Opinion ID: 494576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Stay Issue and Nunc Pro Tunc Entrance of the Settlement

Text: 40 Appellants finally assert that the District Court erred in granting the government's motion to stay proceedings; they object particularly to the court's apparent reliance on ex parte materials in issuing the stay. They ask us to rule that the government's extensive participation in No. 83-3685, premised as it was on ex parte materials, was improper. 41 Appellants contend that the ex parte materials and the stays had significant and deleterious effects, because they resulted in a one year delay of trial that permitted the IRS to file tax liens against Markowitz, NV, and Strahan before appellants could secure a final decree and enforce a judgment lien against them. A five day trial in No. 83-3685 was scheduled to begin October 22, 1984, and there probably would have been a final decree prior to the filing of the tax liens had the stays not issued. 16 Appellants therefore request that relief in TMG II's favor be entered nunc pro tunc to October 26, 1984, the scheduled concluding date for the trial on the merits of C.A. 83-3685. 42 This Court does not pass upon appellants' suggestion that entry of a stay of discovery, following ex parte communications by the government, was reversible error. 17 Regardless of the propriety or impropriety of the stays, the core issue here is whether justice requires entrance of the settlement nunc pro tunc, since this is the only remedy that would redress any injustice appellants claim to have suffered. A judgment entered nunc pro tunc is one given effect as of a date in the past. 18 The principle underlying entry of a judgment or an order nunc pro tunc is that of fairness to the parties, seeking to rectify any injustice suffered by them on account of judicial delay. 19 43 There are several reasons why such relief might be appropriate in this case. First, we note that the government sought, and was granted, an order rescinding its intervention nunc pro tunc to the date it first intervened. If the government can move the calendar back one year there is no reason why the appellants should not have an opportunity for similar relief. Second, the government's intervention was intended to protect a criminal investigation; it is unclear why the District Court's acquiescence for this narrow purpose should confer an advantage to the government in enforcing its civil tax lien. 44 This latter consideration makes clear, however, why we must have the District Court determine whether the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc for TMG II is appropriate. The government, which stands to lose its tax lien priority if judgment is entered nunc pro tunc, is the real party in interest as to this issue. But the government is not a party to this appeal and therefore cannot defend its interests. Accordingly, we remand so that the District Court may request from the government any evidence, argument, or briefing that it believes is necessary. 45 As the Supreme Court has stated, a nunc pro tunc order should be granted or refused, as justice may require, in view of the circumstances of the particular case. Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 62, 65, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881). Entry nunc pro tunc thus must have a proper factual basis. 20 Our inability to appraise this factual basis on appeal, without the participation of the real party in interest, compels our restraint. This issue is best left to the discretion of the District Court on remand. 21