Opinion ID: 1351711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Competing Time Limitations.

Text: The State claims the transfer process was accomplished under article IV, while Widmer-Baum claims it was done under article III. In considering competing or overlapping requests under article III and article IV, we apply a rule that the first party to perfect the compact request, be it the state or the prisoner, is entitled to proceed according to the article of the compact under which that request is made. Webb, 570 N.W.2d at 915. In this case, the State made its request for temporary custody under article IV nearly a year prior to the time Widmer-Baum made his request for disposition under article III. Thus, the State was first to perfect. [9] Applying our rule in Webb, the district court found Widmer-Baum was timely tried pursuant to the 120-day time limitation established under article IV of the compact because the period of limitations did not commence until Widmer-Baum arrived in Iowa on May 24, 2001. It is important to recognize that our rule in Webb does not merely look to the first party to make the request after the detainer is lodged to determine the proper speedy trial time frame to apply. Under our rule, the first party to perfect the request is entitled to proceed according to the article of the compact under which that request is made. Id. at 915. This means the first party to perfect is entitled to complete the process it started. Yet, the rule does not prevent the other party from requesting transfer. Moreover, the rule does not prevent the first perfected party from waiving its right to proceed under its request and elect to proceed under a subsequent request by the other party. Thus, the inquiry to determine the applicable time limit not only considers which party was first to perfect a request, but also considers under which article the parties proceeded following a request. See Laster, 546 A.2d at 479 (the question is whether the IAD proceeding ... was pursuant to a prisoner demand for disposition or [the receiving state's] request for temporary custody). In this case, the State may have been the first party to perfect a request under article IV, but the facts reveal the State elected to proceed pursuant to the second request made by the prisoner under article III nearly one year later. Wisconsin authorities did not respond to the State's request and there was no further action by the State until Widmer-Baum made his request for disposition under article III by completing form II. [10] The warden then sent form II, form III, and form IV to Iowa authorities. At this point, the State did not insist that the transfer proceed under its prior article IV request. Instead, the State responded to the warden by submitting form VII. This form specifically provided that Iowa was accepting the offer created by the prisoner's request for disposition of the detainer. It also provided that Widmer-Baum would be tried within the time specified in article III(a) of the agreement on detainers. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show any of the procedures under article IV were followed, such as allowing the governor of Wisconsin an opportunity to disapprove of the transfer. Thus, the process followed by the parties to accomplish the transfer mirrored the process set forth in article III, and revealed Iowa elected to proceed under article III instead of article IV. Consequently, the time limits of article III governed the transfer. The State waived any ability to proceed under its prior article IV request by accepting Widmer-Baum's offer to return under article III, and Widmer-Baum gained the right to be tried within the 180 day period prescribed in Article III. Laster, 546 A.2d at 479. The IAD provides that the indictment shall be dismissed if the prisoner is not brought to trial within 180 days of the time the receiving state receives the prisoner's IAD request, absent good cause for a continuance. Iowa Code § 821.1, art. III(a), art. V(c). This provision constitutes an express mandate. See Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 153, 121 S.Ct. at 2084-85, 150 L.Ed.2d at 195 (use of word shall in the IAD is absolute). It means, absent a continuance or waiver, the charges must be dismissed with prejudice if a prisoner is not brought to trial within the prescribed time period. The district court erred in applying the 120-day time limit under article IV. Under article III, Widmer-Baum was not tried within 180 days from the time the State received his request for disposition of the charges. Additionally, the State did not request a continuance beyond the 180-day time period, nor was there any evidence of good cause presented before the district court to support a continuance. Consequently, Widmer-Baum was entitled to have the trial information dismissed. This remedy is consistent with the purposes of the compact, and was known to the compact members when they joined the compact.