Opinion ID: 1349673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proper Interpretation of the Definition of Disability in Subsection 301(4)

Text: In reexamining our order in Rea, we are now persuaded that the Legislature must have intended, in 1981, to adopt the definition of disability as argued here on appeal by plaintiffs, as the Court of Appeals concluded in Rea, for one basic reason. Given the ambiguity in 301(4) and examined in the context of our precedents, the language of the statute logically sustains this interpretation of the definition of disability. Subsection 301(4), as previously stated, requires the employee to prove a disability, i.e., that he is eligible for compensation, and then prove wage loss, i.e., that he is entitled to an award. This language codifies the prior approach in Michigan that injury is not compensable without wage loss. If the employee establishes a disability, he must further prove a wage loss because wage loss will not be presumed. See subsection 301(4). However, in order to prove a wage loss, under the language of the statute and on the basis of our longstanding interpretation of related precedent, most recently confirmed in Sobotka, the employee must establish a reduction in earning capacity. [24] With this conclusion, the definition of disability in subsection 301(4) cannot then be logically interpreted as a reduction of wage-earning capacity as long as wage loss is also measured by a reduction in wage-earning capacity. See Lawrence v. Toys R Us, 453 Mich. 112, 121, 551 N.W.2d 155 (1996) (Levin, J., plurality opinion). [25] Subsection 301(4)'s second sentence eliminates the possibility that disability and wage loss are defined the same way when it provides that proof of a disability does not create [a] presumption of wage loss. As a consequence, the Legislature must have instead intended a different meaning for disability. The only other meaning that the ordinary words of the statute may sustain is the definition urged by plaintiffs: an employee is disabled whenever he can no longer perform a job suitable to his qualifications and training as a result of his injury. This conclusion is consistent with our analysis in Michales. Total disability arises from an injury, i.e., incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is total under subsection 351(1), when an employee proves that he is unable to perform all work suitable to his qualifications and training as a result of his injury. [26] A partial disability arises from an injury, i.e., incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is partial under subsection 361(1), when an employee proves that he is unable to perform a single position within his qualifications and training.