Opinion ID: 2318562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Agency's View of Its Jurisdiction

Text: Carter impresses upon us that the MIA construed in Zappone its legislative grant of jurisdiction as concurrent. Reviewing the MIA's Zappone amicus brief, however, we found no instance where the MIA addressed the controversy before this Court. As noted above, the issue in Zappone was whether the Commissioner and the court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear a claim, arising out of conduct which is both prohibited by the Insurance [Article] and... [the] common law.... Brief for Maryland Insurance Administration, Zappone, at 10. More illuminating is a relatively recent amicus brief (brought to our attention by Huntington) where the MIA addressed whether an individual must first exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking injunctive relief in court, for a claim arising solely from Maryland's comprehensive statutory scheme for the regulation of insurance.... Brief for Maryland Insurance Administration, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Med. Protective Co. v. Bottiglieri, No. 1826 (Md.App. Jan. 14, 2008), at 1. The MIA concluded that [w]hen an administrative process is available to a litigant for the violation of a statutory obligation, that process must be pursued and exhausted before judicial relief may be sought. Brief for Maryland Insurance Administration, Bottiglieri, at 15. The agency quoted from Muhl, 313 Md. at 480-81, 545 A.2d at 1330: Where the General Assembly has provided a special form of remedy and has established a statutory procedure before an administrative agency for a special kind of case, a litigant must ordinarily pursue that form of remedy and not bypass the administrative official. So strong is this public policy that this Court will, sua sponte, vacate judgment and order an action dismissed where the litigants have not followed the special statutory procedure. (Citations omitted.) Once we explain, in greater detail infra, why we find that Carter alleges in his complaint a violation of a statutory obligation, as opposed to a truly and fully independent common law claim, we will be able to say fairly that, for such violations, the General Assembly has provided a special form of remedy.... Therefore, the longstanding and commonsensical principle of first pursuing that form of remedy should be applied in this case.