Opinion ID: 2973674
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Others

Text: Next, Plaintiffs provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the rental agreement granted them the right to occupy Augusta House to the exclusion of others. No Kentucky court has defined the phrase “to the exclusion of others” in the context of KURLTA. However, the Oregon Court of Appeals has interpreted “to the exclusion of others” in an identical provision of its landlord tenant act. Tobeck v. Chamberlain, 910 P.2d 389 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). The Oregon Court of Appeals held that exclusion of others means the exclusion of the public at large and not the exclusion of other tenants, or in some cases, even the landlord. Id. at 392-93. Several considerations render the Oregon court’s interpretation persuasive. First, KURLTA instructs courts to apply its provisions liberally to improve the quality of housing. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 383.505. Thus, “tenant” should be interpreted broadly to expand KURLTA’s coverage, not to exclude living arrangements from KURLTA’s protections. Second, the Oregon court’s interpretation is in accord with the common law. At common law, a tenancy was defined as the right to occupy a premises to the exclusion of others, including the landlord. See Richmond v. Standard Elkhorn Coal Co., 300 S.W. 359, 360 (Ky. 1927). Nonetheless, common law courts have recognized exceptions to a tenant’s ability to exclude others. Id. For example, in Kentucky, common law courts have upheld the existence of a tenancy despite a landlord’s contractual right to enter the premises for limited purposes. See id. Third, tenant is defined as a person with the right to exclude others, not necessarily the right to exclude all others. In this case, Plaintiffs have offered evidence that they had the right to exclude the public from Augusta House. Plaintiffs each had keys to the house. Plaintiffs’ possession of their own keys to the premises evidences their ability to lock the members of the public out of Augusta House and quintessentially symbolizes their right to exclude others. Additionally, each Plaintiff occupied her own room and had the right to exclude other residents from her space. Finally, the record indicates that Zinious and Mission House staff had only limited rights to enter Augusta House, as opposed to a general occupancy right. That is, they could enter to enforce house rules but did not have a have the right to live at Augusta House. Therefore, whether the rental agreement granted Plaintiffs the No. 05-5072 Thomas, et al. v. Cohen, et al. Page 11 right to occupy Augusta House to the exclusion of others, at the very least, constitutes an issue for the jury. In summary, Plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find both that § 383.535(1) does not render KURLTA inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House and that Plaintiffs are tenants within the meaning of KURLTA. Thus, KURLTA may have granted Plaintiffs a protected property interest and summary judgment in Defendants’ favor was improper. III.