Opinion ID: 2465757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bailiff as Witness

Text: [¶7] Deputy Al Nelson was involved in the search of Ms. Smith's home as the K-9 (drug dog) handler. He apparently was not initially listed as a witness for either the State or the defendant. At the beginning of the trial, the district court appointed Deputy Nelson as the trial bailiff. As part of his duties, he gathered the jury notebooks, conducted the jury back and forth between the courtroom and the jury room during breaks, etc. [¶ 8] During the second day of trial, one of the other investigating officers mentioned that Deputy Nelson and his drug dog were involved in the search of Ms. Smith's residence. The district court judge called the attorneys into chambers, but those proceedings were not reported. Upon returning to the courtroom, the district court told the jury: For the record, we took a break. The Court became cognizant of the fact that. . . our Bailiff is the drug dog guy, okay. So I need to replace the Bailiff for the remainder of the trial. [¶ 9] After another break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because the bailiff participated in the search and was a potential witness. When asked if the defense intended to call Deputy Nelson as a witness, defense counsel stated that it may be necessary because the primary investigating officer could not testify as to whether the dog alerted on the black bag or Ms. Majors' other property. The district court denied the mistrial motion, stating that counsel should have known about Deputy Nelson's involvement from the police reports. The judge stated that he would simply replace the bailiff. [¶ 10] Defense counsel called Deputy Nelson as a witness. He testified that he participated in the search of Ms. Smith's residence on May 3, 2009, stating he deployed [his] K-9 for a K-9 sniff of that residence. On direct examination, Deputy Nelson testified that the dog alerted to a bedroom dresser and the black bag. He further stated that the dog did not alert to anything else in the residence, including any backpacks, suitcases or luggage, or to any of the vehicles at the residence. [¶ 11] Ms. Majors claims the district court erred by denying her mistrial motion. We review a district court's denial of a motion for a mistrial by applying the abuse of discretion standard. Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 131 P.3d 348, 352 (Wyo.2006). A district court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it did. Id., citing Gunnett v. State, 2005 WY 8, ¶ 15, 104 P.3d 775, 779 (Wyo.2005). [¶ 12] Advancing her argument that the district court should have granted her motion for a mistrial, Ms. Majors cites to two primary cases Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965) and Romo v. State, 500 P.2d 678 (Wyo.1972). In Turner, the United States Supreme Court reversed the defendant's capital conviction, concluding he was denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because the trial court placed two sheriff's deputies, who were also the key prosecution witnesses, in charge of the jury during the trial. The deputies had freely mingled and conversed with the jury while the jury was sequestered during the trial. Id. at 467-68, 85 S.Ct. at 547. The Supreme Court stated: In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the evidence developed against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel. What happened in this case operated to subvert these basic guarantees of trial by jury. It is to be emphasized that the testimony of [the two deputies] was not confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution. On the contrary, the credibility which the jury attached to the testimony of these two key witnesses must inevitably have determined whether Wayne Turner was to be sent to his death. To be sure, their credibility was assailed by Turner's counsel through cross-examination in open court. But the potentialities of what went on outside the courtroom during the three days of the trial may well have made these courtroom proceedings little more than a hollow formality. It is true that at the time they testified in open court [the deputies] told the trial judge that they had not talked to the jurors about the case itself. But there is nothing to show what the two deputies discussed in their conversations with the jurors thereafter. And even if it could be assumed that the deputies never did discuss the case directly with any members of the jury, it would be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association throughout the trial between the jurors and these two key witnesses for the prosecution. We deal here not with a brief encounter, but with a continuous and intimate association throughout a three-day trial. . . . Id. at 472-73, 85 S.Ct. at 550 (footnotes and citations omitted). See also, Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052, 92 S.Ct. 1503, 31 L.Ed.2d 787 (1972) (reversing the defendant's conviction because a county sheriff, who was the prosecution's key witness, served as bailiff). [¶ 13] In Romo, 500 P.2d at 680-82, we reversed the defendant's conviction on a second degree murder charge because three jurors had lunch with two police officers, one of whom was a principal witness in the case. Although the officers testified that they did not discuss the case with the jurors, we held the communication was improper and rebuttably presumed to be prejudicial. We noted that reversal was required because the witness who commingled with the jury was a police officer and also a principal witness for the prosecution, and therefore, a part of the prosecution team. Id. at 682. [¶ 14] Applying these principles to the case at bar, we conclude that it was improper for an officer who participated in the investigation to act as bailiff at the trial. Although the district court placed the blame for allowing Deputy Nelson to be appointed as bailiff on counsel, it was the judge's responsibility to make sure that such a situation did not occur. Judges are required to supervise their staffs and make sure they follow the Code of Judicial Conduct. Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.12. Rules 2.11(A)(1) and 2.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandate disqualification of a judge, or any member of his staff, when he has personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. Because he had participated in the investigation, Deputy Nelson had personal knowledge of the facts in dispute and should have been disqualified from acting as bailiff in this case. [¶ 15] Although we have concluded that the appointment of one of the investigating officers as bailiff was erroneous, in resolving whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial, we must determine whether it reasonably could have concluded that Ms. Majors was not denied her constitutional right to due process and a fair trial by an impartial jury. In undertaking that analysis, we must consider the potential for prejudice. See State v. Ford, 306 Wis.2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61, 63 (2007) (stating that any error in allowing a witness to serve as bailiff must be shown to be prejudicial to mandate reversal). [¶ 16] Unlike the officers in Turner and Romo, Deputy Nelson was not a principal witness in the case. In fact, he apparently was not even initially listed as a possible witness by either side. It was not until the primary investigating officer could not answer certain questions about the drug dog alerts that Deputy Nelson's testimony was determined to be necessary by the defense. Moreover, Deputy Nelson's testimony was not particularly critical and was, in fact, helpful to the defense because he testified that the dog did not alert on any of Ms. Majors' other belongings (except the black bag, which the other officers had already discussed) or her car. [¶ 17] The record does not contain any specific information about the nature of the communication between Deputy Nelson and the jury. We do know that, according to the district court, Deputy Nelson performed the typical duties of a bailiff. The judge explained: I will note for the record that we have gone through one day of trial, we're into the second day of trial, and Mr. Nelson didwas present at the time of jury selection, he did take charge of the jury after his oath and after the jury was seated after the break following the selection of the jury. Also that there is one, one break mid-morning and then following that break for the lunchtime, and Bailiff Nelson did make sure that thehe collected the jury notebooks and that sort of thing. [¶ 18] There is absolutely no evidence in the record that Deputy Nelson did anything as bailiff other than the routine, administrative matters he was charged with performing. W.R.Cr.P. 24.1(a) makes the bailiff responsible for collecting jury notebooks, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-201 (LexisNexis 2009) states that the court will place the jury in the custody of the appropriate officer. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-207 (LexisNexis 2009) provides specific directions to the bailiff about communicating with the jury: The officer having [the jury] under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them nor make any himself except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, unless by order of the court. We assume, for the purposes of this case, that Deputy Nelson communicated with the jury to the extent permitted by law. [¶ 19] In many respects, this case is like Ford, 742 N.W.2d 61. In that case, the victim was working as a convenience store clerk when the defendant assaulted him. At trial, the victim was asked who recommended that he contact the police after the assault and he responded by pointing to the bailiff. The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing the bailiff could be an important defense witness. The court denied the motion for a mistrial because there was no indication that the bailiff had any improper communication with the jury and he was not listed as a State witness. The court did, however, appoint a different bailiff for the reminder of the trial. Id. at 64. [¶ 20] The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Id. at 72. The court emphasized that the bailiff was not a witness in the case and there was no showing of close or improper contact between the jury and the bailiff. Id. at 69-70. While there is a distinction between Ford and the case at bar, in that Deputy Nelson did help investigate the crime and ended up testifying on a minor element of the case, we believe that the circumstances are sufficiently similar to justify applying Ford's rationale to the case at bar. [¶ 21] We cannot say that Ms. Majors was prejudiced by the admittedly unorthodox procedures employed here. Deputy Nelson was not a key witness and there is no indication of any improper contacts between him and jury. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Majors' motion for a mistrial.