Opinion ID: 4211658
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Counsel at the Lineup

Text: In Kirby v. Illinois, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the “Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against [the defendant].” 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). The Supreme Court confirmed this holding in a long line of subsequent cases. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187–88 (1984) (collecting cases). The government may initiate judicial criminal proceedings “by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689. Thus, while a defendant has a right to counsel at a post-indictment lineup, see Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37, there is no clearly established right to counsel at a pre-charge lineup. Sanders was arrested on December 22, 1980, but was not arraigned until December 24, the day after the lineup. Charges were not filed against him until March 18, 1981. Since Sanders’s right to counsel did not attach until after the lineup, it is unlikely that the court would have granted a motion to suppress on this basis. The state court could have reasonably determined that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress on this ground because an attorney is not ineffective for failing to file an 68 SANDERS V. CULLEN unmeritorious motion. Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012).