Opinion ID: 3181052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obstruction of the OPR Process

Text: FBI Offense Code 2.11 prohibits “taking any action to influence, intimidate, impede or otherwise obstruct the OPR process.” The Board held that Parkinson obstructed the OPR process in crafting the mutual recollection document, categorizing Parkinson’s action as meeting with “potential witnesses to ensure that they had their stories straight,” and convincing “a key witness to lock in his story by committing it to writing.” J.A. 14. The Board explained that the obstruction was in preventing the OIG from acquiring Rodda’s untainted recollection. There was no evidence that Rodda’s testimony regarding the check was altered by the meeting or the document. We agree that the Board’s determination was sup- ported by substantial evidence. There is no dispute that Parkinson did in fact meet with Rodda and Rawls, that he prepared the statement from his notes, and that he asked Rawls to type it and Rodda to sign it. Indeed, Parkinson 12 PARKINSON v. DOJ testified that his motivation for the meeting and for creating the document was “to clarify the expenditure in light of the false accusation Sacramento management was levying against me that I had stole[n] $77,000 of Mr. Rodda’s money.” J.A. 758. The document was thus intended to improperly influence the investigation that he believed would arise from the Sacramento office’s accusation. Parkinson offers two unconvincing arguments against this charge. First, that as of April 2010, he did not know of the OPR investigation into his actions, and cites United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) for the proposition that knowledge of a particular proceeding (not an “ancillary proceeding”) is necessary to support a charge of obstructing that proceeding. Aguilar was not interpreting FBI Offense Code 2.11, and did not purport to set overarching rules for all obstruction-based offenses, particularly as the language of the criminal statute atissue in that case was critical to the decision, see 515 U.S. at 598–600. Arthur Andersen also cannot stand for the broad proposition Parkinson asserts; that case interpreted a different criminal statute and required only that the proceeding was “foreseeable” to support an obstruction charge. 544 U.S. at 708. Parkinson does not dispute that he knew about the OIG investigation as of April 2010, and indeed argued to the Board that he “was trying to facilitate—not obstruct— the OIG’s investigation,” J.A. 958–59, by meeting with Rodda and Rawls. Moreover, in his briefs to the Board, Parkinson explained that in April 2010 “Mr. Parkinson did believe the OIG would look into the build-out, in the context of conducting an investigation into Mr. Parkinson’s whistleblower reprisal complaint.” J.A. 958–59. Parkinson admitted that the reason for the April 2010 meeting—“to clarify the expenditure in light of the false accusation Sacramento management was levying against PARKINSON v. DOJ 13 me that I had stole[n] $77,000 of Mr. Rodda’s money,” J.A. 758—was directly related to the anticipated OPR proceeding. This is sufficient to establish the nexus between the obstruction and the proceeding; the OIG investigation here was not “ancillary” to the OPR process. Second, Parkinson argues that because Rodda later testified that the April 2010 statement was true, he cannot be said to have obstructed the OPR process. FBI Offense Code 2.11 does not require a showing that the action taken in fact influences the OPR process—it requires only that actions are taken for proscribed purposes. Parkinson’s admission that he wanted to “clarify the expenditures in light of the false accusation Sacramento management was levying against me” provides substantial evidence to support the charge that he was trying to improperly influence the OPR process, which is all that is required. 3