Opinion ID: 63406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sex Offender Conditions

Text: Ybarra insists that the district court erred in requiring him to (a) participate in sex offender counseling and (b) register as a sex offender, as conditions of his supervised release. Specifically, Ybarra contends that the court erred because he has never been convicted of a sex offense, Saldana’s testimony regarding the sexual assault was incredible as a matter of law, and the conditions are overbroad and not reasonably related to the statutory sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As noted earlier, we ordinarily review the conditions imposed on supervised release for abuse of discretion.15 But since Ybarra did not object when, at the revocation hearing, the probation officer recommended that sex offender registration and counseling be imposed as conditions of his supervised release, we review for plain error.16 Plain error arises when “(1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”17 If such error is found, the court exercises its discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”18 “[T]his Court has stated repeatedly that plain error is error so obvious that our failure to notice it would seriously 14 United States v. Gonzalez, 250 F.3d 923, 926-29 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), district court has authority, upon revocation of concurrent terms of supervised release, to impose consecutive revocation sentences). 15 United States v. Talbert, 501 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2007). 16 Id. 17 United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2005). 18 Id. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 No. 07-40294 affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings and result in a miscarriage of justice.”19 A district court has “wide discretion”20 to impose any condition of supervised release “it considers to be appropriate” if the conditions are “reasonably related” to four factors: “(1) ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ (2) the need ‘to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,’ (3) the need ‘to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,’ and (4) the need ‘to provide the defendant with needed [training], medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.’”21 A reasonable relationship with but one of the four factors is required,22 thus the fact that a condition is not related to the crime of conviction does not, by itself, render a condition invalid.23 The condition must, however, “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve the policies of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public.24
The district court did not plainly err in requiring Ybarra to participate in sex offender counseling as a condition of his supervised release. For defendants 19 United States v. Surasky, 974 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001). 21 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1); Paul, 274 F.3d at 165 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)(1)-(2)). 22 See United States v. Love, 431 F.3d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that special condition only has to be “related to a punitive goal” out of four goals set forth in the statute (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Brown, 402 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Despite the use of the conjunctive in the Guidelines, a condition may be imposed if it is reasonably related to any one or more of the specified factors.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 23 United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2004). 24 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) (emphasis added). 8 No. 07-40294 who, like Ybarra, have never been convicted of a sex offense, the First and Seventh Circuits have upheld the imposition of sex offender counseling, under plain error review, when “there was sufficient evidence of a propensity for a future sex offense that requires deterrence or can be considered a threat to public safety.”25 The district court found that Ybarra sexually assaulted Saldana and physically assaulted her after she refused to have sex with him. These findings provide a “reasonable relationship” between the sex offender counseling mandated by the district court and the need to deter Ybarra’s future criminal conduct, to protect the public from his future crimes and to provide Ybarra with “correctional treatment.”26 Because the other supervised release conditions imposed by the court — that Ybarra not contact Saldana and that he undergo anger management counseling — do not adequately address the problems posed by Ybarra’s sexual and domestic abuse violations, sex offender counseling does not impose a greater deprivation of Ybarra’s liberty than is “reasonably necessary” to further deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public. Ybarra’s contention that the court erred in requiring counseling, therefore, does not clear the high hurdle of plain error review.
Whether the district court erred in requiring that Ybarra register as a sex offender presents a more difficult question for this court. Section 3583(d) requires that, “as an explicit condition of supervised release,” a defendant convicted of a sex offense must register as a sex offender.27 Ybarra has not been 25 United States v. Jimenez, No. 06-41678, 2008 WL 1881462, at  (5th Cir. April 29, 2008) (citing United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 875-76 (7th Cir. 2007)). 26 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1); 3553(a)(2)(D). 27 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Specifically, § 3583(d) states that any person “required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act” register as a sex offender. Id. To be required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and 9 No. 07-40294 convicted of a sex offense, and thus is not required to register as a sex offender. Nevertheless, the fact that Ybarra is not a convicted sex offender does not end our inquiry, as § 3583(d) does not expressly prohibit the imposition of sex offender registration for offenders with no history of sex offense convictions,28 especially given the “wide discretion” afforded to the district courts to impose conditions on supervised release.29 Courts have held that sex offender registration involves a more serious liberty deprivation than does sex offender counseling. In United States v. Prochner, the First Circuit upheld conditions of supervised release relating to sex offender treatment, despite the fact that the defendant had never been convicted of a sex offense.30 The court determined that the condition of sex offender treatment did not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than was necessary, but specifically noted that the defendant had not been required to register as a sex offender, which it found to be “a stigmatizing condition.”31 Similarly, in an unpublished opinion, we upheld conditions of supervised release requiring a defendant who had not been convicted of a sex offense to participate in sex offender treatment, but also distinguished sex offender treatment from sex offender registration.32 Notification Act, the person must have been “convicted of a sex offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). Similarly, the Guidelines require — as a mandatory condition of supervised release — that a defendant convicted of a sexual offense, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c)(4), register as a sex offender. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(7). 28 Prochner, 417 F.3d at 63 (“Nothing contained in the statute . . . limits the condition of sex offender treatment just to individuals convicted of sex offenses.”). 29 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001). 30 417 F.3d at 64. 31 Id. & n.7. 32 See United States v. Penny, 215 F. App’x 336, 337 (5th Cir. 2007). 10 No. 07-40294 Although the requirement that Ybarra register as a sex offender is a greater deprivation of liberty than is the requirement that he undergo sex offender treatment, we cannot conclude that imposition of sex offender registration constituted plain error, given the lack of circuit or Supreme Court precedent prohibiting imposition of this condition in any circumstance save supervised release following a sex offense conviction.33 We are sympathetic to the argument that the stigma of sex offender registration may eventually hinder, rather than help, Ybarra’s post-release rehabilitation, and we appreciate that the imposition of sex offender registration is somewhat unusual when, as here, the offenses underlying the original conviction were not sexual in nature. 33 Neither this court nor any of our sister circuits has directly addressed this issue, in the context of plain error review, in a published decision. Although we are under no obligation to follow an unpublished opinion, we note that even if, arguendo, United States v. Jimenez, No. 06-41678, 2008 WL 1881462, at  (5th Cir. April 29, 2008), were binding precedent, it is distinguishable from this case. In Jimenez, we found that the district court had committed plain error in requiring a defendant whose underlying conviction was not for a sex offense to register as a sex offender pursuant to the revocation of supervised release. Jimenez is similar to this matter in many respects: The district court found that Jimenez had committed sex offense violations of the terms of his supervised release, as has Ybarra. Our holding in Jimenez, however, focused on process. We held that the district court’s plain error in requiring Jimenez to register as a sex offender occurred because the “only evidence arguably related to a propensity to commit a sex offense consists of three allegations from three young victims contained in the investigative police reports.” Id at . The district court’s plain error was in not allowing for a process by which evidence concerning Jimenez’s propensity to commit a sex offense could be presented and disputed: The court conducted only a brief supervised release revocation hearing, at the end of which, almost as an afterthought, it added on sex offender registration. Id. at.. In the instant case, in stark contrast, the judge held many hours of hearings over the course of a month before determining that Ybarra had violated the terms of his supervised release by committing, inter alia, sexual assault and physical assault related to the refusal of sexual advances. During these hours of hearings, significant evidence concerning Ybarra’s sexual and physical assaults was presented to the court — evidence much more substantial than “three allegations from three young victims contained in the investigative police reports,” as in Jimenez. Id. at . It is certainly not plain error to conclude that past behavior can be indicative of a “propensity to commit a sex offense.” Id. We are satisfied that the district judge provided a satisfactory process in which evidence of Ybarra’s propensity to commit a sex offense could be, and was, presented and debated. This case and our Jimenez decision differ in this important respect. 11 No. 07-40294 Although extensive hearings on whether Ybarra assaulted Saldana were held, the issue of sex offender registration received relatively scant attention. Had an objection been raised, the record on this point could have been more fully developed. None was. As a result, our standard of review in this case is for plain error, meaning that we will reverse only if the district court’s decision threatens “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings and result[s] in a miscarriage of justice.”34 Even assuming that requiring Ybarra to register as a sex offender was error, and that the error was clear and obvious, the fact remains that the district court imposed sex offender registration as a condition of supervised release only after a series of three thorough hearings at the conclusion of which the court determined that Ybarra had committed, inter alia, sexual assault. We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to correct the requirement that Ybarra register as a sex offender because, under the facts and proceedings of this case, this requirement did not rise to the level of “error so obvious that our failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings and result in a miscarriage of justice.”35
Finally, Ybarra contends that the sex offender conditions must be vacated because the district court did not give him notice that it was contemplating the imposition of such conditions, thereby violating Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h). Rule 32(h) states that “[b]efore the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court must give 34 See United States v. Surasky, 974 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). 35 Id. 12 No. 07-40294 the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure.”36 Rule 32 promotes “focused, adversarial resolution of the legal and factual issues relevant to fixing Guidelines sentences.”37 As this argument was not raised in the district court, our review is again for plain error.38 In United States v. Coenen, we held that courts are required to give “reasonable pre-sentence notice” that sexual offender registration provisions are “under consideration.”39 In Coenen, we recognized that “invasive” sex offender notification provisions were analogous to upward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines and thus could not be categorized as simple “occupational restriction[s] . . . which do[] not require . . . notice.”40 But Coenen was decided before United States v. Booker, which invalidated the mandatory features of the Guidelines.41 Whether, post Booker, sex offender conditions require notice, or even whether there is a notice requirement at all for any conditions in the context of supervised release, is unclear.42 We need not address these questions today because even if, arguendo, Ybarra were entitled to notice that the district court was contemplating sex 36 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h) (emphasis added). In addition, under Rule 32(h), “[t]he notice must specify any ground on which the court is contemplating a departure.” Id. 37 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137 (1991). 38 See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 172 (5th Cir. 1991). 39 135 F.3d 938, 943 (5th Cir. 1998). 40 Id. 41 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 42 The government argues that, following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Irizarry v. United States,128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008), “there is no notice requirement prior to the imposition of a variance from the Guidelines range of punishment, at least in the context of an original sentencing hearing.” The government further urges us to extend this “same reasoning” to “the context of supervised release revocation.” We decline to address either of these issues. 13 No. 07-40294 offender conditions, he indisputably had “reasonable notice” that such conditions were under consideration. In Coenen, although we held that the defendant was entitled to notice that the court was contemplating sex offender requirements, we upheld the supervised release conditions because Coenen had actual knowledge that the conditions were being considered by the court.43 As we stated, courts have generally interpreted Rule 32(h) “to require notice either from the court, the PSR [Pre-Sentence Report], or a pre-hearing submission by the Government,”44 but “other means” can provide sufficient notice, too.45 “[A]ctual knowledge satisfies the ‘reasonable notice’ requirements of Rule 32 . . . .”46 In the instant case, Ybarra unquestionably had actual knowledge that the district court could be reasonably contemplating sex offender conditions by the time Ybarra received his sentence following revocation of his original term of supervised release, including the conditions imposed on his subsequent term of supervised release. The district court heard testimony on Ybarra’s sexual assault and physical assault violations over three days in February and March 2007. Ybarra was present during all three days of hearings. On the first day, February 22, 2007, Saldana discussed in detail Ybarra’s sexual assault and physical assault (for refusing his demand that Saldana engage in sexual intercourse). Saladana testified, for example, that Ybarra held her down by her hair and then by her hands, and, against her will, forcibly raped and sodomized her. Saldana also testified that, on another occasion, Ybarra had punched her in the breast area after she refused his sexual advances. We are satisfied that, 43 Coenen, 135 F.3d at 943. 44 Id. at 944. 45 Id. 46 Id. (emphasis added). 14 No. 07-40294 after the first day of testimony from Saldana in which these details were revealed, Ybarra was placed on notice that the court could be considering sex offender conditions. By the time the court actually imposed Ybarra’s revocation sentence and supervised release conditions on March 19, 2007, at the conclusion of the third day of hearings on his sexual and physical assault violations, Ybarra had been on notice of the substance of the sexually related allegations against him for nearly one month, convincing us that he had actual knowledge that the imposition of sexual offender conditions could well be within the court’s contemplation. An approximate one-month period of notice is clearly reasonable enough to assure “focused, adversarial resolution of the legal and factual issues relevant to”47 Ybarra’s supervised release revocation sentence and supervised release conditions. Therefore, we do not hesitate to conclude that Ybarra’s actual notice was reasonable, and that the district court did not commit plain error by not providing formal notice.