Opinion ID: 864505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether there was sufficient evidence of

Text: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL TREATMENT TO SUPPORT THE CHANCELLOR'S DIVORCE DECREE. ¶12. We begin by referring to that portion of the chancellor's bench decision which is excerpted above. That excerpt shows that the chancellor made some specific findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals later found insufficient to meet the standard of proof. ¶13. There is no question that there are areas of the law where specific findings are mandated. A division of marital assets is one such area. Fisher v. Fisher, 771 So. 2d 364, 369 (Miss. 2000); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994). If findings are not mandated by the nature of the case, procedural rules are applied to determine whether findings should be made. Lowery v. Lowery, 657 So.2d 817, 818-19 (Miss. 1995). In a case tried without a jury, the court may make specific findings of facts and conclusions of law, but shall do so when requested by a party or by if required by another rule. M.R.C.P. 52(a). A uniform chancery court rule says essentially the same thing, and the uniform rule recites that it is made pursuant to Rule 52. Unif. Chan. Ct. R. 4.01. While a chancellor is not directed by rule to make findings and conclusions in the absence of a request, whether findings should be made is a separate question and depends largely on the complexities of the case. See M.R.C.P. 52 cmt. 5 ¶14. Here Jack did not request, through objection at trial or post-trial motion, that the chancellor make amended or additional findings. Notwithstanding that failure, the rule permits him to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. M.R.C.P. 52(b). However, whether additional or amended findings are requested affects the standard of review. ¶15. If a request is made and no ruling is entered, the appellate court must consider the effect of the trial court's missed responsibility, and overwhelming evidence may be required as a condition for affirmance. Lowery, 657 So. 2d at 819. If no request is made, as here, the appellate court accepts facts specifically found unless manifestly wrong. The court will then review the record and presume that the chancellor resolved, in the appellee's favor, those fact issues not specifically found. Owen v. Owen, 798 So. 2d 394, 398 (Miss. 2001); Bryant v. Cameron, 473 So.2d 174, 179-80 (Miss. 1985); Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So. 2d 1139, 1143-44 (Miss. 1983). Where the presumption applies, the chancellor's decision will stand if it is supported by substantial and credible evidence. Owen, 798 So. 2d at 398. ¶16. An appellate court will view the facts of a divorce decree in a light most favorable to the appellee. Richard v. Richard, 711 So. 2d 884, 888 (Miss. 1998). If specific findings are made without clear error, the appellate court will draw from those findings all reasonable inferences which support the trial court's ruling. Bruce v. Bruce, 687 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (Miss. 1996); Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss. 1987). ¶17. Our determination of the proper scope of review is particularly applicable to appeals of fault-based divorces. In Fisher, 771 So. 2d at 368, this Court affirmed a divorce for habitual cruelty after conducting its own examination of the record. A de novo review of another record resulted in a reversal of a finding of habitual cruelty where the only finding was that there was sufficient testimony to warrant a divorce. 6 Potts v. Potts, 700 So. 2d 321, 322 (Miss. 1997). In a case involving the fault-based ground of adultery where no facts were found, the Court of Appeals reached similar conclusions to those stated here. After careful review of precedent, the Court of Appeals' recent opinion demonstrates that an absence of findings is frequently decried, then followed by a de novo review to determine if the record supports the fault-based divorce Curtis v. Curtis, 796 So. 2d 1044, 1047-50 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). ¶18. In a bench trial, the trial judge has sole authority to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Bell v. Parker, 563 So. 2d 594, 597 (Miss. 1990). Here, the chancellor made a specific finding that Susan and her witnesses were credible. That finding is not qualified or limited, and there is a special endorsement of the testimony regarding the indictment. The finding is not manifestly wrong. No finding was made regarding Jack's credibility. An entirely reasonable, if not inescapable, inference is that the testimony by and for Susan should be given substantial weight, while Jack's testimony should be given correspondingly less weight. ¶19. Different standards of proof apply to the different grounds of fault-based divorce. Adultery, for example, requires clear and convincing proof. Rushing v. Rushing, 724 So.2d 911, 917 (Miss. 1998). Habitual cruel and unusual treatment is proved by the less stringent preponderance of the evidence standard. Smith v. Smith, 614 So.2d 394, 396 (Miss.1993). If that standard is met to the chancellor's satisfaction, the judgment below will not be disturbed unless we find a manifest error of law or fact. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 437 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1983). ¶20. Habitual cruel and unusual treatment is defined as conduct that (1) endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the offended party, or (2) is so unnatural and infamous as to make the marriage revolting to the offended spouse and 7 render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance. Daigle v. Daigle, 626 So.2d 140, 144 (Miss.1993); Gardner v. Gardner, 618 So. 2d 108, 113-14 (Miss. 1993); Rawson v. Buta, 609 So. 2d 426, 431 (Miss. 1992). ¶21. While the facts in this case just breach the threshold of conduct sufficient to support granting a divorce based upon habitual cruel and unusual treatment, we find the chancellor's judgment to be supported by the evidence. Most of the conduct in this case correlates to the second category of habitual cruelty described in Daigle. Proof on this ground does not require maltreatment which is intended for or directed at the offended spouse. Instead, it can be established by the effect of unnatural and infamous conduct upon the offended spouse. ¶22. Seldom will conduct fit neatly into a single category, and the facts in this case present elements which somewhat overlap the two categories. For example, it is undisputed that Jack filed assault charges against Susan, subjecting her stress and embarrassment. The pressure put on Susan to carry on Jack's business is another example. Those are types of behavior which were specifically directed at Susan. ¶23. The words unnatural and infamous have not been precisely defined by precedent because the plain meanings of those words are sufficient. Such conduct is found or not found on a case by case basis. Cases involving cruel and unusual conduct have typically presented unusual and unique factual situations, and it is impossible to provide a list of unmistakable bright-line markers of such conduct. There are, however, some guidelines which give a sense of the conduct necessary to provide a threshold. Physical violence directed at the offended spouse is not required. Richard, 711 So.2d at 889 (slovenly behavior coupled with accusations of incest held sufficient). Mere unkindness, rudeness, petty indignities, frivolous quarrels, incompatibility or lack of affection are not sufficient. Steen v. Steen, 641 So.2d 1167, 1170 8 (Miss. 1994); McKee v. Flynt, 630 So.2d 44, 48 (Miss. 1993). One set of conduct evincing habitual cruel and unusual conduct is ill-founded accusations, threats and malicious sarcasm, insults and verbal abuse which cause such mental suffering as to destroy health and endanger the life of an innocent spouse. Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 859 (Miss.1994). ¶24. There is a dual focus on the conduct of the offending spouse and the impact of that conduct on the offended spouse. Fisher, 771 So. 2d at 368. The effect of the conduct on the offended spouse is determined by a subjective standard, which is to say that an attempt is made to weigh the likely effects of the conduct on the offended spouse, as opposed to a normative standard. Morris v. Morris, 783 So.2d 681, 688 (Miss. 2001); Talbert v. Talbert, 759 So.2d 1105, 1110 (Miss. 1999); Faries v. Faries, 607 So.2d 1204, 1209 (Miss. 1992). ¶25. While a criminal indictment obviously does not equate to a conviction, an indictment for three counts of attempted murder is serious business for all concerned. An indictment is a determination by a grand jury that probable cause exists to hold the person indicted for trial. Stevenson v. State, 244 So.2d 30, 33 (Miss. 1971). The indictment against Jack was introduced into evidence at the trial for divorce. Unfortunately for him, the stain of the indictment might never be removed completely from Jack or his family, even in the event that he is acquitted. It has become a matter of public record and media fixation. Susan testified of matters relating to the charges against Jack which gave her cause for grave concern. The chancellor apparently found this testimony especially compelling and credited this testimony towards the ultimate finding. Under the precise facts of the case, we cannot say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong. 9 ¶26. The indictment is not all there is to consider and weigh. There is the testimony that Susan was frequently subject to verbal abuse in the time before the indictment. There is the assault charge Jack brought against Susan but never prosecuted. There is the testimony regarding the pressure Jack placed on Susan to continue his business in his absence. There was testimony regarding Jack's selfish use of marital assets. Those are among the matters which can be deemed to have been proved to the chancellor's satisfaction under the standard of review and given the ruling on credibility. ¶27. Finally, there are the questions surrounding the child pornography on the home computer. The parties were the only ones with access to the computer. Both testified that Susan was computer illiterate or barely literate. Jack made no claim that Susan had planted the pornography. Instead he blamed a law enforcement officer who, Jack said, had a personal vendetta against him. Yet Susan testified that she watched the officers boot the computer and stayed until they found the offensive materials, and she said the officers never inserted anything into the computer. Jack never revealed what the officer stood to gain or did gain from the alleged vendetta. Susan's testimony was corroborated and credible; there was no finding regarding Jack's. ¶28. We accept circumstantial evidence as proof of adultery because of its typically secretive nature, even though adultery has a higher standard of proof than habitual cruelty. Holden v. Frasher-Holden, 680 So.2d 795, 798 (Miss. 1996). Child pornography is likewise of a secretive nature. In these facts we can infer that the chancellor counted the facts surrounding the child pornography as additional proof of unnatural and infamous conduct. ¶29. The sum of the evidence supports a finding of unnatural and infamous conduct. The chancellor found that such conduct had an impact on Susan's health. These findings are not manifestly wrong. The 10 chancellor applied the correct standard of proof. The chancellor's judgment granting a divorce should be reinstated.