Opinion ID: 2981856
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Similarly Situated Employers

Text: Next, Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s refusal to give judicial notice that a reasonable and similarly situated employer would have been able to predict the Chrysler bankruptcy. Plaintiffs correctly note that the test for an unforeseeable business circumstance focuses on whether the employer exercised “such commercially reasonable business judgment as would a similarly situated employer.” 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(2). Plaintiffs’ primary argument is that Chrysler’s impending bankruptcy was “in fact, common knowledge in early 2009,” because the economic recession in 2008 “was resulting in decreased sales 7 for automobiles, and that these decreased sales would likely result in several, if not all, of the ‘big three’ American automakers filing bankruptcy.” Courts take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge. Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 38 (1875). Here, however, there is no “reliable source of verification” for this fact, as required by a court taking judicial notice. 4 J. MCLAUGHLIN , WEINSTEIN ’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201.12 (2d ed. 1997). Judicial notice of an adjudicative fact is appropriate only where the fact is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED . R. EVID . 201(b). The only evidence Plaintiffs offer is their own depositions, stating that the bankruptcy was common knowledge, but Plaintiffs fail to present any source typically used for judicial notice such as a dictionary, public record, or even a newspaper article.1 Plaintiffs only cite Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir. 1994), which holds that a “business development that had been expected for some time, even when the exact timing is unknown, is not unforeseeable.” However, in Carpenters, the defendant knew and endorsed a proposed merger. Id. Here, there is no proof that Defendant had any advance knowledge of the bankruptcy, and Defendant certainly was not involved in its filing. This case is clearly distinguishable. 1 Ironically, Plaintiffs’ argument here is essentially that Defendant should have known about the bankruptcy because Plaintiffs knew about the bankruptcy. This means that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is that Defendant failed to notify them of something that they already were aware of. Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, they have failed to present any evidence that Defendant knew anything more than they did about Chrysler’s bankruptcy plans. 8