Opinion ID: 1366656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of due process, right to counsel, and right to confront witnesses

Text: As explained, on the same day he charged Parsons with first degree murder, the prosecutor took the statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest under oath. Parsons now argues that by taking these sworn statements without giving notice to the defense, the prosecutor violated his federal constitutional right to counsel and to confront the witnesses against him, U.S. Const. amend. VI, and his federal and state constitutional rights to due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Utah Const. art. I, § 7. Parsons raises this argument independent of his ineffective assistance allegations. Habeas relief is available where a defendant has suffered an obvious injustice or substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right. Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d at 319; Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989). However, the writ can neither substitute for, nor perform the function of, regular appellate review. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983); see, e.g., Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989); Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968). For this reason, a party may not raise issues in a habeas corpus petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal. Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549. However, where unusual circumstances are present that justify the failure to raise the issue on direct appeal, a court may entertain such a claim raised for the first time in the habeas corpus petition. Id. The State argues that Parsons' substantive constitutional arguments are procedurally barred because he failed to raise them on direct appeal and because he has not shown unusual circumstances justifying his failure to do so. While it is true that he has not alleged the requisite unusual circumstances, procedural default is not always determinative of a collateral attack on a conviction where, as in this case, it is alleged that the trial was not conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in harmony with constitutional standards. Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036. We therefore reach the merits of Parsons' federal constitutional arguments. However, after careful consideration, we conclude that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated. [2] Rule 14(h) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exclusively governs the taking of depositions in criminal cases. [3] See State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Utah 1974) (holding that rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting discovery depositions, does not apply to criminal cases). It permits depositions in narrow circumstances: (h) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for believing that he will be unable to attend a trial or hearing, either party may, upon notice to the other, apply to the court for an order that the witness be examined conditionally by deposition. Attendance of the witness at the deposition may be compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall be present at the deposition and the court shall make whatever order is necessary to effect such attendance. Utah R.Crim.P. 14. When a prosecutor takes a statement that does not conform to the requirements of rule 14(h), he or she has not taken a deposition even if the witness gives the statement under oath. Admittedly, the term deposition is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath. 23 Am.Jur.2d Depositions and Discovery § 108 (1983). [4] However, according to rule 14(h), a statement under oath is not a deposition unless the court has ordered the proceeding, the deposing party has given notice to the other party, the defendant is present, and the witness being deposed is about to leave the state or is so ill that his or her attending the trial is unlikely. At the habeas proceeding, the prosecutor testified that he was not proceeding under rule 14(h) when he took the statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest. Rather, he took the statements to preserve and gain information and to put everything in perspective  times, dates, who did what. He did not apply to the court for an order to take the statements, nor did he notify Parsons. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest were not `depositions', but were rather `sworn statements' generated by a careful and thoughtful investigative prosecutor. While no statutory or procedural rule affirmatively authorizes a prosecutor to take investigatory statements outside the confines of rule 14(h), due process of law is not offended when a prosecutor chooses to do so. In fact, the record indicates that Parsons benefited from the statements. The habeas court found it likely that the prosecutor took the statements before defense counsel was appointed, thereby preserving information for Parsons when it was fresh in the minds of two critical witnesses. Likewise, defense counsel used Mrs. Ernest's sworn statement at the sentencing hearing for impeachment purposes. Parsons enjoyed the benefits of the sworn statements at trial without objection but now argues that taking the statements violated his right to due process. This inconsistency smacks of invited error, which is procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987); see, e.g., State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (A defendant cannot lead the court into error by failing to object and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions.). Parsons' Sixth Amendment claims must also fail. The primary object of the constitutional right of confrontation is to prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used against the accused at trial in lieu of personal examination and cross-examination of the witness against him. State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980). The statements in question were not used in place of personal examination. Both Williams and Mrs. Ernest testified at the sentencing hearing, and Parsons had full opportunity to confront them at that time. Parsons argues that the threat of perjury prosecution may have prevented Williams and Mrs. Ernest from deviating from their sworn statements when subjected to cross-examination at the sentencing hearing. He contends that this chilling of truthful testimony would not have occurred if the prosecutor had not placed Williams and Mrs. Ernest under oath when he took their statements. We are not persuaded. Parsons' argument presumes that Williams and Mrs. Ernest gave false statements to the prosecutor and that neither the oath nor the threat of perjury prosecution deterred them from doing so. The more probable presumption is that the oath had its intended effect. The purpose of the oath is to ensure that the affiant consciously recognizes his or her legal obligation to tell the truth. 58 Am.Jur.2d Oath and Affirmation § 6 (1989). It is regarded as the highest test of truth and is the instrument appropriated by the law for the ascertainment of the truth in judicial investigations. Id. Thus, the oath and its attendant penalties for false swearing are the best assurance that the investigatory statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest were true. [5] By taking the statements under oath, the prosecutor did not chill truthful testimony at the sentencing hearing. Rather, he ensured that the testimony of both witnesses would comport with their prior truthful statements. Furthermore, Parsons' claims are at best speculative. He has not shown that Williams or Mrs. Ernest would have testified differently at the sentencing hearing had their initial sworn statements not been taken under oath. Therefore, we must conclude that any benefit Parsons might have gained by having counsel present when the prosecutor took the statements could also have been realized during cross-examination at the sentencing hearing. For these reasons, we hold that the taking of investigatory statements under oath by the prosecution without notice to the defense did not violate Parsons' federal rights to counsel, to confront witnesses, or to due process. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV.