Opinion ID: 2982005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Viagra as a controlled substance.

Text: Because Viagra is not a controlled substance, it may not be the object of a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. To the extent that the jury instructions stated otherwise, they were incorrect. Moore did not object to the instructions in this regard, so we also review them for plain error. United States v. Castano, 543 F.3d 826, 833 (6th Cir. 2008). In Hedgpeth v. Pulido, the Supreme Court rejected a rule requiring reversal in cases like the instant one, where the jury was “instructed on multiple theories of guilt, one of which was improper.” 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008). Instead, the Court held that such errors are subject to the same type of harmless error analysis as other instructional errors. Id. (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11(1999)). We must therefore determine whether the erroneous instruction amounts to harmless error. -7- Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. Although the jury instructions incorrectly stated that Viagra is a controlled substance, they also correctly stated that marijuana, cocaine, ecstacy, and Vicodin are controlled substances. Thus, if the jury convicted Moore of conspiring to distribute any of these, his conviction should stand. Under this analysis, Moore’s argument fails because, as explained above, he was not implicated by the evidence presented at trial regarding Viagra. He does not identify one instance at trial where evidence connected him to the trafficking of Viagra. Rather, evidence concerning Moore’s participation in the Nagi conspiracy focused only on marijuana and cocaine. For these reasons, the instruction, while erroneous, does not warrant reversal of his convictions. Nevertheless, Moore should be resentenced on Count 19 employing a five-year statutory maximum sentence. The evidence presented against Moore focused overwhelmingly on marijuana and, to a lesser degree, cocaine. A defendant may not be sentenced under the statutory penalties for a cocaine conspiracy following a general jury verdict on a conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and marijuana as the jury may have found only a marijuana conspiracy. United States v. Dale, 178 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1999). This is because the maximum statutory sentence for conspiring to distribute a controlled substance depends on the substance being distributed. 21 U.S.C. § 846. In the case of a general verdict, this information is lacking, and the district court may not impose a sentence exceeding the shortest maximum sentence for any one of the pertinent violations. Dale, 178 F.3d at 432. Therefore, Moore should be resentenced applying a statutory maximum of five years pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). The United States agrees that resentencing in this narrow regard is proper. -8- Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. 3. Moore’s motions for re-trial or judgment of acquittal. Moore next argues that the district court erroneously denied his motions for a new trial or judgment of acquittal on all counts of his convictions, except for Count 15. A denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal based upon the insufficiency of evidence presented is reviewed de novo. United States v. Morales, 687 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of Moore’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 592 (6th Cir. 2007).
Moore first challenges the weight and sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Evidence was presented that Moore was part of a “tight crew” in the Nagi conspiracy which involved mostly marijuana trafficking. Although his involvement in the “crew” could have indicated a mere superficial relationship with Nagi without involvement in the drug business, a rational factfinder could have concluded otherwise because of the evidence presented of his particular involvement in these activities. Moore threatened Kirchoff and pressured him to pay his “dope bill.” He also intimidated him into keeping quiet about their dealings and interactions. His conviction should therefore stand.
Moore next challenges the weight and sufficiency of evidence supporting his RICO conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1963(a). To establish a RICO violation, the -9- Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. government must prove (1) the existence of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; (2) the defendant’s association with the enterprise; (3) the defendant’s participation in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs; and (4) a connection between the participation and a pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 418 (6th Cir. 2008). Moore argues that the third and fourth elements were not satisfied. In order to meet these elements, the United States must have proven that Moore participated in the operation or management of the enterprise either by making decisions on behalf of the enterprise or knowingly carrying them out, and that he completed a minimum of two predicate acts within a ten-year period in furtherance of the enterprise. Id. at 419; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Ample evidence of Moore’s participation and pattern thereof was presented at trial. He led other HMC members in stealing motorcycles on a visit to Myrtle Beach, which benefitted several HMC leaders. In addition, his role in the Nagi conspiracy demonstrated sufficient involvement in HMC’s organized drug-trafficking affairs, as he carefully planned and implemented theft and drug schemes. These facts support Moore’s substantive RICO convictions. Moore’s RICO conspiracy conviction is also supported by the evidence presented at trial. To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to violate RICO, the United States must prove that a defendant entered into an agreement to violate RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1961. This showing requires proof that the defendant intended to further the endeavor which, if successfully completed, would satisfy all the elements of an underlying RICO violation. Fowler, 535 F.3d at 421. Particular to this appeal, the United States must prove that Moore agreed that he or someone else would commit two - 10 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. predicate acts in furtherance of the criminal endeavor. United States v. Driver, 535 F.3d 424, 432 (6th Cir. 2008). Moore’s RICO conspiracy conviction is premised upon two predicate acts, Racketeering Acts 8 and 11. He challenges the latter of these two, which alleges that he knowingly and intentionally agreed to “distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, as well as marijuana, Vicoden, Viagra, Ecstacy, and other controlled substances.” Evidence at trial discussed above sufficiently established that Moore distributed drugs for Nagi and assisted him in collecting outstanding drug debts from purchasers. Recorded telephone conversations captured Moore’s discussing sales of marijuana and deliveries of cocaine. These facts support his conviction for RICO conspiracy. c. Assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering and aiding and abetting of the same (Count 9). For his connection to the Walker incident, Moore was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering and aiding and abetting assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(3) and (2), and Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.82 and 767.39. He challenges his participation in the underlying assault, as well as the finding that he knew his accomplices were armed with a dangerous weapon. The lynchpin of his argument is that no witness testified to seeing him with a weapon during the incident. However, and as he concedes, actual possession of a firearm is not required for accomplice liability. See Rattigan v. United States, 151 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 1998). As long as he was a willing participant, and he knew that others were armed, his conviction should stand. The evidence speaks clearly on this point. Walker testified that Moore participated in the assault and his uncle similarly recalled seeing Moore at the bar where - 11 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. the shooting had occurred, as he identified Moore to police as one of the perpetrators. On that same day, a recorded telephone conversation revealed Moore’s willingness to assist with the assault and suggested he had weapons readily available for use. These facts are sufficient to support the conviction on Count 9. d. Use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting of the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 (c) and 2 (Count 33). For his involvement in the Walker shooting, Moore was convicted of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The district court omitted the term “carry” from its instruction to the jury and instead instructed the jury solely regarding “use.” Moore argues that this omission renders the instructions “as a whole so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” Section 924(c) establishes penalties for the use or carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime. Thus, § 924(c) may apply in cases where either use or carrying is present. Here, the indictment correctly mentioned both options, yet the jury instructions defined only “use,” and not “carrying.” However, the instructions limited the charge against Moore to “using a firearm” in connection with the Walker shooting. The narrowing of the jury instruction in this regard is permissible, despite that the word “carry” was not stricken from the indictment. See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1985). The five-year mandatory minimum sentence for using a firearm in relation to a violent crime increases to ten years if a firearm is discharged. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). At sentencing, the district court exercised its discretion under Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), to find that - 12 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. Moore had in fact discharged a firearm and therefore applied a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Moore argues that because the element of discharging affects the statutorily prescribed range of permissible sentences, it must be decided by a jury. At the time of this appeal, Moore’s argument plainly contradicted the Supreme Court’s holding on this issue in Harris, 536 U.S. at 557, which allowed judicial factfinding which would increase a mandatory minimum sentence. Since the parties submitted their briefs, however, the Supreme Court has expressly overruled Harris and held that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.” Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). Here, because the district court, rather than a jury, found discharging of the firearm, Moore’s sentence for violation of § 924(c)(1)(A) must be vacated and remanded for resentencing consistent with the jury’s verdict. 4. Whether criminal intent is an essential element of aiding and abetting. Moore challenges the district court’s instruction to the jury regarding the element of intent necessary to impose aiding and abetting liability. Moore did not object to this error, so we review it for plain error. United States v. Katuramu, 174 F. App’x 272, 278 (6th Cir. 2006). Jury instructions are viewed “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1035 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The district court instructed the jury as follows regarding aiding and abetting: Anyone who intentionally assists someone else in committing a crime is as guilty as the person who directly commits it and can be convicted of that crime as an aider and abettor. To prove that a defendant acted as an aider and abettor, the following elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. - 13 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. One, that the alleged crime was actually committed. Two, that before or during the crime, the defendant did something to assist in the commission of the crime. Three, that the defendant must have intended the commission of the crime or must have known that the other person intended its commission at the time of giving the assistance. (R. 2067 at PAGE ID #14523) (emphasis added). The instructions mirror those for aiding and abetting under Michigan state law. Cf. People v. Moore, 679 N.W.2d 41, 49 (Mich. 2004). Moore argues that this definition produced a miscarriage of justice because it omits the element of intent and because it fails to distinguish between the role of a spectator, which does not amount to aiding and abetting, and that of a participant, which does. However, he does not elaborate on this argument or provide any support thereof. He also fails to acknowledge that the jury instructions included the following: “Anyone who intentionally assists someone else in committing a crime is as guilty as the person who directly commits it and can be convicted of that crime as an aider and abetter.” Although the jury instructions were short of perfect,1 they did not rise to the level of reversible error because they indeed instructed the jury twice that Moore must have acted intentionally in order to be convicted. Therefore, the instructions are not plainly erroneous. 5. Evidence of other acts. Officer Brooks testified that Donald Megdanoff, Walker’s uncle, identified Moore to police as the perpetrator. Moore objected to this testimony because Megdanoff had testified himself at trial 1 It is puzzling that the district court modeled its aiding and abetting instruction on state law. Federal aiding and abetting instructions are readily available and routinely given. See Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, § 4.01 Aiding and Abetting. - 14 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. to being unable to identify any shooters. However, Megdanoff had also specifically testified that Moore “took a couple of steps toward [him] and he said, ‘You f want some of this too?’” Based on this testimony, the district court permitted Brooks’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), which allows admission of an out-of-court statement identifying a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier as long as “the declarant testifies and is subject to crossexamination.” We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 1993). Because admissibility pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) does not turn on whether the declarant’s trial testimony is consistent with his prior statement, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Brooks’s testimony. Furthermore, and despite Moore’s argument to the contrary, the district court properly ruled that a limiting instruction on its use solely for impeachment was unnecessary as statements of prior identifications are admissible as substantive evidence. United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 485 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 801 advisory committee’s note). Therefore, Moore’s argument on this point fails. Moore also challenges the district court’s admission of a recorded phone call between Moore and Nagi. During the recording, Moore described beating an unidentified person in a bar fight. Moore argues that the assault was irrelevant to any of the offenses of which he was convicted and served no purpose other than to establish his propensity for violence. This argument fails because the recording, while prejudicial, was probative evidence of Moore’s involvement in the RICO and VICAR enterprises as it demonstrated that he employed violent tactics to further the objectives of the enterprise. See United States v. Garland, 320 F. App’x 295, 305 (6th Cir. 2008). For this reason, - 15 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. Moore asserts similar arguments regarding the district court’s admission of 27 firearms seized from Nagi’s residence and graphic photos of facial injuries to Gerald Deese, who was assaulted by another HMC member. Like the recorded phone conversation between Moore and Nagi, these items were probative evidence of an enterprise that used violence to further its objectives. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them at trial. Finally, Moore challenges the admission of Burnett’s testimony concerning selling cocaine for Burton and having seen Nagi, Moore, and Jarrell go out together on one occasion to collect a drug debt from someone. Moore argues that a proper foundation for this testimony was lacking because Burnett did not participate in the Nagi conspiracy and admitted that he did not know who precisely in HMC was dealing drugs with whom. However, Moore fails to mention that Burnett continued on in his testimony to state that he had discussions with Nagi about his drug activity and had witnessed Nagi’s conversations with other HMC members about their organized drug activities. Therefore, while Moore presents factually valid points, the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Burnett’s testimony because it was soundly supported by his own knowledge of events. 6. Guidelines calculation. Moore argues that the district court erroneously calculated his Guidelines sentence by applying certain enhancements and by rejecting an offense-level reduction. Challenges to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of a sentence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578-81 (6th Cir. 2007). To the extent that sentencing challenges - 16 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. concern factual determinations, we review them for clear error. Id. at 579. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. Moore first challenges the district court’s 12-level enhancement and 2-level enhancement pursuant to USSG §§ 2B1.1(b)(1) and (2) for the amount of loss resulting from HMC’s motorcycletheft activities. To successfully challenge the district court’s loss-calculation, Moore must demonstrate “that the court’s evaluation of the loss was not only inexact but outside the universe of acceptable computations.” United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 326 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moore cannot meet this requirement because the district court estimated the total loss as between $200,000 and $400,000, which is conservative based upon the testimony of Neil Wisner, an investigator for the National Insurance Crime Bureau, who estimated that the total value of the motorcycles stolen in South Carolina was $463,000. Therefore, the district court’s estimate of total loss falls well within the universe of acceptable computations. Moore also challenges the district court’s application of a 2-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(4) for being in the business of receiving and selling stolen property. We have affirmed the application of this enhancement where evidence establishes that a defendant deals in stolen merchandise by assisting in the process of obtaining and sorting items and then preparing them for resale. See United States v. Abdelsalam, 311 F. App’x 832, 843 (6th Cir. 2009). Because evidence was presented that Moore coordinated efforts to steal numerous motorcycles, store them, and ultimately resell them, the enhancement was correctly applied. Finally, Moore challenges the district court’s decision not to apply an offense-level reduction pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2 for his mitigating role in the charged offenses. However, at sentencing, - 17 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. Moore agreed that a sentencing reduction pursuant to § 3B1.2 was inappropriate. His argument was therefore waived and should not be considered on appeal. See United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468, 477 (6th Cir. 2007).