Opinion ID: 1541540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Suppress Komal's 9-1-1 Phone Call

Text: The defendant next contends that the admission of Komal's 9-1-1 call into evidence violated Rules 401 and 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. [11] The defendant contends that the recording was irrelevant and that even if it did have some minimal probative value, the playing of the tape in unedited form to the jury resulted in unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed any evidentiary value the recording may have had. We have said that the discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be exercised sparingly. Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 1193 (R.I. 1994). It is only evidence that is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial that must be excluded. State v. Silvia, 898 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I.2006) (quoting Wells, 635 A.2d at 1193). Because [t]he ultimate determination of the effect of evidence lies in the discretion of the trial justice, we will not disturb such a determination on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 924 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Aponte, 649 A.2d 219, 223 (R.I.1994)). Below, defendant urged for the tape's exclusion because of its likelihood to inflame the passions and sympathies of the jury, or alternatively, that the crying and screaming that made much of the recording incomprehensible should be edited. The state countered that the tape was relevant to show the demeanor of all those present at the crime scene and to explain why the responders acted as they did. The state also argued that murder is not a pretty sight, and the judge was free to give a cautionary instruction advising the jurors that sympathy was not to play a part in their consideration of the evidence. [12] Unquestionably, the content of the 9-1-1 tape is disturbing to the listener  it portrays the agonized screams of the decedent's family, moments after his slaying. Additionally, it is difficult to understand Komal's statements to the emergency operator, a fact that is compounded by more screaming in the background; presumably from the little boy who watched as his father was gunned down. We also note that a transcript of the 9-1-1 call was available and utilized by the jury. Although this evidence  like any first-hand glimpse of a bloody homicide  is difficult for a jury to digest and is potentially prejudicial, we are of the opinion that any danger of unfair prejudice did not overcome its probative value. A Rule 403 analysis requires the trial justice to not only examine the evidence in the context of the case on trial, but to balance the evidence to determine whether its probative force is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,   . We agree with the First Circuit Court of Appeals that this balancing must be left to the trial justice's discretion; [o]nly rarely  and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances  will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a [trial] court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the    weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 155-56 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir.1988)). Unfortunately, after the trial justice examined the 9-1-1 tape in camera, and ruled that it was admissible, she failed properly to set forth her reasoning and the factors that weighed in favor of its admissibility. The trial justice merely concluded that the tape does furnish relevant evidence  a finding that is both disappointing and of little assistance to this Court. However, we are satisfied that the issue of the tape's relevance, as balanced against the risk of unfair prejudice, is apparent on the record before us. After careful review of the transcript in this case, we are satisfied that the tape was relevant and probative to the crimes charged in the indictment and that the trial justice did not err when she allowed it to be played to the jury. The state's evidence in this case largely was circumstantial. Under our law, we do not distinguish between the probative value of circumstantial and direct evidence; the jury must weigh the evidence and determine whether it establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 584 (R.I.1987) (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)). The state may prove guilt by a process of logical deduction, by reasoning from an established circumstantial fact through a series of inferences to an ultimate conclusion of guilt. State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1202 (R.I.1995). We previously have held, in a context similar to the case before us, that the state carries the burden of establishing every element necessary to the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, even if some of those elements may not be disputed. State v. Mora, 618 A.2d 1275, 1280 (R.I. 1993). Even when the evidence is gruesome, or graphic, or as in this case, produced in real time, the state has a right to establish the existence of the elements of the crimes. See id. Although we concur with defendant that the evidence may have been cumulative, because eyewitness testimony was offered by the same witnesses as were on the recording, this fact does not overcome the tape's probative value. Notably, Komal placed Graham at the scene when she described the shooter as a black guy, and a tall guy. The state argues that the tape reflects the events immediately after the homicide and placed the co-conspirator at the scene, with a gun in his hand. Because defendant was charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder, proof that Graham killed Sangeev was necessary despite the tape's disturbing content. Notably, in Mora, 618 A.2d at 1280, this Court declined to hold that an enhanced audio-tape recording of the victim's screams during a brutal rape should have been excluded under Rule 403, even though the issue of force and coercion was not a disputed issue in the case. We also rejected the contention that the tape was a needless presentation of cumulative evidence or that it was intended to evoke the jury's sympathies for the victim. Mora, 618 A.2d at 1280. The Court concluded that the recording established where the parties were situated and served the same purpose as any other form of demonstrative evidence[.] Id. In the case before us, although we do not minimize the emotional wallop to anyone who listens to this recording, after balancing both ends of this difficult analysis, we cannot say that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the recording. Because we find no clear error, we affirm the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the recording.