Opinion ID: 460972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appealability Under Carson v. American Brands

Text: 16 Alternatively, CP & P argues that the order is appealable under Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), because it has the practical effect of denying an injunction. In its original complaint filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of California, CP & P asked for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Trust, including an injunction prohibiting the Trust from taking any action whatsoever to initiate arbitration proceedings as provided by 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1401. 8 CP & P's Eastern District action was later consolidated with the Trust's action for withdrawal liability in the Central District. CP & P's answer to the Trust's complaint for withdrawal liability included a prayer for injunctive relief identical to that prayed for in its complaint. CP & P did not renew its request for an injunction at any time after its answer to the Trust's complaint. At the time the district court ruled on the cross motions for summary judgment, it had before it no express request for an injunction, and it never expressly ruled on such a request. CP & P argues, however, that the district court's order to arbitrate has the practical effect of refusing CP & P's long-dormant request for injunctive relief, and thus this court has jurisdiction to review the order under section 1292(a)(1). 17 If an express request for an injunction had been before the district court, and if the district court had expressly ruled on such a request when it granted partial summary judgment for the Trust, this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1) would be clear. 9 However, when an interlocutory order of a district court does not expressly rule on a specific request for injunctive relief, but merely has the effect of granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving an injunction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1), the case must meet the requirements set forth in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). 18 In Carson, the Supreme Court held that a litigant must show more than that the order has the practical effect of refusing an injunction for an interlocutory order to be appealable under section 1292(a)(1). 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996. Unless a litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a 'serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,' and that the order can be 'effectually challenged' only by immediate appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory appeal. Id.; see also Sentry Life Insurance Co. v. Borad, 759 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir.1985). 19 In Alascom, Inc. v. ITT North Electric Co., 727 F.2d 1419, 1422 (9th Cir.1984), this court held that the grant of a motion to stay arbitration is appealable under section 1292(a)(1). If [a] party must undergo the expense and delay of a trial before being able to appeal, the advantages of arbitration--speed and economy--are lost forever. We find this consequence 'serious, perhaps, irreparable' and 'effectually challenged' only by immediate appeal. Id. at 1422. Alascom suggested, however, that the denial of a stay of arbitration is not similarly appealable because arbitration awards are not self-executing and, therefore, any harm caused by the denial of a stay will ordinarily be neither serious nor irreparable. 10 Id. We agree with Alascom that, under ordinary circumstances, a denial of a stay of arbitration does not threaten serious, perhaps irreparable consequences and so is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1). 20 CP & P advances two arguments to show that the order to arbitrate in the instant case does have serious consequences. First, under the MPPAA a district court reviewing an arbitrator's decision must give the arbitrator's findings of fact a presumption [of correctness], rebuttable only by a clear preponderance of the evidence.... 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(c). CP & P alleges that an arbitrator's decision that CP & P withdrew after the statute's effective date will deprive CP & P of de novo review of that factual question in the district court. We cannot find that section 1401(c)'s required presumption of correctness constitutes the serious, perhaps irreparable harm Carson requires. Arbitrator's awards in other contexts generally receive deferential review in the district courts, yet have not been held to impose irreparable harm on the parties. See Sentry Life Insurance, 759 F.2d at 698 (review under the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Secs. 9-10 (1982)); Carpenters' Local Union No. 1478 v. Stevens, 743 F.2d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir.1984) (review of labor arbitrator's decision), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2018, 85 L.Ed.2d 300 (1985). 21 In any event, it is doubtful that section 1401(c)'s presumption of correctness seriously affects the parties' right to review in a district court. The Fourth Circuit recently rejected an argument that the compulsory arbitration provisions of the MPPAA violated due process because the district court's review was essentially meaningless in light of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(c). Republic Industries, Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83, 718 F.2d 628, 639-41 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3553, 82 L.Ed.2d 855 (1984). The Fourth Circuit concluded that section 1401(c) does little more than allocate the burden of proof to the challenger and direct that issues which are close be resolved in favor of the nonjudicial dispute resolver. 11 Id. at 641; accord Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1511 (D.C.Cir.1984); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 854-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3554, 82 L.Ed.2d 856 (1984); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1277 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3554, 82 L.Ed.2d 855 (1984). 22 CP & P's second basis for alleging serious, perhaps irreparable consequences from the order to arbitrate in this case is that arbitration, which usually has the advantages of ... speed and economy, Alascom, 727 F.2d at 1422, will actually result in delay. Because the Trust refused CP & P's request to bifurcate arbitration and to allow the issue of coverage under the MPPAA to be determined before arbitrating the amount of withdrawal liability, CP & P will have to litigate both issues in the same arbitration proceeding. Should an arbitrator find that CP & P is subject to the MPPAA, CP & P will have to arbitrate the more complex issue of its withdrawal liability before appealing to a district court the arbitrator's initial decision on CP & P's withdrawal date. 23 We find no serious or irreparable harm under these circumstances. The expense and delay of such a process should be compared to the expense and delay if we allowed an immediate appeal. See Sentry Life Insurance, 759 F.2d at 698; cf. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. Much, 754 F.2d 773, 778 (7th Cir.1985) (concluding district court's remand to arbitrator to calculate damages would impose shorter delay than allowing immediate appeal). Of course, should the arbitrator find that CP & P withdrew before the effective date of the MPPAA, there will be no need to challenge to the amount of withdrawal liability at the arbitration hearing, and CP & P will have benefitted from the speed and economy of arbitration. If the arbitrator finds that CP & P withdrew after the MPPAA's effective date and then assesses the amount of CP & P's withdrawal liability, however, CP & P will be able to challenge both findings in a single appeal to the district court. If arbitration were bifurcated, CP & P would face a far more lengthy delay. CP & P would first have to arbitrate the issue of its withdrawal date, appeal an adverse finding to the district court, and, in turn, to this court. If this court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, it would send CP & P back to arbitration to determine the amount of liability. If CP & P then wished to appeal the arbitrator's findings on the amount of liability, it would again face the slow process of review and appeal in the federal courts. 24 In addition, denying CP & P immediate appeal will not foreclose the possibility of appellate review of the issues CP & P raises. CP & P's argument that the date of withdrawal is not arbitrable will not be lost because the parties must submit to arbitration, nor will the district court's required deference to the arbitrator's findings hinder the assertion of that argument on review in a district court. If CP & P is correct that the date of withdrawal is not arbitrable, the factual findings of the arbitrator will be a nullity and the district court will have nothing to which it must pay deference. 25 Because we find that the district court's order to arbitrate does not satisfy the requirements of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine and does not represent the serious, perhaps irreparable consequences effectually challenged only by immediate appeal, as Carson v. American Brands requires, we find that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1). 26 The appeal is DISMISSED.