Opinion ID: 769749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identifying the Right

Text: 16 In ruling that the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established in 1996, the District Court framed the issue as whether the fabrication of evidence by a prosecutor in and of itself gives rise to an injury cognizable under the Constitution. Zahrey, 1999 WL 587904, at  (emphasis added). The Court thus viewed Zahrey's claim as limited to the assertion of a constitutional right not to have a prosecutor manufacture false evidence. Viewed that narrowly, the claim was properly rejected. The manufacture of false evidence, in and of itself, in the District Court's phrase, does not impair anyone's liberty, and therefore does not impair anyone's constitutional right. 3 Thus, if Zahrey had claimed only that Coffey fabricated evidence and did nothing to precipitate the sequence of events that resulted in a deprivation of Zahrey's liberty, no constitutional violation would have been alleged. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994) (Buckley IV) (if prosecutor tortured witness to obtain statement implicating defendant and put statement in a drawer, or framed it and hung it on the wall but took no other step, no constitutional right of defendant would be violated) (emphasis added); Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 1980) ([W]e do not see how the existence of a false police report, sitting in a drawer in a police station, by itself deprives a person of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.). 17 But Zahrey's claim, though premised on the manufacture of false evidence, is not limited to that act. Rather, he alleges an example of a classic constitutional violation: the deprivation of his liberty without due process of law. 4 The liberty deprivation is the eight months he was confined, from his bail revocation (after his arrest) to his acquittal, and the due process violation is the manufacture of false evidence. The complaint alleges that the deprivation of the liberty interest was the result of the due process violation. 18 However, although it is too limited to state the right as a right not to have a prosecutor fabricate evidence, it is too broad to state it as a right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law. The Supreme Court has instructed courts encountering a qualified immunity defense to claimed violations of constitutional rights to consider carefully the level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). If the right is identified at a high level of generality, such as the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, the concept of qualified immunity would become meaningless because every government officer is reasonably aware of a right defined that broadly. See id. On the other hand, the right need not be identified with such particularity that qualified immunity would be a defense unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful. Id. at 640. 19 It is arguable that in this case the right should be identified as the right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of any governmental misconduct occurring in the investigative phase of a criminal matter. A right defined that broadly, however, would cover too much ground because some investigative actions, though fairly labeled as misconduct, might not merit condemnation as a denial of due process. On the other hand, the right need not be identified at such a level of particularity as to focus only on fabrication of evidence by a prosecutor acting in an investigating capacity. Coffey has conceded, for purposes of this appeal, that he was acting in an investigating capacity, a capacity that entitles him, at most, only to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court's rationale for according only qualified immunity to prosecutors who act in an investigating capacity is that their conduct in that capacity should be judged in the same manner as other investigating officers. When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is 'neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.' Buckley III, 509 U.S. at 273 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)). 20 We think the right at issue in this case is appropriately identified as the right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in an investigating capacity. Understood this way, we conclude that the right at issue is a constitutional right, provided that the deprivation of liberty of which Zahrey complains can be shown to be the result of Coffey's fabrication of evidence. 21