Opinion ID: 3039377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mental State–Dr. Gelbort

Text: Bucklew first argues that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the trial by failing to call Dr. Gelbort to testify concerning Bucklew's state of mind at the time of the crime and how his brain dysfunction affected his ability to deliberate. Bucklew's defense at trial was that he did not deliberate prior to killing Sanders but acted out of a sudden passion. At the PCR motion hearing, Dr. Gelbort testified that his evaluation and testing of Bucklew prior to trial had revealed the presence of organic brain dysfunction, which he stated could also be described as an organic personality disorder. (PCR Tr. at 68.) Dr. Gelbort testified that Mr. Bucklew shows up with a pattern of results on testing that demonstrate that when pushed to extremes when he's dealing with complex information, emotionally laden or charged information, when he has to process information quickly, then his thinking skills deteriorate rapidly and he shows very 3 We find unpersuasive Bucklew's argument that the district court did not apply the controlling authorities of Wiggins and Williams. Like the state court, the district court correctly identified Strickland as the controlling Supreme Court precedent. In ruling on Bucklew's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend its judgment, the district court squarely addressed the Wiggins and Williams cases. The district court concluded that these cases do not amount to supervening precedent but demonstrate specific applications of Strickland to particular fact situations which are distinguishable from this case. The district court did not err in concluding that the present case does not involve similar facts of a failure to investigate or discover important mitigating evidence as in Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527-29 (finding counsel failed to uncover the existence of extensive sexual and psychological abuse as a child), and Williams, 529 U.S. at 395-98 (finding counsel failed to conduct an investigation that would have revealed a nightmarish childhood filled with abuse and a condition of borderline mental retardation). Thus, the district court applied the correct legal authorities. -8- clearly his impairments. (Id. at 71.) More specifically, Dr. Gelbort testified that in the emotionally charged situation that unfolded in Sanders' trailer before the murder, he could not see where [Bucklew] would have been able to coolly deliberate at that point in time. (Id. at 80.) The PCR motion court concluded that Dr. Gelbort's testimony was not persuasive on the issue of Bucklew's lack of ability to deliberate because of the truly overwhelming evidence of deliberation in this case–that is, Bucklew's prior threat to kill Sanders; arming himself with two guns, two knives, extra ammunition, and two sets of handcuffs; traveling to lie in wait for Ray; and following her to the victim's home, where he then killed Sanders and kidnapped and raped Ray. (Legal File at 96; Bucklew v. Missouri, No. 98CC79828, at 5 (Circuit Court of Boone County, Mo., Dec. 29, 1999).) The PCR motion court found that [a]n opinion by a psychologist flying in the face of such evidence pales by comparison. (Id.) Because Dr. Gelbort's testimony would not have made a difference to the jury, the PCR motion court found no prejudice under Strickland. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, finding that, while Dr. Gelbort would have testified that Bucklew was not able to form the intent to deliberate, he would also have confirmed that Bucklew has characteristics associated with antisocial personality disorder. Bucklew, 38 S.W.3d at 398. Additionally, Bucklew's [t]rial counsel was concerned about introducing this point during the guilt phase. Id. Bucklew asserts that the state supreme court unreasonably determined the facts in light of the record because his trial counsel did not articulate a strategic reason for not calling Dr. Gelbort at the guilt phase and never even asked Dr. Gelbort to render an opinion as to whether Bucklew was able to deliberate at the time of the shooting. Bucklew's attorney testified that he could not recall whether he had asked Dr. Gelbort to render a theory about Bucklew's ability to deliberate, and that, while he had -9- engaged in a thought process about whether Dr. Gelbort should testify, he could not recall his exact thought process. (PCR Tr. at 173-75.) The record, however, includes testimony from Dr. Gelbort that counsel had indicated to him a concern that he should not testify at trial because not all of his findings were beneficial to the defense. Dr. Gelbort admitted at the PCR hearing that his discussion of Bucklew's behavior as consistent with and characteristic of an antisocial personality disorder would not have been helpful to the defense. The record also shows that counsel had considered both doctor's reports prior to trial, and that, despite Dr. Gelbort's assertion that Bucklew has brain deficiencies and functions in certain circumstances at a level of one who has suffered brain injuries, Dr. Harry had concluded that Bucklew was capable of knowing and appreciating the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the crimes. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the state court did not unreasonably determine the facts in light of the record. Even assuming counsel performed deficiently by not calling Dr. Gelbort to testify at the guilt phase of the trial, we agree with the district court that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland. The state supreme court determined that there was no prejudice because Dr. Gelbort's testimony would not have produced a different outcome at trial. While Dr. Gelbort could have testified to his opinion that Bucklew was not capable of cool deliberation at the moment he pulled the trigger, Dr. Gelbort's testimony necessarily would have included a great deal of negative information about Bucklew's mental state. More importantly, a deteriorating or impaired thought process immediately preceding the shooting, as Dr. Gelbort would have testified to, could not negate the extensive, indeed overwhelming, objective evidence of pre-crime planning and deliberate planned conduct in which Bucklew engaged. See Lyons, 403 F.3d at 596 (Substantial evidence existed to undermine the likelihood of success in using a diminished capacity defense, and trial counsel did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in deciding not to use that defense.) -10-