Opinion ID: 2074214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fifth-Amendment Privilege

Text: On appeal, Bunnell argues that the trial justice erred when, after she refused to testify at trial, he admitted her statements to the Woonsocket police into evidence. Bunnell contends that the use of this evidence violated her rights as embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [9] Bunnell argues that the exceptions to the exclusionary protections afforded by § 15-7-7(f) [10] prevented her from giving testimony because any statements or admissions could be admissible in the pending criminal prosecution for T.J.'s death, and, therefore, she contends, her prior statements should have been excluded. Although she correctly cites Tona, Inc. v. Evans, 590 A.2d 873, 875 (R.I.1991), for the proposition that the Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is available in a civil proceeding, whether or not a criminal proceeding is pending, her contention that the Fifth Amendment precludes the use of her prior statements to the Woonsocket police is erroneous. We note that Bunnell does not argue that the statements she made to the Woonsocket police were involuntarily given, or in any way violated her Miranda rights. Although termination of [one's] parental rights is a significant event in which a parent's due process rights reasonably should be protected[,] [11] In re Ginger G., 775 A.2d 255, 258 (R.I.2001), it is nonetheless a civil proceeding, and as such, the protections afforded a criminal defendant, as enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), do not apply. See In re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80, 84-85 (R.I.2006) (acknowledging that a termination of parental rights is a civil proceeding, not a criminal one, and the parent has no absolute right to be physically present). Here, the trial justice found that Bunnell knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made the statement and he permitted Sgt. Brien to testify as to the content of the statement under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence as a Statement by Party-Opponent. [12] We are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in admitting this evidence which was obtained in connection with the criminal investigation into T.J.'s death. Finally, Bunnell asserts that the trial justice erred when he drew adverse inferences based on her refusal to testify. This argument is without merit. We specifically have stated that in the trial of a petition seeking the termination of parental rights, the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the drawing of adverse inferences against a party who refuses to testify. In re Rosalie H., 889 A.2d 199, 206 (R.I.2006). In this instance, the trial justice quite properly considered Bunnell's refusal to testify in light of all the other evidence adduced at trial. Id. After reviewing the record and our relevant case law, we are satisfied that the trial justice appropriately admitted Bunnell's statements and did not err if he drew adverse inferences from her refusal to testify.