Opinion ID: 2614790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Requested Preliminary Examination.

Text: Appellant further contends that it was error for the district court to accept his tendered not guilty pleas after the breakdown in negotiations when it was apparent that appellant desired to exercise his right under NRS 171.196 to a preliminary examination. Prior to his appearance in district court, appellant had waived his right to a preliminary examination as part of a plea bargain agreement. But, when such an agreement is not consummated, the validity of the waiver is vitiated, and it is incumbent upon the district court to absolve appellant of the adverse consequences of the aborted plea bargain. See Schoultz v. Hocker, 469 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.1972); Fine v. Warden, 90 Nev. 166, 521 P.2d 374 (1974); Riley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 510, 515 P.2d 1269 (1973). The court was thus obligated to inform appellant of his right to a preliminary examination before permitting him to enter a plea. The effect of the district court's error was that appellant forfeited his opportunity to exercise the statutory right to a preliminary examination. Although a preliminary examination is not constitutionally mandated, see Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968), it does provide important benefits to the defense of an accused. See Coleman v. Alabama, 339 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970); cf. Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 590 P.2d 1152 (1979) (post-indictment preliminary examination not constitutionally mandated). [2] Nevertheless, to say that the district court erred in refusing to remand for a preliminary examination does not mandate reversal following trial and conviction. [3] Because appellant had a clear right to a preliminary examination, and the district court exercised no discretion in failing or refusing to remand to the justice court, NRS 171.208, mandamus was available to compel remand. NRS 34.160. [4] By failing to pursue this remedy, and instead proceeding to trial, appellant has waived any impropriety regarding the trial court's inaction. In analogous situations, we have held that failure to bring an issue before this court in a timely manner results in a waiver of the objection. See Nix v. State, 91 Nev. 613, 541 P.2d 1 (1975); George v. State, 89 Nev. 47, 505 P.2d 1217 (1973); Skinner v. State, 83 Nev. 380, 432 P.2d 675 (1967); Oberle v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 428, 420 P.2d 251 (1966); Ex parte Merton, 80 Nev. 435, 395 P.2d 766 (1964). In Franklin v. District Court, 85 Nev. 401, 455 P.2d 919 (1969), we stated that: As a general proposition we approve the notion that appellate review should be postponed, except in narrowly defined circumstances, until after final judgment has been rendered by the trial court. Id. at 403, 455 P.2d at 921 (emphasis added). In circumstances such as those present in the instant case, where abuse is so patent and deprivation purportedly so crucial to the accused, an extraordinary remedy must be sought, because no post-judgment appeal will be available to review the error complained of, absent compelling reasons. To the extent that State v. Rollings, 58 Nev. 58, 68 P.2d 907 (1937) (we reached the merits of a post-conviction claim that a preliminary examination was held beyond the statutory limit, but denied relief), is inconsistent with this opinion, it is expressly overruled. In so holding, we emphasize that this case is decided on these facts alone. We reaffirm our holding in Franklin, finding that the instant case presents one of the narrowly defined circumstances perceived in Franklin. Finally, appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence which supports his convictions. Indeed, Where there is substantial evidence to support a verdict in a criminal case, as the record indicates exists in this case, the reviewing court will not disturb the verdict nor set aside the judgment. Sanders v. State, 90 Nev. 433, 434, 529 P.2d 206, 207 (1974). The judgments of conviction are affirmed. THOMPSON, J., concurs.