Opinion ID: 2805850
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Penney

Text: Dr. Penney’s report expresses the following opinions: (1) Regarding general causation, low-level exposure to carbon monoxide can cause serious neurological damages of the type that Ms. Macy and Mr. Santos complain; and 8 FED. R. EVID. 702. 9 See Brown, 705 F.3d at 535 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). 10 Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). When assessing reliability, courts consider the following non-exclusive list of factors: (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the method used and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether the theory or method has been generally accepted by the scientific community. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Id. (citation omitted). 4 Case: 14-20603 Document: 00513067518 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 No. 14-20603 (2) Regarding specific causation, Ms. Macy’s and Mr. Santos’s injuries were caused by the gas range. We first consider whether the district court erred in striking Dr. Penney’s general causation conclusion. If we conclude that the district court correctly excluded the general causation opinion, we need not proceed to specific causation. 12 The district court stated that it struck Dr. Penney’s general causation opinion because “[h]is only evidence for this conclusion is that he says that the World Health Organization has adopted his [6.5 ppm] standard.” This observation by the court is inaccurate. Our review of Dr. Penney’s expert report reflects that he relied on scientific literature, some of which he authored, to support his general causation opinion: (1) An article he prepared for the World Health Organization (“WHO”) indicating that the upper limit for carbon monoxide over a 24 hour period should be set at 6.5 ppm; (2) two studies, one of which he authored, demonstrating that relatively low-level carbon monoxide exposure over an extended period of time can lead to serious health effects; and, (3) three studies prepared by other individuals indicating that COHb measurements are not an accurate metric for carbon monoxide poisoning. Although Dr. Penney did rely on more than just his one article published in the WHO compilation, as indicated by the district court, our review of the cited studies compels the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Dr. Penney’s opinion on general causation. 13 As an initial matter, the three studies that address the viability of relying on COHb measurements to determine carbon monoxide poisoning do 12 See Knight, 482 F.3d at 352 (citing Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 356 F.3d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 2004)). 13 Dr. Penney did not attach any of the studies to his expert report. Neither are they contained elsewhere in the record. We rely on Dr. Penney’s summations of the studies in his expert report. 5 Case: 14-20603 Document: 00513067518 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 No. 14-20603 not appear to assess the relationship between low-level carbon monoxide exposure and the symptoms reported by Ms. Macy and Mr. Santos. Rather, they provide only an “inferential starting point for doing so,” and a district court may permissibly conclude that such studies do not support an expert’s conclusion. 14 The two case series studies that Dr. Penney claimed address the relationship between low levels of carbon monoxide exposure and serious health effects do not present facts analogous to those presented by this case because the majority of the studies’ subjects were exposed to much higher levels of carbon monoxide and for longer periods of time than those at issue here. In Dr. Penney’s study, which appeared in a book that he edited, 43 nonsmokers were exposed to carbon monoxide for a mean average of 27.5 months in amounts between 24.2 and 150.5 ppm. 15 The second study, which appeared in that same book, addressed 21 individuals who were chronically exposed to carbon monoxide in amounts between 123.0 and 123.6 ppm. Because the highest reading recorded during Mr. Carper’s testing conducted at Ms. Macy’s residence was 42.6 ppm, 16 which occurred at the conclusion of a six-hour period in which the gas range was running continuously with the residence’s airconditioning turned off, both studies lack relevance to this case—or, at least, Dr. Penney’s expert report does not adequately explain their relevance to his conclusion. 14 See LeBlanc ex rel. Estate of LeBlanc v. Chevron USA, Inc., 396 F. App’x 94, 99 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Knight, 482 F.3d at 353). 15 See David G. Penney, Chronic Carbon Monoxide Poisoning: A Case Series, in CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING 551, 552-53 (David G. Penney ed. 2008). 16 As later discussed, we hold that the district court properly excluded Mr. Carper’s opinion because he is not qualified to render an opinion as to whether the gas range complied with the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) Z21.1 standard. Assuming that the results of Mr. Carper’s field test of the gas range were admissible, the studies cited by Dr. Penney do not present analogous facts because they involve much higher concentrations of carbon monoxide and for significantly longer periods. 6 Case: 14-20603 Document: 00513067518 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 No. 14-20603 Finally, there is the article that was published by the European Office for the WHO, in which Dr. Penney proposes a 6.5 ppm guideline. As the district court observed, this is a recommended standard that has not been adopted by any domestic agency and that the WHO did not endorse. 17 Moreover, that standard is irrelevant to the question whether low-level carbon monoxide exposure causes the type of alleged injuries at issue in this case. Mindful that under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a district court has broad discretion to determine whether a body of evidence relied on by an expert is sufficient to support that expert’s opinion, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Dr. Penney’s general causation opinion. 18 We do not suggest that an expert must support his opinion with published studies that “unequivocally support” his conclusions. 19 Nevertheless, an expert’s testimony must be reliable at every step, including the methodology employed, the facts underlying the expert’s opinion, and the link between the facts and the conclusion. 20 The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Dr. Penney’s proffered expert opinion on general causation failed this test. 21