Opinion ID: 1143784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charge on the Law of Principals

Text: La. R.S. 14:24 defines principals: All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals. In State v. Holmes, 388 So.2d 722 (La. 1980), this court made clear that the principal's mental state was an important consideration: [U]nder R.S. 14:24, not all principals are automatically guilty of the same grade of offense. One who aids and abets in the commission of a crime may be charged and convicted with a higher or lower degree of the crime, depending upon the mental element proved at trial. State v. McAllister, 366 So.2d 1340 (La.1978). Thus, an individual may only be convicted as a principal for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. In the case of a first degree murder conviction, the requisite mental state is that the defendant had the specific intent to kill. It is not enough to find merely that his coconspirator or accomplice had the necessary mental state, since this intent cannot be inferred to the accused. It must be shown that this accused also had the specific intent to kill. 388 So.2d at 726 (emphasis added). At issue in Holmes was the use of a hypothetical by the prosecution during voir dire which suggested all that was necessary to establish the defendant's guilt of first degree murder was proof that he was knowingly involved in the armed robbery which resulted in the victim's death. The court found the prosecutor's hypothetical was erroneous. However, it held the prosecutor's misstatement of law was not reversible error, since the trial court's instruction to the jury properly stated the law of principals and the necessity for the proof of specific intent. The court cited this instruction with approval: The law as to principals reads as follows: All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime are principals. One who aids and abets in the commission of a crime may be charged and convicted with a higher or lower degree of crime depending on the mental element proved at trial. The first degree murder statute, with which this defendant is charged, requires proof of specific intent on the part of this defendant. I have previously read to you the definition of specific criminal intent. 388 So.2d at 727 (emphasis added). In Flowers v. Blackburn, 779 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1986), the United States Fifth Circuit found the trial court's jury instructions on the law of principals could have improperly allowed the jury to find Flowers guilty of first degree murder without finding he had specific intent to kill. [7] Considering the charge as a whole, the court found the erroneous instructions could have been interpreted as creating a mandatory presumption that if the jury found specific intent on the part of Flower's co-perpetrator, it need not find specific intent on the part of Flowers. By relieving the state of its burden of proof, the court held such a presumption was clearly unconstitutional. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The court of appeal held the reasoning of Flowers applied to the present case: The charge in the instant case contains the Flowers charge in its entirety. The Court in Flowers, supra, found that the charge read as a whole does not alleviate the error and, therefore, the jury charge violated Flowers' right to due process. Though the charge also contains additional language, this language does not appear to correct the presumption found objectionable in Flowers. The fact that the jurors twice asked for clarification points out their confusion on the law. At no point did the judge explain that West, personally, had to have had the specific intent to kill to be found guilty of first degree murder. 552 So.2d at 484. The state argues the court of appeal erred in this conclusion, since the trial judge's charge went beyond the charge in Flowers. In analyzing jury instructions, our cases caution against taking certain phrases out of context of the charge as a whole. State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La.1989); State v. Taylor, 410 So.2d 224 (La.1982). The test articulated is whether, taking the instruction as a whole, reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence would understand the charge. Our review of the record reveals the jury was properly instructed on specific intent in the context of the first degree murder statute. However, unlike the charge in Holmes, the charge in the present case on the law of principals did not clearly point out to the jury that it had to find specific intent on the part of this defendant. By stating all persons knowing the unlawful intent of the person committing the crime ... are principals and are equal offenders and are subject to the same punishment, the charge could have led a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence to believe he could imply specific intent from the mere fact defendant knew of his co-perpetrators' intent. Such an interpretation would relieve the state of its burden of proof on the critical question of state of mind. Flowers, 779 F.2d at 1121 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 521, 99 S.Ct. at 2458). Therefore, we conclude the court of appeal correctly found the instruction erroneous.