Opinion ID: 431103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits

Text: 7 Pursuant to the relevant criteria of the California statute, the employees were eligible for California benefits if they were able to work and available for work. Cal.Unemp.Ins.Code Sec. 1253(c). The Secretary held that the employees were ineligible for the period they were limited to light duty work, because they were not able and available within the meaning of the California statute. 8 The California Supreme Court has stated that: 9 Availability for work within the meaning of section 1253, subdivision (c), requires no more than (1) that an individual claimant be willing to accept suitable work which he has no good cause for refusing and (2) that the claimant thereby make himself available to a substantial field of employment. 10 Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Board, 20 Cal.3d 55, 67, 141 Cal.Rptr. 146, 154, 569 P.2d 740, 748 (1977) (footnotes omitted, emphasis added); see also Glick v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Board, 23 Cal.3d 493, 153 Cal.Rptr. 1, 591 P.2d 24 (1979). Several decisions by the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board are cited by the parties with respect to this issue. See In Re Dahl, Precedent Benefit Decision No. P-B-172 (1976) (claimant restricted to working five hours per day able and available); In Re Collins, Precedent Benefit Decision No. P-B-225 (1976) (claimant with lifting restriction and nervous condition who had made very limited search for work not able and available); In Re Joergensen, Precedent Benefit Decision No. P-B-178 (1976) (claimant with handicaps so extensive re-employment would require agency-employer cooperation not able and available). These decisions appear largely fact dependent, and the primary inquiry remains whether the employees met the criteria set down by Sanchez. 11 In each of the cases before us an administrative law judge of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board found the claimant to be able and available for work under the California law. The California administrative law judges have expertise in construing the California Act. We find no error in their conclusions. 12 The Secretary contends that, even if the employees met the able and available criteria of the California statute, they did not meet the able and available criteria stated by section 201(12) of the Act in defining layoff with respect to employees who have been receiving workers' compensation. Section 213(f) of the Act requires the Secretary to adopt that construction of the Act most favorable to employees where two or more constructions are reasonable. Because, based on the California Supreme Court's pronouncement in Sanchez, we have concluded that the parallel language of the California statute may cover employees released for light duty work, an analogous interpretation of the Redwood Act's language is reasonable. 13 We hold that the employees were qualified for California Unemployment benefits. We now must focus on whether they were on layoff status.