Opinion ID: 1487028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The binding authority of the Sousa decision.

Text: It is well-settled that where an appellate court has disposed of an issue on appeal, [that issue] will not be considered afresh on collateral attack in a trial court of the same judicial system, absent special circumstances. Doepel v. United States, 510 A.2d 1044, 1045-46 (D.C.1986) (footnote and citations omitted); see also Minick v. United States, 506 A.2d 1115, 1116-17 (D.C.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 836, 107 S.Ct. 133, 93 L.Ed.2d 76 (1986). We are also bound by the related rule that one division of the court cannot overrule the decision of a prior division. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971); Minick, supra, 506 A.2d at 1116-17. This court has not definitively construed the term special circumstances as used in Doepel. In Peoples v. Roach, 669 A.2d 700, 702 n. 5 (D.C.1995), we suggested that [s]uch special circumstances might consist of an intervening change in the relevant law. [23] In United States v. Palumbo, 608 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.1979), the court held that in the absence of [1] newly discovered evidence that could not reasonably have been presented at the original trial, [2] a change in applicable law, [3] incompetent prior representation by counsel, or [4] other circumstances indicating that an accused did not receive full and fair consideration of his federal constitutional and statutory claims, a § 2255 petitioner may not relitigate issues that were adjudicated at his original trial and on direct appeal. Id. at 533 (footnotes omitted; bracketed numerals added). An examination of the four special circumstances or exceptions identified in Palumbo reveals that none of them permits a trial judge to disregard a ruling of the appellate court, or a successor division to second-guess a predecessor division's decision, simply because the trial judge or the successor division disagrees with the earlier division's legal analysis and perceives a constitutional violation where the earlier division found none. [24] On the contrary, each Palumbo exception involves a circumstance which prevented the earlier division, through no legal error of its own, from correctly deciding the constitutional issue. In other words, the special circumstances must be such that, if the original panel had been apprised of them, its decision would have been different. See Minick, supra, 506 A.2d at 1117 (on collateral attack, the defendant must show that the initial ruling is clearly erroneous in light of newly presented facts or a change in substantive law). Any other reading of the phrase special circumstances would undermine the rule of M.A.P. v. Ryan , the doctrine of the law of the case, and the need for consistency which these rules represent. Indeed, if we were to adopt the appellants' argument, then a judge of the Superior Court would be free to rule in 1996 that the Court of Appeals erred in 1979 when the appellate court decided, on the same record, the very question which is now before the Superior Court judge. We know of no authority for such a startling proposition. [25] Of the four Palumbo exceptions, only the firstnewly discovered evidence has any possible application here. The appellants make no claim of a change in applicable law. [26] There is no allegation that their trial counsel were incompetent. [27] Finally, the appellants received a full and fair hearing on their constitutional claim, and they have made no persuasive showing to the contrary. [28]