Opinion ID: 2107625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Takings Remedy.

Text: Pork Xtra argues that even if the statutory immunity violates the Takings Clause, it is unconstitutional only to the extent that it prohibits a remedy for the actual taking of the plaintiffs' property. Under this argument, it contends, immunity granted from liability for damages other than the just compensation required by the constitution would not be prohibited. Thus, asserts the defendant, while it may be liable for damages for the diminution in value of the plaintiffs' property, it has immunity from any other damages arising from its animal feeding operation unless the plaintiffs prove one of the statutory exceptions to the nuisance immunity. We first note that Iowa Code section 4.12 supports the underlying premise of the defendant's argument: section 657.11(2) may be enforced to the extent it operates constitutionally. Section 4.12 states: If any provision of an Act or statute or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act or statute which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the Act or statute are severable. Iowa Code § 4.12. We have held that [s]everance of unconstitutional provisions from constitutional portions of a statute is appropriate if it does not substantially impair legislative purpose, the enactment remains capable of fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, and the remaining portion of the enactment can be given effect without the invalid provision. Clark v. Miller, 503 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa 1993); accord City of Council Bluffs v. Cain, 342 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1983) (The question is whether there remains a viable statute expressive of legislative intent.). Thus, the question here is twofold: (1) whether there is any immunity bestowed by section 657.11(2) that does not violate the Takings Clause; and if so, (2) whether this immunity is a viable expression of legislative intent such that it may be given effect in the absence of the unconstitutional application of the statutory immunity. In determining whether any application of section 657.11(2) is constitutional, we must initially identify what compensation would be required for the taking effected by this statute. As we have stated, the taking that occurs by operation of the statutory immunity is the granting of an easement in the property burdened by the animal feeding operation. The standard of compensation required for the taking of an easement is the decrease in value of the dominant estate ... resulting from the taking of the easement. 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 385, at 790 (1996); accord Dolezal v. City of Cedar Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Iowa 1973) (determining damages for city's condemnation of a clearance easement over private property to allow planes to approach landing strip of municipal airport). This decrease is measured by the difference in fair market value of the property before and immediately after imposition of the easement. See Dolezal, 209 N.W.2d at 88; 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 385, at 790 (The measurement of this decrease must be derived from an appraisal of the value of the dominant estate before and after the taking.). Applying these principles to the case before us, we conclude the statutory immunity cannot constitutionally deprive private property owners of compensation for the decreased value of their property due to the statutory imposition of an easement for the operation of an animal feeding operation as a nuisance. Because the recovery of diminution-in-value damages fully compensates the burdened property owners for the unlawful taking of an easement, the restrictions of the Takings Clause end at that point. The Takings Clause does not prohibit limitations on other damages recoverable under a nuisance theory. Cf. Peel v. Burk, 197 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Iowa 1972) (holding just compensation required by Takings Clause does not include payment of condemnees' trial preparation expenses, attorney fees, or expert witness fees); Anderson v. City of Detroit, 54 Mich.App. 496, 221 N.W.2d 168, 170 (1974) (rejecting takings challenge to sovereign immunity statute, stating the right to sue for a future tortious injury is not property and may be abrogated by the Legislature). That leaves only the question whether legislative intent can be given effect by a limited application of the nuisance immunity granted by section 657.11(2). We think it can. The general assembly sought to protect and preserve animal agricultural production operations in Iowa by sheltering them from the costs of nuisance lawsuits. Iowa Code § 657.11(1). That intent is promoted by giving effect to section 657.11(2) to the extent it is constitutional. In other words, giving animal producers limited immunity from nuisance suits, requiring them to pay only for the value of the easement resulting from their creation of a nuisance, improves their economic position as envisioned by the legislature. In conclusion, we hold that Bormann and state takings jurisprudence requires us to invalidate the statutory immunity only insofar as it prevents property owners subjected to a nuisance from recovering damages for the diminution in value of their property. The Takings Clause does not prohibit the legislature from granting animal feeding operations immunity from liability for any other damages traditionally allowed under a nuisance theory of recovery. Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that immunity from nuisance liability was an unconstitutional taking without distinguishing the elements of damage in a nuisance claim from the compensation demanded under the Takings Clause. This conclusion is not necessarily dispositive of the plaintiffs' claim that section 657.11(2) is unconstitutional, however, as the plaintiffs relied on several constitutional provisions in attacking the statute in the district court, including the Equal Protection Clause and article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. On appeal, the plaintiffs have abandoned their equal protection argument and claim only that the grant of nuisance immunity violates Iowa Constitution article I, section 1. We now consider that contention.