Opinion ID: 1165790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of Constitutional Provision

Text: The questions presented by the instant case are not new. As early as 1854 the territorial legislature granted owners of property abutting navigable waters the right to build wharves, under certain conditions, and to extend them so far into said waters or water courses as the convenience of shipping may require, and to maintain them for not more than 20 years. [2] On numerous occasions the territorial legislature memorialized Congress to grant tidelands to the territory so that they might be sold and the funds used for internal improvements, [3] or to grant them to certain towns and cities to aid in their development. [4] In 1873 the territorial legislature passed an act confirming the title of the Seattle and Walla Walla Railroad and Transportation Company to the tidelands south of King Street in Seattle and around Elliott Bay from extreme high to extreme low tide, and to deep water ... derived by deed from the city of Seattle to the said company dated August 19, 1873, provided the first section of 15 miles of railroad be constructed within three years. The territory purported to convey such title as would otherwise belong to and vest in the state, upon the admission of Washington Territory into the Federal Union as a state. [5] One cannot read the record of the proceedings of the state constitutional convention [6] and the newspaper and editorial comment published during the convention ( Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, 292, 347 P.2d 1081 (1959)), between July 4 and August 22, 1889, without concluding, as do the historians of that period, [7] that the most vexing and politically sensitive problem confronting the convention was that of harbors, and the control, use, ownership, and disposal of the tidelands of the new state to be. No other problem was of more vital concern to the economic development of the state, for the tidelands in front of Seattle and other cities on Puget Sound and the ocean were of tremendous value. During the convention suggested constitutional proposals ranged from a declaration of inalienable state ownership of tidelands with limited leasing privileges, to no declaration at all, thus leaving all questions of tideland ownership and use to the whim of future legislatures. The major source of difference arose from whether the state, the cities, or private individuals and corporations should control the water front. Generally, five groups brought pressure to bear upon the 75 members of the convention: (1) the owners of upland property; (2) the occupiers or preemptors of tidelands who had placed improvements thereon; (3) land speculators; (4) cities and towns; and (5) the railroads. The conflict of interests was sharp and the debates reported were acrimonious. It was not until August 22, 1889, the final day of the convention, that article 17 (quoted supra ) was adopted. [8] The article is, in truth, a Janus-like compromise of the contentions of the various schools of thought in the constitutional convention. Although it asserts state ownership of tidelands and disclaims all right to tidelands theretofore patented by the United States, it makes no declaration of policy to govern the use or disposition of such lands. The convention left the use and sale of state-owned tidelands to the politics of future legislatures and to the interpretation to be given article 17 by the Supreme Court. Before discussing our decisional law, it is necessary to review briefly the tideland statutes subsequent to statehood, the definition of the line of ordinary high tide, and the administrative and superior court interpretations of the statutes.