Opinion ID: 1355643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relationship of the district judge to the court commissioner.

Text: The designated court commissioner, under W.S. XX-XX-XXX(k) [3] and Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 14, [4] has no more extended function than initial fact finding and entry of preliminary orders. The recommendations  conclusions based upon fact as well as law which are distilled into judgment orders  cannot be blindly accepted by the district court. The district court cannot delegate the power to hear, try, or determine a case to a court commissioner. Foster v. Foster, 768 P.2d 1038 (Wyo. 1989); Huhn v. Quinn, 21 Wyo. 51, 128 P. 514 (1912). This court recently discussed in Foster, 768 P.2d 1038 the court commissioner's role in relation to domestic relations matters. This court found that the district court's cursory review and acceptance of the court commissioner's findings leading to an increase in child support which was substantiated only by the district court's reading and signing of the prepared order were insufficient. Id. at 1042. [W]e do perceive that the Wyoming Constitution and applicable statutes contemplate that the district court shall conduct an independent review of the court commissioner's actions beyond that afforded in this case. The court commissioner may take evidence, make findings, and submit a recommendation to the district court. The district court, however, must review the evidence and findings and make its decision upon the basis of that review. Id. at 1041 (emphasis added). This court further elucidated that the record should clearly indicate that the district court independently reviewed the evidence and findings to reach its informed decision. Id. at 1041. In the instant case, the district court's rejection of the alternative placement recommendation and imposition of the state hospitalization plan shows that the required independent review of the case was undertaken. Simply put, [g]eneral court commissioner responsibilities as a hearing examiner cannot be outspread, absent expansion of constitutional authorization, to include power of decisional finality within present constitutional terms. The differentiation is between adjunct fact finding and plenary judicial responsibility. Id. at 1042, Urbigkit, J., specially concurring. See also Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982). While the sociologically well-founded intent of the commissioner and the medical examiner [5] concerning the sufficiency of the state institution may be well-founded, it is not determinative and binding upon the district court in its exercise of application of state statutes and funding opportunities to its decision. Consequently, the real issue does not encompass an abuse of discretion analysis for the district court to disregard part of the commissioner's recommendation as it did, but rather a sufficiency of fact to sustain the district court's exercise of discretion in institutional selection. It is to that subject that we next address attention.