Opinion ID: 695622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Five-Kilogram Claims

Text: 23 Calculating the base offense level for drug distribution requires a determination of the quantity of illegal drugs properly attributable to a defendant.... [T]he Guidelines require a district court to attribute to a defendant all drugs foreseeably distributed pursuant to a common scheme of which that defendant's offense of conviction was a part. United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Butler, 41 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (11th Cir.1995); see also U.S.S.G. Secs. 2D1.1 and 1B1.3. In making this determination, the district court must first make individualized findings concerning the scope of criminal activity undertaken by a particular defendant. Once the extent of a defendant's participation in the conspiracy is established, the court can determine the drug quantities reasonably foreseeable in connection with that level of participation. United States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). In order to comply with this individualized standard, we will review the appellants' claims separately. In conducting this review, we apply the clearly erroneous standard. See Lawrence, 47 F.3d at 1565; Butler, 41 F.3d at 1442.
24 The district court did not make individualized findings as to Hansley; it simply stated that all of the conspirators could have reasonably foreseen that at least five kilograms of crack cocaine were involved. Nevertheless, we may uphold Hansley's sentence if the record supports the amount of drugs attributed to him. Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499. 25 The record clearly demonstrates that Hansley was the leader of this conspiracy, and that all of the crack cocaine involved should be attributed to him. Indeed, Hansley does not dispute his leadership role, and appears to concede that he should be held accountable for all of the crack cocaine. He, however, maintains that the district court clearly erred in determining that the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy totaled more than five kilograms. 26 The record shows, at the very least, twenty attempted trips from Hazelhurst to south Florida for the purpose of purchasing drugs: fifteen for Sellers; one for Bennett and Glenn Hansley; three more for Bennett; and one for Hansley. Also, the record reveal[s] sufficient circumstantial [and] direct evidence to show that each of these trips was an attempt to purchase approximately 272 grams of crack cocaine. Butler, 41 F.3d at 1447. 4 Thus, based on these figures, the conspiracy involved an attempt to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine base. 5 Because this entire quantity is attributable to Hansley, the district court did not clearly err in setting his base offense level at forty.
27 Unlike Hansley, Jackson was not the leader of this conspiracy. As a result, he argues that he is not responsible for all of the crack cocaine. Furthermore, Jackson asserts that he was only personally involved in a small quantity, and he could not have reasonably foreseen that more than five kilograms were involved. At the sentencing hearing, the district court did not make any individualized findings concerning the scope of Jackson's criminal activity in the conspiracy. 28 We have reviewed the record and conclude that, without individualized findings, the conspiracy's entire output cannot be attributed to [Jackson]. Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499. While the record reveals that Jackson was one of Hansley's sources in south Florida, and that he provided couriers with crack cocaine on several occasions, it does not reveal on how many occasions he did so, and whether he could have reasonably foreseen the conspiracy's entire output. [W]ithout individualized findings concerning the scope of [Jackson's] involvement with the conspiracy, it cannot be determined that [he] should be liable for some quantity less than all. Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499. Likewise, if Jackson is not liable for the entire output, individual findings need to be made as to the quantity for which he is accountable. 29 Thus, we remand to the district court for further factual findings. We do not suggest that Jackson could not have reasonably foreseen that more than five kilograms of crack cocaine were involved, or that he himself was involved in less than five kilograms. Rather, we simply find that we are unable to make these determinations without individualized findings.
30 Like Jackson, Riley was not a leader of this conspiracy. Thus, Riley makes the same arguments as Jackson: he could not have foreseen the conspiracy's output, and he was only personally involved in a minimal amount of crack cocaine. Unfortunately, Riley has waived this argument. 31 Unlike Hansley and Jackson, Riley did not file an objection to the PSR's calculation of his base offense level. Then, at the sentencing hearing, the district court offered Riley multiple chances to articulate this objection. He did not do so. Nonetheless, Riley now argues that he has preserved this claim, pointing to the following comment which his counsel made at the sentencing hearing: Your Honor, I'd like to make a brief statement on behalf of my client.... [A]ny sentence given Bobby Riley should be based solely on any involvement of which he was involved and convicted and not based on the far-reaching and very detrimental negative effects of any drug trafficking conspiracy. 32 We do not find that the above comment preserved this issue for appeal. Where the district court has offered the opportunity to object and a party is silent or fails to state the grounds for objection, objections to the sentence will be waived for purposes of appeal. United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 275, 112 L.Ed.2d 230 (1990), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc ). When the district court asked for objections, Riley failed to present any. The above comment, which counsel made in the middle of a general statement on Riley's behalf, does not constitute an objection. Thus, Riley waived this contention. 33 This court, however, will consider sentence objections raised for the first time on appeal under the plain error doctrine to avoid 'manifest injustice.'  United States v. Newsome, 998 F.2d 1571, 1579 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Neely, 979 F.2d 1522, 1523 (11th Cir.1992)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 734, 126 L.Ed.2d 698 (1994). The district court erred when it failed to make individualized findings as to Riley's involvement in the conspiracy. The issue, however, is whether this mistake constitutes plain error. Plain error exists where the mistake is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Newsome, 998 F.2d at 1581 (quoting United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)). We cannot say that the district court's failure to make individualized findings reaches this high standard of egregious error. Thus, we refuse to entertain Riley's contention.