Opinion ID: 282320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the prior fraud suit

Text: 38 In 1958, a suit was filed against Colonial by two individuals who complained of alleged fraudulent representations made to them in January, 1957, by an employee of that company and judgment was rendered against Colonial. The plaintiffs in the present case offered the pleadings and judgment in that case as evidence here. They were offered and admitted only as to Colonial and solely to establish its 'intent and good faith.' The defendants announced they had no objection. 39 During the later examination of one of the defendants, the defendants' counsel proceeded to read portions of the exhibit to McBride and interrogate him about the allegations made in the complaint and about his personal lack of participation in the events leading to that suit. Later, upon continued examination, plaintiff's counsel began to read the rest of the exhibit to McBride and ask him other questions about it. 40 After a considerable part of the exhibit had been read, defendants' counsel objected because all of the exhibit had not been read. Plaintiffs' counsel offered to read the rest of it. Defendants' counsel then objected. At this stage, the court announced that it would admit the exhibit for all purposes because defendants' counsel had begun reading parts of it to the jury. After this ruling was made, defense counsel objected 'on the ground of hearsay,' but stated no further ground for the objection and requested no limiting instruction. It will be noted that, by this time, much of the exhibit had been read to the jury without objection by either party and without any request for further limiting instruction by the court. 41 While the evidence tendered was hearsay, it was admissible to show Colonial's intent. 28 But in a suit charging the commission of a fraud, evidence of similar frauds committed by someone else is of course inadmissible. 29 Therefore the evidence should have been admitted only against Colonial, not against its co-defendants, and only for the limited purpose of proving Colonial's knowledge, motive or intent. 42 Counsel, by reading the exhibit to the jury, may well have waived any limitation of its purpose. If there was no waiver, the trial court's reversal of its earlier correct ruling was erroneous. However, this was only one of the dozens of rulings made by the court in a lengthy and hotly contested trial. It did not then have the benefit of the reasoned objections now made by counsel, nor indeed of any objections based on the grounds now asserted. 43 Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, 'It is sufficient that a party, at a time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor   .' This implies, however, that such an exposition must bemade. This rule is not a mere technicality, but is of substance in the administration of the business of the courts. Revlon, Inc. v. Buchanan, 5 Cir., 1959, 271 F.2d 795, 798, 81 A.L.R.2d 222. 44 This rule is simply a codification of the prior practice of the federal courts. Johnston v. Reily, 1947, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 160 F.2d 249. The Supreme Court long ago held: 45 'Objections to the admission of evidence must be of such a specific character as to indicate distinctly the grounds upon which the party relies, so as to give the other side full opportunity to obviate them at the time, if under any circumstances, that can be done.' Noonan v. Caledonia Gold Mining Co., 1887, 121 U.S. 393, 400, 7 S.Ct. 911, 915, 30 L.Ed. 1061. 46 ' The purpose (of Rule 46) is to inform the trial judge of possible errors so that he may have an opportunity to reconsider his ruling and make any changes deemed advisable. It is therefore the general rule that points not raised and preserved below will not be considered on appeal. Tucker v. Loew's Theatre & Realty Corp., 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 677; Louisiana & Ark. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 5 Cir., 214 F.2d 290, certiorari denied, 348 U.S. 875, 75 S.Ct. 111, 99 L.Ed. 688; Knight v. Loveman, Joseph & Loeb, Inc., 5 Cir., 217 F.2d 717. Though an appellate court, in a proper case, has power, on its own motion, to consider errors to which no objections were made, such power should be exercised only in exceptional cases and in the interest of justice. Curd v. Todd-Johnson Dry Docks, 5 Cir., 213 F.2d 864. This is not such an exceptional case.' Fort Worth & Denver Railway Co. v. Harris, 5 Cir., 1956, 230 F.2d 680, 682. 30 47 ' It is fundamental that where an objection is specific it is deemed to be limited to the ground or grounds specified and it does not cover others not specified.' Knight v. Loveman, Joseph & Loeb, Inc., 5 Cir., 1954,217 F.2d 717, 719. 31 The burden was on the defendants' counsel to make a timely request that the court properly limit the admissibility to the evidence and properly charge the jury with respect to the manner in which it was to be considered. Camps v. New York City Transit Authority, 2 Cir., 1958, 261 F.2d 320. Failure to do so constituted a waiver of the objection. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Wayne Broyles Engineering Corp., 5 Cir., 1965, 351 F.2d 478. 48 Therefore, it was not reversible error for the trial court to fail to exclude the evidence for reasons not stated by counsel or to fail to give limiting instructions that were never asked for.