Opinion ID: 1175384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the trial court abused its discretion in basing the fee award on this fee agreement

Text: The trial court awarded contingent and hourly fees for the same work. The court's award of attorney fees was based upon untenable reasons and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Allard, at 407. Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108 Wn.2d 38, 64, 738 P.2d 665 (1987). The Allards negotiated a contingent fee agreement under which Paul Luvera and Associates and the firm of Mullavey, Prout, Grenley, Sonkin & Foe would receive 25 percent of the gross recovery (excluding attorney fees awarded for the first trial). See Clerk's Papers, at 909. Luvera then associated Charles Wiggins and the firm of Edwards & Barbieri to act as cocounsel. Based on the fee agreement, the trial court awarded $596,646 to Luvera and the Mullavey, Prout firm as a contingent fee and awarded $80,000 to Wiggins calculated on an hourly rate. The majority relies on the so-called Iranian attorney provision of the fee agreement to justify the award of both a contingent fee and an hourly fee, which in pertinent part provided: Paul [Luvera] also felt that there might be a requirement that we hire other counsel to help us as the case progresses and if that is the case, those costs would be considered expenses that would be paid by you at the time that the expenses are incurred. As an example, if we were assigned an Iranian Judge, Paul might want to hire an Iranian attorney to argue a particular motion to the Iranian Judge, and that would be an expense that would be paid by you. I recognize that this is a far fetched example, but I hope it illustrates the thought that Paul had. (Italics mine.) Clerk's Papers, at 910. Wiggins' services are not covered by the Iranian attorney provision. That provision contemplated the hiring of outside counsel for certain specific and narrowly defined purposes. Wiggins' services were extensive. He handled depositions; represented the plaintiffs at pretrial hearings; researched, briefed and argued most of the pretrial motions; and took the leading role in posttrial arguments. At trial, he made opening and closing arguments and handled the examination of two of the plaintiffs' six witnesses. The Iranian attorney provision cannot be construed to encompass the hiring of cocounsel, at an hourly rate, to handle a substantial portion of the trial as well as pretrial and posttrial proceedings. A contingent fee should cover all routine legal work for the preparation and presentation of a case. Because Wiggins performed extensive work that needed to be done to have the matter presented for trial, his hourly fee should have been paid out of the contingent fee. To hold otherwise gives counsel the right to collect a contingent fee and then hire outside counsel, at an hourly rate, to try the case. Such calculation, at the appellant's expense, should not be sanctioned by this court. If Wiggins' services were performed by Luvera or his own personnel, admittedly there would be no additional fee on top of the contingent fee. The fee agreement, as interpreted by the majority, authorizes a contingent fee and an hourly rate for the same work. Awarding a contingent fee in addition to an hourly fee, under the terms of the subject agreement, is unreasonable. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to deduct Wiggins' hourly fee from the contingent fee award.