Opinion ID: 1163229
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of duty to warn of obvious dangers

Text: Courts appear universally to agree with the Restatement that a seller is not liable for injuries caused by an obviously dangerous product. See, e.g., Mele v. Turner, 106 Wash.2d 73, 720 P.2d 787, 790 (1986) (no liability arising from failure to warn of obvious danger); Nichols v. Westfield Indus., Ltd., 380 N.W.2d 392, 400 (Iowa 1985) (supplier's duty is to warn of dangers which are not obvious with respect to use of the chattel in the condition in which it is supplied). As Section 388(b) suggests, [i]t is not necessary for the supplier to inform those for whose use the chattel is supplied of a condition which a mere casual looking over will disclose, unless the circumstances under which the chattel is supplied are such as to make it likely that even so casual an inspection will not be made. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. k (1965). Judge (now Justice) Breyer in applying Maine law refused to impose liability for injury caused by an obviously dangerous condition. [I]f the law required suppliers to warn of all obvious dangers inherent in a product, `[t]he list of foolish practices warned against would be so long, it would fill a volume.' Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 620 (1st Cir.1985) (citation omitted). We have refused to impose strict liability based upon failure to warn of hazards or dangers that would be readily recognized by the ordinary user of the product. Prince, 685 P.2d at 88. See also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 96, at 686-87 (5th ed. 1984). These cases and the Restatement are based on the rationale that once aware of the danger posed by a hazardous item, the purchaser is in the best position to evaluate the risks of operation and to make the decision whether to assume or avoid those risks. Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law 94-95 (1980). The provider of a good generally has superior information regarding the potential hazards posed by the good; the law presumes, however, that once in possession of this information the user of the good is in a better position to evaluate the risks and avoid accidents in connection with use. The decision to place the risk of dangerous products upon a fully-informed user gains further support in the context of the particular injury at issue in this case. Given the wide range of individual sizes and strengths, the person lifting a weighty object is the best judge of his or her ability to lift it safely. [7] Not only is the risk of injury particularly obvious to the person lifting the object, it is extremely difficult for the seller to perceive. This fact does not relieve the seller, however, of the prior duty to inform the purchaser of the weight of the boat-trailer combination; that duty is relieved only if the purchaser may reasonably be expected to become aware of the weight before placing himself or herself in danger.