Opinion ID: 1818601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lightbourne

Text: In Lightbourne, a police officer approached a parked car that was brought to his attention through a citizen complaint, motivated by a concern that the [occupant] might be in need of assistance. 438 So.2d at 388. The officer found the defendant sitting awake in the car. After asking a few questions, the officer requested identification, which the defendant voluntarily relinquished. While the defendant remained inside his car, the officer took the license to his patrol car to check for outstanding warrants. Upon returning to the defendant's car, observing the defendant's furtive movements and nervous appearance, the officer removed him from the car and searched him for weapons. Id. at 388-89. The defendant claimed he had been unreasonably seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Although we acknowledged that when the officer approached the defendant he had no probable cause or well-founded suspicion that the defendant was about to commit or had committed any crime, id. at 387, we held that the defendant consented to the identification check, which meant that no showing of founded suspicion was required to justify the encounter. Id. at 388 (citing State v. Rawlings, 391 So.2d 269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). We reasoned as follows: Officer McGowan's investigation of the suspicious vehicle in this case does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional stop or seizure. Officer McGowan simply approached the parked car, asked defendant a few simple questions as to the reason for his presence there, his current address, and then ran a routine check on the defendant's car and identification. Surely the average, reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would not find the officer's actions unduly harsh. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that prior to defendant voluntarily relinquishing his driver's license to Officer McGowan he was not free to express an alternative wish to go on his way. Id. at 387-88. We quoted a district court opinion holding that mere contact between a citizen and a police officer which evokes voluntary cooperation on the part of the citizen is not a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 388 (quoting Rawlings, 391 So.2d at 270) (emphasis added). We then held that no `stop' or `seizure' of the defendant within the meaning of Terry and its progeny occurred prior to [the defendant's] removal from the car . . . to conduct the pat-down search. Id. at 388. Thus, Lightbourne was based on the voluntary nature of the encounter. We unambiguously held that the defendant was not seized when the officer checked the defendant's identification in his patrol car while the defendant waited in his car. [12] Because the encounter in Lightbourne began with an officer investigating a suspicious car and eventually matured to the point where the defendant was removed from the car based on his furtive movements and nervous appearance, id. at 387-88, some courts have interpreted that case as one resting entirely on reasonable suspicion. See State v. Taylor, 826 So.2d 399, 405 n. 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (suggesting that Lightbourne involve[d] an officer responding to a call about suspicious or criminal activity that, when coupled with the officer's observations, could create the requisite degree of reasonable suspicion); Baez v. State, 814 So.2d 1149, 1152 & n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (distinguishing Lightbourne as a case involving a suspicious activity rather than consent, but conceding that we may be wrong in our interpretation), quashed, 894 So.2d 115 (Fla.2004). Most courts, however, recognizing that the initial encounter, and the relinquishment of the license, were consensual, have interpreted it as a consent case. See, e.g., Chappell v. State, 838 So.2d 645, 647 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding under Lightbourne that the officers asking Chappell for identification and running a check did not change the encounter into a detention); State v. Chang, 668 So.2d 207, 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding under Lightbourne that an officer's asking for identification, receiving Chang's driver's license, and running a check for warrants was nothing more than a consensual encounter). [13] I agree that this is the correct interpretation. The encounter with police, and specifically the relinquishment of identification, were consensual.