Opinion ID: 2823382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Suppress the Search Warrant

Text: When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United States v. Smith, 386 F.3d 753, 757-58 (6th Cir. 2004). In so doing, the evidence “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. at 758. A district court’s factual findings will be overturned on appeal only if the reviewing court has “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we “pay[] great deference to the determinations of probable cause made by a state magistrate, whose findings should not be set aside unless arbitrarily exercised.” United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1376 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2013). Franklin argues that the search warrant executed at Mustang Sally’s Bar on January 26, 2010 should be suppressed because the affidavit serving as the basis of this warrant did not establish probable cause. He further argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant him a Franks hearing. 10 No. 14-5093
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In the context of a search warrant, “probable cause exists when there is a fair probability, given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 819 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). An affidavit serving as the basis for a search warrant must “contain adequate supporting facts about the underlying circumstances to show that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant.” Weaver, 99 F.3d at 1377. “When confronted with hearsay information from a confidential informant or an anonymous tipster, a court must consider the veracity, reliability, and the basis of knowledge for that information as part of the totality of the circumstances for evaluating the impact of that information.” Helton, 314 F.3d at 819. The Supreme Court has held that: The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). In order to facilitate “an independent judicial determination that the informant is reliable,” an affidavit must include sufficient supporting facts, but “those facts need not take any particular form.” United States v. McCraven, 401 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 2005). We have previously held that such supporting facts could take the form of police corroboration of “significant parts of the informant’s story,” an attestation “with some detail that the informant provided reliable information [to the affiant] in the past,” or “the willingness of the informant to reveal his or her name.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 No. 14-5093 Additionally, the reliability of a confidential informant’s hearsay statements “may be corroborated by various means, including direct surveillance or circumstantial evidence, or [being] vouchsafed by the affiant’s statements about the informant’s past performance.” United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the affidavit supporting the challenged search warrant included the following description: On 1-26-20 at approximately 1900 hrs, Detective Galluzi met with a confidential informant, hereafter referred to as CI. The CI and the CI’s vehicle were searched for illegal contraband, and none was found. The CI arranged to sell 3000 80 mg Oxycontin tablets at Mustang Sally’s Bar located at 1800 Dickerson Road. Detective Galluzzi gave the CI 3000 placebo Oxycontin tablets. The CI was directed to pick up Anthony Griffin at 26th Avenue and Clarksville Pike prior to arriving at Mustang Sally’s. The CI was followed directly to this location where he picked up Anthony Griffin. Griffin entered the vehicle with the CI, and the CI drove Griffin to Mustang Sally’s, 1800 Dickerson Pike. The CI and Anthony Griffin exited the vehicle and entered Mustang Sally’s Bar. Albert Franklin was waiting inside, and asked the CI to show him the pills. The CI displayed the pills, and Albert Franklin pointed a handgun at the CI. Franklin told the CI to leave the bar. The CI exited the bar leaving the pills inside. The CI was under constant surveillance of officers. Said CI is familiar with Oxycontin from past exposure and experience. Your affiant knows CI is reliable for said CI has given information in the past that has led to the lawful recovery of illegal narcotics, narcotics equipment, weapons, money and felony arrests and convictions. Affiant will disclose CI’s name to the Judge signing the warrant only. The CI wishes to remain anonymous for fear of reprisal. (R. 129-2, Affidavit, Page ID # 286.) Franklin argues that the affiant’s statement regarding Kirkup’s veracity and reliability was insufficient because it lacked detail regarding the frequency and nature of the affiant’s previous interactions with Kirkup. However, an “affidavit is judged on the adequacy of what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or on what a critic might say should have been added.” 12 No. 14-5093 United States v. Thomas, 605 F.3d 300, 309 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 975 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Considering the totality of the information provided in the challenged affidavit, we find that the affidavit contains enough of the elements discussed in McCraven and Smith to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. First, the affidavit includes detailed information regarding the circumstances of Kirkup’s knowledge in this particular case, namely the fact that he had been instructed to arrange the drug transaction by detectives and had been given the placebos by the officers. Second, Kirkup had been under consistent police surveillance during the events described in the affidavit. Finally, the affiant attested that he had previously received reliable information from Kirkup leading to the “lawful recovery of illegal narcotics, narcotics equipment, weapons, money and felony arrests and convictions.” (R. 129-2, Affidavit, Page ID # 286.) Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Franklin’s motion to suppress the search warrant.
Franklin further argues that he was entitled to a Franks hearing because the affidavit contained false and misleading statements, and that the district court erred by refusing to grant him such a hearing. Although affidavits supporting search warrants are presumed to be valid, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,” if the challenged statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. If the defendant is able to establish the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard for the truth by a preponderance of the evidence, and if 13 No. 14-5093 “the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” Id. at 156. In order to make the necessary threshold showing to receive a Franks hearing, the defendant must satisfy a two-prong test. United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 1998). First, the defendant must make a “substantial preliminary showing that specified portions of the affiant’s averments are deliberately or recklessly false.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the district court must find that these specified portions are “necessary to a finding of probable cause.” Id. The district court held a hearing on Franklin’s motion to suppress at which it considered whether a Franks hearing was warranted. The court determined that Franklin failed to make a “substantial preliminary showing of a false statement [made] knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard of the truth . . . by the affiant in the affidavit.” (R. 207, Hearing Transcript, Page ID # 1065.) On appeal, Franklin specifically challenges (1) the statement that “the CI was under constant surveillance of officers” and (2) the veracity of the portion of the affidavit stating: “Said CI is familiar with Oxycontin from past exposure and experience. Your affiant knows CI is reliable for said CI has given information in the past that has led to the lawful recovery of illegal narcotics, narcotics equipment, weapons, money and felony arrests and convictions.” a. Statement that “CI was under constant surveillance” With respect to the first challenged statement regarding the officers’ surveillance of Kirkup, Franklin concedes that the statement is technically correct. Nonetheless, he argues that in the context of the rest of the affidavit, the statement that “the CI was under constant surveillance” was misleading because it suggests that the Kirkup was under direct visual 14 No. 14-5093 surveillance of law enforcement. In reality, Kirkup was under audio (rather than visual) surveillance for all of the events that transpired within the bar. Franklin contends that the proximity of this challenged statement in the affidavit to the sentence “Franklin pointed a handgun at the CI” would lead a magistrate judge to believe erroneously that law enforcement visually observed this event. As a preliminary matter, Franklin does not appear to be arguing that the statement regarding surveillance is false, but rather that key details about the nature of the surveillance were improperly excluded. This distinction affects our analysis. We have previously held that a “Franks hearing may be merited when facts have been omitted in a warrant application, but only in rare instances.” Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1998). In Mays we clarified that, “except in the very rare case where the defendant makes a strong preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical information from the affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding of probable cause, Franks is inapplicable to the omission of disputed facts.” Id. at 816 (defining “a showing of intent” to include “a ‘deliberate falsehood’ or ‘reckless disregard for the truth’” (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 165)). Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) defines “surveillance” to mean “[c]lose observation or listening of a person or place in the hope of gathering evidence.” Giving the affidavit its plain meaning, the affidavit accurately describes the officers’ involvement in the underlying conduct. Even if the reference to “constant surveillance” in the affidavit is suggestive of visual surveillance, Franklin has failed to make a strong preliminary showing that the statement is false, or that critical information was excluded from the affidavit “with an intention to mislead.” Franklin presents no evidence showing that the affiant exhibited a “reckless disregard for the truth” or included a “deliberate falsehood” in the affidavit. Mays, 134 F.3d at 15 No. 14-5093 816. Accordingly, Franklin fails to make the necessary preliminary showing to receive a Franks hearing on the basis that the affidavit omitted the fact that the officers engaged in audio rather than video surveillance of Kirkup. See Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasizing that “[t]he mere existence of omissions alone is ordinarily not enough to make [the] strong preliminary showing” articulated in Mays). b. Information about the Confidential Informant Franklin next argues that the district court erred in denying him a Franks hearing on the basis of material omissions in the affidavit regarding Kirkup’s reliability and veracity. In particular, Franklin argues that Kirkup’s reliability and veracity was misrepresented by the omission of information about his criminal history, his compensation of $1,000 for his work in the underlying case, and the fact that he had worked with law enforcement for only a few months. “Indicia of an informant’s credibility are certainly important in an affidavit, and the omission of known information regarding credibility can in some cases be misleading enough to be deemed a falsehood under Franks.” United States v. Jones, 533 F. App’x 562, 568 (6th Cir. 2013). In Jones, we considered whether a defendant was entitled to a Franks hearing where an affidavit omitted information about the confidential informant’s criminal record, addiction to drugs, and the fact that the informant was paid for working with the police. We found that the defendant failed to make the strong preliminary showing, described in Mays, that the affiant had intentionally misled the judge. We also concluded that the police officer’s corroboration (including audio and visual recording of the confidential informant’s controlled drug purchases) suggested that the confidential informant’s information was credible, and that the omitted information did not undermine probable cause. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Fowler, we 16 No. 14-5093 held that, “[w]ithout more than a mere allegation that the affiant failed to disclose the nature and degree of the confidential informant’s criminal activity, [the defendant] was not entitled to a Franks hearing.” United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 416 (6th Cir. 2008). As in Jones, Franklin fails to make the requisite showing that the affiant intended to mislead the magistrate judge. In fact, other than stating in a conclusory fashion that “Defendant made a ‘strong preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical information from the affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding of probable cause,’” Franklin does not meaningfully address this requirement. Appellant’s Br. at 41. Moreover, given the affiant’s past experience receiving reliable information from Kirkup, as well as the police officers’ surveillance of Kirkup during significant portions of the relevant events, introduction of the omitted information would not have rendered Kirkup’s information unreliable or eliminated the affidavit’s probable cause. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Franklin’s request for a Franks hearing.