Opinion ID: 2832657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Indictment amendment

Text: Caroni argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when the jury was charged in the disjunctive but the indictment read in the conjunctive. 10 Count One charged the Defendants with engaging in a conspiracy to unlawfully dispense controlled substances through prescription practices done outside the usual course of medical practice and for other than legitimate medical purposes. However, the Government’s proposed jury instructions stated that the jury only had to find one or the other. Caroni objected and asked for a ruling before opening arguments. The district court instructed the lawyers to avoid the standard in their openings and did not rule until 20 days into the trial, after the Government had rested. It overruled Caroni’s objection and instructed the jury in the disjunctive. Caroni argues that the charge impermissibly expanded the indictment by broadening the possible bases for conviction. Caroni points to our decision in United States v. Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1995), where we held that the Government had to prove willfulness even though the statute did not include that language because the Government had put the word in the indictment. We so held because the entire defense was based on the defendant’s lack of willfulness and the Government did not seek to have willfulness removed until after the close of evidence. Here, Caroni contends that 10 Both Pastorek and DiLeo adopt this argument. 26 Case: 13-10661 Date Filed: 09/01/2015 Page: 27 of 47 his entire defense was prepared based on the grand jury’s charges and changing the rules midstream was highly prejudicial. We have explained that a constructive amendment “takes place ‘when the essential elements of the offense contained in the indictment are altered to broaden the possible bases for conviction beyond what is contained in the indictment.’” United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014)) (quoting United States v. Dortch, 696 F.3d 1104, 1111 (11th Cir. 2012)). We have stated repeatedly that when an indictment charges several means of violating a statute, a conviction may be obtained on proof of only one of the means. Id. at 1283-84. In Mozie, we explained that in Cancelliere, there were some key differences. One was that willfulness was not an alternative means because it was not in the statute. Id. at 1284. Second, Cancelliere was different because the defendant based his entire defense on disproving the mental state that was removed. Id. Finally, we stated that to the extent Cancelliere supported Mozie’s position, it was inconsistent with cases that came before it and they would trump Cancelliere. Id. at 1285. Caroni’s argument fails for several reasons. This case is more like Mozie than Cancelliere. The disjunctive instruction was not error. Section 1306.04(a) of the code of Federal Regulations provides an exception to the prohibitions found in § 841 that ban the sale and provision of certain drugs. That regulation permits prescriptions for controlled substance if they are “issued for a legitimate medical 27 Case: 13-10661 Date Filed: 09/01/2015 Page: 28 of 47 purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.” Thus, under the plain language of the regulation, in order to qualify for the exception, a defendant must have provided the prescription for both a legitimate medical purpose and while acting in the usually course of his profession. Without both, the defendant is subject to prosecution. Accord Joseph, 709 F.3d at 1094 (citing the regulation and holding “[i]f a prescription is issued without a legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of professional practice”, it is subject to criminal penalties). Hence, the Government needed only to prove one of the two prongs and the Defendants were on notice because the language of the section clearly mandated that requirement.