Opinion ID: 1180042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Errors or Omissions by Trial Counsel

Text: Aplaca contends that her trial counsel failed to conduct an investigation of a list of witnesses she provided as well as witnesses that were made known through the discovery material he received. Moreover, counsel failed to ascertain that full discovery had not been provided by the State. In support of her motion for new trial, Aplaca submitted affidavits from: 1) Captain Watkins, which indicated that Aplaca's trial counsel never contacted her prior to trial, although she did speak with him briefly on the day of trial; that as the supervisor of both Aplaca and Viernes, Watkins was familiar with them and would have testified that Aplaca was a truthful and peaceable person who should be believed under oath; 2) ACO Gillespie, who conducted an investigation of the incident for the Department of Corrections, tape recorded an interview with Viernes about the incident, and made a report wherein he concluded that no assault had taken place; 3) ACO Ueda and Waiawa administrator Clayton Frank, stating that if called to testify, they would have indicated that Viernes was not a truthful person, even if she were under oath; 4) Aplaca, which indicated that she hired counsel approximately six months before trial and asked him to investigate the case by contacting Captain Watkins, who would testify as a character witness for her, and ACO Gillespie, who had conducted an investigation of Viernes's complaint. She also told her attorney about other potential witnesses, including ACO Ueda; and 5) Partington, Aplaca's current attorney, who stated that his investigation revealed that full discovery had not been provided by the State, namely, a three-page handwritten statement by Viernes, which he obtained from ACO Gillespie's report, but which had not been furnished to trial counsel, and two microcassette tapes of Viernes's interview wherein Viernes indicated that she was walking out the door rather than in the door as she testified at trial. The copies of Gillespie's report, which had been provided to Aplaca's trial counsel by the Attorney General's Office, were also submitted in support of her motion. These materials included, inter alia, information that Aplaca had passed a polygraph test and that ACO Gillespie's investigation indicated that Aplaca did not assault Viernes. Additionally, copies of the materials discovered by Partington, including the transcribed statement of Viernes, were also submitted in support of Aplaca's motion. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel admitted that Aplaca informed him several months prior to trial of the potential witnesses and their anticipated testimony. He also stated that he did not contact any of them and had never conducted an investigation of the materials he received from the Attorney General's Office. He did speak with Captain Watkins, but admitted this occurred on the day of trial and that it was brief, only small talk, really nothing in depth. Significantly, trial counsel stated: Yeah, there are some things that I later found out that I didn't obtain. There are some tapes of Viernes made by Gillespie which are materially different from her testimony in court. Uh, I that had I done further investigation on that that would've been material to the defendant's case. There was other activity by the complainant herself in terms of filing complaints. . . . . .       I think that if I had looked at the material more carefully there are things in there that I should've investigated into. I should've conducted a more thorough investigation to the A.C.O.s and other witnesses that were related to the case and mentioned in the material that was subpoenaed from the correctional facility. I should've talked to Gillespie in much more detail because Gillespie had some very important information that would've helped the case. A primary requirement is that counsel must `conduct careful factual and legal investigations and inquiries with a view to developing matters of defense in order that he may make informed decisions on his client's behalf;' ... both at pretrial proceedings ... and at trial. State v. Kahalewai, 54 Haw. 28, 30-31, 501 P.2d 977, 979-80 (1972) (citations omitted). Aplaca's trial counsel conceded that he made an error in not investigating the case other than subpoenaing materials from the facility, and acknowledged that he should have done more to emphasize the credibility issues involved in the case. We reiterate our belief that [t]he decision whether to call witnesses in a criminal trial is normally a matter within the judgment of counsel and, accordingly, will rarely be second-guessed by judicial hindsight. State v. Onishi, 64 Haw. 62, 64, 636 P.2d 742, 744 (1981); accord Thompson v. Yuen, 63 Haw. 186, 190, 623 P.2d 881, 884 (1981); State v. El'Ayache, 62 Haw. 646, 649, 618 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1980); State v. McNulty, 60 Haw. 259, 270, 588 P.2d 438, 446 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979). Nonetheless, absent here is a foundational factual predicate upon which an informed decision whether to call a witness to testify must be based. We agree with the Supreme Court of Utah, which stated: If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's performance cannot fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. This is because a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) (footnote omitted). Thus, the decision not to conduct a pretrial investigation of prospective defense witnesses cannot be classified as a tactical decision or trial strategy. Although effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, we believe trial counsel's assistance fell below the level of ordinary competence demanded of lawyers in criminal cases and reflected his lack of skill, judgment or diligence. Kahalewai, 54 Haw. at 30, 32, 501 P.2d at 980. Finally, when Aplaca's trial counsel called Captain Watkins as a witness, the State objected and requested an offer of proof. Trial counsel's failure to make an offer of proof further demonstrated his lack of skill and judgment. [3] Furthermore, his reasoning for not making an offer of proof does not, as a matter of law, constitute trial strategy or a valid on-the-spot strategic choice. As trial counsel testified, well, quite frankly, I didn't want to upset the judge. That's one of the reasons. Based on these errors and omissions, we find that Aplaca has met the first part of the Antone test.