Opinion ID: 683948
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the fingerprint evidence at the second trial

Text: 24 Martinez claims the district court erred in admitting the fingerprint evidence during the second trial. He argues that because the government failed to turn over the evidence prior to the first trial as required by the early disclosure agreement, it should be precluded from introducing the evidence at the retrial. We will reverse an evidentiary ruling only for abuse of discretion, United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 994 (9th Cir1991), and we find none here. 25 Martinez asks us to enforce the early disclosure agreement in a meaningful way by ruling that the government should be permanently barred from using the fingerprint evidence. However, he cites no authority supporting such a severe sanction. 26 Furthermore, the agreement's purpose was to give each side notice of what evidence the other intended to use, so both sides would be prepared for trial. In denying Martinez's motion to exclude this evidence, the district court stated: 27 [Y]ou have had those reports now for a substantial period of time, and the sanction that I imposed at that time was the mistrial because you didn't have them in advance. But I don't think it's appropriate to exclude that evidence now that you have had an opportunity to be aware of its existence and meet it in any way that you feel is appropriate. 28 ER at 61-62. We agree with the district court that any arguable prejudice the government might have caused by not disclosing the report was cured when the court declared a mistrial. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence at the second trial.