Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to instruct on unconsciousness

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct on its own motion on the defense of unconsciousness under CALJIC No. 4.30. Among those persons deemed incapable of committing a crime are individuals who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof. (§ 26, class four.) Unconsciousness, when not voluntarily induced, is a complete defense to a charged crime. ( People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 693, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253; People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 573, 111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875.) Unconsciousness does not mean that the actor lies still and unresponsive. Instead, a person is deemed `unconscious' if he or she committed the act without being conscious thereof. ( People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 313, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 423-424, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) A trial court must instruct on unconsciousness on its own motion if it appears the defendant is relying on the defense, or if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (See generally People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 157, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Here, defendant did not apparently rely upon the defense of unconsciousness. No expert testified that defendant was unconscious during either killing; nor did defendant himself testify he was unconscious, but only that he could not later recall the killings. Further, defense counsel during argument did not articulate a theory of unconsciousness. Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to instruct on that defense only if substantial evidence supported it. Defendant contends his testimony that he had no independent memory of the Clark killing from the time he pushed the victim out of the truck, coupled with expert testimony suggesting that defendant blacked out and could not remember the incident, warranted an unconsciousness instruction with respect to the Clark count. (See People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749, 762-763, 59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820 [unconsciousness instruction warranted where defendant testified he did not remember shootings and was distraught and mentally exacerbated by the events preceding the shootings].) The defense experts' testimony, however, fairly read, does not imply that he was unconscious during the events. Rather, it suggests he was aware of the events as they were occurring, but reacted to them emotionally rather than logically. For example, Dr. Glaser testified the killing was an emotional, impulsive heat of passion event, and Dr. Bird testified the killing was an impulsive, emotional act of passion and fear. Further, defendant's own testimony that he could not remember portions of the events, standing alone, was insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction. ( People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820, 829-830, 166 Cal.Rptr. 786 [evidence defendant was forgetful and told a psychiatrist he awakened after the crime was committed did not entitle defendant to an unconsciousness instruction]; People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10, 107 Cal.Rptr. 859 [there is no ineluctable rule that a defendant's inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction]; cf. People v. Coston (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 23, 40, 185 P.2d 632 [a defendant's mere statement of forgetfulness, unsupported by any other evidence, is at most very little evidence of unconsciousness at the time of performing a particular act].) The only evidence supporting an unconsciousness instruction with regard to the Benintende count was defendant's confession and his testimony that he had no memory of that killing. Defendant's experts did not testify regarding his mental state during that killing, and there was no other evidence of the circumstances surrounding that crime. Defendant's professed inability to recall the event, without more, was insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction. ( People v. Heffington, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at p. 10, 107 Cal.Rptr. 859; People v. Coston, supra, 82 Cal.App.2d at p. 40, 185 P.2d 632.)