Opinion ID: 29291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: lindsey’s race discrimination claims

Text: On appeal, Lindsey asserts two theories of discrimination under Title VII. First, he claims that Chevron discharged him on the basis of race and second, he claims that he endured a racially hostile work environment while at Chevron. As to the first theory, to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, Lindsey must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he was qualified for the position held; (3) he was discharged from his position; and (4) that he was replaced by someone outside of the protected group. E.g., Byers v. Dallas 5 Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000). After Lindsey makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, Chevron must provide some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)). If Chevron proffers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, Lindsey must come forward with evidence that Chevron’s reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. See id.1 To make out his prima facie case, Lindsey contends that he was a member of a protected class and that he was qualified to perform his job duties as assigned. He further asserts that similarly-situated Caucasian employees were treated more favorably. To explain, Lindsey provides the example of another Chevron employee, Joseph Guy, who was allegedly given adequate 1 Under the Racial Discrimination section of his Amended Complaint, Lindsey merely asserts that he was “terminat[ed] . . . while on medical leave.” Perhaps because of Lindsey’s conclusory pleading on the issue, the district court did not specifically address the elements of the discriminatory discharge claim in its opinion. The court did, however, grant summary judgment on Lindsey’s discriminatory denial of promotion claim. Even though the district court did not specifically address the discriminatory discharge claim, the reason for granting summary judgment as to the discriminatory denial of promotion claim would equally apply. Further, the court need not address whether Lindsey raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claim for discriminatory denial of promotion (or the retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, for that matter) because he waived review of these issues by not incorporating them into his Brief. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.5 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing cases and FED. R. APP. P. 28). 6 warning prior to termination, while Lindsey was not provided with such a warning. Chevron counters that in relying on Lindsey’s record of excessive absences and tardiness, it presented uncontested evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. Thus, Chevron claims, it satisfied its burden of production under the Title VII framework and that Lindsey has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as far as pretext is concerned. Our assessment of the discriminatory discharge claim, however, need not involve the burden shifting analysis because Lindsey has failed to satisfy his prima facie case of discrimination. Lindsey does not rely on the proper standard for discriminatory discharge articulated by the Fifth Circuit. As a result, Lindsey fails to come forward with any evidence as to one essential element of his prima facie case, i.e., whether Chevron replaced him with someone outside of his protected group. There is no evidence in the record that Chevron replaced Lindsey with a non-African-American once he was terminated. Because summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to establish facts supporting an essential element of his prima facie claim, e.g., Mason v. United Air Lines, 274 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2001), Lindsey’s claim for discriminatory discharge fails. As to Lindsey’s claim of a racially hostile work environment, this court has made it clear that a plaintiff must 7 show the following to satisfy a prima facie case: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. E.g., Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). Harassment based on race affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). When determining whether a workplace constitutes a hostile work environment, courts consider the following circumstances: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id. (quoting Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000)). All of the alleged circumstances must be taken into consideration when evaluating a claim of a racially hostile work environment. See id. In support of his claim, Lindsey argues that his supervisors at Chevron used racial epithets in his presence; that while he 8 was hospitalized, Chevron officials did not send him flowers or visit him in the hospital, which was allegedly unlike the treatment that several non-African-American employees received; that he was required to climb a ladder when he was dizzy; that a supervisor cursed at him; and that Chevron management allegedly allowed employees to hang Confederate flags in the maintenance trailer. Chevron argues that none of the alleged harassment rises to the level of affecting a term, condition, or privilege of Lindsey’s employment. Lindsey fails to present competent summary judgment evidence support a prima facie case. Of all the articulated incidences, the only acts of harassment alleged to be race-based are the racial epithets, the hanging of Confederate flags, and the lack of hospital visits. These incidences do not rise to the requisite degree of severity and pervasiveness that our precedents require. While a plaintiff may survive summary judgment by showing the existence of “routinely [made] racist remarks,” Walker, 214 F.3d at 626, the instant case is distinguishable because Lindsey never provides evidence concerning the frequency (or a chronological description) of the epithets. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lindsey, we cannot assume that the epithets were routine in nature. Further, Lindsey provides no evidence to suggest that these racial slurs, combined with Chevron’s decision not to visit 9 Lindsey or send him flowers when at the hospital and the hanging of the flags, either unreasonably interfered with his work performance or caused him to feel physically threatened or humiliated. In sum, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of Lindsey on the ground that he experienced harassment that was sufficiently severe and pervasive. Accordingly, we again find it unnecessary to undergo the burden shifting analysis because Lindsey failed to establish his prima facie case for a racially hostile work environment. Summary judgment as to this particular claim was proper.