Opinion ID: 2576334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 10 Montiel contends that the court of appeals erred in affirming his conviction because the trial court (1) failed to consider all legally relevant factors; (2) exceeded the scope of its authority; and (3) acted arbitrarily in its rejection of the plea agreement. We first outline the scope of judicial discretion in rejecting plea agreements. We then address each of Montiel's arguments in turn.
¶ 11 We begin by noting that there is no constitutional principle that obliges a trial court to accept a defendant's guilty plea. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (There is, of course, no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted.); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court....). Indeed, [a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). ¶ 12 We generally adhere to the proposition that, subject to constitutional constraints, [t]he Executive remains the absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and presumptively best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir.1975); see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). Plea bargains, however, implicate not only the ordinarily plenary executive power to indict or dismiss; they also go to the traditionally judicial function of determining what penalty to impose. United States v. Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1981); see also United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1997) ([W]hen the dismissal of charges or agreement not to pursue potential charges is conditioned on acceptance of a plea agreement, the court's authority to adjudicate guilt and impose sentence is implicated.). Thus, after initial charges have been filed, the vast majority of courts permit, encourage, or require some degree of judicial discretion in accepting or rejecting such arrangements. ¶ 13 Moreover, it is well established under Utah law that trial courts are not required to accept plea agreements. This principle is based on the plain language of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly provides that [t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty. Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e) (emphasis added). [4] This discretion extends to guilty pleas that are tendered as part of a plea bargain. See State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 1153; Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190; State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct.App.1989). ¶ 14 The foregoing, however, does not imply that a trial court may reject a guilty plea arbitrarily. We acknowledge that the state is usually in a better position than the court to determine whether a plea agreement is in the public interest, and we do not take lightly the role of prosecutorial discretion in this regard. We affirm that, generally speaking, courts should be wary of second-guessing prosecutorial choices. Miller, 722 F.2d at 565. Even as we acknowledge prosecutorial prerogatives regarding plea agreements, however, we also recognize that unfettered discretion invites abuse. Thus, some oversight from the bench is necessary both to protect a defendant from the power of coercion and abuse of the state, [and] also [to] protect the interests of other members of our society in living in a peaceful, orderly atmosphere. Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ind.1983). The trial court has an important role to play in assessing the appropriateness of a proffered plea agreementespecially where there is evidence of either an overzealous or a lackadaisical prosecutionand may reject a plea in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. [5] Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495.
¶ 15 Having established that the exercise of judicial discretion in such matters is both necessary and proper, we now must define the extent of that discretion. Because Utah case law is not fully developed on this issue, we look to the case law from other jurisdictions for guidance. Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, ¶ 17, 991 P.2d 584. ¶ 16 In regard to accepting or rejecting plea agreements, jurisdictions vary, as to precisely what degree of discretion is appropriate and the manner in which that discretion must be exercised. The numerous approaches, each with its own particular nuances, do not lend themselves to easy categorization. However, we are able to extract principles common to the majority of jurisdictional approaches that inform our analysis. Those principles are: (1) that trial courts retain broad discretion to reject plea agreements, but may not do so arbitrarily; (2) that courts need not methodically consider a list of mandatory factors before rejecting a plea agreement; and (3) that courts must state their reasoning for rejecting a proposed plea agreement on the record.
¶ 17 With a few notable exceptions, [6] the vast majority of jurisdictions require some affirmative exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court before rejecting a plea agreement; that is, courts are not permitted to categorically reject all plea bargains. [7] See, e.g., Darlington, 105 P.3d at 232 (holding that trial courts cannot reject a plea on an arbitrary basis but must give the plea agreement due consideration before reaching a decision on whether to grant [it]). [8] This rule against arbitrary or blanket rejections of plea agreements makes sense in light of the fact that plea bargaining is an essential component of the administration of justice, and that, when properly administered, it is to be encouraged. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260, 92 S.Ct. 495. We therefore adopt the majority rule in requiring an affirmative exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court prior to rejecting a plea agreement.
¶ 18 Even while recognizing the need to exercise discretion, few jurisdictions have imposed rigid boundaries on a trial court's exercise of this discretion. See, e.g., State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Iowa 2001) (noting that in the context of plea bargains, there are no established criteria or standards to consider in the exercise of discretion); State v. Brown, 268 Neb. 943, 689 N.W.2d 347, 351 (2004) (noting that, judicial discretion to reject plea bargains is not unlimited but declin[ing] to adopt specific limitations). Similarly in the federal courts, the rules of procedure do[] not purport to establish criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement. United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.1986). [9] Indeed, [j]ust how much `consideration' should be given to the disposition agreed to by the prosecutor and just how `independent' the judge should be in these circumstances is a most difficult issue, seldom addressed in the cases. [10] 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.3(e) (2d ed.1999). ¶ 19 Given the absence of clear guidelines, the prevailing approach among those courts that have considered this issue is decidedly ad hoc. Courts generally limit their investigation of what constitutes a valid reason for rejecting a plea agreement to the individual circumstances of the case at hand. We likewise decline to set forth a specific list of mandatory factors that a judge must consider before rejecting a plea agreement. Rather, the trial court must simply demonstrate that it gave sufficient consideration to the plea prior to rejecting it such that the decision to reject was not arbitrary.
¶ 20 As a means of demonstrating that the trial court gave all due consideration to the plea, the majority of jurisdictions require that judges make their reasoning for rejecting a proposed plea agreement a matter of record. See, e.g., Darlington, 105 P.3d at 232 (The trial court must ... articulate the reasons for rejecting an agreement on the record.). [11] We agree that requiring district courts to articulate a sound reason for rejecting a plea is the surest way to foster the sound exercise of judicial discretion. Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136. By adopting this rule, we facilitate[] appellate review when the defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting a plea. United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir.1998); see also Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438 (Requiring district courts to articulate the reasons for rejecting a plea agreement not only helps insure the court is aware of and gives adequate deference to prosecutorial discretion, it is the surest, indeed the only way to facilitate appellate review of rejected plea bargains.). ¶ 21 To summarize, the weight of authority stands for the following propositions: (1) while a trial court retains broad discretion to reject a proposed plea agreement, it may not do so arbitrarily; (2) a court need not apply a list of mandatory factors in rejecting a plea; but (3) it must state its general reasoning for rejecting the plea on the record. We adopt these principles for review of plea agreements in Utah.
¶ 22 Having outlined the principles governing judicial rejection of plea agreements, we now determine whether the trial court's action here was in accord with them. We conclude that the trial court was well within its discretion in rejecting the plea agreement in this case and consequently reject each of Montiel's three arguments, listed above.
¶ 23 Montiel first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider all legally relevant factors before rejecting the proposed plea agreement. In support of this claim, Montiel cites this court's statement, made in the context of sentencing review, that a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider all legally relevant factors. State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990). He then cites certain cases from other jurisdictions that have sought to identify what factors are legally relevant in the context of plea bargaining. [12] As we noted above, however, most jurisdictions decline to specify all those factors that are legally relevant in rejecting plea agreements, and for good reason. First, it would be quite difficultif not impossibleto anticipate the myriad potential legitimate bases for rejecting plea agreements. Second, to adopt stringent guidelines would undermine our stated goal of vesting trial courts with broad discretion in this area. ¶ 24 Because we have elected not to set forth any mandatory list of factors that must be considered when rejecting a plea agreement, we cannot import the definition of abuse of discretion in the context of sentencing (where mandatory factors are indeed defined [13] ) for use in the context of plea bargaining. More appropriate language defining the abuse of discretion standard for this context is found in our decision in State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 63 P.3d 731, in which we held that a trial court has abused its discretion only if the trial court's decision [is] beyond the limits of reasonability, or, in other words, that an abuse of discretion has occurred if the trial court's actions are inherently unfair or if ... no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Id. at ¶ 101, 63 P.3d 731 (internal quotation omitted). So long as the trial court carefully considers a proffered plea agreement and states its reasons for rejecting the plea in the record, it will not be overturned on appeal unless it can be said that the trial court's decision was beyond the limits of reasonability. Id. Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar standard. See, e.g., United States v. Greener, 979 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir.1992) ([W]e will not reverse the district court's decision [to reject a plea agreement] if any reasonable person could agree with the district court.); Darlington, 105 P.3d at 232 (Where the trial court clearly exercises independent judgment in rejecting the plea agreement and sets forth on the record its reasons for doing so, its ruling will not be set aside on appeal.). ¶ 25 Because we decline to adopt the unnecessarily burdensome standard Montiel proposes, Montiel's first argument fails.
¶ 26 Montiel next argues that the trial court abused its discretion because its rejection of the plea agreement exceed[ed] the limits [of judicial authority] prescribed by law. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 66, 52 P.3d 1210. In support of what is essentially a separation of powers argument, Montiel cites cases from two jurisdictions that place great emphasis on prosecutorial discretion to enter into plea agreements and therefore require a trial court to show abuse of that discretion or other similarly extreme circumstances before it is permitted to reject a plea agreement. [14] As we noted above, however, in the vast majority of jurisdictions such a stringent restriction on judicial discretion is limited to the inherently executive powers of indictment and dismissal, and not to plea bargains, in which both executive and judicial functions are involved. The simple fact that a plea bargain may contain an agreement to dismiss one or more charges does not limit judicial discretion in considering the plea. Even though a plea bargain [may be] cast in the form of a dismissal of [a] count, [its] effect [is] to limit the sentence available; thus, the district judge [may] properly exercise[] reasonable discretion in rejecting the plea bargain. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1463 (10th Cir.1985) (internal quotation omitted); see also Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 697 ([A] prosecutor's proposal to dismiss a claim ... in consideration of a plea of guilty to some other offense... implicates core judicial functions. In such a case, the court's adjudicatory and sentencing responsibilities justify active scrutiny of the plea agreement....). ¶ 27 We thus do not believe that any separation of powers concerns are implicated in this case. Indeed, our discussion above distinguishes this case from those in which such concerns might arise. Here, it is clear that the trial court was well within its authority to review and reject the proposed plea agreement. Thus, Montiel's second argument also fails.
¶ 28 Lastly, Montiel argues that the trial court was arbitrary in its decision to reject the proposed plea agreement and therefore abused its discretion. As noted above, we agree that a trial court may not reject pleas on an arbitrary basis. Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136. We disagree, however, that the trial court in this case acted arbitrarily. ¶ 29 Montiel insists that the trial court refused to consider the proffered plea agreement solely because the court had a fixed policy never to waive firearm enhancements. We agree with the court of appeals that the record instead supports the conclusion that the trial court considered at least three different factors before rejecting the proposed plea agreement: (1) the violent nature of the offense (a robbery committed with a firearm), (2) the effective reduction in felony level that the plea would produce and the corresponding reduction in the possible term of imprisonment, and (3) the fact that the victim had not been informed of the specific plea agreement reached between the prosecution and defendant. Either of these two latter criteria, on their own, would likely have provided a legitimate basis for the trial court to reject the plea agreement, [15] and when combined that is certainly the case. We are confident, based on the exchange in the record, that all of these factors, in combination with the violent nature of the crime, led the trial court to reject the plea agreement. ¶ 30 While the trial court used language signaling finality in his references to firearm enhancements at the outset of the presentation of the plea agreement, it did not reject the plea at that juncture. Rather, it was only after further discussion of the available sentence and of the status of notice to the victim that the trial court reached and announced a decision. Identifying a predilection against a certain type of plea agreement is a far cry from refusing to even consider a plea. Indeed, if the trial court had arbitrarily applied an unwavering policy as Montiel suggests, one would have expected the court to terminate discussion and reject the plea at the outset. Instead, the court entertained an ensuing dialogue at some length, and even furthered this discussion on its own by raisingunprompted by either partythe issue of whether the victim had been informed of the plea. Thus, we cannot say that the court's decision to reject the plea in this case was arbitrary. Consequently, Montiel's third argument also fails.