Opinion ID: 1652318
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plea Agreements of Codefendants

Text: Johnson argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to question the veniremembers as to their feelings regarding the credibility of State witnesses that testify pursuant to a plea agreement. The State made the following remarks during the general voir dire: Ladies and gentlemen, two of the State's witnesses in this case, Antwane Grant and Rodriguez Grant, were charged with different but related offenses due to activities they engaged in before and after the murders for which the defendant is charged. In exchange for Rodriguez Grant's truthful testimony in this case, the State has agreed to recommend a sentence of 10 years in prison for aiding and abetting Ernest Johnson before the defendant allegedly committed a robbery.... And in exchange for Antwane Grant's truthful testimony in this case, the State has agreed not to prosecute him for two charges of tampering with evidence committed after the defendant allegedly perpetrated the offenses.... [Is] there any member of this panel, just based on that, [who] would refuse to listen to and consider the testimony of these two witnesses because of feelings that the State should never make such agreements in return for testimony? Rulings on voir dire questions will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of the trial court's discretion. [4] Johnson concedes that review of this issue is further restricted to that of plain error, due to the lack of a timely objection. He must, therefore, demonstrate that the action of the trial court was not only erroneous, but that the error so substantially impacted upon his rights that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice will result if the error is left uncorrected. [5] The general rule is that it is error to tell a jury about codefendants who have pleaded guilty because it taints the trial with the unfair implication of guilt by association. [6] Under certain circumstances, however, such a disclosure during voir dire may not be prejudicial, especially where the defendant has opportunity to cross-examine the codefendants during the trial. [7] The determination of prejudice is necessarily made on a case-by-case basis. [8] Voir dire is the most practical method for probing the minds of the prospective jurors to ascertain those who are fair and impartial and those who are biased and prejudiced. [9] The State is entitled to elicit from prospective jurors any preconceived notions that they might have concerning the law and to ask specifically whether they would refuse to consider the testimony of State witnesses with the benefit of a plea agreement. [10] As Johnson's codefendants gave eyewitness testimony concerning Johnson's actions immediately before and after the murders took place, the State had the right to discern any prejudice on the panel against testimony procured by the terms of a plea agreement. Once the jury was empaneled, the plea agreements were not used as substantive evidence against Johnson. [11] Both codefendants took the stand at trial, affording Johnson the opportunity for cross-examination. Cross-examination of each codefendant involved questions concerning the details of the plea agreements. For these reasons, and in light of the overwhelming physical evidence against Johnson, this Court finds that no miscarriage of justice occurred. On a directly related claim, Johnson argues for the first time on appeal that his guilt-phase trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve this issue for review other than for plain error. Johnson's failure to raise this issue before the Rule 29.15 motion court waived this claim. [12]