Opinion ID: 2007860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of Recidivist Statute

Text: Appellant argues the habitual offender statute is unconstitutional on the following bases: (1) The failure to prescribe one jury to hear the principal offense and another jury to determine the recidivist count violates his constitutional right to a public trial before an impartial jury. (2) The enhanced sentence constitutes an increase in punishment which violates the double jeopardy clause. (3) The mandatory enhanced sentence of thirty years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when prior convictions were non-violent, property offenses. (4) The mandatory nature of the enhancement violates the equal protection clause because the sentencing court has wide latitude in the sentences imposed for similar offenses. Appellant acknowledges that case law is contrary to his position but requests this Court to reconsider these issues. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court adheres to a principle of law which has been firmly established. Important policy considerations militate in favor of continuity and predictability in the law. Therefore, we are reluctant to disturb longstanding precedent which involves salient issues. Teeters v. City National Bank of Auburn (1938), 214 Ind. 498, 14 N.E.2d 1004. Precedent operates as a maxim for judicial restraint to prevent the unjustified reversal of a series of decisions merely because the composition of the Court has changed. Grubbs v. State (1865), 24 Ind. 295. Once the validity of a statute has been frequently recognized by this Court and the statute declared to be constitutional, we will not reconsider the constitutionality of that statute unless there are compelling reasons to do so. Kassabaum et al v. Bd. of Finance (1939), 215 Ind. 491, 20 N.E.2d 642; State ex rel. Monroe Gravel Road Co. v. Stout (1878), 61 Ind. 143. However, this Court will overrule a decision or a series of decisions which are clearly incorrect due to a mistaken conception of the law or other judicial error. Martin v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 543; Bd. of Comm'rs of Jasper County v. Allman (1895), 142 Ind. 573, 42 N.E. 206. Still, a rule which has been deliberately declared should not be disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation of error. Moore-Mansfield Construction Co. v. Indianapolis, Newcastle, and Toledo Railway Co. (1912), 179 Ind. 356, 101 N.E. 296. Appellant has not presented cogent reasons for us to reconsider the constitutionality of the habitual offender statute. He merely repeats grounds offered by appellants under prior cases. We decline the invitation.