Opinion ID: 1433861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Lack of instruction on relative weight of aggravation and mitigation

Text: Defendant faults the trial court for failing to instruct the jury that a life sentence was mandatory if they did not find the aggravating circumstances outweighed those in mitigation and that they could return a judgment of life in prison even if they found to the contrary. We have previously addressed and rejected both arguments in light of the standard instructional language. As explained in People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131, with respect to the first point, We do not think that there is a reasonable likelihood that any of the jurors would have concluded that, even if the mitigating factors outweighed those in aggravation, the `so substantial in comparison with' language nevertheless might demand imposition of the higher punishment. [Citation.] The instruction clearly stated that the death penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. There was no need to additionally advise the jury of the converse.... With respect to the second point, we noted that unlike other sentencing schemes creating a presumption in favor of death, our statute and instruction give the jury broad discretion to decide the appropriate penalty by weighing all the relevant evidence. The jury may decide, even in the absence of mitigating evidence, that the aggravating evidence is not comparatively substantial enough to warrant death. ( People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 979, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131; cf. Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 [concluding the Pennsylvania death penalty statute satisfied the requirements of the Eighth Amendment even though it mandated a death sentence upon the jury's finding one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances].) We decline to reconsider this determination.
Although several family members and friends presented mitigating testimony as to his background and character, defendant contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the penalty phase in failing to submit additional evidence regarding his childhood, including alleged abuse, his mental health, his military service and injuries, and his employment history. We find none of this evidence of record. Accordingly, without engaging in speculation, we cannot infer anything about its existence, availability, or probative force, or the probable consequences of its use at trial. ( People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1116, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020.) Defendant has thus failed to establish either incompetence or prejudice. ( People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 426, fn. 16, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.)
As in the guilt phase, we find virtually no merit to defendant's individual assignments of error. Accordingly, we reject his claim of cumulative prejudice as well.
Defendant raises several challenges to the constitutionality of California's death penalty statute. We have previously resolved these issues against defendant and decline to reconsider our analysis. In sum, our capital sentencing scheme does not contain so many special circumstances that it fails to perform the constitutionally mandated narrowing function. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 356-357, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846; see also People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 465-68, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808.) Nor does the felony-murder rule falter in this regard. ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 946, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) The statutory categories have not been construed in an unduly expansive manner. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 154-156, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) The breadth of the prosecutor's discretion in choosing to seek the death penalty does not render it unconstitutional. ( People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 843, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) The jury need not make express findings with respect to circumstances in aggravation ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1246, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254), or find beyond 1^ reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1101,25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867,864 P.2d 40).
Following the penalty verdict, Defense Attorney William Cater requested the court appoint new counsel for the purpose of making a new trial motion that might involve issues of ineffective assistance at trial. In camera, Cater indicated he thought the investigation for both the guilt and penalty phases had been deficient due to inadequacies on the part of the investigative agency retained by prior trial counsel, Charles Soria. Because Cater had represented defendant at both the guilt and penalty phases, he felt it was inappropriate for him to argue ineffective assistance in the context of a new trial motion. Defendant did not express dissatisfaction with Cater during any of the proceedings. Relying on the standard set forth in People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 388, 217 Cal.Rptr. 306, [16] the court denied the request because the defense did not present a colorable claim the assistance of another attorney was necessary for the new trial motion. (See 171 Cal.App.3d at pp. 396-397, 217 Cal.Rptr. 306.) In the court's view, Soria's representation was adequate, and I certainly don't think by any stretch of the imagination that any more favorable determination would have occurred. When, after trial, a defendant asks the trial court to appoint new counsel to prepare and present a motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must conduct a hearing to explore the reasons underlying the request. [Citations.] If the claim of inadequacy relates to courtroom events that the trial court observed, the court will generally be able to resolve the new trial motion without appointing new counsel for the defendant. [Citation.] If, on the other hand, the defendant's claim of inadequacy relates to matters that occurred outside the courtroom, and the defendant makes a `colorable claim' of inadequacy of counsel, then the trial court may, in its discretion, appoint new counsel to assist the defendant in moving for a new trial. [Citations.] ( People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 573-574, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171.) At the in camera portion of the proceedings, Cater cited only two reasons defendant's representation may have been incompetent: In eater's view, the case was not properly investigated because the defense investigator had not adequately interviewed witnesses, had been intoxicated when he did so, and had not personally contacted other potential witnesses. Additionally, an investigator apparently had misappropriated funds belonging to defendant, which were subsequently returned to him after he complained. Cater also referenced defendant's complaints to the trial court at the end of the guilt phase, which prompted the court to grant a Marsden motion and relieve Soria. ( People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156,465 P.2d 44.) At the Marsden hearing, defendant had asserted that the shootings were the responsibility of several other individuals possibly in confederacy with Mincy and Wilson to steal his marijuana and that he himself had been wounded in the incident. Although he had given Soria names and addresses of some of the alleged assailants as well as names and addresses of persons to whom he had shown his wounds after he left Kern County, Soria failed to call any of them to testify at trial. Defendant also complained discussions he had with Soria had become known to the prosecutor possibly through some breach of confidentiality on the part of the defense investigator. Soria responded that he had investigated or attempted to investigate the witnesses provided by defendant, with inconclusive results. In particular, medical information indicated defendant's wounds were inconsistent with his description of the events. Soria also did not think the investigator had been the source of any leaks. He acknowledged, however, that he and defendant were in conflict. The court found no substance to defendant's complaints, but nevertheless determined a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship jeopardized defendant's right to a fair trial and therefore relieved Soria. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to appoint new counsel to prepare and present a new trial motion. The court originally concluded, and later reiterated, that Soria's representation was not inadequate. Because it was able to observe his trial performance, we defer to that assessment absent contrary evidence. ( People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 574, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171.) With respect to Cater's concern about the adequacy of penalty phase investigation, the record contains no colorable claim that it was in fact deficient. At best, he offered only speculation based on hearsay reports, and defendant added nothing to substantiate the allegation. Accordingly, the trial court properly declined to replace Cater for a new trial motion. ( Ibid. ) The court also properly refused to appoint additional counsel for that purpose. As we have noted before, no authority supports the appointment of simultaneous and independent, but potentially rival, attorneys to represent defendant. ( People v. Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 695, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192.)