Opinion ID: 1817650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside.

Text: In Phillips, supra, we recognized that we had not previously specifically addressed the question of who, in a motion to set aside a default judgment, has the burden of showing that the plaintiff would not be unfairly prejudiced if the motion is granted and the default judgment is set aside. 828 So.2d at 278. We concluded: [W]hen a party files a motion to set aside a default judgment, the movant has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the plaintiff will not be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside. If the movant makes a prima facie showing that the plaintiff will not be unfairly prejudiced, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present facts showing that the plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside. 828 So.2d at 278. In its motion to set aside the default judgment, Care asserted in conclusory form, There is no evidence that was available prior which is not available now. No witness is believed to have died in the meantime between the entry of the judgment and the time when additional and thorough and comprehensive discovery would be conducted on the merits of the allegations of the complaint. In Lifestar's motion to set aside the default judgment, it took no note whatsoever of this Kirtland factor. At the July 22, 2003, hearing, neither Care nor Lifestar offered any evidence or argument relating to the issue of prejudice to the plaintiff by the setting aside of the default judgment. Accordingly, we have no basis for concluding that Judge Price exceeded his discretion in concluding that Lifestar had failed to make the requisite showing of this factor. In this case, the defendants' motion to set aside the default judgment makes no statement that [the plaintiff] would not be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment was set aside. In light of Phillips [ v. Randolph, 828 So.2d 269 (Ala.2002),] we conclude that the defendants failed to meet their initial burden of showing that [the plaintiff] would not be prejudiced by setting aside the default judgment and thus failed to make the requisite showing under the second Kirtland factor. Triple D Trucking, 840 So.2d at 874.