Opinion ID: 534798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the risk-utility claim

Text: 199 The District Court ruled that the New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. Sec. 2A:58C (hereafter The Act) operated in this case to bar plaintiff's risk-utility claim. 44 Section 3(a)(2) of the Act provides that if the plaintiff asserts a design defect claim against a manufacturer, the manufacturer shall not be liable if: 200 The characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user, and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent characteristic of the product and that would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses or consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for whom the product is intended.... 201 To the extent that the Act imposed new rules with regard to the imposition of liability, it purported only to apply to actions filed after the date of its enactment. Section 8 of the Act provides that the act shall take effect immediately except that provisions of this act that establish new rules with respect to burden of proof or the imposition of liability in product liability actions shall apply only to product liability actions filed on or after the date of enactment. In its October 27, 1987, opinion, however, the district court found that, based on the New Jersey Assembly Insurance Committee's report, the New Jersey legislature intended section 3(a)(2) to be a codification of existing common law and hence that the legislature intended that section to be applied retroactively. Although the district court disagreed with the legislature on the question whether section 3(a)(2) was a codification of existing law, the court nonetheless held that section 3(a)(2) applied to the Cipollone case, even though it was filed before the Act became law, because the legislature's belief that it was not a new rule reflected an intent that the rule be applied retroactively. 202 The applicability of section 3(a)(2) to claims like this is currently before the New Jersey Supreme Court in another tobacco case, Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 N.J.Super. 375, 542 A.2d 919 (App.Div.), certif. granted, 113 N.J. 379, 550 A.2d 481 (1988). We think it highly unlikely that the issue will not be resolved definitively by the time the instant case is re-tried. Therefore, we will not dwell at length on the issue. 203 We do not believe that section 3(a)(2) was a codification of existing common law, although it may have been a clarification of New Jersey law. See N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1, Senate Judiciary Committee Statement at 464-65 (These sections [2-4] are intended to establish clear rules with respect to specific matters as to which the decisions of the courts in New Jersey have created uncertainty.). See also Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.1984) (the levels at which lead exposure becomes dangerous are not generally known, but general public knowledge of danger is relevant to the risk-utility injury); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983) (generalized knowledge of above ground swimming pools did not prevent a risk-utility claim from going to the jury). 204 As a clarification, the provision was meant to be applied retroactively, because section 8's prospective only provision applies only to new rules. Nonetheless, we cannot affirm the district court's decision to deny, as a matter of law, plaintiff's generic risk-utility claim because, applying the language of the Act, we cannot find, and we do not think that there was sufficient evidence for the district court to find, that the inherent[ly] [dangerous] characteristic[s] of cigarettes were known to the ordinary consumer or user, prior to 1966. This is an issue of fact for the jury. 45 205 Our view is in accord with what the Appellate Division of the Superior Court held in Dewey. That court wrote: [w]e have no quarrel with defendant's proposition that plaintiff may not recover if a factfinder concludes that the death of her decedent was caused in large measure from exposure to the danger inherent in all cigarettes, a danger acknowledged to be within his contemplation as an ordinary consumer. 275 N.J.Super. at 386, 542 A.2d at 925 (emphasis added). No such ordinary consumer knowledge has been acknowledged in this case, and it is up to the jury to determine what the ordinary consumer knew. Therefore we will remand on this issue, and, if the New Jersey Supreme Court has not written expansively enough to dispose of this issue before the case is retried, the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed on his generic risk-utility claim. 46