Opinion ID: 2023838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Corrections Code Section 3-3-5(f)

Text: Corrections Code section 3-3-5 establishes procedures for hearing and evaluating the cases of prisoners eligible for parole. Paragraph (f) of that section governs the frequency with which parole hearings must be granted. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f) (West 1996). Plaintiffs allege that at the time they committed their offenses, they were entitled to annual parole hearings. Section 3-3-5(f) formerly provided in pertinent part that if [the Board] denies parole it shall provide for a rehearing not more than 12 months from the date of denial. Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1003-3-5(f). Section 3-3-5(f) was amended several times, so that by 1988, the section provided in pertinent part: In its decision, the Board shall set the person's time for parole, or if it denies parole it shall provide for a rehearing not less frequently than once every 3 years. The Board may, after denying parole to a person originally sentenced or who became eligible for parole between January 1, 1973 and September 30, 1977, schedule a rehearing no later than 3 years from the date of the parole denial, if the Board finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing prior to the scheduled rehearing date. Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 1003-3-5(f). Today, the provision reads in pertinent part: In its decision, the Board shall set the person's time for parole, or if it denies parole it shall provide for a rehearing not less frequently than once every year, except that the Board may, after denying parole, schedule a rehearing no later than 3 years from the date of the parole denial, if the Board finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing prior to the scheduled rehearing date. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f) (West 1996). Thus, amended section 3-3-5(f), as it did at the time of this court's decision in Tiller v. Klincar, 138 Ill.2d 1, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561 N.E.2d 576 (1990), permits the Board to schedule a prisoner's parole hearings at intervals of up to three years if the Board finds that it is not reasonable to expect that the prisoner would be granted parole before the next scheduled hearing date. See Tiller, 138 Ill.2d at 6-7, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561 N.E.2d 576. In Tiller, 138 Ill.2d at 6-12, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561 N.E.2d 576, this court applied the Miller-Weaver-Lindsey test of ex post facto lawmaking to the 1988 amended section 3-3-5(f). In Tiller, the Board conceded that the 1988 amended section 3-3-5(f) was intended to apply retroactively to prisoners such as Tiller, the plaintiff in that case. This court concluded that Tiller was disadvantaged when the Board scheduled his next parole hearing at an interval greater than one year. The Tiller court noted that [t]he possibility of parole is an element of the punishment annexed to any crime. Tiller, 138 Ill.2d at 11, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561, N.E.2d 576, citing, inter alia, Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 662-64, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 2537-38, 41 L.Ed.2d 383, 391-92 (1974). The court then reasoned: If that opportunity is curtailed through a reduction in the frequency of parole hearings or in their complete elimination, then the inmate has suffered a disadvantage for ex post facto purposes. [Citations.]    `[O]nly an unusual prisoner could be expected to think that he is not suffering a penalty when even though he is eligible for parole and might be released if granted a hearing, he is denied that hearing.' [Citation.] Tiller, 138 Ill.2d at 11, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561 N.E.2d 576. The Tiller court also held that two features of the 1988 amended section 3-3-5(f) did not sufficiently ameliorate the disadvantage to Tiller. The 1988 amended section 3-3-5(f) required the Board to make the special finding that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing prior to the scheduled rehearing date. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1003-3-5(f). The Tiller court concluded that this provision merely made explicit what the Board would have implicitly considered in scheduling the next parole hearing. Tiller, 138 Ill.2d at 10, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561 N.E.2d 576. Also, the Board's regulations provided that a prisoner may request a rehearing at any time based upon `new facts or extraordinary circumstances which could not have been known' to the prisoner at the time of his interview or `which have arisen subsequent to the time of the interview    which have not been previously considered.' Tiller, 138 Ill.2d at 10, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561 N.E.2d 576, quoting 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 1610.100(a)(2) (1985). The Tiller court concluded that this provision nevertheless delayed Tiller's ability to present to the Board information that, if known to the Board, might have caused the Board to grant Tiller's parole application. Tiller, 138 Ill.2d at 11, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561 N.E.2d 576. The Tiller court held that the 1988 amended section 3-3-5(f), as applied to Tiller, was an ex post facto law and, therefore, unconstitutional.