Opinion ID: 595542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellant jean-paul lamere

Text: 67 Count V, the count of Jean-Paul Lamere's conviction, was drawn under 18 U.S.C. § 472, which makes it a crime to, inter alia, possess or conceal counterfeit currency. 8 Count V charges that: 68 On or about the 20th day of May, 1990, in the State and District of Minnesota, the defendant JEAN-PAUL ALLEN LAMERE 69 with intent to defraud, did possess or conceal falsely made, forged, counterfeit obligations or securities of the United States, to wit: counterfeit $20 face value and $100 face value Federal Reserve Notes in the total approximate amount of $40,000; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 472. 70 (Emphasis added). As noted above, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Jean-Paul Lamere pled guilty to Count V of the indictment charging him with possessing or concealing falsely made counterfeit obligation of the United States. Plea Agreement and Sentencing Stipulations, United States v. Jean-Paul Lamere, Cr. No. 3-91-73(02), Minn.D. Aug. 20, 1991. (Emphasis added). 71 Appellant argues that the offense to which he pled guilty included the elements of possession and concealment of the counterfeit currency in question. This possession and concealment was at the direction of his brother and was one and the same with conduct upon which the district court supported its two point enhancement for obstruction of justice. Appellant urges that basing an obstruction enhancement upon the same conduct for which he was convicted amounts to double counting and is violative of the intention of the Sentencing Commission that Guideline sections should not be construed in a manner that would result in cumulative punishment for the same conduct. See United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1017-18 (8th Cir.1990). 72 In Werlinger, this Court stated its opinion that the Guideline Commission did not intend for the obstruction adjustment to apply cumulatively to the same conduct. Id. at 1017. This Court applies the presumption that sentence enhancement provisions will not be applied cumulatively, in the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary. Id. (citations omitted). Put another way, Congress does not intend to impose multiple punishments for one offense unless it clearly expresses an intent to do so. Id. (citations omitted). The Court reasoned that there is nothing in the Guidelines or its commentary to indicate a clear intention to impose cumulative punishments. Id. at 1018. On the contrary, the Guidelines Commission has recognized that 'double-counting' conduct in applying the Guidelines is inconsistent with the congressional goal of proportionality in sentencing and should be avoided. Id.; see also the commentary to various Chapter Three adjustments, which explain application so as to prevent double-counting. This recognition, and resultant policy of mutual exclusivity indicates that the Sentencing Commission did not intend for multiple Guidelines sections to be construed so as to impose cumulative punishment for the same conduct. Werlinger, 894 F.2d at 1018. 73 In United States v. Lloyd, this Court followed Werlinger. 947 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.1990). Lloyd involved a defendant convicted for bankruptcy fraud. Id. The district court enhanced his offense level for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C.1 based on his conduct in concealing assets from bankruptcy court officers and for committing perjury. Id. This Court found the conduct supporting the enhancement to be coterminous with the conduct that was the basis for criminal charges. Id. Citing Werlinger, this Court held that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (obstruction enhancement) does not apply to conduct that is part of the crime itself and remanded the case to the district court to resentence Lloyd. Id. 74 Here, the two level obstruction enhancement, as applied against Appellant Jean-Paul Lamere, was based upon conduct that was coterminous with the conduct for which he was convicted. Under Werlinger and Lloyd, supra, such enhancement would amount to double-counting. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement to Appellant Jean-Paul Lamere. We therefore REVERSE that portion of the district court's decision.