Opinion ID: 1194220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was There a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy?

Text: A review of the present state of the law surrounding a claimed Fourth Amendment violation is necessary because, in my judgment, the majority opinion fails to correctly analyze the prevailing constitutional concepts. The most recent discussions of constitutional search and seizure law emanating from both the United States Supreme Court and this court emphasize that the underlying question which must be answered is whether the individual challenging the search had a justifiable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Parkhurst v. State, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1369 (1981). We said in Parkhurst that in order to claim a violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and Art. 1, § 4, of the Wyoming Constitution, [1] the challenging party must be able to show a legitimate expectation of privacy. 628 P.2d at 1374. Therefore, the protections afforded by the exclusionary rule only apply to unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment or Art. 1, § 4, which searches must be shown to have taken place in an area where a legitimate expectation of privacy has attached. [2] In order for this appellant to contend successfully that the cabin was illegally searched, he must initially demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in those premises. I read the majority opinion to assume that Jessee at least had an expectation of privacy in the interior of the cabin for the reason that the opinion sanctioned the search on plain-view and exigent-circumstance grounds. If this were not the position of the majority there would be no purpose in discussing plain view and exigent circumstances. This would, of course, be true because these concepts speak to the exception to the exclusionary strictures of search and seizure in those circumstances where it can be shown that the defendant has an expectation of privacy in the premises. I would suggest, however, that, in light of the trial judge's conclusion that no expectation of privacy existed in the appellant's cabin, it is necessary to decide the question. In determining whether the appellant had an expectation of privacy in the cabin, I refer to the guidelines we adopted in Parkhurst. There we said that some of the factors to be considered in determining a person's expectation of privacy include: (1) the precautions taken in order to maintain one's privacy; (2) the likely intent of the drafters of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions; (3) the property rights the claimant possessed in the invaded area; (4) the legitimacy of the individual's possession of or presence in the property which was searched or seized. 628 P.2d at 1374, citing from Comment, 15 Land & Water L.Rev. at 283, fn. 56, and at 295. [3] Applying these guidelines, the record tells us that appellant used the cabin as his partial residence. He had protected the windows with plastic covering and there was a No Trespassing sign on the only door to the cabin. The defendant had permission from the owner of the cabin to reside there and it can therefore be said that he was lawfully in possession. Finally, as noted by the majority, it has never been questioned that the framers of both the United States and Wyoming Constitutions intended to guarantee the sanctity and privacy of an individual home. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Steagald v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). Also, the United States Supreme Court decision in Rakas v. Illinois notes that, by virtue of his right to exclude others an individual will, in all likelihood, have a legitimate expectation of privacy in property he owns or lawfully possesses. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 143, n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430, n. 12. With these rules in mind, I would, without hesitation, conclude that the appellant had a justifiable expectation of privacy in the cabin. We held in Parkhurst that, under Art. 1, § 4, of the Wyoming Constitution an individual's legitimate presence on the seized property in and of itself established a legitimate expectation of privacy, 628 P.2d at 1374, n. 7. Indeed, in this case the appellant had established his right to use the cabin as well as his right to exclude others from its interior. Even though the trial judge found to the contrary, I conclude that the appearance of abandonment cannot be the pivotal issue upon which a decision here can be rendered. The record shows that it was in fact not abandoned and that the appellant had established the cabin as his residence. I am, therefore, in agreement with what must be the majority's assumption that appellant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the cabin, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment and Art. 1, § 4, are therefore applicable. I would make clear, however, that it is my belief that appellant's expectation of privacy is limited to the cabin's interior. This conclusion finds its genesis in the fact that the cabin itself was located on public domain, in an area of historical significance. Thus, although appellant could exclude others from the cabin's interior, he was not possessed of a right to exclude members of the general public or the police from the surrounding areas. I find support for this judgment in a factually similar case from the State of Hawaii. In State v. Dias, 62 Haw. 52, 609 P.2d 637 (1980), the Supreme Court of Hawaii decided that the appellant had a justifiable expectation of privacy in the interior of a home that was illegally located on state property, because the state had acquiesced in the possession of the property by squatters, 609 P.2d at 640. The court held that the fact of possession did not alter the public nature of the surrounding areas and therefore the appellant's expectation of privacy did not extend to the exterior of the building, but this did not preclude an expectation of privacy in the interior. Jessee's claim to his expectation of privacy in the cabin's interior seems even stronger, since the cabin is located on BLM land with government permission. By analogy we can conclude that although appellant had a protectable interest in the cabin he could not lay claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy to the adjacent land and, as compared to the facts in the Hawaii case, Jessee's expectation of privacy in the cabin's interior was greater than that of the Hawaiian appellant because here the cabin was located on BLM land with the Bureau's permission.