Opinion ID: 16333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Exclusion of Thomas's Confession

Text: 13 Little maintains that the trial court's exclusion of Thomas's confession violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Little's due process claim rests on two separate, but related, theories. First, Little contends that the trial court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the reliability of Thomas's confession violated due process, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), and Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979). Next, Little argues that the exclusion of the Thomas confession violated due process. Both arguments prove unavailing. 14 Little has procedurally defaulted on his first due process theory. When the ground upon which the petitioner relies for habeas relief was not exhausted in state court and state procedural rules would bar subsequent presentation of the argument, this court may not consider the claim absent cause and prejudice, neither of which exceptions is argued here. See Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir.1998); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 422-23 (5th Cir.1997). The issue of reliability of Thomas's confession was not raised at trial. Further, in state habeas proceedings, Little did not argue that the trial court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing violated due process. He asserted instead only that the exclusion of the confession amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of due process. Therefore, under Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 11.071 § 5(a), Little would not be permitted to pursue habeas relief on this theory in a successive state petition. Absent proof of cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice 3 --showings the petitioner does not make--Little is barred procedurally from pursuing his argument that the trial court should have conducted a hearing regarding the reliability of Thomas's confession. 15 Even if Little's claim regarding the alleged lack of an evidentiary hearing were not procedurally barred, Chambers and Green neither embody the constitutionally mandated hearing proposed by Little nor demand the admission of Thomas's confession. In Montana v. Egelhoff, the Supreme Court explained, 16 [T]he holding of Chambers--if one can be discerned from such a fact-intensive case--is certainly not that a defendant is denied a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations whenever critical evidence favorable to him is excluded, but rather that erroneous evidentiary rulings can, in combination, rise to the level of a due process violation. 17 518 U.S. 37, 53, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2022, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996). Indeed, even the Chambers Court placed limits on the consequences of its holding: 18 In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial. 19 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. at 1049 (emphasis added). Thus, as this court has twice recognized, Chambers and Green stand for the limited proposition that certain egregious evidentiary errors may be redressed by the due process clause. Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir.1983) (We think that Green is limited to its facts ....); see also Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88, 91 (5th Cir.1975) (recognizing factual limits on Chambers holding). 20 Even if Chambers and Green provide a rule of decision relevant to this case, that rule turns on the existence of a confession that bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 297-98, 301-02, 93 S.Ct. at 1047, 1049. Thomas's confession provided no such assurance. First, contrary to the petitioner's assertions, the state trial court did conduct a limited evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of Thomas's confession. During the course of this testimony, the court was made aware of Thomas's confinement in a mental institution following his confession, his subsequent confession to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, his denial of responsibility for the Peter murder under hypnosis, and the finding, by a jury, that Thomas was not competent to stand trial. The court also knew that the indictment of Thomas for capital murder had been dismissed on the state's motion. Moreover, aspects of Thomas's confession were inconsistent with the forensic evidence. 4 The trial court was able to observe Thomas's halting invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege and consequent refusal to testify at Little's trial. All of these factors support the trial court's hearsay exclusion of the Thomas confession 5 and critically distinguish the nature of Thomas's confession from the reliable confessions that are the linchpin of Chambers and Green.