Opinion ID: 1905441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constructive Breaking

Text: The defendant next contends that the trial justice erred when he denied the motion for judgment of acquittal on the count that charged burglary of Rivera's dwelling; he argues that the record contains no evidence of a breaking, and instead establishes that Rivera voluntarily admitted the intruders into the building. Furthermore, Abdullah asserts that the trial justice's finding of a constructive break-in was erroneous because the doctrine of constructive breaking never has been recognized by this Court. This argument is without merit. It is well established that the burglary statute, G.L.1956 § 11-8-1, incorporates the common law definition of the crimethe breaking and entering the dwelling-house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony therein, whether the felony be actually committed or not. State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d 849, 852 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Hudson, 53 R.I. 229, 230, 165 A. 649, 650 (1933)). The breaking element traditionally requires the use of force, no matter how slight, to gain entry. Compare State v. Fernandes, 783 A.2d 913, 916 (R.I.2001) (use of force may be satisfied by the act of opening a closed door), with State v. Beeley, 653 A.2d 722, 725 (R.I.1995) (walking through an already open door does not amount to force). In this case, the record is devoid of any evidence that the intruders exerted force to gain entry into the Atlantic Avenue dwelling; there is no indication that either man physically opened the door when they followed Rivera into the dwelling, notwithstanding the gun that was pointed at her head. Although the trial justice acknowledged this fact, he concluded that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to establish a constructive break-in. We agree. The doctrine of constructive breaking was developed at common law to address cases in which the intruder gained entry to a dwelling without physical force, but by fraud, trick, or threat of force. 13 Am. Jur.2d Burglary § 17 at 193 (2000). According to a respected treatise writer: When entry was gained by fraud or threat of force, a constructive breaking was deemed to have occurred. Although this would seem an exception to the basic common-law rule, it is only an extension of its rationale. In this situation the occupant of the dwelling had not invited the offender into his home by a grant of authority or through his negligence. The intruder had indeed caused the opening of the structure. If the occupant had a reasonable chance to close the opening procured in this manner, then no breaking would have occurred, as it would have been the owner who allowed the opening to invite an intrusion. 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.1(a) at 207-08 (2d ed.2003). In our view, a criminal who achieves entry into a dwelling by fraud, trick, or threat of force is no less guilty of burglary than the thug who exerts force upon entry. See State v. Maxwell, 234 Kan. 393, 672 P.2d 590, 593 (Kan. 1983) ([T]he law regards force and fraud with equal abhorrence, and an invasion, for the purpose of stealing, of the tenant's possession by one means or the other, is all one in the eyes of the law.). By criminalizing the actions of those who enter by trickery or threats as well as by force, the doctrine of constructive breaking furthers the goal of criminal law: The intruder who breaches the barrier [of a home] with a lie or deception, by pretending to deliver a package or to read a meter, is no less dangerous than his more stealthy cohorts   . People v. Hutchinson, 124 Misc.2d 487, 477 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966-67 (Sup.Ct.1984) (emphasis added); see also Nichols v. State, 68 Wis. 416, 32 N.W. 543, 546 (1887) (So it has frequently been held in this country that, `to obtain admission to a dwelling-house at night, with the intent to commit a felony by means of artifice or fraud, or upon a pretense of business or social intercourse, is a constructive breaking, and will sustain an indictment charging a burglary by breaking and entering.'). We hold that the breaking element necessary to establish the crime of burglary may be satisfied by evidence that the defendant unlawfully gained entrance by way of fraud, trick, or threat of force. In this case, the intruders summoned Rivera to the main entrance by ringing her doorbell. Reyes held up a pizza box as a ruse to trick her into opening the door. The fraudulent scheme worked: Rivera opened the door and faced Reyes, who pointed his gun at her, told her it was a robbery, and threatened to kill her while he walked through the door along with the knife-brandishing Abdullah. When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt, the evidence is such that a reasonable juror could find that defendant and his associate gained entry into the building by trick and by threat of force. [10] Accordingly, the trial justice did not err when he denied the motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis that the prosecution presented sufficient proof of a constructive break-in.