Opinion ID: 168389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A New Trial In the Alternative

Text: 34 Having rejected the district court's legal premise for the grant of a new trial, we also note that the district court lacked authority to grant a new trial because Mr. Montgomery never moved for one. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a), states that [u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. Mr. Montgomery moved for a judgment of acquittal, but he never moved for a new trial. A motion for a new trial based on anything other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within seven days of the verdict. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(2). We have held that this time period constitutes a jurisdictional limit on the district court's power to act. United States v. Miller, 869 F.2d 1418, 1420 (10th Cir.1989). 35 Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(d)(1) states that [i]f the court enters a judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, the court must also conditionally determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is later vacated or reversed. Yet, even this rule requires that a motion for new trial be before the court. Because Mr. Montgomery never filed a motion for new trial 4 , much less one within seven days of the verdict, the district court had no jurisdiction to order a new trial. 36 REVERSED. We REINSTATE the jury's verdict and REMAND for sentencing.