Opinion ID: 852709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Solar's Motion to Strike Expert's Affidavit

Text: At the outset we deal with Solar and Daniel's motions to strike portions of the affidavit of David MacCollum which the Vaughns designated in response to the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The trial court admitted all of the designated evidence except paragraph 17 of MacCollum's affidavit. Daniels and Solar assert that MacCollum's affidavit relied on two documents that constitute hearsay and are not self-authenticating. MacCollum states that he reviewed the documents entitled Design, Procurement, and Construction of the Cannelburg Preparation Plant for Solar Sources, Inc. [2] and Defendant Daniels Health and Safety Policy and that these documents are the type of information normally relied upon by me in the field of my experience in providing opinions. Indiana Trial Rule 56(E) provides: Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies not previously self-authenticated of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. Indiana Evidence Rule 703 provides that: Experts may testify to opinions based on inadmissible evidence, provided that it is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. The defendants do not challenge MacCollum's professional credentials and do not claim that these documents are not of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Accordingly, under Rule 703, the contested documents may be used by MacCollum in forming his opinions whether or not the documents are themselves admissible evidence. Solar and Daniels also challenge MacCollum's affidavit on the ground that it contains inadmissible legal conclusions. Indiana Evidence Rule 704 permits opinions to embrace ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, but prohibits opinions as to legal conclusions. MacCollum's opinions concerning engineering standards, procedures, and the design of the coal sump and facility are based on his expertise and are permitted by Evidence Rule 704. His opinions concerning reasonable care or proximate cause in paragraph 17 embrace ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact and therefore are admissible. [3] See Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 388 (Ind.2004) (the issue of proximate cause is one usually left to the jury); Stephenson v. Ledbetter, 596 N.E.2d 1369, 1372 (Ind.1992) (Whether a particular act or omission is a breach of a duty is generally a question of fact.). Solar and Daniels also contend that the opinions expressed by MacCollum lack foundation because he did not view the plant and reviewed only the documents setting forth Daniels's proposal. Hands-on experience, formal education, specialized training, study of textbooks, performing experiments and observation can provide the foundation for an expert's opinion. See Summit Bank v. Panos, 570 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied (citing 13 W. Miller, Indiana Practice § 702.103, at 35-37 (1984)). Moreover, although Trial Rule 56(E) mandates that affidavits be made on personal knowledge, this does not mean that an expert must obtain his knowledge based solely on first-hand experience. See Bunch v. Tiwari, 711 N.E.2d 844, 849 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). MacCollum stated that his opinions were based on his engineering and construction management expertise and review of the documents setting forth Daniels's proposal. We conclude that MacCollum's prior experience and review of these documents provided a sufficient foundation and that it was not necessary for MacCollum to have seen the sump in person for him to render an expert opinion. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in striking paragraph 17 of MacCollum's affidavit but correctly admitted the remaining portions of it.