Opinion ID: 203320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Chill

Text: Plaintiffs also argue that the statement presumption is an unconstitutional allocation of the burden of proof, which chills a whole range of protected expression. [17] The majority treats the plaintiffs' chill claim as an overbreadth claim, although only Appellant Pietrangelo describes the claim in those terms. This designation by the majority is understandable because plaintiffs are unclear as to whether this is a facial challenge, an as-applied challenge, or both. Because the plaintiffs have not expressly raised a facial challenge to the statement presumption, I will treat the claim as an as-applied challenge. The majority is correct to state that [n]one of the plaintiffs contend that they were separated from service because they participated in expressive activities. Op. at 62 n. 13. However, the core of the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge is that they were chilled from engaging in protected speech, not that they were punished for engaging in such speech. As a preliminary matter, the government has argued that this allocation-of-proof challenge to the statement presumption was not raised before the district court, and is therefore waived. While the plaintiffs raised a chilling argument before the district court, they did not raise this precise argument. However, in a First Amendment case, [o]nce a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379, 115 S.Ct. 961, 130 L.Ed.2d 902 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in my view, in this case involving a First Amendment challenge, plaintiffs' argument that the statement presumption violates the First Amendment because it requires service members to rebut the presumption should not be deemed waived. The government contends that the DoD Directives and Issuances specifically carve out protected speech, quoting Directives and Issuances that show that the presumption is not triggered by rumors, suspicions, or capricious claims of others, see DoD Directive No. 1332.14 ¶ E3.A4.1.3.3, or by going to a gay or lesbian bar, possessing or reading homosexual publications, associating with gays and lesbians, or marching in a gay rights parade in civilian clothes. See id. ¶ E3.A4.1.3.3.4; see also S.Rep. No. 103-112, at 292 (1993) (What the policy recognizes is that heterosexuals, as well as homosexuals, might march in gay rights parades, frequent a gay bar, [and] read gay literature.). Citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974), the government argues that the military's need for obedience and necessity may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it. 417 U.S. at 758, 94 S.Ct. 2547 (affording deference to regulations applied to an Army doctor who protested Vietnam War and refused to obey orders on base). As the Supreme Court has held, its review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986). Moreover, Congress is given the highest deference when legislating in the realm of military affairs. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996); see also Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (noting that Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military). While judicial deference is at its apogee when legislative action regarding military affairs is challenged, deference does not mean abdication. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981) (None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs.). The Supreme Court has struck down restrictions on speech imposed by Congress on First Amendment grounds, even when military matters were involved. See Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 60, 62-63, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970) (striking down a statutory restriction that allowed the wearing of military uniforms by actors in civilian theatrical productions only when such productions would not tend to discredit the military). The Supreme Court has afforded its strongest deference to the military for speech in military settings. See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507-10, 106 S.Ct. 1310 (affording deference to regulation that prevented soldiers from wearing yarmulkes while on duty and in uniform); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-55, 100 S.Ct. 594, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980) (affording deference to regulation that prevented soldiers from circulating petitions on air force bases). Even then, the deference is not absolute. In Brown v. Glines , for example, the Court held that the limitations on on-base petitions restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary because it allowed for alternative channels of protest, such as through the United States mail, and the regulations specifically prevent commanders from halting the distribution of materials that merely criticize the Government or its policies. 444 U.S. at 355, 100 S.Ct. 609. The most troubling aspect of the Act's statement presumption is that it covers purely private speech, and public speech made off base and off duty. By its own terms, the Act is pervasive in scope, applies 24 hours [a] day, and applies even to speech made off base and/or off duty. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 654(a)(9)-(11). Thus, as alleged in the complaint, the Act required the discharge of some of the plaintiffs based upon strictly private speech, such as confiding in a friend or words within a letter from a friend or family member. In addition, the amicus brief submitted by the constitutional law professors cites the example of an Arizona state representative who spoke about his homosexuality on the floor of the legislature. After the military discovered the speech through an anonymous complaint and initiated discharge proceedings against the representative, he negotiated a voluntary separation from the Army. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 89 Iowa L.Rev. 1633, 1644-50 (2004) (providing examples of the Act's statement presumption being applied to conversations with family members, sessions with chaplains and psychotherapists, and certain public statements). Plaintiffs argue that the statement presumption, as applied, chills speech because a service member will fear triggering a discharge proceeding, regardless of whether he or she could successfully rebut the presumption. As the Supreme Court explained when striking down a statement presumption in another context, [t]he man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (in a due process challenge, invalidating a statute that conditioned a veteran's tax exemption on the signing of an oath disavowing the violent overthrow of the government and that established a rebuttable presumption against eligibility for the exemption if one failed to sign the oath); see also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1939) (explaining that the allocation of the burden of proof, like many other legal devices that ordinarily pass constitutional muster, cannot be applied in settings where they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual the more reluctant to use it.). As alleged, the Act's statement presumption chills individual service members from discussing homosexuality both privately and publicly even when they have no intent to engage in prohibited homosexual conduct. In conclusion, the plaintiffs' burden is a tough one in light of the strong deference owed to Congress and the military seeking to protect unit cohesion. Yet, when all reasonable inferences are drawn in their favor, plaintiffs have made sufficient allegations that the burden that the statement presumption places on speech is greater than is essential, particularly in nonmilitary settings off base and off duty. Thus, I believe that the motion to dismiss should be denied. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent in this very difficult case.