Opinion ID: 820732
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against Hart and Karas

Text: We begin our inquiry into whether the conduct of Hart and Karas may be “fairly attributable to the State . . . . by identifying ‘the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). On this score, Glotfelty advances two arguments. First, he claims that Hart and Karas acted under color of state law by invoking Louisiana law and relying on governmental authority to request, obtain, and pursue enforcement of the allegedly unlawful attachment order. Second, Glotfelty argues that Hart and Karas were willful participants acting in concert with Richard, Doe, and the STPSO to effect an unconstitutional arrest of Glotfelty. We may expeditiously dispose of Glotfelty’s first claim. A private party does not act under color of law simply by invoking state authority. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980) (explaining that “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a coconspirator or a joint actor with” governmental officials); Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Ass’n, 778 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The execution by a private party of a sworn complaint, which forms the basis for an arrest, is, without more, not sufficient to make that party’s acts state action.”). Indeed, in the specific scenario presented here of an attorney advocating for a client, we previously have held that even “[i]f a judge reaches a decision based on misinformation that counsel provides, the issuance of the decision does not imply that counsel acted under color of state law.” Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2003). Simply put, Hart and Karas did not transform themselves into state actors merely by relying on Louisiana’s legal 7 Case: 12-30532 Document: 00512145045 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/15/2013 No. 12-30532 system to pursue their representation of Richard. As the district court noted, to hold otherwise would lead to the absurd conclusion that every person who seeks redress through the legal system acts under color of state law. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (explaining that without the “state action” limitation in § 1983 cases, “private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them”). We therefore turn our attention to Glotfelty’s claim that Hart and Karas collaborated with Richard, Doe, and the STPSO to perpetrate an unlawful arrest of Glotfelty. As alluded to above, a private citizen may be held liable under § 1983 where the plaintiff alleges “that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors.” Mylett v. Jeane, 879 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989). For a claimant to successfully press such a suit, he “must allege: (1) an agreement between the private and public defendants to commit an illegal act and (2) a deprivation of constitutional rights.” Priester, 354 F.3d at 420. “Allegations that are merely conclusory, without reference to specific facts, will not suffice.” Id. More particularly, where the plaintiff claims that a private party acted under color of law as part of a conspiracy to effect an unlawful arrest, we consistently have held that he must demonstrate the existence of a “preconceived plan” for the authorities to arrest the person without investigation, “merely because he was designated for arrest by the private party.” Sims, 778 F.2d at 1079; see also Hernandez v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 673 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1982) (a plaintiff must prove a “‘customary’ or ‘pre-existing’ arrangement between” the private party and the police to detain suspected shoplifters); Smith v. Brookshire Bros., 519 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1975) (a plaintiff must show that the private party had a “customary plan” by which the police would effect detentions like the one then at issue), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976). 8 Case: 12-30532 Document: 00512145045 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/15/2013 No. 12-30532 Here, to convert Hart and Karas into the equivalent of state actors based on their role in his arrest, Glotfelty thus needed to allege facts demonstrating that there was a “preconceived plan” for Richard, Doe, and the STPSO to arrest Glotfelty simply because Hart and Karas designated him for arrest. On this front, Glotfelty’s complaint stated principally as follows: On information and belief, due to the close connection of HART and/or RICHARD to law enforcement, specifically, the [STPSO], and despite the fact that in excess of 46,492 warrants were waiting to be served which included 28,733 arrest warrants for failure to appear and contempt of court were unserved in St. Tammany Parish, it seems more than coincidental that the wrongfully issued ex-parte attachment was executed by the STPSO through DOE shortly after its issuance and GLOTFELTY, who had no prior record nor any arrests, was arrested from his home on a Saturday morning and brought to jail despite the fact that the attachment stated that he was to be brought to Court on December 9, 2010. Therefore, the facts alleged were that: (1) Hart and Richard were closely connected to law enforcement;1 (2) thousands of warrants were awaiting execution in St. Tammany Parish when Glotfelty was arrested; (3) Glotfelty’s attachment order was executed shortly after its issuance, even though he had no prior record or arrests; (4) the arrest took place on a Saturday morning; and (5) the arrest occurred earlier than it should have, and resulted in Glotfelty’s transfer to the police station rather than the courthouse. Even when liberally construed in Glotfelty’s favor, these facts do not allow us reasonably to draw an inference that Hart and Karas willfully acted in concert with Richard, Doe, and the STPSO to effect an unconstitutional arrest of Glotfelty. First, as the district court correctly explained, there is no allegation—as required under Sims—of a preconceived plan between the 1 As noted earlier, Glotfelty’s complaint elsewhere alleged that Richard was an employee or deputy of the STPSO, and that Hart was a mayor’s court judge who previously had been employed by the St. Tammany Parish District Attorney’s Office. 9 Case: 12-30532 Document: 00512145045 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/15/2013 No. 12-30532 defendants to have Glotfelty unlawfully arrested merely because Hart and Karas designated him for arrest. Indeed, Glotfelty’s complaint acknowledges that a state court judge issued the attachment order, which is inconsistent with such a theory. More generally, Glotfelty’s factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“The pleading must contain something more than a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action.” (alterations and citation omitted)). Glotfelty implies in his complaint that, because the circumstances surrounding his arrest “seem[] more than coincidental,” a conspiracy must have existed. But this claim is no more than “a conclusory allegation of agreement,” which the Supreme Court dismissed as insufficient in Twombly. Id. at 556-57; see also Priester, 354 F.3d at 420. Although, to be sure, Glotfelty’s factual allegations would support a finding of an agreement between the defendants to arrest him, as already noted, it is not enough to plead facts that merely are consistent with the defendants’ liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Simply put, Glotfelty’s complaint does not allege specific facts that would support a finding that Hart and Karas were willful participants in joint activity with the state or its agents. Furthermore, we note that the authority on which Glotfelty relies, Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2005), is not to the contrary. As here, we considered in Ballard the propriety of a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a plaintiff’s § 1983 suit. 413 F.3d at 512. There, the plaintiff alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when private attorneys conspired with a state court judge to keep the plaintiff in jail until he paid certain debts. Id. The district court dismissed the claims against the attorneys after concluding that the plaintiff did not establish that they were engaged in “state action.” Id. at 518. We reversed, holding that the allegations pleaded in the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently stated facts supporting the finding that the 10 Case: 12-30532 Document: 00512145045 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/15/2013 No. 12-30532 attorneys conspired with the judge to violate the plaintiff’s due process rights. Id. at 519. Significantly, however, we reached this conclusion only after explaining that the complaint alleged that the judge had not ordered the plaintiff jailed until after she initiated a telephone conversation with one of the defendant attorneys. Id. Here, as we already have noted, Glotfelty pleaded no similar facts that would support finding an agreement between the defendants to violate his constitutional rights. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Glotfelty did not advance a plausible claim that Hart and Karas acted under color of law and, by extension, that he did not sufficiently plead a claim against them arising under § 1983.2