Opinion ID: 1904493
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Heading: Plaintiffs' Claim for Attorney Fees under Section 1988

Text: Plaintiffs also contend that they are entitled to recover attorney fees from the State pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, because they brought their action alternatively under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1988 in the Civil Rights Act provides for the allowance of reasonable attorney fees as part of the costs [i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [section 1983]. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ... person... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1981). Plaintiffs contend that their class action, which resulted in the judicial declaration that the reciprocal truck taxes violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, vindicated one of the rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution that section 1983 was intended to protect. Therefore, they say, they are entitled to recover their attorney fees under section 1988. [9] Relying on Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 237 (Me.1979), the Superior Court ruled that plaintiffs' section 1983 claim, as well as their dependent section 1988 claim for attorney fees from the State, was barred by sovereign immunity, there being no evidence of bad faith on the part of defendants in implementing the reciprocal truck tax statute. We need not consider the correctness of that ruling because plaintiffs failed in any event to state a claim for relief cognizable under section 1983. We are convinced that the Congress never intended to make a violation of the Commerce Clause actionable under that section of the Civil Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit has so held in a well-reasoned opinion in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 126, 83 L.Ed.2d 68 (1984). Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue so far as the Commerce Clause is concerned, it did hold in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), that the Supremacy Clause does not give rise to a claim of right secured by the Constitution within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), a jurisdictional counterpart to section 1983. Id. at 615, 99 S.Ct. at 1914. See also Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 750 F.2d 608, 616 (7th Cir. 1984) (Supremacy Clause violation does not present a cognizable claim under section 1983). The Eighth Circuit, drawing on the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman, stated: Although the Commerce Clause differs from the Supremacy Clause in that the Commerce Clause is a specific grant of legislative power to Congress, the two clauses are analogous in the sense that both clauses limit the power of a state to interfere with areas of national concern. Just as the Supremacy Clause does not secure rights within the meaning of § 1983, neither does the Commerce Clause. Consolidated Freightways, 730 F.2d at 1144 (footnotes omitted). We adopt as our own the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Consolidated Freightways: It is clear from the language employed by the Supreme Court in Commerce Clause cases that the Commerce Clause deals with the relationship between national and state interests, not the protection of individual rights. These decisions are replete with references to the national or federal interest in preventing the burdensome state regulation of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524, 79 S.Ct. 962, 965, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1959); Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-42, 69 S.Ct. 657, 664-67, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1523-24, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945). . . . . Although individuals are oftentimes benefited through the indirect protection resulting from the limitations placed on the states through the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, such benefit is not the same thing as a right secured by the Constitution within the meaning of § 1983.... . . . . ... To hold that an alleged violation of the Commerce Clause constitutes an action cognizable under § 1983 would ... be an unwarranted extension of the Civil Rights Act. We do not believe that such a cause of action was within the intent of the Congress that enacted the civil rights statutes, nor do we believe that such an interpretation of the scope of § 1983 is mandated by either the language of § 1983 or the nature of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1144-47 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). We find unpersuasive, as did the Eighth Circuit, two earlier federal cases stating terse holdings going the other way. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 186 n. 5 (3d Cir.1980); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F.Supp. 1297, 1304-05, (D.Mont.1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976). [10] Neither of those cases analyzed the merits of extending section 1983 to encompass violations of the Commerce Clause, but rather merely relied on generalized statements in Supreme Court cases that did not involve the Commerce Clause issue. Consolidated Freightways, 730 F.2d at 1142-43. The complaint in this class action sought relief directly on the basis that section 2243-C was void because it violated the Commerce Clause; the plaintiff class has prevailed on that claim. In another count, the complaint attempted to state a claim under section 1983 to the effect that [t]he actions of defendants [in imposing taxes violative of the Commerce Clause]... deprive plaintiffs of rights secured to them by the United States Constitution. That latter count, however, did not state a cognizable cause of action under section 1983. Consequently, section 1988 never came into play, and the plaintiff class is left with no basis for departing from the American rule that they bear their own attorney fees in the litigation. They cannot recover attorney fees from the State. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.