Opinion ID: 1189835
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Racial Classification/Discriminatory Intent

Text: Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim, however, lacks merit, with respect to both the racial classification and disparate treatment arguments. As the Second Circuit held in Hayden when rejecting plaintiffs' classification argument, if an exam is administered and scored in an identical fashion for all applicants, there is no racial classification. Hayden, 180 F.3d at 48. Further, a desire to design an entrance exam which would diminish the adverse impact on black applicants ... does not constitute a `racial classification.' Id. Here, all applicants took the same test, and the result was the same for all because the test results were discarded and nobody was promoted. This does not amount to a facial classification based on race. [13] Likewise, where a test is administered and scored in the same manner for all applicants, plaintiffs cannot make out a claim that the exam was a facially neutral test used in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 50. Plaintiffs argue that their equal protection rights were violated because they passed the tests and therefore were not similarly-situated to minority applicants who failed. Plaintiffs argue that if a black employee shows up for work and works a full day and a white employee does not, and the black employee complains that he was due his wages, the employer cannot be heard to defend the complaint on the ground that the employees were treated the same because neither was paid. PI. Mem. in Opp. at 64. Plaintiffs' analogy is faulty because performing well on the exam does not create an entitlement to promotion, whereas working entitles an employee to be paid. Second, a presumptively flawed test result may not be a proper measure for determining whether anyone should be promoted. Finally, plaintiffs cannot show that defendants acted out of an intentionally discriminatory purpose. Discriminatory purpose `implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.' Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)). Nothing in the record in this case suggests that the City defendants or CSB acted because of discriminatory animus toward plaintiffs or other non-minority applicants for promotion. Rather, they acted based on the following concerns: that the test had a statistically adverse impact on African-American and Hispanic examinees; that promoting off of this list would undermine their goal of diversity in the Fire Department and would fail to develop managerial role models for aspiring firefighters; that it would subject the City to public criticism; and that it would likely subject the City to Title VII lawsuits from minority applicants that, for political reasons, the City did not want to defend. [T]he intent to remedy the disparate impact of [the tests] is not equivalent to an intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants. Hayden, 180 F.3d at 51. None of the defendants' expressed motives could suggest to a reasonable juror that defendants acted because of animus against non-minority firefighters who took the Lieutenant and Captain exams. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim will be granted and plaintiffs' motion will be denied. [14]