Opinion ID: 3011456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Threshold Issue - Collateral Estoppel

Text: Defendants Daddona, Monahan, Boyer, Mitchell and the City assert that the plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from contesting both these issues. As to plaintiffs Kerrigan, Dieter and Bowser, this argument is plainly without merit. Due process requires that a party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted have some fair relationship with the prior litigation relied upon. See Moldovan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 790 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1986). None of these three were parties to the prior action to which the defendants assign preclusive effect. See Suppan v. City of Allentown, No. CIV. A. 97-2102, 1997 WL 476359 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (hereinafter Suppan I). Furthermore, that case involved an entirely different set of promotion lists than the ones at issue here, and the plaintiff 's cause of action was based on alleged retaliatory adoption of a new seniority policy that adversely affected the plaintiff, which is not the same retaliatory conduct at issue here. See id. at -2. The mere fact that plaintiffs Kerrigan, Dieter and Bowser are now co-plaintiffs with a party to the prior action and are represented by the same counsel is not sufficient to make them privies to the prior action. Moreover, even as to plaintiff Suppan, the defendants have not met their burden of establishing an identity of 7 issues between the cases. Identity of the issue is established by showing that the same general legal rules govern both cases and that the facts of both cases are indistinguishable as measured by those rules. 18 Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure S 4425, at 253 (1981). The party seeking to effectuate an estoppel has the burden of demonstrating the propriety of its application. See Chisolm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir. 1981). The defendants have relied entirely on the District Court's opinion to establish which issues were litigated in the prior case. See Suppan I, 1997 WL 476359. That opinion does not establish that the Court considered the same issues presented here. As noted, Suppan I involved subsequent promotion lists and different acts of alleged retaliation on the part of the defendants. Moreover, the Suppan I Court considered whether a change in the seniority policy that resulted in the plaintiff 's low ranking could by itself support a First Amendment retaliation claim. See id. That issue is not before us. In the instant case, what we must decide is whether a campaign of harassment, including threatening statements and culminating in a retaliatory low ranking that purports to be based on an assessment of the plaintiffs' qualifications, and that results inmental anxiety, . . . stress, humiliation, loss of reputation, and sleeplessness, is an actionable First Amendment violation. (A. 107). The injuries that result from a low-ranking based on lack of seniority and a low-ranking based on qualifications are not indistinguishable in the context of First Amendment retaliation. For example, there is no indication in the Suppan I opinion that the plaintiff there had suffered humiliation and loss of reputation as a result of his low-ranking. Moreover, a low-ranking on the list by itself  is distinguishable from a series of retaliatory incidents including threats and culminating in a lowranking. Given that it is generally a question of fact whether a retaliatory campaign of harassment has reached the threshold of actionability under S 1983, see Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982), we cannot say that these differences are legally insignificant. Suppan I also determined that the plaintiff 's claim for retaliatory failure to promote was not ripe for decision 8 where, for reasons having nothing to do with the plaintiff 's protected conduct or the defendants' alleged retaliation (i.e., the plaintiff's poor performance on an objective exam), the plaintiff would not be eligible for promotion until eighteen promotions had been made. See Suppan I, 1997 WL 476359, at -8. Put differently, the issue in Suppan I was whether the plaintiff 's failure to promote claim was viable in light of undisputed evidence of an intervening and superceding cause for the plaintiff 's not having been promoted. In contrast, the second issue presented in the instant case is whether the plaintiffs have viable failure to promote claims where there is evidence that the plaintiffs' protected conduct and the defendants' retaliation were substantial factors in each step of the decision-making process, and where therefore there was no independent and superceding cause. Therefore, because the instant case involves different legal issues that arise in a different factual context, none of the plaintiffs claims are collaterally estopped.