Opinion ID: 1752241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction on justification.

Text: Assault is defined by section 708.1, The Code 1979, as follows: A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person does any of the following: 1. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. 2. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. 3. Intentionally points any firearm toward another, or displays in a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another. Provided, that where the person doing any of the above enumerated acts, and such other person, are voluntary participants in a sport, social or other activity, not in itself criminal, and such act is a reasonably foreseeable incident of such sport or activity, and does not create an unreasonable risk of serious injury or breach of the peace, the act shall not be an assault. (Emphasis added.) Apparently on the basis of the language of the statute, the court of appeals concluded that absence of justification is an element of assault. We believe, however, that justification is an affirmative defense rather than an element of that crime. The question of whether language in a statutory definition constitutes an element of the crime or an affirmative defense has been addressed by this court on a number of occasions. E.g., State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Iowa 1981); State v. Gibbs, 239 N.W.2d 866, 867-69 (Iowa 1976). The significance of the distinction between an element and an affirmative defense is that with regard to an element, the State has the burden of going forward with the evidence as well as the ultimate burden of persuasion. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d at 62. By contrast, it is the defendant who has the burden of going forward with evidence of an affirmative defense. There is no burden on the State to negate an affirmative defense unless the defendant meets his initial burden by producing sufficient evidence that the defense applies. Id. at 62-63. In State v. Sharkey, 311 N.W.2d 68, 72-73 (Iowa 1981), the defendant objected to the trial court's jury instruction defining assault because it omitted the words without justification found in the section 708.1 definition of that crime. Citing the rule that where the record in a prosecution for assault does not contain substantial evidence of self defense the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury on justification, id. at 72, this court concluded that the record in that case did not contain substantial evidence to generate a fact issue on self-defense, id. at 73. Thus, it is clear that justification was treated as an affirmative defense in Sharkey because the burden of going forward with the evidence was placed on the defendant. In stating the rule that no instruction need be given on justification unless the record contains substantial evidence of self-defense, the Sharkey opinion cited assault cases which were decided under Iowa's criminal code as it existed prior to its revision in 1978. See id. at 72. Before that revision, assault was referred to as a crime in the code, but was not expressly defined, see, e.g., § 694.1, The Code 1977; therefore, the common law definition was used. Nevertheless, for reasons hereafter discussed, it is clear that Sharkey was correct in continuing to treat justification as an affirmative defense under the revised criminal code. First, we note that the 1978 criminal code revision was primarily a restatement of prior law. Emery v. Fenton, 266 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 1978). Changes made by that revision are not to be construed as altering the law unless the legislature's intent to do so is clear and unmistakable. Id. at 10. Furthermore, [a]n intent to make a change does not exist when the revised statute is merely susceptible to two constructions. Id. We find that the inclusion of the words without justification in section 708.1 merely makes the statute susceptible to two constructions; therefore, the language does not signify a clear and unmistakable legislative intent to make lack of justification an element of assault. Moreover, we cannot believe the legislature intended justification to be an element of the offense because such a construction of the statute would be unworkable. Chapter 704 of the criminal code sets forth eight distinct types of justification, ranging from self-defense to the use of force in making an arrest. See §§ 704.3-.5, .7-.12, The Code 1979. It is unreasonable to think that the legislature intended to place upon the State the burden of laboriously disproving each of those forms of justification in every prosecution for assault, no matter how unrelated to the facts of the case they may be. We hold that justification is an affirmative defense to assault, as defined in section 708.1, rather than an element of that crime. Accordingly, the next question is whether there was sufficient evidence in the record here to generate a jury question on justification. The justification of self-defense is defined by statute as follows: A person is justified in the use of reasonable force when he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend himself or herself or another from any imminent use of unlawful force. § 704.3, The Code 1979. The only possible evidence that unlawful force was used against defendant was deputy Redlinger's testimony that he grabbed defendant by the shoulder, and the testimony of defendant and his passengers that the same officer grabbed defendant by the hair and knocked defendant's head against the car. Defendant argues that he was justified in stomping on the accelerator to retreat from deputy Redlinger's use of unlawful force. We think it is clear from the record, however, that the jury convicted defendant not because he stomped on the accelerator, but because it believed that defendant, in mid-retreat, deliberately turned the car around and drove it back toward the officers with the intent to seriously injure them. The latter act, of course, could not be considered necessary as a matter of self-defense within the meaning of section 704.3. See 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery § 160 (1963) (Self-defense may operate as justification only if the act committed by the defendant was defensive, and not where it was retaliatory.) Accordingly, we conclude there was no evidence in the record to generate a jury question on the justification of self-defense. Trial court therefore properly refused to instruct on that issue.