Opinion ID: 1428265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: aggravated exceptional sentence

Text: Petitioner Sweet challenges his exceptional sentence of 342 months for his conviction of assault in the first degree. [79] He asserts that under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 and RCW 9A.08.020 (accomplice liability statute) an exceptional sentence for an accomplice cannot be based on the `deliberate cruelty, multiple incidents, [and] ... severity of the injury' inflicted by the principal. [80] His sentence is twice the standard range sentence for a person with his offender score of 4. The trial court based Petitioner's Sweet's exceptional sentence on the following aggravating factors: (1) [T]he defendant's conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim, and multiple incidents to the victim. That the victim, Judith Schuh, was struck from behind on the head causing her to fall to the ground. Once on the ground the victim was repeatedly struck over her entire face and body as evidenced by the severe bruising covering her face and body. (2) The severity of the injury to the victim, Judith Schuh, is also an aggravating factor justifying grounds for an exceptional sentence. The harm inflicted upon victim Judith Schuh was far greater than necessary to establish the crimes.... (3) The defendant's conduct was far more egregious than typical in such a case, and is therefore an additional aggravating factor justifying an exceptional sentence. The harm inflicted upon the victim was far greater than necessary and covered her entire body.... (4) The defendant's knowledge that the victim, Judith Schuh, was particularly vulnerable.... [He] knew that the victim would be incapable of defending herself because of her age and stature. The victim, Mrs. Schuh, is a small woman of 5'2 tall. She was 52 years old when the crime was committed. The defendant knew that the victim would be home alone as her husband routinely left early each morning for work. The victim's home is isolated in a rural area of Orting, Washington. The victim's home is surrounded by approximately 9 acres of property. There were no neighbors on the victim's property, and no one to help victim Judith Schuh. The defendant is 5'8 tall and weighs 290 pounds. The defendant's accomplice is 6'5 tall and weighs approximately 240 pounds. (5) The defendant's use of his position of trust and confidence to facilitate the commission of the offense.... The defendant is the nephew of the victims Ronald and Judith Schuh. The defendant lived on the Schuh property off and on during a five year period from approximately 1989 until 1993. During the time that the defendant lived on the Schuh property he was shown the safe that contained money, jewelry and other valuables concealed in the victim's bedroom. Only someone familiar with the safe would have known of its existence, and location concealed from view in a nightstand. The defendant also knew that his aunt, Judith Schuh, would be home alone during the day with his uncle, Ronald Schuh, at work. The defendant knew that Mrs. Schuh was a homemaker who did not work outside the home, and had not worked during the time period that the defendant lived on the Schuh property. The safe and its contents were the only items stolen in the burglary. [81] A trial court may impose an exceptional sentence outside the standard range when there are substantial and compelling reasons. [82] On appeal the appellate court inquires whether those reasons justify the sentence. The inquiry uses the following questions and standards of review. 1. Are the reasons given supported by evidence in the record? As to this, the standard of review is `clearly erroneous'. 2. Do the reasons justify a departure from the standard range? The standard of review on this is as a `matter of law'. 3. Is the sentence clearly [too excessive or] too lenient? The standard of review on this last question is `abuse of discretion'. [83] Under the facts in this case, the instructions to the jury, and the verdict of the jury, the trial court properly concluded that Petitioner Sweet engaged in manifest deliberate cruelty to the victim, Mrs. Judith Schuh; that Mrs. Schuh suffered severe injury; that Petitioner's conduct was more egregious than typical; that Petitioner knew Mrs. Schuh was particularly vulnerable; and Petitioner used his position of trust and confidence (as nephew of Mrs. Schuh) to facilitate commission of the crime. For these reasons the court concluded it was appropriate to go beyond the standard range sentence of 129 months to 171 months. [84] There was no abuse of discretion. Petitioner Sweet did not challenge all the aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court in imposing the aggravated exceptional sentence. An exceptional sentence may be upheld on appeal even where all but one of the trial court's reasons for the sentence have been overturned. [85] The trial court stated sufficient reasons to justify the aggravated exceptional sentence imposed upon Petitioner Sweet. We therefore affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals in the cases of both Petitioner Robert James Slaton and Petitioner Isaac Donald Sweet.