Opinion ID: 1535099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defense of Qualified Immunity

Text: [¶ 23] Having determined that there is a genuine issue of material fact on one of Richards' section 1983 claims against the police officers, that is, the excessive force claim, we must determine whether the officers are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct. [G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). [¶ 24] In a recent case the Supreme Court articulated the twofold inquiry that must be made when police officers raise a defense of qualified immunity to a claim of excessive force. Saucier v. Katz, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The threshold question is: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Id. at 2156. We have conducted this inquiry in our discussion at Part III, A, 2, above and determined that the facts taken in the light most favorable to Richards demonstrate that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the force utilized by Stacy and Godfrey. [¶ 25] The second question, enunciated in Saucier v. Katz , is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. This question cannot be answered with the general proposition that the use of force is a violation of a person's constitutional rights if the force is excessive under the objective standards of reasonableness. Rather, it must be answered in light of the specific context of the case. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. [¶ 26] Our review of the excessive force cases decided before the date that Richards was arrested, particularly the Maine cases, convinces us that the right was clearly established. The federal court for the District of Maine has held that police officers in similar situations using similar degrees of force had violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. In each of the following cases the court denied summary judgment to the police officers on the excessive force claim and the qualified immunity defense, thereby determining that the plaintiff's version of the facts was sufficient, if believed by the factfinder, to support a judgment against the officers: Comfort v. Town of Pittsfield, 924 F.Supp. 1219 (D.Me.1996) (after arresting plaintiff for operating under the influence, police rammed plaintiff's head into door jamb, causing him to fall and hit his head on the floor); Barber v. Guay, 910 F.Supp. 790 (D.Me.1995) (after arresting plaintiff for theft, deputy wrenched plaintiff's shoulder; twisted his wrist behind his back; and threw him into the cruiser head first); [7] Brooks v. Bailey, No. 95-22-P-H 1995 WL 746340 (D.Me. Dec. 8, 1995) (in arresting plaintiff for criminal trespass, police pushed him against a tree; jerked his handcuffs; banged his head against the cruiser; pushed him into cruiser so he ended up face down on floor; and pulled him out by his feet causing him to fall face down on ground); McPherson v. Auger, 842 F.Supp. 25 (D.Me.1994) (police handcuffed plaintiff's wrists too tightly and refused to loosen them after plaintiff was arrested for refusing to sign a traffic ticket); McLain v. Milligan, 847 F.Supp. 970 (D.Me.1994) (in arresting plaintiff for disorderly conduct, police twisted plaintiff's arms behind his back; picked him up off the floor and carried him out of apartment; kicked his legs out from under him; forced him to his knees; slammed his chest and face onto concrete; kneed him in his back; and slammed his face onto the pavement). [¶ 27] These cases made clear that, when arresting a person for a nonviolent offense when she is not attempting to flee or resisting arrest and is not a threat to the officers' safety, striking her with sufficient force to knock her to the ground, kneeing her in the ribs while she was face-down on the ground, lifting her by the handcuffs, and causing severe pain, constitutes conduct that is excessive and unreasonable. The number of cases with similar factual scenarios, all concluding that the force used by the police was excessive, would have made it clear to a reasonable police officer, at the time of the Richards incident, that the alleged force against Richards, in the situation alleged by Richards, was unlawful. [¶ 28] Thus, having examined both prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry, we conclude that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Richards, show that the force used by Stacy and Godfrey, when viewed under objective standards of reasonableness, was excessive, and that it would be clear to a reasonable officer, at the time these events took place, that the force used against Richards, given all of the facts surrounding that situation, was unlawful. [¶ 29] In summary, the Superior Court correctly granted summary judgment to Godfrey and Stacy on the section 1983 claims for illegal arrest and malicious prosecution. The police officers, however, were not entitled to summary judgment on the section 1983 claim of excessive force, and that portion of the court's judgment will be vacated.