Opinion ID: 199507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presentence Waivers of Appellate Rights: An Overview.

Text: 19 The basic argument against presentence waivers of appellate rights is that such waivers are anticipatory: at the time the defendant signs the plea agreement, she does not have a clue as to the nature and magnitude of the sentencing errors that may be visited upon her. Her waiver typically embraces all determinations later made by the sentencing court - some of which may never have occurred either to her or to the government, and some of which may be quite different than either thought possible. In a certain sense, then - though not in the usual criminal law sense - a waiver of the right to appeal cannot be knowing. In the appellant's view, this is a fundamental defect - and one that distinguishes presentence waivers of appellate rights from other waivers contained in a plea agreement. 20 We are not unsympathetic to this argument. Withal, three reasons counsel persuasively in favor of a rule that accords general validity to presentence waivers of appellate rights. 3 First, waivers are not inherently suspect in criminal cases any more than in civil cases. Criminal defendants typically may waive their rights, as long as they do so voluntarily and with knowledge of the general nature and consequences of the waiver. See Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (discussing waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-67 (1938) (discussing waiver of right to counsel). Indeed, guilty pleas are a staple of our criminal justice system - and a guilty plea inevitably entails a waiver of numerous rights. Although many of these waivers pertain to future events - a waiver of the right to trial by jury is a good example - their prospective nature has never been thought to place them off limits or to render the defendant's act unknowing. 21 Moreover, the idea of permitting presentence waivers of appellate rights seems relatively tame because the right to appeal in a criminal case is not of constitutional magnitude. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Since the Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled that a defendant may waive constitutional rights as part of a plea agreement, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970), it follows logically that a defendant ought to be able to waive rights that are purely creatures of statute. 22 The Criminal Rules themselves lend support to this conclusion. Effective December 1, 1999, the Supreme Court, with the approval of Congress, amended the Criminal Rules to provide specifically that, during a change-of-plea hearing, the presiding judge must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the terms of any provision in a plea agreement waiving the right to appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(6). While the advisory committee, in its explanatory note, made clear that it took no position on the underlying validity of such waivers, it recognized that they had become an accepted part of federal plea-agreement practice. See id., advisory committee notes. This widespread acceptance of the practice is itself a clear indication that those who deal most frequently with criminal cases have come to conclude that presentence waivers of appellate rights are not forbidden. 23 Considerations of public policy furnish a second pillar on which to rest a holding that breathes vitality into presentence waivers of appellate rights. Since criminal defendants are entitled to appeal convictions and sentences as a matter of statutory right, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, a defendant is unlikely to waive this right unless she believes that some feature of a proffered plea agreement makes it worth her while to do so. Allowing a criminal defendant to agree to a waiver of appeal gives her an additional bargaining chip in negotiations with the prosecution; she may, for example, be able to exchange this waiver for the government's assent to the dismissal of other charges. This benefit is very real; in some cases the government, without such a waiver, might not be willing to plea-bargain at all. 24 The benefit to the prosecution - conservation of resources -is obvious. 4 In the same vein, presentence waivers of appellate rights also husband judicial resources by discouraging groundless sentencing appeals. With court-appointed counsel freely available and nothing to lose by trying, a defendant, unfettered by a waiver agreement, is quite likely to appeal on a wing and a prayer. Reducing the number of baseless appeals promotes both efficiency and finality in the adjudication of criminal cases. 5 25 These policy considerations properly factor into our assessment of presentence waivers of appellate rights. Cf. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 117 (2000) (We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests.). They indicate that the government, the defendant, and the judicial system all have something to gain from presentence waivers of appellate rights. This makes the device attractive: broadly speaking, plea agreements are in the best interests of the parties and the criminal justice system, United States v. Penta, 898 F.2d 815, 817 (1st Cir. 1990); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973), and the more options that both sides have, the more likely it is that they will reach an accord. 26 The third reason supporting a rule that accords validity to presentence waivers of appellate rights is the sheer weight of authority. On a close question, where no obviously right or wrong answer exists, courts of appeals should strive to avoid creating needless conflicts. In this instance, presentence waivers of appellate rights have been accepted by all nine of the circuit courts which have passed upon their validity. See United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763-64 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cuevas-Andrade, 232 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1998). While these courts set varying boundaries, they all agree that, under ordinary circumstances, a knowing, voluntary waiver of the right to appeal from a sentence, contained in a plea agreement, ought to be enforced. 6 Absent some convincing countervailing argument - and we are aware of none - we are reluctant to brush aside this collective wisdom. Thus, this unanimity strongly suggests that such waivers, if appropriately drafted, asserted to, and explained, should be honored. 27 We will not paint the lily. Given the general availability of waivers in criminal cases, the public policy gains to be reaped by allowing plea-agreement waivers of appellate rights, and the impressive body of precedent sanctioning such waivers, we hold that presentence waivers of appellate rights are valid in theory. 28