Opinion ID: 867297
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying FERA

Text: ¶ 17 Hardesty conceded that the State had a compelling interest, although he did not clearly articulate which interest he conceded to be compelling. This concession comports with the case law regarding marijuana, which shows that courts consistently find the government's interest in regulating marijuana to be a compelling interest. See, e.g., United States v. Israel, 317 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2003); Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1462 (D.C.Cir.1989) (noting that [e]very federal court that has considered the matter, so far as we are aware, has accepted the congressional determination that marijuana in fact poses a real threat to individual health and social welfare (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
¶ 18 The existence of a compelling interest is not the end of the inquiry because FERA, by its terms, allows exceptions to neutral state laws of general applicability that substantially burden the free exercise of religious beliefs, see A.R.S. § 41-1493.01(A)-(C), unless the government also demonstrates that the application of the [substantial] burden to the person is ... [t]he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Id. § 41-1493.01(C). Hardesty argues that the law does not accomplish its goals by the least restrictive means. ¶ 19 Because use of the least restrictive means is determined in light of the specific interest asserted as compelling, we must ordinarily determine which government interest is compelling. See id. (requiring the state to use [t]he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest (emphasis added)). The State asserted at least two compelling interests: preventing the deleterious health effects associated with marijuana use and combating the danger to public safety and welfare that result from trafficking in marijuana. The State presented several cases in which courts found compelling the government's interest in regulating marijuana and combating the crimes associated with drug use and drug trafficking. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 824-25 (11th Cir. 1982); Randall v. Wyrick, 441 F.Supp. 312, 315-16 (W.D.Mo.1977); United States v. Kuch, 288 F.Supp. 439, 446 (D.D.C.1968); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that [t]he public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (concluding, in a free speech context, that the State has the necessary [compelling] interest in extirpating the traffic in illegal drugs); Armijo v. State, 111 Nev. 1303, 904 P.2d 1028, 1029 (1995) (holding that the State has a compelling interest in protecting its children from the evils that follow both the use and trafficking of drugs); Commonwealth v. Martin, 534 Pa. 136, 626 A.2d 556, 560 (1993) (referring to a compelling state interest in eradicating illegal trafficking in drugs); McDorman v. State, 757 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex.Ct.App.1988) (observing that the State has a compelling interest to suppress illicit drug traffic); see also Nat'l Drug Intelligence Ctr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2008, at v-vi, 16-17, 57-58 (2007) available at http://www. usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/25921p.pdf (describing the persistent marijuana smuggling problem generally and the increase in smuggling operations in Arizona). Another obvious compelling interest is the public safety concern posed by unlimited use, particularly by those driving motor vehicles. ¶ 20 Against these compelling interests, Hardesty claims the broad right to use marijuana at all times, including the right to ingest while driving and, presumably, the right to drive while impaired by marijuana. The State argues that only a ban will prevent such use. ¶ 21 To prove that a ban on marijuana is the least restrictive means, the State must show that proposed alternatives for achieving the State's compelling interest are ineffective or impractical. See A.R.S. § 41-1493.01(C) (placing the burden on the state). It does not have to show that no less restrictive way to regulate is conceivable, only that none has been proposed. Blount v. Dep't of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1382 (Me.1988) (The State need not meet the impossible standard of proving that no adequate less restrictive alternative can be developed, only that none has been proposed.); cf. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir.2007) (referring to the least restrictive means available rather than the least restrictive means possible); Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 648 (4th Cir.1995) (same). ¶ 22 Hardesty claims an unlimited religious right to use marijuana when and where he chooses, and in whatever amounts he sees fit. In the context of this case, no means less restrictive than a ban will achieve the State's conceded interests. ¶ 23 Although Hardesty argued to the trial court that he is entitled to assert a religious use defense identical to that afforded peyote users, there is an obvious difference between the two situations. Members of the Native American Church assert only the religious right to use peyote in limited sacramental rites; Hardesty asserts the right to use marijuana whenever he pleases, including while driving. He also failed to address the disparate magnitudes of the illicit use and trafficking of peyote as opposed to marijuana. See Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1463 (citing report that fifteen million pounds of marijuana were seized during an eight-year period compared to only nineteen pounds of peyote). Given Hardesty's religious beliefs, we conclude that there is no less restrictive alternative that would serve the State's compelling public safety interests and still excuse the conduct for which Hardesty was tried and convicted. [8]