Opinion ID: 2181640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ninth issue: service grants: validity of wayne county exclusion

Text: It remains to consider whether the legislative design for financing probation services is a proper method of distributing the burden of this admittedly state responsibility. The probation laws are an integral part of the administration of justice in the State of Michigan. Probation officers are appointed by the state executive authority acting through the corrections commission upon the recommendation of state officers, circuit judges. The work of supervising probationers is a state function. Jurisdiction is lodged in the department of corrections. MCLA § 791.204 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.2274), provides: Sec. 4. Subject to constitutional powers vested in the executive and judicial departments of the state, the department shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the following: (a) Probation officers of this state, and the administration of all orders of probation. Chapter 2 of PA 1953, No 232 (MCLA § 791.221 et seq., Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.2291 et seq. ), creates a bureau of probation within the department of corrections. Sections 25 and 26 of that act are particularly noteworthy. Sec. 25. Where the courts of more than 1 county are served by the same probation officer or officers, the compensation of such officer or officers and the expenses of administering probation service within such counties shall be met jointly by the boards of supervisors therein: Provided, That when it shall appear to the commission that any county is unable to adequately maintain its probation program according to the standards set by the state bureau of probation, then service grants to such an extent and under such conditions as the commission may determine, may be made available to said county: Provided, That uniform rules to be followed in making available such service grants first shall be promulgated by the commission. MCLA § 791.225 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.2295). Sec. 26. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to probation departments heretofore established in any county of over 500,000 population, according to the latest or each succeeding federal decennial census. MCLA § 791.226 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.2296). Population as a measure of legislative classification has been considered by this Court many times. In Mulloy v. Wayne County Board of Supervisors (1929), 246 Mich 632, at page 635, we held: If it is a reasonable and logical basis of classification, considering the subject of legislation, unquestionably a specified population may be made the test of the applicability of a general legislative act; and under such conditions the act will not be construed to be invalid as local legislation. Hayes v. Auditor General (1915), 184 Mich 39. But where the subject of legislation is such that population has no obvious relation to the purpose sought to be accomplished, an attempt to make the application of the legislative act dependent on population is unwarranted and amounts to local legislation. Attorney General, ex rel. Dingeman, v. Lacy (1914), 180 Mich 329. PA 1953, No 232, is entitled, An act to revise, consolidate and codify the laws relating to probationers and probation officers as herein defined, to pardons, reprieves, commutations and paroles, to the administration of penal institutions, correctional farms and probation recovery camps, to prison labor and prison industries, and the supervision and inspection of local jails and houses of correction; to create a state department of corrections, and to prescribe its powers and duties; to provide for the transfer to and vesting in said department of powers and duties vested by law in certain other state boards, commissions and officers, and to abolish certain boards, commissions and offices the powers and duties of which are hereby transferred; to prescribe penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act; and to repeal all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act. The purpose of this legislation is to discharge the state's responsibility for the correction and rehabilitation of criminals. If population has any obvious relation to this purpose, it would be that in the populous areas of the state there is a greater need for the commitment of the state's resources and the discharge of the state's responsibility to correct and rehabilitate criminals. In Hayes v. Auditor General, supra , we said at page 42: County agents, under the provisions of act No 6 of the Public Acts of 1907 (Extra Session) (2 How Stat [2d ed] § 3458), are charged with numerous duties relating to the care, investigation, and supervision of dependent, neglected, and delinquent children. It is a well-known fact that the problem of dependency, neglect, and delinquency of children is practically limited to communities with congested population.    The legislature undoubtedly had in mind the fact that, on account of the number of cases, their complexity, and the added responsibility entailed thereby, the counties with congested population demanded the services and therefore the pay of an efficient, high-grade officer with more or less expert knowledge and training. We can easily paraphrase what was said in Hayes by substituting probation officer for county agent and convicted criminal for delinquent children. But we cannot reconcile the legislative intent considered in that case with the legislative scheme disclosed by § 26 and considered here. To what permissible purpose does the state commit its resources to maintain an adequate probation program in every part of the state, except where it is needed most? By what logic is law and order deemed a local problem in one county and a statewide problem in another? The discriminatory thrust of § 26 is the more apparent when its classifying language is considered. In 1953, there was only one probation department heretofore established in a county of over 500,000 population, and no others could thereafter become heretofore established irrespective of any succeeding decennial census. [] Mulloy v. Wayne County Board of Supervisors, supra, at page 638, emphasizes that, `The classification should be prospective, calculated to embrace any change in population or circumstances,' and that the classification `must be so framed as to include in the class additional members as fast as they acquire the characteristics of the class.' Bingham v. Board of Supervisors of Milwaukee County (1906), 127 Wis 344 (106 NW 1071). PA 1953, No 232, § 26 is unconstitutional as an invalid classification constituting local legislation in violation of Const 1963, art 4, § 29. The invalidity of § 26 does not by reason of MCLA § 8.5 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 2.216), affect the balance of the act.