Opinion ID: 2975781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The audio tape

Text: The district court’s decision allowing Officer Fegan to display an audio cassette tape of a prior interview with Lofton during Officer Fegan’s rebuttal testimony did not result in unfair prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence on the basis of relevancy or unfair prejudice absent a showing of “a clear abuse of discretion.” Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1990). The reviewing court “must look at the evidence in ‘the light most favorable to its proponent, - 15 - Nos. 06-5810, 06-5811 United States v. Lofton and Black maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.’” United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1984)). “Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to evidence which tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis.” Paschal v. Flagstar Bank, 295 F.3d 565, 579 (6th Cir. 2002). Lofton argues that the district court erred in permitting Officer Fegan to testify regarding his 2000 interview of Lofton and to display an audio cassette recording of the interview. He argues that he offered to stipulate that Officer Fegan knew Lofton well enough to identify him, rendering minimal the probative value of the testimony and the display of the tape, and that any probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of displaying the tape because the existence of a taped interview suggests Lofton’s involvement in criminal activity. The first flaw in this argument is that Lofton directly attacked Officer Fegan’s ability to recognize him during cross-examination. Such an attack is inconsistent with and not erased by Lofton’s offer to stipulate to Officer Fegan’s familiarity with him, and the Government was entitled to present rebuttal evidence. See United States v. Segines, 17 F.3d 847, 856 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 822 (6th Cir. 1989). Moreover, although the tape may tend to indicate, as Lofton argues, that Lofton was involved in prior criminal activity, the tape could also have been made because Lofton was a witness or informant. The district court’s instruction to the jury not to speculate about the tape’s contents - 16 - Nos. 06-5810, 06-5811 United States v. Lofton and Black further bolsters the conclusion that the display of the tape was not unfairly prejudicial. On balance, the Government was entitled to rebut Lofton’s assertions that Officer Fegan could not reliably identify him, and it cannot be said that any prejudicial effect of testimony regarding the prior interview substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the display of the audio tape was unfairly prejudicial, any error was harmless. “Unlike the Rule 403 analysis that considers the unfairly prejudicial effect of the particular piece of evidence at issue, harmless error analysis requires this court to consider whether the particular evidence prejudiced the outcome of the trial and resultant convictions.” United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 430 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Zamlen, 906 F.2d at 216 (“[E]ven if the lower court’s decision amounts to an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal if it did not result in a substantial injustice . . . .”). We cannot say that the mere display of an audio tape of an interview during permissible rebuttal testimony prejudiced the outcome of Lofton’s trial.