Opinion ID: 1944979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Risk of Erroneous Deprivation/Probable Value of Additional Process

Text: The defendant argues that his attorneys pursued an incompetency finding while the State took virtually no position, resulting in a constitutionally deficient lack of adversarial testing. The process he seeks is the appointment of additional counsel and/or guardians to ensure the competency issue is fully litigated in an adversarial proceeding. [T]he requirements of due process are flexible and call for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (quotation and brackets omitted). Here, the defendant's legal competency to be tried for the alleged crimes was the issue being adjudicated. Although competency is ultimately governed by a legal standard, the determination is largely based upon medical observation and testimony. See RSA 135:17; State v. Briand, 130 N.H. 650, 653, 547 A.2d 235 (1988) (recognizing that court has inherent authority to order a defendant to submit to psychiatric evaluation). Full adversarial testing is not always the most desirable method of evaluating such testimony. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Court determined that disability benefit determinations did not require full adversarial testing because they usually turned upon routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists, concerning a subject whom they have personally examined. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quotation and citation omitted). It noted previous holdings recognizing the reliability and probative worth of written medical reports, and the reduced importance of evaluating witness credibility and veracity. Id. (quotation omitted). In Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640, 649-50, 99 S.Ct. 2523, 61 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979), the Court upheld voluntary admission procedures for mentally ill children in the absence of an adjudicative hearing primarily because [n]o child is admitted without at least one and often more psychiatric examinations by an independent team of mental health professionals whose sole concern ... is whether the child needs and can benefit from institutional care. After the public defenders raised the issue, the procedural determination of the defendant's competency consisted of the following: two medical experts personally examined him and determined whether, in their opinion, he met the legal standard for competency; an impartial judicial fact finder evaluated the expert medical testimony with the assistance of counsel and issued detailed written findings and rulings; notice was given to all parties of the proceeding, and a hearing was held on the record before any finding of incompetency was entered. Pursuant to RSA 135:17, III, any expert conclusion of incompetency was required to include the examiner's findings as to whether there is a course of treatment which is reasonably likely to restore the defendant to competency. And, the trial court's competency decision was subject to appellate review with appointed counsel. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (subsequent review of a determination and a short statement of reasons provided by the decisionmaker also help guard[] against arbitrary decisionmaking). We hold that these procedures, taken together, sufficiently protect the defendant's reputational interest by ensuring a reliable competency determination. Likewise, we find the value of additional process in deciding the competency issue minimal. The defendant contends that if he had not been functionally precluded from testifying and offering evidence, then the outcome of the competency hearing might very well have been different. [A] fair opportunity for rebuttal is among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous deprivations. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226, 125 S.Ct. 2384. Thus, had the defendant requested to testify or call other witnesses at the competency hearing, due process may well have afforded him that right. See People v. Harris, 14 Cal. App.4th 984, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 98 (1993); cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(c), 4247(d) (2000) (stating that federal defendant should be afforded opportunity to testify and call witnesses at competency hearing). On the record before us, however, it appears that the defendant never requested as much. While the defendant moved pro se for certain relief prior to the competency hearing, his motion effectively only requested new counsel. Had the defendant wished to testify, he should have informed his counsel and/or the trial court instead of raising the issue for the first time in his 2006 pro se notice of appeal. Accordingly, we cannot say that he was denied any such right. In addition, we note that the defendant was personally interviewed by both medical experts. These interviews provided him with a forum to demonstrate competency, see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (holding that only process due a stigmatizing injury is an opportunity to refute the charge), and the medical experts later testified at the competency hearing, cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (written report by a physician who examined claimant and who set forth in his report his medical findings is admissible in disability hearing and, despite its hearsay character and absence of cross-examination, may constitute substantial evidence supportive of an adverse finding). We find little value in the defendant's proposed procedure whereby his appointed counsel would, over his client's objection, simply flag[] the competency issue and then contest that issue, with a guardian ad litem appointed to protect the defendant in case he was in fact incompetent. If the competency issue is serious enough to flag, defense counsel will have a good faith doubt as to the defendant's competency. See ABA Criminal Justice Standards Committee, supra at 176. In such a case, it is the right not to be tried if incompetent that should first be protected by counsel. See id. at 181 (recognizing that Standard 7-4.2(c) resolves the difficult conflict of concerns inherent in such circumstances ... in favor of counsel's obligation to the court). Furthermore, nowhere is the defendant's desired procedure contemplated within the comprehensive comments to ABA Standard 7-4.2. See id. at 177. We also note that appointing a guardian ad litem is tantamount to appointing separate counsel because, assuming the State's neutrality, the task of asserting and demonstrating incompetency in the adversarial procedure would fall to the guardian. On these facts, and in consideration of the authorities discussed below, we decline to recognize a right to separate appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause. We have clearly said that where the primary focus of a[] ... proceeding is the mental condition and dangerousness of the person ... rather than determination of guilt or innocence, the full range of protections afforded by the State ... due process provision[ ] does not come into play. In re Richard A., 146 N.H. at 298, 771 A.2d 572 (quotation and brackets omitted). The defendant received the assistance of counsel guaranteed by Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution in raising the competency issue and evaluating the expert testimonyboth tasks undertaken in vindicating his right not to be tried if incompetent. We have cast doubt upon the notion that the Due Process Clause expands upon the constitutional right to appointed criminal counsel. See State v. Westover, 140 N.H. 375, 378, 666 A.2d 1344 (1995); cf. State v. Gibbons, 135 N.H. 320, 323, 605 A.2d 214 (1992). Although we have recognized that a due process right to counsel might attach in complicated nonsupport contempt hearing[s], Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 427, 322 A.2d 1 (1974), we do not find Duval controlling here. Duval rested primarily upon the potential for incarceration after the proceedings, Duval 114 N.H. at 424, 426, 322 A.2d 1 (discussing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)), whereas here any loss of liberty flowing from infringement upon the reputational interest does not rise to a similar level. Thus, declining to appoint counsel solely to vindicate that interest does not offend fundamental fairness. Saviano, 151 N.H. at 320, 855 A.2d 1278; see United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1188 (10th Cir.1998) (rejecting argument that additional or substitute counsel was necessary to satisfy due process where defense counsel moved for a competency evaluation over the client's wishes), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1083, 119 S.Ct. 828, 142 L.Ed.2d 686 (1999); State v. Cunningham, 197 Or.App. 264, 105 P.3d 929, 943 (Where a criminal defendant is at odds with counsel because counsel believes that the defendant is not competent, while the defendant believes that he or she is competent... [, d]ue process does not require the appointment of additional counsel....), review denied, 339 Or. 406, 122 P.3d 64 (Or.2005). We therefore conclude that the procedures attending the competency adjudication reliably guard the defendant's reputational interest and the value of additional process is minimal.