Opinion ID: 196027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Step Two: The Factual Predicate.

Text: 24 Since the lower court isolated a conceptually proper departure-justifying circumstance, the second step of the review process looms. At this stage, we must determine whether, on the whole record, the court supportably could have found that the departure-justifying circumstance actually existed. See Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49. Because this determination implicates the court's factfinding, our standard of review is deferential. See id. (explaining that the findings of fact underlying a departure decision may be set aside only for clear error). 25 Aside from the defendants' actions, the district court identified three factors that contributed to the magnitude of the loss in this case: (1) the conduct of the bank's senior management; (2) the buyers' esurience; and (3) the nosedive in condominium prices. The government does not seriously dispute either the incidence of these factors or their aggravating effect upon the amount of loss. 8 Instead, the government asserts that the court clearly erred in finding an overstatement because the loss figures that the court used for sentencing purposes represented only a fraction of the actual losses caused by the defendants' criminal activity. 26 This argument will not wash. Calculating the amount of loss for purposes of the sentencing guidelines is more an art than a science. Courts can, and frequently do, deal with rough estimates. See United States v. Skrodzki, 9 F.3d 198, 203 (1st Cir.1993); see also U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1, comment., n. 8 (stating that the loss need not be precise, so long as the court make[s] a reasonable estimate of the range of loss, given the available information). Hence, a party dissatisfied with the sentencing court's quantification of the amount of loss in a particular case must go a long way to demonstrate that the finding is clearly erroneous. See Skrodzki, 9 F.3d at 203; Tardiff, 969 F.2d at 1288. 27 Here, the court computed the amount of loss based on 43 loans that were specifically enumerated in various substantive counts of the indictment, plus an additional 97 loans that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had classified as fraudulent. The court then excluded from its loss calculation for each defendant any loan that formed the basis for a specific count on which he or she had been acquitted. In restricting her computations to these 140 loans, the judge relied on an affidavit subscribed to by an FBI case agent, who reviewed the bank's records and culled out loans for which he found specific evidence of fraud. 28 Bearing in mind the wide berth that sentencing judges must be given in determining what information is, or is not, sufficiently reliable to be used in imposing sentence, see Tardiff, 969 F.2d at 1287, we cannot say that Judge Zobel's refusal to venture beyond these 140 loans constituted clear error--especially since the record contains only sketchy information about the origin and extent of losses on other loans. Nor can we say that the judge erred in excluding acquitted loans. Although relevant conduct must be determined by the court, not the jury, see, e.g., United States v. Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 306 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.1989), we believe the evidence here falls well short of compelling a finding that any acquitted loans must be included in calculating the amount of loss. 29 Because the record adequately supports the district court's findings as to both multiple loss causation and amount of loss--indeed, the government has shown us nothing that casts serious doubt on the plausibility of the court's findings in either respect--we conclude that the departure decision passes muster at step two. 30