Opinion ID: 197937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror Communications

Text: 8 Three days into the government's case-in-chief, one of the jurors (Juror A) contacted the court clerk and asked: When we're polled, do we have to face each of the lawyers? Presumably because a jury poll would only follow a conviction, Rowe's counsel was concerned that Juror A had already decided the case against his client and asked the district court to inquire into the matter. The court obliged by summoning the juror to the sidebar, telling him that he might not even be polled, and asking whether there was some particular reason he was interested in the polling process. Juror A responded: No. I mean, I was just curious what--who does it and how it happens, when it happens, if it happens. I don't really know much about the courtroom. After the court pressed a bit further and asked why he was concerned about the polling process, the juror elaborated: 9 Um, I don't know. I mean, if--I--I'm not really sure, but I know that--I mean, the way things are going, I don't know who--you know, how--I don't know. I mean, really--I don't really have an answer, but I feel that I'd like to know how the proceedings are going to end. I mean, I--yeah, I don't know how to--it's just a concern. That's all. 10 The court then asked Juror A whether his concern would in any way impede or impair [his] impartial consideration of the case, and the juror assured the court that his evaluation of the case would be impartial. 11 After Juror A returned to the jury room, Rowe's counsel complained that the court had not asked him why he was concerned about facing the lawyers while being polled. The court then summoned the juror back to the sidebar and asked him why he harbored such a concern. Juror A responded: Um, I don't know. It seemed like they're hard on the witnesses. That's what my question is. I mean, I don't know--you know, we can only go by the facts, so--you know, and we'll all know what those are. Subsequently, Rowe's counsel challenged Juror A for cause, arguing that he was the only lawyer who had been hard on the witnesses to that point, that the juror's answers reflected both sympathy for the government's witnesses and a predisposition to convict, and that the juror's answers also demonstrated a disqualifying mental[ ] deficien[cy]. The court rebuffed the challenge, finding no basis for an inference that Juror A had already made up his mind and observing that [w]hen attorneys choose their method of dealing with witnesses, [they] do it in the presence of the jury, [they] take risks, [they] deliberately take those risks, and that ... that there is some reaction to that is not a basis for a challenge for cause. 12 On the same day as the incident involving Juror A, a second juror (Juror B) informed the court clerk that she wished to speak with the district court. In the presence of counsel, Juror B (an occupational health worker) told the court: 13 I was talking to a co-worker last night at my job who was just filling in on my patients and I guess she was covering one of my patients. I had never talked about the case, but she knew I was at a federal criminal case and I'd be back in two weeks to go back to work. And I guess one of the patients she was covering, the family said: Oh, I wonder if she's on the Rowe case. And when she told me that I said: I can't discuss--I said: No, but I can't discuss any case that I'm doing, and that was it. 14 And then--it wouldn't affect my impartiality, but I felt like I should report it. 15 The court then asked the juror if she could identify the patient by name, which she did. At this point, Juror B also told the court that she had treated the patient for about a week prior to being called for jury duty, and that she had never discussed anything with the patient other than her treatment. After Juror B returned to the jury room, Rowe's counsel informed the court that the patient in question was Rowe's current wife's grandmother. When the court asked all counsel present if they wanted it to probe further into the matter, they all declined the invitation. 16 Yet one week after the verdicts were returned, Rowe filed a motion for a new trial, alleging misconduct on the part of Juror B. Rowe claimed that, at the time of the events just described, Juror B knew that her patient was related to Rowe by marriage, but did not disclose her knowledge to the court. In support of this claim, Rowe submitted an affidavit from his wife to the effect that Mrs. Rowe had been present in the first row of the spectator section of courtroom throughout the trial; that, after the trial, Mrs. Rowe had happened upon Juror B in her grandmother's room; that Juror B had expressed no surprise at seeing Mrs. Rowe; that, when Mrs. Rowe asked Juror B if she knew her, the juror replied that she was not sure; that when Mrs. Rowe identified herself, Juror B said that she really didn't know her; and that Mrs. Rowe had learned after the first day of trial (and therefore prior to the juror's disclosure to the court) that the juror had been caring for her grandmother. Rowe also asked the district court to call Juror B in for further questioning. 17 The district court held a hearing on Rowe's motion, during which it asked Rowe's counsel why, prior to the verdicts, counsel had elected not to have the court question Juror B about whether she knew of the relationship between Rowe and her patient. Rowe's counsel replied that doing so would have been dangerous because [o]nce that question was asked, she would have been off the jury. When the court asked why, Rowe's counsel explained that the way he would have had to ask the question--Do you realize that your patient is the grandmother of the wife of the defendant?--would have tainted the juror by informing her of the nature of the relationship. The court disagreed, opining that Juror B would have been disqualified only if knowing the nature of the relationship would somehow have precluded her from sit[ting] fairly and impartially on the issues in this case. Following a continuance and after hearing from the co-worker who initially had asked Juror B if she was sitting on the Rowe case, the court declined to call the juror in for questioning and denied Rowe's motion. In explaining its ruling, the court observed that a contrary ruling would create incentives for defense counsel to pursue matters of juror misconduct only after having waited to see whether the jury verdict was favorable or unfavorable. 18 The final juror communication appears to have occurred after the verdicts but prior to sentencing. Following the imposition of sentence at the sentencing hearing, Rowe's counsel asked the court why it had not placed into the record a letter that the court had received from a juror (Juror C) after the verdicts had been returned. Counsel did not reveal how he had learned of the letter; he did, however, evince some familiarity with its contents, asserting that it was relevant to sentencing. Counsel then asked the court to make the letter, and the court's response to the letter, a part of the record. Analogizing to cases prohibiting counsel from communicating with jurors after a trial, see, e.g., United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967 (1st Cir.1985), the court declined his request because it is not the function of a juror to be concerned with the sentencing function. Without divulging the letter's contents, the court also stated that Juror C's views were not considered by me as relevant [to sentencing] in any respect.