Opinion ID: 1987945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: Following a hearing, Defendant's motion to suppress from evidence items of sexual paraphernalia seized pursuant to a search warrant was denied. Defendant assigns such ruling as reversible error. The search warrant authorized officers to search for movies depicting obscene sexual conduct, magazines depicting obscene sexual conduct, movie projector and rubber sexual devises (sic) and was issued by the Gibson Circuit Court upon the following affidavit: AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT George Ballard, being first duly sworn says that he believes and has good cause to believe that there are movies depicting obscene sexual conduct, magazines depicting obscene sexual conduct, movie projector, and rubber sexual devices located in and about the premises, described as follows: a white frame house, with aluminum siding, black shutters and enclosed porch, located at 901 South Seminary Street, Princeton, Gibson County, Indiana, and further described as being Lot 165 in Southside Addition to the City of Princeton, Gibson County, Indiana. This affiant makes the above allegations on the basis of the following facts, to-wit: 1. George Ballard is employed by the Gibson County Sheriff's Department and has been for approximately 6 years. 2. That on the 24th day of February 1982, this affiant talked with [R.C.], [1] a 12 year old girl, and that the said [R.C.] told this affiant that she had been sexually assaulted by Jackson A. Clifford, Jr. on or about the 21st day of December 1981. 3. [R.C.] further told this affiant that said sexual abuse had been going on since she was approximately 10 years of age and that on certain occasions Jackson A. Clifford, Jr. would display magazines depicting obscene sexual conduct to her and the said Jackson A. Clifford, Jr. would also show movies depicting obscene sexual conduct by means of a projector prior to or simultaneous with his sexual assaults on [R.C.]. Furthermore [R.C.] told this affiant that Jackson A. Clifford, Jr. would insert rubber sexual devices into her vagina while the said Jackson A. Clifford, Jr. was showing movies depicting obscene sexual conduct. 4. That [R.C.] told this affiant that the above mentioned magazines, movies, projector and rubber sexual devices are located in the premises heretofore described. 5. That your affiant believes [R.C.] is telling him the truth in this matter because she is implicating Jackson A. Clifford, Jr., her father, in the crime of child abuse. 6. That your affiant believes that said described items would be evidence in criminal charges against the defendant and that further your affiant believes that said items, being of a portable nature, may be removed and destroyed as potential evidence in any criminal action. Further affiant saith not. (signed) George Ballard Subscribed and sworn to before me, the Prosecuting Attorney, in and for said county and state, this the 2nd day of March, 1982. (signed) George Ankenbrand, Prosecuting Attorney Defendant first argues that the items should have been suppressed because the terms of the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and Indiana Code § 35-1-6-1 (Burns 1979) [repealed effective September 1, 1982; amended and recodified at Ind. Code § 35-33-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1984)], which provides, in pertinent part: A Court may issue warrants upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized[.] He argues that the warrant failed to describe particularly the items to be seized, inappropriately leaving that decision to the discretion of the police officers. He relies upon the holding in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, (1979) 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920, to support his argument. In Lo-Ji Sales, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a search warrant to leave entirely to the discretion of the officials conducting the search the determination of what items are likely to be obscene. In that case a police officer had purchased two films from a bookstore. He then took those films to a Town Justice for a determination of whether reasonable cause to believe the films violated state obscenity laws justified a search. The Justice issued a warrant for other copies of the two films and items which he would independently determine to be obscene. He signed the warrant without listing particular items to be seized and then accompanied officers to the bookstore where he viewed several books, magazines, and films which he determined should be seized. Only later were the particular items which had been seized listed in the warrant. The State argues, and we agree, that the facts in the case at bar are distinguishable from those in Lo-Ji Sales in that the officers did not have an open-ended warrant. They were directed to search for books and magazines depicting obscene sexual conduct. The terms obscene and sexual conduct are defined by Ind. Code § 35-30-10.1-1(c) and (d). Hence, the officers conducting the search did not have complete discretion in their determination of what to seize. In addition, the descriptive phrase rubber sexual devices is sufficiently specific to restrict the officers' search. Next, Defendant claims that the items seized were not properly seizable. Ind. Code § 35-1-6-1 provides for the seizure of: (1) Property which is obtained unlawfully. (2) Property, the possession of which is unlawfully. (3) Property used or possessed with intent to be used as the means of committing an offense or concealed to prevent an offense from being discovered. (4) Property constituting evidence of an offense or tending to show that a particular person committed an offense. (5) Any child that has been abandoned or neglected. (6) Evidence necessary to enforce statutes enacted to prevent cruelty to or neglect of children. Defendant argues that the sexual paraphernalia seized does not fall into any of the specifically enumerated categories. However, we agree with the State that the items were property constituting evidence of an offense or tending to show that a particular person committed an offense in that the items were corroborative of the victim's testimony. Moreover, Defendant was charged with criminal deviate conduct with a person twelve years of age pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2(b)(3), and we find that such statute was enacted to prevent cruelty to or neglect of children. Defendant further argues that the information upon which Officer Ballard based his affidavit in support of the search warrant was hearsay and that he presented insufficient facts to establish the credibility of the informant. In Pawloski v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 350, 380 N.E.2d 1230, Chief Justice Givan noted that there are two major kinds of informants, professional informants and cooperative citizens, and that the test for determining the reliability of each is different. With regard to cooperative citizens who act as informants, he observed: This group includes victims of crime or persons who personally witness a crime. These individuals generally come forward with information out of the spirit of good citizenship and the desire to assist law enforcement officials in solving crime. They are usually one-time informants and no basis exists from prior dealings to determine their reliability. Further, information of this type usually goes to past completed crimes rather than future or continuing crimes. Some jurisdictions have therefore held that informants of this type are to be considered reliable for the purpose of determining probable cause unless incriminating circumstances exist which cast suspicion upon the informant's reliability. (citations omitted). Id. at 354, 380 N.E.2d at 1232-1233. In both Baker v. State, (1983) Ind., 449 N.E.2d 1085, and Wells v. State, (1979) Ind. App., 397 N.E.2d 1250, the victims of the crimes were determined to be credible persons as a consequence of their status as victims. In Baker, the Court observed: It is reasonable to presume the rape victim and a witness who saw appellant walk away from the victim's burning car to be credible persons, speaking reliably of facts within their knowledge. The probable cause affidavit stated the witness `informed the affiant of facts and answers to the affiant's questions which were straight forward and which appeared to be true and accurate accounts to the best of their recollections.' Baker v. State, 449 N.E.2d at 1091. In Wells, a bank robbery was reported by a bank official who gave a description of the robber to the police. The appellant argued that the police officer, in his testimony, did not state that he knew the bank officer was a credible person or give the reasons for such belief. The Court of Appeals stated, It is reasonable for an official of a bank branch which has been robbed to be the person who reports the robbery to the police. Wells v. State, 397 N.E.2d at 1257. Similarly, in the case at bar, the victim of the crime gave a detailed account of the incident forming the basis of the instant charge to police and welfare officers. It is reasonable to believe that she was a credible person. Officer Ballard, in his affidavit, stated that he believed that R.C. was telling the truth because she was implicating her father in the crime of child abuse. Such a statement was sufficient, in conjunction with the circumstances of the case, to comply with the requirements of Ind. Code § 35-1-6-2 (Burns 1979) which provides that the affidavit shall contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay, and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished. Defendant further relies upon the holdings of Aguilar v. Texas, (1964) 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, and Spinelli v. U.S., (1969) 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. However as the State notes in its brief, the Supreme Court has abandoned the two-pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli in favor of a totality of the circumstances analysis. The Court held: The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a `substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548. We hold that in the case at bar there was a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Finally Defendant claims that the search warrant was defective and that no probable cause existed for its issuance because it recites that it was [g]iven under my hand and seal of the Court, this the 2nd day of March, 1981, while the supporting affidavit bears the date March 2, 1982. It is clear, however, that the March 2, 1981 date recited in the search warrant is the result of typographical error and that the warrant was, in fact, executed on March 2, 1982 and supported by affidavit. The victim did not reveal the information which formed the basis of the charge until December 22, 1981. Thereafter, on February 24, 1982, Officer Ballard took a statement from her, and on March 2, 1982 filed his affidavit in support of a search warrant. The language of the warrant includes these words; the Court having examined said affidavit and being fully advised in the premises, now finds that there is probable cause for the issuance of this search warrant. The search was conducted on March 2, 1982, and the warrant and the attached affidavit were filed with the Clerk of the Gibson Circuit Court on March 5, 1982. In addition, Officer Ballard testified during the trial that the incorrect date recited in the search warrant was the result of a typographical error and oversight.