Opinion ID: 885165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Danielle

Text: ¶ 19 McGinnis' complaint alleged that, after he stopped the Mercury and began to exit his patrol car, the Mercury, which was being operated by Defendant Jennifer Hand, along with the assistance and encouragement of Defendants Moore and Aldridge speeded east on Clinton Street. It further alleged that the vehicle's occupants should be held liable for McGinnis' injuries resulting from the subsequent high-speed chase. The District Court concluded that, because Danielle was only a passenger in the vehicle, she could not be held liable for the driver's negligence and granted summary judgment to Danielle. McGinnis asserts that the District Court erred. ¶ 20 McGinnis concedes that Danielle was a mere passenger in the Mercury and that, generally, negligence by a driver cannot be imputed to a passenger. See, e.g., Buck v. State (1986), 222 Mont. 423, 430, 723 P.2d 210, 214; Hernandez v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. (1965), 144 Mont. 585, 593, 398 P.2d 953, 958. He cites to Black v. Martin (1930), 88 Mont. 256, 292 P. 577, however, for the proposition that an exception to the general rule that negligence of a driver may not be imputed to a passenger exists where the passenger in some way actively participates in the driver's negligence. From that premise, McGinnis argues that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Danielle actively participated in Hand's alleged negligence by encouraging her to engage in the high-speed chase, allowing it to happen and taking no steps to prevent it. ¶ 21 In support of her motion for summary judgment, Danielle submitted her affidavit stating that she had no knowledge Hand was going to attempt to evade McGinnis and that she did not consent, aid or agree to Hand's conduct in attempting to evade McGinnis. Under Black, Danielle's affidavit establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether she actively participated in Hand's conduct of engaging in the high-speed chase. ¶ 22 McGinnis asserts, however, that his affidavit controverts Danielle's statements that she did not consent to, aid in or agree to Hand's conduct and raises genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment in Danielle's favor. We disagree. ¶ 23 McGinnis' affidavit states the following: When I approached the vehicle (the Mercury) before the chase, all of the girls were giggling and laughing and seemed to be enjoying themselves. After chasing the car and when I was finally able to get the car to come to a stop, each of the Defendant girls acted as though it was all a lark, and they were simply having a fun and exciting time.... Danielle Aldridge certainly assisted and encourage [sic] the high speed chase which led to my injuries.... She was fully aware that Jennifer Hand was going to evade me, and she encourage [sic] it and delighted in it. ¶ 24 First, McGinnis' statement that, prior to the high-speed chase, the three girls were laughing and appeared to be enjoying themselves does not constitute substantial evidence that Danielle encouraged or actively participated in Hand's subsequent conduct of driving off at a high rate of speed. It is speculative to assume that, because Danielle was laughing before the chase, she necessarily was involved in Hand's decision to drive away at high speed. Similarly, and contrary to McGinnis' assertion, the fact that Danielle appeared to be enjoying herself when the vehicle was stopped after the chase does not raise a genuine issue of fact that she encouraged Hand to engage in the chase. ¶ 25 McGinnis' additional affidavit statements that Danielle certainly assisted and encouraged the high-speed chase and was fully aware that Hand was going to attempt to evade McGinnis also do not raise a genuine issue of material fact. As stated above, mere speculation or conclusory statements are not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact because they are not evidence of a substantial nature. Klock, 284 Mont. at 174, 943 P.2d at 1266. There is no indication in his affidavit of the information on which McGinnis bases these statements; while the statements clearly reflect McGinnis' opinions and conclusions, they contain no facts. Thus, the statements are conclusory and do not constitute evidence of a substantial nature which raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Danielle actively participated in Hand's alleged negligence in attempting to evade McGinnis. ¶ 26 McGinnis also contends that Danielle is liable under a negligent entrustment theory because she gave Hand  who he asserts was underage and not licensed to drive a car  permission to drive the Mercury on the morning of March 10, 1992. In essence, this is an argument that Danielle supplied Hand with the Mercury and knew or should have known that Hand would use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm. See Williams, 265 Mont. at 114, 874 P.2d at 1227. ¶ 27 Danielle's affidavit states that she had no knowledge Hand was going to attempt to evade McGinnis. Thus, it meets Danielle's burden of establishing the absence of genuine issues of material fact regarding her knowledge that Hand was going to use the Mercury in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm. ¶ 28 In response, McGinnis argues that, because Hand was underage and not licensed to drive, she was incompetent to be driving the Mercury and Danielle knew or should have known that Hand, not being competent to drive, would be likely to drive the vehicle in a manner which would create an unreasonable risk of physical harm. We conclude, however, that McGinnis failed to present any substantial evidence in support of this assertion. ¶ 29 McGinnis' affidavit contains no evidence establishing that Hand was underage for driving purposes or that she was not licensed to drive. Moreover, even evidence to that effect, without more, would be insufficient to establish a lack of competence to operate the vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner. See Williams, 265 Mont. at 114, 874 P.2d at 1227 (citation omitted). Nor does the affidavit contain evidence that Hand was not competent to drive or that she had a reputation for negligent driving. Finally, the affidavit does not contain evidence that Danielle knew or should have known that Hand would attempt to evade McGinnis by engaging in the high-speed chase. We conclude that McGinnis failed to come forward with substantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that Danielle knew or should have known that Hand was not competent to drive or that she would drive the Mercury in a manner which would create an unreasonable risk of physical harm. ¶ 30 We have concluded that, on this record, no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the negligence of either Pamela or Danielle in light of the substantive law governing McGinnis' claims against them. We hold, therefore, that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to Pamela and Danielle. ¶ 31 Affirmed. J.A. TURNAGE, C.J., and WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR., JAMES C. NELSON, TERRY N. TRIEWEILER, JJ., concur.