Opinion ID: 1135610
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Taking Contention

Text: Plaintiff contends that compelling it to provide a forum on its private property is a taking under both Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution provides: Private property shall not be taken for public use    without just compensation[.] The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.  (Emphasis added.) By the Fourteenth Amendment, the rights of persons as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment are made applicable to the states. Plaintiff does not suggest any different analysis under the Oregon Constitution than under the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that the analysis would be the same under both constitutions. See Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568, 572 n. 4, 825 P.2d 641 (1992), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 467, 121 L.Ed.2d 374 (1992) (making that assumption). In addition, as held in Hughes v. State of Oregon, 314 Or. 1, 34, 838 P.2d 1018 (1992), [n]ot every acquisition of a private property interest by the state constitutes a taking under section 18[.] In a previous case involving the Lloyd Center, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States did not confer upon persons seeking to distribute handbills within the Lloyd Center the right to do so. [1] But in the later case of PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81-83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980), the Court held: Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.       here there has literally been a `taking' of that right [to exclude others] to the extent that the California Supreme Court has interpreted the State Constitution to entitle its citizens to exercise free expression and petition rights on shopping center property. But it is well established that `not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a taking in the constitutional sense.' Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1568, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). Rather, the determination whether a state law unlawfully infringes a landowner's property in violation of the Taking Clause requires an examination of whether the restriction on private property `forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Id., at 49, 80 S.Ct., at 1569. This examination entails inquiry into such factors as the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.    Here the requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property rights under the Taking Clause.  (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, supra , involved a large shopping center in California. Again, assuming that the analysis under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution is the same as the analysis under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the result under Article I, section 18, is the same as the result in PruneYard. Accordingly, we hold that there is no taking in this case in violation of the Takings Clause of the Oregon Constitution or the Fifth Amendment.