Opinion ID: 771682
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definitions of Independent Expenditure, 103(7), Political Committee, 103(10)(a), and Political Message, 103(11)

Text: 51 We begin with the plain language of the challenged provisions. The FCPA defines an independent expenditure as: 52 payment of money by any person 6 for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, which expenditure is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. 'Independent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office, but does not include expenditures made by persons, other than political parties and political committees, in the regular course and scope of their business and political messages sent solely to their members. 53 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(7) (2000) (emphasis added). A political message, which is incorporated in the definition of independent expenditure, is: 54 a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate or which unambiguously refers to such candidate. 55 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(11) (2000) (emphasis added). Any person making an independent expenditure over $1,000 is subject to reporting and notice requirements, see Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-107(1) (2000), and to content requirements. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 107(2) (2000). A willful and intentional violation of 107(1) or (2) is a class two misdemeanor. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 113(1) (2000). A political committee, which incorporates both 103(7) and (11), and which is itself -- somewhat circuitously -- incorporated in 103(7), is: 56 two or more persons who are elected, appointed, or chosen, or have associated themselves, for the purpose of making contributions to candidate committees, issue committees, political parties, or other political committees, or for the purpose of making independent expenditures. 57 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(10)(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Political committees are subject to the FCPA's contribution restrictions, see Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-105.3 (2000), reporting requirements, see Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-108(1), -108(2), -108(2.3), -108(2.5), -109 (2000), and registration requirements. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-108(3), 108(4) (2000). Violations of the foregoing provisions are punishable by criminal and civil penalties. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-113 (2000). 58 Without taking evidence or making factual findings, the district court ruled on June 18, 1997, that 103(7) and (10)(a) -- and implicitly 103(11), by virtue of its incorporation in 103(7) -- did not apply to Plaintiffs Colorado Right to Life, Inc. (CRLC) or Citizens for Responsible Government, Inc. (CRG). 2 J.A. 288-90. The court therefore dismissed the 103 claims on the merits. Id. at 290. CRLC and CRG challenge both rulings. They urge this court to hold that the plain language of 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) renders many substantive provisions of the FCPA applicable to organizations like CRLC and CRG that engage in issue advocacy but not express advocacy. CRLC et al. Br. at 24-27 (Dec. 16, 1999). Because issue advocacy is core First Amendment speech, Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980), the plaintiffs argue that the challenged definitions are substantially overbroad, Sec. of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964-65 (1984), not readily susceptible to a narrowing construction, Virginia v. Am. Booksellers' Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988), and therefore facially unconstitutional. CRLC et al. Br. at 27-39 (Dec. 16, 1999). In response, Colorado claims that the district court was correct to defer to the Secretary's narrow construction, under which 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) apply only to groups formed for the purpose of engaging in express advocacy. Colo. Answer Br. at 13-21. Colorado asks us to affirm the district court's ruling that because the statutes are not applicable to the plaintiffs, they have no standing to challenge them. In any case, the State argues, the statutes are not unconstitutional. 59
60 We construe the district court's order of June 18, 1997, as a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction -- i.e., for lack of standing -- under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo, applying the same standard used by the district court. Sac & Fox Nation of Okla. v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2657 (2000). Accordingly, we review the district court's interpretation of 103 de novo, Houston v. Norton, 215 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 2000), and construe the allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in favor of Plaintiff[s]. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying same standard of review to sua sponte dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). 61 The district court described Plaintiffs' arguments in the following terms: CRG and CRLC contended at the hearing that, although they were not a political committee and they did not engage in independent expenditures as defined by the statute, the provision[s] of the statute, when read together, made them 'political committees' and brought them within the purview of the statute. 2 J.A. 289 (Order, June 18, 1997). Our review of the record indicates that this characterization of Plaintiffs' arguments was inaccurate. At the hearing referenced by the district court, Plaintiffs' counsel cogently stated that both plaintiffs [CRG and CRLC] do have expenditures which unambiguously refer to candidates for state political office. Therefore, they are deemed to have under the statute made an independent expenditure and therefore are deemed to be a political committee. 13 J.A. 2819 (Tr. of H'rg on Mot. for Prelim. Inj., March 14, 1997). These claims were consistent with the allegations in the complaint. CRLC et al. Compl. at 9-10 (Dec. 10, 1996), attached to CRLC et al. Br. at A166-67 (Dec. 16, 1999). Thus, we do not agree that Plaintiffs conceded that the 103 definitions were inapplicable to their organizations. Indeed, taking all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construing all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of Plaintiffs, we find that the plain language of 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) is clearly applicable to CRG and CRLC and that the organizations face a credible threat of prosecution under the FCPA. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in denying CRG and CRLC standing to challenge the definitions. 62 a. Are Subsections 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) Applicable to CRG and CRLC and Their Activities? 63 The district court deferred to Colorado's narrow construction of the statute, which the court deemed reasonable in light of both [the statute's] purpose and its plain language. 2 J.A. 289 (Order, June 18, 1997). Colorado's construction focuses on the emphasized portions of the following four clauses in 103: (1) the definition of political message as a message . . . which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate or which unambiguously refers to such candidate, see Colo. Answer Br. at 19 (Jan. 14, 2000); (2) the provision that '[i]ndependent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office, see id. at 15-18; (3) the definition of political committee, in part, as two or more persons who . . . have associated themselves . . . for the purpose of making independent expenditures, see id. at 14-15; and (4) the exception in the definition of independent expenditure for expenditures made by persons, other than political parties and political committees, in the regular course and scope of their business and political messages sent solely to their members. See id. at 17. 64
65 Because the definition of independent expenditure incorporates the definition of political message, we begin our analysis with the definition of political message. Under 103(11), a political message is a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate or which unambiguously refers to such candidate. Colorado urges us to adopt its reading of 103(11). Under the state's construction, the disjunctive phrase advocates the election or defeat of . . . or . . . unambiguously refers to . . . is read as if it were written in the conjunctive, thereby rendering the statute inapplicable to organizations -- like CRLC and CRG -- who do unambiguously refer to candidates, but do not expressly advocate their election or defeat. See Colo. Answer Br. at 16, 19 (Jan. 14, 2000). In other words, Colorado asks as to construe the fourth or in the definition as signifying and. We are unable to do so. 66 We interpret state laws according to state rules of statutory construction. Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1071 n.23 (10th Cir. 1995). The goal of Colorado courts in interpreting the meaning or scope of any statutory term . . . is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 778 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (citations omitted). [W]e look first to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. Id. at 778. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face, there is no need to apply rules of statutory construction because it may be presumed that the legislature meant what it clearly said. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause & Summary for 1999-2000 No. 219, 999 P.2d 819, 820 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). Although 103 was originally proposed via ballot initiative, Colorado courts employ the general rules of statutory construction when interpreting citizen-initiated measures. Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215, 228 n.10 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). 67 The definition of political message in 103(11) is clear and unambiguous. In re 1999-2000 No. 219, 999 P.2d at 820. We may therefore presume[] that the legislature meant what it clearly said, i.e., that all four uses of the word or in 103(11) were intended to signify or -- not sometimes or and sometimes and. Id.; cf. Foutz v. United States, 72 F.3d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1995) (The word or . . . is not a fertile word which is subject to varied constructions.). We need not look to the State's construction for assistance with this interpretation; our inquiry ends with the plain language of the statute. We hold that the use of the disjunctive term or in 103(11) renders the definition of political message applicable to messages which unambiguously refer to a candidate, even if such messages do not also advocate the election or defeat of that candidate. In sum, to qualify as a political message under 103(11), a message need only: (1) be delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material, and (2) either (a) advocate the election or defeat of any candidate or (b) unambiguously refer to such candidate. 68 Colorado's next argument focuses on the definition of independent expenditure in 103(7). The first sentence of the definition provides that a payment is an independent expenditure when it is (1) made for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, and (2) not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. The second sentence provides that '[i]ndependent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office. Colorado argues that the second sentence does not expand upon the first, but merely clarifies its meaning. Colo. Answer Br. at 16 (Jan. 14, 2000). Again, we disagree. 69 Colorado is among the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that read the word includes as a term of extension or enlargement when used in a statutory definition. Colo. Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153, 163-64 (Colo. 1988) (en banc). Therefore, [t]he use of 'includes' in the statutory definition . . . connotes that something else is encompassed by the definition beyond what was previously covered by the immediately preceding language. Id. at 164 (citation omitted, emphasis added). In this case, that something else is expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office. 70 As noted above, our standard of review requires us to accept as true the factual allegations underlying Plaintiffs' challenges. See Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1231-32; Apple, 183 F.3d at 479. In their complaint, CRLC and CRG each allege that 71 [the organization's] purposes are to educate the public on issues relating to abortion, to restore protection of the life for [sic] unborn children, and to promote the sanctity of all innocent life. Its major purpose is not to nominate, elect, or defeat candidates, or to pass or defeat ballot measures, and it does not engage in express advocacy. As part of its issue advocacy, CRLC distributes voter guides prior to state elections which educate the voting public on the positions of candidates on issues of public concern. CRLC's voter guides unambiguously refer to specific candidates but do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of any candidate. 72 CRLC et al. Compl. at 9 (Dec. 10, 1996), attached to CRLC et al. Br. at A166 (Dec. 16, 1999); see also id. at 10 (same allegations with respect to CRG). Accepting these allegations as true, as we must, we hold that the voter guides distributed by CRLC and CRG clearly constitute political messages, as defined in 103(11). CRLC and CRG also allege that they are not associated with any political candidate, political party, or campaign committee. Id. at 9-10. In light of our obligation to accord CRLC and CRG the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we infer from this allegation of independence that the distribution of voter guides is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(7). We therefore conclude that the funds expended by CRLC and CRG to produce and disseminate voter guides are subject to regulation as independent expenditures, as the term is defined in 103(7). 73
74 Colorado's next argument relates to the definition of political committee in 103(10)(a), and relies heavily on Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748 (Colo. 2000). In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted an analogous FCPA provision, 103(8), which defines issue committee, in part, as [t]wo or more persons who are elected, appointed, or chosen, or have associated themselves, for the purpose of accepting contributions and making expenditures to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot question . . . . Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(8)(I) (2000) (emphasis added). In response to the certified question of whether an organization formed for other purposes may later become an issue committee as defined by the FCPA, Common Sense Alliance, 995 P.2d at 749, the court held that the phrase for the purpose of must be read to include only those issue committees that were formed for the purpose of supporting or opposing a ballot initiative. Organizations that form for another purpose and later commit to ballot issue activity are not within the clear ambit of the statute. Id. at 758 (emphasis added). 75 This court is bound by the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of 103(8). Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State.); Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1106 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 525 U.S. 182 (1999). Although Common Sense Alliance construed for the purpose of in 103(8) rather than 103(10)(a), it is a well-settled rule that identical words or phrases in the same statute have the same meaning. Colo. Common Cause, 758 P.2d at 161 ([W]hen . . . the legislature employs the same words or phrases in different parts of a statute, then, in the absence of any manifest indication to the contrary, the meaning attributed to the words or phrases in one part of the statute should be ascribed to the same words or phrases found elsewhere in the statute.). Thus, we hold that a political committee is formed when two or more persons associate themselves with the original purpose of making independent expenditures. 76 CRLC, CRG, and Citizens for Responsible Government State Political Action Committee (CRGS-PAC) filed their initial complaint on December 10, 1996. See 1 J.A. 3 (Docket for No. 96-S-2844). The district court dismissed their 103 claims on June 18, 1997. 2 J.A. 288-90. Common Sense Alliance was decided almost three years later, on March 13, 2000. It is therefore not surprising that Plaintiffs' complaint only sets forth the organizations' present purposes, without specifically alleging the purposes for which they were originally formed. Giving Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we surmise that the organizations' current purposes are consistent with their original purposes, and that they would be permitted to amend their complaint accordingly. Thus, CRLC and CRG are political committees, as the term is defined in 103(10)(a), and the district court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous. 7 Accordingly, 103(7)'s exception for expenditures made by persons, other than political parties and political committees, in the regular course and scope of their business does not apply to CRG or CRLC. 77 b. Do CRLC and CRG Face a Credible Threat of Prosecution Under the FCPA? 78 A plaintiff need not await and undergo a criminal prosecution in order to challenge a statute on constitutional grounds. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)). Article III standing exists [w]hen the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder . . . . Id. The plaintiff need not demonstrate to a certainty that it will be prosecuted, Vt. Right to Life, 221 F.3d at 382, only that it has an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against [it]. Id. (quoting Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 393). 79 Throughout this litigation, Colorado has insisted that under the State's construction of 103(7), (10)(a), and (11), organizations like CRLC and CRG will not be prosecuted under the FCPA. E.g., Colo. Answer Br. at 13-21 (Jan. 14, 2000). Such representations, however, are insufficient to overcome the chilling effect of the statute's plain language. In this sense, this case presents an even more compelling threat of prosecution than the plaintiff faced in Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2000). The statute challenged in Vermont Right to Life established content requirements for political advertisements -- including advertisements that only implicitly advocate[d] the success or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 380 (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 2881). The statute required all such advertisements to clearly designate the name of the candidate, party or political committee by or on whose behalf the same is published or broadcast. Id. (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 2882) (emphasis added). The State read on whose behalf to mean only as the agent or representative of; the plaintiff read the phrase to include any advertisement supporting a viewpoint with which a candidate is associated or with which his or her opponent takes issue . . . . Id. at 383. While suggesting that the State's construction was perhaps even better, the Second Circuit deemed the plaintiff's construction reasonable enough to support a legitimate fear of prosecution. Id. In this case, we need not defer to either side's construction. As discussed above, CRG and CRLC are clearly covered by the plain language of the statute. 80 This case is also distinguishable from Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1998), in which the court denied the plaintiff standing to challenge an ambiguously worded statute because the interpretive mandate sought in the lawsuit was already codified in an advisory opinion by the Wisconsin Attorney General and in regulations promulgated by the Wisconsin Election Board. Id. at 1185. The court therefore held that the plaintiff's fear of prosecution was not well-founded, id. at 1186, characterizing the lawsuit as an attempt to resolve a controversy that has not yet arisen and may never arise. Id. at 1187-88. In the present case, we are aware of no such administrative regulations, and the Secretary's representations in this litigation are not binding on this or future administrations. See Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 395 ([A]s the [State] Attorney General does not bind the state courts or local law enforcement authorities, we are unable to accept her interpretation of the law as authoritative.); accord Vt. Right to Life, 221 F.3d at 383-84 (citations omitted). We therefore hold that the fear of prosecution alleged by CRLC and CRG is sufficiently well-founded to support Article III standing. 81
82 Having determined that CRLC and CRG have standing to challenge 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) on constitutional grounds, we now consider the merits of those claims. We review questions of constitutional law de novo. United States v. Wynne, 993 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1993). Although Plaintiffs characterize their argument as an overbreadth challenge, CRLC et al. Br. at 22-25 (Dec. 16, 1999), we must consider the Supreme Court's admonition that overbreadth analysis is strong medicine, to be applied sparingly and only as a last resort. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The Court has recently affirmed that the overbreadth doctrine enables litigants 'to challenge a statute, not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.' Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2497-98 (2000) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612) (emphasis added). In this case, it is unnecessary to employ the overbreadth doctrine because the challenged definitions are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs CRLC and CRG. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (noting that one of the cardinal rules governing the federal courts is never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied) (quotations and citation omitted). The phrases which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office in 103(7), and or unambiguously refers to such candidate in 103(11), each extend the reach of the FCPA's substantive provisions to advocacy with respect to public issues, which is a violation of the rule enunciated in Buckley and its progeny. Vt. Right to Life Comm., 221 F.3d at 387. 83 We must next inquire whether the definitions, though unconstitutional as written, can be saved. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy.). Courts employ two mechanisms to preserve unconstitutional statutes from wholesale invalidation. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 177 (3d Cir. 2000). First, if a statute is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction that will remedy the constitutional infirmity, the statute will be upheld. Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 397. If the language is not readily susceptible to a narrowing construction, but the unconstitutional language is severable from the remainder of the statute, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502 (quotations omitted). 84
85 In order to save the definitions, they must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that contain explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. It is well-settled that a federal court must uphold a statute if it is 'readily susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional . . . . The key to application of this principle is that the statute must be 'readily susceptible' to the limitation; we will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements. Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 397 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Even the Supreme Court is without power to adopt a narrowing construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2616 (2000) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (statute must be genuinely susceptible to narrowing construction); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987) (fairly or obviously susceptible); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (easily susceptible). 86 In order to narrow 103(7) and (11) so that they are consistent with Buckley, we would not only have to add qualifying language (indicated with an underline), but would also have to disregard entire phrases (indicated by 87 103(7) Independent expenditure means payment of money by any person for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, which expenditure is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. 'Independent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages . . . . 88 103(11) Political message means a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which expressly advocates the election or defeat of any candidate. 8 89 To rewrite the statutes in this manner would exceed the power and function of the court, and would fail to bind state prosecutors, leaving the citizens of Colorado vulnerable to prosecutions under the actual language of the statute. See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2616; Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 397. Accordingly, we decline [Colorado's] invitation to give the statute[s] a construction more restrictive than that provided by [their] plain language. Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 948 (10th Cir. 1987). As written, 103(7), (10), and (11) are not susceptible of a narrowing construction. As explained below, however, we can sever the problematic language from the definitions and then narrowly construe the remaining text. 90
91 Although we cannot save the definitions with a narrowing construction, we need not invalidate the entire statutory scheme. In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's facial invalidation of a state obscenity statute according to the normal rule that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course. Id. at 504. The statute at issue codified the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), including the requirement that the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find [that the material], when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . . Brockett, 472 U.S. at 493 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 7.48A.010(2)(a) (1983)). Unlike Miller, which left the word undefined, the Washington statute defined prurient as that which incites lasciviousness or lust. Id. (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 7.48A.010(8)). The Court assumed without deciding that the Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that the inclusion of lust rendered the definition overbroad, see id. at 500-01 & n.10, but held that [f]acial invalidation of the statute was nevertheless improvident. Id. at 501. 92 Noting that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, the Brockett Court held that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. Id. at 502 (quotations and citations omitted); accord Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). [T]he rule that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case before it applies with equal force in the First Amendment context. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502. In order to determine whether partial invalidation of a state statute is appropriate, federal courts look to state law. Id. at 506-07. 93 The FCPA contains the following severability clause: 94 If any provision of this article or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the article which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this article are declared to be severable. 95 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-118 (2000). Under Colorado law, a severability clause creates a presumption that the legislature would have been satisfied with the portions of the statute that remain after the offending provisions are stricken as being unconstitutional. People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 371 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted), cited with approval in People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181, 190 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). The presumption of severability raised by the clause is dispelled only if what remains is so incomplete or riddled with omissions that it cannot be salvaged as a meaningful legislative enactment. City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52, 70 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (quotations, alterations, and citation omitted), cited with approval in People v. District Court, 834 P.2d at 190; accord Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 928 P.2d 796, 798 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). 96 In this case, the constitutionally problematic portions are discrete and their removal would not compromise the integrity or coherence of the statute in any way. The presumption of severability raised by 118 is therefore controlling. We conclude that the unconstitutional phrases are severable, and we hereby declare subsections (7), (10)(a), and (11) of 103 invalid only insofar as they reach beyond that which may constitutionally be regulated. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504. Specifically, we strike only the language indicated below: 97 103(7) Independent expenditure means payment of money by any person for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, which expenditure is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. Independent expenditure includes expenditures for political messages . . . . 98 103(11) Political message means a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate. 99 Without the stricken phrases, the remainder of the definitions are readily susceptible to an interpretation that is consistent with Buckley and MCFL i.e., that a political message is a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which [expressly] advocates the election or defeat of any candidate, and that an independent expenditure is payment of money . . . for the purpose of [expressly] advocating the election or defeat of any candidate . . . . E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.