Opinion ID: 312744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Need to Show an Involuntary Source.

Text: 14 On its face Sec. 610 requires that the Government establish five distinct elements in order to prove a violation. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a labor organization (2) made a contribution or expenditure (3) in connection with a specified federal election (4) for purposes of active electioneering and that (5) the defendant officer consented to the making of the contribution. Appellant does not contest that the jury was properly charged on these elements, nor that there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that these elements had been proved. 15 Appellant contends, however, that an additional element must be established to support a guilty verdict under Sec. 610. He argues that there is a violation if, and only if, money ultimately contributed to a political candidate was collected by that union or organization through payments actually or effectively required for employment or union membership. 9 Such funds would, for example, be money collected from members in the form of dues or assessments and may be characterized as being given involuntarily to the union or affiliated organization in order for a person to remain a member of the union. Appellant contends that only contributions of such involuntary funds are forbidden, that the union is free to contribute any other funds it controls if those funds come from a voluntary source. Such a voluntary source, according to appellant, could be contributions by union members not required for membership or gifts to the union from outside sources. 16 Appellant's argument is based on language in the Supreme Court's decision in Pipefitters v. United States. 10 That decision held that not all political contributions by labor organizations are prohibited by Sec. 610, but only those derived from funds which were actually or effectively required for employment or union membership. 11 This additional element of the offense in Pipefitters was found by the Supreme Court not in the express language of the statute, but rather in the legislative history of the enactment. The opinion reversed the convictions because the jury instructions failed to require proof of [this] essential element for conviction . . . 12 Appellant argues that in Boyle's case, as in Pipefitters, the jury was not instructed and did not find that the contributions came from an involuntary source. 17 We believe, however, that appellant misconstrues the import of the language relied on in Pipefitters. The Court there repeatedly emphasized that its discussion dealt with a separate, segregated fund in which there was strict segregation of its monies from union dues and assessments. 13 The Pipefitters fund was composed of contributions by union members that were not required for membership and which at least superficially did not appear to have been the product of a coercion. Strict segregation, combined with the appearance that the funds were not coerced from union members, raised a presumption that the money contributed was derived from a voluntary source. Logically, when the union has taken the precautions necessary to make it appear that the funds were given voluntarily for use in political campaigns, the burden should be on the Government to prove the contrary. 18 In Boyle's case, though, contributions were made from funds derived from the general UMW treasury, which was composed predominantly of dues, assessments and other involuntary funds. The UMW made no effort to segregate dues and assessments from funds that might be legally contributed to political campaigns. 19 The legislative history of Sec. 610 reveals Congress' primary concern that funds from a general union treasury not be available for federal political campaigns. 14 The Court in Pipefitters explicitly interpreted the section as being designed to prohibit expenditures from the general union treasury. 15 20 The clear intent of Sec. 610, as evinced in the legislative history and interpreted by the Supreme Court, is to permit expenditures from separate, segregated funds if the contributions to it were, in truth, voluntary, and to prohibit expenditures from a union's general treasury. 16 If the Government proves that the source of the funds directed to a political contribution is the general union treasury, derived in part from dues and assessments, this is all that need be established on the question of voluntary or involuntary contributions. 21 This interpretation is the only one consistent with the policies underlying Sec. 610. Appellant's contention, stripped of legalisms, is that the Government must show in all circumstances that the contributions could not have come from a voluntary source. Since the funds expended here were derived from the UMW general treasury, this reading would require the Government to determine the source of all funds that have flowed through the treasury during the period in question, and to prove that this amount (which could run into the hundreds of millions) could not have been derived from a voluntary source. This would place an insuperable burden on the Government; likewise, and even more perniciously contrary to the avowed objectives of the Act, it would also place a premium on poor bookkeeping by discouraging unions from maintaining complete records of revenue. The resulting difficulty in tracing the sources of union contributions would make Sec. 610 virtually useless. 22 In Pipefitters the Court held that solicitation of contributions for the segregated political fund must be conducted under circumstances plainly indicating that donations are for a political purpose and that those solicited may decline to contribute without loss of job, union membership, or any other reprisal within the union's institutional power. 17 There is no contention that there was ever a report to the UMW membership that any transfers were being made from the general UMW treasury to the League. In fact, evidence shows that steps were taken to conceal this. Appellant's argument on voluntariness thus is in first and last analysis an argument that contributions by UMW members were voluntary when the individual UMW member knew, and could have known, nothing about his own contribution. Congress intended to protect individual union members against both overtly coerced and unknown contributions; each is equally involuntary. 23 Boyle's case, involving transfers from the UMW general treasury derived principally from dues, assessments, and other obligatory member contributions, is thus different from Pipefitters. Where there are individual contributions to a fund which is ostensibly set up as a separate voluntary affair, then there is a rational justification for requiring the Government to prove, and the jury appropriately to be so charged, that the contributions ultimately employed politically were involuntary. This the Supreme Court held in Pipefitters. But in Boyle's case the contributions to the separate fund, the League, were alleged to be a series of massive infusions from the UMW's general treasury, not a multitude of contributions from individual members, as in Pipefitters. Boyle's evidence raised no issue of the voluntariness of individual members' contributions to the UMW general treasury; quite the contrary, dues, assessments and other obligatory payments were accepted as making up the individual members' contributions. 24 Hence a jury charge of the style found necessary in Pipefitters would have raised an issue of voluntariness of individual contributions that does not exist in Boyle's case; the undisputed evidence establishes the involuntary nature of the members' contributions to the UMW general treasury; the jury should never have been permitted to find that individual members authorized voluntary political contributions of which they knew nothing, and the jury was not so instructed. 25 The proper issue here, by which the Government was required to and did satisfy its burden of proof of involuntariness, was the source of the funds transferred into the League account. If this source was the UMW general treasury, its nature established the funds as involuntarily obtained from the UMW members; no subsequent legerdemain by an official or board of the UMW could make voluntary what had been involuntary in origin. Clearly, the indictment here alleged that the source of the contributions was the UMW general treasury. 18 Sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to permit the issue to reach the jury, and the jury was properly instructed that it must find that the contributions came from such funds. 19 The Government, consequently, established and the jury found all of the elements necessary to show a violation of Sec. 610.B. The Constitutionality of Sec. 610 26 Appellant argues that even if Pipefitters does not compel reversal, the convictions under Sec. 610 must be overturned because that statute imposes an unconstitutional limitation on the union's freedom of speech. He does not dispute that Congress may legitimately regulate federal campaign financing and that there must be valid reasons to limit spending by a union. Appellant contends, however, that the legitimate goals of the statute may be achieved in a manner that will not so substantially restrict the union's right to present its views by supporting candidates of its choice. If it is true that the legitimate goals of the statute may be achieved in a less restrictive manner, the statute is overbroad. Even when a compelling interest exists, if the statute protects that interest by a needless infringement of First Amendment rights, it must be struck down. 20 27 Appellant seeks to invoke this principle by pointing to one purpose of Sec. 610, to assure the purity of the federal electoral process by preventing undue influence by labor unions who might use the aggregated wealth of their general treasuries in federal elections. He then contends that this goal may be achieved less restrictively by limiting the maximum amounts which could be contributed by unions, rather than by banning contributions entirely. This misapprehends the scope and scheme of Sec. 610. That provision, as interpreted in Pipefitters, only prohibits contributions from monies which are not strictly segregated from union dues and assessments. 21 Appellant's suggested alternative would actually be more restrictive than Sec. 610; unions may now contribute any amount so long as it is from a proper source, while under appellant's suggestion the maximum would be limited. 28 Appellant then points to a second purpose of Sec. 610, to assure that a dissenting union member is not forced to contribute, in the form of mandatory dues and assessments, to support political views with which he disagrees. Appellant contends that this admittedly justifiable goal of protecting minority interests could be protected less restrictively in one of two ways. 29 First, appellant asserts that minority interests are adequately protected by the democratic procedures under which a union must operate. It is argued that majority approval of political expenditures would somehow validate the unwanted burden placed upon dissenters. Democratic majority rule does not, in itself, necessarily protect minority interest. Indeed, it is based on the premise that the losing side (the minority) must accept the dictates of the winning side (the majority). Democracy in labor unions as elsewhere, without additional protection, does nothing more than hold forth the possibility that in time the minority may become the majority. By definition the protection of minority interests requires that the majority be restrained in exercising its will over the minority. If a union could expend involuntary funds upon the vote of a majority of its members, minority interests would not be protected-they would be rendered irrelevant. 30 Second, appellant argues that Congress could have protected minority rights by adopting the mechanism employed in Great Britain. This permits the refunding of a proportionate amount of a member's dues if the dissenter gives notice of his disagreement. Appellant argues that 31 [l]egislation protecting the minority union member could be drawn to permit either of two forms: contracting in, in which all members approving of the proposed political assessment would be required to give affirmative evidence of such approval, or contracting out, in which a union member objecting to the political use of a portion of his dues could refuse to tender that particular assessment. 22 32 This argument ignores the fact that Sec. 610, as interpreted in Pipefitters, does establish a system of contracting in just as appellant suggests. Unions are permitted to make contributions if assenting members give affirmative evidence of such approval by assenting to having a deduction made from the member's pay check. 23 33 Assuming, only arguendo, that Sec. 610 does restrict in some degree a union's otherwise unlimited right of free speech, appellant has failed to advance a less restrictive alternative to Sec. 610 which will both prevent the use of a union's aggregate wealth in federal elections and protect union minority interests, and we have found elsewhere no such viable less restrictive alternative. We hold Sec. 610 to be constitutional.