Opinion ID: 1878297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Standard and Statutory Procedure

Text: We begin our analysis by noting that the law concerning the acceptance of guilty or no contest pleas relates to two different points in the plea-taking process: the initial plea hearing and, when applicable, the post-conviction motion to withdraw. The law relating to such matters may be discussed in terms of what the Constitution requires, what relevant statutes require, and what additional rules may be necessary to ensure that a plea is voluntarily and intelligently made. In Cecchini, that defendant brought a sec. 974.06 motion to withdraw his no contest plea on the claim that he did not understand the elements of the crime at the time the plea was accepted. We reiterated at that time that `the plea proceedings themselves must be constitutionally acceptable or the plea may be withdrawn as a matter of right.' Cecchini, 124 Wis. 2d at 206 (quoting State v. Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d 467, 480, 334 N.W.2d 91 (1983)). Implicit in that statement is the conclusion that the procedures used to accept a guilty or no contest plea are themselves constitutionally mandated. E.g., Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d at 480 ([T]he plea proceedings themselves must be constitutionally acceptable or the plea may be withdrawn as a matter of right.) After a thorough review of the relevant federal and state cases, we hold that that conclusion is erroneous; we withdraw any language from our prior decisions which indicates that plea hearing procedures, beyond the general standard discussed in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), are mandated by the Federal Constitution. The view that the Constitution imposed certain procedural requirements upon on states in accepting guilty or no contest pleas had its origin in this jurisdiction in Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661. Ernst, in turn, relied on Boykin v. Alabama, 396 U.S. 238. We do not interpret Boykin as addressing the procedures which states must follow to achieve conformance with the constitutional standard. In Boykin, the state court judge did not question the defendant concerning the entry of his guilty plea, and the defendant did not address the court. Id. at 239. The Supreme Court held that it was error plain on the face of the record for the trial judge to accept the guilty plea without an affirmative showing that [the plea] was intelligent and voluntary. Id. at 242. Similar to a confession, the constitutional validity of a plea must be measured in terms of whether it was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Thus, Boykin merely sets forth the constitutional standard that there must be an affirmative showing or there must be an allegation and evidence which show[s] that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Id. This includes a showing or an allegation and evidence which shows that the effective waiver of federal constitutional rights was knowing and intelligent. Id. at 243. A plea will not be voluntary unless the defendant has a full understanding of the charges against him. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, n. 6 (1970). Other federal case law assists in delineating the Boykin constitutional standard. The Supreme Court has stated that a guilty plea cannot be considered voluntary unless the accused has `real notice of the true nature of the charge against him. . . .' Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 4622, 436 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). The high court has also intimated that the voluntariness of a plea should not be tested by determining whether a litany of the formal legal elements was read to the defendant. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644 (1976). Instead, a court may consider the totality of the circumstances to make such a determination. Id. See also, Brady, 397 U.S. at 749 (voluntariness of defendant's plea can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it). In Ernst, this court construed Boykin as requiring that the procedures of Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 11 are required in state courts as a matter of federal constitutional law. Ernst, 43 Wis. 2d at 673. As interpreted in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), Rule 11 required that the federal district judge must directly inquire whether the defendant understands the nature of the charge against him and whether he is aware of the consequences of his plea. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465. However, the McCarthy Court expressly stated that its decision was based solely on Rule 11, not on any constitutional grounds. Id. at 464. McCarthy also set forth that a plea of guilty or no contest cannot be voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. Id. at 466. The upshot of McCarthy was that a federal district judge could no longer assume that a defendant was entering a plea with a complete understanding of the charge against him. Under Rule 11 the federal judge must personally determine the defendant's understanding. Because in Ernst we viewed this procedure as constitutionally mandatory upon state courts by virtue of Boykin, we overruled that portion of State v. Strickland, 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965), which allowed trial courts to assume that defendant's counsel had fully explained the nature of the offense to the defendant which, in turn, obviated any need of personal inquiry with the defendant. Instead of the presumption, we made it mandatory upon the trial court as a matter of constitutional imperative to establish the accused's understanding of the nature of the crime and the range of punishment for it. Ernst, 43 Wis. 2d at 674. Federal case law subsequent to Ernst indicates that our premise in Ernst was inaccurate. The Supreme Court in Henderson intimated that a state trial court may appropriately presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the charge to the defendant. Counsel's explanation thereby would give the accused sufficient notice of the true nature of the charge. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. In Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, the Court expressly applied the Henderson presumption to the factual determinations of the state court proceedings and concluded that the plea was made with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts and, therefore, was voluntary. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 436-37. Although Ernst may have been a logical reading of Boykin at the time Ernst was decided, we cannot ignore the conclusion to be drawn from Henderson and Lonberger that the requirements of Rule 11 are not procedures which are constitutionally incumbent upon state courts when accepting a guilty or no contest plea. The Constitution sets forth the standard that a guilty or no contest plea must be affirmatively shown to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. It does not impose the requirements of Rule 11 on state courts. Even if this court does not revive that part of the presumption of Strickland utilized in Lonberger, we must conclude that the availability of such a presumption militates against our Ernst holding that Rule 11 procedures of personal inquiry are constitutionally required to be followed by state courts. We withdraw such language from Ernst and from subsequent cases which indicate otherwise. See, Minniecheske, 127 Wis. 2d at 244; Cecchini, 124 Wis. 2d at 209-10; Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d at 480; McAllister, 54 Wis. 2d at 230; Martinkoski v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 237, 243, 186 N.W.2d 302 (1971). We do not discard the mandatory requirement that trial judges undertake a personal colloquy with the defendant to ascertain his understanding of the nature of the charge, however. We merely determine that such communication is a statutory requirement, pursuant to sec. 971.08(1), Stats. That subsection reads: 971.08 Pleas of guilty and no contest; withdrawal thereof. (1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or not contest, it shall: (a) Address the defendant personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if convicted; and (b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged. We note that sec. 971.08 is modeled after the former Fed.R.Crim. Proc. 11. See, Comment to 1969 Wis. Laws 255. McCarthy discussed Rule 11 as it existed at the time sec. 971.08 was enacted. The Supreme Court stated that Rule 11 expressly directs the district judge to inquire whether a defendant . . . understands the nature of the charge against him and whether he is aware of the consequences of his plea. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 464. [2] Although sec. 971.08 is not a constitutional imperative, the procedure of the statute nevertheless is designed to assist the trial court in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's plea is voluntary. [3] Cf., id. at 465. [3] Nor do we discard the general duties of the trial court prior to accepting a plea of guilty or no contest. Those duties are: (1) To determine the extent of the defendant's education and general comprehension; (2) To establish the accused's understanding of the nature of the crime with which he is charged and the range of punishments which it carries; (3) To ascertain whether any promises or threats have been made to him in connection with his appearance, his refusal of counsel, and his proposed plea of guilty; (4) To alert the accused to the possibility that a lawyer may discover defenses or mitigating circumstances which would not be apparent to a layman such as the accused; (5) To make sure that the defendant understands that if a pauper, counsel will be provided at no expense to him, Ernst, 43 Wis. 2d at 674 (citing State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964)); and (6) To personally ascertain whether a factual basis exists to support the plea. Id. In this case Bangert challenges the sufficiency of only the second enumerated duty, which we have characterized as a statutory requirement pursuant to sec. 971.08(1)(a), States. The sixth obligation also has been codified. See, sec. 971.08(1)(b). Bangert asserts that the plea colloquy in this case fails to demonstrate on the record that he understood the elements of second-degree murder prior to the trial court's acceptance of the plea or that he exercised a knowledgeable waiver of his constitutional rights. The record indicates the following discussion between the court and Bangert prior to the court's acceptance of his no contest plea: