Opinion ID: 75997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jenness v. Fortson

Text: 8 In support of their challenges to this requirement, Appellants first acknowledge the decision in Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), where the United States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the same Georgia law over thirty years ago. In Jenness, the Supreme Court stated that [t]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot — the interest ... in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election. Id. at 442. The Supreme Court compared Georgia's 5% signature requirement with the Ohio election law struck down in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). The Ohio law barred write-in voting, required nominees to be endorsed by a political party established enough to participate in the state primary, and created a 15% signature requirement that candidates were required to fulfill unreasonably early. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 436-38, 91 S.Ct. 1970. In comparison, Georgia's 5% signature requirement, in the context of the open quality of the Georgia system, was not unconstitutional. Id. at 439-40, 91 S.Ct. 1970. 9 After acknowledging Jenness, the Appellants argue in this case that Georgia's new notarization requirement and its new congressional districts have changed the Georgia system so much that Jenness no longer applies. We disagree. In upholding the validity of the Georgia system over thirty years ago in Jenness, the Supreme Court noted that Georgia impose[d] no suffocating restrictions whatever upon the free circulation of nominating petitions. Id. at 438, 91 S.Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court observed that under the Georgia system: 10 A voter may sign a petition even though he has signed others, and a voter who has signed the petition of a nonparty candidate is free thereafter to participate in a party primary. The signer of a petition is not required to state that he intends to vote for that candidate at the election. A person who has previously voted in a party primary is fully eligible to sign a petition, and so, on the other hand is a person who was not even registered at the time of a previous election. 11 Id. at 438-39, 91 S.Ct. 1970 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court also noted that [n]o signature on a nominating petition need be notarized under the Georgia system. Id. at 439, 91 S.Ct. 1970. 12 Under the current Georgia system, it is still true that no signature on a nominating petition need be notarized. The new notarization requirement to which the Appellants referred provides that an individual circulating a petition sheet submit a sworn affidavit before a notary public attesting that, among other things, each signer manually signed his or her own name with full knowledge of the contents of the nomination petition. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170(d)(2) (Supp.2002). The notarization requirement places no restriction upon the ability of a voter to sign a petition. 13 The Appellants' complaint also alleges that the 5% requirement is no longer acceptable because petitioning experience shows that voters cannot identify correctly their respective congressional districts, especially after reapportionment, thereby requiring petition circulators to acquire surplus signatures. Even accepting Appellants' allegations, we conclude that, like the notarization requirement, reapportionment has not imposed any suffocating restrictions upon the free circulation of nominating petitions. Reapportionment arguably may lead to some voter confusion and may place an extra burden on candidates to be sure that they have obtained the requisite 5%. Even so, this does not make the 5% requirement unduly burdensome for independent candidates. In Georgia, as Jenness notes, petition circulators have ample time to obtain signatures — about six months. 403 U.S. at 438, 91 S.Ct. 1970; O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170(d)(3) (Supp.2002). Furthermore, no harm results if a voter accidentally signs the wrong petition, as [a] voter may sign a petition even though he has signed others. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438-39, 91 S.Ct. 1970. Also, the boundaries of the districts are known to the petition circulators who readily can ask voters where they reside and thereby ascertain if they reside in the district. In short, Appellants fail to establish that Jenness no longer applies. 14 Appellants also stress that no Libertarian Party candidate has ever been able to satisfy the 5% requirement for ballot access. But Jenness directly addressed the 5% figure, stating as follows: 15 The 5% figure is, to be sure, apparently somewhat higher than the percentage of support required to be shown in many States as a condition for ballot position, but this is balanced by the fact that Georgia has imposed no arbitrary restrictions whatever upon the eligibility of any registered voter to sign as many nominating petitions as he wishes. Georgia in this case has insulated not a single potential voter from the appeal of new political voices within its borders. 16 Id. at 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970 (citation omitted). In sum, we conclude the following analysis in Jenness still equally pertains today, to wit: The fact is, of course, that from the point of view of one who aspires to elective public office in Georgia, alternative routes are available to getting his name printed on the ballot. He may enter the primary of a political party, or he may circulate nominating petitions either as an independent candidate or under the sponsorship of a political organization. We cannot see how Georgia has violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by making available these two alternative paths, neither of which can be assumed to be inherently more burdensome than the other. 17 Id. at 440-41, 91 S.Ct. 1970 (citation omitted).