Opinion ID: 1603125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Affirmative Act of Negligence

Text: ¶ 22 A principal employer may be liable to an independent contractor's employee for injuries caused by the principal employer's affirmative act of negligence. Wagner, 143 Wis.2d at 388, 421 N.W.2d 835. This exception was first articulated in Barth, in which this court concluded that something extra, meaning an affirmative act of negligence that increased the risk of injury, is necessary to sustain an action against a principal employer brought by an independent contractor's employee. 71 Wis.2d at 783, 239 N.W.2d 92; see also Danks, 298 Wis.2d 348, ¶ 17, 727 N.W.2d 846. The relevant inquiry is whether the alleged negligent act was an act of commission constituting an affirmative act of negligence or whether it was an act of omission which does not rise to the level of an affirmative act. Wagner, 143 Wis.2d at 389, 421 N.W.2d 835. Accordingly, even though the traditional concept of negligence would impose liability for a negligent omission, in addition to a negligent affirmative act, see Wis. JICivil 1005, Wisconsin case law precedent requires more than an omission in order to impose liability on a principal employer for injuries sustained by an independent contractor's employee. The principal employer's alleged negligent act must be affirmative. ¶ 23 For example, in Wagner , we concluded that the act of negligently hiring an independent contractor to perform demolition work did not constitute an affirmative act of negligence but rather an omission. 143 Wis.2d at 390, 421 N.W.2d 835. The defendants' failure to check the independent contractor's credentials could not be viewed as active misconduct; instead, it was `passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect' the plaintiff from harm. Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 373 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Snider, 81 Wis.2d at 239, 260 N.W.2d 260 (concluding that the plaintiffs' argument that the principal employer's failure to furnish supervisory control over its independent contractors constituted an affirmative act of negligence defie[d] the commonly accepted meaning of `affirmative'). ¶ 24 In Estate of Thompson, the estate of an independent contractor's employee sought to hold the principal employer liable for the employee's death on account of the principal employer's alleged affirmative acts of negligence. 225 Wis.2d at 600-01, 593 N.W.2d 901. In that case, Thompson, employed by Emblom Brothers Construction Company (Emblom), was fatally electrocuted while removing a utility pole carrying energized lines. Id. at 591, 593 N.W.2d 901. Emblom had a contract with Jump River Electric Cooperative (Jump River) to construct an overhead electrical distribution line, which entailed removing old utility poles, installing new ones, and transferring the electrical lines. Id. Thompson was electrocuted while holding a support wire that touched an energized wire. Id. At the time, Thompson was not wearing protective rubber gloves, despite Emblom's instructions otherwise. Id. ¶ 25 Thompson's estate argued that it was permitted to bring an action in tort against Jump River, despite the principal employer's general non-liability, on the grounds that Jump River committed affirmative acts of negligence. Id. at 600, 593 N.W.2d 901. In particular, the estate alleged that Jump River committed various safety violations, negligently designed the new electrical distribution line, failed to incorporate safety precautions into the design, allowed the support wire to hang from the old utility pole before the pole's removal, and failed to remedy and take precautions against the danger those situations presented. Id. The estate further alleged that the circuit court erroneously granted Jump River's motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether Jump River knew or should have known of the dangerous safety violations. Id. ¶ 26 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Jump River, concluding that Jump River's alleged negligent conduct did not constitute affirmative acts of negligence but instead `passive inaction or a failure to protect the plaintiff from harm.' Id. at 601, 593 N.W.2d 901 (quoting Wagner, 143 Wis.2d at 390, 421 N.W.2d 835). The court determined that Jump River's alleged negligence lay in its failure to discover and act regarding safety violations, id., and its fail[ure] to incorporate safety precautions in its allegedly dangerous design, id. at 602, 593 N.W.2d 901, both of which constituted passive inaction for which Jump River could not be held liable. Id. at 601-02, 593 N.W.2d 901. ¶ 27 Similarly, in Danks, the court of appeals held as a matter of law that a principal employer was not liable for injuries sustained by the independent contractor's employee because neither the principal employer nor its employee committed affirmative acts of negligence. 298 Wis.2d 348, ¶ 2, 727 N.W.2d 846. In that case, Danks, an employee of C&R Concrete (C&R), was injured while assisting in loading a truss onto a truck at a construction site. Id., ¶ 4. C&R had been hired by Stock Building Supply, Inc. (Stock) to load trusses by crane onto Stock's flatbed truck. Id., ¶ 1. Stock's employee, Wagner, drove to the construction site in the truck and parked it. Id., ¶¶ 11-12. Wagner then stood on the flatbed and used hand signals to direct the crane operator, C&R's owner, as to the direction the truss should move and when it should be lowered. Id., ¶ 12. Danks was positioned at the rear of the flatbed, using a two-by-four to guide the truss onto the truck. Id. When the truss was about eight feet above the truck bed, it fell, and Danks was discovered laying on the street near the rear of the truck. Id., ¶ 13. Danks suffered a spinal cord injury from the accident. Id., ¶ 4. ¶ 28 The circuit court dismissed Danks' tort claims against Stock and Wagner, and Danks appealed. Id., ¶ 1. Danks argued that Stock was not protected by the general rule of non-liability because, inter alia, Wagner committed an affirmative act of negligence: he was in a position to see that the truss was improperly attached to the crane cable but failed to warn Danks or C&R's owner that the truss was being lifted and moved in an improper and hazardous manner. Id., ¶ 33. The court of appeals rejected Danks' argument, concluding that Wagner's conduct was at most `passive misconduct,' not an affirmative act of negligence that increased the risk of harm to Danks from the loading operation. Id. ¶ 29 Turning to the facts of the case now before this court, we conclude that FMC's alleged negligent conduct did not constitute an affirmative act of negligence. The allegations in Tatera's complaint are grounded in FMC's alleged omission, namely, the failure to warn Walter and B&M of the health hazards associated with asbestos and asbestos-containing products. Specifically, the complaint alleges five negligent acts: (1) the failure to adequately warn of the health hazards of asbestos; (2) the failure to warn of the danger and harm of the asbestos after the products or equipment were installed at the premises; (3) the failure to investigate or test for the health effects of asbestos prior to distribution and sale; (4) the failure to instruct in the use of precautionary measures relating to asbestos-containing products; and (5) the manufacture, supply, installation, or removal of unsafe asbestos-containing products. [17] The first four alleged negligent acts are disposed of with dispatch. By definition, the failure to warn, the failure to investigate or test, and the failure to instruct are omissions, not affirmative acts. As the court of appeals recognized in Danks, the failure to warn is at most `passive misconduct,' not an affirmative act of negligence. 298 Wis.2d 348, ¶ 33, 727 N.W.2d 846. Likewise, FMC's alleged failure to investigate or test for the health effects of asbestos is akin to Jump River's alleged failure to discover and act regarding the electrical safety violations in Estate of Thompson, see 225 Wis.2d at 601, 593 N.W.2d 901; such conduct does not constitute an affirmative act of negligence but rather `passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect' the plaintiff from harm. Wagner, 143 Wis.2d at 390, 421 N.W.2d 835 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., supra, § 56, at 373). ¶ 30 The fifth negligent act alleged against FMC relates to FMC supplying the asbestos-containing friction disks to B&M to be machined. Though not as explicit as the previous four, this act is also grounded in FMC's alleged failure to warn. Contrary to Tatera's argument and the court of appeals' conclusion otherwise, see Tatera, 319 Wis.2d 688, ¶ 51, 768 N.W.2d 198, [18] the act of supplying the asbestos-containing friction disks to B&M does not itself constitute an affirmative act of negligence. The act of supplying the asbestos-containing friction disks is no doubt affirmative, but the mere fact that FMC supplied the disks to B&M is not enough to impose liability on FMC for committing an affirmative act of negligence. That is, supplying a dangerous chattel does not alone give rise to negligence. The crux of Tatera's claim is the alleged failure to warn of the dangerousness of the chattel supplied. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388. As previously discussed, the failure to warn is not an affirmative act. Danks, 298 Wis.2d 348, ¶ 33, 727 N.W.2d 846. ¶ 31 Tatera attempts to create an exception to the general rule protecting principal employers from liability by imposing traditional negligence liability under § 388 onto a principal employer that supplies a chattel to an independent contractor to be machined. However, permitting such liability to attach would completely undermine our three decades of precedent that requires an affirmative act of negligence. Liability for supplying a dangerous chattel is necessarily premised in failing to warn of the chattel's dangerousness, an omission. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388(c); see also Strasser, 236 Wis.2d 435, ¶ 58, 613 N.W.2d 142; Wis. JICivil 3242. The affirmative act exception would be eviscerated if a principal employer's liability is met through an omission. We decline to so hold and thereby overturn over three decades of precedent. Because FMC's alleged negligent conduct did not constitute an affirmative act of negligence, the first exception to Wagner 's general rule of non-liability is here inapplicable.