Opinion ID: 77581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Violation of the Horse Protection Act

Text: 18 The Horse Protection Act makes it illegal for any individual to enter for the purpose of showing or exhibiting in any horse show or horse exhibition, any horse which is sore. 15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(B). As used by the statute, soring means the application of devices or chemicals to the forelimbs of a horse to achieve the distinctive high-stepping gait of the Tennessee Walking Horse. Soring causes intense pain to the horse and gives the horse trainer an unfair advantage in competition by artificially inducing the distinctive gait. 19 Under the Act, a horse is sore only if the soreness is the result of one of several artificial means: 20 (A) an irritating or blistering agent has been applied, internally or externally, by a person to any limb of a horse, 21 (B) any burn, cut, or laceration has been inflicted by a person on any limb of a horse, 22 (C) any tack, nail, screw, or chemical agent has been injected by a person into or used by a person on any limb of a horse, or 23 (D) any other substance or device has been used by a person on any limb of a horse or a person has engaged in a practice involving a horse, 24 and, as a result of such application, infliction, injection, use, or practice, such horse suffers, or can reasonably be expected to suffer, physical pain or distress, inflammation, or lameness when walking, trotting, or otherwise moving, except that such term does not include such an application, infliction, injection, use, or practice in connection with the therapeutic treatment of a horse by or under the supervision of a person licensed to practice veterinary medicine in the State in which such treatment was given. 25 Id. § 1821(3). A horse is presumed to be sore if it manifests abnormal sensitivity or inflammation in both of its forelimbs or both of its hindlimbs. Id. § 1825(d)(5). 26 With respect to Lady Ebony's Ace, there is no dispute that the statutory presumption of soreness was triggered. The Designated Qualified Person and two veterinarians for the Department of Agriculture palpated Lady Ebony's Ace and observed abnormal sensitivity in both of her forelimbs. Nevertheless, it is well settled that the presumption of soreness is rebuttable. While it imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of producing evidence to me[e]t or rebut the presumption, the burden of proof remains with the [Complainant] and never shifts to the Respondent. In re Martin, 53 Agric. Dec. 212, 223 (Mar. 16, 1994) (brackets in original). 27 B. The Decision of the Judicial Officer that Zahnd Did Not Rebut the Statutory Presumption of Soreness Is Supported by Substantial Evidence. 28 Whether we can meaningfully review the decision of the Judicial Officer that Zahnd failed to rebut the statutory presumption of soreness is a close question. The Administrative Law Judge found that Zahnd rebutted the presumption, but the Judicial Officer disagreed. Because the Judicial Officer is not bound by the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and can draw independent inferences, we review only the decision of the Judicial Officer for substantial evidence. See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 496, 71 S.Ct. at 469. Our decision is made difficult because, although the Judicial Officer expressed his disagreement with the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the Judicial Officer did not offer any reasoning for his decision that Zahnd did not rebut the statutory presumption. The Judicial Officer failed to address at least some of Zahnd's evidence and explain why that evidence did not rebut the presumption. 29 At the hearing, Zahnd presented a few explanations to rebut the presumption that Lady Ebony's Ace was sore. Zahnd's evidence was that Lady Ebony's Ace was an irritable horse: she had been subject to the irritation of a day in a horse trailer; she had been subject to multiple palpations; the manner of palpation can affect whether a horse moves; and an irritated horse could exhibit greater reactions than a non-irritated horse. Zahnd also presented two other possible causes for some of the movements of Lady Ebony's Ace: first, Appleton testified that the movement of another horse behind a horse being examined ordinarily will make the latter horse move; and second, Zahnd observed that Lady Ebony's Ace stood resting a back foot during an examination, which was, in Zahnd's lay experience, a position a horse does not take when it is sore. Both Appleton and Zahnd apparently were credible witnesses. 30 The only response of the Judicial Officer to this evidence was that the record did not support the finding that Lady Ebony's Ace was a silly horse. Although the record supports that finding, the suggestion that Lady Ebony's Ace was acting silly was not the sole explanation for her behavior offered by Zahnd. The term silly was used to refer to the horse's irritability. In an affidavit procured by an investigator for the Department of Agriculture, Zahnd stated that the horse was stirred up, because she acted silly during the whole time she was being checked. The Administrative Law Judge described Zahnd's explanation for the horse's behavior as due to the horse acting `silly' as a result of spending most of the day in a horse trailer, and as a result of the extended examination process. Although both Appleton and Zahnd provided other testimony such that Lady Ebony's Ace moved when a horse walked behind her and that a horse will not rest a foot when it is sore, the Judicial Officer did not explain his rejection of these explanations. 31 Nevertheless, under our highly deferential standard of review, we conclude that the rejection by the Judicial Officer of the explanation that Lady Ebony's Ace was silly was intended to encompass Zahnd's explanation that the mare was aggravated or irritated, and substantial evidence supports that finding. As we have noted in our review of agency decisions under the arbitrary, capricious, . . . (or) unsupported by substantial evidence standard, `[t]he agency must articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. . . . While we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given, we will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.' Refrigerated Transp. Co., Inc. v. I.C.C., 663 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)). Although Zahnd and Appleton provided testimony that the reactions of Lady Ebony's Ace could be attributed to her irritable temper and multiple irritations, Dr. Dussault testified that Lady Ebony's Ace was not acting aggravated or irritated when she was palpated. The Judicial Officer was entitled to rely on Dussault's testimony and an independent review of the videotape of the examinations by Thomas, Dussault, and Guedron to reject the explanation given by Zahnd. 32 The only remaining evidence offered by Zahnd to refute the presumption was Appleton's testimony that the movement of one horse behind another could cause the latter horse to move, and Zahnd's testimony that, in his experience, a horse would not rest its foot when it is sore. Neither statement is sufficient for us to conclude that the decision of the Judicial Officer is not supported by substantial evidence. The Judicial Officer was entitled to rely on both his review of the videotape of the examinations and the expert testimony of a veterinarian who performed a reliable examination of the horse rather than the vague and speculative testimony of two lay witnesses.