Opinion ID: 2630977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 8 We review constitutional questions de novo. Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wash.2d 208, 215, 143 P.3d 571 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1844, 167 L.Ed.2d 324 (2007).
¶ 9 RCW 9.94A.712, which governs the sentencing of certain nonpersistent sex offenders, mandates that offenders receive an indeterminate sentence comprised of a minimum and maximum term. RCW 9.94A.712(3)(a). Before the expiration of an offender's minimum term, the Department of Corrections conducts an end of sentence review by evaluating the offender based on methodologies . . . recognized by experts in the prediction of sexual dangerousness. RCW 9.95.420(1)(a). The Board then conducts a hearing to determine whether the offender poses a risk of engaging in sex offenses if released to community custody. RCW 9.95.420(3). [2] Under RCW 9.95.420(a) and (b), the Board  shall order the offender released under appropriate conditions unless the [B]oard determines by a preponderance of the evidence that, despite such conditions, it is more likely than not that the offender will commit sex offenses if released. (Emphasis added.) If the Board does not order the offender released, it must establish a new minimum term for the offender, which may not exceed two years and must fall within the maximum term. Id. ¶ 10 According to the Board, offenders are entitled to the following procedural protections during .420 hearings: (1) an opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board, (2) the right to question other persons providing information to the Board, (3) a neutral and detached hearing body, and (4) a written statement by the Board explaining the reasons upon which it decided to either release the offender to community custody or extend the offender's minimum term. Suppl. Br. of Board at 15. The Board decision is recorded and subject to judicial oversight through a personal restraint petition. Id. McCarthy contends that due process also requires that offenders have the right to counsel.
¶ 11 An individual seeking the procedural protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause must establish that his or her interest in life, liberty, or property is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005). A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution, from guarantees implicit in the word `liberty,' or from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies. Id. Where an individual establishes a liberty interest, some minimal due process protections apply. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). ¶ 12 Thus, as a threshold issue, we must first determine whether McCarthy has a liberty interest at stake during a .420 hearing. Inmates generally do not have a liberty interest in release prior to the expiration of a valid sentence. State v. Clarke, 156 Wash.2d 880, 890, 134 P.3d 188 (2006). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that state statutes may create liberty interests where none otherwise exist. [3] Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). In Greenholtz, the Court held that the unique structure and language of a Nebraska parole statute, which mandated that the Board of Parole shall order an inmate's release unless it found one of four designated reasons for deferring parole, created a legitimate expectation of release. Id. at 11-12, 99 S.Ct. 2100. According to the Court, the mandatory language established a presumption that offenders would be released on parole and thus created a limited liberty interest. See id. at 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100. ¶ 13 In the instant case, RCW 9.95.420(3) creates a presumption in favor of release. Like the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz, RCW 9.95.420(3) requires the Board to release the offender unless it finds the offender likely to commit sex offenses upon release. Pursuant to Greenholtz, RCW 9.95.420(3) creates a limited liberty interest by restricting the Board's discretion and establishing a presumption that offenders will be released to community custody upon the expiration of their minimum sentence. [4] ¶ 14 Having concluded that offenders have a limited liberty interest under RCW 9.95.420(3), we must next determine what process is due. When a statute creates an expectancy of release, offenders are entitled to some measure of constitutional protection. See id. at 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100. [T]he quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error. Id. at 13, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). In determining the appropriate level of protection in the parole context, the Supreme Court has applied the Mathews balancing test, which examines the private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the government's interest, including the function involved and the additional fiscal and administrative burdens. 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893. ¶ 15 With respect to parole release statutes that create limited liberty interests, the Supreme Court has held that due process does not require formal, adversarial hearings. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15-16, 99 S.Ct. 2100. In Greenholtz, the Court reasoned that such hearings would provide at best a negligible decrease in the risk of error because the parole release decision primarily involves an examination of the inmate's files regarding the gravity of his offense and prison behavior record. Id. at 14-15, 99 S.Ct. 2100. The Court concluded that the Board's review of the inmate's file, together with the inmate's opportunities to appear before the Board, adequately safeguards against serious risks of error and thus satisfies due process. [5] Id. at 15, 99 S.Ct. 2100. Merely because a statutory expectation exists cannot mean that in addition to the full panoply of due process required to convict and confine there must also be repeated, adversary hearings in order to continue the confinement. Id. at 14, 99 S.Ct. 2100. The Court evaluated the process due in parole release hearings and concluded that [t]he Constitution does not require more than the opportunity to be heard and an explanation when the Board denies parole. Id. at 16, 99 S.Ct. 2100. ¶ 16 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals relied on Supreme Court precedent relating to parole revocation proceedings to support its holding that due process requires the Board to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether counsel is necessary for offenders during .420 hearings. See McCarthy, 134 Wash.App. at 759-60, 143 P.3d 599 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)). In Scarpelli, the Court adopted a case-by-case approach for determining whether counsel is necessary for parole revocation hearings: [T]he decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness  the touchstone of due process  will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees. 411 U.S. at 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756. The Court in Scarpelli adopted this approach in part because of the more significant liberty interest at stake when an inmate already released on parole faces revocation of that parole status. The more significant liberty interest arises because parolees live a relatively normal life after release from prison and rely on the implicit promise that the State will revoke parole only if they fail to abide by the parole conditions. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (recognizing that [r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions). The Court also deemed the case-by-case approach appropriate because of the factual nature of the inquiry when a parole board determines whether a parolee violated conditions of parole. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 787, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (explaining that the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts). ¶ 17 The .420 hearings are more analogous to parole release than to parole revocation. The liberty interest at stake for an offender facing revocation of parole is more significant because the offender has already been released from incarceration. Offenders in .420 hearings face continued incarceration. Further, the nature of the Board's inquiry during .420 hearings is more predictive and discretionary than the inquiry in parole revocation hearings. In determining whether an offender is likely to commit sex offenses if released under RCW 9.95.420(3), the Board hears testimony from the offender's treatment counselors about the offender's performance and behavior in the institution. The offender may testify on his or her own behalf and present support letters and plans for reintegration into society. The Board then makes an informed prediction about whether it believes the offender is likely to commit more sex offenses if released before the expiration of his or her maximum sentence. ¶ 18 Given the distinction between the liberty interests and the nature of the inquiry involved in parole revocation and parole release proceedings, the Court of Appeals erred when it adopted the case-by-case approach applicable to parole revocation proceedings for .420 hearings. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has established that due process requires legal representation for offenders facing parole release decisions such as .420 hearings, even on a case-by-case basis. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15-16, 99 S.Ct. 2100. We have likewise rejected the argument that due process requires legal representation for offenders during other Board proceedings. See In re Pers. Restraint of Whitesel, 111 Wash.2d 621, 631, 763 P.2d 199 (1988) (holding that inmates do not have the right to an attorney during the Board's minimum term redetermination); Arment v. Henry, 98 Wash.2d 775, 778-80, 658 P.2d 663 (1983) (declining to adopt a per se rule mandating the right to counsel at Board disciplinary hearings that could increase the offender's minimum term); In re Pers. Restraint of Sinka, 92 Wash.2d 555, 564-65, 599 P.2d 1275 (1979) (holding that offenders are entitled to minimum due process protections when the Board establishes their minimum terms). ¶ 19 The unique statutory language and structure of RCW 9.95.420 give offenders only a limited liberty interest in .420 hearings  an interest more limited than the interest at stake during parole revocation decisions. To protect offenders' limited liberty interest in .420 hearings, due process requires that offenders have minimum procedural protections. Under Greenholtz, these protections do not include the right to counsel. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that the Board must exercise its discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether offenders are entitled to counsel during .420 hearings. [6]