Opinion ID: 1057886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Origins and Persuasive Authority

Text: The recognition of tortious interference with parental rights finds precedent in our common law. We have previously stated that our adoption of English common law... ends in 1607 upon the establishment of the first permanent English settlement in America, Jamestown. From that time forward, the common law we recognize is that which has been developed in Virginia. Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 82, 705 S.E.2d 503 (2011). Prior to 1607, a comparable cause of action did lie in England, providing a father with recourse for the abduction of his heir or sons rendering services. See Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650, 651 (1930) (citing Barham v. Dennis, (1599) 78 Eng. Rep. 1001 (K.B.); Cro. Eliz. 770). Clearly, there are ways in which this ancient writ is markedly different from the modern cause of action urged by Wyatt, which would permit recourse for either parent, regardless of gender, and which encompasses a recovery not merely for loss of services but also for loss of companionship. This difference reflects society's changing values as reflected in this Court's rulings over the centuries, including principles of gender equality, an inherent value in the relationship between parents and their children beyond the value of services rendered, and the modern trend in tort law to make plaintiffs whole by compensating not only pure pecuniary loss but also emotional harm. Although the action has not heretofore been brought in Virginia, and hence has never come before this Court, its evolution elsewhere can be clearly identified. Blackstone wrote that the abduction of any child, not merely an heir, was remediable by writ of ravishment, or, action of trespass vi et armis, de filio, vel filia, rapto vel abducto; in the same manner as the husband may have it, on account of the abduction of his wife. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries -41 (internal footnote omitted). By 1938, the American Law Institute's first Restatement of Torts included recovery for the abduction of a child, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 recites the more modern embodiment of the ancient writ: One who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent. In Stone v. Wall, 734 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court, responding to a certified question of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, recognized the common law tort of custodial interference in Florida as a modern iteration of the English common law writ: As indicated, the tort of intentional interference with the custodial parent-child relationship has its origins in English common law and is derived from a cause of action for the abduction of the father's heir. The tort has evolved significantly since 1600 so that in its contemporary version either custodial parent may recover, the child does not have to be the heir, and recovery is not predicated on loss of services but on the sanctity of the parent-child relationship. It would be violative of constitutional equal protection issues not to recognize the equal rights of both parents in allowing either a cause of action or an element of damages. Additionally, outdated common law principles based on the view that children are nothing more than the economic assets of their parents have likewise been replaced with a more enlightened and realistic view of the role of children in their parents' lives. Thus, the cause of action for interference with a custodial parent-child relationship is a natural progression of the common law with due regard for constitutional principles, changes in our social and economic customs, and present day conceptions of right and justice. Id. at 1044 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The overwhelming majority of the high courts of our sister states that have considered the issue have also recognized such a tort, many of them tracing its evolution in the common law. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 672 So.2d 787, 789, (Ala.1995) (noting that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 does not represent a new tort in Alabama but rather accurately reflects the common law principle that parents have a right to the care, custody, services and companionship of their minor children, and [that] when they are wrongfully deprived thereof by another, they have an action therefor (internal quotation marks omitted)); Washburn v. Abram, 122 Ky. 53, 90 S.W. 997, 998 (1906) (concluding that, although the common law right of action historically arose from the right of the father to recover for lost services of his child and such allegations are necessary for recovery, [i]t matters not whether the child [actually] renders such services; and [the parent] is not confined in a recovery to the loss of services alone, but may recover damages for injury to his feelings and the loss of companionship of his child); Khalifa v. Shannon, 404 Md. 107, 945 A.2d 1244, 1248-62 (2008) (recognizing a common law action of interference with parental-child relations against one who abducts and/or harbors a child, and, in a thorough discussion of the evolution of the common law, finding that loss of services was never a substantive element of the common law tort but rather tied to certain ancient English forms of remedy); Plante v. Engel, 124 N.H. 213, 469 A.2d 1299, 1302 (1983) (holding the intentional aiding and abetting in the interference of parental rights to be an actionable tort in New Hampshire); Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex.1986) (recognizing that the common law had evolved to substantially track the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700); Kessel v. Leavitt, 204 W.Va. 95, 511 S.E.2d 720 (1998) (upholding a finding of tortious custodial interference against maternal grandparents, uncle, and mother's attorney, but not the child's mother, due to her equal parental rights). Kessel, which likewise addressed an adoption dispute, provides a particularly helpful model for the elements of the tort. [3] See Part II.D., infra. In evaluating certified questions of law, we are ultimately charged with stating the law governing each question. Rule 5:40(i). The evolution of the common law of our sister states and of the laws of England where similar actions have been brought since 1607 provides persuasive authority as to the certified questions of law set before the Court: whether the common law recognizes tortious interference with parental rights and, if so, what elements comprise the tort.