Opinion ID: 870682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ala Loop had a private right of action to enforce HRS chapter 205

Text: Since the ICA relied on Pono in determining that Ala Loop did not have a private right of action, and that the circuit court accordingly lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we begin our analysis there. The ICA held in Pono that private citizens do not have the authority to enforce the provisions of HRS chapter 205 and, therefore, lack standing to invoke a circuit court's jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims under chapter 205. [20] 119 Hawai`i at 167, 194 P.3d at 1129. The plaintiffs, an unincorporated association and several of its members (collectively Pono), filed a complaint in circuit court against Molokai Ranch (MR) for allegedly violating HRS chapter 205 by developing fifteen overnight campgrounds on agricultural lands without obtaining a special use permit pursuant to HRS § 205-6. [21] The complaint alleged jurisdiction pursuant to HRS §§ 6E-13, 603-21.5, 603-21.7(b), 632-1, and Article XI, Sec. 9, Hawaii Constitution. Id. at 173-74, 194 P.3d at 1135-36 (footnotes omitted). The circuit court, relying on a Special Master's report, [22] dismissed the complaint and Pono appealed. Id. at 179, 194 P.3d at 1141. The ICA began its analysis by noting that this court in Reliable Collection Agency v. Cole, 59 Haw. 503, 584 P.2d 107 (1978), had utilized the United States Supreme Court's approach set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), to determine whether `a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one'an analysis that also involves the determination of whether a statute creates a right upon which a plaintiff may seek relief. Pono, 119 Hawai`i at 184-85, 194 P.3d at 1146-47. The ICA further noted that the Reliable court discussed the following three relevant factors used in Cort to make this determination: First, is the plaintiff `one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted[`]...  that is, does the statute create a... right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? Id. at 185, 194 P.3d at 1147 (emphasis and citations omitted). The ICA also cited to Rees v. Carlisle, 113 Hawai`i 446, 153 P.3d 1131 (2007), wherein this court stated that Subsequent to Cort , decisions of the United States Supreme Court have emphasized that the key inquiry is whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action. Whitey's Boat Cruises, Inc. v. Napali-Kauai Boat Charters, Inc., 110 Hawai`i 302, 313 n. 20, 132 P.3d 1213, 1224 n. 20 (2006) (quoting First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Heifer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2000)). Therefore, as we recognized in Whitey's Boat Cruises, we apply Cort 's first three factors in determining whether a statute provides a private right of action though understanding that legislative intent appears to be the determinative factor. Id. See also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) (For a statute to create private rights, its text must be phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286, 121 S.Ct. 1151 [1511], 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.). Pono, 119 Hawai`i at 185, 194 P.3d at 1147 (quoting Rees, 113 Hawai`i at 458, 153 P.3d at 1143). Applying the Rees / Reliable test, the ICA first concluded that no statute expressly creates a private right to enforce HRS chapter 205. Id. at 187, 194 P.3d at 1149. Unlike other statutes enacted by the legislature which expressly authorize private causes of actions for violations of those statutes, the ICA noted that there is no provision in HRS chapter 205 that expressly authorizes a private individual to enforce the chapter. Id. at 187, 194 P.3d at 1149. As to the second factor, the ICA concluded that there was no indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create a private right of action to enforce chapter 205, and that implying a private right of action on the basis of legislative silence would be a hazardous enterprise, at best. Id. at 189, 194 P.3d at 1151 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979)). Finally, as to the third factor, the ICA concluded that recognizing a private right of action to enforce HRS chapter 205 is not consistent with the underlying purposes of HRS chapter 205. Id. The ICA noted that pursuant to HRS § 205-12 (1993), [23] the legislature has delegated enforcement of the restrictions and conditions relating to land-use-classification districts in a county to the county official charged with administering the zoning laws for that county[.] Id. Relying on Lanai Co. v. Land Use Commission, 105 Hawai`i 296, 97 P.3d 372 (2004), in which this court held that HRS § 205-12 authorizes counties, but not the LUC, to enforce chapter 205, the ICA concluded that it would be incongruous to hold that the legislature intended to grant private citizens a right to enforce the provisions of HRS chapter 205 against violators of the chapter. Pono, 119 Hawai`i at 190-91, 194 P.3d at 1152-53. In a concurring opinion, Judge Foley, relying on Kona Old , stated that, I would hold that Pono did not exhaust its administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in the circuit court because Pono did not appeal [the DPW director's] decision to the BVA. Id. at 200, 194 P.3d at 1162. Judge Foley noted that at the time of the events that led to Pono's lawsuit, Section 8-5.4(2) of the Maui County Charter provided that the BVA [h]ear and determine appeals alleging error from any person aggrieved by a decision or order of any department charged with the enforcement of zoning, subdivision and building ordinances. Id. at 199, 194 P.3d at 1161. Under the Maui County Code, the DPW was charged with the enforcement of zoning, subdivision and building ordinances. Id. at 200, 194 P.3d at 1162. Pursuant to § 8-5.4(2), the BVA had the authority to hear and determine appeals alleging error from any person aggrieved by a decision or order of the DPW director. Id. Accordingly, in Judge Foley's view, Pono was required to exhaust its administrative remedies, by appealing the DPW's determination that camping was a permitted use and that a special use permit accordingly was not required, before it could seek judicial review. Id. Ala Loop and the amicus fault the ICA's analysis in Pono on several grounds. First, they note that the ICA did not consider the effect of article XI, section 9 of the Hawai`i Constitution in its Rees / Reliable analysis. Second, they argue that the ICA failed to consider the effect of HRS § 607-25, which authorizes the award of attorneys' fees in actions brought by private parties to enjoin development undertaken without permits, including permits required under Chapter 205. Finally, they argue that the ICA's analysis is inconsistent with cases of this court that granted standing to plaintiffs in environmental cases, and with cases of this court which have implicitly recognized private rights of action to enforce environmental laws, including chapter 205. We conclude that Ala Loop had a private right of action to enforce chapter 205 against Wai`ola. While the Rees / Reliable test is appropriately used to determine whether the legislature intended to create a private right of action when it enacts a statute, it is not applicable when the state constitution creates the private right of action. In Reliable , the question was whether the legislature intended to create a private right of action when it enacted prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law. 59 Haw. at 506, 584 P.2d at 109. In Rees , the question was whether the ordinances of the City and County of Honolulu created a private right of action by which a citizen could seek to enforce the provisions of the city's ethics code against a public official. 113 Hawai`i at 456-459, 153 P.3d at 1141-1144. Neither case addressed the question of whether a provision of the state constitution had created a private right of action. Thus, the ICA erred in Pono and here by applying the Rees / Reliable analysis to chapter 205, without also addressing the question of whether article XI, section 9 created a private right of action for the enforcement of that chapter. For the reasons set forth below, article XI, section 9 creates a private right of action to enforce chapter 205 in the circumstances of this case, and the legislature confirmed the existence of that right of action by enacting HRS § 607-25, which allows recovery of attorneys' fees in such actions.
Article XI, section 9 of the Hawai`i Constitution provides: Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law. This provision was proposed by the 1978 Constitutional Convention, and approved by the voters in the November 7, 1978 general election. See Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1978, at 689 (1980). It has both a substantive and a procedural component. First, it recognizes a substantive right to a clean and healthful environment, with the content of that right to be established not by judicial decisions but rather as defined by laws relating to environmental quality. [24] Second, it provides for the enforcement of that right by any person against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law. In order to determine the relevance of article XI, section 9 here, we must answer several questions. First, is chapter 205 a law[] relating to environmental quality within the meaning of article XI, section 9? Second, is article XI, section 9 self-executing, i.e., does the legislature need to act before the ability to enforce this right can be realized? Finally, if the provision is self-executing, has the legislature acted to impose reasonable limitations and regulation that are applicable in the circumstances of this case, and which would preclude Ala Loop from maintaining an action for alleged violations of Chapter 205?
Article XI, section 9 establishes the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality. The provision goes on to set forth examples of such laws, including laws relating to control of pollution and the conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. HRS chapter 205 is a law relating to the conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources, and thus falls within the scope the enforcement right established by article XI, section 9. When the legislature enacted what became HRS chapter 205 in 1961, it stated that the purpose of the statute was to preserve, protect and encourage the development of the lands in the State for those uses to which they are best suited for the public welfare[.] 1961 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 187, § 1. A committee report on the bill stated that its purpose was to protect and conserve through zoning the urban, and agricultural and conservation lands within all counties in order to, inter alia, conserve forests, water resources and land. See H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 395, in 1961 House Journal, at 855. Moreover, in Curtis v. Board of Appeals, County of Hawai`i, 90 Hawai`i 384, 978 P.2d 822 (1999), this court examined the reason and spirit of the statute and concluded that its overarching purpose... is to `protect and conserve' natural resources and foster `intelligent,' `effective,' and `orderly' land allocation and development. Id. at 396, 978 P.2d at 834 (emphasis added, citation omitted). Consistent with that understanding, the provisions of chapter 205 expressly require consideration of issues relating to the preservation or conservation of natural resources. See HRS § 205-17(3) (requiring that the land use commission in reviewing any petition for reclassification of district boundaries consider among other things [t]he impact of the proposed reclassification on the [p]reservation or maintenance of important natural systems or habitats, the [m]aintenance of valued cultural, historical, or natural resources and the [m]aintenance of other natural resources relevant to Hawaii's economy, including, but not limited to, agricultural resources); HRS § 205-2(e) (mandating that land classified as conservation districts include areas necessary for protecting watersheds and water sources; preserving scenic and historic areas; providing park lands, wilderness and beach reserves; conserving indigenous or endemic plants, fish and wildlife....). Finally, HRS § 607-25 reflects the legislature's determination that chapter 205 is an environmental quality law. That determination is particularly pertinent since article XI, section 9 does not itself define the substantive content of the right to a clean and healthful environment, but rather leaves it to the legislature to determine. HRS § 607-25 is a fee recovery statute that authorizes the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs by private parties against other private parties who undertake development without obtaining all permits or approvals required by law from government agencies[.] HRS § 607-25(e). HRS § 607-25(c) provides that [f]or purposes of this section, the permits or approvals required by law shall include compliance with the requirements for permits or approvals established by chapter[] ... 205... and ordinances or rules adopted pursuant thereto under chapter 91. Thus, permits or approvals required by chapter 205 are expressly covered by the statute. The legislature explained the purpose of HRS § 607-25 as follows: The legislature finds that article XI, section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii has given the public standing to use the courts to enforce laws intended to protect the environment. However, the legislature finds that the public has rarely used this right and that there have been increasing numbers of after-the-fact permits for illegal private development. Although the legislature notes that some government agencies are having difficulty with the full and timely enforcement of permit requirements against private parties, after-the-fact permits are not a desirable form of permit streamlining. For these reasons, the legislature concludes that to improve the implementation of laws to protect health, environmental quality, and natural resources, the impediment of high legal costs must be reduced for public interest groups by allowing the award of attorneys' fees, in cases involving illegal development by private parties. 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 80, § 1 at 104-105 (emphasis added). Thus, in enacting HRS § 607-25, the legislature recognized that chapter 205 implements the guarantee of a clean and healthful environment established by article XI, section 9. Accordingly, we conclude that chapter 205 is a law[] relating to environmental quality within the meaning of article XI, section 9.
In State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412, 629 P.2d 1111 (1981), this court held that a constitutional provision is self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced[.] Id. at 414, 629 P.2d at 1113 (citing Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403, 21 S.Ct. 210, 45 L.Ed. 249 (1900)). However, a provision is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law. Id. The Hawai`i Constitution itself addresses the subject of whether its provisions are self-executing, providing in article XVI, section 16 that [t]he provisions of this constitution shall be self-executing to the fullest extent that their respective natures permit. In Rodrigues , the question was whether article I, section 11 relating to the appointment of independent grand jury counsel was self-executing. [25] Id. at 413-14, 629 P.2d at 1113. We evaluated the plain language of the provision, as well as the intent of the framers as reflected in the standing committee reports from the 1978 Constitutional Convention. Id. at 416-17, 629 P.2d at 1114-15. We concluded that the provision's reference to the appointment, term and compensation of the independent counsel as provided by law reflected the framers' intent that subsequent legislation was required to implement the amendment[,] since at the time the amendment was adopted, there [were] no other constitutional provisions or statutes to which the phrase could refer. Id. at 415, 629 P.2d at 1114. We have revisited the analysis of Rodrigues in several subsequent cases. In In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai`i 97, 131-32, 9 P.3d 409, 443-44 (2000), this court considered a challenge to actions taken by the Commission on Water Resource Management, including the apportionment of water for various uses. The Commission had cited the public trust doctrine, in addition to the State Water Code, as support for its decisions. Id. at 113, 9 P.3d at 425. We held that article XI, section 1 [26] and article XI, section 7 [27] adopted the public trust doctrine as a fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawai`i, and rejected a claim that the doctrine was not self-executing. Id. at 132 n. 30, 9 P.3d at 444 n. 30. We examined the history of the provisions, and concluded that [w]hereas review of the history of article I, section 11 in Rodrigues evidenced the intent to require further legislative action, the same inquiry here reveals that the framers intended to invoke the public trust in article XI, section 7. Id. We cited to article XVI, section 16 as further support for that conclusion. Id. In United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646 v. Yogi, 101 Hawai`i 46, 62 P.3d 189 (2002), this court considered whether a statute which prohibited public employers and public employee unions from collectively bargaining over cost items for the 1999-2001 biennium violated article XIII, section 2 [28] of the Hawai`i Constitution. Id. at 47, 62 P.3d at 190. This court noted that at the time article XII, section 2 was amended in 1968, [29] collective bargaining as provided by law had a well recognized meaning, usage and application under both federal and state laws. Id. at 51, 62 P.3d at 194. Thus, we concluded that  Rodrigues is inapposite[,] and explained: The context in which the phrase as provided by law in Rodrigues was used is factually distinguishable from the situation presented in the instant case. Unlike the amendment at issue in Rodrigues , when article XII, section 2 was amended in 1968, there were pre-existing federal and state statutes, constitutional provisions, and court cases which give meaning to the term collective bargaining. Id. After evaluating the intent of the framers as reflected in committee reports from the 1968 Constitutional Convention as well as the voters' understanding of the term collective bargaining as reflected by its common definition at the time, this court concluded that the provision's reference to collective bargaining had a clear meaning which entailed the ability to engage in negotiations concerning core subjects such as wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Id. at 53, 62 P.3d at 196. Accordingly, this court held that lawmakers did not have the absolute discretion to define the scope of collective bargaining. Id. In Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City and County of Honolulu, 102 Hawai`i 465, 78 P.3d 1 (2003), this court considered whether article XI, section 3 [30] relating to the conservation and protection of agricultural land was self-executing. Id. at 474-76, 78 P.3d at 10-12. This court concluded that article XI, section 3 read as a whole required future action be taken by the legislature in order for the two-thirds vote of the body responsible for the reclassification or rezoning action provision to be effective. Id. This court explained that since the text imposes a duty on the legislature to provide standards and criteria to accomplish the foregoing [mandate with respect to the preservation of agricultural lands], it did not appear that the framers considered article XI, section 3 to be complete in itself, and instead required implementing legislation. Id. at 475-76, 78 P.3d at 11-12. Several principles emerge from these cases. First, we closely review the language of the provision at issue to determine whether it indicates that the adoption of implementing legislation is necessary. While a reference to a right being exercised as provided by law may reflect an intent that implementing legislation is anticipated, see Rodrigues, 63 Haw. at 415, 629 P.2d at 1114, it can be interpreted in other ways, such as simply referring to an existing body of statutory and other law on a particular subject, see Yogi, 101 Hawai`i at 51-53, 62 P.3d at 194-96. [31] Second, we review the history of the provision, to determine if the framers' intent as reflected in that history confirms our analysis of the plain language. The plain language of article XI, section 9 suggests that the right of enforcement described in the provision is self-executing. While the right is subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law, that provision does not suggest that legislative action is needed before the right can be implemented. Put another way, although the provision preserves the ability of the legislature to impose reasonable limitations on the exercise of the right, the right exists and can be exercised even in the absence of such limitations. It is noteworthy that some limitations already existed in the State's environmental laws at the time the amendment was approved in 1978. For example, HRS § 343-7(a) (Supp.1975) provided that judicial proceedings challenging the failure to prepare an environmental impact statement must be brought within 180 days. Absent the final clause in article XI, section 9, it could be argued that such provisions would be unconstitutional because they restrict the right to enforce environmental quality laws. Thus, the situation here is similar to that in Yogi , where the phrase as provided by law in article XIII, section 2 was interpreted as a reference to the existing law of collective bargaining, rather than that in Rodrigues , where article I, section 11 established a new right to grand jury counsel, and the phrase as provided by law reflected the framers' understanding that administrative details such as the compensation of the counsel needed to be addressed by the legislature first. It is also worth noting that the right at issue herei.e., the right to seek enforcement through appropriate legal proceedingsis within the ability of the judiciary to implement without legislative action. Unlike the establishment of a new right to grand jury counsel, which raised issues of implementation such as who gets to serve as such counsel and how much they will be paid, establishing a right to enforce environmental rights does not raise practical issues of implementation. This interpretation of the plain language of article XI, section 9 is confirmed by an examination of the intent of its framers, as reflected in the proceedings of the 1978 Constitutional Convention. The report of the Committee on Environment, Agriculture, Conservation and Land observed: Your Committee believes that a clean and healthful environment is an important right of every citizen and that this right deserves constitutional protection. .... Your Committee believes that this important right deserves enforcement and has removed the standing to sue barriers, which often delay or frustrate resolutions on the merits of actions or proposals, and provides that individuals may directly sue public and private violators of statutes, ordinances and administrative rules relating to environmental quality. The proposal adds no new duties but does add potential enforcers. This private enforcement right complements and does not replace or limit existing government enforcement authority. Your Committee intends that the legislature may reasonably limit and regulate this private enforcement right by, for example, prescribing reasonable procedural and jurisdictional matters, and a reasonable statute of limitations. Your Committee believes that this new section adequately recognizes the right to a clean and healthful environment and at the same time would prevent abuses of this right. Concern was expressed that the exercise of this right to a clean and healthful environment would result in a flood of frivolous lawsuits. However, your Committee believes that if environmental law enforcement by government agencies is adequate in practice, then there should be few additional lawsuits, given the barriers that litigation costs present. Moreover, your Committee is convinced that the safeguards of reasonable limitations and regulations as provided by law should serve to prevent abuses of the right to a clean and healthful environment. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1978, at 689-690 (1980). The committee report does not indicate that the framers understood that implementing legislation was needed before enforcement actions could be brought pursuant to article XI, section 9. To the contrary, the report explicitly recognizes that the provision provides that individuals may directly sue public and private violators. [32] Id. at 690. While the report recognizes that the legislature retains the power to impose reasonable limits on the right to bring suit, such as statutes of limitations, [33] it does not suggest that such limits must be in place before actions can be brought. [34] Id. at 689-90. This interpretation is further confirmed by the subsequent actions of the legislature, which reflect its understanding that the provision was self-executing. In 1979, the State House appointed the committees on Ecology and Environmental Protection and the Judiciary to serve as a joint Interim Committee to review article XI, section 9 to determine whether legislation is necessary to implement the right to a clean and healthful environment established by the provision. H. Spec. Comm. Rep. No. 22, in 1980 House Journal, at 1247. The joint Interim Committee reviewed the provision and its history, and held a hearing at which various witnesses testified, including four former delegates who served on the committee that drafted the provision. Id. at 1247-48. The committee reported to the House as follows: Your joint Interim Committee ... finds that both of the constitutional rights contained in the environmental rights amendment took effect and were granted to each person in Hawaii immediately upon ratification, at the general election of November 7, 1978, of the amendment to the Hawaii State Constitution now designated as Article XI, Section 9. Your Committee relatedly finds and concludes that the environmental rights amendment (Article XI, Section 9) is self-executing or self-implementing, and that no legislation is necessary at this time to implement its provisions. Id. at 1248. The committee further reported that [a]lthough Article XI, Section 9 does not mandate the legislature to enact limitations and regulations, testimonies presented by representatives from the private sector ... expressed concern that the broad, liberalized standing-to-sue provision in the subject amendment will encourage a flood of lawsuits[.] Id. at 1250. The report noted that the experience to date in Hawai`i with the provision, as well as that in other states (such as Illinois) with similar provisions, did not justify those concerns. Id. Thus, the report concluded that your joint Interim Committee on Environmental Rights recommends no legislation, at this particular time, to implement, limit or regulate the provisions of, or the rights granted by[] article XI, section 9. Id. (emphasis in original). The report is not dispositive in our analysis since it cannot change the meaning of article XI, section 9 as approved by the voters in 1978, and since it sets forth the views only of the joint committee, rather than the legislature as a whole. Nevertheless, it is relevant to the extent that it provides an explanation for the non-action of the legislature, which is the body that would be charged with enacting legislation to implement the provision if it was not self-executing. Even stronger evidence of the legislature's views on the self-executing nature of article XI, section 9 came in 1986, when the legislature enacted Act 80, which was codified as HRS § 607-25. When the legislature enacted Act 80, it specifically included chapter 205 among the list of provisions for which attorneys' fees could be recovered in a suit by one private party against another for an injunction against development undertaken without permits or approvals. See 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 80, § 607 at 105 ([f]or purposes of this section, the permits or approvals required by law shall include compliance with the requirements for permits or approvals established by chapter[] ... 205 ... and ordinances or rules adopted pursuant thereto under chapter 91.). Although one might read the inclusion of chapter 205 within HRS § 607-25 as creating a cause of action under HRS § 607-25, the legislature's findings and committee reports all suggest that the legislature understood that such causes of action already existed and were authorized by article XI, section 9. See 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 80, § 1 at 104-05 (The legislature finds that article XI, section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii has given the public standing to use the courts to enforce laws intended to protect the environment. However, the legislature finds that the public has rarely used this right....); H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 766-86, in 1986 House Journal, at 1373 (Your Committee further finds that if the bill is adopted, it will give fuller effect to Article XI, Section 9 of the State Constitution, which gives Hawaii's people the right to bring lawsuits enforcing environmental laws.); S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 450-86, in 1986 Senate Journal at 976 (The bill will give fuller effect to Article XI, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii, which gives Hawaii's people the right to bring lawsuits enforcing environmental laws.). In sum, it appears that the legislature found in 1986 that article XI, section 9 was self-executing. Moreover, to ensure that the public was not dissuaded from asserting their rights under that provision, the legislature enacted HRS § 607-25 to allow citizens to recover their attorneys' fees for bringing a successful civil action against a private party for a violation of the enumerated chapters (including chapter 205) contained within the statute. This view is consistent with this court's discussion of HRS § 607-25 in Kahana Sunset Owners Association v. Maui County Council, 86 Hawai`i 132, 948 P.2d 122 (1997). In Kahana, the plaintiffs failed to prevail on appeal in an action against a private defendant with regard to the approval of a rezoning application. Id. at 133, 948 P.2d at 123. After a review of the legislative history of HRS § 607-25, this court concluded that the legislature intended that individuals and organizations would help the state's enforcement of laws and ordinances controlling development by acting as private attorneys general and suing developers who did not comply with the proper development laws. Id. at 134-35, 948 P.2d at 124-25. We concluded that an award of attorney's fees to the defendants was not warranted, because the plaintiffs' arguments were not frivolous. Id. at 135, 948 P.2d at 125. The conclusion that article XI, section 9 is self-executing is also widely supported in the scholarly writing about the provision. See Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in Wildlife, 35 Land & Water L.Rev. 23, 65 (2000) (describing article XI, section 9 as expressing a manifest self-executing nature); Janelle P. Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment: Enforcing Environmental Protection Through State and Federal Constitutions, 11 Int'l Legal Persp. 185, 208 (2001) (noting that this court in Kahana found that Hawaii's environmental constitutional provision, Article XI, Section [9], gives citizens standing to use the court to protect the environment); Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 Fordham Envtl. L.Rev. 107, 139 (1997) (noting that this court in Kahana affirmed that article XI, section 9 gives the Hawaiian people the right to bring lawsuits to enforce environmental laws); David Kimo Frankel, Enforcement of Environmental Laws in Hawaii, 16 U. Haw. L.Rev. 85, 135 (1994) (noting that article XI, section 9 was intended to be self-executing and that [t]he plain language and history of [that] provision declare that citizens have the right to sue, but that this right can be limited and regulated by the Legislature). This court's other decisions have not directly addressed whether article XI, section 9 is self-executing. See Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp. ( Superferry I ), 115 Hawai`i 299, 320 n. 28, 167 P.3d 292, 313 n. 28 (2007) (stating that [a]lthough this court has cited [article XI, section 9] as support for our approach to standing in environmental cases, we have not directly interpreted the text of the amendment, and declining to discuss the meaning of article XI, section 9 further because the environmental statute at issue contained specific language regarding who may enforce the law and the parties did not discuss the constitutional provision in their appellate briefs) (internal citations omitted); Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 63 Haw. 166, 172 n. 5, 623 P.2d 431, 438 n. 5 (1981) (noting that standing requirements are tempered by article XI, section 9); see also Bremner v. City & County of Honolulu, 96 Hawai`i 134, 145 n. 3, 28 P.3d 350, 361 n. 3 (App.2001) (addressing the text of article XI, section 9 to the extent it recognized that, [i]n his complaint, Bremner asserts the omission of an environmental assessment violated his environmental rights under article XI, section 9 of the Hawai`i Constitution. The manner in which Bremner's rights under article XI may be enforced, however, is governed by section 9's qualification that any such legal proceeding be `subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.' Haw. Const. art. XI, § 9. Because Hawai`i Revised Statutes ch. 343 provides reasonable limitations and regulations for adjudicating disputes involving environmental assessments, Bremner's failure to comply with its provisions forecloses further consideration of his constitutional claim.). While several of our decisions have touched upon the existence of private rights of action for violations of environmental laws, they did not consider article XI, section 9. See Citizens for the Prot. of the N. Kohala Coastline v. County of Hawai`i, 91 Hawai`i 94, 979 P.2d 1120 (1999); Whitey's Boat Cruises, Inc. v. Napali-Kauai Boat Charters, Inc., 110 Hawai`i 302, 132 P.3d 1213 (2006). [35] For the foregoing reasons we conclude that article XI, section 9 is self-executing. Having determined that article XI, section 9 is self-executing, we turn to whether the legislature has acted to impose reasonable limitations and regulation that might preclude Ala Loop from maintaining an action for alleged violations of chapter 205.
Article XI, section 9 provides that the legislature has the authority to impose reasonable limitations and regulation on potential litigants, such as Ala Loop, who seek to bring private actions to enforce laws relating to environmental quality. In its response to the application, Wai`ola argues that the legislature has expressly delegated enforcement of chapter 205 to the counties in HRS § 205-12, [36] and thereby precluded a private right of action by Ala Loop. In support of its argument, Wai`ola cites to Lanai Co. v. Land Use Commission, 105 Hawai`i 296, 318, 97 P.3d 372, 394 (2004). Although the response does not discuss article XI, section 9, Wai`ola's argument amounts to a contention that HRS § 205-12 is a reasonable limitation[] and regulation within the meaning of the provision. However, HRS § 205-12 does not preclude Ala Loop's private right of action to enforce chapter 205. In Lanai Co ., this court considered the power of the Land Use Commission (LUC) to enforce the provisions of chapter 205. After examining the authority granted to the LUC under chapter 205, we concluded that the LUC must necessarily be able to order that a condition it imposed be complied with, and that violation of a condition cease. Id. However, we further concluded that HRS § 205-12 gave the counties, rather than the LUC, the authority to enforce the provisions of chapter 205. Id. We noted that although HRS § 205-12 expressly gave enforcement authority to the counties, [t]here is no provision in HRS § 205-12 that expressly delegates enforcement power to the LUC. Id. We added that [i]f the legislature intended to grant the LUC enforcement powers, it could have expressly provided the LUC with such power. Id. Thus, the issue in Lanai Co . was which of two governmental entities (the LUC, or the county) was authorized by the legislature to enforce chapter 205. There was no suggestion that article XI, section 9 was relevant to that analysis, or that HRS § 205-12 reflected any intent by the legislature to preclude private enforcement. Thus, Lanai Co . is not dispositive of the issues here. In any event, if we were to interpret HRS § 205-12 as Wai`ola suggests, it would exceed the power granted to the legislature in article XI, section 9 to impose reasonable limitations and regulation on the right of private enforcement. The inclusion of the word reasonable in that phrase clearly indicates that the power to limit or regulate is not unfettered. The abolishment of the private right altogether by HRS § 205-12, on the theory that the county would enforce the same underlying substantive interests, would not be a reasonable limitation within the meaning of the provision. This interpretation is supported by the history of article XI, section 9. After discussing the right to a clean and healthful environment, the report of the 1978 Constitutional Convention's Committee on Environment, Agriculture, Conservation and Land observed: Your Committee believes that this important right deserves enforcement and has removed the standing to sue barriers, which often delay or frustrate resolutions on the merits of actions or proposals, and provides that individuals may directly sue public and private violators of statutes, ordinances and administrative rules relating to environmental quality. The proposal adds no new duties but does add potential enforcers. This private enforcement right complements and does not replace or limit existing government enforcement authority. Your Committee intends that the legislature may reasonably limit and regulate this private enforcement right by, for example, prescribing reasonable procedural and jurisdictional matters, and a reasonable statute of limitations. Your Committee believes that this new section adequately recognizes the right to a clean and healthful environment and at the same time would prevent abuses of this right. Concern was expressed that the exercise of this right to a clean and healthful environment would result in a flood of frivolous lawsuits. However, your Committee believes that if environmental law enforcement by government agencies is adequate in practice, then there should be few additional lawsuits, given the barriers that litigation costs present. Moreover, your Committee is convinced that the safeguards of reasonable limitations and regulations as provided by law should serve to prevent abuses of the right to a clean and healthful environment. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1978, at 690 (emphasis added). As the highlighted sections of the report indicate, the framers understood that private enforcement would complement government enforcement, rather than be supplanted by it. The clear import of the passage is that reasonable limitations and regulation would encompass matters such as statutes of limitations or procedural or jurisdictional limitations. While such restrictions might preclude a particular plaintiff from bringing suit in a particular circumstance, the framers did not envision that they would be used to eliminate private enforcement altogether. Accordingly, we conclude that HRS § 205-12 does not limit or restrict the ability of Ala Loop to enforce the provisions of chapter 205 against Wai`ola. Finally, we note that Wai`ola has not identified any other reasonable limitations or regulation. Specifically, it has not suggested that exhaustion or primary jurisdiction applies. Accordingly, we do not address whether the application of those doctrines would constitute a reasonable limitation or restriction under the facts of this case. Cf. Pono, 119 Hawai`i at 192-201, 194 P.3d at 1154-1163 (Foley, J., concurring) (concluding that Pono's action was properly dismissed since Pono did not exhaust its administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in the circuit court, because Pono did not appeal the decision of the director of Public Works and Waste Management to the Board of Variances and Appeals).
We respectfully disagree with the dissent's suggestion that this court has recognized a private right of action for adjoining landowners who are affected by land use decisions that interfere with the enjoyment of their property, dissenting opinion at 1141, based on our holdings in Dalton v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969), East Diamond Head Association v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City and County of Honolulu, 52 Haw. 518, 479 P.2d 796 (1971), Town v. Land Use Commission, 55 Haw. 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974), Perry v. Planning Commission of the County of Hawaii, 62 Haw. 666, 619 P.2d 95 (1980), and Mahuiki v. Planning Commission and Planning Department of the County of Kauai, 65 Haw. 506, 654 P.2d 874 (1982). To the extent the cases cited by the dissent focus on the status of the plaintiffs as adjoining landowners, they did so in the context of assessing standing. [37] Moreover, the appeals in East Diamond Head Association , Town , Perry , and Mahuiki were brought pursuant to chapter 91, and do not establish the existence of a private right of action outside of that context. In Dalton , the plaintiffs, who apparently `live[d] across the street from [the] real property' at issue, sought a declaratory judgment that four Honolulu zoning ordinances were null and void. 51 Haw. at 400-01, 403, 462 P.2d at 201, 202. The defendants, lessees and developers of land rezoned under the ordinances, argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.  Id. at 402, 462 P.2d at 202 (emphasis added). This court identified the issues to be resolved as  standing, laches, and the validity of the ordinances. Id. (emphasis added). In addressing the defendants' standing argument, this court concluded that [p]laintiffs' interest in this case is that they `reside in very close proximity' to the proposed development.... Clearly this is a `concrete interest' in a `legal relation'. Id. Accordingly, this court concluded that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the validity of the ordinances in question. Id. (emphasis added). Without addressing whether the plaintiffs had a private right of action to challenge the ordinances, [38] this court went on to address the plaintiffs' contention that the ordinances were null and void, and concluded that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants was erroneous. Id. at 408, 417, 462 P.2d at 205, 209. In East Diamond Head Association , an association of neighboring landowners challenged the trial court's order concluding that the association was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of the Hawai`i Administrative Procedures Act (HAPA), and was therefore not entitled to judicial review of the zoning board's issuance of a variance allowing a parcel of land to be used for movie production. [39] 52 Haw. at 518-19, 479 P.2d at 796-97. The zoning board had held a public hearing on the movie studio's petition for the variance, at which members of the association had testified that the movie operation interfered with the enjoyment of their property[.] Id. at 520-21, 479 P.2d at 797-98. After the zoning board's decision to issue the variance, the association instituted proceedings for a judicial review under [§] 91-14(a) (1968) of the [HAPA]. Id. at 521, 479 P.2d at 798. The trial court dismissed the association's agency appeal, finding that the association was not entitled to review as a person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case as provided for in HRS Chapter 91 and HRS [§] 91-14(a) because it had not intervened in the board's proceedings[.] Id. This court disagreed and concluded both that the association was a person aggrieved and that the public hearing was a contested case. Id. at 522, 524, 479 P.2d at 798, 799. In concluding that the association was a person aggrieved, this court noted that the [s]tudio's industrial use within [the association members'] residential neighborhood as sanctioned by the board's zoning variance immediately and directly affects each homeowner[,] and that the association members were therefore not merely tangentially touched by the zoning change[.] Id. at 522, 479 P.2d at 798. In holding that the public hearing was a contested case, this court concluded that the association had done everything possible to perfect an appeal by comport[ing] with all board procedural dictates[.] Id. at 524, 479 P.2d at 799. Accordingly, this court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. In Town , adjoining landowners challenged the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the Land Use Commission (LUC), where the LUC had approved a petition to amend the district designation for a parcel of land from agricultural to rural. 55 Haw. at 539, 524 P.2d at 85. The LUC had held a public hearing on the petition, at which the adjoining landowners spoke in opposition to the [] petition. Id. at 539, 524 P.2d at 86. Two subsequent meetings were held, at which a decision on the petition was deferred. Id. At a third meeting, where the adjoining landowners were not present, the owner of the parcel spoke to rebut all statements made by the opposition to his petition and submitted documents for the consideration of the [LUC.] Id. at 540, 524 P.2d at 86. A motion to approve the petition was carried, but the Vice-Chairman of the LUC noted that the motion was `not based on anything that was said here today because these facts were made known to us before.' Id. The adjoining landowners appealed, seeking reversal of the LUC's decision. Id. In the adjoining landowners' agency appeal, this court concluded that the meeting at which the petition was approved was a contested case, id. at 548, 524 P.2d at 91, the provisions of the HAPA were applicable, id. at 545, 524 P.2d at 89, and the LUC had violated the provisions of the HAPA in accepting the owner's testimony and evidence, id. at 549, 524 P.2d at 91. In concluding that the meeting was a contested case [40] within the meaning of HRS § 91-1(5), we noted that: The appellant has a property interest in the amending of a district boundary when his property adjoins the property that is being redistricted. Therefore, any action taken on the petition for boundary change is a proceeding in which appellant has legal rights as a specific and interested party and is entitled by law to have a determination on those rights. Id. at 548, 524 P.2d at 91 (citations and footnoted omitted). This court further concluded that the approval of the petition was rendered in violation of HRS [§§] 205-3 and 205-4 as well as Land Use Regulation 2.35 because the LUC had failed to act on the petition within the prescribed statutory period. Id. at 542-545, 524 P.2d at 87-89. In Perry , adjoining landowners challenged the grant of a special permit to Shield-Pacific, Ltd. and Kapoho Land and Development Company (hereinafter Applicants), who had filed an application with the County of Hawai`i Planning Commission (planning commission) seeking permission to use a parcel of land for quarrying purposes. 62 Haw. at 669, 619 P.2d at 99. Since the land was within an `agricultural' district for purposes of Land Use Law, HRS Chapter 205, favorable actions upon the request by both the [planning commission] and the [LUC] were necessary before such use was permissible. Id. The planning commission held a public hearing, at which opponents object[ed] to the proposed quarrying operations[.] Id. at 670-71, 619 P.2d at 100. The planning commission later voted to permit the requested use, and the planning commission's decision was transmitted to the LUC pursuant to HRS § 205-6. Id. at 671, 619 P.2d at 100. Following a lengthy public meeting in which opponents of the application again voiced their ... concerns, the LUC approved the special permit. Id. at 672, 619 P.2d at 101. The owners of property adjoining the proposed quarry site appealed from the decision and order of the LUC, and the circuit court set aside the grant and approval of the special permit on several grounds, including that the planning commission had not acted on the application in a timely manner and that the LUC therefore lacked jurisdiction to act on the permit. Id. at 672-73, 619 P.2d at 101. The government agencies and the Applicants appealed the circuit court's judgment. Id. at 673, 619 P.2d at 101. On appeal of the circuit court's judgment, this court did not address jurisdiction, but instead proceeded directly to address the appellants' arguments on the merits and reversed the circuit court. Id. at 673-86, 619 P.2d at 101-08. Thus, although Perry provides an example of adjoining landowners bringing a chapter 91 appeal of a LUC decision, [41] it contains no discussion directly relevant to the issues here. In Mahuiki , a limited partnership sought to develop a condominium and single family residence project at Haena on Kaua'i. 65 Haw. at 508, 654 P.2d at 876. The partnership sought various approvals from the Kaua'i Planning Commission, including a special management area use permit under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), HRS chapter 205A. Id. at 508, 654 P.2d at 876. The commission held a hearing on the request, and approved the permit with conditions. Id. at 511, 654 P.2d at 877-78. The appellants, who were adjacent landowners or residents of Haena, id. at 515, 654 P.2d at 880, appealed to the circuit court, challenging the commission's approval of the permit on numerous grounds, id. at 512, 654 P.2d at 878. The circuit court dismissed the appeal on the ground that appellants had not participated in the administrative proceedings. Id. On appeal, this court first considered the appellants' standing to seek review of the administrative action[,] and concluded that two of the appellants had satisfied the requirements of HRS § 91-14 since there was a final decision and order in a contested case, appellants' interests were injured, and they had submitted written testimony in opposition to the permit request and thus were involved in the contested case proceedings. Id. at 508, 512, 514-15, 654 P.2d at 876, 878-80. With regard to the injury to the appellants' interests, we noted that: The interests asserted by appellants were special and personal unto themselves, as they are adjacent landowners or residents of Haena. And a decision to permit the construction of multi-family housing units on undeveloped land in the special management area could only have an adverse effect on their environment. Id. at 515, 654 P.2d at 880. We then concluded that the planning commission erred by omitting a required finding, and accordingly vacated the dismissal of the case. Id. at 519, 654 P.2d at 883. In sum, each of these five cases addressed standing requisites. Dalton expressly discussed its determination that adjoining landowners had a `concrete interest' in a `legal relation' in standing terms. 51 Haw. at 403, 462 P.2d at 202. Mahuiki , Town and East Diamond Head Association directly addressed questions relating to whether the adjoining landowners had standing to appeal an agency action in a contested case under HRS § 91-14. [42] Perry , similarly, was an agency appeal, and did not directly discuss standing or private rights of action. Moreover, to the extent that Mahuiki , Town and East Diamond Head Association discussed the nature of the parties' status as adjoining landowners, they did so in the context of determining whether they were person[s] aggrieved for purposes of HRS § 91-14. Because the landowners lived adjacent to the properties that were the subject of the proposed land use action at issue in each case, we determined that they had a sufficient stake to be aggrieved persons. Thus while the nature of the impacts that the neighboring landowners alleged provided the basis for determining that they had standing under HRS § 91-14 as persons aggrieved, at no point in our discussion in those cases did we suggest that they had a cause of action independent of chapter 91 based on their status as neighboring landowners. See Punohu v. Sunn, 66 Haw. 485, 487, 666 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1983) (holding that it would be anomalous to permit a declaratory judgment action to be substituted for an appeal from an agency determination in a contested case). Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the dissent's interpretation of these cases, and conclude that they did not recognize the existence of a private right of action in the circumstances here.
Ala Loop had a private right of action under article XI, section 9 of the Hawai`i Constitution to enforce its chapter 205 claims against Wai`ola. [43] Accordingly, the ICA erred in its March 12, 2009 SDO, and the ICA's April 22, 2009 judgment must be vacated.