Opinion ID: 2608339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: State courts have quite universally accepted the proposition, where custody of children is involved in a divorce action, that the court retains jurisdiction so the decree may be modified at any time respecting custody or the payment of support money, the paramount consideration being to serve the best interest and welfare of the children. This jurisdiction is generally referred to as a continuing jurisdiction. Application of Lorenz, 194 Or. 355, 241 P.2d 142, 147, rehearing denied Ex parte Lorenz. Or., 242 P.2d 200; Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119, 322 P.2d 99, 103; Maudlin v. Maudlin, 68 Idaho 64, 188 P.2d 323, 327. As expressed in In re Cutts, 229 Or. 33, 366 P.2d 179, 183, subject to requirements of due process of law and orderly procedure, custody provisions of divorce decrees remain open during minority of the children concerned. Some courts have indicated the continuing jurisdiction of the court is such that it may on its own motion modify the decree, if the welfare of the children require; or that those interested are at liberty at any time to invoke the inquiry of the trial court concerning the condition and the needs of the children. Bishop v. Bishop, Okl., 321 P.2d 416, 421; Kenworthy v. Kenworthy, 197 Okl. 679, 174 P.2d 587, 588-589. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in State of Illinois ex rel. Shannon v. Sterling, 248 Minn. 266, 80 N.W.2d 13, 21, has specifically refused to hold that a court is powerless to amend its own final decree of divorce without first having an express application therefor. To do so, it said, would disregard the inherent equitable power of the court to control the custody of children and would subject their welfare to intolerable delay through a needless circuity of actions. The Minnesota court quoted this with approval, from one of its former decisions:    Why send the parties who are already before the court out through one jurisdictional door when they may immediately, via a subsequent and different action, return for such relief through another door? (All italics in original.) Regardless of what we may say of the court's continuing jurisdiction to modify divorce decrees, the requirements of due process of law and orderly procedure are always present. Therefore, in disposing of the matter presently before us, we should look first to the applicable statute, § 20-61, W.S. 1957, which provides: The court, in granting a divorce,    may make such disposition of, and provision for, the children as shall appear most expedient under all the circumstances, and most for the present comfort and future well-being of such children; and the court may from time to time afterward on the petition of either of the parents, revise and alter such decree concerning the care, custody and maintenance of such children, as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children shall require. The effect of the foregoing statute, as it applies to the instant case, is that it authorizes the court, on the petition of either of the parents, to revise and alter its decree. In procedural matters, however, we must give effect to Wyoming's Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules themselves declare that statutory provisions shall not apply whenever inconsistent with such rules. Rules 1, 81, and 87, W.R.C.P. And we have said the rules govern procedure but do not change substantive rights. State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District In and For County of Big Horn, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583. Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., states that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Chief Justice Parker, in the Frederick case, discussed the distinction between procedure and substance in connection with the relative application of statutory provisions and rules. In the case at bar, the rules of procedure do not conflict with any statutory procedure. Rule 15(b) merely augments and supplements § 20-61, by stating that certain issues shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. In other words, the issue of modification may, under certain circumstances, be treated as if it had been requested or petitioned for by a parent. The application of Rule 15(b) has become established in our judicial processes to the extent that we would be reluctant to ignore it  especially in a case where the inherent equitable powers of the court are present to the extent they are in matters affecting the welfare of children. The record before us reveals that the trial judge in this instance considered the issue of modification as having been tried, at least by implied consent; he treated the issue as if it had been raised in the pleadings; and he let the parties know he would decide the matter on that basis. If either of the parties had additional evidence to be offered on the issue of modification, there was ample opportunity for it to be made known. Neither side objected to the judge's indication that he was going to decide whether the decree should be modified. Appellant now suggests the lack of due process, but she points to no pertinent or specific evidence on the issue of modification which was not before the court. In fact, she names nothing definite in connection with the issue which in any way surprised her or kept her from being fully heard. After all evidence had been received in the case, and before the decision of the court had been announced, this is what the judge said, in the presence of the parties and their attorneys: Well, I'll hear your motion after I've said what I've got to say. I don't know, I'm a little bit confused on this thing and I'm going to treat this matter  because all of this evidence that's been presented, which I think is most material  not only as a technical contempt matter but I believe that the Court, under the case of Starrett vs. Starrett [sic Stirrett v. Stirrett (35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1)], has an inherent right to modify or change the provisions of a decree with regard to custody of children where it interferes or is paramount to their welfare and well-being. Now, I'm going to approach this thing in that regard. I want to advise you beforehand because I can't see the necessity of turning around and spending a day and a half or more again going over the same thing in a bed of modification, so I assume that that will be the next step. And apparently there has been no written defense, as I indicated at the last motion filed on behalf of the plaintiff, Mr. Strahan. But I'm going to treat it as such with the approach that in addition to considering the contempt I'm going to also consider the evidence as submitted here with regard to the welfare and well-being of these children. Do I make myself clear? Do you have any questions, gentlemen? After an attorney for the husband answered that he understood, the judge continued with this statement: Is there any question on it? I mean, this is not only contempt proceedings but apparently I have allowed both parties to go probably a little beyond the extent of just an out and out contempt proceedings, and I see nothing to be gained as far as the time of the Court or anyone else, the parties, in going through this all over again, so I'm going to consider it in that light before I make any decision. There can be no doubt, we think, but that the trial court in this case treated the issue of modification in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. His decision in that regard is not subject to review, except for abuse of discretion. 1A Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 449, pp. 793-794 (1960). We fail to find any abuse of discretion  especially where the inherent equitable powers of the court were present as they were in this case.