Opinion ID: 77281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the statute's silence

Text: 54 The words of a statute are normally ascribed their plain meaning, see, e.g., Consolidated Bank, N.A. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 118 F.3d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir.1997), but § 1101(a)(48)(A) does not specify how to treat a nolo contendere plea which has subsequently been vacated on the merits to remedy a violation of the alien's constitutional or statutory rights. The statute defines a conviction up through the time of sentence, but says nothing about what effect, if any, the conviction or plea should be given when there is a subsequent vacatur because the alien's statutory or constitutional rights were violated during the underlying criminal proceeding. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (court should ask whether the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue before it...) (quotations omitted). 55 We recognize our prior decision in Resendiz-Alcaraz, 383 F.3d at 1265-69, but do not find it controlling on this precise issue. In Resendiz-Alcaraz, we held that a conviction vacated pursuant to a state rehabilitative measure still counts as a conviction under § 1101(a)(48)(A). See id. A conviction vacated pursuant to a state rehabilitative measure still meets the literal definition of a conviction under § 1101(a)(48)(A), and it makes no difference that the conviction is later expunged. See id. at 1268 ([T]he statutory definition on its face appears to negate for immigration purposes the effect of state rehabilitative measures that purport to expunge or otherwise remove a conviction.). Resendiz-Alcaraz, however, does not require us to hold that all vacated convictions or nolo contendere pleas, regardless of the circumstances, continue to count as convictions under § 1101(a)(48)(A). The actual holding of Resendiz-Alcaraz — as opposed to dicta in the opinion — is that the statute speaks clearly only as to vacatur or ex-pungement pursuant to state rehabilitative measures. The conviction in Resendiz-Alcaraz was not set aside because the alien's statutory or constitutional rights were violated during the underlying criminal proceeding; it was expunged pursuant to a statute requiring that, where sentence is suspended, the case be closed and the conviction expunged, once the case is finally terminated. See id. at 1265. The situation presented here was not addressed in Resendiz-Alcaraz, and thus, that decision does not control this case. Indeed, Resendiz-Alcaraz acknowledged that its holding did not govern a case like Mr. Alim's: 56 As the First Circuit has noted, [t]he emphasis that Congress placed on the original admission of guilt plainly indicates that a subsequent dismissal of charges, based solely on rehabilitative goals and not on the merits of the charge or on a defect in the underlying criminal proceeding, does not vitiate that original admission. [ Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 306 (1st Cir. 2000)]. 57 Id. at 1270 (emphasis added). 58 A hypothetical helps to illustrate that Congress did not expressly address the issue before us in § 1101(a)(48)(A). Suppose an alien is charged with a felony punishable by five years in prison. The alien does not speak much English, has spent only a short time in the U.S., and is completely unfamiliar with the American judicial system. Although he is indigent and constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), no attorney is appointed to represent him. He decides, on the advice of his cellmate, to plead guilty. At change of plea hearing, the trial court does not advise him of his basic constitutional rights; the court does not tell him that he has the right to a trial by jury, the right to testify or not testify, and the right to court-appointed counsel if he is indigent. With the court's encouragement — and without knowing enough to be able to intelligently waive the right to counsel — he pleads guilty. The court adjudicates him guilty and sentences him to a year in prison. After he is sentenced, someone in jail tells him that the court should have provided him with an attorney and informed him of his basic constitutional rights. Based on this information, he files a pro se notice of appeal to challenge the guilty plea and sentence. The appellate court appoints counsel and, after briefing, notices the trial court's obvious constitutional errors. Because uncounseled convictions are presumptively void, see, e.g., Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115-16, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), the appellate court vacates the conviction and remands the case for appropriate proceedings. After the remand, the state decides not to pursue the matter any further and files a one-line memorandum asking the trial court to convert the disposition to a nolle prosequi. The court grants the request, thereby vacating the conviction, and the alien is released from custody. 59 If § 1101(a)(48)(A) did not permit consideration of any post-sentence vacaturs — regardless of the reason underlying the vacatur in question — the conviction in our hypothetical would remain a conviction for immigration purposes. So too would a conviction that was vacated on appeal (with a judgment of acquittal entered) due to insufficient evidence. These outcomes are so foreign, so antithetical, to the long-standing principles underlying our criminal justice system and our notions of due process that we would expect Congress to have spoken very clearly if it intended to effect such results. It has not, however, done so. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 322, 12 S.Ct. 609, 36 L.Ed. 445 (1892) (It is impossible to presume an intention on the part of Congress to make so serious and far-reaching an innovation in the criminal jurisprudence of the United States.). 60 As we read § 1101(a)(48)(A), Congress did not address the effect to be given a conviction or nolo contondere plea that is subsequently vacated because of a defect in the underlying criminal proceeding. Given the statutory silence, we turn to see if the BIA has construed the statute, and, if so, whether that construction is entitled to deference under Chevron and its progeny.