Opinion ID: 558566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: On the Hound.

Text: 15 The first step taken by the police consisted of dogging the defendant's car, flagging it down, and bringing it to a halt on the edge of the highway. A traffic stop can be executed as long as the officers have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person detained was, is, or will be engaged in criminal activity. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3149, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (analogizing routine traffic stops to pedestrian stop-and-frisk activity pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). The district court applied this rule forthrightly in upholding the initial stop. The court credited testimony ... that the officers believe[d] that an altercation was taking place and found that the defendant's arguably reckless driving conferred a right, indeed a duty, on the officers to intercept the defendant's vehicle. Since this finding derives abundant support from the record, it cannot be set aside on clear-error review. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.); United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 68 (1st Cir.1991) (no clear error so long as the record contains sufficient evidence ... to support a reasoned conclusion). Hence, the traffic stop itself was reasonable and, therefore, constitutionally valid. 16