Opinion ID: 1145444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: elements of obscenity

Text: Obscenity is not protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2613, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308-09, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). Miller established a three-part test for determining whether material is obscene and thus falls outside the protection of the First Amendment: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615 (citations omitted). To regulate or prohibit publication of speech, the government must prove all three parts of the Miller test. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir.1983). Material that deals with sex, even though exactly and forthrightly, is not necessarily obscene. [T]he portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1310, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). Customary standards of taste, propriety, and social convention do not define the line between obscenity and constitutionally protected speech. Even vulgar, crude, and degrading material does not fall outside First Amendment protection unless something more is shown. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 246, 787 P.2d 1042, 1048 (1986). Thus, even though most people would likely consider the figures on the bed sheets that formed the basis of the prosecution to be crude and vulgar, and even though the statements and symbols on the four bed sheets, taken as a whole, have no serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value within the meaning of the St. George ordinance, that alone does not make the drawings legally obscene. [2] The Utah Court of Appeals found the first Miller standard dispositive as to whether the figures on the bed sheets were obscene, that is whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. The court held that the depictions did not appeal to the prurient interest as a matter of law. We agree. The definition of prurient interest raises conceptual and definitional difficulties. The legal definition is not based on, or even necessarily congruent with, any particular person's definition. Although contemporary community standards provide the legal point of reference for determining prurient interest, mere nudity or simple reference to or discussion of sex does not, as a matter of law, appeal to the prurient interest. A prurient interest in sex under the law is not the same as a candid, wholesome, or healthy interest in sex. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2798-99, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985); State v. Bartanen, 121 Ariz. 454, 591 P.2d 546, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979). The first Miller standard requires that when determining whether a work appeals to the prurient interest, it must be judged as a whole, and not on the basis of its isolated parts. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1311, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). The context in which the sexual material is presented must also be considered. See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231, 92 S.Ct. 2245, 2245-46, 33 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972). In this case, it is problematic to dignify the bed sheets by calling them a work. There is no overall theme to the graffiti on the bed sheets. The statements and symbols were apparently rendered by different individuals who were venting whatever thoughts, however base, crude, or unconventional, that came into their minds. The two isolated sexual images do not make the four bed sheets plainly and unmistakably sexual in nature, nor do the other phrases and symbols contribute in any way to an aura of sexuality, prurient or otherwise. Indeed, one does not even see the two sexual drawings without first encountering the overwhelming chaotic jumble of statements and symbols. The two sexual figures constitute a very small part of some fifty phrases, symbols, and figures, and they are the only two that are sexual in nature. Even viewing the two drawings in isolation, we conclude as a matter of law that they do not stimulate a prurient interest in sex. Material does not evoke a prurient interest unless it has the capacity to provoke sexual responses over and beyond those that would be characterized as normal. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2799, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985). An expression or depiction must at least be erotic in some significant way to the average person, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971), unless it is intended for a sexually deviant group, in which case it is sufficient if the materials appeal to the prurient interest of that group. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958, 16 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966). The spray painted drawings of female genitalia at issue here simply are not erotic or sensual. The images are blurry, and one of them is difficult to discern. The two figures have no capacity to titillate or provoke a sexual response from either the average person or any definable group of persons. We agree with Judge Garff of the court of appeals when he wrote: While the spray painted drawings depict representations of genitalia, the drawings are too crudely rendered to be salacious or titillating or to provoke sexual responses, normal or healthy, much less those that are over and beyond those that would be characterized as normal. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 498, 105 S.Ct. at 2799. Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the States' broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). The arresting officer admitted as much at trial. Even though the drawings are vulgar, offensive, and confrontational, they are too sketchy and abstract to appeal to a shameful or morbid interest in sex. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504, 105 S.Ct. at 2802. City of St. George v. Turner, 813 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah Ct.App.1991), see also Brockett, 472 U.S. at 498, 105 S.Ct. at 2798-99. The statements near the drawings do not make the drawings any more erotic. Except for the small signpost saying tunnel of love and a faint arrow pointing from the signpost to the drawing of female genitalia, the other statements surrounding the drawings, such as keep out and its mine all mine, have, at best, an attenuated sexual connotation that some viewers might discern as being related, but others might not. Indeed, these words seem to stand by themselves, like the many other random, unconnected statements on the sheets. The tunnel of love sign is an insignificant part of the collage that would not even be noticed by those who did not carefully study the various signs and phrases on the sheets. Clearly, Miller and its progeny allow government to regulate and ban the commercial exploitation of hard-core pornography. However, the drawings at issue here do not even come close to `public portrayal of hard core sexual conduct for its own sake and for the ensuing commercial gain.' Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 34, 93 S.Ct. at 2620). First, the drawings were not rendered for the purpose of commercial marketing. Second, mere nudity does not constitute hard-core sexual conduct. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2755-56, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). Before sexual conduct can be obscene, there must be some degree of sexual activity. The lewd exhibition of the genitals in a manner that suggests some kind of sexual action or conduct may constitute hard-core sexual conduct, but simple nudity without more is not lewd conduct for the purpose of determining legal obscenity. [3] In United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499, 501 (1st Cir.1974), the court held that pictures of naked men that revealed no bodily contact, exotic positions, or sexual arousal did not constitute a lewd exhibition of the genitals. Similarly, in Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 401 (D.C.Cir. 1971), the court held that the First Amendment protects the depiction of nude women even where the pictures focus upon the public areas and poses are struck in such a way as to emphasize the female genitalia. See also Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1365 (5th Cir.1980). In Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F.Supp. 306, 396-97 (N.D.Ohio 1977), the court observed: [T]he line drawn between hard core pornography which is subject to restriction, and the depictions and descriptions of sexual conduct which may not be restricted, depends on the amount of physical activity which is connected with the sexual depiction or description. If the human subject of the depiction or description is engaged in sexual action, whether by himself or herself, or with another, then the material is hard core sexual conduct, as the Supreme Court used the term, and it may be banned. When, however, the description or depiction is of sexual conduct without a significant action element, i.e., the sexual conduct is passive in nature, then the description or depiction is not hard core and it may not be banned or restricted. (Emphasis in original.) A similar observation was made in People v. Ventrice, 96 Misc.2d 282, 408 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992-93 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1978): Since lewdness cannot be presumed from the mere fact of nudity, there must be a showing of lewd conduct from which the intention to act in a lewd manner can be drawn.... Where genitalia have been graphically portrayed, together with some indication of sexual activity, e.g., sexual intercourse, masturbation or sodomy, absent social justification or excuse, the material in question has been held obscene. However, the graphic representation of genitalia, without more, is not a violation of the obscenity statute.... It is [the] graphic depiction or simulation of sexual conduct that establishes the line beyond which lies obscenity. (Citations omitted); see also People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d 314, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601, 307 N.E.2d 805, 815 (N.Y.1973). Because there is no sexual conduct, express or implied, in either of the two depictions on the bed sheets, they cannot be lewd as that term is used for First Amendment purposes. Turner challenges the St. George ordinance as unconstitutional because it makes simple nudity obscene by defining sexual conduct as any explicit close-up representation of a human genital organ or a spread eagle exposure of female genital organs. An ordinance that makes simple nudity obscene may be unconstitutionally overbroad unless it is construed narrowly to pass constitutional muster. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-07, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801-04, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985); City of Portland v. Gatewood, 76 Or.App. 74, 708 P.2d 615, 618 (1985); State v. Regan, 97 Wash.2d 47, 640 P.2d 725, 729 (1982). In this case, the ordinance can be construed to be constitutional. Section 1a(2) of the ordinance requires that the work portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. Under section 1e, patently offensive sexual conduct includes any explicit close-up representation of a human genital organ or a spread eagle exposure of female genital organs. The established rule of construction of legislative enactments is that they should be construed to be constitutional whenever possible. Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989); see also Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). Because mere nudity is not obscene, section 1e must be construed, as we have done here, to require some express or implied action or conduct in addition to the nudity. Under that construction, section 1e is not unconstitutional on its face. [4] Affirmed. HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate C.J., concur.