Opinion ID: 1842822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Character and Reputation Instruction.

Text: The defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of the defendant's character and reputation for truthfulness in determining whether a person of such character and reputation would be likely to commit the crimes charged. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.404( a )(1) (permitting evidence of a pertinent trait of the defendant's character for the purpose of proving the defendant acted in conformity with this trait at the time of the offense). Instead, the court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence about the defendant's and Banker's characters and reputations for truthfulness only in deciding whether to believe the testimony of these witnesses, and how much weight to give it. See Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.607, 5.608 (permitting evidence of character for truthfulness or untruthfulness to attack or support the credibility of a witness). See generally People v. Miller, 890 P.2d 84, 94-96 (Colo.1995) (discussing the differences between admitting evidence under rule 404( a )(1) and rule 608( a )). Martinez claims on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested instruction because Martinez's honesty was a central issue in the case. We review the trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction for correction of errors at law. Lynch v. Saddler, 656 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 2003). As long as a requested instruction correctly states the law, has application to the case, and is not stated elsewhere in the instructions, the court must give the requested instruction. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996). When we apply these principles to the facts presented, we conclude the court did not err because the requested instruction is not applicable to this case. Generally, evidence regarding the accused's character and reputation is not admissible to demonstrate the likelihood that the accused committed the charged offense. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.404( a ); 7 James A. Adams and Joseph P. Weeg, Iowa Practice: Evidence § 5.404.2, at 186 (2003) [hereinafter  Iowa Practice: Evidence ]. An exception is recognized, however, where the defendant offers evidence of a pertinent trait of the [accused's] character. Iowa R. Evid. 5.404( a )(1) (emphasis added); see Miller, 890 P.2d at 91. A character trait is pertinent if it is particularly involved in the crime alleged. State v. Hobbs, 172 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Iowa 1969); accord Iowa Practice: Evidence § 5.404.2, at 186; see also State v. Brown, 592 A.2d 163, 164-65 (Me.1991) (A trait is pertinent if the existence or nonexistence of the trait would be involved in the commission or noncommission of the particular crime charged ... even if the trait of character is not an essential element in the case.); State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 376 S.E.2d 745, 751 (1989) (In criminal cases, in order to be admissible as a `pertinent' trait of character, the trait must bear a special relationship to or be involved in the crime charged.). As one writer has stated, the trait of character offered by the defendant should be closely or strongly related to the criminal behavior in issue. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. Pa. L.Rev. 845, 853 (1982) [hereinafter Uviller Article]. Whether the trait is pertinent is a question different from whether the evidence is relevant. As this court has noted, one reason [a] specific rule is required in order to exclude [character] evidence [is] because it otherwise qualifies for admission under general relevancy standards. See State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1987); accord 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 186, at 649 (5th ed. 1999) (Evidence of the general character of a party or witness almost always has some probative value ....), § 188, at 654 (evidence that an individual is the kind of person who behaves in certain ways almost always has some value as circumstantial evidence of how this individual acted ... in the matter in question), § 190, at 658-59 (noting that while evidence of bad character would not be irrelevant in a criminal case, the dangers of prejudice, confusion and time-consumption outweigh the probative value of such evidence) [hereinafter  McCormick on Evidence ]. Thus, the evidence falling within the exception found in rule 4.404( a )(1) is subjected to a more exacting standard than merely showing its relevancy to the defendant's general propensity to commit a crime. Rather, the trait itself must directly relate to a particular element or facet of the crime charged. See Stitt v. State, 102 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex.Ct.App.2003) (A pertinent character trait is `one that relates to a trait involved in the offense charged or a defense raised.'); McCormick on Evidence § 191, at 673 (stating pertinent traits are those involved in the offense charged); Uviller Article, 130 U. Pa. L.Rev. at 853 (stating the relevancy of a particular trait is found in the assessment that its establishment makes less likely the occurrence of the specific item of behavior attributed to the defendant). Our prior cases illustrate this requirement. For example, in Hobbs, the defendant was charged with aggravated robbery. 172 N.W.2d at 270. We held the traits implicated in a robbery charge were honesty, integrity, and good citizenship, while the aggravation aspect of the crime concerned the specific traits of peacefulness and nonviolence. Id. at 271; see also Iowa Practice: Evidence § 5.404.2, at 186 (stating in an assault case, the accused can introduce his character trait of peacefulness). In a later case, State v. Kramer, 231 N.W.2d 874, 876-77 (Iowa 1975), we considered the admissibility of testimony of the defendant's good character where the defendant was accused of breaking and entering. We affirmed the trial court's refusal to give a proposed instruction that this testimony could be used as direct evidence of the defendant's innocence, noting the testimony did not relate to the particular character traits involved in the crime charged. Kramer, 231 N.W.2d at 877 (citing Hobbs, 172 N.W.2d at 271). The question raised in this case, then, is whether the character traits to which the defendant's witnesses testified without objectionhonesty, trustworthiness, and dependabilityare pertinent to the crimes of delivery of methamphetamine and failure to affix a tax stamp. Although our court has not faced this precise issue, a few other courts have considered the admissibility of character evidence as substantive proof that the defendant was innocent or guilty of similar crimes. See United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir.1979); Miller, 890 P.2d at 91-96; State v. Rabe, 5 Haw.App. 251, 687 P.2d 554, 562-63 (Haw.Ct.App.1984). In Jackson, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin and possession of heroin with the intent to distribute. 588 F.2d at 1048. The appellate court held the trial court properly excluded evidence of the defendant's reputation for truth and veracity because these traits were not pertinent to the crimes charged. Id. at 1055. In Miller, the defendant was charged with possession and distribution of cocaine. 890 P.2d at 86. The court held the defendant's character for truthfulness was not a trait `pertinent' to his drug offense. Id. at 96. Finally, in Rabe, the defendant, charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana in prison, offered proof of numerous character traits that he claimed should be admitted under rule 404( a )(1). 687 P.2d at 562. The Hawaii court of appeals held that the traits of reliability, dependability, diligence, amiability, reasonableness, decency, honesty, truthfulness, and abstinence from alcohol [were] not pertinent to the crime of conspiracy to promote prison contraband (in the form of marijuana). Id. We reach the same conclusion as these courts in our consideration of whether the witnesses' testimony in this case concerning the defendant's traits of honesty, trustworthiness, and dependability is evidence of pertinent traits so as to constitute direct proof of the defendant's innocence. These traits are not strongly related to the criminal behavior at issue herethe delivery of methamphetamine and the failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that it could consider this testimony as substantive evidence of Martinez's commission or noncommission of the charged offenses. See Kramer, 231 N.W.2d at 877 (holding trial court correctly refused requested instruction on legal effect of character evidence because the testimony did not relate to the particular character traits involved in the crime charged).