Opinion ID: 1476426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Instructions on Lack of a Body

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court's jury instruction concerning the lack of a body presented an unbalanced and misleading summary of the evidence. Specifically, defendant maintains that the court summarized only evidence unfavorable to him and ignored evidence in support of his version of events. The State counters that the court properly incorporated the facts necessary to guide the jury in its deliberations. After carefully reviewing the evidence presented at trial by both parties and the court's summary of that evidence, we agree with defendant and conclude that a new trial is warranted on this ground as well. We have stated that a trial judge has the right, and oftentimes the duty, to review the testimony and comment upon it, so long as he clearly leaves to the jury ... the ultimate determination of the facts and the rendering of a just and true verdict on the facts as it finds them. State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 439, 245 A. 2d 481 (1968). The need to comment on the evidence arises when an instruction modeled solely on the language of an applicable statute or rule of law will not adequately guide the jury's deliberations. State v. Olivio, 123 N.J. 550, 567-68, 589 A. 2d 597 (1991). In those circumstances, the better practice is to mold the instruction in a manner that explains the law to the jury in the context of the material facts of the case.... State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379, 545 A. 2d 119 (1988). But when a court delves into the facts, any comment must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury. State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987) ( Biegenwald II ). Thus, with respect to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the evidence, we have instructed that such arguments more properly emanate from counsel. State v. Robinson, 165 N.J. 32, 45, 754 A. 2d 1153 (2000). If, however, a court finds it necessary to comment on the strengths of one party's case, it must refer to the opponent's counterarguments; conversely, if weaknesses are discussed, the countervailing explanations must be mentioned. Ibid. It is difficult to overstate the importance of jury instructions. Indeed, [a]ppropriate and proper charges are essential for a fair trial. State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287, 430 A. 2d 914 (1981); see also State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994) (same), overruled in part by, State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 700 A. 2d 306 (1997). It is the independent duty of the court to ensure that the jurors receive accurate instructions on the law as it pertains to the facts and issues of each case, irrespective of the particular language suggested by either party. State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 411, 283 A. 2d 513 (1971). Finally, [a]s an indication of the paramount importance of accurate jury instructions, we have held that erroneous instructions on material issues are presumed to be reversible error. State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 359, 801 A. 2d 1142 (2002) ( Marshall IV ). At issue here are the instructions concerning the inability of the State to locate Rosenthal's body. The court instructed the jury as follows: The disappearance of Yeda Sharon Dede Rosenthal could support the inference of suicide, natural death, accidental death, or continued life in absentia. It can also support the inference that her disappearance was the result of a criminal act that caused or resulted in her death. As to continuing life in absentia, you may[,] given the facility of worldwide travel and communications technology[,] properly take into account the unlikelihood of such event in view of the evidence you have heard regarding Ms. Rosenthal's employment, her family relations, the failure of investigative efforts of the police, family, and friends to locate her, and any other evidence adduced during the course of the trial. []As to a cause of death other than by a criminal act, the fact that Ms. Rosenthal's body was never found can justify an inference that her death was in fact caused by a criminal act. It is highly unlikely that a person who dies from suicide or from natural causes will successfully dispose of her own body. While such a result may be a theoretical or hypothetical possibility, it is contrary to the normal course of human affairs. Therefore, in order for you to find the defendant guilty of murder and/or felony murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Yeda Sharon Dede Rosenthal was the victim of a homicide and is, therefore, dead. It is not necessary for the State to produce the body of Yeda Sharon Dede Rosenthal in order to establish her death[,] provided that you are satisfied from all the evidence in the case that she was the victim of a homicide. In fact, her disappearance alone is circumstantial evidence entitled to weight equal to that of any other circumstantial evidence. The successful concealment or destruction of Ms. Rosenthal's body does not prevent or preclude you finding defendant guilty of murder and/or felony murder so long as proof of Ms. Rosenthal's death and Mr. Reddish's guilt are established beyond a reasonable doubt. [(Emphasis added).] At the charge conference, defense counsel objected only to a portion of that instruction. Nevertheless, in view of the instruction's one-sided picture of the evidence produced at trial, we conclude that the charge was improper. As the theory of his defense, defendant argued that Ms. Rosenthal had not died but, instead, had disappeared of her own volition. To that end, he presented witnesses who claimed to have seen a woman fitting her description in a Jackson Township bar after the alleged homicide took place. He also presented evidence that Ms. Rosenthal had been experiencing financial difficulties and had been reported missing on prior occasions. However, despite the court's recounting of testimony adverse to defendant's theorye.g., her family relations, employment history, and failed investigative efforts to locate her the instructions made no mention of the evidence defendant proffered to rebut the State's proofs. We, of course, do not present any opinion on the credibility of defendant's witnesses or their testimony. To the contrary, we have recognized that the question of a witness'[s] credibility has routinely been regarded as a decision reserved exclusively for the jury. State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 594, 811 A. 2d 414 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, and precisely because credibility is peculiarly within the province of jury, id. at 595, 811 A. 2d 414, once the trial court commented on the strengths of the State's evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom, the court was obliged to point to evidence and arguments that favored defendant. In failing to do so, the court improperly focused the jury's attention on the weaknesses in defendant's case. Apart from the failure to mention evidence adduced by defendant, the court's commentary on the relevance of technology in assessing the cause of Ms. Rosenthal's disappearance is particularly troubling. The same technology that facilitates worldwide travel could just as easily allow one to relocate on short notice and, thus, disappear, provided one might be so inclined. Although the court would have been better advised not to engage in this commentary at all, once it did, it was required to instruct on inferences to be drawn in defendant's favor as well as those advantageous to the State. We recognize that defense counsel failed to object to much of the challenged instruction, but we nevertheless conclude that ultimately this charge left the jury with an impermissibly unbalanced commentary on the evidence. The court had an independent duty to ensure that the jurors received an accurate instruction on the relevant law and, when necessary, a balanced assessment of the facts to allow them to apply that law. In failing to fulfill that obligation, the court erred.
We have recognized that although an error or series of errors might not individually amount to plain error, in combination they can cast sufficient doubt upon the verdict to warrant reversal. Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 540, 776 A. 2d 144. Mindful of that concept here, we do not decide whether one or the other of the two errors to which we have adverted, if standing alone, would require reversal. Rather, viewing the court's error in summarizing the evidence in conjunction with the improper admission of other-crimes evidence, we conclude that a new trial must be had. Simply stated, we cannot excuse error on the basis of other overwhelming evidence of guilt when that other evidence also possesses the taint of error. With little independent physical evidence, the State's case hinged largely on the credibility of statements that defendant made to the police and to the reporter for the Burlington County Times. As we have explained, the introduction of the other-crimes evidence posed the distinct possibility that the jury's evaluation of defendant's confessions was affected by its inference that defendant had also killed his girlfriend. Consequently, it is impossible to isolate the error regarding the summation of the evidence on the ground that the jury had sufficient independent evidence of guilt to keep the verdict free of doubt. Thus, even if we were inclined to excuse the one-sided summation of the evidence on grounds of harmless error, the admission of other-crimes evidence precludes that possibility. In other words, we must admit that affording the jury the ability to infer that defendant had previously committed murder and then summarizing the evidence in a manner favorable to the State leaves us unable to gainsay that those errors led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336, 273 A. 2d 1 (1971). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a new trial.