Opinion ID: 748364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ramos' Commerce Clause Claim

Text: 41 Ramos launches an attack on 18 U.S.C. § 1959, contending that it is unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the Commerce Clause. 42 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate Commerce ... among the several States. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate or prohibit activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, even if the activity is purely local. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. 43 The substantial effect requirement is satisfied when criminal statutes contain a jurisdictional element, which ensures through case-by-case inquiry, that the prohibited act affects interstate commerce. See id. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348-49, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522-23, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). 44 Section 1959 satisfies the substantial effect requirement. Section 1959 incorporates a jurisdictional element requiring a nexus between the offense in question and interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-62, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31. Specifically, § 1959 prohibits the commission of a violent crime as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, and defines enterprise as an entity which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) & (b)(2). Because Ramos' constitutional challenge is facial only, we see no need to address the facts of Ramos' case to ascertain whether § 1959 is constitutional, as applied.