Opinion ID: 2365392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: mr. ott's counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to victim impact evidence, thereby prejudicing mr. ott

Text: ¶ 21 Mr. Ott argues his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to object to the admission of certain victim impact evidence during his capital sentencing hearing. Specifically, counsel did not challenge the admissibility of a six-minute videotape featuring pictures of Lacey Lawrence set to moving music, testimony from Lacey's family members about the devastating effect Lacey's death had on them, and testimony from Lacey's family on their opinion of Mr. Ott's character and the appropriate sentence. ¶ 22 An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. Id. To satisfy the first part of the test, defendant must overcome the `strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance.' Id. (quoting State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)) (alterations in original). ¶ 23 In State v. Carter , we questioned whether victim impact evidence concerning a defendant's blameworthiness was probative and held that victim impact evidence was inadmissible in capital sentencing. 888 P.2d 629, 652-53 (Utah 1995), superseded by statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iii) (1995) (This censure of victim impact evidence in capital cases applies to evidence of the victim's character, evidence of the effects of the crime on the surviving members of the family, and evidence of the surviving members' opinions of the crime.). In 1995, the Legislature amended section 76-3-207 to expressly allow evidence pertaining to the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family and community without comparison to other persons or victims, in capital sentencing proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iii) (2008). ¶ 24 Mr. Ott argues that regardless of the amendment to section 76-3-207, his trial counsel should have argued that the victim impact evidence presented by the State in his sentencing proceeding was not admissible either because (1) section 76-3-207(2)(a)(iii) is unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution, or (2) that under Carter the evidence is inadmissible because it is not probative. Mr. Ott also contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to object to portions of the victim impact evidence that spoke to Mr. Ott's character, chances for his rehabilitation, and the appropriate penalty to be imposed; all of which he insists violated the United States Constitution. We do not address Mr. Ott's first two arguments today because we hold that portions of the impact evidence the State introduced at Mr. Ott's sentencing hearing violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that Mr. Ott's counsels' failure to object to this evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. [3]
¶ 25 To establish a claim of ineffectiveness based on an oversight or misreading of law, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). In Payne v. Tennessee, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not bar, per se, victim impact evidence, but victim impact evidence may be inadmissible if the evidence is so prejudicial that it makes sentencing fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause. 501 U.S. 808, 823, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974))). Payne overturned Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), which held the Eighth Amendment barred victim impact evidence. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830, 111 S.Ct. 2597. However, to the extent Payne overruled Booth, Booth retained viability for its holding that victim impact evidence that addresses the defendant's character or expresses the victim's opinion of the appropriate sentence at the penalty phase of trial is inadmissible under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 830, n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (stating, Payne is limited to holding that evidence and argument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing); see also id. at 833, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (stating, we do not reach this issue as no evidence of this kind was introduced at petitioner's trial); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1217 (10th Cir.1998) (stating,  Payne did not overrule the prohibitions in Booth against the admission of `information concerning a victim's family members' characterization of and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.' (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 835 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (Souter, J., concurring))). ¶ 26 We hold that large portions of the victim impact evidence introduced at Mr. Ott's capital sentencing hearing featured the victims' opinions of the defendant's character or the appropriate sentence and were therefore clearly at odds with United States Supreme Court precedent. Each victim was asked to testify about how he or she would feel if Mr. Ott were to be released in twenty years. Each expressed the opinion that Mr. Ott could not be rehabilitated and the notion that he might ever be released frightened them. We recount the relevant testimony below. In order to provide context for the statements made, we have quoted large portions of the testimony given at Mr. Ott's sentencing hearing. Although this testimony contains many impermissible statements, we are not suggesting that every statement quoted below is constitutionally inadmissible. ¶ 27 Allen Lawrence, Lacey's father, testified as follows: Q. In giving you an opportunity at this point to express your thoughts and feelings to the jury about what you think they ought to consider in imposing sentence on Mr. Ott, what would you say? A. Well, I think they need to take what kind of guy this person is into consideration. I mean, he's shown his hand. He's shown what he truly is, the kind of man he is . . . these types of crimes are committed by certain types of people and he just happens to be one of them. They are psychopathic in nature. They have no feelings for other people. They have no respect for other people's rights. No respect for other people's pursuit of happiness. No respect for other people's feelings. They can kill and they don't have any more feeling for killing someone than if they reached up and picked an apple off of a tree. They don't feel it. That's the kind of guy this is. I don't think he'll ever change. I don't think he should ever have the opportunity to again perpetrate his violent nature on any human being anywhere again ever. He doesn't deserve it. He's used up all his chances. He's shown who he is and what he does when he does not get his way. He's shown us. He showed his hand. That's what he is. That's is [sic] the defining moment of that man's life. That five minute episode defined him as what he is. That's what Mr. Ott is. That's him. Q. Based upon your personal experiences with Mr. Ott . . . and what you observed and perceived in the manner and fashion in which he carried out the attack on you on Hawthorne Drive, is it your perception that if he had known Lacey was in that house would he have escorted her out before setting that house on fire? A. I don't think he would have done a damn thing different. This man is a terrorist. He deals with anarchist cookbooks. He looks at how bombs are built. When he set that house on fire this isn't like building a campfire with a grocery sack. This is a bomb. If I dumped gallons of gasoline on this floor right here and lit it with a match, can you imagine how explosive that would be? It goes up instantly. I've thrown little bits of gas on a campfire to start one. It flares up instantly. Can you imagine that much gasoline in the house? . . . He didn't care. This guy does not care about other people's feelings. He has no empathy for anybody, none. He doesn't have it. It's not inside of his character to have that. ¶ 28 Donna Ott testified as follows: Q. Assuming that Mr. Ott was given a sentence of life with possibility of parole, do you have any concerns about him getting out of prison? A. I think I should. As a matter of fact, I do. Q. Okay. What is that concern? A. I know a lot of very healthy 60-year-old men. I don't see that things will change much in 20 years. I believe that he'll come out and he will look for us. Knock. Knock. Exactly right. Q. So do you feel like he'd do this to you again? A. Exactly. Yes. Yes. Q. You said that you don't see him changing. What is that based on? A. The control freak. They don't knowif they don't get what they want, they don't know any other way but to threaten. It's a lifestyle. He doesn't know how to dealit's how he lives his life. ¶ 29 Sarah Gooch, Donna Ott's daughter, responded to a similar line of questioning as follows: Q. Based upon youryour knowledge having lived with Mark Ott for those years, experienced life in the home with Mark Ott, and experienced the attack on September 1st of 2002 by Mark Ott, what if any concerns do you have if Mark Ott is ever released from prison? A. I have a hard enough time sleeping as it is. It's a long time for somebody to stir about how pissed off they are. Q. What about his ability to change in prison based upon what you know of him? A. Mark's been likehis whole life, ever since I've known him. How is he gonna change? Q. How will that impact you personally, do you believe, if he's ever released from the Utah State Prison? A. I don't know. II don't know. I'm terrified now. I'd hate to see how scared I'd be if he was actually out. ¶ 30 Lucy Gooch testified: Q. After the event of that night, what you've done, what you've gone through since, do you have anyare you fearful of the defendant? A. Very much so. Q. And do you have any fear if he would be released from prison in 20 years or what he might do? A. I think that if we let him out, it doesn't matter how old he's going to be, I think that, you know, he'll finish what he went there to do. I honest to God I [sic] feel that way. ¶ 31 Amber Lawrence, Lacey's sister, testified as follows: Q. Amber, knowing what happened in the home on September 1st of 2002, in the Out [sic] Home, and what happened to your little sister, what are your thoughts and feelings on how it would make you feel knowing that the man that did this to your father and sister might have the possibility of being released from prison in 20-plus years. A. Terrifies me. I don't think that it he wouldn'the wouldn't change. He wouldn't change at all. And I didn'tI came here not knowing about not even a portion of the things that have went on in the jail, things that he had done. But I mean, it scares me enough just sitting in this courtroom with him knowing he has no handcuffs on. That scares me enough. And I don't even want to think about how it would be knowing he was going to get out in any amount of time. I don't see how anybody could do what he did. But he did that today. And I know that if it was up to him, my dad wouldn't be sitting here today. My dad would not be here at all . . . But it could have very well been me instead of my little sister, or both of us. Q. Amber, is there anything else you want this jury to know? Any other thoughts or feelings you have you want to make sure they are A. I want them to know that Mark does not care. He doesn't care what happened that night. He doesn't care if it was me or my sister or everybody in that house. He burned it down. He didn't help anybody out of it. He didn't try to pick out one person out of five. He wanted just for us, my dad. He was there for whoever and whatever was in that house. I mean, the house could have caught on fire to the next door neighbors. He didn't care who died. He didn't care who got hurt. I know his intention was to kill my dad, but instead he killed my little sister. And I don't think he deserves anything more than what she got. She can't be here today to say what she thinks. I don't think that he deserves any rights. He shouldn't have any rights. He took all of hers away from her, and I don't believe that he should have any. ¶ 32 Terry Cook, Lacey Lawrence's mother, testified as follows: Q. . . . Do you have any feelings that you would like to express as they relate to the defendant and what should happen to the defendant? A. Yeah. I think he should have to walk in my shoes. I think you should have to walk in my shoes `cause my last two years have been horrible. You know what? They are not going to get better. I loved my daughter. The love I had for my daughter was so strong. You can't take that away . . . and I hate to say this, but I hope you don't get out on parole because you don't deserve it. My daughter don't get to come back to me right now. I didn't get to finish with my daughter's life. I have to go home tonight without my daughter there, and I have to be alone for the rest of my life and be unhappy for the rest of my life. I hope you can think about that for the rest of your life. ¶ 33 It is clear to us that the testimony offered at Mr. Ott's sentencing falls squarely within the categories of evidence identified as inadmissible, in capital sentencing hearings, by Payne and Booth. Mr. Ott's counsel was objectively deficient for failing to object to the offensive evidence. ¶ 34 The State argues, however, that Mr. Ott's counsel deliberately chose not to object to the inadmissible evidence as part of trial strategy. We find this argument to be without merit. Proving that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness requires [Mr. Ott] to `rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.' Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ¶ 73, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ¶ 40, 44 P.3d 626). We `will not review counsel's tactical decisions simply because another lawyer, e.g., appellate counsel, would have taken a different course.' Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 524 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991)). Additionally, whenever there is `a legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice of trial strategy, the fact that it did not produce the expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel.' Id. (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989)). In essence, the question is [w]as the failure to raise the objections before the trial court the result of a consciously chosen strategy of trial counsel rather than an oversight, and if it was a strategic decision, did the making of that choice constitute ineffective assistance of counsel? Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59. ¶ 35 We have previously analyzed whether trial counsels' failure to object to victim testimony at trial is merely trial strategy. Id. at 155. In Bullock, a child sexual abuse case, the defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that videotaped testimony of alleged child abuse victims and expert testimony was inadmissible. Id. At trial, videotaped testimony of four boys describing the alleged abuse was presented to the jury, and the social worker to whom the boys first disclosed the abuse was questioned at trial. Id. at 156. Among other things, defense counsel did not object to the admissibility of the out-of-court statements, the videotaping procedures, or the expert witness's testimony that the children were victims of sexual abuse. Id. at 157-58. ¶ 36 We found that allowing the jury to hear the videotaped descriptions and the expert testimony and then cross-examining the expert to attack the credibility of the children's accusations was defense counsels' strategy. Id. at 160. Defense counsel attempted to attack the quality of the State's evidence in an effort to persuade the jury of the insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Id. at 158. We held that counsel in Bullock was not objectively deficient because [w]hile the evidence complained of may have been inadmissible, trial counsel could reasonably conclude under these circumstances that there was little chance of keeping the testimony of the children out of evidence, and that it was necessary to allow the expert testimony of the social worker in order for defense counsel to challenge the veracity of the expert's techniques. Id. at 159. We also took into account that defense counsels' presentation of defense experts and evidence of defendant's good character and reputation for truthfulness was consistent with a rational defense strategy. Id. at 158. ¶ 37 Mr. Ott's counsels' failure to object to the victim impact evidence presented in this case cannot be construed to be a component of any rational defense strategy. The State presents us with what it views as one defense strategy that would include tolerating the admission of prejudicial and inflammatory inadmissible evidence: one that employed as its central features avoiding the perception that Mr. Ott was pushing Lacey aside while presenting Mr. Ott as a remorseful man who took responsibility for his actions. The State argues that any objection made to the victim impact evidence would minimize the effect of this strategy. ¶ 38 We conclude, however, that counsels' overall strategy was not just to avoid dishonoring Lacey's death, but also to present Mr. Ott as someone who could be rehabilitated and who deserved the possibility of parole. In State v. Hovater, we noted if the evidence ha[s] no conceivable beneficial value to [the defendant], the failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy. 914 P.2d 37, 42 (Utah 1996). Victim impact testimony that portrayed Mr. Ott as a murderer who was motivated by a desire to terrorize his victims and who is beyond rehabilitation does not conceivably support Mr. Ott's defense under the State's theory or any other that could be rationally constructed. ¶ 39 We note that avoidance of drawing the jury's attention to certain facts or over-emphasizing aspects of the facts is a well recognized trial strategy. See State v. Harter, 2007 UT App 5, ¶ 16, 155 P.3d 116 (finding strategic decision in failure of defense counsel to argue for curative jury instruction on implication of defendant's flight because defense counsel did not want to emphasize the fact that defendant fled the scene of the crime). In Mr. Ott's case, however, tactical methods were available to his counsel, which could have limited the type of victim impact evidence admitted. For instance, Mr. Ott's counsel could have sought exclusion of the victim impact evidence about Mr. Ott's character through a motion in limine. A decision not to object to the victim impact evidence, especially when the evidence violated existing precedent prohibiting victims expressing opinions about the sentence or the defendant's character, falls below the line of objective reason and therefore amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 40 We also hold that Mr. Ott's objectively deficient representation prejudiced him. A defendant is prejudiced by counsel's actions only if the result of the proceedings would have been different absent the claimed deficiency. State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, ¶ 9, 165 P.3d 1185. To show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's errors `actually had an adverse effect on the defense' and that `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's . . . errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' State v. Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 34, ¶ 20, 2007 WL 1095559 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). `A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ¶ 56, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Because' [s]ome errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated trivial effect,' in determining the effect of the error, we `consider the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury.' State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶ 86, 152 P.3d 321 (alterations in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052). ¶ 41 In this case, the record discloses that there is a reasonable probability that but for the admission of the victim impact evidence that addressed Mr. Ott's character and the victims' opinions of the appropriate sentence, Mr. Ott would have received a more favorable sentence. The admission of the evidence sufficiently undermines our confidence in Mr. Ott's sentence. ¶ 42 In State v. Kell , we analyzed the prejudicial effect of victim impact evidence. 2002 UT 106, ¶¶ 52-54, 61 P.3d 1019. [4] Mr. Kell, already incarcerated for murder, was charged with the aggravated murder of Mr. Blackmon, another inmate, and Mr. Kell was convicted and sentenced to death. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. At the guilt phase of the trial, the victim's family testified about the pain, devastation, and anguish the loss of the victim had caused them. Id. ¶ 52 n. 15. We concluded that the victim impact evidence in Mr. Kell's case was not prejudicial. In making that determination, we emphasized that the family's victim impact testimony was [not] particularly inflammatory, moderate in tone, descriptive of the family's loss and mourning but not militant or angry, and made no effort to pressure the jury to impose the death penalty. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. Specifically, a statement prepared by the victim's family and read to the court stated: Concerning the penalty phase for this individual, the family has an abiding conviction that man's laws were written for the unjust and for evildoers. Therefore whatever punishment is meted out by this Court or this jury, whether it be the death penalty or some other sentence, my family will accept that ruling. Id. ¶ 52 n. 15. ¶ 43 In concluding that the admission of the victim impact evidence did not prejudice the defendant, and therefore did not undermine our confidence in the outcome, we found it important to note that the victims' statements did not ask for the death penalty, but left the decision up to the jury in remarkably neutral terms. Id. ¶ 53. In dicta, we also suggested that our inquiry might have been different had the victim impact evidence been introduced in the penalty phase of the trial. Id. ¶ 54 (Absent [the presence of the victim impact evidence] in the penalty phase, we see no possibility that the jury's verdict would have been different.). ¶ 44 The content of victim impact testimony in Mr. Ott's case is dramatically more inflammatory than the evidence admitted in Kell. Here, the testimony was angry in tone, inflammatory in content and contained messages that Mr. Ott was beyond rehabilitation. Additionally, the victim impact evidence was admitted during the penalty phase of the trial and comprised a large portion of the total evidence presented. The existence of these factors, especially considering that Mr. Ott's counsel never uttered a word objecting to the admission of the evidence, undermines our confidence in the outcome. ¶ 45 The State argues mitigation evidence presented by Mr. Ott's counsel ameliorates any prejudicial or inflammatory effect the victim impact evidence had. Our caselaw addressing prejudice under Strickland suggests that deficient counsel that leads to the admission of inflammatory statements is not prejudicial if other mitigating statements or evidence is presented. For instance, in State v. Dunn we held that a defendant was not prejudiced by his counsels' failure to request a jury instruction concerning uncorroborated witness testimony because the county attorney had testified that the witness's testimony was given in exchange for a reduction in his own charge, the witness admitted on the stand to be a pathological liar, and the judge instructed the jury that they may disregard evidence they deemed incredible. 850 P.2d 1201, 1226-28 (Utah 1993). The ameliorating statements mitigated any prejudicial effect the absence of an uncorroborated witness jury instruction may have had on the outcome of Mr. Dunn's trial. Id. ¶ 46 Mr. Ott's case does not present an instance where the mitigating evidence presented negates the prejudicial effect of the unlawful victim impact evidence. The single question before the jury was whether Mr. Ott should receive a sentence of life with parole or life without parole. Implicit in a sentence of life with the possibility of parole is a belief by the jury that Mr. Ott could one day be rehabilitated and re-enter society. Underlying the jury's decision is the large amount of evidence addressing Mr. Ott's mental health, including any mood or personality disorders. ¶ 47 Dr. Egli, the prison psychiatrist who treated Mr. Ott, testified that Mr. Ott was responding positively to medication. Mr. Ott's counsel also presented evidence of Mr. Ott's tumultuous childhood, war experience, and numerous psychiatric hospital stays leading up to the night of the crime wherein he may have been improperly medicated. While persuasive, this evidence does not, in our judgment, neutralize in any meaningful way the prejudicial effect that the characterization of Mr. Ott as a murdering terrorist made by people who directly encountered Mr. Ott on the night of the crime. That he was improving while medicated in prison did nothing to mitigate the numerous statements made that, once released, Mr. Ott would become uncontrollable. In considering `the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury,' Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶ 86, 152 P.3d 321 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052), we must conclude that counsels' failure to object to the inadmissible evidence undermines confidence in the outcome and therefore prejudiced Mr. Ott. ¶ 48 We therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to afford Mr. Ott a new sentencing hearing.