Opinion ID: 1918445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Fraud Claim

Text: The trial justice also granted WDC's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the city's fraud claim. She explained that WDC was not organized enough to form what I think would be the necessary intent to commit fraud   . As a result, she concluded, the city had failed to prove the required elements of fraud. To establish a prima facie case of common law fraud in Rhode Island, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant `made a false representation intending thereby to induce plaintiff to rely thereon,' and that the plaintiff justifiably relied thereon to his or her damage. Travers v. Spidell, 682 A.2d 471, 472-73 (R.I.1996). In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the city, and without assessing the witnesses' credibility, we conclude that factual questions remain concerning the viability of the city's fraud claim about which reasonable minds could differ. See Hernandez v. Fernandez, 697 A.2d 1101, 1103 (R.I.1997); Lutz Engineering Co. v. Industrial Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631, 635 (R.I.1991). Moreover, as the following summary demonstrates, the city presented enough evidence on each element of its fraud claim to substantiate a prima facie case: [8] 1. A false representation. WDC's subcontractor-architect testified that he fabricated an invoice at the request of a WDC employee for work that had not been performed. WDC's vice president confirmed this testimony. From this and other evidence a jury could conclude that WDC had deceived the city into paying for architectural services it had never received. 2. Knowledge of the statement's falsity. WDC's president testified that she knew that no architectural services had been performed for the period covered by the invoice. Furthermore, thearchitect testified that a WDC employee had instructed him to fabricate the invoice. This evidence supports a reasonable inference that WDC knew its representations on the invoice were false. 3. Intent to induce reliance. The architect's undisputed testimony was that a WDC employee instructed him to backdate the invoice in order to receive advance payment for work not yet performed. This conduct is at odds with the contract's requirement that WDC would be paid only for services already performed. And it supports an inference of WDC's intent to deceive the city on this invoice. 4. The city's detrimental reliance. The evidence also showed that the city paid WDC for services that had not been completed based upon the phony invoice. Thus, at the very least, it would appear that the city may have paid for these services when no such payment was due, and suffered damages as a result. In light of the foregoing evidence, we conclude that the trial justice erred in granting WDC's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the city's fraud claim.