Opinion ID: 1169308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reasons for strict liability

Text: As the Vermont Supreme Court noted when it adopted strict liability in tort, [a]n extensive review of the history and development of the doctrine embodied in the Restatement would serve little purpose. Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110, 113 (1975). The history of the doctrine is well known and readily discoverable in basic torts treatises. See, e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts §§ 96-97, at 681-692 (1984). On the other hand, although the policies supporting the adoption of § 402A have been discussed elsewhere, we think it worth noting some of the policies that we find persuasive. While these policy rationales are not exclusive, they should help guide the district courts and litigants who will inevitably grapple with strict liability law. When a defective article enters the stream of commerce and an innocent person is hurt, it is better that the loss fall on the manufacturer, distributor or seller than on the innocent victim. This is true even if the entities in the chain of production and distribution exercise due care in the defective product's manufacture and delivery. They are simply in the best position to either insure against the loss or spread the loss among all the consumers of the product. W. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960); W. Keeton, supra, at 692-693; Restatement, Second, Torts § 402A, comment c (1965). There are many products liability cases in which the plaintiff must essentially show negligence in order to prove that a product is defective. And there are cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can provide the missing link to an otherwise solid negligence case. Under these circumstances, the strict liability action is unnecessary to ensure that the deserving plaintiff is made whole. There are cases, however, in which the negligence action proves inadequate. For instance, when a person is injured by a defect that causes the wheel of a car to come apart, it may be practically impossible to establish that the manufacturer's negligence caused the failure. Let us assume that 5,000,000 wheels for automobiles were manufactured and one was defective. The manufacturing, inspection, and testing procedures may have exceeded engineering standards. Due care was exercised and yet there was one defective wheel. Thus, there may have been an entire absence of negligence in the total manufacturing and sale of the product, yet a totally innocent person was injured when the defective wheel came apart. On these facts, that person justly ought to have a claim. But he can recover only if strict liability has been adopted and the fault requirement discarded. Manufacturers and distributors can easily and efficiently apportion the injured person's loss among themselves and ultimately among their customers, and that is better than affording no relief to the person injured. W. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, supra, at 1116-1117. The problems with the negligence cause of action when applied to products have been recognized for many years and courts and legislatures long ago responded by creating a cause of action in breach of warranty. E.g., §§ 34-21-230 through XX-XX-XXX, W.S. 1977. Whenever strict liability in tort is suggested, those opposing the doctrine argue that the warranty action is adequate in products cases. This argument has consistently failed, however, because most courts have recognized that strict liability on `warranty' concepts based on implied misrepresentation or promise involving an objective manifestation of an intent to guarantee carries far too much luggage in the way of undesirable complications, and is more trouble than it is worth. W. Keeton, supra, at 692; see also Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1074 (1967). Earlier in this opinion we discussed the commercial connotations of the warranty action which interfere with its usefulness to those suffering personal injury. We pointed out that the UCC's breach of warranty action carries a statute of limitations which begins to run on the date of tender and can bar an injured user from recovery before he suffers an injury. Because the statute is explicit and has some justification in a commercial setting, we declined to give it a strained interpretation that could have altered its impact in personal injury cases. We concluded that it was far better to recognize an independent strict liability action based on tort principles, which carries a tort statute of limitations, than it was to compromise the commercial code with unsound statutory construction. [9] The notice requirement of § 34-21-270(c)(i), W.S. 1977 (U.C.C. § 2-607) is another requirement which causes difficulty in warranty actions for personal injury. The statute provides: (c) Where a tender has been accepted: (i) The buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy. In Western Equipment Company, Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., Wyo., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (1980), we held that this statute means what it says in cases involving commercial damages. Perhaps we could interpret the section so that it does not apply in personal injury cases. But such a construction might diminish the effectiveness of the notice requirement in the commercial context where it serves a useful purpose. Again, the best solution to this statutory dilemma is to recognize strict liability in tort as an independent cause of action to which the statute does not apply. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1962). A third piece of excess baggage carried by the UCC warranty action is the doctrine of disclaimer of warranties. An injured person's warranty action may be barred if the seller has properly disclaimed all express and implied warranties. The drafters of the U.C.C. have attempted to solve this problem by providing in § 2-719 that [l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not. Section 34-21-298(c), W.S. 1977. Unfortunately, § 34-21-298(c) (U.C.C. § 2-719) is only a partial remedy because it applies only in cases of consumer goods. In the case at bar, where the scraper was not a consumer good, appellant's cause of action in warranty could have been barred by a disclaimer of warranty even though he did not personally bargain with the manufacturer and accept the disclaimer. [10] We have explicitly held that a remote buyer cannot prevent the manufacturer from disclaiming warranties in his original contract with the original buyer. Western Equipment Company, Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., supra, 605 P.2d at 810. Strict liability in tort, however, is not hampered by the disclaimer problem because it is not based on express or implied warranties created by the U.C.C. In summary, the cause of action for strict liability in tort is necessary because of the inadequacies of breach of warranty actions when applied to claims in tort for personal injury.