Opinion ID: 1239233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appointment of Independent Counsel for the Alibi Witnesses

Text: We first address Graham's claim that the State committed error by suggesting that two alibi witnesses could be subject to prosecution and by petitioning the district court to have independent counsel appointed to represent the two witnesses. Shortly before trial, the State received notice that two alibi witnesses would be testifying on Graham's behalf. The two witnesses were Graham's former girlfriend and the former girlfriend's mother. According to statements given to an investigator, the girlfriend intended to testify that Graham had been at her home on the evening in question. Her mother would also testify that she had seen Graham that evening. During pretrial hearings, the State expressed concern that the alibi testimony being offered was false. The State explained to the district court that at the time of the murder Graham was under a court order to have no contact with the girlfriend, who had been the victim of Graham's terroristic threats. Further, before pleading guilty to the charge of terroristic threats, Graham had written a letter to the girlfriend from jail instructing her on what she must say to exonerate him from the terroristic threats charge. The State also expressed concern over the late appearance of the witnesses-nine months after commission of the crime. In moving to have independent counsel appointed for the alibi witnesses, the State argued that if the statements [the two witnesses] already provided prove to be false, they could be both be charged with aiding an offender [under Minn.Stat. § 609.495 (2008)], and the sentence that crime would carry is half of what the defendant is looking at.... The State indicated there was an active investigation into whether the witnesses' statements were false. Defense counsel objected to the appointment of counsel, arguing that the State was issuing an implicit threat to the witnesses not to testify, and interfering with Graham's due process rights under the state and federal constitutions. The district court agreed there was some possibility the witnesses could incriminate themselves, and concluded the witnesses should have the opportunity to consult with counsel if they felt the need to do so. Independent counsel was then appointed. Independent counsel read the file and spoke with the prosecutor, then met with the two witnesses. After meeting with independent counsel, each witness decided to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege. The witnesses never spoke directly with the prosecutor, and only spoke with the court on the record when being assisted by the independent counsel. We begin by noting that the allegation of State intimidation of defense witnesses is not to be taken lightly. As an agent of the government, a prosecutor must be more than just an advocate for its sidehe or she is also an officer of the court and a minister of justice. State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 513 (Minn.2006). It is paramount that the State not use its power inappropriately to affect the testimony of prospective witnesses. In defining the role of the State in dealing with prospective witnesses, the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice states that: A prosecutor should advise a witness who is to be interviewed of his or her rights against self-incrimination and the right to counsel whenever the law so requires. It is also proper for a prosecutor to so advise a witness whenever the prosecutor knows or has reason to believe that the witness may be the subject of a criminal prosecution. However, a prosecutor should not so advise a witness for the purpose of influencing the witness in favor of or against testifying. Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function § 3-3.2(b), at 53 (3d. ed.1993). The ABA standard presents a potential conflict for prosecutors. On the one hand, a prosecutor should not hamper a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution provide a defendant with a fundamental constitutional right to present a full defense. See State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn.2006) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7). The defendant has a right to `present the defendant's version of the facts ... to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies,' and this includes the right to call witnesses. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)); see also Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d at 201. On the other hand, a prosecutor should protect a witness's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. A defendant's constitutional right to present a defense is not an unfettered right; it does not permit a defendant to compel a prospective witness to waive her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Moose, 266 N.W.2d 521, 525 (Minn.1978). Both the United States and the Minnesota Constitutions preserve a right not to incriminate one's self. U.S. Const. amend. 5; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. In determining whether the State has infringed on a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense by warning a witness of possible self-incrimination, federal courts have held that the dispositive question in each case is whether the government actor's interference with a witness's decision to testify was `substantial.' United States v. Serrano, 406 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Crawford, 707 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1983)). Federal courts prohibit the State from giving warnings of self-incrimination that exert such distress on the witness' mind as to preclude him from making a free and voluntary choice whether or not to testify. Commonwealth v. Jennings, 225 Pa.Super. 489, 311 A.2d 720, 722 (1973) (citing Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry into whether interference is substantial is `extremely fact specific.' U.S. v. True, 179 F.3d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir.1998)). Factors include the manner in which the prosecutor or judge raises the issue, the language of the warnings, and the prosecutor's or judge's basis in the record for believing the witness might lie. True, 179 F.3d at 1090 (quoting Vavages, 151 F.3d at 1190). Here we face a slightly different, although related, questionwhether the State committed error in requesting independent counsel be appointed to advise a witness of possible self-incrimination. We have not, up to now, articulated a standard to govern State treatment of prospective defense witnesses under these particular circumstances. We find it prudent to do so today. We choose to apply a two-part test for determining whether the State has acted properly in seeking the appointment of independent counsel for defense witnesses. First, the State must be able to point to facts that support a reasonable and substantial belief that the witness will offer false or self-incriminating testimony. Second, once the State has demonstrated a reasonable basis for believing a witness's testimony may be false or self-incriminating, the warnings of self-incrimination must be given in an appropriate manner, so as not to preclude a witness's free and voluntary choice to testify by exerting undue distress on the witness. See Jennings, 311 A.2d at 722 (citing Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972)). We conclude, based on application of the two-part test, that the State acted properly here. First, the State was able to point to facts supporting a reasonable and substantial belief that the two witnesses would testify falsely. The State articulated the following facts. The primary witness was the defendant's former girlfriend, and she had been the victim of the defendant's prior terroristic threats. Before ultimately pleading guilty to the terroristic threats charge, the defendant had written a letter to the witness from jail telling her to lie for him so that he would be acquitted of the charge. As a result of the terroristic threats conviction, the defendant was under a no-contact order with the witness at the time of the murders. The second witness was the mother of the girlfriend. Neither witness came forward with an alibi until nine months after the defendant was charged, and Graham's co-defendant, Bobo, had implicated Graham in the murder when Bobo entered his guilty plea. We conclude that these facts are sufficient to establish a reasonable and substantial belief that the two witnesses may have testified falsely had they taken the witness stand. Second, we look at the manner in which the State raised the self-incrimination issue to determine whether the witnesses made a free and voluntary choice to testify. Graham focuses primarily on the State's characterization, made to the district court outside the presence of the witnesses, that the the witnesses face impending criminal liability if they testify. (Emphasis added). Graham points to cases which indicate that it is improper for either the State or the court to make direct threats to the witnesses or to threaten prosecution regardless of the content of the witness testimony. See, e.g., Jennings, 311 A.2d at 722. The record as a whole, however, leads us to the conclusion that the State acted properly. The State raised the issue of self-incrimination with the district court, the court then made a decision based on the evidence to appoint independent counsel to advise the witnesses. The witnesses were provided as much time with counsel as they required to consider their options, and neither the court nor the State talked to the witnesses outside the presence of their independent counsel. The phrase impending liability was used only once by the State, and not in the presence of the witnesses or their appointed counsel. Given the appointment of independent counsel and the lack of direct contact between the State and the witnesses, we conclude that the witnesses were able to make a free and voluntary decision. Because we conclude that State met the requirements of the two-part test, we hold that the State did not commit error when it requested the appointment of counsel to advise the alibi witnesses.