Opinion ID: 205369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Calculation of Criminal History Score

Text: We next turn to whether the district court clearly erred in making the factual finding that Hernandez last reentered on June 29, 1995. According to the PSR, Hernandez informed ICE officials that he last reentered the country on June 29, 1995. This statement was not challenged or controverted by any other evidence. The district court is entitled to rely on an unchallenged portion of a PSR. See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) ([T]he district court may rely on undisputed statements in the PSR at sentencing.); United States v. Charlesworth, 217 F.3d 1155, 1160-61 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that information in a PSR was sufficient because the defendant offered no evidence to contradict the PSR and instead only argued that the government had not sustained its burden of proof). In this case, not only was the date provided by the PSR unchallenged, but the information was provided by Hernandez himself. Contrary to Hernandez's insistence that the government provide exact proof that he was in the country continuously after June 29, 1995, a court may find continuous presence in the United States by a preponderance of the evidence even if the government's evidence does not account for [the defendant's] presence in the United States at every moment since [the reentry]. Garcia-Jimenez, 623 F.3d at 941-42. Here, the PSR presented evidence establishing Hernandez's continuous presence in the United States in the form of employment history and dates of arrest in the United States, and established motivation to stay in the country to remain with his family. See id. at 941. Nothing in the record indicates Hernandez was anywhere but in the United States during the relevant time period. Accordingly, the court did not clearly err when it concluded that the PSR, uncontradicted by any other evidence, established by a preponderance of the evidence that Hernandez last reentered the United States and commenced the instant offense on June 29, 1995. The three-year sentence imposed in 1992 was imposed within fifteen years of the 1995 commencement of the instant offense. Therefore, the district court's calculation under the Sentencing Guidelines was correct. AFFIRMED.