Opinion ID: 4357626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State-of-Mind Exception

Text: Watson challenges a statement that was admitted under the exception to the hearsay rule that permits statements introduced “‘for the limited purpose of showing the state of mind of the declarant’ if the declarant’s state of mind is at issue in the trial.” 18 Jones, 17 A.3d at 632 (quoting Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930, 944 (D.C. 2007)). During a pretrial hearing, government witness John Carrington identified Logan in court and testified that, prior to Mr. 18 Logan does not challenge the admission of these statements on appeal. 42 Bolden’s murder, Logan asked Mr. Carrington “to rob Dink and kill him,” referring to Mr. Bolden as “Dink.” Mr. Carrington said that, after he refused, Logan “said he would have his man, Tiger [Ashby,] do it.” The court ruled that it would allow this testimony from Mr. Carrington under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, though it instructed counsel that the statement must be redacted to omit any reference to Ashby (“Tiger”).19 This statement, as edited by the trial court, meets the requirements of the state-of-mind exception. In the past, we have held that a declarant’s expression of an intent to do harm to the victim is relevant to state of mind, where the government has the burden of showing an intent to commit the crime. See, e.g., Rink v. United States, 388 A.2d 52, 55-56 (D.C. 1978) (declarant’s threats towards the victim are admissible to establish declarant’s malice aforethought in a seconddegree murder trial). Here, in order to secure a conviction for felony murder, the government had to show “intent to commit the underlying felony.” Waller v. United States, 389 A.2d 801, 807 (D.C. 1978). Logan’s statements reveal an intent to rob and kill Mr. Bolden, actions which are both at issue in this case. Where 19 The trial court also instructed that the statement be redacted to omit reference to Logan committing the crime with “other people,” though Mr. Carrington included this portion of the statement in his testimony at trial, appellants did not object, and the court did not intervene. 43 hearsay statements have “a highly prejudicial nature,” they must be excluded, even if they are probative and fall under this exception. Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d 21, 27 (D.C. 1980). This statement, however, was not so prejudicial as to be barred. Mr. Carrington recounted Logan’s statement about killing Mr. Bolden, but did not mention Watson or Ashby, as there was no reference to Watson in the first place and the reference to “Tiger” (Ashby) was redacted. Thus, the jury was not told who Logan’s accomplices may have been, and would have had to infer, based on other evidence, the extent of Watson and Ashby’s involvement.20 Additionally, Watson contends that, because Logan’s state of mind would not have been at issue if Watson had been the only defendant at trial, the statement should not have been admitted against him, even in a trial where all three appellants were tried together. However, the court provided this limiting instruction to the jury, which was sufficient to ameliorate any prejudice to Watson: 20 This is not unlike our ruling in Baker v. United States, where the admitted statement of future intent was harmless because it was “vague and cumulative . . . . The statement itself offer[ed] only an imprecise notion that Baker, along with unnamed and unenumerated others” planned to commit a crime. Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988, 1003 (D.C. 2005). While Logan was clear about the exact crime he planned to commit, the omission of Ashby’s nickname made the statement seemingly refer to “unnamed and unenumerated others” that Logan would eventually recruit to join in his plan. Id. 44 The testimony of John Carrington that Keith Logan made a statement to him or in his presence was offered to prove the state of mind of Defendant Keith Logan. That statement attributed to Mr. Logan was not offered as proof of the state of mind of Defendant Paul Ashby or Defendant Merle Watson and may not be considered proof of the state of mind of Defendant Watson or Defendant Ashby. See Thomas, 978 A.2d at 1232, n.65 (a statement that implicates a co-defendant admitted under the state-of-mind exception entitles the implicated, non-declarant co-defendant to a limiting instruction). We therefore find no error in the trial court’s admission of Mr. Carrington’s statement.21 21 We note that, while the trial court permitted this statement under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, it would likely also have been admissible as an opposing party’s statement, as such statements include those made by co-conspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 116 (D.C. 2003) (discussing and applying Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)). 45