Opinion ID: 3062995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Substitute

Text: An indigent criminal defendant has a right to be represented by counsel, but “he does not have a right to be represented by a particular lawyer, or to demand a different appointed lawyer except for good cause.” United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973). “Unless a Sixth Amendment violation is shown, whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. In order to warrant a substitution of counsel, “the defendant must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id. A district court’s failure to inquire into the 2 factual basis of a defendant’s dissatisfaction “normally” constitutes “reversible error.” Id. In Young, we held that reversal was not required after considering the record as a whole. Id. at 995-96. The defendant in that case moved for substitution of counsel because he alleged that his attorney was disclosing confidential matters to the prosecution. Id. at 995. The district court rejected that argument based on its professional acquaintance with the defense attorney. Id. We held that reversal was not required because the defense attorney had represented the defendant during his first trial, a successful direct appeal, and second trial. Id. at 994, 996. We noted that the defendant only expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney during the second trial. Id. at 994. Additionally, the second trial was “a virtual duplicate of the first” because the defense strategy was the same for both. Id. at 996. We rejected the defendant’s argument that his distrust of his attorney made effective representation impossible because the record did not demonstrate an irreconcilable conflict between he and his attorney or any breakdown of communication between them. Id. at 996. We ultimately concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint the defendant a new attorney. Id. In this case, although the district court failed to inquire into Quinones’s motion to substitute counsel based on allegations that his attorney had failed to 3 bring an interpreter to several of their meetings prior to sentencing, the record as a whole demonstrates no reversible error. The record demonstrates that Quinones’s former attorney made several objections to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and argued those objections at sentencing. During sentencing, that attorney succeeded in reducing Quinones’s base offense level. Additionally, Quinones did not voice any dissatisfaction with his attorney when the district court gave him an opportunity to address the court at sentencing. Moreover, with the exception of the restitution claim, Quinones with new counsel, now appeals the same issues raised by former counsel. Accordingly, we find no reversible error.