Opinion ID: 2999609
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strict Liability for Sexual Harassment

Text: “Harassment by a supervisor of the plaintiff triggers strict liability, subject to the possibility of an affirmative defense in the event the plaintiff suffered no tangible employment action.” Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 505. As discussed above, Phelan suffered an adverse employment action, so the No. 04-3991 15 question with regard to strict liability is whether Phelan introduced sufficient evidence that at least one of her harassers was her supervisor for the purposes of Title VII. Phelan cannot demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact with “evidence that anyone with managerial authority engaged in sexual harassment.” See id. (emphasis added). Rather, Phelan must demonstrate that “that the harasser served specifically as her supervisor.” Id. The term “supervisor” has special meaning within the context of a Title VII lawsuit. “A supervisor is someone with the power to directly affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.” Id. (emphasis in original). In Rhodes, we concluded that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that her alleged harassers were Title VII supervisors where the harassers “managed Rhodes’ work assignments, investigated complaints and disputes, and made recommendations concerning sanctions for rule violations to the Department Administrative Services Manager.” Id. at 506. Neither of the alleged harassers “had authority to make any decisions affecting the terms and conditions of Rhodes’ employment, i.e., the authority to hire, fire, promote, demote, discipline or transfer Rhodes.” Id. The situation is different here. Phelan argues that either Callaghan or Partee, both alleged harassers, constituted a Title VII supervisor.4 Callaghan supervised all of Phelan’s work at Cook County. He testified at his deposition 4 Phelan’s brief refers to Silva as a “supervisor” and Cook County has failed to contest the supervisory status of Silva, the most egregious harasser. However, Phelan has not pressed the inquiry into Silva’s Title VII supervisory status in her briefs, and the record is insufficient for us to conclude that he is a supervisor for Title VII purposes. We therefore do not consider him in our assessment of whether Cook County should be subject to strict liability. 16 No. 04-3991 that he was directly responsible for Phelan’s performance evaluations. He held the power to call for a disciplinary hearing, a power which he exercised in Phelan’s situation. There is evidence that Callaghan was at least partially responsible for the selection of the hearing officer. Ultimately, because of Cook County’s system for handling terminations, Callaghan did not have the final say as to whether Phelan was terminated, but we do not believe that he should avoid being a supervisor for Title VII purposes simply because Cook County employed a final administrative step involving the Human Resources Department. This is particularly true here since Callaghan triggered the termination hearing, selected the hearing officer, and provided information critical to the termination decision. Partee might also be considered a Title VII supervisor since, as a Human Resources Officer and as Phelan’s hearing officer, she appears to have had what amounts to ultimate authority to fire Phelan. See Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 506. Phelan testified that Partee was a direct participant in her sexual harassment. Partee’s role as a Human Resources employee does not, however, fit the typical mold of a Title VII supervisor. But Cook County’s system seems to divest any one individual of all of the powers that our cases have traditionally associated with the Title VII supervisor. It would be an odd result if an employer could escape the possibility of strict liability for supervisor harassment simply by scattering supervisory responsibilities amongst a number of individuals, creating a Title VII supervisory Hydra. Indeed, in the context of Title VII discriminatory termination suits we have concluded that employers are liable where a supervisor uses a human resources committee as his “cat’s paw”—the conduit of his prejudice. Cf. Shager, 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A committee of this sort, even if it is not just a liability shield invented by lawyers, is apt to defer to the judgment of the man on the spot.”). We think that No. 04-3991 17 between Callaghan and Partee all of the supervisory authority necessary to invoke strict liability likely existed. There is evidence that both of these individuals were involved in Phelan’s sexual harassment. Indeed, they were not the worst offenders, but where supervisors participate in the creation of a web of clear sexual harassment, the court need not sort out how many of the strands are attributable to the supervisors. Ultimately, we leave for another day the question of whether strict liability is appropriate in this situation. The record is insufficiently developed for a complete assessment of Callaghan and Partee’s supervisory roles. And as discussed below, Phelan has produced sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment under a negligence theory.