Opinion ID: 2997264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Head-Of-State Immunity—Some Background

Text: The appellants’ first argument relates to the assertion by the United States, which the district court took as disposi- 6 No. 03-3989 tive, that President Jiang was immune from the appellants’ suit. The appellants argue that the actions President Jiang is accused of amount to violations of “jus cogens” norms of international law and that immunity may not be conferred upon a person accused of violating these norms. The Supreme Court recognized the immunity of foreign sovereigns from suits brought in United States courts nearly 200 years ago. In Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that although “the jurisdiction of the United States over persons and property within its territory ‘is susceptible to no limitation not imposed by itself,’ . . . as a matter of comity, members of the international community had implicitly agreed to waive the exercise of jurisdiction over other sovereigns in certain classes of cases, such as those involving foreign ministers or the person of the sovereign.” Republic of Austria v. Altman, 541 U.S. ___, slip op. at 9 (2004) (quoting McFaddon, 11 U.S. at 136). Following McFaddon, courts have been expected to “defer[ ] to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.” Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). For most of the next 165 years, the Executive Branch determined whether a foreign nation was entitled to immunity. The practice during this period was that the State Department would provide a court with a “suggestion of immunity.” On reception of this “suggestion,” courts would dismiss a suit, or any claims brought in a suit, against a foreign nation. In 1952, the State Department adopted the “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 48687. “Under this theory, immunity is confined to suits involving the foreign sovereign’s public acts, and does not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state’s strictly No. 03-3989 7 commercial acts.” Id. at 487. The restrictive theory was often honored in the breach: “On occasion, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive theory.” Id. In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the “FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. As an initial matter, the FSIA provides a foreign state with immunity from suit in courts of the United States or of any state. 28 U.S.C. § 1604; Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (“Under the [FSIA], a foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts . . . .”). Such immunity is subject, however, to international agreements to which the United States was a party in 1976, as well as certain exceptions set forth in the FSIA. Id. These exceptions codify the restrictive theory of immunity. The responsibility for determining whether an exception applies is left to the courts. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[The FSIA] codified the State Department’s general criteria for making suggestions of immunity, and transferred the responsibility for case-bycase application of these principles from the Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch.”). Insofar as a foreign state is concerned, therefore, the pre-1976 practice of courts reflexively deferring to the Executive Branch’s immunity determinations has been eliminated. The FSIA does not, however, address the immunity of foreign heads of states. The FSIA refers to foreign states, not 7 their leaders. The FSIA defines a foreign state to include a political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a foreign 7 In this way, the FSIA does not recognize (as McFaddon clearly did) the classical conflation of a head of state with the state itself (succinctly stated by King Louis XIV of France, “L’etat, c’est moi.”). 8 No. 03-3989 state but makes no mention of heads of state. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Because the FSIA does not apply to heads of states, the decision concerning the immunity of foreign heads of states remains vested where it was prior to 1976— with the Executive Branch. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1212. (“Because the FSIA addresses neither head-of-state immunity, nor foreign sovereign immunity in the criminal context, head-of-state immunity could attach in cases, such as this one, only pursuant to the principles and procedures outlined in [McFaddon] and its progeny. As a result, this court must look to the Executive Branch for direction on the propriety of Noriega’s immunity claim.”).