Opinion ID: 527859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The County of Cook

Text: 41 Thompson also appeals the district court's decision to grant Cook County's motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Cook County's practice of simply following state law is not the promulgation or maintenance of a practice which directly causes injury. Thus, the court refused to impose section 1983 liability upon Cook County for its alleged violation of Thompson's constitutional rights. 42 In Monell [v. Dept. of Social Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)], the Supreme Court held that a municipality can be found liable under Sec. 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. City of Canton v. Harris, --- U.S. ----, ----, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (discussing Monell ) (emphasis in original). The Court has noted that the issue is whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom, and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. Nevertheless, Thompson argues that Cook County is liable for its failure to train its employees--Hardiman, Patrick, and their subordinates--under the Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Canton. There, the Court held that a municipality may be found liable under section 1983 if the deprivation results from its failure to train its employees, but only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons with whom [its employees] come into contact. Id. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 1204. 43 The problem with Thompson's failure to train argument, and his corresponding argument that the county promulgated a policy of blindly following the state's decisions, is that Cook County itself has no authority to train the employees involved or to set the policies under which they operate. The Cook County Jail, and the Cook County Department of Corrections, are solely under the supervision and control of the Sheriff of Cook County. See Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 125, paragraphs 202, 203 (Smith-Hurd 1967 & Supp.1989). The Sheriff is an independently-elected constitutional officer who answers only to the electorate, not to the Cook County Board of Commissioners. Ill. Const. Art. VII, Sec. 4(c); see also Baltz v. County of Will, 609 F.Supp. 992, 995 (N.D.Ill.1985); Thomas v. Talesky, 554 F.Supp. 1377, 1378-79 (N.D.Ill.1983). Consequently, Thompson cannot maintain a section 1983 action against Cook County for practices, policies, or actions which are unrelated to that entity. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cook County under Monell.III. CONCLUSION 44 We hold that the district court correctly found that the state defendants were absolutely immune from suit in light of the quasi-judicial nature of their activities. We also hold that the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the county defendants, Hardiman and Patrick, and Cook County. Thompson cannot demonstrate that any entity other than the state had the responsibility for conducting the allegedly untimely parole revocation hearing. 45 The district court's decision is in all respects AFFIRMED.