Opinion ID: 222293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jaso’s Request for Equitable Tolling

Text: 17 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 Jaso next argues that the district court erred in refusing to allow his proposed second amended complaint because he properly alleged that the statute of limitations on his claims should have been equitably tolled. Equitable tolling “applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some other extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Rashidi v. Am. President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1996). But a plaintiff who “fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (per curiam); see also Rashidi, 96 F.3d at 128 (declining to apply equitable tolling to claim where plaintiff “could have filed his claim properly with even a modicum of due diligence”). As the first basis for equitable tolling, Jaso claims that the statute of limitations on all of his claims should be tolled because, in 2000, Jaso was “threatened at gunpoint to stop all lawsuits against Coca Cola” and because “there was a kidnapping attempt against his son in Mexico as well as other threats of violence against his immediate family.” Broadly speaking, this type of threat could be viewed as falling under conduct by the defendant that prevents the plaintiff “in some other extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Rashidi, 96 F.3d at 128. Assuming, without deciding, that this conduct could equitably toll the statute of limitations, it does not do so in this case. Jaso’s complaint refers only to two instances in which he or his family was threatened with harm. Both instances occurred in 2000. Proof of threats have been considered in tolling the statute of limitations only where “the threats themselves continue up to the point that the plaintiff brings her action.” Baye v. Diocese of Rapid City, 630 F.3d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Rakes v. 18 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 United States, 442 F.3d 7, 26 (1st Cir. 2006) (plaintiff must demonstrate that threats leading to duress were continuous before equitably tolling the statute of limitations); Overall v. Estate of Klotz, 52 F.3d 398, 404 (2d Cir. 1995) (same). Accordingly, this form of equitable tolling is not available to Jaso, and the district court correctly rejected its application.12 As a second basis for tolling the statute of limitations, Jaso claims that he could not commence his lawsuit against Defendants from Mexico and had to wait until he arrived in the United States in 2008. The district court correctly rejected this argument. Aside from his physical presence in Mexico, Jaso has not alleged that any “extraordinary” circumstance prevented him from obtaining local counsel and commencing his suit against Defendants in the United States. Furthermore, Jaso arrived in the United States in 2008 and did not commence his lawsuit against Defendants until July 7, 2010. Jaso has not demonstrated that he pursued his rights with due diligence, and he cannot invoke equitable tolling on this ground.13 Thus, the district court properly denied Jaso’s motion to amend with respect to his equitable tolling claims, and Jaso’s claims based on 12 Relatedly, Jaso appears to claim that Coca Cola threatened him, that these threats were aided by the Mexican government, and that the threats were “in essence” torture. Thus, according to Jaso, his claims were brought within the ten-year statute of limitations under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying ten-year statute of limitations from Torture Victims Prevention Act to ATCA claim based on torture and extrajudicial killing). Jaso has waived this argument on appeal by failing to raise it below in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 2004). 13 Jaso also argues that a hodgepodge of other factors prevented him from timely commencing his suit against Coca Cola, including the assertions that he suffered from depression and drug dependency and that he was incarcerated in Mexico for four and one half months in 2000 on charges that were later dismissed. None of these factors justified tolling the statute of limitations on any of Jaso’s claims. 19 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 20 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 individual acts of copyright infringement, racketeering activity, and violations of the Lanham Act that occurred outside of the limitations period are barred on remand.