Opinion ID: 844263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions for Continuance and Mistrial Based on the Struggle for the Gun

Text: As described, Salvador Berber wore a wire and recorded his conversation with Gonzales while the two were being transported in a sheriff's van. Gonzales in his tape-recorded conversation with Berber claimed sole responsibility for shooting Skyles and Price. During cross-examination, counsel for Soliz asked Berber whether Gonzales had made any gestures or had any expressions on his face when he described how he shot Skyles and Price. Counsel then asked, at what point was it that [Gonzales] indicated that he had a gun . . . ? Berber answered: That was the time in theyou can't hear it on the tapethat he said that him and Jasper [Soliz] were struggling for the gun to, I guess, see who were gonna shoot the black kids. During a break and outside the presence of the jury, counsel for Soliz moved for a continuance to obtain an expert to analyze the tape or, in the alternative, to strike Berber's answer as unresponsive and to admonish the jury to disregard it. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance but agreed to instruct the jury to disregard Berber's statement about the struggle for the gun. Soliz then moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. Soliz, joined by Gonzales, contends the trial court erred in denying the continuance and the motion for a mistrial. (10) Granting or denying a motion for midtrial continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must consider not only the benefit the moving party anticipates, but also the likelihood the benefit will result. ( People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1105-1106 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36].) The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion; it made the reasonable assessment that because of the loud road noise on parts of the tape no further conversation would be recovered through audio enhancement. In any event, the trial court struck Berber's statement and admonished the jury to disregard it, which eliminated any prejudice to Soliz. (11) As to Soliz's motion for mistrial, we have stated that a trial court should grant a mistrial only if the defendant will suffer prejudice that is incurable by admonition or instruction. ( People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 553-554 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417].) A trial court has considerable discretion in its assessment of incurable prejudice. ( Id. at p. 554.) Here, the trial court struck Berber's testimony and properly admonished the jury. Although Soliz asserts the admonitions were inadequate, we see no basis for the assertion and presume, as always, that the jury followed the court's instructions. ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 453 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790].) We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in denying Soliz's motion for mistrial.