Opinion ID: 751402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the superseding indictment should have been dismissed

Text: 15 Varona challenges the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. Because the grand jury that issued the superseding indictment heard her immunized statements, she contends that indictment should have been dismissed. Varona relies on United States v. Tantalo, 680 F.2d 903, 909 (2d Cir.1982), in which the Second Circuit adopted a per se rule that an indictment must be dismissed as to any defendant whose immunized statement or testimony was heard by the grand jury returning the indictment. However, to the extent that Tantalo establishes a per se rule 1 , we disagree with it. We have never accepted a per se rule for dismissing indictments obtained as a result of a defendant's immunized testimony; the facts of this case show why a per se rule is inappropriate. 16 The grand jury returned the original indictment against Varona based on the testimony of a DEA case agent named Lucas. Subsequently, Varona made her proffer statements inculpating Hechavarria. Later, the same grand jury heard Agent Lucas' recitation of Varona's proffer statements and returned the superseding indictment. The superseding indictment reflected but two substantive changes: (1) Hechavarria was substituted for Caceras in the conspiracy count; and (2) a count for using a telecommunications facility to facilitate a narcotics transaction was added against Varona. 17 It is clear that the addition of the telecommunications facility count was harmless; that charge was dismissed after the jury deadlocked on it. So, too, was the change in the conspiracy count. Varona does not challenge the validity of the conspiracy count in the original indictment, nor does she contend that there would have been a material variance between the proof and the indictment if that count had not been modified. Varona's proffer statements were only used against her to accuse her of conspiring with Jose, Pielago, and Hechavarria, instead of with Jose, Pielago, and Caceras. Either way, she was still on the hook for her participation in the conspiracy; it matters not with whom she shared that hook. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 851 (11th Cir.1982)(The existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the identity of those who agree is the essential element to prove conspiracy.). Therefore, the use of Varona's proffer statement resulting in a change of the indictment did not prejudice her. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the superseding indictment. 18