Opinion ID: 2106562
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Calibration of the Intoxilyzer Device

Text: The Superior Court held that calibration must occur monthly and that this condition was met in the case at bar. We affirm Anderson's conviction, but hold that no bright-line rule exists requiring calibration either monthly or every thirty days. If there is to be a bright-line rule requiring monthly testing of the intoxilyzer for admissibility purposes, that rule must, of necessity, come from the General Assembly. Section 4177 makes no mention of the frequency of calibration required for the intoxilyzer results to be admissible. Failure to test the device for an unreasonably extended period of time would render the evidence unduly prejudicial as compared to its probative value. Under these circumstances, Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 would allow the trial court to bar its introduction. This analysis must be on a case-by-case basis. In the absence of a statute prescribing precise rules of admissibility, the trial court may consider the frequency of calibration as a factor bearing on admissibility only if the offer of proof is found to be unreliable because the temporal proximity of the calibration is too remote to be reasonable under the circumstances of the case. If this reasonableness threshold for admissibility is met, the extent of the temporal proximity or lack of it goes only to the weight to be ascribed by the trier of fact to evidence gathered from the intoxilyzer device. Prior case law of this Court is in accord with this result. As we held in McConnell v. State, Del.Supr., No. 293, 1993, 1994 WL 43751, Holland, J. at 3 (Feb. 3, 1994) (ORDER), [i]t is well-established in Delaware that the prerequisite to introducing the result of an intoxilyzer test into evidence is to present the certifications of the State Chemist that the intoxilyzer machine was operating accurately before and after testing the breath of the defendant on trial (citing Best v. State, Del.Supr., 328 A.2d 141 (1974)). We have found no precedent of this Court purporting to state a bright-line rule. Moreover, we do not construe Peck as establishing such a rule for all cases. The ruling in Peck was case-specific, but may have been read subsequently as standing for a broader principle. To the extent that Peck may be construed to be at odds with the decision we now reach, it is overruled.