Opinion ID: 1896880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immediate Necessity Quick-Take

Text: The Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, § 21-16, is titled `Quick-take' condemnation  in general, and states in subsection (a), titled Petition for Immediate Taking, that: Whenever any proceedings are instituted under Title 12 of the Real Property Article of Public General Laws of the State of Maryland or by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for the acquisition of any property for any public purpose whatsoever, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, simultaneously with the filing of said proceedings or at any time thereafter, may file a Petition under oath stating that it is necessary for the City to have immediate possession of, or immediate title to and possession of, said property, and the reasons therefore.  § 21-16(a) (emphasis added). Section 21-16(c) requires that the City, in a petition for immediate possession of and title to property, state under oath the reasons why it is necessary for the City to have immediate possession of the property. A property owner is entitled to challenge the validity and sufficiency of those reasons or the requirement would be no requirement at all. Moreover, the statute places the issue before the courts. If the trial court is satisfied that there is an immediate need, it may then grant immediate possession if it feels it is required in the public's interest:  If it appears from a Petition for Immediate Possession, with or without supporting affidavits or sworn testimony, that the public interest requires the City to have immediate possession of said property. . . . § 21-16(d) (emphasis added). In Valsamaki, we distinguished such quick-take condemnation actions from regular condemnation actions: In the case of regular condemnation, once the City establishes at least a minimal level of public use or purpose, judicial review may be thereafter limited to determining that the agency's decision is not so oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable as to suggest bad faith; that, however, is not the case in assessing immediacy in a quick-take condemnation action in Baltimore City under § 21-16. Rather, the court must also determine whether there is a necessity to justify an immediate taking and, in that determination, must be able to assess the reasons for the immediacy. Section 21-16 expressly requires the City to state reasons relating to immediacy, thus the City has the burden not only to present a prima facie case of public use, but, additionally, in a quick-take action, the burden to establish the necessity for an immediate taking. Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 254, 916 A.2d at 343 (2007). Concerning the immediate necessity for quick-take condemnation, Mr. Sapero asserts that § 21-16 specifically require[s] that some justifiable, readily apparent and irrefutable evidence [must] exist that a taking is necessary, not just a bald assertion that a necessary reason exists. And furthermore, that [t]he quick-take law's plain language initially places the burden of proof upon the Petitioner requesting immediate possession, that is, [the City], to provide reasons for the necessity for immediate possession, not just some general assertions that a reason exists. We agree with the gist of Mr. Sapero's contentions. They are in accord with our decision in Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 916 A.2d 324 (2007). The City, however, while acknowledging that it has the burden to prove immediate necessity in order to proceed with quick-take condemnation, argues that the case sub judice is distinguishable from Valsamaki. Specifically, the City states: In the Valsamaki case the court found that the City had not demonstrated the reason or reason(s) why it was necessary for it to have immediate possession and immediate title to a particular property via the exercise of quick take condemnation. In this case not only did the City provide an affidavit stating the need for the property as `business expansion', but both Mr. Paul Dombrowski, Planner and Mr. M. Jay Brodie, President of Baltimore Development Corporation (`BDC') testified at the hearing before Judge Berger on March 20, 2006. We do not find the City's arguments to be persuasive. The affidavit in the case sub judice stated only that the Properties must be in possession of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore at the earliest possible time in order to assist in a business expansion in the area.  [Emphasis added]. That language is identical to the affidavit language in Valsamaki, which we found to be inadequate in demonstrating necessity for an immediate taking. 397 Md. at 231, 916 A.2d at 329 (2007). Discussing the relevant petitions in Valsamaki, which, we reiterate  with the exception of the property addresses  utilized language virtually identical to the petitions in the case sub judice, we stated: Section 21-16(a) specifically provides that the City must show the necessity for an immediate taking. The City's petitions evince a dearth of any specific evidence showing a necessity for the immediate possession of the Property via quick-take condemnation as opposed to a regular condemnation. In the petition for condemnation, the City simply stated that: `This property will be used for redevelopment purposes; namely in the Charles North Project area.'[ [11] ] The petition for immediate possession and title referenced an attached affidavit which provided only a conclusory and general statement that: `The property . . . must be in possession of the [City] at the earliest time possible in order to assist in a business expansion in the area. ' [Emphasis added]. . . . The record does not demonstrate sufficient evidence to support a finding that the City is entitled to immediate possession of the Property. As stated supra, the affidavit attached to the petition for immediate possession and title only provides that immediate possession is necessary `in order to assist in a business expansion in the area.' This statement, in and of itself, while perhaps sufficient to justify regular condemnation, does not justify a quick-take condemnation. Cf. Free State, [ [12] ] supra (where affidavit showed necessity for public safety). Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 256, 916 A.2d at 344 (2007). The City stresses that the testimony of Mr. Dombrowski and Mr. Brodie, supra, provides further indication of the necessity for the immediate acquisition of the Properties. In particular, the City points out that, unlike the situation in Valsamaki, in the case sub judice, Mr. Brodie testified that three proposals for the redevelopment of the Properties had already been received by the City. As indicated supra, however, Mr. Dombrowski did not testify at all as to the necessity for the City's immediate possession of the Properties. And Mr. Brodie did not testify to anything other than what Ordinance No. 82-799 and Ordinance No. 04-695 outlined, [w]ell, I quoted from the ordinance so as not to be spontaneous about it[,] and to the fact that three proposals had been received, [t]he city received three proposals. As stated supra, further response was stricken from the record upon the sustaining of Mr. Sapero's additional objection. The admitted testimony is insufficient to show the reason or reasons why it is necessary for the City to have immediate possession of the Properties in the case sub judice. The City argues that Mr. Sapero's objections kept specific information about the RFP [Requests for Proposals] and the plan the City contemplated out of the record [13] and that Mr. Sapero, by declining to cross-examine Mr. Brodie, curtailed evidence that Mr. Brodie would have given in support of the necessity for the immediate taking. The City states that [i]t is specious of [Mr. Sapero] to assert now that there was no immediate necessity for the City's taking. We do not believe that his argument is specious. The City has the burden under § 21-16 to show the necessity for the immediate possession of property via quick-take condemnation. There is a reason for this. Quick-take condemnation results in a deprivation of the constitutionally protected right to property without the more complete due process protections available in a regular condemnation action. In the case of such limited proceedings, it is the City's responsibility to provide evidence of the actual exigency or emergency for such an immediate taking. The City is arguing that its inability to effectively elicit testimony from its own witnesses  testimony necessary to support its case  justifies a finding of immediate necessity. This argument is unavailing. It is the responsibility of a particular party to establish evidence in support of its own argument. The City failed to do that here. The fact that Mr. Sapero objected to questions posed by the City and to the testimony of the City's witnesses and that such objections were sustained, is part and parcel of litigation. Moreover, because of the time constraints of quick-take actions, discovery was effectively curtailed for Mr. Sapero. His objections were based on the fact that the type of process chosen by the City deprived him of an opportunity to fully litigate the issues upon which the City's witnesses were about to testify. The City's choice of procedures created the problem, not Mr. Sapero's objections. Furthermore, there is no requirement that a party must cross-examine a witness. It was Mr. Sapero's right to decline to question the witnesses, especially in light of the effective denial of discovery caused by the City's choice of action. The City, citing to Johnson v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 187 Md. 454, 462-63, 50 A.2d 918, 922-23 (1947), also argues that [t]he necessity for the taking does not have to be absolute; all that is required is that it be reasonable under the circumstances. Specifically, the City states that Johnson holds that [u]nless the discretion of the condemning agency as to reasonable necessity is wrongfully, arbitrarily, or oppressively exercised, that discretion cannot be controlled or reviewed by the Court. 187 Md. at 463, 50 A.2d at 923 (citing Beall v. Redmiles, 176 Md. 677, 681, 6 A.2d 551, 553 (1939)). These arguments in relation to Johnson, however, are inapposite to the case at hand. The Court in Johnson addressed an instance of regular condemnation for the right-of-way for electric light and power lines, as well as transmission towers, across a piece of private property in Baltimore County. 187 Md. at 457, 50 A.2d at 919. The case did not involve quick-take condemnation in Baltimore City under § 21-16, which requires a prima facie showing of immediate necessity significantly different than that referred to in Johnson. Under a regular condemnation action, reasonable necessity for the condemnation itself may (or may not) be sufficient, but § 21-16 specifically requires for quick-take condemnation that the City demonstrate the reason or reasons why it is necessary for the City to have immediate possession of and immediate title to property. The necessity for immediacy relates to the actual existence of an exigency or emergency and such necessity for immediate possession in quick-take actions is different and more demanding than the necessity for condemnation in general. Two instances in which we have found such necessity for immediate possession occurred in Free State Realty Co., Inc. v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 550, 369 A.2d 1030 (1977) and Segall v. City of Baltimore, 273 Md. 647, 331 A.2d 298 (1975) (per curiam). [14] In both cases, the affidavits presented evidence showing the alleged necessity for the City's immediate possession of the properties in question. In Free State, the Court addressed whether a severely deteriorated building could be condemned via quick-take. The affidavit attached to the petition for immediate possession stated that: [T]he dwelling . . . `ha[d] deteriorated to such extent as to constitute a serious and growing menace to the public health, safety and welfare, ' which was `likely to continue to deteriorate unless corrected, and [that] such continued deterioration m[ight] contribute to the blighting or deterioration of the immediately surrounding area thereto.' It further recited that the owner had `failed to correct the deterioration thereof as evidenced by the violation notice[s] attached. . . .  279 Md. at 552, 369 A.2d at 1031 (emphasis added). The Court found that, based upon the evidence in the affidavit, the property constituted an immediate serious and growing menace to public health, safety, and welfare. Id. There is no finding in the case sub judice, nor facts presented, of a serious and growing menace to public health, safety, and welfare. In Segall, the Court found that the affidavit showed that all of the other properties in the development area had been acquired and that the sale of the entire site could not be completed until that last property had been acquired, i.e., a hold-out situation may have existed. [15] 273 Md. at 648, 331 A.2d at 298-99. Specifically, the one paragraph opinion of the Segall Court stated, in relevant part, that: The basis of the[] claim is the requirement of Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1969) § 21-16(a) as amended by Chapter 420, Acts of 1972, that a petition for immediate possession state `the reasons therefor.' [The appellants] say the City failed to comply. The short answer to this contention is that the City's petition referred to an attached affidavit. That affidavit said `[t]hat all other property interests in the ten disposition lot areas aforesaid ha[d] been acquired, and demolition and sale of the entire site areas [could] not be completed until possession and title of the subject property interest [were] granted to the City.' This complied with the statute. For this reason we have not addressed ourselves to the City's motion to dismiss the appeal. Segall, 273 Md. at 648, 331 A.2d at 298-99. Unlike Free State and Segall, the instant case does not present the Court with sufficient evidence to justify quick-take condemnation under § 21-16. The affidavit only stated that the Properties were needed at the earliest possible time in order to assist in a business expansion in the area, which, we deem to be an insufficient indication of necessity for immediate possession. See Valsamaki, supra . Furthermore, although Mr. Brodie testified that three proposals had been received for the redevelopment of the Properties (or at least the Chesapeake Restaurant property), there was no specific evidence, or any evidence, admitted by affidavit or otherwise, of a need for the use of quick-take or even a specific plan for the Properties introduced beyond that basic statement. [16] There certainly was no evidence presented that quick-take was necessary for the public's health, safety, or immediate welfare, and it was not asserted by admitted evidence that Mr. Sapero was a hold-out of any sort. In fact, the City had the power to initiate condemnation for approximately a year and a half and chose to wait, apparently until the last minute, and then decided to make use of a type of action that curtailed the property owner's ability to present a defense. Based upon this lack of evidence for the necessity of the City's immediate, i.e., quick-take possession of the Properties, especially in light of our recent holding in Valsamaki, we hold that the Circuit Court erred in granting the City's petition for the immediate taking. [17] We now turn to address the due process concerns which arise from quick-take condemnation under § 21-16.