Opinion ID: 2608844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Oral Admissions

Text: (6) Defendant next correctly asserts that the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that evidence of oral admissions should be viewed with caution. (CALJIC Nos. 2.71, 2.71.7.) These instructions would have been applicable to Billy B.'s testimony that following the shooting defendant said to Marlin Lewis, Did I drop her or did I drop her? [8] The prosecution cited this statement during closing argument as evidence the killing was wilful, deliberate and premeditated. In People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1], we held the trial court must instruct sua sponte that evidence of oral admissions must be viewed with caution.... Under Beagle, the court's failure in this case to so instruct was error. The error, however, was not prejudicial. As we explained in Beagle : The omission ... does not constitute reversible error if upon a reweighing of the evidence it does not appear reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( Ibid. ) In assessing potential prejudice, we stressed that the primary purpose of the cautionary instruction is to assist the jury in determining if the statement was in fact made. ( Id. at p. 456.) Applying these principles to the case at hand, we are persuaded there is no reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different result absent the error. The testimony concerning defendant's oral admission was uncontradicted; defendant adduced no evidence that the statement was not made, was fabricated, or was inaccurately remembered or reported. There was no conflicting testimony concerning the precise words used, their context or their meaning. (See People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1224-1225 [249 Cal. Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795]; People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 456.) Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the jury was properly instructed as to how they should treat the testimony of an accomplice, if they determined that Billy B. was an accomplice. (See People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1315 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) Accordingly, we are persuaded that a result more favorable to defendant was not a reasonable probability absent the instructional error.