Opinion ID: 1895338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court commit error in its handling of the sentencing phase of johnson's trial?

Text: Johnson argues that there was technical non-compliance with the habitual offender statute in his sentencing. The statute in question, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (1972), states: Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation. Johnson's argument is as follows: In the instant case, the Defendant was indicted on a felony charge of sale of cocaine at the time he was indicted for being a habitual offender. The Defendant was found guilty of sale of cocaine following that indictment. However, no mention of that conviction was made in the habitual offender trial. This material element of the offense was not proven nor mentioned during the sentencing trial. Clearly, the Court could have taken judicial notice of this fact, but such notice does not appear of record. This error was not raised in the lower court and consequently is procedurally barred. Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 338 (Miss. 1988); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 719 (Miss. 1984). In addition, the trial court stated, Mr. Johnson, the jury has found you guilty of the crime of the sale of cocaine. Now it becomes my responsibility to sentence you according to the law. This would seem to be adequate for the judicial notice that Johnson suggests in his brief. In Seely v. State, 451 So.2d 213, 215 (Miss. 1984) this Court stated: The state has the same burden of proof as to the habitual offender portion of the indictment as it has on the principal charge. The defendant also has the same rights at both stages of trial. There appears to be some tendency to routinely allow the state to produce some documentation of prior offenses and for the trial court to perfunctorily find the defendant an habitual offender, then routinely pass out the sentence mandated by § 99-19-81. We wish to leave no doubt that the requirement of a bifurcated trial means a full two-phase trial prior to any finding that a defendant is an habitual offender and subject to enhanced punishment. Further, a complete record of the second part of the trial must be made. Johnson also contends that the trial court erred in omitting any record of the arguments of counsel during the sentencing trial. In addition to failing to request that the argument be included or in failing to object, Johnson has not shown that he has suffered any prejudice as a result. Johnson concedes that procedural errors are not major errors of substance, but nonetheless argues that they should be subject to strict scrutiny. It is unclear exactly what Johnson is seeking or hopes to accomplish under this assignment of error. Any error that was committed was minimal and certainly not deserving of any notice by this Court. This assignment of error is without merit.