Opinion ID: 2604678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Approach

Text: The United States Supreme Court has struggled mightily with the basis for compensation for temporary regulatory takings. Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 1307, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981), argued monetary loss from a temporary regulatory taking ought to be compensable under the Just Compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court so held in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987) (mere invalidation of a regulation is not enough). See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987) (employing multifactor test to determine a compensable regulatory taking had not occurred), and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987) (holding compensable regulatory taking had occurred because of lack of essential nexus between regulation and asserted public interest). In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992), the Court further refined regulatory takings law by holding where a regulation takes all economically beneficial use of property there is a taking per se, and no balancing of interests is permitted. Most recently, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), the Court held there must be rough proportionality between the cost of the taking and the public benefit. The Court placed the burden of proving rough proportionality on the regulatory agency; in the absence of such rough proportionality, the statute, regulation, or ordinance effects a taking.