Opinion ID: 2155542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abuse of Writ

Text: There is a presumption that a trial judge should conduct a hearing on a § 23-110 motion. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 765-766 (D.C.1992) (citing cases). This court has recognized, however, that in some circumstances a hearing is not always required. See Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142, 147 (D.C.1990) (listing three categories of claims that do not merit hearings); Pettaway v. United States, 390 A.2d 981, 984 (D.C.1978) (same). Here we are dealing with appellant's second § 23-110 motion, in which he raises issues not raised either on direct appeal or in his first § 23-110 motion. In such circumstances the rule is more strict. [I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel's ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court's consideration of appellant's claim. Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987). [6] Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure. Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)); accord, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 772 A.2d 818, 824 (D.C. 2001); Vaughn v. United States, 600 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C.1991). Moreover, when, as in this case, the defendant has already launched several collateral attacks on his conviction, the reasons supporting the application of the cause and prejudice test are even more compelling. Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1993); see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (abuse of writ doctrine generally prohibits subsequent... consideration of claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first [collateral] proceeding). [7] The procedural default articulated in Shepard and other cases is not insurmountable. To establish legally sufficient cause for his failure to raise a claim on direct appeal, however, appellant must show (if he can) that he was prevented by exceptional circumstances from raising the claim at the appropriate time. Head, 489 A.2d at 451; see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (a defendant must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim on direct appeal). [8] Once cause is shown, appellant must then shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (emphasis in original). We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that appellant was procedurally barred from asserting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard. Instead of demonstrating sufficient cause for his failure, either on direct appeal or in his first § 23-110 motion, to raise his present claims of ineffective assistance, appellant merely recites in his brief the same arguments that he made in his second § 23-110 motion as to why his counsel's performance was supposedly deficient. He makes no real attempt to explain why these claims could not have been raised earlier. The closest that appellant comes to arguing cause is the assertion that his counsel never provided to him, and thus he never received, the government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing which, according to appellant, contained false information that his attorney should have challenged. One answer to this argument is that appellant himself was present at his sentencing hearing and surely must have known that the government was making false statements if in fact it did so. Thus he was aware of this basis for an ineffectiveness claim before he even noted his direct appeal, let alone before filing his first § 23-110 motion. [9] Indeed, the same reasoning can be applied to each of the ineffectiveness claims raised in appellant's second § 23-110 motion, since he was present at his trial and therefore aware of any alleged errors as they took place. As the government observes in its brief, appellant's claims are on their face the types of claims that he knew or should have known about at the time he filed either his brief on direct appeal in 1989 or his first § 23-110 motion in 1990. [10] In fact, appellant even acknowledges being aware of at least so me of his attorney's decisions with which he now finds fault. Regarding counsel's failure to cross-examine a government witnesses (Christine Blake), for example, appellant alleges that at trial he asked [counsel] repeatedly to do so. The same is true with respect to counsel's failure to call an exculpatory witness (Paula Hackney). In his brief appellant states that counsel's inactions became clear when he refused to speak with Ms. Hackney at appellant's trial proceeding. Statements such as these plainly show that appellant knew of the facts on which he now bases his ineffectiveness claims as they were occurring, yet he can point to no external factors (as required by Murray ) which prevented him from timely presenting those claims to the court at an earlier date. For these reasons we hold that appellant has not demonstrated cause for his failure to raise his current claims of ineffective assistance either on direct appeal or in his first § 23-110 motion. Because appellant has failed to show cause, this court need not decide whether he suffered prejudice or even if the trial court was in error. Head, 489 A.2d at 451 n. 5.