Opinion ID: 393906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of a Continuance, Cocounsel and Travel Expenses

Text: 16 Reed and Bibby contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motions for a continuance and for appointment of cocounsel or, in the alternative, travel expenses for their attorneys. 17 Reed was arraigned in Minot, North Dakota, on April 18, 1980, and was released on bond to return to his home in Rochester, Indiana. On April 29, 1980, counsel who resided in Minot was appointed for Reed and Reed was so notified. 18 Bibby was arraigned in Fargo, North Dakota, on April 30, 1980, and he was released on bond to return to his home in Cicero, Illinois. Counsel for Bibby was notified of his appointment on April 25, 1980, and met with Bibby for five hours on the day he was arraigned. Counsel for Bibby resided in Minot. 19 On April 22, 1980, the trial judge entered an order setting June 2, 1980, as the date of trial. 20 Reed argues that a continuance was necessary because trial counsel had only three weeks to prepare for trial due to an intervening one week trial. Reed concedes that the government followed an open file policy but emphasizes that the government's files contained the results of a major investigation involving seven defendants and there was no government effort to separate the information as to each defendant. Reed also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying motions for appointment of cocounsel in Rochester, Indiana, or, in the alternative, expenses for counsel to travel to Indiana. Reed states that these expenditures were necessary for counsel to meet personally with him, to investigate the junkyard where the transaction took place, and to interview defense witnesses. 21 Bibby argues that his motion for a continuance should have been granted because counsel had only about four weeks to prepare and the indictment charged seven defendants in eight counts. Bibby asked that the district court, as an alternative to a continuance, appoint cocounsel in Illinois or that counsel's request for travel expense to Illinois be approved. Bibby argues that such expenditures were necessary so that counsel could meet with him and conduct an investigation. 22 The district court denied the motions for a continuance noting that both attorneys had been aware of the June 2, 1980 trial date since April 29th or 30th. The district court also denied counsels' request for travel funds or appointment of cocounsel because it had not been established why such expenditures were necessary. The court stated that such expenditures will not be allowed on the basis of the conclusory statements contained in the affidavits submitted by counsel. 23 The denial of a continuance will constitute reversible error only if there was a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Wolf, 645 F.2d 665 at 667 (8th Cir. 1981). In reviewing the denial of a motion for a continuance which is based on inadequate preparation for trial, the appellate court considers the amount of time granted for preparation, the conduct of counsel at trial, and whether prejudice appears from the record. United States v. Wolf, supra, at 667, quoting, United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1282, 63 L.Ed.2d 604 (1980). 24 Our review of the record reveals no prejudice to appellants due to inadequate preparation. Trial counsel for both appellants conducted themselves ably and therefore we find that the preparation time granted was adequate. While appellants argue that the length of the government's investigation and the voluminous government file warranted additional preparation, appellants do not indicate what they were unable to do at trial which additional preparation would have allowed. United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1282, 63 L.Ed.2d 604 (1980). 3 25 Similarly, appellants' briefs do not allege how their defense was prejudiced by the denial of cocounsel or travel expenses. Reed concedes that counsel communicated with him by phone but alleges that the district court abused its discretion in failing to allow travel expenses for a personal interview. But even if we were to assume an abuse of discretion, Reed does not state how the denial of the personal interview resulted in prejudice. See United States v. Sailer, 552 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959, 97 S.Ct. 2687, 53 L.Ed.2d 278 (1977). 26 Reed's request for cocounsel or travel expenses stated that travel expenses were necessary to discuss this matter with potential witnesses and to go to the site of the alleged incident to investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident. At oral argument counsel for Reed stated that he should have been allowed to view the junkyard because of the amount of testimony describing the location of various items in the junkyard. 27 At trial the defense presented extensive testimony regarding the junkyard through Reed's wife and two other persons who lived or worked at the junkyard. After reviewing the detailed examination of these three witnesses by Reed's counsel regarding the junkyard as it appeared at the time of the incident, we are convinced there was no prejudice to the defense. Furthermore, Reed does not allude to the possible existence of additional defense witnesses who could have been interviewed by counsel. 28 As indicated, the record also shows no abuse of discretion in the denial of Bibby's motions. As to his motion for a continuance, we note that Bibby's counsel had a month to prepare for trial, met with Bibby for five hours on the day of arraignment and had constant phone contact with Bibby. 29 The only indication as to how the defense may have been prejudiced by denial of the motions for a continuance, for appointment of cocounsel or travel expenses was alluded to at oral argument. Counsel for Bibby stated that his client had unsuccessfully attempted to locate Jerry and that the FBI had made no effort to check on Jerry. 30 However, the affidavit and motion submitted to the district court merely stated that counsel could not adequately prepare by phone and that cocounsel be appointed to assist in preparation of the case, or that travel expense be authorized for necessary preparation. Counsel made no statements concerning the need for investigation or more specifically, the need to find and interview Jerry. 31 At oral argument there was no indication that additional information had been found concerning Jerry or his whereabouts. Also at oral argument Bibby's attorney indicated that Bibby had given a statement to the FBI on April 23, 1980, which indicated Jerry was the person at the Lake Station truckstop. Counsel's motions were not made until May 13, 1980, well after Bibby's statement to the FBI and the five hour interview of Bibby conducted by counsel. 32 Considering these facts, we believe that counsel did not make as complete a showing of necessity as could then be reasonably expected of him. Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975). More importantly, Bibby has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence, that he was substantially prejudiced by the denial of his motions. Id. at 1353. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bibby's motion due to the conclusory affidavits filed by counsel.