Opinion ID: 552427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the ordinance resulting in anticompetitive conduct violates california law

Text: 14 Appellants next argue that the legislature could not have intended the City's allegedly anticompetitive conduct because: 1) that intent cannot be inferred from the general grant of power to zone housing subdivisions; and 2) the City's actions violated California law. 15 We reject appellants' invitation to look behind California's general grant of zoning power to municipalities. The Supreme Court has made clear that an in-depth substantive review of a statute to determine the legislature's intent is not appropriate. See Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41-43, 105 S.Ct. 1713, 1717-19, 85 L.Ed.2d 24 (1985). 16 The legislature is deemed to have intended anticompetitive conduct as long as it may foreseeably result from a broad authority to regulate. Id. at 42-43, 105 S.Ct. at 1718-19 (finding legislative intent from state's specific authorization to cities to provide sewage services and its delegation to cities of express authority to take action which could foreseeably result in anticompetitive conduct); see also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64-65, 105 S.Ct. 1721, 1730-31, 85 L.Ed.2d 36 (finding that state's failure to describe the implementation of its policy in detail will not defeat protection of the state action doctrine if legislature's intent to establish an anticompetitive regulatory program is clear). Under this non-substantive review of the statutory scheme, the only instance in which the Court will apparently deny a finding of legislative intent to sanction the alleged anticompetitive conduct is where the state has given the municipality an exceedingly broad and unspecific grant of power. See, e.g., Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54-56, 102 S.Ct. at 842-43 (holding that a grant of home rule authority to the city was not specific enough to warrant state action immunity). The Court's rejection of substantive review of state statutes is wholly consistent with the policies of federalism and state sovereignty upon which the state action doctrine is based. Once the state decides to delegate its regulatory authority to a city, that city enjoys the same immunity from federal antitrust law that the state would have enjoyed. 17 The relevant portions of the California Government Code Sec. 65300 et seq. (West 1983) delegate to the City the power to adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county or city, including waste disposal, conservation, analysis of housing needs and regulation of the housing market. We find that this statute clearly delegates sufficient regulatory authority to the City to uphold state action immunity. The legality of the 1983 Ordinance under California case law is irrelevant for the purposes of this case. The relevant question is whether the state intended the authorizing statute to have anticompetitive effects. Thus, what the city does to implement that statute, rightly or wrongly, reveals nothing about the state's intent. 18 For the reasons stated above, we hold that appellee has immunity from appellant's antitrust claims.