Opinion ID: 1219144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Correctness of Standard

Text: We first address whether the court used the correct standard in determining attorney fees and expenses. AWDI argues that the trial court did not properly limit the award to those fees and expenses for activities that were rendered useless by the dismissal. Such a criterion, it contends, is the correct standard for assessing the limits of a permissible award of fees and expenses incident to a voluntary dismissal under C.R.C.P. 41(a)(2). Tillery contains some guidance concerning the proper standard: The district court could require the costs and fees to be reimbursed as a condition of granting the motion to dismiss, although consideration should be given to the fact that the defendants may recoup some of the fees if they prepare an answer to the petitioner's complaint in federal court. Tillery, 692 P.2d at 1085. Because C.R.C.P. 41(a)(2) is identical to the corresponding federal rule and the rules adopted by several other states, Tillery, 692 P.2d at 1084, it will also be helpful to look to the standards applied in cases outside this jurisdiction for guidance. Federal courts have consistently limited reimbursement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) to expenses for work that will not be useful in future litigation of the same claim. Lau v. Glendora Unified School District, 792 F.2d 929, 932 (9th Cir.1986) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (defendant not entitled to reimbursement of costs and legal fees incurred in preparing work product that may be useful in continuing litigation); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855, 860 (11th Cir.1986) (where a subsequent similar suit between the parties is contemplated, expenses awarded might be limited to those incurred in discovering information that will not be useful in the later suit); Cauley, 754 F.2d at 772 (trial court found to have abused its discretion in awarding fees for work product which could be useful in defending same claim in state court where claim was being pursued); McLaughlin v. Cheshire, 676 F.2d 855, 856-57 (D.C.Cir.1982) (no entitlement to reimbursement for expenses in preparing work product that will be useful in continuing litigation in another forum); GAF Corp., 665 F.2d at 369 (same); Brown v. Zackert, 10 Kan.App.2d 466, 701 P.2d 711, 714 (1985) (while the conditions of dismissal are within the discretion of the court, the range of that discretion is confined to terms which relieve the defendant from the potential waste occasioned by the dismissal). These cases are consistent with Tillery and provide helpful elaboration of the standard that we suggested in that case. AWDI asserts that the trial court failed to apply this standard in the present case. In issuing the payment order, the trial court noted that dismissal of the tributary claim had previously been conditioned on the applicant's payment to the objectors of all of their attorney fees, expert witness fees, costs, fees, and other expenses related to the tributary claim. AWDI contends that the words related to sweep too broadly and asserts that this language is evidence that the trial court improperly ordered the payment to the objectors of all expenses having anything to do with the tributary claim, including those incident to gathering information also useful in litigating the nontributary claim or that could be used against AWDI in future litigation of the tributary claim. The remainder of the trial court's order, however, indicates that the court properly considered the danger of overlap with the nontributary claim and the possibility that work expended on the tributary claim would be useful in future litigation of the latter claim. The court rejected the possibility that work devoted to the tributary claim would be useful in future litigation of that claim, stating: Depending on when a new tributary claim may be filed, much of the material discovered by Objectors prior to September 1991 will be outdated, if not useless, in any hearing concerning a new tributary claim. Any benefit from this earlier discovery is speculative at best. In addition, the trial court expressly recognized the necessity of avoiding reimbursement of expenses incurred in gathering information useful in litigation of the nontributary claim. Out of concern about the possibility of overlap, among other things, the court discounted the award of attorney fees and expense claims by ten percent. Other than the court's use of the phrase related to the tributary claim, AWDI offers no support for its contention that the trial court failed to apply the proper standard limiting its award of attorney fees and costs under Rule 41(a)(2) to expenses for work that it determined was not useful in defending against the nontributary claim or would not be of use in future litigation of a renewed tributary claim. We reject the contention that the trial court used the wrong standard in awarding fees and expenses.