Opinion ID: 1831644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The A/Any Test

Text: To properly resolve the certified question, we must first trace the history and purpose behind the a/any test. In Grappin, we were confronted with a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal that was in direct conflict with decisions from two other district courts of appeal. The issue presented was the Legislature's intended unit of prosecution for the theft of a firearm under subsection (2)(b)(3) of Florida's general theft statute. § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (1979). Employing what it called a common sense reading of the plain language of section 812.014(2)(b), the Second District determined that such a reading demonstrates that the legislature unmistakably intended for the simultaneous unlawful taking of more than one firearm to be subject to a separate prosecution. State v. Grappin, 427 So.2d 760, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (emphasis added), approved, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984). Section 812.014(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), read as follows: (b) It is grand theft of the second degree and a felony of the third degree... if the property stolen is: 1. Valued at $100 or more, but less than $20,000. 2. A will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument. 3. A firearm. 4. A motor vehicle. 5. Any member of the genus Bos (cattle) or the genus Equus (horse), or any hybrid of the specified genera. 6. Any fire extinguisher. 7. Any amount of citrus fruit consisting of 2,000 or more individual pieces of fruit. (Emphasis added.) The Second District noted that the Legislature's enactment prefaced the respective item of property in parts 2 through 4 of subsection (2)(b) with the article `a'.... In contrast, it prefaced the respective object of property in parts 5 through 7 with the article `any.' Grappin, 427 So.2d at 762-63. The Second District believed the Legislature's differing use of a and any was intentional. It stated: We do not believe that the legislature inadvertently inserted different articles in parts 2 through 4 and 5 through 7. In our view, the legislature's use of the article a in parts 2 through 4 reveals its recognition of the distinction in meaning between the articles any and a for purposes of establishing the permissible unit of prosecution. In other words, its use of different articles signifies its intent, with respect to simultaneously pilfered firearms ... to treat separately each stick in the bundle. Grappin, 427 So.2d at 763 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added). The Second District buttressed its determination of legislative intent in two ways. First, it looked at the overall statutory scheme relative to firearms. It found that firearms are subject to strict, comprehensive statutory regulation and that in light of the strong policy considerations within this statutory scheme, it is unreasonable to presume that the legislature intended to make simultaneously stolen firearms (or motor vehicles or testamentary instruments) cheaper by the dozen. State v. Grappin, 427 So.2d at 763. Secondly, the Second District looked at related cases. It cited several federal cases interpreting the intended unit of prosecution under federal firearm statutes that used either a or any. We acknowledged the Second District's use of a common-sense approach in its interpretation of this statute and approved its decision. In fact, we employed the same common-sense approach in our own interpretation. We acknowledged that the Legislature must fix the punishment for violation of statutes clearly and without ambiguity. If there is ambiguity, we said that the rule of lenity applies to resolve the ambiguity against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. But we also stated that [w]here legislative intent as to punishment is clear ... the rule of lenity does not apply. Grappin, 450 So.2d at 482. To reach a common sense interpretation of the legislatively intended unit of prosecution, we used the same basic analysis as the Second District. First, we looked at the various uses of a and any within the statute itself. Next, we looked at our prior interpretation of the same statute in State v. Getz, 435 So.2d 789 (Fla.1983). Lastly, we looked at decisions of other courts. We looked at federal court cases faced with similar questions of statutory interpretation. As did the Second District, we found that our construction was consistent with federal circuit court decisions construing similar federal statutes that used either any firearm or a firearm. Ultimately, by applying this common-sense approach to statutory interpretation, we found that the use of the article `a' in reference to `a firearm' in section 812.014(2)(b)3 clearly shows that the legislature intended to make each firearm a separate unit of prosecution. Grappin, 450 So.2d at 482. Eight months after Grappin, we applied the a/any test in Watts and held that a prisoner could only be charged with one count of possession of contraband based on his possession of two prison-made knives discovered in his cell at the same time. Watts, 462 So.2d at 814. The contraband statute in Watts prohibited possession by an inmate of [a]ny firearm or weapon of any kind. 462 So.2d at 814 (quoting section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1981)). [3] In the Watts opinion, even though a completely different statute was at issue, there is no discussion of the common-sense approach to statutory interpretation employed in Grappin to determine the legislatively intended unit of prosecution. The Watts opinion simply extrapolates the a/any distinction specifically derived from section 812.041(2)(b) to a wholly unrelated statute. The prison contraband statute contained no variant uses of a or any before the prohibited items of property. Section 944.47 consistently used any before each item listed. So, unlike section 812.041(2)(b), within section 944.47 itself there was no clear expression of legislative intent as to the unit of prosecution. Unlike the Grappin decision, the Watts opinion does not discuss either the overall statutory scheme relative to contraband, the public policy behind the statute, or how other courts have interpreted similar statutes. Therefore, when the Watts opinion stated that it was applying the rationale of Grappin to section 944.47, it actually was only applying a portion of the Grappin rationale. Watts, 462 So.2d at 814. There was no effort to find the legislatively intended unit of prosecution. Only the syntactical distinction between a and any was used to find ambiguity and thus apply the rule of lenity. Consequently, applying only the a/any rationale of Grappin, we held that the use of any created an ambiguity as to the intended unit of prosecution and this ambiguity precluded the State from charging multiple counts based on the defendant's simultaneous possession of multiple items of contraband. Watts, 462 So.2d at 814. Twelve years later in Wallace v. State, 724 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1998), we held that a defendant who resisted two officers during a single incident could be charged with only one crime because the statute prohibited resisting any officer. Id. at 1181. We analyzed the language of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Id. (emphasis added). We ultimately determined that the case should be resolved in accordance with our decisions in Grappin and Watts. In reaching this conclusion, we relied in part on the United States Supreme Court's analysis of a similar federal resisting arrest statute. Wallace, 724 So.2d at 1179 (citing Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958)). Ladner had permitted only one offense regardless of the number of officers affected. We explained the Court's conclusion in Ladner as follows: Because the meaning of the statute could not be discerned from the wording of the statute or its legislative history, the Court construed the statute in favor of the accused individual. Wallace, 724 So.2d at 1180. We also noted that Ladner reached its result because the Court concluded that the statute's primary purpose was to prevent the hindrance of government duty, and not to prevent assault upon federal officers. Id. at 1179. We found that the Florida Legislature had a similar purpose in enacting section 843.01. Noting that chapter 843 is entitled Obstructing Justice, we concluded that this context indicated a legislative focus on the obstruction of justice by resisting arrest and not just the physical protection of law enforcement officers. Wallace, 724 So.2d at 1180. Essentially, our analysis of the statutory language and related case law in Wallace led us to conclude that [a]t the very least, under the analysis in the cases set out above, the language and purpose of the statute is ambiguous and susceptible to different interpretations. Wallace, 724 So.2d at 1180 (emphasis added). Within this context, we held that a continuous resistance to an ongoing attempt to effect an arrest constitutes only a single instance of obstruction under section 843.01, Florida Statutes. Wallace, 724 So.2d at 1180-81. We applied the rule of lenity because the language and the purpose of the statute did not indicate a clear legislative intent to permit separate prosecutions of resisting separate police officers during one episode. [4]