Opinion ID: 1975333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Access to proof and availability of compulsory process

Text: Beard's principal argument is that the trial court should have ruled that the factors of access to proof and availability of compulsory process required dismissal of this action. He contends that the District of Columbia is a seriously inconvenient forum because it is impossible for him to present his affirmative defense to SMB's claim here. Because Marvin Joubert and Derrick Beard are necessary witnesses to establish his defense of fraud, he maintains, he is precluded from raising his only defense to SMB's claim because the District of Columbia courts cannot compel the attendance of either witness. The unavailability of a defense in the plaintiff's chosen forum may, in some cases, be a compelling reason for dismissing the case on the ground of forum non conveniens. A prerequisite for any forum non conveniens dismissal, however, is the availability of an alternate forum in which the plaintiff's action may more appropriately be entertained. Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Insurance Co., 511 A.2d 8, 13 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted); accord, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. v. Rose, 583 A.2d 156, 160 (D.C.1990). The alternate forum cannot be a more appropriate one if the defense that is allegedly precluded in the plaintiff's chosen forum is also unavailable in the alternate forum. Although Beard asserts that he is precluded from raising his defense of fraud in the District of Columbia, he has not made even a rudimentary showing that he can raise it in Texas. [1] In the trial court, Beard relied solely on the unsworn allegations of his counsel to substantiate his claim that a trial in the District of Columbia would seriously inconvenience him by precluding him from raising a defense of fraud. Counsel alleged that Joubert and Derrick Beard were in Texas and that he needed their trial testimony, which would consist of their denial of Beard's allegations. Counsel never even tried, however, to demonstrate that Joubert and Derrick Beard were actually in Texas or were otherwise subject to the compulsory process of the Texas courts. No mention was made of any other witness who might be available in Texas but not in the District of Columbia. This court said in Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d 1367, 1371 (D.C.1987) (en banc), that the empty assertions of appellant's counsel were entitled to very little weight in deciding a forum non conveniens motion. I think the same can be said here. This is the sort of case in which one would expect to find at least some evidence in the record, actual or proffered, to support Beard's claims of fraud. Beard claims that large sums of his money were mistakenly placed in Derrick Beard's account on two separate occasions, and that when he discovered this, he complained to Joubert about the error. It seems likely that there would be some sort of documentation to support this defensesuch as, for example, a letter from the bank acknowledging that the loan proceeds had mistakenly been deposited in the wrong account. Yet Beard has not furnished the court with any documents (aside from his own pleading), nor has he even alleged that any exist. By contrast, SMB has produced a letter from Beard and other bank records showing that Beard personally authorized the transfer of other funds in June and July of 1982, shortly before the loans at issue here, to Derrick Beard's account. [2] Beard has not proffered even a shred of evidence, other than the anticipated testimony of Joubert and Derrick Beard, which might be relevant to his claim of fraud. Beard conceded in his motion to dismiss, moreover, that their testimony would amount to nothing more than a denial of his allegations. I do not see how such testimony could support his defense of fraud. Moreover, there is no assurance that either Joubert or Derrick Beard would be available to testify. SMB contends that if Beard can locate these witnesses in Texas, D.C.Code § 14-104 (1989) and Super.Ct.Civ.R. 45(d)(2) would allow him to depose them in Texas and use their deposition testimony at trial. Beard argues that because the witnesses will deny his allegations of fraud, their depositions will not be sufficient; he needs their live testimony at trial so that the trier of fact would have the benefit of observing their demeanor. . . . Both arguments miss the mark. I find it doubtful at best to expect that Joubert and Derrick Beard, even if they can be found and subpoenaed, will testify anywhere. The allegedly fraudulent conduct that Beard ascribes to them is undoubtedly criminal under the laws of Texas, just as it is in the District of Columbia, [3] so that they would almost certainly have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Texas courts recognize that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies in civil as well as criminal trials. Ex parte Butler, 522 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex.1975). Thus, even if we were to allow dismissal of this case in favor of trial in Texas, it is extremely unlikely that Beard would be able to compel the testimony of these two witnesses. On the other hand, as Chief Judge Rogers points out, ante at 207, there was nothing before the trial court to suggest that Joubert and Derrick Beard would not be available in Texas, or that, if available, they would claim their privilege and refuse to testify. In the last analysis, this court cannot base its decision on the possibility that Joubert and Derrick Beard may have a Fifth Amendment privilege when we do not know whether the trial court even considered that possibility. I raise the point here mainly for the trial court's consideration on remand. Unless Beard can show that these witnesses are available ( i.e., in Texas and subject to subpoena) and willing to testify despite the possibility of self-incrimination, the court could reasonably conclude that the factors of access to proof and availability of compulsory process do not justify dismissal of this case in the District of Columbia. But that is a conclusion that the trial court must make in the first instance; this court cannot do so on the assumption that the trial court would so rule.