Opinion ID: 836351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: requires: freedom to choose health care provider; equal reimbursement, coverage

Text: RESULT OF `YES' VOTE: `Yes' vote requires patient's freedom to choose health care provider; requires equal reimbursement rates, coverage. RESULT OF `NO' VOTE: `No' vote rejects requiring freedom to choose health care provider; rejects equal reimbursement rates, coverage. SUMMARY: Modifies health care provider contracting options by requiring health and casualty insurance policies, managed health care plans to provide same reimbursement rates, coverage, regardless of care provider. For medical services, allows patient's choice of physician or chiropractor as primary care, health care provider. For vision services, allows choice of ophthalmologist, optometrist. Patients may change primary care provider, but can be limited to two changes over twelve months. Excludes Oregon Medical Assistance Program, Oregon Health Plan, student health insurance programs, public employee benefits, inmates, workers' compensation. Petitioner objects to each segment of the Attorney General's ballot title. We review those objections in order, bearing in mind that we must decide only whether the Attorney General's ballot title complies substantially with statutory requirements. ORS 250.085(5). [1] See also Mabon v. Kulongoski, 325 Or. 121, 126, 934 P.2d 403 (1997) (The review statutes do not authorize this court to draft a `better' or `improved' title; substantial compliance with the requirements stated in ORS 250.035 is sufficient.). Petitioner first challenges the Attorney General's ballot title caption. The ballot title caption must reasonably identify, within 10 words, the subject matter of the measure. ORS 250.035(2)(a) (1997). [2] To determine whether a caption accurately states the subject matter of a proposed initiative measure, we examine the text of the measure itself   . Doell v. Myers, 328 Or. 635, 640, 984 P.2d 266 (1999). Petitioner first argues that the Attorney General's caption fails to identify the subject matter of the measure because it does not mention how the measure would change the ways in which physicians and other specified health care providers may contract and be paid for their services. The Attorney General responds that the caption reasonably identifies the subject matter of the measure because it states that the measure requires    equal reimbursement, coverage, thereby informing voters that the subject of the measure encompasses the options for insurers and managed health care plans when contracting with health care providers. We agree with the Attorney General. The measure requires that specified health care plans and insurance policies [p]rovide the same policy benefits, rate of reimbursement and extent of covered expenses to specified health care providers. The phrase requires    equal reimbursement, coverage reasonably identifies that subject matter within the constraints of the word limitation imposed on the caption and, thus, substantially complies with statutory requirements. Petitioner further argues that the caption uses terminology that is not objective. Particularly, petitioner contends that the phrase freedom to choose is inappropriate for a ballot title because it is not neutral and might mislead voters into supporting the proposal without understanding its true effects. The Attorney General responds that the phrase freedom to choose accurately identifies the subject matter of the measure by indicating that the measure would prevent insurers and managed health care plans from restricting patients' freedom to choose their own health care providers. The Attorney General further observes that the phrase mirrors wording used in the measure itself. We agree with petitioner that, in this context, the phrase freedom to choose is likely to prejudice voters regarding the measure. See Marr v. Thornton, 237 Or. 503, 504, 392 P.2d 458 (1964) (deleting phrase right-to-work from ballot title caption as slogan that amounted to argument for measure and that likely would create prejudice). It is true that the phrase freedom to choose appears in the measure itself. However the Attorney General and this court are not constrained to certify a ballot title that is slanted toward passage or defeat of the measure. See Dirks v. Myers, 329 Or. 608, 616, 993 P.2d 808 (2000) (court has resisted attempts to incorporate into ballot title terms or phrases that tend more to promote or defeat passage of the measure than to describe its substance accurately.). Proponents of a measure are not entitled to engineer a favorable ballot title by incorporating politically inflated terms or phrases in the text of the measure in order to advance its passage. Cf. Bernard v. Keisling, 317 Or. 591, 596-97, 858 P.2d 1309 (1993) (court will not hesitate to look beyond words of measure if those words obfuscate subject, chief purpose, summary, or major effect of measure). We have considered petitioner's other objections to the caption and reject them without further discussion. We conclude that petitioner is correct that the caption does not comply substantially with statutory requirements and requires modification to remove the phrase freedom to choose. To remedy that problem, we rephrase the caption to state that the measure would afford to patients the opportunity to select their health care provider. Additionally, because the phrase freedom to choose also appears in the yes and no vote result statements, and conveys the same meaning in those contexts, we make similar conforming changes to those parts of the ballot title to conform to the changes that we make to the caption. See Garst v. Myers, 329 Or. 529, 535, 992 P.2d 451 (1999) (following that practice). As a consequence of the foregoing discussion, we modify the caption as follows: