Opinion ID: 1694303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: do the plans and specifications for the home being built by the appellant, karen goode, as approved by the architectural control committee, or the home in its present state of construction, violate the declaration of covenants and restrictions of the village of woodgreen?

Text: Appellants argue that the home as built does not violate the covenants of the subdivision because the covenants place no limitation on architectural design, floor space, or roof line of a home built in the Village of Woodgreen. The law in Mississippi favors the free and unobstructed use of real property. City of Gulfport v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 299 (Miss. 1992); Kinchen v. Layton, 457 So.2d 343, 345 (Miss. 1984). [Restrictive] covenants are subject more or less to a strict construction and in the case of ambiguity, construction is most strongly against the person seeking the restriction and in favor of the person being restricted. Kemp v. Lake Serene Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 256 So.2d 924, 926 (Miss. 1971). An important corollary rule, however, is that the clear and unambiguous wording of protective covenants will not be disregarded merely because a use is prohibited or restricted. If the intent to prohibit or restrict be expressed in clear and unambiguous wording, enforcement is available in the courts of this state. Andrews v. Lake Serene Property Owners Ass'n, 434 So.2d 1328, 1331 (Miss. 1983). The applicable provision of the restrictive covenants for the Village of Woodgreen provides that, [n]o structure ... shall be constructed ... unless complete plans, specifications, and site plans therefore, showing the exterior design, height, building material and color scheme thereof ... shall have been submitted to and approved in writing by the Architectural Control Committee... . Construing this restrictive covenant in its ordinary sense and according to its apparent purpose, Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679, 688, 103 So.2d 418, 422 (1958), the covenant clearly and plainly states that before a house can be constructed in the subdivision, the Committee must approve of the building plans. To state that this covenant places no limitation on the construction and architectural design of a house is simply an erroneous statement. The appellants also had notice of this covenant. Goode's deed contained language stating that she acknowledged and assumed all of the obligations described in the protective covenants for the subdivision and that she specifically acknowledged the receipt of a copy of the protective covenants of the subdivision and of the bylaws of the Association. Goode also signed the deed acknowledging that she accepted the conditions of the deed and consented to the terms and conditions found in the protective covenants and bylaws of the Association. Furthermore, both Crimm and Goode testified that they knew that the Committee had to approve any building plans prior to construction in the subdivision. Based on the testimony, the evidence and the admission of Goode, the chancellor found that the building plans that were submitted and approved were not followed. The appellants' actions in not building in accordance with the building plans that were approved runs afoul of the plain language found in the restrictive covenant.