Opinion ID: 1003698
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Contribution Action

Text: After the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the Callahan verdict, SLU filed this contribution action against the United States. In its complaint, SLU alleged that Danny Callahan’s polio was caused by the government’s failings identified in the In re Sabin cases, specifically the government’s approval of excessively neurovirulent vaccine seeds. The government moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that SLU was barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating the Callahan jury’s conclusion that SLU’s malpractice caused Danny’s polio. The district court granted the motion, concluding that SLU was prohibited from relitigating the following facts that the court believed the Callahan jury necessarily found in order to reach its verdict against SLU: (1) that SLU breached the applicable standard of care when treating Danny’s abscess; (2) that Danny’s immune system would not have been suppressed but for SLU’s inadequate treatment of the abscess; (3) that, but for the suppressed state of Danny’s immune system, the live polio virus contained in the vaccine would not have been able to replicate fast enough to cause polio; and (4) that, but for SLU’s negligence, Danny would not be paralyzed. In essence, the district court’s collateral estoppel ruling prevented SLU from arguing that it was not negligent at all or that any negligence on its part did not contribute to Danny’s polio, but the ruling allowed SLU to proceed on any theory consistent with the Callahan verdict. Thus, after the collateral estoppel order, SLU could still prevail on its contribution claim against the government if it could establish that an immunosuppressed child would not have contracted polio from a vaccine that complied with all regulatory requirements. After the collateral estoppel ruling, the parties engaged in eighteen months of discovery. The government then moved for summary judgment on the ground that SLU could not prove that the government’s negligence caused Danny’s polio. The district court reviewed the evidence submitted by SLU and concluded that it was insufficient, given 6 ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. UNITED STATES the Callahan findings, to establish a causal connection between the government’s negligence and Danny’s injuries. The court explained that SLU’s experts continue to be of the view that, the verdict in the Callahan case notwithstanding, Callahan’s system had not been immunosuppressed. That view is central to their evaluation of the medical evidence and cannot be separated from their opinion that Callahan’s paralysis was caused by the neurovirulence of the vaccine. Therefore, to permit their opinions to be admitted into evidence would undermine the collateral estoppel ruling I have made. . . . [N]one of SLU’s experts have expressed an opinion that, if Callahan had been given a vaccine that satisfied the neurovirulence requirements of the applicable regulations, he would not have contracted polio . . . . SLU asserts that it never tendered these witnesses as experts on neurovirulence. SLU goes on to say that the whole purpose of their testimony was to show that Danny Callahan was a paralytic poliomyelitis case from Type III vaccine, and that immunosuppression played a de minimis role. As such, the testimony is insufficient to meet SLU’s burden of proof as to causation since SLU’s theory of liability against the government necessarily rests upon the implicit premise that an immunosuppressed child (as Callahan must be assumed to have been) would not have contracted polio but for the alleged excessive neurovirulence of the vaccine administered to him. Appendix at 89-90. The district court therefore granted summary judgment to the government on SLU’s contribution claim. SLU appeals, contending that the district court’s collateral estoppel ruling was incorrect under Missouri law and that it produced sufficient evidence of causation to avoid summary judgment.