Opinion ID: 197635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Assault and Battery Exclusion

Text: 10 United National claims that coverage for Burke's injuries is excluded because they arose out of two assault and batteries: first Burke was attacked by another Penuche's patron; and then he was manhandled by Tousley, who was attempting to break up the fighting. United National argues that the assault and battery exclusion applies if the claims arose out of either or both of these incidents.
11 It is not disputed that Burke was battered by another patron of Penuche's on October 4, 1995. However, the assault and battery exclusion is only implicated by this fight if batteries by customers were a type of battery excluded by the contract, and if Burke's injuries could fairly be said to arise out of this patron's attack. 12 The policy excludes claims arising out of an assault and/or battery, whether caused by or at the instigation of, or at the direction of, or omission by, the Insured, and/or his employees. (emphasis added). Tousley claims that this exclusion is inapplicable to any claims arising out of the patrons' fight because its terms only exclude coverage for assaults caused by acts or omissions of employees. In other words, Tousley reads the examples following the word whether as an exhaustive list. He argues that, at the very least, this provision is ambiguous, and that under New Hampshire law this ambiguity must be resolved against United National. See Hoepp v. State Farm Ins. Co., 697 A.2d 943, 945 (N.H.1997). These arguments fail. 13 An insurance policy's language must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning. Coakley v. Maine Bonding and Cas. Co., 136 N.H. 402, 618 A.2d 777, 781 (1992) (quoting Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980)). Tousley's position either reads the word whether out of the exclusion completely, or gives it a meaning identical to the word if. This interpretation runs against the commonly accepted meaning of the word whether in this context. If one hears, the post office will deliver your mail, whether it is raining or snowing, one will not take this to mean that mail is only delivered in inclement weather. Similarly, where this policy lists specific types of excluded assaults and batteries after the word whether, it does not follow that other assaults and batteries are not excluded. Our interpretation of this exclusion is consistent with the only other court that we have found to have addressed this question. In United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Horning, Ltd., 882 F.Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y.1995), United National sought a declaratory judgment under an identical exclusion in a liquor liability policy. Horning involved an action brought by a rape victim against a drinking establishment and bartenders for serving her attacker even though he was under the influence. Rejecting a reading of the clause identical to that proposed here by Tousley, the district court held that [t]he specific instances identified in the clause are simply not meant to provide an exhaustive list of the conduct contemplated by the exclusion. Id. at 314. We agree. 14 Furthermore, if Burke is trying to hold these defendants liable for the actions of a customer, his theory of liability must necessarily follow from an act or omission of Penuche's or its employees. See, e.g., United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 109-110 (2d Cir.1993) citing United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. The Tunnel, Inc., 988 F.2d 351, 354 (2d Cir.1993) (identical assault and battery exclusion cannot be read to exclude only more direct acts or omissions of employees as opposed to more remote acts of negligence leading to assaults and batteries). Therefore, the exclusion applies to the fight in this case, and the district court erred in adopting Penuche's limited interpretation of this clause. 15 Even if the policy exclusion covers this type of battery, however, the exclusion only precludes recovery in this case if Burke's injuries also can be said to arise out of the fight. Under New Hampshire law, arising out of is a very broad term meaning originating from or growing out of or flowing from. Winnacunnet Coop. Sch. Dist. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Merrimack Sch. Dist. v. National Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 140 N.H. 9, 661 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1995) (quoting Carter v. Bergeron, 102 N.H. 464, 160 A.2d 348, 353 (1960))). While the concept of arising out of is broader than proximate causation, it is not so broad as to encompass a tenuous connection. See Cannon v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 138 N.H. 365, 639 A.2d 270, 271 (1994); Akerley v. Hartford Ins. Group, 136 N.H. 433, 616 A.2d 511, 515 (1992). 16 United National argues that Burke's injuries arose out of the altercation with the other patron insofar as that altercation necessitated Tousley's doomed intervention. While this argument has some plausibility, we hold that Burke's injuries cannot be said to arise out of the initial attack. The spinal injury occurred when Tousley's bear hug and his momentum from hurrying over to stop the fight caused Burke to fall backward, into a table and onto the floor. All of the damages in this tort action stem from a discrete intervening act of alleged negligence, and this claim cannot be said to arise out of earlier actions. Tousley had a completely different objective from the brawling patron, and Burke's eventual injuries were not caused by the blows he received in the fight. See Winnacunnet, 84 F.3d at 38 (observing that assault and battery exclusions are intended to preclude coverage of claims where such excluded acts immediately cause the injury). This is not a case in which a bartender or bouncer joined sides in a donnybrook. The injury caused by the employee in this case arose entirely out of his own actions. 17 The district court's conclusion that the assault and battery exclusion is inapplicable to the fight is affirmed on these alternate grounds. See Frillz, Inc. v. Lader, 104 F.3d 515, 516 (1st Cir.1997) (reviewing court is not bound by the rationale of the lower court on summary judgment, but may affirm on any alternative ground made manifest by the record). 18
19 Having disposed of United National's argument that Burke's fight precludes coverage, the applicability of the assault and battery exclusion hinges on whether Tousley's attempt to break up the fight itself constituted a battery. Since there is no definition of battery in the policy, we look to the common law definition of the term. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an actor is liable to another for battery if: 20 (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and 21 (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results. 22 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1977). As both parties acknowledge in their briefs, the disputed issue here is whether Tousley had the requisite intent to cause an offensive contact with Burke. 1 23 United National refers this Court to section 19 of the Restatement (Second), which provides that bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable person's sense of personal dignity. It argues that Tousley's protective bear hug would offend a reasonable person's sense of dignity. We find this argument unpersuasive. 24 Burke testified at his deposition that, from the moment he saw Tousley about to grab him, he understood Tousley to be acting in a peacekeeping role. No reasonable person would feel their personal dignity offended by a bartender trying to prevent fighting in his establishment. This would be a different case if Tousley had hit or pushed Burke, however, it is undisputed that Tousley was merely attempting to keep Burke out of harm's way. 25 Professor Prosser offered a helpful example to distinguish between the intentional battery and negligence:If an automobile driver runs down a man in the street before him, with the desire to hit him, or with the belief that he is certain to do so, it is an intentional battery; but if he has no such desire or belief, but merely acts unreasonably in failing to guard against a risk which he should appreciate, it is negligence. 26 Prosser, Law of Torts, section 31 at 145 (4th ed.1971). In this case, Tousley's actions were negligent at most, and United National's offending dignity argument is unavailing.