Opinion ID: 1996184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Other Challenges

Text: Appellant's other two contentions merit only brief discussion. First, appellant contends that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding the requisite intent for aiding and abetting second-degree murder. See Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818 (D.C.2006) ( en banc ). Even assuming error, however, it would be harmless because appellant's conviction for second-degree murder merges with his conviction for felony murder. [8] Appellant's other argument is that he was denied due process because the trial judge assumed a prosecutorial role. Specifically, appellant claims that the trial judge asked him questions in such a way to telegraph [his] skepticism of appellant's testimony. Appellant also complains about the five or six instances where the trial judge said the word sustained even before the government raised an objection. Appellant concedes that the plain-error standard of review applies because his trial counsel failed to object below. Under the plain-error standard, [t]here must be an `error' that is `plain,' and that `affect[s] substantial rights.' United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Even then, we may not exercise our discretion to correct a forfeited error unless it `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (citations omitted). We have stated before that the trial court must not take on the role of a partisan. . . . Prosecution and judgment are two separate functions in the administration of justice; they must not merge. Johnson v. United States, 613 A.2d 888, 895 (D.C.1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have also said, though, that a trial judge may properly ask questions of a witness, including the defendant, when he deems that the end of justice may be served thereby. Greenhow v. United States, 490 A.2d 1130, 1135 (D.C.1985) (quoting Griffin v. United States, 83 U.S.App. D.C. 20, 21, 164 F.2d 903, 904 (1947)). On this record, we cannot say that the trial court's questions or its anticipatory sustained rulings  even when considered collectively-meet the high standard of plain  error review. Indeed, even assuming they were error, appellant has not and cannot demonstrate that these errors affect substantial rights, much less that they seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. First, regarding the trial court's questioning of defendant, we note that we rejected a similar plain-error challenge in Greenhow. In that case, the court had questioned the defendant sua sponte about whether he was employed at the time of his arrest. 490 A.2d at 1135. The court then called a bench conference to alert the prosecutor that the defendant had previously given an inconsistent response to the court's intake personnel. Armed with the court's intake paperwork, the prosecutor then impeached the defendant in front of the jury. Id. at 1136. Even though the defendant's credibility and his employment status were key to his defense, we held that Mr. Greenhow's substantial rights were not affected because, inter alia, he had an opportunity, in responding to the court's question, to make a logical answer explaining his conduct . . . consistent with his [defense] theory. Id. (quoting Griffin, 83 U.S.App. D.C. at 21, 164 F.2d at 904); see also United States v. Spencer, 306 U.S.App. D.C. 399, 404, 25 F.3d 1105, 1110 (1994) (defendant not prejudiced by trial court's questioning of his alibi witness, even though questions arguably connoted the court's disbelief, because witness' response could have assisted the defense theory); Griffin, 83 U.S.App. D.C. at 21, 164 F.2d at 904 (defendant not prejudiced by court's questioning of him where his responses supported his self-defense theory). In this case, the court questioned appellant about his inconsistent explanations for why he confessed to a crime that he did not commit. [9] Like the situations in Greenhow, Spencer, and Griffin, we find that appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's questioning because, inter alia, his responses could have helped his defense. Had the jury believed him, appellant's responses might have explained why he gave a false confession. Furthermore, that appellant's trial counsel apparently perceived the court's questioning as innocuous enough not to object or even pose any follow-up questions is just another indication of a lack of prejudice. See Golsun v. United States, 592 A.2d 1054, 1060 (D.C.1991). [10] We are similarly unpersuaded that the trial court's preemptive sustained rulings affected appellant's substantial rights or seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. It is well settled that trial judges have wide latitude to control the conduct of a trial and ensure that counsel's questioning of witnesses, including on cross-examination, comport with evidentiary rules. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 883 A.2d 76, 81-82 (D.C. 2005). Furthermore, we note that appellant does not even attempt to argue that the trial court's rulings were incorrect on the merits. In one instance, for example, the trial court stopped defense counsel from cross-examining a witness about a matter upon which he was not qualified to testify. On another occasion, the trial court stopped defense counsel from repeating a question that the expert had already stated she could not answer. Even if we were to assume that the trial court erred by interjecting a sustained before the government had made an objection, we cannot say that these five or six instances affected appellant's substantial rights or seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. [11] Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770.