Opinion ID: 878359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Delay has Caused Actual Prejudice:

Text: The trial court also determined defendant had not been prejudiced by the delay in any significant way. The court concluded defendant had been released on his own recognizance after his first appearance in Justice Court and any anxiety and concern he had over the pending criminal charges was no greater than the anxiety and concern he was experiencing because of several pending civil cases. We cannot so view the defendant's anxiety. Anxiety over potential loss of liberty because of a criminal conviction is certainly of greater concern in the normal case than that of losing property or being forced to pay money as a result of a civil proceeding. The criminal charge was pending for over a year and at least 50% of the defendant's anxiety and concern could be attributed to the unresolved charge. However the trial court may have viewed this anxiety and concern, we view it as significant. In State v. Larson (Mont. 1981), 623 P.2d 954, 38 St.Rep. 213, we held that another factor to consider is whether the defense has been impaired. Delay is not always beneficial to the defendant and detrimental to the State. Delay of a trial may result in defense witnesses becoming unavailable or their memories fading. And one charged with a felony, even though he may not be in jail awaiting trial, may find it difficult or even impossible to maintain or find meaningful employment while the charges are pending. Here it was the State's burden to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the 396-day delay. The State has not sufficiently done so, and we therefore conclude the delay has resulted in prejudice to the defendant. The State should have been aware it was treading dangerously close to an unconstitutional delay. The most glaring neglect is from July 8, 1982 to January 12, 1983, the period between arrest and arraignment. Even assuming defendant did not contact the sheriff on his return from Spokane in July of 1982, it is nonetheless clear defendant had no duty to prosecute himself and the State had the burden to proceed in a manner that would protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The State did not do so, and the delay continued with the State giving no constitutionally acceptable explanation for the substantial delay. We reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss all charges against the defendant. HASWELL, C.J., and HARRISON, SHEEHY and GULBRANDSON, JJ., concur.