Opinion ID: 1959344
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hearsay Testimony at Penalty Phase

Text: Defendant called Eugene McLucas, an acquaintance from Essex County Jail, as a witness during the penalty phase. When defense counsel asked: Would you tell the jury what you know of Cheryl Hubbard?, the trial court sustained an objection as double hearsay because McLucas conceded that he did not know Cheryl Hubbard. Rather, he explained that his girlfriend's sister spoke of her and my girlfriend. Defense counsel then asked whether McLucas had ever spoken to Mr. Savage about Ms. Hubbard, the court again sustained an objection on hearsay grounds. The record does not reveal the scope or substance of McLucas' testimony. In State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 477 A. 2d 308 (1984), we acknowledged that although a sentencing judge may exercise far-ranging discretion with respect to the sources and types of evidence admissible at sentencing, we also emphasized that in the sentencing phase of a capital proceeding  a life or death contest  a defendant is entitled to use all reliable, helpful information. Id. at 619, 477 A. 2d 308. Moreover, we determined that when defendant offers evidence of a mitigating factor, any doubts concerning admissibility must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Id. at 620, 477 A. 2d 308 (footnote omitted). Thus, on remand, the testimony of Eugene McLucas, if demonstrated to be relevant to any mitigating factor, should be admitted at the penalty phase of the trial. The judgment of conviction for capital murder is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Law Division for a new trial. HANDLER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. Defendant, Roy Savage, was tried and convicted of the murder of Carolyn Hubband and sentenced to death for the crime. The Court holds that defendant received constitutionally-deficient representation at both phases of his capital trial. I concur with the Court's judgment on that issue, but would employ a per se analysis. Additionally, I disagree with the Court's conclusion that in the event of a retrial, the N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c) aggravating factor may be resubmitted to a jury. I write separately to explain my views on these points. Additionally, I reaffirm my position that New Jersey's Capital Murder Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 possesses fatal constitutional flaws that pervade and contaminate the entire scheme. See, e.g., State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 284-285, 571 A. 2d 914 (1990) (Handler, J., dissenting and concurring).