Opinion ID: 2973546
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ohio Law Governing Employer Intentional Tort

Text: A federal court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 must apply the substantive law of the forum state. See U.S. v. Jandro, 167 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 1999). In Ohio, employees injured in the course of their employment are usually limited to the remedial measures afforded by the Ohio Workers’s Compensation Act. See O. Const. II § 35, see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123 et seq. There are certain instances when an employee may seek redress for an injury outside of the Act. An injury caused by the intentional tort of the employer is such an event. See Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ohio 1982) (explaining that an employee is not precluded from pursuing common law remedies for an intentional tort committed by his employer). In Fyffe v. Jeno’s, 570 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 1991), the Supreme Court of Ohio set out the test used to determine whether an employer has committed an intentional tort. In such a case, the plaintiff must prove: 1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition within its business operation; -6- No. 05-3498 Smith v. General Motors Corp. et al 2) knowledge by the employer that if the employee is subjected by his employment to such a dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality, or condition, then harm to the employee will be a substantial certainty; and 3) that the employer, under such circumstances, and with such knowledge, did act to require the employee to continue to perform the dangerous task. Id. at 1112.2 According to Fyffe, a plaintiff must offer proof beyond that required for negligence, or recklessness. Id. In the absence of direct evidence of intent, a plaintiff may prove such a claim by inferred intent. Id. Ohio law creates a harsh test for establishing employer liability for an intentional tort. See Goodwin v. Karlshamns U.S.A., Inc., 619 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ohio App. 1993) (stating “a reckless tort is not sufficient to allow recovery against one’s employer”). In Jandro v. Ohio Edison Co., the Sixth Circuit stated “it must be shown that the employer ‘(1) specifically desired to injure the employee; or (2) knew that injury to an employee was certain or substantially certain to result from the employers act, and despite this knowledge, still proceeded.’” 167 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 532 N.E.2d 753, 756 (Ohio 1988)). It is not enough that harm was likely to occur, or that there was a high risk that it would occur. Jandro, 167 F.3d at 313. Acts of an employer that have a high risk of harm are most often reckless acts, but could under certain 2 The Ohio legislature passed R.C. 2745.01, effective October 20, 1993. This legislation was intended to revise the requisite elements and standards of an employer intentional tort. However, the statute was found to be unconstitutional, because it imposed excessive standards and a heightened burden of proof for plaintiffs seeking a remedy for an employer intentional tort. See Johnson v. B.P. Chemicals, Inc., 707 N.E.2d 1107 (Ohio 1999) (Because R.C. 2745.01 imposes excessive standards (deliberate and intentional act), with a heightened burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence), it is clearly not a law that furthers the' . . . comfort, heath, safety, and general welfare of all employees.' Id. at 1114 (citation omitted). Since that time, the Ohio legislature repealed R.C. 2745.01 and passed H.B. 498, revising R.C. 2745.01 effective April 4, 2005. The revised statute is less stringent than the former. Because the injury in this case occurred in the year 2000, there are no controlling statutes, and Fyffe and its progeny control our determination. -7- No. 05-3498 Smith v. General Motors Corp. et al circumstances “equate to one that is substantially certain to result in harm to the employee, and reasonably raise a justiciable issue of an intentional tort.” Fyffe, 570 N.E.2d at 1111-12. The plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer had “actual knowledge of the exact dangers which ultimately caused” injury. Sanek v. Duracote Corp., 539 N.E.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Ohio 1989) (citation omitted).