Opinion ID: 213952
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initial Action

Text: The City asserts the district court erred in finding the statute of limitation expired before the City filed an initial action to recover response costs incurred relocating part of the City's water supply system. The applicable statute of limitation, CERCLA § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), provides An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in section [107] of this title must be commenced (A) for a removal action, within 3 years after completion of the removal action, except that such cost recovery action must be brought within 6 years after a determination to grant a waiver under section 9604(c)(1)(C) of this title for continued response action; and (B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action, except that, if the remedial action is initiated within 3 years after the completion of the removal action, costs incurred in the removal action may be recovered in the cost recovery action brought under this subparagraph. Admitting § 113(g)(2)(B) has expired if the City's relocation of part of its water supply system beginning in the 1980s constitutes a remedial action, the City contends § 113(g)(2)(A) applies, but has not begun to run because the City's work constitutes an ongoing removal action. Determining whether a response is a removal action or a remedial action requires reference to CERCLA § 101(23)-(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24). Section 101 provides in pertinent part (23) The terms remove or removal mean[ ] the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term[s] include[ ], in addition, without being limited to . . . provision of alternative water supplies. . . . (24) The terms remedy or remedial action mean[ ] those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. The term[s] include[ ], but [are] not limited to . . . provision of alternative water supplies. . . . The inclusion of the provision of alternative water supplies in both definitions complicates the analysis. The parties agree the City's replacement of wells and mains constitutes the provision of alternative water supplies, but disagree as to which definition describes the City's actions in this case. [5] In construing the statutory language and supporting regulations, we have described removal actions as those taken to counter imminent and substantial threats to public health and welfare, while remedial actions are longer term, more permanent responses. Minnesota v. Kalman W. Abrams Metals, Inc., 155 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir.1998); see also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 360, 106 S.Ct. 1103, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (characterizing a removal action as a short-term cleanup and a remedial action as measures to achieve a `permanent remedy' to a particular hazardous waste problem). Generally, a removal action costs less, takes less time, and is geared to address an immediate release or threat of release, whereas a remedial action, which usually cost[s] more and take[s] longer, seeks to effect a permanent remedy to the release of hazardous substances when there is no immediate threat to the public health. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir.1999). The district court concluded the ongoing activities the City performed for the provision of alternative water supplies constituted a remedial action, not a removal action under CERCLA. The district court reasoned the City's two-and-a-half decades of work were consistent with a permanent remedy for the lack of water that resulted from the closing of contaminated wells, but were not in the nature of an emergency cleanup or other interim response to an imminent threat to public health. We agree. Although neither definition fits perfectly, we conclude the City's replacement of wells and mains more closely fits the definition of a remedial action. Having already continued for over twenty-five years, the City's ongoing relocation of part of its water supply system lacks the immediacy and relatively short duration of a removal. The City's hope, that the clean-up actions will eventually return the contaminated wells to service, does not alter our conclusion that retiring contaminated wells and obtaining uncontaminated supplies of water to meet the needs of the City's residents for the foreseeable future is more in the nature of a permanent remedy. The City contends that, in concluding the City's work on the water supply system was a remedial action, the district court improperly focused on the phrase consistent with permanent remedy while ignoring the phrase to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances. The City asserts that because the work on the water supply system did not clean one molecule of water or rid the environment of any contamination whatsoever, that part of the definition of remedial action does not describe water system improvements. The City's argument is unavailing. First, the City's narrow interpretation of the term remedial action would render Congress's specific inclusion of the provision of alternative water supplies in the second sentence of the definition a nullity. By its inherent nature, the provision of alternative water supplies never cleans contaminated water, nor rids the environment of contamination. We avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders any section of the statute superfluous or fails to give effect to all of the words used by Congress. Westerfeld v. Indep. Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819, 824 (8th Cir.2010). Second, shutting down contaminated wells and providing alternative water sources to prevent the City's residents from drawing and using contaminated water does prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances to protect the public health and welfare. The district court did not err in finding § 113(g)(2)(B) barred the City's claims for costs incurred relocating parts of its water supply system.