Opinion ID: 1773753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the family court, subsequent to an adjudication of neglect, can refuse visitation rights to a natural parent and order the department of human services to cease working with the parent thereby effectively terminating parental rights when the chancery court has denied the state's petition for termination of parental rights.

Text: ¶ 27. Appellant J.P. argues that [t]ermination, regardless of what it is called, is termination. J.P. argues that cessation of DHS services coupled with denial of visitation equates to termination of parental rights. J.P. further points out that the family court's actions were not conducted according to the governing statutes and the proof failed to meet the clear and convincing proof standard. ¶ 28. Appellee DHS argues that [t]here was sufficient evidence presented to allow the Family Court Judge to exercise his lawful authority to terminate reunification efforts by MDHS and visitation as concerns Mrs. P.... DHS further states that, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-613 (1993), J.P. retains the option to seek, herself or through the Guardian Ad Litem, modification of the family court's order, which, DHS believes, is not an order terminating parental rights. ¶ 29. Guardian Ad Litem Frank McCreary argues that the family court properly exercised its exclusive jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues. McCreary further states that the family court's order was not terminative, was a lawful exercise of the court's power, was in the children's best interests, and should be affirmed. ¶ 30. In Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003 (Miss.1983), this Court reiterated the rule that the polestar concern is that of the best interests and welfare of the child. See id. at 1005; see also In the Interest of R.D. (Linda D.), 658 So.2d 1378, 1386 (Miss.1995). The Albright Court further stated that the age of the child is one factor to be considered equally with other factors such as health, emotional ties between the child and the parent, employment of the parent, and the parent's willingness and capacity to provide primary child care. See Albright, 437 So.2d at 1005. Further, [i]n custody battles involving a natural parent and a third party, it is presumed that a child's best interest will be served by placement in the custody of his or her natural parent, as against any third party. See Sellers v. Sellers, 638 So.2d 481, 484 (Miss.1994). Also, the focus [on the child's best interests] does not change in custody matters where it is not one parent vying against the other for custody of their child, but rather, DHS seeking to retain custody of a neglected or abused child rather than have him returned to a parent. In the Interest of R.D. (Linda D.) , 658 So.2d at 1387. ¶ 31. In M.L.B., a case involving an indigent mother who sought in forma pauperis grant of the trial transcript so she could appeal the termination of her parental rights, the United States Supreme Court stated that such a case, involving the State's authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important is at stake. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116-17, 117 S.Ct. 555 (footnote omitted). Indeed, [c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as `of basic importance in our society,' rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. See id. at 116, 117 S.Ct. 555 (citations omitted). ¶ 32. As in M.L.B., the stakes for J. P., i.e., forced dissolution of her parental rights, are more substantial than mere loss of money. See id. at 121, 117 S.Ct. 555 (citations omitted). Further, [f]ew forms of state action ... are both so severe and so irreversible. See id. at 118, 117 S.Ct. 555 (citations omitted). In contrast to loss of custody, which does not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termination is `irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]' of the most fundamental family relationship. And the risk of error, Mississippi's experience shows, is considerable. See id. at 121, 117 S.Ct. 555 (citations omitted). ¶ 33. As previously stated, we are governed by 1994 law and must acknowledge that two courts-chancery and family-maintained original jurisdiction in this case. Original and exclusive jurisdiction in child neglect cases is granted to the family court under Miss.Code Ann. § 43-23-5 (1993). See also Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-151(1) (1993) (speaks of the youth court's jurisdiction; reading § 43-21-151(1) with § 43-23-5, the family court has the same jurisdiction as the youth court). Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-103 (1993) provides regarding the youth court: This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the youth court shall become a responsible, accountable and productive citizen, and that each such child shall receive such care, guidance and control, preferably in such child's own home as is conducive toward that end and is in the state's and the child's best interest. It is the public policy of this state that the parents of each child shall be primarily responsible for the care, support, education and welfare of such children; however, when it is necessary that a child be removed from the control of such child's parents, the youth court shall secure proper care for such child. See id. ¶ 34. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-603 (1993), in pertinent part, governs the proceedings. If a child is regarded as neglected, the youth court should consider factors such as the child's physical and mental conditions, the child's need of assistance, the manner in which the parent, guardian or custodian participated in, tolerated or condoned the neglect, and the ability of a child's parent, guardian or custodian to provide proper supervision and care of a child. See id. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-609 (1993) further provides alternatives the court may employ in disposing of neglect cases. See id. Of the alternatives, custody to the parents precedes assistance by child-care agencies. See id. ¶ 35. The family court's jurisdiction is despite the Mississippi Constitution, which states in Section 159 of Article 6 that the chancery court shall have full jurisdiction in ... [m]inor's business.... See id. Yet, Section 172 of Article 6 of the Mississippi Constitution states that [t]he legislature shall, from time to time, establish such other inferior courts as may be necessary, and abolish the same whenever deemed expedient. See id. In light of such, this court has held constitutional the youth court and its jurisdiction. See In the Interest of D.K.L., 652 So.2d 184, 189 (Miss.1995); DeLee v. Wilkinson County (In the Interest of D.L.D.), 606 So.2d 1125, 1127 (Miss.1992); Cortesi v. Washington County DHS (In the Interest of T.L.C.), 566 So.2d 691, 696-97 (Miss.1990). ¶ 36. Key to this termination case is the 1994 statutory language of Miss.Code Ann. § 93-15-105 (1994), which limits the filing of petitions for termination of parental rights to chancery court. See id. Section 93-15-109 requires that before the chancellor may terminate parental rights the chancellor must be satisfied by clear and convincing proof that the grounds provided in § 93-15-103(3) are met. The clear and convincing proof standard was mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Indeed, in a case where the family court ordered termination proceedings be instituted in the chancery court, this Court stated: We hold that there was no error in the trial below and in the order of the Family Court of Harrison County. The institution of proceedings to terminate parental rights would necessarily have to be initiated in the proper chancery court where appellants here would have a full opportunity to appear and defend the action and the right to be represented by competent counsel. The burden of proof in such a proceeding rests upon the agency seeking to terminate parental rights, and the evidence must be clear and convincing. In the Interest of T.T., 427 So.2d 1382, 1384 (Miss.1983) (citation omitted). ¶ 37. In determining whether the family court properly acted, we must apply the proper standard of review. In Collins v. Lowndes County Pub. Welfare Dep't, 555 So.2d 71, 72 (Miss.1989), we stated that: [w]hen a Youth Court makes an adjudication of neglect, this Court considers all the evidence before the Youth Court in the light most favorable to the State. If the evidence so considered is opposed to the finding of the Youth Court with such force that reasonable men could not have found as the Youth Court did by a preponderance of the evidence, this Court must reverse. See id. at 72 (citation omitted). Further, when visitation questions are at bar, `[a]ll that need be shown is that there is a prior decree providing for reasonable visitation rights which isn't working and that it is in the best interest of the children as fostering a positive and harmonious relationship between them and their ... parents [or DHS] to have custody provisions made specific....' See Clark v. Myrick, 523 So.2d 79, 83 (Miss.1988) ( quoting Cox v. Moulds, 490 So.2d 866, 869 (Miss.1986)). As we explained in a case heard in chancery court, evidence must be presented that the restriction is necessary to protect the children from harm before the restriction may be imposed; otherwise, imposition of such restriction is abuse of discretion. See Harrington v. Harrington, 648 So.2d 543, 545 (Miss.1994). ¶ 38. While the family court has exclusive original jurisdiction over neglect matters, this case involved two separate questions(1) custody and visitation, and (2) termination. A termination decision differs from one dealing with custody and visitation. This case began in family court. The chancery court heard the case on termination as was its exclusive right under § 93-15-105, per the statute's 1994 language. Hence, the family court's decision, admittedly `effectively terminating' J.P.'s parental rights, was beyond its power. Indeed, this Court has stated that [w]hen a decree terminating parental rights is entered, it either terminates the parental rights or it does not. Millien v. State, 408 So.2d 71, 74 (Miss.1981). ¶ 39. The facts of Millien are enlightening to the facts here. In Millien, there was an ambiguous decree terminating the mother's parental rights and then provided for visitation rights with the children. Id. There, this Court stated that such a decree does neither when it claims to terminate and yet grants visitation rights. This Court held there that such a decree has no force and effect and is set aside. Id. Here, we have an equally vague and ambiguous order which must be set aside as null and void, thereby leaving the chancellor's decree in effect. ¶ 40. The Family Court Judge appeared to be frustrated with J.P.'s failure of total commitment to her children to the extent that the judge believed she was not acting in the children's best interests. There is also convincing evidence that the judge was also frustrated about DHS's ineffective performance in handling this case. Although the Family Court Judge states in his order, dated January 26, 1998, that he, in effect, has terminated J.P.'s parental rights, there is nothing in the order that declares that her parental rights were in fact terminated. The order either terminates the parental rights or it does not. Millien at 74. There was no petition to terminate parental rights before the Family Court Judge. In fact, the Family Court initially recommended termination proceedings in the Chancery Court. Subsequently, the Family Court noted that the Chancery Court had denied DHS's attempt (at the direct order of the family court) to terminate her parental rights based on DHS's failure to carry its burden of proof. In response to the chancellor's denial, the family court subsequently claimed to effectively terminate her rights by denying custody and visitation and that is all the judge did, i.e. deny custody and visitation. ¶ 41. However, the termination of child custody and visitation rights does not, in and of itself, terminate parental rights. See Humphrey v. Pannell, 710 So.2d 392, 402 (Miss.1998)(Banks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(granting custody to one parent is not tantamount to termination of parental rights). The controlling statute contemplates that parental rights involve more than custody and visitation, as follows: After hearing all the evidence in regard to such petition, if the chancellor, family court judge or county court judge is satisfied by clear and convincing proof that the parent or parents are within the grounds requiring termination of parental rights as set forth in this chapter, then the court may terminate all the parental rights of the parent or parents regarding the child, and terminate the right of the child to inherit from such parent or parents. The termination of the parental rights of one (1) parent may be made without affecting the parental rights of the other parent, should circumstances and evidence ever so warrant. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-15-109 (Supp.1998). Parental rights therefore involve more than simply visitation and custody. ¶ 42. In this case, J.P. was required to meet three criteria-pay child support regularly for six months, visit the children weekly for six months, and continue outpatient psychotherapyset out by a courtappointed psychologist in order to keep her parental rights. The record indicates that J.P. substantially met those three criteria. However, in In Interest of R.D. (Linda D.), we held that compliance with a service agreement, in and of itself, is insufficient to warrant a finding that her children should be returned. It is simply one element of proof to be considered. 658 So.2d 1378, 1389 (Miss.1995). The polestar consideration in custody matters is the best interest of the children. Mercier v. Mercier, 717 So.2d 304, 306 (Miss. 1998). Thus, J.P.'s, compliance with all that was required of her is only one element of proof to be considered in determining the best interests of the children. The family court was therefore correct in following the procedures set out in In Interest of R.D. (Linda D.) ¶ 43. However, in viewing the entire record, it is unmistakable that DHS did a poor job of presenting its case to the chancery court, and it is no wonder that the chancellor denied the Termination of Parental Rights (TPR). While J.P. may not have performed admirably toward her children on all occasions, nevertheless, this record before us does not support the family court's decision to effectively terminate her rights by denying her custody and visitation. The family court cites an incident that occurred at the foster care review board hearing in the summer of 1996 where the children allegedly regressed. However, DHS employee Beth Ramsey testified before the family court that [i]t was a very upsetting meeting. She further testified that the children cried, clung to their mother, and wanted to go home with her. Finally, she stated that such is usually the case. In other words, such is normal behavior for children in these circumstances and hardly implies regression sufficient to justify denial of custody and visitation. ¶ 44. Not only was J.P. denied visitation and custody, but the family court's July 3, 1997, order also denied J.P. the right to work with DHS or to provide any services to her ... because of DHS's tremendous caseload. This is clear error based upon the facts presented here. Based upon the record which supports the chancellor's denial of the TPR presented by DHS, J.P. is still the children's mother by law. DHS services should be continued to J.P. She may still be able to show a material change in circumstances at a later date and attempt to regain custody or at least visitation. Regardless of its workload, DHS should be required to provide services to her as the mother of the three children. Finally, it is the obligation of the court to act in the best interests of the children, and denying DHS services to their mother without a termination of parental rights is an abuse of discretion. ¶ 45. The family court's judgment is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion, such that the rights of J.P. to receive DHS services and possibly visit her children are reinstated and a chance for reunification available as per the order of the chancery court. Hence, the family court judge, consistent with the guide of this opinion, shall follow the court expert's plan for reunification. That plan should at a minimum be given an chance to succeed. The best interests of the children demand it.