Opinion ID: 1407728
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Degree of Suspicion Mandated by the Fourth Amendment

Text: For investigatory traffic stops conducted pursuant to Terry, the totality of the circumstances approach creates the possibility that multiple factors quite consistent with innocent travel can, when viewed together, amount to reasonable suspicion. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (citations omitted). Indeed, Terry and its progeny accept[ ] the risk that officers may stop innocent people. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Ultimately, then, the key determination is not the innocence of an individual's conduct, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a consequence of the inherent risk that Terry stops will be conducted against innocent persons, appellate courts should take great care not to set the standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion so low that the Fourth Amendment is rendered meaningless. It is true that the degree of suspicion required for Terry stops is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence and obviously less demanding than that for probable cause. Id. at 7, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (citations omitted). On the other hand, the requisite degree of suspicion must be high enough to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Such would be the case if reasonable suspicion were to be founded upon an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch' and nothing more. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868.