Opinion ID: 1026252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McGlon’s Challenges

Text: McGlon challenges his convictions on Counts II-X, XVI, and XVII (Wire Fraud and Aiding and Abetting); Counts XIX-XXXIII (Money Laundering); and Counts I and XVIII (Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, Bank Fraud, False Statements/Perjury). With respect to his convictions for wire fraud, for money laundering, and for conspiracy to commit money laundering, wire fraud, and bank 6 fraud, McGlon argues that the Government failed to prove he had the requisite intent to defraud.
Wire fraud under § 1343 is defined as occurring when a defendant having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Wire fraud has ―two essential elements: (1) the existence of a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of . . . wire communication in furtherance of that scheme.‖ United States v. Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 966 (4th Cir. 1995)). To establish a scheme to defraud, the Government must prove that McGlon acted with the specific intent to defraud, which ―may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.‖ United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Saxton, 691 F.2d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rhoads, 617 F.2d 7 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979)). Here, the totality of the circumstances indicates that McGlon intended to defraud the victims. West, the trust attorney for McGlon‘s company Villei International Trust, received the funds from many of the advance fee schemes and for the fraudulent CD scheme into his attorney trust account. West would then wire the proceeds to various recipients, often including Villei International and McGlon & Associates, both McGlon‘s companies. Furthermore, McGlon testified that he would use Villei International‘s money for his personal expenses. McGlon explained, ―Well, I didn‘t pay myself any money. You know, it was borrowed money, so I just--all I did was borrow it from the partnership. All of the money in Villei is borrowed money.‖ (J.A. 2199.) Additionally, Villei International Trust was often held out to victims as the source for either funding or for collateral. Even McGlon‘s brief states that ―Villei International Trust offered collateral in the form of certificates of deposit that were credit enhancements. Mr. McGlon was introduced as the owner of Villei International Trust. Clifton West was the trust lawyer for Villei Trust.‖ (Appellants‘ Br. 6.) McGlon himself encouraged these misconceptions. He produced several fraudulent documents, such as stand-by letters of credit and CDs, that were then used to 8 gain the trust of the fraud victims. At trial, Lou Ann Jackson, an employee of Federated Business Services, testified that McGlon personally directed her to prepare several documents that proved to be misleading and/or fraudulent. (J.A. 1648.) Although many of the victims dealt more directly with Muwwakkil, Watlington, and West, McGlon‘s involvement in and benefit from the wire fraud is clear. As a result, we affirm the district court‘s denial of McGlon‘s motion for a judgment of acquittal on multiple wire fraud counts.
Money laundering, as conceived by § 1956(a)(1), prohibits a much broader range of conduct than what constitutes the popular concept of money laundering. United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 486 (4th Cir. 2003). Both McGlon and Watlington were charged with money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)9 and conspiring to commit money laundering under § 1965(h). Section 1956(a)(1) provides: Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-- . . . (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part– 9 Counts XIX-XXXIII charged McGlon with money laundering pursuant to Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). As stated, the district court dismissed Counts XXVII, XXIX, XXXII, and XXXIII. 9
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). In short, to be convicted of money laundering, a defendant must first know that the property involved in the financial transaction represents the proceeds of some specified unlawful activity. Although McGlon maintains he was not aware that the funds he received were laundered fraud proceeds, the evidence that he was aware of and participated in the fraud contradict this assertion. Moreover, McGlon‘s multiple companies with multiple offices and his employment of West, as well as his efforts to send and receive mail at several locations, such as the Mailboxes, Etc.10 and Edward Jones Investment,11 indicate an attempt to divert attention from who was receiving the funds. DeBellonia testified that when he 10 McGlon would receive mail addressed to both him personally and Villei International at a Mailboxes, Etc. in Dalton, GA. 11 McGlon had an account with Edward Jones Investment in Calhoun, GA. In 1997, he met with investment representative Frances Burton Cochran (―Cochran‖). (J.A. 500-01.) He told Cochran that he was receiving money from some bonds and wanted to invest it with her company. (J.A. 502.) He asked her to prepare and sign a letter on Edward Jones‘ letterhead, stating that Edward Jones had received twenty-four Japanese bonds from Dean Witter Reynolds. (J.A. 511-15.) He also asked Cochran if he could receive a package at that address and subsequently have it picked up and sent by Fed-Ex. (J.A. 503-09.) 10 first began working with Villei International Trust and McGlon, ―Mr. West wanted me to be very clear that all fees that would be paid would be paid by my clients to Villei International Trust [and] would be going to his trust account. . . .‖ (J.A. 231.) Because the record demonstrates that the use of West‘s attorney trust account and the wiring of funds to several separate recipients was an attempt ―to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,‖ we affirm the district court‘s denial of McGlon‘s motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to his money laundering convictions.
Section 371, the general conspiracy statute, criminalizes agreements to commit substantive offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 371. To establish that a conspiracy took place, the Government must prove that there was ―an agreement to commit an offense, willing participation by the defendant, and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.‖ United States v. Tucker, 376 F.3d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Edwards, 188 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 1999)). Count I charged McGlon with a multiple object conspiracy: to commit wire fraud, to commit bank fraud, and to make false 11 statements under oath.12 (The Government also charged McGlon with a separate count for conspiracy to commit money laundering, which appeared in Count XVIII.) Courts have ―uniformly upheld multiple-object conspiracies, and they have consistently concluded that a guilty verdict must be sustained if the evidence shows that the conspiracy furthered any one of the objects alleged.‖ Bolden, 325 F.3d at 492 (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) (emphasis added)). Although McGlon challenges each of these objects separately, they are all associated with the single conspiracy in Count I. Thus, despite what McGlon argues, the evidence need only show that a conspiracy furthered one of the three objects for the guilty verdict in Count I to be sustained. While the Court recognizes we need only to hold that one object was sufficiently proven to sustain the verdict, we address each of the objects in turn.
Above, we affirmed the district court‘s denial of McGlon‘s motion for a judgment of acquittal for his substantive wire fraud charge. Similarly, the evidence of substantive wire fraud likewise indicates McGlon‘s participation in the conspiracy to commit that object. For example, McGlon produced fraudulent 12 Count I includes the conspiracy charge, as well as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect its objectives. (J.A. 67-71.) 12 documents which were then held out by other members of the conspiracy, such as Watlington and Muwwakkil, to defraud the victims. McGlon‘s lawyer, West, received the wired proceeds of the fraud and then transferred the money to McGlon or one of McGlon‘s companies. We, therefore, conclude that McGlon entered into an agreement to commit wire fraud, that he willingly participated in that conspiracy, and that he committed overt acts in order to further the conspiracy.
Section 1344 prohibits knowingly defrauding or attempting to defraud a financial institution. It provides: Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—

credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 18. U.S.C. § 1344. McGlon does not challenge his conviction for substantive bank fraud. He only attacks bank fraud as an object of the Count I conspiracy charge. In committing bank fraud, McGlon acted in concert with other individuals, including Watlington and Muwwakkil. While other members of the conspiracy played more visible roles, McGlon agreed to commit the offense, willingly participated, and 13 committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. For example, McGlon met with a victim of the counterfeit check scheme, who sought a refund of the returned check, and represented himself as an associate of Continental Investment Bank. The victim never received his money. Additionally, McGlon had documents made, such as stand-by letters of credit and CDs, which were then used in the fraud.13 Although Watlington and Muwwakkil dealt with the fraud victims more directly, McGlon participated in the bank fraud willingly and committed overt acts to perpetuate that fraud.
McGlon also challenges the perjury object of Count I. A person has committed perjury when he or she 13 From 1999-2005, McGlon was a regular customer of Federated Business Services, a company that provides business services. One of the employees, Lou Ann Jackson (―Jackson‖) testified that McGlon had her scan an image of an Asian signature and then create a signature stamp using the scan. (J.A. 1668-69.) Jackson also typed documents. She recalled that McGlon would tape signatures to finished documents and make copies. (J.A. 1634-35.) Later, Jackson would insert electronic signatures, as directed by McGlon. McGlon kept the original documents. During the trial, Jackson identified several documents she had prepared for McGlon, including stand-by letters of credit and CDs. While awaiting trial, McGlon filed a criminal complaint against Jackson, alleging she committed fraud and made a fraudulent statement under oath during the FBI investigation. (J.A. 2297-2300.) He denied giving her any instructions or signatures. Villei International also obtained business services from a Bahamas-based business named Presidential Services. (J.A. 1059-61.) The company sent and received faxes. The company also prepared a document with the Union Bank name and address. 14 (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true. 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Again, McGlon does not challenge a substantive perjury conviction,14 but rather the perjury object of his conspiracy conviction. As mentioned, one of the schemes perpetrated by the defendants consisted of passing off fraudulent Japanese bonds as genuine. During a deposition with the SEC, McGlon denied any knowledge of the counterfeit bonds: Q: Did the fact that the other bonds were seized concern you? A: No, it had nothing to do with it. Q: Why did you think they were seized? A: I guess because they were phoney. I have no idea. Q: Did the notion that Northeast was working on some phoney bonds concern you? A: Not at all. Q: Why not? 14 There was no independent, substantive perjury charge. 15 A: Why would it, you know? It has nothing to do with me, period. (J.A. 1123.) Watlington similarly claimed the bonds were authentic. (J.A. 1114.) Yet contrary to McGlon‘s and Watlington‘s depositions, at trial, the owner of a printing and graphics company testified that McGlon had contacted him about producing a certificate with a hand-drawn border. (J.A. 528-30.) The printer referred McGlon to a graphic designer who took the project. (J.A. 530.) McGlon later gave the graphic designer foreign characters to add to the design, telling him that the certificates were part of a gift to twelve Japanese salesmen reflecting the amount of product they had sold. When the graphic designer was finished the printer printed and embossed the certificates using a special paper provided by McGlon. Additionally, the FBI‘s investigation revealed that the bonds had been deposited by an individual who received them from Northeast Investment, a company in which McGlon, Watlington, and Muwwakkil were officers. Among the authenticating documents was a letter from Northeast Investment describing the bonds‘ history that included McGlon‘s name, passport number, and initials. There was also a letter of authenticity signed by McGlon, Muwwakkil, and Watlington. 16 This evidence indicates that McGlon was well-aware that the bonds were fraudulent at the time he was deposed. Thus, while it is clear that both McGlon and Watlington lied under oath, whether they coordinated those untruths is unknown. That said, although there is not as much evidence supporting the false statement object as that which supports the wire and bank fraud conspiracy objects, the Court need only establish one of the objects to affirm the conspiracy conviction in Count I. In sum, given McGlon‘s relationship with Muwwakkil, Watlington, West, and other members of the conspiracy established by the record, as well as his own actions in furtherance of the conspiracy, we sustain the guilty verdict against McGlon on Count I. We, therefore, affirm the district court‘s denial of McGlon‘s motion for a judgment of acquittal for Count I.
Above, we affirmed the district court with respect to McGlon‘s substantive money laundering convictions. However, McGlon also challenges the associated conspiracy conviction pursuant to § 1956(h), found in Count XVIII. Section 1956(h) provides that ―[a]ny person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or § 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). 17 Again, West acted as Villei International Trust‘s trust attorney and West‘s attorney trust account was a major situs of the money laundering. Because McGlon‘s companies received the laundered money and he paid personal expenses with the money he received, we conclude that McGlon entered into an agreement to receive the laundered funds from West‘s attorney trust account. As a result, we likewise affirm the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to McGlon‘s Count XVIII.