Opinion ID: 199137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unlawful Termination

Text: 22 We begin with Marcano's claim for unlawful termination, which the district court dismissed at the close of evidence following Pueblo's motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). We review the grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, examining the facts and the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Andrade v. Jamestown Hous. Auth., 82 F.3d 1179, 1186 (1st Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we do not consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence. See Richmond Steel, Inc. v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1992). To affirm the withdrawal of any claim from the jury, we must find that, as a matter of law, the record would permit a reasonable jury to reach only one conclusion as to that issue. Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1994). However, [a] mere scintilla of evidence will not rise to a triable issue of fact necessary to avoid dismissal under Rule 50. Irvine v. Murad Skin Research Lab., 194 F.3d 313, 316 (1st Cir. 1999). 23 Plaintiffs' unlawful termination claim is governed by the burden-shifting analysis originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999) (In order to facilitate inquiries into whether an employer's adverse employment decision was motivated by an employee's disability, courts generally use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme.). The basic framework of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is well known: 24 [A] plaintiff who suffers from a disability makes out a prima facie case of employment discrimination by demonstrating that she is a member of a protected group who has been denied an employment opportunity for which she was otherwise qualified. Such a showing gives rise to an inference that the employer discriminated due to the plaintiff's disability and places upon the employer the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. This entails only a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion; the task of proving discrimination remains the plaintiff's at all times. Once such a reason emerges, the inference raised by the prima facie case dissolves and the plaintiff is required to show . . . that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. 25 Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations and footnote omitted). This analytical framework was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., in which the Court clarified that once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case and the employer has offered a nondiscriminatory justification, although the presumption of discrimination 'drops out of the picture' once the defendant meets its burden of production, the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing plaintiff's prima facie case 'and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.' 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000) (citations omitted). 26 We first address whether Marcano made out a prima facie case of discrimination. Pueblo argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie demonstrating because she cannot show that other similarly situated persons, not in the protected class, were treated more favorably. See Ruiz v. Posadas de San Juan Assocs., 124 F.3d 243, 247-48 (1st Cir. 1997). In this regard, defendant stresses that the reduction in force was implemented blindly, solely according to seniority within each job classification and geographic area, and that within that body of employees no individual with less seniority than plaintiff was retained. Plaintiff's only response is that she was improperly classified as a produce clerk in the first place, and her suggestion that such classification was discriminatory. However, plaintiff offers no evidence that other similarly situated employees without physical disabilities were treated differently with regard to their classification. To the contrary, the record shows that all weight station clerks (plaintiff's prior position) were reclassified as produce clerks in 1996. Defendant also notes that plaintiff's position was not subsequently filled by a person without a disability and argues that this is further indication that her termination was made on a legitimate and nondiscriminatory basis. 27 Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that discrimination was a motivating factor in her termination. All evidence in the record supports the contrary conclusion--that her termination was the result of a legitimate reduction in force by Pueblo. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's unlawful termination claim on this ground alone. 28 However, even if Marcano had succeeded in making a prima facie showing of discrimination, her claim would founder on the remaining steps of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry for essentially the same reasons that her prima facie case is deficient. Pueblo stated a nondiscriminatory justification for terminating Marcano and she failed to offer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that such justification was pretextual. At trial, Pueblo presented a plethora of evidence that Marcano was terminated on January 24, 1997, due to a reduction-in-force implemented by the corporation for economic reasons. This evidence included the following: In 1996, Pueblo retained the services of Deloitte & Touche to evaluate Pueblo's operations. Deloitte & Touche recommended that Pueblo reduce its managerial and salaried full-time personnel. Pueblo made the decision to implement that recommendation and reduce its workforce. The company informed the Uni&#8804;n de Empleados de los Supermercados Pueblo, and a stipulation and release was negotiated and executed with the union on January 17, 1997. Pursuant to the terms of this stipulation, the RIF was implemented in strict adherence to employee seniority within each job classification and geographic area. The determination of which employees to dismiss as part of the layoff was a mathematical and blind determination which did not take into consideration any criteria other than seniority. The individual stores had no input in the determination, and the entire process was kept confidential. Including Marcano, the RIF affected 294 regular employees and 197 management employees. Within Marcano's job classification and geographical area, no employee with less seniority than her remained employed by Pueblo after the RIF. 1 29 Given this evidence, there is no question that Pueblo met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Marcano. The burden shifts, therefore, back to Marcano to show that Pueblo's justification--the reduction in force--was a pretext for discrimination. In this regard, Marcano relies primarily on her allegation that she was never properly transferred from the cashier position and that, on January 24, 1997, her classification should have been bagger/cashier. From the record, it appears that if Marcano had been classified as a bagger/cashier on January 24th, she would not have been terminated as part of the RIF. Nevertheless, we believe that this allegation of a classification error, without more, is insufficient to show pretext. There is no dispute that when the position of weight station clerk was eliminated in 1996, all employees classified as weight station clerks were automatically reclassified as produce clerks regardless of their personal circumstances. Therefore, even if we accept that Marcano was not properly classified as a produce clerk pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, Marcano has still not shown that the erroneous classification -- let alone the company's reduction in force -- was a pretext for discrimination. Because there is no evidence to indicate that Marcano's classification as a produce clerk on January 24th was discriminatory or that it was intended to result in her dismissal, Marcano's unlawful termination claim must fail as a matter of law. 2