Opinion ID: 195118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial Hearing on Jurisdiction.

Text: 5 Appellants first maintain that the FJDA divested the district court of jurisdiction to try them as adults unless some of their conspiratorial conduct occurred after they reached eighteen years of age (post-majority conduct). Since appellants contested the factual basis for the charge that they participated in the Sepulveda conspiracy after attaining their majority, they insist that the FJDA required a threshold evidentiary hearing on their jurisdictional claim before they could be subjected to trial as adults. 3 We do not agree. 6 The FJDA defines a juvenile as a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purposes of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his twenty-first birthday.... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5031 (emphasis added). 4 Both Welch and Driesse were between ages eighteen and twenty-one at the time of their indictment. Juvenile delinquency is defined as the violation of a law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the FJDA does not apply to a defendant who ... is not a juvenile and who has not committed an act of juvenile delinquency. United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 969 (7th Cir.1989). 7 Generally speaking, it is readily apparent whether a non-continuing substantive violation was committed prior to or after the alleged offender's eighteenth birthday. See United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1477 n. 15 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 1631, 95 L.Ed.2d 204 and cert. denied, 482 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 3215, 96 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987). On the other hand, a criminal conspiracy--often a continuing offense--may persist long past its commencement, sometimes spanning the eighteenth birthday of an alleged conspirator. See United States v. Gjonaj, 861 F.2d 143, 144 (6th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 135 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 162, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987). 5 8 The government asserts that the FJDA is inapplicable to appellants simply because the indictment charged that the conspiracy spanned their eighteenth birthdays. Appellants counter that the FJDA's applicability in a conspiracy case ought not depend conclusively on bare allegations as to the time period spanned by the conspiracy or the defendant's membership in it. On balance, however, we find the allegation-based approach to FJDA applicability more consonant with its language and structure, its legislative history, the case law, and important policy considerations. 9 Prosecutorial discretion is a hallmark of the criminal justice system. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) ([T]he decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charges to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion.) (quoting Bordenkircher v. United States, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)). Notwithstanding several amendments expanding the role of the courts, the FJDA continues to impart considerable prosecutorial discretion as to whether an accused will be tried as an adult even though the criminal conduct charged qualifies as an act of juvenile delinquency. 6 For example, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032 the government may bring a motion to transfer a juvenile defendant to the district court for trial as an adult if the juvenile is at least fifteen years of age and the government alleges that the juvenile committed certain enumerated transferable offenses (e.g., violent crimes or controlled substance violations). Although transfer is subject to an interest of justice test as well, the district court nonetheless may assume, without receiving evidence, that the government's factual allegations relating to the character of the offense are true. See In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C.Cir.1990); United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1250 n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 276, 107 L.Ed.2d 257 (1989). Yet more to the point, section 5032 permits the government to implement--again, on mere allegation, without prior hearing or judicial authorization--the mandatory transfer of a recidivist juvenile offender for trial as an adult. See Pub.L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. XII, Part A, Sec. 1201, 98 Stat. 1837, 2149-50 (1988). 7 Given the breadth of Congress's consignment of other jurisdictional determinations to the prosecutor's discretion under the FJDA, it is not surprising that appellants cite no case law directly supporting their asserted right to a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the district court's jurisdiction to try them as adults. 8 10 Our interpretation comports with three basic policy concerns as well. First, neither appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the district court's decision to defer its determination of the applicability of the FJDA until trial. Congress did not amend the FJDA primarily in order to confer greater procedural rights on juveniles than are available to adults, but to assure that the procedural rights afforded juveniles would be augmented to a level comparable to those available to adults. See S.Rep. No. 1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5312 (FJDA simply codifies safeguards fundamental to our system of justice, per In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). In fact, alleged offenders between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one at indictment often receive more procedural protections under the adult criminal justice system than would be available under juvenile process. 9 11 Second, the proposed pretrial evidentiary hearing would place an unwarranted burden on the prosecution, especially in multi-defendant conspiracy cases where most alleged coconspirators are adults. Regardless of the precise burden of proof applicable at the pretrial evidentiary hearing, the government would no doubt be expected to present substantial evidence outlining the alleged conspiracy, thereby prematurely tipping its hand on trial strategy and the testimony of its witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500(a) (Jencks Act); Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(2). Furthermore, we do not think a pretrial hearing would significantly enhance the procedural protection of youthful defendants already indicted by a grand jury. 12 Finally, the issue of district court jurisdiction in cases implicating the FJDA seems to us sufficiently similar to other fact-bound defenses to tip the balance in favor of a determination by the trial jury. See infra Pt. I.C. Appellants could only be convicted as adults if they participated in, or ratified the conspiracy, after age eighteen. See United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 400, 610, 116 L.Ed.2d 349, 633 (1991), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 948, 1219, 1978, 2317, 117 L.Ed.2d 117, 456, 118 L.Ed.2d 577, 119 L.Ed.2d 236 (1992). A finding of participation or ratification ordinarily depends heavily upon (i) common-sense evaluations of the youthful defendants' actions--viewed in the context of the criminal enterprise and the conduct of their coconspirators--and (ii) inferences as to the state of mind of the various actors. See United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1536, 1537 (1st Cir.1989) (conspiracy requires that the individual defendant knew of the agreement, had intent to agree, and had intent to commit the substantive offense), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2886, 115 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1991). These are matters especially suited to jury resolution. See United States v. Piedrahita-Santiago, 931 F.2d 127, 130 (1st Cir.1991) (It is the province of the jury, not this court, to determine the credibility of the witnesses.); cf. United States v. Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d 979, 985 (1st Cir.) (We defer, within reason, to inferences formulated by the jury in light of its collective understanding of human behavior in the circumstances revealed by the evidence.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982, ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. 1637, 2808-09, 113 L.Ed.2d 732, 115 L.Ed.2d 980-81 (1991). 10 Properly instructed in the performance of their traditional tasks, trial juries can be entrusted to discriminate between pre-majority and post-majority conduct. See, e.g., Cruz, 805 F.2d at 1476. We therefore conclude that the FJDA's language, structure, legislative history, and related policy considerations, militate against requiring a pretrial evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction. 13