Opinion ID: 171744
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the claim for monetary relief?

Text: The Tucker Act mandates that the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against government agencies founded on contract or federal law only when the action seeks monetary relief in excess of $10,000. Hamilton Stores, Inc. v. Hodel, 925 F.2d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). To determine whether a claim seeks monetary relief, however, a reviewing court must look beyond the face of the complaint. [T]he Court of Federal Claims' exclusive jurisdiction may not be avoided by `framing a complaint in the district court as one seeking injunctive, declaratory, or mandatory relief when, in reality, the thrust of the suit is one seeking money from the United States.' Burkins, 112 F.3d at 449 (quoting New Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d 1318, 1322 (10th Cir.1984)). Even if a complaint does not explicitly seek monetary relief, the Court of Federal Claims' exclusive jurisdiction is triggered whenever the prime objective or essential purpose of a suit is to recover money in excess of $10,000 from the federal government. See Burkins, 112 F.3d at 449. A plaintiff's prime objective or essential purpose is monetary unless the non-monetary relief sought has significant prospective effect or considerable value apart from the claim for monetary relief. Id. (internal quotations omitted). In the instant action, Normandy did not expressly seek monetary relief. Rather, it asked for temporary and permanent injunctive relief ... against [HUD's] attempts to terminate Housing Assistance Payments to Normandy on the basis of [its] inspection scores and reports. Complaint 16. The district court, however, understood Normandy's claim to be, in essence, a disguised claim for monetary relief. See Normandy Apartments, Ltd., 2007 WL 3232610 at  (Although the relief sought in the complaint is couched as injunctive and declaratory relief... what plaintiff is really seeking is money from the federal government, that is, the stream of Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments allegedly due under the HAP Contract.). We disagree. In those cases in which we have found that the prime objective of an equitable action is, in actuality, the procurement of money in excess of $10,000 from the federal government, we have typically found dispositive that the action lacks any significant prospective effect or considerable value apart from facilitating a monetary claim to compensate for past wrongdoing. See, e.g., Burkins, 112 F.3d at 449. In Burkins, for example, an Army veteran petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the Army to correct his military records to reflect that he received a disability discharge twenty years earlier. Although the relief Mr. Burkins sought was not monetary on its face, we recognized that his prime objective was to obtain benefits exceeding $10,000 from the retroactive disability payments he would have been owed upon obtaining a successful verdict. Id. We found that Mr. Burkins failed to show how the relief he sought had any significant prospective effect or value apart from the retroactive benefits, as he had already secured entitlement to future benefits. See id. at 449-50. Because we concluded that the primary purpose of Mr. Burkins's suit was to obtain monetary benefits for past wrongs, we determined that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Id. at 450. See also Francis E. Heydt Co. v. United States, 948 F.2d 672, 674-77 (10th Cir.1991) (finding no significant prospective effect apart from a claim for monetary relief for past harms). In contrast, the focus of Normandy's claim, when filed, was entirely prospective in nature. At the time of the district court's hearing on Normandy's preliminary injunction request on October 30, 2007, HUD had not yet terminated benefits and Normandy did not have any claim for past moneys due. See Aplt. Br. 13-14 (noting that HUD was not scheduled to terminate benefits until November 1, one day later). Had Normandy's action for injunctive relief been successful, it would not have enabled a claim for money damages; instead, it would have prevented such a claim from arising in the first place. Normandy's claim was primarily designed not to enable a claim for past pecuniary harm, but to preserve an ongoing relationship. In such instances, we have found a claim's prime objective to be to obtain equitable relief, not monetary relief. See Francis E. Heydt Co., 948 F.2d at 676; see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 905 n. 41, 108 S.Ct. 2722 (recognizing that whether relief is likely to have significant prospective effect upon [an] ongoing ... relationship is relevant to applicability of the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity). Normandy's claim is therefore similar to the claim in Southeast Kansas Community Action Program Inc. v. Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, 967 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir.1992). In that case, a nonprofit corporation sued the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, challenging the Defendants' failure to renew its contract to administer a federal child nutrition program. Id. at 1454. We concluded that the essential purpose of the suit was to obtain equitable relief, finding significant that the plaintiff sought an Order declaring [the] regulations void and a mandatory injunction compelling Defendants to continue to provide funds for Plaintiff's operation of the [federal] program until such time as an adequate hearing is held on the merits of Plaintiff's disqualification and failure to renew Plaintiff's contract. Id. at 1456. Similarly, Normandy sought an order declaring HUD in violation of its regulations and injunctive relief compelling HUD to continue funding its Section 8 housing activities until the merits of Normandy's claim were resolved. See Aplt.App. 20. It is true, of course, that should Normandy's claim prove successful todayover a year after HUD ceased disbursing funds to the companythis might enable a subsequent claim for monetary relief. This, however, does not alter our assessment. [D]istrict court jurisdiction over a suit for nonmonetary relief is not foreclosed by the fact that it may later be the basis for an award of damages against the United States. Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 589 (3d Cir.1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the Claims Court should retain jurisdiction in all suits where Plaintiff's requested relief would have an impact on the federal treasury. Se. Kan. Cmty. Action Program, 967 F.2d at 1456 (citing Bowen, 487 U.S. 879, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749). The fact that in some later suit, collateral estoppel may require the Claims Court to adhere to a district court determination of the lawfulness of government conduct does not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction at this point. Hahn, 757 F.2d at 589. Because Normandy's claim for a permanent injunction, if successful, could enable the restoration of Normandy's contractual relationship with the government, it retains significant prospective value today. We therefore conclude that the claim's prime objective remains securing equitable relief.