Opinion ID: 1394925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ's decision without comment, we review the IJ's findings of fact and reasoning as though they were those of the BIA itself. Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 762, 765-66 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Mousa v. INS, 223 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir.2000)). We apply the substantial evidence standard, and uphold the BIA's denial of relief as long as it is `supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.' Sina v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Margos v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.2006); Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir.2005)).
An applicant claiming asylum as a refugee must show that he is unable or unwilling to return to [his] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . .. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see Sina, 476 F.3d at 461. The applicant bears the burden of proving that he is eligible for asylum. Sina, 476 F.3d at 462 (quoting Hernandez-Baena v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir.2005) (citing Jamal-Daoud v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.2005); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a))). We will not disturb the IJ's decision unless the petitioner shows that the evidence not only supports reversal but compels it. Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992)). An IJ's adverse credibility determinations must be made with reference to specific, cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the finding. Adekpe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir.2007). Such determinations are afforded substantial deference. Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 382 (7th Cir.2004). We cannot say that the IJ's adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence in this case. Aung's stated reasons for his fear fell apart upon questioning, revealing that his claims were supported by mere rumors and speculation. When questioned as to why he believed that the authorities might arrest him for distributing information on forced labor, Aung admitted that he had never been caught with such materials. Despite repeated opportunities to do so, Aung was unable to explain how the authorities might have learned of his activities, and why they might care. The following excerpt from the asylum hearing is exemplary: Q: Well you were never caught with any material like leaflets, or the magazine articles about [forced] labor, correct? A: No, no, no, not like that. Q: So I don't understand why the military officer would be asking your mother about you for any reason. A: At the time, (indiscernible) was released from house arrest, and when I go back in 2002, the army called me and then they told me to stay away from politic. Q: But they had no information that you'd ever been involved in politics did they? A: I was arrested one time in 1998, and at that time, they warned me not to be involved in politic in the future. R. p. 93. Aung points only to his 1998 arrest, which was years before he sent information on forced labor to Thailand, and which he concedes did not amount to persecution. Many of Aung's other answers were equally nonresponsive. See, e.g., R. p. 81, 83, 87, 90, 96. Nor could Aung support his claim that his cousin was arrested because of their information smuggling activities. Upon questioning by the IJ, Aung admitted that he in fact did not know why his cousin was arrested, but merely speculated that it could have been because he passed information to Aung. R. p. 82. When questioned about any trouble that the Burmese government had caused his mother because of his political views, Aung said that they expect her to feed the rice from her business to their soldiers and to sell rice to the government at a discounted price. R. p. 91. But this, and the fact that Aung had to pay bribes for travel documents, are very consistent, as the IJ noted, with the general corruption that is unfortunately common in Burma. R. p. 95. Indeed, Aung was able to move in and out of the country with as much ease as can be expected given the corruption. While we have warned that discrepancies that may arise due to an applicant's limited English skills should not be held against him, this is not that case. See Jamal-Daoud, 403 F.3d at 923. Aung had the benefit of an interpreter at the asylum hearing and there is no indication that the interpreter was deficient in any way. Throughout the hearing, Aung asked for clarification when he did not understand the questions asked of him. The IJ appeared to patiently question Aung in order to reach the answers to his questions. Aung even stated that the reason he applied for asylum in the United States, but not in any of the other countries he traveled through, was because of his familiarity with the English language. R. p. 97. We therefore cannot say that the IJ's decision was based on anything but the legitimate discrepancies, non-responsive answers, and general weaknesses in Aung's case. The IJ's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and we will not disturb it. Where, as here, the IJ finds the applicant's testimony incredible, his claim for asylum will fail unless he can provide a convincing explanation of the discrepancies or extrinsicand crediblecorroborating evidence. Korniejew, 371 F.3d at 382-83 (citing Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th Cir.2004)). Aung has done neither. He was unable to explain the discrepancies in his testimony, and offered little evidence outside of his testimony. The IJ had Aung's statement that he made when he applied for asylum, a photo of Aung commemorating the sixteenth anniversary of the 1988 popular uprising in front of the Burmese Embassy in New York City, Aung's identifying documents and educational credentials, a 2004 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, and a 2004 Reporters Without Borders Report, none of which did anything to support Aung's fear of future persecution, either subjectively or objectively. The BIA's denial of Aung's request for asylum must stand.
An applicant seeking withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3) of the INA must demonstrate a clear probability of future persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Shmyhelskyy, 477 F.3d at 481. An applicant seeking deferral of removal under the CAT must show that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R. § 1208(16)(c)(2); Shmyhelskyy, 477 F.3d at 482. As both of these standards are greater than that required of asylum applicants, Aung's failure to prevail on his asylum claim necessarily precludes the success of either his withholding of removal claim or his CAT claim. Shmyhelskyy, 477 F.3d at 481-82 (citing Selimi v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir.2004); Stankovic v. INS, 94 F.3d 1117, 1119 (7th Cir.1996)).