Opinion ID: 6326281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: As to each of his convictions, Bryant asserts the court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 Third Degree Assault and Terroristic Threats We first address Bryant’s assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for terroristic threats and third degree assault. Section 28-311.01(1) describes the crime of terroristic threats: A person commits terroristic threats if he or she threatens to commit any crime of violence: (a) With the intent to terrorize another; (b) With the intent of causing the evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation; or (c) In reckless disregard of the risk of causing such ­terror or evacuation. The intent to terrorize another, for purposes of the crime of terroristic threats, is an intent to produce intense fear or anxiety in another. 3 Section 28-311.01 does not require that the 1 State v. Figures, 308 Neb. 801, 957 N.W.2d 161 (2021). 2 Id. 3 State v. Smith, 267 Neb. 917, 678 N.W.2d 733 (2004). - 213 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BRYANT Cite as 311 Neb. 206 r­ ecipient of the threat be actually terrorized, and it does not require an intent to execute the threats made. 4 Section 28-310(1)(b) sets forth the crime of third degree assault, stating that “[a] person commits the offense of assault in the third degree if he . . . [t]hreatens another in a menacing manner.” Threatening another in a menacing manner for purposes of the crime of third degree assault is a promise to do another person bodily harm which is made in such a manner as to intentionally cause a reasonable person in the position of the one threatened to suffer apprehension of being so harmed. 5 Thus, a violation of § 28-311.01(1)(a) need not produce a result in the victim, while a violation of § 28-310(1)(b) must cause a reasonable person to suffer apprehension of being bodily harmed. 6 Section 28-311.01(1)(a) requires an intent to terrorize another and is not concerned with the result produced by an individual’s threat, while § 28-310(1)(b) is violated when a person acts in a manner that intentionally causes a reasonable person in the position of the one threatened to feel apprehension of being bodily harmed. 7 Bryant makes no specific argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish all the elements of third degree assault other than to assert that if the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude his statement was a terroristic threat, then it was likewise insufficient for the jury to find the requisite act of threatening in a menacing manner for purposes of third degree assault. Bryant’s argument thus focuses on the crime of terroristic threats. Bryant argues that when the threat of a crime of ­violence is “words only,” 8 there must be an unambiguous and ­specific 4 Id. 5 See id. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Brief for appellant at 15. - 214 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BRYANT Cite as 311 Neb. 206 threat of imminent violence against the person being spoken to before the evidence will be sufficient to establish all the elements of the crime. Bryant does not argue that § 28-311.01(1)(a) is unconstitutional, facially or as applied, and did not file a notice of an issue of constitutionality of a statute. 9 He asserts his statement to K.B. that she should consider herself next on Bryant’s list for a bullet, after previously making statements to K.B. that the judge and the county attorney “deserved a bullet,” was too ambiguous and of too indeterminate a timeline for performance to establish the elements of the crime of terroristic threats, given that the statement was unaccompanied by any violence or threatening gestures and was outside the context of a relationship involving past violence or threats of violence. In several cases, we have affirmed terroristic threats convictions that were based on words alone. 10 Most apposite to the case at bar is State v. Saltzman. 11 Therein, we found the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of three counts of terroristic threats based on three phone calls— one made to a protective services worker, one made to the chief of police, and one made to the ex-spouse of a witness at a prior trial for sexual assault. To the protective services worker, the defendant said, “‘[Y]ou’re gonna die, you bitch!’” 12 To the chief of police he said, “‘[Y]ou’re going to die. I’m going to blow up your house.’” 13 To the witness’ ex-spouse, he said he “‘was going to get my wife and kids.’” 14 9 See Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2022). 10 See, State v. Saltzman, 235 Neb. 964, 458 N.W.2d 239 (1990); State v. Veatch, 16 Neb. App. 50, 740 N.W.2d 817 (2007); State v. Powers, 10 Neb. App. 256, 634 N.W.2d 1 (2001) (disapproved on other grounds, State v. Smith, supra note 3; State v. Rodriguez, 6 Neb. App. 67, 569 N.W.2d 686 (1997). 11 State v. Saltzman, supra note 10. 12 Id. at 966, 458 N.W.2d at 241. 13 Id. at 966, 458 N.W.2d at 242. 14 Id. at 967-68, 458 N.W.2d at 242. - 215 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BRYANT Cite as 311 Neb. 206 [2,3] We observe, first, that these threats were not necessarily of imminent violence. And the language of § 28-311.01 does not address when the crime of violence is threatened to occur. The intent of the Legislature is generally expressed by omission as well as by inclusion, and we are not at liberty to add language to the plain terms of a statute to restrict its meaning. 15 Whether or not based on “words only,” § 28-311.01 does not require that the threatened crime of violence be imminent. [4-6] Nor do we find merit to Bryant’s suggestion that, in a “words only” case of terroristic threats, those words must be facially unambiguous. The threat for purposes of § 28-311.01 may be written, oral, physical, or any combination ­thereof. 16 We have never set forth different evidentiary burdens for different methods of threatening the victim. Whether the defend­ ant threatens a crime of violence need not be determined solely based upon the literal meaning of the defendant’s words alone. Instead, whether particular conduct constitutes a threat depends on the context of the interaction between the people involved. 17 While Bryant and K.B. did not have a past relationship involving violence, Bryant’s statements were nevertheless made in a context that was properly considered by the jury. Accepting all relevant evidence as true, giving the State the benefit of every inference reasonably drawn from the evidence, and resolving every controverted fact in its favor, 18 Bryant was “very upset” throughout the day in question and resistant to the order for his children to be taken into the custody of DHHS, which K.B. was trying to execute. After informing K.B. that he believed the judge and county attorney “deserved a bullet,” Bryant told K.B. “take my [expletive] kids, consider yourself next on my list for a bullet.” 15 See State v. Frederick, 291 Neb. 243, 864 N.W.2d 681 (2015). 16 See State v. Duckworth, 29 Neb. App. 27, 950 N.W.2d 650 (2020). 17 Id. 18 See State v. Canady, 263 Neb. 552, 641 N.W.2d 43 (2002). - 216 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BRYANT Cite as 311 Neb. 206 It was reasonable for the jury to infer from these words and all the relevant surrounding circumstances of this interaction between Bryant and K.B. that Bryant was not simply making philosophical statements about what K.B. and the others “deserved.” Competent evidence supported the jury’s determination that Bryant was threatening an act of violence against K.B. if she executed the custody order in question and that he did so with either an intent to produce in K.B. an intense fear or anxiety or with a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror. Bryant concedes that if his statement constituted a threat under § 28-311.01, it constituted a threat under § 28-310(1)(b). There are differences between the elements of § 28-311.01 and § 28-310(1)(b), and Bryant does not elaborate, but we find the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found Bryant made a promise to do K.B. bodily harm, which was made in such a manner as to intentionally cause a reasonable person in the position of K.B. to suffer apprehension of being so harmed. Intimidation by Phone Call Lastly, we address Bryant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for intimidation by phone call. Bryant asserts that the evidence did not support the elements of the crime because the phone call at issue was originally initiated by K.B. and he simply called her back to continue the conversation after the call was dropped due to poor cell phone coverage. Section 28-1310(1)(b) provides in relevant part that [a] person commits the offense of intimidation by telephone call or electronic communication if, with intent to intimidate, threaten, or harass an individual, the person telephones such individual or transmits an electronic communication directly to such individual, whether or not conversation or an electronic response ensues, and the person: .... - 217 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BRYANT Cite as 311 Neb. 206 . . . [t]hreatens to inflict physical or mental injury to such individual or any other person or physical injury to the property of such individual or any other person[.] [7] Section 28-1310(1)(b), in specifying “telephones such individual,” does not place a time limit on when the telephone call is made in relation to a telephone call initiated by the victim. At least one other court has rejected, under a similar statutory scheme, a reading of the verb “telephone” that would be narrower than its plain and ordinary meaning. 19 We often turn to dictionaries to ascertain a word’s plain and ordinary meaning. 20 The dictionary definition of “telephone” as a verb is “to speak to or attempt to reach by telephone.” 21 The plain and ordinary meaning of “telephones such individual” in § 28-1310(1)(b) does not require that the conversation be a new one. Thus, Bryant “telephone[d]” K.B. Immediately after the connection was made by telephoning K.B., Bryant made the threat at issue. Nevertheless, Bryant argues that the jury could only reasonably infer that Bryant’s intent when telephoning K.B. was to simply continue the conversation that had been dropped due to poor cell phone coverage. We disagree. [8] The intent with which an act is committed is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident. 22 And making a threat shortly after the inception of the call is usually sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to find that the defendant telephoned the victim with the requisite intent to intimidate, threaten, or harass. 23 Despite the 19 In re Shaneace L., 130 N.M. 89, 18 P.3d 330 (N.M. App. 2000) (overruled in part, State v. Trossman, 146 N.M. 462, 212 P.3d 350 (2009)). 20 State v. Gilliam, 292 Neb. 770, 874 N.W.2d 48 (2016). 21 “Telephone,” Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/telephone (last visited Mar. 14, 2022). 22 State v. Golyar, 301 Neb. 488, 919 N.W.2d 133 (2018). 23 See In re Shaneace L., supra note 19. See, also, State v. Saltzman, supra note 10. - 218 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BRYANT Cite as 311 Neb. 206 e­ vidence of a prior dropped call, the evidence here was sufficient for the jury to infer that Bryant meant to intimidate, threaten, or harass K.B. when he telephoned her. Bryant does not contest on appeal the other element of § 28-1310(1)(b), that he threatened to “inflict physical or mental injury to such individual or any other person or physical injury to the property of such individual or any other person” during the call in question. The fact that Bryant telephoned K.B. shortly after a call initiated by K.B. was dropped due to poor cell phone coverage does not render the evidence insufficient to establish all the elements of § 28-1310(1)(b). Accordingly, we find no merit to Bryant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of intimidation by phone call.