Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: 1. Trial Judge's Impartiality

Text: Having determined that the communication at issue was ex parte, we must address Lotter's contention that it tainted the impartiality of the trial court. In State v. Barker, 227 Neb. 842, 420 N.W.2d 695 (1988), we held that a judge who initiates, invites, or considers an ex parte communication concerning a pending or impending proceeding before the judge must recuse himself or herself from the proceedings when a litigant requests such recusal. Moreover, we held that the judge must recuse himself or herself regardless of whether any prejudice is shown. Id. A litigant need not show that the trial judge was actually biased by the ex parte communication, because in order to do so, the litigant would have to question the judge, which would render the judge a witness at trial, in violation of § 27-605. Accordingly, a litigant need show only that a judge initiated, invited, or considered an ex parte communication to require the judge's recusal. However, we note that not all ex parte communications subject a judge to recusal. Rather, a trial judge must recuse himself or herself only when the ex parte communication poses a threat to the judge's impartiality. See, State v. Jacob, 253 Neb. 950, 574 N.W.2d 117 (1998) (discussing ex parte communications between judge and jury); State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994) (indicating that Canon 3B(7) of Nebraska Code of Judicial Conduct applies); State v. Red Kettle, 239 Neb. 317, 476 N.W.2d 220 (1991) (holding that defendant cannot complain about ex parte communication between defendant and judge). Although it appears that the ex parte communication at issue in the instant case might have posed a threat to the trial judge's impartiality, see Bell v. State, 655 N.E.2d 129 (Ind.App.1995), we need not determine whether the trial judge should have recused himself, since Lotter did not request the judge's recusal, see State v. Jenson, 232 Neb. 403, 440 N.W.2d 686 (1989). One cannot know of improper judicial conduct, gamble on a favorable result by remaining silent as to that conduct, and then complain that he or she guessed wrong and does not like the outcome. Id. at 405, 440 N.W.2d at 688.