Opinion ID: 1670122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred by failing to allow testimony of two of the City of Jackson's fact witnesses.

Text: ¶ 13. On February 27, 2002, Engine Parts submitted its First Set of Interrogatories to the City of Jackson. Engine Parts filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, and the City of Jackson submitted its Response to the interrogatories on June 17, 2002. Engine Parts' Interrogatory Numbers 2 and 3 and the City of Jackson's respective responses were as follows: Interrogatory No. 2: Identify by name, address and present whereabouts each person other than an expert whom you will call as a witness at the trial of this case and state after each person the subject or subjects upon which he or she is expected to testify. Response: This has yet to be determined, but this response will be supplemented in a seasonable manner pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Interrogatory No. 3: Identify by name, address and present whereabouts all persons who you claim to have knowledge of the facts and claims set forth in your answer. Response: Dan Still ... Lanier Wilcher... Mavis Collins ... and Bwana Jones. ¶ 14. On December 20, 2002, the trial court entered its Order Setting Deadlines for Discovery wherein both parties were to have completed all discovery by April 30, 2003. A pre-trial conference was held on October 29, 2003. At this conference, the trial court ordered the parties to exchange final witness lists by October 31, 2003. On October 31, 2003 (six days prior to trial), the City of Jackson produced a witness list that included nine individuals. Of these nine individuals, only two witnesses, Lanier Wilcher and Mavis Collins, had been previously identified by the City of Jackson's response to Interrogatory No. 3 as having any knowledge of the facts and claims of the case. Engine Parts then filed a Motion in Limine to exclude the testimony of all witnesses other than those who had previously been identified in the City's response to Interrogatory No. 3. In granting the motion the trial judge stated that, there has been ample opportunity here since December, at least December of last year, which is almost a year ago, for compliance with notification as to who the anticipated witnesses, or who will be called for trial testimony by the city. And that has not been done. The trial judge referred to Busick v. St. John, 856 So.2d 304 (Miss.2003), when making his ruling to exclude the testimony of the newly added witnesses. ¶ 15. The trial court has wide and considerable discretion in matters relating to discovery; its order will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. at 319. In Busick, the plaintiff requested permission to allow the testimony of her husband 17 days before the start of the trial, furthermore she offered her mother and daughter as witnesses the day of the trial. Id. at 320. In ruling that the testimony of the surprise witnesses was properly excluded, this Court stated that [w]e have long held that the rules of discovery are to prevent trial by ambush. Id. at 321 (citing Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So.2d 911, 917 (Miss.2002)). Furthermore, this Court has found that trial courts are committed to the discovery rules because they promote fair trials. Once an opponent requests discoverable material, an attorney has a duty to comply with the request regardless of the advantage a surprise may bring. Id., citing Williams v. Dixie Elec. Power Ass'n, 514 So.2d 332, 335 (Miss.1987). ¶ 16. The City of Jackson argues that the Court in Busick not only determined that the disclosure was untimely, but that the exclusion of the witnesses did not result in prejudice to the plaintiff. While the Court did find in Busick that the exclusion of the witnesses did not result in prejudice, this Court has ruled that litigants have an obligation to timely comply with the orders of the trial courts. Salts v. Gulf Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 872 So.2d 667, 674 (Miss.2004). This Court stated in Salts, quoting Bowie v. Montfort Jones Memorial Hospital, 861 So.2d 1037, 1042 (Miss.2003), that, Our trial judges are afforded considerable discretion in managing the pre-trial discovery process in their courts, including the entry of scheduling orders setting out various deadlines to assure orderly pre-trial preparation resulting in timely disposition of the cases. Our trial judges also have a right to expect compliance with their orders, and when parties and/or attorneys fail to adhere to the provisions of these orders, they should be prepared to do so at their own peril (citations omitted).    While the end result in today's case may appear to be harsh, litigants must understand that there is an obligation to timely comply with the orders of our trial courts. Id. ¶ 17. The trial judge here was correct in excluding the testimony of the newly added witnesses. The City submitted its discovery responses on June 17, 2002. The trial court entered the discovery order on December 20, 2002, designating all discovery to be complete on April 30, 2003. The City had almost a year to supplement its responses and failed to do so. Furthermore, the City waited an additional six months after discovery was closed to reveal additional witnesses, and then only within a week of the trial. Therefore, the proposed witnesses were correctly precluded from testifying at trial.