Opinion ID: 44626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Benkiser's Acts Effectively Created a Pre-Election Inhabitancy Requirement and so Violated the Constitution

Text: 17
18 The question before this Court centers on the Texas statute permitting a party officer to declare a candidate ineligible. TEX. ELEC.CODE ANN. § 145.003. An officer can do so if (1) a candidate's application for a place on the ballot indicates ineligibility or (2) facts indicating that the candidate is ineligible are conclusively established by another public record. Id. at § 145.003(f). 7 If the public record establishes ineligibility, the officer shall declare the candidate ineligible. Id. at § 145.003(g). If the candidate is declared ineligible on or before the 74th day before the election, the candidate's name is removed from the ballot. Id. at § 145.035. The party can fill the vacancy with a replacement candidate if the new candidate is certified to the secretary of state by 5:00 p.m. of the 70th day before the election. Id. at § 145.036(a), § 145.037. In situations such as the one before this Court, a replacement candidate cannot appear on the ballot if the original candidate merely withdraws. See id. at § 145.036(b). 19 The district court held that the ineligibility statute as applied in the present case violates the Constitution's Qualifications Clause by creating a pre-election residency requirement. 8 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2. The Qualifications Clause states: 20 No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. 21 Id. The RPT argues that the statute is constitutional under the Elections Clause because it merely acts as a procedural regulation. See id. at art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. The Elections Clause states: 22 The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. 23 Id. 24
25 As the parties agree, the Qualifications Clause is exclusive and cannot be enlarged by the states. 9 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) ([T]he text and structure of the Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and, most importantly, the `basic principles of our democratic system' all demonstrate that the Qualifications Clauses were intended to preclude the States from exercising any such power and to fix as exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution.). The plain language of the inhabitancy requirement of the Qualifications Clause shows that a candidate for the House of Representatives must only be an inhabitant of the state when elected. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2. 26 Moreover, there is ample evidence suggesting that the Framers deliberately chose to use the when elected language. As explained by the district court, records from the constitutional convention show that the Framers debated whether to include lengthy inhabitancy requirements. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 217-19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). Delegates considered seven-year, three-year, and one-year requirements and rejected all three. Id. The position is further buttressed by an 1808 case in which Congress considered the election of a Representative who moved to Maryland a mere two weeks before the election. CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS 224 (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds. 1834) (discussing Sundry Electors v. Key, case XXVIII). Congress found that the Representative was qualified, given that he was an inhabitant of the state as of election day. Id. at 233. 27 When Benkiser reviewed the public records sent by DeLay and concluded that his residency in Virginia made him ineligible, she unconstitutionally created a pre-election inhabitancy requirement. The Qualifications Clause only requires inhabitancy when that candidate is elected. Given this language, Benkiser could not constitutionally find that DeLay was ineligible on June 7, the date she made her decision. 10 Therefore, her application of the ineligibility statute to DeLay was unconstitutional. 11 28 Our conclusion conforms with the Texas principle that [a]ny constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold office must be strictly construed against ineligibility. Wentworth v. Meyer, 839 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1992). In addition, it is supported by decisions in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that struck down pre-election day residency requirements. Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir.2000); Campbell v. Davidson, 233 F.3d 1229, 1235 (10th Cir.2000). In Schaefer, relying on U.S. Term Limits and evidence of the Framers' intent, the Ninth Circuit held that a one-year pre-election residency requirement violates the Constitution by handicapping the class of nonresident candidates who otherwise satisfy the Qualifications Clause. 215 F.3d at 1037. The Tenth Circuit, in Campbell, struck down a Colorado law that, inter alia, required candidates to be residents of the state for at least thirty days. 233 F.3d at 1231-35. Like the Ninth Circuit, it relied on U.S. Term Limits and evidence of the Framers' intent. Id. at 1233 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison)). 12 29 The RPT does not dispute that the Qualifications Clause requires inhabitancy on election day. Instead, the RPT argues that such a determination can be made prospectively in a procedural manner allowed by the Elections Clause. 30
31 States, through the Elections Clause, exercise some regulatory authority over federal elections because as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274. This authority, however, is not unlimited. Any regulation of time, place, and manner must not violate other portions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944) (Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her electorate as she may deem wise, save only as her action may be affected by the prohibitions of the United States Constitution....). In addition, while states enjoy a wide latitude in regulating elections and in controlling ballot content and ballot access, they must exercise this power in a reasonable, nondiscriminatory, politically neutral fashion. Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1125 (8th Cir.1999). There is evidence that Benkiser did not act reasonably and with political neutrality when she declared DeLay ineligible. Indeed, the district court's description of the events surrounding the letter sent by DeLay imply, at the very least, a lack of neutrality. Dist. Ct. Op. at  n.5 (explaining that Benkiser had personally revised a previous draft of DeLay's letter). 32 More to the point, even had Benkiser acted with political neutrality, her actions would not fall within the limited authority delegated to the states under the Elections Clause. The manner 13 of elections encompasses matters like `notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.' Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24, 121 S.Ct. 1029, 149 L.Ed.2d 44 (2001) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932)). Benkiser's determination of ineligibility does not fall within this definition of the manner of elections. 33 The RPT argues that the determination did affect merely the manner of elections because the act was procedural and predictive. Assuming the RPT's argument is correct, the problem with the theory is that the TDP makes an as-applied challenge. Despite the RPT's attempt to classify the declaration as merely predictive, the evidence shows that it was not. 14 Benkiser's declaration was based on DeLay's current residence, not his inhabitancy on election day. Simply put, her declaration of ineligibility was not a mere predictive, ministerial act affecting the manner of the election. It was a direct determination of DeLay's qualifications as a candidate. As such, the declaration was unconstitutional and cannot be saved by the Elections Clause. 34 The RPT also contends that the declaration of ineligibility is a permissible manner regulation because DeLay is a frivolous candidate and removing frivolous candidates from the ballot constitutes protection of voters under Supreme Court precedent. This argument fails. Whenever the Supreme Court has discussed the states' authority to prevent frivolous candidates from appearing on the ballot, it has been in the context of a candidate that will only receive minimal support in an election. See U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 834, 115 S.Ct. 1842; Storer, 415 U.S. at 743, 94 S.Ct. 1274. There is no evidence that DeLay, the incumbent candidate of a dominant political party, will receive only minimal support. Here, we fail to see how removing DeLay from the ballot would protect the voters, inasmuch as it was the voters themselves who selected DeLay as the Republican candidate for the general election. 35 Even if Benkiser's declaration could be construed as a manner regulation, it would only survive a constitutional challenge if it would not exclude classes of candidates from federal office. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832-33, 115 S.Ct. 1842; see also Schaefer, 215 F.3d at 1035 (asking whether state action has the likely effect of handicapping an otherwise qualified class of candidates). Given that Benkiser's method of application would exclude, or at a minimum handicap, the pool of nonresident prospective candidates, it is unconstitutional under U.S. Term Limits. 15 36