Opinion ID: 2995118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Training on the High-Speed

Text: Scanner Hoffman claims that Caterpillar’s denial of training on the high-speed scanner violated the ADA. The ADA proscribes discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). As a threshold requirement, Hoffman must first establish that she has a disability as defined by the ADA. Disability is defined as (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2). A plaintiff must also demonstrate that she is qualified for the position in question. An individual is qualified if she satisfies the pre-requisites for the position and can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. sec. 1630.2(m)). Once a plaintiff has established that she is a qualified individual with a disability, she may show discrimination in either of two ways: by presenting evidence of disparate treatment or by showing a failure to accommodate. See Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1997). Disparate treatment claims arise from language in the ADA prohibiting covered entities from limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee, 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(1), while failure to accommodate claims stem from language in the ADA defining discrimination in part as not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A). A disparate treatment claim under the ADA is similar to disparate treatment claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a), and the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. sec. 623(a)(1) in that the plaintiff attempts to show that she was treated differently than other workers on the basis of a protected characteristic. As with other federal anti-discrimination statutes, an ADA plaintiff may prove disparate treatment either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination, or she may prove it indirectly using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). In order to prevail in the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she was meeting the legitimate employment expectations of her employer; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment. See Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2001). In failure to accommodate claims, unlike disparate treatment claims, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach is not necessary or appropriate. See Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1997). Instead, the plaintiff, in addition to showing that she is a qualified individual with a disability, must show that the employer was aware of her disability and still failed to reasonably accommodate it. See Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1999). Reasonable accommodations may include: (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(9). Hoffman claims that Caterpillar’s denial of training on the high-speed scanner constitutes both disparate treatment and a failure to accommodate under the ADA. Because Caterpillar does not challenge Hoffman’s claim that she is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA, we turn first to Hoffman’s disparate treatment claim.
At the outset, we note that it is quite clear that Caterpillar is not obligated to train Hoffman on the high-speed scanner if she is not capable of running it. The ADA certainly does not require employers to allow employees to use equipment that they are unable to operate. Nor does anything in the ADA mandate that Caterpillar must tolerate a drop in productivity in order to allow Hoffman to run the high-speed scanner. Usually, the question of an employee’s ability to perform a specific task will be decided at the outset of a disparate treatment claim in the context of determining whether the plaintiff is qualified under the ADA. In situations such as this one, however, where an employee can clearly perform the essential functions of the position but alleges disparate treatment as to some non-essential function, the employee’s ability to perform the task in question becomes relevant at this later stage. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hoffman, we find that there is an issue of fact as to whether Hoffman would be able to operate the high-speed scanner. Because Congress perceived that employers were basing employment decisions on unfounded stereotypes, Siefken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995), the ADA discourages employment decisions ’based on stereotypes and generalizations associated with the individual’s disability rather than on the individual’s actual characteristics.’ Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998)). The ADA recognizes that a non-disabled person’s instincts about the capabilities of a disabled person are often likely to be incorrect. Therefore, a determination that two- handed people use both of their hands to operate the high-speed scanner, or even a determination that most one-handed people would be unable to run it, should not be the end of an employer’s inquiry. In this case, it seems doubtful that Cripe made an individualized determination as to whether Hoffman could operate the high- speed scanner because he never gave her a chance to try it. Caterpillar claims that the primary reason that Hoffman lacks the capability to run the high-speed scanner is that she would be unable to effectively clear the frequent paper jams that occur. There is evidence in the record, however, that Hoffman clears paper jams from the copy machine without assistance, and Caterpillar presents no evidence to suggest that clearing paper jams from the high-speed scanner is somehow different. Nor does Caterpillar counter Hoffman’s claim that she could use her left arm in a manner similar to a flat hand to hold down the paper as it is being fed into the machine. Therefore, drawing all inferences in favor of Hoffman, we must assume that she is physically capable of running the high- speed scanner. Thus, we move on to the substance of Hoffman’s disparate treatment claim. Hoffman’s supervisor, Cripe, admits that he refused Hoffman’s requests for high- speed scanner training because of her disability. Notwithstanding this admission, the district court granted summary judgment for Caterpillar. The court determined that because Hoffman failed to show that the denial of training affected her compensation, benefits, hours worked, job title, or ability to advance within Caterpillar, she had not shown a materially adverse employment action--one of the elements of the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. See Hoffman v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 98-1062 , slip op. at 7 (C.D. Ill. July 12, 1999) (citing Spencer v. AT&T Network Sys., No. 94 C 7788, 1998 WL 397843, at  (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1998) (finding that denial of training was not a materially adverse employment action because plaintiff’s pay, hours, job title, and quality of her responsibilities were not significantly affected); Needy v. Vill. of Woodridge, No. 96 C 5188, 1997 WL 461093 at  (N.D.