Opinion ID: 2516937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶9] We give great deference to a jury verdict: In reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence question, we assume the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning every favorable inference to the evidence of the successful party that can be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection Ass'n, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980); Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979). In addition, when reviewing a jury verdict, we leave to the jury the duty of ascertaining the facts, reconciling conflict therein and drawing its own inferences if more than one inference is permissible. Neal v. Wailes, Wyo., 346 P.2d 132, 134 (1959). Also, when the facts permit the drawing of more than one inference, then it is for the jury to choose which one will be utilized and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury's choice will be held by us to be conclusive. Berta v. Ford, Wyo., 469 P.2d 12, 15 (1970); Ford Motor Company v. Arguello, Wyo., 382 P.2d 886 (1963). Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Wyo.1982). Further: Juries generally have great discretion in determining the amount of damages to be awarded. John Q. Hammons Inc., 954 P.2d at 1358; see also Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Richards, 702 P.2d 1272, 1278 (Wyo.1985). We are reluctant to interfere with a jury's verdict on damages unless the award, by its excessiveness or inadequacy, denotes passion, prejudice, bias or some erroneous basis. John Q. Hammons Inc., 954 P.2d at 1358. See also Union Pacific Railroad Company, 702 P.2d at 1278. Francis v. Pountney, 972 P.2d 143, 146 (Wyo.1999). Knowles v. Corkill, 2002 WY 119, ¶ 21, 51 P.3d 859, 865-66 (Wyo. 2002). [¶10] With this standard of review in mind, we proceed to set out below only those facts which we are permitted to take into account in deciding this issue in this case. At the outset, we note that many demonstrative exhibits, especially photographs, were used by the parties. We are unable to include those photographs in this opinion, and our only comment on them will be that they likely had a significant impact on the jury's decision-making process. The old saying is that a picture is worth a thousand words, and that is the case with some of the photographs in the record on appeal. In some cases, perspective on the size of the hole in which the mining takes place is emphasized by the contrast between people, pickups, pieces of large machinery, and the high wall and benches of the strip mine. We will also note here that throughout the testimony at trial, and in the briefs, frequent mention is made of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MHSA) and its role in circumstances such as those presented here. [¶11] On January 22, 2002, Mr. Butts was employed by the Thunder Basin Coal Company as a utility man at the Black Thunder Mine. He and a fellow employee were in an area of the mine known as the East-West Boxcut. That area of the mine was unique because it had high walls on both sides, and the catch benches were in the coal rather than in the overburden. Some employees referred to that area as the valley of death or coffin box because of the potential dangers it held for mine employees. Butts and his workmate were laying out electrical cable to be used by one of the coal shovels the next day. That fellow employee saw no apparent signs of danger for Butts, but admitted that the catch benches were ineffective because they were full of rubble. Catch benches are designed to catch rubble such as that which sloughed off and injured Butts. Butts's part in the mining process was to operate a piece of equipment called a Terra-Gator. While he was doing that job, a rock fell from the south high wall and landed on top of the Terra-Gator, which was in the middle of the open pit. However, that fellow employee did not actually see the rock strike the Terra-Gator because his back was turned to Butts at that moment. However, he testified that he had not before seen a rock come out into the middle of the boxcut. Due to his injuries, Butts had no memory of the day of the accident, or the events that occurred during the two days before the accident. Thus, events of those days could only be told by other employees who were present, and there is a paucity of that. Because of the narrowness of the boxcut area, traffic was confined to only the middle of the boxcut (so as to avoid being hit by falling debris). Butts was doing his work in that area, so no traffic could pass by him until he completed his work. The only eyewitness was a truck driver who was required to stop until Butts was clear of the middle of the road. [¶12] Butts's theory of this case was that the rock that landed on the Terra-Gator came down from the south high wall, rolled off the debris-filled catch benches, traveled down the face of the coal high wall, bounced to a height of 20 to 30 feet, and launched into the middle of the open pit onto the top of the Terra-Gator. The eyewitness to the accident, Brian Kivi, testified that he saw: ...the high wall came down and hit the TerraGator. Kivi conceded that his recollection of that day's events was not especially good. However, based on Kivi's testimony, as well as expert testimony, the Appellants' theory was that this was an extremely unusual event in that a large piece of debris shot out of the high wall and into the middle of the pit, about 53 feet out into the pit from the wall, without ever hitting any of the catch benches. The official report made on the day of the accident indicated that the pit was scary early in the morning, other crews had said they would not operate the shovel in that area, there were a couple of sloughs during the day some rocks hit the rubber tires of the Terra-Gator (it was in the middle of the boxcut at that time), earlier sloughs sent rocks into [the] middle of the pit and blocked truck traffic (had to be pushed out of the way so trucks could [be driven on the narrow roadway]). The supervisor that day was not aware of any of these things, although he testified that he made rounds through that area five times during that day and found or heard nothing unusual. [¶13] Dan Dowdy related an incident involving an earlier slough (a mass of material that sloughed from the side of a mine working hole) that occurred at a different location on the high wall in August or September of 2001. The principal purpose of his testimony was to disclose that he had personally spoken with both Hannifan and Hampleman about the dangers of the high wall immediately after his brush with death when that slough occurred. [¶14] Hannifan testified that he was the Safety Manager at the Black Thunder Mine. The first goal of his work was to identify dangers. The second goal was to eliminate identified dangers, if possible. If the danger cannot be eliminated, then the next step was to guard or protect against the danger. He admitted that he anticipated problems with all high walls, and that they are extremely dangerous at times. He also conceded that the catch benches were full and, thus, not effective in guarding against the danger of sloughs such as that which injured Butts, other than that they would tend to slow material headed down into the pit. Hannifan conceded that state-of-the art FOPS (Falling Objects Protection System) would have been effective to protect Mr. Butts. [¶15] Hannifan's testimony became problematic because another witness, Tom Skinner, a safety advisor for pit operations at Thunder Basin Coal, testified that the Terra-Gator used by Butts was required to have FOPS in place, and that it did have FOPS in place. However, as it turned out, he was wrong about that, and later testimony established that it did not have FOPS in place. Hannifan disagreed with Skinner that FOPS was required on the Terra-Gator, and characterized the Mine Safety Regulations as open to interpretation in that regard. An important part of Hannifan's job was to enforce the Ground Control Plan (Revised: October 15, 2001). Examination of that document revealed that the East-West Boxcut was narrower than the Control Plan required (it was 135-140 feet but should have been 160-400 feet). In addition, the high walls were 75 degrees steep, rather than 70 degrees steep. Hannifan also conceded that the full benches might have the effect of projecting rubble out to the center of the boxcut. Hannifan contended that the catch benches did not look like ski jumps (as characterized by Butts's counsel), but described them as having a 35 degree slope (the angle of repose common to all materials). There was also a discrepancy with respect to the width of the catch benches built into the coal (they were 20, rather than 30, feet wide), and that no catch benches had been put into the high wall, although one or two such benches could have been put into it. On January 21, 2002, the day before the disabling event, Marty Martens, Hannifan's safety adviser, told Hannifan that he was concerned about that area of the pit  because the high wall was unstable and the catch benches were full. He warned Hannifan that he was concerned about utility people, such as Butts, working on the ground under the high wall. Although Martens had the authority to close down the area, he did not. Instead, both Hannifan and Hampleman went and visually inspected the high walls on the day before the accident that injured Butts and ascertained that there was no reason to close down mining operations. In addition to Martens's warning to Hannifan, there had been freezing and thawing temperatures immediately preceding the slough that injured Butts, and such freezing and thawing temperatures add to the danger of sloughs occurring. [¶16] Hannifan's testimony also revealed that MSHA had noted problems with the high walls three times in 2001, before Mr. Dowdy was hurt in the much larger slough described previously. Hannifan also testified that although the Dowdy incident could have been a fatality, no additional precautions were taken. Indeed, Hannifan was not aware that there was mining going on in the area where Butts was injured until the day before Butts was injured. During January of 2001, all the miners were required to take a refresher safety course from MSHA, and Hannifan made a spot decision to ask participants to make comments on any safety problems that they were concerned about. Many of those comments were directed at the safety problems with the high walls in the boxcut where Butts was injured. [¶17] Hannifan's credibility was severely tested because of his testimony about whether or not he had directed an employee to shred many of the written comments received from participants in the training classes, after Butts was injured. At first, he said he did not, and then said he could not remember, and then finally admitted that he had. As Hannifan's testimony wound down, he conceded that the boxcut was dangerous and that it was an unsafe working condition. Furthermore, he conceded that he was the person legally responsible for safety at the mine. Although Hannifan at first denied that there were rocks out in the center area of the pit other than the one that hit Butts and the Terra-Gator, after reviewing photographs taken that day, he had to admit that there were many other rocks out in the area of the Terra-Gator. [¶18] Bob Moore was a safety advisor at the mine and worked for Mr. Hannifan. Moore disagreed with Hannifan, in that Hannifan testified that the safety people only advised higher management. Moore thought they needed to take a more active role in assuring the day-to-day safety of employees. He participated with Hannifan in the safety refresher course in January of 2001, and recited substantially the same information as Hannifan did with respect to the safety concerns expressed by the participants  i.e., the high wall conditions. At the time Dan Dowdy was involved in the slough of August or September of 1991, Dowdy asked Moore if he had authority to shut down the mine. Moore said he did not, and he also believed that Hannifan did not have that authority, that they were just advisors to higher management, i.e., Mr. Hampleman. [¶19] Kevin Hampleman testified that he was the mine manager at the Thunder Basin Mine and that he had general overall responsibility for running the mine. He noted that the mine went through a change in operational management just before Mr. Butts's injuries occurred. Prior to that time, Michael O'Keif was in charge of operations, and after his retirement in mid-January of 2002, Hampleman was in charge. However, there were other managers with the same level of authority as Hampleman, including Mike Hannifan, the safety manager. During this transition period, Hampleman was out in the field (i.e., pits, areas being stripped, etc.) 75% of the time, as were many other supervisors. One of the purposes of this field time was to monitor the high walls. Hampleman testified that MSHA did not cite him or the mine for its failure to have installed FOPS on the Terra-Gator, although MSHA has authority to issue a citation to any individual working in a mine. After the incident wherein Mr. Butts was injured, the citation issued was only to Thunder Basin Coal. Hampleman never saw the comments collected by Hannifan during the safety refresher course, described more fully above. Hampleman agreed that Marty Martens came to him on January 21, 2002, the day before Butts's accident, and expressed concern about the high wall in that particular area. He and Hannifan went out and looked at it and thought it looked okay. The spot where they parked, and from which they made their observations, was near where Butts was injured. Also, at about the same time that they were making their observations, blasting in another area of the mine rattled the pit pretty good, but it did not appear to disturb the high wall. Thus, a decision was made to continue operations. Hampleman was not directly supervising Butts the day of the accident. Under cross-examination, Hampleman also agreed that if the rock that hit the Terra-Gator had come straight out of the wall, and come down at a 45 degree angle, and hit the Terra-Gator, without ever hitting any catch bench, then the fact that the catch benches were full would not have had any affect on the event. [¶20] Ben Seegmiller is a mining engineer who testified on behalf of the Appellants. He is one of 10-20 persons who specialize in his particular area of study, high wall stability and rock mechanics for mining operations. His direct testimony can best be summarized by simply saying that it was his opinion that Thunder Basin Coal had done everything in a manner consistent with the standards usually applied in such mining and that the methodology used was safe, economic, and practical. He also testified that conditions such as those prevailing at the Thunder Basin Mine on the day of Butts's accident are the sorts of conditions that lead to large sloughs. He also testified that catch benches are designed to retard sloughs but that even if the catch benches are full and no longer functioning as catch benches, they still tend to retard the movement of material so that it ends up at the toe (essentially at the bottom very near the wall, but not out into the middle of the pit). His opinions included the observations that visually monitoring the high walls is one of the best possible methods to protect workers from sloughs of high walls. Also monitoring devices of various sorts are used (but none apparently were in this instance). He also testified that to walk out and see some small place and say, well that's going to fail, there's just simply no way to do it. Seegmiller also testified that he used a program to explain how that one rock managed to get out to the middle of the pit and land on the top of the Terra-Gator occupied by Butts. It is called the sturztrom failure phenomenon. It was developed by a Swiss scientist in the 1880's to explain a landslide that killed hundreds of people in the Swiss village of Elm. And his conclusion, and the thinking  up until the mid 1970's, the thinking was the way you would get rocks to move way out where you couldn't explain them by any other way, was that the rocks would come down and envelop air and contain air inside of them, and the rocks would sit on this cushion of air, and they would flow out. Air doesn't have much friction to it, and they would simply flow on that cushion of air. It was the only thing people could understand that could allow an explanation for these slope failures that would go out so far. Continuing, Seegmiller explained, that the theory got debunked in the 1970's, ...[s]o they had to come up with a new hypothesis, and what they hypothesized since then, it's very difficult to understand. I'm not even sure I understand it myself. But when the rocks begin to fail, they agitate and kinetic energy is created in there by the rocks bouncing off one another. The failure begins and develops and rocks can come shooting out from that. For Seegmiller, Brian Kivi's testimony absolutely confirms that this incident was a sturzstrom event. Seegmiller based this upon Kivi's testifying under oath. We are compelled to note here that, when read in its entirety, Kivi used various words to describe the incident and, most importantly, did not really remember it very well at all. Seegmiller knew of no other case where such an event had happened in mining. A hard-nosed cross-examination undermined much of Seegmiller's testimony, including that he did not see Kivi's deposition in its videotaped format where pictures and pointing to pictures were an important part of that material. He only read the transcript of it. [¶21] Rodney King was called as a witness for the Mine, and his direct testimony favored its position. However, on cross examination he conceded that he had personal knowledge of many events of sloughing off the high wall that damaged equipment, including a rock going through the window of a pickup that was parked 160 feet from the high wall. [¶22] We have carefully reviewed all of the evidence in the record, and we conclude that the evidence was sufficient so that the jury could conclude as it did. The conglomeration of circumstances that led to Butts's injuries included the fact that the high walls soared to 272 feet. Such walls are inherently dangerous in and of themselves, but these were too steep and not in compliance with the ground control plan adopted for the mine. The boxcut where Butts was working was the only place in the mine with high walls on both sides. The boxcut was the only place in the mine with coal benches but not catch benches. The boxcut was too narrow and not in compliance with the ground control plan. The slough incident involving employee Dowdy gave an early warning of nascent problems with the high walls, but nothing different was done to address those problems. The coal benches, that were not wide enough to be effective, were rendered even more ineffective because they were full of debris forming what was described as the minimum angle of repose. The benches tended to direct material out into the center of the pit. Freezing and thawing temperatures added to the potential for instability in the high walls. The day before the injurious event, an experienced supervisor told Hannifan and Hampleman of dangers in the boxcut. Finally, the Terra-Gator did not have FOPS, the last line of defense for Butts and a requirement under MHSA regulations. Furthermore, we conclude from our careful review of the record that, although neither Hannifan nor Hampleman were directly supervising Butts at the time he was injured, both had direct supervisory authority for Butts's safety and working conditions the day he was injured.