Opinion ID: 2974628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Younger’s abstention criteria

Text: There are three requirements for proper invocation of Younger abstention: “(1) there must be on-going state judicial proceedings; (2) those proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Brennan, 921 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “So long as the constitutional claims of respondents can be determined in the state proceedings and so long as there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other No. 05-4513 Squire v. Coughlan Page 4 extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate, the federal courts should abstain.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435. We review de novo a district court’s decision to abstain. Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Ohio state constitution vests its supreme court with original jurisdiction over the “[a]dmission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to the practice of law.” Ohio Const. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g); see also Berger, 983 F.2d at 72324 (holding that abstention was proper under Younger and Middlesex where two attorneys had sued for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief arising out of state-bar disciplinary proceedings against them). Members of the Board are appointed by the Chief Justice and Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court. Gov. Bar R. V, § 1(D). The Board, with the approval of the Supreme Court, appoints the Disciplinary Counsel to investigate allegations of judicial misconduct. Gov. Bar R. V, § 3(B). Such investigations are an adjudicative, rather than a legislative, function. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433-34; Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that state disciplinary proceedings against an attorney are “judicial in nature for purposes of Younger abstention”); Berger, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (holding that “Ohio [disciplinary] procedures are judicial in nature” for abstention purposes). Thus, the first prong of Younger abstention is satisfied.
Middlesex held that the state “has an extremely important interest in maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses.” 457 U.S. at 434. This court has held that “[t]he policies of comity and federalism counsel that because [the state] has such an important interest in regulating its own bar, a state forum should have the first opportunity to review [the state’s] rules of lawyer conduct and procedures for lawyer discipline.” Fieger, 74 F.3d at 745. The Ohio disciplinary rules apply equally to justices, judges, and attorneys. Gov. Bar R. V, § 2(A). Thus, the second prong of Younger is satisfied. 3. Adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges A plaintiff must have “an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges” to satisfy the third prong of the Younger abstention test. Berger, 983 F.2d at 723. Abstention is appropriate “unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” Fieger, 74 F.3d at 745 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that state law barred presentation of his or her constitutional claims. Id. at 746. Once this third and final requirement is met, abstention is appropriate “unless the plaintiff can show that one of the exceptions to Younger applies, such as bad faith, harassment, or flagrant unconstitutionality.” Id. at 750 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Judge Squire argues that she was denied the opportunity to raise her due process challenge at the precomplaint stage of the state proceeding. She claims that Coughlan’s alleged refusal to provide her with the names of all persons spoken to in the course of the investigation deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to respond at a critical predeprivation stage of the disciplinary process. Coughlan, on the other hand, testified that the names of all potential witnesses were provided to Judge Squire. He conceded, however, that she was not provided with the names of every single person contacted in connection with his investigation of her alleged misconduct. Addressing this allegation, Coughlan testified that Judge Squire did not in fact ask for the names of all persons contacted, but asked only for the names of the persons who filed the grievances. Judge Squire’s argument is unpersuasive because it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s holding in Middlesex. In Middlesex, the Middlesex County Ethics Committee served a formal statement of charges on the plaintiff, a New Jersey attorney, arising out of an investigation into No. 05-4513 Squire v. Coughlan Page 5 improper comments by the plaintiff in connection with a criminal trial. 457 U.S. at 428. Rather than file an answer to the charges as required by New Jersey state disciplinary procedures, the attorney filed suit in federal district court, arguing that the disciplinary rules violated his First Amendment rights. Id at 429. He claimed that there was no opportunity in the state disciplinary proceedings to raise his constitutional claim. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the attorney had “failed to respond to the complaint filed by the local Ethics Committee and failed even to attempt to raise any federal constitutional challenge in the state proceedings.” Id. Judge Squire argues that Coughlan’s alleged refusal to provide the identities of all complainants and witnesses was a denial of due process. Whether or not there was a denial of due process, the record makes clear that Judge Squire, like the attorney in Middlesex, failed to raise this constitutional claim in the state disciplinary proceedings. Instead, Judge Squire took her claim directly to federal district court before the draft complaint was even filed with the Board. She states no facts in support of her assertion that there was not an adequate opportunity to raise this due process challenge at the precomplaint stage of the proceeding. As the district court pointed out, Gov. Bar R. V “does not expressly permit or deny Plaintiff the ability to raise any constitutional objection.” At oral argument, counsel for Judge Squire emphasized that there were no explicit instructions in either the Bar Rules or the Judiciary Rules for raising constitutional claims at the precomplaint stage of the process. Because there were no explicit procedures in place, the reasoning goes, there was no adequate opportunity for Judge Squire to raise her claim. Judge Squire is correct in pointing out that there are no such procedures contained in the Rules. An absence of explicit procedures however, does not establish that Judge Squire had an inadequate opportunity to raise her claim. The dispositive fact in this case is that Judge Squire has not shown that Coughlan would have refused to consider her constitutional challenge. See Fieger, 74 F.3d at 747 (“Similar to the Plaintiff in Middlesex, Fieger has failed to demonstrate that members of the hearing panel and the Board, the majority of whom are lawyers, would have refused to consider a claim that the rules which they were enforcing violated federal constitutional guarantees.”) (citation omitted). Because Judge Squire failed to meet her burden of showing that Ohio law barred her from raising her constitutional claim in the state disciplinary proceeding, the third prong of the Younger test is satisfied. See Berger, 983 F.2d at 723 (holding that Younger abstention was appropriate because the “plaintiffs had the opportunity to present their constitutional claims in their answer to the [disciplinary] complaint against them”).