Opinion ID: 2020300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The question before us, whether an order is final and appealable absent a Rule 304(a) finding where a contempt petition remains pending, is one of law, which we review de novo. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill.2d 324, 332, 266 Ill.Dec. 915, 775 N.E.2d 987 (2002). Rule 304(a) provides, in pertinent part: If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.    In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties. 210 Ill.2d R. 304(a). An order is final and appealable if it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate part thereof. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill.2d 153, 159, 229 Ill.Dec. 533, 692 N.E.2d 306 (1998). Absent a Rule 304(a) finding, a final order disposing of fewer than all of the claims is not an appealable order and does not become appealable until all of the claims have been resolved. Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill.2d 458, 464, 150 Ill.Dec. 572, 563 N.E.2d 459 (1990). This court has defined a claim as any right, liability or matter raised in an action. Marsh, 138 Ill.2d at 465, 150 Ill. Dec. 572, 563 N.E.2d 459. The rule was meant to discourage piecemeal appeals in the absence of a just reason and to remove the uncertainty which existed when a final judgment was entered on fewer than all of the matters in controversy. Marsh, 138 Ill.2d at 465, 150 Ill.Dec. 572, 563 N.E.2d 459. The appellate court below held that a contempt petition, although a part of the underlying action, does not raise a claim for relief in that action within the meaning of Rule 304(a). 376 Ill.App.3d at 763, 315 Ill.Dec. 806, 877 N.E.2d 1135. Therefore, according to the court, the order terminating maintenance was a final order as to all claims in the dissolution action and required no Rule 304(a) finding to be final and appealable. We disagree. The appellate court held that the pending contempt petition in this case is entirely separate from the dissolution proceeding. In so doing, the court departed from two previous decisions in which the opposite conclusion was reached. See In re Marriage of Colangelo, 355 Ill.App.3d 383, 388-89, 290 Ill.Dec. 986, 822 N.E.2d 571 (2005) (absent a Rule 304(a) finding, a party could not appeal the denial of a civil contempt petition while a postdissolution petition to increase child support was pending); In re Marriage of Alyassir, 335 Ill.App.3d 998, 270 Ill.Dec. 419, 782 N.E.2d 978 (2003) (absent a Rule 304(a) finding, a party could not appeal a judgment on a postdissolution petition to increase child support while a civil contempt petition was pending). The appellate court held that [a]lthough a civil contempt petition is a part of the underlying action, it is nevertheless `an original special proceeding, collateral to, and independent of, the case in which the contempt arises.' 376 Ill.App.3d at 762, 315 Ill.Dec. 806, 877 N.E.2d 1135, quoting Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 45 Ill.2d 405, 415, 259 N.E.2d 282 (1970). In relying on the Kazubowski decision, however, the appellate court ignored language immediately preceding and following the quoted statement. What we actually held in Kazubowski was: ordinarily an adjudication in a contempt proceeding is final and appealable because it is an original special proceeding, collateral to, and independent of, the case in which the contempt arises where the imposition of the sanction does not directly affect the outcome of the principal action.  (Emphases added.) Kazubowski, 45 Ill.2d at 414-15, 259 N.E.2d 282. The appellate court disregarded the language limiting the original and special status to an adjudication of contempt. The court unjustifiably expanded the language in Kazubowski to apply to the pending contempt petition in the case at bar. No other court has held a pending contempt petition to be an independent action separate from the underlying case. Rather, the rule, which this court has consistently held, is that only a contempt judgment that imposes a sanction is a final, appealable order. See People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill.2d 167, 172, 57 Ill.Dec. 585, 429 N.E.2d 483 (1981) ([t]he imposition of a sanction for contempt is final and appealable because, although occurring within the context of another proceeding and thus having the appearance of being interlocutory, it is an original special proceeding, collateral to and independent of, the case in which the contempt arises); Valencia v. Valencia, 71 Ill.2d 220, 228, 16 Ill.Dec. 467, 375 N.E.2d 98 (1978) (Generally, it is held that where no punishment has been imposed an order adjudicating one to be in contempt is not final and is not reviewable); People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d 180, 191, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967) (The imposition of a fine or imprisonment as a sanction for contempt is final and appealable because it is an original special proceeding); Lester v. Berkowitz, 125 Ill. 307, 308, 17 N.E. 706 (1888) (Had the court attempted to enforce obedience to its order by the imposition of a fine   , or by a definitive term of imprisonment, as for contempt of court, the judgment of the court imposing such fine or imprisonment would be final, and from which an appeal might be taken). Moreover, Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(5) provides that [a]n order finding a person or entity in contempt of court which imposes a monetary or other penalty is appealable without a Rule 304(a) finding. 210 Ill.2d R. 304(b)(5). It is clear from the language of the rule that only contempt judgments that impose a penalty are final, appealable orders. Until the entry of a contempt order imposing a sanction, a contempt petition provides no basis for obtaining immediate appellate jurisdiction over any part of the case under Rule 304(b)(5). The rationale for authorizing immediate appellate jurisdiction under Rule 304(b)(5) upon the entry of a contempt order imposing a penalty does not apply when a contempt petition is merely pending before the court. Litigation proceedings may linger for years before a final judgment and the subject of a contempt judgment may face incarceration or forfeiture of property. It would be unreasonable to force a party to wait until final judgment on all issues before allowing an appeal on the contempt ruling. Rule 304(b)(5) codifies this distinction by allowing the contemnor to seek immediate review of the finding and sanction imposed. However, this justification for treating contempt petitions as separate proceedings for purposes of appeal is not present when there has been no ruling and sanction imposed. Accordingly, we reject the reasoning of the appellate court and hold that Mary's pending contempt petition was not a separate claim independent of the dissolution action.