Opinion ID: 1859626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instituting Charges Without Probable Cause.

Text: In count I, the Board alleged, among other things, the following. While acting as Clay County Attorney, Zenor had the authority to enter into plea agreements and amend traffic citations. On numerous occasions, in connection with plea agreements, Zenor amended traffic citations to cowl-lamp violations pursuant to Iowa Code section 321.406. It was obvious to Zenor that the cowl-lamp violations were not supported by probable cause. The Board alleged this conduct violated several provisions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. These provisions included DR 7-102(A)(2) (lawyer shall not [k]nowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law), (5) (lawyer shall not [k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact), (6) (lawyer shall not [p]articipate in the creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false), (7) (lawyer shall not [c]ounsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent); DR 7-103(A) (A public prosecutor ... shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.); and DR 1-102(A)(1) (lawyer shall not [v]iolate a disciplinary rule), (4) (lawyer shall not [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), (5) (lawyer shall not [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). Between January 1998 and February 10, 2004, the Clay County Attorney's office participated in the process of amending 168 charges to cowl-lamp violations. Zenor himself participated in the process of amending at least ten of these charges to cowl-lamp violations. During all this time, Zenor was aware that motor vehicles were no longer equipped with cowl lamps. Zenor admitted he had no probable cause to believe the cowl-lamp violation had occurred. Probable cause for a criminal charge means that the circumstances would support a belief by a reasonable person that the defendant committed the crime with which [the defendant] is charged. Howe, 706 N.W.2d at 368. Zenor also admitted that he knew his assistants were participating in the practice of amending charges to cowl-lamp violations but he did nothing to stop the practice. In his brief to this court, Zenor attempts to explain away the probable cause violation on a number of grounds. For example, when he became county attorney he was aware of a common practice in Clay County for prosecutors to use the cowl-lamp statute as a basis for reducing a simple misdemeanor moving traffic violation to a non-moving violation pursuant to a plea agreement. He continued this practice in exceptional cases but only with the complete concurrence of the arresting officer and the court. He considered amending a charge to be an exercise of prosecutorial discretion to accomplish justice in cases in which mitigating circumstances exist. Everyone involved in the plea bargain, including then Magistrate Nancy Whittenburg (now district judge), understood that the cowl-lamp charge lacked a factual basis, but no one believed that a factual basis was required. No one was misled. We rejected all of these explanations and contentions in Howe, a case involving similar facts but involving a city attorney rather than a county attorney. 706 N.W.2d at 366-71. Bradley Howe, a part-time city attorney for the city of Spencer, Iowa, admitted that from January 1998 through February 2004, he successfully moved then Magistrate Whittenburg to amend 174 citations that originally charged violations of a city ordinance to allege violations of the cowl-lamp statute. Id. at 367. Howe also admitted he knew at the time that there was no probable cause to believe the defendants in those 174 cases had violated the cowl-lamp statute. Id. We concluded in Howe that DR 7-103(A) contains no exceptions to the probable cause requirement for charges resulting from plea bargains. We insisted that this ethical provision means what it says: prosecutors cannot ethically file charges they know lack probable cause. Id. at 371. Concluding that Howe violated DR 7-103(A), we said: [Howe's] ethical duty [not to institute charges lacking probable cause] is not affected by the requirements for a guilty plea to a simple misdemeanor. Nor does the informed and willing participation of the police officers, the defendants, and the magistrate in the plea bargains at issue here excuse the respondent's violations. Id. Likewise here, we conclude Zenor's conduct constituted a violation of DR 7-103(A), prohibiting a prosecutor from institut[ing] or caus[ing] to be instituted criminal charges when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause. DR 7-103(A).