Opinion ID: 2898039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leading Questions on Direct Examination

Text: Leading questions on direct examination are permitted when necessary to develop a witness’ testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 611(c). It is the province of the trial court to make this necessity determination. Chonich v. Wayne Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 874 F.2d 359, 368 (6th Cir. 1989). As an appellate tribunal, we review this decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 641 (6th Cir. 1977). Here, the district court allowed the government to use leading questions during the direct examination of S.E. in order “to facilitate the progression of trial and avoid wasting time, to make S.E.’s testimony effective for determining the truth, and to protect S.E. from harassment and undue embarrassment to the extent possible . . . due to her cognitive impairment.” [R. 188 at PGID 6409.] Callahan argues that this was an abuse of discretion. We can dismiss this assignment of error in short order. First, there was evidence that S.E. was cognitively impaired, suffered a traumatic brain injury in a car accident, had “learning issues,” and was receiving federal disability benefits due to “mental retardation.” Second, this Court has recognized that it can be appropriate to permit leading questions on the direct examination of a cognitively impaired witness. See Jordan v. Hurley, 397 F.3d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 2005). And most importantly, the district court gave the jury cautionary instructions about leading questions, assessing a witness’ credibility, and the weight to give to testimony. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the government to ask S.E. leading questions. V. Circumscribed Cross-Examination of Indicted Co-Conspirator When a district court limits the scope of cross examination, we review that ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Obiukwu, 17 F.3d 816, 821 (6th Cir. 1994). “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant an opportunity to impeach the credibility of a witness against him because impeachment is fundamental to effective cross-examination.” United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 704 (6th Cir. 2009). But “this does not mean that the defendant is free to impeach a witness ‘in whatever way, or to whatever extent the defense might wish.’” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 17 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Obiukwu, 17 F.3d at 821. “[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The key issue is whether the jury had enough information to assess the defense’s theory of the case despite the limits placed on cross-examination.” Holden, 557 F.3d at 704. “So long as cross-examination elicits adequate information to allow a jury to assess a witness’s credibility, motives, or possible bias, the Sixth Amendment is not compromised by a limitation on cross-examination.” United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 638 (7th Cir. 1998); accord United States v. Fields, 763 F.3d 443, 464 (6th Cir. 2014). Indicted co-conspirator Brown testified against Defendants in this criminal trial. During cross-examination, Hunt’s counsel wanted to question Brown about the fact that he was originally charged with the substantive count of forced labor, but his plea agreement only included a conspiracy charge. Brown faced significantly more time in prison on the forced labor charge than he faced on conspiracy charge. Hunt’s counsel wanted to get across to the jury that Brown had a strong incentive to lie. The district court did not allow Hunt’s counsel to ask Brown about “a charging decision over which Brown had no control” because the court believed “[t]hat line of questioning would have obviously and, perhaps intentionally, elicited irrelevant, prejudicial, and confusing testimony that would not have been based on Brown’s personal knowledge.” R. 188 at PGID 6422. More specifically, the court did not allow inquiry into why he was charged with the conspiracy charge as opposed to the substantive offense. The court did allow Hunt’s counsel to ask Brown about whether he was facing more time under the substantive forced labor charge as opposed to the conspiracy charge. The court also permitted counsel to ask whether Brown expected a reduced sentence as a result of his cooperation. And defense counsel did cross-examine Brown about a variety of impeaching Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 18 information, including his past drug abuse; his prior conviction for child endangerment in which Defendants testified against him; his plea agreement with the government in this case; that he and Callahan sold drugs together and Brown believed Callahan was unfair to him; and the nature of his prior, intimate relationship with S.E. Based on this array of impeaching information, we are “hard-pressed to conclude that the jury was not otherwise in possession of sufficient information concerning formative events to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’ motives and bias.” Fields, 763 F.3d at 464–65. VI. Kidnapping Jury Instruction and Special Verdict Form “We review jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately submitted the issues and applicable law to the jury.” United States v. Mack, 159 F.3d 208, 218 (6th Cir. 1998). “A refusal to give requested instructions is reversible error only if (1) the instructions are correct statements of the law; (2) the instructions are not substantially covered by other delivered charges; and [(3)] the failure to give the instruction impairs the defendant’s theory of the case.” United States v. Hargrove, 416 F.3d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plain error review applies here because Defendants did not “contemporaneously object” to the instructions. United States v. Adams, 214 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 2000). “Plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 729. The relevant subsection of the forced labor statute states: Whoever violates this section shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from a violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnaping, an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(d). This subsection provides that the maximum potential penalty for violation of the statute is twenty years of incarceration, but if any of the specified acts occurred during the underlying violation, then the maximum term of imprisonment is life. As a statutory sentencing enhancement, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a kidnapping, an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill was part of the Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 19 forced labor offense. The government sought to prove that Defendants kidnapped S.E. when they forced her to work for them. The district court submitted a special verdict form to the jurors (along with the jury instructions) on which they could render their verdict as to the kidnapping enhancement. Defendants argue that the district court’s instructions were erroneous for two reasons: (1) they did not indicate that the kidnapping had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) there was no place for the jurors to mark “not guilty.” We consider these arguments in turn.
The district court instructed the jury: For Count 2, if you find that the government has proved each of the offense elements beyond a reasonable doubt as to one or both of the defendants, you will next be asked to consider whether the offense as to each such defendant included kidnapping. For purposes of this case, “kidnapping” means to restrain and confine a person by force, intimidation, or deception with the intent to terrorize or cause bodily injury to that person; or to restrain a person’s liberty in circumstances that create a substantial risk of bodily harm to that person. If you find that a defendant engaged in any of the conduct I have just described with respect to S.E. or B.E., you may find the offense -- the charged offense included kidnapping. R. 158 at PGID 5731–32 (emphasis added). Defendants argue that the district court erred by failing to specify that the jurors had to find that the government proved kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. Viewing the instructions as a whole, it is evident that the jury was instructed that their findings had to be made beyond a reasonable doubt. The court instructed them: “Your second duty is to take the law that I give you, apply it to the facts, and decide if the government has proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” R. 158 at PGID 5688; The “presumption of innocence stays with the defendant unless the government presents evidence here in court that overcomes the presumption, and convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she is guilty,” id. at PGID 5689–90; “It is up to the government to prove that a defendant is guilty, and this burden stays on the government from start to finish. You must find a defendant not guilty unless the government convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she is guilty, id. at Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 20 PGID 5690; “The government must prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt,” id.; “To find defendants guilty, every one of you must agree that the government has overcome the presumption of innocence with evidence that proves his or her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at PGID 5749. There was no reference to any other burden of proof throughout trial, and nothing in the record suggests the jury believed that the standard of proof for the special verdict form was anything other than the same standard on which the district court repeatedly instructed them. Certainly the kidnapping instruction would have been more complete if the district court had again mentioned the reasonable doubt standard. “The instructions as given and taken as a whole, however, were not so confusing, misleading, or prejudicial as to cause a grave miscarriage of justice.” Mack, 729 F.3d at 605.
Defendants argue that the district court erred by failing to provide a written “not guilty” or “none of the above” option on the forced labor special verdict form. However, as the government points out, this argument is waived. When Defendants raised this issue before the district court (after the jurors had already begun deliberating), the government suggested polling the jury to clarify their findings if they returned a guilty verdict on the forced labor charge. Callahan’s counsel agreed with that suggestion, and Hunt’s counsel did not object. Based on that discussion, the court explained that it would not modify the special verdict form, and instead would clarify the instructions for the jury if they had any questions. The jury returned guilty verdicts for Defendants on the forced labor charge and found the kidnapping aggravator. The court polled the jury and asked each juror whether he found that each Defendant had committed the proscribed act as marked on the special verdict form. Defense counsel said they were satisfied with that polling. Thus, Defendants cannot now claim that the special verdict form was unclear. See United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 465, 494–95 (6th Cir. 2014) (“defense counsel’s agreement with the judge’s proposed course of conduct waived his claim on this issue” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 21 VII. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentences “[W]e review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2012). This deferential standard is comprised of two parts: procedural soundness and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2009). “In reviewing for procedural reasonableness, a district court abuses its discretion if it commits a significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 201–02 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we must consider the sentence imposed in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Kirchhof, 505 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] sentence that is within the advisory guidelines range . . . is accorded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.” Id. at 414. A. Defendant Callahan Callahan argues that his sentence is unreasonable because his alleged conduct is not criminalized by §§ 1589(a) and 843(a)(3), and therefore the district court had no authority to sentence him to any term of confinement. As discussed above, Callahan was properly convicted of Counts I, II, and IV. Callahan’s single mention of “disproportionality” with respect to his sentence in the title of his argument is waived because he offered no further discussion on the issue. See United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 886 (6th Cir. 2004) (“issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived”). Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 22 B. Defendant Hunt Hunt argues that the district court erred in calculating her Guidelines sentence. The court increased Hunt’s base offense level by several points to account for specific offense characteristics related to the forced labor charge. The Sentencing Guideline applicable for violation of 18 U.S.C § 1589 is U.S.S.G. § 2H4.1. Hunt also argues that her sentence is disproportionally greater than that of other defendants who have been sentenced for violating the forced labor statute. Hunt contends that no additional points should have been added to her base offense level for: (1) “serious bodily injury” under § 2H4.1(b)(1)(B) because the smashing of S.E.’s hand by Silsby was done as part of the group’s desire for pain medication in relation to the 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) charge; (2) use of “a dangerous weapon” under § 2H4.1(b)(2)(A) because no dangerous weapon was used during the offense and any handling of a firearm was done outside of her presence and thus not reasonably foreseeable; (3) “peonage or involuntary servitude for . . . more than one year” under § 2H4.1(b)(3)(A) because there was not sufficient evidence showing that S.E. was kept in that condition for the requisite amount of time; and (4) the “other felony offense” of kidnapping under § 2H.41(b)(4). The district court properly applied a two-level enhancement under § 2H4.1(b)(1)(B) because S.E. sustained “serious bodily injury” while in a condition of forced labor. “Serious bodily injury” is defined as “injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, n.1(L). There was significant evidence at trial that S.E. sustained serious bodily injury in connection with her condition of forced labor: Hunt beat S.E. with a wooden fence post upon discovering S.E. had taken food to feed B.E.; Hunt punched S.E. in the face when S.E. bought an item that was not on the shopping list; Callahan kicked S.E. in the face and knocked her tooth loose after he learned about her note discussing escape plans. Each of these events caused S.E. extreme physical pain and therefore the district court properly applied the two-level enhancement. The district court properly applied a four-level enhancement under § 2H4.1(b)(2)(A) because a “dangerous weapon was used” during the commission of the forced labor offense. “A Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 23 dangerous weapon was used” means “that a firearm was discharged, or that a firearm or other dangerous weapon was otherwise used.” U.S.S.G. 2H4.1, n.1. Any “instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury” and any “object that is not an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury but . . . closely resembles such an instrument,” qualifies as a “dangerous weapon.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, n. 1(D). This Court employs a “functional approach” to “what constitutes a dangerous weapon” under the Guidelines, and we have recognized that “in the proper circumstances, almost anything can count as a dangerous weapon, including walking sticks, leather straps, rakes, tennis shoes, rubber boots, dogs, rings, concrete curbs, clothes irons, and stink bombs.” United States v. Tolbert, 668 F.3d 798, 802–03 (6th Cir. 2012). In this case, Hunt used a fence post to beat S.E., which qualifies as a dangerous weapon under the circumstances. Because Defendants were both convicted of conspiracy, Hunt was equally culpable for her co-conspirator’s acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding for purposes of a firearm enhancement that “[p]ossession of a firearm by a co-conspirator is attributable to any other conspirator if the coconspirator’s possession was reasonably foreseeable”). And there were at least two occasions when Callahan pointed a gun at S.E. and B.E., and one occasion when Callahan threatened S.E. with a knife while questioning her about who she talked to and why she took so long to run an errand. Accordingly, the district court properly applied the four-level use-of-a-dangerousweapon enhancement. The district court properly applied a three-level enhancement for “peonage or involuntary servitude for . . . more than one year” under § 2H4.1(b)(3)(A). The record supports the finding that S.E. was held in a condition of involuntary servitude from at least the spring of 2011 when Defendants began keeping S.E. locked in the basement (and then later a room upstairs) until S.E. was arrested by the police for shoplifting in October 2012. Thus, the three-level enhancement was warranted. The district court properly applied a ten-level enhancement for “other felony offense” under § 2H4.1(b)(4)(B). The provision states, “If any other felony offense was committed during the commission of, or in connection with, the peonage or involuntary servitude offense, Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 24 increase to the greater of . . . 2 plus the offense level from the offense guideline applicable to that other offense, but in no event greater than level 43.” U.S.S.G. § 2H4.1(b)(4)(B). Under subsection (b)(4), “‘any other felony offense’ means any conduct that constitutes a felony offense under federal, state, or local law (other than an offense that is itself covered by this subpart). When there is more than one such other offense, the most serious such offense . . . is to be used.” Id. at n.2. The jury’s special verdict concluded that the forced labor offense involved kidnapping so Hunt’s most serious underlying offense is kidnapping, which is governed by Guideline § 2A4.1. Defendant Hunt argues that the cross-reference to kidnapping does not apply because she was not charged with kidnapping. She also argues that the inclusion of the specific offense characteristics (i.e., serious bodily injury, use of a dangerous weapon, length of confinement) under the kidnapping calculation resulted in impermissible double counting. We disagree. First, Hunt need not have been convicted under the federal kidnapping statute for § 2A1.4 to apply because cross-referencing “is not limited to ‘offenses charged in the indictment or that resulted in a conviction.’” United States v. Grimes, 348 F. App’x 138, 140 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Cowan, 196 F.3d 646, 649 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Cooper, 739 F.3d 873, 884 (6th Cir. 2014). Because the most serious “other felony offense” that Hunt committed in connection with her forced labor violation was kidnapping, and the jury unanimously found that her conduct involved kidnapping, the district court properly applied § 2A4.1. Second, no impermissible double counting actually occurred in Hunt’s case. As this Court explained in United States v. Walters, 775 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2015): Double counting occurs when precisely the same aspect of a defendant’s conduct factors into his sentence in two separate ways. No double counting occurs if the defendant is punished for distinct aspects of his conduct. Where double counting does occur, however, it may be permissible. Where it appears that Congress or the Sentencing Commission intended to attach multiple penalties to the same conduct, double counting is permitted. Indeed, the Guidelines explicitly state that the offense level adjustments from more than one specific offense guideline are applied cumulatively (added together) unless otherwise noted. Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 25 Id. at 782 (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted). Section 2H4.1(b)(4) instructs courts to calculate the offense level for “other felony offense” during the forced labor violation before adding two additional levels to the greater of the forced labor calculation or to the other felony offense calculation. In applying the kidnapping cross-reference, the district court added the specific offense characteristic enhancements to determine whether the kidnapping calculation or the forced labor calculation was higher before applying the two-level enhancement mandated by § 2H4.1(b)(4). The kidnapping calculation, being the higher of the two, essentially replaced the forced labor calculation, and therefore Hunt’s conduct was not counted twice in her ultimate sentence. The district court’s application of the cross-reference was proper. Hunt’s last argument is that her 384-month sentence is much greater than other sentences imposed for violation of § 1589. In support of the argument, she points to three forced labor cases where the defendant was sentenced to a shorter period of imprisonment. “[W]e have criticized the comparison of the defendant’s sentence to those imposed in other singular cases as weak evidence to show a national sentencing disparity.” United States v. Rossi, 422 F. App’x 425, 435 (6th Cir. 2011). And, as previously discussed, “this Circuit applies a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to sentences that are within a properly calculated Guidelines range.” United States v. Recla, 560 F.3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Here, Hunt’s Guideline sentence for the forced labor charge was life imprisonment, and the district court varied downward and sentenced her to a 384-month term of confinement. The court appropriately considered aggravating factors, including that Hunt provided untruthful testimony at trial on several material issues; that S.E. has permanently lost custody of her daughter because of Hunt’s conduct; that Hunt’s use of her children to harm S.E. and B.E. was deplorable; and that Hunt inflicted physical abuse upon the victims. The court also took into account the mitigating factors, including that Hunt had a tough upbringing, a history of substance abuse, was under-educated, and had also lost custody of her children. The district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and imposed what it believed to be an appropriate sentence. Hunt has pointed to nothing that indicates that the district court erred in varying Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 26 downward from her Guidelines range of imprisonment such that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.