Opinion ID: 789574
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Laches Defense

Text: 27 Milstein next contends that the District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that laches was available as a defense to Count Two. Milstein cites 18 U.S.C. § 2320(c), which provides that [a]ll defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an action under the Lanham Act shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section. It is well established that the equitable defense of laches may be applied to cases brought under the Lanham Act. Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir.1996) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1069 (In all inter partes proceedings equitable principles of laches... where applicable may be considered and applied.)). Therefore, Milstein argues, the District Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the defense of laches, which requires that the defendant prove unreasonable delay resulting in prejudice, see, e.g., King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 832 (2d Cir.1992), was available to him. We disagree. 28 We begin by noting that, in the criminal context, the relevant statute of limitations, as well as the speedy trial safeguards of the Due Process Clause, see, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), serve to protect a defendant's interests against unreasonable delay. Further, it is well established that, as a general rule, 29 [l]aches is not a defense to an action filed within the applicable statute of limitations, United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489, 55 S.Ct. 813, 817, 79 L.Ed. 1559 (1935), nor is it available against the United States, United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 1020, 84 L.Ed. 1283 (1940). 30 United States v. RePass, 688 F.2d 154, 158 (2d Cir.1982). We have found no case applying a laches defense in the criminal context. 31 Of course, Congress could have provided that, in this context, such a defense would be available. Against the backdrop of these well-established principles, however, we decline to interpret the statutory scheme in that way. Section 1069 states that the laches defense may only be applied where applicable; thus indicating that it may be applied in the criminal context at most where it would be applicable in an analogous civil context. Because laches may not be asserted against the United States in a civil matter, see United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002) (laches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest), it seems that it is equally inapplicable against the Government in a criminal prosecution. 32 Further, the manifest purpose of 15 U.S.C. § 1069 is to encourage trademark holders timely to assert their rights against alleged infringers and to protect to some extent the alleged infringers' reliance interests. See generally Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d at 192-93. However, when or whether a trademark holder asserts its right against an alleged infringer is irrelevant to the Government's decision to begin a prosecution for criminal trademark infringement; criminal liability irrevocably attaches at the time of the willful infringement irrespective of the subsequent behavior of either the infringer or the trademark holder. Unlike other defenses to infringement, those contained in § 1069 do not go to the question of the alleged infringer's substantive liability, and therefore are not incorporated by § 2320(c). 33 Lastly, we note that construing the defense of laches to apply to prosecutions under § 2320 would lead to absurd results. The equitable doctrine of unclean hands, it seems, would prevent its application in every prosecution under that section. As the Supreme Court has explained, [t]he equitable powers of this court can never be exerted in behalf of one who has acted fraudulently, or who by deceit or any unfair means has gained an advantage. Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 246-47, 12 L.Ed. 416 (1848). Because willful infringement necessarily involves fraudulent acts, anyone convicted of it would be unable as a matter of law to benefit from a laches defense. Therefore we conclude that § 2320(c) does not evince a congressional intent to extend the equitable defense of laches to criminal prosecutions. 34