Opinion ID: 1491353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reasonableness of search

Text: Of course, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches, not all searches, and thus, in addressing the reasonableness of the search conducted by Officer Goins upon her entry into Appellant's home, we must consider the officer-parolee context of that search. While residence searches generally require both probable cause and a warrant, the special needs of supervised release reduce probationers' and parolees' reasonable expectations of privacy. The United States Supreme Court has thus held that a warrantless search of a probationer's residence is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the search is supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation. [17] Similarly, this Court has found constitutionally permissible the warrantless searches of parolees when authorized by the terms and conditions of parole. [18] Thus, having determined that Officer Goins's entry into Appellant's home constituted a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we examine the constitutionality of that search by assessing its compliance with regulations governing searches in the context of parole supervision. Before beginning our analysis, however, we observe that the Commonwealth raises a series of arguments as to whether: (1) Appellant had standing to contest the search; (2) Appellant actually objected to Officer Goins's visit or merely attempted to delay her entry; and (3) Appellant's positive drug test, standing alone, gave Officer Goins a sufficient basis to search the residence. We find no merit in any of these claims. The first is squarely contradicted by the evidence that Appellant resided in the home searched. [19] The second asks us to disregard a factual finding supported by substantial evidence. [20] And the third not only asks us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and make our own factual finding, but to make a finding that is not just unsupported but actually contradicted by the evidence at the evidentiary hearing. Officer Goins testified that Appellant's positive drug test was unrelated to the at-home visit that brought her to the property, and Officer Goins was asked no questions regarding any suspicions she had as a result of the positive drug test or any other interaction with Appellant. In accordance with its statutory authority to adopt administrative regulations with respect to...conditions to be imposed on parolees, [21] the Kentucky Parole Board has adopted regulations outlining mandatory conditions for parolees, including: (1) The parolee shall: ... (c) Not indulge in the use of a nonprescribed controlled substance. ... ( l ) Comply with the conditions of supervision and administrative regulations prescribed by the Division of Probation and Parole and special instructions of his parole officer. [22] And, pursuant to similar statutory authority, [23] the Justice Cabinet and the Department of Corrections have adopted regulations incorporating certain policies and procedures, [24] including those relating to searches of persons under parole supervision. [25] Specifically, Department of Corrections Policy No. 27-16-01 outlines policies and procedures relating to the warrantless search of a parolee: If Reasonable Suspicion Exists to believe that an offender is violating a condition of supervision or the officer has possession of evidence of a violation of the terms and conditions of supervision, an officer may search without a warrant. [26] During the evidentiary hearing conducted by the trial court, Appellant's parole officer testified that Appellant had, on multiple occasions, signed his name to and thereby acknowledged the terms and conditions of his parole. One of the conditions he acknowledged addressed his officer's right to search his person or premises: I agree that I may be subject to search and seizure if my officer has reason to believe that I may have illegal drugs, alcohol, volatile substance, or other contraband on my person or property. [27] Accordingly, we evaluate the merits of Appellant's constitutional challenge by determining whether the search was accomplished in accordance with the applicable policyi.e., by assessing whether Officer Goins had reasonable suspicion that the performance of the search may produce evidence to support [an alleged violation of Appellant's parole]. [28] And, because, in the trial court, the Commonwealth premised its argument for the admissibility of this evidence exclusively upon its belief that Officer Goins lawfully entered the residence in connection with an at-home visit we find no evidence supporting the contention that Officer Goins's entry itself was authorized under departmental policy. Specifically, the record contains no evidence that, prior to her entry into Appellant's home, Officer Goins possessed any reasonable suspicion that Appellant had given her erroneous information as to his residencyor any evidence that Officer Goins had reasonable suspicions that Appellant was otherwise violating his parole based on either Appellant's positive drug test or Appellant's refusal to permit her entry. [29] Because we find no other exception to the warrant requirement, we find that Officer Goins's entry into Appellant's home was unlawful, and we hold that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence that was discovered during the subsequent search as well as Appellant's statements relating to the contraband discovered.