Opinion ID: 891686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clarifying Rendleman and Myers II

Text: {29} We acknowledge that our opinion in Myers II did alter Rendleman in two respects. [3] First, the Court of Appeals had limited the scope of lewd and sexually explicit exhibition to hard-core child pornography; that is, it must display visible signs of sexual eroticism, rather than merely depict a naked child. Rendleman, 2003-NMCA-150, ¶ 44, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554 (An `exhibition' requires an objective showing, apart from the child's genitalia being merely visible. Webster's defines `exhibition' as `showing, evincing, or showing off.' To `exhibit' is to `show or display . . . outwardly esp[ecially] by visible signs or actions; . . . to have as a readily discernible quality or feature; [or] . . . to represent or make clear by a drawing, plan or other visual means.' The word `explicit' is `characterized by full clear expression; being without vagueness or ambiguity: leaving nothing implied: unequivocal.' In the context of the Act then, a `lewd and sexually explicit exhibition' means a visible display or readily discernible depiction of a child engaged in sexually provocative conduct. In other words, the photograph must be identifiable as hard-core child pornography. . . . (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted)). This Court, however, found that a sexually explicit exhibition is a clear, graphic and unequivocal display or portrayal of nudity or sexual activity and concluded that this display or portrayal, even combined with lewdness, need not be synonymous with hard-core pornography. Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 19, 26, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105. {30} We clarified that, in the context of adult pornography, the idea of hard-core pornography assists in describing images that are obscene (and thus unprotected by the First Amendment, as recognized in federal jurisprudence), but when the objects of the pornography are children, no such hard-core pornography consideration should be read into the Act. Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 26, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), and contrasting the application of the term hard-core in obscenity jurisprudence with its use to determine lewd and sexually explicit in Rendleman, 2003-NMCA-150, ¶¶ 44, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554). Though we differed with the Court of Appeals on this point, we noted approvingly certain language from the Rendleman opinion that described the obscenity standard: `What the community finds tolerable for adults will be a far cry from what it will tolerate when visual materials include children.' Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 38, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105 (quoting Rendleman, 2003-NMCA-150, ¶ 61, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554). Our disagreement with Rendleman on this pointmerely a small part of a larger discussion of lewdness, most of which we agreed with in Myers II falls far short of the unexpected and indefensible standard that would give rise to due process concerns. We note that although Myers III initially equates our eliminating hard-core child pornography with changing an element of the crime, the opinion never returns to that point or explains why a hard-core child pornography analysis would have any impact on the application of the Act to Defendant's conduct or help Defendant in any way. Accordingly, we shall not pursue it either. {31} Second, we altered the Rendleman analysis in terms of the third element in the Section 30-6A-2(A)(5) definition of a sexually prohibited act: whether images are made for the purpose of sexual stimulation. Rendleman had concluded that images must pass an objective test; they must objectively appear to be intended to sexually stimulate others. See 2003-NMCA-150, ¶ 48, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554. The images cannot just stimulate the perverse, private mind of the maker. Id. In Myers II, we concluded that, usually, images must do both: (1) they must objectively appear created for the purpose of sexually stimulating, to satisfy the sixth Dost factor (designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer), customarily used to define lewdness; and (2) the accused must also have the subjective intent to make the images for the purpose of sexual stimulation (either his own stimulation or someone else's). Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 20, 21, 32, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105. Although this construction might appear to conflict with Rendleman, on closer examination the two opinions are more in harmony than not. {32} Rendleman was concerned that the maker's own perspective should not alone render otherwise innocent images pornographic. See 2003-NMCA-150, ¶ 48, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554. And so, Rendleman made clear that subjective intent alone would not suffice. See id. The premise behind an objective intent analysis is that child pornography is not created and the Act is not violated simply because a person derives sexual enjoyment from otherwise innocent photographs. Id. We find no fault with either Rendleman 's concern or its conclusion: subjective intent alone will not violate the Act. As we pointed out in Myers II, before we get to the question of the maker's intent, the prosecutor must first establish that the images are lewd, a question that considers the images objectively. 2009-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 20-21, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105. The images cannot be innocent if they meet the threshold element of lewdness. {33} Thereafter, we look to the maker's intent to see what he or she had in mind in manufacturing images that already meet the objective criteria of lewd. In Rendleman, however, the Court of Appeals chose to look to the purpose of sexual stimulation, yet again from an objective perspective, in effect creating a redundancy which we corrected in Myers II. Compare Rendleman, 2003-NMCA-150, ¶¶ 43, 46-48, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554 (concluding that the Act is not violated simply because . . . a defendant's private reaction . . . transforms an innocent photo into a lewd exhibition, but rather [because of] the objectively ascertainable intended effect on the viewer when it determined how to apply the third prong of sexually prohibited act, requiring that an image be for the purpose of sexual stimulation), with Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105 (clarifying that lewdness focuses on whether the visual depiction was intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, whereas the statute focuses on whether the visual depiction was intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the defendant and that the two inquiries are separate and distinct). But far from being an unfair surprise to Defendant in this case, our change in Myers II actually worked to his benefit. {34} Whereas previously in Rendleman, the prosecution only had to meet an objective standard, now, after Myers II, the state must apply both: an objective standard for lewdness and a subjective standard for the statutory element of for the purpose of sexual stimulation. In line with the Court of Appeals' caution in Rendleman, no accused can be convicted under the Act merely for his own misguided subjective intent; the images must first satisfy the objective criteria for lewdness, such as the Dost factors. Where-as, before Myers II the state had only one purpose or intent hurdle, now it has twohardly a due process imposition on Defendant in this case. {35} Even Rendleman appears to recognize the need for a subjective intent analysis of the accuseda fact we appreciate, perhaps belatedly. It seems that Rendleman always considered the subjective intent of the accused as a factor in its analysis. Rendleman directed that [a]t trial, the subjective motive of the photographer, the circumstances of the photography, and the use of the photo become relevant on the issue of intent. 2003-NMCA-150, ¶ 49, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554 (emphasis added). These considerations are exactly the type we addressed in Myers II when we applied a subjective test to determine the fulfillment of the third statutory element of the Section 30-6A-2(A)(5) definition of sexually prohibited act: whether the images were made for the purpose of sexual stimulation. 2009-NMSC-016, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105. {36} For the all the reasons previously discussed, we find no due process violation by virtue of applying Myers II to Defendant.