Opinion ID: 2176137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Jurors Deslandes and Rhone

Text: Henry claims that there is nothing in the record to support the trial court's action of excusing prospective jurors Deslandes and Rhone for cause and therefore, Henry's federal and state constitutional rights were violated. Henry maintains that although these two prospective jurors had misgivings about the possible imposition of a death sentence, each juror's concern would not have `prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980)). We disagree. The statements made by both Deslandes and Rhone indicate that the trial court had sufficient cause to believe the men could not discharge their duties as jurors effectively or impartially. Prospective juror Deslandes testified as follows: MR. DESLANDES: I apologize for my bad English. I don't know how to say it, but I have to say something. As a Christian, I'm a Seventh Day Adventist. I don't know how to handle this kind of trial, you know. I don't know how to put God's law in and man in the same bag. It is very hard for me to judge a situation like that.       THE COURT: All right. Do you think you are just as qualified as all of those people sitting back there to make a decision based on the facts and circumstances? MR. DESLANDES: I feel confused, you know, I don't know how to handle that.       THE COURT: ... Let me ask you this. If based on the facts of this case you felt that the evidence in this case warranted the imposition of the death penalty after I explain the law to you in regards to the facts, do you think that you could then impose the death penalty? MR. DESLANDES: You see I have a conflict. THE COURT: What is your conflict? MR. DESLANDES: My conflict is that there was a murder, okay? Someone was killed. Now, to repair that I'm going to kill another? On the other hand, let the guy be free to kill again? I don't know, it is confusing for me. I don't feel comfortable to face this kind of trial.       THE COURT: Do you think based on the evidence in this case you could find him guilty or not guilty? Do you have any problem on that? MR. DESLANDES: I'm not sure. THE COURT: What problem would you have? MR. DESLANDES: To understand why, you know. THE COURT: Finding him guilty or not guilty has nothing to do with the sentence in this case. Do you think you would have any problems? MR. DESLANDES: Another thing is emotionally I think sometimes I can be biased. THE COURT: What does that mean? MR. DESLANDES: You don't know. It is hard to explain. THE COURT: What does that mean? MR. DESLANDES: Sometimes I go by emotionally, you know. After that I'm not too sure I did the right decision.... In this case I'm not sure. I never thought I would one day be serving in this kind of thing. You see my situation? Probably not. Similarly, prospective juror Rhone indicated that he would not be able to impose a sentence of death. THE COURT: All right, Mr. Rhone, what do you want to tell me? MR. RHONE: I don't have a whole lot in the form of explanation, it is just that I don't have a problem with saying yea or nay to guilt or innocence because based on the information I hear. It is just if it comes down to a death sentence I don't believe I could do that. I have never seen where it has solved anything. If it had we wouldn't be here. I just  the thought of possibly being the 12th person when 11 others are in agreement and I'm the one in disagreement, and being put in the position to go along for a verdict I just couldn't do that. THE COURT: Can you think of any case where you could do it? MR. RHONE: I would have to be totally convinced and I'm not sure that's possible. THE COURT: Let me ask you this in regards to what you have said. If you were totally convinced based on the facts of this case and the law as I explained it to you that the death penalty should be imposed, could you then impose the death penalty? MR. RHONE: I don't think so. I just don't see where it served any purpose in the past. Like I said, we wouldn't be here. I'm sorry if that is a lousy explanation. In Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990), we discussed the Supreme Court's determination in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-77, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 67, 21 L.Ed.2d 186 (1968), that a prospective juror could not be excluded for cause from a case simply because the juror expressed a general objection to the death penalty. Hunt, 321 Md. at 414, 583 A.2d at 231. The Witherspoon Court further stated that if jurors make it unmistakably clear that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial, then they may properly be excluded for cause. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d at 785 n. 21. (Emphasis in original.) The Supreme Court has since modified this holding by refusing to engage in a ritualistic adherence to the language of Witherspoon. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 419, 105 S.Ct. at 849, 83 L.Ed.2d at 848. The standard adopted by the Supreme Court is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Id. at 420, 105 S.Ct. at 850, 83 L.Ed.2d at 849 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d at 589). We acknowledged and applied this standard in Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 725, 506 A.2d 580, 600, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). The result of this application was that the trial judge's factual determination about the extent of a juror's bias must be given deference, for the prospective juror's bias need not be proven with unmistakable clarity before the juror could be excused for cause. Hunt, 321 Md. at 415, 583 A.2d at 231. We should give deference to the decision of the trial judge in the instant case. As is evinced by the record, the trial judge asked the two prospective jurors whether they could serve on the jury without bias and whether they could apply the law according to the court's instructions. Juror Deslandes stated that he could be biased and emotional and expressed misgivings as to whether he could determine guilt or innocence in this case. Juror Rhone doubted whether he ever could impose a death sentence. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial judge committed error when he excused these two jurors.