Opinion ID: 2374243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against Schiavi

Text: When considering a motion to dismiss under M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded material allegations are admitted, Beckett v. Roderick, 251 A.2d 427, 430 (Me. 1969), and construed in favor of the pleader. Dom J. Moreau & Son v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 378 A.2d 151, 152 (Me.1977). A complaint is sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it avers facts which would entitle a plaintiff to relief upon some theory or if it asserts every necessary element of a claim. 378 A.2d at 153. Both the warranty claim and the strict liability claim against Schiavi must fail for the simple reason that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish Schiavi's status as seller of the mobile home in question. [3] The pleaded facts asserted that the plaintiff was in the mobile home as a business invitee. The complaint in this case did not indicate that any sale by Schiavi ever occurred. [4] Because no sale occurred, Schiavi did not impliedly warrant to the plaintiff that the mobile home was merchantable or fit for its particular purpose. See 11 M.R.S.A. §§ 2-314 to -315 (1964). [5] The plaintiff, therefore, could not recover against Schiavi under the breach of implied warranty theory. Similarly, the dismissal of the strict liability claim against Schiavi was correct. The strict liability statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 221 (1980) [6] provides in part that [o]ne who sells any goods or products in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer ... is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to a person. . . . Schiavi did not sell the product in question, defective or otherwise, and thus lacked the status of one who sells. [7]