Opinion ID: 2757628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: As his first point on appeal, Airsman argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree murder. He contends that the evidence presented actually supported his position that the homicide was committed in self-defense. Specifically, he points to his immediate flight to Missouri, the fact that Jones’s body had been burned, and the testimony by a forensic psychologist as evidence in support of his “self-defense followed by a mental break resulting from . . . post-traumatic stress disorder . . . caused by his military service.” Airsman claims that because the evidence supported his justification defense, it was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder. The State counters Airsman’s contention, maintaining that there was substantial evidence to show that Airsman was not justified in shooting Jones. This court treats a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Loggins v. State, 2010 Ark. 414, 372 S.W.3d 785. The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. See id. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. See id. When a criminal defendant challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only that evidence that supports the verdict. See id. Circumstantial evidence may provide the basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and 5 Cite as 2014 Ark. 500 inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. See id. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. See id. Airsman was convicted of first-degree murder, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-10-102(a)(2), which provides in relevant part: (a) A person commits murder in the first degree if: ... (2) With a purpose of causing the death of another person, the person causes the death of another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl. 2013). A person acts purposely with respect to his or her conduct or a result of his or her conduct when it is the person’s conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2013). A criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. See Davis v. State, 2009 Ark. 478, 348 S.W.3d 553. Thus, this court has recognized that the intent necessary for first-degree murder may be inferred from the type of weapon used, from the manner of its use, and the nature, extent, and location of the wounds. See Copeland v. State, 343 Ark. 327, 37 S.W.3d 567 (2001). Here, Airsman does not dispute that he shot and killed Jones. Rather, he contends, he did so because he feared for his father’s life when Jones brandished a gun and turned in his father’s direction. The following testimony was elicited at trial. Chief Deputy Mickey Atkinson of the Hempstead County Sheriff’s Office testified that, prior to Jones’s death, he had spoken with Jones on two separate occasions, once in February 2012 and again in March of that same year. 6 Cite as 2014 Ark. 500 On both occasions, he said, Jones expressed concern about his safety because he feared Airsman and wished to have Airsman removed from his home. Mandy Turner, the Hempstead County Coordinator for Domestic Violence Prevention, also testified that she visited with Jones in late March 2012. She stated that Jones began the paperwork required for a protective order against Airsman, but decided not to file it because he had hoped that Airsman would leave the home on his own. She further testified that on April 24, 2012, Jones had changed his mind because he continued to fear for his life, and they filed for the protective order on April 26.1 The next day, Jones called Turner’s office to see if the order had been served on Airsman, stating that he needed to check his mail at his home and believed his life was in danger. Karla Denton, who began seeing Jones after the death of his wife, Airsman’s mother, testified that Jones began staying at her home because he feared staying in his own. She stated that Jones had told her that he was afraid of Airsman and afraid for his life. Denton also testified that Jones bought a .380 firearm because he was scared of Airsman. Like Denton, Kristi Dellinger, Jones’s daughter, testified that Jones had expressed his fear of Airsman and that he had purchased a gun for his protection. Dellinger testified that after she was notified by Denton that her father was missing, she called Airsman to see if he had any knowledge of her father’s whereabouts. She stated that Airsman told her that her father had been at his 1 The record reflects Turner’s testimony that she delivered the protective order to the sheriff’s office, but that upon its receipt, there was no record of effort by the sheriff’s office to serve the order on Airsman. 7 Cite as 2014 Ark. 500 home the night before, but had picked up some things, checked his mail, and left before 8:00 p.m. She further testified that Airsman told her that he had left a little before 9:00 p.m. to go to Missouri. Airsman’s father, Donnie Edwin Airsman, Sr., testified that on the night of the shooting, Airsman, Jr., had told him that Jones might come by, and Airsman, Sr., asked his son if it would be a problem that he was at Jones’s home. He said that Airsman, Jr., patted him on the shoulder, chuckled, and said, “[W]ell, I might have to kill him.” While inside the workshop on the property, Airsman, Sr., heard a shot; he testified that he then ran outside and saw Airsman, Jr., shoot Jones two more times. He said that he had to tell his son to stop shooting. He also stated that there was a black automatic pistol on the ground close to Jones’s hand. Airsman, Sr., testified that after Jones fell to the ground, he died two or three minutes later. He stated that Airsman, Jr., then wrapped Jones’s body with a blanket he retrieved from the house and put Jones’s body in Jones’s car. According to Airsman, Sr., Airsman, Jr., directed his father to leave his cell phone in the truck at the house and to follow him “in a little while.” Airsman, Sr., testified that his son then washed the blood from the driveway using a water hose and picked up the shell casings. Airsman, Sr., further testified that, after cleaning up, Airsman, Jr., drove Jones’s car with Jones’s body in the back, about thirty to forty-five minutes out of town, when Airsman, Jr., stopped the car on the side of the road, left it, and got into Airsman, Sr.’s car. After that, he said, they returned to the home in Saratoga, where Airsman, Jr., put some of his mother’s 8 Cite as 2014 Ark. 500 things into his truck, and they followed each other to Missouri. Airsman, Sr., acknowledged that they did not call law enforcement or emergency responders after the shooting. In addition to the foregoing, the jury heard both of Airsman’s statements to police, including the Arkansas statement in which he admitted shooting Jones. Airsman stated that when Jones arrived at his home, Jones told Airsman that he should have already been out of the house and pulled a gun, which he held towards Airsman’s face. Airsman told the officers that his father exited the shop, at which point Jones turned with the gun in his father’s direction. Airsman stated that it was at this time that he shot Jones with a gun he kept in his pocket. He further admitted shooting Jones several times and loading Jones’s body into the back of Jones’s car, as well as Jones’s glasses, hat, and gun. Airsman stated that he drove the car, eventually abandoning it, and was picked up by his father. Airsman told the officers that when he went back into his house, he changed his clothes, placed the ones with blood on them in a bag, and threw that bag out of his car on his way to Missouri. Airsman also told police about the calls he received from Jones’s daughter asking if he knew where Jones was. He admitted that when he received those calls, he “started freaking out.” The jury further heard the testimony of Jennifer Whitmore, a psychologist formerly at the Arkansas State Hospital. She testified that following her examination of Airsman, she diagnosed him with posttraumatic stress disorder and personality disorder, neither of which, she said, was considered a mental disease or defect under Arkansas law. She stated that it was her opinion that at the time of the offense, Airsman had the capacity to conform his conduct 9 Cite as 2014 Ark. 500 to the law. She also stated that, based on the information she received from Airsman himself, he had problems with hostility and anger. Dr. Whitmore believed that Airsman had told her that his duties during his military service “consisted of piling up bodies and burning them” and acknowledged that such activity had a bearing or effect on his suffering from posttraumatic stress. She further said that even if his behavior after the shooting could be indicative of his posttraumatic stress disorder, that behavior could also be an indication of his attempts to cover up the crime and avoid detection. In his defense, the jury also heard from Charlie Airsman, Airsman’s brother; his brother stated that while at their mother’s funeral, he heard Jones ask Airsman to stay at his house in Saratoga with him because Jones did not want to live in the house alone. The instant record reflects that the jury found Airsman guilty of first-degree murder, despite also being instructed on second-degree murder and manslaughter and being given the justification instruction. Clearly, the jury disbelieved Airsman’s defense of justification, which it was free to do. It is well settled that the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not this court. See Brunson v. State, 368 Ark. 313, 245 S.W.3d 132 (2006). Furthermore, the jury is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. See id. In doing so, the jury may choose to believe the State’s account of the facts rather than the defendant’s. See id. But, in addition, the jury was free to consider Airsman’s lies to law enforcement officials and his changing stories about his knowledge of Jones’s whereabouts. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003). Furthermore, the jury could have 10 Cite as 2014 Ark. 500 considered the fact that Airsman burned Jones’s body and his car in an attempt to cover up his involvement in the crime. See id. We have held that such proof is further evidence of a purposeful state of mind. See id. In sum, the fact that the jury chose not to believe Airsman’s justification defense does not lessen the substantial nature of the evidence. “One who asserts the defense of justification of a homicide must show not only that the person killed was using deadly physical force, but that he responded with only that force which was necessary and that he could not have avoided the killing.” Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 438, 930 S.W.2d 297, 300 (1996); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607 (Repl. 2013). The jury was instructed accordingly and rejected Airsman’s defense, and its rejection is supported by the same evidence that supports the jury’s finding that he acted purposely. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 337 Ark. 239, 988 S.W.2d 492 (1999). Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that there was substantial evidence to support Airsman’s conviction for first-degree murder and that the circuit court did not err in denying his motion for directed verdict.