Opinion ID: 2051749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: What procedural safeguards are attendant upon state interference with property interests in continuous employment and wages, and were those safeguards clearly established in 1990?

Text: ¶ 63. The defendants argue that neither of these property interests are protected by the constitution, relying upon the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Gilbert in which the Court wrote that although it had previously held that public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due process, [it has] not had occasion to decide whether the protections of the Due Process Clause extend to discipline of tenured employees short of termination. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 928-29 (internal citations omitted). The defendants suggest that this statement by the Court in 1997 dispositively demonstrates that the law in 1990 did not clearly establish a tenured employee's right to due process prior to discipline short of termination. ¶ 64. We disagree. As early as 1972, federal law clearly established that a property interest arises for the purposes of the due process clause, that is, the property interest is constitutionally protected, if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support [a] claim of entitlement to the benefit. . . . Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601 (emphasis supplied). Wisconsin Stat. § 230.34(1)(a) provides these rules, and, accordingly, the due process clause protections must accompany demotions and suspensions with pay. See Williams v. Com. of Ky., 24 F.3d 1526, 1538 (6th Cir. 1994)(Supreme Court cases decided before [May 1991] are clear that [statutes providing that classified employees can't be dismissed, demoted, suspended or otherwise penalized except for cause] create property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.); see also Sower v. City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 737 F.2d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1984) (firefighters who by statute and ordinance could not be demoted without just cause had a property interest which they could not be deprived of without due process of law). ¶ 65. Therefore, since Arneson had a property interest in both the wages which are commensurate with his MIS 3 position and in continuous employment within the MIS 3 position, and these property interests were clearly established in 1990, they were protected by the Due Process Clause and the State could not interfere with them without according him the process he was due. ¶ 66. Once it is determined that the Due Process clause applies, `the question remains what process is due.' Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). The amount of process due is a matter of federal constitutional law. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. ¶ 67. So far, we have concluded that Arneson had property interests which were protected by the due process clause. However, this finding does not sufficiently identify the precise nature of the claimed constitutional violation. To present a cognizable claim, Arneson must also show that the amount of due process that defendants were required to accord him was clearly established in 1990. ¶ 68. It is not enough that Arneson allege a violation of a constitutional right in the abstract. The constitutional right alleged to be violated must be specific. As the Supreme Court has stressed, the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said of any other constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of clearly established law were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the objective legal reasonableness that is the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). ¶ 69. `In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty without due process of lawwithout adequate procedures' that is unconstitutional. D'Acquisto v. Washington, 640 F.Supp. 594, 606 (1986)(quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 678-679 (1986)(Stevens, J., concurring)(emphasis in the original)). If the adequacy of procedures attendant upon a suspension and demotion were not clearly established in 1990, then the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. [6] ¶ 70. In order to show that the law was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes, [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right. . .[I]n light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; see also McGrath, 44 F.3d at 570. [T]he `clearly established law' must be sufficiently analogous [to the plaintiff's current situation] to provide the public official with guidance as to the lawfulness of his or her conduct. Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 408. The law must be clear in relation to the specific facts confronting an official at the time of the official's action. Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1209 (citing Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1987)). ¶ 71. In this particular case, we must decide whether a reasonable official would have know that the holding of an informal meeting, before which Arneson knew that a particular female subordinate employee had made a complaint against him concerning sexual harassment, and during which Arneson was asked specific questions regarding his interest in taking photos of the employee and her sister and was told nothing about the employee's allegations except to the extent that they were corroborated by Arneson's statements, and Arneson was informed of a broad range of discipline that could result from the complaint near the end of the meeting, violated clearly established due process rights that were to be accorded an employee prior to suspension and demotion. See Price v. Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 107). ¶ 72. Arneson relies almost exclusively upon Loudermill as clearly established law that at a minimum, he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond, to the charges prior to his discipline. In Loudermill, the Court held that prior to termination, [t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral and written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. Id. As the Court explained: An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property `be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). We have described `the root requirement' of the Due Process Clause as being `that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.' Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)(emphasis in the original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971). This principle requires `some kind of hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542. ¶ 73. The defendants disagree with Arneson that Loudermill is dispositive and argue that the facts of Loudermill are not sufficiently analogous to the circumstances then facing the defendants to make them aware that they would violate his constitutional rights by providing the process that they in fact gave him. They argue that the minimum due process requirements as set forth in Loudermill are applicable only where a person is terminated from his or her tenured position. Therefore, Loudermill is not clearly established law on the question before this court because Arneson was not terminated from his employment. ¶ 74. We agree with the defendants that Loudermill does not involve property interests which are as significant as one's continued employment, and therefore Loudermill does not clearly establish the process due an employee disciplined short of termination. The Court's discussion in Loudermill foreshadowed this conclusion when it stated that '[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings' Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)). ¶ 75. We do recognize that a 30-days suspension without pay and a permanent reduction in pay of nearly $3 per hour is a significant property interest that must be safeguarded. However, it is not as significant as the severity of depriving someone of the means of livelihood, as is the result in a termination. ¶ 76. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that due process is a flexible concept in that its requirements vary depending on the circumstances of each case. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 930 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481). It is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Id. (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). Indeed, the Court's decisions, including its decision in Loudermill, have recognized that the determination of what process is due includes the balancing of three distinct factors: 'First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest.' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 931-32; see also Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-543. ¶ 77. Because balancing of competing interest is necessary, plaintiffs face a high hurdle in demonstrating that the law is clearly established in any given case. The federal circuit courts of appeals have observed that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interests may make it more difficult to find the law `clearly established.' Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992)(citations omitted). And as the Seventh Circuit has explained: it would appear that there is one type of constitutional rule, namely that involving the balancing of competing interests, for which the standard may be clearly established, but its application is so fact dependent that the law can rarely be considered clearly established. In determining due-process requirements for discharging a government employee, for example, the courts must carefully balance the competing interests of the employee and the employer in each case. Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that one can only proceed on a case-by-case basis and that no all encompassing procedure may be set forth to cover all situations. It would appear that, whenever a balancing of interest is required, the facts of the existing case law must closely correspond to the contested action before the defendant official is subject to liability under the [sic] Harlow. . . [Q]ualified immunity typically casts a wide net to protect government officials from damage liability whenever balancing is required. Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). ¶ 78. Of course, that balancing is required is not to say that defendants will always be entitled to qualified immunity, for there are some circumstances in which the law is so clearly established as to leave no doubt in an official's mind that his or her action would violate a constitutional right. For instance, given Loudermill, where the state has no arguably significant interest in quick discipline, a tenured employee's interest in continued employment is of such significance that he or she must receive the requirements of Loudermill. But as we have already noted, the facts of the instant case are not sufficiently analogous to those in Loudermill for that case to present the defendants with clearly established law on the circumstances they then faced. ¶ 79. Arneson argues that he has identified closely analogous law which established in April 1990 that property rights are implicated in suspensions and demotions. To the extent that he argues that suspensions and demotions are property interests protected by the Due Process Clause, we agree. However, the cases are not closely analogous law on the question of how much due process the defendants were required to give him. Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 2d 513, 520-23, 289 N.W.2d 259 (1980), Hanson v. Madison Services Corp., 150 Wis. 2d 828, 840-46, 443 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1989), and McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 1989), each involve employees who were terminated, not disciplined short of termination, and discuss, as does Loudermill, pretermination due process requirements. They are, as is Loudermill, not clearly analogous on the question the defendants faced. And while Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trustees of Connecticut State Univ., 850 F.2d 70 (2nd Cir. 1988), and Gillard v. Norris, 857 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1988), both involve employees who were disciplined short of termination, neither establishes the minimum process due such an employeeat best they stand for the proposition that some due process must be provided an employee, and even then the court in Gillard held that a suspension without pay for three days was de minimus and entitled the employee to no procedural safeguards. Id. at 1098. ¶ 80. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Williams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526 (1994), provides us with a helpful inquiry into a qualified immunity defense under circumstances similar to those here. In Williams, the court was faced with the question of whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity when they did not give the process due under Loudermill prior to demoting an employee. The court agreed with the defendants in the action that [b]ecause the process due varies with the quality and extent of the deprivation of a property right. . . Loudermill did not clearly establish that [plaintiff] had a right to notice and hearing before her demotion. Id. at 1539. The court wrote: 'Not every deprivation of liberty or property requires a predeprivation hearing or a federal remedy.' Ramsey v. Board of Educ., 844 F.2d 1268, 1272 (6th Cir. 1988). In fact, the Loudermill Court noted that `[t]here are, of course, some situations in which a postdeprivation hearing will satisfy due process requirements. ' Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 n.7, [] (citing Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, [] (1950) and North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 [] (1908)). Because determining what process is due in a given case involves the balancing of several interests, including the nature of the property interest involved, we cannot say that a reasonable public official should have known from the Loudermill case that its requirement of notice and hearing prior to termination of employment applied with equal force to a demotion. Id. Since it did not believe that Loudermill was the closely analogous case required to clearly establish the law, the court then searched for opinions of its own circuit, and the opinions of other circuits, to find a case that did clearly establish that Loudermill predeprivation requirements apply to demotions. ¶ 81. The court found unhelpful the two cases decided by its own circuit which merely state the rule of Loudermill and determine that the rule was complied with in those cases. Id. at 1540. It also found that in two other circuits (First and Fifth), that through dicta they had indicated without discussion that they would apply Loudermill to demotions. Id. at 1541. These cases were also considered not to have clearly established federal law on the question. ¶ 82. The court did find two cases from outside the Sixth Circuit in which district courts, following a balancing of the competing interests, found that a tenured public employee is entitled to a Loudermill hearing before being demoted. Id. (citing Williams v. City of Seattle, 607 F. Supp. 714, 720-21 (W.D. Wash. 1985); DelSignore v. DiCenzo, 767 F. Supp. 423, 427-28 (D.R.I. 1991)). However, it found that these two decisions were not `so clearly foreshadowed by' Loudermill or opinions in [the Sixth Circuit] `as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that' not giving a tenured employee notice and hearing before a demotion would violate the employee's due process rights. Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 83. We have found that Seventh Circuit cases, decided following Arneson's discipline, serve as evidence that the due process requirements attendant upon deprivations of property interests less significant than continued employment may be less than that required of Loudermill for terminated employees. In Domiano v. Village of River Grove, 904 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit considered whether providing a tenured employee the courtesy of a telephone call before termination was a violation of the employee's right to a pretermination hearing. The court found that such a violation had occurred, but it also intimated that without running afoul of the due process clause, the employer could have suspended the employee without a hearing until he had an opportunity to respond. Id. at 1149. And had the employer provided the employee with a post-termination hearing, the court stated that the necessary scope of its pretermination hearing would also have been narrower. Id. ¶ 84. In another case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly partook of the balancing of interests under the test in Mathews. In Chaney v. Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority, 52 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995), the court reviewed the due process procedures required to support a suspension of a bus driver who was involved in an accident. Following the accident, and without a hearing, the bus driver was suspended immediately without pay pending the results of alcohol and drug tests. Id. at 626. Even after the results of the test proved that the driver had not been under the influence of either substance, his suspension and the investigation continued. Id. ¶ 85. After weighing the three Mathews' factors, and concluding that the state had a greater interest in the safety of the public than the driver in his continuous employment, the court held that the prior notification to the driver that he would remain suspended pending further investigation was deemed sufficient due process under the circumstances: [W]e have little trouble concluding that due process did not mandate giving [the driver] additional notice or a hearing before [the employer] suspended him. The [driver's] interest in avoiding a suspension is significant. Nonetheless, the [driver] was on notice as to why he was being suspended and [the employer's] interest in both managerial efficiency and in public safety clearly outweigh [the driver's] interest in a presuspension hearing. The Constitution does not mandate additional protections at this stage. Id. at 628. ¶ 86. While both of the Seventh Circuit cases, and Williams in the Sixth Circuit, were decided following the defendants' discipline of Arneson and cannot be used to show whether the law was clearly established in 1990, they do serve as evidence that in 1990 the breadth of Loudermill was unclear as to the question of the necessary process due an employee prior to discipline short of termination. As the court in Williams stated: Although Loudermill's analysis should be applied to determine if [the plaintiff] was entitled to a predeprivation hearing, it is not yet clear how this analysis would come out in the demotion setting as opposed to the discharge setting. Loudermill recognized that there are some property interests for which a postdeprivation hearing will satisfy due process, but by balancing the competing interests the Court found that a predeprivation hearing must be provided before a tenured public employee is discharged. In a demotion case the balancing of competing interests may or may not compel a different result. Williams, 24 F.3d at 1541. ¶ 87. We cannot say that given the ambiguity of the case law governing suspensions and demotions in 1990 that the unlawfulness of not providing a predemotion or presuspension hearing would have been apparent to a reasonable official at the time Arneson was disciplined. See Williams, 24 F.3d at 1541. [7] ¶ 88. Under the specific circumstances of this case, we find that in 1990, federal law did not clearly establish the amount of due process a tenured employee was entitled to receive prior to being suspended and demoted. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Although we agree with the result reached by the court of appeals, we do so on different grounds. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. ¶ 89. CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON did not participate.