Opinion ID: 2614563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Promptness of a Curative Instruction

Text: With regard to the second factor in determining prosecutorial misconduct, we have previously stated that a prosecutor's improper remarks are [generally] considered cured by the court's instructions to the jury, because it is presumed that the jury abided by the court's admonition to disregard the statement. State v. McGriff, 76 Hawai`i 148, 160, 871 P.2d 782, 794 (1994) (quoting Pemberton, 71 Haw. at 475, 796 P.2d at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted)). In this case, however, no curative instruction was given after the inflammatory comments were made. Indeed, not only was there no curative instruction given to address the inflammatory comments, but the circuit court overruled defense counsel's timely objection. Although the circuit court instructed the jury prior to its deliberations that [s]tatements or remarks made by counsel are not evidence and that [y]ou must not be influenced... by passion or prejudice against the defendant[,] it is unlikely that the circuit court's general instructions that were delivered well after the inflammatory comments along with the other general jury instructions could have negated the prejudicial effect of the deputy prosecutor's comments. See State v. Marsh, 68 Haw. 659, 661, 728 P.2d 1301, 1303 (1986) (vacating conviction and noting circuit court's failure to issue specific instruction concerning prosecutor's closing comments). Therefore, the second factorthe promptness of a curative instruction weighs heavily in favor of Rogan inasmuch as no curative instruction was given.