Opinion ID: 2543536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exhausting administrative remedies

Text: ¶ 27 In granting summary judgment, the Culbertson II court concluded that plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies and thus were entitled to bring their actions in the district court. Defendants contest this holding on two grounds. First, they contend that plaintiffs did not exhaust all available administrative remedies on their cause of action to enforce compliance with zoning ordinances and the CUP (enforcement claims) because they did not pursue each remedy mentioned by the Culbertson I court when it dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. [10] Second, defendants contend that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies on their roadway exceptions claim because they failed to voice their particular objections to the exceptions at the planning and county commission hearings on the issue. We address each argument in turn. ¶ 28 Parties are often required to exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before pursuing relief in court. This requirement serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency, McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992), by allowing an agency to correct its own mistakes and apply its expertise in resolving conflict and by creating a factual record for judicial review, respectively. See id.; [11] see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Structural Steel & Forge Co., 9 Utah 2d 318, 320, 344 P.2d 157, 158 (1959). Parties must exhaust administrative remedies when so required by a relevant statute or ordinance. See Vaccaro v. City of Omaha, 254 Neb. 800, 579 N.W.2d 535, 538 (1998) ([W]here [a] statute [does] not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies, we [have] held such exhaustion [is] not a jurisdictional prerequisite to instituting legal action.); cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (stating exhaustion is in sound discretion of court unless specifically required by Congress). Thus, before we decide whether plaintiffs exhausted all available administrative remedies, we must determine whether they were statutorily required to do so. [12]
¶ 29 Section 1001 of the County Land Use Development and Management Act (Land Use Act) provides that [n]o person may challenge in district court a county's land use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this chapter until they have exhausted their administrative remedies. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(1) (1996). The County asserts that plaintiffs were required under section 1001 to exhaust all administrative remedies, including those prescribed by, the Culbertson I court before filing their enforcement claims in district court. We disagree. ¶ 30 Section 1001 applies only when a party desires to challenge a land use decision. [13] Plaintiffs do not challenge any decisions made under the Land Use Act, but instead seek enforcement of decisions made pursuant to it, i.e., zoning ordinance and the CUP. Enforcement of the act and ordinances made pursuant to it is addressed in 1002, which provides that (a) ... any owner of real estate within the county in which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other remedies provided by law, institute: (i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions; or (ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building, use, or act. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1002 (1999). ¶ 31 Because plaintiffs own real estate in Salt Lake County where the alleged violations of the Land Use Act occurred, they are permitted to seek enforcement of ordinances made pursuant to the Act directly in district court without first exhausting administrative remedies. Thus, the Culbertson I court's ruling that plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies before refiling their zoning ordinance and CUP enforcement claims was erroneous.
¶ 32 The County also contends that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies on their roadway standards exceptions claim by not voicing particular objections at either the planning or the county commission hearings on the exceptions. Specifically, the County asserts that by not arguing in those hearings that no unusual topographic or aesthetic condition existed to justify an exception, as required by the ordinance, plaintiffs failed to give the County an opportunity to address those issues at the County level. One of the plaintiffs attended those hearings and argued against the granting of the exceptions, but she did not articulate that particular argument to the planning commission or the county commission. Before determining whether plaintiffs' exceptions claim is barred for failure to exhaust, we must review the applicable legislation to determine whether exhaustion was required. ¶ 33 Chapter 14.12 of the Salt Lake County Ordinances is entitled Standards for Roadway Development, and it provides guidelines for all public and private roadway development located within the unincorporated county. Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances § 14.12.020 (1992). Section 14.12.150 of this chapter provides: In cases where unusual topographical, aesthetic, or other exceptional conditions or circumstances exist, variations or exceptions to the requirements of this chapter may be approved by the county commission after receiving recommendations from the planning commission and the public works engineer; provided, that the variations or exceptions are not detrimental to the public safety or welfare. Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances § 14.12.150 (1992). We note the absence of any requirement of exhaustion before seeking review of the commission's decision in district court. The County has not referred us to nor have we discovered any other ordinance or statute requiring a party to exhaust any remedies before challenging the grant or denial of a request for exceptions to the county roadway standards in district court. ¶ 34 Because there is no statute or ordinance mandating exhaustion before seeking review of exceptions to county roadway standards, we must determine whether exhaustion is required in this case. Cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (stating that court has discretion to mandate exhaustion when Congress silent on the issue). We decide that it is not required. Moreover, the County could not have been prejudiced by any failure of plaintiffs to articulate the precise argument that they are now making to this court. The County had its ordinance before it and does not assert that it was unaware of the standard it had to meet to grant the exceptions. See Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances § 14.12.150 (1992).