Opinion ID: 1273939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Error in Allowing Hickman to Make a Judicial Confession of the Crime

Text: The majority hold ( ante, pp. 392-394) that the trial court erred in allowing Hickman (a convicted coconspirator who has not appealed) to testify in detail as to the facts of the crime and thus make a full judicial confession. The opinion asserts that such confession was elicited by a cross-examination that exceeded the scope of the direct examination of Hickman, which dealt only with the initially claimed, but subsequently disproved, involuntariness of his extrajudicial confession. In my view neither the established facts nor the applicable law support this holding. A reading of the relevant portion of the transcript (see especially fn. 1, post ) shows that the matter assertedly elicited or obtained by the prosecutor was in fact volunteered by Hickman in the course of an indubitably proper cross-examination. It is undisputed (see majority opinion, ante, p. 385, fn. 11a) that Hickman took the witness stand and testified on direct examination that his previous account (given on his request before the confession was received in evidence) of asserted events allegedly coercing his confession was true. The prosecuting attorney then cross-examined, and that inquiry began and progressed to the volunteer statement exactly as set forth in the margin. [1] It is apparent from this transcript that the italicized testimony  i.e., and the statement I gave Sergeant Wrona is the truth  was volunteered by Hickman rather than being responsive to any question theretofore asked by the prosecutor. [2] It is true that a number of the prosecutor's inquiries thereafter were phrased in the form, technically, of leading questions. But on cross-examination this is not improper. There is no indication that Hickman at this time was in any way reluctant to tell the truth on the witness stand: not only did he first volunteer the subject testimony, but throughout the entire remainder of the cross-examination he made no objection or motion to strike, and declined to join in those made by his codefendants. We may reasonably infer that Hickman  as he had every right to do  chose this course of action in the hope of impressing the jury with his candor and asserted minimal participation in the actual shooting and thus warrant a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. [3] Hickman's tactics proved justified, as in his case the lesser penalty was in fact assessed by the jury; and it is significant that Hickman, alone of those convicted, chose neither to move for a new trial nor to appeal. The majority's extended discussion about hearsay in relation to Hickman's testimony appears to be devoid of materiality because no such issue is actually involved. As counsel at the trial apparently well knew, Hickman's judicial confession was not subject to hearsay objection at all. This, the majority ultimately acknowledge ( ante, p. 393): the factual testimony of any witness, given in open court, is not hearsay. But the opinion nevertheless ascribes error to this portion of the trial: it holds that the subject cross-examination of Hickman exceeded the scope of his direct examination. As will next be shown that holding is untenable for at least three independently adequate reasons. To begin with, the record discloses that the only objection made on the ground that the cross-examination of Hickman exceeded the scope of the direct was belatedly voiced by counsel for Robinson ; no such objection was at any time made or joined in either by Hickman, who was the defendant actually being examined, or by Drivers, who now benefits from the asserted error. Robinson's objection came too late, in that Hickman had already testified without such objection that his extrajudicial statement was true and in particular that he and Robinson and Drivers had several times discussed robbing the Fox Hills Country Club about three weeks before the night of the crime. Moreover, no motion was made by any defendant to strike the latter testimony, which therefore remained in the record for the jury to consider with the defendants' acquiescence. Secondly, even if a timely objection had been made by the proper party it would not have warranted restricting the prosecutor's right of cross-examination in the circumstances here shown and under existing law. It has been held in varying contexts that if a defendant in a criminal case volunteers a statement on cross-examination he may be further examined thereon by the prosecuting attorney (or judge), even though the statement concerns matters which were not embraced in his direct examination. ( People v. Peete (1946) 28 Cal.2d 306, 321 [10] [169 P.2d 924]; People v. Sutton (1887) 73 Cal. 243, 244-245 [15 P. 86]; People v. Shields (1945) 70 Cal. App.2d 628, 638 [7] [161 P.2d 475]; People v. Fitch (1938) 28 Cal. App.2d 31, 44 [6] [81 P.2d 1019].) Applying that rule to the case at bench, the subject cross-examination would thus have been proper even if it had technically exceeded the scope of Hickman's direct examination. Thirdly, it does not appear that the latter's scope was exceeded in any event. The majority acknowledge ( ante, p. 392) that it was a proper subject of cross-examination to ask Hickman whether the facts stated [in his extrajudicial confession] were true, on the theory that the truth or falsity of the statement is a fact from which the jury might infer that it was voluntary. But the majority then assert ( ante, p. 393) that the truth or falsity of any fact, without relation to the extrajudicial statement, bore no relationship to the matter developed on direct. That point would be relevant only if during the subject cross-examination some new fact had appeared; but again the record is otherwise, and discloses that no substantial incriminating fact was elicited or obtained in this cross-examination that had not already been brought out in the admittedly proper reading of Hickman's extrajudicial confession to the jury. It follows under the majority's analysis that the prosecutor would have remained within the bounds of a proper subject of cross-examination if only he had prefaced each factual inquiry with the phrase, Is it true that, as you said in your prior statement given to Officer Wrona on February 4, 1962, and heretofore read to the jury, . .? It would be a time-wasting exercise to require the prosecutor to repeatedly utter such a ritualistic formula. He was properly seeking to verify the portions of truth, if any, in Hickman's extrajudicial statement; what more logical and effective way to do so than to ask Hickman if each of the confessed events actually occurred? There can be no doubt that the court and the jury understood the prosecutor's purpose and the significance of his questions. Hickman's answers, of course, constituted a judicial confession implicating each of his codefendants, but the latter have no ground to complain of its admission in evidence against them. As noted above (and as the majority acknowledge), such a confession is not hearsay; rather, it is direct evidence competent for the proof of all elements of the crime ( People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 445 [18] [20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].) It was volunteered by Hickman for reasons best known to himself; [4] and if in so doing he also dealt a blow to his codefendants' chances of acquittal, such is a risk that must be run by those who conspire together to break the law. It is, after all, far from rare that one of a band of arrested conspirators decides to unburden his guilt at the bar of justice, and his partners in crime must be prepared to face that eventuality.