Opinion ID: 2538480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the district court may consider an award of attorney fees

Text: The Drivers argue that the district court erred in holding that he had no statutory authority to award attorney fees incurred in district court proceeding to confirm an arbitration award. The Drivers assert that the district court does have such authority under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 as well as under the terms of the UAA. The interpretation of these statutes is an issue of law over which this Court exercises free review. It is not clear on the face of I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 whether a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award is a civil action as contemplated by those statutes. Where statutes are ambiguous, the Court employs relevant rules of statutory construction, beginning with the literal words of statute, giving the language of the statute its plain, obvious, and rational meanings. Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Serv. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 404, 913 P.2d 1168, 1174 (1996). Section 12-120(3) states: In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. I.C. § 12-120(3). Section 12-121 states that this Court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil action. Rule 3(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states, A civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court which may be denominated as a complaint, petition or application.... This Court has explained that for an action to be a civil action within the meaning of Rule 3(a) and I.C. § 12-121, it must be commenced by the filing of a complaint. See Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. State, Dep't of Employment, 129 Idaho 548, 550-51, 928 P.2d 898, 900-01 (1996); Lowery v. Board of County Comm'rs, 117 Idaho 1079, 1081-82, 793 P.2d 1251, 1253-54 (1990). Therefore, no matter what the characterization of the action, it appears that it must commence by a filing having the characteristics of a complaint for these provisions to apply. It is however, not necessary to decide the applicability of §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, because attorney fees are awardable through I.C. § 7-914. I.C. § 7-914 specifically addresses arbitration confirmation proceedings. See Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 444, 599 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1979) (where both a general statute and a special or specific statute deal with the same subject matter, the provisions of the special or specific statute will control those of the general statute). Section 7-914 states that once an order confirming or denying an award is entered, [c]osts of the application and of the proceedings subsequent thereto, and disbursements may be awarded by the court. I.C. § 7-914 (emphasis added). Whether the term disbursements in I.C. § 7-914 includes attorney fees is not clear on its face. The UAA provides that it shall be construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. I.C. § 7-921. Of those courts addressing this precise issue, the majority construe disbursements to include attorney fees. See Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 352 Md. 31, 720 A.2d 912, 916-17 (1998); Canon Sch. Dist. v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 180 Ariz. 148, 882 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Ariz.1994); County of Clark v. Blanchard Constr. Co., 98 Nev. 488, 653 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1982); Wachtel v. Shoney's Inc., 830 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tenn.App.1991); Anchorage Med. & Surgical Clinic v. James, 555 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1976), overruled on other grounds by Ahtna, Inc. v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 894 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1995); Stein v. Feldmann, 85 Ill.App.3d 973, 41 Ill.Dec. 270, 407 N.E.2d 768, 769 (1980): But see Terra West Towne Homes, L.L.C. v. STU Henkel Realty, 298 Mont. 344, 996 P.2d 866, 873 (2000); Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis of New England, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 401 N.E.2d 839, 844 (1980). The purpose of the UAA is to afford the opportunity to reach a final disposition of differences between parties in an easier, more expeditious manner than by litigation. MSP Collaborative Developers v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 596 F.2d 247, 250 (7th Cir.1979): See also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Phoenix Mailers Union Local 752, 989 F.2d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that one of the central purposes of arbitration is to achieve speedy and fair resolutions of disputes). As the Supreme Court of Arizona noted, interpreting the term disbursements to include attorney fees promote[s] the public policy of encouraging early payment of valid arbitration awards and the discouragement of nonmeritorious protracted confirmation challenges. Canon Sch. Dist., 882 P.2d at 1279. Such an interpretation is in line with the purposes of the UAA and of arbitration generally. Some aspects of the UAA also encourage an interpretation that attorney fees are not allowed. Section 7-910 states, Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award. I.C. § 7-910 (emphasis added). However, this section only applies to fees incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, not the proceedings to confirm the arbitration award. Considering the very limited scope of challenges to an arbitration award the limitation of section 7-910 should not be extended beyond its express terms. Otherwise the party successful in arbitration will be deprived of the full benefits of that award.