Opinion ID: 1058577
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Green's Motion to Dismiss

Text: Green first assigns error to the Panel's denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Green asserts that the Board was without jurisdiction to consider the charges against him because the basis for the Panel's issuance of the rule to show cause was the result of erroneous information in the Bar's Complaint, particularly the attached Determination. Green alleges that Bar Counsel first notified the Panel during the hearing that the certifications recited in the Determination were actually made on February 24, 2006 and not on the three dates listed in the Determination: June 16, 2005, June 21, 2005 and February 24, 2005. Green contends he thus did not receive proper notice of the charges against him because there was no prompt mailing of a Determination after the certifications and consequently, the Panel was without jurisdiction to proceed against him. Green also argues that Bar Counsel failed to inform the Panel before the hearing that the Schwartz matter had already been the subject of certification in 2003 and that the matter had been resolved. Green further contends that the Subcommittee on February 24, 2006 acted improperly when it considered actions and proceedings by other subcommittees when certifying the Determination, and that those actions also deprived the Panel of jurisdiction to proceed against him. The Bar responds that Green's argument [relating to his first assignment of error] is wholly unsupported by the record in this matter. The Bar also avers that Green's argument appears to be based solely upon the typographical error . . . and the timing of the charges brought against him. The Bar contends that the Panel had jurisdiction regardless of the typographical and other mistakes contained in the Determination, and that the Panel considered the timeliness of the certification and granted Green's motion to dismiss in part based upon the Bar's failure to certify certain charges properly. Green's contentions about the Panel's failure to grant his motion to dismiss have some superficial appeal, in part, because the Determination and the Bar's other pleadings are poorly prepared and confusing. Essentially, Green argues the mailing of the Determination on March 8, 2006 was not in compliance with the requirement under Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(G)(4) that the Subcommittee Chair shall promptly mail a copy of the Certification [Determination]. He also argues the mailing was ineffective because it was apparently done by Bar Counsel instead of Richardson as the Subcommittee chair. The latter argument has no merit as it is uncontested that Richardson signed the Determination, which was then mailed to Green showing that signature. The fact that the actual mailing of the Determination may have been done by Bar Counsel is of no legal significance and represents substantial compliance with the Rules as required by Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(E). What is of significance is whether that mailing of the Determination was prompt in relation to the Subcommittee certification. While Green expends considerable effort arguing that the recited June 16, 2005 subcommittee action regarding the Schwartz matter, and the recited June 21, 2005 subcommittee action regarding the James matter, were not prompt certifications through a March 8, 2006 mailing, his point is moot because he prevailed below. The Panel dismissed both matters, and neither formed the basis for the ultimate judgment against Green. However, Green's argument regarding the February 24, 2005 subcommittee certification is relevant on appeal, although not dispositive. Green argued to the Panel that the Subcommittee could not have properly certified the charges in the recited February 24, 2005 Subcommittee meeting because the Bar's own investigative documents were dated later in the year. In any event, Green argued that the Panel did not have jurisdiction of any of the February 24, 2005 charges because the Rule requirement for prompt mailing was not met as a matter of law by a March 8, 2006 mailing. At the November 14, 2006 hearing, the Bar responded to Green's arguments and the confusion its pleadings created by representing to the Panel that the February 24, 2005 date was a typographical error and that the Subcommittee actually met on February 24, 2006. The Bar, as further discussed in Part 3, infra, was permitted to amend its Complaint, over Green's objection, to reflect the correct date. The Bar then admitted that the February 24, 2006 Subcommittee actually consolidated and certified all the charges against Green. The Bar admitted that the subcommittees did recite in the Determination that they met on June 16, 2005 (Schwartz) and June 21, 2005 (James), but those subcommittees never certified charges against Green. Instead, the Schwartz and James matters were presented anew to the February 24, 2006 Subcommittee and certified at the same time as the four remaining matters. Despite the grossly inadequate pleadings of the Bar, the Panel did not err in refusing to sustain Green's motion to dismiss. As noted above, the legal inadequacies of the Schwartz and James matters are of no aide to Green in this appeal as he prevailed on those claims. We have previously considered the prompt mailing provision of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(G)(4) and upheld an eleven-month delay in notice of certification, when the attorney is unable to demonstrate how such delay caused him prejudice. Motley v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 251, 536 S.E.2d 101 (2000). As we stated in Motley, [i]n the absence of a showing of prejudice resulting . . . from the failure to comply with the procedural requirement of prompt mailing contained in Subsection [13(G)(4)], dismissal of the charges against [Green] would be inappropriate. 260 Va. at 258, 536 S.E.2d at 104. Green has shown no prejudice caused him by virtue of the inaccuracies in the Bar's pleadings or the two-week period that elapsed between the February 24, 2006 Subcommittee action and the March 8, 2006 mailing. In view of the fact that the remaining four matters before the Panel were actually certified from a February 24, 2006, not 2005, Subcommittee meeting, the March 8, 2006 notice was prompt within the meaning of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(G)(4). Thus, the Panel had jurisdiction over the matters before it and did not err in dismissing Green's motion to dismiss. However, before turning to Green's other assignments of error, the Court states its strong disapproval of the Bar's performance in this case. The Bar, as the public body charged with the administration of professional responsibility and ethics of Virginia lawyers, can be held to no lesser standard than the lawyers it regulates.