Opinion ID: 1559891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the respondent's cross-appeal

Text: On its cross-appeal respondent does not suggest that the trial justice in his review of the evidence either overlooked or misconceived any that was material. Instead it argues that this is a case where the only evidence on damages came from experts who were equally qualified, that it was nearly balanced or was such that different minds could fairly and naturally come to different conclusions thereon, and that in such circumstances the trial justice in disregarding the testimony which the jury accepted was in effect substituting his opinion for theirs. The respondent's argument misconceives the duty of the trial justice. He was required in the exercise of his independent judgment to consider all of the material evidence in the case in the light of his charge to the jury and to pass on its weight and the credibility of the witnesses. This the trial justice did. He found Virgadamo's appraisal wanting because it was premised on a square-foot-value of property located in a residential zone and did not take into consideration the incremental value which attached because it was a nonconforming commercial use located in a residential zone. Moreover, he specifically observed that Virgadamo's figure of $600 for 5,017 square feet of land,    in any part of the City of Newport, even in the middle of the dump, is ridiculous. In short, he rejected Virgadamo's testimony because of its self-contradictions and because of its inherent improbabilities. In so doing, he was, of course, well within his province. The trial justice went further, however, and after having thus disposed of Virgadamo's testimony he considered what Laudati had said. While he rejected Laudati's $10,000 appraisal as exceptionally high because of his failure to make sufficient adjustments on the sales used as comparable, he nonetheless accepted his testimony as being generally superior to Virgadamo's. After the completion of this process of accepting and rejecting the relevant testimony, the trial justice then reexamined the record as if it were purged of the testimony he had found wanting. Then, convinced that the jury's award of damages on such a record was inadequate because it failed to administer substantial justice to the parties and was against the fair preponderance of the evidence, and because it did not respond truly to the merits in the case, he ordered a new trial unless the respondent consented to an additur. In our judgment he scrupulously observed the duties which were incumbent upon him in passing on a motion for a new trial. Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. 191, 196 A.2d 836. We find no error. If following the hearing to be held on April 7, 1969, as herein provided, it shall appear that the petitioner was prejudiced by the evidentiary ruling limiting the petitioner's cross-examination of the respondent's expert, his appeal will be sustained and the case will be remitted to the superior court for a new trial; if, however, it shall then appear that he was not so prejudiced, his appeal will be denied and dismissed as will the respondent's, and then the case will be remitted to the superior court for a new trial unless the respondent shall within the period to be fixed by that court consent to the additur heretofore awarded by the trial justice.