Opinion ID: 1654187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-submission Juror Substitution Errors are Subject to Harmless Error Analysis.

Text: None of the three Kentucky cases previously discussed addresses whether an improper post-submission juror substitution could be a harmless error. Upon reflection, however, we conclude that this type of error should be subjected to a harmless error analysis. Foremost in our reasoning is the inescapable fact that RCr 9.24 mandates that no error or defect in any ruling ... or in anything done or omitted by the court ... is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict ... unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. RCr 9.24 further provides that we must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Virtually all errors, therefore, are subject to harmless error analysis. In addition, a seeming majority of other courts have held that juror substitution of this sort does not violate the constitution. [29] Similarly and significantly, neither Woods , Thurman , nor Holland concluded that post-submission juror substitution was an issue of constitutional import. In fact, none of those three cases even mentions in passing any constitutional dimension to this issue. Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument alone, that this type of juror substitution error was one of constitutional import, our conclusion that a harmless error standard would apply would be unchanged. Errors of constitutional importthe most fundamental and serious type of errorsare generally analyzed under a harmless error standard. [30] As the Court of Appeals of Michigan noted, [t]he prevailing holding among the [federal] circuits is that reinstating a discharged alternate juror during deliberations, absent consent of the defendant, requires reversal of a conviction only when the defendant has been prejudiced by the procedure. We believe that this is the better, more reasonable rule. [31] Our decision to apply the harmless error standard to this issue should come as no great surprise since we refused to reverse an unpreserved juror substitution error in Holland. [32] After all, we would have had to reverse the conviction in Holland if juror substitution errors were structural errors, not subject to harmless error analysis. By contrast, non-constitutional errors will rarelyperhaps never rise to the level of being a structural error. [33] We reject Crossland's contention that this type of juror substitution error rises to the level of a structural error errors which are, per se, reversible because they undermine the fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process. [34] Structural errors are rare. Examples of errors that have been held to be structural (and, thus, compel reversal) are such fundamental errors as a complete denial of counsel, a biased trial judge, or denial of a public trial. [35] Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by jury under both the federal and Kentucky Constitutions, [36] we join many federal courts in concluding that generally, substitution of an alternate juror in place of a regular juror after deliberations have begun does not violate the Constitution.... [37] Because we have already determined that this error is not of constitutional dimension, we conclude that it is both permissible and appropriate to analyze a post-submission juror substitution error under the harmless error standard, provided the error is properly preserved. If the error is not properly preserved, it should be analyzed for palpable error under RCr 10.26.