Opinion ID: 2098532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hacket's Statements Were Excited Utterances

Text: The State sought to introduce Hacket's 911 call into evidence. Dixon objected and argued that the 911 call was inadmissible hearsay because Hacket failed to appear at trial. The Superior Court held that the content of the 911 call was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Generally, hearsay statements are not admissible at trial. [1] There are, however, certain exceptions to that general rule. [2] These exceptions are defined by circumstances that are deemed to provide an indicia of trustworthiness to the statement. One exception is an excited utterance, which is defined as [a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. [3] There are three foundational requirements that must be satisfied before a statement can be admitted pursuant to the excited utterance exception in Rule 803(2): (1) the excitement of the declarant must have been precipitated by an event; (2) the statement being offered as evidence must have been made during the time period while the excitement of the event was continuing; and (3) the statement must be related to the startling event. [4] According to Dixon, Hacket's statements to the 911 operator were not excited utterances because too much time had elapsed between the shooting and her call and Hacket was no longer under the stress of excitement. For admission as a present sense impression under D.R.E. 803(1) a sine qua non is for the hearsay statement to be made either immediately or in very close temporal proximity to the precipitating event. [5] For admission as an excited utterance under D.R.E. 803(2), however, [w]hile the amount of time that has elapsed from the occurrence of the event or condition is a factor to consider in the analysis, it is not solely determinative. [6] In Culp v. State, [7] the Superior Court denied a defense request to play recordings of 911 calls made by the defendant because too much time [had] elapsed between the time of the event and the making of the statements to satisfy the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. [8] This Court reversed, holding that, to be admissible under Rule 803(2), the declarant must simply be under the `stress of excitement' caused by the startling event or condition at the time of the statement's making. [9] In Warren v. State, [10] this Court held that a 911 call to describe events that occurred over one hour before the call was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule in D.R.E. 803(2). In this case, Hacket's call to the 911 dispatcher was made shortly after the shooting. Butcher testified that the shooting took place at 2 a.m. The 911 dispatcher received the first call from Hacket just prior to 2:15 a.m. The trial judge found that Hacket was still under the stress of excitement at the time of the 911 call. After listening to the 911 call, the trial judge stated that the caller sounds excited, she describes herself as being upset. The trial judge also noted that the caller was out of breath, was moving and claimed to be running away from the shooter. The trial judge concluded that Hacket's statements were almost a classic excited utterance. The record reflects that Hacket's statements to the 911 dispatcher satisfied all three of the foundational requirements to qualify as an excited utterance under D.R.E. 803(2). Hacket's statements to the 911 operator were precipitated by the shooting, were made as she was running from Dixon, and were made while she was still under the stress of excitement caused by the event. Accordingly, we hold that Hacket's statements were admissible as excited utterances under D.R.E. 803(2).