Opinion ID: 2967649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: najjar’s claims

Text: Najjar first contends that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to grant Najjar’s several severance and alternative UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR 7 mistrial motions. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 provides for joinder of defendants when they are alleged to have participated in the same act or series of acts constituting an offense. Rule 14. There is no doubt that Najjar was properly joined as a defendant with officers White and Downing, and Tri-City Auto Outlet in this case. However, Najjar maintains that the district court should have granted him severance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 before trial, during trial, or granted him a mistrial for failure to grant any of his several severance motions. We review the district court’s rulings on severance and mistrial claims for abuse of discretion, United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 287-88 (4th Cir. 1989), and factual findings made in conjunction with these claims for clear error, United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1269 (4th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has indicated that [t]here is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993). Accordingly, severance under Rule 14 is only warranted when there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. The defendant must establish that actual prejudice would result from a joint trial, . . . and not merely that a separate trial would offer a better chance of acquittal. United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1995). Najjar contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to sever pre-trial. Najjar argued that the there would be evidence admitted against his co-defendants that would be inadmissible against him, and the spillover effect of the evidence would prejudice him. The district court found that Najjar had not articulated a theory that qualified as an irreconcilable defense sufficient to warrant severance at that time. Najjar’s contentions appeared purely speculative to the district court and we cannot say on the basis of the record before us that the district court abused its discretion in denying Najjar’s motion to sever. See United States v. Becker, 585 F.2d 703, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (Speculative allegations as to possible prejudice do not meet the burden of showing an abuse of discretion in denying a motion for severance.). 8 UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR Najjar offers two bases for severance once the trial had commenced. First, Najjar states that his co-defendants pressed antagonistic and irreconcilable defenses resulting in an unfair trial. Secondly, Najjar claims that his joint trial violated his trial rights under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). We will address each of these claims in turn. Najjar points to several instances in the record where counsel for co-defendants White and Downing attacked his credibility or otherwise blamed the whole criminal enterprise on Najjar. These instances, so the argument goes, demonstrate that Najjar was deprived of a fair trial because the jury was confronted with the dilemma of either choosing to believe Najjar or White and Downing. For instance, Najjar identifies this question posed by White’s counsel on crossexamination of Najjar as the prime example of the conflicting defenses: Mr. Najjar, it serves your purpose to say that these vehicles were not ready when the salvage certificate was signed, doesn’t it? It would serve your purposes because you can’t explain in any legitimate way how you could have a vehicle put together in three days. There does appear to be some conflict in the presentation of defenses. The presence of conflicting or antagonistic defenses alone does not require severance, however. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538. We note that [t]he mere presence of hostility among defendants . . . or a desire of one to exculpate himself by inculpating another [are] insufficient grounds to require separate trials. United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The rule requires more than finger pointing. There must be such a stark contrast presented by the defenses that the jury is presented with the proposition that to believe the core of one defense it must disbelieve the core of the other, see United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1984), or that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty. Becker, 585 F.2d at 707. We are presented with no such situation here. Co-defendant’s counsel indeed attempted to focus the jury’s attention on Najjar during cross-examination; however, this attention came only after Najjar testified that White and Downing came to Clinton and signed salvage certificates before the cars had been rebuilt. This testimony not only UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR 9 implicated Najjar, but White and Downing on the honest services prong of mail fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1346. Once Najjar elected to testify, he was rightly subject to vigorous cross-examination by the government and his co-defendants. As noted, [t]he party moving for severance must establish that actual prejudice would result from a joint trial, . . . and not merely that a separate trial would offer a better chance of acquittal, United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d at 767 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Perhaps Najjar would have fared better had his co-defendants not been there to cross-examine him. However, absent other circumstances not present here, we decline to adopt a rule that would allow a defendant to testify and then immunize himself from the consequences of that choice by limiting the ability of his co-defendants to test the veracity of that testimony, especially when that testimony implicates them. We are of opinion that the content of the cross-examination does not rise above mere finger pointing, which does not provide the stark conflict necessary for relief. Counsel’s statement focused on Najjar’s part in the criminal enterprise. It did not, however, present a situation where Najjar’s guilt was dictated by the asserted innocence of the codefendants. Najjar’s testimony implicated himself on the honest services prong of mail fraud. If, as counsel suggested, Najjar’s testimony was self-serving, and the jury discredited Najjar’s testimony, rather than dictate guilt, counsel’s tactic actually tended to exonerate Najjar as to that particular count. To the extent there was any actual prejudice suffered by Najjar by any conflict in the defenses, we think that the district judge cured such conflict by proper limiting instructions. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540-1 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987) ([J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.). Therefore, we are of opinion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Najjar’s motions to sever or grant him a mistrial for failure to do so.
Najjar also claims that the district court abused its discretion for failure to sever or grant a mistrial based on the admission of out of court statements made by White and Downing that allegedly incrimi10 UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR nated Najjar in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). A Bruton problem exists only where a co-defendant’s statement on its face implicates the defendant. United States v. Locklear, 24 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1994). The admitted statements were redacted by the trial judge to eliminate any facial incrimination of Najjar. In fact, Najjar does not identify any facially incriminating statement. Additionally, the district court told the jury that the statements were admissible only as to White and Downing and not to any other defendant. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Najjar’s motion to sever or grant a mistrial based on Bruton. 3. Denial of instruction regarding Co-defendant’s failure to testify Najjar argues that the district court erred in not allowing Najjar to comment on his co-defendant’s failure to testify. It is axiomatic that a defendant’s failure to testify cannot be used to draw an inference of guilt. Similarly, a co-defendant’s failure to testify cannot be used to draw an inference of innocence on behalf of the complaining defendant. See United States v. Marquez, 449 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1971). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Najjar’s motion.
Najjar’s next claim is that the district court’s denial of his motion to exclude evidence obtained through two search warrants secured in 1997 and 1998 was error and requires reversal of his convictions. In short, Najjar argues that much of the evidence used to obtain these warrants derived from the execution of a 1995 warrant issued by a Maryland court, later invalidated, and therefore, the 1997 and 1998 search warrants were illegally obtained. The nub of Najjar’s argument is that the district court erred in not considering and finding that the illegally obtained evidence tended significantly to direct the investigation to the evidence in question. Appellant’s Br. at 53. We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR 11 This issue requires a recitation of the relevant facts surrounding the application and issuance of the search warrants. In 1995, Officer Brown of the Prince Georges County Police Department obtained two search warrants for the premises of Clinton Auto Sales based upon a previous warrantless entry. Upon execution of the warrants, the police seized motor vehicles, parts, a firearm, and documents including salvage certificates pertaining to cars sold by Clinton Auto Sales. Officer Brown noticed that many of the seized salvage certificates were signed by Maryland State Police Officer Michael White. Brown complained to Maryland State Police Officer Wright that White was impeding Brown’s investigation. To support his charge, Brown showed Wright 20 of the salvage certificates obtained in the search of Clinton Auto Sales. Brown also provided Wright with confidential law enforcement records from the Maryland Interagency Law Enforcement System and the FBI’s National Crime Information Center, all of which were seized from Clinton Auto Sales and printed at the Maryland State Police Leonardstown barracks by Officer White. Brown and his supervisor eventually provided Wright with two boxes of documents, including 70 other salvage certificates, and a Rolodex seized from Clinton Auto Sales. Additionally, Officer Brown summarized information Jessica Ellis, a former girlfriend of Najjar’s, provided to him in order to secure the 1995 search warrants. On the basis of this information, Wright initiated an administrative investigation of Officer White. Wright began his investigation by reviewing records of White’s activities regarding inspection and certification of Najjar’s salvaged vehicles. Wright found that very few incident reports had been filed for White’s inspections.1 Wright then personally interviewed Jessica 1 Under Maryland law, after a vehicle is declared salvage, the original certificate of title is returned to the MVA, which issues a salvage certificate. Once the vehicle is returned to safe operating condition, the owner must have the vehicle inspected by a duly trained and certified police officer. Md. Trans. Code § 13-506. Salvage inspections are carried on by appointment at state police barracks. Officers are required to confirm the VIN at three different locations and search for evidence of theft or VIN tampering. Each inspection requires the officer to cause the barracks where the inspection occurred to issue a Complaint Control Card to document the inspection. 12 UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR Ellis. Ellis described a Maryland State Police Officer who would visit Clinton Auto Sales late at night to sign salvage certificates without inspecting the vehicles. According to Ellis, the Officer received envelopes from Najjar and had been given a vehicle to use. Because no records or incident reports were available from the state police barracks, Wright broadened his investigation by requesting vehicle records for all of Najjar’s vehicle purchases from auction houses. These companies provided Wright with information regarding over 500 vehicles Najjar had purchased. In addition, Wright generated a list of insurers from the salvage certificates Brown provided him and requested investigative files from the insurer’s special investigative units. Wright then requested certified histories for all of these vehicles from the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration. These certified histories contained duplicates of all the salvage certificates Wright previously received from Officer Brown. Wright contacted the manufacturers of the salvaged vehicles to cross-reference part numbers of the specific vehicles with their unique vehicle identification numbers. From March to June 1996, Wright reviewed photographic surveillance conducted by Special Agent Gary Pontecorvo of the FBI, who had been investigating Clinton Auto Sales in a separate narcotics and money laundering investigation in 1993 and 1994. Some of the video tapes showed Officer White visiting Clinton Auto Sales with Najjar and Ellis present. Wright conducted his own surveillance including inspection of ten vehicles sold by Clinton Auto Sales. In March, 1997, based on the information recounted above, Wright applied for a search warrant for Clinton Auto Sales premises. The warrant issued and a search was conducted. Two more search warrants issued for other garage bays Najjar owned. In 1998, federal search warrants issued for the premises of Perdue’s Auto Sales and Lee’s Autobody and Frame based on their association with Najjar, Clinton Auto Sales, and Tri-City. At trial, Najjar sought to suppress Once a satisfactory inspection is complete, the officer signs the salvage certificate certifying that the vehicle is restored, inspected, and that the officer has certified the VIN. This salvage certificate allows the owner to retitle the vehicle. Finally, the officer submits an Incident Report describing the inspection, vehicle, and owner. UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR 13 all of the evidence obtained from these searches. The district court, following Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), denied the motion. The basic rule for whether evidence derived from an illegal search should be suppressed comes from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Wong Sun v. United States: whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. 371 U.S. 471, 487-8 (1963) (citation omitted). Najjar’s argument on appeal is essentially that every investigative step taken by White had its wellspring in the salvage certificates and other evidence seized from Clinton Auto Sales in the unlawful 1995 search, and therefore, the later searches were directly linked to the primary illegality. Generally, evidence derived from an illegal search or arrest is deemed fruit of the poisonous tree and is inadmissible. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 484-485. However, not all evidence conceivably derived from an illegal search need be suppressed if it is somehow attenuated enough from the violation to dissipate the taint. In United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), the Supreme Court stated: Even in situations where the exclusionary rule is plainly applicable, we have declined to adopt a per se or ‘but for’ rule that would make inadmissible any evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which somehow came to light through a chain of causation that began with [a Fourth Amendment violation]. 435 U.S. at 276 (citation omitted). That is to say, a direct, unbroken chain of causation is necessary, but not sufficient to render derivative evidence inadmissable. To determine whether the fruit is no longer poisonous, we consider several factors, including: 1) the amount of time between the illegal action and the acquisition of the evidence; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. See United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d at 548 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-4 (1975)). What suffices to dissipate the taint from derivative evidence depends 14 UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-9 (1973), and therefore, is particularly amenable to resolution by the district court. We begin with the physical evidence. The original illegality occurred in 1995 when the Prince George’s County Police Department sought a search warrant based upon information gained during warrantless entries. JA 629. Applying the first Brown factor, the district court stated, [t]he search warrant in this case is two years . . . later . . . a significant period of time in Fourth Amendment lore, I suggest. JA 629. The first factor, time elapsed between the initial illegality and acquisition of evidence, cannot be evaluated in isolation of the other factors, at least with respect to physical evidence. The temporal proximity of the primary illegality to the second search does not, after some identifiable point on a time line, magically dissipate the taint on subsequently obtained physical evidence. In other words, the mere passage of time cannot serve to make tainted physical evidence admissible.2 Rather, the temporal aspect can inform the attenuation analysis, for instance, by providing a context to the government’s further investigations. 2 Brown involved an illegal arrest and subsequent confession after the giving of a Miranda warning. In posing the issue to be addressed, the Court made it clear that the focus of the inquiry was directed at determining whether the accused himself had purged that taint by acting of his own accord: In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. Brown, 422 U.S. at 602 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the temporal factor in Brown served as evidence of the exercise of free will on the part of the accused in giving a confession subsequent to an illegal arrest. See also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1985); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279 (1978). UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR 15 Here, we must recognize that very little time elapsed between the primary illegality and Wright’s new investigation, perhaps a period of weeks. Wright began to use this material immediately and worked diligently to amass more information on White’s role in Najjar’s enterprise. However, Wright’s investigation continued for more than two years; this amount of time was necessitated by the fact that White had not filed incident reports or other documents normally completed for salvage certificates. This absence of records at the State Police barracks, in effect, ended the initial paper trail manifesting Officer White’s potential involvement in the criminal enterprise. In this connection, the district court found: It is correct [that] Lieutenant Wright had specific cars and salvage certificates at hand and in mind when he made the original requests to the barracks, both with the original 20 and later 70. What happened, though, I find as a matter of fact, ended any direct use of those salvage certificates and those identifiable cars because the information that came back was that there were no [Complaint Control] log records or [Complaint Control] cards or incident reports so that it was not possible to trace from the salvage certificates themselves the activities of the person under investigation, that is, Officer White. What happened was that Lieutenant Wright stepped back, regrouped and started again with the auction houses, with the insurance companies and then with the MVA to track the activities of Clinton Auto Sales that obviously broadened his investigation . . . . [The salvage certificates] are records that exist in . . . several different locations at the same time. . . . The ones that are being used here were come about by an independent mechanism, one that was available to the police and would have been, regardless of what happened at Clinton Auto Sales in January of 1995. These conclusions of fact are not clearly erroneous. The absence of records at the barracks obviously caused considerable difficulty to Wright’s investigation, at least in part evidenced by the two-year duration of the investigation. In short, Wright’s investigation was not a simple matter of looking at salvage certificates obtained in the 1995 16 UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR search and obtaining new evidence from their use, rather it was a substantial investigative effort unconnected to the seized documents themselves once Wright encountered the impediment at the Maryland State Police Barracks. The result of this investigation was that the public records seized from Clinton Auto Sales were rediscovered from independent sources. Because the documents subsequently came into Wright’s possession independently, they cannot be the result of the primary illegality. Najjar argues that the district court’s conclusion here is wrong because the illegally obtained evidence tended significantly to direct the investigation to the evidence in question. However, it is not enough that the original certificates may have triggered Wright’s suspicion or gave impetus or direction toward what is to be focused on by the government. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Even if the original illegal search in some slight way was a but-for cause of the later searches, Wright’s two-year investigation and the intervening circumstances were sufficient to break the causal link between any primary illegality and later obtained evidence. Therefore, we are of opinion that the first and second factors weigh in favor of the government. Finally, we note that the purpose of the misconduct was to obtain information to apply for a later, ostensibly legal search warrant. While a warrantless search used to justify a later warranted search, a violation that goes to the core of the Fourth Amendment, should be viewed with somewhat heightened suspicion, there is no reason to suppress the information gained here. As the district court concluded, and we agree, there was no intent to deceive the judge who issued that first search warrant. All the information was given to that judge. . . . [I]t was not so flagrant and purposeful misconduct by Prince George’s County Police to require any extra vigilance by this Court. J.A. 63435. Because the relevant factors identified in Brown v. Illinois favor the government, we are of opinion that Najjar’s suppression motions as to the physical evidence were properly denied by the district court. We now turn briefly to suppression of the statements of Jessica Ellis. The standards for suppression of witness testimony are stricter than for physical evidence: [S]ince the cost of excluding live-witness testimony often will be greater, a closer, more direct link between the UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR 17 illegality and that kind of testimony is required. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 278. No such link exists here. The district court found that Jessica Ellis contacted the authorities herself, and as this contact was a product of her own free will, it cannot be tainted. Therefore, there is no basis to suppress her testimony.
Najjar claims that the 1997 and 1998 search warrants were not supported by probable cause. Probable cause exists if the facts presented would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution’ to believe that evidence of a crime will be found. United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 480, 481 (4th Cir. 1992). As the discussion above demonstrates, Wright developed extensive evidence of the commission of crimes by Najjar. Therefore, we are of opinion that the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis . . . for conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing and thus the warrants were supported by probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Najjar next contends that four of his mail fraud convictions must be reversed because his actions do not fit the statutory definition of the crime. Specifically, Najjar was found guilty of defrauding the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration of property under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and Najjar claims that motor vehicle titles do not qualify as property under the statute after Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000). Najjar states that this case requires the reversal of its convictions for mail fraud where the jury specified the deprivation of property as an object of the scheme. The jury, by special verdict found Najjar guilty on six mail fraud counts.3 On the first, unchallenged here, it found the sole objective 3 A general verdict in a multiple object conspiracy should be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957). Special verdicts obviate this problem by allowing a court to determine upon what factual and legal basis the jury decided a given question. Because the district court employed special verdict forms, no Yates problem presents itself. 18 UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR was to defraud customers. On counts two through four, the jury concluded that all three charged objectives were proven: defrauding customers, defrauding the State of property in the form of licenses, and depriving the State of honest services. Finally, on counts five and 10, the jury found proven the objective of depriving the State of honest services. Assuming, without deciding, that Cleveland removes certificates of title as a species of property cognizable under the mail fraud statute, we nevertheless affirm Najjar’s mail fraud convictions because they rest on at least one valid theory of liability specifically found by the jury and thus any error was harmless.4