Opinion ID: 2441634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Capital Punishment Arguments

Text: Echols asks us to reconsider our holding in Wilson v. State, 271 Ark. 682, 611 S.W.2d 739 (1981), and to declare the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment. We adhere to our prior holdings. In Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993), we rejected the defendant's argument that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment and stated that both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment. In Wilson v. State, the case referred to by Echols, we rejected the defendant's argument that life without parole was cruel and unusual punishment and stated that it has long been this court's holding that sentencing within the statutory limits is not cruel and unusual punishment. Echols's next argument involves the statutory overlap between the elements of capital murder and first-degree murder. In this argument his initial predicate is that there is no clear difference between the elements of capital murder, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101 (Repl.1993), and the elements of first-degree murder, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-102 (Repl. 1993). His next step in the argument is to state that the prosecutor has discretion in choosing whether to file a capital murder charge or a first-degree murder charge, and, if capital murder is charged, the jury is then left to speculate about the degree of offense to which it should affix a finding of guilt. The final step in the argument is that it is not until the penalty phase of the trial, after the jury has already determined the defendant to be guilty of capital murder, that the jury considers aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We have already answered this argument, and we adhere to our prior holding. In Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995), we said: Nooner raises the spectre of unconstitutional overlapping between our capital murder statute and first degree murder statute in that the two statutes blur and proscribe the same conduct. According to his theory, the statutes do not give proper notice of the criminal offenses and are void for vagueness. This court has discounted this argument on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Greene v. State, 317 Ark. 350, 878 S.W.2d 384 (1994); Sanders v. State, 317 Ark. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 (1994); Buchanan v. State, 315 Ark. 227, 866 S.W.2d 395 (1993); Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992); Van Pelt v. State, 306 Ark. 624, 816 S.W.2d 607 (1991); Smith v. State, 306 Ark. 483, 815 S.W.2d 922 (1991). Id. at 105-06, 907 S.W.2d at 687. In Nooner , this court also explained that it was acceptable for the jury to not consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances until the penalty phase of the trial. The court stated: Nooner argues that the definition of capital murder does not sufficiently narrow the crime for which the death penalty can be imposed. He specifically alludes to overlap between definitions of capital murder and first degree murder, which we have already discussed. The United States Supreme Court has held that the required narrowing of crimes susceptible to the death penalty may occur at the penalty phase of the trial. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). This court has previously held that our statutes pass the narrowing requirement by limiting the death penalty to crimes involving sufficient aggravating circumstances. See Sheridan v. State, supra . There is no merit to Nooner's contention. Id. at 107, 907 S.W.2d at 687-88. In Echols's next point, he initially states that Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603 (Repl. 1993), requires the jury to impose the death sentence if it unanimously returns certain written findings. From that predicate he argues that the instruction quoting the statute is binding, and a binding instruction is unlawful. Finally, he asserts that if the statute were declared unconstitutional, there would be no need to qualify a jury for the death penalty. Again, the argument is without merit. Section 5-4-603 of the Arkansas Code Annotated provides in pertinent part: (a) The jury shall impose a sentence of death if it unanimously returns written findings that: (1) Aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Aggravating circumstances outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist; and (3) Aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt. (b) The jury shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole if it finds that: (1) Aggravating circumstances do not exist beyond a reasonable doubt; or (2) Aggravating circumstances do not outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist; or (3) Aggravating circumstances do not justify a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603(a) & (b) (Repl. 1993). In Hill v. State, 289 Ark. 387, 713 S.W.2d 233 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1331, 94 L.Ed.2d 182 (1987), we held that Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603 does not require a mandatory death sentence, but rather provides specified criteria that must be fully satisfied before the death sentence can be imposed. More recently, in Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995), we held: Nooner maintains that our sentencing statutes demand a death sentence and eliminate consideration of mercy by the jury. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603 (Repl. 1993). We have previously held that this is not the case. See Cox v. State, 313 Ark. 184, 853 S.W.2d 266 (1993); Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993); Henderson v. State, 311 Ark. 398, 844 S.W.2d 360 (1993); Johnson v. State, supra . We have underscored that our statute provides that a jury is free to sentence to life without parole if it finds the aggravating circumstances do not justify death. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603(b)(3) (Repl.1993). There was no error on this point. Id. at 106-07, 907 S.W.2d at 687. The wording of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603 and our case law applying the statute make it clear that the statute does not contain a binding instruction. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Echols's motion to declare Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603 unconstitutional. Echols contends that Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604(8) (Supp.1995) is unconstitutionally vague because it provides that the jury can find an aggravating circumstance upon a finding that a murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. In his argument, he first notes that the prior statute, which provided that the jury could consider the heinous, atrocious or cruel nature of the crime was struck down by this court in Wilson v. State, 295 Ark. 682, 751 S.W.2d 734 (1988) as being overbroad because it did not provide a clear standard to distinguish between ordinary and especially cruel capital murders. He then states that we have not reviewed the statute since it was amended, and that the cruel and depraved language does not provide a genuine narrowing of the types of persons deserving a life sentence from those eligible for the death penalty. In addition to arguing that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, Echols argues that it is unconstitutional as applied to him because there is insufficient evidence that he inflicted serious physical abuse or did so for a considerable period of time before killing the three boys, and that there is insufficient evidence that establishes that Echols intended to inflict mental anguish or did so prior to any killing. Pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603, the death penalty cannot be imposed unless the State can prove the existence of an aggravating circumstance. In the present case, the jury found the aggravating circumstance that the murders were committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. Section 5-4-604 provides the following regarding an especially cruel or depraved manner: Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: . . . . (8)(A) The capital murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. (B) For purposes of this subdivision (8), a capital murder is committed in an especially cruel manner when, as part of a course of conduct intended to inflict mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death, mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture is inflicted. Mental anguish is defined as the victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate. Serious physical abuse is defined as physical abuse that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Torture is defined as the infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the victim's death. (C) For purposes of this subdivision (8), a capital murder is committed in an especially depraved manner when the person relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion, or shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure in committing the murder. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604(8) (Supp.1995). In Willett v. State, 322 Ark. 613, 911 S.W.2d 937 (1995), we addressed the defendant's argument that the statutory definition of the aggravating circumstance of especially cruel or depraved was void for vagueness on its face and as applied to him. The defendant claimed that the definitions did not provide clear and objective standards to the jury. We rejected the arguments and held: The General Assembly rewrote this aggravating circumstance in Act 683 of 1991 after this court declared in Wilson v. State, 295 Ark. 682, 751 S.W.2d 734 (1988), that its statutory predecessor was unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution. The 1991 statutory amendment includes language substantially similar, if not identical, to language upheld as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Greene, 317 Ark. 350, 878 S.W.2d 384. For the reasons stated by the Supreme Court in Walton, our statute is therefore not void on its face. Id. at 629, 911 S.W.2d at 945. See also Johnson v. State, 326 Ark. 430, 934 S.W.2d 179 (1996). Thus, the trial court correctly denied Echols's motion to hold Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604(8) unconstitutional. Moreover, the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Echols. In the present case, the jury was instructed on cruel and depraved manner as follows: For definition purposes, cruel manner is defined: A capital murder is in an especially cruel manner when as a part of a course of conduct intended to inflict mental anguish, serious physical abuse or torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death, mental anguish, serious physical abuse or torture is inflicted. Mental anguish is defined as the victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate. Serious physical abuse is defined as physical abuse that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted impairment of health or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Torture is defined as the infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the victim's death. Depraved manner is defined as a capital murder is committed in an especially depraved manner when the person relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion or shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure in committing the murder. There was substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that the murders were committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. At least one of the victims had defensive wounds. The autopsy revealed that two of the victims died by drowning, but that their head wounds were so severe that they would have died from them if they had not drowned. There was evidence that these two victims were tortured before they drowned. The third victim bled to death. Echols contends that the death penalty imposed on him is out of proportion to his conduct and is, therefore, cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. He argues that a proportionality review is a requirement under Arkansas law and that his death sentence should be compared to other death sentences in Arkansas and, in particular, to Baldwin's sentence to life without parole. He contends that we might infer aggravating circumstances from the nature and extent of the wounds, but argues that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances. Finally, in this argument, he contends that when his death sentence is compared to the life sentences of Baldwin and Misskelley, the death sentence was freakishly and arbitrarily applied. In Willett v. State, 322 Ark. 613, 911 S.W.2d 937 (1995), we stated that we would no longer conduct proportionality reviews of death sentences and cited Williams v. State, 321 Ark. 344, 902 S.W.2d 767 (1995) for the reasons. In Williams, we wrote: The state has asked this court to conduct a proportionality review which we have done in the past. See Sanders v. State, 317 Ark. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 (1994); Parker v. State, 300 Ark. 360, 779 S.W.2d 156 (1989); Hill v. State, 289 Ark. 387, 713 S.W.2d 233 (1986). Comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally mandated in every case where the death sentence is imposed. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). Our Legislature, by enacting recent sentencing procedures, has provided a statutory check on arbitrariness by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the jury is provided with information on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and with standards in the use of that information. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-4-103, 5-4-603-605 (Repl.1993). Additionally, our review upon appeal includes a review of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented to the jury and a harmless error review of the jury's findings. See § 5-4-603. Id. at 352-53, 902 S.W.2d at 772.