Opinion ID: 1440004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Count II

Text: (2) Diedrich contends that the conviction on count II must be reversed because no evidence was presented that any specific action regarding Anaheim Hills was pending before the board on December 31, 1974, the date identified in the count II indictment. The contention has no merit. The law does not require any specific action to be pending on the date the bribe is received. Penal Code section 165 prohibits asking or receiving a bribe to effect the consideration ... of any question or matter, upon which [a person named by the statute] may be required to act in his official capacity, ... (Italics added.) The use of the word may suggests that payments designed to alter the outcome of any matter that could conceivably come before the official are within the prohibition of the statute. In People v. Markham (1883) 64 Cal. 157 [30 P. 620], a contention similar to defendant's was rejected. In Markham, a police officer was charged with asking for and receiving a $15 bribe on the understanding that he would not arrest persons for violation of the gaming laws. On appeal Markham contended that no evidence was introduced showing that any one had committed the crime for which he had agreed not to arrest. Affirming the conviction, this court said: [W]e think when a police officer receives money in consideration of his promise that he will not arrest any one of a class of offenders against the criminal laws, he is guilty of receiving a bribe, because the case of one who has committed the offense, and the consequent duty of the officer to arrest is `a matter which may be brought before him in his official capacity.' We are of the opinion that a police officer who shall receive a weekly stipend, or a single payment of money, in consideration of his promise not to arrest any violator of the gaming law, is not only morally guilty, but may be found guilty under the statute. ... (Italics in original; Markham, supra, at p. 159.) In this case, there is ample evidence of matters that might have come before the board of supervisors: (1) zoning approvals for housing tracts to be developed, (2) allocation of gas tax for building roads in the area, (3) use of open space for orchards, and (4) sale of land needed for a flood plain to the county. Evidence concerning each of these issues was received at the trial. Of overriding importance, however, was the matter left open by the March 1974 vote. As noted, the terms of the March 6, 1974, agreement required AHI to dedicate to the county 954 acres for a perpetual easement in gross. Under the agreement, the boundaries of 504 of these acres were not specified and the county had the right to approve the selections when offered in the future. The land was to be ceded in 100-acre lots beginning in 1976 and continuing yearly until 1981. According to the testimony of John R. Shaddy, Orange County Manager of Facility Planning, AHI had a considerable stake in the county's approval of land it proffered. Land that was tentatively identified to be conveyed to the county was divided into three categories based on its slope. However, there was no provision in the agreement specifying the acreage in each category that would be conveyed to the county. It was possible, for example, that all of the land conveyed to the county could be in the 30-plus degree category. Depending on the slope of the land eventually selected, the value of the land conveyed could vary from $1.2 million to $2.9 million. The board had discretion to determine whether the land offered met the terms of the agreement. Clearly, the board's pending approval of this land was a matter that might come before Diedrich in his official capacity. [7] (3) Diedrich also contends that there was no evidence of any agreement or understanding that official action would be influenced by the payments alleged in count II of the indictment. Again we disagree. Once the agricultural preserve problem was out of the way, the purpose of the bribe alleged in count I was presumably accomplished. Yet a month later, Diedrich called Owen to request a $70,000 loan. In itself, this was questionable behavior for a legislator who had just voted on a matter specifically pertaining to AHI. Owen, in fact, testified that he thought the bribe attempt had ended when Remington encountered his legal problems and that, when Diedrich requested the loan, he thought, Here it comes again. Defendants contend that AHI's hiring of Leroy Rose to prepare a conceptual plan was based on his ability as an architect and planner, as well as political influence  that it was not a bribe. A number of witnesses, including Owen, testified that Rose was, in fact, known for his architectural abilities and political clout. Defendants further claim that the project for which Rose was hired was legitimate, not make work as the prosecution contended. There was, however, considerable evidence from which the jury could have inferred that at least a portion of the money flowing to Rose was intended as a bribe for Diedrich. Rose received $142,000 for a conceptual plan that was intended to influence the Anaheim City Council, but never appeared before the council to argue about grading ordinances. The council completed action on the proposed ordinance before a brochure explaining the plan was prepared. The plan Rose ultimately prepared, which was never implemented, cost almost three times as much as the master plan of Anaheim Hills and the design of the buildings it suggested violated existing building codes. Although Rose allegedly spent 900 to 1,000 hours on the job and produced a number of drawings and renderings, he was unable to justify his billings adequately. He testified that, of the approximately $142,000 he was ultimately paid, $60,000 was for his own efforts and the remainder for his employees' services. However, he could not produce time records establishing his employees' hours. He was also unable to fully document his own fees  testifying at one point that he billed AHI at $30 an hour (or $30,000 for 1,000 hours) but then explaining that the $60,000 figure was reached by adding fees for liaison work. Rose testified that his fees for liaison work were not hourly but were determined arbitrarily. The jury could easily have inferred that Rose's assignment was not legitimate. [8] In addition, there was evidence that Diedrich acknowledged that AHI's payments to Rose were intended for him. In September 1974, the $80,000 note that Owen helped Diedrich secure became due and was in default. Owen, apparently concerned that the default would jeopardize his own relations with the bank, called Diedrich and urged him to pay the loan. Diedrich responded to Owen's request: ... Mr. Rose hasn't paid me and you haven't paid him. Shortly after the call, AHI began to pay Rose substantial sums. Rose, in turn, paid $10,000 directly to Diedrich and $40,000 to Remington. Remington then cashed the checks from Rose and paid most of the money to Diedrich. The defendants' explanation of the pattern of payments flowing from Rose to Remington to Diedrich was wholly inadequate, raising more questions than it put to rest. Rose claimed that $30,000 paid to Remington was a finder's fee for architectural projects that Remington had directed to Rose and that $10,000 was a legal fee for collecting a debt. However, Rose was unable to specify the work Remington had done to earn these fees, commenting at one point: We never questioned people about finder's fees. No agreement was drawn up between Rose and Remington regarding Remington's purported legal services for Rose. Remington's testimony was strongly at odds with Rose's explanation of the payments. Remington testified that in late 1974 Diedrich asked if he could handle some additional income that year. He agreed. Shortly thereafter, Remington began to receive checks from Rose. When he called Rose to ask why the checks had been sent, Rose responded: Talk to Ralph [Diedrich]. Diedrich instructed Remington to run [the money] through [his] practice and pay the tax on it and give [Diedrich] the balance in cash. Remington testified that he did no work for Rose during this period, and that Rose had no financial obligation to him. Remington testified that he cashed the checks from Rose and, after keeping a small portion with which to pay taxes, [9] gave the cash to Diedrich. Although Diedrich denied that he received any cash from Remington during this period, the pattern of Remington's checking account deposits and Diedrich's payments on his loan support Remington's testimony. [10] All of this evidence strongly suggests that Diedrich not only received money from AHI, but that he actively attempted to hide the payments. In sum: While there is no express evidence of any agreement or understanding, the proven facts not only imply one, but are virtually irreconcilable with any other theory. The jury's conclusion that Diedrich was guilty as charged in count II was amply justified. [11]