Opinion ID: 2544339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-trial sanctions

Text: Gonsalves's final issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred by denying his motion for HRCP Rule 11 sanctions based on Nissan's (1) violation of a pretrial order and (2) false claims of privilege and relevance. [26] HRCP Rule 11 provides that [i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. Thus, the circuit court has the discretion to determine whether the imposition of monetary sanctions is appropriate. See Fujimoto, 95 Hawai`i at 137, 19 P.3d at 720. In the present case, the circuit court examined Nissan's counsel's conduct at issue and found that, although it was questionable, it did not rise to the level of being sanctionable. With respect to a report Nissan improperly claimed as irrelevant and privileged, the court stated: ... I think that counsel certainly needs to be cautioned here that if you didn't cross the line, you were certainly tiptoeing on it and you have to be careful and you should not be playing fast and loose to gain a strategic advantage and I think it came very, very close to crossing that line. With respect to Nissan's effort to introduce evidence without notice and contrary to a pretrial order, the court explained: In terms of the court's pre-trial order regarding the dress, I think I've already made the finding regarding a violation of that order and so the real issue then comes to sanctions .... .... So it really comes down to the pre-trial order and sanctions and whether they should issue or not. Again, Miss Evans, I think the matter with the pre-trial order and dress, you are a zealous advocate for your clients. No one's going to argue with that. And the question is, how far is that zealousness permitted to go? And at the same time, in settling jury instructions, in conversing with you off the record about a number of things, you're a nice person. I have no animus personally or anything like that, but you are very zealous when you defend your clients, as well you should be. And the real question is, where is the line? Where are you going to draw it? Are you going to step back from the line or are you going to go up to, on, dip your toe over the line. And I think you havewith the pre-trial order, I think you crossed the line.... You were tiptoeing on that line. That's the benefit of the doubt. Am I going to sanction you for it? It's discretionary with the court and no, I'm not. You're cautioned. You're admonished. You can be zealous and you can be straight up and be zealous at the same time. You don't have [to] cross that line. You don't have to tiptoe on it and I think those comments of mine are sanction enough and I'm not going to impose any monetary sanction. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the circuit court exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. Gold, 962 P.2d at 359, 88 Hawai`i at 100 (citing Bronster, 82 Hawai`i at 54, 919 P.2d 294 at 316). Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose a monetary sanction. See Fujimoto, 95 Hawai`i at 153, 19 P.3d at 736 (For purposes of appellate review, a distinction must be made between zealous advocacy and plain pettifoggery.).