Opinion ID: 567915
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bonnie Sue Anders

Text: 80 This defendant, Anders, was charged in three of the ten counts contained in the indictment. 22 The only point of any significance again involves the prosecutorial tactics in attempting to show the prior indictments and convictions of Bonnie Sue Anders in the instant case in which she elected not to testify and her character had not become an issue by any evidence offered by her. Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(1). 81 The five (5) incidents involved each arose during the presentation of the government's case-in-chief. The first incident occurred on December 5, 1988, after the case had been proceeding for approximately one week. The witness was Brenda Champlin (testimony commenced at R. 13-1057), who was named as a defendant in the 1988 indictment (erroneously named Camplin) along with many others, and who negotiated a plea agreement requiring her to testify. Champlin had accompanied Anders to Fort Lauderdale from Kentucky on several occasions immediately following the Sylvania, Georgia, robbery on May 23, 1983. It is obvious that Anders and Champlin became good friends and that Anders' past history was well known to Champlin. At a point where the prosecutor was attempting to show the part played by Anders in the preparation of a partially fictitious video tape made in 1988 for purported use by the defendants in the 1988 trial, the prosecutor asked Champlin (R. 13-1095-96): 82 Q. Okay. What was occurring that would require you--had you been indicted at that time? 83 A. No. 84 Q. Okay. What was occurring or what were you told was occurring that might put you in a position to have to testify in court? 85 A. Someone else had been indicted. 86 Q. Who? 87 A. Bonnie Anders. 88 Q. But in a different case up in Kentucky, right? 89 A. Yes. 90 (MOTION FOR MISTRIAL) 91 At this point Brenda Champlin was temporarily excused (R. 13-1101) to return the following morning after the partially fictitious tape had been seen and heard by defense counsel. Layton Champlin, the son of Brenda Champlin, then testified. Although Layton was not indicted, his name was included in his mother's plea agreement. Layton testified for the balance of the day and was carried over until the next morning. 92 After the jury had been excused for the day, the motion for mistrial was argued. The court volunteered to give a curative instruction and criticized the prosecution for not anticipating Brenda Champlin's response. Prosecutor Segrest suggested that the answer of the witness only reflected that Anders was indicted in Kentucky but the nature of the alleged crime was not mentioned (R. 13-1144). Such an argument by the prosecutor is aside from the point that an indictment for any charge may well be perceived as reflecting on a trait of character; such character evidence is clearly prohibited by Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a). 93 Incident No. 2 occurred while Layton Champlin was testifying during the same afternoon session (R. 13-1134). Another prosecutor was questioning the witness: 94 Q. Okay. Let's talk about that tape. When did you make this tape? 95 A. That was after Bonnie was indicted in Kentucky. 96 Q. And what year was that? 97 A. That was--this is--this year. 98 Q. 1988? 99 A. Yes, ma'am. 100 (MOTION FOR MISTRIAL) 101 It is difficult to conclude that the direct question by the prosecutor commanded the answer which was forthcoming from Layton Champlin. Other than to note that the prosecutors or investigative agents should have warned Layton Champlin to avoid any reference to Anders' indictment and conviction, the error could probably be overcome by a curative instruction. It is apparent, however, that the prosecution team made no effort to warn prospective witnesses to avoid references to obviously inadmissible testimony. The prosecutors, for themselves, claim a lack of time, but the many agents for the various law enforcement agencies are fully capable of rendering this service to the prosecutors and thus assist in avoiding the errors occasioned by overly zealous prosecutors. 102 Incident No. 3 again involved Brenda Champlin when she continued the following morning on direct examination (R. 14-1182). Renewing the unnecessary and repetitious questioning of this witness as to the preparation of the partially fictitious tapes, prosecutor Segrest asked (R. 14-1189): 103 Q. Now, at that time on July the 24th, 1988, you have not been indicted, had you? 104 A. No, I hadn't. 105 Q. Did you know that you were even being investigated? 106 A. No, I didn't. 107 Q. Was anything said on that occasion in July of '88 or on July the 24th of '88, about you were under investigation? 108 A. No. 109 Q. What was said as to the reason for making this tape? 110 A. Because there had been an indictment before, which I was not involved in. 111 Q. Okay. Who said that--no, no. All I am asking you is whether anything was said to you about your being investigated? 112 A. No. 113 (MOTION FOR MISTRIAL RENEWED AND OVERRULED) 114 When the motion for mistrial was renewed in the absence of the jury by counsel for Anders (R. 14-1204), the court directed an inquiry to the prosecutor, I will hear from you as to what in the world you were doing. The prosecutor replied (R. 14-1204): 115 I am not charging her with a separate offense. I am charging that the person that perpetrated it with a lawyer present [Russell, the Tennessee attorney who did not represent either Champlin or Anders], a lawyer that didn't tell her that it might be a violation of law to do that. Now, I was not attempting to elicit anything about the Kentucky charges at all. There was a conversation that I understood about the fact that Karla was talking and an investigation was going on, and that's what I expected to seek, but the truth of the matter is, there was a lawyer present, with Bonnie-- 116 THE COURT: Well, I had indicated very strongly that anything about another indictment shouldn't be brought out in this case. 117 MR. SEGREST: I understand. 118 THE COURT: I don't know whether that's what you had in mind or not. 119 MR. SEGREST: No, sir, it [sic] did not, and I don't have any idea of another indictment about that incident as far as this girl or anybody else right this minute. But what I am saying, it appears to me that--it appears to me we ought to be able to bring out just like every time De Franco testified and every time that--when Cornell testified, and anybody else testified to something that they are breaking the law, Mr. Bailey [attorney for Jerry Allen Lequire] can ask every time whether it's a violation of law to tap phones, whether it's a violation-- 120 THE COURT: Nobody has objected to your asking whether it's a violation. 121 MR. SEGREST: That's what I thought the objection was to. 122 THE COURT: The lawyer is not on trial here. 123 MR. SEGREST: No, sir. 124 THE COURT: So that's not--I didn't see the relevancy of that, but what I am saying is-- 125 MR. SEGREST: Well, the remark she made, which was unresponsive and surprising to me, was there had been another indictment, there was an indictment in '83 and '84 against this-- 126 THE COURT: I don't think--I did not think it was clear from her statement that she was talking about another indictment of Bonnie, but I am telling you to stay away from that, tell your witnesses to stay away from anything like that. 127 MR. SEGREST: Yes, sir. 128 It is apparent that the prosecutor had not, to this point in the trial, considered the issue of character evidence and the effect of calling to the attention of the jury an indictment unrelated to the case on trial. 129 Incident No. 4 took place while Karla Espinal, the principal witness for the prosecution was testifying (R. 14-1342-43). Prosecutor Segrest inquired as to what Anders did for Jerry Allen LeQuire, to which question Karla Espinal replied, She tapped phones. Then follows: 130 Q. Okay. Now, did you ever discuss with Bonnie Sue Anders what her background was that would give her any expertise or facility to tap phones? 131 A. Yeah, she worked for the phone company as a telephone repairman until she got fired when she got convicted on-- 132 Q. No, she got fired, right? 133 A. Right. 134 (MOTION FOR MISTRIAL) 135 At the conclusion of that day's proceedings, in the absence of the jury, the argument on the mistrial motion was renewed, with the court again directing the prosecutor to instruct his witnesses to avoid any mention of a conviction or anything else, and the prosecutor pleading lack of time to attend to this detail. While the court made no express ruling, it is apparent that the motion for mistrial was denied as the court gave a curative instruction (R. 15-1387) to the jury. 136 The fifth and final incident with respect to the admission of evidence was Karla LeQuire's testimony as to her actions with respect to cocaine in 1986. She had testified that she had been getting her cocaine from Alvaro Palaez (R. 15-1466) but, not satisfied with that answer, Prosecutor Segrest inquired: 137 Q. Did you also deal with anyone else? 138 A. In the beginning, in 1986, when I started selling cocaine, it was--Bonnie and myself got into a business together to sell the cocaine. 139 MR. FUGATE: Your Honor, I have a motion at the appropriate time. 140