Opinion ID: 471621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Objections.

Text: 11 The City asserts that Maddox failed to timely object to the instruction on the standard to provide medical care, the proposed instruction on negligence per se, the proposed instruction incorporated in the special verdict on proximate cause of death, and the exclusion of evidence regarding a police disciplinary proceeding. 12 The jury was instructed over a two-day period with the bulk of instructions read on the first day, followed by counsels' closing argument and the final jury instructions on the second day. Maddox did not object to some of the instructions until the second day, but before the jury was given its final instructions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 states that, ... no party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. 13 Maddox's counsel timely objected to the court's instruction that the standard of care for failure to provide medical assistance was deliberate indifference, stating his belief that the appropriate standard was negligence. Although his objection was raised after the first day of jury instructions, it is timely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 because it was raised before the jury retired to consider its verdict. 14 Maddox timely requested a negligence per se instruction based upon Cal.Gov.Code Sec. 845.6. Although Maddox's counsel initially failed to include an instruction based on Cal.Gov.Code Sec. 845.6 in his proposed instructions, the issue was brought to the court's attention before any jury instructions were read. Before the jury retired to consider its verdict, Maddox's counsel also proposed a revised jury instruction which incorporated the negligence per se instruction. 15 Maddox's counsel also made clear to the court at a side bar discussion that Officer Harris' admission to violating City policy with respect to the moratorium on the use of choke holds was relevant and probative as to defendant Harris. Maddox's counsel objected to the exclusion of this evidence. He made the substance of the evidence and his theory of admissibility apparent to the district court. Therefore, the exclusion of the evidence is reviewable on appeal. See Coursen, 764 F.2d at 1333; Fed.R.Evid. Sec. 103(a)(2). 16 Finally, Maddox's counsel timely objected to the failure to give an instruction on proximate cause and the thin-skulled plaintiff. Maddox's counsel requested an instruction or special verdict inquiry on this matter before any jury instructions were read and before the special verdict was submitted to the jury. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a) (If ... the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury). This objection was timely. 17