Opinion ID: 776100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Temporary Insanity

Text: 18 While the guidelines do not address temporary insanity as a basis for departure, they do specifically address a significantly reduced mental capacity. USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. 4 Thus, the Sentencing Commission adequately considered mental capacity as a basis for downward departure and USSG § 5K2.13 provides the only basis for such a departure, 'foreclosing consideration of diminished mental capacity under section 5K2.0.' Premachandra v. United States, 101 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Dillard, 975 F.2d 1554, 1555 (8th Cir. 1992)). 19 A defendant must have committed a nonviolent offense to be considered for a downward departure under USSG § 5K2.13. United States v. Valdez, 146 F.3d 547, 551 (8th Cir. 1998). The jury convicted Petersen of multiple violent offenses. Accordingly, a departure based upon a reduced mental capacity or temporary insanity in the instant case is not authorized by the guidelines and is contrary to law. 20 The district court did not explicitly rely upon USSG § 5K2.13, but cited only USSG § 5K2.0 for its departure based on temporary insanity. Although this was error, as described above, we find the district court did not make adequate factual findings that could support such a departure in any event. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 56 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1995) (district court reviewed medical and psychological information prior to considering downward departure). 21 Facts considered by the court at sentencing must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Plumley, 207 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000). The defendant normally bears the burden of establishing a factor that would result in a reduction of his sentencing range. See United States v. Dinges, 917 F.2d 1133, 1135 (8th Cir. 1990). 22 The district court adduced no evidence with respect to Petersen's mental capacity. 5 The judge stated that he believed Petersen perpetrated the offenses because he did not want the divorce, was attempting to reconcile with his wife, [and] was attempting to keep his child on the reservation where he lived. The district court thus reasoned that Petersen's motivation was not the same as a typical sexual assault and abuse. 6 The district judge apparently relied only on his experience with divorce cases as a trial attorney, reciting his familiarity with cases where people are involved in divorce cases and who probably suffer some degree of temporary insanity. Whether or not the court's observation is true in general or in this case, beating, choking, threatening to kill and raping a spouse are neither excused nor mitigated by a pending divorce proceeding. The judge recognized that although Petersen's conduct occurred under a certain degree of temporary insanity, such insanity would not have constituted a legal defense. 23 We find the district court's factual finding of temporary insanity is not supported by the record and is clearly erroneous. Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing without consideration of temporary insanity or reduced mental capacity on the part of Petersen.