Opinion ID: 704068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Reviewability of Security Clearance Decisions in a Title VII Action.3

Text: 8 The Supreme Court's holding in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988), and our own in Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905, 111 S.Ct. 1104, 113 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991), preclude judicial review of security clearance decisions made by the Executive or his delegee. That bar to review applies equally, we conclude, in the context of a Title VII discrimination action. 9 Although Egan prohibited only outside administrative board review of security clearance decisions, it provided the base from which Dorfmont extended its bar to judicial review. The court in Egan explained that, while there ordinarily might be a strong presumption favoring appellate review of administrative decisions, that presumption is negated when it conflicts with national security concerns. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527, 108 S.Ct. at 824; see also Dorfmont, 913 F.2d at 1401 (summarizing Egan ). 10 At the core of Egan's deference to the national security mission is the recognition that security clearance determinations are sensitive and inherently discretionary exercises, entrusted by law to the Executive. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527-29, 108 S.Ct. at 823-25. The Court in Egan pointed out that security clearance decisions are highly uncertain, and heavily dependent on the ability of the decision-maker to predict the future behavior of the applicant. Thus the Court elected to leave the [p]redictive judgment of this kind to those with the necessary expertise in protecting [the sensitive material], rather than in the hands of an outside nonexpert body. Id. at 529, 108 S.Ct. at 825. 11 In Dorfmont, we held that the Supreme Court's reasoning on the reviewability of security clearance decisions applie[d] no less to the federal courts than to [administrative review boards]. Dorfmont, 913 F.2d at 1401. When it comes to security matters, a federal court is 'an outside nonexpert body.' We have no more business reviewing the merits of a decision to grant or revoke a security clearance than does [a merit review board]. Id. Thus in Dorfmont we held broadly that judicial review, like outside administrative review, of security clearance decisions was precluded: 12 The Department of Defense revoked [plaintiff]'s security clearance. The Department derives its authority directly from the President. The decision to grant or revoke a security clearance is committed to the discretion of the President by law. The district court therefore cannot review the merits of the department's decision to revoke [plaintiff]'s security clearance. 13 Id. (internal citations omitted). Although Brazil's circumstances may be compelling, he asks the court to do exactly what Egan and Dorfmont forbid, for we find that in this case a Title VII analysis necessarily requires the court to perform some review of the merits of the security clearance decision. 14 Analysis of a Title VII discrimination claim advances according to a three-step process. Under Title VII, a plaintiff has the initial burden of pleading a prima facie case of disparate treatment. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). If the plaintiff is successful, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Id. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. at 1824-25. Finally, should the defendant produce such legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, the burden is then on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's supposedly legitimate reasons were in fact a pretext to mask an illegal motive. Id. 15 After finding that Brazil had made a prima facie case of discrimination satisfying step one of the Title VII analysis, the district court concluded that it could not perform step two to determine whether the Navy's proffered reasons for its decision were legitimate without necessarily reviewing the merits of that decision. The court's conclusion was correct. 16 The second and third steps of the Title VII analysis present an insurmountable hurdle for Brazil. It is impossible for the court to establish in the first place whether the Navy's proffered reasons were legitimate without evaluating their merits. Even if the court were able to get by step two, it is very likely to be impossible for it to proceed to step three and determine whether the given reasons were mere pretext without considering their merits. The district court thus properly applied Dorfmont in granting the Navy's motion for summary judgment. 17 Brazil argues that Title VII analysis does not involve a review of the merits because it does not require the court to determine whether the Navy's reasons for revoking his clearance were valid; it merely requires a determination of whether the proffered reasons were the actual reasons. We disagree. The more valid a reason appears upon evaluation, the less likely a court will be to find that reason pretextual; the converse is also true. Even when the court faces independent evidence of a discriminatory motive, it is still necessary to weigh the validity of the defendant's proffered reasons when deciding if they are pretextual. In short, the merit of such decisions simply cannot be wholly divorced from a determination of whether they are legitimate or pretextual. We therefore reject Brazil's argument. 18 Brazil finally asserts that Dorfmont and Egan do not control here because Congress has specifically provided for our review of Title VII claims arising from security clearance decisions that are brought by civilian employees of the military. In support of his position, Brazil relies on section 717(a) of Title VII, which provides that [a]ll personnel actions affecting employees ... in military departments ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(a) (emphasis added). According to Brazil, the use of the phrase all personnel actions demonstrates Congress' specific intent to include security clearance decisions within the scope of Title VII judicial review. 19 Like other courts before us, we are unconvinced by this argument. Neither the express language nor the legislative history of Title VII is as persuasive or definitive as Brazil urges. The provision does not by its terms ... confer broad authority on the federal courts to review security clearance decisions. Egan, 484 U.S. at 530, 108 S.Ct. at 825; see also Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1325 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that section 717 of Title VII does not evidence the kind of unmistakable expression of purpose necessary to conclude that Congress intended security clearance decisions to be subject to judicial review). We therefore reject this argument as well. 20