Opinion ID: 2194789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are Property Interests Generally Created by Zoning Ordinances?

Text: The Supreme Court of the United States, when discussing the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property, has stated that: Certain attributes of `property' interests protected by procedural due process emerge from these decisions. To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than an unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims. Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. (Emphasis added.) Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roth, saying: Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their having a property right in continued employment. If they did, the State could not deprive them of this property without due process. Property interests are not created by the Constitution, `they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. . . .' The Ohio statute plainly creates such an interest. Respondents were `classified civil service employees,' entitled to retain their positions `during good behavior and efficient service,' who could not be dismissed `except . . . for . . . misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office'. . . . The statute plainly supports the conclusion, reached by both lower courts, that respondents possessed property rights in continued employment. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) (Footnotes omitted.) Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Unlike the Ohio statute referred to by the Loudermill Court, there is no ordinance or other statute that has been brought to our attention, or that we have found, that plainly creates any right for the respondents to participate in the purely ministerial process leading to the issuance of a building permit where the application and the permit are in accordance with the law. Montgomery County Code (MCC) (2003), [9] § 8-25, provides that where the application complies with all the requirements of the building and zoning provisions, the Director must issue a permit as soon as practicable. Section 8-25 provides in relevant part: (a) Action on application. The Director must examine or cause to be examined each application for a building permit or an amendment to a permit within a reasonable time after the application is filed. If the application or the plans do not conform to all requirements of this Chapter, the Director must reject the application in writing and specify the reasons for rejecting it. If the proposed work conforms to all requirements of the Chapter and all other applicable laws and regulations, the Director must issue a permit for the work as soon as practicable.  (Emphasis added.) Sub-section (g) further provides: The building permit or a true copy thereof and a copy of the building or other plans covered by the permit shall be kept on the site of operations open to inspection by the department, fire or police officials in the course of their duties, during the entire time the work is in progress and until its completion. We have been directed to no further express requirement in the MCC, under the circumstances here present, [10] placed on the permit holder or the Director or any other official to notify abutting or neighboring property owners of the issuance of a building permit. We have found none. Accordingly, the MCC itself creates no right of notice nor does it create any additional property rights in adjacent property owners that they do not have inherently. [11] In Feldman v. Star Homes, Inc ., [12] neighbors contended that, as neighboring property owners, they had a constitutional right to public hearings in respect to an approval of a subdivision plan, even though the local statutes did not require public hearings. The Court held: [W]e find nothing in the sections dealing with subdivision plans that requires notice or a public hearing. Indeed, under Section 118, it is provided that the mere failure of the Commission to act upon a plan submitted to it shall be equivalent to approval. . . . In the absence of . . . restrictions duly imposed by the zoning authorities, it is still true that a property owner has the right to use his property as he sees fit, so long as the use does not constitute a nuisance. The appellants contend, however, that they have a constitutional right to a hearing before a street layout is approved by the Commission. . . . In the instant case it does not appear that property rights of the appellants were affected by the Commission's approval. Feldman, 199 Md. 1, 6, 84 A.2d 903, 905 (1951). Referring to Feldman, this Court in Clarke v. County Commissioners for Carroll County, stated: This leaves for our remaining consideration only appellants' argument that they were denied a hearing prior to approval of the [subdivision] plan. . . . [N]either Art. 66B nor the subdivision regulations require that a public hearing be conducted by the commission before acting on subdivision plans. Nor does this argument rise to a constitutional level . . . . (Emphasis added.) 270 Md. 343, 350, 311 A.2d 417, 421 (1973). Neither Feldman nor Clarke has been overruled and they remain the law in this State. Indeed, this point of law in Feldman has been recognized as the contrary view to that of another jurisdiction. In Horn v. County of Ventura, the California Court opined on the position then extant in that State in respect to notices and hearings of applications for subdivisions of land: [The] party urges that plaintiff [adjacent property owner] suffered no significant deprivation of property which would invoke constitutional rights to notice and hearing. However . . . land use decisions which `substantially affect' the property rights of owners of adjacent parcels may constitute `deprivations' of property within the context of procedural due process. . . . (For a contrary view, see Feldman v. Star Homes (1951) 199 Md. 1, 84 A.2d 903 and Hancock v. City of Concord (1974) 114 N.H. 404, 322 A.2d 605.) 24 Cal.3d 605, 156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 596 P.2d 1134 (1979). In Hancock, [13] statutory provisions [14] provided that abutting property owners were entitled to participate in hearings in respect to applications for subdivision approval. The issue involved whether non-abutting, but nearby, property owners [15] were entitled to be heard at the hearings in respect to applications for subdivision approval. The Court identified the issue as: [W]hether nonabutters have a right to be heard at a hearing before the Concord Planning Board concerning an application for subdivision under RSA [Revised Statutes Annotated] 36:23. Hancock v. City of Concord, 114 N.H. 404[, 322 A.2d 605] (1974). That Court opined: Mr. Sylvia sought to subdivide his land into separate parcels for the purpose of erecting garden apartments, a permitted use in the R-3 district. Notice of a May 1, 1972 hearing . . . was sent to abutters of the Sylvia property as required by RSA 36:23. Plaintiffs, as nonabutters were not entitled to notice under RSA 36:23 and were not notified of the hearing by the planning board, but learned of the hearing and were in attendance. . . . They alleged before the superior court that their properties would be affected . . . and that they [had] intended to speak at the hearing, but were not given that opportunity. Plaintiffs argue that the decision of the board without giving them an opportunity to speak at the hearing amounted to a deprivation of their property rights without due process of law. Hancock, 114 N.H. at 404-06, 322 A.2d at 605-06. The New Hampshire Court went on to hold that: We do not agree that failure to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to speak at a hearing pursuant to RSA 36:23 amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of their property rights under the due process clause. While the legislature could have provided for a public hearing . . . as it has in several other sections . . . failure to so provide is in no way violative of the due process clause nor inconsistent with the basic principles of representative government. Hancock, 114 N.H. at 407, 322 A.2d at 607. See Carter v. City of Nashua, 116 N.H. 466, 362 A.2d 191 (1976). Laclede Gas Co. v. Abrahamson, 296 S.W.2d 100 (Mo.1956), was a condemnation case where the plaintiffs were seeking to intervene in an action in which property belonging to another property owner was being taken. Citing Feldman and other cases, the Court opined: `Interest, generally, means a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire. One interested in an action is one who is interested in the outcome or result thereof because he has a legal right which will be directly affected thereby or a legal liability which will be directly enlarged or diminished by the judgment or decree in such action.' . . . The Court held that no right to intervene was shown because the intervenor showed `no direct interest in the litigation but only a consequential interest in the probable use of the property if plaintiff is successful, and no possibility of gain or loss from the direct legal effect of any judgment that might be rendered.' Laclede Gas Co., 296 S.W.2d at 102-103. Returning to our own State, we recently discussed a similar issue. In a case involving the Public Service Commission, where there was a statutory provision requiring advertisement of a public hearing, but no other notice requirement, neighboring property owners asserted that they were entitled to actual personal notice of the hearing. The question posed, as relevant to the instant case, in Sprenger v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 400 Md. 1, 5, 926 A.2d 238, 240 (2007), [16] was: Is an interested person . . . entitled to bring an action for declaratory relief if the Public Service Commission fails to provide [actual personal] notice [to the `interested person'] and the time to file an appeal . . . has expired? After noting that the only express requirement for a general notice of the hearing through newspaper publication had been met, we addressed the contention that Sprenger was entitled to actual personal notice of the hearing. There is no requirement in [the statutes] that personal service of notice be given to interested persons. Those sections only require that notice be given to interested persons. If we were to agree with petitioners that these sections required personal service of notice, we would be, at best, forcing an interpretation that limits the manner in which notice may be given. . . . . . . [U]nder petitioner's theory, all interested persons should receive personal service of notice. Petitioners, without substantive explanation, define interested persons as those owning property contiguous to the Facility and those within half a mile of the project. . . . [H]ow then would the Commission determine who are interested persons? In the circumstances of this case should individuals whose sight lines are affected by the towers be included? They could be five miles or more away located in the mountainous terrain where the Facility is sited. . . . And what about those thousands who might claim to be, or to pass, within earshot of the spinning blades? Would all of such persons or groups, and many others, be entitled to `personal' individualized service of notice? The extent of the pool of interested persons could never be determined. . . . The agency could never be sure it had served notice, by certified mail or otherwise, on all interested parties. Sprenger, 400 Md. at 30-32, 926 A.2d at 255-56. This case also involves high towers, albeit less than half as tall as the towers in Sprenger. We have found no evidence in the record we have reviewed that indicates that the fall pattern [17] of the towers was an issue. As far as can readily be discerned, the issue revolves around the towers being in the line of sight of respondents. [18] While the area from which the pool of interested persons might come may well be less in the present case than the potentially impacted area in Sprenger, depending on demographics, the pool of interested persons might well be larger. If individualized personal notice were to be required, how could the agency ever verify that it had given such notice to all interested persons? How could it do so in the over 10,000 instances of ministerial building permit issuances each year in that county and the numerous other types of permits issued in Montgomery County? In cases such as this, where the underlying issue involves sight lines, hundreds, if not thousands, of individualized personal notices might be required. This is not a case where municipal authorities have the right to exercise initial discretion. It is not a request for a variance. It is not a request for piecemeal rezoning. According to the record, at the time of the original issuance of the permit, petitioner's project complied with the provisions of the land use codes and building codes. [19] As such, the issuance of the building permit was a purely ministerial act.