Opinion ID: 777318
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officers' Continued Presence Over Koch's Objection

Text: 23 Although Koch's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the police officers' initial entry into the house, Koch also argues that their continued presence over his objections violated his Fourth Amendment rights. It is unsettled whether the Fourth Amendment allows the police to remain in a home over the objections of the primary occupant when they enter pursuant to the reasonable belief that a third party, whom the police know has lesser authority over the premises than the primary occupant, has consented to their entry. Therefore, Koch cannot point to a clearly established right that was violated. As such, we find it unnecessary to decide, as the district court did, whether the officers violated Koch's Fourth Amendment rights. Instead, we explain both arguments only to show the ambiguity in the law and affirm the grant of summary judgment because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 24 Some lower courts have addressed whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to leave a residence when the primary occupant objects to a third party's consent to their search. All begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242. 25 In Matlock, the defendant was arrested based on evidence that the police found at his residence without a warrant or the defendant's consent. When the police first approached the residence, they saw the defendant outside in the front yard. Instead of asking the defendant himself for consent to search his residence, the police obtained the consent of a third party. In upholding the search of the residence and seizure of evidence found inside, the Supreme Court stated that permission to search [may be] obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Id. at 171, 94 S.Ct. 988. The Matlock Court reasoned that in such a situation, it is reasonable to recognize that... others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Id. at n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988. 26 The fact that the defendant in Matlock was present, but not consulted, at the time of the search has played an important role in subsequent lower court decisions where the defendant has specifically objected to a third party's consent. The leading Court of Appeals case on point, United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 932, 98 S.Ct. 1507, 55 L.Ed.2d 529 (1978), held that the facts of Matlock showed that a defendant's objection to a search is irrelevant if an authorized third party consents to the search. 5 Citing the fact that the defendant in Matlock was present, although not consulted for his consent, the court said: 27 There is no reasonable expectation of privacy to be protected under such circumstances. We cannot see how the additional fact of Appellant's initial refusal to consent in any way lessened the risk assumed that his co-occupant would consent. This additional fact does not increase a reasonable expectation of privacy. 28 Id. at 688. It is worth noting however, that although the Sumlin court considered the Appellant to have objected to the search, the court also found that after his initial objection, the defendant did not urge the third party to withhold consent, and even told her that her consent need not be withheld. Id. at 685. Additionally, the third party in Sumlin was a co-occupant of the residence, having her name on the lease. Therefore, the third-party's authority probably inhered independent of the defendant. Here, as discussed earlier, Reed's authority was probably not independent of Koch's, but derived from Koch's permission to gain access. 29 Koch advances the counter-argument that because a primary occupant has the greater power to create and destroy a third party's authority to consent to a search of his personal and exclusive premises, the primary occupant retains the lesser power to object to a third party's consent when present. 6 Such an objection would thus revoke or limit the third party's existing authority to consent; when he is absent or silent, 7 however, he would assume the risk that the third party may act adversely to his interests. 30 While not deciding which of these or other positions is mandated by the Fourth Amendment, we note that existing law is unclear on this issue. Therefore, Koch cannot point to a clearly established right that Lake and Holbrook violated in order to break the officers' qualified immunity and survive the summary judgment motion. 31