Opinion ID: 402449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Intercepted Conversations

Text: 16 The government stipulated at trial that no warrant or other judicial authorization was ever issued for any of the interceptions of the conversations between Quick and Shields on November 6, November 14, and January 16. Appellant Shields claims that the interceptions were illegal and inadmissible under the Omnibus Crime Control Act. He further maintains that the evidence of the conversations should be suppressed on the grounds that the FBI agents violated his fourth amendment rights by (1) playing and listening to the tapes which Andrews had given the agents and (2) intercepting Shields' conversations in his home, in his office, and elsewhere through the use of the radio transmitter. Because express consent to the FBI's actions was given only by Andrews, who was not a party to the conversations, this case raises difficult questions.
17 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-20 (the Act) prohibits the electronic interception of oral communications except under certain circumstances and provides that the contents of conversations intercepted in violation of the Act may not be received in evidence in any court proceeding. See §§ 2511 amd 2515. The legality of the interceptions involved here turns on the construction and application of § 2511(2)(c), a consensual exception to the Act's broad proscriptions. 1 That subsection states: 18 It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. 19 Whether the requirements of § 2511(2)(c) were met thus depends upon (1) what acts constituted interceptions of the conversations between Quick and Shields, (2) who was responsible for each interception, (3) whether that person was acting under color of law, and (4) whether that person was a party to the communication or whether there was consent to the interception by a party. 20 The Act defines intercept as the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Under this definition, each communication in question was intercepted twice. One aural acquisition occurred when the agents heard the conversation being transmitted by radio. The other involved the tape recording and occurred at the time the recording was made, not when persons listened to the tape. United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 74, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976). 21 In ruling on the motion to suppress, the district court determined that the tape recording was an interception by Andrews. That finding was based upon the district court's conclusion that the recording ... equipment came to be on defendant Quick's person as a result of Quick's explicit request that Mr. Andrews assist him with acquiring such electronic paraphernalia as was necessary for Andrews to record said conversations. Appellant Shields argues, however, that Quick intercepted the conversations by making the tapes and that the evidence is inadmissible under § 2511(2)(c) because Quick was not acting under color of law. 22 The district court's determination of who intercepted the conversations was a finding of fact. As such, it must be upheld unless we find it clearly erroneous. See generally McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 53 (2d ed. 1972). 23 We find that the record sufficiently supports the district court's view of the events. Andrews' testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that he, not Quick, controlled the recording equipment. Andrews installed the recorder, turned it on, and taped the switch in the on position. After the conversation, he removed the equipment and turned off the recorder. Though the recording was apparently done at Quick's request, and though Quick wore the recorder, Andrews did the recording. He used Quick's body as the means of inserting the equipment into the presence of the conversationalists; Quick's request would have been granted had Andrews arranged for the recorder's and the transmitter's presence in any other acceptable way. 24 Courts have repeatedly held that informants who tape-record private conversations at the direction of government investigators are acting under color of law within the meaning of subsection (c). See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1377 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988, 99 S.Ct. 584, 58 L.Ed.2d 661 (1978); United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1412, 47 L.Ed.2d 349 (1976); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 476 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980, 985 (8th Cir. 1975). Consequently, it seems clear-and Shields apparently admits-that Andrews was acting under color of law when he recorded the conversations here. 25 The remaining inquiry is whether Quick consented to the interception within the meaning of § 2511(2)(c). The legislative history explains the consensual exception as follows: It shall not be unlawful for a party to any wire or oral communication or a person given prior authority by a party to a communication to intercept such communication. S.R.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1968) U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News 2112, 2182. Since Andrews' activities were invited, he did have prior authority to make the interception. 2 Also, the requirement that the consent be voluntary is satisfied in this case. See United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267, 278 (5th Cir. 1978). 26 We find, then, that the recordings were legal interceptions and that the taped evidence of the conversations was admissible. We need not decide whether the interceptions through the reception of radio transmissions were legal. 3
27 Appellant Shields contends that evidence of the content of his conversations with Quick should be excluded because the government violated his fourth amendment rights in two ways. First, with regard to the interception of the conversations, Shields maintains that his rights were violated when the FBI, without a warrant and without Shields' consent, acted through Andrews to place a transmitter and a recorder inside Shields' home, in his office, and in a field. 28 Contrary to the tone of Shields' argument, the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The location of the conversations that were intercepted is not determinative; the proper inquiry is whether the government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the conversations violated privacy upon which Shields justifiably relied. See id. at 353, 88 S.Ct. at 512; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971). 29 Supreme Court cases have consistently held that the government does not violate the fourth amendment by recording and transmitting private conversations with the consent of one of the parties, even though the other party does not know his conversation is being recorded or transmitted. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952). The principle underlying them is that when one reveals information to an individual, one takes the risk that one's confidence in that individual is misplaced. Flaherty v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 995, 999, 94 S.Ct. 1599, 1601, 39 L.Ed.2d 893 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Since the fourth amendment affords no protection to a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 413, the government's warrantless interceptions involved no violations of justifiable expectations of privacy. Those cases have arisen where a party was an informant or agent, a slightly different context than we have here. Nonetheless, they have focused on constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, as we must do, and they control this decision. 30 Here, Quick was in Shields' home and office with Shields' consent, if not his invitation. Cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 1387, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963) (approving agent's recording of conversation in another's office). Quick, as party to the conversation, wore the recorder and the transmitter; the equipment was not placed on Shields' premises. Compare United States v. Padilla, 520 F.2d 526 (1st Cir. 1975) (disapproving recording of conversation with agent where microphone had been placed in hotel room). Shields knowingly placed his trust in Quick by conversing with him, taking the risk that Quick would not convey the content of the conversations to others either then or later. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 751-52, 91 S.Ct. at 1125-26. True, Quick did not expressly authorize an interception by government agents; however, Shields' contentions fare no better simply because his confidante instead authorized the interception of the conversation by a confederate who turned out to be a government informer. There was still no governmental intrusion into a conversation which was intended by both parties to be private. Under these circumstances, the government's interceptions did not violate Shields' justifiable expectations of privacy. 31 Shields also contends that the government violated his fourth amendment rights by the agents' playing and listening to the tapes which Andrews gave them without first obtaining a warrant. In support of his contention, Shields cites United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 74, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976); Robbins v. California, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981), (plurality opinion), and Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). 32 In Turk, a tape recording of a conversation between Turk and another party was seized when the other party was lawfully arrested. The Fifth Circuit held that the warrantless playing of the tape by law enforcement officers after it was seized was improper. 33 Similarly, Robbins involved a warrantless opening of a closed paper bag found in the luggage compartment of a car which had been stopped and was being lawfully searched. The court announced, in a plurality opinion, that the opening of the closed container violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 4 34 Walter involved warrantless screening of obscene films which had been turned over to the FBI by a private party who had received the films through an innocent miscarriage of shipment. The court determined that the screening was an unreasonable search. 35 The case before us is fundamentally different from the cases cited by appellant Shields. In none of those cases did the government obtain consent to the search from anyone who had the right to control or use the item in question because of ownership or possession of the item with the knowledge of the owner. Other authority controls here. 36 The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of searches conducted upon the consent of a third party where that party has a sufficient relationship to the property which has been searched. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (joint user of a dufflebag). In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the Court explained that warrantless searches are constitutional where permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Id. at 172, 94 S.Ct. at 993. The authority which justifies the third-party consent ... rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes .... Id. n.7. 37 Here, Andrews had the right to use the tape. He had supplied the taping equipment for Quick at Quick's request. He had recorded the conversation, and had purportedly taken the original tape with Quick's consent to make copies. Furthermore, Quick knew that Andrews had retained his own tape even after Quick had received his recording of each conversation. The interest which Andrews had in the tape was unquestionably sufficient to enable him to authorize the government's listening to the recorded conversation. 38