Opinion ID: 2801675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: HISD as a Defendant

Text: HISD contends that school districts are not proper RICO defendants for two reasons. First, RICO requires demonstrating an underlying criminal act, which entails a mens rea requirement that a governmental entity cannot form. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming Lancaster). 12 Second, municipal entities enjoy common law immunity from punitive damages, and, whatever else it is, RICO’s trebledamages provision is at least partially punitive. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 908 (3d Cir. 1991). These reasons have proven persuasive to other courts. 13 We agree with these holdings. GRG would have received but for Marshall’s improper influence—totaling $177,307. Based on the same data, a defense expert calculated the range of damages between $16,776.76 and $145,032.96. The defendants also challenge the reliability and thus admissibility of GRG’s expert report. 12 Several district courts in this circuit have also recognized “strong authority that governmental entities, such as counties or government agencies, cannot be proper RICO defendants.” Dale v. Mo. Governor Jay Nixon’s Office, No. CIV.A. C-11-114, 2011 WL 1810321, at  (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2011); see also Nationwide Pub. Ins. Adjusters Inc. v. Edcouch-Elsa I.S.D., 913 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Dammon v. Folse, 846 F. Supp. 36, 38 (E.D. La. 1994); La. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 806 (E.D. La. 1986). 13Either of these theories—the inability to form a mens rea or immunity from punitive damages—might suffice to remove HISD from RICO’s ambit in this case. There are also sound policy reasons for this conclusion: [T]he . . . theories for refusing to hold a municipal entity liable under RICO are not mutually exclusive—indeed, it can be said that they are two sides of the same concept. In an abstract but doctrinal sense, a corporation in and of itself cannot form mens rea. Similarly, a corporation, that is, the institutional construct itself, cannot be deterred; deterrence can only be achieved by targeting the behavior of the people who determine corporate conduct. Thus, if punitive damages would not operate to encourage innocent and essentially powerless taxpayers to prevent RICO’s condemned activity by municipal officials, short of the election process, it would seem inappropriate to hold the municipal corporation liable. Dammon, 846 F. Supp. at 38. 16 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 17 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 A particularly good reason for rejecting governmental RICO liability stems from judicial reluctance to impose punitive damages on the public fisc. The Supreme Court has held that a municipality’s liability for § 1983 damages does not thereby subject it to punitive damages, from which government entities were historically immune. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2758 (1981). City of Newport emphasized that because a public entity itself “can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials,” 453 U.S. at 267, 101 S. Ct. at 2760, punishment by punitive damages would be inequitably assessed against the public. Moreover, “the deterrence rationale of § 1983 does not justify making punitive damages available against municipalities.” Id. at 268, 101 S. Ct. at 2160. 14 City of Newport held that, to overcome municipal immunity from punitive damages, Congress must clearly express its intention. Id. at 263, 101 S. Ct. at 2749. No such clear intent to overcome governmental immunity appears in the RICO provision for treble damages. GRG, however, fastens hope on the Supreme Court’s ambiguity about treble damages, “which have a compensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives.” Cook Cnty., Ill. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130, 123 S. Ct. 1239, 1246 (2003). The Supreme Court locates “different statutory treble-damages provisions on different points along the spectrum between purely compensatory and strictly punitive awards.” PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 405, 123 S. Ct. 1531, 1535 14 When the Supreme Court held that municipal entities were liable under federal antitrust law, it “understandably [left] open the question whether municipalities may be liable for treble damages[.]” Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 455 U.S. 40, 65, 102 S. Ct. 835, 848 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Before there was occasion for the high court to resolve that question, Congress exempted governmental units from all monetary damages. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 17 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 18 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 (2003). Treble damages provisions designedly go well beyond the amount of actual harm, but the Supreme Court has “repeatedly acknowledged that the treble-damages provision contained in RICO itself is remedial in nature.” PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406, 123 S. Ct. at 1535. The Court’s ambivalence about punitive damages complicates analysis here, but we believe PacifiCare cannot salvage a claim against HISD. First, the Supreme Court’s characterization of RICO treble damages as “remedial” in PacifiCare cannot substitute for an express Congressional abrogation of municipal immunity from treble damages, which, whatever the characterization, exceed actual provable damages. To hold otherwise would mock City of Newport. Second, nothing in PacifiCare contravenes the Court’s earlier holdings that treble-damages provisions serve both compensatory and punitive functions. See Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2345 (1987); accord Genty, 937 F. 2d at 910 (“there is convincing authority that Congress authorized civil RICO’s powerful treble damages provision to serve a punitive purpose”). 15 Third, the narrow question posed in PacifiCare was whether an arbitration agreement’s ban on punitive damages included RICO treble damages. The Court refused to interpret the private parties’ agreement, holding that threshold duty for an arbitrator. PacifiCare has no bearing on the liability of governmental entity defendants for treble damages under RICO. For these reasons, we conclude that GRG cannot proceed against HISD under RICO’s mandatory treble damage provision. Because Congress wrote no 15Albeit in non-precedential opinions, the Third Circuit has continued to apply Genty since PacifiCare was decided. Tengood v. City of Philadelphia, 529 F. App’x 204, 209 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (rejecting argument that PacifiCare abrogated Genty); Heinemeyer v. Twp. of Scotch Plains, 198 F. App’x 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2006); Kadonsky v. New Jersey, 188 F. App’x 81, 85 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Cranberry Promenade, Inc. v. Cranberry Twp., No. CIV. A. 09-1242, 2010 WL 653915, at  (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2010). 18 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 19 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 single-damage alternative, and we lack power to revise federal statutes, Appellants fail to state a cognizable RICO claim against HISD. See Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 713 (2d Cir. 1987) (“civil RICO requires that a successful plaintiff be awarded treble damages”). II. State Law Claims A. Breach of Contract and Estoppel Theories GRG appeals the district court’s summary judgment rejecting its state law claims against HISD for breach of contract and estoppel. GRG’s breach of contract argument relies on an implied duty of good faith, which, as the district court noted, Texas law rejects except in the context of special relationships. See Hall v. Resolution Trust Corp., 958 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1992); see also City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. 2000). The case that GRG cites to the contrary is inapposite, as the court relied expressly on the Texas Uniform Commercial Code, which imposes a duty of good faith in contracts for sales of goods, a condition plainly not met here. See Mailing & Shipping Sys., Inc., v. Neopost USA, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 2d 879 (W.D. Tex. 2013). Indeed, Neopost admonished that there is no general duty of good faith in contracts in Texas. Id. at 889. GRG also argues that “HISD breached its promise to GRG to permit GRG to seek JOC projects[.]” However, it cites neither a contractual provision nor other evidence of a promise. Consequently, GRG identifies no obligation that HISD failed to perform. 16 GRG’s promissory estoppel and quasi estoppel claims fare no better. The district court held that the promissory estoppel claim failed because the JOC contract covered the subjects of dispute, and that the quasi estoppel claim 16 HISD urges several grounds to reject the contract claim other than those on which the district court relied. We need not and do not address these arguments. 19 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 20 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 failed because GRG did not create a genuine, material fact issue on the elements of that claim. Both of these holdings are correct. Promissory estoppel “may be asserted by a plaintiff as an affirmative ground for relief.” Fertic v. Spencer, 247 S.W.3d 242, 250 (Tex. App. 2007). To succeed on a promissory estoppel cause of action, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment.” English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983). This cause of action, however, “presumes no contract exists[.]” Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2002). “If . . . a valid contract between the parties covers the alleged promise, the plaintiff cannot recover for the promise under promissory estoppel.” Fertic, 247 S.W.3d at 250. GRG’s JOC contract here covered both the terms for the assignment of JOC work and the parties’ rights in renewal. By its terms, the contract did not oblige HISD to assign JOC work, and the contract was renewable for successive years at HISD’s sole discretion. Promissory estoppel is utterly displaced. 17 Quasi estoppel, on the other hand, is not a freestanding cause of action but a procedural device or affirmative defense. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Stockdick Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tex. App. 2012). “Unlike equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel requires no showing of a false representation or detrimental reliance” but describes “certain legal bars, such as ratification, election, acquiescence or acceptance of benefits.” Steubner Realty 19, Ltd. v. Cravens Rd. 88, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. App. 1991) (citing 31 C.J.S. 17GRG argues that the district court dismissed its estoppel claims “on the basis that GRG had a contract with HISD. But if the Court holds that no contract claim is stated, it should necessarily reinstate GRG’s estoppel and quasi-estoppel claims.” However, it is the existence of a contract that makes estoppel inappropriate, not the viability of any contract claim. Further, GRG pressed only quasi-estoppel in its reply brief. 20 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 21 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 Estoppel § 107 (1964)). “This concept was developed to prevent a party from retaining a benefit by asserting a position to the disadvantage of another and then asserting a right which is inconsistent with that previous position.” Stimpson v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App. 1987, writ denied). GRG cannot prevail on quasi-estoppel either. Quasi-estoppel “requires (1) a previous action and (2) a subsequent inconsistent action which is thereby sought to be estopped.” Mulvey v. Mobil Producing Tex. & N.M Inc., 147 S.W.3d 594, 607 (Tex. App. 2004). GRG argues that HISD should be “estopped to deny GRG’s rights consistent with the parties’ contractual relationships” and it accurately recites the elements of quasi-estoppel. GRG does not, however, identify HISD’s prior inconsistent action or the alleged benefit that it received at GRG’s expense. Its reply brief refers to “the promise relevant to the quasi-estoppel claim,” but, as just discussed, quasi-estoppel needs no promise. The district court found that “HISD did not take inconsistent positions[;] it merely acted according to the JOC contract.” Even if GRG’s expectations were defeated by a bribery scheme, HISD’s contract is not inconsistent with its actions regarding GRG. 18 18 In affirming these conclusions, we, like the district court, reserve judgment on whether public entities like HISD can be held liable at all under theories of estoppel. Texas law generally immunizes municipalities from estoppel for governmental (as opposed to proprietary) functions, but the decisions seem to be split over whether a school district ever exercises proprietary functions. Compare S.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist., 435 S.W.3d 414, 421 & n.10 (Tex. App. 2014), with Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clear Lake Rehab. Hosp., L.L.C., 324 S.W.3d 802, 809 (Tex. App. 2010). And while Texas courts have contemplated exceptions in certain extreme cases, see Bowman v. Lumberton Indep. Sch. Dist., 801 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. 1990); City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 835-36 (Tex. 1970), we decline to explore the scope of these exceptions except to note that the cases address estoppel to deny agency, normally in the employment context. See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Chapel Hill I.S.D., No. 03-06-00243-CV, 2007 WL 1647818, at  (Tex. App. June 8, 2007); La Villa Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gomez Garza Design, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding agency authority by estoppel); Bowman, 801 S.W.2d at 888. It is unhelpful to talk about “estoppel” simpliciter when the different types of estoppel implicate different analyses. 21 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 22 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 B. Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations GRG brought tortious interference with prospective business relations claims against Marshall, Clay, and the vendor defendants and appeals the district court’s rejection of those claims. We hold, contrary to the district court, that Marshall is not entitled to dismissal on state law grounds, nor is summary judgment appropriate for these defendants. 1. Election of Remedies for Claims Against Marshall Marshall contends that he is immune from GRG’s state law claims for tor tortious interference and conspiracy for two reasons. First, he argues that (a) the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) requires an election of remedies where a plaintiff has sued both a governmental entity and its employee and (b) that he is an “employee” of HISD under a statutory definition, Tex. Educ. Code § 22.051(a)(5), and therefore falls within the protection of the election of remedies provision of the TTCA. Second, Marshall argues that he is separately entitled to professional immunity under the Texas Education Code § 22.0511. The district court granted summary judgment in Marshall’s favor on the first basis. We disagree with that conclusion and also find Marshall ineligible for the professional immunity provision. The TTCA waives the state’s immunity from suit in certain circumstances. Importantly for present purposes, the TTCA also covers all tort theories that may be alleged against a governmental entity whether or not it waives that immunity. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2008). Further, “[i]f a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(e). The state supreme court interpreted this language to mean that “if a plaintiff brings virtually any state common 22 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 23 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 law tort claim against both a governmental unit and its employees, § 101.106(e) will allow the employee defendants to be dismissed if the governmental unit so moves.” Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 463 (citing Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 658). In Bustos, this court held that where state law claims against the municipality based on negligent hiring and supervision were joined with claims against police officer defendants for excessive force, the claims against the city were “rooted in the same alleged common law violations.” Id. at 464. Accordingly, the court was bound to grant the city’s motion to dismiss the officers pursuant to § 101.106(e). In this case, the district court assumed that Marshall was an HISD employee and, based on TTCA § 101.106(e) and Bustos, granted HISD’s motion to dismiss both state law conspiracy claims filed against HISD and Marshall and the tortious interference claims brought against Marshall alone. The court concluded that the tortious interference claims were “rooted in the same alleged common law violations” as the global conspiracy claims. Why HISD would have wanted to shield Marshall from GRG’s suit in this fashion, given the seriousness of the allegations and the state of proof, is unclear. Nevertheless, in this posture it becomes critical to determine whether Marshall was an “employee” of HISD who could be statutorily shielded. Because we conclude that he was not, there is no need to reach the question whether Bustos compels the dismissal of claims brought against Marshall but not HISD. The TTCA defines an employee as “a person, including an officer or agent, who is in the paid service of a governmental unit by competent authority” but excludes “a person who performs tasks the details of which the governmental unit does not have the legal right to control.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(2). Marshall, an elected school board trustee, was neither 23 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 24 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 in HISD’s paid service nor did the District have any right to control him. He is not an employee under the TTCA. To overcome this deficiency, Marshall asserts that he was an “employee” pursuant to the recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011). One defendant in Franka was a medical resident who did not fit TTCA’s definition of employee, because she “was not both paid by and subject to the legal control of the same governmental unit[.]” Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 373. The court deemed her an employee under the TTCA, however, pursuant to a provision of the Texas Health and Safety Code, which designated medical residents as employees “for purposes of determining liability[.]” Id. at 374. Marshall analogizes his position to that of the medical resident in Franka. Provisions of the Texas Education Code define a school board trustee as an employee, Tex. Educ. Code § 22.051, 19 and grant immunity to “employees” for “any act that is incident to or within the scope of the duties of the employee’s position . . . and that involves the exercise of judgment or discretion[.]” Tex. Educ. Code § 22.0511(a). On the basis of this analogy, Marshall urges us to rely on the Education Code’s definition of employee. But even if some “employees” under these Education Code provisions might fall within the scope of Franka, Marshall does not. The same Education Code provision limits personal liability “for any act that is incident to or within the scope of the duties of the employee’s position of employment and that involves the exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of the employee[.]” Tex. Educ. Code § 22.0511 (emphasis added). Marshall is not alleged to have 19 The statute defines a “professional employee of a school district” to include “a member of the board of trustees of an independent school district[.]” Tex. Educ. Code § 22.051(a)(5). 24 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 25 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 been acting “within the scope” of his duties. To the contrary, bribery and peddling influence are not within the scope of a trustee’s duty. He was allegedly defiling his position and wholly outside the legitimate scope of a trustee’s duties if he accepted bribes in exchange for advancing the interests of certain contractors. Marshall’s rationalization that getting involved with contracting and procurement decisions is “minimally” within the scope of his duties, particularly when he served as HISD Board President in 2009, cannot stand against GRG’s detailed evidence of the pay-to-play scheme. Marshall is not entitled to immunity under the TTCA or the Education Code. 2. Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations Next to consider is whether summary judgment was appropriate on GRG’s claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations against Marshall, the vendor defendants and Clay. GRG contends that there was a reasonable probability that it would have entered into additional contracts with HISD and that Marshall, Clay, and the vendor defendants “intentionally interfered with the relationship.” The Texas Supreme Court has recently defined the elements of tortious interference with prospective business relations. The common law cause requires that (1) there was a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered into a business relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant either acted with a conscious desire to prevent the relationship from occurring or knew the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of the conduct; (3) the defendant's conduct was independently tortious or unlawful; (4) the interference proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and (5) the plaintiff suffered actual damage or loss as a result. Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 923 (Tex. 2013). The second element in this list—the requisite mental state—was the 25 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 26 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 deciding factor for the district court, which found that any bribery on the part of competing vendors did not have as its object the interference with GRG’s status as a JOC contractor. The district court relied on Bradford v. Vento, in which the Texas Supreme Court adopted the explanation of the Second Restatement of Torts that when a defendant “had no desire to effectuate the interference by his action but knew that it would be a mere incidental result of conduct he was engaging in for another purpose, the interference may be found to be not improper.” 48 S.W.3d 749, 757 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. d (1979)). Bradford is distinguishable on its facts. The plaintiff in Bradford claimed he had bought a particular store from its previous owner. The defendant mall administrator had allegedly interfered with the plaintiff’s sales by stating, in response to a police inquiry, that the previous owner still owned the store. Bradford, 48 S.W.3d at 754-55. The Texas Supreme Court found that “the interference was at most only an incidental result of Bradford’s legitimate conduct.” Id. at 758. Bradford dealt with statements made in good faith, whereas these defendants’ actions hardly occurred in good faith. GRG bolsters its argument by citing Strickland v. Joeris, an unpublished Texas court of appeals case. No. 04-11-00626-CV, 2012 WL 6013423 (Tex. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (mem. op.) (unpublished). The plaintiff in Strickland contended he was fired because of a dispute he had with one of the firm’s largest clients over a transaction unrelated to the firm’s business. Shortly after the dispute, the client called the firm and complained about the employee. The plaintiff introduced evidence that the client “made it clear” that the plaintiff’s dispute “could possibly jeopardize all current and future work.” Id. at . The court held that this was sufficient to create a triable fact issue as to whether the client intended to jeopardize the employee’s future with the firm. Id. GRG 26 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 27 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 contends that the evidence here likewise supports the inference that its competitors “instructed Marshall to get rid of GRG[.]” In Strickland, the defendant actually made statements to a party in the business relationship about the plaintiff, and circumstantial evidence strongly supported an inference that the statement was designed to harm the plaintiff. 20 In contrast, there is in this case no direct evidence of communications between any vendor defendant and any HISD official on the subject of GRG. The nature of the alleged bribery scheme, however, was to fix the contracting process in favor of the vendor defendants. Where only a limited number of JOC contractors would be selected, all of the participants in the scheme “knew the interference was substantially certain to occur as a result of the conduct.” See Coinmach Corp., 417 S.W.3d at 923. This reasoning would apply to GRG’s claim as regards the decrease in projects under the 2009 contract and the non-renewal of GRG’s JOC contract in the 2010 RFP process. 21 That this one element of the claim survives summary judgment does not, of course, resolve questions concerning the other elements on which the court did not rule. III. Civil Conspiracy Claims Our partial reinstatement of the RICO claim and the claim for interference with prospective business relations requires reinstatement of the 20 See also Lee v. Levi Strauss & Co., 897 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1995), in which a letter from the defendant led the plaintiff’s employer to believe he had to fire the plaintiff. Id. at 504-05. 21 Appellees strenuously contend that GRG’s claim also fails for lack of evidence that it would have become a JOC contractor following the 2010 RFP. This contention was not addressed by the district court, and we do not address it either. Assessing the “likelihood” of “prospective business relations” under Texas law suggests different considerations than the RICO inquiry we discussed earlier herein, which is whether HISD “would have” entered into a 2010 JOC arrangement with GRG. 27 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 28 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 civil conspiracy claim against the defendants targeted thereby (except HISD) pending further developments on remand. IV. Constitutional Claims GRG and Ramirez brought equal protection, First Amendment, and due process claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against HISD and Marshall. The First Amendment claim fails for essentially the reasons stated by the district court: Appellants did not “speak” or intend to convey a particular message, and no one would have “reasonably apprehended” that they so intended, when they refused to pay bribes to Marshall. See Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 108 (5th Cir. 1997). The due process claim fares no better. GRG identifies no constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972). GRG’s equal protection claim also lacks support. 22 The Equal Protection Clause forbids state actors from treating similarly situated individuals differently for a discriminatory purpose and without a rational basis. GRG argues that the zero-sum nature of the JOC program meant that Marshall and HISD knew that favoring bribers would harm those who refused to bribe, and that a plaintiff must only “show that the decisionmakers were aware” of potential harm to disfavored individuals. “‘Discriminatory purpose,’ however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2296 (1979). The district court concluded that GRG failed to demonstrate that Marshall or HISD discriminated against GRG “because of” and not “in spite of” its refusal to pay bribes. See id. (equal protection claim requires showing that “the 22At the outset, we reject HISD’s unpalatable argument that there was no disparate treatment since all vendors were given an opportunity to bribe a trustee. 28 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 29 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects”). Nothing in the record suggests that Marshall or any of his collaborators acted to harm nonbribers. See SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil, 666 F.3d 678, 687 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting equal protection claim arising out of pay-off scheme involving state contracts when harm was “at most a foreseen (but unintended) side effect”). That Marshall may have perverted HISD’s procurement processes to cause HISD to discriminate in favor of RHJ and FBM is not sufficient to show that GRG was discriminated against. See Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, Mich., 470 F.3d 286, 299 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting equal protection claim when one vendor “was treated beneficially, but no party was discriminated against”). Further, an equal protection claim depends on either identifying a class, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976), or showing that the aggrieved party is a “class of one,” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000). Ramirez does not claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of his membership in any particular class and therefore must rely on the class of one theory. However, the class-of-one rationale does not apply to “forms of state action . . . which by their nature involve discretionary decision-making based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.” Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 603, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008). Engquist held that the discretionarydecision-making “principle applies most clearly in the employment context, for employment decisions are quite often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify.” Id. at 604, 128 S. Ct. at 2154; see also Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2653 (2014) (“the government has wider constitutional latitude when it is acting as employer 29 Case: 13-20753 Document: 00513046886 Page: 30 Date Filed: 05/18/2015 No. 13-20753 than as sovereign”). HISD calls our attention to the “obvious parallels between government employees and government contractors.” Engquist is not dispositive of GRG’s class of one theory but cuts against it. In any event, even if GRG’s dealings with HISD fall within a class of one for equal protection purposes, the absence of discriminatory intent dooms its claim. For the foregoing reasons, GRG cannot sustain its constitutional claims. 23