Opinion ID: 2507480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the amendments to section 23-3-430 clarified rather than changed the law requiring pardoned sex offenders to comply with the statute's registration requirements.

Text: Appellant asserts that the General Assembly's amendments to section 23-3-430 of the South Carolina Code clarified already existing law on pardoned sex offenders rather than changing that law. We find this position without merit. The General Assembly created the state's sex offender registry in 1994. However, at the time of its creation, the statute did not address what effect a pardon may have on a sex offender's registration requirement. In 2005, the General Assembly amended the statute to address this issue. The newly amended statute provided: (F) If an offender receives a pardon for the offense for which he was required to register, the offender may not be removed from the registry except: (1) as provided by the provisions of subsection (E); or (2) if the pardon is based on a finding of not guilty specifically stated in the pardon. S.C.Code § 23-3-430(F) (2007). In 2008, the General Assembly amended paragraph F to add the offender must reregister as provided by Section 23-3-460.... S.C.Code § 23-3-430(F) (Supp.2010) (emphasis added). The statute currently provides in pertinent part, [I]f an offender received a pardon for which he was required to register the offender must reregister as provided by Section 23-3-460 and may not be removed from the registry.... Id. (emphasis added). These amendments to section 23-3-430 occurred subsequent to the General Assembly's creation of the state's pardon statute. That statute provides, [A]n individual is fully pardoned from all the legal consequences of his crime and of his conviction, direct and collateral, including the punishment, whether of imprisonment, pecuniary penalty, or whatever else the law has provided. S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-940 (2007). It is clear that the General Assembly's amendments to the sex offender registry statute changed rather than clarified the law. The statute was silent regarding pardons at its creation in 1994. In 2004, the General Assembly mandated, via section 24-21-940, that a pardon relieved an individual of all criminal and civil penalties accompanying her crime. In 2005 and 2008, the General Assembly ensured that the broad application of the pardon statute would not relieve sex offenders of their registration obligation. The State relies on Stuckey v. State Budget and Control Bd., 339 S.C. 397, 529 S.E.2d 706 (2000), in support of its position that the General Assembly's amendments clarify the legislature's original intent that, with only limited exceptions, even those with pardons should be required to register. In Stuckey, Appellant began employment as a public school teacher in August 1972 and was enrolled in the state retirement plan until she terminated her employment in June 1973. Appellant attended law school full-time from August 1973 to May 1976, and in October 1976 she began employment with the State Department of Education. In May 1995, Appellant filed a request with the South Carolina Retirement Systems (Agency) for two years retroactive educational leave pursuant to section 9-1-1140 of the South Carolina Code, which at the time provided, [A] member who leaves employment to attend graduate school and returns directly to employment may establish up to two years' retirement credit by paying the actuarial cost as determined by the [State Budget and Control] Board. S.C.Code Ann. § 9-1-1140 (1986). Agency denied Appellant's request because she had not returned directly to covered employment. Agency interpreted directly to mean immediately but allowed for a grace period of ninety days in order to accommodate teachers who had an annual three month lapse in employment. Stuckey, 339 S.C. at 400-01, 529 S.E.2d at 707. This Court found that the General Assembly's amendment to section 9-1-1140 shed light on the legislature's intent. Id. at 401, 529 S.E.2d at 708. After Appellant filed her claim, the General Assembly amended the statute to provide, [A] member who leaves covered employment to attend undergraduate or graduate school and returns to covered employment within ninety days after the member's last date of enrollment may establish up to two years' retirement credit by paying the actuarial costs as determined by the board. Id. (quoting S.C.Code Ann. § 9-1-1140 (Supp.1997)) (emphasis added). This Court found the subsequent statutory amendment clarified original legislative intent. Id. at 401, 529 S.E.2d at 708. However, the statute creating the sex offender registry did not speak to the issue of pardons, and thus, there was no language for the subsequent amendments to clarify. Thus, the facts and analysis of Stuckey are inapplicable to the amendments of section 23-3-430 of the South Carolina Code. The purpose of the amendment evinces the legislature's intent to except the sex offender registry requirements from the broad relief afforded by the pardon statute, and no evidence can be shown of a previous legislative intent that would require clarification. As such, we find Appellant's position is without merit.