Opinion ID: 4564472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Harrison’s Employers

Text: Parts Galore and Soave first argue that neither entity was an employer of Harrison, and therefore neither may be held liable for her employment-related claims. The district court rejected this argument, stating that although Harrison testified that neither Parts Galore nor Soave Enterprises was her employer, “companies can be so intertwined that they constitute a single 6 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. employer.” Harrison, 2019 WL 296699, at . On appeal, Parts Galore and Soave Enterprises argue that the evidence of corporate interwovenness cited by the district court was not enough to allow a reasonable jury to find that those companies were also subject to liability given her admission that she was employed only by Ferrous. We disagree. Harrison testified only as to which business she considered to be her formal employer. However, neither the ADA’s plain language nor our precedent limits liability solely to such formal employers. Start with the statutory text. It states that no “covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” in various terms and conditions of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). The ADA defines “covered entity” to include “an employer.” Id. § 12111(2). And it defines “employer” as a “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce” with a certain number of employees as well as “any agent of such person.” Id. § 12111(5)(A). Nowhere does this statutory text require the “covered entity” that engages in the illegal discrimination to be the formal employer of the disabled individual who is subjected to the discrimination. Cf. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 16–18 (1st Cir. 1994). Likewise, our case law has noted that an “employer” under the ADA is not always limited to the company with whom the aggrieved employee has a direct employment relationship. Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that there can be circumstances in “which a defendant that does not directly employ a plaintiff may still be considered an ‘employer’ under [the ADA]”). In these situations, we follow three approaches to examine whether two companies constitute one employer. Id. Under the first, we examine “whether two entities are so interrelated that they may be considered a ‘single employer’ or an ‘integrated enterprise.’” Id.; see, e.g., York v. Tenn. Crushed Stone Ass’n, 684 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 7 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C. 1982). The second approach “consider[s] whether one defendant has control over another company’s employees sufficient to show that the two companies are acting as a ‘joint employer’ of those employees.” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993; see, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1985). The third addresses “whether the person or entity that took the allegedly illegal employment action was acting as the agent of another company, which may then be held liable as the plaintiffs’ employer.” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993; see, e.g., Deal v. State Farm Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex., 5 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1993). We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Soave and Parts Galore are subject to liability under this framework. Among other evidence concerning the relationship between the entities, the individuals who were involved in the decision to terminate Harrison (and thus who engaged in the alleged “discriminat[ion] against” her, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)) actually worked for Parts Galore or Soave, not Ferrous. Tony Murell, the primary person who made the decision to fire Harrison, was employed by Parts Galore. See Harrison, 2019 WL 296699, at . And Marcia Moss, who was present with Murell during Harrison’s termination, was employed by Soave as its Human Resources Director. See id. Soave and Parts Galore make no claim that they do not otherwise qualify as “employers” under the relevant statutory definition (which requires that they be engaged in an industry affecting commerce and have the required number of employees). See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). And the definition of employer encompasses an employer’s “agent”— like Murell and Moss for Parts Galore and Soave, respectively. While Soave argues that Moss had no role in the actual termination decision, a dispute of fact exists on that issue. And a factual dispute exists over whether the different entities are “so interrelated” that they would be considered a “single employer” or “integrated enterprise.” We therefore hold that Soave and Parts Galore are potentially subject to liability under the ADA. 8 Case No. 19-1176, Harrison v. Soave Enterprises, L.L.C. and Parts Galore, L.L.C.