Opinion ID: 848685
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Heading: the state's limited role under igra

Text: In order to understand the contractual nature of the compacts, it is essential to understand the state's limited role under federal law generally, as well as IGRA. Since at least 1832, the United States Supreme Court has recognized tribal sovereignty. In Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 31 U.S. 515, 557, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832), the United States Supreme Court noted that the tribes were distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States. This tribal sovereignty is limited only by Congress: The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). Similarly, only the federal government or the tribes themselves can subject the tribes to suit; tribal immunity is not subject to diminution by the States. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 756, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998). Through IGRA, however, Congress has permitted the states to negotiate with the tribes through the compacting process to shape the terms under which tribal gaming is conducted. The states have no authority to regulate tribal gaming under the IGRA unless the tribe explicitly consents to the regulation in a compact. Although 25 USC 2710(d)(1)(C) provides that class III gaming activities are only lawful if conducted in conformance with a tribal-state compact, that does not mean the states have any authority to regulate class III gaming activities in the absence of a compact. States may not enforce the terms of IGRA; rather, the only enforcement provided for in the IGRA is through the federal government. The IGRA provides that civil enforcement lies only with the tribes themselves or with the National Indian Gaming Commission, which was created by IGRA. 25 USC 2713. Judicial review of the Commission's decision may only be obtained in federal court. 25 USC 2714. Similarly, criminal enforcement is left solely to the federal government under 18 USC 1166(d). See also Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 545 (C.A.8, 1996) (Every reference to court action in IGRA specifies federal court jurisdiction.... State courts are never mentioned.). In other words, although it may be unlawful for the tribes to engage in class III gaming absent a compact, the Legislature is powerless to regulate or prohibit such gaming. State legislatures have no regulatory role under IGRA aside from that negotiated between the tribes and the states. In Gaming Corp., supra at 546-547, the court explained: Congress thus left states with no regulatory role over gaming except as expressly authorized by IGRA, and under it, the only method by which a state can apply its general civil laws to gaming is through a tribal-state compact. Tribal-state compacts are at the core of the scheme Congress developed to balance the interests of the federal government, the states, and the tribes. They are a creation of federal law, and IGRA prescribes the permissible scope of a Tribal-State compact, see § 2710(d)(3)(C). Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).] Such compacts must also be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. § 2710(d)(3)(B).    Congress thus chose not to allow the federal courts to analyze the relative interests of the state, tribal, and federal governments on a case by case basis. Rather, it created a fixed division of jurisdiction. If a state law seeks to regulate gaming, it will not be applied. If a state law prohibits a class of gaming, it may have force. The courts are not to interfere with this balancing of interests, they are not to conduct a Cabazon balancing analysis. This avoids inconsistent results depending upon the governmental interests involved in each case. With only the limited exceptions noted above, Congress left the states without a significant role under IGRA unless one is negotiated through a compact. The only way the states can acquire regulatory power over tribal gaming is by tribal consent of such regulation in a compact. In fact, our Legislature has recognized that the state's regulatory authority cannot extend to tribal gambling. MCL 432.203(5) provides that state regulation of tribal casinos can only occur [i]f a federal court or agency rules or federal legislation is enacted that allows a state to regulate gambling on Native American land. Absent such federal authorization, MCL 432.203(2)(d) acknowledges that the state's gambling regulatory requirements do not apply to [g]ambling on Native American land and land held in trust by the United States for a federally recognized Indian tribe on which gaming may be conducted under [IGRA]. Further, contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, 18 USC 1166 does not change this analysis. Section 1166 provides: (a) Subject to subsection (c), for purposes of Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State. (b) Whoever in Indian country is guilty of any act or omission involving gambling, whether or not conducted or sanctioned by an Indian tribe, which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State in which the act or omission occurred, under the laws governing the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment. (c) For the purpose of this section, the term gambling does not include  (1) class I gaming or class II gaming regulated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or (2) class III gaming conducted under a Tribal-State compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior under section 11(d)(8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act [25 USC 2710(d)(8)] that is in effect. (d) The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this section to Indian country, unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior under section 11(d)(8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act [25 USC 2710(d)(8)], or under any other provision of Federal law, has consented to the transfer to the State of criminal jurisdiction with respect to gambling on the lands of the Indian tribe. [Emphasis added.] Section 1166 does not grant the state regulatory authority over tribal gaming; rather, it simply incorporates state laws as the federal law governing nonconforming tribal gaming. Thus, although a state's gaming laws apply in the absence of a tribal-state compact, they apply only as federal law. It follows that when the Legislature approves a tribal-state compact, it approves a change in federal law rather than its own. Moreover, this federalization of state law regulating gambling does not give a state enforcement power over violations of state gambling laws on tribal lands because the power to enforce the incorporated laws rests solely with the United States. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma, 927 F.2d 1170, 1177 (C.A.10, 1991). The state remains powerless to assert any regulatory authority over tribal gaming unless the tribes have assented to such authority in a compact under IGRA. AT & T Corp. v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899, 909 (C.A.9, 2002). Although 18 USC 1166(d) effectively borrows Michigan law for purposes of federal law, it does not delegate any regulatory power to the states. Section 1116(d) is not a way to extend the state's power to regulate tribes through the federal government. Rather, the federal government may conclude at any time that it will no longer apply state law and so amend the IGRA. In other words, the fact that, for purposes of expediency, the federal government has currently chosen to apply Michigan law for purposes of federal law does not mean that it will always choose to do so. Therefore, § 1166(d) cannot be viewed as a delegation of regulatory power to the states.