Opinion ID: 1990858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Initial Stop By Pennsylvania Police

Text: To resolve the present case, we must analyze: 1) the initial stop made by Officer Weikert; 2) the discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant for Myers; and 3) the search subsequent to his arrest. Collectively the stop, arrest warrant, and the search incident to the arrest, yielded the evidence used by the Maryland police to support their application for a search warrant for 26 Belview Avenue. We will also consider Washington County Investigator Greg Alton's knowledge of the circumstances leading to Myers's arrest when he obtained and executed the search warrants in Maryland and whether, as a result, he exploited the primary illegal activity. As discussed supra, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes direct and indirect evidence that is a product of police conduct in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although we assume arguendo that the traffic stop was illegal, Officer Weikert's discovery of an outstanding warrant for Myers's arrest was sufficient to remove the taint of the initial illegal stop from the subsequent search of Myers and his vehicle and is not subject to exclusion under the exclusionary rule as fruit of the poisonous tree. Moreover, we find no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that either Investigator Alton or any of the individuals involved in the application and execution of the search warrant of the Hagerstown residence acted in bad faith. Further, we agree with those courts that have held that an outstanding warrant for the detainee's arrest was an intervening cause capable of attenuating the taint of the illegal stop. [19] The arrest warrant provided Officer Weikert with adequate probable cause to arrest Myers, independent of the initial illegal stop. We note that the time that elapsed between the illegal stop and the discovery of the evidence varied because there were multiple seizures over a period of time. [20] Some of the evidence was discovered by Officer Weikert in the search immediately following Myers's arrest on the outstanding warrant, [21] while other evidence was discovered after execution of the search warrant for Myers's vehicle, which was impounded. [22] We conclude that the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, especially because there was an outstanding arrest warrant discovered between the initial stop and the subsequent search incident to the arrest, even though some of the evidence was discovered shortly after the illegal stop. While recognizing that the warrant was capable of purging the taint to evidence subsequently discovered, it is the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, which forms the lynchpin of our attenuation analysis. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427; see Ferguson, 301 Md. at 549, 483 A.2d at 1258. If the purpose of Officer Weikert's stop was determined to be blatantly egregious and in violation of Myers's Fourth Amendment rights, or for the purpose of searching the vehicle, it can hardly be said that the arrest warrant intervened in those circumstances. In examining the third factor of Brown, we acknowledge the Court of Special Appeals's discussion of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hudson, supra, 405 F.3d 425. In Hudson, Investigator Hesson (Hesson) acting on the information provided by an anonymous tipster, located Scotty Lee Hudson, who was wanted for armed robbery. Hudson, 405 F.3d at 428-29. Hesson learned that Hudson's girlfriend would be arriving at work around 3:00 p.m., where the investigator waited so that he could question her about her boyfriend's location. Id. When Hudson's girlfriend arrived at work, there were also two unidentified males seated in her vehicle. Hudson, 405 F.3d at 429. Investigator Hesson speculated that one of the passengers was Hudson, so he approached the car with his weapon drawn and put the occupants in handcuffs in order to search them. Id. That court noted that had the officers positively, or at least reasonably, identified Hudson as a passenger before approaching [the] car with their guns drawn for example, by reference to a photograph of Hudson, or a composite drawing they would have had reasonable suspicion to seize the car and its occupants. But, lacking reasonable suspicion, the officers elected to seize first and identify second. Hudson, 405 F.3d at 434 (alterations in original) (alterations added). Because the purpose of the illegal stop was to arrest Hudson on the outstanding warrant, the court concluded that the crack cocaine obtained during the illegal stop must be suppressed because it [was] the fruit of the fact that the arrest was made [pursuant to an illegal stop] rather than [a legal one].' Hudson, 405 F.3d at 441 (citation omitted) (alterations in original) (alterations added). In the case sub judice, although Officer Weikert had a suspicion that Myers may have been engaged in criminal activity, the purpose of the stop was not to effectuate the arrest of Myers on an outstanding warrant or to search his vehicle. Merely because Officer Weikert's stop of Myers was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant. Instead, Officer Weikert pursued Myers because of what he believed was suspicious activity. The officer initiated the stop after he estimated that the vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed. Once Officer Weikert learned Myers's identity and discovered an outstanding warrant for his arrest, the officer gained an independent and intervening reason to arrest and search Myers. [23] Thus, the subsequent search of Myers and his vehicle was separate and apart from the initial stop. We agree with the Court in Green, supra, that a chance discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant makes a more compelling intervening circumstance than others. Green, 111 F.3d at 522 (noting that in situations where the police elicit incriminating statements, after reading the unlawfully-arrested person his or her Miranda rights, allows officers the opportunity to influence the actions and reactions of the detainee. Conversely, where a lawful arrest due to an outstanding warrant is the intervening circumstance, . . . any influence the unlawful stop would have on the defendant's conduct is irrelevant.). Under the circumstances of this case, the taint of the illegal stop was dissipated by the subsequent legal arrest of Myers pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant. The search based upon that warrant was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Accordingly, to hold otherwise would not further the goal of deterring unlawful police activity, but would result in the application of an unreasonable but for test that was rejected by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun, supra. The Maryland Search Warrants The evidence that the Maryland police seized from the Hagerstown residence was discovered pursuant to a search warrant, issued and based on evidence taken from Myers and his vehicle in Pennsylvania. If the evidence used to obtain the search warrant was attenuated from the taint of the illegal stop, it follows logically that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant would also be attenuated. For the purpose of guiding future decisions in this State, we apply the Brown attenuation analysis assuming that the evidence that formed the basis for the search warrant was, in fact, tainted. Eight days elapsed between the initial illegal stop on February 12, 2003, and execution of the search warrant on the Hagerstown residence. Washington County Investigator Greg Alton learned of Myers's arrest on the same day as the stop. He immediately became involved, piecing together evidence which led to the discovery of the Hagerstown residence. [24] During such a short period of time, it was impractical, we conclude, for Investigator Alton  who was unaware of the details of Myers's stop and detention, except that it was made on an outstanding warrant to investigate the procedural and substantive Pennsylvania laws with regard to probable cause and reasonable suspicion. An officer who has no knowledge of the circumstances leading to a defendant's arrest, but knows merely that he was arrested on an outstanding warrant, has no stake in that primary illegal activity nor any reason to investigate it.