Opinion ID: 1235169
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Starr's Consent

Text: Starr also challenges the admission of evidence obtained contemporaneously with his arrest. He argues that the written consent that he provided to police gave consent only to search a closet and a roll of film. He further contends that any reasonable person would understand that in mentioning these two items, he intended to circumscribe his consent. The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of `objective' reasonablenesswhat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). The defendant's actual subjective state of mind at the time that he allegedly gave his consent is not determinative; our focus, rather, is on how a reasonable person could have perceived his state of mind at that time. United States v. Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2004). Here, the district court's findings of fact regarding the scope of Starr's consent largely turned on its credibility determinations. A credibility determination made by a district court after a hearing on the merits of a motion to suppress is virtually unassailable on appeal. United States v. Frencher, 503 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir.2007) (citation and punctuation omitted). At the suppression hearing, Starr disputed whether he gave consent to search his entire residence. Detective Miller testified that Starr gave consent and later added specific language referring to the film and the closet. Starr testified to the contrary that he never gave consent for a full search of his home and only gave consent to search the two specified items. In reaching its conclusion, the district court found Miller's testimony more credible than Starr's. Based upon this record, Starr has not shown that the district court clearly erred. In assessing the scope of consent, we must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the language of Starr's consent and his actions while the officers were conducting their search. See United States v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1010-12 (8th Cir.1989) (finding that defendant gave consent to full search, including a locked storage room, where he gave officers his keys and permission for a `complete search' of his apartment and authorization to seize, among other items, `any drugs'); United States v. Stapleton, 10 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that an officer reasonably believed he had consent to search when, after receiving consent to search a car, the officer told the defendant that the officer was about to search a telephone from the car and the defendant remained silent); Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d at 684-85 (stating that a person can render a search legal by behaving in a way that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she has knowingly and voluntarily consented, whether or not the person actually intends to consent). Starr's written consent reads as follows: I, David Evan Starr, having been informed of my constitutional rights not to have a search made on my residence without a search warrant and the right to refuse consent to such a search, hereby authorize Det. Lance S. Miller and S/A Troy Raper (U.S. Postal Service) Marion Police Officers to conduct a complete search of my residence located at 1645 George Drive, Marion, IA 52302. These officers are authorized by me to take from my residence/closet (roll of film) any letters, papers, materials or other property which they may desire. This written permission is being given by me to the above mentioned officers voluntarily and without threats or promises of any kind. Starr's written consent is most reasonably interpreted as an unqualified consent to search his entire home. Also, Starr was present during the officers' full search of his home, but remained silent and made no attempt to impede their efforts or to express his concern that they were exceeding the scope of his consent. Given these facts, we conclude that a reasonable person would have believed that the officers had authority to conduct a full search of Starr's home including his closet and a roll of film; therefore, this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was authorized by Starr's consent.