Opinion ID: 1210761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Doctrine of Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi

Text: The first issue is whether the common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi prevents a statute of limitations from barring the civil action brought by the DEP when the DEP was acting in the public interest by bringing such action. As we explained in In re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation, 193 W.Va. 119, 127, 454 S.E.2d 413, 421 (1994), cert. denied, W.R. Grace & Co. v. West Virginia, 515 U.S. 1160, 115 S.Ct. 2614, 132 L.Ed.2d 857 (1995), the phrase nullum tempus occurrit regi literally means time does not run against the King. This common law rule has existed as an element of the English law from a very early period.... The common law fixed no time as to the bringing of actions. Limitations derive their authority from statutes. The king was held never to be included, unless expressly named. No laches was imputable to him. These exemptions were founded upon considerations of public policy. It was deemed important that, while the sovereign was engrossed by the cares and duties of his office, the public should not suffer by the negligence of his servants.... When the colonies achieved their independence, each one took these prerogatives, which had belonged to the crown; and when the national Constitution was adopted, they were imparted to the new government as incidents of the sovereignty thus created. United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489-90, 25 L.Ed. 194, 195 (1878). See also Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46 W.Va. 544, 547-48, 33 S.E. 326, 327-28 (1899). Likewise, when West Virginia adopted its constitution it also adopted the common law rule of nullum tempus occurrit regi pursuant to W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 13 which states: Except as otherwise provided in this article, such parts of the common law, and of the laws of this State as are in force on the effective date of this article and are not repugnant thereto, shall be and continue the law of this State until altered or repealed by the legislature. (art. VIII, § 13 formerly was art. VIII, § 21) (emphasis added). [6] Eventually, however, the legislature, pursuant to its authority under W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 13, altered the common law rule of nullum tempus occurrit regi by expressly stating that [e]very statute of limitation, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the State. W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923]. See Riffle v. Skinner, 67 W.Va. 75, 90, 67 S.E. 1075, 1082 (1910) (Brannon, J., concurring) (Until 1868 the rule nullum tempus occurrit regi applied). This Court recognized the abrogation of the common law rule of nullum tempus occurrit regi in syllabus point 5 of In re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation, supra : W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923] abrogates the common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi thereby making statutes of limitations applicable to the State. See also syl. pt. 1, State v. Mines, 38 W.Va. 125, 18 S.E. 470 (1893) (Section 20, c. 35, Code 1968 [which is now W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923] [7] ], abolished the common-law rule, that no time runs against the State, and made the State's right subject to statutes of limitations, the same as individual rights.) In the case before us, the DEP asserts that W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923] only applies when the State is asserting its private or proprietary rights. The DEP maintains that if the State brings an action to protect public rights, then W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923] is inapplicable. Essentially, the DEP argues that if the State brings an action to protect public rights, then no statute of limitations applies to bar the State's claim. Thus, the DEP concludes that because its claim against the appellees was brought to protect the public and the environment from hazardous waste, no statute of limitations would bar its claim. We are not persuaded by the DEP's argument. Though at common law the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi only applies when the State is asserting a right belonging to the general public, but does not apply when the State is asserting a proprietary right, W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923] does not make such a distinction. [8] Notwithstanding the fact that many jurisdictions still follow the common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, many jurisdictions have acknowledged that the doctrine may be modified or abolished by statute. See Commonwealth, Dept. of Public Welfare v. Maryland Casualty Co., 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 301, 643 A.2d 139, 141 (1994) (If the statute of limitations expressly limits the time in which the Commonwealth may bring an action, then the doctrine of nullum tempus does not apply. (citations omitted)); Shootman v. Dept. of Transportation, 926 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Colo.1996) (`In the states that continue to follow the nullum tempus doctrine, when filing lawsuits in the posture of plaintiffs, [the states] are immune from statutes of limitations except where their respective legislatures have decided otherwise.' (emphasis added and citation omitted)); Laramie County School District # 1 v. Muir, 808 P.2d 797, 801 (Wyo.1991) (The doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi is to be applied in those cases where the State is asserting a public right, unless the legislature expressly includes governmental bodies as subject to the applicable statute of limitations or those governmental bodies are included within the statute by necessary application [.] (emphasis added)). See generally 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 416 (1970) ([T]he rule that the statute of limitations does not apply to the state when public rights are involved has been abrogated in some states by statute, either expressly or by clear implication. (footnote omitted)); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 17 (1987) (Unless it is expressly or by necessary implication provided otherwise by constitution or statute, statutes of limitation do not run against the sovereign, such as a state[.] (footnotes omitted)). As previously noted, we have concluded that the legislature abrogated the common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi by enacting W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923]. See syl. pt. 5, In re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation, supra . Indeed, given the clear language in W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923] that [e]very statute of limitation, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the State[,] the DEP's argument that this statute does not apply when the State is asserting public rights is significantly weakened. (emphasis added). The DEP's argument would require this Court to add language into W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923]. [9] As we have indicated in prior cases, `[i]t is not for [courts] arbitrarily to read into [a statute] that which it does not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included, we are not obliged to add to statutes something the Legislature purposely omitted.' Williamson v. Greene, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 490 S.E.2d 23, 28 (1997) (emphasis provided) (quoting Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535, 546-47, 474 S.E.2d 465, 476-77 (1996)). Indeed, this Court has recognized that we have no authority to construe a clear and unambiguous statute: `[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute. Point 1, syllabus, State ex rel. Fox v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund of the City of Bluefield, et al., 148 W.Va. 369 [135 S.E.2d 262 (1964)]. Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Board of Trustees v. City of Bluefield, 153 W.Va. 210, 168 S.E.2d 525 (1969).' Syl. pt. 3, Central West Virginia Refuse, Inc. v. Public Service Com'n of West Virginia, 190 W.Va. 416, 438 S.E.2d 596 (1993). Syl. pt. 2, Keen v. Maxey, 193 W.Va. 423, 456 S.E.2d 550 (1995). See also syl. pt. 1, State v. Boatright, 184 W.Va. 27, 399 S.E.2d 57 (1990) (`Courts always endeavor to give effect to the legislative intent, but a statute that is clear and unambiguous will be applied and not construed.' Syllabus Point 1, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).). It is for this reason that we find the DEP's reliance on Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46 W.Va. 544, 33 S.E. 326 (1899) and Foley v. Doddridge County Court, 54 W.Va. 16, 46 S.E. 246 (1903) to be misplaced. Both of these cases hold that no title by adverse possession can be acquired of land owned by the government and used for governmental purposes. In arriving at its conclusion the Court in both Ralston and Foley concluded that notwithstanding the statutory language that [e]very statute of limitation, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the state[,] the statute of limitations did not prevent the government from reclaiming property claimed by adverse possession when the property was being used for a governmental purpose by the government. Both cases concluded that a statute of limitation will not bar an action brought by the State for public purposes. Furthermore, Ralston and Foley state that a statute of limitations will only apply when the State is bringing an action in its private or proprietary function. At the outset, we note that [u]nder the rule that, in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, the statute of limitations does not run against the government, title to public lands cannot be acquired by adverse possession as against any of the several states[.] 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 269 (1986) (footnotes omitted). However, [i]n some jurisdictions, it is expressly provided that the statute of limitations shall run against the state generally, or to a limited extent, and of course in that event its lands are as liable to effective adverse occupancy as are those of individuals. Id. (footnote omitted). Because the matter now before us does not involve adverse possession, we decline to further address whether title of public lands by adverse possession may be obtained. However, because the language in W.Va. Code, 55-2-19 [1923] is unambiguous in stating that [e]very statute of limitation, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the State[,] the language in Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46 W.Va. 544, 33 S.E. 326 (1899) and Foley v. Doddridge County Court, 54 W.Va. 16, 46 S.E. 246 (1903) which suggests that statutes of limitation apply only when the State is acting in its private or proprietary capacity, is misleading. Thus, to the extent that Ralston and Foley imply that W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923] only applies when the State is acting in its private or proprietary capacity, they are hereby modified. [10] Accordingly, because the legislature's intent in W.Va.Code, 55-2-19 [1923] could not be more clear, this Court must apply the plain language to this case and examine whether there are statutes of limitations which will bar any of the DEP's three counts.