Opinion ID: 218954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Existence of Substantial Evidence

Text: The Government urges this court to defer to the BIA's finding that there are reasonable grounds to regard Petitioners as a danger to the security of the United States. The Government focuses on the Executive's power and expertise in the area of national security, and relies on recent Supreme Court precedent to support its position. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), the Supreme Court acknowledged that when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [the area of national security and foreign relations], the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked, and respect for the Government's conclusions is appropriate. ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2727, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). We do not arrogate to ourselves knowledge and sources superior to that of the Government. But neither should we take its statements as ipse dixit. Its statements, like that of any party, must be supported by the record it makes. In HLP, the Government substantiated its position regarding the operation of terrorist networks through Congressional history, factual documentation, expert testimony, and an affidavit from the United States Department of State. [15] On the contrary, this court has little to which to defer in this case. Neither the BIA nor the Government has provided the name of any potential terrorist organization or extremist movement with which they claim Petitioners are affiliated nor did either provide a coherent and reliable narrative connecting Petitioners' seemingly innocuous actions and circumstances with any particular harm that Petitioners pose to the United States. Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir.2009). Without some hard information, this court is left guessing. It is significant that even the State Department has declined to offer any opinion about the dangerousness of the Petitioners. During the course of these proceedings, the State Department issued letters to the immigration court concerning Petitioners' applications. The Department explained that issuance of the extradition requests is consistent with the Uzbek Government's practice of using broad provisions in its Criminal Code against political opponents for non-terrorism-related activities. The Department declined to offer a position with respect to Petitioners' applications, stating it has no evidence connecting [Yusupov or Samadov] to acts of terrorism. The information available does not allow the Department to make a judgment as to whether [Petitioners] otherwise present[] a threat to the national security of the United States. Y.Br.App. at 45, S.App. at 2170. As the Supreme Court stated in HLP, concerns of national security and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role. 130 S.Ct. at 2727. On remand, this court clearly instructed the BIA to ascertain whether reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the whole record reveals reasonable grounds to believe Petitioners actually pose a danger to the United States  a more certain determination than whether they may or could be. Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 201-02. The BIA failed to follow this court's mandate when it issued substantially similar opinions pre- and post-remand. We recognize that the BIA is not required to write an exegesis on every contention; however, it must consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted. Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 256 (3d Cir.2006) (internal quotation omitted). A formulaic recitation of our instructions simply does not suffice. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 250 (3d Cir.2003) (en banc) ([T]he soundness of the basis of the decision-making, even if experiential or logical in nature, must be apparent.). The closest the BIA comes to identifying a particular threat posed by Petitioners involves their alleged support of Muslim extremists, to wit terrorists, in Uzbekistan based on the politically motivated Uzbek extradition requests and Interpol warrants. [16] See In re Yusupov, No. A XX-XXX-XXX, at 3-4 (BIA Dec. June 18, 2009) (the evidence shows a fair probability that [Yusupov] supports and assists terrorist activity); In re Samadov, No. A 79-729-711, at 4 (BIA Dec. June 18, 2009) (the Government met its burden of establishing reasonable grounds that Samadov is a security danger by supporting or assisting terrorism inspired by Muslim extremists). It appears that the principal basis for the BIA's finding that Petitioners are a danger to the United States stems from the extradition requests and Interpol warrants issued by the Uzbek Government. Yet the BIA could not find that both IJs were clearly erroneous in their findings that the extradition requests and Interpol warrants were politically motivated and based on Petitioners' peaceful, religious beliefs. Even giving full deference to the BIA, we conclude that there is no credible evidence in the record to support the BIA's conclusion. On the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence that Article 244 of the Uzbek Criminal Code, upon which the Uzbekistan charges are based, is used by that government as a pretext to single out and punish those in peaceful opposition to the authoritarian regime. Y.Br.App. at 45, S.App. at 2110 (letter from State Department referring, inter alia, to Uzbek Government's practice of using broad provisions in [its] Criminal Code ... against its political opponents for non-terrorism-related activities). Olexa (who testified on behalf of the Government at Petitioners' removal hearings, emphasized the extradition requests and the Interpol warrants in support of a finding that Petitioners were dangerous) apparently had no direct knowledge about the situation in Uzbekistan, and offered no information as to Petitioners' role in any alleged terrorist activity in Uzbekistan. [17] It would lead to a perverse outcome were we to allow reliance on the fundamentally questionable extradition requests and Interpol warrants. How can the BIA on one hand assert that the Uzbekistan charges are pretextual and provide grounds for the United States to protect Petitioners under the CAT while at the same time credit the very same allegations to find Petitioners are a danger to this country? The BIA's reliance on these documents is even more problematic because, as we noted in Yusupov I, the information therein was apparently obtained by torture. See Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 191-92 n. 9; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1006 (D.C.Cir. 2007) (Testimony procured by coercion is notoriously unreliable and unspeakably inhumane.); Abdah v. Obama, 709 F.Supp.2d 25, 28 n. 3 (D.D.C.2010) (statements that are the product of torture are unreliable); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (in a criminal case, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts) (internal quotation omitted). It follows that the documents relied on by the BIA are not probative as a matter of law. Even if there were some basis for the charges in the extradition request, [t]errorist activity that is directed at another country does not invariably or necessarily involve a danger to the security of the United States. Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir.2006). See also Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 858 (9th Cir.2004) (it does not follow that an organization that might be a danger to one nation is necessarily a danger to the security of the United States). The relevant statute and regulations adopted by the United States are based on an underlying assumption that aliens frequently seek protection from their own countries that regard them to be dangerous, usually because of their opposition to the government in power. If we were to allow the BIA's decisions to stand, it would run counter to this country's strong tradition of granting protection to individuals sought by authoritarian regimes based on politically motivated charges. [18] The additional bases given by the BIA for its finding that Petitioners are dangerous is based on evidence that is impermissibly speculative. Samadov argues persuasively that the legal standard requiring reasonable grounds to believe Petitioners are dangerous cannot be met without presentation of evidence satisfying probable cause. Guilt by association does not suffice. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961) (In our jurisprudence guilt is personal....); United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 277 (3d Cir.2006) (probable cause must be ... particularized with respect to that person) (internal quotation omitted). Part of the BIA's rationale for its conclusion that Petitioners pose a danger to the United States lies in their association with, inter alia, Zakirov. Samadov argues that the BIA's rationale of guilt by association presents serious due process concerns which we must avoid. He states that we can do so by imposing a firm substantive requirement limiting the application of the national security exception to cases in which sufficient probative evidence establishes that an individual is engaged in actual dangerous conduct, or otherwise meaningfully associated with avowedly dangerous organizations or countries. [19] Samadov's Br. at 39-40. As Samadov points out, this limiting principle finds its roots in Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring conduct or meaningful association in the application of immigration statutes to suspected Communist Party members in the middle of the last century. See, e.g., Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479-80, 83 S.Ct. 1819, 10 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1963) (holding mere membership in Communist Party was insufficient to meet threshold requirement of meaningful association required for deportation); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120, 78 S.Ct. 180, 2 L.Ed.2d 140 (1957) (reversing BIA deportation order because active, dues-paying Community Party member who worked at an official outlet for communist literature did not constitute meaningful association to warrant deportation); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 145-46, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2103 (1945) (course of conduct which reveals cooperation with Communist groups for the attainment of wholly lawful objectives does not constitute affiliation as defined by INA). This reading is also consistent with contemporary cases applying the national security exception that stand in sharp contrast to the instant case. [20] In Malkandi v. Holder, 576 F.3d 906 (9th Cir.2009), for example, the Ninth Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that an Iraqi Kurd is a danger to national security. There, the court found that Malkandi served as a travel facilitator for a notorious al-Qaeda operative who was involved in attacks against United States interests overseas. Id. at 908. As the court stated, the facts found by the BIA connect[ed] the dots between a known terrorist from the Middle East, a Yemeni go between, and Malkandi. Id. at 915. The plot was substantiated by the Government's expert witness as well as specific 9/11 Commission findings and FBI interrogations of the operative. Id. at 910-11, 915. Moreover, the court found altogether implausible Malkandi's innocent explanations for the charged conduct. It found that his pattern of misrepresentations with the immigration authorities under oath discredited his portrayal of himself as an innocent participant. Id. at 917. Cf. Matter of U-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356 (BIA 2002) (finding reasonable grounds to believe Iranian national is a danger to national security because he is a member of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a designated foreign terrorist organization under INA § 219). In contrast to its holding in Malkandi, in Cheema the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's finding of dangerousness in part because no evidence supplies a link between the applicants' alleged donations and any specific organization, let alone... militant organizations. 383 F.3d at 856. Cf. Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 628 (6th Cir.2004) (reversing BIA's order where government failed to establish individual engaged in violent acts or that he knew or reasonably should have known of terrorist organization's activities). The INA also contains a related bar to the grant of asylum and withholding to individuals who have persecuted others on account of one of the protected grounds. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i). As the Second Circuit noted, courts must be cautious before permitting generalities or attenuated links when applying the bar for persecution of others because the aliens have established that they will likely be persecuted upon return to their country. Xu Sheng Gao, 500 F.3d at 98. See also Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder 558 F.3d 450, 455 (6th Cir.2009) (the alien must have done more than simply associate with persecutors; there must have been some nexus between the alien's actions and the persecution of others); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir.2005) (requiring a showing of genuine assistance in persecution rather than an inconsequential association). The same concerns motivate our decision here. The record does not provide substantial, if any, evidence that Petitioners engaged in conduct that was dangerous, or were planning as much, or meaningfully associated with organizations or countries inimical to the United States, terrorist or otherwise. Although a probable cause requirement does not require more probable than not proof, it does require more than mere suspicion. It is established when the facts and circumstances within the [Government's] knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by [Petitioners]. Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir.2010) (internal quotation omitted). In analyzing whether probable cause exists, we take a totality of the circumstances approach. Id. We therefore proceed to consider each remaining ground given by the BIA. Computer Materials: The BIA accorded evidentiary significance to videos on the computer shared by the occupants of Petitioners' apartment and to an email sent, not to either Petitioner, but to someone else living in the apartment. These materials either viewed individually or with the record as a whole do not meet the probable cause standard. [21] With respect to the videos, the BIA made significant prejudicial errors regarding the contents. [22] The record does not support the BIA's contention that Ayman za-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, appeared in any of the videos much less that he was giving a speech. The BIA also characterizes the video of Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev as a speech, whereas the record refers to it as an interview. Y.App. at 364, S.App. at 1949. Further, the BIA described one clip as appear[ing] to show how to wire a roadside bomb. In re Samadov, No. A 79-729-711, at 2 (BIA Dec. June 18, 2009). However, Agent Olexa specifically testified that none of the videos were training materials. Y.App. at 191. Moreover, contrary to the BIA's finding, several of the videos, including that of bin Laden, originated from Al Jazeera, a recognized news source. [23] As discussed above, the BIA also failed to acknowledge that the IJ presiding over Yusupov's hearing found credible Yusupov's innocent explanations. To now find Yusupov's innocent explanations not credible, the BIA must point to evidence in the record that compels the conclusion that the IJ erred. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (Facts determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous.). It has not done so. The IJ found that Yusupov understandably had a general interest in the activities occurring in his home country in the name of his religion and that he rejected the views espoused on the videos, as opposed to his own beliefs and understanding of Islam. Indeed, millions worldwide were glued to their television sets and computers in the wake of 9/11 in an attempt to understand the tragic events. The BIA has provided no plausible link between the act of watching these videos and any risk to this Nation's defense, foreign relations or economic interests. [24] This court also finds significant the IJ's finding, ignored by the BIA, that Yusupov did not intend to permanently download or archive the videos in any way. Reliance on the videos to support a finding of Samadov's dangerousness is even more specious. A mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause. Shields, 458 F.3d at 277 (internal quotation omitted). The BIA impermissibly shifted the burden on the required showing with respect to national security to Samadov when it required that he corroborate his assertions that no evidence connected him to the activities of his roommate, Yusupov. [25] See Malkandi, 576 F.3d at 915 (noting that the burden only shifts to the alien to prove he is not a danger to national security once the Government has provided substantial evidence that he is). Even if Samadov happened to be present when Yusupov was watching the videos, inadvertent viewing does not constitute evidence of affirmative, nefarious activity. Cf. Shields, 458 F.3d at 279 (active registration with e-groups dedicated to trading child porn negated inference that defendant stumbled upon the sites never to return). The Government did not present evidence that either Petitioner ever saw the email referring to jihad on the computer. Moreover, the email is vague, see supra note 4, and the BIA, relying on stereotype and speculation failed to consider alternative meanings presented by Petitioners. In Yusupov I, we instructed the BIA on remand to consider the weight of Petitioners' evidence that there are alternative meanings to the word jihad. In addition to violent holy war, which is the commonly used meaning of jihad, other meanings proffered on the record include from an inward spiritual struggle to attain perfect faith to an outward material struggle to promote justice and the Islamic social system. Yusupov I, 518 F.3d at 191 n. 7 (internal quotation omitted). Petitioners' consistent testimony, corroborated by country conditions evidence, was that they identify as Independent Muslims who follow a peaceful practice. In short, in spite of the number of years Petitioners have been present in this country, their computer did not produce any direct or causal link suggesting that [they] espoused violence, such as email messages of a questionable nature. In re Yusupov, No. A 79-729-905, at 6 (IJ Dec. Nov. 19, 2004). Manner of Entry: Once again, we are unanimous that the BIA's finding that Petitioners' manner of entry supports a finding of dangerousness is not supported by substantial evidence. Samadov entered on a student visa with Zakirov and attended a four week program. [26] Yusupov also entered on a student visa several months later but unlike his former roommates, never attended school. Y.App. at 109-10. Petitioners testified that they did not follow through with their education for financial reasons. Y.App. at 109-10, 129, S.App. at 2297. This explanation is not inherently suspect and cannot substitute for affirmative evidence of dangerousness. [27] See Hosseini, 471 F.3d at 958 (reversing denial of withholding of petitioner who overstayed student visa, because BIA made no finding, and cited no evidence, of any reason other than terrorist activity [abroad] why Hosseini is a danger to the security of the United States). The Government makes passing reference in its briefs to its suspicion based on the timing of Petitioners' entries to the United States as just after a bombing in Uzbekistan in 1999. However, it makes no attempt to connect[] the dots between this event and any actual evidence implicating Petitioners. Malkandi, 576 F.3d at 915. Petitioners have submitted evidence that the Uzbek Government itself was implicated in the 1999 bombings and used the events to crack down on opponents of its regime. Y.App. at 788, S.App. at 930. [28] Alleged evasion of the authorities: The BIA's finding that Yusupov and Zakirov sought to evade detection by the authorities in the United States through interstate and international flight mischaracterizes the record and fails to acknowledge the plausible explanations provided by Petitioners. Although Zakirov left the United States before the Government had a chance to file a motion to reopen with the new evidence found on the roommates' shared computer, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Government or the BIA has attempted to rescind the grant of withholding of removal. See In re Zakirov, No. A XX-XXX-XXX (BIA Dec. Sept. 21, 2004). Petitioners contend that Zakirov traveled openly to Canada after being granted withholding of removal and the Government presents no evidence in contradiction. Indeed, at that time, nothing prevented Zakirov from seeking asylum, a more permanent form of relief, in Canada after his proceedings in the United States were final. [29] In any event, the BIA does not explain why it paints Petitioners with Zakirov's brush. Yusupov testified that he moved to Virginia after being granted withholding of removal, not in an attempt to evade the authorities. However, after he learned that the Government reopened Samadov's case and incarcerated him, Yusupov quit his job to avoid detection because he feared deportation to Uzbekistan where he believed he would be tortured. Y.App. at 149. As soon as Yusupov learned that the Government was not going to deport his friends, he returned to his Virginia job and cooperated with subsequent investigations. Y.App. at 150. The BIA has not explained why it did not take this alternate, credible explanation into account. See Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir.2005) (unexplained decision not supported by substantial evidence where contrary to testimony). There is no evidence that Samadov sought to evade detection. Any purportedly suspicious activities undertaken by Samadov's friends are, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish individualized suspicion against him. This is particularly applicable here, as the three individuals were no longer living together. The Government speculates that Samadov did not flee because it would have been more difficult for him to do so  and perhaps in his mind, less necessary  because he had married an American citizen. Appellee's Br. at 51 n.19. No evidence supports this speculation. Moreover, where a factor and its opposite can both be used to support a finding of reasonable suspicion, here flight or no flight, the court should not give weight to either factor. Gonzalez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 22 F.3d 1441, 1446-47 (9th Cir.1994). Yusupov's Misdemeanor Conviction: The BIA has failed to explain how Yusupov's misdemeanor conviction for misrepresenting his nationality in an attempt to obtain employment provides any connection to his asserted dangerousness. [30] The IJ in Yusupov's hearing and the BIA found Yusupov's testimony to be credible regarding the heart of his claims (the prior standard) and there is no evidence that claiming citizenship to obtain employment indicates he is a danger. This is not unusual behavior, albeit undesirable and unlawful, for the tens of thousands of economic migrants and refugees who enter our borders each year and does not here support a finding of probable cause. [31] Samadov's adverse credibility determination: The charge emphasized most vehemently by the BIA and the Government stems from the adverse credibility finding made by the IJ. Samadov argues that finding is clearly erroneous, is not material to any of the Government's allegations that he is a danger and, even if upheld, cannot be used to undermine Samadov's other testimony. It is, however, our responsibility to examine the record scrupulously in this connection. Like factual findings, adverse credibility determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence. Balasubramanrim v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir.1998). As such, adverse credibility determinations based on speculation or conjecture, rather than on evidence in the record, are reversible. Dia, 353 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation omitted). Notably, at Samadov's first hearing, IJ Sease found his testimony regarding his activities in Uzbekistan and the origin of the extradition request to be extremely credible. S.App. at 46. In the reopened proceedings, the same IJ without recanting her earlier findings, found Samadov's account of some aspects of his life in Philadelphia to be not credible. In re Samadov, No. A 79-729-711, at 9-10 (IJ Dec. Aug. 2, 2005). The IJ based her latest adverse credibility finding on the following: (1) Samadov did not know every guest who stayed at the communal home rented in his name in Philadelphia; (2) Samadov was not familiar with everything stored on the computer he shared with his roommates; and (3) Samadov did not mention that he wired $3,000 to his brother in Uzbekistan when he was initially questioned by the Government about money sent home. No record evidence supports the IJ's first contention that it was implausible that Samadov did not know everyone who was living in his house. Samadov was never asked to provide the occupants' names and never testified that he lacked this knowledge. Rather, Samadov testified to the transient nature of the house and testified that anywhere from six to eight men lived there at any given time. The Government conceded at oral argument that this was a peculiar finding by the IJ that does not support the adverse credibility determination. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 58. The IJ's second contention is based on pure conjecture and similarly cannot support a lack of credibility on the part of Samadov. Dia, 353 F.3d at 249-50. Samadov testified that he never saw the materials found on the computer and that he rarely used the computer because it was frequently in use by others in the house and he spent little time at home given his work schedule. S.App. at 430. As we previously noted, the Government presented no evidence to the contrary. Indeed, as Samadov points out, the Government failed to inform the IJ that Yusupov had admitted that he was the one who found the videoclips on the internet, and that in the course of viewing they were cached  not downloaded, as the BIA claimed  on the computer without his knowledge. AALDEF Br. at 26. We see no basis in the record for the IJ's finding that Samadov must have known about the cached videoclips. That finding is impermissibly based on the IJ's assumption that Samadov would have been interested in the video contents because he is a Muslim. Finally, we examine the record for any support for the IJ's determination that Samadov's testimony concerning the wire transfer to his brother is suspect. The Government argues that Samadov could not have honestly forgotten sending $3,000 to his brother five years prior to the hearing. Samadov counters that when he was first questioned about sending money to Uzbekistan, the questioning was focused on charitable contributions [32] and because he regarded the payment to his brother as a repayment of a debt obligation, he did not think it was relevant. See AALDEF Br. at 28 (many Muslims draw a stark distinction between the concepts of debt and charity). Samadov argues that a review of the transcript makes clear that he did not intend to mislead the factfinder. When Samadov sought to explain his testimony, the IJ denied him the opportunity to clarify his responses. S.App. at 440-41. See Caushi v. Att'y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Campos-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.1999) (requiring the BIA to consider applicant's explanations for inconsistencies before making a credibility determination)); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 2007) (IJ must provide a petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to offer an explanation of any perceived inconsistencies that form the basis of a denial of relief) (internal quotation omitted). The Government's argument that Samadov only admitted to transferring money to his brother because the Government confronted him is belied by the record. [33] Samadov testified that he telephoned his brother to help him remember the amount of debt he repaid before the hearing. At the continued hearing, Samadov produced a letter from his brother, and on his own accord, provided an explanation for the discrepancy that arose in the prior hearing. S.App. at 560. Regardless, this discrepancy does not go to the heart of Samadov's claims and, as such, cannot support an adverse credibility determination. Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir.2004). [34] The Government presented no evidence and the IJ made no finding that this $3,000 supports a finding of danger by Samadov to the United States. The IJ made no finding that the $3,000 went to finance terrorist or extremist activities, or that Samadov had any motive to lie or hide other transfers. [35] See Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.2005) (one adverse credibility determination does not beget another ... an IJ must justify each credibility finding with statements or record evidence specifically related to the issue under consideration) (internal quotation omitted). This is not surprising because, as the Government admitted at oral argument, [t]here is no direct evidence. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 67. The only reliable evidence is a letter from Samadov's brother confirming that the money was sent to repay a debt. S.App. at 560. Other than the $3,000, Samadov testified that he sent about $200 cash to needy families, testimony the Government does not dispute. Cf. In re R-S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 629, 641 (BIA 2003) (upholding adverse credibility finding where respondent's testimony was directly related to whether he was aware of the terrorist-linked activities of an organization, despite his role therein). The IJ also noted that she took into account Samadov's demeanor, candor, [and] responsiveness. In re Samadov, No. A 79-729-711, at 9 (IJ Dec. Aug. 2, 2005). However, the IJ did not explain why these factors demonstrated that all of Samadov's testimony was incredible and the IJ's holding deserves no deference. [36] See Dia, 353 F.3d at 252, 275 (McKee, J., concurring) (resting factual conclusions upon unexplained and unarticulated demeanor poses an even greater risk of biased fact finding that can deny a petitioner due process). Accordingly, we find no evidence to support the IJ's finding, adopted by the BIA, that Samadov's testimony was not credible. Neither the IJ nor the BIA made any affirmative finding that the testimony it deemed incredible implicates national security. Substantial evidence is required to link the associations and activities of Yusupov and Samadov with one of the criteria relating to the security of the United States. The Government, [w]ith the extensive resources of the Executive Branch, including the resources of the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury and others ... is in a unique position to provide such evidence. Cheema, 383 F.3d at 857. The Government has not so done. The evidence viewed as a whole not only supports a conclusion contrary to the BIA, but compels it. See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir.2001).