Opinion ID: 203910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether this court has jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of Makieh's asylum application as untimely

Text: Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), we lack jurisdiction to review the agency's determination that Makieh failed to show extraordinary circumstances that could excuse the untimeliness of his asylum application under § 1158(a)(2)(D). The REAL ID Act provides an exception under which we do retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). However, the agency's determinations as to timeliness and changed or extraordinary circumstances are usually factual determinations outside the court's jurisdiction. Odmar v. Mukasey, 294 Fed.Appx. 611, 613 (1st Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citing Hayek v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 501, 506-07 (1st Cir.2006)). To overcome § 1158(a)(3)'s jurisdictional bar, Makieh must identif[y] a legal or constitutional defect in the [agency's] decision. El-Labaki v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2008). To trigger our jurisdiction, the putative constitutional or legal challenge ... must be colorable; that is, the argument advanced must, at the very least, have some potential validity. Pan v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir.2007); see also De Araujo v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 146, 154 (1st Cir.2006). 1. Timing of asylum applications An alien applying for asylum must demonstrate[] by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien's arrival in the United States or by April 1, 1997, whichever is later. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2). However, [a]n application for asylum of an alien may be considered, notwithstanding [the one-year limitations period], if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the [statutory] period. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). An applicant attempting to demonstrate changed or extraordinary circumstances must also demonstrate that he filed the application `within a reasonable period' given those circumstances. Oroh v. Holder, 561 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4), (5)). 2. Makieh's petition for review Before the IJ and BIA, Makieh argued both changed and extraordinary circumstances as reasons he should be eligible for consideration of his untimely filed application for asylum. The IJ determined that even if Makieh were correct that circumstances in Syria changed due to a rise in Islamic fundamentalism after September 11, 2001, Makieh's 2004 application still was not file[d] within a reasonable time given those changed circumstances. Makieh does not challenge that determination in his petition for review. Makieh also argued before the agency, and argues in his petition for review, that his mistaken reliance on his father's and wife's visa petitions constituted an extraordinary circumstance that should make him eligible for consideration of an untimely filed application. Makieh urges that we have jurisdiction to review the IJ's and BIA's decisions as to this issue because the agency committed constitutional and legal error by not considering this argument regarding his reliance on the visa petitions. According to Makieh, the IJ and BIA violated his right to due process by failing to actually adjudicate every claim which he present[ed]. 3. Analysis Makieh fails to state a colorable constitutional claim or question of law. See De Araujo, 457 F.3d at 154-55. In his oral decision, the IJ said explicitly that Makieh has stated that the reason ... he waited [to file the asylum application] w[a]s th[at] in addition to the withdrawn visa petition by his U.S. citizen wife, sometime in 2003, also, the fact that his father had earlier submitted a visa petition for him in the year 2000. Having concluded that Makieh did not timely file his application after learning of the changed conditions in Syria after September 11, the IJ went on to make the explicit finding that [n]o other extraordinary circumstances have been shown in this case, and the Court, thus, finds that [Makieh] is barred from asylum under [INA] Section 208(a)(2)(B). ( Id. at 64.) As his oral decision makes abundantly clear, the IJ did, indeed, consider Makieh's argument as to his reliance on the visa petitions. He also made an explicit finding that the evidence Makieh presented failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, where Makieh had attempted to characterize his reliance on the visa petitions precisely as an extraordinary circumstance warranting an exception to the timeliness requirement. Furthermore, even if the IJ could have been more exact in linking his finding of no extraordinary circumstances with his acknowledgment of Makieh's argument as to the visa petitions, we have made clear that `[a]lthough we expect an immigration judge to make findings on all grounds that are necessary to support his decision, those findings can be either explicit or implicit.' Pulisir v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 302, 308 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68, 72-73 (1st Cir.2008) in parenthetical). Here, even if we were to conclude that the IJ did not make an explicit finding as to the extraordinary circumstances argument, we certainly would conclude that he made an implicit finding in that regard. Nothing in the record suggests that the agency failed to consider Makieh's argument with respect to his reliance on the visa petitions, much less that it committed constitutional error in this regard. See Jamal v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 60, 65-66 (1st Cir.2008). 4. Conclusion as to Makieh's application for asylum Makieh's petition for review of the denial of his application for asylum does not present any colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction to consider this element of the petition for review.