Opinion ID: 1988266
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Corporal Punishment

Text: Section 79-4,140, codified as § 79-295, effective July 19, 1996, simply states that [c]orporal punishment shall be prohibited in public schools. The Nebraska statutes do not define the term corporal punishment. The primary effect of § 79-4,140, now § 79-295, was to partially repeal Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-1413 (Reissue 1985), which had provided in part: The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if: .... ... The actor is a teacher or a person otherwise entrusted with the care or supervision for a special purpose of a minor and: ... [t]he actor believes that the force used is necessary to further such special purpose, including the maintenance of reasonable discipline in a school, class or other group, and that the use of such force is consistent with the welfare of the minor[.] This statute essentially stated the commonlaw rule regarding corporal punishment, as it existed in the state before the adoption of § 79-4,140, now § 79-295. See Cornhusker Christian Ch. Home v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 227 Neb. 94, 416 N.W.2d 551 (1987). A brief examination of the legislative history of § 79-4,140, now § 79-295, helps shape our analytical framework. Section 79-4,140 was adopted in 1988 as an amendment to L.B. 316, which added to that bill the full text of what had previously been L.B. 955. The record of the Judiciary Committee hearing on L.B. 955 contains the following exchange: SENATOR [JERRY] CONWAY: I was just going to ask you, is corporal punishment that particular term, defined some... in the statutes elsewhere; or did you purposely not define it or? SENATOR [ERNIE] CHAMBERS: It's a term that is so well known in terms of its meaning. There have been court cases dealing with this subject that it doesn't require a definition. Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 955, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. 7 (January 29, 1988). While it is true that there have been court cases defining corporal punishment, none of those cases have been decided in Nebraska. Most cases from other jurisdictions, in fact, define corporal punishment in the context of statutes that permit reasonable corporal punishment. This provides definitions that delineate the line between reasonable and unreasonable corporal punishment, but are of little guidance in determining what is and is not corporal punishment. Generally, however, corporal punishment is reasonably understood to be the infliction of bodily pain as a penalty for disapproved behavior. See, e.g., Nadine Block and Robert Fathman, Convincing State Legislatures to Ban Corporal Punishment, 9 Children's Legal Rts. J. 3:21 (1988). Both words of the term corporal punishment are commonly given effectthe act must be corporal, in that it inflicts pain on the physical body of the victim, and it must be punishment, such that the intent of the actor is punitive. The interpretation of corporal punishment includes not only striking, but any action which seeks to induce bodily pain, for example, forcing a student to stand on tiptoes with fingertips outstretched against the wall or to crouch and bend over and remain in cramped, painful positions for a long time. See id. Most statutes from other jurisdictions that ban corporal punishment effectively include the same elements as set forth above. See, e.g., Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 53a-18 (West 1994); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71, § 37G (West 1996); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 392.465 (1997); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:6-1 (West 1989). Other state statutes contain those elements, but also have exceptions that provide, generally, for use of physical contact to maintain order and control. For instance, Wisconsin law provides that corporal punishment does not include [u]sing incidental, minor or reasonable physical contact designed to maintain order and control. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 118.31(2)(h) (West 1991). See, also, e.g., Cal. Educ.Code § 44807 (West 1993); Mont. Code. Ann. § 20-4-302 (1997); Va.Code Ann. § 22.1-279.1 (Michie 1997). Nebraska statutes do not deal with this issue in the specific context of corporal punishment. The Legislature has provided, however, that [a]dministrative and teaching personnel may take actions regarding student behavior, other than those specifically provided in the Student Discipline Act, which are reasonably necessary to aid the student, further school purposes, or prevent interference with the educational process. Neb. Rev.Stat. § 79-258 (Reissue 1996). We determine that § 79-258, while obviously not authorizing corporal punishment, does provide authority for school teachers and administrators to use physical contact short of corporal punishment to the degree necessary to preserve order and control in the school environment. Moreover, the statute authorizes an acceptable level of incidental physical contact, as is necessary for teachers to promote personal interaction with their students. A certain amount of incidental physical contact is virtually unavoidable for people working together in a social environment. The key distinction between such reasonable and necessary physical contact and corporal punishment, as commonly understood and prohibited by statute, is to be found in the elements set forth above. Contact that does not cause pain is simply not corporal punishment. Corporal punishment also does not include physical contact that is not intended to punish a student for disapproved behavior but is instead intended to preserve order in the schools or intended to protect persons or property from harm. Other jurisdictions, in addressing the issue of corporal punishment, have consistently focused on the punitive intent of the teacher. In Daniels v. Gordon, 232 Ga.App. 811, 503 S.E.2d 72 (1998), the appellate court found that a teacher had grasped a student's face and turned the student's head to face her. The court found that not all physical contact instigated by an educator amounts to corporal punishment. Id. at ___, 503 S.E.2d at 75. The court found that [i]n this case, [the teacher's] actions were instituted to regain control and supervise the classroom.... [Her] uncontroverted testimony established that her grasping of [the student's] face was meant to get [his] attention and not to punish. (Citation omitted.) Id. Consequently, the court found that the teacher's actions did not constitute corporal punishment under Georgia law. Id. Similarly, a Florida appellate court found that physical contact with students did not constitute corporal punishment where the contact was intended not to punish, but simply to restore order in the classroom. Williams v. Cotton, 346 So.2d 1039 (Fla. App.1977), cert. denied 354 So.2d 988. The Florida court found that a Florida statute requiring teachers to `keep good order' in [the] classroom necessarily implies the power to the teacher to use reasonable physical force [not amounting to corporal punishment] to do so. Id. at 1041. The court found that [w]ithout such reasonably implied power, the requirement to `keep good order' would be meaningless. Id. Where the circumstances indicate a punitive intent, however, courts have found corporal punishment. In People v. McMillan, 45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 821, 114 P.2d 440 (1941), the court found that a supervisor in a juvenile facility had committed corporal punishment when he slapped a student. Although the defendant argued that he was merely attempting to preserve order, the court found in the record evidence tending to show ... that such force as defendant used was applied just after the objects of it had violated some rule of the institution and apparently for the purpose of punishing them for the violation and not to prevent one. Id. at 827, 114 P.2d at 444. Under similar circumstances, a Pennsylvania court found that a teacher who slapped a student on the face had committed corporal punishment. Harris v. Commonwealth Secretary of Ed., 29 Pa. Cmwlth. 625, 372 A.2d 953 (1977). The court said that [t]his Court does not consider slapping fourth graders on the face on [sic] attention getting device. Considering the circumstances of the incident, this Court finds that [the teacher] did administer corporal punishment to [the student]. Id. at 632, 372 A.2d at 956. The court found, however, that the same teacher had not committed corporal punishment in touching a student to remove a pencil from his hand. Id. Having reviewed and considered the relevant Nebraska statutes, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions, we hold that corporal punishment, as prohibited in § 79-295, is reasonably understood to be the infliction of bodily pain as a penalty for disapproved behavior. One of Daily's arguments in the district court, and preserved in his brief on appeal, was that § 79-295 is void for vagueness, thereby denying Daily his procedural due process rights under article I, § 3, of the Nebraska Constitution and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The district court, because of its resolution of the case, had no cause to consider Daily's constitutional claim. For the sake of completeness, we find it necessary to address Daily's vagueness claim. Daily presents a facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 79-295, claiming that the use of the term corporal punishment does not provide adequate notice to teachers as to what conduct is prohibited or provide adequate standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement by school boards. It is axiomatic that statutes are afforded a presumption of constitutionality, and the unconstitutionality of a statute must be clearly established before it will be declared void. Kwik Shop v. City of Lincoln, 243 Neb. 178, 498 N.W.2d 102 (1993). Even when a law is constitutionally suspect, a court will attempt to interpret that law in a manner such that it is consistent with the Constitution. Id. The burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute is on the one attacking the statute's validity. Id. When a legislative enactment is challenged on vagueness grounds, the issue is whether the two requirements of procedural due process are met: (1) adequate notice to citizens and (2) adequate standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Id.; City of Lincoln v. ABC Books, Inc., 238 Neb. 378, 470 N.W.2d 760 (1991) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). In other words, due process requires that an enactment supply (1) a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and (2) explicit standards for those who apply it. Kwik Shop v. City of Lincoln, supra ; City of Lincoln v. ABC Books, Inc., supra (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). A statute will not be deemed vague if it uses ordinary terms which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.... ... The prohibition against vagueness does not invalidate a statute simply because it could have been drafted with greater precision. The test is whether the defendant could reasonably understand that his conduct was proscribed by the statute. State v. Sprague, 213 Neb. 581, 587-88, 330 N.W.2d 739, 744 (1983). The U.S. Supreme Court has held: [The] prohibition against excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties. ... Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid. (Citation omitted.) Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975). While § 79-295 could have been drafted with greater precision, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 110. In State v. Rogers, 44 Ohio App.2d 289, 337 N.E.2d 791 (1975), an Ohio appellate court rejected a vagueness challenge to a corporal punishment statute. In that case, the defendant teacher challenged the vagueness of the term corporal punishment, as applied by the Ohio trial court to her alleged abuse of a pupil. The court found that the use of the term did not make the statute unconstitutionally vague or overbroad since a person of ordinary sensibilities and intelligence should be capable of ascertaining its meaning and abiding by its proscriptions. Id. at 291, 337 N.E.2d at 793. Likewise, we conclude that a person of ordinary sensibilities and intelligence should be capable of ascertaining the generally understood meaning of corporal punishment and abide by the statute's proscriptions. Daily's void for vagueness challenge to § 79-295 is without merit.