Opinion ID: 901903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Alleged flaws in Judge Neiles's analysis

Text: [¶ 21.] Gilmore's last attack is based on the claim of error in Judge Neiles's analysis and conclusion that probable cause existed for Judge Srstka to issue the warrant. [7] In the memorandum opinion, Judge Neiles stated in part: Review of the affidavit reveals that police had information from a known informant, not an anonymous tipster, and that information was specific as to the location to be searched and the drugs to be found. The tip was an admission against interest, in that the tipster was admit[ing] to a felony drug offense as part of the information provided. Defense counsel spends some time talking about the test to be applied in evaluating informant tips, citing Illinois v. Gates [.] However, counsel misstates when he claims [i]n the present case, the detective knew full well that he needed to corroborate the statements of his anonymous informant. Unlike Gates, where police had received a letter from an unknown tipster about drug trafficking, here the police knew the name of the person that was providing the information. He or she was not anonymous. As pointed out in Gates, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activitywhich if fabricated would subject him to criminal liabilitywe have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. ([C]itations omitted[.]) Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. Clearly the facts here fall squarely under this standard. The tipster here was perhaps not the unquestionably honest citizen mentioned in Gates (he or she was a drug user that had `slipped'), the explicit and detailed description of the sale of the drugs, the address, the name of the owner, the risk of criminal prosecution for making a false statement to police all add up to the police and ultimately, the court, giving his tip greater credence [than] it might otherwise have been allotted. Then, when added to this tip is the information, some of it going back a couple of years, of the defendant's long association with drug transactions, and his recent association with persons known by the police to be involved in the recent past with drug transactions, all add up to probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant. [¶ 22.] Gilmore's primary argument rests on the premise that because the circuit court wrongly concluded the CI's statements regarding the drug purchase from Gilmore were statements against interest, the court placed undue weight on the veracity prong of its analysis. Statements against interest are generally accorded greater weight because they implicate the informant in criminal activity. Gilmore asserts, however, that these were not statements against interest because purchasing drugs, unlike possessing or ingesting drugs, is not illegal in South Dakota. [8] Gilmore's argument is flawed in three basic respects. First, nowhere in the memorandum opinion does Judge Neiles specifically state that the statement against interest was limited to the purchase of drugs. Rather, he broadly states, The tip was an admission against interest, in that the tipster . . . admitted to a felony drug offense as part of the information provided. (Emphasis added.) That leads to the second point. Gilmore fails to recognize that the CI reported to law enforcement not only a purchase of meth from Gilmore, but also that the CI relapsed on the drug. The CI's relapse implies violations of South Dakota statutes by possessing and ingesting a controlled substance. See SDCL 22-42-5, 22-42-15. The CI also could have been prosecuted for a false report, if that were the case. The Supreme Court recognized: [I]f an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activitywhich if fabricated would subject him to criminal liabilitywe have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2330 (internal citation omitted). No one claims the CI is an unquestionably honest citizen, given his admitted drug relapse. However, the CI provided an explicit and detailed description of Gilmore's wrongdoingan older individual named Doug, who lived in a trailer house located at 4606 W. 16th Place in Sioux Falls, sold the CI one gram of crystal meth for $120 on March 19, 2007and because the CI was the buyer, the CI observed the event firsthand. Therefore, under Gates, the CI's tip is entitled to greater weight. [¶ 23.] Gilmore's argument is flawed in a third respect in that strict adherence to the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test is no longer required. The Gates Court explained: [T]he two-pronged test directs analysis into two largely independent channelsthe informant's veracity or reliability and his basis of knowledge. There are persuasive arguments against according these two elements such independent status. Instead, they are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability. Id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. Thus, if the information supporting the basis of knowledge prong is strong, the veracity prong need not be as well supported. Along the same lines mentioned above, the CI witnessed and actively participated in the criminal activity firsthand. Therefore, the basis of knowledge prong is supported by the best evidence available: firsthand knowledge. Even if we agreed with Gilmore's claim that the circuit court put too much weight on the veracity prong because it wrongly concluded that the purchase of an illegal substance is a violation of state law, we still fail to arrive at the conclusion that the affidavit was insufficient in establishing probable cause. [¶ 24.] In Raveydts, we borrowed language from Gates in identifying two elements crucial to the probable cause inquiry when an informant's tip was involved. 2004 SD 134, ¶ 11, 691 N.W.2d at 295. First, an `explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles [the informant's] tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.' Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2330). Second, the extent to which the tip is corroborated by the officer's own investigation is important. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 244, 103 S.Ct. at 2335). Both of these elements are met here. As mentioned before, the tip was explicit, detailed, and witnessed firsthand. Therefore, any deficiency in the veracity prong is compensated by the strong firsthand knowledge of the CI. Secondly, there was sufficient corroboration of the information by law enforcement thereby ensuring its reliability. Therefore, under our deferential standard of review, Judge Neiles's determination was appropriate.