Opinion ID: 1792208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: James and Hattie's Issues

Text: Prior to trial, James and Hattie filed a motion through which they contended that the indictment failed to set forth facts which would have sufficiently apprised them of the nature and cause of the accusations against them. Judge Carlson disagreed: I've ... stud[ied] the indictment and the statutes, and, also, the applicable case law and also Rule 2.05 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice ... [and] I'm satisfied the [motion] should be overruled. James and Hattie appealed this decision. Questions regarding the adequacy of indictments are tested by Rule 2.05 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Winston v. State, 479 So.2d 1093, 1095 (Miss. 1985). The major purpose of an indictment is to furnish the accused such a description of the charges against him as will enable him to adequately prepare his defense. Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 804 (Miss. 1984) (citing Westmoreland v. State, 246 So.2d 487 (Miss. 1971); Woods v. State, 200 Miss. 527, 27 So.2d 895 (1946)). The description should include a concise and clear statement of the elements of the crime charged. Id. (citing Love v. State, 211 Miss. 606, 52 So.2d 470 (1951)). Nothing more is required. Id.; see Cantrell v. State, 507 So.2d 325, 329 (Miss. 1987) (The rule in this state is that an indictment which states the statutory language is generally sufficient to inform the accused of the charge against him.). This Court has perused the nine-page indictment and concludes that it comported with relevant law  i.e., the Kings were sufficiently apprised of the offenses with which they were charged. The indictment cites and tracks, or quotes, relevant statutory language and, in accordance with Rule 2.05 and case law, it provides a concise description of the essential facts pertaining to each offense. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-1 (1990 Supp.); id. §§ 97-9-55 & 97-9-5 (1972). In sum, Judge Carlson properly overruled the motion.
On July 14, 1987, James filed an Application and Affidavit for Continuance. James requested a continuance because he had scheduled a doctor's appointment in Memphis, Tennessee, on July 20, 1987  the day before the trial was set to begin. More specifically, James explained that, as result of an auto accident which occurred several months earlier, he scheduled himself to undergo medical testing at a Memphis hospital; therefore, he would be unable to attend the trial on the date set. On July 17, Judge Carlson held a hearing on James' application. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Carlson rejected James' application. James appealed this decision and now contends that his so-called summary incarceration violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Disposition of this issue is unnecessary; whether the judge improperly incarcerated James has nothing to do with the merits of this case and, as a consequence, reversal is not a possible remedy. [4] This Court therefore rejects James' contention without prejudice. If James continues to feel aggrieved, he may opt to seek a remedy, if any, other than reversal of this case.
Pursuant to Judge Carlson's sequestration order, the jurors along with the bailiffs stayed at a Holiday Inn each night of the four-day trial. On two occasions, three of the jurors visited the Inn's Tadpole Lounge. Upon learning of the jurors' visits, James and Hattie filed a post-trial Motion to Set Aside Verdict, Declare Mistrial, and Grant a New Trial. During a hearing on the motion, the three jurors testified that they did not discuss the case with each other nor with anyone else. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Carlson denied the motion and reasoned: It is admittedly regrettable and disturbing that 3 of the younger male jurors took it upon themselves to consume alcohol at the motel lounge and in their rooms during the overnight recesses, and the Court is disappointed in their conduct. But disappointment does not bring about vitiation of the guilty verdicts. The record is clear that any consumption of alcohol in no way affected their ability to perform their duties as jurors, and there was at no time discussion with any one about the case during this period of time. ... . Based on the facts and circumstances peculiar to this particular case, as revealed in the record of the post trial motion hearing, and based on the entire record in this case, the Court is satisfied that a fair and impartial jury reached verdicts based on the evidence and the law. This is true of the guilty verdicts returned, and this is true of the not guilty verdicts returned. This Court is satisfied that, except for the aforementioned consumption of alcohol, the jurors followed the instructions of the Court regarding their conduct. This Court will admit that it could not, and did not, give these Defendants a perfect trial; but they did receive a constitutionally fair trial. Record Vol. III, at 198 & 201-03. James and Hattie appealed this decision. In Weaver v. State , this Court held that a presumption [exists] that jurors follow the instructions of the court relative to their conduct during the course of the trial. 272 So.2d 636, 638 (Miss. 1973), quoted in Stringer v. State, 279 So.2d 156, 160 (Miss. 1973). The Court added that it will not conclude that prejudice resulted by separation of the jury in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. Id. Separation of jurors, under proper instructions by the court in a criminal case less than capital, is not error. Id. (emphasis supplied by this Court in Stringer v. State ). In Schwarzauer v. State, 339 So.2d 980, 981 (Miss. 1976), this Court concluded that a determination of whether an improper separation of sequestered jurors resulted in prejudice must be made on an ad hoc basis. Restated, the rule is that such cases must be decided upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case and considerable discretion is vested in trial judges when confronted with [such an issue]. Id. (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)); see also Lampley v. State, 291 So.2d 707 (Miss. 1974) (case in which this Court held that separation of jurors did not vitiate the verdict of guilty); White v. State, 566 So.2d 1256, 1260-61 (Miss. 1990) (In this case involving juror misconduct, this Court held: Applying our standard of review to the findings of fact made by the court, we are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.) (citing Carter v. State, 493 So.2d 327 (Miss. 1986); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984); Anderson v. State, 231 Miss. 352, 95 So.2d 465 (1957)); cf. Carter, 493 So.2d at 329 ([A]ny presumption of prejudice may be rebutted by an affirmative showing that no such prejudice exists.) (citing Anderson, 231 Miss. at 352, 95 So.2d at 465; Pepper v. State, 200 Miss. 891, 27 So.2d 842 (1946)). In sum, James and Hattie failed to present even a scintilla of evidence evincing influence of a juror and resultant prejudice; thus, Judge Carlson did not abuse his discretion by denying their motion. This Court affirms.
As noted in Section I of this opinion, the jury found Hattie guilty of conspiracy only. Hattie now contends that the evidence does not support the verdict. The State concedes: Undeniably, the evidence against Hattie King is close. The State nonetheless concludes that the evidence does support the verdict. This issue will be treated as an appeal of the judge's denial of Hattie's j.n.o.v. motion. In circumstantial-evidence cases such as this: the test to be applied on motion for judgment of acquittal and on review of denial of such motion is not simply whether in the opinion of the trial judge or the appellate court the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis, but that of guilt, but rather whether the jury might reasonably so conclude. McDonald, 454 So.2d at 493 (quoting Harper v. United States, 405 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.1969) (quoting Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.1954)). Considering as true all the evidence most favorable to the State, together with reasonable inferences, this Court is unpersuaded that the jury could have excluded  every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793, 796 (Miss. 1985) (Robertson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The only evidence which the State presented to prove that Hattie was a member of the conspiracy was the testimony of William Taylor. Taylor testified that, late one night, James drove to his house: Q. Did he [James] have anybody with him? Taylor: His wife. Q. Hattie Ray? Taylor: Yes, sir. Q. What happened when he came ... by there? Taylor: He come ... by and asked me about the [jury] list [which he had given me during a previous meeting] and where it was and I told him it was in the house. He told me to go in there and get it. Q. What did you do? Taylor: Went back in there and got it and gave it to him. Q. What did he say to you? Taylor: He said  said the law might come around to talk to [me], and I said, About what, I ain't did nothing, and he said, Well, I don't know, but I believe they're going to come around and talk with you. Q. What did he say for you to do? Taylor: He told me to keep his name out of it. Q. What did Hattie Ray say? Taylor: I don't think she said anything. Q. You don't remember her saying anything? Taylor: No, sir. Q. Was she there with him while the conversation was going on? Taylor: Yes, sir. Vol. VII, at 568-69 (This meeting between James and Taylor transpired after Taylor had attempted influence jurors, Truly and Harris). Thus, the only evidence discoverable in the record, which suggests that Hattie was a member of the conspiracy, was her presence in the vehicle when James drove to Taylor's house one night to pick up the jury list and warn Taylor to keep quiet if investigators pay him a visit. Mere presence at the scene of the crime, even when coupled with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is insufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy. Moreover, mere association with conspirators is similarly insufficient. Davis v. State, 485 So.2d 1055, 1058 (Miss. 1986) (citing authoritative support); see McDonald v. State, 454 So.2d 488 (Miss. 1984) (It is elementary that neither association with conspirators nor knowledge of illegal activity constitutes proof of participation in a conspiracy.); see also United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir.1944) (It is true that at times courts have spoken as though if A. makes a criminal agreement with B., he becomes a party to any conspiracy into which B. may enter, or may have entered, with third persons. That is of course an error: the scope of the agreement actually made always measures the conspiracy, and the fact that B. engages in a conspiracy with others is as irrelevant as that he engages in any other crime... . [In order for B. to considered a member of the conspiracy, B.] must be aware of th[e] purposes [of the conspiracy], must accept them and their implications. ...) (emphasis in original). For further analysis of the law of conspiracy, see Davis, 485 So.2d at 1057-59, and McDonald, 454 So.2d at 488. Admittedly, Hattie probably heard all that was said during James and Taylor's conversation. However, hypothetically, the phraseology being used was so general or generic that a disinterested or unknowledgeable bystander would not have understood what James and Taylor were specifically talking about. An individual may not be deemed a co-conspirator absent proof that the individual recognized her entrance into or participation in some kind of common plan and knowingly intended to further its common purpose. McDonald, 454 So.2d at 495; see also Davis, 485 So.2d at 1058 (There must exist some evidence that a defendant has associated himself with the venture in some fashion, participated in it as something that he wished to bring about, or sought by his action to make it succeed.) (citing cases). Clearly, the record is devoid of evidence reflecting beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite mens rea of knowledge. The very best the State can claim with respect to Hattie is guilt by association, which is clearly insufficient to sustain a conviction of conspiracy. Finally, the facts of this case are analogous to those of McDonald, 454 So.2d at 488. In McDonald, this Court reversed and rendered after concluding that the State's case against one of the alleged conspirators, Miss Bookout, did not support the jury verdict: Crediting all the evidence and all reasonable inferences most favorable to the government, we are unpersuaded that the jury could reasonably exclude the hypothesis that Miss Bookout did not enter into the conspiracy to utter the counterfeit currency. Miss Bookout did nothing and said nothing from which the jury could reasonably infer that she entered the conspiratorial agreement prior to the attempt by Miller to pass the bill in the Broward Drug Store. Certainly, no event occurred in the Capatorto home supportive of such an inference. At most, the evidence reveals that Bookout first gained knowledge of the plan when she entered the Miller bedroom to comb her hair. She did not indicate at the time that she gave any attention to the transaction and conversation underway at the bed, but the government is entitled to the inference that she overheard plans being discussed as to methods of using the money. ... . In sum, we are left with an abiding conviction that the jury's verdict of guilty as to Bookout is based upon suspicion and surmise only. She associated with the wrong people and was convicted because of guilt by association only. Her conviction for conspiracy may not be permitted to stand since we conclude that the inference of her guilt was not a reasonable one for the jury to entertain. Id. at 493-94 (emphasis in original). In sum, the case against Hattie is simply too weak to support the verdict. This Court is left with little choice but to reverse and render the case against Hattie.
In view of this Court's disposition of the case against Hattie, this issue need not be reached.