Opinion ID: 2994051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Armed-Robbery Conviction and Sentence

Text: 13 ¶31. This Court has a statutory duty, under Section 99-19-105(3)(b) and Section 99-19-105(6) to conduct an inquiry into the evidentiary support and validity of any prior conviction determined to be an aggravating factor. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3) (Supp. 2014); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(6) (Supp. 2014). This Court has interpreted this mandate to require our courts to make a determination that the record of the prior conviction is accurate and the defendant to be sentenced is indeed the person who was previously convicted. Nixon v. State, 533 So. 2d 1078, 1099 (Miss. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985 (Miss. 1998); see Phillips v. State, 421 So. 2d 476, 481 (Miss. 1982) (providing the same for habitual-offender enhancements and noting that trial courts are not required to relitigate the prior conviction). The Court “is not required to go beyond the face of the prior convictions . . . . ‘[I]f, on its face, the conviction makes a proper showing that a defendant’s prior plea of guilty was both knowing and voluntary, that conviction may be used for the enhancement of the defendant’s punishment . . . .’” Nixon, 533 So. 2d at 1099 (quoting Phillips, 421 So. 2d at 481); Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213, 1236 (Miss. 1996) (providing courts may look to the face of the prior conviction to determine validity and need not “retry all prior convictions”); see also Culberson v. State, 612 So. 2d 342, 344 (Miss. 1992) (providing that, on a motion for post-conviction relief, an assault upon a prior conviction used as an aggravating factor should be conducted in a separate proceeding apart from the capital-murder, post-conviction proceeding). ¶32. Therefore, as a general rule, this Court will not inquire into the validity of a prior conviction used as an aggravating circumstance if it appears valid on its face. Here, however, 14 circumstances dictate we examine Hollie’s armed-robbery conviction with a higher level of scrutiny. This is supported by our statutory obligation to ensure Hollie’s death sentence is valid – if the armed-robbery conviction, the only aggravator the jury found, is vacated, so too must be Hollie’s death sentence. And, as a practical matter, this is an efficient use of judicial resources. ¶33. The record before us today contains Hollie’s murder conviction and sentence and also that of his armed robbery of Patel. Hollie raises a nonfrivolous allegation that he lacked the competence to plead guilty to the armed robbery, the same allegation he raises as to his capital-murder conviction and sentence. The order for the competency evaluation was for both Hollie’s capital-murder charge and his armed-robbery charge. All of the armed-robbery and capital-murder proceedings, including the plea hearings and sentencing, were conducted concurrently. ¶34. Accordingly, because there is a credible concern about the validity of the prior conviction used as an aggravating factor, the Court has before it an adequate record of that prior conviction, and the Court is required by statute to ensure the validity of the death sentence, this Court will undertake a review of Hollie’s prior armed robbery that goes beyond the mere face of the conviction. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(6) (Supp. 2014); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 167, 198, 206, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2922, 2937, 2941, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976) (affirming death sentence in part because the Georgia statute, like Mississippi’s, required the Georgia Supreme Court to review the jury’s findings regarding aggravating factors, including prior convictions); Gillett v. State, 56 So. 3d 469, 506-07 15 (Miss. 2010) (analyzing defendant’s prior conviction used as an aggravating factor to determine if the conviction was for a violent felony); Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 684 (Miss. 1997) (discussing whether a plea of nolo contendere qualified as a prior conviction of a violent felony for purposes of an aggravating circumstance); Phillips, 421 So. 2d at 481; Nixon, 533 So. 2d at 1099; Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d at1236. ¶35. As noted above, the trial court ordered a mental evaluation of Hollie regarding his armed-robbery charge. The evaluation was conducted, but no hearing was held. Nevertheless, the trial court accepted Hollie’s guilty plea to armed robbery, which subsequently was used as the aggravating factor in his death-penalty sentencing phase. Ordering the mental evaluation, but failing to hold the mandatory hearing on the matter is reversible error. Smith, 149 So. 3d at 1035. As a result, we reverse Hollie’s conviction for armed robbery as well and vacate that sentence. This case is remanded to the trial court to determine Hollie’s competence to stand trial. See Smith, 149 So. 3d at 1035; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(6) (Supp. 2014).