Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to instruct on diminished capacity

Text: Defendant contends his conviction of the murder of John Davies must be reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on diminished capacity negating the mental state required for first or second degree murder. At the time of the Davies murder, the defense of diminished capacity was still recognized in California, and the parties agree that, if warranted by the evidence, diminished capacity instructions should have been given in this case. ( People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1240-1241, 278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899; see Stats.1981, ch. 404, §§ 2, 4, pp. 1591-1592 [amending § 22 and adding § 28]; see generally People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1111-1112, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) That condition is met when the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that a defendant's voluntary intoxication or mental defect may have prevented him from forming the mental state required for the charged offense. ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) In arguing such instructions should have been given, defendant notes that he told police, in a confession that was admitted into evidence, that he was pretty well drunk the night he killed Davies, that he had spent time earlier that evening with other friends, drinking and taking dope, and that when he drank beer and consumed marijuana his body chemistry changed, he became aggressive, and he developed extremely assaultive behavior. This evidence, however, lent only minimal and insubstantial support to [defendant's] theory of diminished capacity from intoxication and therefore was not sufficient to justify the requested instruction. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 762, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) That defendant was, to some degree, intoxicated on the night of the offense, and that he behaved aggressively after consuming alcohol and marijuana, did not constitute substantial evidence that he lacked the capacity to form the intent to kill or to premeditate and deliberate. To the contrary: Defendant's description of his conduct in killing Davies failed to reflect the influence of alcohol or marijuana. He admitted that after picking up Davies and driving to Edgewood Park, he took a knife from the glove compartment and committed himself to killing Davies. After walking with Davies a half mile to two miles down a dirt road, defendant stabbed him in the back, sat on his chest, stabbed him in the throat, and struck him in the head with a large rock. Defendant proceeded to dispose of the body and the clothing he had been wearing. This goal-directed, purposeful behavior is incompatible with any suggestion of diminished capacity. Thus, lacking a sufficient evidentiary predicate for instructions on voluntary manslaughter on a theory of diminished capacity, the trial court did not err in failing to give them.