Opinion ID: 2334867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Identical reciprocal discipline is imposed in reciprocal cases, unless the respondent demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the five exceptions set forth in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c) applies. [5] D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(f); In re Zilberberg, 612 A.2d 832, 834 (D.C. 1992). But when a respondent does not contest reciprocal discipline, the Board's function is limited to reviewing the foreign proceeding sufficiently to satisfy itself that no obvious miscarriage of justice would result in the imposition of identical discipline. . . . In re Childress, 811 A.2d 805, 807 (D.C.2002) (quoting In re Spann, 711 A.2d 1262, 1265 (D.C.1998)). See also In re Cole, 809 A.2d 1226, 1227 n. 3 (D.C. 2002) (per curiam) (when respondent does not object, imposition of identical discipline should be close to automatic, with minimum review by both the Board and this court). The Arizona proceedings accorded Respondent due process. Respondent entered a formal Agreement for Discipline by Consent, and the violations found by the Hearing Officer were consistent with the conditional admissions he made in support of that agreement. The record thus reveals no infirmity of proof. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(2). Nothing in the record suggests that the Court's imposition of the same discipline as that imposed in Arizona would result in grave injustice, and the record contains no evidence that the conduct for which he was disciplined does not constitute misconduct in the District of Columbia. D.C. Bar R. XI, §§ 11(c)(3) and (5). Bar Counsel, however, contends that the repeated nature of the conduct coupled with Respondent's awareness of the financial mismanagement indicates that his actions were at least reckless, and as such they warrant[] substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia. Statement of Bar Counsel, p. 3; D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(4). In support of its contention, Bar Counsel advances the proposition that a long line of established precedent demonstrates that Respondent's intentional or reckless misappropriation would result in disbarment in the District of Columbia. Statement of Bar Counsel, p. 4 (emphasis added); see also id. at 5-6. Respondent's misappropriations, however, were not found in the Arizona disciplinary proceeding to have been either intentional or reckless. The Arizona State Bar conditionally admitted, with respect to every investigative file showing that Respondent misappropriated funds in his trust account, that it could not prove a violation of [the rule against misconduct involving dishonesty] due to a lack of clear and convincing evidence Respondent had the requisite intentional state of mind. Arizona Report ¶ 158. That concession explicitly ruled out any finding of intentional misappropriation in the Arizona proceeding. It also renders it unlikely that the Arizona Hearing Officer deemed Respondent's misappropriations reckless. Those misappropriations occurred over a period beginning in August 2001 and continuing until mid-2004  more than two and a half years. See Arizona Report ¶¶ 40-47, 123-26. If the Arizona State Bar had shared Bar Counsel's view that Respondent's repetitive conduct was clear and convincing evidence that he was reckless  and therefore conscious of the serious risk of loss that his withdrawals created  it would hardly have conceded, as it did, that at no time in that two-and-a-half-year period were Respondent's misappropriations intentional. The Arizona Hearing Officer, on the record before her, made no finding that Respondent's misappropriations were intentional or reckless. Her failure to so find is consistent with the Arizona State Bar's conditional admissions  and could have been based upon evidence of emotional and medical circumstances that was sealed in the Arizona hearing and not made part of the record in this reciprocal matter. It may well be the case that, were Bar Counsel to initiate an original disciplinary proceeding against Respondent in the District of Columbia and rely upon the same record that the Arizona Hearing Officer had before her, a hearing committee might find intentionality or recklessness in Respondent's lengthy period of repetitive behavior. But the Court has made clear that, unless the exceptions in D.C. Bar R. XI, §§ 11(c)(1), (2) or (5), are applicable (and none applies in this matter), reciprocal discipline is not to be based upon an independent evaluation of the evidence to find violations that the disciplining court did not find. In In re Belli, 766 A.2d 526, 527 (D.C.2001) (per curiam), the Court held that both D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 and notions of comity dictate that we give deference to the assessment of an attorney's conduct and the measure of discipline imposed by the other jurisdiction. See also In re Pennington & Wiggins, 921 A.2d 135, 142 (D.C.2007). In this matter, the highest court in Arizona imposed a disciplinary sanction that was agreed to by both the Arizona State Bar and Respondent and was approved by an Arizona Hearing Officer after a full hearing and a careful examination of the evidence. Bar Counsel concedes that no reason exists in this matter to invoke the exceptions in D.C. Bar R. XI, §§ 11(c)(1), (2) or (5), but would nonetheless have us rely upon an incomplete Arizona record, of which an ostensibly pertinent portion has been sealed in Arizona for reasons of confidentiality, to find that Respondent's misappropriations were intentional or reckless and therefore warrant a substantially different sanction than the Arizona Court deemed suitable. A finding of that nature would fail to give effect to the Arizona Hearing Officer's failure to make any such finding and would fly in the face of the Arizona State Bar's concession that it could not support a finding of intentionality. Mindful of the deference due the original disciplining court in our own reciprocal proceeding and of the Court's holding in Zilberberg, 612 A.2d at 835, that in a reciprocal proceeding, when a greater sanction is sought in the District of Columbia, the record must affirmatively show that a greater sanction is warranted, we decline to adopt Bar Counsel's proposal that Respondent be disbarred. With regard to the other conditions in the Arizona disciplinary order, we recommend the approach taken in In re Winick, Bar Docket No. 308-02, et al. (BPR May 12, 2004), recommendation adopted, 866 A.2d 51 (D.C.2005) (per curiam). Before us in that case was a Florida disciplinary order that imposed post-reinstatement probation, a disciplinary sanction that we pointed out [o]ur system has, at least until now, not imposed. Winick at 11. We noted that, as a practical matter, it would be difficult for our jurisdiction to monitor the progress of Respondent's post-reinstatement probation in Florida on an ongoing basis. Id.; but see In re Pinckney, 759 A.2d 1069, 1070 & 1072-73 (D.C.2000) (per curiam) (Court adopted Board recommendation in reciprocal case from a neighboring jurisdiction (Maryland) that a practice monitor be ordered to the same extent required by the Maryland court). In addition, because Respondent should not be subject to a double requirement of restitution, we did not recommend in Winick a separate restitution in the Court's reciprocal discipline order, but concluded that Respondent's efforts to comply with the restitution requirement imposed by Florida shall be a proper subject of inquiry at any fitness hearing in this jurisdiction. Winick at 11. On review, the Court confined its sanction in Winick to a suspension with [r]einstatement . . . conditioned on [Respondent's] demonstrating fitness to practice law. In re Winick, 866 A.2d at 54. Because this matter, like Winick, involves a distant disciplining jurisdiction, we see no reason to recommend a departure from the Winick precedent in this matter.