Opinion ID: 845996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: blakely and michigan's intermediate sanction cells

Text: When a defendant is entitled to a sentence within an intermediate sanction cell, MCL 769.34(4)(a) sets the maximum sentence. That sentence is either the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months in jail, whichever is shorter. Under the guidelines, the court must impose this maximum sentence, unless it can state substantial and compelling reasons to depart upward. Therefore, the process is no longer concerned with the defendant's minimum sentence. This alteration in focus changes the statutory maximum discussed in Apprendi and Blakely. The new maximum sentence set under MCL 769.34(4)(a) is the statutory maximum. This is true because it is the highest sentence to which the court can sentence a defendant solely on the basis of the defendant's criminal record, admissions, and the jury's verdict. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-252, 119 S.Ct. 1215. And, if the court makes findings of fact moving the sentence to a higher statutory maximum, the defendant faces either (1) a different criminal charge or (2) the increased stigma of an extended sentence. This is specifically what the Supreme Court sought to avoid. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Any judicial fact-finding that shifts the defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum is unconstitutional and violates Jones and its progeny. By scoring the OVs or stating substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the sentencing guidelines range, a court engages in such judicial fact-finding. The question then becomes: Who is entitled to an intermediate sanction cell? Again, the central holding of the pertinent cases is that [a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [ Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738.] In other words, a defendant is entitled to a sentence based solely on (1) the defendant's prior convictions and (2) any facts he or she admitted or any facts that were specifically found by the jury. Id. To determine an appropriate sentence in Michigan, the sentencing court should score only the PRVs. This is true because these factors are based on the defendant's prior convictions and relations to the criminal justice system. To determine whether a defendant's sentence falls within an intermediate sanction cell, the sentencing court should not score the OVs. This is because they are based on factual determinations that are made by the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence. Such judicial fact-finding was explicitly rejected in the Blakely line of cases. Id. at 234-235, 119 S.Ct. 1215. The only time the sentencing court should score an OV is when the underlying fact was admitted by the defendant or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. But this occurs only in rare cases. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that a Michigan defendant is entitled to an intermediate sanction cell sentence when his or her PRV level alone supports such a sentence. On the other hand, a defendant whose PRV level is too high to place him or her in an intermediate sanction cell is not entitled to a sentence within an intermediate sanction cell. The latter defendant falls under the general sentencing scheme and is subject to the maximum sentence set by law. In that case, the trial court is free to make the judicial findings of fact necessary to score the OVs. The instant case is demonstrative of the distinction. Defendant did not admit any fact necessary to score OVs 1, 2, and 3. And the jury made no specific findings of fact regarding these OVs. Thus, defendant's sentence should be based solely on his PRV level. Defendant's PRV level was two points, which placed him in the B-I cell. The B-I cell provides a sentence range of zero to 11 months for a second-offense habitual offender. MCL 777.65; MCL 777.21(3)(a). This is an intermediate sanction cell. MCL 769.34(4)(a). Therefore, defendant was entitled to an intermediate sanction sentence. As discussed above, this means a maximum sentence of 11 months in jail. But the trial court made judicial findings of fact using a preponderance of the evidence to score OVs 1, 2, and 3. These judicial findings increased defendant's maximum sentence because they moved defendant into a straddle cell. At that point, he was no longer entitled to an intermediate sanction sentence. Because the judge's findings of fact increased defendant's maximum sentence, they violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Defendant suffered a greater stigma through an increased sentence than the stigma he would have been subjected to had his sentence been based solely on his PRV level. This increased stigma undermines the basic concepts of the right to trial by jury and defeats the intent of the Founding Fathers to ensure a publicly controlled judiciary. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-484, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Just as in the Ring case, scoring the OVs here was the functional equivalent of convicting defendant of a different criminal offense. Although he had been convicted only of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, he was sentenced for an assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (1) in which the victim was touched by a weapon, [12] (2) in which defendant possessed a potentially lethal weapon, [13] and (3) in which the victim suffered life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury. [14] Just as in Ring, the Sixth Amendment requires that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts that enhanced defendant's guilt. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Some may argue that the statutory maximum was the maximum sentence allowed by law and not the intermediate sanction sentence of 11 months. The argument is that all defendants in Michigan should assume that they will receive the statutory maximum because they do not know how the judge will score the OVs at sentencing. This reasoning is inaccurate and is directly contradicted by the Blakely line of cases. In fact, both Blakely and Booker make clear that it is not relevant that the possibility exists for the judge to depart from the statutory maximum sentence in some circumstances. It is not relevant that the maximum sentence could increase with additional fact-finding by the judge. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234-235, 125 S.Ct. 738; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Under Blakely, the statutory maximum in this case remains the 11-month intermediate sanction sentence even though the judge was empowered to increase it after additional fact-finding. Blakely succinctly explained the Supreme Court's reasoning on this point: The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea. Those facts alone were insufficient because, as the Washington Supreme Court has explained, [a] reason offered to justify an exceptional sentence can be considered only if it takes into account factors other than those which are used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense, [ State v. ] Gore, [143 Wash.2d 288, 315-316, 21 P.3d 262 (2001) ], which in this case included the elements of second-degree kidnapping and the use of a firearm, see [Wash. Rev. Code] 9.94A.320, 9.94A.310(3)(b). Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he would have been reversed. See [Wash. Rev. Code] 9.94A.210(4). The maximum sentence is no more 10 years here than it was 20 years in Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding an aggravator). [ Id. ] In the instant case, had the judge sentenced defendant to a maximum of 15 years without scoring the OVs or making additional fact-finding, he would have committed error requiring reversal. The same rule of law applies as in Ring, Blakely, and Booker. Despite the fact that the statute permits a different maximum in some situations, sentencing a defendant to that maximum on the basis of judicial fact-finding constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Some also argue that the Blakely line of cases does not affect Michigan's sentencing guidelines because Michigan has an indeterminate sentencing scheme. I would agree with this assessment in cases in which the defendant's PRV level places the defendant somewhere other than in an intermediate sanction cell. But I disagree with respect to cases in which the indeterminate sentencing scheme sets two possible maximums, [15] which is exactly what occurs in cases involving intermediate sanction cells. In these cases, the indeterminate sentencing scheme resembles the determinate sentencing schemes discussed in the Blakely line of cases. Blakely itself contains a discussion of the difference between indeterminate and determinate schemes: Justice O'Connor argues that, because determinate sentencing schemes involving judicial factfinding entail less judicial discretion than indeterminate schemes, the constitutionality of the latter implies the constitutionality of the former. This argument is flawed on a number of levels. First, the Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on judicial power, but a reservation of jury power. It limits judicial power only to the extent that the claimed judicial power infringes on the province of the jury. Indeterminate sentencing does not do so. It increases judicial discretion, to be sure, but not at the expense of the jury's traditional function of finding the facts essential to lawful imposition of the penalty. Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentenceand that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned. In a system that says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail. In a system that punishes burglary with a 10-year sentence, with another 30 added for use of a gun, the burglar who enters a home unarmed is entitled to no more than a 10-year sentenceand by reason of the Sixth Amendment the facts bearing upon that entitlement must be found by a jury. [ Id. at 308-309, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).] Once this reasoning is applied to the instant case, the problem posed by Michigan's sentencing scheme becomes apparent. It would be one thing if every second-offense habitual offender convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder faced the same 15-year maximum. Then, there would be no problem with judicial fact-finding that results in a sentence in the range of zero to 15 years. But that is not the case. Some second-offense habitual offenders convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder face a maximum sentence of 11 months. They are offenders whose criminal records do not support the scoring of the OVs. [16] These offenders are entitled to a sentence falling within an intermediate sanction cell. Id. Given that there are two possible maximum sentences for the offense in question, a defendant is entitled to whichever is supported by the conviction and his or her admissions and criminal record alone. [A]nd by reason of the Sixth Amendment the [additional] facts bearing upon that entitlement must be found by a jury. Id. at 309, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Therefore, if certain other facts are necessary to move the defendant to the higher maximum sentence, they must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [17] In this case, the judge moved defendant from the 11-month maximum to the 15-year maximum. He did this using facts that he determined to be true by a mere preponderance of the evidence. The prosecution was not put to its proofs regarding these facts, and defendant faced an increased sentence without the full opportunity to challenge the facts the prosecution claims support it. This is exactly the problem recognized by Blakely. And it constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation. The argument has also been made that no defendant is entitled to a sentence in Michigan until after the OVs have been scored. See MCL 777.21. It is this argument on which the majority bases its decision. This argument does not survive even casual inspection, and the Blakely line of cases clearly contradicts it. Essentially, it boils down to a claim that judicial fact-finding should occur to determine if judicial fact-finding should occur. It is a claim that the court should be able to make some judicial fact-finding. If, as a consequence, the guidelines place a defendant in an intermediate sanction cell, no more judicial fact-finding would be appropriate. But, the claim continues, if initially the court's fact-finding moves the sentence beyond an intermediate sanction cell, more judicial fact-finding would be acceptable. I find this argument intellectually disingenuous and circular. Nowhere in Blakely or in any of the other related cases does the Supreme Court indicate that any initial judicial fact-finding is appropriate. In fact, all the cases specifically contradict this contention: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [ Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738.] Any fact means any fact. Certain facts are not excepted, and no exception is made for an initial round of fact-finding. The holding of the Blakely line of cases is simple: Any facts, aside from past convictions, that increase a defendant's maximum sentence must be either admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority ignores this central tenet of the Blakely line of cases. It is irrelevant that a defendant would or could receive a higher sentence under the traditional application of the sentencing scheme. A defendant is entitled to the maximum sentence authorized by the defendant's past convictions and the facts admitted or established during a guilty plea or by a jury verdict. Id. A defendant's sentence must not be based on facts later found by a judge using a preponderance of the evidence standard. MCL 777.21 does not change this central tenet. The statute is similar to the statute in Ring. In Ring, the statute directed the judge to conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence of specified circumstances in order to decide whether to impose death or life imprisonment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The fact that it is possible to impose a higher sentence under the sentencing scheme is not relevant. A defendant is entitled to a sentence based solely on the jury verdict and the defendant's admissions and criminal history. The Supreme Court explained: In an effort to reconcile its capital sentencing system with the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi, Arizona first restates the Apprendi majority's portrayal of Arizona's system: Ring was convicted of first-degree murder, for which Arizona law specifies death or life imprisonment as the only sentencing options, see Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-1105(C) (West 2001); Ring was therefore sentenced within the range of punishment authorized by the jury verdict. See Brief for Respondent 9-19. This argument overlooks Apprendi 's instruction that the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect. 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In effect, the required finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict. [ Id. at 603-604, 120 S.Ct. 2348.] Defendant in this case was exposed to a greater punishment than was authorized by the jury's verdict. This was a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 609, 120 S.Ct. 2348.