Opinion ID: 1043362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Compensation Provision

Text: This provision subjects a campaign organizer, as employer, to criminal prosecution for compensating employees assisting in the campaign in a manner prohibited in this section. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 13.008. The Compensation Provision has three subparts: (1) a ban on “compensat[ing] another person based on the number of voter registrations that the other person successfully facilitates,” Id. § 13.008(a)(1); (2) a ban on “present[ing] another person with a quota of voter registrations to facilitate as a condition of payment or employment,” Id. § 13.008(a)(2); and (3) a ban on “engag[ing] in any other practice that causes another person’s compensation from or employment status with the person to be dependent on the number of voter registrations that the person facilitates.” Id. § 13.008(a)(3). The plaintiffs do not challenge subpart (1). They contend, however, that the remaining provisions severely burden their ability to conduct registration drives by preventing them from rewarding or sanctioning employees based on performance. They submit that the provisions expose them to criminal sanctions if they either: (1) terminate or discipline a canvasser who performs poorly; or (2) reward high performers by promoting them or increasing their pay. The Secretary interprets the provisions as only imposing criminal sanctions on an employer who pays canvassers on a per-application basis or conditions payment or employment solely on a preset quota. However, I agree 44 Case: 12-40914 Document: 00512395979 Page: 45 Date Filed: 10/03/2013 No. 12-40914 with the district court that this interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.3 Subparts (2) and (3) prohibit an employer from conditioning employment on the number of applications collected or basing the employee’s compensation on applications collected. These restrictions effectively subject the plaintiffs to criminal sanctions for engaging in many common hiring and firing decisions. The Secretary argues that neither provision precludes general consideration of an employee’s productivity. However, when the employee’s job is to gather voter registration applications, the number of applications he obtains or facilitates is clearly an important measure of his productivity – a measure the Compensation Provision bars the plaintiffs from using as a basis for employment and compensation decisions. That these provisions hamper the voter registration activities of the plaintiffs is obvious. As the Sixth Circuit explained in striking down an Ohio compensation prohibition that banned “pay[ing] any other person for collecting signatures on election-related petitions or for registering voters except on the basis of time worked”: [W]hen petitioner’s means are limited to volunteers and to paid hourly workers who cannot be rewarded for being productive and arguably cannot be punished for being unproductive, they carry a significant burden in exercising their right to core political speech. Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375, 385-87 (6th Cir. 2008). 3 “[T]his Court may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction.” United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591-1592 (2010) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)). 45 Case: 12-40914 Document: 00512395979 Page: 46 Date Filed: 10/03/2013 No. 12-40914 Again, the Secretary’s justification for this provision is the need to combat voter registration fraud. The ban on paying compensation directly for each application obtained serves this interest and the plaintiffs do not challenge that provision. However, the remaining provisions further the state interest minimally, if at all, and burden speech and association by banning commonly accepted employment practices such as performance evaluations, performancebased pay, and the requirement of performance as a condition of employment. Violation of these provisions subject the employer to criminal prosecution and place an undue burden on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. In my judgment, the district court correctly enjoined enforcement of subparts (2) and (3) of this provision.