Opinion ID: 1940364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are the interests of the intestate heirs transmissible by will?

Text: This question is really answered by our discussion of the first point. If the interests descend as in a case of intestacy they are interests transmissible by will. The wills of Henry Wilson and Richard Merritt thus transmitted the contingent interests in the testator's estate. See Restatement, Property, Future Interests, § 165. We do not understand that this proposition is disputed; at all events we think it clear. What appellants argue, in effect, is that the rules of intestacy are not applicable because Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the will create not only contingent remainders in the relatives named but also contingent remainders in the testator's heirs, and that such contingent remainders pass to the heirs in being when the contingency happens and the estate vests. Preliminarily, it should be noted that this would require the question of transmissibility by will to turn upon the date of death of Samuel D. Wilson, the last surviving remainderman, in 1957. As the Chancellor pointed out, this would certainly be an anomalous result. But the real fallacy of the argument lies in its attempt to apply the law of contingent remainders to what is in effect a simple case of intestacy. All of appellants' arguments about contingent remainders are based on the assumption that Paragraph 8 embodies a substitutionary bequest to individuals. This is simply not the fact. Thus, appellants seek to import into the case principles which have no bearing upon it. Compare the remarks of Chief Justice Booth in Burton v. Burton, 4 Har. 41, in dealing with a somewhat similar case of directed intestacy. The same comment is applicable to the argument that the estate in the heirs of the testator was a possibility of reverter. A possibility of reverter commonly arises when a defeasible fee is created. Cf. Addy v. Short, 46 Del. 178, 81 A.2d 300, reversed on other grounds, 47 Del. 157, 89 A.2d 136. This argument is another attempt to escape the simple and plain result of a directed intestacy. We are in agreement with the Chancellor's opinions on both points. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the contention of the amicus that Paragraph 8 never became operative. The judgment below is affirmed.