Opinion ID: 807765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Postdeprivation Process

Text: As to postdeprivation process, the statute provides that if a license is suspended or revoked, the aggrieved individual may file a petition to obtain judicial review in the district court within ninety days after receiving notice of the revocation or suspension. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(f). The statute requires the district court to hold a hearing before making a determination as to the licensing decision, id., and the Massachusetts courts, before Heller, interpreted the statute as requiring an evidentiary hearing. Godfrey, 616 N.E.2d at 487; see also Moyer, 453 N.E.2d at 464. After such a hearing, a justice of the reviewing court may direct that a license be issued or reinstated to the petitioner if such justice finds that there was no reasonable ground for denying, suspending or revoking such 24 Section 129D also enables the owner of the firearm, within a year after surrender, to direct the custodian of the firearm to transfer it to any . . . person legally permitted to purchase or take possession of such firearms. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 129D. -51- license and the that petitioner is not prohibited by law from possessing same. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(f). This provision has been interpreted, in pre-Heller cases, as placing the burden of proof on the applicant to show that the licensing authority's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Howard, 794 N.E.2d at 606 (quoting Moyer, 453 N.E.2d at 464) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Godfrey, 616 N.E.2d at 488 (stating same standard); Ruggiero, 464 N.E.2d at 107 (same). Further judicial review may be had in an action in the nature of certiorari under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, § 4. Levine, 750 N.E.2d at 1000. Hightower's only argument as to why these postdeprivation procedures are inadequate is that the standard of review places the burden of proof on the individual challenging the revocation. Hightower failed to develop the argument or cite to any pertinent authority in her opening brief, so this claim is waived. See United States v. Berk, 652 F.3d 132, 137 n.5 (1st Cir. 2011) (issues not developed in the opening brief are waived), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1650 (2012). We also reject the notion that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, in conjunction with an evidentiary hearing where the aggrieved individual may introduce evidence to demonstrate that the licensing decision was erroneous, renders the postdeprivation judicial process inadequate. The arbitrary and -52- capricious standard of review is widely accepted in the context of reviewing agency action. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). And, unlike typical administrative review provisions, the Massachusetts statute allows the aggrieved individual to introduce new evidence before the reviewing court as to the licensing authority's determination. See Stavis, 2000 WL 1170090, at  (In one respect, the nature of the judicial review available in the district court under G.L. c. 140, § 131 is clearly broader than the review available under [Massachusetts's general administrative review provision] because the district court is authorized to re-examine the facts found by the licensing authority and find facts.). In addition, the Supreme Court has explained that [o]utside the criminal law area, where special concerns attend, the locus of the burden of persuasion is normally not an issue of federal constitutional moment. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Massachusetts legislature could have reasonably concluded that, on review in the district court, the burden should be placed on the aggrieved individual, who would be in the best position to present relevant evidence as to the suitability requirement. We reject Hightower's claim that the revocation scheme violates procedural due process. -53-