Opinion ID: 1939942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony about Sean's Cognitive Ability

Text: The defendant also argues on appeal that the trial justice improperly overruled an objection to Mrs. Farley's testimony that her son Sean had the mental maturity level of a ten-to-twelve-year old. [10] The defendant argues that this testimony constituted hearsay because Mrs. Farley was not the person who diagnosed her son's level of cognitive functioning. He further contends that the testimony cannot be properly construed as lay witness opinion and that the prosecution should have presented this testimony through a qualified expert. [11] The state counters that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in allowing Mrs. Farley to opine on her own son's mental maturity level, especially considering that Sean's cognitive limitations were not at issue in the case and had no bearing on defendant's conviction.
It is well settled that `[t]he admissibility of evidence is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.' State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 1005 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1031 (R.I.2004)). We give considerable latitude to a trial justice's rulings made during examination of witnesses at trial. Id. (quoting State v. Gomez, 848 A.2d 221, 237 (R.I.2004)).
Both parties find support for their respective positions in State v. Barrett, 768 A.2d 929 (R.I.2001). In that case, we upheld the ruling of the trial justice precluding lay witnesses, including the defendant's father, from testifying about the defendant's mental state. Id. at 939. We broadly recognized that [a]ny supporting rationales for the admission of lay witness opinion is less available in cases calling for lay opinion on an individual's mental state, especially at a time when that other person was not being observed by the lay witness. Id. at 941. In the case under review, defendant asserts that the prosecutor was permitted to do what this Court held the trial court properly did not permit in Barrett namely, allowing a lay witness to testify to another's mental state. The state, however, emphasizes that the holding in Barrett was predicated on the fact that the decision to permit lay-opinion testimony is left to the sound discretion of the trial justice. Significantly, in Barrett, the defendant's mental state was a disputed element of the crime at issuemurderand our holding pertained narrowly to the defendant's mental state at the time of the killing, an event that the witnesses did not observe. See id. at 939-40. We are of the opinion that Barrett is not controlling with respect to the case before us, in which Sean's cognitive maturity was not an issue. [12] The charges against Mr. Farley had no correlation with Sean's limitations. Additionally, Sean's cognitive ability was not new information to the jury. The state said in its opening statement that Sean has some limitations as to his mental maturity, and both Sean and his mother testified that he attended special education classes in school. As the trial justice indicated to counsel outside the presence of the jury, I think the jury had a chance to observe [Sean] as he testified, and I think that they could see that there had to be some liberties taken with regard to how he was questioned. In light of these circumstances we decline to assign reversible error to Mrs. Farley's testimony concerning her son's mental maturity. Moreover, in State v. Gardiner, 895 A.2d 703, 712 n. 11 (R.I.2006), we noted that [t]here is no precedent in Rhode Island holding that expert testimony is required to establish mental disability under [G.L. 1956] § 11-37-2(1) in which the victim's mental incapacity is an element of first-degree sexual assault. We further observed that [t]he majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue have applied a case-by-case approach to assess whether lay evidence proffered at trial is sufficient to establish the victim's diminished mental state. Gardiner, 895 A.2d at 712 n. 11. Here, there was no allegation that Mr. Farley took advantage of a mentally disabled person. Thus, Sean's mental state was neither an element of an offense with which defendant was charged nor an issue in the case. It was mere surplusage. The trial justice committed no error in allowing Sean's mother to testify concerning his mental capacity. See Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 589, 590 (Alaska Ct. App.1995) (allowing victim's mother to testify about her daughter's mental disability because her lifelong relationship to [the victim] and intimate knowledge of her daughter's condition made her peculiarly well qualified to give lay testimony). Also, we need not tarry over defendant's argument that Mrs. Farley's statement that Sean has the mentality of between a 10 to 12-year old constitutes impermissible hearsay. Even if she were merely repeating a diagnosis made by some other person, which is not at all clear from the context of the questioning, the admission of the statement could not have prejudiced defendant. We are satisfied that the admission of her testimony was a sustainable exercise of the trial justice's discretionary authority.