Opinion ID: 2637049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver and Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel

Text: Forest Oil nonetheless protests that Cook Inlet Keeper either is barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel from arguing for project-specific review or waived its right to raise this argument by failing to raise it below. [27] Neither argument has merit. Res judicata precludes subsequent litigation of a claim that could have been brought during a prior administrative or judicial adjudication that resulted in a final judgment. [28] Here, as already noted above, the state conducted a consistency review in connection with the EPA's general permitting process for Cook Inlet discharges; that review addressed a distinct project and had a markedly different scope than the specific project addressed in the state's separate consistency review of the Osprey project. As a practical and legal matter, Cook Inlet Keeper could not have litigated the proposed Osprey project's specific consistency with the Coastal Program in the procedural context of the general permit's consistency review. Moreover, Forest Oil identifies nothing from the record of the state's review process of the general permit that served timely notice on Cook Inlet Keeper or other interested parties that its consistency determination in that proceeding would not be subject to case-specific re-evaluation as part of the usual review process that would later be required for any newly proposed exploration project involving discharges covered by the general permit. Nor does Forest Oil point to any specific issue of fact or law that was actually and necessarily decided in the former review proceeding so as to collaterally estop Cook Inlet Keeper from raising any issues it sought to assert in the Osprey project's review proceedings. There are three necessary elements to a claim of collateral estoppel: (1) the issue decided in a prior adjudication was precisely the same as that presented in the action in question; (2) the prior litigation must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) there must be mutuality of parties, i.e., collateral estoppel may be invoked only by those who were parties or privies to the action in which the judgment was rendered. [29] Here, even assuming that Forest Oil satisfied its burden of establishing the second and third elements, it has failed to establish the first. [30] Forest Oil fares no better with its waiver argument. In Trustees for Alaska v. State, Dep't of Natural Resources, we stated that a party must meaningfully raise an issue in administrative proceedings so as to preserve it for appeal by alerting the agency to the party's position and contentions. [31] Here, in soliciting public comment on the Osprey project, the state noted that, if the general permit was finally approved before the conclusion of the Osprey project's consistency review process, Forest Oil would rely on the EPA general discharge permit rather than on the project-specific permit it had requested. By the time public comments were due, the EPA general permit had been finally approved. Responding to the state's request for comment, Cook Inlet Keeper's comment acknowledged that the general permit covered the Osprey platform's discharge activities but argued that the state had authority to apply more stringent state-law standards. The comment expressly noted the facial inconsistency between the Osprey project's discharge activities and the Coastal Program's general habitat standard. [32] It went on to emphasize that the project's location would require compliance with the habitat standards governing estuarine and offshore areas. [33] The comment further reminded the state that Forest Oil bore the burden of proving compliance with the applicable standards: Regardless of the standard applied, the applicant carries the burden of showing compliance with the ACMP, and at a minimum, the applicant must make a conclusive showing of `no harm' in order to prove the project will `maintain' habitat and fisheries. [34] In our view, these comments easily sufficed to alert both the state and Forest Oil to Cook Inlet Keeper's contentions and position. True, they only implicitly asserted Cook Inlet Keeper's present contention that Alaska law required a separate, project-specific consistency determination. But when it submitted its initial comment, Cook Inlet Keeper had no obvious need to advance a more elaborate argument on this point: before the Osprey project's public comment period closed, the state gave no express notice of its intent to completely omit the Osprey's discharge activities from the scope of the project's consistency review determination. Given the apparently unprecedented nature of this omission, Cook Inlet Keeper can hardly be faulted for failing to predict the state's position. Finding no ground to sustain Forest Oil's claims of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or waiver, we must vacate the final consistency determination and remand for a new consistency determination that considers the Osprey's discharge activities within the scope of the project's overall consistency review. [35]