Opinion ID: 1467545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: compulsory process of witnesses

Text: Philip Palmer was introduced to the jury on voir dire as a witness who would testify for appellant. During opening statement, the jury was informed that Philip Palmer would testify that he had been with appellant in another part of the city at the time the crime had allegedly occurred, thereby providing appellant with an alibi. A few minutes before he was to be called, the Assistant United States Attorney told one of Palmer's attorneys that if Palmer testified he might be charged as an accessory after the fact to murder. The attorneys interpreted the prosecutor's remark as a threat and advised their client to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. After appellant objected to the prosecutor's action as improper and designed to chill his witness' intention to testify, the court held a hearing on the matter out of the jury's presence. Palmer's attorneys argued that he was justified in refusing to testify because (1) he did not want to be implicated in the murder charge in any way; and (2) if he testified and admitted that he had been on the streets after midnight, he would thereby admit that he had violated the early curfew condition of his pretrial release in an unrelated case. Noting that the government had not contested his refusal to testify before the grand jury, relying upon the curfew violation alone, counsel requested immunity from prosecution for the murder in exchange for Palmer's testimony. The court denied this request, stating that it was the prosecutor's province to grant immunity. It upheld Palmer's decision to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify, however, after the prosecutor said that a government witness could testify that Palmer had been on the scene after the shooting. Appellant's principal contention is that he was improperly deprived of the testimony of his witness, Philip Palmer, due to the remarks of the prosecutor. The right of a defendant to establish a defense by presenting his own witnesses is a fundamental element of due process of law. United States v. Simmons, 216 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 210, 670 F.2d 365, 368 (1982) (per curiam) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)), aff'd following remand, 226 U.S. App.D.C. 98, 699 F.2d 1250 (1983). Various courts have held that governmental interference can deprive a defendant of this right. E.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (defense witness intimidated by remarks of trial judge); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir.1982) (federal prosecutor's warning to defense witness' attorney destroyed her choice to testify freely); United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.1979) (defense witness intimidated by remarks of FBI agent); United States v. Smith, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 478 F.2d 976 (1973) (federal prosecutor's warning to the defense witness was plainly a threat which prejudiced the defendant). In this case, the prosecutor told one of Palmer's attorneys that Palmer could possibly be charged as an accessory if his alibi testimony included facts which implicated him. There is no evidence that the prosecutor's reason for so acting was to chill the witness' intention to testify. Indeed, the trial court stated that the prosecutor might have done Palmer a favor by warning his attorneys because there was always a possibility of prosecution where the facts justified it and where there had been no grant of immunity, as here. Nevertheless, we conclude that it would have been reasonable for counsel to interpret the prosecutor's remark as a threat. We agree with the government that the potential harm of such an act by a prosecutor is greater where he has spoken directly to the witness, see Smith v. United States, supra; United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824, 97 S.Ct. 78, 50 L.Ed.2d 87 (1976); but are not convinced that this unsolicited communication to the witness' attorney was necessary, appropriate or timely. [4] See United States v. MacCloskey, supra . Where prosecutorial misconduct is alleged, the erroneous action must rise to the level of substantial prejudice in order to justify reversal. McCowan v. United States, 458 A.2d 1191, 1196 (D.C.1983); Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980). As appellant objected to the prosecutor's alleged misconduct here, the test for substantial prejudice is whether the misconduct substantially swayed the judgment. See Dyson v. United States, supra, 418 A.2d at 132; Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). In United States v. Simmons, supra , the circuit court decided that the appellant there was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's warning a defense witness of the dangers of testifying falsely. It concluded that the witness' refusal to testify resulted from considerations which were independent of any threats by the prosecutor, namely: (1) the witness' attorney had advised him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify; and (2) it was unlikely that the appellant would have called the witness because his attorney was concerned that the witness would perjure himself if put on the stand. Similarly, in our case, there is evidence that Palmer's decision not to testify was not based solely upon a perceived threat by the prosecutor. Although Palmer had agreed to testify at trial before the Assistant United States Attorney warned of the possibility of prosecution, both of the reasons that Palmer was advised not to testify in the grand jury remained at the time of the trial. Thus, either of these reasons could have been the basis of counsel's recommendation that he not testify at trial. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to say that but for the prosecutor's statement, Palmer would have testified; or to conclude that the judgment was substantially swayed by the prosecutor's misconduct. [5]
Appellant contends that the court erred in permitting Philip Palmer and Carroll Montgomery to invoke blanket privileges against self-incrimination. We have said that where a defendant's Sixth Amendment right [to the compulsory attendance of witnesses] is in conflict with a witness' properly asserted Fifth Amendment right, the latter will prevail. Letsinger v. United States, 402 A.2d 411, 416 (D.C.1979); Alston v. United States, 383 A.2d 307, 310 (D.C.1978); In re J.W.Y., 363 A.2d 674, 682-83 (D.C.1976). In evaluating the validity of a witness' claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the trial court must determine, from all the circumstances, whether the claimant has reasonable cause to apprehend a real danger of prosecution. Alston v. United States, supra, 383 A.2d at 312. The Supreme Court has explained the type of proof that is necessary: [I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). The Fifth Amendment privilege of a witness is narrower than that of a defendant; a witness may not assert a blanket privilege where a narrower privilege would suffice to protect his interests. Letsinger v. United States, supra, 402 A.2d at 416; United States v. Reese, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 7, 561 F.2d 894, 900 (1977). However, the trial court may bar a witness from testifying in the jury's presence if it properly concludes that the witness will refuse to answer essentially all of the questions which he may be asked. Alston v. United States, supra, 383 A.2d at 313; United States v. Reese, supra, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 6, 561 F.2d at 899; Bowles v. United States, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 26, 32, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995, 91 S.Ct. 1240, 28 L.Ed.2d 533 (1971). [6] After extensive discussions with the witnesses, their attorneys and the parties (out of the jury's presence), the court determined that Palmer and Montgomery might incriminate themselves if they testified. Montgomery's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege was based upon his pending trial for the first-degree murder of Andrew Anderson. The defense had proffered that Montgomery would testify, inter alia, that Andrew Anderson had had a motive for killing the decedent here (Jerome Wilson) because Wilson had intervened in an assault which Anderson had allegedly committed less than a week before Wilson's death. As it was likely that on cross-examination the government would probe into areas that could harm Montgomery in the defense of his own case, the court correctly ruled that Montgomery had a valid privilege against self-incrimination. [7] See Alston v. United States, supra, 383 A.2d at 312. The court also properly decided that Palmer had reasonable cause to fear prosecution given the government's proffer that a witness had seen Palmer near the scene of the shooting within minutes after it happened. See id. at 312. Moreover, because Montgomery and Palmer had personally informed the court that they had decided not to testify at all, the court did not err in failing to require them to invoke the privilege on a question by question basis. See id. at 313. [8]
At the conclusion of the government's case, counsel for appellant told the court that he would call Charles Miller as a defense witness and that Miller would recant his grand jury testimony that appellant had confessed to the murder of Wilson. The court ordered counsel to bring Miller's attorney into court to confer with his client before he exposed himself to prosecution for perjury by so testifying. After the attorney informed the court that Miller would testify, the trial judge advised Miller of his Fifth Amendment rights and that anything to which he testified could be used against him in another proceeding. The judge further explained the penalty for perjury. Following a weekend recess, the prosecutor told the court that he had no evidence which implicated Miller in this case. He further said that Miller, who had been a government witness before the government decided not to call him, had expressed concern for his safety and that of his family if he testified. Miller's attorney then said that in spite of the prosecutor's proffer, his client had decided to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and face a contempt charge, if necessary. No evidence was proffered to demonstrate that Miller had cause to fear prosecution. The court subsequently ruled that Miller had no grounds for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. After asking Miller personally if he would testify, and being told that he would not, the court held him in contempt. Relying upon Webb v. Texas, supra, 409 U.S. at 98, 93 S.Ct. at 353, appellant asserts that the trial court intimidated his witness, Charles Miller, and thus deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to the compulsory process of witnesses. In Webb v. Texas, supra , the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that the trial judge had threatened and harassed the sole defense witness, causing him to decline to testify. There is no evidence here that the trial court threatened or harassed Charles Miller. The court sought to insure that the witness was fully aware of his potential criminal liability by requiring that Miller's attorney come to court to confer with his client; and by personally informing Miller of his Fifth Amendment rights, and that his testimony could be used against him in subsequent proceedings, including prosecutions for perjury. Unlike the trial court in Webb, the court's remarks were not coercive or threatening; they were pointedly informational. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court intimidated the witness and deterred him from testifying. [9]