Opinion ID: 670636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: State Law Claims against the Individual Defendants

Text: 29 The parties agree that the proper standard of immunity to be applied under Georgia law to the discretionary acts of Pierce, Pruett and Conley is stated in Hennessey v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 330-331, 264 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1980), namely: 30 [W]here an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him, he is ... usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result of an erroneous decision; provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority, and without wilfulness, malice, or corruption. 31 (Emphasis in original). See also, City of Atlanta v. Chambers, 205 Ga.App. 834, 839, 424 S.E.2d 19, 24 (1992) (The record in the present case is utterly devoid of any conduct by [the Commissioner] which could remotely be construed as being sufficient to lift the shield that protects officers acting colore officii.). 32 Plaintiffs do not dispute that the acts complained of with respect to Pruett and Pierce, to-wit: the recommendation regarding reorganization and the approval of the letter of termination, respectively, were discretionary. Plaintiffs do argue that Conley's action was not discretionary because his duty was simply to process [Walter's] transfer request[ ], (Appellees' Brief at 46), but such argument is, for the reasons discussed above, without merit. 33 The district court's decision to deny Pierce's, Pruett's and Conley's motion for summary judgment on the state law claims was predicated solely on the conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether [the individual] defendants wilfully and/or maliciously violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. (District Court's Order at 26). However, plaintiffs submitted no evidence from which malice could be inferred relative to Conley's actions. Plaintiffs did submit as evidence of malice on the part of Pierce and Pruett two affidavits alleging certain statements by Pierce and Pruett relating to Maury Winkler. 6 There is, however, no evidence of any animus towards the plaintiffs by Pierce or Pruett or towards either Maury Winkler or the plaintiffs on the part of the Board of Commissioners, the persons ultimately responsible for the reduction-in-force. 34 Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the Board of Commissioners was ultimately responsible for the decision to reorganize and to eliminate the Planning & Engineering Division by its failure to override the CEO's veto as provided by Section 15(b) of the DeKalb County Organizational Act. Pierce and Pruett lacked any authority to implement such a plan. The district court therefore erred in its conclusion that, by virtue of Pruett's recommendation to CEO Maloof and Pierce's mere approval of the termination letters sent by Pruett, Pierce and Pruett possessed final decision-making authority in regard to plaintiffs' termination. (District Court's Order at p. 19). 35 Even if Pierce and Pruett had been vested with the ultimate authority to implement the reorganization plan and terminate the plaintiffs, the evidence proffered by the plaintiffs is insufficient to create a question of fact concerning malice in connection with the reorganization. In their affidavits, Pearson G. Sides does not state when Pierce made the alleged statement about Maury Winkler while Bruce Henry admits that the alleged statement by Pruett was made in the winter of 1988, approximately two years prior to the reduction-in-force at issue in this litigation. There exists, therefore, no evidence in this record to intimate that these statements were made within a time frame relevant to the reorganization and reduction-in-force at issue in this case. 7 36 Consequently, the district court erred in denying summary judgment in favor of not only Conley but Pruett and Pierce on plaintiffs' state law claims. Pierce, Pruett and Conley are entitled to state law immunity in connection with the recommendation regarding reorganization, the approval of the letter of termination and the failure to process Walters' letter as an application for demotion, respectively.