Opinion ID: 2333373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: adjective sufficiency of the findings of fact.

Text: Erie included in its questions involved on these appeals the question whether the Division's adoption of Commissioner Hull's report was invalidated by the use of the term suggested therein. The findings of fact expressed in the report were not individually so characterized. As a preliminary measure the report contained the phrase: Now, mindful of our duty to propose factual findings from the evidence and to recommend judgments founded thereon, we suggest the following:. This phrase demonstrates only that the panel recognized the statutory mandate that the Division, and not the panel, make the ultimate determination in the matters under consideration. The word suggest was clearly used in the sense of recommendation. Upon consideration of all the evidence submitted by the parties, and adoption of the report, by the Division the term lost its significance and became superfluous. Literary perfection is a requisite of neither the statute nor the decisions of this court, by virtue of which the requirements for written findings of fact and determinations exist. Erie further contended that the expression of findings of fact was inadequate. In support of this contention Erie asserted that the crux of Commissioner Hull's lengthy and detailed report was contained in two paragraphs. This argument takes these paragraphs out of context and ignores many additional instances in which express basic and ultimate findings were made. Adjectively there is no merit in Erie's charge of inadequacy of the expression of findings. The sufficiency of the findings in fact or on the law is considered by us on the merits of these appeals. It is required only that the findings of fact be sufficiently specific under the circumstances of the particular case to enable the reviewing court to intelligently review an administrative decision and ascertain if the facts upon which the order is based afford a reasonable basis for such order. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. Communications Workers, etc., 5 N.J. 354, 377 (1950).