Opinion ID: 2633019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Almendarez-Torres

Text: In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 227, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), an indictment was returned by the federal grand jury that charged the defendant with having been `found in the United States after being deported' without the `permission and consent of the Attorney General' in `violation of Section 1326.' (Ellipses omitted.) The defendant pled guilty to the charge and admitted, inter alia, that the earlier deportation had taken place pursuant to three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). At the sentencing hearing, the defendant asserted that because the indictment failed to mention his prior convictions, the indictment did not set forth all elements of a crime. Id. Consequently, he alleged that he could not be sentenced to more than two years of imprisonment. Id. The two year imprisonment term was the maximum authorized by federal statute for an offender without a prior conviction. Id. The trial court rejected the defendant's argument and instead imposed a sentence of eighty-five months imprisonment, which was affirmed on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. [1] Id. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court said that [a]n indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges. Id. at 228, 118 S.Ct. 1219. However, the Court pointed out that an indictment need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime. Id. Within limits, the Supreme Court said, the question of which factors are which is normally a matter for Congress. Id. Accordingly, the Court framed the issue as whether Congress intended the factor that the statute mentions, the prior aggravated felony conviction, to help define a separate crime? Or did it intend the presence of an earlier conviction as a sentencing factor, a factor that a sentencing court might use to increase punishment? Id. Emphasizing in that particular case that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism[,] id. at 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219, the Supreme Court observed that the sentencing factor at issue here-recidivism-is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence. Id. at 243, 118 S.Ct. 1219. Consistent with this tradition, the Court said long ago that a State need not allege a defendant's prior conviction in the indictment or information that alleges the elements of an underlying crime, even though the conviction was necessary to bring the case within the statute. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624, 32 S.Ct. 583, 585-86, 56 L.Ed. 917 (1912). That conclusion followed, the Court said, from  the distinct nature of the issue,  and the fact that recidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment only, and therefore may be subsequently decided. Id. at 629, 32 S.Ct. at 588 (emphasis added). Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243-44, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (emphases in original) (ellipsis omitted); see Graham, 224 U.S. at 628, 32 S.Ct. 583 (An indictment is confined to the question whether an offense has been committed. Here the question was simply whether the party had been convicted of an offense.). [T]o hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an `element' of petitioner's offense would mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as `going to the punishment only.' Id. at 244, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (quoting Graham, 224 U.S. at 629, 32 S.Ct. 583). Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judgement when it rejected the defendant's constitutional claim that his recidivism must be treated as an element of his offense. Id. at 247-48, 118 S.Ct. 1219. Almendarez-Torres has not since been overruled by the Supreme Court, but its holding has been clarified.