Opinion ID: 2575291
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Letters to Laura Black

Text: Defendant wrote Black approximately 150 to 200 letters. During the prosecution's direct examination of Black, 20 of these letters were admitted into evidence. The letters included the threatening comments noted above, and also showed defendant importuning Black to socialize with him, his obsessive need to know her whereabouts, his desire to buy a house with her, and information regarding his relationship with Mei Chang, his college classes, his work at Covalent and another company, his roommate, the foreclosure on his house, and his obligation to pay $30,000 to the IRS. The letters also included statements such as that defendant cared for Black and tried never to really threaten you, I wouldn't hurt you and I think you realized that, and Jean, presumably Jean Tuffley, should have sent us both to a marriage counselor to find out why we fight like an[] old married couple. During defendant's cross-examination of Black, he sought to question her concerning 13 other letters he wrote to her. He asserted those letters were admissible under Evidence Code section 356, [14] because they were necessary to understand other documents admitted into evidence. The trial court admitted two of the 13 letters and excluded the remaining 11 letters as hearsay, stating that, although the latter letters pertained to the same general subjects as the letters proffered by the prosecution, they were separate and distinct statements from the letters proffered by the prosecution. During defendant's testimony on direct examination, he again sought admission of the 11 letters, arguing they were necessary to understand defendant's state of mind and corroborated his testimony regarding his state of mind. He also argued they were admissible under Evidence Code section 356 to show the evolution and context of the letters. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection, ruling the letters were hearsay. Near the conclusion of defendant's testimony on direct examination, defendant sought to introduce six additional letters. The court admitted two of these letters. The two letters, and the two previously proffered by defendant and admitted by the court, noted that over the prior period of nearly three years, defendant had never hurt you or your property, referred to Black as the love of my life, profusely apologized for past behavior, and asked Black to buy a house with him, enumerating 16 discussion points (such as what would happen if one person missed a monthly payment) for working out an agreement that both of us can live by. Defendant contends that all of the letters were admissible under Evidence Code section 356 during his testimony, because the letters presented the true tenor of the correspondence by showing not only [defendant's] obsessive need for Black, but also his attempts to understand her, his concern with how she was feeling, and his attempts to control his behavior. He asserts, [I]f it is unreasonable to introduce ... all 150 lettersthen at least a representative portion should be shown to the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proffered letters were not necessary to the jury's understanding of the letters introduced by the prosecution. (Evid. Code, § 356.) Rather, the letters proffered by the prosecution were independently comprehensible on the relevant topics of defendant's premeditation and intent to kill. ( People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 131, fn. 4 [187 Cal.Rptr. 716, 654 P.2d 1243] [postarrest statement not necessary to understand prearrest statement].) [15] Therefore Evidence Code section 356 did not provide a basis for the admission of these letters. (12) Defendant also contends the letters were admissible to establish his state of mind. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 23, fn. 9 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 239 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512], and People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] [victim's out-of-court statement was not hearsay when offered as circumstantial evidence of the victim's state of mind rather than to prove the truth of the statement]; Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1) [evidence of a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the declarant's state of mind].) Defendant testified, describing his various states of mind not only during the years he pursued Black and sent her numerous letters, but also when he received the TRO, as he thereafter prepared to confront Black, and as he undertook his assault upon the ESL facility. Moreover, the letters that were admitted established the facts he claims would have been adduced by the excluded letters, that is, defendant's purported love and concern for Black, his obsessive need for and delusion regarding her, and his attempts to control his behavior. Therefore, to the extent the letters he proffered establish the depth of his delusion, and thereby suggest the destruction of the psychic reality [he] had constructed and maintained in his mind for four years and explain his state of mind during his rampage, their exclusion was harmless. It is not reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the letters been admitted to establish his state of mind. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Although defendant makes no persuasive argument supporting his contention that the exclusion of the letters constitutes a violation of his right to present a defense, we observe that, in light of the extensive evidence presented relating to defendant's state of mind, exclusion of the proffered letters also was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824].) [16]