Opinion ID: 2625939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Can the Finding of an Aggravating Circumstance Be Implicit in the Jury's Verdict of Conviction?

Text: ¶ 73 We asked the parties to discuss whether any aggravating circumstance could necessarily derive from a jury's verdict of conviction for first degree murder, either standing alone or when considered in conjunction with other contemporaneous convictions. The State argues that pecuniary gain, A.R.S. section 13-703.F.5, other homicides committed during the commission of the offense, A.R.S. section 13-703.F.8, and age of victim less than fifteen years or seventy years or older, A.R.S. section 13-703.F.9, can logically inhere in a verdict. The defendants argue that an aggravating circumstance can never be implicit. ¶ 74 We hold that the pecuniary gain and multiple homicide aggravators usually are not implicit in a jury's verdict. However, the age of the victim can be implicit in the verdict, if the jury simultaneously convicts the defendant of an offense that includes the age of the murdered victim as an element of the crime. [29]
¶ 75 Under A.R.S. section 13-703.F.5, an aggravating circumstance exists when a murder is committed as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. A.R.S. § 13-703.F.5. To establish the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance, the state must prove that the murder would not have occurred but for the defendant's pecuniary motive. State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 296-97, 670 P.2d 383, 394-95 (1983). ¶ 76 Determining whether a defendant murdered his victim for pecuniary gain requires a highly fact-intensive inquiry. The state must establish the connection between the murder and motive through direct or strong circumstantial evidence. State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 159 ¶ 94, 42 P.3d 564, 590 (2002) (holding murder of victim and only witness to robbery is powerful circumstantial evidence of an intent to facilitate escape and supports finding pecuniary motive); State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 512, 662 P.2d 1007, 1019 (1983) (Without some tangible evidence, or strong circumstantial inference, it is not for the sentencing court to conclude that because money and items were taken, the purpose of the murder was pecuniary gain.). ¶ 77 Complex fact situations require careful attention and analysis before a fact-finder confidently can conclude that pecuniary ends motivated the killing. When the state concurrently prosecutes a capital defendant for first degree murder and, for instance, robbery, both crimes resulting from the same occurrence, the state does not establish the pecuniary gain factor simply by showing that the robbery occurred. Rather, the state assumes the additional burden of showing that pecuniary gain was a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely the result of the murder. State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 433 ¶ 32, 984 P.2d 31, 41 (1999); see, e.g., State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 558, 917 P.2d 692, 701 (1996) (affirming pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance where defendant killed to facilitate escape after robbery). ¶ 78 The pecuniary gain factor thus requires more than the jury's conviction of a defendant for first degree murder and robbery or burglary. The fact-finder must draw the separate conclusion that the defendant killed, at least in part, for pecuniary motive. For that reason, we cannot conclude that a jury finding of pecuniary gain inheres in its robbery or burglary verdict. ¶ 79 Therefore, we will apply a harmless error analysis to the pecuniary gain factor. In those instances in which no reasonable jury could find that the state failed to prove a pecuniary gain motive beyond a reasonable doubt, we will find harmless error affecting that factor. In other instances, we will consider whether the Ring II error requires that we remand for resentencing.
¶ 80 A.R.S. section 13-703.F.8 permits a judge to find an aggravating circumstance if [t]he defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as defined in § 13-1101, that were committed during the commission of the offense. A.R.S. § 13-703.F.8. As with the pecuniary gain factor, this factor requires the state to establish more than that the jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder and one or more other homicides occurring around the same time. Instead, all homicides must take place during one continuous course of criminal conduct. State v. Rogovich, 188 Ariz. 38, 45, 932 P.2d 794, 801 (1997) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 130, 871 P.2d 237, 251 (1994)). This conclusion can be drawn only after the fact-finder analyzes the temporal, spatial, and motivational relationships between the capital homicide and the collateral [homicide], as well as ... the nature of that [homicide] and the identity of its victim. Id. (quoting State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 393, 814 P.2d 333, 350 (1991)). ¶ 81 A jury verdict convicting a defendant of two or more homicides does not in itself establish the multiple homicide aggravating circumstance. Without a finding that the murders are temporally, spatially and motivationally related, the bare jury verdict does not implicitly support the F.8 aggravator. Id. ¶ 82 We will find harmless error affecting this factor in those cases in which no reasonable jury could find that the state failed to prove the F.8 factor beyond a reasonable doubt. In other instances, we will consider whether the Ring II error requires that we remand for resentencing.
¶ 83 Under A.R.S. section 13-703.F.9, an aggravating circumstance exists when, at the time the murder was committed, [t]he defendant was an adult ... or tried as an adult and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age or was seventy years of age or older. A.R.S. § 13-703.F.9. The statute is straightforward; the ages of the offender and victim invoke the aggravator. Medina, 193 Ariz. at 511 ¶ 23, 975 P.2d at 101 (holding this aggravating circumstance does not require further finding that the defendant was aware of the victim's age). The F.9 finding is implicit in the jury's verdict if the jury convicts the defendant of first degree murder and another crime committed against the murder victim in which the age of the victim constitutes a substantive element of the crime. ¶ 84 In some instances, Arizona's criminal code defines crimes based on the young age of the victim. For example, a person commits child molestation by intentionally or knowingly engaging in or causing a person to engage in sexual contact, except sexual contact with the female breast, with a child under fifteen years of age. A.R.S. § 13-1410.A (2001). ¶ 85 Because the victim's age constitutes a substantive element of certain criminal offenses, a conviction necessarily reflects a jury determination that the victim was less than fifteen years old. The jury will have already found the necessary fact, age of the victim, through criminal proceedings compliant with Sixth Amendment safeguards. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. at 2362. Under these circumstances, the jury's implicit finding of the victim's age satisfies the F.9 aggravating circumstance. ¶ 86 If the trial judge found the F.9 factor and the jury also convicted the defendant of an age-dependent crime committed against the murder victim, we will find any Ring II error harmless. Other circumstances that may involve harmless error include, for example, those instances in which the defendant stipulated to the age of the victim or in which overwhelming evidence establishes the victim's age. In other instances, we will consider whether the Ring II error requires that we remand for resentencing.