Opinion ID: 1172027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the arizona little miller act

Text: In 1969, Arizona enacted A.R.S. § 34-221, et seq. modeled after the Federal Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a, et seq. (Federal Act). The Arizona Act provides: Every claimant who has furnished labor or material in the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in respect of which a payment bond is furnished under the provisions of § 34-222, and who has not been paid in full ... shall have the right to sue on such payment bond. ...
The purpose behind both of the Miller Acts is to provide security for those who supply materials or labor in the construction of public projects. General Acrylics v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 128 Ariz. 50, 52, 623 P.2d 839, 841 (App. 1980). Since no lien rights are allowed on public projects, the Arizona Act allows an unpaid party to recover for performance under the payment bond. General Acrylics, 128 Ariz. at 54, 623 P.2d at 843. Like the Federal Act, the Arizona Act does not state who must be joined as a party. Federal case law, however, has generally held that a claimant need not join the general contractor when suing a surety. U.S. v. Peerless Insurance Co., 374 F.2d 942, 945 (4th Cir.1967); U.S. ex rel. Goodenow v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 5 F.2d 412, 413 (6th Cir.1925). We do not believe such interpretation of the federal statute is allowed by the Arizona Act for two reasons. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain a counterpart to Rule 17(f). Rule 17(f) is a procedural rule. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. Engler, 90 Ariz. 321, 324, 367 P.2d 665, 667 (1962). Thus, the interpretation of the Federal Act is made without a federal equivalent of Rule 17(f). We have stated on occasion that when the state legislature adopts or models a statute after that of another state or the federal government, relevant judicial interpretations from the donor jurisdiction will be persuasive in interpreting the Arizona statutory counterpart. State v. Tramble, 144 Ariz. 48, 51, 695 P.2d 737, 740 (1985). However, to be persuasive, the construction given by the courts of the donor jurisdiction must be based on the same statute or rule. In the instant case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have no counterpart to Rule 17(f). Accordingly, the cases construing the Federal Act have not dealt with the effects of such a rule. Conceivably, had the Federal Rules contained a counterpart to Rule 17(f), the interpretation placed upon the Federal Act might have been different. We therefore do not find the interpretation placed by the federal courts on the Federal Act to be persuasive. Second, when the legislature enacts a statute, there is a presumption that the legislature has knowledge of the existing laws. Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 357, 678 P.2d 934, 938 (1984). In this case, Rule 17(f) was in effect at the time the Arizona Act was adopted and the Arizona Legislature had presumptive knowledge of the Rule. The Arizona Act makes no mention of Rule 17(f), nor are there any provisions of the Act which would remove the Act from application of Rule 17(f). Had the legislature intended to exempt Rule 17(f) from the provisions of the Arizona Act they could have easily done so. The fact that they did not is persuasive.