Opinion ID: 1736768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendant's global objection

Text: Near the end of a lengthy voir dire that spanned several days and twelve panels of prospective jurors, [10] defendant's attorney voiced a combined Batson-J.E.B. challenge, stating: at this time we would like to raise a Batson objection on two grounds. One is that State's use of its peremptory exceptions was directly targeted to exclude people according to race. Following an interruption, defendant's attorney completed the objection, stating: I said on two grounds. One is that they're using a peremptory challenge to exclude women and the other to exclude blacks. This was the full extent of the defense's argument. Other than providing a list of the excluded jurors, no attempt was made to particularize the objection to any of the excluded jurors. Nor did the defense object contemporaneously with the prosecution's exercise of any of its previous peremptory challenges. Rather, the above global objection was the only objection in this case, and it was not made until after the examination of panel number ten (of twelve) prospective jurors. By the time defendant's global objection was made, all but one of the jurors had been selected, and the state had exercised eight of its twelve available peremptory challenges. All eight of these challenges were exercised to exclude women; more particularly, five of the women were African-Americans, and three were Caucasian-Americans. [11] In response to defendant's global objection the following exchange took place: By the Court: My problem with this is you guys wait until we've released these people and they're gone and then you put me on notice and obligates me to have someif you make some kind of showing and I've got to have a hearing, and the people are gone. If you're going to do this, you've got to put the Court on notice timely. By Mr. Perkins: Well, I didn't understand there was to be any hearing as to the challenges themselves. By the Court: Well, you're making these challenges for the record, but we can't have a hearing. If I have a hearing, how am I going to decide it if the people are already gone? By Mr. Jones: Your Honor, they have to show a pattern of discrimination by exercise of the preempts of the State. By the Court: But what I'm pointing out is By Mr. Jones: And there is no pattern. So there is no hearing. By the Court: But, Mr. Jones, if they did show a pattern, they have waited until these people have all been released and gone before they even notify me. If they showed a pattern what could I do? By Mr. Jones: I understand your Court's ruling, but there is no pattern to it. There is absolutely no pattern. Every one that I excused has been for a valid reason. The trial court's concern over the timing of defendant's objection was understandable; as we recently noted, [t]he issue of the timeliness of Batson objections is difficult because a pattern of discrimination may not become evident in early stages of voir dire. State v, Jacobs, 99-0991 at p. 4 (La.5/15/01), 803 So.2d at 939. While counsel should preferably make the objection as soon as the discriminatory pattern is evident, [c]ontemporaneous objections are not always feasible ... because a pattern of invidious discrimination may not be evident until jury selection is complete. Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205,1209-10 (D.C.App.1993). Although Batson mandated that the challenging party make the objection timely, a Batson objection is timely if it is made before the jury is empaneled and sworn. State v. Green , 94-0887 at p. 20 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 285; State v. Williams, 524 So.2d 746 (La.1988); see also La. C. Cr. Pro. art. 795 B(1)(mandating that [p]eremptory challenges shall be exercised prior to the swearing of the jury panel.) [12] Defendant's global objection, albeit made near the end of the lengthy voir dire, was made before the jury was sworn and therefore was timely.