Opinion ID: 807749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factual Finding as Error

Text: In assessing whether a district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, including its application of any sentencing enhancements, this Court review[s] the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2009). 11 There is apparently some dispute as to what Horton’s offense level would have been had the cross-reference for murder not been applied. The Government contends that the total offense level would have been 34 and Horton’s advisory Guidelines range would have been 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. In his sentencing memorandum before the district court, however, Horton argued that his total offense level should have been 33, with an advisory Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months. Because it applied the murder cross-reference, the district court did not need to resolve this dispute. Since we are remanding with instructions not to apply the murder cross-reference, however, this is an issue for the district court to address in the first instance. UNITED STATES v. HORTON 19 We first address Horton’s contention that the district court clearly erred in finding, as a factual matter and by a preponderance of the evidence, that Horton was involved in the August 17, 2007 robbery and responsible for the murder of Ms. Harris. As noted, we review this factual finding only for clear error, which is a very deferential standard of review, allowing us to reverse only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. F.C. Wheat Mar. Corp. v. United States, 663 F.3d 714, 723 (4th Cir. 2011). While there was some conflicting evidence on the point, the district court heard extensive testimony from two agents regarding the investigation into the murder of Ms. Harris and there was sufficient evidence to support a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Horton committed the murder. Thus, to the extent that Horton challenges the district court’s factual finding that he committed the murder as unsupported by reliable evidence, he has not shown error under the applicable standard of review.12 12 We respectfully disagree with our colleague’s conclusion as to Section III-B. We addressed Horton’s arguments in their logical order. If we had concluded that the district court clearly erred in its factual determination regarding the August 17, 2007 murder, the more complicated issue of the murder cross-reference’s applicability would not have been reached. Both this Court and other appellate courts routinely affirm factual findings relevant to sentencing decisions, even when remanding for resentencing based on other errors. See, e.g., United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 388-90 (4th Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding where district court erred in applying a vulnerable victim adjustment without an adequate explanation, but affirming the application of an aggravating role adjustment because it was not clearly erroneous); United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1057 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2011) (vacating sentence for a new determination of intended loss, but finding district court properly applied separate enhancement for the number of victims); United States v. Flores, 640 F.3d 638, 644-45 (5th Cir. 2011) (remanding for resentencing because a leadership role enhancement was based on erroneous facts, but affirming obstruction of justice enhancement); United States v. Newman, 614 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding for resentencing because district court erred in applying enhancement for extensive scope of offense, but affirming district court’s application of an enhancement for 20 UNITED STATES v. HORTON That fact alone, however, does not establish the propriety of applying the cross-reference. As noted, Horton also argues that, even assuming the district court’s factual finding that he committed the murder was proper, the application of the cross-reference is nonetheless improper. We turn to this contention next. interfering with the administration of justice); United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008) (remanding for resentencing because sentencing adjustments for aggravated role and for abuse of trust were unjustified, but nonetheless affirming the district court’s finding that the defendant obstructed justice). Moreover, while we have concluded that the murder of Ms. Harris is irrelevant to determining the appropriate advisory Guidelines range, it is up to the district court to decide whether to take it into consideration at sentencing pursuant to the court’s § 3553(a) determination. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50 ([t]he Guidelines are not the only consideration . . . . [A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.); United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 2007) (district court is required to determine whether a sentence within [the advisory] range . . . serves the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and, if not, select a sentence [within statutory limits] that does serve those factors.) (citation omitted); United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 799, 802 (4th Cir. 2009) (after Booker, [s]entencing courts continue to exercise their long-standing authority to hear the evidence, and consider any evidence at sentencing that ‘has sufficient indicia of reliability[,]’ including evidence of uncharged conduct). Of course, if the district court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence on remand, it would be required to provide sufficient explanation for its chosen sentence and any major departure would require a more significant justification than a minor one. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Finally, we disagree with our colleague’s statement that there is no authority for the district court to decline to revisit this factual issue at resentencing. Post at 32. In fact, this Court has squarely held that the district court would be well within its authority to decline to revisit every sentencing issue on remand, unless the mandate indicates otherwise or the interrelationship of sentencing components makes it advisable to do so. Susi, 674 F.3d at 286; id. at 284 ([n]othing in Pepper [v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011)] . . . requires the district court to reconsider every component of the sentencing decision during resentencing). UNITED STATES v. HORTON 21