Opinion ID: 2779090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: personal restraint petition

Text: Meirhofer also challenges his continued confinement by way of a personal restraint petition, largely reiterating his substantive arguments above. The State responded that relief by way of a personal restraint petition is not available. While we agree with the State that Meirhofer is not entitled to relief on the merits, we stress that there are no special rules prohibiting those committed under the SVP act from filing otherwise meritorious personal restraint petitions. Personal restraint petitions are modern version of ancient writs, most prominently habeas corpus, that allow petitioners to challenge the lawfulness of confinement. In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 128, 267 P.3d 324 (2011) (citing Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wn.2d 607, 609-11, 746 P.2d 809 (1987)). But relief by way of a personal restraint petition is extraordinary. See id. at 132 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 810-12, 792 P.2d 506 (1990)). A personal restraint petition is not a substitute for statutory avenues for review, and [t]o prevent it from becoming a substitute for an appeal, and to protect the finality of judgments, this court has imposed significant threshold, prima facie burdens on the petitioner before the merits of the substantive 8 The dissent suggests that Meirhofer is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing because it is reasonably possible that his change in diagnoses could lead a reasonable trier of fact to believe that he is no longer suffering from a mental abnormality that renders him dangerous. Dissent at 11. But under the statute, such changes are a basis for an evidentiary hearing only when the change in the person's mental condition [was] brought about through positive response to continuing participation in treatment and not a change in a single demographic factor. RCW 71.09.090(4)(b)(ii), (4)(c). Meirhofer has not participated in treatment, so any change in his diagnoses cannot stem from that. We upheld the facial constitutionality of this statute in McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 398. The dissent does not show that McCuistion should be overruled or not applied. 14 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 claim will be considered. In re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 211, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). Among other things, reliefis limited to those who meet the requirements of RAP 16.4, including its requirement that the petitioner show that other remedies which may be available to petitioner are inadequate. RAP 16.4(d). Chapter 71.09 RCW creates an avenue for review, which Meirhofer must show is inadequate in his case. Meirhofer contends that if he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under RCW 71.09.090, he is entitled to relief in a personal restraint petition as a matter of due process because new evidence shows the basis for Mr. Meirhofer's original commitment no longer exists and his continuing confinement is unconstitutional absent a jury trial on the issue of whether the State's new alleged bases for confinement are sufficient. Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 19 (citing RAP 16.4(c)(2), (3)). 9 While we are dubious that these provisions apply given that Meirhofer is restrained pursuant to a 2000 order not before us, a -personal restraint petition could conceivably be available to Meirhofer under RAP 16.4(c)(7), which authorizes the petition when [o]ther grounds exist to challenge the legality of the restraint of petitioner. He essentially argues that the statutory avenue is inadequate because within it, he could 9 (2) The conviction was obtained or the sentence or other order entered in a criminal proc~eding or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government was imposed or entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of Washington; or (3) Material facts exist which have not been previously presented and heard, which in the interest of justice require vacation of the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a criminal proceeding or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government. RAP 16A(c). 15 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 not show probable cause that he had been so changed as to proceed to an evidentiary hearing under RCW 71.09.090(2)(c)(ii), and that he was not entitled to have the trial judge weigh his evidence against the State's in determining whether he was still appropriately confined under RCW 71.09.090(2)(c)(1). But we effectively rejected similar arguments in McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d 369. McCuistion argued that because he presented prima facie evidence that he no longer meets the definition of a SVP, as Meirhofer has, he has both a statutory and constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 382. We disagreed.Id. 10 We began with first principles. Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an individual subject to civil commitment is entitled to release upon a showing that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. !d. at 384 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-78). However, once a fact-finder has determined that an individual meets the criteria for commitment as an SVP, the court accepts this initial conclusion as a verity in determining whether an individual is mentally il1 and dangerous· at a later date. !d. at 385 (citing Burke v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Yakima, 64 Wn.2d 244, 246, 391 P.2d 1-94 (1964)). Accordingly, where an individual was found beyond reasonable doubt to be mentally ill and dangerous at the time of his commitment trial, a showing that he no longer satisfies the constitutional criteria for confinement necessarily requires a showing of change. !d. (citing LAws OF 2005 ch. 344, § 1). We rejected McCuistion's contention that he was 10 McCuistion brought many challenges. Among other things, he maintained that his condition .. had changed because of his age and his abstention from alcohol and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing notwithstanding the statutory amendments that limited the grounds for such hearings. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 377-78. We considered and rejected all of McCuistion's arguments. ld. at 398. 16 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 constitutionally entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on the evidence he presented on age and recidivism, concluding that [t]here is no substantive due process right to a full annual evidentiary hearing based upon a mere showing of a change in a single demographic factor. Id. Thus, he did not show that his restraint was unlawful on those grounds. We also rejected McCuistion's contention that the 2005 amendments were facially unconstitutional·because (relevant to this case) they limited detainees seeking to prove their mental condition had changed due to a positive response to treatment. Id. at 387. Again, similarly to Meirhofer, McCuistion argued that requirement violated the constitution because it created the possibility someone could be detained who was not 'currently likely to commit sexually violent offenses due to a mental disorder.' Id. (quoting trial court record). We rejected that argument on the grounds the SVP act provided adequate constitutional protections: If the individual no longer meets the definition of a SVP, then the secretary shall authorize the person to petition the court for conditional release or unconditional discharge and the court shall within fortyfive days order a hearing. RCW 71.09.090(1). This statutory scheme comports with substantive due process because it does not permit continued involuntary commitment of a person who is no longer mentally ill and dangerous. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 388. Meirhofer makes no 'attempt to show that McCuistion should be overruled or that RCW 71.09.090 cannot be constitutionally applied to him. The State is required to review the condition of every detainee at least annually and, when challenged, present prima facie evidence that continued commitment is statutorily and constitutionally appropriate. In re. Det. ofPetersen, 145 Wn.2d at 809- 17 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 10. If the secretary ofDSHS determines continued commitment is not appropriate, the detainee is allowed to petition for an evidentiary hearing without having to first show cause. !d. at 810. Meirhofer has not shown that these statutory remedies are inadequate as applied to him. 11 Thus, his due process challenge fails. Accordingly, we dismiss his personal restraint petition under RAP 16.4. 12