Opinion ID: 3167560
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Alleged Beating — The Year it Occurred

Text: The fourth and final fact specified by the Board’s order was that Nancy Marouf had referred to Saed’s beating as occurring in February 2007, while other references placed it in February 2006. A.R. 4. The IJ concluded on the basis of a statement submitted in Nancy’s application referring to Saed’s injury as having occurred in February 2007, that “a fraudulent document” had been submitted to the court. A.R. 285. No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 13 Saed attempted to explain the discrepancy as a possible misstatement or mistake in translation (the statement was made in Arabic and dictated to a translator), but the Immigration Judge concluded that Saed “was speaking out of both sides of his mouth within a matter of seconds about whose mistake the year was.” A.R. 79, 282-90. In rejecting out of hand Saed’s translation-based explanation because it was accompanied by an alternative explanation, the Immigration Judge made no effort to be “sensitive to misunderstandings caused by language barriers, the use of translators, and cultural differences.” Reyes-Cardona, 565 F. App’x at 367. Despite Nancy’s reference to Saed’s injury and subsequent corrective surgery occurring in 2007, Saed Marouf was consistent in placing the injury in February 2006, and produced evidence of the corrective nose surgery he underwent in December 2006. A.R. 271, 273, 279, 281, 283, 288-90, 395, 400, 459-60, 502-06. Even if the inconsistency was not the result of the language barrier, which it might well have been, and was actually stated, it still would not support an adverse credibility determination. In the context of a largely consistent account of persecution, reference to an incorrect date is not sufficient basis for discrediting an applicant’s account. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that multiple date inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s otherwise consistent account were “manifestly trivial” and inadequate to sustain the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination). An inability to accurately recall the date when a traumatic event occurred is not particularly probative of a witness’s credibility when alleging traumatic persecution, because such traumatic persecution itself may cause the witness difficulty in recalling details of the incident. See id. at 1085-86 (“We have previously recognized that victims of abuse ‘often confuse the details of particular incidents, including the time or dates of particular assaults and which specific actions occurred on which specific occasion.’”) (quoting Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Deborah Davis & William C. Follette, Foibles of Witness Memory for Traumatic/High Profile Events, 66 J. Air L. & Com. 1421, 1514–15 (2001))); cf. Ilunga, 777 F.3d at 212 (recognizing that bona fide victims of persecution may struggle to remain composed during testimony). It is worth emphasizing that Nancy consistently stated that Saed was beaten in February and operated on in December — testimony consistent with all other evidence. It makes intuitive sense that she would more readily be able to recall the months of the year in which these events happened, No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 14 because other contextual and seasonal factors (like weather, holidays, work schedules, and school schedules) allow one to more easily place an event within a certain time of year. In contrast, different years do not offer the same type of contextual information — for instance, one might easily recall that a certain event happened around Christmas, but struggle to remember if it was Christmas in 2006 or 2007. In light of all these factors, Nancy’s placement of Saed’s beating and surgery in 2007 does not amount to substantial evidence supporting an adverse credibility determination. The IJ’s conclusion that Nancy’s application was fraudulent was “speculation and conjecture.” Al Ameri, 361 F. App’x at 645. 5. A Reasonable Adjudicator Would Be Compelled to Reach a Contrary Conclusion The four factual findings adopted by the Board in support of its adverse credibility determination do not constitute substantial evidence. See supra Parts II.C.1-4. Thus, the Board’s “totality of the circumstances” adverse credibility determination, A.R. 3; 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii), is necessarily not supported by substantial evidence. Saed Marouf consistently testified that his nose was broken as a result of an attack by a mob of Muslims in February 2006, and that his nose was operated on in December 2006. A.R. 271, 273, 279, 281, 283, 288-90, 395, 400. Nancy also consistently testified that Saed’s nose was broken by a Muslim mob in February and operated on in December (although she placed the incident in 2007, potentially as a result of a mistranslation or misremembering, see supra Part II.C.4). The Maroufs corroborated this account by producing medical records showing that Saed underwent a septoplasty at Augusta Victoria Hospital in Jerusalem in late December 2006. A.R. 502-04, 506. A septoplasty is a surgical procedure to correct a deviated septum — a disorder in which the septum that divides the left and right nostrils is displaced from the center of the nose. Mayo Clinic, Deviated septum: Treatments and drugs, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/deviated-septum/basics/treatment/con-20031537. Trauma is one of the most common causes of a deviated septum. Mayo Clinic, Deviated septum: Causes, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/deviated-septum/basics/causes/con-20031537. The Maroufs also submitted medical records from 2012 in which a Michigan doctor confirmed that the surgery had been performed, but diagnosed Saed as still suffering from a deviated No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 15 septum and nasal obstruction. A.R. 459-60 (“The examination confirms that the surgery was done[,] however there is still deflection off the anterior septum to the left . . . .” ). The Maroufs offered ample evidence that the attack on Saed was premised on his being Christian in a predominantly Muslim society that persecuted Christians, and offered ample evidence of these premises. The priest in Taybeh issued a letter stating that the Maroufs were practicing Catholics and active in the Taybeh Catholic community, A.R. 500, and the family submitted Palestinian birth certificates listing all three as Christian, A.R. 519-20, 524. The Maroufs also submitted a document certifying Saed’s baptism. A.R. 523. The Immigration Judge ultimately found that the Maroufs were “Catholic and Christian,” A.R. 76, and the Board did not question that finding, A.R. 3-4. The Maroufs also produced compelling evidence of general persecution of Christians by Muslims in the West Bank: multiple articles they submitted detail violence, sexual violence, harassment, and intimidation. A.R. 570-71, 576-77, 581-83. One article specifically chronicled Muslim persecution of Christians in Taybeh, recounting widespread violence and arson in 2005 that erupted after a Muslim woman became pregnant by a Christian man. A.R. 570. Generally contemporaneous State Department reports support the picture of persecution these articles paint. In a 2010 report, the State Department wrote: “[Palestinian Authority] government policy contributed to the generally free practice of religion, although problems persisted throughout the reporting period. The [Palestinian Authority] did not take sufficient action during the reporting period to investigate and bring to justice Persons who harassed, intimidated, and perpetrated attacks against some Christian residents of Bethlehem and Ramallah.” A.R. 669 (emphasis added). The Maroufs’ hometown of Taybeh is a small village that is variously described as being part of or outside of Ramallah, and is addressed as “Taybeh Ramallah” in many formal contexts. See A.R. 493, 496, 500, 519-20, 524, 528-29, 536, 566, 570, 706, 712, 720, 755. The same 2010 State Department report noted that “[r]elations among other religious and ethnic groups, including Muslims and Christians . . . also continued to be strained,” and that Palestinian Christian emigration from the West Bank accelerated after 2001, in part due to security concerns. A.R. 662-63, 667. Instead of relying on the many reports of No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 16 hostile relations between Muslims and Christians in the West Bank, in particular in the region where the Maroufs lived, the IJ relied on one statement in that same report that “Palestinian Christians and Muslims generally shared good relations” and concluded that the Maroufs’ account was not “consistent with the country conditions,” A.R. 98-100, 673. In so doing, he impermissibly “cherry-pick[ed]” a general statement that was belied by more specific and relevant evidence in the same report, Ilunga, 777 F.3d at 207,2 and indicated a general state of mind hostile to the Maroufs. The Maroufs’ testimony about Saed’s beating, the medical evidence of his injury and corrective surgery, the evidence of the Maroufs’ Christian religion, and the extensive documentation of persecution of Palestinian Christians by neighboring Muslims strongly support that a Muslim mob did in fact descend on the Maroufs’ home and violently attack Saed. The same evidence likewise refutes the IJ’s unsupported conclusion that the Maroufs fabricated the incident. The Maroufs’ evidence and testimony may not have been perfect, but perfection is not required and could not have been expected. The passage of time, the language barrier and use of translators, and the effects of stress on memory may all have produced deficiencies in the Maroufs’ case. See Reyes-Cardona, 565 F. App’x at 367; Ilunga, 777 F.3d at 207-08; Ren, 648 F.3d at 1085-86. But notwithstanding any minor deficiencies, the Maroufs’ evidence compels the conclusion that, at least as to Saed’s beating at the hands of a Muslim mob, the Maroufs were credible. The IJ and Board were in error to hold otherwise. See, e.g., Chen v. Gonzales, 151 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (Substantial evidence did not support IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on alien’s lack of specificity and inconsistency of testimony with application where alien provided detailed testimony regarding her forced intrauterine device insertion, hiding from authorities, and telling cadres that she was too weak to be sterilized when they first wanted to take her for sterilization. Alien’s failure to recall specific date of her sterilization, which revealed nothing about her fear for her safety, was a minor inconsistency.); Chen v. Gonzales, 173 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2006) (Substantial evidence did not support IJ’s 2 The IJ also cited Al Yatim v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2008) in support of this conclusion. A.R. 99. That case does not support the conclusion that Palestinian Christians are not generally subject to persecution from Muslims in the West Bank, as the Eighth Circuit held only that the petitioner before it had not proven that he was or would be subject to persecution in the West Bank, and that he had not shown sufficiently changed country conditions since the time of filing his application to support his motion to reopen in the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Al Yatim, 531 F.3d at 586-91. No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 17 adverse credibility determination where alien testified in support of asylum application that he was persecuted for practicing Falun Gong before China banned Falun Gong, where the IJ ignored portions of State Department report that corroborated alien’s claim that Falun Gong practitioners were persecuted before institution of ban.). Thus, we must vacate the denials of asylum and withholding of removal under the I.N.A. based on lack of credibility. D. Eligibility for Asylum and Withholding of Removal under the I.N.A. In order to establish asylum eligibility, an asylum applicant must show that he or she meets the definition of “refugee” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A); Kaba v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 741, 747 (6th Cir. 2008). That definition provides: The term “refugee” means . . . any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “Even though applicable statutes do not define the term persecution, we have determined that persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty.” Kaba, 546 F.3d at 748 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “An applicant who has been found to have established such past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1); Kaba, 546 F.3d at 748. However: That presumption may be rebutted if an asylum officer or immigration judge . . . [finds that:] There has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant’s country of nationality or, if stateless, in the applicant’s country of last habitual residence, on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; or [that] . . . The applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality or, if stateless, another part of the applicant’s country of last habitual residence, and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so. No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 18 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1), (b)(1)(i)(A)-(B); Kaba, 546 F.3d at 748. As to withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3) of the I.N.A., [t]he burden of proof is on the applicant . . . to establish that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of . . . religion . . . The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration. The evidence shall be evaluated as follows:
(i) If the applicant is determined to have suffered past persecution in the proposed country of removal on account of . . . religion . . . it shall be presumed that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in the future in the country of removal on the basis of the original claim. This presumption may be rebutted if an . . . immigration judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence. (A) There has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened on account of any of the five grounds mentioned in this paragraph upon the applicant’s removal to that country; or (B) The applicant could avoid a future threat to his or her life or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so. (ii) In cases in which the applicant has established past persecution, the Service shall bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the requirements of (b)(1)(i)(A) or (b)(1)(i)(B) of this section. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i)-(ii). The IJ and Board, having determined that Saed and Nancy Marouf were not credible, concluded that the adverse credibility determination was fatal to their claims to asylum and withholding of removal. A.R. 4, 75. However, those determinations were in error, supra Part II.C., and we now consider whether they are eligible for asylum. On the face of the record, the Maroufs have established eligibility for asylum and withholding under the I.N.A. Specifically, the Maroufs offered credible testimony of past No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 19 persecution: A Muslim mob descended upon their home and committed religiously-motived violence against Saed. A violent attack on the basis of religion amounts to past persecution, even if perpetrated by civilians. See Singh v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Discrimination, harassment, and violence by groups that the government is unwilling or unable to control can also constitute persecution.”). This past persecution creates a presumption that the Maroufs have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). But the Maroufs have established more than a mere presumption of a well-founded fear; that presumption is supported by the State Department report indicating the existence of Muslim-onChristian violence in the area the Maroufs lived that the Palestinian Authority is unable or unwilling to control, A.R. 662-63, 667, 669. The Maroufs evidence therefore compels the conclusion that they have a sincere, well-founded fear of persecution in the West Bank. E. Discretionary Asylum Asylum is a discretionary remedy vested in the Attorney General and delegated to Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); Ljuljdjurovic v. Gonzales, 132 F. App’x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Asylum can be granted by the Attorney General and, by delegated authority, the [Board of Immigration Appeals] and any [Immigration Judge].”). However, that discretion is subject to our review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), (b)(4)(D). Because the IJ and Board erroneously found that the Maroufs were not credible, neither considered whether the Maroufs were eligible for asylum, supra Part