Opinion ID: 861112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: legal analysis of issues on appeal

Text: A. Whether the trial court erred by failing to terminate or alternatively reduce alimony payments to Sandra Ashford? William argues that he was entitled to the reduction or termination of alimony based on Sandra's sexual misconduct and a change in her financial circumstances. 1. The Alleged Sexual Misconduct. The record reflected that Sandra had a relationship with John Vlahos (Vlahos). The chancellor, in her bench ruling stated: The Court listened to the testimony and weighed [Vlahos'] credibility and found at this instance that the movant [William] failed to meet his burden of proof in convincing this Court that there was any in this Court's opinion morality issue. The formal written judgment stated that William had failed to prove a change in circumstances that would justify any termination or reduction in alimony. William again contends before this Court that Sandra's relationship with Vlahos was not wholesome and that she should receive less alimony or no alimony as a result of her sexual conduct. Sandra contends that she had not engaged in sexual misconduct or cohabitation sufficient to warrant a reduction or termination of alimony. She also argues that, under this Court's standard of review, the chancellor's ruling as to the absence of sexual misconduct in this case should be given great weight. The standard of review in determining the weight of the evidence has been well established by this Court and it will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Ellis v. Ellis, 651 So. 2d 1068, 1071 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Crow v. Crow, 622 So. 2d 1226 (Miss. 1993)). For years, the courts of this State viewed sexual conduct and its application to alimony as a moral issue; as a result, former wives (by engaging in sexual conduct) have forfeited their right to support from their former husbands. See generally McRae v. McRae, 381 So. 2d 1052 (Miss. 1980); McHann v. McHann, 383 So. 2d 823, 826 (Miss. 1980); Owen v. Gerity, 422 So. 2d 284, 287 (Miss. 1982). However, this Court, in conformity with the modern trend, has recently held that sexual conduct as it relates to alimony is an economic issue -- not a moral issue. See generally Ellis , 651 So. 2d at 1072; Hammonds v. Hammonds, 641 So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 1994). Indeed, alimony is a purely economic issue. The general rule is that the wife is entitled to a reasonable allowance of alimony commensurate with her accustomed standard of living and the ability of the husband to pay. Hockaday v. Hockaday, 644 So. 2d 446, 448 (Miss. 1994). The test for modification of spousal support is whether there has been a material or substantial change in circumstances since the divorce. Ellis, 651 So. 2d at 1072. In cases of sexual activity by the recipient of spousal support with a third party, this Court has held that there are two factors to consider in determining whether a change in circumstances merits a reduction in alimony: (1) whether the third party provides support to the recipient . . .; and (2) whether the recipient spouse contributes to the support of a third party. Ellis 651 So. 2d at 1072; Hammonds, 641 So. 2d at 1216). The record in the case sub judice reflects that Sandra and Vlahos had exchanged gifts of clothing, jewelry, a camera, furniture, etc. In addition, they had shared expenses on one trip to Florida where Sandra stayed in a room with Emily and Vlahos stayed in a room with his children. Both Sandra and Vlahos denied that they ever stayed overnight with one another, and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Sandra had never given or loaned Vlahos money. Sandra and Vlahos did not own any property, incur any debt, or file their income tax together. They had always maintained separate homes. They had never pooled their income and resources. Therefore, there is no evidence that Sandra (upon receiving support from William) used her resources to support Vlahos. In addition, there is no evidence that Sandra was supported by Vlahos, thereby reducing or eliminating William's obligation to provide support. Thus, considering these two factors in the light of the deferential standard of review applicable in this case, this Court finds that the chancellor properly denied William's request for reduction or termination of alimony due to Sandra and Vlahos' relationship. See Ellis, 672 So. 2d at 1072; Hammonds, 641 So. 2d at 1216. 2. The Alleged Change in Financial Circumstances. William, who is an ophthalmologist earning almost one million dollars per year, admits that he is able to pay alimony. However, he contends that, due to Sandra's financial success, alimony is no longer justified in this case. As stated earlier, the standard of review in these matters is deferential, and the chancellor's findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Hockaday, 644 So. 2d at 448. Courts of equity in determining whether an award of alimony in a divorce should be modified should consider the present status of the parties and inquire into their respective earning abilities and probable future prospects and all other circumstances which might bear on the subject, such as age, sex, health and station in life. Spradling v. Spradling, 362 So. 2d 620, 623 (Miss. 1978). The general rule is that the wife is entitled to a reasonable allowance of alimony commensurate with her accustomed standard of living and the ability of the husband to pay. Hockaday v. Hockaday, 644 So. 2d 446, 448 (Miss. 1994). The evidence reflected that Sandra's business was not profitable. She had some money from her father; however, much of it was pledged as collateral for a business loan. The marital home was struck by lightning and burned, forcing Sandra to relocate during renovations. Even though much of this was covered by insurance, Sandra did incur expenses as a result of the relocation. In addition, the $10,000 per year that Sandra received in alimony was scheduled to end in 1998. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Sandra's ability to maintain her accustomed standard of living had improved. Furthermore, William's income had increased substantially; in fact he admitted that he was able to afford the alimony payments. Therefore, the chancellor properly ruled that no change in circumstances had been proven, such that reduction or termination of alimony was warranted. See Hockaday, 644 So. 2d at 450; Spradling, 362 So. 2d at 625. B.. Whether the trial court erred in denying the request of Emily Ashford, age 18, to have her father as custodial parent? William next argues that, pursuant to Mississippi statute, the chancellor should have granted 18-year- old Emily's request for William to be her custodial parent. William also contends that the chancellor erred by failing to make an on-the-record finding as to why Emily's best interests were not served by having William as a custodial parent. The chancellor ruled that Sandra and William would have joint legal custody of Emily, who was attending college in Alabama. The chancellor also held that Emily's primary physical custody should remain with Sandra. The law in child custody cases is well-settled. For the custody decree or order to be modified so as to transfer custody to the non-custodial parent, the non-custodial parent must prove that since the entry of the decree or order sought to be modified, a material change of circumstances has occurred within the custodial home which adversely affects the child's welfare. Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294 (Miss.1984); Phillips v. Phillips, 555 So.2d 698 (Miss.1989). In considering this alleged change, the court should view the evidence within the totality of the circumstances, and not base a finding on an isolated incident. Once the material change has been found, a change in custody is in order only if it would be in the best interest of the child involved. Spain v. Holland, 483 So.2d 318 (Miss.1986). A chancellor's finding of fact on such a matter will not be set aside or disturbed on appeal unless the finding is manifestly wrong, or is not supported by substantial credible evidence. . . Miss. Code Ann. § 93-11-65 (Supp.1990) . . . provides in part: Provided, however, that if the court shall find that both parties are fit and proper persons to have custody of the children, and that either party is able to adequately provide for the care and maintenance of the children, and that it would be to the best interest and welfare of the children, then any such child who shall have reached his twelfth birthday shall have the privilege of choosing the parent with whom he shall live.