Opinion ID: 202945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Villanueva-Rivera's Other Alleged Errors

Text: Villanueva-Rivera argues that his conviction should be reversed because the prosecution improperly allowed the cooperating witness, Escobar-Lopez, to testify falsely and then used that false testimony in its closing argument. At a sidebar conference on March 11, 2005, the government made the following explicit admissions: (1) the government has no intention of prosecuting [Escobar-Lopez] for these charges at this time; (2) the government has no intention of pursuing charges . . . [because] he cannot be prosecuted based only on his own statements; and (3) at this point in time, at no time has the government had any intention of prosecuting Mr. Escobar, because without his cooperation, we would not have been able to proceed with this case. However, on March 16, 2005, during cross-examination by a co-defendant's counsel as to Escobar-Lopez's motivation for cooperating, Escobar-Lopez testified to the contrary, stating that just like the defendants here, I'm sitting here testifying without a piece of paper, and because of my testimony, I could also be put in jail. Finally, during closing arguments on April 12, 2005, the prosecutor said: [Escobar-Lopez] decided let me save my hide and help, and maybe I'll get something out of this for me, maybe I'll get rid of that case in Boston. But he also told you there are no promises, no promises. . . . You don't have a plea agreement, you don't have a cooperation agreement, you don't have any kind of immunity? No. No. No. The rules governing this issue were established by the Supreme Court in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). There a government witness, in response to a question by the prosecutor, testified that he had received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony. Id. at 265, 79 S.Ct. 1173. The prosecutor had in fact promised him consideration, but did nothing to correct the witness' false testimony. Id. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction regardless of whether the prosecutor solicit[s] false evidence or, as here, allows [false evidence] to go uncorrected when it appears. Id. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. The use of such false testimony violates the defendant's constitutional right to due process. Id. A new trial is required if the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We first reject Villanueva-Rivera's assertion that the prosecutor's statements during closing argument constituted a Napue violation. The prosecutor merely said there [we]re no promises and no plea, cooperation, or immunity agreement. Villanueva-Rivera has pointed to no evidence to the contrary. Turning to Escobar-Lopez's testimony itself, the government argues that no Napue violation occurred because Escobar-Lopez was unaware that the government did not intend to prosecute him. We disagree. In light of the government's prior admission that at no time has the government had any intention of prosecuting Mr. Escobar, the government clearly knew that Escobar-Lopez was not going to be put in jail for his testimony. Yet, Escobar-Lopez was permitted to testify that because of my testimony, I could also be put in jail. Thus, the government allow[ed] [false testimony] to go uncorrected when it appear[ed]. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. However, the government's admissions regarding its intent not to prosecute Escobar-Lopez occurred at a sidebar conference in the presence of the defense counsel before Escobar-Lopez made the challenged statements. Villanueva-Rivera's counsel was thus equally aware that Escobar-Lopez's testimony was false. Although there is some division within the circuits on the issue, we agree with the majority of circuits that absent unusual circumstances, the right of the defendant to disclosure by the prosecutor is deemed waived if defense counsel with actual knowledge of the [false testimony] chooses not to present such information to the jury. United States v. Iverson, 648 F.2d 737, 739 (D.C.Cir.1981) (opinion on rehearing) (footnote omitted). [7] When the defendant knows about the false testimony and fails to bring it to the jury or the court's attention, the assumption is that he did so for strategic reasons, and the defendant will not be allowed to question his own strategic choices on appeal. Beltran, 294 F.3d at 736. Nor does this case present unusual circumstances that undermine this presumption, such as when the failure to object is the result of defense counsel's conflict of interest, see Ross, 638 F.2d at 986, or when the defendant was prevented from raising or pursuing the issue at trial by circumstances essentially beyond his control, see Iverson, 648 F.2d at 739. Having had knowledge that Escobar-Lopez's testimony was false at the time it occurred and having chosen not to raise this issue at the time, Villanueva-Rivera cannot now raise the issue on appeal.
Villanueva-Rivera argues that his conviction should be reversed because prosecution witnesses made repeated references to a larger, and very violent organization, despite the limited scope of the charged conspiracy. Since there was no defense objection to these statements on the specific basis that Villanueva-Rivera raises on appeal, [8] we review only for plain error. See United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1453 (1st Cir.1992). All of the statements relied on by Villanueva-Rivera merely provided background information about the investigation. Almost any large drug trial will have references to gangs and violent activities. Since none of the statements connected Villanueva-Rivera to this activity, [9] we find no plain error.