Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Meaning of Neutrality

Text: In theory, when religious liberties are at stake, the state is only neutral when it does not choose sides. (Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty (1996) 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313 [[T]he core point of religious liberty is that the government does not take positions on religious questions  not in its daily administration, not in its laws, and not in its Constitution either].) This would mean that the state may not prefer or seek to impose a particular normative view by squelching a competing religious perspective. Genuine neutrality would allow many different and contending voices to be represented in public discourse. (McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the First Freedom?, supra, 21 Cardozo L.Rev. at p. 1262.) In the present controversy, one side posits that sex is an aspect of autonomy, a vital human function in which men and women should be able to engage, enjoying their sexuality free from anxiety. (Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System: Viagra v. Birth Control (1999) 13 J.L. & Health 171, 181.) This may in fact be the view of a majority of American adults. The Catholic Church's view, in contrast, deems all forms of nonmarital sex immoral, and views sex within marriage as a unitive, procreative, and sacred reflection of a spiritual, emotional, and biological reality that comes complete with reproductive anxiety. (See George & Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination (1995) 84 Geo. L.J. 301-320.) This is a perspective many people would disparage as archaic. Several of the legislators debating the WCEA seemed to think so. [3] The Catholic Church purports to be one of those different and contending voices, a church which has never envisioned a sharp divide between the Church and the world, the spiritual and the temporal, or religion and politics. For the Church, the internal spiritual life of its members and institutions must always move outward as a sign and instrument for the transformation of the larger society. (Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective Bargaining Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, supra, 49 Vill. L.Rev. at p. 157.) Petitioner complains the narrow exemption was designed to lend the state's considerable weight to the dissenting side of a conflict within the church about the legitimacy of contraceptive practice  under the banner of protecting the `rights' of those who disagree ... and to deny the church exemption based on the allegedly unpopular nature of a church doctrine that diverges from contemporary cultural mores. In petitioner's words, the state's action has the effect of declaring the Catholic hierarchy's stand `heresy' in the eyes of secular culture. Of course, practice always diverges from theory. In contemporary American society, the government does take sides on policy issues. The First Amendment precludes the government from taking sides if the dispute involves internal church governance, but that leaves an area of overlap where the religiously dictated conduct of churches operating in the world comes into conflict with public policy. The question then is whether the coercive force of the law may be brought to bear to compel a religious organization that holds an alternative view, based on religious scruples, to support a hostile and competing vision of the good.
Smith could be read, as the majority apparently reads it, to suggest that religion is not entitled to constitutional protection unless the government action expressly and specifically targets religious expression. Under this interpretation, protection for religious liberty requires proof of religious bigotry, i.e., proof that government officials acted out of anti-religious motives. Thus, Smith  even as modified by Lukumi  would prohibit infringements of religious liberties only if a statute has the object or purpose of ... suppress[ing] religion or religious conduct or involves [o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment. ( Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. at pp. 533-534, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) Since this statute imposes a mandate on all employers that provide prescription coverage, it arguably does not target religious conduct. On one level, religious interests and secular interests are treated with equal dignity, and since the mandate provides an escape hatch, Catholic Charities' attempt to claim specifically unequal treatment faces formidable obstacles. Consequently, the majority finds Catholic Charities has failed to prove an anti-religious motive and the statute is neutral.
There is, however, more than one way to look at neutrality. As Lukumi explains it, [f]acial neutrality is not determinative.... The [free exercise] clause `forbids subtle departures from neutrality' [citation] and `covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.' ( Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object. ( Id. at p. 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) [I]f the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral [citation]; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. ( Id. at p. 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) The Free Exercise Clause `protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment.' ( Lukumi, at p. 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) But equality in the context of religious liberty must be broadly defined. In effect, the general applicability requirement is needed to ensure neutrality across broad categories of regulation. Pursuant to Lukumi, if other activities which cause comparable harm to the same governmental interests are not regulated, the law is not generally applicable. Thus, Lukumi makes it clear that strict scrutiny is required if a law is not neutral  and it considers the question of neutrality broadly. In this case, for instance, defendants argue that Catholic Charities' ability to opt out, i.e., to choose not to provide any prescription coverage, obviates any concern about infringement. Catholic Charities insists it should not be forced to relinquish its vision of appropriate employee relations to preserve its right to object to the use of contraceptives. From the Church's perspective, to demand that contraception be funded, despite bona fide religious objections, is to take sides, to abandon the commitment to public neutrality. In this sense, the WCEA, with its grudging religious exemption, may not be neutral. The majority's response that the WCEA's narrow exemption is an accommodation and not an imposition seems entirely unresponsive. In the whole scheme of things, the risk associated with allowing government to impose a stifling orthodoxy in pursuit of the good society may greatly outweigh the small harm of tolerating heterodoxy in this circumstance. [4] At oral argument, counsel indicated the Catholic Church, including Catholic Charities, employs fewer than 60,000 of California's millions of employees. [5] Some of the Church's employees belong to religious orders and are presumably fully in agreement with the church's position. Some are men, some are women no longer capable of childbearing, and some are spouses of people employed by other companies who are covered by their spouses' health plans. Of the women of childbearing age who remain, and to whom contraceptive coverage is a critical concern, none are faced with a pervasive practice which would prevent them from finding more congenial employment. [6] THE EXISTENCE OF Wcea's mandate  TO Which the vast majority of California employers apparently have no religious objection  enhances their employment options. In fact, the defection of talented female employees may cause Catholic Charities to reconsider its position. Such a result has no First Amendment implications. A substantial amount of federal case law supports Catholic Charities' claim that the Legislature's attempt to draw distinctions between the religious and secular activities of a single religious entity is an impermissible government entanglement in religion. I am inclined to agree. Such an action is constitutionally invalid and that ends the discussion. If, however, the existence of the narrow exemption simply shows the statutory scheme is not neutral in operation or effect, it is invalid only if it fails strict scrutiny.