Opinion ID: 2136730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amending the charge.

Text: The state argues that sec. 971.29 (2), Stats., cures the defect in the state's case. This section in part provides: (2) At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the complaint, indictment or information to conform to the proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the defendant. After verdict the pleading shall be deemed amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the trial. Sec. 957.16 (1), Stats. 1967, is the predecessor of sec. 971.29 (2) (Laws of 1969, ch. 255, sec. 63, effective July 1, 1970). However, there was no significant legislative change in the language regarding the amendment after verdict found in sub. (2). Sec. 957.16, Stats. 1967, was entitled Variances disregarded; amendment, where the new sec. 971.29 is entitled Amending the charge. However, the judicial council explained: This section is a restatement of existing law except that it provides that prior to arraignment the district attorney may amend a complaint or information without leave of the court or notice to the other party. Since the district attorney is in charge of the prosecution he should be permitted to amend his pleadings prior to the time that the defendant has been required to plead. [Bill 603-A] 1970 Wisconsin Annotations, p. 2141. We are of the opinion that the sentence regarding amendment after verdict was intended to deal with technical variances in the complaint such as names and dates. The case law in Wisconsin considering this section concerns such technical amendments. State v. Lincoln (1863), 17 Wis. 597 (), (variance in spelling surnames deemed amended); Baker v. State (1894), 88 Wis. 140, 59 N. W. 570 (variance as to ownership and amount of money deemed amended in complaint charging larceny where penalty not affected); Golonbieski v. State (1898), 101 Wis. 333, 77 N. W. 189 (variance in corporate name deemed amended); Meehan v. State (1903), 119 Wis. 621, 97 N. W. 173 (larceny of watch deemed amended to larceny of gold watch); Hess v. State (1921), 174 Wis. 96, 181 N. W. 725 (allowing amendment of information before trial not prejudicial where offense originally alleged to have been committed on August 24, 1918, but amended to August 31, 1918). In State v. Bednairski (1957), 1 Wis. 2d 639, 85 N. W. 2d 396, this court considered the defendant's contention that his conviction, under sec. 343.44, Stats. 1953, prohibiting the willful tearing down of any fence standing upon the land of another, was not supported by the evidence where the complaint charged that the land belonged to one John Schaefer but the proof indicated it belonged to the state. The court concluded: 3. There was no fatal variance between accusation and proof even if we accept the view that the land belonged to the state instead of to the Schaefers. The precise ownership of the land was not material to the merits of the case, it not being contended that defendant was the owner or had any authority from the owner; and there is no showing that defendant was misled to his prejudice by the reference in the complaint and warrant to ownership by Schaefer. It was therefore a case for application of sec. 957.16, Stats. 1955, authorizing amendment to conform to the proof in cases where the variance is not material to the merits of the action, and providing that after verdict the pleading shall be deemed so amended if no objection based on the variance was timely raised at the trial. Supporting the view that the variance was properly disregarded here are Anderson v. State, 221 Wis. 78, 85, 265 N. W. 210; State v. Carroll, 239 Wis. 625, 633, 2 N. W. (2d) 211; State ex rel. Wenzlaff v. Burke, 250 Wis. 525, 531, 27 N. W. (2d) 475. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Bednarski, supra, pages 642, 643. Furthermore, in this case it would be impossible for the defendant to raise any objection to such an amendment of the charge because the state advances the argument for the first time on this appeal. As we understand the argument of the state, such an amendment could be made as a matter of course. If the reasoning of the state is viable, then the defendant would have no right to object to such an amendment until after the respondent's brief raising the issue is filed on appeal. Such is not the law. 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indictments And Informations, p. 1072, sec. 310: Sec. 310. Aider or cure by verdict. It is well settled that a verdict will not cure a failure to allege a criminal offense or the omission of any essential allegation; any such objection is fatal after as well as before the verdict. It is equally well settled, however, that defects which are merely matters of form and not of substance, or ambiguities, etc., in an indictment or information, are cured by verdict; objections to such a defect, if made after verdict, come too late, regardless of the fact that they might have rendered the indictment bad had they been seasonably taken. Failure to allege that which the law presumes, may be cured by verdict. 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indictments And Informations, p. 1073, sec. 312: Sec. 312. Different offense from that charged. It is the general rule that a person cannot be convicted of an entirely different offense from that charged or necessarily included within the terms of the indictment or information. To test the question whether an indictment for one offense includes another, it has been said that where the offenses are of the same general character, the indictment for the one offense must contain all the essential elements of the other; otherwise, the prosecution for the latter cannot be maintained. Even then, it has been held that by alleging matters wholly immaterial to the description of the crime charged, the state cannot compel the defendant to come to trial prepared to contest any issue which the state is not bound to prove in order to convict him of the offense charged. In Cole v. Arkansas (1948), 333 U. S. 196, 201, 68 Sup. Ct. 514, 92 L. Ed. 644, the United States Supreme Court held that: . . . It is as much a violation of due process to send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that was never made. . . . The Arkansas Supreme Court, on appeal, found that the defendant was guilty of violating sec. 1 of Act 193 of the 1943 Arkansas legislature although he had been tried and convicted under sec. 2 of the same act. In reversing, the supreme court held: No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal. Cole v. Arkansas, supra, page 201. It does not follow from our reversal in this case that the defendant could not now be appropriately charged with any other alleged offense arising out of this incident. By the Court. Judgment reversed.