Opinion ID: 2599781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Defense Penalty Phase Instructions

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred by declining to give four special defense instructions and that the errors, individually and cumulatively, violated his right to a fair penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We reject these claims. First, defendant contends the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury that the absence of a mitigating factor cannot be considered a factor in aggravation. In cases where, as here, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.85, we have consistently rejected this particular claim of error. [A]s we have held, `a reasonable juror could not have believed ... that the absence of mitigation amounted to the presence of aggravation.' ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 299, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990 [rejecting claim that trial court should have instructed the jury ... that the absence of a mitigating factor could not be considered an aggravating factor]; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1100, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct on lingering doubt. As defendant acknowledges, such instruction is required neither by state nor federal law ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 166, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461), and we have consistently held that this concept is sufficiently covered in CALJIC No. 8.85. ( Ibid.; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 77-78, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) Defendant's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, we see no reason to re-examine those principles in the present case. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred when it declined to give his special instruction on sympathy. We have consistently held, however, that the trial court does not have to give such an instruction ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 943, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93), and that such instruction is duplicative of an instruction given by the trial court that the jury could consider `[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspects of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.' ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068-1069, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388; see CALJIC No. 8.85.) Defendant's arguments do not persuade us that these principles should not apply equally here. Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury that it could impose life without the possibility of parole even in the absence of any mitigating factors. As defendant acknowledges, we have previously rejected this instruction on the ground, that under CALJIC No. 8.88, which was given here, [n]o reasonable juror would assume he or she was required to impose death despite insubstantial aggravating circumstances, merely because no mitigating circumstances were found to exist. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) We adhere to this view. We conclude that, under settled precedent, the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury with the special defense instructions. Necessarily, we find no constitutional violations or any prejudice, singular or cumulative, requiring reversal of the penalty determination.