Opinion ID: 42577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denigrating Counsel and Cumulative Effect

Text: 16 Finally, to the extent that Martinez argues that the prosecutor denigrated defense counsel by discrediting him in front of the jury, we have held that, to “discredit defense counsel in front of the jury is improper, and even subsequent jury instructions aimed at rectifying this error may not ensure that these disparaging remarks have not already deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” United States v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861, 867 (11th Cir. 1990) citing United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1987) overruling on other grounds recognized by United States v. Watson, 866 F.2d 381, 385 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989). In McLain, we further noted that “[r]eversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the misconduct be ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” McLain, 823 F.2d at 1462. There, we found that the prosecutor’s misconduct did not warrant a reversal, but rather the cumulative effect of errors committed by the judge and the prosecutor denied the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Id. (emphasis in original). Here, the prosecutor’s comment that the evidence would never be enough for defense counsel, assuming it was improper, was an isolated comment, defense counsel objected to it, and the district court sustained the objection and told the jury to disregard it prior to, as noted above, instructing the jury not to consider as evidence anything said by the attorneys. Thus, the prosecutor’s misconduct did not 17 “permeate” the trial and, in any event, was immediately addressed by the district court. Furthermore, in Hernandez, we found that a prosecutor’s comment regarding defense counsel’s role as an advocate was probably improper, but found that it did not violate the defendant’s substantial rights. The Court stated: We note that defense counsel immediately objected to the improper comment and that the trial court sustained the objection. We note that the trial court instructed the jury both before closing arguments and after the closing arguments that the arguments were not evidence and that the jury was to decide Hernandez’s guilt based solely on the evidence. Under such circumstances, the statement by the prosecutor is not sufficiently egregious so as to mandate a reversal of Hernandez’s conviction. Hernandez, 145 F.3d at 1439. Like in Hernandez, defense counsel here immediately objected and the district court sustained the objection. The court also instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s statement and further instructed the jury that it was not to consider the attorneys’ statements as evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that any impropriety by the prosecutor here is not insufficient to mandate reversal. In sum, we conclude that the prosecutor’s statements made in rebuttal to defense counsel’s closing argument did not, when taken together, amount to misconduct that “permeated” the entire trial. Compare McLain, 823 F.2d at 1462. Furthermore, taken separately, we cannot say that the district court plainly erred by 18 refusing to sua sponte declare a mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor’s comment that only one person knew who the “Lakeland friend” was, and did not err by finding that the prosecutor’s comments, rebutting the defense’s argument that the government didn’t proffer certain evidence, was not an improper attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 19