Opinion ID: 1542243
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Unconstitutionality of Act.

Text: Appellants make six attacks upon the validity of the Act as follows: (a) It denies defendants freedom of speech; (b) it violates the Tenth Amendment; (c) the Act is too broad; (d) the executive usurps the prerogative of the grand jury; (e) the Act is contradictory and meaningless, and (f) the Act is unreasonable. (a) Denial of Free Speech. The argument as to denial of free speech is that the Act would punish organized labor and its leaders by making it a crime for them to communicate their wage demands to employers. This contention is unsound. In so far as here pertinent, the Act makes it a felony to obtain, attempt to obtain or to conspire to obtain or attempt to obtain money, property, or other valuable considerations by use of, attempt to use or threat of force, violence or coercion. Wages, even though obtained by the means condemned in the Act, are excepted from the statute. Not only is this exception expressed but it is emphasized by being twice stated. In section 2(a) of the Act, 48 Stat. 980, 18 U.S.C.A., § 420a(a) is the language not including, however, the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee. Again in section 3(b) of the Act, 48 Stat. 980, 18 U. S.C.A. § 420b(b) it states that The terms `property', `money', or `valuable considerations' used herein [in section 420a of title] shall not be deemed to include wages paid by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee. Individuals may obtain power in labor organizations which is capable of use to obtain unwilling payments from employers through bringing about or threatening to bring about violence or through coercion. So long as that power is used solely to obtain more wages such exercise of power is expressly excluded from the Act. It is only when such power is misused to obtain personal benefits for such individuals and not for the membership that the Act applies. The Act covers no action by a labor leader honestly acting for the members of his organization. It does cover the compulsory payment of graft to a labor leader for his own individual enrichment. Thus construed, the Act is clearly as protective to labor organizations and their membership as it is to employers. The payment of graft to a labor leader is, clearly, the purchase of his loyalty to his organization. The result is betrayal of his organization. Labor is likely to suffer more through such a sellout than the employer who, willingly or unwillingly, pays the bribe. By punishing the traitorous leader who uses his power for his personal enrichment at the expense of his organization, the Act truly is at least as protective of employees at it is of employers. The Act makes such betrayal hazardous. (b) The Tenth Amendment. The argument as to the Tenth Amendment is that this Act undertakes to invade State jurisdiction and deal with domestic violence  in short, is an attempt to exercise the police power reserved to the States under the Amendment. Clearly this is not true. The Act is an exercise of police power but it is based upon the protection of interstate commerce. If it comes within the commerce clause of the Constitution it is not open to this objection. If it does not come within the commerce clause it would be invalid whether it involved an exercise of police power or not. That the Act is within the commerce clause seems clear under National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 604-606, 59 S.Ct. 668, 83 L.Ed. 1014. The Fainblatt case holds that manufacturers of articles entering into interstate commerce are within the commerce clause and subject to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 151 et seq. where the cessation of manufacture necessarily results in the cessation of the movement of the manufactured product in interstate commerce. 306 U.S. page 604, 59 S.Ct. page 670, 83 L.Ed. 1014. In that case, the cessation of the movement of the manufactured product in interstate commerce existed because if the clothing could not be manufactured it could not enter into interstate commerce. There the effect was upon the origination of interstate commerce. The situation before us affects the termination or purpose of interstate commerce and is just as effective in preventing such commerce. The only purpose for shipping these picture films in interstate commerce is to have them licensed or leased for exhibition purposes. If exhibitors are prevented or seriously obstructed in exhibiting the films they will not buy them. If exhibitors will not buy the films they will not be shipped in interstate commerce. In effect upon interstate commerce, there is no difference between preventing the films entering interstate commerce and in preventing them being used at the points to which they may be shipped  in either case, the films will not be shipped because of the obstruction. (c) Act Too Broad. The objection that the Act is too broad is answered, also, by the Fainblatt case, 306 U. S. pages 606-609, 59 S.Ct. 668, 83 L.Ed. 1014. The argument here is the same as answered in the Fainblatt case. It is that the Act covers things which may only remotely affect interstate commerce. The language of this Act is broad. It evinces an intention of the Congress to cover the entire constitutional range of interstate commerce in its prohibition of racketeering. We have no doubt that the actions here involved are such as come within the range of regulation under the commerce clause. In such situation, we need not trouble ourselves as to whether the language of the Act may or may not be broader than the constitutional power. The Act certainly is valid in so far as it does not exceed that power and it clearly does not do so as to the matters here. (d) Executive Usurpation in Act. The contention that the executive usurps a prerogative of the grand jury is based on a requirement of the Act, 48 Stat. 980, 18 U.S.C.A. § 420c, which is that prosecutions under the Act shall be commenced only upon the express direction of the Attorney General of the United States. This prosecution was so commenced. Appellants' argument is that this requirement undertakes to deprive the grand jury of its statutory power to investigate crime by delegating the jurisdictional function to the Attorney General when it invests him with the power to determine who has violated the Act. This contention is unsound. The obvious purpose of this provision is for the protection of those who might be liable to the Act by requiring the consent of the highest legal official of the Government before a prosecution under the Act can be commenced. Similar provisions appear in other Acts, Federal Trade Commission Act, § 9, 15 U.S.C.A. § 49; Fair Labor Standards Act, § 9, 29 U.S.C. A. § 209. The similar provision in the Federal Trade Commission Act has been recognized as beneficial by the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174, 47 S.Ct. 553, 71 L.Ed. 978. Appellants are in no position to challenge this provision of the Act because any possible effect thereof would be to their benefit. Also, the grand jury was not prevented from acting upon and returning the indictment here. (e) Act is Contradictory and Meaningless. The contention that the Act is contradictory and meaningless is not well founded. It may be true that the Act seems loosely drawn, as stated in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Local 807, 2 Cir., 118 F.2d 684, but it is not difficult to get its meaning that certain acts, constituting extortion, are made unlawful. (f) Act is Unreasonable. The contention that the Act is unreasonable is supported by an argument which is not quite clear. It seems to be that unless the Act is construed in a reasonable manner the United States will have assumed complete control of State offenses. It is said that this Act was designed to extend the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 Note, and 38 Stat. 730 and, therefore, the construction of those Acts should control in the construction of this Act: with respect to intent and potential ability to actually, immediately and directly, exert an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce, as distinguished from the remote or indirect effects on commerce incident to the pursuit of an objective (appellants' brief, p. 75). It may or may not be true that decisions construing the Sherman and Clayton Acts may be useful in construing this Act. Be that as it may, such construction cannot affect the validity of this Act. Our conclusion is that the Act is not open to the challenges here presented.