Opinion ID: 1636527
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Heading: the texas long-arm statute

Text: A Texas court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident if two conditions are met. First, the Texas long-arm statute must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 17.041-§ 17.069 (Vernon 1986). Our long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over those who do business in Texas. Id. at § 17.042. The statute lists particular acts that constitute doing business. The statute provides, however, that other acts of the nonresident may place him within the doing business requirement. Id.; see generally Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1063, 108 S.Ct. 1022, 98 L.Ed.2d 986 (1988). Although Schapiro's acts in Texas do not fit into any of the particularly described acts listed under Section 17.042 of the long-arm statute, his acts do concern a business enterprise. Jurisdiction, therefore, is authorized by the other acts language of Section 17.042. We must now determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction under the longarm statute is consistent with due process. This court has decided that the broad language of the long-arm statute's doing business requirement allows the statute to reach as far as the federal constitution permits. See U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1235, 55 L.Ed.2d 763 (1978). Our inquiry, therefore, focuses on the decisions of this court and of the United States Supreme Court outlining the constitutional test for in personam jurisdiction.