit the attorney to testify to prevent an injustice or redress a wrong. [13] Crivello was not conducting the trial. He testified to correct what was a clerical mistake. It does not appear that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing him to testify. Furthermore, his testimony benefited the defense because he stated on cross-examination that Officer Baier, the policeman who signed the complaint, could not identify Koller at that time. Next, the defendant quotes an exchange between his lawyer and the judge as evidence of bias. When Mr. Eisenberg objected to Crivello's taking the stand as a conflict of interest, he said, I am sure I couldn't take the witness stand or call an attorney from my office. The court replied, I am sure you couldn't. If you were trying the case you could not. It appears that the judge was only responding to the first half of Mr. Eisenberg's statement. The defendant also points to a remark that the trial judge made outside the presence of the jury. When Mr. Eisenberg made a further objection to Crivello's testimony, the judge said, Mr. Eisenberg, this witness has taken an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. This witness is also an officer of the Court and has taken the oath as an attorney to be truthful at all times and ethical in his appearances before the Court. The Court is convinced that he will tell the truth, and nothing but the truth so help him God. [14] While this comment was unnecessary, it does not constitute grounds for reversal. Since the jury was not in the courtroom when the judge made this statement, it had no prejudicial impact. In Pulaski v. State, 24 Wis.2d 450, 458, 129 N.W.2d 204 (1964), the judge made similar comments on the veracity of a witness in the presence of the jury, and the court made the following comments: . . . in a jury trial, a trial judge must be ever careful not by word or action to unconsciously influence the jury or to convey any impression contrary to his impartial status. While we cannot approve the trial court's arguing with counsel over what the testimony showed or commenting on the veracity of a witness before a jury, we cannot find the isolated remarks in view of the whole testimony and the instructions on the weight and credit to be given to witnesses had any prejudicial effect on the jury or denied Pulaski of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. The defendant also asserts that the trial judge showed his bias when he allowed the prosecutor to recall a previous witness, but denied Mr. Eisenberg's request to recall Nauertz, one of the prosecution witnesses. Eisenberg was cross-examining Ms. Johnson, and he attempted to question her about an earlier incident at the Bus Stop Tavern in which Nauertz allegedly took a gun and fired at Frankovis and another companion and about whether Nauertz had subsequently lied about the incident. The court said that Eisenberg could not cross-examine Nauertz through Ms. Johnson's testimony. The following exchange took place:  Mr. Eisenberg: The materiality is it relates that this woman is aware that Nauertz took a gun there for the purpose of shooting Drobac and Frankovis. That she knows he fired the gun at them while he was there and that afterwards, she has testified the police told Nauertz to lie about having a gun there and that Nauertz covered up his shooting his gun by replacing the firing pin and cleaning it out. Court: What has that got to do with her? Mr. Klinkowitz: I will submit it as hearsay. Court: You can't cross examine one witness on the testimony of another. You could have asked Mr. Nauertz this but not her. Mr. Eisenberg: I've got to lay a foundation with her. Court: Oh no, when you had him here you could have asked him those things. Mr. Eisenberg: He is still here. Court: You could have asked at that time if it were material to impeach his testimony. You can't impeach his testimony through her. Mr. Eisenberg: I don't think it makes any difference if I lay the foundation with her or him. Either way both of us has an opportunity to put him on the stand and ask him. Court: He has already been called and excused. Mr. Eisenberg: He is not excused, he is still here. Court: I excused him. Mr. Eisenberg: If the Court would have asked me I wouldn't have agreed to it. Court: I asked if you were through with him and you said yes. Mr. Eisenberg: I have no recollection of that. [In fact, all the court said when Mr. Eisenberg finished cross-examining Nauertz was that is all. Who is your next witness.] This exchange does not show a specific request by Mr. Eisenberg to recall Nauertz to the stand. While Mr. Eisenberg argued with the judge as to whether the witness had been excused, this exchange falls far short of a request to recall the witness. Later on, the court permitted the prosecutor to recall Officer Simet. Mr. Eisenberg objected that the court should not permit the recalling of Simet unless there was a showing of necessity. Mr. Klinkowitz said that an issue was raised on cross-examination of Assistant District Attorney Crivello as to the ability of the police officers to identify Koller. Officer Simet testified that he was able to identify Koller at the time the complaint was prepared. Officer Baier was also recalled, and he testified that he was able to identify Koller to the district attorney. There was no abuse of discretion in allowing the officers to return to the stand.