Opinion ID: 1776445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Benchmarks

Text: The facts or happenings of this case are largely undisputed. A political campaign was underway; the political advertisement was aired on four television stations in this state; and, most importantly, the statements of the advertisement are without dispute. There are, however, two important factual disputes that a jury must determine in this case: (1) whether the statement was understood as imputing some sort of corrupt conduct to Camp; and (2) whether, if a jury finds that the statement was understood as imputing corrupt conduct to Camp, Yeager knew that such an imputation was false. The first factual dispute must be resolved by determining the meaning that would be ascribed to the language by a reader or listener of ordinary or average intelligence, or by a `common mind,' Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 325 So.2d 137, 142 (1975), and is not to be determined by critical analysis of a trained legal mind, Gray v. WALA-TV, 384 So.2d 1062, 1065 (Ala.1980). The common mind concept is the conduit that carries this case through the summary judgment stage to the jury for resolution. The value of the statement as suggesting corrupt conduct must be measured by common mind jurors, as opposed to a trained legal mind. This is so because political statements, if they are to be effective, must be designed to appeal to the general public, the citizensthe votersin an effort to persuade them that the thrust of the statements is true or has merit, either favorable to the candidate who makes those statements or unfavorable to his opponent. We have no hesitancy to excerpt certain language from Anderson, language that we perceive supports our conclusion that this case should be presented to a jury: Our holding that the clear and convincing standard of proof should be taken into account in ruling on summary judgment motions does not denigrate the role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Neither do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513 (citations omitted). The determination of whether the summary judgment here should be denied on the issue of actual malice is whether the evidence in the record could support a jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not. Finally, we note, as an earlier Court noted: `The issue of actual malice on the part of defendants seems peculiarly inappropriate for disposition by summary judgment because it concerns motive, intent, and subjective feelings and reactions.' Loveless, 325 So.2d at 143 (quoting Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 261 F.Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y.1966), aff'd, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049, 90 S.Ct. 701, 24 L.Ed.2d 695 (1970)). For reasons indicated, not the least of which is the necessity of a jury's opportunity to weigh and determine credibility and subjective intent, we find this case uniquely suited for presentation to a jury. We, therefore, determine that the factual disputes here should be presented to a jury for decision pursuant to the clear and convincing evidence standard mandated by the current law. The summary judgment entered in favor of Yeager and Timbes & Yeager is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur. HOUSTON, J., concurs specially. MADDOX, J., dissents.