Opinion ID: 848681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Michigan's Judicial Standing Test

Text: Without standing, a court will not hear a person's complaint  the doors to the court are closed. Unlike other substantive rules governing access to the courts, standing rules focus on the person bringing the claim rather than the claim itself. [10] Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what has traditionally been referred to as the question of standing to sue. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). In Michigan, the judicial test for standing has focused on prudential, as opposed to constitutional, concerns. Lee, supra at 743, 629 N.W.2d 900 (WEAVER, J. concurring); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Detroit, 449 Mich. 629, 643, 537 N.W.2d 436 (1995) (RILEY, J. concurring). [11] Prudential concerns are essentially matters of judicial self-governance.... Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Before Michigan courts will hear a case, they consider whether a party's interest in the outcome of the litigation ... will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy. House Speaker v. State Admin. Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 554, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). The courts further consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the plaintiff's substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner distinct from the citizenry at large. Id. In developing prudential standing rules, Michigan courts have often drawn from federal case law discussing prudential standing requirements. Id. at 559, 495 N.W.2d 539. Yet the federal courts are bound not only by judicially imposed prudential considerations, but also by federal constitutional limitations on standing imposed by article III of the federal constitution. [12] Warth, supra at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Federal constitutional standing limitations involve whether the plaintiff has made out a `case or controversy' between himself and the defendant within the meaning of article III of the United States Constitution. Id. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197. [13] The United States Supreme Court has made clear that article III-based constraints apply to every person who seeks to invoke federal court jurisdiction. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). However, the United States Supreme Court has also made clear that article III-based constraints are distinguishable from federal prudential constraints, because prudential constraints can be modified or abrogated by Congress.... Id. [14] Before Lujan, supra, the United States Supreme Court described the difference between federal constitutional and federal prudential constraints on standing in Sierra Club, supra at 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361: Where the party does not rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, [82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)], as to ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947. Where, however, Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain functions according to law, and has provided by statute for judicial review of those actions under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff. There has never been a federal case applying article III's case or controversy based standing constraints to state courts. As noted by Justice Kennedy writing for the Court in ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989): We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justicibility.... Nevertheless, because the majority incorrectly and at length insists that article III's case or controversy constraints do apply to Michigan, it is necessary to review those constraints. For the purposes of this case, the relevant articulation of federal article III-based standing test is found in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). [15] In Lujan, supra at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, the lead opinion of the United States Supreme Court concluded that the irreducible constitutional minimum for standing within the meaning of Article III's case or controversy limitation is as follows: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact  an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.' Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of  the injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... the result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. [Citations omitted.] In Lujan, six United States Supreme Court justices agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a concrete injury resulting from a lack of opportunity to consult regarding the impact of certain federally funded overseas activities on its members ability to observe endangered species on unspecified future trips abroad. [16] The Lujan lead opinion, with the qualified support of the concurrence, noted that [w]e have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government  claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in the proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large  does not state an article III case or controversy. Id. at 573-574, 112 S.Ct. 2130. [17] Until the decision in Lee, it was well-understood by this Court that article III's case or controversy limitation was inapplicable to Michigan courts. [18] Until Lee, no decision of this Court characterized standing in Michigan courts as being a constitutional question. Nonetheless, the Lee majority adopted Lujan's article III-based test, concluding vaguely that Lujan's test was fundamental to standing. Lee, supra at 740, 629 N.W.2d 900. The Lee majority warned that to neglect standing would imperil the constitutional architecture whereby governmental powers are divided between the three branches of government. Lee, supra at 735, 629 N.W.2d 900. Obscuring the fact that Michigan's Constitution contains no corollary to article III, § 2, the Lee majority suggested that Michigan's standing doctrine developed on a parallel track by way of  additional constitutional underpinning. Lee, supra at 737, 629 N.W.2d 900 (emphasis added). The additional constitutional underpinning referenced by the Lee majority was Const. 1963, art. 6, § 1, which vests the state judicial power in the courts, [19] and Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2, which divides the powers of government into three branches. [20] However, the cases addressing these provisions cited by the Lee majority were not standing cases; rather each involved a distinct question regarding the scope of judicial power. [21] In other words, the Lee majority incorrectly equated Michigan case law addressing unrelated issues of judicial power with federal case law addressing article III's case or controversy constraints on standing. [22] The Lee majority's analysis, and its adoption of Lujan's article III-based standing test, laid the groundwork to question the Legislature's authority to confer standing on plaintiffs who would not survive Lee's test. I continue to believe that the adoption of the Lujan test for standing by the Lee majority was unnecessary. Lee, supra at 744, 629 N.W.2d 900 (WEAVER, J. concurring). Further, the majority's application of Lee's standing test to a case involving a constitutionally based, expressly legislated grant of standing demonstrates that the adoption of Lujan is not only unnecessary, it is wrong for Michigan. Michigan's case law addressing distinguishable issues involving the scope of judicial power before Lee already protected the balance of powers among Michigan's three branches of government. [23] It is simply not true that a judge-made standing test based on a federal constitutional provision that has no corollary in Michigan would, as promised by the Lee majority, better preserve Michigan's constitutional architecture. Lee, supra at 735. Certainly, the majority's distracting diversion into contemplations of federal law does nothing to clarify or justify its abandonment of thirty years of precedent under MEPA. Nevertheless, it is clear that Lee has, and the majority in this case has, constitutionalized Michigan's judicial standing test. In so doing, the majority usurps the Legislature's authority to modify or abrogate the judiciary's prudential standing constraints. It is, thus, the majority's application of Lee's article III-based test to this and future MEPA cases that will disrupt Michigan's constitutional architecture and the legislatively conferred access to the courts.