Opinion ID: 1208887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances

Text: Montgomery makes a number of points in an effort to show that his statement was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. He states that Heiser incorrectly informed him that other passengers in the car had to give statements, when in reality neither had, and falsely claimed his prints were found on the gun. He also cites the investigators' claim that it was a possibility that federal charges may not have been brought if Montgomery had given a statement to Riddle earlier that day, and argues that the investigators wanted to give Montgomery the impression that he was hurting himself by refusing to speak to them. He acknowledges that the investigators told him he could speak with a lawyer, but says they should have told him the interview would terminate if he requested to speak with a lawyer. He also states that the procedure of having him read and initial an advice of rights form undermined the significance of the procedure. Finally, he cites his borderline intelligence and claims that this places him in the low borderline range of intellectual abilities, and thus made him more susceptible to police coercion. This court has held that [a] confession is voluntary if, in the totality of circumstances, it is the `product of a rational intellect and free will and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will.' United States v. Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir.1998)). Finding that the police engaged in coercive activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a suspect's confession was involuntary. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). We determine whether police conduct was coercive by examining factors such as the defendant's age, education, intelligence level, and mental state; the length of the defendant's detention, the nature of the interrogations; the inclusion of advice about constitutional rights; and the use of physical punishment, including deprivation of food or sleep. Huerta, 239 F.3d at 871. As we explained above, we do not find that the investigators promised a lighter sentence or more favorable treatment in exchange for a confession or statement from Montgomery. Montgomery does not claim that he suffered any kind of physical punishment or coercion, or that the investigators deprived him of food or sleep prior to the interviews. With respect to Heiser's incorrect answer to Montgomery's question about whether the other passengers in the car had to give a statement, that would not overbear Montgomery's free will. Montgomery had already been advised of his right not to give a statement earlier that day in his meeting with Riddle, and was once more advised of his right not to speak to the investigators prior to giving his videotaped statement. Montgomery's decision not to speak to Riddle earlier that day, and his back-and-forth with Heiser and Williams on his right to remain silent prior to giving the videotaped statement, demonstrate that he understood this right. The mere fact that Heiser was wrong when he stated that the two other suspects had given statements would not render Montgomery's statement involuntary, either. Heiser did not say that those statements implicated Montgomery, and the district court did not find any effort rising to the level of trickery. Even if Heiser had told Montgomery that the other passengers implicated him, there is no rule finding such conduct necessarily coercive. In fact, precedent holds that a police officer may actively mislead a suspect prior to obtaining a statement or confession so long as a rational decision remains possible. United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1131 (7th Cir.1990); see also United States ex rel. Hall v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 578 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.1978) (no ipso facto coercion when police told a suspect, wrongly, that co-defendants had implicated him as the ringleader). In this case Montgomery was fully advised of his rights prior to making a statement, and any belief that his two fellow passengers had also spoken to the police would not prevent him from making a rational decision about his options. Heiser and Williams' statements that an earlier statement may have kept the case at the state level, and that they could not say what a lawyer's presence would effectuate were not false promises of leniency in exchange for cooperation nor even really deceptive. Both statements were noncommittal. While they may not have fully apprised Montgomery of the legal landscape, such omissions are not inherently coercive behavior on the part of the police. The government acknowledges that Montgomery has borderline intelligence, but this factor alone does not result in a finding of coercion. At the time of his arrest, Montgomery was approximately forty years old and had prior experience with the criminal justice system. He appeared well aware of what was going on throughout the questioning: He understood the difference between the federal and state criminal justice system, he understood that he did not need to give a statement in his interview with Riddle, and in fact did not; and he noticed the differences between the two advice of rights forms he was asked to sign. Perhaps most significant of all, he asked relevant questions about his rights prior to giving his statement to the officers. While we take account of Montgomery's intelligence when determining whether his statement was voluntary, we do not find that it fatally affected the statement in this case. Finally, we note that the district court found no evidence that Montgomery was intoxicated, exhausted or otherwise incapacitated. The witnesses at the suppression hearing, from Keller to Riddle to Williams and Heiser, all testified that Montgomery was coherent and did not appear to be intoxicated or sleep deprived. While he and the other occupants of the car were, according to statements, drinking and smoking marijuana prior to Keller's traffic stop, this behavior apparently did not affect his choice to give a statement. In light of the totality of the circumstances, we concur with the district court that Montgomery made a rational choice to give a statement to Williams and Heiser and that his statement was not involuntary or the result of police coercion.