Opinion ID: 2615930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Incidental Crimes and Duplicity

Text: Defendants argue the facts giving rise to the charge of kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping were also incident to the charge of aggravated robbery and are duplicitous of such other charge, and were not separate and distinct offenses under all facts and circumstances of the crimes. We have construed K.S.A. 21-3420, pertaining to kidnapping, to require no particular distance of removal, nor any particular time or place of confinement. State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 214, 547 P.2d 720 (1976). One of the four objectives enumerated in the statute must be satisfied. We are concerned here with the second objective, that of facilitating flight or the commission of any crime. We have discussed the difference between a taking which is facilitating the commission of a crime and a taking which is merely incidental to the main crime: We therefore hold that if a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: ( a ) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; ( b ) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and ( c ) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. at 216. In the present case the actions of defendants in forcing the bank employees into the basement were clearly intended to facilitate flight and aid in the commission of a crime, pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3420( b ). Applying the tests enumerated above, when the taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, defendants' contentions must fail. One of the victims, Linder, was accosted by defendants while making his early morning rounds outside the bank. He was struck on the head with a pistol, his gun and keys were taken, and he was forced into the basement of the bank where he was tied up. The taking and subsequent confinement of Linder was neither slight nor inconsequential. The act of deliberately moving him from the exterior to the interior of the bank, coupled with the bodily harm done to his person, was clearly designed to facilitate commission of the crime of bank robbery and cannot be considered slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime. The taking and confining of the other three bank employees was equally important to the facilitation of the crime. The employees were bound and confined in the basement in order to more easily reach the contents of the night depository and to substantially lessen possible detection of the crime. Defendants' reliance on the California cases of People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225 (1969); People v. Williams, 2 Cal.3d 894, 88 Cal. Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 919, 27 L.Ed.2d 821, 91 S.Ct. 903 (1971); and People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 204 N.E.2d 842, cert. denied 381 U.S. 938, 14 L.Ed.2d 701, 85 S.Ct. 1770 (1965), is misplaced. These cases were distinguished in Buggs. Defendants contend the facts giving rise to the charges of kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping are duplicitous to the charge of aggravated robbery and are not separate and distinct offenses. Duplicity is defined as the joining in a single count of two or more distinct and separate offenses. 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 142 at 306 (1969). See also State v. Dorsey, 224 Kan. 152, 578 P.2d 261 (1978). In the case at hand each count in the information contained only one offense. Defendants' argument is without merit.