Opinion ID: 1531299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the trial court's interference with the prerogative of the jury

Text: The case was submitted to the jury shortly after two o'clock in the afternoon. At 8:45 P.M. the jury returned for further instructions. It retired again at 8:50. A few minutes after midnight the court returned the jury to the trial room and asked if there was a reasonable chance that they might arrive at a verdict. The foreman replied, I think so, and the jury retired for further deliberation. At 12:57 A.M. the court had the jury brought in again and inquired whether they could arrive at a verdict with further deliberation. The foreman announced: I am sorry, we can't, sir    We can't reach a decision. The court then asked the foreman to tell him in numbers only how the jury was divided. The foreman replied the jury was divided eleven to one, whereupon the court said: Eleven to one. I want you to go back and deliberate further in connection with this matter. The jury returned at 1:22 A.M. and announced its verdict of guilty of manslaughter. No exception to the court's utterance or direction was taken, but her new counsel insists the court's conduct was tantamount to an attempt to coerce and improperly persuade the jury by invading its independence by improper judicial effort. It was well within the discretion of the trial court to return the jury for further deliberation despite the fact that they had announced their inability to arrive at a verdict. And in determining whether to so exercise his discretion, the trial judge could properly inquire as to whether or not the jury entertained a predominant view without disclosing what it was. However, to ask the explicit numerical standing of the jury, as was done here, is not to be encouraged as sound judicial procedure. This form of specific inquiry easily lends itself to suggested or apparent compulsion and should be avoided, especially where, as here, the trial judge returned the jury for further deliberation after having ascertained that they were divided eleven to one. Under the circumstances present, the absence of any cautionary instructions was closely akin to unlawful compulsion as set forth in In re Stern, 11 N.J. 584 (1953). However, we are confident that the same difficulty will not occur again, and in view of the disposition already made, it is unnecessary for us to make any definitive ruling on this assignment of error.