Opinion ID: 680033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Congressional Power to Abrogate

Text: 21 Having concluded that IGRA authorizes suits against the States, we next must consider whether the Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to override the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 7 This question has sharply divided the courts. Compare Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.1994) (upholding Congress' authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause), Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 281 (same), with Seminole Tribe of Florida, 11 F.3d at 1028 (concluding that Congress lacks the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under IGRA). 22 The abrogation doctrine is based on the principle that, while the Eleventh Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of Article III courts, Congress may remove the amendment's specific constraint on federal judicial power by a federal statute enacted pursuant to certain constitutional provisions bestowing plenary powers on Congress. See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 227, 109 S.Ct. at 2399. The Court first articulated the concept of abrogation in Fitzpatrick, holding that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in legislation enacted pursuant to Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456, 96 S.Ct. at 2671. 23 The dual rationale underlying the Court's analysis in Fitzpatrick was that the Fourteenth Amendment expanded federal power at the same time that it contracted state power. When Congress acts pursuant to Sec. 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. Id. (upholding money award against a state under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 24 Not until 1989 did the Court recognize a second constitutional source of authority for Congressional abrogation, namely, the Interstate Commerce Clause. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 13-23, 109 S.Ct. at 2280-86 (plurality opinion). 8 Anchored on the dual principles articulated in Fitzpatrick, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Union Gas explained that, like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same time as it confers it on Congress. Id. at 19, 109 S.Ct. at 2284. The plurality added that to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable. Id. at 19-20, 109 S.Ct. at 2284-85. As in Fitzpatrick, the plurality in Union Gas observed that the Commerce Clause reflected a shift in the balance of power between the states and the federal government under our constitutional structure, a logical consequence of which is that Congress may exercise its plenary powers by subjecting the states to suit in federal court. This theory of structural federalism pervades the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 Colum.L.Rev. 1243, 1253-64 (1992). 25 In an attempt to sap Union Gas of any doctrinal significance, the states in the instant cases first make much of the fact that the Court was splintered in Union Gas and that Justice White, the fifth vote on the Commerce Clause abrogation question, stated that he did not agree with much of [Justice Brennan's] reasoning. Id. at 57, 109 S.Ct. at 2296. 9 However, we are unwilling to sweep aside Union Gas as lacking precedential value or guidance for our analysis. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds....'  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2923 n. 15, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.)). It is beyond dispute that five Justices in Union Gas held that Congress possesses the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause of Article I. 26 Also, we find informative the Union Gas plurality opinion's reliance on the dual factors articulated in Fitzpatrick to explain Congress' ability to abrogate: the Commerce Clause with one hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 16, 109 S.Ct. at 2282. Thus, for purposes of Congress' abrogation authority, and the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential component of our constitutional [federal-state] structure, Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 228, 109 S.Ct. at 2400, we perceive no constitutional distinction between the plenary powers bestowed in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause. 27 Consistent with our understanding of Congress' plenary powers and the teachings of Fitzpatrick and Union Gas, the Ninth Circuit recently held that IGRA strips the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity because Congress enacted the statute pursuant to its plenary powers under the Indian Commerce Clause. Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d 991, 995-997. [T]he analysis developed by the Supreme Court in both Union Gas and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer is equally applicable to the Indian Commerce Clause.... [A]s in Union Gas and Fitzpatrick, Congress is acting under one of its plenary powers. Id. at 996. See also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 280 ([g]iven Congress' plenary authority over Indian relations ... Congress, when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, has the power to abrogate the States' [eleventh Amendment] immunity) (quoting with approval Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F.Supp. 655, 658 (S.D.Fla.1992), rev'd, Seminole Tribe of Florida, 11 F.3d at 1028)). 28 The Indian Commerce Clause confers on Congress the plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192, 109 S.Ct. 1698, 1716, 104 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989). Just as the Interstate Commerce Clause shifts the balance of state-federal power to Congress to regulate commerce among the states, so too does the Indian Commerce Clause render Indian relations ... the exclusive province of federal law. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 234, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1251, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985); Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (Congressional power pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause ... cannot be less than its authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause.). 29 The States argue that the disparate purposes of the Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses render the abrogation analysis in Union Gas inapposite. In so doing, the States cite to Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192, 109 S.Ct. at 1716, that explained that whereas the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free trade among the States ... the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs. Because the jurisprudence under Interstate Commerce Clause [ ] is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of the States in our constitutional system, it is not readily imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause. Id. 30 The obvious differences between the two clauses, however, do not lead us to conclude that Congress lacks the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. Indeed, the States' focus is misplaced. What was relevant for the abrogation analysis in both Fitzpatrick and the plurality opinion in Union Gas was not just the subject matter of the constitutional provisions, but also whether the provisions bestowed plenary power on Congress to the exclusion of the states' authority in the field. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456, 96 S.Ct. at 2671; Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20, 109 S.Ct. at 2284-85. 10 Moreover, Cotton Petroleum 's discussion of the disparate applications of the two clauses considered only whether Indian tribes could be treated as states under the Interstate Commerce Clause for purposes of tax apportionment. 490 U.S. at 191-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1715-17. The case did not address Congress' ability to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity and therefore is not controlling precedent for our analysis. Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d 991, 995 (The Cotton Petroleum observation that Interstate Commerce Clause doctrine cannot always readily be applied to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause ... does not speak to the scope of congressional power under either [clause].). Accord Seminole Tribe of Florida, 11 F.3d at 1027 (Cotton Petroleum is not directly on point for whether the Indian Commerce Clause allows Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.). 31 Nor do we find convincing the States' contention that the Court's opinion in Blatchford compels us to conclude that Congress lacks the power to abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause. In Blatchford, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by Indian tribes against states because the states did not consent to such suits when they adopted the Constitution. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782, 111 S.Ct. at 2583. There, the tribes argued that, just as the states are deemed to have waived their immunity against suits by sister states, so had the states waived their immunity against suits by tribes. The Court in Blatchford rejected this argument, noting that the states' waiver of immunity against suits by sister states arises from a mutuality of ... concession between the states that is inherent in the constitutional compact. Id. 501 U.S. at 781, 111 S.Ct. at 2582 Because the constitutional compact does not embody an analogous mutuality of concession between the states and the tribes, Blatchford held that the states have not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits brought by tribes. Id. 501 U.S. at 782, 111 S.Ct. at 2583. 32 The States' reliance on this discussion in Blatchford elides the difference between waiver and abrogation. Indeed, the Court discussed both doctrines and held that, in addition to a lack of waiver, Congress did not satisfy the Dellmuth clear-statement abrogation test in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1362. Id. 501 U.S. at 786, 111 S.Ct. at 2585. 11 The Indian tribes in the cases before us advance only an abrogation claim, not a state waiver theory. The Blatchford Court's historical analysis about waiver in no way undermines Union Gas, which only considered Congress' abrogation powers. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. at 2286 n. 5 (Since Union Gas itself eschews reliance on the theory of waiver ... we neither discuss this theory here nor understand why Justice Scalia feels the need to do so.). Blatchford 's only abrogation analysis was under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1362, and, as pointed out above, that analysis is not instructive for us because the court found no unequivocal Congressional statement of intent to abrogate in that statute. However, the fact that the Court in Blatchford proceeded to consider the tribe's separate abrogation theory demonstrates that the historical analysis of waiver does not undermine the conclusion that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its Article I plenary powers. 33 For these reasons, we conclude that the Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and that IGRA constitutes an unequivocal expression of Congress' intent to do so. 12 We therefore affirm the judgment in Kickapoo and reverse the rulings in Ponca, Pueblo of Sandia, and Mescalero. 13