Opinion ID: 186875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Existence of Enforceable Florida CBA

Text: 29 Finally, Dick Corporation challenges the district court's determination that there is a genuine issue of material fact — precluding summary judgment — whether an enforceable Florida CBA existed at the time of its Florida construction projects. The Company asserts that the district court erred in relying on proffered evidence related to the Florida CBA in light of the Fund's alleged discovery violations. See Appellee's Br. at 14-26. Indeed, when the Company requested a copy of the Florida CBA, including the CBA's specific wage and contribution rates, during discovery, see JA 267, the Fund produced only a standard Florida CBA form (with blanks not filled in), JA 267-68; 129-50, and Dick Corporation claims that the Fund failed to provide the specific information needed to establish the existence of an enforceable CBA until the Company moved for summary judgment, see Appellee's Br. at 16. Because of the Fund's failure to produce, the Company argues, the district court should have excluded any rate information under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). 10 Instead the district court erroneously relied on the evidence and thus, Dick Corporation asserts, erroneously found an enforceable Florida CBA. Absent an enforceable contract, the Company continues, the Fund's contribution arguments fail for lack of an obligation. See Appellee's Br. at 14-18. 11 30 In response, the Fund claims that it provided the substantial justification for non-disclosure necessary to avoid Rule 37(c)(1). See Appellants' Reply Br. at 20-21 n. 27; Pls.' Sur-Reply to Def.'s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. First, the Fund argues that it did supply the requested wage and contribution rates during discovery, thereby providing the information needed to establish an enforceable CBA. See Appellants' Reply Br. at 21 n. 27; Decl. of Seth Richardson, reprinted in JA at 525. Second, the Fund showed that some of the requested information was within the control of a Florida BAC official. See Decl. of Robert Blanco at 1-2, reprinted in JA at 474-75 (describing Florida BAC official's providing Florida CBA to Fund). Finally, before the district court, the Fund explained that the only reason why the documents at issue were not gathered and produced earlier ... was because Dick Corporation chose to wait until its summary judgment motion to argue for the very first time that the Florida [CBA] was illegal and unenforceable because it did not contain the governing rates. Pls.' Sur-Reply to Def.'s Reply Br. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 2 (emphasis in original). 31 In general, the district court enjoys wide discretion in managing discovery, and, accordingly, [w]e review the district court's discovery ruling[s] for abuse of discretion only. See Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 898 (D.C.Cir.2006). This deference extends to the district court's imposition of discovery sanctions. See Jankins v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 21 F.3d 436, 445 (D.C.Cir.1994); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) (In addition to or in lieu of [exclusion of evidence], the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to be heard, may impose other appropriate sanctions.). Here, the district court used the challenged evidence to revise its summary judgment order in response to the Fund's Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion. See JA 664-65. We also review a district court's decision to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) for abuse of discretion. See Messina, 439 F.3d at 758-59. 32 Both Dick Corporation and the Fund presented arguments to the district court regarding discovery sanctions. Nevertheless, the district court did not expressly decide the discovery dispute. Instead, it simply used the challenged evidence in deciding on reconsideration that the Court erred when it found that evidence of the detailed wage scales and contribution rates necessary to complete the contract had not been submitted into the record. JA 665 (citing Decl. of Robert Blanco at JA 474-82). The district court therefore found that the existence of an enforceable CBA in effect at the time of Dick Corporation's Florida projects presented a genuine issue of disputed material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Id. 12 33 Moreover, the district court did not deliberate[ly] reject the proffered evidence in its initial summary judgment ruling as a discovery sanction but simply overlooked the evidence [a]wash in [the] sea of unsigned and unlabeled agreements and contracts in the case. Id. at 665 n. 4. While we owe deference to the district court's discovery decisions, we cannot defer to a decision that has not been made and we therefore remand for the district court to exercise its discretion in deciding the Rule 37(c)(1) matter. See EEOC v. Nat'l Children's Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1410-11 (D.C.Cir.1996) (remanding for district court to exercise discretion by mak[ing] a finding as to whether `good cause' exist[ed] for restricting the use of the depositions in this case). 34 To sum up, we reverse the district court's holding that the benefit contributions sought by the Fund are prohibited under the LMRA because Dick Corporation's breach of the Florida CBA — to which the Company is bound by operation of the August 2002 CBA's traveling contractor's clause — brings the requested benefit contributions within the exception of section 302(c)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(2). While we agree with the district court that the Fund's claims are not subject to the Florida CBA's arbitration requirement, to the extent the Fund's suit seeks to recover on behalf of the BAC as well, such claim is subject to compulsory arbitration and therefore must be dismissed. We remand to the district court its Rule 59(e) ruling — finding evidence of an enforceable Florida CBA — to consider the Company's outstanding Rule 37(c)(1) motion. Finally, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion the issues of the applicability of the Florida collective bargaining agreement at the Company's Florida jobsites and the appropriate award of damages. 35 So ordered.