Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Prosecutor's Argument Regarding Factors (d) and (h)

Text: (32) Defendant claims the prosecutor warned the jury it should not consider mitigating evidence regarding his intoxication or psychological problems unless the impairment was so severe as to amount to insanity or diminished capacity. He urges this is not consistent with factors (d) and (h) [32] and violates the principle that the jury must be allowed to consider any aspect of defendant's character or background relevant to penalty. (Cf. People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) In paraphrasing several factors, the prosecutor did add to the list: Whether or not he had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law; whether or not it was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication. This is, roughly speaking, factor (h). The prosecutor rambled on: And in regards to that, you have the testimony, both during the trial and the penalty phase of the trial, the guilty phase and the penalty phase, as to the degree of intoxication; the degree of whatever emotional disturbance, albeit a psychologist, although it was not a mental disease or psychosis does not excuse the criminal conduct, as it might in some cases.  โ Whether or not it is such that it would impair his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of law. You recall that Dr. Maloney testified, on direct, that given his background and whatever you want to call his condition, he was responsible for his conduct. He may have been drinking. What was the effect of that drinking? In deciding that, was it such that he did not know what he was doing? That he was out of his mind? That he just couldn't conform his conduct? Or was it such that he had been drinking, but he was responsible and he knew what he was doing? We just cannot agree with defendant that this portion of the argument somehow prevented the jury from considering relevant mitigating factors. The prosecutor himself went on to consider such factors, stating that defendant's behavior was certainly not normal but it was within that degree of normalcy where we say his conduct is not excused.... He discussed defendant's disturbed childhood, arguing it did not merit lesser punishment. Thus, rather than telling the jury to ignore this mitigating evidence, the prosecutor addressed it. Defense counsel also discussed defendant's childhood resulting in mental and emotional damage and he discussed defendant's impairment with either alcohol or drugs. He admitted these did not amount to a legal excuse and that if they had, he would have raised a defense such as insanity. But nevertheless, it was a mitigating factor the jury should consider in imposing penalty. What I am saying is that he is, nevertheless, severely and substantially emotionally and mentally impaired, and that what we don't do in this country is we don't kill people who are sick people. We just don't do it. Again, there is simply nothing in the argument of either counsel to suggest the jury was not to consider mitigating evidence unless that evidence reached the level of an insanity or diminished capacity defense. The jury was instructed on factors (d) and (h); and we conclude that these instructions and the arguments of counsel allowed the jury to consider any mitigating evidence relating to defendant's alleged intoxication or mental defects at the time of the crimes. (See generally, People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 720-721 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 296-297 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].)