Opinion ID: 2318327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Ambiguity Of Question 8

Text: Furda first attacks the language of Question 8 (Have you ever been adjudicated mentally defective or have you been committed to a mental institution?), arguing that it is impermissibly ambiguous and cannot serve as the basis for his convictions. His challenge is two-pronged. The first ambiguity, he contends, lies in the compound nature of Question 8, which permits a legitimate answer `no' to [the question of] whether a person has ever been adjudicated a mental defective or whether a person has been committed to a mental institution. (emphasis in original). Second, he claims that the word committed is susceptible to multiple meanings, depending on whether federal, [10] State, [11] or local law applies. Furda emphasizes that the trial court determined that he was a prohibited person under federal and local law, but not under State law, and the application was a State form for the purchase of firearms. Accordingly, he believes that his answer no to the commitment portion of Question 8 was a true statement. We take each of these contentions in turn, starting with a general review of some Federal perjury cases involving responses to allegedly ambiguous questions. [A] prosecution for a false statement... under the perjury statutes cannot be based on an ambiguous question where the response may be literally and factually correct. United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir.1978) (citing Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362, 93 S.Ct. 595, 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973)). Yet, [a]s a general rule, the fact that there is some ambiguity in a falsely answered question will not shield the [defendant] from a perjury or false statements prosecution. United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir.1987). An inquiry is not rendered impermissibly or fundamentally ambiguous merely because the words used in the question have different meanings in different situations[.] United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir.1986). Rather, the question is fundamentally ambiguous when it [is] entirely unreasonable to expect that the defendant understood the question[ ] posed to him. United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir.1977). Moreover, [a] defense to a charge of perjury may not be established by isolating a statement from context, giving it in this manner a meaning entirely different from that which it has when the testimony is considered as a whole. United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir.1976). Accordingly, a court should consider the context of the question and [the defendant's] answers, as well as other extrinsic evidence relevant to [the defendant's] understanding of the questions posed in the Form. United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.2003). Whether a question is fundamentally ambiguous is a matter of law that courts review de novo. See Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury conviction ... [and] a reviewing court may override a jury determination.). We apply these cases in assessing Furda's challenges to Question 8. With respect to the compound nature of a question, we have found several Federal cases holding that a compound question is not always fundamentally ambiguous. In United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir.1995), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the defendant's perjury conviction based upon a false declaration he made to a grand jury regarding his use of marijuana. On appeal, the defendant attacked the question at issuewhether he had ever bought or sold marijuanaarguing that it was a misleading double question[.] Id. at 327. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, saying that the defendant dramatically overstates the complexity of the question[ ] to which he had to respond. Id. The Court reasoned that, put in context, the question[ ] [was] understandable and plainly clear enough to elicit informed and intelligent responses. Id. (quoting United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir.1989)). Thus, there was no fundamental ambiguity that would have required the court to remove the question from the jury's consideration. Id. See also United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 411 (4th Cir.2001) (question of whether [defendant's co-conspirator] `directed, coordinated, or orchestrated' the disbursement of funds to the investors was not fundamentally ambiguous because all three possibilities refer to some conduct on [the co-conspirator's] part intended to bring about the repayment of investors.). Applying similar reasoning in this case, we conclude that the question was not impermissibly ambiguous just because an applicant was required to answer yes if either of the two events had occurred (adjudicated a mental defective or committed to a mental institution). Underlying Furda's argument for ambiguity is the assumption that, if the answer to one subpart is no, the applicant may legitimately answer no to the full compound question. Yet nothing in the wording of the question suggests or even permits this interpretation. The word or is not ambiguous: it means that if either of the events have occurred, then the applicant's answer should be yes. We see no ambiguity in the question arising from its compound nature. We next consider Furda's second contentionthat the word committed is susceptible to multiple meanings, depending on whether federal, state or local law applies. Again, federal case law is helpful. Federal courts have held that a term is not impermissibly ambiguous simply because, when considered in isolation, it may have two plausible meanings. In United States v. Camper, 384 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2004), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the false statement conviction of a defendant who, on an employment criminal history questionnaire, answered no to the question Have you been convicted ... [of] [u]nlawful possession, use, sale, distribution or manufacture of an explosive or weapon[,] even though he had pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge of carrying a loaded firearm in public without being a registered owner.... Id. at 1074. The Court recognized that, although there were two plausible meanings to the phrase unlawful possession, extrinsic evidence shed light as to which construction [the defendant] placed on the question. Id. at 1078. Specifically, when he had pleaded guilty to carrying a loaded firearm, he had used the phrase `unlawfully possessed' to refer to the offense[.] Id. Thus, the Court reasoned that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude ... that the questionnaire asked, and [the defendant] answered, a question about convictions for possessing a gun in an unlawful manner[,] meaning that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Id. There is comparable extrinsic evidence in this case. The circuit court's order referenced federal and local law. Furda's own lawyer testified that he had advised Furda, and Furda [u]nquestionably understood, that the judge had ruled that he was a prohibit[ed] person because he was involuntarily committed[.] Furda's motion for reconsideration challenged the court's finding that he had been committed under federal and local law. He brought that motion to the gun store, and engaged in an extended conversation with the store's owner, referencing the motion. Had Furda believed that Question 8's use of the word committed was somehow different than the court's use of that term in its order, then there would have been no need to bring and discuss his motion for reconsideration. This is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that, when he went to Gilbert's Guns, Furda understood that the Denial Order and application used a similar definition of the term commitment, that the Denial Order was still in effect, and that the false statement was not the result of confusion or an honest mistake. Furthermore, it is no defense that the circuit court's findings were made pursuant to Federal and local law, and not the Maryland statutory definition. See Md. Code, Public Safety Article, § 5-118 and § 5-133(b)(7) (defining commitment as when a person has been confined for more than 30 consecutive days to a mental institution). Question 8 was not limited to commitment under Maryland State law, and was phrased broadly enough to include multiple definitions of the term commitment. Indeed, it is the question that precedes question 8 which limits its inquiry to the state-law prohibition in section 5-133(b)(7), [12] specifically asking: Have you ever spent more than 30 consecutive days in any medical institution for treatment of a mental disorder or disorders? Question 8, which follows this narrower question, must be interpreted to ask for different information. As further evidence that Furda was required, under the circuit order, to answer yes on the application, the language of Question 8 tracks, almost verbatim, the language of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(4). Compare 18 U.S.C Section 922(g)(4) (a prohibited person is someone who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution) with Question 8 (Have you ever been adjudicated mentally defective or have you been committed to a mental institution?). Furda was well aware of the Federal law. He attended the hearing on his motion to recover firearms, and thus was aware of the State's contention that he had been committed within the meaning of the Federal statute. The Denial Order was issued before Furda went into Gilbert's Guns, and there is no dispute that Furda knew of the contents of that order and discussed its significance with the owner of the store before completing the firearm application. The Denial Order described Furda as a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(4) because he had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution[.] (emphasis added). Once again, this language tracks exactly the language of Question 8, leading any reasonable person to conclude that the term committed had the same meaning in the application as it did in the federal statute. If Furda had any doubt, he should have disclosed the Denial Order in conjunction with his answer. In sum, we agree with the State's averment that These facts yield the reasonable inferences that: (1) Furda knew that federal and state statutory schemes evince concern about gun ownership by people with mental illness; (2) Furda knew that the federal definition of commitment is broader than the Maryland definition; (3) Furda knew that the application sought disclosure of any commitment within the federal law definition; and (4) Furda knew that he had been deemed committed, at least within the meaning of federal law[.] Ultimately, our examination of all of the circumstances of this case leads us to the conclusion that Question 8 is not fundamentally or impermissibly ambiguous and can serve as the basis for Furda's convictions.