Opinion ID: 2397328
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Specific Intent Instruction

Text: Appellant argues that by instructing the jury that specific intent means the defendant knew he was acting wrongfully or was disregarding the law when he fired the shots at Leander Crowe, the trial court misstated the law and created the possibility that the jury would convict him of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter on the theory that he knew it was wrong to shoot someone. He contends that the instruction erroneously: (1) permitted the jury to reject his self-defense claim if it found that he knew he was acting wrongfully when he shot Crowe, regardless of the reasonableness of his belief that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm; and (2) placed upon him the burden of proving that he acted in self-defense. He contends that this instruction negated the court's proper instruction that [s]pecific intent to kill means purpose or conscious intention to cause death. The government argues in response that the instruction, considered as a whole, properly defined specific intent and correctly restated the government's burden of proof. It also contends that the specific intent instruction was unduly favorable to appellant because manslaughter does not require proof of specific intent. Further, the government contends that even if error, it was not plain error. We conclude that the court did not plainly err in giving the instruction. `Plain' is synonymous with `clear' or, equivalently, `obvious.' Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also Baxter v. United States, 640 A.2d 714, 717 (D.C.1994). This means that the error must be clear under settled law either at the time of trial or on appeal. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also Baxter, 640 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted). The portion of the definition for specific intent that appellant challenges is consistent with a definition found in the 1978 version of the CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (3d ed. 1978) (1978 Redbook). [16] In subsequent editions of the Redbook, the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee recommended avoiding the standard definition for specific intent in favor of instructions defining the requisite mental state required for the charged offense. [17] See CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 3.01 (4th ed. 1993); see also CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 3.01 (4th ed. 2002). While the 1978 Redbook instruction was still the standard instruction, this court sanctioned the use of either the standard instruction on specific intent from the 1978 Redbook or, a substitution of the statutory language for the offense, where the requisite intent is set out therein. See DiGiovanni, supra, 580 A.2d at 126 (citing Marcinski v. United States, 479 A.2d 856, 861-62 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1224, 105 S.Ct. 1216, 84 L.Ed.2d 357 (1985)). The standard language from the 1978 Redbook to which the court referred in DiGiovanni defined specific intent in terms of knowingly do[ing] an act which the law forbids, intending with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. Id. (citation omitted). The trial court in DiGiovanni had substituted intending to disobey or in conscious disregard of the law, for the last phrase of the previous quote, and, considering the instructions as a whole, this court found that the jury had been adequately instructed on specific intent where the court also included with that specific intent instruction, the statutory language for specific intent for the charged offense. [18] Id. In the present case, in re-instructing the jury, the trial court used similar phraseology, stating [w]ith respect to the instructions ..., voluntary manslaughter while armed, specific intent means the defendant knew he was acting wrongfully or was disregarding the law when he fired shots at Leander Crowe.  In spite of the admonition in later versions of the Redbook for this formulation, since this court found the 1978 Redbook instruction and similar language acceptable in DiGiovanni, it can not be said that the instruction as given was clearly contrary to settled law; therefore, it cannot constitute plain error. See Baxter, 640 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted). Moreover, there is no likelihood, as appellant argues, that the instruction would dilute[] the government's burden on an essential element of the offenses and ... create[] the possibility that the jury would convict [appellant] of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter on the theory that he knew it was `wrong' to shoot someone, when viewing the instructions as a whole. See Hunt, supra, 729 A.2d at 325 (citations omitted) (In determining whether prejudicial error occurred, jury instructions must be considered as a whole). After giving the challenged language, the court added immediately the following correct statement of the law: [i]n other words, he acted with the specific intent to kill or seriously injure the decedent. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, one, had the specific intent to kill or the specific intent to seriously injure the decedent; or two, the defendant acted in conscious disregard of extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to the decedent; and three, the defendant did not act in self-defense as I have otherwise instructed you. Thus, the instructions again informed the jury that the government had the burden of proving that appellant had either the specific intention to kill or the specific intention to injure the decedent or that he was consciously disregarding the extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to the decedent. We also reject appellant's arguments that the instruction permitted the jury to reject his self-defense claim upon a finding that he knew it was wrong to shoot someone and placed upon him the burden of proving his self-defense claim. Although the jury note had not inquired directly about self-defense, at appellant's request, the re-instruction correctly stated that the government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense as previously instructed. In the court's initial instructions, which the jury had in writing in the jury room during deliberations, the trial court explained clearly that it was the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. Therefore, on this record, we find no plain error in the court's re-instruction on specific intent.