Opinion ID: 196096
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of Cross-Examination. As a subset of their

Text: 3. Lack of Cross-Examination. 14 claims regarding the supposed necessity for both an evidentiary hearing and additional discovery, appellants contend that the district court should have allowed them to cross-examine the PSC members concerning the hours that they logged and their contribution to the creation of the Fund. This is merely a backdoor attempt to rekindle an extinguished flame and satisfy appellants' thwarted desire for either an evidentiary hearing or extensive depositions. In Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987), we held that, in the context of an administrative hearing, lack of cross-examination did not work a violation of due process. See id. at 41-42. So it is here. Moreover, because the lower court could reasonably conclude that its liberal policy with regard to written submissions, in conjunction with the IRPAs' access to PSC documentation, obviated the need for further probing via crossexamination, pretermitting cross-questioning did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Cf. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 905 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (noting that a live hearing is not necessary if the adversary papers filed by plaintiff and defendant . . . adequately illuminate the factual predicate for a reasonable fee). Appellants' attempt to anchor their claimed right to cross-question PSC members on language excerpted from our earlier opinion, see, e.g., Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 615, leaves them adrift. We flatly reject the suggestion, noting that 15 appellants, to their discredit, have pieced the argument together by cutting words loose from their logical and contextual moorings, and ignoring limiting language that contradicts their interpretation. The bottom line is that the district court did not err in refusing to convene an evidentiary hearing, declining to permit more wide-ranging discovery, and barring crossexamination. Thus, whether the issue is cast in a constitutional mold or considered under an abuse-of-discretion rubric, appellants' challenge fails. Either way, the adjudicative process employed on remand passes muster.