Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: 3, b.181, b.221, h.2)

Text: The claims in this subcategory include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning counsel's alleged failure to produce evidence relating to the crime scene. The alleged ineffectiveness includes counsel's failure to offer into evidence a videotape of the crime scene made shortly after the homicide, his failure to offer independent evidence that defendant's decision to pull into the picnic area had been motivated by a desire to avoid the fate of a Toms River physician, known to defendant, who was killed while attending to his disabled vehicle along the side of the Garden State Parkway, and his failure to produce evidence of the noise level at the picnic area to rebut the inference that defendant should have heard the opening of the door on the perpetrator's car. Defendant also claims that the trial court violated defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury trial by permitting the jury to view the crime scene, a contention that defendant asserts to have been advanced in defendant's rejected brief on direct appeal. We address all claims on their merits and conclude that they should be dismissed. The trial court's decision to permit the jury to view the crime scene was a permissible exercise of the court's discretion. See State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 25-26, 214 A. 2d 393 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950, 86 S.Ct. 1210, 16 L.Ed. 2d 212 (1966). Contrary to defendant's contentions, the trial testimony of Trooper Mathis verified that the changes in the crime scene between the date of the homicide and the jury's visit resulted in less underbrush and greater visibility from the Garden State Parkway, lending support to trial counsel's decision not to offer into evidence a videotape of the crime scene made shortly after the murder. Counsel's discretionary determination not to offer expert testimony about the noise level at the picnic area could not conceivably rise to the level of ineffective assistance. Finally, counsel's decision not to offer direct evidence of Dr. Klausner's untimely accident may have reflected counsel's prudent recognition that such evidence would have been unpersuasive in view of the abundant proof elicited by the State about the substantial number of safe locations along defendant's route at which he could have checked out his vehicle. See Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 52, 586 A. 2d 85. 6. Defendant's Injuries and Treatment