Opinion ID: 185696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to the Factual Underpinnings of an FSIA Complaint

Text: 27 Before we turn to the due process issue, as well as to the antecedent question of whether plaintiffs have stated valid claims under § 1605(a) for hostage taking and torture, we must first address a separate argument that Libya has advanced on appeal. Libya contends that the District Court erred in assuming the truth of the factual allegations in plaintiffs' complaint for purposes of determining whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant correctly points out that in Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C.Cir.2000), we held that when a foreign state defendant raises a dispute over the factual basis of the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, the trial court is required to go beyond the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of which is necessary to a ruling upon the motion to dismiss. 28 Libya now claims that it did not engage in the actions described in plaintiffs' complaint. Thus, it contends that we must reverse the District Court's finding of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for further fact-finding on that issue. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 448-49 (D.C.Cir.1990) (holding that where the conclusory allegations in a plaintiff's complaint are challenged by a sovereign defendant, the district court must do more than just look to the pleadings to ascertain whether to grant the motion to dismiss). We reject this argument. 29 In its original motion to dismiss, Libya specifically stated that, for purposes of that pleading, it was not challenging the well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, at 2 (Jan. 21, 1998). When it renewed this motion, Libya still did not challenge the factual basis of plaintiffs' allegations. Instead, it wrote that, [e]ven viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the facts alleged in the complaint do not establish `acts of torture' by Libya. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, at 26 (Feb. 9, 2000). The District Court then properly [took] the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and determine[d] whether they [brought] the case within any of the exceptions to immunity invoked by the plaintiff. Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40. It now falls to this court to review this determination, which we do de novo. See McKesson HBOC, 271 F.3d at 1105.