Opinion ID: 1941185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the question of delivery

Text: The 1940 deed from Eddie to Henry was properly recorded but was in the possession of Eddie's widow, Ruth, who claimed to have had its possession since 1953. The chancellor found that after recordation the deed was sent to Rudolph Hans, Jr., brother to both Eddie and Henry. Rudolph then delivered the deed to Henry. The record is silent as to how Ruth Hans got the deed, but the chancellor affirmatively found that there was never a retention of the deed by Eddie. Two contrary rebuttable presumptions thus confront one another. First, possession of the deed by the grantor raises a presumption that the deed was never delivered to the grantee, and delivery is an essential element. Farmer v. Runnels, 244 Miss. 525, 142 So.2d 198, 200 (1962). However, in Martin v. Adams, 216 Miss. 270, 62 So.2d 328, 329 (1953), we find, ... while the recordation of a deed raises a presumption of its delivery, this presumption yields to the proof that the deed was never delivered. Faced with these two presumptions and the conflicting evidence offered by the parties in an effort to overcome them, we cannot say that in finding that the appellees had overcome the presumption of non-delivery and that the appellant had failed to overcome the counter-presumption of delivery that the chancellor committed manifest error. Our rule in this regard is too well established to bear repeating let alone to support a retreat from its soundness. We will not reverse a chancellor's finding of fact upon conflicting evidence unless he is manifestly wrong. Our cases in this regard are legion and we cite but one, Duane v. Saltaformaggio, 455 So.2d 753, 757 (Miss. 1984). Appellant fails in her defense of non-delivery of the 1940 deed. Under this general assignment, appellant offered some evidence and seeks to argue that the 1940 deed was not an actual sale by Eddie but an accommodation in furtherance of a scheme to defraud potential creditors of Eddie's. As to any claim that there was no consideration for the 1940 deed, we draw attention to Covington v. Butler, 242 So.2d 444, 447 (Miss. 1970), wherein we stated, ... a voluntary conveyance of land cannot be vacated at the instance of the grantor upon the ground that it was made without any consideration. Also, this attack by the appellant upon the validity of the 1940 deed is barred by any of the statutes of limitations.