Opinion ID: 2549030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure of Counsel to File Motion for Arrest of Judgment.

Text: The State contends on review that the Court of Appeals' decision of January 17, 2003, is erroneous for several reasons. First, it asserts that the decision essentially gutted State v. Hall and sets a dangerous precedent in that any trial counsel who fails to file a motion to vacate is automatically deemed ineffective counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes. According to the State, Ferguson's collateral attack claiming ineffective assistance of counsel is an effort to circumvent the Court of Appeals' holding in her original appeal. In this case, Ferguson filed a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507. That statute states, in pertinent part: (a) Motion attacking sentence. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of the state of Kansas, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may at any time move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. (b) Hearing and judgment. Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the county attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. The court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence said prisoner or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. Ferguson claims she was deprived of her right to effective assistance of counsel at trial as guaranteed by the United States and Kansas Constitutions. The touchstone case discussing the right to effective assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668. Thus, a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the `ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled. [Citations omitted.] 466 U.S. at 685. This court has stated: The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 568, Syl. ¶ 12, 932 P.2d 981 (1997). The proper standard of appellate review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by a convicted defendant is well recognized: Once a proper determination of the issue of claimed ineffective assistance of counsel has been made by the trial court, the scope of review by the appellate court is to review de novo the trial court's analysis of the performance and prejudice components, which are mixed questions of law and fact. Rice, 261 Kan. at 568, Syl. ¶ 16. A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. (a) The proper standard for judging attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the circumstances. When a convicted defendant complains of the effectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. (b) With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the proper standard requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Chamberlain, 236 Kan. 650, Syl. ¶ 3. In its decision concerning Ferguson's collateral attack, the Court of Appeals panel wrote: Ferguson first contends she was denied effective assistance of counsel because Meisenheimer did not file a timely motion to dismiss under K.S.A. 22-3208(3) or postconviction motion to arrest judgment under K.S.A. 22-3502. Ferguson argues that Meisenheimer did not `advance some grand defense strategy' for not filing either motion, that he admitted at trial that he thought he waived the objection after the verdict, and that his deficient performance prejudiced her rights. The complaint in this case was defective. The State does not argue otherwise.. . . The complaint failed to allege Ferguson's acts were done `knowingly' and `by means of fire or explosive,' which are elements of arson in K.S.A. 21-3718. The Kansas Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the State cannot merely refer to a statute to state the requisite elements of a crime. [Citation omitted.] We are bound by those decisions. Here the complaint clearly failed to state all the elements of the crime of arson. . . . . If counsel had timely filed a motion to arrest judgment and the motion was granted, the State would have been able to file a new complaint that sufficiently stated the arson charge and then retry Ferguson. [Citations omitted.] A troubling aspect of this case is that allowing Ferguson to invoke review under the stringent pre- Hall standards by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel undermines the Supreme Court's apparent aim in Hall to reduce the number of jurisdictional challenges of this kind raised for the first time on appeal. By allowing a defendant to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and reevaluate the case under the pre- Hall standards, much of the Hall process would be rendered meaningless. . . . . In a 60-1507 ineffective assistance of counsel context, the Hall process breaks down. Ferguson either did or did not receive a fair trial, using the common sense approach of Hall, whether or not an arrest of judgment motion was filed. It is difficult to see why there should be a different posttrial procedure depending on the filing of the motion. However, it appears that Hall requires precisely that analysis. On the other hand, it is obvious that in almost every conceivable situation, a competent defense counsel should know when a complaint is facially defective and that such a conviction can be set aside and a new trial obtained by the filing of a motion to arrest judgment. It was, therefore, obviously below standard for defense counsel to fail to notice an obvious defect and take the necessary steps to obtain a new trial for the defendant. 31 Kan. App. 2d at 104-07. Ferguson acknowledges that the Court of Appeals' decision allowing a defendant to obtain a reevaluation of a defective information under pre- Hall standards by asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim renders much of the Hall process meaningless. Ferguson claims that the answer to the problem is to hold that trial counsel's failure to move to arrest judgment when an information is defective is not automatically ineffective assistance of counsel. Ferguson urges this court to hold that there is no ineffective assistance of counsel in those situations where the defendant's attorney deliberately chooses not to file a motion to arrest judgment for some tactical reason, but not where defense counsel fails to file a motion as a result of incompetence. Ferguson asserts that this would bar criminal defendants from employing a strategy of delay to gain a tactical advantage, while affording the truly aggrieved defendant the constitutional protection of the right to assistance of counsel under K.S.A. 60-1507. The Court of Appeals apparently considered whether to impose a limitation on ineffective assistance of counsel claims where defense counsel deliberately chooses not to file a motion to arrest judgment for some strategic reason, but rejected that option, stating: All that would be left to apply Hall to would be the conceptually difficult instance where counsel knew of the jurisdictional problem but deliberately did not file a motion to arrest judgment for some tactical reason. It is difficult to see what valid reason there might be to do that. 31 Kan. App. 2d at 107. Ferguson's brief outlines several situations in which defense strategy might dictate not filing a motion to arrest judgment, such as where a defendant wishes to avoid other threatened federal or state prosecutions, wishes to avoid retrial on undecided charges, or wishes to avoid trial on more serious charges. According to Ferguson, adopting this interpretation would effectuate the true goal of Hall, which is to encourage defense attorneys to challenge a defective information in the district court, not to wait to raise the issue until the direct appeal. The State contends that the Court of Appeals' decision essentially gutted Hall, and sets a dangerous precedent in that any trial counsel who fails to file a motion to vacate is automatically deemed ineffective counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes. We must consider whether under this factual set of circumstances, a 60-1507 motion collaterally attacking the sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel provides a defendant with a procedural vehicle for circumventing a holding on direct appeal that defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of errors in the charging documents. In State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 793 P.2d 737 (1990), the defendant alleged various claims of error in his direct appeal. In one claim, the defendant challenged the legality of one of his convictions because the complaint failed to allege the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, an essential element of theft. After finding that the information omitted an essential element of the crime, the Hall court found it to be jurisdictionally and fatally defective and reversed the defendant's conviction for that offense. 246 Kan. at 747. Defendant also contended on direct appeal that he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's alleged failure to present evidence at trial making his testimony more plausible. The Hall court declined to review the issue of effective assistance of counsel, stating that such an issue would not be considered for the first time on appeal. Noting that the defendant raised the issue of a defective information for the first time on appeal, the Hall court expressed its concern with the number of appeals in Kansas in which the allegation of a defect in the information is raised for the first time on appeal. 246 Kan. at 753. The court set forth a detailed analysis of the constitutional safeguards incorporated into Kansas statutory and case law and crafted a new rule of law concerning assertions of charging document defects raised for the first time on appeal. The Hall court stated: The Bill of Rights in the Kansas Constitution requires that the accused be allowed to demand the nature and cause of the accusation. Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 10. . . . The § 10 language is similar to the language of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which extends to an accused the right `to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.' [Citation omitted.] The constitutional protections referred to are implemented by the requirements of K.S.A. 22-3201. The complaint, information, or indictment shall be a plain and concise written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged and, when drawn in the language of the statute, shall be deemed sufficient.. . . We agree with the statement in 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Crim.2d § 125 at 365, to the effect that the fundamental purpose of the pleading is to inform the defendant of the charge so that the defendant may prepare a defense. The test for sufficiency ought to be whether it is fair to require the defendant to defend on the basis of the charge as stated in the particular indictment or information. The stated requirement that every ingredient or essential element of the offense should be alleged must be read in the light of the fairness test just mentioned. The information is sufficient, even if an essential averment is faulty in form, if by a fair construction it may be found within the text. All parts of the pleading must be looked to in determining its sufficiency. [Citation omitted.] Common sense will be a better guide than arbitrary and artificial rules. The sufficiency of an information should be determined on the basis of practical rather than technical considerations when addressed for the first time on appeal. [Citations omitted.] . . . . K.S.A. 22-3502, Arrest of judgment, patterned after Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 34, was incorporated into the 1970 criminal code revision. . . . `The court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if the complaint, information or indictment does not charge a crime or if the court was without jurisdiction of the crime charged. The motion for arrest of judgment shall be made within 10 days after the verdict or finding of guilty . . . .' (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-3502. . . . . Subject matter jurisdiction lies in the district court and follows the defendant through the process of the issuing of the complaint, arrest pursuant to a warrant, initial appearance, the setting or denial of bond at the bond hearing, and the preliminary hearing, arraignment, and trial. We have focused in Hall's case upon the claim of a defective information raised for the first time on appeal. An information is defined in K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 22-2202(12) as `a verified written statement . . . presented to a court, which charges the commission of a crime.' (A `complaint' is a written statement under oath of the essential facts constituting a crime. K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 22-2202[8]. An `indictment' is a written statement, presented by a grand jury to a court, which charges the commission of a crime. K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 22-2202[11]). Our past reasoning has dictated the reversal we have applied to Count II, the theft of the cattle, in the instant case. The word `permanently' was omitted from the information. There was no incorporation by reference from Count III where `permanently' was alleged with reference to the theft of the truck and trailer that hauled the Count II cattle. We note: (1) the jury was instructed properly as to all of the elements of theft in Counts II and III; (2) the information in Counts II and III cited the theft statute (K.S.A. 21-3701, listing a class E felony); (3) no bill of particulars was requested by Hall (K.S.A. 22-3201[5]); (4) no motion for arrest of judgment was filed (K.S.A. 22-3502); (5) Hall was represented by experienced retained counsel; and (6) no argument has been advanced by Hall that the omission of `permanently' in Count II of the information prejudiced him in any way or in any way interfered with the preparation of his defense. We have reversed Count II based upon precedent.  We now depart from that precedent. We depart from what we believe to have been a mistaken judicial blending of the concepts of `jurisdiction.' K.S.A. 22-3201 requires the information to be `a plain and concise written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged . . . .' We have then consistently held that if an element of the crime is omitted a jurisdictional defect is present which may be raised for the first time on appeal. [Citations omitted.] We have also held that, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3201(4), the trial court may permit an information to be amended at any time before verdict if no new crime is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. State v. Rasch, 243 Kan. 495, 758 P.2d 214 (1988). . . . We held that when a motion to amend is made during trial, with defendant and counsel present, absent any showing of prejudice to the defendant, the amendment is effective immediately. The court's action is not invalidated because a written journal entry is not filed until after the trial has been completed. We extended the rationale of Nunn in State v. Switzer, 244 Kan. 449, 769 P.2d 645 (1989), to permit an oral amendment of the information during trial to be validated by a nunc pro tunc amendment to the journal entry ordered by this court in our opinion. The cases that we have considered under K.S.A. 22-3201(5), in amending an information, have not presented insoluble jurisdictional problems. Jurisdiction does not descend on the proceedings at the moment the amendment is granted or, as in Switzer, months or years later when the nunc pro tunc order is signed by the trial court after a ruling on appeal. . . . . We are applying a `common-sense' interpretation of informations when faced in the future with the issue of jurisdiction or failure to charge a crime as a result of a claimed defective information raised for the first time on appeal. We will review the information as a whole and interpret it to include facts which are necessarily implied. A tardy `first time on appeal' challenge to the information will be faced with a liberal construction in favor of validity. [Citations omitted.] A motion for arrest of judgment is the proper procedure for a defendant who wishes to challenge the sufficiency of the information after trial because of either a claim that it did not charge a crime or that the court was without jurisdiction of the crime charged. When such a motion is timely field, the trial court, in reviewing the motion, shall test its merit by utilizing the rationale of our pre- Hall cases. (Emphasis added.) 246 Kan. at 753-64. The Hall court then announced the now well-recognized test to be applied to all prospective cases raising the issue of an information defect for the first time on appeal. The primary effect of the post- Hall liberal interpretation rule was to impose a procedural rule to prevent automatic reversal of convictions on appeal on due process grounds where defense counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of a defective information at the district court level. The court's rationale for crafting the new rule in Hall appears to be to set up a mechanism whereby convicted defendants were encouraged to bring claims of defects in charging documents to the attention of the trial court and to discourage such claims from being subject to review for the first time on appeal. Logically, allowing Ferguson to profit from the application of the pre- Hall standard on collateral attack would undermine the rationale behind the rule and would instead discourage defendants from bringing timely claims of informational defects to the attention of the trial court, and result in numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims subject to review for the first time on collateral attack. This result could not have been anticipated by the Hall court. Here, Ferguson contends that Meisenheimer's failure to move for dismissal of the information or to arrest judgment on the ground that the information did not charge a crime was outside the range of professionally competent assistance of counsel in violation of the laws and Constitutions of the United States and Kansas. On review, this court must consider the trial court's analysis of whether counsel's performance was deficient and whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The district court concentrated on the potential prejudicial effect of trial counsel's deficient performance, if any, on the outcome of the trial. In the collateral attack, however, Ferguson focuses on the prejudicial effect of trial counsel's failure to move to arrest judgment on the outcome of proceedings after the trial. Even if this court accepts the Court of Appeals' determination that Meisenheimer's inaction satisfies the deficient performance prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), test as correct, it must satisfactorily address the perplexing question of prejudice presented here. In the original appeal of Ferguson's conviction, the Court of Appeals determined that Ferguson suffered no prejudice at trial as a result of the defective information. Adopting the Court of Appeals' approach that applied the pre- Hall test in this situation results in a second review of the merits of whether a defendant was prejudiced as a result of a defective information. Arguably, the issue of whether she suffered prejudice as a result of the defects in the information was determined in the original appeal, and Ferguson should be precluded from claiming prejudice again on collateral attack in the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the case of Roach v. State, 27 Kan. App. 2d 561, 7 P.3d 319 (2000), the Court of Appeals considered a petitioner's 60-1507 claim that his conviction should be reversed 20 years after he pled guilty to amended charges because the complaint failed to allege essential elements of the crime and, thus, was jurisdictionally defective. Judge Lewis, authoring the decision for the Court of Appeals, wrote: In this case, petitioner basically argues that the complaints filed against him did not charge a crime and that the court had no jurisdiction to convict him. We conclude, after our review of the record, that petitioner's argument is without merit. . . . . Petitioner argues that since his conviction was final before Hall was decided, the `pre- Hall ' rule should apply in his case. . . . We conclude the pre- Hall cases are no longer the law of this state and that in the case of a collateral attack such as the one in question, the liberal common-sense rule enunciated in Hall will apply. In Hall, the Supreme Court dealt with a direct appeal in which a jurisdictional issue based on the language of the complaint was being raised for the first time on direct appeal . In this case, we deal with a 20-year-old collateral attack on the defendant's convictions that has never been raised before. The spirit and purpose of Hall requires that we apply its common-sense rule to the facts presently before this court. The real issue in this case is whether the information filed against petitioner was sufficient to charge him with the crimes and establish jurisdiction of a court to try him and convict him of those crimes. The Supreme Court has clearly defined what a complaint must allege in order to charge a crime in State v. Rasch, 243 Kan. 495, 758 P.2d 214 (1988), and State v. Micheaux, 242 Kan. 192, 747 P.2d 784 (1987). Both of these decisions were relied on by the Supreme Court in arriving at its decision in Hall. . . . . As we understand the Supreme Court's decision, where a defendant is adequately apprised of the offense charged and the offense is a crime under the laws of the state, a defect in the complaint does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over that crime. 27 Kan. App. 2d at 565-67. The core of the Roach opinion is the conclusion that the pre- Hall analysis does not apply in collateral attack cases challenging jurisdiction based on defects in the charging documents, so long as a defendant was adequately apprised of the offense charged and that offense is a crime under the laws of Kansas. Instead, on collateral attack, the liberal common-sense rule of Hall will apply. The liberal common-sense rule enunciated in Hall should extend not only to challenges to the sufficiency of the charging document, but also will apply for purposes of analyzing the prejudicial effect of trial counsel's failure to file a motion to vacate in a collateral attack based on ineffective assistance of counsel. This necessitates overruling Hall in part. The Hall opinion states: A motion for arrest of judgment is the proper procedure for a defendant who wishes to challenge the sufficiency of the information after trial because of either a claim that it did not charge a crime or that the court was without jurisdiction of the crime charged. When such a motion is timely filed, the trial court in reviewing the motion, shall test its merit by utilizing the rationale of our pre- Hall cases. 246 Kan. at 764. The pre- Hall standard will no longer apply in the case of a collateral attack such as we see in this case; instead, the liberal common-sense rule enunciated in Hall will apply. We reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm the trial court.