Opinion ID: 1345038
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriate Mens Rea When Child Abuse Directly Inflicted

Text: We first consider whether a violation of section 273a(1) based on direct infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering requires proof of general criminal intent or criminal negligence. As noted above, the Court of Appeal concluded that criminal negligence is required; defendant urges us to adopt this view. The Attorney General argues that only general criminal intent is required. We begin with the language of the statute. The language inflicts [on a child] unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering is most readily interpreted as requiring general criminal intent. That is, the statute describes a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence. ( People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370.) Moreover, the language of section 273a(1) is similar to that of section 273d, which proscribes corporal punishment or child beating. [7] Indeed, sections 273a(1) and 273d have been described as related statute[s]. ( People v. Stewart (1961) 188 Cal. App.2d 88, 91, 10 Cal.Rptr. 217 [relying on section 273a case to interpret section 273d]; see also People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 801, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886 [defendant convicted of both sections 273a(1) and 273d]; People v. Jackson (1971) 18 Cal. App.3d 504, 505, 95 Cal.Rptr. 919 [same]; People v. Mills (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 898, 902, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 [same].) Section 273d has been interpreted as a general intent statute. ( People v. Atkins, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 358, 125 Cal.Rptr. 855 [[t]here need not be found a deliberate intent to cause a traumatic condition, but only the more general intent to inflict upon a child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury]; see People v. Mills, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 921, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 [corpus delicti of offense that child was injured and that injury was willful and intentional proven independent of the defendant's admission]; People v. Lawrence (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 630,633,297 P.2d 144 [When father struck and burned his daughter, The corpus delicti was established when it was shown that the corporal injury was inflicted upon the child by the defendant and the circumstances and injuries to the child demonstrated that such injuries were deliberately and intentionally inflicted upon her.]; People v. Gutierrez (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 1076, 1079, 1080, 225 Cal.Rptr. 885 [defendant conceded section 273d general intent crime].) Furthermore, battery (§ 242), which requires general criminal intent, is a lesser included offense of section 273d. ( People v. Atkins, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 352, 125 Cal.Rptr. 855; People v. Stewart, supra, 188 Cal.App.2d at p. 90, 10 Cal.Rptr. 217.) Given the similarities between section 273a(1) and section 273d, the mens rea element should be the same. The similarities between felony child abuse involving direct infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering and assault (§ 240) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245) also support the application of general criminal intent to section 273a(1). ( People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 807, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886 [The elements of section 245 and the offense here [violation of section 273a(1)] are strikingly similar; the principal difference is that the assault prohibited by section 273a is committed on a child. (Fn.omitted.)].) Assault and assault with a deadly weapon are general intent crimes. ( People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 214-215, 218, 219, 221, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 908, 865 P.2d 704.) In addition, section 273ab, [8] which proscribes assault resulting in a child's death, expressly refers to assault by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury.... (Italics added.) Thus, when the Legislature chooses to create a reasonable person standard, it knows how to do so. Defendant asserts that section 273a(1) and section 273d differ significantly because section 273a(1), but not section 273d, requires that the culpable conduct occur under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death. Thus, while only general criminal intent may apply to the actual infliction element, criminal negligence applies to the condition or circumstances element of the offense. Defendant likewise asserts that the relevant scienter in this case is the scienter required with respect to the `circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,' not the scienter required with respect to the actual conduct or omission. There appears to be, however, no basis for concluding that the appropriate mens rea for direct infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering is contained in the language under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death. Section 273a does not provide that a defendant must know or reasonably should know that his or her actions occur under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death. Rather, the statute proscribes the infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on a child. Whether that infliction is under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death is a question for the trier of fact. In this case for example, the jury reasonably would have considered Michael's tender age and fragile physical development, the degree of force used by defendant in violently shaking him on two different occasions, and the likelihood of great bodily harm or death created by that force as evidenced by the medical testimony and the injuries sustained. By contrast, if Michael had been a 17-year-old varsity linebacker, those facts would also have been circumstances or conditions the jury would consider. In this manner, section 273a(1) is similar to that portion of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), which proscribes assault ... by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. Numerous cases have held that whether the force used by the defendant was likely to produce great bodily injury is a question for the trier of fact to decide. ( People v. Armstrong (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1066, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 [`[T]he question of whether or not the force used was such as to have been likely to produce great bodily injury, is one of fact for the determination of the jury based on all the evidence, including but not limited to the injury inflicted.']; People v. Duke (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 296, 303, 219 Cal.Rptr. 873 [reasonable jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that headlock on victim constituted force likely to produce great bodily injury]; People v. Kinman (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 419, 422, 286 P.2d 28 [`Whether a fist would be likely to produce such injury is to be determined by the force of the impact, the manner in which it was used and the circumstances under which the force was applied.']; People v. Pullins (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 902, 904, 214 P.2d 436 [Whether the force applied and the means used were calculated to `produce great bodily injury,' is a question for the trier of fact.]; People v. Bumbaugh (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 791, 797, 120 P.2d 703 [In view of the injuries sustained by the complainant, as well as the manner of the assault made upon her, the jury was authorized to conclude that the manner of as well as the means used to perpetrate the attack constituted assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.]; see 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law, supra, Crimes Against the Person, § 419, p. 481 [where the blows are serious, but still leave a question of fact as to the character of the force used, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on the included offense of simple assault]; see also People v. Martinez (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 355, 359, 107 Cal.Rptr. 284 [It is now settled that assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, is a general intent crime rather than a specific intent crime.].) Moreover, similar language in other penal statutes has not precluded them from being interpreted as general criminal intent statutes. (See People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 755-756, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 [Section 12022.7, subdivision (d), which provides, Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence in the commission or attempted commission of a felony, is a general intent statute.]; People v. Gonzales (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1684,1691, 1695, 1698, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 450, called into doubt on other grounds in People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 229, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184 [Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), which deems serious any other felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, is a general intent statute.].) The scienter for any crime is inextricably linked to the proscribed act or omission. (See § 20 [In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.].) The actus reus for section 273a(1) is infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on a child. Hence, the scienter requirement applies to such an act. There is no separate scienter which attaches to the phrase circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death. We note this inquiry, as a practical matter, will in most cases not differ significantly from the imposition of a criminal negligence mens rea element into the language under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death. Thus in this case, while defendant denied any awareness that his actions were likely to harm Michael, any reasonable person would recognize that shaking a four-and-a-half-month-old infant, who had been born three months prematurely and had the neck development of a four- to six-week-old, with the force equivalent to dropping him out of a second story window, was a circumstance or condition likely to result in great bodily harm or death. As Presiding Justice Puglia observed in his dissent in the Court of Appeal, section 273a(1) is not unlike other criminal statutes that gauge the precise measure of the defendant's culpability for an intentional act by matters extrinsic to the intent element of the crime. The actor may neither anticipate nor have any particular intent or knowledge with respect to these extrinsic matters. For example, a thief unaware the property stolen is worth more than $400 has no defense against conviction of grand theft because of ignorance of the value of the property. (See §§ 487, 488.) Nor may a burglar, unaware the structure entered is inhabited, avoid conviction of first degree burglary on the basis of such ignorance. (§§ 459, 460.) Thus the scienter required for felony and misdemeanor theft is precisely the same. So also is the scienter required for first degree burglary and the lesser crime of second degree burglary. Such is the case with felony child abuse under the second branch of section 273a(1). The scienter required for both section 273a(1) and section 273 former subdivision (2) (now section 273a, subdivision (b)) violations is the same. The reference to the infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering occurring under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death in subdivision (1) simply states the context in which the subdivision applies. (See People v. Carter, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 755, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 [reference to domestic violence in [section 12022.7,] subdivision (d) was designed to describe the context in which the subdivision applies, not the intent requirement needed under that provision].) It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the act was done under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, i.e., under conditions in which the probability of serious injury is great. (§ 273a(1); People v. Jaramillo, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 835, 159 Cal.Rptr. 771.) If so, the crime is punishable as a felony; if not, solely as a misdemeanor. ( People v. Deskin, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th at p. 1401, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 391.) Defendant recognizes that In cases where a person brutally beats a child, it appears absurd to engage in[] an inquiry as to whether an ordinary prudent person would have been aware of the risk of serious bodily harm or death. However, there is nothing intrinsically distinct about the act of violently shaking a vulnerable infant that separates it from other methods of direct child abuse. Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, will section 273a(1) be tantamount to a strict liability crime if we do not conclude criminal negligence is a required element of the statute. Generally speaking, a strict liability offense is one which dispenses with a mens rea, scienter, or wrongful intent element. (See People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 519, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271.) Felony child abuse requires a mens rea: the defendant must willfully inflict unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on a child. At oral argument, defendant's counsel asserted that concluding the second branch of section 273a(1) has a general criminal intent mens rea would result in parents being prosecuted for shaking a child or slapping it on the back to save it from choking. However, shaking or slapping a choking child, whatever physical pain or mental suffering that may involve, is justified. Section 273a(1) sanctions only the infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. In sum, we conclude that when the conduct at issue involves the direct infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on a child, criminal negligence is not an element of the offense. Rather, the defendant must have a mens rea of general criminal intent to commit the proscribed act. In addition, the trier of fact must determine whether the infliction of the unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on a child was under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death. If so, the crime is punishable as a felony. If not, it is punishable solely as a misdemeanor. In light of this conclusion, there is no need to address whether the Court of Appeal properly modified the judgment to reflect a conviction for misdemeanor child abuse without giving the prosecution an opportunity to retry defendant.