Opinion ID: 1125005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DISCUSSION NCC v. Higashi

Text: We review the grant or denial of a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict by determining whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment as to the facts. Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Schwartz, 915 P.2d 632, 635 (Alaska 1996); ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Alaska 1988). Reasonable jurors could not find that the Browns had agreed to sell the liquor store. All of the documentary evidence supports the Browns' position that the parties had entered into a management agreement. Mr. Brown informed the vendors that the Higashis were the new managers, and continued to personally guarantee all liquor purchases. The Browns had access to the store's bank account after the time Mrs. Higashi alleges the sale was completed. Mrs. Higashi permitted Mr. Brown to reinstate his authority over the account in 1992 without objection. The Higashis made several sworn statements that the Browns continued to own the store. NCC's and the Browns' income tax returns reflect the fact that they were the store's owners. Mrs. Higashi finds support in the statement contained in the notes of the Cabo San Lucas meetings that the parties agreed to proceed with the drafting of a long term lease which when executed would also cause the liquor license to be transferred in compliance with applicable state law. While this could suggest that the parties had entered into an agreement to sell the liquor store in 1989, it could also be interpreted to support Mr. Brown's contention that the parties discussed the sale of the store in 1991, a couple of years after Mrs. Higashi contends she and her husband had already purchased the store. Regardless of how the statement is interpreted, it is not enough to contradict the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The remaining evidence is the conflicting testimony of the parties. The Browns testified that the parties entered into a management agreement. Mrs. Higashi testified that she and her husband purchased the store on December 1, 1989, and had completed their end of the bargain as of September 1990. The documentary evidence directly contradicts this assertion. The Higashis themselves made several sworn statements after these dates that the Browns were the sole owners of the liquor store. The Higashis never asserted an ownership interest in the store prior to the instant litigation, although there were several instances where one would expect an owner to object to a nonowner's assertion of ownership. On balance, we conclude that the documentary evidence is compelling. Reasonable jurors could not conclude that the Higashis purchased the store on December 1, 1989. We remand the case with instructions to the superior court to enter a directed verdict in favor of NCC and the Browns.
An actor is never liable ... where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment g (1964); see also Woods v. ABC Ins. Co., 580 So.2d 480, 481 (La. App. 1991) (holding eviction for non-payment of rent is proper and not a valid basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). Since the Browns did not agree to sell the store to the Higashis, Mrs. Higashi's contractual rights to run the store ended upon her husband's death. The Browns cannot be held liable for emotional distress suffered by Mrs. Higashi. The Browns were legally entitled to inform her that the contract with her husband ended upon his death, and to protect their interests regarding the management of their store. We reverse, and instruct the superior court to enter a directed verdict in favor of the Browns. [4]