Opinion ID: 778685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aaron Dale Carver

Text: 26 The district court entered a judgment of conviction on the conspiracy count and the firearms count on February 26, 2001. At sentencing, the district court found that Carver was responsible for over 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine, supporting a base offense level of 34. USSG § 2D1.1(c)(3). The district court applied a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight pursuant to USSG § 3C1.2, a three-level enhancement for being a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(b), and a two-level enhancement for possessing a weapon during the course of the conspiracy pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). Carver's total adjusted base offense level amounted to 41, and his criminal history category was V. The applicable Guidelines sentencing range was 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court sentenced Carver to consecutive sentences of 240 months on the conspiracy count and 120 months on the felon in possession count. 27 Like Zimmer, Carver argues that the district court applied the wrong version of the Guidelines. Like Zimmer, Carver was convicted of participating in a conspiracy that straddled the effective date of the 1997 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. As aforementioned, our case law indicates that in these circumstances the district court's application of the more recent Guidelines is not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Cooper, 35 F.3d at 1251; Reetz, 18 F.3d at 598. Carver argues that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy before the more punitive guidelines went into effect. We reiterate that it is not easy to prove withdrawal from a conspiracy: Carver bears the burden of showing that he made a clean breast of the conspiracy or communicated his intent to withdraw to his coconspirators. Grimmett, 236 F.3d at 454; Granados, 962 F.2d at 773. We conclude that Carver has not met his burden to show a withdrawal. Independently, even assuming that Carver had withdrawn from the conspiracy, his argument gains him nothing. Under the version of the Guidelines he asks to be sentenced under, Carver's adjusted base offense level would have amounted to 39 instead of 41, but the applicable sentencing range would have still been 360 months to life imprisonment. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Nov.1995). Accordingly, because the application of the Guidelines as amended did not produce a sentence harsher than one permitted under the Guidelines in effect at the time the crime [was] committed, Reetz, 18 F.3d at 598, we conclude that no ex post facto violation occurred. 28 We also conclude that the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Carver was accountable for between 1.5 and 5 kilograms of methamphetamine. Like Zimmer, Carver is responsible for all drug quantities that he knew about or that were reasonably foreseeable to him, including those previously discussed. Smith, 240 F.3d at 737; USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1). As the lead cook in this conspiracy, Carver manufactured a significant amount of methamphetamine on his own and with the assistance of others. The testimony of his coconspirators indicates that Carver personally produced or instructed others how to produce well in excess of 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. 29 Carver challenges the district court's application of a three-level enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor within the meaning of USSG § 3B1.1(b). The Guidelines provide for a three-level enhancement if a defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants. USSG § 3B1.1(b). The district court should consider `the nature of [the] defendant's role in the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, and the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense.' United States v. Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 1 F.3d 662, 667 (8th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 980, 116 S.Ct. 487 (1995). A manager or supervisor need only have managed or supervised one other participant in the criminal conspiracy. United States v. Barrett, 173 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir.1999). In addition, the enhancement may apply even if the management activity was limited to a single transaction. United States v. Garrison, 168 F.3d 1089, 1096 (8th Cir.1999). We review the district court's determination for clear error. Skorniak, 59 F.3d at 757. 30 It is undisputed that this conspiracy involved more than five persons, and Carver cannot seriously dispute that he exercised managerial or supervisory authority over at least one other coconspirator on at least one occasion. On 30 to 36 different occasions, Carver directed the activity of coconspirator May when May assisted Carver in cooking methamphetamine. Carver directed Sandberg in the procurement of a significant amount of ephedrine pills to make methamphetamine. Carver taught Chandler how to extract ephedrine from the precursor drugs and how to set up a methamphetamine lab. Carver even created a videotape instructing others how to manufacture methamphetamine. Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence supporting the application of the role in the offense enhancement. 31 Carver asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for a two-level sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines provide for a two-level reduction where a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. USSG § 3E1.1(a). The district court's determination is given great deference. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 239 F.3d at 954. Because of the district court's unique vantage point, we will overturn the court's decision to deny an acceptance of responsibility reduction only if it is without foundation. Skorniak, 59 F.3d at 757 (internal quotation omitted). We review the district court's determination for clear error. United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1044 (8th Cir.2000). 32 Carver put the government to its burden of proof at trial. The acceptance of responsibility reduction generally does not apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n. 2). Only in rare situations may a defendant demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility after exercising his constitutional right to trial. United States v. Smith, 40 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir.1994) (internal quotation omitted). Such a rare circumstance would occur when the issues for trial did not relate to factual guilt. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 239 F.3d at 954. At trial, Carver argued that he was not a part of this conspiracy and that he did not move to Minnesota to manufacture methamphetamine. This was clearly related to his factual guilt. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Carver's motion. 33 Finally, Carver argues that the district court erred in imposing consecutive maximum sentences on each count of conviction. We disagree. Section 5G1.2(d) provides that when the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively... to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment. USSG § 5G1.2(d). We have held that total punishment is the precise sentence determined by the sentencing judge from within the appropriate Guidelines range. Ervasti, 201 F.3d at 1045-46. An analysis of Carver's sentence reveals that the maximum possible sentence available on each count of conviction was alone not adequate to achieve the total punishment. 34 Here the district court determined that the total punishment was 360 months. Because the district court did not submit the issue of drug quantity to the jury, the constitutionally permissible maximum punishment for the drug conspiracy offense was 20 years or 240 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 934 (8th Cir.) (concluding that Apprendi does not apply where sentence does not exceed the statutory range regardless of drug quantity), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026, 121 S.Ct. 600, 148 L.Ed.2d 513 (2000). Carver was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm which carries a statutory maximum penalty of ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). In this instance, the total punishment (360 months) exceeded the maximum sentence available under each count. The Guidelines require a district court to run sentences from multiple counts consecutively, rather than concurrently, if the Guideline sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for each count. United States v. Sturgis, 238 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 182, 151 L.Ed.2d 127 (2001). Accordingly, the district court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences nor was the application of § 5G1.2(d) a departure, requiring a written explanation, as Carver asserts.