Opinion ID: 150718
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cable Act Claim.

Text: Congress passed the Cable Act in order to fashion a national policy that would promote competition in cable communications and assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public. 47 U.S.C. § 521. The Act's franchising provisions are an integral part of this national policy. In drafting those provisions, Congress sought to formulate franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth and development of cable systems and to establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable operators against unfair denials of renewal. Id. These provisions create a decentralized franchising regime, in which local authorities award (or decline to award) franchises for the provision of cable service in particular areas. Id. § 541(a)(1). Once a cable operator receives a franchise, it enjoys the right to build a cable system over public rights-of-way and through compatible easements. Id. § 541(a)(2). It may then provide cable service in the franchised area. See id. § 541(b)(1). Without a franchise, the provision of cable service is forbidden. Id. OneLink claims that PRTC jumped the gun by undertaking construction and testing activities without having obtained a franchise. In its view, these premature actions violated section 541(b)(1). As a threshold matter, its attempt to enforce that statute against PRTC hinges on whether the Cable Act grants it a private right of action for that purpose. It is to this question that we now turn. OneLink concedes that the text of the statute does not confer an express private right of action. The question, then, reduces to whether a private right of action can be implied. At the end of the day, this is a question of statutory interpretation. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). Hence, the conventional tools of statutory construction serve as useful implements. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988). Unlike other questions of statutory interpretation, however, the scales are tilted. The baseline rule is that a federal statute ordinarily should be read as written, in effect creating a presumption against importing, by implication, a private right of action. See Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 68 (1st Cir.2002); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287-88, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). This de facto presumption has considerable bite; it can be overcome only by compelling evidence of a contrary congressional intent. Frazier, 276 F.3d at 68. [T]he ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981). Against this backdrop, we look first to the text and structure of the Cable Act. See TAMA, 444 U.S. at 16, 100 S.Ct. 242; Frazier, 276 F.3d at 68. That perscrutation reveals a wealth of evidence that Congress did not intend to foster private enforcement of section 541(b)(1). The text of the Cable Act is replete with express private rights of action. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 551(f)(1), 553(c)(1), 554(g). This circumstance reveals with conspicuous clarity that Congress knew how to provide for a private right of action when it deemed such a right appropriate. Given Congress's persistent employment of express private rights of action in the Cable Act, it would be inconsistent to imply additional private rights of action. The hoary maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes readily to mind. We think it particularly noteworthy that Congress provided an express private right of action in favor of cable operators with respect to the enforcement of an adjacent provision in the very same section of the Cable Act that OneLink seeks to use. That provision explicitly permits a cable operator to sue a franchising board for an unreasonabl[e] refus[al] to award a[ ] ... franchise. Id. § 541(a)(1). Yet, Congress did not include similar language in section 541(b)(1). The inclusion of an express private right of action in a statutory provision and the exclusion of similar language in a neighboring provision gives rise to an inference that the exclusion was purposeful. See Nashoba Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Town of Danvers, 893 F.2d 435, 440 (1st Cir.1990). An analysis of the types of private rights of action that Congress expressly extended to cable operators strengthens this inference. Under the Cable Act, cable operators are empowered to sue franchising boards for denying a suitor's franchise application, 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), refusing to modify the requirements of a suitor's franchise, id. § 545(b)(1), refusing to renew a suitor's franchise, id. § 546(e)(1), and failing to follow specified procedural rules with respect to a suitor's application, id. A common denominator characterizes all of these private rights of action: each of them enables a cable operator (or prospective cable operator) to enforce a provision of the Cable Act to preserve and protect its ability to provide cable service. Here, however, OneLink envisions a private right of action of a very different ilk one which, if validated, will enable it to enforce a provision of the Cable Act against another cable operator in order to prevent that operator from providing cable service. Such an outward-looking private right of action is incongruous when viewed in conjunction with the inward-looking private rights of action expressly granted in the Cable Act. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that Congress intended to allow a cable operator to enforce section 541(b)(1) against a competitor (actual or aspiring). To clinch matters, implication of a private right of action would be at odds with the paramount goals of the Cable Act. In crafting this legislation, Congress sought to promote competition in the cable industry and ensure the widest possible diversity of cable offerings. See id. § 521; see also Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enters., 633 F.Supp. 1315, 1318 (D.Del.1986). At the center of this statutory scheme, the local franchising board stands as a watchful sentinel guarding the portals of entry into the cable market. To ensure that would-be cable operators are not unfairly deprived of an opportunity to enter the marketplace, Congress created express private rights of action aimed at allowing an applicant or franchise-holder to challenge a variety of board decisions that directly affect its own right to provide cable service. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 545(b)(1), 546(e)(1). Relatedly, Congress strove to promote diversity by prohibiting any award of exclusive cable franchises. Id. § 541(a)(1). Given the architecture of this scheme, we can think of no reason why Congress would have wanted to afford incumbent cable operators the ability to thwart potential competition from new market entrants by pursuing private rights of action. OneLink makes two counter-arguments. In the first instance, it places heavy reliance on cases holding that a cable operator enjoys a private right of action to enforce the provisions of section 541(a)(2). See, e.g., Media Gen. Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condo. Council, 991 F.2d 1169, 1171-72 (4th Cir.1993); Centel Cable T.V. Co. of Fla. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., 835 F.2d 1359, 1364 (11th Cir.1988). This reliance is mislaid. Section 541(a)(2) extends to franchise-holding cable operators the right to construct cable systems over public rights-of-way and through compatible easements. In each of the cases cited by OneLink, the court concluded that a cable operator could sue a third party (a landowner or developer) who impeded access to a compatible easement and thereby obstructed the construction of the plaintiff's own cable system. See Media Gen., 991 F.2d at 1171; Centel, 835 F.2d at 1360-61, 1364. These decisions are inapposite. They involve a statutory provision that grants to a cable operator a specific right necessary to ensure the construction of its own cable system. The statutory provision at issue here is of a different character. It contains no analogous grant of a special right but, rather, prohibits any and all persons from operating a cable system without a franchise. The difference between a rights-granting statute and a purely prohibitory statute is significant in determining the existence vel non of an implied private right of action. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) (explaining that implied private right of action can only exist where Congress intended to create both a private right and a private remedy in a statute); Bonano v. E. Carib. Airline Corp., 365 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir.2004) (same). This is not the only distinction. To the extent that the Cable Act allows private enforcement, it does so in service of a cable operator's (or would-be cable operator's) own franchise. The cases cited by OneLink illustrate this point. See Media Gen., 991 F.2d at 1170; Centel, 835 F.2d at 1360. Here, however, there is no allegation that PRTC's actions have in any way interfered with OneLink's use of its own cable system. OneLink's interest here is not in providing service but, rather, in heading off competition. OneLink's second counter-argument is that implication of a private right of action is compelled under the four-factor test delineated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). Under that formulation, courts are directed to consult the following factors: Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was passed? Is there any cogent indication of legislative intent to create or deny the remedy sought? Would recognition of the remedy be consistent with the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme? Would it be inappropriate to infer a federal remedy because the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law ...? Royal Bus. Group v. Realist, Inc., 933 F.2d 1056, 1060 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting and paraphrasing Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080). Our previous discussion forecloses this argument. The four Cort factors are not entitled to equal weight. See TAMA, 444 U.S. at 23, 100 S.Ct. 242. The second factorcongressional intentis a potential trump card. The proponent of an implied private right of action cannot prevail under the four-factor Cort test in the face of a showing that Congress probably did not intend to create such a right. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (explaining that without a showing of congressional intent to create a private remedy, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute); TAMA, 444 U.S. at 23-24, 100 S.Ct. 242 (noting that, in determining the existence of an implied private right of action, the central inquiry is whether Congress intended to create one); Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 33 n. 4 (1st Cir. 2007) (similar). Here, there is no evidence of congressional intent to provide an implied private right of actionand there is ample evidence to the contrary. Thus, pausing to analyze the first, third, and fourth Cort factors would be an empty exercise. That ends this aspect of the matter. We conclude, without serious question, that section 541(b)(1) of the Cable Act does not carry with it an implied private right of action in favor of an incumbent cable operator against a would-be rival.