Opinion ID: 4519361
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second, the petitioner must show diligence in

Text: pursuing the claims to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance. Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Equitable tolling for a mental impairment does not “require a literal impossibility,” but instead only “a showing that the mental impairment was ‘a but-for cause of any delay.’” Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100). The “availability of assistance is an important element to a court’s diligence analysis,” but we have stressed that it is only “part of the overall assessment of the totality of circumstances that goes into the equitable determination.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1101. Even when legal assistance is available, “a petitioner’s mental impairment might justify equitable tolling if it interferes with the ability . . . to cooperate with or monitor assistance the petitioner does secure.” Id. at 1100. The district court erred by categorically concluding that Milam’s retention of counsel meant that his “mental illness could not have been an extraordinary circumstance that MILAM V. HARRINGTON 9 prevented him from complying with AEDPA’s time limits.” As Bills expressly notes, equitable tolling for mental impairment is available in “myriad circumstances,” including cases with petitioners “employing counsel.” Id. at 1099. “The relevant question is: Did the mental impairment cause an untimely filing?” Id. at 1100 n.3. The fact that a petitioner was represented by counsel, while relevant to the analysis, does not categorically resolve the ultimate question. If Milam’s impairment prevented the monitoring of his state habeas lawyer, and if monitoring would have prevented state habeas counsel from waiting so long between filings, Milam’s impairment could have been a but-for cause of the untimely federal filing. See Forbess, 749 F.3d at 841. In refusing to treat the retention of counsel during the relevant period as automatically foreclosing an impaired petitioner’s claim to equitable tolling, Bills is consistent with the approach taken by our sister Circuits. In Riva v. Ficco, for example, the First Circuit faulted a district court’s “failure to consider whether the counseled filings enjoyed the petitioner’s effective participation” and remanded “for further development of the record with a view toward determining whether the petitioner’s mental illness so severely impaired his ability effectively to pursue legal relief, either on his own behalf or through counsel.” 615 F.3d 35, 43–44 (1st Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit has taken a similar approach. See Stiltner v. Hart, 657 F. App’x 513, 523–26 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Bills and awarding equitable tolling to a petitioner unable “to monitor the legal assistance provided for him by a fellow prisoner or an attorney to make sure that they met the relevant deadline”). Moreover, Bills is consistent with our treatment of equitable tolling in other contexts. See Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (awarding equitable tolling to Title VII 10 MILAM V. HARRINGTON plaintiff whose “mental illness . . . precluded her from exercising an agency relationship with the attorney who handled her EEOC case”). In holding that the district court erred when it refused to consider evidence of Milam’s mental impairment simply because he had counsel during the periods at issue, we do not suggest that Milam is entitled to equitable tolling without a further showing. Even if Milam suffered from a mental impairment while represented by state habeas counsel, equitable tolling requires that the impairment be a “but-for” cause of his untimely federal filing. See Forbess, 749 F.3d at 841. Milam claims that but for that impairment, he would have monitored state habeas counsel’s filings to be sure that his federal habeas rights were preserved. The district court never addressed either whether Milam was actually impaired or, if so, whether that impairment caused the untimely federal filing. “Mindful of the Supreme Court’s observation that ‘often the exercise of a court’s equity powers must be made on a case-by-case basis,’ we find it appropriate for the district court in the first instance to apply the facts of the case to the legal standards we set forth today.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1101 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 649–50).