Opinion ID: 203337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Riccio's Request for a Mistrial

Text: Mr. Riccio argues on appeal that the district judge should have granted his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's misconduct in making reference to evidence that was not admitted at trial. He further contends that the district judge (1) failed to make a legal determination of the prejudicial effects of the prosecutor's misstatements in light of the evidence at trial; (2) did not ask to hear any argument regarding the prejudicial effect of the misstatements applied to the issue of Mr. Riccio's credibility; (3) made no findings about the risk of any prejudicial effect on the jury; (4) failed to state its reasoning for denying the mistrial motion; and (5) unduly gave a defective jury instruction. Without a contemporaneous, aggressive curative instruction, the defense argued, ... there is no way that we can determine whether the jury did, in fact, disregard the prosecutor's misstatement when discussing the weight of all conflicting admissible evidence. If, like in this case, the government admits that its recitation of the evidence was factually inaccurate, the misstatements constituted prosecutorial misconduct. [5] See United States v. Azubike, 504 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir.2007). Because the prosecutor's statements constituted misconduct, we must then determine whether they resulted in prejudice to Mr. Riccio. Id. ; see also United States v. Mangual-García, 505 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2007). In determining whether the prosecutor's misconduct so poisoned the well as to require a new trial, this court has applied a three part test: (1) whether the prosecutor's conduct was isolated and/or [sic] deliberate; (2) whether the trial court gave a strong and explicit cautionary instruction; and (3) whether it is likely that any prejudice surviving the instruction could have affected the outcome of the case. Azubike, 504 F.3d at 39; Mangual-García, 505 F.3d at 6; United States v. Cormier, 468 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir.2006). Having carefully reviewed the transcript of the proceedings before the district court, it is clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Riccio's request for a mistrial. Applying the first prong of the analysis, we agree with the government that the prosecutor's remarks were relatively brief in nature, were not deliberate and, as the district court itself found, stemmed from an understandable misrecollection of Ms. Dogan's testimony. Second, the district court gave strong and thorough curative instructions to the jury. Moreover, the court informed the jury that there was no evidence that Mr. Riccio had denied having other employment when questioned by Ms. Dogan, and that the prosecutor was incorrect in stating otherwise. It explained that Mr. Riccio did not tell Ms. Dogan at any time that he was not employed elsewhere and that there's no evidence that Mr. Riccio told her that he was not working any place else. The court then instructed the jury that the issue of what Mr. Riccio had said or not said to Ms. Dogan during the deposition was irrelevant, reminded the jury that the trial was not about the worker's compensation claims, and told the jury to put that one out of your mind. Finally, the court diligently cautioned that statements of the prosecutor and Mr. Riccio were not evidence. [6] We believe the court's curative instructionsgiven without objectionwere sufficiently explicit to allow the jury to render a fair verdict. This court has repeatedly held that a strong, explicit and thorough curative instruction to disregard improper comments by the prosecutor is sufficient to cure any prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct. Mangual-García, 505 F.3d at 7 ( quoting United States v. Cormier, 468 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir.2006) and United States v. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1991)). Our holding dove tails with the fact that our system of trial by jury is premised on the assumption that jurors will scrupulously follow the court's instruction.... United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 756 (1st Cir.1999). Finally, this is not a close case and there is no likelihood that the remarks could have affected its outcome. The record is clear that there was enough independent evidence that Mr. Riccio submitted a false SF-86 Form and that he did so intentionally. Considering the evidence in this case, the terse character of the remarks and the thorough curative instructions given by the court, it is unlikely that the remarks altered the result of the trial. Thus, the district court correctly denied Mr. Riccio's motion for a mistrial. No error occurred. [7]