Opinion ID: 2516402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cartwright Act claim

Text: Although we find plaintiffs' abuse of process and fraud claims barred on exclusivity grounds, we reach a contrary conclusion as to their Cartwright Act claim. Because the wrongful acts and motives that give rise to plaintiffs' Cartwright Act claim fall outside the compensation bargain, it is not subject to workers' compensation exclusivity. We begin with the alleged acts that give rise to plaintiffs' Cartwright Act claim. The Cartwright Act makes unlawful any `trust.' ( Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 118, 81 Cal.Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 ( Jones ); Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16726.) To establish that defendants comprised a trust, plaintiffs allege that defendants combined their capital, skill and acts in order to drive them out of business. As part of this combination, each defendant not only mishandled lien claims filed against it, but also: (1) encouraged other insurers to deny plaintiffs' claims; (2) distributed hit lists of medical providers; and (3) exchanged strategies for delaying or avoiding payments to plaintiffs. This concerted effort by insurers to interject themselves into lien claims they did not insure is not a normal part of the claims process. Indeed, only the insurer that has insured a claimant's employer and no other insureris typically involved in that claimant's workers' compensation claim. By conspiring to influence the processing of claims it did not insure, each defendant stepped outside its proper role as an insurer and became a `person other than the employer.' ( Unruh, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 630, 102 Cal.Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d 1063.) In doing so, each defendant stripped itself of the protection afforded by the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA. The motive element of a Cartwright Act claim also makes the exclusivity bar inapplicable. A cause of action for restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act . . . must allege . . . a purpose to restrain trade. ( Jones, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 119, 81 Cal.Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464; see also Bus. & Prof.Code, § 16726.) By imposing such a requirement, [t]he Cartwright Act merely articulates in greater detail a public policy against restraint of trade that has long been recognized at common law. ( Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters (1946) 29 Cal.2d 34, 44, 172 P.2d 867 ( Speegle ).) Because a Cartwright Act claim requires a motive that violates a fundamental public policy rooted in a statutory provision, it is not reasonably encompassed within the compensation bargain. Hazelwerdt does not compel a contrary result. In Hazelwerdt, the plaintiff alleged that an insurer and a physician employed by that insurer to treat the plaintiff conspired to mishandle the plaintiffs medical treatment. The Court of Appeal barred plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim because the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were closely connected to a normal insurer activitythe provision of medical treatment for a workplace injury. (See Hazelwerdt, supra, 157 Cal.App.2d at p. 763, 321 P.2d 831.) Unlike the conspiracy claim in Hazelwerdt, plaintiffs' Cartwright Act claim alleges that each defendant conspired with parties that had no role in the handling of that defendant's claims and sought to influence lien claims filed against other unrelated insurers. Thus, defendants' conspiratorial acts cannot be linked to a normal insurer action during the claims process. (See Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 718, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559.) Moreover, a Cartwright Act claim, unlike a civil conspiracy claim, requires a motive that violates a fundamental public policy. (Compare Speegle, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 44, 172 P.2d 867, with Lyons v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1019, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 174.) Accordingly, Hazelwerdt is inapposite, and we decline to bar plaintiffs' Cartwright Act claim on exclusivity grounds.