Opinion ID: 2625842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr. Ofshe's Testimony at the Voluntariness Hearing

Text: ¶ 33 At the voluntariness hearing, defense counsel asked Dr. Ofshe: Was there a particular tactic utilized during the July 21st, '98 interrogation of Mr. Blakley that was motivated to shift from denial to admission? Dr. Ofshe answered yes, and the state objected because the testimony would go to the ultimate fact for decision. The court ruled: I will allow you to elicit from him observations about police tactics but to the extent that you are asking him to expressto express an opinion that these tactics on this specific occasion caused the defendant to react and do something, that's not something I will allow him to testify to so you can rephrase your question if you want. Defense counsel then went through the interrogation and the witness commented on the tactics that were used in Blakley's questioning. Later in his testimony, Dr. Ofshe attempted to relate what the defendant had told him about his motivation to confess. The state objected on hearsay grounds, and the objection was sustained. On cross-examination, the state tried to elicit an opinion about Blakley's ability to answer questions during the interrogation, and a defense objection was sustained. ¶ 34 Blakley argues that expert testimony about his will being overborne and the coercive nature of the confession should have been allowed to provide information that is not within the common knowledge of the common juror, or, in the case of the suppression hearing, the judge. The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. State v. Rodriguez, 186 Ariz. 240, 250, 921 P.2d 643, 653 (1996). ¶ 35 Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Ariz. R. Evid. 704. Some opinions on ultimate issues, however, may be rejected if they would not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. See Ariz. R. Evid. 704, cmt. ¶ 36 In State v. Lindsey, a case dealing with expert testimony concerning the credibility of a particular witness, we said: Thus, even where expert testimony on behavioral characteristics that affect credibility or accuracy of observation is allowed, experts should not be allowed to give their opinion of the accuracy, reliability or credibility of a particular witness in the case being tried. Nor should such experts be allowed to give opinions with respect to the accuracy, reliability or truthfulness of witnesses of the type under consideration. Nor should experts be allowed to give similar opinion testimony, such as their belief of guilt or innocence. The law does not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the case. 149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986) (citations omitted). ¶ 37 We fail to see how the trial judge's ruling here constituted an abuse of discretion. Dr. Ofshe provided general information about police interrogation methods. He then went step by step through Blakley's confession, pointing out what he viewed as coercive tactics. The witness testified that, in his opinion, the police made promises and threatened Blakley. He was only prevented from rendering a final opinion as to whether the confession was voluntary. Two other experts supplied insight into the unique mental and psychological make-up of the defendant that might have been instructive and useful to the judge. The ultimate conclusion offered by Dr. Ofshe was of little or no additional value. ¶ 38 Whether Arizona Rule of Evidence 703 would allow Dr. Ofshe to testify concerning Blakley's statements to him was not preserved as an issue in the trial court and is therefore waived. State v. Brita, 158 Ariz. 121, 124, 761 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1988) (stating that it is improper for an appellate court to consider an issue for the first time on appeal). Furthermore, although Blakley's statements may have been admissible under a hearsay exception, such as state of mind, that issue has also been waived. Thus, we conclude that exclusion of Dr. Ofshe's testimony regarding the ultimate issue, as well as Blakley's statements to him, was not an abuse of discretion.