Opinion ID: 768365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of State Procedures

Text: 5 This circuit has never been presented with the opportunity to examine the adequacy of a state's procedures to determine whether a death-row prisoner is competent to be executed pursuant to Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). In Ford, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from executing a prisoner who is insane. See 477 U.S. at 409-10. A majority of the Justices did not reach the issues of what constitutes insanity in this context or what state procedures would adequately address a prisoner's Ford claim. Therefore, this court must look to the position taken by Justice Powell, who concurred in the judgment on the most narrow grounds, for the Court's holding on these issues. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 6 First, Justice Powell concluded that prisoners will be considered insane for the purposes of competency to be executed when they are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they areto suffer it. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). In Ford, a psychiatrist's findings showed that the death-row prisoner believed that he would not be executed but rather understood the death penalty to have been invalidated. This led Justice Powell to conclude that [i]f this assessment is correct, petitioner cannot connect his execution to the crime for which he was convicted as required under the competency standard. Id. at 422-23 (Powell, J., concurring). It appears that the Supreme Court has accepted this competency standard as the Ford holding. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989) (noting that under Ford v. Wainwright, someone who is 'unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it' cannot be executed (citation omitted)). 7 Second, Justice Powell determined that in evaluating a prisoner's competency-to-be-executed claim, the state must comply with the Due Process Clause and that, under these particular circumstances, the clause requires the state to provide the prisoner with a fair hearing. Ford, 477 U.S. at 424 (Powell, J., concurring). In Ford, the Governor of Florida was responsible for deciding a prisoner's competency to be executed and for appointing a panel of three psychiatrists to evaluate the prisoner. The prisoner was not given the opportunity to present any material for the Governor to consider in making a competency determination. Justice Powell noted that the opportunity to be heard is a fundamental requisite of due process. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). The prisoner was not given this fundamental opportunity to be heard, and the decision on his competency was made solely on the basis of the findings from the state-appointed experts. Justice Powell stated that [s]uch a procedure invites arbitrariness and error by preventing the affected parties from offering contrary medical evidence or even from explaining the inadequacies of the State's examinations and does not, therefore, comport with due process. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). 8 Justice Powell cautioned, however, that he would not require the kind of full-scale 'sanity trial' he thought implied in Justice Marshall's opinion. Id. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring). 1 Although a prisoner is entitled to due process on a Ford claim, [d]ue process is a flexible concept and its procedural protections may vary depending on the context of a particular situation. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). A competency-to-be-executed claim only raises the issue of when a prisoner will be competent for execution and does not challenge the validity of the prisoner's conviction or sentence. Although an important question, it is not comparable to the antecedent question whether [the prisoner] should be executed at all.Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Therefore, Justice Powell asserted that the heightened procedural protections usually required in capital cases are not applicable in this context. See id. (Powell, J., concurring). In addition, because the prisoner necessarily was found competent to stand trial in order to be convicted, Justice Powell concluded that [t]he State therefore may properly presume that petitioner remains sane at the time sentence is to be carried out, and may require a substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing process. Id. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Finally, Justice Powell noted that the competency determination requires a basically subjective judgment based on expert analysis in a discipline fraught with 'subtleties and nuances.' Id. (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)). Therefore, ordinary adversarial procedures - complete with live testimony, cross-examination, and oral argument by counsel - are not necessarily the best means of arriving at sound, consistent judgments as to a defendant's sanity. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). 9 Accordingly, Justice Powell concluded that a state need not carry out a formal trial to determine a prisoner's competency. At a minimum, he stated, [t]he State should provide an impartial officer or board that can receive evidence and argument from the prisoner's counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State's own psychiatric examination. Id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring). However, [b]eyond these basic requirements, the States should have substantial leeway to determine what process best balances the various interests at stake as long as the states observe the requirements of basic fairness under the Due Process Clause. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
10 Invoking its inherent supervisory authority and with the Ford decision as guidance, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently adopted and set forth the procedures that a death-row prisoner must follow to challenge his competency to be executed. See Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1999). First, the court adopted Justice Powell's standard for competency and held that under Tennessee law a prisoner is not competent to be executed if the prisoner lacks the mental capacity to understand the fact of the impending execution and the reason for it. Id. at 266. 11 Next the court established the procedures to be used in Tennessee. After the State Attorney General moves the Tennessee Supreme Court to set an execution date, the prisoner must raise the issue of competency in his response to the motion within the ten-day period for response. If such a motion is made, and the Tennessee Supreme Court sets an execution date, the prisoner's competency claim will be remanded to the trial court where the prisoner was originally tried and sentenced. Within three days of the entry of the remand order, the prisoner must file a petition with the trial court setting forth the factual allegations of incompetence along with supporting affidavits, records, or other materials and a list of any mental health professionals who would be available and willing to testify on the prisoner's behalf. See id. at 267-68. The district attorney general must file a response within three days. Within four days the trial court then must decide whether the prisoner has made the required threshold showing of incompetence in order to receive a hearing as suggested by the opinions of Justice Powell and Justice Marshall. See id. at 268 (citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 (Marshall, J., plurality opinion); 477 U.S. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring)). Noting that the Supreme Court did not indicate what would satisfy the threshold showing, the Tennessee Supreme Court looked to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985), cited favorably in Justice Powell's concurring opinion, inwhich the Court concluded that a defendant must make a substantial showing of his insanity before due process requires the state to appoint a defense psychiatrist at its expense. It also examined its own cases, applying Ake, which require that before a mental health expert will be appointed to evaluate a defendant's competency to stand trial, the defendant must point to the facts and circumstances of his particular case which warrant a belief that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 268. Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the burden is on the prisoner to present affidavits, depositions, medical reports, or other credible evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there exists a genuine question regarding petitioner's present competency. Id. at 269. The court also emphasized that pursuant to the nature of a Ford claim, the prisoner must submit some evidence from recent mental evaluations or observations relating to his present competency. See id. 12 If the prisoner satisfies this threshold showing for a hearing, the trial court must appoint at least one, but no more than two, mental health professionals from each list submitted by the respective parties. Id. The experts then must submit written reports to the trial court. Within ten days after the filing of the mental health professionals' reports, the trial court is required to hold a hearing to determine competency. No jury is impaneled. At the hearing, the prisoner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his incompetency to be executed. See id. at 270-71. Adopting the more stringent requirements in Justice Marshall's opinion in Ford, the Tennessee Supreme Court emphasize[d] that the strictures of due process must be observed at the hearing. Id. at 271. A prisoner must be given notice that an evidentiary hearing will be held and must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence relevant to the issue of competency at an adversarial proceeding at which the prisoner is entitled to cross-examine the State's witnesses. Id. In order to satisfy Justice Marshall's determination that a prisoner should not be barred from presenting relevant material for the factfinder's consideration, the court stated that the rules of evidence should not be applied to limit the admissibility of reliable evidence that is relevant to the issue of the prisoner's competency. Id. 13 After the hearing, the trial court must file an order with detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law granting or denying the prisoner's Ford petition. The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that a prisoner's competency to be executed is a question of fact and therefore the trial court must in its findings of fact set out any undisputed facts, explain its assessment of the credibility of the various expert witnesses and their conflicting opinions, and include findings as to the prisoner's behavior during the hearing. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court automatically reviews the trial court's competency determination, which as an issue of fact is presumed correct unless the evidence in the record preponderates against the finding. Id. at 272. If a prisoner is found competent to be executed, he will not be allowed to bring a subsequent Ford claim unless he provides to the Tennessee Supreme Court an affidavit from a mental health professional showing that there has been a substantial change in the prisoner's mental health since the previous determination of competency was made and the showing is sufficient to raise a substantial question about the prisoner's competency to be executed. Id. 14 In setting forth the procedures for handling a Ford claim, the Tennessee Supreme Court properly followed the narrow concurring opinion of Justice Powell in establishing the standard for competency to be executed and by placing the burden of proof on the prisoner to make a threshold showing of incompetence for a hearing. The court then chose to implement the views in the opinion of Justice Marshall, which argued for more procedural protectionsthan Justice Powell's opinion, to mandate an adversarial hearing in which the prisoner is able to present all relevant material regarding his competency and to cross-examine the state's expert witnesses. Therefore, the procedures identified in Van Tran are generally adequate to protect a prisoner's right to a fair hearing of his Ford competency claim as required by due process. To the extent that Coe challenges specific aspects of the Van Tran procedures, we discuss them below in Part II.C.