Opinion ID: 1600170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Discussion of the law of Sovereign Immunity

Text: Without doubt the doctrine of sovereign immunity has to apply in this case. Although this Court abolished this doctrine in Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1982)  effective July 1, 1984, it is still firmly entrenched in our law. This is not so because of any action of this Court, but because the legislature responded to Pruett by enacting the Sovereign Immunity Act of 1984. See Ch. 495, 1984 Miss. Laws. Now codified as Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1, et seq. (Supp. 1990), the legislature has reenacted annually this statute which provides in pertinent part: [A]s a matter of public policy ... after July 1, 1991, the state [3] and, ... October 1, 1991 its political subdivisions ... shall not be liable and shall be immune from suit ... on account of any wrongful or tortious act or omission ... Notwithstanding that any such act or omission constitutes or may be considered as the exercise or failure to exercise any duty, obligation or function of a governmental, proprietary, discretionary or ministerial nature ... Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3 (Supp. 1990); see also McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871, 876-77, n. 2 (Miss. 1989). The Immunity Act also provides a waiver of immunity after July 1, 1991, for states and after October 1, 1991, for political subdivisions. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5(1) (Supp. 1990). But, claims, as to the state, which accrued prior to July 1, 1991 and after October 1, 1991 as to political subdivisions are not affected by this statute and are governed by the case law governing sovereign immunity as it existed immediately prior to the decision ... of Pruett.  Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1990). Consequently, the holding in Pruett has never come into effect. Webb v. County of Lincoln, 536 So.2d 1356, 1358 (Miss. 1988). And, the state, and its political subdivisions ... have continuously remained protected from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it existed prior to [the Pruett decision]. Richardson v. Rankin County School District, 540 So.2d 5, 8 (Miss. 1989). Since this case arises out of an accident which occurred on June 15, 1967, pre- Pruett law governs, and all claims of tort liability against state agencies are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity absent statutory authority to the contrary. Joseph v. Tennessee Partners, Inc., 501 So.2d 371, 374 (Miss. 1987); see also White v. City of Tupelo, 462 So.2d 707 (Miss. 1984) (since this cause of action accrued on October 13, 1980, we must analyze pre- Pruett decisions to determine whether the lower court properly applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity in this case); Marshall v. Chawla, 520 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Miss. 1988) (causes accruing before July 1, 1984 are governed by the traditional common law immunities); and Region VII, Mental Health v. Isaac, 523 So.2d 1013, 1015 (Miss. 1988) (same). We, therefore, briefly turn to some pre- Pruett cases. One of the earlier cases we must look to is Stewart v. State Highway Commission, 166 Miss. 43, 148 So. 218 (1933). In that case, this Court relied on a prior case, State Highway Commission v. Gulley, 167 Miss. 631, 145 So. 351 (1933), which held that the highway commission is an official agency of the state; consequently, it is not subject to suit. Id. at 647, 145 So. at 354. Gulley construed Chapter 122, Section 5006(c) of the Miss.Code 1930 [4] and concluded that the general statutory grant of authority to sue the commission does not create any liability or authorize suit against it for any liability not authorized by statute, either expressly or by necessary implication. Id. Thus, in Stewart, where the appellant was suing the highway commission for personal injuries sustained as a result negligence by an employee of the commission, this Court concluded that the general statutory grant of authority to sue the [highway] commission does not impose liability for the negligence of its officers, agents, or employees, and there is no other statue imposing such liability. 166 Miss. at 49, 148 So. at 219. In a more recent case, Karpovs v. State, 663 F.2d 640 (5th Cir.1981), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a suit for wrongful death filed against the highway commission was barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 646. In its opinion the court explicitly relied on Stewart, supra, and Gulley, supra, and concluded that [w]e are cited to no statute, and independent research reveals no authority that imposes liability on the MSHC... . Id. Likewise, in the case, sub judice, McKay has failed to provide that statute or other authority which imposes liability. Moreover, that sovereign immunity still exists for the Highway Commission was reaffirmed recently in Webb, 536 So.2d at 1359. [5] McKay next asserts that his claim is different because it alleges more than negligence. Specifically his complaint is grounded in public nuisance, a concept rather universally accepted as a cause of action ... that transcends the tradition[a]l notions of sovereign immunity which the Pruett case found to be unjust. (Brief of Appellant at 2). In support of this position, McKay relies on the following language: Although the courts have sometimes spoken interchangeably about the tort concepts of negligence and nuisance, the terms are not synonymous, but describe completely distinct concepts, which constitute distinct torts, different in their nature and in their consequences ... [N]uisance is the invasion of plaintiff's interest in the reasonable use and enjoyment of his land, which invasion can be caused by conduct of a defendant which is either intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous. ... [Nuisance and negligence] may be, and frequently are, coexisting and practically inseparable, as where acts or omissions constituting negligence also give rise to a nuisance ... The distinction between negligence and nuisance is of some importance with regard to the question of liability of owners or occupants of property for injuries created by reason of defects or hazards on the property or by activities of owners or occupants or their servants or employees.       ... [W]hile negligence has sometimes been defined as the failure to exercise the degree of care demanded by the circumstances, a defendant's failure to act reasonably, which is an essential element of negligence, is simply not relevant to a determination of nuisance; liability for nuisance, unlike liability for negligence, exists regardless of the degree of care exercised to avoid injury. The creation or maintenance of a nuisance is a violation of an absolute duty, the doing of an act which is wrongful in itself, whereas negligence is a violation of a relative duty, the failure to use the degree of care required under particular circumstances in connection with an act or omission which is not of itself wrongful. At time it is said that to constitute a nuisance there must be a degree of danger which is likely to result in damage inherent in the thing itself, beyond that arising from the mere failure to exercise ordinary care in its use.       Nuisance is a condition and not an act or failure to act... . In short, as distinguished from negligence liability, liability in nuisance is predicated upon an unreasonable injury rather than upon unreasonable conduct. 58 AM.JUR.2d NUISANCES §§ 9-11, pp. 676-78 (1989). Another section of this legal encyclopedia, to which McKay failed to cite, provides that [i]t has been said that an act cannot be a nuisance if it is lawful, and that, although it otherwise would be a nuisance, the doing of that which the law authorizes cannot be a nuisance... . However, in general, legality is not conclusive on the issue of whether a nuisance exists, the fact that an act may otherwise be lawful does not necessarily prevent it from constituting a nuisance, either public or private, which result has, in some instances, been expressly mandated by statute. 58 AM.JUR.2d NUISANCES § 462, p. 1032 (1989). There is also useful language from a separate volume, which provides the following: There is a general agreement upon the proposition that any permanent, fixed, or stationary object or impediment, as distinguished from a mere temporary obstruction incidental to a lawful use of the way, which unreasonably and unnecessarily interferes with public travel, or which endangers the safety of travelers, constitutes a public nuisance per se.... It follows from the foregoing statements that an obstruction may be a nuisance although it occupies only a part of the way and sufficient space still remains to accommodate public travel, or although it is outside the traveled or worked part of the way, or even though it is in fact a thing of public convenience or benefit. A necessary corollary of the foregoing statement of general rules is that an obstruction made in the proper exercise of a proprietary right or pursuant to due public authorization, and maintained in a proper condition, is not regarded as a nuisance. However, one invoking the protection of such authorization must show that he acted strictly within the authority conferred, and where an authorization to obstruct the public way is exercised in an improper manner, the obstruction becomes a nuisance of a kind which arises out of negligence. 39 AM.JUR.2d HIGHWAYS, STREETS, AND BRIDGES, § 274, pp. 661-62 (1968) (emphasis added). In addition to the above language, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, comment f (1979) provides that if conduct, that ordinarily would be a nuisance at common law, is fully authorized by statute, ordinance or administrative regulation [it] does not subject the actor to tort liability; see also Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts § 29.4, p. 609-11 (In the absence of statute or constitutional provision it is doubtful whether the state is liable for the creation or maintenance of a condition that would be a nuisance if a private person created or maintained it) (emphasis added). Undoubtedly the Highway Commission has the duty and authority in the control and supervision of the construction and maintenance of the highway system. See, MISS. CODE ANN. § 65-1-8 (Supp. 1990). This obviously includes the construction of bridges along the state's highways. Still, McKay insists that Mississippi case law supports his public nuisance contention. For this proposition he relies on United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Jones, 236 Miss. 471, 111 So.2d 240 (1959). In that particular case, the facts detail an accident on one of the state's highways. A father allowed his fourteen year old son to drive his car, and in turn, the son permitted one of his friends to drive the car. Id. at 484-85, 111 So.2d 240. The friend, who had been driving 90 mph, entered a curve and while slowing down, the car left the road and hit a concrete post, which was 3 to 3 1/2 feet from the road. [6] Id. at 485, 487, 489, 111 So.2d 240. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found several defendants liable for injuries that the plaintiff suffered. The pipe line company appealed claiming that it was entitled to a directed verdict. Id. at 483, 111 So.2d 240. In reaching the conclusion that the pipe line company was not entitled to a directed verdict, the court made the following announcements, which McKay relies: Highway officers have no power to surrender the use of the highway for private purposes, or to authorize a nuisance on the highway. If the public authorities, in authorizing an obstruction, exceed their powers, such obstruction will be illegal ... Any unauthorized obstruction which unnecessarily impedes or incommodes the lawful use of a highway is a public nuisance at common law... . Even though the entire width of a highway is not prepared for travel, or although a bridge or culvert does not extend to its entire width, the public rights of passage are not thereby limited in favor of one who places an unauthorized or improper structure within the highway limits, nor is the latter relieved from liability for injuries resulting therefrom by reason of the fact that such obstruction is outside of the traveled way... . One is not justified in obstructing a highway because he leaves sufficient room for the passage of the public. An obstruction placed anywhere within the highway limits, although outside of the traveled part, may constitute a nuisance. The same is true of any object placed close to the roadway, constituting a present source of danger ... Id. at 496-97, 111 So.2d 240 (citations omitted). Clearly the most distinguishing point in that case, when comparing it to the case sub judice is that there the parties were not suing the state. The question in that case was narrowly focused and limited to whether the pipe line company was entitled to a peremptory instruction. With this in mind, it was appropriate for the trial court to dismiss the action against the State Highway Commission because it was cloaked with the doctrine of sovereign immunity and could not be sued. Now, we turn our attention to the assignments that relate to Boyd.