Opinion ID: 2178146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Order of Consideration

Text: Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by directing the jury to first make reasonable efforts to reach a verdict on the voluntary manslaughter charge before considering involuntary manslaughter. In Comber, 584 A.2d at 53 n. 46, we said: [I]f the [trial] Court allows the Government to go to the jury on both [voluntary and involuntary manslaughter] counts, it should not be in the nature of lesser-included offenses but instead in the nature of legally inconsistent counts which will require the alternative verdict instruction. The trial court accordingly should not instruct the jury that it may consider involuntary manslaughter only if it has acquitted appellant of the greater offense of voluntary manslaughter. Because voluntary manslaughter is typically deemed a more serious offense than involuntary manslaughter, however, the trial court may direct the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter first in its deliberations. [quoting Bradford, supra, 344 A.2d at 218; other citations omitted; alteration in original]. While both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, we specifically acknowledged that voluntary manslaughter is a more serious offense than involuntary manslaughter. Id. As already discussed above, this is because involuntary manslaughter is committed with a lower level of intent than voluntary manslaughter. See Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 6, Nos. 4.20.A-B, 4.22.III, and 4.24.A; Comber, supra, 584 A.2d at 42-43, 48-52 (Voluntary manslaughter is only distinguishable from second degree murder through a finding of the existence of adequate provocation or other mitigation. Involuntary manslaughter consists of a completely different state of mind, requiring the government only to prove either that the defendant should have been aware of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury or that the defendant caused the death of the decedent during the commission of a misdemeanor in a manner that was dangerous and that, under the circumstances, created a foreseeable risk of appreciable injury.). Thus, in Comber, we held that, although it may not give an acquit-first instruction, the trial court may direct the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter first in its deliberations. 584 A.2d at 53 n. 46. Appellant's primary contention to the trial court was and the essence of appellant's argument to us is that the court's instruction intimated that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of rather than an alternative offense to voluntary manslaughter, and that the trial court, therefore, should not have directed the jury to consider the lesser-included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in any particular order. However, the trial court identified both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of second degree murder by explicitly stating to the jury, I am going to instruct you on this charge [second degree murder] and also the lesser-included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. In addition, appellant's argument regarding the ordering of offenses directly contradicted this court's holding in Comber that the trial court may instruct the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter first. Comber, supra, 584 A.2d at 53 n. 46. Finally, to the extent that appellant wanted an express instruction as to the precise relationship between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, he proposed no specific language regarding such equipoise to the trial court. Cf. Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1012 (D.C.1997) (a party's request for jury instructions must be made with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis). In this case, the trial court did not give the jury an impermissible acquittal first instruction. Furthermore, the court committed no error in instructing the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter before involuntary manslaughter as Comber explicitly permitted the court to do just that. 584 A.2d at 53 n. 46. The only remaining question, then, is whether the reasonable efforts element of the court's instruction was permissible. Appellant did not object to the reasonable efforts language. In fact, appellant specifically requested such an instruction, at least as to second-degree murder: I would actually ask for the reasonable efforts instruction. Hoping that if he gets convicted the government is not going to come back with a second degree  go forward on a second degree murder even given the recent case, says they can do that. But I would ask for a reasonable efforts instruction. As they first consider second degree murder, then after that if they've reached a verdict of not guilty on second degree murder or after reasonable efforts they can't reach a verdict they can consider voluntary manslaughter and then two sorts, two types of involuntary manslaughter. It is true that with respect to the consideration of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, appellant asked that the trial court not give any instruction as to the order in which the jury might consider the various types of manslaughter. As already indicated, that request was contrary to Comber. Appellant made no specific objection to the inclusion of the same reasonable efforts language that he had asked for with respect to second-degree murder, nor did he propose any alternative language to guide the jury. See Super. Ct.Crim. R. 30. Accordingly, we review for plain error and find none. Cowan v. United States, 629 A.2d 496, 502 (D.C.1993). Appellant has not demonstrated a clear showing of a miscarriage of justice. Id. Indeed, it is not readily apparent what instruction could be given to a jury permissibly directed to consider the voluntary manslaughter charge first that would be meaningfully helpful to the jury but would not employ the equivalent of a reasonable efforts concept. In any event, appellant did not proffer any. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.