Opinion ID: 201524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 6 We review a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo, and we ask whether the well-pleaded facts, taken as true, justify recovery on any supportable legal theory. See Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir.2000). Thus, for purposes of our review of the district court's motion to dismiss, we assume that the defendants were obligated to disclose under the RLPHRA, that they did not disclose in violation of the RLPHRA, and that Natasha and Jason's lead poisoning was caused by the defendants' violation of the statute. With these assumptions, we turn to our review of the statute.
7 The RLPHRA was enacted in 1992 in an effort, among other things, to develop a national strategy to build the infrastructure necessary to eliminate lead-based paint hazards in all housing as expeditiously as possible and to educate the public concerning the hazards and sources of lead-based paint poisoning and steps to reduce and eliminate such hazards. § 4851a(1), (7). The Act was the response to congressional findings that low-level lead poisoning is widespread among American children, afflicting as many as 3,000,000 children under age 6, § 4851(1); that the health and development of children living in as many as 3,800,000 American homes is endangered by chipping or peeling lead paint, or excessive amounts of lead-contaminated dust in their homes, § 4851(5); and that the danger posed by lead-based paint hazards can be reduced by abating lead-based paint or by taking interim measures to prevent paint deterioration and limit children's exposure to lead dust and chips, § 4851(6). 8 As part of a comprehensive plan to reduce the hazards of lead-based paint in the national residential housing stock, the RLPHRA provided the statutory framework to require the disclosure of information concerning lead hazards upon the transfer of residential property. § 4852d. It is this disclosure provision that is the subject of the case before us today. 9 The disclosure provision of the RLPHRA directs the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate regulations ... for the disclosure of lead-based paint hazards in target housing which is offered for sale or lease. § 4852d(a)(1). 5 The statute goes on to state: The regulations shall require that, before the purchaser or lessee is obligated under any contract to purchase or lease the housing, the seller or lessor shall — 10 (A) provide the purchaser or lessee with a lead hazard information pamphlet ...; 11 (B) disclose to the purchaser or lessee the presence of any known lead-based paint, or any known lead-based paint hazards, in such housing ...; and 12 (C) permit the purchaser a 10-day period ... to conduct a risk assessment or inspection for the presence of lead-based paint hazards. 6 13 § 4852d(a)(1). 14 The statute also provides for an array of penalties for violations of the disclosure provision including a civil liability remedy which states: Any person who knowingly violates the provisions of this section shall be jointly and severally liable to the purchaser or lessee in an amount equal to 3 times the amount of damages incurred by such individual. § 4852d(b)(3). The HUD and the EPA have jointly promulgated regulations implementing Section 4852d, and have defined lessee to mean any entity that enters into an agreement to lease, rent, or sublease target housing, including but not limited to individuals, partnerships, corporations, trusts, government agencies, housing agencies, Indian tribes, and nonprofit organizations. 40 C.F.R. § 745.103; 24 C.F.R. § 35.86. The issue we must decide is whether Congress intended for the minor children of lessees to have standing to enforce this civil liability provision against landlords who violate the disclosure provision.
15 In our review of § 4852d(b)(3), we must first ask whether it is clear that Congress intended either to limit the term lessee to a party who legally enters into a lease with a lessor or to permit the minor children who reside with the lessee to enforce the disclosure provision. See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir.2002) (If the meaning of a statute is clear, we enforce that meaning.). Here, the plain language of the statute limits recovery under § 4852d(b)(3) to a purchaser or lessee. We find this limitation not only clear, but also consistent with the purpose of the disclosure provision — to provide the purchaser or lessee of target property with notice that there could be a lead-based paint hazard present in the subject premises, and the opportunity to either decline to enter into a contract regarding the premises or proceed forward with the transaction in the face of the knowledge that a lead-based paint hazard could be present. See § 4852d(a)(1). This disclosure provision does not require the seller or lessor to abate the lead-paint hazard, nor disqualify a purchaser or lessee with young children from occupying a property that possibly contains lead-based paint hazards. Thus, because a violation of the statute occurs when the seller or lessor fails to disclose, it is logical that the party harmed by the failure to disclose is the purchaser or the lessee. See Gladysz v. Desmarais, No. Civ. 02-208-B, 2003 WL 1343033, at  (D.N.H. March 17, 2003) (unpublished) (The civil liability provision in RLPHRA is within the `disclosure' section and as such, it is both logical and reasonable to read the civil liability to cover only purchasers or lessees who were deprived of the required notice of lead hazards `upon the transfer of residential property.'). Although it appears that we are the first circuit court of appeals to address this issue, district courts have similarly found that the plain meaning of § 4852d(b)(3) limits recovery to a purchaser or lessee to the exclusion of minor children of a lessee. See id. at  (holding that grandchildren of lessee residing in home with lead-based paint hazards did not have standing to sue landlord because § 4852d(b)(3) clearly limits recovery to a `purchaser or lessee'); L.B. III v. Hous. Auth. of Louisville, 345 F.Supp.2d 725, 729 (W.D.Ky.2004) (minor children of lessees fail to fit the statutory [standing] requirement because they were neither purchasers nor lessees of the property in which they lived). 7 16
17 Having determined that Congress' intent to limit recovery under § 4852d(b)(3) to a purchaser or lessee is clear from a plain reading of the statute, it is not necessary for us to consult either the HUD/EPA regulation defining lessee or the legislative history of the RLPHRA. See Bryson, 308 F.3d at 85 (If a statute is unambiguous, we use neither legislative history, nor administrative agency interpretation.) (internal citations omitted). We briefly discuss both, however, because we do not find that our interpretation of the statute is in conflict with either. 18 First, our interpretation is consistent with the HUD/EPA definition of lessee, which essentially confirms that any entity that is capable of entering into a legally binding contract for the purchase or lease of real property is permitted to seek redress for a violation of the disclosure provision of the RLPHRA; that is, the regulation clarifies that the term lessee is not limited to individuals and that it includes sublessees. See 40 C.F.R. § 745.103; 24 C.F.R. § 35.86 & Comment IV(C)(9). Thus, the regulation, which is a reasonable clarification of the statute, does not, as the Appellants contend, impermissibly narrow the class of lessees who have standing under Section 4852(b)(3), and the Appellants do not have standing under either the regulation or the statute. 19 Similarly, our interpretation of Section 4852d does not conflict with the legislative history of the RLPHRA. To be sure, as Appellants point out, it is clear from both the legislative history and the text of the statute itself that the RLPHRA was enacted to protect children from the hazards of lead-based paint in residential housing. But, the disclosure provision is merely one method in an attempt to effectuate this goal, and does not conflict with the overarching purposes of the RLPHRA to protect children from lead poisoning. 20 Lastly, we note that the federal scheme to reduce the hazards of lead-based paint in residential housing is intended to be implemented in conjunction with state and local laws that require abatement of lead-based paint. Thus, the Mason children are not left without a remedy: they can pursue claims against the Appellees in the New Hampshire state courts.