Opinion ID: 1179846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion to Act As Co-Counsel

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to participate in the trial proceedings as co-counsel. He argues that he has a constitutional right to act as co-counsel. At trial, he relied exclusively on Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. [7] In the trial court, defense counsel's written motion asserted that [d]efendant wishes to have the option to participate fully in his defense. Later, during voir dire, defense counsel again advised the trial court that defendant's motion was a request to have him participate fully as co-counsel throughout the trial. According to defense counsel, defendant would be subject to the [same] rules as counsel are and subject to the discipline of the Court as he is anyway and if that there's [ sic ] no cause to believe that there would be any disruption or any problem. The district attorney objected, arguing that, because of the increased risk of error, of mistrial, of all sorts of problems created from letting someone who is not learned in the law act as a lawyer, defendant's motion should be denied. He argued further that, because to the extent that the defendant stands a chance of being convicted and eventually executed, he personally has no real stake in seeing the trial come to a proper end. He has no reason to follow the Court's rules because a mistrial [based on defendant's misconduct would] hardly be a sanction against him even if he did know the proper rules. The district attorney disagreed with defense counsel's assertion, that defendant would be subject to the same discipline as the lawyers, arguing that the defendant can't be disbarred, [and] it would take something very drastic on his part to cause him to be removed from the courtroom, he can hardly be suspended from the practice of law or fined if he misbehaved. Finally, the district attorney reminded the court that defendant had three defense lawyers representing him. In State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 119, 123-25, 806 P.2d 92 (1991), this court held that a defendant has no state constitutional right to hybrid representation. Under a hybrid form of representation, defendant and counsel act, in effect, as co-counsel, with each speaking for the defense during different phases of the trial. See 2 LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure 51, § 11.5(f) (1984) (although raised in a substantial number of cases, this contention has failed to persuade either federal or state courts). Having rejected in Stevens the same constitutional argument advanced by defendant here, we hold that the trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's argument that he had a state constitutional right to act as co-counsel, i.e., to have hybrid representation. [8] As this court noted in Stevens, however, a trial court has discretion to allow, as well as to deny, hybrid representation. 311 Or. at 124-25, 806 P.2d 92. In this case, in the alternative to his constitutional argument, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion seeking such representation. In denying defendant's motion, the trial court explained: This is, of course, a capital punishment case, and it is argued that the defendant should be allowed to participate to the fullest extent possible. Yet, it is the very nature of the case that dictates that the potential for error be minimized. Allowing this request would, based upon the Court's experience, invite error; the defendant's position will be adequately expressed through the efforts of co-counsel. Those reasons are cogent. Thus, reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion.