Opinion ID: 681183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Properly Denied Ramos' Motion to Suppress Evidence

Text: 17 First, Ramos asserts the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because Dollahite exceeded the scope of the underlying justification for the stop. Specifically, Ramos argues once Dollahite issued the traffic ticket, the basis for the detention ceased, and Dollahite had no grounds for any further detention or investigation of Ramos. We disagree. 18 In reviewing a motion to suppress, we must accept a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 963 (6th Cir.1980). Conclusions of law, however, such as the determination of reasonableness pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, are reviewed de novo. Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.1989). 19 First, we note Dollahite properly stopped Ramos. Traffic stops are a species of Terry investigative detentions. United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1090 (1990). The detaining officer must have an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or is occurring before stopping the automobile. United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir.1993). Here, Dollahite noticed Ramos was violating the minimum interstate speed of 45 miles per hour by travelling 40 miles per hour, and that several trucks were passing Ramos. Thus, the stop and detention for impeding traffic was clearly supported by a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. 20 Next, we must inquire whether Dollahite's actions after the stop were tailored to the underlying justification for the stop, the traffic violation. During a routine traffic stop, an officer may: 21 ... request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning. 22 United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 351 (1992) (quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, Cummins v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 428 (1991)). 23 Here, Dollahite detained Ramos to determine his right to operate the vehicle, which was directly related to the initial stop. Although Ramos presented a drivers license, he was unable to produce a vehicle registration or any other proof of his right to operate the vehicle. The stop prior to the search, which lasted no more than seven minutes, was devoted to checking Ramos' license and ownership of the car and issuing a traffic citation for impeding traffic. Because Ramos produced no proof of right to operate the vehicle, Dollahite delayed him for further questioning. Ramos' inability to produce proof of his right to operate the vehicle gave Dollahite reasonable suspicion to detain Ramos for further questioning. Based on reasonable suspicions arising from Ramos' statement he did not know the car's owner, Dollahite decided to investigate further. We find that here, the short period before the search was reasonable and was not an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 24