Opinion ID: 783829
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Concerning the Effect of Harris's Head Injury

Text: 149 Thereafter, however, Harris did request a competency hearing, citing the fact that he had recently been shot in the head, and the bullet remained lodged in his brain. Although it is reasonable to assume (perhaps even to expect) that a person who suffers a gunshot wound to the head might, at least for a time, have a diminished mental capacity relative to that person's mental capacity before the gunshot wound, the mere existence of Harris's head injury was not enough to require a competence examination. Harris's head injury is only relevant if it actually produced a diminished capacity at the time of Harris's trial. 150 However, there is no evidence, other than the statements of Harris's trial counsel and the cryptic nature of Harris's response to the trial judge's questions at the October 17, 1984 hearing (both of which we discuss below), to support the notion that Harris suffered lingering effects of the gunshot wound of a type that might warrant a competence examination. In order to obtain habeas relief, Harris has the burden of showing that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the state judge. However, Harris's counsel failed to submit any medical documentation about the effects (if any) of the injury on Harris's competence. Nor did he submit a list of medications Harris was taking, or documentation about the side effects (if any) of any medication Harris was taking. We know that Harris was competent to stand trial before the shooting, but very little is presented to show the effect of the shooting on Harris's competency. 151 On the other hand, there was evidence proffered to the state trial court suggesting that Harris had recovered from the gunshot wound without any serious adverse effect on his mental capacity. During the October 17, 1984 hearing, the prosecutor stated that: (1) Harris had been released from the hospital and returned to the jail; and (2) jail personnel with whom the prosecutor had spoken that morning reported that [t]hey ha[d] no problem in communicating with [Harris] and ha[d] made no noticeable observation of any inability to communicate at th[at] time. 152 c. Harris's Response to the State Trial Judge's Questions During the October 17, 1984 Hearing 153 Another significant piece of evidence cited by Harris and the District Court is the bizarre nature of the responses Harris gave to the trial judge's questions at the October 17, 1984 hearing. The District Court concluded that it was patently obvious that during the proceedings held on October 17, 1984, Harris' responsiveness and lack of understanding indicated his inability to comprehend the proceedings. For example, he did not know the day of the week, and he said he had not spoken recently to his attorney. Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 345. We agree that evidence that a defendant did not know the day of the week and did not recall the last time he spoke to his attorney (when, in fact, it was obvious that he had spoken to his attorney several minutes prior) could be strong evidence that a competence hearing is warranted. However, we do not agree with the District Court's conclusion that Harris's answers to the trial judge's questions necessarily establish that he was unaware of the day of the week or when he last spoke to his attorney. 154 Based on the trial transcript alone, we cannot determine whether Harris was legitimately confused in his answers, or he was simply uncooperative. During the earlier suppression hearing, the government argued (and the trial court apparently agreed) that Harris was malingering — exaggerating his apparent mental limitations in order to bolster his legal arguments. Thus, another reasonable interpretation of Harris's responses to the trial judge's questions is that Harris was being deliberately uncooperative in order to support the perception that he was incompetent to stand trial. 155 Based solely on the bare language of the trial transcript, without neither detailed findings of fact nor evidence about Harris's demeanor during the hearing, it is impossible for us to determine which view of this evidence is the correct one. We do know that the trial judge had observed Harris conferring with counsel during the hearing, and that immediately following the strange answers the judge stated that, based upon his observations of defendant during questioning, he was constrained to deny the motion. In such circumstances, an appellate court should generally defer to the conclusions of the trial judge, who was present in the courtroom and in a position to assess the defendant's demeanor. See Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 634 (2d Cir.1996) ([W]e must accord great deference to the trial court's findings regarding credibility because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate a witness's demeanor and tone of voice as well as other mannerisms that bear heavily on one's belief in what the witness says.). This is especially appropriate in a habeas case, in which the state court's factual determinations are presumed to be correct and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. 156 d. Statements by Harris's Trial Counsel 157 Finally, Harris argues that a competence hearing was required because Harris's trial counsel reported that he was unable to communicate effectively with Harris. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that representations [by defense counsel] concerning the competence of his client ... [are] unquestionably a factor which should be considered when determining whether that client is competent. Drope, 420 U.S. at 177 n. 13, 95 S.Ct. 896. In the instant case, the transcript reflects that the trial judge considered the representations of Harris's counsel regarding Harris's competence, asking the prosecutor directly: How do you respond to [Harris's counsel's] oral argument that irrespective of the fact that none of the personnel that you've described have difficulty in communicating with the defendant Harris that he [Harris's counsel] has difficulty communicating with [Harris] ... ? 158 However, it is indisputable that courts are not required to accept the representations of defense counsel without question. Id. On the contrary, such representations are merely one factor to be considered by the court, including, in this case, the court's own observation of the defendant's conduct and evidence concerning the effects of Harris's injury, as well as evidence adduced at Harris's pre-injury competence hearing. 159 e. The Cumulative Weight of this Evidence 160 The District Court concluded, citing the evidence discussed above, that the circumstances before the trial court in October 1984 presented a reasonable ground for believing that Harris was, at that moment, incompetent to stand trial. Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 346. However, the relevant question in this case is not whether the evidence presented a reasonable ground for believing that Harris was incompetent; instead we must ask whether it was objectively unreasonable for the state trial court to have concluded (and the state appeals court to have agreed) that the circumstances did not present a reasonable ground for believing that Harris was incompetent. See Ryan v. Miller, 303 F.3d 231, 245 (2d Cir.2002) (Under § 2254(d)(1), we must determine not whether the state court was incorrect or erroneous in rejecting petitioner's claim, but whether it was objectively unreasonable in doing so. (citation, internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). 161 Considering all of the evidence before the state trial court at the time of the October 17, 1984 hearing, we cannot conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the court to have denied Harris's motion for a competence hearing. Although there was evidence to support the notion that Harris was incompetent ( e.g., Harris's low I.Q., the fact of the recent gunshot wound to his head, and his attorney's statement that Harris was uncommunicative), there was also evidence to the contrary. The prosecutor proffered evidence that Harris had left the hospital, returned to the prison population and was recovering from his injury. There was evidence that Harris had, in fact, been conferring with his attorney (although there was no evidence about the substance of any conversations between Harris and his attorney at that time). Moreover, there was evidence suggesting that Harris had malingered in the past in order to bolster his legal arguments, and may have been doing so again. 162 The trial judge, having observed Harris in the courtroom over the course of several proceedings and heard several days of testimony about Harris's mental capabilities and demeanor, was in a better position to assess this evidence than are we. See United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir.1986) ([D]eference is owed to the [trial] court's determinations [about a defendant's competence] based on observation of the defendant during the proceedings.). Consequently, based on the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court's denial of Harris's motion for a competence hearing was objectively unreasonable. 163 However, this question does not end our analysis. The ultimate question upon which Harris's claim turns is whether the state trial court committed constitutional error by failing to order sua sponte a competence hearing at the time of Harris's trial. The District Court held that it did not, and with this conclusion we agree. See Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 347. 164 2. The Trial Court's Failure To Order Sua Sponte a Competence Hearing at the Time of Harris's Trial 165 The evidence that Harris offers in support of his contention that the District Court erred by failing to order a competence hearing sua sponte at the time of Harris's trial is largely the same evidence as that offered in support of Harris's October 1984 motion for a competence hearing. The only evidence available to the state trial court at the time of Harris's trial that was not available at the time of the earlier hearing are the statements of Harris's counsel during the Sandoval hearing prior to trial. 166 However, although these statements — to the effect that Harris was unable to communicate effectively with his counsel or otherwise assist in his own defense — could, if credited, raise a question about Harris's competence, it appears that the state trial court did not credit them. For example, when Harris's counsel stated that he was unable to communicate with Harris, the trial court pointed out that counsel had repeatedly sought opportunities to confer with Harris during jury selection. Thereafter, the trial judge told Harris's trial counsel that he had seen no evidence ... to indicate to my satisfaction certainly that Mr. Harris can't participate with you, cooperate effectively and also aid you in the trial of this action. 167 Given the state trial court's apparent unwillingness to credit Harris's counsel's statements about the extent of Harris's ability to communicate with his counsel or participate in his own defense, we cannot hold that it was objectively unreasonable for the trial court not to order a competence hearing. By the time of Harris's trial, more than three months had elapsed since Harris was shot, and Harris had been out of the hospital for more than two months. Harris had not submitted any medical documentation about the lingering effects (if any) of his head injury. Moreover, although Harris's counsel complained that Harris was uncommunicative, Harris's counsel did not renew his prior motion for a competence hearing. Consequently, we cannot conclude that, in light of what was... known [to the state trial court at the time of the trial], the failure to make further inquiry into [Harris's] competence to stand trial[ ] denied him a fair trial. Nicks, 955 F.2d at 169 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 174-75, 95 S.Ct. 896 (internal quotation marks omitted)). On the contrary, as the District Court noted, there is scant evidence in the [state] trial record to suggest [Harris's] competency was sufficiently in doubt at the time of his trial. Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 347. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the District Court's decision which denied Harris habeas relief on his incompetence claim. 168