Opinion ID: 178296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Performance Improvement Plan Extension

Text: Even if the PIP itself can be deemed valid, Vega claims that Wyeth's extension of the PIP was an improper discriminatory action. For the same reasons the low performance rating and implementation of the PIP could constitute a denial of an employment benefit under USERRA; so too could the PIP's extension. See 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2) (defining a benefit of employment as any advantage ... that accrues by reason of an employment contract or agreement or an employer policy, plan, or practice). Vega has therefore raised a cognizable USERRA claim and we turn to the merits of his argument. In our review of the record, the following was established as to the PIP's extension. The PIP itself stated that although Vega completed the set goals, it was being extended because of: (1) an email Vega sent in which he described a supervisor in a disrespectful manner; (2) a letter Vega improperly solicited his co-workers to sign attesting to his job performance; and (3) Vega's authorized leave. The PIP was to remain open for at least three months after Vega returned from leave so that positive behavior and work habits could be verified. Additionally, Vega testified that one of his supervisors, Andrew Espejo (Espejo), informed him that he did not pass the PIP because his performance was affected by his military service. Based on the above facts, the district court found that Vega satisfied the first prong under USERRA, particularly his burden of demonstrating that his military service was a motivating factor in Wyeth's actions. [7] See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1). We agree. Both Espejo's comments, and the language contained in the PIP attributing the extension to Vega's leave, satisfied his burden on this issue. The district court then moved to the second prong-Wyeth's burden to demonstrate that it would have extended the PIP in the absence of Vega's military status. Id. The court found that Wyeth satisfied this burden and was therefore entitled to summary judgment. [8] In finding for Wyeth, the court relied on Vega's disrespectful email and the inappropriate letter he circulated. Additionally, the court believed that Wyeth was generally entitled to extend a PIP when an employee was on leave during a portion of it. This reasoning is not persuasive. First, while the email and letter may be sufficient grounds on which Wyeth could base the PIP's extension, the inquiry is not whether Wyeth was entitled to extend the PIP, but whether such action would have been taken in the absence of [Vega's military] membership. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1); see, e.g., Velázquez-García, 473 F.3d at 20 (holding that with respect to employee termination, [t]he issue under USERRA is not whether an employer is `entitled' to dismiss an employee for a particular reason, but whether it would have done so if the employee were not in the military). Specifically, Wyeth must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would indeed have extended the PIP regardless of Vega's military service. Velázquez-García, 473 F.3d at 20. Here the PIP itself stated that Vega successfully completed its objectives prior to Wyeth's extending it. Further, Espejo purportedly remarked that Vega did not pass the PIP due to his military service. Notably, Wyeth has not rebutted this assertion. Given the PIP's language and the testimony concerning Espejo's comment, there is sufficient doubt on this issue to make it a jury question. Id.; see also Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC, 575 F.3d 145, 153 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004)) (In instances where the record contains inconsistencies `that favor in some lights the defendant[] and in others the plaintiff,' as long as the `plaintiff's evidence is both cognizable and sufficiently strong to support a verdict in [his] favor, the factfinder must be allowed to determine which version of the facts is most compelling.'). Further, the district court's finding that Wyeth would have extended the PIP for any employee on leave  whether it be military leave, sick leave, or otherwise  is not relevant. The fact that Wyeth may have treated other absences similarly does not overcome the fact that it may have based its treatment of Vega, at least in part, on his military absences. See Erickson v. U.S. Postal Service, 571 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2009) (An employer cannot escape liability under USERRA by claiming that it was merely discriminating against an employee on the basis of his absence when that absence was for military service.). We hold that the evidence is sufficiently strong that a reasonable jury could find in Vega's favor; therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue.