Opinion ID: 445224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Environmental Protection Agency's Assertion of Inherent Revocation Authority

Text: 27 Section 211(f) does not state whether waivers granted under subsection (f)(4) may be reconsidered and revoked. According to the legislative history, however, Congress contemplated regulation of fuels and fuel additives so waived into commerce only through proceedings under section 211(c); the legislative understanding thus rejects the implied revocation authority claimed by the EPA. Moreover, the interrelationship of subsections (f) and (c)--with subsection (f) regulating the first introduction of fuels and fuel additives into commerce and subsection (c) governing the control or prohibition of fuels and fuel additives already in commerce--gives effect to the requirements of each subsection and comports with Congress's understanding of their interdependence. Finally, our recognition of authority under section 211(c) to regulate fuels and fuel additives in commerce, to the exclusion of an implied revocation authority under section 211(f), is consistent with past administrative practice and effectuates the objectives of the Clean Air Act. 51
28 A revealing paragraph in the committee report on the Senate bill suggests that the EPA administrator, once having waived a new fuel or fuel additive into commerce under section 211(f)(4), may not revoke a waiver under that same section: 29 The committee was mindful that the Administrator could choose not to act on the waiver application within the 180 days provided for such action. If the Administrator does fail to act under subsection (d) [now subsection (f) ] to either grant, conditionally grant, or deny the waiver, it does not diminish the Administrator's power to act against the fuel or fuel additive through the application of the provisions of subsection (c) of this section. 52 30 Congress, according to this passage, understood that waivers granted by default could not be revoked; rather, the Administrator must initiate appropriate proceedings pursuant to section 211(c) if he wants to control or prohibit a fuel or fuel additive waived into commerce. 31 EPA agrees with this reading of the quoted paragraph, but believes its logic is limited to waivers granted automatically after 180 days: 32 There is absolutely no indication that the committee gave any thought to what remedies EPA might pursue if it appeared that its affirmative decision that the applicant had satisfied section 211(f)(4) had been based on serious factual mistakes. In contrast, waivers granted under the 180-day provision do not involve any affirmative decision that could be called into question or reconsidered later. 53 33 EPA's reading of the Senate Report, however, would have the perverse and presumably unintended effect of according the greatest deference to the least thought-out waivers. To permit revocation only of waivers granted after due consideration would inexplicably insulate from reconsideration waivers granted by operation of law and without any thought on the agency's part. Waivers granted after the statutorily-prescribed determination that the fuel or fuel additive will not cause or contribute to a failure of any emission control device or system ... to achieve compliance ... with emission standards 54 would be open to revocation at any time, based on any evidence, subject to no substantive or procedural safeguards. We cannot believe that Congress would countenance such an ill-conceived revisory power. 34 We have held that agencies have an inherent power to correct their mistakes by reconsidering their decisions within the period available for taking an appeal. 55 That period has long expired here. We need not consider what further inherent or implicit authority might exist in the abstract, since, in the present case, Congress has provided a mechanism for correcting error by authorizing under section 211(c) control or prohibition of fuels and fuel additives mistakenly waived into commerce under section 211(f). 35 Thus, when Congress has provided a mechanism capable of rectifying mistaken actions, in this case by authorizing under section 211(c) control or prohibition of fuels and fuel additives mistakenly waived into commerce under section 211(f), it is not reasonable to infer authority to reconsider agency action. This  'common sense'  56 observation recalls the maxim frequently invoked by the Supreme Court in construing statutes: 57 expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that is, mention of one thing implies exclusion of another thing. 58 As the Supreme Court stated in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. National Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak), 59  '[w]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.'  60 Thus, while Congress may have wanted the Administrator to correct his mistakes, it provided a mechanism sufficient to this task in section 211(c). It further understood this mechanism as the exclusive means by which he was to correct waivers mistakenly granted by default. We therefore see no need to imply authority under section 211(f) to reconsider waivers granted after due deliberation. What suffices to correct waivers mistakenly granted by default should also suffice to correct the (hopefully) far smaller proportion of waivers mistakenly granted after careful consideration.
36 The absence of implied revocation authority suggests a straightforward relationship between sections 211(c) and 211(f) which is consistent with the text of the statute and its apparent design: 61 section 211(f) forbids the first introduction of new fuels and new fuel additives into commerce; section 211(c) provides for regulation of fuels already in commerce. 37 Section 211(f)(1) on its face governs every fuel or fuel additive ... first introduce[d] into commerce or whose concentration in any fuel or fuel additive is increased. 62 Waivers of this prohibition under section 211(f)(4) are required only of these same fuels and fuel additives. 38 By way of comparison, section 211(c) authorizes the Administrator to control or prohibit the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offering for sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive in order to reduce harmful air pollution and to maintain the performance of emission control equipment. 63 Construing section 211(f) not to authorize revocation of waivers thus leaves no lacuna in the statute: The Administrator is empowered to take action against an offending fuel or fuel additive under section 211(c) if it impairs the performance of pollution control equipment, which is precisely the evil an implied revocation authority would remedy. 39 Furthermore, our unwillingness to imply revocation authority under section 211(f) is consistent with subsection (f)(4)'s requirement that the Administrator act on a waiver application within 180 days or be deemed to have granted the same. 64 The implication of a standardless revocation authority, exercisable over an indefinite term, would in effect empower the Administrator to deny a waiver after the 180-day period had elapsed, thereby writing the 180-day time limit out of the statute. This revocation power would be exercised, moreover, without regard for the substantive and procedural safeguards afforded by section 211(c)--safeguards which the EPA concedes are applicable to fuels waived into commerce by default by virtue of the paragraph in the Senate Committee Report quoted above. 65 The text and design of section 211 thus support our conclusion that Congress did not authorize the EPA Administrator to revoke waivers granted under section 211(f). 40
41 Our unwillingness to wrest a standardless and openended revocation authority from a silent statute is strengthened by examination of EPA's own commitment to revocation authority--a commitment that has been qualified and tepid at best. 42
43 In its brief and at oral argument, EPA conceded that a correct initial waiver could not be revoked and that any subsequent action against the fuel or fuel additive must perforce be taken in a proceeding under section 211(c). 66 By correct, EPA apparently means that the initial waiver must have been warranted by the record compiled at the time the waiver was granted; only if the original waiver decision was fundamentally wrong because the record, upon re-examination, actually did not support the necessary showings may the waiver be revoked. 67 44 Because there is no issue now before us as to the original administrative record justifying the Petrocoal waiver, however, revocation is unwarranted on the agency's own view of the statute. In its notice of proposed revocation, EPA advanced three reasons for reconsidering the Petrocoal waiver. Two of the reasons appear to be make-weights by EPA's own admission; the third is based on new evidence and reflects no deficiency in the agency's original determination. Since this last reason seemingly prompted the Administrator's second thoughts about Petrocoal, we consider it first. 45 The chronology of events, 68 EPA's notice soliciting comments on whether to reconsider the Petrocoal waiver, 69 and the agency's notice of proposed revocation, 70 all show that EPA's principal concern is that cars using Petrocoal will exceed the limits imposed on evaporative emissions of hydrocarbons. Whatever the validity of this concern, it in no way impugns the validity of the original waiver--the Administrator's concern is based, as he put it, on new data. 71 As he stated in his Federal Register notice proposing revocation: Based on information submitted in response to the May 2, 1983 Federal Register notice, and other information provided to the Agency since the grant of Petrocoal waiver, the Agency is today proposing to revoke that waiver. 72 The Administrator's answer to American Methyl's argument that expiration of the sixty-day period for judicial review precludes reconsideration, leaves no issue before us as to the adequacy of the original waiver. In a footnote, the Administrator pointed out that the sixty-day time limit was inapplicable because the information on evaporative emissions became available after the period had expired:Moreover, regardless of the merits of American Methyl's argument with respect to MVMA's original petition for reconsideration, the petition as supplemented and the comments in response to the May 2, 1983 Federal Register notice clearly present new information not available to the Agency during the comment period.... 73 46 EPA's primary reason for revoking American Methyl's waiver does not relate to a defect in the original grant; thus, under EPA's own interpretation of its powers, a revocation proceeding is not warranted in this case. 74 47 EPA's remaining two reasons for reconsidering the Petrocoal waiver, although they relate to the original waiver grant, are red herrings. In six trim paragraphs of his eight-page, triple-columned, single-spaced notice of proposed revocation, the Administrator now finds that he had no basis for approving the particular alcohol blend used in Petrocoal when he approved the waiver in 1981. 75 Intervenors Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association raised precisely this contention in their petition for administrative reconsideration filed on 4 December 1981, 76 yet EPA took no action until presented with new data on evaporative emissions a year-and-a-half later. Tellingly, if the Administrator was concerned about the high alcohol content of Petrocoal, one would hardly expect him to dismiss out of hand American Methyl's offer to reduce the percentage of alcohol. 77 48 In the pages of the Federal Register the Administrator also professes concern over whether some test samples of Petrocoal contained the metallic additive CV-100. 78 The presence of the additive in test samples but not in the fuel actually marketed could mean that Petrocoal at the pump fails to perform like the Petrocoal submitted for testing and approved by EPA. Yet in a letter denying American Methyl a hearing on this question, the agency declared that the issue itself is not significant enough to warrant imposition of full trial-type hearing procedures and adopted the analysis in American Methyl's memorandum of April 27, which recognized that the presence of CV-100 is at best an ancillary matter, unlikely to influence EPA's final decision. 79 49 Because the Administrator points to no defects in his original approval of the Petrocoal waiver, he may not--according to his own interpretation of section 211(f)--reopen that waiver. He may proceed to regulate Petrocoal, if he thinks it necessary, under the powers conferred upon him by section 211(c). 50
51 Independent of EPA's admissions before this court, the agency's prelitigation administrative practice belies its professed belief in an implied revocation authority. In seven years of administering section 211(f), American Methyl is the first manufacturer subjected to a revocation proceeding. 80 In a prior case, when assertion of such authority would have been appropriate, the Administrator made no mention of it and instead relied on his power under section 211(c), a course of conduct exemplifying the understanding of section 211 we adopt today. 52 A brief recitation of a proceeding involving the Sun Petroleum Products Company exposes the novelty of EPA's construction of section 211. The Administrator conditioned the grant of Sun Petroleum's waiver on disclosure of a proprietary additive's chemical composition; he reserved the right to revoke the waiver if, after receiving a petition for reconsideration, he determines that based on new data and information not available prior to the public disclosure of the proprietary additive's chemical composition, the applicant is not entitled to the waiver. 81 53 General Motors subsequently filed a petition for reconsideration in the Sun Petroleum proceeding. Because the initial waiver provided for reconsideration, the Administrator applied the same standard of review that he applied to Sun Petroleum's initial application. 82 The Administrator denied General Motor's petition and thereby removed the revocation contingency in Sun Petroleum's waiver. Revealingly, in describing his remaining authority under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator said: 54 This [waiver] does not preclude GM or others from continuing to research this question and developing sufficient date [sic] to support a future rulemaking in this area. I retain the authority under Section 211(c) of the Act to control or prohibit this blend or other alcohol/gasoline blends if new data are presented to warrant such action. 83 55 Taking EPA's past administrative practice as implementing the proper reading of section 211, the agency is without authority to revoke a noncontingent waiver, based on new evidence, nearly two-and-one-half years after its initial approval. 84 Combined with Congress's understanding of section 211 and the consistency of that understanding with the statutory design, the Sun Petroleum precedent constitutes a tacit admission that section 211(f) does not impliedly authorize the reconsideration of waivers in these circumstances. 85
56 Our inquiry ends upon ascertaining that the Administrator's reading of his authority under section 211(f) is contrary to what Congress intended; 86 we note, however, that our interpretation furthers both procedural certainty as well as the public's need for protection from harmful air pollution. 57 By upholding Congress's disinclination to grant EPA an unguided and open-ended power to revoke waivers, we ensure that entities subject to regulation under section 211 know what is expected of them. Protecting the legitimate expectations of fuel manufacturers comports with basic fairness; it also encourages investment in technology to create more efficient, less costly, and less polluting substitutes for conventional fuels. 58 Like the sword suspended by a hair above the courtier Damocles, the Administrator's claimed revocation authority would pose an ever-present threat to the marketing of new fuels, fostering great uncertainty in the business community. Technologically-advanced fuels could be taken off the market at any time, and neither specified hearing procedures nor rules of repose would cabin the Administrator's discretion. This risk is hardly typical of commercial operations in a regulated economy. Moreover, because the manufacturer's product is assumed undeserving of waiver, the presumption is against the continued existence of his business even if his waiver is challenged with evidence gathered years after heavy capital investment--an extraordinary risk for a commercial entity to bear, as agency counsel conceded at oral argument. 59 Because a manufacturer could never know ex ante whether his product would be available for sale for a sufficient time to recoup his initial investment, he might well decide not to risk his capital in the first place. As a consequence, the public and this nation would suffer from lack of innovation in fuels and fuel additives, to the ultimate detriment of air quality and our national security. 87 60 Besides providing procedural certainty, our opinion should also promote more accurate agency decisionmaking in the first instance. Under EPA's reading of the waiver provision, the agency may permit a waiver to be granted by default after the passage of 180 days and revoke it later if some problem is brought to its attention. Under our reading of section 211(f)(4), however, the agency is motivated to consider a waiver request promptly and thoroughly because it cannot rely on the expedient of a post-grant revocation. The Administrator must do his job well and fast--if he makes a mistake, he must act against the fuel or fuel additive under section 211(c), with its admittedly more cumbersome but congressionally-mandated procedural safegurads. 88 Our refusal to imply a power to revoke waivers parallels Congress's insistence that EPA make a careful, albeit expeditious, decision in the first instance; subsequent proceedings based on new evidence, when substantial investments are at stake, understandably are subject to the more exacting substantive and procedural safeguards contained in section 211(c).