Opinion ID: 1205031
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In support of the allegation of first degree murder, the prosecution proceeded upon three alternate theories: premeditation and deliberation, torture murder, and felony murder (based upon the commission of rape and burglary). According to defendant, his guilt was not proved under any of these theories. (6a) Having reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and presuming the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could have deduced from the evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of defendant's guilt under each of these theories of first degree murder. ( People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1237 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].)
(7) In a case, such as the present one, based upon circumstantial evidence, we must decide whether the circumstances reasonably justify the findings of the trier of fact, but our opinion that the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding would not warrant reversal of the judgment. ( People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159].) (8) In order to ascertain whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of first degree murder based upon premeditation and deliberation, we generally examine whether there is evidence of planning, motive, or method, although these factors are not exclusive. ( People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 887 [8 Cal. Rptr 2d 678, 830 P.2d 712]; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 813-814.) When the record discloses evidence in all three categories, the verdict generally will be sustained. Otherwise, convictions for first degree murder typically have been upheld where there is `either very strong evidence of planning, or some evidence of motive in conjunction with planning or a deliberate manner of killing.' [Citations.] ( People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 887.) (6b) Our review of the record reveals evidence falling within all three categories. With respect to planning, the evidence (the unfiltered cigarette butt found near a window and a handprint on the windowsill) supports an inference defendant spent a period of time just outside Mrs. Stendal's residence observing her, before entering to commit the offenses. Once inside, defendant rendered the victim subject to his complete control by tying her hands and cutting the telephone lines. After binding the victim, defendant had a significant period of time in which to contemplate and plan her eventual death as he engaged in various acts of torture. (See People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 887.) Although evidence of defendant's motive is less clear, a rational trier of fact could have determined that defendant's motive in murdering Mrs. Stendal was to avoid detection for the sexual and other physical abuses he had committed against her. (See People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 887; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688 [268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].) Finally, the manner of killing supports a finding of premeditation. The evidence establishes that defendant sequentially strangled the victim  first manually, and then by means of ligature  after subjecting her to prolonged physical abuse through the infliction of various types of wounds, some of which were not random. During the infliction of these wounds, defendant could have quickly dispatched the victim by means of stabbing and beating, had he chosen to do so. These circumstances do not suggest an unreflecting explosion of violence, but rather a preconceived design to kill the victim by the particular means chosen, and to prolong her agony in the process. ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 814; see People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 887.) Therefore, we conclude the evidence, although circumstantial, affords an adequate foundation for an inference of premeditation and deliberation, and is sufficient to support such a conclusion by a rational trier of fact.
(9a) The evidence also is sufficient to support the finding that defendant killed the victim with the intent to torture her. (10) `Torture murder is murder committed with a wilful, deliberate and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain. [Citation.]' ( People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 888, quoting People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239.) Such intent, considered sufficiently culpable to warrant punishing the perpetrator for first degree murder, is the calculated intent to cause pain for `the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any other sadistic purpose.' ( People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 888, quoting People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 168 [133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881]; see also People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1101 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 267 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) However, there must be a causal relationship between the torturous act and death, as Penal Code section 189 defines the crime as murder `by means of' torture. [Citation.] ( People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239, quoting People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 267.) (9b) Defendant, relying upon the evidence that the numerous drag knife wounds across the victim's chest apparently were not inflicted for the purpose of causing death and did not cause death, asserts that no causal relationship exists between these torturous acts and Mrs. Stendal's death. This assertion ignores the additional evidence that her death was caused by manual and ligature strangulation after she not only had been bound, beaten, and stabbed in the manner just described, but also had received a series of additional injuries (described more fully below), inflicted over her entire body. The finding of murder-by-torture encompasses the totality of the brutal acts and the circumstances which led to the victim's death. ( People v. Talamantez (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 443, 456 [215 Cal. Rptr. 542]; see also People v. St. Joseph (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 289, 297 [276 Cal. Rptr. 498]; People v. Hindmarsh (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 334, 349 [229 Cal. Rptr. 640].) The acts of torture may not be segregated into their constituent elements in order to determine whether any single act by itself caused the death; rather, it is the continuum of sadistic violence that constitutes the torture. ( People v. Talamantez, supra, 169 Cal. App.3d at p. 456.) In the present case, the victim was subjected to strangulation by two different methods, her wrists were bound so tightly as to cut into her skin, she was beaten in the face severely enough to have caused her eyes to be swollen shut and her lips to be swollen, she received severe blows to other parts of her body, and she suffered repeated, incision-type stab wounds to her neck, chest, and breast area. We conclude that this evidence amply supports the finding that Mrs. Stendal's death was brought about by torture. Defendant additionally contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to the then-current version of CALJIC No. 8.24, [4] because the evidence did not establish that the torture caused the victim's death. As explained above, there was ample evidence to demonstrate that the murder was accomplished by means of torture. Thus, the trial court did not err in giving this instruction. (11) Although it is in the context of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the torture-murder special-circumstance finding that defendant also questions the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the intent to torture, for the sake of convenience we review this related claim at this point in our opinion, because intent to torture also must be present in order to sustain a conviction of first degree murder on a theory of torture murder. Again relying exclusively on the evidence of drag marks on the victim's chest, defendant urges that the specific intent to torture may not be inferred solely from the condition of the victim's body, because even severe wounds may be as consistent with an explosion of violence as with torture. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 888; People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 268.) Intent is a state of mind which, unless established by the defendant's own statements, must be proved by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 433; see also People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239), which include the severity of the victim's wounds. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 433.) In the present case, the coroner testified that many of the victim's wounds, particularly the knife drag marks, were inflicted while she still was alive but after she had been rendered incapable of avoiding further attack. The wounds revealed that a relatively slow, methodical approach had been employed in their infliction, rather than their having resulted from sudden, explosive violence. The nature of many of the wounds, including the repeated blows to the face and to other parts of the body, as well as the knife drag marks, suggests that they were administered over a substantial period of time and that defendant intended to inflict cruel pain and suffering on the victim. Considered with the circumstances that the victim was isolated and prevented from resisting or escaping during these acts, this evidence establishes defendant's intent to torture the victim.
(12a) The evidence also is sufficient to support a finding of first degree murder based upon the theory of felony murder, whether the underlying felony is considered to be rape or burglary. (13) We have required as part of the felony-murder doctrine that the jury find the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit one of the enumerated felonies, even where that felony is a crime such as rape. [Citations.] ( People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 346 [253 Cal. Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289].) It also is established that the killing need not occur in the midst of the commission of the felony, so long as that felony is not merely incidental to, or an afterthought to, the killing. ( Id., at p. 348; see People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631 [276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].) (12b) Defendant urges that the only items of evidence linking him to the commission of the rape are the unfiltered cigarette butt found near the residence, his presence in the residence on the night in question, and certain marks on his legs which an expert opined were similar to marks seen on other perpetrators of sexual assaults. Defendant ignores the additional circumstantial evidence that a short time prior to the commission of the present offenses, he participated in making telephone calls of a harassing nature to various persons and was present when his companion made a call of a sexual nature to the murder victim. On the evening the offenses were committed, defendant informed one witness that he was going to pick up a woman, and another that he was going to get a piece of butt. The evidence that Mrs. Stendal was forcibly raped, prior to her death, was uncontradicted. This evidence, considered with the circumstances that the victim was tied in a manner consistent with defendant's formal education in the art of trucker's knots, that the abrasions below defendant's knees and above his right knee were incurred by defendant while his legs were unclothed, and that these abrasions were consistent with injuries observed in other cases of sexual assault, amply support the jury's implied finding that defendant specifically intended to commit rape and that the rape was not a mere incident of the murder. (14) Defendant also urges there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of felony murder based upon the underlying felony of burglary because there is no evidence demonstrating he entered the residence with the requisite felonious intent (§ 459), in this case the intent to commit rape. Such intent usually must be inferred from all the facts and circumstances revealed by the evidence, because only rarely can it be proved directly. ( People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41 [117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 528 P.2d 752].) In view of (1) the previously described evidence of defendant's conduct in the hours preceding his entry of the Stendal residence, (2) the evidence he spent a period of time immediately outside the residence, presumably contemplating his next act, and (3) the methodical manner in which defendant isolated the victim and committed the rape, the nonsexual physical abuse, and finally the murder itself, it is clear that a rational trier of fact could conclude defendant had the requisite felonious intent prior to his entry into the residence.