Opinion ID: 2978318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: applicable restitution statute

Text: Whether a restitution order is permitted under the law is subject to de novo review. United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 849 (6th Cir. 2006).
Elson argues that the district court erred in applying the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (“MVRA”). Elson first contends that the district court’s use of the MVRA to determine the amount of restitution violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Second, Elson maintains that application of the MVRA to determine the amount of restitution he owes is contrary to the terms of his plea agreement.
The MVRA, passed as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, amended the Victim Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (“VWPA”), and made restitution mandatory for offenses against property under Title 18, “including any offense committed by fraud or deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). The MVRA applies to convictions on or after April 24, 1996—the effective date of the statute—subject to constitutional limitations. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 211, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996); see also United States v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 661 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The statutory notes under 18 U.S.C. § 2248 provide that the MVRA, including § 3663A, are to be effective to the extent constitutionally possible for . . . cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after April 24, 1996.”). No. 07-3778 United States v. Elson Page 7 Applying the MVRA to determine restitution for a crime committed prior to the effective date of the statute—even where a defendant’s conviction occurs after the effective date of the MVRA—implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 662. Although some circuits have held that restitution is not punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, see, e.g., United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 537-38 (7th Cir. 1998), this Circuit has concluded that restitution imposed under the MVRA constitutes punishment, and that “where an act was committed prior to the effective date of the MVRA, the retroactive application of the MVRA to that act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Schulte, 264 F.3d at 662. Elson argues that determining restitution pursuant to the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because his relevant criminal activity—selling St. Paul’s judgment to McPeak in 1995—occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. However, in addition to engaging in criminal activities in 1995, Elson admitted, pursuant to his plea agreement, to conspiring to obstruct a grand jury investigation beginning in 1998, after the MVRA’s effective date. Specifically, count three of the third superseding indictment, to which Elson pled guilty, charged that “[b]eginning in or about May 1998 and up through the date of this indictment, . . . [Elson] did unlawfully and knowingly conspire . . . to corruptly endeavor to obstruct and impede the due administration of justice .” (J.A. 143.) Moreover, Elson’s conduct in advising St. Paul to sell its judgment to a Schultz nominee at a substantial discount was part of the larger conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud to conceal Schultz’s assets from creditors that continued through 2000. “[T]he ex post facto clause is not violated when a district court orders restitution under the MVRA for related but uncharged conduct that is part of a . . . scheme occurring prior to and continuing past the MVRA’s effective date.” United States v. Grice, 319 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the district court’s application of the MVRA to determine Elson’s restitution obligation did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. No. 07-3778 United States v. Elson Page 8
Elson also argues that the restitution order must be vacated because his plea agreement states that restitution will be determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A), the provision applicable to Elson’s offenses prior to the enactment of the MVRA. Based on his plea agreement, Elson contends that the district court “was precluded as a matter of law from . . . sentencing Elson pursuant to the [MVRA].” (Def.’s Reply Br. 2.) Thus, Elson argues that the district court did not comply with the terms of the plea agreement, and that it therefore exceeded its authority. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth three types of plea agreements: (1) a plea agreement in which the government agrees to dismiss other charges; (2) a plea agreement where the government recommends that a particular sentencing range is appropriate; and (3) a plea agreement in which the government and defendant agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). Where the parties agree that a particular sentence is appropriate, the court is bound by that agreed-upon disposition. See United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that, under certain circumstances, once a court accepts a plea agreement, it is “bound by the bargain” the parties reached). However, Rule 11(c) specifically provides that a “recommendation or request” that the court apply a particular sentence or sentencing range “does not bind the court.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B). In this case, the parties did not agree on an appropriate sentence. Instead, the plea agreement provides that the “the Court is not a party to and is not bound by this Plea Agreement or any recommendations or stipulations contained herein, including any stipulations to which the parties may agree.” (J.A. 203.) The government and Elson further agreed that the “sentence will be imposed in accordance with the United States Sentencing Guidelines” and that “the Court has jurisdiction and authority to impose any sentence . . . . and that the final determination concerning sentencing rests within the sole discretion of the Court.” (J.A. 202.) Accordingly, the district court was not bound by the plea agreement, and the plea agreement did not prohibit the district court from No. 07-3778 United States v. Elson Page 9 determining restitution pursuant to the MVRA. We therefore conclude that the district court properly applied the MVRA in sentencing Elson.