Opinion ID: 2763454
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I do.

Text: [permission granted to approach witness] Q. On Page 10, beginning at Line 10, I said, “What did you do in response to that red tag in Exhibit 3 being placed on the stove?” Do you want to read your response? A. Line 12. Specifically, we took the stove to the dump and threw it out. And then I don't think it was much longer after that when Gary moved out and the place just sat idle for some time. [¶26] In their motion for costs, Defendants again provided no explanation to the district court as to how Trey Warren’s deposition was reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case for trial. For this reason alone, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of costs related to Mr. Warren’s deposition. Moreover, we are not persuaded, based on Defendants’ reference to the above-quoted passage, that the cost of the deposition would have qualified as an allowable cost pursuant to U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(D)(i)(II) or (III). The rule requires more than that a deposition was used for impeachment or to refresh a witness’ recollection. Rule 501(a)(3)(D)(i)(II) requires a showing that the deposition was used “for impeachment concerning a material line of testimony,” and (III) requires a showing that the deposition was “[n]ecessarily, and not merely conveniently, used to refresh the recollection of a witness.” In their argument on appeal, Defendants cite to the rule with no explanation as to how the quoted testimony, which was elicited by Plaintiffs' counsel, not defense counsel, was a) impeachment 7 testimony, b) concerned a material line of testimony, or c) was necessarily used to refresh a witness’ recollection. For this additional reason, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of costs for this deposition. [¶27] With respect to the deposition of Dr. Foley, Defendants argue the costs were allowable because although Dr. Foley ultimately was able to testify in person, his deposition was originally taken as a trial deposition. This again is a cost for which Defendants provided no basis to the district court for how the deposition was reasonably necessary for preparation of the case for trial. And again, for this reason alone, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of costs related to this deposition. Further, Defendants have cited no authority for the proposition that a deposition originally taken as a trial deposition but ultimately not used as a trial deposition meets the guidelines of U.R.D.C. 501 or is otherwise an allowable cost. For this additional reason, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of costs for this deposition. 2. Counsel’s Travel Expenses for Depositions of Foley and Upton [¶28] Defendants contend the district court abused its discretion in denying counsel’s travel expenses for taking the depositions of Dr. Foley and Dr. Upton because both depositions were taken as trial depositions. This argument ignores one of the mandatory provisions of U.R.D.C. 501. Rule 501 specifies that “[f]ees and expenses of counsel for traveling to and attending depositions are not taxable as costs.” U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(D)(iii); see also Gore, ¶ 23, 50 P.3d at 712 (explaining mandatory nature of Rule 501 provisions that do not contain qualifying language). 3. Costs of Filing Fees and Obtaining Records [¶29] Defendants do not cite to the precise costs that they contend should have been awarded as filing fees and “obtaining necessary records.” Their motion for costs, however, identifies two fax filing fees of $2.00 each and two items apparently relating to obtaining copies of documents, one for $100.05, and the other for $50.00. With respect to the $4.00 in filing fees, these were again arguably allowable costs, but given Defendants’ failure to identify the costs for the district court along with a Rule 501 basis for their award, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of the costs. Defendants’ application for costs relating to obtaining records suffers the same defect. Moreover, Defendants have not explained how the costs relating to those records are allowable under Rule 501, which limits duplicating costs to those “necessarily incurred for documents admitted into evidence” and bars duplication costs “for documents for counsel’s own use.” U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(E). For this additional reason, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of these costs. 8