Opinion ID: 364210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether a violation of 18 u.s.c. s 2113(e) was proved

Text: 54 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) provides in relevant part: 55 Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense . . . kills any person . . . shall be imprisoned . . . . 56 Defendants contend that no violation of this section was proved in this case. We do not agree. 57 The government alleged that defendants kidnapped Colleen Battaglia in Carbondale to acquire her car to commit the bank robbery. The defendants then robbed the Elkville State Bank and fled to the dump in Carbondale where they murdered Colleen Battaglia. The verdict of guilty demonstrates the jury agreed with the government's view of the case. 58 We are aware, of course, that criminal statutes must be construed strictly. However, we find no ambiguity in the statute. The kidnapping and murder of Colleen Battaglia after the bank robbery 15 falls plainly within the statutory prohibition of murder in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of (the) offense. See United States v. Etheridge, 424 F.2d 951, 963 (6th Cir. 1970), Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993, 91 S.Ct. 463, 27 L.Ed.2d 442 (1971). 16 59 VIII. WHETHER IT WAS PROPER TO IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(D) AND 2113(E) 60 The question before us is whether consecutive sentences can be imposed under subsection (d) and (e) of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. Defendants contend that these subsections each prescribe a more severe punishment for the substantive offense defined elsewhere in § 2113 rather than creating separate offenses for which separate sentences may be imposed. 61 The pertinent part of subsection (d) provides: Whoever, In committing . . . Any offense defined in subsection (a) . . . assaults any person, . . . shall be fined . . . . (Emphasis added.) This language has been uniformly interpreted to increase the subsection (a) penalty for committing an assault during the course of a bank robbery and not to create a distinct offense authorizing a separate penalty. United States v. Faleafine, 492 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1974). Cf. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957). 62 The language of subsection (e), differs significantly from the language of subsection (d). Subsection (e) has three separate subparts stated in the disjunctive which, to facilitate analysis, we number in brackets: Whoever (1) in committing any offense defined in this section, (2) Or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense (3) Or in freeing himself or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such offense, kills any person . . . . (Emphasis added.) 63 Whatever the merits of arguing about the construction of § 2113(d) and (e), this circuit has long ago committed itself to the position that this § 2113(e) creates separate offenses for which separate sentences can be imposed. United States v. Parker, 283 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1960). Other circuits have reached the same result. E. g., Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied 423 U.S. 1057, 96 S.Ct. 791, 46 L.Ed.2d 647 (1976); Clark v. United States, 184 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1950). Contra, Sullivan v. United States, 485 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1973); Simunov v. United States, 162 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1947). 64 Having considered all the contentions of the defendants, the judgments as to James Earl Fleming and Henry Fleming are affirmed. The judgment as to Tommie Millender is reversed, and his cause remanded for a new trial. 65 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.