Opinion ID: 3052561
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones’s Testimony

Text: [1] The Arizona Supreme Court considered whether in context the prosecutor’s “if he testifies truthfully” remark placed the prestige of the government behind Jones’s testimony or suggested that information not presented to the jury supported 9 See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653-54 (2006). 10 Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). 11 Id. 12 Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous.” (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003))). 13 Id. 14 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). KING v. SCHRIRO 10307 Jones’s testimony.15 These were the right factors to consider, under the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Young.16 As to the first factor, far from giving the jury the government’s assurance that Jones was honest, the prosecutor was revealing doubts about whether he would testify honestly. As the Arizona Supreme Court explained, the prosecutor was “preparing the jury for the possibility that Jones might testify otherwise” than the account he gave to the police officer who interrogated him.17 As to the second Young factor, suggesting that the prosecutor knew something that the jury did not, the prosecutor put the police officer on the stand to testify about what Jones had told him and got Jones to admit (after considerable memory difficulties) what he had previously told the police officer. The implication was that the prosecutor knew what Jones told the police, nothing more, and the jury heard the testimony of the police about what Jones told them. [2] What controls the outcome of this case is whether the Arizona Supreme Court unreasonably concluded that, taken in context, the prosecutor’s comments neither placed the government’s imprimatur on Jones’s testimony nor implied that information not in evidence showed what the truth really was, such that the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings”18 were seriously affected.19 A cautious prosecutor may well wish to avoid saying anything that implies that he knows what is actually the truth. And an epistemologically sensible prosecutor may realize that he does not, since he was not at the scene of the crime and relies on what others of varying credibility say they saw or heard and on arguable inferences from the circumstantial evidence. Even 15 State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024, 1032-33 (Ariz. 1994). 16 470 U.S. 1, 7 n.3, 11-12 (1985). 17 State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024, 1033 (Ariz. 1994). 18 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)); see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 (1986). 19 See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006). 10308 KING v. SCHRIRO the criminals, victims, and witnesses are often unsure or mistaken. In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of the Supreme Court’s holding in Young was not unreasonable, so we must deny relief.20