Opinion ID: 1888913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Waiver: Ohler v. United States

Text: Judge Raker weaves three generally valid principles of law together to find a waiver in this case: (1) that a party who introduces evidence in a case may not complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted; (2) that, under Maryland Rule 4-323, an objection to the admission of evidence in a criminal case is waived unless it is made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection becomes apparent; and (3) that ordinarily, a pre-trial motion in limine to exclude evidence does not suffice to constitute or preserve an objection to the evidencethe objection must be made when the evidence is offered. Those principles are not absolute, however, and, when they have the effect of creating undue prejudice to a testifying defendant in a criminal case, they must yield. Maryland Rule 5-102, which states the general purpose of the rules of evidence, makes clear that one of the functions of those rules is that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. [4] Maryland Rule 5-609 permits evidence of a criminal conviction [f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness if the crime is either an infamous one or one that is relevant to the witness's credibility, certain other requirements are met, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting party. Any witness, of course, is subject to being impeached with prior criminal convictions under the Rule, but because of the particularly acute danger of prejudice when used, or threatened to be used, against a defendant in a criminal case, we have viewed their use in that context with special caution. See Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981); Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 619 A.2d 105 (1993); Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 668 A.2d 8 (1995). The threatened use may affect the defendant's decision to testify, which he or she has a Constitutional right to do and, as a practical matter, may need to do in order to meet the State's evidence and establish a defense. If the defendant testifies, evidence of prior criminal convictions, despite limiting instructions, may be taken by a jury not as simply weakening the credibility of the defendant's testimony, but as propensity evidenceif he engaged in that conduct once, he likely did it againor as establishing the defendant as a bad and disreputable person generally deserving of punishment whether or not he or she committed the crime currently at issue. Indeed, given the lessons learned from common human experience, those are the more likely ways in which such evidence may be used. Lay people, and, I expect, even lawyers, may have considerable difficulty in putting what they regard as logic and common experience aside and treat this powerful experiential evidence as affecting only one's credibility as a witness. It is this very likelihood that makes evidence of prior convictions so troublesome for defendants in criminal cases and so popular with prosecutors. It is rare, I expect, that a prosecutor will decline to offer a prior conviction even potentially admissible under the Rule because of any concern over whether, despite a limiting instruction from the judge, the jury might use the conviction as substantive propensity evidence. It is common, then, for defendants, before they decide to testify, to determine which convictions the State intends to offer and to seek to exclude those that may be particularly prejudicial. The device for presenting the issue to the court in a timely fashionbefore the defendant is forced to cross the Rubicon by either testifying or electing not to do so, is the motion in limine, in which the court is asked to determine whether disputed evidence likely to be offered will, or will not, be admitted. If the court concludes that the conviction is admissible, it is necessarily determining that the conviction (1) is relevant to the defendant's credibility and (2) has substantial probative value as to that issuesufficient probative value to outweigh any prejudice to the defendant. If the defendant then decides to testify, he or she must reasonably expect that the jury will conclude likewisethat, even if it does not use the conviction for any improper purpose, once the conviction is brought to its attention, it may well determine that the defendant is not a credible person and that his or her testimony, to the extent it is inconsistent with other evidence, is not worthy of belief. Some defendants, though convinced that the court erred in its ruling that the prior conviction was admissible, have attempted to gain the best of both worlds by declining to testify, thereby avoiding revelation of the conviction, and then raising the issue on appeal, complaining that the court's allegedly erroneous decision effectively prevented them from testifying. The courts generally have rejected that attempt and have concluded that, because the prior conviction was never presented, any harm to the defendant from the in limine ruling was too speculative to entitle him or her to relief. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), a case relied upon in Ohler and therefore worthy of comment. In Luce, the defendant, charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, moved in limine to preclude the Government from impeaching him with a prior conviction of simple possession of a controlled substance. Under Federal law, such a conviction was regarded as a serious crime and was therefore within the universe of crimes admissible under F.R.E. 609, and the question became whether its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. [5] In addressing that issue, the Supreme Court observed that when the defendant does not testify, (1) a reviewing court does not have a complete factual record from which to determine the likely impact of the prior conviction, (2) any possible harm flowing from the trial court's in limine ruling is entirely speculative, in that the ruling might have changed had the actual testimony been different from what was contained in the defendant's proffer, (3) the reviewing court has no way of knowing whether the Government would, in fact, have used the conviction as impeachment evidence, and (4) there is no way of knowing whether, if the in limine ruling was erroneous, the error was harmless. Id. at 41-42, 105 S.Ct. at 463-64, 83 L.Ed.2d at 447-48. For all of those reasons, the Court concluded that, to preserve for appellate review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, the defendant must testify and the conviction must be admitted into evidence. Id. at 43, 105 S.Ct. at 464, 83 L.Ed.2d at 448. Like Ohler, Luce was not a Constitutional ruling but one based on the Court's interpretation or implementation of F.R.E. 609. Although we have not had occasion to consider precisely the same question, we reached a similar conclusion with respect to a challenged confession. In Jordan v. State, 323 Md. 151, 591 A.2d 875 (1991), the defendant moved, before trial, to suppress a statement he had given to the police, on the ground that it was both involuntary and given without a waiver of counsel. The trial court ruled that the statement was voluntary but that Jordan had not waived his right to counsel, and that, as a result, the confession could not be used in the State's case-in-chief but could, under Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), be used as impeachment evidence if Jordan testified. Faced with that ruling, Jordan decided not to testify but nonetheless raised the issue on appeal. Following somewhat the reasoning used in Luce, and indeed citing Luce, we concluded that the alleged injury was remote and speculative, in that there was no way to tell whether the State would actually have used the confession had Jordan testified. Blinding our eyes to reality, we suggested the prospect that Jordan may have testified consistently with the confession, thereby depriving the confession of any impeachment value. We were not inclined, we said, to review a trial court's decision authorizing the State to use particular evidence when, as a result of a tactical decision by the defendant, the State ultimately was precluded from utilizing that same evidence. Jordan, supra, 323 Md. at 156, 591 A.2d at 877. Despite the obvious differences between the Luce-Jordan situation and the one now before us, the Ohler Court regarded Luce as a similar, but not identical, situation, Ohler, 529 U.S. at 759, 120 S.Ct. at 1854, 146 L.Ed.2d at 832, and Judge Raker in this case regards Jordan as analogous and therefore instructive. Any similarity, in my view, is merely facial, not real. In Ohler, the defendant was charged with importation of, and possession with intent to distribute, marijuana. The Government moved in limine to admit her prior conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a conviction, as noted, that was admissible under the Federal rule but would be inadmissible in Maryland. The trial court ruled that the conviction was admissible. Ohler testified and, on direct examination, drew the sting by admitting the conviction, but on appeal she challenged the in limine ruling. She sought to avoid the consequences of the general rule precluding a party who introduces evidence from complaining that the evidence was wrongfully admitted by arguing, among other things, that to apply a waiver rule in that situation would be unfair. It would be unfair, she said, because it compels a defendant to forgo the tactical advantage of pre-emptively introducing the conviction in order to appeal the in limine ruling. Id. at 757, 120 S.Ct. at 1853, 146 L.Ed.2d at 831-32. If a defendant is forced to wait for the conviction to be revealed on cross-examination, she complained, the jury will believe that the defendant is less credible because she was trying to conceal the conviction. Id. Evoking aspects of the somewhat outmoded and discredited sporting theory of justice, the Court responded that both sides in a criminal trial must make tactical decisions as the case progresses. Id. at 757, 120 S.Ct. at 1854, 146 L.Ed.2d at 831. The defendant must choose whether to testify and whether, if he or she does, to draw the sting. Id. at 757-58, 120 S.Ct. at 1854, 146 L.Ed.2d at 831. The Government, on the other hand, must make the tactical decision whether to use the conviction, the Court suggesting that, if the defendant does not mount a plausible defense, the Government may decide not to risk reversal from its use. Id. at 758, 120 S.Ct. at 1854, 146 L.Ed.2d at 831. Ohler's approach, the Court said, would deprive the Government of its right to wait until the defendant testifies before making that decision. Id. at 758, 120 S.Ct. at 1854, 146 L.Ed.2d at 832. Judge Raker finds that response compelling. I do not. It is important to note that, prior to Ohler, the majority of State courts and a number of Federal courts had held that drawing the sting by revealing a prior conviction, after the prosecutor has clearly indicated an intent to use the conviction for impeachment and the court, over the defendant's objection, has ruled that the conviction would be admitted, does not preclude the defendant from challenging the in limine ruling on appeal. See Eubanks v. State, 516 P.2d 726 (Alaska 1973); State v. Ellerson, 125 Ariz. 249, 609 P.2d 64 (1980); People v. Carpenter, 21 Cal.4th 1016, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531 (1999); State v. Miller, 186 Conn. 654, 443 A.2d 906 (1982); People v. Williams, 161 Ill.2d 1, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296 (1994); State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 1978); People v. Harris, 86 Mich. App. 301, 272 N.W.2d 635 (1978); McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191 (Miss.1990); State v. Williams, 212 Neb. 860, 326 N.W.2d 678 (1982); State v. Ross, 329 N.C. 108, 405 S.E.2d 158 (1991); State v. Eugene, 340 N.W.2d 18 (N.D.1983); State v. Mueller, 319 S.C. 266, 460 S.E.2d 409 (App.1995); State v. McGhee, 746 S.W.2d 460 (Tenn. 1988); Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 806 P.2d 235 (Utah App.1991); State v. Ryan, 135 Vt. 491, 380 A.2d 525 (1977); State v. Watkins, 61 Wash.App. 552, 811 P.2d 953 (1991); Nicholas v. State, 49 Wis.2d 683, 183 N.W.2d 11 (1971); Vanlue v. State, 87 Wis.2d 455, 275 N.W.2d 115 (App.1978); rev'd on other grounds, 96 Wis.2d 81, 291 N.W.2d 467 (1980); United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 844, 94 S.Ct. 106, 38 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973); United States v. Yarbrough, 352 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.1965); United States v. Vanco, 131 F.2d 123 (7th Cir.1942); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034, 100 S.Ct. 706, 62 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980). Ohler was a five-four decision that went against that strong tide. Justice Souter, writing for the dissent, noted that [w]ith neither precedent nor principle to support its chosen rule, the majority is reduced to saying that `there is nothing unfair... about putting petitioner to her choice in accordance with the normal rules of trial.' Things are not this simple, however. Ohler, supra, 529 U.S. at 763, 120 S.Ct. at 1857, 146 L.Ed.2d at 834. When convictions are revealed for the first time on cross-examination, he observed, [t]he jury may feel that in testifying without saying anything about the convictions the defendant has meant to conceal them, and its assessment of the defendant's testimony may be affected not only by knowing that she has committed crimes in the past, but by blaming her for not being forthcoming when she seemingly could have been. Id. at 764, 120 S.Ct. at 1857, 146 L.Ed.2d at 835. Justice Souter concluded that `[c]reating such an impression of current deceit by concealment is very much at odds with any purpose behind Rule 609, being obviously antithetical to dispassionate factfinding in support of a sound conclusion, that the chance to create that impression may be a tactical advantage for the Government but disserves the search for truth, and that allowing the defendant to draw the sting promotes the fairness of trial without depriving the Government of anything to which it is entitled. Id. The Federal courts, of course, are bound by Ohler, but we are not, and, although we necessarily give any decision of the United States Supreme Court great respect, there is good reason not to give this one very much weight. It is not based on sound reasoning, and, as Judge Souter complained, it is antithetical to the search for truth by necessarily placing the defendant in a false light before the jury. Nor is it really supported by Luce. The points made in Luce and Jordan are, for the most part, legitimate. If the defendant does not testify, it is usually impossible for an appellate court to know for certain why whether the admissibility of the conviction was the determining factormuch less what effect the conviction might have had if it had been revealed to the jury. In this situation, there is no mystery, no speculation. It was clear that the State intended to use the conviction, and, from the closeness of the case, there can be little doubt that it would have been compelled to do so. There was no doubt as to the court's ruling or to the finality of that ruling. It was not made before trial but at the close of the State's case. Petitioner did testify, and the Court thus has a full factual record from which to judge the correctness of the trial judge's ruling. Other States have declined to follow Ohler. See State v. Daly, 623 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 2001) (where issue is fully argued and trial court, apprised of defendant's objection, rules evidence of prior conviction admissible, defendant need not abandon all trial tactics to preserve error); State v. Keiser, 807 A.2d 378 (Vt.2002); State v. Thang, 145 Wash.2d 630, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002); compare State v. Dunlap, 346 S.C. 312, 550 S.E.2d 889 (App.2001), where the defendant revealed his prior conviction in opening statement, before the ruling on its admissibility was final. I would adhere generally to the contemporaneous objection rule, because it is a useful rule. I would bend it in this situation, however, because, when rigidly applied, it fails to serve the ends of either fairness or the search for truth. Bending it in this limited setting advances the cause of justice and creates no problem, either for the courts or for the State. The limited setting is where (1) the State makes clear that it intends to offer the conviction if the defendant testifies, (2) the defendant makes a clear objection to the evidence, (3) the court makes a definitive ruling, intended to be final, that the evidence will be admitted, and (4) the defendant testifies and, to blunt the force of the conviction, reveals it on direct examination. For the reasons stated, I would hold that there was no waiver in this casethat petitioner did not lose his right to challenge the court's ruling that the conviction was admissible by revealing the conviction during direct examination.