Opinion ID: 2774437
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Modify

Text: [¶18] Dexter next argues that the court erred in denying his motion to modify. We review the denial of a motion to modify spousal support for an abuse 11 of discretion and consider “(1) whether factual findings, if any, are supported by the record pursuant to the clear error standard; (2) whether the court understood the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given the facts and applying the law, whether the court weighed the applicable facts and made choices within the bounds of reasonableness.” McAllister v. McAllister, 2011 ME 69, ¶ 11, 21 A.3d 1010 (quotation marks omitted); see also Day v. Day, 1998 ME 194, ¶ 5, 717 A.2d 914 (“Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court’s decision of whether to modify spousal support only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice . . . .”). A party who seeks a modification of spousal support must prove that the modification is justified based on a showing of “a substantial change in either the payor or payee spouse’s financial condition.” Charette v. Charette, 2013 ME 4, ¶ 7, 60 A.3d 1264 (quotation marks omitted). The “baseline” against which those changes are measured “includes whatever future circumstances were both foreseen and probably provided for in the amount of alimony already set.” Klopp v. Klopp, 598 A.2d 462, 464 (Me. 1991). The court’s decision to deny Dexter’s motion was fully consistent with these principles for several reasons. [¶19] First, the court found that any economic changes caused by Dexter’s retirement were anticipated at the time of the divorce because, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the amount of Dexter’s post-retirement support payments to 12 Patricia was expressly tied to the amount of money he would receive after he retired. Further, the amount of the post-retirement support payments was not an absolute dollar figure but rather a percentage of his retirement earnings, which would automatically accommodate changes in his financial circumstances. Therefore, the terms of the judgment already anticipated the change on which Dexter based his motion. Cf. McAllister, 2011 ME 69, ¶¶ 14-15, 21 A.3d 1010 (finding a substantial change in circumstances where there was an unanticipated drop in the value of marital property). [¶20] Second, the court did not commit clear error in finding that Dexter can afford to pay the current amount of spousal support. The court was presented with evidence that, except for the amount of his spousal support obligation, Dexter’s expenditures did not change after he retired. Further, he purchased a new vehicle several months prior to the hearing; he budgets $200 per month for recreation and vacation expenses; and in 2013 he paid for vacations to Las Vegas and South Carolina. The court also noted that Dexter’s current wife receives annual retirement benefits of $20,000.5 Therefore, although Dexter’s annual income and benefits dropped from $64,000 at the time of the divorce to approximately $51,000 at the time of the motion hearing, the court did not commit 5 Dexter argued that his current wife’s income was not relevant (although he nonetheless was willing to argue that his support obligation should be reduced because of expenses attributable to her). However, the court properly considered his current wife’s financial circumstances as they bear on his own ability to pay support to Patricia. See Sorey v. Sorey, 1998 ME 217, ¶ 12, 718 A.2d 568. 13 clear error in finding that Dexter could maintain a reasonable standard of living while still paying the amount of spousal support required by the judgment. [¶21] Finally, the court did not err when it concluded that Patricia’s need for spousal support had not diminished. Patricia’s financial statement, see M.R. Civ. P. 108(c), revealed that, without spousal support, her annual income would be less than $9,000. Even while receiving spousal support from Dexter, she qualified for subsidized housing. [¶22] The court considered Dexter’s allegation that although Patricia had not remarried after the divorce, she became involved in a relationship that was the functional equivalent of marriage,6 warranting a termination of spousal support pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(12) (2014).7 The court found that although Patricia shared a residence and housing expenses with a friend for a period of time after the divorce, she entered into that arrangement so that she could “get by” financially, and the relationship was not the functional equivalent of marriage. 6 Dexter’s written motion to modify was based only on an allegation that his financial circumstances had changed after the divorce. After 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(12) (2014) went into effect, see P.L. 2013, ch. 327, § 2 (effective October 9, 2013), he argued that his spousal support obligation also should be terminated or reduced because, after their marriage, Patricia had lived with another person. 7 Title 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(12) provides: When it appears that justice requires, an order awarding spousal support is subject to modification to terminate spousal support when it can be shown that the payee and another person have entered into a mutually supportive relationship that is the functional equivalent of marriage that has existed for at least 12 months of a period of 18 consecutive months. 14 These findings are not clearly erroneous, and the court did not err when it concluded that section 951-A(12) did not provide a basis for a modification of spousal support. [¶23] The court’s decision to deny Dexter’s motion to modify, based on its findings regarding the overall financial circumstances of Dexter and Patricia, was not an abuse of discretion or a “plain and unmistakable injustice.” See Day, 1998 ME 194, ¶ 5, 717 A.2d 914. We therefore affirm. The entry shall be: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: Kirk D. Bloomer, Esq., Bangor, for appellant Dexter R. Voter Benjamin K. Cabot, Esq., C.W. & H.M. Hayes, Dover-Foxcroft, for appellee Patricia Mae Voter Dover-Foxcroft District Court docket number FM-2006-86 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY