Opinion ID: 4271420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Objection to Alleged Photographing

Text: PruittHealth additionally contends that the Board erred in failing to credit its unlawful photographing objection. This claim is not properly before us, however, because PruittHealth failed to properly raise it with the Board. 16 Section 10(e) of the Act provides that “[n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The Board’s regulations interpreting Section 10(e) require parties to raise objections in their request for Board review of the underlying representation proceedings in order to preserve the issues for consideration in subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(g); see also Matson Terminals, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 50, slip op. at 1 n.1 (Sept. 26, 2014), enforced, 637 F. App’x 609 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam). If a party fails to raise an objection “in the time and manner that the Board’s regulations require,” this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claim. Spectrum Health–Kent Cmty. Campus v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 341, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Here, although PruittHealth raised its objection to alleged photographing in its initial objections to the election, it failed to include this objection in its request for Board review. PruittHealth therefore waived this objection. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(a)(1)(ii) (“Any exception to a ruling, finding, conclusion, or recommendation which is not specifically urged will be deemed to have been waived.”). PruittHealth contends that it preserved this claim by objecting, in its exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s report, to the “totality of the Hearing Officer’s conclusions,” including findings regarding conduct that involved “menacing eligible voters.” Petitioner’s Reply Br. 19. This argument lacks merit because it merely states a “generalized objection” to the Hearing Officer’s analysis “without providing the detail required by the Board’s rules or otherwise putting the Board on notice of the specific grounds for its objection[].” Nova Se. Univ. v. NLRB, 807 F.3d 308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also 17 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(a)(1)(i) (requiring that parties “[s]pecify the questions of procedure, fact, law, or policy to which exception is taken” and “[c]oncisely state the grounds for the exception”). PruittHealth’s unspecified, generalized exception to the “totality of the Hearing Officer’s conclusions” was insufficient to preserve its objection to allegedly objectionable photographing. Accordingly, Section 10(e)’s jurisdictional bar applies here. E. Cumulative Impact and Closeness of the Election PruittHealth raises two additional arguments as to why the Board erred in adopting the Regional Director’s findings and recommendations and certifying the Union. Neither argument has merit. First, the Company asserts that the Regional Director and Hearing Officer analyzed each allegation of objectionable conduct in isolation rather than, as Board law requires, cumulatively to determine whether the conduct as a whole destroyed the conditions required for a free and fair election. See Petitioner’s Br. 41–42; Petitioner’s Reply Br. 24–26. It is true that the Board is required to assess the cumulative impact of alleged incidents of misconduct in order to determine whether such conduct tainted the results of the election. See Swing Staging, Inc. v. NLRB, 994 F.2d 859, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1993). However, in order to make that “overall judgment,” the Board first reviews and weighs the seriousness of the specific incidents of alleged misconduct. See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Hearing Officer and Regional Director here did just that. The Hearing Officer stated at the outset of his report that he had assessed the “conduct alleged in the Objections . . . , both 18 in isolation and cumulatively.” J.A. 237. And the Regional Director explained in his decision that “the question which must be asked [in determining whether to set aside the election results] is whether based on the objective evidence . . . the alleged objectionable conduct can be reasonably said to have affected the outcome of the election.” J.A. 273. He then held that, “[b]ased on the record [in this case], I do not believe it can be.” Id. This determination is unassailable. As we have explained before, a petitioner may not use a cumulative-impact argument “to turn a number of insubstantial objections to an election into a serious challenge.” Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 736 F.2d at 1569 (quoting NLRB v. Van Gorp Corp., 615 F.2d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 1980)). Zero plus zero equals nothing. That is what we have here. Second, PruittHealth argues that the Regional Director gave “[in]sufficient consideration to the number of employees impacted by the objectionable conduct and the closeness of the election results.” Petitioner’s Br. 41. The Regional Director found that the close vote here did not warrant setting aside the election results because the record did not support PruittHealth’s contention that the Union engaged in misconduct during the election campaign. Therefore, the Board’s determination that misconduct did not taint the election can hardly be doubted. A close election result may or may not be caused by Union misconduct. If there has been no misconduct, however, then a close vote is simply an indication of divided views among the employees. Therefore, a close vote, without more, is insufficient to require the rerun of an election. Indeed, any suggestion to the contrary is specious. The Union garnered a majority of the votes in the election, and the Board found that 19 the allegations of objectionable conduct were meritless. That is the end of the matter. Accordingly, we decline to overturn the Board’s decision to certify the Union as the lawful bargaining representative.