Opinion ID: 3061372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Richitelli’s Confession

Text: Later that day, Gerard Starkey, a task force officer assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), interviewed Defendant Richitelli at the Pembroke Pines Police Department. After receiving a Miranda warning, Defendant Richitelli admitted his participation in the attempt to rob the money courier, but claimed that Wainwright planned the operation. Richitelli said that he was a confidential informant (“CI”) working with Detective John Sousa of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”), but admitted that he had not told Detective Sousa about the planned robbery. Agent Starkey contacted Detective Sousa and confirmed that Richitelli was a CI and that Detective Sousa was unaware of the plan to rob the money courier. C. Richitelli’s CI Relationship with Detective Sousa Detective Sousa met Richitelli in November 2008 through the Broward County State Attorney’s Office. Richitelli was contracted to be a CI by Detective Sousa on behalf of the BCSO. Under his CI contract, Richitelli: (1) was not allowed, inter alia, to possess a firearm or be involved in any criminal activity, and (2) was required to notify Detective Sousa and await permission before investigating anyone. At the time of the attempted robbery, Richitelli was working with Detective Sousa on a prescription-pain-killer drug operation. 5 Although Detective Sousa and Richitelli spoke on the telephone on August 24 and 25, 2009, Richitelli never mentioned a robbery planned for August 25. According to Detective Sousa, Richitelli had a tendency to talk a lot and, during one investigation, waited three days before alerting Detective Sousa that he had been approached about committing a crime. Detective Sousa had counseled Richitelli to contact him before meeting with any suspects. D. Indictment After his confession, Richitelli was arrested. Richitelli was appointed counsel, who filed a written invocation of Richitelli’s right to remain silent and to counsel. A superseding indictment charged Richitelli, along with Wainwright and Smith, with conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (Count 1); attempting a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (Count 2); conspiring to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o), (Count 3); carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (Count 4); and possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (Count 6). Richitelli filed a notice of 6 public authority defense, claiming that, at the time of his arrest, he was working as a documented CI for Detective Sousa.1 E. Richitelli’s Recorded Call to Detective Sousa On October 30, 2009, while Richitelli was in pretrial detention at the Federal Detention Center (“FDC”) in Miami, Richitelli called Detective Sousa. Because all calls from the FDC are recorded, the government had a recording of Richitelli’s call to Detective Sousa. Prior to trial, Richitelli moved to suppress the recorded call, arguing that, at the time of the call, he had appointed counsel and had not waived his right to counsel. The government responded that Richitelli knew when he placed the call to Detective Sousa that it would be recorded because (1) he was advised during intake at the FDC that phone calls were recorded; (2) signs posted in the FDC alerted him that phone calls were recorded; and (3) interruptions during phones calls stated that calls were recorded. The district court denied Richitelli’s motion to suppress, finding that Richitelli had initiated contact with Detective Sousa voluntarily and had impliedly waived his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 1 The public authority defense is an affirmative defense under which the defendant must show that he reasonably relied upon the authority of a government official authorizing the defendant to engage in an illegal activity. United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359, 1365 (11th Cir. 1998). 7 At trial, the government played the recorded call and introduced redacted transcripts.2 During the call, Richitelli denied being involved in the planned robbery. Richitelli said that Wainwright “popped up,” and Richitelli “wanted to see what was going on.” Richitelli claimed that Wainwright broke into his shed and took the firearm without his knowledge. Detective Sousa scolded Richitelli for getting involved in crimes outside his CI relationship, repeatedly told Richitelli that he (Sousa) had nothing to do with Richitelli’s federal robbery case, and advised Richitelli to cooperate with the FBI. F. Proposed Defense Witness Steve Emerson At trial, Richitelli asked to call Steven Emerson, Richitelli’s former supervising agent at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Defense counsel argued that Emerson’s testimony was relevant “to show Mr. Richitelli’s actions as a confidential informant, how he acts in a very - - that he’s very active, that he talks a lot, that sometimes he doesn’t think before he acts, and that he’s not - - he’s very good at gathering information, he’s very good at conducting investigations and that he somewhat needs very strict supervision, and as late as 2007, he was able to refer a case for prosecution.” After defense counsel 2 For reasons that are not pertinent to this appeal, portions of the transcript were redacted pursuant to the district court’s pre-trial order. 8 conceded that Emerson had not had any contact with Richitelli since 2008 and did not have anything to do with the instant case, the district court denied the request. G. District Court’s Inquiry Into Richitelli’s Decision to Testify During trial, but out of the jury’s presence, the district court asked defense counsel, “Do you mind if I inquire of your client regarding his right to testify and his right not to testify?” Defense counsel responded that he “would support the Court to do that,” and the district court confirmed with Richitelli that: (1) he understood that he had a right to testify and not to testify; (2) he understood that if he elected to testify, information about the number of felony convictions he had could be brought out and he would be subject to cross-examination; (3) he had fully discussed the issue of whether to testify with his attorney; and (4) he had not yet decided whether to testify. The next day, before the defense rested, the district court asked whether Richitelli was going to testify. Defense counsel stated, “I don’t believe so, but at this time I would invite the Court to voir dire him.” The district court pointed out that it had already asked Richitelli some questions and then confirmed that the government would not object to a jury instruction on the public authority defense even if Richitelli did not testify. Defense counsel then asked Richitelli whether he wanted the district court to inquire. Richitelli nodded his head affirmatively. 9 The district court again discussed with Richitelli his decision whether to testify and learned that Richitelli had decided not to take the stand, as follows: THE COURT: All right. Well, I will be more than happy to. As I was explaining to you yesterday, you essentially have two rights. You have a right to testify and you have a right not to testify. If you do elect to testify, you would be subject to cross-examination by the government. In other words, Mr. Chase could ask you questions, and he could bring out the fact that you’ve been convicted of more than one felony. Now, I don’t know how many felony convictions you have, but whatever number that is, Mr. Chase could bring that out. As it stands right now, the jury is only aware of one felony conviction. Now, if you elect not to testify, the jury is advised that that cannot be considered by them in any way in arriving at their verdict. They can’t conclude that by virtue of the fact that you elected not to testify that you’ve got something to hide, and you are guilty. Have you had enough time to discuss the issue of whether or not you should testify with your two lawyers? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. I discussed with Mr. Tucker about me testifying in the case, and he gave me his statement and, you know, his theory on it. And since I had my accident with an aneurysm and my IQ level ain’t very high, so I decided I ain’t going to testify because I won’t remember everything periodically because I lose my memory sometimes. THE COURT: Is that your decision? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. H. Jury Instruction on Count 3 During the charge to the jury, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of Counts 1 and 2, which charged Richitelli with conspiracy and attempt to commit a Hobbs Act Robbery. As to Count 3, which charged Richitelli with 10 conspiracy to use a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, the district court stated: Now, Count 3 charges that defendant Jay Anthony Richitelli did knowingly and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with others to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. That is, a violation of Title 18 United States Code Section 1951(a) as set forth in Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment and to possess said firearm in the furtherance of such crimes, all in violation of Title 18 United States Code Section 924(c)(1)A. It is further alleged that the firearm is a Beretta .40 caliber pistol. The definition of a conspiracy was explained in Count~1 the -- in the Count~1 instruction. Such information will not be repeated, but reference can be made during deliberations to the portion of Count 1 that addresses conspiracy if the need arises. Title 18 United States Code Section 924(c)(1) makes it a separate federal crime or offense for anyone to carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or possess a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The defendant can be found guilty of the conspiracy offense charged in Count 3 of the indictment only if all of the following facts are proved prosecute [sic]. First, that the defendant conspired to commit the crime of violence charged in Count~1 of the indictment. Second, that during the commission of that offense, the defendant knowingly carried or possessed a firearm as charged. And third, that the defendant carried the firearm in relation to or possessed the firearm in furtherance of the crime of violence. After concluding the jury charge, the district court asked the parties whether they had any new objections to the instructions or the manner in which they were read. Defense counsel responded that he had no objections. 11 The jury found Richitelli guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced Richitelli to imprisonment terms of life on Counts 1 and 2, 240 months’ imprisonment on Count 3, and 180 months’ imprisonment on Count 6, all to run concurrently, and 60 months’ imprisonment on Count 4, to run consecutively to the other counts. Richitelli filed this appeal.