Opinion ID: 1746855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Exacting Scrutiny

Text: We conclude that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) serves compelling state interests. First, the state has a compelling interest in preventing fraud and libel. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964); New York Times Co, supra . [T]his interest carries special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large. McIntyre, supra at 349, 115 S.Ct. 1511. States have an interest in preserving the integrity of the election process. Brown, supra at 52, 102 S.Ct. 1523. This interest extends to protecting the process from distortions caused by false statements. Id. at 61, 102 S.Ct. 1523. The state also has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the judiciary. In Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 944 F.2d 137, 142 (C.A.3, 1991), the Third Circuit recognized this important interest: There can be no question ... that a state has a compelling interest in the integrity of its judiciary. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965), the Court upheld a state statute barring picketing near a courthouse, pointing out that [a] State may also properly protect the judicial process from being misjudged in the minds of the public. Id. at 565, 85 S.Ct. at 481. In another case, Justice Stewart said, There could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State's interest in the quality of its judiciary. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1546, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). The state's interest in the integrity of the judiciary extends to preserving public confidence in the judiciary. The appearance of fairness and impartiality is necessary to foster the people's willingness to accept and follow court orders. See, generally, Snyder, The constitutionality and consequences of restrictions on campaign speech by candidates for judicial office, 35 UCLA L R 207, 239-240 (1987). The state's interest in protecting the reputation of the judiciary is also a compelling interest. In re Kaiser, 111 Wash.2d 275, 288, 759 P.2d 392 (1988); see also Shepard, supra at 1067. We conclude, however, that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) is facially unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling interest. In Brown v. Hartlage, supra , the Supreme Court considered a Kentucky statute that voided an election because the victorious candidate had announced during his campaign that he intended to serve at a salary less than that fixed by law. The Court rejected the state's argument that its interest in protecting the political process from distortions caused by false or inaccurate statements justified the sanction. The Court concluded that, absent a showing that the candidate made the disputed statement other than in good faith and with knowledge of its falsity, or that he made it with reckless disregard of its falsity, the sanction was inconsistent with the atmosphere of robust political debate protected by the First Amendment. Brown, supra at 62, 102 S.Ct. 1523. Brown, supra at 60-61, 102 S.Ct. 1523, determined that First Amendment extends protection to all statements, but not the same level of protection: Of course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). But erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the `breathing space' that they `need ... to survive,' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-272, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). The Court then concluded that the harsh sanction, as applied to the candidate in Brown, did not afford the requisite breathing space. In so concluding, the Court explained that more speech, not enforced silence is the preferred remedy for untrue and inaccurate campaign speech. Id. at 61, 102 S.Ct. 1523, quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Like the statute in Brown, Canon 7(B)(1)(d) attaches adverse consequences to a candidate's statements that are not knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity. The canon applies to any statement that the candidate reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, [or] deceptive. It also applies to a statement that contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, and a statement that omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading. It further prohibits a statement that is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve. The canon, thus, essentially applies the restrictions imposed on lawyer advertising [8] to a candidate's political speech. The Supreme Court has held that the state may prohibit false, deceptive or misleading lawyer advertising and advertising concerning unlawful activities. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200-203, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982). Moreover, although the First Amendment protects truthful advertising relating to lawful activities, In re R.M.J., supra at 203, 102 S.Ct. 929, the state may regulate it nonetheless if the regulation is narrowly drawn and directly and materially advances a substantial government interest. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995). Canon 7(B)(1)(d), however, regulates political speech, not commercial speech. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the state may regulate commercial speech to an extent that it cannot regulate core First Amendment speech. In Florida Bar, supra at 623, 115 S.Ct. 2371, it explained: We have always been careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment's core. `Commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,' and is subject to `modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.' Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y.v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). We have observed that `[t]o require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.' 492 U.S. at 481, 109 S.Ct. 3028, quoting Ohralik, supra, 436 U.S. at 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912. We agree that the state's interest in preserving the integrity of the judiciary supports the imposition of greater restrictions on a candidate's speech during a campaign for judicial office than is permissible in other campaigns. See In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (C.A.7, 1995). That interest, albeit compelling, does not, however, support applying permissible restrictions on commercial speech to what is core political speech. We conclude that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) unnecessarily circumscribes protected expression. Canon 7(B)(1)(d) greatly chills debate regarding the qualifications of candidates for judicial office. It applies to all statements, not merely those statements that bear on the impartiality of the judiciary. [9] A candidate for judicial office faces adverse consequences for statements that are not false, but, rather, are found misleading or deceptive. Further, the canon extends beyond the candidate's actual statement to permit discipline for factual omissions. Faced with the prospect of future disciplinary action, a candidate's safest course may sometimes be to remain silent on many issues. To avoid the risk of discipline, a judicial candidate will merely state academic credentials, professional experience, and endorsements received. A rationale for judicial elections is that meaningful debate should periodically take place concerning the overall direction of the courts and the role of individual judges in contributing to that direction. Such debate is impossible if judicial candidates are overly fearful of potential discipline for what they say. By chilling this debate, Canon 7(B)(1)(d) impedes the public's ability to influence the direction of the courts through the electoral process. We recognize that the broad language of the canon is intended to promote civility in campaigns for judicial office. [10] Nevertheless, the state's interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary does not support the sweeping restraints imposed by Canon 7(B)(1)(d). The prohibition on misleading and deceptive statements quells the exchange of ideas because the safest response to the risk of disciplinary action may sometimes be to remain silent. The Supreme Court explained in Brown, supra at 61, 102 S.Ct. 1523, that the preferred First Amendment remedy for misstatements and misrepresentations during the campaign is to encourage speech, not stifle it. We conclude that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) fails to provide the necessary breathing space to satisfy the First Amendment. We therefore conclude that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) is not narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interests. As the Supreme Court observed in Brown, supra at 60, 102 S.Ct. 1523: [The First] Amendment embodies our trust in the free exchange of ideas as the means by which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad, and between candidates for political office. The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech. Accordingly, we hold that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) is facially unconstitutional.