Opinion ID: 31577
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Hearn’s Parole Eligibility

Text: Before the start of trial, Hearn asked the trial court to include the following jury instruction: Regarding the law of parole, you are instructed that a prisoner under sentence of death is not eligible for parole. A prisoner serving a life sentence for a capital felony is not eligible for release on parole until the actual calendar time the prisoner has served without consideration of good conduct time, equals 40 calendar years. Prior to closing argument, the trial court denied Hearn’s request to include this instruction in the jury charge. According to Hearn, the trial court should have informed the jury, which had to consider whether he would pose a future danger to society, that he would not be eligible for parole for 40 years if he was not sentenced to death. In support of his argument, Hearn relies primarily on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that [i]n assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration of the defendant’s prison sentence is indisputably relevant. Holding all other factors constant, it is entirely reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a defendant who is eligible for parole as a greater threat to society than a defendant who is not. Indeed, there may be no greater assurance of a defendant's future nondangerousness to the public than the fact that he never will be released on parole. The trial court’s refusal to apprise the jury of information so crucial to its sentencing determination . . . cannot be reconciled with our well-established precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause. In Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000), a four-justice plurality of the Supreme Court held that “[t]he parole-ineligibility instruction is required only when, assuming the jury fixes the sentence at life, the defendant is ineligible for parole under state law.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote: “Simmons entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury that he is parole ineligible where the only alternative sentence to deat h is life without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 181 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Taken together, the plurality and concurring opinions in Ramdass indicate that the Simmons parole 7 eligibility instruction is only required when the only alternative sentence to the death penalty is life without parole. As Hearn concedes, Texas does not provide for the possibility of life without parole. If he had not been sentenced to death, Hearn would have been eligible for parole in 40 years. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the jury instruction requested by Hearn, for he had no right to a Simmons instruction. Alternatively, to hold that Hearn was entitled to a parole eligibility jury instruction, this Court would have to announce a new rule of constitutional procedure. Id. at 166, 181. Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1989), this Court may not announce new rules of constitutional procedure on collateral review. Therefore, Hearn’s claim as to the parole eligibility jury instruction is Teague-barred.