Opinion ID: 2212940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: In determining the issue arising from the trial court's rulings on evidence adverse to defendants we first consider those alleged to have occurred during the first trial.

Text: Defendants' first complaint is directed to the trial court's adverse ruling on their objection to exhibit 101 described by Sue Rehberg, bookkeeper for Harms Implement Company, as a communication from Pella Implement to Harms Implement dated May 15, 1971. The name Henry A. Klein was typed at the bottom of the letter but it was not otherwise signed. The memo on the stationery of Pella Implement Store was among the documents seized from Jack Harms' files. It stated, Jack: I have signed up the following dealers to go on the $100 program. There followed a list of seven dealers in Klein's zone. The exhibit then listed six towns that said no. Defendants objected to the admissibility on the ground the document was not signed by anyone and was hearsay since it purported to be a report by an individual who was not a defendant, an alleged co-conspirator or listed as a witness regarding a conversation Klein had had with a number of other individuals. In their brief defendants argue the exhibit does not fall within the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule. This rule has been stated in the following manner: Any act or declaration by one co-conspirator committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its pendency is admissible against each and every co-conspirator provided that a foundation for its reception is laid by independent proof of the conspiracy. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 Mich.L.Rev. 1159, 1161 (1954). Attention is called to rule 801(d)(2)(E), Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, in regard to categorization of conduct and declarations of a co-conspirator of a party as hearsay. Some description of the state of the record at the time exhibit 101 was offered is necessary for a determination of defendants' hearsay objection. As indicated, the offer of this exhibit was made during the State's examination of Harms' bookkeeper who identified many of the exhibits received in this case. Before her testimony the State had submitted evidence detailing the content, distribution and purpose of the Harvester price books and the events leading to the publication and distribution of the price books printed in South Dakota. The State had also introduced evidence describing the dealer council and the events leading to and occurring during the March and July meetings in Ames. Many exhibits identified as copies of newsletters sent by Harms in connection with the possible acquisition of these price books were received in evidence. Included in this evidence was exhibit 95 identified as a letter from Jack Harms dated May 7, 1971, mailed to one Harvester dealer in each zone in Iowa. This exhibit disclosed, among other things, the cost of reprinting the parts price book at a figure ten percent higher than prices then in existence. It referred to the fact that at a meeting held April 27 it was decided to contact one dealer for each zone for the purpose of explaining this idea and the cost of the project. It placed the responsibility on the dealer to contact the dealers in his zone and collect a fee for the reprinting. It advised the addressees that if enough dealers participated in the program a $100 fee would cover the costs with perhaps a balance to be returned to the dealer. The letter directed the dealers to contact defendants Harms, Hendrickson or a Minnesota dealer in the event they had any questions. Before exhibit 101 was offered there was sufficient independent proof in the record to warrant the judge in concluding the State had established a prima facie case on the existence of a conspiracy to fix or regulate prices of International repair parts sold in Iowa and of defendants' connection therewith. Thus, one prerequisite for a necessary foundation for admissibility of the exhibit was fulfilled. Klein's name appears on exhibit 92, a list of those dealers attending the January meeting in Ames. His name also appears on exhibit 135, a list of dealers who paid the $10 fee to cover postage and expenses mentioned earlier. This list was attached to exhibit 94, Harms' report of events which occurred at the March 30 meeting in Ames. This constitutes evidence independent of Klein's declaration which tends to connect him with the conspiracy. It is undisputed Klein's declaration contained in exhibit 101 was made during the pendency of the conspiracy. Exhibit 95, the request from Harms to a dealer in each zone, was binding on other defendants as evidence of efforts to accomplish the object of the conspiracy. It is a fair inference exhibit 101 was Klein's reply to exhibit 95 and indicated a furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, the requisite foundation for admissibility of exhibit 101 was established. See Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 735, n. 21 (9 Cir. 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 953, 84 S.Ct. 1626, 12 L.Ed.2d 498. See also State v. Priebe, 198 Iowa 609, 610-611, 199 N.W. 276, 277; State v. Davis, 230 Iowa 309, 316, 297 N.W. 274, 277, cert. den., 315 U.S. 814, 62 S.Ct. 799, 86 L.Ed. 1212; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 118 (6 Cir. 1944), aff'd, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575. There remains defendants' contention Klein's declarations and conduct were not admissible since he was neither a defendant nor alleged to be a conspirator. The fact Klein was not a defendant is irrelevant. There is substantial evidence he had associated himself in the prosecution of a common understanding to fix and regulate prices of repair parts with those named as defendants. Once a prima facie case has been disclosed the declarations and conduct of a co-conspirator whether named as a defendant or not are admissible against defendants under a charge of conspiracy. United States v. Vehicular Parking, 52 F.Supp. 751, 754-755 (D.C.Del.1943), citing Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249, 38 S.Ct. 65, 72, 62 L.Ed. 260, 275. Defendants' contention is without merit. The trial court did not err in overruling their objection to exhibit 101. VIII. Defendants also attack the court's adverse rulings on their objections to the cross-examination of Harms, particularly in reference to letters received from Robert E. Cline (exhibit 108) and Elmo Roe (exhibit 118). Part of the Cline correspondence stated that at a zone meeting members voted no to the new parts book subscription. The same problem stopped the majority of us as in the past, we couldn't get a 100 percent to sign up. Cline was not a defendant and did not purchase the books, but was called as a State's witness. Roe's letter stated some dealers in his area are close to company stores and are hesitant to go along on the increase.   . In both instances Harms was asked what he thought Cline and Roe meant by what was said in the letters. Defendants objected for the reason the opinion and conclusion of Harms as to what he thought another individual meant was irrelevant and immaterial to prove or disprove any issue in the matter. The objection was overruled. The form of the question is bad. However, a reading of the trial transcript clearly indicates Harms understood the questions called for his interpretation of the Cline and Roe letters and so answered. This view is supported by subsequent answers given by Harms. Finally, the State did get around to asking Harms for his interpretation of the letters. This was proper. The cross-examination was not prejudicial. Defendants argue their subsequent motion to strike should have been sustained since Cline was neither indicted nor alleged to be a conspirator. The views of this court expressed in division VII are adverse to defendants' contentions. Defendants' contention in regard to Tomlinson's testimony concerning statements made to him by Miller, an indicted dealer, is also without merit. In another division of their argument defendants insist the court permitted the prosecution to engage in improper tactics by asking argumentative questions, questions assuming facts not in evidence and by using argumentative, improper and prejudicial words to describe the price books. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether prosecutorial conduct, if any, was sufficient to deprive defendants of a fair trial. This court will interfere only when that discretion has been abused. State v. Horsey, 180 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1970); State v. Wright, 203 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 1972). However, where it appears a fair trial has not been had this court will not hesitate to reverse. State v. Levy, 160 N.W.2d 460, 467 (Iowa 1968). The court's rulings on evidence in the first trial did not deprive defendants of a fair trial. There was no abuse of the trial court's discretion.