Opinion ID: 1770580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court of Appeal's Reasoning

Text: The Third Circuit's close reading of Manuel led it to conclude that Spooner's reliance was misplaced. It conceded the opinion contained language to the effect the state must prove each ground for forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt, but the appellate court considered Manuel of no precedential value because the case involved a pre-trial proceeding, and the precise issue of the burden of proof required of the State ... was not before [the Court]. As a result, the Third Circuit viewed Manuel's statements concerning the burden of proof as dicta, not a firm adjudication of the issue and, thus, not binding on lower courts. With respect to the nature of the proceedings, the Third Circuit had no quarrel with Manuel's assessment that forfeitures were quasi-criminal in character. In the court's view, however, this was not inconsistent with the legislature's designation of forfeiture as in rem proceedings under La.R.S. 32:1551 and with the whole body of federal statutory and jurisprudential law, which recognized forfeitures as civil in rem remedial sanctions, quasi-criminal in nature, which do not require the wide range of constitutional protections required in criminal cases. Spooner, 505 So.2d at 233. The Third Circuit then undertook an exploration of federal jurisprudence interpreting forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881 to determine the precise nature of forfeiture proceedings and the extent of constitutional protections due claimants. Finding this body of law persuasive the court construed La.R.S. 32:1550 as calling for a civil proceeding. It went on to dispose of the core of Spooner's contentions this way: The legislature recognized the difficulty in proving the origin of monies seized in connection with narcotic arrests and in an attempt to diminish the profitability of the illegal drug trade and to help finance the state's effort to fight illicit drug trafficking established the § (A)(7)(c) presumption. That presumption is nothing more than an inference, deduced from facts in evidence, which continues to stand only in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The foregoing leads us to the inescapable conclusion that La.R.S. 32:1550 et seq. establishes a civil remedial proceeding and the presumption created by § (A)(7)(c) is permissive and constitutional. We therefore find this issue without merit. Id. at 237.