Opinion ID: 464799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admissibility and Sufficiency of the Evidence of a Policy of Deliberate Indifference

Text: 43 The City defendants contend that Fiacco should not have been allowed to introduce evidence of third-party claims and complaints against the City and that, even with such proof in the record, the evidence was insufficient to establish a policy of negligent supervision of police officers by the City defendants rising to the level of a deliberate indifference to the violation of constitutional rights. We reject both contentions. 44
45 Fed.R.Evid. 403 grants the trial judge broad discretion to determine whether to allow the introduction of relevant, but prejudicial, matters into evidence. When the trial judge has assessed both the probative value and the likely prejudicial effect of the evidence, the reviewing court wil not disturb his decision to admit or exclude evidence unless it finds an abuse of discretion. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 775 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514-15 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 1451, 55 L.Ed.2d 496 (1978). We find no abuse of discretion here. 46 We have no doubt that, in the context of a theory that the City negligently supervised its officers in their use of force, the evidence that a number of claims of police brutality had been made by other persons against the City, together with evidence as to the City's treatment of these claims, was relevant. Whether or not the claims had validity, the very assertion of a number of such claims put the City on notice that there was a possibility that its police officers had used excessive force. The City's knowledge of these allegations and the nature and extent of its efforts to investigate and record the claims were pertinent to Fiacco's contention that the City had a policy of nonsupervision of its policemen that reflected a deliberate indifference to their use of excessive force. The fact that none of the claims had yet been adjudicated in favor of the claimant was not material; if the City's efforts to evaluate the claims were so superficial as to suggest that its official attitude was one of indifference to the truth of the claim, such an attitude would bespeak an indifference to the rights asserted in those claims. 47 Further, the value of such evidence to a plaintiff in a Sec. 1983 action is clear. Since the existence of a policy of nonsupervision amounting to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights cannot be established by inference solely from evidence of the occurrence of the incident in question, see City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle; Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 202-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 577, 66 L.Ed.2d 475 (1980), a plaintiff cannot prevail on a Sec. 1983 claim against a municipality without introducing other evidence. Proof that other claims were met with indifference for their truth may be one way of satisfying the plaintiffs' burden. 48 Given that the evidence of third-party claims was both relevant and valuable to Fiacco's case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that its probative value outweighed its possible prejudicial effect. The court properly attempted to minimize any such effect by repeatedly instructing the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted. The jury was instructed that there had never been any authoritative finding as to whether or not any claimant's charge was valid and that the jury was neither to assume that the claims were true nor to try to assess their truth; rather, the jury was merely to focus [its] attention on [whether] the chief of police and/or the city [took] sufficient steps in their supervisory capacity in handling those claims. 49 In all the circumstances, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit into evidence against the City defendants proof as to the assertion of other claims of police brutality. 50
51 The evidence presented by Fiacco to establish the existence of a policy of nonsupervision on the part of the City was of two types: evidence of the failure of the City defendants to adopt appropriate procedures to deal responsibly with complaints of police brutality, and evidence of their failure to make reasonable investigations of such complaints. The City defendants contend that the trial court should have granted their motion for a directed verdict because this evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish such a policy. We disagree. 52 In reviewing the denial of defendants' motion for a directed verdict, we, like the trial court in ruling on the motion, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Fiacco, giving her the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in her favor. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962) (The Court of Appeals was, of course, bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Continental [the party against whom it ruled a verdict should have been directed] and to give it the benefit of all inferences which the evidence fairly supports, even though contrary inferences might reasonably be drawn.) (footnote omitted); Croce v. Kurnit, 737 F.2d 229, 237 (2d Cir.1984); 5A Moore's Federal Practice p 50.02, at 50-27 (2d ed. 1985). A directed verdict is proper only if the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable men could have reached. Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1970). With this standard in mind, we review the evidence presented at trial. 53 As to the police department's own supervision of its officers with respect to the use of force, Fiacco brought out through the testimony of Stark that in early 1978 the police department had adopted general rules and regulations that were set forth in a pamphlet entitled Duties and Rules of Conduct, issued by the Bureau of Municipal Police, Division of Criminal Justice Services (hereinafter Duties & Rules). Duties & Rules contained the following statement with respect to the use of force by police officers: 54 Use of force: Officers shall not use more force in any situation than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Officers shall use force in accordance with law and departmental procedures. In its commentary, the pamphlet stated: 55 This section follows the general rule on use of force, i.e., use only that amount of force which is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. Departmental procedures should spell out the details for use of force. 56 (Duties & Rules art. 11.25; emphasis added.) Stark testified that no written departmental procedures spell[ing] out the details for use of force were adopted. 57 As to the general framework within which the City dealt with civilian complaints of police brutality, Fiacco introduced sections of the City Charter which made the City's Public Safety Board (Board) responsible for supervision of the police department and for hearing any charges against a police officer. The Charter authorized the Board to adopt and enforce reasonable rules for the government, discipline, and administration of police officers. Stark testified that the Board had adopted rules relating to police discipline, but that Stark had never seen them. 58 The Charter also established procedures to be followed by the Board in disciplinary hearings and stated that any charges filed with the Board must be in writing, in form prescribed by the Board. From its inception in 1978 through the time of Fiacco's arrest in April 1981, however, the Board provided no form on which a civilian could make a complaint against a police officer. During that period there were no hearings by the Board into any civilian claim of excessive force. Though the allegation that the City defendants had negligently failed to discipline police officers was not submitted to the jury (because the validity of claims that might have warranted such discipline had not yet been decided), Fiacco contended--and the jury could have found--that the above evidence showed that the City had in place general procedures relating to the appropriate supervision of police officers but had declined to implement them. 59 Finally, as to specific allegations of police brutality during the five years before the incident involving Fiacco, Fiacco introduced seven written claims that had been filed, called as witnesses four of the complainants, and elicited testimony from Stark as to his handling of complaints. The evidence relating to the five most recent claims, all made after Stark became police chief in 1977, included the following. 60 Daniel Terrance Malark testified that in June 1979, shortly after he had been injured in an automobile accident and was bandaged from waist to neck, he was arrested and taken to the City police station. In the course of obtaining personal data from Malark, police officers continually poked him, admonishing him to speed up his answers. When they asked Malark his social security number and he said he did not know it, defendant Meyer came to the bench where Malark was sitting and punched him in the face. Malark's head hit the wall behind him and he sustained a concussion and injury to his eye. Malark complained to Stark. Stark testified that he did not open an investigative file with respect to this complaint. He did not take a written statement from Malark; he did not obtain a written statement from anyone else. He did not assign anyone to investigate the complaint. He did not make any notation of the complaint in Meyer's file. 61 Robert J. Halse filed a claim against the City alleging that in July 1980 he was at his home when he was approached by a police officer who stated that he was going to arrest Halse for violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The officer, without justification, struck Halse in the face with his nightstick and caused him to spend the night in jail without medical attention for his injuries. Stark testified that he did not assign anyone to investigate this claim; he investigated it himself and determined that there should be no disciplinary action. It is not clear of what Stark's investigation consisted; but it did not include talking to Halse, the complainant. 62 Margaret Mackey testified that in August 1980 a police officer, apparently in connection with activities of Mackey's son with a go-cart, hit Mackey four times with a night stick in order to gain entrance to her home. Mackey went to the police station to complain; while there she collapsed and had to be taken to the hospital because of the injuries she had suffered. Mackey says she thereafter complained to Stark. Stark recalled learning of the complaint but did not recall having spoken to Mackey about it. Stark did not assign anyone to investigate Mackey's complaint. He investigated it himself by simply talking to the officer accused. He concluded that the complaint was not true, apparently without having interviewed Mackey herself. 63 John Joseph Mellen testified that in December 1980 he was arrested and taken to the City police station. There three police officers, including defendant Meyer, kicked, punched, and beat him, leaving him with two black eyes and a swollen lip. Mellen, then a teen-ager, and his father went to Stark to complain. Stark testified that he recalled that Mellen had some discoloration around his eye at the time of this visit. Stark interviewed the accused officers. He did not open a file on the matter; he did not assign anyone to investigate; he did not take a written statement from Mellen; he did not check any medical records. He did check Mellen's arrest record, which was substantial; he concluded that no further investigation or action was required. 64 Henry Miller testified that in January 1981, while he was in a bar in the City, he was grabbed by persons who turned out to be plainclothes policemen and taken outside, where he was hit and slapped. He was handcuffed with his hands behind him, hit in the face with a nightstick, and thrown into a police car. Upon arriving at the police station, he was kicked out of the car and then lifted by the handcuffs and carried into the station. The handcuffs were fastened so tightly that they numbed his hands. Miller requested medical attention and then fainted. When he regained consciousness, one officer was standing on Miller's back; another had his foot on Miller's head. Miller was then required to strip down to his shorts and remain in a cell until a new shift of officers came on duty. He complained to these officers about the treatment he had received. Neither Stark nor any other member of the police department ever asked him for a statement regarding his claim of excessive force. 65 Stark testified that, with respect to each claim or complaint, he had conducted as much investigation as he thought necessary. He satisfied himself with respect to each of the claims described above that no departmental rules had been violated and no disciplinary action was warranted. No hearing was held on any of these claims. No officer was reprimanded, suspended, discharged, or demoted. With Stark's approval, Meyer, the subject of three complaints, including that of Fiacco, was promoted to sergeant. 66 Stark testified that in connection with certain claims not introduced by Fiacco, he had, prior to April 1981, discharged three police officers for use of excessive force. He acknowledged that at his deposition, taken more than a year before trial, he had testified that he had never discharged anyone for the use of excessive force, and that his answers to interrogatories had failed to mention any discharges. Stark testified that the discharge of one of these men came after he had been convicted of a felony; the other men were temporary policemen, one discharged for assaulting an elderly woman in her home and the other discharged for threatening someone with his blackjack and slapstick. When questioned about his failure to mention these events at his deposition or in his interrogatory answers, Stark said that the fact that he had ever discharged anyone for the use or threat of excessive force had, until a few days before trial, slipped [his] mind. 67 The trial evidence left no doubt that the City endorsed Stark's handling of the complaints made after he became police chief. The City's mayor, who was a member of the Public Safety Board, testified that Stark informed him by telephone of every claim. Stark never put any of these reports in writing and apparently was never requested to do so. 68 Though the City defendants argue that this evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that they had a policy of nonsupervision of police officers that amounted to a deliberate indifference to the use by those officers of excessive force, we are unpersuaded. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that the City Charter outlined procedures for the consideration of charges against policemen, but that in the period prior to Fiacco's arrest the Public Safety Board had never implemented those procedures and had never held a hearing into a civilian complaint against a policeman. The evidence showed that within the 22-month period preceding Fiacco's arrest, five complaints were made that City police officers had used excessive force, either in making arrests or in transporting or detaining those whom they had already arrested; four of the complaints came within the ten months preceding Fiacco's arrest. Any investigation of these charges was done by Stark himself, for he never assigned anyone else to make an investigation. Stark's sole investigative act in most instances consisted of questioning the officers accused. In none of these instances did Stark open an investigative file or place any notation in the officer's file. In no instance was any hearing held. In no instance did Stark take a written statement from any of the five complainants. He did not even interview three of them. 69 Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Fiacco, the jury could rationally have concluded that during the two years prior to Fiacco's arrest, the City defendants' response to complaints of use of excessive force by City police officers was uninterested and superficial. It could reasonably have inferred that a response to complaints that generally consisted solely of the chief's speaking to the accused officer--with no formal statement being taken from the complainant, no file being created, no notation being made in the officer's file, and no further investigation being made--would have been viewed by the officers, and should be viewed by an objective observer, as reflecting an indifference by the City to the use of excessive force. The permissibility of this inference is not diminished by the fact that none of the claims introduced by Fiacco had yet been adjudicated in favor of the claimants. The jury was free to reason that the very failure of the City defendants to conduct a nonsuperficial investigation into civilian claims of excessive force indicated that the City and the chief simply did not care what a thorough investigation would reveal, that they were indeed indifferent to whether or not excessive force was used. 70 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to permit a rational juror to find that the City had a policy of nonsupervision of its police officers that amounted to a deliberate indifference to their use of excessive force. The trial court therefore properly denied the City defendants' motion for a directed verdict. 71 We find no greater merit in the contention that the verdict against the City defendants was so against the weight of the evidence that the court erred in denying defendants' motion for a new trial. Such a motion is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, see, e.g., Brady v. Chemical Construction Corp., 740 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir.1984); Bevevino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676, 684 (2d Cir.1978), and we see no abuse of that discretion here. The arguments presented by the City defendants to the effect that Stark conducted an appropriate investigation in each instance and that the procedures used were, according to the City's expert witness, in accordance with accepted police practices, are arguments properly addressed to the jury. The jury rejected them, as it was free to do, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to overturn the jury's conclusions.