Opinion ID: 2576193
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Heading: The Unruh Act

Text: Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b) states: All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. Enacted in 1959, the Unruh Act amended an 1897 version of Civil Code section 51 that was declarative of a common law doctrine requiring places of public accommodation to serve all customers on reasonable terms without discrimination and ... to provide the kind of product or service reasonably to be expected from their economic role. ( In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 212, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992 ( Cox ).) Seminal decisions of this court construing the scope of the Act concluded that its protections were not confined to the enumerated categories in the statute but that these categories were illustrative rather than restrictive. ( Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 216, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992 [the Act prohibits a business from excluding a customer because of his association with another person of unconventional appearance]; Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 735, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115 [the Act prohibits an apartment owner from refusing to rent an apartment to a family with a minor child]; O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427 [the Act prohibits a condominium development from restricting residence to persons over 18].) We also concluded that in enacting the Unruh Act, the Legislature intended to ban all forms of arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations. ( Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72, 75, 219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212 [The Act is this state's bulwark against arbitrary discrimination in places of public accommodation].) We revisited these conclusions in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873 ( Harris. ) In the process of doing so, we created a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim of discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the Act. Harris involved a claim by women receiving public assistance that a landlord's policy requiring prospective tenants to have gross monthly incomes equal to or greater than three times the rent charged for an apartment (the minimum income policy) constituted economic status discrimination and was barred by the Unruh Act. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant's policy excluded persons who could pay the rent, but were unable to meet the minimum income policy. They maintained they were entitled to a trial to determine whether the policy constituted arbitrary discrimination under the Act. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1154, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) We held that the Unruh Act did not include within its ambit claims of economic status discrimination because economic status is fundamentally different than the categories either enumerated in the Act or added by judicial construction. In reaching this conclusion, we affirmed the principle articulated in our earlier decisions that the Act's enumerated categories are illustrative, rather than restrictive. Beginning with Cox in 1970, the Unruh Act has been construed to apply to several classifications not expressed in the statute. [Citations.] [¶] We generally presume the Legislature is aware of appellate court decisions. [Citations.] It has not taken specific action to overrule these cases. Moreover, the Legislature has amended the Act several times in the 20-year period since Cox [citation] was decided. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1155-1156, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) However, our examination of the legislative response to our prior decisions led us to conclude that the Legislature had not acquiesced in the broad proposition set forth in those decisions that the Act was intended to ban all forms of arbitrary discrimination. Notwithstanding our language about `arbitrary discrimination' and `stereotypes,' the Legislature has continued to pay close attention to the specified categories of discrimination in the Unruh Act.... Thus, the Legislature's continued emphasis on the specified categories of discrimination in the Act (without adding the words `arbitrary,' `unreasonable,' or similar language to its provisions) reflects the continued importance of those categories in its proper interpretation. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1158-1159, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Having therefore concluded that the Unruh Act's ban on arbitrary discrimination was qualified by the continued importance of the enumerated categories, we considered whether the Act could, nonetheless, be extended to claims of economic status discrimination in light of both the language and history of the Act and the probable impact on its enforcement of the competing interpretations urged on us by the parties. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1159, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) We devised a three-part analysis to answer this question. First, in reviewing the statutory language, we discerned an essential difference between economic status and both the Act's enumerated categories and those added by judicial construction. We found that their common element was that they involve personal as opposed to economic characteristics  a person's geographical origin, physical attributes, and personal beliefs. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1160, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Thus, the first prong of the Harris inquiry is whether a new claim of discrimination under the Act is based on a classification that involves personal characteristics. Second, we asked in Harris whether a legitimate business interest justified the minimum income policy. We found it did. The minimum income policy is no different in its purpose or effect from stated price or payment terms. Like those terms, it seeks to obtain for a business establishment the benefit of its bargain with the consumer: full payment of the price. In pursuit of the object of securing payment, a landlord has a legitimate and direct economic interest in the income level of prospective tenants, as opposed to their sex, race, religion, or other personal beliefs or characteristics. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1163, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Third, we considered the potential consequences of allowing claims for economic status discrimination to proceed under the Unruh Act. We perceived two significant adverse consequences that would likely follow from plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of the Act. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1166, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) First, we believed it would involve courts in a multitude of microeconomic decisions we are ill equipped to make regarding the reasonableness of the criteria used by landlords to screen tenants unable to pay their rent regularly and on time throughout the tenancy. ( Ibid. ) Second, permitting prospective tenants to challenge such criteria on a case-by-case basis might induce landlords to abandon such neutral criteria as income, applicable to all prospective tenants regardless of their personal characteristics, and use subjective criteria that might disguise and thereby promote the very kinds of invidious discrimination based on race, sex and other personal traits that the Unruh Act prohibits. ( Id. at p. 1169, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Therefore we concluded that the minimum income policy did not violate the Act. ( Ibid. )