Opinion ID: 705166
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII's Remedial Provisions

Text: 88 Title VII's remedial provisions also lead us to conclude that Congress never intended to hold agents individually liable for violations of the Act. Before Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a (CRA of 1991), a successful Title VII plaintiff was typically limited to reinstatement and backpay as potential remedies. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g)(1). Clearly, backpay and reinstatement are equitable remedies which are most appropriately provided by employers, defined in the traditional sense of the word. See Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir.1982). While it might be argued that a supervisory employee with the power to hire, fire or discipline a plaintiff should be treated as an employer because the supervisor has the power to reinstate and correct employment records, see Grant, 21 F.3d at 653, this interpretation would require a court to differentiate between supervisors with the power to hire and fire from supervisors without these powers. Because Title VII speaks only of agents, there is no basis in the statute for this distinction. See id. Moreover, the dissent's suggestion to leave such difficulties to the discretion of the district court fails to consider the lack of any differentiation among agents in the statute and would in any event provide little clear guidance for a court confronted with the issue. It is therefore unlikely that Congress intended to subject agents to liability for reinstatement and backpay. 12 89 The CRA of 1991 adds compensatory and punitive damages to the remedies available to a victim of intentional discrimination. 13 Although money damages are of the type that an individual can normally be expected to pay, Congress calibrated the maximum allowable damage award to the size of the employer and failed to repeal the exemption for defendants with less than fifteen employees. 14 In addition, the CRA of 1991 does not contain similar limits on damage awards against agents of an employer, or even address the subject of individual liability. Thus, it appears that Congress contemplated that only employer-entities could be held liable for compensatory and punitive damages, because if Congress had envisioned individual liability ... it would have included individuals in this litany of limitations and discontinued the exemption for small employers ... Maxwell's Int'l, 991 F.2d at 588 n. 2. 90 Moreover, the practical implications of agent liability would create potential inequities that Congress could not have intended when it enacted the CRA of 1991. The dissent correctly notes that a prerequisite to agent liability is a finding that the complained-of conduct can be imputed to the employer. See Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63 (citation omitted). In addition, a Title VII plaintiff will rarely file a suit against the agent alone, because the plaintiff has the best chance of recovering from the employing entity. However, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which an agent may still be forced to bear the brunt of a Title VII judgment. For example, the employer-entity may file for bankruptcy, leaving the agent as the only defendant exposed to liability. Similarly, a plaintiff who settles with a corporate defendant may continue a Title VII suit against the agent, as the plaintiff did in Maxwell's Int'l. In such a situation, the agent's liability for compensatory or punitive damages would depend on the size of the agent's employer. Thus, an agent for an employer with 110 employees would be potentially liable for damages of $100,000; if the agent's employer had 100 employees, however, the agent would be liable for $50,000. It is doubtful that such an anomalous result was contemplated by a Congress that failed even to address individual liability. 91