Opinion ID: 1369544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's statement about burden of proof

Text: Storey claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to: The prosecutor's voir dire there would come a time in deliberations when satisfying beyond a reasonable was not required when that is always respondent's burden. During voir dire, the prosecutor told the jurors that after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, you reach a point where you are no longer talking about matters being proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is simply a matter of deciding what the penalty should be. Storey argues that the prosecutor, in effect, told the jury the State's burden was not always beyond a reasonable doubt and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object. In State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 769-70 (Mo. banc 1996), the Court held that a prosecutor's analogy during voir dire was not improper. In that case, the prosecutor described a hallway with three doors, where the first door represented the State's burden of proof on the defendant's guilt and the second door represented the State's burden of proof regarding the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance that warrants the death penalty. Id. at 769. If the State met its burden at the first two doors, the third and final door would have represented a decision on a death sentence. Id. This Court held: Considering the analogy with the closing arguments as a whole, there was no plain error in explaining the jurors' decision-making process in this way. Id. at 770 (citing sections 565.030 and 565.032). During voir dire of Storey's 1999 sentencing trial, the prosecutor stated: Now mitigating circumstances lessen the severity of crime, assuming that you believe them and you think that they should be given some weight and whether you believe them and how much weight you should give them is up to you; is that clear? However, the defense does not have to prove any of those things beyond a reasonable doubt nor do they ever have to prove anything. The only thing that you, that  if you believe those things are true, you will then weigh them against all of the mitigating  that is mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors. After you go through that weighing process, you reach a point where you are no longer talking about matters being proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is simply a matter of deciding what the penalty should be. I'm going to call that the final point, I'm going to call it the final point of decision, if I may. . . . When asked why she did not preserve this for appeal, counsel Beimdiek testified: I think we should have. I think that I find those instructions extremely confusing, especially what we call step three, the weighing of the mitigators and aggravators, and burden of proof. . . . So I think in hindsight it is something that is right for preservation, should have been objected to and included in the motion for new trial. Counsel Kenyon testified: I don't believe those remarks to be inaccurate. . . . What the prosecutor was referring to was the fourth step, when you talk about four steps in the penalty phase process. My understanding of what the prosecutor was saying from listening to him, the prosecutor was talking about that very fourth step. And in the fourth step, there is no language with respect to that fourth step itself that requires the state to prove anything beyond a reasonable doubt. The proof beyond a reasonable doubt language is in the first two steps. . . . And because it wasn't confusing to me and I believed it to be a correct statement of the law, I didn't object. The motion court held: Counsel indicated that the questioning by the state was not so obviously improper that counsel was ineffective in failing to object. Nor does the court find it so misleading or prejudicial as to have denied movant a fair trial or an impartial jury. There is no claim here. In the context of the prosecutor's argument, it is very clear that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In the context of the statement, it is also true that the concept of reasonable doubt does not apply to weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. Counsel made no error by not objecting.