Opinion ID: 2015081
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Waiver for Sentencing

Text: Defendant's affidavit in support of his post-conviction petition asserts that he waived the jury for sentencing based on the advice of his lawyers that the trial judge would not impose the death penalty. As the majority opinion reveals, other affidavits attached to the amended post-conviction petition corroborate that defendant's trial attorneys, Clare Hillyard and Michael Brennock, did in fact inform defendant that the trial judge was not likely to impose death as a sentence if defendant waived the jury. According to one affidavit, Brennock told defendant he was 99% certain the judge would not impose the death penalty, and he and Hillyard were stunned when the court subsequently did so. Attorney Hillyard stated in an affidavit that she understood from the court's comment, facial expression, and vocal inflection that the judge would not impose the death penalty. Hillyard denied, however, that her preparation of the mitigation evidence was curtailed because of her strong certainty that the court would not impose the death penalty. The circuit court denied defendant's post-conviction counsel's requests to depose Brennock and Hillyard. Notwithstanding the undisputed and factually corroborated assertion that defendant waived the jury for sentencing based on his two attorneys' express conviction that the judge would not impose the death penalty, the majority holds that defendant has not met the requirement of Strickland that he was actually prejudiced by counsels' perceptions. The majority concludes that because Clare Hillyard, one of defendant's attorneys, offered additional reasons for her belief that defendant should waive his right to have a jury determine his sentence, reasons that were consistent with legitimate trial strategy, no harm resulted to defendant. To support its conclusion, the majority discusses at length portions of the direct appeal, in which a different issue regarding Hillyard's advice to waive the sentencing jury was resolved against defendant. In the direct appeal, this court acknowledged that Hillyard's advice to her client to waive the sentencing jury was based on her erroneous view of the law, i.e., that evidence of defendant's other crimes would not be admissible in aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial. Hillyard had expressed concern that the jury would be inflamed against defendant if the jury learned that he was accused of participating in a series of armed robberies near in time to the charges for which defendant was on trial. Accordingly, she advised defendant to waive the jury for sentencing. In holding that defendant sustained no prejudice from his attorney's erroneous view respecting the admission of other-crimes evidence at his sentencing hearing, this court concluded on direct review that counsel's main objective was to prevent defendant from being sentenced by a jury possessing knowledge of defendant's other crimes. Maxwell, 148 Ill.2d at 144, 170 Ill.Dec. 280, 592 N.E.2d 960. This court observed that by recommending that defendant waive the jury for sentencing, Hillyard achieved this strategic goal of removing the sentencing decision from the jury. I note that the jury was apprised of the other-crimes evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of defendant's trial because the trial court denied the defense motion in limine to bar reference to defendant's pending armed robbery charges. Therefore, Hillyard's advice to waive the sentencing jury for fear that the jury would be inflamed by the other-crimes evidence was not a persuasive reason for urging defendant to consent to the jury waiver. Nonetheless, in the instant appeal the majority relies to a large extent on the analysis of the direct appeal to support its conclusion that defendant has not established prejudice stemming from his attorneys' misleading advice that the judge was not inclined to impose the death penalty. The majority implies that if the defense attorneys' advice to waive the sentencing jury may be justified on any of the various grounds advanced, no prejudicial error exists as a matter of law. This view does not, in my opinion, withstand analysis. In the instant appeal, unlike the direct appeal, defendant has offered affidavits outside the trial record showing that his defense attorneys informed him that the judge exhibited a physical sign that he would not impose the death penalty. In his affidavit, defendant states that he relied on Clare Hillyard's advice that the trial judge told her he would not impose the death penalty. Defendant's reliance on such representation as the primary reason for waiving the sentencing jury is far more compelling than the other reasons offered. Would not a defendant facing capital punishment waive the jury for sentencing if counsel declared that the trial court manifested its intent not to impose death? To merely conclude, as the majority does here, that trial counsel may have had other facially valid reasons to waive the jury for sentencing is to evade the essential point of defendant's argument; i.e., if trial counsel had not assured defendant that the trial court stated it would not impose the death penalty, defendant would not have waived the jury. Under the circumstances, I cannot conclude that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the jury for sentencing. Nor can I join the majority's conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's misguided assurances that the judge would not impose death. Therefore, I would permit defendant the opportunity to proceed to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the jury waiver. As a related matter, defendant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for substitution of judges, which was presented as part of the post-conviction proceedings. The court summarily denied the motion and no discussion of its merits appears in the transcript. In the instant appeal defendant argues that the court should have recused itself from ruling on the amended post-conviction petition because the impartiality of the court had been called into question over the issue of the jury waiver and trial attorneys' belief that the court had signalled how it would rule on the issue of the death penalty. Moreover, defendant claims, during the court's admonishments on the issue of his rights with respect to waiver of the jury, the trial court did not inquire whether defendant had received any promises or inducements to waive the jury for sentencing. Accordingly, defendant argues, the post-conviction petition should have been transferred for consideration by a different judge. The majority opinion does not address or even acknowledge the concerns raised by defendant's motion for substitution of judges, despite the apparent significance of the issue. The affidavits of Clare Hillyard and defendant's appellate counsel indicate that the trial judge conveyed something which led the defense attorneys to believe with 99% certainty that the death penalty was not seriously being considered as a penalty by the trial judge. Had a hearing on the post-conviction petition or a hearing on the motion for substitution of judges been allowed, it is likely that the trial judge might have been a witness on this issue. In view of the serious stakes involved, any alleged cue from the judge raises the possible appearance of impropriety. I believe, therefore, that the circuit court should have granted the defense motion for substitution of judges. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 38 Ill.2d 446, 232 N.E.2d 738 (1967).