Opinion ID: 2975578
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Verdict

Text: The City’s next argument is that the district court abused its discretion by permitting Detective Kenneth Austion, an African-American CPD employee, to testify about a verdict in his similar racial discrimination suit against the City. Evidence is properly excluded when it poses a “likelihood of misleading the jury and confusing the issue.” Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 438 F.2d 833, 837-38 (6th Cir. 1971). Evidence of a prior verdict is likely to mislead the jury because “[a] jury is likely to give a prior verdict against the same defendant more weight than it warrants. Admission of a prior verdict creates the possibility that the jury will defer to the earlier result and thus will, effectively, decide a case on evidence not before it.” Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1351 (3d Cir. 1975). In essence, the jury may “import the whole verdict . . . from the prior proceeding.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007). While Detective Austion’s history of similar treatment and experiences may have had some probative value, see Robinson v. Runyon, 148 F.3d 507, 512-13 (6th Cir. 1998), testimony regarding a jury verdict in his favor did not “possess such additional probative value . . . to overcome the risk of prejudice and confusion that the verdict posed.” Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1010. Had Austion testified only to the similar treatment he endured, there would have been little potential for prejudice and confusion. However, when he testified that he obtained a favorable verdict in his trial, there was -4- No. 06-5372 Blakely v. City of Clarksville a substantial risk that the jury would import the whole verdict from the Austion case, especially since his case involved identical claims. Moreover, just after this case was argued on appeal, the Austion case was decided by this court, partially affirming the jury verdict and partially reversing the judgment, in particular, with regard to his demotion and failure-to-promote claims. Austion v. City of Clarksville, No. 05-6626, ___ F. App’x ___ (6th Cir. July 31, 2007). Although the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction, it did not cure any resulting prejudice. The admission of this evidence was an abuse of discretion. C. Admission of Previous Racial Conduct Finally, the City argues that the district court should have excluded evidence of racial comments directed at other City employees. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence because it was relevant to Blakely’s claim of a hostile work environment. Although these incidents were not aimed at Blakely, “an employer may create a hostile environment for an employee even where it directs its discriminatory acts or practices at the protected group of which the plaintiff is a member, and not just the plaintiff herself.” Jackson v. Quantex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 661 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 87 (1986)). Further, “[c]omments that single out a member of a protected class are relevant not only as to whether a particular work environment was objectively hostile to members of the protected class, but also as to whether an employee belonging to the protected class subjectively felt harassed.” Jackson, 191 F.3d at 661.