Opinion ID: 1687228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the barajases' causes of action

Text: Firestone conclusively showed it did not design, manufacture or sell the wheel in question. Accordingly, Firestone owed no duty to the Barajases. Firestone negated an essential element of the Barajases' negligence cause of action. See Graff, 858 S.W.2d at 919. The Barajases and the court of appeals rely on Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588 (Tex.1986), to support the claim that a designer or manufacturer of a product owes a duty to a consumer. However, Alm is easily distinguished on its facts. In Alm, Alcoa designed and marketed the bottle closure process. Alcoa designed the bottle cap. Alcoa designed, manufactured, and sold the bottle capping machine. See Alm, 717 S.W.2d at 590.
Firestone proved that Kelsey-Hayes significantly changed the wheel's design. These design differences are enough to show, as a matter of law, that Firestone did not design all or a component part of the wheel. Firestone's summary judgment evidence showed that the product it originally designed and later modified reached the user with substantial changes in the condition it originally left Firestone's possession. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965); Armstrong Rubber Co., 570 S.W.2d at 375. Firestone proved it did not introduce the wheel or a component part into the channels of commerce. It is not enough that the original designer merely introduce a product of similar design into the stream of commerce. See Armstrong Rubber Co., 570 S.W.2d at 376. Firestone proved that it did not supply the product that caused Jimmy Barajas' death. See Gaulding, 772 S.W.2d at 68. The Barajases' theory is that Firestone should be liable in strict liability because it developed a design idea that another manufacturer Kelsey-Hayescopied, modified, and used. Under this theory, the automobile manufacturer who first developed air bags could be held liable because other manufacturers used the idea, modified the design, and incorporated air bags in their own cars. If there were a successor company of the Wright Brothers, this company could be held liable because other airplane manufacturers borrowed the idea of aerodynamic wings. This is not the law. As we have already held, Firestone did not design, manufacture or sell the particular wheel in question. The summary judgment evidence shows only that Firestone originally designed and licensed the 15-degree-bead taper and low-flange-height features of an automobile wheel. For a licensor to be strictly liable, the licensor must be an integral part of the overall marketing process that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products. Imposition of strict liability demands more than an incidental role in the overall marketing program of the product. Here, the undisputed summary judgment evidence shows only that Firestone was the original designer and that it was not involved in the production, marketing or distribution of the Kelsey-Hayes defective product. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in reversing summary judgment for Firestone under these circumstances. See Piscitello, 799 F.Supp. at 225-26. We reach the same conclusion about the Barajases' assertion that because Firestone was the original designer of the bead-taper, low-flange wheel that it had a duty to warn their son about the alleged defective nature of the Kelsey-Hayes product. A manufacturer does not have a duty to warn or instruct about another manufacturer's products, though those products might be used in connection with the manufacturer's own products. Walton, 796 S.W.2d at 226; see also Baughman v. General Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1133 (4th Cir.1986). Additionally, Firestone's summary judgment evidence showed that it only introduced a concept, the 15-degree bead seat taper wheel, to the industry. The concept is an intangible which is not a product within the meaning of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. To impose strict products liability upon Firestone for the introduction of a concept, under the facts of this case, is contrary to the very essence of a products liability cause of action under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Way v. Boy Scouts of America, 856 S.W.2d 230, 239 (Tex.App.Dallas 1993, writ denied). Accordingly, Firestone negated essential elements of the Barajases' strict products liability cause of action. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1)(a), (b) (1965); Lubbock Mfg. Co., 598 S.W.2d at 236; Armstrong Rubber Co., 570 S.W.2d at 375.
Firestone proved it had no duty to the Barajases. Accordingly, Firestone negated the Barajases' civil conspiracy claim as a matter of law. Civil conspiracy is an intentional tort. Massey, 652 S.W.2d at 933. For a civil conspiracy to arise, the parties must be aware of the harm or wrongful conduct at the beginning of the agreement. Triplex Communications, 900 S.W.2d at 719. Because a conspiracy requires intent, parties cannot conspire to be negligent. Triplex Communications, 900 S.W.2d at 720 n. 2. The court of appeals relied on Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 761 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.App.Beaumont 1988, writ denied), to conclude that a course of conduct, agreed upon by conspirators, does not have to involve a separate, distinct intentional tort to impose liability. See Barajas, 895 S.W.2d at 794. However, in Triplex Communications, this Court expressly disapproved Rogers to the extent it held there can be a civil conspiracy to be negligent. See Triplex Communications, 900 S.W.2d at 720 n. 2.