Opinion ID: 4579005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strickland’s Prejudice Standard

Text: “The standard for legal errors under § 2254(d)(1) was meant to be diﬃcult to satisfy.” Dassey, 877 F.3d at 302. The issue is not whether we “agree with the state court decision or even whether the state court decision was correct,” it is “whether the decision was unreasonably wrong under an ob‐ jective standard.” Id. When the state court “‘explains its deci‐ sion on the merits in a reasoned opinion,’ this presents a ‘straightforward inquiry’ for the federal habeas court.” Lentz v. Kennedy, 967 F.3d 675, 688 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018)). Here, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was the last reasoned decision on the merits, and “thus we focus on that decision and ‘simply review[] the spe‐ cific reasons given by the state court and defer[] to those rea‐ sons if they are reasonable.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192). Habeas relief is only warranted if the petitioner shows that the state court’s determination “was so lacking in justifi‐ cation that there was an error well understood and compre‐ hended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Given this narrow and exacting standard of review, we con‐ clude that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreason‐ ably apply Strickland’s prejudice prong. The state appellate court determined that Gage had not shown prejudice from his trial counsel’s failure to call Josh No. 19‐2002 13 and Nancy as witnesses because their testimony was largely consistent with H.R.G.’s—meaning it did not significantly un‐ dermine her account of the sexual assaults. Thus, there was not a reasonable probability of a diﬀerent outcome had they testified. As the district court noted, the state appellate court’s analysis of the issue was brief and failed to discuss some of Josh’s and Nancy’s statements in their proﬀered testimony. Their testimony that “they never witnessed any sexual touch‐ ing or unusual behavior between Gage and H.R.G.,” for ex‐ ample, “would have made H.R.G.’s testimony at trial that Gage sexually assaulted her ‘almost every time [she] visited’ at least somewhat doubtful,” given Josh’s proximity to her in all three locations. Gage II, 2019 WL 1900338, at . Nonetheless, the state appellate court “provided a terse but suﬃcient explanation” for why Josh’s and Nancy’s testi‐ mony did not significantly undermine H.R.G.’s. See Dassey, 877 F.3d at 312–14 (noting that the “relative brevity” of the state appellate court opinion was “not a reason for granting habeas relief”). Much of their testimony corroborated H.R.G.’s version of events: nearly all the points Nancy and Josh conveyed in the postconviction hearing came out during H.R.G.’s cross‐examination. H.R.G., for example, testified that Josh was always nearby when the assaults occurred, Nancy could easily access the basement sewing room, she had de‐ clined Nancy’s oﬀer to sleep in the upstairs bedroom, and sound traveled in the cabin. And while Josh and Nancy testi‐ fied that they did not witness any of the assaults, this fact alone does not suggest a reasonable probability that the jury would have disbelieved H.R.G. given that she testified the as‐ saults occurred after everyone went to sleep. Thus, Josh’s and Nancy’s testimony not only failed to undermine much of H.R.G.’s testimony, it—in many cases—corroborated it. 14 No. 19‐2002 Further, while Josh’s testimony that he could not remember H.R.G. sleeping in the basement bedroom potentially under‐ mined her account of the first assault—which she testified happened when she was sleeping in the bedroom—Gage was ultimately acquitted of that charge. There is of course a chance the additional testimony could have changed the jury’s mind. Given this case rested on the jury’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses, fair‐ minded jurists may well disagree over the extent to which Josh’s and Nancy’s testimony was consistent with H.R.G.’s. But without any directly contradictory testimony, it was rea‐ sonable for the Wisconsin appellate court to conclude there was not a reasonable probability of a diﬀerent outcome had they testified.