Opinion ID: 426379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nexus Contention

Text: 40 Defendants contend that even a proper finding that the RICARDO was stateless would not establish that the vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States since international law prohibits a state's exercise of penal jurisdiction over a stateless vessel on the high seas unless there is some nexus between the state and the vessel. We disagree with defendants' interpretation of international law. 41 First, we note that in enacting statutes, Congress is not bound by international law. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316, 34 S.Ct. 429, 431, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S.Ct. 456, 458, 31 L.Ed. 386 (1888). If it chooses to do so, it may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by international law. As long as Congress has expressly indicated its intent to reach such conduct, a United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.1972). Accord, United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 165, 74 L.Ed.2d 136 (1982). 42 Our review of the language and history of Sec. 955a et seq. persuades us that, assuming that the RICARDO was stateless, Congress intended these sections to reach the conduct of the defendants in this case. In Sec. 955a(h), Congress expressly stated its intention to reach acts committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In addition, in the legislative history of Sec. 955a, there is evidence that Congress had as a primary goal the ability to reach stateless possessors of narcotics who could not be proved to have intent to distribute the narcotics in the United States. The Senate Report accompanying H.R. 2538, which noted the technical amendments the Senate Committee made to the bill before it was enacted as Sec. 955a, stated that the bill [was] intended to address acts committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. S.Rep. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2785. Experts who testified at the hearing on H.R. 2538 noted that many drug traffickers responsible for transporting drugs that ended up in the United States were able to travel with impunity over the high seas because of the then-existing requirement that the traffickers intend to distribute the drugs in the United States before being subject to prosecution there. The difficulty of proving intent allowed many such traffickers to go free, although their wares were in fact intended to be distributed in the United States. Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings on H.R. 2538 Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1979) (Hearings ) (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration); id. at 65, 68 (statement of Michael P. Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Southern District of Florida). Section 955a was enacted to close this loophole. Thus, the House of Representatives Report accompanying H.R. 2538 observed that United States jurisdiction was to be extended to vessels without nationality on the high seas, and that [a]ny person on board such a vessel, of either U.S. or foreign citizenship, is prohibited from ... possessing with the intent to ... distribute any controlled substance. H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979). The Report noted that [t]he intent to distribute need not be within the United States. Moreover, the intent element may be inferred by proof of a presence of a large quantity of the narcotic or dangerous drug, giving rise to the inference of trafficking, id. at 10, and that it would not be necessary to prove that the vessel or the controlled substance was bound for the United States, id. at 12. Congress's explicit intention, therefore, was to extend the reach of Sec. 955a to foreigners on stateless vessels on the high seas who possess large quantities of narcotics that they may or may not intend for distribution in the United States. 43 Defendants point out that despite this explicit intention, Congress also expressed its intention that Sec. 955a be consistent with the strictures of international law, see, e.g., H.R.Rep. at 11 (section [955a] is designed to prohibit all acts of illicit trafficking in controlled substances on the high seas which the United States can reach under international law), 9 and they argue that international law permits the extension of the jurisdiction envisioned by Congress only if there is some nexus between the vessel and the state seeking to assert jurisdiction. Defendants' argument fails, however, since it apparently was Congress's understanding--and correctly so--that international law does not provide such protection to vessels that are stateless. 44 One of the basic principles of international law is that all nations have an equal and untrammelled right to navigate on the high seas. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 748, 74 L.Ed.2d 967 (1983); see Convention on the High Seas Art. 2. With this right, of course, comes responsibility. To preserve all nations' freedom to travel on the high seas and to avoid conflict among nations, Article 2 of the Convention provides that each state must exercise its right with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. 45 To enforce compliance with these principles among individual ships traveling on the high seas, Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention provide that a ship has the nationality of the state whose flag it flies and that the ship is subject to that state's jurisdiction. Each state has the responsibility of fixing the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.... [I]n particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. Id. Art. 5. To eliminate any confusion over which state has jurisdiction over a ship, Article 6 provides that a ship may sail under the flag of only one state and that while doing so, it is generally subject to that state's exclusive jurisdiction. A ship may not change flags during a voyage except when a real transfer of ownership or registry occurs, and a ship that flies under the flags of more than one state, claiming the nationality of whichever it deems convenient, is considered to be a ship without nationality that may not claim the protection of any of the nationalities in question. Id. 46 The suggestion underlying these principles is that a stateless vessel, which does not sail under the flag of one state to whose jurisdiction it has submitted, may not claim the protection of international law and does not have the right to travel the high seas with impunity. There is ample evidence that Congress properly understood that these principles were consistent with its desire that Sec. 955a reach stateless vessels on the high seas whether or not the narcotics carried were intended for distribution in the United States. During the hearings on H.R. 2538, Congress was repeatedly presented with statements by experts, reflecting what was apparently a common understanding among those interested in the bill, that the United States could, consistent with international law, assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas. See, e.g., Hearings, supra, at 48 (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration) (We can, under both international law and United States case law, assert jurisdiction over these [stateless] vessels ....); id. at 51 (statement of Robert Chasen, Commissioner of the United States Customs Service) ( 'Stateless' vessels ... also present prosecutorial problems, although permission to board is not required.); id. at 55 (statement of Morris D. Busby, Director of Ocean Affairs, OES Bureau, Department of State) (There is also an exception [to international law] which allows us to board a vessel on the high seas which is without nationality ....). 47 In light of these principles and Congress's manifest intentions, courts have agreed uniformly that stateless vessels on the high seas are, by virtue of their statelessness, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. United States v. Marino-Garcia, supra, 679 F.2d at 1382-83 (construing Sec. 955a); United States v. Howard-Arias, supra, 679 F.2d at 371 (same); United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir.1979) (construing 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89(a)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2162, 64 L.Ed.2d 794 (1980); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir.1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S.Ct. 664, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir.1979) (same); see United States v. Monroy, 614 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir.) (implicitly construing 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89(a)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892, 101 S.Ct. 250, 66 L.Ed.2d 117 (1980). As the court in Marino-Garcia put it, 48 [v]essels without nationality are international pariahs. They have no internationally recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas.... Moreover, flagless vessels are frequently not subject to the laws of a flag-state. As such, they represent floating sanctuaries from authority and constitute a potential threat to the order and stability of navigation on the high seas.... 49 The absence of any right to navigate freely on the high seas coupled with the potential threat to order on international waterways has led various courts to conclude that international law places no restrictions upon a nation's right to subject stateless vessels to its jurisdiction.... Thus, the assertion of jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas in no way transgresses recognized principles of international law. 50 679 F.2d at 1382 (citations omitted). 51 We find inapposite the authorities invoked by defendants in their effort to show that a nexus must exist before the United States may exercise jurisdiction over a stateless vessel on the high seas. The nexus requirement has been applied only to a vessel that is registered with, and is flying the flag of, one state to whose jurisdiction it has submitted. See, e.g., United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (5th Cir.1978). See also Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States Secs. 18, 28, 33, 34 (1965). In such cases, international law requires the state seeking to assert jurisdiction to show a nexus between it and the foreign vessel that is sufficient to justify supplanting the flag state's normally exclusive jurisdiction granted by Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas. Only a limited number of such nexuses have been found to be sufficient to warrant permitting a state to assert jurisdiction over another state's vessel. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States Secs. 18 (vessel engaged in illegal activity intended to have an effect in the state), 33 (vessel engaged in an activity that threatens the state's security or governmental functions), 34 (vessel engaged in a universally prohibited activity, such as piracy) (1965). See United States v. Marino-Garcia, supra, 679 F.2d at 1380-82. But we find no authority in international law for requiring any nexus where the ship otherwise would be subject to the jurisdiction of no state. 52 We conclude, therefore, that international law provides no bar to an assertion of jurisdiction over a stateless vessel by the United States pursuant to Sec. 955a(a), even absent proof that the vessel's operators intended to distribute their cargo in the United States. Accord, United States v. Marino-Garcia, supra, 679 F.2d at 1383; United States v. Howard-Arias, supra, 679 F.2d at 372. Consequently, we conclude that a properly supported finding by the district court that the RICARDO was stateless would, in itself, be sufficient to establish the court's jurisdiction over the defendants. 53