Opinion ID: 2592762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Need to Admit Eyewitness Expert Testimony is Recognized by Courts Throughout the Nation

Text: ¶ 26 The admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony was first considered by the nation's courts starting in the 1970s. In general, these early decisions excluded the testimony on grounds that have since been undercut by the research cited above. [18] The majority of courts that have considered the issue since then have held that admission or exclusion of the evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court. [19] Starting in the 1980s, however, numerous state and federal courts recognized that the statistical evidence on eyewitness inaccuracy was too substantial to ignore. Many of these appellate courts instructed trial judges that, under certain circumstances, it would be an abuse of discretion not to allow expert testimony on the subject. ¶ 27 The first such decision came from the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983). There, the trial court excluded an eyewitness expert on grounds that the testimony would not assist the jury and that cross-examination was sufficient to reveal problems with the identification. Id. at 1223-24. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held that, in cases where the expert would provide information about eyewitness factors relevant to the case, it was error to exclude the testimony as unhelpful. Id. Over the last two decades, numerous other state courts have either reversed decisions to exclude or encouraged the inclusion of eyewitness expert testimony. [20] Calling on courts to face up to the reliability problems of eyewitness identification, the Supreme Court of California held in People v. McDonald that it will ordinarily be error to exclude qualified expert testimony when an eyewitness identification is key to the prosecution's case and is not substantially corroborated by independent evidence. 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 717, 727 (1984), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 23 Cal.4th 896, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265 (2000). ¶ 28 Similar positions have been adopted in the federal courts. The Sixth Circuit was the first to hold that eyewitness expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to assist the jury. United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir.1984). The next year, the Third Circuit held that exclusion of expert testimony was an abuse of discretion when the conviction was based solely on an eyewitness identification. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3rd Cir.1985). The Third Circuit further held that the discretion of trial judges was limited in this area, and that rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires . . . that expert testimony on eyewitness perception and memory be admitted at least in some circumstances. Id. at 1232. The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Moore and held that in a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that identification is admissible and properly may be encouraged. 786 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir.1986). ¶ 29 In short, a growing number of courts have recognized that eyewitness expert testimony is both reliable and helpful to the jury. See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311-12 (6th Cir.2000). Numerous courts have also rejected the idea that such testimony is impermissible because it is misleading or because it invades the province of the jury. See, e.g., McDonald, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d at 722 (calling the latter argument no more than a shibboleth which . . . would deprive the jury of important information) (quoting Patrick M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 213 (1965)). With this in mind, we now provide new guidance regarding the admissibility of such expert testimony in Utah trial courts.