Opinion ID: 2103388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: prosecutorial rhetoric

Text: The defendant contends that 13 arguments made by the prosecutors in their opening and closing statements were so prejudicial and inflammatory that he must receive a new trial. The defendant waived the errors, if any, in most of these arguments by failing to make timely objection to them during the trial. ( People v. Edwards (1973), 55 Ill.2d 25, 35, cert. denied (1974), 415 U.S. 928, 39 L.Ed.2d 486, 94 S.Ct. 1438; People v. Vaughn (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 399, 401-02.) Even when no objection is made, however, inflammatory rhetoric warrants reversal when it prevents the defendant from receiving a fair trial or causes substantial interference with the fundamental integrity of the judicial process. (See, e.g., People v. Romero (1967), 36 Ill.2d 315, 320; People v. Young (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 443, 447-48.) After examining the arguments to which no objections were made, we conclude that they did not so substantially undermine the fairness of the defendant's trial as to warrant reversal. Most of the arguments that were the subject of a defense objection were either cured in the trial court or were not prejudicial. When the prosecutor argued Let's give [the defendant] another shot, give him another shot, and Maybe he'll blow Preze away, maybe he'll blow one of your relatives away next, the court sustained the defendant's objection, and directed the prosecutor to cease and desist from any such    remarks. When the prosecutor told the jury in his opening statement that you will get a little insight into [the defendant's] character and his personality from the evidence of the Preze shooting, the court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial because the prosecutor's argument did not mislead the jury, but the court also stated that the jury would be thoroughly instructed on the proper use of the other-crimes evidence. These instructions were given to the jury, and the prosecutor's passing reference to the defendant's character did not result in any prejudice to him. Probably the strongest attack upon the prosecutor's closing argument is the defendant's complaint about the prosecutor's reference to the victim's family at the end of his closing statement: Let's talk about this girl's rights. To say good night to your grandma `good night, I'm going, be back. Can I borrow your car? Can I go back to school in a couple of days? Can I say goodbye to my brothers and sisters?' Does she have any more rights?    She's got nothing because he took it upon himself to take the gun out of his pocket or out of his car or out of his shoulder holster and snuff her life away in a ridiculous and unmotivated and ignorant, ignorant lack of responsibility. That's what he did. You decide, ladies and gentlemen, what it's all about, you take the law, you take the evidence, you say if somebody shoots this thing it's a reckless act at four people, and then you tell the Quinn's what you decided. (Emphasis added.) The family references in the first paragraph, perhaps, can be excused as fair comment on the testimony of the victim's mother, who testified without the defendant's objection as a life and death witness for the State. However, the exhortation in the last sentence of the prosecutor's argument cannot be excused on that basis. Common sense tells us that murder victims do not live in a vacuum and that, in most cases, they leave behind family members ( People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378, 415). Thus, this court has held that every mention of a deceased's family does not necessarily, in and of itself, entitle the defendant to a new trial, since, in certain instances, dependent upon the factual circumstances, such evidence and argument can be harmless, particularly when the death penalty is not imposed. People v. Wilson (1972), 51 Ill.2d 302, 307; People v. Jordan (1967), 38 Ill.2d 83, 91-92. Considering the prosecutor's closing remark in the context of the entire case, we hold that, although the prosecutor's conduct was improper, inexcusable and unprofessional, what he did was harmless error. Unlike many of the cases where comments about the victim's family required reversal, there was no presentation of irrelevant evidence about the grieving family and the prosecution did not dwell upon the victim's family so much that the jury could well have related this fact to the question of defendant's culpability. ( People v. Jordan (1967), 38 Ill.2d 83, 92; see People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378, 413-15.) In light of all this, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's remarks about the victim's family did not affect the verdict of the jury.