Opinion ID: 2639711
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Language of Section 34A-2-413 Is Ambiguous

Text: ¶ 13 Both LPI and the respondents [1] present permissible grammatical readings of section 34A-2-413(1)(c)(iv). The relevant portion of the statute reads, To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude that ... the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's: (a) age; (b) education; (c) past work experience; (d) medical capacity; and (e) residual functional capacity. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1)(c)(iv) (2005) [2] . ¶ 14 LPI relies on the rule of the last antecedent to argue that the language of section 34A-2-413(1)(c)(iv) permits the Commission to consider only the five enumerated factors when determining whether other work is reasonably available and that the statute prohibits the Commission from considering location, stability, and wage. In contrast, the Commission asserts that the five enumerated factors do not determine whether other work is reasonably available but instead relate to the individual worker's ability to perform reasonably available work. The Commission argues that the interpretation urged by LPI would lead to an absurd result because the Commission would not be able to award benefits even in those cases where the only work available was outside of the state. ¶ 15 The rule of the last antecedent does not mandate that we limit the Commission's interpretation of other work reasonably available to the enumerated five factors. Under the rule of the last antecedent, `[q]ualifying words and phrases are generally regarded as applying to the immediately preceding words, rather than to more remote ones.' Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, ¶ 10, 976 P.2d 1202 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1977)). But the rule of the last antecedent does not mandate that qualifying rules and phrases only apply to the immediately preceding words; rather when given a choice between the immediately preceding words and more remote words, we prefer the words closer in proximity to the qualifying words and phrases. This rule does not prevent us from deciding that qualifying words and phrases apply to `several preceding terms of the same character.' Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Salt Lake City, 568 P.2d at 741). Moreover, rules of statutory construction, such as the rule of the last antecedent, `are useful guides, but poor masters[,] and they should not be regarded as having any such rigidity as to have the force of law, or distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent.' Id. ¶ 10 n. 4 (quoting Salt Lake City, 568 P.2d at 741). ¶ 16 LPI argues that the rule of the last antecedent mandates that the five factors modify other work reasonably available, thus limiting the Commission's authority to consider any other factors in determining whether other work is reasonably available. However, the rule of the last antecedent actually suggests that the five factors modify the entire preceding phrase, the employee cannot perform work otherwise reasonably available, rather than just the latter portion of the phrase. Under this interpretation, it is just as likely that the legislature specified the five factors to be considered in assessing the employee's ability to perform reasonably available work but first intended the Commission to consider whether work was reasonably available. We therefore conclude that the rule of the last antecedent does not shed any light on the legislature's intent because the phrase preceding the qualifying words can be interpreted to have two meanings. Further, neither proposed interpretation leads us to an absurd result that the legislature could not have intended. Because the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, we turn to the legislative history to discern the legislative intent.