Opinion ID: 1848533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: state manual.

Text: There remains the question of whether the state department by its own rule or regulation has bound itself to conduct such hearing within a sixty-day time limit. The claim that it has is based on the manual, Administrative Methods (revised 8-12-68), particularly Chapter IX-5, setting forth provisions for conducting review hearings by the state agency of county department rulings. It sets forth a step-by-step procedure, including: 1. Mailing notice of hearing not later than three working days after receipt of petition or request for hearing. 2. Requiring county agency to prepare and provide state agency with a summarized statement of the case within ten days from the date of the notice. 3. Scheduling a hearing not later than fifteen days from the day the summary is received. 4. Providing for conduct of hearing by hearing officer; providing for stenographer who can operate a tape recorder to be present. 5. Providing that summary of the hearing, the recorded tape, exhibits and the recommendation of the hearing officer be sent to the legal section within seven days of hearing for preparation of formal decision. 6. Providing that the decision on the hearing will be made within fifteen days after receipt of the summary. There is dispute as to whether the manual constitutes a rule or regulation as statutorily defined, [10] particularly because it was not enacted pursuant to the normal and statutorily prescribed procedure. [11] The contention is that the manual material is no more than a set of suggested guidelines for the conduct of review hearings. However, we hold that the manual material does constitute a rule or statement of policy within the meaning of the statute, particularly so because the legislature has exempted purely procedural rules from the notice and hearing requirements of ch. 227. Is such rule or statement of policy mandatory or directive? The trial court held it to be directive, not mandatory, and we agree. Since the rule-making process of an administrative agency is derivatively a part of the legislative process, [12] this court has applied statutory rules of construction to the construction of administrative agency rules. [13] The general rule followed in the construction of time provisions in statutes has been stated as follows: . . . a statute prescribing the time within which public officers are required to perform an official act is merely directory, unless it denies the exercise of power after such time, or the nature of the act, or the statutory language, shows that the time was intended to be a limitation. [14] Here there is neither expressed nor to be implied any cutoff of the power of the department to act following the expiration of the time limits set forth in the manual. Such cutoff in the right to proceed would be destructive of the purposes of the hearing and the categorical aid program to which such hearings relate. To this extent and on this point, the situation is analogous to the case where this court held a sixty-day time limit within which the state employment relations board was required to make a decision directory, not mandatory. [15] In the case before us, not only is there no cutoff of the right to proceed, but no penalty is placed upon failing to meet the schedule set forth. Moreover, an examination of the rule reveals that it consists of a series of procedural steps, giving sequence and suggested time limits to each such step. As to the requirement that notice be given to concerned and affected parties, the word shall is used. As to subsequent steps, the word will is used. Examples: . . . the county agency will prepare . . . The hearing will be conducted ..., a summary of the hearing . . . will be sent . . ., and The decision will be made . . . The shift from shall to require notice to will to describe subsequent procedural steps strengthens the interpretation given the manual materials by the trial court.