Opinion ID: 1921960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: filed by Ms. Brannan and Mr. Rezneck

Text: We agree with much of the Board's Report and Recommendation. We concur with respect to the findings of fact, the conclusions as to the disciplinary violations, and much of its sanction discussion. We disagree only as to the appropriate length of the suspension that we would recommend the Court to order in this case. Every member of the Board participating in this case agrees that a short suspension is warranted, for all of the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation. Where a conflict of interest is protracted, does harm to a client, and is accompanied by collateral violations such as dishonesty, we agree that a suspension is an appropriate sanction even for a first-time offender in the disciplinary system. Conflicts of interest, such as the one involved in this case, undermine the confidence that a client should be able to have that his or her attorney is acting solely in the client's interest. We have difficulty, however, reconciling a sanction of longer than 30 days with the Court's cases. In In re Jones-Terrell, 712 A.2d 496 (D.C.1998), the Court concluded that a lawyer had engaged in a conflict of interest, accompanied by violations involving dishonesty (Rule 8.4(c)), prohibited contact with a person known to be represented by a lawyer without the lawyer's consent (Rule 4.2(a)), prohibited personal contact with an incapacitated person concerning a proposed representation (Rule 7.1(b)(3)), and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)). The Court ordered a 60-day suspension, even though the conduct by the lawyer was financially self-interested: She and her husband moved in the incapacitated client's home without paying rent and took on the representation of the client, who already had a lawyer, thus making improper contact regarding representation, and engaging in a prohibited business transaction with a client, without full disclosure, or fair and reasonable terms. 712 A.2d at 600. The respondent already represented the heirs of the incapacitated client's estate, hence the conflict. This was accompanied by respondent's false and misleading representations to the court in petitions for appointment as guardian and conservator of the estate of the incapacitated client. Jones-Terrell also presented a situation in which the respondent had no previous record of discipline. The conduct in Jones-Terrell is substantially worse than the misconduct in this case. In addition to dishonesty, Jones-Terrell 's conflict of interest was accompanied by improper contact and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. While we are very troubled by the Respondent's misconduct here, it was not undertaken for the Respondent's financial gain. The Hearing Committee, which had an opportunity to hear Respondent's testimony, concluded that there is little risk that Respondent will engage in such conduct again and that she generally is of strong character. Hearing Committee Report at 41-42. We also conclude that the conduct in In re Sandground, 542 A.2d 1242 (D.C.1988), was more serious than the conduct here. The respondent in Sandground assisted a client in starting a transactionand personally participated in the transactionin an effort to mislead an opposing party in litigation. That the scheme was not more protracted or successful was fortuitous. Here, J.C.'s deception was far along before he consulted Respondent. Her efforts were not intended to help him deceive, but to mitigate the impact on E.Y. and their daughter of what J.C. already had done. While Respondent could not do so without a conflict of interest, and accordingly had to mislead E.Y. to avoid telling her the truth, her intent was far less sinister than that in Sandground. Drawing distinctions between and among the fact patterns presented by attorney misconduct is difficult at times, but we believe that Rule XI entrusts the Board with recommending consistent discipline. In the area of conflict of interest, the disciplinary system has not produced a large number of cases for comparison. Based on the authority cited in the Report and Recommendation, we conclude that a principled approach to the area of conflict of interest would result in a short suspension (30 days), even for a first conflict of interest violation, where the conflict is prolonged, damaging to a client, and accompanied by at least one other intentional, serious Rule violation. We would reserve longer suspensions for repeat offenders, situations in which the conflict serves respondent's financial or other self interest, or for conflicts accompanied by multiple intentional and serious rule violations. /s/ Patricia A. Brannan Patricia A. Brannan Chair May 19, 1999