Opinion ID: 171900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Acts Prescribed by the Orders

Text: Importantly, quasi-judicial immunity extends only to acts prescribed by the judge's order. Turney, 898 F.2d at 1474. Therefore, absolute immunity does not protect defendants from damage claims directed not to the conduct prescribed by the court order itself, but to the manner of the order's execution. Martin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 402, 403-05 (10th Cir.1990). In Valdez v. City and County of Denver , this court explained that because the record viewed as a whole indicated that every action of the law enforcement officers to which the plaintiff objected was taken under the direction of a state court judge, the law enforcement officers qualified for quasi-judicial immunity. 878 F.2d at 1290. However, in Turney v. O'Toole , we held that because the judge's order only decreed the plaintiff's confinement and did not dictate any specific placement or treatment within the hospital in which the plaintiff was to be confined, the defendants were not absolutely immune from liability arising from the 17-year-old plaintiff's placement in a maximum security ward. 898 F.2d at 1472, 1474. Here, Yanaki and Moss argue that the deputies exceeded Judge Medley's orders because (1) Kopp threatened to kick in Yanaki's door, (2) Kopp and Herlin threatened to detain Moss if she interfered, and (3) the deputies obtained property that did not belong to Yanaki. First, even though the court orders did not specifically authorize Kopp to threaten to kick in Yanaki's door, this single statement by Kopp is significantly different from the conduct we have held exceeds a judicial order for the purpose of this element of the quasi-judicial immunity analysis. In Turney, we held that the defendants exceeded the judge's order when they were directed to merely confine the plaintiff at a hospital, and instead placed the plaintiff in a maximum security ward. 898 F.2d at 1472, 1474. Incorrectly placing someone in a maximum security ward when only directed to confine the person in a hospital appears excessive. However, the single statement by Kopp in this case (which did not even immediately prompt Moss to allow Kopp to enter Yanaki's home, as she did not permit Kopp to enter until after the private attorney returned with the supplemental order), made while Kopp was directed to obtain property from Yanaki's residence, cannot be said to be similarly excessive for purposes of quasi-judicial immunity. Second, the threats made by Kopp and Herlin to detain Moss if she interfered were made after the private attorney returned to Yanaki's residence with the Supplemental Order, which specifically authorized the deputies to detain[] any person who resists enforcement of the [Discovery Order]. Therefore, the deputies were merely making Moss aware of what the Supplemental Order authorized, and it was prudent to do so. Finally, Kopp and Herlin did not exceed the court orders even if they inadvertently obtained property that was not owned by Yanaki, because the Discovery Order specifically directed the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office to take custody of property in the possession, custody, or control of Yanakinot merely property owned by Yanaki. Yanaki and Moss allege that Kopp and Herlin obtained the property from Yanaki's home, but they do not allege any facts indicating that even though the property obtained was in Yanaki's home, it was still not in his possession, custody, or control. Further, Yanaki and Moss do not allege that property not meeting the description of the property in the Discovery Order was taken by the deputies. Under these facts, Kopp and Herlin did not exceed either the Discovery Order or the Supplemental Order.
The final issue we must address is whether Yanaki and Moss have sufficiently alleged § 1983 claims against Kennard (the sheriff of Salt Lake County who is being sued solely in his official capacity), [13] and Salt Lake County. Municipal entities and local governing bodies are not entitled to the traditional common law immunities for § 1983 claims. Whitesel, 222 F.3d at 870. That is, unlike various government officials, municipalities ( e.g., local officials in their official capacity and counties, among others) do not enjoy absolute immunity from suit under § 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165-66, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). To establish a claim for damages under § 1983 against municipal entities or local government bodies, the plaintiff must prove (1) the entity executed a policy or custom (2) that caused the plaintiff to suffer deprivation of constitutional or other federal rights. Whitesel, 222 F.3d at 870. That is, `a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.' Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018). More specifically, we have recognized that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 if the final policymaker takes the unconstitutional action. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 724 (10th Cir.1989), rev'd en banc in part on other grounds, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991). We have also acknowledged two situations where municipal liability may be found even though the action is taken by an individual other than the final policymaker. Id. First, `egregious attempts by local government to insulate themselves from liability for unconstitutional policies' will be precluded if the plaintiff establishes `the existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.' Id. (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). In addition, if a subordinate's position is subject to review by the municipality's authorized policymakers and the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification will be chargeable to the municipality. Id. We have also further clarified that proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is ordinarily not sufficient to impose municipal liability, and where a plaintiff seeks to impose municipal liability on the basis of a single incident, the plaintiff must show the particular illegal course of action was taken pursuant to a decision made by a person with authority to make policy decisions on behalf of the entity being sued. Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir.1996). In their complaint Yanaki and Moss allege that a policy of Kennard that has deprived them of their constitutional rights is shown by the fact that two Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputies, one of whom is a Sergeant, were willing to assist in the illegal actions to deprive Moss and Yanaki of their rights. However, assuming Kennard is the final policymaker for § 1983 purposes, they fail to allege any conduct by Kennard or by Salt Lake County officials apart from the conduct of Kopp and Herlin. See Melton, 879 F.2d at 724 (recognizing that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 if the final policymaker takes the unconstitutional action or when a widespread practice exists). [14] Neither do they allege that Kennard approved the underlying search that forms the basis of their § 1983 claim. See id. (charging the policymakers' approval of the unconstitutional activity of a subordinate to the municipality). Further, Yanaki and Moss are alleging that Kennard and Salt Lake County should be liable on the basis of this single incident, but do not allege the incident occurred pursuant to a decision made by Kennard. See Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 994 (explaining that where a plaintiff seeks to impose municipal liability on the basis of a single incident the plaintiff must show the particular illegal course of action was taken pursuant to a decision made by a person with authority to make policy decisions on behalf of the entity being sued). As Yanaki and Moss rely entirely on the conduct of the deputies alone, they can only be alleging respondeat superior liability for Kennard and Salt Lake County, which the Supreme Court has ruled cannot support § 1983 liability against municipalities. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (observing that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the claims against Kennard and Salt Lake County.