Opinion ID: 1168194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: privately retained and compensated expert witnesses are immune

Text: The Washington case most on point here is Bader v. State, 43 Wn. App. 223, 716 P.2d 925 (1986). In Bader, Eastern State Hospital evaluated a criminal defendant, Morris Roseberry, for the purpose of determining whether he was competent to stand trial. Roseberry was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and manic depressive, but was found competent to stand trial. Roseberry was acquitted and released, conditioned on his submitting to treatment. He later murdered a neighbor and the victim's estate sued Eastern State for negligence in its evaluation of Roseberry. Division Three of the Court of Appeals held Eastern State immune from suit on grounds of judicial immunity. Bader, at 226. Accord, Tobis v. State, 52 Wn. App. 150, 758 P.2d 534 (1988); Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891, 892 (8th Cir.1987); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir.1970); Bartlett v. Weimer, 268 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.1959); In re Scott Cy. Master Docket, 618 F. Supp. 1534, 1575 (D. Minn. 1985); Kravitz v. State, 8 Cal. App.3d 301, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970); Linder v. Foster, 209 Minn. 43, 45, 295 N.W. 299 (1940). The Court of Appeals found Bader distinguishable, arguing: Such immunity certainly would not apply to an expert retained by a party to litigation, because such an expert does not act on the court's behalf. Bruce, 51 Wn. App. at 201 n. 1. Reasoning along the same lines, the Court of Appeals held that the general rule of witness immunity should not apply here because: Byrne is a professional, with a pecuniary motive for testifying. He voluntarily undertook to render his expert opinion in the original action, knowing that the parties and the court would rely on that opinion. He was not merely a bystander who fortuitously came to have information relevant to the claim, nor was he subject to contempt of court if he refused to assume this undertaking. Bruce, 51 Wn. App. at 201. The fact that Byrne was retained and compensated by a party does not deprive him of witness immunity. The Court of Appeals assumed that participants in adversarial judicial proceedings derive their immunity from their relationship to the judge, who is himself immune from suit. In many instances, that is correct. See Adkins v. Clark Cy., 105 Wn.2d 675, 717 P.2d 275 (1986) (immunity of bailiff). However, the rationale behind quasi-judicial immunity, as set out in Briscoe, sweeps more broadly. The purpose of granting immunity to participants in judicial proceedings is to preserve and enhance the judicial process. The central focus of our analysis has been the nature of the judicial proceeding itself. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 334. The various grants of immunity for judges and witnesses, as well as for prosecutors and bailiffs, are all particular applications of this central policy. They are best described as instances of a single immunity for participants in judicial proceedings. [1] The principles set forth in Pierson v. Ray [, 386 U.S. 547, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967)] to protect judges and in Imbler v. Pachtman [, 424 U.S. 409, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976)] to protect prosecutors also apply to witnesses, who perform a somewhat different function in the trial process but whose participation in bringing the litigation to a just  or possibly unjust  conclusion is equally indispensable. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46, 75 L.Ed.2d 96, 103 S.Ct. 1108 (1983). In the Bader case, Eastern State was immune, not because it partook of the judge's immunity, but because it took part in judicial proceedings. In this light, it is immaterial that an expert witness is retained by a party rather than appointed by the court. The basic policy of ensuring frank and objective testimony obtains regardless of how the witness comes to court. This was recognized recently in Kahn v. Burman, 673 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Mich. 1987) in which the court granted immunity to a medical doctor who was retained as an expert in a medical malpractice case and who allegedly made defaming statements in reports to the attorney investigating the case. As a matter of policy, also, witness immunity should extend to reports prepared by both potential and retained expert witnesses. Justice Stevens reasoned in Briscoe that damage suits against witnesses must yield to the dictates of public policy, which requires that the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as possible. This policy of providing for reasonably unobstructed access to the relevant facts and issues mandates the extension of immunity to Dr. Burman for all statements that he made in his reports to Attorney Gray. The overriding concern for disclosure of pertinent and instructive expert opinions before and during medical malpractice actions is no less significant than the clearly-recognized need for all relevant factual evidence during the course of litigation. (Citation omitted.) Kahn, at 213. [2] In addition, the Court of Appeals is simply wrong to say that an expert witness does not act on the court's behalf. 51 Wn. App. at 201 n. 1. While it may be that many expert witnesses are retained with the expectation that they will perform as hired guns for their employer, as a matter of law the expert serves the court. The admissibility and scope of the expert's testimony is a matter within the court's discretion. Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wn.2d 441, 462, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985). That admissibility turns primarily on whether the expert's testimony will be of assistance to the finder of fact. ER 702. The court retains the discretion to question expert witnesses. ER 614(b). The mere fact that the expert is retained and compensated by a party does not change the fact that, as a witness, he is a participant in a judicial proceeding. It is that status on which witness immunity rests. The Court of Appeals noted the fact that an expert witness is compensated for his testimony, but did not explain how that affects the basic rationale for witness immunity. Contrary to that court's conclusion, the economics of expert testimony dictate in favor of granting immunity to retained expert witnesses for at least two reasons. Both derive from the fundamental policy of ensuring frank and objective testimony, as stated in Briscoe. First, unless expert witnesses are entitled to immunity, there will be a loss of objectivity in expert testimony generally. The threat of civil liability based on an inadequate final result in litigation would encourage experts to assert the most extreme position favorable to the party for whom they testify. It runs contrary to the fundamental reason for expert testimony, which is to assist the finder of fact in a matter which is beyond its capabilities. To the extent experts function as advocates rather than impartial guides, that fundamental policy is undermined. Second, imposing civil liability on expert witnesses would discourage anyone who is not a full-time professional expert witness from testifying. Only professional witnesses will be in a position to carry insurance to guard against such liability. The threat of liability would discourage the 1-time expert  the university professor, for example  from testifying. Such 1-time experts, however, can ordinarily be expected to approach their duty to the court with great objectivity and professionalism. The main argument to the contrary is that the threat of liability would encourage experts to be more careful, resulting in more accurate, reliable testimony. While there is some merit to this contention, possible gains of this type have to be weighed against the threatened losses in objectivity described above. We draw that balance in favor of immunity. Civil liability is too blunt an instrument to achieve much of a gain in reliability in the arcane and complex calculations and judgments which expert witnesses are called upon to make. The threat of liability seems more likely to result in experts offering opinions motivated by litigants' interests rather than professional standards and in driving all but the full-time expert out of the courtroom. In sum, the fact that an expert witness is retained by a party has no bearing on the underlying rationale of witness immunity. That basic rationale  ensuring objective, reliable testimony  dictates in favor of immunity for experts. As a policy matter, the economics of expert testimony generally also favor immunity as a means of ensuring that a wide cross section of impartial experts are not deterred from testifying by the threat of liability.