Opinion ID: 1698614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the veterans' disability payments which are sole income of the veteran can be alienated or seized for alimony under state law in violation of the anti-alienation federal statute which would violate the supremacy clause of the united states constitution.

Text: ¶ 20. Kenneth argues that the chancellor erred in concluding that his veteran's disability payments could be considered in the award of alimony. Kenneth argues the United States Supreme Court barred such a result in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) in which the Court interpreted the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1048 et seq. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Mansell that the U.S.F.S.P.A. does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits. 490 U.S. at 594-95, 109 S.Ct. 2023. ¶ 21. Grace contends a more appropriate case for this Court to rely on is the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987). The Court held that state courts can use contempt sanctions and a veteran can be incarcerated for failing to pay child support even if the only source of those payments was the veteran's disability benefits. Rose also held that state court jurisdiction in matters of child support and enforcement of support payments is not preempted by anti-attachment statutes. ¶ 22. Mansell and Rose are not precisely on point with the instant case. Mansell applied to division of marital property in a community property state, California, and not necessarily to alimony. Likewise, Rose dealt with child support and not alimony. However, in Rose, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the purpose of disability benefits was to provide compensation not just to the injured veteran but also to the veteran's family. 481 U.S. at 630, 107 S.Ct. 2029. ¶ 23. Even if this Court were to conclude that Mansell was directly applicable to this case, the result would not necessarily be one favorable to Kenneth. An analysis of other jurisdictions demonstrates that some state courts have narrowly applied Mansell. For example, the Court of Appeals of Virginia has allowed trial courts to consider exempt military disability benefits in determining spousal support. Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va.App. 472, 375 S.E.2d 387 (1989). Thus, a trial court would be allowed to award an amount of spousal support that exceeded the veteran's monthly non-disability income. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin concluded Mansell did not apply to the question of whether disability benefits may be considered by the court as a factor in assessing [the veteran's] ability to pay spousal maintenance. Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis.2d 540, 463 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Wis.Ct.App.1990) The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland also concluded that VA disability benefits may be considered as a resource for purposes of determining [one's] ability to pay alimony. Riley v. Riley 82 Md.App. 400, 571 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1990). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky allowed a court to increase the amount of spousal support when there is an inequity in divorce proceedings due to the payment of disability benefits to one spouse. Davis v. Davis, 777 S.W.2d 230 (Ky.1989). Another example is the holding of the Court of Appeals of Arizona that Mansell did not preclude the veteran's ex-wife from suing to enforce a separation agreement. Harris v. Harris, 195 Ariz. 559, 991 P.2d 262, 264-65 (Ariz.Ct.App.1999). The Supreme Court of Arkansas applied a similar logic to that of Davis but went even further. In Murphy v. Murphy 302 Ark. 157, 787 S.W.2d 684, 685 (1990), that court held that the decision in Mansell does not preclude the trial court from ordering appellant to pay alimony, and once awarded, the FSPA does not relieve a retiree from paying such alimony obligations. ¶ 24. The case that seems to most closely parallel the instant case is from the Court of Appeals of Iowa, In re Marriage of Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). That court affirmed an award of alimony by expanding Rose to apply to alimony as well as child support, noting that both are viewed as familial support by the United States Supreme Court in Rose. Id. at 101. ¶ 25. We recognize that there are conflicting opinions such as Ex parte Billeck, 777 So.2d 105 (Ala.2000) and Abernethy v. Fishkin, 699 So.2d 235 (Fla.1997) that interpret Mansell as not allowing disability benefits to be applied in any way toward alimony. However, because neither Mansell nor Rose is precisely on point with the instant case, the trial court would be justified in not relying on either case and could not be said to have applied an erroneous legal standard. Indeed, a more equitable result is reached by relying on Rose. Thus, it cannot be said the chancellor's decision was an abuse of discretion. This assignment of error has no merit.