Opinion ID: 2211835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: right to counsel under the federal constitution

Text: We next address defendant's argument that the federal constitution guarantees him the right to appointed appellate counsel when seeking leave to appeal his guilty plea conviction. Of course, the federal constitution does not require the fifty states to provide any appeal whatsoever to criminal defendants. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894). As discussed, after the enactment of Proposal B, Michigan no longer affords an appeal of right to defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere. Art. 1, ง 20. A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may only appeal his conviction by seeking and obtaining leave from the Court of Appeals. Our research discloses no authority that recognizes the right to appeal a plea of guilty as a fundamental right. Under the due process-equal protection test of Ross v. Moffitt, supra , Michigan's scheme gives guilty-pleading defendants a fair opportunity to have their claims heard in our appellate courts. Further, Michigan's current arrangements for inmate access to the courts, including law libraries, paralegal assistance, and staff attorney programs, satisfy the so-called right to meaningful access. Accordingly, we conclude that Michigan's scheme does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has never specifically held that the federal constitution commands that an indigent defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere, and whose appeal therefrom is purely discretionary, is entitled to the appointment of appellate counsel. In Douglas, the California District Court of Appeals denied the defendants' request for appointed appellate counsel in their appeal of right following their convictions at trial. Douglas, supra, pp. 353-355, 83 S.Ct. 814. The Court required the states to furnish appellate counsel for indigent defendants in their first appeal as of right. Id., pp. 356-357, 83 S.Ct. 814. The Douglas Court relied on Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), in which the Court, in a plurality opinion, held that a state cannot deny a defendant an appeal because he lacks the financial resources to purchase a trial transcript. In Douglas, the Court reasoned, in part, as follows: There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit [under California's then-existing system for deciding whether to appoint counsel], is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal. [ Id., pp. 357-358, 83 S.Ct. 814.] The Court also noted, however, that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an `invidious discrimination.' Id., p. 356, 83 S.Ct. 814. [6] In Ross, North Carolina provided the defendant appointed counsel in his appeal of right to their intermediate appellate court following a conviction at trial. Id., pp. 603-604, 94 S.Ct. 2437. That court affirmed the convictions, and the defendant then sought to invoke the discretionary review procedure of the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to appoint counsel for review in that court. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court. It held that the federal constitution does not require the appointment of appellate counsel on discretionary review to the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id., pp. 610-612, 94 S.Ct. 2437. Unlike Douglas, Ross separately analyzed the issue under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In its due process analysis, the Court noted a fundamental difference between the trial and appellate stages of criminal proceedings. Id., pp. 610-611, 94 S.Ct. 2437. At trial, due process requires that the state provide the accused counsel as a shield to fend off the state's efforts to convict him. Id. By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge or jury below. Id., p. 610, 94 S.Ct. 2437. Appellate counsel serves as a sword rather than a shield. Id., pp. 610-611, 94 S.Ct. 2437. The Court thus concluded that [u]nfairness results only if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty. That question is more profitably considered under an equal protection analysis. Id., p. 611, 94 S.Ct. 2437. In its equal protection analysis, the Ross Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require absolute equality, but does require an appellate system that is free of unreasoned distinctions. Id., p. 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437. The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process. [ Id., p. 616, 94 S.Ct. 2437.] In concluding that appointed counsel is not required for a discretionary appeal to a state Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court noted that the defendant had received the benefit of counsel in examining the record of his trial and in preparing an appellate brief on his behalf for the state Court of Appeals in his first appeal of right. Id., p. 614, 94 S.Ct. 2437. The United States Supreme Court thus reasoned: We do not believe that it can be said, therefore, that a defendant in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court. At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion of the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review. [ Id., p. 615, 94 S.Ct. 2437.] The doctrinal basis of the Griffin/Douglas line is difficult to ascertain. To the extent that Griffin and Douglas rely on equal protection principles, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), undermined their validity by making proof of discriminatory purpose an essential element of an equal protection claim. Const. 1963, art. 1, ง 20 is unquestionably facially neutral. Defendant in this case has not shown that the state intended to discriminate against criminal defendants on the basis of indigency. Recently, however, the Supreme Court in MLB v. SLJ, 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996), rejected the notion that Davis had implicitly overruled the Griffin/Douglas line. In MLB, the Court extended the Griffin rationale to require Mississippi to supply a record to an indigent parent whose parental rights had been terminated to permit proper appellate consideration of her claims. While noting that the Griffin line of cases have reflected both equal protection and due process concerns, the MLB Court reasoned that most decisions in this area rest on an equal protection framework since due process does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal. Id., p. 120, 117 S.Ct. 555. The Court distinguished termination of parental rights cases from the mine run, id., p. 116, 117 S.Ct. 555, of civil cases on the ground that they involve the permanent destruction of the most fundamental family relationship. Id., p. 121, 117 S.Ct. 555. The Court did not explain, however, why the Davis purposeful discrimination requirement is inapposite. Indeed, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate any constitutional underpinnings for its access to appeal decisions in light of its own modern equal protection jurisprudence. Despite the muddled state of its jurisprudence, we adhere to our duty to attempt to understand and apply what the Supreme Court has opined regarding the right of meaningful access. As explained below, we conclude that meaningful access does not require the appointment of counsel for defendants who seek discretionary leave to appeal from their guilty pleas. Our current system already provides those defendants with an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly.
Appeals from plea-based convictions and appeals from convictions obtained following trials, like those appeals at issue in Douglas and Ross, are fundamentally different. Foremost, a defendant who tenders a plea has admitted guilt of the offense in open court. [A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 16.02, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). Further, the state has a fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas.... Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). A guilty plea evidences a defendant's desire to terminate the prosecution. Thus, a defendant who concedes his guilt has acceded to the state's fundamental interest in finality. Plea proceedings are also shorter, simpler, and more routine than trials; the record most often consists of the factual basis for the plea that is provided to the trial court. In contrast with trials, less danger exists in plea cases that the record will be so unclear, or the errors so hidden, that the defendant's appeal will be reduced to a meaningless ritual. Also, a concession of guilt limits considerably the potential issues that can be raised on appeal. See 1A Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure (2d ed.), ง 16:30, pp. 94-104 (discussing the effect of a plea on the availability of various appellate claims). [7] These are all reasoned distinctions that are relevant to determining whether Michigan provides meaningful access to the appellate courts.
Given the obvious differences between trial-based and guilty plea convictions, it is clear that our current guilty plea procedures provide sufficient methods of assistance to meet the Ross meaningful access requirement. To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must move to withdraw his plea before the trial court. MCR 6.311(C). MCR 6.005(H)(4) states that unless an appellate lawyer has been appointed, [appointed trial counsel is responsible for the] filing of postconviction motions the lawyer deems appropriate, including motions ... to withdraw plea, or for resentencing.  (Emphasis added.) Thus, our court rules require trial counsel to assist the defendant in organizing and presenting to the trial court any potential appellate issues that warrant preservation. Accordingly, a pro se defendant seeking discretionary review will have the benefit of a transcript, trial counsel's framing of the issues in the motion to withdraw, and the trial court's ruling on the motion. As in Ross, these factors will aid the defendant in identifying and asserting claims. Further, prison inmates filing discretionary applications will have the same access to law libraries, paralegal assistance, and staff attorneys that Michigan provides to them in other postconviction proceedings. While trial counsel cannot be relied on to advise the defendant of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, those claims that have merit likely will be apparent on the record. [8] We acknowledge that the tools available to indigent defendants seeking leave to appeal from their guilty pleas are not equivalent to those present in Douglas and Ross. However, Douglas and Ross both involved appeals from convictions following trial. Neither Douglas nor Ross addressed the issue before us, namely, whether a defendant is entitled under the federal constitution to appointed counsel in a first discretionary appeal from a plea-based conviction. As stated, the differences between trial- and plea-based convictions are undeniable. Thus, any statements in Douglas and Ross suggesting the necessity of a reasoned lower court decision and a brief prepared by an attorney in the lower court must be considered in the context in which those cases were decided. Finally, we acknowledge that the Court has, since Ross, continued to expand its meaningful access line of cases in the context of filing fees and transcripts. See, e.g., MLB, supra . However, we note that none of those decisions have expanded on the right to counsel recognized in Douglas. Thus, we conclude that the free transcript and counsel cases are really on separate trajectories. Indeed, compare the Court's expansive jurisprudence in the free transcript/filing fees cases against its contracting jurisprudence regarding the right to counsel in identical settings. See, e.g., 3 LaFave, Israel and King, Criminal Procedure (2d ed.), งง 11.2(c) and (d). The Court has extended the right to transcripts at state expense in collateral attack cases and habeas corpus proceedings. In the analogous postconviction setting, the Court has never voted to expand the Douglas right to counsel. Since Douglas itself, the Supreme Court has never, not once, even in the case of inmates on death row, ordered counsel appointed for individual petitioners as a component of the right of meaningful access. [9]