Opinion ID: 2551157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determining the Necessity of a Cautionary Instruction

Text: In our view, federal case law interpreting FELA sets a low threshold for determining whether an assumption of the risk instruction is warranted; however, there is no consensus among the federal courts as to the precise evidentiary scenarios which necessitate a cautionary instruction. The Third Circuit concluded, in Fashauer, that, the most difficult part of the inquiry is determining when the facts merit [the instruction]. 57 F.3d at 1275. As noted by the Fashauer court, some courts have guarded against jury confusion by ... describing assumption of the risk to the jury and instructing it not to reduce the plaintiff's recovery on that basis. Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1274 (citing the Third Circuit's decision in Koshorek, 318 F.2d at 370 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Jenkins, 22 F.3d at 212); see Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309, 1316 (1986) (holding that evidence which implicated assumption of the risk when an employee entered a hostile workplace and continued to perform his job was inadmissible altogether so no instruction was needed on how to differentiate the legal theories applicable to the evidence). Other circuits, however, have been more hesitant to provide the instruction when the doctrine is not explicitly raised by the litigants. [14] In the present case, the intermediate appellate court employed the analytical approach suggested by the Fashauer court and concluded that Amtrak's evidence did not explicitly or implicitly raise the assumption of the risk defense; therefore, according to the Court of Special Appeals, the trial court committed no error in omitting the instruction. The first dispositive factor according to Fashauer is whether the employee acted pursuant to an order or to his or her own discretion. Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1278 (recovery can never be reduced because of implied consent in performing a task as specifically directed). An employee may not be found to be contributorily negligent if he or she followed a direct order. In other words, when a plaintiff has no real choice, his recovery should not be reduced because he performed the task, regardless of whether the plaintiff acted reasonably or unreasonably. Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1279; accord Jenkins, 22 F.3d at 211-12. The Ninth Circuit distinguished general and direct orders in Jenkins, noting that the former implicates contributory negligence and the latter the forbidden assumption of the risk doctrine: The traditional rule [is] that when an employee carries out his supervisor's general order in an unsafe manner, he is responsible under FELA for his own contributory negligence. But when an employee carries out a direct order, even if he has reason to know the order exposes him to danger, he is not contributorily negligent; rather his conduct falls under the abolished doctrine of assumption of the risk. Jenkins, 22 F.3d at 211 (emphasis added). Under Fashauer and Jenkins, direct orders implicate assumption of the risk, while general orders implicate contributory negligence. Secondly, under Fashauer, if there is evidence of a general order, if the employee exercised discretion, or alternative methods to perform the task were available, then the reasonableness of an employee's actions is dispositive and unreasonable assumptions of risk constitute evidence of contributory negligence. [15] Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1278. The Third Circuit summarized the confluence of unreasonable assumption of the risk and contributory negligence as follows: The subcategory of unreasonable assumption of the risk sounds suspiciously like a negligence concept. In fact, in such caseswhere the plaintiff unreasonably assumed a known riskthe difference between assumption of risk and contributory negligence appears purely semantic. Rather than saying the skier [plaintiff] assumed a risk, we easily could say that he failed to act with due care. Fashauer, 57 F.3d 1269, 1276 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 68 at 481); Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002, 1005 (3d Cir.1983). [16] Our concern with the Court of Special Appeals's opinion, decided pursuant to Fashauer, is that it did not address the full spectrum of reasonable inferences that the jury may have drawn from the evidence regarding both orders and discretion, and reasonable or unreasonable action. We cannot say as a matter of law that the assumption of risk defense was not injected into the case because as a matter of fact it was implicated by the evidence. Thus, the jury was denied the benefit of having the law explained explicitly before rendering a verdict. Here we have assumption of the risk masquerading under another name, and a cautionary instruction was required to ensure a proper application of the statute to the evidence presented to the jury. Green v. River Terminal Ry., 763 F.2d 805, 806 (6th Cir.1985) (explaining that in light of FELA's remedial purpose, the statute should be liberally constructed in favor of the injured plaintiff). Therefore, in light of the Fashauer analysis, we think it prudent for the trial judge to give a cautionary instruction when evidence of an employee's knowledge of dangerous conditions of employment is before the jury, where the jury must draw inferences from the facts about the existence of direct or general orders, and where determinations of reasonableness must be made. [A cautionary instruction] is properly given when the issue of assumption of risk is expressly or implicitly before the jury, even though not explicitly raised at trial. Hamrock, 103 Ill.Dec. 736, 501 N.E.2d at 1279. As noted by the Court of Special Appeals: [I]f no evidence of impermissible assumption of risk has reached the jury, a correct instruction on contributory negligence will do. However, if, either because of evidence introduced at trial or because of statements made by counsel in opening or closing arguments, there is a risk that the implied consent theory of assumption of the risk seeped its way into the case, the jury should be instructed that it may not find contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff... simply because he acceded to the request or direction of the responsible representatives of his employer that he work at a dangerous job, or in a dangerous place, or under unsafe conditions. Collins, 187 Md.App. at 310, 978 A.2d at 831 (citing Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1280) (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). We are cognizant of the delicate task before a trial judge who must discern whether the evidence adduced might evoke an impermissible line of reasoning among the jurors, while being required under the Maryland rules of civil procedure and common law to adequately address a defendant's theory of the case, including affirmative defenses. Cf. Clark v. Pa. R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 591, 595 (2d Cir.1964) (holding that an assumption of the risk instruction might well cause such confusion as to water down or even eliminate the issue of contributory negligence). The potential prejudice to an injured employee, namely a complete bar to recovery, however, warrants careful scrutiny of the evidence and the inferences that jurors may reasonably draw from the presentation of the case.