Opinion ID: 6336022
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: has previously been convicted of two

Text: or more prior felonies, each of which is— [. . .] (B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 841)[.] 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)(2)(B) (emphasis added). We have stated that the career offender Guideline “implements 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)[.]” See United States v. Whyte, 892 F.2d 1170, 1174 (3d Cir. 1989). And, as we explained above, § 841 proscribes distributing drugs via “attempted transfer”. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(8) and (11); United States v. Rowe, 919 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 2019) (21 U.S.C. § 802 provides relevant definitions for terms in 21 U.S.C. § 841). Consequently, to hold that the Guideline excludes “attempted transfer” offenses would be inconsistent with our holding in Whyte that “predicate drug offenses” include those which “could have been prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. § 841,” as “attempted transfer” can be so prosecuted. 892 F.2d at 1174; see also United States v. Tobin, 20 676 F.3d 1264, 1289 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming conviction as instance of “attempted transfer”). Worse, it would mean embracing the absurd proposition that § 841—marked out by Congress as the paradigmatic controlled substance statute—is not categorically a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 994 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2021) (“It would be remarkable if [appellant] were right that § 841(a)(1) did not describe a ‘controlled substance offense’ under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)). In directing the Sentencing Commission to enact the career-offender Guidelines, Congress specifically instructed that ‘offense[s] described in . . . 21 U.S.C. [§] 841’ be covered.”); Garth, 965 F.3d at 497 (“By this logic, federal distribution encompasses attempted distribution, so all 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) convictions for distribution and possession with intent to distribute (that is, most federal drug convictions) would fall outside the guidelines’ definition of a controlledsubstance offense. That can’t be what the guidelines’ drafters had in mind.”); United States v. Havis, 929 F.3d 317, 320 (6th Cir. 2019) (Sutton, J., concurring in the denial of en banc reconsideration) (“I agree that it would be bizarre if violating the primary provision of the Controlled Substances Act turned out not to be a controlled substance offense.”). That result would be contrary to Dawson’s own implicit assumption before us that § 841 convictions can function as the instant offense, § 4B1.1(a)(2), triggering the career offender Guideline, see Appellant’s Br. at 14–34 (arguing for reversal based only on § 4B1.1(a)(3)). Dawson’s argument that “attempted transfer” crimes cannot serve as Guideline predicate offenses would prove too much, as the same definition of “controlled substance offense” applies to both § 4B1.1(a)(2) and § 4B1.1(a)(3). He thus argues for a rule that 21 would fly in the face of long-established, universal Circuit Court practice assuming the contrary.12 Our law does not command such a bizarre result. See Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1879 (2019) (“We should not lightly conclude that Congress enacted a self-defeating statute.”). The caselaw of our sister Circuits is also instructive in a more direct way, as three of them have held that “distribution” in § 4B1.2(b) has the same meaning as under the CSA. See Thomas, 969 F.3d at 584–85; United States v. Madkins, 866 12 See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 998 F.3d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Richardson, 958 F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Womack, 610 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Brown, 1 F.4th 617, 619 (8th Cir. 2021). Although § 841’s role in the career offender calculus is usually as the triggering offense under § 4B1.1(a)(2), rather than as a predicate offense under § 4B1.1(a)(3), these categories are plainly identical. See, e.g., Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) (“[I]dentical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning[.]”); United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 616 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994). Thus, Courts that have treated § 841 violations as career offender triggers— whether sua sponte or by invitation of the parties—have effectively assumed they must be predicate “controlled substance offenses” as well. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 898 F.3d 323, 333 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2016); Booker, 994 F.3d at 596. 22 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. McKibbon, 878 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 716 (7th Cir. 2019). The Sixth Circuit in particular has thoroughly analyzed this issue, concluding that the CSA can be “utilize[d] . . . in defining the relevant conduct covered by the Guidelines.” United States v. Jackson, 995 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2021); see also Havis, 929 F.3d at 319 (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring in the denial of en banc reconsideration) (“Though [the Guidelines] do not define distribution, I see no reason to give the word . . . a different meaning from the one in the [CSA].”). The Tenth and Seventh Circuits have also held that Guidelines “distribution” should be understood according to the CSA’s definitions. See Madkins, 866 F.3d at 1144; McKibbon, 878 F.3d at 972; Smith, 921 F.3d at 716.13 In sum, Dawson would have us hold that any statute criminalizing the “attempted transfer” of drugs will not trigger the career offender enhancement. Following him would require us to find that: the Commission has flouted Congress’s clear command for more than three decades; the universal assumption of the Circuit Courts has been incorrect; and the clear holdings of three Circuits are misguided. This we will not do. All the authority points in the contrary direction: the Guidelines category of “distribution” offenses includes prohibitions on the “attempted transfer” of drugs, including § 841(a) and § 780-113(a)(30). 13 The Second Circuit has also appeared to indicate its agreement, albeit in dicta. See United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 965 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that a mere offer to sell drugs does not constitute distribution “as Guidelines § 4B1.2(b) and 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) define the term.” (emphasis added)). 23 Resisting this conclusion, Dawson contends that we should ignore the CSA’s definitions when interpreting the meaning of “distribution” in the Guidelines. He cites several out-of-Circuit cases, none of which is on-point. His citations to United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2020) do him little good, as those cases addressed a distinct issue: how to interpret the term “controlled substance” in § 4B1.2(b)—does it refer only to drugs in the CSA schedules, or does it also reach state schedules? See Ruth, 966 F.3d at 652–53 (distinguishing the two issues). Neither side of that debate appears to doubt that the Guidelines cover at least those substances in the CSA schedules. See, e.g., id. at 653–54. Here, we come to an analogous conclusion: the Guidelines cover “distribution” offenses at least to the extent those are defined under the CSA, which includes “attempted transfer”.14 14 Nor are we moved by the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2018). There, the D.C. Circuit declined to add “attempted transfer” to the list of offense categories in § 4B1.2(b). Id. at 1091–92. It reasoned that the Sentencing Commission could have added such a category to § 4B1.2(b)—as they did elsewhere in the Guidelines—but chose not to, and § 4B1.2(b)’s list provides the exclusive definition of the term “controlled substance offense” in the Guidelines. Id. This reasoning has little bearing on the question before us, which concerns how to define a term—“distribution”—which is already on the list of § 4B1.2(b) offense categories and is not itself defined within the Guidelines. We do not alter the text of the Guideline, which was, in effect, the proposal facing the Winstead Court. 24