Opinion ID: 2257769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the prosecution violate defendant's constitutional rights by alluding to defendant's views of the Second Amendment and a bloody revolution?

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor violated her due process and free speech rights by using her views of the Second Amendment and bloody revolution to suggest to the jury that defendant had pursued a personal goal of killing police officers. Because the evidence, as presented, was not probative of any disputed issue in the sentencing phase, we agree. In the penalty phase, defendant called Doctor Kenneth Weiss as an expert in forensic psychiatry. Doctor Weiss had examined defendant on several occasions and had evaluated her mental condition. During the State's cross-examination, the following exchange took place: Q. Doctor, on October 10th, 1995, Leslie Nelson told you, and I quote, I'm just a person who loves guns and thinks the Second Amendment is sacrosanct, correct? A. Yes. Q. She also told you in that same interview, and this is another quote, the Founding Fathers had in mind that there might be another bloody revolution. A. Yes. She said that to me. Q. And she talked to you a number of times about the Constitution and her love of guns, correct? A. Oh, she certainly talked about her love of guns on a number of occasions. I was more interested, of course, in her attachment to them than I am about her thoughts on the Constitution. Q. Well, Doctor, if the Founding Fathers as Ms. Nelson interpreted it, her right, and if there were going to be another bloody revolution and if Leslie Nelson were to be a revolutionary, against whom would she be focusing her violence? A. I really don't know, Mr. Lynch [the prosecutor]. My imagination didn't go that far. Q. Well, if you're in revolt, sir, you're in revolt against the government, against the authorities, correct? A. I suppose that would be so. Q. Well, you don't just suppose that, you know that, sir, if you're talking about revolution, you're talking about revolution against a government, correct, isn't that what revolution means? A. I believe that's right. Q. Okay. So the persons in government that represent the interests of government among other people are police officers; isn't that right? A. That could be interpreted certainly as an authority figure representing the structure of society. The State pursued this theme in its closing argument. Downplaying the evidence relating to defendant's failures in life, the prosecutor said, Well, here, here on the twentieth of April, 1995, she found something she could be successful at. She found success because she clearly wanted to kill police officers and she did it. She was successful and she did it. She was successful and killed them. No one may be punished in this country for merely espousing particular political beliefs or for associating with others who share those beliefs. U.S. Const. amends. I and XIV. Evidence relating to a criminal defendant's beliefs or associations is admissible at trial if it is relevant to material issues or witness credibility; United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52-53, 105 S.Ct. 465, 469, 83 L.Ed. 2d 450, 457-58 (1984); but if evidence of those beliefs does not make the truth of a material proposition any more or less probable, the admission of that evidence is unconstitutional. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L.Ed. 2d 309, 319 (1992). The facts of this case are similar to those presented in Dawson. There, the submission of evidence of a defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was held to violate free speech and fair trial rights. Ibid. A jury convicted David Dawson of first-degree murder, which made him eligible for Delaware's death penalty. During the penalty phase, the State sought to introduce evidence relating to Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. The parties stipulated that [t]he Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960s in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware. Id. at 162, 112 S.Ct. at 1096, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 315. The Supreme Court acknowledged ways in which evidence relating to the prison gang might have been relevant and thus permissible, but it concluded that the stipulated facts concerning the gang were too narrow to have any relevance to Dawson's sentencing. The Court noted that evidence of racial intolerance and subversive advocacy may be considered when relevant to disputed issues. Id. at 164, 112 S.Ct. at 1097, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 316 (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1134 (1983)). It recalled that Aryan Brotherhood membership was held admissible to impeach a witness when it was shown that members of the gang take oaths to lie for other members. Id. at 164, 112 S.Ct. at 1097, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 317 (citing Abel, supra, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed. 2d 450 (1984)). However, the Court examined Dawson's stipulation and realized that Delaware had proven only that the Aryan Brotherhood originated in California in the 1960s, that that gang espoused white racist beliefs, and that there is a gang in Delaware's prisons that refers to itself by the same name. Id. at 165, 112 S.Ct. at 1097, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 317. According to the Court, the evidence surrounding the gang was irrelevant to Dawson's sentencing for three reasons. First, the stipulation did not state that Delaware's version of the gang is a racist organization. And even if it were, the Court reasoned that the murder of which Dawson was convicted, unlike the murder in Barclay, was not racially motivated because Dawson and his victim were of the same race. Id. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1098, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 317-18. Second, Delaware did not establish that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed such acts. Had Dawson been a member of a gang that endorsed the killing of an identifiable group, the Court reasoned, that membership might be relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future. Id. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1098, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 318. But the inference [that] the jury was invited to draw in [Dawson's] case tended to prove nothing more than the abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter. Ibid. The Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the use of evidence that proves nothing more than a defendant's possession of such abstract beliefs. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 1099, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 319. Third, the Dawson Court acknowledged that prosecutors must have the leeway to rebut a capital defendant's mitigating evidence. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 1098-99, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 318. The opinion further suggested that once a capital defendant offers positive character evidence in mitigation, a State may offer whatever bad character evidence it has, even if it does not specifically contradict the defendant's mitigating evidence. Id. at 168-69, 112 S.Ct. at 1099, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 319. But Delaware's evidence concerning the prison gang did not even serve that principle of broad rebuttal because the Aryan Brotherhood evidence presented ... [could not] be viewed as relevant `bad' character evidence in its own right. Id. at 169, 112 S.Ct. at 1099, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 319. The State's evidence relating to defendant's thoughts on the Second Amendment are in the same category as Delaware's evidence concerning Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. The testimony the State elicited from Doctor Weiss established nothing more than defendant's beliefs that the Second Amendment is sacrosanct and that the Founders had in mind that there might be another bloody revolution. Without explaining why the witness, qualified as an expert in psychiatry, would have any knowledge of who the victims of such a bloody revolution might be, the State had Doctor Weiss speculate, in response to leading questions, that  if Leslie Nelson were to be a revolutionary, she would focus her violence against the government, and possibly against the police as authority figure[s] representing the structure of society. (Emphasis added.) Had the State proved that defendant desired or advocated violent attacks on the government (such as in the Oklahoma City or World Trade Center bombings), that evidence would have been relevant to rebut defendant's mitigating contentions that the lack of police training, her emotional disturbance, and her impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct caused the deaths of the two officers. However, the State never established that defendant was actually a revolutionary. It established nothing more than defendant's abstract belief in the importance of the Second Amendment and the Founders' concern about a future revolution. According to Dawson, the admission of such abstract beliefs, without more, violated defendant's First Amendment rights. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 1099, 117 L.Ed. 2d at 318. Defense counsel did not object to the State's questioning of Doctor Weiss concerning defendant's political beliefs. Because the Brady violation requires a retrial, we need not decide whether the improper pursuit of the Bloody Revolution theory constituted plain error under Rule 2:10-2 requiring a new penalty trial. At a retrial, the State shall be obliged to prove the defendant desired or advocated violent attacks on government as a condition to the admission of such evidence.