Opinion ID: 2975934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the district court’s limitation of testimony

Text: “The conduct of a criminal trial is a matter within the discretion of the court. . . . [S]uch discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse.” United States v. Wade, 364 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1966). Even if there is a clear showing of abuse, “a judge’s rulings will not be the basis for 12 reversal of a criminal conviction unless a defendant’s substantial rights are affected.” United States v. Terry, 729 F.2d 1063, 1067 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying FED . R. EVID . 611).
Ferguson claimed in his brief that “[d]ue to the denial of the trial court to allow counsel to assess the ‘totality of circumstances’ that the officer knew at the time the warrant was issued, the Appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights were violated.”5 Appellant Br. at 8. During the incident in question, Ferguson called the affiant, Harrison, as a witness in the hearing on the motion to suppress challenging the existence of probable cause. As Ferguson’s attorney tried to ask questions about actions that Harrison might have taken, but not reported, to corroborate the CI’s tip, the district court repeatedly emphasized skepticism over the value of the testimony. After interrupting the questioning three times with concerns about relevancy, the district court decided that Harrison’s efforts to corroborate the CI’s tip, beyond what was described in the affidavit, were irrelevant to the evaluation of probable cause, and the court stopped this line of questioning. In response, Ferguson concluded his questioning of Harrison. A trial judge has broad discretion to control testimony in her court to ensure that only relevant evidence is presented and that the court’s time is not wasted. See FED . R. EVID . 611(a) (“The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”). Accordingly, “courts may curtail or entirely preclude questioning as to any matter of questionable relevance.” 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6164, at 357 & n.49 (1993). 5 A federal judge acting in his official capacity could not violate the appellant’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (“[The Fourteenth] Amendment by its terms applies only to the States.”), but we can evaluate this claim as though it were appropriately raised under the Fifth Amendment. 13 We cannot conclude that the district court judge’s actions constitute an abuse of discretion. Ferguson was trying to elicit testimony as to any additional information the affiant Harrison had but did not disclose at the time the warrant was issued. Generally speaking, however, the sufficiency of an affidavit is judged solely upon “the adequacy of what it does contain, not on what it lacks.” Allen, 211 F.3d at 975. The one exception to this general rule is that in a Franks hearing, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), a defendant can try to show that the affiant omitted some material fact that would have swayed the magistrate’s probable-cause determination. See Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721, 726 n.4 (6th Cir. 2005). Although such questions about Harrison’s knowledge at the time he requested a warrant would be relevant in a Franks hearing, Ferguson was not in a Franks hearing when his attorney attempted to ask these questions. Thus, the questioning was not relevant in the context in which it was occurring. Furthermore, to qualify for a Franks hearing, a defendant must “make[] a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and [ ] the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-156; see also United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1026 (2002). It appears from the record that Ferguson could not have made the substantial preliminary showing necessary to qualify. While Ferguson had asked both of his attorneys to seek a Franks hearing, his attorneys refused on ethical grounds. J.A. at 193 (Tr. at 5:1217) (“Both Mr. Brown[, Ferguson’s original attorney,] and I have told Mr. Ferguson that we can’t ethically do that, and I’m not going to perpetrate fraud on a court.”). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to limit testimony that could have been relevant only for a hearing that Ferguson was not then seeking, and was apparently not entitled to obtain. 14