Opinion ID: 546132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Testimony and Closing Statements

Text: 25 Appellants' next argument seeks a reversal of their convictions on the grounds that they were unfairly prejudiced by certain witness testimony and prosecutorial remarks made during the course of the trial. The statements at issue can be grouped into three categories for purposes of review: (1) Thomas Gervais' statement made during the course of his direct examination that he did not want to be partners with Philip and Vito Caliendo because of their affiliation with the outfit; (2) references by three government witnesses, both on direct and cross-examination, mentioning the federal Witness Protection Program; and, (3) a statement made during the prosecution's closing argument describing the conspiracy as something that grew like a cancer. In each instance, the various motions for mistrial and/or severance made on behalf of the individual defendants were denied. The objections to the remarks, however, were sustained and in certain situations limiting instructions were given. 3 Doubting the ability of the limiting instructions to cure the cumulative prejudice which allegedly resulted from these references, appellants argue that a reversal and new trial are mandated. We disagree. 26 The remarks to which appellants direct our attention were five single references in the course of a trial that took over a month to complete and more than 2600 pages of transcript to record. The reference to the Caliendos' affiliation with the outfit amounted to no more than one comment in the course of the government's direct examination of its primary witness, Tom Gervais. Indeed, except for the unsavory connotations which accompany the term outfit, the content of the response was entirely appropriate in the context of the trial. 4 Nevertheless, in response to the appellants' objections to the use of the term outfit, the district court ordered the reference to outfit stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard it. Moreover, the court instructed the parties that testimony regarding a witness's state of mind should not employ terms such as outfit, mafia, syndicate or organized crime. Appellants point to no other instances in which this type of language was used in the course of the trial. In light of the limited nature of this single reference and the district court's efforts to cure any prejudice which may have resulted therefrom, we reject appellants' assertions that a reversal of their convictions is warranted. 27 Three isolated references were made to the fact of certain witnesses' participation in the federal Witness Protection Program; two during the government's examination of its own witnesses and one during a defense counsel's cross-examination of a government witness. Although these remarks were improper in the sense that they were volunteered by the witness without solicitation on the part of counsel, 5 we do not believe that these remarks, either independently or in concert with the outfit reference, prejudiced the appellants to such an extent as to mandate a reversal. 28 In response to appellants' objections to each limited reference, the district court concluded with the guidance of counsel that any action beyond striking the objectionable reference from the record--that is, any limiting instruction to the jury on the witness protection program--would only highlight the remark to the ultimate detriment of the defendants. Moreover, these remarks together with the outfit reference amounted only to four isolated, limited references in the course of a four-week trial. In light of the passing nature of these remarks in the context of a lengthy and involved trial, and in light of the district court's careful efforts to allay any prejudice which may have nevertheless resulted from these remarks, we reject appellants' arguments that a reversal of their convictions is mandated. 29 Finally, the prosecution in its closing argument analogized the growth of the conspiracy in this case to that of a cancer. This remark, according to appellants, was improper in that its only purpose was to inflame the passions of the jury. We disagree. 30 In reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we initially determine whether the challenged remark or conduct was improper. If it was, we examine that improper remark in light of the entire record to determine whether the remark deprived the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). Today we need proceed no further than the first prong of this analysis in that the reference to cancer in the prosecution's closing argument was not improper in the context of this trial. 31 Although remarks during closing argument may not be aimed at inflaming the passions of the jury, it is entirely appropriate for the prosecutor to impress upon the jury the seriousness of the charges as they have been brought in the indictment. United States v. Peco, 784 F.2d 798, 810 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1160, 106 S.Ct. 2281, 90 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986) (citing United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332, 1340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965, 104 S.Ct. 403, 78 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983)). In this case, the cancer metaphor was entirely appropriate in light of the manner in which the conspiracy spread itself through legitimate businesses rendering them, in some instances, submissive in the face of the conspiracy's demands. For all of these reasons, we reject appellants' arguments that these statements prejudiced them to such an extent that a reversal of their convictions are mandated.