Opinion ID: 2975306
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Negligent Hiring, Training, and Retention

Text: With respect to the claim of municipal liability under § 1983, plaintiff argued that the Airport Authority failed to exercise ordinary care in the hiring, training and/or retention of DeSoto. As the district court observed, the applicable standard for municipal liability is deliberate indifference. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997). As a result, the district court found that the failure of “ordinary care” asserted by plaintiff was insufficient to establish municipal liability under § 1983. Even before reaching the issue of whether the municipality was deliberately indifferent, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate a constitutional violation at the hands of an agent or employee of the municipality. Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006); Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001). This is, of course, because municipal defendants may only be sued under § 1983 for their own unconstitutional or illegal policies and may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of their employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Having concluded that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation, whether for unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force, or malicious prosecution, we find plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim for municipal liability under § 1983. Moreover, while it appears that plaintiff did not marshal his evidence regarding an alleged municipal custom or policy in response to the defendants’ dispositive motions, we cannot help but note that the evidence recounted on appeal simply falls short of what is needed to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Plaintiff specifically asserts that the Airport Authority’s failure to adequately scrutinize DeSoto’s background constituted deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom he would come in contact. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. The Supreme Court has explained, as the district court noted, that: “Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right can the official’s failure to scrutinize the applicant’s background constitute ‘deliberate indifference.’” Brown, 520 U.S. at 411. Nothing in the litany of DeSoto’s shortcomings suggests that the “plainly obvious consequence” of a decision to hire him would be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected rights. The judgment entered in favor of defendants DeSoto and the Airport Authority is AFFIRMED.