Opinion ID: 1779062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lemon v. Kurtzman

Text: ś 28. Our current interpretive guidance for an Establishment Clause analysis is Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2135, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), which describes the primary purpose of the Establishment Clause as preventing sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. Id. at 612 (quoting from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970)). ś 29. Reliance upon Lemon for Establishment Clause analysis is unpleasant, but required. In 1947, the United States Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of government aid to religious institutions. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711(1947), the Court, grounding its newly-discovered constitutional imperative in the words of Thomas Jefferson, stated, The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. Id. at 18, 67 S.Ct. 504. Everson, and its progeny, led to numerous separation cases, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (holding prayer in public schools unconstitutional), and eventually to Lemon which, although still good law, enjoys little popularity on the Court and elsewhere. For instance, Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, has stated: Like a majority of the Members of this Court, I have previously expressed my disapproval of the Lemon test. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (SCALIA, J., joined by THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (other citations omitted). I would grant certiorari in this case if only to take the opportunity to inter the Lemon test once for all. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1254, 120 S.Ct. 2706, 147 L.Ed.2d 974 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). ś 30. As stated, however, Lemon is our current guidance for application of the Establishment Clause to claims of governmental intrusion into religious territory. Lemon provides a three-pronged test for governmental restrictions on religious activity. To test negative for an Establishment Clause violation, the governmental action must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) not have the primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) avoid excessive entanglement with religion. 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2135. As to the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test, we are provided yet another test to determine when entanglement becomes excessive; that is, we are instructed to examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. Id. at 615, 91 S.Ct. 2135. ś 31. The governmental intrusion which must be tested in the case sub judice is subjecting the Diocese to common law causes of action such as negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment, all springing from the Diocese's alleged negligence in hiring and retaining Broussard. Obviously, no one claims these common law causes of action have anything but a secular purpose, or that they have the primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion. Therefore, having disposed of the first two prongs of the Lemon test, we are left with the third, that is to say, we are left to determine whether enforcement of these common law causes of action against the Diocese would result in excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2135. As Lemon teaches, we must therefore examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted (by those laws), the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. Id. at 615, 91 S.Ct. 2135. ś 32. Similarly, the first two prongs of this test (character and purpose of benefitted institutions, and nature of the state aid) are not at issue; instead, it is whether the resulting relationship between government and the Diocese creates excessive entanglement. To address this question, we turn to interpretive case law. M.K. v. The Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon ś 33. As to the Morrisons' vicarious liability, or respondeat superior, theory against the Diocese, we find instructive the analysis of the court in M.K. v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 228 F.Supp.2d 1168 (D.Or.2002), which involved a civil suit for sexual battery against the archdiocese arising out of sexual abuse by priests employed by the archdiocese. The court held: As with any employer-employee relationship, the parameters of a priest's duties can be discerned by reviewing the job description of the priest, in addition to communications between the church and the priest. While this will require the court to consider a number of Defendants' canons delineating the duties of a priest, the court will not need to make any judgment on appropriateness, correctness or validity of any of the canons. The canons will merely define the duties of a priest and the court will then consider whether the Priests' acts of grooming fall within this definition. The court will not in any matter limit the priests duties or the ability of the church to supervise the priests. Id. at 1172. ś 34. Thus, the Oregon federal district court concluded that an examination of the duties and responsibilities of the priest would not excessively entangle the court in ecclesiastical matters. ś 35. We hold that the level of authority and control possessed by the Diocese over the actions of its priests belies any notion that the Diocese is immune from any and all claims against it under the theory of vicarious liability. However, having found that claims of vicarious liability against the Diocese are not jurisdictionally prohibited, we do not hesitate to add that any such claim must be carefully analyzed for a determination of whether the particular activity is of such a religious nature as to remove it from examination by the courts. By way of example, we would not hesitate to allow a claim against a religious organization for negligent operation of an automobile by a church employee. The driving of an automobile is not a religious activity. On the other hand, we would not likely allow a claim of vicarious liability against a religious organization for negligent marriage counseling, since the alleged negligence would require a clear understanding of the particular religion's beliefs and practices with respect to marriage. ś 36. The wrongful act alleged in the case sub judice (for purposes of the vicarious liability claim) is sexual molestation of children. There is nothing remotely religious or ecclesiastical about such reprehensible conduct. And since, according to the affidavits, the Diocese enjoyed substantial power and control over the actions of Broussard, we hold the Morrisons are not foreclosed from bringing their claim of vicarious liability against the Diocese because of an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Whether they will prevail on such theory is a matter for the trial court and/or jury to determine.