Opinion ID: 4530920
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: McNeill

Text: With the challenge to McNeill, the trial court found that defendant had presented a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court then conducted a full Batson hearing. At the third stage, the trial court considered all of the evidence presented and arguments made, and ultimately determined defendant had not - 22 - STATE V. HOBBS Newby, J., dissenting proven that the State purposefully discriminated in peremptorily challenging McNeill. The burden of proof was on defendant to prove discriminatory intent. In making its decision, the trial court made the following findings: (1) the State had exercised eight of its peremptory challenges to excuse black prospective jurors and passed the same number of black prospective jurors to defendant; (2) when asked whether he could impose the death penalty, McNeill had equivocated on his responses and expressed a general preference for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole; (3) McNeill had family members with anxiety issues; (4) that in his position as a pastor, McNeill dealt with individuals who had drug problems; and (5) when compared with Rosas, who the State also excused, both McNeill and Rosas expressed hesitancy about imposing the death penalty. Significantly, the only specific prospective juror comparison that defendant argued to the trial court was that of McNeill to Rosas. These race-neutral reasons found by the trial court have a direct bearing on the issues presented in this case and McNeill’s duties as a prospective juror. While McNeill’s equivocation about the death penalty may not have risen to a level sufficient for the State to challenge him for cause, McNeill’s reservations on the death penalty relate to an essential part of the case. Moreover, given defendant’s extensive mental health and substance abuse concerns presented in detail at trial, certainly the trial court did not clearly err by determining that these types of connections, especially that McNeill worked directly with individuals with similar concerns as - 23 - STATE V. HOBBS Newby, J., dissenting defendant, fairly informed the State’s decision to exercise a peremptory challenge. Thus, the trial court appropriately considered the evidence and arguments presented to it and held that the State did not intentionally discriminate in exercising a peremptory challenge to remove McNeill from the jury. Applying the correct standard of review, the trial court’s decision to reject defendant’s Batson challenge of McNeill was not clearly erroneous. In order to justify its remand, the majority recites what it characterizes as “three legal errors” committed by the trial court. First, it holds that “in evaluating the defendant’s Batson challenge, the number of peremptory challenges exercised by the defendant are not relevant to the State’s motivations.” That is not true. When considering the totality of the circumstances, the ultimate racial composition of the jury is directly impacted by the defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges to excuse minority prospective jurors. Second, the majority says the trial court erred because it “did not explain how it weighed the totality of the circumstances surrounding the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, including the historical evidence that [defendant] brought to the trial court’s attention.” However, the trial court thoroughly evaluated all of the evidence presented and each of defendant’s arguments and set forth its reasons in finding that there was no racial discrimination by the State. Notably, the historical evidence was argued by defendant at the prima facie showing phase regarding the first two jurors. It was not part of the argument regarding McNeill during the third - 24 - STATE V. HOBBS Newby, J., dissenting stage. The majority creates a new legal standard by requiring the trial court to explain how it weighed an argument that was not presented. Third, the majority holds “the trial court misapplied Miller-El II by focusing only on whether the prosecution asked white and black jurors different questions, rather than also examining the comparisons in the white and black potential jurors’ answers that [defendant] sought to bring to the court’s attention.” With this holding, the majority finds that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by not addressing arguments that defendant failed to present to them. The comparison to Stephens presented by the majority was not presented to the trial court or the Court of Appeals. The majority says that the Court of Appeals “failed to conduct a comparative juror analysis, despite being presented with the argument by” defendant. Notably, the entirety of defendant’s comparative juror analysis at the Court of Appeals was as follows: the “circumstances the State said were reasons for striking African-American jurors also fit white jurors the State accepted as jurors.” Defendant carries the burden of making arguments to the trial court and the appellate courts, and he advanced no argument about any specific comparative juror analysis to the either court. It is not the role of the appellate court to peruse the trial transcript and formulate new arguments for defendant that he did not make at trial or on appeal. The majority cannot realistically say that the trial court or the Court of Appeals should have addressed factually specific arguments that defendant himself did not make. - 25 - STATE V. HOBBS Newby, J., dissenting Importantly, the standard of review for reviewing Batson challenges is whether the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Lawrence, 352 N.C. at 14, 530 S.E.2d at 816 (quoting State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 433, 407 S.E.2d 141, 148 (1991)). This Court is not a trial court. It should not make factual determinations based on a cold record. Furthermore, it should not create arguments not presented to the trial court or the Court of Appeals. The trial court did not clearly err by determining that defendant had not shown that the State purposefully discriminated in exercising its peremptory challenges. As such, the trial court’s determination as to those prospective jurors should be upheld. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. - 26 -