Opinion ID: 202188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factual misstatements/vouching.

Text: 29 1. Phone calls. Ortiz claims that the prosecutor incorrectly told the jury that Ortiz had spoken with Collazo a couple of times and made more than one call from his cell phone to the undercover buyers. Ortiz asserts that there was no evidence that he made multiple calls, and he terms the evidence of even one call implausible. We need not tarry over this contention. As discussed earlier, Collazo's testimony and the transcript of the calls permitted an inference that Ortiz participated in two calls — an inference the government was free to argue in closing. 30 2. Drug quantity. Ortiz next argues that the record lacks support for the prosecutor's statement that Ortiz agreed to transport $125,000 worth of cocaine in the trunk of his car. Although Ortiz is correct that the record does not show his knowledge of the quantity of cocaine in the blue bag, the prosecutor was entitled to argue that Ortiz had agreed to transport the cocaine that was found in his vehicle — an amount that turned out to be worth $125,000. To the extent the prosecutor's statement was at all misleading, it surely does not constitute plain error given that the finding of guilt did not depend on the exact amount of cocaine at issue. 31 3. Driver for drug deals. It is undisputed that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in arguing that Ortiz admitted that he had driven other people in the past to other drug deals. 2 What Ortiz in fact said was that he had given rides in the past to people he believed were drug dealers — a statement significantly different from admitting that he had driven them to deals, particularly since the government claimed he had done precisely that in this case. 32 The prejudice attached to this misstatement cannot be denied, but, in context, it does not rise to the level of plain error. Ortiz's admission that he gave rides to known drug dealers similarly supports an inference that he was familiar with drug dealing and thus an unlikely innocent by-stander in this deal. The reference comprised a brief portion of the closing argument, and the district court instructed the jury that counsels' statements are not evidence and that their own recollection must govern their deliberations. See United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1999) (instruction that counsel arguments are not evidence found sufficient to cure any potential prejudice). Moreover, there is no assertion that the prosecutor deliberately misstated the evidence. In these circumstances, the prosecutor's misstatement was not even reversible error, let alone sufficient to scale the high hurdle of the plain error standard. See Henderson, 320 F.3d at 105; see also United States v. Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)) (`[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.'). 33 Ortiz additionally argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Gallarelli when, after she noted that Ortiz had conveniently forgotten telling the officer that he had driven other drug dealers, she continued: but he did say it that night. He said it on the night of his arrest. In making that observation, the prosecutor was not, however, asserting her personal belief in the truthfulness of Gallarelli's testimony, but simply urging the jury to accept the officer's version of what occurred. This was permissible argument, not vouching. See United States v. Marshall, 109 F.3d 94, 100 (1st Cir.1997) (Not every factual recitation in the prosecutor's argument must start with a personal disclaimer.). 34