Opinion ID: 594395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Taking of Mr. Nixon's Property

Text: 65 Given that the per se doctrine applies to this type of property, Mr. Nixon argues that PRMPA constitutes a per se taking since the Act has authorized the Archivist of the United States to assume complete possession and control of Mr. Nixon's presidential papers. PRMPA § 101. Moreover, Mr. Nixon points out that PRMPA denies him the power to unilaterally dispose of the materials as he wishes or to exclude others from them. PRMPA §§ 102, 104. The Government counters that the Act did not dispossess Mr. Nixon of the materials, but merely continued a pattern of access that was implemented by Mr. Nixon himself: the materials were left in the White House when Mr. Nixon resigned his Presidency; they were to remain in the custody of the Administrator pursuant to the Nixon-Sampson agreement; there had always been widespread access to them during the Nixon administration; and PRMPA's implementing regulations allow Mr. Nixon supervised access to them as well as the means of objecting to access tentatively granted others by the Archivist. 36 C.F.R. § 1275.26 (1992). Thus, the Government argues, PRMPA does not fundamentally alter Mr. Nixon's interest in the materials and cannot, therefore, constitute a taking. Again, the Government asks this court to indulge in the fantastic. 66 First, the Act unambiguously provides for federal possession of the materials. PRMPA § 101. Although it is true that Mr. Nixon may still view and use the documents, 33 that fact is hardly dispositive. The retention of some access rights by the former owner of property does not preclude the finding of a per se taking. See Lucas, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2895[298 U.S.App.D.C. 266] (taking where owner allowed to keep land, but prohibited from any economic use of the land); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3146, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987) (taking found where owner granted a building permit for beachfront property conditioned upon the creation of a public easement across the property). The test must be whether the access rights preserve for the former owner the essential economic use of the surrendered property. That is, has the former owner been deprived of a definable unit of economic interests? If so, then it is no answer that he may still stand in some relation to the property. In the present case, the right of access retained by Mr. Nixon is but a thin reed among those associated with the ownership of presidential papers. Although he may still use them, presumably for his own autobiographical and historical work, he has lost all bargaining power with respect to them, not to mention the ability to dispose of them. 67 More importantly, PRMPA has completely abrogated Mr. Nixon's right unilaterally to exclude others from the materials. As the Court has confirmed time and time again, the right to exclude others is perhaps the quintessential property right. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176, 100 S.Ct. at 391; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433, 102 S.Ct. at 3175; Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716, 107 S.Ct. 2076, 2083, 95 L.Ed.2d 668 (1987). Without this right, one's interest in property becomes very tenuous since it is then subject to the whim of others--an interest more akin to a license than to ownership. The Government attempts to circumvent this difficulty by referring us to the widespread access to the materials given to the White House staff during the Nixon administration. The Government reasons that Mr. Nixon cannot be injured by allowing others to view the documents since so many have viewed them in the past. This approach, however, completely misapprehends the distinction between regulation affecting one's relationship to those voluntarily admitted to property versus government action compelling an owner to allow continuous access to third parties. Compare Yee, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1530-31 (regulation of the relationship between landlord and tenants voluntarily admitted to the property not a per se taking) with Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436, 102 S.Ct. at 3176 (per se taking where landlord required to admit a cable company to her property). In the first case, the owner may terminate the permissive use, thus reclaiming sole dominion over the property. That is not to say that this action will always be costless, but it remains, at least, an option. In the latter case, that option has been taken--the owner can do nothing to avoid the unsolicited invasion. So it is in this case. Mr. Nixon may not prevent any person to whom the Archivist grants access from viewing or using the materials. In this way, he has been deprived of perhaps the paramount property right. 68 The Government persists, though, arguing that, under PRMPA § 104(a)(5) and its implementing regulations, Mr. Nixon has mechanisms available to him to exclude others. Yet, even a cursory review of these sections makes it apparent that they in no way approach the at will power to exclude others that all property owners enjoy and expect. Under the regulations, Mr. Nixon must be given notice and an opportunity to be present at any search of the materials by federal agencies or in connection with judicial process. 36 C.F.R. § 1275.26(d). Moreover, Mr. Nixon must be notified prior to the release of materials to an agency or in connection with judicial proceedings, or prior to the opening of any integral file segment of the materials to public access. 36 C.F.R. § 1275.26(f). If he has any objection to the release based on rights or privileges, Mr. Nixon may file a claim with the Archivist and obtain a temporary stay of the release pending an administrative determination. Id. This determination is subject to judicial review. However, in substance, these privileges are not materially different from the privileges enjoyed by other members of the public with respect to these same materials. See 36 C.F.R. § 1275.42(b) (30-day notice prior to public release); id. at § 1275.44(a) (right to assert a claim to block release based on right or privilege). Thus, Mr. Nixon actually [298 U.S.App.D.C. 267] retains no right to exclude others from this property; and certainly not one capable of being called a property interest. 69 Similarly unavailing are the Government's references to Mr. Nixon's abandonment of the materials upon his departure from Washington and his subsequent acceptance of the Nixon-Sampson agreement. First, nothing can be inferred from Mr. Nixon's having left the materials in the White House. In view of the volume of the materials (42 million items), Mr. Nixon did what he could to ensure that they would find their way to his California destination by arranging with his staff for the organization and shipment of the materials. Mr. Nixon's having left without them is in no way remarkable. Second, the Nixon-Sampson agreement does not reflect an acquiescence to complete dispossession of the materials. Indeed, the purpose of the agreement was apparently just the opposite: to ensure that valid judicial process could be satisfied by the new administration without Mr. Nixon having to relinquish title and control of his papers. The agreement was for a limited duration and it authorized Mr. Nixon to exclude unilaterally anyone from access other than those acting pursuant to a subpoena. The inference from this conduct that Mr. Nixon willingly engendered the PRMPA construct is simply too great of a logical leap. 70 In conclusion, PRMPA not only physically dispossessed Mr. Nixon of his property, but it also severely restricted his right of access to the property, his right to exclude others from the property, and his right to dispose of the property. Therefore, under the per se doctrine, PRMPA resulted in a taking and compensation is constitutionally required.