Opinion ID: 2631067
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invited Error Generally Requires an Affirmative Representation to the Court

Text: ¶ 18 We have recently stated, Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues. [21] The following cases illustrate affirmative representations that can properly be characterized as leading the court into error. ¶ 19 In State v. Hamilton, [22] the defendant argued on appeal that instructions given to the jury were prejudicial. [23] But before the trial court instructed the jury on the law, defense counsel had approved the disputed language. [24] The trial court specifically required counsel to confirm on the record, that the State takes no exception to the instructions . . . nor does the Defense. [25] Defense counsel did so by affirmatively indicating that they had no objections to the jury instructions. [26] Thus, we held that the manifest injustice exception did not apply because invited error precluded review of the jury instructions. [27] ¶ 20 In State v. King, [28] defense counsel made an affirmative representation to the trial court, both during and after voir dire, that he had no objection to the jury panel that was selected. [29] We held that the defendant had failed to preserve the issue of whether the jury was impartial for appellate review and stated that the defendant must demonstrate plain error. [30] We recognized, however, that defense counsel's affirmative representations to the court that he had no objections to the jury panel implicated the invited error doctrine. [31] But we declined to apply invited error only because the State had failed to raise the issue in its brief. [32] ¶ 21 In State v. Dunn, [33] the defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it reversed its pretrial ruling and allowed questioning about his prior conviction. [34] He argued that if he had known that the prior conviction was going to be admissible, he would not have taken the stand or, at the very least, he would have deflected the impact of the prior conviction by disclosing it during his case-in-chief. [35] We held that the defendant was precluded from raising this claim of error because of the invited error doctrine. [36] ¶ 22 In Dunn, defense counsel moved to exclude the evidence of the prior conviction, providing the trial court with citations to the authority on which the court based its pretrial ruling. [37] But contrary to [the defendant's] position before the trial judge, the law at the time clearly allowed evidence of prior convictions to be admitted for impeachment purposes without any restriction. [38] We concluded that [defense] counsel's actions in making the motion in limine without informing the trial judge of the controlling law had led the trial court into error. [39] We therefore held that the defendant was precluded from asserting that the pretrial ruling misled him into taking the stand. [40]