Opinion ID: 2974639
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Agent Brock’s Statement

Text: Defendant argues that the district court erred by refusing to admit into evidence either a tape or transcript of a statement he made to Agent Brock, thus limiting his ability to crossexamine Agent Brock. At trial, Agent Brock testified that he interviewed defendant at the time of the September 14, 2001, search and he admitted that he had fired a shotgun which was later traded at a flea market by a third party for a Marlin .22 rifle. Defendant sought to impeach this 10 testimony by introducing a tape or transcript of his later statement in which he allegedly said he had not shot a shotgun and had been confused earlier. The district court refused to admit the tape or transcript because the second statement was hearsay and made about an hour after the first statement. However, the district court permitted counsel to ask Agent Brock if defendant later stated he had been confused when he gave the earlier statement, to which Agent Brock replied that defendant had not. We review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2006). We find no error in the district court’s decision. The statement could not be admitted as non-hearsay for impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) because Rule 801(d)(1) permits a witness to be impeached with his or her own inconsistent statement. Defendant’s statements do not show Agent Brock’s testimony was inconsistent, but rather show that defendant made inconsistent statements. The rule does not provide for the admission of an inconsistent statement by another witness. Second, defendant’s statement was not admissible under the exception for when the declarant is unavailable under Fed. R. Evid. 804. Moreover, the statement was not admissible under the doctrine of completeness. This doctrine allows a party who is prejudiced by an opponent's introduction of part of a “document, or a correspondence, or a conversation,” to enter so much of the remainder as is necessary to explain or rebut a misleading impression caused by the “incomplete character” of that evidence. United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Littwin, 338 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir.1964)). It was partially codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 106: When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 11 The doctrine, however, does not “make inadmissible evidence admissible.” United States v. Shaver, 89 Fed. Appx. 529, 532 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (unpublished) (citations omitted). “Exculpatory hearsay may not come in solely on the basis of completeness.” Id. Because no hearsay exceptions allowed the introduction of defendant’s later statement to Agent Brock, it cannot be admitted under the doctrine of completeness. Finally, we note that even assuming the statement was admissible, there was no prejudice given the substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt. See Argentine v. United Steelworkers of America, 287 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir. 2002).