Opinion ID: 186445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was it a Repeat Violation?

Text: 22 Wal-Mart makes two arguments that the ALJ erred in holding its violation to be a repeat: the present and the prior citations concerned substantially dissimilar conduct; and the Secretary ... failed to show that the citation was issued to the same employer.  23 The Secretary makes a prima facie showing that a violation is `repeat' if the prior and present violations are for failure to comply with the same standard, Manganas Painting Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 273 F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C.Cir.2001), as they are in this case. Wal-Mart therefore has the burden of demonstrat[ing] that the two violations took place under disparate conditions and hazards. Id. Here, Wal-Mart argues the present citation concerns a blocked way of exit access whereas the prior citation concerned a blocked exit; as the two quoted terms refer to separate parts of a means of egress, see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.35(a)(1) (A means of egress ... consists of three separate and distinct parts: the way of exit access, the exit, and the way of exit discharge), the citations are for creating different hazards. Whether the purported difference is meaningful we need not decide, for Wal-Mart does not show there was in fact a difference. 24 In support of its claim that the prior citation concerned a blocked exit, Wal-Mart points to the citation itself and to Marino's testimony. The citation charged that [s]hopping carts were aligned against the walls adjacent to the emergency exit and found to be obstructing [the] path of egress. But path of egress is an ambiguous phrase that does not appear anywhere in the standard; it could refer to an exit but it could also, and indeed more naturally does, suggest either a way of exit access or a way of exit discharge. Marino's testimony is also equivocal. Although she responded affirmatively when asked whether the previous citation issued because ... the exits were actually being blocked by shopping carts, Marino also testified that she thought the carts [were] in the aisleway. In fact, Marino did not see the violation in question; she was merely interpreting the citation. Wal-Mart's evidence, therefore, does not carry its burden of proving the two violations occurred under disparate conditions and hazards. Manganas Painting Co., 273 F.3d at 1135. 25 We are mindful a repeat violation should not be defined in such a way that an employer is disadvantaged merely for being large. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Herman, 154 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir.1998) (observing need [t]o distinguish between repeated violations that reflect simply the scale of a company's operations and those that indicate a failure to learn from experience). Nevertheless, Wal-Mart, although large, has offered no reasonable basis for concluding that the prior citation should not have put it on notice of the need to take steps to prevent the second violation. Id. 26 Turning to Wal-Mart's second argument, we conclude the Company has not shown the present and the prior citations were issued to different employers. Concerned that Wal-Mart's proposal to treat the two Wal-Mart stores where the violations occurred as separate employers would fragment[ ] compliance with [the Act], Wal-Mart Super Center, 2004 WL 334495 at  (quoting Sec'y of Labor v. Potlatch Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1061, 1979 WL 61360 (1979)), the ALJ concluded that both stores were part of a single employer, namely, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 27 Wal-Mart's only argument for treating the two stores as different employers is that the two citations were mailed to, and identified the employer as, the Wal-Mart stores at which the violation in question took place. Both stores are, however, owned by the same corporation: Marino testified that the inspection report (OSHA Form 1A) for the store to which the prior citation was issued listed Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as the controlling corporation and that the manager at the store to which the present citation was issued told her the store was owned by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wal-Mart Super Center, 2004 WL 334495 at . Neither is, as far as the record shows, a separate legal entity with a juridical personality of its own. It follows from the statutory definition of employer that the same employer was charged in the present and the prior citations. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (employer is a person engaged in a business affecting commerce); id. at § 652(4) (person is one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized group of persons).