Opinion ID: 2064164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Kidnapping is defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 2901 as follows: (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another a substantial distance under the circumstances from the place he is found, or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation . . . (b) . . . A removal or confinement is unlawful within the meaning of this section if it is accomplished by force, threat, or deception. . . . In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence presented and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. The test is whether the evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 353 Pa.Super. 178, 181, 509 A.2d 394, 395 (1986). See: Commonwealth v. Madison, 501 Pa. 485, 490, 462 A.2d 228, 231 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shaver, 501 Pa. 167, 169, 460 A.2d 742, 743 (1983); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 324 Pa.Super. 420, 424, 471 A.2d 1228, 1229 (1984). While seated in a bar at or about 7:30 a.m. on April 2, 1983, the discussion between appellant and Michael McDonald turned to the unreported rape of appellant's girl friend six years earlier. Appellant requested McDonald to pick up Casmir Stalczynski, who was believed to be one of the rapists, so that appellant could beat the hell out of him. McDonald and his brother proceeded in appellant's car to Stalczynski's home, where they induced him on the pretext of a purported drug purchase to return with them to the bar where appellant was drinking. Upon arrival at the bar, appellant entered the rear seat of the automobile where he began to berate loudly and beat Stalczynski. Appellant then instructed McDonald to drive to appellant's home, and McDonald complied. Stalczynski was blindfolded and forced to lie on the floor of the car, and appellant, to scare his captive, withdrew a pistol, loaded it, and fired a shot into the floor. At the home of appellant, Stalczynski was taken into the basement and ordered to undress. For a period of several hours thereafter, appellant proceeded to punch, kick, slap, beat and scream at his victim. Appellant also stabbed him twice with a bayonnet. During the course of the day, the McDonald brothers left the basement, and other persons also came and went. Finally, when appellant was alone with Stalczynski, he grabbed his victim by the hair, forced him to stand up, tied his hands and shot him in the back of the head. At trial, appellant contended that the gun had discharged accidentally while he was pistolwhipping Stalczynski. In any event, the victim was removed from the basement and placed under a bridge. When found at or about 3:00 p.m., Stalczynski was naked, blindfolded, unconscious, bleeding, and his hands were tied. He died three days later without regaining consciousness. Appellant argues that the evidence failed to show that the victim was unlawfully removed by force, threat or deception or that he was confined in a place of isolation. We reject this frivolous argument. In the first place, there was ample evidence that the victim had been removed to Mease's home both by force and by the threat of force. Moreover, the requirement that the victim be confined in a place of isolation did not require that he be left alone. The concept is not geographical location but rather effective isolation from the usual protections of society. Model Penal Code § 212.1, comment 3. In the instant case, Stalczynski was confined in the basement of appellant's home where discovery and rescue were unlikely. This was a place of isolation within the meaning of the statute. The fact that friends of appellant were present from time to time did not negate the victim's isolation from the usual protections of society. [1] Appellant also argues that the evidence failed to show that the killing was in furtherance of the kidnapping. However, the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b), which define murder of the second degree, require only that the criminal homicide be committed while defendant was engaged as a principal . . . in the perpetration of a felony. The killing of Stalczynski while he was being confined in a place of isolation, and thus during a kidnapping, cannot seriously be questioned. Appellant's reliance upon Commonwealth v. Waters, 491 Pa. 85, 418 A.2d 312 (1980), is misplaced. There the issue was accomplice liability for a killing committed during the perpetration of a burglary. The Supreme Court held that the accomplice, who had not fired the fatal bullet, was entitled to a jury instruction that to be found guilty of murder of the second degree there would have to be proof of a conspiratorial design by the slayer and the others to commit the underlying felony and of an act by the slayer causing death which was in furtherance of the felony.  Id., 491 Pa. at 95, 418 A.2d at 317 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). In the instant case, Mease was the slayer and not merely an accomplice, and it was enough that the evidence showed that he had killed his victim while engaged in committing the crime of kidnapping.