Opinion ID: 3049756
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Circumstances of the search

Text: Finally, we consider “the circumstances of the search” to determine whether Hurd’s residence was within the scope of the warrant. Hitchcock, 286 F.3d at 1071. On September 15, 2005, Officer Clifton executed the search warrant with the help of other officers. They stopped and searched Hurd and his vehicle, and Officer Clifton read the entire search warrant to Hurd, including the portion describing Hurd’s residence. Later that day, the officers went to the residence described in the warrant and forced entry because no one was at home. At the residence, Officer Clifton read the entire search warrant to Ms. Clay, an occupant of the apartment who arrived at the scene shortly after the police. Officer Clifton stated that the warrant authorized the search of the residence.5 [4] Hurd does not allege, nor does the record indicate, that the officers committed any procedural misconduct during the search. They confined their search to the specific locations described in the warrant. Officer Clifton kept a detailed record of the seized evidence, all of which was listed among the items authorized for seizure in the warrant. The day after the search, Officer Clifton properly returned the warrant to Judge Douglas G. Beckman, in Judge Kurshner’s absence. On the “Return of Search Warrant” form, Officer Clifton openly stated that the search included the residence as described in the warrant. Neither Judge Beckman nor Judge Kurshner ever 5 The district court found that Officer Clifton did not notice the absence of Judge Kurshner’s initials on the blank line next to the paragraph describing the residence when he read the warrant aloud to Hurd and Ms. Clay. We do not address the legitimacy of this finding because “our inquiry is an objective one, [and so] we need not be concerned with the state of mind of the officer who executed the warrant.” Hitchcock, 286 F.3d at 1072 n.9; see also United States v. Ewain, 88 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant to the determination of whether a search is within the scope of a warrant). UNITED STATES v. HURD 10519 told Officer Clifton, or anyone else, that the officers had gone beyond the scope of the warrant by searching the residence. [5] In sum, “[t]he circumstances surrounding the issuance of the search warrant, the contents of the warrant, and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the warrant” all suggest that the search of Hurd’s residence was within the scope of the search authorized by Judge Kurshner. Hitchcock, 286 F.3d at 1072. The only evidence to the contrary is the absence of Judge Kurshner’s initials from the blank line next to the paragraph describing Hurd’s residence. In light of all the relevant objective factors, most importantly the nature of Officer Clifton’s interaction with Judge Kurshner and her affirmative statement that the warrant was fine, “the record indicates that the only reason the search warrant [lacked Judge Kurshner’s initials] was the court’s inadvertence.” Id.; see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984) (“[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.”). [6] Accordingly, we hold that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Clifton to believe that Judge Kurshner authorized the search of Hurd’s residence, despite her failure to initial the appropriate line on the search warrant.6 6 Hurd argues that we would create an inter-circuit conflict with United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006), by finding that the search of the residence was within the scope of the warrant in this case. However, Angelos is readily distinguishable. Most notably, in that case (1) the search warrant did not include the same locations that were described in the supporting affidavit, (2) the officers searched a location that was not described anywhere on the face of the warrant, and (3) the issuing judge did not give an affirmative indication that the location in question was within the scope of the warrant. Angelos, 433 F.3d at 743-45. 10520 UNITED STATES v. HURD