Opinion ID: 1192851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Convictions of Conspiracy and Attempt to Kidnap

Text: Defendant argues that he cannot be convicted of both conspiracy to kidnap and attempt to kidnap. His argument, although unclear, seems to have two components. First, he argues that, by charging him with conspiracy to kidnap Post, the government necessarily has alleged that the crime of kidnapping Post was completed, rather than inchoate. Second, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted kidnapping if he actually committed the greater offense of a completed kidnapping. Defendant is mistaken on both theories. Conspiracy to commit a crime is not equivalent to the completion of that crime. By definition, conspiracy and attempt are inchoate crimes that do not require completion of the criminal objective. United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2100, 170 L.Ed.2d 830 (2008). The crime of conspiracy comprises three elements: (1) an agreement to engage in criminal activity, (2) one or more overt acts taken to implement the agreement, and (3) the requisite intent to commit the substantive crime. United States v. Sullivan, 522 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The crime does not require completion of the intended underlying offense. An attempt to commit a crime, on the other hand, comprises two elements: (1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct, [and] (2) an overt act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. United States v. Morales-Perez, 467 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Just like conspiracy, an attempt to commit a crime does not require completion of the crime. Each of those crimes contains an element that the other does not: Conspiracy does not require a substantial step, while attempt does not require an agreement. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, it is constitutionally permissible to charge and convict a defendant of both conspiring to commit a crime and attempting to commit the same crime. See, e.g., Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d at 1013 (charging the defendant with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance and attempt to possess with intent to distribute). Here, Defendant conspired to commit an actual kidnapping. He also committed a substantial step toward kidnapping. Thus, he was properly convicted of both conspiring to kidnap and attempting to kidnap. The fact that the acts he committed could have supported a conviction for the greater crime of a completed kidnapping does not entitle Defendant to an acquittal on either the conspiracy or the attempt conviction. Rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth that [a] defendant may be found guilty of . . . (1) an offense necessarily included in the offense charged; (2) an attempt to commit the offense charged; or (3) an attempt to commit an offense necessarily included in the offense charged, if the attempt is an offense in its own right. Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c). This rule codified pre-existing law. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 n. 6, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973). Indeed, if Defendant's contention, that one cannot be convicted of a lesser included offense if he actually committed the greater offense, were true, then most plea agreements would be unenforceable. Defendant has pointed to no constitutional or statutory provision that would yield that result. AFFIRMED.