Opinion ID: 2222316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the in-trial ruling:

Text: We next review the trial court's overruling of appellant's objection to the admission of the same incriminating statement. The procedure for challenging the admissibility of a confession on constitutional or statutory grounds has in Indiana traditionally been the in-trial objection, with request for a hearing before the judge if needed to determine disputed factual matters. Until more recent years, this procedure was deemed exclusive in confession cases. McGee v. State and Radford v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 423, 104 N.E.2d 726; Kokenes v. State (1937), 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E.2d 524. In spite of the condemnation in these cases of the use of the pre-trial motion to suppress with its separate pre-trial hearing and ruling, that procedure has now become widely used and accepted, as a discretionary alternative practice in our trial courts. The following cases of recent vintage demonstrate this fact: Brown v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 558, 270 N.E.2d 751; Mims v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 37, 262 N.E.2d 638; Smith v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 425, 249 N.E.2d 493; Dowlut v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 86, 235 N.E.2d 173. See also, 1 A.L.R.2d 1012. The history of the use and development of the pre-trial motion to suppress in search and seizure cases has been different. There, the pre-trial mode of determining the admissibility of seized items has been a common non-exclusive practice for years. Riddle v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 501, 275 N.E.2d 788; Shuck v. State (1944), 223 Ind. 155, 59 N.E.2d 124; Kokenes v. State, supra . At present, suppression hearings are being held in the pre-trial period in both confession and search and seizure cases. We consider the procedure to be properly used in confession cases in the discretion of the trial court. The pre-trial consideration of the admissibility of a confession likely to be used by the State would appear to have statutory sanction in that part of the new statutes governing criminal procedures which authorizes omnibus hearings and pre-trial conferences. IC 1971, 35-4.1-3-1, being Burns § 9-1201. It, of course, remains entirely proper to consider a motion to suppress or an objection at trial, at the time the challenged statement is offered. In light of the growing use of the pre-trial motion to suppress in confession cases, it is deemed appropriate to set forth some guidance for the trial judge who is faced with a trial objection to a confession previously determined to be admissible. As a backdrop to proper consideration of this matter, it should be kept in mind that, in these situations, the State has already successfully met the issues raised in the challenge and shown beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of the waiver and statement. When a simple objection for the purpose of preserving appellate rights is made, the trial judge should consider the pre-trial determination res judicata and binding upon him and overrule the objection. If, however, the trial objection is based upon new factual or legal matter, a simple overruling of the objection would not be appropriate. In that instance, the trial judge may expect, and indeed require, that he be provided with an accurate summary description of such new matter. Thereafter, either of two levels of judicial response is appropriate. The trial judge may summarily overrule the objection if the new matter could in no event result in a determination of inadmissibility. This summary disposition may be made upon consideration of counsel's description, or, in the discretion of the judge, after having permitted the defense to call witnesses, to present its new matter. On the other hand, if the trial judge deems such new matter to be of sufficient substance, he may conduct a hearing on the motion to suppress, having a scope appropriate under the circumstances, and reconsider the issue of admissibility. Gasaway v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 241, 231 N.E.2d 513. In Rouse v. U.S., 123 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 359 F.2d 1014, (1966), the D.C. Court of Appeals identified the nature of new matter which would call for a further hearing, as matter first appearing at trial which casts reasonable doubt on the pre-trial ruling. Where, as in the case at bar, the judge who conducts the trial is not the judge who conducted and determined the pre-trial motion, obstacles to a full and fair reconsideration at trial exist. The trial judge is not acquainted with the evidence presented in the pre-trial hearing. Consequently, he is unable to weigh the old evidence with the new. This problem does not arise, of course, where the trial judge makes a summary denial of the objection based upon an inadequate showing of substantial new matter. Neither does the problem arise when the new matter would provide an independent and sufficient ground for suppression, as in the case at bar. The problem would exist, where the trial judge deemed it appropriate to reopen an issue litigated and finally determined at the pre-trial stage, for, in such instances, reweighing of the new and old evidence as a body would be required. In such extreme cases, re-litigation of the motion to suppress is indicated. A transcript of the pre-trial hearing may or may not be used in such re-litigation, depending upon, for instance, whether the credibility of a single witness or existence of a single fact is undermined by the new matter. In such cases, the balance of the transcript, unrelated to that witness or that fact, might well serve in lieu of the live testimony of the State's suppression witnesses. In the case at bar, defense counsel's in-trial objection to the admission of appellant's statement was: Well, our objection to the statement, your honor  I will put it as directly as I can and then your honor can make his ruling, is that this defendant was not competent at the time he made the statement to knowingly waive his constitutional rights. The prosecutor objected to holding a hearing on the objection on the ground that the issue had been heard and determined adversely to the defendant in the St. Joseph Circuit Court. This objection was withdrawn, and a hearing was held before the Marshall Circuit Court outside the presence of the jury. Appellant presented only his own testimony. The State called only Agent Quigley. Appellant testified that, at the time of the homicide, he was twenty-four years old. He had been in the ninth grade when he quit school. He had spent three to four years in Beatty Memorial Hospital as an adolescent. From November, 1967 to May, 1972, he was in the penitentiary in Minard, Illinois. While he was there, he took the high school equivalency test and received his diploma. He also took a course as a medical technician. He knows four foreign languages. In regard to the conditions of his confinement, he stated that his cell had had only a steel bunk, a sink and a toilet. Toilet tissue was provided, but there was no blanket, mattress or toilet articles. Appellant was not permitted to shower or shave. At the time he was wearing only a pair of coveralls and shoes. He was awakened constantly by officers who reached through the bars and shook his feet. Several officers told him that they had gone to school with the victim. Appellant alluded to a threat made by an officer named Keith Forsythe in the following vague answer: Q. Any other items which you consider duress? Did anything else take place prior to making a statement which you consider duress? A. Yes, which would be hearsay entirely on my part but there was some officer, etc. that mentioned they would like to shoot me and see how far I would jump. Appellant admitted that he was not physically abused but testified that he had been unable to sleep and was exhausted when he made the statement. At this hearing, he testified that the reason he gave the statement was in order to get out of the holding cell, since he had learned that his accomplices who had made statements against him were transferred to the second floor immediately. Appellant's testimony established the fact that no officer questioned him until he decided to make a statement. Quigley testified that appellant was treated fairly, without any physical or mental pressures being put on him at the time he gave the statement. Appellant spoke cordially and was alert and cooperative. He made no complaints to Quigley that he had been unable to sleep or had been denied access to an attorney. The State included in the record the fact that Friday, the day following appellant's arrest, was Veterans' Day, followed by the weekend, and that he was taken to court on Monday. Clearly, appellant was repeating his contentions, previously made at the pre-trial hearing, that prior to making the statement he had been without sleep, harassed and threatened, and denied counsel upon request. Counsel replayed this testimony of allegedly coercive police tactics, so that the trial judge could consider their impact upon the appellant's allegedly diseased or defective mind. The issue of competency to waive his rights raised by this in-trial objection was intended as an independent and sufficient ground for challenging the written waiver of rights signed by appellant. It was so litigated. Appellant posits that the spartan surroundings in the holding cell, experienced over a period of about twenty-four hours and the delay in presentment to a magistrate, coupled with his history of mental illness, should have created in the mind of the judge a reasonable doubt as to the admissibility of this confession. Even though these matters are uncontradicted in the record, we do not consider them to have been of sufficient import to have rendered his waiver involuntary. Appellant was twenty-four years old, an eighth grade graduate, and of above average intelligence. He had been convicted of a crime before, so that he had some experience with the police. Quite obviously, appellant's testimony that he had been confined in a mental hospital during puberty establishes no mental disease or incompetence which the alleged coercive police tactics might have exacerbated. Nothing in his testimony indicates that he was mentally disturbed in such a way as to be easily convinced by others, overwhelmed by unfamiliar surroundings, or afraid of persons in authority. Contrast Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, 367 U.S. at 625, 81 S.Ct. 1860; Fikes v. Alabama (1957), 352 U.S. 191, 193, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246; McNabb v. U.S. (1943), 318 U.S. 332, 334-35, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819; Chambers v. Florida (1940), 309 U.S. 227, 238-40, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; Robbins v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 219, 235 N.E.2d 199. Appellant had lived away from home in institutional environments for seven or eight years. The idea of being alone in strange or hostile surroudings would not have been so frightening or confusing as to undo his will. The testimony of appellant himself indicated that he was intellectually capable of understanding his constitutional rights and probably not so mentally disoriented as to act contrary to his will at the time of the confession. In addition, Quigley testified that appellant behaved normally and was alert during the questioning. At this hearing, appellant presented no evidence of any threat to harm his family. Contrast Haynes v. Washington, supra ; Rogers v. Richmond (1961), 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760; Hall v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 606, 266 N.E.2d 16. After hearing the witnesses present this new matter, the trial court correctly decided at this point in the trial that the State had carried its burden of showing the waiver of rights to have been voluntarily and knowingly made, as against this challenge. In his brief, appellant points to the testimony which the psychiatrist gave on the issue of insanity and argues that we should consider their testimony also in determining whether the trial judge erroneously admitted the statement. We decline to do so. Their testimony does not stand undisputed on the record. Davis v. North Carolina (1966), 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895; Haynes v. Washington, supra . Moreover, it was presented long after the pre-trial and in-trial rulings on the admissibility of the statement. At trial, counsel made no motion to reconsider these rulings in light of the testimony of the psychiatrists, and, in the absence of such a motion, the testimony is not pertinent on appeal to a review of a judge's ruling on admissibility. Such evidence was for the jury.