Opinion ID: 1823510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: What was Miller's Intent?

Text: Finally, Pirtle and Prchal argue that the will is invalid because, they say, it does not reflect Miller's true intent. They did not raise this assertion in their complaint or at the hearing before the circuit court, but they did assert it in a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion. They argue that because Miller stated that he wanted them to have everything and because Tucker admitted that Miller wanted them to have whatever was left or $100,000, the will does not reflect Miller's testamentary intent, and should be deemed invalid under Thurlow v. Berry, 249 Ala. 597, 604, 32 So.2d 526, 532-33 (1947), which states: `The fundamental and cardinal rule in the interpretation of wills is that the intention of the testator, if not inconsistent with some established rule of law or with public policy, must control, and it is the duty of the courts to ascertain such intention and to give force and effect to the scheme that he had in mind for the disposition of his estate. 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, (2d Ed.) p. 661.' (quoting Castleberry v. Stringer, 176 Ala. 250, 254, 57 So. 849, 850 (1912)). Tucker, citing Kershaw v. Kershaw, 848 So.2d 942 (Ala.2002), and deGraaf v. Owen, 598 So.2d 892 (Ala.1992), argues that the will should be presumed valid and the exclusive evidence of Miller's intent absent some ambiguity requiring reference to extrinsic evidence. Pirtle and Prchal did not properly present their argument regarding intent to the circuit court. Moreover, The rules stated in Thurlow, Kershaw, and deGraaf relate to the construction and interpretation of a will, not its validity. See Thurlow and deGraaf, supra; Parker v. Bozian, 859 So.2d 427, 434-35 (Ala.2003); Cottingham v. McKee, 821 So.2d 169, 171-72 (Ala.2001). Because Pirtle and Prchal challenge the validity of the will, their reliance on such a rule is misplaced. Furthermore, we cannot find any case invalidating a will solely in the face of evidence indicating that a testator's intent conflicts with the provisions of a will. As a result, Tucker was entitled to a summary judgment as to this issue. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's summary judgment as to the claims alleging lack of testamentary capacity and improper execution. We also affirm the circuit court's judgment as to Pirtle and Prchal's argument that the will should be invalidated based solely upon conflicting evidence of Miller's intent. We reverse the circuit court's summary judgment as to the undue-influence claim, and we remand the cause for further proceedings as to that claim. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. NABERS, C.J., and SEE, STUART, and BOLIN, JJ., concur.