Opinion ID: 770877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' Claims of Qualified Immunity

Text: 30 1. Whether Plaintiff Alleges Violation of a Constitutionally Protected Right - Does Section 541.22 Create a Protectable Liberty Interest? 31 In order to determine whether Tellier has stated a claim for procedural due process violations, 3 we must determine:  '(1) whether the plaintiff had a protected liberty interest in not being confined . . . and, if so, (2) whether the deprivation of that liberty interest occurred without due process of law.'  Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Bedoya, 91 F.3d at 351-52). As we have recognized previously, after the Supreme Court's decision in Sandin, our determination of whether the plaintiff had a protected liberty interest in not being confined also requires a two-part analysis. Id. (citing Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). 4 As a result of Sandin, a prisoner has a liberty interest only if the deprivation . . . is atypical and significant and the state has created the liberty interest by statute or regulation. Id. at 52. 32 First, we examine whether the alleged deprivation was atypical and significant. We have previously held that whether a plaintiff's confinement satisfies the atypical and significant hardship requirement involves factual determinations. See Miller, 111 F.3d at 8-9. Here, Tellier has alleged a confinement of 514 days under conditions that differ markedly from those in the general population, and we cannot conclude as a matter of law that this confinement was not atypical and significant. See Wright v. Coughlin, 132 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating and remanding grant of summary judgment where district court failed to consider length and conditions of segregated confinement). Thus, defendants cannot support their motion to dismiss on this issue. 33 Second, we must examine whether the state has created a liberty interest by statute or regulation. See Sealey, 116 F.3d F.3d at 51. In conducting this examination, we have held that Sandin abandoned the framework established in Hewitt for analyzing whether a prisoner who is subjected to a disciplinary confinement had been deprived of a liberty interest. Frazier, 81 F.3d at 317 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483). Sandin, however, rejected only the portion of Hewitt stating that the use of 'explicitly mandatory language,' in connection with the establishment of 'specified substantive predicates' to limit discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty interest. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989) (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472) (emphasis added). Thus, we have construed Sandin to mean that a state may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added). Furthermore, we have recognized that nothing in the Sandin decision indicates that the Court intended to create a per se blanket rule that disciplinary confinement may never implicate a liberty interest. Miller v. Selsky, 111 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1997). 34 We note that there is some debate among courts as to whether Section 541.22 creates a protectable liberty interest. Compare, e.g, Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (We . . . hold that § 541.22 does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest), Moore v. Ham, No. 92-3305, 1993 WL 5874, at  (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 1993) (unpublished decision) ([Plaintiff's] assertion that 28 C.F.R. § 541.22 grants him a liberty interest in remaining in general prison population is not supported by the law of this jurisdiction.), and Awalt v. Whalen, 809 F. Supp. 414, 416 (E.D. Va. 1992) ([Sections 541.22 and 541.23] do not create a liberty interest in release from detention which a hearing would protect.), with, e.g., Muhammad v. Carlson, 845 F.2d 175, 177-78 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating in dicta, prior to Sandin, that Section 541.22-23 is couched in 'unmistakably mandatory' language, and intimating that it would therefore give rise to a protectable liberty interest), and Maclean v. Secor, 876 F. Supp. 695, 701-02 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ([Sections 541.22 and 541.15] are sufficient to confer a liberty interest here . . . .). 35 After conducting the Hewitt/Sandin analysis with respect to Section 541.22, we conclude that Section 541.22 creates a liberty interest. Under Hewitt, courts considering the existence of an alleged liberty interest must ascertain whether statutes or regulations require, in 'language of an unmistakably mandatory character,' that a prisoner not suffer a particular deprivation absent specified predicates. Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 392 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72). We find that Section 541.22 contains such mandatory language and therefore creates a protectable liberty interest in not being confined. 36 In reviewing the text of Section 541.22, we find its text replete with words such as shall, unless, and only. Although the mere use of these words is neither dispositive nor talismanic, it supports plaintiff's argument that the Bureau of Prisons intended to guide the decision making power of prison officials by requiring that certain prerequisites be met and certain procedures be followed whenever a prisoner was subject to segregated housing. This conclusion is most strongly supported by the last sentence of Section 541.22(c), which instructs that [t]he SRO shall release an inmate from administrative detention when reasons for placement cease to exist. 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(c)(1) (emphasis added). 37 Defendants argue that Section 541.22 does not create a protectable liberty interest because the procedural protections outlined in the Section are not designed to determine whether the prisoner meets any of the standards for placement in administrative detention as set forth in Section 541.22(a)(1)-(6). Appellants' Reply Br. at 8. Rather, defendants argue that the procedure is designed to monitor the condition and adjustment of the prisoner in administrative detention. Id. 38 Defendants contend that the mandatory language used in Section 541.22 might indeed require certain hearings and reviews, but that these hearings and reviews concern the mental and physical condition of the inmate, not the decision to place or keep him in detention. Appellants' Reply Br. at 9. They argue that these hearings are such that they cannot reach a result that requires a prisoner be returned to the population, and therefore that plaintiff has no liberty interest in receiving such hearings. 39 In fine, Defendants argue that the Warden's decision regarding a prisoner's placement in SHU is discretionary. Defendants further argue that the discretion that the Warden has in electing to place a prisoner in administrative detention affords him or her the discretion to continue a prisoner's segregation. Appellants' Br. at 20. As such, under the Court's decisions in Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the prisoner would have no liberty interest in the hearings and reviews described in Section 541.22 because the Warden always has the discretion to have a prisoner housed in a segregated unit. Cf. Olim, 461 U.S. at 249 (If the decisionmaker is not 'required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria,' but instead 'can deny the requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all,' the State has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest.) (citation omitted) (quoting Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466-67 (1981)). 40 We agree with defendants that the Warden's initial decision to place a prisoner in SHU is, in applicable cases, an entirely discretionary decision. Because the regulation at issue clearly indicates that the Warden's decision to place a prisoner in SHU is discretionary as long as certain predicates are satisfied, see 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(a)(1)-(6), a prisoner has no protected liberty interest that is violated when the Warden removes him or her from the general population. 5 41 We cannot, however, take the leap urged upon us by defendants. Whatever discretion the Warden might have in placing a prisoner in SHU, the discretion surrounding this decision is not boundless and continuing. While subsection (a) of Section 541.22 may be read to afford the Warden discretion in placing a prisoner in SHU, subsection (c) clearly provides for certain hearings and reviews that constrain the Warden's discretion in maintaining a prisoner in SHU and further commands that [t]he SRO shall release an inmate from administrative detention when reasons for placement cease to exist. 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(c)(1). 42 We also reject defendants' argument that the procedures in Section 541.22 are not linked to the duration of a prisoner's term in SHU, or defendants' related contention that Section 541.22 does not contain mandatory language related to placement or continued confinement. See Appellants' Br. at 23. Section 541.22 explicitly states that [a]dministrative detention is to be used only for short periods of time . . . or where there are exceptional circumstances, ordinarily tied to security or complex investigative concerns. 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(c)(1). While it is undisputed that plaintiff's placement in SHU was occasioned by security concerns after he allegedly attempted escape on two occasions, and thus that his case may be one of those in which longer periods in SHU is permitted, the next sentence of the regulation is designed to limit even longer stays. The regulation provides that [a]n inmate may be kept in administrative detention for longer term protection only if the need for such protection is documented by the SRO. 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(c)(1). 43 In context, we read this directive, alongside Section 541.22's required personal interviews, written reports, and psychiatric or psychological assessments, to mean that Section 541.22's procedures are designed to ensure that a prisoner is kept in SHU for no longer than is necessary. We therefore cannot accept defendants' reading of the regulation as contemplating simply the monitor[ing] of an inmate; such monitoring would amount to a needless exercise were it not designed to provide officials with information to evaluate whether continued segregation was warranted. Section 541.22(c) mandates that the SRO release a prisoner from segregated housing when the reasons for confinement cease to exist; we fail to see how this directive is infused with even a modicum of discretion. 44 Defendants also argue that Tellier is mistaken in relying on certain provisions in Section 541.22 as preconditions for confinement, Appellant's Br. at 20 (citing Appellee's Br. at 22), because such a focus is mistakenly premised on Hewitt's approach to analyzing liberty interests later abandoned by Sandin. We disagree with defendants' articulation of the effect of Sandin on cases involving prisoners and prison regulations. Defendants argue that Sandin rejected the portion of Hewitt that emphasized examination of regulations for mandatory language and substantive predicates, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480-81, in order to determine whether a regulation created a protected liberty interest. As we have stated in previous cases, we do not read Sandin to have so radically undone the tenets of Hewitt. See Sealey, 116 F.3d at 52 (noting that even after Sandin, courts must determine whether the state has created a liberty interest by statute or regulation). While the Supreme Court noted that Sandin represented an abandonment of Hewitt's methodology, it also carefully noted that it was not overruling Hewitt and declared that the Court was returning to the principles set out in Wolffand Meachum. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 n.5. 45 In returning to the approach used in Wolff and Meachum, the Supreme Court shifted the emphasis of the inquiry from the strict language of the statute to an analysis of the right safeguarded by the statute. Read together, Sandin, Wolff, and Meachum, all support the proposition that a statute or regulation which involves state-created right[s], Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, creates a protectable liberty interest when an official's failure to adhere to the statute results in an atypical, significant deprivation, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, of real substance, Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, and not simply ephemeral and insubstantial violations. Mecum, 427 U.S. at 228. 46 In this case, we find that Section 541.22 contains mandatory language that gives rise to a state-created right, and since we agree with the district court that Sandin requires a factual determination regarding the nature of Tellier's confinement, defendants' motion to dismiss was properly denied at this point in the litigation. See Miller, 111 F.3d at 9 (stating that district courts must examine the circumstances of a confinement to determine whether that confinement affected a liberty interest.). 47 2. Whether the Right Allegedly Violated Was Clearly Established 48 Defendants also contend that regardless of whether Section 541.22 creates a liberty interest, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Under the so-called discretionary function immunity, officials are immune from suits for damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Even in cases where such rights are clearly established, qualified immunity . . . protects a government official 'if it was objectively reasonable for [the official] to believe that his acts did not violate those rights. Russell v. Coughing, 910 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987)). 49 Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, however, the defendants bear the burden of showing that the challenged act was objectively reasonable in light of the law existing at that time. Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815)). Furthermore, qualified immunity does not act as a shield for individuals who knowingly violate the law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see also Catanzaro v. Weiden, 140 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1998). We therefore must examine whether defendants have met their required burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of a clearly established right or that it was reasonable, as a matter of law, for defendants to take the actions that plaintiff alleges they took. 50 To determine whether Tellier's liberty interest was clearly established, we must look to the state of the law as it existed between 1992 and 1994, when the events in question allegedly occurred. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. For a right to be clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, it is sufficient if decisions of the Supreme Court or of the appropriate circuit have defined the contours of the right with reasonable specificity. Russell, 910 F.2d at 78 (citing Francis v. Coughing, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Furthermore, a law is considered clearly established so long as this circuit's decisions 'clearly foreshadow' a particular ruling on the issue. Varrone, 123 F.3d at 79 (quoting Shabazz v. Coughing, 852 F.2d 697, 701 (2d Cir. 1988)). Thus, the absence of a decision by this Court or the Supreme Court directly addressing the right at issue will not preclude a finding that the law was clearly established, Shabazz, 852 F.2d at 701, at the time of the alleged violation. 51 Applying these principles to the regulation at issue here, Section 541.22, we conclude that Tellier's procedural due process rights in defendants' adhering to the regulation were clearly established. At that time, this Court had already clearly stated that a prisoner's federal due process rights were implicated by even a ten-day confinement period. See Russell, 910 F.2d at 79 ([D]efendants could not have reasonably believed that releasing Russell on his tenth day of confinement without providing any notice or opportunity to be heard complied with the requirements of federal due process.). Additionally, our decision in Wright v. Smith reaffirms that as early as 1983, prison officials [could not] doubt that they have acted unconstitutionally where confinement . . . continued, without a hearing, for 67 days. 21 F.3d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing cases). 52 While we recognize that this line of cases deals with prisoners in state facilities, these decisions are grounded in federal due process rights. These cases readily establish that the use of terms such as must and shall in prison regulations give rise to a federally protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Russell, 910 F.2d at 79. Even though this Court had not ruled specifically that Section 541.22 created a protectable liberty interest prior to the alleged events in question, such a decision was clearly foreshadowed, Varrone, 123 F.3d at 79, by our prior precedents. See also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) ([A] general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though 'the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.' ) (quoting Anderson, 417 U.S. at 640). 53 3. Whether Defendants' Actions Were Objectively Reasonable 54 Defendants also argue that they are shielded by qualified immunity because at the time of their alleged actions, no objectively reasonable actor could have known that he or she was violating a prisoner's constitutional rights by not adhering to Section 541.22. According to defendants, the only courts to have considered whether Section 541.22 creates a liberty interest have concluded that it did not do so. Defendants also cite decisions subsequent to the alleged occurrence in this case as support for their argument that no objectively reasonable official could have known that his or her actions were unlawful. 55 We reject these arguments. First, we cannot accept the notion that qualified immunity confers protections on officials in cases where the officers may have knowingly violate[d] the law. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. Assuming that Tellier's allegations are true, as we must at this stage of this litigation, defendants confined him to SHU for a period of 514 days without affording him any of the procedural protections outlined in Section 541.22. Had defendants confined Tellier for a brief period without a required hearing, we might be inclined to agree that no objectively reasonable officer could have known that such a minor infraction constituted a violation of Tellier's constitutional rights. Indeed, the cases that defendants maintain support their arguments for qualified immunity all concern relatively brief periods of confinement. See, e.g., Crowder, 74 F.3d at 814 (three months); Awalt v. Whalen, 809 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Va. 1992) (91 days); Rowe v. Hurley, No. 94-2343, 1995 WL 375861, at  (7th Cir. June 7, 1995) (unpublished decision) (ten months); Franklin, 1994 WL 559228, at  (69 days and 183 days); Moore, 1993 WL 5874, at  (three days); Eggleton v. Gluch, No. 89-1927, 1990 WL 155316, at  (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1990) (six months). 56 In this case, however, whatever good faith belief that the officers might have held regarding a brief deprivation of Tellier's rights under Section 541.22, it is simply unreasonable for any official to believe that a continuing violation of 514 days without a required hearing was permitted by Section 541.22. As we stated in an earlier case concerning a similar New York State statute: 57 With regard to the officials' claim to qualified immunity for impairment of the liberty interest in the pending case, we note that the New York regulation itself gave the officials clear notice that confinement could not be continued beyond 14 days without a hearing. Morever, we had said as early as 1977 that prison authorities could confine an inmate for his own safety as long as a hearing follows as soon as is practicable. Whether or not that requirement would suffice to overcome a qualified immunity defense as to a modest period of confinement without a hearing, it surely leaves prison officials in no doubt that they have acted unconstitutionally where confinement has continued, without a hearing, for 67 days. 58 Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The principle established in Wright-that a period of 67 days in SHU without hearings when such hearings were required by regulation at 14 days violates due process-surely applies a fortiori in this case, where Tellier allegedly was confined for 514 days without hearings when such hearings are required at seven days and again every 30 days. 59 While qualified immunity properly protects officials who operate in areas of legal uncertainty and who act with a good faith belief that their behavior comports with constitutional and statutory directives, we simply cannot accept that it would ever confer protections on egregious violations of a federal regulation. This Court will not confer immunity on any official who glaringly disregards the very regulations that he or she is entrusted to discharge dutifully and in good faith. 60 We also reject defendants' contentions that decisions from other courts in which the courts found that Section 541.22 did not create a liberty interest somehow confer immunity on their actions in this case. First, many of the decisions cited by defendants are unpublished decisions by distant circuits. It stretches the bounds of credulity for prison officials to claim that they could not have known their acts violated a clearly established right because they were aware of decisions from courts in Kansas, Kentucky and Oklahoma that are only available on electronic databases. 61 Defendants' citation of these cases does, however, present a more difficult point that requires us to examine these cases with a closer lens. If, after all, a court of presumably reasonable jurists reads a regulation as not establishing a protectable liberty interest, why should prison officials, who are less likely to be trained in legal analysis, be held liable for failing to reach the opposite conclusion. A close examination of these decisions, however, reveals that they are inapposite. 6 62 For example, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Moore, 1993 WL 5874, at , cited by defendants, offers no support for their arguments. In Moore, the plaintiff was held in SHU for a period of no more than three days, id., and was provided with a record review by the SRO on the third day as required by Section 541.22. See id. The thrust of plaintiff's claim in Moore was not so much that defendants violated his procedural rights under Section 541.22, but rather was that defendants fabricated the rationale given for detention. Id. As the Moore court noted Section 541.22 would not have entitled Moore to a hearing until he had spent seven continuous days in detention, id., and since Moore had not alleged that he had spent such a period, the court affirmed the district court's order of dismissal. This case has little or no bearing on the analysis in the case before us because it did not consider the question at issue here, namely, whether not providing plaintiff with a hearing on the seventh day of his confinement, and during the 507 days thereafter, violated his rights under Section 541.22. 63 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Eggleton, 1990 WL 155316, at , is similarly at odds with the law of this Circuit. See Wright, 21 F.3d at 500. In fact, Eggleton, an unpublished and nonbinding decision, is also squarely at odds with later Sixth Circuit precedent. See Mackey v. Dyke, 29 F.3d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir. 1994) (reversing and remanding district court's grant of qualified immunity where [a] district court within this circuit concluded in 1981 that prison officials denied an inmate's right to due process by failing either to return him promptly to the general population or to follow the same procedures for placing him there originally if they decided not to release him). We hold that a three-judge panel's unpublished opinion that was later disapproved simply does not establish reasonableness as a matter of law. Cf. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 596 (2d Cir. 1999): The district court, in a thoughtful and thorough opinion . . . held that the individual defendants' actions . . . complied with procedural due-process requirements. While such a conclusion would not entirely preclude us from finding that the individual defendants' actions violated plaintiffs' 'clearly established right,' the district court's determination . . . that no such right existed helps persuade us that [at the relevant time] the right was not 'clearly established.' (Emphasis added.) 64 Thus, defendants have failed to point to either a decision of this Court or the Supreme Court, or even another circuit court, that would support a reasonable conclusion that their actions were not in contravention of Tellier's constitutional rights. We therefore conclude that defendants have not met their burden of establishing their qualified immunity defense as a matter of law. The district court correctly denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.