Opinion ID: 1681700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Deposition of Smykowski

Text: In the current proceedings, postconviction counsel asserted that Smykowski, while a fugitive from U.S. authorities, had given a statement to a German journalist that his trial testimony was false. Terri Backhus, Riechmann's current counsel, testified that she learned from Peter Mueller, a German journalist, that Smykowski had given an affidavit recanting his testimony from trial. Thereafter, Backhus met with Smykowski in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in March 2002 and showed him his affidavit that she had obtained from Mueller. Smykowski told her that he had lied at Riechmann's trial and that the State told him what his testimony should be. However, Smykowski would not return to the United States to testify because there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Riechmann moved to perpetuate the testimony of Smykowski by asking the trial court to accept his deposition in lieu of live testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Counsel stated that she proposed an investigative trip to Dubai, and that while there she would arrange a deposition, assuming she could locate Smykowski, and the State could appear by overseas telephone and Smykowski could testify while being videotaped and recorded. The State objected to this proposal because a definite location as to Smykowski's whereabouts was not then known and, further, because Riechmann was asking the court to accept testimony that had none of the reliability and procedural safeguards set out in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(j) concerning depositions to perpetuate testimony. The trial court denied postconviction counsel's motion on the basis that there was no witness available at that point, but it did so without prejudice and held that if the witness was later located, it would revisit the matter. Rule 3.190(j) states in relevant part: (j) Motion to Take Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony. (1) After the filing of an indictment or information on which a defendant is to be tried, the defendant or the state may apply for an order to perpetuate testimony. The application shall be verified or supported by the affidavits of credible persons that a prospective witness resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court or may be unable to attend or be prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that the witness's testimony is material, and that it is necessary to take the deposition to prevent a failure of justice. The court shall order a commission to be issued to take the deposition of the witnesses to be used in the trial and that any nonprivileged designated books, papers, documents, or tangible objects be produced at the same time and place. If the application is made within 10 days before the trial date, the court may deny the application. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.190(j). Of course, rule 3.190(j) applies to trials, not to postconviction proceedings where discovery is limited and substantial discretion is afforded the trial court. The decision whether to grant a motion to perpetuate testimony lies within the discretion of the trial court. Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1054 (Fla. 2000). Hence, we review such a decision by the trial court for abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 575 So.2d 181, 187 (Fla. 1991). In the present case, Riechmann's motion was neither under oath nor accompanied by sworn affidavits. Importantly, there was no assertion as to where Smykowski was actually then residing, and the motion essentially asserts, If counsel finds Mr. Smykowski, a deposition can be arranged. Riechmann filed his motion to perpetuate the testimony of Smykowski on January 28, 2002, and proposed that the deposition be taken sometime between February 1 and 3, 2002. The State asserts that the defense did not allow the State adequate notice to attend Smykowski's deposition even if it had occurred or could be arranged. At the hearing on the matter, counsel admitted she had no address or phone number for Smykowski and did not know if he could be found. The State points out that any oath administered over the telephone from the United States to Dubai would not have subjected Smykowski to the penalty of perjury or otherwise have been effective in even assuring a minimum level of reliability. See Harrell v. State, 709 So.2d 1364, 1371 (Fla.1998) (stating that an oath is one of the additional safeguards of the Confrontation Clause and that an oath is only effective if the witness can be subjected to prosecution for perjury upon making a knowingly false statement). Further, Harrell held that it must be established that an extradition treaty exists between the witness's country and the United States. Id. Here, it is undisputed that there is no extradition treaty between the United Arab Emirates and the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2000). Hence, these fundamental safeguards are wholly lacking here. We agree that the circumstances presented to the trial court do not demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the court's rulings. The defense was presenting a speculative scenario to the trial court fraught with concerns of reliability. Not only would the defense attorney be traveling to a country with which the United States has no extradition treaty in an attempt to find a convicted felon and depose him with no enforceable oath, but at the time the request was ripe there was only a three-day window of opportunity, with a state attorney presumably on standby via phone in the United States. Further, although Riechmann's counsel testified that she met with Smykowski in March 2002 (two months after Riechmann's initial motion to perpetuate testimony was denied), she waited until the end of the day on July 11, 2002, the day before the evidentiary hearing was scheduled to conclude, to renew this motion, which again was denied. Rule 3.190(j)(1) specifically states that requests to perpetuate testimony made within ten days of the evidentiary proceeding may be denied. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.190(j)(1) (If the application is made within 10 days before the trial date, the court may deny the application.). Finally, Riechmann's counsel continuously acknowledged throughout the proceedings that she could not state with any confidence where Smykowski might be at any given time. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Riechmann's motion to perpetuate Smykowski's testimony insufficient and denying the motion without prejudice so that Riechmann could renew the motion if Smykowski was actually located and the requirements of the rule could be satisfied. See Pope v. State, 569 So.2d 1241, 1246 (Fla.1990) (holding that a party offering the deposition must show it has exercised due diligence in its search for the deponent) (citing Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983)). Those circumstances were never demonstrated to exist here. We also find no error in the trial court's ruling that Smykowski's affidavit could not be introduced into evidence instead of a deposition because it is hearsay. See Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051, 1062 (Fla. 2003) (finding that an affidavit cannot be admitted into evidence in a postconviction proceeding unless it falls under one of the four hearsay exceptions by which the statement of a declarant who is unavailable as a witness may be presented into evidence). Riechmann has failed to identify a proper legal predicate for admission of the affidavit.