Opinion ID: 1859529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the bar's petition for review

Text: The Bar seeks review of the referee's recommended sanction, arguing that a public reprimand is inappropriate under the facts of this case and that a three-year suspension is in order. Although a referee's findings of fact are given deference, our review of a referee's recommended discipline is more extensive, because this Court has the ultimate responsibility to determine the appropriateness of a recommended sanction. See Florida Bar v. Niles, 644 So.2d 504 (Fla.1994). However, we typically will not disapprove a referee's recommended discipline so long as the referee's recommendation has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw. See Florida Bar v. Lecznar, 690 So.2d 1284, 1288 (Fla. 1997). In this case, we conclude that in light of the duty violated and the injury caused by the misconduct, the referee's recommended discipline of a public reprimand does not have a reasonable basis in existing caselaw, and we therefore disapprove the recommended discipline. Cox argues that the referee's recommended sanction is supported by many cases involving misrepresentations in which public reprimands were imposed. [2] Having reviewed the cases cited by Cox, we find that these cases are distinguishable because the misrepresentations at issue in these cases either did not have a dramatic effect on the proceedings, [3] were less severe or less culpable than the instant case, [4] arose in uncontested disciplinary cases, [5] or were mitigated by unusual circumstances. [6] Cox also relies on our recent case of Florida Bar v. Feinberg, 760 So.2d 933 (Fla.2000), in which we publicly reprimanded an Assistant State Attorney for making false statements to defense counsel and for having direct contact with a defendant who was represented. We find that case distinguishable because Feinberg involved misrepresentations induced when a somewhat clever defendant indicated to Feinberg that he had discharged (or would be discharging) his attorney, and the defendant requested that Feinberg not reveal these conversations to his counsel based upon an alleged fear for the defendant's safety (due to the attorney's alleged contacts with the `drug community'). Id. at 939. Although Feinberg involved misrepresentations to opposing counsel, that case notably did not involve misrepresentations to the court or the knowing presentation of false testimony to a jury. Feinberg and the other cases cited by Cox do not support a public reprimand. The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provide a starting point for determining, in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, an appropriate discipline based on the duty violated and the potential or actual injury caused by the violation. As discussed above, the referee in this case initially determined that suspension was the presumed discipline under Standard 6.12; however, the Bar argues that Standards 6.11 and 7.1, which presume disbarment, apply in this case. Standard 6.11 provides: Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer: (a) with the intent to deceive the court, knowingly makes a false statement or submits a false document; or (b) improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding. The Bar concedes that subsection (a) was not presumptively appropriate because the referee found that Cox did not intend to deceive the United States District Court on any matter of substantial justice. The Bar instead argues that the referee did not give sufficient weight to subsection (b) of this standard and that Cox's improper withholding of material information posed a potentially serious injury to the defendant in the case. Furthermore, the Bar maintains that, the actual result, dismissal with prejudice, was a significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding. The Bar additionally contends that Standard 7.1 constitutes a proper starting point, insofar as it provides that [d]isbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. The Bar argues that Cox either acted for her own benefit to ensure the availability of a reluctant witness, or for the benefit of Jackson to ensure Jackson's anonymity and conceal her involvement in the case from her former husband. The Bar contends that the dismissal with prejudice of the criminal case constitutes a serious injury to the legal system. We agree that Standards 6.11 and 7.1 apply in this case and that, accordingly, disbarment and not suspension was the presumptive sanction. The referee found that, although Cox knew Jackson's real name, she introduced her to the court, jury, and defense counsel as Gracie Greggs; assisted the witness in concealing her true name from the court, jury and defense counsel; and assisted Jackson to testify falsely. These findings indicate that Cox improperly with[held] material information as described in Standard 6.11. Further, the indictment against Sterba was dismissed with prejudice and no appeal was taken. We can think of no greater significant ... adverse effect on the legal proceeding than a dismissal with prejudice of a criminal indictment due to a prosecutor's misconduct. Equally important, Cox's misconduct involved potentially serious injury to a party, namely the criminal defendant, Sterba, whose rights to a fair trial, confrontation, and due process would have been denied had Cox's misconduct not been revealed. As the United States District Court observed in dismissing the indictment, Cox either manufactured or accepted a plan to employ a fictitious name for Jackson and deploy that name in the service of the prosecution both before and during trial to further the prosecutorial goal of a conviction. The expectation was to proceed with the plan without the knowledge of the defense and without the knowledge or consent of the court. By that means, the AUSA [Cox] could secure for the prosecution the presumed benefit of a conviction of Sterba, while avoiding any presumably unnecessary and bothersome little entanglements with whatever lingering facts might impinge the credibility of her featured witness. ... [T]his plan was hatched with the notion that it would succeed, undetected and unimpaired. In this instance, success means jail for Sterba and a readily repeatable template for renewal in future occasions. The conception and implementation of this plan was intentional and calculated to deprive the defense of its right of confrontation. It almost succeeded. Sterba, 22 F.Supp.2d at 1340. We also deem application of Standard 7.1 appropriate under the facts as found by the referee. The referee found that Jackson was reluctant to return to Florida for trial because of a custody dispute with her former husband, and that Customs had assured Jackson that she would not have to testify at trial. The referee found that Cox listed the name Gracie Greggs for the confidential informant because of concerns for the witness, and acted (albeit without reflection) in what she thought was the best interest of her witness. Knowingly presenting false evidence is a violation of an attorney's professional duty, [7] and Cox's intent in doing so was to obtain a benefit for ... another, namely the witness, Jackson. As discussed, such conduct caused serious injury to the legal system and potentially serious injury to the defendant, Sterba. Thus, under the Standards, we view disbarment as the presumptive penalty in this case. Likewise, we also find disbarment to be the presumptive sanction under this Court's caselaw. Of all the cases cited by the parties, Florida Bar v. Agar, 394 So.2d 405 (Fla.1980), is the most instructive on the conduct at issue here. In Agar, the attorney knowingly elicited and presented false testimony as to the identity of a witness during a court proceeding. Although the witness in Agar was the wife in an uncontested divorce proceeding and the substance of her testimony was to prove an apparently uncontested and minor issue in those proceedings, this Court disapproved the referee's recommended suspension of four months and disbarred Agar, stating that [n]o breach of professional ethics, or of the law, is more harmful to the administration of justice or more hurtful to the public appraisal of the legal profession than the knowledgeable use by an attorney of false testimony in the judicial process. When it is done it deserves the harshest penalty. Agar, 394 So.2d at 406 (quoting Dodd v. Florida Bar, 118 So.2d 17, 19 (Fla.1960)). Because there is no discussion in Agar of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, we conclude that Agar stands for the proposition that absent any mitigating or aggravating factors, disbarment is the presumptive sanction for an attorney knowingly presenting false testimony in a judicial proceeding. Although disbarment is the presumptive penalty, we are mindful of the substantial mitigation found by the referee. However, in support of its argument for a three-year suspension, the Bar recommends that we consider Cox's role as a prosecutor in aggravation, arguing that the list of aggravating factors in Standard 9.22 is not all-inclusive. Although we decline to formally characterize Cox's role as a prosecutor as an aggravating factor, we find that Cox's failure to abide by a prosecutor's duty to ensure the fairness of a criminal proceeding is essential to evaluating the gravity of the duty violated in this case. The tenor of the caselaw discussing the role of prosecutors makes clear that prosecutors are held to the highest standard because of their unique powers and responsibilities. The United States Supreme Court observed over sixty years ago that a prosecutor has responsibilities beyond that of an advocate, and has a higher duty to assure that justice is served: The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.... He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Thus, a prosecutor has a duty not only to fairly present the evidence and permit the jury to come to a fair and impartial verdict, Pendarvis v. State, 752 So.2d 75, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), but also properly functions in a quasi-judicial capacity with reference to the accused ... to, see that the accused is accorded a fair and impartial trial. Gonzalez v. State, 97 So.2d 127, 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1957). By the nature of their position, prosecutors direct the power of the government against an accused person. See Ruiz v. State, 743 So.2d 1, 8-9 (Fla. 1999) (reversing conviction and vacating death sentence in part due to prosecutors' attempt to tilt the playing field ... by invoking the immense power, prestige, and resources of the State). Therefore, prosecutors must be ever mindful of their awesome power and concomitant responsibility... [to] reflect a scrupulous adherence to the highest standards of professional conduct. Martin v. State, 411 So.2d 987, 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see also DeFreitas v. State, 701 So.2d 593, 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (prosecutor must seek justice with the circumspection and dignity the occasion calls for). A criminal prosecution is not a game where the prosecution can declare, `It's for me to know and for you to find out,' Craig v. State, 685 So.2d 1224, 1229 (Fla.1996), and a prosecutor is duty-bound to remember that obtaining a conviction at the expense of a fair trial is not justice. Briggs v. State, 455 So.2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). A prosecutor's heightened duties are likewise reflected in the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. Rule 4-3.8 is entitled Special responsibilities of a prosecutor. Although the Bar did not charge a violation of this rule, the commentary to the rule provides that [a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.8, cmt. Additionally, Standard 5.2 specifically provides a special set of standards for attorney conduct where the attorney is in an official or government position, Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 5.2, which clearly encompasses prosecutors on both state and federal levels. We considered these high standards in the recent Feinberg case, discussed above, by observing that [t]ruth is critical in the operation of our judicial system and we find such affirmative misrepresentations by any attorney, but especially one who represents the State of Florida, to be disturbing. Feinberg, 760 So.2d at 939. When a prosecutor fails in these duties and violates an individual's constitutional rights, a prosecutor not only may be admonished by the trial court, but should expect to be subject to disciplinary proceedings by The Florida Bar. Boatwright v. State, 452 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (Glickstein, J., concurring specially). The purpose of lawyer discipline is threefold. First, lawyer discipline must protect the public from unethical conduct but at the same time not deny the public the services of a qualified attorney. See Florida Bar v. Pahules, 233 So.2d 130, 132 (Fla.1970). In this case, the referee found, based on the testimony of many distinguished jurists, attorneys, and others that Cox is a hardworking prosecutor who is dedicated to justice and serving the public, and that the conduct in the instant case is an aberration in an otherwise unblemished career. However, Cox failed to heed her duty to represent the public fairly and justly in her role as a prosecutor, and damaged the public by undermining the confidence in the very core of the judicial processthe search for truth. The public clearly deserves protection from a prosecutor who determines on her own when and how to follow the rules. The United States District Court described this breach thus: In short, [Cox] arrogated to herself the legal and moral authority to decide what truth became public and, thereby, what fate awaited Sterba. [Cox] substituted herself for the judge, jury, and defense, in effect, making away with the fact-finding machinery. Sterba, 22 F.Supp.2d at 1340. The public expects and deserves fairness and candor from attorneys, especially from a prosecutor who has the power and responsibility derived from representing the government. If we are to preserve the credibility of our self-regulated profession, we must address breaches of that trust in a manner that is commensurate with the severity of the breach. Second, the discipline must be fair to the attorney, with the object of correcting the wayward tendency in the accused lawyer while offering to [the lawyer] a fair and reasonable opportunity for rehabilitation. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Ruskin, 126 So.2d 142, 144 (Fla.1961). Cox's previously unsullied reputation and this apparently isolated lack of judgment support the conclusion that Cox must be given the opportunity to rehabilitate herself. Finally, lawyer discipline must operate as an effective deterrent to other lawyers who might be prone or tempted to become involved in like violations. See Florida Bar v. Lord, 433 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1983). The only effective deterrent to the conduct at issue in this case is a suspension with the requirement that rehabilitation be proven prior to reinstatement. Were we to impose a suspension with automatic reinstatement, we would fail in our duty to deter others, because [a] mere suspension for a fixed period of time, with the assurance of automatic reinstatement at the end of the prescribed period, does not impose upon the lawyer the responsibility of taking affirmative action during the period of suspension in order to gain readmittance at the end of the period. Ruskin, 126 So.2d at 144. We warn that we will not hesitate to deal harshly with such misconduct in the future, and trust that our decision here will have the desired effect of deterring this type of disregard for the rules of our profession that directly impact the administration of justice.