Opinion ID: 1102409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: people v. mcdonald

Text: Several state courts have reached the same conclusion. In the oft-cited case of People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984), the accuracy of eyewitness identifications was at issue since no other evidence connected the defendant to the murder. The trial court refused to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification. McDonald was subsequently convicted of the murder and sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court reversed McDonald's conviction, reasoning as follows: When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony. Id., 208 Cal.Rptr. at 253-54, 690 P.2d at 727. The court held that the exclusion of the qualified expert's testimony undercut the evidentiary basis of defendant's main line of defensehis attack on the accuracy of the eyewitness identificationsand deprived the jurors of information that could have assisted them in resolving that crucial issue. Id., 208 Cal.Rptr. at 253, 690 P.2d at 726. In applying the California Evidence Code, [13] the court explained that expert opinion may be admitted whenever it would `assist' the jury [and] will be excluded only when it would add nothing at all to the jury's common fund of information.... Id. at 247, 690 P.2d at 720. The court explained that the jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the expert opinion in order to justify its admission. Id. In specifically rejecting the contention that the jurors' knowledge of the problems associated with eyewitness testimony precluded admission of an expert's testimony, the court observed: It is doubtless true that from personal experience and intuition all jurors know that an eyewitness identification can be mistaken, and also know the more obvious factors that can affect its accuracy, such as lighting, distance, and duration. It appears from the professional literature, however, that other factors bearing on eyewitness identification may be known only to some jurors, or may be imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of most. For example, in the case at bar Dr. Shomer would have testified to the results of studies of relevant factors that appear to be either not widely known to laypersons or not fully appreciated by them, such as the effects on perception of an eyewitness's personal or cultural expectations or beliefs, the effects on memory of the witness's exposure to subsequent information or suggestions, and the effects on recall of bias or cues in identification procedures or methods of questioning. Id. (citations omitted). [14] The court dismissed concerns that expert testimony on eyewitness identification would usurp the jury's task of evaluating credibility, concluding that as with all expert testimony, the jury is fully capable of evaluating such expert testimony and could reject it completely after weighing the expert's opinion, reasons, qualifications, and credibility. Id. at 249, 690 P.2d at 722. Other state courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Skamarocius v. State, 731 P.2d 63 (Alaska Ct.App.1987) (holding that judges clearly have authority to permit expert testimony on eyewitness reliability if the testimony is based on information not generally understood by lay people sitting on juries); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow expert testimony on the reliability of identifications).