Opinion ID: 728966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ADA Cases from Other Circuits

Text: 51 Despite the plain language of the ADA, its legislative history, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of identical causal language in Title VII, the defendants argue that we should nonetheless interpret because of to mean solely because of. They contend that precedents from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits support that interpretation, and point us to Doe v. University of Maryland Medical Sys., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir.1995); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.1995); Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir.1996); Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir.1995); and White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir.1995). Even if all five of those cases from four other circuits had actually held that because of means solely because of under the ADA, we would still part company with those circuits, because we are firmly convinced that such an interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute and the intent of Congress. However, in this case, our task is made much easier by the fact that only one of the five decisions cited by the defendants actually held that because of in the ADA context means solely because of. The others did not. 52 In University of Maryland Medical Sys., 50 F.3d at 1266, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer in an ADA case because the employee was not a qualified employee with a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Although the court stated that an ADA plaintiff is required to prove that he was discriminated against solely on the basis of the disability in order to prove his case, id. at 1264-65, that observation is dictum. Because the court determined that the plaintiff was not a qualified employee with a disability to begin with, it was not required to, and did not purport to, examine the causal connection between the plaintiff's termination and his disability. 53 Similarly, in Myers, 50 F.3d at 282, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer in an ADA case because the employee was not a qualified individual with a disability. Although the court observed in dicta that the substantive standards for determining liability are the same under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, id. at 281, the court was not required to, and did not purport to, authoritatively resolve the issue that faces us today. 54 In Rizzo, 84 F.3d at 760, the Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of an employer, because it found that a genuine question of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability. Because the defendant in that case did not deny that the plaintiff was terminated because of her disability, there were no causal connection questions in the case. See id. at 762. Although the court did observe that the ADA required the plaintiff to prove that her employer took an adverse employment action solely because of her disability, that observation has no bearing on the court's decision; it is dictum. 55 In White, 45 F.3d at 363, the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer because the employee was not a qualified individual with a disability. As with the foregoing cases, the court had no occasion to consider the causal connection question at issue in this case, and it explicitly declined to address whether York terminated [the plaintiff] solely because of his disability. Id. A court does not make a holding with language directed toward an issue it expressly declines to address. 56 To summarize, the foregoing cases do not trouble us. Although they do contain dicta that supports the defendants' position, we are not required to follow dicta contained in our own precedents, much less dicta from our sister circuits. Dicta can sometimes be useful when it contains a persuasive analysis of a particular issue, but the opinions in the foregoing cases are not even useful for that purpose, because they do not include any meaningful analysis of whether because of in the ADA context means solely because of. The passing references that those cases make to the applicable causal standard shed little or no light on the question, and give us no pause. 57 However, Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir.1995), is more problematic. In that ADA case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer. Id. at 637. In doing so, it held--not merely stated in dicta, but held--that judgment for the employer was proper, because the alleged disability was not the sole cause of the demotion in question. No extended discussion or helpful rationale is given in Despears for the holding that the ADA requires a showing of sole causation. Because we believe that holding is contrary to the language of the statute, the will of Congress, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of substantially identical causal language in the Title VII context, we decline to follow it. 58 We hold that the because of component of the ADA liability standard imposes no more restrictive standard than the ordinary, everyday meaning of the words would be understood to imply. In everyday usage, because of conveys the idea of a factor that made a difference in the outcome. The ADA imposes a but-for liability standard. The contrary verdict form language is error which requires reversal. That is not the only error in the verdict form. 59