Opinion ID: 6326613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: As noted, Henderson claims that, in his case, the risk-notification condition impermissibly delegates Article III power to the probation officer. “While probation officers have broad power ‘to manage aspects of sentences and to supervise probationers and persons on supervised release with respect to all conditions imposed by the court,’ those powers are limited by Article III of the United States Constitution.” 8 “The imposition of a sentence, including the terms and conditions of supervised release, is a core judicial function that cannot be delegated.” 9 A district court is, of course, free to “delegate to a probation officer” decisions regarding the details of a condition. 10 But the sentencing court may not delegate to the probation officer the authority to determine whether such condition applies. 11 As Henderson acknowledges, we have already held—albeit in the unpublished opinion of United States v. Johnson 12—that a district court does not commit plain error when it imposes this particular condition. And Henderson offers no reason for us to think that his case can be distinguished from Johnson. “[B]ecause we have not yet addressed [the merits of] . . . 7 Id. (citing Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135). 8 United States v. Franklin, 838 F.3d 564, 567–68 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995)). 9 Id. at 568 (quoting United States v. Lomas, 643 F. App’x 319, 324 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 10 Id. (quoting Lomas, 643 F. App’x at 324). 11 See id. 12 777 F. App’x 754, 754 (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished). 4 Case: 21-50526 Document: 00516252138 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/24/2022 No. 21-50526 whether the instant notification condition constitutes an improper delegation of judicial authority,” the district court’s error, if any, was neither clear nor obvious. 13 There thus can be no plain error here. Affirmed. 13 Id.; see United States v. Cabello, 916 F.3d 543, 544 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“We ordinarily do not find plain error when we have not previously addressed an issue.” (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 2009))). Other circuits that have reached the issue appear to be split on whether such a delegation is impermissible. See, e.g., United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687, 691, 697–99 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding that a similar condition constituted an impermissible delegation); United States v. Robertson, 948 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding that a similar condition did not constitute an impermissible delegation, though basing its conclusion on the fact that “nothing in the record . . . show[ed that] the district court disclaimed ultimate authority over [the defendant’s] supervision”). 5