Opinion ID: 172871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Motivating (Causation) Factor and Detrimental Employment Decision (Adverse Employment Action)

Text: Under the fourth-prong of Garcetti, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing both a detrimental employment decision (adverse employment action) and causationthat is, that the constitutionally protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in the employer's decision to adversely alter the employee's conditions of employment. Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1188 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2005). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants because Dr. Couch was unable to establish a genuine issue of fact on step-four of the Garcetti-analysis. The court concluded that Dr. Couch had established neither (a) any adverse employment action by defendants nor (b) that any or all of the defendants' actions were motivated by Dr. Couch's speech. Like the district court, we will consider in the analysis that follows both parts of Dr. Couch's burden at step four: that he establish an adverse employment action and that he establish causation. With regard to the need to show causation as part of the fourth prong of Garcetti, we have said Although protected conduct closely followed by adverse action may justify an inference of retaliatory motive, the mere temporal proximity of Plaintiff's protected speech to the adverse action is insufficient, without more, to establish retaliatory motive. Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1221 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations, citations and alterations omitted). We have explained, for instance, that it might be relevant in establishing a retaliatory motive that the employer expressed opposition to the employee's speech, Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1189, or that the protected speech implicated the individual defendant in wrongdoing. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1221. On the other hand, we also have explained that evidence such as a long delay between the employee's speech and challenged conduct, or evidence of intervening events, tend to undermine any inference of retaliatory motive and weaken the causal link. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1189 (internal citations omitted). With regard to the need to show a detrimental employment decision or an adverse employment action as part of the fourth prong of Garcetti, the Supreme Court has noted that First Amendment protection extends beyond employer conduct amounting to termination of employment or the substantial equivalent. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990). In Rutan, the Supreme Court noted that such a limit would fail to recognize that there are deprivations less harsh than dismissal that nevertheless press state employees and applicants to conform their beliefs and associations to some state-selected orthodoxy. [16] Id. In so doing the Court recognized that promotions, transfers, recalls after layoff, and hiring decisions are actionable conduct. Id. Likewise, this court has recognized that certain types of less severe conduct can be the basis for a First Amendment claim, as we have noted on more than one occasion that some forms of retaliation may be actionable under the First Amendment while insufficient to support a discrimination claim under Title VII. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1188 n.5 (citing cases); see also Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1208 (forbidding teachers to speak with parents about school matters and blacklisting teachers from future employment at the school could be an actionable adverse employment action for First Amendment purposes); Schuler v. City of Boulder, 189 F.3d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999) (removing an employee's job duties, issuing a written reprimand, giving a poor performance evaluation, and transferring an employee can be actionable in the First Amendment context). But we have never ruled that all [of an employer's acts], no matter how trivial, are sufficient to support a retaliation claim. Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1340 (10th Cir. 2000). In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), the Court held that the actionable adverse employment action is broader in the Title VII-retaliation context than in the Title VII-substantive discrimination-context. Id. at 61. Specifically, the Court held that in order for an employer's conduct to be actionable, a plaintiff must show that the conduct might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Id. at 68 (internal quotation and citation omitted). This standard is analogous to our definition of an adverse action in First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants other than the plaintiff's employers. Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (Plaintiff must establish that the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity. (internal quotation omitted)). Also, this standard is consonant with the Supreme Court's discussion in Rutan that deprivations which press state employees and applicants to conform their beliefs and associations to some state-selected orthodoxy raise First Amendment concerns. 497 U.S. at 75. The test in Burlington Northern is also consonant with our First Amendment employment retaliation cases. For instance, just as Burlington Northern held in the Title VII-retaliation context, we have explained that an adverse action for purposes of retaliation under the First Amendment can be broader than adverse actions in the Title VII discrimination context. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1182 n.5 (noting that some forms of retaliation may be actionable under the First Amendment while insufficient to support a discrimination claim under Title VII). Additionally, the test in Burlington Northern is analogous to the standard articulated by several other circuits in the First Amendment context. See, e.g., Matrisciano v. Randle, 569 F.3d 723, 730 (7th Cir. 2009) (employee must establish that he suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech), abrogation on other grounds recognized in Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525-26 (7th Cir. 2009); Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d 217, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (adopting Burlington Northern standard in the First Amendment retaliation context); Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir. 2006) (adverse action means an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in [the protected] activity). But see Akins v. Fulton County, Ga., 420 F.3d 1293, 1300-01 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (action must tend to chill free speech and alter some important condition of employment to be adverse; but also observing that the First Amendment and Title VII standards are consonant). Therefore, in determining whether Dr. Couch's complaints of retaliation satisfy the fourth Garcetti-prong, we will consider whether the hospital's specific actions would deter a reasonable person from exercising his . . . First Amendment rights. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1208.