Opinion ID: 2630950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Injury to the Water Rights of Others

Text: FRICO argues that the water court erred in finding that Broomfield's application would not injuriously affect the water rights of others. FRICO bases this allegation on the water court's refusal to consider tables and calculations, which it argues were based on evidence presented at trial and were submitted in FRICO's post-trial proposed decree. The water court ruled that Broomfield had no opportunity to cross-examine the creators of these tables and calculations, and the water court therefore refused to consider this evidence. As explained below, we defer to the water court's findings of fact unless the evidence is wholly insufficient to support those determinations. Evaluating each of the issues that FRICO raises, we conclude that the evidence supports the water court's findings, and therefore, we affirm those findings.
The water court shall approve an application for a change of water rights if such change . . . will not injuriously affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or a decreed conditional water right. § 37-92-305(3)(a), C.R.S. (2009). The applicant for a change of water right bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that the proposed change will not have an injurious effect on others' water rights. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 811 (Colo.2001). Once the applicant successfully meets this initial burden, the opposers have the burden of going forward with evidence that the proposed change will result in injury to existing water rights. Id. If the opposers present contrary evidence of injury, then the ultimate burden of showing the absence of injurious effect by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the applicant. Id. at 812. The issue of injurious effect is inherently fact specific, and we require the water court to make findings on this issue. Id. In evaluating whether a proposed change will have an injurious effect, the water court may have to make determinations about the historic beneficial consumptive use of the water rights in question. See, e.g., Pueblo W. Metro. Dist. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 717 P.2d 955, 958-60 (Colo.1986). We defer to the water court's findings of fact unless the evidence is wholly insufficient to support those determinations. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 219 P.3d 774, 779 (Colo. 2009). This is a highly deferential standard that recognizes the water court's unique ability to evaluate the evidence and make factual determinations in complex water allocation decisions. Id. We defer to the water court's finding that FRICO's post-trial tables and calculations were new evidence because they were not introduced at trial. Therefore, in evaluating each of FRICO's arguments, we rely only upon the evidence presented at trial, not the tables and calculations in FRICO's proposed decree, to determine whether the record supports the trial court's findings.
FRICO argues that Broomfield's calculation of the historic beneficial consumptive use of the water from the Slate Ditch improperly included water used on the Salinas Parcel. The water court considered this argument and ultimately rejected it, relying on evidence presented at trial. The evidence at trial showed that Broomfield owns 115 shares out of 210 shares in the Lupton Meadows Ditch Company. The Lupton Meadows Ditch Company owns a right to use 7/50ths of six cubic feet per second (c.f.s.) of water in the Slate Ditch with a priority date of 1893 and a right to use six c.f.s. of water in the Slate Ditch with a priority date of 1917. FRICO argues that the right conferred in the 1893 appropriation excluded water used on the Salinas Parcel. The water court considered two decrees and witness testimony in finding that both the 1893 and 1917 water rights were appropriated for use on lands that included the Salinas Parcel. According to a 1918 decree, the 1893 appropriation was for irrigation of three hundred acres of land. A second decree from 1924 stated that the 1917 appropriation was also for the irrigation of three hundred acres of land. Jennifer Ashworth, Broomfield's expert witness, testified that the Salinas Parcel is within the three hundred acres referred to in both decrees. Moreover, Howard Cantrell, who owned the lands irrigated by the Lupton Meadows Ditch Company, testified that both the 1893 and 1917 appropriations were historically used on the Salinas Parcel. Thus, the record supports the trial court's finding that both the 1893 and 1917 appropriations included water used on the Salinas Parcel.
The water court found that the 1863 Lupton Bottom Ditch right permits the use of water on parcels of land within eleven miles of the headgate. FRICO contends that the 1863 Lupton Bottom Ditch right is limited to use on parcels within four miles of the headgate. To support this claim, FRICO submitted analysis of the evidence relating to the historical development and the use of senior priority rights in the Lupton Bottom Ditch. The water court refused to consider this analysis because [t]he basis of FRICO's tables and calculations [is] not apparent and Broomfield did not have the chance to cross-examine the creator of this analysis. The water court relied on several pieces of evidence to conclude that the 1863 appropriation extended to use on property along the entire eleven-mile stretch of Lupton Bottom Ditch, instead of property along a four-mile stretch. First, the water court considered a decree from 1883 and the statement of claim filed in that case. The statement of claim preceding this decree said that the ditch was eleven miles long, not four. The decree also recognized that the ditch had been extended from four miles to eleven miles. While a decree does not create or grant any rights, it serves as evidence of pre-existing rights. Cresson Consol. Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273, 283, 338 P.2d 278, 283 (1959) (A decree in a water adjudication is only confirmatory of pre-existing rights; the decree does not create or grant any rights; it serves as evidence of rights previously acquired.). Second, the water court considered the testimony of Howard Cantrell, who owned the property served by the Lupton Bottom Ditch Company. He testified that the Lupton Bottom Ditch extended eleven miles. [1] Thus, the record provides ampie support that the 1863 right to the Lupton Bottom Ditch extended to parcels within eleven miles of the headgate.
The water court found that the 1863 Brighton Ditch right included water that has been historically used on parcels beyond five miles of the headgate. These parcels include the Asphalt Paving Company (APC) Parcel, located approximately five miles from the headgate, and the Hein Parcel, located approximately eight miles from the headgate. FRICO argues that the 1863 Brighton Ditch right permitted the use of water no further than five miles from the headgate, and thus the trial court could not consider the use of water on the APC and Hein Parcels when it calculated the historic beneficial consumptive use. The water court, in analyzing FRICO's argument, referred to an 1883 decree that recognized the 1863 priority to use the Brighton Ditch. [2] This decree did not limit the use of the 1863 right to any particular length of the ditch. Thus, the water court could have construed the lack of a restriction in the 1883 decree as evidence that the 1863 right extended beyond five miles. Further, Jennifer Ashworth, who was qualified as an expert, testified that the Brighton Ditch was eleven miles long, which means it was long enough to reach the APC and Hein Parcels. Thus, the record supports the water court's holding that the 1863 right included water used on both parcels. FRICO further argued to the water court that quantification of the historic beneficial consumptive use of water on the APC and Hein Parcels must be based on the amount of water used on those parcels prior to 1930. The water court instead relied upon Jennifer Ashworth's study of diversions from 1950 to 1990. The water court identified three reasons that Ashworth selected these years: the Office of the State Engineer had readily available electronic diversion data for these years; an augmentation plan that began in 1991 was not reflected in these years; and the period included sufficient wet, dry, and average years. Although the water court could have relied on other data for calculating historic beneficial consumptive use, these three reasons bolster the water court's decision to rely on Jennifer Ashworth's study. Hence, the record supports the water court's finding that the 1863 Brighton Ditch right includes water used on the APC and Hein parcels, and the record justifies the water court's reliance on Ashworth's method for calculating historic beneficial consumptive use.
FRICO argues that some water from the Coal Ridge Waste Reservoir should be excluded in the calculation of historic beneficial consumptive use because that water was diverted from Boulder Creek and stored out of priority. According to FRICO, approximately fifty-nine percent of the water stored in the Coal Ridge Waste Reservoir was unlawfully filled with tailwater and seepage from the Lower Boulder and Coal Ridge Ditches. FRICO made this argument to the water court and supported it by submitting tables containing detailed calculations after trial. The water court disregarded these tables because FRICO created them after trial and failed to present them as evidence at trial. The record supports the water court's determination that the water was diverted in priority from Boulder Creek and was stored lawfully in the Coal Ridge Waste Reservoir. The water court cited a 1935 decree that granted the Coal Ridge Waste Reservoir a water right with a diversion rate of sixty c.f.s. from Boulder Creek, which amounts to a storage right of 199.04 acre-feet. The Coal Ridge Waste Reservoir and the Boulder Creek diversion point are in different districts, so different commissioners maintain the diversion and storage records. Robert Carlson, the Water Commissioner for District Six, testified that the water from Boulder Creek was diverted in priority. Robert Stahl, the Water Commissioner for District Two, also testified that, during his tenure, the Coal Ridge Waste Reservoir stored water in priority under that Boulder Creek water right. Further, Stahl testified that he never recorded any tailwater from the Lower Boulder and Coal Ridge Ditches in the Coal Ridge Waste Reservoir. This evidence is sufficient to support the water court's finding that water from Boulder Creek was diverted and stored in the Coal Ridge Waste Reservoir in priority.