Opinion ID: 1355314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Error Cured by Verdict.

Text: The remaining question and the most important question herein is as to whether or not the admission of erroneous testimony mentioned above was reversible error, particularly in view of the instruction of the court limiting the force of it. The state contends that it is not; that since the jury convicted defendant of manslaughter only, he is in no way prejudiced. We think it clear as already stated that there was ample testimony to convict the defendant even though the testimony erroneously admitted had been excluded. We think another trial would result in again finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter. So we can see but little benefit to the defendant in sending the case back for a new trial. Error in the admission of evidence is frequently cured by the verdict. In this case the testimony, in regard to threats and hostile attitude of defendant as shown by the hearsay testimony heretofore mentioned, went to the point of malice and even premeditated malice, and it is quite clear the jury ignored that testimony when they found the defendant guilty only of manslaughter. It is stated in 24 C.J.S. § 1915, p. 981: So there is no reversible error where accused was acquitted of the offense with respect to which the improper evidence was admitted. In the case of Little v. State, 130 Tex.Cr.R. 603, 95 S.W.2d 141, 142, the court stated: The testimony of the witness tended to support the theory of the state that, in shooting the injured party, appellant was actuated by malice. The jury expressly found appellant guilty of assault with intent to murder without malice and assessed the punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for one year. Under the circumstances, we are unable to reach the conclusion that the testimony of the witness could have injured appellant. In the case of State v. Burnett, 226 S.C. 421, 85 S.E.2d 744, it is held that where a defendant was not convicted under a count charging intent to ravish, but only of assault and battery, and alleged inadmissible evidence pertained to intent, the defendant was not prejudiced. In State v. Bodie, 33 S.C. 117, 11 S.E. 624, it was held that one on trial for murder, the admission in evidence of the record of a prosecution for malicious mischief, instituted by deceased against defendant offered to show the feeling between the parties, if error, is harmless, where the defendant is convicted of manslaughter only, thus ignoring the question of malice. In Tyrrel v. State, 177 Ind. 14, 97 N.E. 14, it was held that the admission of testimony of similar offenses to show the intent charged in a prosecution for assault and battery with intent to rape was harmless error, where the verdict acquitted the defendant of the intent charged and found him guilty of assault and battery only. In Coulter v. State, 100 Ark, 561, 140 S.W. 719, it is held that where the accused was convicted of manslaughter only, error, if any, in admitting testimony that immediately after the killing he appeared at a church with two pistols, ordered the people out, and stated that he had shot deceased, was not prejudicial. The same holding is true when the defendant is charged with several counts but is acquitted of some of the counts and it is held improper admission of evidence of any count of which the defendant is acquitted is not reversible error. See People v. Harmon, 117 Cal. App.2d 511, 256 P.2d 340. See cases collected in Decennial Digest, Criminal Law, 1169 (6). The case of Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 P. 1099, is, we think, distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case the erroneous testimony went to prove the guilt of the defendant, while in the case at bar the erroneous testimony admitted tended merely to prove a higher degree of crime. We are not prepared to say the rule herein mentioned should be adopted in all cases but we think it is properly adopted in the case at bar, in which the jury were clearly justified in finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and in which the trial judge under our law fixes the punishment. We are constrained under the foregoing authorities to hold that, in view of the fact the defendant was convicted of manslaughter only, the admission of hearsay evidence of threats and hostility, all showing malice, is not reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed. If, however, the trial court is of the opinion that the testimony improperly admitted may in any way have influenced the severity of the punishment imposed, it may, if it sees fit, cause the defendant to be brought before it and reduce the punishment as it may deem proper. Affirmed.