Opinion ID: 2516369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation on Defendant's Cross Examination of Nelson

Text: ś 59 Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing cross-examination of witness Nelson concerning a conversation between Nelson and defendant's sister that would allegedly have revealed Nelson's anger toward defendant and establish bias. [4] ś 60 Specifically, defendant asserts that while incarcerated prior to trial, he informed his sister, Jenise, that an unknown figure, Paul, gave him the gun used in the murder and that he had been framed for the crime. Defendant also asserts that Jenise repeated this story to Nelson. Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to cross-examine Nelson concerning Jenise's alleged statement to Nelson about Paul. Defendant argues that this hearsay should have been admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay doctrine because it would have shown that Nelson was aware of defendant's claims regarding Paul and, given Nelson's anger toward defendant, this was evidence that he might lie. ś 61 The state points out that any statement by Jenise to Nelson was hearsay and that Nelson's prior statements were consistent, did not demonstrate a motivation to lie, were not suggestive of Nelson's state of mind, and that defendant's statements to Jenise were simply his unsuccessful attempt to conjure up a third party defense. ś 62 The state argues that Nelson's testimony, based solely on a conversation with Jenise, would have no tendency to connect the unidentified Paul to the crime. Cf. State v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 252, 778 P.2d 602, 617 (1988). Defendant introduced no evidence to suggest that even if Jenise had related the conversation to Nelson, it would have caused a deviation in Nelson's testimony. ś 63 We conclude that Jenise's alleged conversation with Nelson was unreliable hearsay unrelated to Nelson's state of mind. See Ariz. R. Evid. 803(3). Moreover, the trial court concluded that the defendant actually sought to introduce the hearsay conversation to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that is, to present to the jury, without testifying himself, the theory that some mysterious person named Paul committed the crime. ś 64 While evidence of third party culpability which raises reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt is ordinarily admissible, we do not allow it unless it would rationally demonstrate an inherent tendency to connect the other person with the actual commission of the crime. See State v. Oliver, 169 Ariz. 589, 591, 821 P.2d 250, 252 (App.1991); Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 252, 778 P.2d at 617. Where, as here, the evidence is hearsay and raises nothing more than selfserving suspicion of third party involvement, the trial court was within its sound discretion to exclude it. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 252, 778 P.2d at 617.