Opinion ID: 1913609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Disqualification of Dr. Bleed

Text: We next discuss whether Dr. Bleed should have been disqualified. Wyoming claims that Dr. Bleed was biased in two ways. First, Wyoming claims that Dr. Bleed favors the specific amount of instream flow requested in CPNRD's applications. Second, Wyoming claims that Dr. Bleed favors instream flows in general. Wyoming cites exhibit 113 as evidence of Dr. Bleed's bias. Exhibit 113 is a report prepared by Dr. Bleed, Dr. Suppalla, and two others. The report is entitled Economic, Environmental and Financing Optimization Analysis of Platte River Development Alternatives and is published by the University of Nebraska. The study upon which the report is based had three general research objectives, one of which was to analyze the economic and environmental tradeoffs associated with alternative uses of the Platte River. To analyze these tradeoffs, the study correlated varying instream flow levels first with environmental consequences and then with economic consequences. The study concluded that instream flow constraints would not dramatically affect net economic returns. In formal agency adjudications, as in court proceedings, due process requires a neutral, or unbiased, adjudicatory decisionmaker. 2 Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 9.8 at 67 (3d ed. 1994). See, also, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); Dieter v. State, 228 Neb. 368, 422 N.W.2d 560 (1988); Bockbrader v. Department of Public Insts., 220 Neb. 17, 367 N.W.2d 721 (1985). Administrative adjudicators serve with a presumption of honesty and integrity. Withrow, supra ; Dieter, supra . With these basic principles firmly in mind, we turn to a consideration of the two alleged biases of Dr. Bleed. First, Wyoming accuses Dr. Bleed of having a specific bias in favor of the amount of flows requested in CPNRD's applications. Wyoming argues that the study sought to identify optimum instream flows for the Central Platte River in relation to other water users and that the study adopted Alternative J ... as the optimum flow levels. Brief for appellant at 33. Wyoming then notes that the flows requested in CPNRD's applications are strikingly similar to Alternative J. Id. Alternative J is one of 15 instream flow levels analyzed in the study. Wyoming's claim that the study adopted Alternative J as the ideal is unfounded. In discussing the economic and environmental tradeoffs, the study notes that Alternative J seems to be a turning point: The present value of net economic benefit expressed in 1983 dollars remained essentially constant until instream flow provision `J' was reached, where they declined.... In summarizing the tradeoffs, the study again makes reference to Alternative J: The establishment of instream flow constraints to meet environmental quality needs substantially reduced the aggregate quantity of water diverted under the corresponding optimum development plan. However, net economic returns were not significantly reduced. For example, in comparison to the option of providing no required instream flow, instream flow provision J reduced the optimum diversion water quantity by nearly 300,000 acre feet per year but reduced economic returns by only 7.2 percent. Nothing in exhibit 113 indicates that the study authors designated or selected Alternative J as the ideal or optimum flow level. To the extent that Dr. Bleed's participation in the study may have caused her to form an opinion as to the optimum flow level, such an opinion is not disqualifying. Although due process requires disqualification when the administrative adjudicator has actually prejudged the precise facts at issue, due process does not require the disqualification of one who has merely been exposed to or investigated the facts at issue. Compare Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. F.T.C., 425 F.2d 583 (D.C.Cir.1970) (due process required disqualification of Federal Trade Commission chairman, who, while considering a misrepresentation case, made a speech mixing facts of the case with examples of obvious fraud), and American Cyanamid Company v. F.T.C., 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.1966) (due process required disqualification of Federal Trade Commission chairman, who had ruled upon an issue in a different capacity and had written a letter expressing factual conclusions about the case), with Withrow, supra (state examining board, which held an investigative hearing, was not disqualified from holding a contested hearing and deciding whether to suspend the doctor's license), and Dieter, supra (director, who had made the initial determination to revoke a day-care operator's license based on the recommendation of a licensing supervisor, was not disqualified from making the final decision to revoke the license). Of course, administrators are not disqualified from deciding a case after remand. See, Withrow, supra ; Labor Board v. Donnelly Co., 330 U.S. 219, 67 S.Ct. 756, 91 L.Ed. 854 (1947). Wyoming has not provided any evidence which would suggest that Dr. Bleed has prejudged the ideal level of instream flow for the Platte River. The evidence merely indicates that she has been exposed to and has investigated various instream flow levels. Second, Wyoming fears that Dr. Bleed has a general bias in favor of instream flows. Wyoming does not cite us to any part of the record which would establish this bias. Exhibit 113 does not establish this biasthe tradeoff analysis reflects only an assumption that both instream and out-of-stream uses are positive and the two uses should somehow be brought into balance. Even if Wyoming could establish that Dr. Bleed has a general bias in favor of instream flows, such a bias would not be disqualifying. An administrative adjudicator's prejudgment of a law or policy question is not disqualifying. See, Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 493, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 2314, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) ([n]or is a decisionmaker disqualified simply because he has taken a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute); Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948) (commission, which had made a full investigation and report to Congress expressing the opinion that a certain system of selling cement violated the Sherman Act, was not disqualified from instituting proceedings and issuing a cease and desist order against a cement company). If such prejudgments were disqualifying, no judge could try the same issue of law twice. See id. To put the case more strongly still: If ... `bias' and `partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions... then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. In re J.P. Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir.1943). We therefore hold that the Department of Water Resources was not obligated to disqualify Dr. Bleed from assisting in the decisionmaking process. We note that although the Court of Appeals reached the correct result, its discussion of other sources which Wyoming could have called on to establish bias is mere dicta and should not be cited as precedent.