Opinion ID: 1156913
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deputization as a Statutory Requirement

Text: (7a) The Court of Appeal concluded that sections 302 and 304, read together, mandate deputization of county employees as registrars if doing so will maximize voting registration. We disagree. Section 302, subdivision (b), states that county clerks ... shall deputize as registrars qualified citizens in such a way as to reach most effectively every resident of the county. (Italics added.) In contrast, section 302, subdivision (e), provides that the governing board of any county ... or other public agency, may authorize and assign any of its officers or employees to become deputy registrars of voters.... (Italics added.) (8) It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that the word may is ordinarily construed as permissive, whereas shall is ordinarily construed as mandatory, particularly when both terms are used in the same statute. ( Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Co. v. Heaton (1894) 105 Cal. 162, 165 [38 P. 693]; Rosenfield v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 198, 202 [191 Cal. Rptr. 611].) (7b) Accordingly, section 302, subdivision (e), does not require deputization of county employees. The Court of Appeal held that section 302, subdivision (b), imposes on counties a mandatory duty to deputize employees if such deputization is necessary to reach most effectively every resident of the county. It is an elementary principle that specific provisions of a statutory scheme modify more general provisions of the same scheme. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; Long Beach City School District v. Payne (1933) 219 Cal. 598, 605 [28 P.2d 663]; Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 723-724 [123 P.2d 505].) Section 302, subdivision (b), imposes a general duty to deputize qualified citizens as registrars in such a way as to reach most effectively every resident of a county. Section 302, subdivision (e), specifically addresses one class of potential registrars  public employees  and squarely places the decision whether to adopt a program deputizing such employees in the discretion of the governing board of the county. The general requirement of section 302, subdivision (b), cannot override the specific discretionary language of section 302, subdivision (e). Accordingly, section 302, subsection (b), does not mandate the deputization of employees as registrars, even if it could be shown that such deputization would constitute the most effective means of reaching every resident of the county. In concluding that an employee deputization program is mandated if it can be shown that deputization will maximize voter registration, the Court of Appeal also relied on the Legislature's declaration, in section 304, of its intent that voter registration be maintained at the highest possible level. Unlike section 302, subdivisions (b) and (e), however, section 304 imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to devise regulations and monitor the counties' compliance with the regulations, rather than imposing a duty directly on counties. The counties' duties under section 304 are governed by the Secretary of State's administrative regulations. [9] The precatory declaration of intent expressed in the statute must be read in context as a principle to guide the Secretary of State in promulgating appropriate regulations. It cannot be viewed as independently creating substantive duties imposed on counties in addition to those imposed by the regulations; nor may it be torn from its context to alter the counties' duties under section 302. We conclude that neither section 302 nor section 304 requires County to adopt the employee deputization program sought by plaintiffs. The Court of Appeal's conclusion that the two statutes read together create such a duty if it can be shown that such a program will maximize voter registration is unsupportable. Although the Legislature has made clear its desire to maximize registration (in its statements of intent and in various substantive provisions of the Elections Code), it also has made clear in the plain language of section 302, subdivision (e), that the decision whether to adopt an employee deputization program rests in the discretion of the individual counties. Thus, regardless of whether counties have a ministerial duty under section 304 to implement voter outreach programs or under section 302 to deputize qualified citizens as registrars, we read section 302, subdivision (e), as, in essence, enabling legislation that authorizes counties to deputize their employees should they decide to do so. The decision whether to take advantage of the authority granted by section 302, subdivision (e), is not administrative, as the dissent asserts; it is a quasi-legislative decision entrusted solely to local elected officials.