Opinion ID: 166442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim 4: Manslaughter Instruction

Text: 55 Mr. Patton challenges the trial court's instruction on manslaughter. As he did before the OCCA, Mr. Patton argues that the instructions' reference to heat of passion did not fit the facts of this case. He contends that heat of passion was not involved in this case, and that, instead, the killing was a case of dangerous weapon manslaughter. According to Mr. Patton, to mention heat of passion and provocation in the instructions merely confused the jury and left it with no options other than guilt of first-degree murder or acquittal, in violation of the due process requirements of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). 56 In rejecting this argument, the OCCA considered the state manslaughter statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 711, concluding that first degree heat of passion manslaughter can be committed in either of two ways, i.e., in a cruel and unusual manner or by means of a dangerous weapon. In either case, `heat of passion' is an element of the offense of first degree manslaughter. Patton, 973 P.2d at 289 (citing Brown v. State, 777 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Okla.Crim.App.1989)) (emphasis in original). 57 Mr. Patton now asserts a federal claim, contending that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to instruct the jury properly on the elements of first-degree manslaughter. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319 ([T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.); see also Rael v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 874, 875 (10th Cir.1990) (explaining that a complete failure to instruct [the jury] on an essential element of an offense violates the right to due process). However, the due process inquiry is controlled by the state law analyzed by the OCCA. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 ([I]n determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the state legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive.); Chapman v. LeMaster, 302 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th Cir.2002) (On habeas review, however, the [state] courts' interpretation of the state . . . statute is a matter of state law binding on this court.). We therefore view the OCCA's decision on this issue as an application of the federal due process standard, and we consider whether that decision was unreasonable. 58 Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we see little merit in Mr. Patton's due process challenge to the voluntary manslaughter instruction. As the OCCA observed, Oklahoma law requires proof of heat of passion in dangerous weapon manslaughter. That requirement is based on the relevant Oklahoma statute, which provides: 59 Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree in the following cases: 60 1. When perpetrated without a design to effect death by a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor. 61 2. When perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless it is committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable or justifiable homicide. 62 3. When perpetrated unnecessarily either while resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a crime, or after such attempt shall have failed. 63 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 711 (emphasis added). 64 Oklahoma courts have interpreted section 2 to require a finding of both heat of passion and either in a cruel and unusual manner or by means of a dangerous weapon. See Brown, 777 P.2d at 1357. Oklahoma is entitled to define the elements of manslaughter as it sees fit, and, as a result, Mr. Patton does not have a federal constitutional right to a particular definition of manslaughter. 65 Moreover, the trial court did instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. That instruction satisfied the due process requirements of Beck. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (stating that [the] central concern of Beck [forcing the jury into an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and innocence] . . . [was] not implicated because the jury was instructed on first and second-degree murder). 66 Accordingly, Mr. Patton is not entitled to relief on this claim.