Opinion ID: 582657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of Federal Sentencing Guidelines

Text: 18 Nance argues his due process rights were violated when the task force referred his case for federal rather than state prosecution without the benefit of a neutral written policy governing such referrals. He relies on United States v. Williams, 746 F.Supp. 1076 (D.Utah 1990) (due process required neutral policy by which task force would determine which cases to refer for federal prosecution). The appropriate remedy, he claims, is resentencing pursuant to state, rather than federal, sentencing guidelines. See id. at 1083. Assuming but not deciding Nance's argument survived his guilty plea, we find it without merit. 19 The Tenth Circuit rejected Williams in United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.1991). The Andersen court reasoned that although task force recommendations [u]ndoubtedly ... have some influence on charging decisions[,].... [t]he ultimate decision whether to charge a defendant, and what charges to file, ... rests solely with state and federal prosecutors. Id. at 597. Prosecutorial decisions on whether and what to charge are almost completely discretionary:Although a prosecutor obviously cannot base charging decisions on a defendant's race, sex, religion, or exercise of a statutory or constitutional right, see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 [105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547] (1985), so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file ... generally rests entirely in his discretion. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (footnote omitted). 20 Id. at 596 (parallel citations omitted); see also United States v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir.1990). Unless a defendant can prove that the decision to initiate federal prosecution is arbitrary, capricious, or based on race, religion, gender, or similar suspect characteristics, see United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299, 1301 (9th Cir.1992), there are no grounds for finding a due process violation, even when the motive for federal prosecution is that harsher sentences are possible.  '[T]he prosecutor may be influenced by the harsher penalties available upon conviction, but this fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause.'  Andersen, 940 F.2d at 596 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204-05, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)). 21 We agree with the Tenth Circuit, as do at least three other circuits. See United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1462 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 873-74 n. 22 (3d Cir.1992); United States v. Allen, 954 F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir.1992). Nance's due process rights were not violated by the referral of his case for federal prosecution. 22 Further, even if we detected a due process violation, recent decisions of this court would require us to hold that absent proof of discrimination based on suspect characteristics, we may not review charging decisions made by prosecutors. See Redondo-Lemos, at 1300-01; United States v. Diaz, 961 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir.1992) (although a defendant has a due process right to be free of arbitrary or capricious charging decisions, there is no judicial remedy to correct such violations). 23 AFFIRMED.