Opinion ID: 1785185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Procedural Assignments of Appellant

Text: In this Court appellant has asserted, for the first time, that the record transmitted to the chancery court from the Health Facilities Commission was incomplete, in that it did not contain a copy of the final order of the Commission granting the certificate of need. There is no contention that the Commission failed to enter an order or to furnish the parties with copies. The omission of the final order apparently was never called to the attention of the Chancellor while the case was pending before him. Indeed, counsel for appellant concedes that the omission was not discovered until appellate briefs were being prepared. Ordinarily, of course, the omission of the final decision of the Commission would be a serious matter. T.C.A. § 4-519 requires that a final decision or order in a contested case shall be in writing or stated in the record. The final decision must include findings of fact, conclusions of law and a statement of reasons for the ultimate decision. Further, the record in a contested case is required to include any decision, opinion or report by the agency or the officer presiding at the hearing. T.C.A. § 4-514(f)(6). We have already noted that the present case has followed an unusual procedural course. In the chancery court, appellant was permitted to take extensive new evidence, not by any means confined to irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record... . as provided in T.C.A. § 4-523(g). Not only were the Commissioners and personnel of the agencies interrogated at length, but a copy of the deliberative session of the Commission, at which it decided to grant the application, was filed as an exhibit. Since all of this evidence was apparently considered by the Chancellor, and since no mention was made in the chancery court of the omission of the final order itself, we are of the opinion that appellant has waived this procedural irregularity and that no useful purpose would now be served by our remanding the case to the chancery court, with directions that the Commission supply a copy of the order for the record. Indeed, appellant almost concedes as much in its brief, and primarily relies upon other assignments of error for reversal. Under these circumstances, we overrule the assignments dealing with the omission of the final order of the Commission from the administrative record. Appellant further insists that it was deprived of the right of cross-examination of witnesses before the area-wide agency, the Mid-Cumberland Comprehensive Health Planning Council. In this regard, the record shows that a physician testified for the applicant, and was then required by reason of prior commitments to leave the hearing. It is not shown what evidence, if any, appellant expected to elicit from him by cross-examination. This witness was available and was cross-examined at a subsequent hearing before the Health Facilities Commission. Although T.C.A. § 53-5412(B) does provide for cross-examination of opposing witnesses before an area-wide health planning agency, we agree with the Chancellor that the denial of cross-examination to appellant under the above circumstances does not amount to reversible error. The most serious assignment of error, from a purely procedural standpoint, deals with the receipt by members of the Health Facilities Commission of ex parte, informal, personal communications concerning the subject matter of the hearings. This practice is expressly prohibited by T.C.A. § 4-521  one of the sections of the Act, however, which had not taken effect at the time the administrative hearings involved in this case were being held. Several members of the Commission apparently had informal discussions with other persons prior to the final hearing on May 29, 1975, some of these being merely general inquiries but some of them dealing with the issue of the need for an additional hospital in Wilson County. As noted by the Chancellor, none of the members of the Commission appear to have been motivated by anything other than a sincere desire to obtain information, and none of them acted for any improper purpose. Most of the information which they received was of a general nature, and all of it was cumulative to other testimony given at the formal hearing. The Chancellor noted that T.C.A. § 4-521 does not contain any express provisions as to the consequences of a violation, and a reviewing court should reverse under T.C.A. § 4-523(i) only if it finds that an error affected the merits of the decision complained of. Since the provisions of T.C.A. § 4-521 were not in effect at the time of the administrative hearings, there was not an actual violation of the Act, and we can find nothing in the testimony of any of the Commissioners which would lead us to believe that information was received which materially affected their ultimate decision. We have previously noted that an affirmative vote of only six members was required under T.C.A. § 53-5407, while nine members actually concurred in the final decision which was reached. Only one member initiated any extensive discussions, and his actions were clearly well-intentioned and motivated only by a desire to render a conscientious decision. The assignments of error pertaining to this issue are, therefore, overruled. Appellant contends that the administrative agencies had failed to promulgate adequate written criteria or guidelines for evaluating applications for certificates at the time of the hearings in question. This contention is not borne out by the record, which reveals both written guidelines and hearing procedures in effect when the hearings were held. Appellant further assigns as error the absence of a public hearing by an adjacent area-wide agency, the Upper Cumberland Council, having jurisdiction over counties east of Wilson, from which the proposed facilities might receive patients. The terms of T.C.A. § 53-5412 provide for public hearings by only one area agency, and this assignment is overruled.