Opinion ID: 587754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Forfeiture is Part of the Sentencing Process

Text: 9 Since in this case the resolution of a question of federal law involves the interpretation of a statute and the intent of Congress, we begin our analysis by looking to the language of the statute itself. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547-48, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). Two portions of section 853(a) demonstrate congressional intent to characterize criminal forfeiture as part of the sentencing process. 6 First, section 853(a) expressly states that the section shall apply to [a]ny person convicted of a drug offense and, second, [t]he court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed ... that the person forfeit ... all property described in this subsection. The legislative history further supports the finding that forfeiture constitutes part of the sentencing phase because it refers to forfeiture as a sanction, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3182, 3374, 3376, and that one of the purposes of section 853 was to deter [and] punish drug trafficking. Id. at 3374. 7 10 Elgersma argues that two rules of federal criminal procedure that pre-date the 1984 amendments support the proposition that criminal forfeiture is part of the substantive criminal charge. 8 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) requires criminal forfeitures to be decided by special verdicts. 9 Also, the note of the Advisory Committee to Rule 31(e) states, [t]he assumption of the draft is that the amount of the interest or property subject to the criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense to be alleged and proved. See Advisory Committee note to rule 7(c)(2). 11 The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 7(c)(2) (referred to in the note to Rule 31(e)) states that there was 12 a congressional purpose to have ... procedures similar to those in [common law criminal forfeitures] apply to ... forfeitures under [section 853]. Under the common law, in a criminal forfeiture proceeding the defendant was apparently entitled to notice, trial, and a special jury finding on the factual issues surrounding the declaration of forfeitures which followed his criminal conviction. 13 Despite this commentary, we are not persuaded that a criminal forfeiture proceeding is part of the substantive offense. First, Rule 7(c)(2) relates only to notice, not to proof. See United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 875 (3rd Cir.1987) (Notice of the proposed action, however, reflects an aspect of due process unrelated to the necessity of proving each element of the offense.). Second, advisory notes do not have the force of law but are merely explanatory. 10 Most importantly, the advisory notes were written prior to the passing of the 1984 criminal forfeiture amendments. The enactment of section 853 clarified congressional intent that forfeiture is not an element of the crime but rather a part of sentencing and thus the assumption in the commentary is simply incorrect. United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1578 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3237, 111 L.Ed.2d 748 (1990). 14 The plain wording of the statute and the legislative history characterize criminal forfeiture as punishment for the crime. Congressional intent is clear; we, therefore, hold that criminal forfeiture is part of the sentencing process and not an element of the crime itself. Accordingly, because due process does not require the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to apply to the sentencing process, Congress has the authority to apply a less strenuous standard of proof than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to criminal forfeiture. 15