Opinion ID: 362441
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Suitcases

Text: 37 The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), establishes that the presence of luggage in an automobile does not necessarily vitiate expectations of privacy that attach to the contents of the luggage. Accordingly, the government has not argued that the search of appellant's luggage was permissible under either the search incident or the automobile exception. Rather, the government argues, and the trial court found, that appellant consented to the search of the luggage. 38 The existence of consent and the voluntariness thereof are questions of fact to be determined from all the circumstances surrounding the search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246-47, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). A trial court's finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir.), Cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908, 96 S.Ct. 2231, 48 L.Ed.2d 834 (1976). Although we find the issue of consent-in-fact, as opposed to the voluntariness thereof, to be a close one, we find no clear error here. 39 As discussed more fully below, the circumstances, surrounding the search of the suitcases had few, if any, of the inherently coercive characteristics that negate a finding of voluntariness. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra. Because appellant never expressly consented to the search, however, we are faced with the more difficult question of when consent may be inferred from action. Appellant urges us to adopt the standard espoused in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976). Abbott held that the acts from which consent is inferred must be unequivocal and specific. Id. at 885. Because the Abbott court selected this evidentiary standard while characterizing consent to search as a waiver of a fundamental right (Id.), a characterization and a mode of analysis expressly rejected in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, we are not convinced that the trial court's conclusion should be subjected to such close scrutiny. Indeed, in United States v. Cepulonis, supra, 530 F.2d at 244, we deferred to the trial court's resolution of equivocal evidence of consent. Nevertheless, even if we apply, Arguendo, the unequivocal and specific standard, we think that the inference of consent was proper on the facts of this case. Appellant's conversation with Drinan aboard the COLD DUCK was relaxed and casual. Appellant was cooperative, and when he did not wish to be helpful he clearly drew the line. Upon returning to the parking lot, appellant unlocked the truck for Drinan. 11 Simply unlocking a vehicle, without saying a word, has been held sufficient to support an inference of consent-in-fact. United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 92, 58 L.Ed.2d 116 (1978). Even if, however, the act of unlocking a vehicle, without more, might not support an inference of consent to search luggage contained therein, appellant's act in this case does support the ultimate finding of consent-in-fact. 40 More important than the foregoing prelude to the search of the suitcases is appellant's behavior at the time of the search. Agent Drinan first removed the four suitcases from the Blazer. Then, before attempting to open each one, the agent asked appellant if he owned the bag. In each case, appellant denied both ownership and any knowledge of the owner of the bag. The first three bags were unlocked and their contents unincriminating. The fourth had a combination lock. Although denying ownership, the appellant stated that he thought he could unlock it and proceeded to do so. Given appellant's demonstrated ability to choose whether or not to cooperate, we think that the disclaimer of any knowledge or interest in the luggage together with the unlocking of the incriminating bag clearly support an inference of consent-in-fact. We find support for this holding in the rule adopted by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that one who denies any interest in luggage has abandoned the property and thereby loses any standing to challenge an ensuing search. See United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). Although we are not convinced that the property law analysis of abandonment ought to be applied where the issue is a reasonable expectation of privacy (See Katz v. United States, supra ), we reach the same result by reasoning that one who disclaims any interest in luggage thereby disclaims any concern about whether or not the contents of the luggage remain private. See United States v. Berkowitz, 429 F.2d 921, 925 (1st Cir. 1971) (disclaimer of interest in allegedly stolen goods vitiates any Fourth Amendment interest in goods). 41 Finally, we find support in our holding in Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45 (1st Cir.), Cert. denied, 385 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 215, 17 L.Ed.2d 140 (1966), that opening and stepping away from the door to an apartment is implied consent to entry and observation by a police officer who knocks. 12 Nor does appellant's citation of United States v. McCaleb, supra, persuade us to the contrary. McCaleb held that the act of unlocking a suitcase will not support an inference of consent. McCaleb involved an illegal stop based upon a drug courier profile and an illegal detention for questioning in unfamiliar surroundings. Moreover, the agents in McCaleb misrepresented their authority to obtain a warrant to open the suitcase. Such circumstances are inherently coercive (See United States v. Watson, supra ). Such are not the circumstances of this case. The finding of consent-in-fact was not clearly erroneous. 42 Many of the factors that support an inference of consent also support the finding of voluntariness. Accordingly, we discuss them only briefly here. Appellant is a man of average education and intelligence. He demonstrated his ability to use that intelligence to avoid incriminating himself in his discussions with Drinan. Appellant had been informed of, and indicated his understanding of, his Miranda rights twice before the suitcase search. No lengthy detention or physical abuse was involved. Rather, although we have held that appellant was technically under arrest when asked to return to the marina, the atmosphere of his detention had none of the coercive aspects involved in questioning at the stationhouse. See United States v. Watson, supra, 423 U.S. at 424, 96 S.Ct. 820. In short, all of the criteria of voluntariness set forth in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, were met here. 13