Opinion ID: 1494368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Propriety of Comments in the State's Rebuttal Argument

Text: Bruce's final argument is that the prosecutor made improper comments during the State's rebuttal argument. First, the prosecutor referred to the defense strategy as a shotgun approach [38] and then told the jury that its concern is[:] should Mr. Bruce accept personal responsibility for taking a gun and sticking it in people's faces and taking their money. On appeal, the State contends that the remarks were merely a colorful and dramatic way of saying that that the categories of evidence presented by the defendant were not persuasive and failed to undermine the state's proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [39] Because defense counsel did not object at trial to these remarks by the prosecutor, we review the remarks for plain error. [40] To constitute plain error, the prosecutor's improper statements must be so clear and defense counsel's failure to object so inexcusable that a trial judge ... has no reasonable alternative other than to intervene sua sponte and declare a mistrial or issue a curative instruction. [41] Both the prosecution and defense counsel necessarily have some license to present a forceful case. [42] Nevertheless, it is likely in most cases to be inappropriate for the prosecutor sarcastically to mock the defense case or to make comments that the jury should take the defendant's guilt as a foregone conclusion. [43] But we find that the prosecutor's comments in this case were not so extreme as to be clearly improper. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to intervene sua sponte. [44] Bruce further argues that the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence when he stated that [T]he proof in this case suggests that Mr. Bruce and his coconspirators borrowed a car from a person by the name of Rhonda Bowie, and we know that, the evidence suggests this possibility, because Rhonda Bowie when she came to pick up her car came with the defendant's sister. So the defendant and his cohorts borrowed a car. The trial court allowed this argument over Bruce's objection. Bruce contends that this statement is misleading because there was no evidence that Bruce borrowed Bowie's car. [45] In closing argument, a prosecutor may properly draw legitimate inferences of the [defendant's] guilt that flow from the evidence. [46] The prosecutor may not, of course, misrepresent the evidence presented at trial. [47] In this case, we find that the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Bruce borrowed the car from Bowie. The State presented evidence establishing that (1) the getaway car was registered to Bowie, (2) Bowie was a friend of Bruce's sister, and (3) Bruce's fingerprints were on the car. In addition, there was no evidence presented at trial to indicate that the car had been stolen from Bowie. Because the prosecutor clearly signaled that he was presenting an inference and described evidence supporting the inference, the prosecutor's argument on this point was not improper. Bruce also argues that the trial court did not appropriately cure another statement by the prosecutor in which he attributed defense counsel's statements directly to Bruce himself. As the trial court implicitly recognized by sustaining the subsequent defense objection, the prosecutor's statement was improper because it constituted an implicit comment on Bruce's decision to exercise his right not to testify. But the trial court neutralized any prejudice from this remark by instructing the jury: Ladies and gentlemen, the defendant doesn't speak. He has no obligation to speak. In fact, he's got a constitutional right not to speak. What you heard from his counsel was argument that his counsel made based on the evidence in the record.... The court then struck the offending comment, and the prosecutor apologized. This remedy was more than adequate to eliminate any prejudice. [48]