Opinion ID: 2999393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The legal sufficiency of a proffered affirmative defense is a question of law which we review de novo. United States v. Simmons, 215 F.3d 737, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2000). We have consistently held that a district court may properly deny a defendant the opportunity to introduce evidence supporting an affirmative defense by granting a pre-trial motion in limine, so long as the facts proffered by the defendant to support the defense are insufficient as a matter of law to meet the minimum standard as to each of the elements of that defense. United States v. Tokash, 282 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. SantiagoGodinez, 12 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1993). Indeed, this is 8 The jury could not reach a verdict on the murder or conspiracy counts, and the court ordered a mistrial on those charges. No. 05-1642 7 what the district court concluded in Sahakian’s case. The district judge found that, even if all of the facts Sahakian presented were accepted as true, he would still be unable to establish the elements of a necessity defense. We agree. A defendant seeking to invoke the defense of necessity in a criminal case must establish that he faced an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death and that he had no reasonable legal alternatives to avoid that threat. Id. at 969-71 (citing Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409-11). In United States v. Tokash, we addressed the issue of what constitutes an “imminent threat” in the prison context. 282 F.3d 962. In a case based on the same incident giving rise to this prosecution, i.e., the murder of Terry Walker at USP-Marion, we concluded that the word “imminent” should be construed narrowly in the prison context. Id. at 971. In doing so we determined that a prisoner must establish that he experienced something more than a “generalized fear of attack by some unknown or unspecified assailant at some unknown time in the future.” Id. at 966. Instead, he must demonstrate “the threat was immediate and that there was no reasonable alternative to violating the law.” Id. at 971. Additionally, in Tokash we reaffirmed our holding that an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm is an essential and necessary element of a necessity defense. Id. at 969 (stating that: “We have repeatedly and unquestioningly held that a defendant claiming a defense of necessity or duress must establish that he was under imminent fear of death or serious bodily harm.”). Although we acknowledged that prisons are inherently dangerous places, we stressed that this perilous atmosphere, per se, does not justify the possession of a weapon. See id. at 970. Rather, we noted that arguments involving generalized allegations of violence within a prison are unavailing and stated: “If prisoners could decide for themselves when to seek protection from the guards and when to settle matters by violence, prisons would be next to impossible to regulate. 8 No. 05-1642 The guards might as well throw the inmates together, withdraw to the perimeter, and let them kill one another . . . .” Id. (quoting United States v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1091 (7th Cir. 1998)). Sahakian argues that the definition of “necessity” should be read more broadly in his case because he genuinely feared for his life due to the unpredictability of his contact with other prisoners and the violent atmosphere at USP-Marion. Sahakian also suggests that this case can be distinguished from Tokash because he, unlike the defendant in Tokash, experienced a real and particularized threat to his life by way of rumors that there was a “price on his head,” and, thus, such a statement should not be classified merely as a “generalized threat” of a future act of violence. Id. at 970. Sahakian’s arguments are ultimately unpersuasive. The rumor that there was a contract out on his life presents, at best, a threat of future violence against him at some unspecified time, as opposed to a threat which was immediate or imminent in nature. For instance, Sahakian does not allege that the person making the supposed threat against him was standing in front of him with a knife or other weapon at the time he informed Sahakian that he would like to see him dead. In fact, Sahakian was unable to identify the source of the threat and only stated that the DC Blacks, a rival gang, had “targeted [him] for death.” This is the same sort of generalized future threat of violence that we addressed in Tokash. As we noted in that case, “ ‘future’ or ‘later’ and ‘imminent’ are opposites.” 282 F.3d at 970. Whether reasonable or not, Sahakian’s fear that he might be assaulted at some future point by some unidentified inmate without any corroboration or identification of a specific assailant, is insufficient to demonstrate an entitlement to the necessity defense. To hold that Sahakian was faced with an imminent threat based on a rumor he heard from some unknown and unidentified individual would No. 05-1642 9 essentially require that each and every inmate who has allegedly received a vague unsubstantiated threat be allowed to arm himself, threatening the safety of guards as well as other prisoners; this would be less than reasonable. See also United States v. Bell, 214 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that the defense is reserved for “extraordinary circumstances” which “require nothing less than immediate emergency.”). The consequences of such a concession would only serve to exacerbate the already violent environment at USP-Marion and any other federal prisons or places of confinement. Sahakian has also failed to demonstrate that the shank he carried would have been of any use to him if he was confronted with “imminent” danger. The record establishes that it took Sahakian approximately fifteen minutes to remove the weapon from his body cavity when prison officers directed him to do so. Obviously, with the quarterof-an-hour spent retrieving the weapon, it would be nigh on impossible for Sahakian to protect himself from any threat, much less one that was immediate or imminent. In light of the level of violence Sahakian described at USP-Marion, as well as the swift, ruthless and orchestrated manner in which Terry Walker was murdered, it is unlikely that a prospective attacker would extend the courtesy of allowing him to retrieve the knife before taking his life. Equally fatal to his claim of entitlement to a necessity defense is that Sahakian failed to establish that he had exhausted all other reasonable legal alternatives before he decided to take matters into his own hands. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410. In Bailey, the Supreme Court made clear that a necessity defense is only available where it has been established that the defendant had no “reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law.” Id. Expounding on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey, we noted in Tokash that there are an abundance of legal alternatives to possessing a weapon in prison, such as filing a proper administrative 10 No. 05-1642 grievance with prison officials or requesting, based upon good cause, to be placed in protective custody or segregation. 282 F.3d at 970. In Tokash, we held that those reasonable legal alternatives remained viable despite Tokash’s argument that informing the prison guards would prove “futile.” Id. at 966. Likewise, in this case, Sahakian argues that pursuing legal alternatives would have been otiose. We respond by reaffirming the theory advanced in Tokash that: “ ‘If prisoners could decide for themselves when to seek protection from the guards and when to settle matters by violence, prisons would be next to impossible to regulate. The guards might as well throw the inmates together, withdraw to the perimeter, and let them kill one another . . . .’ Appellate courts are ill-equipped to consider and adopt policies and practices to maintain the safety and security of this country’s penitentiaries. Indeed, the operation of our correctional facilities is ‘peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our government, not the Judicial.’ ” Id. at 970; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Sahakian, as did the defendants in Tokash, falls far short of demonstrating that he exhausted all available lawful means of avoiding the alleged contract on his life before resorting to carrying a weapon. He never informed the prison guards of the threat on his life, he did not request to be moved and he did not ask to be placed in protective custody. Rather, he chose to take the matter into his own hands by carrying a concealed weapon, an action this court has been well advised not to condone in the past and will not excuse in this case. See generally id.