Opinion ID: 795341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Statements of Mill Representatives

Text: 17 Champagne also argues that the district court erred by excluding statements of mill representatives before testing whether they were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)'s exception for statements of co-conspirators. [W]e review a district court's evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Griffin, 389 F.3d 1100, 1103 (10th Cir. 2004). 18 In its briefs to the district court, Champagne argued that statements of both the Established Distributors and the mill representatives should be admitted under this exception. However, at the outset of its order, and without reference to the co-conspirator exception, the district court ruled that transcribed conversations and non-deposition statements of mill representatives were hearsay and would only be considered for the non-hearsay purpose of showing the state of mind of mill decision makers under Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). 19 In United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir.1996), we explained the process by which a district court should determine the admissibility of alleged co-conspirator hearsay evidence: [t]he court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy; and (3) the hearsay statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 1242. We further noted that, [i]n making its preliminary factual determination as to whether a conspiracy exists, the court may consider the hearsay statement sought to be admitted, along with independent evidence tending to establish the conspiracy. Id. 20 Here, the district court failed to make a preliminary factual determination as to whether a conspiracy existed among the Established Distributors and the mills, as required by Lopez-Gutierrez. 5 This legal error was an abuse of discretion. See generally Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 703, 709 (10th Cir.2005). On remand, the district court should follow the procedure laid out in Lopez-Gutierrez in determining whether the mill representatives' statements should be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 6