Opinion ID: 1908225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Pre-Miranda Silence

Text: Although error in the admissibility of a defendant's pre- Miranda silence regarding alibi is not necessarily prejudicial, there are certain issues regarding the probative value of the silence that must be addressed before drawing an inculpatory inference from that silence is permissible. The trial court must exercise its discretion in determining whether such silence can be used to impeach a defendant's exculpatory testimony. [9] The Supreme Court has held that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). This court has recently noted that when the accused has not been informed of her right to remain silent because she has not yet been placed under arrest, there is no constitutional bar to the use of her pre-arrest silence for the purpose of impeachment. Bedney v. United States, 684 A.2d 759, 766-767 (D.C. 1996). However, there are limits to the use of pre- Miranda silence. In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand. A State is entitled, in such situations, to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant's own testimony. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) (appellant impeached with silence after arrest but before Miranda warnings given). Such limits are imposed because [i]f the Government fails to establish a threshold inconsistency between silence at the police station and later exculpatory testimony at trial, proof of silence lacks any significant probative value and must therefore be excluded. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975). In this jurisdiction, we have developed a procedure for determining whether to allow pre- Miranda silence impeachment: The pretrial statement to be admissible for impeachment purposes should purport to address the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense. The prosecutor... must apprise the trial court of the omitted facts to be relied upon as showing inconsistency and the court must consider whether such facts are sufficiently material that the failure to have mentioned them amounts to inconsistency. Hill v. United States, 404 A.2d 525, 531 (D.C.1979). The party wishing to impeach has the burden of demonstrating that the prior silence was probative for credibility purposes. In reviewing this record, we note appellant's argument that there was nothing extraordinary or unnatural in his failure to mention his alibi because, he claims, he did not feel that he was seriously under suspicion for committing the crime. Although this claim is undercut by testimony concerning the complaining witness' reaction to his presence at the scene following the incident, it raises an issue concerning the probative value of appellant's silence. The initial determination of whether appellant's omission was unusual or unnatural, and therefore inconsistent with appellant's defense theory at trial, is one of fact that must be made by the trial court. See Hill, supra, 404 A.2d at 531. We do not require that the trial court make explicit findings of fact on this matter. We simply note that it is the function of the trial court to determine, as a subsidiary factual matter, whether pre- Miranda silence as to alibi is probative of culpability before evidence of that silence is used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the accused.