Opinion ID: 2831677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the twenty-one-year delay in this appeal

Text: VIOLATES CRAWFORD’S DUE-PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE MISSISSIPPI AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. ¶36. Crawford contends that the twenty-one-year delay for his appeal in this case to be heard has denied him due process of law. We disagree. ¶37. The record does not disclose why an appeal was not filed with this Court until now, which Crawford’s current appellate counsel acknowledges. Counsel asserts, however, that Crawford is not to blame. We do not know that to be the case from the record before us. ¶38. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has extended a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial to the appellate context. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 523 (9th Cir. 2011) (“No Supreme Court decision ‘squarely addresses’ the right to a speedy appeal, nor does the right to a speedy trial ‘clearly extend’ to the appellate 3 On December 16, 2013, the circuit court entered an order appointing the Office of the State Public Defender, Indigent Appeals Division, to represent Crawford in this appeal. The Public Defender’s Office determined that it had a conflict in this case, and therefore contracted with the undersigned counsel under the provisions of Mississippi Code Section 99-40-1(2) to represent Crawford in the appeal of this matter. 13 context.”) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 123, 125, 128 S. Ct. 743, 169 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2008)); Kolberg v. State, 704 So. 2d 1307, 1320 (Miss. 1997) (“The remedy for denial of a speedy appeal is not clear since this Court has never recognized such a right and does not do so now.”). In certain circumstances, due process concepts may become implicated when substantial delays during the criminal appellate process occur. Lanier v. State, 684 So. 2d 93, 98 (Miss. 1996). This is rare, however. And we stress that, unlike in a criminal trial, where the State bears the responsibility of bringing a criminal defendant to trial, the same burden does not lie with criminal appeals. As a matter of course, criminal defendants carry responsibility for submitting an appeal. And we are loathe to set aside timelimit requirements–fundamental in their own respect–in cases where that responsibility is eschewed. Again, we do not know that to be the case here. Accordingly, we have decided to hear Crawford’s appeal. We remain adamant, though, that denial of a speedy appeal is not reversible error on its own in this state. Haynes v. State, 584 So. 2d 432, 433 (Miss. 1991). And where no other reversible error exists, reversal on the grounds of a denial of a speedy appeal is inappropriate. Lanier, 684 So. 2d at 100 (citing Haynes, 584 So. 2d at 433). ¶39. We find that to be the case here. As mentioned, we have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and find no merit in any of the ten assignments of error Crawford raises in this appeal. We find only four of these issues warrant discussion. Having addressed the previous issue, we now proceed to the remaining three.