Opinion ID: 1733223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Separation of Powers under the Louisiana Constitution

Text: The responsibility of this Court... is to construe and enforce the Constitution and laws of the [State] as they are not to legislate social policy on the basis of our own personal inclinations. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 447, 90 S.Ct. 628, 24 L.Ed.2d 634 (1970). The issue is not whether private and consensual acts of oral and anal sex should be legal or illegal in Louisiana. That issue has been resolved by the legislature in enacting La. Rev.Stat. 14:89. Under this law, commission of unnatural carnal copulation, which has been interpreted to include both oral and anal sex, is against the criminal law of Louisiana, and performance of such an act in private between consenting adults is not exempted from that statutory prohibition. This case does not require a determination of whether laws against oral and anal sex, in general, are wise or desirable. No questions are raised about the right or propriety of state legislative decisions repealing laws criminalizing sexual acts. The issue presented is whether the Louisiana Constitution confers a constitutional right to engage in consensual sexual acts of oral and anal intercourse, and whether this prohibits the legislature from proscribing such conduct. The Louisiana Constitution is the highest law by which the government of this state was established. As such, our constitution is not be subject to judicial amendment to express whatever a majority of this court happens to conclude at any given time is the more enlightened viewpoint on a particular controversial issue. If our constitution can be judicially amended in such a manner, that constitutes government by this court, rather than government through a constitutional system of which this court is a separate and equal branch. To hold otherwise would be to allow any and all disaffected groups unable to obtain legislative redress need only convince a majority of this court that what they seek is an implicit right afforded by the Louisiana Constitution. Our constitution wisely provides for separation of powers, and authorizes the legislature to make public policy determinations in this area. Under our constitution, therefore, the public policy of Louisiana on the practice of oral and anal sex, is a matter within the power of the legislature, not this court. A violation of the criminal law of this state is not justified as an element of the liberty or privacy guaranteed by this state's constitution. The freedom to violate criminal law is simply anarchy and, thus, the antithesis of an ordered constitutional system. Therefore, the only perceptible unconstitutionality in this case is that which would be evident if this court would determine, by acting as social engineers rather than jurists, and elevate our own personal notions of individual liberty over the collective wisdom of the voters' elected representatives' belief. That belief has already determined that a prescription on oral and anal sex, consensual or otherwise, is in furtherance of the moral welfare of the public mind. Social engineering is not a valid function of this court. Neither the Louisiana nor United States Constitution empowers this court to second guess the legislature in its heavy responsibility of weighing competing interests. We are not asked to decide whether legislation is wise or best fulfills relevant social and economic objectives that the state might ideally espouse. Courts do not rule on the social wisdom of statutes nor their workability in practice. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1270 (La.1978). If a crime or a penalty is not defined to reflect current societal values, it is for legislature, not the courts, to reflect this change. It is not a court's role to consider wisdom of the legislature in adopting a statute; it is a court's province to determine only the applicability, legality, and constitutionality of the statute. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 97-2985 (La.4/23/98), 711 So.2d 675, 688; Soloco, Inc. v. Dupree, 97-1256 (La.1/21/98), 707 So.2d 12, 16. Many critics of this law note that this court would not be alone in interpreting a state constitutional right to privacy so broad as to include engaging in oral and anal sex. What this fails to acknowledge, however, is that most states in which consensual sodomy is no longer a crime achieved that result by legislative repeal of their laws criminalizing sodomy. Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18, 32 (1998) (Carley, J., dissenting) (quoting Christensen v. State, 266 Ga. 474, 468 S.E.2d 188, 190 (1996)). In the exercise of its police power, the legislature has determined that the long-recognized ban on oral and anal sex should remain in place. The defense relies upon numerous cases from other jurisdictions, in particular, Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998), to support the proposition that La.Rev.Stat. 14:89 is unconstitutional. [11] This court does take notice that Powell v. State was decided only two years after the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the Georgia sodomy law was constitutional in Christensen v. State, 266 Ga. 474, 468 S.E.2d 188 (1996). We are not bound by foreign courts and consider them only for their persuasiveness. We decline to follow the Georgia Supreme Court, because we believe, to borrow from Mr. Justice Black, Whether the legislature takes for its textbook [John Stuart Mill, Thomas Acquinas [12] or Lord Devlin [13] ] or some other is no concern of ours.  [R]elief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the [General Assembly]. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963). [14]