Opinion ID: 783131
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury instructions on federal and state law discrimination

Text: 31 The jury instructions given by the district court for discrimination under § 1981 and under Washington law were substantially identical, differing only in that the federal law instruction required Zhang to show that his race was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action, while the state law instruction required him to show that his race was a substantial factor. Both instructions also stated that Zhang was not required to prove that his race or national origin was the only factor or the main factor in the adverse action. The appellants proposed additional instructions on the meaning of motivating factor and substantial factor, and appeal the district court's rejection of these instructions. Reviewing the district court's decision for abuse of discretion, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 85 F.3d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir.1996), we find no error. 32 The general rule is that the district court need not define common terms that are readily understandable by the jury. United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir.2000) (collecting cases discussing terms that need not be defined, including commercial advantage, private financial gain, violence, organizer, supervisor, and manager). The motivating factor instruction given conforms to the model federal instructions in § 1981 cases where both legal and illegal motives may be present: The jury should find for the plaintiff if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that race was a motivating factor, even though other factors also motivated the practice. Modern Fed. Jury Instr. Form Instr. 87-22AA (2002). The instruction also conforms to the model Ninth Circuit instructions, whose commentary expressly notes that [t]he term `motivating factor' may not require definition because of its common usage. 9th Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. 12.1 cmt. (2002). The appellants cite no cases in which this term has been explained, and we have recently read equivalent jury instructions to be adequately precise. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 858 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (noting that in sex discrimination case, jury was instructed, apparently without further definition, that [i]f you find that the plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason). 4 While it might have been prudent for the district court to elaborate on this term, it was not an abuse of discretion not to do so. 33 As for the substantial factor language, the court's instruction likewise conforms to Washington's pattern instruction: 34 To recover, plaintiff has the burden of proving that [his][her] [race] [sex][age] [religion] [national origin] [marital status] was a [significant or] substantial factor in defendant's decision [to terminate][not to promote] [not to hire] [lay off][him][her]. Plaintiff does not have to prove that [race] [sex] [age] [religion] [national origin] [marital status] was the only factor or the main factor in the decision, or that plaintiff would have been [retained] [hired] [promoted] but for [his][her] [race ][sex][age] [religion] [national origin] [marital status]. 35 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.01 (4th ed.2002). Neither the pattern instruction nor the commentary suggests that a definition of substantial factor is necessary. The Washington Supreme Court has noted, without disapproval, that trial courts have used jury instructions that conform to the pattern instructions and do not define substantial factor. See Delgado Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 Wash.2d 907, 32 P.3d 250, 254 (Wash.2001). The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to define this term for the jury. 36 The appellants contend that the district court erred in rejecting its instructions because the terms motivating factor and substantial factor are equivalent, and that they were entitled to an instruction equating the two. This argument fails for the simple reason that they never sought such an instruction; the rejected instructions only elaborated on the meanings of these terms. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to preserve objections against jury instructions, a party must stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 (emphasis added); see Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has enjoyed a reputation as the strictest enforcer of Rule 51). The appellants never objected on the grounds that the standards should be identical, nor did they assert that if they were exonerated from liability under one law, they must be exonerated under the other as well. They have waived any argument that the instructions should have equated these two terms.