Opinion ID: 247306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Do the Statements of Counsel Entitle Plaintiffs to a New Trial?

Text: 22 The taxpayers complain bitterly about a remark made by counsel for the Government in his summation. In the course of his address to the jury he discussed the original trusts set up by Eisenberg and Schaeffer for their children. Then he said: 23 When it came 1936 and Schaeffer and Eisenberg wanted to open up a business they didn't have the money on their own, so what do they do? They steal the kids' money. 24 The language is described by the appellants as an irrelevant untruth which far transcended the bounds of decent advocacy.    We agree that counsel's language was too strong. This Court has several times talked about improprieties of counsel in the course of trial and has, in a strong enough case, reversed and ordered a new trial for that reason. See Straub v. Reading Co., 3 Cir., 1955, 220 F.2d 177; Robinson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 Cir., 1954, 214 F.2d 798. 25 The set of facts which led up to this comment was this. In 1930 these taxpayers established the savings accounts for the children with themselves as trustees. When later they started this furniture business they needed capital. They proceeded to get that capital from the savings funds thus established. No note was given. No interest was paid. They simply took the money from the savings accounts and used it in the business. In other words, the situation, on its face, is that of a declared trustee using the trust res for his own business without any indication of the knowledge or consent of the beneficiaries. Restatement, Trusts § 170, comment l (1935). The dilemma in which the taxpayers are left with this situation is obvious. If the suggestion is made that the original gift to the children was not complete, then the foundation for the claimed partnership is weakened. On the other hand, if there was a complete gift, then the taxpayers were doing something which, as trustees, they ought not to have done. 26 All of this was the background of the charge made by Government counsel in the excerpt quoted. 27 In examining the seriousness of what could have happened from the charge made, we should look at the record and see what the court did. Taxpayers' counsel objected to the remark as improper. The judge said, I wouldn't characterize it as stealing. Counsel argued since there was no note given he thought his argument was proper. Then the court said, I would hesitate to characterize it as that. I don't think it was. Then the taxpayers' counsel suggested it was a tentative trust and the court said he would take back what he said. Finally, the judge concluded, I was just trying to tone down the statement that they stole the money, which I don't think they did. I do think it could have been held to be a breach of trust under certain circumstances. 28 This was all there was to it. The jury would certainly take the word of the judge on the legal point as against the argument of counsel. And the judge made it perfectly clear that stolen was not the proper characterization of the withdrawal of the money. 29 This trial was not a rough and tumble affair as was the situation in other cases which we have had recently in this Circuit. See Russell v. Monongahela Ry. Co., 3 Cir., 1958, 262 F.2d 349; United States v. Stirone, 3 Cir., 1958, 262 F.2d 571. In fact, as lawsuits go, it was quiet as a tax case should be. The Government attorney in his summation did not make an impassioned oration. The one thing he did was to say stolen instead of improperly withdrew. That is not enough for reversal. 30 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.