Opinion ID: 2638762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Against declarant's penal interest

Text: Morris's postarrest statements to police, as related in Sergeant O'Hanlon's testimony, indisputably contained admissions that appear on their face to be contrary to Morris's interest in avoiding criminal liability or punishment. Among other things, Sergeant O'Hanlon testified that, while sitting in the police car after his arrest for shooting at the Sullivan house a little over a month after the incident occurred, Morris stated he had committed a drive-by shooting in retaliation for an earlier shooting but that the wrong house had been shot. At the police station a short time later, Morris provided details. The sergeant testified that Morris stated he had been at Borchard Park hanging out with friends when, against the urging of one of them, Eran Knox, he decided to do the shooting and armed himself with a Tec-9 semiautomatic machine gun having a long clip. Morris related that he left the park in his own car, went by the house twice and, upon observing a light in the window, fired about 30 shots at the house. These statements tended, generally, to implicate Morris in criminal activity. Nevertheless, the precedents in the hearsay area provide a persuasive reminder that declarations against penal interest may contain self-serving and unreliable information and, consequently, an approach which would find a declarant's statement wholly credible solely because it incorporates an admission of criminal culpability is inadequate. ( People v. Campa (1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 883, 206 Cal.Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634, italics in original.) As scholars have observed, `a self-serving statement lacks trustworthiness whether it accompanies a disserving statement or not.' ( People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 439, fn. 15, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296 ( Leach ), quoting Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule (1944) 58 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 60.) Moreover, that a hearsay statement may be facially inculpatory or neutral cannot always be relied upon to indicate whether it is truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely [an] attempt[ ] to shift blame or curry favor. ( Williamson v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431.) Even a hearsay statement that is facially inculpatory of the declarant may, when considered in context, also be exculpatory or have a net exculpatory effect. (See, e.g., People v. Coble (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 187, 191, 135 Cal. Rptr. 199.) Ultimately, as the high court has noted, whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context. ( Williamson v. United States, supra, at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431.) In view of such concerns, and as the People concede, we long ago determined that the hearsay exception should not apply to collateral assertions within declarations against penal interest. ( People v. Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 882, 206 Cal.Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634.) In order to `protect defendants from statements of unreasonable men if there is to be no opportunity for cross-examination,' we have declared section 1230's exception to the hearsay rule inapplicable to evidence of any statement or portion of a statement not itself specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant. ( Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296, fn. omitted; accord, People v. Shipe (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 343, 354, 122 Cal.Rptr. 701 [a declaration against penal interest must be `distinctly' against the declarant's penal interest].) Under the rule of Leach, a hearsay statement which is in part inculpatory and in part exculpatory (e.g., one which admits some complicity but places the major responsibility on others) does not meet the test of trustworthiness and is thus inadmissible. ( In re Larry C. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 62, 69, 184 Cal.Rptr. 505; see People v. Coble, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at p. 191, 135 Cal.Rptr. 199.) Pursuant to the foregoing principles, only those portions of Morris's statements that were specifically disserving ( Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296) to his penal interests were admissible under section 1230. Therefore, in redacting Morris's statements, the court should have excised any statement or portion of a statement ( Leach, supra, at p. 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296) that was not specifically disserving to Morris. The record reveals that the redacted version of Morris's statements related by Sergeant O'Hanlon, while perhaps less exculpatory of Morris than an unredacted version would have been, nevertheless retained a number of statements that, far from specifically disserving Morris's penal interests, positively served those interests. Sergeant O'Hanlon testified, for example, that Morris, while admitting he had committed a drive-by shooting, stated he shot at the wrong house and that he did the shooting in retaliation for an earlier shooting. Pressed, Morris explained that he saw on TV that a lady had been shot in the leg, and that he realized then it had been the wrong house and that he had intended to shoot the house of a guy who had done a drive-by shooting in the past. Morris also said that he had used a Tec-9 gun, but that a clip police found in his apartment wasn't the one used in the shooting. Most significantly, Sergeant O'Hanlon testified as follows: Q. What, if anything, did Mr. Morris tell you about the shooting? A. He said that he had shot at the wrong house. He actually went by the house twice, but then he shot at the house, because he saw a light on in the front window. He also said he didn't want to kill anybody, or take a chance of hurting anybody, so he shot high, at the roof. Thus, among the hearsay declarations admitted against defendant were statements and portions of statements that suggested Morris only by mistake (repeated reference to the wrong house) participated in the shooting of the Sullivan residence and, hence, contributed to any injuries suffered by its occupants. Admitted also were statements and portions of statements that tended to cast a more sympathetic light on Morris's motives (retaliation for an earlier shooting) and intentions (he didn't want to kill anybody or even take a chance of hurting anybody) than authorities or a jury might otherwise perceive. Most significantly, especially in light of other evidence revealing that Morris was not the only shooter and that Ms. Sullivan was struck by a bullet (which facts Morris, at the time of his statements, knew from having been present and from the news reports he mentioned), the court admitted Morris's statements suggesting that Morrisbecause, assertedly, he shot high, at the roofwas not the shooter responsible for injuring Ms. Sullivan and endangering her children. We conclude that these portions of Morris's statements cannot, considered either on their own or in their net effect with other evidence, properly be characterized as specifically disserving ( Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296) of Morris's penal interests. Rather, they tended sympathetically to describe Morris's participation in the shooting of the Sullivan residence, to minimize his responsibility for the injuries caused thereby and to imply that others who were or might become implicated should bear a greater share of the responsibility. [2] As the statements were not specifically disserving to Morris, the trial court erred in admitting them into evidence against defendant.