Opinion ID: 2109108
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Paula Colemer

Text: The first evidentiary issue we must address is whether the admission of testimony by Paula Colemer that Pool told her he was afraid of McCollum and appellant was error. In State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn.1982), we held that evidence of a victim's fear of a perpetrator is admissible only when all three of the following conditions are met: a. The victim's state of mind must be a relevant issue. The victim's state of mind is generally relevant only where the defendant raises the defense of accident, suicide, or self-defense. b. The trial court must weigh the probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. c. A proper limiting instruction must be given to the jury. Id. at 432-33. According to Blanchard, these conditions are necessary because of the risk that the jury will consider the victim's statements of fear as a true indication of a defendant's intentions or actions. Id. at 432 (citing Campbell v. United States, 391 A.2d 283, 287 (D.C.App.1978)). None of these conditions have been met in this case. The victim's state of mind in this case was not a relevant issue  appellant did not raise the defenses of accident, suicide, or self-defense. While it is difficult to assess the second and third prongs of this analysis because the admission of the testimony at issue was not objected to at trial, the trial court did not weigh the probative value of the testimony against the unfair prejudice and a proper limiting instruction was not given to the jury. Therefore, as also determined by the postconviction court, the admission of Colemer's testimony as to the state of mind of Pool was error. A finding of error does not require a new trial if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn.1997). In determining whether error was harmless, we must examine the basis upon which the jury rested its verdict, and if the verdict was surely unattributable to the error, it is harmless. Id. at 292 (quoting State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn.1996)). Here the error was harmless because the evidence was cumulative  the jury could have inferred Pool's fear of appellant and McCollum by the facts that he did not spend the night at his home, changed his phone number, and purchased new door locks for his home. Nonetheless, Colemer's testimony will not be considered in support of the verdict in our determination of the sufficiency of evidence issue.