Opinion ID: 2552688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Anderson's Argument

Text: Anderson first claims that the Superior Court erred in finding that the State has discretion under Section 2804 of the habitual driving offender statute to decide whether or not to bring an habitual driving offender petition against a respondent. [23] She argues that the statutory language [t]he Attorney General, upon receiving the abstract from the [DMV], shall forthwith file a petition . . . requires the State to institute a petition every time the DMV makes a recommendation. [24] Because the State did not obey that mandate, but instead exercised its prosecutorial discretion in determining which petitions to bring, the Court of Common Pleas had the inherent power to vacate her adjudicated habitual driving offender status to remedy an unfair application and enforcement of Section 2804. Anderson's claim rests on an incorrect premise, namely, that the State's exercise of its prosecutorial discretion constituted a wrong that required a judicial remedy. Article III, Section 17 of the Delaware Constitution provides that it is the role of the executive to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. [25] Thus, [t]he decision as to which crimes and criminals to prosecute is entrusted . . . not to the judiciary, but to the executive who is charged with seeing that laws are enforced. [26] The Attorney General's Office is given broad discretion when deciding against whom to focus its limited prosecutorial resources, [27] and a strong presumption of regularity supports . . . [its] prosecutorial decisions. [28] Consequently, the judiciary must give deference to a prosecutor's exercise of charging discretion, unless that exercise violates equal protection or due process principles. [29] Anderson has not claimed that the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion violated equal protection or due process principles. Therefore, our inquiry ends here. [30] Notwithstanding Anderson's contrary claim, there is no requirement that the State prosecute each and every violation of the law. Such a requirement would ignore the reality resulting from limited law enforcement and judicial resources. [31] That the Attorney General has chosen not to file an habitual driving offender petition in every instance does not give the Court of Common Pleas the power to deny the State's habitual driving offender petition against any specific person, such as Anderson. [32] The habitual driving offender statute recognizes only two circumstances authorizing the denial of a petition: (1) if the trial court finds that the respondent is not the person identified in the certified DMV driving record, or (2) if the trial court finds that the respondent was not actually convicted of a predicate offense listed in the certified DMV driving record. [33] Neither circumstance was argued to the Court of Common Pleas. Thus, the Court of Common Pleas had no legal basis to conclude that Anderson was not an habitual driving offender, where, as here, the statutory requirements for habitual driving offender status had all been established.