Opinion ID: 888972
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent

Text: ¶ 38 The State asserted in the District Court that Morrisey did not invoke his right to counsel; therefore the police were free to continue questioning him. The issue, however, is whether he invoked his right to remain silent, and the fact that he did not request an attorney is certainly irrelevant to the question of whether he invoked his right to remain silent. United States v. Rambo, 365 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir.2004). Moreover, it does not follow that the police were free to continue questioning Morrisey simply because he did not invoke his right to counsel. If he invoked his right to remain silent, the police were required to cease any interrogation and to scrupulously honor his right to cut off questioning. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 100, 104, 96 S.Ct. at 325, 326. ¶ 39 Alternatively, the State argues that Morrisey's invocation of his right to remain silent was invalid because it was ambiguous or equivocal. This standard, which derives from Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), applies to a post-waiver invocation of the Miranda right to counsel (i.e., an invocation after having initially waived that right), and the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed whether it applies to the right to remain silent, let alone a pre-waiver invocation of that right. See DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1000-01 & n. 1 (9th Cir.2009) (noting that an ambiguous pre-waiver assertion might require a different analysis); State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997) (refusing to extend Davis to pre-waiver scenarios). But even assuming, arguendo, that a person in custody must articulate his pre-waiver desire not to answer questions sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent, Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355, we conclude that Morrisey did so. ¶ 40 [A] suspect need not `speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.' Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. Nor need he rely on talismanic phrases or any special combination of words to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir.1996); accord McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir.2001). Laypeople are not learned in constitutional principle or legal nicety, and to require that precise words be uttered would elevate form over substance. State v. Spang, 2002 MT 120, ¶ 23, 310 Mont. 52, 48 P.3d 727, overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶ 48, 331 Mont. 517, 134 P.3d 53. Whether the suspect invoked his Miranda rights is an objective inquiry. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. Here, when Cameron told Morrisey, You have the right to remain silent, Morrisey responded, Yeah, I will. And when Cameron stated, Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law, Morrisey asserted, I ain't saying nothing. Taken together, we find nothing ambiguous or equivocal about these responses. Cf. State v. Szpyrka, 220 Ariz. 59, 202 P.3d 524, ¶ 5 (App. 2008) (finding no meaningful difference between the defendant's statement I got nothin' to say and the locution I wish to remain silent); People v. Carey, 183 Cal.App.3d 99, 227 Cal.Rptr. 813, 814-15 (1986) (I ain't got nothin' to say was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent); Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 163 (Fla.2007) (No quiero declarar nada, or I don't want to declare anything, constituted a clear invocation of the right to remain silent); State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 269-70 (Tenn.1992) (I don't have anything to say was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent). ¶ 41 The State notes Morrisey's subsequent statements to the detectives and contends that his remarks could not have been interpreted to mean that he was unwilling to talk. But a suspect's post-request responses to further questioning may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100, 105 S.Ct. 490, 495, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam). We conclude that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would have understood Morrisey's initial statements to be an assertion of his right to remain silent. [8]