Opinion ID: 2709519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Malpractice Claim Against Geldes

Text: We begin with the district court’s grant of sum- mary judgment in favor of Geldes on the Administrators’ legal malpractice claim. A plaintiff must prove five elements in an action for legal malpractice in Illinois: “(1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) a duty arising out of that relationship; (3) a breach of that duty; (4) causation; and (5) actual damages.” Wash. Group Int’l, Inc. v. Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, LLC, 383 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Griffin v. Goldenhersh, 752 N.E.2d 1232, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2001)). Plaintiffs are generally required to present expert testimony to prove their claim, and a failure to do so may prove fatal. Barth v. Reagan, 564 N.E.2d 1196, 1200 (Ill. 1990). Illinois courts, however, have carved out a niche from this general requirement, known as the “common knowledge rule.” See, e.g., House v. Maddux, 360 N.E.2d 580, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1977). Under the common knowledge rule, expert testimony is not required “[w]here no issue is raised as to defendant’s responsibility for allowing the statute of limitations to run, where the negligence of defendant is apparent and undisputed, and where the record discloses obvious and explicit carelessness in defendant’s failure to meet the duty of care owed by him to plaintiff[.]” Brainerd v. Kates, 386 N.E.2d 586, 18 No. 12-1969 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979) (quoting House, 360 N.E.2d at 584). In other words, no expert testimony is needed “where the professional’s conduct is so grossly negligent . . . that a layperson could readily appraise it[.]” Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1021 (Ill. 1996). The magistrate judge barred the Administrators from offering expert testimony on the standard of care owed by Geldes to Hedstrom, and the district judge concluded that decision was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. Because those determinations were not appealed to us, the main issue here is whether the information presented and the allegations against Geldes show “such obvious and explicit carelessness” by Geldes as to repudiate the requirement that the Administrators present expert testimony. In short, if the common knowledge rule does not apply, the Administrators lose. Looking to the allegations against Geldes, the Administrators contend Geldes should have recognized the conflict of interest between Hedstrom, the principal, and Kotter, who was acting as an agent for Hedstrom but also benefitting from the transaction. In the Administrators’ eyes, “when a real estate attorney is confronted with a transaction that is presumptively fraudulent as [a] matter of law,” the duty of care required by an attorney is obvious. The Administrators also vaguely reference two additional contentions made in the district court regarding Geldes’ alleged malpractice: (1) Geldes represented Hedstrom and Kotter No. 12-1969 19 in the purchase of the Units, and she failed to disclose or resolve the conflict; and (2) Geldes failed to disclose and explain to Hedstrom the legal effect of Kotter’s direction regarding how title to the Units would be held. But because these allegations also relate to Geldes’ duty of care and obligation to properly communicate with Hedstrom, regardless of how they are phrased, we address them collectively. Our task is to determine whether the standard of care underlying the allegations in this case is obvious or apparent. No argument has been put forth that an attorney-client relationship did not exist between Hedstrom and Geldes, so the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and the affirmative obligations required under them and Illinois case law are relevant to the standard of care. See Owens v. McDermott, 736 N.E.2d 145, 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000) (explaining that the rules of professional conduct and the rules of legal ethics are relevant to the standard of care in a legal malpractice suit (citing Nagy v. Beckley, 578 N.E.2d 1134, 113637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991))). The Rules, however, “do not establish a separate duty or cause of action,” and they are “not an independent font of liability.” Id. We agree that the Rules provide that a “lawyer has [an] affirmative duty to take necessary steps to keep [a] client informed about his case so [the] client can make intelligent choices as to [the] direction of litigation, as well as to respond to client questions and demands for information promptly,” as the Administrators explain, citing In re Smith, 659 N.E.2d 896, 902 (Ill. 1995). See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 20 No. 12-1969 407 N.E.2d 47, 48-49 (Ill. 1980). But a violation of the Rules in and of itself does not establish liability in a legal malpractice case, and there is a difference between having a “duty” to do something under the Rules and determining just what that “something”—i.e., the standard of care—encompasses. Compare Duty, B LACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY 543 (8th ed. 2004) (“A legal obligation that is owed or due to another that needs to be satisfied; an obligation for which somebody else has a corresponding right.”), with Jones v. Chi. HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1129-30 (Ill. 2000) (“What the defendant must do, or must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty.” (quoting W. Prosser, Torts, at 324 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis omitted))). Barth v. Reagan is instructive here. The plaintiff in Barth argued that “the basic duty of an attorney to communicate with a client” should fall within the common knowledge rule because a lay person would understand an attorney’s “total lack of communication” with a client. Barth, 564 N.E.2d at 1200. The Illinois Supreme Court held otherwise, concluding that the attorney’s duty to communicate naturally depended on the parties’ relationship and the particular facts of the case, which involved “intricacies” that were beyond the purview of lay persons. Id. at 1200-01 (“ ‘Conflicting interest’ is the simultaneous adverse representation of multiple clients. We view the concerns an attorney has regarding his or her professional responsibilities in this area as being complex, and we do not find the intricacies of this type No. 12-1969 21 of representation to be within the common knowledge of lay persons.” (internal citations omitted)). Accordingly, what is required to satisfy a more complex “duty”—one based on a professional’s skill—is different than when an attorney misses a deadline, fails to comply with a statute of limitations, or completely neglects to take any action regarding a case. See id. at 1201 (citing Gray v. Hallett, 525 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1998); Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47, 49-50, 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980); House, 360 N.E.2d at 584). A lay juror need not be “skilled in the profession” to understand when an attorney has made one of the aforementioned obvious blunders; thus, expert testimony on the standard of care is unnecessary in those types of cases. See id. The same goes for a medical malpractice case, for example, when a surgical instrument is left in a patient’s body, Walker v. Rumer, 381 N.E.2d 689, 691 (Ill. 1978), or when a plaintiff alleged that he was “restrained on a bed and left alone in a hospital emergency room to be exposed to an ignition source that set[] him on fire[.]” Heastie v. Roberts, 877 N.E.2d 1064, 1076-77 (Ill. 2007). Some negligence is obvious; other types are not. Communicating with clients and recognizing conflicts of interest in a legal transaction do not fit within these “obvious” examples or the purview of a lay juror. The Administrators maintain that the duty Geldes owed to Hedstrom is “clearly delineated,” but they fail to explicitly opine on what was required to satisfy Geldes’ duty, aside from “recognize the conflict of interest.” If the 22 No. 12-1969 Administrators are unable to provide us with the scope of Geldes’ duty, then the standard of care required surely cannot be within the common knowledge of a lay juror. For example, again comparing this case to a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff can allege that a doctor has a duty to not “exceed a plaintiff’s scope of consent,” but an expert is required to opine as to the extent of consent given. See Holzrichter v. Yorath, 987 N.E.2d 1, 2013 IL App. (1st) 110287, ¶88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Mar. 4, 2013) (“[W]hether [the defendant-doctor] exceeded the parameters of the surgery to which the plaintiff consented is beyond the ken of a layperson, and it requires a medical expert to opine on whether cutting tendons is part and parcel of the Z scarf osteotomy procedure.”). Here, looking to the “duty of care,” it would not be readily apparent to a lay juror as to (1) whom Geldes was required to communicate with; (2) the type of communication required (e.g., letter, email, phone, in-person); (3) how often Geldes was required to communicate; (4) what specific information Geldes was required to communicate; (5) and what steps Geldes was required to take in response to the information and issues presented in this particular situation. Expert testimony was needed to establish the answers to questions like these, which would in turn form the basis of the applicable standard of care. Only then could the Administrators attempt to prove the other elements required in a legal malpractice case: breach, causation, and damages. See Jones, 730 N.E.2d at 1130 (“Expert testimony is necessary to establish both (1) the standard No. 12-1969 23 of care expected of the professional[,] and (2) the professional’s deviation from the standard.”). In light of these questions, we do not see how Geldes’ alleged conduct could be considered “so grossly negligent that a layperson could readily appraise.” See Advincula, 678 N.E.2d at 1021. The Administrators direct us to Lincoln Cardinal Partners v. Barrick, 578 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991) in support of their argument that the common knowledge rule should be applied. This reliance is misplaced. The issue in Lincoln Cardinal Partners was whether the participant, third party in the transaction should have recognized that the principal’s agent was acting improperly or in conflict with the interests of his principal. See id. at 316-20 (“We hold here that a purported agent’s otherwise apparent authority to contractually bind a principal to a third party is destroyed when a showing is made requiring the third party to recognize that a conflict of interest exists between the purported agent and the principal.”). If so, then the participant could not indulge himself in the transaction’s benefits. As applied to this case, Lincoln Cardinal Partners could only be helpful if, say, Kotter filed suit against the Administrators and argued she was still entitled to her interest in the properties despite Geldes doing a substandard job in effecting the transactions. The Administrators (the principal) could rely on the case to argue that Kotter (the participant) cannot benefit from the transaction, like the participant, third party in 24 No. 12-1969 Lincoln Cardinal Partners, because Kotter should have recognized Geldes’ (the agent’s) shortcomings—e.g., her failure to (1) properly document the transactions, or (2) recognize the conflict of interest between Kotter and Hedstrom (as an agent benefitting from a transaction with her principal) or Geldes, Kotter, and Hedstrom (as an agent-attorney representing two distinct parties with competing interests).4 This does not help the Administrators; the Administrators were not harmed by Kotter’s failure to recognize some alleged form of malpractice. And as relevant here, Lincoln Cardinal Partners had nothing to do with the tort of legal malpractice, the use of expert testimony, or the standard of care required of an attorney. Barth sets forth the applicable guidance. That is what we follow. Alternatively, the Administrators make a bald assertion that expert testimony would be improper, as well as unnecessary, because the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and the published case law “clearly state the legal standards controlling this case.” But we agree with the district court that this argument is without merit. The Administrators rely on Sohaey v. Van Cura, 607 4 The parties hotly contest whether Geldes was also representing Kotter in the transactions. The district court discussed the information that “suggest[ed] Geldes represented Kotter as well as Hedstrom in the two condominium purchases.” See Ball, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 946-47. But our decision does not require a determination as to this issue, so we express no opinion as to whether a fiduciary relationship actually existed between Geldes and Kotter. No. 12-1969 25 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1992), and LID Associates v. Dolan, 756 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2001) to bolster their contention; however, the cases only explain when expert testimony is prohibited, not when it is required. The court in Sohaey said experts cannot give testimony that “amounts to statutory interpretation,” offer “legal conclusions” that a jury could make on its own, or “testify regarding what legal research shows with respect to a key legal term” that should be defined by the court. Sohaey, 607 N.E.2d at 283 (citations omitted). The court in LID Associates similarly noted that an expert witness cannot give testimony “amounting to statutory interpretation” or regarding “legal conclusions” and opinions based on the “interpretation of case law.” LID Assocs., 756 N.E.2d at 876-77 (citations omitted). Without rehashing our prior discussion of why expert testimony was required here, we do not believe expert testimony in this case would amount to any of the prohibited forms of testimony. The allegations and information in this case required Ball to present expert testimony as to the standard of care required of Geldes. Accordingly, the Administrators’ inability to present the required expert testimony in this case is fatal to their legal malpractice claim. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Geldes.