Opinion ID: 1059907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Lakisha Spruill

Text: Shortly before the expected close of the Commonwealth's case in chief, it appeared that a recess until the next day would be required to obtain the presence of a witness for Jackson. To conserve trial time, the court suggested that the Commonwealth rest its case except for some evidence relating to Jackson's failure to conform to court orders to appear in criminal matters and his flight to avoid arrest on an unrelated motor vehicle charge. Defense counsel responded that I think procedurally we cannot do that. When the court responded that it was a perfectly acceptable procedure, defense counsel made and argued the motion to strike, which the court considered and denied. The next day, the Commonwealth called Lakisha Spruill, an eyewitness to Jackson's encounter with Bonney. Jackson objected to this action on the ground that the Commonwealth had rested its case. Jackson did not claim that he would be surprised by Spruill's testimony or that he had not talked to her about her testimony. In fact, he had summoned her as a witness. The court overruled the objection, assigning a number of reasons for its action, one of which was that it had the discretion to vary the order of trial. Jackson argues that he was prejudiced by the court's action (1) in requiring him to argue the motion to strike in which he pointed out the lack of corroboration of Jackson's attempted robbery of Bonney before the Commonwealth had actually rested its case, and (2) in permitting Spruill to testify after Jackson had made his motion to strike. In the absence of a showing of prejudice, a trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, permit the Commonwealth to reopen its case after it has rested and the defendant has moved to strike the evidence. Hargraves v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 604, 608, 248 S.E.2d 814, 816-17 (1978). We will not reverse such a ruling, absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Under the circumstances of this case, and without necessarily approving the procedure followed, we are unable to say that the court abused its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to call Spruill as a witness after it had rested its case. Nor can we say that the trial court erred in holding that Jackson was not prejudiced by its action.