Opinion ID: 1491821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DHS's appeal from the contempt order.

Text: DHS first argues that the trial court erred in holding it in contempt because its orders did not conform with constitutional requirements of due process. DHS essentially makes two separate arguments, the first is that the September 30 order was indefinite as to the obligations imposed upon DHS, and second that the trial court's show cause orders were insufficient to give it notice. DHS primarily relies on Gatlin v. Gatlin, 306 Ark. 146, 811 S.W.2d 761 (1991), and Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 Ark.App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992). In Gruber DHS argued that the trial court erred in holding it in contempt after one of its representatives failed to appear at a placement hearing. The court of appeals rejected DHS's jurisdictional argument. Even one not a party to an action, who has been served with an order, or who has notice of it, may be held in contempt of the order, [citation omitted]. Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms as to the duties imposed upon him and the command must be expressed rather than implied. Id. The DHS representative there was given notice in open court, as well as in writing, of the date and time to appear for the placement hearing. One who has full knowledge of a court order and its import, as DHS did, cannot flout it with impunity. Id. In Gatlin this court similarly reiterated that a person may not be held in contempt for violating a court order unless the order is definite in its terms as to the duties imposed upon the person and the command must be express rather than implied. We reject DHS's argument that the September 30 order was somehow vague as to the obligations imposed upon it. The order provided that Dept. of Human Services is to provide adequate housing for the [P. family]including water and electricity. The evidence shows that DHS knew that the purpose of the order was for it to restore utilities to the P. family home. At the September 30 hearing, Cooper stated that Judge Reynolds expected us to pay their bills for them. And, I have no way to accomplish that. I've talked with my area manager about it, on two different occasions, and there's justwe don't have the budget to do that. So, we've done what we can. Cooper later testified at the December 11 hearing that it was her understanding that the court ordered DHS to pay the past-due electric bill and the past-due water bill. This was communicated to Doherty via e-mail, who responded with instructions to contact an attorney to file an appeal, and to not pay the bills. She also had a conversation with Doherty where she explained that she thought the order meant that DHS was to get the electricity and water turned on. Although the September 30 order does not mention cash assistance, DHS knew that it was to restore the utilities within a reasonable amount of time. We also find meritless DHS's claim that its notice of the show cause hearing was constitutionally deficient. [2] Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-10-108 (Repl.1994), governing the court's power to punish for criminal contempt, provides in part that the party charged shall be notified of the accusation and shall have a reasonable time to make his defense. This court has also held that the Due Process Clause, as applied in criminal proceedings, requires that an alleged contemnor be given notice of the charge of contempt pending against him and to be informed of the specific nature of the charge. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988). In Fitzhugh this court reversed a criminal contempt finding imposed upon an attorney where the attorney never received notice that he was charged with contempt. While DHS makes much of the fact that it received no written notice of the first scheduled show cause hearing on November 21, the fact remains that it was served on December 6 with the show cause order directing it to appear for the December 11 hearing. This order provided That on the 30th day of September, 1996, [DHS] and its agents were ordered by this court to pay cash assistance for electricity and water for R.P. in the home in which she is living or to provide other adequate housing. That to date [DHS] has failed and refused to pay said amounts. Under these circumstances, we hold that DHS received notice comporting with due process and the requirements of Ark.Code Ann. § 16-10-108.
Here DHS argues that the trial court erred in finding that its actions were willful and constituted contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. This point is in actuality a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the contempt finding. In a criminal contempt proceeding, proof of contempt must exist beyond a reasonable doubt. Jolly v. Jolly, 290 Ark. 352, 719 S.W.2d 430 (1986). On appellate review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision concerning the contempt and affirm if there is substantial evidence to support its decision. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 810 S.W.2d 331 (1991) ( Clark II ). Clark II is illustrative on this point. The contempt finding at issue there involved DHS's failure to comply with an order of the trial court to provide transportation to a family and to provide the remainder of available preventative funds. With regard to the transportation issue, the evidence showed that there had been a two-month delay in obtaining bus tokens without justification. With respect to the disbursements, the evidence showed that DHS was aware that certain cash disbursements were ordered, but explained that payment of the money was not in compliance with agency policy and could result in an audit leading to a penalty of funds reduction. DHS additionally explained that it thought that its staff was under the impression that the case was on appeal and assumed a stay order had been obtained. The trial court found DHS in contempt, rejecting DHS's argument that it did not act willfully. The trial court stated that there are various degrees of willful as there are various types of being willful, and I think in an agency this big, you're going to have some lags in time, and we understand that. What I'm concerned with is, I think the agency just deliberately did not do very much to comply with the Court's order until pretty much the eleventh hour. Id. The Clark II court affirmed, observing that the trial court's statement was not an inapt characterization of the proof offered by DHS to explain its inaction, and while it may not have been motivated by rancor, neither was it inadvertent. Id. There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that DHS was in willful contempt. It was undisputed the order was not complied with and we find no basis for disagreement with the conclusion of the trial court that DHS's failure to act constituted willful contempt. Id. In the present case, the substance of DHS's argument is that there was no willful noncompliance with the trial court's order because it made ongoing attempts at compliance, and that it never intended to disobey the court order. In particular it highlights Harper's efforts to obtain support for the P. family from community providers. Given these alternative methods made until the motion to set aside was heard, it reasons that their efforts could never be defined as willful disobedience. We disagree. As already discussed above, DHS understood the trial court's order to require it to restore the utilities. Nonetheless, Doherty specifically informed Cooper not to pay the bills. The very fact that DHS immediately took the position that its own funds could not be used to pay the bills substantiates the notion that it knew it was to pay the bills with its own funds if it could not otherwise restore the utilities. While the evidence showed that Harper made efforts to obtain funds through community providers, the fact remains that the bills were not paid until the end of November. While DHS may not have been motivated by rancor, neither was its failure to pay the bills inadvertent. Cf. Clark II, supra . Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision concerning the contempt, the trial court had substantial evidence before it with which to conclude that DHS was in willful contempt of its order.
DHS also argues that the trial court erred in finding DHS in contempt due to the doctrine of separation of powers. Its contention is that the trial court usurped the executive branch's power of allocating and disbursing resources for family services which were appropriated by the legislative branch. We agree with intervenor that we are precluded from reaching the merits of this point as it is in substance an attack on the underlying order. In Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993), this court stated that the law is long settledwhere the failure or refusal to abide by an order of the court is the issue, we do not look behind the order to determine whether the order is valid. Because DHS is merely attempting to challenge the underlying order here, we decline to set aside the contempt finding based on separation of powers.
Finally, DHS argues that the contempt order should have been set aside due to instances of bias on the part of the trial court. In its brief it writes that the trial judge should have recused herself from the contempt hearings on December 11 and 16, 1996, as requested in [DHS's] motion to amend brief and judgment. While DHS points to a number of actions by the trial court which DHS contends reflect judicial bias and should have resulted in the trial court's recusal, we deal only with the instance actually brought to the trial court's attention. See Franklin v. State, 314 Ark. 329, 863 S.W.2d 268 (1993) (issue of bias may not be raised on appeal absent objection below). In its motion to amend judgment filed on February 10, 1997, DHS argued that the January 31, 1997 order should be set aside under Rule 59(a)(1) in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Majore Kesl, an attorney for the Office of Chief Counsel, submitted an affidavit in which she stated she was present with the trial court on December 10, 1996, when the court reporter informed the trial court during an in-chamber conference that Doherty was out of the state and would not be at the upcoming hearing. The trial court's response was to comment that she was going to have to put Sandi Doherty in jail. DHS argued in their motion that the trial court had pre-judged the case and should have recused from the December 11 contempt hearing. Judges must refrain from presiding over cases in which they might be interested and must avoid all appearance of bias. Reel v. State, 318 Ark. 565, 886 S.W.2d 615 (1994). To decide whether there was an abuse of discretion, we review the record to determine if any prejudice or bias was exhibited. Id. The question of bias is usually confined to the conscience of the judge. Noland v. Noland, 326 Ark. 617, 932 S.W.2d 341 (1996). Judges are presumed to be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification has the burden of showing otherwise. Turner v. State, 325 Ark. 237, 926 S.W.2d 843 (1996). While we are inclined to hold that DHS failed to even preserve this issue due to a failure to timely object at the first opportunity, we nonetheless affirm on the merits as the alleged instance of bias is not enough to warrant the trial court's recusal. While it certainly evinces displeasure and frustration on the part of the trial court, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying DHS's motion to amend judgment on grounds of judicial bias.