Opinion ID: 14238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 11 While neither party contests this court's jurisdiction to entertain this matter, we are obligated to satisfy ourselves that appellate jurisdiction is proper. See Silver Star Enterprises, Inc. v. M/V Saramacca, 19 F.3d 1008, 1013 n. 5 (5th Cir.1994). Initially, we are confident in stating that under normal circumstances a post-judgment order imposing sanctions is final and appealable. See Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir.1993)(noting that a postjudgment order, which is the last order entered in an action, is final and appealable); Cassidy v. Cassidy, 950 F.2d 381, 382 (7th Cir.1991)(determining that Rule 11 sanctions awarded after judgement are separately appealable); see also Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc., 849 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir.1988)(stating that an award of attorney's fees may be appealed separately as a final order following a final determination of liability on the merits). However, in this case, the district court's order imposed two separate sanctions on Strauss: one sanction suspending him from practice before the Western District effective immediately and the other a monetary sanction of unquantified attorney's fees. Normally, an unquantified award of attorney's fees does not constitute a final appealable order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Southern Travel Club, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 986 F.2d 125, 129-30 (5th Cir.1993). However, the portion of the district court's order suspending the appellant is final and appealable. 12 We believe that the two sanctions ordered by the district court are severable with respect to the issue of finality. See John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir.) (addressing portion of Rule 11 finding as to monetary sanction but ruling that court had no jurisdiction over award of attorney's fees in which amount not fixed), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 821, 111 S.Ct. 69, 112 L.Ed.2d 43 (1990); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 340 n. 5 (5th Cir.1993)(addressing number of Rule 11 sanctions although order contained one sanction over which the court did not have jurisdiction and apparently was not appealed by the parties). Thus, we may consider the propriety of the court's determination that Strauss' pre-filing conduct contravened Rule 11 because at least one portion of the district court's order, i.e. the suspension sanction, is a final appealable order. 13 Considering the finality of at least one aspect of the district court's sanction order, both parties urge this court to exert pendant appellate jurisdiction over the normally unappealable attorney's fees liability order. See Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc., 85 F.3d 675 (D.C.Cir.1996)(recognizing the potential for pendant appellate jurisdiction over non-final attorney fee liability orders); see also Note, Timothy B. Smith, Court-Created Expansion of Pendant Appellate Jurisdiction, 65 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 653 (1997). Pendant appellate jurisdiction is only proper in rare and unique circumstances where a final appealable order is inextricably intertwined with an unappealable order or where review of the unappealable order is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the appealable order. See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 n. 29 (5th Cir.1995); see also Swint v. Chambers Cty. Commission, 514 U.S. 35, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995)(implying that pendant appellate jurisdiction is proper in very limited circumstances). In this case, the propriety of the district court's attorney's fees sanction is inextricably intertwined with the suspension sanction as to make pendant appellate jurisdiction appropriate over the attorney's fees sanction. Moreover, considering the result reached by the court in this matter, pendant review promotes judicial economy by providing both parties with a speedy resolution of the issues while allowing for a sensible allocation of judicial resources. Gilda Marx, 85 F.3d at 678-79.