Opinion ID: 1898472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutional Provision

Text: In order to pass on plaintiffs' contention, we must once again, in the context of this case, define the scope and content of the constitutional provision. That definition is critical to our determination of a remedy. While precision in such definition is desirable, certain considerations suggest caution against constitutional absolutism in this area. First, what a thorough and efficient education consists of is a continually changing concept. As the Legislature stated: Because the sufficiency of education is a growing and evolving concept, the definition of a thorough and efficient system of education and the delineation of all the factors necessary to be included therein, depend upon the economic, historical, social and cultural context in which that education is delivered. The Legislature must, nevertheless, make explicit provision for the design of State and local systems by which such education is delivered, and should, therefore, explicitly provide after 4 years from the effective date of this act for a major and comprehensive evaluation of both the State and local systems, and the sufficiency of education provided thereby.... [ N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-2a(4).] We observed in Robinson V that [t]his statement reveals a perceptive recognition on the part of the Legislature of the constantly evolving nature of the concept being considered. It manifests an awareness that what seems sufficient today may be proved inadequate tomorrow, and even more importantly that only in the light of experience can one ever come to know whether a particular program is achieving the desired end. Robinson V, supra, 69 N.J. at 457-58, 355 A. 2d 129. Second, whatever the content of a thorough and efficient education may be, the question of what must be done to achieve it is debatable, as this case well illustrates. Third, embedded in the constitutional provision itself, at least in its construction thus far by this Court, are various objectives and permissible outcomes  equality, uniformity, diversity, and disparity  that may require, if they are to be allowed, a continued general definition of the constitutional mandate. Finally, any definition of the constitutional obligation must operate in an area where confrontation between the branches of government is not only a distinct possibility but has been an unfortunate reality. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A. 2d 713 (1975) ( Robinson IV ); Robinson V, supra, 69 N.J. at 468, 355 A. 2d 129; and Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A. 2d 457 (1976) ( Robinson VI ). That potential confrontation concerns one of the most important functions of government  education  and involves substantial public funds, implicates the taxing power, and is potentially of a continuing nature. The Legislature's role in education is fundamental and primary; this Court's function is limited strictly to constitutional review. The definition of the constitutional provision by this Court, therefore, must allow the fullest scope to the exercise of the Legislature's legitimate power. The initial construction of the thorough and efficient clause was permeated by the concept of equality. In Landis v. Ashworth (School District No. 44), 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (Sup.Ct. 1895), the court construed the constitutional provision (effected by the 1875 amendment to our former Constitution of 1844) as requiring equality within the intended range of that amendment.... Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 514, 303 A. 2d 273 (1973), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed. 2d 219 (1973) ( Robinson I ). The qualifying language that we added, permitting local decisions only above and beyond that mandated education, ibid., reflected our understanding of Landis as allowing local districts the option of operating high schools, at that time a level of education not generally available. As Landis noted, if absolute equality were mandated by the thorough and efficient clause, it would mean either that all districts must have high schools or that none could  [n]either of these consequences... contemplated by the amendment of 1875. Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 514, 303 A. 2d 273 (quoting Landis, supra, 57 N.J.L. at 512, 31 A. 1017). Implicit in our discussion was that education below the level of high school  the intended range [of the] amendment  must be equal in all districts. We noted that without doubt, today high schools were very much a part of the rights of all, Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 514, 303 A. 2d 273 (quoting Landis, supra, 57 N.J.L. at 512, 31 A. 1017), and that a system of public education which did not offer high school education would hardly be thorough and efficient. Id. 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A. 2d 273. That requirement of equality of educational opportunity through high school appears again in our observation, after our rejection of the claim that the constitutional provision required taxpayer equality, that we do not doubt that an equal educational opportunity for children was precisely in mind. Id. at 513, 303 A. 2d 273. What that equality meant, while not precisely defined, was indicated in several ways. First, in deciding that the statute then in place was unconstitutional as not affording a thorough and efficient education, we relied solely on the disparity of funding, i.e., on the fact that the dollars spent on education per pupil varied from one district to another (from below $700 per pupil to over $1,500 per pupil, Robinson V, supra, 69 N.J. at 480 n. 4, 355 A. 2d 129). As we stated: The trial court found the constitutional demand had not been met and did so on the basis of discrepancies in dollar input per pupil. We agree. We deal with the problem in those terms because dollar input is plainly relevant and because we have been shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate. The constitutional mandate could not be said to be satisfied unless we were to suppose the unlikely proposition that the lowest level of dollar performance happens to coincide with the constitutional mandate and that all efforts beyond the lowest level are attributable to local decisions to do more than the State was obliged to do. [ Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 515-16, 303 A. 2d 273.] Rather than on equality, our decision was based on the proposition that the Constitution required a certain level of education, that which equates with thorough and efficient; it is that level that all must attain; that is the only equality required by the Constitution. Embedded in our observation that if the lowest level of expenditures per pupil constituted a thorough and efficient education, then the constitutional mandate would be met was the clear implication that no matter how many districts were spending well beyond that level, the system would be constitutional. Second, we noted that the State, while assigning the obligation to local government to afford a thorough and efficient education, had never defined in some discernible way the educational obligation, the content of the constitutionally mandated educational opportunity; it was an unstated standard. Id. at 519, 303 A. 2d 273. Again, the clear import is not of a constitutional mandate governing expenditures per pupil, equal or otherwise, but a requirement of a specific substantive level of education. Equality of expenditures per pupil could not have been constitutionally mandated when we recognized the right of districts to spend more to address students' special needs (the need for additional dollar input to equip classes of disadvantaged children for the educational opportunity) and disclaimed any intent to deprive the State of the power to authorize local government to go further than the constitutionally mandated education and to tax to that further end. Id. at 520, 303 A. 2d 273. Our only condition was that such excess not become a device for diluting the State's mandated responsibility. Ibid. Our decision in Robinson I was necessarily general because of the narrow record in that case, consisting primarily of dollar per pupil information and related socioeconomic data. Although general, however, our holding in Robinson I was clear and formed the basis for our holding in Robinson V: a thorough and efficient education requires a certain level of educational opportunity, a minimum level, that will equip the student to become a citizen and ... a competitor in the labor market. Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A. 2d 273. The State's obligation to attain that minimum is absolute  any district that fails must be compelled to comply. If, however, that level is reached, the constitutional mandate is fully satisfied regardless of the fact that some districts may exceed it. In other words, the Constitution does not mandate equal expenditures per pupil. We implied that the level can  and should  be defined in terms of substantive educational content. But while disparity was explicitly permitted, there was a caveat  the excess spending could not somehow be allowed to mask a failure to achieve thoroughness and efficiency in other districts. This holding in Robinson I was reaffirmed in Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A. 2d 713. After the Legislature failed to act within the time limits set by the Court, we afforded a contingent or provisional remedy, Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 146, 351 A. 2d 713, that substantially increased equalization aid. Id. at 150, 351 A. 2d 713. In the course of our opinion we referred to our statement of the constitutional command in Robinson I that the State afford an equal educational opportunity for children, id. at 140, 351 A. 2d 713 (citation omitted), and shortly thereafter acknowledged the legitimacy of permitting any school district wishing to do so to spend more on its educational program through local effort provided, again in the words of Robinson I, such did not become a device for diluting the State's mandated responsibility. Id. at 141 n. 3, 351 A. 2d 713. Foreshadowing what was to come, we also observed that while disparity in expenditures per student was the sole criterion in our decision in Robinson I, that was because we [had] been shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate. Id. at 141, 351 A. 2d 713 (citation omitted). We noted that in addition to the Robinson I record, the Court now had further material showing that a multitude of other factors play a vital role in the educational result, and that therefore while funding is an undeniable pragmatic consideration, it is not the overriding answer to the educational problem, whatever the constitutional solution ultimately required. Id. at 141 n. 3, 351 A. 2d 713. The Legislature acted in response to Robinson IV. In addition to defining and providing for the achievement of a thorough and efficient education through administrative measures, it provided a new funding mechanism to finance the substantive education defined in the Act as constituting thorough and efficient. It firmly placed responsibility on the State to assure achievement of the thorough and efficient level in every district. It did so, however, through a scheme that continued to allow disparity in both dollars per pupil and educational content. Indeed, while the statute was sustained as facially constitutional, the doubts and qualifications expressed by some members of the Court suggested the inevitability of the litigation now before us. We reaffirmed the concept of a constitutionally required level of education, equivalent to thorough and efficient, and the corresponding power to exceed that level; but we gave no further content to the warning that any excess spending must not dilute the constitutional obligation. We spoke in the context of a statute that guaranteed continuation of substantial disparities among school districts in educational expenditures per pupil. Despite the certainty of those disparities, we held the statute facially constitutional and awaited the day of its return when it would be attacked as applied. The change of focus from the dollar disparity in Robinson I to substantive educational content in Robinson V is clear; it was the main theme underlying the Court's determination that the Act was constitutional. Noting at the outset that for the first time we had before us a statute that defined the constitutional obligation, provided for its implementation through both state and local administration, required that implementation to be monitored, directed the State to compel compliance where that monitoring revealed deficiencies, and provided a funding mechanism to achieve the constitutional goal, we observed that the state's school-aid provisions must be considered, not in comparative isolation, but as part of the whole proposal formulated by the Legislature. Robinson V, supra, 69 N.J. at 463, 355 A. 2d 129. Although the opinion sketched the State-aid formula, it dwelt in considerable detail on the new approach to a thorough and efficient education: its definition, its involvement of both the State and district in fleshing out the details, standards, and elements against which thorough and efficient was to be measured, its requirements of reporting and monitoring, the whole range of remedies available to the Commissioner and the Board for corrective action to force districts to upgrade their educational offerings when monitoring revealed deficiencies, and the non-delegable duty of the State to do so. We described the process of district-by-district evaluation, monitoring, and corrective action intended to lead to thorough and efficient education everywhere in the state, not by a financial measuring rod but by an actual direct measurement of numerous factors that reflect the level of substantive education. The only question about financing was not whether it provided equal dollars per pupil  indeed, we noted that there may be and probably are legitimate differences between and among districts and students, id. at 464, 355 A. 2d 129, but whether it was sufficient to support the entire system and its goal of achieving a thorough and efficient education throughout the state. The fiscal provisions of the Act are to be judged as adequate or inadequate depending upon whether they do or do not afford sufficient financial support for the system of public education that will emerge from the implementation of the plan set forth in the statute. We are no longer considering the needs of the public system as it existed before the 1975 Act. We assume the Legislature had this in mind when preparing the state aid clauses of this statute. [ Ibid. ] We acknowledg[ed] the diversity that will inevitably exist among these separate [districts], id. at 459, 355 A. 2d 129, and in referring to equal opportunity, we noted the Commissioner's and the Board's responsibility to assure that throughout the State each pupil shall be offered an equal opportunity to receive an education of such excellence as will meet the constitutional standard. Id. at 459-60, 355 A. 2d 129. In other words, it was not an equal opportunity, without qualification, but an equal opportunity only up to a point: to receive a thorough and efficient education. The clear thrust of our decision was to render equal dollars per pupil relevant only if it impacts on the substantive education offered in a given district. Compliance with the constitutional mandate was to be determined on a district-by-district measurement, and if money was a factor in the district's failure, the remedy was not to change the statute but to implement it by forcing the district to spend more or by supplying further state funds. Indeed, the only explicit suggestion for statutory change was our observation that the Legislature should consider addressing the question of what kind of showing must be made by a school district asking for state assistance due to local inability to recruit needed funds. Id. at 466, 355 A. 2d 129. Most telling of our view of the constitutional mandate was that, while noting that the funding mechanism would equalize only about 64% of the districts if fully funded (368 out of 578, leaving 210 districts with ratable resources superior to the rest, id. at 465 n. 4, 355 A. 2d 129), we nevertheless observed that the Act eliminated  gross disparities in per pupil expenditures and tax resources. Id. at 467, 355 A. 2d 129 (emphasis supplied). Our description of the implementation of the Act, whereby the process of monitoring and evaluation results in a review treating the school districts as separate entities, id. at 463, 355 A. 2d 129, was consistent with our statement at the outset that whether the Act would be found to be constitutional after its funding and implementation would depend on a test of it as applied in the future to any individual school district at any particular time.... Id. at 455, 355 A. 2d 129. While not purporting to definitively describe the potential thrust of any future attack on the legislation as applied, we deemed the Act's structure and financing mechanism as effectively limiting that claim to its operation in a particular district. The strength of our holding of facial systemic validity despite the certainty of continued substantial expenditure disparity from one district to the next is highlighted by the opposing strength of the two dissenting opinions. Both forcefully pointed out, as the centerpiece of their disagreement, the significant variations in financial resources and the almost certain consequent variations in educational expenditures and educational quality that are a fundamental ingredient in the guaranteed tax base formula of the Act. Our opinion, therefore, cannot be viewed as momentarily putting aside the expenditure-disparity issue: it was at the heart of our decision. On the record then before us it was rejected. Chief Justice Hughes' concurring opinion reflects the competing considerations that faced the Court. While concurring in result, the Chief Justice disagreed with our implied conclusion that the inequality of resources allowed under the Act did not threaten its constitutionality. His concurrence in the finding of constitutionality was clearly based on his evaluation of the importance of allowing the Legislature to devise a constitutional remedy. It was explicitly based on his hope that in the future the funding formula would be changed to assure substantially more equality. He expressed serious reservations about the ability of the Commissioner to achieve a thorough and efficient education by monitoring one by one 578 school districts, Robinson V, supra, 69 N.J. at 470, 355 A. 2d 129 (Hughes, C.J., concurring); the preferred route to thoroughness and efficiency was through equality of funding and equality of expenditures per pupil. Id. at 471-75, 355 A. 2d 129. Nevertheless, in deference to the Legislature's clear responsibility, the newness of the statutory response, and the lack of experience under it, he joined the majority, trusting this Court's continuing power, explicitly reserving the right to declare the Act unconstitutional if experience showed that in practice it did not afford a thorough and efficient education. With that as background, Abbott v. Burke, testing the Act as applied, came before us first in a procedural controversy and now in full substance. As often occurs, constitutional questions shift and sometimes sharpen as relatively abstract issues take on factual substance. When we first viewed the apparent scope of the factual controversy in Abbott I, supra, 100 N.J. 269, 495 A. 2d 376, as it bore on the issue of appropriate forum, we found it necessary to underline the basic holdings of the Robinson v. Cahill cases, including explicitly the power of local districts to spend beyond what was required for a thorough and efficient education, subject to the limitation that such authorization does not become a device for diluting the State's mandated responsibility, Abbott I, supra, 100 N.J. at 291, 495 A. 2d 376 (quoting Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A. 2d 273). We also recognized the revision of Robinson I effected in Robinson V that the Court has been constantly mindful that money is only one of a number of elements that must be studied in giving definition and content to the constitutional promise of a thorough and efficient education. Abbott I, supra, 100 N.J. at 292, 495 A. 2d 376 (quoting Robinson V, supra, 69 N.J. at 455, 355 A. 2d 129). But we gave, in view of the issues about to be projected, a new potential gloss to the constitutional obligation. For instance, in the context of plaintiffs' claim that the disparities in dollar expenditure disproportionately affected disadvantaged students, we recognized that the State not only had the power to spend in excess of the norm in view of the presumed greater needs of such students, but that it might be required to do so. Id. at 291-93, 495 A. 2d 376. Our application of the constitutional standard first presented in Robinson I  an educational opportunity ... needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market, Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A. 2d 273  reflects the context of the present case. [T]he thorough and efficient education issues call for proofs that, after comparing the education received by children in property-poor districts to that offered in property-rich districts, it appears that the disadvantaged children will not be able to compete in, and contribute to, the society entered by the relatively advantaged children. [ Abbott I, supra, 100 N.J. at 296, 495 A. 2d 376.] Finally, after noting plaintiffs' contention that educational deficiencies could substantially be ameliorated only by increasing [local districts'] entitlement to state aid, id. at 285, 495 A. 2d 376, we observed that the continuation of the local fiscal burden was based in part on the Legislature's finding that local funding is important to encourage local involvement in public education, N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-2a(7).... Ibid. We described a wide array of potentially relevant issues allowing the broadest presentation on remand of the parties' contentions and evidence, and gave point to that intention by couching our remand with a condition that made it clear the case would first be heard by an ALJ. The OAL's [Office of Administrative Law] obligation and capacity to designate specially qualified judges cannot be overemphasized in the present context. This litigation exemplifies the type of complex, sensitive, important, multi-issue, and cross-disciplinary matter that the Legislature contemplated in authorizing the selection of persons to serve as administrative law judges both from within and without state government. See N.J.S.A. 52:14F-6 b. Thus, remand to the administrative agency is particularly appropriate in this case. We anticipate that the OAL will conduct a thorough hearing, where the parties shall present all their evidence relevant to the constitutional claims and defenses. This will serve to consolidate all fact-findings in a single proceeding. We intend that the proceedings will promote development of a complete and informed record, which will reflect determinations of appropriate administrative issues as well as the resolution of factual matters material to the ultimate constitutional issues. [ Id. at 302-03, 495 A. 2d 376.] Thus, while leaving the door open to the numerous factual and legal contentions of the parties, we reiterated the constitutional mandate as it had developed through Robinson V. But we added a new element of considerable relevance to this case. We said, in effect, that the requirement of a thorough and efficient education to provide that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market, Robinson I, supra, 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A. 2d 273, meant that poorer disadvantaged students must be given a chance to be able to compete with relatively advantaged students. The Act and its system of education have failed in that respect, and it is that failure that we address in this case. Issues similar to that before us today have been litigated in various state courts. Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P. 2d 590 (1973); Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W. 2d 90 (1983); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971) (later history omitted); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P. 2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A. 2d 359 (1977) (later history omitted); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E. 2d 156 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P. 2d 635 (1975); People of Illinois ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App. 3d 189, 350 N.E. 2d 767 (App.Ct. 1976); Rose v. The Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A. 2d 758 (1983); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W. 2d 711 (1973); Helena Elementary School Dist. 1 v. State, 784 P. 2d 412 (Mont. 1990) modifying 769 P. 2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Board of Educ., Levittown, etc. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y. 2d 27, 453 N.Y.S. 2d 643, 439 N.E. 2d 359 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 775, 74 L.Ed. 2d 986 (1983); Board of Educ. of City School Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E. 2d 813 (1979); Fair School Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P. 2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P. 2d 139 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A. 2d 360 (1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E. 2d 470 (1988); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P. 2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E. 2d 859 (1979); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W. 2d 568 (1989), reh'g denied, 443 N.W. 2d 314 (1989); Washakie Co. School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P. 2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Hot Springs Co. School Dist. No. 1 v. Washakie Co. School Dist. No. 1, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed. 2d 28 (1980). Their resolution has depended on the court's interpretation of the state's constitutional education provision and/or the state's equal protection doctrine. These state constitutional claims, the underlying contentions and facts, although presenting great variety of detail, are remarkably similar to those facing us: an educational funding system that depends on a combination of state and local taxes producing disparity of expenditures in the face of inverse disparity of need. Fourteen of the states have rejected both constitutional claims [5] ; six, including New Jersey, have held the state system of financing education invalid under the state education article, while rejecting or declining to reach equal protection claims [6] ; three determined that the existing system violated both claims, and one that the system violated only equal protection. [7] Almost invariably the remedy extended no farther than the observation that the Legislature will presumably revise the system to conform with the Court's decision, the Court frequently reserving jurisdiction in order to impose a judicial remedy if the Legislature failed to act. Very few of the cases have a factual record that even begins to approach that before us. None has the unique attribute of this case: an educational funding system specifically designed to conform to a prior court decision, having been declared constitutional by the Court but now attacked as having failed to achieve the constitutional goal. In short, we are the only state involved in a second round on this issue. The command of our thorough and efficient clause is strong and clear, but to the extent that further interpretation is required, to the extent that questions of conformance to the constitutional command exist, and difficult questions remain open, we cannot look out of state for an answer  it must be found through the interpretation of our own Constitution, with the aid of the parties and the numerous amici who have participated in this case. [8]