Opinion ID: 1714041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancery court erred by failing to transfer the matter to the circuit court of simpson county.

Text: ¶ 14. USF & G asserts that its right to a trial by jury was abrogated when the chancellor refused to transfer the case to the circuit court. USF & G reminds this Court that Article 3, § 31 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 holds the right of a trial by jury inviolate. In further support of its claim, USF & G cites Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Deakle, 661 So.2d 188 (Miss.1995), McLean v. Green, 352 So.2d 1312 (Miss.1977), Blackledge v. Scott, 530 So.2d 1363 (Miss.1988) and Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088 (Miss.1999) as authority regarding a chancellor's discretion involving the transfer or retention of cases based upon jurisdictional questions. ¶ 15. Deakle involved numerous toxic tort suits which found their way into chancery court through the ancient, but viable bill of peace. A bill of peace is a procedural vehicle employed when a person has a right which may be controverted by various persons, at different times and by different actions. Deakle, 661 So.2d at 192 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 151 (5th ed.1979)). This Court held: Where the chancery court has exercised its equity jurisdiction, it may proceed to a complete adjudication of the suit and award all appropriate legal and equitable remedies. This complete adjudication extends to include the award of any punitive damages appropriate, although the chancery court has actual subject matter jurisdiction over such claims rather than merely pendant jurisdiction. Unless the case is one historically tried by a jury, the chancery court may retain jurisdiction and make determinations typically made by a jury.... Whether denominated a bill of peace or a motion for other equitable relief, if such request is a pleading filed subsequent to the initial complaint, as this one is, once the chancery court exercised its equity jurisdiction over any part of the dioxin litigation, it could have proceeded to a complete adjudication of all claims. However, the right to a jury trial must also be considered. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted). Because the chancery court had reached a final judgment on the merits of the case and because there was no error other than the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. Id. at 197. ¶ 16. In McLean, the legal guardian of a minor attempted to adjudicate a personal injury claim arising from a motorcycle accident in chancery court based on the chancery court's jurisdiction over minors. This Court determined that, although minors were involved, the case did not require any equitable relief. McLean, 352 So.2d at 1314. This Court held when the action at bar arises from a tort claim, courts of equity should not assume jurisdiction over claims for personal injury. Id. One reason offered in support of the Court's holding is that, historically, tort claims have been tried by jury. Id. McLean further noted that: [W]here the chancellor erroneously assumed jurisdiction of a common law action, the right to trial by jury had been taken away. However, we also held that § 147 was just as much a part of our Constitution as § 31, and, therefore, they must be construed together. In doing this, the net result is that trial by jury shall remain inviolate except in cases where the chancellor's erroneous assumption of jurisdiction is the only error in the proceeding. Despite the mandate of § 147, we look with disfavor upon and consider it an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to assume jurisdiction of a common law action which properly should be tried in a court of law where the right to trial by jury remains inviolate. But absent other error, we cannot reverse. Id. (citing Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. v. McLeod Lumber Co., 147 Miss. 186, 113 So. 433 (1927)). The judgment of the chancery court was affirmed because no other reversible error was found. This Court has reversed the judgment of a lower court when error other than the lack of subject matter jurisdiction has been found. ¶ 17. In Blackledge, this Court reversed the Chancery Court of Claiborne County, holding the suit lay outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the chancery court. This Court determined the suit was filed in chancery court in an attempt to vest that court with jurisdiction over a purely legal claim. Blackledge, 530 So.2d at 1365-66. Blackledge involved a rear-end collision accident similar to the case at bar. The plaintiffs alleged that the chancery court jurisdiction was proper because the matter would be too complicated for a jury and discovery expense in circuit court would be exorbitant. Id. at 1365. The chancellor agreed with the plaintiffs' argument and accepted jurisdiction over the entire matter. ¶ 18. Recognizing that § 147 of the Mississippi Constitution forbids reversal upon jurisdictional grounds alone, this Court found the suit against the three insurance companies involved amounted to a fraudulent joinder as to venue and reversed on that basis because errors in venue are not within the bar of § 147. Id. at 1365-66. The facts of this case and the facts of the case sub judice can be distinguished. In the case sub judice, no other error subject to remand is found as to USF & G's assignments of error except for the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Blackledge, venue was not proper; and therefore, this Court could reverse the final judgment of the chancery court without being restricted by § 147. ¶ 19. In Southern Homes, this Court held that matters historically tried by a jury, such as a breach of contract claim, are best heard in circuit court. Southern Homes, 742 So.2d at 1090. This Court also held if any doubts were to arise as to the jurisdiction of the chancery court, those doubts should be decided in favor of transfer to circuit court for a trial by jury. Id. Southern followed the correct procedure by filing an interlocutory appeal with this Court before a final judgment was issued on the merits of the case because the Mississippi Constitution prohibits reversal on a jurisdictional issue following a trial on the merits. Id. at 1091. Article 6, § 147 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that: No judgment or decree in any chancery or circuit court rendered in a civil cause shall be reversed or annulled on the ground of want of jurisdiction to render said judgment or decree, from any error or mistake as to whether the cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common-law jurisdiction; but if the Supreme Court shall find error in the proceedings other than as to jurisdiction, and it shall be necessary to remand the case, the Supreme Court may remand it to that court which, in its opinion, can best determine the controversy. Therefore, this Court was able to grant the interlocutory appeal ordering that the case be transferred to the circuit court. Id. ¶ 20. As Southern Homes indicates, it is appropriate to seek permission to bring an interlocutory appeal to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in order to prevent a final resolution of the case in an inappropriate forum. In the case sub judice, USF & G filed a petition for interlocutory appeal on August 3, 1999, six days before the scheduled trial. USF & G also filed a motion to stay the proceedings which was denied, and the trial proceeded on August 9, 1999. The petition for interlocutory appeal was not considered by this Court until after a final judgment had been decided on the merits of the case; therefore, it was denied as moot. This Court has continuously recognized the inviolate right of its citizens to a trial by jury pursuant to Article 3, Section 31, of the Mississippi Constitution. But this Court, as previously stated, has also recognized the restraints imposed by Section 147 of the Constitution once a final judgment has been rendered. Since a final judgment has been rendered in this matter and there is no evidence of another error other than subject matter jurisdiction, as relates to USF & G's assignments of error, it would be against the weight of established judicial precedent and Article 6, § 147 of our State's Constitution to reverse the case on this basis. ¶ 21. Francis/Draper incorrectly rely on Cossitt v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 551 So.2d 879 (Miss.1989) in their argument that USF & G chose the forum in which to proceed by filing their interpleader action in the Simpson County Chancery Court. The facts in Cossitt are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the case sub judice. In Cossitt, Nationwide interpled uninsured motorist coverage of $25,000 into the Hinds County Chancery Court. Id. at 880. Cossitt then counterclaimed for $75,000 and for punitive damages. Id. Thus, equity issues and issues of law were all contained within a single action before the chancellor. This is not so in the case sub judice. USF & G, like Nationwide, interpled $25,000 into the Simpson County Chancery Court. But Francis/Draper did not answer with a counterclaim. Francis/Draper filed a separate action in the Simpson County Chancery Court against USF & G and the Estate of Lewis Henry Johnson. The Francis/Draper complaint did not contain any equity issues. The complaint alleged a negligent motor vehicle accident, sought damages for personal injury and wrongful death, sought benefits from the insurance policy and alleged negligence on the part of the insurance company's agent. Although there was an interpleader action before the chancery court, that alone does not establish subject matter jurisdiction of the separate tort action. Cossitt is distinguishable and thus not applicable to the case at bar. ¶ 22. Francis/Draper also incorrectly argue the chancery court obtained subject matter jurisdiction by consolidating the two separate claims. This Court has established the rule that consolidation is in the sound discretion of the trial court and should be liberally construed. See Stoner v. Colvin, 236 Miss. 736, 110 So.2d 920 (1959); Gwin v. Fountain, 159 Miss. 619, 126 So. 18 (1930); Planters' Oil Mill v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 153 Miss. 712, 121 So. 138 (1929). But [i]t is important to keep in mind that consolidated actions never lose their identity as separate actions. Smith v. H.C. Bailey Cos., 477 So.2d 224, 231 (Miss.1985). Consolidation in no way dispenses with the need for separate pleadings or, most importantly, separate final judgments. Id. See Elliott v. Harrigill, 241 Miss. 877, 882, 133 So.2d 612 (1961); Stoner v. Colvin, 236 Miss. 736, 110 So.2d 920 (1959); V. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 506 (2d ed.1950). ¶ 23. The chancellor, in the case sub judice, consolidated the two separate actions of USF & G and Francis/Draper over the strenuous objections of USF & G. USF & G continued to maintain throughout the action that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit. We agree with USF & G, but we also understand that once a chancery court makes a final judgment on the merits of the case, this Court may not reverse that finding without finding an error in addition to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Again as to USF & G's assignments of error on direct appeal, we are unable to find such error subject to remand and conclude that because a final judgment was rendered, this Court, in accordance with § 147 of the Mississippi Constitution, may not overturn the finding of the chancellor for want of subject matter jurisdiction alone.