Opinion ID: 831254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statutory rights to participate in the dhs service plan

Text: The failures of the DHS and the court also directly violated their statutory duties. If the court orders placement of a child outside the child's home, the DHS must prepare an initial services plan within 30 days of the child's placement. MCL 712A.13a(8)(a). Before the court enters an order of disposition, the DHS must prepare a case service plan, which must include, among other things, a [s]chedule of services to be provided to the parent, child, and if the child is to be placed in foster care, the foster parent, to facilitate the child's return to his or her home or to facilitate the child's permanent placement. MCL 712A.18f(3)(d). If a child continues in placement outside of the child's home, the case service plan shall be updated and revised at 90-day intervals.... MCL 712A.18f(5). Further, at each review hearing, the court is required to consider, among other things, [c]ompliance with the case service plan with respect to services provided or offered to the child and the child's parent, ... whether the parent ... has complied with and benefited from those services, and [t]he extent to which the parent complied with each provision of the case service plan, prior court orders, and an agreement between the parent and the agency. MCL 712A.19(6)(a) and (c). The court may then modify the case service plan, including by [p]rescribing additional services and [p]rescribing additional actions to be taken by the parent ... to rectify the conditions that caused the child to be placed in foster care or to remain in foster care. MCL 712A.19(7)(a) and (b). The only documented service plan in this case listed respondent's obligations and stated that the DHS worker will refer the family to the appropriate agencies in order to meet the goals of the service plan. It is unclear, however, whether the DHS sent a copy of the service plan to respondent; although a copy appears in the circuit court record, the section reserved for respondent's signature is notably blank. In any event, neither Haag nor the court ever facilitated respondent's access to services and agencies or discussed updating the plan. Although Haag testified that as a matter of general policy the DHS tr[ies] to make contact with the prison social worker that might be able to help [a respondent] fulfill some of [the service plan requirements] and get into the services in the prison, Haag did not assert that he complied with this policy here. At a minimum, there is no evidence that Haag spoke to a prison social worker about respondent's need for services. Indeed, Haag admitted that respondent could not comply with the service plan as written while in prison, but provided no explanation for his failure to update the plan or to contact respondent, [8] particularly after Smith's noncompliance with the plan became evident. Haag first reported Smith's noncompliance and the DHS's intent to seek termination at the December 3, 2008, permanency planning hearing. Yet the DHS and the court still failed to address respondent's right to services or updating the service plan. Respondent's parental rights were terminated a mere two months later, on February 3, 2009. Under these circumstances, the circuit court was required to consider MCL 712A.19a(6), which provides: If the court determines at a permanency planning hearing that a child should not be returned to his or her parent, the court may order the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, if the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the court shall order the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights. The court is not required to order the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights if 1 or more of the following apply:    (c) The state has not provided the child's family, consistent with the time period in the case service plan, with the services the state considers necessary for the child's safe return to his or her home, if reasonable efforts are required. [Emphasis added.] Although the initial conditions of MCL 712A.19a(6) were metthe children could not yet be returned to respondent and they had been placed out of their home for more than 15 monthsthe court and the DHS failed to consider that respondent had never been evaluated as a future placement or provided with services. Rather, the DHS had focused on its attempts to reunify the children with Smith and, in doing so, disregarded respondent's statutory right to be provided services and, as a result, extended the time it would take him to comply with the service plan upon his release from prisonwhich was potentially imminent at the time of the termination hearing. The state failed to involve or evaluate respondent, but then terminated his rights, in part because of his failure to comply with the service plan, [9] while giving him no opportunity to comply in the future. This constituted clear error. As we observed in In re Rood, a court may not terminate parental rights on the basis of circumstances and missing information directly attributable to respondent's lack of meaningful prior participation. In re Rood, 483 Mich. 73, 119, 763 N.W.2d 587 (2009) (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.); see also id. at 127, 763 N.W.2d 587 (YOUNG, J., concurring in part) (stating that, as a result of the respondent's inability to participate, there is a `hole' in the evidence on which the trial court based its termination decision).