Opinion ID: 1676352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to Section 321B.13.

Text: The district court did not consider Barnes' due process and equal protection challenges to section 321B.13. Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, the district court functions in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency. Lefebure Corp. v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 341 N.W.2d 768, 770 (Iowa 1983); Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 318 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Iowa 1982). We conclude that the constitutional claims which have been lodged by Barnes were adequately preserved for review in that court. In our review of the action of the district court, we merely apply the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. Lefebure Corp., 341 N.W.2d at 770; Foods, Inc., 318 N.W.2d at 165. Where the district court has not reached certain issues because they were deemed unnecessary to the decision under the rationale it elected to invoke, we are faced with the problem of whether, when we disagree with that rationale, to go ahead and decide the additional issues ourselves or remand those issues to the district court for its determination. If the additional issues are not briefed and argued in this court, we have no choice but to remand them for district court determination. See Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 382 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Iowa 1986). Where, however, as in the present case, the additional issues have been fully briefed and argued in this court, we conclude that it is in the interest of sound judicial administration to decide these issues here. We therefore consider Barnes' equal protection and due process arguments. A. Due process challenge. Barnes contends that those features of section 321B.13 which limit entitlement to a temporary restricted license to those who have entered a plea of guilty serve to deny him due process of law. With respect to any potential claim of substantive due process, we believe that issue has been answered contrary to Barnes' contentions in Veach, 374 N.W.2d at 249-50. We held in that case that the state's interest in obtaining reliable evidence of intoxication or sobriety and in facilitating citizen cooperation in the enforcement of highway safety justified an administrative rule denying temporary licenses with respect to all refusals of chemical testing. We think this rationale precludes any substantive due process challenge to the present statute denying entitlement in some but not all situations of refusal to submit to chemical testing. We also reject Barnes' contention that the statute works a denial of procedural due process in its application to his present situation. The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act and applicable agency rules satisfy procedural due process in affording him adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on his application for a temporary restricted license. His complaints do not involve the procedural aspects of the agency's determination but rather its substantive rules of decision. The available constitutional challenges to these rules of decision, if any, must be predicated on some basis other than procedural due process. B. Equal protection. In considering an analogous situation in Veach, 374 N.W.2d at 249, we determined that an equal protection challenge to the Department's refusal of a temporary restricted license will be considered under the traditional rational basis test. Under this test, a class distinction will survive if it rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In Veach, we upheld a classification which denied temporary restricted licenses to all persons who refused chemical testing but permitted the granting of such temporary licenses to persons whose licenses were revoked for other reasons. We found a rational basis for that classification in the strong interest of the state in obtaining the best available evidence of the amount of alcohol in a driver's bloodstream for purposes of enforcement of highway safety. We are now asked to determine whether a rational basis exists for the granting of temporary restricted licenses to those persons who refuse chemical testing but later plead guilty to the underlying OWI charge while denying eligibility to those persons refusing testing and not pleading guilty to such an offense. We conclude that a rational basis, sufficient to sustain this classification, lies in the fact that a person who pleads guilty subsequently supplies a substantial equivalent to chemical testing for purposes of the enforcement of the applicable statutory and administrative machinery. Any adverse consequences which the challenged statute has in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea for purposes of the underlying criminal action must be decided in regard to the criminal proceeding. Those considerations afford no basis for challenging the administrative consequences which flow from section 321B.13. Barnes also suggests that section 321B.13 creates a second classification which is violative of due process as applied to his situation. That classification involves, on the one hand, persons who have pled guilty to the underlying OWI offense, and, on the other hand, those persons who had no opportunity to plead to such a charge because no charge was filed or an OWI charge was filed but subsequently dismissed. In terms of the underlying state interest which supports the denial of temporary restricted licenses to persons who refuse to submit to chemical testing, we believe that there is a rational basis for limiting any exception to that proscription to persons who have in fact pled guilty. As we found in Veach, the policy underlying the imposition of sanctions for the refusal of chemical testing is to aid in obtaining accurate and reliable evidence. With this purpose in mind, the failure to file an OWI charge, or the reduction or dismissal of such a charge, is not a valid reason for withholding the sanctions triggered by refusal of chemical testing because such disposition may have been the result of an evidentiary void which the refusal created. Finally, we consider Barnes' equal protection challenge based upon the fact that other violations resulting in revocations may have public safety ramifications equal in magnitude to the refusal of chemical testing, although temporary licenses may be approved during revocations based on that type of conduct. We think this argument is sufficiently similar to that which was lodged and rejected in Veach, 374 N.W.2d at 249-50, that a different result may not obtain on the present appeal. We have considered all arguments advanced by the appellee for sustaining the district court's determination but agree with the Department's contention that the district court should be reversed and the final agency determination reinstated. We so order. REVERSED.