Opinion ID: 1692282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Withholding information during voir dire.

Text: Appellant claims that his right to an impartial jury was violated when at least one juror withheld material information during voir dire. He argues that the affidavit and the newspaper article prove that a juror or jurors knew of the rumors about racing before trial and withheld that information when the trial court asked the following question during voir dire: Does anyone have any knowledge as to the facts and circumstances of this case? It is well settled that [t]o obtain a new trial because of juror mendacity, `a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.' Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 796 (Ky.2003) (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984)). The evidence cited by Appellant falls short of meeting this standard. For example, in Paenitz v. Commonwealth, 820 S.W.2d 480 (Ky.1991), we remanded for a new trial where there was evidence to prove that a juror withheld the fact that she had discussed the details of the case with the government's expert witness prior to trial. Id. at 481. In contrast, Juror 25's statements, if taken as true, do not indicate that the unidentified juror had knowledge of the facts and circumstances of Appellant's case; indeed, the only allegation was that the unidentified juror had heard rumors. If this did actually occur, we can only speculate as to the amount and substance of these rumors, given the threadbare allegations set forth by Appellant. In circumstances where no challenge is made to juror qualification prior to or during trial and the challenge first occurs after rendition of a verdict, a party seeking relief from the effect of the verdict bears a heavy burden. It is incumbent upon such a party to allege facts, which if proven to be true, are sufficient to undermine the integrity of the verdict. Gordon v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Ky.1995). In light of the speculative nature and paper-thin credibility [4] of Appellant's allegations, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion for a new trial. Cf. Key v. Commonwealth, 840 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky.App.1992) (jury verdict affirmed where defendant failed to elicit testimony from juror in question and the only evidence offered showed nothing more than speculation that juror was biased).