Opinion ID: 359526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specific intent under the conspiracy to export count.

Text: 9 The convictions of both appellants under the conspiracy to export count must be reversed because the court erroneously instructed the jury with respect to intent. 10
11 To sustain a conviction on a charge of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States the government must prove at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense, Ingram v. U. S.,360 U.S. 672, 678, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 1319, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1508 (1959); See U. S. v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 1264, 43 L.Ed.2d 541, 554 (1975), in this case the substantive offense of exporting a weapon on the Munitions List. Section 1934(c) provides: 12 Any person who Willfully violates any provision of this section or rule or regulation issued under this section . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 13 22 U.S.C. § 1934(c) (emphasis added). In Etheridge v. U. S., 380 F.2d 804 (CA5, 1967), we sustained convictions under an indictment charging that the defendants knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully exported articles on the Munitions List without having obtained an export license or written approval from the State Department. We said that the count set forth all of the elements of the offense. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, however, we stressed, Evidence of facts and circumstances introduced at the trial afforded adequate support for a finding by the jury that each of the defendants Knew it was unlawful to export (an article on the Munitions List). 380 F.2d at 807 (emphasis added). Thus Etheridge suggests that specific intent is required, even though the opinion did not squarely address the question of degree of intent. In U. S. v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826 (CA9, 1976), the Ninth Circuit held that § 1934's requirement of wilfulness connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. Because the items covered by the statute are spelled out in administrative regulations and include items not known generally to be controlled by the government, the Ninth Circuit inferred that Congress did not intend to impose criminal penalties on innocent or negligent errors. We are persuaded by this analysis and agree that § 1934 requires specific intent. 2 14
15 The district court correctly instructed the jury: 16 The word willfully as used in this charge means that the act or omission or failure to act was committed by the Defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally, and with knowledge that it was prohibited by law, and with the purpose to disobey or to disregard the law, and not by mistake, accident or in good faith or other innocent reason or motive. The court, however, then went on to say: 17 An act is done knowingly if it is done willfully and intentionally, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake, accident or other innocent reason or motive. 18 Just before the court gave the above-quoted instructions on wilfulness, the court had said: 19 Unless outweighed by evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person knows what the law forbids and what the law requires to be done. Therefore, the evidence that the Defendant acted or failed to act because of ignorance of the law does not constitute a defense. 20 These two instructions are inconsistent with the element of specific intent, which requires the government to prove that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty. 21 In a series of recent decisions this circuit has dealt with the problem of instructions on ignorance of the law in specific intent crimes. U. S. v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519 (CA5, 1977); U. S. v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922 (CA5, 1978); U. S. v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (CA5, 1978); U. S. v. Wellendorf, 5 Cir., 574 F.2d 1289 (1978); See U. S. v. Petersen, 513 F.2d 1133 (CA9, 1975) (relied on in Schilleci ). Considered together, these cases require that the trial court, when instructing that specific intent is required, may not instruct that ignorance of the law is no excuse, because ignorance of the law goes to the heart of the defendant's denial of specific intent. Schilleci, 545 F.2d at 524. 22 Our cases are not one hundred percent consistent. Schilleci dealt with a conspiracy-to-wiretap charge. The trial court properly instructed the jury on specific intent but also instructed: 23 It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew that a particular act or failure to act is a violation of law. The presumption is that every person knows what the law forbids, and what the law requires to be done. 24 The defendant had requested a charge indicating that evidence of ignorance of the law is relevant to whether or not the defendant acted with specific intent. 3 We held that the trial court's instructions were erroneous. As a result of the instructions, the jury never had the opportunity to consider the effect of lack of knowledge on the requisite specific intent. 545 F.2d at 524. 25 Granda dealt with a charge that defendant failed to report that she was transporting into the country over $5,000, an offense we held to require specific intent. The trial court did not instruct the jury at all on specific intent. We said, (T)he proper instruction would include some discussion of the defendant's ignorance of the law since the defendant's alleged ignorance of the reporting requirement goes to the heart of his or her denial of the specific intent necessary to commit the crime. 565 F.2d at 926. Schnaiderman dealt with the same reporting requirements as Granda. We reiterated the responsibility of the trial court to discuss in the instructions the effect of defendant's ignorance of the law. 568 F.2d at 1211 n. 8. 26 Wellendorf dealt with a charge of filing false federal income tax withholding forms. The trial court properly instructed that specific intent was required. We said that the court's failure to instruct that ignorance of the law may be considered was not erroneous. We distinguished Schilleci on the ground that the judge in Schilleci had given an instruction that it is presumed everyone knows the law. 574 F.2d at p. 1290. Wellendorf referred only to Schilleci and did not consider the later cases, Granda and Schnaiderman. We need not resolve the possible conflict between Wellendorf and Granda, because in this case, as in Schilleci, the court gave an instruction covering the presumption that everyone knows the law. The court's failure to discuss the relevance of ignorance of the law brings this case squarely within Schilleci, Granda, and Schnaiderman. 27
28 Neither Davis nor Hill objected to the court's erroneous instruction. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30. But insistence on an objection would be a pointless formality in this case. Hill had requested in writing a charge that specific intent was required. The court conducted a charge conference at which the question of specific intent was thoroughly aired. The trial judge discussed at length his conclusion that one who exports a shotgun has a duty to ascertain whether it is a legal gun (i. e., with barrel over 18 inches) or an illegal gun (with barrel under 18 inches). He analogized the case to a duck hunter's shooting a duck thinking it is a species that can be killed legally and finding that instead he has shot a protected duck. He ended up by saying this: 29 Now, the defendant has offered evidence that he did not know that his conduct was unlawful. On the contrary, the law presumes that every person knows what the law forbids and what the law requires to be done in light of the illustrations I have given you. Therefore, the evidence that the defendant acted or failed to act because of ignorance of the law does not constitute a defense, which in this particular kind of offense, gentlemen, and I'm talking about the gun charges, now specific intent as such is not an essential element. 30 Counsel for Hill excepted and counsel for Blackwell was permitted to adopt Hill's request and exception. Thus, with respect to both defendants, in these circumstances every function of the written request procedure, and of objections to the charge as given before the jury retired, were met. Whether this was a specific intent crime was squarely raised, fully discussed, and the court's position clearly and forcefully made and recorded. The position of court and of defendants was clear to each other. Counsel for both defendants, advised of an erroneous concept of the law, were unable to make closing arguments on lack of specific intent. See U. S. v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 697 (CA5, 1974). 4 The procedure for requesting charges, and for objections, should not be employed woodenly, but should be applied where its application will serve the ends for which it was designed. If it be applied blindly and without the benefit of analysis of particular fact situations before individual courts in specific cases it will be transformed from a sound principle of judicial administration into a trap for the unwary, a trap reminiscent of the senseless technicalities that characterized common law procedural systems and which made them a source of scorn and anger to many lawyers and to most laymen. U. S. v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 759 (CA3, 1961). 31