Opinion ID: 2102198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State Constitution Permits the Delegation

Text: Article V, § 1 of the State Constitution is a wellspring of the Comptroller's authority. The provision does not specify financial audits, performance audits or indeed audits at all, but broadly empowers the Legislature to delegate to the Comptroller both supervision of the accounts of any political subdivision of the State and administrative duties incidental thereto. The City zeroes in on a single word of the constitutional provisionaccountsurging that both in the abstract and in the context of the history of the provision, only financial audits were intended. As for the isolated word accounts, as well as the key constitutional phrase supervision of the accounts, we cannot agree that the meaning is so plain and precise as to signify financial audits and prohibit performance audits. Indeed, as we noted in Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp. (256 NY 374, 380), it is hard to think of a situation in which incompetence or laxity so general as to amount to proof of method will not also have direct relation to the accounts of the department or office subject to the criticism, since the wages of the assistants are wastefully expended if reasonably efficient service is not rendered in return ( see also, Ward Telecommunications & Computer Servs. v State of New York, 42 NY2d 289, 290). [2] Thus, use of the word accounts and the phrase supervision of the accounts in article V, § 1 does not restrict the Comptroller to financial audits or preclude inquiry into the efficiency and effectiveness of the City's expenditure of State funds. Authority to supervise the accounts of the State's political subdivisions leaves ample room for wider inquiry by the Comptroller. Nor does our constitutional history evince an intent to so limit the Comptroller's core authority to financial audits. Review of the duties performed by the Comptroller prior to, contemporaneously with and after adoption of article V, § 1 makes clear that authority to supervise accounts has never been confined to examinations of a municipality's financial records but has included the broader inquiry contemplated by performance audits. In 1925, when the Constitution was amended for the first time to describe the Comptroller's responsibilities with respect to political subdivisions, the duties of the Office already included: the examination, investigation and audit of [municipal] fiscal accounts and affairs    to see that controlling statutes [were] observed, that the local activities [were] economically and efficiently administered, to call attention to and correct illegal and irregular practices, and to advise improvements where possible (1925 Annual Report of Comptroller, 1926 NY Legis Doc No. 8, part 1, at xviii; see also, 1924 Annual Report of Comptroller, 1925 NY Legis Doc No. 8, part 1, at xxv). Rather than an intent to limit the Comptroller's core functions, article V, § 1 had as its object protection of the independent character of the Comptroller's audit function. This was accomplished both by preventing the assignment of additional, unrelated duties (such as the accrual and collection of taxes and revenues) and by permitting the assignment of supervision of the accounts of political subdivisions and administrative duties incidental thereto (Report of Reconstruction Commn to Governor Alfred E. Smith on Retrenchment and Reorganization in the State Government [Oct. 10, 1919], 1920 NY Legis Doc No. 51, at 53-54; see also, Blue Cross & Blue Shield v Mc-Call, supra, 89 NY2d at 167-168). The constitutional amendment of 1925 was followed immediately by a legislative commission constituted to recommend coordinate statutory changes. Recognizing that the constitutional amendment did not necessitate changes in the Comptroller's duties with regard to oversight of municipal accounts, the Commission advised that [p]ursuant to the provisions of the constitutional amendment    the duties which at present devolve upon the Comptroller, of supervising the accounts of the various political subdivisions of the State shall be continued (Report of State Reorganization Commn, 1926 NY Legis Doc No. 72, at 24). As such the Comptroller's duties, which included performance examinations, remained unchanged. Subsequent reports reflect that the relationship between the Comptroller and municipalities was of an advisory and helpful nature (4 Report of 1938 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee on State and Local Government in New York, at 341). At the time of the 1938 Constitutional Conventionultimately resulting in our current Constitutionthe Comptroller remained responsible for examining accounts for the purpose of ascertaining the accuracy of the records and the legality of the payment of claims, together with such other investigation as may be necessary in order to determine the efficiency of administration in so far as the fiscal affairs of such municipality are concerned ( id. ). Again, the drafters took no action to reframe or restrict the Comptroller's powers. Thus, we conclude that article V, § 1 permits the delegation of authority to conduct performance audits of political subdivisions of the State.