Opinion ID: 2136461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: An orderly approach to the first issue here raised necessitates a prefatory reference to some pertinent, though perforce general, principles regarding disclosure of an informer's identity.

Text: As instantly applied the so-called informer's privilege is actually the State's right of nondisclosure as to identity of those persons who supply law violation information to officers charged with enforcement of any such law. This privilege is premised upon public interest in maintaining the flow of information essential to law enforcement. To be weighed against that interest, however, is an accused's right of access to facts necessary for the preparation and presentation of his defense, and to a fair trial. Therefore, any determination as to whether an informer's identity is to be revealed requires a balancing of the aforesaid countering interests in light of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Among facts to be considered in this weighing process are (1) nature of the offense charged; (2) defenses raised; and (3) potential significance of an informer's testimony. The burden is inceptionally upon defendant to show cause for such disclosure. And in this regard the mere assertion of entrapment as a defense to a criminal charge will not suffice. But when showing is made by an accused that an informer's identity is material to his defense or essential to a fair trial the informer privilege disappears. In support of the foregoing see Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-65, 77 S. Ct. 623, 627-630, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); United States v. Alvarez, 472 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1973); Lannom v. United States, 381 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041, 88 S.Ct. 784, 19 L.Ed. 2d 833 (1968); State v. Crawford, 202 N. W.2d 99, 102 (Iowa 1972); State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70, 71-72 (Iowa 1972); State v. Denato, 173 N.W.2d 576, 577-579 (Iowa 1970); 8 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2374 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); McCormick on Evidence, § 148 (2d ed. 1972); 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 332; 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 534; 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 954; Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262. Moreover, courts have generally held the identity of an informer must be disclosed when the informant participated in or witnessed the crime charged. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. at 63-65, 77 S.Ct. at 629-630; State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d at 71; Bennett v. State, 252 Ark. 128, 477 S.W.2d 497, 499 (1972); Burks v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 298, 300-301 (Ky.1971); State v. Davis, 450 S. W.2d 168, 172-173 (Mo.1970); State v. Phillips, 27 Ohio St.2d 294, 56 Ohio Op.2d 174, 272 N.E.2d 347, 350-351 (1971); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d at 286-290. II. At close of defendant's previously noted pretrial motion hearing trial court held, as aforesaid, the identity of any informer or informers need not be disclosed. Under existing circumstances we find no error in that holding. Inceptionally Lamar, in course of that proceeding, elicited evidence from testifying officers only to the effect policemen were stationed at the robbery site as the result of advice received from an informant or informants. Noticeably defendant then presented no evidence from which it could even be inferred he participated in the offense charged because of inducement or the urging of anyone whomsoever. Neither did Lamar, at that time, show identity of an informer was in any respect material or essential to his defense. Finally, in this area, there is nothing in the record from which it could be found Lamar was then precluded from making a full and adequate showing of cause for informant identity disclosure.