Opinion ID: 1202382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Carrying Out the Jury's Sentence

Text: (25) Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give several requested instructions. The first we shall discuss was defendant's proposed number 31 which provided: You are instructed that if your decision in the penalty phase of this trial, is that the defendant should be put to death, the sentence will be carried out. On the other hand, if you determine that life without the possibility of parole is the proper sentence, you are instructed that the defendant will never be released from prison. During voir dire virtually all the jurors were informed, either by defense counsel or through general instructions from the court, that they should assume the sentence they voted for, whether death or life without possibility of parole, would be carried out. Defense counsel also commonly suggested that the jury would be so instructed at the conclusion of the penalty phase. Despite what may have been conveyed to the jurors on voir dire, the trial court subsequently rejected the requested instruction on this subject since it was untrue and ignored a number of factors that might have meant this defendant either would not be put to death or would not serve the rest of his life in prison. Whatever its value in impressing on the jurors the seriousness of their task at the outset of the the case โ and that was the tone of questions to the jurors on this point โ the instruction was, in the court's view, an inappropriate and misleading instruction for a jury entering into actual deliberations on penalty. In a way, this proposed instruction presents a sort of reverse Briggs problem. The Briggs instruction informed the jury that the Governor had the power to commute or modify a sentence of life without possibility of parole to one of life with possibility of parole. (ง 190.3, 5th par.) Inferences from such instruction would include the possibility that a sentence of life without possibility of parole would not be carried out. The United States Supreme Court found no federal Constitutional error in an accurate instruction bringing to the jury's attention the possibility that the defendant might be returned to society. ( California v. Ramos, supra, 463 U.S. 992, 1003-1013 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1182-1183].) This court nonetheless invalidated this instruction on state constitutional grounds, concluding that it invited the jury to be influenced by speculative and improper considerations. A jury might conclude that the penalty of death was the only penalty that could prevent defendant's return to society, not realizing that even a death penalty could be commuted. The jury would also be speculating on the fact that defendant in a certain number of years would be eligible for commutation and that a person as yet unidentified โ a future Governor โ might be inclined to grant his release. ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1150, 1151; People v. Myers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 250, 270-273 [233 Cal. Rptr. 264, 729 P.2d 698]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153-158 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430].) Applying these principles here, the first and principal problem with the proposed instruction is that it is not accurate. It ignores the power of the superior court to reduce a sentence of death on review under section 190.4, subdivision (e). It ignores the Governor's power of commutation. In commenting on its decision in California v. Ramos , the United States Supreme Court noted the prerequisite for upholding the Briggs instruction had been the determination that the instruction was both relevant to a legitimate state penological interest and accurate. ( Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320, 335 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 243, 105 S.Ct. 2633].) It is as incorrect to tell the jury the penalty of death or life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out as it is to suggest they need not take their responsibility as seriously because the ultimate determination of penalty rests elsewhere. The proposed instruction also invites, although not explicitly, the same sort of speculation as to whether unidentified officials will in the future perform their job in a specified way and whether defendant will be unsuitable for any modification of his sentence. In general, impressing the jury with the weight of its responsibility is beneficial. Hence it was not necessarily error to suggest to them on voir dire that the sentence they decide on will be carried out. [29] At the stage of formal instruction to the jury at the penalty phase, however, the effect of the inaccuracy in this instruction is hard to predict. We commented in Ramos that if a jury were to raise the issue of commutation, the trial court should briefly address the issue by accurately informing the jury of the commutation power but cautioning them against considering this factor in determining appropriate sentence. ( Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 159, fn. 12.) Likewise should the defense request it, such a cautionary instruction should be given. Similarly in this case, had the jury raised during deliberations the issue of whether sentence would in fact be carried out, the issue would have had to be addressed. Or had the requested instruction correctly informed the jury that whether or not there were circumstances that might preclude either the death penalty or life without possibility of parole from being carried out, they should assume it would be carried out for purposes of determining the appropriate sentence for this defendant, such instruction should have been given. This requested instruction, however, was properly refused. The fact that the subject had been mentioned during voir dire does not mean that refusing this requested instruction was error. ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 770.)