Opinion ID: 70404
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cost-of-Confinement Fines

Text: 25 The Prices argue that the fines levied upon them pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 5E1.2(i) to pay for costs of incarceration are excessive under the Eighth Amendment and violate due process under the Fifth Amendment because they are not rationally related to the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. The Prices argue that U.S.S.G. Sec. 5E1.2(i), which provides for cost-of-incarceration fines, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a) (1988), which states that courts shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, are in conflict, since Sec. 5E1.2(i) imposes an additional fine on top of the fine ranges contained in the table provided by Sec. 5E1.2(c). 7 The government, on the other hand, asserts that the fine is neither excessive nor irrational. Such questions of law are subject to plenary review. See United States v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir.1991). 26 The validity of U.S.S.G. Sec. 5E1.2(i) is an issue of first impression in this circuit, and other circuits are split on the question. Compare United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 165-67 (3d Cir.1992) (holding Sec. 5E1.2(i) to be inconsistent with Sentencing Reform Act while avoiding due process question) with United States v. Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 187 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 108, 121 L.Ed.2d 66 (1992) (finding that cost-of-incarceration fines are rational means to assist victims of crime collectively). In declaring guideline Sec. 5E1.2(i) invalid, the Third Circuit found that the plain language of the section indicated that the fines imposed thereunder were to reimburse the government for the costs of imprisonment. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d at 166. The court concluded that the Sentencing Reform Act did not authorize fines to cover costs of confinement, even though the money collected from the fines went to the Crime Victims Fund and not actually to pay for penal operations. Id. at 166-67. 27 We disagree with the assertion that Congress did not consider imposition of cost-of-confinement fines to be within the scope of the Sentencing Reform Act's goal of restitution. See 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3572(a)(6) (West Supp.1995) (providing that courts can consider the expected costs to the government of any imprisonment, supervised release, or probation component of the sentence in setting amount of fine); 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 994(y) (West Supp.1995) (stating that Sentencing Commission may include as component of fine calculus the expected costs of imprisonment). Instead, we find Hagmann to be persuasive. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the uniform practice of fining criminals on the basis of their individualistic terms of imprisonment--an indicator of the actual harm each has inflicted upon society--is a rational means to assist the victims of crime collectively. Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 187. 28 Although the Third Circuit in Spiropoulos found the analysis in Hagmann to be too facile, 976 F.2d at 168, Spiropoulos has been rejected, and Hagmann followed, in every other circuit that has addressed the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Zakhor, 58 F.3d 464, 466 (9th Cir.1995) (upholding cost-of-confinement fines); United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 891 (10th Cir.1995) (finding guideline rationally related to legitimate government interest); United States v. Leonard, 37 F.3d 32, 39 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Hagmann and holding Sec. 5E1.2(i) consistent with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a)); United States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that Sec. 5E1.2(i) is authorized by statute), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 639, 126 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). We join the other circuits that have upheld U.S.S.G. Sec. 5E1.2(i), and we reject both constitutional challenges made by the Prices. 29