Opinion ID: 335077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: freedom of information act.

Text: 27 The producer's first argument is that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, is an absolute bar to the release of this information. That statute states in relevant part: 28 (a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows: . . . (b) This section does not apply to matters that are . . . (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from persons and privileged or confidential; . . . (9) geological or geophysical information and data including maps, concerning wells. 29 In this contention, the producers argue that exclusions (4) and (9) of FOIA clearly encompass the information that the Commission seeks to make public. 2 The producers then argue that since the statute requires all information not in the exclusions to be made public the logical Congressional intent is that information within the exclusions is required to be kept confidential. According to the producers, once the information is determined to be encompassed by an exclusion of FOIA the inquiry is at an end; under no circumstances can that information be released. 30 We believe that this argument distorts the clear intent of the Freedom of Information Act. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the basic thrust of the Freedom of Information Act is to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80, 93 S.Ct. 827, 832, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973). See also, NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975); Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976); Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973). The Court, moreover, has recently reaffirmed that the thrust of the Act is toward disclosure. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11, 44 L.W. 4503 (1976). Interpreting the statute as an absolute bar to the release of certain information would be at war with the basic principles embodied in the Freedom of Information Act. 31 Several additional factors lead to the conclusion that the Act was not intended as a bar to disclosure. The statute simply states that this section does not apply to matters included in the exclusion. Secondly, the provision that confers jurisdiction in the federal courts speaks only in terms of a complainant that had been denied information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp.1976). Also, various statements by the Supreme Court strongly suggest that the statute is not an absolute bar to disclosure. Recently, in Department of the Air Force v. Rose, the Court said, 32 There are, however, exemptions from compelled disclosure. There are nine in number as set forth in § 552(b). But these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act. --- U.S. at ----, 96 S.Ct. at 1599, 44 L.W. at 4505. (Emphasis added.) 33 The Court has also stated that the statute distinguishes between material that may be withheld or must be disclosed. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, supra 410 U.S. at 79, 93 S.Ct. at 832. (Emphasis added.) Third, other courts that have dealt with this question have held that the statute is not a bar to releasing information. Charles River Park A, Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C.Cir.1975); Moore-McCormack Lines v. ITO Corp., 508 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974). Finally, to reject the producer's argument is consistent with the commentary on FOIA 3 and with Congressional reports concerning the statute issued subsequent to its passage. 4 34 While we reject the producer's contention of an absolute prohibition against disclosure, FOIA is not irrelevant in determining whether information encompassed in its exclusions should be disclosed. In reviewing the agency's exercise of discretion concerning the release of such information, this court must be cognizant of the fact that Congress in drafting a broad disclosure statute found sufficient justification for withholding this type of information from public perusal. Recognition of this congressional policy is particularly desirous when the information is encompassed in such a narrow provision as exclusion (9) of FOIA. In the proper case, where releasing the information serves no legitimate function, this court will prohibit disclosure. Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Superior Oil v. Federal Power Commission, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 2168, 48 L.Ed.2d ---, 44 L.W. 3659 (May 18, 1976). 35