Opinion ID: 2994430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count one: The Park District’s Administrative

Text: Hearing Process Violated Due Process In support of his claim that the Park District’s administrative hearing process violated due process, Amundsen alleges that: (1) the hearing officer was hired and paid by the Park District and thus was biased in favor of his employer; (2) he did not have the ability to subpoena witnesses; and (3) the hearing was not conducted in accordance with formal rules of evidence. At the outset, we note that Amundsen relies on both Illinois and federal law in part to support his sec. 1983 suit. However, both Illinois and federal courts have rejected arguments similar to those raised here by Amundsen./5
Amundsen initially accuses the hearing officer of being biased in favor of the Park District as it is apparent that a hearing officer who consistently rules against the Park District will not continue to enjoy his place on the Park District payroll. Thus, he claims, [a]s a paid agent of the [Park District] deciding a dispute over the propriety of the actions of the Defendant, the hearing officer can hardly be relied upon to be impartial in such a situation. [But a contention of bias] must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, . . . [there is] such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); see Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1982) (citation omitted); Scott v. Department of Commerce, 416 N.E.2d 1082, 1089 (Ill. 1981) (Without a showing to the contrary, State administrators ’are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)). This presumption can be rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195-96; see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973). To establish bias that is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, the asserting party would need to prove that the adjudicator had a pecuniary interest in the outcome . . . [or had] been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. But the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest rests on the party making the assertion. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 196. The plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of actual bias on the part of the hearing officer. Amundsen’s bald accusation is based solely on the fact that the hearing officer was employed by the Park District, which of itself is insufficient to establish actual bias. Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971); Cannon v. Apfel, No. 99-1578, 2000 WL 684688, at  (7th Cir. May 24, 2000); Van Harken v. Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that even when an administrative or adjudicative body derives a financial benefit from fines or penalties that it imposes is not in general a violation of due process). Thus, we hold that Amundsen has failed to satisfy his burden of overcoming the well-established presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47; see also Kloman v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 674 N.E.2d 38, 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
Amundsen’s next claim is that he did not have the ability to subpoena witnesses, which he contends, also violated due process. Contrary to his assertion, the record reflects that an employee challenging his discharge may request that the Personnel Board or one of its hearing officers issue a subpoena for witnesses as provided under Illinois law. See 70 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1505/16a(c)(2). In spite of this fact, Amundsen never requested a subpoena for a witness. Nonetheless, this court has held that in the administrative hearing context, the ability to subpoena witnesses is not an absolute right. See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1999); see also DeLong v. Hampton, 422 F.2d 21, 24-25 (3d Cir. 1970); Henley v. United States, 379 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (M.D. Pa. 1974). In fact, the Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in the Social Security context because of the additional and pragmatic factor of the sheer cost of providing live . . . testimony at administrative hearings. Perales, 402 U.S. at 406. Indeed, in administrative matters, due process is satisfied when the party concerned is provided an opportunity to be heard in an orderly proceeding which is adapted to the nature and circumstances of the dispute. Obasi v. Department of Prof. Reg., 639 N.E.2d 1318, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). It is worthy to note that the hearing officer did in fact read him a statement of his hearing rights at the outset of the hearing, including the right to call witnesses, the right to present evidence on his behalf and the right to cross- examine witnesses testifying against him. Amundsen was represented by counsel at the hearing, testified himself and called three witnesses to testify on his behalf. The plaintiff also submitted evidence into the record, including numerous letters of support from other parents. Based on the record, we are convinced that the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to be heard, see Obasi, 639 N.E.2d at 1325, and thus, we reject Amundsen’s claim that the alleged denial of his right to subpoena witnesses violated due process.
Lastly, Amundsen contends that the hearing was not conducted in accordance with formal rules of evidence and that hearsay evidence was improperly considered. Contrary to his contention that the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (APA) mandates that the rules of evidence and privilege be followed, we hasten to point out that the APA does not apply to Park District administrative hearings. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that [c]learly the [Park District Personnel] Board is an administrative unit created pursuant to statute, specifically, the Chicago Park District Act (Park Act) . . . . , [and] the APA does not apply to it because it is a unit of local government and is therefore specifically exempted from its provisions. Schmeier v. Chicago Park District, 703 N.E.2d 396, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (emphasis added); see also 70 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1505/16a. Because Amundsen has failed to present nor have we been able to discover any law that mandates that Park District hearings are bound by formal rules of evidence, we reject his claim that his hearing did not comport with due process. Thus, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Count one of the amended complaint was proper.