Opinion ID: 2977465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discrete acts of discrimination

Text: We now turn to the plaintiffs’ claims that they suffered discrete acts of discrimination on the basis of their race. These claims consist of various evaluation scores that were allegedly reduced by white supervisors, numerous instances where the plaintiffs assert that they were not promoted because of their race, and one incident in which Darryl Jones contends that he was inappropriately disciplined for conduct that he says never occurred. The district court granted summary judgment on each of these claims after thoroughly analyzing each allegation. Claims based on several of the discrete acts alleged by the plaintiffs were declared by the district court to be time-barred. Because the plaintiffs’ EEOC charges were filed more than 300 days after each of these alleged acts, the claims are barred under Title VII. See Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2001) (describing the “dual statute of limitations” under Title VII, pursuant to which an EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act in “deferral states,” or within 180 days in other states); Tartt v. City of Clarksville, 149 F. App’x 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2005) (Tennessee is a “deferral state,” meaning that the 300-day statute of limitations applies). Similarly, the plaintiffs filed their complaints in the district court more than one year after these alleged acts occurred, which bars the claims under the THRA. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21311(d). Regarding the remaining allegations of discrete acts of race discrimination, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case. This was true either because there was insufficient proof to establish that the complained-of conduct was an adverse employment action or because the plaintiff who was denied a promotion could not show that he had equal or 11 No. 08-5180 Jones v. City of Franklin superior qualifications to the successful candidates. The plaintiffs present no detailed argument on appeal to challenge these conclusions by the district court. Addressing each of the alleged discrete acts individually would be duplicative of the district court’s thorough analysis and would serve no jurisprudential purpose. Because we agree with that analysis, we adopt the district court’s opinion on the plaintiffs’ discrete claims of discrimination as our own.