Opinion ID: 744751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Proper Inquiry?

Text: 93 Before we turn to the manufacturers' implied pre-emption arguments, we first address the Commonwealth's contention that Cipollone precludes any preemption analysis beyond the scope of the express preemption clause. In Cipollone, the Court held that the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act is governed entirely by the express [preemption] language in ... each Act and explained that Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted. 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618. The Court further stated: In this case, the other provisions of the 1965 and 1969 Acts offer no cause to look beyond [the express preemption provision] of each Act. Therefore, we need only identify the domain expressly pre-empted by each of those sections. Id. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618. 94 Subsequent to Cipollone, the Court clarified the appropriate approach to implied preemption issues in cases in which express preemption language exists. In Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995), the Court acknowledged Cipollone 's holding that the pre-emptive scope of the two statutes at issue was governed by the language in each act, id. at 288, 115 S.Ct. at 1487, but further explained that [t]he fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies'--i.e., supports a reasonable inference--that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption, id. at 288, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. Thus, the Court concluded, [a]t best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule. Id. at 289, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. 95 In this case, the manufacturers' implied preemption arguments are largely based on the ingredient reporting provisions added to the FCLAA by the CSEA in 1984, which were not at issue in Cipollone. See 505 U.S. at 508, 112 S.Ct. at 2613. Thus, the Cipollone Court's refusal to look beyond the express preemption clauses for the purposes of analysis under the 1965 and 1969 Acts does not per se foreclose an implied preemption analysis based on the 1984 amendments. Thus, while we might be tempted to end our preemption analysis here, we feel compelled to explore the manufacturers' implied preemption theories. 96 We are bound, however, by the Cipollone majority's holding that § 1334(b) governs the preemptive scope of the 1965 and 1969 Acts. Having found that the Disclosure Act falls outside the domain of § 1334(b), we engage in an implied preemption analysis only to the extent it relies on the amendments wrought by the CSEA in 1984. In other words, we are not at liberty to address any implied preemption theories based solely on the FCLAA in its 1965 or 1969 versions, independent of the CSEA. Moreover, given that a majority of the Court has indicated that the FCLAA's express preemption clause implies that matters outside its scope are not preempted, see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618, it becomes apparent that any attempt to surmount the presumption against preemption of the state's historic police powers under an implied preemption theory faces a considerable obstacle. See Snow, 898 F.2d at 282 (The burden of overcoming th[e] presumption in favor of state law is heavy in those cases that rely on implied preemption, which rests in turn on inference (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).