Opinion ID: 2525107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Comparison to other special circumstance cases

Text: Defendant argued his crimes were not the worst of the worst. During argument, defense counsel asked what kinds of heinous crimes are we talking about that justify the death penalty? He then described in vivid detail the murders committed by infamous serial murderers, including Richard Ramirez, the Night Stalker; Lawrence Bittaker, who tortured, raped and murdered five teenage girls, and recorded their death screams; David Carpenter, the Trailside Strangler, who raped and killed eight or ten women; and William Bonin, the Freeway Killer, who murdered 14 teenagers. Although the defense counsel conceded, [Y]ou don't have to be a mass murderer to get the death penalty, he argued, I am trying to show you also that it takes more. [¶] It takes the worst of the worst or it should for a death penalty. . . . [Defendant] is not the worst of the worst. He is not in the category of people that should get the death penalty. The prosecutor attempted to answer the question defense counsel posed. What kind of cases do we have a death penalty for. . . . [¶] The death penalty isn't sought in every case where special circumstances are alleged. The defense objected, citing Brooks v. Kemp (11th Cir.1985) 762 F.2d 1383 ( Brooks ). The court overruled the objection, finding the People's argument responded fairly to the defense argument. I would never allow the prosecutor to stand up in the opening argument and give a laundry list of people in the State of California who committed one felony murder and were given the death penalty. I would never allow that, [¶] But when you make the argument only the worst of the worst get the death penalty, and you give a laundry list of all the cases, giving the jury the impression that only those people are appropriate for death, it's proper for the prosecutor to point out there are cases involving special circumstances that are not appropriate for death. The trial court properly overruled the objection. The prosecutor continued, explaining the numerous special circumstances that could support a death sentence. Not all of those cases, not in every case where there is an allegation of special circumstances . . . do we even seek the death penalty. . . . [¶] [Defense counsel] said you will see the death penalty . . . in only the worst of the worst. I submit to you that's not correct. [¶] I'm not going to give you names or specifics of cases, but there are cases where the death penalty is imposed . . . where there is one count of murder committed. . . . And these people do receive the death penalty. Finally, the prosecutor directed the jury's attention to defendant's individual circumstances. It's not an appropriate function to speculate as to what other cases involve in terms of the evidence and the factors. . . . [Y]our sole function in this case [is] to determine what those circumstances or factors are, the good and the bad, and weigh and balance them. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found nonprejudicial error in the prosecutor's argument that the prosecution sought death in very few cases, which could `lead the jury to believe that the whole governmental establishment had already determined the appellant to be guilty. . . .' ( Brooks, supra, 762 F.2d at p. 1410, quoting Hall v. United States (5th Cir.1969) 419 F.2d 582, 587.) The Eleventh Circuit expressed concern that [t]he argument improperly suggested that the prosecutor had canvassed all murder cases and selected this one as particularly deserving of the death penalty, thus infringing upon the jury's decisionmaking discretion and improperly invoking the prosecutorial mantle of authority. (Brooks, at p. 1413, fn. omitted.) The prosecutor's argument neither implied any governmental establishment had determined the propriety of a death sentence in this case nor infringed upon the jury's discretion. Furthermore, the prosecution offered a fair response to the defense argument that capital punishment was properly limited to serial killers. If the defense argued that only the worst of the worst received a death sentence, the prosecutor was entitled to argue defendant was not among the best of the worst, and a death sentence was therefore appropriate. This argument was proper. 3. Jury Instructions Defendant contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury and improperly denied defendant's proposed instructions. We reject each allegation of instructional error.