Opinion ID: 798533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Incident to Service Test to Claims Brought by Civilians

Text: The question we must decide here is whether the Feres doctrine's incident to service test bars Mr. Newton's claim despite his civilian status. Mr. Newton argues that because he was not a service member at the time of his alleged injuries, the Feres doctrine does not apply. [13] The rationales underlying the Feres doctrine have shifted over time, but the importance of the military disciplinary structure ... has been labeled the `best expla[nation]' for Feres.  Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299, 103 S.Ct. 2362) (second alteration in original). Suits brought by service members against the Government for service-related injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691, 107 S.Ct. 2063, 95 L.Ed.2d 648 (1987). In light of the nature of military life,  Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by service members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are barred by the Feres doctrine because they are the ` type[s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.' Id. at 690, 107 S.Ct. 2063 (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985)) (alteration in original). Relatedly, separation of powers concerns that the judiciary should not delve into the internal affairs of the military counsel in favor of the intramilitary immunity doctrine. Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1129. The Feres doctrine prevents courts from second-guessing military decision-making and interfering in matters reserved for the political branches of government. Id.; see also Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683, 107 S.Ct. 3054; Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691, 107 S.Ct. 2063; Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57, 105 S.Ct. 3039; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301-02, 103 S.Ct. 2362. There is no bright-line rule for determining if the Feres doctrine applies to a given case. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57, 105 S.Ct. 3039. In applying the incident to service test, however, we do not delve into how each case would implicate issues of military decision-making. The Supreme Court in Stanley explicitly rejected a `special factors' analysis which would consider how military discipline would actually be affected in a particular case. Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1130 (discussing Stanley, 483 U.S. at 681, 107 S.Ct. 3054). The Court explained: A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would call into question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters. Whether a case implicates those concerns would often be problematic, raising the prospect of compelled depositions and trial testimony by military officers concerning the details of their military commands.... The incident to service test, by contrast, provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned with less extensive inquiry into military matters. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682-83, 107 S.Ct. 3054 (emphasis added). Thus, following the Court's guidance, in evaluating whether Mr. Newton's ATCS certificate due process claim is barred by the Feres doctrine, we do not speculate or inquire how his particular suit would intrude upon military matters or force us to second-guess military decisions. Instead, we ask whether his suit arises from injuries incident to his military service. See id.; see also Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1130-31. In applying the incident to service test, an individual's military status quite obviously plays a role in the inquiry. See Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.2000) (listing the duty status of the plaintiff when the negligent act occurred as among the factors to consider when applying Feres ); Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1132 ([A] person's military status may affect the applicability of the Feres doctrine.). As we have previously noted, the Supreme Court has broadened Feres, to the point where it now `encompass[es], at a minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that are even remotely related to the individual's status as a member of the military. ' Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1223-24 (quoting Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 296 n. 7 (9th Cir.1991)) (alteration in original) (additional emphasis added). The incident to service test has been interpreted to encompass even those injuries that are attenuated from the servicemember's duty status. Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1128. An individual's military status will not necessarily be determinative of whether Feres applies, however. Nothing in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence ... suggests that a person's complete discharge creates a per se rule that Feres is inapplicable. Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1132. For example, in Ricks we applied Feres to bar the claims of a former airman for injuries he allegedly incurred while held in a military prison. See id. at 1126. Although Mr. Ricks had been fully discharged from the Air Force at the time of his alleged injuries, we nevertheless held his claims were incident to his military service. We explained that a complete discharge from the military does not automatically transform a servicemember into a civilian for purposes of Feres analysis. Id. at 1131. Instead, [t]he paramount inquiry is whether the alleged constitutional violations are incident to the plaintiff's military service. Id. [I]f a servicemember's claims are incident to service, it is immaterial whether the plaintiff has been fully discharged from the military. Id. at 1133. Despite having been discharged, Mr. Ricks' injuries were incident to military service because he was a military prisoner at a prison which confined no civilians and was operated by military personnel, he was incarcerated for offenses committed during active duty, and he continued to be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See id. at 1132. He would not have been in the military prison but for his military service. Consequently, his incarceration at the military prison and the alleged injuries sustained during incarceration stemmed from his military relationship such that [his claims were] incident to his military service. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Other circuits have extended Feres to bar claims brought by certain nominally civilian employees of the military. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held Feres barred a suit brought by a retired naval officer working as a Junior ROTC instructor. See Norris v. Lehman, 845 F.2d 283, 287 (11th Cir.1988). The instructors were required to be on active duty or, if retired, have served in the armed services on active duty for at least 20 years. Id. at 285. The court held that although the plaintiff in Norris was nominally a civilian, his position as an instructor was in its very essence military in nature. Id. at 287. Thus, any injury he suffered arose out of or was in the course of activity incident to service. Id. Similarly, some circuits have applied Feres to bar claims brought by dual-status National Guard Technicians. See, e.g., Wetherill v. Geren, 616 F.3d 789, 798 (8th Cir.2010); Walch v. Adjutant Gen.'s Dep't of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 297 (5th Cir.2008); Overton v. N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 373 F.3d 83, 91-96 (2d Cir.2004); Fisher v. Peters, 249 F.3d 433, 443 (6th Cir.2001); Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 589-91 (1st Cir.1993); Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395, 400 (9th Cir.1988). Although National Guard Technicians are civilian employees of the military, they are required to enlist in the National Guard as a condition of their civilian employment. See 32 U.S.C. § 709; Stauber, 837 F.2d at 396. As an illustrative example, the Second Circuit explained that the Feres doctrine could apply to suits brought by Guard Technicians because of the military characteristic of their work and the difficulty of attempting to disentangle a plaintiff's civilian and military duties when determining if a suit is incident to service. Overton, 373 F.3d at 92. Notably, in all of these cases military service was a prerequisite for the plaintiffs' civilian employment. But we have not found any cases from the Courts of Appeals that have extended Feres to bar the claims of an individual like Mr. Newton: a civilian employee of the military who was not required to have any military service for the position. The Fifth Circuit encountered similar facts in Meister v. Texas Adjutant General's Department, 233 F.3d 332 (5th Cir.2000). There, the plaintiff was a full-time civilian employee of the Texas National Guard, id. at 334, and she also happened to be a non-commissioned officer in the Texas Air National Guard, id. at 338 n. 4. The suit alleged several Title VII violations arising from her civilian employment. Id. at 334. The court noted that the plaintiff's enlistment in the Texas Air National Guard was irrelevant because she was not required to enlist for her employment. Id. at 338 n. 4. It also observed that the plaintiff was employed in a civilian capacity, was not subject to military discipline or the military hierarchy, and could quit whenever she wanted. Id. at 338. For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit held Feres was inapplicable. Id. The Supreme Court has never suggested that Feres applies to suits brought by civilian employees of the military. Instead, the Court has consistently cabined the doctrine to reach only injuries to service members. See, e.g., Johnson, 481 U.S. at 687-88, 107 S.Ct. 2063 ([T]he Feres doctrine has been applied consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Government based upon service-related injuries. (emphasis added)); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (We hold that enlisted personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations. (emphasis added)). Indeed, the Court has even characterized the Feres doctrine as failing to reach claims by civilians. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988), the Court considered when a contractor providing military equipment to the federal government could be held liable for injury caused by a design defect. Although the Court considered extending the Feres doctrine to bar such claims, it concluded the doctrine was in some respects too broad and in some respects too narrow to address a contractor's liability. Id. at 510, 108 S.Ct. 2510. The Court explained that the Feres doctrine was too narrow because it covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by the military to civilians. Id. The district court and defendants both rely on Presley v. Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, 94 F.Supp.2d 755 (S.D.Miss.2000), to support applying Feres to purely civilian employees of the military. In Presley, the district court held that although the plaintiff, a civilian firefighter for the state Air National Guard, was not actually an enlisted member of the military, the Feres doctrine barred the suit. Id. at 761. The court reasoned that his position was of a decidedly military nature and his claimed injury indisputably arose incident to his service to the military. Id. We respectfully disagree with the reasoning in Presley. The incident to service test asks whether injuries are incident to a service member's service in the military, not whether injuries are incident to an individual's service to the military. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305, 103 S.Ct. 2362 ( [E]nlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations (emphasis added)); Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1131 (The paramount inquiry is whether the alleged constitutional violations are incident to the plaintiff's military service.  (emphasis added)). In applying the incident to service test, we must not conflate a civilian's employment by the military with an enlisted person's service in the military. The Court has repeatedly noted that civilian life and military life are necessarily different, and the relationship between an enlisted person and the military is distinct from anything in civilian life. In every respect the military is ... `a specialized society.' Johnson, 481 U.S. at 690-91, 107 S.Ct. 2063 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)). In the civilian life of a democracy many command few; in the military, however, this is reversed, for military necessity makes demands on its personnel without counterpart in civilian life. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (internal quotation marks omitted). And because no military organization can function without strict discipline that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting, the military has developed a hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in its application to the military establishment and wholly different from civilian patterns. Id. We therefore must adhere to the line drawn in [ Feres ] between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the course of military duty. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954). We are persuaded by this fundamental distinction between military life and civilian life that Mr. Newton's suit cannot be barred by the Feres doctrine. Injuries cannot arise incident to service if a plaintiff's claims are wholly unrelated to his current or former military service. Mr. Newton retired from the UANG more than a year before his ATCS certificate was withdrawn, so he was a civilian employee when his injuries arose. Furthermore, unlike the plaintiff in Ricks, 295 F.3d at 1132, or dual-status National Guard employees, Mr. Newton's injuries did not stem from his military relationship with the UANG. His position as Air Traffic Control Supervisor was a civilian position that did not require current or prior military service. Mr. Newton's ATCS certificate was originally issued by the FAAa civilian government agencybefore he enlisted in the UANG. His prior National Guard service had nothing to do with his alleged injuries, except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has already transpired. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949). Simply put, although Mr. Newton was employed by, and formerly a member of, the UANG, he was a civilian employee whose alleged injuries were not in any way incident to his military service. The military status of defendants does not change our analysis. The Supreme Court has never suggested that the military status of the alleged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine .... Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Government based upon service-related injuries. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686-88, 107 S.Ct. 2063. Defendants argue that this case must be barred by the Feres doctrine because although Mr. Newton was a civilian employee, he played an integral role in military activities, his supervisors were in a military chain of command, and his claims call into question basic choices about military discipline, supervision, and control. Aplt. Br. on Cross-Appeal at 18. All of this may be true, but we must follow the Supreme Court's instruction not to examine the extent to which particular suits would call into question military discipline and decisionmaking. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682, 107 S.Ct. 3054. As the Supreme Court has observed, judges are not given the task of running the Army. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953). The complex subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). Intramilitary immunity may help ensure effective military operations, but we leave it to the elected branches of government and to the military to decide which employment positions within the armed forces should be held by civilians, rather than enlisted personnel. Significantly, the UANG employed Mr. Newton as a civilian and did not require military service as a prerequisite for the position. It is not our job to question whether this was appropriate. Mr. Newton was a purely civilian employee of the military whose alleged injuries were unrelated to his prior military service. The Feres doctrine does not apply.