Opinion ID: 169434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Second Motion to Suppress Hearing

Text: 23 At a second motion to suppress hearing on May 21, 2002, Officer Wortham again testified. During direct examination, he reiterated that he applied the twist lock prior to seeing the firearm for officer safety purposes. Id. at 269. On cross-examination, Officer Wortham conceded that Mr. Novitsky neither made furtive movements nor resisted his instruction to exit the vehicle. He also admitted there was no evidence that Mr. Novitsky had committed a crime. 24 Defense counsel also asked Officer Wortham if the Aurora Police Department instructed its officers to use the twist lock to remove individuals from their vehicles during routine traffic stops, i.e., when issuing speeding tickets. Id. at 279. Officer Wortham explained he would not use the twist lock under such circumstances: 25 If it was a simple traffic [stop], as you just said, I would ask them to step out of the vehicle. If there was some other reason . . . like it came up that [the detained individual] had a warrant or there was something that maybe he was making false statements or he was making furtive movements in the vehicle . . . . [t]hen that's how I would get them, because I want to limit their movement as they come out. 26 Id. Officer Wortham then explained why he believed using the twist lock on Mr. Novitsky was justified: 27 [H]is partner [in the front seat] was intoxicated, so there was a possibility that [Mr. Novitsky] might be intoxicated, so that's why my awareness was heightened and that's when I took him out. 28 Id. at 280. 29 Based on Officer Wortham's testimony, Mr. Novitsky argued the application of the twist lock was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In opposition, the government argued that Officer Wortham's use of the twist lock was a reasonable exercise of his community caretaking functions, viz., those duties that are totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). 30 On July 1, 2002, the district court granted Mr. Novitsky's motion to suppress. Although it found the officers were reasonably exercising their community caretaking functions in approaching the car and contacting the occupants to determine whether they were in need of medical help or other assistance, id. at 35, the court concluded Officer Wortham unreasonably applied the twist lock because he did not have any reason to believe [Mr. Novitsky] was armed or otherwise presented a threat to [the officers'] safety. Id. at 38. 31 The government appealed. In February 2003, we affirmed the district court's grant of Mr. Novitsky's motion to suppress. See Novitsky, 58 Fed.Appx. at 436. The government then dismissed the indictment, and Mr. Novitsky was released from prison.