Opinion ID: 3154725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant’s Motion to Proceed Pro Se

Text: 29 Case: 13-12596 Date Filed: 11/13/2015 Page: 30 of 35 As soon as the court denied Defendant’s motion to appoint new counsel, Defendant moved to proceed pro se. After conducting a full Faretta inquiry, the court granted his motion. Defendant now argues on appeal that his decision to proceed pro se was not knowing and voluntary. As with his first allegation of error, he seeks a new sentencing hearing, with new appointed counsel. A district court’s conclusion that a defendant has validly waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. 10 United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088 (11th Cir. 1995). On direct appeal, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the validity of the waiver. Id. A decision to proceed pro se must be knowing and voluntary. Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The “knowing and voluntary” standard considers whether the defendant knows the risks of proceeding without a lawyer and voluntarily makes the decision to proceed without counsel in light of those risks. See United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2002). It is not concerned with whether the defendant has the necessary legal knowledge to conduct his own defense. Id. 10 Our court has not yet decided in a published decision whether the de novo standard of review becomes a plain error standard when a defendant has failed to challenge in the district court the validity of his waiver. See United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 644–45 (11th Cir. 2014). As in Stanley, Defendant’s argument fails under either standard. We therefore examine Defendant’s claim de novo. 30 Case: 13-12596 Date Filed: 11/13/2015 Page: 31 of 35 We have identified several factors that are important in determining whether a defendant’s decision to proceed pro se is knowing and voluntary, including: (1) the defendant’s age, health, and education; (2) his contact with lawyers prior to trial; (3) his knowledge of the nature of the charges and possible defenses and penalties; (4) his understanding of the rules of evidence, procedure, and courtroom decorum; (5) his experience in criminal trials; (6) whether standby counsel was appointed and, if so, the extent to which standby counsel aided in the trial; (7) any mistreatment or coercion of the defendant; and (8) whether the defendant was attempting to manipulate the trial. Id. at 730–31. “All factors need not point in the same direction.” Cash, 47 F.3d at 1089. Defendant first argues that his decision to proceed pro se could not have been knowing and voluntary because the court presented him with a Hobson’s choice: go forward with conflicted counsel or proceed pro se. But as discussed supra, Defendant did not have conflicted counsel. Once the district court made that determination, it properly presented Defendant with the only two options to which he was constitutionally entitled: accept representation from Golder or waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se. “[A] district court does not compromise the defendant’s free choice by presenting him with accurate information regarding his lawful choices and asking him to choose between them.” Garey, 540 F.3d at 1265–66. In short, the court’s refusal to appoint different counsel did not negate 31 Case: 13-12596 Date Filed: 11/13/2015 Page: 32 of 35 Defendant’s subsequent ability to knowingly and voluntarily choose to represent himself. Defendant also argues that the involuntariness of his waiver is illustrated by the fact that during the colloquy concerning whether he could be transferred to a facility with a law library, he vacillated in his request to represent himself, based on that uncertainty. We are unpersuaded by this argument. The record shows some vacillation on Defendant’s part based on the absence of a law library, but only up to the point when he finally understood that the court would not be appointing him new counsel. Once that realization sunk in, Defendant was quite decisive in announcing his decision to represent himself. Indeed, Defendant’s overriding concern throughout the hearing was maintaining his ability to call all the shots at his sentencing hearing. And while he might have preferred having a compliant lawyer at his side to act as his mouthpiece during sentencing, it was clear that Defendant was ready to go it alone rather than cede control to an attorney who did not totally buy into Defendant’s plans.11 Finally, a review of the record in its entirety, as measured against the factors used in evaluating the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of counsel, persuades 11 Defendant also cites the fact that he was unable to have access to case materials and voice recordings while in jail awaiting sentencing. Logistical issues arising from Defendant’s incarceration, however, were a reality that the court could not change and one that Defendant necessarily accepted when he chose to represent himself. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (“When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.”). 32 Case: 13-12596 Date Filed: 11/13/2015 Page: 33 of 35 us that Defendant was well aware of the risks and dangers he faced, but notwithstanding that knowledge, he voluntarily chose to waive his right to counsel. Defendant was a healthy, 51-year old lawyer who had practiced civil litigation for thirty years. And while he testified that he had experience in at least one previous criminal case, waiver of counsel may be valid even if the defendant has no previous criminal trial experience. See United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 648 (11th Cir. 2014). Indeed, Defendant’s long experience as a litigator sets him apart from most other defendants whom an appellate court typically encounters in this type of review. As an experienced lawyer, Defendant understood courtroom decorum and procedure, and also knew that the rules of evidence did not apply at sentencing. It is clear that he knew his overriding goal at the sentencing hearing was to persuade the court to impose as low a sentence as possible. In fact, he conducted himself professionally during the sentencing proceedings and, as unwise as his legal strategy may have been, he was able to challenge the PSR, question witnesses, and present his own testimony. The record also demonstrates that Defendant understood the serious charges and penalties he faced, including a possible life sentence and loss of a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Virtually every participant in the proceedings warned him of the dangers a defendant confronts when he represents 33 Case: 13-12596 Date Filed: 11/13/2015 Page: 34 of 35 himself and that he specifically faced based on the implausible explanation he intended to offer for his criminal conduct. Yet, aware of all of this, Defendant insisted he could best represent his own interests, telling the court, “No one knows my life better than me.” Further, there was no mistreatment or coercion of Defendant. To the contrary, the district court granted his first request for appointment of counsel and, as to Defendant’s second request for new counsel, the court patiently and thoroughly explained to Defendant all of his options and the particular pitfalls that self-representation entails. Indeed, the court’s thorough inquiry and emphatic warning that Defendant’s decision to represent himself was a mistake undercuts any inference that Defendant was somehow bulldozed into choosing to represent himself. Finally, Defendant did have standby counsel, although it is true that she did not figure prominently in the sentencing hearing. However, not every factor must weigh in favor of the court’s decision. See Cash, 47 F.3d at 1089. In short, as did the district court, we conclude that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and chose to represent himself at sentencing.