Opinion ID: 1512016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CV-77-48: Creation of a Public Way by Statutory Procedure

Text: CV-77-48 involves Comber's attempt to have Rancourt Road made a public way by the statutory method of laying out and accepting a way . . .. Vachon v. Inhabitants of Lisbon, supra at 259. Under former 23 M.R.S.A. §§ 3001-3012 (1964) (repealed 1975), [3] creation of a town way involved two steps. First, the municipal officers in this case the Board of Assessors on petition of an inhabitant or owner of cultivated land in the particular town, had to lay out the public way. 23 M.R.S.A. § 3001 (1964) (repealed effective July 29, 1976). [4] And second, after the municipal officers had laid out the town way and filed their written report with the town clerk, the town in town meeting had to accept the road as a public way. 23 M.R.S.A. § 3003 (1964) (repealed effective July 29, 1976). [5] As former section 3003 expressly provided: The way is not established until it has been accepted in a town meeting legally called . . .. Comber, joined by three other persons living on Rancount Road, all four being hereinafter referred to as Comber, initiated the first step by presenting the proper petition to the Board of Assessors of Dennistown Plantation. However, the Board of Assessors denied the petition, stating that [t]he future expense of this property will be prohibitive when it comes to snow plowing, sanding, repairing and maintaining which will take many hours of labor and much material. Comber then petitioned the County Commissioners pursuant to former 23 M.R.S.A. § 3006 (1964) (repealed effective July 29, 1976) [6] to lay out Rancourt Road as a public way. On Comber's petition the County Commissioners, upon finding that the municipal officers had acted unreasonably in refusing to lay out the requested public way, were authorized by former section 3006 to act as is provided respecting highways. 23 M.R.S.A. § 2051, the pertinent section outlining the powers and duties of county commissioners regarding highways, empowered county commissioners to lay out highways. Comber and the Town appeared as parties before the Commissioners. After a full hearing, which included an on-site inspection of Rancourt Road, the Commissioners granted Comber's petition, expressly finding that establishing a public way [over Rancourt Road] would serve the public convenience and necessity, and that the refusal of said municipal officers to lay out the town way was unreasonable. The Town then appealed the Commissioners' decision to the Superior Court pursuant to former section 3006, which provided: When the decision of the commissioners is returned and placed on file, such owner or tenant or party interested has the same right to appeal to the Superior Court as is provided in sections 2063 to 2066 . . . [7] The Superior Court appointed a referee to hear the evidence and make recommendations regarding the Town's appeal. After a hearing, in which both the Town and Comber presented witnesses, the referee recommended that the Commissioners' decision be affirmed. The Superior Court accepted the referee's report and recommendation, and entered judgment for Comber. The Town now appeals that judgment on grounds that (1) the referee erred in admitting the testimony of two witnesses who allegedly had not appeared before the Commissioners and in striking the testimony of two witnesses who had testified before the Commissioners, and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the Superior Court's affirmance of the Commissioners' finding that the Town Assessors unreasonably refused to lay out Rancourt Road as a public way. We reject both contentions. The Town's assertion that the referee erroneously struck the testimony of witnesses McGuire and Seymour rests on an apparent misreading of the referee's order. As noted by the Town, the referee admitted the testimony of McGuire and Seymour de bene subject to a motion to strike. [8] However, in his report, the referee expressly states that the Motions to Strike are not granted. Thus, the testimony of McGuire and Seymour is a part of the record on this appeal. The Town has no basis for complaint. We find equally without merit the Town's assertion that the referee erred in admitting the testimony of Comber's witnesses Pooler and Levesque. The Town rests this contention on the factual assertion that these witnesses had not appeared before the County Commissioners. [9] However, Pooler stated on direct that he had in fact testified before the Commissioners. The Town did not challenge this assertion on cross-examination. Nor did the Town attempt to establish that the substance of Pooler's testimony before the Commissioners differed from that presented to the referee. In short, the record tends to contradict the Town's assertion that the Pooler testimony had not been considered by the Commissioners. It is clear from the record that Comber's witness Levesque had not appeared before the Commissioners. However, the Town waived the right to challenge the admission of this testimony on appeal by failing to object to its admission at the hearing before the referee. As we have often stated, questions of error not raised and properly preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. Frost v. Lucey, Me., 231 A.2d 441, 445 (1967). Finally, we cannot agree with the Town's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's affirmance of the Commissioners' finding that the refusal of the Board of Assessors to lay out the town way was unreasonable. As the referee noted in his report, the evidence presented established that the Town had for years, spent maintenance money on the road in question including placement of gravel and snow plowing. One of the County Commissioners testified before the referee that it was this evidence of the Town's past assumption of responsibility for the road, combined with the finding that certain residents had used that road as a public road . . . and had moved in there thinking that it was a public road, that led to the Commissioners' conclusion. We cannot say that this evidence was insufficient to support the Superior Court's affirmance of the decision of the Commissioners. In short, we find that the Superior Court's affirmance of the order of the Commissioners that Rancourt Road shall be and hereby is laid out as a public way to be maintained as a public way by said Dennistown Plantation was entirely proper. The entries in these consolidated appeals must be: In CV-75-81, appeal denied and judgment affirmed. In CV-77-48, appeal denied and judgment affirmed. POMEROY and NICHOLS, JJ., did not sit.