Opinion ID: 2639277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: LaMunyon

Text: In LaMunyon, we acknowledged that the KSGA expressly requires inclusion of juvenile adjudications in a criminal history score. 257 Kan. at 57. Further: The fact that a juvenile adjudication is not a `criminal act' has not been interpreted to mean that a juvenile adjudication can have no impact upon the sentence for a subsequent `criminal conviction.' Considering a juvenile adjudication in calculating an offender's criminal history score under the KSGA does not turn that adjudication into a criminal act. The terms `criminal act' and `criminal history score' simply mean different things. 259 Kan. at 61. We recognized that Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 128 L. Ed.2d 745, 114 S.Ct. 1921 (1994), held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could be used to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense. Further, we noted that in State v. Delacruz, 258 Kan. 129, 133-36, 899 P.2d 1042 (1995), we used Nichols to justify our conclusion that the use of an uncounseled but constitutionally sound misdemeanor conviction could be used in determining a criminal history score under the KSGA. See La-Munyon, 259 Kan. at 63-65. In LaMunyon, we likened a nonjury juvenile adjudication to an uncounseled adult misdemeanor convictionboth obtained absent rights that did not attach to the particular type of offense. We concluded: Here, the defendant's juvenile adjudications were constitutional even if he had no right to a jury trial in those proceedings. Because the juvenile adjudications were not constitutionally infirm, they may be used in calculating the defendant's criminal history score under the KSGA. 259 Kan. at 65. LaMunyon was decided several years before Apprendi and State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 23 P.3d 801 (2001). In Gould, we adopted the Apprendi rationale to declare that the Kansas scheme for imposing upward departure sentences, embodied in K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-4716, is unconstitutional on its face. 271 Kan. 394, Syl. ¶ 3. We said: Gould received a sentence beyond the statutory maximum based upon a court finding of certain aggravating factors found by a preponderance of the evidence. Apprendi, on the other hand, requires `any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' 530 U.S. at 490. Any other procedure `is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system. 530 U.S. at 497.' 271 Kan. at 413.