Opinion ID: 4533839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of claims

Text: On direct appeal, Mr. Gray argued he received ineffective assistance when his trial counsel failed to (1) request that the state court require the prosecutor to specify the acts of rape, sodomy, and molestation underlying each count, (2) object earlier to the prosecutor’s comment on his failure to testify, and (3) object to other instances of prosecutorial misconduct, including the prosecutor’s attempts to elicit sympathy for the victim. The OCCA rejected each argument for failure to show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland. Gray, No. F-2014-322, slip. op. at 17-18. The district court, citing the OCCA’s analysis, agreed Mr. Gray had not shown a reasonable probability that trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance would have changed the outcome of his trial. Gray, 2020 WL 873908, at -14. It also concluded “the OCCA’s determination of this claim was in accordance with Supreme Court law” and “was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” Id. at . 11 Mr. Gray offers no basis to challenge the decisions of the OCCA or district court. He does not contest the prejudice analysis under Strickland; argue that the OCCA’s decision was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); or explain why the district court “should have . . . resolved [the claim] in a different manner,” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. He is not entitled to a COA. ii. Arguments raised in application for post-conviction relief The state trial court, OCCA, and district court determined that 22 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1086 barred Mr. Gray’s later-raised arguments for ineffective assistance of counsel because he could have brought them on direct appeal but did not. The district court concluded Mr. Gray had “not presented any evidence of cause and prejudice” or made “a colorable claim” for a fundamental miscarriage of justice, as necessary “to overcome [§ 1086’s] bar.” Gray, 2020 WL 873908, at -15. We have reviewed Mr. Gray’s brief in district court and agree. 7 Reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the district court’s decision. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. We therefore deny a COA. 7 The Supreme Court has held that “a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012); see Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 422 (2013). Mr. Gray has made no such argument here. Although he argued in the district court that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he has abandoned that claim on appeal. 12 Insufficient Evidence (Claim VII/Issue C) Mr. Gray asserts violation of his due process rights because the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. He raised this argument for the first time in his application for post-conviction relief. The state trial court held it was barred under 22 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1086 for failure to raise it on direct appeal, and the OCCA agreed. The district court concluded that Mr. Gray had failed to overcome the procedural bar with evidence of prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Gray, 2020 WL 873908, at . Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s ruling. Mr. Gray claims on appeal that “there was no physical evidence of any type of rape” and that the “[coworker’s] testimony was all hearsay.” Aplt. Br. at 6. But these points go to the merits of his insufficient evidence claim, “not . . . the district court’s procedural bar ruling.” James v. Martin, 567 F. App’x 594, 599 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). Because Mr. Gray has not argued prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice from application of the procedural bar, he is not entitled to a COA. 8 8 In Issue D of his brief, Mr. Gray argues the state trial court violated his “postconviction due process and constitutional rights” by failing to provide notice of certain court filings and hearings. Aplt. Br. at 7. Because Mr. Gray did not raise this argument in his § 2254 habeas application, we will not review it here. See Hammon, 466 F.3d at 926 n.8; McLuckie, 337 F.3d at 1200 n.3. 13