Opinion ID: 456404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 21 Initially, it is necessary to clarify the nature of appellees' claims against Bristol. Their complaint, as amended, states basically two categories of claims. The first is a typical Title VII employment discrimination claim, in which they allege Bristol discriminated against them on the basis of sex when it refused to credit them with retroactive seniority back to the date of their initial applications, and refused to train, recruit, hire and promote female employees. With regard to this claim, appellant Bristol Steel maintains that federal jurisdiction could not be grounded in Title VII, since appellees did not file charges with the EEOC within 180 days of these alleged discriminatory acts, as required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). E.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before ... [Title VII] was passed. It ... has no present legal consequences). Appellees do not contest appellant's assertion. 22 We are, of course, mindful of the Supreme Court's decision in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), holding that filing a timely charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. It would appear that, under Zipes, there would be federal jurisdiction of appellees' first category of claims. However, it also appears that this claim might be time-barred since appellant did raise, as a defense, appellees' failure to file timely charges with the EEOC. In any event, the district court never ruled on this first category of claims, resting its judgment exclusively on appellees' second category of claims. It is thus on that category of claims that our jurisdictional inquiry focuses. 23 The second category of claims made in appellees' complaint is grounded on the executive order conciliation agreement. Appellees alleged that Bristol breached the terms of this agreement, and they sought enforcement of those terms. They based their cause of action, apparently, on: (1) their status as actual parties to the releases, in which they agreed not to bring any Title VII claims based on their delay in being hired and Bristol agreed to give them the benefits provided them in the executive order conciliation agreement; and (2) their status as third-party beneficiaries to the executive order conciliation agreement. 24 We hold that there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over appellees' second category of claims, which, essentially, seeks enforcement of the releases and the executive order conciliation agreement. That jurisdiction is conferred by Title VII, and by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, which governs federal question jurisdiction. 5
25 Section 706(f)(3) of Title VII provides, in relevant part, that [e]ach United States district court ... shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter [i.e., Title VII]  (emphasis added). A typical action brought under Title VII is one in which an employee sues his or her employer for the latter's discriminatory practices. It is with respect to such actions that, as noted above, charges typically must be timely filed with the EEOC. However, the courts have recognized that suits brought by the EEOC to enforce Title VII conciliation agreements entered into by the EEOC, the employer and the affected employees also are suits brought under Title VII, over which federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction. With respect to these suits, charges need not be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged breach of the agreement. Administrative remedies need not be exhausted. The EEOC can go directly to court to enforce such agreements, as soon as it believes the agreement has been breached. E.g., E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2384, 81 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984); E.E.O.C. v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.1982). Following this line of authority, we hold that the releases signed by the employed appellees, in which they agreed not to bring charges under Title VII in return for Bristol Steel's compliance with the executive order conciliation agreement, are themselves Title VII conciliation agreements, and that appellees' suit, which, in essence, seeks to enforce the terms of the releases, is an action[ ] brought under Title VII. Appellees need not have filed charges with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged breaches in order to bring this action under Title VII. 26 To understand what has been meant by the term Title VII conciliation agreement in the context of Safeway Stores, Liberty Trucking Co., and the other cases that have established the rule of law stated above, it is necessary to describe the statutory framework governing Title VII. Typically, an employee who believes he has been discriminated against by his employer and wants to do something about it must file charges with the EEOC. When a charge against an employer is filed, the Commission is required to serve notice on the employer and investigate the charge. If, after investigation, the EEOC determines there is not reasonable cause to believe the allegations are true, it must dismiss the charge and notify all parties. If the EEOC determines there is reasonable cause, it must initially attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice through conciliation and persuasion. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(b). Should the EEOC not secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer within thirty days after the charge is filed, it may bring a Title VII action against the employer in a United States District Court. Id. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). 27 In Safeway Stores and Liberty Trucking, the EEOC had found reasonable cause to believe that charges filed by employees were true, and had attempted to rectify the situations through conciliation. In these cases, conciliation agreements were, in fact, entered into by the EEOC, the employers and the affected employees. The employers, subsequently, breached these agreements. The EEOC then filed suit in federal district court to enforce the conciliation agreements. The employers argued that under the express terms of Title VII the only action the EEOC can take when conciliation fails is to bring a civil action against the employer to litigate the underlying claims of discrimination, and that the EEOC can not enforce conciliation agreements in federal court. 28 The courts rejected this position, determining that even though Title VII did not explicitly provide the EEOC with authority to seek enforcement of conciliation agreements in federal courts, Congress must have intended to provide the EEOC with a federal forum. The courts noted that Title VII has been and is to be interpreted in a manner that places emphasis on its remedial purposes, and that a hyper-technical construction of Title VII is inappropriate. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d at 1040. See, e.g., Zipes, 455 U.S. at 397, 102 S.Ct. at 1134. The courts concluded that the emphasis in Title VII on conciliation and the legislative history of Title VII indicate that Congress intended Title VII to be enforced primarily through conciliation and voluntary compliance. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1017, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal). The courts determined it would be antithetical to Congress' strong commitment to conciliation if there were no federal forum for enforcement of conciliation agreements. 29 The releases involved in the instant case certainly take on the same conciliatory spirit as the Title VII conciliation agreements involved in Safeway and Liberty Trucking. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Liberty Trucking, 695 F.2d at 1041-42, 30 Conciliation agreements are voluntary contracts containing terms upon which the employer, the employee, and the EEOC agree. Nothing in the legislation compels either of these parties to reach final agreement. 31