Opinion ID: 1704745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: legislatively proposed amendments

Text: The Secretary in her supplemental brief argues that the Court should adopt a special standard for evaluating the validity of constitutional amendments proposed by the Legislature. She does not contend that all legislatively proposed amendments are automatically exempt from the accuracy requirement or that the courts have no authority to review such amendments. Rather, she claims that the accuracy requirement is applicable to legislatively proposed amendments only if a party can show conclusively that the Legislature engaged in fraud, deceit, or trickery. [17] We disagree. Article XI, section 1, Florida Constitution, sets forth the procedure for amending the constitution via legislative resolution: Section 1. Proposal by legislature. Amendment of a section or revision of one or more articles, or the whole, of this constitution may be proposed by joint resolution agreed to by three-fifths of the membership of each house of the legislature. The full text of the joint resolution and the vote of each member voting shall be entered on the journal of each house. Art. XI, § 1, Fla. Const. Although the constitution does not expressly authorize judicial review of amendments proposed by the Legislature, [18] this Court long ago explained that the courts are the proper forum in which to litigate the validity of such amendments: Under our system of constitutional government regulated by law, a determination of whether an amendment to the Constitution has been validly proposed and agreed to by the Legislature depends upon the fact of substantial compliance or noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of the existing Constitution as to how such amendments shall be proposed and agreed to, and such determination is necessarily required to be in a judicial forum where the Constitution provides no other means of authoritatively determining such questions. Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 50, 59 So. 963, 966 (1912) (emphasis added). This Court has reviewed legislatively proposed amendments throughout this century, and we have evaluated amendments' validity on various grounds, including ballot accuracy. [19] In conducting this review, we traditionally have accorded a measure of deference to the Legislature: Another thing we should keep in mind is that we are dealing with a constitutional democracy in which sovereignty resides in the people. It is their Constitution that we are construing. They have a right to change, abrogate or modify it in any manner they see fit so long as they keep within the confines of the Federal Constitution. The legislature which approved and submitted the proposed amendment took the same oath to protect and defend the Constitution that we did and our first duty is to uphold their action if there is any reasonable theory under which it can be done. This is the first rule we are required to observe when considering acts of the legislature and it is even more impelling when considering a proposed constitutional amendment which goes to the people for their approval or disapproval. Gray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785, 790 (Fla. 1956). This deference, however, is not boundless, for the constitution imposes strict minimum requirements that apply across-the-board to all constitutional amendments, including those arising in the Legislature. [20] Several modern cases involving legislatively proposed amendments illustrate the applicability of the accuracy requirement in article XI, section 5. The Court in Smathers v. Smith, 338 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1976), reviewed a proposed amendment that gave the Legislature the power to nullify any administrative rule of any executive agency. Preliminarily, the Court noted the need for accuracy: [L]awmakers who are asked to consider constitutional changes, and the people who are asked to approve them, must be able to comprehend the sweep of each proposal from a fair notification in the proposition itself that it is neither less nor more extensive than it appears to be. Smathers, 338 So.2d at 829. [21] Recognizing the deference due legislative acts in general, the Court evaluated the amendment under an implicit germaneness theory and approved it, concluding that the proposed amendment was minimally germane to the provision it amended. The Court further ruled that the amendment comported with the requirements of section 101.161 and was not misleading. [22] In Grose v. Firestone, 422 So.2d 303 (Fla.1982), the Court reviewed a legislatively proposed amendment that required courts to construe the Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Clause in the Florida Constitution in conformity with its federal counterpart. Again, the Court stressed the need for accuracy: What the law requires is that the ballot be fair and advise the voter sufficiently to enable him intelligently to cast his ballot. Grose, 422 So.2d at 305 (quoting Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla.1954)) (emphasis omitted). The Court then conducted an analysis under section 101.161 and approved the amendment, concluding that [t]he wording of the ballot summary of proposed Amendment 2 is unambiguous and clearly states the amendment's chief purpose. [23] And finally, the Court in Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151 (Fla.1982), reviewed a legislatively proposed amendment that banned former legislators from lobbying for a two-year period after leaving office unless the legislator made full disclosure of his or her financial interests. [24] Again, the Court noted the need for accuracy on the ballot: Simply put, the ballot must give the voter fair notice of the decision he must make. Askew, 421 So.2d at 155. Although the ballot summary faithfully tracked the text of the proposed amendment, the summary failed to explain that the amendment would supersede an already existing constitutional provision that imposed an absolute two-year ban on lobbying by former legislators (i.e., regardless of financial disclosure). The Court concluded that the summary was misleading because it failed to tell voters that the amendment was intended to end the existing ban: The problem ... lies not with what the summary says, but, rather, with what it does not say. . . . . If the legislature feels that the present prohibition against appearing before one's former colleagues is wrong, it is appropriate for that body to pass a joint resolution and to ask the citizens to modify that prohibition. But such a change must stand on its own merits and not be disguised as something else. The purpose of section 101.161 is to assure that the electorate is advised of the true meaning, and ramifications, of an amendment. A proposed amendment cannot fly under false colors; this one does. The burden of informing the public should not fall only on the press and opponents of the measurethe ballot title and summary must do this. Askew, 421 So.2d at 156 (emphasis added). The Court struck the proposed amendment because it was misleading. As these cases illustrate, the gist of the constitutional accuracy requirement is simple: A ballot title and summary cannot either fly under false colors or hide the ball as to the amendment's true effect. The applicability of this requirement also is simple: It applies across-the-board to all constitutional amendments, including those proposed by the Legislature.