Opinion ID: 2494642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Petitioners contend that the federal tolling provision of section 1367(d) applies to toll the state statute of limitations in the instant case where the federal court determined that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their state law claim against Textron. They allege that the decision of the Second District not to apply the federal tolling provision in the instant case expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Fourth District in Scarfo, which held that the federal tolling provision applied despite the lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction over a federal claim. Textron contends that Scarfo is distinguishable and that the tolling provision does not apply in the instant case. The conflict issue before this Court is whether the tolling provision of the federal statute on supplemental jurisdiction tolls the applicable state limitations period after the state law claim was dismissed for lack of the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction. Because this case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008). It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis. Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004). To discern legislative intent, we first look to the statute's plain language. See Borden v. E.-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006). When the statute is clear and unambiguous, `there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.' Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So.3d 1078, 1082 (Fla.2009) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). Further, we are `without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.' Velez v. Miami-Dade County Police Dep't, 934 So.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla.2006) (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998)). Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the language of section 1367, the federal statute at issue here, to determine if any of its provisions prohibit application of the tolling provision to state law claims dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides that a federal district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over certain claims, and it governs when the court may do so. The statute provides in pertinent part: § 1367. Supplemental Jurisdiction (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. . . . . (c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. (d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). The plain text of the federal statute does not, by its terms, bar the application of the tolling provision where a claim is dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the savings protection of section 1367(d) applies for any claim asserted under subsection (a). The plain and unambiguous language of section 1367(d) thus permits the application of the tolling provision to claims commenced in federal court but later dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Our precedent concerning statutory interpretation also supports the Fourth District's interpretation of section 1367(d) in Scarfo, where the court concluded that the dismissal of a federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction did not bar the application of section 1367(d) to toll the state limitations period for claims refiled in state court. The Fourth District noted that [s]ection 1367(d) exactly fits the facts and circumstances of this case, reasoning that the fact that the dismissal of the plaintiff's federal claim was based on jurisdictional grounds does not change the text of section 1367. Id. at 921. [4] We find that the same reasoning applies to state law claims dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. We thus conclude that the fact that Petitioners' constructive trust claim was dismissed for lack of the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction does not preclude the applicability of the federal tolling provision in this case. Textron also contends that the Petitioners' constructive trust claim is not subject to the tolling provision of subsection (d), asserting that subsection (d) only applies to those supplemental claims asserted under section 1367(a) and dismissed by the federal district court under one of the four circumstances set forth in subsection (c) of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute. Textron further contends that the constructive trust claim was not dismissed under the criteria set forth in subsection (c) because there was never a decision by the bankruptcy court or the federal district court not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. We disagree with Textron's contentions. We note that a similar narrow reading of section 1367(d) was rejected by the First District Court of Appeal in Blinn v. Florida Department of Transportation, 781 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). There, the district court considered whether section 1367(d) tolls a state limitations period when the federal action was terminated by the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of the case in federal court with the intention of refiling the same claims against the same parties in state court. Id. at 1104. Based on the text of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the First District concluded that the tolling provision was not limited to dismissals predicated on a federal court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to the criteria set forth in section 1367(c)(1)-(4). Id. at 1108. The court reasoned that [a] policy of this nature would force a plaintiff to litigate the supplemental jurisdiction question in order to gain the savings protection of section 1367(d), and consequently held that the tolling provision was applicable. Id. We agree with the reasoning of the First District in Blinn. Moreover, the district court's holding in Blinn is consistent with the plain language of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which was also the focus of the Fourth District's analysis in Scarfo. We agree with this analysis and hold that the text of subsection (d) does not limit the applicability of the tolling provision solely to instances where the federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under the circumstances set forth in subsection (c) of the statute. In so holding, we recognize, as stated above, that we are without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. McLaughlin, 721 So.2d at 1172 (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)). We note that the tolling provision serves to prevent the limitations period from expiring while a plaintiff unsuccessfully pursues state claims in federal court in conjunction with federal claims. As we have explained above, the plain language of section 1367 leads us to conclude that the dismissal of a claim in federal court or, as here, in a bankruptcy court which is a unit of the federal district court, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, does not bar the applicability of the federal tolling provision in the subsequent state court action.