Opinion ID: 874394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues specific to the facts of Wheeler's case

Text: First, Wheeler asserts the Department did not have authority under the FLLSA to institute license suspension proceedings against him. Wheeler argues that because the Department did not present evidence that it notified the Department of Transportation (DOT) of Wheeler's delinquency and that the DOT failed to take action within 30 days, the Department failed to prove that it met the statutory prerequisites to commence suspension proceedings under I.C. § 7-1404. Idaho Code § 7-1404, which governs jurisdiction for license suspension proceedings, states in pertinent part: Upon notification by the department [of health and welfare] of a child support delinquency, a licensing authority shall initiate proceedings to suspend a license in accordance with its statutory process, petition the court, or refer the matter to the department to initiate proceedings for suspension of the license in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. Upon referral, or if the licensing authority takes no action within thirty (30) days after notification of the delinquency by the department, the department is authorized to commence a license suspension proceeding under this chapter. The licensing authority shall notify the department of all action taken in response to the notification of the delinquency. (Emphasis added). In sum, the Department must first notify the DOT of a licensee's child support delinquency, and then wait for the DOT to either not take action within 30 days or refer the case to the Department before the Department may commence license suspension proceedings under the FLLSA. Here, the Department established that it substantially complied with these statutory prerequisites through the affidavit of Kristy White, a policy specialist for the Department. In her affidavit, Ms. White stated: The Idaho Department of Transportation has referred all of the child support cases which qualify for license suspension to the Department for the initiation of license suspension proceedings. Ms. White's affidavit establishes that the Department met the statutory referral requirement, and thus contrary to Wheeler's assertion, it was unnecessary that the Department also prove the DOT failed to take action within 30 days. It can be reasonably inferred from her affidavit that the DOT waived the statutory prerequisite of notice when it provided a blanket referral of all cases to the Department. The notice requirement merely triggered the DOT's choice as to whether to commence license suspension proceedings itself or to refer the case back to the Department for handling of the suspension proceedings. With the blanket referral in place, it would be superfluous for us to require the Department to continue to notify the DOT of each child support delinquency case before commencing license suspension proceedings against a licensee. Because we find that the Department substantially complied with I.C. § 7-1404, we uphold the district court's decision to dismiss Wheeler's argument. [1]
Wheeler also argues that because all three of his child support orders were entered before the FLLSA became effective on January 1, 1997, [2] the FLLSA was applied to his orders ex post facto. Ex post facto laws are prohibited by article I, section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution and by article I, section 16 of the Idaho Constitution. The ex post facto clauses prevent the enactment of any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed.... Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2716-17, 111 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 (1990) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217 (1925)). Thus, the ex post facto prohibition only applies to penal and criminal actions, not to civil actions. See 16B Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 646 (1998). In order to determine whether a law is penal in nature for purposes of ex post facto analysis, this Court must conduct a two-part inquiry. See U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742, 749 (1980). First, we determine whether the legislature has indicated, either expressly or impliedly, a preference for the statute to be labeled civil or criminal. Id. Second, where [the legislature] has indicated an intention to establish a [civil regulatory scheme], [the court] inquires further whether the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. Id. at 248-49, 100 S.Ct. at 2641-42, 65 L.Ed.2d at 749. Here, there is no ex post facto violation since the FLLSA does not invoke criminal jurisprudence. The legislature specifically provided for license suspension under the FLLSA to be a civil remedy, rather than a criminal penalty. In its statement of intent, the legislature provided: [We] find[] that the remedy of suspension of a wide variety of licenses is needed to increase the effectiveness of enforcement of child support orders.... I.C. § 7-1401 (emphasis added). We can reasonably infer from this statement that the legislature intended for license suspension under the FLLSA to be labeled as a civil remedy rather than a criminal penalty. Furthermore, Wheeler has failed to demonstrate that the effects of license suspension are so punitive so as to override the legislative intent to create a civil, regulatory scheme. Therefore, we find that no ex post facto violation occurred in this case. Even if Wheeler intended to argue that the FLLSA was applied retroactively as prohibited by I.C. § 73-101, his argument still fails. Idaho Code § 73-101 sets forth that no statute, whether criminal or civil in nature, is retroactive unless expressly so declared. A retrospective or retroactive law is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 407 (1999). [I]n Idaho, a statute is not applied retroactively unless there is `clear legislative intent to that effect.' Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 432, 745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987) (quoting City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 515, 660 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1983)). However, in the absence of an express declaration of legislative intent, a statute, which is remedial or procedural in nature, and which does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy contractual or vested rights, is generally held not to be retroactive, even though it was enacted subsequent to the events to which it applies. Id. Here, there is no need for us to consider whether the FLLSA is retroactive since Wheeler accrued more than $10,000 in arrearages after the statute was enacted in 1997. Child support arrearages equaling or in excess of the total support owing at least 90 days or $2,000, whichever is less, provide the Department with adequate grounds to initiate license suspension proceedings under I.C. § 7-1404. In other words, a retrospective analysis is inapplicable in this case. Thus, under either an ex post facto or a retrospective argument, we uphold the district courts decision to dismiss Wheelers argument. [3]