Opinion ID: 70479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Id. at 370-75.

Text: The Reed court stated that we had recently agreed that Miller-El II requires us to consider a comparative analysis in a Batson claim. Id. at 373 (citing United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 797 (5th Cir. 2008) (direct appeal)); cf. United States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 673 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) (when considering an allegation of pretext, defendant must convince the district court 10 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 that the prosecution’s proffered reasons are pretextual by introducing “evidence of comparability”). Specifically, the Reed court noted that the Brown court determined “there [was] some indication that both the prosecution and the court failed to take the comparative features of two venire members into account,” and it concluded, after comparing those two members, that, under Miller-El II, a further explanation from the prosecution for the dismissal of the excluded juror was necessary. Id. at 373-74. The Reed court ultimately concluded, after considering, among other things, Reed’s comparative juror analysis, that Reed was entitled to habeas relief with respect to his Batson claim. Id. at 375-82. This court therefore reversed the district court’s decision denying relief and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to grant the writ. Id. at 382. When reviewing a Batson ruling regarding purposeful discrimination, the Supreme Court has initially considered statistical evidence when considering whether the prosecution used its peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 342; Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240-41. In Miller-El I, prosecutors used ten of their fourteen peremptory strikes against AfricanAmerican venire members, thereby excluding ninety-one percent of the eligible African-American venire members. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 342. The Court concluded that “[h]appenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity.” Id. In the instant case, the prosecutor used eight of his eleven peremptory strikes against African-American venire members, thereby excluding 100% of the eligible African-American venire members. While we agree with the district and magistrate judges that this fact alone is not dispositive, see Fields, 588 F.3d at 281, it is unlikely to be the product of happenstance and is indicative of discriminatory intent. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 342. “More powerful than these bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists 11 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 allowed to serve.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S at 241. “[W]e are also cognizant that the Supreme Court has made plain that appellate review of alleged Batson errors is not a hollow act.” United States v. Williamson, 533 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2008) (addressing a Batson challenge on direct criminal appeal). Sometimes the reasons given for striking jurors are “race-neutral” when “[v]iewed in isolation.” Id. at 275. “However, the explanation[s] [may] falter[] upon closer examination.” Id. In order to engage in the appropriate analysis, we will examine both jurors and then compare them to other non-African-American jurors who were not struck. B. Prospective Juror Jackson After Hayes objected that all eligible African-American venire members were struck in a discriminatory manner in violation of Batson, the prosecutor proffered numerous “race-neutral” explanations. With respect to Juror # 16 Jackson, the prosecutor asserted the following explanations: (1) Jackson gave inconsistent answers to questions regarding whether she would require the State to introduce a firearm into evidence to convict Hayes, thus indicating she might hold the State to a higher burden of proof; (2) Jackson stated that a primary goal of the criminal justice system was rehabilitation; and (3) at the time of the trial, Jackson had a cousin who was out on bond in a pending criminal case in Dallas County, Texas. Hayes’s defense counsel responded that the State’s reasons for striking Jackson were pretextual. He argued that the State used hypothetical questions regarding the need to see a weapon as a cover for impermissibly striking jurors by presenting a slanted one-sided explanation of the weapon requirement without fully exploring it. The prosecutor argued that she presented the questions fairly; that all of the jurors who gave inconsistent answers regarding the firearm were struck; that punishment was the major focus in this case; and that those jurors who responded that punishment and rehabilitation were important were not struck because the 12 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 State had only ten strikes and that was all the State had to justify striking those jurors. The state trial court overruled Hayes’s objection as to Jackson, finding that Jackson gave inconsistent answers regarding whether she would require the State to introduce a firearm into evidence to convict Hayes. In the federal district court, Hayes focused on a comparative analysis of the pool. He argued that non-African-American Juror #5 Newsome, who was not struck by the prosecution, also gave inconsistent answers concerning the need to introduce a firearm to convict. Hayes argued that several non-AfricanAmerican jurors, who were not struck, stated that rehabilitation was one of the important goals of the criminal justice system (Stanton #7, Stevens #18, Fain #25, Sapp #27, Olivares #28, Ryan #41, Doyle #42, Crump #44, and Noble #45). Hayes also argued that several non-African-American jurors, who were not struck, had relatives who had been prosecuted for crimes and had stated that they believed that their relatives had received excessive sentences (Keeble #29, Artieschoufsky #40, Ryan #41), whereas Jackson stated that her cousin had been treated fairly by the criminal justice system. The district court rejected these arguments and found that the reasons the State gave for striking Jackson were distinguishable from the characteristics of the seated jurors. Specifically, the district court determined that the State struck Jackson in part because she had a cousin who had pending criminal charges in Dallas County, and none of the seated jurors had a relative with pending criminal charges in Dallas County. The district court determined that the record indicated that Jackson did give inconsistent answers when asked if she would require the State to introduce a firearm in order to convict Hayes. The district court also determined that Jackson was distinguishable from Juror # 5 Newsome because, in the district court’s view, Jackson gave arguably inconsistent answers concerning the need to produce a firearm even after the law was explained. The district court did not address the prosecutor’s third 13 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 reason for striking Jackson, her statement that rehabilitation was an important goal of the criminal justice system. We disagree with the conclusions of the district court. Hayes has shown that the State’s reasons for striking Jackson were implausible or invalid and, therefore, were pretexts for discrimination. First, regarding the alleged inconsistency, Jackson initially stated that she thought the State should produce a firearm in order to convict Hayes. After the trial court explained the law to the jury, the State did not question Jackson further concerning introduction of the firearm. In response to defense counsel’s questions, Jackson at first stated that she would need to see the firearm if she did not believe the eyewitness; she then stated that the State need not produce a firearm if she believed the eyewitness testimony. Accordingly, Hayes has shown that Jackson’s answers to the questions were not inconsistent 5 and that she ultimately answered that the State would not need to produce a firearm if it presented credible eyewitness testimony.6 Moreover, the prosecutor attempted to challenge Jackson for cause 5 It should be noted that the federal district court may have confused Juror #16 Jackson with Juror # 46, whose last name was also Jackson. After the trial court explained the law, the State questioned Juror #46 Jackson concerning the need to produce the firearm; even after the law was explained, Juror #46 Jackson stated to the prosecutor that she “would want to see the gun” and “I would require it.” 6 During the prosecution’s questioning about the gun, Jackson (#16) responded: Q: Ms. Jackson, okay, you want that gun, you’re going to require the State to bring that gun in? A: If the State says that it was used, I’d like to see it. Q: Sure you’d like it. And that’s the thing, it’s definitely – as a juror, there’s all kinds of things you’d like to get. You know, I’d like to know why, I’d like to understand, I’d like to see the gun, I’d like to see the bloody shirt, I’d like to see that knife. You know, that would make, you know, your job a lot easier, but – and I understand that, but you understand that the State is not required to bring that in. And that’s okay. There’s all kind of – you know, there are people that say, “I’m sorry, I just absolutely have to have it.” That’s okay if you feel that way. You feel that way, Ms. Jackson, Juror No. 16? 14 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 on precisely these grounds before using a peremptory strike and the trial court ruled that Jackson remained qualified for the jury due to the fact that she affirmatively stated she would accept testimony in lieu of physical evidence. As A: (Nods head affirmatively.) Thereafter, the judge interjected that the law should be explained to the jury and proceeded to explain that the element of a firearm being used could be proved in various ways “but it’s not necessary that they actually bring a physical firearm into the courtroom and show it to you. They can do that by evidence, description, if a person is familiar with handguns or whatever, . . . .” The prosecutor did not thereafter question Jackson, but the defense did so yielding this discussion: Q: Well, yeah, the question is, when that witness testifies and they – you know, if they convince you that they saw a pistol and there was a pistol, would you still have to see the pistol? A: I would want to. Q: Well, sure. Really, we’d all like to have a video of it, so then we’d know – so then we’d know because we could see it, you know. Then we wouldn’t have to guess. But there isn’t one. But – and – I mean, really, see the question? Do you believe the witness and does that prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt? Do you believe her or him when they say they saw a pistol? If you do, then you don’t need to see the pistol. A: Well, yeah, that’s right I would need to see the pistol. Q: You would need to? A: If I didn’t believe that person. Q: Of course, if you don’t believe the person, they haven’t proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt. A: Right. Q: So you could get along without the pistol if you were convinced a pistol was used? A: I guess. Q: Well, you can’t guess. A: Okay. Yes, if he were believable, yes. 15 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 such, any misperception that Jackson was inconsistent was put to rest by the trial court well before the prosecutor advanced inconsistency as the justification for the State’s strike. Nonetheless, even if the “inconsistency” justification was plausible notwithstanding all of the above, Hayes correctly notes that the trial court failed to follow the Supreme Court’s clearly established Batson protocol. The required comparative analysis would have demonstrated that non-African American Juror Newsome also gave inconsistent answers to the same series of questions. In short, a proper application of Miller El II in the broader context of this voir dire would have required Jackson’s reinstatement. Second, the prosecutor’s “pending charges” justification similarly lacks credibility, and the trial court’s contrary conclusion runs afoul of clearly established federal law under the required comparative framework. Although Jackson had a cousin with pending criminal charges, she also stated that she believed her cousin was being treated fairly in the criminal justice system. Moreover, Jackson stated that her cousin’s pending case would not affect her jury service. Although no other jurors had family members or friends with pending criminal cases, numerous jurors had family members or friends who had criminal convictions. As Hayes pointed out, some of these non-African-American potential jurors had relatives that the potential jurors believed were treated unfairly by the system or received harsh sentences (Keeble #29, Artieschoufsky #40, and Ryan #41). While the district court divorced the question of pendency from the question of fairness/severity, we find that these two concerns are inextricably intertwined because the quality of each juror’s prior experience directly informs the credibility of using that experience as a justification to strike. Viewed in that way, the decision to strike Jackson, with her favorable view of the justice system, rather than Keeble, Artieschoufsky, or Ryan, who had personal objections to that same system, cannot be justified under comparative 16 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 analysis. Again, properly applying Miller El II, the trial court had clear Supreme Court guidance mandating Jackson’s reinstatement. Hayes has thus shown that the reasons given by the State for striking Jackson also applied to non-African-American jurors who were not struck. In particular, Juror # 5 Newsome, a non-African-American prospective juror, gave inconsistent answers concerning the need to see a firearm to convict. Numerous non-African-American jurors, who were not struck, stated that rehabilitation was a primary goal of the criminal justice system. (Stanton #7, Stevens #18, Fain #25, Sapp #27, Olivares #28, Ryan #41, Doyle #42, Crump #44, and Noble #45). Several non-African-American jurors, who were not struck, had relatives who had been prosecuted for crimes. (Keeble #29, Artieschoufsky #40, Ryan #41). When these non-African-Americans were questioned further concerning their relatives with criminal convictions, they stated that they believed their relatives received harsh sentences. (Keeble #29, Artieschoufsky #40, Ryan #41). Juror # 41 Ryan was ultimately chosen to serve on the jury. In view of these comparisons, Hayes has shown that the state trial court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in examining the prosecutor’s reasons for striking Jackson. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 247, 251-52. C. Prospective Juror Richard With respect to Juror # 15 Cynthia Richard, the district court erred in deferring to the state court’s decision to a greater degree than directed by MillerEl and Snyder. The district court stated that “based on all of the circumstances, a trial court could have found that the prosecutor lacked credibility in her explanation of why she struck Richard. However, the Court does not agree that the trial court was obliged to so find.” The district court’s analysis is inconsistent with the analysis in Miller-El II, Snyder, and Reed in its approach to reviewing the state court’s determination in those cases. 17 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 The prosecutor advanced three allegedly race-neutral subjective explanations for striking Richard: (1) she was “hostile,” (2) she failed to respond to the judge’s questions 7 ; and she had a “bad juror rating.” The prosecutor also offered two “objective” justifications: (1) Richard was employed as a teacher and (2) she selected “rehabilitation” as an important goal of the criminal justice system. The “objective” factors are quickly dispatched: two white jurors were teachers and served on the jury; other persons who selected rehabilitation served on the jury and, notably, Richard did not in fact select the “rehabilitation” option.8 The state trial judge also did not appear to credit these reasons but, instead, focused on the “hostility” prong.9 While Snyder requires deference to a state trial court’s finding of credibility, the state trial judge here did not expressly find that the explanation was truthful. See Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1209. Instead, the trial court focused on the concept that hostility is a valid basis for 7 The state trial judge rejected this reason stating, “The few questions I had dealt with the qualifications of the jurors, and just general questions that was [sic] directed to the entire panel as to whether or not they could accept certain propositions of the law.” 8 Appellee makes much of the fact that Hayes has supplemented the record to include the juror cards from the trial and a juror rating form to assist the comparative analysis. Appellee claims we are barred from considering this information as it was not presented to the state appellate courts. This argument is without merit. We have held that we will consider additional information where evidence presented supplements but does not fundamentally alter the claim presented to the state courts. Anderson v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 382, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2003). Hayes has consistently argued that the prosecutor offered pretextual justifications for striking the African-American jurors. In providing the juror cards and printouts, Hayes merely added evidentiary support to the claim he has raised in every court to address his case. Id. at 387-88 (holding that presenting a habeas claim in a “stronger evidentiary posture” does not trigger an exhaustion dismissal where the petitioner does not seek to advance “a ground [for relief] that is entirely independent of the grounds presented in the state courts.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Furthermore, these juror cards are not case dispositive. 9 The state trial judge also discounted the “bad juror rating” justification. Hayes notes that another non-African-American prospective juror, Deborah Noble, had a “bad juror rating” but sat as an alternate. 18 Case: 08-10057 Document: 00511007241 Page: 19 Date Filed: 01/19/2010 No. 08-10057 striking a juror. But the state trial judge stated that he observed no such hostility from Richard. More importantly, he never made any finding regarding whether “hostility” was the prosecutor’s true motive. Taken against the trial court’s statements with respect to both Juror Hashaway and Juror Jackson, it appears that the trial judge’s analysis was based upon whether the proffered explanation was a “valid” reason to strike a juror peremptorily, not on whether the reason given was “true” or, more pointedly, whether the prosecutor was telling the truth. In this respect, then, the state trial judge unreasonably failed to apply clearly established law to the facts by failing to examine not just the validity of the reason but the credibility of the prosecutor.10 This is particularly a problem because neither the judge nor defense counsel observed this supposed hostility. Thus, while it is true that hostility towards a lawyer could be a valid race-neutral reason to strike a prospective juror, we have no clear answer to the question of whether Richard was actually hostile. The answers to the voir dire questions evince no hostility. The judge saw none. The judge did not affirmatively find the prosecutor’s testimony credible, only the reason given to be one that, if true, is a valid reason to strike. This case is thus similar to Snyder where no finding as to demeanor was made, and the United States Supreme Court found no deference could thus be given. 128 S. Ct. at 1209. Accordingly, the state court’s failure to overrule the strike of Richard represents an unreasonable application of clearly established law to the facts.