Opinion ID: 790927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retroactive Legal Effect

Text: 20 Boatswain argues in the alternative that we cannot apply the aggravated felony bar to him because to do so would create a retroactive legal effect, and there is no clear indication in the statute that such an effect was intended. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (recognizing presumption against application of statute to conduct pre-dating its enactment where it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed). He points out that when he enlisted in the military in 1975, § 1101(f)(8) did not bar individuals who had committed an aggravated felony from demonstrating good moral character; at the time, the statutory bar contained in that provision applied only to one who at any time has been convicted of the crime of murder. 6 Boatswain concludes from this that [e]ven if the [§ 1101(f)] bars apply to [§ 1440] applicants ... they should not be applied where they change the terms of the bargain between the government and a person ... who honorably concluded his wartime military service. (Appellant's Br. at 41-42). 21 `A statute does not operate retrospectively merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law.' Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269, 114 S.Ct. 1483; alteration from original omitted). Rather, the inquiry demands a commonsense, functional judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Id. (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citation omitted). In Rankine, we emphasized that `the judgment whether a particular statute acts retroactively should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.' Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we looked for some indication of a quid pro quo, or reasoned exchange, wherein the individual whose settled expectations were in question relied on a potential benefit in structuring his conduct. See id. at 99-100. 22 Boatswain cannot plausibly contend that he entered military service in 1975 with the expectation that following his discharge he could commit an aggravated felony (short of murder) and still be permitted to become a U.S. citizen. Such a benefit — if it may be called that — is far too remote to constitute a settled expectation in this context. We conclude that § 1101(f)(8) does not have a retroactive effect with respect to Boatswain and may therefore be applied to bar him from naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1440, with or without a clear indication of its temporal reach. 23 Having found that Boatswain is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) from demonstrating the good moral character requisite to naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1440, we do not address the district court's conclusion that Boatswain could not establish good moral character even if § 1101(f)(8) did not apply.