Opinion ID: 78313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Bribery Counts and the Statute of Limitations

Text: Defendants claim that their bribery convictions are time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run no later than the date of Siegelman's receipt of the IHS check or Scrushy's appointment and the indictment was returned more than five years after that. They did not, however, raise this argument before the district court, either in a pretrial motion or at trial. It is, therefore, waived. Defendants do not dispute that they first raised this limitations claim in motions for judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c), over one month after the jury rendered its verdict. We have previously rejected such attempts to challenge the sufficiency of the indictment after the trial. United States v. Ramirez, 324 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir.2003). In Ramirez, we rejected a limitations defense raised by way of a post-trial Rule 29 motion. Id. We held that when a statute of limitations defense is clear on the face of the indictment and requires no further development of facts at trial, a defendant waives his right to raise that defense by failing to raise it in a pretrial motion. Id. at 1228-29. Even where the facts are at issue regarding the limitations period, this court and its predecessor have long held that the statute of limitations is a matter of defense that must be asserted at trial by the defendant and that failure to do so results in a waiver. United States v. Najjar, 283 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir.2002); accord Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir.1933). Other circuits agree. See, e.g., United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d Cir.1986). Requiring the defendant to assert a limitations defense at trial gives the prosecution a fair opportunity to rebut the defense through additional evidence or during summation. See United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Oliva, 46 F.3d 320, 324-25 (3d Cir.1995). Furthermore, the determination of when the crime has been committed for statute of limitations purposes . . . is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Oliva, 46 F.3d at 324-25. Allowing a defendant to raise a limitations defense for the first time in a post-verdict Rule 29 motion is inconsistent with the characterization of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and would unfairly sandbag the government. United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 63 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097, 125 S.Ct. 984, 160 L.Ed.2d 988 (2005). The defendants apparently made a strategic decision not to present a statute of limitations defense at trial. Such a defense would have required them to make an argument to the jury that assumed their guilt on the bribery charges. While defendants are free to make the strategic decision not to do so, they may not later be heard to complain when the claim is held to have been waived. 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Obstruction of Justice Siegelman was charged with two counts of obstruction of justice. [24] The indictment alleged and the government undertook to prove that eighteen months after the $9200 pay-to-play payment to Siegelman from Lanny Young, Siegelman and Bailey became aware of the federal-state corruption investigation and instigated a series of sham check transactions in an effort to coverup the payment. The coverup was designed to make it appear that Bailey had borrowed the $9200 from Young so that he could buy a motorcycle from Siegelman. Count 16 alleged that Siegelman corruptly persuaded Bailey to write a check for $10,503 to Young with the notation repayment of loan plus interest. Count 17 alleged that Siegelman corruptly persuaded Bailey to write and give him a check for $2973.35 with the notation on it that it was the balance due on m/c. Count 17 also alleged that Siegelman engaged in misleading Bailey's attorney with the intent to hinder or prevent the attorney's communication of information regarding these transactions to the FBI. The jury acquitted Siegelman of Count 16, but convicted him on Count 17. Siegelman contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he persuaded Bailey to write the check charged in Count 17 or that he misled Bailey's attorney. We turn now to the evidence. At trial, Young testified that in January of 2000, Siegelman asked him for $9200 to buy a motorcycle and that he gave it to Siegelman as part of the pay-to-play, on-going agreement he had with Siegelman. He also testified that, eighteen months later, after the federal-state corruption investigation began, he and Bailey had the following conversation: Young: Right after the investigation started, Nick [Bailey] called me and asked me if I could recall how I made out the check for the motorcycle. And I saidon what account I had written the check for the motorcycle. And I said no, why? He said because if it's on one of your personal accounts, you are going to have a motorcycle in your driveway tonight. Bailey testified that the coverup began when: Bailey: I found out about the investigation that was going on with Lanny could have involved others; we weren't sure at the time. I wanted to repay Lanny's $9200. I did it in the form of a check. Did a promissory note with Lanny to repay this $9200 plus interest, $10,503. Bailey gave the following testimony regarding Siegelman's involvement in this first step in the coverup: Government: When you went to write this check to Lanny [Young] to disguise this earlier transaction, did you do that with the knowledge of the Governor? Bailey: Yes. Government: Did you talk to him about it before you did it? Bailey: Yes. Government: Was he in agreement with you doing that? Bailey: Yes. Government: When you talked to him about why you were going to do that, did you guys talk about the fact that this criminal investigation was going on? Bailey: Yes. Government: What were you and the Governor trying to accomplish when you wrote that check back to Lanny Young 17 months after that check had been written for $9200 to the Governor? Bailey: To disguise the $9200 that went from Lanny to me to the Governor. Young's testimony regarding the purported repayment was: Government: Had you loaned Nick Bailey any money that would cause him to give you that $10,503 check? Young: No. Government: Well, what was going on when he wrote you that check, if you know? Young: He was trying to make the $9200 look like a loan. Bailey testified that the final step in the coverup was to give Siegelman a $2,793.35 check with the notation on it that it was balance due on m/c to make it appear that the check was Bailey's final payment for the motorcycle. His testimony about Siegelman's involvement in this step of the coverup was: Government: What was going on here? Bailey: We made a decision to finalize the agreement we made regarding the motorcycle early on, and this was to finish that. We met at the Governor's attorney's office and with my attorney, and that's when I finished paying the Governor in full for the motorcycle to carry out the plan that we had entered into probably 12 to 18 months earlier. Government: And what was that plan? Bailey: To disguise the $9200 from Lanny to the Governor. Finally, Bailey testified regarding his interview with the FBI regarding this meeting: Government: Now, not long after [he gave the check to Siegelman] you had an occasion to be interviewed by federal and state criminal investigators, didn't you. Bailey: Yes, sir. Government: When they questioned you about this transaction on that occasion, did you tell them the truth about what had happened? Bailey: No. Government: Why not? Bailey: There were a number of reasons; but primarily, I was still trying to protect myself and my boss. The jury considered all of this testimony and found Siegelman guilty of the obstruction of justice charged in Count 17, but not in Count 16. This means that the jury decided, as a matter of fact, that Siegelman persuaded Bailey to write the check for $2973.35, but not the initial check for $10,500. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict, we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the jury's verdict. United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir.2007). The evidence needs not be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable juror could have concluded that Siegelman persuaded Bailey (he asked and Bailey agreed) to take the final step in the cover up by giving him a $2793.35 check with the notation that it was final payment for the motorcycle. See United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir.1998) (affirming jury inference of persuasion from defendant's strong influence over witness who was employee); United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629-30 (D.C.Cir.1996) (making a request sufficient persuasion). The testimony was that Siegelman knew and agreed that Bailey would disguise Young's payment to Siegelman as a loan to Bailey to buy the motorcycle by paying back Young with his own check. The evidence further showed that Siegelman accepted and cashed the $2973.35 check from Bailey with the notation that it was final payment for the motorcycle. Finally, the jury had heard testimony that Bailey always did what Siegelman asked him to do. The jury's acquittal on Count 16 shows that it was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Siegelman instigated the coverup by directing Bailey to pay back Young with the initial $10,500 check. But by the time Bailey wrote the check to Siegelman for $2793.35, just over four months later, as a final step in the coverup, the jury's conviction on Count 17 indicates that it concluded Siegelman not only knew what Bailey was doing to coverup Young's corrupt payment, but that he was directing the coverup by persuading Bailey to write the check to him. This sort of split verdict is itself evidence that the jury considered the charges carefully and individually, addressed the strength of the evidence on each charge, and reached a reasoned conclusion. See United States v. Dominguez, 226 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir.2000) (making these comments in the context of allegations of premature jury deliberations). Siegelman's argument against the sufficiency of this evidence mirrors that he made against his convictions on virtually all the other countsthat the evidence in this case was not perfect, that it relied too heavily on circumstances and required the jury to draw inferences from those circumstances that might have been drawn differently by different jurors. But this is far too academic a view of trial by jury. In the absence of a defendant's confession or observation of his wrongdoing by a third person, proof by circumstantial evidence and the fair inferences to be drawn therefrom is both necessary and permissible. Siegelman's contention throughout his brief that there was no evidence to support a particular inference too often meant merely that there was no evidence other than Bailey or Young's testimony. While Siegelman may not approve that the testimony of coconspirators was sufficient to support the jury's findings of fact, the jury was free to disregard or disbelieve it. They believed it. With respect to the misleading prong of the statute, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury's finding that the delivery of the final check in the presence of the two lawyers and the use of the lawyers to finalize the sale of the motorcycle to Bailey was an attempt to create witnesses as part of a cover-up and to use unwitting third parties or entities to deflect the efforts of law enforcement agents in discovering the truth, United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1247 (11th Cir.1998) (statute satisfied by the possibility or likelihood that [the defendants'] false and misleading information would be transferred to federal authorities ...). The jury was entitled to infer from the sham check transaction in Bailey's lawyer's presence that Siegelman intended to mislead the lawyer into believing that the transaction was legitimate, that Bailey had, indeed, purchased the motorcycle from him, and that the check was final payment. As the unwitting third party, the lawyer would be in a position factually to support the cover up since Siegelman clearly knew that there was a possibility that the federal investigators would come asking. [25] 4. Admission of a Co-conspirator's Statement Defendants challenge the admission of Hanson's out-of-court statement to Martin at a HealthSouth retreat in the fall of 1999. Martin testified that Hanson was bragging about the fact that he was able to get [HealthSouth] a spot on the CON Board with the help of the [IHS] check. Under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), a court has the discretion to admit coconspirator statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court's admission of such statements is an abuse of its discretion to do so if the statements do not meet this legal standard. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir.2005). This court applies a liberal standard in determining whether a statement was in furtherance of a conspiracy. United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir.1988). The statement need not be necessary to the conspiracy, but must only further the interests of the conspiracy in some way. United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.2002). [I]f the statement `could have been intended to affect future dealings between the parties,' then the statement is in furtherance of a conspiracy. United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir.1979)). Finally, [s]tatements between conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy.... United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir.1983). Even defendants concede that boasting or bragging is in furtherance of a conspiracy if the statements are directed at obtaining the confidence or allaying the suspicions of coconspirators. Santiago, 837 F.2d at 1549. Hanson's statement at the HealthSouth retreat furthered the conspiracy. We agree with the government that, given Martin's own involvement in the conspiracy (obtaining the IHS check), Hanson's bragging to him about purchasing the CON Board seat with the help of the IHS check informed Martin that their plan had worked and that Martin's involvement had helped. This alone is sufficient to permit its introduction under Ammar, 714 F.2d at 252. Additionally, however, the statement is easily seen to affect the coconspirators future dealings because Martin's assistance might be needed in connection with the second $250,000 donation and Hanson knew this. Thus, Hanson's statement easily meets the Caraza standard. 843 F.2d at 436 (approving statement admitted after several acts of conspiracy helping to ensure final acts). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. 5. Juror Misconduct Defendants filed a joint motion for a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a), alleging juror misconduct by way of both juror exposure to extraneous information as well as by improper juror deliberation and that each impropriety violated the Sixth Amendment and requires a new trial. [26] After conducting two evidentiary hearings on this issue, [27] the district court held that no substantial violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred that required a new trial. We review the denial of a motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Venske, 296 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir.2002). [28] We will consider each of the claims of misconduct in turn.