Opinion ID: 312652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 8 The contentions of the appellants fall into two categories, contentions of fact and contentions of law. First, the appellants argue that the district court was incorrect in its finding that the Naval Live Oak Reservation was not used exclusively for public park purposes. Secondly, appellants dispute the findings that the operation of the reverter clause could not be blocked by government regulations, terms of the 1947 deed, laches, waiver, or estoppel. 9  It is urged by appellants that the district court ruled incorrectly on the facts presented below. Appellants contend that clear and convincing evidence was presented which could leave little doubt that the reservation was used for public park purposes. 4 10 Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the findings of fact by a district court in actions tried without a jury shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. United States v. United States Gypsum Company, 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948), reh. den. 333 U.S. 869, 68 S.Ct. 788, 92 L.Ed. 1147 (1948). 5 Under this rule the determination of the factual content of ambiguous testimony is for a trial court, and such determination can be set aside on review if clearly erroneous. Guzman v. Ruiz Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 82 S.Ct. 1095, 8 L.Ed.2d 205 (1962). The rule is also applicable insofar as the district court's conclusion is based on inference drawn from documents or undisputed facts. United States v. Singer Manufacturing Company, 374 U.S. 174, 83 S.Ct. 1773, 10 L. Ed.2d 823 (1963). 11 Furthermore, since the jurisdiction of this court is appellate, we have no right to re-try the issues of fact de novo or substitute our judgment with respect to such issues. United States v. United States Gypsum Company, supra; Guzman v. Ruiz Pichirilo, supra; United States v. Singer Manufacturing Company, supra. The function of this court is to determine whether, as a matter of law, the findings sustain the judgment. If, however, the findings of the district court are unsupported by substantial evidence, then the lower court's decision may be set aside. 6 12 The evidence presented before the district court included over 200 exhibits and testimony by more than fifteen individuals. Included in the exhibits were pictures of the land in question, various publications concerning parks, actual no trespassing signs taken from the property, and other similar items. Witnesses testified as to their knowledge of the actual use to which the land in question had been put. The record on appeal also included approximately 170 documents representing the legal proceedings below. This court has examined all the exhibits, testimony and documents involved and we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has not been committed. 7 13 Furthermore, this court is well aware that in many situations a trial court's findings of a particular fact shade into its conclusion of law. In cases in which the trial court's findings of fact are based on non-demeanor evidence, the trial court has only to draw the proper conclusions of fact and law from the evidence presented. This court has taken cognizance of that problem in reviewing the district court below, and although this can possibly be considered an unclear area of the law, this court does not find the decision of the district court in the least bit unclear. 8 14 Moreover, this court has found that even if it did have the power and authority to review this case de novo, it could only agree with the district court when that court said: . . . it appears by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence that the land has not, since the conveyance in 1947 and during the times pertinent to this decision, been used exclusively for public park purposes; to a large extent it has not been used at all and the uses made of it cannot be characterized as uses for public park purposes. II 15 Appellants also argue that even if the terms of the 1947 conveyance were not complied with, the government is precluded from exercising its right of reentry under the reverter clause because of any one of the following various factors: government regulations, terms of the 1947 deed, laches, waiver, and estoppel. 16 This court, having considered appellants' arguments as to government regulations and terms of the 1947 deed, finds those arguments without merit. 9 Appellants' contentions as to laches, waiver and estoppel will be briefly discussed by this court because of the variety of interpretations which can be placed on these terms. They, however, also are equally without merit. 17 Appellants urge that the United States, as to this property, is acting in a proprietory function rather than a governmental one. This court finds that the ceding of land by the United States government to the State of Florida for public park purposes is a governmental function, the action itself being for the benefit of the public. 18 Whether the defense of estoppel may be asserted against the United States in actions instituted by it depends upon whether such actions arise out of transactions entered into in its proprietory capacity or contract relationships, or whether the actions arise out of the exercise of its powers of government. The United States is not subject to an estoppel which impedes the exercise of the powers of government, and is not estopped to deny the validity of a transaction or agreement which the law does not sanction. Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 45 S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 352 (1925); Utah Power & L. Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 S.Ct. 387, 61 L.Ed. 791 (1916). Nor does an estoppel arise through an act or representation made by an officer or agent without authority to act for the government in the premises. Wilber Nat. Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120, 55 S.Ct. 362, 79 L.Ed. 798 (1935); Jeems Bayou Fishing & Hunting Club v. United States, 260 U.S. 561, 43 S.Ct. 205, 67 L.Ed. 402 (1922). 19 Furthermore, appellants claim that by certain actions of the United States it acknowledged that the land was being used for public park purposes and thereby the terms of the deed were being complied with. It should be remembered, however, that the United States is not bound by declarations of its agents founded upon a mistake of fact unless it clearly appears that the agent was acting within the scope of his authority and was empowered in his capacity as agent to make such declarations. Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366, 3 L.Ed. 373 (1813). The mere mention, therefore, of a Department of Interior official that this land was being used for park purposes is not binding upon the United States in this case. 20 Appellants have also asserted that the United States cannot now exercise a right of re-entry because of laches; that is, the United States failed to exercise its legal right within the proper time. Not only can laches not be applied as a defense against the United States, but, even if it could, this is not the case for laches. Mount Vernon Mortg. Corp. v. United States by Atty. Gen., 1956, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 429, 236 F.2d 724, cert. den. 352 U.S. 988, 77 S.Ct. 386, 1 L.Ed. 2d 367 (1957); Engel v. United States, 6th Cir. 1958, 258 F.2d 50. See also, United States v. Silliman, 3rd Cir. 1948, 167 F.2d 607, cert. den. 335 U.S. 825, 69 S.Ct. 48, 93 L.Ed. 379 (1948). 10 21 This court then finds that the United States is not subject to the defenses of laches, waiver or estoppel by virtue of its sovereign immunity and that it is performing a governmental function in ensuring that this land is properly used as a public park. Even if the United States were found to be acting in a proprietory manner as opposed to a governmental manner, the defenses themselves, even though applicable, this court finds would not be valid in this case. The appellants were well aware that the United States was planning to enforce its right of re-entry if a public park were not maintained and, furthermore, the United States, throughout the period of time from 1947 to the present, has shown an interest in the status of this land. Therefore, in the conclusion, this court finds that the United States is the rightful owner of this land and the lower court in all respects is 22 Affirmed.