Opinion ID: 1822394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grant of Cause Challenge

Text: In his first issue, Johnson asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in excusing juror Grace Monforte for cause after she voiced doubt over her ability to recommend a sentence of death. After reviewing Monforte's responses during voir dire, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the challenge for cause. The validity of a cause challenge is a mixed question of law and fact, on which a trial court's ruling will be overturned only for manifest error. Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 281 (Fla.1999). Manifest error is tantamount to an abuse of discretion. See Kimbrough v. State, 700 So.2d 634, 638-39 (Fla.1997) (stating that court's determination of juror's competency will not be overturned absent manifest error and concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing a juror for cause). The trial judge has the duty to decide if a challenge for cause is proper, and this Court must give deference to the judge's determination of a prospective juror's qualifications. Castro v. State, 644 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla.1994) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). A potential juror may be excused for cause if the juror has a state of mind regarding the case that will prevent the juror from acting with impartiality. § 913.03(10), Fla. Stat. (2006). In a capital case, this standard is met if a juror's views on the death penalty prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with the juror's instructions or oath. Fernandez, 730 So.2d at 281. A juror must be excused for cause if any reasonable doubt exists as to whether the juror possesses an impartial state of mind. Ault v. State, 866 So.2d 674, 683 (Fla.2003). Monforte gave a range of responses to questions concerning the death penalty on voir dire. As did the trial court, we consider these responses in their totality. Cf. Franqui v. State, 804 So.2d 1185, 1192 (Fla.2001) (relying on vacillation throughout voir dire in reviewing grant of cause challenge); see also Meade v. State, 867 So.2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (reviewing grant of cause challenge based on the totality of the juror's responses). When first asked by the State about her views on the death penalty, Monforte stated: I don't say I don't believe in the death penalty, but I would choose it as a very very last resort. She elaborated: I don't know, don't agree with it, I don't agree that it should be applied to everything, even though I feel that everybody has the right to live and if a person takes another's life, they should pay for their consequences, their actions, but the death penalty, I would have some doubt myself. MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Are you doubting your ability to vote for the death penalty? GRACE MONFORTE: Yes, I'm doubting my ability that I could. I don't believe in it but could I bring myself to not vote for it, no. If it needed to be that way then, yes, I could vote for it. I don't like it, I don't agree with it. MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Let's take this one step further. The law is going to provide, as I said, the definition of aggravators, mitigators, you weigh the two, assuming that the state has proved one aggravator, one or more, then you weigh those and you come out with what should be an appropriate recommendation in this case. That may disagree with the way you feel. You may sit there and say, the law says I should vote for this, but I just don't like it and I don't want to do it in this case and this is not one of the cases I would define as calling for the death penalty, could you subordinate your own feelings and vote for the death penalty in this case or are your personal feelings so strong you just wouldn't be able to? GRACE MONFORTE: I down [sic] know. I can't give you a yes or no answer. Monforte later responded affirmatively when the prosecutor stated that her prior answers indicated she was unsure of her attitude about the death penalty and her ability to vote for it. Subsequently, she told defense counsel that she could weigh the sentencing circumstances and would vote for the death penalty as a last resort. Finally, Monforte had the following exchange with the prosecutor: MR. SEYMOUR: . . . Ms. Monforte, kind of did this earlier today, I think you told us that you really don't like the death penalty? GRACE MONFORTE: Correct. MR. SEYMOUR: And you really wouldn't like to vote for it? GRACE MONFORTE: Correct. MR. SEYMOUR: I think I asked you earlier whether your ability [sic] about the death penalty would substantially impair your ability to follow the law in that regard and to vote for it if it were required? GRACE MONFORTE: I would definitely follow the law if asked to, but it's not something I like to do. I would not  I would like to follow the law, I would not like to give that decision. The trial court concluded that the entire sequence of her comments and statements during voir dire provided sufficient grounds to grant the challenge for cause. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. A potential juror's initial response to questioning about the death penalty alone will not automatically provide good cause for excusal if subsequent responses alleviate doubt on the juror's ability to impartially render an advisory verdict. However, a juror who gives consistently equivocal voir dire answers on his or her ability to recommend death is subject to a challenge for cause. Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 942-43 (Fla.2003). In Conde, we rejected a claim that the trial court erred in granting a cause challenge against a juror whose equivocal responses evinced what the trial court termed deep doubt about her ability to serve in a death penalty case. Id. Similarly, in Franqui, this Court found no abuse of discretion in excusing for cause jurors who vacillated or gave equivocal responses on whether they could recommend the death penalty. Franqui, 804 So.2d at 1192; cf. Fernandez, 730 So.2d at 281 (concluding that challenge to grant of cause challenge would have no merit even if it had been preserved because [t]he four prospective jurors to whom appellant points gave equivocal responses to questions from the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court as to whether they could follow the law and set aside their beliefs concerning the death penalty); Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla.1995) (concluding that trial court erred in denying a cause challenge against a death penalty supporter who said he could follow the court's instructions but gave other responses sufficiently equivocal to cast doubt on this). Persistent equivocation or vacillation by a potential juror on whether he or she can set aside biases or misgivings concerning the death penalty in a capital penalty phase supplies the reasonable doubt as to the juror's impartiality which justifies dismissal. In their totality, Monforte's responses indicated a state of mind concerning the death penalty that would have substantially impaired her ability to perform her duties as a juror. Therefore, the trial court did not err in excusing her for cause on grounds that she lacked the qualifications necessary to serve as a juror in a capital case.