Opinion ID: 2598126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the district court improperly interfere with the appellant's right to allocution ?

Text: [¶14] A criminal defendant's right to allocution is both rule-based and constitutionally protected. [4] Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo. 1987). [5] The appellant relies upon Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1082 (Wyo. 1992), for the proposition that the courts do not prescribe limits on what the defendant can or cannot say during allocution. While that statement was, indeed, made by this Court in Harvey, it has been taken out of context and does not suggest that the right to allocution equates to the right to filibuster. The context in Harvey, unlike the context of the present case, was the use of an allocution statement in later proceedings against that defendant. [¶15] A trial judge always has the inherent authority to exercise reasonable control over the presentation of evidence, and that authority extends to the authority to limit allocution. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (10th Cir. 1993). A defendant's right to allocution is not violated when he has been given an adequate opportunity under the circumstances to speak on his own behalf. Id. at 1025. In the present case, the district court did not cut off allocution until the appellant had described at length the family circumstances that resulted in commission of the crimes, and not until defense counsel interjected that the appellant's statements were being made against his advice. There was no error, much less an abuse of discretion suggesting manifest unfairness or injustice. See Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo. 1989).