Opinion ID: 1795117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the insurance policy covers all claims of negligence.

Text: ¶ 10. South Carolina argues that the insurance policy does not cover the Keymons' claim of negligent supervision and training of McKee's Stateline's employees inasmuch as the language of the policy excludes any damages resulting from providing alcohol to Waldon. On the other hand, the Keymons argue that the language does not specifically exclude negligent supervision and training; thus, the policy's language is vague, which should result in the policy being construed in their favor and against South Carolina, the drafter of the contract of insurance. ¶ 11. The Keymons first argue that the case sub judice presents a choice-of-law issue for us to decide, namely, whether Mississippi or Tennessee law applies. South Carolina argues that there is no choice-of-law issue; alternatively, South Carolina argues that the policy does not cover the Keymons' claim of negligent supervision and training, regardless of whether Mississippi or Tennessee law is applied. ¶ 12. Succinctly stated, we find that there is no choice-of-law issue, [4] inasmuch as both Mississippi and Tennessee construe an ambiguous insurance policy in favor of the insured. Choice of law analysis arises only when there is a true conflict between the laws of two states, each having an interest in the litigation. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920 So.2d 427, 432 (Miss.2006) (citing Boardman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 470 So.2d 1024, 1038, (Miss.1985)). We find that no ambiguity exists in the policy at issue. The case law in Mississippi is clear: Ambiguous terms in an insurance contract are to be construed most strongly against the preparer, the insurance company. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Omnibank, 812 So.2d 196, 198 (Miss. 2002) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So.2d 658, 662 (Miss. 1994)). Although ambiguities in an insurance policy are construed against the insurer, a court must refrain from altering or changing a policy where terms are unambiguous, despite resulting hardship on the insured. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Scitzs, 394 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Miss.1981). A clear and unambiguous contract will be enforced as written. Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 697 So.2d 400, 403 (Miss. 1997). Titan Indem. Co. v. Estes, 825 So.2d 651, 656 (Miss.2002). Similarly, the case law in Tennessee also is clear: In interpreting an insurance contract, we must determine the intention of the parties and give effect to that intention. Christenberry v. Tipton, 160 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tenn.2005); Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn.1975). An insurance policy must be interpreted fairly and reasonably, giving the language its usual and ordinary meaning. Parker v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 582 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn.1979). When there is doubt' or ambiguity as to its meaning, an insurance contract must be construed favorably to provide coverage to the insured. Christenberry, 160 S.W.3d at 494. However, the contract may not be rewritten by the Court. Id.; see also Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Witt, 857 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Tenn.1993). Naifeh v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 204 S.W.3d 758, 768 (Tenn.2006). ¶ 13. Thus, both Mississippi and Tennessee clearly hold that an unambiguous policy provision must be strictly construed. To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence each of the elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation and injury. Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So.2d 1, 3 (Miss.2007) (quoting Miss. Dep't of Mental Health v. Hall 936 So.2d 917, 922 (Miss. 2006)). South Carolina argues that the plain language of the Liquor Liability Exclusion applies to all claims of negligence. In other words, the sale of the beer to Waldon was the proximate cause [5] of the Keymons' injuries, no matter what duty the Keymons allege that Stateline breached, including negligent supervision and training. Thus, the policy clearly and unequivocally excluded injuries caused by the sale of alcohol to a minor, and it does not matter what cause of action the Keymons allege because the damages are the same, whether negligence, an intentional tort, or an illegal act. [6] Therefore, since this policy provision is unambiguous, we must construe the provision according to the plain language. Accordingly, we find that this issue has merit.