Opinion ID: 2106091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Errors in the Trial

Text: At the trial Hurst testified in person that he was the owner of the car being driven by the defendant at the time of his arrest by virtue of a lease with an option to purchase entered into with Rush Motors, Inc., Columbus, Ohio. Mr. Hurst stated that he did not have title to the car but that under the lease agreement he had exclusive possession and control of the car. The defense argues that this evidence is insufficient to establish the ownership element of the crime. Courts have not required proof that the victim had legal title to the car to support a conviction for the crime of operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. State v. Bruley, 274 A.2d 467, 468 (Vt. 1970); Allen v. State, 252 S.W. 505 (Tex. 1923); King v. State, App. 292 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Ind. App. 1973).  [14] The offenses involving personal property contained in Chapter 943, Stats., Crimes Against Property, consistently make possession of the property the key to ownership as an element of the crime. See: Robbery, sec. 943.32 (3), Stats., which provides that owner within that section means a person in possession of property whether his possession is lawful or unlawful; sec. 971.33, Stats., stating that In the prosecution of ... any crime committed by stealing, damaging or fraudulently receiving or concealing personal property, it is sufficient if it is proved that at the time the crime was committed either the actual or constructive possession ... was in the person alleged to be the owner thereof. Owner as it is used in sec. 943.23, Stats., should be construed consistent with its accepted meaning in the criminal law and in the other Wisconsin statutes on the same subject matter. We hold that evidence of possession or control over the use of the car, as presented in this case, is sufficient to establish the ownership element of this crime. [15] However, the defendant argues that under the best evidence rule ownership must be established by the actual documents evidencing the ownership and that the personal testimony of Hurst that he was the owner of the car alone was insufficient to satisfy the rule. The defendant first objected to the testimony of Hurst for failure to comply with the best evidence rule at the close of the state's case. When defense counsel cross-examined Hurst, Hurst testified that he did not bring these documents with him. The defendant's counsel could have moved to strike Hurst's testimony based on the best evidence rule at this time. Since the defendant did not move to strike the evidence as soon as he became aware of its objectionable nature, we are entitled to avoid reaching the merits of the best evidence rule issue because it was not properly  preserved at trial. State v. McClanahan, 54 Wis.2d 751, 196 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Bennett v. State, 54 Wis.2d 727, 735, 196 N.W.2d 704 (1972). However, the defendant did object prior to the end of the trial. Since the defendant raised an objection based on the best evidence rule during the trial, though belatedly at the close of the state's case, we will consider the merits of the issue. [16, 17] The best evidence rule, now codified in sec. 910.02, Stats., states that To prove the content of a writing, recording or photograph, the original writing, recording or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in chs. 901 through 911 or by statute. The best evidence rule only applies where evidence other than the writing itself is offered for the purpose of proving its terms. Anderson v. State, 66 Wis.2d 233, 246, 223 N.W.2d 879 (1974); York v. State, 45 Wis.2d 550, 173 N.W.2d 693 (1970); Goetsch v. State, 45 Wis.2d 285, 172 N.W.2d 688 (1969); McCormick on Evidence, sec. 233 (1972). Hurst's testimony concerning the lease was not admitted to prove the terms of that contract but to prove the fact of its existence as evidence of ownership. The fact of ownership could be proved not just by documentary evidence of the title but by certificate of state vehicle registration, insurance receipts, tax receipts, etc., or by Hurst's personal testimony that he owned a particular car. As pointed out in York v. State, supra at 557-8, documentary evidence of ownership may carry more weight than Hurst's uncorroborated testimony that he owned the car, but it does not raise a question of admissibility under the best evidence rule. We hold that at both the preliminary examination and at the trial there was sufficient evidence presented on all of the elements of the crime, and we affirm the judgment of conviction. By the Court. Judgment and orders affirmed.