Opinion ID: 1150904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Codefendant received a life sentence

Text: Defendant's last argument is that codefendant's life sentence is a mitigating factor in defendant's favor. Although a codefendant's life sentence could be a mitigating factor, State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 64, 628 P.2d 943, 947 (1981), we do not find it to be one in this case. At codefendant's sentencing, the court found that codefendant's age, 16 at the time of the offense, and the fact that defendant actually executed the women called for leniency. See State v. Gerlaugh, 135 Ariz. 89, 91, 659 P.2d 642, 644 (1983) (codefendant was 18, a first offender and was less active in the commission of the crimes). As noted above, therefore, defendant's age of 19 is the only mitigating factor. Like the trial court, we also conclude that it is not sufficient to outweigh the three aggravating factors. In State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982), we recognized that a defendant's young age is a substantial and relevant factor that should be given great weight. 132 Ariz. at 250, 645 P.2d at 241. But we also recognized that age, in and of itself, will not reduce every death penalty to a life sentence. Id. When addressing the issue of young age, we look at defendant's level of maturity, judgment and involvement in the crime. Walton, 159 Ariz. at 589, 769 P.2d at 1035; State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 461, 698 P.2d 694, 706 (1985); Gillies, 142 Ariz. at 571, 691 P.2d at 662. In Gillies, we found that the extent and duration of defendant's participation in the crime minimized the impact of his youth as a mitigating factor. 142 Ariz. at 571, 691 P.2d at 662. Further, in Walton we noted that [c]arrying out a plan over a significant period of time reflects [a] delay of gratification, which in turn evidences relative maturity; impulsive acts reflect relative youth and immaturity. 159 Ariz. at 589, 769 P.2d at 1035. Defendant's participation in this crime was substantial and his actions were deliberate. Not only did he plan the robbery two weeks before hand, he alone executed the two women. The trial court found that defendant's actions in the crime and the evidence of brutality far outweighed his chronological, emotional and mental age. Therefore, defendant's age is insufficient to call for leniency when weighed against the three aggravating factors. The trial court found that as to both count one and two, the aggravating factors found in A.R.S. §§ 13-703(F)(5), (6) and (8) applied, as did the mitigating factor found in A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(5). We agree. We have also independently reviewed the record for further evidence of mitigation beyond the issues presented by defendant and have found none. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider and find the other mitigating factors he proffered. We disagree. The trial court stated that it [had] considered all other mitigating factors, those presented at the ... hearing, and also those ... submitted ... in the sentencing memorandum and any other matters of record. (emphasis added). We find no error. 5. Did the State fail to prove that defendant committed the murders? Defendant argues that because the jury was not asked to decide whether he actually killed the two women, this court may not decide the issue. The underlying premise of defendant's argument is that because the jury was instructed on both premeditated and felony murder theories and returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder, the jury did not establish that defendant killed, attempted to kill or intended to kill. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). We addressed this same issue in State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 199, 665 P.2d 70, 81 (1983), and agreed that when a jury is instructed on both felony and premeditated murder and returns a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder, the Enmund requirements are not satisfied. This court stated that, [i]n order to comply with Enmund, ... the trial judge must determine beyond a reasonable doubt prior to imposing a sentence of death that the defendant killed, attempted to kill or intended to kill. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. at 199, 665 P.2d at 81. The trial judge in this case made the following findings before imposing sentence: As to Counts One and Two, Count One being the first degree murder of Lili Champagne, and Count Two being the first degree murder of Mindy Peters, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that not only did the defendant have major personal involvement in the felony, and not only did he show a reckless indifference to human life, but, Mr. Greenway, the court finds that you fired the fatal shots into each of the victims. (Emphasis added). The trial judge's findings satisfy not only the Enmund requirements, but also comply with Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). In Tison, the United States Supreme Court held that  major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. at 1688, 95 L.Ed.2d at 144-145 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Defendant argues that an Enmund-Tison finding would violate his right to a jury trial under the sixth amendment. We do not agree. In Cabana v. Bullock, the Supreme Court held that the Enmund rule is a substantive limitation on sentencing, and like other such limits it need not be enforced by the jury. 474 U.S. 376, 386, 106 S.Ct. 689, 697, 88 L.Ed.2d 704, 716 (1986). Thus, the Constitution is not offended when the Enmund finding is made at any point in the capital sentencing process. Id. The trial judge's Enmund findings did not violate defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Finally, defendant argues that the State did not prove that he committed the murders or that he fit within the Tison rationale. Again, we do not agree. Defendant admitted to his coworker, his cellmate and his sister that he killed the two women. Moreover, defendant planned and prepared for two weeks to rob the victims. After entering the house and robbing the victims, he shot and killed both of the women execution style. The record supports the trial court's finding that defendant fired the fatal shots, was a major participa[nt] in the felony committed and showed reckless indifference to the lives of Lili and Mindy.