Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Instructions pertaining to penalty phase deliberations

Text: Defendant contends it was error for the trial court to refuse certain of his specially proposed penalty phase instructions. We find no error respecting any of the individual claims. First, the trial court properly rejected defendant's specially proposed instruction that would have listed the evidence he viewed as mitigating. The instruction was patently argumentative and, among other things, would have usurped the jury's proper role as fact finder at the penalty phase. [12] A capital defendant is not entitled to unduly argumentative instructions in the penalty phase. (See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 1003-1004, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) Although instructions pinpointing the theory of the defense might be appropriate, a defendant is not entitled to instructions that simply recite facts favorable to him. (See People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805-806, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) Next, defendant argues the court erred in refusing his specially proposed instruction that would have told the jury that life without the possibility of parole means defendant will be imprisoned for the rest of his life, and that imposition of the death penalty means defendant will be executed. Although the court initially indicated it would consider giving the instruction, thereafter the court determined to reject the instruction but permit counsel to argue its substance before the jury. This ruling was correct. In People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37, we upheld the rejection of a similarly worded instruction, finding it inaccurate and prone to inviting speculation. ( Id. at pp. 130-131, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37; see also People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 971-972, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 561-562, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420 [trial court not required to instruct that life without possibility of parole means just that].) Thompson further indicated that counsel's proper argument to the jury characterizing the full nature of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole was permissible. ( People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 131, fn. 29, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37.) The trial court also refused defendant's specially proposed instruction that would have told the jury, If you have a reasonable doubt as to which penalty to impose, death or life in prison without the possibility of parole, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the penalty at life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant would next have us assign error to the court's refusal to give the instruction, but it was properly refused as it was patently wrong. `[W]e have consistently rejected the contention that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies to the process of penalty determination....' ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1101, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40; see also People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 806, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485; People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1244, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 782, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Defendant next argues it was error to refuse his specially proposed instruction that would have told the jury, You are instructed that nothing I have said requires you to reach a verdict of which penalty to impose. [¶] The possibility of a hung jury is an inevitable by-product of the requirement that a verdict must be unanimous. The ruling was correct. [T]here is no duty to instruct a jury regarding its possible failure to reach a [penalty] verdict in the absence of a request by the jury for an explanation. ( People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 664, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80; see also People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 227, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 105, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) Defendant proposed a special Concluding Instruction that he would have substituted for the standard instruction defining the weighing process, CALJIC No. 8.88. [13] He now argues it was error to refuse the instruction because it was necessary to advise the jury that the result of the weighing process had to be a reasoned decision as to penalty, and that a single mitigating factor could be sufficient to reject the penalty of death. There was no error. Nothing in the standard weighing instruction suggested to the jury that it could make an arbitrary decision as to penalty, as opposed to a reasoned decision. To the contrary, CALJIC No. 8.88 expressly instructed the jury to consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and further cautioned the jury not to engage in a mere mechanical counting of factors. Nor was there any need to specially instruct the jury on the appropriate process of weighing mitigating factors. In this regard, CALJIC No. 8.88 properly advised the jury that To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. As we have explained, CALJIC No. 8.88 properly describes the weighing process as `merely a metaphor for the juror's personal determination that death is the appropriate penalty under all of the circumstances.' ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1244, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, quoting People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1250, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) Last, defendant contends the trial court should have given CALJIC No. 2.83, pertaining to the resolution of conflicting expert witness testimony, at the penalty phase. The request was properly refused on the ground that no conflicting expert testimony was presented at the penalty phase. Moreover, CALJIC No. 2.83 was given at the guilt phase and there was no need to reread it at the penalty phase. (See, e.g., People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 561, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420 [no need to reread generic instructions at penalty phase that were given at guilt phase and did not conflict with penalty phase instructions]; People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 723, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729; People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 600, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.)