Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Plain Error Limits on Allocution

Text: Under the Delaware death penalty statute, where the defendant pleads not guilty in a capital case and does not waive trial by jury, there must be a trial to determine guilt. If the jury in the guilt phase unanimously renders a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, the same trial judge and jury will then turn to the separate penalty phase hearing. At the penalty phase, evidence is presented relating to mitigating and aggravating circumstances. [412] At the conclusion of the hearing, the jury will report to the trial judge whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance ( e.g., premeditation and the result of substantial planning) and whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The jury report carries with it the final tally by number of affirmative and negative votes cast by the jury on each question. [413] Significantly, the statute also provides that the defendant has the right personally to address the jury in summation in addition to having counsel address the jury in summation on the defendant's behalf: At the hearing the Court shall permit argument by the State, the defendant and/or the defendant's counsel, on the punishment to be imposed. Such argument shall consist of opening statements by each, unless waived, opening summation by the State, rebuttal summation by the defendant and/or the defendant's counsel and closing summation by the State. [414] This statutory provision is complementary to the requirement of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Superior Court: Before imposing sentence, the court shall ... (C) Address the defendant personally and determine if the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence. [415] These statutory and rule provisions are, on their face, broad and openended in establishing the framework of the right of allocution belonging to a defendant facing the death penalty personally to address the jury and/or the judge before the determination of the penalty. It is important to focus on the fact that the right of allocution does not involve sworn testimony by the defendant nor does it subject the defendant to cross-examination. Black's Law Dictionary defines allocution as follows: allocution ... 1. A trial judge's formal address to a convicted defendant, asking him or her to speak in mitigation of the sentence to be imposed.  This address is required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(C). 2. An unsworn statement from a convicted defendant to the sentencing judge or jury in which the defendant can ask for mercy, explain his or her conduct, apologize for the crime, or say anything else in an effort to lessen the impending sentence.  This statement is not subject to cross-examination. [416] Under Delaware law, the function of the jury in the penalty phase is solely advisory. It is the judge who has the ultimate responsibility to impose either a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction. But the judge must consider and give substantial weight to the recommendation of the jury before imposing sentence. [417] The jury's recommendation is significant, and therefore the conduct of the penalty phase hearing must be conducted fairly. Accordingly, the nature and scope of the right of the defendant personally to address the jury in allocution is one we have recently addressed [418] and one we must now apply to this case.
Capano elected his right of allocution January 28, 1999, the last day of his penalty phase hearing. On that day, Capano intended to allocute by reading a prepared statement from the witness stand. Before he began, Capano's counsel informed the trial judge that they had instructed Capano about the law of allocution. [419] Capano's counsel, however, informed the court that Capano had not told them the substance of his allocution. [420] Before Capano began, the trial judge imposed limitations, without objection, on the substance of allocution. Outside of the jury's presence, the trial judge explained to Capano that his allocution was limited as follows: Allocution is extended only to acceptable expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency, statements about his own good person and plans or hopes for the future. It is not to dispute the evidence or the verdict, to attack the investigation or the prosecutors. These limits are to be strictly enforced. And if in fact they are violated, I will terminate the allocution.... [421] No objection was raised by Capano or his counsel to these limitations. In fact, as noted, these ground rules had already been explained to Capano by his attorneys. [422] Before Capano began to exercise his right of allocution, the trial court related these limitations to the jury, explaining that a man who is facing the possibility of capital punishment has the right to address his jurors, his judge, not to dispute the facts of the case or to comment on matters related to the trial, but to deal with those areas that are appropriate for you to consider in determining the questions that lie ahead of you. [423] Capano began his allocution by saying, I'm not allowed to talk about the evidence, and the next thing I was going to say was about the evidence, so I won't. [424] Again, at a later point in his testimony, he said with reference to a matter concerning his daughters, I'm not allowed to talk about that evidence.... [425] Finally, at the end of allocution, he said, There are a couple of other things that I wanted to say but better check and make sure they don't violate any rules. Maybe just one other. [426] Capano gave a lengthy allocution covering a number of subjects. [427] He alluded to his accident defense, saying, for example, that his actions on the night of June 27 were those of a panicked man, and were a result of very cowardly decisions which I think when I was on the stand before I basically already said that much. [428] Capano did in fact make some references to the evidence, in spite of the court's limitation. In addition, he discussed his family life, explained his background and personal qualities to the jury, and described his relationship with Fahey, among other things. Thus he had a substantial opportunity to receive the intended benefits of allocution. Capano raises on this appeal for the first time for plain error review not only the trial judge's limits on discussing the evidence but also the trial court's reaction when Capano entered into a discussion of certain evidence. For example, Capano was discussing his pride in his daughters, and then veered into a discussion of what he viewed as harassment of his daughters, presumably by State officials. He told the jury that my kids were harassed. They were lied to and.... At this point the trial judge interrupted Capano as follows: The Court: We're done. Please take Mr. Capano out of the courtroom. The Defendant: Can I take it back, Your Honor? The Court: No. The trial judge immediately relented, however, stating in the presence of the jury: I will let him continue. Sort of blown my rules apart here and I'll instruct the jury on that, but the next time you make such a blatant attack on the rules that you're forced operate under I will remove you. There won't be taking back anything. You will not be present for the rest of the trial. [429] Later, when Capano began discussing his relationship with Fahey, the trial court interrupted, saying: Mr. Capano, if you have any remarks that deal with expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency, plans or hopes for the future, or statements about your own good person, some of which you have already made, please make them now. I will not tolerate any deviance from these conditions. [430] When Capano left the stand, the trial court delivered the following instruction to the jury: Members of the jury, as I indicated before Mr. Capano started his allocution, it's limited to a very narrow framework, specifically the defendant is not permitted to rebut any facts or to deny his guilt or to voice an expression that contradicts the evidentiary facts that you heard in the trial. It is solely for the purpose of acceptable expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency, statements about his own good person, and for his plans and hopes for the future. To the extent that Mr. Capano spoke to those valid areas, you should consider it his testimony. To the extent that he violated the terms of the allocution, which he was specifically informed of prior to taking the stand, you should consider that in any way you deem appropriate. [431] The trial judge did not explain what he meant by the term consider that in any way you deem appropriate. Then, in the presence of the jury, the trial judge asked the prosecution if the State [has] anything [it] wish[ed] to present in view of the deviation from the purposes of allocution. Following a sidebar conference during which the State pressed for an instruction regarding Capano's suggestion that he had been stopped from testifying about certain matters, the Court stated the following to the jury: The purpose of the sidebar was for me to reflect on certain statements that were made by Mr. Capano which may have been misleading. Mr. Capano elected the right of allocution, which means that he could take the stand and, within the limitations which I indicated to you, could speak and not be subject to cross examination. There was nothing to permit him or to  excuse me  there was nothing to keep him from taking the stand and testifying on broader issues in the penalty phase; however, had he done that, he would have subjected himself to cross examination. So when he indicated that there were things that he could not talk about, he was right because allocution is very limited, but had a different form been chosen, those limitations would not have been the same. [432]
The jury returned its recommendations on January 28, 1999. [433] Eleven of the 12 jurors found the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder was premeditated and the result of substantial planning, while one juror did not. The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones, and recommended by a vote of 10 to 2 that the death penalty be imposed. The trial court sentenced Capano to death on March 16, 1999, based on its finding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravating circumstance that Capano had premeditated and substantially planned Fahey's murder. [434] The trial court also found that the State had proved by substantial and reliable evidence the existence of six non-statutory aggravating circumstances, and that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the five mitigating circumstances that also existed. [435] One of the nonstatutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court was the defendant's disdain for authority. [436] The trial court stated that it also is noteworthy that defendant breached many rules the Court imposed during these proceedings. The Court, directly, and through counsel, on numerous occasions set forth rules to defendant which it expected him to follow, and defendant consistently violated those rules. He openly defies authority. [437] In remarks accompanying the handing down of the sentence, the trial court noted that in spite of the limits of allocution, Capano had specifically refused to ask for mercy, showed no remorse, and continued his attack on the decision of the jury [and] the disloyalty of those who testified against him.... [438]
Capano argues that his death sentence should be set aside because the trial judge improperly limited the scope of his allocution during the penalty phase of his trial. He argues that he was impermissibly restricted to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency, statements about [his] own good character and person and plans and hopes for the future. In addition, Capano contends that the trial judge erred by interrupting him during his allocution and admonishing him in front of the jury for exceeding the scope of the allocution and by commenting to the jury that they could view Capano's exceeding the scope of the allocution in any way ... appropriate. Finally, Capano argues that the trial judge erred during sentencing by considering the fact that Capano violated his ruling on the scope of the allocution as a factor in imposing the death sentence. Capano contends that this Court's standard and scope of review should be de novo. Despite his failure to object, Capano asserts that his resistance to the judge's attempt to limit his right to allocution calls for a less deferential standard of review than plain error. Regardless of the standard, Capano contends that this Court should review his claim because the right to allocution is arguably a `substantial right' of a capital defendant. [439] The State contends the standard and scope of review is plain error. We agree that plain error is the standard and scope of review. The issue we consider is whether the trial judge committed plain error in his limitations on Capano's allocution, in the judge's reactions to Capano's attempts to discuss evidence, made in the jury's presence, and in the judge's direct statements to the jury. The State conceded at oral argument in this Court that the trial judge's limitations on allocution were erroneously restricted and that the court's comments probably did affect the jury's attitude toward Capano. [440] Nevertheless, it was proper for the jury to consider any violations of courtroom rules as a nonstatutory aggravating factor in its recommendation. [441] The issue that concerns us here is the likely effect on the jury of the trial judge's reactions to those violations. We are mindful of the trial judge's duty to act instantly to control disrespectful or obstructionist tactics in the courtroom. [442] A trial judge has broad latitude to take measures to preserve order and appropriate conduct in judicial proceedings. [443] In this case, the trial judge's remarks at sentencing and the sentencing opinion reflect that he found Capano to be a continually disruptive and unruly presence. [444] The trial judge has a unique vantage point, and we do not undertake to second-guess his assessment. We further recognize that the challenge of managing a difficult litigant is magnified in the context of a lengthy capital trial subject to intense public scrutiny. [445] The trial in this case began on October 6, 1998 and ended on January 17, 1999, a period of nearly three months. The trial judge firmly and ably maintained control over these most difficult proceedings and moved the trial forward expeditiously. Our task is to assess the likely effect of the trial judge's statements on the fairness and integrity of Capano's penalty phase. Our review of the record convinces us that the totality of the trial judge's handling of the allocution did not unfairly prejudice Capano.
On June 25, 1999, while Capano's direct appeal to this Court was pending, we released an opinion in Shelton v. State. [446] In Shelton, the defendant was instructed by the trial judge that he could not use his allocution to talk about the facts surrounding the murder. [447] The trial court instead limited Shelton's allocution to asking the sentencing authority ... to give you mercy, spare your life in this case, and sentence you to life. Shelton acquiesced in that limitation because he did not want to discuss the facts in any event. Speaking briefly in allocution, Shelton did not discuss any evidence. [448] Shelton was sentenced to death for first degree murder and his death sentence was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. [449] In his motion for post-conviction relief, Shelton argued for the first time that the trial court had infringed his right to present mitigating evidence to the jury in allocution. Shelton argued that this right was guaranteed under Superior Court Criminal Rule 32 as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. According to Shelton, his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the limitations placed on his allocution. [450] Despite Shelton's clear assent to the limits placed on allocution, we reached the merits of his claim under a plain error standard of review. [451] We concluded that the limitations placed on Shelton's allocution did not reflect the full scope of allocution under Delaware law. [452] We defined the scope of allocution as follows: [T]here is no blanket rule that would preclude a defendant who wished to do so from discussing or arguing in allocution facts already in evidence either in the guilt phase or the penalty phase.    In our view, Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(a)(1)(C) and 11 Del. C. § 4209(c)(2) provide a defendant in the penalty phase of a capital case the opportunity to argue in allocution from the facts already in evidence in the guilt phase or the penalty phase why those facts should not result in the death penalty. This is true whether the argument is to assert diminished responsibility, reduced culpability in comparison to other defendants, mistaken identity, mistake by the jury in finding guilt or any other reason. [453] Thus, the Shelton holding allows a defendant to discuss in allocution facts already in evidence, but requires that the defendant be sworn and subject to cross-examination before making a statement of new evidence. [454] We indicated that this limitation on the presentation of new evidence achieved a balance of the important purposes served by allocution, considerations of fairness toward the defendant as well as the State and the truth-seeking function of the jury. [455] In Shelton, we explained the purposes served by allocution: Presently, allocution serves two purposes: First, it reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity to ask for mercy. Second, it permits a defendant to impress a jury with his or her feelings of remorse. Put another way, allocution is necessary because it affords an opportunity for the jury to learn about the `whole person' and it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury `which has never heard the sound of his voice.' [456] The importance of allowing a defendant to discuss evidence in his allocution must be measured in light of these purposes. In some cases, such as the Shelton case itself, the defendant may have no wish to refer to the facts of the crime for which he was found guilty. In other cases, however, discussing the evidence presented at trial may be a crucial part of the defendant's plea for mercy. Although this evidence may have been before the jury in the guilt phase, the purpose of allocution is for the defendant to be heard under procedures that allow him to speak directly to the jury. In fact, the Delaware death penalty statute expressly permits the defendant as well as his counsel to present argument and summation, [457] and the Superior Court Rule permits the defendant to present any information in mitigation. [458] In Shelton, we quoted with approval Justice Frankfurter's observation that [t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. [459] This policy is a key factor in analyzing the right of allocution and its application to this case. The issue in Shelton was first raised in a post-conviction proceeding in that case. The question at that stage of the proceedings was whether Shelton was entitled to a new penalty hearing because of the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing either to object to the overbroad and erroneous limits the trial court had placed on his allocution or to raise the issue on direct appeal. We held that he was not entitled to a new penalty hearing because he was unable to show that that he was prejudiced by the erroneous limitations. [460] This was because Shelton's considered strategy [461] was to avoid discussing in allocution the facts of the case. Not only had he made no proffer of what facts he would argue in allocution if allowed, his wish not to discuss the facts surrounding the murder had been made unusually clear through extensive colloquy among the judge, Shelton and counsel. [462] Shelton's strategy was carried out in his actual allocution, during which Shelton did not discuss the facts or express remorse. Twice he stated in his allocution that he was not pleading for his life. Therefore, the limits placed on allocution and trial counsel's failure to object to those limits became a moot point that resulted in harmless error, and thus were not grounds for overturning the sentence.
Capano argues that the limits placed on his allocution were error in light of Shelton. Neither Capano nor his counsel objected to the limits placed on his allocution. Under plain error review, [463] the Court will grant relief only if the error complained of is so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. To establish plain error, Capano has the burden of showing actual prejudice. [464] As noted above, Shelton was not decided until after Capano was sentenced. Nevertheless, the State concedes that the limitations placed on Capano's right of allocution were too restrictive in light of Shelton. [465] Although it thus concedes error, the State argues that the trial judge's limits on allocution were not plain error in this case. First, the State seems to contend that Shelton should not be applied because it was decided after Capano was sentenced. The rationale of the State's argument is that because the scope of the right of allocution was unclear before Shelton was decided, and was an issue of first impression in Shelton, the error in this case cannot have been plain  i.e., obvious. This argument misconceives the nature of plain error review. Plain errors must be apparent on the face of the record. [466] As suggested by this language, the issue is whether the error is apparent from the vantage point of the appellate court in reviewing the trial record, not whether it was apparent to the trial court in light of then-existing law. [467] In this case, it is apparent, and conceded by the State, that the limitations imposed on the right of allocution accorded Capano are inconsistent with the right of allocution established in Shelton. The trial judge in the case before us was, of course, unaware when he imposed limits on Capano's allocution of what we were later to decide in Shelton. His error, therefore, was understandable. Accordingly, the fact that Shelton was decided after Capano's penalty hearing is not itself a bar to a finding of plain error, but that analysis requires a showing of unfairness and substantial prejudice to Capano. The State also contends that there is no plain error because this Court has not definitively declared allocution a substantial right. Shelton held that on the facts of that case the defendant had not shown that he was prejudiced by the limits placed on his allocution. Shelton was carrying out his own strategy  however misguided that strategy might have been  not to discuss the facts of the case as developed in the guilt phase. We held in Shelton that it does not follow, however, that a trial judge's setting of parameters on allocution similar to this one [in Shelton's case] would not be reversible error in a proper case where objection to the limitation was preserved, where there was plain error, or where there was a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel and resulting prejudice to the defendant. [468] We also noted  although determination of the point was not necessary to the decision in Shelton  that the right to allocution is arguably a substantial right of a capital defendant. [469] We also held that whether the right of allocution is a substantial right in a given case, it is not a constitutional right under the state or federal constitution. This Court stated in Shelton that the right to allocution is not a right granted by either the federal or state constitutions, [but rather] ... a right that is grounded solely on the Superior Court Criminal Rule, the Delaware death penalty statute and Delaware decisional law. [470] In the context of plain error review, the defendant must show that the error affected substantial rights. [471] Under the federal plain error rule, the phrase affecting substantial rights means in most cases ... that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the [trial] court proceedings. [472] To say that a right is not substantial may be merely another way of saying that the defendant cannot have been prejudiced by an erroneous abridgment of that right. We need not engage in an abstract analysis of whether allocution is a substantial right. Rather, consistent with this Court's plain error jurisprudence, we must decide whether the error that occurred in this case prejudiced Capano when viewed in the total context of the record relating to the allocution issue. [473]
Capano argues that his death sentence should be reversed because the trial judge improperly imposed restrictions on his allocution and because he paid an enormous price for the trial judge's error during the penalty phase. Capano contends that his allocution deteriorated into an ongoing battle between [him] and the trial judge. The record shows that this is not the case. There are at least three important distinctions from Shelton that are relevant to our evaluation of this case in light of the Shelton jurisprudence. (1) Capano had already told his story to this jury in extensive direct testimony and cross-examination in the guilt phase, whereas Shelton did not testify in his guilt phase. This, in and of itself, is not dispositive, but it is a factor that plays into our plain error review of how far the trial judge must permit the defendant to go in allocution in rehashing and arguing the effect of admitted evidence. (2) The main purpose of allocution is to permit a defendant to present in his own halting eloquence his remorse, personal life or diminished culpability (relative to other perpetrators) to a jury that may not have heard the sound of his voice. [474] That policy may have applied to Shelton (but for his express waiver). Capano, on the other hand, was a trained lawyer with trial experience. (3) Judicial control of the proceedings was clearly at issue here and not in Shelton. Shelton himself was an unsophisticated defendant who was confused but nonetheless clearly and expressly waived his allocution right to argue the facts. Capano, on the other hand, was a trained lawyer. Apparently, the trial judge thought Capano was attempting to manipulate the system and needed to be reined in. Although the trial judge may have been harsh in rebuking him in the presence of the jury, [475] we must evaluate the colloquies that took place during the penalty phase in the context of Capano's performance during the entire three-month trial, including his testimony in the guilt phase and his allocution in the penalty phase. The State argues that here, as in Shelton, the limitations had no effect on Capano's allocution. According to the State: (a) Capano did manage to discuss some evidence in his lengthy allocution in disregard of the limitations imposed by trial court; and (b) Capano's tactics and comportment during both trial and allocution may well have alienated the jury and foreclosed an argument that he was prejudiced by limits placed on allocution. [476] The State also argues that the trial court's attempts to control Capano and enforce the limitations on allocution were appropriate efforts to deal with Capano's transgressions and maintain control of the proceedings. [477] Capano contends that the trial judge's rebukes of him for violating the erroneous limits on his allocution substantially prejudiced him. Specifically, he argues that the ongoing dispute between Capano and the trial judge risked conveying to the jury that the trial judge felt personal animus toward Capano. In the circumstances, he contends that this atmosphere would likely have affected the jury's deliberations. [478] This is a capital case that resulted in a death sentence, based in part at least, on the jury's recommendation. Death cases are different from other cases and require heightened sensitivity to the finality of the punishment and scrupulously fair process in the penalty phase. [479] Notwithstanding these concerns, we find that the trial judge did not commit plain error. We focus on four important factors that lead us to conclude, in these circumstances, that the trial court applied a rational, although erroneous, standard when it instructed Capano on the limitations on the scope of his allocution and informed the jury that it had done so. First, Shelton does not mean that there is an almost limitless boundary to the right of allocution. During the penalty phase, to the extent that a defendant seeks to present new matters of relevance that go beyond the record in the guilt phase, thus exceeding the limited parameters permitted in allocution, the defendant must testify under oath and be subjected to cross-examination. Second, the trial judge was endeavoring to help the jury focus on those areas that are appropriate for you to consider in determining the questions that lie ahead of you. [480] The questions for determination by the jury at the penalty phase do not include a re-examination of their decision that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Capano had intentionally murdered Anne Marie Fahey. Third, Capano not only failed to make a proffer, as he should have, regarding the scope of his intended allocution, but also he refused to inform his own counsel  who otherwise may have had the responsibility to do so as officers of the court. His counsel had informed the trial judge that while Capano wished to exercise his right to allocution, I have no idea what he is going to say. He won't tell me. [481] Capano's own maneuvering raised a red flag to the trial judge that trouble loomed ahead. Fourth, Capano did discuss facts that had been admitted in evidence in the guilt phase. We believe that when facts relate to a capital defendant's attempt to display remorse, to minimize the circumstances that relate to aggravation, to diminish degrees of culpability relative to other perpetrators (not applicable here, of course), or to establish a basis for mercy, those facts admitted into evidence at the guilt phase can be drawn upon to support the jury's focus on the questions that lie ahead. The trial judge, in our view, appropriately attempted to establish rational guide-posts in light of the anticipated uncertainty. He attempted, as an experienced trial judge managing a difficult case and an unpredictable defendant, to keep the defendant and the jury properly focused on the objective of the penalty phase. Throughout Capano's allocution, and despite the limitations set by the trial judge, Capano referred to the facts of the case. [482] In so doing, he consistently deflected responsibility for Fahey's death. He demonstrated disdain for expressing remorse, eschewed a plea for leniency, and spoke little of his good character and person or his plans and hopes for the future. His discussion in his allocution of the facts adduced at the guilt phase was not used to advance the purpose of allocution at all. Capano is not a typical defendant, nor is he an unsophisticated defendant. He is a sophisticated lawyer, trained and experienced in the law and the public domain. He consciously avoided making a proffer of his remarks, refused to tell his counsel of his plans, heard and accepted the trial judge's rulings without objection and then intentionally and purposefully violated the parameters of the rulings he accepted. In his sentencing decision, the trial judge found that [t]he evidence showed defendant is manipulative, controlling, vindictive. His need for control over those around him is overwhelming. [483] The trial judge added: It is also noteworthy that defendant breached many rules the Court imposed during these proceedings. The Court, directly, and through counsel, on numerous occasions set forth rules to defendant which it expected him to follow, and defendant consistently violated those rules. He openly defies authority. [484] Capano claims that his allocution became an unmitigated disaster because the trial judge maintained control over him. The trial judge showed understandable frustration with Capano's antics, and may have been harsh in his rebukes, but he also showed patience and restraint with Capano. Indeed, Capano's counsel admitted that the trial judge showed restraint despite Capano's repeated violations of the court's ruling on the scope of the allocution. [485] Capano also argues that the trial judge improperly considered Capano's allocution when imposing the sentence of death. During the sentencing hearing, the trial judge summarized Capano's behavior and attitude during the entire trial. While lengthy, the quote below is important to understand the context in which the statements that Capano complains about were made: In the end, the defendant claimed the right of allocution, the ancient avenue of a convicted criminal facing death to accept responsibility, express remorse, and ask for mercy, relying upon his good and contrite character to gain that mercy. As a lawyer, specifically instructed by his own lawyers on the limits of allocution, and further admonished by the Court before and during allocution, he specifically refused to ask for mercy, showed no remorse, and continued his attack on the decision of the jury, the disloyalty of those who testified against him, and the tactics of the investigators who assembled and presented the case against him, all specific violations of the right of allocution. The selfishness, arrogance and manipulativeness of Thomas Capano destroyed his own family as well as the Fahey family. He did not hesitate to use his family to commit or suborn perjury or to ask for the mercy he specifically refused to ask for himself. His only remorse is for himself. The most powerful mitigation presented does not involve the defendant. Rather, it is the impact on his remarkable daughters and a brother he involved in his criminal activities and then ridiculed and excommunicated from the family when guilt and circumstances forced him to tell the truth. Tom Capano does not face judgment today because his friends and family failed him. He faces judgment because he is a ruthless murderer who feels compassion for no one, and remorse only for the circumstances he finds himself in. He is a malignant force from whom no one he deems disloyal or adversarial can be secure, even if he is incarcerated for the rest of his life. The trial judge did not emasculate Capano's right to allocution by considering his behavior or attitude during allocution. [486] Capano failed to adhere to the purpose of allocution. Although the limitations in the instructions were erroneous and although the trial judge may have been harsh in his reactions to Capano's antics, it was Capano alone who destroyed his opportunity to present evidence in mitigation. Instead, he used the opportunity to vilify others and transfer responsibility for Fahey's death. The error of the trial judge in limiting Capano's right to discuss proper facts is harmless. In fact, it is a moot point for two reasons: First, Capano did not want to discuss proper facts; he wanted to assail people and institutions. This is not an acceptable use of the right of allocution. Second, he did in fact discuss a number of matters despite the trial court's limitations, and he was thus able to put before the jury much of what he wanted them to hear  although it is doubtful that he helped his own case. If there was any prejudice to Capano in the allocution episode, it was primarily self-inflicted. Accordingly, we hold that as a matter of Delaware's law of allocution, any erroneous limitations placed on Capano's right of allocution and the trial judge's colloquy with Capano in front of the jury, although regrettable, did not prejudice Capano and do not entitle him to a new penalty hearing.