Opinion ID: 1187815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court erred in ruling against the plaintiffs on their claims of violations of idaho's open meetings law

Text: In 1974, the legislature declared that the formation of public policy is public business and shall not be conducted in secret. 1974 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 187, § 1, p. 1492, codified at I.C. § 67-2340. In order to implement this mandate, the legislature has declared that [a]ll meetings of a governing body of a public agency shall be open to the public and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting except as otherwise provided by this act. I.C. § 67-2342(1). An exception to the requirements of I.C. § 67-2342(1) otherwise provided by this act is made for meetings classified as executive sessions. I.C. § 67-2341(2) defines executive sessions as any meeting ... of a governing body which is closed to any persons for deliberation on certain matters. Such sessions are authorized for several types of matters, including when a governing body wishes to deliberate the dismissal of a public employee working under the supervision of that body. I.C. § 67-2345(1)(b). No executive session may be held, however, for the purpose of taking any final action or making any final decision. I.C. § 67-2345(3). Where only an executive session is held, notice first must first be given to the members of the governing body, and to the general public, stating the reason and the specific provision of law authorizing the executive session. I.C. § 67-2343. Finally, any action taken at any meeting in violation of Idaho's Open Meetings Act, shall be null and void. I.C. § 67-2347.
The Commission fired Walhof on February 3, 1984, during the course of a public meeting. Walhof contends that insufficient notice of this meeting was given by the Commission. We disagree. The record establishes that notice of the February 3, 1984 meeting was mailed out by Walhof and that she did in fact attend this meeting. R., Vol. 1, p. 24. Walhof cannot, therefore, argue prejudice as far as any allegation of improper notice is concerned, because it is clear that she was not disadvantaged by any notice deficiency. Walhof next contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to when she was dismissed. Specifically, Walhof argues that viewing the facts most favorably on her behalf leads to the conclusion that she was fired in advance of the February 3, 1984 meeting, and that this was in violation of I.C. § 67-2340 and 67-2345(3). Accordingly, pursuant to I.C. § 67-2347, Walhof argues that her dismissal is null and void. Furthermore, Cheadle argues that Barton's appointment was premature and, thus, that his dismissal is also null and void. The facts that Walhof and Cheadle argue create a genuine issue of fact about when she was fired and Barton hired, include the following: 1. Dr. Gardner testified that Barton, who was appointed by the Commission to replace Walhof, made an acceptance speech before the Commission had even voted on whether to dismiss Walhof. 2. Dr. Gardner next testified that within a few minutes after the February 3, 1984 meeting was over, a locksmith was at the Commission's office changing locks. 3. A press release stating that Walhof had been dismissed was released to the press before the Commission had voted on her dismissal. 4. A letter of dismissal was given to Walhof a very short time after the February 3, 1984 meeting. According to Dr. Gardner, the letter had legal-type wording, which Bartonthe signatory to the lettercould not have written. Furthermore, Dr. Gardner testified, the letter to Walhof made reference to things that the board had told her ostensibly during the meeting about her being dismissed which the board never told her during that meeting. 5. A similar letter was given to Cheadle, whom Barton dismissed upon being named Director of the Blind Commission. A close review of each of these alleged facts show that they would be either irrelevant, inadmissible, or incompetent as evidence and therefore do not create any genuine issue of fact with respect to Walhof's and Cheadle's dismissal. I.R.C.P. 56(e) requires that supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. (Emphasis added.) The matters referred to by Gardner, and upon which the plaintiffs rely, do not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility or competency under Rule 56(e). Most are opinions or conclusions of Gardner, which are not only inadmissible, but which are contrary to other admissible evidence in the record. Other evidence relied upon is irrelevant to the issue before us. Taking the five items up in order, it is readily apparent that Gardner's testimony that Barton made an acceptance speech before the Commission even voted on whether to dismiss Walhof is an inadmissible conclusion. It is also contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in the case. As mentioned above, the February 3, 1984 meeting was properly noticed by Walhof herself, and started at 9:00 in the morning, with the Commission meeting in an executive session. The public portion of the meeting commenced sometime around 10:00. At the very start of the public portion, a motion was made by Commissioner Barnes that we relieve Mrs. Walhof of her duties as administrator immediately and leave her on administrative pay for 45 days.... I'd like to appoint Howard Barton acting administrator for six months. The motion was seconded by Commissioner Ugaki. There then followed approximately two to three hours of heated discussion between two competing factions, with some fifteen or twenty people debating the pros and cons of the motion. The meeting adjourned for lunch and reconvened sometime around 2:00 p.m. At that time Howard Barton spoke in an effort to reconcile the two factions supporting and opposing Barnes's motion. A transcript of the meeting shows that he commenced his remarks with the statement, I think that in the future if the board does make the decision to retain me as acting administrator for a short period of time I will make every effort to work with all of the organizations of the blind in this state. (Emphasis added.) He then went on to state what steps he intended to take to try to accomplish that. Thus, it is clear that not only is Gardner's statement that Barton made an acceptance speech before the Commission voted an inadmissible opinion or conclusion of Gardner, it is contrary to the uncontradicted record in the case. Barton only spoke some two to three hours after the motion had been made and debated, and then he qualified his remarks with the comment, if the board does make the decision to retain me. Accordingly, there is no merit to Gardner's first contention that the Commission must have met before and made a decision because Barton had made an acceptance speech before the Commission even voted on whether to dismiss Walhof. Regarding the locksmith's presence, the testimony shows that the locksmith arrived several minutes after the meeting concluded. We do not see how this evidence is substantial and competent proof that Barnes and Ugaki met before the meeting and had an agreement to discharge Walhof. It therefore fails to create any genuine issue of material fact, and we so hold. The plaintiffs' third contention that a press release stating that Walhof had been dismissed was handed to the press before the Commission had voted on her dismissalis irrelevant with respect to the issue before us. It is not shown that it was prepared by anyone connected with the Blind Commission or the defendants in this action. Rather, the record shows that the press release was prepared by a Brian Wardle, who was president of the Independent Blind of Idaho, and a supporter of the defendants' decision to fire Walhof. In two separate depositions, Wardle testified that he wrote the press release during the noon hour from notes he made while at the morning session as the various people testified. He also testified that he did hand a copy to a member of the press before the Commission's vote. The individual read it and said, This hasn't happened yet, to which Wardle said, You're right, I'll give it to you after the meeting, if it happens. Wardle then testified that the person gave it back to me, and I handed it out to the press corps after that was over. Thus, it is clear from the record that the press release emanated from the Independent Blind of Idaho, and is not attributable to the Commission or the defendants. It falls short of being relevant to fixing the time when the decision was made to fire Walhof. The next contention which Gardner made in his deposition is that the letter of dismissal given to Walhof a very short time after the meeting terminated had legal type wording, which Gardner opined Barton was incapable of composing. Accordingly, it was his conclusion that it must have been drawn by a lawyer beforehand. This mere conjecture and opinion, without any foundation laid, would not be admissible evidence. Accordingly, under Rule 56(e) the trial court properly disregarded it, as must this Court. The last contention is that a letter of dismissal given to Cheadle whom Barton dismissed after he took over also could not have been written by Barton. For the same reasons stated above, it is clear that this allegation is equally inadmissible as pure conjecture and a conclusion of the witness. Accordingly, we hold that the facts do not create a genuine issue of material fact. We therefore affirm the district court on this issue.