Opinion ID: 531232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Coursey's Felony Conviction

Text: 8 In the course of discovery, Coursey revealed that he had pleaded guilty in August 1983 to a felony charge of cattle theft. Coursey filed a pretrial motion in limine in an attempt to exclude evidence relating to this conviction, contending that such evidence would be of very low probative value to the jury and would substantially prejudice his interests. The district court denied his motion. As explained in its order denying Coursey's motion for a new trial, 2 the court ruled that evidence of Coursey's conviction was admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence after determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. In his opening statement to the jury, counsel for Broadhurst made the following remarks: 9 We do believe, as you'll see from their presentation of the evidence and then our presentation of the evidence, there is a conflict in what happened that day as to the testimony and the facts. We believe it would be your opportunity and obligation to determine who's telling the truth and who's not telling the truth in this case. To determine that you've got to determine the demeanor of the witnesses, each witness from the stand, and their credibility. 10 We expect the evidence to show that the Plaintiff is a convicted felon, which is a fact. 11 Coursey immediately moved for a mistrial. The trial court noted that mention of Coursey's felony conviction was improper during Broadhurst's opening statement. However, the court denied Coursey's request for a mistrial. 12 Coursey renewed his complaint of attorney misconduct in a post-judgment Rule 59 motion for new trial. In its order denying Coursey's motion, the court explained that the prejudice, if any, to Coursey occasioned by mention of his prior felony conviction was not such as to deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. The court also concluded that any error regarding admitting evidence of Coursey's conviction was cured when he explained the circumstances of the conviction on direct examination in his case-in-chief. 13 Coursey argues on appeal that evidence of his 1983 conviction should not have been admitted at all--i.e., the court should have granted his motion in limine--because theft is not a crime that involves dishonesty or false statement for purposes of Rule 609(a). He further contends that even if evidence of his conviction was admissible, it was admissible under Rule 609 only during cross-examination for purposes of impeaching his credibility. Therefore, argues Coursey, the district court erred in not granting a mistrial when Broadhurst's counsel improperly referred to Coursey's conviction during opening statements. Coursey maintains that such misconduct permeated the jury's mind with prejudice which adversely influenced the verdict and deprived Mr. Coursey of a fair and impartial trial. We hold that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Coursey's 1983 felony conviction. 3 Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides: 14 (a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 15 Looking first to Rule 609(a)(2), we briefly address the parties' disagreement as to whether Coursey's conviction was admissible under this subsection. 16 Subsection (a)(2) of Rule 609 is premised on a logical assumption that evidence showing a witness's conviction for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is probative of the issue of the witness's propensity to testify truthfully. The mandatory language of Rule 609(a)(2) requires that a trial court admit evidence of such crimes to allow a party to impeach an adversary witness's credibility. Citing cases from other circuits, Broadhurst argues that felony theft, the crime for which Coursey was convicted, is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. The rule in the Fifth Circuit is clearly to the contrary; evidence of conviction for a crime of the present nature cannot be used for impeachment under Rule 609(a)(2). See Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir.1981) (felony theft) and cases cited therein. 17 We turn then to Rule 609(a)(1). This subsection has, until recently, been the subject of considerable controversy when applied in the context of civil lawsuits. The difficulty arises from Congress's use of the word defendant in its requirement that a court allow impeachment of any witness with prior convictions only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudice to the defendant. In civil trials, Rule 609(a)(1) could thus be interpreted to provide the benefit of prejudice-weighing to civil defendants, but not to civil plaintiffs. Concluding that Congress could not have intended such an absurd--and perhaps unconstitutional--result, the Supreme Court held last term in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. that the term defendant in Rule 609(a)(1) means criminal defendant. --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1991, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989). Therefore, the prejudice-weighing prerequisite to admissibility of felony convictions applies only in criminal trials. In civil trials, Rule 609 precludes such judicial discretion; impeachment evidence of prior convictions must be admitted. The Court also held that the specific mandate of Rule 609--evidence shall be admitted--overrides the general discretionary authority granted under Rule 403 for a judge to balance probative value against prejudicial effect. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1992-93. Thus, the Court concluded that Rule 609(a)(1) requires a trial judge to permit impeachment of a civil witness with evidence of prior felony convictions regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to the witness or the party offering the testimony. 4 Id. at 1993. 18 Under the prevailing Fifth Circuit law at the time this case came to trial, the district court, in ruling on Coursey's motion in limine, balanced the probativeness of his felony conviction against its prejudicial effect and determined that the impeachment evidence was admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Green, we cannot now hold that the court abused its discretion. Therefore, we hold that the district court's denial of Coursey's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a prior felony conviction was proper. 19 Coursey also argues, however, that Rule 609 contemplates the introduction of evidence relating to a prior conviction only during cross-examination. Coursey contends that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for a mistrial when counsel for Broadhurst referred to Coursey's criminal past during opening statements. 20 The decision to grant or deny a mistrial due to allegedly improper arguments rests within the broad discretion of a trial judge. See Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251, 258 (5th Cir.1971); Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, 715 (5th Cir.1967). Having determined that evidence of Coursey's conviction was admissible under Rule 609(a)(1), we must consider whether Broadhurst's conduct in jumping the gun during his opening statement was so prejudicial that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a new trial. 21 Broadhurst's counsel, in summarizing to the jury what he believed the evidence at trial would show, referred to Coursey as a convicted felon in the context of explaining the jury's obligation of weighing the credibility of witnesses. Thus, counsel was previewing the impeachment evidence he planned to offer--and was permitted to offer under Rule 609--during cross-examination of Coursey, who was designated as a plaintiff's witness. We agree with Coursey that the proper time to impeach a witness with a prior felony conviction is when that witness is on the witness stand, not during an advocate's opening argument to the jury. However, the impeachment evidence in this case would have come out eventually, 5 and Coursey ameliorated its impact on the jury during direct examination and closing arguments. 6 22 Under these circumstances, we hold that the reference to Coursey's felony conviction in Broadhurst's opening statement, if error, constituted harmless error because Coursey's substantial rights were not prejudiced. Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. The jury returned a verdict in Coursey's favor. The fact that the damage award was not as large as Coursey may have requested is not dispositive on the issue of jury prejudice. 7 Moreover, the trial judge was in the best position to determine whether the tone or implications surrounding Broadhurst's opening remarks carried an inflammatory or prejudicial message beyond the mere words used, so as to warrant a new trial. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Coursey's motion for mistrial. 23