Opinion ID: 187348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Westfall Act Framework

Text: The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act, accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 229, 127 S.Ct. 881 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). The Westfall Act's core purpose, as the Supreme Court has explained, is to relieve covered employees from the cost and effort of defending the lawsuit, and to place those burdens on the Government's shoulders. Id. at 252, 127 S.Ct. 881. In pertinent part, the Westfall Act provides: Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Thus, when a federal employee is named in a tort suit, the Attorney General or his designee may certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose. Id. ; see also 28 C.F.R. § 15.4. Upon the Attorney General's certification, the federal employee is dismissed from the case and the United States is substituted as the defendant in place of the employee. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Thereafter, the suit is governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and is subject to all of the FTCA's exceptions for actions in which the Government has not waived sovereign immunity. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 230, 127 S.Ct. 881. When one of these exceptions applies, the Attorney General's certification converts the tort suit into a FTCA action over which the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and has the effect of altogether barring plaintiff's case. A plaintiff may contest the Attorney General's scope-of-employment certification before a district court. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995) (holding that scope-of-employment certification is subject to judicial review). Once a plaintiff advances this argument, the certification constitute[s] prima facie evidence that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 662 (D.C.Cir.2006) (per curiam). To rebut the certification and obtain discovery, a plaintiff must alleg[e] sufficient facts that, taken as true, would establish that the defendant['s] actions exceeded the scope of [his] employment. Stokes, 327 F.3d at 1215. If a plaintiff meets this pleading burden, he may, if necessary, attain limited discovery to resolve any factual disputes over jurisdiction. Id. at 1214, 1216. This court has made it clear that [n]ot every complaint will warrant further inquiry into the scope-of-employment issue. Id. at 1216. Consequently, where a plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to rebut the certification, the United States must be substituted as the defendant because the federal employee is absolutely immune from suit. The parties agree that if the certification is not successfully rebutted in this case, Wuterich's action must be dismissed because his claims fall within the FTCA's exception for claims arising out of ... libel [or] slander. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). See Appellee's Br. at 23 n. 8 (noting that upon substitution [t]he case would then proceed under the FTCA, which confers immunity to the Government for claims of libel and slander); Appellants' Br. at 10 (same); Mem. of Law in Support of Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Substitute Def. and Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 10 (June 8, 2007) (Wuterich agrees that if the United States is properly substituted as the defendant in place of Mr. Murtha, his lawsuit stops there.), J.A. 149.