Opinion ID: 2651135
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to reopen Raymond's deposition

Text: The district court originally imposed a deadline of December 16, 2011 for the completion of depositions. Pina allowed the deadline to lapse and then sought permission to amend her complaint to include a failure to rehire claim. The district court allowed the amendment and set a second deposition deadline of January 26, 2012. On January 24, 2012, Pina's counsel deposed Raymond in his capacity as a representative of TCP pursuant to -9- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6).5 Subsequently, Raymond submitted a four-page errata sheet to correct and clarify his testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e), which gives a deponent the opportunity to review a deposition transcript and, if there are changes in form or substance, to sign a statement listing the changes and the reasons for making them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e)(1). Pina argued that the changes to Raymond's deposition testimony were material and necessitated the reopening of his deposition, but the district court disagreed, giving rise to Pina's argument that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to reopen Raymond's deposition. By way of support, Pina cites Tingley Sys., Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 120 (D. Mass. 2001) for the proposition that a deposition may be reopened where the changes contained in the errata sheets make the deposition incomplete or useless without further testimony. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Pina points to three changes in Raymond's testimony that she believes show that re-opening was required.6 In the first 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) provides in relevant part that a party may name as the deponent a . . . corporation . . . and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The [corporation] must then designate one or more . . . persons who consent to testify on its behalf . . . . The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the [corporation]. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). 6 Pina also correctly notes that a party served with a proper Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) notice must produce a -10- instance, Raymond changed his answer to a question regarding whether those reapplying with TCP are interviewed from Yes, sometimes to Yes, when we have a qualified applicant and an open position. Second, when asked whether the Associate Handbook or Code of Conduct stated that the punishment for disruptive and disorderly behavior was suspension and termination, Raymond originally said I don't know. His revised answer stated that [u]nacceptable behavior may result in disciplinary action ranging from counseling sessions to immediate discharge as stated in our Associate Handbook. Finally, Pina directs us to Raymond's testimony that Henry had called him saying that she received this and didn't know what to make of it. In response to the question [d]idn't know what to make of what, Raymond originally said [t]he allegation that she had applied for the assistant manager witness who can testify as to facts known or available to the corporate deponent on the matters specified. She then complains that Raymond was not prepared to discuss either vacancies at TCP stores to which Pina did not apply or what Pina herself said when reapplying, and that the district court was therefore required to strike his testimony as if he had not appeared. Pina, however, never sought to preclude Raymond's testimony, neither area of inquiry was identified with reasonable particularity in the 30(b)(6) notice, and -- even if this Circuit elected to adopt a rule that a 30(b)(6) witness's severe unpreparedness could constitute constructive non-appearance -- Pina has fallen well short of showing constructive non-appearance in this case. See Baker v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 670 F.3d 119, 124 (1st Cir. 2012) (declining to create a 30(b)(6) exception to the rule that sanctions for non-appearance are only available when a deponent literally fails to show up for a deposition session in a case where evidence of unpreparedness was limited) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). We need say no more on this subject. -11- position, and she had gone to MCAD. Raymond's revised answer stated: She was confused. She (Ms. Henry) had no idea Ms. Pina had applied for an Assistant Manager position at Downtown Crossing, which did not have an Assistant Manager opening, and she (Ms. Pina) was alleging discrimination or retaliation because she was not hired. We did not have an Assistant Manager opening at Downtown Crossing. Pina thus concludes that reopening was required since the changes were material, not mere 'corrections' of stenographic errors, and because she needed to explore the myriad inconsistencies in Raymond's testimony. In seeking to advance her argument, Pina has lost sight of the law. Rule 30(e) does not limit a party to the correction of stenographic errors; it permits changes in form or substance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e)(emphasis added); Glenwood Farms, Inc. v. Ivey, 229 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D. Me. 2005) (Changes in the substance of a deponent's testimony are contemplated by the rule.). When witnesses makes substantive changes to their deposition testimony, the district court certainly has the discretion to order the depositions reopened so that the revised answers may be followed up on and the reasons for the corrections explored. See Tingley, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (permitting reopening where revisions materially alter[ed] the answers such as to render those portions of the deposition incomplete absent further testimony). Here, though, Pina is unable to establish that the district court abused -12- that discretion. The changes at issue constituted clarifications or corrections consistent with Raymond's original testimony. For example, Raymond's original deposition testimony -- like his revised answers -- included statements to the effect that interviews would not be conducted absent job openings, that there were no available ASM positions at the Downtown Crossing store when Pina applied, and that the Associate Handbook prohibited Pina's behavior. In sum, any changes to Raymond's deposition testimony were either not substantive or were not material to the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Pina's motion to reopen Raymond's deposition.