Opinion ID: 3053475
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Explicitly Declared To Be a Substitute”

Text: [4] A careful analysis of the first prong of the Carlson “explicit[ ] . . . substitute . . . and . . . equally effective [remedy]” standard, Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19, also compels the conclusion that § 233(a) does not preclude relief under Bivens. The PHS Defendants maintain that, in § 233(a), Congress “explicitly declared [the FTCA] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution.” Id. Specifically, the PHS Defendants urge that we read § 233(a)’s command that the FTCA remedy “shall be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding” to necessarily include actions or proceedings seeking a Bivens remedy. We decline to do so.
[5] The plain text alone of § 233 makes it clear that Congress did not explicitly declare § 233(a) to be a substitute for a Bivens action. The section does not mention the Constitution or recovery thereunder, let alone “explicitly declare[ ]” itself to be a “substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution.” Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19. [6] Moreover, § 233(a) cannot be read as an expression of Congress’s desire to substitute the FTCA in place of Bivens relief for the simple reason that Bivens relief did not exist when § 233(a) was enacted. See Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-623, 84 Stat. 1868 (1970); Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Carlson requires an intention to substitute one form of relief for another, but substitution does not occur, and is in fact impossible, if the person or thing 14002 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD being “replaced” does not exist. Because Bivens relief did not exist at the time of § 233(a)’s enactment, as well as because there is no mention of constitutional torts in its text, we cannot read the text of § 233(a) as a declaration of Congress’s intent to substitute the FTCA for Bivens relief.
[7] Our conclusion that § 233(a) does not constitute an explicit declaration that the FTCA is a substitute for Bivens actions is supported by the history of the legislation in question. That history demonstrates that the exclusivity provision of § 233(a) was intended to preempt a particular set of tort law claims related to medical malpractice. Although codification can produce the illusion of a timeless, unitary law, statutes are passed in particular historic and legal contexts and their language must be read and interpreted with that context in mind. “[O]ur evaluation of congressional action in 197[0] must take into account its contemporary legal context.”9 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979); see also Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979) (describing courts’ “obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history”) (emphasis added); Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9 Public context is especially important in examining “Congress’s enactment (or reenactment) of . . . verbatim statutory text.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001). In this case, the key preemptive phrase, “exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee,” was identical to language in the Federal Drivers Act, which at the time provided that the FTCA was the exclusive remedy “for personal injury, including death, resulting from the operation by any employee of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1970). If constitutional tort suits against Public Health Service officers and employees, arising out of performance of their medical duties, seemed like a remote possibility in 1970, they would have seemed positively Dada for suits against drivers of motor vehicles in 1961. See Pub. L. No. 87-258, 75 Stat. 539 (1961). CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14003 9, 24 (1845) (stating that courts interpreting legislation should look, “if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed”). Thus, although the term “any other civil action or proceeding” may appear clear in ahistorical isolation, “[t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000). [8] As the Court noted in Carlson, the FTCA was enacted long before Bivens recognized a right of action under the Constitution. 446 U.S. at 19. Section 233(a), too, predated Bivens: it was passed December 31, 1970, almost six months before Bivens was decided the following June, and almost six years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), established the “deliberate indifference” standard for prisoner medical care under the Eighth Amendment. Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-623, 84 Stat. 1868 (1970). It is therefore unsurprising that § 233(a) says nothing about preempting direct constitutional remedies—such remedies were not recognized at the time of its passage. An ordinary reader, at the time of § 233(a)’s passage, would have understood “any other civil action or proceeding” with respect to “personal injury, including death, resulting from the performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related functions” to refer instead to a host of common-law and statutory malpractice actions.10 [9] This understanding is borne out by the legislative history of § 233(a), which reveals that Congress’s exclusive concern was with common law malpractice liability. The only 10 At oral argument, amicus the United States noted that while the Supreme Court had not decided Bivens when § 233(a) was passed, it had already granted certiorari in the case the previous June. See 399 U.S. 905 (1970). This does not make the directive more “explicit”; at best, it introduces a further element of ambiguity as to whether § 233(a) was intended to preempt constitutional claims. 14004 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD two statements on the floor of either house of Congress respecting the bill mentioned only medical malpractice, with nothing being said about constitutional violations. See 91 Cong. Rec. H42,543 (1970) (statement of Rep. Staggers) (“So they have asked, if in the event there is a suit against a PHS doctor alleging malpractice, the Attorney General of the United States would defend them in whatever suit may arise.”); 91 Cong. Rec. S42,977 (1970) (statement of Sen. Javits) (“I am pleased to support . . . the provision for the defense of certain malpractice and negligence suits by the Attorney General.”). Representative Staggers noted that the Surgeon General had requested the amendment because PHS physicians “just cannot afford to take out the customary liability insurance as most doctors do.” 91 Cong. Rec. H42,543. The section itself was titled in the Statutes at Large11 “Defense of Certain Malpractice and Negligence Suits.” 84 Stat. at 1870; see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available for a resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, not only is the authoritative text of the statute silent as to constitutional torts in particular, but the title and legislative history, if anything, indicate an exclusive concern with state malpractice claims.12 11 When § 233 was codified in the United States Code, it was given the title “Exclusiveness of Remedy.” See 42 U.S.C. § 233. Title 42 of the U.S.C., however, has not been enacted into positive law. See 1 U.S.C. § 204 note. To the extent title or heading can affect our reading of otherwise ambiguous statutory language, then, it is the Statutes at Large that provide us with the “legal evidence of [the] law[ ].” U.S. Nat’l Bank of Oreg. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 & n.3. 12 We disagree with PHS Defendants’ and amicus the United States’ contention that “malpractice” here encompasses cruel and unusual punishment or violations of due process under the Eighth or Fifth Amendments, respectively. As we have noted, it certainly did not in 1970. The term malpractice, in ordinary speech, even now connotes negligence or incompetence in performing one’s professional duties. See Black’s Law Dictionary 978 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “malpractice” as synonymous with “profesCASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14005 [10] Subsequent congressional action has revealed no inclination to make the FTCA a substitute remedy for Bivens actions. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143 (“At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings.”). The FTCA itself has been modified to add an express exclusivity provision and to provide that the sional negligence” and “medical malpractice” as a “doctor’s failure to exercise the degree of care and skill that a physician or surgeon of the same medical specialty would use under similar circumstances”). In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court stressed the difference between malpractice and an Eighth Amendment violation: “Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” 429 U.S. at 106. While the acts giving rise to a constitutional action might also give rise to one for malpractice, the two are nonetheless quite distinct. In Bivens, the Supreme Court rejected a view of “the relationship between a citizen and a federal agent unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no different from the relationship between two private citizens,” noting that an “agent acting—albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.” 403 U.S. at 391-92. That observation is particularly relevant here. To describe the allegations in the complaint as averring mere “malpractice” is to miss the point. Castaneda was not a walk-in patient at Defendants’ clinic; neither are Defendants merely alleged to have misread a chart or fumbled a scalpel. The ordinary doctor, no matter how careless, does not hold her patients under lock and key, affirmatively preventing them from receiving the medical care they need and demand. Even when denying his requests for a biopsy in the fall of 2006, DIHS officials were aware that Castaneda “is not able to be released to seek further care due to mandatory hold and[,] according to ICE authorities, may be with this facility for a while.” The Kafkaesque nightmare recounted in Plaintiffs’ complaint, which we assume here to be true, draws its force not only from Defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference, but also from Castaneda’s state-imposed helplessness in the face of that indifference. The element of state coercion transforms this into a species of action categorically different from anything Congress would likely term “malpractice.” 14006 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD provision does not bar actions for constitutional torts. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 299 (1988),13 Congress passed the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (LRTCA), Pub. L. No. 100-694 (1988). The LRTCA expanded 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), which previously made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for injury resulting from a federal employee’s operation of a motor vehicle, to encompass any “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Because, under the FTCA, the United States is substituted as the defendant in place of employees acting within the scope of their official duties, the LRTCA acts as a general grant of immunity to government employees for all such acts. The amendment went on to clarify that general immunity “does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government . . . which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States.” Id. § 2679(b)(2)(A). In so doing, Congress made explicit what, when Carlson was decided, had previously been implicit: that “constitutional claims are outside the purview of the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1995). It would defy logic to suppose that § 233(a) must be read, despite the lack of any statutory language or legislative history counseling such a reading, to smuggle them back in again for this one subset of defendants. [11] What is more, the legislative history of the LRTCA makes it clear that Congress viewed the general grant of immunity it was extending to all employees, which expressly exempted constitutional claims, to be identical to the immu13 In Westfall, the Supreme Court held that “absolute immunity does not shield official functions from state-law tort liability unless the challenged conduct is within the outer perimeter of an official’s duties and is discretionary in nature.” 484 U.S. at 300. CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14007 nity it had already extended to PHS officers and employees sixteen years earlier.14 The House Report, in discussing the effect of the LRTCA, noted: There is substantial precedent for providing an exclusive remedy against the United States for the actions of Federal employees. Such an exclusive remedy has already been enacted to cover the activities of certain Federal employees, including . . . ...