Opinion ID: 64035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eastus and Metro Ford

Text: We next consider Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1996), and Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1998), on which Poche relies in arguing that section 1441(c) permits district courts to remand [an] entire action, federal claims and all, if the state law claims predominate. Eastus, 97 F.3d at 106; see also Metro Ford, 145 F.3d at 328. In Eastus, Greg and Paige Eastus sued Blue Bell in Texas state court for violation of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations after Greg Eastus lost his job at the company. 97 F.3d at 102-03. Blue Bell removed the case to federal court, and the Eastuses filed a motion to remand the entire case. Id. at 103. The district court remanded the state law intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference claims, but not the federal FMLA claim. Id. The Eastuses appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in remanding their state law claims. Id. at 104. In considering the appeal, we explained that for remand to be proper under section 1441(c), the claim remanded must be (1) a separate and independent claim or cause of action; (2) joined with a federal question; (3) otherwise non-removable; and (4) a matter in which state law predominates. Id. Applying this standard, we determined that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was not separate and independent from their FMLA claim, and accordingly held that [b]ecause § 1441(c) does not authorize remand of state law claims unless they are separate and independent from the removed federal question claim, the district court abused its discretion by remanding this claim. Id. at 105. We reached a different conclusion regarding the tortious interference with prospective contractual relations claim. After determining that the tortious interference claim was separate and independent from the FMLA claim, we considered the argument that § 1441(c) allows remand only when state law predominates as to the entire case and because district courts have the power to remand the entire action, they no longer have the power to remand specific causes of action. Id. at 106. Though we acknowledged that the argument was not without force, we rejected it: [W]e hold that § 1441(c) still allows the district court to remand separate and independent state claims, if state law predominates as to the individual claim. Therefore, § 1441(c) authorized the district court to remand the tortious interference claim. Id. at 106-07. It is true, as Poche observes in her brief on appeal, that in discussing the meaning of section 1441(c), we stated that [c]ourts that have considered the meaning of the new § 1441(c) have decided overwhelmingly that the provision now permits them to remand the entire action, federal claims and all, if the state law claims predominate. Id. at 106. We further stated that the phrase in which State law predominates in section 1441(c) is not superfluous if it is understood to give district courts the power to remand the entire case if state law predominates. Id. Neither of these statements, however, was essential to our holding in Eastus, and in any event, the case did not present the question now before uswhether section 1441(c) permits a district court to remand claims conferring removal jurisdiction. The statements are thus dicta and do not end our inquiry. See, e.g., Breen v. Texas A&M Univ., 485 F.3d 325, 336 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that statements in ... cases ... unnecessary to their holdings... constitute[ ] only non-binding dicta). Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co ., however, comes closer to the mark. In that case, Metro sued Ford in Texas state court, seeking to prevent Ford from terminating Metro's franchise agreement or taking actions to correct problems at Metro uncovered by an audit. Metro Ford, 145 F.3d at 323. After Ford filed counterclaims against Metro and third-party claims against Metro's principal, Metro filed an amended petition that included a claim against Ford for price discrimination under the Texas Antitrust Act. Id. Ford removed the case to federal court on the theory that the Texas Antitrust Act does not prohibit price discrimination, and, therefore, Metro's antitrust claim for price discrimination could arise, if at all, only under the federal Robinson-Patman Act, conferring federal question jurisdiction. Id. After the district court denied Metro's motion for remand, Metro filed an amended complaint asserting claims against Ford for price discrimination and vertical price fixing in violation of federal law, and Ford amended its third-party complaint against Metro's principal to include a RICO claim. Id. The district court granted Ford summary judgment on Metro's antitrust claims, and remanded the entire case, including Ford's federal RICO claim, to state court. Id. at 324. Metro appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment, and Ford appealed the court's remand of its third-party RICO claim and the state law claims. Id. In arguing that the district court had no authority under section 1441(c) to remand its RICO claim, Ford relied on several cases, including Buchner, in which the court sought to remand federal claims which would have been otherwise removable. Id. at 328. We explicitly rejected Ford's reliance on these authorities, explaining that Ford's RICO claim did not confer removal jurisdiction: The essential concept governing in this appeal, perhaps overlooked by Ford, is that the district court's jurisdiction was derived from a § 1441 removal. When an action is brought to federal court through the § 1441 mechanism, for both removal and original jurisdiction, the federal question must be presented by plaintiff's complaint as it stands at the time the petition for removal is filed and the case seeks entry into the federal system. It is insufficient that a federal question has been raised as a matter of defense or counterclaim. Similarly, the defendant's third-party claim alleging a federal question does not come within the purview of § 1441 removability. Id. at 326-28 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). Were this the extent of Metro Ford 's analysis, the case would lend no support to Poche's positionunlike the RICO claim at issue in Metro Ford, her FLSA claim is indisputably otherwise removable. After discussing the fact that Ford's RICO claim could not, and did not, confer removal jurisdiction, however, we cited Eastus for the proposition that the new § 1441(c) permits courts to remand an entire action, or distinct claims, both state and federal, if state law predominates. This statement could be characterized either as an alternate holding or as dicta, cf. Republic of Tex. Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F.2d 1026, 1038 (5th Cir.1981), though at least one unpublished, non-precedential decision of our court has relied upon it in holding that district courts can remand claims conferring removal jurisdiction. See Jones v. Belhaven College, 98 Fed.Appx. 283, 284 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Metro Ford, 145 F.3d at 328). We need not navigate the murky waters between alternate holdings and dicta, however, because an earlier precedent, Laurents v. Arcadian Corp., No. 94-41183, 1995 WL 625394, 69 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1995), controls. [1]