Opinion ID: 836190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: under troxel, mcl 722.25(1) must control over mcl 722.27(1)(c) in order to adequately protect fit parents' fundamental rights

Text: Troxel established a floor or minimum protection against state intrusion into the parenting decisions of fit parents. It invalidated the state of Washington's third-party visitation statute as a violation of a natural parent's fundamental rights. It reasoned that the Washington statute was flawed because it afforded no deference to a fit parent's decision about his or her children's best interests. [24] Rather, the statute allowed any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent's children to state-court review. [25] Troxel also forbade courts from overturning decisions by a fit custodial parent based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best interests. [26] Rather, it held that courts must give some special weight to the parents' determination of their children's best interests. [27] The constitutional protection in Troxel centers on the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. [28] The Washington statute's lack of deference to a fit parent's decision was inconsistent with the presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Hence, it was constitutionally infirm. Using that reasoning, Troxel established that a natural parent's fitness to parent is the touchstone for invoking the constitutional protections of fundamental parental rights. The application of the statutory presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must therefore be considered specifically in the context of a fit parent to determine whether it satisfies constitutional scrutiny under Troxel. In Heltzel, our Court of Appeals recognized Troxel's mandate: In order to protect a fit natural parent's fundamental constitutional rights, the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must control over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c). We agree. Several considerations compel this conclusion. First, Troxel explicitly requires courts to give some deference to a parent's decision to pursue custody because it is inherently central to the parent's control over his or her child. By contrast, unlike the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1), no constitutional protections for third persons underlie the established custodial environment presumption in MCL 722.27(1)(c). This Court has held that no constitutional or statutory basis exists for third parties to have standing to seek child custody solely because they have an established custodial relationship with the child. [29] Finally, we note that the vast majority of Michigan cases interpreting the CCA support the conclusion that these presumptions were not meant to be given equal weight. [30] This conclusion is also in accord with Michigan's longstanding history of affording great respect to parental authority while consistently recognizing that the best interests of the child control the analysis. [31] For these reasons, we conclude that, when these presumptions conflict, the presumption in MCL 722.27(1)(c) must yield to the presumption in MCL 722.25(1). [32] A remaining constitutional question involves the amount of deference due under Troxel to fit parents. We conclude that the statute provides sufficient deference to a fit natural parent's fundamental rights to the care, custody, and management of their child.... [33] We so hold because the statute requires, in order to rebut the parental presumption, clear and convincing evidence that custody by the natural parent is not in a child's best interests. The clear and convincing evidence standard is the most demanding standard applied in civil cases.... [34] This showing must `produce[] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.' [35] We agree with the Court of Appeals in Heltzel that, given the unique constitutional considerations in custody disputes involving natural parents, it is not sufficient that the third person may have established by clear and convincing evidence that a marginal, though distinct, benefit would be gained if the children were maintained with him. [36] A third party seeking custody must meet a higher threshold. He or she must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it is not in the child's best interests under the factors specified in MCL 722.23 for the parent to have custody. This is entirely consistent with Troxel's holding. Although a fit parent is presumed to act in his or her child's best interests, a court need give the parent's decision only a presumption of validity or some weight. That is precisely what MCL 722.25(1) does when it requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. Given our determination that (1) the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) prevails over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c) and that (2) the parental presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that custody with the natural parent is not in the best interests of the child, we conclude that MCL 722.25(1) satisfies constitutional scrutiny under Troxel. [37]