Opinion ID: 1786569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General Discussion of the Law

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized that [t]his inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-9, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The Court held that a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of a person if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articuable facts that the individual is, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity. The officer may also conduct a patdown search of the outer clothing of the person if the officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The search, however, must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868. To justify the investigatory stop and patdown search, the officer's actions must not be in response to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch,' but [must be in response] to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. (Emphasis added.) In Gaskin v. State, 565 So.2d 675 (Ala. Crim.App.1990), a case factually similar to the case before us, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied Terry and held that an officer's investigatory stop and search of Gaskin was illegal. While patrolling a high drug crime area, Officer Park observed Gaskin sitting in his truck parked in an alley off a main street and a person standing near the driver's side of the truck. Officer Park did not know whether the parties were talking, and he did not see the parties exchange anything. As Officer Park approached the parked truck, the person standing near the truck walked away and Gaskin drove away. Officer Park followed Gaskin, stopped him, and conducted a patdown search of him. During the patdown search, Officer Park felt a hypodermic needle in Gaskin's sock and removed the needle, which contained a clear liquid substance in the syringe. Officer Park arrested Gaskin, searched him further, and discovered another syringe, marijuana, and pills in his possession. The trial court denied Gaskin's motion to suppress the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, because Officer Park failed to articulate specific facts to justify his Terry stop of Gaskin, the controlled substances seized during the illegal stop and search should have been suppressed. In reaching its decision, the Gaskin court found the United States Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), compelling. In that case, Brown was arrested for illegal possession of drugs after he was stopped and searched by two police officers who had observed him and another man walk away from a man in an alley in a high drug crime area. Reversing Brown's conviction, the United States Supreme Court stated that [t]he fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637. More recently, the Court of Criminal Appeals followed the rationale of the United States Supreme Court regarding Terry stops in Childs v. State, 671 So.2d 781 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), where Officer Horn, who was patrolling a high crime drug area, observed a black man leaning into the passenger side window of Childs's car, which was stopped in the roadway. Officer Horn pulled his patrol car parallel to Childs's car to see what the parties were doing, and Childs drove a few feet. Officer Horn signaled his patrol car lights and stopped Childs. Officer Horn approached Childs, who remained in his car, asked Childs for his driver's license, and asked him what he was doing. Childs responded he was just talking to a friend. Officer Horn told Childs that he thought Childs may have been involved in a drug sale because he was stopped in a high drug crime area. Officer Horn then asked Childs whether Horn could search the car, but Childs refused. Another officer brought a trained drug-sniffing dog, which found and indicated the scent of drugs on the passenger side of the car. Horn then obtained Childs's consent to search the car and found marijuana in a film canister on the front passenger's seat. Childs moved to suppress the marijuana on the ground that the investigatory stop and search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress because the investigatory stop of Childs was illegal and the evidence seized during the search was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree. Childs, 671 So.2d at 782. The court stated that the officer's only basis for stopping [Childs] was that [he] was in an area known for drug activity and that someone was leaning into the window of [Childs's] car. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that there were insufficient facts to create a reasonable suspicion that Childs was involved in criminal activity. Id.; see also State v. Bodereck, 549 So.2d 542 (Ala.Crim.App.1989) (holding that an officer's observation of a Cadillac parked in a high drug crime area and a black male leaning into the car did not create a reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop and search of the occupants of the Cadillac). We recognize the fairly recent case of Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). There the United States Supreme Court states the facts as follows: On September 9, 1995, Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago Police Department. The officers were driving the last car of a four car caravan converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions. The officers were traveling together because they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers. As the caravan passed 4035 West Van Buren, Officer Nolan observed respondent Wardlow standing next to the building holding an opaque bag. Respondent looked in the direction of the officers and fled. Nolan and Harvey turned their car southbound, watched him as he ran through the gangway and an alley, and eventually cornered him on the street. Nolan then exited his car and stopped respondent. He immediately conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience it was common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions. During the frisk, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag respondent was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a gun. The officer then opened the bag and discovered a .38-caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition. The officers arrested Wardlow. 528 U.S. at 121-22, 120 S.Ct. at 674-75. The issue was whether Officer Nolan was justified in conducting a Terry stop and frisk of Wardlow. Holding that the officer was justified, the Supreme Court reasoned: An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a `high crime area' among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 and 147-48, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent's presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers' suspicion but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) ( per curiam ); United States v. Sokolow, [490 U.S. 1], at 8-9 [109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1(1989)]. Headlong flight wherever it occursis the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such .... We conclude Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further. Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), where we held that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Id., at 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319. And any `refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.' Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not `going about one's business'; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676 (emphasis added).