Opinion ID: 836508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Assignments 12-17, Pro Se Assignments 1-4)

Text: Defendant first challenges the denial of his motion for a mistrial, made on the ground that the prosecutor had suggested, during examination of a witness, that defendant had been charged with multiple murders. The issue arose when the prosecutor was examining Hutcheson, defendant's former housemate, about events that had occurred in February and March of 1993, after defendant had been arrested and jailed on a matter unrelated to the Bryant murder. Hutcheson testified that, on March 5, the police had searched the house that he shared with defendant and that, in the course of the search, Hutcheson had given to the police defendant's nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol (which had been connected to the Bryant murder by other state witnesses). Hutcheson testified that when he told defendant about the search over the telephone, defendant was angry about the pistol and that defendant called him the day after the search and told him to burn down the house: Q: Did [defendant] tell you why he wanted you to burn the house? A: Because there was something in there that could link him to a murder. Q: Did he say what it was that was in the house that could link him to a murder. A: No, he didn't. Q: Did he say what murder it would link him to ? A: No. (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor's question, emphasized above, implied that defendant had been charged in other murders. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that, although the questions could have elicited inadmissible testimony that implied that defendant was connected with other murders, inadmissible testimony was not, in fact, given. The trial court concluded that, by itself, the question was not significant. The trial judge was in the best position to assess the prejudicial effect, if any, of the prosecutor's questions. We review his decision for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396, 425-26, 927 P.2d 1073 (1996); State v. Pratt, 316 Or. 561, 583, 853 P.2d 827 (1993) (both applying that standard in similar circumstances). We find no abuse of discretion in this case. It appears unlikely that the jury would derive from the prosecutor's question the implication for which defendant argues. To the uninitiated, the question would appear to ask merely whether defendant had made specific reference to the Bryant murder, not whether defendant had distinguished the Bryant murder from other murders that he may have committed. [5] Moreover, to the extent that the objectionable implication was presented, it was isolated and fleeting. In view of those facts, it was within the trial court's discretion to conclude that the questions were not damaging to defendant or, at least, not damaging enough to require a mistrial. See, e.g., Pratt, 316 Or. at 583, 853 P.2d 827 (no abuse of discretion to deny mistrial based on suggestion that defendant was on death row when reference was isolated and made in passing). Defendant's next claim of error pertains to the state's examination of Robinson, a Hillsboro police officer assigned to investigate the Bryant murder. Defendant contends that, in the course of Robinson's testimony, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to elicit Robinson's opinion about the veracity of another witness. Defendant argues that that was reversible error, citing State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 438, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983) (improper for one witness to express opinion whether another witness is telling the truth). Robinson testified, among other things, that he had spoken to a jailhouse informant, Lord, about conversations between Lord and defendant that occurred while the two men were in the Washington County Jail. Robinson further testified that other police officers had interviewed Lord about the jailhouse conversations and that he (Robinson) had listened to a tape recording of the interview. The following exchange occurred during the state's redirect examination: Q [Prosecuting Attorney]: Now, you did not conduct the taped interview with Mr. Lord, is that correct? A [Robinson]: No, I did not. Q: And is it clear to you, in talking to Mr. Lord, in talking to the other investigators, and in reviewing the tape, that Mr. Lord was telling what [defendant] had told him? A: There's no doubt in my mind that, in listening to the tape and having some [Defense Attorney]: I'm going to object to that, Your Honor. It's a comment on the credibility of Mr. Lord. THE COURT: No, the question is not. By [Prosecuting Attorney]: (continuing) Q: No. Just to make it simple, was there any doubt in your mind that in terms of the source of the information, that what Mr. Lord was telling you was what he said that [defendant] had told him? A: Right. Q: And Mr. Lord was not suggesting that he was there or he personally had verified the information? He was relaying what [defendant] had told him? A: Right. He's telling us, to the best of his recollection, without taking extensive notes, certainly, that these are the things that [defendant] told him. And he did, I think, an excellent job in relaying as many points as he did. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection. He maintains that the prosecutor's question was designed to, and in fact did, elicit inadmissible testimony, i.e., a comment on Lord's credibility. We reject defendant's contention, because the asserted error that the trial court committed in allowing Robinson's testimony was not preserved for our review. Defendant did object to the prosecutor's initial question on the ground that it asked for a comment on Lord's credibility, but the prosecutor rephrased his question. Although Robinson's response to the second question included an inappropriate comment on credibility, that comment was unresponsive to that second question. Defendant could have objected to Robinson's comment at that point or asked that it be stricken. He did not. Consequently, any error in permitting the jury to hear Robinson's comment was not preserved for review. Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's decision to admit, over his objection, the testimony of Duran-Snell, a nurse-midwife who had worked with Bryant and who, like Bryant, often delivered babies at the Tuality Hospital. Duran-Snell's testimony pertained to an incident that occurred at that hospital on October 7, 1992, two days before Bryant's murder. Duran-Snell testified that she left the hospital around midnight on that date. As she walked to her car, which was parked in a lot reserved for medical personnel, she noticed a man standing outside, just beyond the hospital's locked glass doors. The man stared at her intently, which made her so uncomfortable that she decided to stay inside the building. Later, when she thought that the man had gone away, she went outside and walked to her car. Once inside it, she realized that the man still was standing on the sidewalk adjoining the lot. Duran-Snell testified that, after leaving the parking lot, she drove along Cornell Road, using the same route that Bryant customarily used when she drove home from the hospital. Somewhere around the intersection near where Bryant's body would be found, a car with a white top came up fast behind her, briefly pulled alongside her, then dropped back behind her again, flashing its lights off and on. Duran-Snell was concerned and, when she noticed a car waiting at an intersection up ahead, pulled up next to it. The car with the white top immediately turned off in a different direction. Duran-Snell stated that, after she learned of Bryant's murder, she reported the incident to the police. She also testified that, when she saw defendant on the television news six months later, after his arrest in the Bryant murder, she recognized him as the man whom she had seen standing outside the hospital on October 7. Defendant argues that Duran-Snell's testimony was not relevant to any trial issue, because a showing that, two days before Bryant's murder, he had been in the Tuality Hospital parking lot or that a white-topped car had followed Duran-Snell added nothing to the state's case. Defendant particularly notes that Duran-Snell did not and could not identify him as the driver of the white car that followed her. Defendant also argues that Duran-Snell's testimony was unfairly prejudicial, because it suggested to the jury, without any evidentiary support, that defendant had been on the Tuality Hospital premises for the purpose of stalking hospital personnel. [6] Regarding the issue of relevance, our inquiry focuses on whether the testimony has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence. OEC 401. Relevance is a minimal requirement: evidence is relevant even if it only slightly increases or decreases the probability that a material fact exists. See State v. Hampton, 317 Or. 251, 255, 855 P.2d 621 (1993) (stating principle). Duran-Snell's testimony was relevant under that standard. Although Duran-Snell was not able to identify defendant as the driver of the white-topped vehicle, the timing of the reported events would support an inference that he was the driver. Moreover, her description of his behavior and his presence outside a locked hospital door, late at night, with no apparent purpose for being there, would support an inference that, two days before Bryant's murder, defendant was planning to intercept a woman as she drove home from the Tuality Hospital and that he went to the Tuality Hospital to find a victim. The evidence increased the likelihood that defendant had planned and prepared for his attack on Bryant, a fact that was relevant to the issue of his intent. Defendant contends nonetheless that the testimony should have been excluded under OEC 403, [7] because any probative value that it had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In so arguing, defendant asserts that the testimony unfairly would suggest to the jury that he had killed Bryant, because he had been stalking a person other than Bryant two days earlier. [8] Generally, evidence is unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403 if it appeals to the preferences of the trier of fact for reasons that are unrelated to the power of the evidence to establish a material fact. State v. Lyons, 324 Or. 256, 280, 924 P.2d 802 (1996). Although it is true that Duran-Snell's testimony was damaging to defendant, its damaging effect was based primarily on the capacity of the testimony to support a rational and material inference, viz., that defendant planned a murder and, two days before Bryant's murder, was preparing for an attack like the one on Bryant. Arguably, Duran-Snell's testimony also might support an inference that perhaps was not material, such as the inference that it is more likely that defendant killed Bryant because he had been out stalking persons other than Bryant two nights before. We cannot say, however, that the trial court abused its discretion, and therefore erred, in concluding that the potential for the testimony to produce that improper inference substantially outweighed its value as evidence of planning, preparation, and intent. Admission of Duran-Snell's testimony did not violate OEC 403. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, over his objections, six autopsy photographs that were offered in the course of a pathologist's testimony. Defendant argues that the photographs were inadmissible under OEC 403, both because they were unfairly prejudicial (they were inflammatory and gruesome) and because they were irrelevant (the pathologist could have presented her findings without them). Defendant argues, moreover, that, because the photographs were irrelevant, the abuse of discretion standard that we ordinarily would employ in a case such as this is not appropriate. It is true that, with respect to defendant's relevancy objection, the abuse of discretion standard is inapplicable. However, that principle does not help defendant here. When defendant suggests that the pathologist could have testified without the photographs, he confuses necessity with relevance. The pathologist used the photographs to illustrate her testimony. The photographs were relevant. The remaining issue, therefore, is whether the photographs were unfairly prejudicial. OEC 403. As defendant acknowledges, we review a trial court's resolution of issues of this kind for abuse of discretion. State v. Rose, 311 Or. 274, 291, 810 P.2d 839 (1991). Applying that standard, we find no abuse of discretion here. Although the photographs in question were graphic, they could not be said to be remarkable in the context of a murder trial. Defendant's next assignment of error is reminiscent of his first guilt-phase assignment of error: As in that assignment, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after the prosecutor implied to the jury that defendant had been involved in other crimes. Defendant moved for a mistrial in response to the state's examination of police detective O'Connell about his contacts with Lord, the informant who had spoken to the police about his jailhouse conversations with defendant. After O'Connell briefly described the circumstances of his contacts with Lord, the prosecutor asked: Q: In your interviews with Mr. Lord, were your interviews limited solely to conversations that he had about the Martha Bryant case? A: No. Defendant's trial attorney immediately renewed his motion for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor's question was a veiled attempt to convey to the jury that defendant had been implicated in other crimes. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the question was as innocuous at it possibly could be. Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. As the trial court noted, the prosecutor's question was innocuous. That fact alone is sufficient to support the denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial. Defendant next assigns error to the admission of testimony of a former acquaintance, Pond, to the effect that she had seen defendant with a nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol some two or three weeks after Bryant's murder. Defendant contends that, because the testimony pertained to his possession of a pistol weeks after the murder, it had no relevance to any issue in this case. We disagree. Pond's testimony about the pistol was relevant. Defendant's former wife had testified that defendant owned such a weapon before the murder. After the murder, police seized a nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol from defendant's home. An expert testified that that pistol had fired the shots that had struck Bryant's car before her death. All that evidence pointed to defendant as the owner (and likely user) of the pistol. Pond's testimony that defendant was carrying the pistol on his person some weeks after the murder furthered that purpose. Pond's testimony thus was probative with respect, to a material issue. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's objection. [9] Defendant's next assignment of error pertains to a motion for mistrial that he made on the ground that the state had failed to disclose the names and addresses of all persons whom the state intended to call as witnesses at trial. See ORS 135.815 (stating requirement). Defendant identified three witnesses whom the state had called without providing the required notice. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that defendant had not been prejudiced by the absence of notice. Defendant argues that lack of proper notice compromised his ability properly to cross-examine the witnesses, at least two of whom, he asserts, were vital to the state's case. Defendant also appears to suggest that he was prejudiced as a matter of law by the lack of notice because fundamental rights of confrontation and cross-examination were offended. The state responds that defendant's claim of error was not preserved. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the state. To preserve error, a motion for a mistrial must be made timely, i.e, it must be made as soon as the objectionable statement or event occurs. See State v. Williams, 322 Or. 620, 631, 912 P.2d 364, cert. den. ____ U.S. ____, 117 S.Ct. 149, 136 L.Ed.2d 95 (1996) (stating and illustrating proposition); State v. Walton, 311 Or. 223, 248, 809 P.2d 81 (1991) (same). In this case, defendant did not raise the state's failure to provide notice of witnesses until after the first of those three witnesses had finished testifying. Also, defendant failed to object when the other two unexpected witnesses were called and did not request a mistrialthe only motion at issue hereuntil after all three had testified. His motion failed to demonstrate that it was made promptly after the objectionable event occurred. At that point, the mistrial request was untimely and, consequently, did not preserve the alleged underlying error for review. Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in permitting a police witness to comment on what defendant asserts was an invocation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant points to the testimony of a police officer, White, who arrested defendant in February 1993 at a tavern in Forest Grove, on charges unrelated to the present case. White testified that, when he patted defendant down for weapons after the arrest, he discovered a key ring. White was then asked whether the key ring contained any recognizable keys: A: Yes, sir. There was a Toyota key on the key ring. Q: And when you exited the tavern or the bar, did you note any Toyota vehicle in the parking lot? A: Yes, sir, there was one.      Q: Did you ask [defendant] at that time if he had a vehicle in the parking lot? A: It may have been prior to us actually stepping on the porch, but in that general time frame, yes, I did ask him if he had one in the parking lot. Q: And what was [defendant's] response? A: `No,' he did not. Defendant contends that, in light of later testimony by other witnesses indicating that the Toyota in the parking lot was defendant's and that it contained a weapon used in Bryant's murder, White's testimony implied that defendant had invoked his Fourth Amendment right to prevent White from searching his car, because he knew that the car contained evidence that would connect him to Bryant's murder. Defendant argues that the state cannot be permitted to use defendant's invocation of Fourth Amendment rights in that manner. Although the constitutional proposition for which defendant contends is an interesting one, it is not one that we can address in this case, because it has no application to the testimony at issue. White testified that defendant untruthfully had denied ownership of a car. That testimony did not state or imply an invocation of a Fourth Amendment right. [10] We find no error. Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Hutcheson to the effect that defendant had ordered Hutcheson to burn down their shared residence. Defendant argues that Hutcheson's testimony cannot support an inference that defendant was attempting to destroy evidence of his involvement in Bryant's murder. That is so, he argues, because nothing in the record specifically connects the arson that he ordered to the Bryant case. Ultimately, defendant argues, because the state failed to show that he had the Bryant murder in mind when he ordered the arson, Hutcheson's testimony was both irrelevant, OEC 401, and unfairly prejudicial, OEC 403. [11] The state responds that Hutchinson's testimony is not rendered inadmissible by the state's failure to forge an airtight connection between the arson order and Bryant's murder. Again, we agree with the state. As noted, evidence is relevant so long as it slightly increases or decreases the probability of the existence of a material fact. Hampton, 317 Or. at 255, 855 P.2d 621. The testimony at issue here satisfies that test. When it was offered, Hutcheson already had testified that defendant had called him from jail and asked him to retrieve a nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol (the one used in Bryant's murder) from his car. [12] Hutcheson also had testified that defendant was angry when he learned that Hutcheson had given the pistol to the police when they searched the house. In light of that testimony, Hutcheson's additional testimony that, within a day of learning that the police had his pistol, defendant ordered Hutcheson to burn down the house because there was something in there that could link him to a murder, carried with it a strong and reasonable inference that defendant's order was motivated by the Bryant homicide. As such, Hutcheson's testimony was relevant to establish defendant's consciousness of his own guilt in Bryant's murder. Although prejudicial, the testimony was not unfairly so. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's OEC 401 and 403 objections. In defendant's final guilt-phase assignment of error, he challenges the trial court's refusal to strike the testimony of four state experts who described and analyzed various DNA tests that had been used to link him to Bryant's murder. Defendant contends that the DNA procedures and samples described by those experts were unreliable and that the state's statistical expert conceded as much when he testified that, because of the relatively small size of the Oregon DNA database, the measure of confidence in the tests employed is only about fifty percent. Defendant also argues that the DNA testimony was misleading and scientifically unsound, because the blood samples at issue had been degraded by the passage of time and by exposure to cleaning products and because the Oregon DNA database does not account for persons of mixed race. This court has held that DNA evidence resulting from the two kinds of tests that were performed in this case is reliable scientific evidence and, as such, generally is admissible. See Lyons, 324 Or. at 279, 924 P.2d 802 (PCR-based DNA evidence is admissible under standard of State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984)); State v. Futch, 324 Or. 297, 924 P.2d 832 (1996) (RFLP-based DNA evidence is admissible scientific evidence). In so holding, we have acknowledged that DNA evidence, like other kinds of scientific evidence, is not necessarily infallible. However, we have concluded that, because DNA evidence relies on methods that produce reasonably certain results, it is admissible. Lyons, 324 Or. at 274-75, 924 P.2d 802. Defendant's arguments do not persuade us that we should depart from the foregoing view, either with respect to DNA evidence in general or the particular tests and analytical methods employed by the experts in this case. First, defendant does not persuade us that the state's DNA analysis involved an unacceptably high margin of error, because that margin was estimated at plus or minus 50%. As the state's expert explained, where extremely small frequencies are involved, a 50 percent margin of error is inconsequential: [I]f you're talking about a number in the area of 100 million, if we cut it in half to only 50 million, we're still only saying that any of these one profiles or six profiles are uncommon. It's astonishing when we see two profiles that are the same. It's astonishing. Neither are we persuaded by defendant's concerns that degradation of DNA samples by the passage of time or exposure to cleaning fluids cast significant doubt on the results that were reported in this case. Two of the state's experts offered uncontradicted testimony that, even if such degradation or contamination had occurred, it would not produce a doubtful or erroneous match. Rather, a degraded or contaminated blood sample would be unreadable. Finally, defendant argues that the state's use of racial categories in DNA analysis caused its results to be unreliable with respect to a person, like himself, of mixed race. That argument is not well taken. The state presented evidence about the frequency of certain DNA by racial group as background against which the jury could evaluate the significance of the fact that certain aspects of a blood sample matched those of a known person. The state's experts did not suggest that defendant belonged to any particular racial group or otherwise rely in its analysis on defendant being of a particular race.