Opinion ID: 3009491
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Methamphetamine (Actual)

Text: The difference between methamphetamine and methamphetamine (actual) is highly significant for sentencing purposes: methamphetamine (actual) is subject to an offense level ten times greater than methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment.(n.10) (Drug Equivalency Table) (one gram of methamphetamine (actual) is treated as the equivalent of ten grams of marijuana while one gram of methamphetamine is equivalent to one gram of marijuana); see also United States v. Lande, No. 94-8038, 1994 WL 627425, at  n.1 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 1994); United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 744 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing the effect on sentencing) (citing United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 789 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied sub. nom., Jessee v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1234 (1994). The district court defined methamphetamine (actual) as pure methamphetamine.4 The court then explained: Well, pure is how you define pure. I'm defining it, pure, as uncut product, not whether the product was good product or bad product. Now that may be erroneous, in which case I'll be reversed on appeal. But the fact of the matter is that a caramel-like mess to me is not the critical point; the point is, that's what came out of the manufacturing process, and it had not yet been cut. Bogusz Appendix at 85. Bogusz and O'Rourke argue that methamphetamine (actual) refers to the percentage purity of the end product. That is, they argue that methamphetamine (actual) refers to the net amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride present in the substance upon which sentencing is based. The Guidelines' commentary defines methamphetamine (actual) as the weight of the controlled substance, itself, contained in the mixture or substance. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), comment.(n.).5 The Guidelines also provide the following 4 . Prior to the 1991 amendments, the Guidelines also used the term pure instead of actual. See U.S.S.G. App. C., amend. 395. 5 . In this respect, the Guidelines' treatment of methamphetamine and PCP is contrary to the gross weight method of calculating the illustrative example: a mixture weighing 10 grams containing PCP at 50% purity contains 5 grams PCP (actual). Id. (under the Guidelines, PCP and methamphetamine are treated identically). Unfortunately, the commentary to the Guidelines is susceptible to either interpretation of pure, and each has case law support. Compare United States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272, 1282 (2d Cir.) (holding that pure merely means uncut or unadulterated), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 146 (1991); United States v. Patrick, 983 F.2d 206 (11th Cir. 1993) (same in dicta) with Carroll, 6 F.3d at 746 (the only way to calculate the quantity of 'pure methamphetamine' in determining a defendant's base offense level under § 2D1.1(c) is to multiply the purity of the mixture times the weight), cert. denied sub. nom., Jessee v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1234 (1994); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 880 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 351 (1992); United States v. Alfeche, 942 F.2d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); see also United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that pure methamphetamine does not include the weight of impurities). At oral argument, the government argued that adoption of the appellants' interpretation would reward them for being poor cooks. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 46. This contention reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of (..continued) quantity of all other controlled substances. See Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1926 (1991). The gross weight method is known as a market oriented approach. Id. at 1925. methamphetamine production and the Guidelines' treatment of it. Sentencing for methamphetamine drug offenses is intended to punish all cooks equally. Sentencing under methamphetamine (actual) punishes particularly good cooks and their employers more severely. Methamphetamine, as produced through normal chemical processes, contains a number of impurities. See Spencer, 4 F.3d at 121 (noting that methamphetamine results from a chemical reaction which yields a mixture of methamphetamine and various impurities); United States v. Stoner, 927 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir.) (noting that methamphetamine virtually never is completely pure), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 129 (1991). The initial product can then be processed further to remove these impurities. The purified product, being more concentrated, can then be cut into larger quantities for resale. The interpretation Bogusz and O'Rourke urge on us does not reward bad cooks; instead, it merely punishes more severely the sophisticated cooks who could otherwise manipulate the Guidelines by producing smaller quantities of more concentrated methamphetamine. The government's reliance on Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1925 (1991), and its discussion of Congress' market-oriented approach is also misplaced. As the Supreme Court noted in Chapman, Congress and the Guidelines identified methamphetamine and PCP as drugs warranting differential treatment with regard to purity and thus provided for their unique sentencing scheme. See id. at 1924. An interpretation of purity that relies upon the treatment of other controlled substances conflicts with the Guidelines' unique treatment of methamphetamine. After consideration of the text and commentary of the Guidelines, existing case law and the peculiar sentencing scheme for methamphetamine, we hold that methamphetamine (actual) refers to the net amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride produced and not the gross amount of uncut methamphetamine. Thus, methamphetamine (actual) refers to the net amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride after all impurities, waste, byproducts, or cutting agents are removed. The government argues that Bogusz and O'Rourke did not show that the methamphetamine contained a cutting agent, waste product, or any substance other than the controlled substance itself. Brief of Appellee at 46. In essence, the government is arguing that defendants bear the burden of showing the portion of the substance that is not methamphetamine (actual). This argument fails. Although the purity of a methamphetamine product does not bear on a defendant's guilt or innocence and, thus, does not invoke the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970), it does have a profound effect on the sentence imposed, and the government bears the burden of proving it, albeit by only a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993). In some situations, a chemical analysis of the substance that indicates its purity may be required for the government to meet this burden. In others, circumstantial evidence of purity may be sufficient. We hold only that the government must produce evidence of the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride the mixture in question contains if a defendant is to be sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for methamphetamine (actual). In this case, some of the evidence produced at trial supports the district court's tacit finding of 100% purity. Trial testimony showed that the defendants were in possession of a functional recipe, proper equipment, and requisite chemicals. There was, however, other evidence on the color and consistency of the product which indicated poor quality and could have supported a finding of impurity. Manufactured methamphetamine is not 100% pure regardless of the sophistication of the equipment. Therefore, the government cannot rely solely on the nature of the production process and assume that the total product is pure methamphetamine which calls for sentencing under methamphetamine (actual). Instead, we think there should be a finding, based on evidence, on how much methamphetamine hydrochloride is included in the mixture that constitutes the end product. Because the district court failed to make such a finding, we will remand for further fact finding on the purity of the product.6 6 . It has sometimes been suggested that giving the government a second chance to make the requisite showing that it was unable to achieve originally is inconsistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This Court, however, has held that sentencing proceedings are not . . . so trial-like as to implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Wilmer v. Johnson, 30 F.3d 451, 458 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 94-5891); see also Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 957 (1994) (refusing to decide this issue).