Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Failure to Allow Sufficient Inquiry of Prospective Jurors

Text: Defendant contends the trial court severely hampered [defendant's] ability to effectively use voir dire to ensure an unbiased and unprejudiced jury by prohibiting defendant from conducting sequestered, individual voir dire of those prospective jurors who had, or who had spent time with, small children. [2] Defendant asserts violations of his right to due process and an impartial jury under the federal and state Constitutions, and violation of his federal constitutional right to a reliable death verdict. During jury selection, defendant requested that the trial court inquire as to the ages of the prospective jurors' grandchildren. The court denied the request, stating, Whether you're going to be prejudiced by the fact that a young child is involved in this case doesn't turn upon whether you have one at the moment. It turns upon whether your personality and capacities are such as to be able to deal with the wrench that goes with that. No matter how many or how few grandchildren you have got or what age you are. It's something that jurors are going to have to deal with; they're going to have to be able to set aside. Over defendant's objection below, and contrary to what he argues on appeal, the trial court correctly ruled that the then recently enacted jury selection provisions of Proposition 115, subsequently codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 223, [3] applied to this case. ( Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 299-300, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434 [jury voir dire provisions of Proposition 115 apply to all trials occurring after the proposition's effective date].) Accordingly, the trial court assumed primary responsibility for questioning prospective jurors, and generally performed this task in open court. This included death qualification, as discussed below. (See post, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 88-89, 5 P.3d at pp. 147-149.) The prospective jurors were instructed at length on the need for candor during voir dire. Sensitive matters were discussed in chambers, and at that point counsel was permitted to inquire. The trial court made the following inquiry to the first panel of prospective jurors regarding Bryan's death: [O]ne of the more pathetic things that you're going to see is at least one picture ... of a little three-year-old boy in his sleepers dead. It's not a picture that's going to make anybody very happy, but you're not here to be made either happy or sorrowful, and you're not here to decide the case on the basis of your emotions in response. The facts are that this little boy ended up dead, and there are factual issues that a jury must decide that arise out of that circumstance. They must be decided on the basis of reason, not any kind of emotion that you feel. Is there anyone who's going to be so upset by that kind of a picture that you can't apply your reason and set aside your emotions? Not telling you you shouldn't have the emotions. I'm telling you you must set them aside and not allow them to cloud your judgment. Is there anybody who feels you can't do that? Is there anybody who feels that because the case involves, among other people and things, a three-year-old child, that you are going to be emotionally moved to do something thatother than reason requires? Shorter but similar inquiries were made to the subsequent panels. Subsequently, several jurors were questioned in chambers regarding their strong emotional reaction to a case involving a small child's murder. The Constitution ... does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. { Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492.) Pursuant to former Code of Civil Procedure section 223, the question of whether individual, sequestered voir dire should take place is within the trial court's discretion. { People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) Such discretion is abused if the questioning is not reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality. ( People v. Chapman (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 136, 141, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 738.) Here, the trial court acted within its discretion. Its inquiry clearly sought to ascertain from the prospective jurors whether they harbored any improper bias. That the prospective jurors understood the inquiry as such is evidenced by the fact that several did come forward and discuss their strong emotional reaction in chambers. Contrary to defendant's assertion, a prospective juror would not reasonably interpret the trial court's comments to mean a biased response was expected and therefore not worth mentioning to the judge. Nor does the fact that some prospective jurors came forward mean that others were too intimidated or embarrassed to do so. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a prospective juror not having a strong emotional reaction to a three-year-old's murder, or feeling shame or embarrassment at revealing in front of others the depth of that reaction. Moreover, the precise parameters of a prospective juror's possibly disqualifying reaction were examined in chambers, and counsel was then permitted to inquire. Defendant also challenges as unconstitutional the trial court's refusal to allow the parties to give the prospective jurors a written questionnaire. The trial court stated a written questionnaire would not adequately provide the necessary explanation needed to understand the questions. The court, however, used the proposed questionnaires in formulating the questions it asked on voir dire, and invited counsel to provide any further questions they wanted the court to consider. Defendant asserts that the questionnaire would have ascertained whether the prospective jurors had young children or grandchildren and how much contact they had with them, and whether they could be impartial in a case involving a three-year-old victim. The bias these inquiries sought to uncover was adequately addressed in the court's voir dire. Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court ordered that jury selection be conducted in less than one week. Not so. The trial court merely predicted the parties would be able to select a jury within that time period.