Opinion ID: 2598779
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert testimony regarding remorse

Text: Over prosecution objection, defendant sought to present opinion testimony of Dr. Douglas Harper, a psychiatrist, regarding defendant's statements of remorse in his tape-recorded confession of August 16, 1989. The court held a hearing outside the jury's presence regarding the admissibility of this evidence. Dr. Harper testified that he was not asked to diagnose defendant or determine whether any mental defense might exist, but only to investigate the question of remorse. To do so, he interviewed defendant twice, read a transcript of the confession, and listened to the recorded confession. Defendant offered Dr. Harper solely to give an opinion regarding whether he expressed remorse in that confession. His opinion was that defendant was experiencing remorse, and had the capacity to do so at that time. He based his opinion on the typed transcript of his statement, my interview, my experience in listening to the tapes. The court excluded the evidence. It noted that remorse is relevant to the issues at trial. But, under the facts, it found the question was not the proper subject of expert testimony. It concluded that it was for the jury, not an expert, to determine the sincerity or lack thereof of any expressions of remorse. Defense counsel asked the court at least to admit the tape recording of the confession itself, so the jury could hear it and draw its own conclusion. Over prosecution objection, the court exercised its discretion to admit the recording. In response to the prosecutor's argument that admitting the tape would deprive him of the right to cross-examine defendant (see People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 838, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436), the court noted that defendant had testified at the guilt phaseโat which he expressed remorseโand the jury has had an opportunity to observe the defendant in that capacity. Defendant contends the court erred in excluding Dr. Harper's testimony. We disagree. Certainly, the presence of remorse is relevant at the penalty phase, as the court realized. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 855, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280.) But the court acted within its discretion in permitting the jury to listen to the tape and judge for itself defendant's expressions of remorse, while excluding expert opinion that the remorse was sincere. Expert opinion testimony must be [r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.... (Evid.Code, ง 801, subd. (a).) We review the trial court's ruling in this regard for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 508, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Defendant cites cases in which expert testimony on remorse was in fact admitted. (E.g., People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 629-630, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 499, 529, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) As we have noted, the fact that evidence is admitted in one trial does not mean it must be admitted in another. (See fn. 9, ante. ) The circumstances in which evidence is offered and its exact nature, and the exercise of the trial court's discretion, can vary from case to case. Nevertheless, we do not doubt that sometimes the question of remorse is properly the subject of expert testimony. In People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 818-821, 837-838, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, we said the trial court could prohibit the defendant from presenting his own taped statement because the statement was hearsay and not sufficiently trustworthy to come within an exception to the hearsay rule. One reason not to permit such hearsay was that doing so would deprive the prosecution of the opportunity to cross-examine the defendant. ( Id. at pp. 820, 838, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) We noted that the defense could ... have presented expert testimony which could have used these materials as a basis for an expert opinion, although none was offered in that case. ( Id. at p. 838, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) Here, the court excluded the expert testimony but admitted the taped statement itself. Doing so was within its discretion. Defendant did not seek to have Dr. Harper testify about expressions of remorse to Dr. Harper himself or as part of a larger diagnosis of defendant's mental state. Rather, he offered Dr. Harper solely to express an opinion regarding the weight the jury should give the expressions of remorse made during the taped statement. Essentially, defendant offered Dr. Harper as an expert on defendant's credibility in making that statement. However, the jury was as able as an expert to judge that question for itself. Credibility questions are generally not the subject of expert testimony, or at least a court could so conclude in a given case. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 576, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 [`the psychiatrist may not be in any better position to evaluate credibility than the juror']; People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal. App.3d 34, 39, 187 Cal.Rptr. 497 [trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert opinion that a prosecution witness was credible].) Here, the court permitted the jury to hear the taped statement for itself. Moreover, unlike the expert, the jury had observed defendant testify and express remorse at the guilt phase, where he was cross-examined, and it heard evidence regarding the circumstances of the taped statement. Thus, it could fully judge the credibility of defendant's expressions of remorse without hearing from Dr. Harper.