Opinion ID: 1696004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Were S.P.'s Procedural Due Process Rights Violated?

Text: S.P. contends her right to due process was violated because the district court judge took on an adversarial role when questioning the witnesses, in effect becoming the applicants' attorney and presenting evidence in their stead. She argues her due process rights were violated because the nature and extent of the court's questions rose to the level of advocacy. [3] The issue of a referee taking on an adversarial role during an involuntary commitment hearing was brought before this court in In re R.P., 606 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 2000). In R.P., the applicant was not represented by counsel and the trier of fact examined the witnesses on the applicant's behalf. 606 N.W.2d at 15-16. Similar to the case at hand, the respondent appealed the referee's civil commitment finding to this court, claiming he was denied due process because the referee took on an adversarial role by questioning the witnesses. Id. at 16. We disagreed, finding the respondent was not denied due process because the referee did not display any evidence of becoming an advocate by such actions as extensive questioning, leading of the witness, or cross-examination of the respondent. Id. at 17. The record in the present case simply does not display what Edmund Burke described as the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. See State v. Glanton, 231 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Iowa 1975). Instead, we have a district court judge trying to elicit testimony that will support the applicants' burden of proof. While we empathize with the court's strong desire to aid the unrepresented applicants and do what is best for S.P., it is, as we stated in State v. Glanton , ordinarily a dangerous practice for a presiding judge to contribute his efforts in an attempt to equalize what he perceives to be disparity in the trial ability of opposing counsel. Id. Even though the court did not become a cheerleader or partisan for the applicants, the court assumed an adversarial role in the process by picking and choosing which evidence would come in on behalf of the applicants. [4] In the process of searching for such evidence, the court marshaled the evidence towards the definition of a chronic substance abuser. This focused questioning changed the court's role from an impartial decision-maker to an advocate. We hold today that an analysis based solely upon the nature of the questions asked by the referee or district court judge is not wholly determinative of the issue of advocacy. We cannot provide the trial court a cookbook of right or wrong questions, but merely observe that any effective questioning will inevitably lead to the heart of the case. When the court itself directs the case in this way it is marshaling or assembling the evidence. Artfully crafted questions will not hide the court's role in the proceedings at that point  the role of deciding what evidence is needed to prove the case and steering the case down that road. R.P. exemplified the rare situation where witnesses, answering a few openended questions with narrative testimony, were able to articulate enough clear and convincing evidence to convince the court that a civil commitment was necessary. But in many cases the applicant's narrative testimony, along with the unguided narrative testimony of the examining physician, will be insufficient for a civil commitment. In those situations the court is prohibited from assuming the role of an advocate. As noted above, when the court takes an active role by examining witnesses on the applicant's behalf, it begins to take on the attributes of an advocate. Therefore, when faced with pro se applicants in a civil commitment proceeding, the referee or district court is advised to either appoint an attorney at the county's expense under the guidelines of Iowa Code section 125.78(2) or warn the applicant at the outset that the applicant will have to prove his or her case without assistance from the court. [5]