Opinion ID: 1801881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juvenile Court's Consideration of Crime's Facts and Circumstances

Text: (8) Section 731 sets two ceilings on the period of physical confinement to be imposed. The statute permits the juvenile court in its discretion to impose either the equivalent of the maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses committed by the juvenile (§ 731, subd. (c)) or some lesser period based on the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the juvenile under the court's jurisdiction ( ibid. ). Here, the juvenile court determined that the maximum adult sentence for Julian's offensestwo counts of assaultwas imprisonment for 10 years. But it did not state on the record that it had considered the crimes' facts and circumstances that might justify a confinement period below the maximum adult prison term for the same offenses. Julian interprets the record's silence on this point as an indication that the juvenile court never considered imposing a confinement period shorter than the maximum adult term. Therefore, according to Julian, a reviewing court must presume from the record's silence that the juvenile court was either unaware of, or failed to perform, its statutory duty to consider that the facts and circumstances might warrant a confinement period shorter than the adult maximum term. (9) But such a presumption would, as the Court of Appeal here concluded, require the reviewing court to ignore a cardinal principle of appellate review: A `judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct [, and a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.' [Citation.] As this court has stated, we apply the general rule `that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law. [Citations.]' ( People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 723, 79 P.3d 1030].) This rule derives in part from the presumption of Evidence Code section 664 `that official duty has been regularly performed,' and thus when a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or order. ( Ibid. ) (10) Here, the juvenile court did set a maximum confinement period by completing the appropriate Judicial Council commitment form. In the circumstances of this case, we presume, as the Court of Appeal did, that (1) the court exercised its discretion in setting a maximum period of physical confinement that was measured against both the ceiling set by the maximum adult prison term and a possibly lower ceiling set by the relevant facts and circumstances (§ 731, subd. (c)), and (2) the court determined that Julian's appropriate confinement period was a period equal to the maximum adult term. [4] As we noted at the outset, this case presents a conflict with the decision by the Court of Appeal in In re Jacob J., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 429. There, as here, the record did not indicate that the juvenile court had considered whether, based on the facts and circumstances of the juvenile's offense, a confinement period shorter than the maximum adult sentence imposed for the same crime was called for. The court acknowledged that section 731 does not require the juvenile court to recite the facts and circumstances on which it relies or to discuss their relative weight. ( In re Jacob J., at p. 438.) Because the record did not reflect the juvenile court's consideration of the crimes' facts and circumstances that might justify a confinement period shorter than the adult maximum term, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the juvenile court. ( Ibid. ) Unlike the Court of Appeal in this case, the Court of Appeal in In re Jacob J. failed to apply the general rule that `a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law. [Citations.]' ( People v. Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114.) That was error. To the extent that In re Jacob J., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 429, 438 is inconsistent with this opinion, we disapprove it.