Opinion ID: 854923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Air Carrier Access Act

Text: The ACAA is an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act (“FAA”).4 The original FAA, passed in 1958, included a requirement that air carriers not “subject any particular person . . . to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.” 49 U.S.C. App. § 1374 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, 1141 (1994). This requirement was repealed by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. App. § 1301, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, 1141 (1994), leaving passengers with disabilities without express protection against discrimination by 4 The FAA and its various amendments, including the ACAA, are codified in Title 49, Subtitle VII of the U.S. Code. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. For ease of reference, we refer to these provisions collectively as the FAA, except where we are discussing a specific amendment, such as the ACAA. GILSTRAP V . UNITED AIR LINES 7 commercial airlines. See Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1991). A different statute, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides generally that individuals with disabilities may not be excluded from or discriminated against by federallyfunded programs. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 599 (1986). In 1979, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the federal agency then in charge of airline regulation, promulgated regulations applying § 504 to those commercial airlines that received direct federal subsidies. Id. at 600–01. Organizations representing individuals with disabilities (collectively, Paralyzed Veterans of America, or “PVA”), challenged those regulations, seeking to apply § 504 to all commercial airlines, on the ground that airlines not receiving direct federal subsidies were indirect recipients of federal funding for airport construction and for the federally operated air traffic control system. Id. The Supreme Court rejected PVA’s arguments, holding that commercial airlines were “beneficiaries,” not “recipients,” of federal grants for airport construction and that the air traffic control system was not “a form of federal financial assistance to airlines.” Id. at 607, 611. Congress responded to Paralyzed Veterans by passing the ACAA. An amendment to the FAA, the ACAA “provide[d] that prohibitions of discrimination against handicapped individuals shall apply to air carriers.” Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 1080; see Shinault, 936 F.2d at 802. In its original form, the ACAA prohibited air carriers from “discriminat[ing] against any otherwise qualified handicapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air transportation,” and directed the Secretary of Transportation to “promulgate regulations to 8 GILSTRAP V . UNITED AIR LINES ensure non-discriminatory treatment of qualified handicapped individuals consistent with safe carriage of all passengers on air carriers.” Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99435, § 3, 100 Stat. 1080.5 In its current version, effective December 12, 2003, the pertinent sections of the ACAA read as follows: § 41705. Discrimination against handicapped individuals (a) In general.–In providing air transportation, an air carrier, including (subject to section 40105(b)) any foreign air carrier, may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual on the following grounds: (1) the individual has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. (2) the individual has a record of such an impairment. 5 Congress has amended the ACAA three times: in 1994, adding provisions to clarify that “a separate violation occurs under [the statute] for each individual act of discrimination prohibited” and to require the Secretary of Transportation to “investigate each complaint of a violation,” Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1141; in 2000, to expand its application to foreign air carriers, Pub. L. 106-181, Title VII, § 707(a), Apr. 5, 2000, 114 Stat. 61, 158; and in 2003, to make minor technical changes. See Pub. L. No. 108-176, Title V, § 503(d)(1), Dec. 12, 2003, 117 Stat. 2490, 2559. GILSTRAP V . UNITED AIR LINES 9 (3) the individual is regarded as having such an impairment. (b) Each act constitutes separate offense.–For purposes of section 46301, a separate violation occurs under this section for each individual act of discrimination prohibited by subsection (a). (c) Investigation of complaints.-- (1) In general.–The Secretary shall investigate each complaint of a violation of subsection (a). 49 U.S.C. § 41705. Although the ACAA itself no longer includes an express directive that the Secretary of Transportation promulgate regulations,6 it is covered by the FAA’s general authorization that the Secretary “may take action . . . consider[ed] necessary to carry out” the FAA’s “Air Commerce and Safety” provisions, “including conducting investigations, prescribing regulations, standards, and procedures, and issuing orders.” Id. § 40113(a). Pursuant to that authorization, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) issued regulations, codified at 14 C.F.R. Part 382, specifying the detailed requirements that airlines must meet to comply with the ACAA. The regulations impose four general duties on air carriers: “not [to] discriminate against any qualified individual with a 6 That directive was removed when the FAA as a whole was reorganized in 1994. See Revision of Title 49, United States Code Annotated, “Transportation,” Pub. L. No. 103-272, July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 745. 10 GILSTRAP V . UNITED AIR LINES disability, by reason of such disability, in the provision of air transportation”; “not [to] require a qualified individual with a disability to accept special services . . . that the individual does not request”; “not [to] exclude a qualified individual with a disability from or deny the person the benefit of any air transportation or related services that are available to other persons,” with certain limited exceptions; and “not [to] take any adverse action against an individual (e.g., refusing to provide transportation) because the individual asserts, on his or her own behalf or through or on behalf of others, rights protected” by the regulations or the ACAA. 14 C.F.R. § 382.11(a).7 With respect to assistance moving through the airport, air carriers must “provide or ensure the provision of assistance requested by or on behalf of a passenger with a disability . . . in transportation between gates to make a connection to another flight” and “in moving from the terminal entrance (or a vehicle drop-off point adjacent to the entrance) through the airport to the gate for a departing flight, or from the gate to the terminal entrance (or a vehicle pick-up point adjacent to the entrance after an arriving flight),” including “assistance in accessing key functional areas of the terminal, such as ticket counters and baggage claim.” Id. § 382.91(a)–(b). Such assistance must include, if the passenger requires it, assistance “with transporting [the passenger’s] gate-checked or carry-on luggage.” Id. § 382.91(d). Carriers must also 7 The current regulations, effective M ay 20, 2009, replaced the less detailed 1990 regulations. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel, 73 Fed. Reg. 27614-01 (May 13, 2008). W e cite throughout to the 2009 regulations. Gilstrap’s first trip was covered by the 1990 regulations, and her second by the 2009 regulations. For present purposes, however, the differences do not matter, although they conceivably could later in this litigation. GILSTRAP V . UNITED AIR LINES 11 “promptly provide or ensure the provision of assistance requested by or on behalf of passengers with a disability . . . in enplaning and deplaning,” including, “as needed, the services of personnel and the use of ground wheelchairs, accessible motorized carts, boarding wheelchairs, and/or onboard wheelchairs . . . and ramps or mechanical lifts.” Id. § 382.95(a). The DOT regulations also explain the training requirements that air carriers must meet: Carriers must, for example, train “all personnel who deal with the traveling public, as appropriate to the duties of each employee,” in, among other topics, the requirements of the ACAA regulations; the airline’s procedures regarding passengers with disabilities; “appropriate boarding and deplaning assistance procedures that safeguard the safety and dignity of passengers”; and “awareness and appropriate responses to passengers with a disability.” Id. § 382.141(a). The ACAA is enforced through three administrative mechanisms. First, the Act directs the Secretary of Transportation to collect and publish data on disabilityrelated complaints and to report annually to Congress on all complaints received. 49 U.S.C. § 41705(c)(2)–(3). Second, the implementing regulations require that each airline maintain an internal dispute resolution program for collecting, responding to, and reporting passenger complaints of discrimination on the basis of a disability. See 14 C.F.R. § 382.151 et seq. Finally, the FAA provides a general administrative enforcement scheme for all its “Air Commerce and Safety” provisions, which include the ACAA. Under this scheme, any person may file a complaint with the Secretary of 12 GILSTRAP V . UNITED AIR LINES Transportation about an alleged regulatory violation. 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(1). After investigation,8 notice, and an opportunity for a hearing, the Secretary “shall issue an order to compel compliance” if a violation is found. Id. § 46101(a)(4). The DOT may also impose civil penalties upon air carriers of up to $25,000 per violation. Id. § 46301(a). Pursuant to certain procedural requirements, any person “disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by the Secretary of Transportation” may petition for judicial review of that order in a U.S. court of appeals. Id. § 46110. These remedies are not exclusive, however: The FAA provision cautions that “[a] remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law,” id. § 40120(c), and requires DOT-certified air carriers to maintain liability insurance sufficient to pay for bodily injury, death, loss of property, or damage to property “resulting from the operation or maintenance of the aircraft,” id. § 41112. We have not squarely decided in this circuit whether, in addition to these administrative enforcement mechanisms, the ACAA may be enforced through private lawsuits.9 Shortly after its enactment, two circuits interpreted the ACAA to 8 Although the general FAA enforcement scheme provides for an investigation only “if a reasonable ground appears,” 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(1)–(2), the ACAA itself requires the Secretary to investigate all complaints of an ACAA violation, see id. § 41705(c)(1). 9 W ithout deciding the question, we addressed the merits of claims brought under the ACAA in Newman v. American Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1999). Also, we held that the ACAA includes an implied private cause of action in a non-precedential memorandum disposition. See Adiutori v. Sky Harbor Int’l Airport, 103 F.3d 137 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished), at . Both cases predate Alexander, 532 U.S. 275. GILSTRAP V . UNITED AIR LINES 13 imply a private cause of action. Shinault, 936 F.2d at 800; Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1989). After those cases were decided, however, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), narrowed the framework for evaluating whether a statute implies a private cause of action. All three circuits to consider the question since Sandoval have concluded that the ACAA does not imply a private cause of action. See Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 596–97 (2d Cir. 2011); Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1269–71 (10th Cir. 2004); Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1354–59 (11th Cir. 2002). We need not, and do not, reach that question in this opinion, because Gilstrap does not allege a cause of action under the ACAA.