Opinion ID: 2672558
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Group Death-qualification Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to conduct the deathqualifying portion of voir dire of potential jurors individually and in sequestration as required by Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1. He asserts violations of his federal constitutional rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, and to reliable guilt and penalty verdicts under the Eighth Amendment. We have noted that Hovey held “prospective jurors in capital cases should be sequestered and questioned individually regarding their views on the death penalty. In 1990, the voters adopted Proposition 115, which as relevant here, abrogated Hovey by adding to the Code of Civil Procedure a provision stating that ‘where practicable, [voir dire shall] occur in the presence of the other [prospective] jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 223.)” (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 167.) We have consistently held individual voir dire is not constitutionally required following passage of Proposition 115. (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 789; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1050-1051.) We decline defendant’s request to reconsider our prior holdings. 2. Constitutionality of Death qualification Voir Dire Defendant contends his death judgment must be reversed because the death qualification portion of jury selection is unconstitutional. The high court and this court have rejected this contention. (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176-177; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1120.) Defendant offers no 12 persuasive reason to reconsider the issue as to our state constitution, and we decline to do so.