Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gibbons' Alleged Intoxication on the Stand

Text: Shelton argues that he was denied the due process right to a fair trial because Gibbons was intoxicated on the stand during a portion of her testimony. Shelton failed to raise the issue of Gibbons' alleged intoxication at trial and on direct appeal. Shelton claims that the cause for his procedural default under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) was that he did not know and reasonably could not have known of the factual predicate of this claim at the time of default at trial. Shelton contends that he was prejudiced by Gibbons' failure to disclose her level of intoxication because the jury was misled by her sobriety, credibility, and the reliability of the evidence suggested by her testimony. [44] In a post-trial interview with investigator Carl Kent, Gibbons for the first time alleged that she was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs during the course of her initial statements to police and prosecutors and that she was intoxicated during her initial trial testimony. [45] Gibbons told Kent, however, that she was not intoxicated when she made her recantation. [46] Kent also interviewed Laurie Shotwell, an acquaintance of Gibbons, who recalled going to a bar near the courthouse with Gibbons two to three times during Shelton's trial and drinking heavily. [47] According to Shotwell, Gibbons sometimes got drunk rapidly, and that Gibbons was tipsy, not falling down drunk, when they drank on the trial dates. [48] Generally, allegations of intoxication by a trial participant require a factfinding hearing because individuals intoxicated at the time they are offered as witnesses are excluded from testifying. [49] In order to establish cause for his failure to request a hearing on Gibbons' sobriety, Shelton claims that at the time of trial he did not know and could not have known that Gibbons was intoxicated. We are not persuaded by this argument because Shelton is unable to substantiate his claim that Gibbons was drinking nor can he show that he could not have known about Gibbons' alleged intoxication. The court, defense counsel, Shelton, and Shelton's co-defendants all observed and interacted with Gibbons at trial. Never once did anyone in the courtroom express a concern that Gibbons might be intoxicated. Furthermore, Shelton knew Gibbons well enough that he could have raised the intoxication issue if she was acting oddly while on the stand. The Superior Court stated: The Court saw no evidence of alcohol consumption during the time Gibbons was testifying and free on unsecured bail. There was no breath or lingering aroma while Gibbons was but a few feet from the Court. The Court observed Gibbons' demeanor while testifying at the bail hearing, the two occasions she appeared at trial, her several days of video testimony and the videotape of her initial statements to the police. Probably more than most witnesses in most trials, Gibbons was observed at great length. Her demeanor could be easily compared. Gibbons walked close to counsel in the case while approaching the witness stand, primarily Nelson's lawyer. Before she ultimately recanted, Nelson's counsel had more incentive than Steven's counsel to raise the question about whether Gibbons was drinking. All counsel, prosecutors and defense, are experienced counsel and are capable of detecting the signs of intoxication. They, too, along with their clients, had been at the bail hearing, the trial video deposition and the trial. Therefore, they had a clear benchmark to detect any change in Gibbons' demeanor suggestive of alcoholic or drug consumption. Nothing was raised. Further, Steven and Nelson knew Gibbons better and longer than counsel and the Court. Yet nothing in her January demeanor prompted them to alert their lawyers that Gibbons may have been drinking or consuming drugs. [50] We defer to the Superior Court's observation that Gibbons exhibited no signs of intoxication while on the stand. Even if Gibbons were drinking, Shelton is unable to show the existence of unknown facts that precluded him from raising the intoxication issue at trial or on appeal. [51] Even if we found that Shelton had established cause, Shelton would not be entitled to relief because he can not show actual prejudice from Gibbons' alleged intoxication. In the Kent reports, Gibbons claimed she was intoxicated during the second half of her first day's testimony. [52] But Gibbons also stated that she was not intoxicated on her second day in the court-room, when she recanted her original story that had exculpated Steven. [53] Thus, when she implicated him in the murder, Gibbons was not intoxicated, with the result that he is unable to prove Gibbons' intoxication prejudiced him. Accordingly, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), Shelton is unable to show cause for his procedural default and is unable to prove that he was prejudiced by Gibbons' testimony because she was not intoxicated when she inculpated Shelton in the murder. Therefore, on that ground, we decline to overturn Shelton's conviction and death sentence.
Shelton argues that he was denied a fair trial because a defense witness, Lisa Bedwell, testified that Shelton previously had been incarcerated. According to Shelton, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move in limine to prevent Bedwell from testifying about Shelton's criminal past, and for failing to make a timely objection to Bedwell's statement. Shelton contends that despite the court's curative instruction, the inadmissible statement was a violation of D.R.E. 404 and deprived Shelton of his constitutional right to due process. [54] Shelton failed to raise this issue at trial or on direct appeal. Therefore, Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) bars relief unless Shelton can show cause for his procedural default and resulting prejudice. [55] He is unable to meet this burden. Shelton's co-defendant, Jack Outten, called Lisa Bedwell for the apparent purpose of undermining the credibility of Christine Gibbons. Bedwell had known Gibbons for approximately nine years and the two were once friends. According to Bedwell, Gibbons called her on the day of the murder and asked her to sell a stereo because Gibbons needed money. During the conversation, Gibbons provided Bedwell with multiple versions of the involvement and culpability of the individual co-defendants in Mannon's murder. On cross-examination, the State sought to show that Bedwell was biased in favor of Steven Shelton. The State asked about Bedwell's relationship with Gibbons and with each of the defendants. The issue at bar arose out of the following colloquy between the prosecutor and Bedwell: Q. How about Steve Shelton, do you know Steve Shelton, also? A. I know him. I don't know him, you know. I met him a couple of times. Q. You know him if you see him? A. Yes. Q. And about how long have you known Steve? A. What did you ask me about Steve? Q. How long, I mean, what period of time? A. I don't even know. I can't  I don't know. Q. A number of years, also? A. No. Well, it was right after he got out of prison the last time. The Court: That answer will be stricken and the jury is instructed quite clearly to disregard it. [Shelton's Defense Counsel]: Can we come to sidebar? [56] At sidebar, Shelton's lawyer moved for a mistrial. Your honor, we tried  We have gone to great lengths at the risk of a mistrial because of trying all three of these men together to absolutely avoid that kind of thing. Now, there has been terrible prejudice done to my client and I do not believe that from now on he can get a fair trial in this case. Now we have a record of him being in prison with no information of any of the other individuals having been in prison and I clearly believe it's grounds for mistrial. I ask that my client be mistried out of this case. [57] The Superior Court denied Shelton's motion for a mistrial. The court stated that the fact that the trial was held jointly was irrelevant and meaningless. The court indicated that the lawyers in the case needed to instruct the witnesses to stay away from problem areas when examining them on the stand. [58] Nevertheless, the court concluded that its specific, clear, immediate instruction cured any prejudice that might have resulted to Shelton. [59] Immediately after the court's ruling, Shelton indicated that he wished to terminate his lawyer's representation. Shelton argued, and his trial counsel admitted, that during cross-examination, Shelton had warned trial counsel that Bedwell was about to say that she had known Shelton since prison. At that time, Shelton asked trial counsel to object to the State's line of questioning, but Bedwell made the statement about prison before trial counsel could stand and object. Trial counsel informed the court that he was in the process of objecting on relevancy grounds when Bedwell blurted out the statement. Neither the prosecutor nor trial counsel had anticipated that Bedwell would make such a statement. The prosecutor informed the court: I have been provided a Jencks statement from ... [Outten's lawyer] and it doesn't mention that she mentioned, he got out of jail. I never talked to this witness before today. I had no idea she was going to say that. And certainly, my question was an open-ended question. It was as to bias, as to how long she had known Steven Shelton. [60] Shelton's lawyer responded: Again, your honor. It was a statement supplied by the State  I had no idea until my client whispered in my ear. I didn't really think it was going to happen, because I thought that she had been properly prompted. [61] Shelton now argues that trial counsel should have made a preemptive objection in the form of a motion in limine to prevent Bedwell from testifying about Shelton's incarceration. Shelton also contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to make a timely objection to Bedwell's testimony. We disagree. First, the record shows that neither the State nor trial counsel had reason to anticipate that Bedwell would answer an innocuous question in the manner that she did. Bedwell's comment was a surprise to both sides. It came in response to the State's relevant inquiry on the issue of Bedwell's alleged bias in favor of Shelton. Therefore, the question was not objectionable and trial counsel had no cause to object at that point. Moreover, as soon as Shelton apprised trial counsel of the likelihood that Bedwell would mention prison, it was already too late. Bedwell blurted out her statement almost contemporaneously with Shelton's warning to trial counsel. Second, Bedwell was Outten's witness whom Outten produced to impeach Gibbons' testimony. Any effort to undermine Gibbons, who by then had retaken the stand to implicate Shelton, was clearly in Shelton's best interest. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Shelton's argument that trial counsel should have moved in limine to silence a witness who was proffering testimony in Shelton's favor. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that trial counsel had no indication that Bedwell would mention Shelton's stay in prison until it already was too late. Third, Bedwell's comment was brief and did not involve the nature of the crime for which Shelton was incarcerated, nor the length of his stay. Therefore, the comment was only mildly prejudicial, if at all. Nevertheless, the Superior Court cured any prejudice that might have occurred by striking sua sponte the answer and instructing the jury to disregard the comment. [62] In a similar context, this Court held that [p]rejudicial error will normally be cured by the trial judge's instructions to the jury. [63] Presumably, the jurors followed the court's instruction. [64] Here, the cautionary instruction, because it was given immediately, sufficed to cure whatever prejudice may have occurred. [65] Under the circumstances, Bedwell's statement did not warrant a mistrial, as a mistrial is mandated only when there are no meaningful and practical alternatives to that remedy. [66] Accordingly, we do not find that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to make a motion in limine or to otherwise prevent the prejudicial testimony of Lisa Bedwell. Therefore, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), Shelton is unable to show cause for his procedural default or that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiency.
Shelton argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to sever the penalty hearing and that he was prejudiced by the joint hearing. Shelton also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. According to Shelton, [e]ven though a motion to sever the trial was denied by the court, it did not address the severance issue in the context of the potential prejudice posed by a joint penalty phase hearing. [67] Shelton contends that a motion to sever a joint penalty phase hearing raises issues that would not be addressed in a motion to sever the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, according to Shelton, the only way effectively to avoid the prejudice of a joint penalty phase hearing was to sever the penalty phase and to provide a separate jury for each hearing. Before jury selection began, Nelson Shelton made a formal motion to sever his trial. [68] Ironically, neither Outten nor Steven Shelton joined in Nelson's motion or took a position on the matter. [69] The Superior Court denied Nelson's motion to sever the trial. At an office conference prior to the beginning of the penalty hearing, the court and all counsel briefly discussed severing the penalty hearing. None of the defendants formally moved for severance and no severance occurred. On direct appeal, Shelton and Outten argued that the Superior Court should have severed the guilt phase of the trial. [70] This Court rejected that argument. [71] Now, Shelton argues that counsel was deficient in failing to move to sever the penalty hearing. We reject Shelton's contention on two grounds: (1) Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) bars Shelton's claim as formerly adjudicated, [72] and (2) under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), Shelton is unable to show cause and actual prejudice for his failure to raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal.