Opinion ID: 3014824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Unreasonable Search Claim

Text: Finally, we must address the unreasonable search claim against Troopers Marasco and Scianna. In its first opinion, the District Court held that Marasco’s and Scianna’s entry into Smith’s backyard was reasonable, in light of the fact that they were responding to a complaint concerning light shining from Smith’s property. On appeal, we rejected this analysis, finding that the troopers had entered Smith’s “curtilage” and that disputes of fact existed which could impact whether the entry was reasonable.14 We repudiated the view “that officers may proceed to the back of a home when they do not receive an answer at the front door any time they have a legitimate purpose for approaching the house in the first place,” Smith I, 318 F.3d at 519-20. 14 A person’s curtilage is the area immediately adjacent to his home in which he has a legitimate expectation of privacy. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). 23 More specifically, we observed: In addition, Marasco had been to Smith’s residence in the past and had been in Smith’s backyard once or twice before. A jury could conclude that he therefore knew that the Smith residence did not have a back entrance as seems to be the case. If Marasco had such knowledge, then this is not a case where the officers necessarily acted reasonably in proceeding to the back of the house to find another entrance after receiving no answer at the front door. . . . It also appears that here the officers entered the backyard at least twice, spending a more significant amount of time looking around Smith’s property than did the officers in Raines and Anderson in looking around the properties involved there, and that the officers here did so despite having been instructed to leave if they did not receive an answer to their initial attempts to contact Smith. Furthermore, the district court did not address the fact that Marasco testified about entering Smith’s garage after receiving no answer. The record indicates that the garage was in fact a part of the structure of the house itself. In the circumstances, there remain questions of fact as to whether the officers’ intrusion into the curtilage was reasonable in light of their asserted purpose in making their entry into Smith’s property which was not to make a search.15 318 F.3d at 521. On remand, the District Court again granted summary judgment for Marasco and Scianna. The Court concluded that 15 We also held that inquiries into the reasonableness of such searches must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. 24 certain facts rendered the search inherently reasonable, namely that the officers “knew there to be a back porch that Smith sometimes sat on”; that “there were lights on in the home, the garage door was open and there were vehicles in the driveway”; and that it “was necessary to locate Smith in order to turn off the lights that were shining on Shafers’ property late that night.” See 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5613 at -.16 We agree with the District Court that it was reasonable for the officers initially to enter the backyard in order to ascertain whether Smith was sitting on his fenced-in back porch.17 As we observed in Smith I: Where officers are pursuing a lawful objective, unconnected to any search for the fruits and instrumentalities of criminal activity, their entry into the curtilage after not receiving an answer at the front door might be reasonable as entry into the curtilage may provide the only practicable way of attempting to contact the resident . . . where the front door was inaccessible. Similarly, officers reasonably may believe, based on the facts available to them, that the person they seek to interview may be located elsewhere on property within the curtilage . . . and, [in such] cases, an officer’s brief entry into the curtilage to test this belief might be justified. 318 F.3d at 520. Given that the troopers believed Smith to be home but did not receive a response when they knocked on his door, as well as the fact that they knew he occasionally sat in the fenced-in porch, it was not unreasonable for them to enter the 16 The District Court also found that the troopers had not, in fact, violated Smith’s curtilage. 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5613 at  n.1. However, we concluded in Smith I that they had done so (based on the initial findings by the District Court), see 318 F.3d at 519, and we are bound by this conclusion. 17 The fact that the porch apparently did not have a door leading to the backyard is irrelevant to this analysis. 25 backyard for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether he was on the porch. However, as we noted in Smith I, the troopers apparently entered Smith’s backyard on two separate occasions. See id. At his deposition, Trooper Marasco testified that, after being unable to locate Smith on the porch, he returned to his car and contacted Corporal Rodriguez. At that point, according to his deposition testimony, he and Trooper Scianna returned to the backyard and waited there while the PCO attempted to reach Smith. In fact, Marasco testified that he and Scianna were simply “buying time” while waiting for the PCO to contact Smith. It was at this point that Trooper Marasco observed the red dot on Trooper Scianna. We cannot conclude, based on the record before us, that this second entrance into Smith’s backyard was objectively reasonable. Indeed this result is essentially compelled by Smith I, as we have explained it. The troopers were justified in entering the curtilage for the purpose of determining whether he was sitting on his back porch; once they determined that he was not, their justification for remaining in his yard ended. As we observed in Smith I, when officers reasonably believe that “the person they seek to interview may be located elsewhere on property within the curtilage,” then a “brief entry into the curtilage to test this belief might be justified.” Id. While the troopers’ first entrance into Smith’s backyard was consistent with this principle, the second was not. For this reason, it was error for the District Court to conclude that Marasco and Scianna were entitled to summary judgment on the unreasonable search claim.18 18 In Smith I, we held that the District Court erred in granting defendants’ summary judgment on the unreasonable search claim and remanded so that the District Court could “address the specific conduct of the defendants in determining whether they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims.” See 318 F.3d at 521 n.13. However, the District Court did not focus on the qualified immunity issue. Judge Roth would hold that the second trip around the house was not an unreasonable search, relying on United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 2003). Rohrig depends upon the existence of exigent circumstances which were found in that case 26