Opinion ID: 1673698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Continuances Requested by Appellant

Text: As discussed in the previous section, Appellant requested and was granted two continuances, the first from March 19, 1998, to August 3, 1998, 137 days, and the second from September 24, 1998, to February 1, 1999, 130 days. [1] It is undisputed that these periods should not be charged against the State. Delays resulting from continuances given at the request of the defendant are excluded in calculating the time for a speedy trial. Eubanks, 334 Ark. 21, 972 S.W.2d 234; Rhodes, 313 Ark. 16, 852 S.W.2d 118. In sum, Appellant was arrested for the murder of his wife and initially placed in jail on May 7, 1996. He was tried on February 3, 1999, after the passage of 1,002 days. The excludable periods outlined above are as follows: (1) 251 days from April 24, 1997, to December 31, 1997, resulting from the grant of a nolle prosequi; (2) 141 days from July 15, 1996, to December 3, 1996, resulting from the hearing on the motion to suppress; (3) 61 days from December 4, 1996, to February 3, 1997, for the hearing on the motion for bond; (4) 45 days from February 2, 1998, to March 19, 1998, resulting from the delay caused by counsel's announced intention to seek a writ of prohibition; (5) 137 days from March 19, 1998, to August 3, 1998, resulting from Appellant's requested continuance; and (6) 130 days from September 24, 1998, to February 1, 1999, resulting from Appellant's requested continuance. These six periods total 765 days. Subtracting those periods from the total time of 1,002 days, it is clear that Appellant was tried within the 365 day period for speedy trial. We thus affirm the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to dismiss.