Opinion ID: 759767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the statutory exhaustion requirement

Text: 11 Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e requires that a state prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The applicable version of § 1997e provides: 12 No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 13 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (Supp.1998). That provision plainly requires that administrative remedies be exhausted before the filing of a § 1983 suit, rather than while the action is pending. 14 Section 1997e was substantially amended by passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub.L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321, which took effect April 26, 1996. Prior to passage of the PLRA, § 1997e provided only that a federal district court had the discretion to require exhaustion when such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of justice. The pre-PLRA version of § 1997e limited that discretion by including requirements that the available remedies be plain, speedy, and effective, and that they meet certain minimum standards defined in the statute. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (1994). Even if the court made a decision to require exhaustion, the statutory procedure under the pre-PLRA version of § 1997e was to stay the case for up to 180 days to permit exhaustion. Thus, prior to April 1996, the statutory exhaustion requirement applicable to § 1983 suits by state prisoners was entirely discretionary, subject to significant limitations, and required merely a stay, rather than dismissal. Cf. Underwood v. Wilson, No. 97-40536, 151 F.3d 292, 1998 WL 476217 (5th Cir. Aug.14, 1998); Whitley v. Hunt, No. 97-40938, 158 F.3d 882, 1998 WL 740134 (5th Cir. Oct.23, 1998). 15 We recently held that the exhaustion requirement imposed by amended § 1997e is not jurisdictional. Underwood, 151 F.3d at 293-95, 1998 WL 476217 at  2-3. Rather, the amended statute imposes a requirement, rather like a statute of limitations, that may be subject to certain defenses such as waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling. See id. at 294-95, 1998 WL 476217 at  3 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)). [N]on-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement[s] may, in certain rare instances, be excused. Id. at 296, 1998 WL 476217 at  5 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992)). McCarthy stated that the decision to require exhaustion pursuant to § 1997e would depend in part upon the relative strength of the individual prisoner's interest in obtaining prompt judicial redress and the countervailing institutional interests that favor exhaustion. See McCarthy, 112 S.Ct. at 1087. McCarthy, however, was interpreting the limited and discretionary exhaustion requirement embodied in the pre-PLRA version of § 1997e. That largely discretionary balancing test cannot survive Congress' 1996 amendment of § 1997e. By shearing § 1997e of the substantial limitations upon exhaustion that were embodied in the prior version of the statute, Congress unambiguously expressed its intent that exhaustion be generally imposed as a threshold requirement in prisoner cases. Underwood, 151 F.3d at 296, 1998 WL 476217 at  5 (identifying Congressional purpose to provide relief from frivolous prisoner claims by requiring exhaustion); see also Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir.1997). It would therefore be contrary to both Congress' intent and the plain language of the amended statute to continue applying in every case the discretionary balancing test defined in McCarthy for use with the pre-PLRA version of the statute. Absent a valid defense to the exhaustion requirement, e.g., Whitley, 158 F.3d 882, 1998 WL 740134 ( holding that § 1997e does not require exhaustion of remedies that are not capable of providing redress, and therefore available), the statutory requirement enacted by Congress that administrative remedies be exhausted before the filing of suit should be imposed. To hold otherwise would encourage premature filing by potential litigants, thus undermining Congress' purpose in passing the PLRA, which was to provide the federal courts some relief from frivolous prisoner litigation. See Underwood, 151 F.3d at 296, 1998 WL 476217 at  5 (citing legislative history in support of decision dismissing claims that were exhausted after suit was filed but before claims were dismissed) 16 . 17 Having identified the statutory exhaustion requirement and having defined the relevant test for determining whether the requirement may be excused, we turn to an examination of whether Wendell exhausted available remedies before filing suit.