Opinion ID: 779903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conduct Outside the Heartland

Text: 44 The government's challenge to the first ground for departure requires us to apply the concept of a heartland — the set of typical cases embodying the conduct... describe[d]. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 4(b). In certain instances when the defendant's conduct significantly differs from the norm and is therefore outside the heartland, see id., the sentencing court may depart from the range of sentences set forth in the Guidelines. Id.; see United States v. Sicken, 223 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.2000) (discussing departure on the grounds of conduct outside the heartland). 45 Whether departure is proper depends upon the factors on which the sentencing court relies. Under the Guidelines, certain factors are encouraged as grounds for departure while other factors are discouraged and still others are simply not mentioned in the Guidelines at all. Under Koon, [i]f a factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines, the court must, after considering the structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole, decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's heartland. Koon, 518 U.S. at 93, 116 S.Ct. 2035. 46 Here, the government maintains that this inquiry establishes that, as a general rule, a defendant's lack of awareness of the restrictions on firearm possession set forth in § 922(g)(8) is not sufficient to remove a defendant's conduct from the heartland. The government also contends that, regardless of the general rule, the evidence in this particular record as to Mr. Bayles's alleged lack of awareness is insufficient to warrant departure. 47 In analyzing the government's arguments we first consider the Guideline provision at issue: USSG § 2K2.1. Section 2K2.1 applies generally to Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition. Section 2K2.1 assigns offense levels to firearms offenses based on a variety of factors, including the defendant's prior felony convictions, the kinds of firearms involved, the number of firearms involved, and how the firearm was used. As noted above, § 2K2.1 also provides for a decrease in the offense level if the defendant possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition. USSG § 2K2.1(b)(2). However, § 2K2.1 does not expressly address the defendant's awareness that the possession of the firearm was illegal. See United States v. Jones, 158 F.3d 492, 501 (10th Cir.1998) (discussing the guideline provisions pertaining to § 922(g)(8) offenses and noting that [l]ack of notice is not addressed specifically by the Sentencing Guidelines). 48 In Jones, 158 F.3d at 501-02, we addressed the argument that a defendant's lack of notice of § 922(g)(8) warranted a downward departure pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1. Noting the reduction of the offense level when the firearm was used for lawful sporting purposes, as well as the increase in the offense level if firearm was used in another felony, we concluded: [Section 2K2.1] clearly intended to punish innocent possession and use of a firearm less severely and improper use more severely. Id. at 501 (emphasis added). 49 Applying that distinction between innocent possession and improper use, id., we held in Jones that the defendant's possession was not innocent. We noted that the defendant had been accused of violating a restraining order by approaching his estranged wife's home while carrying a handgun, that the defendant was arrested while in possession of his own handgun, and that he had been convicted in state court of negligent use of a deadly weapon. Accordingly, we concluded that even though the sentencing court had specifically found that the defendant lacked notice of the criminality of his conduct and was unaware that [possession of a firearm] was an offense, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), this lack of notice was not a permissible basis for downward departure. 50 In the instant case, Jones directly supports the government's initial contention in its appeal: the mere fact that Mr. Bayles was unaware that § 922(g)(8) prohibited his possession of firearms after the issuance of the protective order does not remove his conduct from the heartland of § 922(g)(8) offenses under the Guidelines. Under Jones, more than ignorance of the statute is required to warrant a downward departure. 51 That conclusion is also supported by case law construing § 922(g)(8). As the government observes, this circuit, along with every other one that has considered the issue, has concluded that a defendant may be convicted of violating § 922(g)(8) even though he or she did not know that the statute prohibited the possession of a firearm after the issuance of a protective order. See United States v. Reddick, 203 F.3d 767, 770 (10th Cir.2000) (We agree with every circuit court that has considered due process challenges to § 922(g)(8) and conclude that due process does not require actual knowledge of the federal statute.). 3 52 Although these decisions do not directly address the question of downward departure, they do indicate that there is a broad class of defendants convicted of violating § 922(g)(8) who, like Mr. Bayles, have asserted that they were unaware that the statute rendered their possession of firearms unlawful. See Wilson (Posner, J., dissenting) (discussing the large number of persons subject to protective orders who also owned guns and who were probably unaware of § 922(g)(8)'s provisions). These decisions thus suggest that the defendant's lack of awareness of the statute does not establish that his or her conduct falls outside the range of typical conduct of those defendants convicted under § 922(g)(8). 53 The Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.2000) also supports this view. There, in affirming the district court's denial of a request for downward departure based upon the defendant's lack of knowledge of a related statute (§ 922(g)(9)), the court referred to the case as entirely run-of-the-mill. 4 Id. at 969. Despite the defendant's contention that he lacked knowledge that his possession of a firearm violated federal law, the court concluded: Nothing about the circumstances of [the defendant's] offense afforded him less notice than any other offender would have had with respect to the lawfulness of the conduct in question. [The defendant's] conduct is by definition, therefore, not outside the heartland of such offenses. Id. 54 In the instant case, the district court found that Mr. Bayles's ignorance of § 922(g)(8)'s prohibition of firearm possession justified a downward departure. The court pointed to both the state court protective order's failure to cite the federal statute and Mr. Bayles's attorney's professed ignorance of the requirements of federal law, concluding that, at the time he possessed the firearms in question, Mr. Bayles did not know what [he] c[ould] and c[ould]n't do. Aplt's App. at 253. In light of the provisions of USSG § 2K2.1, Jones, circuit decisions construing § 922(g)(8), and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hutzell, we conclude that the district court erred: a defendant's ignorance of § 922(g)(8) does not remove his or her conduct from the heartland and is therefore not a permissible basis for departure. 55 In so concluding, we do not foreclose the possibility that, in a given case, a defendant's ignorance of the prohibition set forth in the statute, combined with additional circumstances demonstrating that the defendant was actually misled into reasonably believing that the possession of firearms was lawful as a matter of federal law, might remove the case from the heartland. For example, if a state court judge actually (but mistakenly) informed a defendant that federal law did not bar the possession of firearms following the issuance of a protective order, or if the defendant's lawyer made such a statement, then a downward departure might be warranted. In such circumstances, the defendant's possession of the firearm might constitute the kind of innocent possession to which we referred in Jones. 56 In this case, however, the record establishes no such circumstances. Although the state court order did not state that Mr. Bayles could not possess a firearm, the order also did not purport to inform Mr. Bayles of the requirements of federal law. Instead, the state court order merely recited the restrictions imposed by the state court judge himself. Similarly, Mr. Bayles's attorney did not inform his client that federal law allowed him to possess firearms following the issuance of the protective order. Instead, Mr. Bayles's attorney stated that he was unsure of the requirements of federal law but that federal laws may require him to not possess firearms and that out of an abundance of caution [he] would recommend [Mr. Bayles] do so. Aplt's App. at 129-130. Apparently, Mr. Bayles chose not to exercise the recommended caution. However, that fact does not establish that he was actually misled about § 922(g)(8) by the state court judge or by his lawyer. 57 Moreover, as the government observes, there is additional evidence in this record indicating that Mr. Bayles's possession of the firearms was not innocent under Jones. In particular, Mr Bayles informed an undercover agent that he had moved many of his firearms as a result of the state court protective order. That fact undermines his assertion that he was entirely unaware of federal restrictions on the possession of firearms. 58 Accordingly, we further conclude that the district court erred in concluding that the particular factual circumstances of this case — the provisions of the state court order and the advice of Mr. Bayles's lawyer — removed Mr. Bayles's conduct from the heartland. See Collins, 122 F.3d at 1303. In light of the district court's error, the case must be remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.