Opinion ID: 2602167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trial court's grant of motion for directed verdict

Text: ¶ 20 Brookside argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that the Residency Act governed Brookside's unlawful detainer action. Brookside's position is based on its view that the Residency Act requires that for a mobile home tenant to claim the protections of the Residency Act, a written lease must exist between the lessee and lessor and that no such lease exists between Peebles and Brookside. ¶ 21 In reviewing a trial court's grant of a directed verdict, appellate courts look to see if any evidence at trial raises a question of material fact which would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor and preclude a judgment as a matter of law. Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, ¶ 3, 975 P.2d 467. Section 78-36-3(2) of the Utah Code requires that [u]nlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home [be] determined under . . . [the] Mobile Home Park Residency Act. (emphasis added). If Peebles was an owner resident then Brookside was required to comply with the notice provisions of the Residency Act, regardless of the existence of a lease, rendering the trial court's grant of Peebles' motion for directed verdict proper. ¶ 22 There is no dispute over whether Peebles is an owner. The Residency Act defines resident as an individual who leases or rents space in a mobile home park. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-3(3)(2000). As the court of appeals noted, Brookside does not challenge the jury finding that Peebles had a written lease with the Park before Brookside brought the Park, nor does it challenge the finding that Peebles did not surrender the lease. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2000 UT App 314, ¶ 28, 14 P.3d 105. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Peebles paid rent to Brookside after Rowley abandoned the mobile home, and the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit served by Brookside on December 11, 1995, referred to Peebles as a tenant. Thus, as a matter of law, because Peebles leased or rented space in a mobile home park, Peebles is a resident under the Residency Act. § 57-16-3(3). Under these facts, it follows that Peebles is an owner resident under section 78-36-3 and an unlawful detainer action against him could only proceed under the Residency Act. The Residency Act provides for a fifteen-day notice period. § 57-16-5(2). Brookside provided only a five-day notice. Thus, because Brookside's notice was deficient, Peebles was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the court of appeals on this issue.