Opinion ID: 195655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: challenges raised separately by flynn

Text: Appellant Flynn challenges the court's denial of his motion for continuance of trial to enable him to seek retained counsel, filed on September 25, 1992, as well as the court's refusal of his motion to reconsider, filed on the first day of trial, October 5, 1992. This Court will review the denial of Flynn's motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 1094 (1990). The record indicates that Flynn first requested, and was granted, the right to seek retained counsel on May 28, 1992, after withdrawing his motion to represent himself pro se. Flynn failed to retain counsel in the time allotted and on June 18, appeared before a magistrate judge in a hearing on the Government's motion to have counsel appointed for him. Flynn told the magistrate that he still desired to seek retained counsel and mentioned the names of two possible lawyers. The magistrate granted the Government's motion and appointed as Flynn's counsel Attorney Lawrence Gillis, who entered his appearance on July 6, 1992. This action by the court in no way interfered with Flynn's continued efforts to retain outside counsel. On September 1, 1992, the district court granted -34- Flynn's motion for continuance of trial, giving him one deadline, which lapsed, and extending it again until September 18 to enable Flynn to retain private counsel.18 Five days after the deadline, on September 23, Attorney Barry Wilson filed a motion to enter his appearance as Flynn's counsel and, on September 25, filed a motion to continue the October trial date until January of 1993, to give him time to prepare for trial. The district court denied the September 25 motion as well as a motion, filed on the first day of trial, to reconsider its ruling, finding that: Flynn's maneuvers with respect to counsel are such as to equate with a waiver of his right to choose counsel. . . . The court fully understands the difficulties imposed on Attorney Gillis by Mr. Flynn's refusal to date to cooperate with him, but it behooves Mr. Flynn to now sit down with his appointed counsel and to assist him in the presentation of his defenses. September 28, 1992, Order (Docket No. 187) at 3-4. Trial continued as scheduled, beginning on October 5, 1992, except that Attorney Gillis withdrew and Attorney Wilson took over as Flynn's retained counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to assistance of counsel, which includes the right to counsel of one's choice. United States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1991). While the right to effective assistance is absolute, 18 Flynn's motion was based on an affidavit filed by Gillis alleging a total breakdown in communication with his client because Flynn refused to cooperate with him in preparing a defense. -35- this Court has long held that a defendant's right to choose a particular counsel must be weighed against administration-ofjustice concerns and cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct reasonable and orderly court procedure. United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); see also Hallock, 941 F.2d at 44; Machor, 879 F.2d at 952; Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987). In light of these factors, this Court does not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Flynn's motion for continuance. In essence, Flynn had nearly four months to secure private counsel -- from May 28, 1992, until September 18, 1992. The trial date was continued for one month at his behest; yet he continually failed to meet deadlines set by the court. Given these circumstances, the Court affirms the denial of Flynn's belated September 25 motion for continuance and his later motion to reconsider.19
Testimony and Its Denial of Appellant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Bank Robbery Counts Appellant argues that the district court improperly admitted the testimony of bank employee Debbie Haskins, who testified with respect to First N.H.'s federally insured status and its involvement in interstate commerce. Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the 19 The Court notes that while Flynn's belated motion for continuance was denied, Attorney Wilson still conducted his representation at trial. -36- jury's guilty verdicts on the bank robbery counts. Appellant first argues that Haskins' testimony should not have been admitted because she lacked personal knowledge of the bank's FDIC status or its involvement in interstate commerce as required by Fed. R. Evid. 602 (witness may not testify to a matter without evidence that she had personal knowledge of the matter). In particular, Appellant argues that Haskins, who worked as an insurance compliance specialist for First N.H., did not commence her employment until a month after the robbery, so her testimony was based on records that she was exposed to in the course of her later employment and not on knowledge formed at the time of the robbery. Evidence is inadmissible under Rule 602 only if in the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion it finds that the witness could not have actually perceived or observed that which he testified to. Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, 843 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1988). Personal knowledge can include inferences and opinions, so long as they are grounded in personal observation and experience. United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 223 (1st Cir. 1992). Haskins testified that her job brought her into contact with records, including certificates provided by the FDIC, which indicated that the Stratham, New Hampshire branch of First N.H. was federally insured, although she had not personally seen such a certificate posted at the branch on the date of the robbery. She also testified that bank records to which she was exposed indicated that the branch had -37- customers in Vermont and Massachusetts and a correspondent banking account in Massachusetts. This Court finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Haskins' testimony because it was limited to information that she actually perceived or observed as an insurance compliance specialist and did not attest to circumstances beyond her personal knowledge.20 Appellant also argues that the guilty verdicts on the bank robbery counts were not supported by a sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the elements of FDIC insurance status and involvement in interstate commerce.21 As the Government points out, Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal on these counts on the basis of other arguments and did not argue below that dismissal should be granted on the above-cited grounds. Consequently, Appellant has waived this argument on appeal unless the bank robbery convictions are clearly and grossly unjust. United States v. L pez, 709 F.2d 742, 746 (1st Cir.), cert. 20 Appellant's argument that Haskins' knowledge was not formed on the basis of information that she possessed on the date of the robbery may have diminished the value of her testimony, but such an argument does not implicate Rule 602. 'The extent of a witness' knowledge of matters about which he offers to testify goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of the testimony.' Hallquist, 843 F.2d at 24 (quoting Nielson v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 570 F.2d 272, 277 (8th Cir. 1978)). 21 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insured the deposits of First N.H. is an essential element of the crimes alleged in Counts 3, 4, and 5, regarding the robbery of First N.H. in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that robbery of First N.H. had some effect on interstate commerce is an essential element of the Hobbs Act violations alleged in Counts 16, 17, and 18. 18 U.S.C. 1951. -38- denied, 464 U.S. 861 (1983). Even under the less rigorous standard governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, however, we affirm the convictions. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, could have persuaded a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that First N.H. was FDIC-insured and involved in interstate commerce.22 Hence, the district court's denial of Flynn's motion for acquittal on the bank robbery counts is affirmed.
Charging Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his motion to sever Count 19 as an abuse of discretion, arguing that the inclusion of his prior felony history resulted in clear prejudice and denied him a fair trial. Appellant moved for severance under Fed. R. Crim P. 14, which provides, in part, that if it appears a defendant may be prejudiced by joinder of offenses, the court may order an election of separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other 22 In addition to Haskins' testimony, the Government introduced into evidence a certified copy of the records of the FDIC establishing that after a diligent search of the agency's records, no evidence was found to indicate that First N.H.'s insured status was ever terminated on or before the date of the September 9, 1991, robbery. Further, Haskins' testimony regarding First N.H.'s interstate accounts was augmented by the testimony of another bank employee, Anita Ramsdell, who was in charge of opening new accounts, teller supervision, and maintenance of the bank vault. According to Ramsdell, the bank sold vault money to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and on the morning of the robbery, the vault contained a large amount of money that was about to be shipped there. -39- relief justice requires . . . .  Trial courts are granted discretion under Rule 14 to take whatever steps are deemed necessary to minimize prejudice; [s]everance is only one remedy -- and certainly the most extreme -- in the federal courts' remedial arsenal. United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Here the record indicates that in ruling on Flynn's motion on the first day of trial, the court declined severance but decided not to disclose the details of Flynn's prior conviction(s) in reading Count 19 to the jury. Flynn's counsel later indicated that he would stipulate to his client being a convicted felon and stipulate that the court could instruct the jury in that regard. In its final instructions to the jury, the court indicated that the parties had stipulated to the fact of the prior conviction(s), without detailing the nature of the criminal acts at issue in them. The Court finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to sever Count 19 and in opting instead to limit the jury's exposure to the details of Flynn's prior criminal history. D. Statements Made During Prosecutor's Closing Argument Appellant asserts that the Government prosecutor made improper comments during his closing argument in which he allegedly injected his personal opinion and referred to facts outside the record regarding the truthfulness of Government witnesses. This Court has long held that a prosecutor may not place the prestige of the government behind a witness by making -40- personal assurances about the witness' credibility nor indicate that facts not before the jury support the testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); United States v. Rosa, 705 F.2d 1375, 1379-80 (1st Cir. 1983). Appellant specifically points to the following comments to support his argument of prosecutorial misconduct: Comment 1: Much comment has been made about deals. It would seem to me that a 17-year stretch in prison isn't much of a deal. Comment 2: Believe me. Richard Ferguson remembers what he remembers. So does Arthur Cosgro. So does Tom McQueeny. So does Brian Raineri. So do all the other witnesses in the case. Sometimes they don't match with each other. Sometimes they don't match with other people at the offenses. And that's fine. They're telling what they remember. These guys, as somebody said, are not great abstract thinkers. I think we can all agree to that . . . . Which is it? . . . . Do we know? No, we don't know. We can choose to believe which of those is accurate or who remembers better. Comment 3: These people believe, rightly or wrongly that they might have had some criminal exposure. Even if they did, I think we can all agree its substantially less than the individuals who are charged with the crimes in this indictment. Comment 2 was not the subject of contemporaneous objection and will be treated first. Absent plain error, the failure to object during the prosecutor's argument forecloses appellate review. United States v. Morales-Cartagena, 987 F.2d 849, 854 (1st Cir. 1993)(stating that plain-error standard -41- requires reversal of a conviction only if a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result). This Court does not find plain error. Other than the phrase, Believe me, which appears to be an expression of personal opinion only if read out of the total context, the prosecutor's comment does not improperly vouch for the credibility of Government witnesses. The comment merely points out that the witnesses, telling the story as they remember it, have generated a number of inconsistencies in the record and that it is up to jury to resolve these issues.23 The Court finds likewise that comment 1 falls within permissible boundaries. When read in context, the phrase it seems to me does not amount to improper vouching for the credibility of a Government witness because the comment is limited to the terms of the plea agreement. It is not error to inform a jury of the contents of a plea agreement, nor is it improper for the government to call attention to a witness' motivation for testifying. United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 156 (1st Cir. 1991).24 Especially here, where the record 23 Even if a contemporaneous objection had been made, comment 2 still does not rise to error sufficient to warrant a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Rodr guez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1989)(where prosecutor explicitly assured jury that witness would tell truth, error not reversible because it was counterbalanced by other statements of prosecutor telling jurors there was conflicting evidence on issues testified to by witness and reminded jury that they should determine issues of demeanor and credibility). 24 Appellant suggests that this comment misrepresented the plea agreement of Arthur Cosgro, who testified that the Government promised to recommend eight years at sentencing. This Court agrees with the Government, however, that the comment actually referred -42- indicates that defense counsel focused much of their crossexamination and closing arguments on the benefits to be bestowed on cooperating co-conspirators, the comment that a seventeenyear stretch in prison isn't much of a deal does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. See Martin, 815 F.2d at 822 (finding no prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor told jury that each of the Government witnesses expects to go to jail; [t]he Government is going to recommend substantial jail, the maximum penalty is five years, and even with good time off, five years, four years in a Federal Penitentiary, that's no walk in the park). Appellant argues that in making comment 3, the prosecutor improperly interjected his personal opinion that Appellant was guilty and asserted that all other trial witnesses agreed with the Government's assessment. Appellant's interpretation of comment 3 is far-fetched. The most this Court can glean from the comment is that (1) the Government witnesses were motivated to testify, at least in part, because of the prospect of criminal prosecution and that (2) their involvement in the conspiracy, as disclosed by their testimony, when compared with the conduct alleged against defendants in the indictment, indicated that the witnesses were less culpable than defendants in the overall conspiracy. This comment is proper argumentation based on the evidence before the jury and does not amount to to the plea agreement of Richard Ferguson, who testified that the prosecution would recommend seventeen years. -43- improper vouching for the credibility of witnesses or a personal opinion as to the guilt of the defendants. Finding no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, we need not reach the issue of whether the comments in question were likely to have prejudiced Appellant by altering the outcome of the case. United States v. Rodr guez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 159 (1st Cir. 1989).