Opinion ID: 2582842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether It Was Error To Grant Summary Judgment in Favor of Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy Based on Hymes's Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Text: The superior court granted Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy's motion for summary judgment with regard to Donald Hymes's medical malpractice and elder abuse claims and Rita Hymes's derivative claim for loss of consortium. The court concluded that Donald failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the DOC, that the failure was not excusable, and that both Donald's direct claims and Rita's derivative claim were thereby barred. The Hymeses argue that Donald Hymes was excused from exhausting administrative remedies because he did not receive a prison handbook and was therefore unaware of the procedure for an administrative appeal. They also claim that any failure to exhaust is excusable because members of the DOC staff were biased against him, and that he would have been retaliated against by being placed in the hole (administrative segregation, that is, solitary confinement) if he filed a grievance. Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy respond that the Department of Corrections has a three-step administrative grievance procedure for medical grievances, that Hymes failed to exhaust this remedy, and that Hymes's failure to exhaust should not be excused. We analyze these claims and defenses in light of our decision in Eufemio v. Kodiak Island Hospital. [22] In Eufemio we held that in applying the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, a court must decide the following: (1) is exhaustion of remedies required; (2) if so, did the complainant exhaust those remedies; and (3) if not, is the failure to exhaust remedies excused? [23]
The superior court concluded that exhaustion was required in this case based on our decision in Broeckel v. State, Department of Corrections. [24] There we held that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies generally applies to prisoner grievance cases. [25] However, we have also held that a trial court should use its discretion in a particular case to determine whether exhaustion is required, balancing the interest of the institution in applying its special competence, correcting its errors, and discouraging deliberate flouting of its processes against the complainant's interest in the availability of adequate redress. [26] The decision whether exhaustion of remedies should apply to a given situation should be based on the particular case before the court. [27] Where the administrative process offers a remedy, even an incomplete one, the policy interests behind exhaustion will usually support requiring exhaustion to allow the agency to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies, develop an actual record, and `discourage the deliberate flouting of its processes.' [28] On the other hand, where there is no remedy at all, and no available means for the error to be corrected in the available administrative process, courts usually should not require exhaustion. [29] These situations are rare, and in most exhaustion cases that we have analyzed, it has been clear that there was some remedy to exhaust. Thus we have held that exhaustion was required where a prison ordered a prisoner to surrender property that could have been restored to him or for which the Department of Corrections may have been able to reimburse him, [30] and where a building owner who contested the number of permits he was issued could have obtained the correct number of permits through the procedures of a zoning appeal board. [31] Likewise, we have required exhaustion in employment disputes in which terminations can be overturned, privileges restored, or suspensions ended. [32] In Eufemio, a physician argued that he should not have been required to exhaust because he sought monetary damages rather than the available remedies in the hospital grievance process, but we held this did not outweigh the strong interests of the hospital in correcting its own errors and to identify unfair or arbitrary processes, such as a biased tribunal, and correct the deficiency to avoid litigation. [33] If an institution has any means of correcting errors, exhaustion should typically be required. It is therefore necessary to determine whether Hymes's claims were of the type that could have been addressed by the prison grievance process. Many problems, including some that could be raised as malpractice claims, may be corrected, and the damage mitigated, if the claim is brought to the attention of prison authorities in a timely manner. In those cases, the prison's interest in requiring exhaustion should carry significant weight. One example of such a claim is Hymes's complaint that his medications were provided inconsistently. It is clear from this complaint that Hymes was aware of the risks and problems associated with such a failure, and aware that immediate action could remedy the problem or reduce potential damage going forward. The classic reasons for requiring exhaustion clearly apply to this situation: The prison has an interest in quickly having the situation brought to its attention and having the chance to correct an error in its systems and to mitigate damages. The department should be given the immediate opportunity to evaluate allegedly substandard care and correct its own errors. This gives the department the opportunity to ensure that no harm or deterioration occurs that could have been quickly and efficiently reversed by the grievance process and that it is given the chance to apply its institutional competency in prison administration to remedy defective practices. On the other hand, certain medical malpractice claims cannot possibly be remedied by any other means than compensatory damages. In a situation in which the medical treatment or error is completely in the past, and the damage to the prisoner's body is irreversibly done, the prison has no means of correcting its own errors. The issue in prisoner malpractice claims in which the harm is completed is not that any remedies are potentially inadequate to fully compensate the plaintiff, as was possible in Eufemio, but that the Department of Corrections process offers no remedy at all. [34] Such cases are in a different category than those in which exhaustion is excused for futility or inadequacy; in the futility/inadequacy cases a remedy exists, but the court finds it either extremely unlikely to be provided, or so inadequate that it would not be in the interest of fairness to require it. If a court finds no effective remedy is available, it will generally be an abuse of discretion to require exhaustion of remedies. We note that one of Hymes's claims may be of the type for which exhaustion is generally not required. The affidavit from Dr. Neuwelt indicates that prescribing Hymes a medication called Feldene may have been an error which caused Hymes long-term damage in the form of increase of blood pressure and renal impairment. The affidavit from Dr. Houk states that it was error to replace Methotrexate with Feldene because Feldene is not appropriate to treat the specific problem Hymes had and that the provider who prescribed Feldene should have monitored renal, liver, and other functions. By the time the elements of this claim were discovered, Hymes was no longer under the care of the Fairbanks Correctional Center and the health care grievance procedure could not correct or lessen Hymes's problem. [35] The initial step in the Eufemio analysis is to determine for which claims exhaustion is required. On remand, after allowing the parties sufficient opportunity to address this question under the guidelines articulated above, the court should determine whether exhaustion is required for any of the claims here. For any claim for which the court finds that exhaustion was required, it should then consider whether, under the third part of the Eufemio test, exhaustion should be excused.
It is undisputed that Hymes did not exhaust his remedies for any of his claims. We therefore move on to the third element of the Eufemio exhaustion analysis: whether the failure to exhaust remedies was excused. In Bruns v. Municipality of Anchorage, [36] we noted that the failure to exhaust may be excused where the administrative remedy is inadequate [37] or where the administrative procedures are ineffective because of lack of meaningful access, bias, ... or the possibility that the claimant could face irreparable harm if the administrative process is followed. [38] The Hymeses argue that Donald's failure to exhaust remedies was excused because he lacked meaningful access to the grievance process. They allege that he was not given a copy of the prisoner handbook or any other source of the rules and regulations regarding grievances. Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy respond that DOC notified Hymes about inmate rules, rights, and procedures and that the prisoner handbook was available for Hymes's use. The record reveals that Donald Hymes signed part of an Orientation Verification on May 7, 2003. But he refused to sign under the statement that he received a Prisoner Handbook because he said that he had not received the handbook. Rather, he signed under the statement that reads, I have been released from the Fairbanks Correctional Center for less than 90 days and verify that I understand the Prisoner Rules, Rights, and Procedures at this institution. Handbooks are available in each housing unit. Hymes signed his name under this statement even though he had just arrived at the prison. He had not been released from the prison as the statement indicates. Thus, the existence of Hymes's signature hardly proves what comes before it. There is no record evidence that he was given access to a handbook, which Timothy Lyden, Standards Administrator for the DOC, explained contains instructions regarding grievance procedures over any matter within the Department's control, including an alleged violation of the Department's regulations, a statute, or a procedure set out in the prisoner handbook, and health care issues. The Hymeses raised genuine issues of material fact in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment and their motion for reconsideration as to whether Hymes had meaningful access to the grievance procedure. In their opposition to the summary judgment motion, they asserted, Donald Louis Hymes was never given a copy of the rules and regulations regarding grievances. In their motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment ruling, they asserted that Hymes asked if he could cross out `received Prisoner Handbook' because he had not received it but was told he could not alter the form in any way and had to sign it. They claimed that Hymes asked whether there was a handbook and was told yes, but [h]e did not receive one, nor did he ever see one. Because his signature on the Orientation Verification is under a clearly inaccurate statement indicating that he had been released from prison, the signature cannot be used to establish that he had any access to the handbook and grievance procedure. Indeed, the Hymeses' assertion in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment was that Hymes had not received the prisoner handbook. [39] [Exc. 50] Hymes's allegations create a factual dispute as to whether he lacked meaningful access to the prisoner handbook and the grievance procedures. The Hymeses also claim that Donald would have been retaliated against by being placed in administrative segregation or solitary confinement if he filed a grievance. [Exc. 29; At. Br. 9] Under our rule regarding grounds for an excuse from the exhaustion requirement, we have included the question of whether following the grievance procedure will threaten a claimant with irreparable harm. [40] We do not interpret this, as the superior court did, to require that Hymes show that he would in fact have suffered irreparable medical harm had Pomeroy retaliated against him. We conclude rather that if Pomeroy did threaten Hymes with the punitive disciplinary sanction of solitary confinement, this threat of retaliation excused him from following the grievance procedures if he reasonably feared he would be irreparably harmed. Hymes raised a material fact dispute regarding the threat of retaliation in his responses to Dr. DeRamus and Pomeroy's interrogatories, completed in December 2005. He stated: Dealing with Mr. Pomeroy was extremely stressful.... [A]t one point he told me that if I were to tell anyone that I was not getting adequate treatment from him, he would see to it that I was `put in the hole.' We note that there is a potential tension between Hymes's claim that he was unaware of the grievance procedures and his claim that he did not follow the procedures because he was afraid of retaliation. However, we believe that it is for the fact-finder to weigh Hymes's testimony regarding these two potential excuses with the other evidence to determine what actually took place. In sum, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether Hymes was excused from the exhaustion requirement due to a lack of meaningful access to the administrative process or a threat of retaliation. Thus, it was error to grant summary judgment on the basis of Hymes's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. [41]