Opinion ID: 1673907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to submit spoliation instruction

Text: Appellants claim that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury an instruction on the spoliation of evidence. Spoliation is defined as the intentional destruction of evidence and when it is established, [the] fact finder may draw [an] inference that [the] evidence destroyed was unfavorable to [the] party responsible for its spoliation. Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc., 342 Ark. 143, 146, 27 S.W.3d 387, 388 (2000) (citing 3 Black's Law Dictionary 1401 (6th ed.1990)). Appellants insist that the record clearly reveals that the appellee was in physical possession and control of the pipe, clamp, and bolt involved in the accident and of certain pre-demolition safety reports. Unquestionably, the clamp, bolt, and safety report were important pieces of evidence. Because the evidence was subsequently lost or not received, appellants asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: Where some instrument, which is a part of the material evidence of the case, has been destroyed or lost, the presumption arises that if it had been produced, it would have been against the interest of the party destroying or losing it. or: If a party fails to produce evidence which is under his control and reasonably available to him and not reasonably available to the adverse party, then you may infer the evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced it and did not. Appellee argued that the instructions had no foundation in Arkansas authority and no evidence indicated that appellee acted intentionally. As a result, appellee suggested that appellants' reliance on cited authority was misplaced. See, e.g., Middleton v. Middleton, 188 Ark. 1022, 68 S.W.2d 1003 (1934). We agree, and we affirm the trial court's decision rejecting appellants' spoliation instructions. First, the trial court specifically found that the evidence was not intentionally lost or destroyed. Second, the trial court permitted counsel to argue the same points to the jury event though it elected not to submit the instructions. Third, and most importantly, the evidence was available in appellee's office shortly after the accident, but no meaningful discovery commenced until five years following the accident. In the absence of any intentional misconduct, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give the jury an instruction on spoliation of evidence.