Opinion ID: 1058511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delegation of Authority to Subdivision Agent

Text: Logan argues that the City Council was prohibited by Code § 15.2-2255 from adopting a provision in its Subdivision Ordinance that delegated to its subdivision agent the authority to approve exceptions involving public improvements. The statute provides: The administration and enforcement of subdivision regulations insofar as they pertain to public improvements as authorized in §§ 15.2-2241 through 15.2-2245 shall be vested in the governing body of the locality in which the improvements are or will be located. Except as provided above, the governing body shall be responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions of the subdivision regulations through its local planning commission or otherwise. Code § 15.2-2255. Relying on the Dillon Rule of strict construction, Logan contends that the first paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 removes the category of public improvements from the general authority of a local governing body to delegate matters concerning the application and enforcement of its subdivision ordinance. Thus, Logan contends that only a local governing body, not its designated agent, may grant exceptions pertaining to public improvements as part of the subdivision plat approval process. In response, the defendants contend that the first paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 addresses situations in which real property is subject to the subdivision ordinances of both a county and a municipality. According to the defendants, in such situations, the administration and enforcement of subdivision ordinance provisions pertaining to public improvements shall be vested in the governing body of the locality in which the improvements are located. Thus, the defendants assert that because approval of the Wilton subdivision plat did not involve public improvements located in more than one jurisdiction, this statutory provision did not prevent the City from delegating to Townsend the authority to grant exceptions relating to public improvements proposed for the Wilton subdivision. We agree with the defendants' arguments. We examine the language of Code § 15.2-2255 in the context of related statutes that also address the application and enforcement of subdivision ordinances. Our consideration of the various statutes involves a pure question of law, which we determine de novo on appeal. Miller v. Highland County, 274 Va. 355, 364, 650 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2007); Budd v. Punyanitya, 273 Va. 583, 591, 643 S.E.2d 180, 184 (2007); Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2006). The central focus of our analysis is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent in enacting the provisions concerning subdivision ordinances adopted by localities. See Miller, 274 Va. at 364, 650 S.E.2d at 535; Boynton, 271 Va. at 227, 623 S.E.2d at 925; Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003). We determine the General Assembly's intent from the words employed in the statutes. Miller, 274 Va. at 364, 650 S.E.2d at 535; Crawford v. Haddock, 270 Va. 524, 528, 621 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2005); Horner v. Dep't of Mental Health, 268 Va. 187, 192, 597 S.E.2d 202, 204 (2004). We may not add words to a statute or ignore any of the actual statutory language. Purce v. Patterson, 275 Va. 190, 194, 654 S.E.2d 885, 886 (2008); BBF, Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 274 Va. 326, 331, 645 S.E.2d 467, 469 (2007). Thus, we presume that every part of a statute has some effect, and we will not consider any portion meaningless unless absolutely necessary. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 630, 634, 652 S.E.2d 111, 113 (2007); Level 3 Commcn's of Va., Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 268 Va. 471, 477-78, 604 S.E.2d 71, 74 (2004); Department of Medical Assistance Servs. v. Beverly Healthcare of Fredericksburg, 268 Va. 278, 285, 601 S.E.2d 604, 608 (2004); Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P'ship, 255 Va. 335, 340-41, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). Additionally, because the several statutes we consider impact the same subject, we harmonize their provisions whenever possible. Peerless Ins. Co. v. County of Fairfax, 274 Va. 236, 244, 645 S.E.2d 478, 483 (2007); Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 439-40, 621 S.E.2d 78, 87 (2005); Capelle v. Orange County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005). We disagree with Logan's argument that the first paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 is intended to restrict a governing body's power to delegate the administration and enforcement of subdivision regulations pertaining to public improvements. Such a construction would render meaningless the phrase in which the improvements are or will be located. Instead, we conclude that the first paragraph of the statute is intended to address situations in which existing or proposed public improvements may be subject to the subdivision ordinances of more than one locality. Such circumstances may arise under the provisions of Code §§ 15.2-2248 and -2249. Under Code § 15.2-2248, in five specified counties, the subdivision regulations adopted by a municipality located within those counties shall apply in certain circumstances beyond the municipality's corporate limits into unincorporated regions of the county, if the municipal ordinance so provides. However, under Code § 15.2-2249, the subdivision regulations adopted by the local governing bodies of these five counties shall apply in all unincorporated areas of those counties, including those areas over which a municipality may extend the application of its subdivision ordinance, provided that any such municipality has been given the opportunity to approve or disapprove the county's proposed regulations. The General Assembly specifically contemplated that disagreements could arise under these provisions regarding whether the regulations of a county or a municipality should be applicable to a given area. To address this problem, Code § 15.2-2250 permits a municipality or a county, or both these parties, to petition the circuit court for the county in which the major part of the disputed territory lies, and the circuit court shall hear the matter and enter an appropriate order. Id. Viewed in the context of these statutes, the legislative intent of Code § 15.2-2255 is plain. We conclude that the General Assembly intended to make certain that control over the development of public improvements not be subject to uncertainty on the part of local officials or to an unresolved dispute between a county and a municipality. By enacting Code § 15.2-2255, the General Assembly specified that with regard to public improvements authorized by the subdivision ordinance enabling statutes, the administration and enforcement of subdivision regulations will be controlled by the governing body in which the improvements are or will be located. Accordingly, this provision removes any uncertainty regarding which jurisdiction shall exercise control over present and proposed public improvements physically located in a given jurisdiction. In view of this statutory purpose, we hold that the first paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 does not reflect a legislative intent to prevent a local governing body from delegating to an agent the responsibility to administer and enforce subdivision regulations pertaining to public improvements within that locality. In fact, such delegation is expressly authorized by the second paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255, subject to the restrictions imposed by the first paragraph concerning public improvements that may be within the joint control of more than one locality. Our conclusion is not altered by Logan's argument that the Dillon Rule of strict construction prohibits this result. Under the Dillon Rule, municipal corporations and counties possess and may exercise only those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, powers necessarily or fairly implied from such express powers, and those powers that are essential and indispensable. Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 402, 408 n. 3, 602 S.E.2d 126, 129 n. 3 (2004); Arlington Co. v. White, 259 Va. 708, 712, 528 S.E.2d 706, 708 (2000); Board of Supervisors v. Countryside Inv. Co., 258 Va. 497, 503, 522 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1999); County of Fairfax v. Southern Iron Works, Inc., 242 Va. 435, 448, 410 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1991). Here, the City Council's delegation of authority to its subdivision agent was expressly authorized by the second paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255. Therefore, the City did not violate the Dillon Rule by delegating authority to its subdivision agent to administer and enforce the provisions of the Subdivision Ordinance pertaining to public improvements.