Opinion ID: 1617337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Insurance Coverage for the Award

Text: In CNA's declaratory action, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of CNA, determining that Cochran and City Realty were not covered under the CNA policy for the $300,000 verdict. On appeal, Cochran and City Realty argue that the trial court misapplied the law to the facts. They say: The issue here, unlike CNA would have this Court believe, is not whether City Realty's conduct was intentional [`expected or intended,' triggering an exclusion in coverage], but rather, whether City Realty intended the injury that their conduct allegedly caused. City Realty and Cochran quote United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Ala.1985), as that case interprets policy language excluding expected or intended injury: The insured must have possessed specific intent to inflict the damage to activate this policy exclusion. City Realty and Cochran say that the trial court misunderstood this standard and, in the absence of any evidence that Cochran acted with specific intent to cause damage or harm to the Forbuses, wrongly entered a judgment for CNA. We are unpersuaded by Cochran and City Realty's arguments in this regard. There is evidence to indicate that Cochran acted with intent to inflict the harm on the Forbuses. However, we agree that the summary judgment was improper. The summary judgment was based on the evidence from the Forbus trial. There were genuine issues of material fact at trial; the culpability of Cochran was an issue of material fact at trial, and it is an issue of considerable dispute here. Furthermore, a determination of Cochran's degree of culpability was not indicated by the jury's verdict. A proper entry of summary judgment presupposes that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Ala.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence before the trial court on the summary judgment motion, that from the Forbus trial, created genuine issues of material fact. The summary judgment was improper, and the parties' arguments with respect to the ore tenus rule, a rule related to the adjudication of disputed facts, has no bearing. Therefore, in case 1911427 we reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1911687 REVERSED. 1911599 AFFIRMED. 1911427 REVERSED AND REMANDED. In case 1911687, SHORES and ADAMS, JJ., concur; MADDOX, HOUSTON and INGRAM, JJ., concur in the result. In case 1911599, MADDOX, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and INGRAM, JJ., concur. In case 1911427, MADDOX, SHORES, ADAMS and HOUSTON, JJ., concur; INGRAM, J., dissents.