Opinion ID: 1579333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Brady Claims Summarily Denied

Text: In addition to his claim of error regarding Dr. Wright's testimony, Duest argues that the court erred in summarily denying his remaining Brady claims. An evidentiary hearing must be held whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual determination. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852, and 3.993, 772 So.2d 488, 491 n. 2 (Fla.2000) (endorsing the proposition that an evidentiary hearing is mandated on initial motions which assert ... legally cognizable claims which allege an ultimate factual basis); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A)(i) (providing that, on initial motions, an evidentiary hearing is required on claims listed by the defendant as requiring a factual determination). On an initial rule 3.851 motion, to the extent there is any question as to whether the movant has made a facially sufficient claim requiring a factual determination, the trial court must presume that an evidentiary hearing is required. See Amendments, 772 So.2d at 492 n. 2 (stating that adoption of provision addressing evidentiary hearings is consistent with Court's endorsement of a presumption in favor of evidentiary hearings on initial postconviction motions raising factually based claims). Moreover, when reviewing the summary denial of an initial rule 3.851 postconviction motion, this Court must accept the movant's factual allegations as true. See Rose v. State, 985 So.2d 500, 505 (Fla.2008). However, postconviction claims may be summarily denied when they are legally insufficient, should have been brought on direct appeal, or are positively refuted by the record. Owen v. State, 986 So.2d 534, 543 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Connor v. State, 979 So.2d 852, 868 (Fla.2007)). After a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court was proper in its summary denial of Duest's remaining claims asserting a Brady violation. First, Duest contends that the State withheld from the defense an exculpatory memorandum written by Assistant State Attorney Richard Garfield, the prosecutor for Duest's initial trial. In the memo, Garfield stated, The case is borderline on sufficiency of evidence, which is totally circumstantial. The trial court denied this claim, agreeing with the State's argument that the statement at issue was the opinion of an attorney, and therefore not discoverable. It was privileged and therefore not Brady material.... We agree with the trial court's findings. The prosecutor's views on the strength of the case were no more than that: the prosecutor's views on the strength of the evidence. Unlike Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1999), which involved notes from the State Attorney's Office regarding interviews with key witnesses and thus were held to constitute Brady material, id. at 559, the prosecutor's statement in this case is pure opinion. The statement is neither admissible nor leads to the discovery of admissible evidence; therefore, it does not constitute exculpatory evidence under Brady and does not change this Court's finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Duest's premeditated murder conviction. See Duest, 462 So.2d at 449. Because this evidence was not exculpatory or admissible, this claim is not one which requires a factual determination, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in summarily denying this claim. In his final Brady claim, Duest alleges that the State withheld the results of a polygraph that had been administered to Mr. Shifflett, a witness for the State and the victim's roommate. In the instant postconviction proceedings, the State turned over to the defense a notebook from law enforcement officers investigating the death of Mr. Pope and any involvement by Duest. The notebook included a handwritten note that stated: 2-16-82, 5 PM, Polygraph by Raoul Vincel, Passed. The State also disclosed an investigative continuation report that stated: At 5:00 p.m., Februrary [sic] 16th, 1982, David Shifflett was given a polygraph test by Rauel [sic] Vincel, of the Broward Sheriff's Office Polygraph Unit, at the Lauderhill Substation. At the conclusion of the test, this writer was advised by Deputy Vincel that there was no indication[ [14] ] in the polygraph administered including the key questions whether or not [unintelligible] Shifflett participated in, set up, or actually murdered the deceased, John Pope. Duest asserts that the handwritten notes in the notebook together with the investigative report indicates that Mr. Shifflett was administered a polygraph examination during the investigation. In addition, Duest alleges that the State withheld the polygraph results of other witnesses. Duest now requests that the State disclose the identity of all witnesses subjected to polygraph examinations, the results of the examinations, and the polygraph reports, including all witness statements given prior to and during the examination. The trial court summarily denied this claim, finding that Duest had failed to establish any of the requirements for a Brady violation. We agree. We recognize that polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible, but the issue we focus on for purposes of determining a Brady violation is whether the evidence would lead to admissible substantive or impeachment evidence. See Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373, 383 n. 11 (Fla. 2001). In Rivera v. State, 995 So.2d 191 (Fla.2008), this Court held that a trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant's Brady claim and ineffective assistance claim, which were based in part on the State's failure to disclose or counsel's failure to uncover that a State's witness had lied in polygraph examinations in other cases. Id. at 195. In contrast to Rivera, in this case the polygraph report does not even indicate that witness Shifflett made contradictory statements during his exam. Rather, the conclusion from the polygraph was that Mr. Shifflett was truthful as to his lack of involvement in the crime. Based on the information contained in the investigative report about Mr. Shifflett's polygraph examination, Duest cannot establish that the polygraph reports are exculpatory as to his involvement in the killing of Mr. Pope. Moreover, Duest has not alleged that any of the other polygraph reports or witness statements taken at the time of the examination are exculpatory or impeaching. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its summary denial of this claim. [15]