Opinion ID: 1282143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Town and City Ordinances

Text: Plaintiffs argue the Town and City Ordinances, like the County Ordinance, are invalid because they conflict with the local sales and use tax statutes. Plaintiffs also argue the Town Ordinance conflicts with the statute imposing a statewide tax on accommodations. We disagree. The ordinances do not attempt to change or circumvent any of the requirements of the State statutes, and nothing in these statutes prohibits the municipalities from imposing an additional and separate charge on accommodations rentals or food and beverage sales. See City of North Charleston v. Harper, supra ; Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., supra ; Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, supra . We also disagree with plaintiffs' argument that the City Ordinance is pre-empted by or inconsistent with the State beer, wine, and alcohol tax statutes. These statutes essentially deal with taxes to be paid by wholesalers or importers of beer and wine, or license taxes to be paid for the privilege of selling alcoholic liquor in this State. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 12-21-1010 to -1130 and §§ 12-33-10 to -630 (1976 and Supp.1994). The statutes do not address taxes or fees on food or beverage sales in establishments holding an on-premises beer, wine, and/or liquor license. Finally, we disagree with plaintiffs' argument that the Town and City Ordinances do not satisfy the constitutional requirements of equal protection. We find that the classification under each ordinance bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose to be effected. See Brown v. County of Horry, supra ; Robinson v. Richland County Council, 293 S.C. 27, 358 S.E.2d 392 (1987).