Opinion ID: 2960272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Administrative Law Claim

Text: Huarcaya’s claim under Chevron is that 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(a)(3) is invalid. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Specifically, Huarcaya argues that the BIA’s interpretation of the regulation – which requires that the petition be both “meritorious in fact” and “non-frivolous” to be “approvable when filed” – renders “non-frivolous” impermissibly redundant. Under Huarcaya’s analysis of the regulation, the only permissible interpretation of “meritorious in fact” and “non-frivolous” is not, as the BIA asserts, that the alien show that the petition was based on a bona fide marriage; rather, he argues that the petition must only establish a prima facie case for eligibility. Only this reading, Huarcaya contends, would give content to both the terms “non-frivolous” and “meritorious in fact,” as opposed to rendering the term “non-frivolous” completely superfluous. The government, in response, argues that this argument simply identifies an ambiguity in the terms and does not undermine the reasonableness of the BIA’s interpretation of the regulation. We first must determine whether and what kind of deference applies to Huarcaya’s claim. Huarcaya argues that Chevron applies. Chevron contemplates a two-step inquiry. At step one, we must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and “unambiguously expressed [its] intent.” Id. at 842-43. If the statute is silent or ambiguous, we must move to the second step and determine whether the agency’s construction is reasonable. Id. 6 at 843. If the interpretation is reasonable, we must accept it. Id. at 844. Because the statute does not speak directly to this question, we can proceed to step two. Leaving aside for the moment the particular language of the regulation, the BIA’s view articulated in Riero, requiring a bona fide marriage, is a permissible interpretation of the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). This interpretation is reasonable in light of the statutory framework Congress constructed. To be admissible to the United States on the basis of marriage to a United States citizen, an applicant must establish that the qualifying marriage was “not entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission as an immigrant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(III). In the related context of a marriage-based visa petition, the BIA has required a petitioner to establish a “bona fide marital relationship” and a “valid marriage from its inception.” See Matter of Phillis, 15 I. & N. Dec. 385, 387 (B.I.A. July 7, 1975); Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec.1, 1 (B.I.A. Dec. 12, 1983). Requiring the visa petition to be “approvable when filed” and “meritorious in fact” is consistent with these principles. Although the regulations merit Chevron deference, Chevron is not necessary to resolve this appeal. In arguing for Chevron deference, Huarcaya conflates the issue of whether the agency has legitimately interpreted a congressional statute with whether the BIA has legitimately interpreted its own regulations. By focusing exclusively on the BIA’s reading of “meritorious in fact” and “non-frivolous” in 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(a)(3), Huarcaya is challenging the BIA’s interpretation of its own regulations, not the agency’s interpretation of the statute.2 Therefore, 2 This confusion is illustrated by Huarcaya’s statement that “[i]t is inexplicable that the [sic] Congress would specifically require that an application be ‘non-frivolous’ and ‘meritorious in fact’ if it thought the terms were equivalent.” (Petr.’s Br. 12). Congress, of course, did not 7 Auer deference, and not Chevron, applies here. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). As we have stated in the past, “Chevron deference is the deference afforded to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering. . . . Auer deference is the deference we afford to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.” Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 308 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Auer requires that an “agency’s interpretations [of its own regulations] are . . . entitled to deference and are ‘controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Llanos-Fernandez v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461). See also Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e give ‘substantial deference’ to BIA decisions interpreting immigration regulations . . . , unless an interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”) (citations omitted). It is “axiomatic that the [agency’s] interpretation need not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards . . . . Rather, the [agency’s] view need be only reasonable to warrant deference.” Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991); see also Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We review [the BIA’s] interpretations of [its] immigration regulations with ‘substantial deference’ . . . .”). Auer deference, like Chevron deference, “is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). It is clear that “approvable when filed” is ambiguous; we previously said as much in Butt v. Gonzales, a case we decided addressing this regulation. 500 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The meaning of promulgate these regulations; the Department of Justice did. 8 ‘approvable when filed’ is ambiguous . . . .”). Indeed, “approvable when filed” could have several different meanings, including that the persons were actually married; that the persons submitted materials showing that they were actually married; that the petition facially met each requirement; or that the petition was non-fraudulent. Moreover, given the fact that “meritorious in fact” and “non-frivolous” – the terms the regulations use to define “approvable when filed” – are somewhat redundant, we find the regulation to be ambiguous. See id. (recognizing potential redundancies in the language “meritorious in fact” and “non-frivolous”). A recognition of the potential for redundancy in the BIA’s interpretation does not, on its own, however, render the BIA’s interpretation plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Under well-settled principles of statutory construction, language should be read to give effect to each of its terms. Although Huarcaya’s interpretation may give more content to “non-frivolous,” this interpretation still does not entirely reconcile “meritorious in fact” and “nonfrivolous,” given that “meritorious in fact” on its own still connotes a requirement of legitimacy beyond a prima facie showing. If in this case the agency had promulgated regulations that rendered a statutory term redundant, Huarcaya’s argument might carry some weight. Yet we are not here to select what a party contends is the “better” interpretation; we are constrained to accept an agency’s interpretation that is not plainly erroneous. As the Supreme Court stated in Auer, “[t]here is . . . no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 462. Further, it is unclear whether the statutory principle not to render a term redundant even applies to deference to an agency regulation. In Auer, the petitioners argued that the Secretary of 9 Labor’s interpretation of its regulation “contravenes the rule that FLSA exemptions are to be narrowly construed against employers and are to be withheld except as to persons plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Court rejected the application of this rule to the Secretary. Justice Scalia wrote that the rule is one “governing judicial interpretation of statutes and regulations, not a limitation on the Secretary's power to resolve ambiguities in his own regulations.” Id. at 462. The Court concluded that “[a] rule requiring the Secretary to construe his own regulations narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute.” Id. at 462-63. A similar argument could be made regarding the BIA’s interpretation of its regulations. At any rate, the BIA’s interpretation is particularly reasonable given that we have allowed the BIA to interpret its regulations in light of a statute, even when the plain language of a regulation might suggest different interpretations. In Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2006), for example, we reviewed a claim that an immigration judge’s decision contradicted the plain language of the applicable regulation, to which we ascribed deference. Although we noted that the “plain-language argument seems plausible,” we concluded that “read in the context of other immigration statutes and decisions, the IJ’s conclusion when applying the statute was reasonable, despite the fact that he seemed to disregard the words of the applicable regulation.” Id. at 179. See also Singh v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We have recognized the BIA’s authority to construe regulations in light of statutes, even when their plain text seems to conflict. In this case, too, the BIA has permissibly construed the regulation so as to 10 harmonize it with the statute. The BIA did not violate our mandate in doing so.” (citation omitted)). The BIA’s interpretation is consistent with Congress’s intent to require aliens petitioning for adjustment under marriage-based visas to prove that their marriages are legitimate, and consequently merits deference. For all these reasons, we conclude that the BIA’s interpretation of “meritorious in fact” in Riero – and the case at hand – is permissible. As the First Circuit explained in adopting the same interpretation, albeit before the BIA’s pronouncement in Riero, requiring a showing of a bona fide marriage is consistent with the “history of the statute’s grandfather clause” which was “aimed to protect those who had legitimate visa applications on file before the more restrictive amendment came into force,” rather than giving applicants a “second bite at the apple.” Echevarria v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 16, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).