Opinion ID: 1829657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactive Abrogation

Text: The Association argues that section 689.225(7), Florida Statutes, has retroactively abolished the common law rule against perpetuities. For the reasons explained below, we disagree. In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a law is presumed to operate prospectively. State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla.1983); see also Metro. Dade County v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So.2d 494, 499 (Fla.1999) ([R]equiring clear intent assures that [the legislature] has itself affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits. (quoting Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla.1994))). In determining whether a statute applies retroactively, we consider two factors: (1) whether the statute itself expresses an intent that it apply retroactively; and, if so, (2) whether retroactive application is constitutional. See, e.g., Chase Fed., 737 So.2d at 499. We conclude that the plain language of section 689.225 does not evince an intent that the statute apply retroactively. We therefore need not address the second prong. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp.-W. Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 784 So.2d 438, 441 (Fla.2001) (finding it unnecessary to reach the second prong of the retroactivity analysis absent clear legislative intent to apply the statute retroactively). The Association argues that section 689.225(7) reflects an intent to retroactively abolish the rule. Therefore, although quoted above, the language bears repeating: This section is the sole expression of any rule against perpetuities or remoteness in vesting in this state. No common-law rule against perpetuities or remoteness in vesting shall exist with respect to any interest or power regardless of whether such interest or power is governed by this section. We agree that this language reflects an intent to abrogate the common law rule. We disagree, however, that it reflects a clear intent to do so retroactively. Nothing in section 689.225(7) states, or even implies, that it is to be applied retroactively. It reflects only an intent to abrogate the common law rule. Moreover, retroactivity would be inconsistent with the immediately preceding subsection. See § 689.225(6), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also State v. Riley, 638 So.2d 507, 508 (Fla. 1994) (noting that two consecutive subsections of the same statute should be read in pari materia ). That subsection provides that the statutory rule against perpetuities applies to a nonvested property interest or power of appointment that is created on or after October 1, 1988.  § 689.225(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). Further, it permits judicial reformation of interests created before October 1, 1988, in the manner that most closely approximates the transferor's manifested plan ... and is within the limits of the rule against perpetuities applicable when the nonvested property interest or power of appointment was created.  § 689.225(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). The Association's construction would render that language meaningless. See, e.g., Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1231 (Fla.2006) ([P]rovisions in a statute are not to be construed as superfluous if a reasonable construction exists that gives effect to all words and provisions.). We therefore resolve the conflict by holding that the abrogation of the common law rule against perpetuities does not apply retroactively.