Opinion ID: 506204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Authority and Separation of Powers

Text: 13 The Territorial Court, created by the Territorial legislature, pursuant to power granted by the Organic Act, contends on several legal bases that the district court erred in ruling that the Department of the Interior, an executive agency of the United States, instead of the AO, a judicial agency, has authority to audit its record. We turn to the pertinent statutory history. 14 The Revised Organic Act passed by Congress in 1954 (1954 Act) created the office of government comptroller to audit and settle all accounts and claims pertaining to the revenue and receipts from whatever source of the government of the Virgin Islands, and to audit and settle ... all expenditures of funds and property pertaining to the government of the Virgin Islands. Organic Act of 1954 Sec. 17(b). In 1982 Congress transferred certain enumerated functions, powers, and duties [previously] vested in the government comptroller for the Virgin Islands ... [to] the Inspector General, Department of the Interior. 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1599 (1982). Included in this transfer was the auditing authority to audit all activities of the government of the Virgin Islands that had previously resided with the government comptroller. Id. 15 The Territorial Court argues that reliance on section 17 is inappropriate because the phrase all activities of the government of the Virgin Islands, should be construed to mean the activities of only the executive branch of the government. We find no merit in this argument because of the breadth of the language employed in the statute and the lack of any valid reason why Congress would want to exclude the other two branches of the territorial government from its auditing supervision. 16 The Territorial Court next asserts that the district court erred in ruling that an executive agency instead of a judicial agency, has authority to audit the Territorial Court. Its position is bottomed on the contention that Sec. 30 of the Organic Act places its judicial branch within the jurisdiction of the AO and excludes the judicial branch from the jurisdiction of the Department of Interior. In effect, the Territorial Court is asserting that the general language of Sec. 17 when read with Sec. 30 shows a congressional intent to carve out an exception to the generality of Sec. 17 by placing the auditing function over the Territorial Court in the AO. From this premise, the Territorial Court argues that only the AO has audit authority over the Territorial Court. 17 Section 30, also enacted in 1954, states in pertinent part that 18 [a]ll reports required by law to be made by the Governor to any official of the United States shall hereafter be made to the Secretary of the Interior, and the President is hereby authorized to place all matters pertaining to the government of the Virgin Islands under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, except matters relating to the judicial branch of said government which on the date of approval of this Act [July 22, 1954] are under the supervision of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 19 (emphasis added). 20 The Territorial Court relies on the emphasized language to suggest that the totality of the Territorial Court system was thereby brought under AO supervision, at least as to the auditing function. 21 The scope of the authority possessed by the AO is defined by Title 28. Unlike the express authority given the AO to audit the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the relevant provisions of Title 28 in effect in 1954 did not grant the AO authority to audit the Territorial Court or its predecessor local courts. See 28 U.S.C. Secs. 604(a)(11), 610 (1982); see also 1951 U.S. Code Cong.Serv. 738. Consequently, such power remained where the district court said it was, in the Department of the Interior. 22 The Territorial Court next contends that, if the relevant statutes confer authority on the Department of the Interior to audit the Territorial Court, such a conferral of authority is unconstitutional, as it violates separation of powers principles, and the due process and equal protection rights of the people of the Virgin Islands. The Territorial Court points out that the Department of the Interior is an executive agency, while the Territorial Court is a judicial body. Permitting an executive agency to audit this judicial body, asserts the Territorial Court, would violate the constitutional principle that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches are independent and co-equal branches of the government. 23 Assuming, without deciding, that separation of powers principles may be viable as among the branches of the territorial government, we are convinced that the doctrine is inapplicable in resolving an attack made on an Act of Congress dealing with the Virgin Islands. We are unwilling to find such a constraint on Congress in its relations with the territories of the United States. 1 U.S. CONST. art IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2 (Congress is authorized to make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States); see also Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 205, 97 S.Ct. 1774, 1780, 52 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 24 In light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the Department of the Interior had authority to audit the Territorial Court and authority to issue the subpoena. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.App. Sec. 6(a)(4) (1982). 25