Opinion ID: 778954
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevance: Assist the Trier of Fact

Text: 59 The district court concluded that Dr. Wicks' testimony was not relevant because (1) the jury could make its own determination about the sincerity and veracity of Finley's beliefs, (2) the jury could also make the same observations Dr. Wicks made, and, (3) the government could not effectively cross-examine the expert diagnosis. 18 The government makes a similar argument to this court, contending that Dr. Wicks' testimony does not assist the trier of fact because it does not exceed the common knowledge of the trier of fact and crediting Dr. Wicks' testimony precludes the jury from finding that Finley possessed the necessary mens rea for the crime. 19 60
61 We reject the government's first argument and hold that the district court abused its discretion when it found that Dr. Wicks' expert opinion did not exceed the common knowledge of the average layperson. 62 We must be cautious not to overstate the scope of the average juror's common understanding and knowledge. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, it is precisely because juries are unlikely to know that social scientists and psychologists have identified [such a personality disorder] ... that the testimony would have assisted the jury in making its decision. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345(7th Cir.1996). 63 Jurors are unlikely to know that psychologists have identified a personality disorder that explains why a seemingly normal person could reject or distort certain overwhelmingly true information. Dr. Wicks' testimony would have offered an explanation as to how an otherwise normal man could believe that these financial instruments were valid and reject all evidence to the contrary. While Finley could and did testify about how and why he believed the instruments were valid, only a trained mental health expert could provide a counterweight to the government's allegations against Finley. On the basis of the record before us, Finley was entitled to present Dr. Wicks' testimony to support his defense theory. 64 Our case law recognizes the importance of expert testimony when an issue appears to be within the parameters of a layperson's common sense, but in actuality, is beyond their knowledge. In United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1019-20 (9th Cir.2001), we reversed a trial court's decision to exclude a school psychologist's testimony that special education students whose first language is not English have difficulties communicating in English in high pressure situations. Even though this testimony was seemingly based on common sense, we stated that the expert testimony was necessary to explain how the defendant and an interrogating officer could have very different perceptions of what occurred during the interrogation, yet could both be correct from a communications standpoint. 237 F.3d at 1019. In Vallejo, we relied on the logic of a First Circuit case in which the court explained: [T]he expert testimony was needed to explain why the defendant would make `false statements even though they were inconsistent with his apparent self-interest' when `[c]ommon understanding conforms to the notion that a person ordinarily does not make untruthful inculpatory statements.' Id. at 1020 (quoting United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 133(1st Cir. 1995)) (concluding that the defendant should have been allowed to present expert testimony that he suffered from a mental disorder which caused him to tell grandiose, self-incriminating lies). The First Circuit reformulated the proper Rule 702 inquiry to be: [w]hether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best degree, the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject matter involved. Shay, 57 F.3d at 132 (citations omitted). In the instant case, the average layperson was not qualified to assess Finley's mental condition without the assistance of an expert's specialized understanding. 65 The district court also concluded that several factors in Dr. Wicks' diagnosis, including the elevated levels of narcissism and Dr. Wicks' observations of Finley's physical conduct, are the kinds of observations a jury is supposed to make. We reject the notion that the jury could make the same observations as Dr. Wicks about Finley's physical demeanor and his psychological test scores. First, we note the obvious distinction between a mental health professional examining a patient in private and a jury observing a defendant testifying on the witness stand. Second, while the jury members might have been able to visually identify Finley's demeanor, they were not trained to interpret and assess those observations. 20 The government describes these as commonsensical observations about Finley's demeanor, but Dr. Wicks was able to carefully detail his expert ability to recognize certain symptoms based on his training and years of experience. 21 We doubt the members of the jury possess such an ability. Finally, as Dr. Wicks explained, interpreting psychological testing scores requires years of experience and training. Providing the jury with this raw information would simply not have been enough. 66 The court also excluded Dr. Wicks' opinion because there's nothing that anybody can get their teeth into if you want to cross-examine him. Contrary to this position and as previously mentioned in note 18 of this opinion, all of the weaknesses the district court noted in Dr. Wicks' testimony, including the subjectivity of his conclusions and his reliance on the veracity of Finley's statements, can be properly addressed by the government on cross-examination. See e.g., Rahm, 993 F.2d at 1413(Any deficits in[the psychologist's] qualifications beyond her professional training go to the weight of her testimony rather than to its admissibility.). Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. We note that even with the short notice the government effectively cross-examined Dr. Wicks during the Daubert hearing. 67
68 Expert testimony that compels the jury to conclude that the defendant did or did not possess the requisite mens rea does not assist the trier of fact under Rule 702 because such testimony encroaches on the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations. Specifically, Rule 704(b) limits the expert's testimony by prohibiting him from testifying as to whether the defendant had the mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged. Morales, 108 F.3d at 1035. The rationale for precluding ultimate opinion testimony applies ... `to any ultimate mental state of the defendant that is relevant to the legal conclusion sought to be proven.' United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting S. Rep. 98-225 at 231). However, Rule 704(b) allows expert testimony on a defendant's mental state so long as the expert does not draw the ultimate inference or conclusion for the jury. Morales, 108 F.3d at 1037-38. It is, therefore, essential that we distinguish between expert opinions that necessarily compel a conclusion about the defendant's mens rea and those that do not. 69 In Morales, we concluded that the district court erred in barring expert testimony under Rule 704(b) because the expert's testimony did not compel the conclusion that Morales lacked the mens rea of the crime. Morales, charged with willfully making false bookkeeping entries, wanted an accounting expert to testify that her understanding of accounting principles was weak. Id. at 1037. We stated: 70 Even if the jury believed [the] expert testimony that Morales had a weak grasp of bookkeeping knowledge (and there was evidence to the contrary), the jury would still have had to draw its own inference from that predicate testimony to answer the ultimate factual question — whether Morales willfully made false entries. Morales could have had a weak grasp of bookkeeping principles and still knowingly made false entries. 71 Id. at 1037. 72 In Morales, we also cited with approval United States v. Rahm, in which we reversed the district court's exclusion of a defense expert who was going to testify that Rahm had poor visual perception and consistently overlooked important visual details. Morales, 108 F.3d at 1038. In Rahm, we drew a distinction between the ultimate issue — whether Rahm knew the bills were counterfeit — and the proffered testimony of the defendant's poor vision, from which the jury could, but was not compelled, to infer that she did not know the bills were counterfeit. Id. (citing Rahm, 993 F.2d at 1411-12). 73 On the other hand, we have applied Rule 704(b) to prohibit certain testimony that does compel a conclusion about mens rea. In Campos, we upheld a district court's exclusion of a polygraph expert from testifying that the defendant was truthful when she stated she did not know she was transporting marijuana. 217 F.3d at 711. We determined that the testimony compelled the conclusion that the defendant did not possess the requisite knowledge to commit the crime because polygraph test results offer an implicit opinion about whether the accused is being deceptive about the very matters at issue in the trial. Id. at 712. 74 Dr. Wicks' expert diagnosis that Finley has an atypical belief system falls into the Morales / Rahm line of reasoning and can be distinguished from Campos. The jury could have accepted the atypical belief diagnosis and still concluded that Finley knowingly defrauded the banks. If credited, Dr. Wicks' testimony established only that Finley's beliefs were rigid and he would distort or disregard information that ran counter to those beliefs. Dr. Wicks did not, and would not be allowed to, testify about Finley's specific beliefs with regard to the financial instruments. The jury was free to conclude that Finley knew the notes were fraudulent, despite the rigidity of his belief system. Just as in Morales and Rahm, the defense was entitled to present evidence so that the jury could infer from the expert's testimony that the defendant lacked the necessary intent to defraud, but such a conclusion was not necessarily compelled by the diagnosis. A psychological diagnosis, unlike a lie detector test, does not automatically entail an opinion on the truth of a patient's statements. Furthermore, the psychological diagnosis can be limited such that it in no way touches upon the specific issues of fact to be resolved by the jury. 22 75 We also observe that a jury is free to reject Dr. Wicks' testimony. A jury might decide that Finley was untruthful with Dr. Wicks, as the government so strenuously argues in its brief to this court. See Vallejo, 237 F.3d at 1020 (allowing the expert testimony would not displace the role of the jury because, after hearing the expert testimony, the jury was free to decide that the reason for the discrepancy was Vallejo's lack of credibility — not his communications disorder). 76