Opinion ID: 871601
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The General Intent Holding

Text: The Yamamoto panel held, [I]n a charge of OVUII under HRS § 291E-61(a)(1), a general intent crime, the state of mind can be inferred without specification in the charge. Yamamoto, SDO at 9 (footnoting citations to State v. Kane, 3 Haw.App. 450, 457, 652 P.2d 642, 647-48 (1982); State v. Bull, 61 Haw. 62, 66, 597 P.2d 10, 13 (1979); Territory v. Tacuban, 40 Haw. 208, 212 (1953); and State v. McDowell, 66 Haw. 650, 651, 672 P.2d 554, 555 (1983)). The distinction between general intent and specific intent crimes, however, no longer applies. This court noted in 2000 that, upon the adoption of the Hawai`i Penal Code in 1973, the only relevant states of mind are intentional, knowing, reckless, and negligent states of mind. [A]rguments concerning specific and general intent are no longer relevant. Hawai`i has adopted the [Model Penal Code's] state of mind requirements, which have abandoned the common law concepts of specific intent and general intent, in favor of four defined culpable states of mind. . . . In that regard, this court, in applying the [Hawai`i Penal Code], has indicated that a state of mind with which the defendant acts applies to all elements of the offense, unless otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense. Kalama, 94 Hawai`i at 65, 8 P.3d at 1229 (citations omitted). See also State v. Pesentheiner, 95 Hawai`i 290, 300, n. 10, 22 P.3d 86, 96, n. 10 (App.2001) (By clearly articulating the mens rea elements utilized by the penal code, HRS § 702-206 extirpates from any analysis of guilt or innocence reference to general or specific intent.). The Nesmith majority, unlike the Yamamoto panel, did not explicitly use the term general intent when it held that an intentional, knowing, or reckless state of mind can be inferred from the conduct alleged in an HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) charge. 125 Hawai`i at 238, 257 P.3d at 251. However, in reaching this holding, the Nesmith majority favorably cited Kane, McDowell, Tacuban, and State v. Torres, 66 Haw. 281, 660 P.2d 522 (1983). 125 Hawai`i at 237-38, 257 P.3d at 250-51. Kane and McDowell are cases in which our appellate courts have specifically held that intent can be inferred from the allegations in the charge for general intent crimes. Kane held, With a general intent crime, the statement of the act itself implies the requisite intent. 3 Haw.App. at 457-58, 652 P.2d at 647 (citing Tacuban ). McDowell held that possession of a sawed-off rifle is a general intent crime; further, under HRS § 806-28, a particularized allegation of general intent in the indictment is not required. 66 Haw. at 651, 672 P.2d at 555 (citing Kane ). We note, however, that Torres and Tacuban are not explicitly general intent cases. Torres held, without addressing whether incest was a general intent crime, Incest as charged here is an offense where intent can be inferred because `sexual intercourse' under the circumstances alleged could only be a willful act. 66 Haw. at 289, 660 P.2d at 527. Similarly, Tacuban held, without any discussion on general intent, An essential ingredient of an offense [in this case, gambling] may be alleged inferentially as well as directly and when so alleged is sufficient[.] 40 Haw. at 212 (citation omitted). In light of the clear abrogation of the general/specific intent distinction in Kalama, it was erroneous for the Yamamoto panel to hold that HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) is a general intent offense for which mens rea can be inferred from the allegations in the charge. To the extent the Nesmith majority may have relied on the distinction between general and specific intent in reaching its holding, it also erred.