Opinion ID: 2123840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lesser included offenses of sexual abuse in the second degree under Iowa Code section 709.3(2).

Text: A defendant may be found guilty of either the offense charged or any other offense the commission of which is necessarily included in the designated crime. Iowa R.Crim.P. 21(3). Accordingly, the trial court is required to instruct the jury both as to the offense charged and all lesser included offenses. Iowa R.Crim.P. 6(3). Constable argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on sexual abuse in the third degree, assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, and simple assault, which Constable claims are lesser included offenses of sexual abuse in the second degree. Our review is for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. The lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense. State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 740 (Iowa 1988). Under the legal elements test, if the lesser offense contains an element which is not required for commission of the greater offense, then the lesser offense cannot be included in the greater. Id. Thus, it would be possible to commit the greater offense without also having committed the lesser offense. We look to the statutory elements rather than the charge or the evidence. Id.
Constable was tried and convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree under Iowa Code section 709.3(2) (1991). The elements of sexual abuse in the second degree are: (1) a person commits sexual abuse as defined in section 709.1 and (2) the other participant is under the age of twelve. It was undisputed at trial that S.W. was eight years old and J.H. was seven years old when the alleged sex acts occurred. Two other circumstances exist under which the State may charge an individual with sexual abuse in the second degree. See Iowa Code § 709.3(1), (3) (1991). The State did not allege that either of these situations formed the basis of any of the counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and relied solely on the basis that each child was under the age of twelve. The elements of sexual abuse in the third degree under Iowa Code section 709.4(1) are (1) a sex act is performed and (2) the act is done by force or against the will of the other participant, whether or not the other participant is the person's spouse or is cohabiting with the person. Constable argues that this offense is necessarily included in sexual abuse in the second degree when the State alleges the participant is under the age of twelve. Constable bases this argument on the legal fiction that a child is not capable of giving consent, therefore any sex act with a child must necessarily be by force and against the child's will. Conversely, the State argues that under our legislative scheme, it is irrelevant whether the act is performed by force or against the will of a child; the youth of the child alone is sufficient to render the perpetrator of a sex act guilty of sexual abuse. We agree that the legal fiction that a child is incapable of consent should not lead to the conclusion that any act performed on that child was necessarily by force or against the will of the child. When a child is under twelve, a sex act performed on that child constitutes sexual abuse in the second degree, regardless of whether that child understood the nature of the act, was forced to perform a sex act or submit to a sex act, or whether that act was against the child's will. When the State charges an individual with sexual abuse in the second degree and bases that charge on the age of the child, sexual abuse in the third degree based upon whether the act is done by force or against the will of the victim is not a lesser included offense. In State v. Lampman, 345 N.W.2d 142 (Iowa 1984), we held that sexual abuse in the third degree is not a lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the second degree when the sex act occurs with a participant under twelve because sexual abuse in the third degree required that the participants in the sex act not be living together as spouses. Our analysis in Lampman does not bear on this issue now because the additional element that was central to the court's analysis in Lampman is no longer included under Iowa law.
Assault with intent to commit sexual abuse under Iowa Code section 709.11 occurs when a person: (1) commits simple assault under section 708.1, with (2) the intent to commit sexual abuse. Iowa Code § 709.11 (1991). Simple assault under Iowa Code section 708.1 is: (1) an act which is intended to cause pain or injury to or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act; (2) an act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act; or (3) intentionally pointing any firearm toward another, or displaying in a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another. Iowa Code § 708.1 (1991). We believe that the legislature recognized that an adult may have contact with a child which that child may not recognize as inappropriate; a sex act with a child may not necessarily occur by force or against the child's will. Consistent with this principle, it is also possible that a sex act performed with a child may not be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive to that child or place the child in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive. In State v. Mateer , this court faced the question of whether simple assault was a lesser included offense of indecent contact with a child. We stated: Assault does not fit the indecent contact mold. The third element of assaultthat the intended physical contact must be painful, injurious, insulting or offensive to the victimis not an element of indecent contact with a child. A consenting child may be the victim of the primary offense even though the physical contact was not painful, injurious, insulting or offensive to the victim and therefore not by definition an assault. Defendant has cited neither legal authority nor persuasive rationale for his contention that the acts made criminal by section 709.12 are necessarily painful, injurious, insulting or offensive as a matter of law. State v. Mateer, 383 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa 1986) (emphasis added). In State v. Tague , we held that assault was not a lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the third degree when the sexual abuse charge is founded upon the performance of a sex act with a child. State v. Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 1981). We stated that while assault may be a lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the third degree when that violation involved commission of a sex act by force or against the will of the other participant, assault was not a lesser included offense when the victim was a child and the consent or will of the child was irrelevant. Id.; see also Lampman, 345 N.W.2d at 145 ([A]ssault requires proof of intent to either cause pain or injury or other offensive contact or fear of such contact while sexual abuse of a child requires no similar proof of intent since it is a strict liability offense.). Our analysis of the elements of these offenses and our adjudicated cases leads us to conclude that assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and simple assault were not lesser included offenses of sexual abuse in the second degree in this case. Our holding does not conflict with this court's decision in State v. Turecek, 456 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1990). In that case, we held that sexual abuse in the third degree, assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, and simple assault are all lesser included offenses of sexual abuse in the second degree. Id. at 223. However, in Turecek, the charge of sexual abuse in the second degree was based upon Iowa Code section 709.3(1) (1987), that the defendant had aided and abetted another in performing sex acts on the victim by force and against the victim's will, without regard to the victim's age. Id. at 221.