Opinion ID: 1690969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: an object susceptible to prescription

Text: The thing which is the object of prescription must be susceptible by its nature of alienation, and alienation of the thing must not be prohibited by law. LSA-C.C. Art. 3497. Plaintiff contends that defendants cannot prescribe property owned by a levee district. Prescription runs against all persons, unless they are included in some exception established by law. LSA-C.C. Art. 3521. Plaintiff contends that the provisions of the State Constitution then in effect prohibited acquisitive prescription against the Levee Board. Article 4, § 2 and Article 19, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution (1921). Article 4, § 2 provided in pertinent part: In all cases the mineral rights on any and all property sold by the State shall be reserved, except where the owner or other person having the right to redeem may buy or redeem property sold or adjudicated to the State for taxes. Article 19, § 16 provided: Prescription shall not run against the State in any civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution or expressly by law. Article 4, § 2 referred to leases by the State. I note that a comparison of the language in Sections 2, 12, and 13 of Article IV illustrates that when the framers intended that the restriction or limitation should apply to the State only as a separate entity from its political subdivisions, the word State alone was used, but where the limitation or restriction was intended to apply to the State and to all political subdivisions thereof, the intent was demonstrated by employing The State, or any political corporation thereof. Article 4, § 2 referred to the State. It is inapplicable to state boards and agencies. Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So.2d 373 (1959). A constitutional provision which is clear and explicit is not subject to construction and should be applied according to the usual signification in which the words are generally understood. LSA-C.C. Arts. 13, 14; State v. Bradford, 242 La. 1095, 141 So.2d 378 (1961); State v. Clark, 186 La. 655, 173 So. 137 (1937); City of Shreveport v. Smith, 130 La. 126, 57 So. 652 (1912). Thus, because Article 19, § 16 referred specifically to prescription against the State, that provision is similarly inapplicable. Haas v. Board of Com'rs of Red River, etc., 206 La. 378, 19 So.2d 173 (1944). This Court has held that one could acquisitively prescribe property owned by a levee district. Haas v. Board of Com'rs of Red River, etc., supra; Board of Com'rs v. Earle, supra; Board of Com'rs of Caddo Levee Dist. v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929). However, in 1938, the Legislature passed Act 76 which provided in pertinent part: Prescription shall not run against any Levee District . . . As to [all] such lands and all rights therein, no Levee District shall be divested of . . . any property or property right by virtue of any prescription or adverse possession whatsoever. No court within the State of Louisiana shall have authority to apply, enforce or maintain against any Levee District . . . any prescription acquirendi cause or liberandi causa. The Legislature repealed the above Act in 1944, in enacting Act 247 of 1944. Later, in 1964, the Legislature again declared that acquisitive prescription shall not run against any levee district of the State. LSA-R.S. 38:295. During the ten year periods between 1948 and 1958 (Powell tract) and between 1951 and 1961 (George tract), there was no prohibition to the acquisitive prescription of property owned by the levee district. Prior to the passage of Act 408 of 1964 (LSA-R.S. 38:295) prescription ran against levee boards. Thus, during the crucial periods of possession in the present case, the property possessed by defendants and S. D. Hunter was susceptible of acquisitive prescription. Since the defendants have satisfied all four requisites for the ten-year acquisitive prescription on both tracts of land in dispute, I conclude that the plea is well-founded.