Opinion ID: 778366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: First Motion for Contempt

Text: 93 A district court's decision to deny a motion for contempt is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hook v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1997). We may reverse only if the district court has misapprehended the law or rested its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of a material fact. Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.2001). 94 Plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt on February 22, 1999. The district court denied the motion, finding that Defendants had substantially complied with the mental health and dental provisions of the Judgment and that a motion for contempt of the remainder of the Judgment was untimely. We affirm the district court's ruling with respect to the mental health and dental provisions of the Judgment. With respect to the other medical services provisions, however, we conclude that the district court misapprehended the law and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
95 Plaintiffs argue in part that the district court improperly denied the contempt motion on the ground that Defendants had not committed an Eighth Amendment violation. However, in its concluding discussion, the court explained: 96 With respect to dental care and mental health care, the Court has determined that the care provided and steps taken to address those issues substantially complied with the terms of the Stipulation and Judgment. In addition, the Court has concluded that there is not a current and ongoing violation of the Constitutional rights of inmates at [the Prison] with respect to the dental and mental health care provided. 97 (Emphasis added.) Substantial compliance with the Judgment is an acceptable defense to Plaintiffs' motion for civil contempt. Go-Video, Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. (In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig.), 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir.1993). The district court addressed that question directly and answered it in Defendants' favor. 98 Because the court applied the correct legal standard, Plaintiffs are left with their alternative argument that the district court denied the prisoners' contempt motion based on the erroneous conclusion that [the Prison] had substantially complied with the terms of the Judgment. For the reasons explained in the foregoing sections of this opinion, the district court did not make clearly erroneous findings of fact. The district court concluded that these findings indicate substantial compliance, a conclusion that is not an abuse of discretion.
99 The district court declined even to consider whether Defendants were in contempt for failing to comply substantially with the other medical care provisions of the Judgment. The court reasoned that the motion for contempt was untimely because Plaintiffs failed to give adequate notice [of] their intent to seek an extension of jurisdiction over anything other than dental and mental health care; those terms of the Stipulation and Judgment expired January 12, 1999. 100 The problem with that reasoning is that the court already had issued two orders deferring the automatic expiration of the Stipulation and Judgment until the court can enter findings regarding whether an extension of jurisdiction is warranted. Because the orders deferring expiration of the Judgment were worded broadly and did not distinguish between the mental health and dental provisions, on the one hand, and other health services provisions, on the other, the entire Judgment remained in force when Plaintiffs filed their first motion for contempt. That is so even though (as we have held above) the court eventually concluded that Plaintiffs had not sought to extend the Judgment in a timely manner as to the other health services provisions. The temporary extension of the Judgment was in aid of the court's jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction. That is, the district court had power to extend the Judgment for the purpose of preserving existing conditions pending a decision upon its own jurisdiction. United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 290, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947); see also Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999, 1000-01 (9th Cir.2001) (We have jurisdiction `to determine whether jurisdiction exists.') (quoting Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.2000)). 101 Defendants argue that the word provisional in the orders extending the life of the Judgment meant that the extension affected only those portions of the Judgment concerning mental health and dental care. We are not persuaded. The term provisional generally means temporary. Black's Law Dictionary 1224 (6th ed. 1990) (Temporary; preliminary; tentative; taken or done by way of precaution or ad interim. ); Oxford English Dictionary 719 (2d ed. 1989) (Of, belonging to, or of the nature of a temporary provision or arrangement; provided or adopted for present needs or for the time being; supplying the place of something regular, permanent, or final....). Because the orders did not otherwise limit the substantive reach of the extension of the Judgment, we decline to adopt Defendants' idiosyncratic interpretation of the term provisional. 102 To the extent that the Judgment required notice before the filing of a motion for contempt alleging a past breach of the substantive terms of the Judgment—as distinct from the notice required to extend the court's continuing jurisdiction into the future—Plaintiffs complied with it. 9 Accordingly, the district court's refusal even to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' motion was an abuse of discretion. We reverse this aspect of the decision and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 103