Opinion ID: 2088997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon

Text: The standard to be applied in respect to a motion for judgment of acquittal has often been stated. The trial justice must consider only that evidence which the prosecution claims is capable of generating proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Such evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the state, and the trial justice must draw therefrom all reasonable inferences that are consistent with the guilt of the accused. Neither the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of the witnesses may be considered in passing upon such a motion. State v. Romano, ___ R.I. ___, ___, 456 A.2d 746, 756-57 (1983); State v. Dionne, ___ R.I. ___, ___, 442 A.2d 876, 883 (1982). With this standard in mind, let us examine the evidence in the case at bar. Although the assailant's presence in the Kentucky Fried Chicken establishment was relatively brief, there was time for him to perform several acts, each one of which might be said to have had independent significance. The assault with intent to murder was clearly committed while the victim attempted to flee. Prior to this point, however, the gunman brandished a pistol at the victim and ordered him to open the safe. When he did not do so, the robber fired a shot into the freezer in order to intimidate the victim. Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, this act could be determined by a reasonable trier of fact to have constituted an assault with a dangerous weapon that was designed to place the victim in fear of imminent bodily harm unless he acceded to the demands of the robber. In answer to the double-jeopardy argument of defendant concerning whether this assault with a dangerous weapon might not be identical to the crime of assault with intent to rob and assault with intent to murder, the following comments may be appropriate. A rational jury could well find that at the time defendant fired a shot into the freezer, he did so not with the intent to murder the victim but solely intending to put him in fear. This act taken by itself could certainly support a finding of assault with a dangerous weapon. The defendant further argues that the assault with a dangerous weapon in this instance was clearly carried out with the intent to rob. It is, of course, a familiar doctrine that several crimes may be committed as part of one transaction. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). In determining when a single act may violate two separate statutes or constitute two distinct crimes, the test has traditionally been whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Id. We considered the application of that doctrine rather carefully in State v. Pope, ___ R.I. ___, ___, 414 A.2d 781, 788 (1980), in respect to the elements of extortion and assault with intent to rob. In that case we determined that neither offense required proof of a fact that the other did not. On the contrary, in the case at bar the offense of assault with intent to rob requires the finding that the accused intended the `felonious and forcible taking from the person of another of goods or money to any value by violence or putting him in fear.' State v. Reposa, 99 R.I. 147, 149, 206 A.2d 213, 215 (1965) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 241 (1896)). Consequently, the charge of assault with intent to rob required proof of a significant additional set of facts that the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon did not. [1] Thus, the holding in Pope, supra, is of no assistance to defendant in this case. The trial justice committed no error in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon.