Opinion ID: 1769906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The trial court properly denied a directed verdict in favor of Appellant because there was sufficient evidence to support the May 10th trafficking conviction.

Text: Appellant next argues that he should have received a directed verdict of acquittal on the trafficking conviction relating to the May 10, 2005 drug purchase. Appellant argues that there was inadequate evidence to support the conviction because the drug informant, Haley, who purchased the drugs initially believed he purchased the drugs from Mann. Despite Haley's confusion as to what the actual name of the drug dealer was, he was certain that his nickname was Black. Later, Haley identified Appellant as the drug dealer. Due to the confusion regarding who the drug dealer was, Appellant now argues that the Commonwealth did not prove every element of the crime of first-degree trafficking and hence a jury could not have convicted him beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Gentry, 261 Ky. 564, 88 S.W.2d 273 (1935) (holding that when a defendant enters a not guilty plea that plea puts in issue every fact necessary to a conviction, and the burden of establishing those facts beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the Commonwealth throughout the trial and never shifts to the accused.) Further, Appellant argues that since Haley was confused about the drug dealer's real name, his testimony lacks the atmosphere of verisimilitude to support a conviction. See Kentucky Power Co. v. Dillon, 345 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Ky.1961). A trial court's decision regarding a directed verdict motion is reviewed under the standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1991): On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Id. at 187. KRS 218A.1412 states that a person is guilty of first-degree trafficking if he: knowingly and unlawfully traffics in: a controlled substance, that is classified in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug; a controlled substance analogue; lysergic acid diethylamide; phencyclidine; a controlled substance that contains any quantity of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), including its salts, isomers, salts of isomers, and analogues; or flunitrazepam, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. In this matter, there is more than adequate evidence for a jury to convict Appellant of first-degree trafficking. While it is true that Haley was initially confused about the name of the person he purchased the cocaine from, he was certain that his nickname was Black. When asked to pick out the person named Black from a crowd of people at the courthouse, he chose Appellant. There is no evidence that Haley could not remember the physical description of the person he purchased drugs from other than an allegation from Appellant that Haley could not remember because he was nervous. A jury could reasonably rely on Haley's testimony and find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree trafficking. See Estep v. Commonwealth, 957 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Ky.1997) (stating that a jury makes all determinations regarding the credibility and weight of a witness's testimony). The trial judge properly denied Appellant's directed verdict motion.