Opinion ID: 526550
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to Privacy

Text: 11 Both Jane Doe and her father claim that the school officials coerced Jane into having an abortion. We find that coercing a minor to abort a child violates the minor's constitutionally protected freedom to choose whether to abort or bear her child. Further, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action on behalf of Jane Doe. Any cause of action alleged by Charles Davis as the father of Jane Doe can only be stated in terms of an impermissible interference with family relations which we will discuss later in this opinion. Here we address Jane Doe's cause of action. 12 Students in our educational system do not leave their constitutionally protected freedoms at the schoolhouse door. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). Indeed, the Supreme court has recognized that [t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487, 81 S.Ct. 247, 251, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). Boards of education educate the young to be productive citizens. To ensure that important principles of our government are not discounted by our youth as mere platitudes, we must give scrupulous protection to their rights at an early stage. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507, 89 S.Ct. at 736. From this, it is clear that the school officials and the board had a duty to respect the constitutional rights of Jane Doe. 13 Our system of ordered liberty regards individual autonomy with high esteem. Although many guarantees of individual autonomy are specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has also found that these specific guarantees have penumbras emanating from them which give them life and substance. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). These penumbral rights create zones of privacy within which we find the constitutional guarantees safeguarding an individual's freedom of choice in matters relating to marriage and family. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169, 93 S.Ct. 705, 735, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (Stewart, J. concurring). 5 The Supreme Court has held that the rights emanating from the fourteenth amendment are broad enough to include the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (emphasis omitted); Roe; 410 U.S. at 153, 93 S.Ct. at 726. 6 14 It is freedom in the decisionmaking process which receives constitutional protection. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2016, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029. Resolution of the childbearing decision embraces two alternatives, those of aborting the child or carrying the child to term. Both alternatives enjoy constitutional protection from unwarranted governmental interference. While the cases in this area have dealt primarily with governmental interference with the abortion alternative, we fail to see how the attention given the decision to abort in any way diminishes the protection which should be given the decision to carry the child to term. We need not create a new constitutional right to protect Jane Doe's freedom to choose to carry her child to term; we merely refocus the emphasis concerning this freedom of choice from the alternative of abortion to the alternative of procreation. There simply can be no question that the individual must be free to decide to carry a child to term. 15 The Supreme Court has struck several state laws found to interfere with the freedom of this decision making process. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705 (struck criminal abortion statutes); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) (struck overly restrictive Georgia abortion regulation); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (struck statutory provisions which required informed consent before an abortion, doctor reports and attendance of a second physician). Like these state imposed restrictions, governmental coercion to abort a child constitutes impermissible intrusion on this constitutionally guaranteed freedom of choice. The particular vulnerability of a schoolchild to influence from one in an authoritative position, such as a school official, intimates that under the circumstances of this case a set of facts could exist which constitutes coercion of Jane Doe to agree to an abortion. We find the allegations in the complaint sufficient to state a constitutional violation under Sec. 1983. 7 16 John Doe and his mother claim that their constitutional rights were violated because school officials coerced John Doe into consenting to Jane Doe's abortion. We find these allegations insufficient to state a cause of action. The pregnant woman is the only one who controls the abortion decision. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71, 96 S.Ct. at 2842. Not even the spouse of a pregnant woman has the legal right to prevent an abortion and require the child to be carried to term. Id. 8 As the boyfriend of Jane, John Doe's agreement or disagreement with Jane Doe's abortion decision does not enjoy constitutional protection. Similarly, Helen Arnold as a putative grandmother has no constitutional rights flowing from Jane Doe's pregnancy. Consequently, John Doe and his mother's abortion related claims are insufficient to establish a constitutional right violation and we affirm the dismissal. 9