Opinion ID: 183811
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is Vicky a victim?

Text: First, we agree with the district court that McDaniel harmed Vicky under the meaning of section 2259(c) by possessing images of her sexual abuse as a minor. In sentencing appeals, we have held that the minors depicted in child pornography are the primary victims not only when the photographs are taken, but also when they are subsequently transported or distributed from one person to another. United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 644 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam). Although an argument can be made that the production of child pornography may be more immediately harmful to the child involved, the dissemination of that material certainly exacerbates that harm, not only by constituting a continuing invasion of privacy but by providing the very market that led to the creation of the images in the first place. Id. In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the distribution of child pornography is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children because, inter alia, the materials produced are a permanent record of the children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. 458 U.S. 747, 759, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3355, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). Like the producers and distributors of child pornography, the possessors of child pornography victimize the children depicted within. The end users of child pornography enable and support the continued production of child pornography. They provide the economic incentive for the creation and distribution of the pornography, and the end users violate the child's privacy by possessing their image. All of these harms stem directly from an individual's possession of child abuse images. Thus the district court did not err in finding that Vicky was a victim of McDaniel's possession of child pornography, and consequently, that she is eligible for restitution under section 2259.