Opinion ID: 451641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of First Amendment

Text: 39 The Supreme Court has held that a teacher's criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern is protected by the First Amendment and may therefore be an impermissible basis for termination of his employment. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Yet reliance on impermissible factors does not, in and of itself, render a termination decision unconstitutional, if there were other, permissible reasons for the termination which were sufficient to support the decision. Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, supra, 429 U.S. at 285-86, 97 S.Ct. at 575. 40
41 The district court relied heavily on the Mt. Healthy doctrine in finding that Paul's role in the termination did not violate appellant's rights. The court acknowledged the possibility that several of the factors relating to Harden's criticism of the Department Chairman and relied upon to support the termination of Harden were impermissible, but concluded that there were also thirteen permissible reasons for termination, twelve of which were not contested by appellant. 42 The district court erred in concluding that the Mt. Healthy doctrine controlled the instant case. First, that doctrine is narrower than the district court's opinion suggests. The Mt. Healthy doctrine does not apply in every case where officials can demonstrate other reasons for a termination; it sustains a termination based on impermissible reasons only when there are other reasons sufficient to support the decision. Second, Mt. Healthy is distinguishable from the instant case in that the appellant there did not have tenure, a fact on which the Court explicitly relied in reaching its decision. To demonstrate reasons sufficient to support the termination of a tenured faculty member, a university would have to make a considerably stronger showing than appellees did in Mt. Healthy. Paul has made no such showing in the instant case. Many of the stated reasons for termination were seemingly trivial (bringing food to class, not following course outlines, failing to keep appointments with students); others were equivocally maintained by the University (the charge of sexual impropriety was raised, disclaimed at the hearing, and re-raised in the district court); and all were denied by appellant during the district court proceedings. It is impossible to say, viewing all of these allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant (Harden) 2 that there was no material issue of fact as to whether the permissible reasons cited for his termination were sufficient to support the decision. This conclusion is supported by the strong policy reflected in the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Circuit against resolving complex First Amendment issues on a motion for summary judgment. See Perry v. Sindermann, supra; Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 648 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). For all of these reasons, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Paul. 43
44 The district court's determination as to Grimmer, Thornton and Kirkland is even less sound; the court failed even to acknowledge the possibility of a First Amendment violation perpetrated by these appellees. The district court stated that these officials were simply doing their duty in reporting negative information and recommending the termination of appellant. Yet the potential for a First Amendment violation existed in their cases as well. Deans Grimmer and Kirkland were directly involved with the communication and investigation of complaints concerning Dr. Harden's criticism of his Department Chairman; and Dean Thornton provided information suggesting that Dr. Harden had fomented disharmony in connection with his sponsorship of Gamma Beta Phi. Moreover, each was fully informed of all charges against Harden, and discussed them at length with the others before recommending to Vice-President Paul that Harden be terminated. Thus the record strongly suggests that these three appellees were intimately involved in a decision to terminate which was based on impermissible factors. 3 As discussed above, it seems unlikely that the permissible factors cited by the University were sufficiently strong to bring the case within the Mt. Healthy doctrine. The district court erred in finding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether these appellees violated appellant's constitutional rights.