Opinion ID: 164802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficient evidence of status as a qualified individual

Text: 21 In its cross-appeal, Michelin objects to the District Court's denial of its motions for judgment as a matter of law. We review this issue de novo, applying the same standard as the District Court. Roberts v. Progressive Independence, Inc., 183 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir.1999). Under this standard, 22 [w]e must affirm if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is evidence upon which the jury could properly return a verdict for the non-movant. In conducting our review, we do not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our own conclusions for that of the jury. However, we must enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis with respect to a claim or defense under the controlling law. Id. at 1219-20 (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
23 First, Michelin challenges the jury's determination that Mr. Bartee is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. The term `qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 24 Michelin admits that Mr. Bartee is an individual with a disability. Mr. Bartee concedes that the planning position — the only job offered to him by Michelin — exceeded his physical capabilities by requiring extensive standing and walking with occasional twelve-hour shifts. Thus, the relevant issues for our analysis are: (1) whether the jury could have found, based on the evidence presented at trial, that extensive standing and walking with occasional twelve-hour shifts are not essential functions of the planning position and (2) whether Mr. Bartee could have performed all essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation. Davidson v. America Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). 25 The term essential function is defined as the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Determining whether a particular function is essential is a factual inquiry. Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1191. In conducting this inquiry, the finder of fact must give consideration to the employer's judgment regarding the functions of a job that are essential, including those functions contained in a written job description. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). However, an employer may not turn every condition of employment which it elects to adopt into a job function, let alone an essential job function, merely by including it in a job description. Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1191 (quotation omitted). 26 Mr. Bartee produced sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to conclude that neither of these conditions are essential functions or prerequisites of the planning position. Plaintiff's Exhibit 36 includes Michelin's position description for the planning job. It lists the eight major responsibilities of the [planning] position. Neither extensive walking nor twelve-hour shifts appear in these primary requirements. In fact, Dr. Troop, Mr. Bartee's treating physician, having already stated that Mr. Bartee could not fulfill a position requiring twelve-hour days and extensive walking, testified that he considers Mr. Bartee qualified to perform all of the tasks required for the planning position. Thus, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that the duration of planning shifts and the amount of walking required are not essential functions or prerequisites of the planning position. 27 As non-essential functions, the ADA required Michelin to reasonably accommodate Mr. Bartee regarding the use of a cart and the length of the workday. Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir.1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). Mr. Bartee presented evidence showing that he could have performed the movements required for the planning job if equipped with an average sized golf cart. Mr. Hill, the area personnel manager, testified that an employee could get almost anywhere in the Michelin plant by cart, although leaving the cart for short walks would be necessary to inspect equipment and interact with certain employees. Other Michelin employees testified that average-sized golf carts maneuvered and otherwise operated effectively throughout the plant. Dr. Troop stated that Mr. Bartee was physically capable of performing labor that consisted of sitting in a properly-sized cart with intermittent standing and walking. In addition, Mr. Bartee testified that he could work effectively with a cart so long as it contained sufficient leg room to relieve the pressure on his hips and allow him to operate the foot controls. 28 The evidence also shows that Mr. Bartee could have worked an eight-hour day. According to Mr. Bartee and Dr. Troop's testimony, Mr. Bartee could work for at least eight hours per day if the job consisted primarily of sitting with occasional movement. Michelin further supported this conclusion by finding him sufficiently qualified to offer him the planning position after reading his May 1999 letter and medical report. Interpreting this evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Bartee, we find that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to reasonably determine that Mr. Bartee was a qualified individual with a disability with respect to the planning position.