Opinion ID: 852687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grinstead's Claim of Appellate Counsel's Ineffectiveness

Text: There are three basic ways in which appellate counsel may be considered ineffective: 1) when counsel's actions deny the defendant her right of appeal; 2) when counsel fails to raise issues that should have been raised on appeal; and 3) when counsel fails to present claims adequately and effectively such that the defendant is in essentially the same position after appeal as they would be had counsel waived the issue. Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 192-195 (Ind.1997) (also noting that Indiana courts apply the two-prong Strickland test to appellate counsel's performance as well). Grinstead's counsel on direct appeal sought relief on federal double jeopardy grounds, that his sentences for conspiracy to commit theft and theft, and that his sentences for conspiracy to commit murder and murder were unconstitutional. We rejected those claims. Grinstead, 684 N.E.2d at 485-86. Grinstead now claims that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to raise a double jeopardy claim under the Indiana Constitution. (Br. Pet'r.-Appellant at 24-25.) At the time Grinstead's direct appeal was filed, this Court had not yet reached our decision in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), concerning double jeopardy under Article 1 § 14 of the Indiana Constitution. Still, even before Richardson, we [had] long adhered to a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that [were] often described as double jeopardy, but [were] not governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson.  Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002). Among those sorts of claims that we considered to constitute double jeopardy was a claim based on [c]onviction and punishment for the crime of conspiracy where the overt act that constitutes an element of the conspiracy charge is the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 56-57 (Sullivan, J., concurring) (relying on Chiesi v. State, 644 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ind.1994)); Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind.2002). These observations were based on Buie v. State, 633 N.E.2d 250, 261 (Ind.1994). Buie was decided prior to Grinstead's direct appeal, and its holding was consequently available to appellate counsel. Failure to make a double jeopardy argument based on Buie certainly falls within the category of ineffective appellate assistance claims in which counsel failed to present a claim adequately. Since the first prong of the Strickland test is satisfied in this case, we turn to the question of whether counsel's error sufficiently prejudiced Grinstead, or in other words, whether the result of the direct appeal would have been different. The State readily concedes that the conspiracy to commit theft and theft charges violate double jeopardy since the only overt act contemplated in the conspiracy charge was the theft. (Br. Appellee at 16.) Indeed, as the information filed against Grinstead states, the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit theft was to take a wallet and [its] contents from the body of Joseph R. Cross. (R. at 101.) Consequently, we hold that, in regards to the theft and conspiracy to commit theft sentences, appellate counsel's failure to raise a double jeopardy claim under Buie constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and hold that the conviction and sentence for theft should be vacated. See Buie, 633 N.E.2d at 261 (where the State has obtained a conviction for Conspiracy based on the commission of the underlying offense as the overt act, the State may not subsequently pursue a prosecution for the underlying offense.) (emphasis added). On the other hand, the charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder were not such that counsel could have made out a Buie claim. The conspiracy to commit murder charge contained three overt acts: [to] take Joseph R. Cross to a remote location, or move the body of Joseph R. Cross from the location where he was killed, or ask another person to provide an alibi. (R. at 100-01.) The murder charge stated that Grinstead did knowingly and intentionally kill another human being. (R. at 100.) The post-conviction court was thus right to say that appellate counsel was not ineffective on these grounds.