Opinion ID: 848628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: retaliation based on filing a grievance

Text: Plaintiff's second theory is that defendant retaliated against her after she filed a grievance claiming national-origin discrimination. After being refused a promotion for the eleventh time, plaintiff filed a grievance with her union in June 1987, claiming that she was being denied promotions because of discrimination based on national origin and color. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of filing the grievance, she was denied subsequent promotion opportunities and was subjected to poor treatment in general by Cathcart and the First North supervisors. With regard to this claim, it is undisputed that plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, namely filing a grievance claiming a violation of the Civil Rights Act. In addition, it is undisputed that defendant was aware that plaintiff had engaged in this activity. Plaintiff presented testimony that defendant's retaliatory conduct took place over an eleven-year period, including acts that took place after she filed the instant action on July 21, 1995. Defendant argues that, pursuant to the three-year period of limitations, any claim based on acts occurring before July 21, 1992, is barred. M.C.L. § 600.5805(10). Despite the statute of limitations, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals permitted plaintiff to recover on the basis of untimely acts, or acts occurring before July 21, 1992, under the so-called continuing violations doctrine adopted in Sumner. We conclude that, absent evidence of these acts, there is insufficient evidence to establish a causal link between the 1987 grievance and any retaliatory acts occurring within the limitations period. The continuing violations doctrine was first addressed by this Court in Sumner, supra at 510, 398 N.W.2d 368. We began our analysis in that case by stating that it is appropriate . . . in discrimination cases [to] turn to federal precedent for guidance in reaching our decision. Id. at 525, 398 N.W.2d 368. We found particularly helpful the considerations relied on by federal courts in nullifying the statute of limitations in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. We described these as follows: First, [the Civil Rights Act] is a remedial statute whose purpose is to root out discrimination and make injured parties whole. Second, employees are generally lay people, who do not know that they must act quickly or risk losing their cause of action. An employee may fear reprisal by the employer, or may refer the matter to a union, which may not take any action within the limitation period. Employees may also delay filing their complaints in the hope of internal resolution or simply to give the employer a second chance. Third, and most importantly, many discriminatory acts occur in such a manner that it is difficult to precisely define when they took place. One might say that they unfold rather than occur. [ Sumner, supra at 525-526, 398 N.W.2d 368]. [6] Sumner also found persuasive the United States Supreme Court's decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). In Evans, the United States Supreme Court for the first time addressed the continuing violations doctrine that had been created by the lower federal courts in order to overcome the statute of limitations. [7] The employee in Evans, a flight attendant with United Air Lines, was fired in 1968 on the basis of a no marriage rule that was later found to violate Title VII. She was rehired by the airline in 1972, but was not credited for her pre-1968 service and, therefore, was treated as a new hire for seniority purposes. The employee argued that the airline's refusal to recognize her past service constituted a present effect to the past illegal act and therefore perpetuates the consequences of forbidden discrimination. Id. at 557, 97 S.Ct. 1885. Therefore, she alleged that the continuing violations doctrine should be applied to allow her to obtain relief for the now-untimely 1968 firing. However, the United States Supreme Court held that merely demonstrating a present effect to a past act of discrimination is insufficient to create a continuing violation. Id. at 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885. [T]he emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation exists. Id. Therefore, in order to support a discrimination claim on a continuing violations theory, an employee must first demonstrate the existence of a present violation. Since the employee in Evans was unable to demonstrate any violation within the time limitations of Title VII, her claim was barred as untimely. Sumner found the federal precedent persuasive and held that the continuing violations doctrine applied to claims under both the Civil Rights Act and the Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.1101 et seq. This Court adopted the Evans requirement that an employee must first demonstrate that a violation has taken place within the limitations period. Sumner, supra at 536, 398 N.W.2d 368. Once an employee has demonstrated this, he or she must then demonstrate either that his or her employer has engaged in a policy of discrimination or has engaged in a series of allegedly discriminatory acts which are sufficiently related so as to constitute a pattern. . . . Id. at 528, 398 N.W.2d 368. There are three factors to consider in determining whether an employer has been engaged in a series of allegedly discriminatory acts: The first is subject matter. Do the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation? The second is frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring ( e.g., a biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated work assignment or employment decision? The third factor, perhaps of most importance, is degree of permanence. Does the act have the degree of permanence which should trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights, or which should indicate to the employee that the continued existence of the adverse consequences of the act is to be expected without being dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate? [ Sumner, supra at 538, 398 N.W.2d 368, quoting Berry v. LSU Bd. of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981 (C.A.5, 1983).] Whatever the merits of the policy crafted by Sumner, it bears little relationship to the actual language of the relevant statute of limitations, M.C.L. § 600.5805, and M.C.L. § 600.5827. Fundamental canons of statutory interpretation require us to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed by the language of its statutes. DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp., 461 Mich. 394, 402, 605 N.W.2d 300 (2000). If such language is unambiguous, as most such language is, Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 468 Mich. 459, 663 N.W.2d 447 (2003), we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed-no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. DiBenedetto, supra at 402, 605 N.W.2d 300. M.C.L. § 600.5805 provides, in pertinent part: (1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.    (10) The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property. M.C.L. § 600.5827 provides that a claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results. Thus, § 5805 requires a plaintiff to commence an action within three years of each adverse employment act by a defendant. Section 5805 does not say that a claim outside this three-year period can be revived if it is somehow sufficiently related to injuries occurring within the limitations period. Rather, the statute simply states that a plaintiff shall not bring a claim for injuries outside the limitations period. Nothing in these provisions permits a plaintiff to recover for injuries outside the limitations period when they are susceptible to being characterized as continuing violations. To allow recovery for such claims is simply to extend the limitations period beyond that which was expressly established by the Legislature. [8] An additional flaw in Sumner's reasoning is its unduly heavy reliance on federal case law, particularly Evans. While federal precedent may often be useful as guidance in this Court's interpretation of laws with federal analogues, such precedent cannot be allowed to rewrite Michigan law. The persuasiveness of federal precedent can only be considered after the statutory differences between Michigan and federal law have been fully assessed, and, of course, even when this has been done and language in state statutes is compared to similar language in federal statutes, federal precedent remains only as persuasive as the quality of its analysis. Here, not only does the continuing violations doctrine in Michigan conflict with the requirements of §§ 5805 and 5827, but, at least arguably, the federal doctrine is given affirmative support by language in Title VII that is absent from the Civil Rights Act. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to extend the period within which an employee must file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 90 days to 180 days. At the same time, Congress imposed a two-year limit on backpay awards. Thus, Congress implicitly recognized an employee's right to recover damages for discriminatory acts beyond those that occurred within the 180-day period. Sumner noted that such amendment constituted an implicit endorsement of the continuing violation theory, because Congress allowed employees to recover damages for discriminatory acts beyond those that occurred within the 180-day period. Sumner, supra at 526, 398 N.W.2d 368. However, Sumner failed to note that there is no corresponding provision in Michigan law that even implicitly endorses the continuing violations doctrine. Thus, rather than supporting Sumner's holding, the existence of the federal statute leads to the opposite conclusion-that the continuing violations doctrine is contrary to Michigan law and, therefore, that federal precedent should not have been imported into Michigan law. [9] Therefore, we overrule Sumner and hold that a person must file a claim under the Civil Rights Act within three years of the date his or her cause of action accrues, as required by § 5805(10). [10] That is, three years means three years. An employee is not permitted to bring a lawsuit for employment acts that accrue beyond this period, because the Legislature has determined that such claims should not be permitted. [11] Whether or not the continuing violations exception of Sumner constitutes a useful improvement in the law, there is no basis for this Court to construct such an amendment. [12] Accordingly, plaintiff's claims of retaliatory discrimination arising from acts occurring before June 21, 1992, are untimely and cannot be maintained. Without these untimely acts, plaintiff's claim is limited to acts occurring five to eleven years [13] after she filed her grievance. In light of this gap, there is insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find a causal link between the 1987 grievance and the discriminatory acts falling within the limitations period. Furthermore, in order to show causation in a retaliatory discrimination case, [p]laintiff must show something more than merely a coincidence in time between protected activity and adverse employment action. West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177, 186, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). There is no evidence to suggest any distinction between the promotion denial that occurred while plaintiff was in Cathcart's chain of command and those denials involving supervisors who had no knowledge of plaintiff's grievance. Five supervisors, including four who were directly responsible for postgrievance promotion decisions involving plaintiff, testified that they were unaware that plaintiff had filed any grievance. Plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence to contradict that testimony. However, despite the First North supervisors' lack of knowledge about the grievance, they treated her requests for promotions in the same manner that Cathcart did, i.e., they denied them. Because these supervisors were not aware of the grievance, they could not have retaliated against plaintiff for its filing. Further, there is no evidence that plaintiff's job qualifications changed in any meaningful way in the time between the denial by Cathcart and the denials by the other supervisors at First North. Thus, a juror could not reasonably conclude that the reasons behind the denials within First North were related to the grievance. Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence affirmatively showing, as is her burden, that the reasons underlying the promotion denial involving Cathcart were any different from the denials involving supervisors who were unaware that plaintiff had filed a grievance. West, supra at 183-184, 665 N.W.2d 468; DeFlaviis, supra . It appears that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals identified a causal connection between the grievance and the promotion denials simply on the basis of timing-that is, because the denials occurred after the grievance, there must be a functional relationship. This is the kind of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning rejected in West. We reject such reasoning in this case as well. Similarly, plaintiff failed to establish that she was treated poorly by Cathcart and the First North supervisors as a result of the grievance. Plaintiff was unable to establish that Cathcart's treatment of plaintiff was distinguishable in any way from her treatment by supervisors who were unaware of the grievance. [14] First, plaintiff claimed that Cathcart treated her differently from other employees by refusing to give her a key to the facility. However, her supervisor at First North, who denied any knowledge of the grievance, similarly refused to give plaintiff a key. Second, plaintiff claimed that her work was subjected to greater scrutiny by Cathcart than that of her coworkers. However, she also claimed that another First North supervisor, who is no longer an employee of defendant and did not testify, wrote her several memos a day unfairly attacking her performance. Finally, both plaintiff and the Court of Appeals found it noteworthy that she was moved to a disgusting office after the transfer to First North. However, the supervisor who assigned her that office testified that he was unaware of the grievance and had informed her that it was only a temporary situation. Under these circumstances, we conclude that no juror could have reasonably concluded that plaintiff was subjected to poor treatment because she had been engaged in protected activity by filing a grievance claiming national-origin discrimination. Finally, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Cathcart's alleged derogatory comments based on national origin establish any causal connection between the grievance and the adverse employment action. In order to establish such a connection, plaintiff needed to show that the comments demonstrated Cathcart's discriminatory animus toward her and that, as a result of such animus, Cathcart retaliated against her for filing the grievance. Plaintiff claims that Cathcart made a racially derogatory statement regarding Indians. [15] Plaintiff testified that Cathcart responded to the news that her son had been admitted to a medical program by stating, I don't know how many Indian doctors we need. [16] This statement does not pertain in any way to the promotion process; neither is it directed toward plaintiff in terms of evaluating her work performance or threatening any future treatment of her. See Sniecinski, supra at 136 n. 8, 666 N.W.2d 186. However inappropriate or ill-informed this statement, it is better characterized, in our judgment, as a stray comment than as reflective of any pattern of biased comments.... [17] Id. More to the point, for the same reason that plaintiff here has failed to demonstrate that Cathcart's treatment of her did not vary in any appreciable way from her treatment by other supervisors-concerning whom there is no evidence of even such stray comments-we do not believe that plaintiff has demonstrated that she was subjected to denials of promotions or otherwise poor treatment by defendant on the basis of her grievance. Again, we reiterate that the question is not the propriety or seemliness of Cathcart's statements, but merely whether such statements establish a causal link between plaintiff's grievance and her subsequent treatment by defendant. In light of insufficient evidence that plaintiff was not promoted or otherwise treated poorly because she engaged in a protected activity, i.e., having filed a grievance against defendant alleging national-origin discrimination, plaintiff has failed to establish a retaliation claim under the Civil Rights Act.