Opinion ID: 1237154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Improper Factfinding

Text: Brezilien argues that the BIA improperly conducted its own factfinding when it reversed the IJ's grant of asylum and withholding of removal, in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). [3] The regulation provides that the BIA will not engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by an immigration judge. Facts determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). The regulation further states that, except in cases where judicial notice is appropriate, the BIA may not engage in factfinding to resolve an appeal, and must remand to the IJ if additional factfinding is necessary. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); see also In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 464 (BIA 2002) ([T]he Board must defer to the factual determinations of the Immigration Judge in the absence of clear error.). According to Brezilien, the BIA engaged in its own factfinding by finding against Brezilien as to whether (1) Brezilien was an intended target of persecution during the September 1991 attack on his home; (2) the Ton Ton Macoutes were responsible for killing Brezilien's two older brothers; (3) the deaths of Brezilien's two older brothers were tied to their work for Lavalas; (4) the murder of Brezilien's paternal aunt was tied to her political involvement with Lavalas; (5) Brezilien could avoid identification in Haiti as an Aristide/Lavalas supporter; and (6) Brezilien could safely relocate in Haiti. Brezilien argues that these are factual determinations that the BIA is not authorized to make. With regard to the first five issues, we agree. We conclude, however, that the BIA has not clearly resolved whether internal relocation is a legal or factual question. Compare Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 2008) (remanding the question of internal relocation to the IJ so that it could properly consider the evidence and make a factual determination) with Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 493, 497-98 (BIA 2008) (declaring that future predictions about what may occur when an alien is returned to his country were legal rather than factual determinations that the BIA was authorized to make). The government argues that Brezilien never raised a challenge to the BIA's application of its review standard before the BIA itself. The record, however, does not support this assertion. In his final brief before the BIA, Brezilien specifically addressed the BIA's authority to reconsider sua sponte factual and legal findings from its prior decisions. He argued that the BIA did have such power and that it should exercise that power in its third review of his case because the BIA had previously issued factual and legal findings contrary to the record, regulations, and case law. He also cited 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(iii) in discussing the standard of review the BIA applies to the IJ's factual findings. These points were sufficient to put the BIA on notice ... and the agency had an opportunity to pass on this issue. Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir.2004) (per curiam). Accordingly, we conclude that Brezilien exhausted this claim. The government further argues that we have no authority to review this claim because there is no prior agency decision resolving it in the first instance. The government is correct that interpretation of BIA regulations is a matter that [is] place[d] primarily in agency hands. Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16, 123 S.Ct. 353. However, it is clear from the text of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) that where the IJ has made a factual finding, the BIA has very limited authority to revisit that finding. Nor is 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) ambiguous as to its treatment of the question posed here: where the IJ has not made a necessary factual finding, the regulation requires the BIA to remand the factual inquiry to the IJ rather than making its own factual finding on the matter. The IJ found Brezilien's testimony credible, including his testimony about his family's connections to Aristide and Lavalas and Brezilien's own political activities. The BIA affirmed this credibility determination. The IJ never made a factual finding as to whether Brezilien and his brothers had been targeted for persecution based on their political ties, whether Brezilien would be identified as an Aristide/Lavalas supporter, and whether he could avoid being identified. Nor did the IJ determine as a matter of law whether Brezilien could safely relocate to the outer provinces if removed to Haiti. Despite the absence of rulings by the IJ on these issues, the BIA did not remand to the IJ to address them in the first instance. The BIA also reversed the IJ's factual findings with regard to Brezilien's and his family's persecution for political opinion, without determining whether the IJ's findings were clearly erroneous. Based on the plain language of the regulations at issue, the BIA violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)'s prohibition against making de novo factual findings, and violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii)-(iii)'s standard of review that governs the IJ's factual findings. Because the BIA's error materially affected its decisions to reverse the IJ's second grant of asylum and withholding of removal, as well as the subsequent grant of CAT relief, we vacate the BIA's decision. The BIA improperly relied upon its own factual findings to conclude that Brezilien had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution, had not established that it is more likely than not that he will suffer persecution in Haiti, and that he could safely relocate within Haiti to avoid persecution. The BIA's decisions to vacate the IJ's second grant of asylum and withholding of removal thus depended on the agency's improper factual findings. Similarly, the BIA relied, at least in part, on its factual finding that Brezilien would not be recognized as an Aristide/Lavalas supporter to overturn the IJ's grant of CAT relief. We thus vacate the BIA's denial of Brezilien's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, and remand for further proceedings. As to whether internal relocation is a factual or legal issue, we agree with the parties that there is tension between Matter of D-I-M- and Matter of A-S-B-. Matter of D-I-M- suggests that it is a question of fact subject to clear error review. After Matter of A-S-B-, however, there is some question whether Matter of D-I-M- can be read to hold clearly that internal relocation is a question of fact, subject to clear error review by the BIA. A fair reading of Matter of A-S-B- suggests that the issue of internal relocation is ultimately a question of law subject to de novo review by the BIA. This uncertainty in the BIA's case law should be resolved by the BIA in the first instance. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16, 123 S.Ct. 353; Negusie v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___ 129 S.Ct. 1159, 1164, 173 L.Ed.2d 20 (2009). We therefore remand this issue to the BIA for further clarification, if necessary. Because we remand this matter to the BIA, we need not address Brezilien's claims that the BIA used an incorrect legal standard in its analysis of his asylum claim, and that the BIA erred as a matter of law in reversing the IJ's grant of asylum.