Opinion ID: 2639091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claim Against the City of Edmond

Text: ¶ 9 Governmental immunity of a subdivision of the State is waived only to the extent and in the manner provided in the GTCA. Moran v. City of Del City, 2003 OK 57, ¶ 6, 77 P.3d 588, 590. However, the GTCA also provides certain exemptions from this liability. 51 O.S.Supp.1994 § 155 is one of these. The City of Edmond argued that it was immune because of 51 O.S.Supp.1994 § 155(5) & (15). These provisions state: The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim results from:. . . 5. Performance of or the failure to exercise or perform any act or service which is in the discretion of the state or political subdivision or its employees; ... 15. Absence, condition, location or malfunction of any traffic or road sign, signal or warning device unless the absence, condition, location or malfunction is not corrected by the state or political subdivision responsible within a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice or the removal or destruction of such signs, signals or warning devices by third parties, action of weather elements or as a result of traffic collision except on failure of the state or political subdivision to correct the same within a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice. Nothing herein shall give rise to liability arising from the failure of the state or any political subdivision to initially place any of the above signs, signals or warning devices. The signs, signals and warning devices referred to herein are those used in connection with hazards normally connected with the use of roadways or public ways and do not apply to the duty to warn of special defects such as excavations or roadway obstructions;... 51 O.S.Supp.1994 § 155(5) & (15). ¶ 10 We discussed § 155(5) in Robinson v. City of Bartlesville Board of Education, 1985 OK 39, 700 P.2d 1013. We first explained that no liability attaches to a discretionary act. We have previously held that allegations of failure to install and maintain traffic control devices, failure to provide patrol service, and failure to light the streets are allegations of failure to perform discretionary functions. It is clear that if the installation and maintenance of the sunken drain in the school parking lot was a discretionary function of the School Board, then there can be no liability, and the demurrer was correctly sustained. Id. 700 P.2d at 1015. We then quoted from Harrigan v. City of Reno, 86 Nev. 678, 475 P.2d 94 (1970) and explained that liability could flow from ministerial or operational acts. But there is a distinction to be drawn between acts of a municipal body that are discretionary and acts that are ministerial or operational. In Harrigan v. City of Reno the plaintiff was injured when she was blown by a gust of wind from a city parking lot with a drop-off of several feet with no guardrail. The City, with a comparable tort-claims act, argued that failure to install a guardrail was a matter of discretion, for which the City had immunity. The Court, however, held: In determining whether this is a proper case for departure from governmental immunity we must first ask what the act of the city was. The answer is, that it built a parking lot. The city need not have constructed the parking lot because that was an exercise of discretion based upon policy, that is, whether or not the municipality would provide a public parking facility adjacent to its city hall for the convenience of the people. Its decision to do so was a policy, or discretionary, decision. Once having decided to construct a parking lot the city was obligated to use due care to make certain that the parking lot met the standard of reasonable safety for those who would use it. Such was the operational stage for which the statute does not exempt the city from liability if due care has not been used and an injury is caused. Robinson v. City of Bartlesville Bd. of Education, 700 P.2d at 1015-1016. In Walker v. City of Moore, 1992 OK 73, 837 P.2d 876, we said: Maintaining the existing pavement markings, the purpose of which is to warn that two lanes are merging into one lane, is operational and a ministerial function. Negligence in the performance of that ministerial function subjects the City to liability. That is, the maintenance of the existing pavement markings is not within the discretionary exemption of the Governmental Tort Claims Act. Walker, 837 P.2d at 879. ¶ 11 Teeter claimed that the City of Edmond failed to adequately maintain the crosswalk. A crosswalk may be created by painted lines on a road surface. [3] Teeter stated that the painted lines on the road surface were worn and insufficient for slowing traffic. This is a claim against the City for not maintaining what it has installed, a failure of performance which is not discretionary but operational. Such a claim is not barred by § 155(5). Robinson v. City of Bartlesville Bd. of Education, supra , Walker v. City of Moore, supra . ¶ 12 Teeter also claimed that the crosswalk was inadequately maintained in that additional traffic signs were necessary for this crosswalk. Teeter does not allege that additional traffic signs are necessary for all crosswalks, but that this particular location, with its volume of traffic and number of pedestrians, needed additional signs to make a crosswalk safe for pedestrians. A claim based upon these allegations is barred by another provision of the GTCA invoked by the City, § 155(15), which states: Nothing herein shall give rise to liability arising from the failure of the state or any political subdivision to initially place any of the above signs, signals or warning devices. Teeter does not argue for the exception in § 155(15) relating to signs for special defects, so her claim against the City based upon a failure to initially place additional signs must fail. ¶ 13 Teeter also makes an allegation that the City of Edmond failed to warn pedestrians of unsafe conditions created by the City's alleged negligence. The language in § 155(15) relating to a failure to initially install traffic signs includes warning devices, so Teeters' claim of a failure to provide a warning by not installing either signs or devices would also be barred by § 155(15). ¶ 14 In summary, Teeter's allegations relating to the City's failure to initially place additional traffic signs or warning devices related to the crosswalk are insufficient to reverse the trial court's summary judgment granted to the City. However, the City's reliance upon the GTCA is not sufficient for summary judgment against Teeter on her allegations that the City failed to maintain the pavement markings and thereby created an unsafe crosswalk that caused her injuries. The summary judgment granted to the City on this claim must be reversed.