Opinion ID: 2609023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the claim of easement by prescription

Text: The requisites for a claim by prescription are essentially the same as for adverse possession except that a prescriptive claim is limited to certain rights in the land of another such as an easement. [2] Possession must be open, notorious, visible, continuous for the statutory period, and under a claim of right. [3] The word hostile is frequently used as a term of art meaning that the claim is adverse or under claim of right, and that it is not subordinate to the title of the true owner. [4] Here there is no question but that the City's use was open, notorious, visible and continuous for the statutory period. The conflict arises over the question of whether the use was permissive as opposed to hostile or under a claim of right. It is not disputed that the City's use of the property originated under a permit issued by the United States. While through a mistake the City at one time sent a letter relinquishing the permit, it thereafter applied for a new permit. In doing so, it again recognized the permissive nature of its use of the property. While the application for a renewed permit was denied, this did not alter the permissive use of the property. The rule is well settled that, when possession has begun permissively, it cannot acquire the character of adverse possession until the presumption of continued subservience is rebutted by proof of a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner of the property. [5] In fact, since title by adverse possession may not be secured against the United States, [6] the City argues in its brief on appeal that it continued as a licensee of the federal government until patent was issued to Blackard and Swank in 1960. It is its contention that this event terminated the license and rendered the City's occupancy thereafter adverse to the subsequent owners. It is true that the conveyance of a servient estate will in most cases constitute a basis for terminating a license. [7] But such an implied revocation, without more, does not ipso facto transform a permissive use into an adverse one. [8] The effect of the issuance of a patent by the United States to Blackard and Swank was the same as though the United States had executed a quitclaim deed to them. [9] Thus, the transfer of the servient estate by patent constituted a conveyance by the United States of its interest in the property. Therefore, the situation presented here is analogous to that of a private landowner's transfer by quitclaim deed of property upon which a license had existed. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt with this identical situation in Sturnick v. Watson. [10] Plaintiff there sought to enjoin the defendant from destroying a brick wall of a building owned by the defendant which was supporting both defendant's and plaintiff's buildings. A license had been given by defendant's predecessors in title to plaintiff's predecessor allowing the use of the wall for support of timbers of plaintiff's building. Some time later, an agreement was entered into whereby plaintiff's predecessors disclaimed any interest in the wall and agreed to remove the timbers whenever requested by defendant's predecessors. The premises were thereafter conveyed without covenants or any reference to an easement through chain of title to defendant. Thus the plaintiff's predecessors had a license to use the wall to support timbers, (similar to the City's license for a maintenance of the power line) when the servient property was conveyed to a new owner, the defendant. The defendant's building had deteriorated over the years so that the defendant sought to demolish it, including the wall in question. Defendant wrote to the plaintiff requesting that he remove the timbers. Plaintiff responded by bringing suit to enjoin destruction of the wall. The plaintiff's argument closely parallels that of the City here: The plaintiff has no easement for lateral support with respect to the defendant's wall by way of grant, and does not contend that he has. But he does contend that he has such an easement by prescription. He concedes that down to February 2, 1912, the use of the wall by his predecessors in title was under license. But on that date the premises now owned by the defendant were conveyed by the trustees, who then owned the property, to another. This conveyance, the plaintiff argues, operated as a revocation of the license, and the use of the wall thereafter was a trespass and hence adverse. [11] The court resolved the question by holding: It doubtless is the law that a license to use another's land is revocable not only at the will of the owner of the property on which it is to be exercised, but by alienation of the land by him. Hodgkins v. Farrington, 150 Mass. 19, 21, 22 N.E. 73, 5 L.R.A. 209; Scioscia v. Iovieno, 318 Mass. 601, 603, 63 N.E.2d 898. But it does not follow that, if the licensee continues to use the land as before, such use is necessarily adverse to the new owner. See Bond v. O'Gara, 177 Mass. 139, 142-143, 58 N.E. 275. Whether the use after the conveyance was permissive or adverse was a question of fact and on this issue the plaintiff had the burden of proof. Bigelow Carpet Co. v. Wiggin, 209 Mass. 542, 547-548, 95 N.E. 938; Tucker v. Poch, 321 Mass. 321, 323, 73 N.E.2d 595. [12] In the Sturnick case, the trial judge found that the use of the wall was permissive until the defendant had requested the plaintiff to remove the timbers shortly before trial. Since no transcript of the evidence was presented on appeal, the finding of permissive use was upheld. We concur in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's holding that continued use by a licensee after transfer of the servient parcel is not necessarily adverse to the new owner, and that the question of whether the use after conveyance was permissive or adverse is a question of fact on which the plaintiff had the burden of proof. Similar to the Sturnick case is Scheller v. Pierce County [13] where there was a change in ownership of property after a five-year easement had been granted to the county by the prior owner. The use continued for 18 years. The Washington Supreme Court observed with reference to the requirement for conversion of an originally permissive use into an adverse one: Under the admitted facts in this case it seems to us that the use by the public was not adverse or in hostility to the title of the true owners. There was clearly no adverse holding during the period covered by the written contract, and nothing transpired after that time to convert the permissive use into an adverse use, except mere lapse of time. Ordinarily this will not suffice. [14] As to what must transpire to convert a permissive use into an adverse use, the court observed: If permissive in its inception, then such permissive character being stamped on the use at the outset, will continue of the same nature, and no adverse user can arise until a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner, and brought home to him, can transform a subordinate and friendly holding into one of an opposite nature, and exclusive and independent in its character. [15] In the case before us, the trial court found that the use of the City after the transfer of the property from the United States was permissive rather than adverse. [16] Such a finding will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. [17] We must thus examine the evidence and the reasonable inferences from that evidence in order to ascertain whether the trial court's finding of permissive use was erroneous. In making such an examination, our most recent opinion pertaining to adverse possession is of considerable assistance. In Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, [18] we held that Mr. Peters had established a claim to property by adverse possession. A question was presented as to whether Peters had failed to satisfy the hostility requirement for adverse possession in that it was contended that his possession was permissive and therefore subservient to the true owner's legal title. We thus were confronted with many of the same issues presented by the claim of the City. There we stated: The test for determining the existence of the requisite degree of hostility is a fairly objective one. The question is whether or not the claimant acted toward the land as if he owned it.       From the standpoint of the true owner, the purpose of the various requirements of adverse possession  that the nonpermissive use be actual, open, notorious, continuous, exclusive and hostile  is to put him on notice of the hostile nature of the possession so that he, the owner, may take steps to vindicate his rights by legal action. [19] Here we are concerned with the acquisition of an easement so that the test would be whether the City acted as though it was claiming a permanent right to that easement. In Peters' case, his use of the land neither originated nor continued under consent of the titleholder. His right to possession was derived from his uncle's possession of the land, not from any acquiescence, consent or permission of the predecessors in title of the Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council. There was no evidence that the uncle's possession originated by permission of the titleholder. In contrast to that situation, the City's possession originated in a permit from the United States, the predecessor in title of appellees, and the City admits that it continued to occupy the land as a licensee after its permit terminated and until such time as the land was conveyed to Blackard and Swank and from them to appellees. Peters had lived on the land for substantial periods of time each year for over 40 years. He had placed structures on it, marked the boundary of the land he claimed and actively asserted ownership. [20] In contrast, the City, having commenced its possession by permission of the legal titleholder, far from indicating to appellees that they were claiming the easement hostile to them, gave the true owners reason to believe that its possession was permissive. The City sought permission for an easement to attach a guy wire in an area partially within that claimed for the easement by prescription. No objection was made when appellees deleted the portions of the document granting the easement prepared by the City, that pertained to the right to maintain a telephone system and erecting, constructing and maintaining an electric transmission and distribution system through, over, across and under the property involved. At the time of the deletion by appellees, it would appear that candor would have required a statement that the City was claiming that easement as its own, but apparently no such indication of hostility was given. There was further testimony, elicited by the City on cross-examination of Nesbett, of negotiations by the City in 1964, 1965 or 1966 to buy the property at a price of $1.00 a square foot for the entire 66,000 square feet. This included the property over which the easement by prescription is now claimed. Again, it would appear that if the City were claiming the right to the easement hostile to the true owners, some mention would have been made of it and a contention would have been advanced that the price should have been reduced accordingly. Moreover, Nesbett and McCutcheon paid the taxes on the entire tract from 1961 through the date of trial, and there was never any indication that the City took the position that the easement belonged to the City, thus reducing the value of the property. While none of these incidents is overwhelmingly significant in and of itself, the combination of them presents a sharp contrast with the facts of the Peters case, [21] and we conclude that the trial court's finding that the City's use was permissive rather than adverse was not clearly erroneous.