Opinion ID: 852107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hopper's Plea Negotiations

Text: We agree with Hopper that the entry of a guilty plea is a critical stage and a valid waiver of counsel is required for a defendant proceeding pro se. We do not reach the same conclusion with regard to Hopper's plea bargain. Hopper argues that plea negotiations are a critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which the right to counsel is required, absent a valid waiver. (Appellant's Br. at 4-7.) This contention appears aimed at the idea that due process is violated when a defendant is not warned about plea bargaining on his own, just as it is when a defendant is not warned about going to trial solo. A defendant's right to counsel arises at any point during a criminal proceeding in which the absence of counsel would erode the defendant's right to a fair trial. Hernandez v. State, 761 N.E.2d 845 (Ind.2002). This includes any critical stage in which `(1) incrimination may occur or (2) where the opportunity for effective defense must be seized or be foregone.' Id. at 850 (quoting Casada v. State, 544 N.E.2d 189, 198 (Ind.Ct.App. 1989), trans. denied ). An initial hearing conducted under Indiana's statutory scheme is not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding requiring the presence of counsel. Benner v. State, 580 N.E.2d 210 (Ind.1991). Hopper cites a single Indiana case in support of his argument that the plea bargain phase is a critical stage requiring a separate warning: Hood v. State, 546 N.E.2d 847 (Ind.Ct.App.1989). (Appellant's Br. at 4-7.) In Hood, the defendant was arrested, charged with theft and forgery, and held in jail awaiting his initial hearing. While in jail, the prosecutor told him that the State would forgo filing an habitual offender charge if the defendant agreed to plead guilty without counsel. At the initial hearing, Hood waived his right to counsel and pled guilty. The court accepted the pleas, but before sentencing Hood requested counsel and sought to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court denied the request and sentenced Hood to eight years. A post-conviction court found the guilty pleas to have been voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 849. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor's actions in conditioning the plea agreement upon the explicit condition that Hood accept without consulting counsel tainted the subsequent waiver. Id. at 850. There were, then, two particular factors that distinguish Hood's circumstances from Hopper's. First, in Hood the prosecutor threatened to add an additional charge as a manner of inducing the defendant to sign the agreement, and second, the plea agreement in Hood was explicitly contingent upon the defendant waiving his right to counsel. Neither of those factors is present here. Hopper does not suggest that the prosecutor in his case threatened to add an additional charge if he refused the plea agreement. [6] And there is no evidence that the plea agreement was contingent upon Hopper continuing to proceed pro se. The agreement itself contains no such language (App. at 55-56), and Hopper provided no testimony detailing the conversation between himself and the prosecutor. (PCR Tr. at 9.) Moreover, Hood involved a jail-house visit by the prosecutor, before the initial hearing occurred. Here, however, Hopper had already attended his initial hearing. [7] He was already aware of the charges against him and the range of punishments. And he had already made the initial public decision to waive his right to counsel. This is not to say that Hood was wrongly decided. Rather, the principles for which it stands do not point to relief for Hopper. Hopper further argues that his waiver of counsel on the Your Rights In Court form could not constitute a valid waiver of counsel at the subsequent plea negotiations. (Appellant's Br. at 7-16.) The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel before he may be tried, convicted, and punished. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). This protection also encompasses an affirmative right for a defendant to represent himself in a criminal case. Id. However, [i]t is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Because the defendant who waives his right to counsel and proceeds to trial unrepresented is forgoing many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. . . . the accused must `knowingly and intelligently' forgo those relinquished benefits. Id. [H]e should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). There is no particular formula or script that must be read to the defendant. The information that must be given will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004). Courts determining whether a waiver of counsel for trial was made voluntarily and intelligently must consider (1) the extent of the court's inquiry into the defendant's decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant's decision to proceed pro se. We have drawn these factors from case law in the Seventh Circuit, see United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407 (7th Cir.2001), and applied them in situations as diverse as trial for battery, Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind.2001), and for capital murder, Kubsch v. State, 866 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. 2007). Hopper's contention is that the Sixth Amendment requires the same warnings and analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court has already answered this question in the negative. In Tovar, a defendant who was a repeat drunk driver facing his third charge in four years contended that his right to counsel had been violated in the course of his first conviction because the trial court had not warned him about the disadvantages of waiving counsel before pleading guilty. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed, declaring that the Sixth Amendment required warnings about the possibility of achieving better outcomes with the aid of counsel. It set aside Tovar's earlier conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment does demand that a defendant who waives counsel `knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open,' Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88, 124 S.Ct. 1379 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279, 63 S.Ct. 236), but that advisements of this sort were required only when a defendant elects to go to trial without a lawyer and not for such a straightforward matter as pleading guilty to driving while intoxicated. The decision in Tovar governs Hopper's Sixth Amendment claim, and he has not made any separate argument that a different result is required by the Indiana Constitution. Our earlier decision in this case likewise did not rest on the state constitution.