Opinion ID: 2978826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Convicting Evidence

Text: Warlick argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to sustain a conviction, in violation of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Under the Jackson standard, a due process violation has occurred “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. To determine whether Warlick merits habeas relief, this court must employ deference at two different levels: “First, deference should be given to the trier-of-fact’s verdict, as contemplated by Jackson; second, deference should be given to the Michigan Court of Appeals’ consideration of the trier-of-fact's verdict, as dictated by AEDPA.” Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2007)). This court must analyze Warlick’s claim with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. The elements of felony murder in Michigan are: (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e., malice], (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in [the statute, including armed robbery]. People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 136 (Mich. 1999) (quoting People v. Turner, 540 N.W.2d 728, 5 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)). Warlick’s argument fails because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict under either theory of the case, and the Michigan Court of Appeals’ consideration of this issue reasonably applied the principles found in Jackson. First, the jury could have believed that Warlick shot Fortune, which would indicate that he had an intent to kill. The evidence presented at trial supported this theory: Warlick admitted that he participated in the robbery, the police found him hiding close to the murder weapon, and the gunshot residue test revealed residue on his hand, face, and clothes. Second, the jury could have inferred that Warlick possessed malice under the aiding and abetting theory. The facts and circumstances of a killing can give rise to an inference of malice. Id. In Carines, a felony murder case, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a jury can infer that a defendant acted with malice, even if the defendant did not personally use the murder weapon, if the “defendant set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” Id. As an admitted participant in the planning and execution of the robbery, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Warlick knew Spoon would be armed. At a minimum, the jury could have deduced that Warlick saw a gun in his partner’s hands right before they entered the apartment since Walker testified that a gun was drawn when they entered.