Opinion ID: 186988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Alleged Bias Against Lawson

Text: Lawson also makes an overarching claim that the district court demonstrated bias against counsel that deprived [Lawson] of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. Appellant's Br. at 37. He points to instances of allegedly unfair evidentiary rulings, see id. at 39, unfair jury instructions, see id. at 39-40, unfair sua sponte questioning of witnesses, see id. at 41, result-oriented reasoning in imposing an unreasonable sentence, id., and critical remarks by the judge against his counsel and her techniques, see id. at 43. Lawson's argument of bias is similar to the one made in United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where we explained: [A] district judge has wide discretion in monitoring the flow of a criminal trial. It is well within her discretion to rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court's instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying behavior. Sharp words spoken by a trial court to counsel do not by themselves establish impermissible bias. There is a modicum of quick temper that must be allowed even judges. Id. at 434 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding this deference, in Donato we reversed the appellant's criminal conviction because the negative comments . . . were more concentrated, frequent, and critical than [in other cases] and the relative brevity of [the] trial ma[de] it more likely that the judge's negative comments colored the entire trial. Id. at 435. We have reviewed the record with Donato in mind, and have some cause for concern. The interactions between the court and Lawson's counsel in this three-day trial were frequently on less-than-friendly terms. Yet, we do not believe that the court's conduct warrants either reversal or a retrial. Lawson fails to demonstrate any harm from the exchanges between the court and his counsel. The court took care to instruct the jury not to take its comments or remarks to counsel as any indication of its opinion of the merits or its view of the facts. See 9/8/05 Tr. at 128. It is also significant that the court's comments were directed at Lawson's counsel and not at him or his witnesses. See United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (considering a mistrial claim and giving weight to the fact that the court's comments were directed at the attorneys, not at defendant or his witnesses (citing Donato, 99 F.3d at 437-38; United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir.1995))). And many of the comments Lawson cites were made at the bench (inaudible to the jurors) or while the jury was not in the courtroom. See, e.g., 9/8/05 Tr. at 51-54, 103-04; 9/13/05 Tr. at 121-23. Furthermore, it is likely that Lawson's counsel bears some responsibility for the court's reactions. In most of the exchanges cited by Lawson, the court correctly ruled that counsel had failed to properly frame her questions. At times, counsel's manner of introducing evidence did not manifest its relevance, either immediately or even after further questioning. See, e.g., 9/8/05 Tr. at 43-54, 102-111. Counsel made arguments in front of the jury that were at least confusing to the jury and the judge, see, e.g., 9/13/05 Tr. at 121-23, and arguably inappropriate, see, e.g., id. at 129-35. Counsel interrupted the judge on a number of occasions, see, e.g., id. at 154. Finally, we again note that despite the packaging and the amount of the drugs found in Lawson's car, the jury did not convict Lawson of any possession-with-intent-to-distribute charges. Therefore, although the court's remarks were occasionally harsh and the exchanges with counsel less than ideal, Lawson has not demonstrated that, under the circumstances, these remarks had such a distorting influence on the jury's determinations as to warrant a reversal of Lawson's conviction or to require a retrial. Having affirmed Lawson's conviction, we now review his sentence.