Opinion ID: 1576954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Child Restraint Evidence

Text: First, we address Ms. Jones' argument that the child restraint evidence introduced at trial was irrelevant and prejudicial because, as a passenger, she did not have a statutory duty to place her child in a car seat and because the medical evidence showed that the child was killed by the air bag. At oral argument, counsel for Ms. Jones asserted that even if Carlon had been in a car seat, he would have been killed by the air bag because he was seated in the front seat. The State counters that the evidence was relevant to show that Ms. Jones ignored well-known risks to the victim. We agree with the State that the evidence was admissible. Ms. Jones argued to the trial court in a motion in limine and in her motion for a new trial that the car seat evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court denied Ms. Jones' motion in limine in part and granted it in part. The court agreed to exclude evidence regarding Tennessee's car seat statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-602 (1998), because it did not apply to Ms. Jones as a passenger. However, the court declined to exclude evidence regarding information in the community regarding car seats. We review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn.1999); State v. McLeod, 937 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tenn.1996). Evidence is relevant and therefore admissible if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tenn. R. Evid. 401. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.... Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Ms. Jones was charged with criminal negligence in the death of her son. Therefore the State's burden was to prove that in holding her son on her lap while traveling in a car, she failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk to her son and that her conduct was a gross deviation from the standard of care. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-11-106 (2003), 39-13-212 (2003). Ms. Jones argues that the evidence was prejudicial because the State was trying to inflame the jury by showing Ms. Jones to be irresponsible. However, we agree with the State that the evidence was relevant to show that Ms. Jones was aware, or should have been aware, of the danger to an unrestrained child and that, in any event, its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Ms. Jones. [3] Ms. Jones argues that Carlon was killed by the air bag, not by being unrestrained, but that argument misses the point. The State charged Ms. Jones with criminal negligence for the act of holding her child in her lap in a moving vehicle. Evidence about car seats and car seat safety was directly relevant to show that Ms. Jones' act was negligent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.