Opinion ID: 1126207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suppression Claim

Text: Lukehart first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers. Specifically, he argues that his statements were not voluntary because the officers (1) did not initially advise him of his Miranda [2] rights when he was handcuffed and waiting for detectives to arrive; (2) denied him counsel and interrogated him after his unequivocal request for a lawyer; and (3) coerced his statement regarding his role in the victim's death by advising him repeatedly of his Miranda rights during the investigation, by showing him a picture of the victim, and by referring to the need to find the baby's body in order to have a Christian burial. Lukehart argues that all of his statements to law enforcement officers were illegally obtained and thus should not have been allowed into evidence at trial. He contends that his exculpatory statements, which the State introduced through law enforcement officers during its case-in-chief and which Lukehart recanted at trial, were harmful because they portrayed Lukehart as a liar and were irrelevant to the manner in which the baby died. He maintains that introduction of his inculpatory statements deprived him of his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Therefore, Lukehart asks this Court to grant him a new trial. In his pretrial suppression motion, Lukehart moved to suppress the statements made to law enforcement officers during the eighteen-hour period beginning the early evening of February 25, 1996, when he walked out of the wooded area in Clay County into the yard of the highway patrol trooper, and ending with his arrest after he led law enforcement officers to the baby's body. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The defense renewed its objection at trial.