Opinion ID: 105074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: disposition of constitutional issues.

Text: Next we direct our attention to the records which were before the District Court in order to review that court's conclusions that North Carolina accorded petitioners a fair adjudication of their federal questions. Questions of discrimination and admission of coerced confessions lie in the compass of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Have petitioners received hearings consonant with standards accepted by this Nation as adequate to justify their convictions? Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312; Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46. First. We take up Brown v. Allen, No. 32, a case that turns more generally than the others on the constitutional issues. Petitioner, a Negro, was indicted on September 4, 1950, and tried in the North Carolina courts on a charge of rape, and, having been found guilty, he was sentenced to death on September 15, 1950. In the sentencing court petitioner made a timely motion to quash the bill of indictment, alleging discrimination against Negroes in the selection of grand jurors in contravention of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. After the verdict, but before sentencing, petitioner, by a motion to set aside the verdict, sought to expand his constitutional attack on the selection of the grand jury to embrace the petit jury also. On appeal the State Supreme Court treated, as we do, petitioner's motions as adequate to challenge the selection of both juries. 233 N. C. 202, 205-206, 63 S. E. 2d 99, 100-101. A second federal question was raised in the sentencing court when petitioner opposed admission into evidence of a confession which he alleged had been given involuntarily. Following sentencing, petitioner took an appeal to the State Supreme Court and there presented for review the issues of jury discrimination and admission of a coerced confession. On this appeal, that court had before it both a brief on behalf of petitioner and a transcript of all those portions of the sentencing court proceedings which petitioner deemed relevant to a review of his federal questions. [20] Dealing with the federal constitutional questions on their merits, the State Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99. A. Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Negroes in the selection of grand and petit jurors in violation of his constitutional rights attacks the operation of a method used by North Carolina in selecting juries in Forsyth County. The statutes detailing the method of selection are cited below. [21] It is petitioner's contention that no more than one or two Negroes at a time have ever served on a Forsyth County grand jury and that no more than five Negroes have ever previously served on a petit jury panel in the county. These contentions are the basis of the allegation that a system of discrimination is being employed against the Negro residents of the county. Petitioner offered no evidence to support his charge of limitation against the jury service of Negroes, except the fact that fewer Negroes than whites, having regard for their proportion of the population, appeared on the jury panels. The 1940 Census shows the following figures in respect to the population of Forsyth County. Population Percent 21 Plus Percent White ............. 85,323 67.5 50,499 66.5 Negro ............. 41,152 32.5 25,057 33.5 _______ _____ ______ _____ Total ............. 126,475 100.0 75,556 100.0 According to the unchallenged testimony of the IBM Supervisor in the office of the Tax Supervisor of Forsyth County, a list of names is compiled from a tabulation of all the county property and poll taxpayers who make returns and is thereafter tendered to the County Commissioners for use in jury selection. All males between 21 and 50 years of age are required to list themselves for poll tax as well as to list their property. Gen. Stat. of North Carolina, Recompiled 1950, §§ 105-307, 105-341. In 1948, Winston Township, the most heavily populated in Forsyth County, had 7,659 white males and 2,752 colored males who listed polls. In the County of Forsyth outside Winston Township, 10,319 white males and 587 colored males listed polls. This indicates that Negroes number approximately 16% of the listed taxpayers. No figures appear in the record of the percentage of Negroes on the property tax lists. In June 1949, a list of approximately 40,000 names compiled from all the tax lists was handed to the Commissioners by the office of the Tax Supervisor. There is uncontradicted testimony by the IBM Supervisor that the list of jurors was prepared without regard to color, and that it constituted a complete compilation of the names of all resident, adult, listed taxpayers of Forsyth County. Both the grand and petit jury panels employed in this case were drawn from that pool. All the names on that list and no others (the list having been cut up into individual slips of uniform size bearing only one person's name) were put into a jury box. The selection from the jury box of names of persons subject to a summons to serve as grand jurors in a term of court is made by lot, as is the selection of panels of persons subject to summons for duty on petit juries. As the drawings were made by a small child and recorded in public there is no claim or evidence of chicanery in the drawings. Grand jurors in Forsyth County are selected in January and July for a six months' term. See c. 206, 1937 Public-Local Laws, as amended by c. 264, 1947 N. C. Session Laws, as amended by c. 577, 1949 N. C. Session Laws. A panel of 60 names is drawn from the jury box each December and June by a child in the presence of the County Commissioners. At the June 5, 1950, meeting of the Commissioners, 60 names were drawn. These 60 names constituted the panel of persons subject to summons for service on the grand jury which returned the indictment against petitioner. After such a drawing, a jury order is immediately prepared and given to the sheriff, who then summons all the parties he can find to appear for drawings for grand or petit jury service, as the case may be. All persons whose names were drawn were summoned if they could be found. Although there is no evidence as to how many persons were summoned by the sheriff, there is evidence to show that at least four or five Negroes were summoned. The final drawing for grand jury service is conducted in the courtroom in the presence of the Superior Court Judge. When the July 1950 grand jury was selected from the panel of 60, the drawing was again made by a child. The names of all the persons summoned by the sheriff were put into a special section of the jury box and the 18-man grand jury was then drawn. The name of one of the four or five Negroes summoned was drawn in the group of 18, and that Negro served on the grand jury. The remaining names are used for the petit jury panel. When they are needed, petit jury panels in Forsyth County are drawn from the same jury box in groups of 44 persons. C. 206, Public-Local Laws, supra. After a drawing, the names are given to a deputy sheriff who then summons those persons on the list whom he can find. On the lists supplied to the deputies there are no indications as to whether the persons named are Negro or white. According to the statute all summoned persons must report for jury service. At the selection of the petit jurors for the trial of this case 8 of the 37 persons summoned on the panel were Negroes, as were 3 of a special venire of 20. Challenges, peremptory or for cause, eliminated all Negroes. No objections are made to the legality of these challenges. Uncontradicted evidence by a state witness shows that in the two years 1949 and 1950 the percentages of Negroes drawn on grand jury panels in Forsyth County varied between 7% and 10% of all persons drawn. In 1950 the percentage of Negroes drawn on petit jury panels varied between 9% and 17% of all persons drawn. Prior to 1947, the jury list was composed of those taxpayers who had paid all the taxes assessed against them for the preceding year. N. C. Gen. Stat., 1943, § 9-1; cf. State v. Davis, 109 N. C. 780, 14 S. E. 55; State v. Dixon, 131 N. C. 808, 44 S. E. 944. This requirement has now been removed, as is shown by comparing the earlier statutes with the present wording of § 9-1 which was put into law in 1947. No change was made in the duty of all males between 21 and 50 to list their polls for assessment nor of the requirement for the county to collect an annual poll tax. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-307, 105-336, 105-339, 105-341; cf. State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 205, 63 S. E. 2d 99, 100-101. The pool of eligible jurors was thus enlarged. This enlargement and the practice of selecting jurors under the new statute worked a radical change in the racial proportions of drawings of jurors in Forsyth County. As is shown by the record in this Court of Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U. S. 851, tried in North Carolina in October, 1946, Forsyth County with its large Negro population, at that time had a jury pool of 10,622 white and 255 colored citizens. At that time a sheriff, then in office for 10 years, testified that he had summoned only about twelve Negroes for jury service in that time. In 1949, the jury box was purged. All those listing taxes and eligible were listed for jury service with the result in this case shown above. Discriminations against a race by barring or limiting citizens of that race from participation in jury service are odious to our thought and our Constitution. This has long been accepted as the law. Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U. S. 851; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 286-287; State v. Peoples, 131 N. C. 784, 42 S. E. 814. Such discrimination is forbidden by statute, 18 U. S. C. § 243, and has been treated as a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to an accused, of the race against which such discrimination is directed. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370. The discrimination forbidden is racial discrimination, however, directed to accomplish the result of eliminating or limiting the service of the proscribed race by statute or by practice. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463. It was explained in 1880 by this Court, when composed of justices familiar with the evils the Amendment sought to remedy, as permitting a state to confine the selection [of jurors] to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages or to persons having educational qualifications. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310. Cf. Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U. S. 161, 167-168; Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 268-272. While discriminations worked by consistent exclusion have been rigorously dealt with, Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, variations in proportions of Negroes and whites on jury lists from racial proportions in the population have not been considered violative of the Constitution where they are explained and not long continued. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403. Of course, token summoning of Negroes for jury service does not comply with equal protection, Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128. Nor can a race be proscribed as incompetent for service, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400. Responsible as this Court is under the Constitution to redress the jury packing which Bentham properly characterized as a sinister species of art, Bentham, Elements of the Art of Packing as Applied to Special Juries, p. 6, it should not condemn good faith efforts to secure competent juries merely because of varying racial proportions. The Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that objection to the lists based on the racial composition of the tax lists was far-fetched and that it was not a racial discrimination when a list which included only taxpayers was used. State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99. [22] We recognize the fact that these lists have a higher proportion of white citizens than of colored, doubtless due to inequality of educational and economic opportunities. While those who chose the names for the jury lists might have included names other than taxpayers, such action was not mandatory under state law. State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 205, 63 S. E. 2d 99, 100. As only property and poll tax lists were used, see p. 467, supra, this case presents a jury selection as though limited by statute to all property owners and voters. We assume only reasonable tax levies were used. It is to be noted all males between 21 and 50 must list both property, however modest in amount, and polls, see pp. 467-468, supra, so that in that sense there is no exclusion on racial grounds. The name of every property owner and every voter is in the jury box. We recognize, too, that we are now reviewing a constitutional objection to a state court conviction, and we may not act to alter practices of a state which are short of a denial of equal protection or due process in the selection of juries. [23] States should decide for themselves the quality of their juries as best fits their situation so long as the classifications have relation to the efficiency of the jurors and are equally administered. Our duty to protect the federal constitutional rights of all does not mean we must or should impose on states our conception of the proper source of jury lists, so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suitable in character and intelligence for that civic duty. Short of an annual census or required population registration, these tax lists offer the most comprehensive source of available names. We do not think a use, nondiscriminatory as to race, of the tax lists violates the Fourteenth Amendment, nor can we conclude on the evidence adduced that the results of the use require a conclusion of unconstitutionality. Assuming that before the Brunson case, 333 U. S. 851, there were unconstitutional exclusions of Negroes in this North Carolina county, the present record does not show such exclusions in this case. The evidence is to the contrary. The District Court correctly determined this issue as to the grand jury. As both the grand and petit juries in this case were drawn from the same filling of the jury box, the reasoning of the District Court is applicable to the petit jury here involved. B. Petitioner contends further that his conviction was procured in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution because the trial judge permitted the jury to rely on a confession claimed by petitioner to be coerced in determining his guilt. At the trial petitioner registered timely objection to use by the state of his purported confessions. The objection having been made, the trial judge immediately excused the jury and ordered a preliminary examination to determine whether or not the statements were voluntary. It was in this preliminary hearing, in which the petitioner and two police officers testified, that the admitted facts were first developed upon which petitioner rests this phase of his case. After hearing the testimony, the trial judge found that the petitioner's statements were freely and voluntarily given and declared them to be competent. Upon recall of the jury, the state introduced the statements in evidence, objections again being noted. Although the petitioner chose not to take the stand in the trial of his cause, his counsel, while cross-examining the officers who had taken the challenged statements from the petitioner, developed again for the jury all the facts upon which petitioner now relies. A conviction by a trial court which has admitted coerced confessions deprives a defendant of liberty without due process of law. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 280, 286-287. When the facts admitted by the state show coercion, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U. S. 274, a conviction will be set aside as violative of due process. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227. This is true even though the evidence apart from the confessions might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401; see Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 597. Therefore, it does not matter in this case whether or not the jury was acquainted with all the facts laid before the judge upon which petitioner now relies or whether the jury heard or did not hear the petitioner testify. Neither does it matter that there possibly is evidence in the record independent of the confessions which could sustain the verdict. The mere admission of the confessions by the trial judge constituted a use of them by the state, and if the confessions were improperly obtained, such a use constitutes a denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In determining whether a confession has been used by the state in violation of the constitutional rights of a petitioner, a United States court appraises the alleged abuses by the facts as shown at the hearing or admitted on the record. Petitioner's contention that he had a constitutional right to have his statements excluded from the record rests upon these admitted facts. He is an illiterate. He was held after arrest for five days before being charged with the crime for which he was convicted. He was not given a preliminary hearing until 18 days after his arrest. No counsel was provided for him in the period of his detention. The alleged confessions were taken prior to the preliminary hearing and appointment of counsel. There is no record of physical coercion or of that less painful duress generated by prolonged questioning. There is evidence that petitioner was told he could remain silent and that any statement he might make could be used against him. He chose to speak, and he made that choice without a promise of reward or immunity having been extended. He was never denied the right to counsel of his choice and was never without competent counsel from the inception of judicial proceedings. If the delay in the arraignment of petitioner was greater than that which might be tolerated in a federal criminal proceding, due process was not violated. Under the leadership of this Court a rule has been adopted for federal courts, that denies admission to confessions obtained before prompt arraignment notwithstanding their voluntary character. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410. Cf. Allen v. United States, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 197, 202 F. 2d 329. This experiment has been made in an attempt to abolish the opportunities for coercion which prolonged detention without a hearing is said to enhance. But the federal rule does not arise from constitutional sources. The Court has repeatedly refused to convert this rule of evidence for federal courts into a constitutional limitation on the states. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55, 63-65. Mere detention and police examination in private of one in official state custody do not render involuntary the statements or confessions made by the person so detained. Petitioner's constitutional rights were not infringed by the refusal of the trial court to exclude his confessions as evidence. Second. We examine the constitutional issues in No. 22, Speller v. Allen . Petitioner, a Negro, was indicted and in August, 1949, tried in the Superior Court of Bertie County, North Carolina, upon a charge of rape. He has been convicted and sentenced to death on this charge three times, the first two convictions having been set aside on appeal by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on the ground of discriminatory selection of jurors. State v. Speller, 229 N. C. 67, 47 S. E. 2d 537; 230 N. C. 345, 53 S. E. 2d 294. At this, his third trial, August Term 1949, petitioner made a timely motion to set aside the array of special veniremen called from Vance County, alleging discrimination against Negroes solely and wholly on account of their race and/or color in the selection of the veniremen in contravention of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. (Transcript of Record, State v. Speller , August Term 1949, Bertie N. C. Superior Court at 12, Item 91, Clerk's Record, Supreme Court of the United States.) Evidence was taken at length on this issue, although some evidence deemed material by petitioner was excluded. In particular, the trial judge, on the ground that it would be immaterial, infra, p. 480, refused to permit petitioner to produce evidence as to all the scrolls in the jury box for the purpose of showing the existence of dots on the scrolls bearing the names of Negroes. The jury box was produced in court, opened, and counsel for defendant permitted to examine the scrolls. The trial judge made findings relating to the manner of selecting the veniremen, determining that no discrimination was practiced, and on these findings denied the motion to set aside the array. Petitioner was thereafter convicted for the third time, and sentenced to death. On appeal petitioner asserted that his conviction violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, assigning the denial of his motion to set aside the array as error, and also assigning as error the trial court's ruling on his request for permission to examine into all the scrolls in the jury box. The Supreme Court of North Carolina had before it on that appeal as part of the record a mimeographed, narrative-style transcript of the entire proceedings below; petitioner makes no objection to the absence of any relevant evidence on that appeal, except that relating to all the scrolls which had been excluded by the trial court. Upholding the rulings of the trial court, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the conviction, 231 N. C. 549, 57 S. E. 2d 759. Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina after we denied certiorari on direct review of the state proceedings. The petition summarily recited the prior history of the litigation, and raised again the same federal question which had been passed upon by both North Carolina courts, and which had been offered to this Court on petition for certiorari, racial discrimination. The District Court heard all additional evidence the petitioner offered. This was in its discretion. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86; Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S., at 214, cases which establish the power of federal district courts to protect the constitutional rights of state prisoners after the exhaustion of state remedies. It better enabled that court to determine whether any violation of the Fourteenth Amendment occurred. Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Negroes in the selection of petit jurors in violation of his constitutional rights attacks the operation of the system used by the North Carolina authorities to select juries in Vance County, from which county a special venire was obtained to try petitioner. The charge rests on petitioner's contentions (1) that no Negro within recent years had served on a jury in Vance County before this case, (2) that no Negro had been summoned to serve on a jury before this case, and (3) that the jury box in this case was so heavily loaded with names of white persons that the drawing could not fairly reflect a cross-section of those persons in the community qualified for jury service. Petitioner offered evidence to support each of these three contentions. The evidence establishes the correctness of contentions (1) and (2). They are inapplicable to this case, however, under the circumstances of the filling of this particular jury box. As is pointed out in Brown v. Allen, supra, at page 470, North Carolina in 1947 enlarged its pool of citizens eligible for jury service. General Statutes, North Carolina, § 9-1. In Vance County, where the special venire for Speller's trial was drawn, the names of substantial numbers of Negroes appeared thereafter in the jury box. 145 Negroes out of a total of 2,126 names were in this jury box. As this venire was the first drawing of jurors from the box after its purge in July 1949, following the new statute and Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U. S. 851, decided here March 15, 1948, the long history of alleged discrimination against its Negro citizens by Vance County jury commissioners is not decisive of discrimination in the present case. Former errors cannot invalidate future trials. Our problem is whether this venire was drawn from a jury box invalidly filled as to Speller because names were selected by discriminating against Negroes solely on account of race and/or color. It is this particular box that is decisive, cf. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 290 and 295. Past practice is evidence of past attitude of mind. That attitude is shown to no longer control the action of officials by the present fact of colored citizens' names in the jury box. It is suggested that the record shows that the names of colored persons in the jury box were marked with a dot or period on the scroll. This could be used for unlawful disposition of such scrolls when drawn. Such a scheme would be useless in the circumstances of this case. The record shows that the defendant and his counsel were present when the venire was drawn by a child, aged 5. All of the names drawn were given to the sheriff and summonses were issued. As a matter of fact the special venire contained the names of seven Negroes. Four appeared. None sat as jurors. Therefore the assertion as to the dots, even if true, means no more than that some unknown person desired to interfere with the fair drawing of juries in Vance County. The trial court found against petitioner on this question. The District Court pointed out its immateriality. 99 F. Supp., at 97. This box was filled by names selected by the clerk of the jury commissioners and corrected by the commissioners. The names put in were substantially those selected by the clerk, who chose them from those on the tax lists who had the most property. The clerk testified no racial discrimination entered into his selection. Since the effect of this possible objection to the selection of jurors on an economic basis was not raised or developed at the trial, on appeal to the State Supreme Court, on the former certiorari to this Court, or in the petition or brief on the present certiorari to this Court, it is not open to consideration here. [24] Such an important national asset as state autonomy in local law enforcement must not be eroded through indefinite charges of unconstitutional actions. As we have stated above in discussing the Brown case, page 473, et seq., supra, our conclusion that selection of prospective jurors may be made from such tax lists as those required under North Carolina statutes without violation of the Federal Constitution, this point needs no further elaboration. The fact that causes further consideration in this case of the selection of prospective jurors is that the tax lists show 8,233 individual taxpayers in Vance County of whom 3,136 or 38% are Negroes. In the jury box involved, selected from that list, there were 2,126 names. Of that number 145 were Negroes, 7%. This disparity between the races would not be accepted by this Court solely on the evidence of the clerk of the commissioners that he selected names of citizens of good moral character and qualified to serve as jurors, and who had paid their taxes. [25] It would not be assumed that in Vance County there is not a much larger percentage of Negroes with qualifications of jurymen. [26] The action of the commissioners' clerk, however, in selecting those with the most property, an economic basis not attacked here, might well account for the few Negroes appearing in the box. Evidence of discrimination based solely on race in the selection actually made is lacking. The trial and district courts, after hearing witnesses, found no racial discrimination in the selection of the prospective jurors. The conviction was upheld as nondiscriminatory by the State Supreme Court, which had once acted to reverse a conviction of this defendant by a jury deemed tainted with racial discrimination, State v. Speller, 229 N. C. 67, 47 S. E. 2d 537, and again to reverse a conviction when adequate time for investigation of discrimination had not been given. State v. Speller, 230 N. C. 345, 53 S. E. 2d 294. It would require a conviction, by this Court, of violation of equal protection through racial discrimination to set aside this trial. Our delicate and serious responsibility of compelling state conformity to the Constitution by overturning state criminal convictions, should not be exercised without clear evidence of violation. Disregarding, as we think we should, the clerk's unchallenged selections based on taxable property, there is no evidence of racial discrimination. Negroes' names now appear in the jury box. If the requirement of comparative wealth is eliminated, and the statutory standards employed, the number would increase to the equality justified by their moral and educational qualification for jury service as compared with the white race. We do not think the small number, by comparison, of Negro names in this one jury box, is, in itself, enough to establish racial discrimination. Third. We have the problems presented by No. 20, Daniels v. Allen . The two petitioners, Negroes, were indicted and convicted in the North Carolina courts on a charge of murder. Their trial in the Superior Court of Pitt County resulted in a verdict of guilty, and each petitioner was thereafter sentenced to death. There is no issue over guilt under the evidence introduced. In addition to the objections stated above at p. 453discrimination in jury lists, coerced confessions and refusal to hear on the meritsthere is also objection here to the procedure for determination of the voluntariness of the confessions. As the failure to serve the statement of the case on appeal seems to us decisive, we do not discuss in detail the other constitutional issues tendered and only point out that they were resolved against the petitioners by the sentencing state court and the Federal District Court after full hearing of the evidence offered. It is also to be noted that the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused certiorari to review the alleged invasions of constitutional rights by the sentencing court and two efforts of petitioners to secure an order permitting them to apply for coram nobis. [27] The writ of coram nobis is available in North Carolina to test constitutional rights extraneous of the record. In re Taylor, 230 N. C. 566, 53 S. E. 2d 857. In the first coram nobis case the Court said, speaking of its refusal of certiorari: Counsel for petitioners were advised, however, that petition might be filed here for permission to apply to the Superior Court of Pitt County, where the cause was tried, for a writ of error coram nobis, through which, if allowed there, they might be heard on the main features on which they asked for relief, which included matters dehors the record, and that appeal would lie to the Supreme Court in the event of its unfavorable action. S. v. Daniels, supra; In re Taylor (230 N. C.), supra; In re Taylor (229 N. C.), supra. The defendants now file a petition for permission to apply to the Superior Court for such a writ. Their petition does not make a prima facie showing of substance which is necessary to bring themselves within the purview of the writ. [28] 231 N. C. 341, 56 S. E. 2d 646, 647. After the refusal of the first coram nobis petition, the Supreme Court of North Carolina dismissed petitioners' attempted appeal on the record proper on the ground that no case on appeal had been filed. 231 N. C. 509, 57 S. E. 2d 653; Rule 17, 4 N. C. Gen. Stat., App.; id., Vol. 1, § 1-282. Such action accords with well-settled practice in that state. Rules requiring service to be made of case on appeal within the allotted time are mandatory. 231 N. C. 17, 24, 56 S. E. 2d 2, 7. They are applied alike to all appellants. [29] The first application for certiorari to this Court raised federal constitutional objections to the judgments of the Supreme Court of North Carolina on both direct and collateral attack by certiorari and coram nobis on the judgment of the trial court. 339 U. S. 954. The failure to perfect the appeal came in this way. Upon the coming in of the verdict on June 6, 1949, the petitioners several times moved for a new trial, in each motion reiterating one or the other of the aforementioned federal questions. These motions were denied, and the trial court pronounced its sentence. Petitioners excepted to the judgments and noted appeals therefrom to the State Supreme Court. In response to petitioners' notice, the trial judge granted petitioners 60 days in which to make and serve a statement of the case on appeal. When counsel failed to serve this statement until 61 days had expired, the trial judge struck the appeal as out of time. This action precluded an appeal as of right to the State Supreme Court. This situation confronts us. North Carolina furnished a criminal court for the trial of those charged with crime. Petitioners at all times had counsel, chosen by themselves and recognized by North Carolina as competent to conduct the defense. In that court all petitioners' objections and proposals whether of jury discrimination, admission of confessions, instructions or otherwise were heard and decided against petitioners. The state furnished an adequate and easily-complied-with method of appeal. This included a means to serve the statement of the case on appeal in the absence of the prosecutor from his office. State v. Daniels, 231 N. C. 17, 24, 56 S. E. 2d 2, 7. Yet petitioners' appeal was not taken and the State of North Carolina, although the full trial record and statement on appeal were before it, refused to consider the appeal on its merits. [30] The writ of habeas corpus in federal courts is not authorized for state prisoners at the discretion of the federal court. It is only authorized when a state prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States. 28 U. S. C. § 2241. That fact is not to be tested by the use of habeas corpus in lieu of an appeal. [31] To allow habeas corpus in such circumstances would subvert the entire system of state criminal justice and destroy state energy in the detection and punishment of crime. Of course, federal habeas corpus is allowed where time has expired without appeal when the prisoner is detained without opportunity to appeal because of lack of counsel, incapacity, or some interference by officials. [32] Also, this Court will review state habeas corpus proceedings even though no appeal was taken, if the state treated habeas corpus as permissible. [33] Federal habeas corpus is available following our refusal to review such state habeas corpus proceedings. [34] Failure to appeal is much like a failure to raise a known and existing question of unconstitutional proceeding or action prior to conviction or commitment. Such failure, of course, bars subsequent objection to conviction on those grounds. [35] North Carolina has applied its law in refusing this out-of-time review. [36] This Court applies its jurisdictional statute in the same manner. Preston v. Texas, 343 U. S. 917, 933; cf. Paonessa v. New York, 344 U. S. 860, certiorari denied because application therefor was not made within the time provided by law. We cannot say that North Carolina's action in refusing review after failure to perfect the case on appeal violates the Federal Constitution. A period of limitation accords with our conception of proper procedure. Finally, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus for those convicted by the state except pursuant to § 2254. See note 17, supra. See also note 2, supra. We have interpreted § 2254 as not requiring repetitious applications to state courts for collateral relief, p. 447, supra, but clearly the state's procedure for relief must be employed in order to avoid the use of federal habeas corpus as a matter of procedural routine to review state criminal rulings. A failure to use a state's available remedy, in the absence of some interference or incapacity, such as is referred to just above at notes 32 and 33, bars federal habeas corpus. The statute requires that the applicant exhaust available state remedies. To show that the time has passed for appeal is not enough to empower the Federal District Court to issue the writ. The judgment must be affirmed. We have spoken in this opinion of the change of practice in North Carolina in the selection of jurors. Our conclusions have been reached without regard to earlier incidents not connected with these juries or trials that suggest past discriminations. Since the states are the real guardians of peace and order within their boundaries, it is hoped that our consideration of these records will tend to clarify the requirements of the Federal Constitution in the selection of juries. Our Constitution requires that jurors be selected without inclusion or exclusion because of race. There must be neither limitation nor representation for color. By that practice, harmony has an opportunity to maintain essential discipline, without that objectionable domination which is so inconsistent with our constitutional democracy. The judgments are affirmed. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON concurs in this result for the reasons stated in a separate opinion. [See post, pp. 532, 548.] MR. JUSTICE BURTON and MR. JUSTICE CLARK adhere to their position as stated in Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, at 219. They believe that the nature of the proceeding upon a petition for certiorari is such that, when the reasons for a denial of certiorari are not stated, the denial should be disregarded in passing upon a subsequent application for relief, except to note that this source of possible relief has been exhausted. They join in the judgment of the Court in these cases and they concur in the opinion of the Court except insofar as it may contain, in Part II, Subdivision A (pp. 456-457), or elsewhere, any indication that, although the reasons for a denial of certiorari be not stated, those reasons nevertheless may be inferred from the record. They also recognize the propriety of the considerations to which MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER invites the attention of a federal court when confronted with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances stated.