Opinion ID: 163124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination of Detective Betz

Text: 123 Before addressing the heart of Petitioner's claim — the exclusion of Dr. Bebensee's testimony — we discuss the cross-examination of Detective Betz. Petitioner argues not only that his confrontation rights were violated by restrictions on his cross-examination of Betz, but also that those restrictions exacerbated the prejudice from exclusion of Dr. Bebensee's testimony. 124 For us to grant relief on the confrontation claim, we must find that the state court's affirmance of the limitations on cross-examination of Betz either involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.... 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). We do not so find. 125 In reviewing Petitioner's confrontation claim, we must recognize that the constitutional right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is not unlimited. [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). In this case the trial judge's limitations on cross-examination appear reasonable. 126 First, consider Betz's testimony concerning inconsistencies in the Victim's statements. Although Betz testified on direct that the statements were consistent, the judge halted the prosecutor's questioning on the matter as soon as an objection was raised by defense counsel. When defense counsel began to enter the same territory on cross-examination, the judge treated the matter as he had before, sustaining the prosecutor's objection. More importantly, all the inconsistencies were in the trial record, so defense counsel could point them out to the jury in final argument. What was relevant was whether the Victim made inconsistent statements; we see no relevance to Betz's opinion regarding whether the statements were inconsistent. 127 Turning next to the cross-examination about Betz's training, we disagree with Petitioner's characterization of the trial judge's rulings as preclud[ing] inquiry into an entire area of relevant cross-examination. Aple. Br. at 59 ( quoting United States v. Atwell, 766 F.2d 416, 419 (10th Cir.1985)). On direct examination Betz had said merely that he had 22 years' experience as a police officer with training and experience in the investigation of crime and training in interviewing child witnesses. Defense counsel was permitted to ask whether Betz had attended seminars or workshops, how long ago the training had occurred, and whether he had been trained by Social Services. The only question regarding training to which objection was sustained was one asking who had trained him not to tape record the interview with the Victim. Moreover, defense counsel was able to ask a number of questions that suggested the sloppiness and incompleteness of Betz's investigation, thereby undermining any claim that his training gave him special expertise. 128 The questions cited by Petitioner to which objections were sustained did not relate to the adequacy of Betz's training but rather appear to have been intended to elicit his opinion regarding potential weaknesses in child sexual abuse cases in general: (1) Can you tell us from your training and experience what are some of the dangers and pitfalls that confront an investigator in a sexual assault on a child case? ROA, Vol. 10, at 240.(2) In your training, are you taught about what possible motives for false reporting should be — you should be on the lookout for? Id. at 241.(3) And are you also aware that recanting is not typical in these types of cases where false reports are made? Id. at 240. The trial court explained: 129 [W]hat [Betz] did is relevant. What he didn't do or might have done is not relevant for you. You can bring an expert in and the expert can be critical of what they did do. And the expert, assuming that one comes in, can say what they did fails to meet a standard. And I don't have any problem with that concept, but to sit here and probe the area that you're doing through this witness, I sustain the objection. 130 Id. at 242. Defense counsel made no effort to convince the court that Betz possessed the requisite expertise to answer the questions (assuming they were otherwise proper). 131 As for the questions regarding Betz's omissions in the investigation — e.g., Did you investigate whether there was any pornography[?] id. at 249 — they were of marginal relevance, because Betz had already fully described his (very limited) investigation. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (Confrontation Clause does not prohibit exclusion of interrogation that is only marginally relevant.) Also, defense counsel could make the same point in jury argument. 132 Finally, Petitioner complains that the trial judge prohibited two questions regarding investigative guides. Betz testified on cross-examination that he had discarded reference materials he had used in these investigations and that he did not know whether there were investigative guides in the field. Defense counsel then asked whether during the investigation of this case Betz was in possession of any books or literature or any kind of materials that provided [him] with a checklist of how to approach the investigation or whether he had rel[ied] on any guide when [he was] investigating this case. The prosecutor objected that the questions were irrelevant. The judge sustained the objections. Perhaps we would have permitted this questioning. Nevertheless, the questions had only marginal relevance. Defense counsel's cross-examination established that Betz had done virtually nothing to check the Victim's story. The apparent purpose of this line of questioning was merely to emphasize that point. If Petitioner's counsel expected to obtain something more useful than that from the questions, he should have so informed the trial judge, through a proffer or otherwise. 133 Based on this review of the restrictions on Petitioner's cross-examination of Betz, we hold that the Colorado courts' ruling on Petitioner's confrontation claim did not involve[] an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 134