Opinion ID: 2625357
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court Had Jurisdiction Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

Text: Teseniar argues that Judge Gleason erred by denying his motion to vacate Judge Hunt's August 2000 child support modification order and to strike Spicer's March 2000 motion for modification because the superior court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction in accordance with the UIFSA, adopted in Alaska as AS 25.25. Teseniar contends that the superior court did not have personal jurisdiction over him and did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order after he moved to Missouri in 1998. We exercise our independent judgment when reviewing a superior court's interpretation and application of a statute, adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. [1] The UIFSA defeats Teseniar's argument. Alaska Statute 25.25.201 provides a variety of alternative bases for personal jurisdiction over a non-resident in a proceeding to modify a support order; there is jurisdiction if the non-resident individual (1) submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction; (2) resided with the child in this state; (3) resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses or support for the child; or (4) engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse[.] Teseniar participated in support proceedings here for several years, including the period of more than a year between the modification order and his motion to vacate it. [2] He lived in Alaska with Samantha, agreed to pay for Spicer's expenses relating to her pregnancy with Robert and Robert's birth, and presumably conceived the children here. The superior court thus had personal jurisdiction over Teseniar. Alaska Statute 25.25.205 makes clear that the superior court also had jurisdiction over the support order. That statute provides that a tribunal of this state will have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a support order it issues as long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued or until each individual party has filed written consent with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. [3] Spicer and the children still reside in Alaska, and the parties filed no written consent for another state to modify the order. The statute does state that an Alaskan tribunal cannot modify a support order if the order has been modified by a tribunal of another state under a law substantially similar to this chapter. [4] But while the order was registered in Missouri, the Missouri court did not modify the support order. [5] Alaska thus maintained jurisdiction. Teseniar relies on section 611 of the UIFSA [6] for his argument that the Alaska courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Spicer was required to file her modification motion in the state of residence of the obligor, namely Missouri. Teseniar's focus on AS 25.25.611 and the comparable Missouri provision is irrelevant, however, because when a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, AS 25.25.301-.701 do not apply except for two small exceptions that are unrelated to this case. [7] Furthermore, this reliance is misplaced. Alaska Statute 25.25.611 and Missouri Statute 454.973 basically say: When a support order issued in another state has been registered in this state, a tribunal of this state may modify the order only if (1) none of the parties or the children live in the issuing state, the petitioner is a non-resident seeking modification, and a tribunal of this state has personal jurisdiction over the respondent; or if (2) a tribunal of this state has personal jurisdiction over the child or one of the parties and all of the parties have filed written consent in the issuing tribunal that a tribunal of this state may modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over it. The issuing state in this case is Alaska. Because Spicer and the children live in Alaska and there has been no written consent, Missouri could not modify the order under its statute. [8] Because Alaska therefore retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, [9] Judge Gleason did not err in denying Teseniar's motion to vacate Judge Hunt's modification order and to strike Spicer's motion for modification due to lack of jurisdiction under the UIFSA.