Opinion ID: 301058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extent of Unionization.

Text: 13 In determining the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, the board has broad discretion. Section 9(b) of the Act provides: 14 The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof. 15 This section has been interpreted to give the board wide latitude within its area of expertise. Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789, 91 L.Ed. 1040 (1947); N.L.R.B. v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968); N.L.R.B. v. Merner Lumber & Hardware Co., 345 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 942, 86 S.Ct. 397, 15 L.Ed.2d 352 (1965). 16 However, the board is limited by Section 9(c) (5) of the Act which provides: 17 In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling. 18 We noted in Westward-Ho Hotel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 437 F.2d 1110, 1112-1113 (9th Cir. 1971): 19 [I]t is clear that Congress in passing this amendment intended to overrule Board decisions approving a unit that could only be supported on the basis of the extent of organization. 20 The legislative history of Section 9(c) (5) includes the following pertinent remarks: 21 [The section] strikes at a practice of the Board by which it has set up as units appropriate for bargaining whatever group or groups the petitioning union has organized at the time. . . . While the Board may take into consideration the extent to which employees have organized, this evidence would have little weight, and, as [the section] provides, is not to be controlling. . . . 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, page 328; House Report No. 245, 80th Congress, 1st Session, page 37. 22 We agree that the compelling inference from the record before us is that the board allowed the extent of unionization to control its decision. Although we do not contest the board's counsel's general proposition that more than one unit may be appropriate at any facility [See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. N.L.R.B., 411 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 87, 24 L.Ed.2d 83 (1969)], we are not convinced that merely because the board, at the urging of the union, has made two conflicting determinations this shows conclusively that there are two appropriate units in one facility. 23 There was no significant change between 1967 and 1970 at the Mays service facility. In view of the fact that the union sought a facility-wide unit, lost the election, and then sought a fragmented unit, we feel that it is incumbent upon the board at the very least to confront the inconsistency between its two rulings and give adequate reasons why it finds two different appropriate units within the same facility. Counsel's after-the-fact attempts to explain the record are inadequate. 24