Opinion ID: 835777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: communication with represented parties

Text: The Bar alleges that the accused violated DR 7-104(A)(1) by speaking to two of his employees about an action that they had filed against him. We find that the Bar proved the following facts by clear and convincing evidence. Four of the accused's employees, including Maddocks and Clark, sued the accused in federal court on employment-related claims. The accused received service of the summons and complaint at his office between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m. on Friday, March 17, 2000. Thirty to 45 minutes later, the accused confronted Maddocks in her office, showing her the summons and complaint, and asking, in an angry tone, what it was and whose idea it had been. Maddocks told him that they should not be discussing the action. The accused left, insisting that they would discuss the matter the following week. The entire conversation lasted between 30 seconds and one minute. Clark was in her office the next day, a Saturday, when the accused entered and tossed a piece of paper at her. He asked her what it was, and she answered that it was the cover sheet of a civil action. The accused asked Clark why she was bringing the action, who had decided to sue him, and whether this is really what you want to do. Clark told the accused to direct his questions to her lawyer, but the accused said that he had a right to speak with her directly. Finally, when Clark threatened to leave the room if the accused did not discuss work-related matters, he gave her some papers to file and left. The conversation lasted between five and 20 minutes. [3] Both Maddocks and Clark believed that the accused was trying to intimidate them into dropping the action. Both women described the conversations with the accused to their lawyers, who amended the complaint in the action to include retaliation claims based on the conversations. (The accused ultimately prevailed in the action.) The Bar alleged that the accused's conversations with Maddocks and Clark violated DR 7-104(A)(1). [4] That rule provides: (A) During the course of the lawyer's representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation, or on directly related subjects with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer on that subject or on directly related subjects, unless: (a) the lawyer has the prior consent of a lawyer representing such other person; (b) the lawyer is authorized by law to do so; or (c) a written agreement requires a written notice or demand to be sent to such other person, in which case a copy of such notice or demand shall also be sent to such other person's lawyer. This prohibition includes a lawyer representing the lawyer's own interests. The trial panel concluded that the accused had violated that rule as to Maddocks, but it further concluded, with one member dissenting, that the violation had been de minimis because the accused should not be expected to engage in detached reflection over his ethical responsibilities immediately after being served with a complaint. [5] However, the trial panel concluded that the accused had violated DR 7-104(A)(1) by speaking with Clark the next day, after he had had time to reflect on the proper course of conduct. The accused argues that this court should conclude that he should not be sanctioned for either alleged violation of DR 7-104(A)(1) because the communications with Maddocks and Clark were very brief, because the accused's emotional distress about being sued caused him to act hastily, and because his intent was to determine whether he could continue to work productively with employees who were suing him and not to invade his employees' relationships with their lawyers. Those arguments are insufficient to avoid the conclusion that the accused violated DR 7-104(A)(1) by separately communicating with Maddocks and Clark regarding the subject of their action against him, when he knew that they were represented. The text of DR 7-104(A)(1) provides no exception for otherwise prohibited communications, and the purposes underlying the rule suggest no basis for such an exception. DR 7-104 is a prophylactic rule designed to insulate represented persons against possible overrreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship, and the uncounselled disclosure of information relating to the representation. The Ethical Oregon Lawyer § 7.42 (Oregon CLE 1991) (quoting ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2, Comment [1]). All violations of the rule present that risk. Accordingly, this court previously has found violations of DR 7-104(A)(1) even when the prohibited communication was brief, transitory, or not likely to cause serious harm. See In re Schenck, 320 Or. 94, 879 P.2d 863 (1994) (rule violated when lawyer mailed notice to produce directly to adverse party whom lawyer knew to be represented by counsel); In re Hedrick, 312 Or. 442, 822 P.2d 1187 (1991) (rule violated when lawyer sent demand letter directly to represented person, with copy to lawyer). The accused's related defenses also are unavailing. This court has rejected, as a defense to a charge of improperly communicating with a represented party, the claim that the lawyer and the represented party share a relationship separate from the lawyer's status as a lawyer that requires them to interact with each other regardless of the pending litigation. See In re Otto W. Heider, 217 Or. 134, 155, 341 P.2d 1107 (1959) (rejecting lawyer's defense that improper communication occurred because accused and represented party had business relationship). This court also has held that an accused lawyer's emotional state during the communication is irrelevant. See In re Lewelling, 296 Or. 702, 706, 678 P.2d 1229 (1984) (rejecting accused's justification that he had communicated with represented party on sudden impulse when he was emotionally upset). Moreover, a lawyer need not intend to violate the lawyer-client relationship of the represented party to violate DR 7-104(A)(1). See In re McCaffrey, 275 Or. 23, 28, 549 P.2d 666 (1976) (direct communication with party lawyer knows to be represented, concerning subject of representation, violates rule even if not done intentionally). Neither the text of the rule nor this court's cases interpreting it recognize as a defense any of the arguments that the accused makes. The accused's arguments are relevant only in determining the appropriate sanction, and we discuss them in that context below. We conclude that the Bar has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the accused violated DR 7-104(A)(1) with respect to both Maddocks and Clark.