Opinion ID: 886611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 22 Did the District Court err when it denied Spooner's motion to dismiss? ¶ 23 Spooner contends that Maner's evidence did not prove a prima facie case for wrongful attachment. It maintains that Maner offered no evidence of malicious attachment and that Spooner was entitled to an involuntary dismissal of the claim as a matter of law. ¶ 24 To prevail on a counterclaim for wrongful attachment, a claimant must prove the responding party: 1) lacked probable cause; 2) acted with malice; 3) interfered with the claimant's rights to that property; 4) the attachment terminated in the claimant's favor; and 5) the claimant was damaged. See Montgomery v. Hunt (1987), 227 Mont. 279, 738 P.2d 887; Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corp. (1954) 239 N.C. 595, 80 S.E.2d 645. A lack of probable cause exists when, at the time of the attachment, the plaintiff did not have reason to believe that the factors necessary to sustain an attachment were present. 6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment and Garnishment § 607 (1999). Malice requires a willful disregard for the rights of another with an improper motive, and may be inferred from a lack of probable cause. Mosback v. Smith Bros. Sheep Co. (1922), 65 Mont. 42, 46, 210 P. 910, 912; 6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment and Garnishment § 606. ¶ 25 Spooner had to have been entitled to payment from Maner to have probable cause for the issuance of a writ of attachment against Maner's property. Spooner's Affidavit in Support of Prejudgment Attachment alleges that it was entitled to payment from Maner pursuant to the Plum Creek agreement and for rental fees for using Spooner's Crawler. In Spooner I, ¶ 38, we held that Spooner was deemed to have admitted that it was not entitled to any money from the Plum Creek agreement and not entitled to any rental fees associated with Maner's use of the Crawler. That admission could be construed to establish that Spooner lacked the requisite probable cause for seeking a writ of prejudgment attachment. ¶ 26 There was also testimony which suggested that Spooner knew where Maner could be contacted at all times relevant to this dispute. However, the evidence indicates that Spooner did not attempt to contact Maner to submit a bill, request payment, or discuss any concerns about the Plum Creek agreement. Instead, Spooner filed a lien against, and later attached, Maner's skidder with the intent to bid on it at the sheriff's sale. Maner testified Spooner disabled his skidder and it was inoperable when he regained possession. These actions prevented Maner from seeking new work, damaged his reputation, and interfered with his right to use and possess his skidder. When the testimony and evidence presented by Maner is construed in a light most favorable to him, the facts are sufficient to establish that Spooner acted with malice. Therefore we, conclude that the District Court did not err when it denied Spooner's motion to dismiss.