Opinion ID: 554071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Initiation of state proceedings

Text: 23 American argues that, even if state proceedings could be considered terminated by virtue of the worksharing agreement, they could not be initiated with the IDHR until the EEOC deferred the charges to the IDHR. 7 This argument is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972). In that case, the Court determined that Title VII's deferral requirement was satisfied without the transmission of a written charge to a state agency as long as the procedure satisfied the purposes of the statute by insuring that the state agency has an opportunity to process charges first. 24 In Love, the EEOC had notified the state agency by telephone that it had received a charge. When the state agency informed the EEOC that it was not interested in acting on the charge, the EEOC proceeded with its investigation. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that state proceedings had not been commenced within the meaning of Title VII because the plaintiff had not filed a written charge with the state agency. In so holding, the Court emphasized that [t]he filing procedure fully complied with the intent of [Title VII]. Id. at 525, 92 S.Ct. at 618. The Court went on to state that the purposes of Title VII were to give state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints and to ensure expedition in the filing and handling of those complaints. Id. at 526, 92 S.Ct. at 618. Although the procedure followed in this case differs from the procedure followed in Love, due to the specific terms of the worksharing agreement at issue, the reasoning of Love clearly indicates that a procedure that satisfies Title VII's purpose of ensuring that a state has an opportunity to play its role is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the EEOC. In Love, some communication was necessary between the state agency and the EEOC because there was no prospective waiver. Here, by contrast, no communication occurred between the IDHR and the EEOC because they had already communicated pursuant to the worksharing agreement. Therefore, a worksharing agreement could establish a procedure that permitted Mr. Sofferin's original filing with the EEOC to commence and terminate state proceedings. 8 25 Such a procedure for handling charges covered by waiver provisions would be fully consistent with the purposes of the deferral provisions of Title VII. These deferral provisions were intended to give states a reasonable opportunity to act under state law before the commencement of any Federal proceedings. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 117, 108 S.Ct. at 1672 (citation omitted). That congressional intent is fully satisfied when states voluntarily waive that opportunity through individually negotiated agreements. Id. 26 Congress clearly foresaw the possibility that States might decline to take advantage of the opportunity for enforcement afforded them by the deferral provisions. It therefore gave the EEOC the authority and responsibility to act when a State is unable or unwilling to provide relief. 110 Cong.Rec. 12725 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). This Court, too, has recognized that Congress envisioned federal intervention when States decline, for whatever reason, to take advantage of [their] opportunities to settle grievances in a voluntary and localized manner. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. at 761 [99 S.Ct. 2066, 2074, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) ].... [D]eferral was meant to work as a carrot, but not a stick, affording States an opportunity to act, but not penalizing their failure to do so other than by authorizing federal intervention. 27 Id. 486 U.S. at 118, 108 S.Ct. at 1673. We do not believe that a state would be deprived of its reasonable opportunity to act under state law if this state waived its right to process initially certain types of claims pursuant to a worksharing agreement. 9 Provided that waiver is a voluntary choice made through individually negotiated agreements, not an imposition by the Federal Government[,] waiver is consistent with the purposes of Title VII. Id. at 117, 108 S.Ct. at 1672. 28 Worksharing agreements are designed to ensure expedition in the filing and handling of complaints by allowing the state agency to facilitate the process by notifying the EEOC in advance of the agency's intention not to process initially a particular type of charge so that the EEOC can promptly begin its processing of such charges. To hold that the waiver cannot occur until the state has been notified of each individual charge and reconfirms what it has already agreed to do in a worksharing agreement would add a procedural technicality that would delay the processing of charges. This result would be contrary to Congress' intent to promote time economy and the expeditious handling of cases. Requiring reconfirmation of every waiver would needlessly delay the overwhelming majority of charges over which the state agency has waived its initial processing rights through its worksharing agreement. Thus, we are confident that a worksharing agreement could provide that a filing with the EEOC simultaneously initiates and terminates state proceedings. 29 However, on the record before us, we cannot say definitively that this worksharing agreement establishes an advance waiver by the IDHR of its jurisdiction when a claim is filed with the EEOC. In this case, the IDHR clearly entered into a worksharing agreement with the EEOC that waived the IDHR's exclusive sixty day right to process claims during the deferral period. Mr. Sofferin and the EEOC, one of the parties to the agreement, interpret the agreement as follows. While the IDHR is the only appropriate state agency to toll the 300-day time limit, the IDHR has relinquished its control over the initial processing of Mr. Sofferin's charge pursuant to a blanket waiver in the worksharing agreement. 10 Although charges are reviewed by Chicago EEOC employees designated as agents of the IDHR, this agent merely reviews whether the charge has already been waived. 11 Therefore, it is of no consequence that Mr. Sofferin filed his charge with the Detroit EEOC, despite the fact that the worksharing agreement was between the IDHR and the Chicago EEOC; EEOC regulations provide that a charge need not be filed in the state where the unlawful employment conduct occurred. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1601.8 (A charge may be made in person or by mail at the offices of the Commission in Washington, D.C., or any of its district, area or local offices or with any designated representative of the Commission.). The worksharing agreement created a relationship between the IDHR and the EEOC that required only that, for his charge to be timely, Mr. Sofferin file his charge with an EEOC office within 300 days of his discharge. 30 American argues for an entirely different construction of the worksharing agreement. American contends that waiver occurs only when the case is reviewed by the IDHR's agent and is determined to fall within the class of claims that are waived under the worksharing agreement. Because no agent of the IDHR could have reviewed the charge until 305 days after Mr. Sofferin's discharge, the charge was not initially instituted with the IDHR within the 300-day limit. 31 After reviewing the worksharing agreement, we cannot say that either Mr. Sofferin's or American's construction is entirely without support. We therefore respectfully disagree on this point with our colleague in the district court who was of the view that the agreement unambiguously required a waiver of each complaint by the IDHR. The crucial inquiry is whether the worksharing agreement provides for waiver of the right to initially institute proceedings at the time of the worksharing agreement itself, or at the time of the review of the IDHR agent. We remand to the district court so that it may hold an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the proper characterization of the IDHR agent's role in the waiver procedure.