Opinion ID: 76193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Test: Mobility of the Automobile and Probable Cause

Text: 16 In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that if there was probable cause to search a vehicle, a warrantless search would not be deemed in contravention of the Fourth Amendment if the facts of the case would have justified a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained. In Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam), the Supreme Court repeated this rule and stated: If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without more. Finally, in Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam), the Supreme Court made it clear again that no special exigency is required beyond a showing of the mobility of the automobile. 17 In Maryland, local law enforcement received a tip from a reliable confidential informant that the defendant had gone to New York to buy drugs, and would be returning to Maryland in a rented red Toyota later that day with a large quantity of cocaine. Id. at 465. A deputy sheriff investigated the tip and found that the license number given to him by the informant belonged to a red Toyota Corolla that had been rented to the defendant, who was a known drug dealer. Id. at 465-66. When the defendant returned in the rented car at 1:00 a.m., local law enforcement stopped and searched the vehicle, finding 23 grams of crack cocaine in a duffel bag in the trunk. Id. at 466. 18 Although the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated that in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to apply, there must not only be probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile, but also a separate finding of exigency precluding the police from obtaining a warrant. Id. Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded that although there was abundant probable cause, the search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant. Id. 19 In Maryland, the United States Supreme Court seemed to express some frustration in having to repeat the automobile exception for the third time, stating [a]s we recognized nearly 75 years ago ... there is an exception to [the warrant] requirement for searches of vehicles. And under our established precedent, the `automobile exception' has no separate exigency requirement. Id. The Supreme Court went on to state that it made this clear in [ Ross ], when we said that in cases where there was probable cause to search a vehicle `a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained. ' In [ Labron ], we repeated that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement. Id. at 467. The Supreme Court went on to conclude that in light of the fact that the defendant was driving his automobile at the time of his arrest, a finding of probable cause alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Id. 20 This Court also has recognized the limited showing necessary to justify a warrantless search in United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir.1990). In Nixon, law enforcement had obtained wiretap information indicating that one of the defendants would be driving from Ft. Lauderdale to Jacksonville the next week in a rented car with a package containing cocaine. Id. at 902. On the day of the scheduled trip, another intercepted phone call identified the estimated times that the defendant would be leaving Ft. Lauderdale and arriving in Jacksonville. Id. When the defendant was seen in a rented car traveling 81 m.p.h. on the route authorities thought he would be taking, he was stopped and a search of the trunk led to the seizure of two kilograms of powder cocaine. Id. 21 In Nixon, 918 F.2d at 903, this Court specifically rejected the defendant's contention that law enforcement agents can justify a warrantless search of an automobile only through some showing of exigent circumstances beyond the exigency inherent in the ready mobility of the vehicle. Rather, this Court made it clear that the requirement of exigent circumstances is satisfied by the `ready mobility' inherent in all automobiles that reasonably appear to be capable of functioning. Id. 22 It is clear from the above caselaw that there are only two questions that must be answered in the affirmative before authorities may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. The first is whether the automobile is readily mobile. All that is necessary to satisfy this element is that the automobile is operational. Nixon, 918 F.2d at 903. In this case, there is no dispute that Watts' Mustang was operational. 23 The second prong of the test, probable cause, is determined under the facts of each case. In this case, there is no dispute that the drug dogs' multiple positive responses constituted probable cause. See United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 402 (11th Cir.1993). 24 Because both elements of the automobile exception were satisfied, law enforcement was authorized to conduct a warrantless search of Watts' car. Consequently, the district court erred in granting Watts' motion to suppress.