Opinion ID: 1878785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Should witness testimony regarding race have been allowed?

Text: ¶ 20. The first mention of race from the witness stand occurred during the following exchange between the district attorney and Townsend on direct examination: Q: Did [Tate] say anything to you Mr. Tate is a white man, is he not? A: Yeah. Q: You're a black man, are you not? A: That's right. Q: This lady has to write all of this down. Did he say anything to you of a racial nature? A: That's right. Q: What did he say? A: Well, could I use the word what he said? Q: I want you to, yes. A: He said, God d   n     . Put my d   fishes back ... ¶ 21. The second instance of which Tate now complains occurred on direct examination when the district attorney asked deputy Keys if Tate made any racial remarks while he was pulled over on the side of the road. Tate objected on the grounds that such testimony was irrelevant and was merely an attempt to inflame the jury. In response, the district attorney stated that the testimony would go to Tate's state of mind. The objection was overruled, and Keys, who is black, testified that Tate called him a boy. Keys also testified that Tate admitted that [he] had pulled a gun on them and cocked it on them black bastards. ¶ 22. The third mention of race from the witness stand took place when the district attorney asked chief deputy Thompson if he, while Tate was pulled over on the side of the road, had advised Tate that he was under arrest. Thompson responded by saying [y]es, sir. When I placed Mr. Tate under arrest, I seen I couldn't get anywhere with him, and he told me he was going to kill them black then he went to cussing. Tate objected to this response as being irrelevant, but the trial court overruled the objection. ¶ 23. Finally, the last mention of race from the witness stand came during the following exchange between Tate's friend, Harry Trammel, and the district attorney on cross-examination: Q: By the way, were all of these people black or were they black and white? What was the racial makeup of the group out there? A: Well, most of them were black. There was a carload of white people that drove off as we drove up. . . . . Q: Are you also telling us that at no point did [Tate] use racial epitaphs [sic] or any stronger words, obscenities or profanities than hell or damn? A: That's right. ¶ 24. It should be noted that although Tate objected to the race-related testimony of deputies Keys and Thompson, he failed to object to the race-related testimony of Townsend and Trammel. Explaining why he did not object to the testimony of Townsend and Trammel, Tate asserts that he did not wish to bring any additional attention to the race issue by objecting to these comments. He was well aware that not only the judge but most of the State's witnesses were black. In fact, the jury was predominantly black. He asserts that juries give great weight to the testimony of law enforcement personnel; therefore, he felt he had no choice but to object when the deputies offered testimony regarding alleged racial slurs. ¶ 25. As a general rule, in order to preserve an issue for review on appeal, a contemporaneous objection must be made at trial. Gatlin v. State, 724 So.2d 359 (Miss.1998). However, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, this Court retains the inherent power to notice error notwithstanding trial counsel's failure to preserve the error. Johnson v. Fargo, 604 So.2d 306 (Miss.1992). ¶ 26. Under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(1)(c), Tate was convicted of attempt[ing] by physical menace to put [Townsend] in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. Tate asserts that intent is not an element of the crime, and that any testimony concerning his state of mind at the time of the assault is irrelevant. This Court has previously stated that the crime of attempt consists of three elements, the first of which is an intent to commit a particular crime. Morris v. State, 748 So.2d 143, 146 (Miss.1999) (citing Harris v. State, 642 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Miss.1994)). Thus, intent is relevant in this case. However, we do agree that the State pursued a line of questioning which wrongfully highlighted race in this case. While intent is an element of attempt, race is not. We find that the trial judge erroneously overruled Tate's objections to Keys' testimony. ¶ 27. Keys testified that Tate admitted that he pulled his gun on the poachers. Keys also testified that Tate allegedly used a racial slur towards him and a racial slur when referring to the poachers. Tate's racial views in general, or toward this particular complaining witness, are not an issue. See De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547, 578-583, 585-586 (Miss. 1998). In Beckwith, race was the only explanation for Beckwith's murdering Medgar Evers. Id. at 579. Stated another way, the only reason Beckwith murdered Evers was because Evers was black. It was strictly a racially motivated crime. Thus, we held that it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to admit documents and testimony illustrating Beckwith's racist views. Id. at 579-580. Conversely, Tate's motivation emanated from people who were trespassing onto his land and stealing his fish, irrespective of the race of the individual poachers. Tate was on trial for simple assault, not for racial discrimination. Thus, the statements Tate made to Keys were irrelevant. ¶ 28. Assuming arguendo that the alleged racial slurs made by Tate were relevant, Miss. R. Evid. 403 provides for the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403 requires a balancing test. The more probative the evidence is, the less likely it is that a 403 factor will be of sufficient consequence to substantially outweigh the probative value. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Lumpkin, 725 So.2d 721, 732, 733 (Miss.1998) (citing Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1117 (Miss.1987)). It is insufficient for one or more of the 403 factors to slightly outweigh the probative value. The 403 factors must, in the language of the rule, `substantially outweigh' probative value before the evidence may be excluded. Id. ¶ 29. The probative value, if any, of Tate's alleged racial slurs made to deputy Keys was clearly `substantially outweighed' by the danger of unfair prejudice. The State's line of questioning appears not only to have created the danger of unfair prejudice, but to have been calculated to have exactly that effect. This is especially true when considered in conjunction with the State's opening and closing statements. While one or two of these alleged racial statements may have been relevant, the State's repeated reference to and focus on alleged racist statements undoubtedly prejudiced Tate's right to a fair trial. The requisite element of simple assault is mens rea, not men's race. The trial judge allowed this improper and highly prejudicial line of questioning over Tate's objection. In so doing, she abused her discretion. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 102 Miss. 768, 59 So. 887 (1912).