Opinion ID: 769703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Termination Provisions

Text: 35 Each of these claims requires a careful analysis of the termination provisions. In undertaking this analysis, we are especially mindful of the guiding principle that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter. United States ex. rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909), quoted and followed in, Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904, _______ (2000). 12 As the Supreme Court has recognized, this is a longstanding principle of statutory construction:This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64 (1804), and has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate . . . . This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it. 36 DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citations omitted); see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) ([A]n Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available.); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 14748 (1928) (Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the same.); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.). 37 The principle is mitigated only by the equally important rule that avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion. George Moore Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933). As the Supreme Court recently noted in upholding the PLRA's automatic stay provisions, where Congress has made its intent clear, `we must give effect to that intent.'  Miller v. French, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 2253, L.Ed.2d (U.S. June 19, 2000) (rejecting a saving interpretation of automatic stay provisions because it would subvert the plain meaning of the statute); 13 see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986). 38 The PLRA establishes a comprehensive set of standards to govern prospective relief in prison conditions cases. Section 3626(a)(1) of Title 18 provides that prospective relief shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. 18 U.S.C. S 3626(a)(1). Thus a district court faced with a prison conditions suit may not grant or approve prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. Id. The provision closes by requiring courts to give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief, id., and by limiting courts' power to grant preliminary injunctive relief, 18 U.S.C. S 3626(a)(2), or to release prisoners as a sanction for failure to comply with other relief. 18 U.S.C. S 3626(a)(3) 14 .Section 3626(a) therefore operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators -no longer may courts grant or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum. 39 If prospective relief has already been granted by a court, S 3626(b) controls. According to subsection (1) of S 3626(b), prospective relief is 40 terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener (i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief; (ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief under this paragraph; or (iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 2 years after the date of enactment. 41 18 U.S.C. S 3626(b)(1). Thus, any prospective relief becomes terminable, at the latest, two years after its imposition. 42 Section 3626(b)(2) goes further, setting forth a retroactive standard for immediate termination of prospective relief where the conditions of S 3626(b)(3) are not met: 43 (2) Immediate termination of prospective relief.-In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. 44 (3) Limitation. Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation. 45 18 U.S.C. S 3626(b)(2) & (b). According to these provisions, then, any prospective relief that exceeds the constitutional minimum must be terminated regardless of when it was granted 15 . 46 The statute defines prospective relief as all relief other than compensatory monetary damages. 18 U.S.C. S 3626(g)(7). Relief, in turn, is all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlements. 18 U.S.C. S 3626(g)(9). Consent decree is also a defined term in the statute. It means any relief entered by the court that is based in whole or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not include private settlements. 18 U.S.C. S 3626(g)(1).