Opinion ID: 206451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Systems Painters's Removal Was Timely

Text: Knudson first argues that the district court erred in denying his remand motion because Systems Painters's notice of removal was not timely. The removal statutes provide a thirty-day deadline by which a defendant must file a notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The event that triggers the running of this thirty-day deadline depends upon whether the case stated by the initial pleading is removable. Id. Both parties agree that this case, as stated by the initial pleading, was not removable. Thus, the running of the thirty-day deadline was triggered whenand ifSystems Painters received through service or otherwise, . . . a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it may first [have been] ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. Id. The district court ruled that Systems Painters's notice of removal was timely, and we review this ruling de novo. Lovern v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.3d 160, 161 (4th Cir.1997). On appeal, Knudson argues that when Systems Painters received Knudson's complaint on July 1, 2008, it could have ascertained that the case was removable because it could have ascertained that diversity of citizenship existed [2] and that the amount-in-controversy requirement was met. Systems Painters argues that it could not ascertain whether Knudson's action satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement until November 13, 2008, when it received records from Missouri's Department of Workers' Compensation which quantified some of Knudson's alleged damages. In response, Knudson argues that even though his complaint did not explicitly state that the case met the amount-in-controversy requirement, Systems Painters had to glean from the general allegations of damages [in his complaint] whether a jury could conceivably render a verdict in excess of $75,000. Knudson argues that since he alleged in his complaint that he suffered permanent lung damage and that he will be unable to be gainfully employed in the future, it is apparent that a jury could conceivably render a verdict in his favor in excess of $75,000. This case raises a similar issue to the one we faced in In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896 (8th Cir.2000). In that case, a Missouri plaintiff brought a personal-injury action against a Virginia defendant in Missouri state court. Id. at 897. The plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering, permanent disability, and wage loss, but the plaintiff's complaint did not explicitly disclose the amount of damages sought. The defendant removed the case to federal court. The plaintiff filed a motion to remand, arguing that the defendant's removal was untimely because he filed his removal notice more than thirty days after he received a copy of the plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 897. We disagreed that the defendant's removal was untimely and stated, We find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount. Id. at 897; see also Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 624 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2010) (approvingly citing In re Willis and stating that the Second Circuit join[s] the Eighth Circuit . . . in holding that the removal clock does not start to run until the plaintiff serves the defendant with a paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought). This rule, we noted, `promotes certainty and judicial efficiency by not requiring courts to inquire into what a particular defendant may or may not subjectively know.' In re Willis, 228 F.3d at 897 (quoting Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir.1992)). Thus, in In re Willis, we rejected Knudson's argument that Systems Painters had to glean the amount in controversy from Knudson's complaint. See also Moltner, 624 F.3d at 37 (rejecting argument that the removal clock runs from the service of the complaint, even where the complaint does not specify the amount of monetary damages sought, when the defendant can reasonably discern from the complaint that the damages sought will meet the amount-in-controversy requirement). Knudson notes that Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 55.19 prohibits him from explicitly stating the amount in controversy in his complaint. However, the plaintiffs in In re Willis and Moltner faced the same restriction. Moreover, despite this restriction, there were other ways Knudson could have triggered the running of § 1446(b)'s thirty-day deadline. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (noting that the defendant's receipt, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper triggers the running of the thirty-day deadline). Therefore, since Knudson's complaint did not explicitly state the amount in controversy, Knudson's complaint did not trigger the running of § 1446(b)'s thirty-day deadline. Knudson points to no other event that triggered the running of the deadline that would have made Systems Painters's notice of removal untimely. [3] Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Systems Painters's removal notice was timely.