Opinion ID: 2102418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Guardianship/Conservatorship Statute

Text: Only after showing by clear and convincing evidence, Minn.Stat. § 525.551, subd. 3 (1982), that an individual is impaired to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person, and who has demonstrated deficits in behavior which evidence his inability to meet his needs for medical care, nutrition, clothing, shelter, or safety, Minn. Stat. § 525.54, subd. 2 (1982), will a person be considered incapacitated and therefor subject to a guardianship or conservatorship of his person. The court must issue specific findings of fact and grant the guardian or conservator only those powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the ward or conservatee. Minn.Stat. § 525.56, subd. 2 (1982). If all powers are granted, a guardianship is established; if less than all powers are granted, a conservatorship is established. Minn. Stat. § 525.539, subd. 2, 3 (1982). The present guardianship statute, particularly the sections of the statute relevant to this case, are the result of massive revisions almost amounting to a rewriting of the statute in 1980. Act of April 7, 1980, ch. 493, 1980 Minn.Laws 414. The revisions came in response to news stories detailing heinous abuses of the old guardianship statute. Case studies chronicled guardians acting as conmen to obtain the guardianship and discount wholesalers to dispose of their wards' estates. Everything was legal; the wards had no recourse. Groups concerned with the rights of the aged and mentally retarded had been working on proposals to modify the statute even before the news articles. The actual bill that reached the legislature was drafted by the Legal Advocacy Project for the Developmentally Disabled. The language of the bill comes from many sources such as the Uniform Probate Code, the Minnesota Mental Retardation Protection Act and the ingenuity of the authors. The purpose of the amendments, according to one of the Senate sponsors of the bill, was an attempt to rewrite the guardianship statute with clear definitions of what incapacity involves and some more specific statements about the powers and duties of a guardian and it expands the due process rights of a proposed ward in a guardianship hearing and increases the requirements of information that must be included in the notice of the proceeding to the proposed ward or conservatee. Testimony of Senator Spear before Senate Subcommittee on Judicial Administration, Feb. 18, 1980. Pervading the bill and the testimony about it is a suspicion that guardians are too often less than benevolent. The thrust of the bill was to make it harder to create a guardianship and, once one is created, that the powers of the guardian should be kept to the bare minimum necessary to care for the ward's needs. The act does not necessarily restrict the powers available to a guardian or conservator in the abstract; it just provides that the actual powers granted should be no more than absolutely necessary in a particular case. The trial court found that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof of incompetence by clear and convincing evidence   . This conclusion, however, does not fully square with other facts found by the trial court. Although finding Mikulanec generally competent, the trial court also found that she still suffers from the same disorder that originally caused her to be confined as mentally ill and dangerous. That disorder, which the trial court makes light of as limited in scope in that she    react[s] in stressful situations as described in the original Order of Commitment, seriously affects her ability to choose a mate. The Order of Commitment specifically notes that she is delusional, unpredictable, explosive, and when others do not respond as she wishes, she is likely to become enraged and lash out in an outburst of anger. The trial court, even though denying the request for guardian or conservator, stated in its memorandum: After hearing the evidence and reviewing the record, the Court is satisfied that should this marriage take place it will, in all probability, end in some form of turbulence in the absence of divine or miraculous intervention. But the Court must follow the limitation of the law as it exists   . Because of a mental problem, she cannot realistically gauge men's affections for her. She builds a delusional world around a man and his affections for her. When reality crashes in upon her delusional world, she violently, and at least once before murderously, lashes out. The limited scope of Mikulanec's disability relates directly to the question of choosing a mate. She lacks sufficient understanding to make a responsible decision concerning the choice of a mate and therefore is incapacitated under the court's findings. After determining a person incapacitated, the trial court must specify the powers of a guardian or conservator. The trial court assumed, however, that it had no power under the statute to grant a guardian the power to approve or disapprove of a marriage. The language of the statute seems to indicate that the powers available in the abstract are broad: The duties and powers of a guardian or those which the court may grant to a conservator of the person include, but are not limited to: (1) The power to have custody of the ward or conservatee and the power to establish his place of abode within or without the state   . (2) The duty to provide for the ward's or conservatee's care, comfort and maintenance needs, including food, clothing, shelter, health care, social and recreational requirements, and, whenever appropriate, training, education and rehabilitation.    Whenever possible and appropriate, the guardian or conservator should meet these requirements through governmental benefits or services to which the ward or conservatee is entitled   . (3) The duty to take reasonable care of the ward's or conservatee's clothing, furniture, vehicles and other personal effects, and, if other property requires protection, the power to seek appointment of a guardian or conservator of the estate.    (4)(a) The power to give any necessary consent to enable the ward or conservatee to receive necessary medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or service, except that no guardian or conservator may give consent for psychosurgery, electroshock, sterilization or experimental treatment of any kind unless the procedure is first approved by order of the court   .       (5) The power to approve or withhold approval of any contract, except for necessities, which the ward or conservatee may wish to make. (6) The duty and power to exercise supervisory authority over the ward or conservatee in a manner which limits his civil rights and restricts his personal freedom only to the extent necessary to provide needed care and services. Minn.Stat. § 525.56, subd. 3 (1982) (emphasis added). The enumerated powers cover the most common eventualities. The general intent of the enumeration section seems to make full powers over a person available in the abstract, but to limit the actual powers given in a particular case by requiring the court to grant specifically the least amount of power necessary to protect a potential ward in the individual case. This is emphasized by the fact that the list of powers is nonexclusive. The powers available in the abstract are not limited to those enumerated powers. One incapacitated with respect to choosing a spouse then should have the benefit of a guardian's guidance, but only to the extent of approving or disapproving of a marriage. Subdivision 6 of the statute grants power to restrict a ward's or conservatee's civil rights and personal freedom as long as the restrictions are no more than necessary. Freedom to choose a spouse is one of those personal freedoms which may, under proper circumstances, be restricted. In certain rare cases, such as this case, where a person clearly is incapacitated with respect to choosing a spouse, a court may appoint a conservator of the person to approve or disapprove of a marriage. The trial court felt that the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 214 Minn. 462, 8 N.W.2d 620 (1943), prohibits guardians or conservators from ever approving or disapproving of a marriage. In Johnson, an elderly man, incompetent to manage his estate, married. His guardian sought to annul the marriage. This court found that: [A]ppointment of a guardian disables the alleged incompetent only from making contracts which relate to his estate, but not other kinds of contracts. One who has been adjudged an incompetent may contract a valid marriage if he has in fact sufficient mental capacity for that purpose. Id. at 466, 8 N.W.2d at 622. Under the present statute, Mr. Johnson would have been subject to a guardianship of his estate. Mikulanec would be subject, however, to a guardianship or, more properly, a conservatorship of her person. A person in Mr. Johnson's situation, needing a guardian of his estate, would still presumably be capable of contracting a marriage. The case does not speak to, and therefore should not be seen as foreclosing, the possibility that a person could have a specific incapacity to choose a spouse, requiring a conservator of the person.