Opinion ID: 4511395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PCR Proceedings

Text: ¶ 19. Almost immediately after we affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, petitioner and appointed counsel each filed separate original and amended PCR petitions. These “petitions together raised no less than thirty separate claims divided into four general categories: prosecutorial misconduct, consisting of essentially five separate claims; ineffective assistance of trial counsel, comprising eighteen instances of alleged error; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, with six claims; and sentencing error.” In re Gregory FitzGerald, 2007 VT 51, ¶ 4, 182 Vt. 639, 945 A.2d 825. The case languished for almost ten years until the PCR court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment in 2005. As to the specific ineffective assistance of counsel claims at issue in this appeal, the PCR court concluded that petitioner had not met his burden because he “provided no evidentiary support beyond conclusory allegations in response to the State’s summary judgment motion.” On appeal, we affirmed the PCR court’s judgment except as to petitioner’s specific claims that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because he failed to “conduct a pretrial investigation, prepare a defense, or interview witnesses.” We remanded these three claims to the PCR court for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 4. ¶ 20. On remand, Judge Pearson conducted evidentiary hearings where he heard testimony from petitioner’s expert witness, Ernest Allen—“a highly experienced and wellregarded Vermont criminal defense attorney.” Allen testified that, in his opinion, trial counsel’s performance at petitioner’s criminal trial “f[e]ll below accepted standards for competent criminal defense counsel” in several ways. First, Allen testified that he was “startle[d]” by trial counsel’s 8 conduct during jury draw and opening statements. He explained that although it is “sort of the industry standard” to lay the blame for the client’s decision to testify on the defense attorney, trial counsel told the jury it was petitioner’s decision. In addition, Allen explained that one of the ideas of the jury draw is to “humanize” your client to the jury. Trial counsel’s statements, however, were “all negative.” As the PCR court explained: In Allen’s view[,] [trial counsel] in his opening statement (and to some extent later in his closing argument) [erred] by going too far in attempting to ‘take the sting’ out of what was expected to be adverse evidence by essentially conceding the facts . . . but downplaying the significance as simply being ‘not so horrible,’ and meanwhile not doing much to ‘humanize’ [p]etitioner and emphasize ‘common traits’ he would have with most people. ¶ 21. Second, Allen testified that trial counsel’s cross-examination of several key witness—including O’Brien and Leo—was subpar. He explained that O’Brien’s testimony was “devastating” and trial counsel had to attack her credibility. Although trial counsel questioned O’Brien at “considerable length” on her inconsistent statements to the police—namely, that she did not initially disclose to police that she knew the victim was Amy—trial counsel failed to question how she knew the details of the crime scene. Allen conceded that trial counsel did a “better job” of cross-examining Leo by establishing that he had a financial incentive to testify. But Allen opined that trial counsel could have established this link during opening statements and jury draw. Allen provided no testimony about trial counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Higbee. ¶ 22. Third, Allen explained that trial counsel failed to present a coherent theory of defense: “[T]here’s no theory that is first sort of developed through voir dire and then presented in the opening . . . developed through the cross-examination and then sealed in the closing argument . . . .” On cross-examination, the State questioned Allen as to what trial counsel’s theory of the defense should have been: Q. [I]f I understood your testimony correctly, [you said] that there was no coherent, articulated theory of defense? 9
Q. If you had done this trial, what would your coherent articulated theory of defense have been? A. Why are these people lying about [petitioner], and unfortunately, you’d have to come up with two different reasons why people were lying: The relatives for the money and . . . O’Brien for a reason of revenge of some sort— Q. Which you don’t know what that was? A. I don’t. ¶ 23. Although the scope of the remand order before the PCR court included only three claims—namely, that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because he failed to “conduct a pretrial investigation, prepare a defense, or interview witnesses,” id. ¶ 4—petitioner, representing himself, asked Allen about whether trial counsel accurately conveyed the State’s plea offer. With some hesitation, Allen testified that he thought trial counsel was “constitutionally deficient” because he did not accurately convey the State’s offer. ¶ 24. Considering Allen’s testimony, the PCR court concluded that there were: [F]our different areas in which [trial counsel’s] performance . . . fell short of minimal expectations for competent defense counsel performance: (1) failure to adequately relate, and advise [p]etitioner with regard to the pretrial plea offer made by the State; (2) failure to conduct adequate pretrial investigation, including the taking of additional depositions, which would have allowed [trial counsel] to more forcefully cross-examine the State’s witnesses, which he then failed to do as to several key witnesses, most especially Denise O’Brien; (3) failure to develop and present to the jury—beginning at the voir dire proceedings, and especially during the opening statement—a ‘coherent theory’ of the defense which would have been consistent with arguable innocence, rather than mostly rely on the State’s burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the specific errors of (a) telling the jury that [p]etitioner himself would decide whether to testify and (b) conceding too much of [p]etitioner’s adverse qualities or history without any countervailing presentation of more positive attributes. Given the strong evidence against petitioner, however, the PCR court concluded that “none of [trial counsel’s] errors . . . support the necessary finding of prejudice under Strickland such that the 10 ‘reasonable probability’ of a different outcome has been proven.” Final judgment was accordingly entered for the State. Petitioner timely appealed. ¶ 25. While petitioner’s appeal of this decision was pending, the Defender General’s Office received a letter from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) as part of a review— conducted in association with the Innocence Project and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers—of “microscopic hair comparison reports and testimony presented by the FBI.” The letter explained that the “microscopic hair comparison analysis testimony . . . presented [at petitioner’s 1994 criminal trial by Agent Oakes] included statements that exceeded the limits of science.” The DOJ identified approximately six “inappropriate” statements that Agent Oakes made during his testimony, including his statement that he found hair in Amy’s bathroom sink that was “consistent with [hair] originating from [petitioner].”2 On May 3, 2017, we placed petitioner’s appeal on waiting status and remanded his case to the superior court so he could “investigate this new evidence and amend his [PCR] petition.” ¶ 26. Petitioner subsequently filed his third amended PCR petition alleging that (1) the State knowingly introduced false and misleading hair microscopy evidence at his 1994 criminal trial and (2) trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because he did not challenge the false hair evidence. To support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner presented the affidavit of Paul Volk, who concluded that trial counsel’s assistance was “more than arguably . . . per se” ineffective because he “apparently conducted absolutely no depositions at all in this case, relative 2 The other “inappropriate” statements the FBI identified were: “All of the hairs that were of human origin that were of value for comparison purposes were consistent with being either the victim’s or the [petitioner]’s”; “hairs vary greatly from one individual to the other, and this can form the basis of strong associations”; “it is very rare that I will find hairs from people that you can’t tell them apart unless it’s arranged in the same way as the [petitioner]’s hair”; “the hair found . . . [and] debris from the sink, is consistent with coming from [petitioner]”; “[c]ertainly the one hair that I, quote, matched to the [petitioner] was, in fact, a full length head hair.” The Innocence Project and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers separately identified an additional inappropriate statement: “I’m able to correctly associate question hairs with known hair samples that we obtain.” 11 to trial preparation.” Had trial counsel adequately prepared and conducted depositions, Volk claims it would have been “highly likely” that trial counsel would have discovered “numerous flaws and non-scientific underpinnings regarding Agent Oakes’ . . . trial testimony.” Volk also opined that it was “quite clear” that the State “significantly relied” on the microscopic hair analysis “to the clear prejudice of [p]etitioner.” The State did not produce any expert testimony on whether trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective for failing to challenge Agent Oakes’ testimony. ¶ 27. In April 2019, Judge Toor granted summary judgment to the State, explaining that petitioner could not establish that the State knowingly introduced false hair evidence in 1994 because hair evidence was not discredited until 2009. The court did not address whether trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective for failing to challenge the hair evidence because it concluded that “it [was] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result . . . without the hair evidence.” Following Judge Toor’s summary judgment ruling, the Court took petitioner’s appeal off waiting status. ¶ 28. On appeal are both Judge Pearson’s December 2014 final merits decision and Judge Toor’s April 2019 summary-judgment ruling. With regard to Judge Pearson’s decision, petitioner argues that the PCR court erred in concluding that trial counsel’s deficient assistance during the 1994 criminal trial was not prejudicial. With regard to Judge Toor’s decision, petitioner argues the court erred in granting summary judgment to the State. He specifically argues that Agent Oakes “should have known about the weaknesses of microscopic hair analysis that others in his field had already acknowledged at the time of [petitioner’s] trial.” Similarly, petitioner argues that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because “[f]or over a decade leading up to [petitioner’s] conviction, defense attorneys throughout the nation were challenging the admission of hair microscopy evidence.” Furthermore, petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by this error because “[b]y not contesting the faulty science underlying Oakes’ testimony, defense counsel conceded 12 that [petitioner’s] hair was found in the same room as Amy Fitz[G]erald’s body,” which “prohibited [petitioner] from presenting any plausible defense.”