Opinion ID: 1172244
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpreting course, scope, and authorization

Text: We turn, as did the court of appeals and trial court, to the nature of Heinze's actions. On this issue, the trial judge in the tort case instructed the jury as follows: If you find that Defendant Heinze intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiff, then you must determine if Defendant APAAC is responsible for his actions. 1. Defendant APAAC is subject to liability for the actions of Defendant Heinze committed while acting in the scope of his employment. To hold an employer liable, an employee must: a) have acted within the scope of his employment; b) be subject to the employer's control or right of control; c) have acted in furtherance of the employer's business. An employee's conduct is within the scope of employment if and only if; a) it is the kind he is employed to perform; b) it occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits; and c) it is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. 2. Defendant APAAC is subject to liability for the actions of Heinze acting outside the scope of his employment, if; a) Defendant APAAC intended the conduct or the consequences; or b) Defendant APAAC was negligent or reckless; or c) Defendant Heinze purported to act or speak on behalf of Defendant APAAC and he was aided in accomplishing his misconduct by the existence of the agency relationship. (Emphasis added.) The instruction, taken almost verbatim from RESTATEMENT § 219, contains two separate theories of vicarious liability. Part 2(c) paraphrases the words of § 219(2)(d), which, as we shall see later, deals with the master's vicarious liability for torts a servant was empowered to commit because of the master's delegation of authority. The court of appeals noted the state correctly asserts that `Heinze is provided coverage [by the statute] only if his acts were performed ... in the course and scope of employment or authorization.' Schallock and Saunders respond that `so long as the tort complained of was caused incidental to the exercise of the supervisory power, Heinze must be deemed as acting within the course and scope of his employment.' Schallock, 185 Ariz. at 219, 914 P.2d at 1310. In concluding that Schallock's position was incorrect, the court of appeals relied on its prior decision in Smith v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., which held the employer was not vicariously liable for a supervisor's harassment and sexual assaults on an employee because the supervisor's acts were not expressly or impliedly authorized by the employer or in furtherance of its business. 179 Ariz. 131, 136, 876 P.2d 1166, 1171 (1994). The language of Smith, standing alone, would mean that an employer is never vicariously liable for an intentional tort. We believe this sweeps much too broadly. In addition, we note that in Smith the evidence did not establish the employer's actual or constructive knowledge of the supervisor's conduct. Thus, even if correctly decided, Smith is much different than the case before us, as can be seen from the court's language: [N]o evidence exists from which a reasonable juror could conclude that [the employer] knew about [the supervisor's] sexual misconduct and ratified it.... Finally, no evidence exists in this record from which a reasonable juror could conclude that [the employer] knew or should have known that [the supervisor] had created a sexually offensive working environment and thus was capable of sexual assault. Id. at 137, 876 P.2d at 1172. We do not believe Smith is applicable here and turn therefore to an analysis of agency law.