Opinion ID: 1621727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: whether the state of mississippi violated watts' constitutional right to a speedy trial

Text: ¶ 59. Watts next contends that his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated by the 959 days that elapsed between the time he was taken into custody and the date of his trial. He does not seriously argue the issue, presenting no facts or even the vaguest attempt at a meaningful discussion; rather, he merely directs the Court to see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) and to vacate his conviction and sentence, citing Trotter v. State, 554 So.2d 313, 319 (Miss.1989). ¶ 60. The circuit court made a detailed on-the-record finding regarding pre-trial delays in the case before hearing peremptory challenges, explaining as follows: THE COURT: Let the record show that James Earnest Watts on June the 13th, 1994, waived arraignment and waived speedy trial, waived 270 days. And a psychiatric/psychological exam was ordered. And then at the next term of court on August the 25th, 1994, James Watts waived arraignment, waived speedy trial, waived 270 days and requested a continuance and the cause was continued till the October 1994 term. And on October the 10th, the cause was continued at the defendant's request and preset for May the 22nd, 1995. And at the same time he waived speedy trial rights and waived 270 days. And then on March the 17th, 1995, the defendant's motion for change of venue was granted and the venue was changed to Lincoln County. And the trial was then moved to May the 21st, 1995no. Excuse me. The trial of May the 21st, 1995, was continued by agreement of both the State and the defense. And at that time the case was preset for August the 29th, 1995, in Lincoln County. And then on August 29th, 1995, in Lincoln County the defendant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. At that time after voir dire of the jury was completed the jury panel was exhausted without a jury being able to be selected. So at that time a mistrial was declared and the case was continued till the February 1996 term of court in Marion County with venue still being changed to Lincoln County. Then on February 26th, 1996, the trial was set again in Lincoln County for March the 4th, 1996. And at that time on motion by the defense because of the methodology that the jury box was loaded the venire was quashed and a mistrial was declared. And the case was reset for trial on June the 24th, 1996, in Lincoln County. Then on March the 8th, 1996, at both parties' request the case was reset for June the 24th, 1996, for today being August the 5th, 1996. And that is the chronological events that have transpired in this case to date. Okay. MS. SONES: Judge, just I'd like to add one thing about that very last thing. The reason that trial date was moved was because one of the experts for the defense could not be there and we had no objection to moving it. THE COURT: Well, it was by agreement of both sides, but whatever the reasons were ... ¶ 61. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches at the time a person is effectively accused of a crime. Skaggs v. State, 676 So.2d 897, 900 (Miss.1996); Noe v. State, 616 So.2d 298, 300 (Miss.1993). An alleged violation of that right is subject to scrutiny under the four-prong analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The Barker factors include 1) the length of the delay, 2) the reason for delay, 3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial and 4) prejudice to the defendant by the delay. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. No single factor is dispositive. Skaggs, 676 So.2d at 900. Rather, this Court looks at the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a defendant's rights have been violated. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 955 (Miss. 1997). ¶ 62. When, as in the case sub judice, the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial, `the burden shifts to the prosecutor to produce evidence justifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of the legitimacy of the reasons.' Herring, 691 So.2d at 955-56 ( quoting State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Miss. 1991)). Watts was granted a total of four continuances. In each of his first three motions for continuances, Watts expressly waived speedy trial rights. His first continuance was granted on June 13, 1994, in conjunction with a motion for a psychiatric examination and evaluation. Watts' second motion for a continuance was granted on October 18, 1994, setting his case for trial on May 22, 1995. At the same time, the circuit court also granted his motions to provide funds for expert witness assistance and a private investigator. Watts' third motion for a continuance was granted on May 29, 1995, because of the unavailability of his DNA statistical expert and the illness of State Medical Examiner, Dr. Emily Ward. The trial was reset for August 29, 1995. Continuances that are attributed to the defendant stop the running of the clock and are deducted from the total number of days before trial. Herring, 691 So.2d at 953; Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375 (Miss.1988). These three continuances clearly were attributable to Watts. ¶ 63. A mistrial was declared in this case on August 29, 1995, when the venire panel was exhausted before a jury was selected. Where a mistrial has been declared, the Barker factors are utilized to determine whether the discretionary time between trials violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss.1990). Trial was reset for March 4, 1996, a little over six months from the time of the first trial. ¶ 64. Watts' fourth order granting a continuance, arising from his ore tenus motion to quash the venire panel, was entered on March 15, 1996. The circuit court found that on February 9, 1996, it was discovered that a problem existed with the venire pool because of improper instructions given to the Lincoln County Circuit Clerk by the Delta Computer Company. In its written order, the circuit court expressly ruled that the delay in the proceedings was not chargeable to either party for purposes of the speedy trial rule. Trial, originally reslated for June 24, 1996, was reset at Watts' request for August 5, 1996, because of a scheduling conflict with his DNA expert. ¶ 65. The delay prior to the first trial weighs heavily against Watts, since it is attributable to the first three continuances he sought. Because just a little over six months elapsed between the first trial and the scheduled date of the second trial, there is no presumption of prejudice. As the trial court found, Watts' fourth motion for a continuance was not chargeable to him or the State because the computer glitch that necessitated the delay was not the fault of either party. While the delay between the original June 24, 1996 trial date and the August 5, 1996 date for which it was rescheduled was made to accommodate Watts' expert witness, the record indicates that both parties agreed to the change. It should not be weighed against either. ¶ 66. While an accused is under no duty to bring himself to trial, `he gains far more points under this prong of the Barker test where he has demanded a speedy trial.' Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1994)( quoting Jaco v. State, 574 So.2d 625, 632 (Miss.1990)). There is no evidence in the record that Watts made any attempt to expedite the proceedings against him. To the contrary, he repeatedly waived his right to a speedy trial in each of his first three motions for continuances. We further note that Watts does not even assert that he was prejudiced in any way by the delay in his trial; he contends only that his rights were violated. The record does not indicate at what point the defendant was incarcerated, and he makes no reference to any particular anxiety or concern he suffered. ¶ 67. In Rhymes v. State, 638 So.2d 1270 (Miss.1994), we found that [w]here, as here, the delay is neither intentional nor egregiously protracted, and where there is a complete absence of actual prejudice, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting Rhymes' speedy trial claim. Id. at 1275. See also Stogner v. State, 627 So.2d 815 (Miss.1993)(in absence of assertion of rights and any showing of material prejudice, twenty-five month delay did not violate right to speedy trial). Given that the delays in Watts' trial were not attributable to the State, but to the defendant's first three motions for continuances, that Watts made no effort to assert his rights prior to trial and that he has not alleged any prejudice, it cannot be said that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.