Opinion ID: 78102
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: To convict Defendant of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, the government had to establish three elements: (1) knowledge; (2) possession; and (3) intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir.1999). Defendant argues the jury's finding of intent was based on speculation, not reasonable inferences. See United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) ([R]easonable inferences, and not mere speculation, must support the jury's verdict.). Inferred factual conclusions based on circumstantial evidence are permitted only when, and to the extent that, human experience indicates a probability that certain consequences can and do follow from the basic circumstantial facts. United States v. Villegas, 911 F.2d 623, 628 (11th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude the government presented ample evidence from which the jury could infer intent to distribute, including a large number of plastic jeweler's bags, [10] the drug ledger, [11] the amount of meth, the lack of paraphernalia used to consume the drug, and testimony about Defendant's purchase of an ounce of meth in Birmingham on the day of his arrest. This evidence was enough. Defendant argues the evidence of intent was insufficient because officers never found money or digital scales in the motel room. In light of the other evidence of intent introduced at trial, the absence of these things is not outcome determinative. Moreover, the Prattville officer testified at trial that when he knocked on the door, it took several minutes for someone to answer. And, Anita Mercer left the motel with a duffel bag that was never searched. Although the jury need not to have done so to convict, a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant and his sister-in-law were slow in answering the door because they were busy hiding further evidence of the drug operation, possibly in the duffel bag. Defendant also argues there was insufficient evidence presented for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime. This Court has determined that to prove possession in furtherance of a drug crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the government must establish that the firearm helped, furthered, promoted, or advanced the drug trafficking. United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir.2002). A conviction is properly supported by a showing of some nexus between the firearm and the drug selling operation. Id. at 1253 (internal quotation marks omitted). The nexus may be established by the kind of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of firearm, whether the firearm is stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the firearm is loaded, proximity of the firearm to the drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm is found. Id. Here, officers found a loaded .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun hidden in a pouch under the mattress in Defendant's motel room. In addition to the firearm, the pouch also contained jeweler's bags and a drug ledger. Because the firearm was readily available in the same room where a jury could infer drugs were being packaged for sale and available in the immediate vicinity of items commonly used in a drug operation, we conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant possessed the firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.