Opinion ID: 2638571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: About the hearsay.

Text: Not only must the prosecution pose direct and relevant questions about the event, but it must also pose direct and specific questions about the alleged hearsay declarations. Failure to pose these questions to the hearsay declarant renders the hearsay inadmissible. Clark, 139 Wash.2d at 159, 985 P.2d 377.
The plurality holds R.G. testified about her statements to Jean Bourget [3] because R.G. affirmed that she was telling the truth when she talked to Bourget. Plurality at 867-68. But the actual colloquy was this: Q Do you remember telling the doctor that your dad touched you in a bad way? A I don't want to talk about it. . . . . Q When you were talking to the doctor about your dad, were you telling her the truth, too? A Yeah. 5 VRP at 636. This affirmation of truth came almost immediately after R.G. d[idn't] want to talk about whether she remember[ed] telling the doctor that [her] dad touched [her] in a bad way. Id. The plurality excludes the exchange directed toward the contents of the hearsay statement but permits the exchange addressing the truthfulness of the excluded statement. Under this reasoning, a witness could properly testify about an event crucial to the prosecution's case by simply stating she had a conversation with some of her friends but never specify what was said much less what really happened. The prosecution would then admit the declarant's hearsay through one of her friends, even though the declarant never testified at trial that the subject matter of the conversation addressed the event in question. This is insufficient under Rohrich and Clark. Because Clark requires the declarant be asked about ... the hearsay statement, 139 Wash.2d at 159, 985 P.2d 377, it necessarily follows that she be asked about the contents of that statement to afford the defendant a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination. Accord Rohrich, 132 Wash.2d at 478, 939 P.2d 697. [4] The plurality argues this conclusion need not be addressed because `I don't remember,' is a constitutionally valid response, and if R.G. does not remember the event, it may be inferred that she does not remember the content of the event. Plurality at 867 n. 8. To the contrary this conclusion must be addressed because the second prong of Clark requires the prosecutor to ask the declarant about ... the hearsay statement, Clark, 139 Wash.2d at 159, 985 P.2d 377, and hearsay by nature refers to the contents of an out-of-court statement. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. ER 801(c). The statement must be an assertion, whether oral, written, or nonverbal conduct. ER 801(a). The general inadmissibility of hearsay relates to the statement's contentsnot whether the statement was made. State v. Collins, 76 Wash.App. 496, 886 P.2d 243 (1995), is instructive. There a detective answered several telephone calls at the defendant's house; each caller had asked for `Larry.' Collins, 76 Wash.App. at 497, 886 P.2d 243. The court upheld the admission of the detective's testimony regarding the conversations because none of the hearsay was assertive. Id. at 498, 886 P.2d 243. Put simply, a witness can testify to whether he or she spoke with another person without violating the hearsay rule, but once the testimony leaks into the contents of the conversation, the hearsay rule generally proscribes admission, unless offered for a reason other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. See United States v. Williams, 133 F.3d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir.1998) (admission of a declarant's statements is permissible so long as the witness's testimony is limited to the fact that he spoke to [the declarant] without disclosing the substance of that conversation). Applying the general rules surrounding hearsay testimony, to ask a declarant about ... the hearsay statement as required by Clark requires questioning toward the contents of the statement not whether the declarant ever spoke to another person. The first question asked if R.G. remembered telling the doctor her dad touched her in a bad way. V VRP at 636. Although this was an appropriate question, the invited I don't want to talk about it response nullified it. The second question to R.G. only referenced talking to the doctor. A question about whether the child declarant remembered speaking to someone is no more a question about ... the hearsay statement than a question of what the weather was on the day the child witness was abusedwithout any reference to the abuseis a question about the event. Clark, 139 Wash.2d at 159, 985 P.2d 377. As such, R.G. never testified about the contents of her statements to Bourget and the alleged hearsay statement to Bourget must accordingly be excluded.
The only reference to child interview specialist Elaine Metz during the entire examination (direct, cross, and redirect) went as follows: Q Okay. Do you remember talking to a nice woman with black hair by the name of Elaine? A I don't remember. Q Okay. Before you went to the doctor, did anyone ask you about your dad? A No, I can't remember. V VRP at 633. Nowhere in that entire two-question-two-answer colloquy is there any reference to the contents of R.G.'s alleged hearsay statement to Metz. The prosecutor never asked about the hearsay statement to Metz. Rather, the questions only go to R.G.'s and Metz's purported relationship. R.G. never testified to the contents of her alleged statements to Metz. Consequently, that hearsay was inadmissible as well.
The plurality correctly holds R.G. never testified for purposes of the confrontation clause about her incriminating hearsay statements to child therapist Kathy Keating-Harvey. Plurality at 868. However, the plurality concludes Keating-Harvey's testimony was admissible under the medical hearsay exception, ER 803(a)(4), and therefore concludes Grasso suffered no prejudice. Plurality at 868-69. To support this bald conclusion the plurality cites State v. Butler, 53 Wash. App. 214, 766 P.2d 505 (1989). See plurality at 868. I disagree. Butler held the defendant suffered no prejudice when the trial court improperly admitted a hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception, ER 803(a)(2), because the statement was independently admissible under the medical diagnosis exception, ER 803(a)(4). Butler, 53 Wash.App. at 217, 219, 766 P.2d 505. Butler may have addressed hearsay, but it did not involve a confrontation clause violation. This case does. To analyze the prejudice prong under Butler is to treat the confrontation clause as a codification of the hearsay rule, an approach squarely rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56, 90 S.Ct. 1930; see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). The plurality, however, concludes this analysis is appropriate because the United States Supreme Court held the medical diagnosis exception is firmly rooted. Plurality at 868-69 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)). The Court in White so held because a patient's out-of-court declarations to his or her medical care professional provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness, White, 502 U.S. at 355, 112 S.Ct. 736. However, in the context of child hearsay, ER 803(a)(4) is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception. State v. Florczak, 76 Wash.App. 55, 68, 882 P.2d 199 (1994); see also State v. Kilgore, 107 Wash.App. 160, 183, 26 P.3d 308 (2001) (The medical diagnosis exception is normally a firmly rooted exception, but this is not true for statements by very young children under the alternative test in Florczak. ). The court in Florczak recognized that it has only been in the last 15 years that the medical diagnosis exception has extended in this state to include out-of-court statements to health care professionals from children too young to comprehend the purpose of the statements. Florczak, 76 Wash.App. at 69, 882 P.2d 199. Conversely, traditional medical diagnosis hearsay is firmly rooted because it dates back for more than two centuries. White, 502 U.S. at 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736. Thus, child hearsay, even if made to a medical professional, does not bear the sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the confrontation clause's reliability requirement. Accord Rohrich, 132 Wash.2d at 480, 939 P.2d 697 ([N]othing about child hearsay indicates the hearsay statement would be more reliable than an in-court declaration of the same accusation.). The child declarant must therefore testify in order to admit the out-of-court statements. Id. at 481, 939 P.2d 697. While Washington's child hearsay statute, RCW 9A.44.120, may provide more protection than the confrontation clause, it certainly does not provide less. Accord Clark, 139 Wash.2d at 157, 985 P.2d 377. Moreover, aside from the hearsay, R.G.'s substantive testimony may have exculpated the defendant had she been responsive. As R.G. did not testify for purposes of the confrontation clause, Grasso suffered the same actual and substantial prejudice as did the defendant in Rohrich.