Opinion ID: 169643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of Transaction

Text: We begin by addressing the argument that the enhancement applies only to a bargained-for exchange or agreement between two or more traders in child pornography. Although the application note contains terms familiar to contract law, the plain language of the provision itself counsels against a narrow interpretation of its application. A person need only have the expectation of receipt of something of value for the enhancement to apply. This expectation need not arise from an underlying agreement to exchange child pornography or distribute it in return for a thing of value. Although the application note indicates that bartering and other inkind transaction[s] are examples of transactions to which the enhancement applies, it does not limit the definition of transaction to these examples. We therefore agree with the Second Circuit's interpretation of the note's language: The word `including' before the examples indicates that any transaction  so long as it involves the `expectation' of the `receipt' of a `thing of value'  suffices to trigger the subsection's enhancement. United States v. Maneri, 353 F.3d 165, 170 (2d Cir.2003); see also United States v. Oldham, 177 Fed.Appx. 842, 846-47 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (agreeing with the Second Circuit's holding that a defendant may have an expectation in the absence of a specific agreement with another person). Hence, Mr. Geiner need not have entered into a specific agreement or understanding with other individuals for the enhancement to apply. The enhancement applies if he engaged in any transaction with the expectation that he would receive a thing of value. Our recent discussion of distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A in United States v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir.2007), illustrates how Mr. Geiner's conduct constitutes a transaction. In Shaffer, we interpreted the term distribution under § 2252A(a)(2) [4] according to its plain meaning, holding that a defendant distributes child pornography under the statute by distributing, delivering, transferring, or dispersing it to others. Id. at 1223-24 (internal quotation marks omitted). We specifically held that a defendant distributes child pornography by making computer files containing child pornography available for others to download. Id. at 1223. We likened a defendant who makes computer files available in this manner to the owner of a self-serve gas station: [N]either the owner nor his or her agents may ever pump gas. But the owner has a roadside sign letting all passersby know that, if they choose, they can stop and fill their cars for themselves, paying at the pump by credit card. Just because the operation is self-serve . . . we do not doubt for a moment that the gas station owner is in the business of distributing[ ] . . . gasoline. Id. at 1223-24. We also do not doubt that the gas station owner and the passerby engage in a transaction, which includes both an act or an instance of conducting business or other dealings . . . [and][a]ny activity involving two or more persons. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004). Hence, the meaning of distribution under § 2252A easily falls within the meaning of the word transaction. [5] Here, Mr. Geiner does not dispute that he attempted to distribute child pornography within the meaning of § 2252A. In addition, he does not contest the District Court's finding that a governmental agent was able to download files containing child pornography from his computer. Because his conduct satisfies our definition of distribution in Shaffer, 472 F.3d at 1224, it also constitutes a transaction as that term is used in the application note to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. See Shaffer, 472 F.3d at 1224 (holding that defendant distributed child pornography under § 2252A when others downloaded it after he made it available through his use of a file-sharing program). Consequently, the only remaining question is whether Mr. Geiner expected to receive a thing of value.