Opinion ID: 781207
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress

Text: 83 The supplemental state claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are governed by California law. Under California law, 84 the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: 85 (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by defendant's outrageous conduct. 86 Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, [903,] 820 P.2d 181, 202 (1991) (in bank) (quotations and citations omitted). The conduct must not only be intentional and outrageous, but must also be directed at plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom defendant is aware. Id. 87 Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1454-55 (9th Cir.1996) (alteration in original). Conduct is deemed outrageous if it is `so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.' Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir.1999). 88 We find that our analysis is simplified by addressing these required elements in reverse order. Although the parties failed to do so in their briefs, we find it necessary to consider the claims of each appellant individually. We conclude that none has presented evidence to demonstrate all of the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 89 Seven appellants have not demonstrated severe emotional distress. Severe emotional distress means emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it. Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for So. Cal., 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 192 Cal. Rptr. 492, 497 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants Chong Suk Kim, Gabriela Uribe, Maria Osorio, Silvie Madrigal, and Lourdes Gonzalez each testified only that they felt threatened or scared by the union's conduct. Appellant Angelina Perez testified that she felt nervousness and tension, and was emotionally hurt. Appellant Teresa Wilson-Sloan's testimony includes no references to any distress. None of these injuries rises to the level of severe emotional distress required by California law. 90 Causation is lacking for at least three other appellants. Maria Clark, Maria Aguirre, and Vilma Garcia each testified that her emotional distress was caused by her loss of work, lack of money, or both. Because claims for emotional distress based on loss of work were found to be preempted in the unchallenged holding of the district court, we will not consider such claims. These appellants did not testify that they suffered distress due to the harassing conduct of the union. 91 The remaining five appellants—Maria Ramirez, Tauni Simo, Petra de Leon, Mariana Godina, and Ana Gonzalez—all testified to severe emotional distress that a jury could reasonably find was caused by the union's alleged harassment. The remaining question is whether the conduct of the appellees was outrageous and could be found to be intended to cause emotional distress. In conducting this analysis, we note that none of the appellees could be held liable if UNITE-SW is not liable; UNITE's liability is derivative of UNITE SW's, and the actions of Orea and Guevara may be considered in determining UNITE-SW's liability. 92 Although outrageous conduct is defined by state law, the definition has federal implications. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Farmer found that federal labor law did not preempt IIED claims, but it noted that 93 [o]ur decision rests in part on our understanding that California law permits recovery only for emotional distress sustained as a result of `outrageous' conduct. The potential for undue interference with federal regulation would be intolerable if state tort recoveries could be based on the type of robust language and clash of strong personalities that may be commonplace in various labor contexts. 94 430 U.S. at 305-06, 97 S.Ct. 1056. Thus, the conduct complained of here must be more severe than ordinarily found in a labor dispute. 95 With certain pieces of evidence properly excluded pursuant to the discussion above, the evidence of outrageous conduct presented by each remaining appellant is as follows: 96 &#x2022; Appellant Ramirez testified that Orea told her that she was going to regret her efforts to decertify the union, that both Orea and Guevara told her she would not have work anymore, and that Orea told the workers during a meeting that the war has just begun. She also testified that union representatives visited her house three times, although she was only home the third time, when a union official told her that they would regret signing the decertification petition, and not to be so stupid and believe the employer's promises. 97 &#x2022; Appellant Simo testified that Guevara told the workers they were stupid for supporting the decertification petition, and that without the union, we would be eating just plain shit. She also testified that Orea visited her home (which Orea also confirmed) and told her that if the employer wanted war, he was going to have war and that the union was going to go to battle; that the workers would be sorry for what they had done; that the union would block work from coming into Sorrento and the workers would end up without jobs; and that the union would try to come back by any means. 98 &#x2022; Appellant de Leon testified that Guevara told her that we're stupid and ignorant by not accepting the union because if ... with the union we were eating beans, without the union we were going to eat shit[,] and that we were going to be sorry for that because they were going to take our jobs away. De Leon testified that, on one occasion, the union played loud music out of a van in the Sorrento parking lot. She also testified that union representatives visited her twice at home, and that one told her that if she didn't support the union, she would lose her job because Shapiro would pull the work; that the Sorrento factory would end up closing; and that the workers had to take the union back. When asked whether anyone from the union had harassed her, de Leon only mentioned the comments of Leovigilda Romero. 99 &#x2022; Appellant Godina testified that Guevara told her that with the union we at least were able to eat beans, but without the union we would be eating shit; that the union had withdrawn the Shapiro work; and that if they didn't support the union, they wouldn't have any work. She also testified that union officials mocked the workers by playing a song called `Cardboard Houses' at the Sorrento factory, and that de Leon had told her that the union had been violent during a strike in 1990. 100 &#x2022; Appellant Ana Gonzalez testified that Guevara told her that she would call immigration about the people who didn't have papers; that they were going to be sorry; and that if they had been eating beans, they were going to eat shit. She also testified that union representatives visited her three times at her home, where she has a gate and dog. The first time, a man yelled and screamed her name from the gate, and told her to sign the union card so that they would have work; the second time, a woman shouted and knocked on her fence; the third time she had been notified by a coworker that a union person would be coming, so she just ignored the visit. 101 As the district court found, this evidence simply is not sufficient to support an allegation of outrageousness. The most compelling testimony is Ana Gonzalez's statement that Guevara threatened to call immigration, but there is no evidence that she felt threatened and suffered emotional distress as a result of this comment. 102 The workers cite four cases to suggest that they have shown outrageous conduct, but all are irrelevant or easily distinguishable. See Milne Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F.2d 1401, 1412-13 (9th Cir.1992) (considering preemption but not reaching the substance of the IIED claim); Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 (1993) (same); Kiseskey, 192 Cal.Rptr. at 496 (finding that threats of physical violence or death were outrageous); Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66 Cal.App.3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (1977) (holding that lawyers' false and illegal threat to file criminal charges against a person who wrote a bad check would constitute outrageous conduct). These cases are not persuasive; rather, we find that the union's conduct here is exactly the type of robust language and clash of strong personalities that may be commonplace in various labor contexts. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 306, 97 S.Ct. 1056. As such, it cannot form the basis of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 9