Opinion ID: 852990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress: Right to Counsel

Text: Malinski argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress his statements because his right to counsel under Indiana Constitution, article I, section 13 was violated. He claims that the police had an affirmative duty to inform him that an attorney was present and actively trying to speak with him while he was being interrogated. A. Current Status of a Custodial Suspect's Right to be Informed About Attorney's Presence. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as well as article I, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution guarantee a defendant's right against self-incrimination. The amendments also afford the rights to remain silent and to be represented by an attorney. The Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), that a defendant may waive these rights so long as the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In other words, there is a right not to be forced to speak, but there is no right to bar a confession freely given after appropriate warnings and waivers. Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 930 (Ind.1998). In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), the Supreme Court examined the validity of a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel under circumstances similar to those presented here. In Burbine, the defendant confessed to a murder after being informed of his Miranda rights. Id. at 415, 106 S.Ct. 1135. While he was in custody, the defendant's sister retained an attorney to represent him. Id. at 416, 106 S.Ct. 1135. The attorney telephoned the police station and was assured that all questioning would cease until the following morning. Id. Nevertheless, the police interrogated the defendant later that evening, and he confessed. Id. at 417. The Court held that the waiver of Miranda rights was valid, despite the police failure to inform the defendant that his attorney tried to contact him and the false assurances that police gave the defendant's attorney. Id. at 423-24, 106 S.Ct. 1135. The Court concluded that neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process were violated. Id. at 419-20, 106 S.Ct. 1135. Though federal law does not require that police inform a custodial suspect about an attorney's efforts to contact him, the Burbine Court observed that states have leeway to adopt different requirements for the conduct of their employees and officials as a matter of state law. Id. at 428, 106 S.Ct. 1135. Malinski thus urges us to hold that the Indiana Constitution was violated. In Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. 1998), we addressed this issue under state constitutional grounds. As in Burbine, the police in Ajabu did not inform a custodial suspect that an attorney, retained by the suspect's father, had called the police station and requested that the interrogation cease until the attorney could meet with his client. Id. at 926. The police told the lawyer that the information would be passed along to the appropriate people. Id. The suspect later waived his Miranda rights and gave a full confession to the murder, without ever having been told of the attorney's call. Id. Ajabu contended that his section 14 privilege against self-incrimination was violated because the police did not inform him of his attorney's efforts to speak to him before the interrogation took place. Id. at 927. We adopted the reasoning in Burbine and held that Indiana's privilege against self-incrimination did not afford custodial suspects any more protection than the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 934-35. We held that a clear request for counsel is a prerequisite for invocation of the right under section 14. Id. at 935. A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted. Id. at 933 (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460-61, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)). We addressed only obliquely the possible application of Indiana's section 13 right to counsel to the facts in Ajabu because Ajabu relied solely on section 14. Ajabu, 693 N.E.2d at 928. Malinski bases his claim directly on section 13's guarantee that an accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel in all criminal prosecutions. B. Other State Approaches to the Duty to Inform. Several other state courts have construed similar constitutional provisions in considering a duty to inform. Those courts that have recognized an affirmative duty to inform have often relied on a factual distinction: whether the attorney seeking access to his client is present at the police station where the suspect is being held, or whether the attorney is simply calling the station. For instance, in Dennis v. State, 990 P.2d 277, 284 (Okla.Crim.App.1999), the court held that under state law a defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to counsel and against self-incrimination where he does not know that retained counsel is present and actively trying to consult with him. The court specifically distinguished between attempts to contact a client in person and attempts over the phone. Id. The court's holding applies only where an attorney is present while a defendant is questioned and actively trying to see the defendant, who is not told the attorney is there. Id. [1] Similarly, in People v. Wright, 441 Mich. 140, 490 N.W.2d 351, 357 (1992), the court believed if the defendant knew that a retained attorney was waiting for him, he would not have waived his right to silence or to counsel. It held that under the Michigan Constitution a suspect has the right to be informed of retained counsel's in-person efforts to contact him in order for there to be a knowing and fully voluntary waiver of the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 356-57. To hold otherwise, it said, would suggest that a State has a compelling interest, not simply in custodial interrogation, but in lawyer-free, incommunicado custodial interrogation. Id. at 357 (citing Burbine, 475 U.S. at 437, 106 S.Ct. 1135 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). [2] In State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446, 452 (1988), the court concluded that under the Connecticut due process and right to counsel clauses police must promptly inform a suspect of timely efforts by counsel to render pertinent legal assistance. It noted Connecticut's history of recognizing the significance of the right to counsel. Id. The duty to inform, however, applied even when the attorney simply calls the police station. Id. at 454. The court reasoned that the police are not entitled to prevent a suspect from exercising the choice to which he is constitutionally entitled by being dishonest with counsel or by keeping a suspect uninformed of counsel's efforts. Id. at 452. [3] Besides urging that the Indiana right to counsel commands greater protection than the federal Bill of Rights, Malinski bases his claim on this same factual distinction. In Burbine and Ajabu, the attorney telephoned the station. Malinski's attorney was present at the station when he unsuccessfully made repeated attempts to reach him. (Appellant's Br. at 40.) The State properly replies that an express request for counsel is required to trigger the Indiana constitutional right to counsel and preclude further questioning of the suspect in custody. (Appellee's Br. at 15); see Ajabu, 693 N.E.2d at 928, n. 4. Adopting the reasoning in Burbine, the State argues that the presence of the attorney at the station would not affect the constitutional result because such distinction would not change the reasoning that events occurring outside the presence of the suspect and unknown to him could not affect the validity of his waiver. (Appellee's Br. at 14.) We have on other occasions concluded that section 13 affords Indiana's citizens greater protection than its federal counterpart. Ajabu, 693 N.E.2d at 929. Depending on the circumstances, the section 13 right to counsel, unlike the Sixth Amendment, attaches prior to the filing of formal charges against the accused. Id.; Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1949); see also Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (Ind.1997). Moreover, our precedents have often interpreted the section 13 right expansively. See e.g., Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d 250 (Ind.1951) (recognizing an unqualified right to counsel in both felony and misdemeanor cases under section 13). [4] In light of Indiana's history of an expansive state right to counsel, we agree with Malinski that an incarcerated suspect has a right under section 13 to be informed that an attorney hired by his family to represent him is present at the station and wishes to speak to him. As we noted in Ajabu, most section 13 cases turn on whether the defendant made a clear request for counsel. When the case involves a claim that police continued to interrogate in the face of a request for counsel, that bright line is appropriate and we re-affirm it. Here the issue seems different: is the waiver of counsel knowing and intelligent when made in ignorance of the fact that a lawyer hired by the family is nearby and asking to see you? As put by the Illinois Supreme Court, The day is long past ... where attorneys must shout legal advice to their clients, held in custody, through the jailhouse door. McCauley, 206 Ill.Dec. 671, 645 N.E.2d at 929. The Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, condemned the scenario where such practice is likely to result in an incommunicado interrogation and surrounding coercive environment. [5] Just as the government cannot conceal from a suspect material and exculpatory evidence, so too the government cannot conceal from a suspect the material fact of his attorney's communication. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 467, 106 S.Ct. 1135 (Stevens, J., dissenting). We hold that law enforcement officials have a duty to inform a custodial suspect immediately when an attorney hired by the suspect's family to represent him is present at the station seeking access to him. C. Effect of Failure to Inform. Obviously, a suspect may waive his right to counsel and give a statement while in custody. Such a valid waiver must be voluntary and intelligent Thus, the question becomes whether withholding information about counsel's presence made the waiver invalid. Courts faced with similar claims have adopted two different approaches. Some have employed a per se rule of exclusion in order to enforce the duty to inform. See e.g., People v. Bender, 452 Mich. 594, 551 N.W.2d 71, 80-81 (1996); State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272, 278-79 (1979); People v. Houston, 42 Cal.3d 595, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174-75 (1986). Other courts have adopted a totality of the circumstances approach. See Stoddard, 537 A.2d at 456; Dennis, 990 P.2d at 285; People v. Wright, 490 N.W.2d at 356. The Stoddard court said that reliance on the totality of the circumstances is consistent with existing rules for the evaluation of the validity of a waiver. Id., 537 A.2d at 456. In applying this test, it considered factors such as the extent to which the police had reasonable notice of counsel's request, conduct of the suspect, nature of counsel's request, and relationship of the suspect to the attorney. Id. The Dennis court used similar factors. Dennis, 990 P.2d at 284-85. We adopt a totality of the circumstances approach as articulated by the courts in Stoddard and Dennis, and turn to the case before us. Taken as a whole, the record suggests a voluntary and intelligent waiver. First, there is no indication that attorney Martin, retained by Malinski's family, had a previous relationship with Malinski himself. While hardly dispositive, this fact makes it seem less likely that Malinski would have responded to the lawyer's request than would be the case if the request came from someone he already knew. Second, the police repeatedly read Malinski his rights and he consistently waived them and agreed to talk. Third, Malinski signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. Indeed, before taking a second recorded statement, the FBI agents showed Malinksi his signed waiver and asked him once again whether he understood his rights. Malinski acknowledged his rights and signature on the waiver form, and again chose to provide a statement. Finally, at no time during the interrogations did Malinski request counsel, a fact more supportive of a knowing waiver than would be the case if the record reflected some indecision. The record does not suggest any hesitation. In fact, Malinski provided two detailed statements of the events surrounding Lori's disappearance. Such detailed accounts demonstrate a willingness on Malinski's part to cooperate with law enforcement officers. The fact that neither statement constituted a confession further suggests the lack of any likely effect that contact with counsel would have had on Malinski's decision to talk. The only effect that resulted from the two statements Malinski provided was that of two inconsistent statements. In both statements he maintained his innocence. Thus, numerous factors weigh in favor of finding a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. In light of all the circumstances, we conclude that Malinski's ignorance of Martin's presence did not convert his waiver into one that was involuntary. The trial court did not err in denying Malinski's motion to suppress his statements.