Opinion ID: 793859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Primary-Jurisdiction Doctrine

Text: 35 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows a federal court to refer issues extending beyond the `conventional expertise of judges' or `falling within the realm of administrative discretion' to the appropriate administrative agency for resolution in the first instance. Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n, Inc. v. AT & T Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222-23 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952)). Specifically, courts apply primary jurisdiction to cases involving technical and intricate questions of fact and policy that Congress has assigned to a specific agency. Id. at 223. Although there is [n]o fixed formula ... for determining whether an agency has primary jurisdiction, courts typically consider four factors in this analysis: 36 (1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within the agency's particular field of expertise; 37 (2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's discretion; 38 (3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings; and 39 (4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made. 40 Id. at 222, 223. 41 The defendants-appellants contend that the district court should have referred this case to the FCC because it raises complex questions of telecommunications policy. Of the questions raised in this case, the only issue that deserves close primary-jurisdiction analysis pertains to the interpretation of Communications Act terms. That issue, important to our discussion in Part III of the filed-rate doctrine, is whether the services offered by ACL are telecommunications services or, alternatively, information services. 42 The four primary-jurisdiction factors do not favor finding FCC primary jurisdiction over the characterization of the services provided by ACL. First, there are many precedents, including those of the FCC, on the meaning of the Communications Act terms information service and telecommunications service. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecommc'ns Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2702-10, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005); In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv. ( Universal Service Report ), 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11531, 1998 WL 166178 (1998); see generally Peter W. Huber et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 12.2, at 1077-86 (1999). The job of applying these reasonably settled definitions to the facts of this case is within the court's competence. See Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n, 46 F.3d at 223 (This record does not present any issues involving intricate interpretations ... that might need the FCC's technical or policy expertise.). Second, while the classification issue is within the FCC's discretion in the sense that the FCC is charged with administering the Communications Act, nothing about the terms invokes the FCC's discretion in the same way that more abstract statutory terms such as reasonable or public interest do. See id. (This case, however, does not involve the statutory reasonableness of the tariff or other abstract concepts. Instead, it focuses on ... a rather simple factual question ....). Third, the defendants-appellants have pointed to no danger of inconsistent rulings on the classification of their service. Fourth, to the extent that the defendants-appellants contend that LO/AD Communications, B.V.I., Ltd. v. MCI WorldCom, No. 00 Civ. 3594, 2001 WL 64741 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.24, 2001), was a prior application to the FCC on the classification issue, they are incorrect. That case concerned the abstract reasonableness standard of 47 U.S.C. § 201, not application of the descriptors that this case asks the court to apply. Id. at -. In sum, none of the four primary-jurisdiction factors weigh in favor of referring the case to the FCC on this issue. 43 The remaining issues in this case go to deceptiveness, unfairness, and common-carrier status under the FTC Act. Congress did not place the interpretation of these terms within the realm of FCC discretion, nor does the FCC have special expertise in interpreting these FTC Act terms. Although the defendants-appellants contend that [e]very other court presented with these issues has referred them to the FCC, in each of the cited cases, the claimed violation was of the Communications Act, not the FTC Act. GTE.Net LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 185 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1144 (S.D.Cal.2002); Audiotext Int'l, Ltd. v. MCI WorldCom Commc'ns, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3982, 2001 WL 1580316, at - (E.D.Pa. Dec.11, 2001); LO/AD Commc'ns, 2001 WL 64741, at . We note that the FCC filed an amicus submission stating that it had no particular interest in or expertise over the case so as to warrant declining jurisdiction. For the reasons given above, we conclude that the primary-jurisdiction doctrine does not require referring this case to the FCC.