Opinion ID: 761705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The results from language of section 841(b)(1)(C)

Text: 44 Our review of a district court's rulings on sentencing matters concerning the interpretation of a statute requiring a mandatory minimum sentence is plenary. See United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir.1992). Here, we exercise plenary review because, notwithstanding Robinson's challenge to the sentence, he concedes that clear and convincing evidence proves that but for the use of heroin that Robinson delivered to Bungar, Allison would not have died. Br. at 15. Robinson argues that for section 841(b)(1)(C) and what he contends are the relevant sentencing guideline provisions to apply, the government needs to show that his conduct was the proximate cause of Allison's death. Robinson asks us to remand to the district court for resentencing using this standard. 45 We have two preliminary observations on the sentencing issue. First, it is not clear to us why the district court's findings with respect to Minchoff led it to conclude that the mandatory minimum sentence was not applicable by reason of his death. Second, even though the government does not contend that the district court made a proximate cause finding with respect to Allison's death, it seems to us that its findings certainly came quite close to satisfying that standard. Nevertheless, we take the case on the basis the parties present it, that only Allison's death is involved and proximate cause was not established. 46 Although we have not decided the sentencing issue, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139 (4th Cir.1994), held that section 841(b)(1)(C) imposes no reasonable foreseeability of death requirement. 38 F.3d at 145. 4 In the circumstances, there can be no question but that if we adopt Robinson's position we must reject Patterson. 47 Patterson held that the plain language of section 841(b)(1)(C) neither requires nor indicates that a district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event. Id. The court explained that the statute puts drug dealers and users on clear notice that their sentences will be enhanced if people die from using the drugs they distribute.... Where serious bodily injury or death results from the distribution of certain drugs, Congress has elected to enhance a defendant's sentence regardless of whether the defendant knew or should have known that death would result. Patterson, 38 F.3d at 145. The Patterson court then explained that it would not second-guess this unequivocal choice. Id. 48 We will not either. After all, our role is to give effect to Congress's intent. Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir.1998). Where, as here, Congress' language is plain and unambiguous, we simply apply the language of the statute as written. Here, the conspiracy was to distribute heroin. Thus, Robinson was subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the ... conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. § 846. Under section 841(b)(1)(C), in a distribution of heroin case if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance a minimum 20-year sentence was required. 49 It is absolutely clear under the district court's unassailable findings that, in the course of the conspiracy Robinson delivered the drugs to Bungar, and that in furtherance of the conspiracy Bungar delivered the drugs to Allison. It was reasonably foreseeable to Robinson that Bungar would deliver the drugs to someone else, and it is indisputable that Allison's death was, in the words of the district court, caused by a heroin overdose as a result of the heroin delivered to her by Bungar during the operation of the conspiracy. In the circumstances, it would be sophistry to say that Allison's death did not result from the use of the heroin delivered pursuant to the conspiracy. 50 Robinson relies on Chief Judge Becker's concurring and dissenting opinion in United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104, amended, 79 F.3d 14 (3d Cir.1996), to argue that the statutory language is ambiguous. In interpreting the sentencing guidelines, Judge Becker stated that the plain meaning of 'resulted from' connotes causation and that [t]he notion of causation runs throughout the law--including the criminal law--and it is generally understood to encompass two concepts. A defendant's conduct generally must be both the 'cause in fact' and the 'proximate cause' of some harm before liability is imposed. Id. at 1115, 1119. In this case, however, unlike in Neadle, we are not dealing with the application of intricate provisions of the sentencing guidelines to calculate a financial loss. Rather, we are applying a statute dealing with a discrete problem, the distribution of controlled substances, products which Congress recognized will in some cases cause death or serious bodily injury. In short, Congress recognized that the risk is inherent in the product and thus it provided that persons who distribute it do so at their peril. It is obvious Congress intended in such a case that the 20-year mandatory minimum would apply if death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance without regard for common law proximate cause concepts. 5 51 In reaching our result, we point out that the sentencing guidelines have limited relevancy here. While it is true that the court established a guidelines range and imposed a sentence within that range, in fact the court fixed the sentence without regard for that range as it imposed the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. 52 We also observe that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(3), which Robinson cites, is completely consistent with our result. Under that section, relevant conduct with respect to factors determining sentencing range include all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) includes as relevant conduct in a jointly undertaken criminal activity ... whether or not charged as a conspiracy[ ] all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. Here, of course, Bungar's distribution of the heroin to a third party was not merely reasonably foreseeable by Robinson. After all, the evidence we describe above shows that Robinson intended that it be distributed for its distribution was the very purpose of the conspiracy. To the extent, therefore, that section 1B1.3(a)(3) is implicated here, there can be no doubt that it is satisfied. 53 We recognize that in some cases it is possible that the death or serious bodily injury which results from the use of a [controlled] substance may be so remote a consequence from the criminal conduct of the defendant with respect to the substance that a court might conclude that it would not be consistent with congressional intent to apply the mandatory 20-year minimum sentence. Wherever, if anywhere, that line might be is of no concern to us now. In this case, Robinson conspired to distribute the heroin and a person to whom it almost immediately was distributed consumed it and died as a result. Surely, here the mandatory minimum sentence is applicable. Accordingly, this case does not require us to consider whether there is or should be a principled way to limit the application of section 841(b)(1)(C) when cause in fact is established. 54 In this regard, we reiterate that the district court's findings in this case came close to satisfying a proximate cause standard. Indeed, if they did not, it was only because the court did not make a finding that it was foreseeable that Allison or another consumer of the heroin might suffer death or serious bodily injury from it. Yet, it cannot have been the intent of Congress to require such a finding as a condition of a mandatory minimum sentence being applicable under sections 841(b)(1)(C), for surely what concerned Congress was the inherent risk from the use of controlled substances. Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into that section, we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress' intent. If section 841(b)(1)(C) is not to be applied as presently written, Congress and not this court should narrow its application.