Opinion ID: 1918759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiffs post judgment interest

Text: ¶ 28. The trial judge awarded Ron interest at the rate of eight percent on the $18,543.00 entered as prejudgment interest. Dee was also awarded interest at the rate of eight percent on her prejudgment interest award of $12,980.00. ¶ 29. All judgments or decrees founded on any sale or contract shall bear interest at the same rate as the contract evidencing the debt on which the judgment or decree was rendered. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (1991). All other judgments or decrees shall bear interest at a per annum rate set by the judge having the complaint from a date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint. Id. ¶ 30. The parties broach this issue only superficially in their briefs. The Johnsons rely on the above statute and the trial judge's discretion in awarding demands for judgment. Preferred contends that the authorities cited under prejudgment interest also apply to a trial court's award of post judgment interest. Further, Preferred asserts that the award of post judgment interest amounts to an award of compound interest, which is not allowable. ¶ 31. The cases interpreting post judgment interest are scarce. Preferred directs this Court's attention to a Fifth Circuit case, Stovall v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 722 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1984). Stovall involved an interpretation of a statute that has since been amended. At the time of the Stovall decision, 75-17-7 read, All other judgments and decrees shall bear interest at the rate of eight percentum (8%) per annum. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (1975). Thus, post judgment interest was permitted on a simple interest basis. Stovall, 722 F.2d at 192. However, since that time, 75-17-7 has been amended to allow interest at a per annum rate set by the judge. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (1991). We hold that the trial judge's awarding of interest at the rate of eight percent after date of entry of the order was within his discretion under the revised statute.