Opinion ID: 1828197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: under applicable principles of contract law, the contract is clear and definite, therefore supporting a claim for specific performance.

Text: ¶ 50. Lastly, the majority erroneously holds that the chancellor correctly found that the contract was incapable of specific performance. ¶ 51. Specific performance has traditionally been regarded as a remedy for breach of contract that is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. Frierson, 794 So.2d at 225 (citing Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Miss. 1989)). [W]here a contracting party can feasibly be given what he bargained for, specific performance is the preferred remedy. ( Id. ) This Court has stated the familiar standard for specific performance as: Before a court of equity will enforce a specific contract for the sale of lands, the contract must be specific and distinct in its terms and must show with certainty that the minds of the parties have met and mutually agreed upon all the details. There must be an offer upon the one hand an unqualified acceptance of this offer upon the other; if any of these requisites be lacking, specific performance will not be declared. Fowler v. Nunnery, 126 Miss. 510, 89 So. 156, 158 (1921) (quoting Welsh v. Williams, 85 Miss. 301, 302, 37 So. 561, 561 (1904)). A contract is sufficiently definite if it contains matter which would enable the court under proper rules of construction to ascertain its terms, including consideration of the general circumstances of the parties and if necessary relevant extrinsic evidence. Estate of Smith v. Samuels, 822 So.2d 366, 369-70 (Miss.Ct.App.2002). The purchase price is an essential term that must be stated with specificity or the contract fails. Leach, 586 So.2d at 803; Hunt, 741 So.2d at 1014. [A]n agreement should not be frustrated where it is possible to reach a reasonable and fair result. Busching v. Griffin, 542 So.2d 860, 862 (Miss.1989) (citing Jones v. McGahey, 187 So.2d 579, 584 (Miss.1966); Estate of Smith, 822 So.2d at 370). ¶ 52. Clint accepted Scottye's offer verbatim and under the specific provisions provided for in her offer. Even the chancellor recognized this. There was no counter-offer or mis-description. Here, we are not dealing with inconsistent instruments. The offer and the acceptance are identical. Even the chancellor found that there was a meeting of the minds with regard to the offer and acceptance. ¶ 53. On this subject, it is worth looking at Estate of Smith and Busching. Estate of Smith dealt with a landowner's estate who sought rescission of a land sale option contract after having second thoughts about the purchase price. 822 So.2d at 370. The court reasoned that allowing such rescission would be inequitable. Id. Likewise, Busching dealt with a landowner who repudiated a land contract after discovering that the price fell below market value. 542 So.2d at 860. This Court opined that if it let the landowner off the hook the integrity and enforceability of written contracts would be greatly doubted. Id. at 866. ¶ 54. The land involved in this sale is very unique to Clint. It has been in his family for years. He intended to keep the land in his family. Scottye, on the other hand, has already disposed of some of the lands rights by selling the hunting and fishing rights to her attorneys. She has exhibited no sentimental family connection to the land. After all, she traded her hunting and fishing rights to pay her legal bills. ¶ 55. The majority places great weight on the fact that if this contract is enforced, Scottye will lose $230,000, because that is Clint's one half (½) of the debt which she would be paying. This is of no consequence. In Taylor v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 519 So.2d 436 (Miss.1988), this Court enforced a settlement agreement whereby the plaintiff only received $2,000 for a personal injury claim, despite the fact that the plaintiff had incurred $6,500 in medical expenses. Id. at 437-38. Scottye made a bad deal or her attorney failed to clarify the offer. In either event, neither mistake entitles her to rescission. [T]he mere fact that the defendant made a bad trade or bargain is not sufficient to defeat an obligation of specific performance. Clinton Serv. Co. v. Thornton, 233 Miss. 1, 11,100 So.2d 863, 867 (1958). ¶ 56. The Chancellor erred in granting rescission of the agreement between Clint and Scottye. The Chancellor's judgment should be remanded for entry of a judgment granting specific performance of the agreement. ¶ 57. For these reasons, I dissent.