Opinion ID: 2995965
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: City of Boerne

Text: In City of Boerne, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Recovery Act (“RFRA”), specifically whether Congress, in enacting RFRA, properly had exercised its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first “acknowledge[d] that § 5 is a ‘positive grant of legislative power to Congress.’ ” Id. at 517 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). “Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states.’ ” Id. at 518. However broad Congress’ power under § 5, the Court continued, it is not unlimited. The Court explained that “[t]he design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.” Id. at 519. Congress is limited to “enforcing” the rights guaranteed by the Amendment. Id. The Court recognized that [w]hile the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Id. at 519-20. The Court then examined the provisions of RFRA to determine if it was a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 powers. 12 No. 01-3448 The parties presented RFRA as a measure to “prevent[] and remed[y] laws which are enacted with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices.” Id. at 529. The Court stated that “[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.” Id. at 530 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)). According to the Court, RFRA’s legislative record lacked examples of instances in which laws of general applicability were enacted by the States for the purpose of inflicting religious discrimination. Rather, congressional hearings had focused on laws of general applicability that placed only incidental burdens on religion. The lack of a legislative record, however, was not dispositive. The Court stated that [r]egardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. Id. at 532. Consequently, RFRA could not stand in the face of the Eleventh Amendment challenge.