Opinion ID: 78775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lopez/Morrison

Text: The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), which made it illegal to possess a firearm in a school zone. Id. at 551, 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1626, 1630-31. The Supreme Court identified the following three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provided a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence, exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority. Id. at 601-02, 120 S.Ct. at 1745. The Supreme Court instructed courts to consider the following four factors in determining whether a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce: (1) whether Congress made findings regarding the regulated activity's impact on interstate commerce; (2) whether the statute contains an express jurisdictional element that limits its reach; (3) whether the regulated activity is commercial or economic in nature; and (4) whether the link between the prohibited activity and the effect on interstate commerce is attenuated. Id. at 610-12, 120 S.Ct. at 1749-51.