Opinion ID: 145556
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of Conspiracy

Text: The essence of conspiracy is agreement. In order to convict a defendant of the crime of conspiracy, the government must show that two or more persons entered into a joint enterprise for an unlawful purpose, with awareness of its general nature and extent. See, e.g., United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir.2008) ( Huezo ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 142, 175 L.Ed.2d 238 (2009); United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.2004) ( Jones ); United States v. Rodriguez, 392 F.3d 539, 545 (2d Cir.2004) ( Rodriguez ); United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir.2004) ( Morgan ); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir.2002) ( Friedman ), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 981, 123 S.Ct. 1785, 155 L.Ed.2d 672 (2003). Although [t]he government need not show that the defendant knew all of the details of the conspiracy, `so long as he knew its general nature and extent,' Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 879, 115 S.Ct. 211, 130 L.Ed.2d 140 (1994)), the government must prove at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself, United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975). [T]he knowledge of the parties is relevant to a conspiracy charge to the same extent as it may be for conviction of the substantive offense. Id. at 695, 95 S.Ct. 1255. Title 21 of the United States Code provides, inter alia, that it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally  to distribute or to possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (emphasis added), or to conspire[] to commit such an offense, id. § 846. To prove intent, of course, the government must show knowledge, for knowledge is the foundation of intent, Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711-12, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 87 L.Ed. 1674 (1943). Thus, since the government cannot establish the substantive § 841(a)(1) offenses of distribution or possession with intent to distribute without proving that the defendant knew he was dealing with a controlled substance, it likewise cannot establish a § 846 conspiracy to distribute or to possess with intent to distribute without proving, inter alia, that the defendant knew that the conspiracy involved a controlled substance. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 392 F.3d at 545 (the conspiracy and substantive charges, both of which are specific intent crimes, required the government to establish that Rodriguez knowingly and intentionally participated in the drug deal); United States v. Lorenzo, 534 F.3d 153, 159-62 (2d Cir.2008) ( Lorenzo ); cf. Friedman, 300 F.3d at 115, 124-26 (a charge of conspiracy to commit extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1) require[s] the Government to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew [that] the specific nature of the conspiracy included extortion); United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 233-34, 236 (2d Cir.2001) ( Samaria ) (a charge of conspiracy to receive and possess stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 requires the government to prove that the defendant knew the goods were stolen), abrogated on other grounds by Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180 n. 2. Proof that the defendant engaged in suspicious behavior, without proof that he had knowledge that his conduct involved narcotics, is not enough to support his conviction for conspiracy to traffic in narcotics. See, e.g., Lorenzo, 534 F.3d at 160-62. 'Proof that the defendant knew that some crime would be committed is not enough.' Rodriguez, 392 F.3d at 545 (quoting Morgan, 385 F.3d at 206 (quoting Friedman, 300 F.3d at 124) (emphasis in Friedman )). `[B]oth the existence of a conspiracy and a given defendant's participation in it with the requisite knowledge and criminal intent may be established through circumstantial evidence.' Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 671 (2d Cir.2007)); see, e.g., Friedman, 300 F.3d at 124; cf. Morgan, 385 F.3d at 205-06 (properly instructed jury is entitled to infer the requisite knowledge on the basis of evidence that the defendant consciously avoided learning the nature of the conspiracy). Nevertheless, where the Government seeks to prove a fact that is also an element of the offense by circumstantial evidence, [w]e must ... be satisfied that the inferences are sufficiently supported to permit a rational juror to find that the element, like all elements, is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Friedman, 300 F.3d at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Rodriguez, 392 F.3d at 544.