Opinion ID: 1261844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: applicability of statutory caps

Text: The trial court ruled the statutory caps set forth in S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-120(a)(3) & (4) were inapplicable to this case. We agree. At the time this action arose in February 1994, S.C.Code Ann § 15-78-120 [6] limited the tort liability of state agencies and employees as follows: (1) Except as provided in Section 15-78-120(a)(3), no person shall recover in any action or claim brought hereunder a sum exceeding two hundred and fifty thousand dollars because of loss arising from a single occurrence regardless of the number of agencies or political subdivisions involved. (2) Except as provided in Section 15-78-120(a)(4), the total sum recovered hereunder arising out of a single occurrence shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars regardless of the number of agencies or political subdivisions or claims or actions involved. (3) No person may recover in any action or claim brought hereunder against any governmental entity and caused by the tort of any licensed physician or dentist, employed by a governmental entity and acting within the scope of his profession, a sum exceeding one million dollars because of loss arising from a single occurrence regardless of the number of agencies or political subdivisions involved. (4) The total sum recovered hereunder arising out of a single occurrence of liability of any governmental entity for any tort caused by any licensed physician or dentist, employed by a governmental entity and acting within the scope of his profession, may not exceed one million dollars regardless of the number of agencies or political subdivisions or claims or actions involved. In Southeastern Freight Lines v. City of Hartsville, 313 S.C. 466, 443 S.E.2d 395 (1994), we held the Legislature's adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasor's Act [7] (Uniform Contribution Act) impliedly repealed the statutory tort claims cap set forth in section 15-78-120 (a)(1), which was adopted by the Legislature as part of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act in 1986. [8] Subsequent to Southeastern, the Legislature responded with 1994 Acts No. 497, Part II, Section 107, in which it held the provisions of section 15-78-120 (a)(1) were reenacted and made retroactive to April 5, 1988, the effective date of the Uniform Contribution Act. [9] Two years later, in Knoke v. S.C. Dep't of Parks, Recreation and Tourism, 324 S.C. 136, 478 S.E.2d 256 (1996), we held that Southeastern (and our subsequent opinion in McClain v. S.C. Dep't of Educ., 323 S.C. 132, 473 S.E.2d 799 (1996)) [10] applied as well to the $500,000 per occurrence cap set forth in section 15-78-120 (a)(2), such that the statutory cap was inapplicable to Knoke's claim, filed before July 1, 1994. In 1997, the Legislature enacted 1997 Act No. 155, Part II, § 55, in which it reenacted section 15-78-120, in toto, and established higher limits of liability. The reenactment of section 15-78-120 states that it takes effect upon approval by the Governor [June 14, 1997] and applies to claims or actions pending on that date or thereafter filed, except where final judgment has been entered before that date. 1997 Act No. 155, Part II, § 55(F). Most recently, however, in Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 (1999), we held that the Legislature's purported reenactment of the statutory caps in 1997 Act No. 155 could not, by the above language of subsection F, retroactively overrule this Court's interpretation of the statutes in Southeastern. Accordingly, we held the plaintiffs' recovery was not limited by the Tort Claims Act as their case was filed prior to the Legislature's 1994 reinstatement of the statutory caps set forth in § 15-78-120 (a)(1) (which were effective July 1, 1994, whereas plaintiffs had filed their claims in June 1994). GHS contends the $1 million dollar caps of § 15-78-120(a) (3) & (4) have never been repealed and that, in any event, the caps were impliedly reenacted by 1994 Act No. 497, effective July 1, 1994 as to causes already filed, or that, at the latest, these caps were reinstated by 1997 Act No. 155, effective June 14, 1997 (and applying to claims or actions pending on that date). We disagree. Initially, we agree with the trial court that under Southeastern and Knoke, the statutory caps set forth in XX-XX-XXX(a)(3) & (4) were impliedly repealed by adoption of the Uniform Contribution Act. Given Southeastern's holding that the pro rata liability provisions of the Uniform Contribution Act are inconsistent with the liability limits in section (a)(1), and Knoke's subsequent recognition that the same reasoning applies to the limits in (a)(2), it is patent that the liability limits set forth in subsections (a)(3) & (a)(4) were likewise impliedly repealed by the Legislature's adoption of the Uniform Contribution Act in 1988. The question remains, however, whether the limits were subsequently reenacted. GHS contends the limits in (a)(3) & (a)(4) were impliedly reenacted by 1994 Act. No. 497. We disagree. The 1994 Act simply reenacted the statutory caps set forth in section 15-78-120 (a)(1) (and purported to make them retroactive to April, 1988, something this Court held the Legislature was without authority to do in Steinke); the 1994 Act did nothing to reenact the remaining subsections. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled the statutory caps as set forth in subsections (3) & (4) were not reenacted by the 1994 Act. However, by 1997 Act No. 155, Part II, § 55, the Legislature reenacted all four subsections, and made the act applicable to all claims pending its effective date [June 14, 1997]. [11] While this provision was sufficient to reenact the liability caps of subsections 3 & 4, the question remains whether the Legislature could make the reenactment applicable to claims then pending, such as Dykema's. Under Steinke, we hold it could not. As noted previously, Steinke held that the Legislature could not retroactively overrule this Court's interpretation of the statutes in Southeastern, but that it could prospectively reinstate such caps. Here, had the Legislature chosen to, it could have reenacted all four subsections in 1994. However, it reenacted only XX-XX-XXX (a)(1) in 1994. 1994 Act No. 497. Although this Court has not previously specifically held subsections (3) & (4) were impliedly repealed, it is patent under Southeastern and Knoke that they were in fact impliedly repealed and have been so since adoption of the Uniform Contribution Act in 1988. Although 1997 Act No. 155 was sufficient to reenact the remaining subsections, under Steinke, [12] such reenactment could not be made retroactive, and therefore took effect upon approval by the Governor on June 14, 1997. Accordingly, as Dykema's claim was filed in 1995, the trial court properly ruled the statutory caps set forth in subsection 3 & 4 do not apply in this case.