Opinion ID: 457137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of the State Regulations

Text: 46 Defendants argue that the trial judge improperly denied them the chance to challenge the validity of the state laws underlying their Lacey Act convictions. The Indian treaty right to take fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with citizens of the Territory may not be qualified by the States. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392, 398, 88 S.Ct. 1725, 1728, 20 L.Ed.2d 689 (1968). However, the Puyallup Court also ruled that the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians. Id. The appropriate standards requirement has been interpreted to mean that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a reasonable and necessary conservation measure and that its application to the Indians is necessary in the interest of conservation. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207, 95 S.Ct. 944, 952, 43 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975) (citations omitted). 47 Thus, a State prosecuting an Indian treaty fisherman for violating a state fishing regulation must establish that the regulation is reasonable and necessary for conservation purposes. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 92 Wash.2d 271, 275, 595 P.2d 916, 919, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930, 100 S.Ct. 272, 62 L.Ed.2d 187 (1979). The case at bar, however, involves a federal prosecution under the Lacey Act for trafficking in fish obtained in violation of state law. 48 Because the Puyallup/Antoine requirements were considered necessary to preserve Indian treaty rights, state laws that failed to meet those requirements were invalid. Therefore, because Congress in enacting the Lacey Act disclaimed any intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights, Congress must have intended its prohibition against trafficking in fish obtained in violation of state law to apply only to valid state regulations. 49 Must the federal government in a Lacey Act prosecution establish the validity of the underlying state regulations (just as a state must, see Reed, supra ), or must the defendant prove the invalidity of the regulations? Given that states must bear the burden in state prosecutions, we do not believe that Congress intended to relieve the federal government, in a Lacey Act prosecution incorporating a state law violation, of the burden of establishing the state law's validity. To shift the burden to the defendant Indians would make it more difficult for the Indians to protect themselves against improper state encroachments on their treaty rights, an outcome that, in light of Congress' explicit disclaimer, could not have been intended. 50 Therefore, we conclude that the federal government must establish the validity of the state regulations underlying a Lacey Act prosecution. The government makes much of the fact that the system of state regulations being challenged was under the continuing jurisdiction and supervision of the District Court for the District of Oregon in the case of United States v. Oregon, Civ. No. 68-513. That court had issued a decree in 1977 adopting A Plan for Managing Fisheries on Stocks Originating from the Columbia River and its Tributaries Above Bonneville Dam (the Plan), a plan drawn up and consented to by both the states and the tribes. 51 Because of this continuing court supervision under the Plan over state and tribal regulation of fishing matters around the Columbia River, the government contends that it no longer has to bear the burden of proving the validity of each individual state regulation. The government seems to be claiming that all state regulations enacted pursuant to the Plan are implicitly validated by the Oregon court if the court is silent and the tribes fail to object. The government even suggests that the defendants are collaterally estopped from challenging the regulations. 52 The government's argument is flawed, however, because the Plan adopted by the Oregon court did not specifically approve or adopt any particular state regulations, let alone those regulations involved in this case, but rather merely laid out a very general framework governing state and tribal rights and regulations regarding fishing matters. Indeed, the Plan states that [r]egulations affecting treaty users which are enacted in conformity with this comprehensive plan shall be considered as complying with the court's decrees enunciated in U.S. v. Oregon. (emphasis added). Naturally, the Plan did not deem all state regulations valid but only those enacted in conformity with the Plan. The government even admits that the tribes have successfully challenged various state regulations that did not conform. 53 Therefore, we cannot accept the government's contention that the District Court of Oregon's adoption and supervision of the Plan validates the particular state regulations the defendants seek to challenge. Consequently, the government must still bear the burden of establishing the validity of the state regulations involved in this case. 8 54 The state regulations encompassed in the government's Lacey Act prosecution, in general, prohibit fishing for commercial purposes outside of certain seasons set aside for commercial fishing, and prohibit the commercial sale of fish taken for subsistence or ceremonial purposes. The states set the 1982 commercial fishing season via the Columbia River Compact, an interstate agency controlling commercial fishing on the Columbia River. The Compact received recommendations from the Washington and Oregon fisheries departments that explained that the seriously depressed upriver spring chinook run required that there be no spring 1982 commercial fishing season. 55 It is especially significant that the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, representing the treaty tribes, agreed with that recommendation stating that it recognizes that the 1982 upriver spring chinook run will be a record or near-record low. [Thus,] no commercial harvest of these fish can be justified. The Yakima and Warm Springs tribes concurred. The Columbia River Compact accepted the recommendations and closed the fishery for the spring of 1982 saying that the closure was reasonable and necessary for conservation and that there was no less restrictive alternative. We conclude that the government has adequately established the validity of the 1982 spring season ban adopted by the Compact. 56 Although the government presented no specific evidence to demonstrate the necessity of the state bans on the commercial sale of ceremonial or subsistence fish, comparable Indian tribal laws prohibit the same activity. The forbidden sales would thus be prosecutable under the Lacey Act regardless of the validity of the state regulations. 57 Both pre-trial and at trial, the defendants attempted to subpoena witnesses who they claimed would testify in support of their contention that the state regulations were not valid because they were not reasonable or necessary to conservation and were not validly promulgated. The trial judge summarily denied the motions for the issuance of the subpoenas simply citing United States v. Sims, 637 F.2d 625 (9th Cir.1980). The only plausible basis for the denial is that the defendants may have failed to make a satisfactory showing, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(b), that the witnesses were necessary to an adequate defense. 58 The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this requirement to mean that: 59 '[i]f the accused avers facts which, if true, would be relevant to any issue in the case, the requests for subpoenas must be granted, unless the averments are inherently incredible on their face, or unless the Government shows, either by introducing evidence or from matters already of record, that the averments are untrue or that the request is otherwise frivolous.' 60 Sims, 637 F.2d at 627 (quoting Greenwell v. United States, 317 F.2d 108, 110 (D.C.Cir.1963) ). The defendants failed to meet this standard. 61 In their affidavits supporting their motions, the defendants made only very general statements to the effect that the witnesses had information relevant to the issue of the validity of the state regulations. The affidavits did not allege any specific facts regarding fishing matters that would buttress the defendants' claim that the regulations were unnecessary for conservation. There were no statements regarding the specific content of the expected testimony of the witnesses. While the defendants did make clear that they expected the witnesses to buttress their claim, the lack of any specificity in their allegations suggests that they may merely have been fishing for unknown evidence. The trial judge acted within his discretion in denying the motions. 62 In sum, the government adequately established the validity of the 1982 spring season ban on commercial fishing. Although given a fair opportunity, the defendants were unable to generate evidence to refute the view of the Inter-Tribal Fish Commission and the states' fisheries departments that the ban was reasonable and necessary to conservation. 63 The defendants' convictions are AFFIRMED.