Opinion ID: 2995132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Buchmeier’s Request for Special

Text: Interrogatories Buchmeier’s final argument on appeal contests the district court’s denial of his request that special interrogatory verdicts be submitted to the jury for each firearm listed in the indictment. He claims that these special interrogatory verdicts were needed because each firearm charged is a separate element of a separate crime. Thus, Buchmeier argues that the jury should have been required to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for each firearm. Additionally, Buchmeier asserts that because the special interrogatory verdicts were not submitted to the jury, he is unable to determine which firearm he was convicted of possessing and receiving. This result, he contends, is so manifestly unfair that it violates the Constitution’s notions of due process and fundamental fairness. We do not agree. The Supreme Court has explained that a jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proven each element of a crime. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 143 L. Ed. 2d (1999). Given our discussionregarding the appropriate unit of prosecution for sec. 922(g)(1) and sec. 922(j), we conclude that the district court correctly instructed the jury that it only needed to find that Buchmeier had possessed or received, depending on the charge, one of the firearms listed in each count in order to satisfy the elements of those violations. As we have explained, the focus of these provisions is upon the individual defendant and the actions taken by the defendant to acquire firearms. A convicted felon is to be prosecuted under sec. 922(g)(1) not for the number of firearms he possesses, but instead for each transaction or acquisition by which that defendant has attempted to arm himself. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 232-33 (7th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Jester, 139 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) (Congress enacted sec. 922(g)(1) in order to keep firearms out of the hands of those persons whose prior conduct indicated a heightened proclivity for using firearms to threaten community peace and the ’continued and effective operation of the Government of the United States.’) (citation omitted). Likewise, a defendant receiving stolen firearms is to be prosecuted under sec. 922(j) not for each of the stolen firearms that the defendant receives in a single transaction, but instead for each transaction or instance by which that defendant receives another stolen firearm or group of stolen firearms. See, e.g., McFarland v. Pickett, 469 F.2d 1277, 1278-79 (7th Cir. 1972). Thus, it is sufficient in this case that the jury was required to unanimously find that Buchmeier possessed one of the firearms listed in each of the counts of the indictment against Buchmeier./4 Buchmeier is correct in noting that the jury’s verdict form did not inform him as to the specific firearms the jury found him to have possessed. Indeed, this general verdict required us to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence for each firearm listed in the indictment when reviewing Buchmeier’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We also recognize the possibility of a situation where a defendant is convicted of one count of violating sec. 922(g)(1) but that such a large number of firearms are listed in the count that the defendant’s inability to know which firearms he was convicted of having possessed creates such a burden on that defendant’s ability to appeal his conviction that it would be problematic. However, we do not find such a situation in this case. Only three firearms were listed in Counts I and III, and seven firearms were listed in Counts IV and VI. Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial indicated that Buchmeier acquired these firearms in groups, through three transactions, further enabling Buchmeier to focus his efforts in challenging his conviction on appeal. Finally, the evidence indicating Buchmeier possessed these firearms came from a limited number of sources, primarily four witnesses, as is demonstrated by his challenge in this appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, Buchmeier’s inability to know which firearms the jury found him to have possessed does not violate constitutional notions of due process.