Opinion ID: 2526957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutionality of utah's internet enticement statute

Text: ¶ 13 Gallegos claims that the enticement statute under which he was charged is unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied to him because it does not put him, nor anyone else, on notice of the point at which the crime is completed. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401 (2008). Until now, this court has not had the opportunity to examine the constitutionality of the enticement statute. Instead, the last word came from the court of appeals in State v. Ansari, where the court noted, albeit in dicta, that the terms of the [enticement] statute are sufficiently precise.. . . Accordingly, we would conclude that [the statute] is not unconstitutionally vague. 2004 UT App. 326, ¶ 45 n. 6, 100 P.3d 231. Although the court of appeals used strong language suggesting it would uphold the statute as constitutional, this case presents an issue of first impression for this court. ¶ 14 A statute may be unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the facts of a given case. State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 854. When asserting an as-applied challenge, the party claims that, under the facts of his particular case, the statute was applied . . . in an unconstitutional manner. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, ¶ 27, 100 P.3d 231 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, when a party presents a facial challenge, he seeks to `vindicate not only his own rights, but those of others who may be adversely impacted by the statute in question.' Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55-56, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999)). Furthermore, in asserting a facial challenge, the party avers that the statute is so constitutionally flawed that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations marks omitted). However, if a statute . . . is clear as applied to a particular complainant [it] cannot be considered impermissibly vague in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge. State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 12, 84 P.3d 1171. In other words, if Gallegos' as-applied challenge of the enticement statute fails, so does his facial attack. ¶ 15 When a party raises a vagueness challenge, courts look at two factors to determine constitutional validity. A statute is impermissibly vague if it either (a) `fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits' or (b) `authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶ 42, 100 P.3d 231 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000)). ¶ 16 Under the first prong of the vagueness test, Gallegos argues that the statute does not provide notice because a person of ordinary intelligence cannot know whether the offense is complete when the person actually meets the minor, takes any step to meet the minor, or whether the chat alone is sufficient. The meaning of the statute, however, is not subject to the confusion Gallegos suggests. Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, a person is guilty of enticing a minor over the internet if he or she knowingly uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice . . . a minor or a person the defendant believes to be a minor to engage in any sexual activity which is a violation of state law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401. The words used to describe the proscribed conduct are both commonly used and clearly defined. [1] In fact, [t]he likelihood that anyone would not understand any of [these] common words seems quite remote, Hill, 530 U.S. at 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480; see also United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 562 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the terms `persuade,' `induce,' `entice,' and `coerce,' . . . have a plain and ordinary meaning), and Gallegos cannot simply inject doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt would be felt by the normal reader. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 18, 84 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 17 Accordingly, contrary to Gallegos' position, we see nothing in the enticement statute that suggests the offense is completed only if a meeting occurs. Instead, the statute is clear that the crime is committed as soon as the defendant solicits or entices a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity. Nothing more is required. The crime is committed at the keyboard. ¶ 18 Gallegos also argues that if this court concludes that the chat alone constitutes the crime, then the enticement statute violates the First Amendment. While we have not addressed this specific issue, courts in other jurisdictions have analyzed whether the federal version of the enticement statute violates the First Amendment. Overwhelmingly, courts have concluded that it does not. See, e.g., United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 473 (3rd Cir.2006) (There is no First Amendment right to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex acts.); State v. Colosimo, 122 Nev. 950, 142 P.3d 352, 356 (2006) (holding that Nevada's internet enticement statute does not violate the First Amendment). ¶ 19 Utah's enticement statute prohibits an individual from solicit[ing], seduc[ing], lur[ing], or entic[ing] a known minor to actually engage in unlawful sexual activity. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(2)(b)(ii). We conclude that such speech is not afforded First Amendment protections. ¶ 20 Under the second prong of the test, whether the statute has the potential to be applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, we conclude that it does not. It is true that Eldredge testified at trial that many individuals contact Chantel and request sex from her, but that those individuals are not arrested. Gallegos argues that this testimony suggests that he would not have been arrested had he not driven to Union Middle School, [2] and, therefore, something more than cybersex with a minor is required. Because the something more is not defined in the enticement statute, Gallegos argues that law enforcement can arbitrarily enforce the law. We disagree. ¶ 21 We conclude that the enticement statute is specific enough to prevent arbitrary enforcement because the discretion to prosecute individuals under the statute is properly limited to those who solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a known minor [3] to engage in unlawful sexual activity. Whether and whom to arrest is ultimately a problem of resource allocation and the difficulty associated with proving the intent element of the crime. That is, law enforcement may more aggressively pursue those individuals who actually arrange a meeting because in those cases it is easier to prove the individual's intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. Accordingly, variation in enforcement of the enticement statute may occur because it is simply easier to prosecute those individuals who actually arrange a meeting, not because the statute itself is impermissibly vague. ¶ 22 In sum, we conclude that the enticement statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it affords the average person reasonable notice of what conduct is proscribed and is specific enough to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Moreover, because Gallegos engaged in conduct that was clearly proscribed by the statute, he cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶ 44, 100 P.3d 231 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, both his facial and as-applied challenges fail.