Opinion ID: 2811263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wyatt’s Testimony

Text: Michael Wyatt, an Assistant El Paso County Attorney who was the lead litigator in a civil lawsuit against Garcia and LKG for the very conduct involved in this suit, testified for the government regarding, among other things, what he uncovered about Madrid’s educational background during his investigation of the conspiracy. On appeal, Madrid contends that (1) allowing Wyatt’s testimony with regard to Madrid’s Ph.D. was improper under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and (2) the district court violated Madrid’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and abused its discretion 33 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 34 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 when it limited counsel’s ability to cross-examine Wyatt as to his potential bias.
Wyatt testified that Madrid obtained a Ph.D., “but it was actually a degree from a degree mill.” Madrid’s counsel contemporaneously objected, contending that there was no predicate laid for the testimony and that it was merely Wyatt’s opinion. The district court sustained counsel’s objection, but Wyatt continued to testify that he conducted research into the online university where Madrid received his Ph.D., and that it is considered to be a degree mill. The district court overruled Madrid’s further objections. Wyatt continued, “[the university] was investigated. A number of articles were written about it, that the individual who founded it wound up going to prison for tax evasion, and it was basically just a guy operating out of a store front.” Madrid contends that the admission of this evidence violated the Federal Rules of Evidence and requires that we vacate his conviction. “A district court’s admission of evidence, if objected to, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 516-17 (5th Cir. 2013). 23 Even when the district court abuses its discretion by admitting inadmissible evidence, however, we must “view the error in relation to the entire trial[,] . . . determine whether the inadmissible evidence contributed to the jury’s verdict and reversal is warranted only if the evidence had a 23Here, Madrid objected at trial to Wyatt’s testimony as “hearsay” and argued that it “lacked a foundation.” Despite the Government’s arguments to the contrary, we conclude that this objection was sufficiently specific to properly preserve the issue. See generally United States v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009) (“To preserve error, an objection must be sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the nature of the alleged error and to provide an opportunity for correction.” (citing United States v. Ocana, 204 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2000)). We will therefore conduct our review under the abuse of discretion standard. See Nelson, 732 F.3d at 516-17. 34 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 35 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 substantial impact on the verdict.” United States v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455, 463 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Generally, a witness may not testify to a matter unless the witness has personal knowledge of it. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Here, Wyatt expressly conceded that his testimony was not based on personal knowledge but, rather, was based on information he learned by reading unspecified articles. Assuming without deciding that the admission of this testimony amounts to an abuse of discretion, we find no reversible error. The quality of Madrid’s Ph.D. was not a substantial piece of evidence in the government’s case and had little probative value as to the critical issues. Considering the record in its totality— which included testimony of a coconspirator and ample circumstantial evidence—we conclude that Wyatt’s testimony about Madrid’s Ph.D. did not have a substantial impact on the verdict and, therefore, any error in the admission of Wyatt’s testimony about Madrid’s Ph.D. was harmless. Accord United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding harmless error where the improper admission of the defendant’s prior conviction “added little to the government’s case” as compared with “the detailed testimony of the two co-conspirators[] [and the] significant amount of strong circumstantial evidence”).
During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Wyatt, Madrid’s counsel elicited testimony that Wyatt was working on the civil suit against Garcia and LKG. Thereafter, Madrid’s counsel questioned Wyatt about his assistance with the criminal prosecution. The government objected to defense counsel’s question as to whether Wyatt sat at the government’s counsel table during Garcia’s guilty plea proceeding and the district court sustained the objection. The court also sustained objections to defense counsel’s questions as to whether 35 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 36 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 Wyatt supplied the FBI with information for the criminal investigation or prosecution. Madrid’s counsel argued that this line of cross-examination goes towards the credibility of the witness and contended that he is allowed to impeach a witness with respect to bias. Madrid argued that if he were permitted to present it, he had an email from Wyatt to the FBI, referring to the FBI agents by first name saying, “Hey here are some materials. . . . Please have Eddie look to see if he’s interested.” Counsel argued that this evidence would allow the defense to argue that the prosecution was “borne by the county attorney’s office.” Madrid contends on appeal that the district court’s ruling that precluded Madrid from fully cross-examining Wyatt as to his bias and interest in the prosecution was an abuse of discretion and violated Madrid’s Sixth Amendment rights under the confrontation clause. “A defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses against him is a constitutional right secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir. 2004). “Alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo, but are subject to a harmless error analysis.” United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 2004). “The Confrontation Clause is satisfied where defense counsel has been allowed to expose the jury to facts from which the jury ‘could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” United States v. Heard, 709 F.3d 413, 432 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 470. If we conclude that “there is no Sixth Amendment violation, [we] [next] address[] whether the district court abused its discretion by limiting cross-examination.” United States v. Jimenez, 464 F.3d 555, 558-59 (5th Cir. 2006). “We will not find an abuse of discretion ‘absent a showing that the limitations were clearly prejudicial.’” United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Diaz, 36 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 37 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 637 F.3d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 2011)). “Prejudice is shown only if ‘a reasonable jury might have had a significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility if defense counsel had been allowed to pursue the questioning.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir. 2004)). Assuming arguendo that the district court violated Madrid’s Confrontation Clause rights by limiting his ability to cross-examine Wyatt regarding his involvement and interest in the prosecution, we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [A]ny violation of the confrontation right is subject to harmless error review by analyzing the following factors: “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)). Balancing these factors, particularly the substantial weight of the evidence adduced against Madrid, outlined above, and the fact that Madrid was permitted to cross-examine Wyatt as to his involvement in the related civil litigation, 24 we conclude that any Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Skelton, 514 F.3d at 443 (reasoning that, even if there was a Confrontation Clause violation, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because defense counsel was permitted to “explore the issue of bias” on crossexamination and the witness’s testimony, although key to the prosecution’s 24 During cross-examination, Madrid elicited the fact that Wyatt was the lead attorney representing the County in the civil suit against Garcia and LKG and that the litigation was filed five years ago but is still pending, in part because of the ongoing criminal prosecutions. Additionally, in an effort to diminish Wyatt’s reliability, Madrid’s counsel elicited testimony that some of the allegations in the civil indictment were inexplicably false. Accordingly, the jury was aware of some facts from which they could reasonably infer Wyatt’s bias. 37 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 38 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 case, was corroborated by two others); United States v. Pryor, 483 F.3d 309, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that, even if there were a Confrontation Clause error, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where “[t]he government’s evidence against [the defendant] was substantial”). We likewise assume arguendo that the district court’s limitation on Madrid’s ability to cross-examine Wyatt amounts to an abuse of discretion, but, for the reasons discussed directly above, we cannot find that, had Madrid’s counsel been able to pursue his line of cross-examination, the jury would have had a “significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility,” and, therefore, we conclude that any abuse of discretion was not prejudicial and does not warrant reversal. Bernegger, 661 F.3d at 239. 4. Evidence Regarding the Judge Cobos Bribe At trial, the government presented evidence that Garcia met with judge- elect Anthony Cobos several times about the renewal of LKG’s contract with the County; that Cobos solicited money in exchange for his support of the LKG contract; and that Garcia and Madrid (and others) met with Cobos and provided him envelopes that contained cash. Madrid contends that the evidence regarding the bribe to Judge Cobos was improperly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and irrelevant under Rule 403 because Madrid was “not on trial for any bribe of Anthony Cobos, and such a bribe is not mentioned at all in the superseding indictment.” The government contends that this evidence was “intrinsic” to the criminal charges here in that it was “inextricably intertwined with the conspiracy,” and thus is admissible and relevant. Alternatively, the government argues that, even if “extrinsic,” the evidence was nonetheless admissible under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) “generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on the [defendant’s] character.” Huddleston 38 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 39 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). However, evidence of other “crimes, wrongs, or other acts,” can be admitted, not to prove character, but to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). “The proper test to apply in deciding the admissibility of ‘similar acts’ or ‘other acts’ evidence depends upon whether the evidence in question is ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ evidence.” United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990). Evidence is “intrinsic” when the evidence of the other act and the evidence of the crime charged are “inextricably intertwined,” if both acts are part of a “single criminal episode,” or if the other acts were “necessary preliminaries” to the crime charged. Id.; see also Turner, 674 F.3d at 431. “Intrinsic evidence is admissible to ‘complete the story of the crime by proving the immediate context of events in time and place,’ and to ‘evaluate all of the circumstances under which the defendant acted[,]’” and thus does not implicate Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). United States v. Carrillo, 660 F.3d 914, 927 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Comparatively, if the evidence is with regard to a “distinct and distinguishable event,” then it is not intrinsic and we must then determine whether it was nonetheless properly admitted under Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 504 F.3d 561, 574 (5th Cir. 2007). Here, we conclude that the evidence of Judge Cobos’s bribe was intrinsic because it was “inextricably intertwined” with the conspiracy to defraud the United States in that it “complete[d] the story of the crime by proving the immediate context of events in time and place,” allowing the jury to assess “all of the circumstances under which [Madrid and Garcia] acted.” Carrillo, 660 F.3d at 927. The government presented evidence that the bribe to Cobos was undertaken for the very purpose of continuing one of the conspiratorial objectives—fraudulently maintaining the LKG contract to obtain federal funds 39 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 40 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 by false pretenses. The evidence at issue demonstrated that Madrid and Garcia conspired to attempt to continue the conspiracy to unlawfully procure federal funds under the SAMHSA grant by bribing Judge Cobos for his support of the contract’s renewal. This evidence therefore further established for the jury the “conspiratorial relationship” between Garcia and Madrid and, as noted, provided relevant contextual evidence regarding the nature and extent of the conspiracy. See United States v. Watkins, 591 F.3d 780, 784 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 749 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that where “non-plead . . . actions tend to show the conspiratorial relationship between [the coconspirators], during the life of the conspiracy, . . . such ‘other acts’ are intrinsic to the Government’s proof and not subject to Rule 404(b)”). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting this intrinsic evidence. 5. Cumulative Error In his last challenge to his conviction, Madrid contends that the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of his conviction because the combination of the errors in his trial denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial. See generally United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 343-44 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “‘Cumulative error’ justifies reversal only when errors ‘so fatally infect the trial that they violated the trial’s fundamental fairness.’” Delgado, 672 F.3d at 344 (quoting United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 362 (5th Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted)). “We have repeatedly emphasized that the cumulative error doctrine necessitates reversal only in rare instances and have previously stated en banc that ‘the possibility of cumulative error is often acknowledged but practically never found persuasive.’” Id. (quoting Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1456 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (footnote omitted)). Here, although 40 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 41 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 we assumed arguendo that the district court erred with regard to the Pinkerton instruction, the admission of Wyatt’s testimony regarding Madrid’s Ph.D., and the limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of Wyatt, these errors are not so pervasive that this court should conclude that the defendant received an unfair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 418 (5th Cir. 1998).