Opinion ID: 1789963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to Claim an Equal Protection Violation.

Text: It is fundamental that the existence of standing is a prerequisite to any equal protection challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-45, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2435-36, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 2302, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). See also Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 950-51 (Ky. 1995) (First Amendment challenges to portions of Kentucky code of legislative ethics and executive branch code of ethics were properly dismissed where the complaining party lacked standing). The standing inquiry is essential to ensure that the complaining party has such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 238-39, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1680, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982). Standing, at its irreducible minimum, is composed of three well-settled requirements. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. at 2302; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First, the complaining party must have suffered an injury in fact, i.e., an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Second, a causal relationship must exist between the complaining party's alleged injury and the challenged conduct. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Finally, there must be a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury, meaning that the `prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling' is not `too speculative.' Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 663-64, 113 S.Ct. at 2302 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). Because Kentec has failed to set forth any facts establishing an injury-in-fact, it lacks standing to claim that the prepayment provisions of KRS 350.0301(5) and 405 KAR 7:092 § 6 violate its equal protection rights. In equal protection cases, persons are required to show that they have been in fact injured in order to have standing to challenge the validity of laws that apply to them. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 142 (1998). In addressing various constitutional challenges to other statutes, Kentucky courts have long adhered to a strict injury-in-fact requirement. E.g., Second St. Prop., Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Ky. 1969) (Before one seeks to strike down a state statute he must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.); Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky.1961) (It is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.); Steel v. Meek, 312 Ky. 87, 226 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1950) (constitutional challenge to statute governing absentee voting procedures on grounds that it made no provisions for absentee voting by the blind, the illiterate, or the disabled, dismissed for lack of standing where appellant failed to show that he, himself, was prejudiced by the alleged discrimination); Stein v. Ky. State Tax Comm'n, 266 Ky. 469, 99 S.W.2d 443, 445-46 (1936) (It is incumbent upon a party who assails a law invoked in the course thereof to show that the provisions of the statute thus assailed are applicable to him and that he is injuriously affected thereby.... We advert to the established principle in testing the validity of a statute, that objections thereto are not available to one not injured thereby.). Kentec's allegations must be tested to ensure compliance with this injury-in-fact requirement. Simon, 426 U.S. at 39, 96 S.Ct. at 1925; Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). It is the responsibility of the complainant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers. Warth, 422 U.S. at 518, 95 S.Ct. at 2215 (emphasis added). Moreover, it is improper to rely on Kentec's representations before this Court to establish standing. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 547, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1334, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986) ([T]he necessary factual predicate may not be gleaned from the briefs and arguments themselves.). Finally, the allegations of fact that would give rise to standing must affirmatively appear in the record and cannot be inferred from the averments in Kentec's pleadings. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 608, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (It is a long-settled principle that standing cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but rather must affirmatively appear in the record.) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To allege an injury-in-fact in the context of an equal protection challenge, the complaining party must set forth facts showing that it was personally denied equal treatment by the challenged conduct. Hays, 515 U.S. at 743-44, 115 S.Ct. at 2435; Allen, 468 U.S. at 755, 104 S.Ct. at 3326. Stated another way, a party cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless he can show that he is within the class whose constitutional rights are allegedly infringed. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 1035, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953). Kentec's equal protection argument is essentially that the prepayment requirement denies a formal administrative hearing on the amount of the proposed penalty assessment to those corporations that cannot afford to prepay the proposed assessment. Kentec was, therefore, required to allege specific facts showing that it, personally, was unable to prepay its proposed assessment. If it failed to make the necessary allegations, it has no standing. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 231, 110 S.Ct. at 608. The only averment in the entire record that even approaches the required showing was Kentec's statement in its unverified petition for formal administrative review that Petitioner does not have sufficient funds by which to pay this large and excessive proposed assessment. At no point in this litigation has Kentec set forth any facts in support of this threadbare allegation. In the absence of such facts, Kentec's claim that it will be denied formal administrative review of its proposed assessment is, at best, conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. See also Warth, 422 U.S. at 508, 95 S.Ct. at 2210 (We hold only that a plaintiff ... must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention. Absent the necessary allegations of a demonstrable, particularized injury, there can be no confidence of a real need to exercise the power of judicial review....) (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Nevertheless, even if Kentec's allegation were sufficient to confer standing under other circumstances, two additional problems exist. [I]t is within the trial court's power to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing. If, after this opportunity, the plaintiff's standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed. Id. at 501-02, 95 S.Ct. at 2206-07. While Warth dealt with a case originally brought in federal district court, its principles are applicable to matters subject to initial administrative adjudication. In this case, the Cabinet was acting as the trial court. See KRS 350.0305 (No objection to the final order shall be considered by the [reviewing] court unless it was raised before the cabinet or there were reasonable grounds for failure to do so. The findings of the cabinet as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.). In this capacity, the Cabinet has already exercised the power discussed in Warth , establishing requirements for pleading a claim of inability to prepay a proposed assessment. The requirements include, inter alia, [a] statement of facts underlying the request, and [a]n affidavit... setting forth the applicant's income, property owned, outstanding obligations, the number and age of dependents, and a copy of his most recent Kentucky and federal income tax returns. 405 KAR 7:092 § 15(2). Kentec's pleading did not contain any of these elements. As Kentec failed to show an inability to prepay as required by the Cabinet's regulations, its equal protection claim should be dismissed under the analogous principles articulated in Warth . Finally, Kentec's failure to plead facts demonstrating that it was personally denied equal treatment is exacerbated by its own admission. In the same petition for review, Kentec stated that the terms and conditions of Section 15 of 405 KAR 7:092 for obtaining a waiver of the prepayment requirement are so strict and unreasonable as to preclude Petitioner's qualification for use thereof. This statement, which likely referred to the presumption against a waiver that arises under the circumstances set forth in 405 KAR 7:092 § 15(5)(b), is effectively an admission that Kentec would indeed have the assets to prepay the amount of its proposed assessment. This admission contradicted Kentec's earlier averment and eviscerates its present claim that it is within the class of entities that are allegedly denied equal treatment by the prepayment requirement. Cf. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 190, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936) (Here, the allegation in the bill of complaint as to jurisdictional amount was traversed by the answer. The court made no adequate finding upon that issue of fact, and the record contains no evidence to support the allegation of the bill. There was thus no showing that the District Court had jurisdiction and the bill should have been dismissed upon that ground.). Despite Kentec's claim that it was unable to prepay, it has neglected to allege facts supporting this claim, failed to offer a scintilla of evidence to maintain it, and acted in a manner completely contrary to it. Kentec therefore has not shown that it was personally denied equal access to a formal hearing. It cannot now be heard to claim that the prepayment requirement injures other corporations that actually are unable to prepay. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255, 73 S.Ct. at 1034 (Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.); Martin v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 38, 50 (Ky.2003) (Generally, a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied cannot challenge it on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in other situations not before the Court.). As Justice Holmes stated in United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 50 S.Ct. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508 (1930), if there is any difficulty ... it will be time enough to consider it when raised by some one whom it concerns. Id. at 399, 50 S.Ct. at 169. Because Kentec has failed to show that it, personally, was injured, it has no standing to assert an equal protection challenge to the prepayment provisions.