Opinion ID: 1436492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Partial Summary Judgment Order

Text: As discussed above, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the Lawyers on Ms. Flax's fraud-related claims because the record in the Fischer litigation belied any claim that Mr. Flax had relied to his detriment on the Reissner letter fabricated by Mr. Fischer, and because Ms. Flax proffered no new evidence to the contrary. That reasoning, however, was not a sufficient basis for rejecting Ms. Flax's claim that the Lawyers negligently failed to bring a fraudulent-inducement claim that was not predicated on Mr. Flax's reliance on the fabricated Reissner letter. A fair reading of Ms. Flax's May 3, 2004 opposition to the Lawyers' April 2004 motion for summary judgment is that she was indeed asserting such an alternative fraud claim. In that opposition, Ms. Flax asserted that Flax expended time and effort to locate financing for Fischer Brewing, in reliance upon Fischer's fraud (Fischer's intention to name another phony finder for a significantly lesser fee once Flax had found a finder) and that [a] reasonable inference suggests Fischer never intended to compensate Flax as per the agreement dated February 21, 1996, only one month prior [to fabrication of the Reissner letter]. [2] Ms. Flax again asserted the claim in her June 14, 2004 Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In that filing, she asserted that Fischer defrauded Flax when he induced Flax into finding investor financing for Fischer Brewing without any intention of ever naming Flax as finder, that Fischer had no intention of ever fulfilling his promise to compensate Flax as finder, and that Fischer signed the February 21, 1996 agreement with full knowledge of his intent to renege on his obligation to pay Flax a finder's fee. [3] We agree with Ms. Flax that the trial court appears to have overlooked this alternative fraud-related claim when it dismissed all of her fraud-related claims against the Lawyers on the basis of Mr. Flax's lack of reliance on Fischer's misrepresentations, and when it declined to reconsider that ruling in light of Ms. Flax's subsequent pleadings. [4] There appears to be no real room for doubt that Mr. Flax undertook his work for Mr. Fischer in reliance on Mr. Fischer's promise of a substantial payment; Mr. Flax had a compensation agreement [with Fischer] and performed services for Fischer pursuant to that agreement. Fischer, 816 A.2d at 6. Moreover, in reviewing the Lawyers' summary judgment motion, the court was required to draw all inferences from facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Flax, as the non-moving party. See Thompson v. Shoe World, Inc., 569 A.2d 187, 189 (D.C. 1990). Further, it is true that Ms. Flax cited only circumstantial rather than direct evidence in support of her fraudulent-inducement claim ( i.e., that Fischer knowingly made a false representation to Mr. Flax with the intent at the outset to deceive him). Circumstantial evidence, however, can be enough to withstand summary judgment on fraud-related claims. See Franklin Inv. Co. v. Homburg, 252 A.2d 95, 98 (D.C.1969) (Malice, fraud, deceit and wrongful motive may be inferred from the acts of the defendant and circumstantial evidence. Such intent is seldom admitted and need not be proved by direct evidence). [5] And, we note, as of the date when the court issued its partial summary judgment ruling, Ms. Flax still had a standard-of-care expert who was expected to testify, so her claim that the Lawyers were negligent in failing to bring a fraudulent inducement counterclaim against Fischer was not subject to dismissal for lack of an expert witness. The Lawyers argued that Ms. Flax had opposed their motion for summary judgment with only conclusory allegations about fraudulent inducement and without the sworn assertions of specific facts that generally are necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Avery v. HPCS, Inc., 818 A.2d 175, 177 (D.C.2003). [6] But the Lawyers' motion was filed only several months into the litigation, when discovery had not been completed, and Ms. Flax's counsel had submitted an affidavit pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 56(f)a rather bare-bones affidavit, to be suredescribing the discovery that Ms. Flax had conducted and explaining that discovery was still in the preliminary stages and that no depositions had been taken. The trial court had discretion to deny summary judgment at that stage, in light of the Rule 56(f) affidavit and Ms. Flax's opposition, to afford Ms. Flax the opportunity to garner deposition testimony or other sworn evidence that could have enabled her to avoid summary judgment. See Kibunja v. Alturas, L.L.C., 856 A.2d 1120, 1125 (D.C.2004) (The trial court may deny a motion for summary judgment or grant a continuance to permit discovery `if the party opposing the motion adequately explains why [in a Rule 56(f) affidavit], at that time point, it cannot present by affidavit facts needed to defeat the motion.') (quoting Strang v. United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, 275 U.S.App.D.C. 37, 864 F.2d 859, 861 (C.A.D.C.1989)); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. United Food & Commer. Workers Int'l Union, 770 A.2d 978, 995-996 (D.C.2001) (although Rule 56(f) affidavit contained only general allegations of the need for discovery, summary judgment was premature because other documents filed by the plaintiff . . . sufficed to alert the [trial] court of the need for further discovery) (quoting First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 267 U.S.App. D.C. 27, 32, 836 F.2d 1375, 1380 (D.C.Cir. 1988)). Notably, as discussed infra, the court exercised its discretion in favor of permitting discovery on Ms. Flax's non-fraud-related claims, even though Ms. Flax's explanation about her discovery plans with respect to those claims and assertions regarding their factual basis were no more specific than her statements with respect to her fraudulent-inducement-related claims. In contrast, the court did not exercise its discretion one way or the other with respect to Ms. Flax's fraudulent-inducement-related claim because, as we have concluded, it apparently over-looked that claim. We review a trial court's denial of a request for discovery premised on a Rule 56(f) affidavit for abuse of discretion. Travelers Indem. Co. v. United Food & Commer. Workers Int'l Union, 770 A.2d 978, 993 (D.C.2001). We conclude that a remand is warranted because, as we have explained, the trial court did not consider whether Ms. Flax was entitled to avoid summary judgment while she undertook discovery on her fraudulent-inducement-related claims, and because, on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the facts left the trial court `with but one option [to] choose' namely, to deny further discoverywithout abusing its discretion. Beard v. South Main Bank, 615 A.2d 203, 212 (D.C.1992) (Terry, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364 (1979)). [7] [T]his court cannot properly substitute its judgment [with respect to] . . . a ruling committed to trial court discretion when that discretionto which the parties had a rightwas not exercised. Wright v. United States, 508 A.2d 915, 920 (D.C. 1986). Ms. Flax also takes issue with the way in which the trial court, in its July 26, 2004 partial summary judgment ruling, handled her claim that the Lawyers were negligent in failing to pursue other intentional tort claims against Laidlaw and Miscoll. The court's ruling explains that, at the hearing on the Lawyers' motion for summary judgment, Judge Kravitz specifically asked Ms. Flax's counsel to identify the other intentional tort claim that Ms. Flax contended the Lawyers should have pursued. Her counsel told the court that the claim was one for malicious prosecution. Judge Kravitz relied on counsel's representation in allowing Ms. Flax to go forward (pending additional discovery) with her claim related to the Lawyers' failure to pursue a malicious prosecution claim. Ms. Flax does not contend that this ruling was erroneous at the time it was made, but she faults the court for not revisiting its ruling upon review of the pleadings that Ms. Flax or her then-counsel filed after the partial summary judgment order was issued. In those pleadings, Ms. Flax repeatedly explained that the other intentional tort claim that the Lawyers failed to plead was not malicious prosecution, but instead a claim that Laidlaw aided and abetted Fischer's bad faith litigation. She contends that the trial judge erred in not modifying its partial summary judgment ruling and permitting her to conduct discovery as to that claim. We cannot fault the trial court for holding Ms. Flax to her counsel's representation as to what claim she intended to pursue. We have held repeatedly that the acts and omissions of counsel are imputed to the client even though detrimental to [her] . . . [unless] the conduct of counsel is outrageously in violation of either [her] express instructions or [counsel's] implicit duty to devote reasonable efforts in representing his client. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Hill, 250 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C.1969) (noting that this rule is necessary for the orderly conduct of litigation); see also Da Costa v. Ruben, 225 A.2d 309 (D.C.1967); Jones v. Roundtree, 225 A.2d 877 (D.C.1967); Askew v. Randolph Carney Co., 119 A.2d 116 (D.C.1955). Although Ms. Flax advised the trial court that her counsel was deficient in his responses to the court's questions at the hearing on the summary judgment motion, she did not assert that her counsel ignored her instructions as to what intentional tort claim she contended the Lawyers should have pursued, or that her counsel failed to devote reasonable efforts in representing her. Certainly, it is necessary for the orderly conduct of litigation that the trial court be able to rely on counsel's representations at important junctures of litigation (such as a summary judgment hearing) with respect to matters that are central to the represented party's case (such as what negligent omission the party is alleging). In her brief to this court, Ms. Flax asserts that her then-counsel was completely unprepared at the July 22, 2004 hearing on the Lawyer's motion for summary judgment and that counsel had pleaded the [malicious prosecution] claim off the cuff without adequate knowledge of her case, allegations that, if presented to the trial court, might have warranted reconsideration of the relevant portions of the partial summary judgment ruling. But, in any event, we are not persuaded that Ms. Flax suffered harm from the court's having ignored her aiding and abetting bad faith litigation claim in its partial summary judgment ruling. As described supra, in that ruling, the court left the door openand permitted discovery to proceed with respect toMs. Flax's claim that the Lawyers failed to advise that any judgments she might have obtained for intentional torts against Fischer, Laidlaw, or Miscoll would not be dischargeable and might have resulted in an award of punitive damages. We think this claim was sufficiently broad that pursuing discovery as to it could have entailed discovery as to the viability of the ignored aiding and abetting bad faith litigation claim. Notably, when the Lawyers filed their motion asking the court to require Ms. Flax to identify what intentional torts she had in mind in pursuing this remaining claim, the court denied their request. As a result, even though the court also explicitly limited discovery to the claims that remained after the July 26, 2004 partial summary judgment ruling, Ms. Flax was left with latitude to garner evidence that had the Lawyers pursued the aiding-and-abetting-bad-faith-litigation claim or some other intentional-tort claim, the claim might have resulted in an award of punitive damages. [8]