Opinion ID: 2982191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fair Presentation

Text: Relying on Brady v. Maryland, Ross also claims habeas relief should be granted because he was denied access to exculpatory grand jury testimony. Before reaching the merits of his Brady claim, we must first decide whether Ross has “fairly presented” this issue as a matter of federal constitutional law. The federal right implicated in this case is whether the non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory grand jury testimony violated Ross’s due process right to a fair trial. The district court held that Ross failed to preserve this constitutional challenge because he merely cited Brady in passing and without argument. But we find that he met the fair presentation requirement. - 18 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda Under AEDPA, a petitioner must exhaust all available remedies in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b), (c). A habeas petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement when the “highest court in the state in which the petitioner has been convicted has had a full and fair opportunity to rule on the claims.” Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994); Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878, 881 (6th Cir. 1990). In other words, each issue must be “fairly presented” to the state courts. See, e.g., Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2009); Fraizer v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780, 797 (6th Cir. 2003). To determine whether a petitioner “fairly presented” a federal constitutional issue to the state courts, we have looked to the petitioner’s (1) reliance upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) reliance upon state cases employing federal constitutional analysis; (3) phrasing the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or (4) alleging facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law. Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 613 (6th Cir. 2005); see also McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that “[g]eneral allegations of the denial of rights to a ‘fair trial’ and ‘due process’ do not ‘fairly present’ claims that specific constitutional rights were violated.”) Nevertheless, a petitioner is not required to cite “book and verse on the federal constitution.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971) (internal quotation and citations omitted). After reviewing Ross’s briefs to the Ohio Court of Appeals, and his memorandum of jurisdiction to the Ohio Supreme Court, Ross has satisfied the exhaustion requirement under AEDPA. In his state court brief, he argued succinctly that Brady requires the prosecution to reveal exculpatory information, including evidence in the form of grand jury testimony. Beyond naming - 19 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda the constitutional issue explicitly, Ross also delineates the three requirements under Brady and considers how the Supreme Court has defined materiality in that case. Ross also provides a basic factual explanation for his argument, by articulating that the victims’ grand jury testimony was inconsistent with the testimony given at trial. Failure to reveal the transcripts, he concluded, violated his due process right to a fair trial. Similarly, in Ross’s reply brief before the Ohio Court of Appeals, he again invokes Brady, laying out the applicable standard, and describing how that case applies to the present analysis. Ross further acknowledged that “Brady v. Maryland sets a constitutional minimum requirement for due process” and cited Dennis v. United States, a Supreme Court decision, for the proposition that “[d]isclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal justice.” Ultimately, Ross fairly presented his federal claim to the Ohio Supreme Court by identifying Brady as the well-established Supreme Court precedent. The court of appeals—while acknowledging that Ross raised a Brady claim—did not address the merits of this federal issue. Instead, the court confined its analysis to the application of state law, specifying that the decision to reveal grand jury testimony is within the trial court’s discretion. It is true that Ross engaged in a more robust discussion of the grand jury issue by way of state law. To be sure, he cited numerous state court decisions to support his argument. Notwithstanding the detailed state law explication, however, Ross plainly articulated the federal basis of his claim to the state court by acknowledging expressly that grand jury testimony, if it is exculpatory, falls under Brady. - 20 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda Whether the state court understood itself as presented with a question of federal law is not dispositive. The Supreme Court in Dye v. Hofbauer held that the “failure of a state appellate court to mention a federal claim does not mean the claim was not presented to it. It is too obvious to merit extended discussion that whether the exhaustion requirement . . . has been satisfied cannot turn upon whether a state appellate court chooses to ignore in its opinion a federal constitutional claim squarely raised in petitioner’s brief in the state court.” 546 U.S.1, 6–7 (2005). The petitioner in Dye fairly presented his claim by articulating in a state court brief that he was denied due process of law and linked his argument to four federal cases, all of which addressed due process violations. In like manner, Ross framed his argument in terms of the pertinent constitutional law by referencing Brady, he examined the elements to sustain a cause of action under Brady, and he relied on federal cases employing the appropriate constitutional analysis, by citing Dennis for the proposition that disclosure promotes the fairness of criminal trials and by mentioning this Court’s decision in United States v. Farley, 2F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 1993). In Farley, we asked whether Brady could be used to overcome the presumption of secrecy in grand jury proceedings. Even if the factual support for Ross’s constitutional claim is underdeveloped, the Supreme Court has recognized that merely labeling a claim “federal” sufficiently preserves the issue. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). Indeed, the fair presentation requirement does not mandate extensive elaboration: “A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds . . . .’” Baldwin, 541 - 21 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda U.S. at 32. Thus, when Ross invoked Brady and incorporated footnotes to Dennis and to our decision in Farley, he sufficiently preserved his federal claim. According to the State, the cases Ross mentions do not “provide the clearly established Supreme Court precedent” relevant to his claim as they involve the application of Ohio Crim. R. 6(E), and do not engage in a constitutional analysis. Even if we assume the State is correct, that Ross “cited the wrong cases in support of his constitutional claim is no basis for default.” Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 798 (6th Cir. 2006). Since a petitioner is not required to cite cases applying federal constitutional principles where he has articulated his claim in terms of a denial of a specific constitutional right, “penalizing a party for citing the wrong cases would create the perverse incentive to cite no cases at all.” Fulcher, 444 F.3d at 798; Newton v. Million, 349 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2003). Because Ross fairly presented his federal claim, he provided the state court with a full and fair opportunity to address his argument premised on Brady. Therefore, we will not dismiss this issue on state exhaustion grounds.