Opinion ID: 2075762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Custodial Preference for a Fit Parent Whose Opportunity Interest is Still Intact

Text: Because state action violated H.R.'s rights to due process, I have concluded that H.R. has not abandoned his opportunity interest in parenting Baby Boy C. I therefore turn to H.R.'s contention that, in resolving custody for Baby Boy C., the trial court erred in applying the best interests of the child standard required by D.C. Code § 16-2353 (1989) (termination), see supra note 18, and id. § 16-304(e) (adoption), see supra note 17. H.R. claims that, because he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in developing parental relations with Baby Boy C. and did all he could reasonably be expected to do under the circumstances to grasp his opportunity to protect that interest, he was entitled to custodyabsent his unfitness as a parent. He adds that application of the best interests standard is especially inappropriate here because procedural violations delayed his awareness of the situation in a way that made it impossible for him to prevail under that standard as traditionally applied ( i.e., by comparing a non-custodial parent with a custodial family with whom the child has lived happily for awhile). In short, H.R. claims that, because he would be a fit parent, the illegally established relationships between Baby Boy C. and the O. family cannot form the basis of a decision to deny him parental rights. Lehr makes clear that a natural father who has not abandoned his opportunity interest has a constitutionally protected interest in establishing parental relations when the natural mother relinquishes their child for adoption at birth. Eason, 257 Ga. at 296, 358 S.E.2d at 463. [34] I believe this means that ordinarily in such circumstances, if the court finds the natural father would be a fit parent, he is entitled to custody. See id. (applying fitness standard on due process and equal protection grounds); see also Jermstad v. McNelis, 210 Cal.App.3d 528, 258 Cal.Rptr. 519 (1989) (construing best interests standard in light of Lehr to create parental preference over prospective adoptive parents when natural parent has diligently pursued opportunity to establish custodial relationship); Buchanan, Constitutional Rights, at 373. This means, in legal effect, that as a matter of constitutional law, an unwed, noncustodial father who has not lost his opportunity interest has maintained a sufficient connection with his child to receive the custodial preferencethe presumptive right to custodyspecified in the guardianship statute, D.C.Code § 21-101 (1989), as interpreted by Shelton and the earlier cases. In short, the due process clause constitutionalizes the applicability of the guardianship statute to an unwed, noncustodial father who has grasped his opportunity interest within the meaning of Lehr. It is conceivable, however, that even granting custody to a fit parent who has not abandoned his opportunity interest could be detrimental to the best interests of the child under certain circumstances as I shall elaborate later. Lehr and earlier Supreme Court cases do not address, let alone foreclose, that possibility, and irrespective of a natural parent's fitness, I do not believe the Constitution, any more than the District's guardianship statute, requires an award of custody that clear and convincing evidence shows would be adverse to the child's best interests. [35] On the other hand, I believe Lehr and Stanley taken together do afford substantive as well as procedural protection, mandating at least a custodial preference for a fit parent who has not abandoned his opportunity interest. See Jermstad, 210 Cal.App.3d at 548, 258 Cal.Rptr. at 531; Buchanan, Constitutional Rights, at 373. Accordingly, I conclude the Constitution requires us to construe the best interests language under the adoption statute, D.C. Code §§ 16-304(e), -309(b)(3) (1989), to mean that, when a natural father who has not abandoned his opportunity interest seeks custody of an infant child whom the mother has surrendered for adoption at birth, he shall be entitledas under the guardianship statuteto custody if he would be a fit parent, unless the adoptive parents persuade the court with clear and convincing evidence [36] that failure to terminate the father's parental rights would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. Because, however, this court's decisions in a number of instances have sustained our local statutes against constitutional attack by permitting termination of parental rights and adoption in the best interests of the child, without employing a presumption favoring custody by a fit parent, we must examine more precisely how parental fitness and the child's best interests relate under those cases. Only by doing so can we determine whether our caselaw permits this division of the court to take the approach I believe is constitutionally required here. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971) (as matter of internal policy, no division of this court will override prior decision of this court; such result can only be accomplished by this court en banc).