Opinion ID: 2150043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Defendant's statements to investigating officers.

Text: Defendant claims infringement of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel as a result of the admission at trial of his statements to police on three occasions  on January 18 and 19, 1989, and on April 4, 1990. At trial, two Indiana State Police detectives and the City of Mount Vernon Police Chief testified as to their roles in the murder investigation, including their questioning of the defendant on those dates. [23] Defendant offers no specifics to support his claim that the January, 1989, statements should have been suppressed, and we are unable to discern any basis for it. Defendant does not contend that he was in custody during this questioning, and the record indicates that he was not in custody and was free to go at the end of the questioning. Miranda safeguards apply only to custodial interrogation, Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and are not applicable to general questioning in a non-coercive atmosphere. Pasco v. State (1990), 563 N.E.2d 587, 593. [24] All questioning appears to have ceased upon defendant's request for counsel on January 20; defendant does not contend to the contrary. The trial court conducted a suppression hearing and concluded that there was no Miranda violation. We agree. No further questioning of defendant occurred until April 4, 1990. This questioning was also non-custodial. Defendant argues that his statement to police should have been suppressed because it was taken in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). According to defendant, this violation occurred because he had requested a lawyer when questioned on January 20, 1989, and he was not provided with a lawyer when questioned again fifteen months later. We cannot agree. Edwards requires that once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been asserted by the defendant, the defendant may not be further interrogated until counsel has been made available, unless the defendant initiates further communication and thereby knowingly and intelligently waives the right previously invoked. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85; James, 613 N.E.2d at 26. Edwards, like Miranda, only applies to custodial interrogation: The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there would have been no infringement of the right that Edwards invoked and there would be no occasion to determine whether there had been a valid waiver. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485-86, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Because the questioning in January, 1989, was not custodial interrogation, no Edwards rights were triggered that could have been violated at the questioning in the April, 1990.