Opinion ID: 2757999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Generic Aggravated Assault

Text: This court uses “a common sense” approach when determining whether a state conviction qualifies as an enumerated offense. 10 Under the commonsense approach, this court decides whether a violation of the statute of conviction constitutes the enumerated offense as it is understood in its “ordinary, contemporary, [and] common meaning.” 11 The “primary source for the generic contemporary meaning of aggravated assault is the Model Penal Code.” 12 The “statute of conviction need not perfectly correlate with the Model Penal Code; ‘minor differences’ are acceptable.” 13 The Model Penal Code provides: A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon. 14 “The generic, contemporary meaning of aggravated assault is an assault carried out under certain aggravating circumstances.” 15 “Assault, in turn, 10 United States v. Izaguirre–Flores, 405 F.3d 270, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2005). 11 Id. at 275 (citation omitted). 12 United States v. Esparza–Perez, 681 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Torres–Diaz, 438 F.3d 529, 536 (5th Cir. 2006)). 13 United States v. Mungia–Portillo, 484 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 2007). 14 Model Penal Code § 211.1(2). 15 Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d at 231 (citation omitted). 6 Case: 14-40019 Document: 00512858868 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/05/2014 No. 14-40019 requires proof that the defendant either caused, attempted to cause, or threatened to cause bodily injury or offensive contact to another person.” 16 The mens rea required for aggravated assault under the Model Penal Code is extreme recklessness. 17 However, this court has held that ordinary recklessness was sufficient to place a state aggravated assault offense within the Guidelines definition, as long as the state statute otherwise matched up with the generic offense. 18 The two most common factors raising an assault to an aggravated assault are “the causation of serious bodily injury and the use of a deadly weapon.” 19 “Physical force in the context of § 2L1.2 requires force capable of causing pain or injury to another person.” 20 Offensive touching, without more, does not constitute the type of violent force typically associated with the generic offense of aggravated assault. 21 However, “the touching of an individual with a deadly weapon creates a sufficient threat of force to qualify as a crime of violence.” 22 Moreover, a defendant need not actually employ force; the threatened use of force is sufficient. 23 This court has “not recognized any distinction between a dangerous weapon and a deadly one,” 24 so the reference 16 Id. (citations omitted). 17 See United States v. Ocampo-Cruz, 561 F. App’x 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (construing North Carolina statute). 18 See United States v. Guerrero-Robledo, 565 F.3d 940, 947-48 (5th Cir. 2009) (construing South Carolina statute); Mungia-Portillo, 484 F.3d at 817 (construing Tennessee statute). 19 Mungia-Portillo, 484 F.3d at 817. 20 United States v. Garcia-Figueroa, 753 F.3d 179, 185 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 21 United States v. Herrera-Alvarez, 753 F.3d 132, 141 (5th Cir. 2014). 22 United States v. Dominguez, 479 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2007). 23 Garcia-Figueroa, 753 F.3d at 185-86. 24 United States v. Padilla-Loera, 559 F. App’x 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 7 Case: 14-40019 Document: 00512858868 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/05/2014 No. 14-40019 to a “dangerous weapon” in Leal-Rax’s state charging document is of no concern.