Opinion ID: 2976739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Violation of the Confrontation Clause

Text: McGee argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser, which deprivation substantially affected his right to a fair trial and requires that his conviction now be reversed. Specifically, McGee argues that at trial, Officer Collins testified to statements made by the confidential informant that related to McGee’s identity, but that McGee was not afforded the opportunity to confront, or cross-examine, the informant. No. 06-2158 United States v. McGee Page 5 Generally, we review de novo evidentiary rulings relating to violations of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582, 592 (6th Cir. 2004). However, violations of the confrontation clause are also subject to harmless error analysis. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-23 (1967). Errors are “‘harmless’ in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial” where “the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). In such cases, an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside. Id. The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment states, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, the Court asserted that “not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.” 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). Rather, the court introduced a distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements for confrontation clause purposes, explaining that the protection applies only to prohibit “testimonial” statements when the declarant is not available to be cross-examined by the defendant. Id. “The threshold determination that we must make is whether the statements of a confidential informant to police are ‘testimonial’ in nature.” United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 672 (6th Cir. 2004). The court must then consider the purpose of the testimonial statements, as the confrontation clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. “The proper inquiry . . . is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused. That intent, in turn, may be determined by querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.” Cromer, 389 F.3d at 675. Under this inquiry, we held in Cromer that “statements of a confidential informant are testimonial in nature and therefore may not be offered by the government to establish the guilt of an accused absent an opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the informant.” Id. at 670-71. Here, McGee argues that Officer Collins’ testimony contained testimonial hearsay that was used to identify the supplier as McGee, and that McGee had no opportunity to cross-examine the informant. McGee points specifically to the re-direct examination of Officer Collins, where the prosecution sought to assuage concerns that Officer Collins misidentified McGee on the phone with the confidential informant. The prosecutor and Officer Collins had the following exchange: Q: Now, what else did you do to confirm that the person your CPI [confidential police informant] was speaking to was Mr. McGee and not Mr. Rimpson? A: I called the CPI back the next day and said, Hey, I know we called a few people. Who was the one that we finally got that we talked to? Mr. Karafa (McGee’s attorney): I object, Your Honor. The question’s objectionable in the first place, but prior to the answer there’s a lack of foundation. It’s incompetence hearsay. The Court: No, he’s just saying what he did, I think. Overruled. Next question. Mr. Lennon (for the government) Q: You called the CPI; is that correct? A: Right. No. 06-2158 United States v. McGee Page 6 Q: And confirmed who you were speaking - who he was speaking to that day? A: Yeah, and he advised Zookie. (Transcript, pages 95-97, emphasis added). The confidential informant’s statement that he was talking to “Zookie” is testimonial because a reasonable person in the CI’s position would anticipate his statements being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting a crime. The purpose of the informant’s statement is also used for the truth of the matter asserted; that is, to identify McGee as the person the CPI talked to on the phone, and with whom he arranged the drug buy. The admission of this evidence therefore violated the confrontation clause. Nonetheless, the government introduced enough evidence at trial to establish McGee’s guilt. We are confident in holding that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. McGee’s conviction does not depend upon the testimonial statements of the confidential informant. On direct examination, Officer Collins testified that he knew from personal contact with McGee prior to February 8, 2006 that his street name was Zook or Zookie. As Officer Collins’ redirect testimony also confirmed, McGee is the individual who showed up at the drug-buy with the drugs, and his cell phone contained a log of the confidential informant’s recent call. McGee argues that this case is analogous to United States v. Cromer, where the “central issue at . . . trial was not whether illegal activity occurred . . . but whether Cromer knowingly participated in that illegal activity.” 389 F.3d at 677. The evidence in that case was “so tenuous that the jury in Cromer’s first trial was unable to convict him.” Id. There, the confidential informant’s testimonial statements, as relayed through the testifying officer, were used to identify and implicate the defendant and went “to the very heart of the prosecutor’s case.” Id. Unlike the tenuous facts in Cromer, the government in this case provided evidence, independent of the confidential informant’s testimony, to establish McGee’s possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine.