Opinion ID: 2799450
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Colorado

Text: Colorado also argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction because the government failed to prove that Colorado knowingly used illegal proceeds to purchase horses. Although we agree with Colorado’s argument that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence on that point—which was the government’s theory of the case—we hold that the government’s evidence supports Colorado’s conviction on a different theory; namely, that Colorado purchased the horses with the knowledge that they would be used as part of a larger money-laundering conspiracy. This knowledge is some circumstantial evidence that he voluntarily joined a conspiracy knowing its purpose was to conceal the source or nature of illegal funds. See Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 567. However, the issue is close, as the government offered weak circumstantial evidence based largely on Colorado’s personal relationships with Los Zetas’ leaders that Colorado’s knew the conspiracy’s purpose was to conceal the nature or source of illegal proceeds. As we explain infra at Part II(C), the erroneous jury instruction on commingling, viewed in light of the 23 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 24 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 sparse evidence of Colorado’s guilt, requires that Colorado’s conviction be vacated. B. Asserted Error in Receiving the Testimony of Spanish-Speaking Witnesses Before Ruling on Objections Jose Trevino argues the district court constructively deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by “allow[ing] witnesses to first answer the question . . . , and then only if the district court decides that the answer to the question is not admissible, the district court will sustain the objection (after the jury of course hears the answer).” The government clarifies that the district judge followed this procedure only with respect to translated testimony. The government contends that district courts have broad discretion in the conduct of courtroom procedures, and that a “constructive denial of counsel occurs in only a very narrow spectrum of cases where the circumstances . . . are so egregious that the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all,” quoting Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2000). Although Jose Trevino’s argument that the district court abused its discretion has force, we agree with the government and hold that any error was harmless. “[A] district judge has broad discretion in managing his docket, including trial procedure and the conduct of trial.” United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 964 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, appellate courts review a district judge’s conduct of the trial to determine whether the cumulative effect amounts to an abuse of discretion. Id. Moreover, any prejudicial remarks “may be rendered harmless by curative instructions to the jury,” United States v. Millsaps, 157 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1998), and “juries are presumed to follow their instructions,” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 25 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 We find Jose Trevino’s argument persuasive and agree that the manner in which the district court received testimony from Spanish-speaking witnesses was problematic—treading dangerously close to an abuse of discretion. The district judge expressed frustration with having to ask the jury to leave each time a defense lawyer wished essentially to make an offer of proof in response to an objection to a question put to a Spanish-speaking witness, and the judge suggested an alternative approach: [THE COURT:] But, counsel, it’s not a good way to proceed to ask a question, have an objection. I don’t know how many people . . . on the jury understand Spanish, but I do know some do because they have indicated in their answers. And so, if I sustain the objection without an instruction, I don’t know that your objection was very informative. But I think we’re going to have to let the answer come, then make your objection, and then, if I think it’s not admissible, I’ll instruct them they can’t consider it for any purpose. Now, a lot of people don’t think that’s a good remedy, but that’s the only one that we have, as far as I know. And I’m not aware of any jury that’s ever not done that because I’ve questioned jurors afterwards. But that’s a very unscientific proof. MR. WOMACK [Garcia–Solis’s attorney]: Your Honor, now that we know the answer that’s coming as inadmissible, I would ask that we do keep it cut off where it is. Your Honor will give the proper instruction to the members – to the jurors not to consider whether the answer would have been and for those who – THE COURT: Oh, I’ll do that now. But I’m talking about the next question and the one after that. MR. WOMACK: Oh, yes, sir. THE COURT: I don’t want the jury having to lea[ve] on each question and hearing the answer. MR. ESPER: Your Honor, I concur with the Court. I believe the jury’s followed the Court’s instructions to disregard. However, unequivocally, they’re humans, they’ve heard the answer. It’s walking a fine line. I know they follow the Court’s instructions. I 25 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 26 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 believe that. But sometimes they hear an answer and it’s that bell sometimes doesn’t get – the vibration doesn’t get out of their brain. .... THE COURT: I’m going to sustain the objection and tell them not to consider that for any purpose. And then, I will tell them, again, that the official interpretation is what they have to have. (emphasis added). Importantly, when the jury returned, the judge instructed them to consider only the official interpretation and to disregard the answer in Spanish. We find that the district judge’s conduct of the trial in this manner was problematic and may amount to an abuse of discretion, but that any error was either harmless or not plain. Jose Trevino does not point to any prejudice to his case—let alone to cumulative prejudice so as to amount to a reversible error in light of the district court’s significant discretion over the mode and manner of witness testimony. See Gray, 105 F.3d at 964. Moreover, any prejudice from the district court’s problematic procedure in this case is presumptively cured by the judge’s instructions to the jury. Jose Trevino does not attempt to rebut this presumption—a tall task in light of the substantial evidence of his guilt summarized above. See Millsaps, 157 F.3d at 993. Third, the record does not indicate that Jose Trevino objected, 16 so our review is for plain error only. Because Jose Trevino does not direct the court to authority finding error in similar circumstances, any error on the district court’s part was not obvious or plain. Jose Trevino’s argument that he was constructively deprived of counsel is also unavailing. “A constructive denial of counsel occurs in only a very narrow spectrum of cases where the circumstances leading to counsel’s The only statement indicating disagreement came from Garcia–Solis’s attorney, Mr. 16 Womack, not from Jose Trevino’s counsel. Garcia–Solis does not challenge the manner in which Spanish-speaking witnesses were questioned on appeal. 26 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 27 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 ineffectiveness are so egregious that the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all.” Gochicoa, 238 F.3d at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because there is no evidence that Jose Trevino’s counsel was absent from the courtroom or suffered from a material conflict of interest with his client, see id., Jose Trevino’s asserted constructive deprivation of counsel does not fit within this narrow spectrum. Therefore, although we find the manner in which the district court conducted the trial proceedings in this case problematic for the reasons identified by Jose Trevino, we do not find a reversible error. C. Jury Instructions A close question in this appeal is the asserted jury-instruction error. Three of the four Appellants—Jose Trevino, Colorado, and Garcia–Solis— challenge the jury instruction describing the commingling of funds. The district court instructed the jury regarding the “intent to conceal or disguise” element as follows: “With respect to the fourth element, the commingling of illegal proceeds with legitimate business funds is evidence of intent to conceal or disguise. Therefore, it would not be a defense that legitimate funds were also involved in a transaction involving illegal and legitimate funds combined.” (emphasis added). The Appellants contend this instruction (1) “had no support in the evidence” and (2) “amounted to a mandatory presumption—effectively directing the jury to infer intent to conceal and disguise from evidence of commingling.” The government counters the district court correctly stated the law because “[i]t is well-established that commingling illegal proceeds with legitimate business funds is evidence of a defendant’s intent to conceal,” citing United States v. Rodriguez, 278 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2002). The government also argues that “the jury heard evidence that [Colorado] commingled drug proceeds into his ADT account.” 27 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 28 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 We hold that the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury in this manner, but that the erroneous jury instruction constituted harmless error as to Jose Trevino and Garcia–Solis. Because the circumstantial evidence of Colorado’s guilt is weaker, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same as to Colorado, and we vacate his conviction and remand. 1. Standard of Review This Court reviews jury instructions “for abuse of discretion, affording substantial latitude to the district court in describing the law to the jury.” United States v. Wright, 634 F.3d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we consider “whether the charge, as a whole, was a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructed the jurors as to the principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The trial court’s charge must not only be ‘legally accurate, but also factually supportable’; ‘the court may not instruct the jury on a charge that is not supported by evidence.’” United States v. Mendoza–Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 132 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Lara–Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 950 (5th Cir. 1990)). In assessing whether evidence sufficiently supports a particular jury instruction, this Court views “the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any error is subject to harmless-error review.” Id. 2. The District Court’s Commingling Instruction Was an Abuse of Discretion We agree with Defendants–Appellants that the district court abused its discretion by giving the commingling instruction it gave. “A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts. A permissive inference suggests to the jury a 28 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 29 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985) (footnote omitted). The analysis turns “initially on the specific language challenged,” but “the potentially offending words must be considered in the context of the charge as a whole.” Id. at 315. The district court’s instruction spoke in mandatory terms: “[T]he commingling of illegal proceeds with legitimate business funds is evidence of intent to conceal or disguise.” Cf. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314. Because the mandatory language was not clarified with an accompanying caveat— indicating that the jury may but need not infer intent to conceal from the commingling of illegal proceeds, see id. (“A permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion.”)—we conclude that the instruction treads dangerously close to an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The government is correct that this instruction was a correct description of the law: our case law does instruct that “[e]vidence that the defendant commingled illegal proceeds with legitimate business funds is sufficient to support a conviction under § 1956,” particularly when the defendant also subsequently used the commingled funds to purchase equipment to further illegal activities. See Rodriguez, 278 F.3d at 491 (affirming § 1956 conviction for money laundering in part because the defendant used commingled funds to purchase a van for his illegal-alien transporting scheme). But we have not approved this statement of the law as a jury instruction, nor would we. A jury instruction must make clear that the inference is permissive and not mandatory, and the instruction given here does not do so. The government defends the commingling instruction and directs us to a Ninth Circuit case in which the court evaluated similar language: United 29 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 30 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 States v. Washington, 819 F.2d 221, 225 (9th Cir. 1987). There, the court considered a challenge to a jury instruction reading: “Use of a weapon or other instrument in a way that causes death is evidence of malice aforethought.” Id. (emphasis added). The court reasoned that “[a]dvising the jury that it may treat the use of a deadly weapon as evidence of malice aforethought is not the same as requiring it to presume or infer malice aforethought from that evidence.” Id. at 225–26. Colorado in reply points out that the Ninth Circuit’s model instruction at issue in Washington was accompanied by the following: If it is shown that the defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of a homicide, then you may find, from the use of such weapon, in the absence of explanatory or mitigating circumstances, the existence of the malice which is an essential element of the offense. You are not obliged to so find, however. Id. at 226. Colorado continues that “[n]o such language accompanied the district court’s commingling instruction here.” We agree with Colorado’s interpretation of Washington. Confronted with the instruction given here, a reasonable juror could conclude that evidence of commingling obligated the jury to infer intent to conceal. The clarifying language in Washington distinguishes that case from this one. Unlike in Washington, the trial court here did not state that the evidence of commingling merely permitted—but did not oblige or require—the jury to infer intent to conceal. See Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371, 1379–80 (5th Cir. 1979). Moreover, the district court should have followed the reasoning in Washington and included similar language clarifying that the inference was permissive and not mandatory. Because the instruction given did not include guidance clarifying that the inference was permissive and not mandatory, we conclude 30 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 31 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 that the district court’s commingling jury instruction constituted an abuse of discretion. 17 3. Harmless-Error Analysis Nevertheless, we find that the erroneous jury instruction was harmless as to Jose Trevino and Garcia–Solis. Erroneous jury instructions are harmless if a court, “after a ‘thorough examination of the record,’ is able to ‘conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.’” United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999)); accord Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580–81 (1986) (holding that harmless-error review applies to erroneous burden-shifting jury instructions). Here, as in Clark, there is no doubt that the “trial court properly could have instructed the jury that it could infer,” 478 U.S. at 581, intent to conceal from evidence of commingling. Examining the jury instructions “as a whole, as we must” in assessing the harmlessness of an erroneous instruction, Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 449 (5th Cir. 2006), apart from the challenged commingling instruction, we see that the jury in this case was clearly instructed that it had to find Appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element, see Clark, 478 U.S. at 579. Further, after a thorough examination of the record, we agree with the government that the record contains ample circumstantial evidence of Jose Trevino’s and Garcia–Solis’s knowledge that the money-laundering conspiracy’s purpose was to conceal the source or nature of illegal proceeds. Accordingly, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict as to Jose Trevino and Garcia–Solis would have been the same had the jury been properly instructed. See United 17Because we find that the jury instruction constituted an abuse of discretion, we need not and do not reach Appellants’ alternative argument that the evidence did not support this instruction. 31 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 32 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 States v. Parker, 73 F.3d 48, 52–53 (5th Cir.) (“[B]ecause the trial judge’s ruling was a correct statement of the law and the jury found that the underlying predicate acts did occur, the error did nothing to change the outcome of the case because under a correct application of the law, the verdict would have been guilty regardless.”), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 80 F.3d 1042 (5th Cir. 1996), and opinion reinstated in pertinent part on reh’g, 104 F.3d 72 (5th Cir. 1997). We do not reach the same conclusion with respect to Colorado, however. The government repeatedly argued that, because Colorado purchased horses with funds from his company, ADT, and ADT was started with drug money in 2003 and 2004, Colorado therefore knowingly purchased horses in furtherance of the money-laundering conspiracy. But the horse-racing money-laundering conspiracy did not begin until 2008. Accordingly, our review of the record reveals no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could trace Colorado’s horse purchases to illegal proceeds—or to illegal proceeds that had been commingled with legitimate funds. At best, the evidence shows that Colorado purchased 121 horses on behalf of conspiracy members using ADT funds and that he was closely associated with members of Los Zetas. While this might be evidence from which a properly instructed jury could infer that Colorado knowingly joined the money-laundering conspiracy—an issue on which we express no opinion—we cannot say “beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the erro[neous]’” jury instruction given in this case. See Skilling, 638 F.3d at 482. This is particularly so given that the government’s expert witness specifically testified that Colorado “commingled personal and business” funds and expenses: a confused jury may have inferred from this testimony together with the erroneous instruction that the jury was obligated to infer from this evidence an intent to conceal. 32 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 33 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in giving the commingling jury instruction it gave. The error was harmless as to Jose Trevino and Garcia–Solis. Because of the centrality of the commingling issue to Colorado’s conviction and the weak circumstantial evidence of his guilt, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same as to Colorado had the jury been properly instructed. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions of Jose Trevino and Garcia–Solis, but we vacate the conviction of Colorado. D. Sentencing Garcia–Solis and Jose Trevino challenge their sentences. Specifically, they contend the district court erroneously increased their offense level for violation of § 1956 based on the value of the laundered funds under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) §§ 2S1.1(a)(2); 2B1.1, among other assorted asserted errors. The district court based its calculation of the offense level on the presentence investigation report’s (PSR) application of application note 3(b), which provides: “If the amount of the criminally derived funds is difficult or impracticable to determine, the value of the laundered funds, for purposes of subsection (a)(2), is the total amount of the commingled funds.” The government counters that the Appellants did not meet their burden to show the calculation was erroneous and that, even if it were, the error was harmless. We agree with the government. 18 1. Standard of Review “A sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range is presumed reasonable on appeal.” United States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 319 (5th Cir. 2009). “Findings of fact used in calculating the Guidelines range are reviewed 18Since we vacate Colorado’s conviction because the jury was improperly and harmfully instructed, we need not and do not address his challenges to the sentence and to the money judgment. 33 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 34 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 for clear error, while interpretation of the Guidelines themselves is reviewed de novo.” Id. “Calculation of total laundered funds is a factual finding, which need only be determined by a preponderance of the evidence, and is reviewed only for clear error.” United States v. Yassine, 574 F. App’x 455, 466 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 14-6941, 2014 WL 5502919 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2014). “A factual finding on a sentencing factor is not clearly erroneous so long as it is plausible in light of the record read as a whole.” Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 622 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Jose Trevino’s Sentence Jose Trevino argues that the scheme only involved $1,734,000, so the district court’s finding that he was responsible for $25,000,000 in laundered funds was clearly erroneous. He also contends the district court erroneously concluded that he was a leader or supervisor within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), that the money-laundering scheme was “sophisticated” under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3), and that Jose Trevino knew it involved drug proceeds under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1)(B)(i). We disagree. Jose Trevino points to no evidence that rebuts the PSR’s analysis or establishes that the district court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. As described in detail above, the money-laundering scheme was sophisticated, involving multiple layers of leadership and organizations, including fictitious entities and shell corporations. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 cmt. n.5(A) (“[S]ophisticated laundering’ means complex or intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of the 18 U.S.C. [§] 1956 offense. Sophisticated laundering typically involves the use of (i) fictitious entities; (ii) shell corporations; [or] (iii) two or more levels (i.e., layering) of transactions, transportation, transfers, or transmissions, involving criminally derived funds that were intended to appear legitimate . . . .”). Additionally, the district court had “no trouble finding” that Trevino “exercised leadership,” citing the thirteen 34 Case: 13-50849 Document: 00513035268 Page: 35 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 No. 13-50849; cons. w/ No. 13-51003 or fourteen employees at the horse ranch. The record reflects that Jose Trevino offered no rebuttal evidence. For the reasons stated above, the district court could reasonably conclude Jose Trevino was aware that drug proceeds were involved. Additionally, Jose Trevino has not shown that the district court’s conclusion that, in light of the trial evidence, “the calculated base is easily over [$]20 million” is clearly erroneous either. As the government points out, after forfeiture, the horses alone sold for about $9 million. The probation officer described $16,272,011.16 paid for horses and an additional $8,794,264.21 paid for horse expenses. Jose Trevino does not offer or point to any evidence to rebut this finding. Accordingly, his sentence is affirmed. 3. Garcia–Solis’s Sentence Garcia–Solis similarly challenges the twenty-level increase for the value of the laundered funds. He contends that he entered the conspiracy late, and therefore, he participated in only “two horse sales with a value of $510,900.” But, as the government points out, at sentencing Agent Lawson testified that Garcia–Solis was involved in more than $9 million to $16 million in horse purchases from 2010–2012. In light of this evidence, the district court’s factual finding that Garcia–Solis was involved in more than $7,000,000 in money laundering was “plausible in light of the record as a whole,” Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 622 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, his sentence is affirmed.