Opinion ID: 1241589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicability of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act

Text: Appellants ask us to review the conduct of the appellees in light of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act (WVSCMRA), now found at W. Va.Code § 22-3-1, et seq. [8] Our Legislature has declared that the goal of our mining regulations is to strike a proper balance between a healthy environment and a healthy economy, and that mining may not be pursued to the detriment of all else: Further, the Legislature finds that unregulated surface coal mining operations may result in disturbances of surface and underground areas that burden and adversely affect commerce, public welfare and safety by destroying or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricultural and forestry purposes; by causing erosion and landslides; by contributing to floods; by polluting the water and river and stream beds; by destroying fish, aquatic life and wildlife habitats; by impairing natural beauty; by damaging the property of citizens; by creating hazards dangerous to life and property; and by degrading the quality of life in local communities, all where proper mining and reclamation is not practiced. W. Va.Code, § 22-3-2 (1994). [9] Thus we take notice that the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, W. Va.Code § 22-3-1, et seq., is remedial legislation that has as one of its primary purposes the protection of the public from the potentially destructive effects that mining may have on our lands, forests and waterways. Furthermore, even though the Act contains the word surface in its title it clearly still applies to the facts of this case, and to underground mining operations in general. The definitions section of the statute provides: (u) Surface mine, surface mining, or surface mining operations means: (1) Activities conducted on the surface of lands for the removal of coal, or, subject to the requirements of section fourteen of this article, surface operations and surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine, including the drainage and discharge from the mine. The activities include: Excavation for the purpose of obtaining coal, including, but not limited to, common methods as contour, strip, auger, mountaintop removal, box cut, open pit and area mining; the uses of explosives and blasting; reclamation; in situ distillation or retorting, leaching or other chemical or physical processing; the cleaning, concentrating or other processing or preparation and loading of coal for commercial purposes at or near the mine site; and (2) The areas upon which the above activities occur or where the activities disturb the natural land surface. The areas also include any adjacent land, the use of which is incidental to the activities.... W. Va.Code § 22-3-3 (2000) (emphasis added). The definitions of surface mine, surface mining, or surface-mining operations contained within the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, W. Va. Code § 22-3-1, et seq., include surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine, and areas where such activities disturb the natural land surface. The Act was intended to encompass the surface impacts of underground mining as well as surface mining. [10] Thus it applies to the case at hand. Also, we note that private citizens may sue a mining company under the Act. The plain language of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act allows private suits against mining companies: Any person or property who is injured through the violation by any operator of any rule, order or permit issued pursuant to this article may bring an action for damages, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, in any court of competent jurisdiction. Nothing in this subsection affects the rights established by or limits imposed under state workers' compensation laws. W. Va.Code § 22-3-25(f) (1994). [11] B. Validity of Waiver We have in the past found existing waivers of the right of subjacent or lateral support to be valid, provided that the language of the deed and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance show a clear intention by the surface owner to waive such support: Under the West Virginia common law of property, the well recognized and firmly established rule is that when a landowner has conveyed the minerals underlying the surface of his land, he retains the right to the support of the surface in its natural state, but the owner of land may release or waive his property right of subjacent support by the use of language that clearly shows that he intends to do so; however, this law has been modified to some extent by the enactment of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, W. Va.Code, 22A-3-1 [1985], et seq. and the extent of such modification will be ruled upon when properly presented. Syllabus, Rose v. Oneida Coal, Co. Inc., 180 W.Va. 182, 375 S.E.2d 814 (1988) ( Oneida I ). However, we have also noted that a waiver is only valid insofar as the proposed activity was within the contemplation of the original parties: A release ordinarily covers only such matters as may fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of its execution. Syllabus Point 2, Conley v. Hill, 115 W.Va. 175, 174 S.E. 883 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Thornton v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 158 W.Va. 504, 213 S.E.2d 102 (1975). Syl. pt. 3, Cogar v. Sommerville, 180 W.Va. 714, 379 S.E.2d 764 (1989). In Cogar, the mining company wished to conduct surface operations within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling, which, absent a proper waiver, is prohibited by the Act. Although the mining company was the beneficiary of broad form waivers in deeds drafted in the early 1900's, we found that the old, broad form waivers were not sufficient under the modern Act. Consequently we held: A waiver of damages provision contained in a broad form coal severance deed is not the type of explicit waiver contemplated by and required by W. Va.Code 22A-3-22(d)(4), before mining operations can be lawfully conducted within three hundred feet of an occupied dwelling. Syl. pt. 4, Cogar v. Sommerville, 180 W.Va. 714, 379 S.E.2d 764 (1989). However, the waiver in the instant case is contained in a deed executed in 1986, and was agreed to by surface owners who were experienced in the coal mining business. Thus, we are hard pressed to find any flaw with the waiver in the Antulovs' deed, and concur with the circuit court as to the waiver's validity. C.