Opinion ID: 6342797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Wratchfords’ Cross-Assignments of Error

Text: The Wratchfords advance two cross-assignments of error in this appeal. First, they contend that the circuit court erred in concluding that a violation of the Ethics Act is not a “violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws” sufficient to thwart summary judgment. As noted above, the Review Board of the Ethics Commission has already determined that there was no violation of the Ethics Act in this case, so we need not determine whether the circuit court erred in this regard. As such, the only remaining argument the Wratchfords advance is that the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Ayersman’s motion for summary judgment regarding 27 their tortious interference claim. The Wratchfords argued below that Mr. Ayersman tortiously interfered with Ms. Wratchford’s employment with the DMV. Specifically, they contend that Mr. Ayersman investigated the Wratchfords’ finances and discovered that they had not paid personal property taxes for some three years. That failure to pay property taxes would have precluded the Wratchfords from renewing their motor vehicle registrations, yet their registrations were current. This was accomplished because Ms. Wratchford falsified property tax receipts and used her position as a DMV employee to fraudulently register the Wratchfords’ vehicles. Mr. Ayersman notified Ms. Wratchford of his discovery and his intention to pass the information along to the State Police. While Ms. Wratchford initially denied any wrongdoing, she later admitted she engaged in this conduct in a handwritten, signed statement. Mr. Ayersman did ultimately inform the State Police, and the State Police subsequently informed the DMV. Thereafter, Ms. Wratchford voluntarily resigned from her position at the DMV. On appeal, as she did below, Ms. Wratchford asserts that this amounts to tortious interference, insofar as Mr. Ayersman’s informing the State Police of her conduct resulted in the loss of her employment. This Court has explained that a prima facie case of tortious interference is established by showing: (1) existence of a contractual or business relationship or expectancy; (2) an intentional act of interference by a party outside that relationship or expectancy; (3) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained; and (4) damages. See syl. pt. 5, Hatfield v. Health Mgmt. Assocs. of W. Va., 223 W. Va. 259, 672 S.E.2d 395 (2008). Once a prima facie case is made, a defendant may prove 28 justification or privilege and affirmative defenses. Id. Under the facts of this case, there is no question that Ms. Wratchford made out a prima facie case of tortious interference. However, Mr. Ayersman had a clear affirmative defense: truth. In syllabus point five of Tiernan v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 203 W. Va. 135, 506 S.E.2d 578 (1998), we held: In the context of tortious interference with a business relationship, one who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to enter into a prospective business relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other’s business relation by giving the third person (a) truthful information, or (b) honest advice within the scope of a request for the advice. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 722 (1979). The information Mr. Ayersman provided to the State Police was truthful, as evidenced by Ms. Wratchford’s own handwritten, signed admission to that effect. Therefore, his conduct did not amount to tortious interference, and the circuit court properly granted his motion for summary judgment on that claim. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on that point.