Opinion ID: 2599060
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Former Defense Counsel's Association with the Prosecutor's Office Creates a Rebuttable Presumption of Shared Confidences

Text: ¶ 19 The limited issue of whether an entire county attorney's office must be disqualified from a defendant's prosecution when that defendant's former defense counsel becomes employed by the county attorney's office is a question of first impression in Utah. McClellan urges us to adopt a rule requiring per se disqualification. We decline to do so. We agree with the court of appeals that a more flexible rule better reflects Utah's rules, precedent, and policy. Accordingly, we adopt the rule formulated by the court of appeals: [T]o ensure faith in the impartiality and integrity of the criminal justice system, and to prevent a chilling effect on a defendant's willingness to confide in defense counsel, the entire prosecutor's office will be assumed to be privy to the confidences obtained by the former defense lawyer. The prosecutor may rebut this presumption by showing that effective screening procedures have been used to isolate the defendant's former counsel from the prosecution of the substantially related criminal charges. State v. McClellan, 2008 UT App 48, ¶ 22, 179 P.3d 825. ¶ 20 While we have not previously addressed the precise question of the consequences of defense counsel's association with the prosecuting entity during the course of prosecution, the concerns underlying this issue are not new. In State v. Brown, this court adopted a rule prohibiting a city prosecutor from assisting in the defense of an accused, emphasizing that such dual representation would jeopardize[] the vital interests of the criminal justice system, and that fairness and impartiality in the adjudication process must be diligently maintained in order to ensure [public] faith in the impartiality and integrity of the justice system. 853 P.2d 851, 856-58 (Utah 1992). These same policy considerations are at issue here. A presumption of shared confidences between the former defense counsel and the county attorney's office adequately addresses these considerations. ¶ 21 In adopting this rule, we are also guided by the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Clearly, under rule 1.9(a), a former defense attorney is prohibited from participating in the prosecution of his or her former client in the same or a substantially related matter absent that client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. Utah Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.9(a) (2009). Ordinarily, such a conflict of interest is attributed to all members of a disqualified attorney's firm. Id. R. 1.10. However, the Rules of Professional Conduct contemplate that the conflict need not be generally attributed if the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom. Id. R.1.10(c)(1). While this rule applies specifically only to attorneys working in the private sector, it demonstrates our preference for screening over per se disqualification of an entire group of associated attorneys. ¶ 22 We note that other courts are divided over whether per se disqualification of the entire prosecutor's office is necessary to adequately protect the rights of the accused. Lux v. Virginia, 484 S.E.2d 145, 150 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). However, the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have rejected the inflexibility of a per se rule and have held instead that the entire staff ordinarily need not be disqualified from prosecuting the defendant if the staff member who had previously worked for the defendant is isolated from any participation in the prosecution of the defendant. New Mexico v. Pennington, 851 P.2d 494, 498 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); see also Nebraska v. Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Neb. 2008)([W]hen the disqualified attorney is effectively screened from any participation in the prosecution of the defendant, the prosecutor's office may, in general, proceed with the prosecution.); In re R.B., 583 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Based upon the extensive efforts made to screen [former defense counsel] from any communication with anyone in the State's Attorney's Office about this case after her employment with that office . . ., we find no error in the trial court's denial of [defendant's] motions to dismiss or recuse [the entire office].). ¶ 23 The rebuttable presumption of shared confidences which we adopt today avoids the drastic result of disqualifying an entire county attorney's office based on only the appearance of impropriety, without regard to whether any confidence was actually breached or any prejudice to the defendant actually resulted, while at the same time ensuring the rights of the accused are protected. See Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d at 443. The rebuttable presumption allows the trial court [to] evaluate[] the circumstances of a particular case and then determine[] whether disqualification of the entire office is appropriate. Id. In order to rebut the presumption, the burden rests with the prosecutor's office to demonstrate that necessary and effective steps have been taken to prevent the transfer of any confidential information between former defense counsel and those conducting the prosecution. The prosecutor's office must show that it has implemented sufficient measures to screen former defense counsel and that it has consistently followed through with those measures. See Michigan v. Davenport, 760 N.W.2d 743, 750 (Mich Ct. App. 2008).