Opinion ID: 2325528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Testimony of David Brox

Text: At the CPO hearing, appellant testified that Parker had harbor[ed] his crack-cocaine-using cousin in her house, and suggested that the harassing phone calls Parker claimed to have received (the basis of the stalking charge) were made by people from whom the cousin had taken money. At trial, the cousin (David Brox) testified that, at the time of trial, he had known Parker for five or six years. He testified that he met Parker while they were in [their] addictions, but that he moved in with Parker on August 23, 2000, because he had got[ten] tired of drugs and knew that [Parker] didn't use drugs anymore. Brox testified that he was in bed on the morning of August 26, 2000, when he heard glass shattering. He ran to the living room, saw a broken window, and as he looked through the window, saw appellant run through an alley. The next morning, Brox heard another window shatter and again saw appellant run away from the apartment. In remanding for the Kastigar hearing, we noted particular concern about whether David Brox may have become a prosecution witness because Detective [Herndon] or Parker heard appellant at the CPO hearing attribute some of Parker's harassment to Brox's enemies. Aiken I, 956 A.2d at 50. We said that it was unclear from the record before us at that time how the government identified Brox as a potential witness, or whether it did so prior to the CPO hearing. Id. At the Kastigar hearing, the government presented proof that it identified Brox as a witness before the CPO hearing. Smith-McGuire's intake form indicates that, on September 8, 2000, Parker told Smith-McGuire that appellant's cousin had been living with her, and on September 13, 2000, Parker gave Smith-McGuire a list of witnesses that specifically included Brox. Moreover, Parker could be heard speaking to David during a 911 call on August 21, 2000, and five days later, in another 911 call, Parker explained to the dispatcher that appellant's cousin had just called her to report that appellant had broken two of Parker's apartment windows. On August 27, 2000, Brox himself called 911. Although he did not identify himself by name, he told the 911 dispatcher that he was staying at his friend's apartment and that he had just seen appellant break another window. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in finding that the government met its burden of proving that it had identified Brox as a potential witness prior to the CPO hearing. Appellant is correct, however, that the government did not prove that it was aware of Brox's cocaine addiction (and claimed recovery therefrom) from a source other than appellant's immunized testimony. [31] Thus, the trial court erroneously found that his trial testimony was untainted evidence. Appellant argues that Brox's admission during his direct testimony at trial that he was a drug addict preempted defense challenges to Brox's credibility, specifically preempt[ing] any defense claim that Brox would not be a reliable witness due to his drug use and undermin[ing] the defense theory that Brox had gone to live with Parker to avoid people from whom he had stolen money. The government argues that Brox's admission of his history of cocaine use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. But Brox's testimony, and thus his credibility, was critical as to two of the property destruction charges. In closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that Brox heard crashes (windows breaking) on both occasions (August 26 and 27) and saw appellant on the scene. In addition, in finding appellant guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of destruction of property charged in Counts 8 and 9, the trial court specifically cited Brox's testimony that he saw the defendant in the area or running away from the area in finding him guilty. [32] Accordingly, we agree with appellant that he is entitled to reversal of his convictions on the charges of destruction of property about which Brox testified (Counts 8 and 9).