Opinion ID: 432019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Material issues of disputed fact

Text: 56 First, the extent of Whitehead's knowledge is a material issue of disputed fact. We are not concerned here with whether Whitehead had general notions that lead could be dangerous. Many products consumed in adequate doses over a sufficient length of time could be dangerous. Thus, it is irrelevant that, as defendants contend, Whitehead may have known that ingesting lead paint chips could be harmful. Rather, the question is whether Whitehead had particular knowledge that lead levels in Alpha's plant were high enough, and her exposure to them was long enough, to impair her health. 57 On this summary judgment record, all 'inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in [the movant's] materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'  Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 979 (3d Cir.1981). If there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the respondent's favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment, no matter how many affidavits are filed. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Litig., 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.1983). 58 In this case, there is ample evidence from which the trier of fact might infer that Whitehead did not know that lead levels were high enough, and her exposure to them long enough, to cause her harm. For example, Alpha tested for each employee's exposure to lead, but did not inform its employees of the test results. A trier of fact might reasonably infer that Alpha did not regard the lead levels detected as posing a health hazard to employees. A jury might also infer that Whitehead and other employees acted reasonably in relying on such an inference. Similarly, Whitehead avers that Alpha posted no warning signs, held no meetings, and did not explain to its employees what the consequences would be if the air in its plant were found not to be good. A jury might infer from those facts that Alpha employees could reasonably believe that lead levels posed no health hazard. Moreover, Whitehead evidently did not inform her physicians of possible health hazards caused by lead exposure until 1979. A jury might infer that she did not believe that high lead levels caused the symptoms about which she complained. These material issues of disputed fact prevent the entry of summary judgment on the basis of Whitehead's knowledge for purposes of sections 402A and 388.