Opinion ID: 2116273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dismissal and Refiling after LaGrange County Suppression Ruling

Text: Citing Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811 (1975), the defendant contends that the ruling by the LaGrange Superior Court suppressing certain evidence was binding upon the Elkhart Circuit Court. He also contends that the State should not be permitted to refile the Murder indictment in Elkhart County after dismissal of the same charge in the LaGrange Superior Court. In the course of reviewing a claim of error in the admission of evidence at trial, the Magley Court in 1975, noting the growing use of the pre-trial suppression motion, sought to provide guidance for the trial judge who is faced with a trial objection to [evidence] previously determined to be admissible. Id. at 634, 335 N.E.2d at 821. When a court conducts a pre-trial hearing to consider objections which it rejects and is subsequently faced with the same objections raised at trial, the following procedure was suggested: When a simple objection for the purpose of preserving appellate rights is made, the trial judge should consider the pre-trial determination res judicata and binding upon him and overrule the objection. If, however, the trial objection is based upon new factual or legal matter, a simple overruling of the objection would not be appropriate. In that instance, the trial judge may expect, and indeed require, that he be provided with an accurate summary description of such new matter. Thereafter, either of two levels of judicial response is appropriate. The trial judge may summarily overrule the objection if the new matter could in no event result in a determination of inadmissibility. This summary disposition may be made upon consideration of counsel's description, or, in the discretion of the judge, after having permitted the defense to call witnesses, to present new matter. On the other hand, if the trial judge deems such new matter to be of sufficient substance, he may conduct a hearing on the motion to suppress, having a scope appropriate under the circumstances, and reconsider the issue of admissibility. . . . Where, as in the case at bar, the judge who conducts the trial is not the judge who conducted and determined the pre-trial motion, obstacles to a full and fair reconsideration at trial exist. The trial judge is not acquainted with the evidence presented in the pre-trial hearing. Consequently, he is unable to weigh the old evidence with the new. This problem does not arise, of course, where the trial judge makes a summary denial of the objection based upon an inadequate showing of substantial new matter. Neither does the problem arise when the new matter would provide an independent and sufficient ground for suppression, as in the case at bar. The problem would exist, where the trial judge deemed it appropriate to reopen an issue litigated and finally determined at the pre-trial stage, for, in such instances, reweighing of the new and old evidence as a body would be required. In such extreme cases, re-litigation of the motion to suppress is indicated. 263 Ind. at 634-35, 335 N.E.2d at 821-22 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The defendant argues that the above reference to res judicata must be literally applied, but we observe that the phrase was not so intended. Rather, it was used to succinctly inform trial judges that they need not necessarily rehear evidence and arguments relating to admissibility issues previously heard and determined during pre-trial proceedings. In the subsequent case of Gajdos v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind.1984), we rejected a defendant's claim that a ruling prior to trial should remain effective and unchanged throughout the trial, stating a ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress is not intended to serve as the final expression concerning admissibility. Id. at 1022. Thus, if the case had continued to trial in LaGrange Superior Court, the preliminary ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress would have been subject to modification at trial. When the Murder charge against the defendant was pending in the LaGrange Superior Court, the defendant filed a motion to suppress and presented videotape evidence of his interrogation by police. The court granted the motion, finding as follows: On motion of the defendant, and with the agreement of the State, the video tape labeled Joyner # 1 was played in open Court. From the tape it is apparent that, prior to signing the Consents to Search 532 James Street and 1982 Firenza automobile, the defendant, Ricky Joyner, requested an attorney. However, an attorney was not provided. The State presented no evidence. . . . After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, . . . the Court now finds.. [t]hat defendant requested the assistance of an attorney prior to signing Consents to Search 532 James Street and the 1982 Firenza automobile, and that an attorney was not provided to him. Under these circumstances, the Court has no choice but to suppress the evidence seized by law enforcement officers pursuant to those Consents to Search. Record at 38. After the case was dismissed in LaGrange County and refiled in Elkhart Circuit Court pursuant to indictment, the defendant again filed a motion to suppress. At the hearing before the Elkhart Circuit Court on the defendant's motion to suppress, the evidence included not only two videotapes of the police interviews with the defendant but also testimony of involved police officers. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant was not in custody and that his statements regarding counsel were ambiguous or equivocal at best and that his statement was not a request for counsel. Record at 343, 344. Because rulings on pretrial motions are not necessarily final, the ruling of the LaGrange Superior Court did not foreclose the Elkhart Circuit Court from considering the defendant's motion to suppress, hearing further evidence thereon, and denying the motion. [5] In an alternative but related argument, the defendant contends that it was improper for the State to dismiss the case in LaGrange County, where the defendant's motion to suppress evidence had been granted, and refile the charges in Elkhart County. He contends that this allowed the State to improperly amend the information by filing it in another county. We disagree. A prosecuting attorney is authorized to obtain a dismissal at any time before sentencing, and the granting of such a motion does not of itself bar a subsequent trial of the defendant for the same offense. IND. CODE § 35-34-1-13 (1993). Absent the attachment of jeopardy, the State's dismissal of criminal charges does not preclude it from refiling and prosecuting a charge for the identical offense. Burdine v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1085, 1089-90 (Ind.1987) (dismissing and refiling identical charges the same day); see also Penley v. State, 506 N.E.2d 806, 811-12 (Ind.1987) (dismissing one count after hung jury and refiling along with a second count in another court). A trial court has no discretion to deny such a motion to dismiss. Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570, 577 (Ind.1996); Holifield v. State, 572 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ind.1991). Our Court of Appeals has recognized that the dismissal of a charge will not bar the renewal of proceedings unless the substantial rights of the accused have been prejudiced. Gregor v. State, 646 N.E.2d 52, 53 (Ind.Ct. App.1994). Furthermore, even where an order sustaining a motion to dismiss would otherwise constitute a bar to further prosecution of the crime charged, the granting of such motion does not bar a subsequent trial on the same charge unless the defendant objects to the dismissal. IND.CODE § 35-34-1-13(b) (1993). The defendant contends that the LaGrange Superior Court proceeding was dismissed before he had an opportunity to object. However, because the initial sustaining of the defendant's motion to suppress was not final and jeopardy had not yet attached, the defendant's substantial rights were not prejudiced by the dismissal and refiling.