Opinion ID: 2293263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Revisiting Azzarello

Text: Phillips amply demonstrates that the core problem in the application of prevailing Pennsylvania law lies in the insistence on maintaining a doctrinal assertion that there is no negligence in strict liability, when, functionally, the law of strict products liability is infused with negligence concepts. Although this fundamental incongruity was at the heart of the dispute in Phillips, in the present case, none of the briefs defending current law squarely addresses it. [7] No one has advised the Court how it is that we can go forward, in resolving the numerous unsettled issues of product liability law, predicating a just and sensible jurisprudence on rhetoric so disharmonious with actual practice. I have respect for counsel advocating the status quo and no intention of criticizing their skill or awareness of the issues. Rather, I believe they are confronted with the same difficulty faced by this Court  a serious misalignment between the descriptions of our strict liability doctrine and its actual operation. [8] The Phillips lead opinion appears to have made the best of what can be done with the situation with the following expression: While it would be imprudent of us to wholesale reverse all strict liability decisions which utilize negligence terms, we can, and do, reaffirm that in this jurisdiction, negligence concepts have no place in strict liability law. Phillips, 576 Pa. at 656, 841 A.2d at 1007. On such a foundation, however, it is very difficult to move forward to decide the numerous unsettled issues of law connected with strict liability doctrine consistent with the core principles. Admittedly, we have cases which incorporate negligence concepts into strict liability doctrine  we will not (and cannot justly) overturn them  and so negligence concepts clearly do have a place in strict liability law. How is it, then, that we may continue to require courts and litigants to continue to say they do not? When product liability law initially was being shaped, like this Court, many others envisioned a categorical divide between strict-liability and negligence concepts. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161 (1972). This was most readily justified in the prototype cases involving manufacturing defects, in which something went wrong in the manufacturing process, so that the product had a loose screw or a defective or missing part or a deleterious element, and was not the safe product it was intended to be. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 831-32, 837 (1973). Once the foundation for strict liability was laid, however, claims involving two other categories of defects, design and warning defects, proliferated. As the treatment of these broader categories evolved, most courts came to realize that application of strict liability in design and warning cases was far more problematic than in the manufacturing-defect paradigm. Particularly in light of the tort system's largely open-ended damages scheme, and the impossibility of designing products incapable of contributing to human injury, doctrinal limiting principles were necessary to contain the liability of product manufacturers and suppliers. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfr'g Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176, 181-82 (Mich. 1984). [9] The alternative, it was widely recognized, was to sanction what would be, effectively, a scheme of mandatory insurance imposed by the judiciary on the business community, an idea foreign to the judicial function and unpalatable in any jurisdiction. [10] In furtherance of establishing essential boundaries and reconciling strict liability doctrine with the historical grounding of tort law in notions of corrective justice, risk-utility balancing  an approach derived from negligence theory  attained wide-scale recognition as a rational limiting principle. See Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 539-41 (3d Cir.2007); Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 183. [11] In its effort to justify curtailing the application of negligence-based principles in Pennsylvania's strict product liability regime, Azzarello relied on two judicial decisions  the California Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Cronin and a New Jersey court's decision in Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J.Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973). Azzarello did not recognize, however, that Cronin already was widely criticized as providing no useful definition of the central concept of product defect in design-defect cases. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816, 826 (1978) (citing Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. at 834-35, 837; W. Page Keeton, Product Liability And The Meaning Of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973)), overruled on other grounds and modified in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 148, 153 (1979), superseded in part by 2A N.J. Stat., Ch. 58C. Indeed, Cronin was curtailed by the California high court soon after its issuance, based on the recognition that it is simply impossible to eliminate the balancing or weighing of competing considerations in determining whether a product is defectively designed or not. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 456 (1978). Thus, the court expanded on Cronin in an effort to give content to the concept of defect and permit risk-utility balancing by jurors. See id. at 456-57. [12] Further, in the ensuing decades, the California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that strict products liability law in California may incorporate negligence concepts without undermining the principles fundamental to a strict liability claim. Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 43 Cal.4th 56, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 179 P.3d 905, 916 (2008). Again, this is the tribunal that pioneered strict liability under Section 402A and was the central source of authority referenced in Azzarello for the proposition that negligence concepts have no place in strict-liability theory. See Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 555, 391 A.2d at 1025 (quoting Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1161). The only other judicial decision upon which Azzarello relied in eschewing negligence concepts is Glass. See Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 555-56, 391 A.2d at 1025. There, a New Jersey court held that the unreasonably-dangerous element had no valid place in strict-liability doctrine based on the rationale that [t]he notions of negligence and of strict liability .... are antithetical to each other. See Glass, 304 A.2d at 564. Azzarello failed to recognize, however, that Glass already had been disapproved, in relevant part, by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See Cepeda, 386 A.2d at 829 (explaining that [t]he Restatement criterion of `unreasonably dangerous' remains soundly applicable to design defect claims and disapproving Glass to the extent it held to the contrary). An accurate account of New Jersey's then-prevailing approach to strict liability would encompass the New Jersey Supreme Court's acute understanding of the criticisms Cronin had generated. See Cepeda, 386 A.2d at 829 (As stated by Dean Keeton ..., `the difficulty is that no content was given (by Cronin) to the concept of defect and this is vitally important when a plaintiff's theory is that a product, although fabricated and constructed as it was intended to be, subjected users or others to an inherent risk of harm that made the product defective.' (quoting Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. at 30-32)). Cepeda also recognized, fundamentally, that `demanding that the defect render the product unreasonably dangerous reflects a realization that many products have both utility and danger.' Id. at 826 (quoting, indirectly, Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir.1968) (emphasis added)). For this reason, the court accepted the critical distinction between manufacturing and design defects, as well as the necessary role of the unreasonably dangerous requirement in the liability scheme, explaining: The heart of the approach we take toward resolution of the matter of defendant's affirmative liability in this case calls for a careful distinction between ordinary manufacturing defects and defects of design.    [T]he point to be made is that in design defect liability analysis the Section 402A criterion of unreasonably dangerous is an appropriate one if understood to render the liability of the manufacturer substantially coordinate with liability on negligence principles. The only qualification is as to the requisite of foreseeability by the manufacturer of the dangerous propensity of the chattel manifested at the trial this being imputed to the manufacturer. Since the proper design is a matter of reasonable fitness, the strict liability adds little or nothing to negligence on the part of the manufacturer. Cepeda, 386 A.2d at 824-25 (citing, inter alia, W.L. PROSSER, TORTS 659 n. 72 (1971)). [13] Whereas Glass had attempted to remove the unreasonably dangerous criterion from the Section 402A analysis, the Cepeda court placed the matter squarely before New Jersey juries by approving an instruction requiring a determination that a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous. Cepeda, 386 A.2d at 827, 829 (It will suffice for purposes of the case at bar, which is clearly a situation of alleged design defect, that the Restatement criterion of `unreasonably dangerous' remains soundly applicable thereto. To the extent that the decision in [ Glass ] may be read to the contrary, it is herewith disapproved.). [14] Azzarello was remiss in its failure to discuss such reasoned, developing counter-positions, particularly as they pertained to the very lines of authority upon which it was relying. [15] In addition to these two decisions, Azzarello referenced scholarly commentary, principally from Dean W. Page Keeton of the University of Texas and Dean Wade. Azzarello did not acknowledge, however, that both scholars strongly favored a negligence-based test for strict liability claims, albeit stripped of any scienter requirement. See Owen, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L.REV. at 353-360 (summarizing the works of Deans Keeton and Wade before and after Azzarello ). [16] Moreover, while highlighting selective portions of these scholars' work, Azzarello summarily rejected other critical aspects. For example, Dean Wade had forcefully argued that it was necessary to use terms such as not reasonably safe or not duly safe to convey essential liability principles to jurors. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. at 15; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. at 833. See generally George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1088 (2000) (The `alternative-safer-design' rule enshrined in section 2 of the Restatement (Third) is the vindication of Wade's view that design-defect litigation should turn on whether the product could have and should have been made safer before it was sold.). Yet Azzarello pronounced, without further explanation, that those terms merely obscure the underlying question and serve no real purpose. Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 556 n. 9, 391 A.2d at 1025 n. 9. Similarly, early on, Dean William L. Prosser of the University of California-Berkeley, who was the reporter for Section 402A, observed that any analysis of a design defect rests primarily upon a departure from proper standards of care, and that the tort is essentially a matter of negligence based upon a duty to use reasonable care to design a product that is reasonably safe for its intended use, and for other uses which are foreseeably probable. W.L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 96 at 641, 644-45 (4th ed.1971). I mean no disrespect to the Justices who participated in Azzarello; in particular, I recognize the decision was well intentioned in following a consumer-oriented direction set by prominent judicial decisions elsewhere. Nevertheless, in light of Azzarello's entrenched status, and the pitch of its defense by various jurists and members of the trial bar over the past thirty years, it is necessary to develop closely its substantial shortcomings in order to lay the groundwork for moving forward. The reality is that Azzarello simply was not well reasoned in its own time, and it certainly has not withstood the test of time. Its good intentions alone cannot justify its continuing longevity, particularly in light of the wealth of experience and scholarship establishing the unworkability, going forward, of its dictates as common-law tort principles. See generally Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 135-36, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (1975) (discussing exceptions to stare decisis ). As noted, the very same jurisdictions upon which Azzarello relied very quickly had recognized that the interests of justice required necessary and substantial adjustments to the experiment with strict liability across the categories of manufacturing, design, and warning defects. This Court has lagged for far too long in this essential recognition, and unfortunately, the ritualistic adherence to Azzarello has substantially impeded the progress of our product liability jurisprudence. See generally 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PROD. LIAB. § 5:10 (explaining that the rhetoric of `strictness' proved so potent and uncompromising that it hampered the reasoned evolution of doctrine over time.). As Appellee notes, this Court had supplemented Azzarello's loss-spreading reasoning with a deterrence-based rationale. See Kimco, 536 Pa. at 9, 637 A.2d at 607 (positing that the deterrent effect of imposing strict product liability standards would be weakened were we to allow actions based upon it to be defeated, or recoveries reduced by negligence concepts. We will not countenance such a development.). Like the loss-spreading rationale, however, the deterrence-based rationale is stated in too conclusory terms, and is too powerful, to be deemed controlling. Courts are not experts in manufacturer behavior, and there are equally reasonable arguments to be made that a negligence-based standard does more to encourage safer products than an absolute liability scheme. See, e.g., Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 185. Moreover, courts and commentators have noted that these types of unsupported social policy judgments can have tremendous social consequences. As explained by one commentator: [C]hallenging a product's design challenges the decision of the manufacturer's engineers and managers to develop and sell a product containing a particular type and level of danger. Thus, unlike a manufacturing defect claim, which implicates merely a single product unit, a design defect claim challenges the integrity of the entire product line and so pierces to the very core of the manufacturer's enterprise. For this reason, design defect claims are of greatest concern to manufacturers, since a judicial declaration that the design of a particular product is defective condemns the entire product line. See Owens, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L.REV. at 296; see also Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 185 (explaining that a verdict for the plaintiff in a design defect case is the equivalent of a determination that an entire product line is defective. It usually will involve a significant portion of the manufacturer's assets and the public may be deprived of a product.). [17] In order to prevent the common law from unduly disrupting product investment and innovation, [18] rational limits are necessary, which provides one substantial explanation for most courts' retreat from more absolute forms of liability grounded on loss-spreading and deterrence-based reasoning in design and warnings cases, in favor of a return to more traditional tort theories. Accord Worthington, The Citadel Revisited, 36 S. TEX. L.REV. at 269 (commenting that courts are beginning to place limits on existing non-fault based theories, representing both a return to traditional moral principles and a pragmatic realization of the chilling effect of the strict tort liability doctrine.). See generally Toogood v. Rogal, 573 Pa. 245, 254, 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (2003) (describing fault-based liability as a traditional cornerstone of tort law). There is some force to Appellee's argument that, at this juncture, this Court should leave alterations to the existing product liability scheme to the General Assembly. Certainly, statutory law now occupies the field of a vast array of substantive matters, and this Court's common-law decision-making role has been substantially curtailed. Moreover, in the face of complex technological and industrial developments, modern products liability law contains many components that are interlocking, interdependent, and/or overlapping, suggesting against the sort of piecemeal development that is inherent in the progression of the common law. [19] Nevertheless, to date, the Legislature has not occupied this particular arena; it is in a state of substantial disrepair occasioned by longstanding adherence to Azzarello and its progeny; and this path has taken our jurisprudence too far from the legitimate home of tort law in the concept of corrective justice. Thus, I believe the Court should make necessary adjustments while the possibility of comprehensive legislative treatment remains uncertain. Cf. Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 316, 433 A.2d 859, 867 (1981) (This Court has full authority, and the corresponding duty, to examine its precedents to assure that a rule previously developed is not perpetuated when the reason for the rule no longer exists and when application of the rule would cause injustice.). In summary, the Court should no longer say negligence concepts have no place in strict-liability doctrine in Pennsylvania, when this simply is not accurate in our tort scheme, or in any scheme purporting to recognize that manufacturers and distributors are not outright insurers for all harm involving their products. To the degree a distinct category of strict product liability doctrine is necessary, at most, it always has been, and rationally should be, one of quasi-strict liability, tempered, in design and warning cases, with the legitimate involvement of notions of foreseeability and reasonableness within the purview of the fact finder. [20]