Opinion ID: 1796351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Administrative Remedy

Text: The State further claims that because the Gees failed to comment on ADEQ's corrective-action plan to remediate their property during the comment period, they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Thus, it contends that the circuit court erred in denying its summary-judgment motion on this basis where the evidence indicated that the Gees' claim was based on their dissatisfaction with ADEQ's plan for restoration. The Gees counter that this point is not preserved for this court's review, because it is an appeal from a denial of summary judgment and this court does not countenance such appeals. We disagree under the facts of this case. The State is also appealing from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the Gees which raises this same issue. For that reason, we will address the issue. On the merits, this court has held that the rule is well established that a litigant must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before instituting litigation to challenge the action of the administrative agency. See, e.g., Arkansas Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Cantrell Marine, Inc., 305 Ark. 449, 808 S.W.2d 765 (1991). In the instant case, however, the Gees sought damages against Felton Oil, the owner of the migrating fuel. While the remediation of the Gees' property before the lawsuit was filed was premised on a corrective-action plan established by ADEQ, Felton Oil was responsible for the cleanup. The Gees maintain that Felton Oil should have done more than ADEQ required, but it did not. That was the basis for the Gees' lawsuit for damages. This court has held that when a plaintiff prays for relief in litigation that is clearly not available at the administrative level, exhaustion of other available administrative remedies is not required. See Cummings v. Big Mac Mobile Homes, Inc., 335 Ark. 216, 980 S.W.2d 550 (1998). Here, the Gees prayed for damages for the cost of restoring their property beyond what ADEQ had done. [4] Such relief is not available from ADEQ. While there is statutory authority requiring a storage tank owner or operator to immediately collect and remove any release of a regulated substance, see Ark.Code Ann. § 8-7-807(a)(1) (Repl. 2000), the same authority limits the owner or operator's obligation to the existing requirements of any other applicable federal or state statutes or regulations. Ark.Code Ann. § 8-7-807(a)(2) (Repl. 2000). The State fails to point to any statutory authority that requires that the Gees should have first urged ADEQ to amend its corrective-action plan and provide more money for the remediation of their land. While the State does point to the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Smith, 844 So.2d 1145 (Miss. 2002), that case is not apposite. In Chevron , the Mississippi Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict of $2,349,275 in favor of the landowners in an oil-field contamination case. On appeal, Chevron argued that the judgment should be reversed, because the landowners unreasonably refused to allow the current operator of the field to remediate. In deciding the matter, the court noted that there already existed binding precedent which held that plaintiffs must seek restoration before the Mississippi Oil and Gas Board before a court could properly assess the appropriate measure of damages. See Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161 (Miss.1999). The Mississippi Supreme Court also cited to its case law in which it had previously held that where an administrative agency regulates certain activity, an aggrieved party must first seek relief from the agency before seeking relief in the trial courts. The court then said: Because the Smiths refused all offers of cleanup, by-passed the administrative remedy provided by the Oil and Gas Board and filed suit prior to exhausting administrative remedies, this Court must continue to adhere to Donald . Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment, and we render the judgment here dismissing the Smiths' complaint and this action without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Smiths are required to seek clean up relief before the Mississippi Oil and Gas Board. 844 So.2d at 1149. In the case before us, the Gees did not bypass any administrative remedy. They sought monetary damages for additional cleanup costs over and above the corrective-action plan approved and implemented by ADEQ. The Chevron case is not persuasive authority for these circumstances. We cannot say that the circuit court erred in denying the State's motion for summary judgment on this basis.