Opinion ID: 1937611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on a motorist's duty while stopping on a public highway.

Text: Martin contends that the trial court erred in giving three instructions regarding certain statutory rules of the road involving parked and stopped vehicles: INSTRUCTION NO. 26 The jury is instructed that a statute of this state declares that in no event shall any person park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon any highway unless a clear or unobstructed width of not less than twenty feet upon the main-traveled portion of such highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for free passage of other vehicles thereon, nor unless a clear view of such vehicle may be obtained from a distance of two hundred feet in each direction upon such highway. To find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated this statute, you may consider such violation along with all other evidence, facts and circumstances in determining whether or not the conduct and acts of the defendant were reckless as that term has hereinbefore been defined by this court. INSTRUCTION NO. 27 The jury is instructed that whenever a vehicle is parked or stopped upon a highway, whether attended or unattended, during the period from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise, there shall be displayed upon such vehicle one or more lamps projecting a white or amber light visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred feet to the front of such vehicle and projecting a red light visible under like conditions from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated this statute, you may consider such violation along with all other evidence, facts and circumstances in determining whether or not conduct and acts of the defendant were reckless as has hereinbefore been defined by this court. INSTRUCTION NO. 28 The jury is instructed that a statute of this state requires that every operator of a motor truck shall immediately, upon bringing his vehicle to a stop upon the traveled portion of any public highway at any time after sunset and before sunrise, or when stopping at any time after sunrise and before sunset if such vehicle is likely to remain upon the traveled portion of the highway after sunset and before sunrise, to place three flares or red electric lights or red reflectors or emergency reflective triangles on the roadway. If traffic on the roadway moves upon a one-way roadway or divided highway, one of these devises shall be placed at least one hundred feet to the rear and one at least two hundred feet to the rear, and one along side the stopped vehicle. The flares, red electric lights, red reflectors or emergency reflective triangles shall be of such type of construction as will furnish continuous light for a period of sunset to sunrise at all times of the year. This statute does not apply if the stop is momentary in obedience to an intersection stop light or conforming to the movement of a line of traffic or within the corporate limits of a municipality. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant violated this statute, you may consider such violation along with all other evidence, facts and circumstances in determining whether or not the conduct and acts of the defendant were reckless as has hereinbefore been defined by this court. Instruction No. 26 is derived from SDCL 32-30-2; Instruction No. 27 from SDCL 32-17-27; and Instruction No. 28 from SDCL 32-17-29. It is Martin's contention that these instructions would have been proper in a situation he had control over. He argues that he had no control over the ability to comply with these traffic regulations after the vehicle had been disabled. He also contends that the difficulty in reading these instructions as a whole is that they change the burden of proof from a general intent crime to one of strict liability. It is not error for a trial court to instruct on the rules of the road if it is justified by the facts of the case as developed by the evidence. State v. Bennett, 326 N.W.2d 720, 722 (S.D.1982). Jury instructions are to be considered as a whole, and if instructions when so read correctly state the law and inform the jury, they are sufficient. State v. Fox, 313 N.W.2d 38 (S.D.1981). We first reject Martin's argument that he had no control over the situation of the truck becoming disabled. Martin had exclusive control over the decision to take the truck initially. Martin, and only Martin, had control over the type of safety precautions to be taken to warn other motorists after the truck became immobile. Implicit in Martin's argument is that the truck controlled the series of events which led up to the collision with the Kortan vehicle. That argument, in our view, lacks logic. We next address Martin's allegation that the trial court's instructions changed the burden of proof. The relevant portion of Instructions 26, 27 and 28 states: If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated this statute, you may consider such violation along with all other evidence, facts and circumstances in determining whether or not the conduct and acts of the defendant were reckless as that term has hereinbefore been defined by this court. (Emphasis added.) This instruction allowed the jury to exercise their discretion in deciding how much weight, if any, should be given the finding of a violation of these statutes if the jury determined the statutes were in fact violated. It also permitted the jury to decide that such violations were not dispositive of the issue of whether or not Martin was reckless. Moreover, if the jury did decide the statutes were violated, they still, in accordance with the instructions, had to consider all the other evidence, facts and circumstances before they could properly decide the issue of recklessness. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err by giving these instructions.