Opinion ID: 2609334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Hearsay Under CRE 804(b)(3)

Text: As a general rule, parties are prohibited from introducing hearsay statements into evidence. See CRE 802; Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931, 937 (Colo.1998). The rule against hearsay exists because [h]earsay statements are presumptively unreliable since the declarant is not present to explain the statement in context. Blecha, at 937. Moreover, since the declarant is not subjected to cross-examination, the truthfulness of the statement is questionable . Id. In order for hearsay to be admissible in this context, a proffered hearsay statement must comply with the specific exception to the hearsay rule under which the statement is offered and must not offend the right to confrontation as guaranteed by the United States and Colorado Constitutions. [11] These two requirementsi .e., compliance with the specific rule of evidence allowing for the admissibility of the hearsay statement and compliance with the confrontation clauses in the United States and Colorado Constitutionsdo not necessarily involve identical inquiries. As the Supreme Court explained in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), evidence admissible under a hearsay exception may not be admissible under the Confrontation Clause: Although we have recognized that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, we have also been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements. The Confrontation Clause, in other words, bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. (Citations omitted.) Conversely, in Williamson, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) to require the exclusion of evidence that may otherwise be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (recognizing that its interpretation of Fed. R. 804(b)(3) was not required under the Confrontation Clause and stating that Congress certainly could, subject to the constraints of the Confrontation Clause, make statements admissible based on their proximity to self-inculpatory statements). [12] Recognizing that hearsay statements must comply with both the specific evidentiary rule and the defendant's right to confrontation, we now proceed to examine the requirements of CRE 804(b)(3). CRE 804(b)(3), which is identical to Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(3), is one of several hearsay exceptions that apply when the declarant is unavailable. See CRE 804(a), (b). The 804(b)(3) exception, commonly known as the statement against interest exception, provides: Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. CRE 804(b)(3). The text of the rule requires that corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement when the statement is offered to exculpate the accused. CRE 804(b)(3). While this court has not previously addressed the corroboration requirement for exculpatory statements, we note that federal courts and our own court of appeals have looked to both the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, as well as independent evidence supporting the substance of the statement. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (examining the circumstances surrounding the declarant's statement as well as determining whether independent evidence supported the statement); United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1993) (same); People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 776-77 (Colo.App.1990) (same). In 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 502, at 851 (2d ed.1994), the authors explain the general approach for determining whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of a statement offered to exonerate the accused: Certainly the requirement [of corroboration for statements that exonerate the accused] is satisfied by independent evidence that directly or circumstantially tends to prove the points for which the statement is offered. But the term corroborating circumstances seems much broader, and reaches circumstantial evidence supporting the veracity of the speaker, including indications that the statement was against interest to an unusual or devastating degree or that he repeated the statement or could not have been motivated to falsify for the benefit of the accused. (Footnotes omitted.) Accordingly, when a statement is offered to exculpate the accused under CRE 804(b)(3), a trial court should proceed as follows. First, the trial court must determine whether the statement complies with the rule, including whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. In conducting the corroboration inquiry, the trial court may examine both the circumstances surrounding the statement as well as other independent evidence that supports the statement. Second, if the defendant does not waive his or her right to confrontation (i.e., the defendant opposes rather than seeks admission of the exculpatory statement), the trial court must determine whether admission of the statement violates the defendant's rights to confrontation. In Wright, the Supreme Court explained that, in cases involving a hearsay rule that is not firmly rooted, [t]o be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial. Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 110 S.Ct. 3139. [13] Thus, the reliability determination for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis is narrower than the corroboration inquiry under CRE 804(b)(3). In assessing whether the statement possessed inherent trustworthiness for constitutional purposes, the trial court should examine only the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. See infra pp. 575-576 and accompanying text discussing the appropriate factors. This court also has not previously addressed the requirements of statements against penal interest offered to inculpate the accused, such as Cummins's statement here. The text of CRE 804(b)(3) does not impose a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements. However, in People v. Moore, 693 P.2d 388, 390 (Colo.App.1984), the court of appeals applied a corroboration requirement to an accomplice's statement that was offered to inculpate the defendant. The Moore court stated that since [the declarant's] statement inculpates one besides the declarant, i.e., [defendant], to be admissible the People must show by a preponderance of evidence that the attendant circumstances confirm the trustworthiness of the statement. Moore, 693 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added). The Moore court's application of the corroborating circumstances requirement to inculpatory statements is consistent with several federal decisions interpreting Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that courts have interpreted the rule as implicitly imposing a similar [corroboration] requirement where the government uses the hearsay to inculpate ). [14] After examining the case law, we conclude that the corroboration requirement for a statement that inculpates the accused is not the same as the corroboration requirement for a statement that exculpates the accused. Courts applying an implicit corroboration requirement for an inculpatory statement have put forth varying views as to the type of corroboration necessary in order to admit the statement. See 2 McCormick on Evidence § 319, at 347 n. 23 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed.1992) (citing cases and explaining that [w]hat corroboration means has been somewhat uncertain). In determining whether a declarant's statement was sufficiently corroborated, some courts have turned to independent evidence introduced at trial that incriminates the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Gio, 7 F.3d 1279, 1288 (7th Cir.1993) (explaining that the trustworthiness of the statement was corroborated in part by other evidence presented at trial [that] independently verified [the declarant's] statement incriminating [the defendant]). Other courts, however, have expressly limited the corroboration inquiry to an assessment of the circumstances surrounding the declarant's statement. See, e.g., Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1170 (explaining that [i]n determining whether such a statement is trustworthy enough to be admissible, the district court must look to the circumstances in which the declarant made the statement). Because the latter viewi.e., that only the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement should be examinedis constitutionally grounded, we are persuaded that this approach is the better method for analyzing the sufficiency of corroboration for a statement that inculpates the accused. Most courts that have required corroboration for inculpatory statements have done so out of concern that such statements comply with the Confrontation Clause. See generally United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 510 (9th Cir.1989) (Those circuits which have read `the corroboration expressly required for exculpatory statements into the rule as applied to inculpatory statements [have done so] in order to satisfy the confrontation clause.' (citation omitted) (alteration in Candoli )). It therefore makes sense that the corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, which is rooted in the Confrontation Clause, complies with the Supreme Court's explanation in Wright that the Confrontation Clause can only be satisfied by looking to the inherent trustworthiness surrounding the making of the statement. See McCormick on Evidence, supra, § 319, at 347 n .23 (indicating that those courts that consider other evidence of guilt in a case as proper corroboration of inculpating statements are inconsistent with Wright and that only the circumstances under which the statement was made, such as its degree of adversity to the declarant's interests and whether made in police custody, should be considered). [15] Moreover, this approach is also consistent with Moore, where our court of appeals considered only the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement to confirm the inculpatory statement's trustworthiness and reliability. Moore, 693 P.2d at 390. In summary, then, a trial court should follow a three-part test before relying on CRE 804(b)(3) to admit a third party witness's statement that inculpates the defendant. First, the witness must be unavailable as required by CRE 804(a). Second, the statement must tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability. On this point, the trial court must determine whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. Third, the People must show by a preponderance of evidence that corroborating circumstances demonstrate the trustworthiness of the statement. In conducting this third inquiry, a trial court should limit its analysis to the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and should not rely on other independent evidence that also implicates the defendant. Appropriate factors for a trial court to consider include: where and when the statement was made, to whom the statement was made, what prompted the statement, how the statement was made, and what the statement contained. See State v. Wilson, 323 Or. 498, 918 P.2d 826, 837-39 (Or.1996) (outlining the above factors).