Opinion ID: 6491238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determination of the Rights, Duties, or Privileges of Specific Parties

Text: The Hui contends that “the January 2004 hearing determined the rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties.” (Capital letters altered.) Specifically, the Hui argues that the January 2004 hearing “determined the Hui’s members’ right and privilege to protect their [n]ative Hawaiian cultural and traditional practices from the activities on [Midkiffs and Myers’] neighboring property, and their right and privilege to protect the historical ruins of Kaniakapupu.” The Hui also argues that the January 2004 hearing determined [Midkiffs and Myers’] duty to use their property consistent with their representations and commitments made in 1989 with the conditions the LUC imposed on [Midkiff and Myers] in 1989.” Furthermore, the Hui claims that the January 2004 hearing “determined [Midkiffs and Myers’] right to maintain their property as an [urban district], rather than having it revert to [conservation district.]” Myers contends that, “[c]ontrary to [the Hui’s] bald assertion[,]” the January 2004 hearing did not determine the rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties. Instead, Myers asserts that “[a]t issue at the January [2004] hearing on [the Hui’s motion for an order to show cause] was whether [the Hui] had met its burden of demonstrating that ... [Myers] failed to perform a condition, representation, or commitment. Even if the [LUC] had found that [the Hui] had made a sufficient showing, the [LUC], at most, could have issued an order to show cause.” In the instant case, the subject matter of the January 2004 hearing was Myers’ compliance or non-compliance with her representations or commitments made during the proceeding involving the 1989 boundary amendment petition and the conditions imposed by the November 1989 order. If the LUC had determined that it “ha[d] reason to believe that there had been a failure to perform according to the conditions imposed, or the representations and commitments made by [Myers],” then the LUC would have issued an “order to show cause why the property should not revert to its former land use classification or be changed to a more appropriate classification[ ]” to Myers. HAR § 15—15—93(b). In other words, the only determination the LUC was required to make when hearing the instant motion for an order to show cause was whether it had reason to believe that Myers had failed to perform (1) according to the conditions imposed by the November 1989 order or (2) any representations or commitments made that led to the November 1989 order. As such, the LUC was not required to—and, therefore, did not—determine the Hui’s rights and privileges to protect their native Hawaiian cultural and traditional practices at Kaniakapupu. Moreover, the possible reversion of Myers’ property to conservation district was not at stake in the instant motion for an order to show cause inasmuch as the LUC could not revert Myers’ property to its former land use classification, i.e., conservation district, on a motion for an order to show cause. Only if the LUC had granted the motion would the LUC have issued to Myers “an order to show cause why the property should not revert to its former land use classification or be changed to a more appropriate classification.” HAR § 15—15—93(b). Stated differently, the Hui’s motion for an order to show cause was essentially a threshold motion or procedural vehicle to obtain a show cause hearing in order for the LUC to determine the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties. Furthermore, the LUC did not determine Myers’ and Midkiffs “duty to use their property consistent with their representations and commitments made in 1989” at the January 2004 hearing on the motion for order to show cause. Rather, the November 1989 order, wherein the LUC granted the 1989 boundary amendment petition, “determined” Myers’ and Midkiffs “duty” to use their property consistent with the representations and commitments that they made during the hearing on the 1989 boundary amendment petition. In other words, the most the LUC determined at the January 200⅛ hearing was that Myers and Midkiff did not breach their duties set forth in the November 1989 order. Consequently, the purpose of the January 2004 hearing was clearly not to determine the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties. Cf. Ko'olau Agric. Co. v. Comm’n on Water Res. Mgmt., 83 Hawai'i 484, 493, 496, 927 P.2d 1367, 1376, 1379 (1996) (holding that, designation of water management area, unlike water use permitting, does not determine the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties because, inter alia, respective rights of water users are not required to be determined). Thus, the January 2004 hearing did not constitute a contested case for the purposes of obtaining judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the Hui's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 15