Opinion ID: 6215901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The showing required to reopen an appeal

Text: {¶ 51} Up until today, we have been clear about the requirements to reopen an appeal. Under App.R. 26(B) and our existing precedent, an applicant must make a colorable showing of two things to reopen his appeal: (1) that appellate counsel performed deficiently and (2) that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the appeal would have been different. In the first step, the applicant 18 January Term, 2022 submits an application to reopen his appeal. State v. Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102, 2020-Ohio-6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, ¶ 12. Our inquiry in this first step asks whether the applicant has demonstrated “a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.” State v. Spivey, 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 701 N.E.2d 696 (1998). If the claim is found to be colorable, the application moves to the second step—the appeal is reopened and proceeds in the ordinary course. Simpson at ¶ 13. We are concerned here with the first step, the threshold question of whether Leyh has established a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. {¶ 52} We recently reaffirmed that we apply the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to determine whether an application for reopening presents a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Simpson at ¶ 14; see also App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). The first prong of this test is concerned with deficiency: counsel’s performance must have been objectively unreasonable. Simpson at ¶ 14, citing Strickland at 687. The second prong looks for prejudice: the applicant must show a “reasonable probability that the result of the appeal would have been different but for counsel’s error.” Simpson at ¶ 14, citing Strickland at 688, 694. Establishing a genuine issue as to ineffective assistance of counsel requires a colorable showing as to both Strickland prongs. See Simpson at ¶ 12; App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). {¶ 53} The two-pronged Strickland standard is reflected in the language of App.R. 26(B). An application to reopen must include a sworn statement of both (1) “the basis for the claim that appellate counsel’s representation was deficient” and (2) “the manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.” App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). {¶ 54} The prejudice requirement “arises from the very nature    of the right to    effective    representation.” (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). Thus, “[c]ounsel cannot be ‘ineffective’ unless his mistakes have harmed the 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO defense (or, at least, unless it is reasonably likely that they have)” and a violation of the right to effective representation “is not ‘complete’ until the defendant is prejudiced.” Id. B. Leyh has failed to make a colorable showing that counsel’s deficient performance affected the outcome of his appeal {¶ 55} I agree with the majority that Leyh has met the first part of the test for reopening an appeal: he has made a colorable showing that his counsel was deficient for failing to supply record materials that would allow the court to evaluate the merger argument. The problem, though, is that Leyh has not satisfied the second part. He has not set forth anything to indicate that he was prejudiced by this failure. {¶ 56} Under the second-prong of the test, Leyh must make a colorable showing that his prior counsel’s deficient performance “ ‘prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.’ ” Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102, 2020-Ohio-6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, at ¶ 12, quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). To meet this prong, Leyh was required to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the result of the appeal” would have been different absent his prior counsel’s deficient performance. (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 14, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. {¶ 57} And here, Leyh offers nothing. He does not contend that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had the omitted materials been included in the record. All Leyh submitted in his application was his counsel’s affidavit. And the only statement in the affidavit that even comes close to dealing with prejudice is the following: “It is my opinion that appellate counsel’s nonfeasance prejudiced Mr. Leyh, as otherwise the Court of Appeals would have considered the merits of the appellate brief on a complete record, instead of an incomplete record.” 20 January Term, 2022 {¶ 58} This statement falls far short of the requirement that Leyh make a showing that counsel’s deficient performance “ ‘prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Simpson at ¶ 12, quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). At best, all Leyh argues is that there is a possibility that the omitted materials might have changed the result of his appeal. Thus, if we follow the rule and our precedent, Leyh’s application to reopen should be denied. C. The Majority Reads the Prejudice Requirement Out of the Rule {¶ 59} The majority acknowledges App.R. 26(B)(2)(d)’s threshold requirement “that an applicant set forth the manner in which his original appellate counsel ‘prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.’ ” Majority opinion, ¶ 29, quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). It says that requirement is satisfied here because the failure to include a transcript precluded the court of appeals from considering the merits of the appeal. Id. {¶ 60} But an inability to consider the merits of an argument does not necessarily equate with prejudice. As the rule itself makes clear, something is prejudicial only when it “affect[s] the outcome of the appeal.” (Emphasis added.) App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). The affidavit submitted by Leyh’s attorney makes no assertion that a transcript would contain anything that would affect the outcome of the appeal. Indeed, Leyh’s application is entirely bereft of any substantiation that he lost his appeal because of his attorney’s deficiency. Thus, under the plain terms of the rule, Leyh has failed to present grounds to reopen the appeal. {¶ 61} The majority also makes much of the fact that App.R. 26 creates a two-stage process, with an applicant required at the first stage to present only a genuine issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. It is true, of course, that an applicant need not definitively prove that he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel at the initial, reopening stage. But what he must do is present at least a colorable claim both that counsel was deficient and that the deficiency “ ‘prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.’ ” Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 102, 2020-Ohio-6719, 172 N.E.3d 97, at ¶ 12, quoting App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). So there has to be something in the record beyond mere speculation that counsel’s deficiency caused prejudice. Here, the problem is not that the appellate court required Leyh to prove the merits of his ineffective-assistance claim to reopen the appeal. The problem is that Leyh did not submit any evidence of prejudice at all. Without any evidence of possible prejudice, Leyh cannot meet the colorable-claim requirement. {¶ 62} The majority’s approach ignores the requirement set forth in our rule and affirmed by our precedent that the application for reopening include a sworn statement explaining “the manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.” App.R. 26(B)(2)(d); see Simpson at ¶ 12. This requirement is consistent with the directive in App.R. 26(B)(5) that “[a]n application for reopening shall be granted if there is a genuine issue as to whether the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal.” (Emphasis added.) As the 1993 Staff Notes to App.R. 26(B) explain, “[t]he term ‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ is intended to comprise the two elements set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,] that is, deficiency in the representation and prejudice resulting from such deficiency.” The fatal flaw in the majority’s holding—and the basis for the court of appeals’ denial of Leyh’s application—is that Leyh’s application failed to set forth how the outcome of his appeal had been affected by his counsel’s deficient performance. Absent such a showing, Leyh failed to establish even a colorable claim for reopening under the rule. {¶ 63} The majority suggests that the need to make a colorable claim of prejudice puts Leyh in a catch-22 because the sentencing-hearing transcript is not a part of the record precisely because of his counsel’s deficient performance. But an application for reopening is a postconviction remedy collateral to a direct appeal, which means an applicant may attach to his application material that is not a part 22 January Term, 2022 of the trial record. See Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 9, 11-12, citing App.R. 26(B)(2)(e). Under App.R. 26(B)(2)(e), an applicant must provide with his application “[a]ny parts of the record available to the applicant and all supplemental affidavits upon which the applicant relies.” (Emphasis added.) The rule clearly envisions a scenario in which a defendant seeking to reopen his appeal may need to supplement an incomplete record to show a genuine issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. {¶ 64} There is nothing that prevented Leyh from ordering the transcript of the sentencing hearing for use in connection with his application for reopening. And if the omitted portions of the trial record did in fact demonstrate that an alliedoffense argument would have had merit, Leyh could have attached the relevant portions of the trial record to the affidavit he filed with his application for reopening. {¶ 65} The majority also posits that there may be situations in which a defendant may not be able to obtain a transcript to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance. But the affidavit submitted by Leyh’s attorney does not indicate that that is the case here. And even if that had been the case, nothing precluded Leyh from submitting other materials in an attempt to meet his burden to show “the manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal.” App.R. 26(B)(2)(d). For example, in her sworn statement, Leyh’s attorney could have explained why, based on her review of the case file, the offenses should have merged. Or Leyh might have included an affidavit from his trial attorney providing insight into the factual underpinnings of each offense and an account of what had transpired during the sentencing hearing. Quite simply, Leyh failed to make any attempt to present a colorable claim of prejudice, and instead insisted that prejudice should be presumed. Because Leyh did not make the required showing as to the “manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of the appeal” 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO as required by App.R. 26(B)(2)(d), the court of appeals properly denied his application to reopen.