Opinion ID: 390845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Inducements

Text: 20 The Company offered evidence tending to show that the Union promised to obtain employment at Miller for Larry Darling, a current Company employee, if Darling supported the Union and the Union prevailed in the election; that the Union helped Company employees to obtain Miller employment application forms; and that a speaker at a Union meeting created the impression that the Union had helped him obtain employment at Miller. From the record, it appears that the Company's employees might have believed that the Union, which represented Miller's employees, was able to exert a significant influence over Miller's hiring decisions. 21 The Company was entitled to a hearing if its evidence demonstrated that there was a substantial and material factual issue which, if resolved in its favor, would require the setting aside of the representation election. NLRB v. Bristol Spring Manufacturing Co., supra, 579 F.2d at 706-07. We conclude that the Company's allegations, if true, required the Board to set aside the election. In NLRB v. Madisonville Concrete Co., 552 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1977), an election was set aside when the Union paid the fine and attorney's fees of an employee who received a $5 traffic ticket. And in NLRB v. Bristol Spring Manufacturing Co., supra, this court indicated that it would have set aside an election if the Union had improperly made payments of $5 and $20 to several employees. The alleged misconduct by the Union here is far more serious than in the above instances where petty sums of cash were at stake and the Union did not explicitly condition its beneficence on the employee's support in the election. Here the Union is charged with promising to obtain improved employment for an employee on the express conditions that he support the Union in the campaign and that the Union prevail in the election. Since the Union would have lost the election had a single pro-Union voter changed his mind and his vote, a tainted Darling vote for the Union would be sufficient by itself to change the result of the election. The effects of the alleged misconduct, however, might be far more broad than this. The plant was abuzz with rumors about the Union's offer to Darling. Furthermore, employees who attended a Union organizational meeting thought that the speaker implied that he got his job at Miller with the help of the Union. The Company's employees could reasonably have concluded that their support of the Union would help them obtain more attractive employment at Miller whereas their support of the Company would hurt their chances of ever obtaining employment at Miller. Thus, the Company's allegations, if true, required the election to be set aside and the Company was entitled to a hearing if it demonstrated, by prima facie evidence, the existence of substantial and material factual issues supporting its allegations. 22 Our review of the affidavits in the record 7 reveals the following evidence tending to support the Company's allegations. One affiant stated that when he asked Darling if he had gotten the union involved at Nixon because the union had promised him a job at Miller Brewing in return, Darling indicated that this was true, and that only later in the campaign did Darling deny it. Another affiant claimed that Darling said that he was quite confident of obtaining a job at Miller because he had the number one and number two men from the Union to get him in. Rumors that the Union had promised Darling a job were all over the shop and several affiants stated that Darling obtained Miller employment application forms for them through his Union connections. One affiant wrote that she had tried, without success, to obtain a Miller employment application form for three or four months, but that Darling obtained one for her the day after she told him about her problem. He told her that he had gotten both his job and my application through union officials at Miller Brewing. Several affiants stated that the speaker at a Union organizational meeting attended by about seventeen employees gave the impression that he had received a job at Miller through the Union. 23 Despite this evidence strongly indicating that the Union offered improper inducements to eligible employees, the Board denied that the Company had raised substantial and material factual issues respecting the Union's conduct to warrant a hearing. Apparently, the Board reached this conclusion because the Company did not produce nonhearsay testimony directly showing that the Union had promised Darling a job at Miller, that the Union had intended to spread rumors that it could help employees obtain employment at Miller, or that the Union's speaker at the organizational meeting had intended to create the impression that the Union had helped him to obtain employment at Miller. 24 By taking this position, the Board placed far too high a burden on an employer who seeks a hearing to prove that improper inducements were offered by a union. Firsthand testimony establishing that the Union intended the improper conduct could come only from Darling or Union officials. But it was impossible for the Company to obtain their testimony because without a hearing an employer must rely upon the voluntary cooperation of witnesses to develop its case, see Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770, 775 (1964). The Board wrongly penalized the Company for failing to produce evidence which at that point could have been discovered only through the voluntary cooperation of those whom the Company had charged with misconduct. Given the very limited discovery permitted in cases of this type, it is only when parties are given an opportunity to introduce evidence and examine witnesses that improprieties in the conduct of an election may be revealed. NLRB v. Bristol Spring Manufacturing Co., supra, 579 F.2d at 707; Home Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1967). Thus, the Board's insistence upon a stronger showing of improper Union conduct was wholly unreasonable in this case. For the Board to hold, despite the Company's strong prima facie case, that there was not even a substantial and material factual issue respecting the Union's conduct, was an abuse of its discretion. 25 The Board's abuse of its discretion was exacerbated by the circumstances of this case. The election result was extremely close. We have previously admonished the Board that (t)he need for a hearing is particularly acute when an election is close, for in such a situation, 'even minor misconduct cannot be summarily excused on the ground that it could not have influenced the election.'  NLRB v. Bristol Spring Manufacturing Co., supra, 579 F.2d at 707, quoting Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, supra, 501 F.2d at 1230. We conclude that the Board's failure to direct a hearing into the Company's objections to the Union's alleged misrepresentations and improper inducements was arbitrary and capricious. See Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 1980). 26 The only question remaining is how we should dispose of this matter. Although we are empowered to remand the proceedings for a hearing, we are not required nor are we inclined to do so. We will grant the relief that furthers the equitable principles which govern judicial action. Ithaca College v. NLRB, supra. The Company urges us not to remand the proceedings. It points to the great expense and delay to which it has been needlessly subjected by the Board's refusal to order a hearing. The Company fears that the delay has decreased its prospects of prevailing at a hearing because witnesses' memories fade and some key witnesses may be unavailable. Other factors also encourage us to avoid any further delay in the disposition of this proceeding. The Union's election victory was very narrow, the labor force at the Company has undoubtedly changed since the election, and there is no way of knowing at this time if the Union enjoys a majority of support. In light of these factors, we conclude that a remand would be inappropriate. See Ithaca College v. NLRB, supra, 623 F.2d at 230; NLRB v. Producers Cooperative Association, 457 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 1972). Accordingly, the Board's petition for enforcement is denied.