Opinion ID: 2805926
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Counties’ New Theory

Text: The counties now argue that Kentucky law empowers them to seek enforcement of a statute in which the county has an interest. Understanding their position requires some background on the legal structure of county government in Kentucky. The Kentucky constitution recognizes counties as subdivisions of the state and establishes several elected offices. See, e.g. Ky. Const. §§ 99, 144. Counties are governed by fiscal courts, which are composed of the county judge/executive and either three commissioners or three to eight justices of the peace. Ky. Const. § 144. The judge/executive, when acting separately from the fiscal court, holds the executive and administrative powers of the county, and the fiscal court exercises the legislative powers of the county. Ky. Const. § 125; Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 67.710, 67.080. The fiscal court may not exercise executive authority, except as specifically assigned by statute. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 67.080(3). The county attorney is also a constitutionally established office. Ky. Const. § 99. A county attorney is responsible for serving as counsel for the fiscal court and “shall institute, defend, and conduct all civil actions in which the county or consolidated local government is interested before any of the courts of the Commonwealth.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 69.210 (1). The counties analogize the roles of the county attorneys to other constitutional officers that act on behalf of the commonwealth, particularly the attorney general, and seek analogous authority to enforce laws that affect the interests of counties. The Attorney General, exercising his common-law powers, may institute such suits in any venue. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020 -7- No. 14-5647 Boyd County, et al. v. MERSCORP, Inc., et al. (mandating that the Attorney General “exercise all common law duties and authorities” pertaining to the office except where otherwise provided by statute); Commonwealth ex rel. Conway v. Thompson, 300 S.W.3d 152, 172–74 (Ky. 2009). Furthermore, in each judicial circuit (the trial-level jurisdiction in Kentucky), the commonwealth’s attorney is empowered to bring and defend litigation on behalf of the commonwealth—in courts within that circuit. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 69.010 (“[T]he Commonwealth’s attorney shall . . . attend to all civil cases and proceedings in which the Commonwealth is interested in the Circuit Courts of his judicial circuit.”); Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 205 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1947) (relying on this statutory authority to empower a Commonwealth’s attorney to pursue an injunction that was not explicitly authorized or available to private parties).1 The counties are staking out a novel legal theory—and such legal innovations are better addressed by Kentucky courts. “[F]ederal courts sitting in a diversity case are in ‘a particularly poor position . . . to endorse a fundamental policy innovation.’” Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 577–78 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co. (Pexto), 739 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir.1984)) (alteration omitted). Therefore, “‘[w]hen given a choice between an interpretation of [state] law which reasonably restricts liability, and one which greatly expands liability, we should choose the narrower and more reasonable path.’” Id. at 577 (quoting Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1412 (7th Cir.1994) (en banc)) (alterations in original). The counties ask us to expand their rights under Kentucky law, and we must refuse. We nevertheless decline to certify the question to the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Kentucky Supreme Court is authorized to receive certified questions from both United States 1 In the circuits that contain large cities, the county attorneys also take on a separate role of representing the commonwealth in civil cases in their own counties. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 69.210(4). Although some of the county attorneys appearing in this lawsuit are empowered to represent the commonwealth, they are not representing the commonwealth in this proceeding. -8- No. 14-5647 Boyd County, et al. v. MERSCORP, Inc., et al. District Courts and United States Courts of Appeal. Ky. Civ. R. 76.37(1). When a party seeks certification of a question from both the district court and our court, we must therefore exercise our own discretion whether to certify, in addition to or instead of reviewing the district court’s exercise of its discretion. The counties initiated this lawsuit in federal court, and they did not ask for certification until after the district court ruled against them. “[C]ertification is disfavored where a plaintiff files in federal court but then, in light of an unfavorable judgment, seeks refuge in a state forum.” Geronimo v. Caterpillar, Inc., 440 F. App’x 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2011). We are not persuaded by the counties’ argument that they filed in federal court because of “the virtual certainty that . . . the state court action [would have been] removed to federal court.” Appellant’s Br. at 27. To the extent that the counties did, in fact, believe that state courts provided a better forum to consider their novel legal argument, they should have filed in state court or at least sought certification before the district court ruled on the merits of the claim. Town of Smyrna, Tenn. v. Mun. Gas Auth. Of Ga.¸ 723 F.3d 640, 649 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The appropriate time to seek certification of a state-law issue is before a District Court resolves the issue, not after receiving an unfavorable ruling.”).