Opinion ID: 1727420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to argue for sentencing pursuant to the youth court act

Text: ¶ 31. Gary asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to argue that he should be sentenced under the Youth Court Act. When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court applies the following standard: In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove (1) that his attorney's overall performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance, if any, was so substantial as to prejudice the defendant and deprive him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Furthermore, there is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Walters v. State, 720 So.2d 856, 868 (Miss.1998). To overcome this presumption, [t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Schmitt v. State, 560 So.2d 148, 154 (Miss.1990). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Only where it is reasonably probable that, but for the attorney's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different will this Court find the counsel's performance was deficient. Id. ¶ 32. In Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1128 (Miss.1996), this Court denied Foster's application for post-conviction relief. Foster was a 17-year-old, first-time offender, who was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. One issue raised by Foster was whether his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request a transfer to Youth Court. This Court held: We have repeatedly held that a defendant is procedurally barred by waiver from making a challenge to a capital sentencing scheme as a whole in a petition for post-conviction relief where the issue was capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal but was not raised, and defendant failed to show cause or actual prejudice for not raising the issue on direct appeal. 687 So.2d at 1135. Foster goes even further to say: In this regard, Foster's application for post-conviction relief cites no authority stating that it is ineffective for counsel to not request a special hearing to determine transfer to youth court. Id. However, no authority existed before Foster. This Court may, in its discretion, choose not to review an assignment of error that is not supported by authority. White v. State, 702 So.2d 107, 108 (Miss. 1997). However, failure to cite authority is not an absolute bar. Id. ¶ 33. The present case is distinguishable from Foster. In Foster, Foster was convicted of capital murder, whereas Gary was a 17-year-old convicted of armed robbery. Gary did not possess the gun, punched a victim once, by his own admission, and left the scene driving the victims' truck. The Court in Foster concluded that Foster had a violent, selfish nature, exhibited uncooperative tendencies and, according to the Whitfield Report, had the maturity to know right from wrong. Foster, 687 So.2d at 1136. The Foster Court went even further to say, Attorney Farrow [Foster's trial counsel] would be hard-pressed to convince a judge that his client would not have committed these types of acts six months from the time of the crime.... In the present case, however, Gary had no prior record, nor was he ever known to have violent tendencies. Additionally, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is being brought by Gary on direct appeal, unlike Foster, who merely camouflaged the issue by couching the claim on a motion for post-conviction relief. Id. at 1135. ¶ 34. Consequently, we find no procedural bar exists and choose to address this issue upon appeal. We must first determine whether Gary's trial counsel was deficient by not arguing that Gary be sentenced under the Youth Court Act. Upon sentencing, the trial court confirmed that Gary was 17 years old. Subsequently, Gary was sentenced to 45 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Gary's trial counsel, however, failed to bring alternative sentencing under the Youth Court Act to the trial court's attention. Sentencing, is one of the most crucial and important stages in the trial process. A primary goal of a defense attorney is to minimize the amount of time his or her client is sentenced to serve. Accordingly, Gary's trial counsel was clearly deficient in not raising this argument before the trial court. ¶ 35. Secondly, we must determine whether the trial counsel's deficiency was so substantial as to prejudice the defense. Gary was sentenced to 45 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. There is a reasonable probability, had the trial counsel brought the alternative sentencing under the Youth Court Act to the court's attention, that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Gary was 17 and had no prior offenses. Had trial counsel mentioned, and the trial court accepted, the alternative sentencing, Gary would have spent, at most, one year in the county jail. ¶ 36. While the trial court was not required to sentence Gary under the Youth Court Act, the court was required to consider the alternative sentencing, and counsel's failure to suggest such was prejudicial to Gary's case. The difference between a 45-year prison term for an adult offender and a one-year term in county jail for a minor is substantial. Clearly, Gary's counsel was ineffective by not bringing the alternative sentencing to the court's attention.