Opinion ID: 854681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Astriab Plaintiffs‟ Claims

Text: 8 For example, Montone‟s refusal to pay Troy money from the settlement of her first lawsuit does not appear to be a matter of public concern. See Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at . 25 The Astriab plaintiffs appeal only the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on their claim pursuant to § 1983 for retaliation for Montone‟s political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment (Count Three). Before addressing whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment, we must first consider whether the Astriab plaintiffs have standing to bring an action for retaliation for political affiliation based on the defendants‟ alleged deprivation of Montone’s First Amendment rights.9 See AT&T Commc’ns of N.J., Inc. v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 270 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001).
“A party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish that he has standing to sue within the meaning of Article III, section two of the Constitution, which limits the courts to hearing actual cases or controversies.” Anjelino v. New York Times, 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 1999). “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing requires a party to set forth specific facts indicating the existence of an actual or imminent injury that is causally connected to the defendant‟s challenged action and is “„likely‟” to be “„redressed by a favorable decision.‟” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 9 The Supreme Court has instructed courts of appeals to answer the jurisdictional question of standing before “proceeding to an easily-resolved merits question despite jurisdictional objections,” in consideration of the “importance of the standing doctrine” to preserving separation of powers. Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998)). 26 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quoting Simon v. En. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). “Courts assess whether a party has established injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability by considering whether the alleged injury falls within the „zone of interests‟ that the statute or constitutional provision at issue was designed to protect; whether the complaint raises concrete questions, rather than abstract ones that are better suited to resolution by the legislative and executive branches; and whether the plaintiff is asserting his own legal rights and interests, as opposed to those of third parties.” Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 88. The Supreme Court has recognized that “when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Astriab plaintiffs‟ suit presents one such difficult case. No other court of appeals has, to our knowledge, addressed the question presented by this case: whether a plaintiff has standing to bring an action for First Amendment political affiliation retaliation pursuant to § 1983 based on the defendant‟s alleged deprivation of another‟s First Amendment rights. The defendants argue that the Astriab plaintiffs do not have standing because they failed to allege an actual injury and cannot satisfy their burden with respect to the causation requirement of Article III standing. According to Jersey City, “[t]he plaintiffs have not produced evidence of an inherent right to a promotion,” or shown that absent the illegal conduct against Montone “any of them was certain or even likely to have been promoted.” (Jersey City‟s A. Br. 48.) Jersey City 27 further argues that the plaintiffs have not established the alleged injury‟s nexus to the defendants‟ purported violation of Montone‟s First Amendment rights, reasoning that “[a]llegations of discrimination concerning Montone, even if true, could have no bearing upon employment decisions made in regard to [the] plaintiffs.” (Jersey City‟s A. Br. 48.) Troy, for his part, distinguishes between the plaintiffs ranked above and below Montone, concluding that the plaintiffs ranked above Montone “could have been promoted regardless of any . . . discrimination” against her, while those ranked below did not suffer an actual injury “because there is no guarantee promotions would have continued beyond [Montone‟s promotion] and that they would have ever been promoted.” (Troy‟s A. Br. 47, 51.) The Astriab plaintiffs argue to the contrary that they have sufficiently alleged an actual injury, namely, their nonpromotion. Furthermore, the plaintiffs aver that they have satisfied the causation requirement by alleging specific facts concerning how Montone‟s political activities during the 2004 mayoral campaign resulted in the defendants refusing to promote Montone, and any other eligible sergeant, during Troy‟s tenure as police chief. The Astriab plaintiffs assert that their position is supported by our decision in Anjelino. We agree. In Anjelino, male and female employees of the New York Times Company (the “Times”) mailroom sued the Times and other defendants for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 200 F.3d at 78. The female employees alleged that they were not promoted from the “priority list,” which determined whether and how often an employee would receive mailroom shifts, due to their gender. 28 Id. at 80. The male employees similarly brought claims under Title VII, alleging, inter alia, that “they suffered pecuniary injury because they were on the priority list among women, who were not hired due to sex discrimination because hiring stopped when the women‟s names were reached.” Id. at 89. The district court dismissed the male employees‟ claims, finding that they lacked standing to sue under Title VII. Id. at 85. We reversed, holding that “„indirect‟ victims of sexbased discrimination have standing to sue under Title VII if they allege colorable claims of injury-in-fact that are fairly traceable to acts or omissions by defendants that are unlawful under the statute,” and therefore the male employees had standing even though the defendants‟ discriminatory actions were directed at the female employees. Id. at 92. In so holding, we emphasized: “That the injury at issue is characterized as indirect is immaterial, as long as it is traceable to the defendant‟s unlawful acts or omissions.” Id. We then concluded that the male employees satisfied Article III‟s injury-in-fact requirement because “allegations that sex discrimination adversely affected [plaintiffs] being hired as extras, as well as their seniority on the priority list, demonstrate actual injury,” and, furthermore, the male employees pled sufficient “specific facts” to make the requisite showing of causation. Id. More recently, the Supreme Court similarly held that an individual has standing to sue for employment retaliation pursuant to Title VII, relying on the protected conduct of another individual. In Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2011), plaintiff Thompson, an employee of North American Stainless (NAS), sued NAS for unlawful retaliation 29 under Title VII when he was fired after his fiancée, also an NAS employee, filed a sex discrimination charge against NAS with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. at 867. In addressing the question of whether Thompson had standing to sue, the Court found that “Thompson‟s claim undoubtedly meets [the] requirements” of Article III standing. Id. at 869. While Anjelino and Thompson involved questions of standing in the context of claims under Title VII, we find the reasoning in those cases persuasive. Indeed, we have similarly relied upon Title VII jurisprudence in resolving questions of first impression related to § 1983 claims because of the “consonance” of the “policy considerations” underlying each statute. Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning of Anjelino and Thompson in holding that a party has standing to bring an action for First Amendment political affiliation retaliation pursuant to § 1983, even where, as here, the alleged retaliation was directed towards another individual, provided the party can satisfy “[t]he irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The three requirements of Article III standing are satisfied here. The plaintiffs allege that each passed the civil service examination as required to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant, were ranked on the promotion list, and nonetheless were not promoted to lieutenant during Troy‟s tenure. The plaintiffs also allege that during Troy‟s term as police chief promotions were made in all other ranks in the JCPD except lieutenant, even though lieutenant promotions were authorized and necessary. Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants consciously chose not to promote 30 Montone or any other sergeant due to Montone‟s involvement in the 2004 mayoral election, to the effect that the Astriab plaintiffs were not promoted or, at the very least, were prevented from moving up in numerical rank on the promotion list. Thus, as in Anjelino, the Astriab plaintiffs‟ allegations that the defendants‟ illegal political retaliation “adversely affected [plaintiffs] being [promoted], as well as their seniority on the priority list, demonstrate actual injury.” Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 92; see also Grizzell v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711, 718 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding plaintiff police officers‟ “alleged injury to be sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy constitutional requirements” where plaintiffs alleged that they were not promoted or incurred a delay in being promoted to sergeant as a result of the defendants‟ use of a 1999, rather than 2001, promotion list). The Astriab plaintiffs have also satisfied their burden with respect to the causation element. The plaintiffs allege that Healy and Troy did not promote Montone following her involvement in the 2004 mayoral campaign, specifically noting that Troy informed several sergeants that he was “not making any lieutenants,” “not promoting [Montone]” because she “hurt us,” and therefore no sergeants would be promoted to lieutenant. (Astriab Appendix 362-63, 374, 387 [“A.A.”].) The plaintiffs also aver that none of the Astriab plaintiffs was promoted to the rank of lieutenant during Troy‟s tenure as police chief, even though all were eligible for promotions, there was a shortage of lieutenants in the JCPD, Troy was authorized to fill vacant lieutenant positions, and promotions occurred in other ranks in the JCPD. 31 The final Article III standing requirement – redressability – is also satisfied. As we have recognized, “§ 1983 has always provided both legal and equitable relief.” Squires, 54 F.3d at 172. Available forms of equitable relief include back pay and “retroactive seniority.” Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1120 (3d Cir. 1980). Additionally, front pay is recoverable, and, in some circumstances, instatement is also an appropriate remedy. Walsdorf v. Bd. of Comm’rs for the E. Jefferson Levee Dist., 857 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (6th Cir. 1985); Todaro v. Cnty. of Union, 920 A.2d 1243, 1248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 19, 2007) (holding that instatement and the “rightful place” remedy, by which the plaintiff is placed in the next comparable job opening, are both appropriate remedies “where a public employee has been denied appointment to a classified civil service position solely on the basis of political affiliation,” in violation of § 1983). Thus, there exists an “appropriate remedy that we can grant” the Astriab plaintiffs, AT&T, 270 F.3d at 171, and the plaintiffs have made the requisite showing that it is “„likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that [their] injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.‟” Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). Finally, we turn to the prudential standing requirement that a plaintiff‟s asserted interest falls within the “zone of interests” that the constitutional guarantee at issue was designed to protect. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004). The Supreme Court “ha[s] described the „zone of interests‟ test as denying a right of review if the plaintiff‟s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent 32 with the purposes implicit in the statute [or constitutional guarantee in question] that it cannot reasonably be assumed” suit was intended to be permitted. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. at 870 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The Astriab plaintiffs assert that, as a result of the defendants‟ retaliation against Montone for her protected political conduct, they did not receive a promotion for which they were eligible, in contravention of the First Amendment and § 1983. It is axiomatic that “political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356. In Robertson v. Fiore, 62 F.3d 596 (3d Cir. 1995), we acknowledged the First Amendment‟s protections for public employees in positions not requiring political affiliation, and explained the important policy considerations motivating this Constitutional guarantee: Without the protection afforded by the Constitution, employees might forgo the expression of their political beliefs or artificially change their political association to avoid displeasing their supervisors. Such coercion, whether direct or indirect, is incongruent with a free political marketplace. 62 F.3d at 600 (emphasis added). 33 That the retaliatory conduct at issue here was not directed at the Astriab plaintiffs is not dispositive, because the First Amendment concerns implicated by political affiliation retaliation are the same whether a plaintiff is the “direct” or “indirect” victim of illegal political retaliation. See Robertson, 62 F.3d at 600. An employee might be equally dissuaded from engaging in protected political activity where it is his fellow workers who experience retaliation for that employee having engaged in the “core” First Amendment activities of free “political belief and association.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357. The Astriab plaintiffs‟ interest in being promoted in a public agency employment position free from the influences of political association thus falls within the “zone of interests” protected by the First Amendment. Because the Astriab plaintiffs have pled specific facts demonstrating the existence of all three Article III standing requirements, and because the plaintiffs‟ asserted interest falls within the “zone of interests” protected by the First Amendment, we hold that they have standing to pursue a claim pursuant to § 1983 for retaliation for political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment, even though the underlying protected conduct is that of Montone, not of the Astriab plaintiffs themselves.
We turn next to the question of whether the District Court erroneously granted summary judgment for the defendants on the Astriab plaintiffs‟ claim. As discussed in Part II(A)(1) supra, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test to establish a claim for First 34 Amendment political affiliation retaliation. See Galli, 490 F.3d at 271. As in the Montone suit, the first two prongs of the test are not in dispute here. Each of the Astriab plaintiffs was employed as an officer with the JCPD, a position where political affiliation is not “an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. Furthermore, as discussed in Part II(B)(i) supra, the Astriab plaintiffs have standing to bring suit for a First Amendment violation pursuant to § 1983 based on the defendants‟ alleged retaliation against Montone as a result of her political activities. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 519; Galli, 490 F.3d at 272-73. Thus, the second prong of the test is satisfied. See Galli, 490 F.3d at 271. Therefore, as in the Montone suit, only the third prong of the test – the causation element – is disputed. See id. The District Court found that the Astriab plaintiffs failed to meet their burden with respect to the causation element because they “failed to point to evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could decide in their favor on the question of whether Montone‟s political conduct was a motivating factor in the decision not to promote her or them.” Astriab, 2011 WL 5080353, at . We hold that when viewed in the light most favorable to the Astriab plaintiffs, the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, and thus the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants. The District Court first erred by failing to consider much of the evidence the plaintiffs adduced to satisfy their burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. When evaluating a summary judgment motion, a district court must consider “materials in the record, including depositions, 35 documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[,] . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Yet, the District Court considered only two types of evidence presented by the Astriab plaintiffs: lieutenant Gillan‟s deposition testimony, which the District Court dismissed as “anonymous,” inadmissible hearsay,10 as well as Inspector Russ‟ memoranda recommending that Troy make promotions to lieutenant and Troy‟s testimony that he did not follow Russ‟ recommendations. Astriab, 2011 WL 5080353, at . Among the evidence not mentioned by the District Court in its analysis of the summary judgment motions were the Jersey City government agreements authorizing the promotion of officers to the rank of lieutenant. The District Court also failed to consider personnel orders signed by Troy ordering promotions in every rank except lieutenant. Additionally, the District Court disregarded correspondence from O‟Reilly and Police Director Samuel Jefferson, as well as deposition testimony from Healy, indicating that the defendants expressly refused to promote any of the plaintiffs to lieutenant upon expiration of the 2003-2006 promotion list, but almost immediately after the issuance of the 2006-2009 list, promoted twelve sergeants to lieutenant, only one of whom was an Astriab plaintiff. Furthermore, the District Court neglected to consider Jersey City and Healy‟s answers to interrogatories, as well as deposition testimony by several 10 A full analysis as to the admissibility of Gillan‟s testimony is unnecessary because, as discussed below, there was sufficient other evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the causation element. 36 Astriab plaintiffs, detailing conversations with Troy in which he explained that Montone and certain Astriab plaintiffs would not be promoted because of Montone‟s involvement in the 2004 mayoral election.11 We acknowledge that evidence was also presented indicating that the defendants‟ failure to promote the plaintiffs was the result of factors other than Montone‟s political affiliation. For example, Whalen testified that when he protested to Troy that it was “not fair” that neither Montone nor any other sergeant would be promoted, Troy responded by asking, “Well, how would you feel if your best friend‟s wife is sitting at the kitchen table crying over threats made by [Montone] against her son and nephew?” (A.A. 401.) Scerbo testified that on another occasion Troy told him that he “should have no problem” obtaining a promotion because he “was in front of Valerie.”12 (A.A. 374.) Finally, 11 Although the District Court rejected as inadmissible hearsay the deposition testimony of several of the Astriab plaintiffs, we hold that their testimony concerning Troy‟s statements is admissible as a party-opponent admission, and thus should have been considered in resolving the summary judgment motions. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 12 Although Jersey City argues that “the unreliable statements of Whalen, DeStefano and Scerbo must be discounted entirely,” (Jersey City‟s A. Br. at 38), “[i]n considering a motion for summary judgment, [the] court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence . . . .” Marino, 358 F.3d at 247. Thus, Jersey City‟s argument is unavailing at this stage of the proceedings. 37 Troy testified that there was no shortage of lieutenants, and that the lack of promotions to lieutenant between 2004 and 2006 was due to budgetary concerns and restructuring of the JCPD. Rather than counseling in favor of granting summary judgment for the defendants, however, the above-described evidence demonstrates the existence of a genuine dispute about material facts related to the causation element of the plaintiffs‟ First Amendment claim, including whether there was a shortage of lieutenants such that promotions were necessary (or not); whether Troy was authorized to make promotions; and the reason for the lack of promotions to lieutenant between 2004 and 2006. The District Court thus erred in concluding that there was no triable issue of fact regarding the causation element of the plaintiffs‟ claim. Finally, the District Court erroneously drew inferences unfavorable to the Astriab plaintiffs, the non-movants, and improperly assumed the role of fact-finder. For example, the District Court found that Inspector Russ‟ memoranda to Troy recommending the promotion of officers to the rank of lieutenant, coupled with Troy‟s decision not to promote the plaintiffs, did not “constitute[] evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could infer that Montone‟s political affiliation motivated Troy‟s decision.” Astriab, 2011 WL 5080353, at . In so holding, the District Court reasoned that “[t]he most that Plaintiffs have pointed to is the temporal proximity of Troy‟s first act of not following . . . Russ‟ staffing recommendations after the November 2004 election.” Id. The District Court thus concluded: 38 [E]ven if a trier of fact were to contemplate the inference, based on temporal proximity, that Montone‟s conduct during the election was a substantial factor in Troy‟s decision not to promote more Lieutenants, the Russ memoranda constitute independent intervening events which tend to preclude finding any such link. It is clear that Troy‟s inaction on the memoranda was most directly in response to the memoranda themselves. There is no evidence that the election played any proximate role and the timing appears to be coincidental. Id. The District Court‟s conclusion that “Troy‟s inaction on the memoranda was most directly in response to the memoranda themselves,” Astriab, 2011 WL 5080353, at , directly contradicts the undisputed fact that after receiving Russ‟ memoranda, which called for promotions to various ranks including lieutenant, Troy made promotions to all other ranks except lieutenant. It also contradicts testimony by several Astriab plaintiffs, including Whalen, who testified that Troy stated that he was “not making any lieutenants” because Montone was not being promoted as a result of “hurt[ing] us” during the 2004 campaign. (A.A. 362-63, 387.) As we recognized in Stephens, a plaintiff in a First 39 Amendment retaliation action may prevail on summary judgment “by discrediting [the defendant‟s] proffered reason [for the employment action], either circumstantially or directly, or by adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or substantial cause of the adverse action.” 122 F.3d at 181. When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence presented in opposition to the summary judgment motions demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Montone‟s political conduct was a motivating factor in the defendants‟ decision not to promote the Astriab plaintiffs. Accordingly, we vacate the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to Jersey City and Troy on the political retaliation claim asserted in Count Three.