Opinion ID: 719627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 12 McCall also argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, for two reasons: first, the defense's alibi evidence was uncontroverted; second, the jury's verdict was inconsistent. The first reason may be disposed of instantly. Beverly Hutchens's testimony alone was sufficient to neutralize McCall's alibi defense and sustain a conviction, because she affirmatively identified McCall as the robber of the bank. The defense misapprehends the standard of review on appeal, which requires the court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Even if we were able to ignore the other compelling evidence against McCall--identification of his baseball cap and automobile, and the bait money recovered from Silenthia Brown--his conviction would still stand, based on Hutchens's identification. 13 McCall's second contention is that his acquittal on the firearm charge, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), means he cannot be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), which prohibits bank robbery through the use of a dangerous weapon or device. This argument rests upon the premise that a firearm under § 924(c) and a dangerous weapon or device under § 2113(d) are the same thing, and an acquittal on one requires an acquittal on both. The premise is faulty. A firearm under § 924(c) is given a very specific definition: 14 (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm. 15 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). A dangerous weapon or device, on the other hand, may include, but is not limited to, a firearm. For instance, a toy gun may be considered a dangerous weapon or device under § 2113(d), see United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935, 939-40 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1101, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991), even though a toy gun does not meet the above definition of firearm. In the present case, because no gun was ever recovered, the jury could easily have found that the government failed to show the existence of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt, but it could also have found that the government did show the use of a dangerous weapon or device beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the bank tellers' testimony that they saw what looked like a revolver. In other words, the jury could have found that the government had proved, at a minimum, the existence of a toy gun or a phony gun. Under Medved, this falls under the definition of dangerous weapon or device, and as a result, we are not persuaded that the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict. 16 Furthermore, we should explain that even if the verdict was inconsistent, we still would not be able to reverse. The Supreme Court has held that inconsistent verdicts do not give rise to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, with the possible exception of a guilty verdict on mutually exclusive crimes. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67-69, 105 S.Ct. 471, 478-79, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Because McCall was clearly not convicted of mutually exclusive offenses, the verdict in this case, if inconsistent, remains insulated from review. Id. at 69, 105 S.Ct. at 479. 17