Opinion ID: 1238399
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disrupting sentencing proceedings

Text: The district court imposed a two-level upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7, which relates to the disruption of governmental functions. This departure was imposed because Arhebamen not only failed to appear for sentencing in the tax-fraud case, but also misled [two physicians] about his background and circumstances and used letters from [the physicians] to manipulate proceedings before Judge Rosen and avoid being sentenced. The court stated that Arhebamen actively solicited [the two physicians'] unknowing assistance, and concluded that such manipulation and the corresponding adjournment of sentencing is an unusual aggravating circumstance that was not adequately considered by the Sentencing Guidelines. Reasoning that the conduct resulted in the significant disruption of a government function ( i.e., the timely sentencing of the Defendant), the court imposed a § 5K2.7 departure. The policy statement regarding § 5K2.7 provides that [d]eparture from the guidelines ordinarily would not be justified when the offense of conviction is an offense such as bribery or obstruction of justice; in such cases interference with a governmental function is inherent in the offense, and unless the circumstances are unusual the guidelines will reflect the appropriate punishment for such interference. Both parties agree that the underlying offense herethe failure to appear for sentencingis one in which interference with a governmental function is inherent. Id. A Guidelines departure is therefore appropriate only if the circumstances are unusual, such that the underlying Guideline does not reflect the appropriate punishment for Arhebamen's failure to appear at his July 2001 sentencing in the tax-fraud case. Id. Arhebamen argues that his alleged manipulation of the two physicians does not create unusual circumstances warranting additional punishment. He contends that obtaining an adjournment of less than a month [by obtaining a recommendation from the first physician] hardly constitutes an extraordinary or egregious disruption of the administration of justice, and that the fact that [he] enlisted the support of a report by [the second physician] did not make the delay any longer, nor did it disrupt the judicial process any further. The government argues in response that the circumstances surrounding defendant's failure to appear [were] particularly significant because they involved the unwitting involvement of third parties. In support of this argument, the government cites United States v. Heckman, 30 F.3d 738 (6th Cir.1994). That case involved a conviction for filing false documents with the IRSan inherently disruptive act. The court affirmed the application of a § 5K2.7 departure because, in addition to attempting to avoid his own tax liability, the defendant used the IRS to harass numerous persons who had the misfortune of coming into contact with him. Id. at 743. According to the government, Arhebamen's alleged harassment of the two physicians as innocent third parties makes Heckman like this case. But Arhebamen did not harass the physicians or cause them any harm or inconvenience; rather, he lied to them about the seriousness of the charges against him and his criminal background in an initially successful attempt to delay his sentencing. No case cited by the government suggests that the means employed by a defendant to interfere with a government function is material in deciding whether to apply the § 5K2.7 departure. Instead, the caselaw supports the proposition that such a departure is appropriate where the harm is greater than usual for the initial government-interfering offense, or where the defendant has interfered with a second, independent government function. See Heckman, 30 F.3d at 743; United States v. Garcia, 900 F.2d 45, 49 (5th Cir.1990) (affirming a § 5K2.7 departure for a defendant convicted of mail theft because the scale of the operation caused an unusually serious disruption of the mail); United States v. Anderson, 353 F.3d 490, 508 (6th Cir.2003) ( superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 374 (6th Cir.2004)) (affirming a § 5K2.7 upward departure from a tax-fraud sentence for the defendants' disruptive behavior at trial). In this case, Arhebamen's lies to the first physician delayed his sentence by one additional month beyond the delay that would have ensued had he simply failed to appear for his original sentencing date. No additional delay was caused by the report of the second physician. Nor does the record reflect that the physicians themselves were harmed or even inconvenienced by Arhebamen's dishonest interactions with them. In light of § 5K2.7's command that the departure not apply except in unusual circumstances, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in departing upward by two levels on the basis of a one-month delay to Arhebamen's sentencing. The underlying Guideline § 2J1.6 adequately accounts for the harm caused by Arhebamen's failure to appear at his sentencing, making the use of § 5K2.7 to add additional punishment a procedural error.