Opinion ID: 392799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: public stations

Text: 12 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides: 13 No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States    shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from    participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ( 37 14 In this case appellants urge that public television station KCET-TV is a recipient of federal financial assistance subject to the statute. This claim rests on two bases. First, appellants argue that a broadcast license is itself a valuable commodity constituting financial assistance as that term is used under the Rehabilitation Act. 38 Second, appellants argue that KCET-TV, as a public or noncommercial educational broadcasting station, is subsidized by congressional appropriations channeled, among other sources, through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Department of Commerce and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. 39 15 In its brief in this court the FCC does not dispute the applicability of Section 504 to public station KCET-TV. At the time it was the agency responsible for interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act and thus at a time when its construction would have been due substantial deference from a reviewing court 40 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare determined that Section 504 applies to public broadcasting stations. 41 The Department of Education, which has now assumed responsibility for developing guidelines applicable to public broadcasters, has apparently accepted this conclusion, 42 and the FCC has indicated a willingness to defer to its judgment. 43 16 The case of KCET-TV also exhibits incidences of more direct and traditional Federal financial assistance. During 1977, the year in which KCET-TV's petition for license renewal was challenged, federal agencies combined to provide the station with $2,298,160 an amount representing roughly 17 percent of its revenues for the year in restricted program grants. 44 The contributing agencies included the National Institute for Education, which granted $1,814,090; the National Endowment for the Arts, $461,872; the National Endowment for the Humanities, $18,243; and the United States Information Agency, $3,955. We therefore conclude that Section 504 imposed legal obligations on station KCET-TV during the term of its license preceding the renewal challenge, and we assume that it continues to do so. 17 There remain, however, important issues concerning the duty of the FCC to define the station's responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act and to enforce the Act's policies in license renewal proceedings. The FCC is not the agency primarily responsible for enforcing the Rehabilitation Act. Nonetheless, appellants argue that the Act's Section 504 reflects a partial congressional definition of the FCC's obligation to serve the public interest in effect, a specification that the FCC must consider compliance with Section 504's nondiscrimination requirement in determining whether a public broadcaster has satisfied the public interest standard. 45 Second, appellants argue that the FCC is bound to take immediate action to implement Section 504, at a minimum by bringing its policies to bear in renewal proceedings such as this. 46 The FCC, noting that no guidelines have yet been issued by the Department of Education, takes a different view. The Commission asserts that it would be unfair to penalize a station in a license renewal proceeding for noncompliance with a statute for which interpretive guidelines were not in existence during the term of the license. 47 18 Under the special circumstances presented by this case, we agree with appellants that the FCC is obligated to take account of a public broadcaster's legal duties under Section 504 in making its public interest determinations. Moreover, given the variety of procedural options pursuant to which the FCC could avoid unfair harshness to the broadcaster, we cannot accept that the public television stations need to be regarded by the Commission as free from any enforceable obligations under Section 504 until interpretive guidelines are issued. 19
20 The FCC is directed to renew broadcast licenses only if it finds that renewal would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976). In construing this standard we must of course accord substantial deference to the Commission's judgments. As the Supreme Court has recently observed,  'the weighing of policies under the public interest standard is a task that Congress has delegated to the Commission in the first instance.'  FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, --- U.S. ----, ----, 101 S.Ct. 1266, 1275, 67 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981), quoting FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 810, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 2119, 56 L.Ed.2d 697 (1978). Yet there remains, under the Communications Act, an inescapable judicial role. Although the public interest standard requires judgments of policy, see FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 1275, it also contains an irreducible element of law, see National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-226, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1013, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943), which makes judicial review both necessary and possible. Cf. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669, 96 S.Ct. 1806, 1811, 48 L.Ed.2d 284 (1976) ((T)he words 'public interest' in a regulatory statute    take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation.). It is the function of the judiciary to resolve disputed questions of law. See Internat'l Brhd of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 & n.20, 99 S.Ct. 790, 800 & n.20, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). 21 In their brief in this court appellants argue that the FCC's public interest mandate must be construed to incorporate the national policy of nondiscrimination against the handicapped minority, at least insofar as that policy imposes specific legal obligations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. We agree. 22 We begin with the settled proposition that a federal agency, in construing the requirements of the public interest under its governing statute, must at least give weight to federal laws and public policies addressed to similar purposes. See, e. g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 79-80, 64 S.Ct. 370, 376, 88 L.Ed. 544 (1944) (Interstate Commerce Commission obliged to weigh policies implicit in Sherman Act); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 961 (D.C.Cir.1968) (Federal Power Commission, operating under public interest mandate, is obliged to make findings related to the pertinent antitrust policies, draw conclusions from the findings, and weigh these conclusions along with other important public interest considerations); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741, 754 (D.C.Cir.1956) (FPC obligation to consider antitrust factors not alleviated by fact that antitrust enforcement generally committed to Attorney General); Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C.Cir.1949); see also FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244, 88 S.Ct. 1005, 1009, 19 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1968) (antitrust laws are tool by which regulatory agency gives understandable content to the broad statutory concept of the 'public interest' ); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, 319 U.S. at 222-224, 63 S.Ct. at 1011. It makes no difference in such cases that Congress may have vested primary responsibility for enforcement of a statutory policy in another agency. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the grant of enforcement power to one organ of government does not free others to ignore national laws and policies until such time as violations have been proved in the courts. See, e. g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, supra, 321 U.S. at 79-80, 64 S.Ct. at 376; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, 319 U.S. at 222-224, 63 S.Ct. at 1011. 23 By its passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Congress placed public stations under a legal obligation to consider and attempt to serve the interests of the nation's hearing impaired minority. Surely the policy of this statute falls well within the broad purposes of the Communications Act. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the public interest standard established by the Communications Act imposes on the FCC an affirmative obligation    to ensure that its licensees' programming fairly reflects the tastes    of minority groups. NAACP v. FPC, supra, 425 U.S. at 670 n.7, 96 S.Ct. at 1812 n.7. 24 Following Congress' decision that recipients of federal assistance must extend their programs to otherwise qualified members of handicapped minorities, settled legal principles compel the conclusion that the FCC must, at a minimum, weigh this congressional policy in making public interest determinations. It is unreasonable to believe that a public station could give service cognizable as being in the public interest without at least making efforts to satisfy its statutory obligations. 48 25 In holding as we do, we do little more than recall the FCC to a position it has itself asserted in the past. The Commission has frequently recognized its obligation under the public interest standard to protect the interests of minority groups previously excluded from full access to broadcast programming. See, e. g., Nat'l Organization for Women, NYC Chapter v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1017 (D.C.Cir.1977) (Commission considers the employment practices of its licensees to the extent those practices affect the obligation of the licensee to provide programming that 'fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups' and to the extent those practices raise questions about the character qualifications of the licensee) (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted); Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 60 FCC2d 222 (1976); Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC2d 766 (1968). Although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was given primary responsibility for enforcement of the discrimination prohibitions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the FCC recognized its independent responsibility, pursuant to the public interest standard, to carry out the Act's policy. Its authority to do so has been recognized by the courts. See, e. g., NAACP v. FPC, supra, 425 U.S. at 670 n.7, 96 S.Ct. at 1812 n.7; Nat'l Organization for Women, NYC Chapter v. FCC, supra, 555 F.2d at 1015-1020. And where the Commission has lagged in accepting its responsibility, this court has not hesitated to direct it to do so. See, e. g., Black Broadcasting Coalition of Richmond v. FCC, 556 F.2d 59 (D.C.Cir.1977) (per curiam ); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.Cir.1966). We do not shirk our duty in the present case.
26 In their brief in this court appellants have asked us to remand the license renewal application of public station KCET-TV for a public hearing and other appropriate proceedings by the FCC. 49 We regard this as the proper disposition. 27 The FCC has objected that KCET-TV complied with all existing Commission rules, and that there is thus no substantial and material question of fact to be determined before final action on the application. 50 But, as this court has held before, Under Section 309(e) the Commission must set a renewal application for hearing where 'a substantial and material question of fact is presented or the Commission for any reason is unable to make the finding' that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the license renewal. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, supra, 359 F.2d at 1007 (emphasis in opinion of Burger, J.; citation omitted). 28 Finding that Congress must be understood to have prescribed that the public interest encompasses at least the legal interests of the nation's hearing impaired minority, we do not believe that a Commission decision in which this factor has not been weighed can escape condemnation as arbitrary, capricious, (or) an abuse of discretion. 51 As the Supreme Court held in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1972), satisfaction of this standard requires, at a minimum, consideration of all relevant factors. 29 The task of weighing the interests of the hearing impaired is not an easy one, and we do not presume to intrude into the Commission's range of discretion in this difficult area. It is appropriate, however, for us to respond to some of the concerns that the Commission has raised on this appeal. 30 These concerns arise primarily from the ambiguity of the legislative policy expressed in Section 504. In construing this provision the responsible administrative agencies have concluded that Congress intended recipients of federal funds to make reasonable accommodations to provide service to handicapped persons, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1977) (HEW guidelines), current version 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (1980) (Department of Education guidelines), and the courts have generally accepted this construction, see, e. g., United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (cause remanded to District Court for application of guidelines); Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (same). But, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2370, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), the line between lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination will not always be clear. 31 Emphasizing the difficulty of line-drawing in this area, the Commission pleads that it has no choice but to stay its hand. The Department of Education is currently engaged in preparation of interpretive guidelines construing the obligations that Section 504 imposes on public broadcasters. 52 Pending completion of those guidelines the FCC has said that it has no basis for assessing compliance with the statute, and that there would be nothing for it to consider in the public hearing requested by appellants. We do not agree. 32 In pursuing the public policy represented by Section 504 it is not the function of the FCC to adjudicate law violations, or, indeed, to regard itself as bound strictly by the specific dictates of the Rehabilitation Act or interpretive guidelines issued thereunder. See, e. g., California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 490, 82 S.Ct. 901, 906, 8 L.Ed.2d 54 (1962); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 350, 79 S.Ct. 457, 466, 3 L.Ed.2d 354 (1959). The Commission's responsibility is rather to effectuate the underlying national policy of providing federally assisted programs, including public television, to handicapped persons, such as the deaf, who are capable of benefitting from them. 33 In effectuating a policy that is currently framed in general terms only, the FCC must of course proceed with sensitivity to the situation of its licensees. In its review of KCET-TV's renewal application the Commission can appropriately consider the station's uncertainty about the precise requirements imposed on it by Section 504. It would indeed be unfair to insist on strict compliance with a standard developed after the fact, and we expect the FCC neither to develop nor to apply a fully formulated set of guidelines at this time. Nonetheless, it is clear to us that the absence of interpretive guidelines either now or during the station's license term could not justify a licensee's disregard of or indifference to the policies of the statute. Eight years after the passage of the Rehabilitation Act, we cannot accept that a public station still has no duty to make reasonable efforts to serve the handicapped, or that this duty cannot be enforced, in an agency proceeding, by an intended beneficiary of the statute. The Commission must therefore proceed immediately to inquire at least into the station's good faith, as manifest in its efforts to provide service in accord with the legislative policy goals of Section 504. 34 The Commission has also argued that it would be unfair for the issues at the heart of this case to be raised for the first time in a license renewal proceeding. 53 During the term of its license KCET-TV lacked clear standards defining the level of service required by Section 504. And in the absence of prior notice of the FCC's renewal policy, the Commission argues, it would be wrong to penalize a station for its shortcomings. 35 Our answer to this argument is implicit in what we have said before. Properly conducted, an FCC inquiry will impose no unreasonable burden on the station. Focusing primarily on good faith efforts to interpret and follow statutory policies, it should not enforce numerical criteria on a retroactive basis, but instead assess the station's willingness as measured against its capacity and its viewers' need to provide programming for the aurally handicapped. 36 As the Commission itself has asserted repeatedly, the predominant concern in a license renewal case may be prospective, seeking to lead a licensee who has not possessed an adequate    program in the past to adopt policies ensuring better performance in the future. Nat'l Organization for Women, NYC Chapter v. FCC, supra, 555 F.2d at 1017, quoting Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 58 FCC2d 419, 422 (1976); see Bilingual Bicultural Coalition of Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 628 & n. 24 (D.C.Cir.1978) (en banc). Consistent with that concern, in a case such as this the FCC may choose among a variety of dispositional alternatives, including short-term or conditional license renewal, as well as standard renewal or denial. We intimate because we hold no a priori preference among them. The ultimate decision is obviously not for us, but for the Commission, 54 with its special expertise concerning what can reasonably be expected of a public broadcaster within the context of current technology and current needs. 37 We recognize the indefiniteness with which our prescriptions are stated. The guidelines promised by the Department of Education will hopefully resolve many of the uncertainties confronting the stations, the Commission, and this court. But we reiterate our strong view that no guidelines are needed to identify the outlines of Congress' policy aims. The Commission like the stations must accept its duty now. There are many ways in which the policy of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act might be implemented. We hold only that it cannot be ignored.