Opinion ID: 1990842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Pursue Plea Agreement.

Text: In his second assignment of error, Rhodes contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to inform Rhodes that he had the ability to present counteroffers in response to the State's plea offers. As an initial matter, there is a dispute as to the correct standard to apply in cases involving plea negotiations. The State relies upon the two-part test set forth in Strickland and contends that in order to show Rhodes is entitled to postconviction relief, he must show that but for his counsel's errors, the result of the plea negotiation process would be different. On the other hand, Rhodes argues that he must show evidence that (1) for nonstrategic reasons, his or her attorney ignored a request to pursue a plea agreement and (2) the prosecution would have cooperated with the plea or had some reason to cooperate with the plea. This was the test stated by the district court; however, Rhodes argues that the district court failed to consider whether the State had reason to cooperate with the plea. In support of this standard, Rhodes relies upon Lipson v. U.S. [13] and Brown v. Doe. [14] We have reviewed Lipson and Doe and are not persuaded that either case sets forth a standard different from the standard enunciated in Strickland for ineffective assistance claims. We further note that the test set forth in Strickland is applicable to claims for the ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant was convicted following a trial. And the U.S. Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart [15] extended Strickland to challenges to guilty pleas based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. We can conceive of no reason to apply a different standard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim presented by this case. We therefore apply Strickland to Rhodes' claim that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not inform Rhodes that Rhodes could propose counteroffers to the State's plea offers. We now turn to that claim. At his deposition, Rhodes testified that he was unaware he could make offers or counteroffers to the State's plea offers. However, Rhodes also testified that he asked counsel to communicate an offer to the State. Given the nature of that offerthat the State release Rhodes for 5 to 7 days prior to sentencingcounsel informed Rhodes that the offer was farfetched, and, indeed, it is unclear whether the offer was even communicated to the State. We nevertheless conclude that the fact that Rhodes requested such an offer be made is a clear indication that Rhodes was aware he could make offers and counteroffers to the State. Rhodes suggested his own counteroffer and therefore could not have been prejudiced by any failure of trial counsel to inform him that such offers could be made. There is no indication from the record that had trial counsel informed Rhodes of this right, the results of the plea negotiation process would have been different. Rhodes has therefore failed to meet his burden of showing he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency in his counsel's performance. Rhodes' second assignment of error is without merit.