Opinion ID: 1628442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mental Competency Hearing

Text: ¶ 24. Jay's second issue is the trial court's failure to conduct a mental competency hearing to determine his ability to stand trial. The United States Supreme Court has defined competency to stand trial as whether [a defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam). ¶ 25. In order to be deemed competent to stand trial, a defendant must be one: (1) who is able to perceive and understand the nature of the proceedings; (2) who is able to rationally communicate with his attorney about the case; (3) who is able to recall relevant facts; (4) who is able to testify in his own defense if appropriate; and (5) whose ability to satisfy the foregoing criteria is commensurate with the severity of the case. Martin v. State, 871 So.2d 693, 697 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Howard v. State, 701 So.2d 274, 280 (Miss.1997) (overruled on other grounds)). When a trial court determines that a defendant is competent to stand trial, we will not overturn such finding unless it was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Martin, 871 So.2d at 698 (quoting Emanuel v. State, 412 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Miss.1982)). ¶ 26. Jay filed a motion for extension of time on April 4, 2005, one week before the trial was scheduled to begin. The motion claimed Jay had sustained a severe traumatic brain injury in September 2004. Attached to that motion was a letter from Dr. Yablon, which stated that [d]ue to the severity of [Jay's] injury, he continues to suffer from cognitive, motor, functional and sensory deficits and is at increased risk for seizures and [deep-vein thrombosis]. He is therefore, unable to make competent medical decisions and unable to participate in any court proceedings at this time. ¶ 27. The trial judge ordered Jay to undergo a psychiatric examination by Dr. Webb in order to determine Jay's ability to stand trial and assist his attorney in his defense. Dr. Webb's report was filed in the court file on April 13, 2005two days after the trial. There is no indication in the record that the trial judge ever read or considered it. Dr. Webb's report concluded that Jay was competent to stand trial. Thus, the court file contained conflicting opinions as to whether Jay was competent to stand trial. We have no way of knowing whether the trial judge considered the two opinions and found Dr. Webb's opinion more persuasive, or simply failed to hold a hearing to consider the matter. ¶ 28. Rule 9.06 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules governs cases in which competence to stand trial is at issue. The rule reads, in relevant part: If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or upon motion of an attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by some competent psychiatrist selected by the court in accordance with § 99-13-11 of the Mississippi Code Annotated of 1972. After the examination the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the defendant is competent to stand trial. After hearing all the evidence, the court shall weigh the evidence and make a determination of whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. If the court finds that the defendant is competent to stand trial, then the court shall make the finding a matter of record and the case will then proceed to trial. Miss. Unif. Cir. & Cty. R. 9.06 (emphasis added). ¶ 29. The rule requires a mental examination be conducted when the trial court has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Here, the trial court clearly had reasonable grounds to believe Jay was incompetent to stand trial, as evidenced by the order for a psychiatric evaluation. ¶ 30. The rule further requires that, following such examination, the court shall hold a competency hearing to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. Id. Furthermore, the rule requires the court to make its finding a matter of record before the case proceeds to trial. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court ever held a competency hearing or made findings as to Jay's competency to stand trial. ¶ 31. The State argues thatbecause the record does not reflect whether or not the trial judge actually received the report before trial or whether he ever spoke with Dr. Webb concerning the defendantthis Court must assume that the trial court objectively considered all the facts and circumstances, including those which are not available to this Court, which bore upon the defendant's competence to stand trial. To support its argument, the State cites Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1251 (Miss.1993) (overruled on other grounds). However, the Conner case references the type of evidence the trial judge, and not the appellate courts, can see first-hand: namely, the defendant's demeanor and behavior. See Conner, 632 So.2d at 1248-1251. Conner gives no support whatsoever to the State's argument. ¶ 32. More recently, in Hearn v. State, 3 So.3d 722, 730 (Miss.2008), this Court found that, because no mental competency hearing was held prior to trial: the trial court failed to comply in the strictest technical sense with Rule 9.06 which mandates that a competency hearing be conducted following a court-ordered mental examination. . . . However, [the evaluating psychiatrist] testified at trial as to [the defendant]'s competency and was subjected to cross-examination. Because [the defendant] was afforded the opportunity to present competing evidence, the purposes of Rule 9.06 were satisfied. Id. There are currently two views on this Court regarding mental competency hearings, that of the majority in Hearn, and that as expressed in Sanders v. State, 9 So.3d 1132, 1141 (Miss.2009) (Kitchens, J., concurring in result only, joined by Dickinson, J.). ¶ 33. Justice Kitchens, advocating strict compliance with Rule 9.06's pretrial competency hearing outside of the jury's presence, stated that the procedures of Rule 9.06 are in place to protect the due process rights of defendants whose competency to stand trial is in doubt. They are not technical requirements that may be side-stepped. Id. ¶ 34. Regardless of which view one takes generally, there was no competency hearing prior to or during trial. Dr. Webb did not testify at trial, and there is, therefore, no argument that the purposes of Rule 9.06 were satisfied, as required in Hearn. Hearn, 3 So.3d at 730. ¶ 35. The United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant's constitutional rights were abridged by his failure to receive an adequate hearing on his competence to stand trial when the evidence raises a `bona fide doubt' as to a defendant's competence to stand trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-386, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). Therefore, the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing was a violation of Jay's constitutional rights and, therefore, requires reversal.