Opinion ID: 1191888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Trial Court Erred In Dismissing The County Defendants From The Action Pursuant To Peasley's Motion For Summary Judgment.

Text: Victoria challenges the magistrate's dismissal of the County Defendants from the action as part of its ruling on Peasley's motion for summary judgment. Victoria argues that a question of fact existed as to whether the County Defendants complied with the applicable execution statutes in timely releasing the property to Victoria. In particular, Victoria's cross-claim alleges that the sheriff improperly delayed in releasing the property following Victoria's third party claim. On May 15, 1991, Victoria filed a third party claim of exemption, authorized under I.C. § 11-203, with the magistrate division of the district court in the divorce action and with the Ada County Sheriff's Office. On June 20, 1991, Sharon's counsel notified the sheriff to release to Vernon all the property levied upon, pursuant to Vernon's filing of the bankruptcy proceeding. The sheriff, on the same day, notified Peasley by letter to release to Vernon, or his agent, the property subject to the execution, which was being stored at Peasley's warehouse. The sheriff at that time paid all storage incurred from May 1, 1991 to June 21, 1991. Peasley attempted unsuccessfully to have Vernon pick up the property and pay for storage costs that continued to accrue after June 21, 1991. On September 3, 1991, the sheriff sent the June 20, 1991 release letter to counsel representing Vernon in a bankruptcy proceeding. The sheriff stated in the letter that Vernon had refused to come to the sheriff's office to sign for and pick up the June 20, 1991 release letter despite several phone conversations between the sheriff's office and Vernon. In ruling on Peasley's motion for summary judgment, the magistrate identified controverted material facts and facts not in dispute. It is undisputed that the sheriff was served with a third party claim by Victoria pursuant to I.C. § 11-203. I.C. § 11-203 of the Idaho Code, as in effect in May 1991, provided in part: If the property levied on be claimed by a third party as his property, ... by a written claim verified by the oath of said claimant, setting out his title thereto, his right to the possession thereof, and stating the grounds of such title or of such claim of exemption, ... and served upon the sheriff, the sheriff is not bound to keep the property, unless the plaintiff, or the person in whose favor the writ of execution runs, on demand, indemnify the sheriff against such claim by an undertaking qualifying in the state of Idaho. Provided, however, that if the plaintiff or the person in whose favor the attachment or execution runs, by failure to so indemnify the sheriff, or otherwise, releases said claimed property, the sheriff shall release the property to the defendant, or his agent, from whom the property was taken. I.C. § 11-203 (1990) (amended 1991). This statute plainly directs the sheriff to release the property to the defendant where the plaintiff fails to indemnify the sheriff or releases the property. In this case, due to the early dismissal of the County Defendants from the action, the magistrate never addressed the timeliness of the County Defendants' delay in releasing Victoria's property. A period of thirty-five days passed between the time Victoria filed her third party claim of exemption and the time the sheriff prepared a letter of release. It was not until September 3, 1991, that the sheriff sent the June 20, 1991 release letter to counsel representing Vernon. Although the sheriff apparently tried repeatedly to have Vernon pick up the release letter prior to September 3, 1991, the reasonableness of the County Defendants' actions was not addressed by the trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of law. See Mitchell v. Bingham Mem'l Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 422, 942 P.2d 544, 546 (1997). The timeliness of the County Defendants' actions is a material issue in this case and it remains disputed. The magistrate should not have determined the timeliness of the sheriff's release because that issue pertained to Victoria's cross-claim and was not put at issue by Peasley's summary judgment motion. Thus, we hold that the magistrate erred in dismissing the County Defendants from the action upon Peasley's summary judgment motion, and we vacate the magistrate's order dismissing the County Defendants and remand to the magistrate to permit Victoria to pursue her cross-claim against the County Defendants.