Opinion ID: 4252706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Harassment and Retaliation

Text: 1. Uncertain Cognizability of the Proposed Cause of Action The second count of Ms. Bereston‘s complaint asserts that the Hospital violated ―District of Columbia public policy‖ by harassing her and retaliating against her ―for her efforts to bring the employer into compliance with the several laws and regulations governing its operation.‖38 As Ms. Bereston acknowledges, this count advances a new common law tort cause of action (which we may denominate for convenience as ―wrongful discipline‖) that our court has never recognized. When this court formulated the Adams-Carl exception to the doctrine of at-will employment, we took pains to emphasize that the tort of wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy is a very narrow one. We did not contemplate the creation of an analogous remedy in tort for adverse employment 38 It may be debatable whether Ms. Bereston‘s harassment and retaliation claim satisfies Carl‘s requirements of a clear public policy mandate and a close fit between its furtherance and her conduct, but we do not reach this issue in view of our rejection of the claim on other grounds. 32 actions less severe than discharge.39 The viability of a non-statutory wrongfuldiscipline claim is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. Although many states recognize public policy claims for wrongful discharge, only a handful of courts have considered whether to extend that recognition (in the absence of statutory authorization) to wrongful-discipline claims, and ―[t]he few decisions on the subject are divided.‖40 Arguably, creation 39 Cf. Darrow v. Dillingham & Murphy, LLP, 902 A.2d 135, 138 (D.C. 2006) (―Of course, one must first be discharged from his or her employment before being able to take advantage of this legal protection from at-will termination [for refusal to violate a statute].‖) Darrow held that an at-will employee may have a claim for wrongful discharge under Adams even if the discharge was ―constructive‖ rather than ―actual.‖ Id. A constructive discharge, which is deemed equivalent to a firing, occurs when the employer deliberately makes working conditions so objectively intolerable that the employee is forced to quit. Id. (citing Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 362 (D.C. 1993)). Ms. Bereston has not claimed that she was constructively discharged. 40 Restatement of Employment Law § 5.01 cmt. c. Compare Trosper v. Bag ‘N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 711-712 (Neb. 2007) (recognizing cause of action for retaliatory demotion for filing a workers‘ compensation claim); Brigham v. Dillon Cos., 935 P.2d 1054, 1059-60 (Kan. 1997) (same) and Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint. Contractors, 551 N.E.2d 981, 986 (Ohio 1990) (holding that ―public policy warrants an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by statute‖), with Touchard v. La Z-Boy, Inc., 148 P.3d 945, 955-56 (Utah 2006) (declining to create a new cause of action for retaliatory harassment or discrimination for pursuing a workers‘ compensation claim); Below v. Skarr, 569 N.W. 510, 512 (Iowa 1997) (same); White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 407-08 (Wash. 1997) (refusing to recognize tort cause of action for retaliatory transfer of employee in violation of public policy); Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. Ct. (continued…) 33 of a wrongful-discipline tort is ―a necessary and logical extension‖41 of the wrongful-discharge tort because employers should not be able with impunity to use demotion or other strong measures short of termination to coerce employees to violate the law, to punish them for refusing to do so, or otherwise to thwart public policy. On the other hand, as a practical matter the need to recognize such a broad cause of action to vindicate public policy is not urgent,42 while doing so would require courts ―to become increasingly involved in the resolution of [all manner of] workplace disputes . . . center[ing] on employer conduct that heretofore has not been actionable,‖43 and perhaps ―could subject employers to torrents of (…continued) App. 1995) (refusing to recognize cause of action for retaliatory failure to promote); and Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ill. 1994) (plurality opinion) (declining to extend cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy to retaliatory conduct such as retaliatory demotion). 41 Brigham, 935 P.2d at 1059. 42 See, e.g., Touchard, 148 P.3d at 955 (reasoning that ―[w]hile retaliatory discrimination or harassment is deplorable, it does not implicate a clear and substantial public policy to the same extent as a discharge‖ because the coercive pressure on the employee is not as great). 43 Zimmerman, 645 N.E.2d at 882 (plurality opinion) (finding no ―compelling reason for expanding judicial oversight of the workplace to include review of demotions, transfers, or other adverse work conditions that are alleged to be retaliatory in nature‖). 34 unwarranted and vexatious suits filed by disgruntled employees at every juncture in the employment process.‖44 We are wary of attempting to resolve these competing policy considerations by judicial fiat. We have appreciated that in matters such as this, the legislature ―is in a far better position than a court to make policy decisions on behalf of the citizenry.‖45 Normally, it is up to the legislature to decide whether to attach liability to previously lawful conduct. In the District of Columbia, it is through legislative action that employees currently have causes of action against employers who harass or retaliate against them for engaging in certain activities, namely those protected by the District of Columbia Human Rights Act,46 the Whistleblower Protection Act,47 and the Workers‘ Compensation Act.48 Whether and how to extend the list of statutorily protected activities so as to protect employees from harassment or retaliation for conduct covered by the Adams-Carl public-policy 44 Mintz, 905 P.2d at 562 (quoting Ludwig v. C & A Wallcoverings, Inc., 960 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1992)). 45 See Rosella, 121 A.3d at 778 (quoting Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C. 1997) (en banc) (plurality opinion)). 46 See D.C. Code § 2-1402.61 (2016 Repl.). 47 See D.C. Code § 1-615.53 (2016 Repl.). 48 See D.C. Code § 32-1542 (2017 Repl.). 35 exception to the at-will employment doctrine is presumptively for the Council of the District of Columbia to determine. 2. Insufficiency of the Allegations of Retaliation and Harassment In this case, however, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether to recognize a common-law cause of action for retaliation and harassment offensive to public policy. Were we to do so, we would require the same prima facie showing as is required for comparable claims of retaliation and harassment under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and other statutes. Under our employment discrimination laws (as under their federal counterparts), a prima facie showing of actionable retaliation requires the employee to show ―employer action[] that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.‖49 Typically, though not inevitably, such an action is one that has ―materially adverse consequences 49 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (construing the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); Smith v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 77 A.3d 980, 993 (D.C. 2013). The same standard would appear to apply to the anti-retaliation provisions in our other statutes. See McCall v. District of Columbia Hous. Auth., 126 A.3d 701, 705-07 (D.C. 2015) (―[d]rawing upon case law from the employment discrimination context‖ in holding that the retaliatory creation of a hostile work environment is a violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act). 36 affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.‖50 The standard of material adversity is meant ―to separate significant from trivial harms‖ and exclude ―petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.‖51 Thus, ―[w]hile adverse employment actions extend beyond readily quantifiable losses, not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.‖52 50 Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (―A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.‖). In Burlington N., the Supreme Court made clear that ―the antiretaliation provision . . . is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment,‖ because ―[a]n employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.‖ 548 U.S. at 63-64 (emphasis in the original). Ms. Bereston does not allege that the Hospital took retaliatory actions unrelated to her employment or outside her workplace. 51 Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68; see also id. (―[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.‖ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 52 Markel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts likewise ―have generally held that personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy and snubbing by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable‖ under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68 (quoting 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 669 (3d ed. 1996)). 37 Appellant also claims that the retaliatory harassment to which she was subjected created a hostile work environment. A prima facie showing of a hostile work environment similarly requires the employee to show, inter alia, ―that the harassment is severe and pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.‖53 The work environment must be objectively as well as subjectively hostile or abusive, ―i.e., one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. . . .‖54 In considering whether a pattern of harassment rises to this level, courts must ―look[] at all the circumstances,‖ including ―the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee‘s work performance.‖55 ―The harassment must consist of more 53 Nicola v. Washington Times Corp., 947 A.2d 1164, 1173 (D.C. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 93 (D.C. 1998) (―[A] plaintiff has an actionable hostile work environment claim . . . when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim‘s employment and create an abusive working environment.‖ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The same requirement exists to make out a case of retaliatory hostile work environment under the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act. McCall, 126 A.3d at 706. 54 Daka, 947 A.2d at 93. 55 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 38 than a few isolated incidents, and genuinely trivial occurrences will not establish a prima facie case.‖56 Ms. Bereston‘s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support a plausible claim of actionable retaliation (i.e., apart from her termination) or hostile work environment. First, Ms. Bereston does not allege that she was demoted or reassigned to a position with different responsibilities, that her salary or benefits were reduced, that she was denied a promotion, salary increase, or bonus, or that she suffered any other significant change in her employment status or materially adverse employment action. We do not deny that ―the [mere] imposition of a PIP – even one that does not result in a negative impact on salary, grade or performance appraisal – can constitute an adverse action.‖57 However, as we have said, Ms. Bereston‘s well-pleaded factual allegations fail to support her conclusory assertion that the PIP in her case was issued in retaliation for her putatively protected conduct (either in refusing to violate HIPAA or for her compliance 56 Nicola, 947 A.2d at 1173 (internal punctuation and ellipsis omitted) (citation omitted). 57 Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F. Supp. 3d 326, 330-31 (D.D.C. 2017). This is not to say a PIP is always materially adverse to the employee by itself, or that it was so in Ms. Bereston‘s case. 39 efforts in general) rather than in response to her identified management deficiencies. Second, although Ms. Bereston‘s complaint repeatedly alleges in conclusory terms that she was ―bullied, harassed, ridiculed, sabotaged, [and] humiliated‖ because of her insistence that the Hospital comply with applicable laws, the wellpleaded factual allegations in the complaint fail to demonstrate it. To be sure, Ms. Bereston alleges that she received what she considered unmerited criticism of her job performance (charges of unfriendliness, aloofness, poor leadership and management of her department, excessive rigor in enforcing regulations, not being a ―team player‖) and was counseled by her superiors to improve. On one occasion she was obliged to listen to complaints of her staff that she deemed ―frivolous and petty.‖ She encountered disagreement with and opposition to her ―unpopular‖ changes in Hospital procedures and did not receive the credit she believes she deserved. Allegedly, the Hospital‘s ―executives, administrators, and physicians did not respect nor always accept her recommendations to comply with existing law and regulations because it meant changing the status quo, creating inconvenience, and making less profit.‖ Simply put, these allegations may show serious workrelated disagreements, criticisms, and dissatisfaction, but without greater specificity, they do not evince the kind of severe and pervasive ridicule, 40 intimidation, threats, or other abuse that would create a hostile work environment or otherwise constitute actionable harassment or retaliation under our law.58 Indeed, despite Ms. Bereston‘s difficulties and understandable stress, her complaint alleges that she continued to perform her job well and does not identify any unreasonable interference with her actual work performance. Moreover, the complaint acknowledges that the Hospital generally implemented the changes she called for in her compliance role, even when her superiors initially were skeptical or reluctant.59 That Ms. Bereston‘s role was, in part, that of a compliance officer does not mean she was immune from questioning and critical evaluation of her 58 See, e.g., Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (general allegations of poor treatment and harassment insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); Baez v. Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y. Family Care Serv., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133930 at  4-5, 15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (list of grievances, including a meeting at which the plaintiff‘s boss told her that her complaints were ―petty[,]‖ too trivial to amount to retaliation); Turrentine v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 976, 991 (D. Kan. 2009) (rejecting claim that ―UPS, by forcing plaintiff to attend the meeting in which UPS management personnel were at times hostile and intimidating, subjected plaintiff to a materially adverse action‖) (citing cases). 59 In point of fact, the factual allegations in Ms. Bereston‘s complaint suggesting that her superiors or Hospital management were unwilling or reluctant to comply with the Hospital‘s legal obligations are very thin and fall well short of showing bad motives; the only unwillingness alleged with any specificity was that of Mr. Davis to agree to Ms. Bereston‘s alteration of Emergency Room admissions procedures early in her tenure, and even Mr. Davis changed his mind when the Hospital‘s Risk Director sided with Ms. Bereston on the legal need for the change. 41 performance, or that opposition to her recommendations was in bad faith, let alone that it amounted to actionable harassment or retaliation. At most, Ms. Bereston‘s complaint cites a few more or less offensive incidents. It alleges that members of Ms. Bereston‘s staff were rude and hostile to her after she changed Emergency Room admissions procedures to their displeasure; that Mr. Davis and another Hospital administrator ridiculed her spelling and grammar in an email; that she was given ―lip service‖ when she reported pharmacy billing irregularities; and that Dr. Brem lost her temper with her and screamed at her. By themselves, these were isolated incidents in a two-year period of employment (and at least some of them might fairly be characterized as trivial). They cannot be said to have been severe and pervasive enough to have altered the conditions of Ms. Bereston‘s employment and created a hostile work environment, or to have constituted materially adverse actions against her by the Hospital.60 60 Moreover, while Ms. Bereston rests her claim of retaliatory harassment in part on abusive behavior by her staff and physicians like Dr. Brem, ―an employer can only be liable for co-workers‘ retaliatory harassment where its supervisory or management personnel either (1) orchestrate the harassment or (2) know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such a manner as to condone and encourage the co-workers‘ actions.‖ Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998). Ms. Bereston has not alleged that Hospital supervisory or (continued…) 42 We conclude that Ms. Bereston‘s complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual allegations to plausibly allege actionable harassment and retaliation. Accordingly, we hold that Count Two (Unlawful Harassment and Retaliation), like Count One (Wrongful Discharge), fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.