Opinion ID: 2402274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Review of Waiver Procedures Followed in Watson's and Blumberg's Cases

Text: [¶ 32] The record establishes that when Watson proceeded to trial without a lawyer, he was not directly warned of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89, 124 S.Ct. 1379. It also establishes, however, that Watson knew of and understood his right to representation by counsel, comprehended the nature of the charges against him, and, as a result of the court's detailed explanation of the trial process, was made aware of the requirements that would be placed upon him at trial and, by necessary implication, the risks of self-representation. Watson was undoubtedly aware of the existence of technical rules and that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story. Acrey, 691 P.2d at 962. At no point in this proceeding has he claimed that he was without the means to hire an attorney. [¶ 33] As previously observed, the scope and level of a trial court's effort to communicate Faretta -related information to a defendant may be calibrated to the defendant's individual circumstances. Watson, who informed the court that he had a college degree, demonstrated an understanding of his right to counsel at his initial appearance and at subsequent court hearings, participated in a lengthy discussion with the court and the prosecutor regarding the nature of the charges against him in which he demonstrated personal familiarity with the OUI statute, and continued in his desire to represent himself after he received a detailed explanation from the trial court regarding the requirements of the trial process. As the Superior Court implicitly concluded from these circumstances, we also conclude that Watson's waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Peppers, 302 F.3d at 133 (requiring that the defendant fully apprehend[] the nature of the charges against him, the perils of self-representation, and the requirements that will be placed upon him for valid waiver). Accordingly, we affirm his conviction.
[¶ 34] Unlike Watson, who was made aware of the dangers of trying a case without counsel through the court's detailed explanation of what would be expected of him at trial, Blumberg received no warning of what lay ahead. Cf. Walls, 501 A.2d at 805 (premising the finding of a valid waiver on the defendant having been made aware of the dangers of waiving his right to the assistance of counsel). There is simply no basis to conclude from the trial record that warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel were rigorous[ly] conveyed to Blumberg, Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89, 124 S.Ct. 1379 (quotation marks omitted), or that Blumberg otherwise demonstrated an understanding of the risks of self-representation. See Acrey, 691 P.2d at 962. [¶ 35] As we stated in Tomah, if a defendant is told no more than that he or she has the right to either seek counsel or represent himself at trial, we have no trouble . . . in concluding that such a record is woefully inadequate to support a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver. 560 A.2d at 576. We apply the strong presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, and conclude that because Blumberg did not receive any warnings or information related to the inherent risks of proceeding to trial without counsel, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. [¶ 36] The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error for which harm is presumed because it casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988)); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 979, 163 L.Ed.2d 722 (2006); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Peppers, 302 F.3d at 127; State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 453 (Iowa 2000); United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48 n. 8 (1st Cir.1991). Because the error associated with Blumberg's trial was not harmless, we vacate his conviction. Accordingly, we do not reach his additional argument that the court erred when it initially concluded that he did not financially qualify for a court-appointed counsel.