Opinion ID: 870455
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kaniakapupu

Text: In Kaniakapupu, landowners of a parcel of land petitioned the Land Use Commission (LUC) to amend the land use district boundary on the parcel of land from conservation district to urban district. 111 Hawai`i at 126, 139 P.3d at 714. The landowners indicated that they sought reclassification of the property to enable them to subdivide the [p]roperty, construct both replacement and new houses on the [p]roperty, and make such other repair and improvements of the existing units in a manner ordinarily and customarily allowed for urban residential uses and thereby provide house lots or homes for their children. Id. A hearing was held before the LUC, and, thereafter, the LUC entered FOFs, COLS, and a decision and order, approving the reclassification. Id. In its FOFs, the LUC found that the landowners, in order to provide reasonable assurance to the LUC that the proposed development is a family enterprise to provide housing for the family members and not a commercial enterprise for speculation, ... represented that they [were] willing to be subjected to a condition that members of the families... would have a right of first refusal to purchase if any interest in the [p]roperty were sought to be sold. Id. (original brackets omitted). Thus, the LUC imposed a condition on the landowners that, should they desire to sell or convey ownership of all or portions of the property, [they] shall first offer such interest to the other or in the alternative convey such interest to any of [their] children, as the case may be. Id. (original emphasis omitted). Kaniakapuputhe historic ruins of the royal summer cottage of Kamehameha III is located on property owned by the State that shares a common boundary with, and is situated approximately 200 to 300 feet from, the [reclassified property]. Id. at 126-27, 139 P.3d at 714-15. Approximately eleven years after the LUC approved reclassification of the property, a Hui [20] was formed in order to `care for and serve as a steward of Kaniakapupu.' Id. at 126, 139 P.3d at 714. Thereafter, the Hui sought to have the LUC issue an order to show cause [(OSC)] as to why the classification of the [property] should not be reverted to conservation district, contending that one of the landowners had violated the condition imposed by the LUC inasmuch as she listed portions of the property for sale to the public. Id. at 127, 139 P.3d at 715. The Hui additionally requested that a hearing be held, pursuant to HAR § 15-15-70(c) (governing motions practice), on its motion for an OSC. Id. The LUC held a hearing on the Hui's motion for an OSC [hereinafter, motion hearing] and, thereafter, denied it on the basis that the Hui had not met its burden of demonstrating a failure to perform a condition, representation, or commitment on the part of the landowners. Id. at 128, 139 P.3d at 716. The Hui filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court and, after briefing by the parties, the circuit court dismissed the Hui's appeal for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 129, 131, 139 P.3d at 717, 719. More specifically, the circuit court found that the LUC did not hold a contested case hearing.... If the motion for an [OSC] had been granted, then a contested case hearing would have been required. .... The [circuit] court concludes that the requirement in HRS § 91-14 that the order appealed from arise from a contested case hearing, has not been met. As such, this court lacks jurisdiction to reach the issue of whether a contested case hearing was required. See Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai`i 64, 69 n. 10, 881 P.2d 1210, 1215 n. 10 (1994). This court can only dismiss the appeal and therefore does so. Id. (original brackets omitted) (format altered). The Hui appealed the circuit court's decision to this court. Id. at 131, 139 P.3d at 719. At the outset, this court set forth the applicable law, stating that: HRS § 91-14(a) provides the means by which judicial review of administrative contested cases can be obtained. Among its prerequisites, the section requires that a contested case must have occurred before appellate jurisdiction may be exercised. Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai`i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994) (citation omitted). HRS § 91-1(5) (1993) defines a contested case as a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing. HRS § 91-1(6) (1993), in turn, defines an agency hearing as such hearing held by an agency immediately prior to a judicial review of a contested case as provided in section 91-14. Thus, [a] contested case is an agency hearing that [(]1) is required by law and [(]2) determines the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties.  [ PASH ], 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d [at] 1252 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Id. at 132, 139 P.3d at 720 (emphasis added). In applying the above test, the Kaniakapupu court explained that the Hui's motion for an [OSC] was essentially a threshold motion or procedural vehicle to obtain a show cause hearing in order for the LUC to determine the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties. Id. at 134, 139 P.3d at 722 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Kaniakapupu court held that, although the motion hearing was required by law, i.e., not discretionary and mandated by HAR § 15-15-70(i), it did not determine the rights, duties, or privileges of the parties because the hearing merely addressed whether a not a contested case hearing was required regarding the Hui's motion to show cause. Id. at 133-34, 139 P.3d at 721-22. The Kaniakapupu court, however, acknowledged the argument raised by the Hui that, if the circuit court has no jurisdiction to determine if an appellant were entitled to a contested case hearing after having requested one, any agency could arbitrarily and capriciously deny anyone a hearing at any time, regardless of whether such hearing were required by law, and the aggrieved party could never obtain judicial review of such denial. Id. at 137, 139 P.3d at 725 (original brackets omitted). Nevertheless, this court held such argument was without merit, indicating that the Hui did not request a contested case hearing and emphasizing that, [i]ndeed, the Hui concede[d] that there is no procedural vehicle for `any party or interested person' to obtain a contested case hearing on whether a petitioner has failed to perform according to the conditions imposed or has failed to perform according to the representations or commitments she made. Id. (original brackets and some internal quotation marks omitted). Here, unlike in Kaniakapupu, there is a procedural vehicle for `any party or interested person' to obtain a contested case, i.e., HAR § 13-300-51, and Kaleikini did request a contested case hearing pursuant to that rule. Indeed, it is undisputed, as discussed more fully infra, that Kaleikini followed the procedures set forth for requesting a contested case hearing. [21] Thus, Kaniakapupu is distinguishable from the instant case on that ground. [22] As such, the appropriate inquiry here is whether Kaleikini has met the requirements of HRS § 91-14. PASH, 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252 (indicating that the necessary inquiry was whether the appellant met the requirements of HRS § 91-14).