Opinion ID: 2757999
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Generic Assault

Text: In United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2012), this court analyzed Arkansas’s aggravated assault statute and determined that it did not satisfy the requirements for the generic offense of aggravated assault. 31 This court noted the requirement of the Model Penal Code generic offense that a person must cause or attempt to cause serious bodily injury, then contrasted that requirement with the Arkansas statute, which “requires that a defendant engage in conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury.” 32 Creation of a substantial danger “does not require any contact or injury or attempt or threat of offensive contact or injury.” 33 This 30 § 76-5-102(1). 31 681 F.3d at 231-32. 32 Id. at 231. 33 Id. at 231-32 (emphasis in original). 10 Case: 14-40019 Document: 00512858868 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/05/2014 No. 14-40019 court found that the Arkansas statute differed from the Model Penal Code definition of aggravated assault sufficiently to remove it from that definition. 34 Utah, like Arkansas, allows a conviction for assault (distinct from attempt or threat, which are covered in separate and divisible subsections) based on the mere creation of a risk of injury, which is included in the same subsection with “an act . . . that causes bodily injury to another.” 35 For example, in Utah, a defendant was found to have committed assault when he entered a female friend’s house, “began to tear things off the wall and ransacked the house” in the friend’s presence. 36 Because § 76-5-102(1)(c), like the Arkansas statute, covers conduct falling outside of the generic offense of aggravated assault, it cannot qualify as a crime of violence under the enumerated offense test. 37