Opinion ID: 361249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of a Magistrate.

Text: 28 Appellants claim that a magistrate has no power, either statutory or constitutional, to preside over a diversity jury trial. They are unable to cite any authority for this proposition. 7 29 The only relevant case cited by appellants, DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), held that parties may constitutionally consent to try a civil matter before a Magistrate. The First Circuit discussed what standard of review should apply to a magistrate's opinion and concluded that factual findings of the magistrate adopted by the district court (are) subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 53(a), and . . . the legal decision of the magistrate (is) subject to the full review of this court. 520 F.2d at 509. See also Campbell v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879, 95 S.Ct. 143, 42 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974). 30 Later cases have also confirmed that the district court must first review the proceedings of a civil trial conducted by a magistrate before it can enter final judgment. See, e. g., Kendall v. Davis, 569 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978). But no court has limited the right of a magistrate, with the consent of the parties, to try a civil matter and make an initial decision upon which the district court, after review, may enter final judgment. The fact that this action is based upon diversity jurisdiction and was tried before a jury is immaterial. 31 Here, a district judge reviewed the transcript of the trial to determine the effect of references to workmen's compensation and concluded that no error occurred. We agree. Under these circumstances, use of a Magistrate to hear the case was proper. 32