Opinion ID: 4114561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Forcible Sex Offense and Or. Rev. Stat.

Text: § 163.427(1)(a)(B) and (C) A conviction under either subdivisions (1)(a)(B) or (C) would also constitute a “crime of violence” as both subdivisions fall within the generic federal definition of a “forcible sex offense.” Under the Guidelines, a forcible sex offense includes crimes in which “consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where the consent is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Prior to a 2008 amendment, the Guidelines simply listed “forcible sex offense” as an example of a “crime of violence” and did not specifically define a “forcible sex offense” as a situation in which consent is lacking. The 2008 amendment broadened the meaning of “forcible sex offense” such that an “indicia of additional force or violence are no longer required for the forcible sex offense enhancement so long as consent to the sex offense is shown to be lacking.”3 3 We clarify that the 2008 amendments to the Guidelines abrogated our holding in United States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042 (2007), by expanding the generic federal definition of “forcible sex offense.” In that case, we held that sexual abuse in the second degree under Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.425 is not categorically a crime of violence. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d at 1044, 1053. We explained that the Oregon statute at issue “constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ only if: (1) the crime constitutes a 12 UNITED STATES V. ROCHA-ALVARADO United States v. Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d 746, 753 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Gallegos-Galindo, 704 F.3d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 2013)). Subdivision (1)(a)(B) of the Oregon statute for sexual abuse in the first degree falls within the federal definition of “forcible sex offense,” i.e., an enumerated crime of violence. The statute requires the victim to be subjected to “forcible compulsion.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a)(B). Under Oregon law, forcible compulsion is force that is (1) “greater in degree or different in kind” from the simple act of touching the intimate part of another and (2) “sufficient to ‘compel’ the victim, against the victim’s will, to submit to or engage in the sexual contact, but it need not rise to the level of violence.” State v. Marshall, 253 P.3d 1017, 1027 (Or. 2011). Because this section of the Oregon statute requires that the touching be against the victim’s will, it meets the generic federal definition of a forcible sex offense as provided in the 2008 amendments and, therefore, is a crime of violence. Subdivision (1)(a)(C) of the Oregon statute also constitutes a forcible sex offense. It requires that sexual contact be made with a victim “incapable of consent.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a)(C). Thus, it definitively meets the ‘forcible sex offense,’ a term left undefined by the guidelines; or (2) conviction of the crime requires proof of ‘the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’” Id. at 1044 (emphasis added). Although we recognized that “the victim’s lack of consent is the defining characteristic” of sexual abuse in the second degree under the Oregon statute, we understood “forcible sex offense” to require “the use of force.” Id. at 1045, 1051. As discussed, the 2008 amendment, however, has defined “forcible sex offense” and broadened the meaning of that term by no longer requiring force if consent is lacking. Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d at 753. UNITED STATES V. ROCHA-ALVARADO 13 generic federal definition of forcible sex offense, as amended in 2008, which includes situations where “consent . . . is not given or is not legally valid, . . . [e.g.,] involuntary, incompetent, or coerced[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Both subdivisions (1)(a)(B) and (1)(a)(C), thus, constitute crimes of violence under the applicable Guidelines.