Opinion ID: 774554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disability Claims

Text: 18 We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
19 A plaintiff in an ADA case bears the burden of proving disability within the meaning of the ADA. Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539 (9th Cir. 1997). A disabled employee under the ADA is one who: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2). Thornton contends that she satisfies the first and third of these requirements. 20
21 On appeal, Thornton argues that she is substantially limited in the major life activities of working andperforming manual tasks. Whether a person is disabled under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). 22
23 Pursuant to EEOC regulations, working is a major life activity. To be substantially limited in working, an individual must be 24 significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broadrange of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 25 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Courts should consider the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access, and the number and type of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A),(B). 1 As the Supreme Court has explained, If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. 26 In this case, the district court concluded thatreporting does not constitute a sufficiently broad class of jobs to satisfy the substantial limitation requirement of the ADA.  Moreover, Thornton had not provided sufficiently specific, admissible evidence as to what jobs [required keyboarding and notetaking] or which she would be precluded from, among other matters. 27 Under the law of our circuit, a plaintiff must present specific evidence about relevant labor markets to defeat summary judgment on a claim of substantial limitation of working. 2 In Thompson, 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1997), an employee brought suit under the ADA, contending that she was terminated from her position as a registered nurse on the basis of her disabling back and neck strain. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was disabled. Id. at 539. We affirmed, noting that the plaintiff pointed to no evidence that the restrictions on her ability to perform total patient care preclude her from engaging in an entire class of jobs. Id. at 540. Nor had she offered the information relevant to this particularized determination. Id. We pointed out that our decision was in accord with that of other circuits and concluded that Thompson's conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment. Id. 28 We reached a similar result in Broussard v. Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 1999). In Broussard, the plaintiff alleged that her carpal tunnel syndrome substantially limited her major life activity of working. She presented an affidavit from a vocational rehabilitation specialist, who determined that she was limited to working in the sedentary to light category of jobs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We again affirmed, concluding that the affidavit was not competent evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1258. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, we held, the plaintiff needed to identify what requirements posed by the class of . . . jobs . . . were problematic in light of the limitations . . . imposed on her. Id. at 1259 (quoting Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 29 These decisions control the present dispute over Thornton's limitations as to working. McClatchy presented evidence of Thornton's level of education, her acceptance into the teaching pool at Fresno State, and her work as a freelance journalist during this litigation, which all suggest that she is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Thornton, however, failed to present evidence of the jobs from which she was precluded and of the relevant labor markets for that class of jobs. Because Thornton presented no evidence on these issues, the district court properly concluded that she had failed to present a triable issue of material fact. 30 Thornton argues that our decision in Wellington v. Lyon County Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999), relieves her of the burden of coming forward with such evidence. In Wellington, a school janitor who developed carpal tunnel syndrome presented evidence that his education was limited to a high school degree, and that his work experience was limited to manufacturing, construction, heavy maintenance, and plumbing. Id. at 1155. He also presented medical evidence that he was permanently unable to perform work involving metal fabrication, welding, . . . heavy activities, carpentry, . . . the use of a variety of tools to do maintenance and repairs. Id. (alteration in original). 31 We reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that [t]hese facts suggest that Wellington may be precluded from working in any capacity involving construction, maintenance or even light plumbing. Considering Wellington's `training, skills and abilities,' there exist[ed] a question of fact as to whether he is `significantly restricted in the ability to perform work in a class of jobs.'  Id. 32 Wellington also stated that [n]o expert or other evidence has been presented to suggest that there are jobs available in the labor market for which a person having comparable training, skills and ability to Wellington would be qualified. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we did not say that the plaintiff was relieved from presenting evidence about jobs in the relevant labor markets. We merely noted that the defendant had not done so. Wellington involved unrebutted medical evidence about the various types of jobs from which the plaintiff was permanently restricted. Here there was no such evidence of restriction, and, unlike the defendant in Wellington, McClatchy presented evidence that Thornton was capable of securing other jobs. 33 Summary judgment for McClatchy on the substantial limitation on working claim was therefore appropriate. 34
35 Thornton also contends that she is substantially limited in the major life activity of manual tasks. The district court noted that Thornton could perform a broad range of manual tasks, including cooking, caring for herself, grocery shopping and light housework. As such, her inabilityto perform a narrow range of activities . . . does not constitute a `substantial limitation' on performing manual tasks. We agree. 36 Although we have not previously considered this issue directly, we conclude that the district court's decision is well-supported by statutory language and by the decisions of other circuits. A substantial limitation is not a mere difference in an ability to perform a particular act. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999). The ADA is concerned only with limitations that are in fact substantial. Id. That Thornton could perform certain manual tasks for only a limited period of time does not present a triable issue that she was substantially limited in a broad range of manual tasks. 37 In Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff suffered from tendinitis and was restricted from certain tasks, such as typing and cutting foamboard, for extensive periods of time. Id. at 1223. The court concluded that the employer was entitled to summary judgment, since the plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial limitation of the major life activity of performing manual tasks: 38 [W]hile Chanda's tendinitis constitutes a physical impairment, his deposition testimony and that of his doctors fails to establish a genuine issue as to any substantial limitation. Chanda acknowledged an ability to assist his spouse with household activities, to dress and feed himself, and to drive an automobile. He acknowledged his ability to attend school and take four classes, all of which required the taking of notes . . . . In light of Chanda's ability to use his hand for the purposes acknowledged in his testimony, we conclude that his tendinitis was not the statutorily required substantial limitation on his ability to perform manual tasks. 39 Id. at 1222-23 (footnote omitted). 40 Similarly, in Ouzts v. USAir, Inc., Civ. A. No. 94-625, 1996 WL 578514 (W.D. Pa. July 26, 1996), aff'd, 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997), the court granted summary judgment to an employer on the ground that a plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome could not establish a substantial limitation of manual tasks, since she was able to perform most ordinary life activities. 4 41 In this case, Thornton was able to perform a wide range of manual tasks, including grocery shopping, driving, making beds, doing laundry, and dressing herself. Her inability to type and write for extended periods of time is not sufficient to outweigh the large number of manual tasks that she can perform. The ADA requires a substantial limitation in performing manual tasks, 5 and the district court properly concluded that Thornton did not present a triable issue of material fact as to this point.
42 Thornton finally contends that, even if she is not actually disabled, she was regarded as such by McClatchy. An individual is protected by the ADA if he or she is regarded as having, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(C), a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual, 42 U.S.C.§§ 12102(2)(A). McClatchy must have believed that Thornton either had a substantially limiting impairment that she did not have, or that she had a substantially limiting impairment which, in fact, was not so limiting. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. As with real impairments, a perceived impairment must be substantially limiting and significant. Thompson, 121 F.3d at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted). 43 Thornton offers deposition testimony of McClatchy employees that demonstrates their awareness of Thornton's keyboarding and handwriting restrictions. McClatchy contends, and the district court agreed, that this evidence did not establish that McClatchy regarded Thornton as substantially limited in any major life activity. We agree. Thornton's restrictions did not rise to the level of substantial limitation, and there is no specific evidence that McClatchy viewed her as substantially limited. It is true that McClatchy considered a variety of measures to accommodate Thornton's restrictions. However, when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employee's restrictions, it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ADA or that it regards the employee as disabled. A contrary rule would discourage the amicable resolution of numerous employment disputes and needlessly force parties into expensive and time-consuming litigation. The district court properly decided this issue in McClatchy's favor.
44 In the proceedings below, Thornton and the district court assumed that the standard for disability under FEHA was the same as under the ADA. After this case had been fully briefed in this court, California enacted a law that states: 45 The law of this state in the area of disabilities provides protections independent from those in the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336). Although the federal act provides a floor of protection, this state's law has always, even prior to passage of the federal act, afforded additional protections [as detailed elsewhere in this act]. 46 Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12926.1. 47 We vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment on the FEHA claims and remand for further proceedings in light of this recent enactment. We express no view on whether this act alters the district court's analysis. However, the parties should be allowed to brief the effect, if any, of this act on Thornton's FEHA claims. 6