Opinion ID: 166052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entrapment as to the Final Transaction

Text: 33 At the close of the evidence, Nguyen asked for entrapment instructions as to all three transactions. The district court rejected a blanket instruction and instead offered to issue an entrapment instruction as to the first two transactions, but not the final transaction following the red notice. The court was satisfied that the first two transactions could support an entrapment defense if the jury believed the defense theory that Nguyen unwittingly found himself drawn into the sale of large quantities of pills. 34 As to the third transaction, however, the undisputed evidence showed (1) prior to the transaction Nguyen learned via the red notice that the pills could be used for illicit drug manufacturing; (2) Agent Sanders clearly communicated the potential criminality of selling large quantities of pills; (3) Nguyen falsely denied buying large amounts of the drug when he had placed substantial orders since the beginning of 2003 with nine wholesalers; (4) he also denied selling more than two bottles of the drug per customer when he had already sold over 5000 pills (50 bottles) to Carroll; and, finally (5) Carroll told Nguyen that the pills would be cooked by a subsequent purchaser. Thus, the court refused to offer an entrapment instruction to the jury. 35 Nonetheless, Nguyen argues the evidence still required an entrapment instruction. His theory is quite simple: since there was a jury question as to entrapment regarding the initial encounter, it follows there is a jury question as to entrapment for all subsequent encounters. In essence, Nguyen argues all of his conduct after the first encounter is tainted by the government's prior alleged inducements. 36 Nguyen's theory is based loosely on a single sentence from the Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992). There, the Court held that once inducement is at issue in a case, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents. Id. at 549, 112 S.Ct. 1535 (emphasis added). From this language, Nguyen argues a blanket entitlement to an entrapment instruction for serial criminal acts. We disagree. Jacobson does not immunize all subsequent criminal conduct from the required threshold showing of inducement and lack of predisposition before an entrapment instruction may issue. 37 Our case law supports this view. We previously interpreted Jacobson as consistent with an individualized treatment of the entrapment defense in multiple transaction crimes. In United States v. Beal, 961 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir.1992), issued only a few months after Jacobson, the defendant was charged with participating in two transactions which resulted in the sale of a controlled substance to an undercover police officer. Beal admitted the nature and substance of the transactions but claimed his participation was the result of entrapment by a government informant. The entrapment defense was the only issue submitted to the jury, which returned verdicts of not guilty on the first count but guilty on the second. Ruling upon a subsequent motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court concluded that, on the record before it, the two transactions were so closely connected that the defendant was induced to commit the second transaction by the same influences which caused him to commit the first. We agreed and held them to be a singular incident: There is nothing contained in the government's proof which provides a factual distinction between defendant's manifested state of mind during those [two] transactions. Id. at 1517. However, we explicitly refused to adopt as a general rule that once entrapment occurs, a defendant's subsequent willing acts are immunized from culpability. Id. Other circuits have agreed with this reasoning. The District of Columbia Circuit, for example, interprets Jacobson to mean only that the government must prove that the defendant's disposition was independent and not the product of the attention that the Government directed at the defendant. United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit explained  Jacobson does not prohibit the Government from inducing bad people to commit crimes; it simply strengthens the requirement that the Government prove that its agents did not induce the defendant's criminality. United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir.1993). 38 Based on these principles, the district court did not err in this case. In contrast with Jacobson and Beal, the record supports the court's conclusion that the last transaction between Carroll and Nguyen consisted of its own bargaining, its own request by Carroll and fulfillment by Nguyen, and its own temporal moment. The evidence demonstrates Nguyen possessed the requisite predisposition independent of Carroll's solicitation—(1) the red notice given to Nguyen; (2) his untrue statements to Agent Sanders about prior orders and sales; combined with (3) the receipts found in his apartment; (4) the pill distributors' warnings; (5) the ease with which he entered the transactions; and (6) Carroll's bald statements suggesting drug manufacturing. In light of this evidence, it is hard to dispute that Nguyen was predisposed to commit the last transaction. As the district court correctly concluded, the record did not support a jury question as to entrapment. 39 This is not to say, however, as in Beal, 961 F.2d at 1516-17, where the trial testimony shows closely connected transactions without any intervening events, a jury question may be present as to whether the subsequent transaction arose from the government's inducement of prior transactions. See e.g., Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549 (D.C.Cir.1996). But such is not the case here. 40 In sum, Nguyen posits a law of entrapment that embraces a concept of original sin. That interpretation has some appeal. But we agree with the observation of Judge Randolph in construing Jacobson: Sinners may become saints and saints may become sinners. Nothing is necessarily permanent about either state. A person might be disposed to commit a crime one day and not disposed to do so some time later. Vaughn, 80 F.3d at 552. Jacobson itself supports this interpretation. In that case, by the time the defendant had finally placed his single order for illegal child pornography, he had already been the target of 26 months of repeated mailings and communications from Government agents and fictitious organizations. As the Court explained, [t]he evidence that petitioner was ready and willing to commit the offense came only after the Government had devoted 2½ years to convincing him that he had or should have the right to engage in the very behavior proscribed by law. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553, 112 S.Ct. 1535. 41 In our view, Jacobson merely requires in a multiple count case where the evidence supports an entrapment instruction, the evidence must support an instruction for each count. Even an initial inducement by the government does not irremediably taint all subsequent encounters with law enforcement. No entrapment corollary to the Fourth Amendment's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine exists. As a matter of logic and common sense, each encounter must be tested on its own merits, and it is the defendant's burden to show that the evidence supports an entrapment instruction. 42 Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the instruction as to the last count.