Opinion ID: 202371
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dual regime

Text: 85 With his position on VARA and the public presentation exception, Phillips argues that VARA essentially creates a dual regime — words that mean one thing as applied to non-site-specific art have a different meaning when applied to site-specific art. Beyond his reading of the public presentation exception itself, Phillips cites only one other provision of VARA in support of his dual regime argument — § 113(d)(1)(A) of VARA, the so-called building exception, which excludes from VARA's protection a work of visual art [that] has been incorporated or made a part of a building in such a way that removing the work from the building will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3). Phillips asserts that because VARA provides an exception to VARA for artwork attached to buildings, but does not contain a similar provision for site-specific art (understood as art attached to real property), VARA must protect site-specific art. 86 With both the public presentation and building exceptions, Phillips is arguing that VARA's silence on a subject is actually evidence that the statute addresses that subject. To say the least, this is an odd way to read a statute. If VARA actually established such a complicated, dual regime, we would expect that the phrase site-specific, or some equivalent, would appear in the language of the statute. There is no such phrase anywhere. Indeed, we would expect much more than just a reference to site-specific art. We would expect an elaboration of how to differentiate between site-specific and non-site-specific art (plop-art). That elaboration is nowhere to be found. 87 Moreover, the creation of a dual regime — which would require us, essentially, to rewrite VARA — has potentially far-reaching effects beyond the protection of Phillips' work in the Park. Once a piece of art is considered site-specific, and protected by VARA, such objects could not be altered by the property owner absent consent of the artist. Such a conclusion could dramatically affect real property interests and laws. 88 For example, as Pembroke argues in its brief, Phillips' work in the Park lies within a rapidly changing urban area and extends beyond Eastport Park to Boston Harbor. If a dual regime were created, there is the potential that: 89 not only would Pembroke's ability to move [Phillips'] work or alter Eastport Park be subject to Phillips' approval, but also the owners of nearby property who had nothing to do with the purchase or installation of Phillips' works would be subject to claims that what they do with their property has somehow affected the site and has, as a result, altered or destroyed Phillips' works. 90 In discussing the possibility of MAPA protecting site-specific art, the SJC echoed this concern, observing that the creation of a dual regime under MAPA would entail a radical consequence for owners of land, that the Legislature directly averted for owners of buildings. Specifically, rights afforded artists would encumber private and public land with restrictions lasting for the life of the artist plus fifty years, without the need for such restrictions to be recorded in a registry of deeds. Phillips II, 819 N.E.2d at 584-85. The SJC ultimately refused to: 91 read such an intent into a legislative act given the recognized legislative policy of disparaging land restrictions (especially unrecorded ones), the common-law doctrine disapproving the long-term burdening of property, and the corollary judicial practice of construing statutory provisions regarding land restrictions in favor of freedom of alienation. 92 Id. at 585 (internal quotation marks omitted). 93 The Supreme Court has also emphasized the principle that statutes which invade the common law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534, 113 S.Ct. 1631, 123 L.Ed.2d 245 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). In such cases, Congress does not write upon a clean slate. In order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 1631 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Phillips' argument that VARA's silence on the subject of site-specific art affords special protection to site-specific art hardly meets this requirement of direct address. 11 94 Ultimately, we agree with Pembroke's position that [t]here is no basis for Phillips' claim that VARA establishes two different regulatory regimes: one for free-standing works of art ... and one for site-specific art that can never be moved and must always be displayed. VARA's plain language also requires us to reject the district court's approach to site-specific art. VARA does not protect site-specific art and then permit its destruction by removal from its site pursuant to the statute's public presentation exception. VARA does not apply to site-specific art at all. 12