Opinion ID: 2516780
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Considerations of deterrence, past punitive awards, and common law factors support the jury's awards of punitive damages.

Text: Finally, the seventh statutory factor, examining the total deterrence of other damages and punishment imposed on the defendant ... including compensatory and punitive damages awards to persons in situations similar to those of the plaintiff, [34] encompasses the appellants' concern for common law factors in assessing punitive damages. In comparing this jury award to those of past cases, the Association and Merculief treat the two punitive damages awards here as one award of $600,000 against the Association and point out that this court has only once allowed a punitive damages award larger than $600,000. [35] We note, however, that this does not mean that the jury's award here was excessive. Indeed, if we examine the awards as they were madeone award of $400,000 and one of $200,000we see that case law supports awards of this magnitude. [36] The Association and Merculief also argue that we should look for guidance to the United States Supreme Court's three guideposts for determining whether punitive damages awards are excessive: (1) the egregiousness of the conduct at issue, (2) the relation between the actual damages and the punitive award, and (3) whether the defendant received fair notice from statutes or previous cases that it could be subject to a punitive award of the magnitude in issue. [37] We agree and proceed to do so. [38] First, as discussed above, the appellants' deliberate use of defamatory statements to get rid of Anderson and to push her out of her chosen career and industry reasonably constituted egregious misconduct. Next, although AS 09.17.020 creates a normal ratio of 3-to-1 for the relationship between punitive and compensatory damages awards, this court has never enforced a specific ratio with regard to such awards. The statute itself clearly allows awards departing from the 3-to-1 ratio. [39] Moreover, this court has upheld several punitive damages awards where the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was greater than 3-to-1. In Pluid v. B.K., we upheld a punitive to compensatory ratio of 5-to-1. [40] In Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors , we allowed a ratio of 10-to-1. [41] We upheld a 48.3-to-1 ratio in Norcon v. Kotowski. [42] As we noted in Cameron v. Beard, [t]his court has refused to prescribe a definite ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. Though comparing punitive and actual damage awards is one way to determine if punitive damages are excessive, other factors ... are equally important to the determination. [43] Here, the jury awarded compensatory damages totaling $35,000 on Anderson's defamation claim and Anderson will be entitled to approximately $13,000 for lost wages. The jury's punitive awards of $400,000 and $200,000 result in ratios of 8.33-to-1 and 4.16-to-1 respectively. Given the Association's and Merculief's conduct and motives in this case, we find that those ratios are not excessive. Finally, as to the United States Supreme Court's last criterion, the Association and Merculief did have notice that they could be subject to punitive damages awards of the magnitude here. We have upheld awards of this magnitude and greater in the past. [44] Further, AS 09.17.020 imparts notice that punitive damages may be awarded for malicious acts and that awards of up to $7,000,000 may be permitted where the acts are motivated by financial gain and committed with knowledge of their consequences. Thus, while the jury's awards of punitive damages against the Association and Merculief are relatively high, they are not beyond sustainable limits according to statute, common law, or constitutional standards. Viewed deferentially or de novo, we conclude that the trial court did not err in upholding the jury's determination of punitive damages.