Opinion ID: 1093261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: iv: should the trial judge have granted a continuance?

Text: After Watkins bowed out of the case as described above, David Stephenson was appointed to represent Fisher on January 6, 1986. The case was set for trial on January 30. Stephenson promptly moved for a continuance, or in the alternative for appointment of additional counsel, an investigator, or both. He cited the length of the record and the close connection of much of the discoverable material to other alleged crimes with the consequent necessity of sorting out the evidence. Both motions were denied. It is hornbook law that the grant or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. E.g., Hughey v. State, 512 So.2d 4, 6 (Miss. 1987); Gates v. State, 484 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss. 1986); Carter v. State, 473 So.2d 471, 475 (Miss. 1985). In numerous other cases, this Court has ruled it was not an abuse of discretion to deny continuance even though counsel had had much less time to prepare than the twenty-four days Stephenson had. See e.g., Boyington v. State, 389 So.2d 485 (Miss. 1980) (over the weekend); Shaw v. State, 378 So.2d 631 (Miss. 1979) (8 days); Brown v. State, 252 So.2d 885 (Miss. 1971) (4 days); Garner v. State, 202 Miss. 21, 30 So.2d 413 (1947) (7 days, murder trial). If the appellant prevails on this assignment of error, it will have been the longest time anyone has had to prepare for trial and yet be entitled to a continuance. We see no reason to be so prodigal.