Opinion ID: 2299396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Quartaro's Testimony

Text: The defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was not given the opportunity to confront all the witnesses against him. To support this argument, defendant likens his case to Bullcoming and asserts that cross-examination of Quartaro, a mere surrogate witness, was an insufficient substitute for his right to confront all the intervening analysts who performed the preliminary stages of the DNA testing. In so doing, defendant points to the fact that Quartaro never touched the evidence, never performed any part of any of the testing, and was not present or observing when the tests were performed to reach his conclusion that the [c]ross-examination of    Quartaro was not an adequate substitute for proper confrontation of the actual testers because he was incapable of ferreting out any fraudulent or faulty work in the extraction and measurement of the DNA in this case. Ultimately, defendant contends that  Bullcoming controls the outcome of this case and mandates reversal. We conclude, however, that defendant's emphasis on Bullcoming is unwarranted; rather, we find there are significant differences between the two cases. Here, Quartaro did not act as a surrogate witness similar to the testifying witness in Bullcoming. In Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2709, the testifying witness had no connection to the scientific report about which he testified aside from having familiarity with the testing laboratory's procedures. [ Bullcoming ] is not a case in which the person testifying [was] a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue. [The surrogate witness] conceded on cross-examination that he [had] played no role in producing the    report and [had] not observe[d] any portion of    the testing. Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The same is not true of this case. To the contrary, Quartaro was integrally involved in the entire process of DNA testing, analysis, and certification, and he formulated the allele table and provided expert testimony at trial concerning the conclusions he drew therefrom. Acting as a supervisor at Cellmark, Quartaro directed specific analysts to perform each stage of the DNA testing on each of the seven samples. After the first three stages of the DNA testing were completed, he then reviewed the entire case file and confirmed that all protocols were followed properly by examining the other analysts' notes, their affirmations that protocols were followed, as well as their conclusions. Most importantly, Quartaro personally reviewed and independently analyzed all the raw data, formulated the allele table, and then articulated his own final conclusions concerning the DNA profiles and their corresponding matches. Those final conclusions are the very statementsthe statements of Quartaroat issue in this case. The DNA profiles and profile matches that Quartaro testified to at trial were his own independent, scientific opinions. Quartaro personally evaluated the DNA profiles to determine whether the samples contained the DNA of one or more people and then determined whether those profiles matched that of one of the known samples (either from defendant or decedent). Further, once a match was so determined, Quartaro ascribed the necessary statistical significance to that match, as only an expert may do. See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 933 N.E.2d 93, 109 (2010) (Only an expert can testify to the likelihood that more than one person possesses a particular DNA profile, based on her knowledge of the alleles selected for the DNA profile and the mathematical probabilities that more than one person may possess the same characteristics of those alleles.). Contrary to defendant's assertion, evidence that Hilario's DNA matched that of the blood found on defendant's clothing had little probative value without Quartaro's expert testimony[e]vidence of a match based on currently used testing processes is meaningless without evidence indicating the significance of the match. Id. at 109 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1346 (1994)). [27] Consequently, Quartaro was the preeminent testifying witness. He testified as to his own conclusions; he did not act as a conduit of the opinions of, or parrot the data produced by, other analysts. [28] Cf. United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2011) (Where an expert witness employs her training and experience to forge an independent conclusion, albeit on the basis of inadmissible evidence, the likelihood of a Sixth Amendment infraction is minimal.    Where an expert acts merely as a well-credentialed conduit for testimonial hearsay, however, the cases hold that her testimony violates a criminal defendant's right to confrontation.); Commonwealth v. Munoz, 461 Mass. 126, 958 N.E.2d 1167, 1174 (2011) (holding that admission of the testimony of [a] substitute analyst who offers an independent opinion does not violate the Confrontation Clause; however, a substitute analyst cannot testify to, or otherwise introduce, the original analyst's reports and conclusions on direct examination). Quartaro, as the author of the DNA profiles at issue, was the very witness that the Supreme Court deemed necessary in Bullcoming : the analysts who write reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation even if they possess `the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.' Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2537 n. 6); see also United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 71 (D.C.Cir.2011) (holding that because a witness testified that he authored the reports at issue and was available for cross-examination at trial, the admittance of those reports present[ed] no Confrontation Clause problem under Bullcoming ); United States v. Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d 382, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd 401 Fed.Appx. 565 (2d Cir. 2010) (Only the final stage of the DNA testing involved the type of analytical judgment for which a certificate would be an inadequate substitute for in-court testimony under the Sixth Amendment.). As the certifying witness in this case, Quartaro was the witness against defendantthe witness that defendant had the right to confront. Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2710 (The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification   .). The defendant assuredly was given this right through the extensive and forceful cross-examination of Quartaro at trial. The defendant claims that cross-examination of Quartaro was constitutionally inadequate because it was incapable of ferreting out any fraudulent or faulty work in the extraction and measurement of the DNA in this case. We disagree. In Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715, the Supreme Court indicated that the surrogate witness's testimony was insufficient because the witness could not convey what [the certifying witness] knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed. Here, Quartaro could and did testify about the precise process employed for DNA testing in his laboratory because he had acted as a supervisor at Cellmark for three years and had performed each step in the DNA-testing process thousands of times while at Cellmark. Quartaro also testified to his familiarity with each testing analyst. Cf. Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715-16 (noting the significance in the testifying witness's lack of knowledge of the reason the certifying witness was placed on unpaid leave); Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d at 6 (stating significantly, as in Bullcoming, [the testifying witness] knew relatively little of the severity of [the certifying witness's] mental illness, or the extent to which it may have affected the quality of his work). Quartaro indicated that he trained these analysts and that their competency routinely was confirmed through proficiency testing. Additionally, although he did not observe their execution of the testing, Quartaro testified that he personally was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc.); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analyst's report can be meaningfully cross-examined on the general risk of error in forensic testing). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been confronted about the risk that his own identifications of the DNA matches in this case were erroneous. See Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1175 ([A] substitute analyst, basing an independent opinion on data generated by a prior analyst, can be cross-examined on many of the specific risks that could lead to an erroneous conclusion concerning the identity and weight of a substance at issue in a particular case.). Quartaro testified as to the process he employed to evaluate the data to reach the conclusion that Hilario's DNA was recovered from defendant's clothing. This opinion readily was testable on cross-examination. See United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 201-02 (4th Cir.2011) (On the witness stand, [the expert] painstakingly explained the process whereby he, and he alone, evaluated the data to reach the conclusion that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, [the defendant] was the major contributor of the DNA recovered   [.] [The expert's] opinion was an `original product' that could be (and was) readily `tested through cross-examination.' (quoting United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir.2009))). Indeed, Quartaro's opinion was repeatedly challenged on cross-examination. See State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1356 (R.I.1996) (holding that provided a defendant is afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the expert[], to question the validity of [his] conclusions, and to disclose the potential weaknesses of the proffered DNA analyses, the results of such analyses may be presented to the jury). That is not to say that cross-examination of Quartaro could have addressed every risk of bias or error in the forensic testing. It is true that all stages of DNA testing and analysis are susceptible to error and falsification, and that a defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to reveal any such errors or falsifications through cross-examination. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2536 (stating that [c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate forensic analysis). However, it is equally clear that such an opportunity is not boundless. The Supreme Court made it clear that the Confrontation Clause does not mandate that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case. Id. at 2532 n. 1. Therefore, the fact that Quartaro used data produced from the work of other analysts to form his final, independent conclusions did not bestow upon defendant the constitutional right to confront each and every one of those subordinate analysts. See id. (noting that the prosecution is not required to call every person who laid hands on the evidence); see also Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1176 ([T]he Constitution has not yet been construed to require the testimony of every person who might conceivably have compromised the reliability of the evidence introduced against a defendant.). Instead, gaps in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 n. 1 (quoting United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir.1988)); see also State v. Nelson, 982 A.2d 602, 612 (R.I.2009) (holding that proof of a continuous chain of custody is relevant only as to the weight, and not the admissibility, of the evidence). As a result, questions as to how prior analysts' handling or preparation of the DNA samples may have affected Quartaro's independent, scientific opinions are evidentiary, and not of a constitutional dimension. See Vann v. State, 229 P.3d 197, 210-11 (Alaska Ct.App.2010) (stating that there is always the possibility that    the sample was misidentified or contaminated or improperly prepared for testing, but that those issues involve evidentiary questions of authentication, weight, and credibility). Accordingly, we hold that in this case, where defendant had ample opportunity to confront Quartarothe witness who undertook the critical stage of the DNA analysis, supervised over and had personal knowledge of the protocols and process of all stages involved in the DNA testing, reviewed the notes and data produced by all previous analysts, and testified to the controls employed by the testing lab to safeguard against the possibility of testing errorsthe Confrontation Clause was satisfied. 2