Opinion ID: 3212912
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: If the family is receiving

Text: payments for welfare assistance from a public agency and a part of those payments, adjusted in accordance with the actual - 21 - housing costs of the family, is specifically designated by that agency to meet the housing costs of the family, the portion of those payments that is so designated. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A). As in Wright, the statutory language unambiguously confer[s] 'a mandatory [benefit] focusing on the individual family and its income.' Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 430).13 As in Wright, HUD regulations flesh out the contours of the statutory right, rendering that right sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable. Wright, 479 U.S. at 432. And as in Wright, the Section 8 rent ceiling's specification that a tenant's monthly subsidy shall be equal to rent minus a percentage of income, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A) (emphasis supplied), creates a mandatory limitation, Wright, 479 U.S. at 430, that is not cast in precatory terms.14 13 Although Wright preceded the Court's admonition in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), that it is rights, not the broader or vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests,' that may be enforced under the authority of [Section 1983], id. at 283, the Gonzaga Court did not overrule Wright, see id. at 289–90, which in any event did find that the Brooke Amendment established enforceable rights, Wright, 479 U.S. at 432 (emphasis supplied). 14 Although DeCambre here focuses on the calculation of her annual income rather than the calculation of her rent, the two are flip sides of the same coin. Section 8 defines the amount of a tenant's rent subsidy entitlement in direct relation to the tenant's income. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A). It follows that any overstatement of a tenant's income necessarily results in an understatement of her subsidy. - 22 - The Fifth Circuit has held that Wright's analysis applies with full force to the Section 8 rent ceiling provision. See Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Par., 442 F.3d 356, 360– 62 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that Section 8 voucher recipients can bring a Section 1983 challenge to a public housing authority's calculation of their utilities allowance because an inadequate allowance would violate their right not to pay more out of pocket than 30 percent of their incomes for housing, id. at 362); cf. Daniels v. Hous. Auth. of Prince George's Cty., 940 F. Supp. 2d 248, 259 (D. Md. 2013) (tenant could bring a Section 1983 suit to enforce her federal right to a properly calculated housing subsidy under an analogously worded Housing Act provision). And although courts have found that certain other Housing Act provisions do not create rights that may be enforced under Section 1983, these provisions are materially distinguishable from the rent ceiling provisions of the Brooke Amendment and Section 8. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 627 (6th Cir. 2006) (Housing Act's housing quality standards provision not enforceable under Section 1983 because of its focus on the entity being regulated and not on the tenant (quoting Johnson v. City of Detroit, 319 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich. 2004))); Banks v. Dall. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 2001) (right to decent, safe, and sanitary housing under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e) not enforceable under Section 1983, in part because the statutory - 23 - provision lacked [t]he specificity of [the Brooke Amendment's rent ceiling provision], coupled with its focus on the tenants); cf. also Caswell v. City of Detroit Hous. Comm'n, 418 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2005) (regulatory right to continued subsidies during eviction proceedings not enforceable under Section 1983 where, unlike in Wright, the regulation interpreted a statutory provision that did not itself, in clear and unambiguous terms, confer[] a particular right upon the tenant).15 In light of the close textual similarity between the Brooke Amendment's rent ceiling and the rent ceiling at issue here, the Supreme Court's continued approval of Wright, see Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289–90, and the weight of persuasive authority from a sister circuit, we hold that Section 8's rent ceiling provision confers a right that is presumptively enforceable under Section 1983. 15 See also McField ex rel. Ray v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 992 F. Supp. 2d 481, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (Housing Act provision requiring public housing authorities to conduct inspections of certain units did not create a right enforceable under Section 1983 because of the provision's focus on the regulator and not the tenants); Koroma v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., No. 3:09cv736, 2010 WL 1704745, at –6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 2010) (Housing Act provision providing that a tenant currently receiving Section 8 assistance may continue to receive such assistance upon moving to another participating housing unit did not create a right enforceable under Section 1983); Anderson v. Jackson, No. 06-3298, 2007 WL 458232, at  (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2007) (provision that [u]nlike [the Brooke Amendment and the Section 8 rent ceiling provision], . . . does not focus on the rights of individual residents and families did not create a right enforceable under Section 1983). - 24 - The presumptive availability of Section 1983 relief can, however, be rebutted through a showing of [c]ongressional intent to 'shut the door to private enforcement' of the rent ceiling. Colón-Marrero, 813 F.3d at 20 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 n.4). Such an intent could be manifest either in language in the [Housing Act] itself specifically foreclosing a remedy under [Section 1983] or by implication from Congress's creation of 'a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement.' Id. (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 n.4). That said, we are not to lightly conclude that Congress intended to bar private enforcement of a federal right that is presumptively enforceable under Section 1983. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423–24 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)). We need not rule on this question today; it suffices merely to observe that the BHA has manifestly failed to develop any argument that Congress expressly or impliedly sought to preclude private enforcement of Section 8's rent ceiling provision. See Colón-Marrero, 813 F.3d at 20 (Appellant makes no meaningful attempt to rebut [the presumption of private enforceability], and we could thus end our analysis here.). The BHA points to no textual indications of such a bar. Nor does the BHA demonstrate any alternative avenue through which tenants can vindicate their rights under Section 8's rent ceiling provision. Cf. Wright, 479 U.S. at 428 (beyond HUD's generalized powers to - 25 - conduct audits, enforce certain contracts, and cut off federal funds, [t]here are no other mechanisms provided to enable HUD to effectively oversee the performance of the some 3,000 local [public housing authorities] across the country). We therefore hold that the BHA has waived any challenge to the presumptive availability of a Section 1983 cause of action for violations of the Section 8 rent ceiling provision, without entirely foreclosing the possibility that a future litigant may be able to successfully raise such a challenge. We are cognizant that the availability of a federal lawsuit as a means of challenging the income calculations made by public housing authorities may appear to risk overcrowding the federal docket. Four considerations, however, at least partially ameliorate such concerns. First, the benefits decisions of public housing authorities are in many places already subject to judicial review under state law. See, e.g., Mathis v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 124 A.3d 1089, 1099 (D.C. 2015); Walker v. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 29 A.3d 293, 309 (Md. 2011); Rivas v. Chelsea Hous. Auth., 982 N.E.2d 1147, 1151–52 (Mass. 2013); Banks v. Hous. Auth. of Omaha, 795 N.W.2d 632, 633 (Neb. 2011). Recognition of a federal cause of action, then, may affect the distribution but not necessarily the volume of litigation. Second, courts will likely apply a healthy measure of deference to the more fact-bound determinations of public housing authorities, see infra notes 20– - 26 - 21, and so the long odds of success on any challenge to this discretion will counsel against the time and expense of litigation in most instances. Third, the instant case provides an apt illustration of a countervailing concern--the need for national uniformity in resolving certain fundamental interpretive questions regarding the parameters of a federal benefit. Where, as here, a voucher recipient's annual income could vary by over $62,000 depending on one's interpretation of federal law, the drawbacks of allowing judicial interpretation to reside exclusively at the state or local level are self-evident. Fourth, Wright was decided nearly three decades ago, and Johnson extended Wright to the Section 8 context in the Fifth Circuit over ten years ago. Meanwhile, no circuit court has yet declined to apply Wright to Section 8's rent ceiling provision. The gates to federal court, in other words, have long been open, and no flood has yet arrived. With this threshold matter resolved, we turn now to the legal question at the heart of DeCambre's case--whether the BHA in fact violated DeCambre's rights under federal law by miscalculating her monthly assistance payment. 2. Inclusion of Settlement-Funded Irrevocable Trust Distributions in Income We deal first--and, as it happens, exclusively--with DeCambre's contention that the BHA misapplied HUD regulations by including the disbursements from her SNT in her annual income. - 27 - DeCambre's SNT was funded exclusively with the proceeds from a series of tort settlements. Had those settlement proceeds been paid directly to DeCambre, the parties agree that they would have been treated as a [l]ump-sum addition[] to family assets, and therefore would have been categorically excluded from annual income upon receipt under HUD's regulations. 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(3). Instead, DeCambre agreed to have the settlement proceeds paid into an irrevocable, disability-based SNT, out of which some of those same funds were later disbursed for her benefit at the discretion of the trustee. HUD addresses irrevocable trusts in the portion of 24 C.F.R. § 5.603(b) (section 5.603(b)) that defines the term net family assets. The relevant passage states as follows: In cases where a trust fund has been established and the trust is not revocable by, or under the control of, any member of the family or household, the value of the trust fund will not be considered an asset so long as the fund continues to be held in trust. Any income distributed from the trust fund shall be counted when determining annual income . . . . Id. § 5.603(b). Because funds held in an irrevocable trust are not considered assets under section 5.603(b) so long as they are held in trust, they escape HUD's default rule that effectively requires any income generated by a tenant's assets to be counted toward her annual income upon accrual. See id. § 5.609(a)(4), - 28 - (b)(3).16 Once an irrevocable trust's accrued income is distributed, however, it shall be counted when determining annual income. Id. § 5.603(b). In short, a plain aim and effect of section 5.603(b) is to postpone the recognition of income derived from holdings in an irrevocable trust until the income is distributed out of the trust. On all of this, the parties appear to agree. The dispute concerns, instead, what happens when the trust distributes to or for the benefit of the tenant some or all of the principal originally paid into the trust. DeCambre's trust generated no substantial earnings or other income; hence, essentially all disbursements were disbursements of principal. DeCambre maintains that this disbursed principal retained the character and classification that it would have had (as a lumpsum addition to family assets, not counted toward annual income) had it been paid directly to her, rather than having first been routed through the irrevocable trust. The BHA concedes that the regulations themselves do not squarely address DeCambre's argument, but it contends that there are at least three reasons to reject DeCambre's ultimate position that the disbursements of her 16 When a tenant's assets exceed $5,000, a minimum income generation is assumed based on a percentage rate determined by HUD. 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(3). - 29 - irrevocable trust principal should not have counted toward her annual income. First, and only briefly in a footnote, the BHA argues that section 5.603(b)'s statement that [a]ny income distributed from [an irrevocable] trust fund shall be counted when determining annual income, 24 C.F.R. § 5.603(b), means that any disbursement from [an SNT] is counted toward annual income. But the BHA itself rejected such a broad, categorical reading of section 5.603(b) by excluding from DeCambre's annual income certain SNT disbursements that reimbursed medical expenses. Moreover, an advisory letter that the BHA treats as controlling, authored by one of HUD's regional offices, expressly states that [n]ot all distributions from a[n] SNT should be counted towards [a Section 8] applicant's annual income. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., New England PIH Advisory Letter #07-05 (Apr. 18, 2007) (hereinafter, Advisory Letter). Rather, the letter provides that only those disbursements that do not fall under an exclusion or deduction are . . . counted towards annual income. Id. If read to cover only income earned on the trust's principal, however, section 5.603(b)'s reference to income distributed from the trust fund, 24 C.F.R. § 5.603(b), serves a straightforward function: it ensures that the irrevocable trust income that would otherwise count immediately upon accrual toward annual income as an amount[] derived . . . from [a tenant's] assets, id. § 5.609(a)(4), but - 30 - that does not do so because of section 5.603(b)'s stipulation that an irrevocable trust fund will not be considered an asset so long as the fund continues to be held in trust, id. § 5.603(b), does eventually count toward annual income when it is disbursed.17 Were the reference, instead, intended to define irrevocable trust disbursements as a distinct category that must in all cases count toward annual income, one would have expected HUD to place the reference under the definition of annual income and not as a caveat appended to a provision ostensibly aimed at explaining how irrevocable trusts fit into the definition of net family assets. For these reasons, we conclude that the word income in section 5.603(b) does not include the principal that initially funded the trust. Of course, our conclusion that not all disbursements from an SNT are income under section 5.603(b) does not resolve the issue at hand. The definition of annual income is certainly not limited to income on investments. Rather, it encompasses all amounts . . . which . . . [g]o to . . . the family head or spouse, id. § 5.609(a)(1), unless those amounts are otherwise specifically excluded under the regulations, id. § 5.609(a)(3). So the question remains: did DeCambre's irrevocable trust 17 We acknowledge the assistance of amici National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Inc.; Special Needs Alliance, Inc.; and National Housing Law Project in elaborating this reading of section 5.603(b). - 31 - principal, which would have been classified as a specifically excluded, id., [l]ump-sum addition[] to family assets, id. § 5.609(c)(3), had it been paid directly to DeCambre, retain or regain that classification despite having first been routed through an SNT? This question moves us to the BHA's second argument: because the settlement proceeds that composed the trust principal were paid first into the SNT, rather than directly to DeCambre, they never became (or stopped being) excluded lump-sum additions to family assets, and were not otherwise excluded from the broad definition of annual income. Under the first branch of this argument, the BHA contends that DeCambre's settlement money did not fall into an income exclusion even at the time it entered the SNT. To make this argument, the BHA contends that because the lump-sum exclusion applies only to [l]ump-sum additions to family assets, id. § 5.609(c)(3) (emphasis supplied), and because, according to the BHA, an irrevocable trust fund is not considered to be an asset, see id. § 5.603(b), the lump-sum exclusion should not even apply where the settlement funds received in a lump-sum were immediately placed in a[n] SNT, and thus never became an asset. This argument, though, begs the question: to what extent should funds be classified differently when they are routed through an SNT, and thus sit beyond a tenant's control for a time, than they would have been had they been put directly under the tenant's - 32 - control in the first instance? Clearly, HUD decided that one difference was called for in order to prevent inaccessible sums from increasing a tenant's annual income: interest on the principal of an irrevocable trust fund, unlike interest generated by a fund to which the tenant has immediate access, see id. § 5.609(b)(3), counts toward annual income not when it first accrues but rather only once it is distributed. Section 5.603(b) expressly so provides, as we have discussed above. It is hard to imagine, though, that, without expressly so stating, HUD also intended, now to the tenant's detriment, to count toward annual income certain funds that would not have counted toward annual income had they not been routed directly into an irrevocable trust, merely because the tenant who opted for an irrevocable trust received the benefit of these funds only after some delay. Under the second branch of this argument, the BHA maintains that even if DeCambre's settlement proceeds had the character of a lump-sum addition to family assets when they entered the SNT, they no longer possessed that character once they were disbursed from the SNT. The BHA concedes that the regulations do not expressly address the matter of whether the nature of the fund's original source (here, a set of lump-sum personal injury settlements) loses its controlling relevance after those funds have been routed through an irrevocable trust, such that the funds are excluded from annual income upon disbursement only if they - 33 - fall anew into an independent exclusion at the time they are disbursed. The language of the regulations does, however, imply that a fund's declassification as an asset by virtue of its placement in an SNT can be temporary. Specifically, section 5.603(b) states that the value of [an irrevocable] trust fund will not be considered an asset so long as the fund continues to be held in trust. Id. § 5.603(b) (emphasis supplied). This language reasonably implies that certain irrevocable trust principal may well be considered to be an asset (rather than income) after it no longer continues to be held in trust. Id. One might therefore fairly reason that DeCambre's interest in her settlement proceeds was an asset that continued to be an asset after its detour through the trust. Indeed, the HUD advisory letter to which we have previously made reference suggests as much: it points out that although irrevocable trust distributions are to count toward annual income, annual income does not include [l]umpsum additions to family assets, such as . . . settlement for personal or property losses. Advisory Letter, supra p. 30, at 1– 2. The BHA does not explain how an irrevocable trust disbursement can constitute a legal settlement in favor of the trust's own beneficiary unless the origins of the disbursed funds are taken into account. Absent more guidance to the contrary, we can discern no reason to exclude from annual income (as the regulations clearly - 34 - do) lump-sum personal injury settlement proceeds paid directly to a tenant, see id. § 5.609(c)(3), yet not exclude those same proceeds merely because they [g]o to, or on behalf of a tenant, id. § 5.609(a)(1), through a trust of which the tenant is the beneficiary. Routing the funds into a trust deprives the tenant of their immediate use. It therefore makes sense that a regulation postpones recognition of earnings on the fund until they are disbursed. Without a reason to think otherwise, one would therefore expect the regulations to treat the principal similarly: while held in trust, an asset remains frozen and inaccessible, and therefore does not have the effect that it would have were it within the tenant's control (i.e., it does not count toward net family assets, see id. § 5.603(b)); once distributed from the trust, an asset is once again accessible, and it therefore does have the effect that it would otherwise have had it not been routed through the trust (i.e., being an asset, it is not counted toward annual income, but it does count toward net family assets). Conversely, if we follow the BHA, then an irrevocable trust becomes a mechanism for transforming assets into income. We also see a potential for untoward results that neither Congress nor HUD likely intended should we accept the BHA's view. If (as the BHA urges) we were to look only to the character of the funds as they exit the trust without reference to their provenance, the risk of double-counting arises. Suppose, for example, that a - 35 - tenant earns wages in Year One that indisputably count toward annual income in Year One. See id. § 5.609(b)(1). Then suppose that, in Year Two, the tenant moves an amount equal to those same wages from her bank account into an irrevocable self-settled spendthrift trust and later receives them as a disbursement from the trust in Year Four. See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Symposium, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2685, 2685– 86 (2006) (describing the growing availability of such trusts under state law). On the BHA's logic, as long as the eventual trust disbursements drawn from those wages do not independently fall into a regulatory exclusion, the wages would once again count toward annual income in the year they are spent for the tenant's benefit. Such a reading has little in logic to recommend it. Trying to cabin the scope of its logic to avoid such results, the BHA moves to its third argument, which maintains that even if passage through an irrevocable trust does not have the potential to convert all assets into income upon disbursement, such passage at least has the potential to convert into income those sums that are originally excluded from annual income only because they fall into the lump-sum exclusion. The BHA contends that the only reason [l]ump-sum additions to family assets, id. § 5.609(c)(3), are excluded from annual income when first received is to prevent a large, one-off monetary inflow from causing a tenant's income to spike abruptly in a single year, potentially - 36 - jeopardizing the tenant's continued participation in the Program. Because periodic disbursements from a trust fund do not have this effect, the BHA argues, the rationale for this regulatory exception does not apply when a settlement is distributed in this way. But this logic does not supply a reason why piecemeal disbursements of what was once a lump sum count toward annual income only if they are made from an irrevocable trust (and not from, say, a bank account or a pile of cash held under a mattress). Effectively acknowledging that it makes little sense to treat the regulations as allowing certain assets to transform into income only if those assets first pass through an irrevocable trust, the BHA doubles down on its third argument by contending that, even had the settlement funds here been paid directly to DeCambre, her subsequent withdrawals of the funds (from, for example, a bank account) would have counted toward her annual income. Under this interpretation of the regulations, all expenditures made from any reservoir of assets constitute income. Notwithstanding the fact that this is the principal interpretation that the BHA advances on appeal, it offers no reading of the regulations that would compel this counterintuitive conclusion that a tenant's withdrawal or expenditure of a portion of her own assets constitutes an amount that [g]o[es] to, or on behalf of, the tenant, id. § 5.609(a)(1), within the meaning of the - 37 - regulations and that is therefore presumptively included in annual income. To the contrary, the regulations point in exactly the opposite direction. For example, the regulations provide that [a]ny withdrawal of cash or assets from an investment will be included in income, except to the extent the withdrawal is reimbursement of cash or assets invested by the family. Id. § 5.609(b)(3) (emphasis supplied). Similarly, [a]ny withdrawal of cash or assets from the operation of a business or profession will be included in income, except to the extent the withdrawal is reimbursement of cash or assets invested in the operation by the family. Id. § 5.609(b)(2) (emphasis supplied). In other words, in usual course the withdrawal of an asset from a holding vehicle generates annual income only to the extent that the asset's underlying value has appreciated in the interim; the initial outlay itself retains its character as an asset that does not factor into the annual income calculation, even once withdrawn.18 So if, as the BHA contends, withdrawals of principal from an irrevocable trust should be treated like the withdrawal of cash or assets from 18To the extent that the BHA is contending that, as a matter of policy, tenants who have access to substantial assets, either in normal course or by receipt from a trust, should be required to devote those assets to housing before receiving Section 8 subsidies, it is not for either the BHA or this court to enact such a change in the law. - 38 - any other vehicle into which a lump sum has been placed, DeCambre would seem to prevail. We have also considered the BHA's contention that the HUD advisory letter to which we made earlier reference, see Advisory Letter, supra p. 30, supports this version of the BHA's argument. The BHA points to the letter's statement that [d]istributions from the trust will be counted when determining annual income. Id. at 1. But the letter also provides that [a]nnual [i]ncome does not include . . . [l]ump-sum additions to family assets, such as . . . settlement for personal or property losses. Id. at 2. Critically, the letter does not expressly acknowledge the issue before us, and it offers no rationale at all that would favor classifying the disbursements of settlement proceeds from an irrevocable trust differently from how one would classify expenditures of those same funds had the funds not first gone into the trust. Indeed, the BHA official who emailed the letter's language to another BHA official commented: [HUD's] GUIDANCE??????????????????????????????? In sum, the letter casts too little light on the question we face to serve as the sort of fair and considered judgment of a federal agency, Massachusetts v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 209 (2011)), that might warrant deference. - 39 - Alternatively, the BHA contends that we should defer to the BHA's own reading of the HUD regulations. One might ask: to which of the various readings the BHA presses on appeal should we defer? In any case, we see no basis for deferring to the BHA on how to read the applicable federal regulations. Our usual deference to a federal agency's construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). And this implicit delegation also confers upon a federal agency the authority to interpret the regulations it has promulgated to fill those statutory gaps. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). Such deference to a federal agency usually produces nationwide uniformity without conflict in the Circuits, thus impart[ing] . . . certainty and predictability to the administrative process. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 n.17 (2012) (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Such deference also recognizes that a federal agency speaks with some measure of authority on the meaning of a regulation simply by virtue of having authored that regulation. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. In contrast, we find no basis for assuming that Congress delegated any authority to the BHA to propound authoritative interpretations of either the - 40 - statute or HUD's regulations. Congress did not authorize the BHA to draft the pertinent regulations, nor does the BHA have a nationwide perspective on implementation of the statute. See Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) (state's interpretation of a federal statute received no deference because the state lacks the expertise in implementing federal laws and policies and the nationwide perspective characteristic of a federal agency). And if federal courts were to defer to state agencies' potentially diverging interpretations of federal regulations, such a practice would defeat the aim of interpretive consistency that, at least in part, justifies deference. Cf., e.g., Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495–96 (9th Cir. 1997) (no deference to state agency's interpretation of federal statute). The BHA, however, claims that the Fourth Circuit appeared to see the matter differently in Ritter v. Cecil County Office of Housing & Community Development, 33 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 1994), in which the court found it appropriate . . . to show some deference to a state agency interpreting regulations under the authority of a federally created program . . . to the extent the agency's rules are not contrary to the . . . regulation, id. at 327–28. But although the Fourth Circuit has recognized the need to permit state agencies to draw[] lines in [regulatory] gray areas, id. at 329, its deference appears so far to have been - 41 - limited to cases in which the state agency resolves mixed questions of law and fact by applying the federal regulation to a specific factual scenario, see Clark v. Alexander, 85 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 1996) (deferring to state agency hearing officer's determination of whether a particular individual could be considered a member of [plaintiff's] family under the federal housing regulations based on the individual's particular conduct around plaintiff's residence).19 We need not decide whether we would adopt the Fourth Circuit's standard were DeCambre challenging a highly fact-bound determination that her specific characteristics brought her within a broadly written regulatory provision.20 Cf. Lessard v. WiltonLyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) (mixed questions of law and fact are handled on a degree-ofdeference continuum, and the exact standard of review depends on whether and to what extent a particular determination is law- or fact-dominated). In this case, the BHA made a purely legal 19In Ritter itself, the federal agency responsible for promulgating the regulation at issue had affirmatively approved the state agency interpretation to which the Fourth Circuit deferred. See Ritter, 33 F.3d at 325. 20 A deferential standard, for example, might be appropriate were we to reach the question of whether the BHA properly determined that certain of DeCambre's specific trust disbursements did not fall into the regulatory exceptions for medical expenses, 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(4), or [t]emporary, nonrecurring or sporadic income, id. § 5.609(c)(9). Because we do not reach that branch of DeCambre's argument, we need not express an opinion about it today. - 42 - determination that a federal regulation commands a reading that would count all irrevocable trust disbursements to a tenant, or at least all such disbursements that do not independently fall into a regulatory exclusion at the time of disbursement, to be annual income upon disbursement. In doing so, the BHA did not purport to rely on local policy considerations uniquely within the ken of its expertise, nor did the BHA draw its categorical conclusion from the sort of careful examination of specific factual circumstances that appellate tribunals lack a comparative institutional advantage in undertaking.21 Therefore, we find no rationale in this case that would support extending deference to the BHA's interpretation. We therefore conclude that the BHA improperly counted the distributions from the principal of DeCambre's settlementfunded irrevocable trust toward her annual income. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment on DeCambre's Housing Act claim. Because we reach this conclusion, we need not address 21 We acknowledge that the HUD advisory letter upon which the BHA relies in part states that [t]he ultimate determination of whether each [SNT] expenditure[] counts towards annual income or falls within an exclusion or deduction is to be made by the local housing authority. Advisory Letter, supra p. 30, at 2. We understand this statement to be an acknowledgement that local public housing authorities will be best positioned in the first instance to apply HUD's regulations to the facts of any given case and not to be a grant of authority to the public housing authorities to issue definitive, nationally applicable legal pronouncements on the scope of those regulations. - 43 - DeCambre's more limited claim that the BHA violated her rights under the Housing Act by failing to exclude certain specific trust distributions from her annual income.22 And because this conclusion will require the district court to determine anew what additional proceedings or remedies are required, we vacate the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction and order remanding to the BHA. Consequently, we dismiss the BHA's crossappeal of the remand order as moot. Cf. Bos. Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 31 n.31 (1st Cir. 2008).