Opinion ID: 1968177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A. Appointment of Conservator

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a member of the bar to serve as conservator. He contends that the court should have given him an opportunity to consult Mr. Jackson, a professional financial advisor and investment counsel about the management of his estate. D.C.Code § 21-2054(g) provides: After the hearing, upon finding that a basis for the appointment of a conservator or other protective order has been established, the court shall make an appointment or other appropriate protective order. As relevant to this case, the order of priority would be (1) the person nominated by the incapacitated person; (2) his parents; and (3) any other person. D.C.Code § 21-2057(a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(7). However, [t]he court acting in the best interest of the protected individual, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having a lower priority or no priority. D.C.Code § 21-2057(b). The decision whether to appoint a conservator is committed to the `considerable discretion' of the trial court, and this court will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Orshansky, supra, 804 A.2d at 1092 (citation omitted). Our standard of review of the trial court's discretionary decision is `deferential' in recognition of the role that the trial court's on-the-spot judgment may play in choosing among alternatives. Id. This court considers whether the trial court had a factual basis for its determination and whether it made an informed decision in light of available alternatives. Id. During closing argument, appellant's counsel informed the court that appellant wanted William Jackson, an attorney in Maryland, to be designated as his conservator. The trial court declined to appoint Mr. Jackson because appellant had never met him, and Mr. Jackson did not present himself to the court as a nominee. [13] Instead, the trial court appointed petitioner's nominee, Darrel Parker, a member of the District of Columbia Bar, as appellant's conservator. In doing so, the court explained that: The court is familiar with [Mr. Parker's} work in this area of law and finds him to be an appropriate choice. Attorney Parker could also serve as a role model to Mr. McMillan. The court adopts. Dr. Wynne's recommendation that the conservator . . . should be someone who is willing and able to work closely with Mr. McMillan, to listen to him closely and carefully and to permit him the greatest possible degree of independence in helping make financial life decisions. The court has found Attorney Parker to be a patient person. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court did not have a factual basis for its choice. It had no indication that appellant had made an informed choice or any choice of a conservator, and it had no evidence that Mr. Jackson was prepared to accept the appointment The court appears to have made an informed decision based upon the alternatives. Applying a deferential standard, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in appointing Mr. Parker as appellant's conservator.