Opinion ID: 2600593
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of asserted exculpatory evidence

Text: Defendant moved in limine to admit a police report prepared on April 24, 1993, by Detective Andrew Espinoza of the Barstow Police Department stating: Sergeant Gibson informed me that he had made contact with a witness who was sure that she, the witness, had seen the victim at the AM/PM Mini Mart on Montara Road last night around 10:30 p.m. [¶] Sergeant Gibson informed me that he had shown a photograph of the victim to the witness and that the witness identified the girl in the photograph as the same girl she had seen at the AM/PM Mini Mart. Defendant also sought to introduce a second police report prepared by Detective Griego stating that Sergeant Gibson had briefed other officers on April 24, 1993, regarding his contact with a witness who had reported seeing Tahisha at the Montara Arco AM/PM market on Friday night. The hearing on defendant's offer of proof to admit the evidence took place almost two years after Tahisha's disappearance. Sergeant Gibson testified he did not recall the events described in the reports, and it was possible the information concerning a witness had been given to him by a third party. He testified that if he personally had shown the photograph to a witness who identified Tahisha, his practice would have been to write down that witness's name, but no name was recorded in this instance. Gibson acknowledged that the two reports, neither of which was written by him, indicated there was a witness. Gibson stated he had attempted to determine whether any such witness existed, but was unsuccessful in identifying the witness. Detective Espinoza recalled that Sergeant Gibson told him about the witness's identification of Tahisha, but stated that Gibson had not given him a name. He testified that Gibson had sent him to the Mini Mart on Saturday, April 24, 1993, to determine whether anyone there had seen Tahisha in the store the previous night. According to Espinoza, he spoke to the manager and clerk who were working that Saturday, as well as the night manager and everyone else whom Espinoza was able to determine had worked at the Mini Mart on the evening of April 23, and no one recalled having seen Tahisha. The store manager provided Espinoza with videotapes from the store's security cameras, which recorded views of the interior of the store and the sidewalk area outside the store directly in front of the door; a person could not enter or leave the store without being recorded by a camera. When Espinoza reviewed the tapes recorded on April 23, he did not observe Tahisha (or any person resembling her) in any of the recordings. Espinoza stated he had no idea who the witness might have been. Defendant claimed he should be permitted to present, at trial, evidence concerning the police officers' investigation to establish the possibility that Tahisha was alive at 10:30 on the evening of April 23. The trial court ruled that Sergeant Gibson could testify regarding what he had done, but not what the asserted witness had said, because her statement was hearsay and was not admissible under any exception.
Defendant sought to introduce evidence concerning a Phil P., 40 to 45 years of age, who resided at the Rimrock Apartments. Steve Pizzo, who lived in the Rimrock Apartments with his wife Mabel and daughter Carrie, assertedly was prepared to testify that the day after Tahisha disappeared, Mr. Pizzo told the police that two weeks earlier, Phil P. had asked Carrie, who then was 11 years of age, to accompany Phil to the desert. According to defense investigator Ron Hawkins, Carrie would testify concerning Phil's invitation and her mother's refusal to allow her to go with Phil. Carrie would further testify that Phil rarely was in the company of the adult residents, and instead spent his time with the children, including Tahisha, in the playground area of the apartment complex. Phil sometimes attempted to teach the children to play tennis, and when he taught a child how to swing a tennis racket, he would put his arms around the child from behind the child. Carrie provided this information to the police the day after Tahisha disappeared. Defendant also sought to introduce evidence establishing that two days after Tahisha disappeared, Brian Z. was arrested by a patrol officer for exposing himself and masturbating near the Rimrock Apartments. Detective Franey contacted Detective Griego at approximately 3:30 p.m. on Sunday, April 25, concerning the arrest, and asked Griego to proceed to an automobile towing company and check the tire pattern on Brian's vehicle. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Franey and Griego interviewed Brian and checked the pattern on the soles of his shoes. The trial court excluded the proffered evidence, because it did not link either of these men to the crime and hence was incapable of raising a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] ( Hall) . ) The court added that, assuming the evidence regarding Phil and Brian was of some marginal relevance, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its undue prejudice.
Defendant contends this evidence was admissible to prove that the police immediately focused upon him without considering other possible suspects, and planted evidence to implicate him. Although he now disavows the thirdparty culpability theory upon which he relied in the trial court, he adds that, assuming arguendo that the evidence that the police failed to investigate other suspects was somehow third-party culpability evidence under People v. Hall, [ supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 833,] it was admissible nonetheless. He asserts the exclusion of this evidence violated his due process right to present a defense, and his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair and reliable trial. These contentions are without merit. With respect to the reported sighting of Tahisha on the night of her murder, defendant claims evidence indicating that the police failed to record a witness's name would have helped prove that the police zeroed in on defendant and were going to make him fit their predetermined view of the crime. In addition, defendant asserts that because the witness's statement assertedly was relevant to prove the character of the police investigation rather than to prove the truth of the matter stated, it was not hearsay evidence. Moreover, defendant claims that even if the evidence was hearsay, it came within the exception of Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 93 S.Ct. 1038], because it was reliable and was relevant to the central issue of his defense. Similarly, with respect to the absence of further police investigation of Phil P. and Brian Z., defendant asserts that the failure to investigate supported the defense theory that [defendant] was targeted by a biased and fraudulent investigation. Therefore, defendant contends, exclusion of this evidence violated his federal due process right to present a defense. ( Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920].) The flaw in defendant's theory is that the proffered evidence has no tendency to establish any relevant fact. The Mini Mart evidence reflects that there may have been a witness who claimed to have seen Tahisha at 10:30 p.m., the police did not record the name of the purported witness, and the police thereafter attempted but failed to verify the purported sighting of Tahisha. The evidence concerning Phil P. and Brian Z. reflects that the police focused more attention upon defendant than upon other men whose conduct was brought to their attention, but that circumstance does not suggest anything other than that defendant, for valid and objective reasons, quickly became the prime suspect and that the police may have elected not to investigate other potential suspects more thoroughly. [15] The proffered evidence does not support the conclusion that the police acted maliciously or planted evidence against defendant. The possibility the police may have chosen not to follow up more thoroughly on all leads does not impeach the evidence against defendant. Because the proffered evidence has no tendency to establish any relevant fact, it properly was excluded by the trial court. [16] (1) As noted above, defendant alternatively asserts the evidence suggesting that the police failed to investigate other suspects was admissible as third party culpability evidence under Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826. Third party culpability evidence is admissible if it is capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. At the same time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party's possible culpability.... [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt; there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. ( Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833; see also People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 581; [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104]; People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1242 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] ( Prince ); People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 625 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363] ( Robinson ).) In arguing that the trial court should have admitted the proffered evidence as third party culpability evidence, defendant ignores Hall 's requirement of a link, focusing instead upon Hall 's rejection of the heightened standard of admissibility of third party culpability evidence established by People v. Arline (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 200, 204 [91 Cal.Rptr. 520] (There must be ... substantial proof of a probability ... that some other person committed the offense). Hall rejected Arline to the extent that it creates a distinct and elevated standard for admitting this kind of exculpatory evidence.... [C]ourts should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any other evidence: if relevant it is admissible ([Evid. Code,] § 350) unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion ([Evid. Code,] § 352). ( Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834, fn. omitted.) From this discussion, defendant concludes that third party culpability evidence may be excluded only if it is excessively prejudicial, and he further asserts that the trial court's discretion to exclude evidence under [Evidence Code] section 352 `must yield to a defendant's due process right to a fair trial and to present all relevant evidence of a significant probative value to his defense.' ( People v. Cunningham [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [926,] 998-999 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519].) Neither the rejection of Arline 's heightened standard of admissibility in Hall, nor the presentation of significant probative evidence as a matter of right, is inconsistent with the rule discussed in Hall that third party culpability evidence is admissible only if it links a third party to the crime.