Opinion ID: 1145118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: (5) Defendant failed to prove prejudice arising from state's delay in bringing him to trial.

Text: We come therefore to the question whether the abridgment of a defendant's right under section 1382 requires a reversal of the conviction. In People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d 139, 151-152, we addressed this issue and concluded that a defendant raising the issue after conviction must prove not only unjustified delay in bringing his case to trial but also prejudice flowing from that delay. We stated in Wilson that if a defendant seeks pretrial relief, he is not required to affirmatively show that he [has] been prejudiced by the delay. ( Id., at p. 151; see Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 504 [149 Cal. Rptr. 957, 585 P.2d 219].) Upon appellate review following conviction, however, a defendant who seeks to predicate reversal of a conviction upon denial of his right to speedy trial must show that the delay caused prejudice: this court, in reviewing the judgment of conviction, must weigh the effect of the delay in bringing defendant to trial or the fairness of the subsequent trial itself. (60 Cal.2d at p. 151.) Because defendant in Wilson failed to show that he was in any way prejudiced by the setting of his trial for a date approximately two months beyond the last day to which he had consented, we concluded that the asserted errors did not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction, and affirmed the judgment. ( Id., at p. 154.) In the present case the record shows no prejudice to defendant arising from the delay. This is not a case in which the statute of limitations would have been a bar to new charges, or one in which a dismissal would itself have barred refiling. Defendant does not assert that the delay actually prejudiced his defense. Indeed, defendant by his silence on this issue essentially concedes the absence of prejudice, urging that we overrule Wilson and reverse his conviction without proof of prejudice. We adhere, however, to the reasoning and holding in Wilson. That decision represents a considered policy judgment that defendants should seek review of speedy trial claims before trial. The decision recognized also that once a defendant has been tried and convicted, the state Constitution in article VI, section 13, forbids reversal for nonprejudicial error. When a defendant has received a fair trial, we believe, neither the public interest nor the scope of article VI, section 13, call for reversal of that conviction because of nonprejudicial error in the scheduling of that trial. (6a) In summary, calendar conflict by appointed counsel does not permit counsel to waive defendant's rights under section 1382 over his client's express objection; likewise calendar conflict on the part of defense counsel or the trial court cannot routinely serve to justify denial of a motion to dismiss when trial is postponed beyond the statutory period. These conclusions, we believe, are essential to enforce the right of defendants and the People to a speedy trial and to forestall the danger that counties may adopt a practice of regular and routine circumvention of the 60-day period specified by the Legislature. [19] (7) In the interest of justice and sound judicial administration, our conclusion that congested calendars of defense counsel or trial courts will not necessarily constitute good cause to deny a motion to dismiss under section 1382 should not be applied to rulings denying such a motion to dismiss rendered prior to the date of finality of this opinion.