Opinion ID: 1826584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the court erred in allowing the state of mississippi to call josephine parker adversely as a rebuttal witness, and further compounded the error by allowing the state then to produce rebuttal witnesses to their own rebuttal witness.

Text: After the State and the defense had rested their cases-in-chief, the State called Josephine Parker, Parker's mother, to the stand for the first time as an adverse witness on rebuttal. The State began cross-examining the witness on direct and Parker's counsel objected. The judge sustained the objection for a moment. Then as the questioning continued, the judge called the attorneys to the bench. After an off-the-record conference was held, the judge overruled the objection by Parker's counsel to Mrs. Parker's testimony. The State continued its direct examination and attempted to impeach its own witness by her prior inconsistent unsworn testimony. The State was questioning Mrs. Parker about whether Parker had come home with a sticky substance all over himself, and whether she had any conversations with Officer Anderson the next morning about such things. She continuously denied that she had ever made any such statements. Subsequently, the State called three witnesses to testify as to the oral statements made by Mrs. Parker to them. At the end of all the State's rebuttal testimony, the trial court afforded the defense an opportunity for surrebuttal, which he declined. Parker objects to this entire rebuttal on two grounds. First, that Mrs. Parker should have been called during the State's case-in-chief. Second, that it was also erroneous to allow the State to impeach its own witness without showing surprise, and then to allow rebuttal witnesses to the rebuttal witness. First, we must determine whether the lower court erred in allowing Mrs. Parker to testify as a rebuttal witness. This Court has held that: In the recent case of Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789, 792 (Miss. 1988), citing Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 827, 150 So. 774 (1933), we held that the State should not withhold evidence for rebuttal which properly belonged as a part of its case-in-chief. It is not always clear, however, whether evidence properly is part of the State's case-in-chief, or rebuttal. In gray areas, some discretion must be afforded the circuit court, especially when the defendant is offered an opportunity for surrebuttal. Breakfield v. State, 275 So.2d 860 (Miss. 1973). Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1234 (Miss. 1988) (emphasis added). This case is a gray one. Did the testimony belong in the State's case-in-chief or rebuttal? Since it is a close call, the circuit court judge is afforded discretion. We cannot hold that the lower court erred in allowing Mrs. Parker to testify, especially because it offered Parker the opportunity for surrebuttal and he declined. Thus, it was not error for Mrs. Parker to testify as a rebuttal witness. However, we must still look to see if the State was erroneous in attempting to impeach its own witness and calling rebuttal witnesses to its rebuttal witness. Courts have not permitted a party to call a disinterested witness, and after eliciting favorable testimony from him, attempt to cross-examine him as to the testimony that is unfavorable. Wilkins v. State, 603 So.2d 309, 318 (Miss. 1992). Regarding this issue, we have held that: [B]efore a party will be authorized to introduce for impeachment purposes an unsworn pretrial inconsistent statement of his own witness, it will be necessary that he show surprise or unexpected hostility, and that such statement can never be used as substantive evidence. Wilkins, 603 So.2d at 322 (emphasis added). Under our previous case law, before the State may even attempt to introduce the pretrial inconsistent statements of Mrs. Parker, it must show surprise or unexpected hostility. This was not done by the State in the present case. The State argues that it was surprised because there was no indication that Mrs. Parker might testify differently from her pretrial statements. Further, the State argues that Mrs. Parker was called to the stand because she possessed first hand knowledge of relevant, admissible evidence concerning the time at which her son arrived home on the night of the murder and concerning the condition of her son's clothing upon his return. This statement may support the State's position that it was surprised. However, if this statement is true, then it seems that Mrs. Parker should have been called during the State's case-in-chief since she possessed such important first hand knowledge of some key evidence. Thus, this statement becomes a double edged sword for the State. If it is true to prove surprise, then it is also true to support Parker's contention that Mrs. Parker should not have been called as a rebuttal witness. The State was not surprised; and it concedes that Mrs. Parker was not unexpectedly hostile. Thus, the State should not have been allowed to impeach its own witness. Moreover, even if we were to find that the State did properly impeach its own witness, the out-of-court pretrial unsworn inconsistent statements may not be used as substantive evidence. The sentence quoted above from the State makes it clear that the State intended to use the testimony as substantive evidence and not merely to call Mrs. Parker's credibility into question. Furthermore, a look at the State's closing argument reflects that the State intended Mrs. Parker's out-of-court statements to be used as substantive evidence. On closing, Mr. Turner stated as follows: Mr. Kilpatrick said, Well, there was nothing on his clothes. Well, you know, that's not what Josephine Parker, his own mother, told not only Larry Walker [District Executive Officer of the Meridian District for the Highway Patrol], but also Bobby Anderson, the day the body was found. Remember what they testified to? Bobby Anderson said at the police department she caused a ruckus and claimed it couldn't be him, because he came home at night with some sticky sweet smelling stuff on him, and he came home about four o'clock in the morning. Larry Walker, when he went out there that same day on a search warrant, Josephine Parker, the Defendant's own mother, told him, He came in here tracking that shit all over the living room. Which is why he was out at the washhouse bright and early at six-thirty the next morning, with those frozen clothes. Clearly, the State used the impeachment evidence as substantive evidence against Parker and in violation of the previous case law of this State. To ensure that the unsworn inconsistent statement is not considered substantive evidence, we have held that: under the unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury provisions of Rule 403, the circuit judge should consider whether a cautionary instruction to the jury will be sufficient to keep the jury from treating the unsworn pretrial inconsistent statement as substantive evidence, and if not, the statement should not be introduced. Wilkins, 603 So.2d at 322 (emphasis added). No such jury instruction was offered in the present case. Therefore, the statements were erroneously introduced into evidence. The testimonies of Anderson and Walker were erroneously admitted into evidence over the objections of Parker's counsel. And further, no jury instruction was offered to instruct the jury that the rebuttal testimony should not be considered substantive evidence. Thus, the lower court erred in allowing the State to impeach Mrs. Parker's testimony and then use it as substantive evidence. This is a bad practice and when this Court sees it, we are required to reverse. Such a blatant violation of our rules of evidence constitutes reversible error.