Opinion ID: 2234355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nearest Feasible Route.

Text: Although section 6A.4(2) prescribes nearest feasible route as the standard for selecting the route of condemnation, it does not define feasible nor describe what factors should be taken into consideration when determining feasibility. This court has also not had the opportunity to determine the meaning of nearest feasible route. In the absence of a statutory definition, the parties have offered competing definitions. The Greens urge us to adopt a flexible approach where there is no rigid formula for establishing the nearest feasible route. Under their theory, a factor for the court to consider in selecting the route of condemnation is the cost of acquiring the condemned property. Wilderness Ridge, conversely, advocates for a narrow definition and asserts that the word feasible as used in section 6A.4(2) solely encompasses whether a particular route can be made into a usable access  i.e., whether a road can be built across the route. Allowing the district court to consider the costs of condemnation, moreover, under the defendant's theory, would usurp the authority of the compensation commission which has jurisdiction over condemnation damages. We agree with the Greens. In the absence of a legislative definition of a term or a particular meaning in the law, we give words their ordinary meaning. State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1997). Dictionaries are ready sources for ascertaining the common and ordinary definitions of a word. Id. Feasible has been defined as capable of being done, executed, or effected: possible of realization, capable of being managed, utilized, or dealt with successfully, and reasonable. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 831 (2002). At the core of the definition of feasible, therefore, are the notions of reasonableness and practicality. A determination of which route is the most reasonable to all parties involved, moreover, must be made on a case-by-case basis. We note that unlike other state eminent domain statutes, section 6A.4(2) does not provide a laundry list of criterion for selecting the route of condemnation. See, e.g., In re Private Rd., 684 A.2d 237, 241 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1996) (noting the four statutory criteria for selecting the location of a private road, including the route which would do the least injury to private property). The failure of the Iowa legislature to establish specific criteria for determining the nearest feasible route suggests the need for an individualized determination that extends beyond a mere determination of which route is easiest to construct without consideration of land acquisition costs. In this instance, determining the nearest feasible route of condemnation requires consideration of which route is easier to construct and which route will do less harm to the neighboring properties. Although we have found no private condemnation statutes in other states using the phrase nearest feasible route, other jurisdictions have followed a flexible approach and considered the impact of condemnation in selecting the appropriate route. See, e.g., Tenn.Code § 54-14-101( a )(1) (2008) (noting that route should do the least possible injury); Brothers v. Holloway, 692 So.2d 845, 848 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (noting that the condemnees' convenience was a material factor for the court to consider); Bean v. Nelson, 307 Ark. 24, 817 S.W.2d 415, 418 (1991) (noting that in selecting the location of a private road, the court must take into consideration not only the convenience and benefit to the limited number of people it serves, but the injury and inconvenience it will occasion the defendant); West v. Hinksmon, 857 P.2d 483, 487 (Colo.Ct.App.1992) (noting that in an action for private condemnation, the condemnee should be permitted to show that an acceptable alternative route across condemnee's property exists which would be less damaging than that proposed by the condemnor). Ignoring the cost of acquiring the condemned property, moreover, would lead to absurdities. The shortest route of access to landlocked property might be through highly-improved land. We think it is unlikely that the legislature intended to mandate that the land to be condemned must always be the shortest route, even though other somewhat longer routes involved less negative impacts on other landholders and less overall cost to develop when land acquisition costs are considered. Nor do we believe that in allowing the district court to consider the costs of acquisition we are usurping the statutory function of the compensation commission. Under Iowa Code section 6B.4, after an action for private condemnation has been granted, a compensation commission is established to assess the damages to all property to be taken. Allowing the district court to consider the impact of condemnation does not usurp the commission's jurisdiction because: (1) it requires only an approximation, and not a determination, of the damages of condemnation and (2) does not require or allow the district court to issue a judgment on those damages. Moreover, the compensation commission has no authority to challenge the route of condemnation. Reserving the Greens' challenge to the damages proceedings, therefore, does not vindicate their rights. Finally, this approach is consistent with our prior case law. In Owens, this court considered the criteria for determining whether a property owner had reasonable access to his land or, in other words, whether the owner had a right to private condemnation. Owens, 610 N.W.2d at 867-68. In reaching that question we suggested that in some cases it may be appropriate to also consider the value of the land sought to be condemned. Id. at 868. If the value of the land sought to be condemned is an appropriate factor to consider in evaluating the right to condemnation, the value of the land sought to be condemned is an appropriate factor to consider in determining the specific route of condemnation. Upon our de novo review, we hold that the district court erred in not considering the costs of condemnation in selecting the nearest feasible route. While both parties seek finality and urge this court to determine the nearest feasible route, we are unable to do so under the record presented. At trial, the Greens presented substantial testimony regarding the cost of acquisition in the selection of the southern route. The record also contains anecdotal evidence in regard to the costs of acquisition for the northern route, which impacts property owners other than the Greens. The district court, however, did not make findings of fact regarding the cost of acquisition of either route. Such findings of fact could involve credibility determinations which should be made in the first instance by the district court. As a result, this case is remanded to the district court for additional factfinding and a determination of the nearest feasible route, which takes into consideration the cost of acquiring the condemned property, under the current record.