Opinion ID: 1934571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: insufficiency of evidence claims

Text: Monroe argues that his convictions and sentence should be reversed because of an insufficiency of evidence as to each charged offense. The State responds that, although the evidence against Monroe is only circumstantial, it is sufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts. Although we have not previously addressed the question before the Court in this case  whether fingerprint evidence under circumstances such as those presented here is sufficient to establish a perpetrator's identity  other jurisdictions have dealt with similar issues. A substantial number of jurisdictions appear to have adopted the following rule in one form or another: a conviction cannot be sustained solely on a defendant's fingerprints being found on an object at a crime scene unless the State demonstrates that the prints could have been impressed only at the time the crime was committed. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 118 Ariz. 562, 562, 578 P.2d 991, 992 (1978) (in banc); State v. Payne, 186 Conn. 179, 440 A.2d 280, 282 (1982); In re J.C.M., D.C.App., 502 A.2d 472, 474-75 (1985); J.C. v. State, Fla.App., 377 So.2d 731, 732-33 (1980); Tyler v. State, 198 Ga.App. 685, 402 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1991); People v. Rhodes, 85 Ill.2d 241, 52 Ill.Dec. 603, 422 N.E.2d 605, 608 (1981), limited on other grounds by People v. Pintos, 133 Ill.2d 286, 139 Ill.Dec. 832, 549 N.E.2d 344, 346 (1989); People v. Woods, 225 Ill.App.3d 988, 167 Ill. Dec. 1094, 1097-98, 588 N.E.2d 1224, 1227-28, appeal denied, Ill.Supr., 146 Ill.2d 650, 176 Ill.Dec. 820, 602 N.E.2d 474 (1992); State v. Pryor, La.Supr., 306 So.2d 675, 677-78 (1975); Colvin v. State, Ct.App., 299 Md. 88, 472 A.2d 953, 964 (1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2725, 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); People v. Himmelein, 177 Mich.App. 365, 442 N.W.2d 667, 672 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1096, 111 S.Ct. 985, 112 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1991); State v. Deutschmann, Mo. Supr., 392 S.W.2d 279, 282 (1965); State v. Ouellette, 125 N.H. 602, 484 A.2d 1148, 1150 (1984); State v. Watson, 224 N.J.Super. 354, 540 A.2d 875, 877, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 535, 102 L.Ed.2d 566 (1988); State v. White, 67 N.C.App. 348, 312 S.E.2d 712, 713-14 (1984); Commonwealth v. Price, 278 Pa.Super. 255, 420 A.2d 527, 529-30 (1980); State v. Giordano, R.I.Supr., 440 A.2d 742, 746-47 (1982); State v. Kyger, Tenn.Crim. App., 787 S.W.2d 13, 30 (1989); Ricks v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 523, 237 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1977). [6] Evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction, however, where the circumstances surrounding a defendant's fingerprints create a strong inference that the defendant was the perpetrator. These surrounding circumstances include, but are not limited to, the following: whether the prints were found in a private or public structure ( i.e., whether the object in question was generally-accessible); whether the defendant had any special access to the object in question which may provide an alternative explanation for the presence of the prints; and whether the manner of placement of the prints on the object is supportive of the defendant having placed them there while committing the charged offense. Representative cases where convictions were not set aside on an insufficiency of evidence basis include: Taylor v. Stainer, 9th Cir., 31 F.3d 907, 908-09 (1994) (defendant's fingerprints found on inside of POE window sill of private home; no special access); Carter, 118 Ariz. at 563, 578 P.2d at 992 (prints on inside surface of POE window of private home; no special access); State v. Crosby, 196 Conn. 185, 491 A.2d 1092, 1094 (1985) (prints on glass door of wall unit inside store from which jewelry was stolen; door was cleaned with solution that removed all fingerprints from surface and store was inaccessible from time of cleaning until burglary); State v. Thorpe, 188 Conn. 645, 453 A.2d 88, 89-90 (1982) (prints on jewelry box located inside business premises from which jewelry was stolen; box was cleaned and not accessible to defendant before burglary); Hawkins v. United States, D.C.App., 329 A.2d 781, 782 (1974) (prints on dresser drawer inside bedroom of burglarized home; no special access); Woods, 167 Ill.Dec. at 1097-98, 588 N.E.2d at 1227-28 (prints on glass shard from broken POE window in private residence; no proof of special access); Colvin, 472 A.2d at 964-65 (prints on glass shards of POE, inaccessible basement door, broken to gain entry to burglarized private home; defendant found in possession of stolen items); Deutschmann, 392 S.W.2d at 282 (prints on coin box located behind counter of burglarized business; not generally-accessible); Ouellette, 484 A.2d at 1150 (prints on certain papers taken from dispenser located behind counter of burglarized store; no special access); Giordano, 440 A.2d at 746-47 (prints on air conditioner unit inside premises that was unsuccessful target of burglary; unit was thoroughly cleaned before burglary and there was no public access to premises between time of cleaning and burglary); Ricks, 237 S.E.2d at 812 (prints on jar inside bedroom of burglarized private home; no special access). [7] Applying the above standards, the courts in each of the following cases reversed a defendant's conviction due to lack of sufficient evidence linking the defendant to the charged offenses. Payne, 440 A.2d at 282-83 (prints on outside of a driver side, front door window of generally-accessible car in which victim was robbed); J.C.M., 502 A.2d at 473-75 (prints on can of air freshener, generally accessible before purchase by victim, and located near POE window of burglarized private home; stolen property not recovered); Townsley v. United States, D.C.App., 236 A.2d 63, 65 (1967) (prints on glass shard from smashed POE front door of burglarized business; glass piece located inside premises); White, 312 S.E.2d at 713-14 (defendant's fingerprints on window shattered while gaining entry to victim's private home; defendant claimed special access); Commonwealth v. Cichy, 227 Pa.Super. 480, 323 A.2d 817, 818 (1974) (prints on cigarette package's cellophane wrapper, found inside burglarized gas station which defendant had visited on at least one prior occasion). In such cases, a defendant has no obligation to offer a credible, lawful explanation for the existence of his or her fingerprints on the object in question. E.g., Payne, 440 A.2d at 282 n. 3; White, 312 S.E.2d at 714. But see Woods, 167 Ill.Dec. at 1098, 588 N.E.2d at 1228 (rejecting defendant's unsupported theory on appeal that his prints could have been impressed at time other than during commission of burglary). We find the treatment of this issue by other jurisdictions useful in analyzing the insufficiency of evidence claims presented here. In the instant case, the State presented the following fingerprint evidence in attempting to satisfy its burden of linking Monroe to the burglary: (1) Officer Ciritella testified that, based on his past experience, fingerprints on a large piece of glass that was dangling at the POE indicates that the print's owner moved the glass piece aside to more easily enter the store. He admitted, however, that he was speculating as to what may have actually occurred. (2) Upon being recalled to the stand, Officer Ciritella conceded that [t]he only latent lift that I can determine that came from inside is [that from] the [dangling] pane of glass that I took out of the door, and that he could not identify those particular prints to be Monroe's. He stated that Officer Liszkiewicz was responsible for making the latter identification. (3) Officer Liszkiewicz presented extensive testimony relating to the prints. Aggregately, he identified eight prints as Monroe's and seventeen prints which belonged to others. As to the latter, he did not know whether they belonged to more than one person, or the identity of their owner(s). He also found an additional fourteen prints which he classified as unidentifiable, that is, of insufficient quality to make a comparison. (4) Officer Liszkiewicz continued that he had no knowledge regarding whether the fingerprints he matched to those of Monroe were removed from one or more pieces of glass, or whether they were removed from glass pieces that were inside or outside the store. (5) Though he initially stated that he could not form some rough hypotheses as to how [Monroe's] fingerprint was left behind, Officer Liszkiewicz later opined that, based on his experience on the streets, the known fingerprints of [Monroe] and the unknown fingerprints left behind by this other person or persons, and the smudges, [were] consistent with someone pulling shards of Plexiglass out of a door frame and moving them out of the way[.] He conceded that the prints were also consistent with somebody just touching the surface of the door[.] (6) Officer Liszkiewicz also conjectured that, based on his training and experience, an area on the door between the ground and the handle (which was the POE and from where the pieces of glass yielded the prints) is less likely to be touched in the normal use of a door than the area adjacent to the door handle. The State's reliance on the above testimony of the two officers to satisfy its burden of making out a prima facie case is unpersuasive. Regarding the testimony relating to the prints on the inside of the dangling plexiglass shard, what is saliently absent from the testimony is any match-up of the prints on that shard and those of Monroe. That is, Officer Ciritella could testify only that he found someone's prints on the inside shard and Officer Liszkiewicz could not match those prints on that piece of glass to Monroe's prints. Officer Liszkiewicz, in fact, did not know whether the fingerprints were all from one piece of shattered plexiglass or several, or whether any particular prints he tested were from shards found inside or outside the appliance center. Thus, even assuming that finding Monroe's prints on the inside surface of the glass piece dangling from the door is somehow more inculpatory than finding them on the outside, [8] the State failed to establish that the prints on the inside were indeed Monroe's. The plexiglass pieces came from the front door of the appliance center, which was generally accessible to the public. See Townsley, 236 A.2d at 65. There was no evidence that Monroe's prints were placed on the glass at the time the door was shattered to gain entry. See id.; Cichy, 323 A.2d at 818; White, 312 S.E.2d at 713-14. Both Officers Ciritella and Liszkiewicz testified that they could not determine on which day or at what time any of the prints were left on the door. None of the items stolen were found in Monroe's possession upon execution of the search warrant. See Colvin, 472 A.2d at 964-65. The only explanation that Officer Liszkiewicz could attribute to the existence of the several sets of identifiable but unmatched, as well as the several unidentifiable, fingerprints on the glass pieces was that a door is a type of object that, in its natural use, tends to accumulate many fingerprints. That explanation is demonstratively indicative of the weakness in the State's case. [9] Though the State no longer needs to disprove every possible innocent explanation in pure circumstantial evidence cases, Williams v. State, Del.Supr., 539 A.2d 164, 167, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969, 109 S.Ct. 500, 102 L.Ed.2d 536 (1988), the range of abundant, innocent explanations for the presence of Monroe's prints on the plexiglass shards is too vast for any rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of both charged offenses  namely, identity. See Payne, 440 A.2d at 282; White, 312 S.E.2d at 713-14; Townsley, 236 A.2d at 65; Cichy, 323 A.2d at 819. The Court holds that the Superior Court committed plain error in not sua sponte granting a judgment of acquittal upon the State's completion of its case. Given the self-evident importance of establishing identity, this error, though perhaps understandable in view of Monroe's failure to raise the question, cannot be said to be harmless. Our holding is limited to the facts before us today. We express no opinion on the sufficiency of fingerprint evidence to establish guilt in cases involving different circumstances. We hold only that the evidence the State presented at trial in this case fell short of the reasonable doubt requirement.