Opinion ID: 2548249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Costs associated with hearings triggered by discretionary expulsion recommendations

Text: We next consider whether reimbursement is required for the costs associated with hearings triggered under discretionary expulsion provisions. Again, we address first the issue that we asked the parties to brief: Does the discretionary expulsion provision of Education Code section 48915 (former subd. (c), thereafter subd. (d), currently subd. (e)), which, as noted above, recognized that a principal possesses discretion to recommend that a student be expelled for specified conduct other than firearm possession (conduct such as damaging or stealing property, using or selling illicit drugs, possessing tobacco or drug paraphernalia, etc.), and further specified that the school district governing board may order a student expelled upon finding that the student, while at school or at a school activity off school grounds, engaged in such conduct, constitute a new program or higher level of service under article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution, and under Government Code section 17514? We answer this question in the negative. The discretionary expulsion provision of Education Code section 48915 does not constitute a new program or higher level of service, because provisions recognizing discretion to suspend or expel were set forth in statutes predating 1975. (See Educ.Code, former § 10601, Stats.1959, ch. 2, § 3, p. 860 [providing that a student may be suspended for good cause]; id., former § 10602 (Stats.1970, ch. 102, § 102, p. 159 (defining good cause); id., former section 10601.6 (Stats.1972, ch. 164, § 2, p. 384 (further defining good cause).))) [19] Accordingly, the discretionary expulsion provision of Education Code section 48915 is not a new program under article XIII B, section 6, and the implementing statutes, nor does it reflect a higher level of service related to an existing program. ( County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202.) The District maintains, nevertheless, that once it elects to pursue expulsion, it is obligated to abide by the procedural hearing requirements of Education Code section 48918 and accordingly is mandated by that section to incur costs associated with such compliance. The District asserts that in this respect, section 48918 constitutes a new program or higher level of service related to an existing program under article XIII B, section 6 and under Government Code section 17514. We shall assume for analysis that this is so. [20] The District recognizes, of course, that under Government Code, section 17556, subdivision (c), it is not entitled to reimbursement to the extent Education Code section 48918 merely implements federal due process law, but the District argues that it has a right to reimbursement for its costs of complying with section 48918 to the extent those costs are attributable to hearing procedures that exceed federal due process requirements. (See Govt.Code, § 17556, subd. (c).) The District asserts that its costs in complying with various notice, right of inspection, and recording requirements (see ante, fn. 11) fall into this category and are reimbursable. The Department and the Commission argue in response that any right to reimbursement for hearing costs triggered by discretionary expulsions  even costs limited to those procedures that assertedly exceed federal due process hearing requirements  is foreclosed by virtue of the circumstance that when a school pursues a discretionary expulsion, it is not acting under compulsion of any law but instead is exercising a choice. In support, the Department and the Commission rely upon Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203, and City of Merced v. State of California (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 777, 200 Cal. Rptr. 642 ( City of Merced ). In Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203, school districts asserted that costs incurred in complying with statutory notice and agenda requirements for committee meetings concerning various state and federally funded educational programs constituted a reimbursable state mandate, because once school districts elected to participate in the underlying state and federal programs, the districts had no option but to hold program-related committee meetings and abide by the challenged notice and agenda requirements. ( Id., at p. 742, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203.) We rejected the school districts' position, reasoning in part that because the districts' participation in the underlying programs was voluntary, the notice and agenda costs incurred as a result of that voluntary participation were not the product of legal compulsion and did not constitute a reimbursable state mandate on that basis. ( Id., at p. 745, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203.) [21] In reaching that conclusion in Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203, we discussed City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 777, 200 Cal.Rptr. 642. In that case, the city wished either to purchase or to condemn, pursuant to its eminent domain authority, certain privately owned real property. The city elected to proceed by eminent domain, under which it was required by then recent legislation (Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.510) to compensate the property owner for loss of business goodwill. The city so compensated the property owner and then sought reimbursement from the state, arguing that the new statutory requirement that it compensate for business goodwill amounted to a reimbursable state mandate. ( City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 780, 200 Cal. Rptr. 642.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the city's increased costs flowing from its election to condemn the property did not constitute a reimbursable state mandate. ( Id., at pp. 781-783, 200 Cal. Rptr. 642.) The court reasoned: [W]hether a city or county decides to exercise eminent domain is, essentially, an option of the city or county, rather than a mandate of the state. The fundamental concept is that the city or county is not required to exercise eminent domain. If, however, the power of eminent domain is exercised, then the city will be required to pay for loss of goodwill. Thus, payment for loss of goodwill is not a state-mandated cost.  ( Id., at p. 783, 200 Cal.Rptr. 642, italics added.) Summarizing this aspect of City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 777, 200 Cal.Rptr. 642, in Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203, we stated: [T]he core point articulated by the court in City of Merced is that activities undertaken at the option or discretion of a local government entity (that is, actions undertaken without any legal compulsion or threat of penalty for nonparticipation) do not trigger a state mandate and hence do not require reimbursement of funds  even if the local entity is obliged to incur costs as a result of its discretionary decision to participate in a particular program or practice.  ( Kern High School Dist., at p. 742, 134 Cal. Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203, italics added.) The Department and the Commission argue that in the present case the District, like the claimants in Kern High School Dist., errs by focusing upon the final result  a school district's legal obligation to comply with statutory hearing procedures  rather than focusing upon whether the school district has been compelled to put itself in the position in which such a hearing (with resulting costs) is required. The District and amici curiae on its behalf (consistently with the opinion of the Court of Appeal below) argue that the holding of City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal. App.3d 777, 200 Cal.Rptr. 642, should not be extended to apply to situations beyond the context presented in that case and in Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203. The District and amici curiae note that although any particular expulsion recommendation may be discretionary, as a practical matter it is inevitable that some school expulsions will occur in the administration of any public school program. [22] Upon reflection, we agree with the District and amici curiae that there is reason to question an extension of the holding of City of Merced so as to preclude reimbursement under article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution and Government Code section 17514, whenever an entity makes an initial discretionary decision that in turn triggers mandated costs. Indeed, it would appear that under a strict application of the language in City of Merced, public entities would be denied reimbursement for state-mandated costs in apparent contravention of the intent underlying article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution and Government Code section 17514 [23] and contrary to past decisions in which it has been established that reimbursement was in fact proper. For example, as explained above, in Carmel Valley, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 234 Cal.Rptr. 795, an executive order requiring that county firefighters be provided with protective clothing and safety equipment was found to create a reimbursable state mandate for the added costs of such clothing and equipment. ( Id., at pp. 537-538, 234 Cal.Rptr. 795.) The court in Carmel Valley apparently did not contemplate that reimbursement would be foreclosed in that setting merely because a local agency possessed discretion concerning how many firefighters it would employ  and hence, in that sense, could control or perhaps even avoid the extra costs to which it would be subjected. Yet, under a strict application of the rule gleaned from City of Merced, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 777, 200 Cal.Rptr. 642, such costs would not be reimbursable for the simple reason that the local agency's decision to employ firefighters involves an exercise of discretion concerning, for example, how many firefighters are needed to be employed, etc. We find it doubtful that the voters who enacted article XIII B, section 6, or the Legislature that adopted Government Code section 17514, intended that result, and hence we are reluctant to endorse, in this case, an application of the rule of City of Merced that might lead to such a result. In any event, we have determined that we need not address in this case the problems posed by such an application of the rule articulated in City of Merced, because this aspect of the present case can be resolved on an alternative basis. As we shall explain, we conclude, regarding the reimbursement claim that we face presently, that all hearing procedures set forth in Education Code section 48918 properly should be considered to have been adopted to implement a federal due process mandate, and hence that all such hearing costs are nonreimbursable under article XIII B, section 6, and Government Code section 17557, subdivision (c). In this regard, we find the decision in County of Los Angeles II, supra, 32 Cal. App.4th 805, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304, to be instructive. That case concerned Penal Code section 987.9, which requires counties to provide indigent criminal defendants with defense funds for ancillary investigation services related to capital trials and certain other trials, and further provides related procedural protections  namely, the confidentiality of a request for funds, the right to have the request ruled upon by a judge other than the trial judge, and the right to an in camera hearing on the request. The county in that case asserted that funds expended under the statute constituted reimbursable state mandates. The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding instead that the Penal Code section merely implements the requirements of federal constitutional law, and that even in the absence of [Penal Code] section 987.9, ... counties would be responsible for providing ancillary services under the constitutional guarantees of due process . . . and under the Sixth Amendment. . . . (32 Cal.App.4th at p. 815, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304.) Moreover, the Court of Appeal concluded, the procedural protections that the Legislature had built into the statute  requirements of confidentiality of a request for funds, the right to have the request ruled upon by a judge other than the trial judge, and the right to an in camera hearing on the request  were merely incidental to the federal rights codified by the statute, and their financial impact was de minimis. ( Id., at p. 817, fn. 7, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304.) Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded, the Penal Code section, in its entirety  that is, even those incidental aspects of the statute that articulated specific procedures, not expressly set forth in federal law, for the filing and resolution of requests for funds  constituted an implementation of federal law, and hence those costs were nonreimbursable under article XIII B, section 6. We conclude that the same reasoning applies in the present setting, concerning the District's request for reimbursement for procedural hearing costs triggered by its discretionary decision to seek expulsion. As in County of Los Angeles II, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 805, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304, the initial discretionary decision (in the former case, to file charges and prosecute a crime; in the present case, to seek expulsion) in turn triggers a federal constitutional mandate (in the former case, to provide ancillary defense services; in the present case, to provide an expulsion hearing). In both circumstances, the Legislature, in adopting specific statutory procedures to comply with the general federal mandate, reasonably articulated various incidental procedural protections. These protections are designed to make the underlying federal right enforceable and to set forth procedural details that were not expressly articulated in the case law establishing the respective rights; viewed singly or cumulatively, they did not significantly increase the cost of compliance with the federal mandate. The Court of Appeal in County of Los Angeles II concluded that, for purposes of ruling upon a claim for reimbursement, such incidental procedural requirements, producing at most de minimis added cost, should be viewed as part and parcel of the underlying federal mandate, and hence nonreimbursable under Government Code, section 17556, subdivision (c). We reach the same conclusion here. Indeed, to proceed otherwise in the context of a reimbursement claim would produce impractical and detrimental consequences. The present case demonstrates the point. The record reveals that in the extended proceedings before the Commission, the parties spent numerous hours producing voluminous pages of analysis directed toward determining whether various provisions of Education Code section 48918 exceeded federal due process requirements. That task below was complicated by the circumstance that this area of federal due process law is not well developed. The Commission, which is not a judicial body, did as best it could and concluded that in certain respects the various provisions (as observed ante, footnote 11, predominantly concerning notice, right of inspection, and recording requirements) exceeded the requirements of federal due process. Even for an appellate court, it would be difficult and problematic in this setting to categorize the various notice, right of inspection, and recording requirements here at issue as falling either within or without the general federal due process mandate. The difficulty results not only from the circumstance that, as noted, the case law in the area of due process procedures concerning expulsion matters is relatively undeveloped, but also from the circumstance that when such an issue is raised in an action for reimbursement, as opposed to its being raised in litigation challenging an actual expulsion on the ground of allegedly inadequate hearing procedures, the issue inevitably is presented in the abstract, without any factual context that might help frame the legal issue. In such circumstances, courts are  and should be  wary of venturing pronouncements (especially concerning matters of constitutional law). In light of these considerations, we agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in County of Los Angeles II, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 805, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 304: for purposes of ruling upon a request for reimbursement, challenged state rules or procedures that are intended to implement an applicable federal law  and whose costs are, in context, de minimis  should be treated as part and parcel of the underlying federal mandate. Applying that approach to the case now before us, we conclude there can be no doubt that the assertedly excessive due process aspects of Education Code section 48918 for which the District seeks reimbursement in connection with hearings triggered by discretionary expulsions (see ante, footnote 11  primarily, as noted, various notice, right of inspection, and recording rules) fall within the category of matters that are merely incidental to the underlying federal mandate, and that produce at most a de minimis cost. Accordingly, for purposes of the District's reimbursement claim, all hearing costs incurred under Education Code section 48918, triggered by the District's exercise of discretion to seek expulsion, should be treated as having been incurred pursuant to a mandate of federal law, and hence all such costs are nonreimbursable under Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c). [24]