Opinion ID: 1960199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Existence of the Contract

Text: Our resolution of this appeal turns on whether Myer and Florence ever entered into a binding oral agreement. Absent our ability to conclude the existence of that contract, the plaintiffs' appeal must fail. The plaintiffs assert in support of their appeal that there is clear and convincing evidence of its existence on the record. That clear and convincing evidence, they contend, consists of: (a) the existence of a series of mutual wills; (b) a large disparity between the couple's personal wealth; (c) a June 2, 1976 memorandum authored by Lester in which he outlines his understanding of the couple's testamentary objectives; and, (d) Florence's concealment of her 1984 will from Myer's beneficiaries. We address each of those contentions. (a) The Mutual Wills The plaintiffs contend that the existence of a series of mutual wills constitutes evidence of a joint estate plan and a mutual desire to equally divide their joint property upon the death of the survivor. Similar assertions have been rejected by this Court in the past. See Lorette v. Gorodetsky, 621 A.2d 186, 187 (R.I.1993) (mem.); Williams v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 88 R.I. 23, 38-39, 143 A.2d 324, 333 (1958). The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish this case from Williams by contrasting the procedural postures of the cases. They note that Williams was decided after a full trial on the merits and then infer that cases involving mutual wills may never be dismissed at the summary judgment stage of a trial. We disagree. As we have stated previously, [t]he law is clear in Rhode Island that a party seeking to prove the existence of an irrevocable will contract must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Gorodetsky, 621 A.2d at 187 (citing Williams, 88 R.I. at 36-37, 143 A.2d at 332). Furthermore, `the mere presence of joint or mutual wills does not raise any presumption that they were executed pursuant to a contract.' Id. Indeed, the existence of `discussions and    understandings between persons of close affinities, especially between husbands and wives [about the execution of mutual wills], are not unusual and the fact that they have taken place is no indication that there has been any thought of a binding contract.' Williams, 88 R.I. at 39, 143 A.2d at 333. Although the plaintiffs concede that a single set of reciprocal wills do [ sic ] not, in and of themselves [ sic ], constitute clear and convincing evidence of a contract to make a will, they contend that this case is different because there were a series of four reciprocal wills, the first two of which were two weeks apart that contained intricate, parallel sets of changes. Thus, the plaintiffs essentially are asserting that although one set of mutual wills, standing alone, is not evidence of an agreement, more than one set constitutes clear and convincing evidence of a contract to make a will. We fail to see the distinction attempted by that pyramiding of inferences. It is not uncommon for married couples to change their wills as their circumstances change; consequently, the mere existence of more than one set of mutual wills still `does not raise any presumption that they were executed in pursuance of a contract' Williams, 88 R.I. at 38-39, 143 A.2d at 333, much less does that fact constitute clear and convincing evidence of a binding oral agreement to follow a specific estate plan. (b) The Wealth Disparity The plaintiffs next contend that in 1976, Myer's personal wealth amounted to $533,800, while Florence's personal wealth amounted to only $12,000. They proffer in their appellate brief that this monetary disparity raises a persuasive inference that Myer, in his various wills, only provided income to Florence, his wife of twenty six years, based on Florence's commitment not to    steal from [Myer's] beloved relatives in order to enrich her own loved ones. That rather obtuse allegation, disguised as an inference, essentially accuses Florence of having been a gold digger and a thief for over twenty six years. Such unsupported allegations and conclusions border on being simple balderdash and fall far short of the requisite positive evidence needed to avoid the grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the moving parties. (c) The Memorandum The plaintiffs place great emphasis on a June 2, 1976 memorandum written by Lester to Samuel Gereboff, an accountant friend of Myer, in which Lester relates in part: After a conference with [Florence] and [Myer] on May 16, I understood their objective to be the ultimate disposition of Mike's estate as though each owned one-half outright during their lifetime, each half to be distributed to the beneficiaries they respectively designate. They contend that this memorandum contains clear and convincing evidence of the existence of the purported agreement between Florence and Myer. We view that assertion as lacking any probative merit and, as did the trial justice, we are unable to note any reference whatsoever in the memorandum to any mutual agreement between Myer and Florence, much less an intent to mutually be bound in perpetuity by the same. (d) Concealment of the 1984 Will Finally, the plaintiffs propose that Florence deliberately concealed the existence of her final will from Lester. [10] They then make a quantum leap and contend that from this concealment, a fact-finder could reasonably infer that she knew she had betrayed her husband and his family, and she understood that her new Will violated a promise that she had made to her husband (and upon which he relied) in consideration for his agreement to provide Florence with more income. This argument might have ostensible merit if the determination of the existence of the oral agreement was a question of fact; however, its determination was a question of law for the trial justice. See Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1202. Only after a judicial finding that the contract existed would the question of its breach become a question of fact for a jury to decide. See Ricard v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 113 R.I. 528, 535, 324 A.2d 671, 675 (1974). Recognizing that a `motion justice should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party' Hendrick, 755 A.2d at 789 (emphasis added), we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err by failing to recognize as reasonable this pyramiding of inferences proffered by the plaintiffs to establish the existence of the alleged oral agreement. We conclude here that the plaintiffs failed to produce the requisite clear and convincing evidence necessary to establish the existence of the oral agreement between Florence and Myer. The trial justice did not err in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, albeit on different grounds than those considered by us on appeal. In view of the plaintiffs' failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the oral agreement, we need not concern ourselves with the remaining issues raised by the plaintiffs in this appeal. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs' appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the papers of the case are remanded to the Superior Court.