Opinion ID: 6833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Jensen contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He contends that although the evidence shows that he received money from loan proceeds that he should not have received, the evidence is insufficient to prove that he acted willfully or with the intent to defraud. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, in the light most favorable to the government with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices to be made in support of the jury's verdict. United States v. Salazar, 958 F.2d 1285, 1290-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 185 (1992). The evidence is sufficient to support a 7 The instructions on the terms knowingly and willfully follow those approved in this circuit. See United States v. St. Gelais, 952 F.2d 90, 93-94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 439, 121 L.Ed.2d 358 (1992); Rochester, supra. -13- conviction if a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be completely inconsistent with every conclusion except guilt, so long as a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Faulkner, 17 F.3d at 768. Jensen does not dispute that [t]he evidence at trial showed various acts by different persons that were fraudulent and illegal. Nevertheless, Jensen claims that the evidence wholly failed to prove that Mr. Jensen was aware of the illegality of these acts by other persons. In other words, Jensen simply challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving his intent or mental state, but does not challenge any of the other elements of his 18 convictions. To prove a conspiracy, the government must show that an agreement between two or more persons to violate the law, that the defendant had knowledge of the agreement, and that the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 240 (1994). Each element of a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. The agreement may be inferred from a concert of action. Id. (citation omitted). Once the government has produced evidence of a conspiracy, only `slight' evidence is needed to connect an individual to that conspiracy. Id. (quoting United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 991 (5th Cir. -14- 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 926, 111 S.Ct. 2036 (1991)). Knowledge of a conspiracy and voluntary participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from a `collection of circumstances.' Id. (citation omitted). The evidence at trial was largely undisputed. In fact, it was undisputed that Jensen received approximately $25,000,000 in a matter of months from the transactions at issue. From the beginning of trial, the defense focused the jury on the issue of whether Jensen had the intent to commit the charged offenses. During opening statement, defense counsel argued as follows: Now, I don't mean to imply and I don't want to mislead you. I'm not trying to tell you that the things that Paul did were all right. Paul Jensen took some money. He took a lot of money out of these savings and loans, out of these deals that were -- that he took in violation of laws and regulations. He should not have taken that money. There is no question about that. That is not the issue of this case. Don't -- don't waste one second worrying about that because we can set that aside right now. Paul Jensen took money that he should not have taken. As I said before, that's not what this case is about. The question is: Did he know that he was taking money he should not have taken. . . .