Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Unconstitutionality of Exclusions Based Solely on the Questionnaires

Text: (1) Under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], `[a] prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is . . . subject to challenge for cause . . . .' ( People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 671 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657].) Defendant contends the trial court violated Witt by excusing 18 prospective jurors for cause based solely on their written questionnaires and without any followup questioning. He argues the trial court had a constitutional duty to personally question prospective jurors. As an initial matter, respondent contends defendant has waived this claim because defendant's trial counsel himself urged the trial court to excuse jurors solely on the basis of their written questionnaires. We agree. The record indicates that trial counsel explicitly endorsed the procedure defendant now challenges on appeal. Defendant has therefore waived this claim. (Cf. People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 452 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] [claim not waived because the record disclosed no indication defendant conceded the propriety of the procedure].) (2) In the alternative, defendant contends that even if his trial counsel urged the procedure, the issue should be reviewed because counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S 668 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052]. Defendant contends the only reason for excusing prospective jurors solely on the basis of their questionnaires was to speed up the voir dire process (which he argues is not a valid tactical reason), and trial counsel had no other valid tactical reason for urging the procedure. We disagree. On excusing prospective jurors solely on the basis of questionnaires, we have cautioned that [t]he legitimate pursuit of laudatory efficiency should not be transformed into an arbitrary pursuit of speed for its own sake. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 530, fn. 25 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076].) But such was not the case here. As expressed by trial counsel and the trial court, the reason for using the questionnaires to exclude obviously Witt -impaired prospective jurors was not to gain speed for its own sake; rather, it was to spend more time with the remaining jurors at voir dire. For example, Defense Counsel Jay Grossman asserted that I think having 20 jurors on Monday morning is better than having 30 when you know there's ten or eight that you're not going to have anyway based on this questionnaire, and that my idea in suggesting that we do this, is that it gives us more time to focus on people that both sides kind of agree are a reasonable part of the pool. The record thus indicates trial counsel had a reasonable tactical strategy in urging the procedure and placing heavy initial reliance on the questionnaires. [8] Turning to the merits of the claim, we have, as defendant acknowledges, previously rejected the argument that excusing a prospective juror for cause solely on the basis of a written questionnaire is per se unconstitutional. ( People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 781-790 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041].) [R]eliance on written responses alone to excuse prospective jurors for cause is permissible if, from those responses, it is clear (and `leave[s] no doubt') that a prospective juror's views about the death penalty would satisfy the Witt standard ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412) and that the juror is not willing or able to set aside his or her personal views and follow the law. ( Id. at p. 787.) As discussed below, we conclude from our review of the individual questionnaires that the trial court did not err in discharging these prospective jurors for cause.