Opinion ID: 1130099
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consequences of Decision.

Text: In its initial instruction at the penalty phase, the trial court admonished jurors that [b]oth the People and [the] defendant have the right to expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence, apply the law, and reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences.  (Italics added.) Defendant claims this instruction minimized the gravity of the penalty decision in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-330 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 238-240, 105 S.Ct. 2633].) No prejudicial error occurred. The quoted language is patterned upon CALJIC No. 1.00, and is routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital trials. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 875 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) It is intended to direct jurors to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence and without regard to such irrelevant and speculative consequences as public opinion (see People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 518), or the punishment the defendant might receive ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 537, fn. 7 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440]). (16) We have repeatedly held, however, that language instructing the jury to disregard the consequences of its verdict is inappropriate and should not be given at the penalty phase of a capital trial. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th 142, 183; People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 991 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475]; People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 517; People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 998 [244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 750 P.2d 794]; People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 537, fn. 7.) Our disapproval of the instruction lay in its potential to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for the penalty decision ... since the precise issue before the jury  whether the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole  is the `consequence' of the verdict. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d 963, 991.) Nevertheless, when the instructions given in this case are viewed as a whole, it is not reasonably likely that the jury was misled as to the nature and gravity of its sentencing responsibility. The trial court gave, among other things, CALJIC No. 8.88, which directs the sentencer to consider and weigh the various factors in aggravation and mitigation and to select the appropriate penalty under the totality of the circumstances. (See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 538-545 & fn. 19.) Another standard penalty instruction, CALJIC No. 8.85, directed the jury to consider any circumstance extenuating the gravity of the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record proffered by the defense as a basis for a sentence less than death. (See People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858, 877-878 & fn. 10 [construing section 190.3, factor (k)].) In addition, the trial court granted defendant's request for certain special instructions highlighting the breadth of mitigating factors deemed relevant to the penalty decision, [20] including repeated references to sympathy, compassion, and mercy. [21] Another special defense instruction prohibited consideration of such irrelevant matters as deterrence and monetary cost. [22] Against this backdrop, the jury almost certainly understood that it was entitled to disregard only those consequences not constitutionally relevant to its sentencing decision, and that it bore the ultimate responsibility for choosing between death and life imprisonment without parole based on the particular circumstances of the case. We therefore reject defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by the giving of an ignore-the-consequences instruction at the penalty phase.