Opinion ID: 2361197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Plain Error Issue

Text: An essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury receive adequate and understandable instructions. State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15, 573 A. 2d 1359 (1990). Correct jury instructions are at the heart of the proper execution of the jury function in a criminal trial. Alexander, supra, 136 N.J. at 571, 643 A. 2d 996. Because defendant did not object to the challenged instruction, he waived the right to challenge the instruction on appeal. R. 1:7-2. A reviewing court may reverse on the basis of unchallenged error only if it finds plain error clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. Plain error, in the context of a jury charge, is [l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422, 688 A. 2d 97 (1997). Erroneous instructions are poor candidates for rehabilitation as harmless, and are ordinarily presumed to be reversible error. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994). In Alexander, we held that an instruction under the kingpin statute must include more than the statutory language. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 provides: (1) that the defendant conspired with at least two others; (2) that the defendant was an organizer, supervisor, financier, or manager; (3) that the defendant engaged in a conspiracy for profit; and (4) that the conspiracy included a scheme or course of conduct unlawfully to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or transport a controlled dangerous substance. [ Alexander, supra, 136 N.J. at 568, 643 A. 2d 996.] In order to achieve the Legislature's intent to target only the most culpable, upper-echelon drug offenders, we reasoned that trial courts should convey to the jury that the status or position of the defendant should be considered a material element of the crime. Id. at 570, 643 A. 2d 996. Status or position can be determined by examining factors such as the seriousness of the offense and the role of the actor in the drug network. Id. at 569, 643 A. 2d 996 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1). There are two requirements for a proper Alexander charge. Id. at 574-75, 643 A. 2d 996. First, a court should instruct the jury that a defendant's position and status should be at a superior or higher level than others involved in the drug trafficking network. Id. at 574, 643 A. 2d 996. To be an upper-echelon leader, the accused must exercise supervisory control or power over others engaged in the organized drug-trafficking network. Ibid. Second, the jury instruction should also amplify other statutory terms that are expressed as material elements of the crime under [the drug kingpin statute]. Id. at 575, 643 A. 2d 996 (emphasis added). Terms such as organizer, supervisor, financier, or manager should be explained so that the jury may fully understand their meaning and significance in relation to the statute. Ibid. The Court recommended the following as possible explanations: [T]he court might define organizer as a person who arranges, devises, or plans a drug-trafficking network; a supervisor as one who oversees the operation of a drug-trafficking network; a financier as one who is responsible for providing the funds or resources necessary to operate a drug-trafficking network; and a manager as one who directs the operations of a drug-trafficking network. [ Ibid. ] The Afanador I jury charge tracked the language of the 1988 Model Jury Charge, which stated without amplification the words of the kingpin statute. The charge did not explain that the jury must find that defendant's status as an upper-echelon leader of the network was an essential element of the offense. Nor did the instructions amplify the terms of the statute. Only the statutory language was read to the jury. Terms such as organizer, supervisor, financier, or manager were not defined in the jury charge in a manner consistent with Alexander. In assaying the effect of the trial court's failure to charge the jury correctly under the drug kingpin statute, we ordinarily recognize that the failure to charge the jury on an element of an offense is presumed to be prejudicial error, even in the absence of a request by defense counsel. State v. Federico, 103 N.J. 169, 176, 510 A. 2d 1147 (1986) (citing State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 506 A. 2d 708 (1986); State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117, 447 A. 2d 168 (1982); State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 430 A. 2d 914 (1981)). Thus, in State v. Butler, the Court reversed a felony-murder conviction because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the elements of the underlying robbery felony. 27 N.J. 560, 143 A. 2d 530 (1958). In Butler, Justice Francis explained: To fail to define the offense attributed to the accused and the essential elements which constitute it, is to assume that jurors are educated in the law  an assumption which no one would undertake to justify.... Accordingly, we hold the view that a mandatory duty exists on the part of the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the fundamental principles of law which control the case. Among such principles is the definition of a crime, the commission of which is basic to the prosecution against the defendant. And the duty is not affected by the failure of a party to request that it be discharged. [ Id. at 595, 143 A. 2d 530.] The Afanador trial court failed to instruct the jury concerning the fundamental principles of law governing the case. The State argues that the jury was made aware by counsel of defendant's arguments that he was not an upper-echelon leader, and thus any error in the instruction was harmless. However, arguments of counsel cannot substitute for correct instructions of law. The trial judge is the most authoritative figure in the courtroom. Jurors naturally look to the judge for definition of the offenses charged. This is not a case in which the instructions were merely capable of improvement. See State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 106, 692 A. 2d 981 (1997). They were incorrect. The equivocal nature of the evidence, Afanador I, 134 N.J. at 178, 631 A. 2d 946, was such that a correctly charged jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant was not a kingpin. We therefore hold that the absence of an Alexander instruction constituted plain error capable of bringing about an unjust result.