Opinion ID: 767687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Patentability of Claims 34, 35, 37-40, 42-44 and 47

Text: 61 Gartside argues that the Board erred in holding claims 34, 35, 37-40, 42-44, and 47 unpatentable under § 103, because the references do not teach or suggest the claimed invention. Gartside principally contends that the '645 and '235 patents are directed to thermal cracking processes, and that there was no suggestion in the art to employ a quench step in catalytic cracking processes. Gartside further asserts that the '235 patent teaches away from employing a quench in catalytic cracking. The Commissioner responds that the claims would have been obvious over Gartside's '645 and '235 patents, as those references contain each and every element of the claimed processes. The Commissioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the '645 and '235 patents, as they both attempt to solve the same problem, viz., continued thermal cracking of the cracked product. The Commissioner also contends that the '235 patent does not teach away from employing a quench in catalytic cracking. 62 A claimed invention is unpatentable as obvious if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994); see Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 998, 50 USPQ2d at 1616. The ultimate determination . . . whether an invention is or is not obvious is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual inquiries including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the prior art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 998, 50 USPQ2d at 1616 (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18, 148 USPQ at 467). We have further indicated that the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art references. Id. at 999, 50 USPQ2d at 1617. That suggestion may come from, inter alia, the teachings of the references themselves and, in some cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved. See Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573, 37 USPQ2d 1626, 1630 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1355, 47 USPQ2d at 1456. 63 We agree with the Commissioner that substantial evidence supports the Board's factfinding and that the Board correctly concluded that the claims were unpatentable under § 103. As an initial matter, we agree with the Commissioner that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Gartside's '645 and '235 patents contain all the limitations set forth in claim 47. See Gartside, Paper No. 72 at 12-13. The Board found that all the limitations of claim 47 are found in the '645 patent, except that the '645 patent accomplishes cracking by a thermal rather than a catalytic mechanism. See Gartside, Paper No. 72 at 13. This finding is clearly supported by the following disclosure in the '645 patent: 64 [T]he reaction proceeds at 1500 F for a residence time of about 0.05 to 0.40 seconds, preferably form [sic] 0.20 to 0.30. The product gases are separated from the solids in separator 8 . . . and the product gases pass overhead through a line 22 and are immediately quenched with typical quench oil that is delivered to line 22 through line 36. The quenched product is passed through a cyclone 24 where entrained solids are removed . . . . 65 645 patent, col. 2, l. 62 to col. 3, l. 2. The Board found the missing limitation in the '235 patent, which teaches that the claimed apparatus may be used in catalytic cracking processes involving quenching and separation steps as in claim 47. See Gartside, Paper No. 72 at 13 (citing '235 patent, col. 4, ll. 42-47). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Board's finding that all of the limitations of the claimed invention are found in Gartside's '645 and '235 patents is supported by substantial evidence. 66 Gartside further contends that the Board erred in finding that sufficient motivation existed to combine the '645 and '235 patents to arrive at the invention in claim 47. See id. at 14. We disagree. As the Board indicates, the '645 patent addresses the problem of hot particulate solids continuing to crack the product after the desired thermal cracking reaction has been completed, solving that problem by applying a quench after primary separation of cracking particles from the product. See Paper No. 72 at 14-15. The Board further found that the '235 patent suggests that the presence of either hot thermal or hot catalytic solids in the product stream may cause undesired cracking. See id. at 15 (citing '235 patent, col. 1, ll. 6-10). These disclosures provide substantial evidence supporting the Board's finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated also to apply the teachings of the '645 patent relating to arresting undesired cracking in thermal processes to minimize undesired cracking in catalytic cracking processes. 67 Gartside also asserts that the '235 patent teaches away from applying the process disclosed in the '645 patent to catalytic reactions. This contention is without merit. Gartside cites the following language from the '235 patent: 68 In some reaction systems, specifically catalytic reactions at low or moderate temperatures, quench of the product gas is undesirable from a process standpoint. In other cases, the quench is ineffective in terminating the reaction. Thus, these reaction systems require immediate separation of the phases to remove catalyst from the gas phases. Once the catalyst is removed, the mechanism for reaction is no longer present. 69 '235 patent, col. 1, ll. 49-56. As the Board found, however, this portion of the specification addresses the undesirability of a quench used in catalytic reactions at low to moderate temperatures, not the high temperature reactions at issue in the '645 patent, and teaches that in other undefined systems, quenching is ineffective. See Gartside, Paper No. 72 at 16. That is not a clear teaching away from use of a quench in all catalytic systems. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that this disclosure does not teach away from the claimed invention. See id. at 16-17. 70 Having concluded that the Board's factual findings relating to its § 103 analysis are supported by substantial evidence, we further conclude that the Board did not err as a matter of law that claims 34, 35, 37-40, 42-44 and 47 are invalid as obvious. We have carefully considered Gartside's additional arguments but find them unpersuasive.