Opinion ID: 2624541
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-admissibility of the evidence at hypothetical separate trials

Text: (6) As explained in Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, there exists a continuum concerning the degree of similarity required for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which introduction of the evidence is sought: The least degree of similarity ... is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] ... In order to be admissible [for that purpose], the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant `probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ( Id., at p. 402, italics added.) By contrast, a higher degree of similarity is required to prove common design or plan, [8] and the highest degree of similarity is required to prove identity. [9] (7) Defendant asserts that only identity, and not intent, actually was at issue in the joint trial, and hence, defendant claims, only identityand not intentwould have been at issue in hypothetical separate trials. [10] It was apparent at the time the trial court denied severance that identity was one of the issues (and perhaps the primary one) that would be disputed at trial. [11] As the People observe, however, intent to kill, along with premeditation and deliberation, also was in dispute and would have been at issue in any separate trial as well. The prosecution, of course, must prove each element of its case. Defendant's assertion that his defense to the two charges was bound to focus upon identity, and not intent, would not eliminate the prosecution's burden to establish both intent and identity beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1223.) In addressing the issue of cross-admissibility, the Court of Appeal below reasoned, first, that the evidence would not be cross-admissible on the issue of identity at hypothetical separate trials, because the evidence underlying the two charges was not `so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.' (Quoting Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 403, set forth more fully, ante, fn. 9.) Next, the Court of Appeal determined that although the evidence underlying the two charges would be relevant and potentially cross-admissible on the issue of defendant's intent under the lower standard of similarity governing evidence offered for that purpose ( Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402, quoted, ante, p. 776), nevertheless, because a jury would be tempted to employ that same evidence for the improper purpose of determining identity, the probative value of the evidence in establishing intent would be outweighed by the possibility of prejudice pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. [12] In the course of its analysis, the appellate court also suggested that in addition to the perceived problem arising under Evidence Code section 352, the evidence would not be admissible at hypothetical separate trials to prove defendant's intent because it was neither conceded, nor could it be assumed, that defendant was the perpetrator of both charged offenses. [13] In response the People assert, first, that the evidence underlying the two charges would indeed be cross-admissible at hypothetical separate trials on both the issue of intent and on the issue of identityand that the trial court was correct in so concluding when it denied the motion to sever and subsequently admitted the evidence for both purposes at the joint trial. The People further contest the Court of Appeal's suggestion (and that of defendantsee, ante, fn. 13) that in order to introduce such evidence of intent, either it must be conceded or a court must be able to assume that the defendant was the perpetrator in both charged offenses. In this regard, the People assert instead that properly admissible evidence may be considered by a fact finder to prove intent if the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed those other crimes. (Quoting People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 380-383 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708] ( Carpenter ); see Evid. Code, §§ 403, 115.) (8) As we recently observed in Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1205, a fact finder properly may consider admissible other crimes evidence to prove intent, so long as (1) the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant committed both sets of crimes ( id., at p. 1224 & fn. 14, citing Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312, 380-383), and further (2) the threshold standard articulated in Ewoldt can be satisfiedthat is, the factual similarities among the charges tend to demonstrate that in each instance the perpetrator harbored the requisite intent. ( Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1224, paraphrasing Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) There is no requirement that it must be conceded, or a court must be able to assume, that the defendant was the perpetrator in both sets of offenses. We return to the People's assertion that the evidence underlying the two charges would be cross-admissible at hypothetical separate trials on both the issue of intent and the issue of identity. Clearly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that defendant was the perpetrator of each of the two offenses, [14] and also satisfies the threshold standard articulated in Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 402, for admission to prove intent. [15] We further agree with the People that the evidence appears to be cross-admissible on the issue of identity, but in an abundance of caution we shall assume for purposes of analysis that (as the Court of Appeal determined) the evidence did not meet the stringent standard for similarity required by Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 403, in order to be admissible on that issue. Accordingly, we also shall assume that the evidence underlying the two offenses would not have been cross-admissible on the issue of identity at hypothetical separate trials. [16] Assuming the absence of a clear finding of full cross-admissibility on both contested issuesintent and identitywe proceed to weigh the factors indicating potential prejudice against the benefits of joinder. As explained below, we conclude there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion or undue prejudice arising from its failure to sever the two properly joined charges.