Opinion ID: 1852042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue of Hearsay Statements

Text: New Plan argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion in limine and in admitting the testimony of Joan Davis about statements made by employees of New Plan. At trial, Morgan presented the deposition testimony from her former neighbor Joan Davis: [PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Did you have an occasiondid you have a conversation or hear of a conversation with anyone from me [sic] who worked for the apartment complex, the maintenance man or Kathy, the cleaning woman? A: Uh-huh. [PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Regarding what happened to [Morgan's] property? A: I did. (Emphasis added.) This particular testimony was introduced without objection. It establishes that Kathy was the cleaning woman who worked for the apartment complex. There is no genuine dispute that the owner-operator of the apartment complex is the defendant. Noteworthily, New Plan did not, either before or after the above-quoted exchange, challenge Kathy's status as its employee-housekeeper. Indeed, the trial judge instructed the jury: There has been evidence presented to you with regard to some of the employees of the defendant. There has been no issue made as to whether or not those employees indeed were agents working with the defendant. So, that's not an issue in the case.... (R. 262.) New Plan did not object to the trial judge's instruction. New Plan's objection to Joan Davis's testimony, interposed only after her last answer quoted above, incorporated only the grounds included within New Plan's motion in limine. The motion in limine itself characterized Kathy as New Plan's housekeeper. The motion in limine did not object to an absence of proof that Kathy was New Plan's housekeeper. Rather, the motion in limine objected only that the housekeeper would not have authority to speak for New Plan. Thus New Plan's allowing Morgan to establish at trial before the jury that Kathy was New Plan's cleaning woman was no lapse or oversight. `[A]cts and declarations of one whose agency is the subject of inquiry, though incompetent when there is no other evidence of agency or of ratification, become competent for consideration in determining both the fact of agency and the scope of authority originally given, when shown in connection with other evidence of agency.' Warren Webster & Co. v. Zac Smith Stationery Co., 222 Ala. 41, 44, 130 So. 545, 547 (1930) (quoting Birmingham Mineral R.R. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 127 Ala. 137, 145, 28 So. 679, 681 (1900) (emphasis added)). Thus Kathy's out-of-court declaration, as recounted by the witness Joan Davis after the trial court overruled New Plan's objection, was admissible to prove both the fact of Kathy's agency and the scope of her authority since Morgan had already established her status as New Plan's cleaning woman. The testimony which New Plan challenges as hearsay reads: [PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Well, as best you could straighten it out, what did Kathy tell you? A: They said that Marsha [Babineaux] had sent them in to clean out the apartment and they were upset because they told Marsha that usually when somebody left that they didn't get all of their things. They took them all over to the office for at least 90 days, you know, gave the person time to come get them. Marsha said she wasn't going to do that, said just to dispose of them, to take the clothes and give them to Goodwill and everything else throw in the dumpster. The exchange follows the trial court's overruling New Plan's objection invoking its motion in limine. New Plan did not object to this testimony on the ground that the witness apparently recounted a sort of conglomerate out-of-court declaration by more than one declarant (they) rather than just the declarant Kathy. Thus, considering the tendencies of the testimony most favorable to the verdict winner, as we must in our review, we must deem Morgan to have established that, usually when a tenant left the apartments and did not get all of the tenant's things, Kathy would take them over to the office for at least 90 days to give the tenant time to come and get the things. This evidence, together with the unchallenged testimony that Kathy was New Plan's cleaning woman, established both the fact of Kathy's agency and the scope of Kathy's agency. Warren Webster, supra. Rule 801(d)(2)(D), Ala. R. Evid., authorizes the admission of a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. Kathy's declaration established that what she did with a tenant's belongings was within the scope of her agency or employment. Consequently, Rule 801(d)(2)(D) authorized the trial judge's admission of Joan Davis's testimony to Kathy's declaration regarding her performance of her duty of handling the belongings of Morgan.