Opinion ID: 509516
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of McCleskey v. Kemp

Text: 114 Last term, the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), considered the use of statistical studies to prove discriminatory treatment. Because Harris' discrimination claims are quite similar to the defendant's contentions in McCleskey, we discuss the Supreme Court's decision in some detail. 115 In McCleskey, the defendant contended the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1763. In support of his claim, the defendant proffered a statistical study that purported to show a disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant. The statistical study examined over 2,000 murder cases which occurred in Georgia during the 1970s. The raw data indicated that defendants charged with killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases. The studies also examined the relationship between the race of the defendant and the victim. 116 The data was subjected to an extensive analysis taking into account 230 variables that could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds. Id. at 1764. One of the models concluded that even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks. Id. 117 In analyzing the defendants eighth and fourteenth amendment challenges, the Court assume[d] the study is valid statistically without reviewing the factual findings of the District Court. Id. at 1766 n. 7. The assumption that the studies were valid did not include the assumption that the studies showed that racial considerations actually entered into any sentencing decisions in Georgia, but only demonstrated a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing decision. Id. (emphasis in original).
118 The Court reiterated that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving 'the existence of purposeful discrimination', id. at 1766 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967)) (footnote omitted), and that the purposeful discrimination 'had a discriminatory effect' on him, 107 S.Ct. at 1766 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)). Thus, the Court held, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. 107 S.Ct. at 1766 (emphasis in original). McCleskey had offered no evidence that would support an inference that racial consideration played a part in his sentence, but instead relied on statistical studies, arguing the studies compelled an inference that his sentence rests on purposeful discrimination. Id. at 1767. McCleskey had argued that the statistics were sufficient proof of discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular case.... Id. 119 The Court noted that it had accepted statistics as proof of intent in certain limited contexts, e.g., equal protection violation in selection of the jury venire in a particular district and in the form of multiple regression analysis to prove statutory violations under Title VII, id. at 1767, but the application of an inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing simply is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn from general statistics to a specific venire-selection or Title VII case. Id. 1767-68. The important differences between the cases in which the Court has accepted statistics as proof of discriminatory intent is that, in the venire-selection and Title VII contexts, (1) the statistics relate to fewer entities, and fewer variables are relevant to the challenged decisions, and (2) the decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain the statistical disparity. Id. at 1768 (footnotes omitted). Because implementing criminal laws against murder necessarily involves discretionary judgment, the Court stated that it would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused. Id. at 1769. The Court held: 120 The unique nature of the decisions at issue in this case also counsel against adopting such an inference from the disparities indicated by the Baldus study. Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose. 121 Id. 122 In the matter before us, Harris proffered a statistical study performed by James Cole which purports to show a disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in California based on the race of the murder victim. Both murder victims in this case were white. Harris is also white. The Cole study is actually two statistical studies that examine 238 cases which resulted in the penalty of death involving intentional homicides and robbery homicides in California from 1978 to 1982. The raw numbers analyzed by Cole indicated that murders involving white victims accounted for 76.5% of all death sentences for intentional homicides in California. By contrast, only 38.7% of the intentional homicides committed at that time involved white victims. Cole concluded that someone whose victim was white had a five times greater possibility of receiving the death penalty than someone whose victim was nonwhite. 123 In the second study involving robbery homicides, Cole indicated that crimes involving white victims accounted for 73% of all death sentences in California. By contrast, only 46.5% of the robbery homicides committed involved white victims. Cole concluded that someone committing robbery murder on a white victim had approximately three times the possibility of ultimately receiving the death sentence as someone committing the crime on a nonwhite victim. 124 As to the gender discrimination claim, Harris submitted declarations showing that in California between 1978 and 1982, 2,179 persons were convicted of murder, of which only approximately 94, or 4.3%, were female. Of the 144 persons sentenced to death during that period, none were female. Harris' expert witness concluded the total exclusion of women from the pool of those defendants receiving the death sentence is indicative of gender influencing the sentencing process. 125 As to the age discrimination claim, Harris submitted affidavits by Dr. Cole showing that in California between 1981 and 1982, the number of persons in the 25 to 29 and 30 to 34 year age groups were disproportionately higher than those defendants receiving the death sentence. Dr. Cole relied on the following comparisons: 126 Age Group Death Sentence Recipients in Age Persons Arrested for Murder in Age 127 Group Group 2024 20.2% 33.4% 2529 35.1 25.4 3034 31.1 16.4 3539 6.8 9.1 40 k 6.8 15.7 Total 100.0% 100.0% 128 Harris' statistical proffer of evidence, even assuming the truth of his allegations, does not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing or discovery on his equal protection claim. Harris has not demonstrated that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose on the basis of the race of his two victims, his gender or age. Harris' statistical evidence does not provide exceptionally clear proof that the jury in his case abused its discretion in recommending the sentence of death. In McCleskey, the defendant's study revealed that someone charged with killing a white victim was 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as a defendant charged with killing a black victim. Harris' study only reveals a marginally higher ratio, i.e., five times as likely. 129 As to Harris' gender discrimination claim, Harris' statistics show that while 94 women, or 4.3%, were convicted of murder during this time period, none of the 144 persons sentenced to death during this period were female. These statistics fail to demonstrate if any of the 94 women (1) committed crimes which permitted their execution, or (2) were eligible for the death sentence. 6 Other than the mere fact that there are no women on death row, there is nothing to support the claim that women are not there because of discrimination. Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F.Supp. 767, 802 (D.Az.1986). These statistical flaws are fatal to Harris' claim. Not only did his statistics not entitle him to discovery or an evidentiary hearing on this claim, but they do not present the exceptionally clear proof required to demonstrate purposeful discrimination. 130 Harris' age discrimination claim likewise suffers from an inadequate showing. The statistical differences are legally insufficient to support his age discrimination claim. Accordingly, we hold that the Cole study is clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in Harris' case acted with discriminatory purpose. Harris was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or discovery.
131 Harris next contends that the California capital sentencing system is arbitrary and capricious in application in violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because racial, age and gender considerations may influence capital sentencing decisions in California. The Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1775. 132 The Court noted that the Baldus study, similar to but more complex than the Cole study before us, did not prove that race enters into any capital sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's particular case. Id. The Court explained that [s]tatistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions. There is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case. There are similar risks that other kinds of prejudice will influence other criminal trials. Id. The inquiry becomes  'at what point [does] that risk become constitutionally unacceptable.'  Id. (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 n. 8, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986)). The Supreme Court in McCleskey held that the Baldus study did not demonstrate the constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice. 107 S.Ct. at 1775. 133 The Court reasoned that a capital sentencing jury representative of a criminal defendant's community assures a '  'diffused impartiality'  ' in the jury's task of 'express[ing] the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.'  Id. at 1776 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). Acknowledging that the Baldus study at most indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race, id. at 1777, the Court stated that [a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system because any mode for determining guilt or punishment 'has its weaknesses and the potential for misuse.'  Id. at 1777-78 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). The Court then held: 134 Despite these imperfections, our consistent rule has been that constitutional guarantees are met when the mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible. Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital-sentencing process.... [p] The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital punishment. 135 Id. at 1778, 1781 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). With these principles of law in mind, we analyze Harris' eighth amendment claim. 136 The Cole study does not prove that the factors of race, gender or age entered into any capital sentencing decision in California or that these elements were factors in Harris' particular case. At most, the Cole study demonstrates a discrepancy that may correlate with the race of Harris' victims, Harris' gender and age. California's capital sentencing system does not contain the systemic arbitrariness and capriciousness in the imposition of capital punishment found in statutory schemes invalidated by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). In Pulley v. Harris, the Supreme Court examined California's capital sentencing statute. 7 The Court held that this system, without any requirement or practice of comparative proportionality review, cannot be successfully challenged under Furman and our subsequent cases. 465 U.S. at 53, 104 S.Ct. at 881. Thus, we hold that the Cole study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial, gender or age bias affecting the California capital sentencing process. 137