Opinion ID: 2770260
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A railroad carrier engaged in interstate or

Text: foreign commerce, or an officer or employee of such a railroad carrier, shall not discharge, demote, suspend, reprimand, or in any other way discriminate against an employee for— (A) reporting, in good faith, a hazardous safety or security condition; (B) refusing to work when confronted by a hazardous safety or security condition related to the performance of the employee’s duties . . . 21 49 U.S.C. § 20109(b) (emphasis added). The DOL contends, consistent with its approach to interpreting subsection (c)(2), that because there is no express qualification in subsection (b)(1)(A), an employee is protected for reporting any “hazardous safety or security condition.” At oral argument the DOL was presented with a reductio ad absurdum: a PATH employee, wearing a PATH sweatshirt, protests pollution at a power plant “entirely unrelated” to railroads, his conduct at that protest impugns PATH’s reputation (since he was wearing a PATH sweatshirt), and PATH disciplines him as a result. The DOL, remaining consistent, responded that such discipline would violate subsection (b)(1)(A). We cannot agree. “[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.)). The purpose of the entirety of the FRSA is as obvious as it is express: “to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroadrelated accidents and incidents.” 49 U.S.C. § 20101. Accordingly, we think that subsection (b)(1)(A) must be read as having at least some work-related limitation, even though no such limitation appears on the face of the 22 statute. And if a work-related limitation must be applied to subsection (b)(1)(A), it would be consistent to also apply a work-related limitation to subsection (c)(2). Subsection (c)(2) itself also supports the conclusion that an on-duty limitation applies therein. Although not the portion directly at issue here, subsection (c)(2) protects employees who “request[] medical or first aid treatment.” (emphasis added). It seems unlikely that Congress was concerned about railroads disciplining employees for requesting medical treatment for off-duty injuries.14 Indeed, at oral argument, the DOL conceded that such a scenario was “unlikely as a practical matter” and could not articulate even a hypothetical situation where an employee would be disciplined for requesting medical treatment for an off-duty injury.15 If Congress 14 Subsection (c)(2)’s title of “Prompt medical attention” also suggests an on-duty limitation, as it is difficult to imagine how railroads could be responsible for ensuring that employees who are injured off-duty receive prompt medical attention. Cf. I.N.S. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) (“The text’s generic reference to ‘employment’ should be read as a reference to the ‘unauthorized employment’ identified in the paragraph’s title.”). 15 The DOL’s able counsel did suggest that an employee who is injured away from work, makes an appointment to consult with his physician about that injury but cannot 23 likely did not consider the application of the phrase “requesting medical or first aid treatment” in subsection (c)(2) to off-duty injuries, it is unlikely that Congress would have shifted course mid-sentence (without any textual indication) to have the phrase “orders or a treatment plan of a treating physician” apply to off-duty injuries.