Opinion ID: 895407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the Willoughby Testimony

Text: Willoughby testified as an expert in this case. A party offering scientific expert testimony must show by clear and convincing evidence that the science is reliable. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see also In re D.W.P., No. 06-07-00113-CV, 2008 WL 53211, at  (Tex.App.-Texarkana Jan. 4, 2008, no pet.) (Even though appeals of juvenile court orders are generally treated as civil cases, we believe the criminal standard for the admission of scientific evidence should apply in light of the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile proceedings. (footnote and citation omitted)). [9] `Unreliable... scientific evidence simply will not assist the [jury] to understand the evidence or accurately determine a fact in issue; such evidence obfuscates rather than leads to an intelligent evaluation of the facts.' Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 572 (alterations in original) (quoting Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier With the Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of Evidence, 32 ARIZ. L.REV. 915, 941-42 (1990)). Kelly governs the reliability determination and specifies several non-exclusive factors to guide the inquiry. [10] 824 S.W.2d at 571-73. Two of these factors, the potential error rate and the existence of supporting literature, are the primary issues in M.P.A.'s false testimony claim and the subjects on which Willoughby testified falsely. Willoughby testified regarding the Abel Assessment outside the presence of the jury. When asked about the Abel Assessment's error rate, he stated that [f]or classifying people who have significant sexual interest in female children under the age of fourteen, the accuracy rate is 85 percent. This is particularly significant because at the time of the alleged offense, S.A. fell into this category. In addition, in response to a question regarding the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the Abel Assessment, Willoughby stated that [t]here is [sic] a number of articles out by Gene Abel and his colleagues. Also researchers at Brigham Young University have established the reliability of the instrument and the classification accuracy of the instrument. Much of this testimony was false. In 1998, the accuracy rate of the Abel Assessment, according to Abel and his colleagues, for classifying people with a significant sexual interest in female children under fourteen was only 65%, not 85%. This weighs against the reliability of the Abel Assessment. [11] Furthermore, contrary to Willoughby's testimony, the Brigham Young University (BYU) studies failed to establish the Abel Assessment's reliability as applied to adults and actively established that it was unreliable as applied to adolescents. Regarding adults, they found that it was a promising instrument based on a sound idea, but concluded that the evidence of its reliability and validity for use with adults is weak as of yet, labeled it a nonvalidated instrument, and called for further research and refinement. Regarding the application of the Abel Assessment to adolescents, they found that no research other than their own had been done and that Abel's initial study only included two adolescents. Their own research led them to conclude that data did not support the reliability of [the Abel Assessment] for use with adolescents, that the ability of [the Abel Assessment] to discriminate adolescent offenders from nonoffenders was not significantly better than chance, and the Abel Assessment's ability to screen or diagnose adolescent perpetrators reliably has not been demonstrated. The State argues that the following evidence supports the admission of Willoughby's testimony:  The statement in one of the BYU articles that approximately 300 therapists in 36 states and two foreign countries, as well as 8 states' judicial systems used the assessment;  Abel's study of the Abel Assessment;  Four independent studies supporting the theory underlying the Abel Assessment;  The inability of M.P.A. and J.W.A.'s attorneys to find an expert to attack the Abel Assessment. With the exception of Abel's own study, the State did not present this evidence to the trial court. Nor would this evidence have been presented to the trial court had Willoughby testified truthfully regarding the Abel Assessment's error rate and the BYU studies' reliability findings. Therefore, we do not consider it in our determination of whether the trial court would have found the Abel Assessment reliable absent Willoughby's false testimony. [12] The State argues that we should consider the four independent studies because the State would have used them to rebut the criticisms in the BYU studies if Willoughby had testified truthfully about the BYU studies. [13] The State's framework would require that we assume Willoughby was aware of these studies and speculate as to how he would have testified about them. We reject this approach and do not consider the four studies. See, e.g., Graves v. Cockrell, 351 F.3d 143, 156 (5th Cir. 2003) (referencing the largely speculative nature of allegations of what an uncalled witness would have testified to as a reason why complaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored). [14] The State additionally argues that we should apply the less stringent standard from Nenno v. State to this case. 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim. App.1999). Nenno held that Kelly 's reliability requirement applies with less rigor to fields of study aside from the hard sciences. Id. Nenno noted that hard science methods of validation, such as assessing the potential error rate or subjecting a theory to peer review, may often be inappropriate for testing the reliability of fields of expertise outside the hard sciences. Id. This case stands in sharp contrast to Nenno. There, an expert testified regarding future dangerousness based on his experience studying cases. Id. at 562. That expert did not contend that he had a particular methodology. Id. Here, the Abel Assessment was subject to peer review and testing of its accuracy rate. Therefore, we consider those factors. See Mendoza v. State, No. AP-75213, 2008 WL 4803471, at  n. 62 (Tex.Crim.App. Nov. 5, 2008) (applying peer review factor in the soft science context of predicting future dangerousness because expert claimed to have a methodology, and contrasting Nenno ); Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561 & n. 9 (stating that Nenno does not preclude employing the error rate and peer review factors in appropriate cases). [15] In sum, had Willoughby testified truthfully, the trial court would have been faced with testimony regarding a test that had only a 65% accuracy rate as applied to this case, was subject to at least some criticism in the literature as applied to this case, and had no support from independent studies as applied to this case. The only evidence to support admission of the testimony regarding the Abel Assessment would have been a study by its creator that did not address the assessment's application to this case. Given the evidence regarding the Abel Assessment's application to adolescents, had Willoughby testified truthfully, the State would not have established the assessment's reliability under Kelly. Therefore, we hold that the trial court would have excluded Willoughby's testimony.