Opinion ID: 2529627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Collective-Bargaining Agreement

Text: Petitioners claim that this court overlooked that, [a]s a non-tenured teacher, Warning's right to have a corrective deficiency plan arises solely out of the collective bargaining agreement. I agree. My colleagues in the majority overlooked the legal centrality of the collective-bargaining agreement in this case. Lacking this focus, with corresponding analysis, this court reached a result that is contrary to settled labor law. One of the fundamental policies of the NLRA and the IELRA is freedom of contract. Indeed, it is a fundamental principle that a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a contract. Kozura v. Tulpehocken Area School District, 568 Pa. 64, 791 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Pa.2002). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the fundamental premise of the NLRA is private bargaining without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract, but with governmental supervision of only the bargaining procedure. H.K. Porter Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 397 U.S. 99, 108, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970). [11] Indeed, federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote the formation of the collective-bargaining agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it. Mulvihill v. Top-Flite Golf Co., 335 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir.2003); United Telegraph Workers v. Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 704 (3d Cir.1985). Correspondingly, the Illinois General Assembly has declared that the public policy of this state is to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all educational employees and their employers and that this overall policy may best be accomplished by    requiring educational employers to negotiate and bargain with employee organizations representing educational employees and to enter into written agreements evidencing the result of such bargaining. 115 ILCS 5/1 (West 2004). Section 10 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA) mandated that the District and the Union confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, and to execute a written contract incorporating any agreement reached by such obligation. (Emphasis added.) 115 ILCS 5/10 (West 2004). When the District and the Union negotiated in good faith about subjects such as discharge and remediation procedures, and memorialized the bargain that they struck in the collective-bargaining agreement, they created a set of rules governing their future relations. See Gratiot Community Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board, 51 F.3d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir.1995); 242 Ill.2d at 135-36, 351 Ill.Dec. at 265, 950 N.E.2d at 1093 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Theis, J.). In creating the collective-bargaining agreement, the District and the Union deliberately bargained for certain adjustments and concessions. The agreement embodies mutual assent and, during the duration of the contract, either party should be able to rely on the provisions previously bargained for during negotiation of the agreement. See Port Huron Education Ass'n v. Port Huron Area School District, 452 Mich. 309, 550 N.W.2d 228, 239-40 (Mich.1996). Accordingly, any rights and remedies possessed by the union and the employer, as parties to the agreement, and by the employee, as a third-party beneficiary thereof, ultimately derive primarily from the language of the agreement itself. Kozura, 791 A.2d at 1174. Once the collective-bargaining agreement is made, its own provisions govern the procedures for resolving disputes which arise under its terms. P.R. Mallory & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 411 F.2d 948, 952 (7th Cir.1969). Provided that the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement do not violate or conflict with a statute or other controlling law, the rights and remedies delineated by the parties in a specific agreement must be respected. Kozura, 791 A.2d at 1174; In re White Mountain Regional School District, 154 N.H. 136, 908 A.2d 790, 794 (N.H.2006) (same; holding that school district violated collective-bargaining agreement regarding teacher evaluation procedures). Therefore, where a collective bargaining agreement is in place, representation rights must be based upon, and may be limited by, that pact. Landers v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 814 F.2d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 485 U.S. 652, 108 S.Ct. 1440, 99 L.Ed.2d 745 (1988). The collective-bargaining agreement in this case, as is true in any collective bargaining agreement, represents a series of trade-offs between an employer and employees reaching a mutually satisfying agreement. Courts should be loathe for a multitude of reasons to abrogate clauses in such contracts absent a pressing legal reason. Espinal v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 253 F.3d 629, 632 (11th Cir.2001). Because of the fundamental policy of freedom of contract, the parties are generally free to agree to whatever specific rules they like, and in most circumstances it is beyond the competence of regulatory agencies or the courts to interfere with the parties' choice. See Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 962 F.2d 48, 57 (D.C.Cir.1992). A court must enforce a collective-bargaining agreement as written so as to give effect to the intent of the contracting parties. A court may not abrogate a lawful agreement merely because one of the bargaining parties is unhappy with a term of the contract and would prefer to negotiate a better arrangement. National Labor Relations Board v. United States Postal Service, 8 F.3d 832, 836 (D.C.Cir.1993). In the present case, this court's only reference to the dispositive significance of the collective-bargaining agreement is found near the end of the majority opinion, where the court erroneously concludes: Warning's proof that she engaged in a protected union activity is lacking because she has provided no evidence that she was entitled, either by law or contract, to union representation at remediation meetings. 242 Ill.2d at 121, 351 Ill.Dec. at 258, 950 N.E.2d at 1086. Without express analysis, the court appears to concede that the collective-bargaining agreement could have entitled Warning to union representation at the 2004-05 meetings. However, this court relies on only one portion of one section of the collective-bargaining agreement. The court reasons: The collective-bargaining agreement here does not explicitly give employees the right to union representation at remediation meetings. Rather, our reading of the contract indicates to us that the right to union representation does not attach to postobservation conferences and remediation, where the possible `disciplinary action' the employee faces is performance based. We reach this conclusion based on section 3-8(F) of the collective-bargaining agreement, which specifically provides, `Evaluative conclusions and remediation decisions are made in the sole discretion of the evaluating supervisor and are non-grievable and non-arbitrable.' This being so, a union representative would have no official role to play at postobservation conferences and remediation meetings. 242 Ill.2d at 121-22, 351 Ill. Dec. at 258, 950 N.E.2d at 1086. This court did not consider the relevant provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. In my dissent, I referenced several sections of the collective-bargaining agreement that indisputably granted Warning the right to union representation at the meetings during the 2004-05 school year. See 242 Ill.2d at 129-30, 351 Ill.Dec. at 261-62, 950 N.E.2d at 1089-90 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Theis, J.). Significantly, the majority cited only part of section 3-8F of the collective-bargaining agreement. That entire section reads as follows, with the part omitted from the majority opinion italicized: Evaluative procedures, contained herein, are subject to the grievance procedure. Evaluative conclusions and remediation decisions are made in the sole discretion of the evaluating supervisor and are non-grievable and non-arbitrable. (Emphasis added.) Further, my colleagues in the majority omit entirely section 7H of the employee handbook, which supplements the collective-bargaining agreement as follows: Evaluative procedures, contained herein, including those pertaining to employee remediation, are subject to the grievance procedure. (Emphasis added.) Also, section 3-1OA provides that a teacher is entitled to union representation for disciplinary matters. These provisions supplied the context and justification for Warning's actions. When the relevant sections of the collective-bargaining agreement are viewed in their entirety, it is clear to see where the court goes off track. Rehearing should be granted in order to allow this court to apply fundamental principles of labor law to the fairly-bargained-for agreement in this case. [12]