Opinion ID: 2328160
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The trial court's failure to consider the recommendation of the Peer Review Committee

Text: At bottom, this exception challenges the legal correctness of Judge McCrone's ruling on the inadmissibility of the Report of the Peer Review Panel (hereafter, Peer Review Report) and the letter communications between Bar Counsel and Respondent's counsel concerning the availability to Respondent of a conditional diversion agreement. In connection with this exception is Bar Counsel's motion asking us to strike from the record the Exhibit containing the Peer Review Report and letter communications, and all references to them in Respondent's Exceptions. For the reasons that follow, we grant the motion and overrule the exception. Respondent makes plain in his Exceptions why, in his view, he should be permitted to rely on the contents of the Exhibit. He states that he seeks to use the Report of the Peer Review Committee to support his contention that a conditional diversion agreement is the appropriate disposition. Respondent does not contend that the Peer Review Report and letter communications are relevant to either the charged rule violations or mitigation. For his part, Bar Counsel argues in the motion to strike (as he did before Judge McCrone) that the Peer Review Report and letter communications are irrelevant to the issues to be decided, either by the hearing judge, or, ultimately, by us. In support, Bar Counsel directs us to several of our opinions on the subject, among which we find Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kinnane, 390 Md. 324, 888 A.2d 1178 (2005), particularly instructive. In that case, the respondent Kinnane had sought at his evidentiary hearing to have admitted into evidence the Peer Review Panel's Report, for the purpose of clarify[ing] the record `with respect to how the formal Bar Counsel petition ultimately was arrived at and filed with the Circuit Court' and that filing of [the petition] was not recommended to Bar Counsel. Kinnane, 390 Md. at 334, 888 A.2d at 1184. The hearing judge refused to admit the Peer Review Report into evidence, reasoning that the Peer Review recommendation was irrelevant for any material purpose and that admission of the Panel Report would violate Maryland Rule 16-723(a).... Id. at 333-34 n. 9, 888 A.2d at 1184 n. 9. We upheld the hearing judge's evidentiary ruling and therefore overruled Kinnane's exception to it. We emphasized that Rule 16-743the rule providing for the Peer Review processmakes clear the limited office that it performs. Kinnane, 390 Md. at 335, 888 A.2d at 1185. We explained that the Peer Review Panel's recommendation function, like that of Bar Counsel, is solely for the benefit of the Attorney Grievance Commission, which then determines whether, and what, charges are to be filed[.] Id., 888 A.2d at 1185. Thus, whether Bar Counsel [or the Peer Review Panel] recommends the filing of charges or another procedure is not only not dispositive ... it is irrelevant. Id. at 335-36, 888 A.2d at 1185; see also id. at 338, 888 A.2d at 1187 (characterizing the function of Peer Review Panels as merely recommendatory, one that is not binding and certainly not dispositive and, consequently, there is even more reason to `insulate' Peer Review Panel Reports from subsequent disclosure at later stages of the attorney discipline process). In short, the recommendation of the Peer Review Panel suggests to the Attorney Grievance Commission, but not to us, what the majority of the panel members considers to be the appropriate course of a given attorney discipline investigation. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 108-09, 874 A.2d 897, 908 (2005) (the purpose of the Peer Review Panel is not principally to make recommendations as to the appropriateness of formal charges; if it appears to the panel that there is a substantial basis for formal charges and there is reason to believe that the [respondent] attorney has committed professional misconduct or is incapacitated, the Panel may ... make an appropriate recommendation to the Commission or ... inform the parties of its determination and allow the attorney an opportunity to consider a reprimand or a Conditional Diversion Agreement). [5] If it happens that the Attorney Grievance Commission directs Bar Counsel to file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, as was the case here, then the Peer Review Panel's recommendation has no further relevance. Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Cappell, 389 Md. 402, 420, 886 A.2d 112, 123 (2005) (The issue of assessing the appropriate sanction to be imposed after review of the merits of a disciplinary action is a matter left solely to the province of this Court.). Furthermore, and in any case, Peer Review Panel Reports are confidential. See Kinnane, 390 Md. at 336, 888 A.2d at 1185 (The Report of the Peer Review Panel qualifies as `records and proceedings [that] are confidential and not open to public inspection [whose] contents may not be revealed by the Commission, the staff of the Commission, Bar Counsel, the staff and investigators of the Office of Bar Counsel, members of the Peer Review Committee, or any attorney involved in the proceeding.' (quoting Md. Rule 16-723)). Respondent presents us with no exception to this rule of confidentiality, and we know of none. Respondent's exception and Bar Counsel's motion to strike are both controlled by Kinnane. Much as the respondent in Kinnane evidently sought ultimately to accomplish in his case, [6] Respondent sought to have the Peer Review Report entered into evidence at the hearing on the Petition, and now considered by us, for no reason other than to suggest that a conditional diversion agreement should have been the appropriate disposition of the matter, rather than the filing of formal charges. As in Kinnane's case, Judge McCrone properly ruled the evidence inadmissible. And, as in Kinnane, we uphold that evidentiary ruling. We therefore grant Bar Counsel's motion to strike and overrule the exception insofar as the motion and exception relate to the Peer Review Report. For much the same reasons, we likewise grant the balance of Bar Counsel's motion to strike and overrule the remainder of Respondent's exception, in connection with a conditional diversion agreement. By the plain language of Maryland Rule 16-736, a conditional diversion agreement is entirely voluntary in nature. The rule provides that neither Bar Counsel nor the [attorney] is obliged to propose or enter into a conditional diversion agreement. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Olver, 376 Md. 650, 658, 831 A.2d 66, 71 (2003). [7] Respondent nevertheless argues that: (1) a conditional diversion agreement is appropriate under the circumstances of his case; (2) Bar Counsel failed to properly consider a conditional diversion agreement; and (3) therefore, the case should be remanded to the Attorney Grievance Commission, to permit consideration of a conditional diversion agreement. Respondent relies heavily on Cappell, 389 Md. 402, 886 A.2d 112, to advance the argument. In Cappell, the attorney respondent was found by the hearing judge to have committed several acts of misappropriation by using client funds for personal and firm expenses. In addition to other mitigating factors, the hearing judge found that Cappell's major depression and personality disorder were the root cause of his misconduct. Id. at 405, 886 A.2d at 114. We took the unusual step of remanding the case so the Attorney Grievance Commission and Bar Counsel could reconsider a conditional diversion agreement even though disciplinary proceedings had begun. See id. at 426, 886 A.2d at 126. Respondent characterizes what occurred in Cappell this way: [U]nder the facts and circumstances of that case, particularly Mr. Cappell's depression, this Court found that remand for proper consideration of a Conditional Diversion Agreement by the Attorney Grievance Commission was required. Respondent's characterization of the reason for remand misses the mark. We deemed a remand necessary in Cappell because it was evident to us that Bar Counsel misunderstood the scope and availability of conditional diversion agreements under Maryland Rule 16-743. Specifically, Bar Counsel believed that our decision in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001), rendered conditional diversion agreements per se unavailable in matters involving misappropriation of client funds or other dishonest conduct. Cappell, 389 Md. at 415, 886 A.2d at 119-20. In correcting Bar Counsel's misconception, we explained that a conditional diversion agreement may be appropriate when there is competent evidence presented from which Bar Counsel and therefore the Commission may conclude that an attorney's unprofessional conduct was not solely the result of wilful or intentional[] dishonesty.... Id. at 426, 886 A.2d at 126. We noted that the Committee note for Maryland Rule 16-736(a) provides: Examples of conduct that may be susceptible to a conditional diversion agreement include conduct arising from[,] inter alia, emotional stress or crisis or abuse of alcohol or other drugs. Under those circumstances, we explained, the resulting [m]ental impairment is a mitigating factor and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney's misconduct. Cappell, 389 Md. at 422, 886 A.2d at 124. We took pains to make clear that the Vanderlinde standard of mitigation (i.e., that when faced with proffers of mitigation involving mental disability, such proffers must pass the `root cause' analysis to be compelling, see Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 209, 9 A.3d 37, 51-52 (2010) (emphasis omitted)) is a separate standard and is not a factor in deciding whether a case qualifies for disposition under Rule 16-736. Cappell, 389 Md. at 422, 886 A.2d at 124. Important for present purposes, we said nothing in Cappell concerning whether a conditional diversion agreement was in fact advisable in that case. Indeed, Cappell does not stand remotely for the proposition that a conditional diversion agreement is available to us as a potential disposition of formal charges that have been filed, heard, and proved. Respondent does not contend that Bar Counsel misunderstood the scope of the conditional diversion agreement rule, as was the case in Cappell. Respondent argues instead merely that the facts, circumstances, and mitigating factors warrant remand for reconsideration of a conditional diversion agreement. We have explained why that argument fails at its start; there is simply no authority in either the pertinent rules of procedure or our cases interpreting them that supports the argument at this stage of the grievance process. To summarize what we have decided with regard to this exception and Bar Counsel's motion to strike: For all the reasons we have set forth, Judge McCrone did not err in ruling inadmissible the Peer Review Report and the letter communications between Bar Counsel and Respondent's counsel concerning conditional diversion agreements. Therefore, we grant the motion to strike in its entirety, and we overrule the exception.