Opinion ID: 1375948
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Change of Judge for Cause

Text: Prior to the sentencing hearing, Defendant requested a change of judge for cause pursuant to Rule 10.1(b) and (c). He claims the trial judge erred when he denied the motion due to its untimeliness. We disagree but confine our discussion to the merits of the motion, which Defendant also raises, to address possible fundamental error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (partial judge is structural defect in trial mechanism and not subject to harmless error analysis) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)). Defendant argues that even if his change of judge motion was untimely, the presiding judge of a superior court can never be a sentencing judge in a capital case. Defendant notes that, as part of the presiding judge's administrative duties under Title 12, A.R.S. and Rule I, Uniform Rules of Practice of the Superior Court, the presiding judge must appoint a chief probation officer who, in turn, appoints deputy officers and support staff. See A.R.S. § 12-251(A). The deputy officers and staff provide presentence investigations for use by the sentencing judge. Id. In his motion to disqualify for cause, Defendant argued that a presiding judge's administrative duties thus create an inherent conflict because the sentencing judge must consider only aggravating factors proven beyond reasonable doubt by the state at the sentencing hearing. Presumably Defendant is arguing that the presiding judge might give the presentence report prepared by his appointees undue evidentiary weight. Both the Arizona and United States Constitutions guarantee the right to an impartial judge, free of bias and prejudice, within the right to a fair trial. See State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 442, 687 P.2d 1180, 1197, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1040, 105 S.Ct. 521, 83 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); see also Rule 10.1(a) (providing that prior to commencement of a hearing, a defendant is entitled to a change of judge if a fair and impartial hearing... cannot be had by reason of the interest or prejudice of the assigned judge); A.R.S. § 12-409(B) (grounds for change of judge include party's inability to obtain fair and impartial trial because of bias, prejudice, or interest of judge). Defendant apparently urges us to adopt a per se rule that presiding judges can never be free from interest in sentencing, and therefore defendants can never obtain a fair and impartial sentencing hearing from a presiding judge. We decline to adopt such a rule. In State v. Watkins, 125 Ariz. 570, 611 P.2d 923 (1980), we addressed a presiding judge's responsibilities to assign cases. In Watkins, the presiding judge had been successfully challenged for cause but exercised his administrative duty to reassign the case to another judge. We held that performance of this ministerial duty created no actual or apparent impropriety. Id. at 575, 611 P.2d at 928. Similarly, in this case, we see no inherent conflict between a presiding judge's administrative duties to supervise the probation department and his judicial duties to hold a fair and impartial sentencing hearing. We see no inherent reason for a presiding judge to give greater consideration to presentence reports simply because he oversees the probation department. Nor do we believe that probation officers necessarily will alter, consciously or otherwise, their reports for the presiding judge merely because he or she happens to supervise their department. We believe defendants can adequately attack actual conflicts arising in sentencing either by timely seeking a change of judge or challenging the presentence report.