Opinion ID: 4468130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court of Appeals Appropriately Exercised

Text: Its Discretion in Applying Laches ¶39 Though we agree that the State proved all three elements of laches as a matter of law, the court of appeals still had the duty and authority to decide whether to apply laches in this case. As noted above, we review this decision for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶17. Therefore, as long as the court applied a proper standard of law and employed a demonstrated, rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable court could reach, the decision should be affirmed. State v. Cooper, 2019 WI 73, ¶13, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192. When we review a discretionary decision, we look for reasons to affirm the lower court's decision, even if its reasoning could have been explained more fully. See State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶29, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174. ¶40 The court of appeals properly acknowledged it needed to exercise its discretion whether to apply laches to Wren's case. In deciding to do so, the court reasoned that application was appropriate because Wren waited over ten years to raise concerns about the lack of appointment of postconviction counsel and a direct appeal, despite the fact that he sought relief numerous times from the trial court. State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, No. 2017AP880-W, unpublished slip op. at 9 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2018). The court relied significantly on the reasoning of Washington, 343 Wis. 2d 434, where the petitioner waited five years to seek reinstatement of his appellate rights. 24 No. 2017AP880-W ¶41 Wren's objections to the court's decision to apply laches are predominantly echoes of his previous arguments: he shouldn't be faulted for the State's failure to ensure he had constitutionally adequate counsel; he didn't know he could do this; and he wasn't familiar with the court system. ¶42 All of these assertions, however, are aimed at a rebalancing of the equities in this court. That is not how we review discretionary decisions. The court of appeals' decision is sufficient to satisfy our standard of review. It was reasonable for the court to conclude that even if the State failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate counsel, any subsequent delays by Wren should not be attributed to the State.28 It was reasonable to conclude that the State's Furthermore, while failure to file an appeal is deficient 28 performance for which prejudice is presumed, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally fail absent some form of corroboration of the attorney's actions. A defendant on a post-conviction motion may bring a claim of ineffective counsel. If the counsel in question cannot appear to explain or rebut the defendant's contentions because of death . . . then the defendant should not, by uncorroborated allegations, be allowed to make a case for ineffectiveness. The defendant must support his allegations with corroborating evidence. Such evidence could be letters from the attorney to the client, transcripts of statements made by the attorney or any other tangible evidence which would show the attorney's ineffective representation. . . . In other words, we will presume that counsel had a reasonable basis for his actions, and the defendant cannot by his own words rebut this presumption. Such a burden will assure that post-conviction proceedings will not be brought solely on the basis of ineffective counsel 25 No. 2017AP880-W inability to mount a defense due to Wren's delay should outweigh Wren's interest in further challenging his conviction.29 The question before us is not whether we would have made the same decision, but whether the court of appeals applied a proper standard of law and employed a demonstrated, rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable court could reach.30 The answer is yes it did.