Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Denying Motion to Modify the Verdict

Text: (60a) Defendant contends that the court erred when it denied his motion to reduce the sentence under former section 190.4, subdivision (e). He argues that the court considered matters it should have not and failed to adequately consider matters it should have. The result, he urges, violated state law and requires a remand. He also contends implicitly, by citing United States Supreme Court cases, that the result violated the federal Constitution. Former section 190.4, subdivision (e), provided as relevant here: In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict or finding pursuant to subdivision (7) of Section 1181. In ruling on the application the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make an independent determination as to whether the weight of the evidence supports the jury's findings and verdicts. He shall state on the record the reasons for his findings. The quoted statute is identical in meaning to the current version of section 190.4, subdivision (e). ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 751 [280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197].) (61) In ruling on the application, the trial judge must independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine whether, in the judge's independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury verdict. [Citation.] The judge must also state on the record the reasons for the ruling. [Citation.] ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 477 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) `On appeal, we subject [the] ruling ... to independent review.' [Citation.] `Of course, when we conduct such scrutiny, we simply review the trial court's determination after independently considering the record; we do not make a de novo determination of penalty.' ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1106.) The court began its discussion of the motion by acknowledging that it must make an independent review of the evidence to determine whether or not the weight of the evidence supports the jury's findings and verdicts. It then stated, the evidence clearly supports the verdict of the People for the following reasons. The three victims were particularly vulnerable. I believe the oldest child was ten if I am not mistaken. Two of the children were at a public park[;] admittedly they did not have permission to be out that night, but they were at a public park fishing. One of the children, and I think [this is] probably the most aggravating circumstance of all in this case, was the son of a family friend so that you had not only the violation of the particular vulnerability of children, but you had the compounding aggravation  it was proper [ sic ] to me the ultimate horror  a family friend tricks and cajoles a vulnerable child of tender years to come into the home, total trust implicit there, and then for little or no provocation, the child is strangled. That fact alone to me I find particularly abhor[rent]. In addition, the court has not seen any evidence of remorse on the part of Mr. Memro. In fact, I have seen the contrary, as indicated by his statement at the penalty phase. He remains as obdurate as he has ever been, and any remorse that he may have felt when he was in custody that evening has long since disappeared into the wind. He remains a truculent, defiant and particularly insensitive individual. There are admittedly factors in mitigation. He has apparently been a[] model prisoner. There is nothing to indicate in the record that he has been other than that. He clearly did cooperate with the police. Those are the only two factors in mitigation the court can find. The others listed by the defense are various ways of saying the same thing over and over again[:] ... remorse of the crimes, confession, admission, cooperation with the police, aiding the police.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... In case, the court feels that the factors in aggravation are overwhelmingly against Mr. Memro[], and the court therefore adopts and approves the verdict of the jury for the reasons I have stated herein, and the court ... affirms and ratifies the verdict of the jury that the commitment should be death. (60b) Defendant contends that the court erred in considering in aggravation his obdurate, truculent, defiant and particularly insensitive personality and his lack of remorse. These comments, he urges, violated state law, for they are not factors the trier of fact could have considered in aggravation (former § 190.3); hence neither could the court have done so (former § 190.4, subd. (e)). We disagree. Defendant presented evidence that he was remorseful when apprehended for his crimes against the four boys whom he assaulted, and he argued that his regret should be considered in mitigation. The trier of fact, and hence the court, was entitled to infer from his demeanor as he testified at the penalty phase that any remorse was short lived  his usual mien, as inferable from the circumstances of the crimes and from his testimony, was wanting in remorse. That is the sole conclusion the court drew. Defendant also maintains that the court failed to consider all possible evidence pointing to factors in mitigation, including evidence of background, character, and lack of a prior felony conviction, and lack of future dangerousness. That is not so. It stated that it could only find in mitigation that he had cooperated with the police and had been a model prisoner. It also stated that the evidence clearly supports the verdict of the People.... The court need not orally recite all possible mitigating evidence (see People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1107); `there is no indication in the record that the court ignored or overlooked such evidence.' ( Ibid. ) Finally, there was no evidence presented on lack of future dangerousness  the only reference to it came in closing argument. Defendant implicitly predicates his claims of federal constitutional error on the putative violation of former section 190.4. Because there was no violation of that statute, there can be no basis for his constitutional claims.