Opinion ID: 2540917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence Of Third-Person Guilt

Text: Nash also asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's motion in limine that prevented him from introducing evidence that another person murdered Judy. The State maintains that the evidence properly was excluded because it failed to meet the direct connection rule for evidence relating to a third person's guilt. This Court has explained the direct connection rule as follows: To be admissible, evidence that another person had an opportunity or motive for committing the crime for which a defendant is being tried must tend to prove that the other person committed some act directly connecting him with the crime. The evidence must be of the kind that directly connects the other person with the corpus delicti and tends clearly to point to someone other than the accused as the guilty person. Disconnected and remote acts, outside the crime itself cannot be separately proved for such purpose; and evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 848 (Mo. banc 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Nash argues that his constitutional rights to present his defense were violated by the exclusion of his evidence that a third person killed Judy. He maintains that the direct connection rule for evidence of third-person guilt unconstitutionally requires the defendant to show evidence of the third person's guilt that meets a higher standard than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard required for convictions. Although there is broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials[,] that latitude is limited by the defendant's constitutional rights to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, which are rights rooted in the 14th Amendment due process clause and the 6th Amendment compulsory process and confrontation provisions. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant's right to present evidence in his defense cannot be impeded by rules that infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Nash notes that in Holmes, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a South Carolina evidentiary rule that had been invoked to exclude third-person guilt evidence offered by the defendant. Id. at 330-31, 126 S.Ct. 1727. The invalidated rule at issue in Holmes, however, differed from Missouri's direct connection rule that Nash challenges. Holmes struck down an evidentiary rule that held that where there is strong evidence of an appellant's guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third party's alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant's own innocence. Id. at 324, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (internal quotations omitted). Holmes noted previous cases where evidentiary rules limiting the defense had been found unconstitutional, [12] but it also highlighted that an evidentiary rule was found not to be unconstitutional where it did not abridge the right to present a defense because [it] served several legitimate interests in the criminal trial process [and] was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in promoting these ends and did not implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the defendant. Id. at 326, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (citing U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted). Holmes provides: While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.... Plainly referring to rules of this type, we have stated that the Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is repetitive [or] only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.... A specific application of this principle is found in rules regulating the admission of evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that someone else committed the crime with which they are charged. [13] ] ... Such rules are widely accepted[.] Id. at 326-27, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (internal references omitted). In light of Holmes, Missouri's direct connection rule is constitutional because it prevents confusion of the issues and reduces the potential to mislead the jury. It is not arbitrary to exclude evidence that does not directly connect a third person to the charged crime.
Nash argues that the trial court wrongly refused to admit his evidence that a third party, Anthony Lambert Feldman, had motive and opportunity to kill Judy. Nash's offer of proof highlighted that the evidence about Feldman included that Feldman's fingerprints were found on Judy's car, but Nash's and Judy's fingerprints were not. Nash asserted that his evidence would include that there had been a heavy rainstorm on the night of March 10, which suggested that the rain had washed other fingerprints off Judy's car. Nash also wished to present evidence that included: Feldman falsely had denied to police that he had met Judy or ever been to Salem; Feldman had an Iowa arrest for stalking a woman with the intent to assault her sexually; Feldman was known to carry a shotgun in his vehicle; and Feldman had killed himself in 2008 with a shotgun. The trial court's decision to exclude Nash's evidence as to Feldman is a ruling that this Court reviews to determine if the trial court abused its discretion. See State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Mo. banc 2006). The trial court has broad discretion in evidentiary rulings, and an abuse of discretion will not be found unless the ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration. Id. Evidentiary errors require reversal if they are prejudicial to the defendant because they deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at 223-24. An error is not prejudicial if there is no reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 224. As discussed above, the direct connection rule required that the Feldman evidence directly connect him to the corpus delicti of Judy's murder. See Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 848. The rule also rejects evidence relating to a disconnected or remote act outside of Judy's murder. See id. Considering Nash's evidence as to Feldman in light of Missouri's direct connection rule, the trial court's conclusion that Nash's evidence did not meet the requirements of the rule was not a decision that was clearly against the logic of the circumstances and so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the Feldman evidence. [14]