Opinion ID: 62
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Warrant Incorporate the Affidavit of Probable Cause?

Text: Before the District Court, the Government conceded that the description of the items to be searched for and seized in the application (and therefore the warrant) lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment unless the affidavit of probable cause was incorporated. On appeal, it contends that Holler did everything he could to incorporate the affidavit into the warrant within the confines of the form and that the standard language on the warrant explicitly incorporated the affidavit. Tracey responds that Holler failed to incorporate the affidavit of probable cause into the warrant, and thus the affidavit does not cure the warrant's lack of particularity. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. It directs that no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Id. The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). Along with preventing general searches, the particularity requirement serves two other functions. It memorializes precisely what search or seizure the issuing magistrate intended to permit, Groody, 361 F.3d at 239, and informs the subject of the search of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search, Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) ( quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977)). [5] Along with other Courts of Appeals, we have held that an affidavit may be used in determining the scope of a warrant that lacks particularity if the warrant is accompanied by an affidavit that is incorporated by reference. United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir.1982); see also Groh, 540 U.S. at 557-58, 124 S.Ct. 1284 ([M]ost Courts of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant.). [T]o take advantage of this principle of interpretation, the warrant must expressly incorporate the affidavit, and the incorporation must be clear. Groody, 361 F.3d at 239; see also Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428-29 & n. 4 (3d Cir.2000). As with the particularity requirement, the primary purposes of this incorporation rule are to limit the [officers'] discretion as to what they are entitled to seize and inform the subject of the search what can be seized. Bartholomew, 221 F.3d at 429. The issue, then, is whether the warrant incorporated the affidavit. We are guided in this regard by Doe v. Groody . There, a mother and daughter brought a § 1983 action against officers who searched them during a search of their home. 361 F.3d at 236-37. Although the officers searched pursuant to a warrant, the face of the warrant only authorized the officers to search the home and the male resident of the home. Id. at 236, 239. The officers, recognizing that the face of the warrant did not authorize them to search the females, argued that the scope of the warrant should be construed with reference to the accompanying affidavit, which did request permission to search all occupants of the house. Id. at 239. We held that the warrant had not expressly incorporate[d] the affidavit so as to permit this construction of the warrant. Id. The warrant specifically referred to the affidavit in response to the questions about the date of the violation and the supporting probable cause, but did not mention the affidavit in response to the question concerning the premises or people to be searched. Id. at 239. That the affidavit was expressly referenced in certain sections demonstrate[d] that where the face sheet was intended to incorporate the affidavit, it said so explicitly. Id. Thus, the absence of a reference to the affidavit in the section describing the premises and persons to be searched negat[ed] any incorporation of that affidavit. Id. at 240. In contrast, we have held that including the statement see Exhibit A sealed by Order of the Court in the items-to-be-seized section of the warrant incorporated that exhibit containing a list of items to be seized. See Bartholomew, 221 F.3d at 429; see also Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, No. 97-5684, 1999 WL 415406, at  (E.D.Pa. June 23, 1999), rev'd, 221 F.3d 425. [6] Similarly, we held an affidavit was incorporated where the warrant direct[ed] the police officers to search the defendant's premises `for ... evidence which is specified in the annexed affidavit.' United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d at 64. [7] Other Courts of Appeals have accepted phrases such as attached affidavit which is incorporated herein, see attached affidavit, and described in the affidavit, as suitable words of incorporation. See, e.g., United States v. Waker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 n. 2 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Curry, 911 F.2d 72, 76-77 (8th Cir.1990). Here, we agree with the District Courtalbeit for different reasonsthat the warrant did not adequately incorporate the affidavit of probable cause. The face sheet of the application and the warrant do not contain any explicit words of incorporation. More importantly, the description of the items to be searched for and seized does not incorporate the affidavit. The first reference to the affidavit on the application and warrant requires that the affidavit be attached to the application and asks for the total number of pages. The box is checked and 7 is handwritten in the blank. However, these markings do not suggest that the description of the items to be seized is to be read in conjunction with the affidavit. The second reference appears in the Search Warrant section of the form, where preprinted words state that the Magistrate Judge has found probable cause from the facts [that] have been sworn to or affirmed before me by written affidavit(s) attached hereto. Again, this statement gives no indication that the items-to-be-seized section is to be read with reference to the affidavit. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 555, 124 S.Ct. 1284 (rejecting a similar statement as insufficient to incorporate the application or affidavit of probable cause into the warrant); see also Curry, 911 F.2d at 76-77 (finding the following language insufficient to incorporate the affidavit: Whereas, the application and supporting affidavit of Det. Ross Swanson [were] duly presented and read by the Court, and being fully advised in the premises. ...). Thus the only two references to the affidavit fail to incorporate expressly the affidavit into the warrant's description of the items to be searched for and seized if found. The Government argues that Holler did all he could to incorporate the affidavit by checking the box, writing in the number of pages, attaching it to the application and warrant, and signing below the preprinted language. But if Holler intended to incorporate the affidavit into the description of items to be seized, he could have written see affidavit, as further described in the affidavit, or any other words of incorporation. This requirement is not difficult, yet it went unmet in this case. The Government's other arguments regarding incorporation are unpersuasive. It correctly argues that this case is distinguishable from Groh because the warrant there contained no words of incorporation and neither the application nor the affidavit accompanied the warrant. 540 U.S. at 557-58, 124 S.Ct. 1284. But this argument does not help the Government  our Court requires clear words of incorporation to cure a warrant lacking particularity. The Government also contends that the District Court failed to recognize that the application and warrant are one document pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Government argues that, under Pennsylvania practice, the description of the items to be seized is to be listed in the affidavit, not the application, and the affidavit must be served with the warrant. See Pa. R.Crim. P. 205 and 206. It posits that this practice serves the purpose of the incorporation rule by providing the agents and the subject with notice of the limits of the search. This argument ignores that the Pennsylvania Rules, in accordance with the federal Constitution, also require that the search warrant itself identify specifically the property to be seized and describe with particularity the person or place to be searched. See Pa. R.Crim. P. 205. Accordingly, we hold that for an affidavit to cure a warrant's lack of particularity, the words of incorporation in the warrant must make clear that the section lacking particularity is to be read in conjunction with the attached affidavit. [8] Merely referencing the attached affidavit somewhere in the warrant without expressly incorporating it does not suffice. In this case, a reader of the warrant would know that an affidavit is attached, but would have no indication that the attached affidavit limits the officers in their search. Because the warrant did not explicitly incorporate the affidavit of probable cause into the description of the items to be searched for and seized, the warrant's lack of particularity is not cured by the affidavit.