Opinion ID: 827256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: quid pro quo sexual harassment under the cra

Text: The CRA recognizes that freedom from discrimination because of sex is a civil right.16 Accordingly, the act prohibits discrimination because of sex in employment, places of public accommodation, and public services.17 MCL 37.2103(i) broadly defines “discrimination because of sex” as follows: Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, 11 See Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). 12 Id. 13 Danse Corp v Madison Hts, 466 Mich 175, 181-182; 644 NW2d 721 (2002). 14 Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich 352, 366; 750 NW2d 570 (2008). 15 Danse Corp, 466 Mich at 182. 16 MCL 37.2102(1). 17 MCL 37.2202 (employment); MCL 37.2302 (public accommodations and public services). For purposes of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that the Wayne County jail is a “public service” as defined by MCL 37.2301(b). 5 and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions: (i) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing. (ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual’s employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing. (iii) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment. [Emphasis added.] The first two subdivisions of MCL 37.2301(i) describe quid pro quo sexual harassment, while the third subdivision refers to hostile-environment sexual harassment.18 A plaintiff alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment affecting public services must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that he or she was subjected to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication described in the statute and (2) that the public service provider or the public service provider’s agent made submission to the proscribed conduct a term or condition of obtaining public services or used the plaintiff’s submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting his or her receipt of public services.19 18 Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 310; 614 NW2d 910 (2000). 19 See id. (stating the test for quid pro quo sexual harassment in the employment context). For purposes of our analysis, we also assume, without deciding, that plaintiff can establish the elements of quid pro quo sexual harassment affecting public services. 6 When the harassment was committed by an agent and the plaintiff is pursuing a civil rights claim against the principal, as in this case, a court must always “determine the extent of the employer’s vicarious liability . . . .”20 We require this analysis because the CRA specifically incorporates common-law agency principles.21 Thus, if a defendant is not vicariously liable for the acts of its agent under traditional principles of respondeat superior, the plaintiff’s claim under the CRA fails as a matter of law.