Opinion ID: 450428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pinkerton Doctrine

Text: 30 Defendants Gironda and Heckens argue that their convictions on Count III for violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(2) should be reversed because the convictions represent an unwarranted extension of the Pinkerton doctrine enunciated in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Section 924(c)(2) provides that whoever: 31 carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years. 32 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(2). The evidence at trial demonstrated that on August 19, 1982, when the Postal Inspectors arrested defendants Balzano and Gironda at the zoo, defendant Balzano was carrying a pistol concealed in the waistband of his pants. On the basis of this evidence, the judge instructed the jury that it could convict defendants Gironda and Heckens of violating section 924(c)(2) if it found them guilty of conspiracy on Count I and if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt [f]irst, that the offense charged in ... Count III was committed; second, that the offense was committed pursuant to and in furtherance of the conspiracy; and third, that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the offense was committed. The trial judge explained that the Pinkerton doctrine was the basis of his instruction and that the Pinkerton doctrine holds a coconspirator who commits an offense in furtherance of a conspiracy ... to be the agent of the other coconspirators. After these instructions, the jury convicted defendants Gironda and Heckens, in addition to defendant Balzano, of violating section 924(c)(2). 33 Defendants contend that the Pinkerton doctrine should not be applied to section 924(c)(2) in this case. In support of their position, defendants advance a number of essentially related arguments. Basically, defendants' first argument is that Pinkerton should not apply to the facts of this case because the offense to which Pinkerton liability would attach is not the objective of the conspiracy. In other words, according to defendants, Pinkerton contemplates that where one conspirator accomplishes the illegal objective of the conspiracy, his coconspirators, although they did not personally commit the substantive crime, may also be liable for that crime. 34 In Pinkerton, two brothers conspired to violate various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Daniel Pinkerton was convicted of committing various substantive offenses, which were the objects of the conspiracy, although the evidence demonstrated that his brother, and not he, actually had committed these offenses. Id. at 645, 66 S.Ct. at 1183. In affirming Daniel Pinkerton's conviction, the Supreme Court noted that [t]he act done was in execution of the enterprise ... [and] we fail to see why the same or other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive offense. Id. at 647, 66 S.Ct. at 1184. 35 This court has interpreted Pinkerton to mean that each conspirator may be liable for overt acts of every other conspirator done in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir.1981). See United States v. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847, 858 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 211, 83 L.Ed.2d 141; United States v. Shelton, 669 F.2d 446, 454 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934, 102 S.Ct. 1989, 72 L.Ed.2d 454; United States v. Garza-Hernandez, 623 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.1980). See also United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 322 (7th Cir.1983) (a proven conspirator is responsible for the substantive offenses based on the overt acts of his fellow conspirators as long as those acts were done in furtherance or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2661, 81 L.Ed.2d 367 (1984). 1 In accordance with this court's established construction of the Pinkerton doctrine, we held in United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.1984), that the district court did not err in giving an instruction on Pinkerton liability similar to the one at issue in this case. Id. at 313, 314. In Galiffa, Count I charged defendant with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and Count IV charged him with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Id. at 307-08. The judge instructed the jury that: 36 [I]f you find that the defendant Galiffa is guilty as charged in Count I, you may also find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in Count IV, provided that you find that the essential elements of Count IV as defined in these instructions have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and provided that you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession of ... marijuana with intent to distribute was committed pursuant to the conspiracy and that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the substantive offense was committed. 37 Id. at 313. Rejecting defendant's challenge to the instruction, this court held that the foregoing instruction comports with the Pinkerton doctrine. Id. at 314. 38 Defendants do not challenge their convictions on Count III on the ground that the section 924(c)(2) violation was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. Rather, defendants maintain that [t]he Pinkerton rationale loses all force when the act with which the defendant is charged is not the objective of the conspiracy. Defendants' interpretation of Pinkerton, however, ignores numerous decisions of this court, cited above, that interpret Pinkerton as imposing liability, not just for the object offense, but also for acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Shelton, 669 F.2d at 454 (each defendant is vicariously liable for the overt acts committed by the other conspirators to further the overall scheme ) (emphasis added). Thus, that the section 924(c)(2) violation was not the object of the conspiracy is irrelevant to defendants' liability as coconspirators. Rather, this court holds that defendants' convictions should be upheld so long as both defendants Gironda and Heckens were conspirators and so long as defendant Balzano unlawfully carried the gun in furtherance of the conspiracy. 39 On the basis of the evidence offered at trial, the jury properly could have found, in accordance with the court's instructions, that defendant Balzano's act of unlawfully carrying the gun was done to further the conspiracy. Only one other court to our knowledge has addressed the relationship of the Pinkerton doctrine to section 924(c)(2). In United States v. Brant, 448 F.Supp. 781 (W.D.Pa.1978), the court held a conspirator liable for his coconspirator's act of carrying a firearm during a narcotics transaction. The court reasoned that, It cannot be denied that the possession of firearms at a narcotics transaction increases the probability of the transaction's success and, thus, is an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 782. 40 Ruiz testified at trial that, as the wire fraud scheme began to stall, defendants became frustrated and made certain verbal and physical threats toward Ruiz and Velazquez. For example, as Velazquez testified, during his first meeting with defendants Balzano and Gironda, defendant Balzano told him that people were breathing down his back and if he was in trouble, so was Velazquez. Furthermore, Ruiz testified that, when Velazquez began to falter, Heckens told Ruiz that if Velazquez did not follow through with the plans, there would be a lot of trouble for all of [them]. In addition, Ruiz testified that Nichols told him that he had received a phone call from defendant Gironda threatening the lives of Ruiz and Velazquez if the conspiracy did not progress. 41 With respect to the physical violence, Ruiz testified that, two days before defendants' arrests at the zoo, defendants Balzano and Gironda physically assaulted him in the presence of defendants Speiss and Heckens. In particular, he testified that Gironda beat him with a rubber hose and put a gun in his mouth and that Balzano put a gun to his ribs and threatened him with a straight edge razor. According to Ruiz, defendants Balzano and Gironda threatened his life for failing to follow through with the conspiracy. During this encounter, Ruiz promised to arrange a meeting with Charles Geiger, his contact at First National. As set forth earlier, defendants Balzano and Gironda apparently believed, when they arrived at the zoo two days later, that they were going to meet with Geiger to discuss the conspiracy. 42 Although the jury acquitted defendants Balzano, Gironda, and Heckens of violating section 924(c)(1), prohibiting the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, in connection with the incident preceding the meeting at the zoo, the jury was entitled to find that Balzano intended to further the conspiracy by unlawfully carrying the gun to the zoo. Even discounting Ruiz' testimony that defendants Blazano and Gironda threatened him with a gun, there was abundant evidence to demonstrate that defendants were frustrated by the failure of the conspiracy to progress as planned. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the jury to find that defendant Balzano carried the gun to the zoo to put pressure on Geiger to follow through with the conspiracy. Thus, because the jury had sufficient evidence to prove that the section 924(c)(2) violation was in furtherance of the conspiracy and because the judge properly instructed it on that issue, this court will not disturb on appeal defendants Gironda's and Heckens' convictions on Count III. 43 Defendants raise a number of policy arguments to support their contention that Pinkerton should not be applied to section 924(c)(2) convictions. 2 First, defendants argue that only by bootstrapping can the Government convict defendants Gironda and Heckens both of conspiring to steal money and of violating section 924(c)(2). They contend that [t]he conspiracy is an essential element of the 924(c) charge and after the conspiracy was used to satisfy the elements of 924(c), that same conspiracy was relied upon to charge other conspirators with a second crime. To convict under section 924(c)(2); however, the Government needs to prove more than the elements of the crime of conspiracy. In addition to proving that the violation occurred during the commission of a conspiracy, the Government must prove that defendant carried the gun unlawfully. To establish the unlawfulness of defendant's possession, the Government may resort to state or local law. United States v. Elorduy, 612 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S.Ct. 2997, 64 L.Ed.2d 861; United States v. Garcia, 555 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir.1977). In this case, the Government demonstrated that defendant Balzano carried the gun concealed in the waistband of his pants. As the judge instructed the jury, under Illinois law, it is unlawful to carry a concealed weapon. This court, therefore, rejects defendants' argument that there was no substantive crime separate and apart from the conspiracy. See United States v. Johnson, 658 F.2d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir.1981) (Section 924(c)(2) ... mak[es] the carrying ... of a firearm during the commission of a felony punishable as a separate offense); United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 107 (6th Cir.1984) (en banc). 44 Defendants maintain that, even if section 924(c)(2) creates a substantive crime distinct from the conspiracy, section 924(c)(2) does not create a federal offense because the unlawfulness element is established under Illinois law. For this reason, defendants continue, [n]o violation of federal law was alleged and, unless the Government is suggesting that Pinkerton creates pendent criminal jurisdiction, the illegality under state law is irrelevant. Defendants cite no cases to support their position that Pinkerton may not be applied to an offense one element of which may be established by resort to state law. Contrary to defendants' arguments, this court finds that section 924(c)(2) does create a federal offense. The federal offense under section 924(c)(2) is the act of unlawfully carrying a firearm during the commission of any felony for which [a defendant] may be prosecuted in a court of the United States. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(2) (emphasis added). In United States v. Howard, 504 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir.1974), the Eighth Circuit held that a conviction under section 924(c)(2) by resort to state law is not unconstitutional. Id. at 1287. The court reasoned that: 45 a violation of a state firearms law ... is only one element of the offense defined by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(2). The other element is the concurrent commission of a federal felony, which--as Congress intended--brings the offense within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 46 Id. Because this court agrees with the Eighth Circuit that section 924(c)(2) establishes a federal offense, we reject defendants' contention that to apply Pinkerton to section 924(c)(2) would create pendent federal criminal jurisdiction. 47 Defendants also argue that the district court's application of the Pinkerton doctrine to section 924(c)(2) contravenes the legislative intent underlying the statute. As the Supreme Court has noted, the legislative history behind section 924(c)(2) is sparse. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 914, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978). The record of the floor debates concerning this section indicates that Congressman Poff, the representative who proposed the statute as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, intended the statute to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a federal felony to leave his gun at home. 114 Cong.Rec. 22231 (1968). By applying Pinkerton to section 924(c)(2), courts may encourage some conspirators to pressure other conspirators to leave their guns at home. As the Government argues in its brief, If the use or unlawful possession of a firearm is an overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy or is a natural consequence of it, then all coconspirators, as agents of each other, should be responsible for it and are in a position to preclude that act. 48 Second, defendants argue that to apply the Pinkerton doctrine to section 924(c)(2) would contravene legislative intent by subjecting defendants to multiple penalties for the same act. In support of this argument, defendants rely on the Supreme Court's decisions in Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), and Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980). Those cases, however, are inapposite. In those cases, the Court examined and answered in the negative the question whether Congress intended section 924(c)(2) to apply if the predicate felony charged provided its own enhancement provision for the use of a dangerous weapon. Simpson, 435 U.S. at 13, 98 S.Ct. at 913; Busic, 446 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. at 1751. Defendants attempt to liken this case to Simpson and Busic by relying on the fact that liability under section 924(c)(2) rests on proof of all of the elements of the separate offense of conspiracy. As discussed above, this court rejects defendants' position that to convict defendants Gironda and Heckens under section 924(c)(2) causes them to be punished twice for the same offense. Because section 924(c)(2) requires proof of an element distinct from the crime of conspiracy, this court holds that defendants' convictions under section 924(c)(2) create no double punishment problems and are not contrary to the legislative intent underlying the statute.