Opinion ID: 2633459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The majority's utilization of the analysis set forth in Schad is misplaced

Text: In Schad, the United States Supreme Court considered whether it was constitutionally permissible for the state of Arizona to treat premeditated murder and felony murder as alternative means by which to prove the offense of first degree murder. Rejecting Schad's contention that these statutory alternatives constituted separate offenses, the Arizona Supreme Court relied upon its holding in a prior decision, which in turn relied upon State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 646 P.2d 268 (1982). [2] In Axley, the Arizona Supreme Court, looking solely to the text of Arizona's first degree murder statute, held that the statutory alternatives were alternative means of proving a single offense. [3] Axley, 646 P.2d at 277. The Court reasoned that [a]lthough the . . . indictment set forth the two bases delineated in [Ariz.Rev.Stat. § ] 13-1105 for classifying appellant's actions as first degree murder, it charged him with only one crime. [4] Id. I emphasize that although Arizona's practice of treating premeditated murder and felony murder as alternative means of proving first degree murder has substantial historical and contemporary echoes[,] Schad, 501 U.S. at 640, 111 S.Ct. 2491; see also State v. Serna, 69 Ariz. 181, 211 P.2d 455, 459 (1949), the Arizona Supreme Court's resolution of the issue in Axley turned entirely on statutory interpretation. Noticeably absent from its analysis, and in stark contrast to the analysis employed by the majority of this court, is a survey of case law from other jurisdictions, or any discussion about history or degrees of blameworthiness and culpability. In my view, the Axley court quite properly limited its analysis to the statute's plain language because issues such as moral equivalence, blameworthiness, and culpability represent value choices more appropriately left to the legislature. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 638, 111 S.Ct. 2491. The issue in Schad was whether Arizona law in this respect was consistent with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Schad, 501 U.S. at 631, 111 S.Ct. 2491; see also Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 820, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999) (citing Schad for the proposition that the Constitution itself limits a State's power to define crimes in ways that would permit juries to convict while disagreeing about means, at least where that definition risks serious unfairness and lacks support in history or tradition.). The Court did not, as the majority suggests, set forth any test or standard to be utilized in determining whether statutory alternatives delineate separate offenses or alternative means of proving a single offense. Rather, the plurality in Schad expressly deferred to Arizona's decision that premeditated murder and felony murder were not separate offenses. 501 U.S. at 636, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (If a State's courts have determined that certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense, rather than independent elements of the crime, we simply are not at liberty to ignore that determination and conclude that the alternatives are, in fact, independent elements under state law.); see also State v. Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 696 A.2d 944, 957 (1997) (In Schad, the United States Supreme Court deferred to the states' determination that certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense.). The plurality in Schad explained: In the present case . . . by determining that a general verdict as to first-degree murder is permissible under Arizona law, the Arizona Supreme Court has effectively decided that, under state law, premeditation and the commission of a felony are not independent elements of the crime, but rather are mere means of satisfying a single mens rea element. The issue in this case therefore is not whether the State must be held to its choice, . . . for the Arizona Supreme Court has authoritatively determined that the State has chosen not to treat premeditation and the commission of a felony as independent elements of the crime, but rather whether Arizona's choice is unconstitutional. Schad, 501 U.S. at 637, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (internal citation omitted). To determine whether Arizona's choice was consistent with due process, a plurality of the Court referred both to history and to the current practice of other States. Id. at 640, 111 S.Ct. 2491. The plurality also indicated that where statutory alternatives constitute alternative means of committing a single offense, the alternatives must reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability. Id. at 644, 111 S.Ct. 2491. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia disputed that the plurality engaged in an evaluation of moral equivalence, contending that the plurality's analysis ultimately relies upon nothing but historical practices. Id. at 651, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also State v. Fortune, 128 Wash.2d 464, 909 P.2d 930, 933 (1996) (noting that the plurality's approval of Arizona's alternative means for first degree murder rested entirely upon an analysis of history and modern practice.) (emphasis in original). The plurality ultimately concluded that Arizona's choice to define these statutory alternatives as alternative means of proving first degree murder did not fall beyond the constitutional bounds of fundamental fairness and rationality. Id. at 645, 909 P.2d 930. Schad is widely understood to stand not for the proposition set forth in the majority opinion, but rather for the proposition that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require jury unanimity on alternative means of proving a single offense. See, e.g., State v. Derango, 236 Wis.2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833, 841 (2000); State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 981 P.2d 738, 744 (1999); Ex Parte Madison, 718 So.2d 104, 106-07 (Ala.1998); Correa, 696 A.2d at 958; People v. Rand, 291 Ill.App.3d 431, 225 Ill. Dec. 580, 683 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (1997); State v. St. Pierre, 693 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Me.1997); State v. Salazar, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996, 1006 (1997); Richardson v. State, 673 A.2d 144, 146-47 (Del.Supr.1996). For this reason, criminal defendants attempting to distinguish Schad have argued that their particular state legislature did not intend to create statutory alternatives, but rather intended to define separate and distinct offenses. See, e.g., Fortune, 909 P.2d at 931 (Wash.1996) (On facts nearly identical to those in Schad, the criminal defendant argued that the Washington Legislature did not intend to make premeditated murder and felony murder alternative ways of establishing the mens rea element of first degree murder.). The Supreme Court of Oregon has explained: The Supreme Court of the United States determined in Schad that different statutory offenses require separate verdicts, but that the question whether statutory alternatives amount to separate offenses is best answered by an inquiry into legislative intent [.] State v. King, 316 Or. 437, 852 P.2d 190, 193 n. 6 (1993) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority in Klinge made the following erroneous statement, which the majority relies upon in this case: [ Schad ] set forth a test for determining whether alternative mental states merely constitute a means of satisfying a single mens rea element, or instead create separate crimes requiring individual proof. 92 Hawai`i at 586, 994 P.2d at 518. The majority in Klinge further concluded that [t]he appropriate test under Schad appears to be whether the level of verdict specificity required by the instructions was rational and fair, considering history and practice, and the degree of `blameworthiness and culpability. 92 Hawai`i at 586-87, 994 P.2d at 518-19 (citing Schad, 501 U.S. at 637, 111 S.Ct. 2491). The majority continues to misread and misapply Schad in this case. The issue that the majority confronts in III.B.2.a, supra, is whether alternative theories of guilt define separate crimes or may be treated as alternative means of establishing elements of a single offense. Majority opinion at 174, 29 P.3d at 364. In my view, this issue is one of statutory interpretation, see Schad, 501 U.S. at 636, 111 S.Ct. 2491, and our inquiry should focus, first and foremost, on legislative intent. Kaiama, 67 Haw. at 554, 696 P.2d at 842. Nevertheless, the majority resorts to `history and practice' in Hawai`i and other jurisdictions, and whether the alternatives `reasonably reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness and culpability.' Majority opinion at 174, 29 P.3d at 364 (citing Klinge, 92 Hawai`i at 587-89, 994 P.2d at 519-21). Applying this test, the majority engages in a wide-ranging analysis. Quite properly, the majority looks to [t]he language and history of the relevant statutory provisions[.] Majority opinion at 174, 29 P.3d at 364. Quite unnecessarily, the majority considers the history and practice in other jurisdictions. Majority opinion at 175, 29 P.3d at 365. To demonstrate the absurdity of the majority's position, I emphasize two points. First, this is the very analysis employed by a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in concluding that premeditated murder and felony murder may be alternative means of proving first degree murder. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 645, 111 S.Ct. 2491. While I presume that the majority would agree that such is not the case in Hawai`i, it employs a test that purportedly leads to such a result. [5] Second, this court has repeatedly recognized that it may accord greater protection to criminal defendants under the Hawai`i Constitution than that conferred under the United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai`i 143, 146, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (1996) (citing State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 397 n. 14, 910 P.2d 695, 710 n. 14 (1996) (citing State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967))). Inasmuch as the analysis employed by the plurality in Schad concluded that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not preclude a state from employing a statute by which premeditated murder and felony murder are but alternative means of proving a single offense, I submit that Article I, sections 5 and 14 of the Hawai`i State Constitution may mandate a different result. In sum, I fail to the see how the majority can extract from Schad an analysis utilized to determine the outside limits of a states' power to define statutory alternatives as alternative means of proving a single offense, see Schad, 501 U.S. at 637, 111 S.Ct. 2491, and transform that standard into the test to be applied to ascertain the intent of the Hawai`i legislature in enacting the Hawai`i Penal Code. [6]