Opinion ID: 6353692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preclusive Effect of the Prior Neglect Finding

Text: Mr. H. argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the trial court from reconsidering the prior neglect finding. Mrs. H. contends that offensive collateral estoppel is a discretionary device and that since certain prerequisites to its applicability are not met here, the trial court was not bound to apply it. (I) Applicable Legal Principles This court has stated that: Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, “renders conclusive in the same or a subsequent action determination of an issue of fact or law when (1) the issue is actually litigated and (2) determined by a valid, final judgment on the merits; (3) after a full and fair opportunity for litigation by the parties or their privies; (4) under circumstances where the determination was essential to the judgment, and not merely dictum.” Newell v. District of Columbia, 741 A.2d 28, 36 (D.C.1999) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C.1995) (quoting in turn Washington Med. Ctr. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1283 (D.C.1990))); Modiri v. 1342 Restaurant Group, Inc., 904 A.2d 391, 394 (D.C.2006). The court also recognizes the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel, which may be used where a plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff. See Newell, 741 A.2d at 36 (citing Ali Baba Co. v. WILCO, Inc., 482 A.2d 418, 421-22 (D.C.1984) (citing in turn Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979))). To invoke offensive collateral es-toppel, the parties need not be identical, i. e., mutuality is not required. See Ali Baba, 482 A.2d at 421 n. 7 (citations omitted). Rather, the party invoking the doctrine must demonstrate that: The issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action. In the prior action, the issue must have been raised and litigated, and actually adjudged. The issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action. The determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. See id. at 421 n. 6 (quoting IB MooRe’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.443[1] (2d ed. 1982)). This court, while permitting nonmutual collateral estoppel, has noted that it applies the doctrine “with some caution ... because it ‘presents issues relating to the potential unfairness to a defendant.’ ” Newell, 741 A.2d at 36 (quoting Ali Baba, 482 A.2d at 422). Thus, following the lead of the Supreme Court, this court “ ‘grant[s] trial courts broad discretion to determine when [the doctrine] should be applied,’ ” see Ali Baba, 482 A.2d at 422 (quoting Parklane Hosiery, supra, 439 U.S. at 329, 99 S.Ct. 645), and has recognized various factors for consideration in determining whether it would be fair to apply the doctrine and whether the defendant had a full opportunity to litigate the issue. See Ali Baba, 482 A.2d at 423. These factors include: (1) whether the first suit was for a trivial amount while the second was for a large amount; (2) whether the party asserting the es-toppel could have effected joinder between himself and his present adversary, but did not do so; (3) whether the estoppel is based on one of conflicting judgments, another of which is in defendant’s favor; (4) whether there are significantly different procedural advantages available to the defendant in the second suit which could affect the outcome. Id. (citing IB MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.441 [3.-4] (2d ed. 1982) (other citation omitted)). Moore’s Federal Praotioe lists several additional factors, including: (1) whether application of the doctrine would be unfair to the defendant under the circumstances; (2) whether the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate; (3) whether the defendant had the incentive to defend vigorously in the first suit; (4) whether the defendant had the ability to foresee additional litigation. 18 Moore’s Federal Praotioe § 132.04[2][c] (3d ed. 2007). The Restatement (Seoond) op Judgments, which Ali Baba cites with favor, see 482 A.2d at 423 n. 14, lists additional factors, including whether: (1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible with an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions involved; (5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent action, or apparently was based on a compromise verdict or finding; (6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate determination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another party thereto; (7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was based; (8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be permitted to relitigate the issue. Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 29 (1982). This court reviews the trial court’s discretionary decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Howard Univ. v. Lacy, 828 A.2d 733, 736 (D.C.2003), reh’g granted on other grounds, 833 A.2d 991 (D.C.2003). (ii) Disposition The basic prerequisites to application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel are met in this case. Specifically, there is a final judgment on the merits, an identity of the issues sought to be precluded (i.e., the neglect determination). Mrs. H., the party to be estopped, was a party to the prior action, and the determination was essential to the judgment. See Newell, supra, 741 A.2d at 36. A final disposition order was entered removing G.H. from her custody based upon the adjudication that he was neglected. While this court in G.H., supra, expressed the view that the evidence was “insufficient to support the finding that H.C.’s conduct placed G.H. and K.H. in imminent danger of being abused,” it left undisturbed the trial court’s disposition order because Mrs. H. did not appeal. 797 A.2d at 686. To obtain relief from a trial court’s judgment, a party must either present it “to the tribunal itself or authority superior to it.” Democratic State Comm. of the District of Columbia v. Bebchick, 706 A.2d 569, 574 (D.C.1998). Mrs. H. did not do so. Where a party fails to do so, that judgment stands as final with respect to that party. “The mere fact that a judgment is erroneous does not deprive it of finality or conclusiveness; until vacated or reversed the judgment is regarded as conclusive.” See 46 AmJur. Judgments § 498 (1994); accord, Kiker v. Hefner, 409 F.2d 1067, 1068 (5th Cir.1969). Here, the trial court did not give preclusive effect to the neglect finding. It applied an incorrect legal standard in deciding not to give preclusive effect to the prior neglect adjudication. Thus, it did not consider the multiple factors relevant to the exercise of its discretion in determining whether to apply the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel or not. Ordinarily, we will remand a case for the proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion based on the relevant factors. Coulibaly v. Malaquias, 728 A.2d 595, 605 (D.C.1999). However, if we can discern from the record only one permissible option, a remand is unnecessary. See id.; see also Johnson v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 841 A.2d 1249, 1257 (D.C.2004) (citing Wright v. United States, 508 A.2d 915, 920 (D.C.1986)). This appears to be a case where the only option was to give preclusive effect to the prior neglect adjudication, considering the relevant factors as established by the record. First, the neglect litigation was certainly not “trivial.” “The right of a parent to raise his or her child ... has been characterized as ‘essential’ and as ‘far more precious than property rights.’ ” In re Ko.W., 774 A.2d 296, 308-304 (D.C.2001) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)). Thus, there was every incentive for Mrs. H. to defend her position vigorously in the first action. Second, Mr. H. could not have had an opportunity to litigate the neglect issue in the first action. Although a neglect rule allows caretakers to become parties to a neglect proceeding, this rule applies only to those who have had the child in the home for twelve months. See Super. Ct. Neg. R. 9(b) (2004). At the time of the neglect adjudication, G.H. had not been with Mr. H. for that period. Third, the estoppel asserted here is not based on conflicting judgments. While Mrs. H. contends that there is an inconsistency with the appellate decision in G.H., supra, that decision is not determinative as to Mrs. H. Since Mrs. H. did not appeal, the appellate decision in G.H. did nothing to alter the neglect finding as to her. Fourth, there are no procedural advantages in the second custody action which outweigh those in the neglect proceeding. Indeed, the opposite may be said to be true, since neglect proceedings afford significantly more procedural advantages than a custody proceeding in the domestic relations context. See, e.g., T.S., supra, 747 A.2d at 164-65 (noting that the “procedural safeguards” in the neglect code “are detailed and substantial” as compared to those in a divorce/custody context). Therefore, this factor does not weigh toward barring the use of estoppel here. Fifth, Mrs. H. had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the neglect action, and therefore, this factor is not an impediment to preclusion. Sixth, Mrs. H. had a strong incentive to defend vigorously in the first action. Seventh, treating the issue as conclusively determined would not be incompatible with administering “the remedies” inherent in the neglect context. Indeed, as Mr. H. argues, the opposite conclusion should be reached. If preclu-sive effect is not given to the neglect finding, parties could lose the incentive to appeal, relying instead on the ability to attack the judgment collaterally in a later proceeding and- creating uncertainty for the finality of neglect determinations. Eighth, the relationships among the parties have not changed since the first litigation. Therefore, this factor will not weigh as a bar to the application of estoppel. Ninth, whether treating the issue as conclusively determined might complicate the issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interest of other parties, according to the Restatement, is a rule primarily directed toward protecting parties who have not yet had their “day in court.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 29, cmt. h. . Here, Mrs. H. had her “day in court” in the neglect proceeding, and therefore, this factor will not weigh toward barring preclusion. Tenth, this is not a case where the neglect issue is a pure question of law and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose the opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it is based. Neither in the first action nor the prior action was Mrs. H. denied the opportunity to raise issues of law on this point. Moreover, it is Mrs. H.’s failure to appeal in the neglect proceeding, rather than the action of any party that forecloses her challenge to the neglect finding. For these reasons, this particular factor is not applicable here to weigh toward barring the preclusive effect of the neglect finding. Eleventh, the court may consider whether the party to be precluded had the ability to foresee additional litigation on the point. Here, Mrs. H. had to know that additional court action related to her children would follow and did. While she might not have known that Mr. H. would seek custody of G.H. by commencing this particular action, she knew that further court proceedings would follow so long as the neglect determination was not challenged, including the possibility that the court would place her child outside her home. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of according preclusive effect to the judgment. Finally, there appear to be no other compelling circumstances that make it appropriate to allow re-litigation of the valid, final judgment in the neglect case. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court had no other option but to give preclusive effect to the neglect judgment. Therefore, a remand is necessary to allow the trial court to determine the appropriate disposition of the case under the neglect statutory scheme, including proceedings under the Permanent Guardianship Act. 9 As Mr. H. argues, since the neglect adjudication must be given preclu-sive effect, he will be held to the preponderance of the evidence burden, rather than a clear and convincing evidence standard in determining placement of the child under the neglect statutes or guardianship proceedings. For the foregoing reasons, the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.