Opinion ID: 1540960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right of Public Employees to Have Their Grievances Presented Through Their Majority Representative

Text: The ultimate touchstone for any analysis of public employment labor relations in this state is Art. I, par. 19 of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 which provides, in pertinent part:    Persons in public employment shall have the right to organize, present to and make known to the State, or any of its political subdivisions or agencies, their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing. In Lullo v. Intern. Assoc. of Fire Fighters, 55 N.J. 409 (1970), this Court held that the representative selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate negotiating unit was the representative[] of their own choosing for all of the employees in that unit within the meaning of the constitutional provision for purposes of collective negotiation with their public employer. 55 N.J. at 414-430, 432. Lullo upheld N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3's grant of exclusivity to a majority representative in the negotiation of the terms and conditions of employment against constitutional attack by finding in that statute the legislative implementation, rather than abrogation, of the constitutional rights of public employees. Id., at 430. We found that the Constitution did not contemplate that each employee had a right to negotiate his own terms and conditions of employment. We observed that in Art. I, par. 19, the framers of the Constitution    made no effort to detail or to prescribe the nature or scope of the representation or the authority of the representative to act for the employees whether their employment was in the public or the private sector. The decision as to whether there should be a single representative to speak exclusively for all the employees, or multiple representatives to speak for different groups of employees or whether an individual employee should have the right to represent himself in all dealings with his employer, or whether all three forms of representation should be authorized, was left to the Legislature. [ Id., at 415] No constitutional infirmity was found in the Legislature's choice in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 to accord a majority representative an exclusive role in the negotiations context. However, in Lullo we expressly declined to consider the question of whether that exclusivity could constitutionally carry over to the handling of grievances so as to preclude an individual employees from presenting and processing his own grievance where a majority representative has been selected for the unit of which he is a member. We noted that the issue was not before us and that its resolution should await an appropriate case. Id., at 435-36. We similarly refrained from approving or disapproving an Appellate Division ruling on that question in N.J. Turnpike Employees Union v. N.J. Turnpike Authority, 64 N.J. 579, 581-82 (1974), aff'g 123 N.J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1973). Since we are not faced with any limitation on the ability of the employees to present or process grievances personally, we again intimate no view on the exclusivity question and shall assume, without deciding, that N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 permits unit employees to enjoy at least a concurrent right with their majority representative with respect to the presentation of grievances. Our concern here is with the statutory permissibility of denying a majority representative the right to initiate organizational grievances with the consent of the affected employee. Nevertheless, we find Lullo's reasoning concerning the constitutional significance of the selection of a majority representative to have relevance beyond the area of collective negotiations. We believe that the rationale of Lullo dictates that a majority representative be considered as the representative[] of the [unit employees'] own choosing under Art. I, para. 19 with respect to grievance presentation as well. Nothing in Lullo suggests otherwise. Since the constitutional provision accords public employees the right to present both their grievances and proposals through their chosen representatives, it would be rather anomalous for a majority representative to be that chosen representative for purposes of collective negotiation under N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 without possessing that status for grievance presentation as well. We accordingly hold that a representative selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit is their sole chosen representative within the meaning of Art. I, para. 19 for purposes of the presentation of their grievances to their public employer. [4] When analyzed in light of this holding, the meaning of the relevant language in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 becomes more clear. We have assumed arguendo, see ante at 135, that an individual employee has a statutory right to present his grievances personally notwithstanding the existence of a majority representative and is free to choose to do so. We interpret N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 to guarantee to each unit employee the right to have his grievances presented through his majority representative if he so desires. This conclusion is essential to the employees' meaningful exercise of their constitutional right to present grievances through their chosen representatives. Arguments addressed to the asserted adequacy of personal presentation of grievances as a substitute for their presentation through a chosen representative overlook the fact that the Constitution has authoritatively resolved the issue by specifically according public employees a right to the latter. The Legislature could not, consistent with Art. I, para. 19, deprive public employees of that right. See Lullo, supra, 55 N.J. at 416. While the Legislature is generally free to grant public employees rights in addition to those guaranteed in the Constitution, Id., it may not abrogate those constitutional rights by creating inconsistent statutory rights to operate in their place. In short, public employees could not constitutionally be limited to presenting their grievances personally. However, we perceive no such intent on the part of the Legislature in its formulation of the grievance presentation rights of public employees in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3. Rather, as we held in Lullo with respect to collective negotiations, we believe that the statute seeks to fully effectuate the constitutional rights of public employees by explicitly implementing their representational rights in the grievance area. When a majority representative has been selected, all of the employees in the unit it represents have effectively chosen it as their representative for the presentation of grievances. We have recently recognized that the Art. I, para. 19, rights of public employees are being exercised when their majority representative presents a grievance on their behalf. See Passaic Cty. Probation Officers Assoc. v. Cty. of Passaic, 73 N.J. 247, 256-257 (1977); cf. Winston v. Bd. of Ed. of So. Plainfield, 125 N.J. Super. 131 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd 64 N.J. 582 (1974). The statute must be read as according the majority representative, by virtue of its status as the constitutional representative of the unit employees, the right to initiate an organizational grievance when requested to do so by a unit employee who claims that he has been aggrieved by an action of the public employer. While N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 permits such an employee to present his grievance personally, the statute affords him the option of availing himself of the representation in grievance presentation secured him by Art. I, para. 19. That representation is to be provided by the majority representative of the particular unit of which the affected employee is a member. [5] When an employee elects to have his grievance presented through his majority representative, it may no longer be accurately viewed as solely his grievance. It is then also the grievance of his unit, brought on behalf of the entire membership of the unit in the name of their chosen collective representative. Thus, we hold that where a majority representative exists, the members of the unit it represents possess a statutory right to have such organizational grievances presented on their behalf. Affording the individual employees the right to initiate grievances on their own, as is the case under the contract involved herein, is a constitutionally inadequate substitute for the right to have that grievance presented as an organizational grievance by the majority representative. The ability to have grievances so presented where a majority representative exists is an integral element of the employees' rights under Art. I, para. 19. We agree with the Appellate Division that this result is supported by the legislature policy underlying the Employer-Employee Relations Act. The principle of collectivity, the advantages of which we discussed extensively in Lullo, in public employment labor relations is at the heart of the legislative scheme. Indeed we have noted that Art. I, para. 19 is itself oriented toward collectivity. Lullo, supra, 55 N.J. at 420. We too find inconceivable the suggestion that the Legislature intended to limit organized public employees' enjoyment of the salutary effects of collective representation  the commonly known means of giving potency and practical effect to the guaranteed right to organize, Id., at 421  only in the negotiations context. We have observed that [t]he legislative aim in writing [ N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3] was to aid, not to hinder, public employees in their relationship with their employers. [ Id., at 429] Permitting a public employer to require individual action at the critical moment when vindication of employee rights is at stake would surely short circuit the system of collectivity the Legislature sought to promote in the Act and weaken its benefits. An employee who views the potential consequences of presenting a grievance in his own name with great trepidation would be forced to endure a possible violation of his rights without redress if he is unable to have that grievance presented through his majority representative. Requiring an individual to put himself on the line as the sole means of initiating a grievance is inherently contrary to the very concept of collectivity and would, if sanctioned, bring about a prejudicial dilution of the basic right to organize secured by the Constitution. Cf. Id., at 425. Moreover, our interpretation of the intended meaning of the relevant language of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 is confirmed by a provision of the 1974 amendments to the Employer-Employee Relations Act, L. 1974, c. 123. Portions of what is now N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4 were enacted in response to this Court's determination in Burlington Cty. Evergreen Park Mental Hosp. v. Cooper, 56 N.J. 579 (1970), that the original version of the Act did not confer jurisdiction over alleged unfair labor practices upon the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC). N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a) (5) prohibits public employers from, inter alia,    refusing to process grievances presented by the majority representative. A public employer which does so refuse commits an unfair practice, the remedying of which is entrusted to PERC. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(c); see generally, Galloway Twp. Bd. of Ed. v. Galloway Twp. Ed. Assoc., 157 N.J. 74 (1978). Although its legislative history does not indicate that N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a) (5) was intended to affect the interpretation of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 governing the presentation of grievances, we believe that this subsequent enactment clarifies any ambiguity in the language of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3. Significantly, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a) (5) does not make it an unfair practice for a public employer to refuse to process a grievance presented personally by an individual employee or one presented through a non-majority representative. Explicit statutory protection is given to the presentation of grievances only when done by a majority representative. Entitlement of this preferred status is not qualified by any statutory requirement that the majority representative be contractually authorized to present grievances. The statutory protection is afforded, without limitation, to all grievances presented by a majority representative. The combination of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 and 5.4(a)(5) would seem to manifest a legislative intention to entrust primary responsibility for the presentation of employee grievances to a majority representative (where one exists) rather than to the aggrieved individual himself. We can only infer from this amendment to the Act that N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 must be construed to safeguard the right of the individual unit employees to have their grievances presented through their majority representative. [6]