Opinion ID: 2128049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the circuit court's application of section 11-31-1

Text: Having found that section 11-31-1 as construed in City of Aurora is constitutional, we review the circuit court's decision to issue a demolition order. Section 11-31-1 requires two findings before an order of demolition may issue. The court must find that the building is dangerous and unsafe. City of Aurora, 38 Ill.2d at 133, 230 N.E.2d 200. The court must also find that the building is beyond reasonable repair. City of Aurora, 38 Ill.2d at 137, 230 N.E.2d 200. We review the court's findings to ensure that they are supported by the evidence and that they are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. City of Chicago v. Birnbaum, 49 Ill.2d 250, 254, 274 N.E.2d 22 (1971). After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the circuit court's finding that the building is beyond reasonable repair was not supported by the evidence. City of Aurora requires that the second finding  that the building is beyond reasonable repair  must be based on a comparison of the cost of repair with the value of the building. City of Aurora, 38 Ill.2d at 135-36, 230 N.E.2d 200. In City of Aurora, the circuit court refused to admit evidence that the building had a value of $15,000 and that repairs would cost $500. City of Aurora, 38 Ill.2d at 135, 230 N.E.2d 200. We held that section 11-31-1 contemplates repair when it is feasible. City of Aurora, 38 Ill.2d at 136, 230 N.E.2d 200. Therefore, evidence comparing repair cost to value should have been admitted. City of Aurora, 38 Ill.2d at 137, 230 N.E.2d 200. There should have been proof of the extent or proportion of its value to which the building had deteriorated. City of Aurora, 38 Ill.2d at 135, 230 N.E.2d 200. The gist of City of Aurora is that demolition is justified only if repair makes so little economic sense that it is unlikely that an owner would make use of any further opportunity to repair. Because knowledge of the current value of the building is necessary to determine whether repair makes economic sense, City of Aurora requires that a court find current value before it may issue a demolition order. In this case, the circuit court found that the cost of repair would be $75,000. The court further found that the value of the building was $100,000. The court's sole evidence of the value of the building was testimony that the property (including, presumably, the land) was sold some 20 years prior to the hearing by Mrs. Dorothy Stokovich to her son Nick Stokovich. We have said that, It goes without saying that a contemporaneous sale between parties dealing at arms length is not only relevant to the question of fair cash market value, [citations] but would be practically conclusive   . (Emphases added.) People ex rel. Korzen v. Belt Ry. Co. of Chicago, 37 Ill.2d 158, 161, 226 N.E.2d 265 (1967). The converse should also go without saying: if a sale is remote in time, or is not an arm's length transaction, it is little evidence of market value. We have never had occasion to rule on whether a sale that occurred as long as 20 years prior to the valuation date would be admissible to prove the value of real estate. Cf. Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Krol, 12 Ill.2d 139, 146-47, 145 N.E.2d 599 (1957) (finding a sale nearly three years prior to valuation date not too remote to be admissible in a condemnation proceeding). There is no doubt, however, that even if the evidence of the 20-year-old sale was admissible it could not, by itself, support the court's finding of value. When defendants' counsel objected to the court's use of a 20-year-old sale, the court made a remark implying that any increase in market value over that time had been negated by the fact that the property was not well kept. However, we find nothing in the record to show that depreciation due to poor maintenance must have negated any appreciation over time. Not only was the sale of the property from Mrs. Stokovich to her son too remote in time to support the court's valuation, Mrs. Stokovich's uncontradicted testimony also indicates that the sale was not an arm's length transaction. She testified that there was no agreement in writing, that her son had not yet paid $75,000 of the agreed price of $100,000, and that she simply trusted him to pay the balance when he could. Because the sale from mother to son was both remote in time and not an arm's length transaction, we conclude that the court's evidence of the value of the property was insufficient as a matter of law. Because City of Aurora requires that a finding that a building is beyond reasonable repair must be based on a comparison of value with cost of repair, the court's finding that the building was beyond reasonable repair was not supported by the evidence. The court thus lacked the basis that section 11-31-1 requires for an order of demolition to issue. We vacate the order of demolition and remand for further proceedings. In the interest of judicial economy we address the following issues to aid the court on remand. First, we review the court's finding that the building was dangerous and unsafe. There was testimony by Jennifer Schaefer, a sanitarian, that in 1998 there were mouse feces throughout the building, as well as feces of some larger mammal, not a dog, at two places in the building. Schaefer also testified that in May of 2000, shortly before the hearing, she saw gaps in the building through which vermin could enter. She stated that the amount of feces suggested numerous mice, that mice are known to carry disease, and that mice would go out into the surrounding area in search of food if none were available in the building. Schaefer was only one of several witnesses who described ways in which the building may threaten public health and safety. Based on the testimony, the finder of fact could conclude that the building is a threat to public health. We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the building is dangerous and unsafe. Furthermore, the defendants have not met the burden of showing that a finding supported by evidence was nevertheless against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record indicates that the building was still vacant at the time of the hearing, and the record evidence did not establish that this vacant building was being kept reasonably free of vermin and in a generally safe condition. We conclude that the court's finding that the building was dangerous and unsafe was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, the circuit court on remand, if the issue arises, should only consider evidence that the building's condition has changed since the first hearing. In the absence of such evidence, the court may rely on its prior finding that the building is dangerous and unsafe. Second, we note that the court refused to admit defendants' proffered evidence of the current value of the property by a licensed real estate agent who had recently sold property in Lake Villa and about recent offers to purchase the property. A witness who is familiar with the property at issue and has direct knowledge of real estate values in the vicinity is competent to offer an opinion about value. Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Krol, 12 Ill.2d 139, 147, 145 N.E.2d 599 (1957). Furthermore, bona fide offers to purchase property for cash, in the absence of evidence of comparable sales, are some evidence of fair cash market value. City of Chicago v. Anthony, 136 Ill.2d 169, 188, 144 Ill.Dec. 93, 554 N.E.2d 1381 (1990), citing Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Lambert, 411 Ill. 183, 191, 103 N.E.2d 356 (1952). Finally, we point out that as the plaintiff the Village bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to support each of the findings necessary for an order of demolition.