Opinion ID: 852392
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Testimony Regarding the State's Delay in Charging Pelley

Text: During rebuttal, the State called Jack Krisor, deputy prosecuting attorney at the time of the Pelley murders, to clarify who was present during Pelley's second interview by police in 1989. Pelley wanted to ask about Krisor's previously-expressed opinion that there was not enough information to charge this case. The trial court limited questioning to the facts raised in the case-in-chief and ruled that Krisor's opinion as to charge or not to charge is not at all relevant. Pelley argues that Krisor's opinion is relevant to why the State waited thirteen years to charge Pelley, and that the trial court erred by not permitting Pelley to question Krisor about his opinion. The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of Krisor's opinion because this opinion was inadmissible under Indiana Rule of Evidence 704(b), which prohibits a witness in a criminal case from testifying to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence or legal conclusions. Whether there was enough evidence to charge Pelley is an inadmissible opinion of a legal conclusion. Moreover, Krisor's opinion as to the sufficiency of evidence to charge Pelley is protected by the work-product privilege. Averhart v. State, 614 N.E.2d 924, 927 (Ind.1993) (per curiam) (Delving into the inner workings of the prosecuting attorney's office at the time of preparation for trial would of course be invading the work-product privilege).