Opinion ID: 1172674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Rebuttal Closing Argument (Guilt Phase)

Text: Upon completion of the prosecuting attorney's rebuttal closing argument, the defense moved for a mistrial, claiming three instances of misconduct. The first instance was when the prosecuting attorney described as ludicrous the defense claim that Ms. Holly C. Washa had been asleep in Appellant's motel room while he made telephone calls to Ms. Susan J. Schnell and for airline reservations. Defense counsel's objection to this characterization was overruled. The defense made the claim in response to the State's theory that Appellant killed Ms. Washa to prevent her from informing the police of his future plans and whereabouts. The defense argued it was not necessary for Appellant to eliminate Ms. Washa as a witness because she was asleep during the telephone calls and was thus not aware of his plans. The remark by the prosecuting attorney was not improper. It is not misconduct ... for a prosecutor to argue that the evidence does not support the defense theory. [80] As an advocate, the prosecuting attorney is entitled to make a fair response to the arguments of defense counsel. [81] The prosecutor's characterization of the defense theory as ludicrous was reasonable in light of the evidence. Appellant admitted raping and torturing Ms. Washa over a prolonged period of time. It was the prosecution's contention that, under those circumstances, she was not likely asleep while Appellant was anywhere nearby. The use of the word ludicrous was simply editorial comment by the prosecuting attorney which was a strong, but fair, response to the argument made by the defense. The second instance was the prosecuting attorney's characterization of Appellant as one who needs to control. The evidence at trial supports that characterization. Appellant himself said in his recorded statement that he used torture to gain control over Ms. Washa. From this evidence alone the prosecuting attorney could reasonably draw and express the inference that Appellant used control to accomplish his purposes. Under these circumstances, use of the word control was not improper. The third instance focuses on the prosecutor's use of transcripts of Appellant's recorded statements to the Palm Springs police officers. Appellant argues it was improper for the prosecuting attorney to read from the transcripts of the tapes during rebuttal because only the tapes, and not the transcripts, were admitted into evidence. This argument is without merit. The jury was informed the transcripts were not evidence of Appellant's statements. When the jurors listened to the tapes during trial, they were provided with transcripts to assist them in following the words. They were instructed at that time, however, that the words on the tapes, not the transcripts, were evidence of Appellant's statements, and that any inconsistency between the two should be resolved by reference to their collective memory of the contents of the tapes. They were reminded of this instruction again by the court after a sidebar conference requested by the defense immediately prior to reference to the transcripts by the prosecuting attorney. Under these circumstances, it was not improper for the prosecuting attorney to repeat portions of Appellant's statements by reading from the transcripts. Because the actual tapes were admitted into evidence at trial, as State's Exhibit 89, Appellant was not prejudiced by any reference to portions of his statements during rebuttal since the jury had already heard the tapes. The trial court's denial of the motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion because none of the prosecuting attorney's statements or actions during rebuttal were improper.