Opinion ID: 702517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: country-wide persecution

Text: 46 As an alternate ground for holding Singh ineligible for either asylum or withholding of deportation, the BIA held that Singh had a burden to demonstrate country-wide persecution and that he had failed to carry it. The BIA also concluded that even if Singh had established eligibility for asylum it would deny that relief as a matter of discretion in view of the absence of a threat of persecution throughout India and the factual circumstances of his case. The BIA erred in requiring Singh to show a threat of country-wide persecution for withholding of deportation and for both the eligibility and discretionary stages of its asylum analysis. 47 We recently reached this same conclusion in Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.1995). We there considered a district court view that the petitioner would not qualify for asylum if his persecution by India for political opinion was confined to the Punjab and concluded that [s]uch is not the law. Id. at 1034. The BIA's decision in this case is thus contrary to controlling, intervening Ninth Circuit law. 48 The BIA's decision is also contrary to INS regulations that provide that once an applicant has demonstrated that he suffered past persecution, there is a presumption that he faces a similar threat on return. For purposes of asylum eligibility the regulations provide that if the applicant suffered past persecution before leaving the country, the applicant is presumed 49 also to have a well-founded fear of persecution unless a preponderance of the evidence establishes that since the time the persecution occurred conditions in the applicant's country ... have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he were to return. 50 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.13(b)(1)(i). For purposes of withholding of deportation, the presumption is similar. Once the applicant establishes initially that his life or freedom was threatened in the proposed country of deportation, then: 51 it shall be presumed that his life or freedom would be threatened on return to that country unless a preponderance of the evidence establishes that conditions in the country have changed to such an extent that it is no longer more likely than not that the applicant would be so persecuted there. 52 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.16(b)(2). Under the regulations, once the applicant has established that he experienced persecution in the past, the only relevant question is whether conditions in the country have so changed that the threat no longer exists upon his return. There is no burden on the applicant to show that his past experience reflected conditions nationwide. 53 The government argues that the BIA's position amounts to an interpretation of the regulations that should be accorded deference under the principles announced in Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The BIA's analysis did not rest upon an interpretation of ambiguous regulations, however. The regulations' unambiguous provisions permit of no conflicting interpretations. 54 Our conclusion is also fully consistent with Congress' intent in passing the Refugee Act of 1980 that established the statutory requirements for withholding of deportation and asylum. Those provisions were enacted with the intent of bringing the United States statutory provisions concerning refugees into conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1336 n. 5 (9th Cir.1986) (citing S.Rep. No. 256, 96 Cong., 2nd Sess. 4, & HR Conf.Rep. No. 781, 96 Cong., 2nd Sess. 19, 20). In light of this legislative intent, the UN Handbook's definition of what factors are relevant to determining refugee status have been deemed by this court to be particularly significant in analyzing Sec. 243(h) [8 U.S.C. Sec. 1153] and 208(a) [8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253] claims. Id. Paragraph 91 of the UN Handbook directly addresses the relocation issue and makes clear that a country-wide threat of persecution is not a necessary prerequisite to a successful asylum claim: 55 The fear of being persecuted need not always extend to the whole territory of the refugee's country of nationality. Thus in ethnic clashes or in cases of grave disturbances involving civil war conditions, persecution of a specific ethnic or national group may occur in only one part of the country. In such situations, a person will not be excluded from refugee status merely because he could have sought refuge in another part of the same country, if under all the circumstances it would not have been reasonable to expect him to do so. 56 UN Handbook, p 91 (1979). 57 This court's early decisions holding that the BIA may consider evidence of an applicant's ability to relocate to another part of the applicant's country of nationality are distinguishable. None involved a person who had established past persecution; nor did any consider the issue after the July 27, 1990 regulations became effective. See Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567, 571 n. 2 (9th Cir.1990) (noting that the court may consider evidence that [petitioner] could avoid the geographical source of his danger when it reviews the BIA's determinations as to 'well-founded fear' of persecution); Quintanilla-Ticas v. INS, 783 F.2d 955 (9th Cir.1986); Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1493 (9th Cir.1986). 58 Although the existence of a country-wide threat of persecution is not relevant to determining either asylum eligibility, under 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.13(b)(1), or withholding of deportation eligibility, under 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.16(b)(2), the reasonableness of an applicant's ability to relocate in his or her home country may be considered in the Attorney General's exercise of discretion in granting or denying asylum as a form of relief. However, the issue must be considered within the constraints of our law. The BIA ignored one such constraint by improperly requiring the petitioner to show the existence of a country-wide threat of persecution by a national police force. 59 This court presumes that in a case of persecution by a governmental body such as a national police force, the government has the ability to persecute the applicant throughout the country. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.1986) (government persecution not limited to one geographical area); Singh, 801 F.Supp. at 321 (noting that a police force controlled by the national government ... would presumably be capable of locating petitioner in other regions of India and that petitioner's ability to avoid further persecution by relocating inconspicuously may be limited by his manner of religious dress and his inability to speak the languages or dialects of other regions of India) (citing Damaize-Job ); cf. Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir.1990) (relocation not an option where persecutor is a death squad with the power to enforce its will). 60 Our laws' wisdom in this area is highlighted by the record in this case. Singh testified credibly and without contradiction that the police could find him in any part of India to which he returned. The record documents the existence of a centralized police force, capable of coordinating its efforts nationally: 61 The Union Ministry for Home Affairs controls the nationwide Indian Police Force, the paramilitary forces, and the intelligence bureaus. Over the last four decades since India's independence, control of law and order operations has moved increasingly under the Home Ministry. This tendency stems in part from the rapid growth of the intelligence bureaus, which function with little reference to the state governments, and in part from the increased use of paramilitary forces against armed insurrectionists in disturbed areas. 62 DOS Report, ER 327. 63 The same report notes that although the TADA was enacted to fight terrorism in Punjab, it is applicable to all of the states except Jammu and Kashmir, which are covered under a different law. Id. at 332. The TADA has been used in a number of different provinces. Id. 64 The only documentation cited by the BIA was an excerpt from the advisory opinion submitted by the DOS Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) stating that many Sikhs who live outside the Punjab do not suffer governmental persecution: 65 The advisory opinion ... notes that the Government of India does not take action against individuals solely as a result of their being members of the Sikh faith and that large numbers of Sikhs lead tranquil and productive lives in other parts of India. 66 BIA opinion (quoting BHRHA Advisory Opinion, ER 553-54). 67 This language, of course, does not pertain to individuals like this applicant who have experienced actual persecution in the Punjab by reason of their suspected political views and associations. The BIA also cited language from the advisory opinion that India is a democratic nation with strong legal safeguards ..., but failed to note that the document continues: 68 A democratic system, however, does not always prevent problems of violence and abuse of authority. In India, social tensions caused by ethnic, caste, and communal differences and violent secessionist politics generate significant abuse of human rights. Specific problems include security force excesses in Kashmir and separatists terrorism by militants and extrajudicial police actions in Punjab. 69 BHRHA Advisory Opinion, ER 553. The advisory opinion outlines terrorist atrocities and notes that [s]ecurity forces have unfortunately responded in kind. Id. It acknowledges reports of harassment and other extra-judicial actions by police in the Punjab. Id. 70 Singh demonstrated eligibility for both withholding of deportation and asylum. The district court correctly held that Singh had shown past persecution on account of political opinion. Because the INS introduced no evidence to rebut the presumption of the national government's ability to act on a nationwide basis, there was no need for the district court to order the BIA to conduct further proceedings on the question of conditions in the country of India. 71 The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the matter is remanded to the district court for entry of a judgment granting Singh withholding of deportation and directing the BIA to exercise discretion in determining whether Singh should be granted asylum. 72 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.