Opinion ID: 1859103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion For New Trial: Proceedings in Dunster I

Text: At the time of Dunster's trial and direct appeal, prisoners were prohibited access to their Department of Correctional Services (DCS) medical records. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-178(2) (Reissue 1995). In 2001, the Legislature amended § 83-178 to allow access to the records in certain circumstances. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-178(2) (Cum. Supp. 2004). After receiving his records, Dunster alleged that information in them showed that he was incompetent to plead guilty and to proceed pro se at trial. Because Dunster's arguments about newly discovered evidence focus on the trial court's factual findings when Dunster entered his guilty pleas and was allowed to proceed pro se, we repeat and paraphrase pertinent facts from Dunster I, adding additional facts when necessary: Sometime in the early morning hours of May 10, 1997, Dunster strangled his cellmate with an electrical cord. The cellmate's body was discovered later that day. In July 1997, the district court appointed the Lancaster County public defender's office to represent Dunster. Attorney Michael Gooch from that office appeared on Dunster's behalf. Dunster stood mute at his November 1998 arraignment, and the court entered pleas of not guilty. In June 1999, the trial judge received a letter from Dunster requesting that the public defender's office be disqualified as his counsel. The court held a hearing on the issues raised by Dunster's letter. In the letter, Dunster stated, 'I have instructed them [the public defender's office] not to investigate or present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase. . . . I've told my attorneys I do not want them investigating these issues, but they tell me that, notwithstanding my desires, they're going to investigate them anyway.' Dunster I, 262 Neb. at 333, 631 N.W.2d at 888. The court stated to Dunster, '[Y]our feeling is that they're not following your directions, therefore you want them discharged.' Dunster responded, 'Exactly.' Id. at 333-34, 631 N.W.2d at 888. The court then began discussing the issue with Gooch. During this discussion, Dunster interjected, saying: [Dunster]: I think I can solve this whole thing. THE COURT: That would be nice. [Dunster]: Okay. Disqualify the public defenders; let me withdraw my plea of not guilty; I plead guilty and then you sentence me to death. That's what I'm requesting, because I'd rather have that than live the rest of my life in a cell. Okay? . . . . THE COURT: . . . Mr. Dunster, I would not unilaterally discharge the Public Defender's Office. You obviously have a right to fire whomever you want to, and then I would have to make a decision whether  and if you tell me, 'I'm going to go ahead and represent myself,' then I would have to make a decision on whether you're aware of certain things and whether your decision is freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made on proceeding to represent yourself. . . . I want you to have an opportunity to sit down and talk with Mr. Gooch . . . . . . . . [Dunster]: I will not discuss anything further with the Public Defender's Office. Id. at 334, 631 N.W.2d at 888. The court told Dunster that it would appoint another attorney to talk with him about the consequences of discharging the public defender's office and representing himself. Dunster responded, 'Well, common sense tells me that's stupid to represent myself. I mean, I don't know enough about the law, but I know what I want and then that's it.' Id. at 334, 631 N.W.2d at 888-89. The court appointed the Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy (NCPA) to advise Dunster on the consequences of discharging the public defender's office and representing himself. The hearing was continued to allow Dunster time to consult with the NCPA. Dunster later requested to withdraw without prejudice the issues raised in the June 8, 1999, letter. The court granted this request, and the public defender's office continued to represent Dunster. In July 1999, a pretrial hearing commenced regarding motions Gooch had filed on Dunster's behalf. At the start of the hearing, Gooch informed the court that he would shortly be leaving the public defender's office and would not be available when Dunster's case came to trial. Dunster then requested that the NCPA immediately be appointed as his counsel. The court denied Dunster's request and determined that Dunster's case would be reassigned to a different public defender. Dunster responded, 'It's a merry-go-round with attorneys . . . I don't get along with the Public Defender's Office.' Id. at 335, 631 N.W.2d at 889. The court reminded Dunster that the issue was not whether Dunster liked the public defender's office, but whether 'the attorney can afford you effective counsel.' Id. Dunster later presented the court with two pro se motions. The first requested that the public defender's office be discharged and that Dunster be allowed to proceed pro se. The second requested the court to allow Dunster to withdraw his not guilty pleas and plead guilty to first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The court spent the rest of the morning and a portion of the afternoon advising and questioning Dunster regarding his motions. The court questioned Dunster concerning his reasons for discharging the public defender's office and advised him of his right to counsel and of the possible consequences of any decision to forgo the aid of counsel. The court also advised Dunster of the charges against him and the possible penalties, including the possible imposition of the death penalty if his guilty plea to first degree murder was accepted. Dunster responded that he was aware of his rights, the charges, and the possible penalties for his crimes. In addition, the court questioned Dunster concerning his understanding of the jury process and a variety of the consequences of proceeding pro se. Dunster stated he understood the issues and that he had discussed his decision with two attorneys. The court further questioned Dunster as follows: THE COURT: . . . Are you now under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, narcotics or other pills? [Dunster]: Yeah, medication. . . . . [Q.] Does the medication affect your ability to understand what's going on around you? [A.] No. [Q.] Does it make you groggy or anything like that? [A.] No. [Q.] What effect does it have on you? [A.] None. [Q.] None? [A.] None. [Q.] None that you're aware of, at least? [A.] None that I'm aware of. Id. at 336, 631 N.W.2d at 890. Dunster stated that he was taking mega-doses of Prozac, Depitol (Depakote), and Librium. Dunster explained: 'I weigh 300 pounds, so I  when I say mega-doses, they would be different than what they give her [the prosecutor] and what they give me.' Id. at 337, 631 N.W.2d at 890. The court then asked, ' What effect do those have on you?' and Dunster responded, ' None.' Id. The court further asked, 'Do they affect your ability to understand what's going on around you?' and Dunster responded, 'No.' Id. The court granted the motion to discharge the public defender's office, finding that Dunster knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The court then appointed the public defender's office as standby counsel. The court explained to Dunster that if he pled guilty to the charges filed against him, he would be waiving his right to confront witnesses against him, the right to a jury trial, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Dunster indicated that he understood these rights and wanted to plead guilty. The court then read aloud the charges against Dunster. The court then asked Dunster, 'Did this happen on or about May 10th, 1997?' Id. at 337-38, 631 N.W.2d at 891. Dunster responded that it had and described details of the crime. The State then presented evidence to support the factual basis for Dunster's guilty pleas. At the conclusion of the hearing on July 14, 1999, the court accepted Dunster's pleas and found Dunster guilty of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The court next explained that the proceedings would next move to the sentencing phase and how the sentencing hearing would proceed. The court stated, 'Mr. Dunster, we've gone from phase 1 of this case, that is the guilt/innocence phase, now to the sentencing phase. I strongly urge you to have an attorney, to step aside and let the public defender represent you with respect to this phase.' Id. at 338, 631 N.W.2d at 891. Dunster responded, 'No.' Id. The court also explained that Dunster would have the right at the sentencing hearing to present any mitigating evidence. Dunster stated, ' I'm not going to present any evidence.' Id. Dunster also expressed his impatience with the time involved before sentencing, stating: And I'm really getting pissed that you keep wanting to drag this out over and over, you know. . . . . . . . I can't believe that it's so hard. I mean, you have suicide by cop, and I'm trying to commit suicide by state, and it is difficult. I could  it is really a pain in the ass to get you people to kill me. Id. Over Dunster's objections, the court stated that it would order a presentence report for purposes of sentencing. On July 28, 1999, the trial court wrote to the probation officer who was compiling the presentence report, stating: [I]t is my understanding [DCS] has information in its possession it is willing to release to you for inclusion as part of the presentence investigation report you are preparing in [State v. Dunster]; however, the Department is concerned about access to the information. I have reviewed Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-178(2) (Reissue 1994) and have decided to have you obtain the information and make it a separate attachment to your report. The attachment will only be accessible to me, without written order of the court, after notice to the parties in this case and [DCS]. If a final decision is appealed, the attachment . . . is not to be released without authorization from the appellate court. Dunster I, 262 Neb. at 338-39, 631 N.W.2d at 891. The letter indicates that a copy of this correspondence was also sent to Dunster, Gooch, and the prosecutor. During the week of August 6, 1999, before the sentencing hearing, Dunster indicated to standby counsel that he would like the public defender's office reappointed as his attorney. On August 6, a hearing was held to consider Dunster's request. Dunster stated that his former decision to proceed pro se and plead guilty had been impaired by the medications he was taking. The court reappointed the public defender's office to represent Dunster and continued any further proceedings until August 10. On August 10, 1999, attorney Robert Hays from the public defender's office appeared on Dunster's behalf. Hays informed the court that he had been assigned to Dunster's case and had filed a motion on Dunster's behalf requesting a competency examination. The court granted the motion and held a competency hearing. At the start of this hearing, Dunster made an oral motion to once again discharge the public defender's office. The court took the motion under advisement, pending the result of the competency hearing. Dr. Y. Scott Moore, a psychiatrist, testified at the hearing. Moore testified that he had conducted a 2-hour interview with Dunster and had reviewed Dunster's medical records. Moore stated that Dunster was 'quite well oriented' and that '[h]e knows . . . what the charge is [and] the possibilities of consequences if he should go to trial.' Id. at 339, 631 N.W.2d at 892. Moore further stated, 'I found absolutely no spot in which Mr. Dunster is not in contact with reality. . . . Mr. Dunster . . . can come up with a defense if he wishes. I believe that he can confer with his attorney if he chooses to do so.' Id. The court asked Moore about the medications Dunster was taking. Moore testified that Dunster was taking Depakote 'for smoothing a mood,' Prozac 'to help smooth mood in people who seem to be quite volatile,' and Librium 'to help Mr. Dunster sleep in the evenings.' Id. at 339-40, 631 N.W.2d at 892. Regarding these medications, Moore testified that he 'saw absolutely no effect on [Dunster] of being able to interfere with his ability to answer questions or to deal with the realities of the moment.' Id. at 340, 631 N.W.2d at 892. Moore also noted that Dunster was receiving a low dosage of these medications. Hays did not ask Moore any questions. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court determined that Dunster was competent. The court then considered Dunster's oral motion to proceed pro se, questioning Dunster about his reasons for wanting to discharge the public defender's office a second time. Dunster advised the court that he was dissatisfied with the public defender's office because it wanted him to withdraw his guilty pleas and go to trial, while Dunster wanted to proceed to sentencing. Dunster also stated that he preferred being able to speak for himself, rather than having counsel speak on his behalf. After informing Dunster of his rights, the court found that his second waiver of counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court then granted Dunster's second motion to discharge the public defender's office and reappointed that office as standby counsel. Dunster's sentencing hearing was conducted on November 22, 1999. Dunster appeared pro se, with Hays present as standby counsel. The court discussed the information it had received which it would consider for purposes of sentencing. The court stated it would consider Dunster's presentence investigation report contained in three bound notebooks. The court also informed the parties that the presentence investigation report included confidential mental health information from DCS. The court noted that because access to this kind of information was restricted, this mental health information would not be released to anyone unless a motion was made and a hearing held. The court also stated that it would consider the report prepared by Moore regarding Dunster's competency. Before the State began presenting evidence, the court again urged Dunster to reconsider his decision to proceed pro se, stating: THE COURT: Mr. Dunster, I have previously advised you on numerous occasions, and I know you think, probably, too many, of your right to be represented by counsel. I'm aware that, at least in my opinion, you understand that right. I strongly urge you again, sir, at this time, to accept representation by the Public Defender's Office to represent you in this sentencing phase. Do you understand that? [Dunster]: Yes. [Q.]: Do you wish to have that done? [A.]: No. [Q.]: You still want to go on your own behalf? [A.]: Yes. Id. at 341, 631 N.W.2d at 893. The State then presented evidence in support of the single aggravating circumstance asserted by the State that Dunster had been previously convicted twice of first degree murder. At the conclusion of the State's evidence, the court asked Dunster if he had any evidence to present. Dunster stated he did not, affirmed that Hays had been available to discuss the issue with him, and referred to a letter Dunster had sent to the court. In that letter, Dunster wrote that he was looking forward to the sentencing hearing and saw the possibility of a death sentence as 'my parole & pardon all in one.' Id. at 342, 631 N.W.2d at 893. In closing, Dunster told the court, 'The position I'm in today is  I put myself there. I take full responsibility for it. . . . I'd rather just be executed than spend another day in prison.' Id. at 342, 631 N.W.2d at 894. The court issued its sentencing order on January 26, 2000. Dunster's appeal was automatically filed with this court, and the NCPA was appointed to represent Dunster on appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, Dunster wrote a letter to this court indicating that he no longer wanted to be executed. After the appeal was docketed, but before oral argument, we requested that the district six probation office forward the confidential DCS records, which were omitted from the report previously sent to this court, and the parties were granted access to it. We affirmed, concluding that the record showed Dunster's competency and that his actions were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. We also determined that Dunster was not denied effective assistance of counsel at his competency hearing when Hays asked no questions of Moore, because there was no prejudice when the court questioned Moore on the pertinent issues. We overruled Dunster's motion for a rehearing. Dunster I.