Opinion ID: 2213389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Leg Shackles.

Text: Finally, the defendant asserts he was denied the right to a fair trial because the court required him to wear leg shackles during the trial. A criminal defendant is presumed innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a defendant is entitled to the indicia of innocence in the presence of the jury. United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 614 (4th Cir.1970). Cases dealing with the physical indicia of innocence, as it pertains to physical restraints during the criminal trial process, may be divided into distinct factual categories. See Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 104-05 (6th Cir.1973). The first category includes those cases in which the defendant is shackled in the courtroom during trial. In some of these cases, the court decides before trial that the defendant must be restrained. See, e.g., State v. Heathman, 224 Neb. 19, 23-24, 395 N.W. 2d 538, 541 (1986) (leg shackling upheld); State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 370-71, 226 S.E.2d 353, 369 (1976) (leg shackling upheld). In other cases, shackles become necessary during the course of the trial because of the defendant's disruptive behavior. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). The second category involves those cases in which members of the jury briefly and inadvertently observe the defendant being moved to and from the courtroom area in shackles during a trial recess. See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 350 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Iowa 1984) (conviction affirmed); State v. Kile, 313 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1981) (conviction affirmed). In cases of this type, the defendant has the burden to show the incident prejudicially affected the jury or that his ability to present his defense was impaired as a result of his being seen in shackles. See Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 109; Kile, 313 N.W.2d at 563. To avoid confusion, courts must distinguish the pure shackling cases, those where the defendant was actually tried in shackles, from the second category of cases involving inadvertent observation. See Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 109. The present case is a pure shackling case. The decision to impose physical restraints upon a defendant during trial lies within the informed discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir.1986) (leg and hand shackling upheld). A defendant is usually not restrained in the courtroom in front of a jury in order to prevent the creation of prejudice in the minds of jurors. Ellis, 350 N.W.2d at 183. Shackling of a defendant should be avoided because (1) it may interfere with the defendant's thought processes and ease of communication with counsel, (2) it intrinsically gives affront to the dignity of the trial process, and most importantly, (3) it tends to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors by suggesting that the defendant is an obviously bad and dangerous person whose guilt is a foregone conclusion. See Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 105-06; Samuel, 431 F.2d at 614-15; Tolley, 290 N.C. at 366, 226 S.E.2d at 367. If a practice gives rise to an unmistakable brand of guilt or creates an unacceptable risk the jury may consciously or subconsciously be influenced in their deliberations, the practice is inherently prejudicial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, ___, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1347, 89 L.Ed.2d 525, 535-36 (1986); State v. Coy, 397 N.W. 2d 730, 735 (Iowa 1986). It is clear that requiring a defendant to appear in shackles before a jury is inherently prejudicial. [1] See Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 107; Tolley, 290 N.C. at 366, 226 S.E.2d at 367; see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 1345, 89 L.Ed.2d at 534; Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 734-35. On rare occasions, however, shackling a defendant may be justified despite the fact that some prejudice will occur. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S.Ct. at 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d at 359. In certain instances, the defendant's right to the physical indicia of innocence before the jury must bow to the competing rights of participants in the courtroom and society at large to a safe and orderly trial. Samuel, 431 F.2d at 615. The burden is on the State to show the necessity for physical restraints. Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 107; Heathman, 395 N.W.2d at 541; Tolley, 290 N.C. at 366-67, 226 S.E.2d at 367. The day before trial commenced the court addressed the State's request for security precautions. After hearing argument by counsel and the testimony of a deputy sheriff, the court decided the defendant's legs should be shackled. The court stated for the record that the shackling was necessary in view of the past history of the defendant ..., and to preclude any possibility that he might make a renewed effort [to escape]. The record shows the defendant assaulted a deputy sheriff and forcibly locked other jail employees in a cell in making his prior escape. Other relevant factors before the district court were the defendant's age, the seriousness of the first-degree murder charge, and the tension likely to arise from the inevitable presence of several members of the media and a large audience at trial. See generally Tolley, 290 N.C. at 368, 226 S.E.2d at 368 (list of factors a court may consider in exercising discretion). The district court is to be commended for its care in minimizing the prejudice to the defendant. The defendant's hands were free. He was brought into the courtroom before the jury entered and remained at the counsel table until the jury left. In addition, after the opening statements of counsel, the court gave preliminary standard instructions to the jury on the presumption of innocence and the standard of reasonable doubt. We believe the procedure followed by the district court in this case should be utilized by all courts that find it necessary to employ security measures that are inherently prejudicial. The district court, preferably before the trial begins, should place in the record in the presence of the defendant and counsel the reasons for shackling and give them an opportunity to make their objections known. See Tolley, 290 N.C. at 372, 226 S.E.2d at 370-71. A formal hearing is not required, but when the stated reasons for shackling are controverted by the defendant, it would be the better practice to hold a formal hearing and to make specific findings of fact as a basis for the court's discretionary ruling. Id., at 372-73, 226 S.E.2d at 371. The court, upon agreement of the defendant, should instruct the jury against bias before taking evidence. We encourage courts to employ the least prejudicial and least conspicuous security measures possible under the circumstances. This approach to the shackling of a defendant will produce the most equitable result in balancing a defendant's right to a fair trial against the competing interests of participants in the courtroom and society at large in preserving a safe and orderly trial. In light of the record presented in this appeal, we find no abuse of discretion by the court in its decision to require the security measures it deemed appropriate under the circumstances.