Opinion ID: 1058123
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crawford v. Washington Analysis

Text: Maclin’s case involves a common scenario—charges arising from a domestic violence incident, and the victim does not appear to testify. It has been estimated that between eighty and ninety percent of domestic violence complainants recant their accusations or refuse to cooperate with prosecutors. See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecution of Violence Against Women, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 687, 709 n.76 (2003).21 Thus, before Crawford, prosecutors tried many domestic violence cases without the complainant’s testimony, relying upon hearsay testimony coming in under an excited utterance or other hearsay exception. See, e.g., Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878. It is conceivable that Crawford will have a great effect upon trials of this kind. In this case, police were summoned to the scene by the victim. When police arrived, in response to the officers’ general question of whether everything was okay, the victim launched into a detailed narrative of the defendant’s assault on her. We cannot characterize the general inquiry as 21 Admittedly, this case is somewhat different from most cases in that the victim is deceased from causes unrelated to the assault in question. In many of these cases, the victim fails to appear because the parties have reconciled or because of fear of retribution from the assailant. -15- “police interrogation” in the sense of formalized, structured questioning. However, considering that the victim initiated the contact with police by her 911 call, that any immediate danger subsided upon police arrival, and the extraordinary detail recited in the victim’s statements to police—evidencing a comprehension of the significance of her words—these statements are such that the “declarant[] would reasonably [have] expect[ed] [them] to be used prosecutorially.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Further, under these circumstances “an objective witness reasonably [would have] believe[d] that the statement[s] would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 52. We conclude that, by making these statements to police, the victim was acting as a “witness” giving “testimony” and, thus, that the statements were testimonial. Cf. United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (reasoning that once the immediate danger has subsided, a person who speaks, even if still under the stress of a startling event, is more likely able to comprehend the larger significance of her words; “[i]f the record fairly supports a finding of comprehension, the fact that the statement also qualifies as an excited utterance will not alter its testimonial nature.”). Although the deceased victim is unavailable, there is no evidence and no claim by the State that the defendant previously had an opportunity to cross-examine the victim about these statements. Accordingly, the admission of these statements violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford. While both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless error review,22 since the only evidence linking the defendant to the victim’s assault was the victim’s statements, the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault is reversed and dismissed. In light of this disposition, it is unnecessary to reach the lesser-included-offense issue.
1. Crawford v. Washington Analysis The issue is much easier to resolve in Anderson’s case. A police officer tracking down the source of an audible burglar alarm was flagged down by teenagers who, in response to the question, “What’s going on?,” pointed to the building from which the alarm was sounding and told the officer that a “large black man with a bald head” had kicked in the door and was still inside. Clearly the officer was on the scene as a result of the burglar alarm and acting in a preliminary investigational mode, trying to ascertain the source of the alarm and what had caused it. Considering the informal nature of the “flag-down” by bystander witnesses and the general nature of the question, “What’s going on?,” this can hardly be characterized as an interrogation. Furthermore, the nature of the statement was not accusatory or even directed specifically at the defendant; it was merely intended to direct police intervention to a crime in progress. It is unlikely that the declarants anticipated that their statements would be used prosecutorially or that an objective witness reasonably would have believed that the statements would be available for use at a later trial. Likewise, the officers’ purpose in speaking with the witnesses was not to develop evidence for prosecution or trial, but 22 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988); State v. Gomez, 163 S.W .3d 632, 647 (Tenn. 2005). -16- merely to determine what was happening and what type of police intervention was needed. The totality of these circumstances leads us to the conclusion that the declarants were not acting as “witnesses” giving “testimony” and, thus, that their statements were nontestimonial. Cf. United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 180 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (teen witness who saw a man pointing a gun at a woman flagged down a passing police cruiser and reported what he had seen; the court held that the statement was an excited utterance made for the sole purpose of securing assistance for the woman in danger and, thus, was not testimonial). Accordingly, the admissibility of the statements at issue is governed by Ohio v. Roberts.