Opinion ID: 2602265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: should hearsay testimony relating to the child's statements have been admitted at trial?

Text: ¶ 10 Hearsay evidence was admitted at trial pertaining to certain statements made by the minor child implicating Clary as sexually abusive. The trial court allowed admission of the hearsay statements under 12 O.S. 1991, § 2803(24), known as the residual exception to the hearsay rule. Section 2803(24), which is modeled after Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (formerly Rule 803(24)), exempts the following statements from exclusion under the Hearsay Rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that: (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (c) the general purposes of this Code and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. A statement shall not be admitted under this exception unless its proponent makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. [12 O.S.1991 § 2803(24).] ¶ 11 According to the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(24) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(24) [does] not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but [does] provide for treating new and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions. The hearsay statements in question were offered into evidence by Kerr through Kerr's own testimony, the testimony of the child's counselor and also the testimony of an employee of the Department of Human Services who had investigated the allegations of sexual abuse of the minor child. ¶ 12 Clary first argues that Kerr failed to comply with the notice provisions of 12 O.S. 1991, § 2803(24). In substance, Clary claims that he was not put on notice of the name and address of the declarant, as required by statute, and that the notice given was vague and imprecise as to the content of the hearsay statement. Thus, Clary argues that Kerr's failure to provide him with the name and address of the declarant, as required by § 2803(24), excludes from admission the hearsay testimony relating to sexual abuse of the child. ¶ 13 On this point, Clary fails to correctly interpret the statutory language of § 2803(24) with respect to the identity of the declarant. A declarant is defined as a person who makes a statement. 12 O.S. 1991, § 2801(2). A statement is defined in § 2801(1)(a) and (b) as an oral or written assertion, or . . . nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. . . . 12 O.S.1991, § 2801(3). ¶ 14 In the instant case, the declarant of the hearsay statements in question, insofar as the notice provision of § 2803(24) is concerned, is Clary's and Kerr's minor child. The declarant is not, as Clary argues, Kerr's witnesses who testified at trial as to the child's hearsay statements. Clary's interpretation of the statute is thus incorrect. Clary was aware of the name and address of his child, and the lack of formal notice on these facts does not violate the notice provision of § 2803(24). ¶ 15 Clary also argues that the child's out-of-court statements pertaining to alleged sexual abuse by the father should have been excluded altogether as inadmissible hearsay testimony. As noted above, the trial judge allowed the statements admitted into evidence under 12 O.S.1991 § 2803(24). The purpose of § 2803(24) is to allow for the admission of hearsay statements not covered by explicit statutory hearsay exceptions but which possess equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. . . . The trial court did not abuse its judicial discretion in admitting the testimony of Kerr, the child's counselor, and the DHS employee concerning the statements of sexual abuse made by the child. ¶ 16 Clary further claims that the court violated his due process rights by denying him the right to confront and cross-examine his son. We have already determined that the child's statements made to the three testifying witnesses were admissible. But Clary will not be heard to argue that he agreed that his son should not be called to testify, and then complain that the son was not called to testify. Clary's argument is without merit, as he waived any right to confront his son when he agreed that his child would not be called as a witness.