Opinion ID: 1297404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: For reasons heretofore stated, determination as to reasonableness of the questioned five year amortization provision dictates a consideration of the factual situation here presented.

Text: As aforesaid, the record discloses defendants owned and operated their auto salvage business prior to passage of the contested ordinance which, inter alia, prohibited operation of any auto salvage yard in the area occupied by defendants, Zone A-Agricultural. It also accorded existing junk yards in that area five years to discontinue operations. At the same time conduct of such a business was permitted in heavy industrial districts, created under section 14 of the enactment. Defendants have intentionally continued their wrecking operations beyond the fixed limitation period. The only evidence regarding their enterprise is that it is a substantial business operation. No showing is made relative to defendants' business investment, value of any improvements on their land, or extent of hardship, if any, in complying with the disputed ordinance. Upon the basis of this record we are called upon to determine whether defendants adequately met and sustained the burden they assumed in challenging reasonableness of the ordinance as it applies to them. It is argued by defendants they did so. In support of that position they cite and lean rather heavily on Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843, 58 A.L.R.2d 1304. But we find that case neither factually comparable nor here controlling. In Stoner McCray this court held unreasonable, a zoning ordinance which, in effect, provided for elimination of certain billboards within two years after the enactment. However, the record there disclosed the sign company, relying on permits issued by the municipality, had promptly made substantial investments in the construction of new and costly advertising boards. The matter of monetary expenditures, though not alone necessarily determinative, is one element to be considered whenever relevant or possible, with regard to any zoning amortization program, in the weighing of private hardship against public health, safety, morals and welfare. See 57 N.W. U.L.Rev. 323, 328, and Annos. 22 A.L.R.3d 1134, 1139-1159. On the other hand, as previously revealed no facts are before us by which we may, in the balancing process, either apply or effectively evaluate the matter of investment, value or other monetary detriment to defendants by application of the prescribed amortization plan. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any informative showing as to other possible material elements or factors manifesting unreasonableness of the subject ordinance as applied to these defendants. See in that regard 24 Md.L.Rev. 323, 329. Moreover, this court said in the Stoner McCray case, supra, loc. cit., 247 Iowa 1320, loc. cit., 78 N.W.2d 843: We do not wish to infer herein that under certain circumstances a municipality could not provide for the termination of nonconforming uses, especially if the period of amortization of the investment was just and reasonable,   . VIII. It is to us evident defendants have failed to show, with sufficient certainty, the amortization provision of the contested ordinance, as applied to them, is unconstitutional. Also, the ordinance being facially valid and its reasonableness fairly debatable, it must accordingly be upheld. Resultantly we now hold the challenged amortization provision of the Cerro Gordo County Zoning Ordinance, as it applies to defendants in this case, is not unreasonable and does not constitute an unconstitutional exercise of the police power delegated by our state legislature.