Opinion ID: 1179411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: fain's polygraph test

Text: Fain further argues that the trial judge committed reversible error by not admitting evidence of the results of Fain's polygraph test. Fain contends that with the exception of the testimony of the two cell mates, he was condemned by evidence which was wholly circumstantial. He argues that since he has consistently asserted his innocence, the critical issue for the jury was whether he or the two cell mates were telling the truth. Fain had taken a polygraph test prior to his arrest. We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the test results. As a general rule, results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible absent a stipulation by both parties. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 645 F. Supp. 374 (D.Wyo. 1986) reh'g den. 648 F. Supp. 141; Wilkie v. State, 715 P.2d 1199 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); State v. Sanford, 237 Kan. 312, 699 P.2d 506 (1985); Fernandez v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 558 (10th Cir.1985); State v. Montes, 136 Ariz. 491, 667 P.2d 191 (1983); State v. Crispin, 671 P.2d 502 (1983); Aguilar v. State, 98 Nev. 18, 639 P.2d 533 (1982); State v. Brown, 64 Or. App. 747, 669 P.2d 1190 (1983); State v. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d 664, 683 P.2d 571 (1984). Where stipulated polygraph results may be admitted, the defendant's participation in the examination must be free and voluntary. The trial court has discretion to exclude evidence if it finds that an examiner was not qualified or that the conditions under which the test was administered were unfair. The opposing party must be permitted to cross-examine the examiner as to his or her expertise, the reliability of polygraph examinations, the accuracy of the apparatus used, and all other points reflecting on the accuracy of the polygraph both in general, and in the particular case. Also, the jury must be instructed that the examiner's testimony as to the results of the test is not conclusive, but is to be taken only as an expert opinion. State v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, the prosecution did not stipulate to the admission of Fain's polygraph exam. Moreover, the courts of many other states have held that results of polygraph examinations are not admissible in a criminal trial, regardless of whether the polygraph testimony is exculpatory. U.S. v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.1985); U.S. v. Nelson, 606 F. Supp. 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); U.S. v. Grandison, 780 F.2d 425 (4th Cir.1985), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1269, 94 L.Ed.2d 130 (1987); U.S. v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.1984); State v. Beachman, 189 Mont. 400, 616 P.2d 337 (1980); State v. Antone, 62 Haw. 346, 615 P.2d 101 (1980); Sheppard v. State, 670 P.2d 604 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Federal law is in accord. U.S. v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir.1974); U.S. v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920, 93 S.Ct. 1544, 36 L.Ed.2d 313 (1973); U.S. v. Watts, 502 F.2d 726 (9th Cir.1974); U.S. v. De Betham, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 2299, 36 L.Ed.2d 972 (1973); U.S. v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 995, 95 S.Ct. 306, 42 L.Ed.2d 267 (1974). The foregoing authorities reflect the prevailing judicial view that the physiological and psychological bases for the polygraph examination have not been sufficiently established to assure the validity or reliability of test results. While scientific developments may one day refine the polygraph examination so that the results of the test may more frequently merit admission into evidence, we will not now overturn the trial court's exclusion of such results absent a stipulation by both parties. Fain also objects to the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of a psychological profile prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The profile was nothing more than the Bureau's guess, after evaluating the facts then before it, as to the personality composite of the unidentified subject. A profile, of course, is not a physical scientific test conducted upon actual evidence using well-established scientific principles. Moreover, the profile simply would not have been relevant evidence as to the issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crimes charged. We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the psychological profile.