Opinion ID: 2626256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecution's Question Constituted Prosecutorial Misconduct.

Text: We hold that the prosecution may not ask a defendant to comment on another witness's veracity. Such questions, referred to as were-they-lying questions, are improper for the following reasons: (1) they invade the province of the jury, as determinations of credibility are for the jury; (2) they are argumentative and have no probative value; (3) they create a risk that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that a contradictory witness has lied; (4) they are inherently unfair, as it is possible that neither the defendant nor the contradictory witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth; and (5) they create a no-win situation for the defendant: if the defendant states that a contradictory witness is not lying, the inference is that the defendant is lying, whereas if the defendant states that the witness is lying, the defendant risks alienating the jury (particularly if the contradictory witness is a law enforcement officer). See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871 (D.C.Cir.1995) (Determinations of credibility are for the jury, not for witnesses. It is therefore error for a prosecutor to induce a witness to testify that another witness, and in particular a government agent, has lied on the stand. (Citations and internal quotation signals omitted.)); State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226, 236-37 (2002) (holding that were-they-lying questions are improper because they invade the province of the jury, have no probative value, are argumentative, and create the risk that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the witness has lied); State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 872-73 (Iowa 2003) (holding that were-they-lying questions are improper because they put the defendant in a no-win situation and because [i]t is unjust to make the defendant give an opinion as to who is lying when, in fact, it is possible that neither witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992) (The question ... is argumentative and seeks information beyond the witness's competence.... [I]t suggests to the jury that a witness is committing perjury even though there are other explanations for the inconsistency. In addition, it puts the defendant in the untenable position of commenting on the character and motivations of another witness who may appear sympathetic to the jury. (Footnote omitted.)). In the instant case, the prosecution did not directly ask Maluia whether Kepa and Ahakuelo were lying; instead, the prosecution asked: Do you know whether [Kepa and Ahakuelo] would have any reason to make up a story against you ... that you can think of? While the question directly asked whether Maluia knew of any motivation for the prosecution's witnesses to lie, the practical effect was that Maluia was asked to comment on the veracity of the prosecution's witnesses. Therefore, the prosecution's question was improper and the circuit court erred in requiring Maluia to answer the question. [5]
The term prosecutorial misconduct is a legal term of art that refers to any improper action committed by a prosecutor, however harmless or unintentional. Therefore, our conclusion that the prosecution's question was improper compels us to apply the label prosecutorial misconduct. Recently, the ICA suggested that we create a separate label for prosecutorial conduct that, while improper, was relatively minor. As the ICA stated, there is a difference between advocacy involving a prosecutorial mistake/error and advocacy involving prosecutorial misconduct. State v. McElroy, 105 Hawai'i 379, 386 n. 7, 98 P.3d 250, 257 n. 7 (App.2004) [hereinafter McElroy (ICA) ], reversed, 105 Hawai'i 352, 97 P.3d 1004 (2004). Judge Nakamura, while dissenting from the majority's opinion, agreed with this point and explained: I agree with the majority's distinction between prosecutorial misconduct and prosecutorial error. Trial lawyers are required to make countless judgment calls under the stress and pressure of trial. A judgment call that we later determine on appeal to have been made in error should not be labeled misconduct simply because it was made by a prosecutor. Instead, as [the majority] properly recognizes, the label of prosecutorial misconduct, with its attendant disciplinary repercussions, should be limited to dishonest and deceitful acts made in bad faith. McElroy (ICA) at 392, 98 P.3d at 263 (Nakamura, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In reviewing the ICA's opinion, we impliedly accepted the ICA's suggestion that there is, in fact, a distinction between prosecutorial error and prosecutorial misconduct when we stated that [a] mistake or error by the prosecution is reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard applied to prosecutorial misconduct. McElroy, 105 Hawai'i at 356, 97 P.3d at 1008. We agree that there are varying degrees of prosecutorial misconduct. We also recognize that most cases presenting allegations of prosecutorial misconduct to this court do not involve prosecutors who intend to eviscerate the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights; instead, they involve situations, like the instant case, in which the law is not entirely clear and where the prosecutor makes a judgment call as to whether a particular question or argument is proper. We share Judge Nakamura's concerns regarding the possibility of disciplinary sanctions for this type of conduct: where the propriety of a prosecutor's argument or question is unclear, such that reasonable appellate judges may reach different conclusions as to whether that conduct is proper, a prosecutor should not face disciplinary action for that conduct. Nevertheless, we decline to create a separate category of prosecutorial mistake or error. There are three reasons why we believe that our current method of analysis  in which all improper conduct is labeled prosecutorial misconduct  is more appropriate. First, there is no need to create separate categories because this court already distinguishes innocuous prosecutorial misconduct from more serious deceitful behavior: where the improper conduct is so egregious that the defendant was denied her or his right to a fair trial, we reverse the defendant's conviction and prohibit reprosecution based on the double jeopardy clause (article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution), see State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 424, 984 P.2d 1231, 1250 (1999) (barring reprosecution where the prosecutor's appeal to racial prejudice was so egregious, from an objective standpoint, that the inference is inescapable that the remark clearly denied [the defendant] his right to a fair trial); where the improper conduct is less serious, we either affirm the conviction (if the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i 465, 483-84, 24 P.3d 661, 679-80 (2001) (holding that the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)) or vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial (if the misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Wakisaka, 102 Hawai'i 504, 516, 78 P.3d 317, 329 (2003) ([W]hile the prosecutorial misconduct reached the level of reversible error, the misconduct was not so egregious that double jeopardy should attach to prevent retrial.)). In sum, whenever a defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct, this court must decide: (1) whether the conduct was improper; (2) if the conduct was improper, whether the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) if the misconduct was not harmless, whether the misconduct was so egregious as to bar reprosecution. In the course of making these three determinations, the seriousness of the misconduct becomes evident, and we need not attach a separate label for our disposition to be clear. Consequently, a separate label for misconduct cases and error cases is unnecessary. Second, a finding of prosecutorial misconduct is not equivalent to a finding of professional misconduct pursuant to the Hawai'i Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC), and a prosecutor need not face disciplinary sanctions merely because we have used the term prosecutorial misconduct. The Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH) do not provide the Disciplinary Board of the Hawai'i Supreme Court (the Disciplinary Board) with authority to investigate a prosecutor merely because this court has applied that label; on the contrary, the Disciplinary Board may only investigate an attorney where the attorney has allegedly violated the HRPC. RSCH 2.2 (2004). Given that the seriousness of the prosecutorial misconduct is evident in our dispositions, we believe that the Disciplinary Board is capable of distinguishing between those cases where the prosecutor should face disciplinary action and those cases where the prosecution has made a good faith mistake (including those cases, like the instant case, where the impropriety of the conduct has not previously been clearly established). Third, we believe that separate nomenclature for different types of prosecutorial misconduct would lead to protracted litigation over semantics; this would place an additional burden on our courts with no corresponding benefit. Our primary goal when analyzing a defendant's appeal is to balance the defendant's right to a fair trial against the public's need for effective enforcement of our criminal laws, see Rogan, 91 Hawai'i at 417, 984 P.2d at 1243, and separate labels will not assist us in making these substantive decisions. We are aware, as the dissent makes clear, that a finding of prosecutorial misconduct may be misunderstood by some to automatically connote a rebuke of [the prosecutor's] professionalism, trustworthiness, or competence. Dissent at 33, 108 P.3d at 987. We again emphasize, however, that prosecutorial misconduct is a legal term of art, and, absent any further action by the Disciplinary Board or this court, should not be reflexively construed as a stain to [the prosecutor's] reputation. Dissent at 33, 108 P.3d at 987. Instead, each case of prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated on its own specific facts. With this in mind, we will continue to apply the term prosecutorial misconduct to all prosecutorial improprieties, regardless of whether the error at issue was a trivial oversight or a flagrant abuse of prosecutorial power.