Opinion ID: 77977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The affirmative bargaining order remedy

Text: In order to grapple with the issue at hand, it is important to understand the dynamics of the Board's chosen remedy in this case  an affirmative bargaining order  from both a procedural and remedial perspective. The Board has available to it an array of remedies to redress unfair labor practices: The Board may order the employer, for example, to cease and desist his unfair practices, to post a notice or read one aloud, and to reinstate and reimburse unlawfully discharged employees. [15] Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 935 (D.C.Cir.1991). A bargaining order is appropriate only where the unfair practices have so intimidated employees that an election, even with the full complement of traditional NLRB remedies, would not reflect their true sentiments. Id. at 935. A cease and desist order and an affirmative bargaining order essentially serve the same function in the context of an incumbent union, except for the bargaining order's accompanying decertification bar which protects the union from a decertification election for a reasonable time, not more than one year. Caterair Int'l v. NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (D.C.Cir.1994) (discussing differences between these remedies); Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 903 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1992) (The decertification bar would last for a `reasonable period'  at least six months, perhaps as much as one year  during which time the employer and the union would presumably bargain.). As such, an affirmative bargaining order is an extraordinary remedy because it infringes on the free association rights of present employees to choose their own representation or no representation. Caterair Int'l, 22 F.3d at 1122. It is both retrospective and prospective in nature. See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 612, 89 S.Ct. at 1939 ([A] bargaining order is designed as much to remedy past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct.). There are generally two categories of cases from which an affirmative bargaining order may issue: precertification election cases and incumbent union withdrawal cases. The typical affirmative bargaining order case is the former and is exemplified by NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969), where the Supreme Court set out a three category test for issuing an affirmative bargaining order when a union claims precertification labor violations caused it to lose an election despite evidence of majority support. See Caterair Int'l, 22 F.3d at 1122-23 (discussing difference between Gissel case and incumbent union case). This case, however, falls into the latter category and is not a Gissel case because here the Union was an incumbent union at the time of withdrawal of recognition. We are presented instead with an unlawful withdrawal of recognition case, where an employer refuses to bargain with an incumbent union and where anti-union animus has sufficiently tainted an otherwise lawful decertification petition. See, e.g., Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 46 (D.C.Cir.1980); see also Sullivan Indus., 957 F.2d at 897-98 (successive employer withdrawal of recognition). The D.C. Circuit, which has seen a disproportionate share of NLRB enforcement actions, [16] requires the Board, prior to issuing an affirmative bargaining order, to justify its remedy in light of the facts of each case. See Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 45-46. In Peoples Gas, the court recognized, for the first time, the Board's obligation to provide a reasoned explanation for ordering an affirmative bargaining order: A remedial order should recognize the competing considerations which are potentially affected by the remedy chosen, be grounded in factual determinations rather than speculation, and explain how, in light of present circumstances its remedy can be expected to effectuate the purposes of the Act. [17] Id. at 45 (footnote omitted). The Board has begrudgingly adopted the approach mandated by the D.C. Circuit (and other circuits), [18] and now supports its selection of an affirmative bargaining order remedy with a reasoned explanation that will enable the reviewing court to determine from the Board's opinion (1) that it gave due consideration to the employee's section 7 rights, which are, after all, one of the fundamental purposes of the Act, (2) why it concluded that other purposes must override the rights of the employees to choose their bargaining representatives and (3) why other remedies, less destructive of employees' rights, are not adequate. Charlotte Amphitheater Corp. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 1074, 1078 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 46. Peoples Gas expressly rejected relieving the Board of its obligation to provide a reasoned justification for imposing a bargaining order in a withdrawal of recognition case: Gissel, of course, involved unfair labor practices committed before any election was held, and the balance of interests at that point may appropriately place more weight on the employees' free choice. In withdrawal of recognition cases, deterrence and industrial stability emerge as important considerations. However, the fact that the balance may be different depending on the facts of the case does not mean that no balance need be drawn. Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 47 n. 23; see also Williams Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 1226, 1237 (D.C.Cir.1992) (The requirement that a bargaining order be accompanied by a reasoned explanation applies not only in election cases ..., but also in cases like Peoples Gas where an employer withdraws recognition from an incumbent union.); Sullivan Indus., 957 F.2d at 903 (refusing to enforce bargaining order in successive employer withdrawal of recognition case where Board failed to give a reasoned analysis). In Lee Lumber and Building Material Corporation v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1460-62 (D.C.Cir.1997), the D.C. Circuit again specifically rejected applying a different analytical framework to incumbent union withdrawal of recognition cases: Gissel, of course, involved a non-incumbent union and as such is not directly implicated here. This court, however, has required the Board to make detailed findings as to why a bargaining order is appropriate not only in cases involving non-incumbent unions, but also in cases involving incumbent unions .... We have repeatedly held that if the Board wishes to impose an affirmative bargaining order, it must explain why that remedy is appropriate given the facts of that particular case. Id. at 1461 (emphasis added). Although the relevant considerations may change somewhat in a withdrawal of recognition case, the necessity of an analysis that explain[s] how, in light of present circumstances its remedy can be expected to effectuate the purposes of the Act does not change. Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 46. The Seventh Circuit has also required the Board to justify its imposition of an affirmative bargaining order, regardless of the type of case in which it is ordered. See Ron Tirapelli Ford, Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 433, 441 (7th Cir.1993) ([T]he Board must follow the dictates of Gissel and its progeny and consider whether less drastic measures would serve the balance of interests. At all times, the Board is charged with accomplishing and articulating this balance of interests against the backdrop of its obligation to craft a remedy for employer misconduct that is remedial rather than punitive.) (emphasis added). [19] Accordingly, we now follow the D.C. Circuit and other circuits, and hold that in all cases, whether a Gissel -type bargaining case or an unlawful withdrawal of recognition case, the Board must justify its imposition of an affirmative bargaining order by employing a reasoned analysis to justify its chosen remedy. In this case, we are satisfied that the Board adequately analyzed the three prongs of the D.C. Circuit's test. [20] Central to the Board's findings that supported the issuance of a bargaining order were the ongoing and pervasive nature of the violations, which occurred during the first year of certification, a time in which unions are usually at their greatest strength. (Board at 6.) The Board specifically rejected a cease and desist order, which the D.C. Circuit has noted should usually be the appropriate remedy when a certified union is in place. See Caterair Int'l, 22 F.3d at 1123 (noting, in an incumbent union case, that a cease and desist order is a prime example of an alternative remedy to those affirmative bargaining orders outlined in Gissel ). Here, the Board found that the employees need the protection of a temporary (no more than one year) decertification bar in order to regroup and bargain through their representative in an effort to reach a collective-bargaining agreement. (Board at 6.) The effect of rampant violations in the first year of union representation underscores the fact that the Union never had an opportunity to bargain with and adequately represent its members: [Goya] substantially undermined the Union's opportunity to effectively bargain, without unlawful interference, during the period when unions are usually at their greatest strength. Because the Union was not given a truly fair opportunity to reach an accord with [Goya], it is only by restoring the status quo ante and requiring [Goya] to bargain with the Union for a reasonable period of time that employees will be able to assess for themselves the Union's effectiveness as a bargaining representative. ( Id. ) We observe that this reasoning is entirely consistent with the purpose of the affirmative bargaining order recognized by the Supreme Court in Gissel Packing Co., see 395 U.S. at 612, 89 S.Ct. at 1939, wherein the Court observed that a bargaining order serves as much as a remedy to right past wrongs as it does serve as a deterrent for future misconduct. One aim of a Board remedy should be to return to the status quo ante the unfair labor practices. [21] See NLRB v. Williams Enters., Inc., 50 F.3d 1280, 1289 (4th Cir.1995) (finding, in the successive employer incumbent union context, that only an affirmative bargaining order can restore the status quo ante  that is, reseat the union as the incumbent and restore to it the bargaining opportunity it would have had but for the successor's unlawful refusal to bargain); see also Ron Tirapelli Ford, Inc., 987 F.2d at 445 (finding in an incumbent union context that a bargaining order is the appropriate remedy to return the parties to the status quo ante). In contrast, a non-incumbent union never enjoyed a presumption of majority status; therefore, an affirmative order to bargain with a nonincumbent union grants it a better position than the status quo  initial recognition as the bargaining agent which it would not have had even before the company's unlawful conduct. Williams Enters., Inc., 50 F.3d at 1289. At oral argument, counsel for Goya acknowledged that the Board was correct to credit in its analysis the fact that the extensive violations that occurred here took place during the Union's first year of certification. Cf. Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 367, 373 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing how vulnerable newly certified unions are to management resistance). The Union was deprived of the opportunity to enjoy the irrebuttable presumption of majority status that ordinarily accompanies unions in the first year of certification, and the attendant bargaining strength that comes with it. The unfair labor practices found by the Board began well before the first year of certification. But just because union support was strong enough to overcome Goya's anti-union efforts in order to secure certification, it would be unfair to penalize the Union by returning to the precertification status. Instead, it seems eminently reasonable and consistent with the remedial purpose of the affirmative bargaining order to restore the Union to the position it would have been in were it not for the unfair practices and the misconduct during its first year of certification that deprived the Union both of its year of presumptive support and  given the evident strength of the Union at the time of certification  a meaningful opportunity to bargain for an initial agreement with Goya. The Board satisfied its burden here: it evaluated each of the required factors in light of the record before it at the time it issued its order. Thus we conclude that the Board adequately justified its imposition of an affirmative bargaining order, which appears from the Board's reasoning to be the appropriate remedy in this case. However, Goya argues that the Board's order, and in particular the affirmative bargaining order, should not be enforced because of the extensive passage of time and changed circumstances (especially employee turnover). We address this argument in the next section.