Opinion ID: 184539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to Intervene

Text: 33 Before reaching the merits of the MTP's petition we must decide whether the CMA or any trade association joining its brief has standing under Article III of the Constitution of the United States to intervene in this case in support of the EPA. See City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1516-18 (D.C.Cir.1994) (denying leave to intervene in support of a respondent agency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2348 for want of standing). 34 An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when: 35 (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the [331 U.S.App.D.C. 13] interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 36 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). In this case all parties agree that the CMA has standing because some of its members produce military munitions and operate military firing ranges regulated under the Military Munitions Rule. These companies are directly subject to the challenged Rule, and they benefit from the EPA's intended use interpretation (under which most military munitions at firing ranges are not solid waste), the conditional exemption from regulation of storage and transportation under Subtitle C, and other features of the Military Munitions Rule that the MTP is challenging in this appeal. These CMA members would suffer concrete injury if the court grants the relief the petitioners seek; they would therefore have standing to intervene in their own right, and we agree with the litigants that the CMA has standing to intervene on their behalf in support of the EPA. 37 Because the CMA has standing, we need not determine whether the other intervenor-applicants listed on the CMA's brief also have standing. [I]f one party has standing in an action, a court need not reach the issue of standing of other parties when it makes no difference to the merits of the case. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C.Cir.1993); cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 n. 16, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (We need not resolve the question of whether Duke Power is a proper party since jurisdiction over appellees' claims against the NRC is established, and Duke's presence or absence makes no material difference to either our consideration of the merits of the controversy or our authority to award the requested relief). The presence of names other than that of the CMA on the intervenors' brief obviously makes no difference to our consideration of the arguments therein. Accordingly, having assured ourselves that the CMA has standing, we grant the pending motions to intervene, and we shall take the intervenors' arguments into account in addressing the merits of the MTP's claims. 38 The MTP has moved to strike portions of the intervenors' brief and of the materials appended thereto on the ground that the subject materials are not part of the administrative record. We deny the motion because the challenged materials--a policy document from the EPA and two reports from the General Accounting Office--are judicially cognizable apart from the record as authorities marshaled in support of a legal argument. See Fed. R.App. Proc. 28(a)(6) (brief must set forth contentions with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on).