Opinion ID: 526438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Panzardi's Counsel of Choice

Text: 11 Panzardi argues that his sixth amendment rights were violated when he was denied his right to be represented by White, his counsel of choice. He claims that the lower court's denials of White's applications for pro hac vice admission were erroneous, with no legitimate grounds upon which to base the decisions. First, although White had not designated local counsel, Panzardi argues that this action was justified because his local counsel was disqualified at the last moment and there remained too little time for White to find substitute counsel. White had not found a replacement at the time that he filed his motion, but he had indicated that he would find suitable local counsel by the time he made his first appearance. Nevertheless, the record is clear that White failed to designate local counsel as is required by Rule 204.2. Although a very technical adherence to the rule, the district judge was clearly justified in requiring compliance. White needed just to obtain local counsel and then was able to refile. 12 Second, Panzardi argues that the district judge erred in relying upon the one case per year rule, which was later declared unconstitutional. Because courts of appeals will not entertain interlocutory appeals on issues of this sort, see Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984) (holding that violations of a criminal defendant's right to counsel of choice can be fully reviewed following a final judgment of conviction), Panzardi was unable to appeal the lower court's denial of White's application. Therefore, Panzardi was forced to accept the services of Porrata and this arrangement should not be considered a waiver of his rights. Prejudice need not now be shown, he argues, because a violation of one's right to choose counsel is a per se Sixth Amendment violation as evidenced by the Flanagan rationale. 13 Panzardi also puts forth another argument that is essential to his claim: that the district judge's determination that White had violated ethical canons, and therefore should be denied pro hac vice admission, was an abuse of his discretion. 2 Basically, Panzardi claims that there was no misconduct or conflict of interest in the procurement and retention of O'Donnell by White. Moreover, even if there was a conflict of interest, White was entitled to attend the conflict of interest hearing so that he could defend his actions and better inform the court as to the true circumstances underlying his actions. Alternatively, nothing from this conference should have been used to determine the impropriety of White's actions. 14 The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the corollary, qualified right of defendants to be represented by counsel of their choice. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.1986). Thus, a decision denying a pro hac vice admission necessarily implicates constitutional concerns. Panzardi, 816 F.2d at 816. The general rule, therefore, must be that  'when an accused is financially able to retain an attorney, the choice of counsel to assist him rests ultimately in his hands and not in the hands of the State.'  Id. (quoting Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir.1985)). 15 This right, however, is not absolute. We have consistently recognized that the right to one's counsel of choice will be limited when insistence upon it would disproportionately disadvantage the government or interfere with the ethical and orderly administration of justice. Id. (citation omitted). Typically, this issue is raised in cases in which the defendant seeks substitution of counsel shortly before the start of the trial or during the trial itself. See, e.g., id. (in which this court upheld Panzardi's attempt, in a different case, to substitute counsel for out-of-town attorney over three months prior to trial); Sampley v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 786 F.2d 610, 612-16 (4th Cir.) (upholding district court's refusal to grant continuance in case in which defendant showed up on day of trial with no counsel), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1008, 106 S.Ct. 3305, 92 L.Ed.2d 719 (1986); United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 913-14 (1st Cir.1984) (upholding district court's refusal of defendant's motion to substitute counsel four days prior to trial). It is also appropriate, however, for the court to consider the effect of the attorney's past actions (especially past ethical violations) on the administration of justice within the court. 16 Local Rule 204.2, permitting pro hac vice appearances by attorneys before the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, is discretionary in nature. Although the rule specifies some requirements necessary for such an appearance, the rule states that an attorney may be permitted to appear and that the district court may find the person meets the standards for practice in this Court. Local Rule 204.2 (emphasis added). Thus, even if all requirements are satisfied, the court may, in its sound discretion, deny the request for admission. 17 Panzardi cites to a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit requiring formal proceedings before making a discretionary decision not to grant a pro hac vice application. In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.1975). The lower court in that case had denied admission to a foreign attorney because of past offensive acts before the court. The circuit set very stringent standards, requiring that the unethical behavior be of the frequency or nature whereby the attorney could face disbarment proceedings. Id. at 1007. Moreover, the court held that a hearing must be conducted giving the attorney the opportunity to rebut specific allegations. Id. at 1008. 18 This court, however, has never adopted such requirements, nor are we inclined to do so at this time. See Panzardi, 678 F.Supp. at 360. Admission before the Bar traditionally has been considered primarily and initially subject to control by the admitting court and this control is subject to review only by reason of abuse of discretion or constitutional infirmities in the exercise of the control. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that pro hac vice admissions are protected by either due process or equal protection. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 99 S.Ct. 698, 58 L.Ed.2d 717 (1979) (per curiam). The Court held that an attorney's interest in appearing pro hac vice is not a protected liberty or property interest under the constitution in states in which these admissions are authorized through wholly and expressly discretionary statutes. Id. at 442-44 & n. 8, 99 S.Ct. at 700-01 & n. 8 (emphasis in original). 19 The court below based its decision primarily on its finding that there had been a joint representation scheme that had acted to the detriment of at least one codefendant, and that was executed in significant part by an attorney not admitted to practice in that case. Panzardi, 678 F.Supp. at 358. The judge below found that White had acted in a manner inconsistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), 3 and therefore had also violated certain sections of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The district judge also considered White's actions with McKenna outside of his chambers. Other circuits have upheld lower courts' decisions to deny pro hac vice admissions because there has been evidence of ethical violations. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Robson, 750 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.1984) (affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of pro hac vice admission when there was some evidence of conflict of interest that had not been reported to the court); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir.1977) (acknowledging power of district court to disqualify attorney if representation raised the mere appearance of impropriety), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 2235, 56 L.Ed.2d 403 (1978); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir.1975) (denial of application because of conflict of interest); Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.1957) (affirming district court's refusal to admit attorney pro hac vice because of attorney's unlawyerlike conduct); cf. Panzardi, 816 F.2d at 817 (recognizing that, although the one case per year rule is unconstitutional, a court may in its discretion deny pro hac vice application because of unethical conduct). 20 It was in the discretion of the district court whether to accept White's application for admission pro hac vice. The court below was fully familiar with the circumstances surrounding White's actions, in much greater detail than we could be through a review of the record alone. In this light, the court determined that a potential conflict of interest had existed. The court also found that other ethical violations may have occurred due to White's actions outside of the judge's chambers and because White had failed to inform the court of his involvement in the representation of Nieves-Baez. The record supports these findings by the district judge, as well as his decision to deny White's admission. Therefore, we find that there was no abuse of discretion and we affirm this decision. 4