Opinion ID: 479003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint

Text: 32 Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint in October 1984, to allege post-complaint injury. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that they had known of the conduct alleged since 1981, that the new allegation was a disguised challenge to UDA's base plan, and that amendment would require the reopening of discovery. We review the denial for abuse of discretion. Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir.1973). We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for leave to amend. 33 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) allows the addition of post-complaint allegations. Motions to amend pursuant to Rule 15(d) should be granted [u]nless undue prejudice to the opposing party will result. Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190. We see no prejudice to defendants in allowing the amendment. Because most of the information on the added claim would be available in UDA's own files, little additional discovery would be needed. Defendants rely upon Waters v. Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Co., 582 F.2d 503, 506-07 (9th Cir.1978), in arguing that because plaintiffs could have sought amendment at an earlier date and because discovery would have to be reopened if the motion were granted, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Waters, however, involved obvious prejudice to the defendants because plaintiffs sought to litigate an issue that they had previously conceded. Id. at 507. It thus is not controlling under these facts. 34 The purpose of [Rule 15(d) ] is to promote as complete an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as is possible. C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1504, at 536 (1971). Because UDA would not be unduly prejudiced by the minimal further discovery that may be required, the district court on remand should allow the motion. 35 REVERSED and REMANDED.