Opinion ID: 2450831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the deed transaction

Text: The trial court found and concluded that defendant did not secure this deed from plaintiff by practicing fraud, trickery and deceit upon her; that there was no confidential relationship between them and no undue influence by him upon her decision to deed the property to herself and defendant as joint tenants and not as tenants in common. These findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. The only questions remaining are whether there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, mixed questions of law and fact. In this connection, the court further found as fact that plaintiff went to her own attorney, unaccompanied by the defendant and executed a deed to her homeplace to herself and the defendant as joint tenants; that the deed was recorded by her attorney and mailed to her; that the deed was among plaintiff's effects left with the defendant when she went on her [European] trip, and she showed the deed to defendant and told him she made him survivor of it; that the deed was returned to her when she returned from the trip. These findings, with one exception, are supported by substantial evidence. The exception is: that she told him she made him survivor of it. There is evidence she showed him this deed, but none that she made such a statement about the deed or homeplace at any time. The court was presented with similar questions in Wilkie v. Elmore, 395 S.W.2d 168 (Mo.1965), the answers to which are applicable to the facts in this case. The court said at 172: Cancellation of a deed is the exercise of the most extraordinary power of a court of equity; such power should not be exercised except in clear cases upon proof which is clear, cogent and convincing, and the burden of such proof is on the party who seeks the cancellation. Cruwell v. Vaughn, Mo., 353 S.W.2d 616, 624[1-4]. On the issue of whether there was a delivery of the deed, the burden of showing nondelivery rests upon plaintiff because she is the one who seeks to invalidate the deed upon that ground. Cleary v. Cleary, supra, 273 S.W.2d [340] l. c. 346[9]; O'Mohundro v. Mattingly, Mo., 353 S.W.2d 786, 792[1]. It is not necessary that there be an actual manual delivery of a deed in order to accomplish an effective delivery, Marshall v. Hartzfelt, 98 Mo.App. 178, 71 S.W. 1061, 1062; Hafford v. Smith, Mo. App., 369 S.W.2d 290, 294[3]   . Although recording of a deed, even by the grantor, does not in itself operate as a delivery of the deed, such recording as here creates a presumption or a prima facie case of delivery in view of our recording statute, Section 442.390, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.   . The acceptance necessary to delivery and validation of the deed can be presumed where the transfer of an interest is beneficial to the defendant grantee as in this case. Clark v. Skinner, 334 Mo. 1190, 70 S.W.2d 1094, 1099[12]. The court said in Schroyer v. Schroyer, 425 S.W.2d 214, 219-220 (Mo.1968): It is not necessary, in order to constitute a delivery of a deed, that the instrument actually be handed over to the grantee or to another person for the grantee. There may be a delivery notwithstanding the deed remains in the custody of the grantor. Baker v. Baker, 363 Mo. 318, 251 S.W.2d 31, 33 A.L. R.2d 1431, and authorities cited l. c. 37. Under the facts and circumstances presented, including the recording of the deed, there was a strong presumption of delivery and acceptance of the deed. There is no clear, cogent and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption. Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof. Accordingly, the decree on Count V setting aside this deed is reversed. In summary, we reverse on Count I, we affirm on Count II, we reverse on Count IV, we reverse on Count V and we affirm as modified on Count VI. The judgment of the trial court on Count III was for defendant and plaintiff did not appeal therefrom. Accordingly, it remains as entered in the trial court. MORGAN, C. J., and BARDGETT, RENDLEN and SEILER, JJ., concur. DONNELLY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed. SIMEONE, J., not participating because not a member of the court when cause was submitted.