Opinion ID: 2173907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contempt can be described as willful disobedience. Amro v. Iowa Dist. Court, 429 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Iowa 1988). A finding of willful disobedience

Text: requires evidence of conduct that is intentional and deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights of others, or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not. Id. Contempt is sufficiently shown if some of the default was willful. Id. Willfulness is the only issue remaining in this dispute, so the case turns on the sufficiency of evidence regarding Ervin's ability to comply with the order. We apply a special rule in reviewing facts in contempt cases. State v. Lipcamon, 483 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Iowa 1992). When a finding of contempt is challenged on appeal, review is not de novo; rather, the court examines the evidence to ensure that proper proofsubstantial evidence supports the judgment of contempt. Id. Because of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceeding, the finding of contempt must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Court, 380 N.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Iowa 1986). Hence substantial evidence can be described as such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lipcamon, 483 N.W.2d at 606; State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980). Where, as here, violation of a court order is shown, so that the question turns on willfulness, the burden shifts to the alleged contemner. Our cases are not consistent on whether the burden then becomes one of production or persuasion. Compare Skinner v. Ruigh, 351 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1984) (contemner's burden is a burden of production on the defense of inability to perform the duty rather than a burden of persuasion) with Wilson v. Fenton, 312 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Iowa 1981) (the alleged contemner has the burden of proof on a defense of inability to comply). The rule in other jurisdictions seems to be in accordance with Wilson v. Fenton . See 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 161 (1990); 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 84(2) (1963). The tension between these competing views is understandable. Evidence of inability to obey is generally under the control of the alleged contemner, and a failure or refusal to bring it forward should not inure to the benefit of one who has violated a court order. On the other hand, in view of the high stakes in this quasi-criminal proceeding, we think the underlying burden of establishing a crucial ingredient, such as willfulness, should rest with the one bringing the charge. We remain persuaded that the proper burden is the one described in Skinner v. Ruigh , one of production and not of persuasion. Our task, then, is to determine whether the record supports the trial court's determination that the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Ervin's violation of the court order was willful. We are convinced it does. II. Ervin contends willfulness was not shown because it was physically and financially impossible for him to move the tires so as to leave the required fire lanes. Ervin, and his witnesses, disputed the practicality of opening lanes by stacking tires somewhat higher (from 15' to 16½'). State witnesses testified it was possible to do this, especially with the aid of a conveyor known to be available at the site. It is clear that the State and the trial court were sensitive to the considerable task facing Ervin as a result of his irresponsible conduct. It is also clear from the trial court's ruling that the finding of contempt stood, not on Ervin's failure to complete the fire lanes, but rather on a total failure to attempt to do so. [2] A contemner is not excused from complying, insofar as possible, with a court order because of personal disagreement with its practicality. Such a rule would arm the contemner with de facto power to veto the court order. Though contradicted by Ervin's showing, the State offered ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Ervin's violation was willful. To be sure, the premises were inundated beyond capacity and Ervin's financial resources were scarce. Evidence nevertheless clearly supports the trial court's conclusion that it was possible for Ervin to begin opening the fire lanes. We conclude the trial court acted within its authority in its finding of contempt and in the punishment imposed. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; WRIT ANNULLED.