Opinion ID: 311379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identifiable Records

Text: 30 Apparently ignorant of the Commission's internal operations and filing system, the NCTA identified the requested documents in terms of the functions they had served in the Commission's development of the proposed fee schedule. Thus, before the Commission could comply with the request, it would have to identify the documents more specifically, as, for example, by name and file number. To do this the Commission would have to retrace the steps taken in the development of the rulemaking notice. The Commission has steadfastly refused to undertake this task, and the ruling of the District Court upheld this refusal. 31 The Freedom of Information Act does not require that a person identify records by providing the agency with a complete description down to the last detail of title and file number. It states: 32 [E]ach agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person. 16 33 This language places part of the responsibility for identifying the records on the agency itself. The responsibility of the person requesting the records is that he provide sufficient information to permit the agency to accomplish this duty. 17 Problems of construction arise when we attempt to determine how much effort the requesting party must make, and how much he may leave to the agency, realizing always that he may be required to reimburse the agency for its efforts. 18 34 The legislative history provides us little added guidance, suggesting only that we look to our decisions construing the discovery rules applicable in civil cases and advising that, while requests must be reasonably identifiable, the requirement should not be used as a device to withhold records. 19 35 Our earlier cases have taken a pragmatic approach to this problem, attempting to draw lines that comport with the overall purposes of the Act. 20 We think our opinion in Bristol-Myers v. F. T. C. 21 is controlling in this case. Additionally, it provides guidance in any attempt to articulate more generally the balance to be struck in cases involving attempts to inspect agency documents used to formulate proposed or final rules. 36 In Bristol-Myers the District Court refused to enter an order compelling the Federal Trade Commission to produce documents described and identified by the Company in terms of the function that they served in the development of proposed rules regulating the advertisement of certain drugs. The basis for that ruling was a narrow interpretation of the identifiability requirement in the Act: 37 An identifiable record necessarily means a record that is described with sufficient precision in order that by ministerial action of some subordinate the document can be identified and selected out of the files. It does not mean that the head of an agency or his immediate assistant must use judgment in seeking through the file to determine whether a particular document is within the classification asked for. That would be an unreasonable request. 22 We reversed, and pointed out: 38 The F.T.C. can hardly claim that it was unable to ascertain which documents were sought by Bristol-Myers. The Commission relied on certain materials in promulgating its proposed rule, and referred to them in announcing the rulemaking proceeding. These materials are adequately identified in the request for disclosure of the items mentioned in the Commission's Notice. 23 39 The Federal Communications Commission now argues, as it did in its motion for summary judgment, that this language is inapplicable in the case before us for the reason that it did not rely on or refer to any documents in its February and March notices, but to its knowledge acquired from documents. 24 40 We think that the Commission misreads both our opinion in Bristol-Myers and the underlying purpose of our holding there. We did not impose a requirement that the notice directly refer to or rely on the documents to be disclosed. In fact, the request in Bristol-Myers did not differ from the request involved here: 41 The petition filed by Bristol-Myers with the F.T.C. sought the identification and disclosure of each item of material, whatever its form or nature, which . . . has contributed to or constitutes the extensive staff investigation, accumulated experience, available studies and reports and other things referred to in the [Federal Trade] Commission's Notice [of proposed rulemaking. 25 42 The scope of the agency's responsibility to identify its own documents may be further delineated by examining a second request by Bristol-Myers, one which we said might present a plausible claim of unidentifiability by the Federal Trade Commission: 43 The petition also sought each item which has contributed to or constitutes information concerning the effect of any analgesic and information concerning the accuracy of appellant's assertions concerning the effects of various ingredients of its own analgesic products. 26 44 This request undoubtedly extended beyond the documents that the F.T.C. itself possessed. Moreover, it was not apparent that the Commission had at any time either indexed its files in a way that would enable it to locate what it did have, or that it had ever brought the materials together for a common purpose or otherwise acted on them as a group. Thus, the requested documents could not be identified by retracing a path already trodden. It would have required a wholly new enterprise, potentially requiring a search of every file in the possession of the agency. 45 Once the request has been made as specific as the agency's public statements permit, Bristol-Myers teaches: (1) If the agency has previously identified a class or category of documents in the normal course of its affairs, it must produce them in response to a request phrased in terms of the class or category. (2) If the agency has never segregated that class or category, production may be required where the agency may be able to identify that material with reasonable effort. 46 Even where an agency has previously identified a class of materials, the passage of time may work such changes in the agency's personnel and records that production requires that identification begin anew. In such circumstances, production may be required only if the task imposed on the agency is not unreasonable. 47 Where rulemaking proceedings have taken place, the agency has, by definition, already identified its Supporting documents. Indeed, it would be a most reasonable practice for the agency to retain the documents as a group or index them for future retrieval. It would be most difficult to rebut the presumption that the agency would be able to produce the documents at least until the validity of its rule has been finally adjudicated in the courts. 27 48 Finally, Bristol-Myers establishes that the specificity with which the agency has identified documents in its public statements is relevant only to the requirement that the request be as specific as reasonably possible. It is not relevant to the question whether the agency can be required to identify and allow inspection of the requested records under section 552(a)(3). 28 49 In the present case the Commission has refused either to state that it did not make use of a mass of financial documents or to identify them. In fact, the District Court openly invited the former response from the Commission witnesses, but they repeatedly asserted that there was a documentary basis for the Commission's action, although it had not been identified in the notices of rulemaking. 29 50 The NCTA phrased its request as specifically as the Commission's public notices reasonably permitted. Accordingly, the Commission should have been required to identify, at least by relevant classes and subclasses, all the documents that it had used to support its proposed rule. Then it should have been required to establish which of those documents were exempt from disclosure under the applicable provisions of the Act. 51 Much of this has now been done, albeit by the NCTA through its examination of Commission staff members. But there remains a substantial factual issue as to whether the Commission relied on trade publications and confidential reports, rather than vague concepts of the profitability of its regulated industries, in preparing its fee schedule. On remand, the Commission should be required to specify, by relevant category and subcategory, which-if any-of these materials it used. 52 For the future we think that these matters should be settled through the discovery process as much as possible. The civil rules governing pretrial discovery provide ample tools for use in compelling the agency to identify and disclose the documents it has that fall within the class or category requested. 30 In addition to facilitating the disposition of these cases by summary judgment, this approach will enable the requesting person to narrow his request if he discovers that he wants only a part of the supporting documents that the agency identifies in response to his discovery requests. 31 B. The Commission's Exemption Claims 53 Because of the confusion involved in identifying the documents that existed within the scope of the NCTA's request in this case, the District Court was entirely diverted from the necessary inquiry into the exemptions now claimed by the Commission. Indeed, the oral ruling of the District Court denied the NCTA's entire request on the ground that the yellow work sheets and adding machine tapes used to prepare the cost factor from the budget were exempt. Yet, so far as we can determine, these were the only documents that the hearing showed not to exist. 54 On the record before us, we perceive two possible exemptions that might justify withholding part of the material that the Commission admits it possesses. Under the applicable case law, however, neither would justify nondisclosure on this record, and the Commission must be required to establish the exemptions on the remand.
55 The Commission asserted below that inspection of the memoranda used in the preparation of the budget request and the memoranda used to determine the value to the recipient of the privileges granted could not be ordered. It pointed to section 552(b)(5) of the Act, which exempts inter-agency or intraagency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. 32 The District Court made no further inquiry into the matter, and the Commission produced nothing except a flat assertion that the documents contained policy arguments and were confidential. 33 56 Both our own cases 34 and the Supreme Court's recent holding in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink 35 make it clear that this is insufficient. In Mink the Supreme Court said: 57 Congress sensibly discarded a wooden exemption that could have meant disclosure of manifestly private and confidential policy recommendations simply because the document containing them also happened to contain factual data. That decision should not be taken, however, to embrace an equally wooden exemption permitting the withholding of factual material otherwise available on discovery merely because it was placed in a memorandum with matters of law, policy or opinion. 36 58 This distinction is particularly important here, where the memoranda at issue relate to the development of a fee schedule said to have been derived from cost data and collections of financial reports. The Commission must show that any factual matter in the memoranda is so intertwined with policymaking processes that it would violate the purpose of the exemption to disclose it. 37 59 Mink went on to point out that the District Court may use a variety of tools in making this determination, including, but not limited to, in camera inspection of some or all of the documents. 38 Additionally, we note that the District Court in the Southern District of New York has recently resolved such a Freedom of Information Act case by appointing a Master and delegating the task of in camera inspection to him. 39 2. Confidential Financial Statements 60 It is equally unclear whether the confidential financial statements that the Commission allegedly used in determining value to the recipient of the privileges granted fall within the scope of the Act's exemption for trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential. 40 The exemption does not protect all data contained in such filings, but only that information which cannot be rendered sufficiently anonymous by deletion of the filing party's name and other identifying information. 41 61 In those cases in which the party that filed the statement is so large or unique that disclosure of the data itself would destroy the confidentiality of that party, it is conceivable that total nondisclosure would be justified. But the Commission's witnesses testified that there are many thousands of such statements filed over a long period of time, and it seems highly improbable that the Commission will be able to establish that they must all be withheld. 62 This, too, will be an appropriate subject for the District Court on the remand, armed with the flexible tools cited by Mink. In particular, the Court should take note of the Supreme Court's suggestion that representative samples of the statements be examined, rather than the thousands that apparently exist. 42 But, before this examination is undertaken, the Commission should be required to state which, if any, of these documents were used in the preparation of its rules. As we have pointed out, the scope of the NCTA's request was coextensive with the scope of the Commission's documentary basis for its rules. 63 Reversed and remanded.