Opinion ID: 1193995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Severability Question

Text: Appellants urge that, even though Sections 163 through 168 of the Act may be unconstitutional and void, we should hold those sections to be severable and sanction implementation of the remainder through agreements between the local governmental entities, and through edicts of this court. For reasons now to be stated, we consider such action legally inappropriate. It is true that the Legislature's draftsmen included in Chapter 648 a so-called severability clause, which recites: If any portion of this act is held to be unconstitutional or invalid for any reason by the decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portion of this act. The legislature hereby declares that it would have passed this act and each portion thereof, irrespective of the portion which may be deemed unconstitutional or otherwise invalid. However, upon both the highest authority and the weight of authority, it seems well settled that this kind of scriveners' boiler-plate neither divests courts of the power, nor relieves them of the duty, to determine whether indeed the remainder can stand independently, and whether the Legislature as a body would intend that it should do so. See, for example: Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 44 S.Ct. 323, 68 L.Ed. 686 (1924); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-313, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1935); Santa Barbara School District v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 315, 118 Cal. Rptr. 637, 530 P.2d 605, 617-618 (1975); Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 711-713 (Alaska 1975); American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1250 (M.D.Fla. 1971; 3-judge panel); Whitehill v. Elkins, 287 F. Supp. 61, 64-65 (D.Md. 1968; 3-judge panel); City of Baltimore v. A.S. Abell Co., 218 Md. 273, 145 A.2d 111, 120 (1958); Burton v. City of Hartford, 144 Conn. 80, 127 A.2d 251, 255-256 (1956). In accord: 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 182, 184, 185 (3rd ed.). All such clauses properly do, according to the authorities and scholars, is to replace the commonly recognized presumption of non-severability with one of severability which, it has been noted, is at best slight and entitled to little weight. See, for example, Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State , cited above, 532 P.2d at 712. In words often quoted, Professor Sutherland has observed: Separability clauses should be given reasonable consideration, but should not, at least under present usage, be paid undue homage. P. 185. The United States Supreme Court has adhered to the prevailing view just mentioned, even when faced with a statutory provision reciting a conclusive presumption that each provision was severable from all others. Speaking through the eminent Mr. Justice Brandeis, the High Court said in a unanimous opinion: But a provision, inherently unobjectionable, cannot be deemed separable unless it appears both that, standing alone, legal effect can be given to it and that the legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall... . [A severability clause] provides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid in determining that intent. But it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command. Dorchy v. Kansas , cited above, 264 U.S. at 290, 44 S.Ct. at 324. The United States Supreme Court's two-pronged test of severability is in accord with the other authorities, cited above. For example, in our sister state California, the Supreme Court recently said: The final determination depends on whether `the remainder [1] ... is complete in itself and [2] would have been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute.' Santa Barbara School District v. Superior Court , cited above, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 650, 530 P.2d 618. Again, quoting Mr. Justice Brandeis, the Alaska Supreme Court held last year: The test for determining the severability of a statute is twofold. A provision will not be deemed severable `unless it appears both that, standing alone, legal effect can be given to it and that the legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall'. Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State , cited above, 532 P.2d at 713. Any suggestion that when a severability clause is present, the test of severability in practical effect is reduced to one element, simply is contrary to prevailing legal authority. We therefore feel constrained to reject any suggestion that this court should sustain the remainder of Chapter 648, merely because that remainder might be mechanically severed from obviously objectionable portions, and thereafter somehow implemented through intervention of this court and of local authorities. Accordingly we turn to consider the question of severability under the recognized test, which we endorse. 1. First, we note that with Sections 163 through 168 excised, it does not appear that, standing alone, legal effect can be given to the remainder of Chapter 648 consistently with established law and legal principles. Instead, implementation would at best require Procrustean restructuring of the law by this court and by local authorities in order to comport with constitutional principles, which may not be possible at all. In this regard, we notice that, although stated in ostensibly general terms, Section 126 like Section 163 requires a board of county commissioners consisting of 11 members. Again, as special counsel for the county acknowledges in his brief, Section 126 contemplates four two-commissioner districts, which is explicit in Section 163 and implicit in Section 126 (seven districts for the election of eleven commissioners). These requirements, which obviously can be attributed only to visions of what should occur in Clark County, seek to implement an improper districting plan clearly unconstitutional under Section 163, and less obviously but equally so as set forth in Section 126. The latter, ostensibly general districting provision declares: Those members of the board of county commissioners elected from the county commissioner districts situate within or substantially within the corporate boundaries of a city organized under the Metropolitan Cities Incorporation Law shall be concurrently elected as the members of the board of commissioners of the city. Section 126 (2); emphasis added. Section 13(2) contains identical language. Thus, Sections 13(2) and 126(2), like Section 163, would contemplate that depending upon whether or not they were assigned to a district substantially within the corporate boundaries non-residents might vote, and residents might not be allowed to vote, for county-city commissioners. Thus, we think, Sections 13 and 126 are not only patterned upon Section 163, but contemplate a districting plan with identical constitutional faults. Obviously, to save Sections 13 and 126, we would therefore not only have to sever them and the rest of Chapter 648 from Sections 163-168, but then would be obliged to restructure 13 and 126 also. Only by imposing requirements clearly contrary to the legislative intent upon them, i.e. requirements that county-city commissioner districts be wholly within the metropolitan city, and that county commissioner districts be entirely outside, could we begin to save the ostensibly general districting provisions from the same manifest unconstitutionality with which Section 163 is afflicted. Moreover, even were we willing to take this step, still in Clark County it might be impossible to utilize Section 126 to achieve the Legislature's plan for that area as originally expressed, to-wit: that eight county-city commissioners from the four large districts should govern the metropolitan area. Application of the one man, one vote concept might well require that some of the eight county-city commissioner seats be downgraded to county commissioner seats, and elected solely by voters from outside Las Vegas. See, Point II, above. Furthermore, of course, even were this court to restructure Sections 13 and 126 to eliminate the above concerns, we note it would not now be possible for this court to order either a redistricting which would comply with Section 126(4), [10] or an election which would comply with Section 99. [11] As Nevada's Attorney General pointed out in his written opinion dated October 8, 1975, it was essential to any possible compliance with Section 126(4) that the county adopt a constitutional districting plan no later than April 22, 1976. [12] This case was not even submitted to us until April 27, and were we now to order redistricting and an election pursuant thereto, we would thereby have to accede to violation of the express time limitation specified in Section 126(4) itself, and accept the prospect of ignoring numerous other time limitations referred to by Section 99. See, for example: NRS 293.176; 293.177(1); 293.180(1); 293.183; 293.187; 293.200(5); 293.200(9); 293.205; 293.309 (1); 293.560; 293.563. For these reasons, therefore, and several others, we do not believe that Chapter 648 can be implemented through the ostensibly general provisions of Section 126, consistently with our law and constitutional principles. The first phase of the established two-pronged test of severability is, therefore, not satisfied. Even so, we turn to consideration of the second phase of that test. 2. As the district court saw, the Legislative proponents of Chapter 648 clearly drafted it with intent that Clark County would be governed as provided in Section 163, and not by Sections 13 and 126, either in their original form or as this court would have to restructure them to meet the one man, one vote objections heretofore discussed. Thus, we think the district court made the proper inquiry, and thereupon took the action contemplated by the decisions heretofore cited. [13] If the total Legislature had become aware of all the various constitutional infirmities already discussed herein  so that a motion had been made and passed to strike the manifestly unconstitutional portions of Sections 163 through 168, and of Sections 13 and 126  we do not believe the Legislature would thereupon have been willing to pass the remainder without restructuring something better. [14] Nor are we at all persuaded that our Governor would, under such circumstances, have signed Chapter 648 into law. Therefore, also under the second phase of the two-pronged test generally recognized, we hold that constitutionally objectionable portions of Chapter 648 are not severable from the unconstitutional provisions hereinbefore discussed.