Opinion ID: 1384955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuing Basis.

Text: Appellant argues that the evidence that the syndicate lasted five months at best is insufficient as a matter of law to establish that it operated on a continuing basis, as required by KRS 506.120(3). We disagree. The standard of proof on this element of the crime is by its very nature indefinite. The Commonwealth is not held to proving any specific number of incidents or any element of time, but must show by the proof what the jury could infer from the evidence as intent to collaborate on a continuing basis. Commonwealth v. Phillips, Ky., 655 S.W.2d 6, 9 (1983). Since Phillips, we have reaffirmed that no specific duration is required so long as the jury can find that the collaboration occurred on a continuing basis. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 343, 348 (1995) (The prosecution is not required to prove any specific number of incidents or any element of time, but must show by proof what the jury could infer from the evidence as to intent to collaborate on a continuing basis.); Dishman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 335, 342 (1995) (The `continuing basis' language in the criminal syndicate statute has been held to be proper because the standard of proof on this element of the crime is by its very nature indefinite.). The facts here were sufficient to support a jury finding of a criminal syndicate operating on a continuing basis. The witnesses generally agreed that the scheme lasted between two and five months. More importantly, much of the evidence supported the conclusion that the operation would have continued indefinitely if not discovered, as evidenced by Ray's direct testimony: Q: [L]et me ask you this, the reason that it stopped is only because you got caught as opposed to people wanting to quit, right? A: Yes. The officer was. . . . Q: Caught? A: Yeah. Q: So this operation was continuing, but the reason it stopped is because Hightower got caught, based to what you know, is that right? A: Yes. Although Ray later suggested, in response to Appellant's cross-examination, that he planned to get out after smuggling a quarter pound of marijuana into the prison, the jury was free to believe his first statement. The syndicate was organized to smuggle marijuana into the prison for use and sale. The testimony of all of the other witnesses indicated that the operation would continue so long as it yielded Appellant the money he allegedly needed to pay his legal bills. Nor was there any suggestion that the appetite for marijuana in the Green River Correctional Complex would be satiated after being serviced by Appellant's syndicate for only a few months. The authorities at Green River were not required to wait and see if the syndicate lasted a year or more before ending the operation and bringing charges pursuant to KRS 506.120. Appellant analogizes this case to cases interpreting the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (RICO), which he interprets as requiring that the criminal activity last longer than the period established here. His interpretations are erroneous. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that RICO's continuity requirement is met when the racketeering acts themselves include a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future. . . . H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2902, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) (emphasis added). Because the authorities interrupt many syndicates in their early stages, liability depends on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated. Id. (emphasis in original). The cases cited by Appellant in which the alleged criminal activity failed to meet the continuity requirement involved closed-ended schemes with no threat of continued operation. For example, Manning v. Stigger, 919 F.Supp. 249 (E.D. Ky.1996), involved a solitary fraud that occurred over four months and came to a natural, voluntary, and planned end. Id. at 253. The court found that the fraud threaten[ed] no future criminal conduct, and therefore was not continuous. Id. at 253-54. And, in Johnston v. Wilbourn, 760 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.Miss.1991), the court found no continuity when the defendants' conspiracy to commit fraud in order to merge two specific banks was merely a short-lived scheme as to which there was no threat of repetition. Id. at 588. There is no inconsistency between these RICO cases and our interpretation of KRS 506.120. [3]