Opinion ID: 608143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ownership of Valid Copyright

Text: 40 The Copyright Act provides that a certificate of registration of a copyright shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). By presenting a registration certificate a party establishes the validity of the copyright prima facie and the burden to dispute the validity of the copyright then shifts to the party challenging it. See Harris Market Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communications, Inc., 948 F.2d 1518, 1526 (10th Cir.1991). The district judge ruled that NESS failed to present either argument or evidence sufficient to rebut Autoskill's prima facie showing of the validity of its copyright. 793 F.Supp. at 1563. 41 As proof of ownership, Autoskill presented evidence of the certificate of registration, No. TX 1 742 632, obtained on its reading program. Appellant's App. at 471-72. In the registration certificate Autoskill identified itself as the author of the work and described the nature of its authorship as [h]irer of entire work comprising program and including manual. Id. (emphasis added). We think the facts stated in the certificate, to which the statutory presumption of validity extends, logically include the identification of the author and the statement that the entire work was made for hire. By introducing the registration certificate in which it identified itself as the author, then, Autoskill presented prima facie evidence that it was the owner of the copyright. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F.Supp. 357, 363 (D.Del.1980) (Where the plaintiff in an infringement action is also the author of the composition, the registration statement is also generally prima facie evidence of ownership.); see also 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12.11[C], at 12-158 (1992) [hereinafter Nimmer ] (explaining that plaintiff who first registers copyright in plaintiff's name thus obtains certificate that constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of his copyright, and of the facts stated therein). We hold that Autoskill satisfied its initial burden on the ownership element by establishing a prima facie case on this issue. 42 NESS argues that the district judge erred factually and legally in ruling that Autoskill was the owner of the United States copyright. One principal contention of NESS is that the judge erred in holding that Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989), should not be retroactively applied to this controversy. And under Reid NESS says this was not a work made for hire because Autoskill's programmers were not its employees under the common law agency test adopted by Reid. Appellant's Brief at 42-43. 12 43 On the retroactivity point, we agree with NESS. It is now settled that [o]nce retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for all others who might seek its prospective application. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2447-48, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991); see Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1543 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1841, 123 L.Ed.2d 467 (1993); Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 971 F.2d 591, 596 (10th Cir.1992). In Reid the new rule adopted was applied to the litigants before the Court; hence, selective non-retroactivity is barred in all other cases as to that new rule. Thus Reid should be applied here, but this does not carry the day for NESS. 44 NESS had the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of Autoskill's ownership of the copyright. NESS says the uncontroverted evidence at both hearings is that all versions of the Autoskill programs were programmed in Canada by contract programming companies or individuals, none of whom worked for Autoskill. Appellant's Brief at 42 (footnote omitted). We note that Dr. Trites was asked by NESS' counsel about Edfour Education Consultants, 13 the programming firm used by Autoskill and referred to in Autoskill's copyright certificate as a manufacturer. Trites replied that Edfour was paid under an independent contract and its people were not employees of Autoskill at the time of that work. Appellee's Supp.App. at 211-12. 45 The broad assertions by NESS about Autoskill's programming and the sparse evidence it presented on the issue do not address the critical question raised, i.e., whether the Autoskill programmers--companies or individuals--were or were not employees of Autoskill, considering the relevant factors under the common law agency law meaning. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739, 109 S.Ct. at 2172. 14 We have considered the references in NESS' brief which it relies upon, Appellant's Brief at 8-21, 44, and find no substantial evidence identified which addresses the important factors under the common law of agency which NESS relies on. See supra note 14. The state of the record is such that this issue--whether the programmers were Autoskill's employees--remains a fair ground for litigation. The prima facie case of Autoskill was not sufficiently rebutted to justify reversal of the preliminary injunction on this point. 46 Furthermore, we note that there was proof on another basis to establish Autoskill's ownership of the copyright. NESS identified Edfour as the contract programmer on the first version of the Autoskill program. Appellant's Brief at 12. With respect to Edfour, there was testimony by Dr. Trites that Autoskill had received an assignment of rights from Edfour. 15 Appellee's Supp.App. at 211-12. The assignment was not in Dr. Trites' possession at the hearing, but the specific testimony about the assignment was given in response to NESS' questioning, it was not objected to nor contradicted, and it is still undisputed at this point. 16 47 In sum, we are not persuaded that the preliminary injunction should be reversed on the basis of the ownership showing.