Opinion ID: 1849825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss josie connerly as a party plaintiff?

Text: Josie Connerly died during the first week of June, 1989, and Southwest filed a Suggestion of Death on June 12, 1989. On June 9, 1989, Southwest served a copy of the Suggestion of Death by first class mail on John Wakefield, attorney for the plaintiffs. Geraldine Hurst was named executor of Connerly's estate and plaintiffs' counsel was retained to represent it. On September 13, 1989, about ninety-two days after the Suggestion of Death was filed, Southwest moved to Dismiss Josie Connerly as a party Plaintiff for failure of the plaintiffs to seek substitution. On September 22, 1989, the plaintiffs filed a response which included a motion for additional time to file for substitution. The trial court denied Southwest's motion to dismiss Josie Connerly and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in order to substitute the Estate of Josie Connerly in the place of plaintiff Josie Connerly, deceased. MRCP Rule 25 provides: If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall, upon motion, order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of summons. The action shall be dismissed without prejudice as to the deceased party if the motion for substitution is not made within ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as herein provided for the service of the motion. Southwest and Burnett argue that since Rule 25 mandates the dismissal of a deceased party where no motion to substitute is filed within ninety days after service of a suggestion of death, the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Rule 25 states that the ninety-day time limit for substitution begins to run only after a suggestion of death issues by service... as herein provided for the service of the motion. The Rule provides that the motion for substitution shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of summons. The Hursts maintain that since Southwest did not effect Rule 4 service upon the Estate, the ninety-day period never commenced. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a remarkably similar situation in Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.1971). In Ransom, the defendant died prior to trial, and the plaintiff moved to substitute the defendant's executrix. The motion was served upon the decedent's attorney pursuant to Rule 5. The executrix apparently had actual knowledge of the motion but never received Rule 4 service as a non-party. The fifth circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to fulfil the service requirements of FRCP Rule 25, a rule virtually identical to MRCP Rule 25. The court explained: The record does not show that Kline [the deceased defendant's attorney] was attorney for the executrix when the motion was served on him. And, even if he were, service of process is not effectual on an attorney solely by reason of his capacity as attorney. Rule 4(d)(1) allows service on an agent only if authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. See generally 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1097. The appellee contends that under the circumstances the service requirements of Rule 25(a)(1) should be relaxed. He asserts that the executrix must have had actual notice of the motion, pointing to the service of the motion itself on Kline, who had been the decedent's attorney, to Kline's subsequent appearance for the executrix and to the fact that the executrix filed no denial that Kline was attorney for her at the time he received the motion. Assuming the executrix had such actual notice, which plaintiff infers that she must have had, it would not operate as a substitute for process. Indeed, whenever a defendant comes into court to challenge the service of process he, of necessity, has received notice of the suit, but, clearly mere `notice' is not a sufficient ground upon which a court can sustain the validity of service of process... . Berner v. Farny, 11 F.R.D. 506, 509 (D.N.J. 1951). Ransom, 437 F.2d at 519. Southwest did not fulfil Rule 25's requirement concerning service on non-parties when it mailed a copy of the Suggestion of Death to the plaintiffs' attorney. The record suggests that the Hursts' attorney had not yet been appointed counsel for Josie Connerly's estate. In any event, there is no showing that the attorney had been authorized to act as the estate's agent for service. It is probable that executrix Geraldine Hurst had actual notice of the service on her personal attorney. But as explained in Ransom, mere notice is not enough to satisfy the service requirements of Rule 4. Since Southwest did not properly serve the Estate of Josie Connerly, the ninety-day limitations period never began to run. The trial court did not err in denying Southwest's motion to dismiss Josie Connerly as a party plaintiff and in allowing the plaintiffs to substitute parties more than ninety days after Southwest filed its Suggestion of Death.