Opinion ID: 2310706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A. Expunged Records

Text: Petitioner's flagship argument is that Respondent never should have been allowed to offer the testimony of the police officers who reviewed the expunged material because the language of the expungement statute, Md.Code (1996, Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.), Art. 27, § 737, supra note 1, clearly prohibits disclosure and review of the expunged material ... and the general policy concerns underlying the statute is to prevent situations such as this from arising. Petitioner's Br. at 20-21. Petitioner further contends that [n]o citizen who receives the extraordinary benefit of expungement should be subjected to the use of the expunged information to deprive him of gainful employment. Id. at 21. We granted certiorari in this case principally to consider important matters regarding the intent and scope of the investigatory files exception to the definition of police records provided for in the expungement statute [13] and the ramifications flowing from the expungement of the criminal case records in this case upon the related administrative action of Petitioner's dismissal from State employment. As presented in the petition for writ of certiorari, it appeared that the present case was an appropriate vehicle for this Court to explore this relatively uncharted territory. As occasionally happens, however, [14] we discovered, after briefing and oral argument, that the vehicle lacked a full tank of gas. Upon closer examination, the record of the present case provided a compelling and fundamental reason not to embark on our intended journey. Thus, we shall not address here these important questions concerning the expungement statute. Concomitantly, we shall neither bless nor curse the positions taken in the Court of Special Appeals's opinion directed to interpretation or application of the statute. Gigeous, 132 Md.App. at 496-502, 752 A.2d at 1243-46 (discussing Mora v. State, 123 Md. App. 699, 720 A.2d 934 (1998), aff'd on other grounds, 355 Md. 639, 735 A.2d 1122 (1999)). Although the admissibility of the officers' testimony is a question of law, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, the determination by the agency that the officers' testimony was not based on inadmissible evidence, i.e., expunged records, is a matter of the agency's fact-finding process, which is subject, on appellate review, to the [deferential] standard of substantial evidence. Gigeous, 132 Md.App. at 495-96, 752 A.2d at 1242-43. ALJ Seaton believed Officer Teare's testimony that he did not rely on, or refresh his recollection, as to any material fact from any police record that arguably fell within the scope of those records covered by the expungement statute or the District Court order in this case. ALJ Seaton's judgment call in this regard was quintessentially one involving the assessment of witness credibility. As the Court of Special Appeals concluded: [T]he circuit court correctly directed the ALJ to determine, on the remand of [Petitioner's] case, if the testimony offered by the police officers was based on information maintained in the investigative file or came from the police officers' independent recollection of the incident. The agency's decision concerning the officers' testimony is a question of fact and we must apply the clearly erroneous and substantial evidence tests. Gigeous, 132 Md.App. at 502, 752 A.2d at 1246. It is this latter partthe question of fact regarding the agency's decision concerning the well-spring of the officers' testimonyupon which our decision turns. To the extent the officers testified from something other than personal memory, it was as to inconsequential and collateral matters. Therefore, Petitioner's argument regarding the province of the expungement statute and the effect of the expungement order in Petitioner's criminal case, on this dismissal action, is not material to our decision on this record.