Opinion ID: 196026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Partiality Claim

Text: 32 The Simones argue that the Bankruptcy Judge ought to have disqualified himself from presiding over the June 4, 1992, trial. They argue that his previous employment as an attorney at a law firm where defense counsel was then working as a paralegal, required his recusal. They further suggest an additional conflict: that the judge's former law firm represented WCIS. A motion for recusal was not made to the bankruptcy court. Instead, the Simones raised the partiality issue for the first time in their Rule 60(b)(2) motion for relief from judgment on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion was filed and denied while the Simones' motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) was pending. The Simones did not appeal from the denial of their Rule 60(b) motion and WCIS argues that, therefore, they have waived the issue. We need not decide the question of waiver since we conclude that the partiality claim is entirely without merit. 33 WCIS admits that its counsel from October, 1978 through June 1985, ... was a paralegal employed at the law firm of Bowditch & Dewey and during that time often worked with Judge Queenan, who, during that same period, was a lawyer and member of the firm. Contrary to the Simones' contention on appeal, however, those circumstances do not require recusal. The relevant statute provides as follows: 34 Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 35 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455. This court has interpreted the statute to require disqualification  'only if the facts provide what an objective, knowledgeable member of the public would find to be a reasonable basis for doubting the judge's impartiality.'  In re Allied Signal, Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 957 (1990). WCIS' counsel's employment, seven years earlier, as a paralegal at the firm where the Bankruptcy Judge then worked as an attorney, and her work with the Judge, on matters unrelated to the present controversy, do not provide a reasonable basis for doubting the judge's impartiality in this case. See Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that judge's former partnership with a lawyer for one of the defendants did not require disqualification), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985). 36 Nor does the Simones' allegation that the Bankruptcy Judge's former law firm represented WCIS require recusal. [A] charge of partiality must be supported by a factual basis. Allied Signal, 891 F.2d at 970. Here, the Simones have provided only the following vague suggestion of partiality: 37 [The Bankruptcy Judge] at one point either worked at the Law Firm of Bowdwitch & Dewey of Worcester Ma. or Fletcher Tilton & Whipple of Worcester, Ma. and ... either of these two Firms handled the accounts for W.C.I.S. Bank. 38 Even if the factual basis were adequate, the alleged relationships would not necessarily require recusal. See National Auto Brokers v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Sec. 455(b)(2) and noting that [e]ven under the more stringent requirements of the current statute, ... the prior representation of [defendant] by [judge's prior law firm and judge] as to unrelated matters would not require him to recuse himself), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). 39 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's dismissal of this case.