Opinion ID: 2268376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: retroactive enactment

Text: The plaintiffs suggest that if applied to them the taxing statutes would violate the due process provisions of the United States and Connecticut constitutions. They argue that although the tax was retroactive to a period when they were admittedly domiciled in this state, Connecticut lacks the jurisdiction to impose the tax on them because they had abandoned their Connecticut domicil before the tax became effective on August 15, 1971. In the absence of an express constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws, income tax statutes may be constitutional although they have some retroactive effect. 71 Am. Jur.2d 76, State and Local Taxation, § 460; Estate of Kennett v. State, 115 N.H. 50, 333 A.2d 452. In Kellems v. Brown, supra, 510, we held the retroactive feature of the 1971 tax enactment valid to the extent that it taxes the realization of gain after December 31, 1970. In another jurisdiction, it has been held that an income tax may be measured by income of a year sufficiently recent that such tax may reasonably be supposed to have some bearing upon the ability of the taxpayer to pay the tax. Welch v. Henry, 223 Wis. 319, 326, 271 N.W. 68. And the United States Supreme Court has held that a taxing statute is not impermissibly retroactive and void although the statute was not enacted until March but laid a tax based upon the net income of the calendar year. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413, 425, 43 S. Ct. 620, 67 L. Ed. 1051. Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the costs of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process, and to challenge the present tax it is not enough to point out that the taxable event, the receipt of the income, antedated the statute. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47, 59 S. Ct. 121, 82 L. Ed. 87, rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 675, 59 S. Ct. 250, 83 L. Ed. 437. Accordingly, courts recognizing the power of taxation as an attribute of government essential to the raising of necessary revenue hold that retroactive tax laws be valid even though they impair vested rights. Parlato v. McCarthy, 136 Conn. 126, 130, 69 A.2d 648; see Rahr v. Smith, 243 Wis. 497,11 N.W.2d 355; 85 C.J.S., Taxation, § 1092 (b). The precise issue raised by the plaintiffs' argument is whether a tax imposed on the basis of domicil but enacted subsequent to the abandonment of such domicil is constitutionally valid. While it is clear that due process requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax; Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45, 74 S. Ct. 535, 98 L. Ed. 744; such a link has been found to exist between a state and the income of a person domiciled within its borders. Id.; Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 279, 52 S. Ct. 556, 76 L. Ed. 1102. That the receipt of income by a resident of the territory of a taxing sovereignty is a taxable event is universally recognized. Domicil itself affords a basis for such taxation. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the cost of government. (Emphasis added.) New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13, 57 S. Ct. 466, 81 L. Ed. 666. The fact that the plaintiffs had income and enjoyed the privileges of government while domiciled in this state constitutes a sufficient nexus for this state constitutionally to impose a tax on them notwithstanding abandonment by the plaintiffs of their Connecticut domicil prior to the enactment of the tax. There is no logical reason why the plaintiffs, who shared the privileges of government, should be immune from responsibility for its costs, simply because, in their own words, they fled across the state line, while others who were or became residents of the state during the year have to shoulder their share of such responsibility. Scobie v. Tax Commission, 225 Wis. 529, 538, 275 N.W. 531. A nonresident transacting business or deriving substantial revenue from goods used within this state subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state; General Statutes §52-59b; we see no reason why a former resident who has received income while domiciled in this state should not similarly be subject to this state's taxation powers. The exaction of a tax can be justified when one is enjoying the protection of government either for himself or his property.... As long as one continues to enjoy that protection he should contribute toward the expense of maintaining it. McCarty v. Conway, 215 Wis. 645, 647, 255 N.W. 913. [8] In support of their argument, the plaintiffs rely upon Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 506, 190 A. 801, which holds that a state may not impose a tax against one who has removed from the state during the taxable year. That opinion did not result from an adversary proceeding, contains few basic facts, and cites no authority for its holding. We find it to be of dubious authority and not persuasive. As we have often noted, a party who attacks a statute on constitutional grounds has no easy burden. Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 195, 332 A.2d 78; Kellems v. Brown, supra, 486. Courts in passing upon the validity of a legislative act do not feel justified in declaring it void unless there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution .... We approach the question with great caution, examine it with infinite care, make every presumption and intendment in favor of validity, and sustain the act unless its invalidity is, in our judgment, beyond a reasonable doubt. Edwards v. Hartford, 145 Conn. 141,145,139 A.2d 599. The plaintiffs have not met that burden in this case.