Opinion ID: 1237936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Presence During Guilt Phase of Trial

Text: After the court made its ruling that defendant would be chained in the courtroom during further proceedings, defendant said he would rather be absent from the trial than appear before the jury in chains. The trial court allowed defendant to leave the courtroom and return to the jail, after informing defendant that his leaving would be construed as a voluntary waiver of presence. After giving the matter further thought, the court directed jail officers to bring defendant back to the courtroom, but defendant refused to dress in civilian clothing for the court appearance. The court then concluded that defendant had effectively waived his presence. The remainder of the guilt phase proceeded in his absence. (20) We reject defendant's contention that the right of presence during the guilt phase of a capital trial is of such fundamental importance that, as a matter of state or federal constitutional law, it may not be waived. The United States Supreme Court has never held that a defendant cannot waive the constitutional right to be present at critical stages of even a capital trial, and this court has concluded, as a matter of both federal and state constitutional law, that a capital defendant may validly waive presence at critical stages of the trial. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1026 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 59-62 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109]; see also, People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1238-1240 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) We find no constitutional infirmity in the trial court's decisions in this case to accept defendant's actions as a voluntary waiver and to proceed with the guilt phase in defendant's absence. Defendant also argues that the trial court, by holding the trial in defendant's absence, violated section 1043, subdivision (a), which provides that in a felony case the defendant shall be personally present at the trial. Although section 1043 provides for certain exceptions to the presence requirement, defendant maintains that none applies in this case. The provision that a trial may proceed when a defendant is voluntarily absent is inapplicable, he argues, because this exception by its terms applies only in noncapital cases. (§ 1043, subd. (b)(2).) The provision that a defendant may waive his right to be present in accordance with Section 977 (§ 1043, subd. (d)) is inapplicable, defendant argues, because section 977 by its terms does not permit a defendant accused of a felony to waive personal presence at those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact. Finally, defendant recognizes that a trial may proceed in the absence of a defendant who has been removed for disruptive behavior (§ 1043, subd. (b)(1)), but he maintains that this did not occur. The trial court did not violate section 1043. In addition to finding that defendant had voluntarily waived his presence, the trial court found that defendant's conduct has disrupted and continues to disrupt the procedure of this Court. The record amply supports this finding. After announcing that he would not appear before the jury in chains, defendant walked out of the courtroom and declined to dress in civilian clothes to be returned to the courtroom. Because defendant had recently assaulted officers during transportation to the courtroom, the trial court could reasonably anticipate that any effort to bring defendant to the courtroom against his will would endanger the safety of the transporting officers and of persons in the courtroom. A trial court need not wait until actual violence or physical disruption occurs within the four walls of the courtroom in order to find a disruption within the meaning of section 1043.