Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Challenge to Prospective Juror G.S.

Text: G.S., 66 years old at the time of trial, was a retired telephone operator with a high school education. She was married with one adult child. Many of her questionnaire answers appeared confused. For example, on question No. 31 she indicated that neither she nor any close friend or relative had been a victim of or a witness to a serious crime, yet she answered the subsequent questions about the crime, stating I felt fine about the police response (question No. 34) and I feel OK about the judicial system's response (question No. 35). Asked the view of her religious organization on the death penalty (question No. 77), G.S. answered None, but asked next whether she felt obligated to accept this view, she checked yes. Asked in question No. 81 whether she could ever, in the appropriate case, see herself rejecting life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and choosing the death penalty instead, she checked no. (Italics added.) Yet on question No. 82, asked for her attitude about the death penalty for someone convicted of first degree murder in the course of a residential robbery and burglary, G.S. checked the two harshest categories, Automatically vote for the death penalty and Strongly favor the death penalty. She also said (on question No. 84) that the death penalty should be automatic for anyone who intentionally commits murder. Finally, asked in question No. 85 what kind of information would be significant for her in choosing between death and life without parole, she answered simply, Yes. In voir dire, the court asked G.S. to say which of six categories printed on placards best reflected her feelings about the death penalty. [19] When she responded, Oh, dear, the court assured her her answer did not have to be precise and she should say if she was between two categories. She chose group 6: Will vote for life without the possibility of parole in every case of murder with special circumstances. The court asked whether that meant under no circumstances could you ever vote for the death penalty. G.S. answered: Oh, yes, if it was proven to be that. G.S. then said she identified with placard group 3 (Somewhat in favor of the death penalty in some cases of murder with special circumstances) as well as group 6. After some additional discussion, she returned to her original answer of group 6, but when the court reminded her that meant she could never impose the death penalty, she answered: No. No, it says parole in every case of murder with special circumstances. It depends on what the evidence says. The court then abandoned the placard approach and asked G.S. directly whether she would have her mind made up before the penalty phase or would listen to the evidence in that phase of trial and weigh it before making a penalty decision. She answered she would listen to and weigh the evidence. The prosecutor also questioned G.S. briefly. She reaffirmed her questionnaire response that she would automatically vote for death for a person found guilty of murder with special circumstances (question No. 82), adding, Anybody that's guilty, sure. But she agreed she would be willing to listen to evidence of aggravation and mitigation and balance both out. In the Wheeler/Batson hearing, the prosecutor explained he excused G.S. because she was very confused. Had nothing to do with race. In her questionnaire she contradicted herself. On the placards, the prosecutor noted, she said six, then she changed her mind, and then she went back and said six. I would always choose life without parole. The prosecutor also doubted G.S.'s ability to understand the proceedings and her responsibility as a juror: I do not believe she was capable of listening to the evidence, weighing the evidence, and applying the law which can become quite complicated. . . . The court agreed G.S. was clearly confused. Her answers were all over the board, so to speak, and there is concern, his concern, that she would be unable to understand and follow the directions of the court, the instructions of the court, I think is a legitimate one, and I made note of that. The prosecutor's stated reasons are well supported by the record. Whether due to anxiety, limited literacy, poor verbal comprehension or other factors, G.S. displayed great difficulty understanding the written and oral questioning and, in consequence, gave answers that were highly ambiguous, confused and contradictory. Her questionnaire and oral examination gave strong reason to doubt her ability to perform her duties as a juror. As with Prospective Juror V.H., discussed above, defendant compares the prosecutor's treatment of G.S. with that of Juror No. 6, a White man whom the prosecutor did not excuse. As noted earlier, Juror No. 6 gave several pro-death-penalty answers on his questionnaire, writing, for example, that in his view if the evidence was sufficient all convicted murderers should receive the death penalty. Yet, defendant points out, he also said he would not always vote for death, regardless of the penalty phase evidence, for a defendant convicted of first degree murder with a felony-murder special circumstance, and he neither favored nor opposed the death penalty in that situation. There was some tension among Juror No. 6's various questionnaire responses, as was true for many of the prospective jurors. But his questionnaire does not display the same level of confusion and lack of comprehension as G.S.'s. His voir dire, moreover, went much more smoothly. Shown the placards with categories of death penalty attitudes, he chose group 2, Favors the death penalty but will not vote to impose it in every case of murder with special circumstances, and agreed that best represented his attitude when the court read it aloud to him. While his questionnaire responses raised a question whether he would automatically vote for death and would not consider the penalty phase evidence, the court, by reminding him of the structure of a capital trial and the responsibilities of jurors in such a trial, was able to clarify his attitudes effectively and remove any suggestion of disqualification. The prosecutor could easily have doubted G.S.'s ability to perform as a juror without harboring the same doubt as to Juror No. 6. As was the case with Prospective Juror V.H., therefore, a comparison with Juror No. 6 does not tend to prove the prosecutor's stated reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against G.S. were pretextual.