Opinion ID: 2190926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: exclusion of jurors at the sentencing hearing

Text: Szabo contends that two prospective jurors were improperly excused from the venire in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770. The United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon said: [A] prospective juror cannot be expected to say in advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before him. The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried out even if applicable statutory or case law in the relevant jurisdiction would appear to support only a narrower ground of exclusion.    We repeat, however, that nothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. (Emphasis in original.) 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 n. 21. In addressing the exclusion of several veniremen in People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill.2d 342, we said, [W]e do not read Witherspoon as prescribing a set catechism, or as requiring a venireman to express himself with meticulous preciseness. (88 Ill.2d 342, 356.) We recognized the need to consider the responses of the veniremen not in isolation but as a whole. (88 Ill.2d 342, 357.) Since the issue of guilt had been determined by the trial court, the only issue before prospective jurors in the case at bar was whether to impose the death penalty. Both the State and defendant agree that in such a situation veniremen can be excluded in compliance with Witherspoon only when the prospective jurors state that they would automatically vote against the death penalty without regard to the evidence produced in the case. Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 n. 21. The State contends that the failure of defense counsel to object to the exclusion of either juror constitutes a waiver of the claim on appeal. We have held, however, that we will consider errors not properly preserved for review where the evidence is closely balanced ( People v. Howell (1975), 60 Ill.2d 117, 121; People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill.2d 280, 283), or if the error is of such a magnitude that the accused is denied a fair and impartial trial ( People v. Manzella (1973), 56 Ill.2d 187, 195). We believe that the above traditional plain error rule is equally applicable to a sentencing hearing involving the death penalty, and we do not consider the improper-exclusion argument to be waived by the lack of a contemporaneous objection here. See People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 542. The two prospective jurors that the defendant asserts were improperly excluded were veniremen by the names of Mrs. Amanda Ivezich and Mrs. Dolores Rogers. We turn first to the voir dire examination of Mrs. Ivezich. After some preliminary questions the court asked Mrs. Ivezich about her feelings toward capital punishment: Q. Now, your Understand [ sic ], Mrs. Ivezich, that if you are one of these twelve people, you may ultimately be the one who would be the last one to say that you vote to impose the death penalty on Mr. Szabo, the defendant here. Do you understand that? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q. If it came to that, could you do that or do you have some reservations or could you never vote to impose the death penalty under any circumstances, whatsoever? A. That right now, that  well, if you know  if I would know the case, right, I could. Q. You could. A. Yes. Q. This is the question. If after you hear everything and you are convinced that it should be done, and could you say so and say that you would put your name on a verdict or a decision that would say put this man to death? A. Give a minute to think. It would be a hard decision. I think I'm too soft-hearted for that. Q. You couldn't do it if it came right down to it, you couldn't do it, is that what you are saying, because this is what the twelve people are going to have to do. A. I understand. I understand. Q. And if you are on this jury, you'd be one of the twelve and you may be the very last one whose vote would decide that. Do you understand that? Could you then do that, if you felt that it was right to do so or are you thinking that under no conditions could you take anybody's life, no matter how the evidence was, how bad it may be or anything else? That you could under no conditions vote to put somebody to death? A. I would rather not. I would rather not. Q. You have some doubts about whether you could do it, is that what you are saying? A. Right. I do. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mrs. Ivezich. I will excuse you for cause. Thank you very much. Mrs. Ivezich indicated that she had some doubts about whether she would vote to sentence a person to death. Instead of excusing Mrs. Ivezich for cause at that point as the trial court did, another question should have been posed. The trial court should have then asked the prospective juror if that meant that those doubts would prevent a vote for the death penalty no matter what the evidence showed. Expressions of doubt do not amount to excusal for cause. For a venireman to express qualms about imposing the death penalty is not unexpected. Witherspoon requires that the venireman make it unmistakably clear that he or she could not impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence presented. Mrs. Ivezich's response that she would rather not vote to put somebody to death is not the kind of unequivocal answer that is needed as a grounds for excusal for cause under Witherspoon. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Witherspoon, a man or woman who expresses serious reservations about voting to impose the death penalty is as capable of obeying the oath he or she takes as a juror as one who favors the death penalty. In rejecting the argument that those who have doubts could not be relied upon to vote for it even if the State and instructions of the trial judge called for the death penalty, the court said: Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment  of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty  such a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority. Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 520, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776. Mrs. Ivezich, unlike the venireman in Gaines (where we rejected the challenge to the exclusion of four prospective jurors), never expressed any clear indication that she could not consider the death penalty. To the contrary, the only unequivocal response was that she could impose the death penalty. The more tentative answers that followed in which Mrs. Ivezich expressed reservations should not have precluded her from serving as a juror. Mrs. Ivezich was not shown to be irrevocably committed  to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. ( Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 n. 21.) She was improperly excused. In view of our conclusion regarding the exclusion of Mrs. Ivezich, it is not necessary to resolve whether Mrs. Rogers was improperly excused. It is clear that the improper exclusion of even a single venireman requires the vacation of a death penalty returned by a chosen jury. ( Davis v. Georgia (1976), 429 U.S. 122, 50 L.Ed.2d 339, 97 S.Ct. 399.) On the basis of Witherspoon alone the death penalty must be vacated.