Opinion ID: 2974697
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Character Evidence

Text: Mooneyham next argues that the district court committed reversible error by admitting statements that put his character in a negative light before the jury, in violation of Rule 404(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which bars the admission of character evidence to prove guilt. Mooneyham points specifically to two facets of Agent Williams’s testimony, first, McMahan’s statement that his supplier had been “in the penitentiary before” and, second, Williams’s comment at the beginning of his testimony that he had “known George Mooneyham pretty much since I’ve been a TBI agent.” Williams also mentioned the fact that “[Mooneyham] was the subject of some drug investigations by the TBI” and Agent Morris testified in passing that he knew Mooneyham because “[h]e was the subject of some drug investigations by the TBI.” Mooneyham did not object contemporaneously to any of these statements, but he did file a pleading labeled “continuing objection to any testimony about co-defendant McMahan’s source having been in the penitentiary” that was heard by the magistrate judge who handled pretrial proceedings and granted. The district court later inquired from the government whether it intended to introduce such evidence in the retrial of the case. The prosecution responded by indicating its intention to admit testimony that McMahan had stated to undercover agent Williams that his supplier had been in the penitentiary and had pulled an extra two years rather than “rat” anybody out. The district court ruled that the statement could be admitted and that Mooneyham need not make a contemporaneous objection. Significantly, however, the statements made by Agents Williams and Morris regarding their prior knowledge of Mooneyham do not fall within the ambit of this continuing objection. They must therefore be reviewed under the plain error standard, requiring a showing by the defendant (1) that their introduction was error, (2) that the error was “plain,” and (3) that it affected his substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, we will note the error if (4) it seriously affected “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 46567 (1997). The phrase “affects substantial rights” “means prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). We conclude that the district court did not commit an abuse of discretion in allowing Williams to testify as to McMahan’s statement that his unnamed supplier had served time in the penitentiary. As noted above, that statement was admissible because it “was made in furtherance of the conspiracy to assure Williams that the ‘source’ could be trusted.” Nos. 04-5189/5190 United States v. Mooneyham Page 6 The other references to Mooneyham’s prior incarceration raise a different question. The defendant describes the testimony of Agents Williams and Morris regarding their prior knowledge of Mooneyham as “gratuitous, with no other purpose other than to make Mooneyham look guilty.” Williams testified as follows: Q: Mr. Williams, do you know the defendant in this case? A: Yes, sir, I do. Q: And when did you first become aware of the defendant in this case? A: I’ve known . . . of George Mooneyham pretty much since I’ve been a TBI agent. A: And that’s been for ten and a half years, is that correct? Q: Yes, sir. Morris’s statements are perhaps less gratuitous and, as argued by the government, could reasonably be interpreted to mean that Morris’s knowledge of Mooneyham was limited to the particular TBI investigation at issue in the case: Q: So in April of 2000, you were still operating as a special agent in charge of the TBI drug unit here in East Tennessee? A: Yes, sir. Q: And for how long, sir, did you serve in that capacity? A: Two years. Q: Sir, are you familiar with the defendant in this case? A: Yes, sir. Q: And how is it that you know the defendant, sir? A: He was a subject of some drug investigations by the TBI. Q: Were you involved in that investigation at all? A: I was involved somewhat, not as much as the other agents. I assisted some on surveillance and assisted them. I was aware of it because I was their supervisor. Mooneyham argues that the prejudicial effect of these statements constitutes plain error because the evidence against him was not overwhelming. The government, on the other hand, argues that if the introduction of these brief references were admitted in error, they did not affect his substantial rights, in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. We agree and conclude that any error in the admission of the challenged testimony did not constitute reversible error. Nos. 04-5189/5190 United States v. Mooneyham Page 7