Opinion ID: 152605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard for pregnancy-discrimination claims

Text: Spees contends that JMI discriminated against her on the basis of her pregnancy on two separate occasions: (1) when she was transferred to work in the tool room, and (2) when she was terminated. The district court concluded that Spees had failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination on the first claim because the tool-room transfer was not deemed an adverse employment action. It further determined that, although Spees established a prima facie case of discrimination regarding her termination, she was unable to show that JMI's proffered justification for the firingDr. Mueller's note restricting Spees to bedrest and Spees's exhaustion of her medical leavewas pretextual. The court thus granted summary judgment to JMI on both claims. Spees brought her pregnancy-discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII and the KCRA. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Because of sex as used in Title VII includes because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). [W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. Id. The KCRA likewise prohibits discrimination against pregnant women. See Ky.Rev.Stat. §§ 344.030(8), 344.040(1). And the KCRA is similar to Title VII of the 1964 federal Civil Rights Act and should be interpreted consistently with federal law. Ammerman v. Bd. of Educ. of Nicholas County, 30 S.W.3d 793, 797-98 (Ky.2000); see also Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91 S.W.3d 583, 586 (Ky.2002) (observing that because the provisions of the KCRA are virtually identical to those of the Federal act[,] ... in this particular area we must consider the way the Federal act has been interpreted (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). As an initial matter, we must determine the proper analytical framework to apply to Spees's pregnancy-discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage of the case. The district court analyzed both claims pursuant to the burden-shifting framework first announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as amended by Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Under that familiar tripartite analysis, a plaintiff seeking to survive summary judgment on a Title VII claim must overcome the following hurdles: First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (citations omitted). The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Subsequent cases, however, have held that a different standard applies to so-called mixed-motive claims. Such claims are based on the plaintiff's allegation that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). Allegations of discriminatory conduct thus fall into one of two categories: single-motive claims, where an illegitimate reason motivated an employment decision, or mixed-motive claims, where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the employer's decision. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 396 (6th Cir.2008). This court in White held that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework does not apply to mixed-motive claims. Id. at 400. Instead, a Title VII plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for the defendant's adverse employment action. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff's burden of producing evidence to support a mixed-motive claim is not onerous and should preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record is devoid of evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff's claim. Id. Although portions of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework might be useful in presenting a mixed-motive claim, the White court made clear that compliance with the ... shifting burdens of production is not required in order to demonstrate that the defendant's adverse employment action was motivated in part by a consideration of the plaintiff's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. at 401 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate question in a mixed-motive analysis is simply whether there are any genuine issues of material fact concerning the defendant's motivation for its adverse employment decision, and, if none are present, whether the law ... supports a judgment in favor of the moving party on the basis of the undisputed facts. Id. at 402. Inquiries into what motivated an employer's decision are very fact intensive and will generally be difficult to determine at the summary judgment stage. Id. (citation omitted). This relatively lenient summary judgment standard is counterbalanced by potential restrictions on a plaintiff's recovery for a mixed-motive claim. Under Title VII, a plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim is entitled only to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs where the employer demonstrates that it would have taken the same employment action in the absence of an impermissible motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Plaintiffs must give proper notice when bringing mixed-motive claims. Hashem-Younes v. Danou Enters. Inc., 311 Fed.Appx. 777, 779 (6th Cir.2009) (affirming the district court's application of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework where the plaintiff failed to raise a mixed-motive claim in her complaint or in her response to the defendants' summary judgment motion, and the record was utterly silent as to mixed motives). Spees provided such notice of her mixed-motive claims in the district court. As stated in her complaint, both discrimination claims alleged that Spees's pregnancy was a motivating factor in [JMI]'s treatment of her. (Emphasis added.) She also specified in a footnote to her motion for summary judgment that she was bringing mixed-motive claims and was using the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework in her motion only because of uncertainty regarding the proper analysis of mixed-motive claims on a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Finally, Spees reiterated that she was pursuing mixed-motive claims under Title VII in her reply in support of her motion for summary judgment/response to JMI's motion for summary judgment. We therefore conclude that Spees provided adequate notice of her mixed-motive claims. In light of this notice, the district court's failure to apply the White analytical framework was in error. To properly analyze Spees's claims, we need determine only whether JMI took an adverse employment action against Spees and whether her pregnancy was a motivating factor for the adverse action. See White, 533 F.3d at 400. Each of Spees's claims is addressed below with the White framework in mind.