Opinion ID: 2272566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stalking Charge

Text: [¶ 17] Elliott first argues that any evidence of his presence on public ways or in parking areas should not have been admitted because the applicable version of the stalking statute explicitly excluded from the definition of course of conduct any activity protected by the Constitution of Maine, the United States Constitution or by state or federal statute. 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A(2)(A). We review de novo interpretations of the United States and Maine Constitutions. See In re Robert S., 2009 ME 18, ¶ 12, 966 A.2d 894, 897. [¶ 18] Elliott's claim that he had a constitutional right to be on public roads, even when he was consistently in the places where he knew Doe would be, is unavailing. The constitutional protection of a right to travel from state to state is not contravened when a State enacts and enforces reasonable regulations to promote public safety. State v. Quinnam, 367 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Me., 1977). For instance, the right to travel is not violated by statutes that require protective headgear when riding a motorcycle, id., or regulate the recreational use of a river for rafting, Brown v. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 577 A.2d 1184, 1185-86 (Me.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122, 111 S.Ct. 1078, 112 L.Ed.2d 1183 (1991). As long as a statute constraining such activity bears a rational relationship to the state's legitimate governmental purpose, the government action is not unconstitutional. Id at 1185-86. [10] [¶ 19] A prohibition against stalking another person is a reasonable regulation of travel that is rationally related to promoting public safety. See Quinnam, 367 A.2d at 1034. Other courts that have directly addressed this issue have reached the same conclusion. See Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 37-38 (Del.1996); State v. Holbach, 763 N.W.2d 761, 765-66 (N.D.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 232, 175 L.Ed.2d 160 (2009); see also People v. Bailey, 167 Ill.2d 210, 212 Ill.Dec. 608, 657 N.E.2d 953, 962 (1995) (holding that a stalking statute did not implicate any constitutionally protected activity), overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005). [¶ 20] Simply put, stalking another person is not constitutionally protected behavior. Because the State has a legitimate interest in protecting public safety by prohibiting defined types of behavior that infringe on the rights of another person, Elliott's prohibited conduct toward Doe was not constitutionally protected. See Holbach, 763 N.W.2d at 766 ([V]iolence or other activities that harm another person are not constitutionally protected.) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984)). The court did not err in admitting evidence of Elliott's conduct in his vehicle because conduct that satisfies the elements of the stalking statute is not constitutionally protected, and the jury was properly charged with determining whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Elliott had engaged in stalking. See 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A.
[¶ 21] Elliott next contends that the court violated his due process rights by failing to instruct the jury that unanimity is required for each of the events that make up a course of conduct on the stalking charge. He argues that the jury may have impermissibly premised its verdict on an insufficient consensus about which events took place. [¶ 22] Because Elliott failed to object to the jury instructions on this basis, we review for obvious error to determine whether the instructions given were incorrect and whether they resulted in a seriously prejudicial error tending to produce a manifest injustice. State v. Perry, 2006 ME 76, ¶¶ 14, 15, 899 A.2d 806, 813. [¶ 23] The Maine Constitution provides that unanimity, in indictments and convictions, shall be held indispensable. Me. Const. art. I, § 7. The requirement of unanimity does not, however, require the jurors to agree unanimously on individual facts when determining whether the State has satisfied a single element of a crime. For example, a jury may convict a defendant of the crime of murder even if jurors disagree about whether the defendant engaged in conduct manifesting a depraved indifference to the value of human life, or acted knowingly or intentionally, in causing the death of another. State v. Erskine, 2006 ME 5, ¶ 19, 889 A.2d 312, 318. This is true because, [i]n Maine, murder is a single offense, even though there are alternative theories for its commission. Id. ¶ 14, 889 A.2d at 317. [¶ 24] Similarly, the crime of unlawful sexual contact is only one crime regardless of whether the sexual contact occurs for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire or for the purpose of causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact. State v. St. Pierre, 1997 ME 107, ¶ 7, 693 A.2d 1137, 1139. Unanimity regarding the purpose is not required in these circumstances. Id. [¶ 25] The same is true regarding crimes tried in federal courts. A conviction for a federal crime upon a jury trial requires that the jury unanimously find [ ] that the Government has proved each element. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999). Although the jury's decision on each element must be unanimous, however, the jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime. Id. [11] [¶ 26] In considering stalking statutes, other jurisdictions have held that juries need not receive unanimity instructions regarding the specific acts that make up a course of conduct. See, e.g., People v. Ibarra, 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 67 Cal. Rptr.3d 871, 891 (2007) (holding that a unanimity instruction was not required regarding the specific acts that constituted stalking because the crime required proof of a course of conduct, not particular individual acts); People v. Carey, 198 P.3d 1223, 1236 (Colo.Ct.App.2008) (same); Washington v. United States, 760 A.2d 187, 198-99 (D.C.2000) (same); People v. Rand, 291 Ill.App.3d 431, 225 Ill.Dec. 580, 683 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (1997) (same); see also Cook v. State, 36 P.3d 710, 720-22 (Alaska Ct.App.2001) (holding same on plain error review); Commonwealth v. Julien, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 679, 797 N.E.2d 470, 476 (2003) (rejecting, on obvious error review, the defendant's argument for a unanimity instruction on the separate acts that collectively constitute stalking); State v. Hoxie, 963 S.W.2d 737, 742-43 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that the State was not required to elect which incidents it was relying upon to prove a course of conduct). [¶ 27] Here, a course of conduct is a single element. Unanimity among the jurors is not required, therefore, as to each act that makes up that course of conduct. The jury was presented with testimony about a series of incidents from which it could find that the State had satisfied the course of conduct element. The court committed no error, much less obvious error, in delivering only a general unanimity instruction at the close of Elliott's trial.