Opinion ID: 852583
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Performance of Counsel

Text: The trial record makes no reference to the belt or to the need for restraint. There is no clear statement of the trial court's policy requiring restraint. There is no evidence that Stephenson was obstreperous or disruptive. In short, the record shows nothing to support an individualized determination that Stephenson required any form of restraint at trial, and there is no explanation in the trial record for use of the stun belt or any other restraint. The belt was not mentioned by the parties or the court in Stephenson's direct appeal.
The law is clear that counsel's performance is presumed effective. [T]he defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance, and judicial scrutiny is highly deferential. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 261 (Ind.2000); see Conner, 711 N.E.2d at 1252. Moreover, as is frequently pointed out: There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and these decisions are entitled to deferential review. Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 603; Perez v. State, 748 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ind.2001)). The State contends that trial counsel made a tactical decision to allow Stephenson to wear a stun belt. The record does not support this contention. At post-conviction, Anthony Long, one of Stephenson's trial counsel, explicitly stated that he made a conscious decision to allow Stephenson to appear before the jury in a stun belt: I understood our choices were either [the stun belt] or shackles and that was certainly not an acceptable alternative. Similarly, trial counsel Dennis Vowels testified: Q: Do you recall any discussions with Anthony Long about the benefits of a stun belt as opposed to being shackled? A: I don't recall them, but we probably talked about it. I know we were not going to let him be shackled in front of a jury. I knew that. Q: Would you agree that a stun belt worn under the clothes would be preferable in front of a jury to the handcuffs, the waist and the leg irons? A: Yes. At the time of Stephenson's trial in 1996 and 1997, no Indiana ruling had addressed the use of stun belts. As in Wrinkles, counsel cannot be faulted for selecting the belt over more visible shackles, given that the case law addressing the issue had largely focused on the visibility of the restraint, and not, as Wrinkles later pointed out, on the belt's potential effect on the defendant's demeanor and ability to participate in the defense. Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1194. Although counsel explained their preference for the belt over shackles, they did not explain why they conceded that any restraint was appropriate and failed to require any finding on the record as to the need for restraint. As explained above, at the time of Stephenson's trial it was well-settled as a matter of both state law and the requirements of federal due process that no form of visible restraint was permissible without an individualized finding that the defendant presented a risk of escape, violence, or disruption of the trial. Deck, 544 U.S. at 626-27, 125 S.Ct. 2007; Coates, 487 N.E.2d at 169. Counsel's unquestioning acceptance of the need for any form of restraint cannot be justified as a tactical decision where the decision was made without awareness of the applicable law favorable to the defendant. Dixon v. Snyder, 266 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir.2001) (If counsel was unaware of the statute, then his decision not to cross-examine Carlisle cannot be accorded the same presumption of reasonableness as is accorded most strategic decisions because it was not based on strategy but rather on a `startling ignorance of the law.' (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986))). Finally, the State's claim of a tactical decision does not enjoy the same support it had in Wrinkles. In Wrinkles's case, the penalty, not guilt or innocence, was the only real issue. The decision to challenge the belt arguably fell into the tactical range, balancing the likelihood of success against the risk of alienating the judge by challenging an announced policy. In Stephenson's case, unlike Wrinkles, guilt was vigorously disputed, so that justification for counsel's omission is weakened, and in any event no such tactical consideration was advanced by counsel in post-conviction.
Even if failure to object to the belt was not justified as a tactical decision, the issue remains whether it was below professional norms to fail to object to the use of any restraint or to the absence of any finding of necessity for restraint. The law regarding use of stun belts was not settled at the time of Stephenson's trial, and counsel are not ordinarily found deficient for failure to anticipate a change in the law. Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 690 (Ind.2005); Fulmer v. State, 523 N.E.2d 754, 757-58 (Ind.1988). Under the law at the time of Stephenson's trial, an ineffective assistance claim based on failure to object to restraints required the restraints to be visible. Failure to object to restraints is not substandard performance where the jury is unaware of the restraints. [2] But the Seventh Circuit has held that failure to object to restraints that are readily visible is substandard performance of counsel. Roche v. Davis, 291 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d 429, 435 (7th Cir.2000)). The Seventh Circuit found unreasonable [3] our conclusion that counsel was not ineffective for failure to object to shackling and failure to take steps to prevent the jury from viewing the shackles. Id. Although Roche addressed shackling, we think its reasoning is equally applicable to a stun belt. The use of a stun belt, if perceived by the jury, produces all of the results that shackling does. It sends a signal that the defendant may be dangerous and thereby impairs the presumption of innocence; it interferes with the defendant's communication with his attorney; and it has the same effect on the dignity of the process. Indeed, some courts have concluded that a stun belt, if perceived by the jury, may be even more prejudicial than handcuffs or leg irons because it implies that unique force is necessary to control the defendant. United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting State v. Flieger, 91 Wash.App. 236, 955 P.2d 872, 874 (1998)). Even if the jury is unaware of the belt, there remain the concerns that a stun belt could disrupt a different set of a defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights. Id. First, [a] stun belt seemingly poses a far more substantial risk of interfering with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confer with counsel than do leg shackles. Id. Second, the device poses a greater threat to the defendant's Sixth Amendment and due process rights to be present and participate in his defense because [i]t is reasonable to assume that much of a defendant's focus and attention when wearing one of these devices is occupied by anxiety over the possible triggering of the belt. Id. at 1305-06. These are in substance the same points emphasized by the majority in Wrinkles in banning the belt under Indiana state law. 749 N.E.2d at 1194. In sum, in the absence of an explanation for counsel's failure to object to a stun belt that is readily visible, that failure is substandard performance.
Whether the belt was readily visible is critical to this branch of the inquiry. Roche, 291 F.3d at 483 (quoting Fountain, 211 F.3d at 435). Some courts have used the term visible to make the point that shackles or jail garb must be perceived by the jury. See, e.g., id.; Deck, 544 U.S. at 631-32, 125 S.Ct. 2007. The broader notion is that it is prejudicial for jurors to be aware that a defendant is being restrained or appearing in jail garb. Fountain, 211 F.3d at 435. We see little significance to whether the jurors learned of the belt by seeing the restraint or by being informed of it. In either case the defendant is branded a dangerous individual. The post-conviction court made no specific finding as to the jurors' awareness of the belt. However, the post-conviction record demonstrates that several jurors knew that Stephenson wore the belt during trial and recognized it for what it was. According to one juror's affidavit: During the trial, I became aware that John Stephenson was wearing a stun belt. I could see he had what appeared to be a rectangle shaped box attached to his lower back, underneath his shirt. I had seen a television show sometime previously to being selected for this jury that described what a stun belt was and what its purpose was. I have been hit by 220 volts and know what effect that amount of power has on a person. I believed the stun belt was to control John Stephenson's behavior. Some apparently learned of the restraint from other jurors. A second juror stated in her affidavit: I was aware that John Stephenson was wearing a device that would prevent him from running out of the courtroom. During the trial one of the male jurors mentioned to me that Mr. Stephenson was wearing this device. I was aware that he was wearing something that controlled his behavior. Similarly, a third juror affirmed, During the trial, I recall that Mr. Stephenson had some type of restraining device on him. I do not recall what the device looked like, or when or where I realized he [was] wearing one. A fourth juror was asked in deposition by Petitioner's counsel, Did you know that John Stephenson had worn a stun belt through his trial? The juror responded: I would say, yes, that I did because he wasn't handcuffed, and naturally I assumed that he had that on because there was like a, you know, he wore like a loose shirt, basically like what you have on, loose, and there was a bulge back there in the back, so that's how I knew that. It was not clear that all jurors were aware of the belt. One testified in deposition offered in post-conviction proceeding: Q: Were you aware that John Stephenson was wearing a stun belt? Do you know what I mean by that, first of all? A: I was aware of that, and I'm not sure at what time, you know, what point I was aware of that. Q: But you know what I mean  A: Yes. Q:  by a stun belt? A: Yes, I do. Q: Okay, so go ahead if you hadn't finished your answer. A: Well, I'm not really sure exactly if it was after the trial that, that I heard about that or  I'm thinking it was afterwards, but I'm not really sure. Q: Did you notice it when you  A: No. Q:  walked by, walked past from the rear? A: No, I never did notice it. Even if at least one juror did not observe or recall the belt, on this record we think Stephenson has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the belt was readily visible to the jury.
The record at post-conviction did not explore more fully counsel's reasoning in accepting the belt without question. For the reasons explained below in discussing the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance claim, it may have been that counsel recognized the futility of an objection and, as in Wrinkles, avoided confronting the trial judge on an issue they deemed ultimately unsuccessful. On this record, however, failure to object to the belt cannot be justified as a tactical decision in Stephenson's case because the explanation offered by counsel for their decision boiled down to a failure to know the applicable law. Equally importantly, counsel failed to insist upon a finding as to the need for restraint. Prevailing norms at the time of Stephenson's trial required counsel to object to visible restraints where there is no evidence suggesting escape, violence, or disruptive behavior. We agree with Roche that failure to object to the belt without a showing of justification fails to meet prevailing norms. No justification for the omission is established in this record. We therefore conclude that Stephenson's counsel's failure to object to the belt meets the first prong of Strickland.