Opinion ID: 1588685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion

Text: ¶ 40 Alexander & Bishop contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether specific performance was appropriate, either because the seller might be able to sell the property to someone else, or because the buyer could demonstrate that it was unable to close. In essence, this argument charges the circuit court with two discrete errors. First, Alexander & Bishop asserts that the circuit court erred by not requiring Ash Park to demonstrate that it had no adequate remedy at law. Second, it asserts that the circuit court erred by failing to determine whether performance of the contract was impossible. We address each argument in turn.
¶ 41 In some contexts, specific performance is unavailable where legal damages are adequate to remedy the breach. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359 (1981); 25 Williston, supra, § 67:1 at 184 ([T]he general rule defining the instances where specific performance will be granted may be stated as follows: where damages are an inadequate remedy and the nature of the contract is such that specific enforcement of it will not be impossible or involve too great practical difficulties ... equity will grant a decree of specific performance.); Contract Law in Wisconsin, supra, § 13.53.; Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 168, 31 N.W.2d 170 (1948). ¶ 42 In the context of contracts for land, however, Wisconsin law does not require a seller to demonstrate the inadequacy of a remedy at law as a prerequisite to an award of specific performance. Wisconsin statutes provide that specific performance of contract or covenant is an available remedy for any person having an interest in real property ... unless the use of a remedy is denied in a specific situation. Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1)(f). ¶ 43 Further, Wisconsin courts have not restricted a seller's remedy of specific performance to cases in which a remedy at law is inadequate. In Heins, the seller of a parcel of land sought specific performance, and this court determined that specific performance was an available remedy. 165 Wis. at 571, 163 N.W. 173. Similarly, in Taft v. Reddy, 191 Wis. 144, 150, 210 N.W. 364 (1926), this court concluded that the [land contract] vendor's right to specific performance is established beyond question[.] See also Yee v. Giuffre, 176 Wis.2d 189, 194 n. 3, 499 N.W.2d 926 (Ct. App.1993). None of these cases requires the seller to demonstrate that a legal remedy would be inadequate. ¶ 44 Alexander & Bishop cites Henrikson v. Henrikson, 143 Wis. 314, 127 N.W. 962 (1910), for the proposition that specific performance is unavailable as a remedy when the buyer breaches a contract to purchase land and there is an adequate remedy at law. Henrikson does not support Alexander & Bishop's argument. In that case, there was no valid and enforceable contract to transfer land. Rather, the agreement at issue was an oral contract that did not satisfy the statute of frauds. Id. at 317, 127 N.W. 962. Henrikson does not address the remedies available to a seller when the buyer breaches an enforceable contract for the sale of land. ¶ 45 Wisconsin law is consistent with the general rule across jurisdictions. Courts have traditionally awarded specific performance of a contract for the sale of land without a prerequisite that the non-breaching party demonstrate that legal damages would be inadequate. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 360 cmt. e (1981) (Contracts for the sale of land have traditionally been accorded a special place in the law of specific performance.... [T]he seller who has not yet conveyed is generally granted specific performance on breach by the buyer.); Edward Yorio, Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions 281 (1989) (Traditionally, when a buyer reneged on a promise to purchase realty, specific performance was almost universally available to remedy the breach.). ¶ 46 Although Ash Park does contend that damages at law would be an inadequate remedy, [17] we need not decide this factual question here. We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by ordering specific performance without requiring Ash Park to demonstrate that a remedy at law would be inadequate.
¶ 47 We turn to Alexander & Bishop's second argument that performance of the contract would be impossible. Wisconsin law recognizes impossibility as a defense to specific performance. Anderson, 155 Wis.2d at 512-13, 455 N.W.2d 885. The defense of impossibility rests on the common-sense principle that a court of equity will not order an impossible act. Yorio, supra, § 5.5 at 112. ¶ 48 In its arguments to this court, Alexander & Bishop asserts that it is impossible for it to perform the contract: [T]he anchor tenant never committed which made it impossible for Alexander & Bishop to get financing and close on the deal. ¶ 49 However, Alexander & Bishop never asserted impossibility in the circuit court as a defense to specific performanceeither in opposition to Ash Park's motion for summary judgment or in its motion for reconsideration or relief from judgment. [18] Further, in its oral ruling granting specific performance, the circuit court appeared to recognize that the financial inability of a buyer could preclude such an award. [19] Yet, Alexander & Bishop never asked the circuit court to determine whether it would be impossible for Alexander & Bishop to perform. ¶ 50 As a result, the circuit court has not made any factual findings about whether performance would be impossible, and there is no finding of fact for this court to review. [W]e will not consider factual matters raised for the first time on appeal; our review is confined to the facts in the record before the trial court at the time it decided the motion for summary judgment. Coopman v. State Farm, 179 Wis.2d 548, 556, 508 N.W.2d 610 (Ct.App.1993); see also Lind v. Lund, 266 Wis. 232, 237, 63 N.W.2d 313 (1954). ¶ 51 Alexander & Bishop's assertion that the circuit court should have held a hearing at its own initiative ignores a litigant's responsibility to develop its case in the circuit court and to raise arguments on its own behalf. Here, Alexander & Bishop had the opportunity to raise defenses and to request an evidentiary hearing, but it failed to do so. ¶ 52 It was not until months after the award of specific performance when faced with the possibility of contempt sanctions that Alexander & Bishop first contended that it did not have the financial ability to perform the contract. Alexander & Bishop asserted that no developer can obtain financing for a shopping mall development as planned here, without a signed long-term anchor tenant. Thus, it argued, contempt sanctions should not be imposed because without a tenant, [Alexander & Bishop] cannot close. ¶ 53 Even if Alexander & Bishop's assertion that it cannot obtain financing for a shopping mall development without an anchor tenant is truea question of fact we do not decide on appealit does not necessarily follow that it is impossible for Alexander & Bishop to specifically perform this contract. The order for specific performance does not require Alexander & Bishop to finance and develop a shopping mall, which could indeed require a large investment of capital. Rather, the order requires that it purchase only this parcel of vacant land. ¶ 54 Without making a viable argument identifying how the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion, Alexander & Bishop essentially asks us to reevaluate the facts and equities in this case. We decline to usurp the equitable function of the circuit court. ¶ 55 We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it awarded specific performance to Ash Park. The court recognized that specific performance was a remedy that was expressly included in the parties' contract. Further, it recognized that specific performance is also an available remedy under the common law. If later proven, Alexander & Bishop's alleged financial inability to perform may be cause for the circuit court to modify its judgment. [20] However, Alexander & Bishop's bare allegations do not provide a basis for this court to conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.