Opinion ID: 344513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Universal's Appeal.

Text: 15 Universal points out that the court's instructions to the jury on issues of negligence and strict liability were substantially identical and that the elements of liability under either theory were the same. Universal argues that since the jury concluded that the crusher was not sold in a defective condition and because the jury further found that the crusher was in fact properly and adequately guarded, that therefore the plaintiff, Bjerk, failed to sustain his burden of proving a defect in the product under either the theory of strict liability or negligence, and therefore, Bjerk cannot recover. Universal cites the Halvorson case, supra, as dispositive. We, therefore, turn to an analysis of that decision. 16 In Halvorson, the plaintiff, who was employed on a highway construction crew, sustained a severe electrical shock when a boom on a truck crane being operated by a fellow employee came in contact with a high voltage overhead power line. Halvorson sought to hold the manufacturer of the truck crane, American Hoist & Derrick Co., liable for damages on the basis that the crane lacked certain safety devices, notably (1) a sensor device which allegedly would have sounded a warning if the boom approached a power line, and (2) an insulated hook which allegedly would prevent an electric charge in the lift and cable from passing down the cable and into the load. At the same time, the manufacturer brought a third-party complaint for contribution or indemnity against Halvorson's employer. Those issues were submitted on special interrogatories to a jury. The jury determined that the truck crane was not in a defective condition, but that American Hoist was negligent in the design, manufacture, and testing of the crane. The jury further determined that American Hoist's conduct contributed 25 percent to the accident and that the employer's conduct contributed 75 percent to the accident. 17 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding defendant-manufacturer American Hoist free of any liability to Halvorson. The Court said: 18 Based on the above analysis, and under the facts in this case, the jury's findings of no strict liability but 25 percent negligence are inconsistent and irreconcilable. 19 Normally such inconsistent findings would result in a remand for a new trial, but further analysis leads us to conclude that plaintiff could not recover as a matter of law on either the theory of strict liability or of negligence. (Halvorson, supra at 307-08.) 20 The Court determined further that American Hoist owed no duty to Halvorson in light of Halvorson's knowledge of obvious danger from electrical contact between the truck and crane and the power line: 21 We hold that American Hoist did not owe this injured plaintiff any duty to install safety devices on its crane to guard against the risk of electrocution when the record demonstrated that risk was: (1) Obvious; (2) known by all of the employees involved; and (3) specifically warned against in American Hoist's operations manual. While no Minnesota case has expressly faced this issue in a negligence context, one of our cases did deny strict liability when plaintiff was aware of the defect. Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969). The general rule in other jurisdictions is that there is no recovery for negligent design where the danger is obvious. (Id. at 308.) 22 The facts here can be distinguished from those in Halvorson. A jury was entitled to determine that the jackshaft bearing needed to be lubricated while the machine operated at an idle speed and, based on past experience of Bjerk and other employees of Thorson, lubrication could be performed safely while in an idle operation. Because under these facts the danger cannot be said to be obvious as a matter of law, the jury was entitled to find negligence on the part of Universal in failing to install certain interior safeguards to prevent an operator from becoming entangled in moving parts, belts, and pulleys while engaged in maintenance work, or in failing to design and install a grease-zerk extension running from the jackshaft bearing to the exterior of the machine or in failing to provide an adequate warning that no lubrication service should be attempted while the machine is in operation. 23 We hold, therefore, that the district court committed no error in denying Universal's post-trial motion for a judgment of dismissal or for amended finding of facts which would require a dismissal of Bjerk's claim. 24 In its brief, Universal urges that if it is not entitled to a judgment of dismissal or amended findings, then it is entitled to a new trial, arguing: 25 (A)t the very least, this Court is required to order a new trial on the liability issues. Although inconsistent answers to special interrogatories must be harmonized, if possible, if the answers are inconsistent with each other and irreconcilable as they are in this case, then    a new trial must be granted. 26 We note that appellant Universal has made no motion for a new trial based on the alleged inconsistency of the verdict. Because such claim was not made to the district court, we deem it inappropriate now to address this issue on appeal. Universal, if it desires to press this issue, may attempt to seek such relief before the district court. 1 27 Universal, relying on language in Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), contends it is entitled to full indemnity against Thorson, Inc., arguing that the employer breached a duty not only to its employee, Bjerk, but also to Universal to make sure that crusher operators receive proper instructions to shut down the machine before lubricating it. In Hendrickson, the Minnesota Supreme Court listed those instances in which a tort defendant has a right of indemnity against another: 28 (1) Where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or vicarious liability for damage caused by the one sought to be charged. 29 (2) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability by action at the direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be charged. 30 (3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability because of a breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to be charged. 31 (4) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability merely because of failure, even though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct of the one sought to be charged. (Id. at 848.) 32 The indemnity argument must fall in light of the jury finding that Universal, as the manufacturer, was 20 percent negligent in the first instance when it placed its rock crusher in the stream of commerce without certain kinds of safety devices and/or warning. The jury also found that Thorson, the employer, was causally negligent to the extent of 65 percent in failing to supervise plaintiff in the use of the rock crusher. These negligent acts are violations of independent duties by the defendant, Universal, and the third-party defendant-employer, Thorson, to the plaintiff. Violations of these independent duties do not fall within the indemnity rules enunciated in Hendrickson. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., Nos. 45790 and 45810 (Minn.S.Ct., Feb. 4, 1977). 33