Opinion ID: 196161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In General. The controlling statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a), states in relevant part:

Text: 37 [I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.... 38 In enacting section 1367, Congress essentially codified the rationale articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). See Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1266 (D.C.Cir.1995); Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir.1995); see generally Elizabeth Delagardelle, Note, Defining the Parameters of Supplemental Jurisdiction After 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367, 43 Drake L.Rev. 391 (1994). The Gibbs Court instructed that pendent jurisdiction exists when the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.'  Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. 9 In particular, [t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. Id. Thus, if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that [she] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole. Id.; see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349, 108 S.Ct. 614, 618, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988); Vera-Lozano v. International Broadcasting, 50 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.1995); Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 356 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 68-69 (1st Cir.1979). 39 The relationship between the plaintiff's Title VII claim and her inchoate claim under Law 17 matches the Gibbs Court's description in all significant respects. Both claims are civil rights claims; both derive from a reservoir of common facts; and, as a consequence, both would ordinarily be heard together in a single consolidated trial. See, e.g., Andrea Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent Jurisdiction Under Title VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 Am.U.L.Rev. 777, 793 (1983). Despite this apparent fit, appellant argues for an opposite result, contending that Congress, in enacting Title VII, forbade jurisdiction over supplemental claims by implication. Although there appears to be a smattering of authority in favor of this position, see, e.g., Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1554 n. 6 (9th Cir.1994) (noting cases so holding); 13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3567.1, at 24 & nn. 30.1-30.2 (Supp.1995) (same), we reject it outright. 40 In our judgment, section 1367 itself disproves appellant's hypothesis. Whatever may have been the situation before the enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute 10 --it may have been possible then to detect scattered signs of implied negation, see Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Sch., 825 F.2d 1004, 1010 (6th Cir.1987) (citing district court cases finding implied negation of pendent jurisdiction under Title VII prior to the passage of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367)--section 1367 specifically authorizes supplemental jurisdiction [e]xcept ... as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute.... 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a). Since the statutory text is unambiguous, and no court or commentator ever has maintained that Title VII expressly negates pendent jurisdiction, there is simply no credible basis on which the statute's broad jurisdictional grant can be shortstopped in the Title VII context. 41 One additional point is worth making. While habit or practice is by no means the barometer of jurisdictional power, we find it telling that we have not heretofore encountered, let alone embraced, the radical hypothesis advanced by the appellant. To the precise contrary, we have regularly entertained suits in which plaintiffs have joined Title VII claims with pendent state-law claims--and we have done so both before and after the passage of section 1367. See, e.g., Vera-Lozano, 50 F.3d at 70; Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 121 (1st Cir.1992) (per curiam); Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 595 (1st Cir.1987). 42 To recapitulate, a sexual harassment claim brought pursuant to state law falls within the district court's supplemental jurisdiction when, as now, the court's original jurisdiction derives from the assertion of a Title VII claim arising out of the same facts. Thus, the court below plainly possessed the raw power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under Puerto Rico Law 17, had one been asserted. 43 2. On Remand. Having determined that supplemental jurisdiction would have attached had a Law 17 claim been advanced ab initio, we must further determine whether such jurisdiction remains available on remand, given that the district court has by now slain the plaintiff's Title VII claim on the merits. Based on controlling law, we conclude that supplemental jurisdiction would be proper despite the interment of the plaintiff's foundational federal cause of action. 44 As a general principle, the unfavorable disposition of a plaintiff's federal claims at the early stages of a suit, well before the commencement of trial, will trigger the dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims. See, e.g., Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 ([I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.); Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 990 (1st Cir.1995) (affirming the dismissal without prejudice of pendent claims when the district court determined far in advance of trial that no legitimate federal question existed). But this praxis is not compelled by a lack of judicial power. It signifies only that, in the usual case in which all federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine--judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. at 619 n. 7. In an appropriate situation, a federal court may retain jurisdiction over state-law claims notwithstanding the early demise of all foundational federal claims. See, e.g., Taylor v. First of Am. Bank-Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287-88 (6th Cir.1992). Thus, as long as the plaintiff's federal claim is substantial, the mere fact that it ultimately fails on the merits does not, by itself, require that all pendent state-law claims be jettisoned. See, e.g., Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 656-57; Warehouse Groceries Mgt., Inc. v. Sav-U-Warehouse Groceries, Inc., 624 F.2d 655, 658-59 (5th Cir.1980). In other words, a court need not always throw out the bath water with the baby. 45 To be sure, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in such circumstances is wholly discretionary. And, moreover, the district court, in reaching its discretionary determination on the jurisdictional question, will have to assess the totality of the attendant circumstances. Because each case is bound to have its own distinctive profile, we are reluctant to compose a list of important elements. Instead, we cite two examples to illustrate the wide variety of considerations that may appropriately enter into the calculus. The running of the statute of limitations on a pendent claim, precluding the filing of a separate suit in state court, is a salient factor to be evaluated when deciding whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir.1994); Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991). Another factor to be weighed is the clarity of the law that governs a pendent claim, for a federal court may be wise to forgo the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when the state law that undergirds the nonfederal claim is of dubious scope and application. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(1) (authorizing district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law); see also Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 1799, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 & n. 15, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 & n. 15. 46 We will not attempt to single out all the elements that could potentially tip the balance here. That is grist for the district court's mill. It suffices for our purposes to remark the obvious: that although the plaintiff's Title VII claim ultimately succumbed on the merits, it was colorable when brought. Consequently, the district court's power to exercise discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over a putative Law 17 claim, extant at the time of trial, will remain intact on remand. 47