Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect on the Benintende count

Text: As to the Benintende count, defendant claims that because the concurrence instruction referred only to the mental state of intent to kill, the court failed to instruct the jury that the mental state required for implied malice murder  conscious disregard for life  must exist at the same time as the acts causing death. This asserted error was one of state law, subject to the Watson standard of harmless error. (See People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 219-220, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365 [applying Watson reasonable probability standard to error in failing to instruct on concurrence requirement for murder].) Any error was harmless. The instructions on implied malice and second degree murder on an implied malice theory substantially covered the concurrence of act and mental state required for implied malice murder. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 220, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) The instruction defining malice aforethought told the jury that malice is implied when the killing results from an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life, or when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.  The implied malice murder instruction contained similar wording. The italicized language in these instructions adequately informed the jury of the concurrence requirement. [21] (See People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 381, 280 Cal.Rptr. 146; see also People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1142-1143, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Finally, the conflict between the implied malice instruction and the concurrence instruction was harmless as to the Benintende count. At worst, the erroneous concurrence instruction might have led the jury to believe it had to find a mental state more culpable than that required for second degree murder  that is, specific intent to kill rather than mere implied malice. Because the instruction at most could have been understood as imposing a burden on the prosecution more onerous than the law required, defendant could not have been prejudiced under any standard.