Opinion ID: 1869328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admissibility of Vickers' Prior Bad Acts.

Text: In his fourth assignment of error, Floyd contends that the district court erred in not allowing him to introduce evidence of specific incidents of Vickers' assaultive behavior [toward her former and current husbands] to combat the allegations that Vickers was abused by Floyd. [13] Floyd contends that his inability to introduce such acts limited his ability to attack Vickers' credibility. Again, we note that we review the district court's rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. As was noted above, § 27-404(1) generally provides that [e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character is not admissible for the purposes of proving that he or she acted in conformity therewith.... There are exceptions to this general rule. As relevant in this case, § 27-404(1) provides as follows: (b) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.... or (c) Evidence of the character of a witness as provided in sections 27-607 to 27-609 [dealing with the impeachment of witnesses]. Assuming without deciding that Vickers is a victim within the meaning of the statute, § 27-404(1)(b) would nevertheless be inapplicable. In order to be admissible, the evidence in question must be of a pertinent trait of character. `[P]ertinent' in the context of Fed.R.Evid. 404(a) is synonymous with `relevant,' [14] which is defined in Fed.R.Evid. 401, as well as in Neb. Evid. R. 401, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 2008). Section 27-401 defines [r]elevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. We conclude, however, that any evidence of specific instances of Vickers' assaultive behavior is not pertinent to this case. That Vickers and her former and current husbands might have had violent relation-ships is of no consequence when considering whether Floyd had the motive or intent to harm Vickers or whether he in fact fired the shot that killed Davis and her unborn child. As such, any specific instances of Vickers' behavior do not fall within the exception provided by § 27-404(1)(b). Nor is the evidence admissible to impeach Vickers' credibility under § 27-404(1)(c). The ability of a party to attack the credibility of a witness is set forth in Neb. Evid. R. 607 to 609, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 27-607 to 27-609 (Reissue 2008). Section 27-608 provides: (1) The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or opinion, but subject to these limitations: (a) The evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.... (2) Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in section 27-609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (a) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.... In this case, whether Vickers might have engaged in assaultive behavior in relationships with her former and current husbands is not probative to the truthfulness of her testimony that Floyd had the motive or intent to shoot her, or her testimony that Floyd fired the shot that killed Davis. As such, the evidence in question would be inadmissible to attack Vickers' credibility. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit evidence of Vickers' prior assaultive behavior. Floyd's fourth assignment of error is without merit.