Opinion ID: 2194284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntary and Intelligent Guilty Plea

Text: A guilty plea results in a waiver of several constitutional rights. For the waiver to be valid, there must be an intentional relinquishment of known rights. Due process therefore requires that a defendant enter a guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently. State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted). If a plea is not intelligently and voluntarily made, the failure by counsel to file a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge the plea constitutes a breach of an essential duty. Id. at 22 (citing Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1983)). To enter a guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently means the defendant has a full understanding of the consequences of a plea. Id. at 21 (citing State v. Boone, 298 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1980)). The overriding question is whether defendant, on the whole record, understood the elements of the crime and the nature of the charge against him. State v. Oberbreckling, 235 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Iowa 1975) (citing State v. Watts, 225 N.W.2d 143, 144-45 (Iowa 1975); Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711, 714-15 (Iowa 1974); State v. Hansen, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1974); State v. Bedell, 220 N.W.2d 891, 892 (Iowa 1974)). Philo claims his plea was not intelligent and voluntary because the district court's initial statements during the plea proceeding led him to believe his sentence for eluding was to run concurrently with his sentence for theft of a motor vehicle. We agree the record presents a confusing picture of the plea agreement in this case. The statements made by the court and the questions propounded by the court make it unclear if the eluding sentence was to be imposed concurrently with or consecutively to the theft sentence. It is clear, however, that the plea agreement was reached between the county attorney and defense counsel and that the court ultimately agreed to accept the plea agreement and imposed the sentence pursuant to the agreement. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.10(3) (acceptance of plea agreement). It is also apparent that defense counsel understood that the eluding sentence would run consecutively to the theft sentence. Yet, for the purposes of determining whether a guilty plea was involuntary due to confusion over the plea agreement, the important inquiry is what the defendant, not the defense attorney, understood. Wallace v. State, 245 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Iowa 1976). Thus, if material misstatements are made by the court that induce a defendant to plead guilty, and those misstatements are not corrected, the plea is not intelligently and voluntarily entered, and the defendant is entitled to have it set aside and to plead anew. Stovall v. State, 340 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Iowa 1983). It is evident that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted by Philo on appeal based on the confusion over the plea agreement must be preserved for postconviction relief. See Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 134 (If it is necessary to more fully develop a factual record, we preserve the ineffective-assistance claim for a possible postconviction relief action.) (citing State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Iowa 2003)). This will allow a record to be developed concerning the actual terms of the plea agreement and Philo's understanding of the terms of the plea agreement. The record must also be developed whether Philo was actually confused by the court's statements during the plea colloquy and whether those statements induced Philo to plead guilty.