Opinion ID: 1192777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: There was substantial evidence to support such a finding by the jury in this case.

Text: Upon examination of the entire record, the following facts appear, in addition to the so-called uncontradicted testimony of Hansen and Lovely: (1) The vehicle which injured plaintiff was not an ordinary passenger car, but was a commercial vehicle  a pickup truck. (2) Mr. Lovely, the driver of the truck, was not only an employee of defendant, but was the foreman of defendant's roofing crew. (3) Mr. Lovely was subject to call by defendant during the evenings, including the evening of the accident, in the sense that in the event of emergency calls he would answer such calls and make temporary roof repairs, as well as cost estimates for permanent repairs. (4) The truck was owned by defendant and was placed by defendant in the possession of Mr. Lovely for use in answering such calls and also because he had a shop large enough for storage of the truck. (5) All gasoline for the truck was furnished by defendant and the truck also carried at least some tools, equipment and supplies belonging to defendant. (6) According to defendant's manager, Mr. Lovely, as foreman of defendant's roofing crew, would supervise the crew when they were on the job and at the end of the day. As foreman, Lovely was interested in the progress of the various roofing jobs. (7) In addition, when even the reluctant Mr. Lovely was asked if he checked with the roofing crew in the evenings to see how they were doing he answered not very often and that he generally had the work for the crew lined out in the morning. (8) On the day of the accident Mr. Lovely was present at the job being worked on by the roofing crew during the morning, but not in the afternoon. (9) That evening Mr. Lovely drove the truck to the house of Mr. Hansen, a member of the roofing crew, parked the truck in front of his house, went to the door, came in and asked, Did you fellows get done with your job?    How did you fellows do today? according to the testimony of Mr. Hansen. Mr. Lovely did not recall this. (10) At that point the conversation was interrupted by the accident. The fact that the vehicle involved was a commercial vehicle; the fact that Lovely was an employee and the fact that the truck was carrying tools belonging to defendant are facts which constituted substantial evidence supporting the inference of agency and make that inference stronger than one based solely upon proof of ownership of a noncommercial vehicle, even though that is held to be sufficient to make a prima facie case on the issue of agency. See Davis v. Underdahl, 140 Or. 242, 247, 13 P.2d 362 (1932); Jasper v. Wells, 173 Or. 114, 130, 144 P.2d 505 (1943) (concurring opinion); and Kraxberger v. Rogers, 231 Or. 440, 451, 373 P.2d 647 (1962). Of more importance, however, is the fact that the requirement of substantial evidence on this issue of this case was amply satisfied by the testimony that Lovely usually checked with the roofing crew at the end of the day's work, but sometimes did so in the evening, coupled with testimony that he was not present that afternoon on the job being worked on by the roofing crew under his supervision and that on meeting Mr. Hansen he inquired as to the progress of the crew on the job that day. That testimony was sufficient to support several inferences by the jury: (1) At least one of the inferences which the jury could have reasonably drawn from that testimony was that the purpose of the visit was in fact to inquire as to the progress of that job, just as stated in the words of the inquiry, and that this inquiry by Lovely was a business inquiry and not a mere pleasantry, as the majority would necessarily assume. Even under the rule of the Jerke case, as adopted by the majority, I contend that this court cannot properly say that based upon this evidence no reasonable jury could have reached such a conclusion and that to do so would have been gross speculation, as held by the majority. Indeed, such a finding by the jury from all of the facts of this case would have been far less speculative than the inferences on inferences which were held not to be speculative in Eitel v. Times, Inc., 221 Or. 585, 352 P.2d 485 (1960). (2) Another inference that the jury could reasonably have drawn from all of this testimony was that Lovely and Hansen were simply not telling the truth in the testimony of their wholly subjective intent to work on one of Lovely's rental houses that evening. (3) Still another inference the jury could have reasonably drawn from these facts was that even if such testimony was true, Lovely nevertheless had a dual purpose in making this trip; one purpose being to check on the progress made by the roofing crew that day, and the other purpose being to pick up Hansen to assist Lovely in working on his house. Even if the jury believed that the trip was taken primarily for that personal purpose of Lovely, such a conclusion would not preclude the trip from being within the scope of Lovely's employment by defendant so long as the jury further believed that Lovely would have visited Hansen to check on the progress of the job on which he had been absent in the afternoon even if he had not also intended to go on from there and work on his rental house. See 1 Restatement 523-24, Agency 2d § 236, Comment b, and 6 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice (3d ed. 1966) 218-19, § 253.52. We must not forget that in this case, as in many automobile accident cases, the injured plaintiff has the burden of proving the fact of agency from the mouths of defendant's own employees and their friends and that in such a case, upon the proof that the truck was owned by defendant the plaintiff made a prima facie case on the issue of agency and was then entitled to have that issue submitted to the jury, even in the absence of any other supporting evidence, unless that inference was overcome by evidence so clear and uncontradicted as to be free from doubt or suspicion. [15] In this case, for reasons previously stated, the evidence did not satisfy that test because: (1) it consisted of testimony by witnesses whose credibility was not free from doubt or suspicion and (2) that testimony was not uncontradicted. Thus, this court cannot properly withdraw from the jury the question of the credibility of Hansen and Lovely, not only because that testimony related to their subjective intent, rather than to any objective fact capable of verification, but also because there were inconsistencies in their testimony constituting substantial evidence from which the jury could properly find that they were biased and unreliable witnesses. Neither can this court properly say that the testimony of Hansen and Lovely was uncontradicted because, in addition to the inference arising from the fact of ownership of the car, there was other affirmative testimony which not only cast doubt upon the veracity of that testimony, but provided additional and substantial evidence on the issue of agency in this case. For all of these reasons, it is my considered opinion that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to submit these issues to the jury for determination. For these same reasons, I must respectfully dissent.