Opinion ID: 2617541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether killinger's conviction and sentence violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy

Text: For the first time on appeal, Killinger argues that each conviction for delivery of a controlled substance in the presence of a minor is based on the same conduct as one of the convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. In the Appellant's Brief, Killinger argues that the sentence imposed is excessive because the trial court effectively double-counted the same conduct for sentencing purposes. I.C. § 18-301. At oral argument before this Court Killinger's counsel asserted for the first time that Killinger's convictions violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. U.S. Const. amend. V; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. Killinger's sentence does not violate the statutory prohibition against multiple punishments for the same act or omission. I.C. § 18-301 provides that [a]n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one[.] However, the crime of manufacture or delivery of controlled substances where children are present is specifically excepted from the I.C. § 18-301 prohibition. I.C. § 37-2737A provides that: Any fine imposed under the provisions of this section shall be in addition to the fine imposed for any other offense, and any term of imprisonment shall be consecutive to any term imposed for any other offense, regardless of whether the violation of the provisions of this section and any of the other offenses have arisen from the same act or transaction. I.C. § 37-2737A(3). This specific exemption from the general statutory prohibition against separate punishments for one act or omission, which was enacted after the more general statute, limits the operation of I.C. § 18-301 in this case. See State v. Wilson, 107 Idaho 506, 508, 690 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1984) (Where two statutes deal with the same subject matter, the more specific will prevail.); Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544 (1980) (Thus to the extent of a conflict between the earlier and later statute .., the more recent expression of legislative intent prevails.). Killinger's sentence is not illegal on the basis that the same acts were punished under separate statutory provisions in violation of I.C. § 18-301. This Court will not consider Killinger's argument that these separate convictions violate the double jeopardy prohibitions of the Idaho and United States Constitutions. Killinger did not file a direct appeal from either his convictions or sentence, nor did Killinger raise this issue at the Rule 35 motion before the district court. This issue was not stated as an issue on appeal in Killinger's initial brief to this Court, and no authorities cited or arguments contained in either of Killinger's briefs on appeal raise these constitutional issues. Killinger's first reference to either the state or federal constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was made at oral argument before this Court. This Court will not address an issue that was neither presented to the trial court nor raised or argued through briefing before this Court. See State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993) (holding that Supreme Court will not address issue raised for the first time in reply brief).