Opinion ID: 797146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Object at the Time of Sentencing

Text: 36 It is not altogether clear to us whether the government contends that Kaba waived her right to challenge the district court's sentencing on this ground because she failed to contemporaneously object to the district court's discussion of her national origin during the sentencing hearing. We do not, in any event, find such an argument to be persuasive. 37 In Leung, the panel noted that [i]n a variety of circumstances ... a party could not reasonably have been expected to raise a contemporaneous objection at a sentencing hearing, [yet] we have allowed the objection to be raised for the first time on appeal. Leung, 40 F.3d at 586 (citing United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir.1994) (addressing claims of unconstitutional disparity in sentences that followed the defendant's)). Unlike cases where a defendant fails to object to factual statements in a pre-sentence report or a legal ruling regarding the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, in Leung the district court's two questionable remarks either occurred after sentencing or were ambiguous. Leung, 40 F.3d at 586. In part because a defendant is understandably reluctant to suggest to a judge that an ambiguous remark reveals bias just as the judge is about to select a sentence, we concluded that the defendant did not waive her argument on appeal. Id. The same principles control here. III. Remand to a Different District Judge 38 As we have noted, there is no indication that the district judge harbored any kind of bias toward West Africans in general, or Guineans or Kaba in particular. To the contrary, he exhibited, we think, particular sensitivity to Kava's plight despite the seriousness of the criminal behavior to which she had pleaded guilty. Indeed, we closely questioned defense counsel at argument as to Kaba's decision to appeal the sentence in light of the possibility that a resulting remand before another judge might result in a higher sentence than the below-Guidelines one at issue on this appeal. If the district judge was sending a message to the Guinean community in New York, as the government urged it to do, it might not only have been [G]ee, do you hear what happened to Fanta? I don't want it to happen to me. Sentencing Tr., United States v. Kaba, June 9, 2005, at 25 (comments of the district judge). It may also have been that our courts can be careful, thoughtful, and fair. 39 Nonetheless, under Leung, we must remand to a different judge for re-sentencing. There, we noted, [t]hough we believe the District Judge could fairly sentence on remand, just as he undoubtedly did at the original sentencing, the appearance of justice is better satisfied by assigning the resentencing to a different judge. Leung, 40 F.3d at 587. We seem to have routinely followed this course of action in our summary disposition of similar cases since. 40 When a sentencing judge has, at minimum, appeared impermissibly to base a sentencing determination on a defendant's national origin, that appearance is not easily effaced. If the same judge were to give the same or a higher sentence on remand, it would be difficult to avoid the impression that he or she was continuing to base the defendant's sentence on the defendant's national origin, at least to some extent. Treating Leung as establishing a prophylactic rule meant to assure groups distinguished by their religion, race, national origin or the like that they need not fear that one of their number is being treated adversely because of his or her membership in that group, we think the better course is to remand to a different judge for re-sentencing as a matter of course, irrespective of whether there was actual bias or reason to think that bias in this particular case was perceived. [A] reasonable observer, hearing or reading the quoted remarks, might infer, however incorrectly, that [Kaba's] ethnicity and alien status played a role in determining her sentence. Id. at 586-87. No more is required.