Opinion ID: 2691379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Explanations of Terminations

Text: {¶ 14} Cydrus first addresses her request for a writ of mandamus to compel the retirement board to issue a new decision explaining why it had terminated her disability-retirement benefits. 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 15} “It is axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the creation of the legal duty that a relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative branch of government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty enforceable in mandamus.” (Emphasis deleted.) Pipoly, 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18. There is no statute imposing a duty on the retirement board to explain its decision terminating disability-retirement benefits. {¶ 16} In addition, although former Ohio Adm.Code 145-11-02 specified that the retirement board must state “its basis of denial” of disability-retirement benefits, that administrative rule was repealed on January 1, 2003, and the new version of the rule has no such requirement. Ohio Adm.Code 145-2-23. See Hamby v Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., Franklin App. No. 08AP-298, 2008Ohio-5068, ¶ 17; 2002-2003 Ohio Monthly Record 1304. {¶ 17} Therefore, the retirement board had no duty under statute or administrative rule to specify the evidence it relied upon or to explain its reasons for terminating Cydrus’s disability-retirement benefits. See, e.g., State ex rel. Marchiano v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 121 Ohio St.3d 139, 2009-Ohio-307, 902 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 23. {¶ 18} Nevertheless, Cydrus argues that the retirement board’s duty to specify the evidence it relied upon and to explain its reasons for its decision arises from constitutional considerations of separation of powers and due process. {¶ 19} The retirement system and retirement board’s claim that Cydrus failed to raise her separation-of-powers argument in the court of appeals is incorrect. She raised her separation-of-powers argument in her objections to the magistrate’s decision. {¶ 20} Appellees next argue that because both constitutional claims were not raised in any complaint or amended complaint and they did not consent to their consideration, Cydrus waived both claims. Although we “need not address” 6 January Term, 2010 the merits of a constitutional claim on appeal when it is not appropriate, we have not held that a court is precluded from considering the merits of such claims if the opposing parties have had the opportunity to fully respond. See State ex rel. Van Dyke v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438, ¶ 42. {¶ 21} In contrast, the court of appeals in this case exercised its discretion by addressing the merits of some of Cydrus’s constitutional claims, and the retirement system and retirement board have briefed them. Therefore, we likewise address the merits.
{¶ 22} Cydrus first claims that insofar as Ohio Adm.Code 145-2-23(C)(3) permits the retirement board to terminate disability-retirement benefits without specifying its reasons, it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by abrogating the plenary power of the judiciary to provide a meaningful review of the board’s decisions. “While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional provision specifying the concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.” S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 158-159, 28 OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136. “The administration of justice by the judicial branch of the government cannot be impeded by the other branches of the government in the exercise of their respective powers.” State ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 20 O.O.3d 361, 423 N.E.2d 80, paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 23} But administration of justice is not impeded by the lack of a statute or rule requiring the board to explain the reasons for its denial or termination of disability-retirement benefits. Reviewing an administrative record in a mandamus proceeding in such a case is “not any more burdensome than reviewing a 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO summary judgment entered by a trial court without a detailed opinion. See Civ.R. 52.” Pipoly, 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 21. {¶ 24} “Although it may be preferable from a policy standpoint that a retirement board explain its reasoning for its decision, the General Assembly is the final arbiter of public policy.” State ex rel. VanCleave v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 120 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-5377, 898 N.E.2d 33, ¶ 27. As we recently observed in rejecting a separation-of-powers claim, “[i]t is not the role of the courts ‘to establish legislative policies or to second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices.’ ” Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 35, quoting Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212.
{¶ 25} Cydrus also claims that due process requires a more detailed retirement board decision. This court has already rejected a similar claim that the School Employees Retirement System had a duty based on procedural due process to identify the evidence it relied upon and to briefly explain its reasons for denying disability-retirement benefits. VanCleave, 120 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008Ohio-5377, 898 N.E.2d 33, ¶ 23. We held that “[e]ven if it were assumed that [the employee] has a property interest in a disability-retirement benefit, she has not demonstrated in this case that she did not receive due process regarding her claim for that benefit.” Id. at ¶ 31. We determined that the following factors established that she had received the requisite due process: (1) after her application for disability benefits was denied, she sought reconsideration of that decision and obtained a personal appearance before the board to present her position, (2) after the hearing, the retirement system medical advisory committee requested and received another medical evaluation, (3) after the board upheld its original decision to deny benefits, she had the opportunity to obtain the medical evaluations and the opinion of the medical advisory committee members and to 8 January Term, 2010 argue in her subsequent mandamus action that the board had abused its discretion in relying on one of the medical reports. Id. at ¶ 31, citing State ex rel. Haylett v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 325, 332-333, 720 N.E.2d 901. See also Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319, 334-335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (in determining what process is due, factors include the value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards). {¶ 26} As in VanCleave, Cydrus received the requisite due process: (1) after the retirement board initially decided to terminate her disability-retirement benefits, the board notified her of its decision and the availability of appeal, (2) she was given the opportunity to submit to the board additional objective medical evidence in support of her appeal, and she did so by providing Dr. Sylvester’s report, (3) after the retirement board denied her appeal and upheld its decision terminating her benefits, she was able to challenge the decision in this mandamus case, and (4) the medical advisors’ recommendations and the board’s decisions were available to her and indicated reliance on the examination reports by Dr. Steiman and Dr. Clary. Indeed, unlike the claimant in VanCleave, Cydrus did not have the opportunity for a personal appearance upon reconsideration, and the board did not request another medical evaluation for her appeal. But these are insignificant distinctions. Cydrus raised claims both in the court of appeals and in this appeal that the retirement board had abused its discretion by relying on Dr. Steiman’s report and ignoring Dr. Sylvester’s report. As in VanCleave, it is unclear here how Cydrus’s mandamus claim has been prejudiced by the lack of a more descriptive retirement board decision. {¶ 27} Therefore, neither the separation-of-powers doctrine nor due process requires that the retirement board support its decision terminating Cydrus’s disability-retirement benefits by specifically identifying the evidence it relied upon and explaining the reasons for its decision. The retirement board does not have a clear legal duty in this regard, and Cydrus is not entitled to the 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO requested extraordinary relief in mandamus to compel the board to provide a more detailed decision.