Opinion ID: 1228357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: indian treaty rights and equal protection

Text: The majority opinion proceeds from the presumption that treaty and nontreaty fishermen possess identical rights to the state fishery and cannot lawfully be placed in separate categories for purposes of regulation. An examination of United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the crucial clause of the Treaty of Medicine Creek and similar provisions in other treaties [5] establishes this is not the law. Native Americans who are beneficiaries of treaties negotiated by our government with their ancestors possess rights to the fish in our waters which clearly exceed those of ordinary citizens. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 49 L.Ed. 1089, 25 S.Ct. 662 (1905), is the first of a long series of cases decided by the Supreme Court from this jurisdiction and concerns the scope of the rights conferred by the fishing provision at issue here. The issue presented in Winans was framed by the court as follows, at page 379: The pivot of the controversy is the construction of the second paragraph. Respondents contend that the words the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the Territory confer only such rights as a white man would have under the conditions of ownership of the lands bordering on the river, and under the laws of the State, and, such being the rights conferred, the respondents further contend that they have the power to exclude the Indians from the river by reason of such ownership. The principles enunciated by the court in answering this contention established the basic precepts which continue to control this area of law. The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. New conditions came into existence, to which those rights had to be accommodated. Only a limitation of them, however, was necessary and intended, not a taking away. In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them  a reservation of those not granted.... There was an exclusive right of fishing reserved within certain boundaries. There was a right outside of those boundaries reserved in common with citizens of the Territory. As a mere right, it was not exclusive in the Indians. Citizens might share it, but the Indians were secured in its enjoyment by a special provision of means for its exercise. They were given the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, and the right of erecting temporary buildings for curing them. The contingency of the future ownership of the lands, therefore, was foreseen and provided for  in other words, the Indians were given a right in the land  the right of crossing it to the river  the right to occupy it to the extent and for the purpose mentioned. No other conclusion would give effect to the treaty. United States v. Winans, supra at 381. The court then held that neither the State nor an abutting landowner could exclude the Indians from access to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds. The decision clearly established over 70 years ago that treaty Indians possess rights distinct from those of ordinary citizens. The opinion in Winans recognized a principle of treaty interpretation which retains crucial importance in evaluating equal protection arguments raised with respect to treaty Indian rights. The rights and powers which Indian treaties establish are not grants of power to the Indians, but rather surrender of rights from them. Thus, rights not explicitly given up are rights reserved by the Indians. The importance of this principle in the current case results from its impact upon proper interpretation of the phrase, in common with. In Winans the Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision limiting the Indians to only the same fishing rights as others had. Using reserved rights analysis, Justice McKenna pointed to the absurdity of this interpretation; it was hardly reasonable to conclude that the Indians had been willing to give up all of their independent fishing rights in their entirety. In an oft-quoted passage, Justice McKenna discussed the decision of the lower court and evaluated it, at page 380: The remarks of the court clearly stated the issue and the grounds of decision. The contention of the respondents was sustained. In other words, it was decided that the Indians acquired no rights but what any inhabitant of the Territory or State would have. Indeed, acquired no rights but such as they would have without the treaty. This is certainly an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word of the Nation for more. Winans stands unequivocally for the proposition that in common with does not limit Indian fishing rights to those which others may also exercise. Thus, the Winans decision is itself a clear recognition of the separate character and separate source of Indian treaty rights; while the ordinary United States citizen has rights as defined by the constitution and subject to limitation by the proper exercise of the police power of the states, treaty Indians retain rights as established under treaty prior to the grant of United States citizenship to the Indians. [6] Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 86 L.Ed. 1115, 62 S.Ct. 862 (1942), involved a challenge by a member of the Yakima Tribe to his conviction for fishing without a state license. The court held: [W]hile the treaty leaves the state with power to impose on Indians, equally with others, such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and manner of fishing outside the reservation as are necessary for the conservation of fish, it forecloses the state from charging the Indians a fee of the kind in question here. In determining the scope of the reserved rights of hunting and fishing, we must not give the treaty the narrowest construction it will bear. In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, this Court held that, despite the phrase in common with citizens of the Territory, Article III conferred upon the Yakimas continuing rights, beyond those which other citizens may enjoy, to fish at their usual and accustomed places in the ceded area; ... (Footnote omitted.) Tulee v. Washington, supra at 684. The extent of the power of the State to regulate the treaty fishery for the conservation purposes recognized in Tulee was the next issue faced by the Supreme Court. In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 20 L.Ed.2d 689, 88 S.Ct. 1725 (1968) ( Puyallup I), the State sought an injunction against fresh water set net fishing by treaty Indians. The Supreme Court responded by reiterating its prior holdings to the effect that the State had power to regulate the off reservation treaty fishery where necessary for the conservation of fish, but pointed out that this standard is distinct from the federal constitutional standard concerning the scope of the police power of a State. (Italics mine.) Puyallup I at 402 n. 14. The court also dismissed the argument that the statutes granting citizenship to Indians altered or abrogated their preexisting treaty rights, stating: The right to fish `at all usual and accustomed' places may, of course, not be qualified by the State, even though all Indians born in the United States are now citizens of the United States. (Italics mine.) Puyallup I at 398. Thus, Puyallup I directly contradicts the assertions by the majority here that the Indians' present status as citizens allows the equal protection clause to be utilized to abrogate established treaty rights. Puyallup I was remanded for further findings on the conservation issue with the admonition that such findings must cover the issue of equal protection implicit in the phrase `in common with'. Puyallup I at 403. The majority mistakenly seizes upon this language as supportive of its position that treaty Indians have no greater rights than other citizens. Subsequent decisions of that court refute the majority's interpretation; it is now clear that the thrust of the court's equal protection concern is directed at securing full state respect for the rights of treaty fishermen. Following the remand in Puyallup I, this court upheld fisheries regulations allowing a treaty net fishery for salmon and denying special rights to treaty fishermen as to steelhead. Both parties petitioned the Supreme Court for review and consolidated writs of certiorari were granted. See Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 414 U.S. 44, 38 L.Ed.2d 254, 94 S.Ct. 330 (1973) ( Puyallup II). In its petition for writ of certiorari in Puyallup II, the State Department of Game listed as one of the grounds for Supreme Court review: The failure of the court, in the opinion below [ i.e., 80 Wn.2d 561] to hold that state conservation laws may be applied to Indian and non-Indian citizens on an equal basis in off-reservation waters violated the Equal Protection Clause adverted to by Justice Douglas in expressing the view for a unanimous court in the Puyallup opinion at 403. Petition for Writ of Certiorari on behalf of the State of Washington Department of Game, United States Supreme Court cause No. 72-481, at 10. An examination of the briefs presented to the Supreme Court in that case confirms that the analysis embraced by the majority here was presented to the Supreme Court in Puyallup II. [7] Such an analysis was expressly rejected in Puyallup II. The issue presented was framed thusly by the court: The ban on all net fishing in the Puyallup River for steelhead grants, in effect, the entire run to the sports fishermen. Whether that amounts to discrimination under the Treaty is the central question in these cases. (Footnote omitted.) Puyallup II at 46-47. Though it was conceded that the Indians were free to pursue steelhead as sports fishermen, the court held the treaty granted to the treaty tribes special rights to a portion of the catch, over and above that enjoyed by others. If hook-and-line fishermen now catch all the steelhead which can be caught within the limits needed for escapement, then that number must in some manner be fairly apportioned between Indian net fishing and non-Indian sports fishing ... The aim is to accommodate the rights of Indians under the Treaty and the rights of other people. (Italics mine.) Puyallup II at 48-49. Puyallup II clearly establishes that Indians fishing pursuant to a treaty possess special rights and constitute a distinct class of fishermen. The conclusion that the type of equal protection argument advanced here by the majority was expressly rejected in Puyallup II is inescapable. [8] Puyallup II also establishes that this special class of fishermen, in addition to other rights such as those enunciated in Winans and Tulee, is entitled to a fair portion of harvestable fish covered by the treaty and that what constitutes a fair portion is to be decided on a case-by-case basis on the facts presented. What formula should be employed is not for us to propose. There are many variables  the number of nets, the number of steelhead that can be caught with nets, the places where nets can be located, the length of the net season, the frequency during the season when nets may be used. On the other side are the number of hook-and-line licenses that are issuable, the limits of the catch of each sports fisherman, the duration of the season for sports fishing, and the like. Puyallup II at 48-49. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions reinforce this analysis. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 43 L.Ed.2d 129, 95 S.Ct. 944 (1975), concerned the scope of the treaty hunting rights of Colville Indians under a similar treaty provision. This court had upheld convictions for hunting out of season in violation of state law, rejecting a treaty defense. The Supreme Court reversed, again recognizing that Indian tribal members have special rights under their treaties. Finally, the opinion of the State Supreme Court construes Art. 6 as merely a promise by the United States that so long as it retained any ceded land and allowed others to hunt thereon, Indians would be allowed also to hunt there. 82 Wash.2d, at 449-450, 511 P.2d, at 1357-1358. But the provisions of Art. 6 that the preserved rights are not exclusive and are to be enjoyed in common with all other persons, does not support that interpretation or affect the Supremacy Clause's preclusion of qualifying state regulation. Non-Indians are, of course, not beneficiaries of the preserved rights, and the State remains wholly free to prohibit or regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing. The ratifying legislation must be construed to exempt the Indians' preserved rights from like state regulation ...