Opinion ID: 797710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 14 On appeal, Jordan asserts one claim attacking his conviction and another challenging his sentence. First, Jordan claims the district court erred in barring the defense from introducing evidence in support of his theory that an alternate perpetrator, inmate Sean Riker, actually murdered Stone. Second, Jordan alleges that the district court erred in finding his 1994 crime spree involved two or more unrelated crimes under the Guidelines §§ 4B1.1(a), 4B1.2(c).
15 The first issue is whether the district court erred in refusing to admit evidence Jordan claims would implicate another inmate in Stone's murder. 16 We review a district court's decision to admit alternative perpetrator evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1188 (10th Cir.1998). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical, or results in a manifestly unreasonable judgment. United States v. Weidner, 437 F.3d 1023, 1042 (10th Cir.2006). Our deference to the trial court is based upon its first-hand ability to view the witnesses and evidence and assess credibility and probative value. Id. Accordingly, the district court's decision to exclude Jordan's alternative perpetrator evidence will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. Id.
17 Jordan's theory of defense pits two evidentiary values against each other: (1) the admission of relevant evidence, Fed. R.Evid. 401, against (2) the exclusion of prejudicial, misleading, and confusing evidence, Fed.R.Evid. 403. The bar for admission under Rule 401 is very low. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1190. This is because the degree of materiality and probativity necessary for evidence to be relevant is minimal and must only provide a fact-finder with a basis for making some inference, or chain of inferences. Id. 18 While the burden is low, it does not sanction the carte blanche admission of whatever evidence a defendant would like. The trial judge is the gatekeeper under the Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 requires courts to exclud[e] [even relevant evidence] if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Such circumstances might arise when evidence suggests to the jury that it should render its findings on an improper basis, commonly . . . an emotional one, and when circumstantial evidence would tend to sidetrack the jury into consideration of factual disputes only tangentially related to the facts at issue in the current case. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotes and citations omitted). 19 When proffered evidence deals with a defense theory of an alternative perpetrator, additional considerations arise. As the Supreme Court recently noted in reviewing the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute that excluded third-party guilt evidence, [e]vidence tending to show the commission by another person of the crime charged may be introduced by accused when it is inconsistent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, his own guilt; but frequently matters offered in evidence for this purpose are so remote and lack such connection with the crime that they are excluded. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1733, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (Third-party guilt evidence may also be excluded where it does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime . . . [such as where it is] speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant's trial.). 20 Our most recent exploration of the alternative perpetrator evidence was in United States v. McVeigh. There, we explained, 21 Although there is no doubt that a defendant has a right to attempt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else did the crime, a defendant still must show that his proffered evidence on the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the asserted alternative perpetrator.  It is not sufficient for a defendant merely to offer up unsupported speculation that another person may have done the crime. Such speculative blaming intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion, and it invites the jury to render its findings based on emotion or prejudice. 22 153 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, courts may properly deny admission of alternative perpetrator evidence that fails to establish, either on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, a non-speculative nexus between the crime charged and the alleged perpetrator. 23 In McVeigh, we upheld the district court's ruling to exclude evidence the defense claimed would link a white-supremacist, anti-government organization to the Oklahoma City bombing. Id. at 1188. McVeigh proffered testimony from an undercover agent in the organization that (1) it harbored similar anti-government views to McVeigh's, (2) some members expressed vague threats to bomb targets in Oklahoma, and (3) an alleged identification of the composite sketches released after the bombing. Id. at 1192. The district court found the evidence relevant under Rule 401, but excluded it under Rule 403. Id. at 1188. 24 We agreed with the district court's order. First, we held that the proffered testimony's highly generalized and speculative nature greatly diminished its probative value. Id. at 1191. Second, in light of the lack of a probative nexus between the extremist group and the Oklahoma City bombing, we found that the testimony would lead to the confusion of the issues because the government would be forced to put on a side trial to disprove the nebulous allegations of the group's involvement in the bombing. Id. Third, we concluded the evidence would threaten unfair prejudice because it would invite the jury to blame absent, unrepresented individuals and groups for whom there often may be strong underlying emotional responses. Id. at 1192. In balancing relevance and prejudice, we concluded the evidence's low probative value did not outweigh the substantial chance of prejudice and confusion, tipping the scales in favor of exclusion. 25 With this background, we turn to Jordan's theory of defense.
26 At trial, Jordan did not dispute that (1) he handled the shank that caused the fatal stab wounds to Stone, (2) he was the man Meadors and Valle saw running across the yard, and (3) he threw the murder weapon on the roof. Jordan contended that he did not kill Stone, who had been his cellmate for two months at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta. Instead, he claimed Sean Riker, who was also at the scene of the stabbing, was the actual assailant. He argues that Riker stabbed Stone and then forced the knife on him. In the confusion, he started running in panic and then threw the knife on the roof. 27 To establish the required nexus to Riker, Jordan pointed to two sources of evidence. The first was evidence that had already been admitted as part of the prosecution's case. Admitted Evidence 28 First, both video and testimonial evidence placed Riker at the scene of the stabbing. The video shows Stone, Jordan, Riker and an inmate identified only as Larry sitting together at a concrete table several minutes before the stabbing. And Collins testified that he saw Riker and Larry seated at Stone's table prior to the stabbing. 29 Second, Collins claimed to have heard through the prison grapevine, albeit after the stabbing, that Riker had given Jordan the shank to hit Stone. Vol. XIV, at 371. 30 Finally, Jordan argues that unidentifiable DNA found on the shank indicates that someone else possessed the shank. Proffered Evidence 31 The second source of supporting evidence — and the heart of this appeal — are four additional pieces of proffered evidence that Jordan claims would point the finger at Riker. 32 First, Jordan proffered evidence that, six months before the murder, Riker possessed a shank, almost identical in size and shape to the shank that killed Stone. Vol. XVI, at 739. 33 Second, Jordan offered statements by Riker to investigators after the stabbing indicating that he was untruthful about the circumstances surrounding Stone's death. Jordan contends that these lies reflect a consciousness of guilt on the part of Riker. Id. at 734. 34 Third, the defense claimed evidence shows that shortly after the stabbing prison officials investigated Riker as a possible suspect in Stone's homicide. Id. at 736. The record unfortunately does not disclose the basis for this statement. 35 Finally, Jordan claimed that Riker would testify that he and other inmates went over to a set of bleachers after the stabbing. On the top of the bleachers, investigators later found a blood-stained glove. Id. at 737. 36