Opinion ID: 1864317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Court-appointed counsel.

Text: Although we have set aside Pierce's conviction, nonetheless, in view of a prospective retrial of Pierce's case, we are obliged to make a further observation regarding the prosecutor's comments during summation to the jury lest similar conduct occur on retrial. During summation, the prosecutor referred to the fact that, as a matter of constitutional right, Pierce's court-appointed counsel was paid for by the taxpayers. A prosecutor's argument must be based on evidence introduced rather than on matters not in evidence which serve to divert jurors from the consideration whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged. State v. Perry, 274 Minn. 1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966). A prosecutor's appeal to the self-interest of jurors as taxpayers is improper. State v. Majors, 182 Kan. 644, 323 P.2d 917 (1958). See, also, Commonwealth v. Joyner, 469 Pa. 333, 335, 365 A.2d 1233, 1234 (1976) (prosecutor's argument that the jury has `borne witness to the unbelievable length our system of justice goes to protect the rights of an accused person' was improper (emphasis omitted)); State v. Perry, supra 274 Minn. at 11, 142 N.W.2d at 579 (prosecutor's argument that `[t]his whole thing [defendant's trial], the whole burden of this whole affair, is carried by taxpayers.... This is a solely supported tax function,' was improper); State v. Majors, supra 182 Kan. at 647, 323 P.2d at 920 (prosecutor's statement, `It cost a lot of money for the taxpayers of Atchison County to put on this trial,' was improper); State v. Muskus, 158 Ohio St. 276, 282, 109 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1952) (prosecutor's statement that it made him `boil to know that we have to waste Stark county taxpayers' money to try a fellow like that' was error). The prosecutor's reference to the fact of court-appointed counsel for Pierce is so far removed from relevance to the issue of Pierce's guilt that the only explanation is the prosecutor's attempt to inject unfair prejudice into the minds of the jurors-taxpayers who were asked to determine whether Pierce was guilty of the criminal charge. Consequently, we find that the prosecutor's remark about payment of taxes in reference to court-appointed counsel for Pierce was improper argument. In Pierce's case, however, the court admonished the jury to completely disregard the comment concerning Pierce's court-appointed attorney. Thus, although we do not condone the prosecutor's improper appeal to the jury's self-interest as taxpayers, we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor's remark in final argument, in the light of the precautionary instruction given, resulted in sufficient prejudice to require a mistrial. See State v. Ross, supra . While some may consider prosecutory misconduct only as a violation of procedural precepts pertaining to a fair trial, we again call attention of prosecutors to our recent reminder in State v. Olsan, 231 Neb. 214, 436 N.W.2d 128 (1989), and our earlier reminder in State v. Borchardt, supra 224 Neb. at 57, 395 N.W.2d at 558: `In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: (1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.' (Quoting from Canon 7, DR 7-106(C)(1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.)