Opinion ID: 1115600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court err in sentencing appellant as a habitual offender?

Text: Appellant argues that neither Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Supp. 1981) or any Uniform Criminal Rule of Circuit Court Practice set forth a procedure for determining and adjudicating a defendant as a habitual offender. appellant acknowledges Rule 6.04 entitled Procedure for Proof of Prior Convictions under the Habitual Criminal Statute, however, contends this rule applies only to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Supp. 1981). This question was answered in Usry v. State, 378 So.2d 635 (Miss. 1979), wherein this Court held: All cases tried in the future involving section 99-19-81, the habitual offenders statute, should be tried pursuant to Rule 6.04 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice (1972). (378 So.2d at 639) Defendant next contends that he should have been entitled to a jury trial on the issue of whether or not he was a habitual offender. This precise question was answered by this Court adversely to appellant in Diddlemeyer v. State, 398 So.2d 1343 (Miss. 1981), Yates v. State, 396 So.2d 629 (Miss. 1981), and Wilson v. State, 395 So.2d 957 (Miss. 1981). Although the aforementioned cases involved Section 99-19-83, the procedure involved under both Sections 99-19-81 and 99-19-83 is identical. Usry v. State, supra . Appellant's contention that the statute constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment has no merit. In Jordan v. State, 383 So.2d 495 (Miss. 1980), this Court stated: Finally, Brown argues that the minumum sentence provision is unconstitutional because it divests the trial court of all discretion concerning the duration of punishment or the granting of probation. In 1916 the Supreme Court held that a United States District Court was not free to ignore a congressionally imposed minimum sentence. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916). The Court reiterated that the statutory boundaries of criminal sentences are peculiarly questions of legislative policy in Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1285, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958). These decisions effectively foreclose appellant's constitutional attack on the mandatory minumum sentence. (383 So.2d at 497) This Court has consistently held that a sentence will be upheld if within statutory limits. Mansell v. State, 403 So.2d 871 (Miss. 1981), Henderson v. State, 402 So.2d 325 (Miss. 1981), and Bracy v. State, 396 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1981). Also, where a sentence does not exceed statutory limits, it does not constitute cruel and inhuman treatment. Baker v. State, 394 So.2d 1376 (Miss. 1981). Defendant in the present case did not even offer any mitigating circumstances. Finally, appellant avers his first conviction, relied upon for enhanced punishment, occurred during his minority; therefore, it should not have been considered by the trial judge. There was no evidence presented by appellant during the sentencing phase to show that appellant was tried other than as an adult in Alabama. Remoteness in the convictions relied upon for enhanced punishment is not a factor to be considered. Pace v. State, 407 So.2d 530 (Miss. 1981). Finding no error in the sentencing of appellant as a habitual offender, this case must be affirmed. AFFIRMED.  PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.