Opinion ID: 1945624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of RSA chapter 159-B

Text: The trial court ruled that RSA chapter 159-B was plainly implicated in this dispute because the alleged noise arose from a combination of excavation, tree-cutting and protected shooting activity, and Sara Realty sought to terminate the shooting range activity as relief. Sara Realty argues that RSA chapter 159-B affords no protection to Country Pond because the excavation and tree-cutting, and not solely the protected shooting range activities, caused the alleged noise nuisance by allowing the sound of admittedly protected shooting range activities to reach its property. It argues that RSA chapter 159-B does not contemplate any such scenario and, thus, we should not read into the statute language which exempts activity ... exacerbat[ing] the gun shooting noise level ... where that increase... is directly attributable to non gun shooting activities. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Residents Defending Their Homes v. Lone Pine Hunter's Club, 155 N.H. 486, 488, 924 A.2d 366 (2007). We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. RSA chapter 159-B affords protection to shooting ranges from noise-related regulation at the state and local levels. Eligible shooting ranges are exempt from state agency noise level limitations, see RSA 159-B:6, and retroactive application of local and state regulations, see RSA 159-B:4. Notably, unlike the approach taken by several other states that withdraw the statutory protections when shooting ranges undertake a substantial change in use, see, e.g., Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2806(1) (West 2006), RSA chapter 159-B protects the original portion in use even if subsequent expansion occurs, see RSA 159-B:3. In addition to insulating shooting ranges from noise-related regulation, RSA chapter 159-B also affords immunity from most noise-related litigation. Two provisions of RSA chapter 159-B bear upon the instant action. RSA 159-B:2 provides: The owners, operators, or users of shooting ranges shall not be subject to any action for nuisance and no court shall enjoin the use or operation of a range on the basis of noise or noise pollution, provided that the owners of the range are in compliance with any noise control ordinance that was in existence at the time the range was established, was constructed, or began operations. RSA 159-B:2. In addition, RSA 159-B:5 provides: Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a person may not maintain a nuisance action for noise or noise pollution against a shooting range, or the owners, operators, or users of the range, located in the vicinity of that person's property, if the shooting range was established, constructed, or being used on a regular basis as of the date the person acquired the property. RSA 159-B:5. We address these statutes as they relate to Sara Realty's claims for private nuisance and for injunctive relief under RSA 676:15.
RSA 159-B:2 and:5 plainly bar noise-related nuisance causes of action, provided the shooting range satisfies any applicable conditions. See RSA 159-B:2,:5. RSA 159-B:2 is conditioned upon compliance with any noise control ordinance that was in existence at the time the range was established, was constructed, or began operations, RSA 159-B:2. We read this condition to apply if and only if such regulation exists. See Jenkins v. Clayton, 273 Ga. 439, 542 S.E.2d 503, 503 (2001). It therefore does not apply here because no noise regulation predated Country Pond's continuously operating [s]hooting range, RSA 159-B:8, II. Country Pond plainly satisfies the condition within RSA 159-B:5 because there is no dispute that the firearm-related noise emanates from its shooting range, or that the range was established, constructed, or being used on a regular basis as of the date [Sara Realty] acquired [its] property, RSA 159-B:5. Once the conditions precedent are met, RSA 159-B:2 and:5 broadly protect, among others, the entity owning and/or operating a shooting range. See RSA 159-B:2 (The owners, operators, or users of shooting ranges shall not be subject to any action for nuisance....),:5 ([A] person may not maintain a nuisance action for noise or noise pollution against a shooting range, or the owners, operators, or users of the range....). We decline to read into this entity-level protection any qualification based upon the variety of ways [n]oise, RSA 159-B:8, I, emanating from a [s]hooting range, RSA 159-B:8, II, might reach properties that had previously enjoyed buffers. Such a leap is for the legislature to make. See Karch v. Bay-Bank FSB, 147 N.H. 525, 530, 794 A.2d 763 (2002). Accordingly, we conclude that RSA 159-B:2 and:5 operate as independent statutory bars to Sara Realty's nuisance cause of action.
RSA 676:15, entitled Injunctive Relief, supplies a cause of action to abutting landowners to enforce compliance with local regulations. See RSA 676:15. Sara Realty originally invoked RSA 676:15 to seek temporary and permanent injunctive abatement of Country Pond's outdoor gun shooting activities. It later amended its RSA 676:15 claim to request only an injunction requiring [Country Pond] to construct a sound barrier as required under the Planning Board condition. The trial court ruled that [t]he [RSA 676:15] issue is ... no longer ... open because it ruled, in a separate action, that the planning board reasonably and lawfully determined that Country Pond met the sound mitigation condition. Sara Realty did not challenge this ruling in its notice of appeal. Accordingly, it is deemed waived. See Dupont v. N.H. Real Estate Comm'n, 157 N.H. 658, 662, 956 A.2d 316 (2008).