Opinion ID: 43200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Barrow’s Failure to Promote Claim

Text: 1 We note that in addition to failing to establish severe and pervasive harassment, most of the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a basis for holding GP liable. Out of these six employees, four never reported any kind of actionable racial discrimination to GP, although all admitted they understood the procedure for reporting harassment. And, of the two employees that did complain, one admitted that GP investigated his complaint and punished the person responsible for the harassment. 8 Barrow contends that he was denied several promotions to a repairman position because of his race. To prevail on a claim of failure to promote, a plaintiff must show (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified and applied for the promotion; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) other equally or less qualified employees who were not members of the protected class were promoted. See Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). The parties do not dispute that Barrow is a member of a protected class, he applied for the promotions, and the positions were given to white employees. GP contends that Barrow was not qualified for the position, and it provides many reasons for his lack of qualification, such as Barrow’s inadequate welding ability; lack of skills in the areas of hydraulics, pneumatics, mechanical transmission, and motor line-up; absenteeism; and failure to follow significant safety procedures. Barrow has not presented evidence of pretext. Barrow presented only his own unsubstantiated opinion that he was qualified for the position. Because Barrow did not establish that he was qualified for the position, the district court properly granted summary judgment. C. Ferguson’s Discriminatory Transfer and Constructive Discharge Claims 9 Ferguson argues that the district court erred in entering summary judgment against two of her claims of discrimination. The first is a purported transfer claim. The second is a claim of constructive discharge. Ferguson contends that she was transferred based on her marriage to an African-American. Although Ferguson raised this argument in her reply brief in the district court, her complaint did not allege this claim, and the district court did not address it. Even if this claim was properly before us and we assumed that she could establish a prima facie case, Ferguson failed to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason advanced by GP for her transfer. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). Ferguson held a temporary receptionist position; when the full-time receptionist returned from medical leave and no remaining clerical work remained for her to do, GP transferred Ferguson to a utility position inside the plant. Ferguson also contends that she was constructively discharged based on the hostile work environment and racial harassment. To maintain a constructive discharge claim based on hostile work environment, Ferguson must show that her 10 working conditions were “so difficult . . . that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, Fla., 267 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The standard for proving constructive discharge is higher than the standard for proving a hostile work environment,” Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1231 (11th Cir. 2001). Ferguson, as explained, failed to meet even the standard for a hostile work environment. She cannot, therefore, meet the higher standard for constructive discharge. D. Williams’s Ineffective Assistance and Discriminatory Transfer Claims Georgia Williams, proceeding pro se, alleges that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that GP discriminatorily transferred her. Both claims fail. “[A] . . . party does not have any right to a new trial in a civil suit because of inadequate counsel, but has as its remedy a suit against the attorney for malpractice.” Mekdeci By and Through Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat. Laboratories, 11 711 F.2d 1510, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir.1981)). Williams also argues that GP transferred her from a Greened utility position to a Dryers utility position because of her race. She alleges that GP moved a white woman into her job and paid other employees overtime to perform her job. To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory transfer, a plaintiff must show that she 1) was a member of a protected class, 2) was qualified, 3) suffered an adverse employment action, and 4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class. Hinson v. Clinch County, Geogia Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 2000). An adverse employment action results in a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. See Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). The employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s act is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances. See id. at 1239-40. Williams cannot establish that she suffered an adverse employment action. GP contends that Williams’s job duties and responsibilities were essentially the same in her new position as they were in her previous position. Williams has not presented admissible evidence to refute this fact. Her bald assertion that her “job 12 responsibilities changed substantially” is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997). The district court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment on Williams’s discriminatory transfer claim.