Opinion ID: 216509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elements of a Batson Challenge

Text: In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race. This holding has since been expanded to forbid the use of peremptory challenges motivated by gender; to forbid the use of discriminatory strikes by the defense; and to permit Batson claims when jurors of a different race than the defendant are excluded from the jury pool. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 129–31 (1994) (banning strikes based on gender); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (discussing reverse Batson strikes by the defense); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (discussing cross-racial Batson challenges). When a party raises a Batson challenge, courts must perform a three-step analysis. “First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006). A defendant establishes a prima facie case when: (1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race; and (3) these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the venire men from the petit jury on account of their race. 7 No. 09-4194 Odeneal, 517 F.3d at 418–19. Once a prima facie case is established, “the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question.” Rice, 546 U.S. at 338. At this stage, “the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation need not be “particularly persuasive, or even plausible, so long as it is neutral.” Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d at 559 (citing United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Kimbrel, 532 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [strike proponent’s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.”) (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)). However, “the trial judge cannot simply accept the prosecution’s explanation on its face.” Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d at 559 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Rather, as a final step, reviewing courts must assess the prosecutor’s credibility, weigh the strength of the prosecution’s asserted justification against the defendant’s prima facie case, and determine whether a defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination in light of all relevant circumstances, including comparative juror analysis and arguments related to pretext. See, e.g., Odeneal, 517 F.3d at 419–20; Kimbrel, 532 F.3d at 466. “In the end, the ultimate burden of persuasion always rests with the party challenging the strike.” United States v. Cecil, 615 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing Batson as a preponderance of evidence test). Where, as here, the trial court has heard and ruled on the prosecution’s asserted race neutral justification, “the issue of whether the defendant made a sufficient prima facie showing becomes moot.” Tucker, 90 F.3d at 1142 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1991) 8 No. 09-4194 (plurality opinion)); accord Braxton v. Gansheimer, 561 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the sole issue presented in this appeal is whether Defendant established “by a preponderance of the evidence that the peremptory strikes were intentionally discriminatory.” Tucker, 90 F.3d at 1142.