Opinion ID: 2561940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: restricting business opportunities

Text: Rost argued to the hearing panel that he was not practicing law because he was merely doing things that a person who is not an attorney might do. For instance, a nonlawyer real estate agent might prepare contracts or deeds, and, therefore, the argument is that a retired attorney is permitted to do the same things without being deemed to practice law. The hearing panel answered that argument by opining that whether a retired attorney was practicing law when doing tasks that are also performed by nonlawyers depends on the retired attorney's area of practice prior to retirement. For example, a retired trial lawyer could become a real estate broker who completes simple contracts, negotiates deals, and fills out forms without practicing law. On the other hand, a real estate lawyer would be deemed to be practicing law if he or she became a real estate broker performing the same tasks. Rost contends that the panel's area-of-prior-practice rule represents an unconstitutional restriction on a retired attorney's pursuit of business opportunities. First, we specifically reject the panel's proposed rule that the determination of whether a retired attorney is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law turns on the nature of the attorney's pre-retirement practice. Apparently, Rost's argument  that he was only doing what nonlawyers often do  enticed the panel to promulgate a rule which would provide some guidance on when an attorney can provide law-related services which are often provided by nonlawyers, e.g., real estate brokers, without being subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct. The panel's endeavor to establish a bright-line rule was unnecessary. An attorney's responsibilities regarding law-related services are specifically defined in KRPC 5.7 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 567). KRPC 5.7(b) defines law-related services as those that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer. 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 567. The comments to the rule note that law-related services can involve [a] broad range of economic and other interests of clients, examples of which include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 569. Accordingly, the services which Rost contends that he was providing to his post-retirement clients, e.g., accounting services and business advice, would appear to be enveloped within the definition of law-related services. Nevertheless, a lawyer remains subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct even when providing law-related services, i.e., those that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by nonlawyers, when the services are provided: (1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or (2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist. KRPC 5.7 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 567). The comments to the rule describe the potential for ethical problems when a lawyer or lawyer-controlled entity performs law-related services. The principal culprit is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. Accordingly, the burden is on the lawyer to show that reasonable measures have been taken to insure that the client understands that he or she may not expect the benefits of a lawyer-client relationship, such as the protection of confidences, the prohibition against representing conflicting interests, or the maintenance of professional independence. In this respect, the panel's focus on prior practice may be germane, if not determinative. If an attorney continues to perform the same law-related services, for the same clients, from the same location, with the same staff as was done when those services were not distinct from the attorney's provision of legal services, the burden to show the requisite client understanding that the lawyer-client relationship had ceased would appear to be onerous, at best. Nevertheless, the touchstone is not the nature of the prior practice. Given that finding, we need not belabor Rost's tenuous and obtuse contention that the panel's area-of-practice rule violates some constitutional right to pursue business opportunities. We discern no such constitutional right. Rost's citation to Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005), which dealt with the Commerce Clause, is unavailing. Moreover, even where constitutional rights are implicated, the Supreme Court, by and through the hearing panel, may nevertheless enforce attorney disciplinary rules. See In re Wilkinson, 251 Kan. 546, 555, 834 P.2d 1356 (1992) (constitutional right of free speech subject to regulation in the area of attorney discipline).