Opinion ID: 52760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: alexis ayala

Text: Unlike the other defendants in this appeal, Alexis Ayala pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(i) and § 846, and two counts of distribution of a mixture or substance containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Alexis Ayala’s first contention is that the district erred by sentencing based on its finding that his offense involved five or more kilograms of heroin. The district court arrived at that amount by considering the PSI and the evidence presented at the trial of his co-conspirators. He now argues that because he 13 pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute “one or more” kilograms of heroin, the district court should have found that his offense involved between one and three kilograms of heroin, giving him a guidelines sentencing range of 121–151 months imprisonment. There is no merit in this argument. Nothing in Booker prohibits a district court from making additional factfindings based on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard when that court is applying the sentencing guidelines in an advisory manner. See Chau, 426 F.3d at 1322–23. Alexis Ayala’s second contention is that the district court clearly erred by refusing to give him a two-level, minor-role sentence reduction pursuant to sentencing guidelines § 3B1.2(b). Application Note 5 to § 3B1.2 defines “minor participant” as a defendant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role cannot be accurately described as minimal. Application Note 3(C) explains that the decision to apply the minor participant reduction is “heavily dependant upon the facts of the particular case. As with any other factual issue, the court, in weighing the totality of the circumstances, is not required to find, based solely on the defendant’s bare assertion, that such a role adjustment is warranted.” “The proponent of the downward adjustment . . . always bears the burden of proving a mitigating role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .” United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 939 (11th 14 Cir. 1999). We review the district court’s decision not to give a minor-participant reduction only for clear error. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002). In determining whether a defendant qualifies for a minor-role reduction, the district court conducts a two-pronged analysis of the defendant’s conduct. Id. Prong one requires the district court to assess whether a defendant’s particular role was minor in relation to the relevant conduct attributed to him in calculating his base offense level. Id. If the defendant can establish that he played only a minor role in the conduct for which he has already been held accountable—not a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy—a downward adjustment may be applied. Id. at 1348–49. If reached, prong two of the analysis requires the district court to consider the defendant’s relative culpability as compared to that of other participants. Id. at 1349. Alexis Ayala argues that his role in the overall conspiracy consisted of street-level transactions and occasional visits to the warehouse where the drugs were stored. He contrasts his participation with that of his co-conspirators who negotiated with drug suppliers, packaged the drugs for sale, supervised other coconspirators, or financed the operation. He argues that he meets the criteria set forth to qualify for a minor-role reduction. 15 This argument is without merit. Simply because he was not the mastermind of the conspiracy does not mean that his role was minor. Applying the first prong of the two-pronged analysis, the district court found that Alexis Ayala’s relevant conduct was participation in a conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute between 18.4 and 28.4 kilograms of heroin. Although he was not the leader of the conspiracy (his cousin Ismael, who was the leader, was given a four-level increase for his role), Alexis Ayala concedes that he hung out at the warehouse where the drugs were distributed and sold some of the drugs in furtherance of the conspiracy. An uncontested factfinding in the PSI states that he participated in the conspiracy for three years. He introduced his cousin Ismael to a drug supplier and personally brought in at least one customer. Those facts establish that Alexis Ayala has failed to show clear error under the first prong of our two-pronged analysis. Alexis Ayala’s third contention is that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence on him. Our “[r]eview for reasonableness is deferential,” Williams, 456 F.3d at 1363, and is guided by the factors set forth in § 3553(a). Id. “[T]here is a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court may choose.” Id. “We will not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors because ‘[o]ur review is not de novo.’” Id. 16 Alexis Ayala argues that his 262–month sentence, although at the bottom of the recommended sentencing guidelines range, is unreasonable because it ignores his minimal role in the offense, his personal history of drug addiction and psychological problems, and physical abuse he suffered in the past. He also points out the hardship his incarceration will work on his family. Instead of the 262–month sentence he received, he argues that a shorter sentence, in conjunction with substance abuse counseling and mental health treatment, would adequately deter him from committing future crimes and would address the nature of his role in the conspiracy. According to Alexis Ayala, the district court’s failure to give a shorter sentence is unreasonable because it is longer than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Under our deferential standard of review, Alexis Ayala has not established that his sentence was unreasonable. The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors, rejected the argument that his role in the conspiracy was minor, and adopted the PSI’s finding that Alexis Ayala had participated in the conspiracy for three years. His sentence was within the advisory guidelines range, and the sentencing guidelines are one of the factors that the district court must consider. 17 And finally, the sentence was well below the permissible statutory maximum of life imprisonment. Accordingly, Alexis Ayala’s sentence is due to be affirmed.