Opinion ID: 70986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gross Sexual Imposition

Text: Count Four of Esqueda–Pina’s Ohio state indictment charged gross sexual imposition and stated, in relevant part: [I]n violation of section 2907.05 of the Ohio Revised Code[, Esqueda–Pina] did have sexual contact with [the female victim], . . . having purposely compelled Esqueda to submit by force or threat of force, and/ or the said [female victim] being less than thirteen (13) years of age, to wit: twelve (12) years of age. The 1997 judgment against Esqueda–Pina, in turn, reflects that he “entered a plea of guilty to Count Four of the Indictment; to wit: Gross Sexual Imposition, a violation of Section 2907.05 of the Ohio Revised Code, a Felony of the Third degree[,] and was found guilty of said charge[ ] by the Court.” The parties do not dispute that only two subsections of § 2907.05 correspond to the conduct described in the indictment. These subsections read: 7 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 (A) No person shall have sexual contact with another . . . when any of the following applies: (1) The offender purposely compels the other person . . . to submit by force or threat of force[; or] ... (4) The other person . . . is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person. O HIO R EV. C ODE A NN. § 2907.05(A).3 Of these subsections, only subsection (A)(4)—sexual contact with a person less than thirteen years of age—is a third degree felony; all other subsections in § 2907.05(A) are fourth degree felonies. Id. § 2907.05(B). The parties also do not dispute that if Esqueda–Pina was convicted under subsection (A)(4), the crime of violence enhancement properly would apply. This is consistent with our precedents, which show that sexual indecency or sexual contact with a minor qualifies as “sexual abuse of a minor,” an enumerated crime of violence under § 2L1.2. See United States v. Zavala–Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding sixteen-level enhancement after holding that conviction for indecent exposure with children under the age of seventeen under Texas Penal Code § 21.11(b) qualified as “sexual abuse of a minor” under § 2L1.2); Najera–Najera, 519 F.3d at 512 (holding that sexual contact with a child, as defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.11(c), qualified as “sexual abuse of a minor” under § 2L1.2; reasoning “if . . . indecent exposure absent physical contact[ ] ipso facto constitutes ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ common sense dictates that an adult’s sexual contact with a child . . . also constitutes ‘sexual abuse of a minor’”); United States v. Izaguirre–Flores, 405 F.3d 270, 271 & n.1 (5th Cir. 3 “Sexual contact,” in turn, is defined as “any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” Id. § 2907.01(B). 8 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 2005) (per curiam) (concluding that “sexual abuse of a minor” encompassed a North Carolina statute that prohibited the “willful[ ] tak[ing] or attempt[ ] to take any immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with any child . . . under the age of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire”). There is no dispute that if Esqueda–Pina was convicted under § 2907.05(A)(4), applicable to sexual contact with a child under thirteen years of age, the sixteenlevel enhancement would apply. The parties further agree that if Esqueda–Pina were convicted under § 2907.05(A)(1) of “purposely compel[ling]” the twelve-year old girl described in the indictment “to submit by force or threat of force” to sexual contact, the crime of violence enhancement would be appropriate. This again is consistent with § 2L1.2, which applies the crime of violence enhancement to “any offense under federal, state or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Esqueda–Pina points out, however, that the indictment actually states that he “purposely compelled Esqueda to submit by force or threat of force.” (emphasis added). He argues that because the indictment, literally read, indicates that he compelled himself to submit to sexual contact by force or threat of force, the indictment and guilty plea to the indictment are not reliable evidence that he “purposely compel[led] the other person, or one of the other persons, to submit by force or threat of force,” as § 2907.05(A)(1) requires. O HIO R EV. C ODE A NN. § 2907.05(A)(1) (emphasis added). The issues, then, are (1) whether it is clear from the Ohio judgment that Esqueda–Pina was convicted under § 2907.05(A)(4), applicable to sexual contact with a child age 13 or younger; and (2) if it is not clear, whether Esqueda–Pina’s guilty plea to “having purposely compelled Esqueda to submit by force” would establish a violation of § 2907.05(A)(1) and therefore support a crime of violence enhancement. 9 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 The government urges that Esqueda–Pina must have been convicted under § 2907.05(A)(4) because the judgment reflects that he was convicted of “Gross Sexual Imposition, a violation of Section 2907.05 of the Ohio Revised Code, a Felony of the Third degree,” and subsection (A)(4) is the only thirddegree felony under that statute (the remaining subsections are fourth-degree felonies). O HIO R EV. C ODE A NN. § 2907.05(B). Esqueda–Pina counters that his conviction of a third-degree felony does not necessarily indicate that he was convicted under subsection (A)(4). He argues that the judgment may instead reflect a conviction under subsection (A)(1) to which some sort of aggravating enhancement was applied. Esqueda–Pina does not point to any statutory basis for this contention, and the face of the statute shows no basis for such enhancement. An Ohio appellate court recently noted the absence of factors that would aggravate a sentence under the statute, describing § 2907.05(A) as prohibiting different kinds of conduct, each “a separate offense, having a separate penalty,” and noting that “there are no additional elements or attendant circumstances that change the penalty.” State v. Kepiro, No. 06AP1302, 2007 WL 2505506, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2007); see also State v. Nethers, No. 08CA-78, 2008 WL 2572105, at  (Ohio Ct. App. June 4, 2008) (“[T]here are no additional elements or circumstances over and above the elements of the offense set forth in . . . § 2907.05(A) that enhance the penalty for a [gross sexual imposition] conviction.”).4 The record strongly suggests that Esqueda–Pina was convicted under § 2907.05(A)(4). Even if Esqueda–Pina’s gross sexual imposition conviction was not under § 2907.05(A)(4), however, it would suffice to support the crime of violence enhancement. Esqueda–Pina concedes that an offense under § 2907.05(A)(1) would qualify as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2, but argues that no such 4 Kepiro and Nethers discuss a revised version of § 2907.05(A), but the prior version, under which Esqueda–Pina was convicted, did not differ materially. 10 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 offense can be proved in this case because the indictment to which he entered a guilty plea states that he “purposely compelled Esqueda,” rather than the twelve-year-old female victim, “to submit [to sexual contact] by force or threat of force” (emphasis added). Esqueda–Pina’s counsel conceded at oral argument the obvious fact that this was a typographical error. This concession is fully supported by the indictment, which otherwise focuses exclusively on acts—rape, vaginal intercourse with a minor, gross sexual imposition, and sexual contact with a minor—that Esqueda–Pina allegedly committed against the twelve-yearold victim. The district court was entitled to find a basis for enhancement on a preponderance of the evidence. Andrade–Aguilar, 570 F.3d at 217. The preponderance of the evidence showed that Esqueda–Pina was indicted for purposely compelling the victim, and not himself, to submit by force to sexual contact. Esqueda–Pina’s plea to that indictment would provide a proper basis for enhancement. Under either of the subsections, therefore, the crime of violence enhancement for the gross sexual imposition conviction was proper. Esqueda–Pina resists this conclusion, contending that the district court did not make any findings of fact as to whether the gross sexual imposition conviction supported the crime of violence enhancement. He points to the following exchange at sentencing: Defense Counsel: Your Honor, we would except to the description of the facts of the conviction made the basis of the 16-level enhancement as they’re described in the PSI report. The Court: Okay. And the objection is what? Just the lack of proof? Defense Counsel: Your Honor, we are actually maintaining that this is not a crime of violence and that . . . the Government has failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to that. I was provided with documentation with respect to that case, your Honor. We nonetheless believe that since it’s really—was eventually a lesser included offense of the indictment, that there is no reference 11 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 to the indictment itself and that the statute is overly broad, all within the definition of a crime of violence. The Court: Okay. I think looking at it, taking a common sense approach, this does satisfy the definition of that enumerated offense. The Court does find it’s a crime of violence. Esqueda–Pina contends, citing his counsel’s reference to the “lesser included offense,” that this exchange considered only whether the attempted rape conviction provided a basis for enhancement and did not reach whether the gross sexual imposition conviction would provide such a basis. He therefore urges that this court remand to the district court for findings of fact as to gross sexual imposition. The argument that the district court did not make findings of fact as to whether the gross sexual imposition conviction provided a basis for enhancement is not persuasive. First, it is not clear that the district judge’s comment that “looking at it[,] . . . this does satisfy the definition” refers only to the attempted rape conviction. Esqueda–Pina’s counsel began by arguing that “the description of the facts of the conviction made the basis of the 16-level enhancement as they’re described in the PS[R]”—which cited both the attempted rape and the gross sexual imposition convictions—did not support enhancement. Counsel only later raised an argument specific to the rape charge. Esqueda–Pina does not dispute that at sentencing, the district judge had before him the indictment, judgment, and PSR, which together set out the facts relevant to the gross sexual imposition conviction. The district court’s comment may have indicated that the record as a whole—not just the attempted rape conviction—supported enhancement. More importantly, Esqueda–Pina ignores that later in the hearing, the district court specifically adopted all of the factual findings contained in the PSR, which included factual findings as to the gross sexual imposition conviction 12 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 and its appropriateness as a basis for enhancing the sentence under § 2L1.2. This adoption established sufficient findings of fact on the gross sexual imposition issue. See United States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 324 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[D]istrict courts need not ritualistically detail each possible finding. When the findings in the PSR are so clear that guesswork by the reviewing court is unnecessary, the sentencing judge may make implicit findings by adopting the PSR.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not err in applying the sixteen-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).