Opinion ID: 658342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pain: Dray's credibility

Text: 22 The hearing officer recognized that Dray has a permanent neurologic impairment related to his surgery and continuing pain. Nonetheless, she found incredible Dray's claims that he can perform no more than six hours of activity in an eight-hour day and that he needs to alternate between sitting, standing, walking, and elevating his feet. Decision of the Hearing Officer at 16. Accordingly, she determined at the fifth step of the disability analysis that Dray retained a residual functional capacity for light work. 3 Dray argues that in making this finding, the hearing officer improperly disregarded his complaints of pain. 23 On November 14, 1991, the Secretary of Health and Human Services began to apply revised regulations for use in evaluation of a claimant's allegations of pain: [W]e will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statement. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1529(c)(2) (1992). This regulation, which clarifies the one it replaces, see Pope, 998 F.2d at 482, was in effect when the Board affirmed and adopted the hearing officer's decision in May 1992, but not when the hearing officer issued her opinion in May 1991. Because the court evaluates decisions of the Board to determine whether they are based on proper legal criteria, Hayes, 966 F.2d at 302, we must consider its adoption in light of the clarifying regulation, even though prior interpretations were in effect at the time that the hearing officer rendered her decision. 24 The hearing officer found that Dray's characterizations of his limitations were unsupported by (1) the fact that he does not use painkillers, and (2) Dray's testimony regarding his activities both prior to and after surgery. The court need not consider Dray's use of medications because Sec. 404.1529(c)(2) makes the absence of objective medical evidence a necessary but not sufficient condition to support a finding of not disabled. But, even under the new regulation, the petitioner's credibility figures decisively in our decision whether a denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Although we cannot discredit a complaint of pain simply because objective medical evidence was not introduced to support the extent of pain, neither are we required to give full credit to every statement of pain, and require a finding of disabled every time a claimant states that she feels unable to work. Pope, 998 F.2d at 486. 25 We will affirm credibility determinations unless the petitioner demonstrates that they are patently wrong. Herr, 912 F.2d at 182 (quotations and citation omitted). A reviewing court generally will not disturb a credibility judgment because the trier of fact is in a unique position to observe and to evaluate witnesses. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); accord Clark v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 175, 178 (7th Cir.1989); Walker, 834 F.2d at 641. But when objective inconsistency or fundamental implausibility is at issue, the hearing officer has no special advantage over a reviewing court in determining credibility. Thomas, 801 F.Supp. at 70 (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. at 1512). In contrast, credibility determinations also can be based on intangible and unarticulable elements which impress the [fact finder and] unfortunately leave 'no trace that can be discerned in this or any transcript that we review.'  Kelley v. Sullivan, 890 F.2d 961, 964 (7th Cir.1989) (citation omitted). In that case, the court should not disturb a credibility determination. See also Pearce v. Sullivan, 871 F.2d 61, 64 (7th Cir.1989) (credibility determinations are essentially unassailable). 26 Dray at no time indicated during the hearing that he was having trouble sitting for any significant period of time. His demeanor there was significant because the hearing officer can rely on his own observations during a hearing concerning the severity of a claimant's pain. Such observations are credibility determinations and are entitled to considerable weight. Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 788 (7th Cir.1982). He testified that he spent his days pursuing his education, running errands, mowing the lawn, visiting, checking on rental properties, doing light housework and paying bills. Also, Dray stated that he needed to put his feet up daily. His wife, however, could not recall witnessing Dray do so on a regular basis. Moreover, Dray reported being able to drive for an hour at a time. 27 In light of this evidence, the hearing officer surmised after consulting with a vocational expert that Dray was able to do light work. In so concluding, she found that Dray experienced some degree of pain yet, given his daily regimen, was not disabled. There is nothing anomalous about a hearing officer finding a claimant's testimony to be generally credible but still determining that he is not impaired in the manner he claims to be. Cf. Ehrhart, 969 F.2d at 539; Imani on behalf of Hayes v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 508, 511-12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988, 107 S.Ct. 580, 93 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). Even if objective medical evidence partially supports complaints of pain, the hearing officer is free to conclude that the claimant is less than credible and may be exaggerating the extent to which his discomfort prevents him from performing certain kinds of jobs or restricts his activities apart from work. Lee v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir.1993). Dray has not borne his burden that this conclusion is patently wrong.