Opinion ID: 1958968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: Defendant at the outset contends that pretrial delays caused by the State deprived him of his right to a speedy trial under Me. Const. art. I, § 6 and U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV, and that the charges against him must therefore be dismissed with prejudice. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 2263, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973). We reject defendant's contention. Whether an accused has been denied his right to a speedy trial can be determined only through the use of a delicate balancing test that takes into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand. See State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me.1984). In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-94, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court identified four factors to be considered in evaluating an alleged denial of the right to a speedy trial: the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant arising out of the delay. In a number of cases we have used the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo under both our state and federal constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 400 A.2d 749 (Me. 1979). A. Length of the Delay We have held that [t]he Barker analysis ... need be undertaken only when the length of delay is so presumptively prejudicial as to warrant consideration of the three remaining factors. State v. Dudley, 433 A.2d 711, 713 (Me.1981). In the case at bar, a total period of 25 months and 3 weeks expired between defendant's arrest and the commencement of his trial. While that length of time is not unusually egregious, see State v. Smith, 400 A.2d at 752 (25-month delay), and cases cited therein, here, as in Smith, we find that it does generate a presumption of sufficient prejudice to necessitate the Barker analysis. However, a period of 25 months' delay is not so inordinate as to require a per se finding of a denial of a speedy trial. Id. at 753. B. Reasons for the Delay Of the 25-plus months between defendant's arrest on June 18, 1982, and the commencement of his trial on August 9, 1984, 5½ months resulted from defendant's motions and count against his claim of a denial of the right to a speedy trial. Id. Three months of delay are attributable to the State's difficulties in scheduling, at various times, hearings in the case. A further period of 8½ months immediately preceding trial, during which defendant does not contend that inadequate progress was made in bringing him to trial, was spent in resolving multifarious matters, including a considerable number of motions filed by defendant. The major controversy on the speedy trial question involves the question of who, the State or defendant, was responsible for a delay of some 8½ months following the entry of an order granting a defense motion for an independent psychological evaluation of defendant to determine his competency to be arraigned, and requiring the State to provide to the defense psychologists all of its medical records relative to Murphy's mental condition. Following that order, some examination of defendant by his own psychologist took place within about two months, but neither the court nor the State was made aware of it for another 6½ months. During that time, the defense was apparently waiting for compliance by the State with the court order requiring disclosure of its medical records so that the defense evaluation could be completed. The defense took no steps during that period to secure compliance by the State with the court order. It never approached Bangor Mental Health Institute, where the records were held, about releasing them. Finally, over eight months after the order for a mental examination of defendant, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the case for denial of the right to a speedy trial. Between the date that motion was filed and the day set for its hearing, defendant received all the State's medical records pertaining to him. The justice who heard the motion found that the delay was attributable to the failure of both the State and defendant to take reasonable steps to ensure that defendant's records were provided to him. We cannot say that that finding was clearly erroneous. See Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 981 (Me.1981). In looking at the various reasons for the delay that occurred in this case, we note that there is a complete absence of any of the undesirable motivations for delay toward which the speedy trial guarantee is especially directed. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531 & n. 32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 & n. 32; State v. Smith, 400 A.2d at 753. When, as here, the reasons for delay in prosecuting a criminal matter are innocent of any invidious intention to deprive a defendant of his liberty unfairly, the delay will weigh less heavily in favor of a claim of denial of the right to a speedy trial. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. C. Defendant's Assertion of his Right The Superior Court justice who heard defendant's motion to dismiss noted that defendant utterly failed to assert his right to a speedy trial at any time prior to his filing of that motion on June 28, 1983, over a year after his arrest. Even then, defendant requested the court not to hear his motion until after September 5. It is unlikely that the delay to which defendant objects would in large part have occurred, had he been more assertive of his right of discovery from the State. While it is true that defendant has no obligation to bring himself to trial, his failure to assert his right to a speedy trial at any time prior to his motion to dismiss makes it less credible that the delay was undue or that defendant suffered any prejudice therefrom. Id. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93. D. Prejudice to Defendant Perhaps most important in the present case is the absence of any showing of prejudice to defendant. No defense evidence was unavailable at trial due to the lapse of time since the murder-robbery. Defendant's own mental condition has apparently improved in the intervening time, as a result of the extensive medical attention he has received. The delay involved in his case may thus have worked to his advantage, by allowing him to be more alert and better able to participate in his own defense than he otherwise might have been. Our analysis of the four Barker v. Wingo factors in the present case leads us to the firm conviction that defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. The only factor that would tend to indicate the contrary is the bare length of the delay, which in this case is not so long that it alone entitles defendant to any relief. While there was obviously some neglect of the case by the prosecutor's office, that neglect was not of constitutional dimension, particularly considering defendant's concurrent inattention to the case. We find, in sum, nothing in the present set of circumstances that would entitle defendant to the drastic remedy of dismissal of the charges against him. Defendant also argues that the procedural history of his prosecution supports three additional, but related, grounds for dismissal: unnecessary delay under M.R.Crim.P. 48(b); denial of constitutional due process; and delay by the State in providing discovery under M.R.Crim.P. 16. We reject those arguments. Criminal Rule 48(b) vests the decision whether to dismiss for unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, along with whether such a dismissal is to be with prejudice, in the sound discretion of the Superior Court justice hearing the motion. See State v. Brann, 292 A.2d 173, 176-77 (Me.1972); cf. State v. Wells, 443 A.2d 60, 64 (Me.1982) (M.D.C.Crim.R. 48(b)). The hearing justice in the case at bar refused to dismiss on that ground, and we are not shown anything to prove that he exceeded his allowable discretion by that decision. Exactly the same reasoning leads us to reject defendant's argument that he was entitled to a dismissal with prejudice under M.R. Crim.P. 16(d), as a sanction against the State for its delay in complying with a discovery order. See State v. Davis, 483 A.2d 740, 742 (Me.1984) (sanction for discovery violation committed to sound discretion of trial judge). Nor are we shown anything in the procedural history of this case that unfairly prejudiced defendant and thus denied him his due process rights.