Opinion ID: 2514470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the ortiz exceptions

Text: However, Ortiz judicially created an exception to the general rule that strict compliance with the temporal requirement of K.S.A. 22-3608(c) is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. In Phinney, we described the exception as follows: A limited exception to the general rule requiring a timely appeal from sentencing is recognized in the interest of fundamental fairness only in those cases where an indigent defendant was either: (1) not informed of the rights to appeal; (2) was not furnished an attorney to perfect an appeal; or (3) was furnished an attorney for that purpose who failed to perfect and complete an appeal. Ortiz, 230 Kan. at 735-36 [640 P.2d 1255] (relying on Brizendine v. State, 210 Kan. 241, 242-44, 499 P.2d 525 [1972]). If these narrow exceptional circumstances are met, a court must allow an appeal out of time. See Willingham, 266 Kan. at 99-102 [967 P.2d 1079]. Phinney, 280 Kan. at 401-02, 122 P.3d 356. During the pendency of this appeal, our court has endeavored to clarify the parameters of the Ortiz exceptions and to define the process for analyzing whether Ortiz mandates an out-of-time appeal in a given case. The result of those efforts is set forth in State v. Patton, 287 Kan. ___, 195 P.3d 753 (2008), which establishes the inquiries to be made for each of the separate exceptions. Gill summarizes his complaint as follows: The sentencing court failed to properly notify Mr. Gill of his right to appeal by inadequately advising of his absolute right to appeal his sentence, and the time frame in which he must file an appeal. Accordingly, Gill has implicated the first Ortiz exception. Patton instructed that due process is denied and the first Ortiz exception is placed in issue unless the district court informs the criminal defendant at sentencing that (1) a right to appeal the severity level of the sentence exists; (2) any such appeal must be taken within 10 days; and (3) if the defendant is indigent, an attorney will be appointed for the purpose of taking any desired appeal. 287 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 6, 195 P.3d 753. Patton explained that an analysis of the first exception should proceed through the following progression. Initially, the defendant bears the evidentiary burden of showing, through the transcript of the sentencing hearing, that the district judge failed to communicate one or more of the items of required information. Obviously, if the record reveals that the sentencing judge adequately informed the defendant of his or her appeal rights, the first exception analysis ends with a denial of the requested out-of-time appeal. If the defendant meets the initial burden of showing a deficiency in the sentencing judge's communication, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the defendant possessed actual knowledge of all of the required information from a source independent of the district court, such as through the advice of defense counsel or the wording of a written plea agreement. If the State meets that burden, the inquiry ends and the defendant loses his or her challenge based on the first Ortiz exception. If the State cannot make a showing of actual knowledge, the defendant must then bear the evidentiary burden of proving that had he or she been properly informed, a timely appeal would have been sought. Patton, 287 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 8, 195 P.3d 753. Patton noted that this final requirement to invoke the first Ortiz exception is consistent with this court's original admonition that a defendant may not `let the matter rest.' 287 Kan. at ___, 195 P.3d 753. Here, Gill contends, the State concedes, and the record corroborates that the sentencing judge failed to advise Gill of the 10-day limitation for taking an appeal and that there is no evidence to indicate that Gill actually knew of that temporal constraint. Therefore, we can progress rapidly to the third step of determining whether Gill was prejudiced by that lack of information, i.e., whether he would have sought a timely appeal if properly informed. Although the district court did not have the benefit of Patton, it made the specific findings that nothing in the file indicates that the defendant ever manifested a desire to pursue an appeal and that [a] delay of eight years in voicing his concern over a lack of an appeal clearly does not support the defendant's claims in his pro se motion. Moreover, on appeal, the State argues that Gill failed to provide any evidence that he in fact wished to appeal his sentence, relying in part on the 8-year delay between sentencing and Gill's motion for an out-of-time appeal. Gill does not directly contend that, but for the lack of information, he would have appealed his sentence within 10 days of judgment. Rather, he challenges the district court's findings in this regard on two grounds. First, he suggests that a stated desire to appeal is not germane to the application of Ortiz, specifically arguing that according to State v. Willingham, 266 Kan. 98, 101, 967 P.2d 1079 (1998), a defendant's failure to state a desire to appeal from such a sentence is not sufficient evidence of his desire to waive such a right. As Patton clarifies, the State need not prove an affirmative waiver of the right to appeal, but rather under the third step of the first Ortiz exception analysis the defendant must prove that he or she wanted to appeal the sentence. Second, Gill contends that the district court's finding of an 8-year delay in requesting an appeal is erroneous because he commenced correspondence with the court in January 2000, less than 2 years after his April 15, 1998, sentencing. Ironically, Gill's appellate brief acknowledges that his correspondence advised the district court that he was preparing a motion `for relief of his conviction' and requested his transcripts for preparing the motion. As the State points out, Gill's correspondence clearly indicated to the court that Gill intended to seek relief from his conviction through a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding. In no way did Gill manifest a desire to obtain relief from his sentence through an out-of-time direct appeal until he filed his motion in 2006. Gill's numerous letters and motions to the district court over a 6-year period provided a logical vehicle for him to express the notion that he wanted to file a direct appeal of his sentence. In other words, the record supports the district court's findings. Without suggesting any bright-line temporal rules, we find that this case presents an example of a defendant who let the matter rest in contravention of the requirement that he or she prove that a timely appeal would have been sought if the appropriate information had been communicated at sentencing. The denial of Gill's motion to file an appeal out of time is affirmed. Affirmed. DAVIS, J., not participating. GREENE, J., assigned.