Opinion ID: 464646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(c)

Text: 17 Having concluded that this matter was not mooted by the airline's release of Umanzor and that habeas jurisdiction attached at the district court when the petition was filed, we must next inquire whether the district court's--and our--jurisdiction over this matter has been curtailed by Congress. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(c) provides, in pertinent part, that: An order of deportation ... shall not be reviewed by any court if [the alien] has departed from the United States after the issuance of the order. The statute's command is unequivocal. See Asai v. Castillo, 593 F.2d 1222, 1223-24 (D.C.Cir.1978) (where alien petitioners departed the United States after having filed habeas petition challenging deportation orders, the appeals were dismissed pursuant to Sec. 1105a(c)). 18 Umanzor argues, however, that when the alien's departure was effected by the government, departure as used in Sec. 1105a(c) is limited to legally executed departures. The authority for this proposition is Mendez v. I.N.S., 563 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir.1977), and Zepeda-Melendez v. I.N.S., 741 F.2d 285, 287 (9th Cir.1984). In both cases it was held that, since no notice of deportation was given to the alien's attorney, the alien was deprived of his right to counsel under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b) and the departures were effected illegally. 19 We entertain serious reservations regarding the Mendez exception for, if the exception is taken to its logical conclusion, any error or procedural defect at any point in the alien's deportation saga (from his arrest, hearing, BIA hearing, habeas proceeding in district court or appeal to the appropriate circuit court, to his final departure from the United States) would render the departure illegal. This being so, any later allegation of procedural error by a deported alien would force the district court and the circuit courts to review the entire matter, despite the express determination of Congress that no such reviews should take place. 5 20 We need not cross that Rubicon today, however, because even were we to adopt the Mendez exception, there is no evidence in this case that Umanzor's departure was effected illegally. Any alien subject to a final order of deportation has six months 6 to file a petition for review in the appropriate circuit court. 7 Filing such a petition effects an automatic stay of the alien's deportation. 8 If the alien is held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation, he may also seek a writ of habeas corpus in the appropriate district court. 9 But, in any event, the right of judicial review of a final deportation does not require the I.N.S. to defer deportation of an alien. The burden is on the alien to obtain a stay. 10 21 Assuming that due process requires that an alien's attorney be notified of the deportation, Umanzor's attorney was notified of the deportation some 22 hours in advance of his actual departure. We therefore cannot say that the district court's finding that Lampard could have obtained a stay in the intervening hours from this court in a direct appeal, or through a timely habeas application in the district court, is clearly erroneous. 22 Even though the district court made no finding, we assume arguendo that Umanzor's attorney, Lampard, verbally petitioned the I.N.S. District Director for an administrative stay of the deportation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Sec. 243.4, 11 and that this request was denied. In deportation proceedings, denials of discretionary relief are reviewed narrowly. Due process is satisfied if the discretion was not exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Tuan v. I.N.S., 531 F.2d 1337, 1338 (5th Cir.1976). There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the I.N.S. Director's denial of a stay of deportation was an abuse of discretion. 23