Opinion ID: 2996477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Award of Attorney’s Fees for First Trial

Text: We review a district court’s refusal to reduce an award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 1998). It is true, of course, that a prevailing party under the ADA is entitled to “an award of fees for all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.” Id. at 416 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431). Therefore, when two trials are required to achieve the “ultimate result,” a plaintiff should be compensated for both trials, so long as the time spent at both was “reasonably expended.” Rush argues, however, that when a plaintiff’s unreasonable arguments at the first trial force 6 No. 02-3839 the parties to participate in a second proceeding, the plaintiff should not be allowed compensation for both proceedings. To establish this principle, Rush relies heavily on our second decision in Jaffee v. Redmond. 142 F.3d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Jaffee II]. The Jaffee case involved two trials and two appeals. In the appeal from the first trial, Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Jaffee I], we held that the district court had erroneously ruled, at the plaintiff’s urging, that there was no federal patient-psychotherapist privilege. Id. at 1356-58. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed our decision and resolved a circuit split by recognizing a federal evidentiary privilege for patient-psychotherapist communications. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996). The case was remanded for a new trial, and at the second trial, plaintiff again prevailed. See Jaffee II, 142 F.3d at 411. On plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees the district court held that given the split in authority, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to argue against the privilege in the first trial; however, the court awarded no fees for the second trial, reasoning that if the plaintiff had not argued incorrectly at the first trial there would have been no need for the second. See id. The plaintiff appealed, and in Jaffee II, we reversed the district court, noting that “[w]hile an unreasonable argument that necessitates further proceedings may justify denying compensation for those proceedings, the district court in this case found that Jaffee acted reasonably in arguing against the privilege. . . . [A] fee award is not automatically precluded because the second trial was ‘necessitated by’ a reasonable but unsuccessful argument.” Id. at 416. Other circuits have also observed that so long as a plaintiff’s actions are not responsible for the need for a second trial, the plaintiff may be compensated for time spent on both proceedings. See O’Rourke v. City of ProviNo. 02-3839 7 dence, 235 F.3d 713, 737 (1st Cir. 2001); Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 878-81 (2d Cir. 1998). Gierlinger, a § 1983 case against a New York State Police Officer, involved three trials. The first trial ended in a jury verdict for the plaintiff, but the Second Circuit reversed and remanded that case for a new trial because it was “not possible to determine from the [jury] instructions whether the jury found [the defendant] liable on the theory of respondeat superior, which is not available in a § 1983 claim.” Gierlinger v. N.Y. St. Police, 15 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1994). The second trial, for reasons discussed below, ended in a mistrial. And the third trial ended with a verdict for the plaintiff. In its ruling on attorney’s fees following the third trial, the district court denied the plaintiff attorney’s fees for the first two trials, reasoning that the plaintiff bore significant responsibility for the errors that voided those trials. The Second Circuit reversed, awarding plaintiff attorney’s fees for all the trials. Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 881. A close analysis of the Second Circuit’s reasoning, however, suggests that had the plaintiff been responsible for the errors that voided the first two trials, compensation for attorney’s fees for those trials would not have been appropriate. For instance, in its ruling as to the award of fees for the first trial, the Second Circuit, focusing on the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s actions in that trial, noted that if [the plaintiff] had proposed erroneous jury instructions, or if she had opposed correct instructions . . . there would be a strong basis for denying her fees for some, if not all, of the hours her attorney expended on [the first trial]. But the record shows just the opposite . . . when the court asked whether [the plaintiff] objected to the addition of a specific instruction that there could be no liability on a respondeat superior theory, her attorney answered in the negative . . . 8 No. 02-3839 Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 881. Similar reasoning is evident in the court’s ruling that the plaintiff could receive fees for the second trial. The district court had ruled that the plaintiff should not receive attorney’s fees for the second trial because the plaintiff had caused the mistrial when she, along with her attorney, gave an interview about the case to a reporter. In reversing this ruling, the Second Circuit found that “the record belies the district court’s rationale that [plaintiff’s attorney] bore significant responsibility for the mistrial.” Id. at 878. Rather, the Second Circuit noted that the district court in granting the mistrial had specifically stated on the record that “the publicity in and of itself wouldn’t justify declaring a mistrial,” but other problems, not attributable to the plaintiff, did warrant a mistrial. Id. (quoting the district judge at the second trial). Therefore, the Second Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff could receive attorney’s fees for both the first and second trial because the plaintiff had not been responsible for the errors that voided those trials. Id. at 881. The First Circuit has agreed with the Second Circuit, finding that when a plaintiff prevails at a second trial, he or she may receive attorney’s fees for both trials so long as the mistake that made the second trial necessary is not attributable to the plaintiff. O’Rourke, 235 F.3d at 737. In the case at bar, the district court, in its ruling on attorney’s fees, held that Shott was not responsible for the errors of the first trial and therefore could receive attorney’s fees for that trial. In that ruling (on attorney’s fees), the district court stated that it had granted a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, not because of any errors committed by the plaintiff. We find that the record does not support this ruling. First, and most importantly, the district court, in its order granting a new trial, stated that Shott pursued an unreasonable strategy that prejudiced Rush such that the verdict had to be set aside: No. 02-3839 9 While the court believes that there is some evidence in the record that could support the jury’s verdict on the disability claim, it concludes that Rush was prejudiced by the way this case was tried and is entitled to a new trial. Plaintiff’s strategy was to throw at the jury approximately 18 months of alleged misconduct by Dr. Preisler and leave it to the jury to sort out his motivation. Under some circumstances this would be a reasonable strategy, but in this case, because Dr. Shott brought her need for an accommodation to Dr. Preisler’s attention so late in the sequence of events, there is substantial likelihood that the jury considered against Rush on the disability claim conduct that preceded any attempt at the good faith interactive process the law requires. (R. 150 at 20.) From this statement, it appears that the district court actually was unsure that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (“there is some evidence in the record that could support the jury’s verdict”), but was sure that Rush was prejudiced by Shott’s presentation of her case—a presentation that the district court found unreasonable. So, in contrast to the situation we faced in Jaffee II—where we held that the district court erred because it refused to award attorney’s fees for the first trial even though it had found the plaintiff’s strategy at that trial to be reasonable, see Jaffee II, 142 F.3d at 411—here the district court awarded attorney’s fees even though it had found the plaintiff’s strategy at the first trial to be unreasonable. Second, Shott opposed jury instructions that may well have alleviated the errors of the first trial. In the first trial, the district court was concerned that the jury would hold Rush responsible for failing to accommodate Shott’s disability based on events that occurred before Shott ever requested an accommodation. Rush had requested an instruction (Jury Instruction No. 23) that addressed this concern: 10 No. 02-3839 For purposes of Dr. Shott’s disability claims, you are directed to focus on events that occurred after May 27, 1994, the date she first requested an accommodation for her disability. In its attorney’s fee ruling, in finding that Shott had not been responsible for the failure to instruct the jury on this point, the district court laid blame upon itself for “not adequately guid[ing] the jury’s consideration of the temporally overlapping discrimination claims in light of the requirement that defendant’s duty to accommodate did not arise until plaintiff brought her need for an accommodation to the defendant’s attention.” (R. 216 at 4.) In its new trial order, however, the district court stated that its failure to instruct the jury properly was in fact the result of Shott’s arguments against such instruction: The court rejected [Instruction 23] based on plaintiff’s argument that her disability was obvious to everyone prior to [the day on which Dr. Preisler was advised of Shott’s disability]. But reviewing all the evidence, it is clear that while her disability may have been obvious, her need for an accommodation was not obvious. (R. 150 at 21.) Again, the reasons given by the district court for granting a new trial in the attorney’s fee ruling do not follow the reasons given in its new trial order. Furthermore, we note that this situation, where a plaintiff unreasonably opposed a proper jury instruction that might have cured the errors of the trial, is almost identical to the situation that the Second Circuit opined would present “a strong basis for denying her fees for some, if not all, of the hours her attorney expended on [the first trial].” Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 881. Shott acknowledges that she opposed Jury Instruction No. 23, specifically the “focus on” language, but she maintains that she did agree that the court could instruct the jury that May 27, 1994, was the first date that she requested an accommodation for her disability. Our reading of the record No. 02-3839 11 of the jury instruction conference, however, indicates that it is far from clear that Shott would have agreed to such an instruction. Furthermore, in its new trial order the district court explicitly noted that it was the “focus on” language in the instruction offered by Rush, that, if given, would have properly guided the jury: [T]he likelihood of prejudice to Rush was compounded by the court’s failure to give an instruction, such as Rush’s proposed instruction no. 23, which would have focused the jury’s attention on the chronology critical to evaluating the failure to accommodate claim. (R. 150 at 21.) Therefore, we conclude that Shott should not receive attorney’s fees or costs for the first trial. As noted above, Shott’s presentation of the evidence in a way that confused the jury and her opposition to jury instructions that may have alleviated some of the confusion—along with the district court’s specific finding that a second trial was necessary because of Shott’s unreasonable strategy—leads us to this conclusion. We simply do not think it appropriate to award a litigant attorney’s fees for a trial that was voided by her unreasonable strategy. In sum, on remand the district court should not award attorney’s fees or costs for the work performed by Shott’s attorneys during the first trial. We see no problem, however, with awarding fees for the work done in preparation for that trial because it is likely that this work benefitted the second trial as well.1 1 We acknowledge that the second trial involved only the ADA claim, as opposed to the first, which involved four claims; therefore, it is possible that some of the preparation for the first trial did not benefit the second, but we find that the district court’s prior reduction of the fees by one-third based on degree of success adequately addresses this issue. 12 No. 02-3839