Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: Admissibility of Victim Impact Statement

Text: We are here asked to reconsider our analysis in Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1452, 89 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986), of the admissibility of victim impact statements in death penalty cases; we decline to do so except in the context of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. See U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 9; Md.Decl. of Rts., art. 17. Grandison argues that prior to July 1, 1983 the thrust of the law relating to victim impact statements was to compensate the victim for financial losses; that effective July 1, 1983, the permissible scope of victim impact evidence was vastly broadened to include evidence of the effect of the crime on the victim's family and made this type of evidence admissible in capital sentencing proceedings. Consequently, he argues the new statute rendered the act of which he was found guilty punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed. In our view Grandison has misread the law in existence prior to July 1, 1983. Article 41, § 124 of the Maryland Code was not limited to compensation to a victim for financial losses. By its terms the act provided: (c)(2)(i) The presentence investigation shall include a victim impact statement, if: 1. The defendant, in committing a felony, caused physical, psychological, or economic injury to the victim; or       (3) A victim impact statement shall: (i) Identify the victim of the offense; (ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; (iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; (iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense; (v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and (vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim that the court requires. It is clear, then, that considerations other than financial losses were allowed. The law as changed in 1983 specifically provided for use of the statement in death penalty cases and inserted or the victim's family in subparagraph (vi) of paragraph (3) in subsection (c) and added a new paragraph (4) which is not pertinent here. We believe the prior law was broad enough to have allowed the information now specifically set out in the current law. Consequently, we see no validity to Grandison's ex post facto argument. Furthermore, the 1983 amendment to Article 41, § 124 was only procedural and ameliorative. The change simply set forth an additional source from which victim impact information could be obtained, namely, the victim's family. The new statute does not change the quantum of punishment attached to the crime; hence, the current law is no more onerous to Grandison than it was prior to its amendment. See Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 734-37, 415 A.2d 830, 850-52 (1980) ( Tichnell I ). Accordingly, we think it clear that the prohibitions against ex post facto laws were not violated in this case.