Opinion ID: 2211188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Second offender sentence.

Text: The trial court determined that the defendant was a second offender within the purview of sec. 161.28, Stats., and thereupon imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of five years. The crime which is the basis of this appeal and upon which the second offender penalty was invoked, was committed April 14, 1966. The defendant was convicted of this crime on November 29, 1967. Between these two dates the defendant committed, and was convicted of, another narcotics violation. A review of the applicable statutes brings us to the conclusion that the defendant should not have been sentenced as a second offender for the offense that was committed April 14, 1966. Applicable Statutes. Sec. 161.28 Penalties; sentence; probation and parole; evidence and procedure on prior convictions. .... (3) The procedure for charging and determining prior convictions under this section shall be as provided in s. 959.12 (1). (Emphasis added.) Sec. 959.12. Sentence of repeater. (1) HOW PRIOR CONVICTION CHARGED AND DETERMINED. Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a repeater as defined in s. 939.62 if convicted, any prior convictions may be alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. The court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant a reasonable time to investigate possible prior convictions before accepting a plea. If such prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the state he shall be subject to be sentenced under s. 939.62 unless he establishes that he was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any crime necessary to constitute him a repeater. ... (Emphasis added.) Sec. 939.62 Increased penalty for habitual criminality. .... (2) The actor is a repeater if he was convicted of a felony during the 5-year period immediately preceding the commission of the crime for which he presently is being sentenced, ... (Emphasis added.) We read the language of these statutes to mean that one who is being sentenced as a second offender under a felony statute must have been convicted of a felony during the five-year period immediately preceding the commission of the crime for which he is presently being sentenced. We recognize that sec. 161.28, Stats., in providing for enhancement of penalty, uses the words second offense whereas sec. 959.12 uses the word conviction. However, this court has previously determined that the use of the word offense as used in a repeater statute means conviction. Faull v. State (1922), 178 Wis. 66, 189 N. W. 274; Meyers v. State (1927), 193 Wis. 126, 213 N. W. 645. Also such an application of the statutes is in conformance with the general and majority rule adopted in other jurisdictions. [2] Regardless of the particular phraseology of repeater statutes, their inherent purpose is to serve as a warning to first offenders. The infliction of more severe punishment for a repeater is based upon his persistent violation of the law after conviction for previous infractions. Whether the word offense or conviction is used it is generally held that it is a prerequisite that the prior conviction or offense must precede the commission of the principal offense in order to enhance the punishment under a repeater statute. Therefore, inasmuch as the defendant was sentenced as a second offender, we have determined to remand for resentencing. He should be sentenced as a first offender for his conviction of November 29, 1967. In connection with such resentencing, the trial court should give consideration to the time the defendant has already served. By the Court. Judgment of conviction affirmed, but the sentence is vacated. The warden of the Wisconsin state prison is ordered to remand custody of Lynn Midell to the sheriff of Milwaukee county preceding his resentence by the circuit court for Milwaukee county. WILKIE, J. (concurring). I agree with the majority that the delay in the prosecution of this case did not amount to a denial of due process. The majority points out that a statute of limitations is not the sole standard by which delay between offense and arrest is to be measured, but in doing so it fails to state any criteria for determining when a delay (less than that permitted by the statute of limitations) in prosecution amounts to a denial of due process. I would adopt standards similar to those set forth in Bond v. United States . [1] In that case the court determined that in deciding whether there has been a denial of due process the court should weigh (1) the amount of delay involved, (2) who caused the delay, (3) whether the delay was purposeful, i.e., did the government make `a deliberate choice for a proposed advantage, which caused as much oppressive delay and damage to the defendant as it would have caused if it had been made in bad faith,' [2] (4) was the defendant prejudiced, and (5) was there a waiver by defendant. In applying these criteria to the facts before us, I concur in the holding of the majority that there was no denial of due process. I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice HALLOWS joins in this opinion. HEFFERNAN, J. (concurring). I concur in the result, but to the extent that the opinion may be interpreted as holding that factors other than the running of the statute of limitations constitute a denial of the due process right of speedy and timely prosecution, I respectfully disagree. The statutory period as set by the legislature must determine the right of a district attorney to commence a prosecution.