Opinion ID: 852707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were Enhanced Sentences Proper?

Text: Bryant argues that his sentences were unconstitutional because the enhancements exceed the presumptive sentence established by the Legislature, and were based upon aggravating factors not found by a jury. (Appellant's Pet. Transfer at 2, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). In Blakely v. Washington , the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the rule expressed in Apprendi that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The Court then went on to define statutory maximum as the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  Id. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531. In Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005), we held that Indiana's fixed terms served the same function as Washington's standard sentencing range for Sixth Amendment purposes and that those sort of facts envisioned by Blakely as necessitating a jury finding must be found by a jury. Id. at 686. Because Apprendi specifically exempted the fact of a prior conviction from submission to a jury, a sentence enhanced because of a prior criminal conviction does not violate the Sixth Amendment. [1] In a sentencing statement, a judge must identify all significant aggravating and mitigating factors, explain why such factors were found, and balance the factors in arriving at the sentence. Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1074 (Ind.1996). The purpose behind requiring the trial court to follow these steps is to guard against arbitrary sentences and provid[e] an adequate basis for appellate review. Id. In this case, the trial court found two aggravators: Bryant had lain in wait, and he had a criminal history. The first of these aggravators cannot support the sentencing enhancement because it: 1) increased the sentence beyond the statutory maximum and 2) was not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The aggravator that Bryant had lain in wait is precisely the sort of fact with which Blakely concerns itself. The second aggravator, Bryant's criminal history, did not need to be submitted to a jury. Even though sentence enhancements based on prior convictions do not violate the Constitutional right to trial by jury, whether and to what extent a sentence should be enhanced turns on the weight of an individual's criminal history. This weight is measured by the number of prior convictions and their gravity, by their proximity or distance from the present offense, and by any similarity or dissimilarity to the present offense that might reflect on a defendant's culpability. We Indiana judges commonly recite that a single aggravator can be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence, and that statement is often true. This does not mean that sentencing judges or appellate judges can stop thinking about the appropriate weight to give a history of prior convictions. The significance of a criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense. Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 n. 4 (Ind.1999). We observed in Wooley that a criminal history comprised of a prior conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated may rise to the level of a significant aggravator at a sentencing hearing for a subsequent alcohol-related offense. However, this criminal history does not command the same significance at a sentencing hearing for murder. Id. To put another example, a conviction for theft six years in the past would probably not, standing by itself, warrant maxing out a defendant's sentence for class B burglary. But, a former conviction for burglary might make it appropriate to impose the maximum sentence for a subsequent theft. Certainly not all cases will produce so clear-cut a separation between significant and non-significant prior convictions as these examples. The need for clarity and careful weighing, made by reference to appropriate prior criminal convictions, is more pronounced than ever given the increased importance prior criminal convictions play in the sentencing process of a post- Blakely world. In this particular case, although the court apparently conducted a thoughtful analysis before imposing sentence, the extent and complete nature of Bryant's criminal history is not clearly laid cut in either the trial record or the record on appeal. [2] In the absence of a presentencing report, or a more complete explanation of Bryant's criminal history and its relationship to the current offense, we cannot sustain the sentencing enhancements.