Opinion ID: 496991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: congressional intent to abrogate the states' eleventh

Text: AMENDMENT IMMUNITY IN SARA The eleventh amendment provides that: 9 The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 10 U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the amendment does not expressly address suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has interpreted it as embodying state sovereign immunity and has therefore constructed a presumptive bar against suits by citizens of the defendant state. See Welch v. State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (Pennhurst II ); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); see also infra at 1354-55 (discussing extent of presumption). 11
12 the Eleventh Amendment 13 In our original panel opinion, we noted that eleventh amendment immunity can be avoided in only two ways: (a) Congress can abrogate it by providing through statute for suits against states, or (b) states can waive their sovereign immunity and consent to be sued. Union Gas I, 792 F.2d at 376 (emphasis in original). After the vacatur of our previous opinion, the Supreme Court decided Welch and noted the same two exceptions to the eleventh amendment's reach. See 107 S.Ct. at 2945-46. 14 We also explained in Union Gas I that, because of the eleventh amendment's importance in maintaining the balance of power between state and federal interests, 792 F.2d at 376, the Supreme Court requires Congress to express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 243, 105 S.Ct. at 3148); see also Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. at 907 (1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1146-47, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). 15 The Court has insisted that the statute, when read literally, not merely allow suits against the state, but that it do so with such specificity that it is clear that Congress consciously and directly focused on the issue of state sovereign immunity and chose to abrogate it. 16 792 F.2d at 376 (citations omitted). 17 The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Welch, which emphasized that Congress can create an exception to the reach of the eleventh amendment only if it expresses its intent to do so in unmistakable language in the statute itself. Welch overturned, at least in part, the decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964), in which the Court had found that Congress had intended to abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity when it enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) and regulated [e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States.... 45 U.S.C. Sec. 51 (1982). Every common carrier, held Parden, included state-owned railroads and thus abrogated their eleventh amendment immunity. Welch explicitly overruled this holding in Parden, reinterpreting the very same provision of the FELA as it was incorporated by reference in the Jones Act. 18 Although our later decisions do not expressly overrule Parden, they leave no doubt that Parden 's discussion of congressional intent to negate Eleventh Amendment immunity is no longer good law.... In subsequent cases the Court consistently has required an unequivocal expression that Congress intended to override Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, to the extent that Parden v. Terminal Railway ... is inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled. 19 107 S.Ct. at 2948 (citations and footnote omitted).
20 In Union Gas I, we found that the language and structure of CERCLA did not sufficiently evince Congress' intention to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. SARA has now changed both the language and structure of CERCLA, and, as we explain below, SARA demonstrates Congress' unmistakable intent to subject the states to suit in federal court. 21 In Union Gas I, we acknowledged both that the liability section of CERCLA allows those who have incurred clean-up costs to sue any person who owned or operated the waste site for all costs incurred in the removal effort, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a) (1982), and that the definitional section defines person to include the United States Government, [a] State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(21) (1982). We found this language insufficient to abrogate the eleventh amendment for two reasons. 22 First, the inclusion of a state in the Sec. 9601(21) definition of persons allows the United States, which does the vast bulk of clean-up work, to sue states for reimbursement under Sec. 9607(a). We concluded that, because of the structure of CERCLA, the language that allows the federal government to sue states cannot be deemed to express Congress' unmistakable intention to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity from suits by individuals against state government. 3 Second, we noted the significance of Sec. 9607(g), which explicitly waives the United States' sovereign immunity. 4 We interpreted the existence of this explicit waiver of federal sovereign immunity as a further indication that the definitional section was insufficient, in and of itself, to subject a state governmental body to suit, for reading CERCLA's definitional section to waive federal sovereign immunity would render Sec. 9607(g) superfluous. We therefore reasoned that to impute to Congress the intention to abrogate states' immunity we would require a specific reference to states' immunity or some other explicit indication of abrogation. See Union Gas I, 792 F.2d at 380 (abrogation of states' eleventh amendment immunity requires no less a showing of congressional intent than does waiver of federal sovereign immunity). 23 In SARA, however, Congress enacted the unmistakably clear statutory language that demonstrates its intent to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. Section 101 of SARA, entitled Amendments to Definitions, adds a new paragraph to CERCLA which defines owner or operator: 24 The term owner or operator does not include a unit of State or local government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title [cost recovery actions]. 25 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 9601(20)(D) (West Supp.1987) (emphasis supplied). 26 Two points of analysis support our conclusion that the amendment to Sec. 9601 provides the requisite unmistakably clear language. First, the plain language of the statute indicates a clear intention to abrogate. Congress provided that a state shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same manner and the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. As the emphasized portion of Sec. 9601(20)(D) demonstrates, Congress, in amending CERCLA, specifically contemplated the unique position of states in the constitutional scheme and, in certain circumstances, chose to make them liable to suit by individuals in federal court. 27 Second, SARA now applies exactly the same waiver to states that it applies to the federal government. The language of the final portion of Sec. 9601(20)(D) replicates for all practical purposes Sec. 9607(g), which waives the sovereign immunity of the federal government. Thus, CERCLA, as amended by SARA, treats the United States and the states similarly--enumerating both as persons and withdrawing the immunity from both. Even if we were to require a greater showing of congressional intent to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity than is necessary to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity, see Union Gas I, 792 F.2d at 380 n. 13, this higher threshold would be satisfied by SARA. SARA's definitional section, which replicates the federal waiver and which specifically contemplates the function of the states as separate sovereigns, addresses this concern. 28 In Union Gas I, the panel, relying on the special federal waiver section of CERCLA, believed that Congress, by explicitly waiving federal sovereign immunity in Sec. 9607(g), demonstrated that more than enumeration in a definitional section was required to abrogate governmental immunity. Although this argument based on Sec. 9607(g) is no longer tenable, given the SARA amendments to that section, we must nevertheless grapple with the question of whether definitional language alone may express congressional intent as to abrogation. As a general matter, we believe that mere enumeration in a definitional section remains insufficient as evidence of congressional intent to abrogate. In our case, however, the definitional section contains a substantive direction that state or local government shall be subject to the provisions of [CERCLA] in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 9601(20)(D) (West Supp.1987). Although found in a definitional section, the language is not definitional in character; it far exceeds the bare enumeration we found insufficient to indicate congressional intent to abrogate in Union Gas I. On the contrary, its clear mandate, replicating the language of the federal waiver, satisfies our concerns about congressional intent to render the states amenable to suit. 29 A third point arises from SARA's amendment of the act's federal immunity waiver in Sec. 9607(g). In Union Gas I, we found that the existence of a special section waiving federal immunity indicated that Congress had given special thought to waiving federal immunity and had not given equivalent attention to the question of state immunity. Essentially we inferred that Congress, by not providing an analogous state waiver, did not intend to abrogate the eleventh amendment. This federal waiver, now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 9620(a)(1) (West Supp.1987), has been amended, however, to provide that [n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the liability of any person or entity under sections 9606 [i.e., abatement actions] and 9607 [i.e., cost recovery actions]. This amendment precludes the reading of Sec. 9607(g) employed in Union Gas I, which construed the federal waiver to affect the liability of states. 30 The explicit abrogation of the eleventh amendment in SARA distinguishes this case from Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Missouri Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1972). As we noted in Union Gas I, Employees demonstrates that the statutory suggestion that states might be sued, when found in a provision separate from the one that creates the cause of action, may be insufficient to demonstrate congressional intent. Here, too, there are separate provisions concerning liability and amenability of states to suit in federal court. However, the clear congressional language provided by SARA overcomes this concern. 31 In Union Gas I, we did not confine our examination to the words of CERCLA. Rather, because these sections had not by their language evinced the congressional intent to abrogate, we canvassed other areas of the statute for such an indication. Having found that Congress in SARA has now enacted clear statutory language to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity in Secs. 9601(20)(D) and 9620(a)(1), we need not address the other areas. Even if they remain inconclusive after SARA, they do not operate to nullify the clear statutory language found in other provisions. 32 For example, SARA adds a citizen suit provision to CERCLA that provides for suits against any person (including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution). 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 9659(a)(1) (West Supp.1987). While this provision expressly prevents abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity in citizen suits under CERCLA, it does not operate to nullify such abrogation in Sec. 9607 liability actions. To the contrary, its inclusion implies that CERCLA had elsewhere abrogated states' eleventh amendment immunity, but did not extend that abrogation to Sec. 9659 citizen's suits. Congress had no reason to declare the states immune from citizens' suits unless it had abrogated the states' eleventh amendment immunity elsewhere in the act. By holding that Congress abrogated the eleventh amendment for some provisions of CERCLA, we give effect to the Sec. 9659(a)(1) limitation on citizens' suits. See 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction Sec. 46.06 (4th ed. 1984 rev.) (A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.). 33 Moreover, distinguishing citizens' suits from liability actions for eleventh amendment purposes makes perfect sense in light of the differing functions of the two provisions. Section 9659 suits are designed to allow citizens, acting as private attorneys general, to bring civil actions to ensure effective implementation of CERCLA. Section 9607 suits, on the other hand, provide compensation for liability, and hence are more defined and circumscribed by actual harms already suffered. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that Congress intentionally limited the reach of citizen actions but chose not to do so for liability suits. 34 We read the applicable Supreme Court precedent to instruct us to look first at Congress' statutory language as the best indication of intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment; only in the absence of clear language are we to rely on the legislative history of an enactment. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 698 n. 31, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2577 n. 31, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). Although we need not rely on the legislative history of SARA because we find that the amendments have provided the requisite clear language, the legislative history supports our holding and would sustain it even were the statutory language less clear. 35 Originally, neither the Senate nor House version of SARA Sec. 101(b)(1) copied the waiver language of Sec. 9607(g) to abrogate state eleventh amendment immunity. However, the conference committee inserted language that replicated the federal waiver into the definition section, stating that its purpose was to clarify that if the unit of government caused or contributed to the release or threatened release in question, then such unit is subject to the provisions of CERCLA, both procedurally and substantively, as any non-governmental entity, including liability under section 107 and contribution under section 113. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185-86, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2835, 3276, 3278-79. To the extent that the added language serves to clarify CERCLA, it amounts to a subsequent declaration of congressional intent that deserves great weight. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 380-82, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801-02, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). 36 In sum, SARA contains statutory language that demonstrates the requisite unmistakable congressional intent to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity from suit, and SARA's legislative history corroborates this view. 37