Opinion ID: 1830790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether Alabama's retirement-tax structure violates the representatives' right to equal protection under the Alabama Constitution of 1901.

Text: The representatives claim that the retirement-tax structure also violates an equal-protection provision they say is made up of §§ 1, 6, and 22 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Because we hold that Alabama has no such equal-protection provision, we conclude that the court, in entering the summary judgment, was not denying equal protection guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution. In declaring the existence of an equal-protection provision in the Alabama Constitution of 1901, this Court in 1977 unfortunately leapt upon a violently egregious editorial error made by an unofficial annotator and built on such an unworthy foundation a theory of constitutional law (equal protection) that absolutely requires solid support. To demonstrate not only how this happened, but the need now to correct that error, we give the following history of the 1901 equal-protection provision that never was. In 1901, the State of Alabama held a Constitutional Convention in Montgomery. The delegates to the Convention specifically discussed and rejected the idea of incorporating into the 1901 Constitution the equal-protection provision that existed in Alabama's 1875 Constitution. What appears as § 1 of the Constitution of 1901 first appeared in the Constitution of 1875, as Art. I, § 1; it was followed by § 2, which provided, in pertinent part: That all persons resident in this state... are hereby declared citizens of the State of Alabama, possessing equal civil and political rights. What was Art. I, § 2, in the Constitution of 1875 had first become a part of an Alabama Constitution with the Constitution of 1868. The first two sections of the 1868 Constitution (Art. I, §§ 1, 2) provided: 1. That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 2. That all persons resident in this state, born in the United States, or naturalized, or who shall have legally declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, are hereby declared citizens of the State of Alabama, possessing equal civil and political rights and public privileges. In the Constitution of 1875, the phrase That all men are created equal (from the 1868 Constitution) was deleted from Art. I, § 1, and the phrase That all men are equally free and independent was substituted therefor. The remainder of Art. I, § 1, was unchanged. All of § 2 was carried over from the 1868 Constitution into the Constitution of 1875 except the last three words, and public privileges. Therefore, it is evident that the drafters of the Constitution of 1868, which was drafted by a Constitutional Convention but was then defeated by the Alabama electorate, and ratified by the Congress of the United States before the ratification of the 14th Amendment, felt that, to provide for equal protection, something more was needed than the phrases all men are created equal; ... they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; [and] ... among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This is evident because these phrases, appearing in § 1, were followed by § 2, which provided that all citizens of Alabama possess[ed] equal civil and political rights and public privileges. It is also evident that the drafters of the Constitution of 1875 felt that, to provide for equal protection, something more was needed than the phrases all men are equally free and independent; ... they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; [and] ... among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This is evident because these phrases were followed by § 2, which provided that all citizens of Alabama possess[ed] equal civil and political rights. The provisions of Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution of 1875 were intentionally deleted from the Constitution of 1901, with the understanding that everything in that § 2 was covered already by the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] and we [the members of the 1901 Constitutional Convention] could not change or alter it if we undertook to do so. Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1901, p. 1640. The minutes of the Constitutional Convention of 1901 show that after a motion was made to adopt what was Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution of 1875, as a section of the 1901 Constitution, there was a motion to amend the section. Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1901, pp. 1622-23. After lengthy discussion (pp. 1623-28), there was a motion to lay the section on the table (p. 1628). This was discussed (pp. 1628-34); and on the 37th day, the Convention was adjourned without action being taken on any of the motions (p. 1634). On the 38th day of the Convention, the motion to adopt § 2 of the 1875 Constitution and the proposed amendments to it were tabled upon a vote of 49 ayes and 42 noes (p. 1642). Before this happened, Mr. Lomax, who the preceding day had moved for the adoption of § 2, stated: We [the Committee on the Preamble and Declaration of Rights, p. 1622] do not desire to get up a heated discussion about the meaning of words in the Declaration of Rights. We believe that everything in that particular section of the bill of rights [§ 2, above] is covered already by the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] and we could not change or alter it if we undertook to do so (p. 1640). The Committee on the Preamble and Declaration of Rights accepted two proposed amendments to § 2 and asked for unanimous consent, to which objection was made (p. 1640). Thereafter, the following transpired: MR. LOMAX: As the Convention refused to grant unanimous consent, I move that the section and the amendments be laid on the table. MR. PILLANS: Will the gentleman allow me to call his attention to one thing that may be material to be considered before that is done[?] Will he withdraw? MR. LOMAX: Yes. MR. PILLANS: It is simply this, the section as we find it in our last Code of this State, has appended to it a note, stating `the effect of this section is to place all persons natural and artificial on a basis of equality in the courts.' Citing the case of South and North Railroad against Morris, 65th, 75th, 85th, 87th and 106th Alabama, etc., and see also citations to another section: `there can be no discriminative advantage bestowed by law between the parties to the same suit,' citing other authorities. `The statute against miscegenation is not a denial of equal civil and political rights to the races.' Now if it appear from that, very likely that is a clause that has some efficacy and meaning, and has force in protecting investments and corporate rights and perhaps individual rights in this State, against hasty and ill advised legislation. MR. WALKER: Will the gentleman allow a suggestion? MR. PILLANS: Yes. MR. WALKER: Isn't that purpose completely effected by the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States? MR. PILLANS: It is, possibly. I only wanted to say that I expect to vote against laying the section on the table for the reason that it can be amended and preserved. . . . . MR. LOMAX: In reply to the suggestion of the gentleman from Mobile, I will state that an investigation which I made last night demonstrated the fact that this provision is not contained in any Constitutions at all, in the language in which it appears in our Constitution. It appears substantially in the following Constitutions: New York, Connecticut, Indiana, Minnesota, South Carolina and Virginia, and does not appear in the Constitution of any other State, except those named, and, as I say, it does not appear in this language in those Constitutions. I have no doubt, however, that everything contained in that section is covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, as I said before, and we could not possibly alter it if we undertook to do so. I think the section ought to stand as it is written, and as it was adopted unanimously by the convention of 1875, or else it ought to go out altogether, and therefore I renew my motion to table both the amendments and the section. . . . . MR. LOMAX: ... I now renew my motion to table. Upon a vote being taken, a division was called for, and by a vote of 49 ayes to 42 noes the section and the amendments were laid upon the table. On the 46th day of the Convention, on motion of Mr. Lomax, the chairman of the Committee on the Preamble and Declaration of Rights, the Preamble and the Declaration of Rights (from which Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution of 1875 had been deleted) were read a third time and were adopted by the Convention by a vote of 116 ayes and 2 noes (pp. 2254-60). Thirty-eight years after the Convention, this Court decided the case of Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939). Pickett involved a challenge to Alabama's then-existing automobile guest statute. The specific facts of Pickett are not as important to the present case as is the understanding of the following language used by the Pickett Court: Sections 1, 6, 22, State Constitution; Amendment 14, Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A. ...: These taken together guarantee the equal protection of the laws, protect persons as to their inalienable rights; prohibit one from being deprived of his inalienable rights without due process; and prohibit irrevocable or exclusive grants of special privileges or immunities. 238 Ala. at 545, 192 So. at 264. Of course, the associative nature of this language could not be clearer. Four constitutional provisions are cited, and four corresponding constitutional doctrines are associated. Stated another way, each doctrine is, as demonstrated below, to be identified with a specific constitutional provision: 1. ... equal protection of the laws...; guaranteed by Amendment 14, [Section 1,] Federal Constitution: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  (Emphasis added.) 2. ... protect persons as to their inalienable rights ...; guaranteed by Section[] 1, ... State Constitution: [A]ll men are equally free and independent;... they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; ... among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. (Emphasis added.) 3. ... prohibit one from being deprived of his inalienable rights without due process ...; guaranteed by Section[]... 6, ... State Constitution: That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, or either; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; and to have a copy thereof; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; to testify in all cases, in his own behalf, if he elects so to do; and, in all prosecutions by indictment, a speedy, public trial, by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense was committed; and he shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law; but the legislature may, by a general law, provide for a change of venue at the instance of the defendant in all prosecutions by indictment, and such change of venue, on application of the defendant, may be heard and determined without the personal presence of the defendant so applying therefor; provided, that at the time of the application for the change of venue, the defendant is imprisoned in jail or some legal place of confinement. (Emphasis added.) 4. ... prohibit irrevocable or exclusive grants of special privileges or immunities; guaranteed by Section[] ... 22, State Constitution: That no ex post facto law, nor any law, impairing the obligations of contracts, or making any irrevocable or exclusive grants of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed by the legislature; and every grant or franchise, privilege, or immunity shall forever remain subject to revocation, alteration, or amendment. (Emphasis added.) The language structure used by the Pickett Court reflects the same understanding of equal protection that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1901 had agreed upon: that any equal-protection guarantee in the State of Alabama would stem solely from the Fourteenth Amendment. This understanding is demonstrated more definitively from the paragraph that directly follows the language from Pickett quoted above: It is claimed that by those principles the legislature cannot legalize a negligent injury to one's person or property, thereby changing the rule of duty not to cause damage by a negligent act, whether that duty is a creature of the common law or statute. It is thought that to do so deprives one of `life, liberty, or property' without due process (section 6, Constitution), because such rights are inalienable under section 1, and create a special privilege under section 22, and violate the equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.  238 Ala. at 545, 192 So. at 264. (Emphasis added.) In fact, this understanding was apparently so clear that in 1949 the Justices of this Court issued an advisory opinion that stated: We point out that there is no equal protection clause in the Constitution of 1901. The equal protection clause of the Constitution of 1875 was dropped from the Constitution of 1901. Hamilton v. Adkins, 250 Ala. 557, 35 So.2d 183 [(1948)]; McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54, 58, 60 So. 392 [(1912)], Ann. Cas. 1915C, 691. Of course, the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are involved [in the question presented].... Opinion of the Justices No. 102, 252 Ala. 527, 530, 41 So.2d 775, 777 (1949). However, the seemingly unmistakable and historically consistent language of the Pickett decision was horribly confused by an erroneous unofficial annotation that appeared in the annotations to §§ 1 and 22 of the Constitution as printed in Ala.Code 1940 (Recompiled 1958), Vol. 1, pp. 26 and 89, and later in Ala.Code 1975, Vol. 1, pp. 79 and 168 (1977). The unofficial annotation misconstrued the Pickett language discussed above and summarized that portion of the decision as follows:  Sections 1, 6 and 22 of the Constitution, taken together, guarantee the equal protection of the laws, protect persons as to their inalienable rights, prohibit one from being deprived of his inalienable rights without due process, and prohibit irrevocable or exclusive grants of special privileges or immunities. Ala.Code 1940 (Recompiled 1958), Vol. 1, p. 26. (Emphasis added.) Of course, this is almost a direct quote from the Pickett opinion, but the annotation obviously and erroneously omits Amendment 14, Federal Constitution, thereby transforming a simple and rather unexceptional list of obvious constitutional principles into a declaration of the birth of a grand constitutional doctrine. Clearly, the annotation would have no authority unless adopted by this Court as a correct statement of the law, a contingency that unfortunately occurred in 1977 when the Court decided City of Hueytown v. Jiffy Chek Co., 342 So.2d 761 (Ala.1977). The City of Hueytown opinion used language that closely resembled that of the faulty annotation: Sections 1, 6, and 22 of the Alabama Constitution combine to guarantee equal protection of the laws. 342 So.2d at 762. The question whether the Court was actually relying on the unofficial annotation to declare the existence of an equal-protection provision in Alabama was answered later that same year in Peddy v. Montgomery, 345 So.2d 631 (Ala. 1977), when the Court practically quoted the annotation as if it were an accurate account of the language in Pickett: Any doubt about whether the Constitution of Alabama contained an equal protection provision was dispelled in Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939), where it was held that §§ 1, 6 and 22 of Article 1 of the Constitution of 1901, taken together, guarantee the equal protection of the laws, and prohibit one from being deprived of his inalienable rights without due process. 345 So.2d at 633. The fact that Alabama's so-called equal-protection provision sits upon a totally nonexistent foundation is evident. This lapse in judicial scholarship has been brought to the Court's attention repeatedly, see American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So.2d 1337, 1347-48 (Ala.1996) (Houston, J., dissenting); Smith v. Schulte, 671 So.2d 1334, 1347-48 (Ala.1995) (Maddox, J., dissenting); Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So.2d 894, 901-10 (Ala.1995) (Houston, J., concurring in the result); Ex parte St. Vincent's Hosp., 652 So.2d 225, 230-31 (Ala.1994) (Houston, J., concurring specially); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156, 174-78 (Ala.1991) (Houston, J., concurring in the result), and it is time that we recognized and corrected our error. As to the role of the doctrine of stare decisis in this matter, we note that `courts are not bound by stare decisis to follow a previous interpretation [that is] later found to be erroneous.' Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. J.M. Tull Metals Co., 629 So.2d 633, 638 (Ala.1993) (quoting 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 49.05, at 16 (5th ed.1992)). See also Ex parte Marek, 556 So.2d 375, 382 (Ala.1989) (noting that the doctrine of stare decisis does not render the courts helpless to correct their past errors). It would be difficult to imagine a more erroneous interpretation of Alabama constitutional law than to allow a wholly inaccurate unofficial annotation (which, by the way, has since been corrected by the Code publishers) to amend the Alabama Constitution. Therefore, we now restate what the Justices of this Court correctly declared in 1949, that there is no equal protection clause in the Constitution of 1901. Opinion of the Justices No. 102, supra, 252 Ala. at 530, 41 So.2d at 777. Under this rationale, then, the summary judgment was appropriate with respect to the representatives' claim that an equal-protection guarantee of the Alabama Constitution had been violated. AFFIRMED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, SEE, and BROWN, JJ., concur specially. KENNEDY and COOK, JJ., concur in the result and dissent from the rationale. JOHNSTONE, J., dissents. LYONS, J., recuses himself.