Opinion ID: 184616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instruction Regarding Statute of Limitations

Text: 43 MSI next argues that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding when the statute of limitations began to run on its breach of contract claim. In its initial charge to the jury the district court stated: 44 For purposes of the parties' breach of contract ... claims, you must rule against either party if you find that it waited more than three years after any breach of contract ... before it raised the claim. 45 During deliberations the jury sent the court a note that stated in part: 46 At what point in time does the clock start ticking for the statute of limitations on the breach of contract? I.e. a) At the time the breach occurred? b) At the time a party became aware of the breach? c) At the time damages were incurred? 47 The court answered that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time a party discovers the breach. 48 District of Columbia law governs the issue of the proper statute of limitations in [331 U.S.App.D.C. 51] this case. See A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int'l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1458 (D.C.Cir.1995) (in diversity case federal court looks to forum state's choice-of-law rules; D.C. treats statute of limitations as procedural and applies its own rule); cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (Supreme Court has reject[ed] the notion that there is an equivalence between what is substantive under the Erie doctrine and what is substantive for purposes of conflict of laws). The general rule in the District is that a claim for breach of contract accrues when the contract is first breached. Capitol Place I Assoc. L.P. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 673 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C.1996). 49 MSI asserts that the district court should have instructed the jury that the statute of limitations begins to run from [the] date of the breach, or [the] date of the termination of the contract, whichever is later. For this proposition it provides a case citation ungarnished by any reasoning. See Computer Data Sys., Inc. v. Kleinberg, 759 F.Supp. 10 (D.D.C.1990). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals does recognize that there may be situations in which the breach occurs only upon the completion of the contract. For example, where the claim is based upon the breach of an implied warranty that equipment the defendant installed would operate properly, the breach does not occur until the installation (and hence performance of the contract) was completed and the equipment did not, in fact, work. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Goudie, 290 A.2d 826, 830 & n. 2 (D.C.1972). Applying such a rule, however, requires an analysis of the facts of the particular case in order to determine whether the breach occurred at the time of completion of the contract or at some other time. MSI suggests no reason, however, why it is entitled to an instruction that Sunmatch's breach occurred at termination of the Agreement and we do not see any analogy here to the cases involving the breach of an implied warranty. Therefore, we adhere to the general rule that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the defendant breaches the contract. 50 Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury that the cause of action accrued at the time of discovery rather than at the time of breach, we need not decide because any error was certainly harmless. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. Running the statute of limitations from discovery could not have given MSI less time to file because obviously a party can discover a breach only when it occurs or later. Not surprisingly, therefore, MSI does not identify any prejudice it suffered from the instruction--other than to say that it must have been prejudiced because the jury rejected its claim, which is circular.