Opinion ID: 107057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: subsidiary issues.

Text: Once it is decided that the definitions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone apply, many of the subsidiary issues before us fall into place. 1. Straight Base Lines. California argues that because the Convention permits a nation to use the straight-base-line method for determining its seaward boundaries if its coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity. California is therefore free to use such boundary lines across the openings of its bays and around its islands. [34] We agree with the United States that the Convention recognizes the validity of straight base lines used by other countries, Norway for instance, and would permit the United States to use such base lines if it chose, but that California may not use such base lines to extend our international boundaries beyond their traditional international limits against the expressed opposition of the United States. The national responsibility for conducting our international relations obviously must be accommodated with the legitimate interests of the States in the territory over which they are sovereign. Thus a contraction of a State's recognized territory imposed by the Federal Government in the name of foreign policy would be highly questionable. But an extension of state sovereignty to an international area by claiming it as inland water would necessarily also extend national sovereignty, and unless the Federal Government's responsibility for questions of external sovereignty is hollow, it must have the power to prevent States from so enlarging themselves. We conclude that the choice under the Convention to use the straight-base-line method for determining inland waters claimed against other nations is one that rests with the Federal Government, and not with the individual States. California relies upon Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, for the proposition that a State may draw its boundaries as it pleases within limits recognized by the law of nations regardless of the position taken by the United States. Although some dicta in the case may be read to support that view, we do not so interpret the opinion. The case involved neither an expansion of our traditional international boundary nor opposition by the United States to the position taken by the State. 2. Twenty-four-mile Closing Rule. The Convention recognizes, and it is the present United States position, [35] that a 24-mile closing rule together with the semicircle test should be used for classifying bays in the United States. [36] Applying these tests to the segments of California's coast here in dispute, it appears that Monterey Bay is inland water and that none of the other coastal segments in dispute [37] fulfill these aspects of the Convention test. We so hold. California asserts that the Santa Barbara Channel may be considered a fictitious bay because the openings at both ends of the channel and between the islands are each less than 24 miles. [38] The United States argues that the channel is no bay at all; that it is a strait which serves as a useful route of communication between two areas of open sea and as such may not be classified as inland waters. [39] By way of analogy California directs our attention to the Breton and Chandeleur Sounds off Louisiana which the United States claims as inland waters, United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 66-67, n. 108. Each of these analogies only serves to point up the validity of the United States' argument that the Santa Barbara Channel should not be treated as a bay. The Breton Sound is a cul de sac. The Chandeleur Sound, if considered separately from the Breton Sound which it joins, leads only to the Breton Sound. Neither is used as a route of passage between two areas of open sea. In fact both are so shallow as to not be readily navigable. [40] California also points to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. That strait is not claimed by the United States as a fictitious bay and it does not connect two areas of open sea. Evidence submitted to the Special Master on the extent of international use made of the Santa Barbara Channel was sparse. What evidence there was indicated the usefulness of the route, but did not specify whether the ships so using it were domestic or international. [41] California now regards the point as important, for under international law as expressed in the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I. C. J. Rep. 4, the International Court of Justice held that a country could not claim a strait as inland water if, in its natural state, it served as a useful route for international passage. We do not consider the point of controlling importance. The United States has not in the past claimed the Santa Barbara Channel as inland water and opposes any such claim now. The channel has not been regarded as a bay either historically or geographically. In these circumstances, as with the drawing of straight base lines, we hold that if the United States does not choose to employ the concept of a fictitious bay in order to extend our international boundaries around the islands framing Santa Barbara Channel, it cannot be forced to do so by California. It is, therefore, unnecessary to reinstitute proceedings before a master to determine the factual question of whether the passageway is internationally useful. 3. Historic Inland Waters. By the terms of the Convention the 24-mile closing rule does not apply to so-called historic bays. [42] Essentially these are bays over which a coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations. [43] California claims that virtually all the waters here in dispute are historic inland waters as the term is internationally understood. It relies primarily on an interpretation of its State Constitution to the effect that the state boundaries run three miles outside the islands and bays, [44] plus several court decisions which so interpret it as applied to Monterey, Santa Monica, and San Pedro Bays. [45] The United States counters that, as with straight base lines, California can maintain no claim to historic inland waters unless the claim is endorsed by the United States. The Special Master found it unnecessary to decide that question because, on the evidence before him, he concluded that California had not traditionally exercised dominion over any of the claimed waters. Since the 24-mile rule includes Monterey Bay, we do not consider it here. As to Santa Monica Bay, San Pedro Bay, and the other water areas in dispute, we agree with the Special Master that they are not historic inland waters of the United States. California contends that two studies of the criteria for determining historic waters have been made since the Special Master filed his report [46] which show that he applied the wrong standards, thus vitiating his conclusions. In particular it is said that the Special Master erroneously thought the concept of historic waters to be an exception to the general rule of inland waters requiring a rigorous standard of proof. We find no substantial indication of this in his report. On the evidence, California's claim that its constitution set a boundary beyond the bays and islands is arguable, but many of the state statutes drawing county boundaries which supposedly run to the limit of the state boundaries cut the other way by indicating a line only three miles from shore. [47] Furthermore, a legislative declaration of jurisdiction without evidence of further active and continuous assertion of dominion over the waters is not sufficient to establish the claim. [48] There is a federal district court opinion. United States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121 (1935), which dismissed federal criminal charges for an offense which took place more than three miles from the shore of San Pedro Bay on the ground that the bay was within California, not federal, jurisdiction; but it is difficult to see this dismissal as an assertion of dominion. In Santa Monica Bay, California did successfully prosecute a criminal offense which took place more than three miles from the shore, People v. Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d 617, 96 P. 2d 941 (1939). However, the decision stands as the only assertion of criminal jurisdiction of which we have been made aware. [49] The United States disclaims that any of the disputed areas are historic inland waters. We are reluctant to hold that such a disclaimer would be decisive in all circumstances, for a case might arise in which the historic evidence was clear beyond doubt. But in the case before us, with its questionable evidence of continuous and exclusive assertions of dominion over the disputed waters, we think the disclaimer decisive. 4. Harbors and Roadsteads. The parties disagree as to whether inland waters should encompass anchorages beyond the outer harborworks of harbors. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Art. 8) states without qualification that the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast. We take that to be the line incorporated in the Submerged Lands Act. As to open roadsteads used for loading, unloading and anchoring ships, the Convention (Art. 9) provides that such areas should be included in the territorial sea, and, by implication, that they are not to be considered inland waters. We adopt that interpretation. 5. The Line of Ordinary Low Water. Along the California coast there are two low tides each day, one of which is generally lower than the other. The assertion of the United States, with which the Special Master agreed, is that the line of ordinary low water is obtained by taking the average of all the low tides. California would average only the lower low tides. We hold that California's position represents the better view of the matter. The Submerged Lands Act defines coastline in terms of the line of ordinary low water. The Convention (Art. 3) uses the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State ( i. e., the United States). We interpret the two lines thus indicated to conform, and on the official United States coastal charts of the Pacific Coast prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, it is the lower low water line which is marked. 6. Artificial Accretions. When this case was before the Special Master, the United States contended that it owned all mineral rights to lands outside inland waters which were submerged at the date California entered the Union, even though since enclosed or reclaimed by means of artificial structures. The Special Master ruled that lands so enclosed or filled belonged to California because such artificial changes were clearly recognized by international law to change the coastline. Furthermore, the Special Master recognized that the United States, through its control over navigable waters, had power to protect its interests from encroachment by unwarranted artificial structures, and that the effect of any future changes could thus be the subject of agreement between the parties. The United States now contends that whereas the Submerged Lands Act recognized and confirmed state title within all artificial as well as natural modifications to the shoreline prior to the passage of the Act, Congress meant to recognize only natural modifications after the date of the Act. The Act, however, makes no specific reference to artificial accretions, and nowhere in the legislative history did anyone focus on the question. [50] The United States points by analogy to the rule of property law that artificial fill belongs to the owner of the submerged land onto which it is deposited. Marine R. & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 47, 65. We think the situation different when a State extends its land domain by pushing back the sea; in that case its sovereignty should extend to the new land, as was generally thought to be the case prior to the 1947 California opinion. [51] The considerations which led us to reject the possibility of wholesale changes in the location of the line of inland waters caused by future changes in international law, supra, pp. 166-167, do not apply with force to the relatively slight and sporadic changes which can be brought about artificially. Arguments based on the inequity to the United States of allowing California to effect changes in the boundary between federal and state submerged lands by making future artificial changes in the coastline are met, as the Special Master pointed out, by the ability of the United States to protect itself through its power over navigable waters. With the modifications set out in this opinion we approve the recommendations of the Special Master. The parties, or either of them, may, before September 1, 1965, submit a proposed decree to carry this opinion into effect, failing which the Court will prepare and enter an appropriate decree at the next Term of Court. It is so ordered. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.