Opinion ID: 2518340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was griffin deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor's misstating the evidence and the law in closing argument?

Text: Griffin contends that the convictions against him were obtained, at least in part, by prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. An appellate court's standard of review is the same whether or not an objection was made at trial. State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 121-22, 61 P.3d 701 (2003). Reversible error predicated on prosecutorial misconduct must be of such a magnitude as to deny a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 504, 996 P.2d 321 (2000). We use a two-step process in analyzing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. First, the court determines whether complained-of comments were outside the wide latitude permitted a prosecutor for language and manner. Second, the court determines whether the prosecutor's remarks constitute plain error, that is, whether the statements are so gross and flagrant as to prejudice the jury against the defendant and deny the defendant a fair trial. 275 Kan. at 121. (a) Evidence. Griffin contends that, because the evidence was that Dixon knocked over the stove, it was incorrect for the prosecutor to state that defendant's acts were responsible for the deaths of Dana and Gabriel Hudson. Griffin complains of the following statements: Dana and Gabriel Hudson died that night. They died because of the defendant's acts along with Wallace Dixon and he should be held responsible for that. We know the defendant was inside that apartment, him and Wallace Dixon, and that they caused a leak in this pipe that ultimately exploded killing Dana and Gabriel. Nothing else caused it. The prosecutor's statements conform to the well-established principles of aiding and abetting. The court has long recognized that all participants in a crime are equally guilty of that crime and any other reasonably foreseeable crime committed in carrying out the intended crime. See State v. Turner, 193 Kan. 189, 196, 392 P.2d 863 (1964); PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 and 54.06. The prosecutor told the jury that Griffin admitted burglarizing Alicia Shaw's apartment, but Griffin contends that he did not admit burglarizing the apartment on the second entry. He complains of the following statements: But that's what happened and that's what he admitted to. He went in the apartment. He committed a burglary and it was during the course of that burglary the place blew up. We brought you the defendant admitting going into the apartment, burglarizing it, and what Wallace Dixon did. The State concedes that Griffin never said that he burglarized the apartment on the second entry; he did admit to entering the apartment with Dixon. The State contends that Griffin's entering the apartment a few hours earlier and stealing property raised the inference that he intended to do the same when he entered the apartment the second time. Intent, a state of mind existing at the time an offense is committed, does not need to be and rarely can be directly proven. It may be established by acts, circumstances, and inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence of acts and circumstances. State v. Wilkins, 269 Kan. 256, 264-68, 7 P.3d 252 (2000). In the absence of proof of other intent, or an explanation of an unlawful breaking and entry into the dwelling of another at night, it reasonably may be inferred that the intruder intended to commit a felony, theft, or sexual battery therein. In Wilkins, although the court reversed the defendant's conviction of burglary on double jeopardy grounds, it held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary where he was found in a pawn shop, having broken in through a hole in the roof. 269 Kan. at 264. In the present case, too, there is no other explanation for Griffin's second unlawful entry into the apartment, and from the evidence of his conduct in the first entry it reasonably may be inferred that he intended to resume his thievery in the second entry. Griffin complains of two aspects of the following statements about how the apartment was going to be blown up: You heard what [Griffin] said about Wallace Dixon's intent, I'm going to burn that house down, I'm going to blow that apartment up. He chose. He chose to stay there. Even when Rodney Hayes, his best friend, said I'm done, I'm done, he shot at me, he wants to blow up a house, I'm done, we're going over to Donnie Wishon's . . . . The defendant made yet another choice, I'm going to go with Wallace Dixon. And when he did so he knew Wallace Dixon's intent. Because as you heard him say, he knew Wallace was intending to blow up that apartment. He knew and yet he made the choice. Griffin claims that there was no evidence that Dixon said anything about an explosion. Griffin himself, however, told police that Dixon was talking like he would blow the house up. Griffin also complains that the prosecutor improperly changed the term house, which was in evidence, to apartment, which was not. The significance of the latter, according to Griffin, is that Dixon's referring to an apartment would have been a clearer expression of his intent. There is no need, however, to impute Dixon's intent to Griffin because the jury reasonably could have inferred that Griffin intended to commit theft when he entered Alicia Shaw's apartment the second time. (b) Law  aiding and abetting. Griffin complains that the prosecutor told the jurors, contrary to established law, that his mere association with Dixon was sufficient to establish his guilt of felony murder. He identifies the following statements: [Dixon] had the reasons to do this. But the defendant went along. The defendant aided Wallace Dixon for, you see, ladies and gentlemen, when you go into a place like this when you're going to commit a crime[,] is it easier to do it alone or with someone else[?] We know this defendant is the one who crawled through the window and cut himself the night during the first burglary. It's easier to do it with a group. That encourages bad behavior, that's common sense. Would Wallace Dixon have done this alone had the defendant not helped him? We'll never know. No one forced him to enter that apartment to help Wallace Dixon, to aid, to encourage, to help Wallace Dixon. No one made him do it, it was his choice to do so. And regardless of the extent of his participation, you heard him start out with the police denying any participation and ultimately he got to the point where he admitted it. But regardless of that, a person who intentionally aids, abets is guilty of the primary crime. In neither of these excerpts did the prosecutor tell the jury that mere association was sufficient for conviction. These remarks do not touch on Griffin's own intent in reentering the apartment. As we have seen in the preceding paragraphs, the prosecutor urged the jurors to infer from all the evidence that Griffin reentered the apartment with a felonious intent. The State's position was not that Griffin was guilty by mere association, and these excerpts do not suggest that it was. (c) Law  intended consequences. Griffin contends that the prosecutor asked the jurors to misapply the law of intended consequences. He states that the theme of the State's closing argument was that, at a number of different times, Griffin chose to associate with rather than distance himself from Dixon so that he eventually was in Alicia Shaw's apartment when Dixon knocked over her stove. The prosecutor quoted the following part of the pattern instruction on intended consequences: And the law says as you've just been instructed in Instruction Number 9 that ordinarily a person intends all of the usual consequences of their voluntary acts. It's a choice we make. Griffin contends that the prosecutor's statements were intended to convince the jury to convict him without reference to the elements of felony murder. We find it difficult to understand Griffin's argument. It appears to be another way of arguing that, without felonious intent to reenter the apartment, Griffin was merely associating with Dixon and the deaths were not the usual consequences of mere association. The prosecutor's statement about intending usual consequences is a correct statement of the law, and, even though the prosecutor did not restrict his use of the principle strictly to a presumption of intent, there does not seem to be anything improper about the way he used it. Hence, the prosecutor's theme and remarks do not extend beyond the wide latitude permitted a prosecutor for language and manner. (d) Law  felony-murder rule. The prosecutor stated: The felony murder rule is simply this: The State says that in our laws that if you commit certain classes of felonies and during the commission of one of those felonies the attempt, even the attempt to commit one of those felonies, or the flight from one of those felonies and someone dies as a result of what happened, it's felony murder. . . . So if you're  for lack of a better example, if you're just committing a burglary and you trip over something on the way out and that causes a gas leak, that's felony murder if people die. Griffin complains that the statement leaves out the requirement that the death must occur during the attempt, commission of, or flight from the felony. His argument is based on an overly narrow reading of K.S.A. 21-3401, which provides that a felony murder is the killing of a human being committed . . . in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony. A less restrictive construction of the statute prevails in the case law, where the requirement is that the killing be some part of the felony. For example, in State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 14 P.3d 409 (2000), the defendant's conviction of felony murder, with possession of cocaine as the underlying felony, was affirmed where he killed the person who was supposed to buy cocaine for him and then went into the drug house and made the purchase for himself. The court held: When applying the felony-murder rule, . . . the felony and the victim's death do not need to occur simultaneously, nor does the felony need to occur before the death. Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing was a part of the felony and therefore subject to the felony-murder rule. [Citations omitted.] We hold that the death need not occur during or after the commission of the felony to support a conviction for felony murder. The question for the jury is whether the death is within the res gestae of the crime, regardless of the actual sequence of events. [Citations omitted.] 270 Kan. 189-90.