Opinion ID: 1651662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the City of Ridgeland's decision to issue the October 10, 2007, Ordinance was arbitrary, capricious and/or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Text: ¶ 31. The Protestants argue that the circuit court erred in affirming the decision of the City of Ridgeland to issue the October 10, 2007, Ordinance. They claim that the Ordinance was beyond the power of Ridgeland to make, and/or illegal and in violation of statutory, common law and Ridgeland's own ordinances, and violated both statutory and substantive rights of the Appellants by the actions of the Board on October 10 and 11, 2007. The Protestants further contend that the circuit court Orders, affirming the decisions of the City of Ridgeland, allowed unlawful spot zoning. Lastly, they argue that the decisions of the City of Ridgeland were result-driven Decisions, performed without adherence to required and mandatory administrative procedures and substantive requirements/criteria, and based upon inappropriate factors. ... ¶ 32. The Developers argue that the City of Ridgeland's decision was supported by substantial evidence, was not arbitrary nor capricious, and should not be reversed on appeal. ¶ 33. The standard of review in zoning decisions is well-established. In Drews v. City of Hattiesburg , a case reviewing grants of variances, this Court explained: The standard of review in zoning cases is whether the action of the board or commission was arbitrary or capricious and whether it was supported by substantial evidence. Thus, zoning decisions will not be set aside unless clearly shown to be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal or without substantial evidentiary basis. There is a presumption of validity of a governing body's enactment or amendment of a zoning ordinance and the burden of proof is on the party asserting invalidity. Where the point at issue is fairly debatable, we will not disturb the zoning authority's action. Drews v. City of Hattiesburg, 904 So.2d 138, 140 (Miss.2005) (citations omitted). See also Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So.2d 416, 419 (Miss.2004) ([A]ctions of a deliberative body such as the Mayor and Board of Aldermen will not be set aside unless found to be arbitrary and capricious.). We have further explained: Unlike decisions to zone or re-zone, which are legislative in nature, decisions on request for special exceptions are adjudicative, and a reviewing court subjects such decisions to the same standard as is applied to administrative agency adjudicative decisions. Therefore, this appeal is subject to the following standard of review: the decision of an administrative agency is not to be disturbed unless the agency order was unsupported by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the agency's scope or powers; or violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Town of Prentiss v. Jefferson Davis County, 874 So.2d 962, 964 (Miss.2004) (internal citations omitted). We have defined an act as arbitrary when it is not done according to reason or judgment, but depending on the will alone. Burks v. Amite County Sch. Dist., 708 So.2d 1366, 1370 (Miss. 1998). Capricious has been defined as any act done without reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles. Id. Substantial evidence has been defined as `such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' or to put it simply, more than a `mere scintilla' of evidence. Hooks v. George County, 748 So.2d 678, 680 (Miss.1999) (quoting Johnson v. Ferguson, 435 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss.1983)). ¶ 34. As explained above, the Protestants have standing regarding the conditional use permit to build higher than four stories, but do not have standing regarding the variance to encroach the setback requirement. Therefore, the remainder of the discussion will focus on the issuance of conditional use permits and the building's height and size, not on variances or the setback requirement. ¶ 35. Under Ridgeland's Ordinance, the terms conditional use and special exception are synonymous and are defined in Article II, Section 21 as: A land use that would not generally be appropriate in a particular zoning district, but which, with certain restrictions or conditions, would, in the judgment of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen, promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the City and would not adversely affect adjacent properties. A permit (building permit or change of use permit) granted by the Mayor and Board of Aldermen for the initiation of a conditional use (with the necessary restrictions included) will not change the zoning of the property involved and will allow such use to continue as long as the specific use granted by the conditional use remains the same. Ridgeland, Miss., The Zoning Ordinance of the City of Ridgeland, Mississippi (Feb. 6, 2001) at 9 (emphasis added). Thus, as the Developers explain, a conditional use or special exception is effectively a license, granted by the Mayor and Board, in its discretion, to allow a specified use of land within a given zoning district, so long as it is of benefit to the city and does not adversely affect adjacent landowners. ¶ 36. Ridgeland's Ordinance provides for seven commercial zoning classifications. As a general principle, the level and degree of commercialization increase in the following progression: C-1 Restricted Commercial, C-2 General Commercial, C-2A General Commercial (arterial streets), C-3 Convenience Commercial, C-4 Highway Commercial, and C-5 High Intensity Commercial. Id. at 46. Under each zoning classification, the Ordinance specifies (1) the type of land use allowed in that district, (2) the types of conditional uses that may be permitted, and (3) the dimensional requirements within that district. See, e.g., id. at 108-110. ¶ 37. Ridgeland's Ordinance explains that the land uses permitted under a C-3 Commercial Convenience District are any uses permitted outright in the C-2 General Commercial district, which include those permitted outright in the C-1 Restricted Commercial District, among which are business and professional offices of all types. Id. at 102; Ridgeland, Miss., Ordinance Amending Sections 440.01, 440.02, and 440.03 of the Official Zoning Ordinance of the City of Ridgeland, Mississippi (Jan. 16, 2007) at 2. As explained above, no part of the 200 Renaissance building will be located in the C-3 portion of the subject property. The development on the C-3 portion will consist of a driveway and temporary visitor parking. ¶ 38. Ridgeland's Ordinance provides, in Article IV, Section 440.02, that in a C-4 Highway Commercial District, land uses permitted outright are professional offices, as well as public streets and highways. Ridgeland, Miss., Ordinance Amending Sections 440.01, 440.02, and 440.03 of the Official Zoning Ordinance of the City of Ridgeland, Mississippi (Jan. 16, 2007) at 2. In addition, however, Article IV, Section 440.03 lists conditional uses (special exceptions) that may be approved in C-4 districts: public or quasi-public facilities; automobile, truck and other vehicle sales and services; yard and garden centers; large, fully enclosed sports and recreational facilities; commercial kennels; any use permitted outright in C-1 Restricted Commercial District, C-2 General Commercial District, or C-3 Convenience Commercial District; conditional uses listed under the C-3 Commercial District regulations; and buildings in excess of forty-eight feet or four stories. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added).
¶ 39. The Protestants argue that the October 10, 2007, Ordinance betrayed Ridgeland's residential residents and constituted arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable actions in violation of the ordinances and statutory and common law. The Protestants state that, at the time the City of Ridgeland was reviewing the Developers' petition, seventy-two of the seventy-three commercial or office buildings located on or adjacent to Highland Colony Parkway in Ridgeland city limits were four stories or less. The Protestants argue that the City allowed the subjective desire of the Developers/appellees to override the objective, established protective zoning ordinances that had heretofore allowed commercial uses and residential uses to peacefully coexist. ¶ 40. First, as explained above, the Developers' petition, as amended, sought a conditional use permit to build an office building within a C-4 district in excess of the usual height limitation of forty-eight feet or four stories set out in Ridgeland's Zoning Ordinance. As also explained above, Section 440.03 of Ridgeland's Ordinance specially allows conditional use permits for the construction of buildings in excess of forty-eight feet or four stories. Id. at 3. ¶ 41. Second, the record reveals that the petition was supported by evidence that the 200 Renaissance building would benefit the City and would not adversely affect adjacent landowners. At the hearings before both the Zoning Board and the Mayor and Board of Aldermen, the Developers presented expert testimony regarding the building's architecture, the building's placement and its effect on homeowner privacy, the economic benefits the building would have on the City, the effect the building would have on residential property values, and the effect the building would have on traffic. The Developers also presented studies prepared by their experts and other supporting documents. At the hearing before the Mayor and Board of Aldermen, comments from residents both for and against the petition were heard, recommendations from City personnel responsible for interpreting and administering Ridgeland's Ordinance were heard, and arguments from both parties' lawyers, as well as the City's counsel, were heard. In addition, the Mayor and Board of Aldermen were informed that the owners of properties adjacent to the subject property supported the conditional use to allow construction of the 200 Renaissance building to a height of thirteen stories. As explained above, the Mayor then approved the October 10, 2007, Ordinance, which sets forth specific findings as to why the conditional use permit was warranted and appropriate. ¶ 42. Therefore, the City of Ridgeland's decision to approve the Developers' request for a conditional use permit regarding the height of the 200 Renaissance building was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. ¶ 43. As already noted, we will not address the Protestants' arguments alleging that the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably in granting the variance regarding the setback requirement, because the Protestants do not have standing to challenge the setback variance. Further, the Protestants are in error to the extent that they intermingle and confuse the zoning action of granting a conditional use permit (special exception) with the zoning action of granting a variance, as the requirements for the granting of these two separate zoning actions differ significantly.