Opinion ID: 225717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: They will become United Mine Workers when they are hired on this job.

Text: 18 Q. You mean they will have to join? A. Yes. 19 Referring to the ten men hired by Freeman, Johnson testified: 20 Q. Were you to use those employees in your work? A. Yes. 21 Q. That was agreed with Mr. Haberlen, was it, that you would use the employees he hired in your company? A. It was agreed by the officers of the two companies. 22 Q. Yes. So that those ten employees were in a day or two or three to become your employees when you were ready to go to work? A. Yes, sir. 23 In spite of Johnson's clear and unequivocal testimony hereinbefore quoted, the following day plaintiff recalled Johnson and succeeded in having him retract a part of his previous testimony. On this second appearance he stated there was no understanding or agreement about the employment of the ten men hired by Freeman; but he could not explain his change of testimony from the day before. 24 At the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge said:    It is unfortunate when men have to fight for a chance to work. I do not mean by physical combat but by other lawful means, and that is all this is. It is a contest between two conflicting forces, two conflicting labor organizations, for a chance and an opportunity to work. 25 The court further stated:    They (plaintiffs) have been interfered with and there has been some little violence, not of any great moment, but sufficient to have prevented a delivery, I think by wrongful acts, of steel to the mine property.    26 The injunction was couched in broad terms, and restrained and enjoined the defendants from interfering with, threatening or attempting to influence or coerce, by force or violence, employees of plaintiff to refrain from working for plaintiff on work under its contract with Freeman (Par. 1, 2); from influencing the employees of Freeman and of independent contractors to refrain from transporting and unloading material at the mine (Par. 3); from congregating in any place where employees of plaintiff, Freeman or independent contractors might from time to time be directed to work, for the purpose of intimidating or injuring said employees, or for the purpose of obstructing, or hindering, or disturbing them in the discharge of their duties (Par. 4); from procuring others to assemble in the vicinity where employees of plaintiff, Freeman or independent contractors were required to work on the project of sinking the mine shafts, or at or near the ways traveled by said employees to or from their respective employment, for the purpose of preventing plaintiff from performing its contract (Par. 5); from collecting at or patrolling or crowding approaches to places where employees of plaintiff, Freeman or independent contractors might be directed to work (Par. 6); from going on the mine site for the purpose of intimidating employees of plaintiff, Freeman or independent contractors (Par. 7); from laying violent hands on officers, agents or employees of plaintiff, Freeman or independent contractors (Par. 8); and from interfering with delivery of supplies to the mine site (Par. 9). 27 The complaint herein was drawn on the theory that a labor dispute is not involved and no attempt was made to comply with the requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115. Plaintiff's counsel frankly admits that if a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is involved, the plaintiff cannot prevail and that the injunction was improvidently issued. 28 Conceding the closeness of the question, the trial court concluded that a labor dispute had not occurred under the facts of this case, and ordered the injunction to issue. Plaintiff here seeks to sustain the conclusion of the nonexistence of a labor dispute by the following arguments: (1) lack of an employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants; (2) lack of a controversy concerning representation of persons seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment; (3) the defendant union does not claim to represent plaintiff's supervisory employees and the plaintiff had no other employees in Montgomery County, Illinois; (4) it was the obligation of Freeman to have the steel for the shafts at the mine site and plaintiff could not begin to work or start hiring employees until such steel had been delivered at the site. 29 Illinois statutes do not define the term labor dispute. However, Sec. 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 113, contains definitions of the term, and included therein are: (a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein;    or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interest in a `labor dispute' (as defined in this section) of `persons participating or interested' therein (as defined in this section). 30 Subsection (b) characterizes a person or association as participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it    has a direct or indirect interest therein   . Subsection (c) provides: (c) The term `labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 31 In New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 304 U.S. 542, 58 S. Ct. 703, 82 L.Ed. 1012, the question was whether the matter in controversy involved or grew out of a labor dispute within the meaning of Sec. 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. An association of negroes, organized for mutual improvement of its members, had requested a grocery company, in the course of personnel changes in certain stores patronized largely by colored people, to adopt a policy of employing negro clerks. When this request was ignored a picket line was established and the store sought an injunction. The court of appeals affirmed the action of the district court in granting the injunction as requested; however the Supreme Court held that the matter in controversy was a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, even though the plaintiff was not a labor union. 32 In a dispute between a brewery workers' union and a teamsters' union as to which had the right to organize and claim as members the drivers of brewery wagons and trucks, the court said in Green v. Obergfell, et al., 72 App.D.C. 298, 121 F.2d 46, 50: It would be difficult to imagine a case which more clearly involves a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.    And, further, 121 F.2d at page 51: Nor is it material that no employer was joined as a party. The fact that, in cases previously arising under the Act, employers have appeared as parties, does not exhaust its possibilities or limit the broad scope and meaning which Congress intended to give to the Act.    33 In Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 et al. v. Fur Workers Union, 70 App.D.C. 122, 105 F.2d 1, affirmed 308 U.S. 522, 60 S.Ct. 292, 84 L.Ed. 443, the plaintiff union was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor while the defendant union was affiliated with the C.I.O. The employer had entered into a written contract with one union and the other union commenced to picket the employer's place of business. The court found that a labor dispute existed. 34 In Blankenship v. Kurfman, 7 Cir., 96 F. 2d 450, 453, this court pointed out that the term labor dispute did not necessarily imply the relationship of employee and employer between the disputants, saying: But the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States    2 clearly have established that there can be a labor dispute, within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act    in the absence of relation of employer and employee, and even when `the petitioners are not engaged in any business competitive with that of the respondent, and the officers, members, or representatives of the Alliance (petitioners) are not engaged in the same business or occupation as the respondent or its employees.' 35 The Progressive Mine Workers realized very well that an owner of a mine can in effect decide which union he will have representing his employees by his selection, according to union affiliation, of the first ten or other such small number of employees as would form the nucleus of a local union at his mine. Here, Freeman's manager took pains to obtain his list of prospects for the Montgomery County mine from the representative of the United Mine Workers, and he of course expected that if the nucleus of men forming the union were members of the United Mine Workers they would naturally vote to have that organization as exclusive bargaining agent at that mine. 36 As issued the injunction restrained defendants as to both Freeman's and plaintiff's employees practically to the same extent. Had Freeman been the party plaintiff it could not have asked that any greater restraint be placed upon the defendants as to Freeman than was done in the decree below. Were Freeman the plaintiff there is no question that a labor dispute existed under the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and under the court decisions heretofore cited. The fact that Johnson brought the action does not change the situation. There was a close working arrangement between Johnson and Freeman that, except for supervisory personnel, only United Mine Workers would be employed. The district court's findings that Johnson may employ such employees as it, in its sole judgment and discretion shall determine, is clearly erroneous. By its written contract Johnson agreed not to employ any person not acceptable to Freeman and it is apparent that except as to supervisory personnel only United Mine Workers would be acceptable. 37 We feel a labor dispute existed. The district court thus lacked jurisdiction to issue the temporary restraining order without notice or hearing, or to issue the temporary injunction without strict compliance with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It follows the decree below must be vacated and set aside. 38 Reversed.