Opinion ID: 2582375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sunderland Failed to Preserve His Right to Privacy Argument on Appeal.

Text: As an initial matter, we note that Sunderland failed to preserve his constitutional right to privacy argument on appeal. In his opening brief, Sunderland claims that trial counsel framed the constitutional question as a blend of freedom of religion and privacy interests. . . . However, that assertion is belied by the record. The parties did not address any right to privacy argument in any of their written submissions before the circuit court. [5] Sunderland attempts to bootstrap a privacy argument by referring to the following arguments orally presented before the circuit court at a hearing conducted on May 19, 2004: The next question is: Has the state shown a compelling interest? I say that these things about driving a car while you're under the influence of marijuana, all these things are red herrings because that's not what this case is about. This case is about someone in his own home possessing a small amount of marijuana for religious purposes. That is the only issue in this case. It is not an issue in this case whether or not you can smoke marijuana and drive a car, whether or not pregnant women should smoke marijuana, any of those others [sic] things. This is an adult male in his own home smoking marijuana for religious purposes. That is the issue. There's no issue beyond that. So whether or not any of these other things is a good idea isn't before this Court, and it's not what we're addressing. They're not asking, hey, he's going down the highway at ninety miles an hour smoking a large joint, and now you're getting him in trouble for that. No. He's getting in trouble for having it at his house. And that's all the issue is. The issue is not a precedent for doing it some place else, only in your own home for religious purposes. . . . . The state  I'm not here to litigate whether or not to permit someone not to drive a car while intoxicated on marijuana. That's a totally different issue than can you do something at your own house, which would bring us to this general idea of what is a compelling state interest. . . . . This case is only about the use of marijuana in the home. And the Supreme Court of Alaska, finally, in not addressing the same issue, addressing a slightly different issue, basically said that the privacy rights, okay  and it's not an issue here. They have done that case in Hawaii. And on a privacy level, you're not allowed to have marijuana. They have raised that. . . . . So I would say that . . . it is not reasonable to say that there's a compelling state interest against the religious use of marijuana in your own home because that's the only issue here. He's found in his home with just a small amount. It's not I've got a ton in my home. Says a small amount in your home. That is what the issue is here. Not the driving. There may be a compelling state interest to say you cannot drive when you're intoxicated with marijuana, or pregnant women shouldn't, all those things could be compelling interest. That's not what we're asking for. We're asking a very limited thing here: Only in your own home because that's the issue presented here. (Emphasis added.) Although Sunderland asserted that he used marijuana for religious practices in his own home, he did not seek to draw the conclusion that his right to privacy was implicated. Indeed, as demonstrated by the afore  emphasized portion of the transcript, he expressly disavowed any right to privacy argument. Rather, Sunderland argued that, despite the inability to succeed on privacy grounds in this jurisdiction, his right to the free exercise of religion required the prosecution to demonstrate a compelling state interest justifying a prohibition on the personal, home-use of marijuana. His focus on the home was meant only to distinguish other potential compelling state interests in preventing public harm that may flow from the use of marijuana outside the home. That argument differs from the argument Sunderland now seeks to assert on appeal  that his right to privacy encompasses the right to possess marijuana for religious purposes within the confines of his own home. Therefore, inasmuch as Sunderland did not raise his right-to-privacy argument before the trial court, we do not address it. See HRS § 641-2 (Supp.2004) (The appellate court . . . need not consider a point that was not presented in the trial court in an appropriate manner.); State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 570, 617 P.2d 820, 826 (1980) (stating that it is well-established that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by the reviewing courts); State v. Kahalewai, 56 Haw. 481, 491, 541 P.2d 1020, 1027 (1975) (Generally, appellate courts will not consider questions which were not raised in the trial courts.); Territory v. Kelley, 38 Haw. 433, 435 (1949) ([N]o question of constitutionality of the ordinance was . . . called to the attention of the trial court and ruled upon, nor has any failure to rule been preserved by proper exceptions. No such question, therefore, can be properly raised for the first time in this court.); Onaka, 112 Hawai`i at 386, 146 P.3d at 101 ([T]he rule in this jurisdiction . . . prohibits an appellant from complaining for the first time on appeal of error to which he has acquiesced or to which he failed to object.) (Ellipses in original.) (Citations omitted.).