Opinion ID: 2163595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: suppression claims

Text: The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements that he made to the police implicating himself in Rodgers' murder in violation of his rights under the fourth, [17] eighth [18] and fourteenth [19] amendments to the United States constitution. [20] The defendant contends that the trial court improperly rejected his claims that he was seized by the police, that the seizure exceeded the bounds of a Terry [21] stop and that, following that stop, he did not voluntarily consent to accompany the police to the Waterbury police department for questioning. The defendant further contends, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, that the fruits of these constitutional improprieties, including his oral and written statements in which he confessed to murdering Rodgers, must be suppressed. We disagree. The following facts are necessary to our resolution of the defendant's suppression claims. The defendant filed a motion to suppress all oral and written statements that he had made to the police โ in which he allegedly confessed to murdering Rodgers โ on the ground that those statements had been obtained illegally. Thereafter, the trial court, O'Keefe, J., conducted a suppression hearing at which both defense counsel and the state presented evidence. The state called as witnesses Detective John Kennelly and Sergeant Gary Pelosi, both members of the criminal investigations division of the Waterbury police department. The defense witnesses included the defendant's girlfriend in 1998, Jacqueline Wilson, the defendant's neighbors, Tamara Oliver and Sydney Vega, and Paul Ariola, a detective with the Waterbury police department. No two witnesses gave the exact same account of events relating to the defendant's alleged seizure by the police. The state's first witness, Kennelly, testified that, sometime in the early morning hours of September 16, 1998, Waterbury police received information that the defendant was the last person to be seen with Rodgers before she was found mortally wounded. Acting on this information, Kennelly and Ariola set up a surveillance of the defendant's house on Sumac Street in Waterbury at approximately 8 a.m. that day. The officers, who were not in uniform, positioned their unmarked police car a short distance away from the defendant's house so that they could observe any vehicles coming down the street. At approximately 10:15 a.m., the defendant pulled up to the front of his house in a Ford Escort with a female passenger later identified as Wilson. According to Kennelly, at that point, he and Ariola immediately exited their police vehicle and approached the defendant's vehicle. After identifying himself and Ariola, Kennelly informed the defendant that they were investigating Rodgers' death and asked the defendant if he would be kind enough to go with them to the police station to answer some questions. The defendant replied, sure, no problem, and exited his vehicle without being asked to do so. Kennelly characterized the defendant's demeanor as calm, cooperative [and] rational, and further observed that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The officers neither handcuffed nor arrested the defendant, and they did not tell him that he was under arrest because, according to Kennelly, there was no probable cause to arrest him at that time. The defendant then entered Kennelly's vehicle, and Kennelly transported him to the station. Although Kennelly did not tell the defendant that he did not have to go to the station, Kennelly testified that the defendant was, in fact, free to decline to do so. After the defendant had arrived at the station, he was placed in an interview room and read his Miranda [22] warnings from a printed card. After the defendant was advised of his rights, he signed and dated the card. The defendant then was asked whether he knew anything about Rodgers' death. The defendant immediately broke into tears and confessed that he had killed Rodgers. He then made a full oral and written confession to the murder, which included the disclosure of the location where he had disposed of the murder weapon. Pelosi testified for the state that, in the early morning hours of September 16, 1998, Waterbury police learned from Rodgers' mother and Rodgers' boyfriend that Rodgers had been with the defendant immediately prior to her death and that Rodgers knew that the defendant was a narcotics user. Sometime between 9 and 10 a.m. that morning, Pelosi drove his unmarked police car to the defendant's Sumac Street address to participate in the surveillance. Upon his arrival there, Pelosi parked his vehicle at the other end of the street from where Kennelly and Ariola were parked and waited for the defendant. At approximately 10 a.m., Pelosi observed the defendant and Wilson pull into the defendant's driveway. At that time, Kennelly and Ariola exited their vehicle and approached the defendant's vehicle. Kennelly then spoke briefly to the defendant. According to Pelosi, Kennelly told the defendant that he wanted to speak to him at the police station about Rodgers' death and asked him if he would be willing to do so. Pelosi further testified that none of the officers was in uniform, no guns were drawn when they approached the defendant's vehicle, the defendant was not told that he was under arrest, and he was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained. Pelosi described the defendant's demeanor as very quiet, calm.... [H]e looked worried, concerned. Pelosi also stated that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Kennelly then drove the defendant to the police station for questioning. At some point, Pelosi asked Wilson if she would accompany him to the station for questioning. She replied that she would and got into the front passenger seat of Pelosi's vehicle. The entire encounter, from the time the defendant and Wilson arrived on Sumac Street until they left in separate vehicles for the police station, lasted no more than five minutes. Wilson testified at the suppression hearing for the defendant. She explained that, at approximately 10 a.m. on the day following Rodgers' murder, she and the defendant, with whom she resided, arrived on Sumac Street in her Ford Escort and noticed that many people in the neighborhood were standing in front of their houses. Before reaching his residence, the defendant pulled over to ask one of his neighbors whether she had seen Rodgers. The neighbor responded, [N]o, cause you all murdered her. The defendant then proceeded to drive down the street toward his residence. When he arrived there, a police car appeared. According to Wilson, the defendant immediately attempted to turn around and to leave, but the police told him to stop, and then blocked him in. Wilson further testified that the police made her and the defendant get out of the vehicle. When asked if she had any choice in the matter, she replied, I didn't know. I just did what they told me. Wilson also explained, however, that, after exiting the vehicle, she went to the police station voluntarily. Oliver testified that she was standing outside her house on Sumac Street in the morning hours of September 16, 1998, when she saw the defendant and Wilson drive up the street. The defendant pulled his vehicle over next to Oliver, and Wilson asked Oliver if she had seen Rodgers. Oliver responded that she had not. The defendant then continued driving toward his house, but a police car was parked nearby. When the defendant saw the police car, he tried to back up and to leave. At that point, however, the police car pulled up beside the defendant's car, causing him to stop. Oliver could not hear any conversation but observed the defendant exit his vehicle and subsequently enter the officer's car. Shortly thereafter, Wilson also got out of the vehicle and entered another police car that also had arrived at the scene. Both police cars then departed. Ariola testified that the only car participating in the surveillance was the car that he and Kennelly were driving and that the officers had parked their car about three houses beyond the defendant's house on the opposite side of the street. After the defendant arrived with Wilson in Wilson's Ford Escort, the defendant pulled in front of his residence, waited [a] few seconds and then started to drive away. Before the defendant could drive away, however, Ariola moved his car into the middle of the street and stopped so close to the defendant's car that the defendant could not get by him. The defendant made no further attempts to drive away. Ariola testified that, if the defendant had asked the officers to move, there would have been no reason to prevent him from backing up. The officers then exited their car and approached the defendant's vehicle; Kennelly approached along the driver's side and Ariola approached along the passenger's side. After the officers identified themselves, Kennelly told the defendant that he wanted the defendant to accompany him to the police station to talk about Rodgers. Neither officer had his gun drawn. Ariola further testified that there was no probable cause at that time to arrest the defendant and that the officers merely had wanted to question him because they had information that he was with Rodgers shortly before her death. The officers asked the defendant and Wilson to exit their vehicle, and, shortly thereafter, Pelosi arrived at the scene. The officers then called a tow truck for the defendant's car. Ariola testified that everybody, including the defendant, was a suspect at the time, and the officers' intention was to question, not to arrest, the defendant. After Kennelly and Pelosi left the scene in separate cars with the defendant and Wilson, respectively, Ariola stayed behind to secure the area and to guard the defendant's vehicle until it could be towed away. The final defense witness was Vega, the defendant's next-door neighbor. Vega testified that, on the morning of the surveillance, he was standing in his front yard and saw four marked police cars block the defendant's vehicle as the defendant approached his home. According to Vega, the police officers opened the defendant's car door, pointed a gun at [the defendant], and pulled him out of the car. Immediately thereafter, the defendant, who was not handcuffed, was placed in one of the police vehicles. Vega stated that he was approximately 600 feet from the scene when he observed the events that formed the basis of his testimony. Following this testimony, the trial court, O'Keefe, J., denied the defendant's motion to suppress. In an oral ruling, the court found that the confrontation or ... meeting between the police and the defendant on the morning of September 16, 1998, did not have the indicia of an arrest. In support of this conclusion, the court observed that the officers did not run up to the defendant or draw their weapons when they approached him. The court stated that Vega's testimony that the officers had drawn their weapons was not credible, noting that, of all the witnesses, Vega was the only one to testify that the police were brandishing guns when they approached the defendant. The court also found that, although the officers did stop [the defendant's] car, their actions were reasonable under the circumstances because it might not have been possible for the officers otherwise to have captured the defendant's attention to alert him to the fact that they wanted to speak with him. The court further found that the confrontation between the defendant and the police was not a seizure for constitutional purposes, and, even if it was, it was based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in Rodgers' death because her murder had occurred only a few hours earlier and the defendant had been identified as the last person to be seen with Rodgers while she was still alive. The court made no other specific findings with respect to the issue of whether the police had exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry stop. The court did note, however, that police officers are paid to speak with people in furtherance of criminal investigations and, therefore, that the officers in the present case had every right to try to speak with the defendant. Finally, the court found that the defendant had gone to the police station voluntarily. In support of this conclusion, the court observed that the defendant may have done so out of feelings of remorse or shame for what he had done because, as soon as he arrived at the station, he immediately began to cry and confessed to stabbing Rodgers. The court concluded, on the basis of the defendant's behavior, that he did not sound like somebody who is really resistant to the efforts of the police to talk to him. Although the court stated that it would expand on its oral ruling in a written memorandum of decision to follow, no such memorandum ever was issued. [23] Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.... [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision.... We undertake a more probing factual review when a constitutional question hangs in the balance.... In the present case, in which we are required to determine whether the defendant was seized by the police, we are presented with a mixed question of law and fact that requires our independent review. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836, 843-44, 955 A.2d 43 (2008). When considering the validity of a ... stop, our threshold inquiry is twofold.... First, we must determine at what point, if any ... the encounter between [the police officer] and the defendant constitute[d] an investigatory stop or seizure.... Next, [i]f we conclude that there was such a seizure, we must then determine whether [the police officers] possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion at the time the seizure occurred. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495, 503, 838 A.2d 981 (2004). Under the fourth amendment to the United States [c]onstitution ... a police officer is permitted in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officer believes, based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity, even if there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]; State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 194-95, 527 A.2d 1168, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927, 108 S.Ct. 293, 98 L.Ed.2d 252 (1987). Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion.... [I]n justifying [a] particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. [at] 21 [88 S.Ct. 1868] .... In determining whether a detention is justified in a given case, a court must consider [whether], relying on the whole picture, the detaining officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. When reviewing the legality of a stop, a court must examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived therefrom.... A recognized function of a constitutionally permissible stop is to maintain the status quo for a brief period of time to enable the police to investigate a suspected crime.... State v. Lipscomb, 258 Conn. 68, 75-76, 779 A.2d 88 (2001); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) ([a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time). In addition, [e]ffective crime prevention and detection ... [underlie] the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. [at] 22 [88 S.Ct. 1868]. Therefore, [a]n investigative stop can be appropriate even [when] the police have not observed a violation because a reasonable and articulable suspicion can arise from conduct that alone is not criminal.... In evaluating the validity of such a stop, courts must consider whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 149-50, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S.Ct. 102, 163 L.Ed.2d 116 (2005). This court also has recognized that [t]he test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court [regarding] whether an investigative stop passes constitutional muster balances the nature of the intrusion [on] personal security against the importance of the governmental interest inducing the intrusion. See United States v. Hensley, [469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)]. A strong law enforcement interest has been particularly recognized in the context of felonies or violent crimes, because `it is in the public interest that the crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible.' Id., [at] 229 [105 S.Ct. 675]. Furthermore, when the situation in which a suspect has been detained has afforded him a lesser expectation of privacy ... fourth amendment protections have been deemed to be correspondingly less stringent. (Citations omitted.) State v. Mitchell, supra, 204 Conn. at 196, 527 A.2d 1168. Because the intrusion resulting from an investigative stop is minimal, the reasonable suspicion standard is not onerous. The determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists rests on a two part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santos, supra, 267 Conn. at 504-505, 838 A.2d 981. The state does not directly address the propriety of the court's finding that the encounter between the defendant and the police officers in the street in front of the defendant's house did not constitute a seizure. The state contends, however, that, even if we assume, arguendo, that the officers' conduct did constitute a seizure, the court properly concluded that the seizure was a lawful Terry stop. In particular, the state contends that the stop satisfied the requirements of Terry because it was based on the officers' reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in Rodgers' murder and because the stop was limited in scope and duration, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate its purpose of inquiring whether the defendant would be willing to answer some questions about Rodgers and the circumstances surrounding her death. The defendant does not challenge the court's finding that the facts in existence at the time of the stop gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion on the part of the police officers to justify a Terry stop. [24] The defendant claims, rather, that the officers' detention of him was marked by such intrusiveness, displays of force and coercion that it exceeded the bounds of a stop permitted by Terry  and, therefore, constituted a de facto arrest, which required probable cause. In support of his claim that the officers used undue force in detaining him, the defendant asserts that, in addition to blocking his vehicle, two or three armed officers surrounded him and ordered him out of the vehicle, behaved in a blunt and forceful manner toward him, and conveyed such urgency when they sought to have the defendant accompany them to the station that he was forced to abandon his vehicle in the middle of the road. In response, the state maintains that the only aspect of the stop that even arguably could be characterized as involving a degree of compulsion or force was the officers' use of their unmarked police vehicles to prevent the defendant from driving away. The state contends, however, that, when viewed in light of the totality of circumstances, the officers' blocking the defendant's vehicle so that he could not leave before the officers were able to speak to him was a reasonable means of maintaining the status quo so that the officers could complete the purpose of the investigatory stop. In other words, the state asserts that the challenged police action did not transform the stop into an arrest. For purposes of this appeal, we assume, arguendo, that the police seized or detained the defendant when they approached him and confronted him with the request that he accompany them to the station. We conclude, however, that the trial court properly determined that the seizure of the defendant by the police constituted a lawful Terry stop. A Terry stop that is justified at its inception can become constitutionally infirm if it lasts longer or becomes more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which that stop was made.... Like the determination of initial justification, this inquiry is fact-bound. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mitchell, supra, 204 Conn. at 197, 527 A.2d 1168. Whether the detention of a suspect exceeds the scope of a permissive investigative stop, however, is a question of law. See, e.g., State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620, 641, 899 A.2d 1 (2006). One function of a constitutionally permissible Terry stop is to maintain the status quo for a brief period of time to enable the police to investigate a suspected crime. A police officer who has proper grounds for stopping a suspect has constitutional permission to immobilize the suspect briefly in order to check a description or an identification, [as] long as his conduct is strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances [that] rendered its initiation permissible.... Determination of the means that are reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo necessarily depends on a fact-bound examination of the particular circumstances of the particular governmental intrusion on the personal security of a suspect. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 689, 495 A.2d 273 (1985). A police officer who has articulable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and to detain someone who may be implicated in that crime must be permitted to make reasonable use of the resources at his disposal at the site of the investigatory stop. Id., at 690, 495 A.2d 273. The defendant claims that two or three armed officers surrounded him, ordered him out of his vehicle and used undue force in detaining him. The defendant's characterization of what occurred, however, is not fully consistent with the trial court's findings concerning the officers' conduct. As we previously have indicated, although the court made only limited factual findings with respect to the encounter between the police and the defendant, it determined that the confrontation had none of the indicia of an arrest because the officers didn't have any guns out, [and] they didn't run up to [the defendant]. The court further found that, although the officers did stop [the defendant's] car by pulling in front of it, that action was the only way for them to get the defendant's attention so that they could talk to him. At no time did the police ever handcuff the defendant or otherwise inform him that he was not free to leave. Moreover, Kennelly testified that he had asked the defendant if he would be willing to accompany him to the station for questioning. Although one witness, namely, Vega, testified that the officers actually had drawn their guns, the court did not credit his testimony and was not required to do so. None of the other witnesses, including Wilson, the defendant's girlfriend, described any conduct on the part of the officers that could be construed as unduly coercive, threatening or oppressive. Although it is true that Kennelly and Ariola approached the defendant's vehicle from both sides, this was not unreasonable in view of the fact that the defendant was accompanied by Wilson, who was sitting in the front passenger seat. Because the suppression hearing testimony fully supports the trial court's factual findings and its conclusion concerning the propriety of the Terry stop, we see no reason to disturb those findings and conclusions. The defendant nevertheless claims that the officers, by virtue of their actions, exceeded the scope of a permissible investigative stop, as a matter of law, when they approached and communicated with him. When engaging in a fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry, we ask, would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a [person] reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?... [T]o satisfy the reasonableness standard, officers conducting stops on less than probable cause must employ the least intrusive means reasonably available to effect their legitimate investigative purposes.... At the same time, however, the law recognizes the important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situation. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nash, supra, 278 Conn. at 641-42, 899 A.2d 1. Connecticut courts have found the patdown of a suspect, the search of a suspect's vehicle and the approach of officers with their guns drawn to be within the permissible bounds of a Terry stop depending on the circumstances. Thus, in State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997), for example, this court held that an investigatory detention was lawful when a uniformed officer, following a traffic stop of a vehicle during which its two occupants engaged in furtive conduct, approached the vehicle with his gun drawn, ordered the occupants out and, thereafter, conducted a patdown search of the occupants and a limited search of their vehicle for weapons. Id., at 493-94, 501-504, 692 A.2d 1233; see also State v. Casey, 45 Conn.App. 32, 41-44, 692 A.2d 1312 (actions of police officers did not exceed permissible limits of investigative detention under Terry , even though police officers removed defendant and other suspects from vehicle at gunpoint, searched vehicle, defendant and other suspects twice, handcuffed defendant and other suspects and placed them in back of police cruisers for one hour before making identifications necessary for probable cause to arrest, when police had information that defendant and other occupants of vehicle may have been involved in shooting and officers' actions accounted for safety of public and themselves), cert. denied, 241 Conn. 924, 697 A.2d 360 (1997); State v. Holloman, 20 Conn.App. 521, 526, 568 A.2d 1052 (permissible in course of Terry stop for officers to order occupants out of car at gunpoint when report indicated occupants were involved in local armed robbery in which handgun was stolen), cert. denied, 214 Conn. 805, 573 A.2d 317 (1990); State v. Wylie, 10 Conn.App. 683, 687-88, 525 A.2d 528 (mere fact that officer ordered defendant to stop with officer's gun drawn does not automatically convert Terry stop into arrest), cert. denied, 204 Conn. 807, 528 A.2d 1154 (1987). Guided by the general principles articulated in the foregoing cases and the policy considerations underlying Terry , we reject the defendant's claim that the officers engaged in conduct that was more intrusive or more coercive than necessary to effectuate a legitimate Terry stop. In view of the fact that the officers were investigating a murder that had occurred in the area only a few hours earlier and the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, the officers' conduct in detaining him briefly was not unreasonable. The only police conduct that fairly may be characterized as coercive was the action undertaken by the officers in blocking the defendant's vehicle to ensure that he would not leave the area before they could speak to him. In light of the defendant's attempt to leave almost immediately after he pulled up to his house, we agree with the trial court that blocking the defendant's vehicle likely was the most efficacious way to maintain the status quo so that the police could gain the defendant's attention. Other courts agree that such action ordinarily is permissible to maintain the status quo when the subject of the investigatory stop is in a vehicle and, therefore, has the capacity to flee from the scene unless physically blocked from doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Tuley, 161 F.3d 513, 515 (8th Cir.1998) ([b]locking a vehicle so its occupant is unable to leave during the course of an investigatory stop is reasonable to maintain the status quo while completing the purpose of the stop); Commonwealth v. Hall, 50 Mass.App. 208, 210, 736 N.E.2d 425 ([b]locking generally will be reasonable [for purposes of a Terry stop] when the suspect is in a vehicle because of the chance that the suspect may flee upon the approach of police with resulting danger to the public as well as to the officers involved [internal quotation marks omitted]), review denied, 432 Mass. 1111, 739 N.E.2d 701 (2000). Furthermore, as we previously indicated, the officers, who were driving an unmarked car and were not in uniform, approached the defendant's vehicle without drawing their guns and merely requested that the defendant accompany them to the police station for questioning about the murder. Thus, other than Vega, whose testimony the trial court expressly discredited, no witness described the officers as having engaged in any conduct that reasonably may be deemed to be unduly intimidating or coercive under the circumstances with which the police officers were confronted when they stopped the defendant. The defendant cites several cases for the proposition that the officers used a level of force and coercion that exceeded the limits of a lawful Terry stop. The officers in those cases, however, used far more coercive techniques than those that were employed by the officers in the present case. See Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 851-52 (4th Cir.2001) (defendant's liberty was curtailed to degree associated with formal arrest because he would not have felt free to leave after being thrown against wall, kicked, handcuffed and locked in patrol car); United States v. Robinson, 30 F.3d 774, 785 (7th Cir.1994) (stop escalated into arrest when defendant was placed in handcuffs and read his Miranda rights); Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 645-46 (2d Cir.1994) (court concluded that police had gone beyond investigatory stop of suspects and had arrested them on basis of facts that suspects had been boxed-in by six police vehicles and outnumbered two-to-one by officers with guns drawn or at the ready, ordered from vehicle, harshly treated, kept in handcuffs for duration of detention, placed in separate police cruisers and questioned with or without Miranda warnings, and extensively searched), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1076, 115 S.Ct. 721, 130 L.Ed.2d 627 (1995); United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir.1992) (blocking of defendant's egress by two agents in separate cars and approach by agent with drawn gun constituted arrest that required probable cause because suspect was not free to leave); United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (11th Cir.1992) (detention went beyond bounds of Terry stop when officer asked suspect to stop and identify herself, placed her in handcuffs, took her to police station, handcuffed her to chair and searched her purse); United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir.1990) (investigatory stop transformed into arrest when officers took hold of and isolated unarmed, compliant juvenile by shining high beams of police car in his face, patting him down, gripping his arm, telling him not to run anymore and directing him to back of one of two patrol cars); State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 70-73, 570 A.2d 193 (1990) (detention in course of Terry stop exceeded permissible limits when officers placed defendant in handcuffs and transported him to police head-quarters to be held for investigative purposes for indefinite period of time). In fact, none of the elements associated with the impermissible Terry stops in the foregoing cases is present in this case: the officers who confronted the defendant did not draw their guns, did not place the defendant in handcuffs, did not seize any items in his possession or control, did not tell him or indicate to him that he could not leave, did not lock him in a patrol car and did not use any other type of physical force against him that might have been considered excessive under the circumstances. The defendant therefore cannot prevail on his claim that the conduct of the officers exceeded the permissible bounds of a Terry stop as a matter of law. The defendant also claims that he did not agree voluntarily to go to the police station to be questioned about the murder. He contends that his purported consent to speak to the police was the fruit of his illegal seizure and that, even if it was not, his agreement merely reflected his submission to lawful authority. We reject the defendant's contentions. We first address the defendant's claim that his consent was invalid because it was the fruit of an illegal seizure. Courts have frequently held that a purportedly voluntary consent given after an illegal arrest or search is nonetheless a tainted fruit when that consent was given very soon after the illegal police action. See, e.g., United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1459 (10th Cir.1985) (consent given promptly after illegal arrest invalid); United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 84 (4th Cir.1982) (consent occurring `within the same brief continuous encounter' as illegal seizure invalid); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 297-98 (La.1985) (consent given within forty minutes of arrest invalid). These decisions imply that a consent given in very close temporal proximity to the official illegality is often a mere submission or resignation to police authority and not necessarily an act of free will. State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 621-22, 522 A.2d 788 (1987). In light of our determination that the defendant's detention was lawful under Terry , however, the defendant cannot establish that his answers to questions posed to him by the police at the station constituted the fruit of an illegal seizure. The defendant next asserts that, even if he was the subject of a lawful investigatory stop, he did not consent voluntarily to go to the police station for questioning because, under the totality of the circumstances, his agreement to do so was the product of police coercion. The defendant also contends that the evidence demonstrates that he merely was submitting to lawful authority. We reject these claims. It is well established that [t]he question [of] whether consent ... has ... been freely and voluntarily given, or was the product of coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances... and, ultimately, requires a determination regarding the putative consenter's state of mind. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 44, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S.Ct. 1614, 158 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004). The state must affirmatively establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the state's burden.... As a question of fact, it is normally to be decided by the trial court [on] the evidence before that court together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.... We may reverse [the trial court's factual] findings on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Azukas, 278 Conn. 267, 275, 897 A.2d 554 (2006). We are particularly mindful that all of these factual findings revolve principally around the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before the trial court, the evaluation of which is left to the trial court's sound discretion because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it. Id., at 277, 897 A.2d 554. This court recently considered the issue of voluntary consent in State v. Azukas, supra, 278 Conn. at 267, 897 A.2d 554. In Azukas , several officers were granted entry into a home in which the defendant, Anthony Azukas, a suspect in a murder, was staying with his girlfriend and their infant child. [25] Id., at 271, 897 A.2d 554. The police located Azukas in an upstairs bedroom and told him that they would like to speak to him about a murder that they were investigating. Id., at 273-74, 897 A.2d 554. Azukas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station, where he confessed to the murder. Id., at 271-72, 897 A.2d 554. On appeal, Azukas claimed that the trial court improperly had denied his motion to suppress his inculpatory statements because, inter alia, his consent to accompany the police to the station had not been voluntary. See id., at 272, 284-85, 897 A.2d 554. In rejecting the claim, we observed that the trial court specifically had credited testimony, adduced by the state, that Azukas willingly had agreed to go to with the officers to the station and that he had not been placed under arrest, handcuffed or otherwise restrained in any way. Id., at 284, 897 A.2d 554. Furthermore, the evidence adduced by the state indicated that the officers had not engaged in any coercive conduct toward Azukas and that they also did not argue with him or harass him in any way. Id., at 284-85, 897 A.2d 554. We concluded that the suppression hearing testimony supported the trial court's conclusion that Azukas had consented to accompany the officers voluntarily. Id. Similarly, in State v. Colon, supra, 272 Conn. at 107, 864 A.2d 666, we observed that the defendant, Ivo Colon, voluntarily had accompanied the police to the station, where he confessed to the fatal beating of a two year old child. [26] Id., at 133, 140-41, 864 A.2d 666. We explained that the trial court had found that, after the police confronted Colon in the hallway of his mother's apartment; see id., at 131, 137, 864 A.2d 666; they briefly detained him under Terry and asked him if he would go to the station with them to discuss the child's injuries. Id., at 151-52 n. 15, 864 A.2d 666. When Colon nodded affirmatively, he was transported to the station by the police. Id. We further noted that the trial court had found that [t]here were no guns drawn, or any evidence of threats, or physical force. The evidence that the court finds credible is that [Colon] was not handcuffed. He was placed in an unmarked police cruiser, without a cage, and taken to police headquarters. [Colon's] demeanor was calm and [he was] under control. Although the police did not tell [Colon that] he could refuse to go to the police station, he did not object or request to go to the... station at another time. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We thus characterized the evidence as indicating that Colon had consented voluntarily to go to the police station for questioning. See id. Other courts also have concluded that a defendant's consent to accompany the police to the station was voluntary when the defendant appeared willing to do so and there was no evidence of coercion. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-58, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (respondent voluntarily agreed to accompany federal agents to airport office after being approached on concourse and asked by agents if she would do so and there was no threat or show of force); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (defendant voluntarily consented to accompany officers to police station because, even though he was not told that he was free to leave or free to refuse further questioning, he expressly agreed to go to station when asked several times, never indicated any unwillingness to do so, and officers did not handcuff, physically restrain, threaten to arrest, coerce or otherwise intimidate defendant); State v. Navarro, 201 Ariz. 292, 296-97, 34 P.3d 971 (2001) (defendant voluntarily consented to accompany officer to police station for questioning after defendant arrived voluntarily at scene of investigation, plainclothes officers did not surround him on public street, handcuffs were removed almost immediately after being placed on him, and defendant verbally agreed to accompany officers to station upon being asked to do so); State v. Bragan, 920 S.W.2d 227, 243 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany police officers to station, there having been no threats, no show of force and no physical compulsion to accompany officers, even though speaking officer's tone of voice indicated that trip to station was mandatory). But cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1128, 1132 (10th Cir.1985) (defendant did not voluntarily consent to accompany police officer to station when officer withheld defendant's driver's license, car registration and title and defendant therefore had no reasonable choice other than to accompany officer no matter how polite officer was in phrasing request). Turning to the present case, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the defendant voluntarily had agreed to go to the police station for questioning. There is no evidence that the officers forced or otherwise pressured the defendant to accompany them to the station. In fact, the testimony indicated that the defendant was cooperative with the police, who were not in uniform and did not display their weapons, and that he got out of his vehicle without being asked to do so. The defendant never was restrained, his demeanor was described as calm, and he did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the evidence that the state adduced demonstrated that the police had asked the defendant if he would be willing to accompany them to the station; at no time was the defendant told that he was obligated to go to the station or that he otherwise was required to speak to the police. Although it may be true that most people would view such an approach by the police with concern or apprehension, we never have held that a Terry stop is so inherently coercive as to compel the conclusion that the suspect's agreement to speak to the police could not have been voluntary. On the contrary, the test is fact specific, so that, ultimately, the determination of whether the consent was voluntary rests on a careful consideration of the totality of the relevant circumstances. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany the police to the station upon being requested to do so. The defendant nevertheless has identified twenty-five circumstances, or reasons, [27] that purportedly demonstrate why his consent was not voluntary. Several of these reasons relate to the fact that the officers did not inform the defendant that he was not required to comply with their request that he accompany them to the police station or that they did not specifically ask him whether his consent was voluntary. Indeed, Kennelly acknowledged that he did not inform the defendant that he did not have to go to the station. It was altogether reasonable, however, for the trial court to have concluded that this fact, standing alone, was insufficient to render the defendant's consent involuntary. Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, we cannot accept the position ... that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a `voluntary' consent. Rather, it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was voluntary or coerced. It is this careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case that is evidenced in our prior decisions.... Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); see also United States v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir. 2008) (knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not a necessary prerequsite to establishing that consent was voluntary [internal quotation marks omitted]); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 651 (4th Cir.1996) (same); Symes v. United States, 633 A.2d 51, 53-54 (D.C.1993) (same). Under the circumstances of the present case, the mere fact that the police did not inform the defendant of his right to refuse to accompany them to the station does not invalidate the court's finding that his agreement to do so was the product of his voluntary consent and not police coercion. The defendant also claims that his consent was involuntary because the officers (1) blocked him from leaving the scene, (2) were armed, (3) approached on both sides of his vehicle, (4) did not allow him to move his vehicle from the middle to the side of the road, (5) sought his consent immediately after he was seized, (6) were blunt in their manner, and (7) had him ride to the police station in the backseat of their vehicle instead of having him drive his own vehicle. We disagree with the defendant's contention that these facts required a finding that his consent had not been obtained voluntarily. Although these facts are relevant to the determination of whether the defendant's consent was voluntary, they are not necessarily dispositive of that issue, and the trial court was not bound to treat them as such. Indeed, in light of the other facts that demonstrate the defendant's willingness to accompany the police, the trial court reasonably concluded that the defendant had agreed to do so voluntarily. [28] We therefore reject the defendant's contention that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his inculpatory statements and the fruits thereof.