Opinion ID: 3148968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to State a Claim under the SCA

Text: The SCA provides a civil cause of action for damages or other relief to any person “aggrieved by any violation of [the SCA] in which the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or intentional state of mind[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a). As discussed, it would be a violation for a provider to “knowingly divulge” subscriber information if the disclosure is not otherwise permitted under the SCA. TWC argued for dismissal on the grounds that its mistaken disclosure of plaintiffs’ information was insufficient to establish that it acted with the required state of mind. We agree. We accept the allegation that TWC’s error resulted in an unauthorized disclosure of plaintiffs’ subscriber information to a governmental entity. But, no facts were alleged to suggest that TWC was aware of the error at the time of the disclosure, namely that the information it disclosed was not associated with the IP address that was the subject of the grand jury subpoena. Without arguing to the contrary, plaintiffs contend that it is sufficient to have alleged that TWC was aware of the “act” of disclosure. Tellingly, plaintiffs maintain that TWC may be held liable for negligently or recklessly failing to ensure the accuracy of the information it disclosed in response to the subpoena. Whether this would be sufficient to establish the requisite state of mind is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See Elgharib v. Napolitano, 600 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2010). The inquiry begins with a natural reading of the full text, including the language and design of the statute as a whole; considers the common-law meaning of its terms; and may examine the relevant legislative history if the statutory language is not clear. Id. Starting with the relevant language, plaintiffs must show that “the conduct constituting the violation”—here, that TWC “knowingly” divulged plaintiffs’ subscriber information without authorization—was “engaged in with a knowing or intentional state of mind.” The provisions governing disclosures of subscriber information to governmental entities make clear that not every disclosure is prohibited. The most natural reading of this language requires a showing that the provider knew not only that it was divulging information (i.e., that the act of disclosure was § 2520(d)(1) where the defendant officer held “an honest and reasonable belief that he acted legally pursuant to a valid court order issued in accordance with state law”). No. 14-3996 Long, et al. v Insight Communications Page 8 not inadvertent), but also what information was being divulged (i.e., the facts that made the disclosure unauthorized). See McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2015) (holding that the most natural reading of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is that “the word ‘knowingly’ applies not just to the statute’s verbs but also to the object of those verbs”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 270-71 (1952) (interpreting “knowingly converts” to require that defendant “had knowledge of the facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion”). The factual allegations do not permit an inference that TWC knew that the wrong subscriber information was being divulged in response to the subpoena.5 The terms “knowing” and “intentional” are not defined by the statute, and alone may have more than one meaning. But, in context, the language specifies that it is the conduct constituting the violation (not just the act of disclosure) that must have been knowing or intentional. Further, this interpretation is supported by the legislative history for the ECPA. First, although not specific to the SCA, the Senate Report explained that, “[a]s used in the [ECPA], the term ‘intentional’ is narrower than the dictionary definition . . . [and] means more than that one voluntarily engaged in conduct or caused a result. Such conduct or the causing of the result must have been the person’s conscious objective.” S. Rep. 99-541, at 23 (1986) (reprinted at 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577); see also H. Rep. No. 99-647, at 48 (1986) (same). It is reasonable to conclude that this definition was intended to apply to both Title I and Title II of the ECPA. Further, the legislative history includes the explanation that “a knowing state of mind is (1) an awareness of the nature of the conduct, (2) an awareness of or a firm belief in the existence of the circumstance, and (3) an awareness of or a firm belief in the substantial certainty of the result.” H. Rep. 99-647, at 49. Also, in discussing the SCA’s related prohibition on the disclosure of the contents of communications in § 2702(a), the legislative history specifically advises that: “The requirement that a violator must ‘knowingly’ divulge the contents is intended 5 It is this mistake that distinguishes this case from Freedman, where the defendant knowingly divulged the plaintiffs’ subscriber information in response to a warrant request but claimed to have been mistaken about the validity of the warrant. See Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749 (E.D. Va. 2004) (clarifying Freedman, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 645). This case does not involve a mistake as to the legal validity of the disclosure, but a lack of knowledge about the fact that the wrong information was being divulged. See, e.g., United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497, 1502-03 (6th Cir. 1992) (knowledge under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 included the fact of whether the interception was nonconsensual). No. 14-3996 Long, et al. v Insight Communications Page 9 to make clear that ‘reckless’ or ‘negligent’ conduct is not sufficient to constitute a violation of this section.” S. Rep. 99-541, at 36-37; see also H. Rep. 99-647, at 64 (“The concept of ‘knowingly’ does not include, however, ‘reckless’ or ‘negligent’ conduct.”). This supports our interpretation that for the conduct constituting the violation to have been knowing and intentional, TWC must have known that it was not divulging the subscriber information associated with the IP address that was the subject of the subpoena. The dismissal of the claim for violation of the SCA is affirmed.