Opinion ID: 1060845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: public duty doctrine/special duty exception

Text: In Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn. 1995), this Court held that the common law doctrine of public duty and its exception, the special duty doctrine, survived the enactment of the GTLA. Because the GTLA was not pled as a defense [1] in Ezell , however, this Court declined to address just how the GTLA and the public duty doctrine would apply in cases in which both bases for immunity were alleged. Both the GTLA and the public duty doctrine are affirmative defenses. Courts first look to the GTLA. If immunity is found under the GTLA, a court need not inquire as to whether the public duty doctrine also provides immunity. If, however, the GTLA does not provide immunity, courts may look to the general rule of immunity under the public duty doctrine. If immunity is then found under the public duty doctrine, the next inquiry is whether the special duty exception removes the immunity afforded under the public duty doctrine. The special duty exception, however, cannot be used to remove immunity afforded by the GTLA. Accordingly, the appellate court erred in using an exception to a common law doctrine to remove immunity conferred by the GTLA. Unlike the appellate court, however, we have found that the defendant's acts are not immune under the GTLA. We will now look to see whether the defendant is immune under the public duty doctrine. In Ezell , this Court recognized that the public duty doctrine shielded public employees from tort liability for injuries caused by a public employee's breach of a duty owed to the public at large. The special duty exception, however, removes the immunity when: (1) a public official affirmatively undertakes to protect the plaintiff and the plaintiff relies upon the undertaking; (2) a statute specifically provides for a cause of action against an official or municipality for injuries resulting to a particular class of individuals, of which the plaintiff is a member, from failure to enforce certain laws; or (3) a plaintiff alleges a cause of action involving intent, malice, or reckless misconduct. Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d at 402. Subsection (1) applies to the facts of this case as Robert Lee and the Animal Shelter affirmatively undertook to protect the plaintiff. They issued a letter to Ms. Stidham indicating that any fencing deficiencies would be corrected. The letter further indicated that the dogs would be enrolled into obedience training. The letter indicated that failure to comply with the Animal Shelter's order would result in the animals' immediate seizure. Ms. Stidham did not appeal the order and relied upon the undertaking of Lee and the Shelter to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine is applicable to this case, and the City may be held liable for the plaintiff's damages under the GTLA.