Opinion ID: 1585751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: can the school system expel a handicapped child who disrupts the educational process of other children?

Text: The EHA limits the school's power to remove handicapped children from school. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1975). The act distinguishes handicapped students from any other disruptive child in that before a disruptive handicapped child can be expelled, it must be determined whether the handicap is the cause of the child's propensity to disrupt. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir.1981). A finding that the child's unacceptable behavior was caused by his handicap would suggest consideration of some change in the child's educational placement or a less harsh form of disciplinary action, rather than the severe sanction of expulsion. School Bd. of Prince William County, Va. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir.1985). As always, schools retain the responsibility to ensure a safe school environment. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348 n. 9. The school may expel a handicapped student based on a reasonable conclusion that the student would disrupt the educational process of other students so long as the school provides the handicapped student with other quality educational services during the expulsion period. Jackson v. Franklin County School Board, 606 F. Supp. 152, 154 (S.D.Miss. 1985), affirmed in 765 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.1985); S-1 v. Turlington, supra . The test developed under case law which should be utilized by school authorities, administrative officers, and the courts when reviewing an expulsion under the EHA is whether the behavior for which the child was expelled was caused in some way by his handicap. School Board of Prince William County, Va. v. Malone, 762 F.2d at 1216-17; S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348. But, a determination that a handicapped student knew the difference between right and wrong is not tantamount to a determination that his misconduct was or was not a manifestation of his handicap. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 346. The district indicated in oral argument that they appealed the chancellor's decision to establish its disciplinary powers under the EHA. Specifically, the district asks us to recognize their need to discipline handicapped students who disrupt a educational process of other students. We acknowledge this need and recognize the school system's restricted power to expel handicapped students. Our decision, however, is more important for its precedential value than how it affects John, who graduated from high school in 1986. He can no longer disrupt the educational pursuits of other students by violating school rules. Denying John credit for the 1983-84 school year and taking away his diploma could not substantially affect the school's need to discipline students. Consequently, we reverse the chancellor's dismissal on the jurisdictional basis only and render so as to inform school authorities, administrative officers, and courts how to proceed under this complicated act.
The Education for the Handicapped Act provides for a unique level of review of administrative hearings. First the trial court must determine whether the administrative hearing officer complied with the procedures of the act as set out in 20 U.S.C. § 1415, and which are reiterated in the State Plan. Next the trial court must address the substantive issues in the case. The act, however, calls for a different review of administrative hearing than the substantive evidence test or the abuse of discretion test typically used in reviewing administrative decisions. Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 736 F.2d 773, 788 (1st Cir.1984); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir.1983). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) of the act provides: In any action brought under this paragraph, the court shall receive the records of administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. [Emphasis added] Courts reviewing administrative proceedings under the act should not substitute their own notion of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities they review. Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 3015. The act, however, allows the trial judge to exercise his discretion to entertain additional evidence in reviewing the hearing officer's decision. This ... does not authorize witnesses at trial to repeat or embellish their prior administrative hearing testimony; this would be entirely inconsistent with the usual meaning of `additional'. We are fortified in this interpretation because it structurally assists giving due weight to the administrative proceedings, as Rowley requires. Rowley, 458 U.S. 206, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education for Massachusetts, 736 F.2d at 790. Id. The trial court must make an independent ruling based upon a preponderance of the evidence, but the act contemplates that the source of evidence generally will be the administrative hearing record, with some supplementation at trial, if requested, and necessary. The reasons for supplementing record will vary; they might include gaps in the administrative transcript, unavailability of a witness, an improper exclusion of evidence by the administrative agency, and evidence concerning relevant events occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing. The starting point for the determination of what additional evidence should be received, however, is the record of the administrative proceeding. Thus, the procedure followed by a trial court falls something short of a trial de novo. Colin K. by John K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1983). After reviewing the administrative hearing record and hearing additional evidence, if required, the trial judge should determine whether the child's behavior is caused by his handicap, and if it was not, whether the school offers other educational services during the expulsion period. The burden of proving that the hearing officer erred is on the appealing party. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. at 3050, 73 L.Ed.2d at 711; School Board of Prince William County, Va. v. Malone, 762 F.2d at 1218; Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 736 F.2d at 794. We, in turn, will not overturn a lower court decision under the act unless it is manifestly wrong. Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155 (Miss. 1985); Gold v. LaBarre, 455 So.2d 739 (Miss. 1984); Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139 (Miss. 1983); see also, Jackson v. Franklin County School Board, 765 F.2d 535, 539 (5th Cir.1985); School Board of Prince William County, Va. v. Malone, 762 F.2d at 1218. REVERSED AND RENDERED. WALKER, C.J., and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.