Opinion ID: 2601903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Carter Is Entitled to Two Years of Reemployment Benefits.

Text: Before it was amended in 2005, AS 23.30.041(k) stated that If the employee's permanent impairment benefits are exhausted before the completion or termination of the reemployment plan, the employer shall provide compensation equal to 70 percent of the employee's spendable weekly wages, but not to exceed 105 percent of the average weekly wage, until the completion or termination of the plan. . . .[ [36] ] Carter asked the board to award subsection.041(k) benefits from July 14, 1994 to January 30, 1999. In its October 9, 2003 decision the board relied on Townsend v. United Parcel Service [37] and Tindera v. Qwick Construction Co., [38] to conclude that an employee may be eligible for subsection .041(k) benefits prior to approval or acceptance of a reemployment plan so long as he has begun the reemployment process. Because the board found that B & B submitted no evidence to contradict the efficacy of a reemployment plan within two years after [Carter's] initial request for [an eligibility evaluation], it granted him reemployment benefits for the statutorily allowed maximum period of two years. Thus, the board implicitly held that Carter had begun the reemployment process when he initially applied for an eligibility evaluation. The board also implicitly rejected Carter's argument that subsection .041(k) benefits are not capped at two years. On October 29, 2003 B & B paid Carter two years of reemployment benefits. Carter then appealed the board's October 9 ruling to the superior court, arguing that the board erred in only awarding two years of .041(k) benefits. In considering Carter's appeal, the superior court read this court's opinion in Raris v. Greek Corner [39] to mean that an employee must be developing or executing a reemployment plan to be eligible for benefits. Moreover, the superior court held that Carter began developing or executing a reemployment plan when he was assigned a rehabilitation specialist to conduct his eligibility evaluation. The superior court held that Carter was entitled to subsection.041(k) benefits only from December 27, 2001 (when he was assigned a rehabilitation specialist) until August 9, 2002 (when his rehabilitation specialist reported that no reemployment plan could be formulated for him). [40] On appeal, Carter argues that the superior court erred because he is entitled to more than four years of reemployment benefits, from July 14, 1994 (when his PPI lump sump payment was exhausted) to January 31, 1999 (when he became permanently totally disabled). B & B counters that Carter is not entitled to more than two years of reemployment benefits because AS 23.30.041(k) has a strict two-year time limit on benefit awards. It also argues that Carter is merely trying to use subsection .041(k) benefits as an income-replacement vehicle without any relationship to any plan's approval, acceptance, completion or termination or to Carter's participation in any plan. Because the superior court acted as an intermediate court of appeal, we will independently review the merits of the board's decision. [41] Carter's request for additional reemployment benefits turns on whether an employee may be entitled to subsection.041(k) benefits before his reemployment plan is approved or accepted and, if so, when that entitlement begins. These are questions of law that do not involve the board's expertise; we will therefore substitute our own judgment for that of the board. [42] We will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. [43] We note initially that B & B is correct that AS 23.30.041(k) contains a two-year cap on benefits after a reemployment plan is accepted or approved. In Binder v. Fairbanks Historical Preservation Foundation, the claimant sought benefits for a period exceeding two years. [44] We rejected that contention, reasoning that the language of subsection .041(k) unambiguously states that an employer's total exposure for any number of reemployment plans an employee pursues must be capped at . . . two years in time. [45] In so holding, we noted that the legislative history of the Act indicates that the two-year reemployment benefits cap was intended to return injured workers to the work force as expeditiously as possible. [46] With respect to Carter's argument that he became entitled to subsection .041(k) benefits before his reemployment plan was approved, we agree with the board's ruling that an employee may be eligible for subsection.041(k) benefits before approval or acceptance of a reemployment plan so long as he has begun the reemployment process. The board has explained that it has consistently held that when PPI benefits are exhausted, [subsection .041(k)] stipend benefits are to be provided during the reemployment process, not just during the course of a reemployment plan. [47] This practice is in accord with Raris, in which we observed that reemployment benefits are paid contingent on the employee's participation in the development and execution of a reemployment plan. [48] In other words, employees become eligible for reemployment benefits when they begin participating in the reemployment process. [49] The more difficult question is this: When does an employee begin participating in the reemployment process? The answer to this question potentially determines whether there was a delay in providing benefits, and thus whether and when interest began accruing on the benefits. The superior court concluded that Carter began participating in the reemployment process when he was assigned a rehabilitation specialist to perform his eligibility evaluation. Although this is not an implausible reading of AS 23.30.041(k), we conclude that it is incorrect. When an employee exhausts PPI benefits before completion or termination of the reemployment process, AS 23.30.041(k) provides a fall-back source of income. [50] Given this purpose, we think that the legislature did not intend that there should be a gap between the expiration of PPI benefits and the commencement of reemployment benefits for employees who are vigorously pursuing eligibility evaluations before their PPI benefits expire. [51] We therefore conclude that the reemployment process begins when the employee begins his active pursuit of reemployment benefits. Because Carter began to actively pursue reemployment benefits on April 27, 1993 when he requested an eligibility evaluation, and because he continued to actively pursue those benefits by petitioning the board for review of the division's May 4, 1993 decision, by petitioning the board for a rehearing, and by appealing to the superior court, we conclude that the board did not err in awarding him reemployment benefits, beginning when his PPI payment was exhausted on July 14, 1994, for the statutory maximum period that a reemployment plan can last  two years. We do not decide whether subsection.041(k) benefits may be payable for more than two years if they start before acceptance or approval of a reemployment plan. That issue has not been briefed or argued here. Carter has not convinced us that the board erred under the circumstances of this case in awarding him subsection.041(k) benefits for only two years.