Opinion ID: 1897396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: prior restraints on core speech

Text: [¶ 12] The Supreme Court has explained that [t]he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101-02, 60 S.Ct. 736. The concept of prior restraint refers to administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993) (quoting M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, 4-14 (1984)). Writing a dissent in Alexander, Justice Kennedy stated, In its simple, most blatant form, a prior restraint is a law which requires submission of speech to an official who may grant or deny permission to utter or publish it based upon its contents. Id. at 566, 113 S.Ct. 2766; see also Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469 (1957) (stating that prior restraints must be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed licensing or censorship). [¶ 13] Because prior restraints have an immediate and irreversible sanction of suppressing speech before it occurs, there is a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 589, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) ( Brennan, J. concurring); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Prior restraints on speech can be unconstitutional, even if subsequent redress of harm is not prohibited. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 714, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Prior restraints are only upheld in exceptional circumstances where the restraint prevents the disclosure of information that would cause irreparable damage to the country in a time of war or would incite violence, see id. at 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, or where, in the case of obscenity, procedural safeguards are in place to reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally protected speech, see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975). [¶ 14] The Commission Rule's requirement that educational materials be submitted to the Commission three weeks prior to dissemination constitutes a prior restraint on core speech. [7] See Organization for a Better Austin, 402 U.S. at 418-20, 91 S.Ct. 1575 (invalidating order enjoining organization from distributing leaflets in the town critical of local real estate agent as a prior restraint on speech). Section 6(B) of the Commission Rule requires T & D facilities to submit their education materials to the Commission for informational purposes only ... whenever possible, at least three weeks ... prior to disseminating the materials to the public. Presumably, the T & D facility cannot disseminate the materials during this three week period. Thus, although the Commission's restriction on the publication of the materials is temporary, it nevertheless is a prior restraint on the utilities' speech. [¶ 15] Section 6(B) of the Commission Rule applies when a public hearing is concluded within the three week period and the Commission determines that corrections to the educational materials are warranted. After receiving the materials, the Commission will conduct a summary investigation to decide if a public hearing is needed to evaluate whether the subject matter of the materials is appropriate for publication. See Commission Rule § 6(C). If a public hearing is held and the Commission determines that the materials are misleading, inaccurate, or deceptive, the Commission will require the T & D facility to correct the portions of the educational materials of which the Commission disapproves. Id. If the hearing is completed within the three week period and changes are necessary, the T & D facility will be required to correct its materials prior to their initial dissemination. [8] As is contended in the amicus curiae brief, In effect, the [Commission] does not want any speech to go to consumers regarding restructuring and retail access unless it is speech with which [it] agrees.  [¶ 16] The Commission contends that the phrase whenever possible precludes the Rule from being characterized as a prior restraint. Prior restraints are prohibited because they have the effect of suppressing speech before it occurs. See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559, 589, 96 S.Ct. 2791. The whenever possible language will not alter that effect. CMP does not know how the Commission will interpret the phrase whenever possible. To ensure it has complied with the Commission Rule, CMP must submit the materials three weeks prior to the dissemination or justify its failure to do so. [¶ 17] The Commission further contends that section 6(B) does not constitute a prior restraint because the Rule and the applicable statute do not impose any sanctions for noncompliance and the Rule explicitly provides that the submission is for informational purposes only. That phrase does not save the Commission Rule from being characterized as a prior restraint. The Commission's comments to section 6(B) of the Rule, as the comments appear in the Commission's order provisionally adopting the Rule, state: The purpose of subsection 6(B) is to inform the Commission prior to implementation of utility-sponsored educational activities so that the Commission can work with the utility to avoid inconsistent or contrary educational messages. We note that although the provision does not require approval by the Commission, we would expect the utility to cooperate with the Commission in redrafting messages to avoid confusion to consumers. As CMP contends, because of the ongoing nature of the regulatory relationship between T & D facilities and the Commission, the language of section 6(B) of the Commission Rule, when combined with the language of sections 6(C) and 7, is essentially the same as a requirement of Commission approval. Although there is nothing to suggest that the Commission has or will misuse its power in this area, coercion, persuasion and intimidation could effectively suppress speech even though formal legal sanctions are not available or are not utilized. [9] See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-67, 68-70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963) (prior restraint even though entity `free' to ignore the Commission's notices, in the sense that [its] refusal to `cooperate' would have violated no law.). Section 6(B) of the Commission Rule constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on core speech. [10]