Opinion ID: 1973913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Complaint elicited through questioning

Text: New Jersey courts have been inconsistent regarding whether a statement made by a child victim as a result of questioning qualifies under the fresh complaint rule. See State v. Hill, 121 N.J. 150, 578 A. 2d 370 (1990), also decided today, in which we trace the history of the fresh-complaint rule and the current rule in New Jersey. In State v. J.S., 222 N.J. Super. 247, 536 A. 2d 769 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 588, 546 A. 2d 513 (1988), the Appellate Division held that a mother's testimony regarding her daughter's sexual abuse was inadmissible under the fresh complaint rule. In that case, the child's mother testified that when she had first broached the subject with her daughter, the child had wept and had refused to talk about it. The mother had then asked the child specifically if the defendant had touched or penetrated different parts of her body. The child had merely responded yes or no to the questions but had not elaborated. The child had never made an actual statement but had merely agreed or disagreed with her mother's accusations. The Appellate Division stated: While the methods employed by Mrs. M. to find out what had happened to her daughter were certainly understandable, our concern is whether the child's out-of-court responses satisfy the exacting standards for admissibility under a rule of evidence which permits such testimony only to demonstrate that the victim made a complaint.... In our view, to qualify as a complaint, the victim's statements must at least be self-motivated and not extracted by interrogation. [ Id. at 253, 536 A. 2d 769]. In contrast, the court in State v. Kozarski, 143 N.J. Super. 12, 16-17, 362 A. 2d 598 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 532, 366 A. 2d 687 (1976), reasoned that even if it were true that the child's statements regarding sexual abuse had been elicited by his mother, it would not matter because the child had made a spontaneous complaint to a friend and playmate within one or two days of the alleged assault. Similarly, in State v. Balles, 47 N.J. 331, 221 A. 2d 1 (1966), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 388 U.S. 461, 87 S.Ct. 2120, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1321 (1967), we admitted a mother's testimony under the fresh-complaint exception, without even noting that the complaint had been elicited through questioning. The child in the case had allegedly been sexually abused by her tutor. When her father had picked her up at the tutor's home, the child had appeared agitated. When he asked her what was wrong, she first refused to answer and then said that she did not want to talk about it. When the child arrived home, she was again questioned by her mother, and said that defendant had fondled her. The inconsistencies in the application of the fresh-complaint exception are due in part to different fact situations and the courts' flexibility in applying fresh complaint strictures to cases involving young children. In deference to children's special vulnerability to being cajoled and coerced into remaining silent by their abusers, courts allow children additional time to make a fresh complaint. In State v. Hummel, 132 N.J. Super. 412, 423, 334 A. 2d 52 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 102, 335 A. 2d 54 (1975), in determining what constitutes a reasonable time for the making of a fresh complaint, the court considered that the children in question lived in foster homes and had been threatened with being placed in a children's shelter if they ever told of the abuse. Similarly, in State v. Kozarski, supra, 143 N.J. Super. 12, 362 A. 2d 598 (App.Div. 1976), the court reasoned that the eleven-year-old victim's two-week delay in telling his mother of having been abused was reasonable given the natural reluctance of a young boy to divulge such information to his parents. Thus, New Jersey courts recognize that children may be too frightened and embarrassed to talk about sexual abuse, and that it is therefore necessary to be flexible in applying fresh complaint guidelines to complaints of children who allegedly have been sexually abused. We recognize also that not all questioning preceding a complaint deprives an utterance of the spontaneity and voluntariness needed for it to be admissible under the fresh complaint rule. People v. Hood, 59 Ill. 2d 315, 319 N.E. 2d 802 (1974) (Complaint elicited by question what's wrong? qualifies as fresh complaint); People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 193 N.E. 2d 25 (1963) (complaint elicited by question What happened? admissible as fresh complaint); People v. Evans, 173 Ill. App. 3d 186, 122 Ill.Dec. 950, 960, 527 N.E. 2d 448, 458 (1988) (complaint made in response to questions such as what's wrong? and Did he do something to you? is admissible because the questions were non-coercive); State v. Stevens, 289 N.W. 2d 592, 594-96 (Iowa 1980) (victim's statement that she had been raped, made in response to a friend's general inquiry about what was wrong, was admissible). Juvenile victims may be reluctant to tell of a rape. Because the child has no clear understanding of what has been done to her, her `original complaint' often consists of responses to the questioning of a patient, persistent adult who draws the child's story from her. State v. Garay, 453 So. 2d 1003, 1007 (La. Ct. App. 1984); accord State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348, 359-60, 537 A. 2d 667 (1988); State v. Kozarski, supra, 143 N.J. Super. at 16-17, 362 A. 2d 598. Thus, to have validity, the rule of law must recognize that in a given case the victim may have made the complaint in response to questioning. Hence, we find that general, non-coercive questions do not rob a complaint of its admissibility under the fresh-complaint rule. See State v. Hill, supra, 121 N.J. at 167, 578 A. 2d at 379. We conclude, however, that statements, even those of children, made directly in response to coercive questioning are inadmissible under the fresh-complaint rule, because coercive interrogation robs those statements of the self-motivation necessary to qualify as fresh complaint. We do not mean to say that every time social workers and doctors question children about sexual abuse, they render the children's responses invalid under the fresh-complaint rule. Therapy play and non-coercive discussion may be necessary to liberate a child from the fear, embarrassment, or ignorance that causes the victim to be silent about abuse. State v. Ramos, 226 N.J. Super. 339, 544 A. 2d 408 (App.Div. 1988) (mother drew complaint from child after generally discussing materials regarding sexual abuse that the child had brought home from school). There is a line, however, between questioning that merely precedes a complaint of sexual abuse and coercive questioning. We leave it to the trial court to determine when that line is crossed. In each case the trial court must examine the degree of coercion involved in the questioning of the child and determine whether the child's complaint was spontaneous or directly in response to the interrogation. Among the factors the court should consider in arriving at its determination are the age of the child, the child's relationship with the interviewer, the circumstances under which the interrogation takes place, whether the child initiated the discussion, the type of questions asked, whether they were leading, and their specificity regarding the alleged abuser and the acts alleged. It is a close question whether Ms. Foster crossed the line. However, we need not resolve that issue, for regardless of whether Ms. Foster's testimony is inadmissible as fresh-complaint testimony, the following factors ameliorate the prejudice to the defendant from the testimony. First, Ms. Foster's testimony was not of singular weight or importance at trial. Ms. Foster was vigorously cross-examined. R.B. herself testified. Dr. Baskerville's testimony, although not conclusive of abuse, did highlight the results of the gynecological exam, which could be interpreted to be consistent with abuse, and the child's atypical response to being vaginally examined. Thus, in addition to the fresh-complaint testimony, other medical and psychological testimony supported the victim's assertions. Thus, unlike Hill, supra, 121 N.J. at 167, 578 A. 2d at 379, the fresh-complaint evidence in this case was not the accusor's sole corroboration. Second, if we were to remand for a new trial, there is a strong likelihood that Ms. Foster's testimony would be admissible pursuant to Evidence Rule 63(33) (enacted subsequent to the Bethune trial), governing the tender-years exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, Ms. Foster's testimony would establish not merely that R.B. had complained but also the substance and details of her conversation with the child. See State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348, 537 A. 2d 667 (1988). Ms. Foster's testimony, then, would not be excluded on remand. Therefore, we find that even if the trial court erred when it admitted Ms. Foster's testimony, the error was harmless.