Opinion ID: 170276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dual Juries

Text: The Oklahoma County District Court tried Mr. Brown and Mr. Wilson together, but submitted the charges to two different juries. Mr. Brown contends that the use of this dual jury approach is structural error. In the alternative, he contends that the use of dual juries prejudiced his defense in this case. Under Oklahoma's Guidelines Governing Juries in Criminal Trials, when using this dual-jury procedure, Both juries will be seated in the jury box and the evidence pertaining to both defendants will be presented to both juries simultaneously. Evidence admissible as to one co-defendant shall be presented to that defendant's jury only. See Cohee v. State, 942 P.2d 211, 213 (Okla. Crim.App.1997) (quoting the Guidelines). We consider Mr. Brown's structural error argument first, because if we find such error, it is not amenable to harmless error review. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (The existence of such defects . . . requires automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire trial process.).
Mr. Brown argues that the use of the dual jury approach constitutes structural error because it is experimental, citing the now reversed Ninth Circuit opinion in Lambright v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477, 484 (9th Cir.) (Nothing Justice Brandeis ever said about the virtue of states as laboratories comes close to sanctioning this type of unguided experiment.), rev'd, 191 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (We are satisfied that the use of dual juries can actually palliate, rather than exacerbate, the risks of a joint trial.). As Mr. Brown concedes, every federal appellate court that has considered a dual jury system has finally concluded that its use is not structural error, and we conclude the same. See, e.g., Lambright, 191 F.3d at 1186 (finding no violation of due process or any other trial right in the use of dual juries in a capital case); Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir.1985) (A defendant is more likely to be prejudiced in the eyes of the jury by being tried with another defendant than by being tried in the presence of a second jury concerned with the other defendant; indeed, the doublejury procedure may reduce the prejudice from being tried jointly with another-a form of prejudice usually held outweighed by the economies of joint trials,); United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 19 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (We accept the dual jury procedure so long as it comports with the ethos of due process commanded by our stringent rules of due process.); United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir.1982) (rejecting a challenge to the use of multiple juries and noting that neither [defendant] has alleged any more than a possibility of generalized harm).
Mr. Brown next argues that the implementation of the dual jury mechanism prejudiced his defense by stifling effective cross-examination and creating a conflict of interest in defense counsel's representation of him at trial. For example, to the extent Mr. Brown and Mr. Wilson maintained antagonistic defenses, his counsel had to seek permission to remove Mr. Wilson's jury from the courtroom. Similarly, in his questioning, Mr. Brown's counsel was required to take extra precautions not imposed upon most defendants. He needed to prepare his case jointly and thus presented Mr. Brown's defense with a potentially less effective strategy, so as to avoid the courtroom disruptions that would have resulted from the removal of Mr. Wilson's jury. There is little doubt, he argues, that the physical uprooting of the jury at too many turns would only impress upon the exiting jury that something was amiss. The trial court recognized that counsel would have to work a little harder. Brown, 989 P.2d at 921. It instructed the juries that each would at times leave the courtroom, and that they could not attempt to draw any inference, or come to any conclusions, or guess at what evidence may be presented or is being presented at the time when [it was] outside of the courtroom. Id. at 921-22. Based largely on these cautionary instructions, the OCCA concluded that the dual system did not prejudice Mr. Brown. In our view, the OCCA's rejection of Mr. Brown's challenge to the use of dual juries was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The trial court was careful and meticulous in its instructions. The OCCA plausibly reasoned that the trial court's instructions to the juries about leaving the courtroom adequately resolved concerns about the prejudicial effects of the practice. Similarly, as the OCCA reasoned, counsel could diffuse any conflict of interest he encountered by informing the judge when his questions might lead to answers that would not be admissible in the codefendant's trial. And, in the end, counsel could object. We acknowledge that counsel had to be more prepared, anticipating, the impact of certain lines of questioning. Thus, the dual jury system may well impose unique burdens upon defense counsel not typically present in a criminal jury trial. Here, however, Mr. Brown does not point to specific instances where he was prejudiced, nor has our review of the record revealed any.