Opinion ID: 2583930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conclusion

Text: ¶ 32 We recognize that Cox's discharge seems a high price to pay for a supervisor nearing retirement. Nevertheless, a balance must be struck between the rights of the employee and the need to have governmental operations run smoothly. The Legislature has established a clear policy against sexual harassment in state agencies. [61] Furthermore, it recently added a new subsection to the progressive discipline regime indicating that evidence over four years old shall not be considered in imposing an increased penalty to a formerly disciplined employee [much of the evidence introduced in relation to Cox was contemporaneous with the charges and, at the oldest, two years preceding the disciplinary action]. However, one of the specific exemptions from the stale evidence rule is any incident involving sexual misconduct and/or harassment. [62] Here, in performing his duties, the employee violated standards, restraints and restrictions on conduct, clearly and explicitly prohibited by the Legislature. Certainly, as a general rule, employers should utilize progressive disciplinary standards to correct inadequate job performance whenever appropriate. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, requiring an employer to retain such an employee would contravene the legislatively created policy against sexual harassmentespecially where 74 O.S.2001 § 840-6.3 [63] and Merit Protection Commission Rule OAC 455:10-11-4 [64] do not mandate the imposition of progressive discipline in all instances or require employers to prove that some less severe disciplinary act would be ineffective before imposing a more stringent penalty. ¶ 33 The record contains conflicting evidence on the issues of sexual harassment and retaliation. Nevertheless, the factual determination to uphold the employee's discharge was neither clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantially competent evidence nor was it arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency's factual determinations. [65] CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. WATT, C.J., HODGES, HARGRAVE, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, JJ., concur. BOUDREAU, J., concurs in result. OPALA, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, J. concur in part and dissent in part. OPALA, V.C.J., with whom LAVENDER, J., joins, dissenting in part. ¶ 1 I would affirm the trial court's judgment.