Opinion ID: 517661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Harper's Possession of Cocaine

Text: 122 Harper also contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possession of cocaine. Harper's conviction for possession of cocaine stems from the search of his condominium. An FBI agent who participated in the search and inventoried items seized during the search testified that upon entry Harper and a woman were sitting on the couch. They were given a copy of the search warrant, and after being asked Where he kept it or the cocaine, were allowed ... to discuss[ ] the matter privately. Harper then went into the kitchen, took out a Country Time lemonade can and handed it to the search agents. In the can were a number of double plastic bags containing a white powdery substance which a DEA chemist identified as totalling 35.46 grams (approximately one and one-quarter ounces) of 49 percent pure cocaine. Also found during the search were two scales, one with traces of cocaine on it, a saucer or plate with traces of cocaine on it, and a rectangular green strip of paper. 123 At trial an FBI agent testified that, in addition to Harper, only Mrs. Harper was present when agents entered the condominium. While the condominium's telephone was in the name of Louise Harper, the recorded conversations reflect that Harper used the telephone to speak with Pipito. 124 Harper argues, as he did in his closing argument, that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he possessed the cocaine found during the search beyond a reasonable doubt. He primarily relies on two cases, United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.1986) and United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.1975). Both cases are distinguishable from this case. 125 In Manzella, the evidence established that the defendant was a drug broker; that is, he brought willing buyers and willing sellers of drugs together. In that case we stated, [t]here is no indication that Manzella had any control, individually or jointly, over the cocaine that he tried to obtain for ... [buyer]. Manzella, 791 F.2d at 1266-67. The same cannot be said in this factual situation, for herein every fact establishes that the cocaine was, at the very least, under the joint control of Harper and his wife, if not under Harper's individual control. 126 In order to demonstrate possession of cocaine, it is sufficient that the government show a level of control that meets the standard of constructive possession. As we explained in United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 756 (7th Cir.1988): 127 The rule of constructive possession holds that 'a person can be convicted for possessing cocaine though he does not possess it in a literal sense.' United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir.1986). 'To establish constructive possession of a controlled substance, the government must produce evidence demonstrating ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband.... ' United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 316 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Ferg, 504 F.2d 914, 916-17 (5th Cir.1974)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 831 F.2d 162, 167 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1234 [99 L.Ed.2d 433] (1988); United States v. Perlaza, 818 F.2d 1354, 1360 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, [--- U.S. ----,] 108 S.Ct. 176 [98 L.Ed.2d 130 (1987); Manzella, 791 F.2d at 1266; United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 785 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 [99 S.Ct. 361, 58 L.Ed.2d 351] (1978). 'Mere association with those who possess the drugs is not good enough.' Manzella, 791 F.2d at 1266. However, '[r]esidence in a house used as a drug distribution center, and evidence of direct access to and participation in the [drug] distribution on the day of [the defendant's] arrest,' is sufficient. Galiffa, 734 F.2d at 316. 128 (Emphasis in original). 129 Our standard accords with the traditional majority state court disposition of this issue which was discussed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court several years ago in State v. Dodd, 28 Wis.2d 643, 649-50, 137 N.W.2d 465, 468-69 (1965): 130 Most jurisdictions which have considered the [question] have held actual physical possession of a narcotic is not necessary, it being sufficient if the defendant has constructive possession or is 'within such juxtaposition' to the narcotic as to justify a finding of possession. 131 The heroin was discovered in the house occupied solely by Dodd and his wife. The eyedropper with heroin in it was found in his bedroom within inches of his feet. Four tin foil packages which contained traces of heroin were found in the refuse container in the bathroom. No claim is made by Dodd that the heroin was not in his exclusive constructive control because his wife had as much control of the house as he did. Proof of joint possession has been held to support a conviction especially in husband-and-wife situations. 132 Dodd took the stand in his own behalf and suggested or inferred that the presence of the drug was due to the visit earlier that night of the two known drug addicts. But such testimony would not overcome the physical facts which gave rise to an inference of knowledge and constructive possession on the part of Dodd which under the circumstances was sufficient to establish the guilt of unlawful possession of heroin beyond a reasonable doubt. Although it is apparent Dodd did not use the heroin personally, the possession of a narcotic prohibited by the section is not restricted to possession for personal use. 133 (Citations omitted). Clearly, Harper's direct access and control over the involved cocaine established the constructive possession necessary to meet the statutory standard. 134 The DiNovo case, on which Harper relies, is also distinguishable in light of the clear evidence of Harper's constructive possession of the cocaine present here. In DiNovo it was not clear where the drugs were located within the residence. The Country Time lemonade can in this case was in a common area of the residence--the kitchen, Harper knew where the can was and went directly to the can containing the drugs during the execution of the search warrant. These facts also support the jury's verdict because again, at the very least, they show that Harper and his wife had joint control and constructive possession of the drugs which was necessary for a finding of guilt. 135 Harper's speculative and self-serving argument that he was being chivalrous in delivering the drugs to the agent for his spouse while the agents were on the premises during the search and during this time that she might have told him where the cocaine was located is without a scintilla of support in this record. Even if Harper's chivalry hypothesis were a permissible construction of the facts, it would not preclude a finding of guilt because the evidence  'need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Radtke, 799 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Thornley, 707 F.2d 622 (1st Cir.1983)). See also United States v. Zanin, 831 F.2d 740, 745 (7th Cir.1987) (Phyllis Zanin argues that all conversations in which she participated are susceptible to an innocent explanation. This may or may not be true--but it is irrelevant. The existence of an innocent explanation does not foreclose a jury from finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 136 The evidence clearly establishes Harper's access to and control of the involved cocaine. Since Harper had possession and control of the cocaine, the evidence is more than sufficient for a rational jury to have properly found possession beyond a reasonable doubt.