Opinion ID: 790121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Toney's Claim Survives Preemption

Text: 10 The IRPA states that a person's identity is protected by the statute. Identity is defined to mean any attribute of an individual that serves to identify that individual to an ordinary, reasonable viewer or listener, including but not limited to (i) name, (ii) signature, (iii) photograph, (iv) image, (v) likeness, or (vi) voice. 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1075/5. In short, the IRPA protects a person's right to publicity. The subject matter of such a claim is not a particular picture or photograph of plaintiff. Rather, what is protected by the right of publicity is the very identity or persona of the plaintiff as a human being. J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 RTS. OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 11:52 (2d ed.2004) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A photograph is merely one copyrightable `expression' of the underlying `work,' which is the plaintiff as a human being. There is only one underlying `persona' of a person protected by the right of publicity. Id. In contrast, [t]here may be dozens or hundreds of photographs which fix certain moments in that person's life. Copyright in each of these photographs might be separately owned by dozens or hundreds of photographers. Id. A persona, defined in this way, can hardly be said to constitute a `writing' of an `author' within the meaning of the copyright clause of the Constitution. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1003-04 (9th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted); see also Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir.2000); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 658 (5th Cir.2000). 2 11 Having reviewed the rights protected by the IRPA, we must now determine whether Toney's claim has been preempted by federal law. Section 301 of the Copyright Act delineates two conditions which, if met, require the preemption of a state-law claim in favor of the rights and remedies available under federal law. Section 301(a) states: 12 On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by section[] 102 ... are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 13 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). We will take the questions in reverse order, first determining whether the work at issue is fixed in a tangible form and whether it comes within the subject matter of copyright as specified in § 102. Second, we consider whether the right is equivalent to the general copyright protections which are set out in § 106. 14 Section 102 of the Act defines the subject matter of copyright as original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, including pictorial works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The Act's definitional section explains that a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 15 The second aspect of the test requires a showing that the right to be enforced is equivalent to any of the rights set forth in § 106. The notes and commentary accompanying § 106 make it clear that copyright holders have five exclusive and fundamental rights: reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display. 3 17 U.S.C. § 106. A copyright is violated or infringed when, without permission, someone other than the copyright holder exercises one of these fundamental rights. Put differently, to avoid preemption, a state law must regulate conduct that is qualitatively distinguishable from that governed by federal copyright law—i.e., conduct other than reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display. See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 659-60 (4th Cir.1993); 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1] (1999). 16 Applying the facts of this case to the requirements for preemption, we find that Toney's identity is not fixed in a tangible medium of expression. There is no work of authorship at issue in Toney's right of publicity claim. A person's likeness—her persona—is not authored and it is not fixed. The fact that an image of the person might be fixed in a copyrightable photograph does not change this. From this we must also find that the rights protected by the IRPA are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright that are set forth in § 106. Copyright laws do not reach identity claims such as Toney's. Identity, as we have described it, is an amorphous concept that is not protected by copyright law; thus, the state law protecting it is not preempted. 17 We also note that the purpose of the IRPA is to allow a person to control the commercial value of his or her identity. Unlike copyright law, commercial purpose is an element required by the IRPA. The phrase is defined to mean the public use or holding out of an individual's identity (i) on or in connection with the offering for sale or sale of a product, merchandise, goods, or services; (ii) for purposes of advertising or promoting products, merchandise, goods, or services; or (iii) for the purpose of fundraising. 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1075/5. Clearly the defendants used Toney's likeness without her consent for their commercial advantage. The fact that the photograph itself could be copyrighted, and that defendants owned the copyright to the photograph that was used, is irrelevant to the IRPA claim. The basis of a right of publicity claim concerns the message—whether the plaintiff endorses, or appears to endorse the product in question. One can imagine many scenarios where the use of a photograph without consent, in apparent endorsement of any number of products, could cause great harm to the person photographed. The fact that Toney consented to the use of her photograph originally does not change this analysis. The defendants did not have her consent to continue to use the photograph, and therefore, they stripped Toney of her right to control the commercial value of her identity.