Opinion ID: 865182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: use of the underlying felony as an aggravating

Text: FACTOR ¶26. Brawner argues that use of the robbery aggravating factor during sentencing was inappropriate as it allowed the use of the underlying felony which elevated the crime to capital murder to elevate the sentence to death. Brawner argues that for three reasons the use of this aggravating factor was inappropriate. First, the underlying felony of robbery was used during the guilt phase, proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, its use at sentencing creates an “automatic” aggravating circumstance. Second, use of the robbery aggravating factor violates the mandate issued by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002). Third, use of the underlying felony during sentencing exposes the defendant to double jeopardy. ¶27. Prior to addressing the merits of this issue, we note that it is procedurally barred pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-39-21 (1) because it could have been raised on direct appeal and was not. Wiley v. State, 750 So. 2d 1193, 1208 (Miss. 1999). Without waiving the procedural bar, we determine this issue is without merit. Brawner concedes in his brief that this Court has refused to grant relief based on his first argument that use of the underlying felony at sentencing constitutes improper doubling. However, he argues that this Court should follow a series of decisions from Florida which he alleges support his position. Specifically Brawner cites Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2002); Griffin v. State, 820 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2002) and Robertson v. State, 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1993). 13 ¶28. We have consistently upheld the use of the underlying felony as an aggravating factor during sentencing. Goodin v. State, 787 So. 2d 639, 654 (Miss. 2001) (citing Walker v. State, 671 So. 2d 581, 612 (Miss. 1995)). The argument is the familiar “stacking” argument. It contends that it is unconstitutional for the State to elevate murder to capital murder and then, using the same factor, elevate the sentence to death. As pointed out in Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1317, 1337 (Miss. 1987), this Court has consistently rejected this argument. Goodin, 787 So. 2d at 654; Davis v. State, 684 So. 2d 643, 664 (Miss. 1996). However, this Court has found impermissible doubling where the trial court in a sentencing proceeding submits as separate aggravating factors both the fact that the capital murder was committed during the commission of a robbery and for pecuniary gain. Goodin, 787 So. 2d at 654. In that case the two aggravating factors essentially comprise one circumstance. Id. (citing Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660 (Miss. 1991)). ¶29. The Florida cases cited by Brawner do not stand for the proposition he asserts. Rather, they stand for the proposition that the use of two aggravating factors which essentially comprise one circumstance results in impermissible doubling. Barnhill, 834 So. 2d at 851; Griffin, 820 So. 2d at 914-15; Robertson, 611 So. 2d at 1233. This is identical to our law as announced in Goodin and Willie. Therefore, this assertion is without merit. ¶30. Brawner’s second argument is that Ring and Apprendi require that the aggravating factor which the State intends to use at sentencing, as elements of the offense of capital murder, must be set forth in the indictment. This Court has repeatedly dealt with this argument 14 finding it without merit. Jordan v. State, 918 So. 2d 636, 661 (Miss. 2005). Simply put Ring and Apperendi have no applicability to Mississippi’s capital murder sentencing scheme. Id. (citing Berry v. State, 882 So. 2d 157, 172 (Miss. 172)). The State is correct in its assertion that a defendant is not entitled to formal notice of the aggravating circumstances to be employed by the prosecution and that an indictment for capital murder puts a defendant on sufficient notice to what statutory aggravating factors will be used against him. Stevens v. St at e, 867 So. 2d 219, 227 (Miss. 2003); Smith v. State, 729 So. 2d 1191, 1224 (Miss. 1998). ¶31. The purpose of the indictment is to provide the accused reasonable notice of the charges against him so that he may prepare an adequate defense. Brown v. State, 890 So. 2d 901, 918 (Miss. 2004). Accordingly, all that is required in the indictment is a clear and concise statement of the elements of the crime charged. Our death penalty statute clearly states the only aggravating circumstances which may be relied upon by the prosecution in seeking the ultimate punishment. Thus, every time an individual is charged with capital murder they are put on notice that the death penalty may result. Id. (citing Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 804 (Miss. 1984)). Therefore, this argument is without merit. ¶32. Brawner’s third argument is that use of the underlying felony at sentencing exposed him to double jeopardy. For this proposition Brawner points to no case law in support. This Court has held that failure to cite to relevant authority relieves us of the duty of reviewing the issue. Glasper v. State, 914 So. 2d 708, 726 (Miss. 2005). Without lifting the procedural bar this argument is also without merit. The United States Supreme Court in Schiro v. Farley, 510 15 U.S. 222, 230, 114 S. Ct. 783, 789, 127 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1994) addressed this issue and concluded that double jeopardy does not apply. ¶33. The Schiro Court held that double jeopardy applies to prevent three errors it protects against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Schiro, 510 U.S. at 229 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969)). These protections stem from the premise that an accused should not be tried or punished twice for the same offense. Id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 1020, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1975)). Double jeopardy operates as a bar against repeated attempts to convict, with consequent subjection of the defendant to embarrassment, expense, anxiety, and insecurity, and the possibility that he may be found guilty even though innocent. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136, 101 S. Ct. 426, 437, 66 L. Ed.2d 328 (1980). ¶34. In the present situation there is no threat of multiple prosecutions for the same offense or for repeated punishment arising from the same conviction. See Schiro, 510 U.S. at 230. The sentencing phase of a capital murder trial is one part of the whole trial which includes the guilt phase. The use of the underlying felony at sentencing does not expose the defendant to double jeopardy. Therefore, Brawner’s arguments under Issue II are without merit. 16