Opinion ID: 1562529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Allegations of prior sexual misconduct involving Lisa

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Lisa to testify concerning her allegations that defendant had engaged in uncharged sexual misconduct against her; defendant contends that Rule 404(b) was thereby violated. Although, at the conclusion of the pre-trial voir dire of Lisa, defense counsel objected to the prosecution's proposed use at trial of Lisa's testimony concerning alleged uncharged sexual misconduct, he did not raise that objection when she testified at trial. In most instances, a trial court's preliminary granting or denial of a motion in limine need not be taken as a final determination of the admissibility of the evidence referred to in the motion. State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1220 (R.I.2002) (quoting State v. Fernandes, 526 A.2d 495, 500 (R.I.1987)); see also State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1162 (R.I.2006); Gomes, 881 A.2d at 108 ([E]xcept when the in limine ruling is clearly definitive, it would at the very least be prudent for counsel to articulate the objection once again in the vital context of the trial itself.). [20] It is not at all clear to us from the record in this case that the in limine ruling at issue was clearly definitive.  However, we need not and do not pass upon that issue. We choose not to decide the preservation issue in this instance because defendant's substantive Rule 404(b) argument is unpersuasive even if it was properly preserved. Questions as to the admissibility of evidence vel non are confided to the sound discretion of the trial justice; this Court will not interfere with a trial justice's decision in that domain unless we perceive a clear abuse of discretion and the evidence was both prejudicial and irrelevant. Breen, 767 A.2d at 58 (The decision on whether evidence of other crimes is relevant to a permissible purpose is left to the sound discretion of the trial justice, and on appeal we shall only disturb his or her decision when it constitutes an abuse of discretion    and the evidence was both prejudicial and irrelevant.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mohapatra, 880 A.2d at 805. Additionally, when someone other than the complaining witness testifies about alleged prior sexual misconduct, these offenses must be nonremote and similari.e., they must be closely related in time, place, age, family relationships of the victims, and the form of the sexual acts. Pignolet, 465 A.2d at 181; see also Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533. Finally, when such evidence is admitted, the trial justice must instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence may be considered. Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 185. [21] In determining whether Lisa's testimony alleging uncharged sexual misconduct by defendant against her fell within an exception to the exclusionary provisions of Rule 404(b), the trial justice pointed to the following factors: both Betsy and Lisa had alleged digital penetration; the age ranges of both girls at the time of the alleged abuse were similar (both being young girls above toddler age and below adolescence); both had a family relationship with defendant; [22] and both had had unsupervised contact with defendant in his Cranston residence. In her ruling, the trial justice found that the evidence was relevant to show motive, intent, plan to abuse children of a similar age in somewhat similar manner   . In addition, cognizant of the requirement that the proffered evidence be reasonably necessary, [23] the trial justice determined that Lisa's testimony was necessary to explain why Betsy disclosed the abuse allegations when she did and to explain the process and events leading up to her disclosure. See Hopkins, 698 A.2d at 186. Additionally, engaging in the weighing process that Rule 403 requires, the trial justice found that the probative value of the evidence (for the purposes of establishing common scheme or plan, motive, and intent) was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect so long as the jury was given an appropriate cautionary instruction. We perceive no basis for ruling that the trial justice clearly erred in making that determination. Taking into account all of the foregoing considerations, it is our judgment that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting, pursuant to one of the exceptions to Rule 404(b), Lisa's testimony alleging that defendant had engaged in uncharged sexual misconduct against her. In so ruling, we specifically note that appropriate limiting instructions were given. See note 21, supra. C