Opinion ID: 1670869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: discovery restriction and continuance

Text: Though the original petition for removal of Cullipher was filed by Morris Jr. on November 17, 1987, the trial on the petition did not commence until March 16, 1990. No discovery had been conducted by Morris Jr. at the time the trial commenced. The probate judge recessed the trial on March 19, 1990, until May 3, 1990, and subsequently entered a scheduling order on March 27, 1990, which mandated preparation of the comprehensive accounting and inventory and which contemplated additional discovery pertaining to the bank accounts and C.D.'s. On March 30, 1990, Cullipher filed a comprehensive accounting and inventory. On April 12, 1990, Morris Jr. filed requests for production of business documents regarding the decedent's farm operation going back twenty-three years, which were to be furnished in five days. The ostensible reason for the request was to trace the title of the property to determine what was individually owned by the decedent or jointly owned. On May 1, 1990, the probate judge entered a protective order denying the expansive discovery, and on July 30, 1990, the probate judge struck subsequent discovery which had been served by Morris Jr. on Cullipher. (Cullipher contends in this regard that most of the title records to personal property were provided to Morris Jr. in advance of the May 3, 1990 hearing.) When the trial reconvened on May 3, Morris Jr. moved for a continuance on the basis that he had not had an opportunity to review all of the provided material. The motion was denied as untimely. Lack of diligence is a factor to consider in denying a continuance. Mixon v. Chrysler Corp., 281 Ark. 202, 663 S.W.2d 713 (1984). Moreover, a trial judge has broad discretion in matters pertaining to discovery, and that discretion will not be second-guessed by this court absent abuse of discretion which is prejudicial to the appealing party. See Bolden v. Carter, 269 Ark. 391, 602 S.W.2d 640 (1980); Marrow v. State Farm Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 227, 570 S.W.2d 607 (1978). Also, when the continuance is based on a request for additional discovery, the appellant must not only show that there has been an abuse of discretion, but also that the additional discovery would have changed the outcome of the trial. See Pinkston v. Lovell, 296 Ark. 543, 759 S.W.2d 20 (1988). We hold that the probate judge was correct, and that there was no abuse of discretion regarding discovery and the continuance.