Opinion ID: 3060511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review and Legal Test

Text: Belcher’s habeas petition is governed by the standards of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Because Becher’s claim was adjudicated on the merits in his state post-conviction proceedings, § 2254(d) allows federal habeas relief only if the state court adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 4 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).2 Belcher’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be reviewed under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “Strickland requires a petitioner to show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense.” Philmore v. McNeil, 575 F.3d 1251, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). Counsel’s performance is deficient only if it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We will find prejudice only if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694. Thus, we will grant relief only if we find that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, affirming the trial court’s denial of his ineffective assistance claims, was contrary to or an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court law. 2 A decision is “contrary to” federal law if it contradicts the Supreme Court on settled law or gives a different holding than the Court’s on a set of materially indistinguishable facts—in short, it is a decision “substantially different from the [Supreme Court’s] relevant precedent . . . .” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A decision unreasonably applies federal law if it identifies the correct governing legal principle as articulated by the United States Supreme Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case, “unreasonably extends [the] principle . . . to a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend [it] to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at 407. 5