Opinion ID: 2631199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deprivation of the Right to Counsel at the In Camera Hearing

Text: On July 13, 1994, the court considered Stenson's motion to substitute counsel or proceed pro se at an in camera hearing in which he was represented by the very attorneys he was trying to replace. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 731, 940 P.2d 1239. [8] The majority rejects Stenson's claim concerning the lack of representation at the July 13, 1994 in camera hearing because Wadsworth [ [9] ] may be distinguished from this case. Majority at 17. The majority is disingenuous in its portrayal of Wadsworth, selectively choosing a passage that suits its purpose and saying it represents what happened in Stenson's case. Majority at 17. Wadsworth does include a second alternative indicating substitution of counsel on the day of trial would not be allowed because of a disagreement on the theory of defense. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d at 1510. However, the majority does not mention the first scenario discussed, in which the court says: [I]f the court determined that the disagreement had escalated to total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, the court would have been required to dismiss counsel and appoint another attorney, after admonishing the defendant that the law did not permit an accused to control the theory of defense. Id. at 1510. Contrary to the assertion of the Majority at 17, Wadsworth does not support its position in this case. In fact, Wadsworth requires the appointment of new counsel where a total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship has occurred. Id. [10]