Opinion ID: 75672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Facial Challenge Based on Time, Place, and Manner

Text: 65 Horton's facial challenge to Section 22-9 as an improper time, place, and manner restriction also fails. We look to our longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence to assess the validity of the City's restrictions on Horton's conduct and hold that he has not established a likelihood of success on the merits on this claim either. 66 As the district court correctly noted, street performances are a form of expression protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See, for example, Davenport v. City of Alexandria, 710 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 619 F. Supp. 1129, 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1985). In traditional public fora, such as the city streets and sidewalks in this case, 17 this Court permits governments to enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which [1] are content-neutral, [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and [3] leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 67 The City's restriction of street performances within a four-block area of a historic district satisfies this First Amendment analysis and is a legitimate exercise of legislative authority. On its face, Section 22-9, as originally enacted and as amended, does not discriminate based on the viewpoints or opinions of the street performers 18 and promotes other enumerated municipal purposes. 19 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (describing test as whether ordinance serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression and is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech). It is also adequately tailored to serve the proffered justification of crowd and traffic control. See Smith, 177 F.3d at 957 (upholding anti-begging ordinance based on effect on tourism because restriction need not be the 'least restrictive or least intrusive means' of serving the City's interest) (citation omitted); Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1318 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying same test). 20 Furthermore, it leaves open a wide swath of public space for Horton's activities outside the enumerated four-block area. See ISKCON Miami, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 147 F.3d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding requirement satisfied even if alternative channels may be less effective than [challenger] would prefer). We thus cannot sustain the district court's grant of injunctive relief based on Horton's time, place, and manner claims.