Opinion ID: 2823812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CRE 606(b) Bars Admission of the Jurorsâ Affidavits

Text: Â¶13Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â CRE 606(b)âs plain language clearly bars admission of the jurorsâ affidavits in this case. Absent narrow exceptions, the rule unambiguously prohibits juror testimony âas to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the juryâs deliberations.â Here, Petitioner seeks to introduce juror testimony precisely to that effect, as the affidavits from both M.M. and L.T. pertain to statements made during deliberations. Therefore, CRE 606(b) precludes their admission. Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Petitioner argues that the affidavits do not involve âan inquiry into the validity of [the] verdictâ as contemplated by CRE 606(b). In Petitionerâs view, the rule only applies to statements regarding the juryâs actual deliberative processâthat is, how the jury reached its verdictâand not to evidence of a particular jurorâs racial bias. To the extent that we can even parse this semantic distinction, we deem it immaterial. Petitioner seeks to introduce evidence of comments made during deliberations in order to nullify the verdict and obtain a new trial. Such a request necessarily involves an inquiry into the verdictâs validity, which is the very inquiry that CRE 606(b) prevents. Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected this exact argument in Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 528 (2014), determining that the rule âdoes not focus on theÂ means by which deliberations evidence might be used to invalidate a verdict.â Rather, the Court held that the rule âsimply applies â[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of the verdictââthat is, during a proceeding in which the verdict may be rendered invalid.â Id. (alteration in original). Although the Court was interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), we have previously recognized that CRE 606(b) is â[s]ubstantially similar to its federal counterpartâ and that we âlook to the federal authority for guidance in construing our rule.â Stewart, 47 P.3d at 321. Thus, Warger forecloses Petitionerâs argument. Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Petitioner next contends that, even if CRE 606(b) applies, the affidavits satisfy the ruleâs exception for âextraneous prejudicial information.â He is mistaken. That exception pertains to âlegal content and specific factual information learned from outside the record and relevant to the issues in a case.â Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1064; see, e.g., Harlan, 109 P.3d at 629 (holding that two jurorsâ introductions of annotated Bibles into deliberations during a death penalty case constituted extraneous information because â[t]he trial court had not admitted these materials into evidence, nor did the courtâs instructions allow their useâ). But it is âgenerally undisputedâ that jurors âmay apply their general knowledge and everyday experience when deciding cases.â Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1064; accord Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 (âGenerally speaking, information is deemed âextraneousâ if it derives from a source âexternalâ to the jury. âExternalâ matters include publicity and information related specifically to the case the jurors are meant to decide, while âinternalâ matters include the general body of experiences that jurors are understood to bring with them to the jury room.â). Here, H.C. did not perform any improper investigation into Petitionerâs case, nor did heÂ introduce evidence from outside the record into the jury room. Rather, his alleged racial bias arose from his personal beliefs and everyday experience. Such bias, however ideologically loathsome, is not âextraneousâ as contemplated by CRE 606(b). Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â And once again, Warger scuttles Petitionerâs claim. In that car-crash case, following a verdict for the defendant, a juror reported that another juror stated during deliberations that her daughter had once caused a motor vehicle accident and that âif her daughter had been sued, it would have ruined her life.â 135 S. Ct. at 524. The Court held that such information âfalls on the âinternalâ side of the line: [The jurorâs] daughterâs accident may well have informed her general views about negligence liability for car crashes, but it did not provide either her or the rest of the jury with any specific knowledge regarding [the] collision.â Id. at 529. The Court noted that even if the jurorâs comments would have warranted a challenge for cause, that did not render them âextraneous,â as otherwise â[t]he âextraneousâ information exception would swallow much of the rest of Rule 606(b).â Id. at 530. The same analysis applies here. Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Accordingly, we hold that the affidavits concerning H.C.âs biased statements fall within the broad sweep of CRE 606(b) and that they do not satisfy the ruleâs âextraneous prejudicial informationâ exception. We now address whether CRE 606(b) was unconstitutional as applied in this case. 5