Opinion ID: 721106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conspiracy to launder money.

Text: 16 To establish a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1956 the government must prove: (1) an agreement to engage in criminal activity, (2) one or more overt acts taken to implement the agreement, and (3) the requisite intent to commit the substantive offense. United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir.1995). 17 The testimony of Sanchez-Concha provided sufficient evidence to convict Hilt for conspiracy to launder money. Sanchez-Concha testified that he and Hilt agreed to wire money to San Antonio. Sanchez-Concha also testified that government exhibits 1 to 144 represented wire-transfer proceeds that Hilt and others sent to San Antonio. Moreover, Sanchez-Concha testified that these proceeds were reinvested in future drug shipments and that Hilt knew of this arrangement. From this evidence, the jury could have found all elements of the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 II. Sufficient evidence supports Hilt's conviction for using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. 19 The indictment charged that Hilt did knowingly use a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, wit: attempted possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Hilt argues that sufficient evidence does not support the jury's findings that he (1) committed the underlying offense of attempted possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, or (2) used a firearm during this offense. 20 A. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Hilt attempted to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. 21 The elements of attempt to possess cocaine with intent to distribute are: (1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct, coupled with (2) an overt act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820, 826-27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 873 (1992). 22 The testimony of Martin Garza and Ron Batters provided sufficient evidence to establish that Hilt attempted to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. Garza testified that in July of 1992, he transported approximately three ounces of cocaine to Montana for Sanchez-Concha. Garza stated that after arriving in Montana he was taken to Hilt's trailer home. Hilt called several friends to inform them that Garza had arrived and these friends subsequently arrived at Hilt's trailer. At first, Garza sold the cocaine directly to Hilt's friends, but Hilt became angry because he was not making money on the transactions. Thereafter, Hilt sold the cocaine directly to his friends, and kept a share of the sale price for himself. 23 Garza testified that the next morning he left Hilt's trailer and rented a motel room. Later that day, Hilt arrived at the motel and knocked on Garza's door. Garza testified that he let Hilt into his motel room and Hilt was accompanied by Virgil Peffer. After entering the motel room, Hilt asked Garza to give him some cocaine, and Garza told Hilt that he could not without first being paid. At this point, Peffer pulled out a gun and Hilt asked: Are you going to turn me on now? Garza was then forced at gunpoint to turn over approximately one-half ounce of cocaine. Garza testified that he gave this cocaine to Hilt. 24 Ron Batters testified at trial on behalf of the government. Batters testified that he was at home when Hilt and Peffer returned from Garza's motel room. At this time, Peffer had possession of the cocaine. Peffer placed the cocaine on a table and told those present to help themselves. 25 The testimony of Garza and Batters was sufficient to allow a jury to find that Hilt intended to distribute the cocaine that he obtained in the robbery. Garza testified that prior to this robbery, Hilt had been distributing cocaine at his trailer. This evidence of prior distribution, in conjunction with the evidence of Hilt's robbery of the cocaine, was sufficient to allow a jury to infer the necessary intent. The evidence was also sufficient to allow a jury to find that Hilt took a substantial step toward the completion of the crime of possession with intent to distribute. Garza's testimony of Hilt's involvement in the robbery provided ample evidence to establish this element. 26 B. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Hilt used a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. 27 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides in part: Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. 28 The United States Supreme Court defined the term use in Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995). The Court held 29 that § 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense. 30 Id. at 505. To illustate activities that fall within this definition, the court wrote: 31 The active-employment understanding of use certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm. We note that this reading compels the conclusion that even an offender's reference to a firearm in his possession could satisfy § 924(c)(1). Thus, a reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the predicate offense is a use, just as the silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a use. 32 Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 33 Sufficient evidence supports Hilt's use of the firearm. As noted above, an offender can use a firearm by making reference to a firearm in his possession ... calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the predicate offense. Garza testified that after Peffer brandished the firearm, Hilt asked: Are you going to turn me on now? The jury could have found that this statement referred to the firearm and was intended to force Garza to turn over the cocaine--a change in the circumstances of the predicate offense. 34 The only other issue is whether the firearm was possessed by Hilt. The element of possession does not require proof of exclusive actual possession; it may be satisfied by proof of constructive or joint possession United States v. Bernard, 48 F.3d 427, 430 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Soto, 779 F.2d 558, 560, amended by, 793 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987)). To prove constructive possession, the government must establish (1) knowledge of the presence of the firearm, and (2) power to exercise dominion and control. Id. From Hilt's reference to the firearm, the jury could have found that he knew of its presence and was exercising dominion and control over it. 1 35 AFFIRMED.