Opinion ID: 3066088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The evolution of Batson as of May 2001.

Text: In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), the Supreme Court held that “a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial.” See also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 47 (1992). Batson established a three-step inquiry. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The Supreme Court stated that it had “confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.” Id. at 97. Second, “[o]nce the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.” Id. Third, the trial court must then “determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 98. In setting forth this three-step standard, the Supreme Court specifically declined “to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges.” Id. at 99. The Court reiterated that “[i]n light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our holding today.” Id. at 99 n.24. As a result, AYALA V. WONG 75 during the quarter of a century that has passed since Batson, courts have considered numerous ways of applying Batson’s three-step standard. Ayala’s primary argument is that the trial court’s exclusion of him and his counsel from the proceedings in which the prosecution justified its recusal of seven jurors violated his constitutional rights to assistance of counsel at critical stages of the proceedings, to be personally present, and to assist his counsel in his defense. In response, the State argued and the district court held that in 2001, when Ayala’s conviction became final, the exclusion of Ayala and his counsel from the proceedings was not a constitutional violation, and hence, Ayala’s claim was barred by Teague, 489 U.S. 288. The California Supreme Court, in reviewing Ayala’s direct appeal, concluded that it was “almost universally recognized that ex parte proceedings following a motion regarding peremptory challenges allegedly made on the basis of improper group bias are poor procedure and should not be conducted unless compelling reasons justify them.” Ayala, 6 P.3d at 203. The majority claims that in May 2001 this rule had been “unequivocally ‘dictated by precedent’” as a result of our opinion in United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987). Majority at p. 75. Thompson concerned a 1985 criminal trial in a federal district court. The judge alone conducted voir dire and “the government used four of its peremptory challenges to exclude all four blacks in the venire.” Id. at 1256. When Thompson’s lawyer moved for a mistrial, the district court “allowed the government to put its reasons for the disputed peremptory challenges on the 76 AYALA V. WONG record, albeit in camera and out of the presence of the defendant and his lawyer.” Id. Thompson appealed, arguing that this procedure violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury. Id. A divided panel concluded that the “district court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel in this case to hear the government’s reasons for excluding the black potential jurors and to present argument thereon.” Id. at 1261. We explained that “situations where the court acts with the benefit of only one side’s presentation are uneasy compromises with some overriding necessity, such as the need to act quickly or to keep sensitive information from the opposing party. Absent such compelling justification, ex parte proceedings are anathema in our system of justice and, in the context of a criminal trial, may amount to a denial of due process.”4 Id. at 1258–59.