Opinion ID: 2375882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Proper Standard Is Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Text: ¶ 10 The Alliance argues that the Court of Appeals used the incorrect standard when it determined that the Alliance must prove the special education mechanism unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Sch. Dists.' Alliance, 149 Wash.App. at 266, 202 P.3d 990. The Alliance asserts that since the State's paramount duty is to make ample provision for the education of children, a lower standard should apply to the petitioners. We disagree and affirm the long standing rule that a party challenging a statute's constitutionality must prove it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 11 In Washington, it is well established that statutes are presumed constitutional and that a statute's challenger has a heavy burden to overcome that presumption; the challenger must prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash.2d 544, 558, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995). This standard, that we will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless its conflict with the constitution is plain beyond a reasonable doubt, stretches all the way back to our holding in Parrott & Co. v. Benson, 114 Wash. 117, 122, 194 P. 986 (1921). This standard has appeared throughout our jurisprudence. See State v. Maciolek, 101 Wash.2d 259, 263, 676 P.2d 996 (1984); see also State v. Aver, 109 Wash.2d 303, 306-07, 745 P.2d 479 (1987). We discussed the reasoning behind the standard in Island County v. State, 135 Wash.2d 141, 147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998): [T]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard used when a statute is challenged as unconstitutional refers to the fact that one challenging a statute must, by argument and research, convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution. The reason for this high standard is based on our respect for the legislative branch of government as a co-equal branch of government, which, like the court, is sworn to uphold the constitution.... Additionally, the Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution. ¶ 12 We later reaffirmed our understanding that a demanding standard is justified because we assume the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enactments and afford great deference to its judgment. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash.2d 201, 220, 5 P.3d 691 (2000). We have also used the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the context of challenges to article IX, section 1. In Tunstall, we used the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining that the legislature had not violated article IX, section 1 by enacting a statute that provided for education for children incarcerated in adult prisons. Id. at 220-23, 5 P.3d 691. In Brown v. State, 155 Wash.2d 254, 266, 119 P.3d 341 (2005), we again used the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining that the State had not violated article IX, section 1 when it reduced the number of days of education that it was willing to fund. ¶ 13 We note that when we say beyond a reasonable doubt, we do not refer to an evidentiary standard. Beyond a reasonable doubt in this context merely means that based on our respect for the legislature, we will not strike a duly enacted statute unless we are fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution. [1] Island County, 135 Wash.2d at 147, 955 P.2d 377. ¶ 14 The Alliance argues that the correct standard is preponderance of the evidence for as-applied challenges. The Alliance bases this argument on our statement in Seattle School District that [t]hus, contrary to appellants' contention, the normal civil burden of proof, i.e., `preponderance of the evidence', applies. 90 Wash.2d at 528, 585 P.2d 71. A reading of that case shows, however, that we were referring to the appropriate evidentiary standard for factual issues when we made this statement. We noted that the State was challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to the reasonableness of the District's salary scale, staffing ratios, associated nonsalaried costs and consequently the failure of the State to adequately fund those reasonable costs before discussing which standard to use. Id. at 527, 585 P.2d 71. The State was not challenging the validity of a statute. When we made that statement, we were not discussing the standard for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but instead whether the existing evidence was sufficient for a trial court to make its findings of fact and conclusions of law. We stated that we would not use the highest burden of proof standard from the inapposite case of In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wash.2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash.2d at 528, 585 P.2d 71. Instead, we merely confirmed the general rule that preponderance of the evidence is the standard for review of a court's factual findings. Id. ¶ 15 There is nothing in the Seattle School District case that mandates a change in the general standard for declaring a statute unconstitutional. In fact, the Seattle School District case did not involve a challenge to any existing statute, but instead focused on the fact that the legislature had not expressly determined what level of education funding would be sufficient to provide basic education and comply with its constitutional mandate. Id. at 519, 537, 585 P.2d 71. We even noted that [w]hile the Legislature must act pursuant to the constitutional mandate to discharge its duty, the general authority to select the means of discharging that duty should be left to the Legislature. Id. at 520, 585 P.2d 71. In short, there is no basis for the Alliance's conclusion that we should apply a preponderance of the evidence standard when we review a claim that a statute violates article IX, section 1. We reaffirm the general rule laid down in Tunstall and Brown that the legislature is entitled to great deference and that a party challenging a statute's constitutionality must therefore prove the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 16 The Alliance also argues (1) that the Court of Appeals improperly applied equal protection analysis and (2) that the burden should shift to the State to demonstrate that it met its paramount duty to fund education once the Alliance proved a prima facie case of underfunding. The Court of Appeals in no way applied equal protection analysis. Furthermore, as discussed in sections II and III, the Alliance did not prove a prima facie case of underfunding. Even if the Alliance did present a prima facie case of underfunding, the Alliance presents no authority suggesting that the burden should then shift to the State to prove that the State did not underfund special education. These arguments are without merit.