Opinion ID: 1033503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exculpatory evidence under brady

Text: Bodison also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). Specifically, Bodison contends that the government failed to disclose the fact that CI Brown had been a member of a gang that sold drugs. Because Bodison did not make this argument in his motion for a new trial, we review it only for plain error. See United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (“When a defendant does not raise a Brady objection in his motion for a new trial, [this Court] need only conduct a plain error review.”). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith 5 We also reject Bodison’s argument that the government’s introduction of this evidence violated the district court’s pretrial order excluding Rule 404(b) evidence. In that pretrial order, the district court excluded (1) evidence of Bodison’s prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and (2) testimony from a proposed witness, Theresa Hawkins. The district court did not exclude all evidence potentially subject to Rule 404(b). 6 To the extent that Bodison argues that the district court abused its discretion when it did not hold a hearing on his motion for a new trial, this argument is deemed abandoned. Bodison mentions it only in a heading of his brief, and does not return to the issue in an argument section. See Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519 n.1 (11th Cir. 1995). 14 Case: 12-15812 Date Filed: 07/11/2013 Page: 15 of 22 or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196–97. To establish the existence of a Brady violation, a defendant must show that: (1) the government possessed favorable evidence, including impeachment evidence; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence, and he could not obtain it himself through reasonable diligence; (3) the government suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been disclosed, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). “Failure to meet any one of these elements will defeat a motion for a new trial.” United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). “The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–10, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (1976). Bodison satisfied the first and third elements because the government knew that Brown had been a member of a gang that dealt drugs, and failed to disclose 15 Case: 12-15812 Date Filed: 07/11/2013 Page: 16 of 22 this information before trial.7 Bodison, however, did not establish the fourth element—that a reasonable probability exists that disclosure of Brown’s experience as a gang member would have resulted in a different outcome in the case.8 Bodison argues that a “reasonable probability” exists because Brown’s having been in a gang would have damaged his credibility, and, according to Bodison, “[t]he whole case rested upon . . . Brown’s credibility.” Bodison’s argument fails because the whole case did not, in fact, rest on Brown’s credibility—there was ample evidence, in addition to Brown’s testimony, to support the jury’s verdict. For example, the jury heard audio recordings from the June 28, 2011 controlled purchase, during which the jury listened to defendant Bodison (1) cook crack cocaine; (2) give instructions to Brown on how to cook crack cocaine; and (3) advise Brown on how to sell crack cocaine without being robbed. 7 Bodison argues that it was not until his sentencing hearing that he first learned that Brown had been a member of a gang that sold drugs. During that hearing, Detective Meade testified that Brown “was a gang member involved in this gang.” Bodison contends that, during his trial testimony, Detective Meade intentionally avoided referring to Brown as a gang member so as not to damage Brown’s credibility. We need not consider this argument, as bad faith is not an element to a Brady violation. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196–97. 8 The government argues that Bodison also has not established the second element. The government contends that “[a]s a drug dealer, Bodison was part of the criminal element in Zellwood.” Thus, the government concludes that “Bodison certainly knew or easily could have learned that Brown had been a member of a Zellwood gang.” Because we conclude that the Bodison has not met his burden on the fourth element, we need not address this argument on the second element. 16 Case: 12-15812 Date Filed: 07/11/2013 Page: 17 of 22 The jury also heard the testimony of Detective Paul Harvey of the Tavares, Florida Police Department. Detective Harvey, working undercover, was with Brown during the August 5, 2011 controlled purchase. Detective Harvey directly corroborated Brown’s testimony about the controlled purchase. Other law enforcement officers provided some corroboration for Brown’s accounts of the other two controlled purchases. Specifically, Detective Meade testified about the June 15, 2011 and June 28, 2011 controlled purchases. Detective Meade was in concealed surveillance positions during these controlled purchases. Special Agents Braccio and Baker testified that they also observed the June 28, 2011 controlled purchase from a concealed location that was approximately 30 yards from Bodison’s residence. Moreover, witnesses also testified about (1) the precautions that law enforcement officers took to ensure that any drugs that Brown turned over after a controlled purchase actually came from Bodison (either directly or through Mobley), and not from some other source; (2) the chains of custody for the drugs recovered during the June 28, 2011 and August 5, 2011 controlled purchases; and (3) the chemical analyses performed on the drugs recovered during the controlled purchases. In light of this extensive evidence, we conclude that defendant Bodison has not shown a reasonable probability that even if the jury heard about Brown’s prior 17 Case: 12-15812 Date Filed: 07/11/2013 Page: 18 of 22 gang affiliation, it would have found Bodison not guilty on any count. Consequently, any failure by the government to disclose Brown’s prior gang affiliation does not entitle Bodison to a new trial.