Opinion ID: 2354297
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burglary in the first degree.

Text: Appellant asserts that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the aggravating circumstance that he murdered Mr. Porter while engaged in the commission of burglary in the first degree. KRS 532.025(2)(a)(2). Appellant premises this argument on the fact that he killed Mr. Porter before entering the Porter residence, thus did not kill him while committing first-degree burglary. [8] KRS 511.020(1) provides: (1) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (c) Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person who is not a participant in the crime. (Emphasis added.) KRS 511.010(1) defines a building as follows: Building, in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any structure, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft; (a) Where any person lives; or (b) Where people assemble for purposes of business, government, education, religion, entertainment or public transportation. ... (Emphasis added.) KRS 511.010(2) separately defines a dwelling as a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein, indicating that building encompasses a broader category of structures than dwelling. This conclusion is reinforced by the legislative history of KRS 511.020(1). As originally enacted, the statute provided that burglary in the first degree could be committed only by entering or remaining in a dwelling under the presently defined aggravating circumstances or at night. 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 406, § 97. Entry into or remaining in a building under the presently defined aggravating circumstances constituted burglary in the second degree. 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 406, § 98. The statute was amended in 1978 to provide that burglary in the first degree could be committed either by unlawfully entering or remaining in a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein, or by entering or remaining in a building under the presently defined aggravating circumstances. 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 406, § 97. Finally, in 1980, unlawfully entering or remaining in a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein was redefined as burglary in the second degree, KRS 511.030(1), but entering or remaining in a building under the presently defined aggravating circumstances remained burglary in the first degree. 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 376, §§ 2, 3. Since burglary in the first degree does not require entering or remaining in a dwelling, e.g., the Porter residence, the inquiry becomes whether the tool shed in which Mr. Porter was murdered falls within the ordinary meaning, KRS 511.010(1), of a building. [T]he first-degree burglary statute applies to every structure that meets the definition of a building as used in common parlance, without regard to whether it is inhabited or inhabitable. Funk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 476, 482-83 (1992) (abandoned, condemned, and uninhabited building is a building for purposes of KRS 511.020(1)). The dictionary definition (ordinary meaning) of building is: [A] constructed edifice designed to stand more or less permanently, covering a space of land, usually covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for animals or other useful structure  distinguished from structures not designed for occupancy (as fences or monuments) and from structures not intended for use in one place (as boats or trailers) even though subject to occupancy. [9] Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 292 (Merriam-Webster 1993) (emphasis added). There was evidence that Appellant unlawfully entered the tool shed and that he remained therein with the intent to commit a crime when he formulated the intent to kill Mr. Porter; and that while in the building, he was armed with a deadly weapon and caused physical injury to a person not a participant in the crime. Thus, he killed Mr. Porter while engaged in the commission of burglary in the first degree  even though it was not the same burglary of which he was separately convicted. Even if Appellant were correct with respect to either of these aggravating circumstances, the error would be harmless because the jury also found the aggravating circumstance of multiple intentional deaths, KRS 532.025(2)(a)(6), which was unquestionably applicable to the murders of both Mr. and Mrs. Porter. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3428, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-89, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747-49, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); Bevins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 932, 935-36 (1986).