Opinion ID: 43341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the consul general can sue as next friend

Text: 9 Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by holding that the Consul General could not sue as Resendiz's next friend. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17(c), an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend. The question for us, then, is whether Resendiz qualifies as an incompetent person within the meaning of Rule 17. 10 We have held that individuals are incompetent for Rule 17 purposes if they lack the capacity to litigate under the law of [their] domicile. See Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir.1990). In Texas, the standard is whether individuals, by reason of mental or bodily infirmity, [are] incapable of properly caring for their own interests in the litigation. Lindly v. Lindly, 102 Tex. 135, 141, 113 S.W. 750 (1908); Berger v. Berger, 578 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.]1979, no writ). Plaintiffs argue that the district court failed to apply this Texas law and instead applied the ordinary criminal law standard for competency to stand trial. See 44 TEX. JUR.3D, INCOMPETENT PERSONS § 6 (Mental capacity is a comparative term that varies with the character of the act to which it refers.). As noted above, however, our review is de novo. As such, if the district court's reasoning was erroneous, we can ignore it. We apply the Lindly standard recited above. 11 In response to the state's motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs presented evidence documenting Resendiz's mental illness. According to Plaintiffs, Resendiz frequently engages in self-mutilation, including banging his head on the door until it bleeds and cutting his face, chin, arm, head, legs, feet, neck and penis with a razor blade. He is also apparently delusional. Plaintiffs document that Resendiz believes he is a man-Angel — that after his execution he will only go to sleep for three days and that he ultimately will awaken with a renovated body to continue to do God's work and to vanquish God's enemies. 12 Plaintiffs' allegations paint a picture of a very troubled individual. The question, however, is not whether Resendiz is mentally ill. Rather, it is whether Resendiz can care for his own interests in this litigation. Lindly, 102 Tex. at 141, 113 S.W. 750. Plaintiffs' allegations do not show that Resendiz is incapable of doing so. According to Plaintiffs' own documentation, Resendiz realizes that he will be administered. . . lethal injection. He knows that the government will place a needle in his arm in an attempt to stop his heart, lungs, and brain function. He apparently remains able to consult with his attorneys with some understanding about their effort to challenge the lethal injection protocol that he knows will be administered to him. ( See Reply Br. at 4); see also Magallón, at 13. In any event, Plaintiffs do not argue to the contrary. Limited as Resendiz's faculties may be, he appears to have the legal capacity to maintain this section 1983 action in his own name. 13 Plaintiffs argue, however, that Resendiz's capacity to consult with his attorneys is immaterial. (Plaintiff Br. 20.) We disagree. An ability to communicate with your attorneys—to tell them your interests and to give them information to help them effectuate those interests—tends to show that you have the ability to take care of yourself in litigation. The district court properly took this into account. 14 Plaintiffs also contend that the complaint's generalized assertion that Resendiz was incompetent should be enough to entitle him to a hearing on the issue. Such a boilerplate allegation of incompetency, however, was insufficient. Cf. Vulcan Materials v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir.2001) (Here, the complaint did not contain a short and plain statement of the claim, only legal conclusions of such generality as to fail to give fair notice.). This is especially true where the Plaintiffs' position on the issue was clarified by subsequent filings in response to the state's motion to dismiss. The district court properly assumed that specific statements in Plaintiffs' response were true. Since those allegations about Resendiz's mental illness, even if true, would not show his legal incapacity, the district court did not need to hold an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Powell, 354 F.3d 362, 370 (5th Cir.2003). 15 We also note that Resendiz himself is represented by counsel experienced in death penalty cases, who litigated the habeas appeal in Resendiz's own name. That reality is fundamentally at odds with Resendiz proceeding by next friend in this case. For these reasons, the court below correctly held that Resendiz could pursue this action on his own behalf and, therefore, needed no next friend. 16 We hasten to emphasize the limits of our holding. That Plaintiffs have not made allegations sufficient under Rule 17 to establish that Resendiz is incapable of bringing a section 1983 lawsuit does not mean, necessarily, that he is competent to be executed. Proceedings currently are pending in state court to determine whether Resendiz is competent to be executed under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 46.05 and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). Those proceedings present different questions of competency than those that we have addressed today. We express no opinion on them. Moreover, we need not address here whether Resendiz was competent, under any standard, prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit. All that is relevant for our purposes is that Plaintiffs did not make allegations sufficient to show that Resendiz was incompetent under Rule 17 at the time that the Consul General initiated this action. 17