Opinion ID: 1547613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: analysis

Text: In its opinion the majority has acknowledged the extremely limited role of the judiciary with respect to the arbitration process. See Purvis Systems, Inc. v. American Systems Corp., 788 A.2d 1112, 1114 (R.I.2002); Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State, 714 A.2d 584, 587 (R.I.1998). The majority also says that it is abiding by the principle that the Court should not reconsider the merits of an award despite allegations that it rests upon errors of fact or on a misinterpretation of the contract. Rhode Island Council 94, 714 A.2d at 588 (citing United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987)). It appears to us, however, that in its holding in this case, the majority has, in fact, substituted its judgment for the judgment of the arbitrator, thereby undermining the strong public policy encouraging the private settlement of labor grievances through the relatively inexpensive and expedient means of arbitration. Id. ; see also Purvis Systems Inc., 788 A.2d at 1118. [7] In our view there is no reason to disturb the arbitrator's determination of a lack of just cause in this case. The arbitrator gave careful consideration to the contractual provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the terms of the code of ethics and conduct, and the practices and termination policies enforced by the department. Upon due regard for all the testimony presented at the arbitration hearings, and carefully weighing the evidence with an eye for how such evidence was obtained, we believe that the arbitrator's award of reinstatement was not irrational and did not conflict with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. We also distinguish this case from those cases in which this Court has held an arbitrator to have improperly substituted his judgment for that of the director of the Department of Corrections, or exceeded his powers in altering the discipline imposed. In those cases, the conduct of the correctional officer had a direct nexus to the job, clearly compromised security at the facility, or was egregious. See State v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 819 A.2d 1286, 1289 (R.I.2003) (holding that the arbitrator did not have authority to alter the discipline from termination to sixty-day suspension for misplacing a key found in an inmate's possession); see also State Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 725 A.2d 296, 299 (R.I.1999) (the Riel case) (arbitrator erroneously and irrationally changed director imposed termination to thirty-day suspension for officer convicted and incarcerated for driving under the influence); cf. State Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Rhode Island Council 94, 713 A.2d 1250, 1259 (R.I.1998) (arbitrator exceeded powers when he found department lacked just cause to dismiss employee convicted of violent crimes). In its holding, the majority cites Riel for the principle that the extent and severity of discipline is left to the DOC director and that that determination is not subject to review by an arbitrator. However, even a cursory review of the Riel case reveals that it is factually distinguishable from the matter now before us, and that the majority's reliance on it is misplaced. In Riel , the correctional officer was charged and convicted of driving while intoxicated in Massachusetts, and subsequently sentenced to a period of confinement. The grievant in that case failed to give notice of her arrest until after her conviction, in direct contravention of the departmental code of ethics. In denying the union's appeal from a Superior Court judgment vacating the award of an arbitrator reducing a termination to a thirty-day suspension, this Court cited the security implications involved in operating a prison and held that it was the director, not an arbitrator, who was responsible for the `consequences of a previously convicted and incarcerated officer filling a security post at the adult correctional institutions.' Riel, 725 A.2d at 298. We believe that Riel should be restricted to its somewhat unusual facts, which differ substantially from the factual pattern present here. In this case, the department was well aware of the charges filed against its employee even before the employee was presented to the Superior Court, eliminating any risk to security that may be engendered by an inmate learning of the incident and compromising the employee. More importantly, Riel involved a conviction, not present here because all charges against Algasso arising from the 1993 raid were dismissed. Finally, Riel involved an acknowledgment by the arbitrator that discipline was warranted, even as the arbitrator lessened the penalty from termination to suspension. Under the circumstances presented in that case, this Court determined the reduction impermissible, balancing the language present in the collective bargaining agreement with the director's responsibility under G.L.1956 § 42-56-10. [8] In this case, however, the arbitrator did not lessen the penalty, but ruled that there was no just cause for discipline in the first place, the very issues submitted to arbitration by the parties. We do not believe that he was completely irrational in doing so and respectfully submit that the majority has simply substituted its judgment for his.