Opinion ID: 715658
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Text: 20 To begin, the government argues that the June 1, 1987 letter from Anderson's counsel waived Anderson's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The fifth amendment privilege is not ordinarily self-executing and must be affirmatively claimed by a person whenever self-incrimination is threatened. United States v. Jenkins, 785 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1143, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984)); see also United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1374 (9th Cir.1987) (The defendant's failure to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination waives a later claim of privilege.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974, 109 S.Ct. 513, 102 L.Ed.2d 548 (1988). Moreover, [a]n individual may lose the benefit of the privilege inadvertently, without a knowing and intelligent waiver. Jenkins, 785 F.2d at 1393 (citing Garner, 424 U.S. at 654 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. at 1182 n. 9); see also United States v. Wagner, 834 F.2d 1474, 1483 (9th Cir.1987) (trial judge has no duty to inquire whether waiver was knowing and voluntary). 21 Here, Anderson did not simply fail to assert his privilege; he explicitly stated through counsel that he waived the assertion of his fifth amendment rights. After initially claiming his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to the document subpoenas and most questions at his deposition, the June 1, 1987 letter from Anderson's counsel stated: 22 Specifically, this is to confirm that after considering all of the various implications of doing so, Mr. Anderson has agreed to waive his fifth amendment privilege with respect to testimony and production of documents in the above-referenced matter. He is, therefore, willing to produce documents and to submit to his deposition in this matter without asserting the fifth amendment privilege. 23