Opinion ID: 429180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant's Alleged Failure to Cooperate in the Investigation

Text: 89 On October 12, 1982, the United States Attorney sent a letter to the defendant's attorney requesting the defendant's cooperation in an investigation of the Black Hebrews. 37 The letter stated: 90 As you are aware we believe that Mr. Lemon has information that would be helpful to us in our continuing investigation of illegal activities being conducted by the members of the Black Hebrew sect. We are interested in learning from him, particularly, the facts and circumstances surrounding his obtaining of the checks charged in the indictment against him and the disposition of the items purchased through the use of the checking account in question. We are further interested in learning from him any other information he might have about illegal activities of members of the Black Hebrew sect. 91 We are extending this offer to your client presentence so that we can inform Judge Jackson of your client's cooperation or lack of cooperation at the time of sentencing. 92 The attorney for the government reported in his memorandum on sentencing and at the hearing that the defendant had failed to respond to this request. 38 93 The defendant has not offered any explanation for his failure to identify the person from whom he obtained the checks; for instance, he does not appear to claim that he is unable to identify the person. 39 However, the defendant has stated that he is unable to provide any information about criminal activity in the Black Hebrew group, and is therefore unable to cooperate with the government in this aspect of its investigation. 40 Although he sometimes asserted that he was unable to provide information because he was not a member, a proposition that the judge very properly questioned, 41 we understand the overall thrust of his statements to profess lack of knowledge about any illegal activities of the Black Hebrews. 94 In Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court may consider, as one factor in imposing sentence, a defendant's refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. In Roberts, however, the court was careful to note the absence of any reason for the defendant's refusal to cooperate despite repeated requests ... over a period of three years. 445 U.S. at 557, 100 S.Ct. at 1362. In particular, the court noted that the defendant had not contended that he was unable to provide the requested assistance. Id. at 557, 100 S.Ct. at 1362. In short, neither he nor his lawyer offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the defendant's claim on appeal that his failure to cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination .... would have merited serious consideration if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge. Id. Justice Brennan added in his concurring opinion that if a justification were proffered, the judge would then proceed to determine its veracity and reasonableness. Id. at 563, 100 S.Ct. at 1366. 95 Because the defendant does not appear to deny that he was able to identify the individual from whom he received the stolen check, we conclude that, under Roberts, his failure to do so in response to the prosecution's specific request for this information may be considered as one factor in sentencing. 42 On the other hand, the defendant repeatedly denied any knowledge of illegal activities of the Black Hebrews. Although the judge regrettably made no explicit inquiry into the veracity of Lemon's claim that he was unable to provide the information requested, his rejection of this claim is implicit in his apparent reliance on the failure to cooperate. 43 In any event, his reliance on the failure to cooperate in this facet of the government's investigation can be upheld, in the face of the defendant's denial that he was able to cooperate, only if there was sufficiently reliable evidence that the defendant did have information about those activities. We assume, as did the government, that the Black Hebrews are engaged not only in illegal activities but also in legitimate activities. It would therefore not be appropriate, particularly given the first amendment concerns discussed below, to infer the defendant's knowledge of illegal activities merely from evidence of innocent associations with Black Hebrews. Due process in this context requires some identifiable link between the defendant and illegality among the Black Hebrews. 96