Opinion ID: 2320890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Interpretation of the Stipulation

Text: The petitioners next argue that, even if the respondents used good faith efforts to secure additional funding, a lack of funding did not justify placing Robin in a facility other than IDDI. The petitioners rely upon language in the Intent section of the Stipulation, which provides: It is the intent of the parties that Robin Czumak will remain at IDDI as long as the facility maintains certification . . . and the guardians continue to find that IDDI is an appropriate placement fro [ sic ] Robin Czumak. . . . They also rely upon language in the Stipulations section, which provides: If additional funding is not available then [DDS and Region 10] agree to fund respite services at the Medicaid rate for respite services (up to 40 hours per month) to the guardians for any time that Robin Czumak is in the direct care of the guardians and the guardians agree to provide direct care for Robin Czumak for up to eight weeks per year as long as the guardians are physically and financially able to provide such direct care. The petitioners assert that the above language shows that the intent of the parties was for Robin to remain at IDDI, and that if the respondents could not fully fund Robin's care at IDDI, the only recourse would be for the guardians to care for Robin for up to eight weeks per year and for the respondents to fund the guardians' services at a lower, respite-care rate. A stipulated agreement is contractual in nature and, therefore, is governed by contract rules. Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Town of Seabrook, 133 N.H. 365, 370, 580 A.2d 702 (1990). The interpretation of a contract is a question of law, which we review de novo. Barclay Square Condo. Owners' Assoc. v. Grenier, 153 N.H. 514, 517, 899 A.2d 991 (2006). When interpreting a written agreement, we give the language used by the parties its reasonable meaning, considering the circumstances and the context in which the agreement was negotiated, and reading the document as a whole. Ryan James Realty v. Villages at Chester Condo. Assoc., 153 N.H. 194, 197, 893 A.2d 661 (2006). Absent ambiguity, the parties' intent will be determined from the plain meaning of the language used in the contract. Id. Reading the Stipulation as a whole, we disagree with the petitioners' assertion that it requires Robin to stay at IDDI even if the eight weeks of respite services are insufficient to mitigate the cost of IDDI's services. The petitioners are correct that, in the Intent section, the Stipulation states the parties' intent to keep Robin at IDDI, with conditions. The Stipulation also reiterates this intent in the Stipulations section, stating, The parties further agree that so long as Robin Czumak is eligible for the New Hampshire Medicaid waiver [DDS] shall continue to provide the existing level of services through IDDI that Robin Czumak currently receives. The next sentence in the Stipulation, however, states, Notwithstanding the above, in the event of a rate increase by IDDI [DDS and Region 10] agree to use their best reasonable efforts to secure additional funding to cover any IDDI rate increase consistent with He-M 503.... This sentence sets forth the first step in dealing with any increase in IDDI's rates: the respondents are required only to use their best reasonable efforts to secure additional funding, but are not required to in fact secure additional funding. The second step is set forth in the next sentence of the Stipulation, which states: If additional funding is not available then [DDS and Region 10] agree to fund respite services ... to the guardians for any time that Robin Czumak is in the direct care of the guardians and the guardians agree to provide direct care for Robin Czumak for up to eight weeks per year .... Thus, if the first step of attempting to secure additional funds is insufficient to keep Robin at IDDI, the second step is for her to stay with her guardians, at a reduced cost to the respondents, for up to eight weeks per year. The next sentence in the Stipulation, which is the last sentence that is relevant here, states: The parties agree to cooperate in good faith regarding these issues. Thus, the Stipulation provides two steps for the parties to take if IDDI increases its rates, but is silent as to what the parties should do if these steps are inadequate to fully fund Robin's care at IDDI, other than providing that the parties should cooperate in good faith. As described above, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the respondents acted in good faith to use their best reasonable efforts to secure additional funding, thus fulfilling step one. As for the second step, the petitioners do not dispute the trial court's finding that Robin left IDDI for eight weeks per year in an effort to reduce costs to the respondents. The petitioners do not assert that the respondents acted in bad faith in paying Robin's guardians for eight weeks of respite services. Thus, the parties fulfilled step two. As the respondents have not acted in bad faith regarding either of the steps required by the Stipulation, and as it is silent as to what should occur once both steps are fulfilled, we find no breach of the Stipulation's terms.