Opinion ID: 2023007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Admitting the Expert's Testimony?

Text: Our standard of review is the same for this alleged error as it was in considering the admission of bad acts evidence: abuse of discretion. See State v. Rains, 574 N.W.2d 904, 916 (Iowa 1998) (considering whether court abused its discretion in admission of expert testimony). Thus, the trial court's decision will not be overturned unless the trial court exercised [its] discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d at 5. Additionally, we note [t]he general rule in this jurisdiction is one of liberality in the admission of opinion evidence. State v. Halstead, 362 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Iowa 1985). Our rules of evidence provide the following standard for the admission of expert testimony: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Iowa R. Evid. 702. In other words, [e]xpert testimony is admissible if it is reliable and `will assist the trier of fact in resolving an issue.' Rains, 574 N.W.2d at 916 (quoting State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Iowa 1991)). The evidence at issue in the present case consists of the testimony of Rachel Smock, who was a supervisor in the Sexual Assault and Domestic Abuse Advocacy Program in Muscatine. She described the elements of a domestic violence relationship, or the cycle of violence, and how different aspects of power and control, the core of domestic violence, are used by the abuser against the victim. Smock noted it is very common for the abuser to refuse to let a victim see her family and to isolate the victim from others so they do not know what is going on. This isolation, she testified, also commonly extends to controlling the victim's ability to work and her access to economic resources, as well as access to medical care and treatment. Smock also testified to what is referred to as the battered women's syndrome. She opined that continued exposure to domestic abuse leads to a feeling of helplessness, where the victim often begins to believe what she is being told by her abuser, i.e., that she is ignorant, stupid, ugly, a terrible mother, etc. The victim feels trapped and unable to leave. Smock said that statistically, the national average is it takes usually about seven times for a woman to go back and forth before [she] finally make[s] the ultimate decision to leave. Additionally, Smock noted that it is common for a battered woman to deny that the incident took place, be reluctant to testify against her batterer, and refuse to assist in the prosecution. Often these reactions are out of fear. Smock also testified that statistically, a battered woman is in the most danger when she tries to leave an abusive relationship. Finally, Smock informed the jury that although she had met the victim in this case, she did not have any personal information about the facts of the case at hand. The defendant does not challenge Smock's qualifications to render the testimony we have summarized. His argument is that the testimony was not relevant because he did not deny assaulting Enriquez, nor did Enriquez ever recant her story so as to put her credibility at issue. Although the defendant did not deny his assault on Enriquez, he sought to prove that he did not intend to seriously injure her and that he did not confine her against her will. Thus, it was necessary for the defendant to attack the victim's contrary testimony. In cross-examining Enriquez, the defense elicited testimony that she returned to live with Rodriquez despite the October 11 assault, that the defendant allowed her to go to work, and that she and Rodriquez did have some good times together. The thrust of this questioning was to create an impression that the assault was not as bad or as serious as Enriquez claimed and that she had not really been confined as a result of the defendant's presence in the bedroom and his threat. We think Smock's testimony allowed the jury to view both the defendant's and the victim's behavior in the context of the nature of their relationship, which clearly reflected a cycle of violence. Moreover, the testimony of the expert on battered women's syndrome gave the jury information that it needed to understand the significance and meaning of the defendant's conduct and to understand the victim's reaction to that conduct. Thus, this evidence assisted the jury in resolving the disputed issues of confinement and intent. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. Cf. State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 374 (Iowa 1997) (allowing expert testimony about battered women's syndrome on issue of victim's credibility where, prior to trial, she had recanted her accusation of defendant); State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 1989) (allowing, in criminal trial for sexual abuse, expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome suffered by victims of sexual abuse).