Opinion ID: 492347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: FLPMA Sec. 206(a)

Text: 28 As noted above, Sec. 206(a) of FLPMA authorizes the Secretary to dispose of a [t]ract of public land or interests therein ... by exchange. ... 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1716(a). In assessing the public interest, the Secretary mustgive full consideration to better Federal land management and the needs of State and local people, including needs for lands for the economy, community expansion, recreation areas, food, fiber, minerals, and fish and wildlife. 29 Id. Plaintiffs argue that the public-interest standard requires the Secretary to consider the significant competitive issues associated with this exchange. Brief for Appellants at 35.
30 We have no doubt that plaintiffs' competitive threat allegations are sufficient to meet constitutional standing requirements. See, e.g., Clarke, 107 S.Ct. at 754; Glass Packaging Institute v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (D.C.Cir.1984). Thus we turn directly to their prudential standing under the APA, and the zone of interests inquiry in particular. 31 The Supreme Court has recently explained the zone of interests test in the context of judicial review under the APA. 7 The Court stated: 32 The zone of interest test is a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency decision.... The test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff. 33 Clarke, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (footnotes and citations omitted; emphasis added). The Court amplified the emphasized clause in a footnote, explaining that in Data Processing, supra, it had been sufficient that the general policy implicit in the National Bank Act and the Bank Service Corporation Act was 'apparent' and that 'those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable.'  Id. at 757 n. 14. 34 In determining whether plaintiffs' claim passes the zone of interests test, we are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress' overall purposes.... Clarke, 107 S.Ct. at 758. In this case, it seems profitable to look beyond FLPMA, to flesh out the meaning of the term public interest and its application to the coal industry. As we noted earlier, Congress has expressed apprehension, and responded with legislation to prevent, coal-owning railroads from discriminating in transportation against competing coal mines. See 30 U.S.C. Sec. 202; NIPSCO, 799 F.2d at 271. Similarly, Congress prohibited interstate railroads from transporting commodities produced or mined under their control. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10746 (commodities clause). 35 In FLPMA itself, Congress incorporated by reference its prior pronouncement that it was the 36 continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to foster and encourage private enterprise in ... the development of economically sound and stable domestic mining ... [and] minerals industries, [and in] the orderly and economic development of domestic mineral resources ... [and] reserves of ... minerals to help assure satisfaction of industrial, security and environmental needs.... 37 30 U.S.C. Sec. 21a (emphasis added). 8 Whether or not Congress intended the Secretary specifically to consider the effects of each proposed exchange on competition (as plaintiffs claim), this language would suffice to bring the fostering of competition at least arguably within the zone of interests that FLPMA sought to protect. Competition can be expected to help satisfy industrial and security needs and move the economy toward efficiency, satisfying industrial needs at the lowest cost in resources; efficient competitive production should in turn enhance security by improving the competitive position of domestic firms in international markets. While this may be said of any mineral product, its importance is unusually obvious for a vital energy source such as coal. Cf. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 21a (defining minerals to include coal). Procompetitive interests thus fall within the protected zone. Plaintiffs, of course, can come within the zone of interests at least arguably protected by the FLPMA, without any indication of congressional purpose to benefit them. Clarke, 107 S.Ct. at 757. 9 38 The Department of Justice is required to report annually to Congress on the state of competition in the coal industry, 30 U.S.C. Sec. 208-2, and its 1980 report sheds light on the relevant concerns. 10 In substantial part, that report is devoted to the potential competitive problems associated with leasing coal to railroads and their affiliates. This report followed up on information in a 1978 Justice Department report to Congress in which the possibility was discussed that the leasing of federal coal to railroads--indeed any participation in the coal industry by railroads--would have an anticompetitive effect. 1980 Report, at 62; J.A. 348. The Justice Department noted that under certain conditions, if 39 the railroad were to acquire an interest in the coal industry, it would then find it profitable to restrict the amount of coal transported. By doing so it would drive up the price of coal, and in this case, it would share in the increased coal profits. 40 Id. at 63; J.A. 349. In the coal industry, procompetitive interests include not only competition among coal companies, but also competition between and among coal companies and the railroads that carry their production to market. 41 Plaintiffs' complaint alleges, among other things, that the Secretary of Interior failed to consider whether defendant [Rocky Mountain Energy's] acquisition in fee of the Corral Canyon coal ... would expand defendants RME's and [Union Pacific] Railroad's ability to discriminate against competing plaintiff, non-railroad coal producers in setting rates and making hopper-car allocations. J.A. 27. Plaintiffs' comments filed to the proposed exchange, and incorporated as an exhibit to the complaint, describe the feared scenario further: 42 The non-railroad producer would be subjected to the possibility that its rail carrier would:(a) Use the contract service mechanism to favor coal produced by railroad entities over non-railroad produced coal. 43 (b) Refuse expansion of tract capacity to serve areas where non-railroad companies were producing in competition with railroad coal; or 44 (c) Decrease or make unsure the transportation of non-railroad coal to markets. 45 J.A. 73-74. The 1980 Report confirms that under certain circumstances, a railroad could find it profitable to engage in such anticompetitive behavior. See 1980 Report, at 35-36, 63-65; J.A. 322-23, 349-51. 46 Plaintiffs have alleged that, because of the monopoly position of defendant Union Pacific Railroad in the Green River-Hams Fork region where Corral Canyon is located, J.A. 24, and because of relative importance of the Union Pacific Railroad in the national transportation system, id., the fee exchange will enhance its ability to injure plaintiffs. 11 They do not seek from this court, however, a determination of whether the Union Pacific Railroad could or would engage in such anticompetitive activity. 12 The thrust of plaintiffs' FLMPA complaint is that the requirement of Sec. 206, that the public interest ... be well served, including the consideration of competitive impacts, was ignored. Whether in fact the Corral Canyon fee exchange was contrary to the public interest is a question for the merits. 13 But in our view plaintiffs are entitled to raise that question. 14 B. Merits 47 In this case, having concluded that competitive concerns are at least arguably within the zone of interests of FLPMA, we need not decide whether in fact, Sec. 206's public interest concerns require that the Secretary consider the competitive impact of each coal land exchange. The District Court concluded that competitive concerns had been sufficiently considered, and we do not disturb that finding, see infra. The Department of the Interior has announced that it will henceforth consider possible antitrust consequences of coal land exchanges, see 51 Fed.Reg. 12609 (1986); 43 C.F.R. subpart 2203. The question of whether the statute requires consideration of competitive effects can await another day. 48 The District Court explicitly rejected plaintiffs' claim that the Secretary had failed to ensure that the coal land exchange be in the public interest, by neglecting to give due consideration to the potential anticompetitive effects of the transaction: 49 It is clear that here the Secretary did, in fact, proceed to consider the potential anticompetitive effect of the Corral Canyon exchange, and he properly found that it was not significant enough to preclude a determination that the exchange was in the public interest. 50 617 F.Supp. 584, 591-92 (D.D.C.1985). Examination of the record confirms that the Secretary indeed addressed plaintiffs' objection that the exchange would have adverse competitive impacts on the coal industry. Bureau of Land Management Decision of June 2, 1983, at 3; J.A. 213. 51 The Department of the Interior, through the Wyoming office of the Bureau of Land Management, explained that the coal land exchange was essentially de minimis in character: The Corral Canyon coal represents less than 3% of the federal coal disposed of through lease sale in Wyoming alone in FY 1982. Id. at 4; J.A. 214. They further explained that Sec. 206 exchanges were considered on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, and that the Teton exchange had been proposed to accomplish an important public interest objective. Id. See also 617 F.Supp. at 591 (When viewed through a practical prism, nothing could be more in the public interest: Princeton and its sister institutions receive capital for their educational or health-providing ventures; parkland in the Grand Teton will remain unspoiled; and a private energy company receives land outside the national parks for commercial mining.). 52 The Secretary's public interest determination is one involving a variety of factors, the relative weights of which are left in his discretion. We will not second-guess his conclusion that the Teton exchange, even after considering potential anticompetitive effects, was in the public interest. 53 Accordingly, the decision of the District Court is 54 Affirmed.