Opinion ID: 1123465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: nrs 41a.100.

Text: In order to demonstrate that the medical malpractice action filed by Dutt was not as simple as the majority would have us believe, I am attaching as Appendix A to this dissent a copy of the lengthy evaluation belatedly sought and received by Dutt from the Foundation. [2] I suggest that even lay persons will understand, as did the jury in the instant case, that the Reno physicians provided Rentnelli with life-saving expertise and treatment, properly characterized even by Dutt as brilliant, and that the requisites of diagnosis and treatment were so complex that no action should have been contemplated, let alone filed, without first obtaining a thorough, professional medical analysis of the care provided by the Reno physicians. Unfortunately, their efforts were rewarded by the trauma and embarrassment of an ill-advised, precipitous and decidedly unenlightened lawsuit. In assessing the majority's opinion that the malpractice action brought by Dutt against the Reno physicians was so simple that more extensive research and consultation with medical experts was unnecessary, I invite all interested persons to read the exhibit in the Appendix to this dissent. The readers should then ask themselves whether any person untrained in medicine could have reached a reasoned conclusion concerning the issue of malpractice without the assistance of someone with medical expertise. Indeed, Rentnelli's condition was so complex and difficult to diagnose, that additional specialized expertise had to be added to the medical team that cared for him and assisted with the diagnosis. I also find it doubly troubling that Rentnelli's Reno physicians, who were demonstrably vigilant and effective in their treatment and care of Dutt's client, were not only subjected to an unwarranted lawsuit, but were further demeaned at trial by Dutt's flippant and contradictory testimony ascribing the physicians' successful and difficult diagnosis to luck. On these facts, it is little wonder that the respondent physicians insisted on having their efforts and their reputations vindicated in a trial against their uninformed, precipitant tormentor, attorney Dutt. I suggest that there is also little cause to wonder why the jury provided the respondent physicians with the vindication they sought from the civil justice system. If society is to have any confidence in the legal system and the administration of justice within our courts, there must be an accountability for derelict lawyers that is equal to the level of accountability we impose on derelict physicians and other professionals. As I view this record, the evidence strongly supports the jury's findings against Dutt. Plainly stated, the jury, by its verdict, announced that lawyers are not privileged to assail the reputation of physicians in court and subject them to the enervating trauma, time and cost of a lawsuit with its concomitant attenuation of professional standing without reasonable cause. [3] Turning now to certain aspects of the majority's legal analysis, I note first my disagreement with the majority's conclusions regarding probable cause and the role it played in this case. The majority endorses for adoption in Nevada the probable cause rule announced in Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498 (Cal. 1989). With due respect to the California Supreme Court, I do not find its reasoning either sound or persuasive on the point. In adopting an objectively tenable standard for determining probable cause, the Sheldon Appel Co. court concluded that the adequacy of an attorney's research is not relevant to the probable cause determination. Id. at 510. In so ruling, the California court disapproved dictum in Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal.App.3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975), to the effect that an attorney's reasonable investigation and industrious search of legal authority is an essential component of probable cause. Id. at 254 Cal.Rptr. at 347, 765 P.2d at 509. It appears to me that the Sheldon Appel Co. rule is in essence a rule of happenstance. In other words, if, in evaluating the issue of probable cause, a court concludes that the action was objectively tenable when filed, then there is a proper basis for finding probable cause for filing the action despite a provable condition of complete ignorance on the part of the plaintiff's attorney regarding the merits of the action when the complaint was filed. I am of the opinion that the objectively tenable rule adopted in Sheldon Appel Co. tends to reward indolence, ignorance, indifference or exploitiveness by focusing on the ability of the defendant attorney and his counsel to produce, after the fact, a semblance of objective tenability that would satisfy the probable cause standard of the California court. This is a backward-looking rule that seeks to find and interject a rational basis for filing an action when an objective analysis of the conditions surrounding the action at the time it was filed would reveal none. I am persuaded that the rule embraced by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 157 Ariz. 411, 758 P.2d 1313 (1988), is more appropriate. Holding that the test for probable cause is both subjective and objective, the Bradshaw court stated that [t]he initiator of the action must honestly believe in its possible merits; and, in light of the facts, that belief must be objectively reasonable.  Id. 417, 758 P.2d at 1319 (citing Haswell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 557 S.W.2d 628, 633 (Mo. 1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 675 cmt. c (1977); Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 120, at 893 (5th ed. 1984)) (emphasis in original text). Under the Bradshaw view, an inexperienced attorney's failure to research, consult, interview and meaningfully prepare before filing a complaint would be relevant in determining whether the attorney could have entertained an honest belief in the possible merits of his or her client's cause of action. Moreover, the second prong of the Bradshaw test requires that the attorney's honest belief be objectively reasonable. The latter test thus becomes a form of validation of the former. Assuming the attorney has a modicum of legal ability that has been adequately focused on meaningful research and evaluation, it is logical to expect that the attorney's honest belief regarding the merits of the client's cause of action will be endowed with an aspect of objective reasonability. [4] Moreover, at least in the more esoteric and complex areas of litigation, such as most instances of alleged medical malpractice, I disagree with both the majority and the Sheldon Appel Co. court in concluding that an attorney is entitled to rely entirely on what the client has said in determining whether there is probable cause to file an action. A client may, without any knowledge of the adequacy of his or her medical treatment, tell the attorney that the physician negligently treated him, describing the basis for his or her opinion. An attorney inexperienced in medical malpractice litigation may be as ignorant as the client with respect to the quality of the medical services actually provided by the client's physician. Under the view espoused by the majority, the uninformed attorney need not look beyond the client's perspective in determining whether there is probable cause to file a lawsuit. I believe such a view denigrates both the legal profession and the lawyers within the profession who are expected to apply enlightened understanding and analysis to a client's problems and concerns. See Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438, 448 (1980). If a client describes a simple battery to his or her attorney, it could be argued that the attorney may have probable cause to file an action against the alleged tortfeasor on the basis of what appears to be an honest factual recital by the client. In such a case, it is at least arguable that the rule adopted by the majority might be justified. In most medical malpractice cases, however, research and diligent inquiry and preparation are essential to an honest conclusion that probable cause exists for the filing of a complaint. I therefore take issue with the blanket rule adopted by the majority in the instant case. [5] I fully agree with both the Sheldon Appel Co. and Bradshaw courts that when the operative facts are not in dispute, the issue of probable cause is an issue of law to be decided by the court. I also agree with the Bradshaw ruling that when the operative facts are in dispute, the trial court may, by special verdict form or by a hypothetical jury instruction, provide guidance to the jury as to what facts will constitute probable cause. Bradshaw, 267 Ariz. at 419, 758 P.2d at 1321. The operative facts in this case are not in dispute and the district court should have ruled on the issue of probable cause as a matter of law. Based upon my review of the record, however, I must agree with respondents that the district court impliedly ruled in their favor on the issue of probable cause. The issue was fully discussed by the parties at trial, and the trial judge refused to grant an NRCP 41(b) motion to dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, ruling that plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case. The trial judge also rejected Dutt's motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the evidence. In any event, my review of the record leads me to conclude, contrary to the majority's determination, that as a matter of law, Dutt did not have probable cause to file the lawsuit even under the Sheldon Appel Co. standard. I have previously recounted the numerous derelictions surrounding the filing of the complaint and will only observe here that if, as the majority concludes, there was probable cause for Dutt's lawsuit, there would appear to be little basis for ever holding attorneys legally accountable for the filing of frivolous medical malpractice claims. Needless to say, I also disagree with the majority's ruling on the issue of malice. A jury may infer malice from an absence of probable cause, Nelson, 607 P.2d at 445, and as previously observed, I find ample evidence in the record undermining the majority's recognition of probable cause. Moreover, I again emphasize that in my view, there is no basis for concluding that Dutt's pre-filing behavior and preparation were reasonable. In any event, the record as I read it provides ample support for the jury's finding of malice. I suggest that the record also provides a factual basis for liability resulting from abuse of process. Dutt's attempt to secure a settlement after he was thoroughly disabused of the possibility of negligence on the part of respondents is discounted by the majority because the settlement attempt was unadorned by a formal demand. I am unable to discern in the majority's characterization of the evidence any basis for casting aside the jury's verdict. Moreover, I find entirely unpersuasive the majority's attempt to distinguish the instant case from that of Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980). In Bull, this court affirmed an award against the attorney who filed a medical malpractice action based upon a determination that substantial evidence in the record supported the finding that the action was filed for the ulterior purpose of coercing a nuisance settlement. By way of contrast, the majority concludes that Dutt's (uninformed) examination of all the medical records, and his after-the-fact, belated consultation with medical and legal authorities, coupled with a lack of formal settlement demand, eventuating in the dismissal of the complaint, justified Dutt's traumatizing efforts against the respondent physicians. I disagree and so did the jury who heard the evidence. [6] For the reasons abbreviated above, I would endorse the jury's verdict and affirm the judgment entered pursuant thereto. I therefore respectfully dissent. [7]