Opinion ID: 1922029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Claim of Ownership to the Centerline of Bayberry Lane

Text: Before this Court, plaintiff argues that the deed to Helen P. Barker in January 1953 included a conveyance to the centerline of the proposed road, now called Bayberry Lane. Based on this Court's holding in Newman v. Mayor of Newport, 73 R.I. 385, 392, 57 A.2d 173, 177 (1948), plaintiff contends that when a platted road is located between two lots, a presumption arises that each lot owner owns to the centerline of the road. Because of this presumption and his status as Helen P. Barker's successor in title, Bitting claims ownership to the centerline of Bayberry Lane. He contends that the conveyance of the proposed road in the deed to the 1953 buyers was ineffectual because a portion of the lane previously had been conveyed to Helen P. Barker in January 1953 by virtue of the presumption. The determination of what are the boundaries of land conveyed in a deed is a question of law. Co-operative Building Bank v. Hawkins, 30 R.I. 171, 187, 73 A. 617, 623 (1909). To glean the intention of the parties to a deed, this Court looks to the language in the deed in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of its execution. Gaddes v. Pawtucket Institution for Savings, 33 R.I. 177, 186-87, 80 A. 415, 418-19 (1911). In this case, the question of whether plaintiff owns a portion of Bayberry Lane is determined by examining the January 1953 deed from the trustees to plaintiff's predecessor in title, Helen P. Barker. According to that deed, the property was bounded and described    SOUTHERLY by a proposed Road forty (40) feet in width, three hundred twenty-two and two-tenths (322.2) feet[.] The deed also refers to the 1952 plat, a fact we deem significant with respect to plaintiff's right-of-way over the lane. In contrast to the later instrument conveying the parcel on the southerly side of the lane to the 1953 buyers, the Barker deed did not expressly convey any property interest in the proposed road. Nonetheless, plaintiff argues that he owns to the middle of Bayberry Lane as it extends along the boundary of his property based on this Court's decision in Newman. This Court held that in the absence of special circumstances    the owner of land abutting on a highway owns the fee to the middle line of the highway. Newman, 73 R.I. at 392, 57 A.2d at 177 (citing Healey v. Babbitt, 14 R.I. 533 (1884)). As a general rule, by the legal establishment of a public highway, the public acquires only an easement in such highway, the fee in the soil remaining in the owners of adjoining lands. Id. Although this is an accurate statement of the law, it overlooks the Court's rationale in adopting this presumption. In Healey, 14 R.I. at 537, we held: [The] presumption, however, that the grantee takes the fee of the soil to the centre of the highway, is not absolute and conclusive. It is created, or rather allowed, in the absence of proof, and is based upon the idea that when the street or highway was laid out, the proprietors on each side contributed their land for the purpose, in equal portions. When it appears that such was not the fact, the presumption does not arise.  (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, if a road is created wholly over the land of one person, the presumption of ownership to the centerline of a road is defeated and a conveyance of property bounded by such road conveys title only to the roadside. Id. In this case, the proposed road, as shown in the 1952 plat, was a portion of the golf course parcel owned by the trustees that included the land to the north, south, and west. Thus, the presumption that the buyer owns to the middle of the highway does not arise and plaintiff's argument fails. Furthermore, as we stated in Healey, 14 R.I. at 537 and Newman, 73 R.I. at 392, 57 A.2d at 177, special circumstances can serve to overcome a presumption of ownership to the centerline of the roadway. Such is the case now before us. In the conveyance to the 1953 buyers, the trustees conveyed the lane in fee but reserved a right-of-way over the lane for the benefit of themselves, Armstrong (the bird sanctuary), Harold S. and Helen P. Barker and their heirs and assigns. We are of the opinion that if the trustees had intended to convey the proposed road to Helen P. Barker, there would have been no need to reserve a right-of-way for her use and enjoyment in the same lane. Accordingly, based on the plain language of the 1953 deed and the reservation of a right-of-way for the Barkers, it is apparent that the trustees did not intend to convey an ownership in the lane to Helen P. Barker. The trial justice correctly concluded that plaintiff did not own any portion of Bayberry Lane. We take a different path however, to determine whether plaintiff has an easement in Bayberry Lane.