Opinion ID: 1984264
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the lower court err in ordering appellant to make restitution of medical expenses and loss of earnings to the various victims?

Text: Appellant contends that the court erred in three respects regarding the sentence. 1) The court failed to consider appellant's ability to pay restitution; 2) The court directed restitution to compensate for commissions lost; and 3) The court ordered restitution to be paid to fully compensate four victims without giving consideration to contribution by co-actors when appellant was adjudged guilty on charges only pertaining to three of the victims. Appellant was sentenced to four (4) months to one year incarceration in a work release program and nine years probation. He was directed to pay restitution [3] in the amount of $14,084.67, [4] at a rate of $55.00 a week. Due to procedural deficiencies we may only address the third contention raised above. Rule 1410, Pa.P.Crim.P. requires an unsatisfied sentenced defendant to file a motion to modify such sentence within ten (10) days of sentencing. Failure to do so will be deemed a waiver of complaints that could be raised in such motion. Commonwealth v. Walls, 481 Pa. 1, 391 A.2d 1064 (1978); Commonwealth v. Gottshalk, 276 Pa.Superior Ct. 102, 419 A.2d 115 (1980); Commonwealth v. Moore, 271 Pa.Superior Ct. 494, 414 A.2d 362 (1979). However, where the sentence is claimed to be illegal appellate courts should review the contention on its merits even though a petition for reconsideration has not been filed. Commonwealth v. Welch, 291 Pa.Superior Ct. 1, 435 A.2d 189 (1981). The Commonwealth, in its brief, after noting appellant's failure to comply with Rule 1410, [5] indicates that appellant's appeal is reviewable under the holding of Commonwealth v. Kerr, 298 Pa.Superior Ct. 257, 444 A.2d 758 (1982). In Kerr, this court reviewed the defendant's sentence, even though no motion for reconsideration had been filed. Kerr raised the propriety of a restitution order where an insurance carrier stood to benefit through subrogation. Finding that Kerr was challenging the legality of the sentence we granted review. However, Kerr does not stand for the broad principle that the propriety of a restitution order is always appealable. A sentence including restitution may not be reviewed when there is an unexcused failure to comply with Rule 1410 unless the sentence imposed is claimed to be illegal. By illegality of sentence is meant that the sentence is, in and of itself defective: for instance, the offenses merged for purposes of sentencing as in Welch, supra; or the court improperly sentenced the defendant as if he were convicted of an offense of a higher degree than he actually was, as in Commonwealth v. Reardon, 297 Pa.Superior Ct. 193, 443 A.2d 792 (1981), or the sentence exceeded the permissible maximum. Appellant's first two claims do not attack his sentence on the basis of illegality but instead claim the sentence is excessive under the circumstances. First, he argues that the court failed to consider his ability to make such payment, from which we may infer that he is claiming inability to pay. Next he questions the order to pay restitution for commissions lost as being speculative. These are questions that should have been raised in both a petition to reconsider and in a statement of issues raised on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Ormsbee, 257 Pa.Superior Ct. 322, 390 A.2d 843 (1978) (opinion in support of affirmance). Due to appellant's omission the trial court did not address these issues. We will not do so either, as to do such would abrogate Rule 1410. Similarly, we may not address a portion of appellant's third claim. Interwoven together is a claim, that appellant was ordered to pay restitution for injuries to four persons when he was only convicted of injuring three of the four, with the suggestion that his co-actors should have been directed to contribute. Whether contribution should have been ordered merely rephrases his argument that the restitution was excessive. Therefore we may not address this claim in the absence of a petition for reconsideration having first been filed. Appellant was directed to pay restitution to Mr. and Mrs. DeSimone, Trimber and DeWitt; he was acquitted of charges concerning Trimber. However, appellant was found guilty of conspiracy. It is a tenet of the criminal justice system that one co-conspirator is responsible for the acts of any of his or her co-conspirators performed in the course of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Roux, 465 Pa. 482, 350 A.2d 867 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bachert, 271 Pa.Superior Ct. 72, 412 A.2d 580 (1979); Commonwealth v. Branch, 239 Pa.Superior Ct. 17, 361 A.2d 435 (1976). Authority for imposing restitution may be found in the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(c) and the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a). The former reads in part to compensate the victim of [the defendant's] criminal conduct; the latter states wherein the victim suffered . . . directly resulting from the crime . . . the offender may be sentenced to make restitution . . . . Conspiracy is a crime under the Crimes Code 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302. In light of the above we hold that restitution may be imposed upon a conspirator for the acts of his fellow conspirators done within the course of the conspiracy. A final point we need to address is one raised in passing by appellant but not further developed. He notes that payments were to be made to various insurers who had paid for services provided to the victims. In Kerr, supra, we found no error with a restitution order even though through enforcement of its subrogation rights, an insurer might recover some part of the restitution. However, in Commonwealth v. Galloway, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 145, 165, 448 A.2d 568, 577 (1982) a panel of this court held that any direct payment to an insurer was unauthorized. Therefore, the current restitution order, to the extent it requires payment to the various insurance carriers, [6] must be vacated. Judgment of sentence affirmed, except as to the order of restitution; said order is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing as to restitution consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.