Opinion ID: 728910
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Brown Affidavit

Text: 84 Although the district court agreed that Dr. Brown was an expert, and that his evidence could be admissible against certain parties, it apparently did not place much weight on the affidavit. It ruled that the expert's sworn statement was not controlling for non-municipal generators, id. at 544, and that it could not be applied to the municipal generators because no adequate foundation for its acceptance had been laid. Murtha III, 840 F.Supp. at 189. More specifically, the district court added, Dr. Brown's references to facts, without specification, in various documents relied on, are insufficient to make his opinions relevant. Id. It therefore rejected the affidavit as lacking probative merit because it did not rely on direct evidence. Id. at 184. In addition, the court expressly weighed the affidavit against the backdrop of the EPA Municipal Policy, according to which the EPA made certain enforcement decisions. Id. at 188. 85 Our view of this affidavit and its probative worth differs dramatically from that of the district court. This is partly because it is difficult for us to imagine an expert with more experience and knowledge in the hazardous substances field than Dr. Brown, and partly because we find his affidavit to be carefully researched, detailed, and directly relevant to this case. As will become clear when we consider each appellee's case individually, we think the trial court assessed the weight of conflicting proof, in effect substituting its judgment for that of the jury. See In Re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1133 (2d Cir.1995) (applying the rule prohibiting such a practice). Environmental science, like epidemiology, is ill-suited to lead a factfinder toward definitive answers, dealing as it does in statistical probabilities. Id. Here there was only one expert opinion before the court, and the court was obliged not to ignore it. Because Dr. Brown reviewed nine studies concerning the subject landfills, his affidavit was laid on a proper foundation. 86 When deciding a motion for summary judgment, only admissible evidence may be considered. Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1993). Where scientific knowledge will assist a trier of fact to determine an issue of fact, an expert witness may testify ... in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Summary evidence is admissible when the underlying documents are admissible and are made available to the adverse party. Tamarin, 13 F.3d at 53. Here, where the reports used by Dr. Brown are of the sort ordinarily relied on by experts in forming opinions within their field of expertise, the reports need not be admissible at trial, see Fed.R.Evid. 703, and need not actually be attached to the affidavit to satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). See Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994). An expert's testimony, in order to be admissible under Rule 705, need not detail all the facts and data underlying his opinion in order to present that opinion. See Fed.R.Evid. 705; Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464, 1469 (D.C.Cir.1992). At any rate, the Brown affidavit does provide the specific facts required by Rule 56(e), see id. at 1470, when he explains which specific hazardous substances are found in each waste disposed of by each appellee. 87 Nor is the Brown affidavit junk science of the sort that should be rejected under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Dr. Brown relied on the methodology and data typically used and accepted in these sorts of cases, see Iacobelli, 32 F.3d at 25, and his testimony would therefore be admissible under Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-98. Moreover, if the appellees honestly believe this scientific evidence is weak, they should cross-examine him vigorously at trial and present contrary evidence to refute his findings and conclusions. Id. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. This is the traditional and appropriate means of attacking admissible evidence with which one disagrees. Id. In addition, given that CERCLA hazardous substances are listed at 40 C.F.R. § 302.4, Table 302.4, we cannot agree that because the Brown affidavit stated whether a given hazardous substance was one listed by CERCLA, it therefore improperly drew a legal conclusion. See United States v. Articles of Banned Hazardous Substances Consisting of an Undetermined Number of Cans of Rainbow Foam Paint, 34 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir.1994) ([E]xperts are not permitted to present testimony in the form of legal conclusions.). 88 The cases appellees cite in opposition are unpersuasive. For instance, Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (7th Cir.1989), involved a seven-sentence-long expert affidavit devoid of factual references or reasoning. By contrast, Dr. Brown's affidavit is 141 pages long, every conclusion in it is drawn with reference to specific facts or explanations. It explains precisely what was reviewed and the general bases for his opinion. 89 The district court also incorrectly compared the affidavit with the second-hand and factually sparse affidavit involved in Chandler v. Coughlin, 763 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir.1985). See Murtha III, 840 F.Supp. at 189. Dr. Brown's extensive use of reports from the relevant facilities, the information found in discovery materials, and past scientific studies make his expert opinion highly probative. Dr. Brown relied in part on the information provided by the appellees, and he considered what sorts of hazardous substances are ordinarily found in the specific kinds of waste disposed of by the appellees. This is a permissible approach for an expert witness in a case such as this. An examination of the Brown affidavit's detail demonstrates that the affidavit was thorough and well-supported, unlike the affidavit in Chandler, which was only a few paragraphs long. 90 Again, were the Brown affidavit the kind of evidence insufficient for a case to survive summary judgment under CERCLA, the Act's scope would be sharply limited. People and companies often dispose of waste without knowing its contents. In future lawsuits, once hazardous substances were discovered in a given facility, the generators would only need say that they could not recall what was in their waste. Because plaintiffs usually lack direct evidence that a defendant dumped hazardous substances, the potentially responsible parties would only be found liable in those rare instances in which a so-called smoking gun is discovered, cf. Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir.1994) (smoking guns rarely found in litigation), and the broad, remedial purpose of the Act would thereby be defeated. 91 Of course, a CERCLA plaintiff is not required to prove its case with scientific certainty; a preponderance of the evidence is enough. Cf. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 3008-09, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing Title VII cases). While certainty is an ideal pursued by scientists and courts alike, it is not always a realistic goal in environmental science, where certainty can be elusive. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25 & n. 52 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 2662, 2663, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976). 92 Although we find Dr. Brown's affidavit highly probative, it is not dispositive of the issues at bar. Defendants may of course produce proof showing why their waste--tire products, for example--did not include the hazardous substances ordinarily found in tire products. It is up to the factfinder ultimately to determine whether Dr. Brown's opinion together with other evidence presented by the coalitions is sufficient to establish appellees' liability. 93 Because disputed factual issues exist, summary judgment--which the appellants request--may not be granted in their favor either. Expert testimony was essential in this complex environmental litigation to help comprehend scientific data and determine whether the chemicals covered by CERCLA as hazardous substances were contained in appellees' waste. It was error to reject Dr. Brown's written testimony that the wastes did contain such substances, particularly in the absence of any expert evidence to the contrary. The affidavit raised genuine issues of material fact in most of the cases before us, and therefore the grants of summary judgment in such cases were improper. III Case-By-Case Review 94 We pass to a review of 85 cases on an individual basis. Our review of the district court's decisions granting summary judgment is de novo. E.g., Randell v. United States, 64 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 65, 136 L.Ed.2d 26 (1996). Because their disposition is duplicative of much of our earlier discussion, we have placed this review in the Appendix at the end of this opinion. The Appendix contains a brief discussion of the district court's ruling, found generally in Murtha III, 840 F.Supp. at 183-91. In each case, unless otherwise indicated, we reverse and remand the case to the district court. IV The Governments' Response Costs Claims 95 We turn next to the government's litigation to recover response costs. The United States and Connecticut (collectively, the governments) both appeal the district court's decisions concerning their lawsuits against several non-settling potentially responsible parties for unreimbursed response costs. Murtha IV, 855 F.Supp. at 546. We deal initially with the claim raised by the United States (U.S.), and we then consider briefly that of the State of Connecticut (State). 96 The U.S. makes two principal claims of error. First, it contends that the district court improperly considered the $1.975 million received by the Laurel Park Coalition under the Murtha consent decree as funds received by the government. Second, the U.S. asserts that judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate because the cost summaries it submitted to the district court showed unreimbursed response costs. Before we examine these specific contentions, we begin with a review of the relevant CERCLA law. A. Governing CERCLA Law 97 The Act addresses the treatment of both settling and non-settling defendants: 98 A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement. 99 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). In short, the Act provides that when, as here, a settlement addresses past and future costs, the non-settling defendants' liability to the government for those costs is reduced by the amount of the settlement. However, the non-settling defendants will still be held accountable for the remainder of the government's response costs, and that liability will be reduced only by the amount of the settlement rather than by the pro rata share attributable to the settling parties. In other words, non-settling defendants may bear disproportionate liability for their acts. See United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1176, 130 L.Ed.2d 1128 (1995). Further, as a means of encouraging settlements, only settling parties are guaranteed not to be liable for future contributions regarding the subjects addressed in the settlement. 100 As such, § 9613(f)(2) strengthens the federal policy of encouraging CERCLA settlements. Elsewhere the Act specifically asks that the government enter into CERCLA settlements in order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation. § 9622(a). Courts considering CERCLA cases have recognized that the usual federal policy favoring settlements is even stronger in the CERCLA context. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.Supp. 677, 692-93 (S.D.N.Y.1988); see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir.1990). 101 Responsible parties are liable for any ... necessary costs of response incurred [that are] consistent with the national contingency plan. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The Act also states that [t]he terms 'respond' or 'response' mean[ ] remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action, and these terms include enforcement activities related thereto. § 9601(25). Thus, the government's recoverable response costs properly include not only the obvious costs of remediation, but also include, inter alia, attorneys' fees, 6 United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1199-1200 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 73, 133 L.Ed.2d 33 (1995), indirect administrative costs, United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1504 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S.Ct. 1527, 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990), studies conducted for remediation, City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F.Supp. 609, 618 (S.D.N.Y.1986), and even prejudgment interest, § 9607(a). The response costs' consistency with the national contingency plan is presumed; the defendant bears the burden of proving inconsistency, and it must show that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in choosing a particular response action. United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913, 114 S.Ct. 300, 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1508. With this legal background in mind, we consider the government's contentions. B. District Court Decision 102 As discussed earlier, the Beacon Heights Coalition and the U.S. agreed that the Beacon Heights Coalition would pay for the remediation at the Beacon Heights landfill and would pay the government for its future non-remediation response costs in excess of $500,000. The Laurel Park Coalition agreed to conduct subsequent remediation at Laurel Park and to pay for the U.S.'s future oversight costs in excess of $200,000. Murtha paid $5,375,000 to discharge its owner and operator liability at both landfills. The Murtha settlement proceeds were divided among several parties: $1,875,000 went to the Beacon Heights Coalition and $322,500 to the government for Beacon Heights response costs. At Laurel Park, the U.S. and the State were each repaid $625,000 for past response costs. The remaining $1,975,000, initially placed in a registry account with the district court, was used for Laurel Park remediation by the Laurel Park Coalition. Had that coalition not formed within 18 months, the governments would have received the money for remediation at Laurel Park. However, when the coalition was formed, the precondition was met, and the money moved directly from the registry account to the Laurel Park Coalition. 103 Several non-settling parties claimed that all response costs incurred by both the U.S. and the State were covered by the Murtha settlement and the settlements with the two coalitions, accordingly those non-settling parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court agreed, finding that the entire amount of the Murtha consent decree ($5.375 million) minus the amount paid to the Beacon Heights Coalition ($1.875 million) had to be credited against any unreimbursed past costs of the U.S. and Connecticut. Murtha IV, 855 F.Supp. at 546. By so holding, the district court credited the $1.975 million set aside for Laurel Park cleanup, and later given to the Laurel Park Coalition, against the governments' response costs. 104 The district court stated that [n]either EPA nor DEP present[ed] figures for incurred response costs not covered by the net Murtha settlement of $3.5 million ($5.375 million minus the $1.875 million given to the Beacon Heights Coalition). Id. Holding that § 9613(f)(2) required that the non-settling defendants be credited with the full amount of the settlement (instead of reducing the government's unreimbursed costs by only the amounts it actually received), id. at 547, the trial court found that this amount, along with funds received from the coalitions, totally wiped out all response costs incurred by the U.S. and the State. It therefore granted judgment on the pleadings. 105 On the government's and the State's response costs appeal, Armstrong Rubber Company, The Eastern Company, Kerite Company, Primerica, Inc., and George Clark are Beacon Heights appellees, and Atlantic Richfield Company, The Eastern Company, and Gerald Metals, Inc. are Laurel Park appellees. C. Judgment on the Pleadings Reversed 106 The government contends first that the district court improperly included the $1.975 million that Murtha agreed to pay for Laurel Park remediation as funds received by the government. We agree with the government for several reasons. In our view, the government had neither possession nor actual control over the $1.975 million given to the Laurel Park Coalition. All parties agree that this portion of the money from the Murtha decree was deposited in a court registry account. It was then released to that coalition upon its formation. The district court took a contrary position, holding that the governments had control and thus constructive possession of the settlement. Murtha IV, 855 F.Supp. at 547. Similarly, appellees contend that because the United States did not have to enter into an agreement with an industrial coalition for the clean-up of Laurel Park, the government effectively controlled the $1.975 million. However, because the Laurel Park Coalition's consent decree (forming the Laurel Park Coalition) was entered by the court one day after the Murtha consent decree was entered, the contingency required for the government to receive the Laurel Park funds--non-formation of the coalition--never occurred. 107 We decline to adopt the district court's expansive understanding of possession. Just as the district court did not credit the government or the State with receipt of the $1.875 million that the Murtha settlement allocated to the Beacon Heights Coalition, it should not have credited the government with receipt of the $1.975 million allocated under the terms of the Murtha settlement to the Laurel Park Coalition. 108 But even if we accepted the district court's constructive possession theory, we would still conclude that the district court failed to consider that this money was spent for remediation at the Laurel Park landfill. Hence, if the $1.975 million had been received by the government, it would follow that the government should then immediately have been credited for spending the money for remediation at Laurel Park--the money would have been part of the incurred response costs. The government recognizes that [t]he sums cancel each other out, and no one disputes that the money was ultimately used for future response costs at Laurel Park. The appellees may be correct that this arrangement does not qualify as a mixed-funding reimbursement under § 9622(b)(1), but that does not make the arrangement impermissible under CERCLA, a broad remedial statute designed to promote settlements. 109 The settlements forged by the government furthered important interests advanced by CERCLA: multi-party settlements and quick remediation. By agreeing to the Murtha settlement, in which Murtha set aside $1.975 million for the Laurel Park Coalition for oversight costs, the government encouraged the formation of that coalition, which will now undertake remediation. This is precisely the sort of creative settlement that the government and private parties should endeavor to craft in the future. In sum, the district court should not have reduced the non-settling defendants' liability to the government by the $1.975 million paid by Murtha to the Laurel Park Coalition under the Murtha consent agreement. 110 We also agree with the governments that unreimbursed response costs at both facilities still may remain, and that judgment on the pleadings was therefore inappropriate. Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), may only be granted when the pleadings show that it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Hence, if the cost summaries submitted by the U.S. and the State support the relief sought, judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate. The government contends that the district court treated this motion as a summary judgment motion under Rule 56 without giving the government notice of its intention to do such. If this is what the district court did, it was error. See Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir.1988). However, because we believe the district court incorrectly interpreted the Act, we need not address this point. 111 The government submitted cost summaries on June 10, 1993 for both landfill sites. For Beacon Heights, the U.S. claimed that even though it had collected $356,508.06 from the Murtha consent decree, $2,855,334.35 remained as total outstanding costs. At Laurel Park, the U.S. collected $690,906.92 from the Murtha consent decree and $500,000.00 from the coalition for past costs, leaving the U.S. with $2,187,109.01 in outstanding costs. These cost summaries are supported by affidavits and other documentation. Based on its submissions, the government could prove facts entitling it to relief. 112 It is true that the coalitions will be paying most of the government's future costs. The Laurel Park Coalition will pay oversight costs in excess of $200,000, and the Beacon Heights Coalition will pay oversight costs in excess of $500,000. The Beacon Heights appellees claim that because the government incurred $1.1 million in response costs before the Beacon Heights Coalition's consent decree and because the Beacon Heights Coalition will pay for all oversight costs over $500,000, the government's costs are effectively capped at $1.6 million. The Laurel Park appellees make a similar argument regarding the government's response costs at that coalition's landfill site, declaring they are capped at $4.5 million ($4.3 million spent by the U.S. before the Laurel Park Coalition's consent decree and $200,000 not paid by that coalition). But the government's costs are not limited to the oversight costs (which the coalitions have agreed to repay). The non-settling defendants might still be liable for other enforcement costs, such as attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest. 113 Further, even if future response costs are somewhat speculative, the government is still entitled to declaratory relief under CERCLA. See Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 844-45 (6th Cir.1994). As the entry of a declaratory judgment of liability for future costs is mandatory under the Act, the government should (if ultimately successful on remand) be granted declaratory relief in this action despite its failure properly to preserve this issue for appeal. See United States v. Restrepo, 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir.) (explaining that where an issue was not properly preserved, appellate court may grant relief were such relief would be available in an independent action), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843, 114 S.Ct. 130, 126 L.Ed.2d 94 (1993). 114 The Beacon Heights appellees also contend that the provision in § 9613(f)(2) that non-settling defendants should have their liability reduced by the amount of the settlement refers to the total amount of money provided to all parties in a settlement. As a consequence, they maintain, because the Murtha settlement did not just provide money to the government for Beacon Heights remediation but also allotted $1.875 million to the Beacon Heights Coalition, this $1.875 million should also be counted when reducing the non-settlors' liability. However, the district court never questioned that the $1.875 million given to the Beacon Heights Coalition should not be counted against the government. The U.S. correctly explains that the appellees' theory would lead to absurd results. Consider the following hypothetical: The government and a state settle their claims with a landfill owner for $2 million, with each receiving $1 million. Each government has spent $2 million in response costs. Under the appellees' theory, even though the federal government only received $1 million, its recoverable response costs would be reduced by $2 million and therefore erased. This is too preposterous to be maintained. 115 Finally, we believe that the disputes in this case over the accounting techniques used by the government raise fact questions inappropriate for determination on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The government has met the limited showing required to avoid judgment on the pleadings.D. State of Connecticut's Claim 116 Connecticut's claims on this appeal arise exclusively out of the Laurel Park landfill site. The State asserts it has incurred a total of $2,546,224.02 in response costs, including the costs for the installation of a water system and a new sewerline, as well as investigation expenses. The State contends that after it received funds from the Laurel Park Coalition's consent decree and the Murtha decree, $760,125.00 of unreimbursed response costs remained. As explained above, the district court incorrectly credited to the State a portion of the Murtha settlement that was paid to the Laurel Park Coalition. See Murtha IV, 855 F.Supp. at 547. Therefore, decision entering judgment against the State must also be reversed. V Summary Judgments Against United States 117 The government sued John and Joseph Betkoski, owners of the Beacon Heights facility until 1970 (when Murtha purchased the facility) and Richard Zollo, an alleged transporter of hazardous substances to the same landfill. All three were granted summary judgment by the district court, which concluded that the government failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to their liability. 118 In the case of Richard Zollo, we again note that sua sponte summary judgment should generally only be granted after the losing party is given notice and an opportunity to present evidence and arguments in opposition. In any event, here the evidence before the court was sufficient for the government to survive summary judgment. The government submitted an affidavit that summarized certain EPA records concerning Zollo's disposal of waste at Beacon Heights. It also presented a letter from a waste generator serviced by Zollo that listed the chemicals present in its waste. This letter and other documents showed that Zollo transported to the landfill various materials (such as waste oil, waste chemicals, liquid paint, heavy sludges, paint residue, and latex dip scrap material) containing hazardous substances. And, Zollo admitted in an interrogatory submitted to the EPA he had transported waste from several companies to Beacon Heights. These papers raised a genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. 119 We also conclude that the district court should not have granted summary judgment to the Betkoskis. If genuinely disputed material facts remain concerning whether Zollo transported hazardous substances to Beacon Heights, it is hard to see how the Betkoskis can obtain summary judgment. They owned the Beacon Heights landfill during the time when Zollo allegedly transported chemical wastes to the site, and would therefore be directly liable under the Act. Moreover, the Betkoskis did not show the absence of disputed material facts and therefore failed to carry their burden at this stage of the litigation. Joseph Betkoski only claimed that he never disposed of any waste at the site and John Betkoski simply stated that he had no knowledge that any hazardous waste was disposed at Beacon Heights. However, the Betkoskis' liability turns on neither their disposal, nor their knowledge of any disposal of hazardous substances at the landfill; it depends solely on their ownership at a time when hazardous substances were deposited at the landfill. 120 Because we hold that summary judgment was inappropriate, the rulings against the United States and in favor of the Betkoskis and Richard Zollo must be reversed and those cases must be remanded.