Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: whether the trial judge should have been recused from the trial of this case.

Text: ¶ 175. Kolberg sought the recusal of the trial judge. He asserts it was error for the trial judge not to recuse himself because of the conflict of interest in the same court being liable in a civil action for the violation of Appellant's speedy appellate rights. Kolberg has not yet filed this civil action. ¶ 176. Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613 (Miss.1997), offers guidance here. One issue with which we were confronted in Evans was whether the filing of a civil rights lawsuit against the trial judge by a criminal defendant requires recusal. Id. at 677. We reaffirmed our standards for judicial recusal: The standard by which the Court determines if a Judge should have disqualified himself or herself, is an objective standard under Canon 3. [5] A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. (Internal citations omitted). The presumption is that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a `reasonable doubt' (about the validity of the presumption)[.] (Internal citations omitted). When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions, the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge and is subject to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion. (Internal citations omitted). Under the appropriate standard, the judge is presumed qualified and unbiased. This presumption may only be overcome by evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge was biased or not qualified. If a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would doubt the judge's impartiality, the judge is required to recuse him or herself from the case. Id. at 677-78 (quoting Collins v. Joshi, 611 So.2d 898, 901 (Miss.1992)). We went on to hold that the mere filing of a lawsuit, wherein a prisoner is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, is insufficient to require recusal of a trial judge named as a defendant in that lawsuit where there is no evidence in the record which demonstrates that the trial judge is biased or unqualified. Id. at 678-79. ¶ 177. Turning to the case at hand, there has been no lawsuit filed against the trial judge, but instead only Kolberg's expression of his intention to do so. Accordingly, if the mere filing of a lawsuit, without more, is insufficient to require recusal, then so to is the mere intention to file a lawsuit, without more, insufficient. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge was biased or otherwise disqualified when it came to Kolberg's case. There is certainly nothing which would establish bias beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.