Opinion ID: 2982614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Alleged Retaliatory Acts

Text: The allegations in Mys’ complaint can be grouped into four broad categories: (1) her initial allegations against Sgt. Miller with regard to the sexual assault incident in 2005; (2) the alleged retaliatory actions taken against her by Lt. Leavitt and Sgt. Miller during and after the first Internal Affairs investigation; (3) the alleged retaliatory actions following her request for a second investigation, which includes the circumstances surrounding her transfer to the Rockford post; and (4) the TRB hearing, her involuntary transfer to Detroit, and the events that followed. With respect to the first category, the parties agreed that details of the alleged sexual assault incident should not be admitted at trial, as those allegations were more prejudicial than probative to Mys’ retaliation claim. Indeed, because those incidents occurred prior to her first complaint, those allegations were more or less irrelevant to her retaliation claim. Everything that happened after Mys filed her first complaint, however, was at least relevant to her retaliation claim insofar as those incidents occurred after her first complaint. The district court allowed evidence from only the fourth category, permitting Mys to present a narrow retaliation theory based on the transfer to Detroit, but excluding evidence of all the other retaliatory acts alleged in her complaint that occurred prior to the TRB hearing. Mys argues that the retaliatory actions taken against her prior to the TRB hearing were essential to her retaliation claim and necessary to illustrate the context in which the TRB arrived at its decision. Because she was not permitted to present those incidents as evidence of her employer’s unlawful retaliation, Mys argues the district court’s evidentiary rulings prevented her from making her case to the jury. - 15 - Case No. 13-2373 Mys v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police (i) Admissibility of Alleged Retaliatory Acts Resulting from Mys’ Initial Complaint against Sgt. Miller Mys claims that the Department’s unlawful retaliation began with her demotion and devolved into an atmosphere of overall hostility, perpetrated by Lt. Leavitt’s targeted reprimands and Sgt. Miller’s ongoing, unchecked harassment. The district court ruled that these incidents were irrelevant to her retaliation claim because they were part and parcel of her sexual harassment claim, which it had already dismissed. With respect to Mys’ demotion, the district court’s exclusion of that evidence in particular was prejudicial error as it went directly to her retaliation claim. As for her allegations concerning Lt. Leavitt’s subsequent unfair treatment, this Court has held that “heightened scrutiny” of job performance, including discipline for selectively enforced policies following a complaint, can support a claim of unlawful retaliation if such actions would dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining of workplace harassment. Laster, 746 F.3d at 732. The district court’s decision to exclude evidence that Sgt. Miller engaged in retaliatory harassment and intimidation tactics after Mys reported his alleged misconduct to Internal Affairs is more complicated. This Court has recognized that harassment by coworkers can support a claim of unlawful retaliation in certain circumstances, if the coworker’s actions are “sufficiently severe so as to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination” and if management is aware of the coworker’s retaliatory behavior, but “manifests indifference or unreasonableness” in its failure to respond to such circumstances. Id. (citing Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 347 (6th Cir. 2008)). - 16 - Case No. 13-2373 Mys v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police In Laster, this Court also made clear that treatment by coworkers that is not severe enough to sustain a substantive claim of harassment or discrimination may still support a retaliation claim because the threshold for establishing that an action is “materially adverse” is substantially “less onerous” in the retaliation context. Id. at 731 (quoting Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 595-96 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This more liberal definition permits actions not materially adverse for purposes of an anti-discrimination claim to qualify as such in the retaliation context.” Id. at 73132 (quoting Michael, 496 F.3d at 596). Putting aside whether Sgt. Miller’s alleged harassment fits that definition, this Court’s cases make clear that evidence offered to support a substantive claim of sexual harassment may also be offered to establish unlawful retaliation. See id. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling that Mys could not present evidence of Sgt. Miller’s alleged harassment to support her retaliation simply because she had cited the same incidents to support her previous sexual harassment claim was erroneous. If the district court’s reasoning had been based on other relevancy and prejudice concerns, then our analysis might be different. Applying the “more liberal definition” of “adverse actions” in the context of Mys’ retaliation claim, however, we cannot accept the district court’s conclusion that Sgt. Miller’s alleged retaliatory acts were wholly irrelevant to Mys’ retaliation claim. (ii) Admissibility of Alleged Retaliatory Acts Stemming from Mys’ Request for a Second Internal Affairs Investigation The events Mys sought to admit as evidence of further retaliation following the second investigation mostly revolved around her transfer to the Rockford post—i.e., the fact that it was involuntary, that the Department’s failure to notify her violated its own policies, - 17 - Case No. 13-2373 Mys v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police and that the manner in which it was carried out was intended to punish and humiliate her before her colleagues. Mys also sought to admit evidence that Sgt. Miller and Lt. Schram conspired to tarnish her reputation by spreading false rumors about her, which were then cited in Captain Gorski’s request for her transfer to Rockford, and that Lt. Schram took further steps to damage her relations with officers at the Rockford post. The district court’s decision to exclude all this evidence was based on its view that Mys’ transfer to the Rockford post was not a “materially adverse” action within the meaning of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. As an initial matter, we note that the district court’s reasoning categorically excluded all evidence surrounding Mys’ transfer to Rockford without specifically analyzing whether the particular manner in which the transfer was initiated was retaliatory in nature, apart from the fact of her being transferred. This was error at least insofar as the district court failed to distinguish between the fact of her transfer to Rockford, which it declined to view as “materially adverse,” and the context in which the transfer was carried out. With respect to the transfer itself, the district court’s legal conclusion that Mys’ transfer to Rockford could not be considered “materially adverse” for purposes of her retaliation claim also constitutes error. The district court reasoned that Mys was precluded from arguing that her transfer to Rockford was “materially adverse” because she ended up viewing it as a positive change in her working conditions. The district court’s analysis on this point was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s definition of “materially adverse” actions in Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, and contrary to this Court’s subsequent cases, which explain that an employee need not show actual harm resulting from an employer’s action in order to establish that such action was materially adverse. See, - 18 - Case No. 13-2373 Mys v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police e.g., Michael, 496 F.3d at 596 (finding that paid administrative leave may be viewed as a materially adverse action even though the employee suffers no direct harm); Deleon v. City of Kalamazoo, 739 F.3d 914, 918-19 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that an employee’s involuntary transfer to a position, for which he had actually applied in the past, could nonetheless be viewed “materially adverse” action in light of the circumstances surrounding the assignment). Applying the framework from those cases to the instant facts, it is apparent that the district court should have allowed Mys to argue that her transfer to Rockford and the circumstances surrounding that transfer were “materially adverse” actions in the context of her retaliation claim.