Opinion ID: 2230015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consideration of Factual Issues in Sentencing

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in its factual considerations regarding sentencing because it: (1) failed to find the defendant's mental condition as a mitigating factor; and (2) improperly found and considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances. First, the defendant claims that the trial court failed to give mitigating weight to the testimony presented by defense neuropsychologist, Dr. Joel Dill, because the sentencing order states that [t]here was no evidence that the defendant ... was under any type of influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time the murders... were committed, and [t]here is no evidence that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law, was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication. Record at 270. Dr. Dill testified that the defendant has a paranoid personality disorder, an essential feature of which is the general expectation of being exploited, interpreting the actions of people as being deliberating demeaning or threatening and usually are present in a variety of contexts which results in the defendant reading hidden or demeaning or threatening meanings into benign remarks or events. Record at 662-63. He testified that the defendant's scores on tests indicated that the defendant would be impulsive, tending to act out of his emotions. Record at 666. Dr. Dill also testified that the personality disorder was caused by problems or difficulties that date back to childhood. Record at 661. While a trial court's failure to find mitigating circumstances clearly supported by the record may imply that they were overlooked and not properly considered, the sentencing judge is not obligated to credit or weigh such evidence the same as the defendant does, nor must the judge necessarily explain the lack of a mitigation finding. Games v. State, 535 N.E.2d 530, 545 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 205, 107 L.Ed.2d 158; Hammons v. State, 493 N.E.2d 1250, 1254-55 (Ind.1986). The defendant argues that the evidence demonstrates the existence of mitigating circumstances under Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-9(c)(2) and (6). However, to constitute such statutory mitigators, the evidence must show that the defendant suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed or that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect. IND.CODE §§ 35-50-2-9(c)(2); (c)(6) (1993) (emphasis added). Addressing these factors, the trial court expressly found that [t]here was no evidence that the defendant... was under any type of influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time the murders ... were committed, and [t]here is no evidence that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law, was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication. Record at 270. We decline to find that the trial court overlooked or improperly considered the evidence. The trial court did not err in its determination that the defendant failed to establish the existence of the (c)(2) and (c)(6) mitigators. Because of his citation to Evans v. State, 598 N.E.2d 516 (Ind.1992), we understand the defendant also to argue that the trial court should have considered the defendant's mental condition as a mitigating circumstance pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-9(c)(8) (Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.). We find, however, that the trial court did expressly find that the defendant's circumstances qualified for consideration as an any other mitigating circumstance permitted by section (c)(8). The court found, as a mitigating circumstance, that the defendant grew up in a dysfunctional family and may have been subjected to physical and emotional abuse. Record at 270. We conclude that the trial court neither overlooked nor failed to consider the defendant's mental condition as a (c)(8) mitigating circumstance. [3] The defendant next asserts that, [i]n his sentencing order, the trial judge improperly considered the `nature and circumstances of the offense,' which is not a statutory aggravator. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 57. We first observe that the circumstances of the crime often provides an appropriate context for consideration of the alleged aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Inclusion of the nature and circumstances of the offense in a trial court's sentencing order does not necessarily compel a conclusion that such matters were improperly considered and weighed as aggravating circumstances. In the present case, contrary to the defendant's assertion, there is no such reference in the court's written sentencing order. The reference to the nature and circumstances of the offense occurred during the trial court's oral remarks at the time of sentencing. There are two reasons why these comments do not amount to the improper consideration of a non-statutory aggravating circumstance. First, as discussed above, our capital sentencing procedure requires that the trial court identify and articulate its reasons in a separate written sentencing order. In the absence of clear contrary indications in the record, we will assume the sentencing order fully discloses the factors considered by the sentencing judge. Cf. Bellmore v. State, 602 N.E.2d 111, 128-29 (Ind.1992) (reversing because trial court's oral explanation upon announcing his decision to impose the death penalty clearly named a non-statutory factor as the determinative factor, notwithstanding omission of said factor in written sentencing statement). Second, notwithstanding the trial court's perfunctory statement that it must consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, the trial judge's oral comments, read in context, consider the nature and circumstance of mitigating, not aggravating, factors. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant asked the trial court to find a mitigating circumstance because he acted under strong provocation. Record at 142. The defendant's version of the murders included a contention that Fillbright approached him, made derogatory racial remarks, and physically threatened him. The defendant claims he shot Fillbright because Fillbright made a movement which the defendant interpreted as maybe going for a gun. Record at 115. When Powers then also moved inside the car, the defendant fired at her. The trial court, in its sentencing remarks, expressed doubt as to this explanation: Another [pre-sentencing] statement revealed that the Defendant believed Mr. Fillbright was about to pull a gun. I do not believe this, as Mr. Fillbright was shot in the back of the head, execution style, at close range. The Defendant also stated he believed Ms. Powers was attempting to pull something from her purse. All the physical evidence shows that Ms. Powers was shot in the back of the head, in the side of her face as she was attempting to get out of her car. The Defendant's explanation for shooting Ms. Powers is just not believable. Record at 929-30. The trial court further mentioned the fact that the defendant drove a car over Fillbright, which is also related to the defendant's mitigation claim that he felt threatened. We agree with the State's argument that consideration of the defendant's driving conduct was relevant to show that Fillbright could not possibly have been a threat to [the] defendant after he had just been shot in the head at close range. Brief of Appellee at 24. We conclude that the trial court properly considered both aggravating and mitigating circumstances and imposed the death penalty in accordance with Indiana law.