Opinion ID: 2743752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FCA Statutory Framework

Text: As we have previously explained in great detail, the FCA makes it unlawful to knowingly submit a fraudulent claim to the government. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2005); United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 738 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1991). “The qui tam provision of the [FCA], permits, in certain circumstances, suits by private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the Government. Prior to 1986, such suits were barred if the information on which they were based was already in the Government’s possession.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 941 (1997). In 1986, Congress amended the FCA to encourage private plaintiffs—relators, in FCA parlance—to bring civil cases if they had information that someone had defrauded the government. See False Claims Amendments Act (FCAA), Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729-33 (1988)); Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 293-95, 298 (2010). But, “to strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits,” Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 295, Congress added the public disclosure bar to withdraw jurisdiction over, among other things, suits based on information that had been 5 previously disclosed unless “the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” FCAA § 3 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A));1 see also United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 518-19 & n.20 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing purpose behind FCAA and public disclosure bar). Congress defined an “original source” as “an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.” FCAA § 3 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)). 1 In full, the FCAA’s public disclosure bar provided: No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information. In 2010, Congress amended Section 3730(e)(4). See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901-02 (2010). Because that amendment does not apply retroactively to Schumann’s 2003-filed case, see Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 283 n.1, we will discuss the now-superseded version of the FCA in the present tense and refer to that version as if it were still in force. 6