Opinion ID: 1273939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Asserted Grounds for Reversal of the Judgments

Text: For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that no prejudicial error was committed as to Drivers and that, contrary to the majority's conclusion of insufficiency ( ante, p. 404), the evidence amply support this appellant's conviction As to his coappellant, the majority  although they reverse his conviction  admit that there is clearly sufficient evidence to support Robinson's conviction. ( Ante, p. 405.) Such evidence is found in Robinson's extrajudicial confession, in the fact that the undisputed evidence placed him at the scene of the crime, and in the inference that his telephoned report of the theft of the car was nothing but an attempt to create an alibi for himself. ( Ante, p. 405.) Moreover, the foregoing evidence of Robinson's guilt was unaffected by any of the errors discussed in the first part of the majority opinion. Yet the majority still conceive and project a theoretical basis for reversing the judgment as to Robinson as well. The majority note ( ante, p. 405) that Robinson's extrajudicial confession was properly admitted by the trial court, subject to its instructions that the jury must first determine that it was voluntary before it could consider it as binding upon Robinson. The majority then make this remarkable statement: However, we cannot say, as a matter of law or fact, that the jury accepted the prosecution's testimony regarding the voluntary character of Robinson's confession, or that it rejected Robinson's claim of coercion. (Italics added.) ( Ante, p. 405.) The statement is the more remarkable because earlier in the opinion ( ante, p. 391, fn. 19) the majority brush aside the same issue of coercion with the following analysis of the relevant facts:  There is no substantial evidence of coercion. Not only was Robinson's testimony in this regard unconvincing, and thoroughly rebutted, but the admitted circumstances militate against any inference of coercion. ... (Italics added.) No citation of authorities is needed to demonstrate that if there is no substantial evidence of coercion, then we not only can say that the jury must have rejected Robinson's claim of coercion  we must say it, if we are to retain integrity in the judicial process; i.e., to remain guided by settled principles of law. To do otherwise is in effect to presume in favor of reversal that the jury violated their sworn duty to be governed (as they were instructed) solely by the evidence introduced in this trial and the law as stated to you by the Court, for it presumes that the jury would illegally reach a finding of coercion when There is no substantial evidence of that asserted fact. This patently incongruous conjecture progenerates the fundamental error of the remainder of the opinion. The majority speculate ( ante, p. 405) that If the jury determined that the confession was coerced they may have convicted Robinson on any of the three other theories (i.e., that Hickman's judicial confession was improperly admitted; that the accomplice instructions were prejudically erroneous; or that conspiracy instructions should not have been given), and conclude that Conviction on any one of the three theories last mentioned would have been improper. Thus the majority (1) reject the only inference that the jury could legally have drawn  under the majority's own analysis of the facts  from the evidence relating to the voluntariness of Robinson's confession, and then (2) search the record for some assertedly erroneous theory upon which the jury conceivably may have convicted the defendant, holding that conviction on such a speculated theory would have been improper. I cannot reconcile the majority's apparently labored search for a ground of reversal with our constitutional duty as an appellate court of the State of California (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4 1/2). It is not our duty to search for error and presume prejudice in favor of reversal; it is our duty to assume, in the absence of a contrary showing, that the jury followed the court's instructions. ( People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 627-628 [8-9] [7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865]; People v. Dabb (1948) 32 Cal.2d 491, 499 [8] [197 P.2d 1].) In conclusion, for whatever it may be worth to those who participated in the proceedings below, I am impelled to express the personal opinion that seldom, in my experience, does a reviewing court see a record as commendably free of error, and creditable to the participants in the trial process, as this one. The trial judge and all counsel for both the People and each defendant, as I view the day-to-day action through the lens of the reporter, appear to me to have conducted the trial  and themselves  with appreciation of high ethical standards as well as with fairness, ability and devotion to duty. Neither is there any credible showing of overreaching at the apprehension or investigative stages. I would affirm the judgments of conviction as to both appellants.