Opinion ID: 853864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Polygraph Results

Text: In his pretrial Motion to Suppress and Exclude All Evidence Pertaining to Polygraph Examination, Willey raised several grounds for the inadmissibility of all evidence relating to the polygraph examination. [2] At trial Willey did not object to much of the polygraph examiner's testimony, including the questions asked and the answers given. But when the State asked the polygraph examiner if he arrived at a determinationas to whether or not the Defendant had told the truth on the relevant questions, Willey objected on the ground that the stipulation did not permit the trial court or jury to hear the results of the polygraph test. As this Court recently observed in Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. 1996), there are four prerequisites to the admission of polygraph results: (1) the prosecution, defendant, and defense counsel [3] must all sign a written stipulation providing for the defendant's submission to the examination and for the subsequent admission at trial of the results; (2) notwithstanding that stipulation, the admissibility of the test results is at the trial court's discretion regarding the examiner's qualifications and the test conditions; (3) the opposing party shall have the right to cross-examine the examiner if his or her graphs and opinion are offered into evidence; (4) the jury be instructed that, at most, the examiner's testimony tends only to show whether the defendant was being truthful at the time of the examination, and that it is for the jury to determine the weight and effect to be given to the examiner's testimony. The stipulation contained the following eight paragraphs: 1. The above-named individual has requested that he be given a polygraph examination by a qualified Boone County Law Enforcement Officer. 2. That Pamela Buchanan, Prosecuting Attorney, consents to said polygraph examination. 3. That the examiner will be competent polygraph examiner and qualified by his education, training and experience to testify as an expert witness in interpreting the results of the polygraph examination performed by him and the use of the polygraph as a means of detection of deception. 4. That the questions of the examiner, the answers by the individual any interrogation or other things relating to said examination, may be admitted as evidence, either on behalf of the State of Indiana or on behalf of the individual, subject to the discretion of the Court trying such case. 5. That the above-named individual hereby waives his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to the extent that the same may be involved in the presentation of evidence in the foregoing matters. 6. The above-named individual also understands that without his consent to the use of these test results, said test results would otherwise be inadmissible. 7. The defendant's polygraph chart recordings, the examiner's various work sheets and all questions other than the relevant test questions are not to be introduced into evidence. 8. It is further understood by all parties that upon signing this Agreement and Stipulation, it is not only binding upon them individually; but upon all further parties and their successors in interest, i.e. such other counsel as the State or the defendant may retain or employ for any trial or hearing involving this indictment. The stipulation is a contract between the State and Willey. Atkinson v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ind.1991). Contract law principles therefore control its use and interpretation, including the well settled doctrine that an ambiguity is to be construed against the party who prepared the contract. See Fresh Cut, Inc. v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (Ind.1995); Rosenbaum Bros. v. Nowak Milling Corp., 222 Ind. 108, 112, 51 N.E.2d 623, 624 (1943). Sheriff Hudson testified that he took a copy of a polygraph stipulation from an adjoining county with him to Florida and called the Boone County Prosecutor's officer for further instruction. After typing the stipulation from this form he faxed it to the prosecutor's office for its approval before presenting it to Willey. Willey took no part in the preparation of the stipulation, asked no questions about it, and made no changes to it. Accordingly, any ambiguity in the stipulation is to be construed against the State. Paragraph four of the stipulation plainly and unambiguously allows the admission of the examiner's relevant test questions and Willey's answers, and these were not objected to at trial. Rather, Willey's objection was to the examiner's opinion as to Willey's truthfulness. The stipulation is ambiguous on this point. See USA Life One Ins. Co. v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind.1997) (a contract is ambiguous only if it is `susceptible to more than one interpretation and reasonably intelligent persons would differ as to its meaning') (quoting Commercial Union Ins. v. Moore, 663 N.E.2d 179, 181 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)); Haxton v. McClure Oil Corp., 697 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (Ind.Ct. App.1998) (A contract is ambiguous if reasonable people would find it subject to more than one interpretation.). The State points to paragraph four, which provides that the questions of the examiner, the answers by the individual [and] any interrogation or other things relating to said examination, may be admitted as evidence.... However, in the context of a polygraph stipulation entered into without the assistance of counsel, other things is too vague to alert a reasonable defendant that the polygraph examiner will be permitted to give an opinion that the defendant was deceptive or a liar. The ambiguity of paragraph four is further compounded by other paragraphs. Paragraph three specifically provides that the examiner will be a competent polygraph examiner and qualified by his education, training and experience to testify as an expert witness in interpreting the results of the polygraph examination, but it does not spell out that this testimony might be offered in court against the defendant, or that interpreting the results may include an opinion as to truthfulness. Moreover, paragraph seven explicitly excludes from introduction into evidence at trial what a reasonable person might believe to be at least part of the polygraph results, the polygraph chart recordings and examiner's worksheets. Cf. Sisson v. State, 181 Ga.App. 784, 353 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1987) (`The results' of a lie detector test can be interpreted to be (1) the charts resulting from a graphing of the responses of the person tested, and/or (2) the opinion of the expert based on those charts.). Other Indiana cases provide examples of stipulations that unambiguously provide for the admission of a polygraph examiner's opinion testimony regarding the defendant's truthfulness in answering questions. See, e.g., Willis v. State, 268 Ind. 269, 273, 374 N.E.2d 520, 523 (1978) (stipulation provided any interrogation or other things related to said examination including the results and the opinions of the examiner relating to said examination, be admitted as evidence); Taylor v. State, 409 N.E.2d 1246, 1249-50 (Ind. Ct.App.1980) (I UNDERSTAND FURTHER that the results of this polygraph (lie detector) test may be used in court against me or for me, that it may become an exhibit in any trial in which I may be involved. I FURTHER STIPULATE, UNDERSTAND AND AGREE that the person administering said polygraph (lie detector) test, may explain, analyze or discuss all or any portion of said test in open court....). This stipulation does not. In addition to failing the Sanchez test requirement that the stipulation provide for admission at trial of the [polygraph] results, there is a separate and equally serious problem with admissibility of this examiner's opinion. Willey submitted to the polygraph after being informed, falsely, that Barnard had implicated him in the crime. It is true, as the State points out, that police deception does not vitiate a Miranda waiver and render a confession inadmissible, but is rather one consideration that must be viewed in determining the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969); Ward v. State, 408 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980). This is based in significant part on the view that the confession is easily understood by even the most limited suspect to be a serious act and one that potentially has severe adverse consequences. One does not easily suppose that a false confession will be elicited by a false report of an accusation. The admissibility of a confession is predicated on its reliability, not on an agreement that it may be admitted. The same is not true of a stipulation to take a lie detector test. Viewed as a matter of contract, the stipulation is based on a misrepresentation of fact. One can easily imagine that an innocent suspect, confronted with a false report that a perpetrator had implicated the suspect, would agree to a lie detector test in the belief that it would exonerate the suspect. Moreover, the product of the deception does not share the reliability of a confession. Indeed, the courts of this state have repeatedly and correctly expressed severe reservations about the reliability of polygraph results. See, e.g., Madison v. State, 534 N.E.2d 702, 704 (Ind.1989) (the value of polygraph examinations is highly questionable ...); Reid v. State, 267 Ind. 555, 559, 372 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (1978) (in any given case, unreliable results may be produced in a polygraph test by influences that cannot be controlled or compensated for by a competent examiner); Vacendak v. State, 264 Ind. 101, 110, 340 N.E.2d 352, 357 (1976) (the degree of accuracy of these tests, currently rated at eighty percent, is not sufficiently accurate to mandate their admission on the question of guilt or innocence) (footnote omitted); Sauzer-Johnsen v. Sauzer, 544 N.E.2d 564, 569 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (Polygraphs are inherently unreliable.). In order for this evidence to be admissible, it must be agreed to in unambiguous terms and the stipulation agreement, like any other contract, must not be the product of misrepresentation or mistake of fact. See, e.g., Park 100 Investors, Inc. v. Kartes, 650 N.E.2d 347, 349 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (where one employs misrepresentation to induce a party's obligation under a contract, one cannot bind the party to the terms of the agreement); Martin Bros. Box Co. v. Orem, 117 Ind.App. 110, 112, 69 N.E.2d 605, 605-06 (1946) (where there is any mistake of the contracting parties by which one of them has in mind one thing as the subject matter of the contract and the other party has in mind something entirely different, and the terms of the contract are such that it will mean either the one or the other, there is no meeting of the minds, and therefore no contract). Even though the trial court erred when it allowed this testimony, the error is harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all of the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties. Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ind.1995); Ind. Trial Rule 61. Willey admitted his involvement in an agreement with Barnard to harm his ex-wife in a detailed typewritten statement to police, see supra note 1, and subsequently told the police that [i]f I just wanted [Janice's] ass kicked, I would have done it myself. Based on these statements, it is clear that Willey was not telling the truth when he denied any involvement in Janice's death. Equally important, taken at face value, Willey's own account of these events amounts to an admission that he conspired with Barnard to commit a burglary and was an accomplice to a felony murder. He concedes that he and Barnard agreed that Barnard would enter Janice's garage to commit a battery. Because that battery resulted in death, this is an admission to the felony murder and involuntary manslaughter charges. Because the polygraph examiner's testimony, at most, had a slight impact on the jury's verdict, we hold that its erroneous admission was harmless.