Opinion ID: 1264099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the majority test

Text: Under Justice Burnett's test, in which I join, Type II and Type III machines are clearly unconstitutional. The majority, on the other hand, advises that under its test, Type II and Type III machines are not unconstitutional lotteries. However, I believe that even under the test proposed by the majority, the federal district court can conclude that Type II and Type III machines constitute a lottery under our Constitution. The majority concludes that the video gaming machines are not unconstitutional lotteries because they do not involve (1) a drawing and (2) tickets or other indicium of entitlement to a prize. Although the majority finds that the video gaming machines do not involve a drawing, the majority fails to consider that the machines at issue here function in the same manner as most modern popular lotteries. These popular lotteries involve a random generation of numbers to determine the winning combination. The drawing does not depend upon the number of people playing the lottery. As such, single person play would not negate the fact that a drawing takes place. Similarly, in this case, all of the video gaming machines are microprocessor based devices with random number generators. A player wins if the right combination of numbers is generated by the machine. Thus, a drawing occurs by the machines' random generation of numbers, irrespective of the number of people playing. As for the second requirement of tickets, even the majority recognizes that the definition of tickets should take into account modern technology. The majority states in footnote 10 of its opinion that [e]lectronic ticketing would not necessarily preclude finding a lottery where electronic registration is the functional equivalent of a lottery ticket.... In the instant case, although a player does not receive an actual ticket or token prior to playing the game, his opportunity to win is symbolized by the activation of the machine upon the insertion of money and the compilation of his credits or plays displayed during the game. Upon the insertion of money, the machines reveal the player's monetary credit with that game. The machines keep track of the player's initial credit and any free plays the player wins during his game. These credits are what the player exchanges with the store owner for cash. There is no practical difference between a physical ticket evidencing the right to play for a prize and an electronic representation of such a right in the form of free play credits. Furthermore, the right to receive the cash prizes from the machine owners is physically represented by the ticket the player receives when he cashes out a game. That prize amount is limited by statute. Finally, although the majority opinion does not discuss the requirement of chance, it is patently clear Type II and Type III video machines would satisfy even a pure chance standard. As stated in the Order of Certification, all of the machines are microprocessor based devices with random number generators. The random selections occur independent of the control or direction of the player, regardless of the player's skill, knowledge, or experience. (Ord. p. 6-7). The bottom line is that a player cannot alter the probabilities inherent in the play of Type I, Type II, or Type III video machine games. (Ord. p. 10). Thus, in my view, under any of the tests proposed today, Type II and Type III video game machines are illegal lotteries under the South Carolina Constitution. Of course, the final application of the law to the facts of this case rests wholly within the discretion of the federal district court. It may very well be that the federal district court, having asked our advice on the application of our lottery test to the facts before it, will accept the advice of the majority. I simply express the view that these opinions give the federal district court a range of choices.