Opinion ID: 796599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of the District Court's Sentence

Text: 18 We review sentences for reasonableness. United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 807 (6th Cir.2006). In doing so, we follow a well-trodden path. After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621, (2005), district courts treat the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory. However, as a court of appeal, we still defer to these guidelines since they reflect nearly two decades of considered judgment about the range of appropriate sentences, United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir.2006) (Sutton, J., concurring), by attaching a rebuttable presumption to a sentence within the Guidelines recommended range. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). That presumption, however, does not imply a presumption against a sentence outside the range. Collington, 461 F.3d at 808. Even so, we give sentences outside the range a closer look. And, like every court of appeals to consider the question, we take the view that when the district court independently chooses to vary from the advisory guidelines range (whether above or below it), we apply a form of proportionality review: the greater the variance from the range, the more compelling the justification for variance must be. United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir.2006). Therefore, when a sentence varies significantly from the guidelines range, extraordinary circumstances must justify the full amount of the variance. Id. at 496-97. 19 [474 F.3d 893] 20 The district court below found that the offense level, in light of Smith's criminal history, was inadequate. Smith contests this upward departure. In this case, therefore, we approach the question of reasonableness in two ways. First, if we find that the district court correctly computed the guideline range in its upward departure in light of Smith's extensive and egregious criminal history, we will treat the sentence as within the guidelines range and therefore presume it was reasonable. We must still subject the sentence to review, but as noted above, that review is less exacting. If, however, we find that the district court was not justified in its upward departure, and that the advisory range was therefore not properly calculated, we will not attach a presumption of reasonableness to it and approach the levied sentence with more skepticism. 21 This brief analysis should reveal an obvious conclusion: our review of a district court's upward departure to a higher offense level should mirror our analysis of its variance from the guidelines range. Since a district court can employ either and arrive at the same result, we should review both methods with the same scrutiny. 22 Prior to Booker, we employed a three-step approach in our review of upward departures under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3: 23 The first step is a question of law regarding whether the circumstances of the case are sufficiently unusual to justify departure. Step two involves a determination as to whether there is an actual factual basis justifying the departure. Here, the standard is whether the determination made involves clear error. . . . The third step is that, once the Court has assured itself that the sentencing court considered circumstances appropriate to the departure, the degree of departure must be measured by a standard of reasonableness on appeal. 24 United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491, 494-96 (6th Cir.1989). The Seventh Circuit has employed its similar pre-Booker § 4A 1.3 case law in attempting to determine whether a sentence was reasonable. United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430 (7th Cir.2005). However, it did so with the caveat that the question before [it] is ultimately the reasonableness of the sentence the district court imposed, not the court's application of a guideline authorizing an upward departure. Id. at 434. Like the litigants before our sister circuit in Castro-Juarez, both parties before us have provided us with their analysis of the case under our § 4A1.3 jurisprudence. 25 Smith concedes that the first two steps are met; that is, his criminal history exceeded that anticipated by the guidelines range and the convictions making up that history did, in fact, occur. Appellant's Br. at 17. He contests the last step, arguing that the upward departure was unreasonable. He would prefer an approach more mechanical than that the district court took. CHCs III, IV, and V each have a range of 3 criminal history points. That is, CHC III ranges from 4-6 points, CHC IV from 7-9, and CHC V from 10-12. CHC VI consists of points 13 and greater. Smith would have us continue this incremental method by adding an offense level for every three points in excess of 12. That is, add an offense level at 16 criminal history points, 19, 22 and so on. 26 Such a mechanistic approach, however, seems to us to be antithetical to our post- Booker approach to reviewing sentences, which emphasizes flexibility and discretion of district judges. In Collington, for example, we stated, There is no mathematical percentage or formula that defines what reasonableness is. Appellate review simply cannot be reduced to such cold 27 [474 F.3d 894] 28 calculations. It is those very calculations that Booker and its progeny attempted to remove from the federal sentencing process. Id. Therefore, it is here that we will incorporate our post- Booker jurisprudence to our review of upward departures under § 4A1.3. 29 We have now split our reasonableness review into two inquiries: procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness. Collington, 461 F.3d at 808. Procedural reasonableness requires a sentencing judge to consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 7. The purpose of procedural reasonableness is to enable appellate review, so we require the district judge to explain the factors that justify the sentence imposed. United States v. James Williams, 432 F.3d 621, 623 (6th Cir.2005). However, this standard does not require that a judge be an automaton, listing inapposite factors by rote. It is enough to explain why this defendant is different from most. 30 A sentence will fail to be substantively reasonable if the district court `select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.' Collington, 461 F.3d at 808 (citing United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir.2005)). 31 Again, we note that the standards for determining whether an upward departure to another offense level is appropriate are similar to those standards we use to judge the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a variance from any guidelines range. Procedural reasonableness can be equated to the first two steps outlined in Joan. First, a district court must explain the reasons justifying a departure and, second, evidence of those reasons must appear in the record. Such explanation allows meaningful appellate review. Third, substantive reasonableness — or what Joan called simply reasonableness — must govern the sentence imposed. The punishment must fit the crime. 32 In this case, the district court not only explained the reasons it was departing upward but it also provided an analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. It examined each of the prior convictions on Smith's record. It concluded, based on this review, that Smith has a history of drug abuse, possessing dangerous firearms, and acts of violence against women. Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. It explained that it chose the sentence it did because Smith has shown utter disregard for the law throughout the course of his life. Id. at 7. It recognized that the sentence would keep Smith off the street and that that alone was a benefit to the safety of the community. In considering all of the above, the court recognized Smith's objections and provided explanation of why it was rejecting them. Further, it provided a section explaining why the downward departure Smith requested was not granted. 33 We do not require a rote recitation of § 3553(a) factors but rather an explanation of why the district court chose the sentence it did. The court below examined many of the § 3553(a) factors and attached to them a not unreasonable weight. We conclude that it was within its discretion to impose the sentence it did. 34