Opinion ID: 768370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Definition of Reasonable Doubt

Text: 133 The trial judge read Ohio's statutory definition of reasonable doubt to the jury, which included the phrase firmlyconvinced, and added some concluding remarks that essentially repeated the same language: 134 Now, the Legislature of Ohio has specifically established the legal meaning of the term reasonable doubt, and I will read that definition to you: Reasonable doubt is present when, the jurors, after they have carefully considered and compared all evidence, cannot say they are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge. It is a doubt based upon reason and common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or dependent upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. 135 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of his affairs. 136 All of the evidence should be examined carefully and conscientiously by you, and, if after a full and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you are firmly convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the charge or charges, then the State has proved its case and you must find the defendant guilty. 137 If you are not firmly convinced of the truth of the charge, then the State has not proved its case and you must find the defendant not guilty. 138 Scott claims that this definition unconstitutionally conflates the reasonable doubt standard with the less demanding clear and convincing standard. 139 The district court correctly relied on Thomas v. Arn, 704 F.2d 865, 867-69 (6th Cir. 1983), which held this precise definition to not violate due process. We recently did the same in Byrd, 209 F.3d at 527-28. Scott provides no reason to ignore this precedent. 140 E. Alleged Unconstitutionality of Ohio's Death-Penalty Scheme Facially and As Applied 141 Scott raised before the district court a number of reasons why the death penalty in general and in Ohio is unconstitutional. He focuses his argument on appeal only on two: that the fact that felony murder is used both as an element of the offense and a ground for capital sentencing fails to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, and that electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment. The rest are incorporated by reference in a footnote. The great majority of these incorporated issues, and the electrocution issue, were mentioned and rejected summarily in Byrd. See 209 F.3d at 527-28. We will do the same, for substantially the same reasons expressed in the district court's Order. Although Byrd also rejected the claim that Ohio fails to narrow the class of death-eligible convicts, it did not explicitly address Scott's ground for this argument. Hence, it merits brief discussion here. 142 The Warden has not argued that Scott's argument on the overlap of felony murder between the underlying crime and aggravating circumstance is procedurally defaulted, and the district court dismissed it on the merits. Even if Scott were right that the same act was the basis of his conviction and aggravating circumstance, this alone would not justify habeas relief. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46 (1988). There, the Supreme Court instructed that aggravating circumstances are not ends unto themselves, but simply one means by which a state may perform the narrowing function. See id. at 244. Lowenfield upheld the Texas death-penalty scheme, in which the narrowing function was performed by the legislature when it circumscribed the range of offenses eligible for the death penalty. See id. at 245-46. The fact that the sentencing jury is also required to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of theconstitutionally required narrowing process, and so the fact that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime does not make this sentence constitutionally infirm. Id. at 246. Similarly, the Ohio Legislature narrow[ed] the class of felony murders subject to the death penalty by excluding those who commit [murder in the course of an] arson, robbery, burglary or escape, unless they are charged with a different aggravating circumstance. State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 807 (Ohio 1986); see also Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(A) (1996) (Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment . . . and proved beyond a reasonable doubt:). Scott fell within the narrowed category of death-eligible felony murderers because he committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(A)(7) (1996). 143 Moreover, even if an overlap were problematic, there is none here. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(A)(7), Scott's indictment for aggravated murder added that either [he] was the principal offender in the commission of the Aggravated Murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the Aggravated Murder with prior calculation or design. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that this language is distinct from the definition of felony murder, because in addition to causing a death during a felony, the defendant must also be proved to have caused the death personally and directly 10 or in a premeditated manner. See State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, 280 n.17 (Ohio 1984); State v. Barnes, 495 N.E.2d 922, 925 (Ohio 1986) (per curiam). 144 F. Sufficiency of the Evidence Used to Convict Scott 145 An habeas court reviews claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient for a conviction by asking whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard [views evidence] in the light most favorable to the prosecution[, and] thus impinges upon jury discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (internal quotations, citations and footnotes omitted). This claim is not procedurally defaulted. 146 Scott argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove that he committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery. If true, this would invalidate his death sentence, as the only specification that made him death-eligible was caus[ing] the death of another . . . while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit Aggravated Robbery. To support his argument, Scott notes that nothing was taken from the V&E Delicatessen, that he entered the store with money, and that O'Neal testified that there had been no discussion of robbery before arriving at the store. 147 We agree with the district court and Ohio Supreme Court that ample evidence was presented to allow a rational jury to find Scott guilty of the specification: 148 [U]nder R.C. § 2911.01, [...] an attempt to commit armed theft constitutes aggravated robbery. [...] This felonious objective is evidenced by the secretive manner in which Jones parked his car around the corner after dropping off [Scott] and O'Neal. Of further relevance is the fact that [Scott] was aware of a pending robbery charge against him upon his apprehension. 149 State v. Scott, 497 N.E.2d at 64. There is no ground here for habeas relief.