Opinion ID: 1923504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Absence at Pretrial Conferences

Text: Kormondy argues that his guilt phase counsel was ineffective for failing to require Kormondy's presence at five specific pretrial conferences, which took place on May 26, June 20, June 21, June 23, and July 1, 1994. We disagree and find trial counsel was not ineffective in her handling of these conferences. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to this pretrial conference issue, Kormondy must show that he was prejudiced by his absence at each particular pretrial conference. As to Kormondy's absences at the pretrial conferences held on May 26, June 20, and July 1, 1994, Kormondy has not demonstrated such prejudice. Moreover, these three pretrial conferences dealt with procedural issues and requests for clarification. Kormondy offers no support for the notion that any of the matters discussed at the conferences required his input, nor has he demonstrated how his presence would have assisted his counsel. Accordingly, Kormondy's absence at these pretrial conferences had no impact on the result, and Kormondy was not prejudiced. Furthermore, although Kormondy correctly argues that there was error because he did not waive his presence in writing, such violation is subject to a harmless error analysis. Thus, the proceeding will only be reversed on this basis if `fundamental fairness has been thwarted.' Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119, 1124 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Pomeranz v. State, 703 So.2d 465, 471 (Fla.1997)). We hold that Kormondy's failure to be at these particular conferences did not affect the validity of the trial itself to the extent that the verdict could not have been obtained. In regards to the two pretrial conferences held on June 21 and June 23, 1994, the trial record indicates that Kormondy was actually present and represented to the court that he wished to waive his appearance. As this Court held in Amazon v. State, 487 So.2d 8, 11 (Fla.1986), [a] capital defendant is free to waive his presence at a crucial stage of the trial. Waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Counsel may make the waiver on behalf of a client, provided that the client, subsequent to the waiver, ratifies the waiver either by examination by the trial judge, or by acquiescence to the waiver with actual or constructive knowledge of the waiver. The trial court found that, despite the absence of a written waiver of Kormondy's presence, the record and evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing indicated that Kormondy's absence from these two conferences was not involuntary. We agree with the trial court's assessment. At both conferences, the court first asked defense counsel if he was waiving Kormondy's presence, and defense counsel answered affirmatively. The court then explained to Kormondy that he had a right to be present and also explained what matters would be discussed at each conference. Kormondy responded that he wanted to waive his presence. The court also asked Kormondy if the waiver was his own choice or if it was the result of threat or force. Kormondy replied that the waiver was his choice and that he was not forced or threatened to waive his presence. Consequently, trial counsel's failure to have Kormondy present for the pretrial conferences was not deficient performance and did not cause prejudice. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim.