Opinion ID: 1094922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the lower court erred in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss for the state's violation of appellant's fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments rights by using appellant's wife as a confidential informer.

Text: Dowbak's argument here is two-fold. First, that Lisa's discussions with Lindley violated Rule 504 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence (husband-wife privilege); ( See also Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5) and second, that Lisa's conversations with Lindley violated Rule 502 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence (attorney-client privilege). The record reflects that Lisa did not testify for or against her husband at his second trial. Likewise, an examination of the record indicates that Lindley did not testify at Dowbak's second trial. Throughout this assignment of error, Dowbak attempts to equate Lisa's conversations with Lindley as testimony. Dowbak states that [e]ach State witness that testified as a result of the Lisa-Lindley conversations to rebut Dowbak's defense was a violation of the husband-wife privilege. We do not know which witnesses these were or how many, we do know that Lindley had all the tapes at his disposal, but destroyed through erasure  all but one. Dowbak gives the historical and public policy underpinnings for the spousal-immunity privilege and argues that if this privilege is not respected, then the defendant has been denied due process of law and the sentence must be reversed. Dowbak offers several cases in support of his argument that he was denied due process as a result of Lisa's conversations with Lindley. First, Dowbak offers Wallace v. State, 254 Miss. 944, 183 So.2d 525, 526 (1966), for the proposition that it is reversible error for the State to offer a wife's testimony against her husband at trial. In Wallace, the State called the defendant's wife to testify at her husband's murder trial. In the case sub judice, Lisa Dowbak was not called at trial to testify against her husband. Nor did the prosecution attempt to offer Lisa as a witness at trial. Lisa did take the stand before the trial and testified that she had no objection to the district attorney's office revealing her as its confidential informant. It should be noted that Dowbak and not the district attorney called Lisa to the stand on this occasion. Accordingly, Wallace is not dispositive to this case. Next, Dowbak cites Bayse v. State, 420 So.2d 1050, 1053 (Miss. 1982), to support his argument that he was denied due process when Lisa spoke to Lindley. In Bayse, this Court held that the trial judge committed reversible error when he allowed a police officer to testify as to out of court statements the defendant's wife made to him (the officer). Id. at 1053. Once again we find that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those found in Bayse. In the case at bar, Lindley did not testify at Dowbak's second trial. Therefore, he could not have repeated conversations he had with Lisa to the jury. Accordingly, we find that Bayse affords Dowbak no relief. The State contends that our holding in Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1015, 112 S.Ct. 663, 116 L.Ed.2d 754 (1991), is dispositive to the issue now before the Court. In Ladner, the defendant's wife informed police that her husband kept a gun at her parent's home. The police went to the parent's home and found the gun that Ladner had used to commit a murder. At trial, Ladner attempted to suppress the gun arguing that it was found in violation of the spousal privilege. The trial judge refused to suppress the gun and on appeal, we held that the trial judge was not manifestly wrong in his decision not to suppress the gun. Ladner, 584 So.2d at 748, (citing Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1328 (Miss. 1987)) (citing Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345, 1350 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988)). We then stated: We have been cited to no case in which this Court has extended the spousal privilege to require suppression of physical evidence which has been obtained by law enforcement officers as a result of their conversations with a spouse. We do not find in this case a violation of either of the statute concerning spousal competency, Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 (Supp. 1990), or the evidence rule concerning the husband-wife privilege, M.R.E. 504. Rule 504 gives a defendant the privilege of prohibiting his or her spouse from testifying as to any confidential communications between the spouses. Neither an out-of-court statement nor trial testimony of his wife was admitted against Ladner. Ladner, 584 So.2d at 748. (emphasis added). In the case sub judice, Dowbak wants this Court to interpret M.R.E. 504 and Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 in such a manner so as to hold that a spouse cannot help law enforcement officers investigate or solve crimes in which their spouse might be involved. We rejected this proposition in Ladner and once again, we reject this proposition in the case sub judice. Dowbak offers no case law from any jurisdiction to support his expansive view of the spousal-immunity privilege and we find no good reason to interpret the spousal privilege so expansively. In summary, we find that the facts of this case do not support Dowbak's claim that the State violated the spousal-immunity privilege. Lisa Dowbak was not called to testify at Dowbak's trial, nor did the State attempt to call Lisa. Likewise, Lindley did not testify during Dowbak's second trial so he could not have informed the jury of any confidential conversations between Dowbak and Lisa. Accordingly, it is this Court's opinion that Ladner is controlling and thus, this part of assignment 1 is without merit. Dowbak also argues that his wife's conversations with Lindley violated his attorney-client privilege and that, therefore, his conviction must be reversed. Dowbak claims that the prosecution used Lisa as a spy to keep them informed of his trial strategy. Notwithstanding this claim, Dowbak cannot point to any examples in the record where the prosecution called Lisa and asked her about the defense's strategy. In fact, Dowbak had Lisa take the stand in a pretrial motion hearing and asked her about her conversations with Lindley. The scope of Dowbak's questioning of Lisa appeared to be whether Lisa knew that her conversations with Lindley were being recorded. Dowbak did not develop evidence, through Lisa's testimony or otherwise, to establish that Lindley called Lisa to get information from her regarding Dowbak's meetings with his lawyers. Likewise, Dowbak did not ask Lisa whether she had given information regarding Dowbak's meetings with his lawyer to Lindley. At some point in his initial conversation with Lisa, Lindley asked her if anyone contacted her and asked her to lie about the case. Lisa responded and said that during the first trial Dowbak's lawyer had asked her if he could put her on the stand. Lisa also indicated to Lindley that she thought her husband's lawyers were trying to keep her out of town because Dowbak's lover, Laurie Pickering, was testifying. Lisa also indicated to Lindley without any prompting that Dowbak's lawyers thought he was in need of psychiatric help because of his unusual conduct. Nonetheless, we note that Dowbak did not attempt to use mental illness as a defense at trial nor does he contend that he was somehow unable to use mental illness as a defense because of his wife's contact with Lindley. Dowbak cites Pendergraft v. State, 191 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1966) for the proposition that he is entitled to have the assistance of counsel. Further, Dowbak offers United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3rd Cir.1978) for the proposition that because Lisa revealed Dowbak's trial tactics to Lindley, his indictment must be dismissed. In Levy, the defendant along with his nephew were arrested for various drug violations. Both men hired the same attorney and met together and discussed trial strategy. Unbeknownst to Verna, his nephew, and co-indictee, had become a confidential informant for the Drug Enforcement Agency. Thus, while Verna's nephew was sitting in on strategy sessions with Verna and their attorney, he was acting as an informant for the DEA. Id. at 202-203. The Third Circuit found that there had been an actual disclosure of the pair's defense strategy and applied a per se presumption of prejudice and dismissed Verna's indictment. Id. at 210. The Third Circuit in Levy adopted a per se rule as to attorney-client disclosures that had previously been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). In Weatherford, the United States Supreme Court held that a party was not deprived of his right to effective counsel, nor denied a fair trial, and that the Sixth Amendment does not establish a per se rule forbidding an undercover agent from meeting with a defendant's counsel. In Weatherford, the petitioner (Weatherford), a government informant, met with respondent (Bursey) and his attorney on two occasions and discussed Bursey's approaching trial. Weatherford did not seek information from Bursey or his attorney nor did he initiate or ask for the meeting. He was brought into the meetings by Bursey and Bursey's attorney in an effort to obtain information, ideas or suggestions as to the plaintiff's defense. Subsequently, Weatherford testified against Bursey, and Bursey was convicted. Thereafter, Bursey instituted a § 1983 action against Weatherford alleging that Weatherford had communicated defense strategies and plans which he had learned at his meetings with Bursey and his attorney to the prosecution, thereby depriving Bursey of the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 547-548, 97 S.Ct. at 840. The district court reversed Bursey's conviction and held that there had been a violation of Bursey's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals agreed and held that whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relationship the right of counsel is sufficiently endangered to require reversal and an new trial. Id. at 549, 97 S.Ct. at 840-841. The United States Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals per se rule and found that this was not a situation where the State's purpose was to learn what it could about the defendant's defense plans. Further, the informant was not instructed to intrude on the lawyer-client relationship nor was this a situation in which the informant assumed that task for himself and acted accordingly. Weatherford went to the meetings not to spy but to maintain his undercover status. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 557, 97 S.Ct. at 844. The Court held: There being no tainted evidence in this case, no communication of defense strategy to the prosecution, and no purposeful intrusion by Weatherford, there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment insofar as it is applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 845. We find that Dowbak's argument as to this issue is without support in the record and is devoid of merit. In the case sub judice, there is no indication that Lisa informed the prosecution of Dowbak's defense strategy. In fact, Dowbak's defense throughout was that Barnett torched his building because Dowbak had discharged him from the hospital before Barnett was ready to be discharged. Dowbak did not attempt to put on an insanity defense, accident defense or any other type of defense. Like Weatherford, there was no tainted evidence admitted into evidence in this case (Lisa was not called to testify), and no purposeful intrusion by Lisa or the State (Lisa was asked to attend the meetings by Dowbak's attorneys and the record does not indicate that the State instructed Lisa to spy on Dowbak's meetings; nor does it appear that Lisa called Lindley and informed him of the contents of each meeting.). Finally, unless Lisa communicated the substance of Dowbak's conversations and thereby created a realistic possibility of injury to Dowbak or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 845. We find that the record is lacking any proof that would indicate that Lisa communicated the substance of Dowbak's conversations with his attorneys to the prosecution. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.