Opinion ID: 1454261
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Niswander's conduct constituted opposition to unlawful conduct

Text: Despite concluding that Niswander's actions did not constitute protected participation in the Rochlin lawsuit, we must still determine whether her conduct was protected under Title VII's opposition clause. That determination requires the careful balancing of competing interests. A balance must be achieved between the employer's recognized, legitimate need to maintain an orderly workplace and to protect confidential business and client information, and the equally compelling need of employees to be properly safeguarded against retaliatory actions. Allowing too much protection to employees for disclosing confidential information may perversely incentivize behavior that ought not be tolerated in the workplacenamely, the surreptitious theft of confidential documents as potential future ammunition should the employee eventually feel wronged by her employer. On the other hand, inadequate protection to employees might provide employers with a legally sanctioned reason to terminate an employee in retaliation for engaging in activity that Title VII and related statutes are designed to protect. There is a paucity of caselaw addressing the production of confidential information in the context of a retaliation claim. The few circuit courts that have faced the issue have all chosen a balancing test to determine whether the unauthorized disclosure of the documents should be protected. One such case is O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir.1996). In granting CIC's motion for summary judgment, the district court relied almost entirely on O'Day and the case of Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., No. C-1-03-033, 2005 WL 3448036 (S.D.Ohio Dec.15, 2005). The plaintiff in O'Day was denied a promotion by his employer and was laid off one month later. Because O'Day believed that he had been denied the promotion and laid off because of his age, he filed a lawsuit alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), which contains an antiretaliation provision that is identical to the one found in Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). During discovery, O'Day produced documents that he had found by rummaging through files in his supervisor's office on the night that he was initially denied the promotion. The district court noted that the file was clearly not meant for general inspection because [n]ot only was the file kept in a closed drawer in his supervisor's desk, but it contained notes and memoranda about sensitive personnel matters and was prominently marked `personal/sensitive.' O'Day, 79 F.3d at 758. O'Day photocopied the documents and showed them to another employee. Once McDonnell Douglas learned of O'Day's conduct, it terminated his employment. McDonnell Douglas later moved for summary judgment, arguing that O'Day's copying and distribution of the confidential documents immunized the company from any liability for discrimination. In response, O'Day argued that his conduct could not provide a legitimate reason for terminating his employment because it was protected activity under the ADEA's opposition clause. O'Day further claimed that by gathering evidence for an eventual lawsuit, he was participating in the investigation of an unlawful employment practice under the ADEA, or at the very least opposing such a practice. Id. at 763. The Ninth Circuit applied the balancing test that it uses in the Title VII context for determining whether O'Day's conduct was protected activity. Under the test, [t]he court must balance the purpose of the Act to protect persons engaging reasonably in activities opposing ... discrimination, against Congress'[s] equally manifest desire not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and control of personnel. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the O'Day court [struck] the balance ... in favor of McDonnell Douglas because O'Day committed a serious breach of trust, not only in rummaging through his supervisor's office for confidential documents, but also in copying those documents and showing them to a co-worker. Id. The court noted that there was no explanation for why O'Day chose to preserve evidence of layoff decisions during a time when he had yet to be laid off. Id. In affirming the grant of summary judgment to McDonnell Douglas, the court explained its rationale as follows: In balancing an employer's interest in maintaining a harmonious and efficient workplace with the protections of the anti-discrimination laws, we are loathe [sic] to provide employees an incentive to rifle through confidential files looking for evidence that might come in handy in later litigation. The opposition clause protects reasonable attempts to contest an employer's discriminatory practices; it is not an insurance policy, a license to flaunt [sic] company rules or an invitation to dishonest behavior. Id. at 763-64. Watkins, the other case relied upon by the district court, arose out of an initial claim of discrimination under Ohio state law and related to Ford Motor's failure to promote Watkins over a period of 28 years. As part of the discovery in the discrimination case, Watkins produced copies of confidential employee profiles that contained information about salaries and performance. Ford Motor subsequently terminated Watkins's employment because of his disclosure of the employee profiles, and Watkins added a claim of retaliation to his lawsuit. The court granted Ford Motor's motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim and rejected Watkins's argument that his copying and disclosure of personnel information is activity that is protected under Ohio's anti-retaliation law. Watkins, 2005 WL 3448036, at . Watkins alleged that he found the profiles in a book that had been left out in the open, the papers were not marked as confidential, and he disclosed the profiles only to his counsel. Id. He did, however, obtain the documents way before filing his EEOC charge and/or his first complaint against Ford. Id. at  1. The court explained that if it were to adopt [Watkins's] argument that such conduct is protected activity, plaintiffs everywhere would be entitled, under the umbrella of protected activity, to steal company information and, so long as they give the information to their lawyer, not only be able to avoid disciplinary action by their employer, but also be empowered to successfully maintain a claim against their employer if adverse action is taken for the misconduct. This result finds no support in Ohio law and is not one the Court is willing to countenance absent compelling authority requiring it to do so. Far from being entitled to protection under the law, plaintiff's conduct was counterproductive, wrongful, and a breach of his employer's trust. Id. at  (citation omitted). Relying heavily on O'Day, the district court in Watkins concluded that a reasonable jury could not determine that the documents were `innocently acquired' because Watkins had committed a serious breach of trust by looking through defendant's files and copying documents that obviously were not intended for general inspection and then providing those documents to his attorneys. Id. at -8. The court also rejected Watkins's argument that he was entitled to protection because he obtained the files for use in a lawsuit, particularly since plaintiff could have sought that information by securing counsel and going through the proper legal channels. Id. at . Another case that is instructive on this issue is Kempcke v. Monsanto Co., 132 F.3d 442 (8th Cir.1998), in which the Eighth Circuit addressed a retaliation claim that was brought by an employee who was fired for refusing to return confidential documents that he had given to his attorney. The claim was brought under the ADEA. Kempcke had discovered documents on his company-issued computer that he believed revealed a plan by Monsanto to weed out senior managers, including Kempcke, at least partially because of their ages. Id. at 445. He confronted his supervisor with these documents and requested an explanation, conduct that the Eighth Circuit concluded was clearly protected activity under the opposition clause of the ADEA. Id. Kempcke also gave the documents to his attorney and told his supervisor that Monsanto must deal with his attorney on the question of whether the documents would be returned. Id. The court described that conduct as at least arguably oppositional or litigation activity, because it placed documents that might evidence discrimination in the hands of a legal professional who would litigate the issue on Kempcke's behalf if he could not resolve the matter informally with Monsanto. Id. Although giving the documents to Kempcke's lawyer was generally consistent with opposing unlawful age discrimination, the court explained that it must also consider whether that conduct was so disruptive, excessive, or generally inimical to [the] employer's interests ... as to be beyond the protection of § 623(d). Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Kempcke court emphasized the fact that Kempcke innocently acquired the documents, discovering them in a computer assigned to him by Monsanto. Id. at 446. Kempcke's innocent acquisition was akin to the employee who is inadvertently copied on an internal memorandum, or who discovers a document mistakenly left in an office copier. Id. The court concluded that when documents have been innocently acquired, and not subsequently misused, there has not been the kind of employee misconduct that would justify withdrawing otherwise appropriate § 623(d) protection. Id. Although employee insubordination is ordinarily a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for adverse action, the Kempcke court explained that when the insubordination consists of refusing to cease what a jury could find to be reasonable ADEA-protected activity, such as retaining a document that may evidence on-going discrimination, summary judgment dismissing a retaliation claim is not appropriate. Id. The Eighth Circuit thus reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Monsanto. O'Day was explicitly distinguished on the basis that O'Day involv[ed] improper dissemination of an employer's documents to third parties other than the plaintiff's attorney.  Id. (emphasis in original). The courts in O'Day, Watkins, and Kempcke all applied some form of a balancing test to determine whether the employee's unauthorized dissemination of the documents qualified as protected activity. See also Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir.1980) (balancing the employer's legitimate and substantial interest in keeping its personnel records and agency documents confidential with the employee's alleged need for surreptitious copying and dissemination of the documents); Abernathy v. Walgreen Co., 836 F.Supp. 817, 820-21 (M.D.Fla.1992) (rejecting the employee's claim that he should be protected for disseminating a personnel record outside of the company, instead finding that the employee demonstrated neither an urgent need to disseminate the record outside the Walgreen organization nor a need that reasonably outweighed Walgreen's interest in confidentiality). In all of these cases, significant weight was placed on how the documents were obtained and to whom they were distributed. The ultimate question under the balancing test is whether the employee's dissemination of confidential documents was reasonable under the circumstances. This type of test is consistent with the general notion that oppositional activity must be reasonable in order to receive protection under Title VII and other similar statutes. See Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579 (6th Cir.2000) ([T]he only qualification that is placed upon an employee's invocation of protection from retaliation under Title VII's opposition clause is that the manner of the opposition must be reasonable.) The balancing test can be applied regardless of whether the employee's actions arise under the opposition clause or the participation clause, and the form of the employee's action (opposition or participation) can be considered in determining whether the employee's actions are reasonable. As discussed in Part II.B.1 above, Niswander's acknowledgment that the documents in question were not relevant to the Rochlin lawsuit prevents a finding that her delivery of the confidential documents constituted participatory activity. An employee's dissemination of confidential documents in other situations, however, might qualify as participatory. Under a balancing test, the strong protections that are normally afforded an employee based on his or her participation in a Title VII lawsuit, investigation, or hearing may lead a court to conclude that the delivery of confidential documents by a participant in such a lawsuit would qualify as protected activity, although the same action by someone who is simply opposing discrimination would not. The analysis of a participation claim does not generally require a finding of reasonableness, as opposed to the requirement that oppositional conduct be reasonable. But when confidential information is at issue, a reasonableness requirement is appropriate. Given that an individual who has filed a lawsuit under Title VII has available the tools of civil discovery, a showing of reasonableness when confidential documents are disseminated outside of the discovery structure provides protections for employees and employers alike. Based on the analysis applied by the courts in the cases discussed above, we believe that the following factors are relevant in determining whether Niswander's delivery of the confidential documents in question was reasonable: (1) how the documents were obtained, (2) to whom the documents were produced, (3) the content of the documents, both in terms of the need to keep the information confidential and its relevance to the employee's claim of unlawful conduct, (4) why the documents were produced, including whether the production was in direct response to a discovery request, (5) the scope of the employer's privacy policy, and (6) the ability of the employee to preserve the evidence in a manner that does not violate the employer's privacy policy. These factors are designed to take into account the employer's legitimate and substantial interest in keeping its personnel records and agency documents confidential and yet protect the employee's alleged need for surreptitious copying and dissemination of the documents. Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir.1980). The district court in the present case, in reliance on O'Day and Watkins, concluded as follows: [T]he Court finds that Defendant's interest in ensuring compliance with its policies of privacy and the law, and maintaining the confidentiality of its clients' personal information outweighs Plaintiff's interest in preserving what she considered to be evidence of unlawful retaliation on the part of Defendant. This is so especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff could have preserved this evidence without violating the law and her employer's policy and trust as she could have taken notes of the incidents that she felt spurned retaliation instead of taking pictures and claims file information that jogged her memory of these incidents and giving them to her attorney. Moreover, this evidence that Plaintiff handed over to her attorney does not prove retaliation in and of itself as Plaintiff herself admitted that the documents that she gave her attorney relating to claims file information only served to trigger her memory about incidents which she believed constituted retaliation. The circumstances surrounding Niswander's delivery of the documents in question are generally undisputed. Through her work as a field claims specialist, she had access to confidential documents related to CIC policyholders. These documents were properly in her possession at her home office. At some point during the course of the Rochlin lawsuit, Niswander discussed with her lawyers perceived retaliation by CIC due to her involvement in the lawsuit. She also received two letters from the Rochlin lawyers asking her for documents related to the EPA claim. Niswander then searched through the documents she had in her possession, looking for documents related to the EPA claim and, by her own admission, documents related to CIC's alleged retaliation. She found no documents related to the EPA claim, but provided an unspecified number of other documents to her lawyers that did nothing more than jog her memory about incidents that she believed constituted retaliation. As the district court explained, Niswander could have preserved the alleged evidence of retaliation in other ways; in particular, she could have taken notes of the incidents that she believed demonstrated retaliation instead of delivering documents that contained confidential policyholder information. Producing confidential documents for the sole purpose of jogging one's memory, when there are readily available alternatives to accomplish the same goal, does not constitute the kind of reasonable opposition activity that justifies violating a company's privacy policy. Although employees deserve protection when they make reasonable attempts to preserve evidence of illegal employment practices, including discrimination and retaliation, we are loathe [sic] to provide employees an incentive to rifle through confidential files looking for evidence that might come in handy in later litigation. O'Day, 79 F.3d at 763. To hold in favor of Niswander would turn the opposition clause into a license to flaunt [sic] company rules or an invitation to dishonest behavior. Id. at 764. So even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Niswander, we conclude that her production of the documents was not reasonable under the six-factor test set forth above. The only factors that arguably weigh in Niswander's favor are factors one and two, but even those do not weigh heavily in her favor. Although she had access to the documents through her employment, Niswander did not innocently acquire the documents in the same manner as the plaintiff in Kempcke, who came across evidence of potential age discrimination in a company computer that had been issued to him. See Kempcke, 132 F.3d at 445. Rather than innocently stumbling upon evidence of illegal employment practices, Niswander specifically searched through the CIC documents that she had at her home office for the purpose of uncovering evidence of retaliation. Such behavior cannot be classified as truly innocent acquisition. As for the second factor, Niswander's providing the documents to her Rochlin attorneys is less problematic than giving them to a fellow employee. But in light of the fact that Niswander had alternative means to inform her Rochlin counsel of the alleged retaliation, her behavior cannot be condoned simply because she limited the dissemination of the documents in question to her attorneys. Niswander's delivery of the confidential documents, therefore, does not qualify as protected activity, so it cannot provide support for her prima facie case of retaliation. And even if we were to assume that Niswander's other evidence of retaliation (such as the e-mails with her supervisor and her being placed on PPR) is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of retaliation for her participation in the Rochlin lawsuit, her delivery of the confidential documents is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for CIC's decision to terminate her employment. Niswander asserts in rebuttal that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CIC's stated reason for terminating her was pretextual because (1) she produced the documents in response to a document request from CIC, and therefore her action falls under an exception to the Code of Conduct, and (2) CIC did not mark the produced documents as confidential once the documents were returned to CIC. A plaintiff who is trying to show that the employer's stated reason for termination is pretextual is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence either (1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate his [or her] discharge, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate discharge. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Niswander argues that she has shown both that her termination had no basis in fact and was not actually motivated by a violation of CIC's Code of Conduct. There is an exception to the Code of Conduct that permits disclosure of confidential information where it is legally mandated, authorized by the company or required for the proper conduct of business. Niswander contends that she produced the documents in question in response to a document request from CIC, and that this made her disclosure of confidential policyholder information both legally mandated and authorized by the company. CIC's document request, however, concerned only those writings relevant to the class-action EPA claim. Her production of irrelevant, confidential documents, when other avenues of preservation were readily available, was neither legally mandated nor authorized by CIC. Niswander's alternative assertion is that CIC's failure to mark the produced documents as confidential proves that her delivery of the documents did not actually motivate its decision to fire her. But as CIC points out, the violation for which Niswander was terminated was the initial disclosure of the documents. The horse was out of the barn, in other words, by the time CIC received the documents from opposing counsel in the Rochlin lawsuit, so whether CIC subsequently marked the documents as confidential has no bearing on whether she was fired for delivering the documents or because of impermissible retaliation. Moreover, even if the decision to terminate Niswander for producing the documents ultimately proved to be flawed, Niswander has failed to show the presence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding Stoneburner's honest belief that she had violated the company's privacy policy. [A]s long as an employer has an honest belief in its proferred nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the employee cannot establish that the reason was pretextual simply because it is ultimately shown to be incorrect. Majewski v. Auto. Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). As we have explained, the key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment action. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir.1998). Niswander has provided no evidence to rebut Charles Stoneburner's testimony that he fired her because he reasonably believed that she had violated the company's privacy policy. We thus conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to CIC because Niswander has failed to show that the stated reason for her termination was pretextual.