Opinion ID: 1367785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: admission of evidence of prior physical abuse

Text: Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior acts of physical abuse toward the child. The state offered the evidence pursuant to OEC 404(3); [10] defendant argued that the evidence was inadmissible for the reason that the prejudicial effect of such evidence to the defendant outweighs any probative value. [11] In State v. Johnson, 313 Or. 189, 195, 832 P.2d 443 (1992), this court set out a three-part test that governs the admissibility of prior acts evidence under OEC 404(3): (1) The evidence must be independently relevant for a noncharacter purpose; (2) the proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient proof that the [acts were] committed and that defendant committed [them]; and (3) the probative value of the [acts] must not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403. (Footnote omitted.) See also State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 725 P.2d 312 (1986) (discussing history of OEC 404(3) and explaining factors trial court considers before admitting evidence under that rule). In addition, when admitting evidence under OEC 404(3), the trial court must make a record which reflects an exercise of discretion. State v. Mayfield, 302 Or. 631, 645, 733 P.2d 438 (1987). We have applied those requirements to the argument made in the present case and have concluded that they were satisfied. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to exclude evidence of his physical abuse of the child.