Opinion ID: 1734792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the lower court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict in favor of the commission.

Text: ¶ 11. The Commission requested a directed verdict at the close of Glidewell's case-in-chief, arguing that Glidewell failed to offer evidence of all requisite elements of the drive out exemption. The chancellor stated that he would defer ruling on the motion until the close of all evidence, and he subsequently denied the motion in his final opinion. On appeal, the Commission asserts that the chancellor erred in denying its request for a directed verdict. ¶ 12. This case was tried by the trial court without a jury. Therefore, the correct name for the Commission's motion is not a motion for a directed verdict but a motion to dismiss pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See Stewart v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 700 So.2d 255, 258-59 (Miss.1997); Davis v. Clement, 468 So.2d 58, 61-62 (Miss.1985). Unlike the standard of review for a motion for a directed verdict, a motion to dismiss in a non-jury case requires the trial court to consider the evidence fairly and to give it such weight and credibility as the trial judge finds is appropriate. Id. The motion should be denied if the evidence viewed in that light and left unrebutted would entitle the plaintiff to judgment. Id. On the other hand, the motion should be granted if the plaintiff has failed to prove one or more essential elements of his claim or if the quality of the proof offered is insufficient to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof. Id. Since the trial court here denied the motion after reception of all of the evidence, we too will review all of the evidence in reviewing the denial of the Commission's motion. ¶ 13. This Court has stated that a tax exemption is to be construed strictly against the one claiming the exemption. Fuel Servs., Inc. v. Rhoden, 245 So.2d 600, 602 (Miss.1971). The presumption is in favor of the taxing power, and the burden is on the claimant to prove or establish clearly his right to exemption.... Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Buelow, 670 So.2d 12, 16 (Miss.1995) (quoting Mississippi State Tax Comm'n v. Medical Devices, Inc., 624 So.2d 987, 990-91 (Miss.1993)). In order to establish his right to the exemption at issue, Glidewell must first show that he was required to pay the tax. See Miss.Code Ann. § 27-65-47 (1990). Second, he must show that he alone bore the burden of the tax and did not directly or indirectly collect the tax from his customers. See Miss.Code Ann. § 27-65-49 (1990). Third, the suit must be filed within three years from the date the return was filed or from the time the assessment was made. Id. Finally, Glidewell must prove the required elements of the particular exemption claimed. Section 27-65-101(1) provides: The tax levied by this chapter shall not apply to the following:... (s) The gross proceeds from the sale of semitrailers if exported from this state within forty-eight (48) hours and registered and first used in another state. Thus, in order to claim the exemption, Glidewell must clearly show that: (1) all the trailers sold were semitrailers under the sales tax law; (2) the trailers were exported from the state within forty-eight hours; (3) the trailers were registered and first used in another state. See § 27-65-101(1)(s). ¶ 14. The chancellor found as follows: Plaintiffs have met their burden of proof by establishing that the additional sales tax assessments in this case were improperly charged and collected. The evidence is also clear that the Plaintiffs alone bore the burden of paying the tax and plaintiffs timely filed their Complaint to have the taxes refunded to them. Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict is therefore overruled. The Commission contends that the chancellor erred in denying its motion because, regardless of whether the trailers sold were semitrailers, Glidewell submitted no proof that the trailers were exported from the state within forty-eight hours and that the trailers were registered and first used in another state. ¶ 15. The Commission is correct in stating that Glidewell submitted insufficient proof that the trailers were exported from the state within forty-eight hours and that the trailers were registered and first used in another state. As Glidewell submits, there was ample proof that the trailers at issue were sold to out-of-state residents. Nevertheless, the fact that the trailers were sold to out-of-state residents does not demonstrate that they were exported from the state within forty-eight hours or that they were properly registered and first used in that state. The only evidence regarding the second element, that the trailers were exported from the state within forty-eight hours, is found in the auditor's report. The report states that the auditor contacted all customers who purchased the trailers in question. The auditor noted that some of the trailers were delivered to the state line, but that others were picked up by the customers at Glidewell's lot in Corinth or at the manufacturer. The second element may have been established as to some of the trailers at issue, but certainly not all. Glidewell offered no evidence whatsoever regarding the third element, that the trailers were registered and first used in another state. Because Glidewell failed to offer evidence of all requisite elements of the exemption, there is no question of fact as to whether Glidewell is entitled to the exemption. ¶ 16. In affirming the assessment of the Board of Review, the Commission stated only that trailers sold by Glidewell did not satisfy the definition of semitrailer in Sales Tax Rule 25, which defines semitrailer as one which is attached to and moved by a truck tractor. Glidewell asserts that the ultimate issue in this case centers around the definition of the term semitrailer. In the hearing before the chancellor, all evidence submitted by Glidewell went to the question of whether the trailers sold by Glidewell were semitrailers within the meaning of the exemption. Still, there were two remaining factors for which Glidewell was required to offer proof in order to claim the exemption. Regardless of whether Glidewell offered sufficient proof to demonstrate that the trailers were semitrailers within the meaning of the exemption, he failed to establish the two remaining factorsthat is, that the trailers were exported from the state within forty-eight hours and that they were registered and first used in another state. The chancellor erred in denying the Commission's motion. Finding that this dispositive issue requires reversal, we decline to address the other errors asserted by the Commission.