Opinion ID: 853537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: GHCS as a Political Subdivision

Text: The parties appear to agree, as they do in Mutka that GHCS does not fit the statutory definition of a community action agency as set out in Ind.Code § 12-14-23-2. See Appellant's Br. at 5-6 (GHCS does not attempt to argue that it satisfies the three requirements in section 12-14-23-2); Appellee's Br. at 8-9. GHCS thus advances alternative grounds on which it should be deemed a political subdivision or governmental entity. GHCS makes two arguments identical to those we disposed of today in Mutka, (1) that because GHCS provides essential governmental services, it is entitled to Indiana Tort Claims Act protection under Ayres v. Indian Heights Volunteer Fire Dep't, 493 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind.1986), (Appellant's Br. at 10-15); and (2) that because GHCS is engaged in a joint venture with LCEOC, it is entitled to Indiana Tort Claims Act protection pursuant to Brunton v. Porter Mem'l Hosp. Ambulance Serv., 647 N.E.2d 636 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), (Appellant's Br. at 15-19). We refer the parties to our disposition of those contentions in Mutka, as we reach the same result here. Greater Hammond Community Serv. v. Mutka, 735 N.E.2d 780 (Ind. 2000). GHCS makes one additional argument in its brief in the present case: that it is a governmental entity for the purposes of the Indiana Tort Claims Act because it is a public agency for the purposes of the Public Records Act. (Appellant's Br. at 19-28.) Assuming GHCS is a public agency for the purposes of one statute, it does not necessarily follow that it is a governmental entity for the purposes of another. GHCS advances two subarguments to support its claim that a public agency should also be deemed a governmental entity: (1) GHCS is publicly controlled, and (2) GHCS is controlled by LCEOC. (Appellant's Br. at 25-26, 27.) GHCS says that it is publicly controlled because it receives the majority of its funds from public sources, is subject to the Public Records Act, and has a board with one-third of the members as elected officials. (Appellant's Br. at 25-26 (citing World Prods., Inc. v. Capital Improvement Bd., 514 N.E.2d 634 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987), trans. denied ).) This level of control does not, however, rise to the level of public control of the Capital Improvement Board discussed in World Productions. The statute creating the CIB provides that the city and county appoint all the Board members and may remove them for cause, the property acquired by the Board is held in the name of the city and may not be sold without approval by the executive of the city, the Board's budget must be approved of by the city-county legislative body, and the Board is subject to audit by the State Board of Accounts. Id. at 637. While GHCS is subject to some governmental supervision due to its receipt of public funds, the only other factor GHCS mentions is the composition of its board, which is determined by agreement with LCEOC, not by statute. See R. at 178 (GHCS shall comply ... with all LCEOC administrative procedures, guides, manuals, program rules and regulations.). Designated community action agencies have historically been required to select elected officials as one-third of their board members. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9904 (West 1995). [3] The Capital Improvement Board, on the other hand, does not select its own elected-official members; instead the city and county appoint them. For purposes of measuring the extent of governmental control, this is the difference between night and day. GHCS claims that it is a `subordinate creature' of LCEOC. (Appellant's Br. at 27 (footnote omitted).) LCEOC's control of GHCS is, again, the product of contractual arrangements rather than statute. (R. at 178-89.) [4] A group that is neither specifically named a governmental entity or political subdivision by statute nor engaged in the provision of uniquely governmental services may not receive the protection of the Indiana Tort Claims Act by contracting to be managed by an established governmental entity. Mutka, slip op. at 10, 735 N.E.2d at 784, 2000 WL 1369879 (citing Perry County Dev. Corp. v. Kempf, 712 N.E.2d 1020, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999)).