Opinion ID: 677118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: 16 The videotape of Linda Proctor interviewing Heather Morton is a film of thirty minutes duration, in which Proctor interviews Heather about the alleged sexual acts performed on her by Webb. The purpose of this interview, according to Proctor's own testimony, was to obtain a statement from her. The interview is conducted with the care and skill of a person who for six years has interviewed alleged victims of child abuse. The social worker first interests Heather in playing with dolls and engages her in questions about her home and family and babysitter. The interviewer then focuses on the sexual characteristics of the dolls and induces Heather to comment on them. In the course of the half-hour, Proctor repeatedly turns the conversation into questions about the conduct of Terry to Heather, salting the conversation three times with the comment that Terry is a bad man or did a bad thing. The social worker asks Heather directly whether she suffered any injury from Terry and whether she now has any injury; that is the extent of her questions that could be considered medical. Her focus is on discovering sexual abuse. She persistently returns to this theme as Heather's attention wanders to the dolls. In a way that would never be permitted in a judicial setting, Proctor repeats questions that Heather declines to answer. 17 The problem of obtaining evidence of sexual abuse of a small child while observing the requirements of due process of law has led to the admission of evidence under firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule. Otherwise the statements are  'presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for confrontation clause purposes.'  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3148, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). 18 The state of Arizona contends that the videotape is admissible under the firmly rooted hearsay exception of medical diagnosis or treatment and thus no further guarantees of trustworthiness are required. The exception to the hearsay rule invoked by the state is, of course, firmly rooted. It is astonishing, however, to have the state contend that Proctor, a social worker, was engaged in medical diagnosis or treatment. Nothing in the videotape supports this statement. At the trial the prosecutor offered an argument not repeated on appeal: that the interview by Proctor was preparatory to the medical examination by Strickland, and the latter could be considered therapeutic. This argument, while showing that Strickland was prepared by Proctor to find that Heather had been abused, does not convert the social worker's interview into a medical procedure. Moreover, Strickland was being consulted by Allan Duprey of the Victim Witness Office for law enforcement purposes; she was not prescribing for Heather as her patient. 19 The state now argues: Heather had no motive in traveling to a San Diego hospital and making the statements other than a patient seeking or needing treatment. There is not the slightest indication in Heather's conduct that she is a patient seeking or needing treatment. She was brought from Arizona to California at the request of the prosecuting authorities and in the company of a state official charged with protecting witnesses in criminal trials. Her only reported comment as the adults took her to California was concern that she would be made to pull down her panties. To suppose that Heather had the capacity to seek medical help on her own or to suppose that the purpose of the victim witness protection program was seeking therapy is to engage in fantasy. It is on the basis of such fantasy that the state has defended its use of the videotape in Webb's trial. 20 Even if the hearsay does not fit within an established exception, however, its admissibility is not barred by the Confrontation Clause if, considered apart from any corroborating evidence, there was  'a showing of particular guarantees of trustworthiness.'  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 818, 110 S.Ct. at 3148, quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). The circumstances to be considered are the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief--so worthy of belief  'that the test of cross-examination would be a work of supererogation.'  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 110 S.Ct. at 3149, quoting Wigmore on Evidence Sec. 1420 (1974 ed.). The guarantees of trustworthiness must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright at 821, 110 S.Ct. at 3149, citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 110 S.Ct. at 2539. An affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was made, is necessary to rebut the presumption of unreliability and exclusion under the Confrontation Clause. The state contends that the court is imposing a new rule. To the contrary, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), applied established precedents in measuring the admissibility of hearing from a child. Id. 21 The Supreme Court declined to list what would constitute the necessary guarantees, but, without approving the results reached in the cases it cited, it gave a list of factors that could appropriately be considered by a trial court: use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; spontaneity and consistent repetition; mental state of the declarant; lack of motive to fabricate. Id. 497 U.S. at 821-822, 110 S.Ct. at 3150. In Idaho v. Wright itself the trial court had admitted the hearsay of a child 2 1/2 years old, finding (1) that she had no motive to lie and (2) that the statements made to her doctor about Daddy touching her pee-pee were not of the type 'that one would expect a child to fabricate.'  Id. at 826, 110 S.Ct. at 3152, citing trial judge. The Supreme Court of Idaho found the presumptive unreliability of these statements to be unaffected by these findings and reversed the defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States agreed, holding that the circumstances found by the trial court offered no special reason for supposing that the incriminating statements were particularly trustworthy. Id. 22 The Supreme Court of Idaho also found that the trial court had erred in admitting the two-year-old's statement to her doctor, he does it a lot more with my sister. The Supreme Court of the United States agreed, although the spontaneity of the statement and the change in demeanor suggested that she was telling the truth. The Supreme Court emphasized that it is possible that where there was prior interrogation or prompting or manipulation by adults, spontaneity was an inaccurate indicator of trustworthiness. Id. at 826-27, 110 S.Ct. at 3152-53. 23 In the light of Idaho v. Wright and its specific examples of testimony that failed to rebut the presumption of unreliability, we examine whether circumstances surrounding the making of Heather's statements on the videotape made her particularly worthy of belief so that the test of cross-examination would have been a work of supererogation. As no mechanical test prevails, Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir.1993), the character of the guarantees of trustworthiness in this case must be weighed. We are not to second-guess the state courts. Id. at 1378. It is not our task to retry the case, or to determine Webb's guilt or innocence, or even to decide if Heather's statements were true. But on the ultimate determination of trustworthiness we act de novo. Id. at 1379. Our task under the Constitution is to determine if these presumptively unreliable statement were made under circumstances affirmatively establishing that they were so reliable that cross-examination of Heather was of marginal utility. Idaho v. Wright, at 820, 110 S.Ct. at 3149. 24 Taken by itself, the videotape does not carry guarantees of trustworthiness. Heather's language is not unexpected of a child of similar age. The video does not contain a declaration of Heather made soon after the alleged assaults; her state of mind, as used in the case cited by Wright, was not the state of mind of one excitedly reporting a recent assault. In the interview, within two minutes of the start of filming, Heather told Proctor that Terry pulled down his pants and put medicine in her. Captured by the camera, her statement comes through with a force and vividness and apparent spontaneity that are striking. Such a precise statement to a stranger, a person Heather had never seen before, invites reflection on what had prepared Heather to be so candid. The inescapable facts are that, for almost a month preceding the interview, she had been asked about Terry's conduct by Connie Martin, Mr. Martin, her mother, Allan Duprey and other state authorities. If the Supreme Court of the United States in Idaho v. Wright found the mere possibility of prior interrogation to destroy spontaneity as a valid indicator, a fortiori Heather's initial accusation on the tape must be stamped as insufficiently reliable and as the product of previous questioning. 25 Thereafter on the tape, Heather gave a variety of answers about Terry after Proctor had deliberately probed with questions about Terry's conduct and after Proctor had described Terry or his actions as bad. In addition, Heather's accusations are marked with grave inconsistency on the principal sexual allegations--according to Heather, Terry did and did not engage in oral sex with her; according to Heather, his vaginal assault on her was by medicine obtained from a bottle. 26 The videotape fails to pass the criteria set by Wright. There are additional reasons for holding it unreliable. Wright forbids recourse to other evidence to corroborate the trustworthiness of the hearsay offered; Wright does not forbid recourse to other evidence that confirms the presumptive unreliability of the hearsay. In this case there is a good deal of such evidence. 27 As to consistency, Heather on September 30, 1986, had denied that Terry had done those things to me. In the videotape interview she used the term medicine in a way that could have been understood to mean male semen, but her usage of this term varied. For example, on December 10, 1986, in an interview with Jacqueline Scheider, a psychotherapist, Heather told her: They spilled the medicine all over Mommy's car and Mommy had to clean it up. Asked about this incident, her mother said that she, the mother, had spilled some hair gel in the car and had had to clean it up. The mother later said that Terry and Cindy had spilled the gel. Here medicine as used by Heather almost certainly referred to a commercial product. 28 As to Heather's reputation for truthfulness and as to whether she had any tendency to fantasize, her mother was asked at trial whether Heather ever lied to her and replied, Not a lie. She's only three years old. Asked if Heather knew the difference between a lie and a truth, her mother said, As well as any three-year-old does. Pressed on cross-examination, her mother admitted that when Heather was fighting with her ten-year-old brother David, she would blame David, not necessarily truthfully, things like that--for example, Heather had blamed David for breaking the back of the toilet seat. 29 On September 23, 1986, on the same occasion on which she first accused Terry to Connie Martin and her husband, Heather also declared to Connie, Terry had made her mother Leslie pull down her pants and he pulled down his pants, and 'he put his pee pee in where she pee pees.'  Heather's mother testified that she had never had a sexual relationship with Webb. On this point either her mother lied or Heather lied or fantasized. There is no way of telling which alternative is true. It is clear that her mother did not believe Heather spoke truthfully about this significant sexual action Heather said that Terry had performed. 30 On September 30, 1986, Heather told Connie: I can't talk any more about my mother being a bad girl and pulling her panties down because she's going to get really sick and she's going to cry and the cops is going to get really mad at me. Her mother testified that she never told Heather not to talk about Terry. Again it is evident that her mother believed that Heather had not told the truth to Connie. Did her mother instruct Heather not to repeat the charge about her and Terry having sex? According to her mother's testimony, Heather lied about her mother's instructions. 31 If Heather had in fact observed sex between a man and her mother, it seems possible, if not actually probable, that she could fantasize that Terry had done something similar with her. Her motive would have been to absorb or cushion the trauma of seeing her mother engaged in intercourse. Leslie Morton, in fact, admitted that she had had intercourse with Terry's brother Irwin, although she denied that Heather could have seen it. Irwin refined Leslie Morton's admission by saying Leslie had given him oral sex; like Leslie he denied that Heather had seen them. 32 In summary, Heather was inconsistent in her accusations and in her use of the key accusatory term. She did not use unusually sophisticated language in setting out the accusations. She had a possible motive to fabricate them. According to Irwin Webb and her own mother she did fabricate another sexual accusation. Her videotape statements carry far fewer guarantees of trustworthiness than those rejected by the Supreme Court of Idaho and by the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright. 33 The videotape was inadmissible evidence seen by the jury and brought into the jury room during the jury's deliberations. Admission of this evidence violated in a gross fashion Webb's right to confront the evidence against him. After a careful review of the entire transcript of the trial, we conclude that this inadmissible evidence had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. Brecht v. Abrahamson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Consequently Webb's conviction must be set aside. 34 As the use of the videotape alone was such a substantial violation of Webb's Confrontation Clause rights, we need not on this appeal evaluate the further violations alleged by the admission of hearsay reported by Connie Martin and by Leslie Morton. If, however, these statements are to be used again they must be reevaluated in the light of this opinion and of Idaho v. Wright. Their earlier admission under a statute now found by Arizona to be unconstitutional is now irrelevant. 35 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed. The district court is ordered to issue the writ sixty days from the issuance of the mandate, unless within that time the state of Arizona indicates to the district court its intention to retry Webb. In that event, the district court shall order Webb released to the proper authorities for the purposes of retrial.