Opinion ID: 2959839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The FCC’s Construction of Profane

Text: The Networks also argue that the FCC employed an improper definition of “profane” under Section 1464. Although we need not reach this argument to dispose of this appeal, on remand, the FCC may desire to explain its gloss on the definition of “profane.” In the Remand Order, the FCC applied its new definition of “profane” as set forth in Golden Globes. The FCC 38 now defines “profane” as “those personally reviling epithets naturally tending to provoke violent resentment or denoting language which under contemporary community standards is so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.” Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at ¶ 13 (quoting Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972)). The FCC, noting that “shit” and “fuck” fall within this definition, ruled that Cher’s and Nicole Richie’s fleeting expletives were “profane,” as well as indecent. Most dictionaries interpret the term “profane” to denote something that pertains to the irreligious, and since 1927, courts—as well as the FCC itself—have assumed that “profane” in the broadcast context refers to sacrilege, and nothing more. See, e.g. Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931) (collecting cases and holding defendant “was properly convicted of using profane language” where he “referred to an individual as ‘damned,’ . . . used the expression ‘By God’ irreverently, and . . . announced his intention to call down the curse of God”); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1966) (“the only words attributed to appellants which could even remotely be considered as being ‘profane’ . . . were ‘God damn it’”); In re Complaint by Warren B. Appleton, Brockton, Mass., 28 F.C.C.2d 36 (1971) (analyzing the word “damn” as a matter of profanity). As the FCC notes, the Seventh Circuit’s 1972 Tallman decision, 465 F.2d at 286, suggested an alternate definition for this term, but we do not believe the FCC can find refuge in this case. Tallman concerned a prosecution for obscenity, not profanity, and thus the Tallman court had no occasion to determine conclusively how profane should be interpreted. See id. (“The trial judge did not undertake to define the terms ‘indecent’ and ‘profane,’ but he had no occasion to do so because he determined that petitioner’s utterances were properly classifiable as ‘obscene.’”). The Tallman court’s brief reference to “profane” served only to demonstrate that 39 there may be a construction of “profane” that could pass constitutional scrutiny. But the FCC’s definition of “profane” here, would substantially overlap with the statutory term “indecent.” This overlap would be so extensive as to render the statutory term “indecent” superfluous. Because our canons of statutory construction do not permit such an interpretation, see TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001), we do not believe the FCC has proffered a reasonable construction of the term “profane.” While we may owe Chevron deference to the FCC’s construction, the FCC must still demonstrate that its construction is reasonable, particularly in light of Congressional intent, the canons of statutory construction, and the historical view of the plain meaning of this term.