Opinion ID: 2979185
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Psychological Evidence

Text: Defendant argues that the district court should have admitted the report alongside Dr. Orlando’s testimony, rather than asking counsel to choose one or the other form of evidence. Defendant has pointed to no authority, and this Court has found none, suggesting that it is an abuse of discretion to allow expert testimony without also admitting the expert report. Dr. Orlando’s testimony was lengthy and covered the topics that Defendant argues would have been discussed in the report: Defendant’s “psychological state, risk of re-offending, and amenability for treatment.” (Appellant’s Br. at 22.) Additionally, Dr. Orlando had his report on the stand with him in order to refresh his recollection if needed and was therefore able to testify to the entire content of the report if defense counsel elicited such testimony. 8 No. 08-4402 United States v. Pritchard We should note that admitting both the report and the testimony would have been the better practice for the district court, given the importance of this psychological evidence to Defendant’s primary arguments for a lower sentence. However, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to only admit the testimony of Dr. Orlando. C. Procedural Reasonableness of Defendant’s Sentence “A district court necessarily abuses its sentencing discretion if it ‘commit[s] [a] significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 579 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to address a nonfrivolous argument made by the defendant in support of a lower sentence. United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 774 (6th Cir. 2006) (“the black letter law of this Circuit requires district courts to consider all factors brought to their attention by a defendant”). Failure to address a nonfrivolous argument is a reversible error even on plain error review. See United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802-08 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining how all four prongs of the plain error analysis are satisfied once the Court has determined that the district court’s explanation was insufficient). This Court in Wallace extended the analysis of United States v. Blackie, 548 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2008), which held that failure to explain how a Defendant’s nonfrivolous argument for a lower sentence was taken into account in imposing an above-guidelines 9 No. 08-4402 United States v. Pritchard sentence, to cover within-guidelines sentences as well. Wallace, 597 F.3d at 806-07.3 Criminal defendants have a substantial right to meaningful appellate review for reasonableness of their sentences, which can only be vindicated if the record in the district court clearly reflects the district judge’s consideration of all nonfrivolous arguments. Id. Under the logic of Wallace and the guidance from the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States that a within-guidelines sentence requires less detailed explanation, see 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007), a plain error for failure to address a nonfrivolous argument may arise less often in the context of within-guidelines sentences because the explanation required would be less detailed than for an above-guidelines sentence.4 However, the 3 Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, Wallace is fully consistent with Vonner and so is binding on this Court as a prior published decision. See Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180, 188 (6th Cir. 2010). This Court’s opinion in Wallace specifically addresses each of the arguments made here in the dissent regarding both Vonner and the distinction between the required depth of explanation for a within-guidelines sentence versus an outside-guidelines sentence. See Wallace, 597 F.3d at 804-808. Other published decisions of this Court post-Vonner also support our view of plain error for failure to explain in this case. See United States v. Barahona-Montenegro, 565 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir.2009). Even United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.2009), may be understood to support our view in this case since the reasoning of the majority in Simmons relied on the conceptual simplicity of the defendant’s argument, whereas here the psychologist’s testimony presented a complex argument for how he arrived at the conclusion that Defendant was unlikely to re-offend. Simmons, 587 F.3d at 361; see also Wallace, 597 F.3d at 810 (McKeague, J. dissenting) (“Considering the simplicity and straightforwardness of Wallace’s argument, it is clear that the district court considered it and intentionally rejected it”). We will not relitigate Wallace here, despite the dissent’s attempt to do so. Only the en banc court or the Supreme Court may overrule this Court’s binding precedent in Wallace, and until such time as either Court sees fit to do so, this panel is bound by the precedent in Wallace and its reasoning regarding plain error review of sentences where defendants argue that the district court failed to explain its reasons for rejecting a nonfrivolous argument for a reduced sentence. See Gor, 607 F.3d at 188. 4 The dissent essentially argues that Vonner forecloses finding a plain error for failure to address an argument made by Defendant for a lower sentence when reviewing a within-guidelines sentence. See 516 F.3d at 387. However, as both Vonner and Wallace instruct this Court, the “crucial question is whether the record makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each 10 No. 08-4402 United States v. Pritchard record still must reflect that the district court understood and considered Defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a lower sentence, even if the explanation is more cursory than extensive. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387. Therefore, if this Court determines that the district court failed to address a nonfrivolous argument for a lower sentence made by Defendant, we would reverse and remand the sentence. Defendant alleges two procedural errors. First, he alleges that the district court failed to address the psychologist’s testimony supporting Defendant’s argument that he was not diagnosed with pedophilia and has a low risk of recidivism. Second, he alleges that the district court presumed that Defendant had engaged in past pedophilic activities without support for that finding in the record. This second error may also be a substantive error, and to the extent that it is such, it will be addressed in the following section. Defendant makes no other procedural challenge in his appeal, and this Court has found no other procedural error in reviewing the record. The district court did not make any specific mention of the evidence presented in Dr. Orlando’s testimony regarding Defendant’s likelihood of re-offending. There was some mention of whether Defendant is a pedophile when the district court stated: This conduct involved potential victimization of somebody that’s 14 years old. There’s -- there was testimony and kind of intimation that that should be significantly different than a prepubescent minor. But, I’d find it difficult to make that distinction. To engage in this conduct with a 14-year-old I think reeks as much or near as much as to that victim as a younger child. So I think there is a need to protect the public from this type of conduct and to reflect the seriousness of the conduct. argument, considered the supporting evidence, was fully aware of the defendant’s circumstances and took them into account in sentencing him.” Wallace, 597 F.3d at 804 (quoting Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our analysis asks no more of the district court in this case. 11 No. 08-4402 United States v. Pritchard (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 47, Sen. Tr. at 46). However, this explanation does not appear to be addressing the psychologist’s testimony concerning Defendant’s lack of sexual attraction to minors in particular or Defendant’s lower risk of re-offending, but rather discusses whether the fact that the hypothetical victim was fourteen is a less serious offense than if Defendant was to meet a younger child.5 The district court made no findings of fact regarding the expert testimony prior to or during his explanation of the sentence imposed. While the district court did engage in questioning of the psychologist, there is no reference in his explanation of the sentence to that testimony and whether the testimony was given weight in crafting Defendant’s sentence. Defendant’s arguments that he does not suffer from pedophilia, is not specifically attracted to underage daughters, and is unlikely to re-offend are not frivolous arguments. These arguments go to the core of the § 3553(a) factors, especially the history and characteristics of the Defendant. He was entitled to have the district court clearly, even if briefly, explain on the record how his primary argument for a lower sentence affected the district court’s decision to impose a within-guidelines sentence of 50 months. There is no evidence in the record that the district court “listened to each argument, considered the supporting evidence, was fully aware of the defendant’s circumstances and took them 5 The dissent apparently finds this cursory mention of testimony about the age of the victim to be an explanation of how the district court weighed Dr. Orlando’s testimony. But in no way is it clear from this statement that the court was addressing the expert’s full argument that, not only the age of the hypothetical victim, but also the fact that Defendant was not particularly attracted to minors so much as to the mother-daughter relationship, was directly related to a lower likelihood of recidivism. Dr. Orlando testified that Defendant was wary of the daughter’s young age and cancelled the first meeting, which further bolstered the conclusion that Defendant was unlikely to re-offend. The district court does not address any aspect of Defendant’s primary argument beyond the age of the hypothetical victim. 12 No. 08-4402 United States v. Pritchard into account in sentencing him,” with regard to Dr. Orlando’s testimony. United States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387; Rita, 551 U.S. at 358) (internal quotations omitted). Defendant’s primary argument for a lower sentence was Dr. Orlando’s finding that he had a low risk of recidivism, which is related to Dr. Orlando’s opinion that Defendant does not suffer from pedophilia and that he is attracted to mother-daughter pairs, not specifically to underage victims. The record is devoid of any evidence that the district court understood and responded to the crux of Dr. Orlando’s testimony, especially since the questions asked by the court and the explanation offered by the district court both focused on the age of the hypothetical victim as being outside the norm rather than the psychologist’s focus on the type of relationship targeted by Defendant as being outside the norm. Failure to address Defendant’s primary argument for a lower sentence, especially the connection between his lack of sexual attraction specifically targeting underage victims to his low risk of recidivism, is a plain error. See Wallace, 597 F.3d at 806 (“This failure to even acknowledge Defendant’s argument mandates remand in this case.”). Though the district court did not need to give a lengthy explanation, it was error for the district judge to fail to address Defendant’s recidivism argument when explaining the sentence imposed. Because our case law is clear that the sentencing judge must explicitly address each of Defendant’s nonfrivolous claims on the record, the procedural error is a clear error. Defendant has a substantial right to meaningful appellate review that necessitates development of a full record below, which is not available here because of the sentencing judge’s failure to address the psychological evidence. See Blackie, 548 F.3d at 402 (finding failure to address Defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments to implicate a substantial right, 13 No. 08-4402 United States v. Pritchard therefore being plain error). Therefore, the sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing due to this procedural error. Defendant’s second argument regarding the district court’s alleged presumption that he had committed prior pedophilic acts is unsupported by the record. The pertinent section of the sentencing judge’s comments is as follows: Somewhat ameliorating this is the -- some suggestion in the -- the e-mails yourself that you did engage in this conduct before. That’s been denied, and it’s not a principal factor, but I think both of those also give some cause for concern to the Court in terms of where to place you within the sentencing ranges. (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 47, Sen. Tr. at 46). These comments refer to the Defendant’s alleged statement in an internet chat room that he had a sexual encounter with an eleven-year-old, which he later claimed was when he also was eleven. It appears from the sentencing judge’s comments that it concerned the district court that Defendant had boasted of a sexual encounter and implied it was a pedophilic encounter, and the fact that it supposedly happened when Defendant was eleven did not ameliorate the district court’s concern. There was evidence in the record that the conversation did not include Defendant telling the chat room that he was also eleven at the time, and thus it was reasonable for the district judge to credit the transcript of the conversation more than Defendant’s after-the-fact allegation regarding his age. See United States v. Gates, 461 F.3d 703, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (judicial fact finding for sentencing purposes requires a preponderance of the evidence). Therefore, the district court did not commit a procedural error regarding Defendant’s alleged statements that he had previously engaged in pedophilic activities. 14 No. 08-4402 United States v. Pritchard The district court’s failure to make any findings regarding the psychologist’s testimony, and therefore failure to address Defendant’s arguments that he is not a pedophile and is unlikely to reoffend, was a procedural error. It is reasonably likely that had the district court addressed the psychologist’s testimony, the result of the sentencing may have been different. Regardless, it is clear that the law of the Circuit requires district judges to respond to all nonfrivolous arguments, implicating Defendant’s substantial right to meaningful appellate review. Therefore, it was plain error to fail to do so, especially since the psychologist had testified mere moments before the court began explaining its sentence. D. Substantive Reasonableness of Defendant’s Sentence “A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 2006)). Defendant argues that the district court failed to consider whether the sentence imposed is greater than necessary to achieve the objectives of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He also argues that the district court’s presumption of past pedophilic activities resulted in the district court either weighing impermissible factors or placing too much weight on one factor. Because we vacate the sentence on procedural grounds, this Court declines to address Defendant’s arguments regarding the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 15 No. 08-4402 United States v. Pritchard