Opinion ID: 1158185
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Miranda Violations

Text: Defendant contends that his taped confession was the product of multiple Miranda violations ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], and that its introduction at trial compels reversal. Shortly after defendant was arrested in Indiana, two officers from the Alameda County Sheriff's Department (Detective-Sergeants Little and McGrail) and an Alameda County deputy district attorney (Martin Brown) flew to Indianapolis to interrogate defendant about the murders at the Sundial Ranch. They met defendant at the police station where he was being held in custody. Mr. Brown advised defendant of his rights and defendant agreed to make a statement. During the following two-and-a-half-hour interrogation, defendant gave a detailed confession to the crimes. Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the confession at a section 995 hearing and at both the guilt and second penalty phase trials. The motions were denied. Defendant renews the substance of his claim here, arguing that the police authorities violated his Miranda rights in four separate respects. We assess each contention in light of the following principles. (1) In considering a claim that a statement or confession is inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of a defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluation of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 947 [275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 800 P.2d 516].) Although we independently determine whether, from the undisputed facts and those properly found by the trial court, the challenged statements were illegally obtained ( ibid. ), we `give great weight to the considered conclusions' of a lower court that has previously reviewed the same evidence. ( People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 979 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475], quoting Miller v. Fenton (1985) 474 U.S. 104, 112 [88 L.Ed.2d 405, 412, 106 S.Ct. 445]; accord, People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 947.) Because the crimes in this case occurred after the addition of section 28, subdivision (d) to article I of the California Constitution, the voluntariness of defendant's waiver and confession must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63 [260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042].) (2) Defendant first contends that his Miranda warnings were inadequate because they failed to inform him that he was entitled to counsel during questioning. (See Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 717 [61 L.Ed.2d 197, 207, 99 S.Ct. 2560]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 473 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 772-773].) At the beginning of the taped interview, the deputy district attorney advised defendant of his rights as follows: [Y]ou have the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law, you have the right to have an attorney present before any questioning if you wish one, if you cannot  if you cannot afford ... an attorney one will be provided to you at no cost before any questioning begins. Now do you understand those rights? Miranda holds that a suspect must be apprised, inter alia, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. (384 U.S. at pp. 478-479 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 725-727].) Although the warning given to defendant here deviated from the standard form in failing to expressly state that defendant had the right to counsel both before and during questioning, we are not persuaded  as defendant's argument implies  that the language was so ambiguous or confusing as to lead defendant to believe that counsel would be provided before questioning, and then summarily removed once questioning began. (See People v. Valdivia (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 657, 662-664 [226 Cal. Rptr. 144] [admonition that defendant had the right to counsel before questioning adequately apprised defendant of his Miranda rights].) As the high court has observed, the Miranda warnings are prophylactic ( Michigan v. Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 446 [41 L.Ed.2d 182, 194, 94 S.Ct. 2357]) and need not be presented in any particular formulation or talismanic incantation. ( California v. Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355, 359 [69 L.Ed.2d 696, 701, 101 S.Ct. 2806].) The essential inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably `[c]onvey to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda. ' ( Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 203 [106 L.Ed.2d 166, 177, 109 S.Ct. 2875].) We are satisfied that the warnings given defendant here reasonably conveyed his right to have an attorney present during questioning. (3) Defendant next contends that he invoked his right to silence during the course of the interview, and that, as a result, the bulk of the confession which followed was inadmissible under Miranda and its progeny. The asserted invocation occurred about one hour into the interrogation. The police had been questioning defendant about his movements since leaving his job at the Sundial Ranch when defendant asked, Um, what's this all about? Deputy District Attorney Brown responded that they were investigating the murders of two women at the Sundial Ranch and that several witnesses had seen defendant walking toward the ranch on the morning of the murders. Defendant had earlier denied returning to the ranch and Mr. Brown observed that the police want to resolve this one way or another in terms of whether you were there or whether you weren't there. Defendant indicated that he understood and stated that the murders shocked him. The following colloquy then occurred: [BROWN]: Uh huh. And I assume that you're ... you're willing to talk to us ... about it and give us the ... the details that you're giving us. [WASH]: I don't know if I wanna talk anymore since it's someone killed, you know. [BROWN]: Okay. That's totally up to you to decide whether or not you do or not. Um, if you wanna talk to us and give us this information that's fine. If you don't that's obviously your right, too. [DETECTIVE LITTLE]: Don't you like, uh, I thought you said that you liked Shelley [ sic ]? [WASH]: Yeah, I s.... [DETECTIVE LITTLE]: You liked them? [WASH]: That's why I'm stunned, stunned. [DETECTIVE LITTLE]: Well, don't you wanna help, uh, with that? After a brief interruption from a knock on the door, the interview continued. [BROWN]: All right, in any event, um, there are.... [DETECTIVE LITTLE]: (Unintelligible). [BROWN]: ... a number of ... of items that we wanna ask you about to resolve this one way or another. And, uh, like I said it's up to you as to whether or not you wanna give us the information so that we can check it out one way or another or not. Um, that's why I wanted to go through your rights with you at the beginning so you could decide if you wanted to talk to us about this or not. After a pause of about 15 seconds, defendant replied, Yeah. Keep on talking. The interrogation continued and defendant eventually confessed to the crimes. At trial defendant moved to suppress the confession, claiming that by stating, I don't know if I wanna talk anymore since it's someone killed, you know, he had effectively invoked his right to remain silent. The trial court, after listening to the tape, ruled that defendant had not actually invoked his right to remain silent but simply considered whether he wished to continue in light of the seriousness of the crimes. After considering the matter and being reminded of his rights, he chose to continue talking. Having independently reviewed the taped interrogation ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 969 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214]), we conclude that the trial court's ruling was sound. The law is clear. Once warnings have been given, [i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 722-723].) Once such a request is made, it must be scrupulously honored ( id. at p. 479 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 726-727]); the police may not attempt to circumvent the suspect's decision by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. ( Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 105-106 [46 L.Ed.2d 313, 322-323, 96 S.Ct. 321].) Although it is true that a suspect's assertion of the privilege need not be unequivocal ( People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 165 [266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857]) or invoked with unmistakable clarity ( People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 955 [83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114]), it is evident that, viewed in context, defendant's statement here does not amount to even an equivocal assertion of his right to remain silent. Defendant expressed uncertainty as to whether he wished to continue  I don't know if I wanna talk anymore. The officers then attempted to obtain clarification of his intentions, twice reminding defendant of his right to remain silent. After some thought, he plainly stated that he wished to proceed with the interrogation. (4) As we recently explained in People v. Johnson (1993) ante, page 1 [23 Cal. Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673], where a defendant expresses ambiguous remarks falling short of an invocation of his Miranda rights, the officers may continue talking for the purpose of obtaining clarification of his intentions. ( Id. at p. 27.) That is precisely what occurred here. Accordingly, we find no Miranda violation in this regard. Similarly, the brief remarks by Detective Little (I thought you said you liked Shelley [ sic ]; Don't you wanna help...), while perhaps ill-advised, cannot reasonably be construed as repeated attempts to wear down [defendant's] resistance ( Michigan v. Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at pp. 105-106 [46 L.Ed.2d at pp. 322-323]), nor, clearly, in light of `the totality of the circumstances' ( Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 [89 L.Ed.2d 410, 420-421, 106 S.Ct. 1135]), did they operate as such. (5) Defendant next claims that the deputy district attorney's failure to inform him that his admissions could be relevant to the state's decision to seek the death penalty precludes a finding that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. We recently considered and rejected a similar argument in People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984].) Noting that a valid waiver of Miranda rights does not require that a suspect be informed of the potential charges against him ( Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564 [93 L.Ed.2d 954, 107 S.Ct. 851]; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 512-514 [273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561]), there is no basis, we reasoned, for concluding that he must be advised of the possible punishment for those charges if proven. ( People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 982.) Thus, defendant was adequately informed of the consequences of waiving his rights. (6) Finally, defendant contends the authorities improperly interrogated him prior to advising him of his Miranda rights. He claims that his subsequent post- Miranda statements were the product of the illegality and must be suppressed. As explained below, the argument lacks merit. At the start of the taped interview, Deputy District Attorney Brown set the scene as follows: [BROWN]: All right. Now, Jeffrey, we, uh, we came in a while ago and just basically introduced ourselves and asked you a few general questions and told you that we wanted to talk to you a bit and then we basically set up the tape recorders ... is that correct? [WASH]: Yeah. Shortly thereafter, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, indicated that he wished to speak, and Mr. Brown began his questioning: [BROWN]: I guess what we'll do is, uh, we'll start back on you  when you were in California in November. You ... indicated you were in California in November of 1983, is that correct? [WASH]: Yes. [BROWN]: And at that time you got a job working on a ranch? [WASH]: Yes. Based on the foregoing, defendant claimed at trial that police questioning prior to the Miranda warnings elicited the incriminating admission from defendant that he had recently been in California working on a ranch. This factual admission, he argued, formed the basis of all subsequent questioning concerning the crimes in California to which he ultimately confessed. Thus, the non- Mirandized interrogation tainted the confession and compelled its suppression under state and federal law. Both Deputy District Attorney Brown and Detective McGrail testified at the suppression hearings. Neither had any specific recollection of questioning defendant before the taped interview about his activities in California. Mr. Brown speculated that defendant had volunteered the information that he had been working on a ranch in California, but could not recall the exact circumstances. The trial court ruled that the statement was not elicited through police interrogation. The record is unclear whether the defendant's pre- Miranda statement was volunteered or the product of police interrogation; the authorities present could not specifically recall how the information was obtained. Even if we were to assume, however, that the statement was elicited through questioning, we would still reject defendant's claim that his subsequent post- Miranda confession must be suppressed as the product of that interrogation. As we have explained: In Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 [84 L.Ed.2d 222, 105 S.Ct. 1285], the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a subsequent confession must necessarily be excluded because it followed an otherwise voluntary statement that was given without Miranda warnings: `It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.' (470 U.S. at p. 309 [84 L.Ed.2d at p. 232].) ( People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 275 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892].) The record here discloses that defendant admitted prior to the taped interview that he had worked at a ranch in California, and subsequently gave a full confession after having been advised of, and having waived, his Miranda rights. There is no evidence that the pre- Miranda statement was obtained through improper police tactics or coercion. [5] Therefore, under Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 [84 L.Ed.2d 222, 105 S.Ct. 1285], which we have adopted as the standard in California (see People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 275-276), the confession need not be suppressed. (7) [A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. ( Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 314 [84 L.Ed.2d at pp. 235-236].) [6]