Opinion ID: 3012746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Damages Awards

Text: The City finally objects to the District Court’s upholding of the jury’s damages award. We review the District Court’s decision not to grant a new trial or vacate the damage award for an abuse of discretion. Evans v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 273 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 2001). The City argues that front pay can be justified only when the employer irreparably harmed the working relationship. However, in Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1987), we stated that while back pay coupled with reinstatement is the preferred remedy in employment discrimination, “reinstatement is not always feasible, e.g., because of irreparable animosity between the parties. . . . In such a case . . . front 9 pay must be used to make the plaintiff whole for future expected losses.” The irreparable animosity does not have to originate with the employer for front pay to be appropriately awarded. The District Court in this case awarded front pay, finding that the relationship between the parties had been irreparably damaged due to a lack of mutual respect and trust, and that reinstatement of Bianchi as a firefighter would put lives in danger because of this damage. W e review the District Court’s assessment for abuse of discretion. See Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 832 (3d Cir. 1994). We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s determination. The City also argues that it was error for the District Court to have decided the propriety of a front pay award after the amount had already been determined by the jury. The City neither formally objected to the jury charge on front pay nor to the Jury Interrogatories on Front Pay. Having failed to object at trial, it cannot do so on appeal. The City finally contends that the front pay and back pay awards were excessive. In reviewing a jury verdict on damages, a district court has an obligation “to uphold the jury’s award if there exists a reasonable basis to do so,” and may not “vacate or reduce the award merely because it would have granted a lesser amount of damages.” Evans, 273 F.3d at 351-52 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A new trial is warranted only upon the showing that the verdict amounted from passion or prejudice, and yet the size of an award alone is insufficient to prove passion or prejudice. Id. at 352. 10 The jury awarded Bianchi $512,500 as front pay. The jury heard that Bianchi’s salary was $49,000 annually, App. 801, and could infer that at age 52, Bianchi had approximately thirteen more years of work left until his retirement. The award was not unreasonable. The City argues nonetheless that Bianchi had a duty to mitigate damages, and that the District Court should have lessened his front pay award. The City had the burden of proof on mitigation, and it failed to examine Bianchi on his job prospects or future earnings potential at trial. See Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 897 (3d Cir. 1993) (placing the burden of proving failure to mitigate on the employer); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1984) (same). On the other hand, Bianchi put forth evidence that he could not and cannot find comparable employment. Bianchi testified that he could find work only as a tow truck driver, truck driver helper, and auto parts delivery person. His last employment paid $5.60 an hour with no medical benefits. In light of the City’s failure to produce evidence, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s refusal to reduce the front pay for the failure to mitigate constituted an abuse of discretion. The jury’s back pay award of $225,000 for the period from October 1998 to February 2002 was similarly within reason. The City argues that the back pay award should have commenced on November 4, 1999, when Bianchi’s paid leave expired, and not, as the jury found, on October 1998, when he asked for reinstatement. However, 11 given a district court’s obligation to uphold a jury award when there is a reasonable basis for doing so, this award must stand. We have previously stated that such an award does not have to be determined with absolute precision. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The court may estimate what a claimant’s earnings would have been without discrimination, and uncertainties are resolved against a discriminating employer.”). The City refused to issue Bianchi medical clearance to return to work when he requested reinstatement, and so compelled him to use accumulated leave time whose benefit and value is impractical to measure. As such there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify the jury award for back pay. Because the jury’s front pay and back pay awards are sufficiently supported by the evidence and are not so excessive as “to shock the conscience of this court,” Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 833 (3d Cir. 1994), we find no abuse of discretion by the District Court’s decision to let them stand.