Opinion ID: 1597749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the 6/10/97 letter sufficient to toll the statute of limitations?

Text: ¶ 12. All parties agree that this case deals with an open account, and thus, the three-year statute of limitation of Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-29 (1995) is applicable. However, the parties differ as to whether the June 10, 1997, letter sent by Harrison to Trilogy was an acknowledgment of an indebtedness and a renewed promise to pay sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, as allowed by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-73 (1995). ¶ 13. This Court has long held that such acknowledgment is not sufficient if it is vague and indefinite. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Krebs, 190 So.2d 857, 861 (Miss.1966) (citing Trustees of Canton Female Acad. v. Gilman, 55 Miss. 148 (1877)). Instead, it must state when the balance was due, to whom the balance was due, and for what the balance was due. Id. It must be both a specification of the debt referred to and a promise to pay a fixed amount in order to support a new promise. Id. (citing Fletcher v. Gillan, 62 Miss. 8 (1884)). Further, the acknowledgment of the debt and the promise to pay must be definite and unequivocal. Id. (citing Philp v. Hicks, 112 Miss. 581, 589, 73 So. 610, 612 (1917)). ¶ 14. However, this Court has also held that [s]uperficial uncertainties as to exact amounts due, resolvable by explanation, are not sufficient to impair identification of the indebtedness. Dyer v. Lowe, 201 Miss. 516, 521, 29 So.2d 324, 325 (1947). Also, the requirement when the balance was due, does not necessarily require a specific date. For example, this Court held that a letter, which had been either lost or destroyed, that reportedly said, Inclosed [sic] I hand you $25.00, which you will credit on my note in the county treasury. I will come down some time soon, and pay you the balance of the note, was sufficient proof of a new promise to toll the statute of limitations. Heflin v. Kinard, 67 Miss. 522, 524, 7 So. 493, 493 (1890). ¶ 15. However, a [s]imple acknowledgment of a debt on account, even in writing, is not sufficient to take the account out of the operation of the statute. McArthur v. Acme Mech. Contractors, Inc., 336 So.2d 1306, 1308 (Miss.1976). The rule in Mississippi is that a partial payment does not take a case out of the operation of the running of the statute of limitations unless such partial payment is accompanied by (1) an express acknowledgement of a further indebtedness, and (2) an express promise to pay. Id. (quoting United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Krebs, 190 So.2d 857, 861 (Miss. 1966)). We, therefore, now apply the rule adopted in Krebbs, supra, on `partial payment' to apply to a simple debit and credit open account. Id. Still, [i]t has never been held in this state that parol evidence is inadmissible to apply the writing to its subject, and, this being done here, there is no uncertainty as to what debt was meant by the writer. Heflin, 67 Miss. at 525, 7 So. at 494. ¶ 16. At issue here is the letter addressed to Trilogy, dated June 10, 1997, on Harrison Enterprises official stationary, and signed by Harrison in his official capacity as president of Harrison Enterprises. That letter reads: WE REALIZE OUR ACCOUNT IS OVER DUE. IF YOU WILL GIVE U.S. UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF AUGUST WE WILL BE ABLE TO PAY OUR ACCOUNT IN FULL. ¶ 17. Harrison Enterprises and Harrison contend that this letter falls short of the legal requirements of an acknowledgment of indebtedness and a promise to pay necessary to toll the running of the statute. They claim the letter does not state the amount of the balance, or when, to whom, or for what it was due. They claim it does not contain a specification of the debt, nor does it promise to pay anything at all; therefore, it is not definite and unequivocal. ¶ 18. Harrison Enterprises and Harrison rely on several cases to support this contention, but their reliance is misplaced since these cases are clearly distinguishable. Since 1877, the law in this area has been clear. ¶ 19. In Trustees of Canton Female Acad. v. Gilman, 55 Miss. 148 (1877), the debt was rent payments. The writing at issue read: [i]t would suit my convenience to execute my note for the balance due for rent, payable January 1, 1877. Id. at 149. This Court held: the writing was not made with any purpose to waive a defense or save the bar of the statute. It does not identify the debt referred to. It mentions a balance due for rent but does not state when, nor from what, nor to whom the rent accrued, or what the balance was. To allow all these things to be proved by parol would produce the evil the statute requiring an acknowledgment or promise in writing to save the bar of the statute was intended to prevent. Id. at 152. ¶ 20. In Fletcher v. Gillan, 62 Miss. 8 (1884), the debt sued on was an open account; however, the alleged acknowledgment and promise to pay were contained in two separate writings. The two writings together read: After the hands are paid appropriate balance due on my account to yourself. I would like to come there and do your work, so I could pay you what I owe you. Id. at 11. This Court held that these two writings, even in concert, could not support a new promise, since [t]here is neither a specification of the debt referred to, nor any promise to pay a fixed amount. Id. ¶ 21. In Allen v. Hillman, 69 Miss. 225, 13 So. 871 (1891), the creditor was relying on various writings from the deceased debtor to toll the statute. This Court held that: While the letters show an acknowledgment of indebtedness ... they were not written to serve as an acknowledgment or promise of a debt in order to prevent the bar of the statute, and are not sufficiently precise and definite as to debt and amount to have that effect under the established rule. Id. at 225, 872. ¶ 22. In Philp v. Hicks, 112 Miss. 581, 73 So. 610 (1917), this Court was again dealing with a promissory note; however, the writing allegedly acknowledging the debt was even less definite and unequivocal: I received a call from atty. J.H. Thompson of this city, re a $127.00 debt which you hold against me. This acct. is a bit late in being presented, as I have been under the impression same had been paid long ago, but as I noted that the note for $75.00 has not been stamped with any cancellation stamp, same certainly must still be unpaid. As I do not want you to lose any of this amount, what will you take for a settlement in a lump sum. I will look for a reply from you within a few days and I trust that this matter will be closed up within a short while. Id. at 587-88, 611. This Court held that the writing was not sufficient to toll the statute since there was no express and definite acknowledgment of the debt, ... [nor] an express promise to pay. Id. at 590, 612. In fact, the admission contained in the writing was for the purpose of procuring a compromise; it could in no way be construed as a reaffirmation of a debt. Id. at 589, 611. ¶ 23. In Blount v. Miller, 172 Miss. 492, 160 So. 598 (1935), this Court was dealing with an open account; but the writing offered to toll the statute of limitation was a deed of trust. It read as follows: Any and all sums of money or other valuable things which may hereafter, and within one year from the date of this instrument, advanced by R.G. Wilson to or for the account of the grantor or grantors herein, or any of them, shall be secured by this instrument, bear interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum, be payable on demand unless otherwise agreed, and be collectible by sale of the property and choses in action herein assigned and conveyed as herein-before provided for. Id. This Court rightly concluded that the language of this deed was insufficient to withdraw the case from the operation of the statute. Id. ¶ 24. More recently, in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Krebs, 190 So.2d 857 (Miss.1966), once again the debt at issue was a promissory note, not an open account. This Court held that the writing in question was not definite and unequivocal in its terms and merely dealt in generalities with the writer's tax difficulties rather than his obligation to pay the indebtedness. Id. at 862. ¶ 25. All of these cases are easily distinguishable from the case sub judice. In all of these cases, the writing proffered clearly failed to both acknowledge an indebtedness and include a promise to pay. In one case the writing was for the purpose of procuring a compromise. In another, the writing merely dealt with the writer's tax difficulties. ¶ 26. Trilogy contends that the letter is not vague and indefinite. The letter states that the debt is overdue to Trilogy and will be paid in full in August, answering the to whom, when, and for what requirement. It promises to pay a specified amount-in full. It is specific as to which debt it reaffirmsthe only debt Harrison Enterprises owes to Trilogy. Further, Trilogy cites to the Miss. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition of Harrison where he admits that the letter was an acknowledgment of debt and promise to pay. ¶ 27. We agree with Trilogy. The letter is not vague or indefinite. The letter's acknowledgment of the debt and promise to pay is definite and unequivocal. The letter was addressed to Trilogy, on Harrison Enterprises stationary, and signed by Harrisonsatisfying the to whom requirement. It states that the debt is overdue and will be paid in Augustsatisfying the when requirement. It says OUR ACCOUNTsatisfying the for what requirement. Further, it is a promise to pay, specific in the amount that will be paid WE WILL BE ABLE TO PAY OUR ACCOUNT IN FULL. In his deposition, Harrison, the president of Harrison Enterprises, admitted that the letter was an acknowledgment and reaffirmation of the debt. To argue now that it was not so intended is somewhat disingenuous. ¶ 28. Harrison Enterprises claims that the most liberal reading WE WILL BE ABLE TO PAY, would indicate is a hoped for, anticipated future ability to pay, but not a promise that it would pay nor even a willingness to pay. Taken in context, this letter being a response to threatened legal action, Harrison Enterprises appears to be trying to play semantical games with this Court. ¶ 29. The letter is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations; therefore, this issue is without merit.