Opinion ID: 450368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: negligence as a basis for liability.

Text: 59 The appellant argues with some force that simple negligence was, as a matter of law, insufficient to trigger the applicable penalty provisions. And, since the district court exculpated Ven-Fuel of any more egregious conduct in the premises, we must confront this contention head on. 7 60 We look first to the language of the statute itself, an enactment which is largely silent on the issue of intent. The version of the law which is applicable to the question of liability here, see note 4 ante, was born in this precise form in 1930. Recodified in 1970, it provides in its entirety as follows: 61 If any consignor, seller, owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person or persons enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, into the commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, or makes any false statement in any declaration under the provisions of section 1485 of this title (relating to declaration on entry) without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or aids or procures the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, whether or not the United States shall or may be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement; or is guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States is or may be deprived of the lawful duties or any portion thereof accruing upon the merchandise or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered from such person or person, shall be subject to forfeiture, which forfeiture shall only apply to the whole of the merchandise or the value thereof in the case or package containing the particular article or articles of merchandise to which such fraud or false paper or statement relates. The arrival within the territorial limits of the United States of any merchandise consigned for sale and remaining the property of the shipper or consignor, and the acceptance of a false or fraudulent invoice thereof by the consignee or the agent of the consignor, or the existence of any other facts constituting an attempted fraud, shall be deemed, for the purposes of this section, to be an attempt to enter such merchandise notwithstanding no actual entry has been made or offered. 62 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592 (1970) (emphasis added). 63 We must, at the outset, reject the analysis of the statute relied upon by the court below. The district court opined that the reasonable cause to believe phrase blanketed the statute in its entirety and thereby allowed the absence of reasonable cause to believe, i.e., negligence, to serve as a basis for liability under the act. Such an interpretation is plausible at first blush, especially when seen in light of the fact that Congress in 1978 believed that 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592 imposed liability for negligence: The penalty applies to negligent as well as intentional violations.... S.Rep. No. 778, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 2228-29. Yet, we think that the matter is not so simplistic. 64 The rule of the last antecedent is, of course, a fundamental tool of statutory construction. That rule holds generally that qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceeding and are not to be construed as extending to others more remote. First Charter Financial Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir.1982); Azure v. Morton, 514 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir.1975); Quindlen v. Prudential Insurance Co., 482 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir.1973); United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d 455, 459 (D.C.Cir.1972); Mandel Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 254 F.2d 18, 22 (7th Cir.1958), rev'd on other grounds, 359 U.S. 385, 79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 (1959). While the rule is not an inflexible one, Pritchett, 470 F.2d at 459, it should be applied unless there is a plain indication to the contrary in the statute. And, there is no such harbinger here. 65 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592 slips neatly within the integument of the rule. The qualifying phrase without reasonable cause to believe must be construed to modify only the last previous antecedent phrase, viz., any false statement in any declaration under the provisions of section 1485 of this title (relating to declaration on entry). The modifying phrase cannot be rationally construed to refer distributively to the more remote antecedent words or phrases, which occur before the disjunctive clause set off by commas. 66 The validity of such an interpretation is further confirmed by the presence of the adjective such in the phrase without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement. In the portion of Sec. 1592 preceding this phrase, the noun statement appears twice, initially before the first disjunctive clause (... or by means of any false statement, written or verbal ...) and latterly within the second or clause, where it is immediately followed (and qualified) by the phrase in any declaration under the provisions of section 1485 of this title (relating to declaration on entry). The definition of such in Black's Law Dictionary 1284 (5th ed. 1979), states: 67 Such represents the object as already particularized in terms which are not mentioned, and is a descriptive and relative word, referring to the last antecedent. (emphasis added). 68 Again, we apply the rule of the last antecedent. Such statement, in this clause, must be construed as referring only to the last prior use of the word statement. Thus, such statement perforce refers only to a statement made in a formal customs declaration, and it is only that type of statement to which the phrase without reasonable cause to believe applies. 69 Any other construction would render nugatory the entire phrase: or makes any false statement in the declaration under the provisions of section 1485 of this title. This is so because the general word declaration appears in the earlier clause: by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper.... The unrestricted word declaration would, of course, include all types of declarations, including declarations on entry made under 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1485. Thus, if Congress had intended the phrase, without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement to apply to statements made in declarations generally (and to statements made in invoices, affidavits, letters or papers), it would have been senseless to make any particularized reference to Sec. 1485 declarations on entry. All words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous. Breest v. Cunningham, 752 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir.1985); Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir.1983); Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 856 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917, 93 S.Ct. 1550, 36 L.Ed.2d 309 (1973); Blue Cross of Rhode Island v. Cannon, 589 F.Supp. 1483, 1491 (D.R.I.1984). See generally Black, Construction and Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 60 at 165 (2d ed. 1911). There is but one reason--and one reason alone--why Congress would have singled out Sec. 1485 declarations on entry by this particularized reference: it is only such declarations to which the without reasonable cause to believe lanuage directly relates. 70 Although the district court was, for these reasons, in error in formulating the rationale upon which it determined that simple negligence was enough to trigger Sec. 1592 liability, ascertainment of that error does not end our inquiry. The law is settled that if the court below reached the right conclusion, albeit on a faulty premise, its decision should be affirmed on appeal. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943); Doe v. Anrig, 728 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir.1984); Pueblo International Inc. v. DeCardona, 725 F.2d 823, 825 (1st Cir.1984). So, in order to divine the meaning and intendment of the statute, and its applicability to the facts as found by the district court, it is necessary in our judgment to trace the full genealogy of 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592. 71 We commence our trek with the proceedings of the fifth Congress, from which emerged an enactment that provided in part as follows: 72 That if any goods, wares or merchandise, of which entry shall have been made in the office of a collector, shall not be invoiced according to the actual cost thereof, at the place of exportation, with design to evade the duties thereupon, or any part thereof, all such goods, wares or merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered of the person making entry, shall be forfeited; and in every case in which the said collector shall suspect that any such goods, wares or merchandise are not invoiced at a sum equal to that for which they have usually been sold in the place or country from whence they were imported, it shall be the duty of such collector to take the said goods, wares or merchandise into his possession, and retain the same with due and reasonable care, at the risk and expense of the owner or owners, consignee or consignees thereof, until their value at the time and place of importation shall be ascertained, and until the duties arising, according to such valuation, shall be first paid, or secured to be paid, as required by this act in other cases of importation. 73 1 Stat. 677, Sec. 66 (1799). 74 This statute, narrowly drawn and limited to invoicing situations, paid particular heed to the place of exportation. But, it did include a phrase that dealt with intent: with design to evade. As the progenitor of a race of laws addressed to fraud on the custom-house, the 1799 statute became the object of interpretation in two crucial areas. 8 Cases decided under that hoary ordinance give us a glimpse of what kind of intent requirement Congress had in mind when it enacted Sec. 66. 75 Wood, decided by the Court in 1842, set the tone for many of the later cases. The Court rejected any notion that the revenue collection laws were to be strictly construed, opting instead for an expansive approach to statutory interpretation in this area. Wood, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 362-63. And, while the Wood Court's liberal reading and application of the statutory scheme was implemented sub silentio, the Court was more direct in its observations some three years later:Upon the point that the revenue laws, on which the information was founded, were not, as the judge in the court below suggested, to be deemed penal laws in the sense in which that phrase is sometimes used, it may be proper to say a very few words. He treated the point as not of great importance in the case, as we think it was not, since it had no tendency to change the interpretation of the provisions of the revenue laws then under his consideration. In one sense, every law imposing a penalty or forfeiture may be deemed a penal law; in another sense, such laws are often deemed, and truly deserve to be called, remedial. The judge was therefore strictly accurate, when he stated that It must not be understood that every law which imposes a penalty is, therefore, legally speaking, a penal law, that is, a law which is to be construed with great strictness in favour of the defendant. Laws enacted for the prevention of fraud, for the suppression of a public wrong, or to effect a public good, are not, in the strict sense, penal acts, although they may inflict a penalty for violating them. And he added, It is in this light I view the revenue laws, and I would construe them so as most effectually to accomplish the intention of the legislature in passing them. The same distinction will be found recognised in the elementary writers, as, for example, in Blackstone's Commentaries, (1 Black.Comm. 88;) and Bacon's Abridgment, (statute I. 7, 8;) and Comyns' Digest, (Parliament R. 13, R. 19, R. 20;) and it is also abundantly supported by the authorities. 76 Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 197, 210-11, 11 L.Ed. 559 (1845) (dicta). 77 Wood and Taylor by no means stand alone. The idea that revenue laws are a special breed, sui generis, demanding a more liberal interpretation in light of the remedial policies which they promote, is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. Thus, the Court in Cliquot's Champagne applied the same analytic approach to the 1863 ancestor of Sec. 1592, holding that: 78 Revenue laws are not penal laws in the sense that requires them to be construed with great strictness in favor of the defendant. They are rather to be regarded as remedial in their character, and intended to prevent fraud, suppress public wrong, and promote the public good. They should be so construed as to carry out the intention of the legislature in passing them and most effectually accomplish these objects. 79 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 145. See also United States v. Willetts, 28 F. Cases 612, 614 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1871) (No. 16,699) (Blatchford, J.). The early authorities are virtually consentient on the point. 9 And, the soundness of their reasoning cannot seriously be doubted, given the salient governmental concerns which underlie the integrity of the custom-house. 80 These cases tell us that, notwithstanding their penal aspects, the revenue laws are to be expansively read in order to give effect to the will of the Congress. But, they are not particularly illuminating as to how that will manifests itself vis-a-vis the degree of culpability necessary to catalyze the statutory scheme. It is on this issue that cases such as United States v. Five Casks of Files, 25 F.Cas. 1095 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1840) (No. 15,112) and Caldwell v. United States, supra, point the way. 81 In the former matter, the government brought an information against merchandise allegedly imported by means of a false invoice with intent to evade or defraud revenue collection, contrary to Sec. 4 of the Act of May 28, 1830, 4 Stat. 410. The importers argued--as Ven-Fuel argues here--that a mere mistake was insufficient to sustain liability. Judge Betts ruled otherwise: 82 [T]he claimant contends that, if W., H. & Moss supposed that they were purchasers, and, under this supposition, inserted the actual cost, instead of actual value, they were merely mistaken in the law, and not guilty of an intent to defraud or evade the revenue. The court, however, is of opinion that this mistake of the law cannot be looked to in their exculpation. They are bound to know the law, and if, without mistake of fact, they make an entry in their invoice contrary to the law, it must be regarded as intentional; and, if tending to evade or defraud the revenue, that intent must be ascribed to the false invoice. The jury are not, in this particular, to inquire as to the actual private intent to defraud the revenue, but whether the importers were in such a relation of manufacturers as bound them to enter the goods, not at actual cost, but at actual value. 83 United States v. Five Casks of Files, 25 F.Cas. at 1096. 84 That something less than the specific intent or scienter usually associated with acts of criminality will suffice in a customs case is also apparent from Caldwell. There, the court, in reviewing the district judge's jury instructions in a suit under the Act of 1799, faulted the charge for intimating that proof of meditated fraud was an essential element of the government's case. Caldwell, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 383. Caldwell, both on the trial level and in the Supreme Court, equated fraud in the sense of the Act of 1799 with improper means; the case plainly indicates that the fraud necessary to impose liability for violation of the customs laws is, and has been from the start, a breed apart. 85 The nature of the intent requirement appears more clearly in United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 139 Fed. 961 (8th Cir.1905). There, the government sought to confiscate gems under Sec. 9 of the Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, 26 Stat. 135-36. That law is a direct lineal ancestor of 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592. 10 It read in part as follows: 86 That if any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person shall make or attempt to make any entry of imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise or the value thereof, to be recovered from the person making the entry, shall be forfeited, which forfeiture shall only apply to the whole of the merchandise or the value thereof in the case or package containing the particular article or articles of merchandise to which such fraud or false paper or statement relates; ... 87 The Eighth Circuit, in a thorough and exhaustive opinion, recognized the duality of meaning which could be ascribed to the word false in the statutory context, and drew the line so as to include negligently false representations within the reach of the revenue law. The court held (139 Fed. at 966): 88 The word false has two distinct and well-recognized meanings. It signifies (1) intentionally or knowingly or negligently untrue, and (2) untrue by mistake, accident, or honestly after the exercise of reasonable care. A statement that is false in the former sense is undoubtedly denounced by section 9. And further (id. at 968-69): 89 The reason of the case, the general rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed, that the judiciary should not interpret into them the creation of offenses which the enacting body did not clearly denounce, and the general current of decisions upon this subject, to some of which reference has been made, indicate that the true rule is this: The words false and falsely, in statutes and contracts which impose forfeitures or penalties for false acts or acts falsely done, generally imply culpable negligence or wrong. They signify more than incorrect or incorrectly, and mean knowingly or intentionally or negligently false or falsely, in the absence of express provisions in the statutes or contracts themselves, or reasonable implications from them, their subjects, and the circumstances to the contrary. (Citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit concluded: 90 Section 9 of the act of 1890 is a penal statute. It prescribes grave forfeitures and penalties, and it falls fairly within the rule which has been announced, and which is sustained by the above authorities. A rational construction of the statute and a consideration of the relation of the offense of the use of a false statement denounced in it to the other offenses created by it strengthen this conclusion. It is neither probable, nor reasonable, to suppose that Congress intended to inflict the forfeiture of the merchandise involved, a possible fine of $5,000, and possible imprisonment for two years for the use of an innocent or mistaken statement that was made with reasonable care and without knowledge that it was not true.... [T]he reasonable inference is that Congress intended that knowledge of its falsity, or culpable negligence in ascertaining the answer to the question, whether it was true or false, should be an indispensable element of the offense of using the false statement, under the familiar rule, Noscitur a sociis. 91 Id. at 969-70 (emphasis supplied). 92 While more modern caselaw on the subject is scanty, it favors an application of the same principles of construction to 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592. The Ninth Circuit, for example, upheld a forfeiture under Sec. 1592 predicated upon a finding below that [t]he claimant made false statements in the entry papers ... without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statements. United States v. Wagner, 434 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir.1970). Wagner dealt with the exact statutory verbiage which was before the district court in the case at bar. The court of appeals flatly rejected the notion that knowing intent was a prerequisite to the application of the statute. Id. at 628-29. 11 93 To the same effect is United States v. R.I.T.A. Organics, 487 F.Supp. 75 (N.D.Ill.1980). That case, like the instant one, involved a proceeding under 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592, as enacted in 1930, wherein the government alleged that the defendant made false statements in connection with the importation of certain merchandise. The district court held squarely that the statute imposes liability without regard to whether the importer's culpability is based upon fraud, negligence, or gross negligence. Id. at 76. Thus, Sec. 1592 makes actionable negligent, as well as fraudulent, misstatements at the time of the importation of merchandise. Id. at 77. 94 In addition to the awkward locution of Jen Dao Chen, discussed ante at note 11, Ven-Fuel relies on a trilogy of musty cases which, in its somewhat myopic view, require a showing of intent to defraud. But, as we shall see, none of these three decisions bears the weight of the appellant's assertion. 95 United States v. 1,150 1/2 Pounds of Celluloid, 82 Fed. 627 (6th Cir.1897) involved a forfeiture under Sec. 9 of the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, 26 Stat. 135. There was no evidence of either negligence or fraud on the part of the owner, and the district court ordered the proceeds from the sale of the seized celluloid to be paid over to the claimant. The United States appealed, making essentially a strict liability argument. In rejecting the government's assignment of error, the Sixth Circuit, id. at 630, quoted with approval the following passage from the opinion in Six Hundred and Fifty-One Chests of Tea v. United States, 22 F.Cas. 253, 256 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1826) (No. 12,916), aff'd, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 486, 6 L.Ed. 702 (1827). 96 I am not aware of a single instance where, by any positive provision of the revenue laws, a forfeiture is incurred, that it does not grow out of some fraud, mistake, or negligence of the party on whom the penalty has been visited. (Emphasis supplied). 97 Closely read, Celluloid stands only for the accepted proposition that an innocent bevue, without more, will not incur the wrath of the custom-house. And, Celluloid 's reliance upon Chests of Tea strongly suggests that its precedential value favors the appellee's position in the case at bar. 98 Ven-Fuel next brandishes the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Seventy-Five Bales of Tobacco, 147 Fed. 127 (2d Cir.1906). In Tobacco, Judge Coxe did little more than to restate the honest mistake rule; Tobacco affirmed a directed verdict in the owner's favor in circumstances where the district court had exonerated the owner of negligence, specifically stating that the government sought to require a degree of care and accuracy in making up the invoice which seems unreasonable. Id. at 129. That is negligence language--it emphatically erases the artificial gloss which the appellant attempts to place on the case. And, the smoke that Ven-Fuel sees in Tobacco' § dicta is further dispelled by Tobacco's express reliance on Ninety-Nine Diamonds, supra. Tobacco, 147 Fed. at 130. 99 Lastly, appellant points to United States v. One Silk Rug, 158 Fed. 974 (3d Cir.1908). But, the case is less an Aubusson than an imperfect remnant. To the extent that One Silk Rug holds to the view that the forfeiture provisions of the customs laws must be judged by the same standard as applies to the criminal prosecution of a person charged with effecting a fraudulent entry, id. at 976, it is simply wrong-headed. There is no respectable authority to support such an extreme perspective, and the One Silk Rug court cites to none. Be that as it may, the issue in the case is much narrower than Ven-Fuel would have us believe. The Third Circuit described the issue there at bar as follows: 100 The learned trial judge took the position that the fraud on the part of the foreign broker would not support a forfeiture of the goods unless this fraud was subsequently adopted by the person making entry of the goods, and that if such person were innocent there was no ground for forfeiture. The position of the government is, on the contrary, as indicated in the exceptions filed, to the effect that, under section 9 of the customs administrative act, the entry of goods by means of a fraudulent invoice put into existence by the seller and shipper of the merchandise, and who is financially interested in defeating the customs, is sufficient to forfeit the goods when entry is made on this invoice.... 101 Id. at 976 (quoting government's brief) (emphasis supplied). 102 Thus, despite the use of intent-oriented language, reminiscent of the awkward locution of Jen Dao Chen, see note 11 ante, One Silk Rug is, at bottom, but one further proof that some blameworthy conduct fairly attributable to the owner/importer of the goods must attach in order to invoke penalty liability. 103 That Congress intended to punish for negligence is evident from legislative actions and history surrounding the adoption of the 1930 Act. At that time, Congress memorialized administrative practice surrounding the customs revenue laws by enacting Sec. 618, which read in pertinent part: 104 Whenever any person interested in any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage seized under the provisions of this Act, or who has incurred, or is alleged to have incurred, any fine or penalty thereunder, files with the Secretary of the Treasury if under the customs laws, and with the Secretary of Commerce if under the navigation laws, before the sale of such vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage a petition for the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Secretary of Commerce, if he finds that such fine, penalty, or forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, may remit or mitigate the same upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just, or order discontinuance of any prosecution relating thereto. 105 Section 618 plainly allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to mitigate fines and penalties if they had been imposed on a lower level of culpability than wilfull negligence. That proviso alone leaves no room to doubt that Congress intended and envisioned that simple negligence could itself support the imposition of such penalties; elsewise, the authority ceded to the Secretary to mitigate or reduce would be an empty exercise. 106 The debates surrounding the adoption of that section demonstrate beyond cavil that Congress intended to give statutory authority to long-standing administrative practice. As Senator Howell noted, [W]e have given to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to exercise his discretion and to relieve to such extent as he may deem proper the fine which has been levied and to collect it. That has ever been an executive function under the Constitution of the United States, and we are continuing it in an executive function here as it has been for some time in the past. See 72 Cong.Rec. S4714 (1929) (remarks by Sen. Howell and Sen. Shortridge); see also 72 Cong.Rec. S3848-52 (1929) (remarks on various administrative cases). The express authorization to punish for negligence in Sec. 618 evidences, we think, congressional intent to utilize a similar standard for Sec. 1592. The statutes, after all, must be read in pari passu. The Secretary was not required--only permitted--to mitigate or remit a forfeiture penalty in cases of negligence; it would be anomalous to allow the Secretary to assess a fine predicated upon negligence but be unable to enforce that fine in a civil action; it would be equally anomalous to prohibit, in a case of negligence, a civil action for forfeiture directly, yet allow the Secretary to impose such a remedy administratively. It is obvious that in enacting the 1930 version of the act, from which the 1970 version of Sec. 1592 was transplanted, Congress assumed--and therefore, intended--that negligence was sufficient to constitute the requisite platform of intent adequately to bottom liability. 12 107 Though we have faulted the district judge for her literal reliance on the without reasonable cause to believe clause contained in Sec. 1592, see text ante at 750-752, her instincts were good. Despite the solecism, the language (which is quite probably superfluous, in the final analysis) does inform the statute as a whole. Again, we must lift the historical veil. 108 Decades ago, Sec. 6 of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, 36 Stat. 95, dealt specifically with false statements made under a customs declaration. A more general provision of the same statute, Sec. 9, covered false and fraudulent practices or appliances, etc. 36 Stat. 97. Unlike Sec. 9--in which, as we have seen, the blameworthiness requirement had historically been implicit in the statutory language--Sec. 6 contained an express intent requirement. 109 Congress amended these sections in 1913, Act of October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 183-84. In so doing, Congress effectively consolidated Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 of the 1909 Act under a single rubric, deleted the word knowingly from the former Sec. 6, and inserted the without reasonable cause to believe verbiage in its stead. While the legislative history of this philological merger is unenlightening for our purposes, the only reasonable illation which we can draw is that Congress sought to match the intent requirements of the former Secs. 6 and 9. And, to do so demanded the softening of the Sec. 6 phraseology to the without reasonable cause to believe level, akin to the minimum showing of negligence which had historically sufficed to energize Sec. 9 culpability. Seen in the albedo of these evolutionary changes, the presence of the without reasonable cause to believe language in 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592 (1970), though not blanketing the entire statute, is an easily-read signpost which points unerringly to our conclusion that negligence can and should be an adequate foundation for a finding of penalty liability. 110 If any doubt remains as to the reach of 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592, it can be set to rest by reviewing the proceedings of the Congress in 1978, when the statute was redrafted. [W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one ... such views are entitled to significant weight ... and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure. Seatrain Shipbuilding v. Shell Oil, 444 U.S. 572, 596, 100 S.Ct. 800, 814, 63 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980) (citations omitted). See Andrus v. Shell Oil, 446 U.S. 657, 666 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 1932, 1938 n. 8, 64 L.Ed.2d 593 (1980); cf. Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 & n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801-02 & n. 8, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). As we have recently observed: 111 Although subsequent legislative history is less authoritative than contemporaneous explanation, subsequent Congressional declaration of an act's intent is entitled to great weight in statutory construction. 112 Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 711 F.2d 431, 436-37 (1st Cir.1983). 113 When the Congress faced up to the need to revise Sec. 1592, it left no doubt as to its understanding of its former enactment: 114 The penalty under Section 592 [19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592] applies without regard to the degree of culpability. The penalty of forfeiture value may be applied to a violation occurring as a result of simple negligence. 115 S.Rep. No. 778, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2211, 2213. See also id. at 17, 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2224-29 (penalties apply to negligent as well as intentional violations). 116 That view was confirmatory of widespread preexisting administrative practice imposing penalties for negligent conduct, id., a practice which all of the commentators had believed to be consistent with the statute in its 1930-1978 incarnation. E.g., Herzstein, The Need to Reform Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 10 Int'l Law. 285 (1976); Note, Anachronism Laid to Rest: Customs Reform Act Accomplishes Long Overdue Reform of Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 10 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1305 (1978). Our search of the textual authorities reveals no expression of any opposite view, and the appellant has cited us to none. 117 Nor does the application of such a penalty for negligence strike a dissonant chord in terms of our jurisprudence generally. The Court has long stressed the remedial purposes of the customs laws and the necessity for expansive, commonsense construction so as to effectively promote the public weal. E.g., Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 145; Taylor, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 210-11 (dicta). It is hornbook law that remedial legislation is to be fairly and reasonably construed so as to effectuate the apparent legislative purpose. E.g., United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 12, 10 S.Ct. 244, 245, 33 L.Ed. 555 (1890). 118 Neither can it be argued that the levying of a civil penalty for carelessness alone is somehow alien to the American way. For a cogent analogy, we need look no further than another, more familiar revenue collection measure, the Internal Revenue Code. Congress there has made explicit what was implicit in the pre-1978 version of 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1952: that monetary sanctions will lie for simple negligence. E.g., I.R.C. Sec. 6653 (1954 & West Supp.1984). And, the courts have consistently upheld such an impost. See, e.g., Lysek v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 583 F.2d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.1978); Abrams v. United States, 449 F.2d 662, 664 (2d Cir.1971); cf. Druker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 697 F.2d 46, 52-56 (2d Cir.1982). In both instances, the compelling public interest in assuring strict compliance with legislation designed equitably to fuel the engines of a democratic government (which runs, like any business, on energy derived in part from gross receipts) constitutes, in and of itself, good reason to hold the citizenry to a comparatively rigorous standard of compliance. 119 Just as good faith is no defense to a charge of civil contempt, McComb v. Jacksonville Paper, 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 499, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949); Donovan v. Enterprise Foundry, 751 F.2d 30, 38 (1st Cir.1984); Fortin v. Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir.1982), so the absence of malevolent intent need not bar the application of a Sec. 1592 penalty when Congress has adequately evinced a contrary intention. The importance of securing compliance with the order of a court, e.g., McComb, supra, or of an arm of the Executive Branch, e.g., Enterprise Foundry, supra, nicely parallels the importance of securing due observance of the Customs laws and protecting the public fisc against losses sustained by reason of noncompliance. 120 To sum up, from 1799 forward the revenue laws have sounded a consistent theme: the will of Congress, as expressed in a long line of successive statutes, has been to excuse honest mistakes and accidental incursions upon the custom-house, but to condemn, in one form or another, more blameworthy violations. Historically, simple negligence has been deemed sufficiently culpable to fall within the latter category. The caselaw, while spotty, has tended to honor this distinction. The commentators, though sometimes critical of the harshness of the rule, have uniformly recognized its vitality. And, there are good and sufficient policy considerations which favor such an approach. We therefore follow the Eighth Circuit's reading of this statute's ancestor and join the Ninth Circuit (albeit for somewhat different reasons) in holding that the district court's finding of negligence was enough to trigger the appellant's liability under 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1592 (1970). 121