Opinion ID: 2226968
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Heading: Admissibility of Hugo's Traffic Conviction

Text: Defendants first argue that the trial court improperly granted plaintiffs' motion to exclude Hugo's traffic conviction. The conviction, following a plea of not guilty, arose from the same incident that now serves as the basis for this civil suit. Defendants argue that the conviction should have been admitted as evidence that Hugo crossed the center line, relying on Thornton v. Paul (1978), 74 Ill.2d 132, 23 Ill.Dec. 541, 384 N.E.2d 335. In Thornton, this court held that a criminal conviction may be admissible in a later civil trial as proof of the facts on which the conviction is based. Specifically, this court found that a conviction for battery was admissible in a subsequent civil trial to show that the convicted party acted intentionally and was therefore not covered by his insurance policy. In Thornton, the defendant was charged with a felony, convicted of a serious misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, and represented by counsel at the criminal trial. Defendants argue that we should now extend the holding of Thornton to allow the admission of a traffic conviction at a subsequent civil trial. We decline. We hold instead that traffic convictions are not admissible in later civil proceedings as proof of the facts that act as a basis for the conviction. This case does not involve the admissibility of a guilty plea, and we do not address that issue. See generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 802.4, at 598-600 (5th ed. 1990). Our holding is supported by authority in the majority of jurisdictions. Several jurisdictions have used case law to exclude a traffic conviction in a related civil action. (See, e.g., Hunter v. Hardnett (1991), 199 Ga.App. 443, 405 S.E.2d 286; Montalvo v. Morales (1963), 18 A.D.2d 20, 239 N.Y.S.2d 72; Loughner v. Schmelzer (1966), 421 Pa. 283, 218 A.2d 768.) Other jurisdictions have adopted a statutory rule based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. (See Fed.R.Evid. 803(22); see also Unif.R.Evid. 803(22) (West 1986).) Federal Rule 803(22) provides that a conviction is admissible only if the underlying crime is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. (Fed.R.Evid. 803(22).) This rule would prohibit the use of most traffic convictions. We note also that our appellate court has been unwilling to admit traffic convictions. See Hengels v. Gilski (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 894, 83 Ill.Dec. 101, 469 N.E.2d 708; Nunley v. Mares (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 779, 70 Ill.Dec. 517, 449 N.E.2d 864; Smith v. Andrews (1964), 54 Ill.App.2d 51, 203 N.E.2d 160. Defendants argue that the judge in a civil action should examine the traffic court proceeding to determine whether the convicted party defended himself vigorously. In this case, Hugo traveled from his home in Cook County to the traffic court in Ogle County and was represented by an attorney in traffic court. Therefore, defendants contend, Hugo defended himself vigorously, and the conviction should be admitted. We disagree. Initially, we note that defendants' approach would penalize individuals who believe in their innocence and exercise their right to defend themselves. Hugo should not be penalized for hiring an attorney to represent him in traffic court. In addition, defendants' approach would require that every traffic proceeding be reexamined to determine if a traffic conviction exists and if it might be admissible. Ultimately, the danger of unfair prejudice from a traffic conviction outweighs its probative value. ( People v. DeHoyos (1976), 64 Ill.2d 128, 132, 355 N.E.2d 19.) A conviction conveys a deceptive sense of certainty to the jury in a civil case that is difficult to challenge. [J]uries may have difficulty grasping the distinction between a prior judgment offered as evidence and one that is conclusive, giving the judgment binding effect even if this is contrary to substantive law. (2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 298, at 297 (4th ed. 1992).) The jury in a civil action may substitute the opinion of the police officer who issued the ticket or the opinion of the traffic judge for its own. ( Ruthardt v. Tennant (1968), 252 La. 1041, 1047-48, 215 So.2d 805, 808.) Traffic court may therefore become the cornerstone of a significant civil action filed after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. Hengels, 127 Ill.App.3d at 910, 83 Ill.Dec. 101, 469 N.E.2d 708; see also Montalvo, 18 A.D.2d at 25-26, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 77. Defendants argue that excluding the conviction deprives the jury of all the relevant facts. We disagree. The witnesses and evidence presented in the traffic proceeding are generally available at the civil trial. Procedural safeguards, such as discovery, allow the parties to present the evidence more fully at the civil trial. Discovery is not available to most traffic court defendants. (134 Ill.2d R. 411.) The traffic conviction therefore provides no extra information to a jury in a civil case. For these reasons, we find that the trial court acted properly in excluding the conviction.