Opinion ID: 339739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possible.

Text: 16 Q. Possible. Were you scared? 17 A. Yes, sir. 18 Q. Did they say that if you gave them a statement that things would go better for you or anything to that effect? 19 A. Yes, sir. 20 We agree that the foregoing admission by Cannon ameliorates the probable effect of disclosure to the jury of Smith's threat. We are also aware that (i)f the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor. Agurs, supra, at ----, 96 S.Ct. at 2400. Thus we attempt no distinction between false or unlawful threats made up out of whole cloth for the purpose of intimidation and true threats that simply arise under the evidence and the law. Both go to the veracity of a witness. It is time honored to argue to a jury that an accomplice's testimony is shaped by self-interest and a real fear of the facts and the law, as the foregoing testimony illustrates. Whether a false threat has a similar effect is also for jury determination. The jury may well have discounted Cannon's fear of prosecution in his admitted role as lender of the automobile, but might have taken much more seriously his apprehension that Agent Smith falsely would place him in the vicinity of the bank as the driver of the getaway car unless he testified to please the government. In short, as in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), here the prosecution allowed a false impression to be created at trial when the truth would have directly impugned the veracity of its key witness. 21 Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the jury's verdict might have been different had it known of Cannon's apprehension that he might be put to trial as an active perpetrator. Because the jury was incorrectly assured that Cannon had not been threatened, and because Smith's threat may reasonably be viewed as impugning Cannon's veracity, and because the case was otherwise wholly circumstantial, we conclude the government's failure to disclose Smith's effort to induce (or coerce) Cannon's testimony was fundamentally unfair and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 22 REVERSED.