Opinion ID: 399825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the proper respondent in the appeal

Text: 33 We must next decide if the OSHRC, the named respondent in this petition for review, has the authority to participate as a party in this court in a proceeding to review one of its decisions. American Cyanamid, in its motion to dismiss, contends that no case or controversy exists because the OSHRC cannot participate as a party. While we agree with the company that the Act limits the role of the OSHRC to that of an adjudicatory agency and precludes the OSHRC from independent representation in judicial proceedings before this court, we decline to dismiss these proceedings. We grant the motion to remove the OSHRC from these proceedings; concurrently, we grant the OCAW's motion to amend and reform the caption and to name the company as the proper party respondent in this petition for review. 34 The circuits are sharply divided on the question of whether the commission is a proper party to an OSHA appeal. Three circuits have held that the commission is not a proper party. 10 Two circuits have stated this position in dictum. The Second Circuit has noted that the commission is assigned the relatively limited role of administrative adjudication. General Electric Company v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 61, 63 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978). In Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1974), the Tenth Circuit found that the commission is an adjudicatory body with no regulatory powers. 35 The opposite position has been taken by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. In Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1267 (4th Cir. 1974), the Fourth Circuit held that it is appropriate for the commission to appear in the courts of appeals to defend the policies Congress empowered it to adopt in adjudication. In Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 648 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976), the court noted that the commission is properly a party similar to other administrative agencies in suits by the Secretary or private parties to review its orders. 36 An examination of the legislative history 11 and the statute persuades us to endorse the position adopted by five other circuits that the commission does not have the authority to participate as a party in proceedings to review one of its decisions. 37 When read together, the legislative history and the statutory scheme of the Act compel the conclusion that Congress designed the commission as an independent adjudicator. Other statutes which provide for judicial review of commission action, and which have been construed to allow the commission to be named as respondent, are simply not analogous to this Act. Under these statutes, true adversity exists between the claimant of a government benefit and the commission which seeks to withhold it. Thus, when review of commission action is sought by an unsuccessful applicant for a license before the FCC, see 47 U.S.C. § 402, or an unsuccessful applicant for a rate increase before the FERC, see 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b), it is clear that the commission must be named a respondent since it is the party against whom relief is sought: the court could not grant an effective remedy without its presence. Similarly, the NLRB may be called upon as a party to defend its decisions in court, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(f), because adjudication is being sought of its right to grant and enforce relief on behalf of the prevailing party before it. 38 In this instance, the OSHRC has no enforcement power comparable to the FCC, FERC or the NLRB. We believe the OSHRC should never be considered a proper statutory respondent under 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). The commission was envisioned by its creators to be similar to a district court. It was established to settle disputes between employers and the Secretary of Labor over citations issued by the Secretary's inspectors. The commission, like a district court, has no duty or interest in defending its decision on appeal. As a purely adjudicative entity, it has no stake in the outcome of the litigation. Accordingly, the OSHRC may not participate in this court to review the commission decision as a party respondent in proceedings initiated by any party to the commission hearing. 12 39 Sufficient adversity exists between the parties at the commission proceeding to ensure a proper case or controversy at the appellate level. When an employer initiates a hearing before the commission to contest the issuance of a citation, the Secretary automatically is a party respondent in the action. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c). He is charged with defending the action of his inspectors in issuing the citation. Employees may intervene as parties in these hearings. Id. If the commission rules in favor of the Secretary and affirms the citation, the employer, a party adversely aggrieved by the commission's order, may file a petition for review of that order within sixty days of the issuance of the order. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). In this instance, the Secretary is the proper party respondent. His interest was adverse to the employer in the commission proceeding below and continues to be so on appeal. He has an interest in sustaining a commission action with which he agrees. 40 In those instances where the commission rules in favor of the employer and dismisses the citation, two parties may appeal the commission's order. The Secretary may file a petition for review of the commission's action. 29 U.S.C. § 660(b). He may have an interest in seeking review of a decision of which he disapproves. In this instance, the employer would be the proper respondent. Like an appellee in the appeal of a district court decision, the employer has a concrete stake in having the commission's order affirmed. 41 In a case such as the instant one, where the union is appealing an adverse decision by the commission, the proper party respondent is the employer. 13 The deletion of the OSHRC does not trigger any jurisdictional problem potentially foreclosing the effective adjudication of the merits of the appeal. The rationale of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a) which mandates that each petition for review of an agency order shall name the agency as respondent is inapplicable. 42 In most cases, a single private party is contesting the action of an agency, and the agency must appear and defend to assure the adversarial stance requisite to a case or controversy. In this case, however, sufficient adversity exists between the union and the company to insure proper litigation without the participation of the OSHRC. The company's interest is adverse to the interests of the petitioner union. It can be expected to litigate vigorously to sustain the ruling of the OSHRC. The union plainly has an interest in having the OSHRC decision reversed and the citation upheld, resulting in an invalidation of the company's Fetus Protection Policy and a fine assessed against the company. To require the OSHRC to appear as a party would parallel requiring a district court to appear and defend its decision upon direct appeal. Just as a district court may not defend its decision in the court of appeals, the OSHRC has no authority to defend its order before this court. 43 In this case, the motion to amend and reform the caption to delete the OSHRC and add the company as a respondent was filed thirty-three days after the sixty-day statutory period to file a proper petition for review of the OSHRC decision had expired. We are in agreement with other circuits that courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to grant relief from a final OSHRC order unless a petition for review is filed within the sixty-day period following the date the order becomes final. Consolidated Andy, Inc. v. Donovan, 642 F.2d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 1981); Midway Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 616 F.2d 346, 347 (7th Cir. 1980); Hoerner Waldorf Pan American Bag Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 614 F.2d 795, 796 (1st Cir. 1980). 44 We are not confronted, however, with this problem. In this case, the petition for review was timely filed but the petitioners mistakenly named the OSHRC as the respondent. Discovering its mistake, the union moved to amend its petition to name the company as the proper respondent; by this time, the statutory sixty-day period had expired. We recognize that, in similar circumstances, some courts 14 have held that the petition must be dismissed for failure to file timely. They have construed the motion to amend as one which initiates a new proceeding outside of the sixty-day statutory period. We are unwilling to adopt so draconian an attitude, particularly in this instance. The jurisdictional issue raised by the company's motion to dismiss is one of first impression in this circuit. Because of the ambiguity in the statutory language and the split in the circuits over the proper respondent in actions brought to review an OSHRC decision, we decline to penalize the union for its mistake in naming the OSHRC as respondent. To do so would defeat unjustly the union's opportunity to prove its case. 45 We will consider this motion to amend the caption as one which relates back to the date on which the petition for review was filed. 15 The company was put on notice of the petition for review within the sixty-day period by means of delivery of process. In addition, the company knew that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper respondent, the action would have been brought against it. We accordingly deny the company's motion to dismiss for failure to name a proper respondent and grant the union's motion to amend the caption to dismiss the OSHRC and add the company as a party respondent.