Opinion ID: 1788495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Terms of the Assigned Sales Agreement

Text: Hill and Thomas argue that Eason told them that the purchase price was $200,000, not $250,000. However, they had constructive notice of all the terms of the sales agreement and of the HUD-1 statement. At most, Hill and Thomas show a unilateral mistake with respect to a contract term. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154 (1981) provides: A party bears the risk of a mistake when . . . . (b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or (c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable under the circumstances to do so. In this case, Hill and Thomas bore the risk of the mistake. See Hackney v. First Alabama Bank, 555 So.2d 97, 101 (Ala.1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154). Hill and Thomas failed to review the closing documents, even though they were aware that they were the actual purchasers of the land. Although they acknowledge that they were aware that Eason and the DeVenneys were negotiating over the inclusion in the sales agreement of a provision addressing the excavation of the retained lot and that the checks from Eason that Thornton handed the DeVenneys at the closing were postdated, the record shows that they failed to inquire as to the impact of these transactions on their purchase of the land. Thus, the record shows that even if Hill and Thomas did not have actual knowledge of the terms of the sales agreement, they were comfortable with having limited knowledge. In light of the fact that Hill and Thomas were experienced in real-estate transactions, we believe that it is reasonable to allocate the risk of the mistake as to the purchase price to Hill and Thomas in this case. With regard to the additional $50,000 Eason promised to pay the DeVenneys for the 30-day delay in making full payment of the purchase price, Hill and Thomas correctly point out that under the Statute of Frauds this agreement should have been in writing. The DeVenneys' agreement to lend or to forbear from collecting $150,000 for a sum of $50,000 must be in writing. § 8-9-2(7), Ala.Code 1975 (stating that [e]very agreement or commitment to lend money, delay or forebear repayment thereof . . . except for consumer loans . . . less than $25,000 is to be in writing or the agreement is void). The DeVenneys argue that the postdated checks of $150,000 and $50,000 sufficiently memorialize the terms of the agreement so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. We disagree. The checks are too indefinite to satisfy the Statute of Frauds with respect to Hill and Thomas's obligation because they fail to state the full terms of the agreement to forbear, the mutuality of the agreement, and the intention of the parties. Webster v. Aust, 628 So.2d 846, 848 (Ala.Civ.App.1993) (holding that a check does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds when it does not disclose the full terms of the contract, the specific dates of the closing, the payment of the balance, and the mutuality of the agreement and is not a final expression of the parties' agreement). Thus, the DeVenneys' agreement to forbear on collecting, or to lend $150,000, is void. [12] See § 8-9-2(7), Ala. 1975; Webster, 628 So.2d at 848-49. The purchase price stated in the sales agreement as assigned to Hill and Thomas did not include the additional fee of $50,000. The DeVenneys did present substantial evidence indicating that the terms of the sales agreement, as assigned to Hill and Thomas, included excavating the retained lot. Mrs. DeVenney and Eason had agreed before the closing that the excavation of the retained lot would be an additional part of the purchase price. Mrs. DeVenney refused to proceed with the closing until the terms of the excavation were put in writing and made a part of the sales agreement. Thornton included the excavation clause in the sales agreement, and the clause was signed below by Eason and the DeVenneys. Hill and Thomas argue that the excavation clause cannot be assigned because, they say, (1) it was a separate agreement between Eason and the DeVenneys and (2) the clause reflects that Eason would personally perform the service for the DeVenneys. First, the sales agreement denominates Eason as the purchaser. The logical interpretation of Thornton's handwritten clause in the sales agreement is that Eason, as the purchaser, would perform the duty of excavating the retained lot. If Eason and the DeVenneys had intended to agree to the excavation of the retained lot separately from the sale of the land, then the clause would not have been included in the sales agreement. In fact, the separate agreement by Thornton to hold for 30 days two postdated checks from Eason to the DeVenneys was not reflected in the sales agreement; Thornton prepared a separate agreement that provided that Thornton would hold the two postdated checks and that Eason and the DeVenneys would not hold Thornton liable for holding them. Thus, the DeVenneys presented substantial evidence indicating that under these circumstances the entire sales agreement, including the excavation clause, was assigned to Hill, on behalf of the partnership composed of Hill and Thomas, and that, as assignees and partners, Hill and Thomas assumed all of Eason's duties. Second, although certain personal-service contracts are not assignable, Sisco v. Empiregas, Inc. of Belle Mina, 286 Ala. 72, 76, 237 So.2d 463, 466 (1970), such unassignable personal-service contracts relate to services that involve special skills, such as the painting of a portrait by an artist. Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep, 377 F.Supp. 1215, 1222 (N.D.Ala.1974). No such special skills are necessary to excavate the retained lot. In the context of the entire transaction for the sale of the land, the fact that the clause provided that David Eason would excavate the retained lot does not indicate that the parties intended for him personally to do so. The DeVenneys presented substantial evidence indicating that the sales agreement was assigned to Hill and Thomas, as partners, and that the terms of the sales agreement included the purchase price of $250,000 and excavation of the retained lot.