Opinion ID: 865371
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: dsp-19

Text: ¶69. King argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give jury instruction DSP-19, which required that the State’s evidence be strong enough “to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, or supposition” and that “facts or circumstances in this case acceptable to two 51 reasonable interpretations” be resolved in the defendant’s favor, because the State’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. King argues that while he confessed to the burglary, he did not confess to Patterson’s killing or any of the facts supporting the HAC and “avoiding arrest” aggravators. Therefore, King argues that the jury’s finding of those aggravators could have been based only on inferences from circumstantial evidence, amounting to reversible error by the trial court in refusing to give instruction DSP-19. The State submits that this case is not entirely circumstantial, as King’s admission to being in Patterson’s home and burglarizing it took this case out of the realm of pure circumstance. ¶70. In Lynch v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254, 1268 (Miss. 2004), this Court discussed the issue of whether circumstantial evidence language is required in a sentencing instruction. This Court held that: [I]t is true that in circumstantial evidence cases the state must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other hypothesis consistent with innocence. See, Jones, 797 So. 2d at 927; Henderson, 453 So. 2d at 710; Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213, 1229 (Miss. 1996) (quoting Isaac v. State, 645 So. 2d 903, 909 n.7 (Miss. 1994)). However, this Court has never held that circumstantial evidence language is required in charging the jury as to the requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7). In order to impose the death penalty, a Mississippi jury must make a written finding of one or more of the following factors:

(c) The defendant intended that a killing take place; (d) The defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed. .... [W]e conclude that the jury instruction is not clearly erroneous because it comports with the requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) and this 52 Court’s jurisprudence regarding the State’s burden of proof as to the elements set out in the statute. Id. As we previously discussed, Instruction SSP-4A properly set out the requirements under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7)(Rev. 2000). See supra Issue X(A). Further, the jury’s finding that King actually killed Patterson indicates its rejection of any other reasonable hypothesis of his participation in the crime. Therefore, King’s argument that he was entitled to DSP-19 based on the circumstantial evidence as to whether he killed Patterson is without merit. Further, we have already found the trial court did not err in giving the instructions on the HAC or “avoiding arrest” aggravators, as these were sufficiently supported by the evidence. See supra Issues IX and X(C). Accordingly, we find this issue devoid of merit.