Opinion ID: 2378132
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Heading: acc authority to waive the composition shingle restriction

Text: The restrictive covenants are subject to the general rules of contract construction. See Scoville v. SpringPark Homeowner's Ass'n, 784 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied). Whether restrictive covenants are ambiguous is a question of law. Courts must examine the covenants as a whole in light of the circumstances present when the parties entered the agreement. See Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee, 943 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex.1997); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.1996). Like a contract, covenants are unambiguous as a matter of law if [they] can be given a definite or certain legal meaning. Grain Dealers, 943 S.W.2d at 458; accord Columbia Gas, 940 S.W.2d at 589. On the other hand, if the covenants are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, they are ambiguous. Grain Dealers, 943 S.W.2d at 458; Columbia Gas, 940 S.W.2d at 589. Article I, paragraph 9 expressly prohibits composition shingles: Roofs of composition type shingles will not be permitted. But this provision does not stand alone: article I, paragraph 9 also provides, All roofs and dwellings or accessory buildings shall be constructed with wood shingles, unless an alternate roofing material is approved by the [ACC], and article II, paragraph 1 provides that the ACC shall have the right to waive any Restrictions herein provided insofar as the same pertains to type of roof or quality of masonry to be used .... (emphasis added). The covenants are clear and unambiguous in giving the ACC the authority to waive the restriction on composition roofs. The Plaintiffs argue that allowing the ACC authority to waive the composition roof restrictions in the restrictive covenants renders meaningless the restriction regarding composition roofs. While it is true that a construction that nullifies a restrictive covenant provision should be avoided, see Crispin v. Paragon Homes, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied), the Plaintiffs' contention is unfounded. Here, the ACC did not waive the composition shingle prohibition altogether; it waived the prohibition only with regard to the Pilarciks' alterations. Indeed, one reason for rejecting the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the restrictive covenants is because their interpretationnot the Pilarcikswould nullify a provision in the covenants. Their interpretation would, for all practical purposes, nullify the provision giving the ACC the right to waive any Restrictions herein provided insofar as the same pertains to type of roof. In concluding that the ACC did not have the authority to waive the restrictive covenant provision regarding composition shingle roofs, the court of appeals reasoned that the specific language in the composition roof restriction should be given greater weight than the subsequent general language in the waiver provision. This rule of construction does not apply here. Both provisions are specific and do not conflict. article I, paragraph 9 states that composition roofs are prohibited; article II, paragraph 9 grants the ACC the power to waive this prohibition. Under the plain meaning of these provisions as a whole, the composition roof restriction continues in full force and effect until and unless the ACC decides to waive the restriction, and then, only to the extent the restriction is waived. This is the only construction that gives both provisions meaning and effect. Finally, we consider Plaintiffs' argument that because the authority given to the ACC in article II, paragraph 1 to waive roofing restrictions is restricted to a proposed house, the ACC may waive the composition shingle prohibition only in cases of new construction. Thus, as the argument goes, any ACC roofing restriction waiver authority would not apply to the Pilarciks' replacement of an existing house roof. We find this interpretation to be strained. This interpretation ignores the collective language and intent of article II, paragraph 1. The first sentence begins: No building shall be erected, placed, or altered. ... The second sentence begins: No fence or walls shall be erected, placed or altered. ... These sentences are followed by the fourth sentence which gives the ACC the right to waive any restrictions regarding the type of roof or quality of masonry.... Clearly, the paragraph is intended to govern alterations to houses, not just new house construction. Because proposed alterations must be submitted to the ACC for approval just as proposed new construction, the word proposed cannot be interpreted to mean only new construction. Moreover, the empowerment clause relating to the ACC expressly allows the ACC the right to maintain its power throughout the life of the restrictive covenants. That is the very purpose of such committees. The argument that the powers of an architectural control committee to waive deed restrictions pertaining to roofs applies only to new homes misconstrues the covenants and improperly constrains the ACC's power.