Opinion ID: 1252767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Applicability of Livestock Waste Management Act and Title 130

Text: In its first assignment of error, FCF contends the district court erred in failing to determine that the ordinances are preempted by state law. FCF argues the ordinances are preempted by (1) the NEPA; (2) the Livestock Waste Management Act (LWMA), Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 54-2401 to 54-2414 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp.2000); and (3) title 130 of the rules and regulations of the Department of Environmental Quality enacted pursuant to both acts. The City argues, however, that neither the LWMA nor title 130 is appropriate for consideration by this court in our preemption analysis. According to the City, the only issue presented to, and decided by, the district court was whether the ordinances are preempted by the NEPA. In response, FCF contends that it could not have included the LWMA in its original Answer and Cross-Petition because the LWMA became operative only after such pleading was filed. FCF further contends that in any event, it was impossible for the district court to evaluate the preemptive effect of the NEPA without examining the LWMA. Reply brief for appellant at 4. We turn first to a consideration of which state enactments are properly before this court in our preemption analysis. The district court determined that the ordinances are not preempted by state law, concluding: Although the pleadings in this matter confine the preemption argument to [Neb Rev. Stat. § 81-1504(11) (Reissue 1999) ], the argument in [FCF's] brief is broader and basically argues that the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act preempts Neb.Rev.Stat. Section 17-536 (Reissue 1997), the statute primarily relied on by the City of Alma. A review of the Environmental Protection Act and the evidence herein, leads this Court to conclude that the field of pollution control has not been preempted by the legislature. Section 81-1504(18) (Reissue 1994 and 1999) directs the Department of Environmental Quality to encourage local units of government to handle air, land, and water pollution problems within their respective jurisdictions and on a cooperative basis and to provide technical and consultative assistance therefore. This is not language indicating a preemptive intent. (Emphasis in original.) The district court's preemption analysis clearly focused exclusively on the NEPA. The district court did not refer to either the LWMA or title 130 in its order, nor did the district court's order discuss any particular provision of either the LWMA or title 130 in its preemption analysis. FCF argues such was error. We disagree. As the district court noted in its written order, the only state law basis for preemption raised by FCF's operative pleadings was § 81-1504(11) of the NEPA. Furthermore, a review of the bill of exceptions discloses that during the trial of this matter, FCF did not argue or present any evidence with respect to the preemptive effect of either the LWMA or title 130. FCF contends that it could not have raised the LWMA at the time it filed its original Answer and Cross-Petition because the LWMA was not yet in effect. Although this is true, it is not persuasive. The operative date of the LWMA was April 15, 1998. See 1998 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1209. On January 27, 2000, 21 months after the effective date of the LWMA, FCF filed its Amended Cross Petition. FCF's amended cross-petition did not contain any allegation that the LWMA or title 130 provided a basis for preemption. We further find unpersuasive FCF's contention that it was impossible for the district court to evaluate the preemptive effect of the NEPA without examining the LWMA. While it is true that the NEPA contains several subsections which refer to the LWMA, the NEPA and the LWMA are distinct and separate legislative enactments containing separate and distinct substantive provisions. Furthermore, having previously concluded that the LWMA was not presented to the district court by the pleadings, we further determine that under the record presented on appeal, it is not only possible but appropriate to analyze the preemptive effect of the NEPA without considering the LWMA. In sum, the issue of whether the City's ordinances are preempted by the LWMA or title 130 was not presented to or decided by the district court. As such, the district court did not err in failing to consider their preemptive effect, if any, and we do not reach that issue. An issue not presented to or decided by the trial court is not appropriate for consideration on appeal. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kment, 265 Neb. 655, 658 N.W.2d 662 (2003); Torrison v. Overman, 250 Neb. 164, 549 N.W.2d 124 (1996). Consequently, our preemption analysis is limited to a determination of whether the NEPA preempts the ordinances.