Opinion ID: 2159898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court's application of the presumptions

Text: [¶ 37] In this case the trial court could have found that the plaintiffs were entitled to the presumption of adversity because all of the other elements of public prescriptive easement were met and because the evidence did not compel a finding that the land was wild and uncultivated. There was evidence that most of the Baptist School property within the Town of Chapman is wooded, but a portion of the land is cleared and was farmed within living memory. More importantly, the Baptist School's property within the Town of Mapleton is extensively cleared and has been built up with numerous buildings and structures to serve the summer camp programs that have been held there since the 1950s. Although the section of the Baptist Park Road in Mapleton is not at issue in this action, because it is uncontested that the public has a prescriptive easement on that section, [8] the trial court was free to consider the developed nature of the adjoining land in deciding whether the Chapman portion of the road was through wild and uncultivated land. The trial court was not required to view the Chapman property in isolation, and by considering both the Mapleton and Chapman portions of the property and the previous use of the Chapman portion, it could have found that the land is not wild and uncultivated. If it made such a finding, which the evidence supports, then the presumption of permission did not arise, the presumption of adversity was applicable, and the burden was on the Baptist School to prove that the public's use of the road was permissive. In the absence of a request for findings of fact, we must assume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decision, Glidden, 684 A.2d at 1316, and I would assume that the court found that the land was not wild and uncultivated and that the Baptist School failed to meet its burden to prove that the public use was permissive. Since neither finding is clearly erroneous, I would affirm the judgment on that basis. [¶ 38] I would reach the same result, however, even if the presumption of adversity does not apply. If the trial court had found that the land is wild and uncultivated, the rebuttable presumption of permission would arise, Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 32, 760 A.2d at 244, and the burden would be on the plaintiffs to prove that the public use of the road was adverse. Adversity is a finding of fact that we review only for clear error. Taylor v. Nutter, 687 A.2d 632, 634 (Me.1996). In my view the evidence amply supports a finding that the plaintiffs met their burden to prove adverse use. [¶ 39] Numerous witnesses testified that they and their friends, neighbors, and relatives had used the road regularly throughout the prescriptive period without asking permission of the Baptist School. Several witnesses stated that they believed they had a right to use the road and one testified, I just always used it. I used it like my backyard. Testimony that some of the users would have respected hypothetical No Trespassing signs had they been posted does not necessarily show that their use was not adverse. The court could have construed this testimony to mean simply that the witnesses would have complied with signs to avoid the possibility of a criminal trespass prosecution, see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(C) (Supp.2001), and not that they believed the Baptist School had the right to exclude them. In any event, no such signs were posted, and the Baptist School made no effort (apart from an abortive attempt to block the road through the Mapleton lot in 1978) to prevent the public from using the road. Baptist School President Raymond Todd testified that the public use was with the organization's knowledge, that some people asked and were given permission and that others did not ask. [¶ 40] This evidence supports the trial court's finding that the public's use of the road was adverse, not permissive. Giving due deference to the fact-finder's superior ability to judge the credibility, weight, and significance of the evidence, Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 29, 760 A.2d at 243, I do not understand how the Court can conclude that there is no evidence of adverse use. The witness's statement, I used it like my backyard, satisfies the classic definition of adverse use: using it as though he owned the property himself .... S.D. Warren Co., 1997 ME 161, ¶ 11, 697 A.2d at 1283. The testimony of eleven different witnesses that the road was used without permission amply supports a finding of adversity. See Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 34, 760 A.2d at 244. [¶ 41] The Court's view that there is no evidence of adverse use appears to stem from an overly restrictive definition of adversity. The Court seems to require a showing of open and demonstrated hostile intent by the plaintiffs in order to meet the adversity element. Our case law, however, does not require this showing. As stated above, adversity is proven by a showing of no permission to use the way and that use of the way by the claimant was as though he owned the property himself. S.D. Warren Co., 1997 ME 161, ¶ 11, 697 A.2d at 1283; see also Glidden, 684 A.2d at 1318 n. 19. The Court also overlooks an important distinction: the claim of right required to establish a prescriptive easement is not the same as the claim of right required to establish adverse possession. See Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 40, 760 A.2d at 246. The adversity element of a prescriptive easement claim requires a disregard for the owner's right to exclude the user, but not an intent to oust the owner from possession. Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 230, 98 A. 743, 745 (1916); cf. Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman P'ship, 1999 ME 111, ¶ 14, 733 A.2d 984, 991-92 (stating that adverse possession requires disseisin; that is, exclusive possession of another's land with intent to claim title). Utilizing the correct definition of adversity, the trial court had sufficient evidence for a finding of adverse use.