Opinion ID: 1826702
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether a question of material fact exists as to whether the injuries suffered by Rolison were a foreseeable consequence or were proximately caused or contributed to by the negligence of the City of Meridian?

Text: The Court is asked to consider whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether proximate cause exists between the alleged negligence of the City and the injuries of Rolison. Negligence consists of a duty and a breach of that duty. In Dillon v. Keatington Racquetball Club, 151 Mich. App. 138, 390 N.W.2d 212, 214-215 (1986), a Michigan appellate court said in part: Moreover we are unwilling to impose a common law duty on defendants to supervise the activities of their patrons in the conduct of their games to ensure that the participants obey the standard rules or do not take unreasonable risks. Such a burden would be unduly onerous and patronizing. Although it may be appropriate to impose a duty to supervise where the participants are children, no such duty should exist where, as here, the participant is a 38 year old adult. Such a duty to supervise might also arise where the nature of the activity carries with it the possibility of danger from which the participant could not extricate himself. Specifically, a situation akin to a public swimming pool or beach where there may be a duty to provide a lifeguard. ... . Certainly a recreation facility owes certain duties to its patrons such as supplying premises and equipment free from defects. However, we conclude that, absent special circumstances, such as the participant's age, the facility has no obligation to supervise the patrons to ensure that they play the game according to the rules or otherwise in a safe manner. 390 N.W.2d at 214-215. We agree. The elements of proof required to support a claim for damages for negligence are a duty, a breach of that duty, damages, and proximate cause. Grisham v. John Q. Long V.F.W. Post, No. 4057, Inc., 519 So.2d 413 (Miss. 1988); Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532, Order of Moose, Inc., 641 So.2d 1186 (Miss. 1994). The damages must be reasonably foreseeable. Ordinary care does not require that a person prevision unusual, improbable or extraordinary occurrences. Failure to anticipate remote possibilities does not constitute negligence. Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532 Order of Moose, Inc., supra ; Grisham, supra; Pargas of Taylorsville, Inc. v. Craft, 249 So.2d 403 (Miss. 1971); Sturdivant v. Crosby Lumber & Mfg. Co., 218 Miss. 91, 65 So.2d 291 (1953); Vincent v. Barnhill, 203 Miss. 740, 34 So.2d 363 (1948); Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421, 9 So.2d 780 (1942); and Illinois Central R. Co. v. Bloodworth, 166 Miss. 602, 145 So. 333 (1933). This Court discussed foreseeability in Mauney as follows: The rule is firmly established in this state, as in nearly all the common law states, that in order that a person who does a particular act which results in injury to another shall be liable therefor, the act must be of such character, and done in such a situation, that the person doing it should reasonably have anticipated that some injury to another will probably result therefrom, but that the actor is not bound to a prevision or anticipation which would include an unusual, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence, although such happening is within the range of possibilities. This rule is affirmed in one way or another in cases which will run into the hundreds in this state. ... . Hence, the law must say, as it does that care or foresight as to the probable effect of an act is not to be weighed on jewelers' scales, nor calculated by the expert mind of the philosopher, from cause to effect, in all situations, Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bloodworth, 166 Miss., page 618, 145 So. page 336; and that it would impose too heavy a responsibility for negligence to hold the tort feasor accountable for what was unusual and unlikely to happen, or for what was only remotely and slightly probable... . A reasonable man can be guided only by a reasonable estimate of probabilities. If men went about to guard themselves against every risk to themselves or others which might by ingenious conjecture be conceived as possible, human affairs could not be carried on at all. The reasonable man, then, to whose ideal behavior we are to look as the standard-of duty, will neither neglect what he can forecast as probable, nor waste his anxiety on events that are barely possible. 9 So.2d at 780-781 (citations omitted). In both Grisham and Crain, plaintiffs were assaulted and injured on the premises. In Crain, the Court discussed foreseeability and said, in part, as follows: In both Grisham and Kelly [v. Retzer & Retzer, 417 So.2d 556 (1982) ], the Court emphasized that the foreseeability of the injury sustained provided the touchstone for liability. Crain, 641 So.2d at 1189 (emphasis original). Every person who testified by deposition or provided an affidavit in this case on the subject, including Rolison, said there was no way to foresee that a player would throw a bat. All that could be done was to discipline a player for the misconduct. Based on the uncontradicted evidence before the Court, the accident in question was not reasonably foreseeable and could not be prevented. Thus, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rolison, this Court concludes there is no issue of material fact as to the foreseeability of this accident occurring.