Opinion ID: 2554541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Suppress Defendant's June 26 Statement

Text: The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress the statement he made to police on June 26, 2006, arguing (1) that the police's exploitation of his intoxicated state rendered his Miranda waiver, and thus his statement, involuntary and (2) that the police unlawfully ignored his request for counsel.
When deciding a motion to suppress, a trial justice can admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only `if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona. ' State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420, 423 (R.I.2000)). In reviewing a trial justice's decision on a motion to suppress a statement that is alleged to be involuntary, this Court employs a two-step analysis. Bido, 941 A.2d at 835. The first step is to `review the trial justice's findings regarding the historical facts relevant to the voluntariness of the challenged confession.' State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 588 (R.I.2005) (quoting State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1273 (R.I.1998)). It is well established that [t]he findings of historical fact by the trial justice are given great weight and will not be set aside [by this Court] unless they are clearly wrong. Perez, 882 A.2d at 588 (quoting State v. Bailey, 677 A.2d 407, 410 (R.I.1996)). The second step of the analysis, assuming we accept the trial justice's findings of historical fact, requires this Court to apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice's determination of the voluntariness of the statement. Bido, 941 A.2d at 836. Before we will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, our independent review of the conclusions of the trial court that are drawn from the historical facts must establish that the defendant's constitutional rights were denied. Perez, 882 A.2d at 588 (citing State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 513 (R.I.2004)).
At the suppression hearing, the trial justice heard testimony from Det. Winman, Mr. Townsend, and defendant. The defendant testified that on the morning of June 26, 2006, three days after the homicide, he purchased a liter of vodka, filled a prescription for Klonopin, took a Klonopin, and then continued home, where he drank three to four glasses of vodka. The defendant proceeded to sit outside and converse with his neighbor, Mr. Townsend, during which time defendant consumed three vodka drinks. Mr. Townsend described him as kind of out of focus, and recalled that he jump[ed] around when discussing recent events; Mr. Townsend was, however, able to understand what defendant was saying. Detective Winman went to defendant's home at approximately 4:30 p.m. on that day to effect an arrest warrant on defendant, and he found defendant standing outside. The defendant testified that he had a glass of vodka in his hand and told the detective that it was vodka. Detective Winman, however, testified that defendant never indicated that he had been drinking. Detective Winman asked defendant to return to police headquarters, explaining that questions had arisen from the medical examiner's report, and defendant agreed. The defendant was taken uncuffed to headquarters and brought into the same interview room that he had been in on June 23. The defendant admits that he never told the police that he was too intoxicated to give a statement. Detective Winman read defendant his constitutional rights, and defendant signed a form acknowledging such. The entire interview was videotaped, and the trial justice viewed the videotape, in full, at the suppression hearing. Detective Winman, who has training and experience in the detection of alcohol and drug-related activity, testified that there was nothing to cause him to be concerned that defendant was intoxicated or impaired during the interview. In his memorandum supporting the motion to suppress, defendant argued that his statement was not voluntary because of his intoxication, sleeplessness, and state of depression, and that the pressure by police exceeded his ability to resist. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial justice found that, even assuming defendant had consumed alcoholic beverages and ingested Klonopin, Det[.] Winman's highly credible testimony belies that the [d]efendant was too intoxicated to provide voluntary, reliable answers during questioning on the 26th. In addition, having watched the entire videotaped interview, the trial justice revealed his own observations: The [d]efendant appeared poised and calm. He used readily understood language, did not slur his words, and appeared to be fully capable of intelligent thought processes and speech. He readily engaged in dialog with the detectives. He was not so intoxicated or afflicted with mental health issues as to make his decision to give a statement involuntary.    The demeanor and speech pattern shown by the [d]efendant's videotaped interview after his arrest on the 26th is similar in many respects to those which he exhibited on the 23rd. Except while demonstrating some physical act or using his hands to emphasize a point, the [d]efendant remained calm with good posture while seated. Similar to the interview three days earlier, the [d]efendant frequently kept his arms folded across his chest and maintained steady eye contact. Although his voice was lower in volume than during the first taped interrogation, his subdued manner is understandable. He had just been arrested for murder. Yet he signed the rights form without hesitation, remained erect in his chair and never broke down. The trial justice further concluded that defendant failed to sufficiently show how the police conduct was coercive. The trial justice explained that there was no aggressive or inappropriate activity by the police; simply admonishing defendant to tell the truth, and pointing out facts that were not adding up, did not amount to coercion. The trial justice further remarked that: Perhaps the most convincing evidence that the police did not use coercion to obtain a statement is the final portion of the interrogation. For about ten minutes at the end of the session, the [d]efendant provided an almost totally unprompted narration of his interaction with the deceased during the night and morning of her death. This was a detailed, articulate, steady narrative of events   . We cannot say that these findings are clearly erroneous. Indeed, the trial justice's determination of these historical facts is firmly grounded upon Det. Winman's testimony and upon defendant's actions that are displayed in the videotaped interview. Accordingly, we accept the trial justice's findings of historical fact and proceed to review de novo his determination of the voluntariness of defendant's statement. The definitive test of the voluntariness of a statement is whether, after taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, it was the product of the defendant's free will or was instead the result of coercion that overcame the defendant's free will at the time that it was made. Perez, 882 A.2d at 589. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial justice found that defendant exhibited no signs of drug or alcohol use during the interview, and even if he had, there was no proof that it overcame his will to resist or made his confession involuntary. [20] The trial justice concluded that there is no doubt, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that the statement was knowingly given, voluntarily given, without any inappropriate coercion on the part of the detectives. Having carefully reviewed the record, considering the totality of the circumstances and applying the trial justice's findings of historical fact, we concur with the trial justice's conclusion that defendant's statement was voluntary. The defendant argues before this Court that because prior to the interview the police were aware that defendant was an alcoholic with mental health problems, that knowledge made their actions improper and defendant's statement involuntary. We disagree. Even if the police knew of defendant's alcohol problems, they did not act in an improperly coercive manner. The defendant was properly informed of his rights, and there is no evidence revealed within the videotape or elsewhere that defendant was subjected to coercion or that he was intimidated in any way. Accordingly, we agree with the trial justice that defendant's statement was voluntary and was not the product of an overborne free will.
The defendant made an oral motion midtrial to suppress the June 26, 2006 statement on an alternative ground, namely, that defendant had invoked his right to counsel and, by continuing to interrogate him, the police violated his constitutional rights. [21] The trial justice denied defendant's motion on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, the trial justice found the motion to be untimely. The trial justice noted that this argument was known by defendant and his attorney for a lengthy period of time prior to trial, and he explained that filing [the] motion at this late date puts the [s]tate at an unfortunate disadvantage. Thus, the trial justice denied the motion. Nevertheless, the trial justice also proceeded to find that even if it had been timely, the motion to suppress lacked merit because defendant did not unequivocally request an attorney and, even if he had, he waived his right to an attorney when he made subsequent statements. This Court established, in State v. Maloney, 111 R.I. 133, 144, 300 A.2d 259, 265 (1973), that in all criminal trials conducted subsequent to the filing of this opinion, efforts to suppress evidence must be, by motions, made and heard prior to trial. This rule is necessary because postponement of the suppression hearing until after trial has begun would subvert the state's right to appeal [the] suppression, because jeopardy then would have attached. State v. Francis, 719 A.2d 858, 859 (R.I. 1998). The defendant had the necessary information to be able to make this argument prior to trial in his written motion to suppress or during the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, but he clearly failed to do so. Rather, the first time defendant raised this argument was midtrial. We are of the opinion that the motion therefore was untimely and was appropriately denied by the trial justice as such. Accordingly, we affirm the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.