Opinion ID: 8704056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Accommodate (Count I)

Text: The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As relevant here, “ ‘discriminate’ is defined to include ‘not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability ..., unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.’ ” Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). The term “qualified individual” under the ADA means “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that she was an individual who had a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the employer had notice of her disability; (3) that with reasonable accommodation she could perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.” Gordon v. District of Columbia, 480 F.Supp.2d 112, 116 (D.D.C.2007) (citing Scarborough v. Natsios, 190 F.Supp.2d 5, 19 (D.D.C.2002)); Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 527 (finding prima facie case satisfied where plaintiff alleged that he was “a qualified individual with a disability” and that his employer “failed to grant him the reasonable accommodations his disability necessitated”) (internal quotations omitted). WHC argues that Hancock’s reasonable accommodation claim fails because she cannot establish the third element above— that she was able to perform the essential functions of her Medical Assistant position. Specifically, WHC claims that, because Hancock was unable to perform triage duties “until further notice,” she was asking WHC to permanently eliminate an essential function of her job on December 21, 2007. (See Dkt. No. 20-1 (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 10-12; Dkt. No. 23 (“Def.’s Reply”) at 6). According to WHC, this precludes Hancock from establishing that she was a “qualified individual” under the ADA. Hancock disputes this assertion and responds that she was not permanently restricted from triaging patients as of December 21, 2007. (Dkt. No. 22 (“PL’s Opp’n”) at 13-15). Based on the record evidence, not only is Hancock correct that this fact is disputed, but WHC’s arguments border on the blatantly false. On December 21, 2007 — when WHC refused to accommodate Hancock’s restrictions — the occupational health form that Ms. Russell reviewed simply indicated that Hancock was unable to perform triage work for approximately two weeks, through January 2, 2008. (Pl.’s Stmt, at ¶ 28). It was not until December 28, 2007 — an entire week after WHC had already denied Hancock’s request — that WHC received the occupational health form that indicated Hancock’s triage restriction was in place “until further notice,” and even then, the form was received not by Ms. Russell, but by Marilyn Cox, the Clinical Manager of WHC’s Occupational Health Department. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at Ex. 19). WHC expressly concedes as much in its reply briefing. (Def.’s Reply at 8). Moreover, the evidence strongly suggests that Ms. Russell had already made up her mind not to grant Hancock any further accommodations before she even received Hancock’s form on December 21st. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at Ex. 20). In her December 26th email message to Mr. Kappalman, Mr. Russell relayed that she “had explained to [Hancock] previously that she needed to be cleared to return to work full duty by 12/24/07 or she would have to make other arrangements.” (Id,.). So it seems that Ms. Russell did not care whether Hancock’s restrictions were temporary or permanent — apparently any further request for an accommodation, no matter the nature or duration, would have been denied. At a minimum, there is a clear factual dispute as to whether, at the time Mr. Russell determined that WHC could not accommodate Hancock on December 21, 2007, Hancock was seeking a temporary accommodation excusing her from triage work, and not a permanent accommodation. While it is true that the ADA “does not require an employer to ‘reallocate job duties in order to change the essential functions of a job,’ ” Terrazas v. Medlantic Healthcare Group, Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 46, 53 (D.D.C.1999), Hancock was not, as of December 21, 2007, seeking the type of permanent restriction that WHC misleadingly argues. Cf. Jones v. District of Columbia, 505 F.Supp.2d 78, 90-91 (D.D.C. 2007) (rejecting employee’s request for permanent light-duty status as unreasonable accommodation); Duncan v. Harvey, 479 F.Supp.2d 125, 132 (D.D.C.2007) (finding employee’s request to permanently remove job duty from position was unreasonable under the ADA). Furthermore, as explained in the EEOC enforcement guidance, “[a]n employer never has to reallocate essential functions as a reasonable accommodation, but can do so if it wishes.” EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Oct. 17, 2002), available at http://www. eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html (emphasis added). 6 Here, WHC itself admits that temporarily reassigning Hancock’s triage duties to other employees for a limited period of time — essentially the accommodation Hancock sought — may have been reasonable. (Def.’s Mem. at 10 (“[TJriage is a function that can be handled by other professionals such as physicians on a temporary basis .... ”)) (emphasis added). Moreover, the record shows that WHC had, in fact, temporarily excused Hancock from performing triage work in the recent past — both in October 2007 and again in late November 2007. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 25-26). As a result, material disputes of fact exist as to whether WHC improperly failed to accommodate Hancock’s disability. Finally, to the extent that WHC argues that it was unable to accommodate Hancock’s triage restriction because it would impose an undue hardship on the Hospital, the competing evidence in the record raises a dispute on this point. Specifically, when Ms. Russell notified Mr. Kappalman that she refused to accommodation Hancock’s restrictions, he asked, ‘Why can we not accommodate her light duty? Don’t we always need staff on the telephone?” (Dkt. No. 20-2 at Ex. 20). Ms. Russell responded, “If I only utilize her on the phones (long-term), then it sets me up to have to make likewise accommodations for other staff members in the future.” (Id.). Confronted with this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that WHC was not concerned about the undue hardship that Hancock’s specific restrictions might impose, but rather about the precedent that granting Hancock’s restrictions might set for future employees. 7 Further, as set forth above, these same email messages suggest that Ms. Russell had already made up her mind that she would no longer accommodate Hancock, regardless of the nature and extent of Hancock’s requested restrictions. Given these material disputes of fact, the Court concludes that summary judgment is inappropriate as to Hancock’s reasonable accommodation claim.