Opinion ID: 2974103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mann further argues that the evidence underlying his convictions for possessing precursor materials and for being a felon in possession of a firearm was insufficient, and that the district court accordingly erred by denying Mann’s motion for judgment of acquittal, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, as to those counts. We review such a denial de novo, using the same standard as the district court. See United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334 (6th Cir. 1992). Thus, we must ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, any rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 1 It is important to note that Mann made his motion pursuant to Rule 14, which allows for severance where prejudice may result, rather than Rule 8, which disallows joinder where a given count is unrelated. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 8 with Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. Had Mann moved pursuant to Rule 8, we could review his motion. See Chavis, 296 F.3d at 457. Furthermore, under our precedent, Mann waived the right to seek severance, rather than forfeited it. Had he merely forfeited some right or objection, this court could review his claim on appeal for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Mere forfeiture, as opposed to waiver, does not extinguish an ‘error’ under Rule 52(b).”). -9- Nos. 05-5470/71 United States v. Mann Mann was convicted of possessing “equipment, products, and materials which may be used to manufacture methamphetamine,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a)(6). The Government introduced evidence at trial that a search of Mann’s garage by local police revealed such equipment. The Government also introduced evidence that, at the time of his arrest, Mann was carrying a backpack sufficiently full of equipment to construct, in the words of one officer, a “fully functioning methamphetamine lab.” Mann argues that “[i]t cannot be determined, from the proof at trial, who was in possession of the illegal items, and who was merely present.” This statement is incorrect, and in any event irrelevant. First, a methamphetamine lab was discovered in Mann’s garage on February 26. Second, an officer specifically testified to recovering the components of a methamphetamine lab from Mann’s backpack. Another officer testified to recovering items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, e.g., a propane torch and a bottle of muriatic acid, from a car belonging to Mann. Finally, according to the testimony of a police officer, Mann admitted to manufacturing methamphetamine. Mann was also convicted of possessing a firearm though a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In support of this charge, officers testified to the recovery of a pistol from inside the hood of a car owned by Mann, which was parked near the place of his and Arnold’s arrest. We have repeatedly held that constructive possession may be proven through the presentation of evidence that the defendant had dominion over the location where the firearm was recovered. See United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1166 (1999), (citing United States v. Clemis, 11 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)); United States v. Snyder, 913 F.2d 300, 304 - 10 - Nos. 05-5470/71 United States v. Mann (6th Cir. 1990). Although, as Mann indicates, Arnold was once observed operating the vehicle, a rational trier of fact could infer that Mann had dominion over the vehicle; he was arrested in its vicinity and, most importantly, he owned it. Accordingly, Mann’s final argument fails.