Opinion ID: 2103389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidence regarding appellant's prior conviction is admissible

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that he was convicted of attempting to rape a ten-year old child in 1994. Because the issue is likely to arise again upon retrial, we address the argument on the merits. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appellant was convicted of attempting to rape a ten-year old girl in 1994. The victim, who is now twenty-three years old, testified at trial. Appellant argues that this testimony was error per KRE 404(b) because the circumstances surrounding the 1994 conviction were too dissimilar to the instant case. Generally, a defendant's prior bad acts are inadmissible. However, KRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of prior crimes or wrongs is admissible if offered for proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. As recognized in Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29 (Ky. 1998), this list of exceptions is illustrative, not exclusive. Among the non-enumerated exceptions we have recognized to KRE 404(b)'s general prohibition on the introduction of prior bad acts evidence is . . . modus operandi  Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky.2007). The modus operandi exception requires that: [t]he facts surrounding the prior misconduct must be so strikingly similar to the charged offense as to create a reasonable probability that (1) the acts were committed by the same person, and/or (2) the acts were accompanied by the same mens rea. If not, then the evidence of prior misconduct proves only a criminal disposition and is inadmissible. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999)). It is not the commonality of the crimes but the commonality of the facts constituting the crimes that demonstrates modus operandi So, as a prerequisite to the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, we now require that the proponent of the evidence to `demonstrate that there is a factual commonality between the prior bad act and the charged conduct that is simultaneously similar and so peculiar or distinct that there is a reasonable probability that the two crimes were committed by the same individual.' Thus, `[although it is not required that the facts be identical in all respects, `evidence of other acts of sexual deviance. . . must be so similar to the crime on trial as to constitute a so-called signature crime.' Id. at 97. The circumstances of the present offenses are sufficiently similar to the 1994 crime to satisfy the standard we have established for admission under KRE 404(b). The prior offense indicated a sexual interest in prepubescent girls, such as the victims here. In both the prior crime and the current offenses, Appellant knew the victims and gained access to their homes by his involvement in a romantic relationship with an adult female in the household. All of the victims had second floor bedrooms and were quietly assaulted while others were in the home. The nature of the sexual act itself was similar in that each incident was of brief duration, the perpetrator said nothing to the victim during the assault, the perpetrator did not ejaculate, and avoided vaginal or anal tearing of the victims by penetrating only partially. Faced with those striking similarities between Appellant's prior conviction and the current alleged crimes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting under KRE 404(b) the evidence of Appellants prior conviction for attempted rape. At retrial, should the same facts be developed, the trial court will be well within its discretion to admit evidence regarding Appellant's prior conviction.