Opinion ID: 1059140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Limiting Voir Dire and Failure to Strike Jury Panel

Text: In his fourth assignment of error, Powell contends that the trial court erred in not permitting him to question prospective jurors about whether knowledge of Powell's prior conviction for capital murder and its subsequent reversal on appeal would influence their opinion as to his guilt. Powell concedes that a prospective juror with knowledge of a defendant's prior conviction is subject to disqualification on that ground. Barker, 230 Va. at 375, 337 S.E.2d at 733. But see Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (refusing to grant a new trial where several jurors had pretrial knowledge of the defendant's prior conviction for the same crime). Powell contends, however, that in his case the jury would ultimately learn of his prior conviction during the trial and, thus, asserts that he should have been able to question jurors on the effect this evidence would have on them. The purpose of voir dire is to ascertain whether [a prospective juror] is related to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein. Code § 8.01-358. To that end, prospective jurors may be asked any question relevant to determine whether they may be subject to being removed from the venire for cause. The test of relevancy is whether the questions relate to any of the four criteria set forth in the statute. If an answer to the question would necessarily disclose, or clearly lead to the disclosure of the statutory factors of relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice, it must be permitted. LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984) The question that Powell attempted to ask the first panel of the venire was not one that would necessarily disclose, or clearly lead to the disclosure of the statutory factors of relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice of the prospective jurors. The panel had already indicted that they had no prior knowledge of the case and had not formed an opinion as to Powell's guilt or innocence. Powell's question would not have revealed any preexisting opinion or bias with respect to his case, but would instead have served to test the jurors' potential response to the evidence that he expected the Commonwealth to present. Whether to permit a party to ask a question that goes beyond what is permissible under Code § 8.01-358 is a matter entirely within the trial court's discretion. Id. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to permit Powell to test the potential response of the jurors to the evidence that would be adduced at trial concerning his prior conviction. In his eighth assignment of error, Powell contends that, having denied him the opportunity to question the potential jurors on this point, the trial court should have disqualified for cause the five members of the first panel because his attempt to question them provided them with knowledge that he had been previously convicted for the capital murder of Stacey Reed. Thus, he contends that these jurors were subject to automatic exclusion under Barker. Even if we were to agree that Powell's curtailed question provided the five prospective jurors with sufficient information to raise the concern for potential prejudice that the jurors' full knowledge of the defendant's prior conviction raised in Barker, that circumstance arose here through Powell's own conduct during the voir dire. The record demonstrates that Powell's counsel was fully aware that advising the prospective jurors that Powell had been previously convicted of capital murder carried with it the potential for creating bias against his client, but apparently deemed this risk acceptable in order to seek the strategic advantage of being able to test the jurors' potential response to the evidence concerning that conviction during the trial. Counsel further recognized the risk that the trial court would not permit him to pursue that line of questioning, and, as we have just determined, was within its discretion to do so. Under the invited error doctrine Powell may not benefit from his counsel's voluntary, strategic choice to place Powell at a potential disadvantage in the hope, unproductive though it was, of gaining some advantage. See, e.g., Moore v. Hinkle, 259 Va. 479, 491, 527 S.E.2d 419, 426 (2000); Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 400, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970); Clark v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 787, 791, 120 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1961). No litigant, even a defendant in a criminal case, will be permitted to approbate and reprobateto invite error ... and then to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong. Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417, 374 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1766, 104 L.Ed.2d 201 (1989). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to strike the members of the first voir dire panel for cause under the particular circumstances created by Powell in this case.