Opinion ID: 1694812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The 180-day amendatory time limit

Text: LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1(D) incorporates an amendatory time limit. It specifically provides that sentence amendments authorized under LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1 shall be completed within one hundred eighty days of the initial sentencing. Although the statutory language is straightforward and mandatory, a cursory reading of the proviso seems to unwittingly limit LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1(A) and conflicts with the provision of LA.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 882 which allows an illegal sentence to be corrected at any time. It is well accepted that criminal statutes are strictly and narrowly construed, with any ambiguity resolved in favor of the accused. State v. Carr, 99-2209 (La.5/26/00), 761 So.2d 1271. Criminal statutes are presumed valid, and are given a genuine construction according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision. LA.REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:3; State v. Muschkat, 96-2922 (La.3/4/98), 706 So.2d 429. What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:03, p. 135 (6th ed.2000). Furthermore, because the Legislature is presumed to intend to achieve a consistent body of law, there is a presumption against an implied repeal of pre-existing statutes on the same subject based on the theory that legislators envision the whole body of law when new legislation is enacted. State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817, 819 (La.1992). Our review of the legislative history of LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1 shows that Paragraph (D), the 180-day amendatory time limit, was not in the original house bill and was added as a result of discussions during the meeting of the House Committee on Administration of Criminal Justice. Representative Jenkins opined at the hearing that there was a need for a time frame for amending a sentence and reasonable notice to the defendant should he opt to appeal. Hearings on House Bill No. 109 Before the House Committee on Administration of Criminal Justice, March 31, 1999, at page 5. In addition, Richard Stalder, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, appeared before the committee for informational purposes and stated that when a person is sentenced, the department must compute a parole date. For a conviction of a crime where there is no eligibility for probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, a computation of a parole date is unnecessary. He concluded by stating that there should be no confusion at the time of sentencing. Hearings, at page 5. Subsequently, the bill was amended on the floor of House of Representatives to add the 180 day amendatory time limit. As amended, the bill unanimously passed the House of Representatives and the Senate. After reviewing the committee minutes, it is apparent from the few comments that the concern for a time limit was directed to the district rather than the appellate courts. That being said, we must now attempt to discern whether the appellate court in the case sub judice, acting 16 months after the defendant's initial sentencing, was authorized to vacate the defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing. [9] Initially, we find that the time limitation recognized in Paragraph D of LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1 is inapplicable to Paragraph A; to rule otherwise would eviscerate the intent of this element of the legislative enactment. To the extent that Paragraph C of LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1 may be applicable to restricted criminal sentences to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, the thrust of Paragraph A of LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1, or any one or a combination of those restrictions, we likewise find Paragraph D of LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1 inapplicable. As noted earlier, we recognized that this provision directs that sentences that require statutory restrictions on parole, probation, or suspension of sentence are  deemed to contain [those] provisions, [10] (emphasis added) whether or not the sentencing court pronounces those restrictions at the time of initial sentencing. It is clear from the statutory language that this proviso is self-activated, eliminates the remand for ministerial correction of sentence, and requires no notice to the defendant. [11] Simply stated, the provisions of Paragraphs A and C do not call for amendment as no correction is required. Rather, that which was legislatively mandated at the time of sentencing is recognized as having existed statutorily without pronouncement being necessary. Accordingly, we find it was appropriate for the appellate court in the present case to so note that [a]t least six months of the [defendant's] sentence of imprisonment imposed shall be without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 14:98(D)(1). However, because of the complete failure of the sentencing court to abide by any of the sentencing requirements of LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 14:98(D)(1) and because an element of sentencing discretion existed as regards the length of sentence served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, it was necessary for the appellate court to remand the matter to the trial court for re-sentencing. In the present case, the appellate decision further recognized that the sentencing court's choice of sentence was inconsistent with the statutory provisions which called for a mandatory fine of $2,000, LA.REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98(D)(1), required the sale of the vehicle, LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 14:98(D)(2)(a), and involved punishment not authorized by LA.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.2(G), (J), the home incarceration statute. Utilizing the categories recognized in LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1, these errors would potentially fall under the provisions of Paragraph (B), sentencing elements which are inconsistent with statutory provisions. A close examination of the language of Paragraph (B) shows that its provisions are activated by the sentencing court or the district attorney. If the district attorney is unable to have the sentencing court amend a sentence that is inconsistent with statutory provisions in the trial court, Paragraph (B) further allows an appellate court to amend such a sentence if the district attorney has invoked appellate review or applied for supervisory relief. In the case sub judice, the sentencing amendment was not sought by either the sentencing court or the district attorney. The plain language of Paragraph (D) subjects sentencing amendments authorized by the provisions of this Section to the 180 day time limitation. As pointed out, no amendment of the defendant's sentence was accomplished through any provision of LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1: sentencing errors akin to those delineated under Paragraph A are not subject to amendment; and those errors recognized in Paragraph B were not raised either by the sentencing court or the district attorney, the method authorized in LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1(B). Accordingly, whatever time limitation provided in Paragraph D was inapplicable to the appellate court under the particular procedural facts present. [12] Rather, in the present case, the authority of the appellate court to recognize sentencing error arises in part from the self-activating provisions of LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1(A) (i.e., the failure to impose sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence) and under the general provisions of LA.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 882 (the sentencing errors other than those which fall under LA.REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:301.1(A)). Under the provisions of article 882, [a]n illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by ... an appellate court on review. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the appellate court on its own properly noticed the numerous sentencing errors in the punishment that the sentencing court imposed without the need to concern itself with the time limitations of Paragraph D.