Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statements and physical evidence

Text: Burns contends that the circuit court erred by failing to suppress his statements given to law enforcement officers on September 21st, 26th, and 27th. He raises specific objections with regard to each statement, so we will consider them separately. Commencing with the September 21st statement, Burns claims that Gochenour provided only a cursory rendition of Burns' Miranda rights. Therefore, the record, according to Burns, does not show that he sufficiently understood those rights to enable him to make a voluntary and intelligent waiver of them. We do not agree. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody.' Oregon v. Mathiasan, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); accord Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 745, 529 S.E.2d 570, 583, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 488, 148 L.Ed.2d 460 (2000). As the circuit court correctly determined, Burns was not in custody when he talked with Gochenour on the evening of September 21st. [12] After Burns stopped at the roadblock and asked Sheriff Green what was going on, Burns voluntarily got into a police vehicle and talked with Gochenour. Burns subsequently agreed to go to the sheriffs office to be fingerprinted. Even then, he traveled there in his own vehicle, which is certainly not an indicia of being in custody. After arriving at the sheriffs office, Burns was taken into an office that contained several desks and a computer. It was not an interview room or a cell, and the office was not locked. Thus, even though Gochenour advised Burns of his Miranda rights both at the roadblock and again upon arriving at the sheriffs office, we conclude that Burns was not in custody at either time. Consequently, he has no basis upon which to allege that the statements obtained on September 21st violated his Fifth Amendment rights. We reach the same conclusion with regard to Burns' September 26th statement. Although Burns argues that he was not advised of his Miranda rights before he made this particular statement, the evidence before the circuit court reflects that Burns again was not in custody when he made that statement. Burns had previously agreed to provide some receipts to Gochenour in order to document Burns' activities on the night of the murder. On September 26th, Burns and Gochenour talked by telephone, and Burns agreed to bring those receipts to the sheriffs office that evening around 8:00 p.m. After he arrived, Gochneour again read Miranda rights to Burns, and Burns then signed a written waiver acknowledging that he understood those rights and that he wished to talk to the law enforcement officers. During the subsequent interview, Burns admitted that he had been in Cooley's residence on the night of her murder and claimed that he had killed an unidentified black male whom he had encountered there. Near the end of the interview, Burns requested an attorney, and the interview was terminated. Burns then asked to use a restroom, after which Gochenour arrested him. Thus, Burns voluntarily came to the sheriff's office that evening and was never in custody until after he made the statement. After the interview on September 26th ended, Gochenour told Burns that, if he wanted to talk to anyone again, he could inform a jailer of that desire. According to Gochenour, he received such a call from a jailer on September 27th. After returning to the jail, Gochenour first advised Burns of his Miranda rights and then asked Burns if he had requested to speak with Gochenour. The transcript of that taped interview reflects that Burns responded affirmatively to that question. Nevertheless, Burns contends that, when he contacted the jailer on September 27th, he did not intend to subject himself to further interrogation by a police officer. Relying on McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), Burns argues that, once he asserted his right to counsel, he could not be approached for further interrogation until counsel was available to him. We do not agree with Burns' argument. As the circuit court concluded, Burns initiated contact with Gochenour on September 27th. If the accused, not the police, [reopens] the dialogue with the authorities', a court, upon consideration of that fact and the totality of the circumstances', may reasonably find that the accused has made a `knowing and intelligent' waiver of his rights. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 583, 423 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1992) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). Here, the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that Burns requested to speak with Gochenour and that Gochenour re-advised Burns of his Miranda rights before even inquiring whether Burns had made such a request, support the circuit court's conclusion that Burns' September 27th statement was knowingly and intelligently and voluntarily made. In addition to these specific objections to each of his statements, Burns also asserts three additional reasons why none of his statements were voluntary in the constitutional sense. First, he claims that his intellectual functioning, psychological problems, recent use of alcohol, and mental and physical condition rendered him incapable of voluntarily making the statements. Next, he argues that Gochenour used the prospect of the defendant seeing his wife as a means of pressuring Burns to the point that his ability to function was critically impaired. Finally, Burns claims that Gochenour repeatedly asked him to submit to a polygraph examination, thus subjecting Burns to increased pressure. Again, the record supports the circuit court's conclusion that all of Burns' statements were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Although Burns was declared incompetent to stand trial at one point before the trial commenced, his competency was restored, and there is no evidence that he was suffering from depression or was incompetent when he made the statements to Gochenour. His ability to understand and act voluntarily is further reflected by the fact that he requested an attorney at one point during the interview on September 26th. In short, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Burns' statements were  the product[s] of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by [their] maker.' Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 324, 356 S.E.2d 157, 163, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)); accord Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 132, 410 S.E.2d 254, 261 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946, 112 S.Ct. 1500, 117 L.Ed.2d 639 (1992). Burns makes the same argument that his fingerprints, hair, and samples of bodily fluids were taken in violation of his constitutional rights. He claims that he did not execute a written consent or waiver, and that his oral consent to be fingerprinted and to provide hair and bodily fluids for the PERK Kit was not voluntarily, intelligently or freely given. For the reasons that we have already enunciated, we do not agree. We have also recognized that consent to a body search may be oral as well as written. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 49, 307 S.E.2d 864, 874 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109, 104 S.Ct. 1617, 80 L.Ed.2d 145 (1984). Furthermore, according to Gochenour, Burns asked several questions about how the bodily fluids would be obtained. Those inquiries evidence Burns' understanding of the PERK Kit and what he was being asked to do. Gochenour also testified that, while Burns was waiting at the hospital, Burns stated that his stomach was hurting and that he would have to leave and come back later if the medical personnel did not hurry. When Burns went into the examination room at the hospital, Thomas accompanied him into that room. Thomas testified that, when the medical personnel asked Burns to remove his underwear, Burns stated that he did not know that his underwear would be taken. At that point, Thomas advised Burns, Well, you know, if you don't want to do this, you don't have to, we can stop now. According to Thomas, Burns indicated that he wanted to go ahead and get it over. Thus, the circuit court did not err in refusing to suppress the results of the tests conducted on Burns' fingerprints, hair, and samples of bodily fluids.