Opinion ID: 478414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: duration of harvesting restrictions

Text: 52 Sierra-Angoon also argue that timber harvest on the Cube Cove inholding is subject to section 22(k) of ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1621(k), which provides: 53 Any patents to lands under this chapter which are located within the boundaries of a national forest shall contain such conditions as the Secretary deems necessary to assure that: 54 (1) the sale of any timber from such lands shall, for a period of five years, be subject to the same restrictions relating to the export of timber from the United States as are applicable to national forest lands in Alaska under rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture; and 55 (2) such lands are managed under the principle of sustained yield and under management practices for protection and enhancement of environmental quality no less stringent than such management practices on adjacent national forest lands for a period of twelve years. 56 The federal regulations implementing section 22(k) interpret these time limits as running from the date of enactment (Dec. 18, 1971), and thus both time limits have now expired. See 43 C.F.R. Sec. 2650.4-5 (1985). Sierra-Angoon argue that the regulation misinterprets the statute. Because the patent must contain the conditions, they argue, the plain language of the statute requires that the conditions run from the date of conveyance, not the date of enactment. 57 We will affirm the Secretary's interpretation of section 22(k) if it is within the range of reasonable meanings of the statute's language and it comports with the statute's purposes. See Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir.1985). Section 22(k) is itself silent about the date from which the time periods are to run, and the remainder of the statute makes Congress' intent no clearer. 58 Sierra-Angoon cite a number of other provisions of ANCSA that specify time periods that expressly begin on the date of enactment, e.g., sections 2(c), 7(b), 12(c)(3), and 17(d)(2)(B) (43 U.S.C. Secs. 1601(c), 1606(b), 1611(c)(3), and 1616(d)(2)(B)). They ask the court to infer that, by failing to tie the section 22(k) time periods to the date of enactment, Congress intended that the periods run from the only other plausible date, the date of conveyance. This inference is a weak one at best. Other provisions of ANCSA contain similar ambiguous time limitations. The phrase for a period of five years appears in a similar context in section 22(c), 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1621(c), and we have construed that time limitation to run from the date of enactment. Alaska Miners v. Andrus, 662 F.2d 577 (9th Cir.1981). Further, Sierra-Angoon expect a degree of consistency that cannot be presumed in the context of complex legislation such as ANCSA. The substance of section 22(k) appeared for the first time as section 23(v) of S.35 less than two months before final passage of ANCSA, and achieved its present form during a hurried Senate floor debate on the day the Senate passed its version of the bill. 117 Cong.Rec. 38,465-66 (1971). The ambiguity appears to result more from accident than design. 59 The legislative history is inconclusive. Sierra-Angoon rely on the rejection on the Senate floor of an amendment to the statute that would have explicitly started the time period from the date of enactment. They cite the following exchange: 60 Mr. GRAVEL.... I wonder if we could dot the i, and provide the 5 years would run from enactment of this legislation. Would my colleague agree on that point? 61 Mr. STEVENS. This would make it 5 years. That could be discussed in conference. 62 117 Cong.Rec. 38,466 (1971) (remarks of Senators Gravel and Stevens). The failure to dot the 'i'  might at worst reflect a disagreement about the application of section 22(k) that Congress chose to leave to the Secretary to resolve, not a rejection of an amendment. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2793, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (Congress can leave to appropriate agency resolution of competing statutory policies). Indeed, subsequent legislative history suggests congressional acquiescence to 43 C.F.R. Sec. 2650.4-5. In considering ANILCA, Congress acknowledged the Secretary's interpretation of section 22(k), but did not see fit to overturn it. The Senate report on ANILCA states that ANCSA restricts the management of lands conveyed from the national forests to native corporations for 12 years. This 12-year period runs from the date of [ANCSA] through December, 1983. S.Rep. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 261-62 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5070, 5205-06. 63 The Secretary has the principal responsibility for administering ANCSA and his interpretation is entitled to deference. Doyon Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954, 99 S.Ct. 352, 58 L.Ed.2d 345 (1978). Sierra-Angoon urge us not to defer to the Secretary's interpretation because, they argue, the agency has not held a consistent view of the statute. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 164, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). They note that two proposed versions of 43 C.F.R. Sec. 2650.4-5 measured the section 22(k) time periods from the date of conveyance, see 38 Fed.Reg. 6505-06 (1973); 37 Fed.Reg. 19,63 6 (1972), while the final regulation adopted time periods from the date of enactment without explaining the change. But the inconsistency the courts have frowned upon is in official interpretations. To hold a final interpretation must be consistent with draft regulations would deprive the rulemaking process of flexibility, transforming proposed regulations into official actions that agencies would be hesitant to reconsider. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C.Cir.1973). 64 The Secretary's interpretation is entitled to great deference as a longstanding contemporaneous administrative construction, upon which interested persons are likely to have relied. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 120, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2062, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). Native corporations that built facilities to service the round log export market using timber from lands conveyed to them under ANCSA may have relied upon 43 C.F.R. Sec. 2650.4-5 for assurances that their exports would be free of restriction. If we were to read the section 22(k)(1) export restrictions as still operative today, their investments could be impaired. 65 Sierra-Angoon urge us not to defer to the agency because the interpretation issue requires no agency expertise. We disagree. The Secretary's interpretation of section 22(k) involved a reconciliation of competing policies that entailed more than ordinary knowledge of the regulated matters. Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2783 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 6 L.Ed.2d 908 (1961)). Congress intended ANCSA and section 22(k) to accomplish several competing goals, including: (1) to create viable, profitable Native Corporations, see Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 517 F.Supp. 1255, 1262 (D.Alaska 1981); (2) to prevent haphazard and disjointed management of forest lands until the Native Corporations could develop their own management plans to govern the tracts they selected, S.Rep. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1971); (3) to prevent the Native Corporations from immediately selling off their resources to raise capital the government would be providing them over the ensuing ten years anyway, see 117 Cong.Rec. 46,965 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Stevens); and (4) to cushion the blow to local sawmills that relied on export restrictions applicable to timber taken from Forest Service lands. 66 The Secretary's interpretation furthered the creation of profitable Native Corporations by lifting export restrictions at an early date. It also limited haphazard and disjointed management by setting a date certain for the expiration of the time limits. Starting the time running from the date of conveyance would result in a confusing, staggered set of limits, especially for Native Corporations (such as Sealaska) that have received different parcels at different times. It limited Native exploitation of the lands for five years, the time period intended to be required for federal distribution of the majority of the money settlements; see ANCSA Sec. 6(a), 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1605(a). And it gave the local timber industry breathing space during a limited transitional period to prepare for the relaxation of import restrictions. The Secretary's interpretation should not be disturbed unless it is unreasonable. See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. We find it to be consistent with both the statute's policies and its literal language.