Opinion ID: 874073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are the Records Requested Public Records under the Public Records Act?

Text: The district court held that Mr. Bujak's records regarding his private bank account would not be a public record under our opinion in Derting. In that case, a county prosecuting attorney, with the unanimous approval of the county commissioners, entered into a contract with various cities to prosecute non-conflicting misdemeanors committed in those cities. By resolution, the county commissioners later required the prosecuting attorney to pay various amounts to the county for the use of county facilities used in performing his contracts with the cities, to pay to deputy prosecutors a percentage of all monies collected under the city contracts, and to pay one-fourth of such monies to the county general fund, beginning on a specified date. The plaintiffs in Derting filed a complaint against the prosecuting attorney seeking to require him to account for and pay to the county all monies that he had received under his contracts with various municipalities. The trial court granted the prosecutor's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action, and the plaintiffs appealed. We affirmed on the ground that performing prosecutorial services for cities pursuant to contracts with them was not part of the duties of the prosecutor. Therefore, he received monies under such contracts in his capacity as a private individual and not as a public official. We stated: Clearly, the monies collected by Walker and other prosecutors throughout the state as a result of contracts with municipalities, do not constitute fees in that context, nor are the monies received for the performance of the duties of the office of prosecuting attorney. Rather, they are personal funds received in his capacity as a private individual for the performance of contractual obligations not relating to the duties of the office of prosecuting attorney. Derting v. Walker, 112 Idaho 1055, 1057, 739 P.2d 354, 356 (1987). We also said that the legislature did not intend that a county prosecutor's contract to prosecute city misdemeanors would make the performance of such contract part of the prosecutor's duties. We stated: If, by voluntarily entering into a contract to prosecute city misdemeanors, the performance of that contract automatically then became a portion of the duties of the office of county prosecutor, and monies earned therefrom were required to be turned over to the county, no prosecutor in his right mind would enter into such a contract to take on additional duties for no compensation. The clear intent of the legislature is to the contrary. Id. at 1058, 739 P.2d at 357. Two years later, the legislature made performing such contracts with cities part of the official duties of a prosecuting attorney. It amended Idaho Code section 31-2604(2), to provide that it was a duty of a prosecuting attorney, when a written contract to do so exists between the prosecuting attorney and a city, to prosecute violations for state misdemeanors and infractions and violations of county or city ordinances committed within the municipal limits of that city when the arresting or charging officer is a city employee. Ch. 292, § 1, 1989 Idaho Sess. Laws 719, 719-720. Thus, after that amendment, once a county prosecutor enters into such a contract with a city, performing that contract becomes a duty of the prosecutor during the contract's existence. It is no longer a private contract between the prosecuting attorney, as an individual, and the city. Rather, the performance of the contract is a statutory duty of the prosecuting attorney and it is, therefore, a public contract relating to the duties of the office of prosecuting attorney. Idaho Code section 9-337(13) states that a `[p]ublic record' includes, but is not limited to, any writing containing information relating to the conduct or administration of the public's business prepared, owned, used or retained by any state agency, independent public body corporate and politic or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. The statute states two criteria for determining what constitutes a public record, although the wording includes, but is not limited to, means that other records not meeting that definition may also be public records. Cowles Publ'g Co. v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm'rs, 144 Idaho 259, 263, 159 P.3d 896, 900 (2007). The first criterion is that the record contain[s] information relating to the conduct or administration of the public's business. I.C. § 9-337(13). Because of the statutory change, the opinion in Derting no longer applies. Once Mr. Bujak entered into the contract with Nampa, the performance of the contract became one of his statutory duties as Canyon County prosecuting attorney. Therefore, the contract was a public contract, and his performance of that contract was the public's business. The payments under the contract were for work to be performed by the FIRM, which the contract with Nampa defined as the CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY. Although the contract provided that the payments due under the contract were to be paid to the county auditor, the county commissioners later agreed to permit the payments to be sent directly to Mr. Bujak. [4] That did not convert the payments into his personal funds received in his capacity as a private individual for the performance of contractual obligations unrelated to the duties of the office of prosecuting attorney. Entering into the Nampa contract required the unanimous consent of the county commissioners. I.C. § 31-3113. Because Mr. Bujak would be using county resources to perform the contract, the commissioners could condition their approval as they desired. They certainly could require that county resources not be used for the personal financial gain of the prosecuting attorney. Under the initial contract, the payments were to be made to the county auditor. Obviously, the commissioners considered those payments public funds. Mr. Bujak later convinced Nampa that the payments should be made directly to him, and he and Nampa executed an amendment to the contract to so provide. That amendment was not binding upon the other party to the contract, Canyon County. He then convinced the county commissioners to permit the payments to be made directly to him. The record indicates that in doing so, the commissioners were not agreeing to change the payments into Mr. Bujak's personal funds. As Resolution No. 09-211 recites: WHEREAS, Mr. Bujak agreed with each and every of his County staff, save himself and his Chief of Staff, in writing, to provide them a salary bump wholly dependent upon the City of Nampa's payment under the prosecution contract, commensurate with a number of factors including the scope of the increased demands upon their professional lives, their years of service, cumulative salary, and other factors; and WHEREAS, Mr. Bujak agreed with this Board to reimburse, by generous annual estimate, the County for its expenditure of those minimal resources devoted to his commingled provision of prosecution services to both City and County so that a zero sum equation would necessarily result: (payment under contract) - (salary adjustments + reimbursement to County) = 0.00; and .... WHEREAS, Mr. Bujak, who could himself realize no financial advantage from his provision of prosecutorial service to the City, advised this Board that the above-described extra-legal issues threatened the continued existence of this mutually beneficial, legal, cooperative joint City-County arrangement, and WHEREAS, Mr. Bujak and the City of Nampa executed an Amendment to the Prosecution Services Term Agreement on September 8, 2009 to provide that the City's payment under the contract would be paid directly to the City Prosecuting Attorney, and WHEREAS, Mr. Bujak and this Board agreed that the County would invoice Mr. Bujak for the salary adjustments and benefits for his staff, as well as to cover the expenditure of any county resources used in furtherance of the City's prosecution needs. (Emphases added.) The recitals stated that Mr. Bujak would give all of his staff a salary increase, save himself and his Chief of Staff; that Mr. Bujak agreed to disburse the payments under the Nampa contract to pay the salary increases for his staff and to remit any balance remaining to the county, so that a zero sum equation would necessarily result; and that Mr. Bujak, himself could realize no financial advantage from his provision of prosecutorial service to the City. The second criterion is that the record was prepared, owned, used or retained by any state agency, independent public body corporate and politic or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. I.C. § 9-337(13). `Local agency' means a county,... or any agency thereof.... I.C. § 9-337(8). Thus, a local agency would include the county and an agency of the county. The word agency is not defined, but `[l]aw enforcement agency' means any state or local agency ... which has authority to investigate... [or] prosecute ... violations of state ... criminal statutes, ordinances or regulations. I.C. § 9-337(7). Because the county prosecuting attorney has the authority to investigate or prosecute violations of state criminal statutes, ordinances, or regulations, the prosecutor would be an agency of the county. Both the county and the office of the county prosecutor would be a local agency under the Public Records Act. The records at issue were prepared, owned, used, or retained by Mr. Bujak as Canyon County prosecuting attorney. In response to Mr. Henry's first public records request, Mr. Laugheed, as a deputy prosecuting attorney, wrote that the payments from Nampa under the contract are deposited in a non-County account. Mr. Laugheed explained that monies from that account are used to pay overhead and salary adjustments for employees of the prosecutor's office, with the balance being paid into the county for deposit into its general fund. That Mr. Bujak used a non-County account into which to deposit monies received as the prosecuting attorney under the contract and from which to pay various office expenses and salary enhancements does not prevent the records of that account from being public records. He could not shield the records from examination by the public by using a private bank account rather than a county bank account. There is no contention that any of the records requested were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act. Therefore, the records requested by Mr. Henry were public records that were required to be provided for examination and/or copying.