Opinion ID: 685154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 12 Our review of the district court's dismissal of Count II on immunity grounds is clearly de novo. Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548 (7th Cir.1994). The applicable standard for our review of the district court's decision to abstain is somewhat more elusive. In A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 921 F.2d 118, 121 (7th Cir.1990), we suggested that the abuse of discretion standard governs our review of all abstention decisions. As defendants readily note, in at least one prior decision, we applied the abuse of discretion standard in the specific context of a Younger abstention. See Sekerez v. Supreme Court of Indiana, 685 F.2d 202, 204-05 (7th Cir.1982). More recently, however, we have held that when a district court has been asked to abstain under the principles enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), our review of its decision is de novo. Arkebauer v. Kiley, 985 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 441 (9th Cir.1991)). 13 We are not alone in our vacillation. Our survey of the law in other circuits reveals no clear consensus on the issue. The Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits apply an abuse of discretion standard. See O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785 (3d Cir.1994); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392 (4th Cir.1994); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.1980); Rindley v. Gallagher, 929 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir.1991). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, appears to review all abstention decisions de novo. Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 675-76 (6th Cir.1985). Finally, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a hybrid approach, applying a de novo review for abstentions under Younger, but an abuse of discretion standard for all other forms of abstention. See World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1080-81 (9th Cir.1987). 14 While mindful of the Supreme Court's general admonition to avoid drawing artificial distinctions among the various grounds for abstention, 5 we find that the Ninth Circuit's dual standard approach is the better rule. Unlike other forms of abstention, such as the Pullman doctrine, which explicitly vests the district court with discretion to decline to exercise ... its jurisdiction, Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1881, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965), application of the Younger doctrine is absolute. As the Supreme Court explained in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n. 22, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246 n. 22, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), when a case meets the Younger criteria, the district court must abstain. A standard of review that asks us to review a lower court's decision for an abuse of discretion that simply does not exist is inappropriate. Our review of the lower court's decision to abstain here is therefore de novo. Accord Fresh Int'l Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 n. 2 (9th Cir.1986).