Opinion ID: 56466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant Conduct for Amount of Loss

Text: Adetona maintains that his sentence should reflect only the amount of loss caused by his own, personal conduct rather than that imputed to him from his coconspirators. This would have resulted in a 6-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D) for having caused just over $30,000 in loss rather than the 18level increase he received pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) for the $5.4 million amount of loss attributable to the whole conspiracy.1 Appellant’s conviction was based, in part, upon his participation in a criminal conspiracy, and relevant conduct for determining the applicable sentencing guideline range therefore includes “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). A defendant is accountable under this provision for the conduct of others that was both “(i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 comment. (n. 2). The guidelines make clear that a defendant’s sentence is not limited to those acts committed by that individual, but 1 Adetona does not dispute the amount of loss attributable to the whole conspiracy. He argues instead that he should not be held accountable for the entire amount, but rather only for the loss that resulted from his individual conduct. We, therefore, will not evaluate the appropriateness of the $5.4 million figure. 7 rather should account for the conduct of others participating in a common criminal scheme that was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. To determine what acts of others are reasonably foreseeable to a defendant, the court must engage in a two-prong analysis. United States v. McCrimmon, 362 F.3d 725, 731 (11th Cir. 2004). First, the court must determine the “scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake.” Id. Then, the court must “consider all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” Id. Adetona does not dispute the factual evidence of the scope of his participation in the conspiracy, but rather disputes the conclusions to be drawn from it. He argues that the evidence shows that his participation was limited to the substantive offenses in which he personally acted and that all other acts were at the direction of Adeniran and not on his own initiative. He argues that this means the scope of criminal activity to which he agreed was far below that of the whole conspiracy. We disagree. Adetona points to United States v. Hunter wherein this court held that lowlevel “runners” on the bottom of the conspiracy hierarchy who were “merely aware” that their activities were part of a larger scheme and never assisted in the design or execution of the scheme should not be sentenced based on the amount of 8 loss attributable to the whole conspiracy. 323 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003). Adetona argues that he was a similarly low-level operative and should not be held accountable for the acts of others. The district court found that the scope of Adetona’s involvement in the conspiracy was extensive. Adetona himself participated in many fraudulent acts in this conspiracy. But most important, he was also the right-hand man of Adeniran—the head of the entire Florida operation—and spoke with Adeniran ten times a day. Adetona even acted for Adeniran by managing the operation when Adeniran traveled to Nigeria for months at a time, including contacting the New York and Chicago branches of the organization to continue coordinating the nation-wide conspiracy during Adeniran’s absences. Additionally, Adetona and his wife initiated separate deals of their own, indicating that Adetona’s work expanded the impact of this fraud scheme. Adetona’s high level of involvement in the conspiracy demonstrates that he was more than “merely aware” of the full extent of the conspiracy. Adetona agreed to jointly undertake the acts of others by running the organization for long periods, by directing others in their roles in the operation, and by discussing strategy with Adeniran and with Cheese. The district court did not err by finding that the acts of his co-conspirators were reasonably foreseeable to Adetona. He knew the extent of the scheme, was 9 involved in coordinating the various branches of the scheme, and assisted the Florida leader in executing the extensive operation. His high level of involvement in the scheme shows that it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that the conduct of his co-conspirators at all other levels would have been reasonably foreseeable to Adetona and that, therefore, he should be held accountable for the entire amount of loss attributable to the conspiracy.