Opinion ID: 2076252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to inform jury of hunt's handgun sentence

Text: Hunt contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to either instruct the jury that Hunt had already been sentenced to 20 years in prison for using a handgun in the murder of Officer Adolfo, or to reopen the case so that Hunt could offer evidence of the sentence. In the alternative, Hunt argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to offer the evidence during his case in chief. A defendant in a death penalty sentencing hearing may offer any relevant and competent information that would aid the jury in assessing the legal and practical effect of a sentence less than death. Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 411-12, 545 A.2d 1281, 1295 (1988). A separate sentence for another crime might have a mitigating effect on the jury. Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 251, 539 A.2d 637, 650 (1988) ( Harris V, because this was Harris' fifth appeal in this Court). A jury, concerned that a defendant be properly punished and not have a chance for an early parole, might find a longer prison stay to be an acceptable alternative to the death penalty. Hunt could have, as part of his evidence of mitigation, offered proof of the handgun sentence. Had he done so, the evidence would have been admissible. In fact, the prosecutor conceded that he would not have objected to such an offer. But Hunt failed to do so, despite ample opportunity throughout his case in chief. Hunt's belated attempt to make the jury aware of the handgun sentence after both sides had rested their cases was subject to the discretion of the judge.
Hunt first asked that the judge take judicial notice of the handgun sentence and instruct the jury that: Mr. Hunt has already received a 20 year sentence for a handgun violation that was related to the offense in this case. That sentence will be served in addition to a sentence of life should your sentence be life imprisonment. The judge properly refused the requested instruction. The proposed instruction was misleading. It asserted that the defendant would serve 20 years in prison in addition to the life sentence the jury might impose for the murder conviction. A consecutive sentence could extend the mandatory minimum time Hunt would have had to serve before being considered for parole; a concurrent sentence would not have the same effect. The judge had no obligation to make the life sentence consecutive to the handgun sentence, and could not declare whether it would be consecutive or concurrent until the defendant had an opportunity to present an allocution. In addition, if the judge had given the proposed instruction, the State would have had no opportunity to rebut or explain the effect of the 20 year sentence. The jury could have only guessed as to the actual impact of the sentence, and its effect on Hunt's parole eligibility. A defendant has no right to an instruction that is inaccurate. Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 290, 568 A.2d 1, 11, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3296, 111 L.Ed.2d 805 (1990). Hunt's requested instruction was potentially misleading and the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing the instruction.
Failing to receive the instruction, Hunt sought to have the judge reopen the case so that he could offer evidence of the sentence. The trial judge has wide discretion in the conduct of a trial. Smith v. State, 299 Md. 158, 179, 472 A.2d 988, 998 (1984). The reopening of a case is within the trial judge's discretion and a denial of a motion to reopen will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. Stansbury v. State, 218 Md. 255, 262, 146 A.2d 17, 22 (1958). See also McCloud v. State, 77 Md. App. 528, 535-36, 551 A.2d 151, 155, modified, 317 Md. 360, 564 A.2d 72 (1989) (within the judge's discretion to deny defendant's request to reopen case for purpose of giving testimony in his own defense). The trial judge had ample reasons to deny Hunt's request. The trial had already reached the instructions phase. Both the State and defendant had rested. Had the judge allowed the defendant to reopen the case in order to present evidence of the handgun sentence, the State might also have sought the opportunity to rebut and explain the effect of parole and good time credits on the 20 year sentence. This might have delayed the jury's deliberations and unduly stressed the testimony in question.... Noel v. State, 202 Md. 247, 252, 96 A.2d 7, 10 (1953). It was a proper exercise of judicial discretion for the trial judge to refuse to allow the defendant to re-open his case. We should also note that the trial judge's failure to grant Hunt's requests did not result in undue prejudice to Hunt. If the handgun sentence had been introduced and explained, the jury would have discovered that Hunt may have served little or no additional time in prison as a result of this sentence. First, the judge would have had to tell the jury that the handgun sentence might be served concurrently or consecutively to the murder sentence. Second, the death penalty sentencing commenced on November 30, 1988. Hunt had been in custody since November 23, 1985, and he could have been eligible for parole on the handgun sentence as early as January 27, 1990. [1] Hunt established through testimony at the hearing that, if the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment, he could not be considered for parole until he served at least 25 years less up to 6 years time off for good behavior. Failure to establish that the earliest possible parole date should be in approximately 20 years rather than 19 years would not tip the scales and cause the jury to believe that death may not be appropriate. Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 475, 499 A.2d 1236, 1254 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986).
Hunt's alternative argument is that his trial attorney's failure to introduce the handgun sentence into evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel's failure to introduce evidence of the sentence earlier in the trial may have been trial strategy. A collateral hearing on the issue, more appropriately conducted in a post conviction proceeding, would be necessary to determine whether counsel was ineffective. Harris v. State, 299 Md. 511, 517, 474 A.2d 890, 893 (1984) ( Harris II, because this was Harris' second appeal in this Court). Unlike the case in Harris II, we are not presented with a unique set of facts which justifies resolution of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a proceeding other than one under the post conviction procedure statute. Id. at 518, 474 A.2d at 893.