Opinion ID: 1944514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the court commit error in admitting a statement of a codefendant into evidence?

Text: Langston contends the statement of the codefendant introduced by Officer Sanderson was prejudicial and should not have been admitted into evidence. The record reveals that the appellant was not denied his right of confrontation of the witness as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Brown v. State, 340 So.2d 718 (Miss. 1976), this Court, followed Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971), in holding that when a jury hears statements made by the codefendant, the defendant must constitutionally have an opportunity to confront such a witness. In Brown we set forth a procedural rule for use in the trial of codefendants. We did so because of the difficulties frequently arising because of the conflicting interests and rights of codefendants. The statement of one codefendant to a police officer implicating the other codefendant deprives the latter of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation if the codefendant does not testify in his own behalf. A counter-constitutional difficulty arises if the offended defendant calls the other codefendant as his witness since the called witness has constitutional immunity from giving evidence against himself, creating a conflict which could be avoided by granting a severance or by observing the procedure enunciated in Brown. It follows: [T]he trial judge should not admit, in evidence, incriminating statements of a codefendant (implicating the defendant) during the State's case in chief, since it could not be known whether the codefendant would testify after the State rested. The statement, if admissible, should be admitted only after the codefendant took the stand and was subject to cross-examination by the defendant, and, when admitted, the trial judge should immediately, and at such other times as the statement might be referred to, tell (orally instruct) the jury that the statement must not be considered against the defendant. Likewise, if so requested by the defendant, the trial judge must instruct the jury in writing. (340 So.2d at 721) We reaffirm this procedure, believing it to be the better practice. Presently, however, the appellant was given the right to confront the witness who gave the statement since the codefendant testified in his own behalf. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him was not violated although the procedures set forth in Brown, supra, were not literally followed. Therefore, under the present circumstances we are unable to state the procedural departure was prejudicial error. Had the codefendant not testified, the cause would necessarily have to have been reversed. Finally, Langston contends the corporation from whom the money was taken was not sufficiently identified. We reject this argument since Earnest described and identified the corporation by whom he was employed. AFFIRMED. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.