Opinion ID: 2320266
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Control or Remove N.C.

Text: ¶ 14. Once the first sexual assault was reported to SRS, the agency's duty to an abused child arose. Sabia, 164 Vt. at 299-300, 669 A.2d at 1191-92. As such, the question of whether SRS had a duty with respect to any later sexual assault by N.C., the subject of the second group of claims, falls within the ambit of Sabia, id., and not Sorge. ¶ 15. SRS argues, however, that Sabia does not control this case because: (1) the statute that forms the basis for the duty found in Sabia was enacted after the alleged sexual assaults; (2) SRS was not notified of N.C.'s alleged subsequent sexual assaults on plaintiff after the first assault; and (3) the private analogs found in Sabia necessary to sustain a tort claim against the State are inapplicable. The superior court rejected the first argument because a predecessor statute provided similar protection to the statutes on which we relied in Sabia. We agree with the court's analysis. ¶ 16. The applicable duty to report child abuse, and SRS's duty to act on such reports, was created by the Legislature in 1974 by the statutes regarding the physical abuse of children, 13 V.S.A. §§ 1351-1356. 1973, No. 152 (Adj.Sess.), §§ 2-3; 1973, No. 237 (Adj.Sess.), §§ 1-5. The statutes were amended in 1976 to specifically include sexual abuse within the definition of abuse. 1975, No. 200 (Adj.Sess.), §§ 1-4. The main SRS duty required by the earlier statute was the same as Sabia later found was required by 33 V.S.A. § 4915(c), [3] that is, a requirement that SRS investigate reports of abuse, and if the investigation produces evidence of abuse, to cause assistance to be provided to the child and his family in accordance with a written plan of treatment. 13 V.S.A. § 1355(a), as amended by 1973, No. 237 (Adj.Sess.), § 5. The legislative purpose for the duties was also the same as that found in Sabia, that is, to protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through abuse or neglect; to strengthen the family and to make the home safe for children, and to provide a temporary or permanent nurturing and safe environment for children when necessary. 13 V.S.A. § 1351, as amended by 1973, No. 237 (Adj.Sess.), § 1. While the duties created in the 1970's lacked some of the details that later appeared in the statutory scheme, the essential obligation on SRS to investigate reports of child abuse and render assistance was created. Thus, our determinative conclusion in Sabia that it is beyond dispute that the relevant statutory provisions create a duty on the part of SRS to assist a particular class of persons to which plaintiffs belong and to prevent the type of harm suffered by plaintiffs, 164 Vt. at 299, 669 A.2d at 1192, applies equally under the earlier statutes applicable here, even without the directory language. Accordingly, we hold that Sabia 's finding of an applicable duty on the part of SRS applies to plaintiff's second group of claims that arise out of N.C.'s sexual abuse of plaintiff after the initial reported abusive act. ¶ 17. The superior court also rejected SRS's second argument that no duty arose because the abuse was not reported after the 1980 incident. The court decided that it was not unreasonable for SRS to extrapolate from its knowledge about [plaintiff's] . . . brother to consider the danger posed to [plaintiff]. We agree with this analysis. We rejected a similar argument from SRS in Sabia v. Neville, 165 Vt. at 524, 687 A.2d at 475: We also do not believe that we can neatly separate out the information about [plaintiff's sister] from the information about plaintiff. If LaPlant sexually abused [plaintiff's sister], it would not be unexpected that Laplant would sexually abuse plaintiff. Thus, any duty [the SRS worker] had to investigate the allegation with respect to [plaintiff's sister], and provide assistance, may have included an accompanying obligation to investigate whether LaPlant was also sexually abusing plaintiff. That duty was even stronger where, as here, N.C. had abused plaintiff in the past, as well as abused plaintiff's brother. ¶ 18. We now address SRS's third argument, that no private analog exists to find the State liable for the alleged torts. On this point, the superior court sided with SRS. ¶ 19. Sabia found a number of private analogs for plaintiffs' failure-to-assist claims after noting that plaintiffs' claim was that SRS failed to provide any assistance whatsoever. 164 Vt. at 301, 669 A.2d at 1193. Thus, we phrased the private analog question as whether a private analog exists for an action based on SRS's failure to perform its statutory duty to assist children seeking protection from reported and substantiated abuse[.] Id. We found an analog under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965) in an action against one who gratuitously undertakes services necessary to protect another, but performs them negligently, where the negligence increases the risk of harm and the harm results from the other's reliance on the undertaking. Id. at 302-03, 669 A.2d at 1194. We also found an analog under Vermont's good samaritan statute, 12 V.S.A. § 519, pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324, referencing a duty of care upon those who take charge of helpless persons, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(b), articulating a duty to control the conduct of third parties to prevent them from causing harm to others in certain circumstances we found to be analogous. Id. at 304-05, 669 A.2d at 1194-95. ¶ 20. SRS argues that none of the tort theories against private individuals that we found applicable in Sabia apply in this case because of a fundamental difference between the two cases. Here, SRS claims its workers did provide plaintiff assistance, thereby fully discharging their statutory duty. Thus, unlike Sabia, this case is about the adequacy of SRS's assistance, and SRS asserts that none of the private analogs accepted in Sabia apply to such a claim. Moreover, SRS argues that plaintiff's central position is that SRS should have removed N.C. from the grandparents' home to separate them, and we specifically stated in LaShay v. Dep't of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs., 160 Vt. 60, 69, 625 A.2d 224, 229 (1993), that there is no private analog for a suit based on failure to remove a juvenile from a home. See id. (stating in passing that only the state can remove [a child] from the custody of his parents and legally grant custody to the Commissioner of SRS). ¶ 21. Although these issues about the reach of Sabia 's analysis of a private analog are important, they are better resolved through another aspect of the Vermont Tort Claims Act that provides an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity for discretionary functions. The superior court also held that this exception applies in this case. Because the application of that exception fully supports the superior court's judgment, we leave undecided SRS's remaining arguments on private analog and turn to that exception. ¶ 22. The discretionary function exception provides that the waiver of immunity does not extend to acts or omissions of state employees that are based upon the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discretion involved is abused. 12 V.S.A. § 5601(e)(1). The purpose of the discretionary function exception is to assure that the courts do not invade the province of coordinate branches of government by passing judgment on legislative or administrative policy decisions through tort law. Sabia, 164 Vt. at 307, 669 A.2d at 1196-97; accord Searles v. Agency of Transp., 171 Vt. 562, 563, 762 A.2d 812, 814 (2000) (mem.) ([T]he purpose of the exception is to prevent judicial second guessing of legislative or administrative policy. . . .). A discretionary function is an act on the part of the state or a state employee that requires the exercise of judgment in its performance, or, in the alternative, a situation where there is no specifically dictated course of action for the employee to follow. Amy's Enterprises v. Sorrell, 174 Vt. 623, 625, 817 A.2d 612, 617 (2002) (mem.). ¶ 23. In Searles, 171 Vt. at 563, 762 A.2d at 813-14, we adopted the two-part test for determining whether a plaintiff's claims are barred by the discretionary function exception to tort liability, a test we derived from United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991). Under this test, a court must first determine whether the act or omission challenged by the plaintiff is one that involves an element of judgment or choice or whether a statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. Searles, 171 Vt. at 563, 762 A.2d at 814 (quoting and citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267). If the court concludes that the act involves judgment or choice, it must then determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. Id. Since the purpose of the discretionary function exemption is to prevent courts from passing judgment on legislative or administrative policy decisions through the use of tort law, the exception protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. Lane v. State, 174 Vt. 219, 224, 811 A.2d 190, 194 (2002) (internal citations omitted). It is, however, presumed that when a government agent is authorized to exercise discretion, the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion. Estate of Gage v. State, 2005 VT 78, ¶ 5, 178 Vt. 212, 882 A.2d 1157. Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to overcome the presumption that the discretion involved policy considerations. Id. ¶ 24. SRS did act in this case in response to the report of sexual abuse of plaintiff. As the trial court found from the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record: [SRS] enrolled N.C. in counseling; it monitored N.C. through a social worker; it enrolled [plaintiff's] brother, and later [plaintiff], in `at risk' day care and therapy; and it worked with [plaintiff's] grandparents to deal with N.C. The counseling therapist did not recommend removing N.C. from the grandparents' home because the therapist viewed the incident as associated with developmental sex play. He reported that N.C. was ashamed of the act, and that the sexual abuse would not occur again. In addition, both the grandparents and plaintiff's mother were aware of the earlier incident and were acting to protect plaintiff. ¶ 25. As the trial court noted, there are no definitive ministerial standards that SRS workers apply in response to a sexual abuse report. Cf. Gloria G. v. State Dep't of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs., 251 Kan. 179, 833 P.2d 979, 987 (1992) (relying on the absence of specific guidelines to respond to sexual abuse accusation to hold that discretionary function exception applies). The workers are highly educated professionals that must use judgment in determining the appropriate intervention. Here, the workers relied upon the judgment of a mental health professional in developing the proper assistance. Moreover, as was present in Sorge, the SRS workers faced the challenge of rehabilitating one juvenile, while protecting others. The placement of difficult-to-manage juveniles with foster families necessarily involves some risk for the foster family and those close to it. As the superior court noted, plaintiff's response is to rely on competing professional analyses of what the SRS workers should have done in these circumstances, rather than on ministerial requirements; this response highlights the inherently judgmental aspects in abuse report responses. There is no question that this case meets the first prong of the discretionary function test because the response of the SRS workers to the report of sexual abuse of plaintiff involved an element of judgment. Searles, 171 Vt. at 563, 762 A.2d at 814. ¶ 26. We turn to the second prong of the discretionary function test, where courts must conclude whether the judgment at issue is of the kind the Legislature intended to insulate from tort liability. Id. We held in Estate of Gage that the determination not to extend a guard rail on the interstate highway involved precisely the kind of policy judgments  the weighing of risks, financial costs, and environmental and aesthetic impacts  that the discretionary-function exception was designed to protect. 2005 VT 78, ¶ 7, 178 Vt. 212, 882 A.2d 1157. The argument for applying the discretionary function exception is equally apt in this case. As the Supreme Court of Minnesota found in a case where a county child protection agency failed to remove a child from the home: In making this placement decision, the County's social worker was required to weigh the competing governmental policies of protecting the child from danger within the family and keeping the family together, a decision involving profound social considerations and, consequently, a decision at the policymaking level protected by discretionary function immunity. Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn.1993); accord Thorne v. Hennepin County, 1997 WL 714705, at  (Minn. Ct.App.1997) (Placement authorities must consider the public interest in providing the best possible care for the child, the cost of the care, and the availability of services.). Other courts have reached the same result under comparable discretionary function exceptions to sovereign immunity waiver legislation. See, e.g., Gloria G., 833 P.2d at 987-88; Foster v. Washoe County, 114 Nev. 936, 964 P.2d 788, 792 (1998). We hold that the child protection decisions made in this case in response to allegations of abuse and for children in SRS custody fall squarely within the intended scope of the discretionary function exception. Because these decisions meet both prongs of the discretionary function exception test, they are protected by sovereign immunity from tort litigation against the child protection agency. The superior court was correct in granting summary judgment to SRS on the second group of claims  those involving N.C.'s sexual assaults on plaintiff after the first reported assault  under the discretionary function exception to state tort liability.