Opinion ID: 1133901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the devise to Era Robertson a general devise?

Text: The heirs contend that the devise to Robertson in Article Two was a general, not a specific, devise. However, even under the common law the devise would be a specific devise. This Court has held: Under the common law, all devises of real estate owned by the testator on the date of the execution of the will were specific devises, and this rule is not modified by the statute, except as to real estate disposed of by residuary devise and real estate acquired by the testator after the execution of the will. Cater v. Howard, 230 Ala. 133, 138, 159 So. 830, 834 (1935) (citing Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785 (1893)). To support their argument, the heirs merely quote the definitions of general devise and specific devise found in the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary 407 (5th ed.1979), stating: `A general devise is one which passes lands of the testator without a particular enumeration or description of them; as, a devise of all my lands or all my other lands. . . . `Specific devises are devises of lands particularly specified in the terms of the devise, as opposed to general . . . devises of land, in which the local or other particular descriptions are not expressed.' (Heirs' brief at 8.) Yet, the subject property fits the very definition of a specific devise: it is particularly specified in Article Two of Downey's will as the real estate which [Downey] derived by inheritance or otherwise from or through [his] late wife, Gladys Wilene Pritchett Downey. . . . Furthermore, the bequest to Robertson meets the definition of a specific bequest: `A specific bequest is defined as a bequest of a particular article or specific part of the testator's estate which is so described and distinguished from all other articles or parts of the same as to be capable of being identified.' Parker v. Bozian, 859 So.2d 427, 435 (Ala.2003)(quoting Matthews v. Matthews, 477 So.2d 391, 393 (Ala.1985), quoting in turn Rowe v. Newman, 290 Ala. 289, 300, 276 So.2d 412, 421 (1972), and citing Ullmann v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 273 Ala. 154, 137 So.2d 765 (1961)). In this case, the subject property is described and distinguished from Downey's other real property and is clearly identified as the real property inherited from his late wife, Robertson's sister. Thus, it can be separated from the rest of Downey's real estate and is therefore a specific devise. See 80 Am. Jur.2d Wills § 1302 (2005).