Opinion ID: 150486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidenceCurrency structuring

Text: The Sweeneys next challenge their convictions on Counts 8, 9, and 15, the currency structuring charges. Although our standard of review again requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Pliego, 578 F.3d at 941, the relevant facts are virtually undisputed, so we will focus on the pertinent legal principles. Generally speaking, domestic financial institutions are required to file reports on certain transactions that exceed a threshold amount designated by the Secretary of the Treasury. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a). The relevant Treasury regulations set this threshold at $10,000. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1). There is no dispute that cash withdrawals from bank accounts and cash purchases at car dealerships exceeding the $10,000 threshold are both typically subject to the reporting requirement. See id. § 103.22(a), (b)(1), (d)(5)(viii). Federal law prohibits persons from structuring cash transactions to evade this reporting requirement. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)(3). Specifically, § 5324(c)(3) provides that [n]o person shall, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) . . . structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions. In turn, the Treasury regulations interpreting § 5324 define what it means to structure a transaction as follows: [A] person structures a transaction if that person . . . conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions in currency, in any amount, at one or more financial institutions, on one or more days, in any manner, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements under section 103.22 of this part. In any manner includes, but is not limited to, the breaking down of a single sum of currency exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at or below $10,000, or the conduct of a transaction, or series of currency transactions, including transactions at or below $10,000. The transaction or transactions need not exceed the $10,000 reporting threshold at any single financial institution on any single day in order to constitute structuring within the meaning of this definition. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(gg). The regulations define the term transaction to include purchase[s] and withdrawal[s], among other things. Id. § 103.11(ii). We find that the Treasury regulations accurately describe the offense of structuring a transaction in violation of § 5324(c)(3). Accord United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 819-21 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2005). [5] There is no real dispute about the elements of the alleged offense. As the district court instructed the jury, The crime of currency structuring, as charged in Counts Eight, Nine, and Fifteen. . ., has three elements, which are: One, the defendant conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction that involved a domestic financial institution; Two, at the time the defendant conducted or attempted to conduct the financial transaction, the defendant knew of the domestic financial institution's obligation to report currency transactions in excess of $10,000; and Three, the defendant purposefully structured the transaction with the intent to evade that reporting requirement. Accord Van Allen, 524 F.3d at 820; MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 189. The Sweeneys do not argue that the evidence was insufficient to establish either their knowledge of the reporting requirement or their intent to evade that requirement. A review of the evidence presented at trial leaves no doubt that the Sweeneys knew about the reporting requirement and intended to evade it. The question, the Sweeneys insist, is whether their acts amounted to structuring a transaction. The Sweeneys make two principal arguments in this vein. The first argument, pressed exclusively by Mrs. Sweeney, is that neither the purchase of the minivan (Count 8) nor her cash withdrawal from the First National Bank of Elk River on October 28, 2002 (Count 15), qualifies as a transaction under § 5324(c)(3). Each of those events, she asserts, merely involved a single transfer of currency. And, according to Mrs. Sweeney, a transfer in an amount less than the $10,000 reporting threshold cannot be illegally structured. We are not persuaded. Initially, we note that Mrs. Sweeney's argument about the meaning of the term transaction under § 5324(c)(3) amounts to a succession of ipse dixits. This entire subsection of Mrs. Sweeney's brief is conclusory and noticeably lacking in relevant legal authority. In any event, the key premise of her argumentthat a purchase or withdrawal in an amount less than $10,000 is not a transaction and therefore cannot be structuredis decisively refuted by the Treasury regulations. Specifically, the term transaction is defined in 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(ii) to include purchase[s] and withdrawal[s]. Moreover, 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(gg) provides that a person structures a transaction [ e.g., a purchase or withdrawal] if that person . . . conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions [ e.g., purchases or withdrawals] in currency, in any amount, . . . in any manner, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements. (Emphasis added.) See also id. (The transaction or transactions need not exceed the $10,000 reporting threshold at any single financial institution on any single day in order to constitute structuring within the meaning of this definition. (emphasis added)). We therefore reject the notion that neither the purchase of the minivan nor the October 28 withdrawal qualifies as a transaction under § 5324(c)(3). On the contrary, both of those events are transactions, and the evidence shows that in both instances, Mrs. Sweeney acted with the intent to evade the reporting requirement. [6] The Sweeneys' second argument starts from the premise that the only way to commit the offense of structuring a transaction is to break up a single cash transaction that was above the [$10,000] reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (stating in dictum that [i]t is illegal to `structure' transactions i.e., to break up a single transaction above the reporting threshold into two or more separate transactionsfor the purpose of evading a financial institution's reporting requirement). The Sweeneys assert that the evidence on Counts 8, 9, and 15 failed to show that they broke up a single cash transaction that exceeded the $10,000 reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions. It follows, we are told, that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Mr. or Mrs. Sweeney committed the offense of structuring a transaction. Again, we are not persuaded. The central flaw in the Sweeneys' second argument is its starting premise, which confuses a sufficient condition for a necessary condition. While breaking up a single cash transaction that exceeds the $10,000 reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions is one way of committing the offense of structuring a transaction, it is not the only way. Recall once more that the Treasury regulations provide that a person structures a transaction if that person . . . conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions in currency, in any amount, . . . in any manner, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements. § 103.11(gg) (emphasis added). The regulations explain that `[i]n any manner' includes, but is not limited to, the breaking down of a single sum of currency exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums . . . or the conduct of a transaction, or series of currency transactions, including transactions at or below $10,000. Id. (emphasis added). In our view, the regulations accurately describe the various ways that a person may commit the offense of currency structuring in violation of § 5324(c)(3). See United States v. Hovind, 305 Fed.Appx. 615, 621 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (By its plain language, the statute prohibits transactions of less than $10,000 that are intended to evade reporting requirements. (citing United States v. Phipps, 81 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (11th Cir.1996))). The Sweeneys would have us adopt a much narrower interpretation of the statute, but we see no sound basis for doing so. Any residual doubt about the Sweeneys' second argument is dispelled by the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814 (7th Cir.2008), which we find persuasive. There, the defendant, relying on the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.1991), made a nearly identical argument to the one the Sweeneys make here. In particular, the defendant argued that the only method of proving structuring is to demonstrate that a defendant held a unitary cash hoard over $10,000 and then broke it up . . . in[to] amounts under $10,000. Van Allen, 524 F.3d at 820. The court recounted that in Davenport it had upheld a conviction for structuring where the defendant made ten cash deposits, each under $10,000 and had observed that the intent of the statute was to prevent individuals from evading the reporting requirement `by breaking their cash hoard into enough separate deposits to avoid activating the requirement.' Id. at 820-21 (quoting Davenport, 929 F.2d at 1173). The court in Van Allen made clear, however, that it never held that breaking up a cash hoard was the only method of proving structuring. Id. at 821. In fact, the court noted, Davenport further defined `structuring' as `altering the form of a transaction in order to avoid activating the . . . duty to file a currency transaction report.' Id. (quoting Davenport, 929 F.2d at 1173). This alternative definition of structuring, the court explained, meshes well with that in the Treasury regulation, id. (citing § 103.11(gg)), which, of course, describes more than one way of structuring a transaction, see § 103.11(gg). We hold that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to support the Sweeneys' convictions on Counts 8, 9, and 15. As to Counts 8 and 9, the evidence showed that both Mr. and Mrs. Sweeney knew about the $10,000 reporting threshold and conducted the vehicle purchases in a manner designed to evade the reporting requirement. See § 103.11(gg); see also Van Allen, 524 F.3d at 821 (noting that the court had previously defined `structuring' as `altering the form of a transaction in order to avoid activating the . . . duty to file a currency transaction report' (quoting Davenport, 929 F.2d at 1173)). As to Count 15, the evidence showed that Mrs. Sweeney knew about the $10,000 reporting threshold and conducted a series of cash withdrawalsincluding the withdrawal of $9,900 on October 28, 2002in a manner designed to evade the reporting requirement. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(gg); see also Van Allen, 524 F.3d at 820 (finding that the defendant engaged in illegal structuring by conducting a series of deposits and withdrawals, and explaining that [t]he sheer volume of the transactions almost compels the conclusion reached by the jury). [7] Because the evidence was sufficient on each count to prove that the Sweeneys conducted one or more transactions in currency, in any amount, . . . in any manner, for the purpose of evading the [applicable] reporting requirement[], § 103.11(gg), we affirm their convictions on the currency structuring charges.