Opinion ID: 628594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Proof Standards

Text: 32 A court's allocation of the burdens of proof in a federal agency handicap discrimination case will be determined in part by whether the court looks to Title VII case law or to the EEOC regulations for guidance. The EEOC regulations direct that [a]n agency shall make reasonable accommodation [for qualified handicapped persons] unless the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.704(a). This rule apparently calls for a two-part approach in which plaintiffs bear their usual burden of showing a breach of duty--namely, that they are qualified handicapped persons who have been denied reasonable accommodations for their handicaps--but in which agencies may demonstrate, as an affirmative defense, that fulfilling this duty would impose undue hardships on their programs. 33 Section 505(a)(1), on the other hand, states, in relevant part: 34 The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16) ... shall be available, with respect to any complaint under section 791 of this title, to any employee or applicant for employment aggrieved by the final disposition of such complaint.... 35 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(a)(1). Section 717 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Yet, although religious discrimination is a closer analog to handicap discrimination than either race or sex discrimination, courts focusing on this language have tended to look to the allocations of the burdens of proof developed for Title VII race and sex discrimination complaints in shaping rules under the Rehabilitation Act. Compare McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth a three-step approach to the proof of race discrimination) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (elaborating McDonnell Douglas and applying it to a sex discrimination claim) with Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir.1989) (Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, lower courts have implemented a two-step procedure for evaluating claims and allocating burdens of proof under [Title VII's religious discrimination] provisions.). Thus, courts allocating burdens of proof under the Rehabilitation Act have been prone to adapt and employ the familiar principles of McDonnell Douglas as elaborated by Burdine. See, e.g., Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir.1981) (applying a three-step burden of proof under the Rehabilitation Act); Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1280-81, 1282 (8th Cir.1985) (same). 36 Burdine places on the plaintiff an initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant, which must then produce evidence of an articulable non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. If the defendant produces such a reason, the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the reason was pretextual and that intentional discrimination had in fact occurred. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-95. 37 The allocation of the burdens of production in the first two steps is designed to sharpen the inquiry into an elusive fact--an employer's discriminatory motivation. Id. at 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 8. Because of the difficulties inherent in establishing such motivation, the Supreme Court placed only a modest initial burden on a Title VII plaintiff; namely, that he establish that although qualified for an available position, he was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. Once this burden is met, it becomes necessary for the employer to produce admissible evidence of legitimate reasons for the plaintiff's rejection, thus fram[ing] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. Id. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95. Such a demonstration having been made, it remains the plaintiff's ultimate burden to show that he was in fact the victim of intentional discrimination. Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748-49, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). In short, the requirement of only a minimal prima facie showing strips the defendant of the ability to remain silent as to its motive while recognizing the plaintiff's ultimate obligation to prove that motive's illegality. 38 An individual bringing an action under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, however, may face a quite different situation from that faced by plaintiffs charging racial discrimination under Title VII. Unlike a person's race, an employer may legitimately take a handicap into consideration in determining whether an applicant or employee is qualified for a particular position. Thus, while an agency would never admit to basing an employment decision on race, agencies frequently acknowledge that they have taken a person's handicap into consideration. Under such circumstances, the ultimate purpose of Burdine 's requirements is typically achieved from the outset. See Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir.1981). 39 It is apparent, then, that the Burdine test is not equally applicable to all cases brought under section 501. To illustrate this point, we describe three of the various categories of handicap discrimination cases that may be brought under that section. The first is one in which the employing agency asserts that it refused a job application, or denied an employee a promotion or discharged him, for reasons unrelated to the person's handicap. See, e.g., id. (Burdine allocation may be appropriate for Sec. 504 suits in which the defendant disclaims any reliance on the plaintiff's handicap); Carter, 840 F.2d at 64 (blind employee discharged on stated basis that employee's job performance and attitude were unsatisfactory). A second category involves suits in which the employer challenges a plaintiff's claim that he is a qualified handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in question. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.702(f). In these cases, the agency will usually contend that no reasonable accommodation is available. See, e.g., Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 476, 478 (11th Cir.1983) (agency permitted to refuse employment to a person capable of walking only one mile per day when its job requirements include the ability to walk six hours per day and stand for another hour); see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979) (educational institution receiving federal funds not required by section 504 to make a fundamental alteration in the nature of [its] program in order to accommodate a hearing-impaired student). In a third category we have those cases, such as the one before us, in which the employing agency offers the affirmative defense of undue hardship on the operation of its program. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.704(a). This last may at times merge with the second, however, as indicated by the regulation's reference to the nature and the cost of a proposed accommodation as an example of undue hardship. Id. Sec. 1613.704(c)(3). 40 The first of these categories involves the sort of inquiry into subjective facts--the employing agency's true motivation--that the Burdine three-step approach was designed to address. But in the last two categories, the fact that the plaintiff's handicap was taken into explicit account in the agency's employment or personnel decision is acknowledged. These cases deal with objective claims that may be tested through the application of traditional burdens of proof. In the second category, for example, a plaintiff must establish that (a) he is handicapped but, (b) with reasonable accommodation (which he must describe), he is (c) able to perform the essential functions of the position he holds or seeks. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.702(f); see also id. Sec. 1613.704(a), (b). As in the usual case, it would then be up to the employing agency to refute that evidence. The burden, however, remains with the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 41 In the third category, the agency invokes the affirmative defense of undue hardship, an inquiry for which the regulations provide three factors for consideration: 42 (1) The overall size of the agency's program with respect to the number of employees, number and type of facilities and size of budget;(2) the type of agency operation, including the composition and structure of the agency's work force; and 43 (3) the nature and the cost of the accommodation. 44 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.704(c). In such a case (as in any other in which an affirmative defense is raised) the agency has the burden of proving the undue hardship. See, e.g., Langon, 959 F.2d at 1060 (burden of showing undue hardship was on HHS); cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2323, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (noting, in a criminal context, that at common law the burden of proving ... affirmative defenses--indeed all ... circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation--rested on the defendant) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 45 As a general matter, a reasonable accommodation is one employing a method of accommodation that is reasonable in the run of cases, whereas the undue hardship inquiry focuses on the hardships imposed by the plaintiff's preferred accommodation in the context of the particular agency's operations. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.704(b) (listing various reasonable methods of accommodation as examples of reasonable accommodation); 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.704(c) (listing considerations bearing on undue hardship by reference to the hardship imposed on the agency in question). As noted earlier, a grey area will arise where a proposed accommodation is so costly or of such a nature that it would impose an undue burden on the employer's operations. Thus, an accommodation would be both unreasonable and impose an undue burden if it either imposes undue financial and administrative burdens on [an agency] or requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of [its] program. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1131 n. 17, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 46 Finally, we note that, although we have revisited the question of allocating burdens of proof under the Rehabilitation Act from first principles, nothing we have said contradicts any of our earlier decisions. Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188 (D.C.Cir.1982), involved the question of whether the Government must cease any discrimination, not whether it had fulfilled an affirmative duty to accommodate. Id. at 1191. Carter suggested that the burden of persuasion might remain with the employee or applicant even in a case where the employer asserts the affirmative defense that accommodation would be unduly burdensome. See 840 F.2d at 65-66 (Credible evidence that reasonable accommodation is not possible or would be unduly burdensome shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to rebut the employer's evidence.). In that case, however, the burdensomeness of accommodation was not at issue. The employer denied that it had discharged the employee because of his blindness. See 840 F.2d at 64. In Langon, the one statement in tension with what we have said is the court's suggestion that the employer (not the employee) had the burden of persuasion on the question of the requested accommodation's reasonableness. See 959 F.2d at 1061 (If [the employee] could [perform the essential functions of her position], the burden [was] on the agency to show why the accommodation was not a reasonable one.). That statement, however, is dictum because it was not necessary to reach the issue of the agency's burden in order to reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment. Therefore, nothing in our precedents forecloses the analysis we have employed today.