Opinion ID: 1265916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Grounds for Concurrence in the Result

Text: I concur in the result reached by the majority because: 1. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-12-10, a judge, having determined that one or more conditions of probation have been violated, may revoke the suspension of imposition or execution of sentence, impose sentence if none has been imposed, and order that sentence be executed.... If, despite a violation of the conditions of probation, the court or judge shall be of the opinion that the interests of justice do not require that the probationer serve his sentence, the court or judge may, except when the violation [of probation] was the commission of a felony, again release him on probation. (Emphasis added.) 2. Nothing in our law requires the revocation of probation and imposition of sentence after the Court learns of one or more probation violations. 3. The circumstances of this case require that, if probation was to be actually revoked for the multiple probation violations appearing from the record, the only sentence available to the court upon revocation was fifteen to thirty-five years in prison. 4. The defendant was subjected to sexual abuse by family members and at least one teacher, the abuse dating from the age of reason, that is from age seven or eight. As a direct result of these attacks, the defendant, at or about age fourteen, acted out, committing against his younger half-brother the same types of sexual crimes of which he himself had been a victim in prior years. 5. At age fifteen the defendant was charged with delinquency as a result of this conduct and forthwith transferred to the adult jurisdiction, thus requiring that the defendant be treated as an adult and not afforded treatment as a juvenile. 6. It appears that, by reason of the seriousness of the crime involved, the transfer to adult jurisdiction was mandatory under West Virginia Code § 49-5-10, the applicable juvenile justice statute. Thus the statute, at that point, required adult criminal prosecution for his conduct and, as punishment, potential imprisonment for fifteen to thirty-five years, rather than treatment as juvenile. 7. As horrible as defendant's underlying crimes might have been, especially in terms of their impact on the half-brother victim and defendant's relationship with other well-behaved members of his family, a possible thirty-five-year term of imprisonment at defendant's age and in these circumstances cries out for close scrutiny under every principle of justice. 8. The record before us does not disclose that anyonethe State or any private partyhas fully diagnosed the impact of and remedies necessary to guide this defendant from the nightmare of childhood sexual abuse, through his own disgusting, but youthful, criminal conduct, past all the anger and frustration generated in him by these events, to the point where the defendant overcomes his own apparently stubborn reluctance to fully cooperate in his recovery. I am satisfied that another effort, short of prison, is more likely to gain the defendant's adherence to society's norms of behavior than is thirty-five years in prison. 9. The record does demonstrate that the trial court attempted at least three available alternatives and that the defendant, to some substantial degree, succeeded in improving his conduct for varying periods of time in some structured situations. 10. The probation violations upon which the execution of this fifteen to thirty-five year sentence was predicated may be summarized as: (1) alcohol and marijuana abuse, (2) lack of anger control, (3) lack of respect for authority, (4) failure to take advantage of all counseling opportunities and (5) failure to observe the administrative rules for probation. 11. Under the provisions of West Virginia Code § 62-12-9, a court may modify the conditions of probation at any time, including requiring intermittent or continuous confinement in jail for up six months. 12. Under the painful circumstances of this case, I believe the trial court should have used the defendant's application for a reduction of sentence to further explore every available alternative to requiring the continued execution of the fifteen to thirty-five year sentence applicable to this case. 13. The trial court originally granted probation for a five-year term running from September 12, 2000, to September 11, 2005; hopefully, time remains to successfully turn this young man around without more prison time. 14. In addition to possibly requiring some jail time, continuous or intermittent, the court has at its disposal an opportunity to enroll the defendant in the program offered by Youth Systems Services, predicated on the articulated belief that the defendant can be saved and can be brought around to a pro-social life. 15. The operative decision of a majority of this Court to reverse and remand with directions means simply that the lower court should, at this time, reverse its decision to revoke the defendant's probation and consider and adopt, before the term of probation expires, alternative means of attempting to secure the defendant's adherence to the norms of society, including further consideration of the Youth Systems Services option, additional jail time and any other community-based alternative, leaving always the option, if these efforts fail, of requiring the execution of the long sentence of incarceration required by the defendant's conviction. It is easy to fathom the total frustration the trial court might well have felt in once again considering the defendant's recalcitrant behaviorgiven the many opportunities for rehabilitation previously extended to the defendant and lost by his erratic conduct. Notwithstanding that quite understandable frustration, the defendant's age and the miserable circumstances of his past life combine to strongly suggest that a possible thirty-five year term of imprisonment ... cries out for close scrutiny under every principle of justice.