Opinion ID: 1060747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Our analysis begins with our decision in Kimbrough. There, we noted that the culpable mens rea for attempted crimes and for felony murder were intrinsically different. The statutes governing attempted crimes stated: (a) A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the offense; (1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute an offense if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person believes them to be; -3- (2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the person’s part; or (3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101 (1997) (emphasis added). Under Tennessee law, a person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the person’s “conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(a) (1997). In contrast, the offense of felony murder in effect at the time of Madkins’ crime required “[a] reckless killing of another committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping or aircraft piracy.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1991). 1 Thus, recklessness as a mens rea sufficed to support a felony murder conviction for a death occurring during one of the enumerated felonies. After analyzing and contrasting these elements, we observed that a charge of attempted felony murder is “inherently inconsistent, in that it requires that the actor have intended to commit what is deemed an unintentional act.” Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d at 890. Thus, like nearly every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue, we concluded that the offense of attempted felony murder does not exist: [I]t is illogical that someone could intend to cause someone else’s death through negligence or even recklessness. While one may reasonably conclude that a defendant intentionally behaved in a reckless manner and may have intended to kill the victim, it does not make sense to say that a defendant intended to kill the victim by being reckless. We conclude that one cannot intend to accomplish the unintended. Consequently, the offense of attempted felony-murder does not exist in Tennessee. 1 As we observed in Kimbrough, the legislature amended the statute in 1995 to delete the mens rea of recklessness. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13 -202(a)(2) (Supp. 1996). -4- Id. at 892. Accordingly, as the State concedes, Madkins’ conviction for attempted felony murder is reversed and dismissed. Although not specifically addressed by the parties or the Court of Criminal Appeals, we now turn to the question of whether the prosecution may proceed against the defendant on other charges. The record shows that Madkins was indicted for attempted premeditated murder and attempted felony murder and that both counts were submitted to the jury. The instructions required the jury to begin by considering attempted premeditated murder; if the jury found the defendant not guilty of attempted premeditated murder, it was to acquit him of that offense and next consider attempted felony murder. If the jury found Madkins not guilty of attempted felony murder, it was to acquit him of that charge and consider the lesser offense of attempted second degree murder. Given these sequential instructions, the jury’s conviction for attempted felony murder was an implied acquittal of attempted premeditated murder. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 236, 114 S. Ct. 783, 792, 127 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1994); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190, 78 S. Ct. 221, 225 (1957). Moreover, under the instructions, the verdict of guilty as to attempted felony murder necessarily means that the jury did not consider the charge of attempted second degree murder, which was properly charged as a lesser offense to attempted premeditated murder. The prosecution is, therefore, able to proceed on this charge upon remand to the trial court should it elect to do so. See State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276, 279 n.2 (Tenn. 1998).