Opinion ID: 864531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the claim relating to the denial of walker’s

Text: CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. ¶80. Walker next contends, again, that certain jurors should have been removed from the jury for cause because of their views on the death penalty. As he did on direct appeal, he relies on Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). However, this claim was raised on direct appeal and decided contrary to Walker's position then. Walker, 611 So.2d at 624-26. This claim is nothing more 35 than an attempt to relitigate a claim that has already been fully discussed and decided against Walker. The attempt to relitigate this claim is barred from consideration on post-conviction review. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1200; Foster, 687 So.2d at 1129, 1138, 1140; Wiley, 517 So.2d at 1377. Unlike the bars of waiver and other theories, the res judicata bar is not subject to the cause and actual prejudice test. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Foster v. State, 687 So.2d at 1137; Gilliard v. State, 614 So.2d 370, 375 (Miss. 1992). ¶81. Walker cannot relitigate this claim in this post-conviction review. Walker is not entitled to seek relief on this claim. VI. THE CLAIM RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION'S RACIALLY BIASED USE OF PEREMPTORY JUROR CHALLENGES IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. ¶82. Walker attempts to relitigate another claim relating to jury selection in his capital trial. He contends that the State used its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. This claim was litigated at trial and on direct appeal. This Court held that the claim was without merit on direct appeal. 671 So.2d at 627-29. Therefore the claim is res judicata. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1200; Foster, 687 So.2d at 1129, 1138, 1140; Wiley, 517 So.2d at 1377. Walker cannot relitigate claims raised and decided against him on direct appeal in a post-conviction application. This claim is barred from relitigation. Walker is entitled to no relief on this claim. VII. THE CLAIM RELATING TO MELINDA ZAPPIE BEING STRUCK FOR CAUSE IS RES JUDICATA. ¶83. Once again Walker attempts to relitigate a claim decided on direct appeal. This issue relates to the removal, for cause, of prospective juror Melinda Zappie. This claim was raised on direct appeal and decided against Walker. 671 So.2d at 629. Because this claim has already been litigated and decided on 36 direct appeal, it cannot be relitigated on post-conviction review. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1200; Foster, 687 So.2d at 1129, 1138, 1140; Wiley, 517 So.2d at 1377. Walker is not entitled to any relief on this claim. VII. WALKER WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THE CONDUCT OF VOIR DIRE. ¶84. Walker now returns to the ineffective assistance of counsel theme and contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate voir dire examination. First, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in attempting to rehabilitate prospective juror Melinda Zappie regarding her views toward the death penalty. Second, he argues that trial counsel failed to make a record of the racial composition of the jury. He contends that the second claim is per se ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Walker's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail because the Court addressed the merits of all of the claims relating to jury selection in its opinion on direct appeal. In the response to the previous ground for relief we discussed the fact that the claim was barred because the merits of the issue had been addressed on direct appeal. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail because Walker cannot demonstrate the requisite deficient performance and resulting prejudice. This Court found that Zappie was properly excused for cause based on her views toward the death penalty. See Walker, 671 So.2d at 629. While Walker contends that trial counsel should have done a better job in attempting to rehabilitate Zappie, he fails to identify a single unasked question that he contends counsel should have asked of Zappie to rehabilitate her. Thus, Walker has not even attempted to show deficient performance, much less prejudice. Since the underlying substantive merits of the claim have been held to be without merit, Walker cannot demonstrate the requisite deficient performance and actual prejudice to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Walker is entitled to no relief on this portion of his claim. 37 ¶85. Second, as to the claim that counsel was per se ineffective in failing to indicate the racial composition of the jury, there is no such requirement in the law. Walker cites to this Court's statement in its direct appeal opinion in which we noted: The defense fails to adequately address the composition of the seated jury, as does the State. Court papers within the record reviewed by this Court lend no support. Walker, 671 So.2d at 627. Such information would be necessary in making a determination of whether a prima facie case had been made in order to require a party to state reasons for the exercise of its peremptory challenges. However, the question of whether Walker made out a prima facie case is moot because the State was ordered to give reasons for its strikes without such a finding. It has long been the law that when the prosecution states its reasons for exercising its peremptory strikes either when ordered to do so without a finding of a prima facie case or voluntarily, the reasons can be reviewed on appeal. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 352-54, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1862-63, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 396 (1991); Hughes v. State, 735 So.2d 238, 250 (Miss. 1999); Manning v. State, 726 So.2d 1152, 1183-83 (Miss. 1998); Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228, 1240 (Miss. 1995); Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1298 (Miss. 1994); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d at 1279-80. In accord with this precedent, this Court reviewed, on the merits, the reasons put forward by the prosecution for the exercise of its strikes in this case. The Court found these reasons to be sufficient and denied Walker's claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Walker, 671 So.2d at 627-29. Since the underlying substantive merits of this claim have been held to be without merit, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the same must fail. Walker has failed to show both deficient performance and prejudice. He has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that the results of his trial 38 would have been different. Having failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel regarding this claim, Walker’s request to seek post-conviction relief must be denied.