Opinion ID: 1382950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: juvenile transfer proceedings.

Text: Appellant was seventeen years old when these offenses occurred, thus the charges against him were first brought in the juvenile division of the Whitley District Court. KRS 635.010. The juvenile complaint/petition charged Appellant with two murders, first-degree arson and first-degree robbery, but not first-degree burglary. Following a transfer hearing held pursuant to KRS 640.010, Appellant was transferred to the Whitley Circuit Court as a youthful offender. Appellant claims it was error to indict and convict him of first-degree burglary, or to use that offense as an aggravating circumstance authorizing the death penalty, since he had not been charged with that offense in juvenile court; thus, the district judge had no authority to transfer that offense to circuit court. (The transfer order recites that Appellant was charged with two murders, first-degree arson and first-degree burglary, but not first-degree robbery.) However, under the statutory scheme for youthful offenders, it is the offender that is transferred to circuit court, not the offense. [T]he child may be transferred to Circuit Court, and if the child is transferred the District Court shall issue an order transferring the child as a youthful offender and shall state on the record the reasons for the transfer. The child shall then be proceeded against in the Circuit Court as an adult, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. KRS 640.010(2)(c) (emphasis added). Appellant's reliance on KRS 640.010(3) is misplaced. That statute requires that the child be returned to juvenile court if the grand jury does not find probable cause to indict the child as a youthful offender under KRS 635.020(2), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8), but does find probable cause to indict the child for another criminal offense. If the grand jury finds probable cause to indict the child as a youthful offender, KRS 640.010(3) does not preclude it from indicting the child for other offenses arising out of the same course of conduct that gave rise to the offense that caused the child to be transferred to circuit court. In fact, the provisions of KRS 610.015(2) and KRS 635.020(8) anticipate that other offenses arising out of the same course of conduct can be charged and adjudicated in circuit court after transfer. Relying on Harden v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 885 S.W.2d 323 (1994), Appellant also complains that the transfer order did not contain written findings with respect to each of the eight factors enumerated in KRS 640.010(2)(b). When Harden was decided, KRS 640.010(2)(c) provided: If, following the completion of the preliminary hearing, the court is of the opinion, after considering the factors enumerated in subsection (b) of this section, that the child should be transferred to circuit court, the court shall issue an order transferring the child as a youthful offender and shall state on the record the reasons for the transfer .... (Emphasis added.) The transfer order in Harden stated the reasons for the transfer, but did not recite that the district judge had considered all the factors enumerated in KRS 640.010(2)(b). The Court of Appeals held that this omission required reversal and remanded the case to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing. Id. at 325. Subsequent to the transfer at issue in Harden, KRS 640.010(2)(c) was amended [1] so that it now reads: If, following the completion of the preliminary hearing, the District Court finds, after considering the factors enumerated in paragraph (b) of this subsection, that two (2) or more of the factors specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection are determined to favor transfer, the child may be transferred to Circuit Court, and if the child is transferred the District Court shall issue an order transferring the child as a youthful offender and shall state on the record the reasons for the transfer. (Emphasis added.) Here, the transfer order recites that all the factors (presumably those enumerated in KRS 640.010(2)(b)) were considered and that three of those factors were found to favor transfer: (1) the seriousness of the offenses; (2) the offenses were committed against both persons and property; and (3) Appellant's age made it unlikely that reasonable rehabilitation could be accomplished by use of juvenile services and facilities. Thus, the transfer order satisfied the requirements of the statute and sufficed to vest the circuit court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the charges for which Appellant was subsequently indicted and convicted.