Opinion ID: 278463
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: He said I could have one.

Text: 14 Q. What did you understand by that statement? 15 A. That means I'd have to pay for it. 16       17 Q. Weren't you told by the Court that a lawyer could be appointed for you? 18 A. Yes sir, I understood that. 19 Q. What did you understand that to mean with respect to whether or not the lawyer would be compensated by you? 20 A. I understood that I had to pay for the lawyer or else you don't get a lawyer unless you pay for it. 21 Q. Did you have any money at that time? 22 A. No sir, I did not. 23 Q. You then signed the waiver which is on the back of this indictment? 24 A. Yes sir. 25 Q. And entered a plea of guilty? 26 A. Yes sir. 27 On cross-examination, appellant persisted in testifying that it was his notion that even though an attorney were appointed for him he would be obligated to pay for the service. 28 To be a valid waiver of such a fundamental constitutional right as the right to counsel must be intelligently and understandingly made. 6 Appellant, of course, admits that he declined the appointment of counsel which was offered to him, but he argues, as the above testimony reveals, that he did not understand that the appointment of counsel would be at the Commonwealth's expense. Since a waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, 7 appellant contends he did not validly waive his right to counsel. 29 The governing principle for determining what constitutes a competent and valid waiver of the right to counsel and responsibility of the trial judge in accepting such a waiver in light of the strong presumption against waiver is stated in Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948): 30 To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts esssential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered. 8 31 The rules relating to which party has the onus of proving a valid waiver of counsel are also well established. Where the record is silent and does not show that the accused was offered the assistance of counsel and declined counsel after an appropriate inquiry by the trial court, the burden of proving an intelligent waiver is on the government. 9 Conversely, when the record indicates that the accused was offered counsel but declined the offer, he has the burden of showing that his declination was not knowingly and intelligently made. 10 In the instant case no transcript exists of the 1961 proceedings at which appellant waived counsel and pleaded guilty. The only evidence as to the advice given appellant is the transcript of the hearing in 1963. It is unnecessary for this court to decide which of the two rules governing the burden of proof is applicable in this case because regardless of on whom the burden rests the determination of the validity of appellant's waiver of counsel depends largely on what was said to him by Judge Mook and what he understood the advice to mean. In determining the credibility of appellant's contention that he understood that he would have to pay for counsel even though court appointed, it was essential that he be given a hearing to enable him to demonstrate the truthfulness of his assertion. The court before whom appellant could testify would have the opportunity to evaluate his demeanor and fully explore the merit of his contention. 32 Although appellant was afforded a hearing in the state court on his habeas corpus petition, the utility of that hearing was lost by the death of Judge Mook who had heard appellant testify but had not yet ruled upon his petition. That Judge Cherry reviewed the transcript almost a year after the date of the hearing does not satisfy the requirements of a full and fair hearing. In Judge Cherry's opinion, dated October 8, 1964, he stated: The record is replete with accusatory statements of the prisoner, made without any foundation, and which carry with them no believability. Since Judge Cherry had not heard appellant testify, his conclusion regarding appellant's credibility, resting solely on his reading of the transcript need not be given the same effect by a reviewing court as a determination of credibility made by a trier of fact who has had the opportunity to observe and hear the witness. 11 33 In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant when the fact-finding procedure employed by the state was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing. The Court stated: 34 Even where the procedure employed [by the state court] does not violate the Constitution, if it appears to be seriously inadequate for the ascertainment of the truth, it is the federal judge's duty to disregard the state findings and take evidence anew. (at 316, 83 S.Ct. at 759) 35 In the circumstances of this case, appellant's contention rested largely on whether the habeas corpus court would believe his assertion concerning his understanding of the effect of appointment of counsel. It was essential for the court ruling on his petition to hear him and observe his demeanor. The United States District Court relied entirely on Judge Cherry's vicarious determination. It should have granted appellant a new evidentiary hearing. Failing to do so, it erred. In so holding we intimate no directive as to how the District Court may choose to rule after it has heard appellant and any other relevant evidence that may be brought forward. 36 The order of the District Court denying the petition for habeas corpus will be reversed and the case will be remanded to the District Court for the purpose of conducting a hearing to determine whether appellant intelligently and understandingly waived his right to counsel and whether he validly entered guilty pleas.