Opinion ID: 706975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Due Process received?

Text: 34 It is well settled that the root requirement of the Due Process Clause [is] that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Although the pre-termination hearing need not be elaborate, some kind of hearing must be afforded the employee prior to termination. Id. The essential requirements of this pre-termination process are notice and an opportunity to respond. Id., 470 U.S. at 544-45, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. See also Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1475-76 (9th Cir.1993); Wheaton v. Webb-Petett, 931 F.2d 613, 617 (9th Cir.1991). 35 The Board contends that these simple requirements were met by the public hearings on the reorganization. They assert that these hearings provided Sue Clements with notice of the proposed eliminations and that she had opportunities to present her views but declined to do so. Although the Board invokes the magical phrases notice and opportunity to respond, the pre-termination process provided here appears to fall far short of that required by Loudermill. The public hearings to which the Board points apparently gave notice only that certain positions would be eliminated and that others would be created, and did not specify which particular individuals would be terminated. Moreover, the discussions at the hearings appear to have suggested that the layoff provisions in the manual would be followed. In view of Susan's seniority in the properties department, it appears that the hearings did not provide her with notice that she was in danger of being laid off. Nor, it would appear, did they provide her with an opportunity to respond and to make arguments as to why she had the right to fill one of the newly created positions rather than being terminated. Thus, the procedure followed here appears not to have fulfilled the purpose of the requisite pretermination hearing. 13 36 Despite the apparent inadequacy of the pre-termination process, the defendants urge that the numerous post-termination hearings provided Sue with all the process she was due. They are incorrect. In the context of process due a terminated public employee, a full post-deprivation hearing does not substitute for the required pre-termination hearing. See L.A. Police Protective League, 995 F.2d at 1475-76. Indeed, Loudermill itself reveals that post-termination administrative hearings, even if followed by judicial review, are ordinarily insufficient standing alone to satisfy procedural due process in the public employee context. 470 U.S. at 544-45, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. Although the nature of subsequent proceedings may lessen the amount of process that the state must provide pre-termination, subsequent proceedings cannot serve to eliminate the essential requirement of a pre-termination notice and opportunity to respond. 37 Although the denial of a pre-termination hearing is a constitutional violation sufficient to support damages, cf. Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.1987), 14 we must also independently assess the adequacy of the post-termination proceedings. For not only is such an assessment usually required to determine the necessary scope of pre-termination procedures, but the inadequacy of post-termination process may itself be the source of a distinct due process violation. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. at 1496 n. 12. Sue argues that the post-termination proceedings provided her were constitutionally infirm. She asserts that the post-termination process was flawed because it was infected with bias at the administrative level when Executive Director White set aside the grievance panel decisions, and the Board affirmed the director's actions. Sue alleges that these actors were biased because they harbored malice towards her stemming from her prior whistleblowing activities. If Sue's allegations are true, then she has stated a valid due process claim premised on the flawed post-deprivation procedures. 38 A biased proceeding is not a procedurally adequate one. At a minimum, Due Process requires a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60, 93 S.Ct. 80, 83, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972). This impartial tribunal requirement applies in both civil and criminal cases. Indeed, the requirement that proceedings which adjudicate individuals' interests in life, liberty, or property be free from bias and partiality has been jealously guarded. Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 241-42, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). Thus, this neutrality principle has been applied to a variety of settings, including administrative adjudications, in order to protect the independent constitutional interest in fair adjudicative procedure. Id. at 241-42 n. 2, 100 S.Ct. at 1613 n. 2. And, it has been invoked in the context of post-termination administrative proceedings. See Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to provide impartial decisionmaker at the post-termination hearing constitutes constitutional error). 39 Moreover, any bias in the administrative process in Sue's case was not cured by the subsequent judicial review in state court. Generally, an adjudication that is tainted by bias can not be constitutionally redeemed by review in an unbiased tribunal. 15 See Ward, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80. 40 In Ward, the Court reversed a defendant's conviction of two traffic offenses because he was denied a trial in an impartial tribunal when he was tried before the mayor who was also responsible for village finances and the village budget was substantially funded through fines obtained through the mayor's court. The Court expressly rejected the village's argument that any unfairness in the mayor's court could be corrected on appeal and trial de novo in the County Court of Common Pleas. The Court stated: 41 Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance. 42 Id. at 61-62, 93 S.Ct. at 84. 43 Ward holds that subsequent state court procedures, even if they include de novo review, can not cure bias in the initial adjudication. 16 We think that this principle applies regardless of whether a petitioner has been convicted or acquitted in the subsequently unbiased hearing, or whether a petitioner ultimately regains or loses his job. Obtaining full relief on the underlying substantive claim does not remedy the initial procedural injury. The right to procedural due process is absolute, and the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Thus, the absolute right to adequate procedures stands independent from the ultimate outcome of the hearing. 17 See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266-67, 98 S.Ct. at 1054. See also Knudson, 832 F.2d at 1148-49 (denial of a required pre-termination hearing is always actionable, even where an adequate post-deprivation hearing was provided and even where the deprivation itself was justified). 44 Sue asserts actual bias in the administrative tribunal and she points to facts in support of her assertions. These assertions raise a material issue of fact as to the adequacy of the post-termination proceedings. Because the record suggests that Sue was not provided with a constitutionally required pre-termination hearing, and because the record also makes it clear that the post-deprivation process may have been flawed, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on Sue's due process claims. 45