Opinion ID: 2832851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grzegorczyk’s Arguments in Mitigation

Text: Grzegorczyk’s second argument is that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to properly weigh the § 3553(a) factors in fashioning his sentence. Specifically, Grzegorczyk contends that the district court did not carefully or completely consider the evidence of his mental health status at the time of the offense and the impact of the subsequent trauma that he suffered at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. At sentencing, the district court is obligated to consider the § 3553(a) factors and provide a record for us to review, but it is No. 14-3460 7 not required to comprehensively discuss each of the factors. United States v. Moreno-Padilla, 602 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2010). The court is also not required to discuss each factor in checklist fashion, United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005), nor extensively address non-principal arguments or “stock arguments that sentencing courts see routinely,” United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2008). See also United States v. Shannon, 518 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The court need not address every § 3553(a) factor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating its conclusions regarding each one. Instead the court may simply give an adequate statement of reasons, consistent with § 3553(a), for thinking the sentence it selects is appropriate” (internal citations omitted)). In this case, the sentencing transcript shows that the district court gave adequate consideration to Grzegorczyk’s principal argument in mitigation, in accordance with § 3553(a). The principal argument advanced by Grzegorczyk at sentencing was that his conduct was not emblematic of how he “normally behaves.” In support of this point, Grzegorczyk argued that his actions were brought on by the emotional trauma of his recent divorce, his history of alcoholism and a personality disorder, which was diagnosed by the doctor who evaluated his competency, Dr. Ostrov.1 Contrary to Grzegorczyk’s contention, however, the district court clearly considered this information in fashioning Grzegorczyk’s sentence. After noting several mitigating factors, including the fact that Grzegorczyk had no 1 Although Dr. Ostrov determined that Grzegorczyk was competent, Grzegorczyk argued that his personality disorder made him act out of character and behave irrationally. 8 No. 14-3460 criminal history and had received letters of support from many people, the court acknowledged his history of alcoholism and personality disorder. The court noted that they were both factors that it would weigh. However, the court found that Grzegorczyk was very serious about the murders he solicited the undercover agents to commit. Furthermore, Grzegorczyk committed the offense at age fifty-one—an age where, in the district court’s opinion, individuals have more control over their emotions and are mature enough to think about the longterm consequences of their actions. Thus, even considering Grzegorczyk’s lack of criminal history and the low rate of recidivism among his age group, the court found that his particular characteristics cut against his argument that his behavior would never manifest itself again. From the record before us, therefore, it is apparent that the court considered Grzegorczyk’s arguments in mitigation, in light of the other § 3553(a) factors, and determined that any mitigating aspects of the defendant’s mental health or conduct were outweighed by the seriousness of the offense and risk to the public.