Opinion ID: 4538313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis of asylum claims

Text: The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives the Attorney General “discretion to grant asylum to applicants who meet the definition of a ‘refugee.’” Umaña-Ramos, 724 F.3d at 670 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)). An asylum applicant bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that she is a refugee as defined by the INA.” Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir. 2004). “A refugee is defined as a person who is unable or unwilling to return to [her] home country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” K.H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d 470, 475 (6th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004)). When an asylum applicant’s claim rests on past persecution that was not carried out by the government, the applicant “need only ‘show that the [county of origin’s] government was unwilling or unable to control [her persecutors] and protect her.’” Id. (last alteration in original) (quoting Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Whitaker, 762 F. App’x 241, 244 (6th Cir. 2019)); Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2009). Petitioners seek review of the BIA and IJ determinations that (1) persecution at the hands of Los Tercerenos was not “because of” their membership in their proposed particular social group, Jesus’s children, their spouses, and their own children, and (2) the Honduran government was not unwilling or unable to protect the petitioners from Los Tercerenos. Pet’r Br. at 2. A. Persecution “because of” membership in a statutorily protected category Asylum seekers must demonstrate that they were “persecuted on account of or because of” their membership a protected category, such as a particular social group. Marku, 380 F.3d at 986; see also Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2015) (considering whether there 6 No. 19-3825, Reyes Almendarez et al. v. Barr was “a nexus” between persecution and the particular social group). A persecutor may have multiple, or “mixed,” motives. Marku, 380 F.3d at 988 n.10; see also Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 997 (6th Cir. 2009). However, “[t]he REAL ID Act clarified that, with respect to asylum claims, ‘the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.’” Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, ___ F.3d ___, No. 19-3417, 2020 WL 2520269, at  (6th Cir. May 18, 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). Asylum applicants cannot show persecution was “because of” their membership in a protected category by pointing to only “[g]eneral conditions of rampant gang violence.” Umaña-Ramos, 724 F.3d at 670; see also Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 501 (stating that “widespread crime and violence does not itself constitute persecution on account of a protected ground”). Nor can applicants simply rely on the fact that family members were persecuted. Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2005). Petitioners argue that the IJ and BIA misapplied the mixed-motive analysis by requiring that petitioners demonstrate that “the threats were based exclusively” on their family membership and “failed to consider the possibility of mixed motives.” Pet’r Br. at 23 (emphasis added). This assertion is not borne out by the record. The IJ noted that the family suffered harm due to the gang’s actions, but ultimately “failed to demonstrate that they suffered harm differing from what all residents of Honduras generally suffer [as a result of] the gang violence prevalent in that country.” A.R. 100. The BIA similarly concluded that the family had failed to provide sufficient evidence that they were persecuted on account of their membership in their family group; it also cited Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526 (BIA 2011), A.R. 4, which expressly considered mixed 7 No. 19-3825, Reyes Almendarez et al. v. Barr motives, Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 531. There is no indication that the BIA or IJ misapplied the “one central reason” standard or failed to consider the existence of mixed motives. Petitioners fail to demonstrate that the evidence compels the conclusion that their relation to Jesus or Alex was a central reason for Los Tercerenos’s alleged persecution. Petitioners point to Jesus’s death in 2011 and an incident shortly thereafter regarding a phone call demanding free meals, but for at least three years, the family heard nothing from Los Tercerenos. Thus, it is difficult to infer that Los Tercerenos members were motivated to persecute the petitioners based on Alex, Lidia, or Limhi’s relation to their father. As for the incidents in 2015, petitioners fail to show that Alex’s death was based on anything other than a personal matter at a soccer field, and applicants cannot rely “solely” on “personal matters” to show that they were persecuted because of their membership in a protected category. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 997 (quoting Zoarab v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2008)).4 Moreover, there is substantial evidence showing that it was not membership in the family group, but Lidia’s act of filing a police report that spurred Los Tercerenos to threaten the petitioners. The petitioners hypothesized that their relation to Jesus and Alex was the genesis of Los Tercerenos’s campaign against them, see, e.g., A.R. 170–71, 257–58, but the petitioners point to no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, that provides a factual basis for these statements. For example, the content of the threats focused on what Lidia had done by filing the police report, not on actions by her father or her relation to him. See Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346, 356 4 Petitioners argue that the BIA and IJ concluded that the personal disputes with Jesus and Alex led the BIA and IJ to ignore the familial connections. Pet’r Br. at 21. Though “the simultaneous existence of a personal dispute does not eliminate [a] nexus,” Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2010), the familial connection still must be a central reason for the persecution. Here, the BIA and IJ concluded that the petitioners “[were] not persecuted on the basis of any protected ground.” Marku, 380 F.3d at 988 n.10. 8 No. 19-3825, Reyes Almendarez et al. v. Barr (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that “the evidence here shows that the [Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación] was persecuting Gonzalez Ruano for the stated purpose of destroying Catalina’s family” (emphasis added)). And Limhi testified that his wife and children, who would clearly be members of the proposed particular social group, remain in Honduras and have not received threats from Los Tercerenos. A.R. 183, 185, 200–04. Petitioners fail to show that the familial connection was at least one central reason for persecuting them, as opposed to, for instance, the gang’s actions being a result of its general, criminal goal of enacting revenge on one who reports gang activities to the police. Put differently, harming Lidia’s family was “a means to achieve some other goal, not an end in itself.” Majano-De Hernandez v. Barr, 777 F. App’x 810, 812 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the gang was motivated by financial reasons); see also Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033, 1037–38 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Cruz’s evidence does not show that 18th Street’s actions were motivated by a particular animus toward the Cruz-Guzman family itself, as opposed to an ordinary criminal desire for financial gain.”). Petitioners rely on only the existence of gang violence and the fact that their family was persecuted by Los Tercerenos, but this does not demonstrate that they were persecuted by Los Tercerenos on account of or because of their family membership. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the record compels a decision contrary to the one reached by the BIA. B. Government is unwilling or unable to control non-governmental persecutors To determine whether a government is unwilling or unable to control non-governmental persecutors, we “must examine ‘the overall context of the applicant’s situation[,]’ and review ‘all relevant evidence in the record[.]’” K.H., 920 F.3d at 475–76 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). To do so, we consider “(1) the government’s response to an asylum applicant’s 9 No. 19-3825, Reyes Almendarez et al. v. Barr persecution and (2) general evidence of country conditions.” Id. at 476 (citing cases). Under the first inquiry, we evaluate the extent and success of police investigations into the alleged persecution, the extent of protection offered to the asylum seeker, and government concessions. Id. at 476–77. Under the second inquiry, we consider “(1) how certain crimes are prosecuted and punished, as well as (2) the efficacy of the government’s efforts.” Id. at 477–78 (citations omitted). Petitioners bear the burden of showing that the BIA misapplied the law or failed to consider any evidence. See Pilica, 388 F.3d at 949–50 (citing cases). Though the IJ could not have applied K.H.’s framework because we decided K.H. after the IJ reached its holding in this case, there is no indication that the IJ did not consider evidence of country conditions. First, it noted the Department of State Human Rights Report for Honduras. A.R. 85. It also relied on Khalili, noting that a similar report was relevant evidence regarding the ability and willingness of a government to control non-governmental persecutors. A.R. 96, 100–01. The BIA expressly recognized K.H. and its directive to consider general evidence of country conditions when evaluating whether a government is unable or unwilling to protect asylum seekers. A.R. 4. Thus, petitioners have not demonstrated that the BIA or IJ failed to consider evidence of country conditions. Furthermore, the evidence does not compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s determination that the Honduran government was willing and able to protect the petitioners. Local police were responsive to each of the petitioners’ crises. When gang members demanded free meals, when Alex was murdered, and when Yony’s brother was murdered, the police responded by investigating, offering protection, and/or working with Lidia to file charges. Though no arrests were made, nor charges brought, an investigation need not result in arrests or convictions to demonstrate that a government is willing or able to protect asylum seekers from the actions of non- 10 No. 19-3825, Reyes Almendarez et al. v. Barr governmental actors. See Borodachev v. Holder, 441 F. App’x 354, 361 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing cases). But at least in this case, there is evidence that officials did investigate successfully and prosecute Los Tercerenos members for similar crimes, here, murder of another. Additionally, Lidia and Yony declined to follow up with police and to continue with efforts to press charges. Petitioners’ reluctance to place themselves at further risk is understandable, but their decision to withdraw their participation makes it difficult to count the police’s failure to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of Alex’s murder against the efficacy of the Honduran government’s response. Petitioners do not point to evidence of country conditions that convinces us that the agency’s determinations are otherwise unsupported by substantial evidence. Petitioners point to evidence that shows violent, gang-related crime in Honduras is a significant problem and that police lack resources at times to respond effectively to such crime. Pet’r Br. at 17–18. But here, it does not appear that this was petitioners’ personal experience with the police. The police responded, investigated, offered protection at least once, and were able to make arrests of Los Tercerenos members around the time that the gang murdered Alex. See K.H., 920 F.3d at 478 (concluding that K.H.’s personal experience with the government’s efforts to stop persecutors was not discounted by evidence of country conditions, nor was her personal experience dispositive). “While we may have reached a different result—and found that the government’s response did not outweigh the record evidence demonstrating the struggles of the [Honduran] government to protect [the family]—that is not the standard.” Id. Whether the record compels a reasonable adjudicator to reach a conclusion contrary to the agency’s conclusion is a high standard, which the petitioners fail to clear here. 11 No. 19-3825, Reyes Almendarez et al. v. Barr