Opinion ID: 1693635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Relevant Activity or Service

Text: Examining Act 374 from the standpoint of the individual units of local government involved in this case, I believe that the court reorganization mandated by the act does violate the Headlee Amendment. While I believe that the Court of Appeals properly viewed this case from the perspective of the individual units of local government rather than local governments in the collective, I believe it erred in defining the relevant activity or service in this case as trial court operations. Rather, I believe the relevant activities or services in this case are former Common Pleas Court functions and former Recorder's Court functions. [8] The Court of Appeals holding is aptly summarized by the majority: The Court of Appeals concluded that trial court operations was the relevant activity or service under § 29. [228 Mich.App. 386] 401-402 [579 N.W.2d 378 (1998) ]. It found that Act 374 requires counties to fund the operation of the circuit courts, district units to fund the operation of district courts, and the state to fully fund circuit and district court judicial salaries. Id. at 402-403 [579 N.W.2d 378]. It found that in 1978, state law mandated that local units fund and operate circuit and district courts and that the state subsidized a portion of judicial salaries. Id. at 405 [579 N.W.2d 378]. It then concluded that Act 374 neither mandated new activities for local units nor increased the level of any activity required of local units. Id. Finally, it concluded that, despite incomplete information to perform the relevant equations, it was able to determine that Act 374 did not decrease the state-financed proportion of necessary costs of trial court operations to either Detroit or Wayne County from that provided on a statewide basis in 1978. Id. at 407-408 [579 N.W.2d 378]. [Op. at 116.] However, defining the relevant activity or service in question as trial court operations is simply too broad a category. First, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Headlee Amendment clearly indicate that the people of Michigan intended the word activity to apply to more specific functions than the umbrella term trial court operations. A primary aim of those who ratified the Headlee Amendment was to prevent the state from enacting laws and regulations that create financial burdens on local units, unaccompanied by financial support to alleviate those burdens. Schmidt, 441 Mich. at 251, 490 N.W.2d 584. If all trial court functions fall under the broad category of trial court operations, the state is free to impose a multitude of laws and regulations on a local unit without an appropriation for the resulting increased costs. To accept the Court of Appeals definition would create a situation in which a local unit can be depicted as having provided practically any activity in 1978, thereby precluding a finding that a new activity had been imposed. [9] This construction effectively nullifies the second sentence of the amendment. The people, in adopting the Headlee Amendment, did not intend to offer so little protection against the very problem that they aimed to prevent. [10] Moreover, this Court's decision in Durant reflects that the proffered definition is too broad. In Durant, one issue presented to the Court was whether education, as a whole, is a state-mandated activity within the meaning of the Headlee Amendment. Plaintiffs attempted to characterize the relevant activity as education. They argued that because the state has delegated to local school districts the duty to provide education, all the functions performed by a school district are required by state law within the meaning of the Headlee Amendment. The Court rejected this reasoning and held that § 29 applies only to specific requirements imposed on the school districts by state statutes and state agencies. [11] By analogy, just as education is too broad a concept for a Headlee examination, so too is the broad concept of trial court operations. The Court of Appeals reviewed the statutory delineations of various educational functions in order to determine if the activities were specific and identifiable. We should similarly examine the statutory delineations of trial court functions. For example, the Common Pleas Court (the predecessor of the 36th District Court) was a distinct judicial entity, established and operated pursuant to 1929 P.A. 260 and vested with specific judicial authority different from any other court in Wayne County. The same can be said of Recorder's Court. Thus, it is logical to define the relevant activity by the statutory parameters set for its delivery. To define the activities as former Common Pleas Court functions and former Recorder's Court functions comports with the purpose and intent of the Headlee Amendment as well as the applicable case law. Thus, I would hold that the relevant activities or services in this case are former Common Pleas Court functions and former Recorder's Court functions. Such a holding would provide the level of specificity required by the Headlee Amendment. Viewing the relevant activities or services as such, I would find that Act 374 violates § 29 of the Headlee Amendment by requiring the city of Detroit to undertake the new or increased responsibility for former Common Pleas Court functions, and Wayne County for undertaking the new or increased responsibility for former Recorder's Court functions.