Opinion ID: 2514039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Snyder Refused to Take the Breath Alcohol Test.

Text: Because the police violated Snyder's right to due process by refusing him an independent blood test, we ordered in Snyder I that courts apply a presumption that the blood test results would have been favorable to him and thus supported his claim that he was not intoxicated. [21] Snyder now argues that, based on the same due process violation, the hearing officer should have either dismissed his case or applied a presumption in his favor. [22] Because this court in Snyder I already determined the remedy for the same due process violation, Snyder is estopped from claiming dismissal as a new remedy. But Snyder is correct in arguing that the remedial presumption created in Snyder I is relevant to this case. We explained in Snyder I that [i]t is a fundamental tenet of due process law that a person accused of a crime has a right to attempt to obtain exculpatory evidence including an independent blood test. [23] Where denial of that right impairs the defendant's ability to defend himself against more than one charge or in more than one proceeding, the legal remedy for the denial applies to all of those charges and proceedings. [24] Thus, if the blood test which police improperly denied to Snyder might have helped Snyder in this license revocation proceeding, then the remedy for that denialthe presumption of a favorable test resultis relevant to this proceeding as well. The relevance of blood test results to a refusal case such as this one is somewhat attenuated. In typical refusal cases, independent blood test results might not be relevant at all: a defendant who expressly refuses to submit to a breath test may lose his license regardless of whether he was actually intoxicated [25] or whether he believed himself to be intoxicated [26] at the time of refusing. In this case, however, Snyder did not expressly refuse to take the test; rather, he claims that he was physically incapable of giving a breath sample despite good faith efforts to do so. Because there exists in this case a factual question about whether Snyder refused the testand whether he subsequently consentedthe presumption that his blood alcohol test would have favored him might be relevant to refusal. A finder of fact could reasonably consider Snyder's actual intoxication or his likely subjective belief about his intoxication in determining whether Snyder made a good faith effort to provide a breath sample, whether he deliberately failed to provide a sample, and whether any of his five expressions of consent to take the test were genuine. However, the presumption is in no way dispositive of the case. Contrary to Snyder's argument, a presumption that he would have passed the blood test does not foreclose the conclusion that he refused to take the breath test. And although a fact-finder might consider blood alcohol results as relevant evidence, the hearing officer's refusal finding in this case did not rest on analysis of Snyder's actual or perceived degree of intoxication. Rather, the hearing officer focused on and resolved the main factual claim raised by Snyder: that Snyder failed to provide a breath sample because he was injured and physically incapable of blowing into the Intoximeter machine. [27] The hearing officer found that this factual claim was unsupported by the evidence and that the only impediment to Snyder blowing into the machine was his own unwillingness to do so. Because the hearing officer's conclusion that Snyder had refused the test did not depend on whether or not he was intoxicated, it is highly unlikely that the hearing officer's failure to presume favorable blood test results affected her resolution of this case. An error affecting a constitutional right such as the right to due process and presentation of evidence survives appellate review under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard if there is not a reasonable possibility that the error affected the result. [28] We find no reasonable possibility that the blood test presumption would have affected the hearing officer's conclusion that Snyder refused a breath test, and therefore conclude that failure to apply the presumption was harmless error.
Snyder claims that his refusal was predicated on a mistaken belief that he had the option of providing a blood sample instead of a breath sample; he argues that this mistake on his part negates the requisite intent to refuse. He claims that Trooper Spencer had a duty to inquire into the nature of Snyder's refusal, and that Spencer breached this duty. [29] But the cases Snyder cites do not establish the existence of such a duty, nor do they provide a defense to refusal in this case. Instead, the cases he cites pertain specifically to arrestees' confusion about Miranda rights and breath alcohol tests. [30] The cases did not consider, and their holdings did not extend to, confusion of any other sort. In Graham v. State , a revocation of license case, we considered a defendant's claim that she had believed, based on the Miranda notice read by the officer, that she need not respond to his request for an alcohol test. [31] We held that where an arrested person refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test, the administering officer must inquire into the nature of the refusal and, if it appears that the refusal is based on a confusion about a person's rights, the officer must clearly advise that person that the rights contained in the Miranda warning do not apply to the breathalyzer examination. [32] We explicitly based our conclusion on the observation that the Miranda warning and the implied consent warning, taken together, could invite confusion. [33] This analysis does not indicate that other kinds of confusion necessarily trigger a police duty to inquire [34] -particularly where, as here, the arrestee never indicated to the officer that he believed he had the right to refuse the test. Even in cases of Miranda warning-based confusion, however, the defendant motorist has the burden of showing that he or she was in fact confused. [35] Snyder has made no such showing in this case.