Opinion ID: 835955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: london matter

Text: London and her husband met during the mid 1970s and married for the first time in 1979. That marriage produced one child and ended in dissolution in 1982. Thereafter, the parties maintained an intermittent relationship, visiting each other periodically, and may have lived together between 1984 and 1986. In December 1991, the couple married again. In April 1993, however, they separated, and the husband petitioned to dissolve the marriage. London and the couple's son (then 12 years old) remained in the marital home, which the husband had owned in his own name since before the couple's first marriage. London, who knew the accused from his prior representation of her in a bankruptcy matter, hired the accused to represent her in the dissolution proceeding. Shortly thereafter, she provided him with a written synopsis of the couple's relationship and an itemized settlement request. The synopsis and settlement request suggested that London expected that the entire span of the couple's relationshipnot only the period of their second marriagewould factor into the outcome of the proceeding. [4] According to the accused, who had been handling divorce cases since 1976, from the beginning [he had] viewed it as a short-term marriage and had informed London that in all probability this marriage was going to be found to be a short term marriage[.] [5] In June 1993, as his first order of business, the accused wrote to opposing counsel, Niedermeyer, requesting that the husband pay $200 per month in child support during the pendency of the proceedings and agree to permit London to remain in the house. The husband agreed to permit London and their son to remain in the house, but he refused to pay child support. The accused did not litigate that issue, concluding that an award of support likely would be accompanied by a requirement that London, rather than the husband, make the monthly mortgage payment. In August 1993, the accused filed London's response to the husband's petition. Around that time, the accused also conducted informal discovery. Specifically, he orally requested from Niedermeyer information concerning the husband's debts, the husband's 1992 income tax return, his latest wage stubs, and any information related to retirement benefits. Niedermeyer gave the accused all the information supplied to [him] by [the husband], which apparently consisted of the husband's W-2 Form and tax return for 1992, and a pay stub from September 1993. That information did not document fully the husband's 401(k) retirement account, a profit-sharing plan, and a pension plan (collectively, the retirement plan). The accused did not seek further discovery; neither did he take the husband's deposition. As the case proceeded toward trial, London discussed matters with the accused as often as was necessary, because she wanted to make sure he had as much information as he needed, and [she] wanted to stay abreast of what was going on. She remembered at least two, and possibly three, office visits with the accused, as well as several telephone calls over the course of the representation. For his part, the accused remembered that London had called a great deal and recalled many meetings with    London[,] who used to come, without appointment, to the office. There is no evidence in the record about the particulars of those conversations. At some point, the accused asked London to write down for him exactly what she wanted. She listed: (1) child support; (2) to stay in the house until their son turned 18; (3) the furniture to remain in order; (4) the rights and privileges of a landlord; and (5) reliable transportation. Based in part upon that list, the accused stated that he was able to comprehend with difficulty that London's most important demand was that she and the couple's son be permitted to remain in the marital home until the son turned age 18. The record does not reflect at what point in the pretrial process the accused came to that conclusion. At some point, the accused also sought to establish the value of the house by driving by it and by reviewing tax assessor records for the property. At trial call on Friday, December 10, 1993, the accused reported ready for trial, which was scheduled for the following Monday. At that time, the accused remained of the view that the marriage was a short-term one, and he even acknowledged as much to Niedermeyer that day. According to the accused, however, during trial preparation over the weekend, London absolutely insisted that she wanted to present this relationship as a long term relationship. He also reviewed some documents that London had brought with her, some of which he believed supported the theory of a long-term marriage. Despite his continuing belief that London was on legally shaky grounds, the accused concluded that she was entitled to make that argument. The accused next determined that he did not have sufficient evidence, including full documentation of the retirement plan, to make the argument: If in fact it was a long term relationship then I lacked the documentation to proceed and I needed more time to produce more documents. But as a short term marriage I was prepared to proceed and accomplish the primary objective of my client to remain in the residence until her son was 18 years old. The accused used the information that he had to prepare the trial memorandum. In that memorandum, in addition to other relief requested, the accused argued that the court should deem the parties to own the marital home as tenants in common, permit London and the couple's son to remain in the home until the son turned age 18, require the husband to make mortgage payments during that period in lieu of paying child support, and thereafter award London half the equity in the home. The memorandum is detailed factually, but contains no citation to legal authority. It appears that, in addition to relying on his recollection of what trial courts had done or said in the past in such cases, the accused consulted a continuing legal education publication to inform his understanding of the relevant legal issues. On Monday, December 13, 1993, at the outset of trial, the accused requested a two-week continuance to present additional documentary evidence of a long-term marriage. The trial court denied that request, adding that he virtually [would] have to treat [the marriage] as the short-term marriage it evidently is. Later, during the accused's direct examination of London, the court chided the accused for not having authority on hand to support the accused's argument for a tenancy in common. At the close of the evidence, the court also denied the accused's renewed motion for a continuance. In its ruling on the merits, the court stated that it must treat this case as a short term marriage and attempt to put the parties somewhat back in the condition that they were at the time of the marriage. As relevant here, the court awarded London possession of the marital home through June of the following year and a judgment for $2,000 to compensate her for the increase in value of the husband's retirement plan during the marriage. The court refused to award attorney fees against the husband and later complained to the Bar about the accused's handling of the London matter. The Bar ultimately filed a complaint alleging that, in his representation of London, the accused had acted incompetently and neglectfully in violation of DR 6-101(A) and (B). Although the Bar's pleading sets out various specifications of alleged incompetence and neglect, three main issues emerged at the trial panel hearing: (1) whether the accused mishandled the issue of long-term versus short-term marriage; (2) whether the accused should have conducted formal discovery; and (3) whether the accused waited too long before beginning trial preparation. As to the first issue, the Bar's expert, Gevurtz, opined, in part, that the accused should have researched whether he could have presented the marriage as a long-term one. Gevurtz added that that area of the law is one of the more confusing [areas]. In a later colloquy with the accused, Gevurtz asserted that you had absolutely    nothing to lose by dealing with it as a long-term marriage and that there was really no reason right from day one not to treat it as such. As to the second issue, Gevurtz offered his opinion that the case had called for something more persistent and formal concerning discovery and that, at a minimum, the accused should have taken the husband's deposition. Finally, as to the issue of preparation, Gevurtz was of the view that the accused had not been timely in that respect. For his part, and in addition to other arguments and evidence, the accused relied upon the testimony of opposing counsel, Niedermeyer. Niedermeyer offered his opinion that London had been well represented in this case. Respecting discovery, Niedermeyer testified that, [i]n fact, I thought [the accused] was giving me a hard time because it was such a short marriage and that the accused was pushing pretty hard. Niedermeyer repeated several times that he always had viewed the marriage as a short-term one and stated that he didn't think the case should have ever gone to trial. The trial panel concluded that the accused had violated both DR 6-101(A) and (B) in his representation of London. In support of that conclusion, the trial panel found, among other things, that [t]he case was tried without the benefit of all available evidence regarding Mr. London's retirement plans. This evidence could have been obtained by the Accused if he had undertaken reasonable and timely discovery. The case was also tried without the Accused advancing any legal authority for the proposition the relationship between the parties was long-term. On review in this court, the accused challenges the trial panel's determination, arguing, among other things, that he was ready, had enough facts[,] and was prepared to argue London's case. DR 6-101 provides: (A) A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. (B) A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer. This court has stated that determining whether a lawyer has provided incompetent representation in violation of DR 6-101(A) is a fact-specific inquiry. In re Eadie, 333 Or. 42, 60, 36 P.3d 468 (2001). So too, we conclude, is the determination whether a lawyer has neglected a legal matter. We also emphasize that the standard for assessing competence and diligence is an objective one; the lawyer's mental state is irrelevant. Compare DR 7-101(A)(3) (lawyer shall not intentionally    [p]rejudice or damage the lawyer's client   ); In re Collier, 295 Or. 320, 328, 667 P.2d 481 (1983) (`Intentionally' is a material and key element of DR 7-101(A)(3).). Instead, the court will consider whether a lawyer who has violated DR 6-101 acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently only as one of the factors in determining the appropriate sanction. As a final general observation that applies to both subsections of DR 6-101, we note that the outcome of a matter in which a lawyer has acted incompetently or neglectfully is not a pertinent consideration. In re Gastineau, 317 Or. 545, 555, 857 P.2d 136 (1993) (If a lawyer does a poor job, but the client fortuitously or through the efforts of others obtains a good result, that does not excuse the lawyer from providing competent representation or justify neglecting the case.). Moving to the subsections of DR 6-101, and beginning with competence under subsection (A), this court has stated that the best measure for determining lawyer competency is the standard stated in DR 6-101(A) itself. Id. at 554, 857 P.2d 136. That standard requires a lawyer to employ the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. DR 6-101(A). We pause to note, however, that incompetence and negligence are not synonymous terms. A lawyerotherwise knowledgeable, skillful, thorough, and preparedmight commit a misstep for which he or she might have to respond in damages. That lawyer, although negligent, has not violated DR 6-101(A). Conversely, but less likely, a lawyer might act without the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, or preparation necessary for the representation, but commit no misstep that gives rise to an actionable negligence claim. That lawyer would have acted incompetently, but not negligently. Consequently, and as the factors set out in DR 6-101(A) themselves suggest, this court's inquiry in competence cases generally has focused upon the reasonableness of the accused lawyer's conduct in the broader context of the representation, rather than in respect of specific aspects of the representation. See, e.g., Gastineau, 317 Or. at 553-54, 857 P.2d 136 (incompetence often found when there is a lack of basic knowledge or preparation[,] but not when lawyer showed experience and professional ability or Bar failed to prove that position was taken `in pretense or bad faith, or in culpable ignorance' ). That, however, will not always be the case; the analysis remains a fact-specific one. We proceed to consider neglect, or lack of diligence, under DR 6-101(B). One commentator has described lack of diligence as a special and wide-spread variety of incompetence, consisting of incompetently failing to act when advancing or protecting a client's interests calls for action, and as ranging from virtual abandonment of the client to procrastination. Charles Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 191 (1986). [6] As with competence, neglect is not interchangeable with negligence: A lawyer's neglect of a client's business does not necessarily give rise to actionable negligence. In re Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 674 n. 3, 642 P.2d 286 (1982). At the same time, however, this court recently has stated that, [t]o prove a violation of DR 6-101(B), the Bar must show a course of negligent conduct. Eadie, 333 Or. at 64, 36 P.3d 468 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added); see also Collier, 295 Or. at 328-29, 667 P.2d 481 (noting that court in prior cases had contrasted course of conduct with isolated acts of ordinary negligence). We adhere to the principal construct set out in Eadie: Neglect in the context of DR 6-101(B) is the failure to act or the failure to act diligently. It requires this court to view a lawyer's conduct along a temporal continuum, rather than as discrete, isolated events. To avoid confusion, however, we restate the Bar's burden under DR 6-101(B) as requiring clear and convincing evidence of a course of neglectful conduct. With those principles in mind, we proceed to determine whether the Bar has proved that the accused acted neglectfully or incompetently in representing London. At the outset, our review of the record leaves the clear impression that, at least until the weekend before trial, the accused both viewed and prepared to try London's dissolution case as involving only a short-term marriage. The accused's belief that the marriage was short term appears to have affected many of the actions that he took, and did not take, in the representation. Accordingly, we begin with an assessment of the accused's determination that the London matter involved a short-term marriage. The record demonstrates that the accused settled upon his theory that the marriage was a short-term one quickly, almost matter-of-factly, and without the benefit of substantial legal research. Moreover, the fact that the accused somewhat altered his theory of the case shortly before trial arguably suggests that his earlier preparation was inadequate. Nevertheless, as set out below, when we view those factors against the record as a whole, we are unable to conclude that the Bar has proved that the manner in which the accused adopted his initial theory of the case was neglectful or incompetent. As a preliminary matter, we reject the Bar's argument that the accused in essence ignored his client's wishes. As noted, we have discounted the significance of the synopsis that London provided to the accused, upon which the Bar's argument primarily relies, and there is no other evidence in the record that clearly indicates that London directed the accused to present the case in one way or another. As to the adequacy of the factual and legal bases upon which the accused formed his theory of the case, we note that the accused was familiar with London from the prior representation, that he maintained something approaching regular contact with her, and that the record does not disclose the specifics of those communications. Moreover, by the time of the representation, the accused had acquired substantial experience with divorce cases. Finally, in shaping his understanding of the case, the accused relied to some extent on prior discussions of the law in that area by trial courts. We also deem as having some relevance to our inquiry the fact that both the trial court and opposing counsel espoused the same view of the case as the accused's initial view. And, significantly, the Bar's expert did not go so far as to state a legal opinion that, considering the nature of the couple's relationship, London's second marriage properly should have been viewed as a long-term one. Instead, he emphasized only that the accused had nothing to lose by arguing for a longer duration relationship. Finally, the Bar has not cited any domestic relations case law or other authority that would tend to demonstrate that the accused should have viewed the case as presenting a long-term marriage. Considering all the foregoing factors together, as well as the record as a whole, the Bar has demonstrated that the accused should have rested his initial theory of the case on a stronger foundation. The Bar, however, has failed to prove that it is highly probable that the accused's legal conclusions or the manner in which he came to them were so unreasonable as to support a determination of either incompetence or neglect. Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether the accused adequately handled the dissolution of a short-term marriage. And, because we conclude that the Bar's arguments that the accused was neglectful under DR 6-101(B) do not require an extended discussion, we begin with that rule. In the course of his approximately six-month representation of London, the accused (1) informally attempted to obtain interim relief for her; (2) filed a response in her behalf; (3) conducted limited informal discovery; (4) met or spoke with her on a number of occasions; (5) prepared a factually detailed trial memorandum; and (6) tried the case. For its part, the Bar points to actions that the accused did not undertake and takes issue with the manner in which the accused carried out some of the tasks that he did undertake. Those arguments are tenable. On balance, however, when those shortcomings are viewed along the continuum of the representation, we disagree with the Bar that this record demonstrates neglect of a legal matter. The accused did not miss deadlines, and the case did not languish. In short, there was no course of neglectful conduct. The accused did not neglect a legal matter in violation of DR 6-101(B). Determining whether the accused acted incompetently under DR 6-101(A) in this matter presents a closer question. The focal points of the Bar's case are the level of discovery respecting the husband's retirement plan and the point at which the accused began his trial preparation. Respecting discovery, we question the overall significance in London's case of information about her husband's retirement account. The focus here was to restore the parties to their premarital positions. Moreover, we do not accept the Bar's argument that minimum standards of professional competence required the accused to depose the husband either as a general matter or specifically as to the retirement plan. Considering together the lack of complexity of the case, the state of this record, and the burden of proof, the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused's limited discovery efforts in London's behalf constituted an unreasonable level of thoroughness or preparation. As a final matter, we consider the timing of the accused's trial preparation. By all accounts, the accused did not begin trial preparation until the weekend before the Monday setting and only after having reported ready at trial call on Friday morning. That timing suggests a lack of reasonable preparedness. See, e.g., Chambers, 292 Or. at 678, 642 P.2d 286 (record left distinct impression that [the accused lawyer] prepared and tried the criminal case `by the seat of his pants'). Moreover, the work that remained to be completed that weekend was not limited to memorializing legal arguments and preparing exhibits for trial. The accused still needed to review, as an initial matter, some of London's documents. That fact, and the fact that the accused ultimately offered no legal citation in support of his position, suggests in this context a lack of reasonable thoroughness. See, e.g., Eadie, 333 Or. at 61, 36 P.3d 468 (accused lawyer who, among other things, failed to order copy of client's deposition transcript for use at trial violated DR 6-101(A)). We must assess those concerns, however, in the context of the legal and factual circumstances of the case that the accused litigated. Concerning the factual circumstances of London's case, the couple was of modest means, there was comparatively little property to distribute, and the issues of contention were few. Moreover, the accused's grasp of the pertinent facts at trial, notwithstanding that he began preparing late, supports his assertion that he ultimately had enough facts to argue London's case. Concerning the legal circumstances of the case, and as we noted earlier, the distribution of property in a short-term marriage dissolution usually is a relatively simple task in the nature of a rescission. 335 Or. at 315 n. 5, 66 P.3d at 1019 n. 5, citing Jenks, 294 Or. at 242, 656 P.2d 286. Once the question whether the accused should have viewed the marriage as a long-term one is removed from the equation, we cannot describe the case as legally complicated. In the context of that simple case, we conclude that the accused both had and conveyed a sufficient understanding of the pertinent legal issues to avoid violating DR 6-101(A). Finally, we note that, although for purposes of this opinion we have grouped the Bar's arguments on review into specific categories, we have considered each of the arguments that the Bar advanced in support of its position. Having done so, and applying the standard that DR 6-101(A) sets out in the broader context of the accused's representation of London as a whole, the record does not demonstrate that it is highly probable that the accused acted incompetently in violation of DR 6-101(A). In conclusion, the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(1) or (2) in the Korgan matter, or DR 6-101(A) or (B) in the London matter. Complaint dismissed.