Opinion ID: 2352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsection (f)

Text: The Government, however, urges us not to read § 4243(g) so literally. It argues that preventing district courts from revoking an acquittee's conditional discharge unless he has failed to comply with his medical regimen would undermine the statute's primary purposeto protect the public. In this vein, the Government relies on § 4243(f) for the proposition that the district court may impose ancillary conditions on an acquittee's release. On the basis of that assumption, the Government argues that a literal interpretation of § 4243(g) would allow acquittees to violate these additional conditions with impunity. Although the question of the court's authority under § 4243(f) has not, strictly speaking, been presented to us on appeal, [6] statutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989). We therefore turn to subsection (f) to determine whether it allowed the district court to impose ancillary conditions on Crape's discharge. Section 4243(f) provides that when the district court finds an acquittee has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that . . . his conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment would no longer pose a danger to other persons or their property, it shall order, as an explicit condition of release, that he comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f). The Government relies heavily on the phrase  an explicit condition of release (emphasis added) to support its contention that the acquittee's compliance with a prescribed regimen of treatment is not the only permissible condition of release. To paraphrase the Government's argument: the compliance condition may be mandatory, but it is not exclusive. Three courts of appeals have agreed with the Government. [7] In United States v. Jain, 174 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir.1999), the Seventh Circuit held that a district court does not overstep its authority by establishing conditions of release relating to an insanity acquittee's dangerousness that are not specifically included in the `prescribed regimen.' After citing Jain with approval, the Ninth Circuit joined the Seventh in United States v. Phelps, 283 F.3d 1176, 1184-87 (9th Cir.2002) ( dicta ). And in an opinion interpreting the materially identical language of 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e), which governs the conditional discharge of hospitalized convicts, [8] the Eighth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Jain and Phelps. United States v. Franklin, 435 F.3d 885, 889-90 (8th Cir.2006). Having considered the arguments in favor of a more permissive reading of § 4243(f), we respectfully disagree with our sister circuits. First, although the Seventh Circuit referred in passing to other statutes that entitle district courts to issue orders ancillary to the disposition of cases before them, Jain, 174 F.3d at 898, it did not actually identify any other statutes that would expand the courts' authority under § 4243(f). The Eighth Circuit cited the All Writs Act [9] as a possibility, Franklin, 435 F.3d at 890, but we question the Act's relevance in this context, and we do not believe its general terms expand the courts' limited power under the specific conditional-discharge statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling. Although that Act empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises, it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate. Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43, 106 S.Ct. 355, 88 L.Ed.2d 189 (1985); see also Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) ([I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general. . . .). We are also unpersuaded that the use of the word an in § 4243(f) implies a wide-ranging authority to impose additional, unspecified conditions on an acquittee's discharge. On the contrary, the use of an indefinite article avoids the ungainly construction that would result from the use of a definite article in its place ( e.g., the court shall order, as the explicit condition of release . . .). Aside from its general awkwardness, the use of a definite article would inaptly suggest the possibility of inexplicit conditions on an insanity acquittee's discharge. Finally, a reading of subsection (f) that allowed district courts to impose additional conditions on an acquittee's discharge would have no natural limits. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have concluded that any additional conditions must be related to the [acquittee's] mental illness, e.g., Jain, 174 F.3d at 898, but there is no discernible textual basis for that limitation.