Opinion ID: 1734443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in denying the testimony of Joseph Bailey.

Text: ¶ 12. Joseph Bailey was Jacobs's first witness at trial. Bailey had been indicted in a separate proceeding with a charge of criminal conspiracy in the murder for which Jacobs was on trial. Beyond his name and his pending charges, Bailey declined to answer any further questions based on his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The defense sought to question the law enforcement officer who interrogated Bailey in order to show through this introduction of hearsay that there was another gun that was used to put Jacobs in duress forcing him to kill. The trial court did not allow Bailey's statements because they were found to be inconsistent, not corroborated by other evidence and contradicted by evidence already admitted. For these reasons, the court found that the statements were inadmissible because they were beyond the scope of the hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence: (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have make the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. ¶ 13. Bailey was clearly classified as an unavailable witness under this rule since he invoked his Fifth Amendment right. The inconsistent statement in question is Bailey's statement to the Jackson County detective about where the handgun that Jacobs claims was held to his head was obtained. Bailey told the detective that he went with Crystal Broadus to get a handgun from her grandparents' house. He said that she reached under the bed and took out a BB pistol, pushed it back under the bed and went to her closet and took another pistol. Bailey made this statement on three different occasions, and there were three different versions of the statement. However, all statements stated that Broadus did in fact go into her room to retrieve a handgun, and that a handgun, not a BB pistol was in Broadus's possession. ¶ 14. Jacobs claims the totality of Bailey's statement inculpated him and incriminated him to an extent that it satisfies the requirement that it is a statement against his criminal interest. Also, Jacobs claims that because this statement would subject Bailey to criminal liability, a reasonable person would not have made that statement unless he believed it was true. Therefore, Jacobs argues, Bailey's statement meets the requirement of the hearsay exception under M.R.E 804(b)(3). Jacobs relies on Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), where the Supreme Court analyzed Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) in stating that this rule is founded on the common sense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true. Id. at 599, 114 S.Ct. 2431. ¶ 15. Jacobs further asserts that the statement should have been admitted because the fact that Bailey told the story three time does not render it unreliable. Jacobs avers that Bailey had no motive to fabricate this statement because Bailey and Jacobs were not friends or acquaintances and there was no indication that Bailey somehow wanted to help Jacobs. The United States Supreme Court has held that reliability can be inferred `where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception ..., otherwise, there must be `a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1148 (Miss.1998) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)). In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), the United States Supreme Court further stated that if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial. ¶ 16. Here, the dispositive question is whether Bailey's statement shows particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. This Court finds that it does not. Because there were three different versions of Bailey's statement, it cannot be said that if the statement had been crossexamined at trial it would have been of marginal utility. Due to the fact that there is three different versions of Bailey's statement, there would be a need for cross-examination at trial. Therefore, the hearsay rule bars admission of the statement due to lack of trustworthiness.