Opinion ID: 848619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: We must begin, as always, with the language of the governing statutes. At the time defendant was sentenced, [11] M.C.L. § 777.33 (OV 3) provided: (1) Offense variable 3 is physical injury to a victim. Score offense variable 3 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points: (a) A victim was killed .......................... 100 points (b) A victim was killed .......................... 35 points (c) Life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim .................. 25 points (d) Bodily injury requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim ......................... 10 points (e) Bodily injury not requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim ............... 5 points (f) No physical injury occurred to a victim 0 points (2) All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 3: (a) In multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for death or physical injury, all offenders shall be assessed the same number of points. (b) Score 100 points if death results from the commission of a crime and homicide is not the sentencing offense. (c) Score 35 points if death results from the commission of a crime and the offense or attempted offense involves the operation of a vehicle, vessel, ORV, snowmobile, aircraft, or locomotive under the influence or while impaired causing death. (d) Do not score 5 points if bodily injury is an element of the sentencing offense. (3) As used in this section, requiring medical treatment refers to the necessity for treatment and not the victim's success in obtaining treatment. [Emphasis added.] Defendant argues that, because the statute governing OV 3 prohibits the trial court from scoring one hundred points on the basis of the death of the victim when homicide is the sentencing offense, the court in this case was required to assess zero points. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that only the ultimate result of a defendant's criminal act-here, the death rather than the injury that preceded the death-may be considered in scoring OV 3. The prosecution argues, on the other hand, that the court correctly assessed twenty-five points for OV 3. Because the court was precluded from considering the victim's death under M.C.L. § 777.33(2)(b), it could, in the prosecution's view, consider and score the next applicable factor on the basis of the physical injury that preceded the victim's death. Faithful application of the plain language of M.C.L. § 777.33 demonstrates that the prosecution is correct and that defendant was properly assessed twenty-five points for OV 3 in this case. The Legislature expressly prohibited the assessment of one hundred points when, as here, the underlying offense is homicide. [12] Consequently, one hundred points under M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(a) must be excluded as a possible assessment for OV 3. [13] It is equally clear, according to the plain language of M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(f), that zero points must be excluded as an option because zero points may be assessed under that subsection only when [n]o physical injury occurred to a victim. [14] The gunshot wound to the victim's head in this case unquestionably constitutes a physical injury. Therefore, the trial court did not have the option of scoring zero points for OV 3. [15] The only options left for the trial court, therefore, were to assess either twenty-five points under M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(c) or ten points under M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(d) on the basis of the life-threatening bodily injury requiring medical treatment sustained by the victim-viz., the gunshot wound to the victim's head. Because the statute directs the trial court to award the highest number of points possible under OV 3, the trial court was required to assess twenty-five points under M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(c). [16] Therefore, the trial court correctly assessed twenty-five points for OV 3. When defendant's offense variables are properly scored, his recommended sentence under the legislative guidelines is 180 to 300 months or life. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to life for second-degree murder, and its sentence must be affirmed.
Our conclusion in part I follows from the plain language of the statute and the undisputed facts in this case. Defendant offers three arguments to counter this reading of the statute governing OV 3. First, he asserts that only the ultimate outcome of the criminal act-the victim's death, in this case-may be considered in scoring OV 3. The statute obviously contains no ultimate outcome requirement. [17] Rather, it instructs courts to [s]core offense variable 3 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points. [18] This language indicates that the Legislature believed that multiple scoring factors may apply to a single offense. The statute simply indicates that the one scoring factor ultimately selected should (a) be applicable and (b) yield the highest number of points possible. Where more than one factor might apply (e.g., when a life-threatening injury requires medical treatment), the one generating the highest points is the correct one. The defendant's assumption that only the ultimate outcome of the defendant's act may be considered in scoring OV 3 is therefore undermined by the statutory language. Defendant's second argument is a variation on the first. Defendant argues that OV 3 presents a graduated scale, meting out the greatest number of points to those who inflict the greatest harm. In light of this purported scale, it would be incongruous, in defendant's view, to assess twenty-five points for a mere physical injury when the defendant caused the victim's death. This argument, however ironic, [19] is unpersuasive for the reasons already noted. The Legislature intended for multiple factors to apply and directed courts to select one in order to assess the highest number of points possible. The Legislature has explicitly eliminated the option of assessing one hundred points in homicide cases, but not the requirement of assessing the highest number of points possible. The graduated nature of OV 3 therefore does not lead to the conclusion that defendant may receive zero points for this offense variable. Finally, defendant argues that zero points must be scored for OV 3 because the Michigan offense variables  generally [indicate] a legislative policy of not assessing points for factors that are inherent in the elements of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. [20] Thus, defendant argues: With the exception of the anomalous and later-added M.C.L. § 777.33(1)(b), involving alcohol-related deaths, this OV assesses points for aggravating circumstances, not for factors inherent in the sentencing offense itself. This is an odd and unpersuasive argument. We consistently look to and enforce the plain language of statutes rather than some imagined legislative purpose supposedly lurking behind that language. [21] The text of M.C.L. § 777.33 is quite clear and, as shown in part I, requires the assessment of twenty-five points in this case. Defendant offers no reason to abandon our usual rule of statutory construction. Moreover, the Legislature has in this very statute demonstrated its ability to preclude the scoring of points for circumstances that are a necessary element of the sentencing offense. For instance, M.C.L. § 777.33(2)(b) precludes the scoring of one hundred points where death is an element of the sentencing offense. In addition, M.C.L. § 777.33(2)(d) precludes the scoring of five points where bodily injury is an element of the sentencing offense. Therefore, if the Legislature had intended to preclude the scoring of twenty-five points where death is an element of the sentencing offense, it clearly knew how to do so. Thus, none of defendant's arguments offers a persuasive reason to depart from the Legislature's intent as manifest in the plain language of the statute governing OV 3.