Opinion ID: 1757479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts, of Appellant's character, and by admitting irrelevant, prejudicial, and inflammatory testimony.

Text: Eakes complains of the trial court's admission of testimony by Linda Palmer, Cleveland Earl Wrencher and Kim Scarbrough.

According to Eakes, Palmer's testimony regarding June Myers was unduly prejudicial pursuant to M.R.E. 403, i.e., that relevant testimony may be excluded if substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Eakes further contends that the trial judge failed to make a finding that the probative value of this testimony outweighed its prejudicial value. Despite his failure to object at trial, Eakes now claims admission of this testimony requires reversal. The State contends that the content of Palmer's testimony, to which Eakes now objects, was first brought out by the defense on cross-examination of June. Eakes also complains of Palmer's testimony regarding statements made by June Myers to the effect that the child was afraid of Eakes and that Eakes had stuck his fingers down her throat. Also specified by Eakes as inadmissible is Palmer's telling of June's reaction to the anatomically-correct dolls. This subject, too, was first introduced by Eakes. When cross-examining June, he asked whether she had ever told Palmer that Eakes had done anything to her (June). [17] When June said she had, Eakes asked if it was true. June admitted it was not. Eakes' attack of June's credibility opened the door for the State to further explore the matter on redirect. Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 133 (Miss. 1988). When Linda Palmer took the stand, the State elicited testimony regarding June's fear of Eakes, June's reaction to the naked adult male doll, her allegations of Eakes' having stuck his fingers down her throat. Palmer also stated that she felt that [June] was being truthful about Eakes' having stuck his fingers down her throat. However, Eakes did not object to this at trial. Thus, because the defense opened the door for such testimony by Palmer, and because the defense failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection, Eakes' argument on this point lacks merit. See Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 133 (Miss. 1988). Robinson v. State, 585 So.2d 735, 737 (Miss. 1991); M.R.E. 103(a)(1). Eakes claims Wrencher's and Scarbrough's testimony should have been excluded pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b) and 608(b) because it introduced evidence of Eakes' character by use of prior bad acts and specific instances of conduct which were unduly prejudicial.
Kimberly Scarbrough testified that Eakes had exposed himself to her and her daughter. Eakes lodged no objection and thoroughly cross-examined the witness. The State first notes Eakes' lack of objection at trial, then submits that this testimony was proper rebuttal; therefore, no finding of prejudicial value versus probative value was necessary. The State says it did nothing more than enter the door opened by Eakes. Although Eakes was slow to object when the State questioned him about any perversions during cross-examination, he did eventually object. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard this line of questioning. When the prosecutor suggested that he might be allowed to call the witness Scarbrough to rebut Eakes' denial of perversion, the court observed that it would be permissible in light of the delayed objection. Eakes made no objection to the prosecution's suggestion or the court's indication of acquiescence. That is, not only did Eakes not object when Scarbrough was called but he failed to object when the prosecutor first broached the subject of her being called or to note any exception whatever to the court's indication that it would be admissible. Any error was waived by Eakes' failure to object to Scarbrough's testimony. Robinson v. State, 585 So.2d 735, 737 (Miss. 1991); M.R.E. 103(a)(1).
On direct examination, Eakes said he had never had a venereal disease and had never been treated for such a disease. He also presented testimony from two women with whom he had been sexually intimate, Sharon Spears and Tammy Herring, to the effect that they had not been infected with venereal disease as a result of their sexual relations with Eakes. In rebuttal, the State offered testimony of Cleveland Earl Wrencher. Wrencher testified that Eakes had said, while in jail, that he wasn't worried about the charges pending against him because he and his girlfriend had been checked, and he had received an injection. Eakes' objections on the grounds of hearsay and relevancy were overruled. The State claims Wrencher's testimony was properly allowed pursuant to M.R.E. 404(a)(1) as rebuttal. M.R.E 404 does not apply here because Wrencher's testimony concerns neither Eakes' character nor a crime, wrong, or act tending to reflect on Eakes' character. M.R.E. 608(a) is also inapplicable as Wrencher's testimony did not involve his opinion as to Eakes' reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Instead, the situation is more akin to that presented in Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329 (Miss. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990), and Lewis v. State, 580 So.2d 1279 (Miss. 1991). In Pinkney, the defendant claimed he had confessed only because a deputy held a gun to his head. Another officer testified that he had never seen that deputy carry a gun. This Court held that the second officer's testimony was a statement of fact, rather than reputation or character evidence. Pinkney, 538 So.2d at 348. In Lewis, the defendant faced charges of aggravated assault with a gun. Lewis claimed he had acted in self-defense, taking the gun from the victim who was the initial aggressor. He further testified that he had not had a gun in his possession on the night of the incident or several days prior to the incident. On rebuttal, the State called a witness who testified that Lewis had visited her three days before the assault and exhibited a gun in his possession. On appeal, this Court found this testimony was not introduced as a specific instance of conduct to impeach Lewis' credibility nor was it impeachment on a collateral issue. Who had a gun and who was the aggressor was [a] central factual issue. Lewis, 580 So.2d at 1288. Comparing the situation to that in Pinkney, this Court found the testimony admissible as a statement of fact relative to the merits of the case. Lewis, 580 So.2d at 1288. Applying the reasoning of Pinkney and Lewis to the instant case, whether Eakes had been infected with venereal disease was relevant to the merits of the case. Eakes sought to prove he had never had venereal disease; and, therefore, could not have given it to April, nor had he likely had sexual contact with April, else he would have become infected. Wrencher's testimony; therefore, constitutes a statement of fact relevant to the merits of the case. Wrencher's testimony was properly admitted.