Opinion ID: 3054164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Taylor Categorical Approach

Text: Following this framework, we first examine whether attempted escape from custody categorically constitutes an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S) as an offense relating to obstruction of justice. [1] “[T]he BIA has interpreted the elements of a generic obstruction of justice offense under § 1101(a)(43)(S) in a precedential decision” to which we defer. Renteria-Morales, 2008 WL 5192056, at  (citing In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889). In Espinoza-Gonzalez, the BIA explained SALAZAR-LUVIANO v. MUKASEY 16689 with respect to § 1101(a)(43)(S) that “[w]e do not believe that every offense that, by its nature, would tend to ‘obstruct justice’ is an offense that should properly be classified as ‘obstruction of justice.’ ” 22 I. & N. Dec. at 893-94. This is so because “Congress did not adopt a generic descriptive phrase such as ‘obstructing justice’ or ‘obstruct justice,’ but chose instead a term of art utilized in the United States Code to designate a specific list of crimes.” Id. at 893. Thus, the question whether a specific offense of conviction counts as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S) depends exclusively on whether “the elements of the offense . . . constitute the crime of obstruction of justice as that term is defined” in the federal criminal law, U.S. Code Title 18, Chapter 73 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521).3 Id. at 892. See also Renteria-Morales, 2008 WL 5192056, at  (“[T]he BIA acted reasonably in deriving the definition of ‘obstruction of justice’ for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(S) from the body of federal statutes imposing criminal penalties on obstruction of justice offenses.”). [2] Here, the parties agree that escape from custody does not match any of the specifically enumerated obstruction offenses and that, to qualify as an aggravated felony, it would have to fall within 18 U.S.C. § 1503’s “catchall” provision. The catchall applies to anyone who “corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influ- 3 In 1987, at the time of Salazar-Luviano’s conviction, Title 18, Chapter 73 included fourteen enumerated offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1515 (1988). By 2001, Chapter 73 had been amended several times and by then included seventeen enumerated offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518 (2000). None of the additional three enumerated offenses is relevant to the question presented here. We therefore need not decide (and the parties have not addressed) which version of Chapter 73 should apply—the 1987 version, (when Salazar-Luviano was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 751), or the 2001 version (when he was charged with removability). Cf. United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730 (9th Cir. 1994) (ex post facto challenge to classification of a conviction as an aggravated felony after commission of the crime but before commission of the offense giving rise to removability). 16690 SALAZAR-LUVIANO v. MUKASEY ences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). Salazar-Luviano argues that because § 1503 requires specific intent to interfere with pending judicial proceedings, the elements of escape from custody cannot constitute obstruction of justice. The government counters that for an offense to qualify under the catchall provision of § 1503, the act must have only the “ ‘natural and probable effect’ of ‘interfering with the due administration of justice,’ ” and any “escape from lawful custody” necessarily and evidently “impede[s] . . . the judicial process.” Even if specific intent were required, says the government, aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime sufficient to bring aiding and abetting an attempted escape from custody within the ambit of § 1503, so interpreted. [3] United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995), suggests Salazar-Luviano, and not the government, is correct— attempted escape from custody does not constitute obstruction of justice under the § 1503 catchall provision. “[I]nterpret[ing] the omnibus clause of § 1503 narrowly,” the Supreme Court has explained that obstruction of justice under that provision requires a defendant to act (1) with knowledge that (2) his actions have the natural and probable effect of interfering with (3) a pending judicial proceeding. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 597, 599. The Court expressly clarified that the catchall provision does not apply to an endeavor to interfere with “some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court’s or grand jury’s authority.” Id. And “a defendant lack[ing] knowledge that his actions are likely to affect [a pending judicial] proceeding [necessarily] lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.” Id. [4] According to this narrow construction, attempted escape from custody does not constitute obstruction of justice within the meaning of § 1503. Both now and at the time of SalazarSALAZAR-LUVIANO v. MUKASEY 16691 Luviano’s conviction in 1987, escape from custody required an (1) escape or attempt to escape from (2) the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative. See 18 U.S.C. § 751. [5] Because a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 does not require the existence of a pending judicial proceeding, much less knowledge of or specific intent4 to obstruct such a proceeding, one could violate § 751 while serving a sentence in federal prison after the conclusion of all judicial proceedings, for example, or (as here) while in detention before the commencement of any judicial proceedings. Under either circumstance, a person attempting to escape from custody would fail all three elements of obstructing justice under § 1503. [6] Although the government is probably correct that “an escape from custody of one who is arrested or charged with a [crime] or held for the purpose of extradition, exclusion, or expulsion . . . impedes the prospective judicial or tribunal process,” the BIA interpreted § 1101(a)(43)(S) narrowly expressly because it “[did] not believe that every offense that, by its nature, would tend to ‘obstruct justice’ is an offense that should properly be classified as ‘obstruction of justice.’ ” Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 893-94. Attempted escape from custody therefore does not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S). 4 The government’s observation that aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime, is beside the point. Aiding and abetting is not a stand-alone offense—one convicted of aiding and abetting “is guilty of the [underlying] substantive offense as if he committed it directly.” Matter of Beltran, 20 I. & N. Dec. 521, 525 (BIA 1992). Thus, under the categorical approach, the question is not whether a defendant guilty under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 751 has specific intent to aid or abet an escape from custody—rather, it is whether escape from custody requires specific intent to obstruct a pending judicial proceeding. Plainly it does not. 16692 SALAZAR-LUVIANO v. MUKASEY