Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proportionality Review in Other States

Text: Gregg did not intend to suggest that only... procedures [similar to the Georgia procedures] would be permissible under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along ... [such] general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman.  428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 887. Nonetheless, in the 1970s and early 1980s, twenty-five states enacted capital punishment statutes that required appellate proportionality review in all capital cases. See Ala.Code § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (enacted 1981); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-46b (enacted 1980); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11 § 4209(g)(2)(a) (enacted 1977); Ga.Code. Ann. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (enacted 1973); Idaho Code § 19-2827(c)(3) (enacted 1977); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 532.075(3)(c) (enacted 1976); La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.9 (enacted 1976); Md. Ann.Code, art. 27, § 414(e)(4) (enacted 1978); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 279, § 71 (enacted 1982); Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (enacted 1977); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.035 (enacted 1983); Mont.Code. Ann. § 46-18-310(1)(c) (enacted 1977); Neb.Rev. Stat. § 29-2521.03 (enacted 1978); Nev.Rev. Stat. § 177.055(2)(d) (enacted 1977); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-4(C)(4) (enacted 1979); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (enacted 1977); Ohio Rev.Code. Ann. § 2929.05(A) (enacted 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.13(C)(3) (enacted 1976); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(h)(3)(iii) (enacted 1974); S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (enacted 1977); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-12(3) (enacted 1979); Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (enacted 1977); Va.Code. Ann. § 17-110.1(C)(2) (enacted 1977); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.130(2)(b) (enacted 1981); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103(d)(iii) (enacted 1982). These statutes were passed because of the then widely-held perception that the Supreme Court would not uphold state capital punishment legislation that lacked such provisions. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only The Appearance of Justice?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 140 (1996). After Pulley, nine states repealed their proportionality review requirements. See 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 95-16(West); 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 127; 1992 Md. Laws ch. 331; 1985 Nev. Stat. ch. 527 § 1; 1985 Okla Sess. Laws ch. 265 (West), § 1; 1997 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1997-28 (West); 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 952; 1998 Va. Acts ch. 872; 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § 2. A substantial number of jurisdictions, however, conduct proportionality review today pursuant to express statutory authority. In addition to the twenty-five states that enacted proportionality review provisions in the 1970s and early 1980s, three states passed similar statutes subsequent to Pulley, including Tennessee after having repealed its earlier statute, see N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 630:5(XI) (enacted 1986); N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 470.30 (enacted 1995); Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (enacted 1992). Today, twenty states, including New Jersey, conduct statutory proportionality review. In one state, Florida, the state supreme court has declared the court's intention to conduct comparative review on its own initiative. See Sinclair v. Florida, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla.1995). As might be expected, the absence of any uniform requirements enforceable under the federal Constitution has led, over the years, to variation in the conduct of proportionality review. Thus, for example, the scope of the pool or universe of comparison cases used for proportionality review varies among the states. New York and Washington have defined broad universes encompassing some homicide cases that were not capitally prosecuted. See N.Y. Jud. Law § 211-a; N.Y. Ct. Rules § 510.18 (authorizing collection of case data for every criminal action in which defendant is indicted for first-degree murder); Wash. Rev.Code Ann. §§ 10.195.120, 10.195.130(2)(b) (authorizing collection of case data for every criminal action in which defendant is convicted of aggravated first-degree murder, regardless of whether defendant is capitally prosecuted). Some states have limited the universe of comparison cases to those cases advancing to a penalty-phase trial. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Rhines, 548 N.W. 2d 415, 455-56 (S.D.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1013, 117 S.Ct. 522, 136 L.Ed. 2d 410 (1996) (finding that `[b]ecause the aim of proportionality review is to ascertain what other capital sentencing authorities have done with similar capital murder offenses, the only cases that could be deemed similar ... are those in which imposition of the death penalty was properly before the sentencing authority for determination' ) (quoting Tichnell v. Maryland, 297 Md. 432, 468 A. 2d 1, 15-16 (Md.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 2374, 80 L.Ed. 2d 846 (1984), and citing Flamer v. Delaware, 490 A. 2d 104, 139 (Del.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 198, 78 L.Ed. 2d 173 (1983), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 185, 88 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1985)); Flamer, supra, 490 A. 2d at 139 (declaring it inherently fair, logical and necessary to prevent disproportionate sentencing that this Court compare the sentence below to the facts and circumstances of cases in which a capital sentencing proceeding was actually conducted, whether the murderers have been sentenced to life imprisonment or death); Missouri v. Bolder, 635 S.W. 2d 673, 685 (Mo. 1982) (finding court's inquiry would be unduly slanted were [the court] to compare only those cases in which the death penalty has been imposed and determining as similar [t]hose cases in which both death and life imprisonment were submitted to the jury) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 770, 74 L.Ed. 2d 983 (1983). Other states have defined the universe of comparison cases to include only those cases in which a death sentence was imposed. See, e.g., Sanborn v. Kentucky, 892 S.W. 2d 542, 556 (Ky.1994) (considering all cases in which death penalty was imposed, as required by statute), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 854, 116 S.Ct. 154, 133 L.Ed. 2d 98 (1995); Nebraska v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W. 2d 706, 737 (1986) (finding universe of death-sentenced cases to be a threshold requirement for comparative study), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed. 2d 157 (1987); South Carolina v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E. 2d 63, 74 (S.C.1982) (relying only on death-sentenced cases because [f]act findings of the trial court ... provide a fundamental line of demarcation and because larger universe would cause court to enter a realm of pure conjecture and to engage in intolerable speculation), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S.Ct. 1802, 76 L.Ed. 2d 367 (1983). Similarly, there is considerable variation among the states in respect of the methods used both to select cases for comparison purposes and to make factual comparisons among selected cases. By way of illustration, the Tennessee Supreme Court has identified at least seventeen separate factors to be used in selecting and comparing similar cases including, among others, the means of death, the manner of death, the motivation for the killing, the absence or presence of premeditation, the defendant's prior criminal record or prior criminal activity, the defendant's cooperation with authorities, and the defendant's remorse. Tennessee v. Bland, 958 S.W. 2d 651, 667 (Tenn.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1536, 140 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1998). The Washington Supreme Court considers four factors: (1) the nature of the crime, (2) the aggravating circumstances, (3) the defendant's criminal history and (4) the defendant's personal history. Washington v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 940 P. 2d 546, 562 (Wash.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1192, 140 L.Ed. 2d 322 (1998). In contrast, many courts have issued proportionality determinations without a particularized statement describing the comparative process. See, e.g., DeYoung v. Georgia, 268 Ga. 780, 493 S.E. 2d 157, 168 (Ga.1997) (referring without discussion to appendix listing similar cases where death penalty upheld), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1848, 140 L.Ed. 2d 1097 (1998); Sanborn, supra, 892 S.W. 2d at 556-57 (incorporating by reference list of cases cited in previous decisions and referring to list of five additional cases); Davis v. Mississippi, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1261-62 (Miss.1995) (referring without discussion to appendix with list of capital cases court previously affirmed), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S.Ct. 1684, 134 L.Ed. 2d 785 (1996); Pennsylvania v. Uderra, 550 Pa. 389, 706 A. 2d 334, 342 (Pa.1998) (making passing reference to statistical data without mention of similar cases). Although eleven state supreme courts have vacated death sentences as disproportionate, most have done so rarely. See, e.g., Hall v. Georgia, 241 Ga. 252, 244 S.E. 2d 833, 839 (Ga.1978) (only one aggravating factor and co-defendant received life sentence); Idaho v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P. 2d 800, 806 (Idaho 1993) (no prior criminal record); Missouri v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W. 2d 333, 341 (Mo.1982) (minimal juvenile criminal record, limited education, limited intelligence, substantial alcohol problems, weak follower of co-defendant who received life sentence, and promptly turned himself in to police). The Florida Supreme Court, however, has vacated over thirty death sentences based on proportionality review, see, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 707 So. 2d 683 (Fla.1998); Jones v. Florida, 705 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.1998); Voorhees v. Florida, 699 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1997); Curtis v. Florida, 685 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.1996), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2521, 138 L.Ed. 2d 1022 (1997); Sinclair, supra, and the North Carolina Supreme Court has vacated at least seven death sentences on proportionality grounds, see, e.g., North Carolina v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E. 2d 517 (N.C.1988); North Carolina v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E. 2d 653 (N.C.1987); North Carolina v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E. 2d 713 (N.C.1986). It is perhaps significant that Florida and North Carolina have relatively large death-row populations compared to other states, see Bienen, supra, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology at 169; more important, in those states proportionality review functions as a check against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The experience of other states is instructive, if only because it demonstrates the diverse responses to questions about the conduct of proportionality review. For example, the propriety of courts utilizing quantitative methods has been vigorously debated. Compare Washington v. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d 628, 904 P. 2d 245, 277 (Wash.1995) (noting that quantitative approachcomparing number of aggravating circumstances, victims and prior convictions in similar casescan point to areas of concern and help court to be as objective as possible), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1026, 116 S.Ct. 2568, 135 L.Ed. 2d 1084 (1996), and Governor's Memorandum of Approval of 1995 N.Y. Laws, c. 1, reprinted in N.Y. Correct L. § 650 (approving consideration of statistical evidence in conducting proportionality review to determine whether race is having a significant impact upon the imposition of the death penalty), with Connecticut v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 680 A. 2d 147, 209 (Conn.1996) (rejecting New Jersey Supreme Court's statistical methods as unworkable attempt to quantify the unquantifiable), [1] and Bland, supra, 958 S.W. 2d at 665 (criticizing New Jersey Supreme Court's use of statistics as departure from jurisprudence of individualized consideration). Despite the concerns expressed by some courts about these methods, several states remain committed to a form of quantitative proportionality review to detect possible racial bias. See N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 470.30 (requiring proportionality review if request based on race of defendant or victim); Connecticut v. Cobb, 234 Conn. 735, 663 A. 2d 948, 961-62 (Conn.1995) (recognizing statutory basis for statistical claim of racial disparity in imposition of death penalty); [2] Washington v. Gentry, 125 Wash. 2d 570, 888 P. 2d 1105, 1154 (Wash.) (utilizing proportionality review to examine patterns in death sentencing based on race), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 843, 116 S.Ct. 131, 133 L.Ed. 2d 79 (1995). Yet, statistical claims of racial bias in the administration of the death penalty present legal and methodological issues of exceptional complexity. We keep in mind the dialogue engendered by these difficult questions when considering how we might answer them ourselves. We turn now to our own experience in applying proportionality review in capital cases.