Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 54. Bryon De La Beckwith, VI was initially arrested for the death of Medgar Evers on June 23, 1963. He was thereafter twice tried for this offense in 1964. The first trial ended in a hung jury and mistrial on February 7, 1964. The second trial ended in a hung jury and mistrial on April 17, 1964. Following the second mistrial, the defendant was released on $10,000.00 bail. He filed no demand for a speedy trial following the second hung jury. William Waller, the prosecuting district attorney, did not seek re-election. His successor moved the court to enter a nolle prosequi of the indictment on March 10, 1969. The nolle prosequi was granted by the Seventh Circuit Court District, without objection by the defendant, on the same date. This order was signed, oddly, by all three Seventh Circuit Court judges. ¶ 55. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ... ¶ 56. The defendant's speedy trial rights attach when he is arrested. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406 (Miss. 1989). These rights continue until the defendant is convicted, acquitted or a formal entry is made on the record of his case that he is no longer under indictment. ¶ 57. Former Chief Justice Armis Hawkins succinctly dealt with the nolle prosequi issue in Beckwith v. State, 615 So.2d 1134, 1147-48 (Miss. 1992), hereinafter Beckwith I, where he stated: Defendants may be repeatedly retried, however, following mistrials granted because the jury was deadlocked and could not reach a unanimous verdict. We have also held that retiring or passing an indictment to the files is not an acquittal barring further prosecution, following which the case may be reopened upon motion of the State. Pursuant to Section 22 of our Constitution, this Court has held that following a mistrial declared because of a hung jury, a nolle prosequi entered at the request of the State did not terminate the original jeopardy, and the State was not barred thereafter from seeking the re-indictment of and re-prosecuting the defendant from the same offense. This same principle has been applied in California and Florida. Nor does this rule in and of itself offend the United States Constitution. The Federal Courts have held that the application of the double jeopardy rule has never been considered absolute. On the record before us, there is nothing to suggest any prosecutorial misconduct or manipulation in moving for a nolle prosequi in 1969. The State had unsuccessfully sought the conviction of Beckwith through two successive trials, both ending when the jury became deadlocked. A hopelessly deadlocked jury is clearly a manifest necessity for a mistrial. Constitutional rights of an accused must be forever safeguarded. Society as well has the right to a criminal justice system that is not a toothless tiger. It is not at all unusual for jurors to be unable to agree on a verdict because they believe there is insufficient evidence to convict. If, following a mistrial declared in such an instance, the State does what it considers manifestly fair, and moves to dismiss the case, it would be shockingly wrong to hold that it could never have the case re-opened upon discovery of additional evidence. In sum, the entry of the nolle prosequi in 1969 did not terminate Beckwith's original jeopardy or accrue unto him the right not to be re-indicted and re-prosecuted for the same offense. Beckwith I at 1147-48. (citations omitted). ¶ 58. Having previously found, in this case, that entry of the nolle prosequi in 1969 did not bar later indictment of Beckwith, we must now determine whether his rights to a speedy trial were violated prior to entry of the 1969 order of nolle prosequi. ¶ 59. Nearly five years passed between Beckwith's 1964 mistrial and entry of the nolle prosequi in 1969. Prior to 1974, our jurisprudence followed the demand rule which held that a defendant waives his rights to a speedy trial for any time period prior to filing his demand. Cummings v. State, 219 So.2d 673 (Miss. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942, 90 S.Ct. 954, 25 L.Ed.2d 122 (1970). The demand rule was in effect in Mississippi until our adoption in Wells v. State, 288 So.2d 860 (Miss. 1974) of the now familiar four-prong test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). ¶ 60. We recognize that the nearly five year passage of time following Beckwith's second mistrial in 1964 until entry of the nolle prosequi in 1969 is presumptively prejudicial under the first factor, i.e. length of delay, of the Barker balancing test. Thus, this passage of time compels a full Barker analysis to analyze the reasons for the delay; the assertion or lack thereof of the speedy trial right; and the prejudice to the defendant. See Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406 (Miss. 1989).