Opinion ID: 2269150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Writ of Review

Text: ¶ 17 A writ of review is an extraordinary remedy granted by statute, State ex rel. Gebenini v. Wright, 43 Wash.2d 829, 830, 264 P.2d 1091 (1953). It should be granted sparingly. City of Seattle v. Williams, 101 Wash.2d 445, 455, 680 P.2d 1051 (1984). We review the superior court's decision whether to grant a writ of review de novo. Commanda v. Cary, 143 Wash.2d 651, 654, 23 P.3d 1086 (2001) (citing Sunderland Family Treatment Servs. v. City of Pasco, 127 Wash.2d 782, 788, 903 P.2d 986 (1995)). ¶ 18 It is well established that the meaning of a statute is a question of law we also review de novo. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 168 Wash.2d 694, 704, 229 P.3d 791 (2010). Our goal in interpreting a statute is to carry out the legislature's intent. Burns v. City of Seattle, 161 Wash.2d 129, 140, 164 P.3d 475 (2007). As noted in the preceding section, we first examine a statute's plain language. Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d at 263, 226 P.3d 131. If a statute is unambiguous after a review of its plain meaning, our inquiry is at an end. Id. A statute is ambiguous, however, when it is `susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,' but `a statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable.' Estate of Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc., 166 Wash.2d 489, 498, 210 P.3d 308 (2009) (quoting State v. Hahn, 83 Wash.App. 825, 831, 924 P.2d 392 (1996)). ¶ 19 The legislature has established factors governing whether a writ of review should issue. See RCW 7.16.040. [9] Two independent prongs must be satisfied before a court can grant a statutory writ of review. The writ shall issue when an inferior tribunal has (1) exceeded its authority or acted illegally, and (2) no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law exists. Unless both elements are present, the superior court has no jurisdiction for review. Commanda, 143 Wash.2d at 655, 23 P.3d 1086. The statute governing writs of review provides in full: Grounds for granting writ. A writ of review shall be granted by any court, except a municipal or district court, when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void proceeding, or a proceeding not according to the course of the common law, and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. RCW 7.16.040. ¶ 20 The phrase acting illegally in the first prong of RCW 7.16.040 is far from a model of clarity. For example, the phrase could mean only an excess of jurisdiction; more broadly, it could also signify any erroneous or faulty ruling of the trial court. It is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations and, accordingly, it is ambiguous. Estate of Haselwood, 166 Wash.2d at 498, 210 P.3d 308. While we have encountered the phrase before, we have not settled its meaning. See, e.g., Commanda, 143 Wash.2d at 655-56, 23 P.3d 1086 (mentioning the phrase acting illegally, but in dicta). ¶ 21 Jacob contends the City should be able to obtain a writ of review only ... when the lower court decision is a patent error such that the ruling is so obviously against the course of common law as to essentially result in an excess of jurisdiction. Pet. for Discretionary Review at 8. [1] The City, on the other hand, argues petitioners should be able to obtain a writ of review to correct any error of law. Answer to Mot. for Discretionary Review at 7. [11] ¶ 22 To date the Court of Appeals has conducted the most in-depth analyses of the words acting illegally for purposes of RCW 7.16.040. A conflict exists regarding whether the phrase means merely a legal error or something more. Court of Appeals Divisions One and Two have held writs may lie to correct clear errors of law. Division Three has embraced a more stringent approach. State v. Epler, 93 Wash.App. 520, 969 P.2d 498 (1999) (Div. Three) and City of Seattle v. Keene, 108 Wash.App. 630, 31 P.3d 1234 (2001) (Div. One) provide the most recent and penetrating examinations; they also disagree. But both followed closely on the heels of Washington Public Employees Ass'n v. Washington Personnel Resources Board, 91 Wash.App. 640, 959 P.2d 143 (1998) (WPEA) (Div. Two). ¶ 23 The WPEA court held statutory writs of review can lie to remedy errors of law. It found the phrase acting illegally cannot mean only acts that exceed the court's jurisdiction, because such an interpretation would render other phrases in RCW 7.16.040 redundant. Division Two observed: To interpret acting illegally narrowly to include only acts that violated procedural requirements would render the phrase superfluous; acting illegally would merely describe conduct already encompassed within the statutes' phrases exceeded jurisdiction or erroneous or void proceeding. RCW 7.16.040. But we are not to interpret statutes so as to render any language superfluous. Thus, we assume that the Legislature intended the phrase `acting illegally' to include acts in addition to those already encompassed in exceeded jurisdiction or erroneous or void proceedings. WPEA, 91 Wash.App. at 653, 959 P.2d 143. ¶ 24 In Epler, Division Three denied relief to a petitioner alleging clear error of law. At trial Epler moved to dismiss a DUI charge pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b). After the trial court denied his motion, Epler sought a writ of review in superior court. His affidavit alleged that the district court committed a `clear error at law, [for] which there is no remedy.' Epler, 93 Wash.App. at 522, 969 P.2d 498 (alteration in original). The superior court granted the writ and dismissed the DUI with prejudice. Id. On discretionary review, the Court of Appeals commented that a writ of review could not issue to correct errors of law because a lower court does not act illegally by committing legal error. Id. at 525, 969 P.2d 498. Instead, the court limited writs to cases where the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction. [A] merely erroneous ruling is not an act in excess of the court's jurisdiction, and therefore no writ lies. Id. at 524, 969 P.2d 498 (emphasis omitted). ¶ 25 The Epler court's discussion of whether a court's legal error satisfies the acting illegally prong of RCW 7.16.040 is dicta. See Keene, 108 Wash.App. at 635, 31 P.3d 1234. Epler was decided on other grounds; namely, the availability of appeal under the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ). Epler, 93 Wash.App. at 525, 969 P.2d 498. If an adequate remedy at law exists, the second prong of RCW 7.16.040 fails and the writ cannot lie. Accordingly, Epler's brief discussion of the first prong of RCW 7.16.040i.e., whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegallyhad no role in deciding the case. Moreover, Epler relies on cases that discuss the writ of prohibitionnot the writ of reviewto arrive at its result. [12] Its precedential value in this area is not robust. ¶ 26 Division One followed WPEA to arrive at its decision in Keene. The court squarely addressed whether, for purposes of RCW 7.16.040, a court act[s] illegally when it commits an error of law. It held that correcting a legal error is, in fact, the sole purpose of a writ of review. Keene, 108 Wash.App. at 639-40, 31 P.3d 1234. Neither a writ of mandate nor a writ of prohibition is authorized to correct errors of law. The writ of review, on the other hand, is for just that purpose. Id. Keene specifically rejected Epler's assertions to the contrary. Id. at 632, 31 P.3d 1234. Keene cited with approval our case of Williams, 101 Wash.2d 445, 680 P.2d 1051, in which we upheld, after reviewing substantive errors of law, a writ for interlocutory review of an order denying a jury trial. While the Williams court indicated interlocutory writs should issue sparingly, it nonetheless implicitly authorized their use to correct errors of law when appropriate. Id. at 455, 680 P.2d 1051. ¶ 27 Jacob contends our holding in Commanda precludes permitting writs of review to remedy mere legal errors. He cites the following language (which the court borrowed from Epler ): If the court has subject matter jurisdiction, a merely erroneous ruling is not an act in excess of the court's jurisdiction, and therefore no writ lies. The court's exercise of discretion is not reviewable by extraordinary writ. Pet. for Discretionary Review at 9 (quoting Commanda, 143 Wash.2d at 656, 23 P.3d 1086). He suggests the Court of Appeals decision must surrender to our precedent. Id. Commanda discusses a merely erroneous ruling in a section of the opinion that summarizes the City's argument. Commanda, 143 Wash.2d at 655-56, 23 P.3d 1086. The language paraphrases the City's position; it does not reflect the position of the court. [13] ¶ 28 While none of these opinions serves as a silver bullet for the issue before us, we find their discussions helpful in arriving at a workable standard. We recognize that the phrase acting illegally is ambiguous. Our purpose is to construe the statute to effect the legislature's intent. With this in mind, we believe the purpose served by a writ of review is sufficiently similar to that served by interlocutory review that the criteria should inform each other. After all, the only method of review of interlocutory decisions in courts of limited jurisdiction is still the statutory writ. Williams, 101 Wash.2d at 455, 680 P.2d 1051. ¶ 29 We hold that, for purposes of RCW 7.16.040, an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, acts illegally when that tribunal, board, or officer (1) has committed an obvious error that would render further proceedings useless; (2) has committed probable error and the decision substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; or (3) has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of revisory jurisdiction by an appellate court. ¶ 30 We borrowed this formula from our rule governing interlocutory review, see RAP 13.5(b), and that governing discretionary review of a trial court decision. See RAP 2.3(b). [14] These standards for granting the statutory writ of review under the acting illegally prong lie somewhere between the standards sought by each party here. They are not so strict that the writ applies merely to cases that exceed jurisdiction. Nor are they so lax that the writ applies only to correct mere errors of law. In any event, these standards are specific and stringent. Geoffrey Crooks, Discretionary Review of Trial Court Decisions Under the Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure, 61 Wash. L.Rev. 1541, 1545 (1986). They are also simple and straightforward. Id. at 1554. ¶ 31 They also make sense from a historical perspective. When this court adopted the RAPs in 1976, they completely replaced all prior rules governing appellate procedure. Id. at 1541; see RAP 2.1(b). [15] In fact, [t]he former procedures for seeking review, particularly interlocutory review, by extraordinary writs of review, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and other writs formerly considered necessary and proper to the complete exercise of appellate and revisory jurisdiction, were superseded. The drafters' comment explains that the intent behind this change was to simplify and clarify this part of appellate practice. As the comment notes, [r]eview by way of extraordinary writ under the former rules has been the most confusing of all the appellate procedures, and precedent for almost any arguable position can be found. Crooks, supra, at 1541 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting former RAP 2.1(b) & cmt. b (1976)). By applying the standards espoused in the RAPs to courts of limited jurisdiction, we ensure the principles governing review are consistent throughout the review process. It would make little sense to apply a much different standard, because the RAPs themselves were adopted, in part, to streamline and clarify the writ morass. Id. Most importantly, these standards comply with our overarching dogma regarding writs of review, namely, that they are extraordinary remedies granted sparingly. Williams, 101 Wash.2d at 455, 680 P.2d 1051. ¶ 32 Finally, we note that these standards do not conflict with the other grounds articulated in RCW 7.16.040. They are also not redundant. The writ may still issue independently of the acting illegally grounds if an inferior tribunal, board, or officer (1) exceeds its jurisdiction, (2) to correct erroneous or void proceedings, or (3) a proceeding not according to the course of the common law, and if there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. See RCW 7.16.040.