Opinion ID: 2036059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Successive Post-Conviction Petitions

Text: Initially, the State argues that defendant's present post-conviction claims are not properly before this court. Thus, at the outset, we must determine a defendant's entitlement to consideration of a second or subsequent post-conviction petition. Defendant, in his brief, makes no attempt to justify our consideration of his present post-conviction claims. However, at oral argument, defense counsel offered the following rationale for filing the second post-conviction petition. Defense counsel stated that upon this court's affirmance of both defendant's conviction and the denial of post-conviction relief, defendant's appellate counsel withdrew from the case. This court then appointed current counsel to represent defendant in any subsequent proceedings. Upon being appointed, current counsel noticed that prior counsel failed to assert as error in the prior proceedings the claimed errors now presented. Believing these unasserted errors to be meritorious, and in light of the seriousness of the penalty imposed in this case, defendant filed a second post-conviction petition. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act contemplates the filing of only one post-conviction petition. ( People v. Free (1989), 122 Ill.2d 367, 375, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184.) Successive petitions may, however, be allowed where the proceedings on the initial petition were deficient in some fundamental way. See Free, 122 Ill.2d at 376, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184, citing People v. Nichols (1972), 51 Ill.2d 244, 246, 281 N.E.2d 873; People v. Hollins (1972), 51 Ill.2d 68, 70, 280 N.E.2d 710; People v. Slaughter (1968), 39 Ill.2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566. The filing of successive post-conviction petitions sets up two competing interests. On the one hand, there is the State's interest in providing a forum for the vindication of the petitioner's constitutional rights. On the other hand, the State has a legitimate interest in the finality of criminal litigation and judgments. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. ( Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1074, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 355.) The successive filing of post-conviction petitions plagues that finality. In Illinois, the operation of waiver and res judicata has generally contributed to the finality of criminal litigation. Section 122-3 of the Act provides that [a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 122-3.) Additionally, a ruling on a post-conviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the initial petition. (Emphasis added.) ( Free, 122 Ill.2d at 376, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184.) Further, any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 122-2.1.) Finally, where a petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, the judgment of the reviewing court is res judicata as to all issues actually decided by the court, and any other claims that could have been presented to the reviewing court, if not presented, are waived. ( People v. Neal (1990), 142 Ill.2d 140, 146, 154 Ill.Dec. 587, 568 N.E.2d 808; People v. Stewart (1988), 121 Ill.2d 93, 104, 117 Ill.Dec. 187, 520 N.E.2d 348.) However, where fundamental fairness so requires, strict application of procedural bars may be relaxed. People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 91, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868; People v. Hollins (1972), 51 Ill.2d 68, 280 N.E.2d 710; People v. Slaughter (1968), 39 Ill.2d 278, 285, 235 N.E.2d 566. We note also that the statutory time limitation contributes to finality. (See Ill. Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 122-1.) This section, recently amended by the legislature, severely limits the time period in which a defendant may file a petition for post-conviction relief. Effective January 1992, no post-conviction proceeding shall be commenced more than 3 years, instead of 10 years, after the rendition of the final judgment. Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 38, par. 122-1, Historical & Statutory Notes, at 48 (Smith-Hurd Supp.1992). Where, however, the claimed error is one which could not have been presented in an earlier proceeding, procedural bars may be ineffectual in bringing about that finality which ordinarily follows direct appeal and the first post-conviction proceeding. In such cases, there is the potential that a second or subsequent post-conviction petition may be filed, thus defeating finality. People v. Stewart (1990), 141 Ill.2d 107, 152 Ill.Dec. 286, 565 N.E.2d 968, is exemplary. The defendant in Stewart filed a second post-conviction petition. Counsel who represented the defendant in the second post-conviction proceeding was other than counsel who had represented the defendant at trial, on direct appeal and at his first post-conviction proceeding. In the second petition, the defendant asserted tiers of ineffective assistance against counsel who had represented him in prior proceedings. The case now before us presents circumstances similar to those in Stewart. We have occasion, therefore, to consider the procedural rules which govern the filing of successive post-conviction petitions which present a question of effective assistance of counsel which could not have been presented in an earlier post-trial proceeding. We first examine the propriety of bringing a second post-conviction petition which seeks relief from ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in the first post-conviction proceeding. Although there is a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial ( Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674), the right has not been found to apply in post-conviction proceedings (see Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987), 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993, 95 L.Ed.2d 539, 546; see also Murray v. Giarrantano (1989), 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (applying the rule to capital cases)). Indeed, in Illinois, `the right to counsel at post-conviction proceedings is a matter of legislative grace and favor which may be altered by the legislature at will.' People v. Porter (1988), 122 Ill.2d 64, 72, 118 Ill.Dec. 465, 521 N.E.2d 1158, quoting People v. Ward (1984), 124 Ill.App.3d 974, 978, 80 Ill.Dec. 161, 464 N.E.2d 1144. Because the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is derived from statute rather than the Federal or State Constitutions, post-conviction petitioners are guaranteed only the level of assistance provided for by the Act. That assistance has been defined by this court to mean a reasonable level of assistance. ( People v. Wright (1992), 149 Ill.2d 36, 64, 171 Ill.Dec. 424, 594 N.E.2d 276, citing People v. Owens (1990), 139 Ill.2d 351, 364, 151 Ill.Dec. 522, 564 N.E.2d 1184.) Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings. (See Wainwright v. Torna (1982), 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (holding that where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance); see also Coleman v. Thompson (1991), 501 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640.) Therefore, because the Act was designed to address only deprivations of constitutional magnitude, a petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel at a prior post-conviction proceeding does not present a basis upon which relief may be granted under the Act. We note, additionally, that the Act expressly provides that the petitioner may assert claims of a constitutional magnitude which occurred in the proceeding which resulted in [the petitioner's] conviction. (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 122-1.) The purpose of the post-conviction proceeding is to permit inquiry into the constitutional issues involved in the original proceeding. ( People v. Silagy (1987), 116 Ill.2d 357, 365, 107 Ill.Dec. 677, 507 N.E.2d 830.) The Act does not, however, provide a forum to test the propriety of conduct at an earlier post-conviction proceeding. Thus, where a petitioner files a second or subsequent post-conviction petition wherein he claims ineffective assistance in his first post-conviction proceeding, consideration of those claims is beyond the scope of the Act. We next address the propriety of presenting, in a second or subsequent post-conviction petition, a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In contrast to post-conviction proceedings, a defendant is guaranteed the effective assistance of appellate counsel as of right. ( Evitts v. Lucey (1985), 469 U.S. 387, 393-97, 105 S.Ct. 830, 834-37, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, 828-30; People v. Avitia (1989), 178 Ill.App.3d 968, 970, 128 Ill.Dec. 70, 533 N.E.2d 1158.) Thus, the filing of successive post-conviction petitions, wherein the petitioner claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, requires us to consider the State's interest in finality in light of the petitioner's right to constitutionally guaranteed protections. We recognize, as does apparently the State, the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver and res judicata simply by couching his claims in the context of ineffective assistance. In that regard, we reiterate the rule that a petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act simply by rephrasing previously addressed issues in constitutional terms in his petition. ( People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 90, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868; Silagy, 116 Ill.2d at 371, 107 Ill.Dec. 677, 507 N.E.2d 830.) Such claims will be properly defeated by operation of waiver and res judicata. Further, we hold that where a petitioner merely attaches a constitutional label to factual allegations that do not themselves raise an issue of constitutional proportion the petition should be dismissed. The sixth amendment right to counsel is the `right to the effective assistance of counsel.' ( Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692, quoting McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773 n. 14.) The right to counsel ensures the defendant's right to a fair trial, the denial of which constitutes a denial of due process. An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697.) Thus, where a petitioner, in a second or subsequent post-conviction petition, raises a meritorious sixth amendment claim, considerations of finality provide an insufficient basis for the courts to compromise the constitutional protections afforded a post-conviction petitioner under the Act and are, necessarily, overridden. Moreover, where a defaulted claim stems from the incompetency of appellate counsel and results in prejudice to the defendant, there can be no doubt that the proceeding on the first petition was deficient in a fundamental way. See People v. Slaughter (1968), 39 Ill.2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (cause remanded for consideration of second post-conviction petition on its merits where appointed counsel in the first post-conviction proceeding did not adequately represent defendant and second petition was dismissed on assumed ground that the Act contemplates that only one petition be filed). We note, parenthetically, that the Supreme Court has recently considered the propriety of filing successive petitions in the context of habeas corpus relief. In the interest of finality, and in an effort to curtail abuse of the writ (28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 9(b) (1988)), the Court, in McCleskey v. Zant (1991), 499 U.S., 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517, adopted the cause and prejudice test. Under McCleskey, where a petitioner files a second or subsequent application for habeas relief in which he alleges errors which could have been presented in a prior proceeding, he must demonstrate cause for failing to raise the error and actual prejudice resulting from the claimed errors. Even where cause and prejudice are absent, Federal courts may, nonetheless, entertain successive claims if necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Cause has been defined as `some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding. ( McCleskey, 499 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d at 544, quoting Murray v. Carrier (1986), 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397, 408.) In defining prejudice, the McCleskey Court cited to United States v. Frady (1981), 456 U.S. 152, 169, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1595, 71 L.Ed.2d 816, 831, quoting Henderson v. Kibbe (1977), 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1737, 52 L.Ed.2d 203, 212, in which prejudice is defined as an error which `so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.` Satisfaction of the cause and prejudice test will excuse a procedural default. ( McCleskey, 499 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d at 545.) In that regard, we note that operation of the test is similar to, and accomplishes no more than, our fundamental fairness concept. See Gaines, 105 Ill.2d at 91, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868 (holding that where fundamental fairness requires, application of res judicata may be relaxed); see also Hollins, 51 Ill.2d at 70, 280 N.E.2d 710 (holding that fundamental fairness dictates relaxation of waiver). Although attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute cause,  [constitutionally `ineffective assistance of counsel ... is cause.' (Emphasis added.) ( McCleskey, 499 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d at 544, quoting Murray v. Carrier (1986), 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397, 409.) Whether the seemingly narrower test of prejudice required in a Strickland analysis satisfies the requisite showing of prejudice under McCleskey is uncertain. (See MacDonald v. Bender (D.Mass. July 1992), No. 86-3452-WF, 1992 WL 193679.) We note that, in either case, the inquiry is whether the defendant has been denied due process. In sum, where a defendant files a second or subsequent post-conviction petition in which he claims sixth amendment ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, because there is no right to sixth amendment counsel in post-conviction proceedings, such claims do not present a basis upon which relief may be granted under the Act. Further, where a defendant files a second or subsequent post-conviction petition wherein he claims ineffective assistance in his first post-conviction proceeding, because the Act is confined to errors which occurred in the original proceeding, only, such claims are beyond the scope of the Act. Where, however, a defendant files a second or subsequent post-conviction petition in which he raises meritorious claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which could not have been raised in a prior post-trial proceeding, the defendant is entitled to consideration of those claims.