Opinion ID: 759223
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Hourly Rate

Text: 143 The rates to be used in calculating the § 1988 lodestar are the market rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); see, e.g., Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 172 (2d Cir.1998); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.1997). Further, in order to provide adequate compensation where the services were performed many years before the award is made, the rates used by the court to calculate the lodestar should be current rather than historic hourly rates, Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284, 109 S.Ct. 2463; see id. at 283, 109 S.Ct. 2463 (compensation received several years after the services were rendered ... is not equivalent to the same dollar amount received reasonably promptly as the legal services are performed, as would normally be the case with private billings); LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d at 764 (instructing district court on remand in seven-year litigation to apply current rates, rather than historical rates in order to compensate for the delay in payment). 144 The court is not necessarily required, however, to award attorneys' fees based on current hourly rates when the delay is due in whole or in substantial part to the fault of the party seeking fees. See, e.g., Sands v. Runyon, 28 F.3d at 1334; Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, 4 F.3d at 146. Though it would be harsh to deny counsel some allowance for the time value of attorney's fees delayed by considerations of judicial administration, Sands v. Runyon, 28 F.3d at 1334, there is no inequity in requiring counsel to bear the cost of delay caused by him or by his client. 145 The district court here set a $195 hourly rate for Pottle's work--$40 per hour lower than the rate that Gierlinger had requested--based principally on the duration of this litigation and the historical rates earned throughout such time-span in this community by similarly experienced and respected attorneys in civil-rights, labor-law and employment-discrimination lawsuits. Posttrial Order at 13 (emphasis added). The court should instead have set the rate of compensation for Pottle's work by reference to current rates. We recognize that a portion of the delay in judgment in this case is attributable to Gierlinger, who requested a postponement of the third trial--originally scheduled for October 2, 1995--in order to participate in an unusually heavy harvest on her family farm. The court promptly adjourned the trial for 10 months. Even if that entire 10-month delay were attributable to Gierlinger (taking into account calendar congestion that might necessitate postponement of the trial until close to the following year's harvest season), the primary responsibility for the protracted nature of this litigation must be placed on the district court, which, as discussed in Parts III.B.2. and III.B.5. above, made unsolicited errors in the first trial that necessitated a second trial, and sua sponte declared a mistrial at the second trial, necessitating the third trial. On remand, the district court should base the rate component of the fee award on current market rates.