Opinion ID: 1109078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Checkpoints under Federal Law

Text: The Constitution of the United States guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Although a police officer must normally have probable cause to effectuate a reasonable seizure, exceptions to this requirement have evolved. The United States Supreme Court has approved an exception for search and seizure by a governmental authority where the officer has no articulable suspicion of wrongdoing in the context of border checkpoints to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); checkpoints to verify driver's licenses, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); and checkpoints to determine sobriety, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). In Delaware v. Prouse , the reasonableness of the seizure was determined by balancing [the] intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Random automobile inspections conducted without articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is in violation of a traffic regulation are prohibited unless there are previously specified neutral criteria which prevent the unfettered exercise of discretion by a police officer in the field. Id. at 662, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Notably, however, the Supreme Court suggested the [q]uestioning of all on-coming traffic at roadblock-type stops as a presumably constitutional alternative. Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), the Court proposed a balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of seizures made without articulable suspicion of wrongdoing that weighs the gravity of public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637. Above all, such a seizure must be conducted under a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Id. Subsequently, in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz , the Supreme Court upheld the use of a sobriety checkpoint. In doing so, the Supreme Court clarified the application of the balancing test enunciated in Brown. To measure the effectiveness of the seizure for advancing the public interest, the Court noted that: Brown was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.... [F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. 496 U.S. at 453-54, 110 S.Ct. 2481. While a complete absence of empirical data may be constitutionally unacceptable, the Supreme Court disproved the searching empirical analysis done by the Michigan court that found a sobriety checkpoint ineffective when only 1.6% of the drivers passing through were found alcohol impaired. Id. at 454-55, 110 S.Ct. 2481. In evaluating the subjective intrusion to the stopped motorist, the Court clarified that the potential for generating fear and surprise must be considered from the standpoint of the law-abiding citizen, not the fear of one who has been drinking. Id. at 452, 110 S.Ct. 2481. Finding the checkpoint to be a reasonable seizure, the Court noted the very brief detention that occurred to each motorist passing through the checkpoint and that the officers followed detailed guidelines which limited their discretion. Id. at 447, 110 S.Ct. 2481. Under federal law, checkpoints such as the instant one presumably do not violate constitutional guarantees under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that a brief stop at a highway roadblock for the limited purpose of verifying a driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance is a reasonable intrusion into the lives of drivers and their passengers even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that an individual passenger or motorist is engaged in illegal activity.); United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1313 (D.C.Cir.1989) (stressing checkpoint involved stopping all the cars passing in either direction); see also United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir.1984). [4]