Opinion ID: 1987778
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merger of Negligence-Strict Liability Theories.

Text: The trial court submitted the design claim on a strict liability theory. Wil-Rich claims this is an unfair standard for manufacturers. It claims the risk-utility analysis under the negligence theory should be utilized. Products liability law broadly refers to the legal responsibility for injury resulting from the use of a product. Smith v. Air Feeds, Inc., 519 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Iowa App.1994). It encompasses three separate and distinct theories of liability: negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. See id.; 63 Am.Jur.2d Products Liability § 3 (1996). Although each is a separate and distinct theory of recovery, the same facts often give rise to all three claims. Smith, 519 N.W.2d at 830. The underlying theories ordinarily concern improper design, inadequate warnings, or mistakes in manufacturing. Id. In the context of a design defect claim, there is currently an academic debate over whether the distinction between strict liability and negligence theories should be maintained when applied to a design defect case. See Keith Miller, Design Defect Litigation in Iowa: The Myths of Strict Liability, 40 Drake L.Rev. 465 (1991) [hereinafter Miller]; Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L.Rev. 593 (1980); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Products Liability: Modern Cases Determining Whether Product Is Defectively Designed, 96 A.L.R.3d 22, 33-34 (1979); 63A Am.Jur.2d Products Liability §§ 933, 934. The new Restatement (Third) recently stirred the debate by dropping the distinction and adopting functional rules rather than the traditional doctrinal labels. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. n (1997). Essentially, it dropped the consumer expectation test traditionally used in the strict liability analysis and adopted a risk-utility analysis traditionally found in the negligence standard, which in most instances will require proof of a reasonable alternative design to establish a design defect. Id. § 2. We are not asked to adopt this new Restatement in our review of this case, but to recognize the merger between strict liability and negligence in design defect claims. In adopting strict liability for defective products, we specifically recognized that the theory did not replace claims based on negligence. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672, 685 (Iowa 1970). Moreover, we have consistently recognized a distinction between the two theories. Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978). This traditional distinction is that strict liability claims focus on the condition of the product, while negligence focuses on the conduct of the defendant. Id.; Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 1980). In strict liability, the plaintiff must establish the product was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. Chown, 297 N.W.2d at 220. In negligence, the plaintiff must show the product was unreasonably dangerous because the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care. Id. At the same time, we have readily acknowledged the similarities between the two theories. See Aller, 268 N.W.2d at 835. This has prompted us to merge the theories in the context of a failure to warn claim. See Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 288-90 (Iowa 1994). Moreover, we have recognized the growing number of courts and commentators that have found no practical difference between strict liability and negligence theories in defective design cases, and have even merged the doctrines in a defective design case for enhanced injuries. See Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W.2d 70, 75-76 n. 2 (Iowa 1991), abrogated by Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992). Although we recognize the merits of the merger of negligence and strict liability in design cases, we nevertheless decline the opportunity to do so in this case. First, the trial court did not instruct on both negligence and strict liability theories. It only instructed on strict liability. The instruction to the jury included the risk-utility balancing analysis utilized in negligence. Thus, even if strict liability actually applies negligence principles, no prejudice occurred. Secondly, the Restatement (Third) was adopted during the pendency of this action. We should not merge the two theories without additionally considering the adoption of the new Restatement. However, because the new Restatement generally adopts an alternative design burden, we refrain from considering the matter until that issue is specifically raised. [6] Furthermore, our legislature has adopted the state-of-the-art defense, which could be impacted if we were to adopt the alternative design requirement. See Miller at 504. In conclusion, we are unable to find legal error occurred by the instruction submitted by the trial court. We decline at this time to adopt the merger of strict liability and negligence in defective design cases.