Opinion ID: 1298515
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: possession of marijuana first offense

Text: ALABAMA Ala. Code §§ 13A-12-214, 13A-5-7(a)(1) (1988) Class A misdemeanor if for personal use only; maximum sentence one year. ALASKA Alaska Stat. § 11.71.070 (1983) For one-half ounce (14 grams), maximum fine $100. ARIZONA Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3405(A)(1); (B)(1) (Supp. 1988) Class 6 felony; possession of less than one pound; maximum sentence one and one-half years. ARKANSAS Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 5-4-401(b)(1), 5-64-215(1), 5-64-401(c) (1987) Class A misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year. CALIFORNIA Cal.Health & Safety Code § 11357(b) (West Supp. 1989) For less than 28.5 grams, maximum fine $100. COLORADO Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-106(1) (1986) Class 2 petty offense for possession of not more than one ounce; maximum fine $100. CONNECTICUT Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-279(c) (1989) Misdemeanor as provided by § 53a-26; for possession of four ounces, maximum fine $1,000; maximum sentence one year, or both. DELAWARE Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4754, tit. 11 § 4206(b) (1988) Class B misdemeanor; maximum sentence six months and such fine and other conditions as the court may order. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA D.C. Code Ann. § 33-541(d) (1988) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000. FLORIDA Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.13(1)(g) (West Supp. 1989) First degree misdemeanor for possession of less than 20 grams; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000. GEORGIA Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-2(b) (1988) For one ounce or less, a misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000, or both, or public works for period not more than 12 months. HAWAII Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 712-1249, 701-107(4) (1985) Petty misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year. IDAHO Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(2) (Supp. 1988) Misdemeanor if not more than three ounces; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000. Felony if more than three ounces; maximum sentence five years; maximum fine $10,000. ILLINOIS Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 56 1/2, ¶ 704 (Smith-Hurd 1985) Class C misdemeanor for less than 2.5 grams; maximum sentence 30 days; maximum fine $500. Class B misdemeanor for more than 2.5 grams, but less than 10 grams; maximum sentence six months; maximum fine $500. Class A misdemeanor for more than 10 grams, but less than 30 grams; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000. Class 4 felony for more than 30 grams but less than 500 grams; maximum sentence three years; maximum fine $10,000. Class 3 felony for more than 500 grams; maximum sentence five years; maximum fine $10,000. INDIANA Ind.Stat.Ann. §§ 35-48-4-11, 35-50-3-2 (Burns 1987) Class A misdemeanor for possession of less than 30 grams; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $5,000. IOWA Iowa Code § 204.401(3) (West Supp. 1987) Serious misdemeanor; maximum sentence six months in county jail; maximum fine $1,000; or both. KANSAS Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4127b(a)(3) (Supp. 1987) Class A misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $2,500. Possession of more than 1,500 grams, presumption of no probation. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4127e. KENTUCKY Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.990(9) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) Possession of less than eight ounces; maximum sentence 90 days in jail; maximum fine $250. LOUISIANA La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-966(D) (West Supp. 1989) Maximum sentence six months in jail; maximum fine $500. MAINE Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2383 (Supp. 1988) Possession of a usable amount; civil violation; maximum fine $200. MARYLAND Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §§ 279(c)(7), 287(e) (1988) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000; or both. MASSACHUSETTS Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 94C, §§ 31, 34 (West 1984) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence six months; maximum fine $500; or both. (Probation mandatory on first offense.) MICHIGAN Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14.15(7403)(d) (Callaghan Supp. 1989) [M.C.L.A. § 333.7403(d)] Misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000. MINNESOTA Minn. Stat. Ann. § 152.15 (West 1989) Petty misdemeanor; maximum fine $100; drug education program. MISSISSIPPI Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1988) For one ounce or less, minimum fine $100; maximum fine $250. (Does not constitute a misdemeanor until third conviction.) (Non-public record which is expunged two years after conviction.) MISSOURI Mo. Ann. Stat. § 195.200 1(1)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) Possession of less than 35 grams, class b misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year in county jail; maximum fine $1,000. MONTANA Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-9-102(2), 50-32-222(3)(j) (1987) Misdemeanor if not more than 60 grams; minimum fine $100; maximum fine $500; maximum sentence six months. NEW HAMPSHIRE N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-B:26(II)(d) (Supp. 1988) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year. NEBRASKA Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(6)(a) (1985) For one ounce or less, guilty of infraction, cited, fined $100, and assigned to attend a course. NEVADA Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 453.336(2)(d) (Michie Supp. 1987) Gross misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year in county jail; maximum fine $1,000. NEW JERSEY N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-10(a) (West Supp. 1989) Disorderly person for possession of less than 50 grams; maximum sentence six months; maximum fine $1,000. Crime of the 4th degree for possession of more than 50 grams; maximum sentence 18 months; maximum fine $7,500. NEW MEXICO N.M. Stat. Ann. § 54-11-23(B) (Supp. 1975) Petty misdemeanor for possession of less than one ounce; maximum sentence 15 days; maximum fine $100. Misdemeanor for possession of more than one ounce but less than eight ounces; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000. Felony for possession of more than eight ounces; maximum sentence five years; maximum fine $5,000. NEW YORK N.Y.Penal Law § 221 (McKinney 1980) Unlawful possession of less than 25 grams; maximum fine $100. Criminal possession in the 5th degree; possession in a public place or possession of more than 25 grams but less than two ounces; maximum sentence three months. Criminal possession in the 4th degree; possession of more than two ounces but less than eight ounces; maximum sentence six months. Criminal possession in the 3rd degree; possession of more than eight ounces but less than 16 ounces; maximum sentence four years. Possession of more than 16 ounces but less than 10 pounds; maximum sentence 15 years. NORTH CAROLINA N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-94, 90-95(d)(4) (1985) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence 30 days; maximum fine $100; or both. NORTH DAKOTA N.D. Cent. Code §§ 19-03.1-05(5)(M), 19-03.1-23(3) (Supp. 1987) For one-half to one ounce, class A misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $1,000; or both. For less than one-half ounce, a class B misdemeanor; maximum sentence 30 days; maximum fine $500; or both. OHIO Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.11(C)(3) (Page 1987) Minor misdemeanor if less than 100 grams; maximum penalty $100 fine. OKLAHOMA Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63 §§ 2-204(C)(10), 2-402(B)(2) (West 1982) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year. OREGON Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4)(f) (1987) If less than one ounce, maximum fine $100. (Oregon is currently revising its marijuana statute to impose harsher sanctions.) PENNSYLVANIA Pa.Con.Stat.Ann. tit. 35 § 780-104(1)(iv), 780-113(a)(31), (g) (Supp. 1988) Misdemeanor for less than 30 grams; maximum sentence 30 days; maximum fine $500. RHODE ISLAND R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 21-28-2.08(d)(10), 21-28-4.01(C)(1)(b) (Supp. 1988) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence one year; minimum fine $200; maximum fine $500; or both. SOUTH CAROLINA S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-53-190(d), 44-53-370(d)(2) (Lawyer's Co-op. 1985) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence six months; maximum fine $1,000; or both. SOUTH DAKOTA S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-42-6, 22-6-2 (1988) For one ounce or less, a class 2 misdemeanor; maximum sentence thirty days; maximum fine $100; or both. TENNESSEE Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-6-415(a)(1), 39-6-417(b)(1) (1988) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence 11 months, 29 days; maximum fine $1,000; or both. (Judge may suspend sentence and order participation in drug rehabilitation program.) TEXAS Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 4476-15, § 4.051(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) Class B misdemeanor for possession of less than two ounces; maximum sentence 180 days; maximum fine $1,000. Class A misdemeanor for possession of more than two ounces but less than four ounces; maximum sentence one year; maximum fine $2,000. Class 3 felony for possession of more than four ounces but less than five pounds; maximum sentence 10 years; maximum fine $10,000. Class 2 felony for possession of more than five pounds but less than 50 pounds; maximum sentence 20 years; maximum fine $10,000. UTAH Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(d), 76-3-204 (Supp. 1988) For one ounce or less, a class B misdemeanor; maximum sentence six months. VERMONT Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4224 (1987) Maximum sentence six months; maximum fine $500. VIRGINIA Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-250.1 (1988) For any possession, maximum sentence of 30 days; maximum fine of $500. WASHINGTON Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.401 (Supp. 1989) Misdemeanor; possession of up to 40 grams; maximum sentence 90 days; maximum fine $1,000; or both. WEST VIRGINIA W. Va. Code § 60A-4-401 (1989) Misdemeanor; first offense automatically diverted. WISCONSIN Wisc.Stat.Ann. § 161.41(3) (West 1989) Misdemeanor; maximum sentence 30 days; maximum fine $500. WYOMING Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(c) (1988) Maximum sentence six months; maximum fine $750. CLABORNE, Judge, specially concurring: I write not because the majority's construction of our constitution is wrong, for it is not. Nor do I write because I feel that the result in this case is not correct, for it is. I write because the dissent in this case portrays our result as somehow lowering the standard by which judges must live. The dissent somehow concludes that Judge Marquardt was convicted of a felony. In fact, he was convicted of an offense which is a simple misdemeanor in Texas, and which may be designated a felony in Arizona. The dissent also attributes some sinister motive to the manner in which the judge decided not to appeal this misdemeanor conviction. Speculation is not a judge's occupation. If the dissent were restricted only to constitutional construction, I would refrain from this special concurrence. The dissent, however, goes further. With the exception of the State of Arizona, no state in the United States has considered first offense possession of a small amount of marijuana to be an offense which deserves punishment greater than a misdemeanor. It seems only reasonable that in deciding the fate of a judge who has for the first time possessed a small amount of marijuana in another state, we should review all of the circumstances concerning his fate in no less an atmosphere than a superior court who decides the same fate of any citizen prosecuted under this statute. The purpose of the sanction of removal from office of a sitting judge is practically universal in America. We said in In re Haddad, 128 Ariz. 490, 492, 627 P.2d 221, 223 (1981): The purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish the individual judge, but to maintain the high standards of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. Judicial discipline protects the public and the integrity of the judicial process and is a balancing of the need for an independent judiciary with the necessity for removal of those who do not measure up to the high standards required of a person holding judicial office. (citations omitted.) (emphasis added.) See also Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1173-74 (Me. 1985); American Judicature Society, Judicial Discipline and Disability Digest, 1981-85 Supplement, Part 2, § IIB3 (1984). How does the judiciary retain the confidence of the public? I am sure neither the court, the commission, nor the lawyers who participated in this proceeding relished their roles or the circumstances of this case. I must rein my temper and quell my indignation when viewing the acts of this judge. I agree with the Michigan court when, in considering an off the bench transgression, it said: [T]hat a judge, whether on or off the bench, is bound to strive toward creating and preserving the image of the justice system as an independent, impartial source of reasoned actions and decisions. Achievement of this goal demands that a judge, in a sense, behave as though he is always on the bench. In the Matter of Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 186, 267 N.W.2d 914, 922 (1978). Our judicial system requires us to weigh and balance the rights of society and of the individual. We place on our scales society's needs and protection and balance those by reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the transgression. We then, and only then, decide. In the search for essential justice, it is instructive to consider how other jurisdictions have dealt with erring judges. In California, a superior court judge to friends, court personnel, court clerks, and in private continually referred to black litigants as coons, jigs, niggers, and to Hispanics as Mexican jumping beans and spics. His discipline was public censure. See In re Stevens, 31 Cal.3d 403, 403-404, 183 Cal. Rptr. 48, 48-49, 645 P.2d 99, 99-100 (1982). In Louisiana, a general jurisdiction judge, over a period of time, smoked marijuana and consorted with prostitutes. He was suspended for one year. In re Whitaker, 463 So.2d 1291 (La. 1985). In Oregon, a superior court judge, when seeing his estranged wife out with another man, rammed the man's car with his own, beat his wife and was charged with reckless endangerment. He was censured. In re Conduct of Roth, 293 Or. 179, 645 P.2d 1064 (1982). In my judgment, these incidents are far graver than the matter at hand. Should we not weigh this judge's illegal conduct against eighteen years of service as a judge? Should we not consider the character testimony in his behalf by the attorney general of this state as well as the county attorney of the most populous county in the state? Should we refuse to consider his retention in office by the voters of this state? Should we not weigh this one mistake against the other works of this man? During his years on the bench Judge Marquardt's decisions have resulted in 135 appellate opinions. Approximately one-half of these were criminal appeals. The court of appeals and supreme court affirmed him over 90% of the time. A review of the written criminal appeals reflects sentences that were firm, and which clearly protected society and the victim. They were also just. His civil appeals reflected knowledge of the law and reasoned deliberation and fairness. Other courts have weighed the circumstances surrounding a transgression by a judge. In re Whitaker, 463 So.2d 1291, 1303 (La. 1985) (the court weighed the probability of reoccurrence and the credibility of the judge); See In re Turner, 421 So.2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1982) (the court weighed letters of confidence, a sincere acknowledgment of the error, and an effort to change); In re Conduct of Roth, 293 Or. 179, 182, 645 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1982) (the court weighed official excellence, prosecutor's confidence and respect for the judge, and found the incident an isolated one); In re Donohue, 390 Mass. 514, 518, 458 N.E.2d 323, 327 (1983) (the court weighed devoted service to court and community). This weighing occurs whether it is suspension or removal. See also American Judicature Society, Judicial Discipline and Disability Digest, supra, at Part 5, § IVA. This judge has received a substantial suspension with a loss of $80,000.00 in salary and the public censure attendant to this decision. Is this sanction not severe enough to maintain public confidence? In a recent Arizona case, the issue was whether possession of marijuana qualified as a crime serious enough to justify a jury trial. Yet, the dissenter here said it was not such a crime: I would hold that the moral quality of a possession of marijuana charge is no worse than that of other offenses Arizona courts have held to be insufficient to satisfy Rothweiler 's [ v. Superior Court of Pima County, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479 (1966)] second factor. See Spitz v. Municipal Court, 127 Ariz. 405, 621 P.2d 911 (1980) (sale of alcoholic beverages to minors); State ex rel. Baumert v. Superior Court [127 Ariz. 152, 618 P.2d 1078 (1980)] (disorderly conduct); Bruce v. State, 126 Ariz. 271, 614 P.2d 813 (1980) (simple assault); Goldman v. Kautz, 111 Ariz. 431, 531 P.2d 1138 (1975) (simple assault and battery); O'Neill v. Mangum [103 Ariz. 484, 445 P.2d 843 (1968)] (drunk and disorderly conduct); State ex rel. Dean v. City Court [141 Ariz. 361, 687 P.2d 369 (App. 1984)] (reckless driving); City of Phoenix v. Jones, 25 Ariz. App. 265, 542 P.2d 1145 (1975) (carrying a concealed weapon). State ex rel. Dean v. Dolny, 161 Ariz. 297, 303, 778 P.2d 1193, 1199 slip op. at 14-15, Arizona Supreme Court (1989) (Corcoran, J., dissenting). In re Ackel, 155 Ariz. 34, 745 P.2d 92 (1987) may have been wrongly decided. I am not obliged nor empowered to re-decide what was essentially a case of judicial corruption, i.e., trading power for sexual favors. I am to help decide only this case. I certainly agree that the exercise of power makes judges different. Here Judge Marquardt and the Texas misdemeanor have been dealt with in a reasoned way. Humane judgment provides us with the capacity to feel and, therefore, to hopefully understand, to know and deal with human frailty, including our own. I feel this court has kept its faith with actual justice and has dealt with judicial discipline in a reasoned, honorable and humane way. CAMERON, J., did not participate in this decision; pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 3, CLABORNE, J., of the Court of Appeals, Division One, was designated to sit in his stead.