Opinion ID: 1262905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Treaty Rights Exception

Text: The Mathesons next argue that the Treaty of Medicine Creek addresses employment rights and payment of overtime, although crudely, because the Treaty states that [t]he said tribes and bands agree to free all slaves now held by them, and not to purchase or acquire others hereafter. Indian treaties are deemed the legal equivalent of federal statutes and they can therefore be modified or even abrogated by Congress.... Nevertheless, the presumption is that a statute does not modify or abrogate Indian treaty rights. Great Lakes, 4 F.3d at 493 (citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986), and Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979)). The text of a treaty must be construed as the Indians would naturally have understood it at the time of the treaty, with doubtful or ambiguous expressions resolved in the Indians' favor. United States v. Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir.2007). Ambiguities in tribal treaties are construed liberally to favor Native Americans and to respect traditional notions of Native American sovereignty. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 185. In Smiskin, this court distinguished its findings in a previous case, United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir.1995), which analyzed a different section of the Medicine Creek Treaty than is at issue in the present case. Baker involved members of the Puyallup Tribe who trafficked in unstamped cigarettes without obtaining prior approval from the State of Washington, in violation of Washington Administrative Code section 458-20-192. The cigarettes were therefore unauthorized under state law and contraband under the CCTA [Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act]. Smiskin, 487 F.3d at 1267. The Smiskin opinion noted that the Medicine Creek Treaty provided only that [t]he said tribes and bands finally agree not to trade at Vanzcouver's Island, or elsewhere out of the dominions of the United States. 487 F.3d at 1267 (citation omitted). The relevant part of the Treaty did not expressly grant any right to the Puyallup Tribe and was ambiguous regarding any trading right. Id. In stark contrast, the Yakama Treaty, which is a different treaty with a different tribe, expressly granted the right to travel. Id. Therefore, this court found that the CCTA would certainly be an impermissible restriction on the Yakamas' right to travel if the Government could rely on it to enforce against tribal members a state fee on the transport of unstamped cigarettes. Id. (emphasis in original). Great Lakes involved treaties that covered thirteen Chippewa Indian tribes that inhabit the Great Lakes region. Great Lakes, 4 F.3d at 492. The Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission (the Commission) supervised the activities and enforced the rights retained by the treaties, including hunting and fishing. Id. The Commission did not pay time and half for overtime to its officers. Id. at 491. The Department of Labor sought enforcement of a subpoena seeking evidence that the Commission was in violation of the FLSA. Id. In order to determine whether the subpoena could be enforced, and whether the Department had jurisdiction to regulate wages of the Commission, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the treaties at issue. The Seventh Circuit determined that the treaties contained only rights to hunt, fish and gather. Id. at 493. The treaties did not mention a system for enforcing those rights, or contain any reference to terms of employment of those hired to enforce it. Id. Therefore, the court focused on the FLSA itself and its exemption for state and local law enforcement officers. Id. Here, there is nothing in the Medicine Creek Treaty directly on point discussing employment or wages and hours. Moreover, the language regarding freeing all slaves is not so ambiguous that it could be construed to cover the payment of required wages. Therefore, the application of the overtime provisions of the FLSA to a retail business such as Baby Zack's does not impact the tribe's agreement that it would free all slaves. Relying on Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), the Mathesons additionally argue that their Treaty right to occupy and exclude gives them a right to regulate employment relationships with those non-tribal members who consent to employment by tribal members. [A] hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian lands.... Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141, 102 S.Ct. 894. In Montana, the Supreme Court stated that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245. This is because the exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes. Id. at 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245. To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (citations omitted). As was the case in Montana, here also, [n]o such circumstances ... are involved in this case. Id. at 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245. First, there is no evidence that the Puyallup Tribe asserted regulatory authority over employment and wages for non-Indians. See MacArthur, 497 F.3d at 1069 ( Montana only applies insofar as the tribe in question is seeking to assert regulatory authority over the activities of a nonmember.). The Mathesons' only argument in this regard is that they were issued a business license by the Tribe. Such information, however, is not in the record. Even if it were, the issuance of a license to do business does not mean that the Puyallup Tribe has sought to regulate wages and hours of employees. Second, there is no evidence that the non-Indians employed at Baby Zack's entered into any agreements or dealings with the Puyallup Tribe that would subject the non-Indians to tribal civil jurisdiction. Finally, the Mathesons have not alleged that requiring payment of time and a half for overtime imperils the welfare of the Tribe. We, therefore, conclude that the Montana holding is inapplicable to the instant case. The Mathesons also contend that the right to exclude and the language preventing non-Indians from residing on their land prevents the Department of Labor from entering the reservation to investigate FLSA violations. In Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the treaty described the boundaries for the reservation and stated that [a]ll of which tract shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for [the tribe's] exclusive use; nor shall any white person be permitted to reside upon the same without the concurrent permission of the agent and superintendent. 935 F.2d at 184 (citation omitted). Construing the treaty liberally in favor of the Indians and resolving ambiguities in their favor, this court stated that it did not construe the term reside narrowly to cover only the exclusion of non-Native Americans from occupying reservation land.... [T]he Treaty was designed to provide them land where they would be able to separate themselves from non-Native Americans. The Tribe's English vocabulary at the time the Treaty was entered into was extremely limited. Read within the context of the entire Treaty and in light of the history of Native American relations, the provision sets forth a general right of exclusion. Id. at 185. This court then determined whether the general right of exclusion barred application of OSHA to the sawmill. This court noted that in Coeur d'Alene we had recognized that Native Americans possess an inherent sovereign right, independent of express treaty language, to exclude non-Native Americans from their reservation. This right, which is analogous to the general right of exclusion contained in the Treaty, was insufficient to bar application of the Act. The identical right should not have a different effect because it arises from general treaty language rather than recognized, inherent sovereign rights. Id. at 186. This court also noted that our previous decisions of Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.1982) and United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.1980), superceded by statute, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467, as recognized in United States v. E.C. Investments, Inc., 77 F.3d 327 (9th Cir.1996), implicitly ruled that the federal government was authorized to enter reservation land where taxable articles are kept, and that federal officers were authorized to enforce the gambling prohibition by entering reservation property. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 185-86. Therefore, this court held that because OSHA was a generally applicable statute, the conflict between the tribe's treaty right to exclude and the limited entry necessary to enforce OSHA did not bar application of OSHA to the sawmill. Id. at 186. This court stated that were it to find otherwise, the enforcement of nearly all generally applicable federal laws would be nullified. Id. at 187. Accordingly, because the FLSA overtime provisions apply to the Mathesons, we conclude that the Secretary was authorized to make entry on to the reservation in order to locate records via her regular procedure in her effort to enforce the statute in question.