Opinion ID: 164453
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Boost

Text: 47 Sam's also argues that, contrary to the district court's holding, the OUSA's language does not provide for a statutory boost in showing a substantial lessening of competition. The OUSA states that [e]vidence of advertisement, offering to sell, or sale of merchandise by any retailer or wholesaler at less than cost to him, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to injure competitors and to destroy or substantially lessen competition. Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 598.5(c). According to Sam's, because the statute does not expressly use the word result, the statutory boost provides prima facie evidence only of the intent to destroy or substantially lessen competition, not its result. 48 Such a construction would render meaningless the specific reference to substantially lessen competition in the statute. To substantially lessen competition is one of the results that is prohibited by the OUSA, not one of the prohibited intents. Moreover, as noted by the district court, because the statute prescribes that below-cost sales shall be prima facie evidence of intent to injure competitors and to destroy or substantially lessen competition, Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 598.5(c) (emphasis added) — using the conjunctive and instead of the disjunctive or — it is more likely that the Oklahoma Legislature intended to establish prima facie evidence both of the intent to injure competitors and of the result of destroying or substantially lessening competition. Star Fuel, 2003 WL 742191, at . Reinforcing this conclusion is the legislature's repetition of the to infinitive before destroy or substantially lessen competition, which would have been unnecessary if meant to refer to another intent. 49 More importantly, despite Sam's use of various canons of statutory construction to decipher the statute, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma's decision in Diehl v. Magic Empire Grocers Ass'n, 399 P.2d 460 (Okla.1965), indicates its stance on the issue. In Diehl, the defendant grocer was advertising items below cost. After quoting § 598.5(c), the court found only one significant fact — that the defendant through advertising circulars offered for sale certain items below the required 6% markup. Id. at 462. The court then concluded that the acts of defendant's servants in advertising the foregoing items for sale at the unlawfully reduced prices indicated, absent any showing to the contrary on his part, were in violation of the statute. Id. at 463 (emphasis added). The emphasized language indicates that once it is shown that a retailer is selling items below its cost, the burden shifts to the retailer to show it did not violate the OUSA. 50 Apparently recognizing the existence of the presumption of substantially lessened competition, Sam's argues that the presumption was successfully rebutted. Prima facie evidence is such evidence as in the judgment of law is sufficient to establish a fact, and if not rebutted, remains sufficient to establish that fact. Glenn Smith, 704 P.2d at 478. As noted above, statutory prima facie rules of evidence in Oklahoma may be rebutted only by clearly proven facts. 51 Sam's offers little more evidence to rebut this presumption than the above referenced testimony of Star's chief operating officer and Dr. Joseph Jadlow. The district court found that this was insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing. 4 Star Fuel, 2003 WL 742191, at . Moreover, as discussed above, Star presented substantial evidence tending to show that Sam's below-cost pricing of gasoline unfairly increased its market share while decreasing the market share of its competitors. The existence of this evidence precludes a determination that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous.