Opinion ID: 1888691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Strom's Claim Against LENRD

Text: In regard to Strom's takings claim against the LENRD, the LENRD required Strom to install erosion and sediment control measures pursuant to its land-use regulatory authority provided for in the Erosion and Sediment Control Act. The act's statement of legislative findings, § 2-4602, recognizes that erosion and sedimentation are serious problems throughout the state. The statement further provides: It is declared to be the policy of the state to strengthen and extend the present erosion and sediment control activities and programs of the state for both rural and urban lands ... and to establish and implement, through the Director of Natural Resources and the Nebraska Natural Resources Commission, a statewide, comprehensive, and coordinated erosion and sediment control program to reduce damage from wind erosion and storm water runoff, to retard nonpoint pollution from sediment and related pollutants, and to conserve and protect land, air, and other resources of the state. This program shall be carried out by the natural resources districts in cooperation with the counties, municipalities, and other local governments and political subdivisions of the state and other public and private entities. § 2-4602. Section 2-4610 of the act provides that the owner of the property is not required to install any ordered permanent soil and water conservation practices pursuant to the act unless he or she is afforded at least 90 percent cost-sharing assistance. Recalling, land-use regulations are not, in effect, an exercise of the power of eminent domain if (1) the regulations substantially advance legitimate state interests and (2) do not deny an owner economically viable use of his land. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987). Clearly, the protection of our soil resources is a legitimate state interest with which the LENRD is charged. The City filed a complaint with the LENRD, contending that sediment runoff in excess of that allowed by the LENRD was occurring onto its property from Strom's farmland. The LENRD investigated the complaint and determined that the sediment runoff from Strom's land was nearly six times the LENRD's limit. The LENRD then ordered Strom to comply with conservation measures directed solely at ameliorating this sediment runoff condition. No doubt an essential nexus, or rough proportionality, exists between the legitimate state interest of erosion and sediment control and the land-use requirements imposed on Strom by the LENRD. The remaining question is whether Strom has been denied economically viable use of his land. Strom does not claim that all economically beneficial or productive use of the land has been taken by the LENRD's actions. Thus, in this regard, this matter is not within one of the two narrow categories of regulatory takings cases in which it is unnecessary to engage in a case-specific inquiry into the public interest and concomitant regulatory requirement nexus. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, supra . In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), rehearing denied 439 U.S. 883, 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed.2d 198, the U.S. Supreme Court, in engaging in what it termed as essentially an ad hoc factual inquiry in this regard, examined three criteria: (1) the reasonable rate of return on an investment, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations, and (3) whether the owner is able to continue to use the property affected in the same manner as before the imposition of the regulatory requirement. The Court concluded that the New York Landmarks Preservation Law did not effect a taking because it did not interfere with the present use of Grand Central Terminal and allowed Penn Central to obtain a reasonable rate of return on its investment. Importantly, land-use regulations which substantially advance legitimate state interests do not effect a taking merely because the regulation caused a diminution in property value alone. Id. See, also, Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15, 104 S.Ct. 2187, 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (impairment of the market value of real property incident to otherwise legitimate government action ordinarily does not result in a taking). For example, in Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Tp., 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied 482 U.S. 906, 107 S.Ct. 2482, 96 L.Ed.2d 375, the plaintiff alleged that the rezoning of his 37 acres caused the value of his property to drop from $495,600 to $52,000. The court found this diminution in property value did not effect a taking. [A]lthough Pace may have been denied the best use or uses of its 37 acres, it has not been deprived of all economically viable uses of this property. Although there has been a substantial diminution in value, this property retains a substantial value that establishes the existence of residual economically feasible uses. (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1031. In the instant case, Strom received 90 percent cost-sharing assistance from the LENRD for the installation of the ordered conservation measures. However, the record does not reflect the dollar amount of Strom's 10-percent share and the economic impact that this share might have on the economic viability of the continued use of his land. In his deposition, Strom states that only 4 acres of his 103-acre tract at issue have been put into terraces. However, Strom does not state how much of his land was devoted to the sediment or water retention basins. Strom did opine that based on purchase offers made for his land before and after the installation of the conservation measures, his land had suffered a diminution in value of $500 per acre, which represents approximately a one-third reduction in the value of his land. Giving all reasonable inferences to Strom, as we are required to do on a motion for summary judgment, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact, or the ultimate inferences to be drawn, are yet to be resolved regarding whether Strom has been denied economically viable use of his land, due to the LENRD's imposition of conservation measures. Although the one-third diminution in fair market value alone, if true, would be insufficient to establish a regulatory taking or damages, we are unable to determine on the record before us, as a matter of law, whether the costs imposed on Strom by the LENRD's action have precluded a reasonable rate of return on his land or have destroyed any distinct investment-backed expectations. Accordingly, the district court erred when it sustained the LENRD's motion for summary judgment.