Opinion ID: 1859418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strickland Standard for Grant of Post-Conviction Relief.

Text: The United States Supreme Court set out the standard for granting post-conviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland . It held that the benchmark for judging whether counsel is ineffective is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It further explained that in order to meet this standard movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that trial counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A movant bears a heavy burden in establishing the first prong of the standard by a preponderance of the evidence, for the movant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent assistance. Rule 29.15(i); Leisure v. State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo. banc 1992). Movant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To do this, movant must identify specific acts or omissions of counsel that resulted from unreasonable professional judgment, and the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In regard to the second prong of the Strickland test, the Court said that an error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For this reason, a movant must claim counsel's errors resulted in prejudice by showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). This standard is not met by showing that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding or that the errors `impaired the presentation of the defense,' as those standards are either unworkable or subject to being satisfied by every error. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. On the other hand, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that a movant must meet an outcome-determinative test by showing that it is more likely than not that counsel's deficient conduct altered the outcome of the case, because [t]he result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome. Id.