Opinion ID: 1398541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Cause of Action Hawkins Act

Text: It is alleged in the second cause of action, in addition to the matters averred in the first, that the housing accommodations in the tract were publicly assisted within the meaning of the Hawkins Act and that defendants knew of such assistance. The act provides that it is unlawful for an owner of a publicly assisted housing accommodation, with knowledge of such assistance, to discriminate against any person because of his race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry in connection with the rental or sale of the housing accommodation. (Health & Saf. Code, § 35720.) [5] Section 35700 of the Health and Safety Code declares that such discrimination is against public policy and that the portion of the code dealing with the matter shall be deemed an exercise of the police power. The term owner is defined as including the lessee, sublessee, assignee, managing agent, or other person having the right of ownership or possession or the right to rent or lease housing accommodations and includes the state and any of its political subdivisions and any agency thereof. (Health & Saf. Code, § 35710, subd. 4.) The term publicly assisted housing accommodation is defined as including any housing accommodation which (1) enjoys an exemption from taxes levied by the state or its subdivisions other than one allowed to veterans; (2) is constructed on land sold below cost by the state or its subdivisions pursuant to the Federal Housing Act of 1949 or is acquired by them for the purpose of such construction; (3) is located in a multiple dwelling and is financed in whole or in part by a governmentally insured loan with respect to acquisition, construction, repair, or maintenance; or (4) is offered for sale by a person who controls the sale of five or more housing accommodations on contiguous land if the acquisition, construction, repair or maintenance of such accommodations is financed in whole or in part by a governmentally insured loan or if a commitment, issued by a governmental agency, is outstanding that the acquisition of such housing accommodations may be financed in whole or in part by a governmentally insured loan. (Health & Saf. Code, § 35710, subd. 3.) The term housing accommodation is defined in the usual sense except that it excludes accommodations operated by religious, fraternal, or charitable associations or corporations not operated for private profit. Multiple dwelling is defined, with certain exceptions, as one which is occupied, as a rule, for permanent residence purposes and is rented to be occupied as the residence of three or more families living independently of each other. (Health & Saf. Code, § 35710, subds. 2, 6.) [6] Any person aggrieved by a violation of the Hawkins Act has a right of action for restraint of such violation and other equitable relief and for damages in a sum not less than $500. (Health & Saf. Code, § 35730.) [16] The sustaining of the demurrer to the second cause of action cannot be justified on the ground that the allegation that the housing accommodations were publicly assisted was merely a conclusion of law. [17] The distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree. ( Estate of Bixler, 194 Cal. 585, 589 [229 P. 704]; see Clark on Code Pleading (2d ed. 1947) 231; Chadbourn, Grossman, Van Alstyne, California Pleading (1961) 812 et seq.; 2 Witkin, California Procedure (1954) 1140.) For example, the courts have permitted allegations which obviously included conclusions of law and have termed them ultimate facts or conclusions of fact. (See Peninsula etc. Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 34 Cal.2d 626, 629 [213 P.2d 489] [one is the owner of property]; Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal.2d 149, 154 [157 P.2d 1] [act was negligently done]; May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703, 707 [271 P. 789] [employee was acting within the scope of his employment].) [18] In permitting allegations to be made in general terms the courts have said that the particularity of pleading required depends upon the extent to which the defendant in fairness needs detailed information that can be conveniently provided by the plaintiff, and that less particularity is required where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to that possessed by the plaintiff. ( Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft, supra, 26 Cal.2d 149, 154-157; Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal.2d 97, 101-102 [114 P.2d 1]; May v. Farrell, supra, 94 Cal. App. 703, 708.) [19] In accordance with these principles it may be alleged generally, in the terms of the statute, that housing accommodations are publicly assisted. [20] The purpose of the Hawkins Act is to prevent future discrimination in connection with the rental or sale of publicly assisted housing. It does not purport to penalize past conduct, and no problem of retroactivity is involved in its application to housing which began receiving public assistance prior to the effective date of the act. [21] A statute does not operate retroactively merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application depends came into existence prior to its enactment. ( United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 [59 S.Ct. 551, 83 L.Ed. 763].) Or, in other words, as said in Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U.S. 559, 570-571 [54 S.Ct. 848, 78 L.Ed. 1425, 92 A.L.R. 794], a statute is not retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation. (See also Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 434-435 [43 S.Ct. 154, 67 L.Ed. 332].) Examples of the application of this principle in particular situations may be found in the following California cases: People v. Union Oil Co., 48 Cal.2d 476, 480-481 [310 P.2d 409]; Eichelberger v. City of Berkeley, 46 Cal.2d 182, 189 [293 P.2d 1], and Gregory v. State of California, 32 Cal.2d 700, 702 [197 P.2d 728, 4 A.L.R.2d 924]. [22] The Hawkins Act imposes sanctions upon conduct occurring after the effective date of the statute, and it does not operate retroactively merely because it may apply in some instances to housing which was receiving public assistance when the statute was enacted. [23] Defendants contend that the Hawkins Act contravenes the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions because it prohibits discrimination by owners of publicly assisted housing but not by owners of other housing. The constitutionality of such legislation has been upheld in New Jersey and New York. ( Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination etc., Dept. of Education, 31 N.J. 514 [158 A.2d 177, 186-187] [appeal dismissed for lack of federal question, 363 U.S. 418 (80 S.Ct. 1257, 4 L.Ed.2d 1515)]; New York State Com. v. Pelham Hall Apts. (Sup. Ct.) 10 Misc.2d 334 [170 N.Y.S.2d 750, 759-760].) We agree with the holdings of these cases that there is a reasonable basis for the classification and no denial of equal protection. We are aware that similar legislation was held invalid by the Supreme Court of Washington in a five-to-four decision ( O'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, 58 Wn.2d 797 [365 P.2d 1]), but we do not find that case persuasive authority here. Three members of the majority took the position that the classification of publicly assisted housing was arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. Their opinion dismissed the case of New York State Com. v. Pelham Hall Apts. (Sup. Ct.) 10 Misc.2d 334 [170 N.Y.S.2d 750], with the statement that since it was decided by a trial court the decision was not binding precedent. The case of Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination etc., Dept. of Education, 31 N.J. 514 [158 A.2d 177], was cited, but there was no reference to the reasoning upon which the Supreme Court of New Jersey based its unanimous decision, nor to the fact that the appeal to the United States Supreme Court had been dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. The other two members of the majority based their concurrence partly upon procedural provisions of the Washington statute having no parallel in the Hawkins Act and partly upon violation of the constitutional provisions protecting the rights of property and privacy. The four dissenting justices, in a well-reasoned opinion written by Justice Rosellini, expressed views in accord with the Levitt and Pelham Hall cases. [24] A statute need not operate uniformly with respect to persons or things which differ in relevant aspects, and a classification will be upheld where it has a substantial relation to a legitimate object to be accomplished. ( Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463 [77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485]; Lelande v. Lowrey, 26 Cal.2d 224, 232 [157 P.2d 639, 175 A.L.R. 1109].) [25] When a legislative classification is questioned, if facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, their existence is presumed, and the burden of showing arbitrary action rests upon the one who assails the classification. ( Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal.2d 742, 760 [329 P.2d 689]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 506-507 [140 P.2d 13]; see Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, ante, pp. 228, 233 [18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101].) [26] Discrimination based upon race or color in housing provided by the state through its branches or agencies violates the Fourteenth Amendment ( Banks v. Housing Authority, supra, 120 Cal. App.2d 1, 16 et seq.), and an extension of the prohibition to private housing receiving public assistance is a reasonable further step in the application of the policy against such conduct. [27] The closer the connection of the discrimination with governmental activity, the more odious its character, and accordingly the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the problem of discrimination is more important in publicly assisted housing than in private housing which has no governmental assistance. [28] Moreover, the primary purpose of the governmental assistance, namely, to raise the housing standards of the community, will be frustrated to a substantial extent if racial minorities, whose housing conditions are often substandard, are hampered in obtaining the full benefits of the assistance. The judgment is reversed.