Opinion ID: 1695852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: W & R's Counterclaims and the Declaratory Judgment

Text: On rehearing, UILIC asks us to affirm the judgment in its favor on W & R's counterclaims and to affirm the declaratory judgment in its favor concerning the July 1999 letter. [4] Both are due to be affirmed. As previously noted, the jury returned a separate verdict in favor of UILIC on W & R's counterclaims against UILIC for money damages; that verdict was distinct from the general verdict it returned in favor of UILIC on its claims for money damages against W & R, and the trial court entered a judgment based on the two verdicts. W & R's counterclaims for damages were grounded upon its argument that the July 1999 letter was an enforceable contract. In its postjudgment motion, W & R asked the trial court for relief from the judgment entered against it on its counterclaims. The trial court denied the motion. W & R also sought in its counterclaim a declaratory judgment. UILIC's complaint sought a declaratory judgment as well. Each claim for declaratory relief related to whether the July 1999 letter was an enforceable contract. The parties agreed to defer this issue until after the trial was completed. Indeed, according to paragraph 4 of the trial court's order set forth below, the parties discussed a procedure whereby the jury verdict on W & R's counterclaims would guide the trial court's resolution of the competing requests for a declaratory judgment. The trial court resolved the parties' competing requests for a declaratory judgment in favor of UILIC, entering a judgment declaring that the July 1999 letter was not a binding contract. The trial court's judgment stated, in pertinent part: 1. The jury in the above-styled case heard testimony for several weeks before it rendered its verdicts in favor of [UILIC]. 2. The verdict form on [W & R's] counterclaims submitted to the jury contained boxes for the jury to check to indicate whether it found for [W & R] on any or all three of the theories on its counterclaims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of [UILIC] on [W & R's] counterclaims and did not check any of the boxes in favor of [W & R], which was a specific rejection of [W & R's] claim that the July 8, 1999 letter signed by the parties constituted a binding contract. 3. The jury returned a verdict in favor of [UILIC] for $50,000,000.00 in compensatory damages and awarded no punitive damages. 4. Prior to closing arguments, the parties and the Court discussed withholding the declaratory judgment claims from the jury and the Court deciding those claims in accordance with the jury's verdict, and that procedure was adopted and followed.[ [5] ] 5. Clearly the jury found [UILIC's] case that there was no binding contractual or other obligation to pay basis points compensation to be the more persuasive case and the Court finds no error in this finding and corresponding verdict. 6. The Court finds that the totality of the evidence presented supports the jury's verdict. The Court further finds that insofar as the testimony of Anthony McWhorter and the testimony of Robert Hechler was in conflict, the jury was entitled to consider the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses and make credibility determinations. 7. The Court further finds and concludes from the totality of the evidence that [UILIC] has no past, present or future obligation to pay either the 20 basis points or 25 basis points compensation referenced in the July 8, 1999 letter. (Emphasis added.) On rehearing, W & R argues for the first time that its counterclaims for money damages are inextricably intertwined with its request for declaratory relief, and that both the trial court's judgment on the counterclaims and its declaratory judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. [6] Even if we were to accept that argument, in order to overturn the trial court's declaratory judgment we would have to reverse it on the ground that the trial court erred in embracing the jury verdict on the counterclaims as to the issue of the existence of a contract. Although in its motion for new trial W & R attacked the judgment based on the jury verdict on the counterclaims, W & R does not refer to the reversal of that judgment in its initial brief in this Court. In that brief, W & R first presented its argument concerning the validity of the July 1999 letter in the context of the availability of a defense to UILIC's conversion claim. Then, in arguing that this Court should reverse the declaratory judgment entered in favor of UILIC, W & R argued only that the July 1999 letter was a valid contract for the reasons stated in its argument concerning the conversion claim and that, therefore, the trial court erred by not entering a declaratory judgment in its favor. Because it never asked this Court to reverse the underlying judgment on its counterclaims for money damages upon which the trial court's declaratory judgment is based, W & R is precluded from seeking a reversal of the declaratory judgment that, according to paragraph 4 of the trial court's order, was based on the judgment entered on the jury verdict on the counterclaims. Issues not argued in a party's brief are waived. Bogle v. Scheer, 512 So.2d 1336 (Ala.1987). We therefore affirm the judgment entered on W & R's counterclaims and the declaratory judgment.