Opinion ID: 2017830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lack of Culpable Negligence

Text: Having decided that defendant's petition was indeed untimely under section 122-1, we must next address defendant's alternative contention, i.e., that even if the petition is deemed untimely, this court should affirm the circuit court's determination that the delay was not due to defendant's culpable negligence. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). In his petition, defendant alleged that he filed his postconviction petition in October, even though the Supreme Court had not yet then ruled on his petition for certiorari , due to the change in the law, which, beginning on July 1, 1995, requires that a Post-Conviction Petition be filed within three years of the imposition of the death penalty or within six months of the denial by the United States Supreme court of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, whichever is sooner. Moreover, in response to the State's motion to dismiss the petition, defendant alleged that when the legislature amended the statute in July 1995, his attorney on direct appeal contacted him and advised him that if defendant wished to institute postconviction proceedings he would now have to do so within three years after his conviction. Defendant attached an affidavit by his direct appeal counsel to his response to the State's motion to dismiss. In the affidavit, counsel stated that when the legislature amended the statute in July 1995 he so notified all of his incarcerated clients, including defendant. Counsel further averred that he advised defendant that he could not wait until certiorari was denied, but would have to file his postconviction petition within three years of his October 1992 sentencing. Counsel averred that he did not at any time advise defendant that there was any relevance to the date that this court's opinion on direct appeal was filed. Counsel also stated that his officethe supreme court unit of the office of the State Appellate Defenderassisted defendant in filing his October 1995 pro se petition. The circuit court found that defendant had made a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory requirements, and the delay was caused by defendant's reliance on the advice of his appellate counsel. The court found that, because of this reliance, the delay was not due to defendant's culpable negligence. Our inquiry, therefore, must focus on whether defendant's allegations as presented to the circuit court are sufficient to establish a lack of culpable negligence so as to avoid dismissal of the petition on the basis that it was time-barred. Defendant maintains that because he relied, in good faith, upon the advice of his appellate counsel and made a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory requirement, he was not culpably negligent in his late filing of that petition. Our resolution of this issue turns upon the meaning of the term culpable negligence contained in section 122-1. We note that the legislature did not define the term culpable negligence within the body of the Act. This court, however, in our recent decision in Boclair, spoke at length regarding the meaning of the term: Culpable negligence has been defined as `[n]egligent conduct that, while not intentional, involves a disregard of the consequences likely to result from one's actions.' Black's Law Dictionary 1056 (7th ed. 1999). Culpable negligence has also been defined as `something more than negligence' involving `an indifference to, or disregard of, consequences.' 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 19 (2000). Accord 1 R. Rawle, Bouvier's Law Dictionary 736 (3d rev. 1914) (stating that `culpable neglect would seem to convey the idea of neglect for which he was to blame as is ascribed to his own carelessness, improvidence or folly'). Our courts have interpreted the `culpable negligence' phrase consistently with these definitions. In People v. Wilson, 143 Ill.2d 236, 248, 157 Ill.Dec. 473, 572 N.E.2d 937 (1991), this court impliedly equated culpable negligence with recklessness. We approvingly cited an opinion of the highest court of the State of New York describing culpable negligence as a `conscious choice of a course of action, in disregard of the consequences' that might follow. Wilson, 143 Ill.2d at 248, 157 Ill.Dec. 473, 572 N.E.2d 937, quoting People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 140, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803-04, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 565 (1956). The culpable negligence phrase also appears in several state statutes and court rules e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-12013, 3-14044 (West 2000) (Counties Code); 65 ILCS 5/10-1-40 (West 2000) (Illinois Municipal Code); 70 ILCS 1210/30 (West 2000) (Park System Civil Service Act); 70 ILCS 1215/33 (West 2000) (Park Annuity and Benefit Fund Civil Service Act); 70 ILCS 2605/4.33 (West 2000) (Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act); 110 ILCS 70/46 (West 2000) (State Universities Civil Service Act); 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000) (Post-Conviction Hearing Act); 750 ILCS 50/5 (West 2000) (Adoption Act); 188 Ill.2d R. 606(c) (Supreme Court Rule 606(c)) and, in interpreting those statutes and rules, Illinois courts have almost uniformly held that culpable negligence entails something greater than ordinary negligence. For example, under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)), courts must often determine whether litigants have exercised due diligence or, conversely, have willfully disregarded the process of the court or were so indifferent to it that they should be chargeable with culpable negligence. See Pronto Two Ltd. v. Tishman Speyer Monroe Venture, 274 Ill.App.3d 624, 629, 210 Ill.Dec. 865, 653 N.E.2d 1327 (1995); Klein v. Steel City National Bank, 212 Ill.App.3d 629, 638, 156 Ill.Dec. 771, 571 N.E.2d 751 (1991); Cunningham v. Miller's General Insurance Co., 188 Ill.App.3d 689, 694, 135 Ill.Dec. 945, 544 N.E.2d 441 (1989); Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Mackworth Rees, Division of Avis Industrial, Inc., 99 Ill.App.3d 789, 55 Ill.Dec. 266, 426 N.E.2d 241 (1981). Likewise, other jurisdictions have defined `culpable negligence' in similar contexts. For example, in Holway v. Ames, 100 Me. 208, 60 A. 897 (1905), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine defined `culpable neglect' in an analogous context as `less than gross carelessness, but more than the failure to use ordinary care.' Holway, 100 Me. at 211, 60 A. at 898. In other contexts, other courts have defined culpable negligence as something more than mere neglect or more than a mere failure to use ordinary care. E.g., Ross v. Baker, 632 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla.App.1994) (holding that `[c]ulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others'); State v. Giordano, 138 N.H. 90, 95, 635 A.2d 482, 484 (1993) (stating that `[c]ulpable negligence is something more than ordinary negligence, mere neglect, or the failure to use ordinary careit is negligence that is censorious, faulty or blameable').    We find that the `culpably negligent' standard contained in section 122-1(c) contemplates something greater than ordinary negligence and is akin to recklessness. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d at 106-08. We continue to adhere to the definition enunciated in Boclair. This definition more than adequately ensures that the portion of the statute permitting a petitioner to file an untimely petition so long as he alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)) does not stand as empty rhetoric. Rather, the definition gives heft to the exception contained in section 122-1, an exception which this court has historically viewed as the special `safety valve' in the Act. People v. Bates, 124 Ill.2d 81, 88, 124 Ill.Dec. 407, 529 N.E.2d 227 (1988); see also People v. Wright, 189 Ill.2d 1, 8, 243 Ill.Dec. 198, 723 N.E.2d 230 (1999). Finally, this definition comports with our long-held view that the Act in general must be liberally construed to afford a convicted person an opportunity to present questions of deprivation of constitutional rights. People v. Correa, 108 Ill.2d 541, 546, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985), citing People v. Pier, 51 Ill.2d 96, 98, 281 N.E.2d 289 (1972). See also People v. Kitchen, 189 Ill.2d 424, 435, 244 Ill.Dec. 890, 727 N.E.2d 189 (1999) (acknowledging that the Act should not be so strictly construed that a fair hearing be denied and the purpose of the Act, i.e., the vindication of constitutional rights, be defeated). In our view, this construction of this portion of section 122-1 serves to further the laudable aims of the Act, and we will apply it to the case at bar. Applying the definition to the case at bar, we hold that defendant has established that the delay in filing was not the result of his culpable negligence. Defendant's conduct cannot fairly be labeled blameable or censorious, nor can it be said that defendant's actions evince an indifference to the consequences. Defendant remained in constant contact with his direct appeal counsel, whose advice and interpretation of the statute defendant had no reason to question. Defendant prepared his petition in what he had every reason to believe was a timely manner, in fact submitting it to the circuit court in advance of the date by which counsel had informed defendant the petition must be filed. The State does not dispute these facts, but rather argues that, such conduct notwithstanding, defendant was culpably negligent. We believe, however, that under the circumstances of this case, defendant did indeed establish that the untimeliness of the petition was not due to his culpable negligence. The circuit court in this case specifically found that defendant and his direct appeal counsel were not acting in bad faith with respect to preparing the petition for filing. The circuit court also found that it was reasonable for [defendant] to rely on that [date] when his lawyer told him that. After reviewing the facts of this case in conjunction with the Boclair definition of culpable negligence, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying the State's motion to dismiss the petition on timeliness grounds.
Having concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying the State's initial motion to dismiss on section 122-1 grounds, we turn to defendant's appellate contentions. As noted previously, both defendant's pro se and amended petitions contained numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In this appeal, as it was originally briefed to this court, however, defendant identifies only six claims of error, three of which concern the propriety of several rulings made by the circuit court during the postconviction proceedings. Defendant's final three claims concern the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty. Before we address the claims relating to the guilt phase of the proceedings, we believe it helpful to set out a somewhat detailed factual recitation of the events leading up to defendant's sentencing hearing.