Opinion ID: 71503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the act of disclosing secret grand jury information.

Text: 10 According to Brenson, the facts of this case require this court to place the metes and bounds on the very broad language of the catchall provision in § 1503 out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, as recognized in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 105 S.Ct. 3127, 87 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985), and out of concern that fair warning be given so the common world can understand based on the language used what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. United States v. Aguilar, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). Brenson argues that the omnibus clause of § 1503 was not intended to apply to his actions in disclosing secret grand jury information. 11 The Government responds by demonstrating that the omnibus clause of § 1503 has been given a broad reading by this court. Section 1503 forbids interferences with the due administration of justice, i.e., judicial procedure. United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir.1984). The statute aims 'to prevent a miscarriage of justice.'  Silverman, 745 F.2d at 1393. 12 In United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460, 1465 (11th Cir.1985), this court recognized that [w]e have stated more than once that the omnibus clause in broad enough to cover any act committed corruptly, in an endeavor to impede or obstruct justice. This court previously determined that [t]he statute [§ 1503] reaches all corrupt conduct capable of producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered, regardless of the means employed. United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir.1984). Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that Brenson's disclosure of grand jury information to the target of the grand jury investigation 2 , prior to any indictment being returned, is the type of conduct capable of being punished under § 1503. 13 In United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.1978) 3 , the defendants were convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice in violation of § 1503 by attempting to sell transcripts of secret grand jury testimony to persons under investigation by the grand jury. On appeal, the court determined that the appropriation and disclosure of secret grand jury materials constitutes an obstruction of justice by breaching the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. Howard, 569 F.2d at 1336. 14 This court has previously determined that [a]ny person 'who knowingly violates Rule 6(e)(2) [Fed.R.Crim.P.] 4 or induces or attempts to induce another person to violate the Rule may be [convicted] for obstruction of justice under § 1503.'  United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950, 114 S.Ct. 396, 126 L.Ed.2d 344 (1993) (quoting Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1561, n. 22 (11th Cir.1988) (JJ. Tjoflat and Roetger, concurring specially)) (alteration in original). Contrary to Brenson's argument, a person who improperly reveals grand jury information in violation of Rule 6(e)(2) can be convicted for obstruction of justice or contempt 5 , provided the elements of § 1503 are proven. 15 According to Brenson, recently decided cases support his argument that the act of disclosing grand jury information is insufficient to support a conviction of obstruction of justice. In making this point, Brenson relies on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Aguilar for the proposition that the providing of false information to agents that the defendant knows will testify before a grand jury was insufficient to demonstrate that Aguilar's action would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury proceeding. However, upon review of the Aguilar decision, the Supreme Court expressly stated that [t]he Government did not show here that the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury, or indeed that the grand jury had ever summoned the testimony of these particular agents [those agents who interviewed Aguilar] and evidence at trial relied on by the Government would not enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that [Aguilar] knew that his false statement would be provided to a grand jury ... --- U.S. at ----, ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362-63. Thus, a close reading of the Aguilar decision refutes Brenson's characterization of the holding. 16 Similarly, Brenson relies on this court's decision in United States v. Thomas, for the proposition that an attorney providing false testimony is not enough to prove an obstruction of a grand jury. In the Thomas decision the court pointed out that the court was not even convinced that the government established that Thomas's testimony was false. 916 F.2d at 653. However, the court did determine that even if they did believe that a jury could reasonably find that Thomas's testimony was false beyond a reasonable doubt, the government's case as to obstruction of justice under § 1503 fails because no evidence was introduced that the statements had a natural and probable effect of impeding justice. Thomas, 916 F.2d at 654. 17 Based on our reading of Thomas, the decision does not include any determination that the act of giving false testimony could not serve as a basis for an obstruction of justice conviction, but rather reversed the conviction based on the absence of the necessary evidence that such false testimony would have the natural and probable effect of impeding justice. While the Thomas decision can be fairly read to require that Brenson's actions of disclosing grand jury information must be accompanied by proof of the natural and probable effect of such disclosures on the due administration of justice in order to support a conviction, we conclude that the Thomas decision does not support Brenson's argument that his illegal disclosures are actionable only as contempt of court and not as a basis for an obstruction of justice conviction. 18