Opinion ID: 2766683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Collins’ Negligent Violation Claim

Text: Section 1681o of the FCRA governs civil liability for negligent noncompliance with the statute. That section provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who is negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of . . . any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1). The district court concluded there were sufficient facts for a jury to find that Experian was negligent in failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1), to determine whether the Equable debt was accurate. According to the district court, an issue of material fact remained as to whether Experian’s investigation was reasonable when it disregarded the small claims court information Collins provided and instead relied solely on Equable to verify the debt. See Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986) (concluding it was unreasonable for a credit reporting agency to contact only the creditor in its reinvestigation of a disputed debt); see also Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 79 (6th Cir. 1982) (making two telephone calls to the creditor was insufficient to re-verify disputed information). Because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Experian was negligent in failing to comply with the reasonable reinvestigation requirement, the district court then had to 6 Case: 14-11111 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 7 of 13 decide whether there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Collins could show “actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1). The district court granted summary judgment to Experian on Collins’ negligence claim because it determined Collins could not show actual damages since he failed to present evidence that the erroneous information regarding his Equable account was ever published to a third party. The district court collected persuasive authority and determined “the majority of courts have consistently required a plaintiff to prove actual harm resulting from the [consumer reporting agency’s] disclosure of the erroneous report to a third party in order to recover damages for emotional distress.” Collins asserts the cases cited by the district court requiring publication to third parties in order to recover emotional distress damages in an FCRA action are distinguishable from this case. We agree. The cases contain language that, taken out of context, seems to apply. None of the cases, however, conducted a statutory analysis, and many also involved different subsections of the FCRA. 2 None answered the question presented here—whether a plaintiff seeking damages for a 2 See Wantz v. Experian Info. Solutions, 386 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Safeco, 551 U.S. at 56 & n.8, 127 S. Ct. at 2208 & n.8; Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2001); Casella v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 56 F.3d 469, 474-75 (2d Cir. 1995). But see Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 Case: 14-11111 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 8 of 13 negligent violation of this specific subsection, § 1681i(a), must show the inaccurate information was published to a third party. 3 We are the first Circuit to address the issue as presented. We have “long recognized that our authority to interpret statutory language is constrained by the plain meaning of the statutory language in the context of the entire statute, as assisted by the canons of statutory construction.” Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2010). Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the statutory language has a plain and unambiguous meaning. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 2003). If the meaning of the words Congress used is clear, we need not resort to legislative history. Id.; see also Silva-Hernandez v. U.S. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 701 F.3d 356, 363 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Where the language of a statute is unambiguous . . . we need not, and ought not, consider legislative history.” (quotation omitted)). The important distinction in this case is the difference in the FCRA’s definitions of the terms “consumer report” and “file.” Congress provided 3 Experian argues our statement in Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 1991), that “[w]e need not reach the substance of [the plaintiff’s] FCRA claims . . . because we find that he has utterly failed to produce any evidence tending to show that he was damaged as a result of an allegedly inaccurate . . . credit report,” decides this issue. Experian, however, reads that sentence far too broadly. Whether a plaintiff must show a consumer reporting agency published his credit report to third parties in order to be entitled to actual emotional distress damages was not at issue in Cahlin because there was at least circumstantial evidence a credit report was published, and we had no opportunity to and did not discuss emotional distress damages in that case. Id. at 1161. 8 Case: 14-11111 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 9 of 13 definitions in the FCRA for both of these terms and gave them different meanings. A “consumer report” is defined as: any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . credit or insurance . . .; employment purposes; or any other purpose . . . . 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (emphasis added). In contrast, “[t]he term ‘file’, when used in connection with information on any consumer, means all of the information on that consumer recorded and retained by a consumer reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g) (emphasis added). According to the FCRA’s definitions, a “consumer report” is communicated by the consumer reporting agency, while a “file” is retained by the consumer reporting agency. Collins claims Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a), which imposes on a consumer reporting agency the duty of conducting a reasonable reinvestigation of disputed information in a consumer’s credit file. That provision states: [I]f the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly . . . of such dispute, the agency shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate . . . . 9 Case: 14-11111 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 10 of 13 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). The reinvestigation provision addresses the “completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s file.” Id. (emphasis added). This stands in stark contrast to the language of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), 4 which requires a consumer reporting agency to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of a consumer report, specifically providing that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (emphasis added). Looking at the entire statute, Congress chose to give different statutory definitions to the terms “consumer report” and “file,” and used the different terms in different subsections. See United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[W]e must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.”); Iraola & CIA, SA v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen Congress uses different language in similar sections, it intends different meanings.”). A “consumer report” requires communication to a third party, while a “file” does not. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983) (“Where Congress includes 4 Collins originally claimed Experian also violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Collins dropped his claim under § 1681e(b) prior to summary judgment, when discovery provided no evidence that Experian had ever furnished Collins’ credit report containing the disputed debt to a third party. 10 Case: 14-11111 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 11 of 13 particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally or purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (brackets and quotations omitted)). Thus, by its plain terms, § 1681i(a) does not require communication to a third party; it provides a consumer reporting agency violates that provision if a consumer notifies the agency there is inaccurate information contained in his file and the agency does not conduct a reasonable reinvestigation into the matter. A file is simply the information retained by a consumer reporting agency. Thus, we hold that the plain language of the FCRA contains no requirement that the disputed information be published to a third party in order for a consumer to recover actual damages under § 1681i(a). The district court viewed Collins’ actual damages evidence under the belief that Collins’ credit report had to have been published to a third party, so it did not have an opportunity to analyze whether Collins’ evidence of emotional distress was sufficient to present a jury question on actual damages. See Levine v. World Fin. Network Nat’l Bank, 437 F.3d 1118, 1124 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating “the existence of compensable emotional distress is relevant to the amount of damages a plaintiff will ultimately recover” in an FCRA case). We therefore remand to the district court to conduct this inquiry in the first instance. 11 Case: 14-11111 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 12 of 13