Opinion ID: 6330934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: as an employer, j. supor must

Text: ARBITRATE ITS DISPUTE Under that definition, J. Supor is an employer. For the Dream Project, it agreed to hire drivers from one union chapter and contracted to pay into their Fund. Though we do not know whether it hired the drivers directly, it promised to pay into the fund either as a direct employer or on behalf of one. Pushing back, J. Supor says that even if it is an employer, the union orally committed not to hold it liable for withdrawal fees. But that does not matter. Arbitrability does not hinge on liability. See 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1). Besides, J. Supor agreed to pay into the fund, so it had to arbitrate any withdrawal disputes. Id. And parties may not contract to “evade or avoid liability” under the statute’s protections. Id. § 1392; Connolly v. Prison Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986). Even so, J. Supor argues on appeal, it was “deceived.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. And it repeats a line from its summary- 9 judgment brief: J. Supor “never would have signed the [agreement] had [it] not received assurances and promises from [a union representative] that [it] would not be obligated to pay withdrawal liability.” Id. at 11. That line gestures at the possibility that J. Supor was fraudulently induced to sign the very agreement that now makes it an “employer.” See Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. W. Penn. Teamsters & Emps. Pension Fund, 847 F.2d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 1988). That suggestion does not let J. Supor off the hook. Even if there was fraudulent inducement, that would at most make the agreement voidable. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(1). To avoid it, J. Supor would have to repudiate it. See id. § 380(2). But J. Supor has never rejected the agreement. On the contrary, it treats the “contribution clauses that required J. Supor to contribute to the [Fund]” as still binding. Appellant’s Br. 4. Yet it claims a “waiver of any withdrawal liability.” Id. at 10. Because it cannot get that carve-out, it is still bound to pay into the Fund—making it an MPPAA employer. Thus, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. On the record before us, J. Supor is an “employer,” so we have no jurisdiction over its withdrawal-liability dispute with the Fund. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a). But in resolving that threshold issue, we do not rule on the underlying merits. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). Instead, if J. Supor would like to continue to contest that liability, it must turn to arbitration. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a). 10