Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel's inaction

Text: First, citing United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 655-657, 659-660, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 ( Cronic ), defendant contends that his trial counsel's inaction  specifically, his filing no documents and making no argument  at this critical stage of the trial (see Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 [recognizing right to effective assistance of counsel in first appeal as of right]; Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128, 134-137, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 [recognizing right to counsel at sentencing]) led to a total breakdown of the adversarial process, requiring reversal without consideration of prejudice. (Defendant expressly makes no claim on appeal that his counsel was ineffective within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ( Strickland ).) In Cronic, the high court stated: `The right to the effective assistance of counsel is ... the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted  even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors  the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.' ( In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017, quoting Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 656-657, 104 S.Ct. 2039, fns. omitted.) The high court gave examples of the ways in which a trial might cease to afford meaningful adversarial testing: `The Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.' ... `Apart from circumstances of that magnitude, however, there is generally no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt.' ( In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 727, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017, quoting Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659, fns. 25, 26, 104 S.Ct. 2039, italics omitted.) In Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 ( Cone ), the high court emphasized the narrowness of its holding in Cronic. When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's failure must be complete.  ( Id. at pp. 696-697, 122 S.Ct. 1843, italics added.) In mounting a guilt phase defense of insanity, defense counsel in Cone presented psychological and neuropharmacological evidence of the defendant's substance abuse and posttraumatic stress related to his military service in Vietnam, as well as testimony by the defendant's mother and evidence of remorse. During the sentencing hearing that followed the jury's verdict of guilty, defense counsel called the jurors' attention to the mitigating evidence they had heard in the earlier phase of trial and asked them to exercise mercy. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's proffer of photographs of the victims' decomposing bodies and, after the junior prosecuting attorney gave a low-key summation, waived closing argument, thereby foreclosing the lead prosecutor, who by all accounts was a highly effective advocate, from offering rebuttal. The high court rejected Cone's claim that his counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case to adversarial testing within the meaning of Cronic, reasoning that the claim was not that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points. For purposes of distinguishing between the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, this difference is not of degree but of kind. ( Id. at p. 697, 122 S.Ct. 1843.) This case is similar to Cone. After presenting a penalty phase defense of current mental illness via the testimony of Dr. Wilkinson and arguing his case to the jury, counsel appeared at the hearing on the automatic motion to modify and noted he had reviewed the prosecutor's proposed ruling and had nothing to add. After the trial court read its decision into the record, counsel reminded the court that he had asked it to defer reading the probation report until after ruling on the automatic application. The trial court responded that it had done so. Before the court recessed to consider the report, defense counsel pointed out a factual error in it. These circumstances, which show that defense counsel was present at and actively participating in the penalty trial as a whole, including the evidentiary portion and argument to the jury, do not reach the magnitude of those in which courts have concluded Cronic required reversal without a showing of prejudice. In particular, this is not a case like People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 365, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 580, 48 P.3d 1136, a pre- Cronic decision in which we reversed a conviction after the defendant's counsel expressly refused to participate in the trial beyond appearing in the courtroom, and remained mute throughout the proceedings. In ruling on the automatic application, the trial court is limited to the evidence that was before the jury; thus, trial counsel was not at liberty to present new evidence and clearly cannot be faulted for not doing so. (§ 190.4, subd. (e); People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 196, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) Defendant's central complaint is that counsel did not argue to the trial court, orally or in writing, for reduction of his sentence. But during his penalty phase summation counsel had argued for a verdict of life imprisonment without possibility of parole based on the evidence he had presented during that phase of trial. That counsel did not repeat himself in the proceedings on the automatic application was not the equivalent of his being absent or failing to subject the prosecution's case to adversarial testing during the sentencing phase of trial. That counsel chose not to present argument at the hearing on the automatic application, moreover, meant that the prosecutor likewise would not enjoy another opportunity to urge the court to confirm the death sentence. The authorities on which defendant relies, all of which predate Cone, supra, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914, are distinguishable on their facts: In Tucker v. Day (5th Cir.1992) 969 F.2d 155, 159, counsel at a noncapital resentencing hearing did not consult with the defendant, had no knowledge of the facts, and acted as a mere spectator of whose presence the defendant was unaware. In Patrasso v. Nelson (7th Cir.1997) 121 F.3d 297, 304-305, counsel in a noncapital case performed no investigation before sentencing and made no effort to obtain a mitigated punishment. As noted, the facts of this case are distinguishable. Our conclusion that the rule in Cronic does not apply here should not be read as an endorsement of defense counsel's performance in connection with the hearing on the automatic application to modify the verdict. Cases in which counsel at such hearings appropriately choose to forgo arguing that their client's life be spared should be rare indeed. As noted, this appeal affords us no occasion to comment on the adequacy of counsel's representation within the meaning of Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at page 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Resolution of any claim predicated on Strickland must await collateral proceedings.