Opinion ID: 2637061
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comments Emphasizing Burton's Drug Use and Appealing to Community Sentiment

Text: [¶ 14] Burton claims that the prosecutor improperly emphasized his drug involvement and appealed to community sentiment in the following exchange: [PROSECUTOR]: Ladies and gentlemen, the State understands that we have just introduced to you a completely andhopefully, an unknown world that's going on out there right here in your community. It's the drug world. You heard a lot of testimony about these young kids and the behavior that they were involved with. But ask yourself, ladies and gentlemen, would they ever get the opportunity to be doing these kinds of things if not for the likes of the Juan Burtons of the world? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that. I think that's objectionable. THE COURT: I think it is, and it's extremely improper. I'll sustain the objection. The jury should disregard that. [¶ 15] In closing argument, counsel may reflect upon the evidence admitted at trial and draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. Gayler, 957 at 861; Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo.1992). Arguments which are calculated to appeal to the jury's prejudice or passion are improper because they pose a risk that the accused may be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his guilt or innocence. Gayler, 957 P.2d at 861; Armstrong, 826 P.2d at 1116. Accordingly, it is improper for a prosecutor to encourage the jury to convict a defendant in order to protect the community rather than upon the evidence presented at trial. See e.g., Gayler, 957 P.2d at 860-62. [¶ 16] In this case, the prosecutor stated that the jury had heard evidence about the drug world in Casper. The victim, Kara Jess, and Lucas Edwards all testified about various drug-related activities in which they were involved. The prosecutor's comment was, therefore, appropriate because it was a reasonable restatement of the evidence presented at trial. [¶ 17] The prosecutor's remark suggesting that the kids would not have access to drugs if it were not for the Juan Burtons of the world is another matter. The trial judge apparently believed that the prosecutor's comment was improper because he sustained defense counsel's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. Nevertheless, the trial court judge denied Burton's motion for a new trial. In denying Burton's motion, the trial judge noted that the comment was isolated and that he had sustained Burton's objection to the comment and instructed the jury to disregard it. The trial judge also stated that Burton had not shown that he was prejudiced by the comment. [¶ 18] Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33, the trial court may grant a new trial if it is required in the interest of justice. Even if we assume that the prosecutor's comment was improper, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Burton's motion for a new trial. The trial court properly sustained defense counsel's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the improper argument. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, [w]e must assume that the jury followed the court's curative instruction. Marquez, 12 P.3d at 717 (quoting Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo.1987)). The prosecutor respected the trial court's ruling and did not return to the inappropriate line of argument. Thus, the prosecutor's conduct was not so egregious as to require a new trial in the interests of justice, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant Burton's motion for a new trial. [¶ 19] On a related matter, Burton argues that the prosecutor made an improper appeal to community sentiment when he stated: You ladies and gentlemen have the opportunity, the power to say that we are going to protect kids like [the victim] in our community. Burton did not, however, object to this comment; consequently, we will apply our plain error standard in reviewing his claim on appeal. [¶ 20] As we stated, supra, it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to appeal to the jury's passion and prejudice and encourage the jury to convict to protect the community rather than upon the evidence presented at trial. See e.g., Gayler, 957 P.2d at 860-62. A prosecutor may, however, remark that conviction of the accused will have the incidental effect of protecting the community if he does not urge the jury to convict on a basis other than the evidence against the accused. See Hodgins v. State, 962 P.2d 153, 158 (Wyo.1998). [¶ 21] The challenged comment was part of a larger point being advanced by the prosecutor: You ladies and gentleman have the opportunity, the power to say that we are going to protect kids like [the victim] in our community. The State wishes that we could have introduced to you a victim that was on the honor roll, that was the best athlete on the volleyball team, and that was the A-1 American kid of the world. But we are never going to see those kind of kids testifying to the things that [the victim] had to testify to. Because those aren't the kind of kids that find themselves in that situation. [¶ 22] When reviewed in context, it is apparent that the prosecutor was not asking the jury to convict Burton on any basis other than the specific evidence that he sexually assaulted the victim. The prosecutor was simply pointing out that the victim was, because of her lifestyle, especially susceptible to Burton's inappropriate advances and that children in her situation are in need of protection. This argument was not an improper appeal to community sentiment. Burton has not, therefore, satisfied the second prong of the plain error analysis because he has not shown a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.