Opinion ID: 1817269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: did the court err in refusing to postpone death qualification of the jury until after the guilt phase?

Text: After the voir dire and out of the presence of the prospective jurors, defense counsel objected to jurors being systematically excluded just because they don't believe in the death penalty. The defense contended Frank, Sr. was entitled to a jury representing a cross section of the community, including people opposed to the death penalty. The court replied that jurors would not be excused for merely possessing conscientious scruples against the death penalty; however, jurors who could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances would be excluded because the death penalty statute would be meaningless if such persons could not be disqualified. The court's action is supported by Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.1984), which held the exclusion from guilt phase juries persons who are unwilling to vote for capital punishment does not result in bias in favor of the prosecution on the issue of guilt or innocence, nor does it give rise to an unfair cross section of the community. 737 F.2d at 1385. Accord, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). We agree with this rationale and conclude proposition XIV is meritless. Having reviewed in detail the record, the assignments of error, the briefs of counsel and oral argument, we are of the opinion the verdict of guilty should be affirmed.