Opinion ID: 1172684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Admissibility of Defendant's Criminal History

Text: In the penalty phase of the trial, the State introduced certified copies of Stenson's prior convictions including: a 1971 King County Superior Court felony conviction for possession of LSD, a 1974 federal felony conviction for distribution of cocaine, and two 1985 federal misdemeanors for failure to file an income tax return and possession of cocaine. The Defendant argues none of his criminal record should have been admitted in the penalty phase of his trial. He argues his felony convictions should not have been admitted in the sentencing phase of the trial because they would have been considered washed out convictions under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), RCW 9.94A.360(2), and therefore would not have been used to compute the standard range sentence if the crime had been other than a capital offense. He argues it violates equal protection to allow the convictions in a capital case to be considered when they would not be relevant to determine the offender score in a non-capital case. He also argues that, under the ER 403 balancing test, their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial impact. The Defendant also argues that his misdemeanor convictions should not have been admitted because they were irrelevant or their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial impact. He asks this Court to hold that no misdemeanor conviction should ever be admitted at the penalty phase of a capital case or that the trial court should conduct a balancing under ER 403 before they are admitted. Under the existing statutes and case law, the Defendant's prior criminal convictions were admissible in the penalty phase of the trial. RCW 10.95.070(1) provides: In deciding the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4), the jury ... may consider any relevant factors, including but not limited to the following: (1) Whether the defendant has or does not have a significant history, either as a juvenile or an adult, of prior criminal activity.... We have held that proof of criminal activity is limited in a capital case to the defendant's record of convictions. State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash.2d 173, 196, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982) ( Bartholomew I), State's cert. granted and remanded, 463 U.S. 1203, 103 S.Ct. 3530, 77 L.Ed.2d 1383, defendant's cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212, 103 S.Ct. 3548, 77 L.Ed.2d 1395 (1983), adhered to on remand, 101 Wash.2d 631, 641-42, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) ( Bartholomew II). In Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 667, 904 P.2d 245, we held that juvenile convictions for both misdemeanors and felonies may be admitted as aggravating evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital case. Since older juvenile misdemeanors are admissible, then adult misdemeanors, such as those of the Defendant here, are also admissible. In Brett, we rejected the argument that prior convictions must be subject to a balancing test under ER 403 and ER 404 to be admissible at the penalty phase of a capital trial and held that admission of prior convictions does not necessitate a balancing test because such evidence is reasonably objective and reliable. Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 183-84, 892 P.2d 29. Stenson argues that while reliable, misdemeanors and old convictions are irrelevant. In Brett, we held that even the use of pre-age-15 convictions is consistent with the purpose to guide and channel the jury's discretion because, along with evidence of mitigating circumstances, it provides the jury a broader understanding of the defendant's background and character. Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 184, 892 P.2d 29. Like the Defendant here, the defendant in Brett argued that convictions not used under the SRA to compute the offender score in a noncapital case (RCW 9.94A.360) cannot be used in the penalty phase of a capital case. In Brett, the defendant argued that pre-age-15 juvenile adjudications are inadmissible in the penalty phase of a capital case because the SRA excludes those convictions from being considered by a sentencing judge in a noncapital felony case. See RCW 9.94A360(4). We rejected that argument and held that the SRA does not govern the sentencing of capital defendants. The SRA and RCW 10.95 serve two separate functions and are consistent. The SRA is a determinate sentencing system for felony offenders.... The statute, however, does not purport to govern or guide penalty phase juries in their sentencing decisions. This function is served by RCW 10.95, which guides and channels the jury's discretion in reaching an individualized sentencing decision for each defendant convicted of a capital offense. Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 184, 892 P.2d 29 (citation omitted). Brett also made the same argument that Stenson makes, that singling out aggravated murder defendants as the sole group to be excluded from RCW 9.94A.360 violates equal protection. We have rejected that argument. Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 185, 892 P.2d 29. See also Lord, 117 Wash.2d at 896-97, 822 P.2d 177 (holding that the admission of his juvenile conviction did not violate equal protection). The trial court properly admitted certified copies of the Defendant's prior convictions.