Opinion ID: 800991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's QMP Claims

Text: Coburn's first argument on appeal is that the District Court erred when it declined to address and dismissed his claim that his separation under the Qualitative Management Program was unlawful. The District Court refused to consider this claim after finding that Appellant did not expressly raise it in the administrative proceedings under review here. Appellant challenges this finding, arguing that he did expressly raise [the QMP claim] in a 2001 application and the ABCMR expressly incorporated the record of that decision into Mr. Coburn's subsequent ABCMR applications. The ABCMR itself thus preserved the issue. Appellant's Br. at 14. Appellant's argument is belied by the record. Coburn filed applications with the ABCMR in 2001, 2002, and 2006, all of which were denied, in 2002, 2003, and 2007, respectively. His 2001 application was the only one in which Appellant challenged the QMP. And Appellant did not seek judicial review of the Board's 2002 decision rejecting his 2001 application. His current appeal to this court regards only the Board's 2003 Decision and its 2007 Decision, and those decisions did not address issues relating to the QMP because Appellant did not raise the issues in his 2002 and 2006 applications to the Board. We agree with the District Court that Coburn's 2002 and 2006 applications focused on what Coburn described as the improper termination of his MEB. Coburn, 744 F.Supp.2d at 182 (citation omitted). Therefore, the District Court did not err in dismissing Appellant's QMP claim. The well-established doctrine of issue waiver . . . permits courts to decline to hear arguments not raised before the agency where the party had notice of the issue. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1079 (D.C.Cir.2009) (citations omitted). Appellant admits that the application giving rise to the ABCMR's 2003 decision did not specifically address the issue of the Article 15 and his alleged marijuana use. Appellant's Br. at 28. The ABCMR's denial in response to that application, in turn, is based wholly on its findings regarding the MEB. See 2003 Decision at 6, J.A. 82. It is not surprising, then, that Appellant's subsequent 2006 application for reconsideration focused on the very same issue that was the subject of the prior application and denial: the MEB termination. See Req. for Recons., Jan. 5, 2006, J.A. 66. While the application discusses the QMP separation as background, it does not assert that the QMP action was unlawful in its Discussion, see id., J.A. 67-72, posit issues related to the QMP separation as a basis for error, see id., J.A. 66, or request that Coburn's record be amended with regard to these issues, see id., J.A. 64. And the Board's 2007 Decision focuses only on Appellant's MEB claim. Appellant claims that because the QMP issue was raised in his 2001 application to the Board, and the Board expressly incorporated the record of its 2002 Decision into its consideration of Coburn's 2002 and 2006 applications, the Board thus preserved the [QMP] issue. Appellant's Br. at 14. This is a specious argument. The 2001 application and the Board's 2002 Decisionboth of which did address the Article 15 action and the NCOERdo not form the basis of this appeal. See Coburn, 744 F.Supp.2d at 181. Indeed, even Coburn characterizes his claims as having accrued . . . August . . . 2003, and March 7, 2007, when the ABCMR issued final decisions on his applications. Compl. ¶ 14, J.A. 26. Furthermore, it is obvious that an agency's mere incorporation of a prior case record in a pending dispute, without more, does not indicate that the agency intends to revisit the issues previously resolved in the prior case. Indeed, decisional references to records from prior, resolved cases may help to define and limit the scope of the issues in pending cases. It is well understood that [a] reviewing court usurps [an] agency's function [if] it sets aside [an] administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the [agency] of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946). We therefore decline to review Appellant's QMP claim because it was not raised with the ABCMR in the administrative actions that are the subject of this appeal.