Opinion ID: 2381051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Summary Judgment by Beverly Petrone and South Side Hospital

Text: When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party's pleadings and give the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. In order to uphold a grant of summary judgment, the record must demonstrate both an absence of genuine issues of material fact and an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Curry v. Estate of Thompson, 332 Pa.Superior Ct. 364, 366, 481 A.2d 658, 659 (1984). See also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035(b). Appellant's complaint alleges that Ms. Petrone made defamatory statements to BIC's employees as follows: (a) By falsely describing and labeling Plaintiff as . . . obnoxious, a smart aleck, and `locally known as being a man who has `ladies of the night', and a `pimp'; (b) By falsely stating that he . . . has several outpatient treatments here at the hospital at least since 1981, none of which he has paid for . . .; (c) By falsely stating that . . . it is common knowledge that (plaintiff) runs or has a stable of women and is a `pimp' . . .. See Complaint at 9. In her response to appellant's interrogatories and her affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment, however, Ms. Petrone stated I know specifically that I did not make all of the comments which are quoted in the complaint or on pages 10 and 11 of Exhibit A. I do not know whether any of the alleged quotes are accurate but I do know for certain that many of the alleged quotes were not spoken by me. See Answers to Interrogatories Directed to Beverly Petrone at # 4; Affidavit of Beverly Petrone at 4. We believe that these conflicting allegations by the parties create a genuine issue of material fact, that is, whether Ms. Petrone actually made the defamatory statements. Accordingly, we find that the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted on the defamation claim. [5] Appellant also argues that Ms. Petrone's release of his hospital records to BIC's employees constituted an invasion of privacy. As discussed above, we find that appellant has not alleged facts sufficient to show a substantial, highly offensive intrusion as required by Restatement § 652B or to show the extent of publicity necessary to state a cause of action under Restatement § 652D. We therefore hold that summary judgment was properly granted on this count. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of the demurrer of BIC and its employees to appellant's defamation and invasion of privacy claims. While we also find that the motion for summary judgment filed by Ms. Petrone and South Side Hospital was properly granted with regard to appellant's count alleging invasion of privacy, we hold that summary judgment should not have been granted on the defamation count. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on that issue. Order of February 3, 1984 is affirmed. Order of June 13, 1984 is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not retained.