Opinion ID: 1772033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trooper Rivera's Liability

Text: In response to Petta's tort claims against Rivera, Rivera asserts that collateral estoppel and the public policy against allowing plaintiffs to profit from their own criminal conduct entitle him to summary judgment. Rivera argues that collateral estoppel bars Petta's claims because Petta cannot relitigate essential facts found against her in her criminal case and which are necessary to establish her claim in this civil case. Again, in defending against her prosecution for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, Petta pleaded the defense of necessity, arguing that Trooper Rivera's actions caused her to reasonably believe that she faced more imminent harm from Rivera's conduct than the potential harm the public might face on account of her unlawful flight. Once the necessity defense has been raised by the evidence, the prosecution has the burden to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt. [9] Had the jury believed Petta's defense, or had any reasonable doubt, it was instructed to find Petta not guilty. But the jury convicted her, thus rejecting her defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Collateral estoppel applies when an issue decided in the first action is actually litigated, essential to the prior judgment, and identical to an issue in a pending action. [10] The doctrine is designed to promote judicial efficiency and to prevent inconsistent judgments by preventing any relitigation of an ultimate issue of fact. [11] Collateral estoppel does not require mutuality. [12] It applies when the party against whom it is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. [13] There is no doubt that Petta had an opportunity to fully litigate whether she reasonably believed she faced more imminent harm at the hands of Trooper Rivera than the potential harm the public might face from her illegal actions. Therefore, Petta is collaterally estopped from trying that issue in this case. The question is whether that issue is identical to an issue that must be proved in this case for Petta to recover civilly from Rivera. We think that it is. In this case, Rivera pleaded the affirmative defense of privilege. A police officer is privileged to use force to the degree he reasonably believes is necessary to make an arrest, taking care that the force used is commensurate with the necessity. [14] If the officer uses more force than necessary, the suspect would then be justified to resist arrest. [15] A suspect may not presume that the threatened use of force by a law officer will become more than a threat, or that the use of force will be excessive. [16] Said another way, Rivera cannot be found liable for assault if he used no greater degree of force than reasonably necessary to arrest Petta. By the jury's conviction of Petta, it necessarily concluded that Petta did not have a reasonable belief of imminent harm that would otherwise excuse her flight from Trooper Rivera. In short, by convicting Petta, the jury found that the imminent harm Petta sought to avoid (Rivera's actions) did not clearly outweigh the harm she created by fleeing. This is an objective standard, measured by the standards that an ordinary and prudent person would apply to the circumstances that the actor faced. [17] And this is the same fact necessary to establish Rivera's privilegethat any imminent harm Rivera caused in using force against Petta was commensurate with the harm Petta potentially created by fleeing. Because both Petta's criminal necessity defense and Rivera's civil privilege defense turned on the same fact issue, i.e., the proportionality of Rivera's actions, collateral estoppel bars Petta from relitigating whether Rivera's use of force against Petta was privileged. Thus, Rivera is entitled to summary judgment on Petta's tort claims. [18]