Opinion ID: 2586621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colorado's Practice in Criminal Appeals

Text: In our decision in McClendon v. People in 1971, we approved of the American Bar Association's approach to the Anders problem as outlined in its Standards for Criminal Justice  an approach that faithfully addresses the constitutional and ethical concerns at play when a court-appointed attorney concludes his client's appeal entirely lacks merit but that renders unnecessary the cumbersome procedure outlined in Anders for those states that have not otherwise addressed the issue. 174 Colo. at 12, 481 P.2d at 717-18. The Standards state, [c]ounsel for a defendant-appellant should not seek to withdraw from a case because of counsel's determination that the appeal lacks merit. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Criminal Appeals § 21-3.2(b) (3d ed.1993). Rather, [i]f the client chooses to proceed with an appeal against the advice of counsel, counsel should present the case, so long as such advocacy does not involve deception of the court. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function & Def. Function § 4-8.3 (3d ed.1993). Comments to Standard 4-8.3 (3d ed.) further elaborate this approach: Before the merits of an appeal are determined by an appellate court, the defendant is entitled to the zealous advocacy of a lawyer in fact as well as in name. . . . When a client seeks to prosecute an appeal against the advice of counsel that there is no hope for success, counsel should present the case but cannot deceive or mislead the court on behalf of the client. By requiring a lawyer to present her client's case, even where the attorney feels the appeal is meritless, the defendant's rights are protected through the normal course of appellate review rather than by some substitute therefor. Cf. Anders, 386 U.S. at 742, 87 S.Ct. 1396. [4] Underlying this approach is the determination that, despite the parties' arguments to the contrary, a court-appointed attorney who determines her client's desired appeal lacks merit does not face an intractable ethical dilemma: where a client enjoys rights to an attorney and an appeal, the action is not frivolous merely because it appears hopeless. [5] The parties here contend that disparate provisions of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct give rise to conflicting mandates where court-appointed counsel are directed by their clients to pursue an appeal they feel is without merit. Specifically, the parties note that, on the one hand, the preamble to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct states that, [a]s [an] advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. Furthermore, Colo. RPC 1.2(a) requires that a lawyer abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation. See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice; Prosecution Function & Def. Function § 4-8.2 (3d ed. 1993) (The decision whether to appeal must be the defendant's own choice.). On the other hand, though, the rules state that [a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous. Colo. RPC 3.1. Moreover, attorneys have a duty of candor to the court which prohibits them from knowingly making false statements of material fact or law, or knowingly failing to disclose adverse controlling legal authority. See Colo. RPC 3.3. The parties here urge that when a court-appointed attorney is directed by her client to pursue an appeal that the attorney feels is without merit, the attorney is put in the difficult situation of disregarding her client's wishes, presenting a frivolous appeal, or violating her duty of candor. We perceive no such dilemma. The ethical duties of a court-appointed attorney tasked with what she concludes to be a meritless appeal are not so incompatible as the parties insist. As the Arizona Court of Appeals noted: The duty of candor requires that an attorney not make a false statement of fact or law to a court, offer false evidence, or fail to disclose a material fact or controlling legal authority. None of those duties directly affects the task of arguing issues on appeal so long as counsel does not misstate the facts or the law. Denise H. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 257, 972 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct.App.1998) (citations omitted) (discussing analogous state rules of ethics). So long as the attorney does not misstate the facts or controlling law, she is free to present her client's arguments to the court as well as her client's desire to prevail. Moreover, an utter lack of merit does not render an appeal by right wholly frivolous. Comment 2 to the Colorado RPC 3.1 concerning meritorious claims describes a frivolous action as follows: [A]n action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. By approving of the ABA approach in McClendon, we implicitly held that, while the merit of an appeal may be related to a determination of its frivolity, a lack of merit alone is not sufficient to render a criminal defendant's appeal by right wholly frivolous. To the contrary, an appointed attorney cannot be held to have violated her ethical duties by presenting apparently meritless claims where her client's right to take the appeal is protected by law. If a defendant is not entitled to prevail on appeal, that conclusion will quickly become evident upon review of the controlling law and examination of the defendant's best arguments. Contrary to this approach, the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee has indicated that counsel may seek to withdraw where it is impossible to make a good faith argument for reversal. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 114 (2006). However, this assertion undervalues the role of an advocate in an appeal by right and equates advocacy with the requirement of a specific conclusion. Contra Anders, 386 U.S. at 743-44, 87 S.Ct. 1396. Certainly advocates are required to pursue good faith arguments on their client's behalf. Colo. RPC 3.1 cmt. 2. But a good faith argument need not conclude with the lawyer's assertion that her client is entitled to prevail. A legal argument is but a discussion of pertinent facts and the application of controlling law that highlights those components more favorable to the client. In those instances where it is possible, and with widely varying levels of success, a lawyer strives to calibrate her arguments such that they lead to the conclusion that her client's desired outcome is also the just and logical one. Indeed, where it is possible to do so, it is the lawyer's duty to do so. Of course, where it is impossible to reasonably assert that her client is entitled to prevail, we will not require her to so conclude, but neither will we entirely discount the value of the advocate's role merely because she cannot assert this final conclusion within her ethical bounds. A limitation on the substance of the advocacy does not undermine the value of an advocate's role, which remains  even without an assertion that the defendant is entitled to prevail  valuable to both the defendant and the court. Rather, where the facts and law leave no other option, a lawyer's conscientious and sensitive efforts to locate viable issues, honestly represent her client's impressions of injustice, and navigate the appellate process on her client's behalf are sometimes all that can be asked of a zealous advocate making a good faith argument. And where the client's rights to an appeal and to appellate counsel are protected by law, that role is not merely asked, it is mandated. An attorney has discretion to choose which arguments to make on appeal, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); what the attorney cannot do is choose not to pursue the appeal at all. If an attorney cannot discern a meritorious legal argument in support of her client's appeal, she must present those issues her client wishes to be addressed. Where neither law nor facts can be framed in support of her indigent client, a court-appointed attorney's obligation as a zealous advocate is fulfilled by accurately describing the facts of the case, locating and applying controlling law, and presenting the issues her client wishes to be considered. Of course, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. Colo. RPC 3.1 cmt. 1. Zealous advocacy may not allow the lawyer to make persuasive arguments in every instance, nor does it require the lawyer make a plea for a particular result. [6] Indeed, the substance of an advocate's brief in such an instance may differ only slightly from a so-called Anders brief. But the role of that advocate throughout the appellate process is crucial, and indeed guaranteed wherever the constitution or General Assembly has extended a litigant the rights to counsel and an appeal. In those rare instances where the law and the facts of a case conspire to confine the role of an advocate to helping her client locate the client's best arguments, even if apparently hopeless, the sensitive and compassionate representation of her client's best arguments, assisting the client in navigating the procedures of appeal, and directing the appellate court to the controlling law that should direct its review, the attorney will have fulfilled her duties and upheld her ethical obligations in doing so. Importantly, the ABA approach better protects a defendant's rights. As Judge Warner noted after her extensive review of state courts' implementation of the Anders decision, If the ultimate fairness of the proceeding is determined by the effectiveness of counsel in representing the defendant, then the goal should be to compel full representation through appeal and not to allow for that representation to be avoided. Anders in the Fifty States, 23 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at 661-62. Warner argues those states that refuse to allow attorneys to withdraw because they deem the appeal wholly meritless more effectively provide for the right to counsel than states that allow withdrawal. See id.; see also State v. Cigic, 138 N.H. 313, 639 A.2d 251, 254 (1994) (noting that the ABA approach preserves the adversarial nature of criminal appeals, which `is much to be preferred over [the Anders ] process in which the appellate judge feels obliged to act as a lawyer and the appellate lawyer feels constrained to rule as a judge.' (quoting Gale v. United States, 429 A.2d 177, 182 (D.C.App. 1981) (Ferren, J., dissenting))); State v. Gates, 466 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Mo.1971) (adopting the ABA approach and noting that Anders -style procedures put defense counsel in the awkward position of arguing against his client). Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court deemed it clear that appellate counsel's mere submission of a motion to withdraw under Anders cannot but result in prejudice to her client. State v. McKenney, 98 Idaho 551, 568 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1977). As Warner concluded, the real problem with [the Anders procedure] is that it creates two distinct classes of appellate review for criminal defendants and results in a failure of equal protection. Anders in the Fifty States, 23 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at 663. Our approval of the ABA approach in McClendon notwithstanding, divisions of the court of appeals have indicated that they would accept an Anders -style brief in conjunction with an attorney's motion to withdraw where an attorney determines her client's appeal is without merit. See, e.g., People v. Marquez, 37 Colo.App. 441, 548 P.2d 939 (1976). We here disapprove of that practice. Even where a court-appointed attorney feels her client's appeal is without merit, she must nonetheless abide by both her duties as an advocate and as an officer of the court. It is not the lawyer's role to pass judgment on a client's cause. ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 21-3.2 cmts. (2d ed. 1986). Finally, any claim that this court adopted the Anders procedure in Breaman in place of the ABA approach misreads that case. Breaman concerned post-conviction relief proceedings under Crim. P. 35(c), a context in which this court has not recognized a right to counsel. See 939 P.2d at 1350. There, the trial court appointed a lawyer for the defendant to review a defendant's claims and determine whether they were frivolous. In the process of disapproving of the trial court's actions confining the appointed lawyer to serving as a fact-finder rather than the defendant's representative, we recognized in a footnote that, while an Anders -style motion to withdraw is appropriate in criminal cases in some jurisdictions, it was unneeded for Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings. See id. at 1351 n. 1. The footnotefar from central to our ultimate holdingfocuses on those contexts where the defendant does not have a right to counsel, unlike the situation in Anders and unlike the situation presented here. Thus, the passing comment in Breaman neither controls nor informs our consideration in this case. Breaman does unequivocally state, though, that appointed counsel must act in the role of advocate and cannot act as a friend of the court. See id. That holding is consistent both with the Supreme Court's concern with the role played by appointed attorneys in Anders and with our conclusion here. Thus, an attorney appointed to a client with an appeal by right who concludes her client's appeal is without merit does not face an intractable ethical dilemma and so should not be allowed to withdraw from the case on that basis alone. Furthermore, due process and equal protection are best served through the normal course of appellate review, and an indigent defendant's rights are best protected where counsel presents her client's best arguments as an advocate. Thus, the procedure outlined in Anders is unnecessary in Colorado where the defendant's rights are protected through the normal course of appellate review notwithstanding his lawyer's misgivings about the merit of the appeal.