Opinion ID: 2978496
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plan’s Terms

Text: 8 SBC maintains that all of the previous commissions were consistent with the Plan’s terms and, hence, its terms or, stated more accurately, SBC’s interpretation of the Plan’s terms governed the commissions for the CCI Agreement. SBC fails to demonstrate that a reasonable jury must conclude that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the large sales provision in the Plan. However, even if the plaintiffs were aware of its terms, SBC fails to show that a reasonable jury must conclude that the plaintiffs assented to SBC’s interpretation of the provision. There were ample facts in the record from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Anton was unaware of the large sales provision, and thus, could not have assented to it. SBC argues that Anton should have been aware that she was bound to the Plan’s terms because her June 10, 1999, offer letter refers to it. The letter, in part, states: In addition to your base salary, you will participate in the GBS 1999 Solutions Consultant-Data Compensation Plan (your manager will provide details of the plan administration). Anton requested the Plan from her manager at the time, but there is no evidence that she received the Plan. When she asked for the Plan, her manager told her that her commissions were paid based on LCR. No one told her that large sales would be compensated differently. SBC also claims that Anton accessed the database containing the Plan right before the CCI Agreement was signed and, thus, was aware of its terms. But Anton testified that she only accessed the database to get pricing information and was unaware that the Plan’s compensation terms were also there. Further, SBC points out that it emailed “compensation banners” to sales employees, which contained a link to the Plan. This is the strongest evidence that could show Anton was aware the Plan could be accessed electronically. Still, there was no proof that Anton received these emails. Moreover, SBC did not require the plaintiffs to sign a statement acknowledging receipt of the Plan, 9 as had been the practice in years before their employment and since the CCI Agreement. This fact provides further support that SBC has failed to show that a reasonable jury must find that Anton had knowledge of the Plan’s terms. With respect to Snipes, the evidence showed that she at least had some knowledge of the Plan’s terms and how to access them. Unlike Anton, Snipes acknowledged that she accessed and viewed the Plan on Lotus Notes in March 2000 before the CCI Agreement was signed. She “breezed through the [Plan]” but testified that she did not come across the large sales provision. In addition, unlike Anton, Snipes acknowledged receiving the compensation banner emails that had links to the Plan. Thus, a reasonable jury must conclude that Snipes had at least some knowledge of the Plan and its terms—clearly more than Anton. Nonetheless, given that the Plan’s terms were sufficiently vague and the other evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor, Snipes’ mere knowledge of the Plan’s terms is not enough to overturn the jury’s verdict. SBC responds that the plaintiffs’ subjective interpretations of the Plan are not relevant here since the terms are clear and unambiguous. See L & S Bearing Co. v. Morton Bearing Co., 93 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Mich. 1959) (“In Michigan the law is clear that where a written contract is not ambiguous the intention of the parties as expressed on the face thereof must be followed . . . .”). In other words, SBC argues that knowledge of the terms is enough to bind the plaintiffs since the terms are unambiguous. But the large sales provision3 merely states that sales with an LCR greater than $2 million will be “reviewed by the BCS Sales Compensation Team (SCT) to determine the 3 SBC also cites a clause in the Plan that states that its Sales Compensation Team can “[r]esolve any and all sales credit . . . situations.” Like the large sales provision, this clause is ambiguous. After reading this clause, a reasonable person would not necessarily conclude that SBC had discretion to reduce the plaintiffs’ commissions for large contracts. 10 commission payment.” Even if a reasonable person read this provision, she could come to the conclusion that SBC reviewed large contracts to ensure correct calculations of commissions—not to devise a new commission scheme. Based on Jensen, SBC argues that the parties’ implied-in-fact contract cannot conflict with an express policy of SBC—i.e., the Plan. On the surface, Jensen has similar facts to the case at hand, but the material facts are distinct. Similar to Anton and Snipes, the plaintiff in Jensen felt that he was under-compensated for a large contract that he secured for IBM. 454 F.3d at 385-86. He did not agree with his sales commissions, which were a smaller percentage than what he had previously received and, hence, filed suit against IBM. Id. at 386. Like SBC, IBM alleged that it treated large sales differently. Id. Jensen based his contract claim, in part, on a “glossy brochure” that IBM provided and “his employee quota letter.” Id. at 386. In addition, he pointed out the higher commission rates he had received on smaller contracts. In the instant case, Anton and Snipes have not alleged that the terms of the implied-in-fact contract come from SBC documentation, like the plaintiff in Jensen did. There, the Jensen court stated that the plaintiff could not use only the sections of an employer’s policy that he agreed with and disregard those sections that were not in his favor. Id. at 389-90. To that end, IBM’s policy expressly stated that it was making no offer and incorporated by reference provisions that mentioned its intention to limit commissions for large sales. Id. at 387-89. Here, there is no express contract, 11 but rather a question over the terms of an implied contract.4 The plaintiffs do not argue that the Plan should decide the terms. SBC does. Hence, the facts of Jensen are materially different. Separately, SBC argues, based on Mannix v. County of Monroe, 348 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2003), that “reasonable notice” was sufficient to bind Anton and Snipes to its interpretation of the Plan. Specifically, SBC contends that having the Plan on an electronic Lotus Notes database was sufficient to bind Anton and Snipes to its interpretation of the Plan’s terms. Mannix, however, was a legitimate expectation case and, thus, the terms were decided based on an employer’s promises to the workforce in general; the instant case is one of implied-in-fact contract and thus the terms are decided based on what Anton and Snipes reasonably believed them to be in light of SBC’s statements and conduct—not necessarily SBC’s promises to the entire workforce. See Novak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 599 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that a legitimate expectations claim rests on “the employer's promises to the work force in general-for example, promises contained in a company handbook-rather than on promises made to an individual employee” (citing Nieves v. Bell Indus., Inc., 517 N.W.2d 235 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Dolan v. Cont’l Airlines/Cont’l Express, 563 N.W.2d 23 (Mich. 1997))). Thus, Mannix is inapplicable.5 4 SBC believes that Brozo v. Oracle Corp., 324 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003) also assists it in arguing that, when an express policy is in place, an employee cannot, as a matter of law, recover commissions on a theory that is contrary to that policy. The question in Brozo was whether the contract terms were ambiguous. Id. at 665. Brozo is inapposite because it is not clear that an express policy was in place at SBC. The question before the jury here was what terms the plaintiffs reasonably believed they assented to based on SBC’s statements and conduct. Thus, the inquiry here is broader than that in Brozo. Also, unlike the policy in Brozo, the Plan’s large sales provision is ambiguous, as the plaintiffs’ and SBC’s interpretations of the provision are both reasonable. 5 SBC also asserts, based on Grow v. General Products, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990), that general circulation of the Plan was enough to bind Anton and Snipes to the terms. In Grow, the employer sent a memo around that stated employment was at-will. Id. at 168. While Grow involved a claim for an implied contract for just cause employment, it nevertheless involved a different inquiry than the instant case. For the same reasons that Mannix is inapplicable, Grow is also 12 SBC counters that Mannix is applicable since it cites Rowe, which involved an implied-infact contract claim. But Rowe is distinguishable from the instant case as well. The question in Rowe was “whether an employer's oral statements and written policy statements created an employment contract terminable only for cause.” Rowe, 473 N.W.2d at 269-70. Under Michigan law, there is a presumption that employment is at will. Id. at 271-72. The presumption can be overcome if there is an express contract stating otherwise or if there is proof of a “promise implied in fact” stating otherwise. Id. at 271. The plaintiff in Rowe believed that the employer’s oral statements amounted to a contract to terminate only for just cause. Id. at 272. While the court in Rowe applied the same test the jury did here, see id. at 273, Rowe is distinct for three reasons.6 First, the employee in Rowe had to overcome the presumption of employment at will. Here, there is no presumption that SBC’s interpretation of the Plan should apply. Rather, the parties have agreed that there is an implied-in-fact contract and the terms are in dispute. Second, Anton and Snipes are relying on more than oral statements; they also have course of dealing evidence in their favor. There was no course of dealing evidence in Rowe. Finally, SBC’s attempt to analogize the Plan to the handbooks sent to employees in Rowe fails. Unlike the plaintiff in Rowe, Anton may have not received the Plan. See id. at 276 (mentioning that “the last handbook which plaintiff received clearly set forth an employment-at-will policy”). In addition, the plaintiffs here could have reasonably interpreted the Plan differently than SBC did. As has been discussed, inapplicable. 6 The first two reasons that distinguish Rowe also serve to further distinguish Mannix from the instant case. Specifically, the plaintiff in Mannix similarly had to overcome a presumption of employment at will, and he had no course of dealing evidence to support his claim. In the instant case, there is no similar presumption at issue and the plaintiffs have significant amounts of course of dealing evidence in their favor. 13 the plaintiffs had a reasonable basis for concluding that SBC merely reviewed large contracts to ensure that commissions were calculated correctly—not to reduce or adjust the commissions scheme for the contracts. On the other hand, the handbooks in Rowe clearly stated that employment was at will, so that was the only reasonable interpretation of the handbooks. Id. at 270. Ultimately, Rowe is distinct from the instant case.