Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: discussion: penalty phase issues

Text: Defendant contends that his right to counsel was violated because the defense expert, Dr. Vicary, revealed during recross-examination that defendant had spoken to one of the Menendez brothers prior to taking several psychological tests that Vicary testified defendant had answered in such a manner as to create the impression he was mentally ill. Defendant objected when the prosecutor asked if one of the people defendant might have spoken to prior to taking the tests was one of the Menendez brothers. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds it was improper for the prosecutor to suggest defendant was receiving advice from one of the Menendez brothers. In the course of the discussion, the prosecutor said that Vicary had mentioned defendant had talked to the Menendez brother off the cuff. The trial court found the question was fair and denied the mistrial but told the prosecutor there's going to be no additional questioning on that. There was no further reference to the subject. Defendant contends that Dr. Vicary violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by revealing to the prosecutor that defendant told Vicary he had talked to one of the Menendez brothers. Defendant failed to object on this ground in the trial court, where he only objected to defendant being associated with one of the Menendez brothers. His claim, therefore, is forfeited. ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 250, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710 [constitutional objection to admission of evidence forfeited if not raised below].) In any event, admission of defendant's statement to Vicary was relevant to the latter's assessment of defendant's mental state, which defendant himself tendered as an issue at the penalty phase, and its admission did not violate either his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1190, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The prosecutor had established from Dr. Vicary that defendant had answered questions on the psychological tests so as to suggest he was mentally ill; that he may have sought advice from other inmates on how to do so was clearly relevant to the assessment of his mental state, and any such information he provided to Vicary was not privileged. Even if the prosecutor's bare reference to one of the Menendez brothers was improper, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's mistrial motion. ( People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 873, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1 [mistrial should be granted only when a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged].) For the same reason, even assuming the reference was improper, there is no reasonable possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict in the penalty phase absent the error. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.)
On direct examination, Dr. Vicary testified that defendant had no prior criminal record as a juvenile or an adult. On cross-examination, he acknowledged that defendant's criminal history included a hit-and-run arrest. Subsequently, at defendant's request, the jury was instructed that defendant's conviction of misdemeanor hit and run was received in connection with Dr. Vicary's opinion of defendant's mental state and could be only be considered in assessing what weight you choose to give Dr. Vicary's opinion. [ķ] This misdemeanor is not violent criminal activity which can constitute an aggravating factor. Defendant contends that admission of this evidence amounted to improper impeachment. Alternatively, he contends the evidence should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. We do not agree. The evidence was admitted to impeach Dr. Vicary's testimony that defendant had no juvenile or adult convictions, to the extent that this conclusion reflected upon Dr. Vicary's opinion of defendant's mental state. As such, it was properly admitted. ( People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642, 244 Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836 [Other crimes evidence may be used to impeach the testimony of an expert witness].) Furthermore, any possibility the jury might have misunderstood the purpose of this evidence was obviated by the limiting instruction, which we presume the jury understood and followed. ( People v. Harris, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 426, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 P.2d 1193.) Defendant's Evidence Code section 352 claim is forfeited by his failure to have made this objection, but even if he had, we would find no abuse of the trial court's considerable discretion in admitting the evidence. (See People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.)
Defendant's witness Victoria Eckstone testified that she believed defendant was the father of her child and she wanted her child to continue to have a relationship with defendant even if he was incarcerated. In rebuttal, a Burbank police detective, Kevin Krafft, testified that Eckstone had told him the father of her child was William Boorstin, whom she described as her common law husband of 10 years. Detective Krafft also testified he had obtained a birth certificate for the child listing Boorstin as the father. Additionally, Deputy Sheriff Brent Rollins testified that Eckstone told him defendant was the father of her child but that the name of the father's child was not on the birth certificate, and that the child would never see her father again. Defendant argues the testimony of Detective Krafft and Deputy Sheriff Rollins should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it was more prejudicial than probative and could have confused the jury and resulted in an undue consumption of time. Defendant also argues that, even if Detective Krafft's testimony was proper impeachment because it was inconsistent with Eckstone's testimony, Deputy Sheriff Rollins's testimony was not. Finally, he argued that the trial court erred in denying his request to order a blood test to determine the child's paternity. The underlying issue presented to the trial court was Eckstone's credibility, not the actual paternity of her child. Thus, the fact that she told Detective Krafft another man was the father of her child and put his name on the birth certificate was not only inconsistent with her testimony that she believed defendant was the child's father, but even more deeply inconsistent with her assertion that a parental bond existed between defendant and her child that she wished to maintain and perpetuate. Similarly, her statement to Deputy Sheriff Rollins that defendant would never see the child also undercut this testimony. Thus, their testimony was proper impeachment testimony. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 474, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610; Evid.Code, § 780, subds. (g), (h).) Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. In light of the relatively brief testimony of Detective Krafft and Deputy Sheriff Rollins, defendant's concern that the evidence would have led to a minitrial on the issue of Eckstone's credibility, causing an undue consumption of time or confusion of the issues, obviously did not materialize. Finally, because the actual paternity of the child was not at issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a paternity test. [39]
Defendant contends the victim impact testimony by Nicole's parents and brothers was cumulative, unsubstantiated and prejudicial. [40] He asserts further that fleeting references by two of the witnesses to the victim's having been abducted and kidnapped were prejudicial because the trial court had previously dismissed kidnapping charges and kidnapping special circumstances for insufficient evidence. Finally, he contends that statements made by the victim's mother to the press urging that defendant be sentenced to death violated rules regulating victim impact evidence. In Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, the United States Supreme Court overruled earlier cases finding a federal constitutional proscription against victim impact evidence and argument. The high court concluded: A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. ( Id. at p. 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) Moreover, after Payne was decided, we concluded that the immediate injurious impact of a capital murder is a `circumstance of the crime' (§ 190.3, factor (a)) which may be introduced and argued in aggravation under state law. [Citation.] ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 935, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436 [factor (a) of section 190.3 allows evidence and argument on the specific harm caused by the defendant, including the impact on the family of the victim].) In Edwards, we stated that our holding only encompasses evidence that logically shows the harm caused by the defendant. ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) We said the trial court should weigh the probative value of the victim impact evidence against the prejudicial effect. `On the one hand, it should allow evidence and argument on emotional though relevant subjects that could provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy or to impose the ultimate sanction. On the other hand, irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invokes an irrational, purely subjective response should be curtailed.' ( Id. at p. 836, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 864, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) Defendant contends that testimony the victim's 16-year-old brother, Chad, had faltered in school and began to use drugs following his sister's death was improper because there was no connection between her death and his drug use. He also complains that, because the family's members testified about the impact of Nicole's death on one another, that the evidence was cumulative and prejudicial. The victim's father testified that, prior to Nicole's death, Chad was the family athlete, and was a 4.0 student, but, following her death, his grades deteriorated, he is drinking a lot and doing drugs, and would not talk about his sister but kept it all inside himself, and refused to go to counseling. Chad's brother, 18-year-old Travis, also testified that Chad was doing worse in school and was not playing sports and stated his belief that Chad is into drugs and alcohol because of it. We conclude that these brief references to Chad's use of drugs and alcohol were neither irrelevant nor prejudicial but, in context, depicted the residual and lasting impact he continued to experience as a result of Nicole's murder. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 398, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) Furthermore, the jury was specifically instructed that in assessing victim impact evidence it could consider only such harm as was directly caused by defendant's act. In these circumstances, we conclude there was no error in the admission of this evidence. Even if it was error, given the brevity of the testimony, we would find any such error harmless. Defendant also contends the victim impact evidence was cumulative because the jury heard three times that Travis Parker ... considered suicide, twice that Chad Parker may have been involved in drugs and alcohol, three times that he was having trouble in school, and twice that Casey Parker, youngest brother of the deceased, was having nightmares. We disagree. There is no requirement that family members confine their testimony about the impact of the victim's death to themselves, omitting mention of other family members. Moreover, in this case the references were brief. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that the testimony was unduly repetitious or prejudicial. Defendant next contends that Mr. Parker's reference to Nicole as having been abducted and Chad Parker's use of the term kidnapped were improper because the trial court had dismissed kidnapping counts and kidnapping special circumstances for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant failed to object to either reference, thus his claim is waived. (Evid.Code, § 353.) In any event his claim is without merit. The witnesses' use of these terms was clearly colloquial, not legal. Moreover, the references occurred only once. In light of these circumstances, we reject defendant's assertion that the terms could have had any prejudicial impact on the jury. Finally, defendant contends that statements the victim's mother made in a television interview calling for defendant's death violated victim impact evidence rules. These statements were not part of her victim impact testimony; nor, as we have previously observed, is there anything in the record to support defendant's allegations that any of the jurors were exposed to her remarks. Therefore, we reject the claim.
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings during the penalty phase require reversal. As we have rejected his claims of error, necessarily he suffered neither individual nor cumulative prejudice from them. ( People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 567-568, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.)
A prosecutor may not argue that lack of evidence of a mitigating factor may be considered by the jury as a factor in aggravation. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) While conceding the prosecutor did not specifically state that a lack of mitigating circumstance was an aggravating factor, defendant nonetheless claims the prosecutor implied as much. He contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial on this ground. In the brief passage of the prosecutor's closing argument that defendant cites, the prosecutor observed there was no evidence of consent by the victim (§ 190.3, factor (e)), nor that the offenses had been committed under circumstances defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct (§ 190.3, factor (f)), nor that he acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person (§ 190.3, factor (g)). The prosecutor concluded: No evidence of that. What you have is one person solely involved in the crime. And that's Mr. Panah. The prosecutor then reviewed in some detail the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)), at the end of which he stated, [t]hese are all factors in aggravation. Defendant claims this last statement implied to the jurors that the absence of any evidence to support the factors in mitigation to which the prosecutor had earlier referred converted them into factors in aggravation. Our review of the prosecutor's argument belies this claim. In context, it is clear he was referring to evidence pertaining to section 190.3, factor (a) only, notwithstanding his reference to factors. His discussion of the lack of evidentiary support for the factors in mitigation was entirely proper. ( People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 83, 246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1.) The trial court properly denied defendant's mistrial motion. Necessarily, then, we also reject defendant's claim that the prosecutor's conduct and the trial court's denial of defendant's mistrial motion violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair trial and a reliable penalty determination.
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied or modified his proposed instructions. We find no error. Defendant contends the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury as follows: A juror properly may reject death as a penalty solely to grant mercy to a defendant. Not so. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 393, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34 [defendant is not entitled to a pure mercy instruction]; People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 344, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) In Bolin, the trial court gave the standard instruction to take into account `any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.' The court also told the jury `to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider.' No additional instruction was required. ( Ibid. ) Substantially the same instructions were given here. Next, defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his request to instruct the jury it could reject the death penalty if it had a lingering doubt about his guilt, though the court allowed the defense to argue the point. We have previously rejected this argument on the grounds that such instruction is not necessary because there is no requirement for it under either state or federal law ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 166, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461), and the lingering doubt concept is sufficiently encompassed in other instructions ordinarily given in capital cases. ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) On the same grounds, we reject defendant's claim. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly modified the following instruction with the addition of the italicized words: The permissible aggravating factors are limited to those circumstances in aggravation upon which you have been specifically instructed. Therefore, evidence which has been presented regarding the defendant's background, if proven, may be considered by you only as mitigating evidence. The trial court justified the addition of the phrase  if proven,  because it made the instruction less argumentative. Defendant contends that the phrase erroneously implied the jury was required to find the mitigating circumstance had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. Nothing in the phrase itself implies that the reasonable doubt standard, or any particular standard applies. Defendant's assertion that, because the reasonable doubt standard was used in the guilt phase, the jury likely applied it in the penalty phase is speculative. Furthermore, the jury was instructed, at defendant's request, that [a] juror may find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any evidence to support it no matter how weak the evidence may be. (Emphasis added.) We conclude, therefore, that the jury was not misled by the trial court's modification of defendant's instruction. Finally, defendant advances two arguments regarding the burden of proof. The trial court instructed the jury that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without the possibility of parole. In addition, the jury was instructed that the determination of the appropriate penalty was not a mechanical counting process, but required the evaluation of the moral weight of all the evidence, aggravating and mitigating; that, to impose the death penalty instead of life without possibility of parole, each juror must be personally persuaded that the balance of aggravation over mitigation justified the punishment; and that each juror may find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any evidence to support it no matter how weak the evidence may be. Defendant nonetheless argues that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury it could not return a judgment of death unless it found that the aggravating factors outweighed the factors in mitigation requires reversal. He makes the further global claim that the trial court's failure to provide a burden of proof instruction failed to give the jury adequate guidance. We disagree. [W]e have consistently held that instructions similar to those given in this case adequately explain the jury's sentencing responsibilities and are not impermissibly vague. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 600, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) In light of our rejection of defendant's claims of instructional error, we necessarily reject his further assertion that the cumulative effect of instructional error violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination.
Defendant raises a number of challenges to the death penalty statute that we have considered and consistently rejected in previous decisions. He provides no persuasive reason for us to reexamine those conclusions. We again conclude therefore that: (1) the statute adequately narrows the class of death-eligible offenders ( People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 596, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1179, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384); (2) section 190.3, factor (a) is not impermissibly overbroad facially or as applied ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 987-988, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750); (3) the statute is not unconstitutional because it does not contain a requirement that the jury be given burden of proof or standard of proof instructions for finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination, other than other crimes evidence, and specifically that all aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or that such factors must outweigh factors in mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or that death must be found to be an appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 767-768, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754); (4) neither the federal nor state Constitution requires the jury to unanimously agree as to aggravating factors, nor have our conclusions in this respect been altered by recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 452-454, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78); (5) the jury need not make written findings disclosing the reasons for its penalty determination ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044); (6) the jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity involving violence or force under factor (b) of section 190.3 ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244), although, we note, in this case no such evidence was introduced; (7) because the statute does not allocate the burden of proof ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 782, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2) and a burden of proof instruction need not, and should not, be given ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 767-768, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754), neither the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that the reasonable doubt standard does not apply to mitigating factors, nor its failure to instruct the jury it need not unanimously agree on such factors, violated defendant's constitutional rights, nor was it likely the jury would have imported the reasonable doubt standard from the guilt phase into its penalty phase deliberations; (8) the trial court is not required to omit inapplicable sentencing factors when instructing the jury ( People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1138, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450); (9) nor is the trial court constitutionally required to instruct the jury that certain sentencing factors are relevant only to mitigation ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078-1079, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68), although in this case the trial court did instruct the jury that defendant's age could only be considered for mitigation; (10) the use of certain adjectives in the list of mitigating factors, here, substantial, reasonably believed, and moral, are not so vague as to erect a barrier to the jury's consideration of mitigating facts and render the statute unconstitutional (see People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123 [extreme, substantial]); (11) CALJIC No. 8.88, with which the jury was instructed, adequately defines mitigation ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 452, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78) notwithstanding defendant's resort to empirical evidence which was not part of the record below ( People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1180, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937); (12) neither the federal nor state Constitution requires intercase proportionality review ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244); (13) the statute does not deny equal protection because the statutory scheme does not contain disparate sentence review ( People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115), nor does it deny equal protection on any other ground ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 465-467, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391); and (14) the statute is not constitutionally deficient because prosecutors retain discretion whether to seek the death penalty ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 461, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78).
Defendant contends the delay in carrying out his execution is violative of his constitutional rights, including federal and state proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment. We have previously considered and rejected this argument because, as we explained in People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pages 477-478, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442, [a]s long as it is reasonable, the time required for our statutorily mandated review is not a violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights; it is essential to ensuring that those rights are and have been respected. ... [ķ] As we stated in [ People v. ] Hill [(1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984], defendant's claim is in reality a facial challenge to the 1978 death penalty law. We have repeatedly held that the 1978 death penalty law is facially constitutional as a general matter [citation], and we adhere to our holding in Hill with regard to defendant's claim.
Defendant argues that California's use of the death penalty violates international norms of humanity and decency. We have, as he acknowledges, repeatedly rejected this claim. International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal and statutory requirements. [Citations.] ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 778-779, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.)
Defendant contends his sentence is disproportionate to his culpability and violates the state's constitutional proscription against cruel or unusual punishment. Defendant cites his lack of a previous criminal history and asserts his `personal characteristics' and background were most impressive. [Citation.] His community activities were extremely impressive. Additionally, defendant argues he was improperly convicted of the charged crimes. To determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual under the California Constitution as applied to a particular defendant, a reviewing court must examine the circumstances of the offense, including motive, the extent of the defendant's involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the consequences of the defendant's acts. The court must also consider the personal characteristics of the defendant, including his or her age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities. [Citation.] If the penalty imposed is `grossly disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability' [citation], so that the punishment `shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity' ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 690, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351), the court must invalidate the sentence as unconstitutional. ( People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 739-740, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.) It is true that defendant was a youth who, before this crime, had no prior record of any serious offenses, and it is also true that his journey from his native land to this country was an arduous and perhaps traumatic one. His personal characteristics, however, pale in comparison to the gravity and circumstances of his current offense. Defendant sexually assaulted and brutally murdered an eight-year-old child. We are unable to conclude that the penalty imposed in this case is disproportionate to his culpability.
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of error during the proceedings in his case, from pretrial rulings through the penalty phase, requires reversal. We have either rejected his claims of error or found any errors to be individually harmless. We also conclude their cumulative effect does not require reversal of the judgment. ( People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 567-568, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.)