Opinion ID: 549048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: statutory compensation

Text: 19 The central provision granting consent to suit in the Claims Court is the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491 (Supp.1990). United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 397, 96 S.Ct. 948, 952, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976). This section does not create any substantive right of recovery against the United States for money damages. It merely confers jurisdiction upon the court whenever a substantive right exists. Id. at 398, 96 S.Ct. at 953. A claimant who is not relying upon breach of a contractual obligation, therefore, must look beyond 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491 and establish that some substantive provision of law, regulation, or the Constitution can be fairly construed as mandating compensation in order to state a claim within the jurisdiction of the court. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1351, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980). 1 20 The Yanceys' turkey breeder flock was quarantined pursuant to the Secretary of Agriculture's authority under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a. This statute allows the Yanceys a claim for compensation if it can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained. Testan, 424 U.S. at 398, 96 S.Ct. at 953. 21 Section 114a of title 21 United States Code provides, in part: 22 The Secretary of Agriculture, either independently or in cooperation with States or political subdivisions ... is authorized to control and eradicate any communicable diseases of livestock or poultry ... which in the opinion of the Secretary constitute an emergency and threaten the livestock industry of the country, including the payment of claims growing out of destruction of animals (including poultry), and of materials, affected by or exposed to any such disease, in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe.... 23 Because the statute appears to give discretion to the Secretary, the Claims Court based its decision on whether the USDA complied with the regulations promulgated pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a. See 9 C.F.R. Sec. 53. The regulations authorize payment of up to 100% of the expense of purchase, destruction and disposition of animals and materials required to be destroyed because of being contaminated by or exposed to lethal Avian Influenza. 9 C.F.R. Sec. 53.2. 24 The Claims Court ruled that none of the requirements under the regulations were satisfied. Yancey v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 311, 316 (1986). The Claims Court concluded that because the turkeys were healthy they could not be contaminated by or exposed to lethal Avian Influenza. Moreover, according to the Claims Court, because the flock was healthy, it was not required to be destroyed. 2 25 Finally, the Claims Court emphasized that the Yanceys' turkeys were not destroyed in a manner consistent with the regulations. Section 53.4(a) of 9 C.F.R. requires destruction as follows: 26 Animals affected by or exposed to disease shall be killed promptly after appraisal and disposed of by burial or burning, unless otherwise specifically provided by the Deputy Administrator, Veterinary Services in extraordinary circumstances. 27 The Yanceys also failed to allege that their flock and materials had been properly appraised as required by regulation to obtain compensation. See 9 C.F.R. Sec. 53.3(a) and Sec. 53.10(c). 28 Yet, an inconsistency appears to have developed in the way the Government applies its regulations. On cross-appeal, to demonstrate this inconsistency, the Yanceys rely on Loftin v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 596 (1984), aff'd, 765 F.2d 1117 (Fed.Cir.1985), an authority that the Claims Court's opinion did not address. Though Loftin ultimately turned on other legal considerations, it is still relevant to our analysis because the Government interpreted 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a so as to allow compensation for destruction of non-diseased animals due to their close proximity to infected animals. 3 29 Similarly, it is clear that the Government quarantined the Yanceys' breeder flock because of its proximity to the outbreaks of Avian Influenza in Virginia. Under the Government's prior interpretation of the statute in Loftin, the Yanceys' flock might have been classified as exposed to the disease and thereby made eligible for indemnities. Thus, according to the Yanceys, insofar as the actions of the Government in refusing to statutorily compensate them for their healthy flock are inconsistent with the approach taken in Loftin, the Government's actions appear to be arbitrary and capricious. 30 If regulations lead to an unreasonable or irrational result that is at odds with the underlying statutory intent, guidance should be sought from the legislative history. Texas State Commission v. United States, 796 F.2d 400, 406 (Fed.Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030, 107 S.Ct. 874, 93 L.Ed.2d 828 (1987). 31 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a was amended July 7, 1962; the amendment was intended to fill gaps in the prior legislation. See S.Rep. No. 582, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961), reprinted in, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1822, 1823-24 (1962). The amendment gave the Government authority to impose quarantines to control Avian Influenza and provide compensation to affected farmers. Id. During the legislative process, Representative Wright, a sponsor of the legislation, made it clear that the individual rights of farmers should be protected under the Secretary of Agriculture's broad new authority. See 108 Cong.Rec. H5571-5572 (1962). 32 The Yanceys argue that the Government's refusal to classify their turkey breeder flock as exposed to Avian Influenza for purposes of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a was contrary to the disease control purposes of the statute. After all, the Government's interpretation, as well as the Claims Court's ruling, provide those in the Yanceys' position with a perverse incentive to allow infection of their flocks in order to receive indemnities. 33 We agree with the Yanceys that denying compensation for their healthy flock is contrary to Congress' clear intent to promote cooperation with quarantine provisions. It is clear from the legislative history that the purpose of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a is to control and prevent the spread of animal diseases and that the indemnity provisions are an integral part of this disease control scheme. See S.Rep. No. 2811, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1956), reprinted in, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4366, 4367 (1956). 34 Unfortunately, it is not at all clear from the legislative history whether Congress intended for the indemnity provisions to extend to healthy animals. Without exception, throughout the legislative history, reference to compensation is linked to destruction of diseased animals. The legislative history of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a demonstrates that either Congress neglected to consider the effect a quarantine might have on owners of healthy live stock and poultry or it actually believed that compensation need not be extended to the owners of healthy stock. Neither scenario is helpful to the Yanceys. 35 Despite the Government's prior favorable interpretation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a in Loftin, Congress' failure to explicitly create a right of compensation for healthy animals, precludes us from finding that the USDA's refusal to compensate the Yanceys was arbitrary or capricious. The Yanceys do not have a right to compensation under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 114a. Thus, we now turn to the issue of whether the Yanceys are entitled to relief based on the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.