Opinion ID: 2403835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: delaware constitution jury trial in civil proceedings

Text: The McCools contend that forcing them to proceed with a bench trial on their tortious interference claim, despite their objection, violated their Delaware Constitutional right to have a trial by jury in that civil proceeding. The historical origins of the right to trial by jury which is provided for in the Delaware Constitution was reviewed by this Court in Claudio v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 1278 (1991). In Claudio, this Court noted that when Delaware adopted its Constitution in 1792, notwithstanding the ratification of the first ten amendments or federal Bill of Rights in 1791, it did not create a mirror image of the United States Constitution with regard to trial by jury. Id. at 1289. When the Delaware Constitution of 1792 was adopted, the right to trial by jury set forth in the federal Bill of Rights as the Sixth [13] and Seventh [14] Amendments to the United States Constitution was only a protection against action by the federal government. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833). Following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal proceedings has been deemed to have been incorporated by the Due Process clause and now also provides protection against state action. [15] Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has not held that the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of jury trials in civil proceedings was made applicable to the states by the incorporation doctrine with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 23 L.Ed. 678 (1876). Accordingly, the right to a jury trial in civil proceedings has always been and remains exclusively protected by provisions in the Delaware Constitution. Delaware adopted its first Constitution in 1776, which provided, in pertinent part: The common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law as have been heretofore adopted in practice in this state, shall remain in force, unless they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this constitution and the declaration of rights, & c. agreed to by this convention. Del. Const. of 1776, art. 25, 1 Del.C. at 118. Delaware also adopted its own Declaration of Rights in 1776, which guaranteed the right to trial by jury to all citizens of the State of Delaware and included a statement [t]hat trial by jury of facts where they arise is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people. Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State § 13 (1776), 1 Del.C. at 110. When Delaware adopted its next Constitution in 1792, its citizens were guaranteed the right to trial by jury as heretofore. See Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d at 1298. Consequently, since its inception in 1776, the Delaware Constitution has afforded its citizens the right to trial by jury in both criminal and civil proceedings. In doing so, the Delaware Constitution has expressly preserved all of the fundamental features of the jury system as they existed at common law. Id. [16] See also Nance v. Rees, 52 Del. 533, 161 A.2d 795 (1960). A sine qua non of that common law jurisprudence is the principle that either party shall have the right to demand a jury trial upon an issue of fact in an action at law. As previously noted, the 1776 Delaware Declaration of Rights, which was preserved by the heretofore text in the 1792 Constitution, referred to the right to trial by jury regarding factual issues as one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people. [17] Similarly, in a letter to Pierre S. DuPont, Thomas Jefferson described the fact finding function of jurors as: the very essence of a Republic.... We of the United States ... think experience has proved it safer for the mass of individuals composing the society to reserve to themselves personally the exercise of all rightful powers to which they are competent.... Hence, with us, the people ... being competent to judge of the facts occurring in ordinary life, ... have retained the functions of judges of facts under the name of jurors. ... I believe ... that action by the citizens, in person in affairs within their reach and competence, and in all others by representatives chosen immediately and removable by themselves, constitutes the essence of a Republic.... Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Pierre S. DuPont (April 4, 1816), in 4 Annals of America 414 (Encyclopedia Britannica 1976) (emphasis added). See 2 J. Kendall Few, In Defense of Trial by Jury 456 (1993). In 1855, the Delaware General Assembly enacted a statute that purportedly allowed judges to decide issues of fact without a jury in actions at law, with the agreement of all the parties. 11 Del.Laws, ch. 270. Nevertheless, because the Delaware Constitution preserved the right to trial by jury as heretofore, Delaware judges took the position that, absent constitutional amendment, the General Assembly could not alter the right by statute. See 3 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Delaware 1730 (Milford Chronicle Publishing Co. 1958) (hereinafter Constitutional Debates ). Therefore, notwithstanding the enactment of the 1855 statute by the General Assembly, Delaware judges remained reluctant to decide issues of fact in an action at law because they concluded that the Delaware Constitution required a jury to decide such questions. Id. Compare Seymour v. Swart, Okl.Supr., 695 P.2d 509 (1985) (similarly interpreting Oklahoma Constitution). When the present Delaware Constitution was rewritten in 1897, the General Assembly included several significant provisions regarding the right to trial by jury. Article I of the 1897 Delaware Constitution was denominated for the first time as the Bill of Rights. Section 4 of that article provided for the right to trial by jury as heretofore. [18] Article IV, Section 19 was a new addition in the 1897 Constitution and provided: Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions of fact in issue and declare the law. Del. Const. art. IV, § 19. The reason given during the Constitutional debates for the adoption of Section 19 was to ensure that Judges shall confine themselves to their business, which is to adjudge the law and leave juries to determine the facts. 3 Constitutional Debates at 1730. See Storey v. Camper, Del.Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 463 n. 4 (1979). In Storey, this Court characterized Section 19 as perpetuating Delaware's commitment to trial by jury in civil actions at law with regard to issues of fact. Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d at 462-65. In examining when a trial judge may set aside a jury verdict, this Court described Delaware's long history of commitment to trial by jury. Id. We explained that Section 19 reaffirmed Delaware's commitment to the common law principles regarding trial by jury: In the policy of the law of this state, declared by the courts in numberless decisions, the jury is the sole judge of the facts of a case, and so jealous is the law of this policy that by express provision of the Constitution the court is forbidden to touch upon the facts of the case in its charge to the jury. Id. at 462 (quoting Philadelphia, B. & W.R. Co. v. Gatta, 27 Del. 38, 85 A. 721, 729 (1913)). In 1897, another new section was added to Article IV of Delaware's Constitution. [19] Article IV, Section 20 provides that, [i]n civil causes where matters of fact are at issue, if the parties agree, such matters of fact shall be tried by the court, and judgment rendered upon their decision thereon as upon a verdict by a jury. Del. Const. art. IV, § 20. According to the Constitutional debates, the purpose of the new Section was to address the concerns of Delaware's jurists about the constitutionality of the 1855 statutory authorization for litigants to waive a trial by jury in an action at law on an issue of fact. WILLIAM C. SPRUANCE: Mr. Chairman, that is new, but it is a provision found in many Constitutions, and it is substantially a restatement of a statute which exists today. But the difficulty is, that some of our Judges  very wise and good men though they be  have taken very solemn oaths that they would not try questions of fact. They said they would not try questions of fact, even though that was put upon them by the Legislature, that the Legislature had no right to put it upon them; and I know one eminent Judge who said in nautical language that he would not do it. 3 Constitutional Debates at 1730. See also Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Del.Supr., 565 A.2d 908, 912 (1989) (explaining that parties to Delaware actions are entitled to request a jury trial, but that they may waive that right if they so intend). In this case the McCools specifically demanded a jury trial on their medical malpractice claim and their tortious interference claim. [20] When the jury that heard their medical malpractice claim was discharged, the McCools agreed to waive their right to a jury trial regarding their tortious interference claim only because the original trial judge offered to decide the remaining claim as a bench trial. The record contains the following statement by the McCools' attorney to the second trial judge: For practical reasons, the [medical malpractice] trial went a bit longer than we expected. Because of the two-week period of the jury panel, [the original trial judge] explained to us that it did not appear we would be able to get the same jury. Discussing this in chambers as well as I think in the courtroom, ... [the original trial judge] proposed [to personally hear] this count ... [as] a bench trial, [the] benefit being, again, that even though we don't have the jury, at least we have a judge who did have the benefit of hearing all the testimony, ... When the original trial judge subsequently declined to hear the tortious interference claim, the McCools objected to proceeding with a bench trial before another judge. Their attorney advised the second judge: Based on our understanding that the matter would be heard on the bench trial before [the original trial judge], my clients and I agreed to have it heard that way rather than [by] jury trial. [I] just want to go on record that is their position. They still are opposed to ... the assignment of your honor. Although a party has no right to insist on a bench trial before a particular judge, [21] the record reflects that the McCools' waiver of their right to a jury trial was, in fact, permitted to be premised upon such a condition. The McCools only waived their right to a jury trial on the condition that the bench trial would be held before the original judge who had heard the medical malpractice claim and was familiar with much of the evidence relevant to the tortious interference claim. When the original trial judge, who had induced the McCools to waive their right to a jury trial, refused to hear their tortious interference claim, the condition upon which the McCools' waiver had been predicated ceased to exist. This Court has recognized that the right to a trial by jury, as guaranteed by the Delaware Constitution, may be relinquished pursuant to a valid waiver. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d at 912. Under the circumstances presented in this case, however, the McCools could not be forced to proceed with a bench trial before a second judge, in the absence of an unconditional waiver of their fundamental right to a trial by jury. Id. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cafritz, 770 F.Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1991). Consequently, the bench trial of the tortious interference claim that proceeded, without the McCools' express and unconditional waiver of a jury trial, violated Article IV, Section 20 and Article I, Section 4 of the Delaware Constitution.