Opinion ID: 2168023
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Estate of Woodner

Text: The Estate maintains that the trial court erred in permitting punitive damages to be awarded against the estate of Jonathan Woodner. While this is an issue of first impression for this court, the issue need not detain us long because we are persuaded by the overwhelming weight of authority, that punitive damages may not be awarded against the estate of a deceased defendant. We first look to the survival statute for guidance. At common law, all personal causes of action against a deceased person died with that person. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 396-97 (D.C.1984). The District of Columbia modified this common law rule by enacting the Survival Statute codified as D.C.Code § 12-101 which provides: On the death of a person in whose favor or against whom a right of action has accrued for any cause prior to his death, the right of action, for all such cases, survives in favor of or against the legal representative of the deceased. Although preserving certain causes of action after death, the statute says nothing about whether an award of punitive damages against the estate survives. We therefore must look for other evidence of legislative intent. An examination of the history of the survival statute and the amendments to it reveals that the imposition of punitive damages against the estate of a deceased defendant was never authorized or envisioned. [15] Rather, until the 1978 amendment, the survival statute only preserved various causes of action following one's death; damages, of course, are not a cause of action, but a form of relief and punishment. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra, 649 A.2d at 1072-73; see also Gibbs v. Investigators of D.C. Inc., 105 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 1, 3, (D.C.Super.Ct. January 3, 1977); Goodacre v. Shulmier, 64 App.D.C. 10, 73 F.2d 519 (1934). Finally, as a statute in derogation of the common law, the survival statute must be narrowly construed. Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C.1968). In the District of Columbia, the basic purposes of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence. Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901, 907 (D.C.1988). In permitting the punitive damage award to stand against the estate, the trial court reasoned that the purpose of punitive damage awards in the District of Columbia is punish the tortfeasor and to deter [the tortfeasor and] others from engaging in similar conduct (emphasis in original). The Estate convincingly argues, however, that the primary purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter the tortfeasor, and that deterrence of others is secondary. See, e.g., id. (identifying deterrence and punishment as purposes of punitive damages without mentioning deterrence of others as additional goal). The theory of justice which punishes a wrongdoer for his or her acts while avoiding punishment of innocent parties has persuaded courts and legislatures in nearly every jurisdiction deciding the issue to disallow punitive damages against estates. [16] For example, in Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1988), the Supreme Court of Florida held that punitive damages may not be imposed upon the innocent heirs or creditors of a decedent's estate because to do so would unduly punish the decedent's widow and children and creditors. The court reasoned: If deterrence is justified in this instance, it would also be justified to require a decedent's family to pay a fine or be imprisoned for the decedent's criminal conduct. With the wrongdoer dead, there is no one to punish, and to punish the innocent ignores our basic philosophy of justice. Id. at 847. In Crooker v. United States 325 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir.1963) the Eighth Circuit echoed similar public policy concerns when it noted that the purpose of criminal fines is to punish the defendant for his offense, but that there is no justice in punishing his family for his offense. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court of Alaska elected to adhere to the judicial philosophy which seeks to punish the wrongdoer and not the innocent in determining to: follow the better reasoned decision and hold that an injured party may not recover punitive damages from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor ... [because t]he central purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter him from future misconduct.... Since the deceased tortfeasor cannot be punished, the general deterrent effect becomes speculative at best, and this, in our view, falls short of furnishing a justifiable ground for an award of punitive damages against the tortfeasor's estate. Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144, 146. [17] For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that our system of liability for wrongful acts is best served by not allowing awards of punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate.