Opinion ID: 1425795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Coconspirator Statement Against Morell

Text: This ground of appeal, also advanced only by Morell, concerns Cobián's testimony on direct examination about one of the meetings in which Vázquez proposed the extortion scheme to Cobián. Cobián testified that he asked Vázquez who else would be helping the subcontractors to secure the Superaqueduct contract, and that Vázquez told Cobián it would be Morell and Granados. At this, Morell objected on hearsay grounds, arguing that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay. The district court provisionally allowed the testimony under our rule in United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.1977), and later kept it on the record after assessing it in light of other evidence presented at trial. See United States v. Mangual-García, 505 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2007). Morell now argues that this constituted reversible error because the testimony was the only piece of evidence linking him to a conspiracy involving Vázquez. Our case law instructs district courts faced with a challenge to the admission of a coconspirator hearsay statement to admit the statement provisionally and wait until the end of trial to consider four factors in the light of all the evidence: (1) whether a conspiracy existed; (2) whether the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; (3) whether the declarant was also a member of the conspiracy; and (4) whether the declarant's statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Colón-Díaz, 521 F.3d at 35-36 (citing Petrozziello, 548 F.2d at 23; Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)). If these four conditions are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence, the statement qualifies under the coconspirator exemption to the hearsay rule and may therefore be admitted into evidence  including to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id. at 35. We review preserved challenges to a Petrozziello determination (or a portion thereof) for abuse of discretion, and unpreserved challenges for plain error. Id. at 36-37. In a sealed written order, the district court made the Petrozziello determination, finding the four Rule 801(d)(2)(E) factors satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence. Morell did not object to this assessment with respect to the first, third, and fourth Rule 801(d)(2)(E) factors, and does not quarrel with it now. As such, he forfeited any challenge to the court's findings on these factors. United States v. Thompson, 449 F.3d 267, 273 (1st Cir. 2006). As concerns the second factor  whether Morell was a member of the conspiracy  we have already concluded above that, on the evidence presented at trial, a rational jury could have found Morell to be a member of the charged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt even absent Cobián's testimony that Vázquez implicated Morell during the meeting in question. A fortiori, the record contains ample evidence to support a finding by the requisite preponderance that Morell was a member of the conspiracy for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Cf. United States v. Gjerde, 110 F.3d 595, 602 (8th Cir.1997) (finding certain Rule 801(d)(2)(E) factors as necessarily satisfied by preponderance where court had already found the relevant facts proven beyond reasonable doubt). The district court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in not striking the statement, and the jury was entitled to consider it for the truth of the matter asserted therein.