Opinion ID: 2143669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal of Self-Defense Instructions

Text: The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing two of his instructions on self-defense. He claims that each tendered instruction is a correct statement of law supported by probative evidence and was not covered by other instructions. The defendant tendered an instruction stating: One who is confronted on his own property with a crime is entitled to great latitude in protection of his right and property. Record at 162. The trial court rejected this instruction and instead modified another tendered by the defendant. The modified instruction was read to the jury: Also, at the time this charge was filed there was in full force and effect a statute in Indiana entitled Use of Force to Protect Person or Property, Qualified Immunity from Legal Jeopardy[,] the pertinent parts of which read as follows: A person is justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person is justified in using deadly force only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself or the commission of a forcible felony. No person in the State shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting himself or his family by reasonable means necessary. Not withstanding (sic) what I just read, a person is not justified in using force if he is committing or escaping after the commission of a crime, if he provokes unlawful action by another person with intent to cause bodily injury to the other person or he has entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor, unless he withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person his intent to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action. Record at 745-46. In giving this instruction, the trial court did not paraphrase Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(b), which addresses the use of force to protect one's dwelling or curtilage. The defendant claims that his tendered instruction was necessary to inform the jury that he was entitled to great latitude in protecting himself and his home. The trial court's instruction substantially covers the subject of the justified use of force to protect oneself and one's property. Also, the defendant's tendered instruction does not mention the protection of one's home, and the protection of property was not truly involved in this case. The trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant's tendered instruction. The defendant also tendered an instruction that stated: Defendant, in prosecution for homicide, may prove specific acts of violence committed by deceased upon third parties of which the defendant has knowledge, by the homicide, to show defendant's state of apprehension, there being some evidence of self defense. Record at 163. This language appears in similar form in McKee v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 590, 598, 154 N.E. 372, 375, wherein this Court held that such evidence is admissible. McKee and other cases cited by the defendant do not involve use of this rule of admissibility as an instruction. An instruction serves to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading it and to enable it to understand the case and arrive at a just, fair and correct verdict. Fox v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 221, 225. A jury must be instructed on matters that are necessary for its information in arriving at its verdict. Id.; Rogers v. State (1979), 272 Ind. 65, 74, 396 N.E.2d 348, 354. An instruction that is apt to mislead or confuse the jury should be refused. Fox, 497 N.E.2d at 225; Eddy v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 24. Generally, an instruction should not single out the testimony of a specific witness, but should instead apply equally to all witnesses. Blackburn v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 139, 142, 390 N.E.2d 653, 655. The defendant's tendered instruction is not a proper instruction for at least two reasons. The instruction needlessly singles out and emphasizes the testimony of one defense witness. This is unlike the situation where an instruction may be helpful in eliminating possible confusion of the jury, such as instructions on expert testimony, Lynn v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 297, 392 N.E.2d 449, a defendant's confession, Tanner v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 665, and deposition testimony, Ingram, 547 N.E.2d at 829. Secondly, the phrase there being some evidence of self defense could mislead the jury and invade its function by directing it that there was qualifying evidence of self-defense. The jury was entitled to find that self-defense was not presented by the facts of this case. The trial court properly refused the defendant's instructions on self-defense. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER and GIVAN, JJ., concur. PIVARNIK, J., not participating.