Opinion ID: 756950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of Position of Trust

Text: 9 Munson first argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted the meaning of position of trust. More specifically, she asserts that the district court applied outdated precedent that conflicts with the current language from Application Note 1 to U.S.S .G. § 3B1.3. 10 At the end of 1993, Application Note 1 was revised to state that a position of trust refers to a position characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature. 1 But the application note explains that the enhancement would not apply in the case of an embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk because such positions are not characterized by the above described factors. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n. 1). 11 Munson asserts that the district court relied on outdated precedent at sentencing when it referred to United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415 (7th Cir.1993). In Lamb, we stated that the pre-1993 Application Note's bank teller example has produced an undesirable amount of confusion. Lamb, 6 F.3d at 420; see, e .g., United States v. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913, 917-18 n. 2 (7th Cir.1994). We found that the bank teller exception conflicted with the plain language of the guideline. Therefore, we said the relevant question is whether the employee's position provided access or authority over valuable things. Id. at 420. 12 At sentencing here, the district court stated that, as in Lamb, this case reveals the unworkable nature of the bank teller example. Munson argues that the district court's citation to Lamb indicates that it relied on the outdated definition for position of trust as meaning access or authority over valuable things. She asserts that this definition is flatly contradicted by the revised application note and that this court's caselaw concerning abuse of trust needs an overhaul. Munson states that the 1993 revision comprehensively and clearly defines position of trust to exist if the employee has substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n. 1). She further argues that this court incorrectly still relies on Lamb's access or authority over valuable things definition to decide abuse of trust cases. United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Strang, 80 F.3d 1214, 1220 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Brown, 47 F.3d 198, 205 (7th Cir.1995). The government asserts that the record reflects that the court properly applied the definition from the revised application note. 13 The district court did not use the definition access or authority over valuable things from Lamb in finding that Munson abused a position of trust. In fact, the district court never mentioned the term access or authority over valuable things. Instead, the court relied upon Lamb for the proposition that the bank teller exception has created significant confusion in the federal courts and that [t]he instant case clearly reveals the unworkable nature of the bank teller example. Sentencing Tr. at 8 (quoting Lamb, 6 F.3d at 420). The district judge stated that he read the application note many times. The sentencing transcript shows that the district court relied on the amended application note because the district court paraphrased the note's language and found that the bank placed Munson in a position with professional or managerial discretion. Therefore, the district court's citation to Lamb does not indicate that the district court improperly interpreted § 3B1.3. 14 Munson also asserts that in order for a defendant to receive the enhancement for abusing a position of trust under the amended application note, the defendant must have decision-making authority over how to allocate her employer's money, as opposed to mere clerical discretion. She argues that although she had clerical discretion, as exhibited by her counting money and preparing the vault tickets, she lacked any decision-making authority. Munson draws this clerical exception from the examples given in the application note of actions that would constitute an abuse of a position of trust. In particular, Munson asserts that the examples of a bank executive's fraudulent loan scheme and a guardian embezzling a client's funds indicate that in order to receive the enhancement, an individual must have discretion over how money is allocated. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n. 1). Munson does not cite to a single federal abuse of trust case that refers to clerical discretion. According to the revised application note, the relevant question is whether the employee occupied a position with substantial discretion that contributed to facilitating the commission or concealment of the offense, and not whether that discretion could be termed clerical. Therefore, Munson's clerical discretion argument fails. 15 The district court made clear that it was following the revised application note in finding that Munson abused a position of trust. Therefore, we find that the district court did not incorrectly interpret § 3B1.3. 16