Opinion ID: 504653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dismissal for failure to join hra

Text: 8 FAB argues that the district court abused its discretion in holding that HRA is an indispensable party needed for just adjudication of the FAB v. Bank action enforcing the arbitration award. We agree. 9 Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs joinder of necessary and indispensable parties. 4 Rule 19(a) determines whether a party is a necessary party who should be joined in the action. If the answer to that first question is yes, then the court must do so if feasible. If the answer to the first question is no, however, then the inquiry need go no further. See Abel v. American Art Analog, Inc., 838 F.2d 691, 695 (3d Cir.1988) (foreclosing any further inquiry once the panel conclude[d] that [absentees] are not necessary parties pursuant to Rule 19(a)). 10 Rule 19(b) governs the situation in which the court determines that a party must be joined but that joinder cannot be effectuated (as, for example, in our case, where the joinder of HRA would destroy diversity). Where joinder of a Rule 19(a) necessary party is not feasible, the court must decide whether the absent party is indispensable, and hence that the action cannot go forward. 11 Even assuming that HRA is a Rule 19(a) necessary party for a just adjudication, which should be joined if feasible, 5 it is clear that HRA cannot be deemed an indispensable party. 12 We note that the equities of the case and the situation of the parties have changed dramatically since the original Rule 19 motion was made. When that motion was first made in the spring of 1984, before the case was stayed for arbitration, the question of liability was still at issue. Now, after the arbitration, the only issue left is enforcement of the award. We agree with FAB that the district court mistakenly decided the 19(b) question as if it were faced with an initial dispute on the merits, and not as an enforcement action against one party to a binding arbitration award against HRA and the Bank, jointly and severally. 13 A defendant's right to contribution or indemnity from an absent non-diverse party does not render that absentee indispensable pursuant to Rule 19. See Field v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 626 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir.1980). In this case, where an agreement already exists for indemnification, the Bank does not allege that it will have any trouble obtaining contribution and we need not worry about any unfairness to the Bank in recovering from HRA for contribution. Furthermore, because HRA and the Bank are joint obligors, HRA will not qualify as an indispensable party. Professor Moore instructs that all joint obligors should be joined in order that there may be a complete determination of the controversy, provided ... their joinder would not destroy federal jurisdiction. 3A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice p 19.11, at 19-213 (2d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted). However, if such a joinder would destroy diversity, the court can proceed without the joinder of all joint obligors. Id. at 19-213 to 19-214. 14 In Gold v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1076 (3d Cir.1983), this court specifically held that an absent tort feasor that is jointly liable to the claimant is not a Rule 19(a) indispensable party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) advisory committee note (It should be noted particularly, however, that the description [of persons to be joined in the rule] is not at variance with the settled authorities holding that a tortfeasor with the usual joint-and-several liability is merely a permissive party to an action against another with like liability.) (citations omitted). See also Field, 626 F.2d at 298 n. 7. 15 Because the arbitrator issued its decision against HRA and the Bank jointly and severally, we find the posture of this case to be analogous to the situation of tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable. Indeed, from a policy perspective, this case represents an even more compelling scenario for finding that the absentee is not indispensable. Because liability has already been determined, there is no argument that suing only one of the jointly and severally liable parties will prove a fruitless endeavor. 16 The Bank, in arguing that HRA is an indispensable party, stresses that we must review the district court decision for abuse of discretion. The Bank recites the tortured history of this case that it believes indicates why HRA is an indispensable party. Specifically, the Bank emphasizes that: (1) HRA and the Bank were both parties to the arbitration; (2) FAB asserted some claims solely against HRA in the arbitration; and (3) HRA agreed in settlement of Bank v. HRA to indemnify the Bank. These facts, however, do not overcome the simple truth that in FAB's motion to enforce the joint and several award against the Bank and HRA, HRA was not indispensable. The Bank and HRA can sort out their accounts separately either pursuant to their agreement over which the district court maintained control or perhaps in some other forum. 17 Of the four factors listed in Rule 19(b), see supra note 4, the only one that seems to weigh in the Bank's favor is the last one--FAB does indeed possess an alternate forum in state court. That fact alone cannot transform HRA into an indispensable party. See 3A J. Moore, supra, p 19.07-2, at 19-161 (surely the availability of an alternative forum cannot be the sole basis for dismissing a suit commenced in the federal courts). We feel satisfied that equity and good conscience indicate that this action should continue in the forum of the plaintiff's choice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Therefore, we will reverse the district court's order dismissing the action.