Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendant's Exclusion from Proceedings

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights under both the state and federal Constitutions to be present at all meaningful proceedings in his trial. [29] In particular, he identifies certain in camera hearings held both before and during trial in which defense counsel (in the absence of both defendant and the prosecutor) declared a conflict due to defendant's threats of violence; other hearings at which counsel, the trial court, and the prosecutor discussed defendant's threats; and a hearing at which defense counsel discussed the possibility of defense counsel's testifying at the penalty phase of the trial. A criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to be present at trial, largely rooted in the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, also enjoys protection through the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [citation] 'whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge,' but not `when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.' ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) [A] criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless he finds himself at a `stage ... that is critical to [the] outcome' and `his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.' ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46, quoting Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631.) Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution applies the same standard. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 433, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) All of the identified hearings were conducted outside the presence of the jury and in some manner concerned defendant's threats to harm his counsel and the prosecutor. As to the hearings directly concerning the effect of defendant's threats against the prosecutor and defense counsel, defendant argues that, had he been present, he could have explained that he posed no threat to either man and thus his presence would have increased the fairness of the hearings or improved his opportunity to defend against the murder and robbery charges. [30] We disagree. Defendant already had testified he was merely trying to delay his trial and did not actually intend to harm the prosecutor. It is doubtful his presence could have added anything to the hearings; accordingly, his exclusion from them did not diminish the fairness of the proceedings. Similarly, defendant was excluded from the hearing on October 13, 1992, wherein defense counsel discussed the possibility he would testify. But this hearing was not a critical one, for defendant had been present at hearings on October 8, 19, and 20, 1992, in which the possibility of counsel's proposed testimony was openly discussed. In the latter hearing, defendant expressly waived his attorney-client privilege and acknowledged his ability to prevent counsel from testifying. Accordingly, we conclude the October 13 hearing did not bear a ``reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.'' ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1357, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Because defendant has not shown the identified hearings were critical to the outcome of the trial, nor that his exclusion had an impact on the fairness of the proceedings, his absence from the hearings does not require reversal. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) [31]