Opinion ID: 779131
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative history of the Retirement Equity Act.

Text: 33 The Fund, again relying on Spacek, also points to the legislative history of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, which added paragraph (2) — the provision concerning amendments that reduce or eliminate early retirement benefits — to § 1054(g). See Spacek, 134 F.3d at 289-90. Spacek found instructive the following comment made by Representative William Clay during the final House debates on the Retirement Equity Act: 34 Nor do those provisions in any way apply to or affect the provisions of ERISA section 203(a)(3)(B) and code section 411(a)(3)(B) relating to the suspension of benefits for postretirement employment, including the authorization for multiemployer plans to adopt stricter rules for the suspension of subsidized early retirement benefits. 35 Spacek, 134 F.3d at 289 (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. 23,487 (1984)). The Fifth Circuit concluded that Representative Clay's remark means that the anti-cutback rule in § 1054(g) does not limit the power of the plan to amend the plan to expand the restrictions on post-retirement employment. See Spacek, 134 F.3d at 289-90. 36 We find Representative Clay's remark ambiguous at best on the question of whether amendments concerning suspensions for disqualifying employment are outside the coverage of § 1054(g). 11 But even if Representative Clay's understanding of the anti-cutback rule were consistent with the Fifth Circuit's — that suspensions upon disqualifying re-employment represent an additional exception to § 1054(g) — we find nothing in the legislative history to indicate that anyone else in Congress shared the understanding attributed to Representative Clay by the Fifth Circuit. The parties have not identified, and we have been unable to find, any further reference in the legislative history of the Retirement Equity Act to the exception for suspensions that the Fifth Circuit infers from Representative Clay's remarks. 12 The absence of any additional support in the legislative history suggests to us that the Fifth Circuit gave undue weight to the statement of Representative Clay, which (as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit) is at odds with the straightforward language of the statute. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 122 S.Ct. 941, 953-54, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) (rejecting interpretation contained in the floor statements of the statute's sponsors); Monterey Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 743 F.2d 589, 596 (7th Cir.1984) (same); Alex v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1235, 1239 n. 3 (7th Cir.1994) ([I]solated remarks of individual legislators, ... [can]not be used to find ambiguity, or contrary intent, in statutory language that, with respect to a case in hand, is clear on its own terms without rendering nugatory the `plain meaning' canon of construction.). 13 Accordingly, we conclude that Representative Clay's remarks cannot be used to support an exception to the anti-cutback rule for amendments that expand disqualifying employment. 37