Opinion ID: 2070572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Heightened Scrutiny in All Stages of a Capital Case

Text: Although the Supreme Court has found that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional, the Court has consistently proclaimed the truism that death is a different type of penalty. Death is different primarily in its severity and irrevocability ( see Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238, 306 [1972] [Stewart, J., concurring]). Because of this difference, the determination that death is the appropriate punishment involves a heightened `need for reliability' ( see Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 US 320, 340 [1985], quoting Woodson v North Carolina, 428 US 280, 305 [1976] [plurality op]). By motion, defendant requested the trial court to apply heightened scrutiny and a heightened standard of due process throughout all of the proceedings in this capital case. The People opposed the motion, arguing that it is well-settled that a capital defendant is not entitled to greater rights at all stages of a prosecution on the ground that `death is different.' The court denied the motion, finding that neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court ha[s] required the application of such a broad elevated across-the-board standard. [1] On appeal here, the People argue that the fact that death is different requires heightened reliability only at the sentencing stage. [2] The People's limitation of heightened reliability to the sentencing stage, however, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's evolving death penalty jurisprudence, which makes clear that regardless of when in the proceedings the issues arise, a trial court's resolution of some issues affecting the guilt determination, as well as the sentencing determination, must comply with the heightened reliability standard ( see Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 US at 340; Beck v Alabama, 447 US 625 [1980]). Initially, the Supreme Court's concerns centered primarily on the procedures under which the death sentence is imposed. In Furman, the Court held that the death penalty in the cases before it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Gregg v Georgia (428 US 153 [1976]), the Court identified one of several safeguards that addressed the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty: a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information ( id. at 195). While the Georgia death penalty statute reviewed in Gregg satisfied the Furman concerns, the death penalty statute of North Carolina reviewed in Woodson v North Carolina (428 US 280), which mandated the imposition of the death sentence upon a guilty finding, did not. The Court found that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S., at 100, 78 S.Ct., at 597 (plurality opinion), requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case (428 US at 304-305). Consequently, the rights of a capital defendant are greater than those of a noncapital defendant at the sentencing stage. In fact, a capital sentence proceeding is treated like a trial for purposes of double jeopardy ( see Bullington v Missouri, 451 US 430, 438 [1981]; Monge v California, 524 US 721, 725 [1998]). In addition, the sentencer in a capital case must consider virtually all of the defendant's mitigating factors ( Lockett v Ohio, 438 US 586, 603-605 [1978]; Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US 104 [1982]). Aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt ( Lewis v Jeffers, 497 US 764 [1990]; see also Ceja v Stewart, 97 F3d 1246 [9th Cir 1996]). In Gardner v Florida (430 US 349 [1977]), the Court found that defendant's right to due process was violated when he was sentenced to death based on information that was not disclosed to him, and thus, he had no opportunity to explain or deny. The Court rejected the holding of an older similar case which was decided at a time when the death sentence was perceived as no different from any other sentence. [3] The Court has applied heightened reliability to the selection of jurors, who under most death penalty statutes, including New York's, determine whether defendant is guilty or not, and if guilty, whether the death sentence is appropriate ( see Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 182 [1986] [citing Witherspoon v Illinois, 391 US 510, 519 (1968)]). [4] In Turner v Murray (476 US 28 [1986]), the Court found the lower court's failure to question prospective jurors on racial bias violated the defendant's right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. [5] Before Turner, lower courts relied on Ristaino v Ross (424 US 589 [1976]), in which the Court stated that the Constitution did not necessarily require trial courts to question jurors on racial bias simply because the defendant was black and the victim white. The Turner Court distinguished Ristaino because it was not a capital case, and concluded that in capital proceedings involving an interracial crime, upon defendant's request, trial courts must inform prospective jurors of the race of the victim and must conduct voir dire on the issue of racial bias ( see Turner, 476 US at 35-36). Because the trial court failed to conduct such voir dire below, the Turner Court vacated the death sentence, but left the conviction undisturbed. In Morgan v Illinois (504 US 719 [1992]), the trial court denied defendant's request to ask jurors whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty, reasoning that the court had asked essentially the same question when it inquired whether each member of the empaneled jury could be fair and impartial and when it asked most jurors whether they could follow instructions on the law. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's questions were inadequate, and that the refusal to ask the questions requested by defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Court noted that while [t]he adequacy of voir dire is not easily the subject of appellate review, it ha[d] not hesitated, particularly in capital cases, to find that certain inquiries must be made to effectuate constitutional protections (504 US at 730). The Court has also applied heightened reliability to issues arising during the guilt phase. In Beck v Alabama (447 US 625), the jury found defendant guilty of intentional killing during a robbery or attempted robbery, and as mandated by the death penalty statute, sentenced him to death. The trial court affirmed the death sentence after holding a hearing in which it considered mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Although there was sufficient evidence to support a jury instruction on felony murder as a lesser included offense, the statute specifically prohibited the judge from charging lesser included offenses. The Court reversed the conviction and the sentence, finding that: [t]o insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of `reason rather than caprice or emotion,' we have invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination. The same reasoning must apply to rules that diminish the reliability of the guilt determination. Thus, if the unavailability of a lesser included offense instruction enhances the risk of an unwarranted conviction, Alabama is constitutionally prohibited from withdrawing that option from the jury in a capital case (447 US at 638). The Court did not decide whether the Due Process Clause required courts to instruct on the lesser included offense in noncapital cases. The Court has also applied heightened reliability to postsentencing proceedings. In Ford v Wainwright (477 US 399 [1986]), the Court found that because the state court hearing was inadequate, defendant was entitled to a new evidentiary hearing in federal court to determine whether he was insane. The Court noted that [i]n capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability.    This especial concern is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different ( id. at 411 [citations omitted]). The clear teaching of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is that heightened reliability should apply to any issue in the pretrial phase of a capital case which, if resolved against defendant, would enhance the risk of an unwarranted guilty conviction or death sentence. The Supreme Court's holding in Estelle v Smith (451 US 454 [1981]) supports this position. In that case, during the pretrial phase, the court, sua sponte, ordered the state's attorney to arrange a psychiatric evaluation of defendant to determine his competency to stand trial because it did not intend to be a participant in a case where the defendant receives the death penalty and his mental competency remains in doubt ( id. at 457 n 1). The examination took place without notice to defendant's counsel. During the sentencing phase, over defendant's objection, the psychiatrist testified that defendant was an incurable sociopath who would continue to commit crimes if given the opportunity. In finding that defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated because he was not advised of his right to remain silent and that any statement he made could be used against him at a sentencing, the Court noted that [i]n this case, the ultimate penalty of death was a potential consequence of what respondent told the examining psychiatrist ( id. at 462). The Court also found that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to consult with counsel was violated by the psychiatrist's examination, which assessed his future dangerousness. Estelle is a case in which the Court applied heightened reliability to a determination that occurred at the pretrial stage and which ultimately affected the sentencer's decision to impose the death penalty ( see also Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68 [1985]). The need for heightened reliability should not be limited to the sentencing phase. The fact that death is different requires that those who face the risk of death generally be provided with greater rights than those who do not. A defendant faces the risk of death at the point the prosecutor serves the notice of intent to seek the death penalty, not just after conviction ( see generally Matter of Hynes v Tomei, 92 NY2d 613, cert denied 527 US 1015 [1999]). Any error that increases the risk of an unwarranted conviction, which would bring the defendant a step closer to death, must be subject to the heightened reliability standard ( see Beck, 447 US at 637). Neither Satterwhite v Texas (486 US 249 [1988]) nor Murray v Giarratano (492 US 1 [1989]) requires a different result. Satterwhite was a straightforward application of Estelle. The Court found that the use of the psychiatrist's testimony at sentencing was a constitutional violation that required reversal of the death sentence. Reversal, however, was not automatic, but was subject to the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v California (386 US 18 [1967]). Heightened reliability and harmless error are not mutually exclusive. Harmless error provides that reversal is not appropriate where the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained ( id. at 24). The heightened reliability standard seeks to prevent errors from occurring. On direct appeal, heightened reliability calls for heightened review of any error that might have affected the guilt and sentencing verdicts. Giarratano involved indigent death row inmates who sought state appointed counsel in their appeal of their state convictions in federal court. The Court declined to provide these capital defendants greater rights than noncapital defendants. The narrow holding of Giarratano is that death is not different when it comes to assistance of counsel for inmates seeking relief in federal court of their state convictions and sentences. The application of the heightened reliability standard to any issue which may affect the death penalty is consistent with the recognition in New York law that unjust convictions may occur ( see Court of Claims Act § 9). A person who has a claim for damages against the state for unjust conviction and imprisonment may bring an action in the Court of Claims (§ 9 [3-a]). The right to monetary compensation, however, can never adequately compensate the person wrongly put to death. [6] As a matter of public policy, any doubt as to whether the heightened reliability standard should apply to all phases of a capital case is put to rest by the findings of a Columbia University School of Law study entitled A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, [7] released in June 2000, and begun in 1991, at the urging of the Chair of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The study, spearheaded by Professor James S. Liebman, found that during the 23-year period, 5,760 defendants were sentenced to death nationally ( id. at 4). Of those defendants, 4,578 (79%) appealed their death sentences directly to the state's highest court ( id. ). Some 1,885 (41%) of these defendants had their death sentences reversed ( id. ). Of nearly all of the remaining defendants, 248 had their death sentences reversed during further postconviction review at the state level ( id. ). Finally, 599 of the remaining defendants had their death sentences reviewed in federal courts, which overturned the death sentences of 237 (40%) defendants because of serious error ( id. ). Overall, only 313 of those sentenced to death were executed ( id. ). In summary, [n]ationally, over the entire 1973-1995 period, the over-all error-rate in our capital punishment system was 68% ( id. at 5). The overall error-rate is the proportion of fully reviewed capital judgments that were overturned at one of the three stages due to serious error ( id. ). `Serious error' is defined broadly to include error that substantially undermines the reliability of the guilt finding or death sentence imposed at trial ( id. ). The study identified the most common errors as: (1) egregiously incompetent defense lawyering (accounting for 37% of the state postconviction reversals), and (2) prosecutorial suppression of evidence that the defendant is innocent or does not deserve the death penalty (accounting for another 16%-19%, when all forms of law enforcement misconduct are considered) ( id. ). For reversals that occurred at the state postconviction level, an astonishing 82% (247 out of 301) of the capital judgments that were reversed were replaced on retrial with a sentence less than death, or no sentence at all. In the latter regard, 7% (22/301) of the reversals for serious error resulted in a determination on retrial that the defendant was not guilty of the capital offense [8] ( id. [emphasis in original]). Since the occurrence of serious errors was not limited to the sentencing stage, neither should the application of the heightened reliability standard be so limited. While a serious error would, in theory, require reversal without the application of heightened reliability, at the trial level, heightened reliability seeks to avoid such errors. And on appeal, heightened reliability seeks to ensure that a court does not overlook a serious error. While the two other issues addressed belowthe failure to permit rebuttal testimony and the failure to exclude a juror for causewould, standing on their own, require reversal, the case for reversal is made stronger by the application of heightened scrutiny to those rulings.