Opinion ID: 77679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recent Amendments to the City Code Moot One of Appellant's Claims

Text: 7 After the appellant filed this appeal, the City adopted comprehensive amendments to its noise ordinance that have mooted at least one of the five claims on appeal. 3 In count IV of their complaint, the plaintiffs challenged the City's authority to vest special masters with the power to adjudicate alleged violations of County ordinances such as the County noise ordinance at issue here. The plaintiffs argued that section 162.03, Florida Statutes, only allowed the City to designate enforcement methods and penalties to be imposed for violation of ordinances adopted by the municipality. Since the City had never formally adopted the County noise ordinance as its own, the plaintiffs maintained that the County's ordinance violated Florida law. Accordingly, they asked the court to declare that sections 30-1(b) and 30-2 of the City Code, which established an alternate code enforcement system that vested special masters with the authority to enforce City and County ordinances alike, were null and void and to enjoin their use. 8 After L.C. filed this appeal on May 3, 2005, the City repealed its own noise ordinance and formally adopted the County noise ordinance in its place. Since the County noise ordinance is now officially a municipal ordinance, the City may enforce compliance by the methods specified in sections 30-1(b) and 30-2 of its Code without violating Florida Statutes. The City has corrected the constitutional infirmity that allegedly plagued these sections of its Code. At oral argument on the motions for summary judgment the plaintiffs conceded that the City could cure the constitutional infirmity in its alternate code enforcement provisions if it adopted the County ordinance. 4 9 A change in statute will not always moot a constitutional claim, however. If a litigant asserts damages from the application of a constitutionally defective statute, he may be able to pursue his constitutional challenge notwithstanding later legislative changes that would appear to address his complaint. See Naturist Soc., Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir.1992); see also CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir.2006). Damage claims can save a § 1983 claim from mootness, 5 but only where such claims allege compensatory damages or nominal damages for violations of procedural due process. See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), which notes that the basic purpose of damages under § 1983 is compensatory and that absent proof of actual injury, courts can only award nominal damages. See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), which endorses nominal damages awards in § 1983 actions only to vindicate certain absolute rights such as the right to procedural due process. Although count VI of L.C.'s complaint requested damages in connection with count IV, it did not allege any facts that would connect its damage claim to a City enforcement proceeding under sections 30-1(b) or 30-2. 6 10 The record indicates that the City never actually applied this section of its Code against L.C. It never held a hearing on L.C.'s citations. L.C. does not dispute this fact, and acknowledged it once more for the record during oral argument before this Court. L.C. appears to have based its claim for damages on the threat that the City might prosecute it for violations of the County noise ordinance. Plaintiffs cannot bring prospective damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however. See Tanner Advertising Group v. Fayette County, 451 F.3d 777, 786 (11th Cir.2006), where this Court held that facial challenges regarding prospective harm cannot give rise to the remedy of damages. See also Adler v. Duval County School Board, 112 F.3d 1475, 1478 (11th Cir.1997) (noting that appellants' claim for money damages continued to present a controversy because it did not depend upon any threat of future harm). 11 Likewise, although the plaintiffs alleged in count V of the Complaint that sections 30-1(b) and 30-2 of the City Code violated their rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, they do not allege a procedural due process claim. The Complaint states that these sections of the City Code violate due process concerns to the extent that they adopt the County noise ordinance, which they allege is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Thus, the plaintiffs frame count V in terms of substantive due process, not procedural due process. However, as we have noted, only damage claims predicated on violations of procedural due process are compensable under § 1983. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042. Accordingly, L.C.'s damage claim, count VI, will not save its constitutional claim against the City from mootness and both claims must fail. 12