Opinion ID: 4519278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third-Party Guilt Charge

Text: Simmons asserts the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury regarding third-party guilt because evidence was presented of third-party guilt, the jury required instructions regarding how to analyze such evidence, and instructions were necessary to ensure the burden of proof remained on the State in light of the presentation of third-party guilt evidence. I disagree. An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge's decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Marin, 415 S.C. 475, 482, 783 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2016) (citation omitted). In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial. Id. (quoting State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011)). Furthermore, to warrant reversal, a trial judge's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. Id. (quoting Brandt, 393 S.C. at 550, 713 S.E.2d at 603). The trial court is required to charge the law as determined from the evidence presented at trial. State v. Gates, 269 S.C. 557, 561, 238 S.E.2d 680, 681 (1977). The admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt is governed by State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 16 S.E.2d 532 (1941). State v. Cope, 405 S.C. 317, 341, 748 S.E.2d 194, 206 (2013). The Gregory rule states: [E]vidence offered by [the] accused as to the commission of the crime by another person must be limited to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence; evidence which can have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible . . . [B]efore such testimony can be received, there must be such proof of connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances, as tends clearly to point out such other person as the guilty party. Gregory, 198 S.C. at 104–05, 16 S.E.2d at 534–35 (internal citations omitted). Throughout the trial, Simmons's defense strategy involved eliciting testimony indicating that Kyle was responsible for downloading and uploading the child pornography, rather than Simmons. In my view, Simmons did not present the requisite train of facts or circumstances tending clearly to point out Kyle as the guilty party. Instead, the evidence had no other effect than to cast suspicion or raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by Kyle. Therefore, I would conclude that Simmons was not entitled to the requested jury instruction. Further, because the instruction would have bolstered Simmons's version of the facts, it amounted to an impermissible charge on the facts. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 21 (Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare the law.); State v. Kennedy, 272 S.C. 231, 234, 250 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1978) ([T]he trial judge must refrain from all comment which tends to indicate his opinion as to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the guilt of the accused or as to controverted facts.). Finally, I believe the trial court's jury instruction made clear that the State had the burden of proof. Therefore, the proposed charge was unnecessary, and the trial court's refusal to give the instruction did not prejudice Simmons.