Opinion ID: 2613153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Judge's Order Excluding Testimony Resulting From the Plea Agreement

Text: The trial court order excluded from the new trial all of Ann Fisher's statements resulting from the consistency provision of her plea agreement. This is a remedy fashioned in cases where the person with an improper consistency agreement has testified. Where, as here, the agreement has produced no testimony, we believe the limitation is unnecessary, unworkable, and unwise. Under the circumstances of this case, the limit imposed by the trial court is inconsistent with the basic principle that all the relevant and admissible evidence should be presented at the new trial. The trial court itself recognized that a jury is supposed to decide one's guilt or innocence on the basis of all admissible evidence available to both parties. If Ann is released from the improper provision of the agreement at this point without ever having testified under the agreement, there is no need for the limitation. In Medina, 41 Cal. App.3d at 464, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 151, the court held that the tainted testimony received at trial as a result of the improper consistency clause could not be used in the new trial. Here, the improper clause has produced no tainted testimony; there is, therefore, no tainted testimony to be excluded. Defendant's rights are appropriately protected by not enforcing the offending clause, by making full disclosure of the terms and circumstances of the agreement, by granting an opportunity to fully cross-examine, and by giving proper instructions to the jury. See State v. Nerison, 136 Wis.2d 37, 401 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (1987). We believe that the truth-seeking function of the trial will be better served if Ann Fisher can testify free of the unenforceable provision and both parties are permitted to introduce any otherwise admissible evidence bearing on her credibility. This will permit the jury to weigh Ann's testimony fully and to determine her credibility.