Opinion ID: 1403743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Halliburton's claim for implied indemnification against Falcon Drilling still exists.

Text: Finally, Falcon Drilling argues that Halliburton can no longer recover implied indemnity against it because Halliburton voluntarily settled with the Plaintiffs and cannot otherwise demonstrate that Halliburton is without fault. Halliburton responds by arguing that Falcon Drilling's argument is premature because Falcon Drilling is not a party to this appeal. As a preliminary matter, when the Court allowed Falcon Drilling to file a brief and participate in oral argument, this Court determined that Halliburton's appeal necessarily impacts both Texas Keystone and Falcon Drilling. See Levine v. Headlee, 148 W.Va. 323, 334, 134 S.E.2d 892, 898 (1964)( quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Buskirk v. Musick, 100 W.Va. 247, 130 S.E. 435 (1925)) (Where one party only appeals, but his rights and the rights of others are not only involved in the same question, but are equally affected by the decree or judgment, the appeal of the one will call for an adjudication also of the rights of those not appealing.). Thus, the Court will address the issue presented by Falcon Drilling. As the Court held in syllabus point two of Harvest Capital v. West Virginia Department of Energy, 211 W.Va. 34, 560 S.E.2d 509 (2002): The general principle of implied indemnity arises from equitable considerations. At the heart of the doctrine is the premise that the person seeking to assert implied indemnitythe indemniteehas been required to pay damages caused by a third partythe indemnitor. In the typical case, the indemnitee is made liable to the injured party because of some positive duty created by statute or common law, but the actual cause of the injury was the act of the indemnitor. Syl. Pt. 2, Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 165 W.Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980). Harvest Capital, 211 W.Va. at 36, 560 S.E.2d at 511, Syl. Pt. 2. Further, [t]he requisite elements of an implied indemnity claim in West Virginia are a showing that: (1) an injury was sustained by a third party; (2) for which a putative indemnitee has become subject to liability because of a positive duty created by statute or common law, but whose independent actions did not contribute to the injury; and (3) for which a putative indemnitor should bear fault for causing because of the relationship the indemnitor and indemnitee share. Id., 560 S.E.2d at 511, Syl. Pt. 4. Additionally, in Hager v. Marshall, 202 W.Va. 577, 505 S.E.2d 640 (1998), this Court held in syllabus point seven that [i]n non-product liability multi-party civil actions, a good faith settlement between a plaintiff and a defendant will extinguish the right of a non-settling defendant to seek implied indemnity unless such non-settling defendant is without fault. Id. at 580-81, 505 S.E.2d at 643-44. In light of the fact that all the Defendants have entered into good faith settlements with the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendants have been dismissed, there is no judgment against any of the Defendants requiring any Defendant to pay damages to the Plaintiff. Further, no non-settling Defendant remains in the litigation. Consequently, there is no basis for any implied indemnification claim by Halliburton. Accordingly, Halliburton's claim for implied indemnification against Falcon Drilling has been extinguished.