Opinion ID: 2119414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fair Public Hearing

Text: We construe fair public hearing as not conflicting with the merit board's proposed use of the Open Door Law's executive session provision. In construing statutes, words and phrases must be given plain, ordinary and usual meaning, unless a contrary purpose is clearly shown by the statute itself. Clipp v. Weaver (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 1092; Overlade v. Wells (1955), 234 Ind. 436, 127 N.E.2d 686. In determining the plain, ordinary and usual meaning of fair public hearing, we first examine the meaning of hearing to discover whether any conflict with the applicable executive session provision exists. We understand hearing to include the presentation of evidence, rebuttal of evidence, and argument about the evidence; but the term in its plain, ordinary and usual meaning does not include the exchange of thoughts by the merit board members. The most common understanding of a hearing is that the appropriate members of the agency hear the facts, the characterization of facts, and argument about the facts. [3] This meaning of hearing is adopted by each of the authorities we have been able to find. [4] The parties have not presented any contrary understandings. As for the term public in this context, we construe that much in the same way as the first and sixth amendment's right of access by media and the accused's right to a public trial. In construing those rights, the Supreme Court has held that the presentation of evidence and argument about the evidence are public but not the jury's or judge's deliberations. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). Practical human experience indicates that private discussions permit greater candor among board members in evaluating their judgments. [5] Their judgment will still contain all the necessary elements for rigorous public scrutiny: the evidence presented, the evidence debated and the final decision explained by findings of fact in writing. See Ind. Code § 36-8-10-11(a) (The board shall make specific findings of fact in writing to support its decision). Thus, because the plain meaning of a fair public hearing does not include private discussions permitted by section 6 of the Open Door Law, we hold that the merit board may proceed as it proposed in its January 22, 1987, correspondence. This statutory construction contrasts with our conclusion in Berry I that the provision of executive sessions for the receipt of evidence conflicts with the fair public hearing provision of Ind. Code § 36-8-10-11 and that the latter must prevail.