Opinion ID: 76774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Boycott Exception

Text: 37 The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in pertinent part: 38 Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 39 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b). Even though Gilchrist's claim attacks practices that are the business of insurance and regulated by state law, if these practices constitute a prohibited boycott, then they are not exempted from our jurisdiction. Uniforce, 87 F.3d at 1300. 40 For purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Supreme Court defines a boycott as the refusal to deal in a collateral transaction as a means to coerce terms respecting a primary transaction. Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 801-05, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993). It is the refusal to deal beyond the targeted transaction that gives the great coercive force to a commercial boycott. Id. 41 Gilchrist does not allege that Insurers refused to deal with her in a collateral transaction in order to coerce the terms of her insurance contract. On the contrary, her complaint alleges the following boycott: 42 ¶ 53. Defendants and unnamed co-conspirators have conspired and combined to refuse to deal with parts manufacturers selling crash parts of like kind and quality as those originally provided by automobile manufacturers, and capable of restoring class members' vehicles to pre-loss condition.... Defendants have also conspired and combined to boycott Plaintiffs and Class members by agreeing to withhold from them crash parts of like kind and quality as originally provided by automobile manufacturers. 43 The boycott she alleges concerns the primary transaction itself — the refusal to provide OEM parts in the repair of policyholders' vehicles. The alleged boycott involves the very same refusal to deal — with OEM parts, either by buying them from their manufacturers or by providing them to plaintiffs in the repair of their vehicles. Consequently, we conclude that the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to state a cognizable antitrust boycott claim as they do not allege a refusal to deal in a collateral transaction as a means to coerce terms respecting a primary transaction. Id.