Opinion ID: 867456
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Potential Jurors' General Objections to the Death Penalty

Text: ¶ 26 Roseberry contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excusing eleven potential jurors for cause based on their personal objections to the death penalty. We review a trial judge's decision to strike potential jurors for cause for abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 302, ¶¶ 24, 26, 4 P.3d 345, 357 (2000). Because defense counsel did not object to the dismissal of individual jurors, however, we review only for fundamental error. Moody, 208 Ariz. at 449-50, ¶ 85, 94 P.3d at 1144-45. ¶ 27 The Sixth Amendment prohibits the exclusion for cause of venire persons solely because they have general objections to the death penalty. State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314, 318, ¶ 6, 4 P.3d 369, 373 (2000) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)). In Anderson, we held that [a] general objection to the death penalty is not sufficient to create a presumption that a prospective juror is unfit because of bias to sit on the panel. Id. This rule, however, has an exception: prospective jurors who state unequivocally that they could never impose the death penalty regardless of the facts of the particular case may be excused for cause without violating the constitution. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 514, 88 S.Ct. 1770). Prospective jurors should be excused for cause if either their objection to, or support of, the death penalty prevents them from properly judging the facts of a particular case. Id. (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 734 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992)). ¶ 28 Roseberry requested that the trial judge privately voir dire each potential juror who indicated a strong feeling regarding the death penalty. The judge agreed to do so. After explaining to the potential jurors that the penalty phase of the trial might require them to impose a sentence of death, the judge asked those assembled in the courtroom if any of them believed that their ability to perform their duty [as jurors] would be substantially impaired or simply would be prevented by their beliefs regarding the death penalty. Eight people responded affirmatively, and all eight of them were brought into chambers individually for further questioning. [4]
¶ 29 The judge asked I.J. pointed questions about his opposition to the death penalty, and I.J. responded that he would not be able to ... effectively come to a right decision. The prosecutor followed up with questions to which I.J. ultimately responded that he would follow the law set forth in the judge's instructions. Based on that response, the judge did not strike I.J. at that time.
¶ 30 When asked in chambers about her objection to the death penalty, J.S. responded that she could not impose the death penalty on anyone and could not consider the State's evidence in the aggravation phase of the trial. Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate J.S., but she maintained her position that she could never vote to impose the death penalty. The judge excused her for cause, without objection by either counsel.
¶ 31 After explaining to B.H. the procedure and issues in Roseberry's case, the judge asked if she had any questions about them. B.H. stated that she could not come to grips with being a part of something that sends somebody to death. After further questioning, she explained that even if all the facts pointed toward a conviction, she was not sure she could convict because she could be sending somebody to death. The prosecutor asked B.H. if she could set aside her feelings and follow the law, to which she responded, No, I wouldn't, I wouldn't be able to. Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate her, but B.H. stated that, for her, imposing death was not an option. She further stated that if it came right down to it, I could not apply the death penalty. At that point, the judge excused B.H. for cause, without objection by either counsel.
¶ 32 Asked whether she could serve as a trial juror, F.F. responded, I couldn't do the death penalty for anybody. I'd feel really, really, reallyI couldn't do it. She stated that she couldn't even hit a fly. Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate F.F., but she remained adamant that she could not sentence anyone to death. When the judge again questioned F.F., she reaffirmed, I can't do the death penalty for anybody. At that point, the judge dismissed F.F. for cause, without objection by either counsel.
¶ 33 After explaining the legal proceedings to M.M., the judge asked him if he would be able to serve as a trial juror. M.M. stated that he is very much against and [his] religion is against the death penalty. He expressed no problem with determining guilt or innocence, but maintained that he could not say that someone deserves the death penalty. The judge then asked him, No matter what the State would prove, you would not vote or make your verdict be death? The prospective juror responded, That's right. Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate M.M., but he continued to assert that he could not sentence anyone to death. Based on M.M.'s answers, the trial judge dismissed him, without objection by either counsel.
¶ 34 After explaining the trial process to prospective juror E.Y., the judge asked him if it would be impossible for him to follow the law, to which E.Y. responded yes. He stated that he was strongly opposed to the death penalty. I would rather find a man innocent and put him out on the streets than send him to his death. Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate the juror, but E.Y. insisted that he could not send a man to his death. Based on his answers, the trial judge excused E.Y. for cause, without objection by either counsel.
¶ 35 After explaining the trial process to S.S., the judge asked her if it would be possible for her to be a trial juror. She responded that she could never, never, never, never go along with the death penalty. She went on to say that God takes life, not people. Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate S.S., and she did indicate that she could determine innocence or guilt, but she maintained that she could not follow the judge's instructions if it involved death. At that point, the judge dismissed S.S. for cause, without objection by either counsel. ¶ 36 She was the last juror individually questioned on the first day of jury selection; but the following day, after the court reassembled the prospective jurors and asked if any might have a problem being a juror in this case, ten people raised their hands. In response, the court individually questioned an additional nine jurors and met with Juror I.J. again. [5]
¶ 37 When asked by the judge about her concerns about being a trial juror, S.A. said, I just feel like from a moral standpoint I could not go along with the death penalty. Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate the potential juror, but S.A. insisted that she could not vote to impose death. With that, the judge excused S.A. for cause, without objection by either counsel.
¶ 38 When questioned by the judge, R.J. stated, I just don't believe in the death penalty. The judge explained the trial process to him and asked if he would be able to apply the law, and R.J. replied that he would not. Defense counsel tried to rehabilitate R.J., but when asked if he would follow the judge's instruction, he said he would not be able to vote for death even if the defense did not establish mitigation sufficient to call for leniency. At that point, the judge excused R.J., without objection by either counsel.