Opinion ID: 290716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellants Were Properly Given Consecutive Sentences for Manufacture and Possession.

Text: 15 Count 4 of the Information charged appellants with the manufacture of LSD under 21 U.S.C. 331(q)(1) and 360a (1965 Amendment). Count 5 of the Information charged that appellants 'did knowingly and unlawfully possess approximately 67.58 grams of LSD' in violation of 21 U.S.C. 331(q)(3) and 360a(c) (1965 Amendment). The court found appellants guilty of both offenses and sentenced them to one year in prison and fined them $1000 for each violation, with sentences to run consecutively. Appellants now contend that possession was a necessary ingredient in the manufacturing charge, and dual convictions and consecutive sentences were improper. 16 Appellants fail to distinguish between the provisions of the 1965 and 1968 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. While appellants were tried after the enactment of the 1968 amendments, those amendments apply only to offenses committed after October 24, 1968 (Section 6 of Pub.L. 90-639, 82 Stat. 1361). Appellants' manufacturing and possession offenses took place December 21, 1967. They were therefore prosecuted under the provisions of the 1965 amendments. 17 The 1965 amendments brought 'depressant or stimulant' drugs, including LSD, under the coverage of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 3 Manufacture and sale were prohibited. 4 Possession was regulated in the following manner under 21 U.S.C. 360a(c). 18 'No person    shall possess any depressant or stimulant drug otherwise than (1) for the personal use of himself or of a member of his household, or (2) for administration to an animal owned by him or a member of his household. In any criminal prosecution for possession    in violation of this subsection    the United States shall have the burden of proof that the possession involved does not come within the exceptions contained in clauses (1) and (2) of the preceding sentence.' 19 In essence, possession for personal use was not forbidden; possession for sale was. 20 The 1968 amendment in practical effect made all possession criminal. It specified two categories of possession; possession for 'sale, delivery, or other disposal to another' and other possession. 5 21 Appellants' contention that possession is a necessary ingredient of manufacture is valid only as regards 'other possession' section of the 1968 amendment. The contention is invalid as regards the 1965 amendment, the amendment under which appellants were prosecuted and convicted. 22 Under the 1965 amendment a person may manufacture LSD for his own use or for other lawful purposes. In so doing he does not violate the possession section. Alternatively, it is obvious that a person may unlawfully possess LSD without having manufactured it. 23 Finally, as is the case here, a person may manufacture LSD and unlawfully possess it. The two offenses, however, require different elements of proof. As noted, the 1965 amendment expressly placed on the government the burden of showing possession for an unlawful purpose. In this case, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that the government met that burden. It was apparent the possession of the LSD was for purposes of sale. 24 We are similarly unimpressed with appellants' claim that the legislative scheme did not envision 'a pyramiding of penalties' for manufacturing and possession offenses. Appellants cite nothing in the statutory scheme or the legislative history in support of such a contention. 25