Opinion ID: 1111213
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Evidentiary Issues Concerning Deanna Erbert

Text: (21a) As noted earlier, Deanna Erbert was four years old at the time of the crimes, and eight years old when she testified at trial. Defendant requested and received a pretrial evaluation in camera of Deanna's competency to testify. The court found her competent. Defendant presents two arguments in connection with that determination. First, he argues the trial court erred and that allowing Deanna's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination and his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a reliable death judgment. Second, he claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not adequately challenging Deanna's capacity to testify or requesting a cautionary instruction. In a related argument, defendant asserts the admission of two extrajudicial statements by Deanna constituted inadmissible hearsay. He contends his counsel was incompetent for not objecting to the statements' admission, which he says violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We consider these issues in turn.
(22) In assessing defendant's challenges to Deanna's competence as a witness, we return to the rules we applied to similar claims in People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 444 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]: As a general rule, `every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no person is disqualified to testify to any matter.' (Evid. Code, § 700; see Pen. Code, § 1321.) A person may be disqualified as a witness for one of two reasons: (1) the witness is incapable of expressing himself or herself so as to be understood, or (2) the witness is incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth. (Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a).) The party challenging the witness bears the burden of proving disqualification, and a trial court's determination will be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.] (21b) Here, the voir dire questioning of Deanna established her ability to express herself in an understandable manner. The examination also amply established that Deanna understood the difference between truth and falsehood and appreciated that she had to tell the truth. She also understood that she was to testify only as to those matters she knew herself from her memory. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Deanna was competent to testify. Defendant contends Deanna should have been excluded as a witness because she was not questioned about her personal knowledge of the subject matter of her testimony. (23) However, as the California Law Revision Commission Comment to Evidence Code section 701 states: [Evidence Code] Section 701 requires the court to determine only the prospective witness' capacity to communicate and [her] understanding of the duty to tell the truth. The missing qualifications  the capacity to perceive and to recollect  are determined in a different manner. Because a witness, qualified under Section 701, must have personal knowledge of the facts to which [she] testifies (Section 702), [she] must, of course, have the capacity to perceive and to recollect those facts. But the court may exclude the testimony of a witness for lack of personal knowledge only if no jury could reasonably find that [she] has such knowledge. [Citations.] Thus, the Evidence Code has made a person's capacity to perceive and to recollect a condition for the admission of [her] testimony concerning a particular matter instead of a condition for [her] competency to be a witness. And, under the Evidence Code, if there is evidence that the witness has those capacities, the determination whether [she] in fact perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact. [Citations.] (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 701, p. 284.) (21c) The voir dire of Deanna showed that she could perceive and recollect, and she understood she should not invent or lie about anything she said in court. She was an eyewitness to the events. Consequently, once the trial court properly determined she was competent to testify under Evidence Code section 701, it had no basis for excluding her testimony for lack of personal knowledge. The facts that Deanna received therapy to help her cope with her mother's death, that she discussed the events with the prosecutor and others, and that she had gaps in her memories of the evening the crimes occurred, do not disqualify her as a witness. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 444-445; see People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 621-622 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635].) The trier of fact can evaluate these matters, when appropriate and otherwise permissible, in resolving the question of credibility. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 444-445.) We also reject defendant's claim that admission of Deanna's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because of her limited memories of her mother's death. (24) The right of confrontation secures to an accused an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses; it does not guarantee testimony free from forgetfulness, confusion, or even evasion. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 622.) (21d) Also without merit is defendant's claim that Deanna's testimony was unreliable and, because it contributed to a judgment of death, it violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant was fully afforded the protections of the procedures constitutionally required to ensure reliability in the factfinding process. As we have previously remarked in rejecting essentially the same contention, defendant `was given an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine in a judicial forum.' [Citation.] ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 623, quoting People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 445.)
(25) Defendant asserts his counsel was ineffective for not challenging Deanna's ability to perceive, recall, or recount the events of her mother's death during the voir dire examination. However, the record shows no basis for such a challenge, much less any prospect it would have succeeded. Instead, Deanna's affirmative responses to the initial inquiries about these matters suggested further questioning by defense counsel may have been counterproductive. Moreover, as the Attorney General observes, defendant's trial counsel might have had a sound tactical reason not to question Deanna in depth: There could be no assurance that further probing would not trigger memories of the killings otherwise unavailable to her. Defendant also faults his trial counsel for not requesting the instruction provided for in section 1127f. [12] The trial court gave the jury the standard instruction on evaluating witness credibility, which in itself provides adequate general guidance for consideration of a child's testimony. There is no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury concerning a child's testimony. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 623-624.) As the Attorney General remarks, defense counsel reasonably could decide to forgo the instruction for tactical reasons. The section 1127f instruction informs a jury that a child may perform differently as a witness from an adult due to the child's cognitive development level, that a child is not any more or less credible than an adult, and that a child's testimony should not automatically be discounted or distrusted. Defense attorneys have attacked the instruction repeatedly. They have claimed that it invades the jury's function of assessing witness credibility ( People v. Jones (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1566, 1572-1574 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 9]), unduly inflates children's testimony, and decreases the government's burden of proof ( People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal. App.4th 1372, 1392-1394 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 660]), and that it impairs the right to confrontation by undermining impeachment based on a witness's immature performance ( People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 439, 455-457 [271 Cal. Rptr. 653]). Although these attacks failed, they were not so baseless and unreasonable as to render defense counsel's performance deficient for not requesting the instruction in this case. In any event, because the jury received adequate guidance from the standard instruction on credibility, the absence of an instruction pursuant to section 1127f does not undermine our confidence in the trial's outcome.
(26) Defendant contends that Charles Erbert's and Jennie Chapman's testimony about statements Deanna made on the night of the killings violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation because they were inadmissible and unreliable hearsay. He also asserts his attorney was incompetent for not objecting to the statements. We conclude the statements were properly admissible. Consequently, although the absence of an objection by defendant's counsel waived the substantive contention, the omission was neither evidence of a deficient performance nor prejudicial. Charles testified that while he and Deanna waited for the fire department's paramedics to arrive and help Doreen, Deanna told him the man who attacked Doreen said, `I'm coming back to kill you. If you tell somebody, I'll kill you. I'm coming for you, too,' or something similar. Jennie Chapman, a neighbor of the Erberts, came to the house immediately in response to a call from Charles. She arrived after the paramedics; Deanna was brought out to her. She testified about waiting outside in a car with Deanna: She would kind of drift off. She'd  she wouldn't say anything. And then she said, he killed my mommy. And I said, who. I can't tell you because he said he'd kill me. He'd come back and get me if I told. As defendant implicitly recognizes, the statements Deanna attributed to the killer were not offered for their truth; that is, they were not admitted to prove the killer would return to kill Deanna if she told. Rather, they were relevant to the killer's state of mind at the time of the killings. Consequently, defendant's statements to Deanna were not within the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Moreover, the hearsay rule does not prevent evidence of a statement made by a party from being admitted against that party. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) The Attorney General acknowledges that Deanna's statements to Charles and Jennie were admitted for their truth to the extent Deanna attributed the threats to the killer. However, Deanna's statements constituted spontaneous utterances that were excepted from the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1240: Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception. Unquestionably, Deanna was under the immediate influence of stress from events that caused sufficient nervous excitement to make her statements about the threats spontaneous and unreflecting. (See People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 318-320.) We reject defendant's contention that a statement admissible under Evidence Code section 1240 nevertheless violates Sixth Amendment confrontation rights unless the prosecution shows both declarant unavailability and adequate indicia of reliability. Defendant made no timely or specific objection on this ground in the trial court. Thus, he has not preserved the claim for review. ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186 [58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) Even if the claim had been preserved, however, it would have no support in the law. The hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations is among those firmly rooted exceptions that carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. ( White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355, fn. 8 [112 S.Ct. 736, 742, 116 L.Ed.2d 848] and accompanying text.) The Sixth Amendment confrontation clause imposes no requirement of declarant unavailability as a prerequisite for admission of spontaneous declarations. ( Id. at pp. 355-356 [112 S.Ct. at pp. 742-743].) Therefore, admission of Deanna's extrajudicial statements did not violate defendant's confrontation rights. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 186-187.)