Opinion ID: 2974103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect on a Substantial Right

Text: Having found a variance, we must next determine whether that variance clearly prejudiced Arnold’s ability to mount a defense, or otherwise rendered her entire trial unfair. See United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 757 (6th Cir. 2000). We hold that it did not. Arnold was on notice as early as April 1, 2004, the date of her initial appearance under Fed. R. Crim. P. 5, that the Government intended to prove that Jones’s death resulted from Arnold’s distribution, with the possible result of a life sentence. Specifically, the Government argued that “it is reasonable that the death of the other inmate was caused by Ms. Arnold . . . [and b]ased upon that and her prior record, her sentence is also a minimum mandatory of life imprisonment.” Moreover, at Arnold’s arraignment on April 27, 2004, the district court asked defense counsel in Arnold’s presence whether Arnold and Mann “underst[ood] the charge or charges against them and the penalties that could be imposed in the event of a conviction,” to which defense counsel responded affirmatively. - 14 - Nos. 05-5470/71 United States v. Mann Arnold’s trial did not begin until November 3, 2004, i.e., seven months after Arnold’s initial appearance. Furthermore, Arnold presented the testimony at trial of Dr. George R. Nichols, a wellcredentialed clinical pathologist and retired medical examiner. Dr. Nichols noted that the deceased, whose autopsy report he had reviewed in addition to other material, suffered from “several different forms of heart disease ongoing in her at the same time.” Dr. Nichols opined that Jones “had sufficient heart disease to kill her, and . . . she was ill from her heart disease before she died.” Although the jury did not ultimately attribute Jones’s death to heart disease, Arnold’s presentation of this testimony suggests that Arnold had a meaningful opportunity to rebut the Government’s allegation. We have found that notice and the opportunity to mount a meaningful defense lie at the heart of the law’s distaste for constructive amendment. See, e.g., Prince, 214 F.3d at 757 (“The purposes underlying the rule against amendments and constructive amendments include notice to the defendant of the charges he will face at trial . . .”); United States v. Feinman, 930 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1991); compare Lucas v. O’Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Because it exposed Lucas to charges for which he had no notice and thus no opportunity to plan a defense, the variance from the indictment to the jury instruction constituted a constructive amendment that deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to notice of the charges against him.”). For the preceding reasons, we find that Arnold has been afforded both. Ultimately, reversal upon plain error review is “very limited,” and reserved for trials “infected with error so plain [that] the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it.” United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1992). Given her notice and opportunity, we are - 15 - Nos. 05-5470/71 United States v. Mann unable to place Arnold’s trial in such a category. Accordingly, Arnold’s claim of constructive amendment fails.