Opinion ID: 1995926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the grand jury subpoenas duces tecum

Text: The defendants first contend that the grand jury subpoenas duces tecum, requiring the telephone company to turn over to the state records of toll calls made from McGoff's residence, were unauthorized by the grand jury, or, alternatively, were improperly issued by the grand jury. Thus, defendants' reasonable privacy interests in the telephone records were violated. Because the toll-record information derived from these subpoenas was used by the state to support its request to install a pen-register device  information derived from which was then used to secure an order to place a wiretap on the McGoff-residence telephone  and because evidence derived from the wiretap was later introduced at trial against them, defendants claim the trial court erred in not granting their joint motion to suppress this evidence as being tainted fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The trial court denied defendants' motion to suppress any product of the subpoenas on the ground that defendants lacked standing to contest subpoenas duces tecum issued to the telephone company and requiring it to turn over ordinary business records, without first showing that such records were recognized as confidential under the law. Absent such a showing, the court ruled, defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone company's business records and thus could not protest their transfer. We agree. The exclusionary rule protects the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy by prohibiting the use, at trial, of evidence obtained in violation of a person's constitutional rights. State v. Timms, 505 A.2d 1132, 1137 (R.I. 1986). When no reasonable privacy interest has been unlawfully invaded, the introduction of evidence seized is not prevented. Id. In determining whether a defendant has standing to invoke the exclusionary rule, we must engage the substantive question of whether the challenged search or seizure violated the constitutional rights of that defendant. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641 (1980). A defendant has no standing to invoke the rule because of the infringement of a third party's rights. Id. In Rawlings, the defendant moved to suppress controlled substances retrieved from a purse owned by and in the possession of another during the search of a house the defendant was visiting. The Court held that since the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a purse belonging to another, the defendant could not challenge the legality of the purse's search even though he claimed ownership of the drugs found therein. [1] Id. at 106, 100 S.Ct. at 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d at 641. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976), the defendant moved to suppress copies of checks and other bank records obtained by the serving of allegedly defective subpoenas duces tecums on two banks at which he had accounts. The defendant argued that he had a Fourth Amendment interest in the records kept by the banks because the records were personal and made available to the banks for a limited purpose only. The Court, in rejecting the defendant's contention, said the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. Id. at 443, 96 S.Ct. at 1624, 48 L.Ed.2d at 79. The Court concluded that because no Fourth Amendment interests of the defendant were implicated, the case was governed by the general rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party to obtain the records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued. Id. at 444, 96 S.Ct. at 1624, 48 L.Ed.2d at 79-80. As for subpoenas issued to the telephone company, this case is governed by the same general rule. [2]