Opinion ID: 1571905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jurisdiction Under the Act

Text: Because the First District based its conclusion that custody is not required under the Act on sections 394.913(4) and 394.9135(4), Florida Statutes (2003), a close examination of the text of those and the other provisions of sections 394.913 and 394.9135 is required to determine the legislative intent and legal effect of subsection (4) of each statute in the context of the entire statute. We must endeavor to ascertain the intent of the entirety of both statutes because all parts of a statute must be read together to discern the intent apparent in the whole. See GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 787 (Fla.2007). This is in accord with the requirement that we give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. Heart of Adoptions, 963 So.2d at 199 (quoting Woodham, 829 So.2d at 898). These principles are especially applicable here where the disclaimer subsections expressly refer to the provisions or time limitations contained in the specific statute of which each subsection is a part. We will first set forth the actual text of each of the subsections relied upon by the district court because [w]e endeavor to construe statutes to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006). We have said many times that legislative intent is the polestar that guides the Court's inquiry and is determined primarily from the language of the statute. Maggio v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 899 So.2d 1074, 1076-77 (Fla.2005). Accordingly, we begin with the `actual language used in the statute.' Continental Cas. Co. v. Ryan Inc. Eastern, 974 So.2d 368, 374 (Fla.2008) (quoting Borden, 921 So.2d at 595). The text of section 394.913(4), Florida Statutes (2004), provides as follows: (4) The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with them in no way prevents the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the provisions of this part. Section 394.9135(4), Florida Statutes (2004), also relied on by the First District Court of Appeal, states: (4) The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with the time limitations, which results in the release of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, is not dispositive of the case and does not prevent the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the provisions of this part. These provisions remain unchanged in the 2008 statutes. We first turn to section 394.913(4). The language of the jurisdictional disclaimer provision in that section does not make any reference to the inmate being out of custody. The subsection refers only to the fact that the failure to comply with the provisions of this part will not prevent the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the statute. The provisions of the section to which the subsection refers involve notice to the multidisciplinary team, with a copy to the state attorney, of certain details regarding an individual who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, including deadlines for the notice, specification of information to be contained in the notice, establishment of the multidisciplinary team, deadlines for its written assessment, and other time frames to be met by the state attorney. The entire statute is predicated on the inmate being in custody, as is evidenced by its very title, which includes the words Notice to state attorney and multidisciplinary team of release. This is also an appropriate consideration because the title of an act is properly considered in determining legislative intent. See Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 959 So.2d 176, 182 (Fla.2007). Based on the text of section 394.913(4) and the provisions contained in the larger part to which it refers, we conclude that the provisions of this section for which compliance is waived by subsection (4) deal only with time frames for notice of the inmate's release, the composition, duties and deadlines for the multidisciplinary team, and other specific matters relating to the assessment of the personnot the fact of the release or status of custody. We now turn to section 394.9135(4). Even though section 394.9135 is replete with references to the individual being in custody, the First District read the provisions of section 394.9135(4) to dispense with all custody requirements in the section. A close reading of the actual text of subsection (4), however, shows that it refers only to failure to comply with the time limitations, which results in the release of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. § 394.9135(4), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). The time limitations in section 394.9135 all pertain to actions that occur after the inmate has come into the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services directly from his or her incarcerative sentence, to be held in a secure facility by that department. The subsection (4) jurisdictional disclaimer, when given a plain reading in the context of the entire statute, can refer only to the two sections that provide time limitationssubsection (2) (seventy-two hours for the multidisciplinary team to make an assessment) and subsection (3) (forty-eight hours for the state attorney to file the petition). [6] The only time limitation in section 394.9135 that would result in release if not met is the requirement that the state attorney file the petition within forty-eight hours pursuant to subsection (3). If the state attorney fails to file the petition within forty-eight hours after receipt of the written assessment, and the individual is released, subsection (4) would allow the state attorney to file a petition after the release. However, this jurisdictional disclaimer does not come into play until after the individual has been kept in secure custody by the Department of Children and Family Services, after a multidisciplinary team has made an assessment, and after the state attorney has failed to comply with a time limitation applicable to the filing of the petition, where that failure has resulted in the offender's release. The Legislative intent of section 394.9135(4) appears to be a safety valve solely to prevent persons from bringing challenges to civil commitment proceedings on technical grounds, such as the giving of late notice of the anticipated release that is mandated by section 394.9135(1)(a) or the late filing by the state attorney. The status of an inmate who has been lawfully released and is no longer in custody, where no steps have been taken in the commitment process, is no mere technical requirement that the Legislature has indicated is waived under subsection (4). Therefore, based on the actual text of the jurisdictional disclaimer, the legislative intent of section 394.9135(4) is that the state attorney retains the right to file a petition even if the person is released as a result of the state attorney's failure to comply with the forty-eight hour time limitation after the multidisciplinary team has acted. This is also supported by the title of the section: Immediate releases from total confinement; transfer of person to department; time limitations on assessment, notification, and filing petition to hold in custody; filing petition after release.  § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So.2d at 182. Even under the circumstances described in section 394.9135 where the person is released as a result of the state attorney's failure to comply with the time limitations, steps in the commitment proceedings would have already been taken while that person was still in custody, pursuant to sections 394.9135(1) and (2). Thus, the jurisdictional disclaimer contained in section 394.9135(4) should not be extended beyond its actual text to dispense with the custody requirement where no steps in the proceedings have been initiated. Neither section 394.913(4) nor section 394.9135(4) can be read in isolation. Rather, all parts of each statute should be read together, as we have endeavored to do in this analysis, in order to achieve a consistent whole. GTC, Inc., 967 So.2d at 787. This is in accord with the principle that [e]very statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992) (quoting Fleischman v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 441 So.2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)). This requires us, as we have done here, to look not only to the words themselves but also to `the context in which the language lies.' Horowitz, 959 So.2d at 182 (quoting Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.1995)). To construe sections 394.913(4) and 394.9135(4) to allow proceedings to be initiated after a person has been released from custody and is living in society, where no part of the process, was begun while the person was in lawful custody, would require us to look only at those discrete subsections in isolation; and under the construction placed on the provisions by the First District, would also render without effect the other, detailed requirements of sections 394.913 and 394.9135. This would violate the basic rule of statutory construction ... that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. Goode, 830 So.2d at 824. We cannot read a statutory subsection in isolation, but must read it within the context of the entire section in order to ascertain legislative intent for the provision. Contract-Point Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d at 1265. We conclude that when each statutory section is read in context, as a whole, to give effect to every clause, it is apparent that the jurisdictional disclaimers contained in the two subsections are not intended to and do not waive or dispense with the underlying requirement, otherwise clearly present in the Act, that the individual against whom commitment proceedings are brought must be in lawful custody when steps are taken to commence those proceedings in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction.