Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Excusing Crenshaw From Testifying.

Text: (18) Defendant's crime partner, Crenshaw, testified for the prosecution at the preliminary hearing, but invoked his privilege against self-incrimination when called by the prosecution at the guilt phase of trial, although he testified briefly for the defense. ( Ante, fn. 4, p. 23.) At the penalty phase, defendant sought to call Crenshaw again, proposing to ask if he had shot White, the victim in the prior-murder special circumstance. The trial court, informed by Crenshaw's counsel he would instruct his client not to answer the question, ruled Crenshaw need not testify, based on the assumption he would invoke his privilege against self-incrimination if called. The court ruled further that based on the offer of proof, the subject matter of Crenshaw's proposed testimony was either not relevant or could be proved by some other means. Defendant contends these rulings were error. We first observe that defense counsel did not object to the challenged procedure, but rather, acquiesced in it; hence defendant may not complain on appeal. ( People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 103, 118 [155 Cal. Rptr. 472].) In any event, the court's ruling that Crenshaw need not take the stand to reassert his Fifth Amendment privilege was not error. Crenshaw had previously exercised the privilege as to all events between March 19, 1981, and March 24, 1981. (See ante, fn. 4, p. 23.) White's murder occurred during those dates. Crenshaw's counsel confirmed he would advise his client not to respond to the proposed question. In these circumstances, the court properly found there was no reason to have Crenshaw personally reassert the privilege. None of the cases relied on by defendant is apposite because in none did the witness, as here, personally assert the privilege at trial. (E.g., People v. Kynette (1940) 15 Cal.2d 731, 747 [104 P.2d 794]; People v. Harris, supra, 93 Cal. App.3d at p. 117; see also People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 435-436 [247 Cal. Rptr. 121, 754 P.2d 168].) Although defendant would have us equate the separate phases of trial to separate proceedings, so as to require a witness to invoke the privilege at each (see People v. Kynette, supra ), we decline to do so. Likewise meritless is defendant's argument that absent Crenshaw's actual reinvocation of the privilege at the penalty phase, the court was in no position to rule whether the privilege applied. Although Crenshaw, based on his guilty plea, had been convicted and sentenced for the White murder and evidently had failed to appeal (cf. People v. Lopez (1980) 110 Cal. App.3d 1010, 1021 [168 Cal. Rptr. 378] [privilege survives pending resolution of appeal]), thus rendering his conviction final, the same was true at the guilt phase. [12] In both instances, he had yet to be tried for the Benham murder, in which trial it was more than likely the prosecution, as in defendant's trial, would seek to introduce evidence of the White murder for purposes of establishing Crenshaw's guilt. Because a response to defense counsel's question whether he shot White thus could lighten the district attorney's burden of proof, Crenshaw was privileged to refuse to answer. (See Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673].) We conclude, therefore, the court did not err in determining Crenshaw's invocation of the privilege extended to the defense's proposed penalty phase question. (See People v. Ford, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 441.) Nor did the court err in its relevance and other-means-of-proof ruling. The record discloses this ruling was directed not to the question whether Crenshaw had shot White, but rather, to matters presented in defense counsel's offer of proof and subsequently proved by documentary evidence  Crenshaw's sentence in the White murder (25 years to life) and the charges pending against him in the Benham case (nonspecial circumstance murder). As to these, the court's ruling was proper.