Opinion ID: 786794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kerman's Claim of Loss of Liberty

Text: 141 In contrast, where the jury has found a constitutional violation and there is no genuine dispute that the violation resulted in some injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages as a matter of law. See, e.g., Atkins v. City of New York, 143 F.3d at 103; Haywood v. Koehler, 78 F.3d at 104; Raysor v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027, 106 S.Ct. 1227, 89 L.Ed.2d 337 (1986); Wheatley v. Beetar, 637 F.2d at 867. In Wheatley, for example, a bifurcated trial was held on the plaintiff's claim that he had been beaten by county police officers. In the first phase of the trial, the jury found the defendants liable for use of excessive force in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights; in the second phase, the jury awarded damages of just $1. The plaintiff moved unsuccessfully for a new trial on the issue of damages. On appeal, we reversed. We noted that although the jury could reasonably have rejected some of the plaintiff's evidence of injury, other injury claims were well substantiated and uncontradicted. Since the jury's verdict that excessive force had been used plainly accepted the plaintiff's testimony that he had been beaten, we concluded that the plaintiff was entitled as a matter of law to some compensation. See 637 F.2d at 865. Thus, we held that in the second phase of the trial, [i]t was error to charge the jury that an award of nominal damages was permissible and an abuse of discretion not to set [such an award] aside. Id. 142 Similarly, where the plaintiff was indisputably deprived of his liberty, and the conduct of the defendant responsible for the deprivation was found to be unlawful, we have held that the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory, not merely nominal, damages. See Raysor v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.2d at 38-39 ( Raysor ). In Raysor, the plaintiff, while attempting to return approximately $16 worth of pills to a store, was arrested and was detained for several hours. Following his exoneration, he brought suit under § 1983 and state law for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The jury found against him on the constitutional claims but found one defendant liable on the state-law claims; it awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages of $16. We held that this award was inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for, inter alia, the loss of time ... involved in a case of false arrest. 768 F.2d at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). We noted that 143 New York cases uphold awards of up to $10,000 for eve[n] short periods of confinement without proof of actual damages. See, e.g., Hallenbeck v. City of Albany, 99 A.D.2d 639, 472 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1984) ($10,000 for three hours); Woodard v. City of Albany, 81 A.D.2d 947, 439 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1981) ($7,500 for five hours); Guion v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 56 A.D.2d 798, 393 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1977) ($10,000 for three hours), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 876, 403 N.Y.S.2d 465, 374 N.E.2d 364 (1978). 144 Raysor, 768 F.2d at 39. We inferred that the inadequate verdict was likely the product of a jury charge that did not inform the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the loss of intangible rights: 145 The admonition not to award speculative damages was, of course, correct, as was the court's instruction that Raysor had the burden of proof with respect to the nature and extent of his injuries, and with respect to his resulting losses. But the court should have made it clear to the jury that it could award monetary damages — the amount necessarily arbitrary and unprovable — for the intangibles which we have referred to above. 146 Id. (emphasis added). 147 Raysor is consistent with traditional common-law principles governing entitlement to damages for the tort of false imprisonment. That tort is complete with even a brief restraint of the plaintiff's freedom; it is not necessary that any damage result from it other than the confinement itself. Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 11, at 48 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton). The compensatory damages that may be awarded for false imprisonment fall into two categories: general damages and special damages. See, e.g., McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 107, at 375-77 (1935) ( McCormick on Damages ). General damage is a harm of a sort inseparable from [the unlawful] restraint. Id. at 375. For false imprisonment, upon pleading and proving merely the unlawful interference with his liberty, the plaintiff is entitled to `general' damages for loss of time and humiliation or mental suffering. Id.; see, e.g., Prosser & Keeton § 11, at 48 (The plaintiff is entitled to compensation for loss of time, for physical discomfort or inconvenience, and for any resulting physical illness or injury to health. Since the injury is in large part a mental one, the plaintiff is entitled to damages for mental suffering, humiliation, and the like. (footnotes omitted)). Items of special damage commonly include physical discomfort, shock, or injury to health, loss of ... employment, and injury to the plaintiff's reputation or credit, and must be specifically pleaded and proven. McCormick on Damages at 376. In contrast, `[g]eneral' damage ... need not be specifically proved-it may be inferred from the circumstances of the arrest or imprisonment and would include at least the value of the time lost by the plaintiff during the period of detention. Id. 148 The damages recoverable for loss of liberty for the period spent in a wrongful confinement are separable from damages recoverable for such injuries as physical harm, embarrassment, or emotional suffering; even absent such other injuries, an award of several thousand dollars may be appropriate simply for several hours' loss of liberty. See, e.g., Hallenbeck v. City of Albany, 99 A.D.2d 639, 472 N.Y.S.2d 187 (3d Dep't 1984); Woodard v. City of Albany, 81 A.D.2d 947, 439 N.Y.S.2d 701 (3d Dep't 1981). In Woodard, for example, the Appellate Division held that a plaintiff who provided no indication that he incurred any substantial physical or mental injury as the result of [his] false imprisonment could recover $7,500 for false arrest and false imprisonment. 81 A.D.2d at 947, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (ordering a new trial on damages unless the plaintiff agreed to a remittitur of a $16,000 jury award to $7,500, the plaintiff [having] only spent approximately five hours in jail). Similarly, in Hallenbeck, where the plaintiff had provided no indication that he incurred any substantial physical or mental suffering, the Appellate Division ruled that he could recover $10,000 for false arrest and confinement. 99 A.D.2d at 640, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 189 (ordering remittitur of a $25,000 jury award to $10,000 where the plaintiff was detained three hours). See also Gardner v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348 (2d Cir.1990) (requiring remittitur of a $150,000 jury award to $50,000 for loss of liberty, and approving other awards for past and future pain and suffering). Thus, a verdict that a plaintiff should not receive more than nominal damages for physical injury, economic loss, or mental suffering does not foreclose a more substantial award for his loss of liberty. 149 In the present case, the facts with regard to Kerman's actual loss of liberty were largely uncontroverted. There was no dispute that Kerman was kept in handcuffs after the officers completed their search for a gun and that he was taken to Bellevue Hospital where he remained overnight; there was no dispute that Crossan was in charge of the group of officers who kept Kerman in custody; there was no dispute that it was Crossan who ordered that Kerman be taken to the hospital ( see, e.g., Tr. 524 (Crossan admits that he made the decision to remove [Kerman] from his home and send him to the hospital); Tr. 750 (instructing the jury that [i]t is not disputed by the parties that the defendant Crossan decided that plaintiff would be brought to the hospital)); and there was no dispute that Kerman did not go to the hospital willingly. 150 The jury, however, was not instructed that Kerman was entitled to compensatory damages for his loss of liberty. This may have been attributable in part to the district court's view, stated in its posttrial discussion of the jury's failure to return a verdict for more than nominal damages, that Crossan could not be held responsible for any loss of liberty after Kerman's arrival at Bellevue. The court stated, inter alia, that Kerman's detention in the hospital was not attributable to Crossan but rather was based on the independent decision of the Bellevue doctors. See Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . That view, however, is contrary to the principle that tort defendants, including those sued under § 1983, are `responsible for the natural consequences of [their] actions,' Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986))(other internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, an actor may be held liable for those consequences attributable to reasonably foreseeable intervening forces, including the acts of third parties. Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation, 115 F.3d at 1071 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Herzog v. Village of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir.2002); Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 556 (2d Cir.1987). The fact that the intervening third party may exercise independent judgment in determining whether to follow a course of action recommended by the defendant does not make acceptance of the recommendation unforeseeable or relieve the defendant of responsibility. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 338-39, 344 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (a judge's decision to issue an arrest warrant does not break the causal chain between an officer's improvident application for the warrant and the ensuing arrest); Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation, 115 F.3d at 1073 & n. 4 (probation department may be held liable for recommending a probationary program that was unconstitutional, notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing judge made his own determination as to whether to accept the recommendation). 151 Although foreseeability is normally an issue of fact, see, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation, 115 F.3d at 1073; Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d at 556; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 453 comment b (1965), it is unquestionable here that Kerman's detention in the hospital for some period of time was a foreseeable consequence of Crossan's sending him there. Crossan has contended throughout that he ordered Kerman taken to the hospital on the premise that Kerman, if left at large, was a danger to himself or others; accordingly, the Bellevue intake record stated that Kerman was Brought by NYPD as possible suicide attempt and B/B [brought by] NYPD as EDP with threats to kill therapist & self (Trial Exhibit 1). Consistent with his premise that Kerman was dangerous, Crossan urged the district court to instruct the jury to determine whether Crossan had probable cause to keep [Kerman] in protective custody and send [him] to the hospital for observation  (Defendants' Requested Charge to the Jury at 6 (emphasis added)), and it would be irrational not to infer that Crossan intended that Kerman be kept at the hospital for a period sufficient to permit observation leading to a determination of whether Kerman was likely a danger to himself or others. No rational factfinder could fail to find that it was foreseeable to Crossan that his sending Kerman to the hospital for evaluation as whether he was suicidal or homicidal would result in Kerman's detention in the hospital for some period of time. Accordingly, we reject the district court's view that Crossan could not be held responsible for any of the period during which Kerman was detained at Bellevue. 152 The district court also found that Crossan was not responsible for Kerman's remaining at Bellevue overnight because it found that Kerman consent[ed] to remaining there overnight. Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . This finding was based on a notation in the hospital record stating that Pt. [patient] does not want to stay in hosp., however agrees to stay o.n. [overnight] for reeval tom. [tomorrow]. (Trial Exhibit 1.) Although we have seen in the record no testimony indicating that Kerman agreed to remain in the hospital overnight, and although Kerman testified that in the hospital he was made to feel like a prisoner, a jury could choose to credit instead this hospital record notation that he consented to stay overnight. However, the hospital record itself indicates that that notation was made at 11 p.m., and there is no indication of any earlier consent. Thus, given that Crossan caused Kerman to be taken the hospital for evaluation at approximately 1 p.m. and that there is no evidence whatever of any consent by Kerman prior to 11 p.m., the evidence at the second trial, even taken in the light most favorable to Crossan, established that Crossan caused Kerman's loss of liberty without probable cause for at least 10 hours. 153 The district court also hypothesized that the jury might have rationally concluded that, although Defendant Crossan had not proved that he had adequate grounds to cause Plaintiff to be brought to the hospital, that decision was in Plaintiff's best interests and did not result in injury to him. Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . We cannot view this as a permissible interpretation of the jury's verdict. If the court had instructed the jury that Crossan, without probable cause to believe that Kerman posed a danger to himself or others, was entitled to deprive Kerman of his liberty simply on the basis that hospitalization was in Kerman's best interests, that instruction would obviously have been erroneous. It would have been impermissible for Crossan to deprive Kerman of his liberty solely on such a best interests premise, and it would have been no more permissible for the jury to rely on such a premise in denying Kerman compensation to which he was entitled as a matter of law. We cannot endorse this hypothesis as an acceptable explanation for the jury's failure to award compensatory damages. 154 Instead, the record suggests to us that the jury's failure to award Kerman compensatory damages resulted from the way in which the jury was instructed on the issue of damages. In describing injury and compensatory damages, the court focused solely on Kerman's claims of medical expenses, physical pain, and mental or emotional suffering. ( See, e.g., Tr. 760-61; see also id. at 760 (right to recover damages is not limited by the fact that his injury resulted from an aggravation of a preexisting condition).) The court's instructions gave no indication that if the jury found that Crossan detained Kerman and sent him to the hospital without probable cause, which necessarily curtailed Kerman's liberty, Kerman was, independently of his claims of physical, mental, emotional, or economic injury, entitled to be compensated for that loss of liberty. The jury should have been so instructed. 155 Although Kerman argued after trial that he was entitled to compensatory damages for his loss of liberty, we see in the record no indication that he objected at trial to the court's failure to give the jury such an instruction. Absent an objection prior to the submission of the case to the jury, a claimed error in instructions is not preserved for normal appellate review, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 51, and, in a civil case, is reviewable only for fundamental error. To qualify as a fundamental error a jury charge must have deprived the jury of adequate legal guidance to reach a rational decision. De Falco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 312 n. 16 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d at 62; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Scor Reinsurance Co., 62 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir.1995); Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors' Guild, Ltd., 930 F.2d 1021, 1026 (2d Cir.1991). 156 In Raysor, although we did not discuss this principle, we treated the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the plaintiff's entitlement to compensatory damages for loss of liberty as an error that was fundamental. The Raysor panel noted that Raysor had been incarcerated for several hours — he said five and Officer Simpson said three and one-half. 768 F.2d at 37. Although the record suggested that Raysor's time might have had little economic value, given his testimony that at the time of his arrest he was a law-school dropout receiving disability benefits ( see Raysor v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 81 Civ. 3808 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1984) Trial Transcript at 37), we ruled that an award of $16 was entirely inadequate to compensate Raysor for, inter alia, the loss of time ... involved in a case of false arrest, Raysor, 768 F.2d at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, we stated that the court should have made it clear to the jury that it could award monetary damages — the amount necessarily arbitrary and unprovable — for the intangibles which we have referred to above, 768 F.2d at 39, and we inferred that the inadequate verdict likely resulted from the failure of the instructions to inform the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for such intangibles as the loss of time. 157 The official appellees in Raysor argued that any such instructional error was waived because Raysor had not objected at trial to the court's failure to give that instruction. ( See brief on appeal of defendant Port Authority, et al., at 16-17 ([A]ppellant cannot complain about any alleged errors in the District Court's charge on the issue of damages, since he not only failed to address the issue of damages in his proposed jury instructions, but also failed to specifically call such alleged errors to the trial court's attention where they could have easily been corrected.).) Despite Raysor's failure to preserve the instructional error for normal appellate review, we concluded that the court's failure to instruct the jury that Raysor was entitled to compensation for a loss that was inseparable from the restraint itself was sufficiently serious to require a new trial before a jury properly instructed that Raysor could be compensated for loss of his liberty. 158 In the present case, where there was no dispute that Crossan caused the postsearch curtailment of Kerman's liberty, and where that loss of liberty indisputably lasted at least 10 hours without any evidence of Kerman's consent, the trial court should have informed the jury that if it found Crossan acted without probable cause it should award Kerman compensation for the loss of his liberty. Given that a loss of liberty is inherent in an unlawful confinement, the failure to give that instruction deprived the jury of the legal guidance needed for a rational decision and thus constituted fundamental error. 159 The dissent disagrees with our view that it was fundamental error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury that, upon finding that Crossan unlawfully deprived Kerman of his liberty, the jury could award Kerman compensatory damages for that loss of liberty. The dissent suggests principally that Kerman's failure to request such an instruction was strategic ( see Dissenting Opinion post at 134, 136), that there can be no compensatory damages for a loss of liberty unless that injury is reflected in emotional or economic harm ( see id. at 134), and that the district court's failure to instruct the jury that it could award [Kerman] compensatory damages for a loss of liberty in the abstract, without regard to any injury compensable at common law was not error ( id. at 137 (citing Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986)) (emphasis ours)). Taking these points in reverse order, we remain unpersuaded for the reasons that follow. 160 We see no parallel between Kerman's claims in the present case and the abstract concepts that were at issue in Stachura. In Stachura, the Court dealt with claims for violations of the plaintiff's rights to procedural due process and academic freedom, and the trial court had instructed the jury that it could award damages for the abstract `value' or `importance' of constitutional rights, 477 U.S. at 310, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (quoting trial court's instructions), and for `the importance of the right in our system of government' and `the role which this right has played in the history of our republic,' id. at 303, 106 S.Ct. 2537 (quoting trial court's instructions). There is no question in the present case of any attempt to vindicate the liberty rights of society at large. 161 Further, the Supreme Court in Stachura, in disapproving the instructions that would have allowed an award based on the abstract societal value of constitutional protections, expressly distinguished that impermissible abstraction from the theory that is pertinent here, to wit, the traditionally permissible concept of presumed damages. The Court noted, citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 262, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252, that [w]hen a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may possibly be appropriate, Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310-11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249, and that presumed damages may roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that may be impossible to measure, id. at 311, 106 S.Ct. 2537. In Carey, which involved a denial of procedural due process before suspensions from school, the Court noted that the doctrine of presumed damages in the common law of defamation per se deals with harms that are virtually certain to be caused by such defamation. 435 U.S. at 262, 98 S.Ct. 1042. 162 The present case does not involve either procedural due process or an attempt to vindicate an abstract societal interest. Rather, it involves an anything-but-abstract physical detention. And although a given person's loss of time may be difficult to evaluate in terms of dollars, his loss of liberty is not just virtually certain to occur; it is inseparable from the detention itself. 163 Accordingly, the availability of compensatory damages for time lost as a result of an unlawful detention was recognized at common law. We disagree with the dissent's view that the common-law concept of loss of time encompasses only loss of economic opportunity ( see Dissenting Opinion post at 136-37). The only cases cited in support of that view are not false-imprisonment cases but rather are cases in which the plaintiffs sought compensation for earnings lost due to injuries suffered as a result of the defendants' negligence. See Southwestern Brewery & Ice Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U.S. 162, 33 S.Ct. 68, 57 L.Ed. 170 (1912) (employee scalded by employer's defective cooking device); Espana v. United States, 616 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.1980)(traffic accident); Kies v. Binghamton Railway Co., 177 A.D. 242, 163 N.Y.S. 736 (3d Dep't 1917) (railway accident). We would agree that in such negligence cases, the loss of time concept focuses squarely on economic losses. In the false-imprisonment context, however, the loss of time concept is not so narrow. A loss of time, in the sense of loss of freedom, is inherent in any unlawful detention and is compensable as general damages for unlawful imprisonment without the need for pleading or proof. See, e.g., McCormick on Damages § 107, at 375 (For ... false imprisonment, upon pleading and proving merely the unlawful interference with his liberty, the plaintiff is entitled to `general' damages for loss of time .... (emphasis added)). The loss of time, an injury distinct from mental suffering or humiliation, may, but need not, have economic consequences; if recovery for an economic loss is sought, the common law treats that loss as an item of special damage that must be pleaded and proven. See, e.g., id. at 376, (`[ G]eneral' damage [for false imprisonment] would include at least the value of the time lost by the plaintiff during the period of detention and any mental suffering or humiliation sustained in consequence of the arrest or restraint.... [I]tems of special damage ... [include] the interruption of business, or the loss of a particular business opportunity or employment .... (emphases added)). 164 The traditional availability of damages for loss of time as a result of false imprisonment has been recognized by the New York courts. As indicated above, the New York Appellate Division decisions in Hallenbeck v. City of Albany and Woodard v. City of Albany sanctioned false-imprisonment awards of $10,000 for a three-hour detention and $7,500 for a five-hour detention, respectively. Those opinions contained no indication whatever that the plaintiff had shown any economic loss. Further, the court in each case noted that there [wa]s no indication that [t]he [plaintiff] incurred any substantial physical or mental injury or suffering, Hallenbeck v. City of Albany, 99 A.D.2d at 640, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 189; Woodard v. City of Albany, 81 A.D.2d at 947, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 702. If in either of these cases there had been some showing of a physical or mental injury but one that was not substantial, such an injury would not have supported an award of more than nominal damages, see, e.g., Brian E. Weiss, D.D.S., P.C. v. Miller, 166 A.D.2d 283, 283, 564 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (1st Dep't 1990) (nominal damages to be awarded where the plaintiff establishes liability but fails to prove a substantial loss or injury to be compensated (emphasis added)), aff'd, 78 N.Y.2d 979, 574 N.Y.S.2d 932, 580 N.E.2d 404 (1991). Since plainly more-than-nominal awards of $10,000 and $7,500 were allowed, we read the Hallenbeck and Woodard decisions as supporting the appropriateness of several-thousand-dollar awards for simply the loss of even a few hours' time spent in an unlawful detention. 165 Thus, although the dissent states that [a] loss of liberty, by itself, does not warrant a compensatory damages award any more than any other constitutional violation (Dissenting Opinion post at 135), and that to recover compensatory damages for a loss of liberty in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that he suffered an injury compensable under the common law of torts (Dissenting Opinion post at 135), the New York and hombook authorities reveal that the loss of liberty inherent in an unlawful detention is an injury compensable under the common law of torts. 166 Nor can we view Kerman's failure to request an instruction that he was entitled to compensation for loss of time resulting from his detention as strategic, rather than as merely an oversight, given that such a request would not have been the least bit inconsistent with his claims of physical, mental, and emotional injury. 167 Finally, we note that the damage done by the court's failure to instruct the jury that it could award Kerman compensatory damages for the loss of liberty inherent in an unlawful detention may well have been compounded by the court's erroneous instruction on nominal damages. The court instructed that when the plaintiff has been deprived of a right .... as a result of any of the defendant's conduct, but no actual damages have been suffered, [n]ominal damages may be awarded, and if you find... the deprivation of a legal right but no other injury, you may award, if you so choose, nominal damages not to exceed $1. (Tr. 761 (emphases added).) It is established, however, that [i]f a jury finds that a constitutional violation has been proven but that the plaintiff has not shown injury sufficient to warrant an award of compensatory damages,.... it is plain error to instruct the jury merely that, having found a violation, it `may' [rather than must] award nominal damages. Robinson v. Cattaraugus County, 147 F.3d at 162. The jury here did in fact find that Kerman should receive nominal damages, making the court's use of may rather than must, inconsequential insofar as nominal damages were concerned. But we have no confidence that the jury would not have awarded compensatory damages for the deprivation that it found unlawful if the court had instructed it that, upon such a finding, the jury must award Kerman at least nominal damages and could award him compensatory damages. Unquestionably the law authorizes the vindication of constitutional violations resulting in nonserious injury through awards of nominal damages. But it is the province of the jury to determine whether the plaintiff's injury resulting from a demonstrated loss of liberty was serious or nonserious and, if serious, to determine what compensation should be awarded. The jury here was not given instructions that provided it with guidance adequate to carry out that function. 168 Finding no significant difference between the present case and Raysor, in which we remanded for a new trial despite the plaintiff's failure to ask the district court to instruct the jury that it could award damages for his loss of liberty, we conclude that the failure in this case to give the jury any indication that it could consider awarding compensatory damages for an injury that was inherent in a confinement found to be unlawful was a fundamental error. Kerman remains entitled to have a jury assess the compensation he should be awarded on his Fourth Amendment claim against Crossan and his state-law claims against Crossan and the City for his loss of liberty for the time spent in the postsearch confinement without his consent.