Opinion ID: 1554436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Opinion regarding bed rest, pelvic rest, and hydration extending pregnancy.

Text: ¶ 28. Dr. Fuselier opined that, had Dr. Mills given Hill the proper instructions, her baby possibly could have been saved. Specifically, Dr. Fuselier stated that there is a great probability that with proper instruction, proper medication[,] proper surveillance that her pregnancy could have been extended.... Based on 25 years of obstetrical experience, residency training, et cetera, that given these circumstances, there is a great probability that the pregnancy could have been extended possibly to a point where there would be enough fetal maturity for the baby to survive. Dr. Morrison disagreed with Dr. Fuselier on this point. This disagreement appears at first blush simply to be a traditional battle of the experts which occurs when two experts have differing opinions. This Court has held that the winner in a battle of the experts is to be decided by a jury. See, e.g., Bickham v. Grant, 861 So.2d 299, 307 (Miss.2003). ¶ 29. However, Dr. Mills's challenge to Dr. Fuselier's opinion (that the pregnancy probably could have been extended) was not limited to Dr. Morrison's opposite opinion. Dr. Mills (through Dr. Morrison) also claimed that the opinion was not reliable because it was not accepted in the scientific community. In support of this claim, Dr. Morrison submitted substantial medical literature, including authoritative medical journals and texts (see note 5, supra ), all of which contradicted Dr. Fuselier's opinion. In response to this attack on the reliability of his opinion, Dr. Fuselier presented nothing. ¶ 30. An expert whose opinions are under scrutiny may not ignore allegations of unreliability and nonacceptance within the scientific community, but rather must respond with some evidence that the opinions are, in fact, accepted within the scientific community. We said as much recently in Smith v. Clement, 983 So.2d 285 (Miss.2008), in which the plaintiff's experta highly qualified engineer opined that certain copper tubing which caused a school bus fire was the same copper tubing that had been installed by the defendant fourteen years earlier. Had the defendant's expert simply disagreed, the case would have presented a battle of the experts. Id. at 289. However, the defendant's qualified expert not only disagreed with the plaintiff's expert, but also challenged the reliability of the opinion by testifying under oath that there are no reliable, or valid, scientific principles or methods that could be utilized by any engineer, or any other specialist, that would enable that person to give [that opinion]. Id. ¶ 31. Thus, the defendant in Smith produced evidence through expert testimony that the plaintiff's expert opinion was unsupported within the scientific and engineering community. During the five-month period following this challenge to the reliability of her expert's opinion, the plaintiff neither contradicted the evidence of unreliability nor offered any evidence of reliability or acceptance within the scientific or engineering communities. In other words, this challenge to the reliability of the expert opinion went unrebutted. Thus, as to whether [the plaintiff's expert's] opinion was properly grounded in science, the only evidence before the trial court [at the summary judgment hearing] was [the defendant's expert's] affidavit, which clearly stated that it was not. Id. at 290. ¶ 32. In holding that the Smith trial judge properly excluded the expert's opinion, we stated that the plaintiff was on notice of the defendant's challenge to the reliability of her expert, and she had a fair opportunity to respond. Because she did not, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding, from the evidence in the record, that [the plaintiff's expert's opinions] should be stricken. Id. ¶ 33. It is important to note that Smith did not present a traditional battle of the experts. The plaintiff's expert opined that the copper pipe present when the bus caught on fire was the same copper pipe which was installed by the defendant fourteen years earlier. The defendant's expert did not dispute this assertion, but rather stated that there was no scientific way to tell. Such challenges to the reliability of expert opinions are squarely within the focus of Daubert and Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. ¶ 34. Justice Chandler's disagreement with our holding today focuses on an expert's qualifications rather than acceptance (or lack thereof) of an expert's specific opinions within the scientific community. Were we to hold (as Justice Chandler's separate opinion suggests) that any qualified expert with twenty-five years experience may render any opinionregardless of how contrary and repugnant that opinion may be to accepted science within the disciplinewe would return our courts to the pre- Daubert days when trials were tainted by unreliable junk science purchased from professional witnesses. We think the better practice is, when an expert (no matter how qualified) renders an opinion that is attacked as not accepted within the scientific community, [7] the party offering that expert's opinion must, at a minimum, present the trial judge with some evidence indicating that the offered opinion has some degree of acceptance and support within the scientific community. ¶ 35. Dr. Morrison provided a sworn affidavit and testimony with citations to peer-reviewed literature which explained in detailnot only that no scientifically reliable literature supported Dr. Fuselier's opinion regarding the efficacy of therapies to prolong the pregnancybut also that all of the authorities and peer-reviewed literature was to the contrary. [8] As already stated, Dr. Fuselier presented nothing in response to this attack on the reliability of his opinion. ¶ 36. Indeed, Dr. Fuselier agreed that he could produce no support for his opinion, other than his own personal experience. Hill argued that Dr. Fuselier's experience should be enough, and that, in excluding Dr. Fuselier's testimony, the trial court applied a standard too rigid and restrictive to comply with Daubert. However, the trial court noted that Dr. Fuselier was required to produce at his deposition any and all published or unpublished material supporting his opinions, and he produced none. ¶ 37. The trial judge stated in his Memorandum Opinion and Order on April 9, 2008: [T]he plaintiff's expert has been unable to identify, produce or cite any scientific or peer review literature in support of his expert opinion. To the contrary, the testimony of Dr. John C. Morrison[ [9] ] cites the Management of Preterm Labor from the ACOG Practice Bulletin, No. 43, May 2003, as well as Williams Obstetrics, 21st and 22nd Editions, which contradict the expert testimony of Dr. Fuselier. There is no evidence in the record of any medical treatise or journal which substantiates Dr. Fuselier's opinion. To the contrary, all medical literature produced in this cause contradicts Dr. Fuselier's opinion. ¶ 38. Hill argues that, even though her expert could produce no peer-reviewed literature to support Dr. Fuselier's opinions, this alone should not render his opinions inadmissible. In support of this argument, she cites Poole v. Avara, 908 So.2d 716, 724 (Miss.2005), in which we held that peer-reviewed literature is helpful when presented, but that peer-reviewed materials are not an absolute requirement, and their absence does not constitute automatic inadmissibility. ¶ 39. We do not today retreat in any respect from our holding in Poole. We find it completely distinguishable. Unlike the present case, the challenged opinion at issue in Poole had not been the subject of peer-reviewed articles. Consequently, the defendant in Poole did not challenge the expert's opinions by producing peer-reviewed articles or authorities which contradicted the opinions. Thus, Poole stands for the proposition that there exists no per se requirement that an expert's opinion be supported by peer-reviewed articles. ¶ 40. In contrast to Poole, the subject matter of the expert opinion in the case before us today has been extensively explored and documented, and one hundred percent of documentation presented to the trial judge contradicts Dr. Fuselier's opinion. Thus, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that, under Rule 702, Dr. Fuselier's opinions regarding available interventions to prolong Hill's pregnancy were unreliable and inadmissible. ¶ 41. We restate for emphasis that, when the reliability of an expert's opinion is attacked with credible evidence that the opinion is not accepted within the scientific community, the proponent of the opinion under attack should provide at least a minimal defense supporting the reliability of the opinion. Smith, 983 So.2d at 290. The proponent of the expert cannot sit on the side lines and assume the trial court will ignore the unrebutted evidence and find the expert's opinion reliable. Id. Were we automatically to allow introduction of expert opinions which are based upon nothing more than personal experience in cases where those opinions are contradicted in the scientific literature, we would effectively render Rule 702 and Daubert a nullity. ¶ 42. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Dr. Fuselier's testimony regarding the efficacy of interventions to prolong Hill's pregnancy.