Opinion ID: 698644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conspiracy intent instruction

Text: 26 Appellants challenge the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that specific intent is an element of conspiracy. We conclude that the district court erred in instructing that a conspiracy to possess and distribute drugs under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 (1988) is a general intent crime, but this error was harmless because its instructions correctly apprised the jurors of the elements of intent they had to find in order to convict the appellants of conspiracy. 27 The district court instructed the jury that there are two elements to a conspiracy charge under Sec. 846: first, that an agreement existed between two or more persons to distribute or possess with intent to distribute the requisite amount of cocaine or cocaine base, and second, that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy. XIV Joint Appendix (J.A.), 3/30/90 Tr. at 61. The court also instructed that the conspiracy charged require[d] only a general intent.... Where this is so, and it is shown that a person has knowingly committed an act which the law makes a crime, intent may be inferred from doing the act. XIV J.A., 3/30/90 Tr. at 65. In elaboration on the requisite elements, the court explained that (1) the government was required to prove that the members of the conspiracy came to a mutual understanding to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means, XIV J.A., 3/30/90 Tr. at 62, (2) that the fact that the acts of a defendant, without knowledge, merely happen to further the purposes or objectives of the conspiracy, does not make the defendant a member of the conspiracy, id. at 63, and (3) if a defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, knowingly encourages, advises or assists in furthering the purpose of the conspiracy, that defendant thereby becomes a knowing and voluntary participant and member of the conspiracy. Id. 28 Appellants objected to these instructions at the close of the evidence, arguing that conspiracy is a specific intent crime. Rachelle Edmond, for instance, argued that under conspiracy law a defendant not only ha[s] to have knowledge, but ... ha[s] to intentionally become a member [of the conspiracy] and ... become a member with the specific intent of furthering the objects of the conspiracy. XIII J.A., 3/28/90 Tr. at 73. Raynice Thompson proposed an instruction that the jury must find that the defendants participated in the conspiracy with the intent to see that the object and purposes of the conspiracy were achieved. Proposed Modification of Jury Instructions (Mar. 30, 1990) at 2, reprinted in II J.A. at 158. The district court rejected these requests, adhering to its position that conspiracy under Sec. 846 is a general intent crime. 29 In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980), the Supreme Court discussed the distinction between general and specific intent. Noting that the venerable distinction ... has been the source of a good deal of confusion, the Court observed that, [i]n a general sense, 'purpose' corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent. 444 U.S. at 403, 405, 100 S.Ct. at 631, 632. As to the difference between knowledge and purpose, the Court explained that 30 a person who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully if he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct, while he is said to act knowingly if he is aware that that result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result. 31 444 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. at 631-32 (internal quotations omitted). The Court further explained that while proof of knowing action is generally adequate to support criminal conviction, certain classes of crimes merit special attention to heightened culpability. Id. at 405, 100 S.Ct. at 632. Among these crimes, the Court identified conspiracy: Another such example is the law of inchoate offenses such as attempt and conspiracy, where a heightened mental state separates criminality itself from otherwise innocuous behavior. Id. 32 With this understanding in mind, it is clear that conspiracy is a specific intent crime. The common law definition of conspiracy is  'a combination of two or more persons ... to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.'  2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law Sec. 6.5 at 86 (1986) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842)). Thus, purposeful intent--or conscious desire to achieve a result, Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. at 631--is the essence of conspiracy. Accordingly, as we have explained in the past, proof of conspiracy requires proof of specific intent to further the conspiracy's objective: A single conspiracy is proven if the evidence establishes that each conspirator had the specific intent to further the common unlawful objective. United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1392 (D.C.Cir.1988); see also United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 264-65 (D.C.Cir.1994) (to convict defendants of conspiracy to possess drugs with intent to distribute, the government had to establish ... that the defendants purposefully agreed to act in partnership) (emphasis in original); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 112 (D.C.Cir.1976) ([T]he specific intent required for the crime of conspiracy is ... the intent to advance or further the unlawful object of the conspiracy.). 33 Indeed, at oral argument the government conceded that the charged conspiracy is a specific intent crime. We briefly address ourselves to the district court's reasons for concluding otherwise. Recognizing that conspiracies are, in general, specific intent crimes, the district court nevertheless concluded that a Sec. 846 conspiracy is different because (1) Congress legislated a distinct definition of conspiracy in Sec. 846, see United States v. Childress, 746 F.Supp. at 1128 n. 8, and (2) several other circuits have construed the elements of a Sec. 846 conspiracy to require that  'the government must prove only that the defendant knew of it, and that, with knowledge, the defendant voluntarily became a part of the conspiracy,'  id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1121 (11th Cir.1990)). Neither ground is persuasive. 34 Although a Sec. 846 conspiracy is different from a general federal conspiracy in certain other respects, they do not differ in the intent required. As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Shabani, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 382, 383, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994), a Sec. 846 conspiracy, unlike a conspiracy under the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 (1988), requires no overt act. But this distinction is in the text of the respective statutes: Sec. 371 requires proof that one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, while Sec. 846 contains no such requirement. In the absence of a statutory requirement of an overt act, the common law controls, and the common law required no overt act. See --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 384. 35 With respect to the intent requirement, by contrast, there is no textual basis for a distinction between Sec. 371 and Sec. 846; they are equally silent on the issue. Section 846 provides that [a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter [Control and Enforcement of Drug Abuse] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. Section 371 provides: If two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense against the United States, ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be guilty of conspiracy. As neither establishes an explicit intent requirement, each is governed by the general law of conspiracy, and the case law in this circuit and others is clear that conspiracy is a specific intent crime. See, e.g., Tarantino, supra; United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d 431, 443 (7th Cir.1993) ([B]ecause drug conspiracy is a specific intent crime, the government must prove intent as an element of the offense.) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800, 808 (1st Cir.1988) (While association with conspirators is evidence of participation in the conspiracy, something more is needed to show beyond a reasonable doubt the deliberate, knowing, and specific intent of the defendant to join the conspiracy.) (internal quotation omitted). 36 In further support of its conclusion that a Sec. 846 conspiracy is distinct from the general conspiracy statute, with no specific intent requirement, the court pointed to several circuit court opinions holding that  '[i]n order to convict a defendant of a Section 846 conspiracy, the government must prove only that the defendant knew of it, and that, with knowledge, the defendant voluntarily became a part of the conspiracy.'  746 F.Supp. at 1127 (quoting Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d at 1121 & collecting cases). These cases do not support the district court's conclusion that there is no specific intent requirement in conspiracy. Although there is a loose[ ] correspond[ence] between  'knowledge' [and] ... the concept of general intent, Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405, 100 S.Ct. at 632, a characterization of a crime as requiring knowledge does not of its own force preclude a specific intent requirement. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit, one of the district court's principal authorities, requires proof of specific intent in order to prove knowing and voluntary participation: [t]o prove [the defendant's] knowing and voluntary participation, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had a deliberate, knowing, and specific intent to join the conspiracy. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 452 (11th Cir.) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 434, 130 L.Ed.2d 346, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 611, 130 L.Ed.2d 521, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 612, 130 L.Ed.2d 521 (1994). Thus, although the knowing and purposeful terms are not always used with perfect consistency, there is, so far as we can see, no fundamental dispute that a Sec. 846 conspiracy is a specific intent crime. 37 Though the district court thus erred in instructing the jury that a Sec. 846 conspiracy is a general intent crime, this error was harmless because the district court's instructions gave the jury adequate guidance on the intent required. Under the district court's instructions, the jury had to find that each defendant entered the conspiratorial agreement with the purpose of furthering the ends of the conspiracy--that he (1) came to a mutual understanding to accomplish an unlawful purpose and (2) with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, knowingly encourage[d], advise[d] or assist[ed] in furthering the purpose of the conspiracy. In so characterizing the elements of the crime, the district court clearly instructed the jury that a purposeful state of mind was required--the jury could not find someone to be a knowing and voluntary participant in the conspiracy without finding that he or she came to a mutual understanding to accomplish an unlawful purpose. We are thus satisfied that the jury could not convict under these instructions without finding what amounts to the specific intent to further the common unlawful objective. Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1392. In light of these instructions, the district court's incorrect identification of the crime as one of general intent was harmless.