Opinion ID: 2395177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: discretionary hearing unconstitutional in protested cases

Text: FNB contends that the statute allowing discretionary hearings in protested cases is unconstitutional unless it is interpreted to allow a discretionary waiver of a hearing in non-protested cases. As noted previously, statutes are presumed not to be unconstitutional, Craighead County Bd. of Educ., supra , and all doubts must be resolved in favor of upholding its constitutionality. Holland v. Willis, 293 Ark. 518, 739 S.W.2d 529 (1987). Additionally, a rational basis for the discretionary hearings can be found in the analogous case of Webster Groves Trust Co., supra , where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the rationale for not requiring the Comptroller of Currency to hold a formal hearing at which commercial banks could present objections relative to issuance of new national bank charters: The very nature of the decision required by the Comptroller indicates that a formal adversary type hearing would be of little benefit to him in the discharge of his discretionary powers. There is the further factor present that if bank applicants were subjected to severe public cross-examination, public presentation of unfavorable evidence and were forced to disclose their future plans and programs to competitors, public confidence in the banking system could be adversely affected. In discussing the discretionary nature of the Comptroller's underlying actions, the court in Webster Groves Trust Co., supra , stated: We believe that competing banks, as interested parties, have a right to challenge illegal acts of the Comptroller and that the Comptroller's discretionary actions are not immunized from judicial review, but we also believe that neither the National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act, nor procedural due process requires a formal hearing of the type sought by appellant. Also, FNB's sole reliance on Pulaski County v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 210 Ark. 124, 194 S.W.2d 883 (1946), is misplaced. In that case, we noted that where notice to a party to be affected and opportunity for him to be heard were not provided for in the law under which an assessment of taxes was made, the law was unconstitutional and void and the assessment was illegal. However, the statute at issue was held to be void insofar as it authorized an appeal by one property owner from the action of the Board of Equalization in refusing to raise the assessment of another property owner without requiring any kind of notice to the property owner whose assessment was being questioned. As we noted in FNB's first argument, FNB does not have a property interest that is recognized as being entitled to the degree of protection it claims. FNB's rights are not directly affected; in fact, FNB is affected only to the extent that the Commissioner's order allows regulated competition in a regulated industry. Consequently, the mandates of due process are not violated, and we hold the statute to be constitutional.