Opinion ID: 1200797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions on Flight and Wilfully False Statements as Consciousness of Guilt.

Text: Defendant fled the state immediately after murdering the victim, traveled to New York City, Washington, D.C., and Charlottesville, Virginia, and was eventually arrested by FBI agents in York, Pennsylvania on July 20, 1985, for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, some five months after his commission of the offense. Upon his arrest he gave a false name, and after waiving his Miranda rights, denied any knowledge of Lisa's murder or that he was wanted for the crime. When police told him the victim had identified him as her assailant before expiring, he claimed she was either confused or lying. Admitting he owned a blue Rambler, he claimed he had left the car parked at his apartment when he left Sacramento. Accordingly, the jury was instructed with the standardized instructions on flight (CALJIC No. 2.52) and wilfully false statements (CALJIC No. 2.03) as those factors bear on consciousness of guilt. Defense counsel's objections to these instructions were overruled. [5] (10) Defendant argues that it was error to give these instructions because he ultimately admitted committing the homicide  leaving his state of mind at the time the crime was committed as the only remaining contested issue in the guilt phase. He urges that through these instructions the jury was permitted to draw irrational and irrelevant inferences about his state of mind at the relevant time. We have rejected this argument respecting CALJIC No. 2.03 in People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871 [251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423], wherein we explained that: A reasonable juror would understand `consciousness of guilt' to mean `consciousness of some wrongdoing' rather than `consciousness of having committed the specific offense charged.' The instruction[ ] advise[s] the jury to determine what significance, if any, should be given to evidence of consciousness of guilt, and caution that such evidence is not sufficient to establish guilt, thereby clearly implying that the evidence is not the equivalent of a confession and is to be evaluated with reason and common sense. The instruction[ ] [does] not address the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense and [does] not direct or compel the drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto. Defendant's parallel claim regarding the instruction on flight as consciousness of guilt is likewise unavailing. If there is evidence identifying the person who fled as the defendant, and if such evidence `is relied upon as tending to show guilt,' then it is proper to instruct on flight. (§ 1127c.) `The jury must know that it is entitled to infer consciousness of guilt from flight and that flight, alone, is not sufficient to establish guilt. ([] § 1127c.) ( People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 943 [277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950].) Defendant having fled the state immediately after committing the murder, the prosecution was plainly entitled to rely, in part, on such evidence to support an inference of consciousness of guilt for the killing.... ( People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 776 [103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129]; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 694 [268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887]; People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 869.) Moreover, the analysis in Crandell regarding the instruction on false statements as evidence of consciousness of guilt ( ante, this page) applies with equal force to defendant's claim of error directed at the flight instruction. Like the instruction on false or deliberately misleading statements, the flight instruction [does] not address the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense and [does] not direct or compel the drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto. ( Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 871.)