Opinion ID: 2213353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Available Grounds

Text: Issues which were considered or available on appeal are waived in a post-conviction relief proceeding unless the issues may be framed within the context of the post-conviction relief rules. Tope v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 873. Rule PC 1, section 8 provides: All grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition. Any ground finally adjudicated on the merits or not so raised and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding the petitioner has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent petition, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original petition. Lane does little to provide sufficient reason for failing to raise on direct appeal the two errors he now cites. Neither allegation qualifies as fundamental error under in Terry v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085, and neither can be raised as a free-standing claim. Bailey v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 1260. First, Lane alleges fundamental error in the failure of his alibi witness to testify at trial. Lane had attempted to call one Doris Hogan to provide him with an alibi. Hogan was a defendant in a jury trial at the time, and her attorney advised her that her testimony in Lane's trial could prejudice her case. Hogan decided not to testify for Lane. Lane contends that Hogan would have testified that she talked to him on the telephone while he was in Atlantic City, New Jersey, between the dates of August 31, 1979 and September 9, 1979. The robbery occurred on September 6, 1979. Lane does not contend that Hogan would have testified that she placed the calls to Atlantic City, only that she would testify that she received calls from her son, daughter and Lane, whom she believed to be in Atlantic City. Putting to one side the modest probative value of such testimony, Hogan's Fifth Amendment right not to testify made her unavailable. Lane's second allegation of error involves the denial of the jury's request to review the testimony of the three witnesses. During its deliberations, the jury requested transcripts of the testimony of the three bank tellers who identified Lane as the bank robber. The trial judge refused. See, Shaffer v. State (1983), Ind., 449 N.E.2d 1074 (replaying substantially the entire trial was reversible error). Lane contends that the requested evidence was crucial to the jury verdict because the conflicting descriptions impeached the major and only evidence against the defendant. This theory was available on direct appeal, and indeed this Court reviewed the sufficiency of the identification evidence. See Lane, 428 N.E.2d at 30.