Opinion ID: 2010717
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutionality of Section 480-D(1)

Text: [¶ 14] Every applicant for a permit must demonstrate that the proposed activity meets nine standards set forth in section 480-D. See 38 M.R.S. § 480-D(1)-(9). In particular, the Ulianos challenge the existing uses requirement that: 1. Existing uses. The activity will not unreasonably interfere with existing scenic, aesthetic, recreational or navigational uses as being unconstitutionally vague and an unconstitutional delegation of authority. See id. § 480-D(1). The Ulianos contend that this standard, as applied to scenic and aesthetic uses, is overly subjective and provides no guidance as to how much interference with scenic and aesthetic uses is permissible. [¶ 15] To a significant degree, both vagueness and unlawful delegation challenges are concerned with the issue of definiteness. Thus, a statute is vague when its language either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must guess at its meaning, or if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 2002 ME 52, ¶ 10, 794 A.2d 62, 67 (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Similarly, legislation delegating discretionary authority to an administrative agency is unconstitutional if it fails to contain standards sufficient to guide administrative action. Lewis v. Dep't of Human Servs., 433 A.2d 743, 747 (Me.1981). Indeed, vagueness and unlawful delegation are often raised simultaneously and properly treated as a single inquiry. See Secure Env'ts, Inc. v. Town of Norridgewock, 544 A.2d 319, 321-24 (Me.1988) (discussing whether an ordinance was impermissibly vague, and thus represent[ed] an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority). Such is the case here. [¶ 16] The operative terms of section 480-D(1), as they relate to scenic and aesthetic uses, are defined either by NRPA itself, by their plain meaning, or by reference to well-established legal principles. We consider, in turn, the terms (a) activity; (b) existing scenic and aesthetic uses; and (c) unreasonably interfere; and then consider these terms in relation to (d) whether a regulatory standard is necessarily void for vagueness if it is not susceptible to quantitative measurement.
[¶ 17] Section 480-D(1) only applies to the specific activities listed in section 480-C(2)(A)-(D): A. Dredging, bulldozing, removing or displacing soil, sand, vegetation or other materials; B. Draining or otherwise dewatering; C. Filling, including adding sand or other material to a sand dune; or D. Any construction, repair or alteration of any permanent structure. 38 M.R.S. § 480-C(2)(A)-(D). In addition, section 480-D(1) only applies when the foregoing activities are located in, on or over a protected natural resource, or adjacent to specific natural resources. 38 M.R.S. § 480-C(1). Protected natural resources encompass a discrete collection of natural environments, including coastal sand dune systems, coastal wetlands, significant wildlife habitat, fragile mountain areas, freshwater wetlands, community public water system primary protection areas, great ponds or rivers, [and] streams or brooks. 38 M.R.S. § 480-B(8).
[¶ 18] Section 480-D(1) employs existing, scenic, and aesthetic to describe uses. A use is the application or employment of something for some purpose. The American Heritage Dictionary 1331 (2d College ed. 1982). Uses involve human activity. A scenic or aesthetic use of a protected natural resource is therefore a human activity arising from the unique scenic or aesthetic qualities of the resource. [¶ 19] Section 480-D(1) also requires that scenic and aesthetic uses be existing in order to be protected. The definition of exist is [t]o have ... actuality. Id. at 475. The term existing establishes that the scenic and aesthetic uses of a protected natural resource do not include theoretical uses; rather, the term existing limits scenic and aesthetic uses to those activities that are extant at the time a permit application is submitted. [¶ 20] Scenic, as it relates to the natural environment, describes the features of a landscape. See id. at 1097. Aesthetic, as it relates to the natural environment, describes objects or areas of visual beauty within that environment. See id. at 83. As used in section 480-D(1), scenic and aesthetic qualify uses. Consequently, section 480-D(1) does not require applicants to identify everything that may be scenic or aesthetic within a particular resource, but rather directs applicants to identify the scenic or aesthetic uses within the resource that are protected by section 480-D(1). Ultimately, it is the existing uses within a resource that are protected by section 480-D(1) from unreasonable interference, and not everything within the resource that may be considered scenic or aesthetic.
[¶ 21] To interfere means to come between so as to be a hindrance. Id. at 669. Reasonableness is a well defined concept under the common law. Town of Baldwin, 2002 ME 52, ¶ 13, 794 A.2d at 68 (quotation marks omitted). As such, statutes prohibiting activities that have unreasonable effects are generally not unconstitutionally vague. See id. Indeed, in In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736, 739, 749-53 (Me.1973), a case quite similar to this, we upheld the constitutionality of the Site Location of Development Law, currently codified at 38 M.R.S. §§ 481-490 (2008), in the face of a void for vagueness and unlawful delegation challenge. Our analysis centered on the law's regulation of unreasonable effect[s] upon existing uses: The requirement that the Commission must be satisfied that there will be no adverse effect upon the natural environment is the very substance of the Legislature's efforts to reduce despoilation of the environment to a minimum. While most such developments may be expected to affect the environment adversely to the extent that they add to the demands already made upon it, it is the unreasonable effect upon existing uses, scenic character and natural resources which the Legislature seeks to avoid by empowering the Commission to measure the nature and extent of the proposed use against the environment's capacity to tolerate the use. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 751 (emphasis in original). [¶ 22] In re Spring Valley Development underscores that a reasonableness determination is a fact-specific inquiry. See also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36, 124 S.Ct. 521, 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003) ([W]e have treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case. ...). We recognized the same with respect to section 480-D(1) in Uliano I when we concluded that it was improper for the Board to treat its practicable alternative analysis as determinative, and that it must instead consider the practicable alternatives as part of determining reasonableness: Whether a proposed project's interference with existing uses is reasonable depends on a multiplicity of factors, one of which is the existence of a practicable alternative. A balancing analysis inheres in any reasonableness inquiry. 2005 ME 88, ¶ 13, 876 A.2d at 19. [¶ 23] Consequently, whether a proposed activity will unreasonably interfere with an existing scenic or aesthetic use will necessarily depend on the specific circumstances of a given case. In Kroeger, for instance, we affirmed the Department's finding that a proposed dock would unreasonably interfere with the scenic and aesthetic uses based on the specific scenic uses made of Somes Sound by the boaters and hikers who flock to Acadia for the scenic beauty of the area. 2005 ME 50, ¶ 16, 870 A.2d at 571. Given the factual nature of the reasonableness inquiry, it is the applicant's burden to establish facts that demonstrate[] that the proposed activity meets the standard[] set forth in [section 480-D(1)]. 38 M.R.S. § 480-D. As illustrated by Kroeger, an applicant may be aided by expert testimony in meeting this burden. See 2005 ME 50, ¶¶ 11-13, 870 A.2d at 570 (evidence on unreasonable interference included the experts' reports on existing scenic uses and the visual impact of the proposed dock). There was no expert testimony offered by the Ulianos on this issue in this case.
[¶ 24] The Ulianos specifically contend that the scenic and aesthetic uses standard is unduly vague because it is completely lacking in quantitative standards, citing, in particular, our decision in Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, 752 A.2d 183. In Kosalka, we held that a municipal zoning ordinance that required an applicant to demonstrate that a proposed project would conserve natural beauty was an unconstitutional delegation because the standard was an unmeasurable quality, totally lacking in cognizable, quantitative standards. 2000 ME 106, ¶ 17, 752 A.2d at 187. Kosalka is in accord with a line of decisions that have held, in the conditional use context[,] that `in order to withstand attack as an impermissible legislative delegation of authority, ordinances that establish criteria for acceptance of a conditional use must specify sufficient reasons why such a use may be denied.' Id. ¶ 12, 752 A.2d at 186 (quoting Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898, 900 (Me.1993)). See also Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575, 577 (Me.1987) (holding the terms intensity of use and density of development not sufficiently quantifiable); Cope v. Inhabitants of the Town of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 227 (Me.1983) (whether a use would comply with the health, safety and welfare of the public and the essential character of the area was a legislative question); Stucki v. Plavin, 291 A.2d 508, 511 (Me.1972) (ordinance authorizing zoning board to approve a use provided the use shall meet the approval of the board failed to prescribe sufficient standards); Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 241 A.2d 50, 52 (Me.1968) (subject to the approval of the Board of Zoning Appeals was not limited by legislative standards). [¶ 25] Section 480-D(1)'s scenic and aesthetic uses standard is distinguishable from the municipal ordinances whose terms we have found unconstitutionally vague due to their failure to provide cognizable, quantitative standards. First and foremost, unlike the terms in section 480-D(1), which are susceptible to a logical construction as discussed above, the standards at issue in the Kosalka line of cases were wholly subjective and permitted municipal employees or board members to make legislative-type decisions based on any factor they independently deem[ed] appropriate. Kosalka, 2000 ME 106, ¶ 16, 752 A.2d at 187. Identifying an existing scenic or aesthetic use for purposes of section 480-D(1) and determining whether a proposed activity will unreasonably interfere with those uses is a far more concrete exercise than the amorphous command we considered in Kosalka requiring an applicant to prove that a project will conserve natural beauty. [¶ 26] Second, the Kosalka line of cases involved delegations of relatively boundless discretion by municipal ordinances. We have long distinguished such delegations of authority from those established by acts of the Legislature. See Lewis, 433 A.2d at 748. Unlike a municipal delegation of authority to a town zoning board, the State's delegation of authority to an executive agency, the Board of Environmental Protection, to administer section 480-D(1) and other provisions of NRPA is subject to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act and its procedural protections. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 8001-11008 (2008); 38 M.R.S. § 341-D (2008). We have previously recognized that in such cases in which the statutory enactment of detailed specific standards is impossible, the presence of adequate procedural safeguards to protect against an abuse of discretion by the administrators of the law[] compensates substantially for the want of precise legislative guidelines and may be taken into consideration in resolving the constitutionality of the delegation of power. Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm'n, 328 A.2d 791, 796 (Me. 1974). [¶ 27] Unlike the municipal ordinances considered in the Kosalka line of cases, NRPA not only involves a delegation of authority by the legislative branch to the executive branch to regulate uses that do not lend themselves to precise guidelines, but also subjects the delegated authority to the procedural protections of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. The procedural history of the Ulianos' application demonstrates the high degree of scrutiny that can result from this approach. [¶ 28] Third, pursuant to 38 M.R.S. § 341-D(1-B), the Board is required to promulgate rules, subject to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, that are necessary for the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of any provision of law that the department is charged with administering. As the rules promulgated by the Board are themselves subject to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, they are subject to public notice, modification, and judicial review. See Ne. Occupational Exch., Inc. v. State, 540 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Me.1988). Consequently, by providing significant protection against abuses of discretion by the Board in exercising its rule-making authority, the requirement that the Board promulgate rules subject to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act compensates substantially for the want of precise [legislative] guidelines. Id. (quotation marks omitted). [4] This requirement stands in contrast to the municipal delegations considered in the Kosalka line of decisions, in which municipal board members were not authorized or presumed to have the expertise necessary to formulate an interpretation of the delegated authority through a rulemaking process, but were instead left to decide ... legislative question[s] anew. Cope, 464 A.2d at 227. [5]
[¶ 29] Unlike Shakespearean notions consigning beauty to the eye of the beholder, [6] the concept of scenic and aesthetic uses within a particular natural resource is, when viewed through the lens of modern sensibilities, sufficiently definite so that such uses can, in any given case, be reliably identified based on competent proof. The same is true as to the determination of whether, under all relevant circumstances, a proposed activity will unreasonably interfere with the uses. The fact-finding required to give effect to NRPA's protection of existing scenic and aesthetic uses is no more imprecise or speculative than the fact-finding required to determine the best interests of a child in a custody proceeding or the mental state of a criminal defendant in a criminal prosecution. [¶ 30] The standard is also not constitutionally deficient simply because it is not couched in empirical terms. Although scenic and aesthetic uses are not readily susceptible to quantitative analysis, the Constitution does not demand such an analysis in order to subject those uses to legal protection. [7] We have previously recognized that [o]bjective quantification, mathematical certainty, and absolute precision are not required by either the United States Constitution or Maine Constitution. Town of Baldwin, 2002 ME 52, ¶ 7 n. 2, 794 A.2d at 66; see also Davis v. Sec'y of State, 577 A.2d 338, 341 (Me.1990). In delegating decision-making authority to an executive agency, a statute need not provide determinate criteria as long as it offers an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, in Whitman, the Court held that a statute requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to set ambient air quality standards requisite to protect the public health was not a vague delegation of authority because requisite meant not lower or higher than is necessary. Id. at 475-76, 121 S.Ct. 903. [¶ 31] Every state, Maine included, has a substantial interest in the preservation of its unique scenic and aesthetic qualities. Thus, in Brophy v. Town of Castine, 534 A.2d 663, 664 (Me.1987), a town's set-back requirement relative to the water's edge was found to be a valid exercise of the police power because it reasonably promotes the town's interest in preserving, for the public's aesthetic welfare, those areas from development. NRPA's protection of scenic and aesthetic uses is a similar exercise of the police power. It rests on the Legislature's finding that the cumulative effect of frequent minor alterations and occasional major alterations of [protected natural resources] poses a substantial threat to the environment and economy of the State and its quality of life. 38 M.R.S. § 480-A. We have no reason to question this legislative finding. As such, NRPA's protection of scenic and aesthetic uses serves a significant governmental interest and is a valid exercise of the police power. [¶ 32] The operative terms contained in section 480-D(1) render the statute susceptible to a logical construction that provides meaningful guidance to both permit applicants and those who are duty-bound to administer it. The statute's regulation of scenic and aesthetic uses does not render it unconstitutionally vague and does not result in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.