Opinion ID: 1196615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misrepresentation of facts surrounding the complaint.

Text: Farrant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of any misrepresentation either to the Bar Association or to his client. He urges us to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The Bar Association insists that his initial written response to the Bar Association that his client's check contained no notation for expenses [24] and his letter to his client indicating that he had received her check for expenses demonstrate misrepresentations supporting the imposition of discipline. A photostatic copy of the check written to Farrant by his client contains a notation in the bottom left-hand corner indicating that the check was for expenses. Farrant's request that the counts relating to misrepresentation be dismissed are premised first on his assertion that he never told the Bar Association that Clapper's check did not contain such a notation. This argument is unpersuasive in light of the letter addressed to the Bar Association, authored and signed by the attorney, on March 23, 1993. The letter provides: I deny that the check which Ms. Clapper left with my receptionist in the sum of $6,162.23, contained a notation for `expenses'. (Emphasis supplied.) Farrant's second argument in support of dismissing the charge of misrepresentation relates to communications with his client. The attorney acknowledges that he wrote Clapper a letter on June 23, 1992, indicating that he had received the check in payment of expenses. [25] However, he asserts that no evidence was presented to the trial panel that he intended to use the check for his own benefit when the letter was mailed. Essentially, what the attorney asks this Court to do, is to absolve him of culpability on the misrepresentation count because it wasn't a misrepresentation at the time he made it; but it turned out to be misleading at some later date. In disciplinary matters, we not only determine the lawyer's continued fitness to practice law, but we must do so while safeguarding the interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession. [26] We cannot perform this function and allow the kind of mental jockeying that Farrant purposes. Farrant admits that he made a conscious decision to use a check intended for expenses for his own benefit. [27] His letter to his client indicated that he understood the check was for expenses. The client had every right to believe that was how the money would be applied. Farrant may have been less than candid with the Bar Association when he denied that his client's check contained a notation for expenses. Even if there were no denial and even if he was less than candid, he made a conscious decision to apply funds to his fee which he had given his client every indication would be used to satisfy costs. His actions violated Rule 8.1(a) [28] and Rule 8.4(c), [29] Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 5.2, [30] Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings.