Opinion ID: 1107717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: which is the relevant proceeding: the trial or the appeal?

Text: Both the district court below and the court in Austing agree that the Strickland prejudice standard applies. The courts disagree, however, on which forum should be the focus of the analysis. The standard requires the postconviction court to consider whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. In these circumstances, the question becomes, which is the proceeding whose potential result should be scrutinized  the trial (as Carratelli II holds) or the appeal (as Austing holds)? Carratelli argues for the latter test based on his contention that (A) counsel renewing (or failing to renew) an objection before the jury is sworn acts as appellate counsel, and (B) the prejudice for such a failure occurs on appeal. We address these contentions below.
Carratelli's claim that, in preserving an objection, counsel acts as appellate counsel, and therefore the prejudice analysis should focus on the appeal, is based on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Davis v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections, 341 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir.2003). There, a Florida defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew (and thus preserve) an objection to the State's peremptory challenge. Davis, 341 F.3d at 1312-13; see Davis v. State, 710 So.2d 723, 724 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding that the objection was not preserved); Davis v. State, 763 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (affirming the summary denial of Davis's postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to preserve the claim). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that under Joiner, to preserve an objection counsel had to renew it at the conclusion of voir dire or accept the jury with a reservation. The federal court decided, however, that in such an unusual circumstance counsel acts as trial counsel when first raising the issue, but as appellate counsel when renewing it. See Davis, 341 F.3d at 1315-16; see also Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 739 (11th Cir.) (This Court held that because the failure of counsel was solely in his role as appellate counsel at trial (those are not the words we used in Davis, but it is what we meant), the prejudice inquiry should focus on the effect that counsel's omission at trial had on the appeal.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 587, 166 L.Ed.2d 436 (2006). The court concluded that the failure to preserve the issue by renewing the objection was error related to the appeal and by its nature, unrelated to the outcome of [the] trial. 341 F.3d at 1315. We believe that Davis misreads our opinion in Joiner. As we explained in Joiner, jury selection is by nature a dynamic process. The requirement of renewing objections before the jury is impaneled allows both the attorney and the court, knowing the final composition of the jury, to reconsider their positions. From the attorney's point of view, many factors may militate in favor of abandoning a previous objection. Joiner, 618 So.2d at 176. From the court's point of view, the trial court may exercise[] discretion to either recall the challenged juror for service on the panel, strike the entire panel and begin anew, or stand by the earlier ruling. Id. Thus, the renewal requirement provides the party with the opportunity at trial to timely raise a claim previously denied (or decide not to), and provides the trial court the opportunity to readdress the claim and possibly correct an error. Id. These considerations are quintessentially issues about the trial, not the appeal. As the Fourth District noted: The requirement of preservation is central to the trial process. Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1262. Therefore, contrary to Carratelli's argument, the requirements we imposed in Joiner address the trial itself. We reject the proposition that trial counsel renewing an objection (or failing to do so) before a jury is impaneled is acting as appellate counsel.
Carratelli also argues that the prejudice a defendant suffers when trial counsel fails to renew an objection to the jury occurs on appeal, not at trial. The Fourth District held that the focus must be on the trial. Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1263-64. The Fifth District in Austing, however, stated that where counsel fails to preserve reversible error in jury selection, there can never be a showing as to what would have occurred with a different jury, 804 So.2d at 604, and concluded that it is apodictic that the result would have been different  i.e., reversal on appeal. Id. at 605. We agree with the Fourth District. In establishing the standard for postconviction relief, the Supreme Court stated that in determining prejudice, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). In this case, the proceeding whose result is being challenged is the trial. Counsel's failure to renew the objection  the subject of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim  occurred at the trial. The result at trial  a conviction  is what Carratelli challenges; and had counsel renewed the objection, the trial court might very well have reconsidered the prior denial and granted the cause challenge. Moreover, the prejudice  a juror to whom Carratelli objects  occurs at trial. Again relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Davis, Carratelli argues that the prejudice occurs on appeal. Davis applied the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). See Davis, 341 F.3d at 1315 ( Flores-Ortega thus establishes that the prejudice showing required by Strickland is not always fastened to the forum in which counsel performs deficiently. . . .). But Flores-Ortega does not support petitioner's argument. In that case, the defendant alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 473, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court held that to establish prejudice in such a case a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed. Id. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court compared the situation to that in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Id. at 485, 120 S.Ct. 1029. In Hill, the defendant alleged counsel's ineffective assistance in advising the defendant about a guilty plea. The Court held that to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant had to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. In Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court rejected any requirement that a defendant identify meritorious issues that could have been raised on appeal. 528 U.S. at 486, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court stated that [i]n adopting this standard, we follow the pattern established . . ., requiring a showing of actual prejudice ( i.e., that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant might have prevailed) when the proceeding in question was presumptively reliable, but presuming prejudice with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims when the violation of the right to counsel rendered the proceeding presumptively unreliable or entirely nonexistent. Id. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029. Thus, the Supreme Court did not hold that the Strickland standard, as applied to trial counsel, is sometimes assessed based on the outcome of the appeal, as the Eleventh Circuit found in Davis. See Davis, 341 F.3d at 1315. [5] Rather, it held that prejudice may be presumed when the defendant essentially was deprived of any proceeding at all. In Flores-Ortega, counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal deprived the defendant of an appeal. In Hill, counsel's deficient advice deprived the defendant of a trial. In this case, Carratelli alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve reversible error in jury selection. He was not deprived of a judicial proceeding, as in Hill and Flores-Ortega, and he is not entitled to a new trial simply because reversible error was not preserved. He had a trial that was presumptively reliable, and under Strickland, it is that trial whose result is being challenged. Accordingly, we hold that a defendant alleging that counsel was ineffective for failing to object or preserve a claim of reversible error in jury selection must demonstrate prejudice at the trial, not on appeal.