Opinion ID: 199936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Default of Merger Doctrine Argument

Text: 14 A finding by a state court that a defendant procedurally defaulted a claim bars federal habeas corpus relief on that claim unless that defendant as a petitioner shows either cause for the default and prejudice from the claimed violation of federal law, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the claim is not considered. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). 15 Here the SJC held that Gunter had procedurally defaulted the merger doctrine argument, that is, the argument that he could not be convicted for felony murder if the underlying felony (armed assault of Jack Berry) was not separate from the acts of personal violence which constitute a necessary part of the homicide itself. Gunter, 692 N.E.2d at 525, 526-27. Gunter could have made this argument even before the trial began, but he did not bring this argument to light on his own initiative in all his proceedings before the Massachusetts state courts. The SJC specifically noted this, stating that Gunter himself did not raise this issue. Id. at 526. 16 Despite the procedural default and to petitioner's potential benefit, the SJC acted under its § 33E power, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E, by asking the procedurally defaulted question itself, and requesting briefing on the issue in the course of determining whether to excuse the default on a miscarriage of justice theory. Under § 33E, in capital cases such as this one, the SJC may overlook procedural defaults if there is a substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Id.; see also McCown v. Callahan, 726 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1984) (citing Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1203-04 (1982)). 17 The SJC concluded that there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in the conviction of Gunter as a joint venturer. Gunter, 692 N.E.2d at 526-27. The court noted that if the underlying felony is assaulting someone in a dwelling, and if the acts constituting that assault also cause the homicide, [the court] could not conclude that the felony defined in G.L. c. 265, § 18A [assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling house], is separate from the acts of personal violence that constitute a necessary part of the homicide itself. Id. at 526. The SJC went on to say that [h]ad the Commonwealth presented evidence only of the assault on Berry, [the court] could not conclude that the assault was `independent.' Id. Because the Commonwealth had also presented evidence of assault on Gilbert, Madden, and McKenzie, there was no miscarriage of justice. 18 The SJC's conclusion was that even if the Commonwealth's original prosecution theory was defective, petitioner procedurally defaulted the claim and would not be saved from his default by a miscarriage of justice finding. There was no miscarriage of justice because Gunter was, on the evidence, guilty of felony murder, even had the indictment and instructions specified the correct theory. The SJC's ruling amounted to nothing more than a decision that Gunter would not be absolved from his procedural default under its miscarriage of justice review. 19 If the SJC did not regularly and consistently enforce this procedural default rule, then it would not, for federal habeas purposes, constitute an adequate and independent state ground. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 588-89, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (when a state procedural rule has not been consistently or regularly applied it cannot be an adequate and independent state ground for affirming petitioner's conviction on direct review in the Supreme Court); see also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262-63, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) (the adequate and independent state ground doctrine applies to cases on direct review to the Supreme Court and to federal habeas cases). But the SJC does do so. The SJC regularly enforces the rule that a claim not raised is waived. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 430 Mass. 517, 722 N.E.2d 406, 409 n. 13 (1999); Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 618, 542 N.E.2d 591, 599-600 (1989); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 374 Mass. 453, 373 N.E.2d 1121, 1127-28 (1978). Thus, this rule is firmly established. Miscarriage of justice review by the SJC under § 33E does not itself create independent rights in habeas petitioners. The regularity with which the state waiver law is applied is not disrupted by the availability or the exercise of state miscarriage of justice review. Tart v. Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that the SJC's miscarriage of justice review does not by itself negate the state's contemporaneous objection rule); Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1200 (1st Cir.1987) (same); McCown, 726 F.2d at 4 (same). 20 Further, where, as here, the state court has unequivocally held that there was a procedural default (on the merger doctrine argument) and that it would not excuse that default, the unexplained denial of a petition for rehearing arguing that the court's discretionary miscarriage of justice review was incorrect and raising ineffective assistance for the first time, cannot fairly be said to rest on federal law. If the last state court to review a petitioner's case reaches the merits of a federal claim presented to it, any bar to federal court review is lifted. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038); see also Doucette v. Vose, 842 F.2d 538, 539-540 (1st Cir.1988) (giving an example of a state court doing so). However, when the last state court decision is an unexplained order, there is a presumption which gives [it] no effect — which simply `looks through' [it] to the last reasoned decision. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 804, 111 S.Ct. 2590. Here, the order denying the petition for rehearing stated only that the Petition for Rehearing ... had been considered and denied. We therefore look through to the SJC's last opinion which rested on the state procedural default. None of the state court's actions lifted the procedural bar. 21 To the extent the district court held that there was no procedural default, it was in error. State procedural default is excused and federal habeas review is permitted only if there is cause and prejudice. Nonetheless, the district court rejected the application of the cause and prejudice standard outlined in Coleman, 501 U.S at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, saying it was inapplicable to this case. The district court said there was no procedural default of what it thought was an independent claim. It characterized the constitutional claim before it as not being based on the merger doctrine in the usual sense, but on how the SJC sought to preserve Petitioner's conviction once it had decided that the merger doctrine applied. The district court was in error: its characterization of the claim is in essence an attempt to critique the SJC's discretionary miscarriage of justice review and the SJC's decision not to excuse the procedural default. 22 A federal court considering a habeas corpus petition does not review, under the due process clause or otherwise, a state court's discretionary decision not to waive a procedural default under state law. The mere fact that a state appellate court engages in a discretionary, and necessarily cursory, review under a `miscarriage of justice' analysis does not in itself indicate that the court has determined to waive an independent state procedural ground for affirming the conviction. Tart, 949 F.2d at 496. To engage in such a factual analysis is to undermine the rule that a state court's finding of procedural default is an adequate and independent state ground. 23 If some exceptional facts might lead a federal court to conclude that the state court's exercise of its discretion itself constituted an independent constitutional violation, this case does not present them. The SJC did not, as the district court reasoned, render its own verdict of guilty on a new theory. Instead, it left intact an existing jury verdict, to which Gunter had preserved no valid objection, because after reviewing the whole record it concluded that justice had been done. 24