Opinion ID: 2370680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. N's Right To Interlocutory Appellate Review

Text: The Department challenges, for the first time, Ms. N.'s right to interlocutory appellate review of the June 20, 2007 order and moves that we dismiss her appeal. [T]he issue of appealability is a threshold one, which may be raised at any time by a party, even on appeal, and, indeed, which must be addressed, and will be, by the Court on its own motion, whether raised or not. Office of State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 356 Md. 118, 125, 737 A.2d 592, 596 (1999). A party, generally, may only appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. CJP § 12-301. Creating an exception to that rule, Section 12-303 permits appeals from certain interlocutory orders. Among these is an order [d]epriving a parent . . . of the care and custody of [her] child, or changing the terms of such an order[.] CJP § 12-303(3)(x). The Department contends that the June 20, 2007 order is not appealable under the Section 12-303(3)(x) exception because it did not change the terms of the antecedent April 3, 2007 order to Ms. N.'s detriment. It argues: [A]t all times after March 12, 2007, the date of the emergency shelter care hearing resulting in Joseph's removal from his mother's custody, Ms. N.'s custodial and visitation rights to Joseph only improved with the June 2007 order adding weekly, supervised visitation.[ [8] ] The permanency plan of reunification with Ms. N. was the first and only permanency plan in the case until February 2008, when reunification ceased to be the permanency plan, and the court closed the CINA case and granted Mr. E. full custody of Joseph. The Department maintains that a final, appealable judgment did not exist until February 2008 when the permanency plan changed . . . from reunification with Ms. N. to a grant of full custody of Joseph to Mr. E. with the resultant closure of the CINA case[.] See CJP § 3-819(e)(stating that if allegations in a CINA petition are sustained against only one parent of a child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that the child is a [CINA], but before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other parent). In In re Samone H., 385 Md. 282, 291, 297, 869 A.2d 370, 375, 379 (2005), we considered the appealability of an order that denied a motion for an independent study of a parent's bond with her children, when the order was issued during a permanency plan review hearing and the plan remained static. We observed that the denial of the bonding study would only be appealable as an interlocutory order under CJP Section 12-303(3)(x) and concluded that the order was not appealable under that Section because it did not adversely affect the mother's parental rights or change the permanency plan terms to her detriment. Id. at 315-16, 869 A.2d at 390-91. We explained: In maintaining the permanency plan to proceed with the adoption of the children, the trial court continued the permanency plan from the prior year, as well as allowed [the mother,] Katina M.[,] increased access to her children. Katina M.'s rights would have been implicated had she made the motion for bonding study and appealed its denial when the court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption . . . but not when the judge continued the plan and increased visitation. We acknowledge that bonding studies can be beneficial to the determination of a permanency plan and may assist the court in making decisions about a child's placement. Nevertheless, based upon the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court's order denying the motion for such a study is not an appealable final judgment and does not constitute an interlocutory order under Section 12-303[(3)](x). Id. at 316, 869 A.2d at 390 (citations omitted). We encountered the issue of appealability again in the In re Billy W. cases: two related cases in which a biological parent challenged the admission of hearsay testimony within the context of a permanency planning hearing. In the first case, we declined to reach the merits of the case because the orders, from which the appeal was taken, continuing the permanency plans for the children, [did] not constitute final judgments nor appealable interlocutory orders. In re Billy W., 386 Md. 675, 677, 874 A.2d 423, 424 (2005). The challenged orders continued the commitment of the biological mother's four children to the care and custody of the Department of Social Services (DSS), continued permanency plans of reunification with the mother for three of her children and continued a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption for her other child. The mother argued that an order continuing a previously established permanency plan should be appealable because the trial court's refusal to abrogate DSS's custody of the children and to return them to her [was] a denial of her parental rights. Id. at 683, 874 A.2d at 428. We rejected this contention and concluded that the orders continuing the permanency plans for the children were not appealable because they did not detrimentally affect the mother's custody rights or visitation with the children. Id. at 692, 874 A.2d at 433. In the second In re Billy W. case, both biological parents appealed permanency plan hearing orders that maintained the extant plans for the children but changed the visitation. In re Billy W., 387 Md. 405, 425, 875 A.2d 734, 746 (2005). The court's orders eliminated the biological mother's unsupervised visitation with two of the children and required the biological father to secure the services of an off-duty officer to supervise his visitation with one of the children. We concluded that the orders were appealable as interlocutory orders under CJP Section 12-303(3)(x) because they changed the terms of visitation to the biological parents' detriment. Id. at 426, 875 A.2d at 746. The order eliminating the mother's visitation infringed upon her opportunities to interact with, and care for, the boys and to potentially build stronger relationships with them. Id. The court's requirement that the father hire an off-duty officer with his own resources constituted a detrimental change in [his] visitation rights because the order operat[ed] as an effective denial of visitation should he not be able to afford to pay for the officer's services. Id. Our most recent case on this issue is In re Karl H., 394 Md. 402, 906 A.2d 898 (2006). In In re Karl H., we were asked to consider whether a concurrent permanency plan order, providing for both adoption and reunification, was an appealable interlocutory order under CJP Section 12-303(3)(x). The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the order was not appealable because `[o]rdering the necessary preliminary steps toward the possible outcome of terminating parental rights did not deprive [Petitioner] . . . of the care and custody of [his] children such that the juvenile court orders were appealable interlocutory orders[.]' Id. at 428, 906 A.2d at 913 (citation and emphasis omitted). It, instead, characterized the juvenile court orders as simply imposing additional work on the county department of social services `to lay the foundation for potential adoption proceedings, including filing the guardianship petitions, serving [Petitioner]. . . with required notice of the guardianship proceedings . . . and seeking to identify and approve a qualified family for adoption[.]' Id. (citation omitted). We rejected this assertion that a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption did not deprive parents of their rights to care and custody of their children. The concurrent permanency plan that included the option of adoption was sufficiently far enough along the continuum of depriving a parent of a fundamental right and, therefore, immediately appealable. Id. at 430, 906 A.2d at 914. We explained: In determining whether an interlocutory order is appealable, in the context of custody cases, the focus should be on whether the order and the extent to which that order changes the antecedent custody order. It is immaterial that the order appealed from emanated from the permanency planning hearing or from the periodic review hearing. If the change could deprive a parent of the fundamental right to care and custody of his or her child, whether immediately or in the future, the order is an appealable interlocutory order. Id. We regarded the goals of reunification and adoption as mutually exclusive and directly contradictory, reasoning that [r]eunification gives a parent the opportunity for reconciliation whereas [t]he goal of adoption . . . guarantees that, under [CJP] § 3-823(g) . . . after thirty days at the earliest, a petition will be filed to terminate a parent's rights along with the hope of reunification. Id. at 431, 906 A.2d at 914. We acknowledged the need for a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption, but recognized the adverse affect of such a plan on a parent's rights to care and custody: We are not unmindful of the need for a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption; however, we find that the implementation of those goals are not parallel. When the option of adoption enters into a permanency plan, whether alone or with a concurrent vision, under § 3-823(g) the local department must file a petition for [termination of parental rights (TPR)] within thirty days (or sixty days if the local department does not support the plan). A parent is deprived of a six-month review of the permanency plan. The six-month review is replaced with a TPR hearing when adoption is a component of the permanency plan. See § 3-823(g). An interlocutory order which includes adoption as a possible outcome has the potential both to accelerate the termination and to terminate a parent's custodial rights; therefore, such orders adversely affect a parent's rights to care and custody and entitle the parent to an immediate appeal. Id., 906 A.2d at 915. The question we must answer in this appeal is whether the court's June 20, 2007 order effectuated a detrimental change to Ms. N.'s custody rights falling within Section 12-303(3)(x). Guided by the cases discussed above, we conclude that it did and is therefore immediately appealable. The court's order reaffirming a permanency plan of reunification, while shifting Joseph's physical custody from foster care to his father, did not merely maintain the status quo for Ms. N., as the Department asserts. This shift was a consequential and potentially outcome-determinative change because it potentially increased the opportunity for Joseph's father to obtain permanent custody. When Joseph was removed from Ms. N.'s care and custody in March 2007 and placed in foster care, the Department had a statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify Joseph with Ms. N. See FL § 5-525(d)(1)(stating that reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families when making placement decisions). The Department was required, moreover, to give priority to Joseph's return to Ms. N. when developing a permanency plan. See FL § 5-525(e)(2)(requiring local departments, [t]o the extent consistent with the best interests of the child in an out-of-home placement, to give priority to returning the child to the child's parent or guardian, unless the local department is the guardian). This focus on reunification with Ms. N. changed, however, on June 20, 2007, when the court moved Joseph into the care and custody of Mr. E., Joseph's father. When the court reaffirmed Joseph's permanency plan of reunification, it did not specify whether the plan was reunification with Ms. N. or reunification with Ms. N. and/or Mr. E. The Department maintains that the plan was for Joseph to be reunified with his mother. But a plan for reunification with only his mother, is substantively different from what the court ordered because the June 20 order expanded the universe of persons eligible for reunification to include Mr. E. The Department's report, prepared for the December 7, 2007 review hearing, confirms that this was the order's effect by stating: Joseph [N.'s] permanency plan of reunification was achieved on June 20, 2007.  (Emphasis added.) This statement is, in essence, recognition by the Department that the court implicitly changed Joseph's permanency plan: the Department's focus was no longer limited to making reasonable efforts to reunify Joseph with Ms. N. and was instead, broadened to facilitate Joseph's reunification with either his mother or his father. This order represented a meaningful shift in direction vis a vis Ms. N., and possible restoration of her rights to parent. The court's June 2007 placement did not immediately award Mr. E. full custody of Joseph or conclusively foreclose Ms. N.'s reunification with her son. But the order had the potential to facilitate and accelerate a grant of full custody to Mr. E. because it implicitly recognized Mr. E.'s availability, willingness, and provisional ability to care for Joseph. Mr. E.'s circumstances trigger the application of CJP Section 3-819(e), which calls for closing CINA proceedings when one parent meets these criteria. CJP Section 3-819(e) provides: Allegations sustained against only one parent.  If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one parent of a child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that the child is a child in need of assistance, but, before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other parent. See also In re Sophie S., 167 Md.App. 91, 105, 891 A.2d 1125, 1133 (2006)(holding that a juvenile court could not adjudicate a child a CINA if there was one parent who was able and willing to provide custody); In re Russell G., 108 Md.App. 366, 380, 672 A.2d 109, 116 (1996)(same). Of special interest in this case is the juvenile court's Section 3-819(e) authority, upon closing the CINA case, to award custody to the other parent. The Department did not request that the court dismiss Joseph's CINA case and award full custody to Mr. E. at the June 20 hearing, but giving him temporary custody under the Department's supervision was a preliminary step in that direction. If that temporary custody arrangement worked well, it was likely the juvenile court would take the next step and award Mr. E. full custody, dismissing the CINA proceeding as it was obligated to do under Section 3-819(e). This could be done even if Ms. N. had not received the full reunification services that the Department could provide. So, the juvenile court's determination that Mr. E. was available, willing, and able enough to care for Joseph [9]  albeit under the Department's supervision  increased the difficulty Ms. N. faced in her effort to be reunified with Joseph. The June 20 order was a pivotal change in the direction of Ms. N.'s permanent loss of custody because it set the stage for the court's dismissal of Joseph's CINA case and an award of full custody in favor of Mr. E. The June 20 order was also consequential and potentially outcome-determinative on the question of permanent custody because of the bonding and attachment that could take place between Joseph and Mr. E. during his placement into his father's provisional care and custody. In In re Samone H., we described bonding as: [T]he forming of a mutual emotional attachment between parent and child. [T]he giving of unconditional love by the parent to the child. [T]he development of an emotional connection between parent and child. [T]he development of a sense of security for the child. [T]he establishment of an emotional intimacy and sense of closeness between parent and child. [T]he beginning step in helping the child to feel a healthy self-worth and self-esteem. [T]he transmission of familial ties between child and parent through which nonverbal communication and understanding takes place. [A] means of providing the child with a sense of belonging to a family. [A] way of bringing the child into the larger network of caring and love present in the parent's extended family. [T]he concern and love for the child by the parent, and for the parent by the child, which is exhibited in all aspects of both their lives. 385 Md. at 307, 869 A.2d at 384-85 (quoting James J. Messina & Constance Messina, Tools for Parents of Children with Disabilities and Special Needs: Bonding with Your Child 1 (2004)). Courts are to consider the factors specified in § 5-525(e)(1) of the Family Law Article when determining a child's permanency plan. CJP § 3-823(e)(2). The factors for consideration under FL Section 5-525(e) include the child's attachment and emotional ties to the child's natural parents[,] the child's emotional attachment to the child's current caregiver[,] and the length of time the child has resided with the current caregiver[.] The Department asserts that the periodic review hearing held on February 7, 2008, fully preserved and realized Ms. N.'s right to appeal the order that did adversely affect her custody rights after the court's grant of full custody to Mr. E. The Department overlooks, however, the relative disadvantage Ms. N. would incur in her effort to be reunified with Joseph were we to delay her right to appeal until the court's grant of full custody. There would be months to establish an emotional attachment between Mr. E. with Joseph while the child was in Mr. E.'s provisional custody. Joseph's time with his natural father and resulting emotional attachment may very well have been instrumental in tipping the custody scales in favor of awarding full custody to Mr. E. For the reasons explained above, we hold that Ms. N. possessed the right to maintain an interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court's June 20, 2007 order awarding temporary custody to Mr. E., subject to the Department's supervision. This holding does not complete our assignment, though, because we must address the Department's argument that her appeal became moot when the juvenile court undertook a review hearing on December 7, 2007, and continued that arrangement.