Opinion ID: 589777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Inculpatory Statement

Text: 9 Asuncion argues that the district court erred by failing to suppress her second statement to the DEA agents. She bases her argument on two grounds. First, she charges that her waiver of Miranda rights two hours after her arrest was neither knowingly nor voluntarily made. Second, she claims that, even if the waiver was valid, her second statement was inadmissible because it was obtained as a product of unreasonable delay in bringing her before a magistrate and because it was involuntarily made. Finally, she argues that admission of her second statement was not harmless error.
10 Asuncion argues that the district court erred in finding that her 11:00 a.m. waiver of Miranda rights was voluntarily and knowingly made. This argument fails because Asuncion has not demonstrated that the district court's findings concerning the Miranda waiver were clearly erroneous. United States v. Doe, 819 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir.1985).
11 Asuncion next argues that, even if the 11:00 a.m. waiver was valid, the 4:00 a.m. confession should have been suppressed due to unreasonable delay and because it was involuntarily made. In federal criminal trials, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988) governs the handling of challenges to the admissibility of confessions. According to section 3501(a), a statement is admissible if it is voluntarily given. Section 3501(b) requires that, in determining voluntariness, the trial judge shall consider all circumstances surrounding the confession including five specified items. The first of those items concerns the delay between arrest and arraignment if the confession was made between them. 12 In this case, there was a 19 hour delay between the time of the arrest and the time of the second statement and a 17 hour delay between the time of Asuncion's Miranda waiver and the second statement. The record in this case reveals no consideration by the trial judge of this delay's effect, if any, upon the voluntariness of Asuncion's second statement. Nor does it reveal any findings concerning the reasonableness of the delay as required by section 3501(c). A valid Miranda waiver does not automatically validate a confession made 17 hours later. See United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir.1988). Accordingly, we remand this case for consideration of the delay factor in accordance with section 3501. See United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 761 (8th Cir.1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973). 13 On appeal, the government argues that Asuncion's second statement was properly admitted. The government does not, however, challenge Asuncion's argument that if it was error to admit the second statement, that error was not harmless. Indeed, Asuncion's second statement is the lynchpin of the government's case. The following analysis considers Asuncion's remaining arguments with the assumption that Asuncion's second statement was properly admitted. This analysis will become relevant should the trial court find on remand that the delay factor did not affect the voluntariness of the second statement.