Opinion ID: 200831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sex Offender Treatment Requirement

Text: 19 York argues that because his conviction was for mailing a threatening communication, not for a sex-related crime, the requirement that he participate in a sex offender treatment program imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to deter criminal conduct or protect the public. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b). York misunderstands the law. 20 The Sentencing Guidelines do not limit district courts to consideration only of the facts of the crime charged. A sentencing court should consider each defendant's history, regardless of the nature of the crime of conviction. The judge has the authority to impose any condition of supervised release that is reasonably related to (1) the defendant's offense, history, and characteristics; (2) the need to deter the defendant from further criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant; and (4) the effective educational, vocational, medical, or other correctional treatment of the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1); Mansur-Ramos, 348 F.3d at 33; United States v. Peppe, 80 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir.1996). Although these factors are connected by the word and, see § 3583(d)(1); § 5D1.3(b)(1), the critical test is whether the challenged condition is sufficiently related to one or more of the permissible goals of supervised release. Brown, 235 F.3d at 6 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Barajas, 331 F.3d 1141, 1146-47 (10th Cir.2003) (noting that every circuit to have decided the issue has adopted this interpretation notwithstanding the and conjunction). So the fact that a condition of supervised release is not directly related to York's crime of conviction does not render that condition per se invalid. 21 York acknowledges these principles but argues that sex offender treatment is uniquely reserved for cases involving sex offenses. He points to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7), which provides that a special condition requiring the defendant's participation in a sex-offender treatment program should be imposed if the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense. But this is little aid to York, as the Guidelines conspicuously do not say that sex-offender treatment is appropriate only if the underlying crime was a sex offense. In fact, the preamble to § 5D1.3(d) provides that the special conditions listed therein, including participation in a program for sex offenders, are recommended in the circumstances described and, in addition, may otherwise be appropriate in particular cases.  (emphasis added). And nothing in the statute underlying § 5D1.3 limits the special condition of sex-offender treatment to defendants under prosecution for sex crimes. 5 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583. 22 There are, however, several limitations on a district court's power to fashion special conditions of supervised release. We list a few. First, a special condition must in fact be tailored to the circumstances: it can involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes of supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2). Second, the condition imposed must be consistent with any pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission. Id. Finally, the trial court's decision to impose the challenged condition must have adequate evidentiary support in the record. Brown, 235 F.3d at 6; United States v. Thurlow, 44 F.3d 46, 46 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (per curiam). 23 Given York's criminal history and in light of the record in this case, which includes a threat of violence by York against yet another woman, the district court was well within its discretion in requiring York to participate in the sex offender treatment program. The condition that he attend sex-offender treatment is plainly related to his criminal history: York has twice been convicted for sexually assaulting young girls, including one conviction only a year before he mailed his threatening letter to A.S. See United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.2001) (approving a special release condition of sex-offender treatment for a defendant convicted of bank larceny where the defendant had been convicted of a sex offense in state court five years earlier). 24 York's proven recidivism, moreover, makes the condition reasonably related to another permissible purpose of supervised release: protecting the public from further crimes by the defendant. In McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002), the Supreme Court observed that convicted sex offenders who reenter society are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault. Id. at 33, 122 S.Ct. 2017. Furthermore, treatment programs of the kind the district court has required York to attend may enable sex offenders to manage their impulses and in this way reduce recidivism. Id. The district court's remarks during sentencing make clear that the court believed that York needed such treatment and that he continued to pose a risk to young girls. 25 The district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, in requiring York to participate in a sex-offender treatment program as a condition of his supervised release.