Opinion ID: 2159715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cooperation

Text: I am convinced as well that trial counsel's failure to pursue DiFrisco's cooperation with the state constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. By his confession, DiFrisco had already given himself up. The prosecutors wanted Franciotti. Although the State never offered a life sentence in exchange for DiFrisco's testimony before the Grand Jury, he still had much to gain from cooperating. Specifically, given trial counsel's plan to submit to the jury the mitigating factor that the defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder, DiFrisco's cooperation, if attested to by the State, would have increased the chances that additional jurors would have found the existence of that important mitigating factor, or that the jury would have given it greater weight. There was little evidence to support the cooperation mitigating factor because, although the prosecutor made efforts to obtain DiFrisco's cooperation, DeLuca steadfastly rejected those efforts unless death was taken off the table, and he led the prosecutor to believe that DiFrisco was not interested in cooperating in the absence of that condition. Even if DeLuca's actions passed muster as a negotiating tool at the early stages of the case, at the point at which he and his successors reached the court house steps, their refusal to explore the issue in the absence of a bargain for a life sentence was clearly ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, on the morning of trial when the prosecutor again sought cooperation but refused a life sentence, DiFrisco had absolutely nothing to lose, and everything to gain, by cooperating. As the report of David I. Bruck explained, trial counsel's failure to pursue cooperation at that point reflected inexperience in capital defense, because even an unsuccessful proffer would have strengthened Mr. DiFrisco's claim in mitigation that he had done everything possible to assist the state in prosecuting Mr. Franciotti. Had counsel been able to present to the jury additional evidence of cooperation, more than six jurors may have found the existence of that mitigating factor and accorded it significant weight. In rejecting that claim, the PCR court incorrectly held that the record failed to support it, because attorney DeLuca was not called to testify as a witness at the PCR hearing. Of course, that ignored the uncontested evidence of DeLuca's correspondence with the State establishing his inflexible position with respect to DiFrisco's cooperation. More importantly, the PCR court ignored altogether that portion of the claim addressing DeLuca's successors' failure to pursue cooperation with the State even as they prepared for the penalty retrial. It is true, as the majority points out, that DiFrisco stated that he did not want to be known as a snitch. However, that is a far cry from a refusal to cooperate. Notably no member of the defense team testified at the PCR hearing that DiFrisco, in fact, refused to cooperate, and his letter seeking removal of DeLuca as counsel specifically stated the contrary. The testimony at the hearing focused on DeLuca's attitude. Nothing in the record eliminated the obligation of DiFrisco's counsel to strongly advise his cooperation in order to enhance his mitigation case, especially because he had absolutely nothing to lose by agreeing to cooperate. In ruling out cooperation with the State because the bargain of a life sentence had not been offered, defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.