Opinion ID: 767846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The FCC's Preemption of Certain State Regulation

Text: 44 As noted earlier, while the rulemaking process was underway, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, providing, inter alia, that 45 No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations concerning such emissions. 46 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). 47 The FCC, as part of its rulemaking, issued a comparable interpretive ruling preempting state and local governments from regulating, based on RF emissions, the operation of personal wireless service facilities that are in compliance with the FCC regulations concerning such emissions. Petitioners claim that the FCC's interpretation is contrary to plain congressional intent. In support of their argument, petitioners point to the deliberate absence of the word operation from the statutory language as evidenced by earlier drafts containing the word. 48 It is now well settled that we review deferentially an agency's construction of the statute that it is charged with administering. Linea Area Nacional de Chile S.A. v. Meissner, 65 F.3d 1034, 1039 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11, 844 (1984)). We must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation where the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a particular issue. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243; Fulani v. FCC, 49 F.3d 904, 910 (2d Cir. 1995). However, [i]f the statutory language is clear, both the agency and the court must defer to Congress's intent. Linea Area Nacional, 65 F.3d at 1039; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 482. 49 The FCC has broad preemption authority under the Telecommunications Act. See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-700 (1984). Congress has circumscribed this authority somewhat, removing from the FCC the power to limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction and modification of personal wireless service facilities. 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(A) (emphasis added). States and local governments, therefore, retain these powers subject to explicit limitations described in subsection (B). Appellants argue that the absence of the word operation from subsection (B)(iv) preserves for the states the right to regulate operations of wireless service facilities as well. Subsection (A) does not, however, preserve their authority to regulate such facilities' operations. Therefore, the absence of the word operation from the subsequent limitation on their authority under subsection (B)(iv) does not grant such power. 50 Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) does not amount to clear congressional intent to permit state and local governments to regulate the operation of such facilities. The FCC's interpretation is therefore entitled to deference and, because the FCC's interpretation is reasonable, we are bound to accept it.