Opinion ID: 203286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Curran's Argument

Text: Curran insists the loss amount is inflated as it includes payments from clients who were not victims of the fraudulent scheme but instead enjoyed the benefits of the legitimate naturopathic services Curran rendered. He argues that the government needed to submit even more individualized evidence than it did for each victim related to the live blood testing results in order to prove that the victim's payments to Curran for the test and prescribed remedies were actual losses to the victim caused by his fraud. We are not persuaded. There was ample evidence from which to conclude that Curran falsely held himself out to his clients to be a medical doctor, and that the clients listed in the summary chart were improperly given blood tests and received medically frivolous remedies designed for Curran's financial benefit rather than his clients' well-being. [3] That a few clients later relayed their satisfaction with this fraudulent treatment through defense counsel is immaterial in light of the clear evidence of professional impropriety and fraud, affecting all his clients, that permeated Curran's practice. Curran complains that the Guidelines offer little direction in how to determine who were actual victims for purposes of assessing the loss total. Victim is defined in the application notes to § 2B1.1 in part as any person who sustained any part of the actual loss determined under subsection (b)(1) . . . (Nov.2005). Actual loss is defined as the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense. USSG § 2B1.1, comment n. 3(A)(i) (Nov.2005). Pointing to language in the Guidelines establishing a causation requirement in assessment of loss, USSG App. C, amend. 617, (Nov. 1, 2001), Curran argues that a causal link was not shown between the fraud and the victims payments. That amendment states that: The amendment defines actual loss as the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense. The amendment incorporates this causation standard that, at a minimum, requires factual causation (often called but for causation) and provides a rule for legal causation (i.e., guidance to the courts regarding how to draw the line as to what losses should be included and excluded from the loss determination). Significantly, the application of this causation standard in the great variety of factual contexts in which it is expected to occur appropriately is entrusted to sentencing judges. Id. We see no definitional problem. Given the proof of Curran's misrepresentation as to his medical qualifications and of his fraudulent practices, including the questionable tests and treatments he provided, the court could properly find that the payments made by the clients fell well within the Guidelines' definition of actual loss, to wit, reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense. USSG § 2B1.1, cmt. n. 3(A)(i). The court found that Curran's actions and services were all part and parcel of his scam designed to scare the clients into spending money. It was reasonable to conclude that the patients' payments to Curran for those services were actual losses resulting from the offense and that they were victims. We see no discrepancy between the court's loss findings and the loss and causation standards in the Guidelines. Curran relies on two cases which were remanded for resentencing after a district court included non-causal factors in its assessment of the loss. See United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir.2005); United States v. Rothwell, 387 F.3d 579, 583 (6th Cir.2004). Both cases are factually distinguishable. Neither involves anything close to the present entwined situation, in which Curran's charges for the tests and medications were shown to be inextricably linked to his misrepresentations, malpractice and fear-mongering. Curran argues the government needed to prove client by client that the live blood test results were the but-for cause of each of the clients' payments, but, as the court noted, the scheme involved a number of fraudulent actions and representations, not just the live blood testing. The live blood testing, although a common thread, was, the court said, part of the larger scam perpetrated by the Defendant in bringing people into his office and then telling them they were very sick people who needed his services. And there was evidence at trial that Curran, not being a doctor, was not authorized by state law to perform or evaluate such a test, as well as that it was rare for parasites to be found in anyone's blood. Curran's test results were described by one doctor as gibberish. Curran contends the court erred in accepting the government's argument that it was statistically impossible for all the clients to have had something wrong with their blood since the clients were self-selecting and more likely to be ill because they were seeking therapy. But this contention is sheer speculation as to the facts at hand, unsupported by any medical or other evidence. On this record, we can see no need for any more refined or individualized loss calculations than those supplied to support the district court's reasonable estimate of the range of loss, given the available information. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 457 (citation omitted). Curran insists that the loss amount should at least be discounted by the amount spent by some clients for legitimate naturopathic therapies. But Curran held himself out to all comers as a licensed medical doctor, not simply a naturopath. Curran's scheme, which included his advertising himself as a medical doctor and telling clients they had all manner of rare blood diseases or the like, could be found to be intended to defraud all comers. There is little evidence to suggest a separate class of clients who understood he was not an M.D. and came to him simply in his capacity as a naturopath. Moreover, the comment in notes accompanying USSG § 2B1.1 states that in cases involving a scheme in which . . . services were fraudulently rendered to the victim by persons falsely posing as licensed professionals . . . loss shall include the amount paid for the property, services or goods transferred, rendered, or misrepresented, with no credit provided for the value of those items or services. Id. cmt. n. 3(F)(v) (2005). The Sentencing Commission noted that the seriousness of these offenses and the culpability of these offenders is best reflected by a loss determination that does not credit the value of the unlicensed benefits provided. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, vol. II, amend. 617, at 183-84 (2003). Thus, even supposing such services as the full body assessment provided some naturopathic benefit, or at least were believed by some clients to have done so, no credit is available under the Guidelines for them where Curran was falsely posing to be a licensed medical doctor at the time. [4] It is true there were fifty-six former clients who submitted letters through defense counsel expressing apparent satisfaction with their treatment by Curran, but even, arguendo, were we to make the doubtful assumption that these fifty-six should somehow be excluded from the loss calculation, Curran concedes the loss amount would still exceed the $1 million upon which his sentence rested.