Opinion ID: 2007872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: analysis

Text: [3,4] Postconviction relief is a very narrow category of relief, available only to remedy prejudicial constitutional violations. [8] And, for any purpose, a plea of guilty generally embodies a waiver of every defense to the charge, whether procedural, statutory, or constitutional. [9] When a defendant pleads guilty, he is limited to challenging whether the plea was understandingly and voluntarily made and whether it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. [10] [5] Bazer alleges both that his plea was involuntary and that it was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. While the plea itself did not waive issues relating to whether he entered into the plea voluntarily, on postconviction relief, a defendant cannot secure review of issues which were or could have been litigated on direct appeal. [11] Whether the trial court gave Bazer the proper admonitions before accepting his guilty plea was a matter concerning the on-the-record pretrial proceedings. Accordingly, this issue could have been raised in a direct appeal. Bazer's counsel did not file such an appeal, and Bazer does not argue that counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. Therefore, we do not address Bazer's claim relating to the court's alleged failure to ascertain whether he understood and waived his privilege against self-incrimination. [12] We will, however, address Bazer's claim that his plea of guilty was the result of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. When a defendant was represented both at trial and on direct appeal by the same lawyers, the defendant's first opportunity to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel is in a motion for postconviction relief. [13] The same is true where trial counsel elects not to file a direct appeal at all. [14] The current postconviction action, in which Bazer was appointed counsel different from his trial counsel, is Bazer's first opportunity to challenge trial counsel's effectiveness. [6-8] In order to establish a right to postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant has the burden first to show that counsel's performance was deficient; that is, counsel's performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law in the area. Next, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense in his or her case. [15] The entire ineffectiveness analysis is viewed with the strong presumption that counsel's actions were reasonable. [16] And, when reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court will not second-guess reasonable strategic decisions by counse1. [17] We conclude that the trial records and files affirmatively show that Bazer's plea was not the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. [18] Bazer's claim is that his guilty plea derived from trial counsel's unreasonable and erroneous strategy of trying to get a lesser-related offense instruction before the jury. According to Bazer, because he believed that such an instruction would be given, he agreed that counsel could admit Bazer's guilt to the jury during voir dire. [19] But once it became clear that the lesserrelated offense instruction would not be given, Bazer had no choice, given this admission, but to plead guilty. We begin by noting that the record clearly demonstrates that Bazer's trial counsel did not, as Bazer suggests, admit Bazer's guilt. Trial counsel told the venire that he was not going to hide the fact that Bazer held the gun that misfired and killed Jirsak, but counsel explained that the charge of felony murder required that the State prove Bazer intended the underlying robbery. Counsel suggested that Bazer was too intoxicated to formulate such an intent, and that therefore, he was not guilty of the crime charged. As the recorded trial strategy discussion between Bazer and his counsel reflects, the decision to admit, from the beginning, that Bazer fired the gun that killed Jirsak was based on the overwhelming evidence against Bazer. Several people witnessed Bazer's admissions that he had shot Jirsak. In addition, Bazer confessed to the police that he had shot Jirsak, although he claimed that the gun fired accidentally. Bazer's motion to suppress these statements to the police had been overruled. Casings from the scene of the crime matched the gun that Bazer led the police to on the day of his arrest. In the recorded strategy conference, counsel explained to Bazer that the jury was not going to have any trouble reaching the conclusion that Bazer shot Jirsak. The strategy of admitting Bazer shot Jirsak stemmed from counsel's determination that Bazer would be better off dealing frankly with the evidence and focusing the jury instead on a theory that might have had a better chance for acquittal. In light of the evidence that was going to be presented against Bazer, such a strategy was reasonable. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, [c]ounsel's concern is the faithful representation of the interest of his client, and such representation frequently involves highly practical considerations. . . . Often the interests of the accused are not advanced . . . by contesting all guilt. . . .  [20] Bazer's ineffective assistance claim focuses exclusively on what he considers trial counsel's unreasonable belief that the jury should have been instructed as to a lesser-related offense. He claims that the decision to admit that he had fired the gun was related to this false belief and not to any other strategy. Contrary to Bazer's allegation, the record demonstrates that the strategy of obtaining a lesser-related offense instruction was merely another way that counsel sought in order to increase Bazer's chance of being acquitted on the felony murder charge. But even if Bazer's plea was a direct result of counsel's pursuit of a lesser-related offense instruction, Bazer is simply wrong in concluding that seeking such an instruction was, at that time, an unreasonable and ineffective trial strategy. In a recorded sidebar discussion with the trial court, Bazer's counsel explained that he was well aware that, traditionally, Nebraska cases had held that there was no lesser-included offense to felony murder, but counsel noted that in State v. Montgomery, [21] this court seemingly left the door open to lesser-related instructions under certain circumstances, and counsel cited Beck v. Alabama [22] for the proposition that due process and equal protection demanded such instructions when the death penalty was in issue. In Beck, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was error not to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses to the capital crime of  Thobbery or attempts thereof when the victim is intentionally killed by the defendant.' [23] The Court reasoned, in part, that the unavailability of the third option of convicting on a lesser included offense may encourage the jury to convict for an impermissible reasonits belief that the defendant is guilty of some serious crime and should be punished. [24] Bazer correctly points out that our law has always been clear that there is no lesser-included offense to felony murder. [25] But this is beside the point. The question was whether Bazer had a right to have the jury instructed on lesser-related offenses of second degree murder or manslaughter. A lesser-included offense is one in which its elements are fully embraced by the greater crime. [26] In contrast, a lesser-related offense is one that shares a common factual ground with the greater offense, but not a commonality in statutory elements. [27] Trial counsel's argument was that regardless of whether second degree murder or manslaughter were technically lesser-included offenses, under the reasoning of Beck, the jury should be instructed on these offenses because it should not be forced to choose between putting Bazer to death or setting him free. Indeed, at the time of Bazer's trial, the law was unclear about the extent to which the principles articulated in Beck were applicable to cases involving felony murdera crime to which, under Nebraska law, there is no lesser-included offense. Many courts have held that lesser-related instructions were mandated by the principles articulated in Beck. [28] In 1996, in Reeves v. Hopkins, [29] the Eighth Circuit affirmed habeas corpus relief to the defendant convicted under Nebraska's felony murder statute because the trial court had refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-related offenses of second degree murder and manslaughter. At the time of Bazer's trial, we had not specifically addressed the applicability of Beck to lesser-related offenses and felony murder. We had said only that it was ordinarily error to instruct the jury in a felony murder case that it could find the defendant guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. [30] In Montgomery, we elaborated that there might occur a set of facts under which an instruction on the lesser offenses of second degree murder or manslaughter might be appropriate. It was not until 1994 that, in State v. Masters, [31] we first addressed and rejected the applicability of Beck to felony murder and its lesser-related offenses. And it was not until 1998 that the U.S. Supreme Court finally resolved this issue when it reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision in Reeves v. Hopkins. [32] In Hopkins v. Reeves, [33] the U.S. Supreme Court explained that mandating a lesser-related offense instruction was unworkable and that because in Nebraska, capital sentencing was in the hands of the judge, the jury was not presented with the stark choice described in Beck. [34] [9-11] [A] voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise. [35] Furthermore, the fact that a calculated trial tactic or strategy fails to work out as planned will not establish that counsel was ineffective. [36] A plea of guilty will be found to be freely and voluntarily entered upon the advice of counsel if that advice is within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. [37] We conclude that based on the law as it existed at the time Bazer made his plea and given the strength of the State's case against Bazer, it is apparent from the files and records that Bazer's trial counsel demonstrated no incompetence in attempting to procure instructions of second degree murder and manslaughter. [12,13] Under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, the district court has discretion to adopt reasonable procedures for determining what the motion and the files and records show, and whether any substantial issues are raised, before granting a full evidentiary hearing. [38] Even if appropriate allegations are made, an evidentiary hearing should be denied if the trial records and files affirmatively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief. [39] In this case, the trial records and files affirmatively show that based upon the allegations made in Bazer's motion, Bazer is entitled to no relief. The trial court was correct in dismissing the motion. AFFIRMED.