Opinion ID: 213525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Taylor argues that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided and abetted Blake in the October 20, 2005, drug deal. In this, Taylor faces a nearly insurmountable hurdle: to prevail, he must show that after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir.2008). Further, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal conviction, we do not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the jury's credibility determinations. Id. To establish that Taylor aided and abetted Blake, the government needed to prove that Taylor associated himself with the criminal activity and that he voluntarily participated in it. United States v. Heath, 188 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Sewell, 159 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir.1998). Association means that Taylor shared in Blake's criminal intent; participation means that Taylor affirmatively acted to make the venture succeed. Heath, 188 F.3d at 921. Taylor's participation in the October 20 drug sale is demonstrated in the record: not only did he drive Blake to and from Ivory's house, but he also rented the vehicle used. Both of these are affirmative, voluntary acts that contributed to the success of the drug deal. What Taylor contests is whether the government proved that he associated himself with the deal: he argues that there was no evidence of anything other than his presence at the scene of the drug deal, and that mere presence is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for aiding and abetting. While he does not appeal his conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack, he argues that all of the evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy related to a period of time months after the October 20 transaction and thus does not support a reasonable inference that he had the necessary intent to aid Blake at the time of the deal. Taylor's premise is correctthere is nothing illegal about renting a car or using that car to give someone a ride. And the mere fact that Taylor's actions aided the venture is not enough to support a conviction without evidence that Taylor knew of the purpose of the venture and intended to abet the drug deal. But Taylor understates the evidence against him. The government introduced enough evidence for the jury to find that Taylor was not merely present. Most significantly, Woods testified that just five days before the recorded controlled buy, Taylor had driven Blake on another controlled buy. At that first buy, moreover, Woods stated that Taylor had actually handled the crack, passing it from Blake to Ivory. This evidence alone refutes Taylor's mere presence theory: Taylor's direct participation with Blake in a crack deal five days prior, in a virtually identical situation, permits the jury to infer that he was not innocently driving Blake to and from Ivory's house, but instead that Taylor rented and drove the Ford Explorer intending to assist Blake in distributing crack. Accordingly, Taylor's conviction for distributing crack on October 20 stands.