Opinion ID: 164789
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's March 29 Letter

Text: 45 As further support for their argument that the FHWA failed to comply with Section 4(f), the Plaintiffs rely on a March 29, 2002, letter from the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to the FHWA. In the letter, the Advisory Council 46 question[ed] the validity of the earlier no effect and no adverse effect determinations made by FHWA, and concurred in by the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), since they were carried out under the terms of the Substitution Agreement Between the Advisory Council and the New Mexico SHPO ... which expired in April 1999. 47 Aplts' App. vol. III, at 599 (Letter from Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, dated March 29, 2002). Based on these overarching flaws in the process, the Advisory Council concluded that FHWA will need to reevaluate all previous findings and determinations related to this undertaking to ensure that the procedures set forth in our regulations are properly met. Id. 2 48 Our consideration of the letter does not lead us to conclude that the FHWA's determination of no effect was in error. First, the concern over the expiration of the Substitution Agreement between the Advisory Council and the New Mexico SHPO is resolved by a subsequent letter from the Advisory Council to the SHPO. 3 See Aples' Supl.App. vol. II, at 443 (Letter from Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, dated May 8, 2002). That letter states: 49 Since Federal agencies have submitted numerous projects to the New Mexico SHPO subsequent to the expiration of the Substitution Agreement, we believe that it is necessary to clarify the status of Section 106 reviews concluded during this period. It is our opinion that the outcomes reached ... between April 1999 and March 2002 ... shall be binding and evidence satisfactory compliance with the requirements of Section 106, unless the New Mexico SHPO or Council have received a timely and substantive objection from the public. 50 Id. 51 The Plaintiffs counter the May 8 letter by arguing that it did not relate specifically to the Hondo Valley Project and that the Council did in fact receive timely objections from the public. We acknowledge that the May 8 letter does not speak to the other concerns articulated by the Advisory Council in the March 29 letter. Taking into account the May 8 letter, however, we do not believe that the expiration of the Substitution Agreement alone is evidence of failure to comply with Section 4(f). 52 Moreover, the other primary concern reflected in the Advisory Council's March 29 letter, that FHWA did not initiate the consultation process for this undertaking pursuant to 36 C.F.R. Section 800.3, also does not establish that the agency erred. Id., vol. III, at 599. As the D.C. District Court acknowledged, section 800.3 does not mandate consultation with the public in the instance where it has been determined that the undertaking `does not have the potential to cause effect on historic properties.' Valley Cmty. I, 231 F.Supp.2d at 36 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a)(1)). We agree with that district court's finding that the FHWA was not mandated to adhere to the findings of the [Advisory Council], as they had determined that there would not be any use of historic properties. Id. We further note that the FHWA did attempt to address the Advisory Council's concerns through the Programmatic Agreement, which the Advisory Council agreed to and signed in July 2002, approximately four months after voicing its concerns in the March 29 letter. Thus the concerns raised in the Advisory Council's March 29 letter do not alter our conclusion that the FHWA complied with Section 4(f). 53 2. Definition of the Area of Potential Effects 54 Plaintiffs' other major argument concerns the definition of the area of potential effects employed during the Section 106 review process. As described in Part II(B) above, the area of potential effects is the geographic area or areas within which an undertaking may directly or indirectly cause alterations in the character or use of historic properties, if any such properties exist. 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(d). Plaintiffs contend that the area of potential effects, as defined by the FHWA, was presumptively invalid, Aplts' Br. at 34, and that as a result, the FHWA's conclusion that no Section 4(f)-protected properties would be used was [a]rbitrary and [c]apricious. Id. at 33. 55 Establishing an area of potential effects requires a high level of agency expertise, and as such, the agency's determination is due a substantial amount of discretion. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976) (Resolving these issues requires a high level of technical expertise and is properly left to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies. Absent a showing of arbitrary action, we must assume that the agencies have exercised this discretion appropriately.) (internal citation omitted). 56 Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the area of potential effects a) was arbitrarily set at 150 feet, thus excluding many structures within 200 feet of the roadway; b) excluded many properties that may suffer adverse effects as a result of vibration impacts and/or traffic noise; and c) focused exclusively on the footprint of the structures themselves, and did not consider the larger property boundaries for these buildings, including any natural or topographical features associated with these buildings. Aplts' Br. at 42. 57 a. Exclusion of structures within 200 feet of the roadway 58 The FHWA adopted a variable area of potential effects of between 150 and 500 feet from the edge of the existing U.S. 70. For much, if not most of the roadway, it appears that an area of potential effects of 150 feet was used. 4 Plaintiffs argue that this restrictive area of potential effects resulted in a failure to evaluate the impact of the project on over one hundred buildings located within 200 feet of the roadway. Essentially, Plaintiffs contend that the FHWA should have established an area of potential effects of 200 feet instead of 150 feet. 59 The FHWA selected the 150-foot variable area of potential effects in consultation with the SHPO, as set forth in Section 106 regulations at 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.4(a). The FHWA explains that [t]he [area of potential effects] was defined by the area FHWA reasonably believed might be impacted by the Project once it was built, and included considerations for noise, visual effects, and vibrations. Aples' Br. at 35. The determination of the area of potential effects took into account both direct and indirect potential effects of the project and varied throughout the corridor depending on the type of resource and the nature of [the] potential effect. See Aplts' App. vol. II, at 454. 60 Having carefully reviewed the pertinent regulations, the record before us, and the district court's findings, we conclude, for substantially the same reasons as the district court, that these variable APEs were based on a consideration of the relevant factors and that there has not been a clear error or judgment. Valley Cmty. II, 246 F.Supp.2d at 1173. 61 b. Vibration and noise impacts 62 Next, the Plaintiffs argue that the 150-foot area of potential effects failed to take into account indirect effects, including vibration impacts resulting from blasting activities and noise impacts resulting from traffic on U.S. 70, that might rise to the level of a constructive use. Having examined the record, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not established that the Hondo Valley Project will use any Section 4(f)-protected properties, either directly or constructively. 63 The FHWA regulations explicitly address vibration impacts, distinguishing between vibration impacts that result from construction activities and vibration impacts that result from the operation of a facility. Vibration impacts resulting from construction activities are not considered a use under Section 4(f) provided [v]ibration levels from project construction activities are mitigated, through advance planning and monitoring of the activities, to levels that do not cause a substantial impairment of the section 4(f) resource. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(5)(ix). In this case, the FHWA adopted a vibration monitoring program to include monitoring before and during project construction, and visual inspections of potentially affected buildings to determine pre-construction conditions and to identify any structural damage that occurs during construction. Aples' Supl.App. vol. II, at 183 (Final EIS). The plan provided for repair of any damage resulting from construction. We are satisfied that this monitoring program comports with the regulations so as to avoid a constructive use as a result of construction-related vibrations. 64 The Plaintiffs' contention that traffic noise may result in a constructive use is also without merit. The Plaintiffs suggest that the new four-lane highway will result in a permanently increased traffic volume; however, there is no evidence to support this assertion. In fact, the Final EIS concluded that [t]raffic volumes on U.S. 70 are expected to be similar with all three alternatives, including the no-build alternative. Id. The Plaintiffs have not established that [t]he projected noise level increase attributable to the project substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of a noise-sensitive facility of a resource protected by section 4(f), 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(4)(i), thus we cannot conclude that the FHWA failed to evaluate indirect effects of the project that may result in a constructive use. 65