Opinion ID: 341470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conformity of Jury Instructions with Specific Intent Requirements

Text: 42
43 Defendant Ehrlichman is charged with violating Dr. Fielding's Fourth Amendment rights by conspiring in the breaking and entering of his office. The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Although the best means of protecting this right against incursions by overzealous executive officers 46 has been subject to some debate, 47 the core meaning of the Fourth Amendment was clear well before defendants conspired to search Dr. Fielding's files: 44 (T)ranslation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task . . . . Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. . . . 48 45 United States v. United States District Court (Keith) capsulized that historic approach in noting that physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. 49 The very heart of the Fourth Amendment directive 50 is that where practical, a government search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's private premises or conversation. 51 The framers formulated that directive against the background of Entick v. Carrington, 52 a case found by the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States 53 to be sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures. Entick overturned an executive warrant to search the studies of political dissidents. 54 46 As a general proposition, few would question the clarity of the Fourth Amendment right of every citizen to be free from governmental searches and seizures unless sanctioned by judicial warrant based on probable cause. For the purposes of section 241, however, that right may not be clear in an individual case if the circumstances are such that an exception to the warrant requirement may be invoked. Just how clear was Dr. Fielding's right to be free from the search directed by defendant Ehrlichman is the question we examine at this point. 47 In pre-trial proceedings before the District Court Ehrlichman claimed that the break-in was not in violation of Dr. Fielding's Fourth Amendment rights and developed a contention along the following lines: The entry was undertaken pursuant to an authorized foreign affairs or national security operation. Since 1940 the foreign affairs exception to the prohibition against wiretapping has been espoused by the Executive Branch as a necessary concomitant to the President's constitutional power over the exercise of this country's foreign affairs, and warrantless electronic surveillance has been upheld by lower federal courts on a number of occasions. 55 No court has ruled that the President does not have this prerogative in a case involving foreign agents or collaborators with a foreign power. 56 The Supreme Court, in a number of decisions requiring officials to obtain a warrant before engaging in electronic surveillance, has been careful to note that its rulings do not reach such cases. 57 48 Hoping to fall within this as yet not fully defined exception, Ehrlichman urges that in September 1971 in a matter affecting national security and foreign intelligence gathering the absence of a judicially approved warrant did not render unlawful a search and seizure authorized by a presidential delegate pursuant to a broad Presidential mandate of power given to that delegate. 58 49 Ehrlichman further argues that no specific authorization by the President or the Attorney General was required: 50 Implicitly, an instruction to accomplish an end carries with it the duty of performing all lawful acts necessary to accomplish that end. In the instant case, the President delegated the power, to sworn officials of the Executive Branch, including Appellant Ehrlichman, to prevent and halt leaks of vital security information. To contend that the President must specifically chart out the methods of employing the power, each and every time he delegates power is absurd. 59 51 The District Court ruled as a matter of law that the national security exemption did not excuse the failure to obtain a judicial warrant for a physical search of Dr. Fielding's office 60 either because there is no exemption for physical searches 61 or because the exemption can only be invoked by the President or the Attorney General in a particular case. 62 This holding, which governed pre-trial discovery instructions to the jury, blocked any evidentiary inquiry into the factual basis for Ehrlichman's alleged belief that the Fielding covert operation could yield significant foreign intelligence information. For purposes of this appeal, we accept as possible of proof that probable cause existed for the operation, so that if application for a warrant had been made it would have been granted. 52 The District Court's ruling was based on two premises. The first is that the national security exemption has been carefully limited to the issue of wiretapping, a relatively nonintrusive search. 63 The circuit court decisions setting forth such an exemption for the special problem of national security wiretaps 64 do not go so far as to dispense with the need for a warrant as a requirement for physical entry of the home . . . the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. 65 We need not in this opinion decide this matter one way or the other, and no inference should be drawn from our failure to discuss it. It suffices to dispose of the case at bar that we find that the District Court was unquestionably correct in its second ground for rejecting Ehrlichman's claim, in its ruling that in any event the national security exemption can only be invoked if there has been a specific authorization by the President, or by the Attorney General as his chief legal advisor, for the particular case. 53 Neither Ehrlichman nor any of his codefendants have alleged that the Attorney General gave his approval to the Fielding operation; and none has attempted to refute former President Nixon's assertion that he had no prior knowledge of the break-in and, therefore, could not and did not authorize the search. 66 Ehrlichman soars into a novel claim of authority. No court has ever in any way indicated, nor has any Presidential administration or Attorney General claimed, that any executive officer acting under an inexplicit Presidential mandate may authorize warrantless searches of foreign agents or collaborators, 67 much less the warrantless search of the offices of an American citizen not himself suspected of collaboration. 54 The defendant totally misapprehends the critical role played by the President and the Attorney General, when the national security exception is invoked. It is argued that this exception gives government officials the power surreptitiously to intrude on the privacy of citizens without the necessity of first justifying their action before an independent and detached member of the judiciary. Unless carefully circumscribed, such a power is easily subject to abuse. The danger of leaving delicate decisions of propriety and probable cause to those actually assigned to ferret out national security information is patent, and is indeed illustrated by the intrusion undertaken in this case, without any more specific Presidential direction than that ascribed to Henry II vexed with Becket. 68 As a constitutional matter, if Presidential approval is to replace judicial approval for foreign intelligence gathering, the personal authorization of the President or his alter ego for these matters, the Attorney General is necessary to fix accountability and centralize responsibility for insuring the least intrusive surveillance necessary and preventing zealous officials from misusing the President's prerogative. 55 Mr. Justice White, concurring separately in Katz v. United States, 69 noted the possibility of recognizing a national security exception to the warrant requirement for electronic surveillance, but only if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable. 70 As of this writing, that is the only statement by any Supreme Court Justice declaring a national security exemption. Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Giordano v. United States, noted that (w)hile two members of the Court have indicated disagreement with that view, the issue remains open. 71 Moreover, the Government in its brief before the Supreme Court in United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 72 stated flatly, We urge the Court to adopt the principle that Mr. Justice White suggested in his concurring opinion in Katz. 73 The Government's argument was based in substantial part on the protection and consistency that would derive from a procedure centered on the Attorney General himself. The Court in Keith noted that . . . the President through the Attorney General may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those who plot unlawful acts against the Government. 74 Yet even this expression was in the context of an opinion that held the Constitution required a judicial warrant as a condition for conducting domestic security surveillance, 75 and disclaimed expression of any ruling on the requirement applicable in the case of activities of foreign powers or their agents. 76 56 As a historical matter, Presidential memoranda from 1940 to 1965 setting forth Executive policies regarding national security electronic surveillance have stressed the requirement of personal approval by the President or the Attorney General, 77 even though at the time the Supreme Court had held that the Constitution did not require a warrant for such surveillance. No court, Justice of the Supreme Court, or Presidential administration has ever suggested a power which could be generally delegated, for example, even to regular intelligence agencies, like the FBI and CIA, let alone to the extrastatutory group involved in the instant case. Even though the employees and administrators of the regular agencies might have the background, training, and departmental discipline to make responsible, expert decisions, the risk of their myopic abuse of such a powerful prerogative is simply too great to permit its delegation. That risk is substantially magnified when the decision-making group, as here, is an amorphous, ad hoc unit with no tradition of public service and no clear lines of responsibility. 57 Skepticism of power to delegate authority at will to make crucial decisions in the Fourth Amendment area led the Supreme Court to hold invalid a delegation within the Department of Justice of the statutory power to authorize even the application for a wiretap warrant to be issued by a magistrate once a probable cause determination is made. The Court insisted that (t)he mature judgment of a particular, responsible Department of Justice official (be) interposed as a critical precondition to any judicial order. 78 A fortiori, when what is involved is a claim that an exception permits a Chief Executive determination to replace the neutral magistrate altogether, that determination cannot be delegated. Talismanic invocation of national security is not a basis for delegation, it is at most a basis for the claim that there may be a Chief Executive warrant. 58 Although Ehrlichman's counsel speak broadly of Presidential authorization, all that they show is that the President authorized the formation of a unit within the White House to stop security leaks and investigate the Ellsberg matter. 79 At no point did the President even mention the possibility of surreptitious wiretaps or other national security searches let alone give any specific authorization for such activity. The law is plain that the simple fact that the President asks a subordinate official to investigate and report on a problem involving national security does not give the official plenary power to exercise all prerogatives the President might have in that area. 59 Ehrlichman can hardly mean that the President intended to give him all the power that he, the President, had. Obviously, the most that could be argued was the authority to perform lawful acts necessary to accomplish that end. 80 Whatever the rule for the President, the delegate may not claim, as lawful acts, those which could not be lawfully delegated to his discretion. 60 As a constitutional matter, if and to the extent that Presidential approval may replace judicial approval for foreign intelligence gathering, the personal authorization of the President or of his Cabinet alter ego for these matters, the Attorney General is necessary to fix accountability and centralize responsibility for insuring the least intrusive surveillance necessary and preventing zealous officials from misusing the Presidential prerogative. 61 Under the circumstances of this case, the law is clear that Dr. Fielding's Fourth Amendment rights were breached when the defendants broke into and searched his office without the requisite judicial authorization. For the purposes of the element of specific intent in section 241, it remains only to determine whether the defendants acted with the necessary purpose of trenching upon constitutionally protected interests. 62
63 As we observed above in connection with our discussion of Screws and its progeny, specific intent under section 241 does not require an actual awareness on the part of the conspirators that they are violating constitutional rights. It is enough that they engage in activity which interferes with rights which as a matter of law are clearly and specifically protected by the Constitution. As we have already pointed out, in this case the law clearly establishes a violation of Dr. Fielding's Fourth Amendment right to be secure against the warrantless entry and search, the exceptions for entry without a judicial warrant being plainly inapplicable. 64 It is not a violation of section 241 for individuals who happen to be government agents to burglarize a doctor's office for purely personal gain. It is a civil rights conspiracy in violation of that section, however, if they enter his office in their capacity as government agents without proper authorization to secure information for an ostensible government purpose. The concern of Congress in enacting section 241 was to extend the federal police power to those who intentionally interfere with federally protected interests e. g., officials whose specific purpose is to accomplish the governmental objectives of punishment or obtaining confessions or searching private premises, individuals who act with the particular intent of preventing other citizens' equal use of the polls or the interstate highways. The objective must be governmental even though section 241, unlike section 242, does not require that conspirators act under color of law. The states can deal with those who kill or mug or burglarize out of passion or greed for purely personal reasons. 65 The District Court instructed the jury as follows: 66 To establish a violation of count one of the indictment, the conspiracy count, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that a conspiracy existed between one or more defendants or unindicted co-conspirators named in the indictment. 67 Second, that the purpose of the conspiracy was to carry out a warrantless entry and search of Dr. Fielding's office without his permission. 68 Third, that the conspirators were governmental employees or agents who intended to enter and to search Dr. Fielding's office without a warrant or permission for governmental rather than purely personal reasons. 69 Fourth, that Dr. Fielding himself was at the time an American citizen. 81 70 These instructions state the law exactly as we have outlined it, and Ehrlichman does not contest that if those instructions were legally correct there was substantial evidence to sustain his conviction under section 241. 82 71 Thus, we conclude that Ehrlichman's conviction of conspiracy as set forth in Count I of the indictment was in full compliance with the mens rea requirements of section 241. We turn now to a brief discussion of the defendant's remaining contentions on appeal.