Opinion ID: 1387285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Privacy Interest

Text: Petitioner contends our state law on search and seizure grants broader protection to Washington citizens than does federal law. This court has held that Const. art. I, § 7 may be interpreted to provide greater protection to individual privacy interests than parallel provisions of the United States Constitution. [34] The nonexclusive criteria for making this determination are outlined in State v. Gunwall [35] and have been adequately addressed by the parties in this case. The differences between Const. art. 1, § 7 and the Fourth Amendment are evident upon comparison of the wording of the two provisions. [36] To determine whether a search necessitating a warrant has occurred under the Fourth Amendment, the inquiry is whether the defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy. [37] Violation of a right of privacy under Const. art. 1, § 7 may occur when the government has unreasonably intruded into a person's private affairs. [38] Under the facts of this case, however, any distinction between the state and federal provisions is of no consequence. Business transactions with the public are not `private affairs'. [39] The evidence shows that Petitioner Carter was in the motel room engaged in a commercial transaction, the sale and delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine. Her action does not then come under the plain meaning of private affairs. Besides, she waived any right of privacy by willingly admitting a stranger into the motel room to conduct a drug transaction. [40] Certainly Petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy when the occupant of a motel room invites outsiders into the room to transact illegal business. [41] Petitioner Carter's business in the motel room was thus entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were conducted in the streets. [42] Assuming the truthfulness of Petitioner's own testimony at trial, her private affairs were not involved. She testified she was upset because Ms. Smothers was not ready to go out when Petitioner came to the motel room to pick her up. Petitioner was thus in the room only temporarily until Ms. Smothers was ready to leave with her. Petitioner also testified she had no idea of the identity of a third woman in the room. This negates any claim she may assert that the motel room was her private domain. Under the facts of this case, it is not necessary to consider whether the state constitution allows greater protection than its federal counterpart. Application of an independent state constitutional analysis does not result in exclusion of the seized evidence. The result under either the state or federal inquiry would be the same. Under the facts of this case and our prior decisions, we conclude that Petitioner Carter did have automatic standing to move for suppression of the evidence obtained through a warrantless search of the motel room when she was present. [43] Although the automatic standing rule may be subject to question under United States v. Salvucci, [44] this is not the case for resolving the question. Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that, assuming Petitioner Carter had standing to move for suppression of the evidence, there were exigent circumstances which justified search of the motel room without a warrant. This was the finding of the trial court, with which we agree.