Opinion ID: 1189026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of the Inculpatory Statement

Text: Williams argues that his partially inculpatory custodial statement should not have been admitted during the guilt phase because his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid and the statement was involuntary. The district court rejected these claims, concluding that the state courts' conclusions did not involve an unreasonable application of Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 575-76, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). We agree. At the North Little Rock police station following Williams's arrest, Detective Dan Cook and Sergeant Kenny Boyd presented Williams with a Miranda waiver form titled Statement of Rights. Cook explained the form, read Williams each right, and told him he would be questioned about kidnapping. Williams initialed and signed the form, stating I've been through this. He also recorded his education level: GED. 1½ semester college read & write. Without naming the victim, Cook then questioned Williams about the abduction of a girl that involved forced ATM withdrawals. Williams said he knew they wanted him to talk about an abduction that's been all over the news and began telling a story about the abduction of Errickson, which he later changed several times and which ultimately proved to be false. The officers then mentioned Errickson by name and continued questioning Williams about her disappearance, attempting to learn her whereabouts from Williams, who maintained she was still alive. The police questioned Williams from 4:22 p.m. on November 29 until nearly 6:00 the next morning. Between 7:15 and 9:15 p.m., Williams and three officers drove around Little Rock trying to locate a house where Williams said they would find Errickson. The rest of the videotaped interview was conducted in an eight-by-ten-foot room by four officers, only two of whom questioned Williams at any given time. The officers allowed Williams ten-to-thirty-minute bathroom breaks and provided him with food, water, and cigarettes. His request to speak with Sergeant Boyd, whom he knew from a previous arrest, was granted. Early in the interview, Williams asked about the chance of gettin' some help from the [prosecutor] if I can help you find that girl that's missing. Detective Mike Jeu replied, I will go to the prosecutor myself, and tell the prosecutor that you fully cooperated and you assisted us in finding this girl, and that you realize that you made a mistake. Jeu later added, you know ... the more cooperative you are, the prosecutor takes that into consideration. Still later, Jeu said Williams would be better off if he disclosed Errickson's location; you know the prosecutor's not going to stick their necks out and say, `Yeah, he fully cooperated, but we still hadn't found Stacy.' Jeu knew that the prosecutor was watching the interview from another room. The officers also urged Williams to give Errickson's family the opportunity for a Christian burial and posited that her body had been laying out in the cold with animals eat[ing] on her. The officers quoted the Bible in urging Williams to come clean and appealed to his concern for his ill mother. Williams never confessed to killing Errickson but did confess to kidnapping her and robbing her through ATM withdrawals. The prosecution introduced portions of the statement at trial as substantive evidence of Williams's commission of kidnapping and robbery, and as evidence of fabrication concerning the murder and rape charges. A. Validity of Miranda Waiver. To be valid, a waiver of the rights protected by Miranda must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Williams argues his waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent because he understood he would be questioned about one kidnapping, but the police in fact questioned him about a separate kidnapping and murder. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court's findings that Williams understood he was voluntarily giving up substantial rights and ... understood the potential consequences. Williams I, 991 S.W.2d at 573. We agree with the district court that this was not an unreasonable application of Spring. The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574, 107 S.Ct. 851. When Detective Cook said the subject of the interview was a kidnapping, Williams himself first raised the subject of Errickson's disappearance. There was no affirmative misrepresentation ... as to the scope of the interrogation, an issue the Supreme Court left open in Spring, 479 U.S. at 576 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 851. B. Voluntariness. An inculpatory statement is inadmissible if the defendant proves that his will was overborne and [his] capacity for self-determination critically impaired by coercive police activity. Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 333 (8th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 822, 114 S.Ct. 81, 126 L.Ed.2d 49 (1993). But it is a rare case when a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was compelled despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda.  Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1132 (8th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924, 122 S.Ct. 280, 151 L.Ed.2d 206 (2001). Williams argues that he was subjected to a variety of coercive practicesmarathon interrogation by a team of officers at night in a cramped room; appeal to divine authority and to sympathy for Errickson's family and Williams's ill mother; and Detective Jeu's promises of leniency. In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found no false promise of leniency because Jeu's statements were not promises of leniency, nor did Williams interpret them as such, and no impermissible coercion. Williams I, 991 S.W.2d at 574. The district court held that this was not an unreasonable interpretation of the Supreme Court's voluntariness precedents. After careful review of the record, we agree. Though lengthy interrogation, appeals to God and family, and promises of leniency can be coercive, the question is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Williams's will was overborne by coercion. Here, there is no evidence of such an effect on Williams. Questioning a suspect for thirteen hours is not unconstitutional per se, particularly when a crime victim has disappeared and may still be alive. Williams received a two-hour respite during the car trip, several breaks, and food, water, and cigarettes. He was relatively well educated and experienced with the criminal justice system. He spoke rationally and articulately throughout the interview, repeatedly acknowledging responsibility for his conduct, pledging to plead guilty to any charges, and stating, I'm not expecting a slap on the wrist for this. I've already prepared myself from a mental standpoint.... Williams himself initiated the question of leniency; after Jeu's final offer, Williams said, You didn't put me in this situation. I did.... [S]omehow I gotta walk alone. [10] These are not the words of a suspect with an overborne will or an impaired capacity for self-determination. See Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d at 922-23; Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d at 1132-33. The Supreme Court of Arkansas' voluntariness ruling was reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).