Opinion ID: 1809679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Chain of Custody and Due Process

Text: We initially note that Arriola has made no allegation of a particularized defect in the chain of custody. Likewise, he does not argue that the testing procedures are inaccurate, or that any of the laboratory procedures interfered with proper testing of a urine sample, or that his urine sample was contaminated. Instead, in a blanket challenge based upon due process, he makes essentially two arguments: first, that due process was not satisfied because there was an insufficient foundation to admit the documentation evidencing the chain of custody; and second, that due process could only be satisfied in this case by presenting live testimony of the individuals who both received and tested the urine sample. We address each argument in turn. Throughout the course of his appeal, Arriola has contended that the only method for the Superintendent to introduce the chain of custody evidence was through the testimony of Dr. Feldman. Arriola argued that the admission of the chain of custody documentation was improper, because the documentation lacked a foundation insofar as Dr. Feldman was not himself a link in that chain. However, contrary to Arriola's assertion that Dr. Feldman's testimony was the sole basis for admitting the evidence, our examination of the hearing transcript reveals that although the Superintendent offered the documentation into evidence after Dr. Feldman's review, the earlier testimony of the phlebotomists, who were the first links in the chain of custody, [5] satisfied the requirements for a proper foundation. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 94-0716, (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/31/95), 650 So.2d 793, writ denied 95-0530, (La.6/23/1995) 656 So.2d 1012. In Merrill, a criminal defendant argued that the State failed to lay the proper foundation for the introduction of a rock of crack cocaine because, he argued, the State failed to prove that the rock analyzed by the State Police laboratory was indeed the actual object he allegedly gave to the arresting parish police officer. The court found that a proper foundation existed, based upon the testimony of the parish officer who was the first link in the chain and the officer's initials on a sealed envelope sent to the State Police Crime Laboratory. The court noted: The law does not require that the evidence as to custody eliminate all possibility that the object has been altered. For admission, it suffices that it is more probable than not that the object is the one connected to the case. Id. at p. 9, 650 So.2d at 799 (Emphasis added). In the instant case, we observed that each phlebotomist testified as to her training and experience with the collection of urine samples and identified her signature as the first link in the chain of custody documentation. Additionally, each testified from her review of the documentation that Arriola initialed the seal on the lid of the bottle containing the sample and that Arriola initialed the seal on the bag that contained the bottle. We observed that the chain of custody documentation also consists of several forms, the first of which has donor identification information which Arriola completed when he presented his sample for testing. The subsequent forms were generated at the SmithKline laboratory and purport to be continuations of the chain, and were generated as needed to reflect the subsequent handling involved in the testing for indicators of various drugs. We note that Arriola makes much over the fact that the phlebotomists who collected his urine did so at SmithKline's Patient Servicing Center in New Orleans and that no one from SmithKline's Atlanta laboratory who received the sample testified. However, because Arriola gives us no basis for doing so, we decline to draw a distinction between the SmithKline Patient Service Facility and the SmithKline testing laboratory. We therefore find that similar to the officer in Merrill, the phlebotomists who collected Arriola's sample were the first links in the chain of custody and that their testimony provided the minimum required by due process to admit the chain of custody documentation. Furthermore, even though the documentation was introduced after the testimony of the third witness, Dr. Feldman, and not immediately after the phlebotomist whose testimony established the foundation, tenure hearings are not held to the same formalistic requirements of trials for the introduction of evidence. See Roberts v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 617 So.2d 187 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993)(holding that in tenure hearings, strict rules of authentication... do not apply and even though the superintendent conceded that the copy of the movie Child's Play offered as evidence was not the same copy that the teacher showed in class, the School Board properly admitted the videotape copy when other witnesses identified the copy as being the same movie). Accordingly, we find no error in the method of introducing the documentation. It is worthy to note that even if Arriola had pointed to a specific gap within the chain of custody between the Smith-Kline Patient Servicing Center and the actual testing laboratory, our review of the jurisprudence indicates that courts have treated gaps within the chain of custody as a question involving the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility. See, e.g., State v. Sam, 412 So.2d 1082, 1086 (La.1982); United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir.1988); State v. Dunbar, XXXX-XXXX, (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/8/01), 798 So.2d 178, 181. Thus, we conclude that a proper foundation for the chain of custody documentation was established. [6] In addition to his first argument, lack of foundation, Arriola further argues that the School Board's findings were based solely on the documentary evidence without live testimony detailing the actual receipt and testing of the samples in the laboratory. Without this live testimony, Arriola contends that he had no opportunity to cross-examine the evidence. In short, while the Superintendent presented the testimony of someone within the chain of custody and testimony as to the testing procedures from the laboratory's director, Arriola's second argument is that due process can only be satisfied by the live testimony of individual(s) who both received and tested the urine sample. Stated differently, this second argument is really a proposal for testimony from both: 1) additional persons in the chain of custody at the actual testing laboratory; and 2) persons actually performing testing. [7] In order to address this argument, because Arriola draws no distinction between the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and the guarantees of Article I, § 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 to show that the Louisiana Constitution would require anything greater than the federal, for present purposes, we treat the guarantees of each as coterminous. Accordingly, we draw upon the jurisprudence for each, and accept the School Board's assertion that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) provide the primary principles to resolve the due process issue. In Loudermill, the Court stated that the balancing test announced in Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, applies when evaluating the process afforded a tenured public employee prior to discharge. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-43, 105 S.Ct. 1487. Accordingly, when evaluating the propriety of the employment termination proceeding, we must balance the following three factors from Elderidge: [F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Turning to the first factor, the nature of the interest, both Arriola and the School Board are in agreement. Arriola's interest in continued public employment is a property interest under Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543, 105 S.Ct. 1487. As to the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation and value of proposed safeguards, Arriola makes no factual contention to buttress his claim that the chain of custody procedures employed in his case presented a risk of an incorrect result. Even his implication in brief, that because the phlebotomists confirmed that the SmithKline Patient Servicing Center had no security to protect against tampering with the samples in storage that his tests may be flawed, challenges only the weight of the evidence. This challenge does not constitute an affirmative showing for requiring the live testimony of others in the chain of custody or of those who actually perform the tests. In short, in addition to failing to show a risk of erroneous deprivation under the procedures used, Arriola fails to show a probative benefit for requiring the testimony of persons in the chain of custody at the laboratory and the testimony of persons actually performing the tests. On the other hand, squarely addressing the second factor in Eldridge, the School Board points out that the chain of custody documentation is reliable, and consequently, that the testimony of the director was sufficient, because SmithKline was a National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) certified laboratory. In support of this contention, the School Board cites to the rigors required for SmithKline's federal certification which obviates the need for certain State inspections [8] and particularly for this case, its continued use of approved agency custody form[s] from the time of collection to receipt by the laboratory and that upon receipt by the laboratory an appropriate chain of custody form account[s] for the sample or sample aliquots within the laboratory. See Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, § 1.2, 53 Fed. Reg. 11,970, 11,979 (1988). Furthermore, to support its argument that not requiring testimony of actual testing personnel presents a minimal risk of erroneous deprivation, the School Board contends that NIDA laboratories are recognized as the gold standard among drug testing laboratories. See David W. Lockard, Protecting Medical Laboratories From Tort Liability for Drug Testing, 17 J.Legal Med. 427, 431 (1996)(stating that [t]he highest standards are found only in the medical laboratories certified by the National Institute on Drug Abuse ... and indicating that in 1996, only 90 out of approximately 1,200 drug testing facilities in the U.S. satisfied NIDA standards). As to the third Eldridge factor, governmental interest and burden of the proposed procedure, Arriola argues that the burden of providing additional chain of custody and testing witnesses cannot be so great because R.S. 17:462 empowers the School Board to issue subpoenas, compel the attendance of witnesses, and require the production of documentary evidence. For its part, the School Board urges that it has a vested interest in ensuring that its employees who come in direct and daily contact with children are people of good moral character and influence. Citing Williams v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd., 95-980, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/96), 670 So.2d 351, 354. Furthermore, the School Board argues that procuring additional chain of custody testimony would be a huge fiscal burden, and amicus Louisiana School Board Association adds that in light of the expense, school systems would effectively be prevented from terminating employees for drug abuse. In light of these arguments, when we consider that on the one hand, Arriola proposes that additional testimony of chain of custody and testing personnel is a prerequisite to admitting the test results, and on the other the school board details the burden and expense of such testimony, without Arriola making a showing of the value of his proposal for additional live testimony, the balance tilts against his position. Indeed, while Arriola has a property interest at stake, his proposal for additional chain of custody testimony to satisfy the foundation requirement appears to exceed the standard for admissibility in criminal trials. See, e.g., United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir.1988); State v. Simon, 544 So.2d 610 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989)(holding that in criminal case, a continuous chain of custody need not be proven as long as the evidence as a whole establishes that it is more probable than not that the object introduced is the same as that seized). Furthermore, Arriola's argument that a constitutionally sufficient opportunity for cross-examination requires the testimony of testing personnel fails when one recalls that due process requires greater protections when liberty interests are implicated as opposed to property interests. See Brown v. Brienen, 553 F.Supp. 561 (C.D.Ill.1982), citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 178-79 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974)(White, J., concurring and dissenting). In sum, we find that due process was accorded to Arriola's hearing. The testimony of the laboratory director presented sufficient opportunity for cross-examination of the test results. Likewise, the testimony of the phlebotomists allowed Arriola to challenge the foundation of the chain of custody documentation. The record reveals that the due process was more than an abstraction as Arriola availed himself of the opportunity to cross-examine the phlebotomists and the laboratory director.