Opinion ID: 4530983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Loudermill Hearing

Text: Next, Borrás argues that [t]he district court erred when finding that [his] Loudermill informal hearing complied with due process, because it goes without saying that Loudermill hearings must take place in an impartial forum, with an impartial - 20 - adjudicator, free of bias. This argument contravenes established law. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court admonished that termination decisions typically require the employee to be granted some kind of a hearing to avoid running into due process concerns. 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). Critically, however, [t]he standard the defendant must meet [for a Loudermill hearing] . . . is not high: the U.S. constitution requires only 'some pretermination opportunity to respond.' Chmielinski v. Massachusetts, 513 F.3d 309, 316 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542). We have consistently held that these hearings need not be elaborate so long as the employee receives (1) 'oral or written notice of the charges against him,' (2) 'an explanation of the employer's evidence,' and (3) 'an opportunity to present his side of the story.' Id. (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46). And, we have explicitly said that there is no requirement that the hearing officer be impartial; indeed, the terminating employer may preside. Id. at 318. Borrás does not assert that any alleged bias deprived him of either notice or the opportunity to put his version of the facts before a decision-maker; this is all that Loudermill requires. Therefore, his argument that his Loudermill hearing did not comport with due process fails. - 21 -