Opinion ID: 530736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony Concerning Request for Counsel

Text: 18 On March 12, 1987, a Wrightsville, North Carolina, police officer, Federal Customs Agent Michael Lemnah, and Miami Police Officer Perez, went to Beto's condominium in Miami Beach in search of Beto. There they found Escruceria. When asked to identify himself, Escruceria stated his name and produced his government I.D. and his passport. When Agent Lemnah began making notations from the passport, Escruceria snatched it back and stated that he would answer no further questions without the presence of his attorney and the Colombian consul. Lemnah then returned the passport and assured Escruceria that there was no need to call an attorney, as the government agents were leaving. 19 At trial the prosecution called Officer Perez, who had acted as an interpreter between Escruceria and Lemnah, to testify about the incident of March 12. In the middle of the government's direct examination of Perez, defense counsel asked the trial court to suppress Perez's anticipated testimony concerning Escruceria's request for an attorney. The trial court requested authority for the defense's argument that an individual not in police custody had the constitutional right to refuse to answer questions without the presence of an attorney. When defense counsel could produce no such authority, the trial court allowed the examination of Perez to continue. The prosecution then elicited the testimony concerning Escruceria's refusal to answer further questions without an attorney present. After Perez had answered the question, defense counsel objected and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard Perez's statement on this issue. 20 On appeal Escruceria again alleges that it was constitutional error to permit this testimony. As he did at trial, however, Escruceria fails to produce any authority for the proposition that this testimony infringed upon his constitutional right to counsel. In refusing to speak to police without an attorney, Escruceria was not asserting either his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda, or his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Those rights do not attach until a person is in police custody, or until the formal initiation of adversarial proceedings against an accused, respectively. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616-620 (1976); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 21 Escruceria also argues that Perez's testimony should have been excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 403, because it was more prejucicial than probative. Assuming, arguendo, that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403, given the trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard it, the question is whether the evidence was so prejudicial that the jury instruction failed to protect Escruceria's right to a fair trial. 22 Two recent Supreme Court decisions make clear that any prejudice caused by the prosecution's elicitation of the evidence concerning Escruceria's refusal to talk without the presence of an attorney was countered by the trial court's prompt instructions to the jury to disregard that evidence. In Richardson v. Marsh, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707-08, 95 L.Ed.2d 176, 182 (1987), the Court held that unless there exists an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to obey a trial court's instructions that it disregard an incriminating inference, the admission of certain evidence will not constitute reversible error. Thus, in Richardson, the Court upheld the admission of a codefendant's confession which had been redacted to omit any reference to the respondent. Respondent was linked to the confession, however, by other evidence properly admitted against her at trial. The Court deemed the admission of the confession nonprejudicial, because the trial court twice instructed the jury that the confession was not to be considered against the respondent. 23 In Green v. Miller, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987), the Court held that a prosecutor's question at trial concerning a criminal defendant's post-arrest silence did not constitute reversible error, even though the prosecution should have known such evidence was inadmissible. The Court reasoned that [t]he sequence of events in this case--a single question--an immediate objection, and two curative instructions--clearly indicates that the prosecutor's improper question did not violate [the defendant's] due process rights. --- U.S. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3109, 97 L.Ed.2d at 630-31. Because the same sequence of events occurred here, we find that the trial court's instructions to the jury to disregard Perez's statement rendered that testimony nonprejudicial. 24 Finally, we find that Escruceria's assertion that the prosecution acted in bad faith by eliciting this testimony from Perez, and that the trial court acted in bad faith by allowing the question to be asked, is without merit. It is clear from the record that the prosecution sincerely believed this evidence to be both relevant and admissible. At the bench conference the trial court asked for authority to suppress the evidence on constitutional grounds, but defense counsel produced none. The trial judge then apparently felt that he had no choice but to allow the question to be asked, and to give the defense an opportunity to object then, presumably on Rule 403 grounds. Unfortunately, defense counsel chose not to object until after Perez had answered the question. At that time, the trial judge promptly instructed the jury to disregard Perez's statements concerning Escruceria's request for an attorney. 25