Opinion ID: 2599558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the role of the state engineer

Text: ¶ 23 This case illustrates the necessity for a public voice in furthering the water policy of beneficial use. Leucadia's original application was filed in 1970, yet as of the mid-1990s no water at all had actually been derived pursuant to the application. Fifteen years after the initial application was granted, the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision granting Leucadia's request for extension of time to November 30, 1989, did so only on the condition that this shall be the last request granted and proof of appropriation shall be submitted on or before that date or the application will be lapsed. Requests for further extension of time will be denied. State Eng'r Mem. Decision No. 81-670(A36857) (Dec. 30, 1985) (emphasis added). Longley alleges that approximately four years after the State Engineer's 1985 Memorandum Decision, just before the final expiration of time on Leucadia's application, he inquired about the application and provided the State Engineer with his address so that he might receive actual notice regarding its status. While we do not hold that such actual personal notice was required by the statute, we note that had such notice been mailed directly to Longley, this litigation would likely have been avoided. ¶ 24 Despite the two signature spaces for Leucadia's agent and proof engineer on the proof of permanent change form, Leucadia's filing of proof on the last day possible contained neither signature. While such a lapse may have been a mere oversight on Leucadia's part, it may also have been intentional, inasmuch as the document contained misrepresentations of concrete steps taken to effect permanent change; these factual statements were found by the State Engineer to have been not correct. State Eng'r Mem. Decision No. 81-670(a6393) (July 10, 1992). Undeterred, some ten months after filing the proof of permanent change, Leucadia requested that the incorrect proof of permanent change be withdrawn, and filed both its request for reinstatement of its change application and a request for a fifth extension. Two years later, in 1992, the State Engineer rejected these requests, on the basis of Leucadia's failure to do what the statute intended, that is, put the water to beneficial use, and also for its failure to compl[y] with rules and regulations. Id. The State Engineer's 1992 decision was clearly correct in light of his findings that Leucadia's filings contained false factual assertions. It is a mystery why the State Engineer did not simply terminate Leucadia's rights at that time. ¶ 25 Seventeen months after its unequivocal rejection of Leucadia's requests, the State Engineer returned Leucadia's fifth extension request so it could be notarized and, without waiting for the notarization to be received, ignored its own previous findings and decision in the matter and honored Leucadia's September 1990 request to withdraw its discredited proofs of appropriation and of permanent change. The State Engineer justified this reversal by explaining that its previous decision, finding that Leucadia did not do what it represented it had done, may have been inappropriate because Leucadia requested that the proof of appropriation be withdrawn, even though Leucadia's request came nearly a year after its submission and two months after a site inspection by the Engineer's office. State Eng'r Amend. Mem. Decision No. 81-670(A36857) & (A6393) (Jan. 31, 1994). As indicated earlier, we disagree. ¶ 26 This is precisely the type of situation where the public needs to be adequately informed of the reasons given by an applicant for its request to extend (here, after nineteen years) and the diligence it claimed. As this court has acknowledged, such notice allows those persons who have a genuine concern about proposed changes in water rights to voice those concerns before the State Engineer and, as an important corollary, provides the State Engineer with all the viewpoints relevant to any proposal. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 750 n. 9 (Utah 1996). Here, the legislature's intent that the public be given meaningful notice was not given effect. We hold that, because the public notice given regarding Leucadia's fifth extension request did not strictly comply with the statutory requirements pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(2)(f)(ii), the notice was invalid and the statutory time period within which Longley was required to protest was never triggered. Longley's protest was therefore entitled to a hearing. Because the only basis upon which the district court found Longley to lack standing to appeal was untimeliness, we hold that Longley has standing and his objections must be heard.