Opinion ID: 202877
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constructive Possession Instruction

Text: Duval and Doucette claim that the court's instructions on constructive possession were insufficient because it failed to give their requested instruction that knowledge alone, however, is not enough to prove possession. Similarly, mere presence in the vicinity of the object is insufficient to prove possession. Duval and Doucette suggest that by failing to give this instruction, the jury was allowed to equate knowledge with possession, and that knowledge alone is not sufficient to establish constructive possession. Applying the three-factor test set forth in White, 221 F.3d at 263, we note that there does not appear to be any dispute that Duval and Doucette's requested instruction was correct as a matter of law: mere presence in the vicinity of an object is insufficient to prove constructive possession of that object, see United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1397 (1st Cir.1992), and knowledge of an object's location, without more, is insufficient to establish possession of that object, see United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st Cir. 2005) ([T]here must be some action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the contraband and indicates that he had some stake in it, some power over it.) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C.Cir.1997)). Furthermore, there is little question that the issue of constructive possession was integral to the case. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested instruction, however, because the law of constructive possession was substantially incorporated into the charge as rendered. White, 221 F.3d at 263. We have said before that a court is not obligated to follow the exact form and wording of the defendant's proposed instructions. United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.1984). Here, the court very clearly instructed the jury that to find constructive possession it needed to find both power and intention to exercise control or dominion and control over something, and that Defendants knowingly possessed the firearms and/or ammunition in question. Thus, it is not the case that the jury was invited to convict based on mere knowledge of the firearms; rather, the jury was plainly instructed that it needed to find knowing possession. Because the court's instructions adequately expressed the law of constructive possession, we detect no error in its denial of Defendant's requested instruction.