Opinion ID: 742997
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Replaying of Tapes

Text: 27 Appellants also challenge the trial court's decision to replay the tapes for the jury during deliberations when neither they nor their attorneys were present. They argue that they were denied their Sixth Amendment right to confront the evidence against them and their Fifth Amendment right to due process. The government asserts that defendants' counsel agreed with the district court's proposal that only his law clerk be present, but the trial transcript is decidedly vague on that point, probably because there were prior discussions off the record between the lawyers and the judge which are not a matter of record. 28 First, appellants speculate about problems that might have occurred during the replaying, which was conducted in the courtroom by the judge's law clerk according to procedures of which both parties were informed beforehand. But, there is in fact no evidence suggesting that the law clerk either made independent decisions about whether or how to replay tapes or remained [325 U.S.App.D.C. 370] in the courtroom while the jury was deliberating, except for the actual playing of the tapes. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to presume harm. See United States v. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C.Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1986) (even where tape-playing government agent and jury were alone in the courtroom, error found harmless beyond reasonable doubt given the obvious efforts of the court, by clearing the courtroom, to prevent any outside influences, and the absence of any suggestion that extraneous matters came before the jury)); see United States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568, 570-71 (6th Cir.1976); cf. Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1119-20 (9th Cir.1995) (complete abdication of judicial control where law clerk independently granted jury's readback request and control over what was read to jury was in hands of jurors and clerk). 29 Second, appellants assert that Sobamowo requires supervision by defense counsel during the replaying of tapes. In that case, the court reasoned that the district court's procedure requiring the presence of the prosecution and at least one defense attorney rendered any potential error harmless. In that same case, however, we held that tape replaying [for the jury during deliberations is] not a stage of trial implicating the confrontation clause or Rule 43(a). Sobamowo, 892 F.2d at 96 (citing Dallago, 427 F.2d at 552-53 (defendant's presence not required when exhibits are submitted to the jury during deliberations)); but see United States v. Felix-Rodriguez, 22 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir.1994) (defendant has a right under Rule 43 to be present when a tape-recorded conversation is replayed to a jury during its deliberations). 3 The Sobamowo court also held that a defendant's absence during replaying does not violate the due process clause because the absence has no  'relation ... to the fulness of [the defendant's] opportunity to defend'  himself. Id. (quoting United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985)). Accordingly, we reject appellants' constitutional arguments.