Opinion ID: 1287681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Whether the State Met its Burden of Proof

Text: Having determined that the defendant submitted sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt as to the issue of whether her actions were made in self-defense, and that the trial judge was correct that the defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction, we turn to the issue of whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were not made in self-defense. Initially, we note that the defendant argues that the State presented no rebuttal evidence in response to her case-in-chief and therefore could not possibly have met its burden of proof. In State v. McClanahan, 193 W.Va. 70, 73, 454 S.E.2d 115, 118 (1994), we addressed a similar argument and noted that: Legally there is a distinction between proof and evidence, and, for this reason, the Court disagrees with the defendant's claim that the State is under a burden to adduce rebuttal evidence. As is stated in 1 F. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers § 1-2(B) (1994): Proof is all of the evidence before the trier of fact relevant to a fact in issue which tends to establish the existence or nonexistence of such fact. While evidence is defined as information received, proof is the persuasion produced by a consideration of the evidence, i.e., the effect of evidence. Accordingly, the standard is not whether the State presented a rebuttal case, but whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to meet the State's burden of proof. As we previously noted, but repeat herein for context, where the defendant has challenged on appeal the sufficiency of the State's evidence, we view that evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Syllabus Point 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). We are further mindful of our holding in Guthrie that: A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent our prior cases are inconsistent, they are expressly overruled. Syllabus Point 3, State v. Guthrie, supra . While we clearly must, according to our precedent, construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the State where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this is not to say that we must abandon sound reasoning in so doing. Instead, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and then apply it to the relevant legal standard. In this appeal, the relevant legal standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not kill the decedent in self-defense. In State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. 47, 272 S.E.2d 457 (1980), we offered a standard jury instruction on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof. This instruction, in part, defined proof beyond a reasonable doubt to mean: A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sensethe kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it. The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture. State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. at 54 n. 9, 272 S.E.2d at 463 n. 9. Applying these standards, we consider the sufficiency of the State's evidence. Initially, we note that the State candidly acknowledges that the defendant suffered an evening of physical and sexual abuse and night of terror at the hands of the decedent and thereby concedes many of the facts of consequence in our analysis. However, the State nonetheless maintains that notwithstanding the evening of physical and sexual abuse, the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the State suggests that the [decedent] was sleeping when the [defendant] shot him and, therefore, that the defendant shot her unarmed husband while he was lying on his couch from behind. As we have noted in this Opinion, the State's argument is premised, in part, upon the incorrect assumption that the decedent's conduct in the hours immediately preceding his death were not relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant's use of deadly force. The State's argument is also premised, in part, upon the incorrect assumption that the defendant had a duty to retreat from her home before using deadly force. With these points made, we examine the sufficiency of the State's evidence. Having fully considered the record in this appeal, and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the State's evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a reasonable basis to believe, and did not believe, that she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury at the time deadly force was used against the decedent. The mere fact that the decedent was found on the couch after being shot creates only a suspicion or conjecture, State v. Goff, supra , that the decedent might possibly have been asleep or possibly have been passed out drunk, and that the brutal beatings, sexual assault, and threats to kill the defendant and the children had ended. The fact that even the State cannot say with any certainty the decedent's disposition at the time of his death is compelling evidence of reasonable doubt on this issue. Evidence that the decedent had sexually assaulted the defendant, and thereafter lay sprawled naked from the waist down on the living room couch does not amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was asleep or passed out drunk; instead, it is equally plausible that the decedent could have been doing exactly what the defendant testified he was doing, which was renewing his threats to kill her and the children and again becoming physically aggressive. Reviewing the record, there is just no evidence, only conjecture, that the defendant's night of terror had ended or that the defendant and the children in her care were safe from death or serious bodily injury. As we have found in Section III.2., of this Opinion, the defendant did not have a duty to retreat from her home before using deadly force against her attacker. Our law entitled the defendant under the circumstances of this case to her subjective belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and to abate that threat, without retreating, with the use of deadly force. [12] Under the circumstances shown by the evidence in this case, the defendant's use of deadly force to protect herself, without retreating, is subjectively reasonable. Additionally, the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that any reasonable person similarly situated would have believed that death or serious bodily injury were imminent. Uncontested evidence from multiple witnesses and sources ( e.g., the photographs depicting the defendant's numerous injuries and that the decedent was naked from the waist down), as discussed supra, established that the decedent's death precipitously followed the decedent's having physically and sexually assaulted the defendant, as well as having threatened  on numerous occasions  the life of the defendant and the lives of the children. Uncontested evidence also established that the decedent was drinking heavily and had a blood alcohol level of 0.22%  nearly three times that where a person would be presumed intoxicated in West Virginia. In this intoxicated state of mind, the uncontested evidence is that the decedent's behavior immediately preceding his death was violent, unpredictable, criminal and placed the defendant at risk of death or serious bodily injury. Under such circumstances the defendant's use of deadly force to protect herself, without retreating, is objectively reasonable. The State's evidence failed to prove otherwise. Supposition and conjecture are not evidence. In State v. Cook , Justice Davis, writing for the Court, properly noted that while we must be [m]indful of the jury's province over the evidence presented on the issue of [self-defense], this Court will not permit an injustice to occur because a jury failed to adequately understand the evidence presented at trial. We agree with that principle, and conclude that [t]his is such a case. State v. Cook, 204 W.Va. at 602, 515 S.E.2d at 138. Accordingly, we hold that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were not made in self-defense and, therefore, the defendant's conviction and sentence must be vacated and this matter remanded for immediate entry of a judgment of acquittal. [13]