Opinion ID: 886539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 51 Did the District Court err in denying Ayers' motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant? ¶ 52 On October 23, 2000, following an in camera inspection of the reports, files and statements requested by Ayers, the District Court ordered that it would not release the CI's files (Files Nos. 6 and 7). In its order, the District Court explained that File No. 6 generally consisted of hearsay information that was discussed in other reports already made available to defense counsel, and noted that the CI had no independent information about the homicide. The court determined that the file consisted of other information that would be considered inculpatory, not exculpatory, and noted that preventing Ayers from viewing the file would not adversely affect his ability to prepare a defense. The court concluded that the balancing test weighed heavily on the side of the State for non-disclosure. The District Court also concluded that File No. 7 contained no useful or relevant information and ordered that it not be disclosed. ¶ 53 Ayers argues that according to the investigative report he did receive, the CI had told law enforcement that Jake Fox had bragged about having sex with Phyllis on the night she was murdered and that the CI had knowledge of important details of the homicide. Ayers contends that his investigator could have followed up on information from the CI and possibly found other witnesses who may have heard Fox make similar statements. Ayers argues the court erred by denying discovery upon the ground that the file contained inculpatory information, and also argues that Fox's statements would have been admissible at trial to effectively cross-examine and impeach Fox. ¶ 54 In response, the State points out that the investigative report showed that the CI did not have any first-hand knowledge about Fox's statements, nor did he have knowledge of any of the important details of the homicide. In addition, the State argues that consideration of the inculpatory or exculpatory nature of the evidence is a part of the balancing test required when assessing whether to disclose an informant's identity. ¶ 55 The State may claim the privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a confidential informant. However, this privilege is not absolute and is subject to the balancing test enunciated in Roviaro v. United States (1957), 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639. In Roviaro, the United States Supreme Court explained, We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62, 77 S.Ct. 623. This Court has repeatedly applied this test since we first recognized it in State ex rel. Offerdahl v. Dist. Ct. of Eighth Jud. Dist. (1971), 156 Mont. 432, 481 P.2d 338. See, e.g., State v. Sarbaum (1995), 270 Mont. 176, 180-81, 890 P.2d 1284, 1287; State v. Campbell (1992), 254 Mont. 425, 429-30, 838 P.2d 427, 430; and State v. Crowder (1991), 248 Mont. 169, 176, 810 P.2d 299, 303. In this balancing test the burden is on the defendant to show the need for disclosure, and this need must be one which overrides the government's interest. Mere speculation will not suffice. Campbell, 254 Mont. at 430, 838 P.2d at 430 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). ¶ 56 Based on our review of the record, including the CI's files, and the above-cited authority, including the balancing test from Roviaro, we conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Ayers' motion to compel disclosure of the CI's identity. ¶ 57 First, we note that the investigative report provided to Ayers accurately summarized the interview between law enforcement officers and the CI, and omitted only the CI's identity. The report explains that Fox's statement originated from an alleged conversation between Debbie Bauer (Bauer)who was named in the reportand Fox, and that the CI heard about this conversation third hand, i.e., not from either Fox or Bauer. ¶ 58 Thus, Ayers' contention that Fox's statements to the confidential informant... clearly falls [sic] under the exception to hearsay contained within Rule 804(b)(3), M.R.Evid., is incorrect. Rule 804(b)(3), M.R.Evid., applies when the declarantwho in this case is allegedly Foxis unavailable. However, both Fox and Bauer testified during trial, while none of those supposedly in the middle of the story's repetitionall of whom were named in the reportwere called as witnesses. ¶ 59 Significantly, the CI was neither present at the crime scene nor a witness to any alleged criminal activity, which bears on the significance or probative force of the CI's information. We note that in Roviaro, the informant's identity was important because he was the only witness to the transaction Roviaro was accused of committing. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64, 77 S.Ct. 623. We have concluded that when an undercover informant played a continuous, active, and primary role in the alleged crime, his identity should have been disclosed since his testimony would be relevant to the defendant's assertions of an entrapment defense. State v. Chapman (1984), 209 Mont. 57, 68, 679 P.2d 1210, 1215-16. See also Offerdahl, 156 Mont. at 439, 481 P.2d at 341-42 (informant who took part in drug transaction was vital material witness because significance of informant's testimony was critical in proving guilt or innocence of defendant and his identity should be revealed unless information could be amended to state sufficient facts). Here, the CI was simply not a vital material witness. At best, he merely passed on to others what he heard. See also U.S. v. Mendoza-Salgado (10th Cir.1992), 964 F.2d 993 (disclosure of identity not required when informant did not actively participate in the transaction that generates the charge or his information would be merely cumulative). ¶ 60 Ayers was provided with the identities of the CI's sources of information and had the opportunity to interview them and call them as witnesses. We conclude that given the information provided Ayers, and the accuracy and thoroughness of the investigative report's summary of the CI's information, denying disclosure of the CI's identity had little if any impact on Ayers' ability to prepare his defense. ¶ 61 Finally, we disagree with Ayers' assertion that the CI accurately described Phyllis's injuries in every detail. While the CI did correctly describe some of Phyllis's injuries, the CI also told law enforcement that Phyllis had been stabbed in the eye and ear, which was incorrect. Again, this information was not based on any first-hand knowledge and the CI was unable to remember who told him that information. Moreover, we note that testimony during trial indicated that some of the facts detailing the manner of Phyllis's death and the nature of her injuries were rumored about the Livingston Community. ¶ 62 After considering the crime charged, the possible defenses, the potential significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ayers' motion to compel disclosure of the CI's identity.