Opinion ID: 3062949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bush’s Employment at Raytheon

Text: Bush worked as an electrical engineer in Raytheon’s Saint Petersburg, Florida office. In 2002, Raytheon provided engineering services to the Department of Defense to develop the next generation, and reduce the size, of cooperative engagement capability (“CEC”) equipment. CEC is a classified program that allows the military to paint a picture of a battlefield using remote sensing. A Technical Instruction document, called Technical Instruction No. 30B or TI30B, set the scope of the work and the government funding for it. According to TI30B, Raytheon was “to improve specified equipment and technology with respect to obsolescence and technology refresh issues.”2 1 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 2 Among other things, Raytheon was charged with: (1) conducting feasibility and impact studies for certain “interfaces that have obsolescence issues;” (2) planning and executing studies regarding the replacement of certain parts currently used in the CEC and in assessing the compatibility of a replacement processor; (3) developing and designing modifications to certain software; (4) updating system documentation; and (5) implementing design changes in “current DDS boards to provide technology upgrade, technical supportability, and obsolescence 2 In September 2002, as part of the CEC project, Bush attended a downconverter design review meeting.3 Another Raytheon employee, Bill Boler, stated that certain parts necessary to make the downconverter were no longer available, but that replacement parts had been found for them. Because there were replacement parts, Bush believed a proposed redesign of the downconverter based on obsolescence was unnecessary and should not proceed. Bush first claimed that he stated that the downconverter redesign violated the TI30B funding statement. In his deposition Bush admitted that his statement in the meeting was “subtle” because it would have been unprofessional to accuse his colleagues of violating the funding statement outright. Instead, Bush said that the engineers needed to “look at [their] funding statement; if there’s no obsolete parts, there may be a problem.” In his appeal brief, Bush admits that he did not say during the meeting that proceeding with the proposed redesign violated any regulation or law. After the meeting, Bush raised his concern in e-mails and conversations with Raytheon’s management involved in the design review, including Matthew Smith, Bush’s supervisor, and Ron Fowler, the CEC project manager. According to Bush, as a result, in October Raytheon stopped the redesign plan, saving the government resolution.” The costs of the engineering services was not to exceed $3,992,000. 3 A downconverter converts high-frequency radio waves to low-frequency radio waves. 3 $400,000. Bush alleges that, after the downconverter redesign was stopped, several Raytheon managers retaliated against him. In January 2003, Bush wrote a list of his accomplishments in his “performance screen,” which included that he had “identified that the CEC downconverter did not require redesign saving over $400,000.” Bush’s supervisor, Smith, changed the notation to read that Bush had “identified an alternative low-cost solution to the CEC downconverter redesign” and deleted that Bush’s actions had saved $400,000. In May 2003, Smith prepared Bush’s annual performance evaluation. Smith rated Bush overall as “Improvement Required,” and noted several areas in which Bush needed to show improvement. In March 2004, Steve Crose, Bush’s new supervisor, prepared Bush’s annual performance evaluation. Crose rated Bush overall as “Meets Requirements.” Bush contended that these two performance evaluations contained false information about his performance and omitted some of his accomplishments. Bush believes that these performance evaluations were retaliation for his complaints that the downconverter redesign violated TI30B. In October 2004, Raytheon undertook a reduction in force, terminating sixty employees in Saint Petersburg, including Bush. Steve Park selected the employees for termination by ranking them within “decisional units” based on four categories. 4 Park ranked Bush with input from other Raytheon managers who worked with Bush. Bush was terminated because he received the lowest ranking in his decisional unit. After his discharge, Bush applied for a position with another Raytheon division and for a position with an outside company. According to Bush, Raytheon’s Saint Petersburg office shared the allegedly false 2003 and 2004 performance reviews with these prospective employers and failed to provide a favorable 2002 annual performance review, which resulted in Bush not getting the new positions. Bush subsequently was rehired by Raytheon on another project, which ended in September 2006.