Opinion ID: 677610
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unfair treatment of counsel

Text: 31 First, AY alleges that its counsel were treated more harshly than plaintiffs'. However, the record does not support AY's position. The fact that a greater number of plaintiffs' objections were sustained than defense objections might equally well prove that defense counsel simply violated more evidentiary rules than did plaintiffs' counsel, as AY does not go on to allege that any of the rulings were erroneous. The three examples cited by AY to support its contention that the judge unfairly chastised defense counsel were relatively mild and probably justifiable reproofs during AY's hour and a half opening statement. 32 Neither of the instances cited by AY to support its claim that the judge repeatedly chastised defense counsel for reading or having the witnesses read portions of exhibits were particularly objectionable. AY also asserts that the judge let plaintiffs lead witnesses freely while chastising AY for doing the same thing. However, AY cites only two instances where it was warned not to lead witnesses; furthermore, plaintiffs' counsel were also admonished not to lead witnesses. AY also cites three examples of plaintiffs' counsel leading witnesses without admonishment, but AY did the same thing itself on at least three occasions. The judge showed no bias in this regard. 33 AY's other claims of inequitable treatment must also fail. Although AY was reprimanded for pleasantries, plaintiffs were also reprimanded. Although plaintiffs were permitted to question a witness who allegedly lacked personal knowledge after AY was denied permission to question another who had personal knowledge, AY never objected to the plaintiffs' questioning. Finally, the specific questions asked of the witness who AY contends lacked personal knowledge concerned matters which actually did come within his personal knowledge. 34 Overall, we find little merit in AY's claims of unfair treatment, particularly given that the trial judge instructed the jury at the beginning of the trial not to draw any inferences from his admonishing one or the other side for procedural or evidentiary mistakes. Even absent this instruction, moreover, the judge's comments would not have required reversal. See Shad, 799 F.2d at 531 (Comments by the court which reflect unfavorably on counsel's conduct at trial are not prejudicial unless of a serious nature.); Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir.1990) (Cutting comments to counsel, particularly those relating to skill rather than good faith or integrity, will not generally mandate reversal.). 35