Opinion ID: 1981116
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Heading: Ruling on motion to dismiss.

Text: Defendant's motion to dismiss, made at the close of evidence, is a motion more appropriately directed to the court in a non-jury trial. We will consider it as a motion for directed verdict. See State v. Jurgenson, 225 N.W.2d 310, 312 (Iowa 1975); Henschel v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company, 178 N.W.2d 409, 414 (Iowa 1970); cf. State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118, 123-125 (Iowa 1972). In the first ground of this motion defendant asserted the State failed to prove he was a bailee, which he argues was essential under the criminal statute specified in the information: 710.4 Embezzlement by bailee. Whoever embezzles or fraudulently converts to his own use, or secretes with intent to embezzle or fraudulently convert to his own use, money, goods, or property delivered to him, or any part thereof, which may be the subject of larceny, shall be guilty of larceny and punished accordingly. Defendant contends if the State proved any crime it was not a violation of § 710.4, supra, but a violation of § 710.5, The Code, embezzlement by agents. He quotes from State v. Folger, 204 Iowa 1296, 1301, 210 N.W. 580, 582 (1926) that [n]ot only are the offenses separate and distinct, but evidence which will sustain one would justify, if not require, an acquittal of the other. It is clear defendant was an employee of McBluffs, Inc. His embezzlement of corporate funds would fall squarely within the proscription of § 710.5. His conviction under § 710.4 (bailee) may be affirmed only if we determine the prosecution, under these circumstances, had a right to elect between § 710.4 and § 710.5. In this connection, we think defendant's reliance on State v. Folger, supra, is misplaced. The court's statement that evidence which will sustain one [charge under 710.4 or 710.5] would justify, if not require, an acquittal of the other was dicta. In Folger defendant had been acquitted on a § 710.5 (agency) charge because he was not shown to be an agent. He was retried and convicted under § 710.4 (bailee). Upon his appeal following the § 710.4 conviction, this court, rejecting a claim of former jeopardy, found the crimes were separate and distinct. Of course, this does not mean a person cannot be both a bailee and an agent. It merely means agency must be proven under § 710.5 and bailment must be shown under § 710.4. Only bailment was established in Folger, so only § 710.4 was available to the prosecution. In a later decision this court, applying a broad definition of bailment, held only to the separate and distinct concept articulated in Folger, stating it was immaterial whether defendant charged as a § 710.4 bailee, was also an agent: The appellant also relies upon State v. Folger, 204 Iowa 1296, 210 N.W. 580. In said case we clearly pointed out the distinction between the two statutes, one providing the punishment for embezzlement by an agent, where proof of agency is indispensable, and the other providing for punishment for embezzlement by a bailee, where proof of bailment is indispensable. We there held that the offenses are separate and distinct.    It is not a material inquiry in this case as to whether or not the appellant was the agent of Mrs. Barnett, who owned the notes and who paid the money to the appellant, or was the agent of Mrs. Frawley, who owned the notes and to whom the appellant was in duty bound to pay the money. The simple situation is that the money at no time belonged to the appellant, nor did he have any rights therein.    He is charged as being a bailee of the fund and with having converted the same. He is not charged as being an agent who converted money coming into his hands.  State v. Cavanaugh, 214 Iowa 457, 460, 236 N.W. 96, 97 (1931). If, as our cases indicate, a person prosecuted under § 710.4 is to be termed a bailee we must give consideration to the relationship the legislature intended. At the outset we note the word bailee does not appear in the text of the statute but only in the headnote. This enactment came into being with the Code of 1897. It was designated as Title XXIV, Ch. 5, § 8, included in one of 26 titles, each prepared and enacted as a separate bill. See Article by A. Loth, An Outline of Iowa Codes, Compilations and Revisions, 3 I.C.A., p. VII at XIV-XVI. Following long-standing precedent in examining the enrolled bill in the office of the Secretary of State, see State v. Lynch, 169 Iowa 148, 151, 151 N.W. 81, 82 (1915); Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa 1, 11 (1861); Clare v. State, 5 Iowa 509, 510 (1858), we have confirmed the headnote was not part of the original statute. It cannot, therefore, control its construction. See § 3.3, The Code; State v. Hollingsworth, 248 Iowa 763, 769, 81 N.W.2d 27, 31 (1957); Monona County v. Waples, 226 Iowa 1281, 1287, 286 N.W. 461, 465 (1939). Thus the headnote word bailee, supplied by the code editor, lends no support to the contention that the legislature intended all the technical aspects of property law bailment be imposed to constrict the broad statutory language of § 710.4. In Cavanaugh, supra, 214 Iowa at 461, 236 N.W. at 97 we said    under statutes of this character    it is unnecessary to prove agency, and    a bailee, within the meaning of such a statute, is one who fraudulently converts to his own use, money, goods, or property delivered to him by another party to be held by him and returned to the bailor or delivered to another party. An employee falls within the Cavanaugh definition: When an employee receives, for his employer, property which has been handed over by a third person, the employee becomes a bailee of the article under broad definitions of bailment because for the moment possession is in the employee while title is in the employer. R. Perkins on Criminal Law, Ch. 4, § 1 at 243 (2d ed. 1969). That the property is delivered to the servant or agent by a third person and not the owner does not affect the bailee relationship. State v. Anderson, 232 S.W.2d 909, 911 (1950); Smith v. State, 78 Okla.Cr. 343, 148 P.2d 206, 208 (1944); People v. Riccardi, 50 Cal.App. 427, 430, 195 P. 448, 449 (1920); Brown, The Law of Personal Property, § 76, pp. 272-273 (2d ed. 1955). It is apparent defendant falls within the broad definition of a § 710.4 bailee. He fraudulently converted money delivered to him by another party (the customers) to be held by him and delivered to a third party (the bank). The bailor was McBluffs, Inc., to whom title to the money passed when the sales were made to the customers. The State produced evidence from which the jury could have found defendant, although an employee of McBluffs, Inc., was also a bailee under the broad definition of that word contained in the instructions, to which defendant made no objection. We hold defendant was properly prosecuted under § 710.4 even though the State might have prosecuted him alternatively under § 710.5. Cf. State v. Carr, 118 N.J.Law 233, 192 A. 36 (1937); Commonwealth v. Cygan, 212 Pa. Super. 384, 243 A.2d 476 (1968). As his second ground for directed verdict defendant urged there was not sufficient evidence to permit the jury to pass on the issue whether he converted the sales receipts to his own use. Such proof may be made by circumstantial evidence and the State is entitled to all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the factual circumstances shown. State v. Graham, 221 N.W.2d 258, 259-260 (Iowa 1974); State v. Williams, 179 N.W.2d 756, 760 (Iowa 1970). In our view the evidence in this case, although circumstantial, was sufficient to generate a jury issue. Unlike the situation in Williams, supra, this property traces directly into defendant's hands. All of the circumstances taken together, including his contemplated termination from employment and failure to return to the restaurant after leaving with the money bag, raises a reasonable inference he converted the funds to his own use. Trial court properly overruled the motion for directed verdict.