Opinion ID: 6344867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The KRPC 3.5(d) and 8.2(a) violations

Text: Huffman next argues KRPC 3.5(d) is unconstitutionally vague and suggests its application, along with KRPC 8.2(a), infringes on her rights to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 11 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. She also contends the evidence failed to prove she violated KRPC 3.5 and KRPC 8.2 because it did not establish her comments about Judge Marten were knowingly or recklessly false. The vagueness challenge is easily disposed of. Our precedent is clear that a respondent in a disciplinary action must either raise an issue before the panel or explain why it is properly before the court if raised for the first time on appeal. 65 [Kansas Supreme Court] Rule 6.02 sets out the requirements for filing an appellant's brief. In subparagraph (a)(5), it requires that '[i]f the issue was not raised below, there must be an explanation why the issue is properly before the court.' Although this rule applies to an 'appellant,' it is incorporated into disciplinary proceedings in this court through Kansas Supreme Court Rule 212 if a respondent has filed exceptions. Rule 212(e)(3) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 257) requires a disciplinary respondent to file a brief, sets forth the timeframe for doing so, and states: 'The briefs shall be of such number and form and be served in such manner as is provided by the rules relating to appeals in civil actions.' (Emphasis added.) Rule 6.02 specifies the form for Crandall's brief, and it required him to explain why the constitutional issue was properly before the court even though he had not raised it before the hearing panel. . . . Our caselaw makes clear that respondents in disciplinary cases must comply with Rule 6.02. We could cite a long line of cases in which this court has enforced Rule 6.02 when disciplinary respondents have filed briefs that do not comply with its requirements but note only a few to illustrate. See, e.g., Hawver, 300 Kan. at 1048 ('document attached to Hawver's brief is not properly before this court because it is not part of the record' as required by Rule 6.02[b]'); Dennis, 286 Kan. at 723 (faulting respondent's brief because it contained neither a statement of facts nor specific citations to the record on appeal as required by Rule 6.02[d] [2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 37]). In re Crandall, 308 Kan. 1526, 1541-42, 430 P.3d 902 (2018). In Crandall, the court held the respondent in an attorney discipline proceeding abandoned his First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to KRPC 8.5 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 382) and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 201 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 233) when he failed to make the arguments before the panel and failed to comply with Rule 6.02(a)(5)'s requirement that he explain why [the court] should consider his constitutional arguments when they are raised for the first time in his brief in this court. 308 Kan. at 1542. 66 Huffman's response brief does not challenge the Disciplinary Administrator's representation that she failed to raise the constitutional question before the panel. And her opening brief does not contain any explanation why the court should still consider the constitutional argument raised for the first time. Her response brief contains an explanation, but only by arguing she should not have to comply with the requirement. Neither brief cites or discusses Rule 6.02 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 35) or relevant caselaw. As to the merits of the rule violations, under KRPC 3.5(d) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 396), [a] lawyer shall not . . . engage in undignified or discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal. And under KRPC 8.2(a) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 432), [a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . . The panel concluded Huffman violated both rules when she recklessly made several false statements about Judge Marten in two motions asking him to reconsider his rulings. These statements included implying he had discriminated against her clients based on race or socioeconomic status, implying he decided based on power rather than truth, and accusing him of treating her differently than opposing counsel. Huffman argues there is no evidence the statements were knowingly or recklessly false. During Huffman's direct testimony, the panel's chairperson asked her to address the comments about Judge Marten. She testified that she did not make any excuse for them, that she wrote what I wrote, and that she did not intend it the way it came across. During cross-examination, the Disciplinary Administrator asked her whether she had any basis for writing that Judge Marten's commentary punctuates the socioeconomic disconnect of the Court with these clients and generally the middle class public, particularly of color, who cannot afford the fights and discovery obstructions of 67 the banks, other than your clients were African American and didn't win. Her response illustrates she had no basis for asserting this: I—this didn't mean to be like a race statement. This, from my perspective, has been misunderstood. This is more political speech. And the KCPA issue is political. I mean, I've been involved in a hearing between the House Judiciary. We changed the law to address some of the things that came out in In Re—In Re Larkin. But access to the Court and this comment about urgings on from, you know, counsel, I think does punctuate the fact that we do not have a system that gives equal advantage that, you know, we have this shortage. We have the middle class who can't afford these kind of fights when you're dealing with these type of big banks. And I think that those things are even more important to minorities. If I—you know, I thought about how it sounds like people are interpreting this, but I didn't play the race card. I didn't play the race card from my perspective on purpose, because I don't—well, I mean. Wells Fargo got hit with NAACP, they have their issues, but this was about—they would have filed that caveat whether my clients were white or black. I mean, but people don't have access to this. People can't afford these discovery wars. Later in cross-examination, she disavowed any belief Judge Marten was biased against R.B. and S.B. She testified: I—I think Judge Marten took the word of Wells Fargo, and I think the wool was pulled over his eyes. I do not believe that he would do anything that he didn't believe was true. And I think that goes back to the discovery and my urgings to tell the Court the truth. I do not think that Judge Marten harbored independent feelings against my client. And I do think that he was very frustrated by the idea that, you know, the case, 'um, was back. And I know in my heart that it would have been different if it had been in state court. I know what my venue was, I know what I was winning in front of that judge. 68 Taken together, her testimony demonstrates a serious lack of judgment in making these comments and statements. But we are also cognizant that judges and courts are not above criticism—even harsh criticism—by lawyers vigorously advocating sometimes unpopular causes on behalf of marginalized people. And balancing this against the equally important need for a decorous and orderly courtroom is an inexact endeavor at best. Given this, a majority of the court holds Huffman's statements do not rise to the heightened standard necessary to support the panel's conclusion that she violated KRPC 3.5(d) and KRPC 8.2(a). In reaching that decision the majority considered and weighed as significant the fact Judge Marten himself did not take affront to Huffman's comments or invoke contempt at the time. A minority of the court would have found violations of these two rules.