Opinion ID: 554950
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of review; review by Supreme Court

Text: 27 The court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the action of the Office or the Secretary or to set it aside, in whole or in part. The judgment of the court shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28. 28 While at first blush section 1234g(a) appears to impose a non-discretionary duty on the Secretary--requiring him to suspend any administrative action while judicial review is pending--this is not clear after a careful examination of the statutory framework. In particular, we note that the legislative history of title VI may indicate that a termination order can be imposed after final agency action. The Senate, for example, rejected an amendment to title VI that would have stayed administrative action while judicial review was pending, i.e., it would have had the same effect as section 1234g(a). 110 Cong.Rec. 14,192-93 (1964). Although section 1234g(a) was added to the GEPA by the Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-297, Sec. 3501, 102 Stat. 130, 356, the legislative history of those amendments does not reflect an intent to make a major change in title VI law. Thus, it is at least a possible inference that only subsections 1234g(b)-(d)--and not subsection 1234g(a)--govern judicial review of terminations under section 504. 14 This position is bolstered by the Secretary's ability to defer federal financial assistance to school districts even during the course of administrative proceedings, if he abides by a strict administrative time frame. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d-5 (1988); 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1232i(b) (1988). An absolute administrative stay after the completion of administrative proceedings would appear to be illogical, given the possibility of deferral during the course of those proceedings.