Opinion ID: 3033428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States v. Seesing

Text: The defendant in Seesing pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered firearm and possession of a homemade silencer not identified by serial number. Id.; 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), (i). At sentencing, the district court imposed a twolevel enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(4) because the silencer lacked a serial number. On appeal, we reversed, holding that because the homemade silencer never had a serial number in the first place, it plainly could not have been altered or obliterated. Seesing, 234 F.3d at 460. We observed that “while we understand the district court’s desire to respect the underlying purpose of Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4), discouraging the use of untraceable weaponry, and agree that this purpose is frustrated by the use of homemade silencers without serial numbers, the plain language of the Guideline is clear.” Id. [7] Emphasizing our use in Seesing of the word “untraceable” to describe the purpose of § 2K2.1(b)(4), Carter argues that, to preserve legislative intent, the enhancement should not apply when a firearm’s serial number remains traceable, if only via microscopy. This argument, however, misapprehends our comments in Seesing about § 2K2.1(b)(4)’s purpose. We did not say in Seesing that § 2K2.1(b)(4) intends to punish only those who possess weapons that are “untraceable” by any means; we said, more broadly, that it intends to “discourag[e] the use of untraceable weaponry.” Id. This purpose is advanced not only by punishing those who possess untraceable firearms, but also by punishing those who possess fireUNITED STATES v. CARTER 11485 arms that are more difficult, though not impossible, to trace because their serial numbers have been defaced. As this case aptly demonstrates, it may be difficult to determine, from a visual inspection alone, whether a serial number that appears defaced is, in fact, untraceable when scientific means are employed. On the street, where these guns often trade and where microscopy is rarely available, one cannot readily distinguish between a serial number that merely looks untraceable and one that actually is. At that level, it is appearances that count: A gun possessor is likely to be able to determine only whether or not his firearm appears more difficult, or impossible, to trace.2 By prescribing enhanced sentences for possessors of firearms with “altered or obliterated” serial numbers, § 2K2.1(b)(4) encourages those who deal in firearms to inspect such weapons and to refuse to handle those with defaced serial numbers. Yet if, as here, a defendant cannot visually distinguish—at the moment he contemplates taking possession—a would-be untraceable firearm from one that is in fact untraceable, it makes little sense for him to be punished in the latter circumstance but to escape punishment in the former. Such an outcome might well encourage, not discourage, the use of untraceable weaponry, for it would signal that although a firearm’s serial number has been materially damaged—and thus will visit upon the government the myriad costs of extraordinary tracing measures—its possession 2 We are mindful, of course, that § 2K2.1(b)(4) “applies whether or not the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm . . . had an altered or obliterated serial number.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.19) (Nov. 2002). That fact does not affect our analysis here. We may presume that a defendant has knowledge of the enhancement, and that such knowledge provides him an incentive to adjust his behavior accordingly; we need not speculate as to the Sentencing Commission’s possible reasons for instructing that the enhancement applies without regard to the defendant’s mental state. 11486 UNITED STATES v. CARTER occasions no additional punishment, so long as the firearm ultimately remains traceable. [8] Because such an interpretation is at odds with § 2K2.1(b)(4)’s purpose to discourage the use of untraceable weaponry, we decline to adopt it. Rather, as we view it, this enhancement, by punishing possession of weapons that appear more difficult to trace, necessarily deters traffic in weapons that are impossible to trace. We conclude, therefore, as we did in Seesing, that the plain language of § 2K2.1(b)(4) controls. We note, in addition, that our interpretation of this plain language remains consistent with § 2K2.1(b)(4)’s purpose as we previously described it in Seesing.