Opinion ID: 769328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Emotional Victim Impact Evidence

Text: 47 Paul argues that the volume and emotional impact of the victim impact evidence offered at the sentencing phase violated his constitutional rights. The Eighth Amendment is not violated when the government uses victim impact evidence at the penalty phase because this evidence is relevant to the jury's decision about whether the death penalty should be imposed. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). Such evidence may be challenged on due process grounds only if evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Id. at 825. We find the evidence in this case was clearly admissible under Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, and note that Paul was also able to present extensive mitigating evidence through the testimony of his mother. Therefore, we find no constitutional error. 48 J. Guilt Phase Evidence about Victim's Habits and Family 49 Paul next argues that the government presented unnecessary and prejudicial testimony during the guilt phase of the trial regarding the victim's personal life. Paul argues this evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because its only purpose was to unfairly create sympathy for the elderly victim. Rule 403 provides Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. We have reviewed the record and find the district court did not commit plain error by admitting such evidence. 50 K. FDPA's Authorization for Non-statutory Aggravating Factors 51 Paul argues that the FDPA allows the government to arbitrarily and creatively choose as many non-statutory aggravating factors as it wishes, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Paul argues the statute improperly delegates this inherently legislative authority to the executive branch. The only other circuit to consider this argument rejected it. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1998), affirmed, 527 U.S. 373 (1999). The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the prosecution was adequately limited in its power to define non-statutory aggravators by the notice provisions in the FDPA, the Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence, the district court functioning as a gatekeeper against impermissibly prejudicial information, and the FDPA's requirement that at least one statutory aggravating factor be found by the jury before it moves on to non-statutory factors. See id. Thus, the prosecution is sufficiently guided by intelligible principles to constitutionally exercise the delegated authority to define non-statutory aggravating factors. See id. at 240. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the prosecutor's authority to define non-statutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress' legislative power. L. Prosecutor's Closing Argument 52 Paul asserts error in several respects about prosecutorial closing argument at both phases of trial. Again, Paul did not object during arguments at trial, and thus the prosecutor's arguments are subject to review for plain error. We have reviewed the record and find no error in the closing arguments and certainly no error which affected Paul's substantial rights. M. Voir Dire Errors 53 Paul argues the district court should have allowed the defense individual and sequestered voir dire. He also argues the district court impermissibly shortened voir dire and made the process prejudicial to Paul and impaired his ability to exercise peremptory challenges. Paul made no objection during voir dire and we review for plain error. Voir dire in this case took approximately two days, and several jurors were questioned individually while sequestered from the rest of the venire. The district court has wide latitude over the conduction of voir dire and we review for an abuse of discretion only. See United States v. Granados, 117 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1997). We find the district court did not abuse its discretion and conducted voir dire in a way that protected Paul's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. See id. 54 Paul also argues the district court improperly ruled on several challenges for cause, alleging that three jurors who were too pro-capital punishment were not dismissed, and that three jurors with anti-capital punishment views should not have been dismissed. With regard to the three jurors allegedly favoring capital punishment, the record shows that all three had indicated on the previously filled-out juror questionnaire that they did not believe a sentence of life without parole was a sufficient penalty for an intentional killing. However, all three of these jurors were individually questioned by defense counsel and by the trial judge, and during questioning, at some point, each one said that he or she could fairly consider a sentence other than death for an intentional killing. A defendant subject to the death penalty may properly challenge for cause any juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case and who will not consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances as required by the instructions. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). That is not the case here. Each juror expressed a good-faith ability to consider a sentence of life without parole if Paul were convicted of the underlying charges. Furthermore, none of the three jurors actually sat on the jury. A defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to remove jurors who arguably should have been removed for cause. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 120 S. Ct. 774, 782 (2000). Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a fair trial is not violated in this situation because those jurors did not end up sitting on the jury. See id. at 781-82. 55 Paul also asserts that three jurors should not have been removed for cause because of their views in opposition to the death penalty. All three jurors indicated an opposition to the death penalty in open court in response to initial questioning by the trial court. Upon reading the transcript of the first juror's individual questioning by defense counsel and by the trial court, we find that this juror could not set aside her views against capital punishment. She stated unequivocally several times that she could not impose the death penalty. Further, Paul voiced no objection when the court dismissed her for cause. 56 The second juror, in response to extensive questioning by both attorneys and the trial court, once stated that she could consider, with difficulty, the death penalty, but at the close of her individual questioning, she stated unequivocally that she could not impose the death penalty. This time, defense counsel even agreed this juror be dismissed for cause, stating to the judge, [y]ou don't have any choice. 57 The third juror was also not willing to set aside her views against capital punishment and follow the law. The closest this juror came to saying that she could even consider the death penalty was to say that if someone were to kill one of her own children, she may want to pull the switch herself. However, this juror obviously was not sitting on a jury for the trial of her child's killer. She made it clear that in reality, she could not fairly consider the death penalty, despite instructions from the court. Again, defense counsel did not object when this juror was dismissed for cause. 58 Each of these three jurors indicated they could not fairly consider imposing the death penalty as a possible sentence, regardless of the instructions from the court. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion by removing them for cause. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. 59 N. Death Sentence Result of Passion and Arbitrariness 60 Paul's final argument is that the cumulative effect of the preceding alleged errors demonstrate that the verdict and death sentence reflect clear arbitrariness. Because we have dismissed all of Paul's allegations of error, we need not consider their cumulative effect. However, under the FDPA, we are required to consider whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. See 18 U.S.C. 3595(c)(1). We find Paul's sentence in this case was not imposed under such arbitrary conditions. The jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of several statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors, and also considered many mitigating factors. This is exactly the process the jury was to complete. In light of the substantial evidence supporting the aggravating factors found by the jury, we cannot say that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.