Opinion ID: 2499424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appealability of tro

Text: [¶ 41] The Town argues as an additional basis to dispose of OSA's appeal that a temporary restraining order is not an appealable order. In support of this argument, it cites to a Colorado case reasoning that such orders are of short duration and terminate with the ruling of the preliminary injunction so that an immediate appeal is not necessary to protect the rights of the parties. See O'Connell v. Colorado State Bank, 633 P.2d 511, 513 (Colo.App.1981). We find this rationale unpersuasive under the present facts and reject the Town's suggestion that the TRO is not an appealable order. [¶ 42] Rule 1.05 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure defines an appealable order as: (a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; or     (e) Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts which: (1) Grant, continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve or modify injunctions[.] W.R.A.P. 1.05. Consistent with Rule 1.05, this Court has held that [g]enerally a judgment or order which determines the merits of the controversy and leaves nothing for future consideration is final and appealable. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Lower Valley Power & Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo.1980); see also Goodman v. Voss, 2011 WY 33, ¶ 22, 248 P.3d 1120, 1126 (Wyo.2011) (order final and appealable where merits of controversy determined). [¶ 43] The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar circumstance when it was presented with an appeal from a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of a Roman Catholic mass during a municipal festival. Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.1990). The Seventh Circuit found the order appealable, explaining: Although 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) does not authorize appeals from temporary restraining orders, San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Investment Trust of America, 692 F.2d 814, 816 (1st Cir.1982); Stricklin v. University of Wisconsin, 420 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir.1970), the order forbidding the observance of mass is not properly characterized as a temporary restraint. Drawing a line between appealable preliminary injunctions and non-appealable TROs makes sense when the TRO holds things in stasis to facilitate an orderly decision. Appellate consideration of such an interim step might disrupt the review the order was supposed to permit, and TROs are so short in duration that an appeal commonly could not be completed before their expiration. Better to allow things to proceed in the district court than to fight at length about the brief interlude until a decision may be rendered on the merits. Nomenclature does not determine whether an order is a preliminary injunction, however, Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 107 S.Ct. 1177, 94 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-88, 94 S.Ct. 937, 951-52, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974), and the name attached to this order is imprecise. It does not create a little delay pending decision. Rather it forbids the mass, which will not be rescheduled. No further proceedings in the district court concerning this mass are in prospect. All questions concerning the 1990 festival have been wrapped up, leaving only the plaintiff's request for an injunction against recurrence. This order is an injunction within the meaning of § 1292(a)(1), and the notice of appeal therefore invokes our jurisdiction. Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1970); see also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Eugene Gressman, 16 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3922 (1977 & 1990 Supp.) (collecting cases). Id. at 1477. [¶ 44] We understand that the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order may not be a final order in the context of on-going litigation. Under those circumstances, both parties would have a further opportunity to be heard at the preliminary injunction stage of proceedings, and the record would likely be better developed for review. In this case, however, there was no on-going litigation. This action began with the ex parte Petition and ended with the issuance of the ex parte TRO, and the TRO is therefore a final appealable order. See Populist Party v. Herschler, 746 F.2d 656, 661 n. 2 (10th Cir.1984) (temporary restraining order is appealable when acts as a final order).