Opinion ID: 1989023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Dr Gardner's Parental Alienation Syndrome Testimony

Text: Norma argues that Dr. Gardner's testimony did not satisfy the reliability requirements of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923) and, thus, should have been barred. In Frye, the court observed: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The general acceptance standard has been adopted by this court. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill.2d 173, 211, 139 Ill.Dec. 756, 549 N.E.2d 268 (1989). We have recently reaffirmed the applicability of that standard in Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill.2d 63, 77, 262 Ill.Dec. 854, 767 N.E.2d 314 (2002). The trial court will apply the Frye test only if the scientific principle, technique, or test offered by the expert to support his or her conclusion is new or novel. People v. Basler, 193 Ill.2d 545, 550-51, 251 Ill.Dec. 171, 740 N.E.2d 1 (2000). The trial court in this case made no specific finding on the issue of whether parental alienation syndrome is a new or novel principle. No Illinois reviewing court has considered the question of the general acceptance of PAS. Evidence at the Frye hearing established that the syndrome had been described in peer-reviewed literature dating from the late 1980s. Dr. Barden, the psychologist proffered as an expert on the issue of general acceptance in the field, testified that the term parental alienation syndrome is not a novel principle, being first referenced by the American Psychological Association in 1994. He testified that PAS is a recognized condition and generally accepted in the field of psychology. Whether PAS remains a new or novel concept several years after it was first described in the literature, the only evidence the trial court heard was that it is generally accepted in the field of psychology. Norma presented no evidence to the contrary. Despite Norma's failure to present any evidence in opposition to the PAS theory, Norma and her amici argue that PAS is junk science and cite cases from other jurisdictions rejecting its admissibility. See, e.g., Wiederholt v. Fischer, 169 Wis.2d 524, 485 N.W.2d 442 (App.1992); Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71, 84 (Ind.App.1997) (Chezem, J., concurring); People v. Loomis, 172 Misc.2d 265, 658 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1997). In People v. Fortin, 184 Misc.2d 10, 14, 706 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (2000), PAS testimony was proffered by the defendant in a rape prosecution. The trial court conducted a Frye hearing, noting that there was no existing authority in New York for the admission of PAS testimony and also noting a split in authority from other jurisdictions. Fortin, 184 Misc.2d at 13-14, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14. The defendant presented general acceptance testimony from Dr. Richard Gardner, described as the leading expert in the field. Fortin, 184 Misc.2d at 14, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 614. The court noted that Dr. Gardner testified on cross-examination: Although the concept of scientific proof may be of importance in such fields as chemistry, physics and biology, the concept is not as applicable in the field of psychology; especially with regard to issues being dealt with in such areas as child custody disputes, and sex abuse accusations. Fortin, 184 Misc.2d at 12, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 613. In Fortin, Dr. Gardner was the only witness who testified in support of the general acceptance of PAS. The court held that the defendant had not established that PAS had gained general acceptance in the professional community. Fortin, 184 Misc.2d at 15, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 614. Dr. Gardner and PAS have been harshly criticized by scholarly writers. See, e.g., C. Wood, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 1367 (June 1994); C. Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome & Parental Alienation: Getting it Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 Fam. L.Q. 527 (2001). Critics have pointed to many flaws in the theory and have challenged Dr. Gardner's expertise and motivation. While we acknowledge Norma's arguments on appeal, we note that no PAS critics testified at the Frye hearing in this case, nor was any other testimony presented in opposition to the general acceptance of PAS. We observe, however, that the evidence amply supported the trial court's conclusion that S.B. did not enjoy a close and continuing relationship with her father under section 602 (750 ILCS 5/602 (West 2002)). Moreover, the evidence showed that, as a result of the damaged relationship with her father, S.B. suffered emotional distress requiring therapy. In its ruling, the trial court announced that it would throw out the words `parental alienation syndrome.' In expressly disclaiming any reliance on the PAS theory, the trial court instead specifically applied the section 602 standard of the Act (750 ILCS 5/602 (West 2002)), finding that Norma interfered with S.B.'s ability to build a close and continuing relationship with her father. Accordingly, even though the trial court, in its pretrial ruling, found PAS generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, the record clearly demonstrates that Dr. Gardner's PAS testimony was not a basis for the trial court's judgment. Thus, we conclude that, whatever the merits of the PAS theory, the court's ruling was not dependent on any finding that PAS was present in this case. We therefore need not review the trial court's general acceptance determination and we express no opinion on the validity of that finding.