Opinion ID: 2281502
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: agreed judgment of custody

Text: Mullins argues that regardless of the fact that she could not qualify as Zachary's de facto custodian under the law, the trial court erred in setting aside the agreed judgment pursuant to CR 60.02. CR 60.02(c) allows a court to grant relief from a judgment on grounds of perjury or falsified evidence[.] and Section (d) permits relief if there was fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified evidence[.] We agree with the Court of Appeals that the assertion in the agreed judgment that Mullins was the child's primary caregiver and primary financial provider constituted both falsified evidence and fraud affecting the proceedings warranting relief from the judgment. We note that the fraud upon which we base our ruling was not Picklesimer's claim that Mullins fraudulently led her to believe that Mullins intended to maintain a relationship with her. Rather, it was the false claim by both parties that Mullins was the de facto custodian. We would add that an agreement regarding parental rights cannot be conditioned upon the couple staying together and living in the same household. Such an agreement is about the parties' relationship with the child, and not the parties' relationship with each other. And the chance that the relationship with the nonparent will not continue does not diminish the strong parental bond that has been allowed to develop between the child and the nonparent. Mullins also maintains that Picklesimer is not entitled to relief under CR 60.02 because she was a party to the fraud and thus had unclean hands. Under the unclean hands doctrine, a party is precluded from judicial relief if that party engaged in fraudulent, illegal, or unconscionable conduct in connection with the matter in litigation. Suter v. Mazyck, 226 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Ky.App.2007). In a long and unbroken line of cases this court has refused relief to one, who has created by his fraudulent acts the situation from which he asks to be extricated. Asher v. Asher, 278 Ky. 802, 129 S.W.2d 552, 553 (1939). A trial courts decision to invoke the equitable defense of the unclean hands doctrine rests within its sound discretion. See Petroleum Exploration v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Kentucky, 304 U.S. 209, 218, 58 S.Ct. 834, 82 L.Ed. 1294 (1938). The doctrine will not be applied to all misconduct, as when the plaintiff has engaged in conduct less offensive than that of the defendant. Suter, 226 S.W.3d at 843. While the evidence established that Picklesimer signed the agreement voluntarily and clearly intended to confer custody rights on Mullins, it was Mullins' idea to have the agreed judgment drawn up by her attorney, and Picklesimer signed it without the benefit of her own counsel. Moreover, because the agreed judgment pertained to child custody, the equity of the parties was subordinate to the welfare of the child, and the judgment could not be permitted to stand if based on fraud or falsified evidence. We likewise reject Mullins' contention that Picklesimer's failure to file an appeal from the agreed judgment barred relief under CR 60.02. Although CR 60.02 is not a substitute for an untimely filed appeal, see United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Ky. 1970), there is no requirement in CR 60.02 that an appeal be filed from the judgment. See Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency v. Goodwin, 514 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Ky.1974) (stating that a motion under CR 60.02 is not an appeal). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the agreed judgment in the instant case.