Opinion ID: 2975823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing Under the Overbreadth Doctrine

Text: While the reasons stated above are sufficient to hold that Plaintiffs have standing, their case is further bolstered by the overbreadth doctrine. The Supreme Court has found that broadly written statutes may have a powerful deterrent effect on free speech and expression. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (establishing the overbreadth doctrine). The Supreme Court has held “that the very existence of some broadly written statutes may have such a deterrent effect on free expression that they should be subject to challenge even by a party whose own conduct may be unprotected.” Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798-99 (1984). Indeed, “such a statute may be challenged on its face even though a more narrowly drawn statute would be valid as applied to the party in the case before it.” Id. “Litigants . . . are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). “The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth was designed as a ‘departure from traditional rules of standing,’ to enable persons who are themselves unharmed by the defect in a statute nevertheless ‘to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.’” Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484 (1989) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613); see also Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1183 (6th Cir. 1995). There is “no requirement that the person 3 Admittedly, the notice pleading requirement was amended slightly by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), which held that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Id. at 1964-65. Twombly does not apply here, however, because Plaintiff has coupled its allegations with facts which suggest that Defendant has deprived it of its alleged right to post signs. Twombly involved a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendants engaged in a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.” Id. at 1961. Rather than alleging that such collusion existed, however, the Twombly plaintiff merely alleged that the defendants were operating their businesses in a manner which is consistent with collusion, and then invited the courts to conclude that a conspiracy must follow from this circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1962-63. The Supreme Court held that, under § 1 of the Sherman Act, a “bare assertion of conspiracy” is not sufficient to state a claim. Id. at 1967. Instead, the Twombly plaintiff was also required to plead facts which “raise[] a suggestion” of actual collusion. Id. In other words, Twombly was a case where the plaintiff invoked a statute banning collusion, but failed to actually state any facts suggesting collusion. This stands in stark contrast to the instant case. Here, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, and supports its allegation with specific examples of instances where the challenged regulations denied it the ability to speak freely. Plaintiff expressly states that it has been unable to post signs “[a]s a result of the Township’s enforcement of its Sign Regulations.” (J.A. 8) (emphasis added). It cites nine specific examples where it was denied its alleged rights as a direct result of the Township’s denial of Plaintiff’s applications to post signs. No. 06-3828 Midwest Media Property, et al. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio Page 16 making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.” Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798-99, n. 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Facial overbreadth claims have also been entertained where statutes, by their terms, purport to regulate the time, place, and manner of expressive or communicative conduct, and where such conduct has required official approval under laws that delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 (citations omitted). Midwest argues that, as an advertising company, it may raise a facial overbreadth challenge to Defendant’s sign regulations. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), the Supreme Court held that sign companies may use overbreadth standing to challenge sign regulations. As the Supreme Court expressly stated, [it] ha[s] never held that one with a ‘commercial interest’ in speech also cannot challenge the facial validity of a statute on the grounds of its substantial infringement of the First Amendment interests of others. Were it otherwise, newspapers, radio stations, movie theaters and producers—often those with the highest interest and the largest stake in a First Amendment controversy—would not be able to challenge government limitations on speech as substantially overbroad. Id. at 505 n.11; see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1988) (holding that “one who is subject to the law may challenge it facially without the necessity of first applying for, and being denied, a license.”). Case law clearly establishes that Midwest, as an advertising company, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the sign regulations at issue in this case because the complaint in this case clearly alleges that Defendant’s zoning ordinances are overbroad. See, e.g., Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 172 F.3d 397, 407 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that “given the First Amendment context . . . a facial challenge is appropriate, and any need for [a party] to participate in the allegedly unconstitutional [ ] process in order to establish standing is obviated.”); Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that advertising companies “have standing to challenge the [municipal sign] permit requirement, even though they did not apply for permits, because applying for a permit would have been futile.”); Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 F.2d 283, 285 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that advertisement company “has a commercial interest in the speech regulated by the sign code” and “has the right to assert a claim, in its own behalf and for third parties, that the code is unconstitutional.”); Nat’l Adver. Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that “because of its commercial interest in the speech appellants seek to restrict, [advertising company] has standing to challenge the ordinances . . . . as facially invalid.”). The majority’s finding to the contrary plainly contravenes well-established precedent from this Court and the Supreme Court. Therefore, Midwest has overbreadth standing to challenge the Township’s sign regulations. Because Plaintiffs have constitutional standing, the district court erred in dismissing this case.