Opinion ID: 149769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims under Section 926A

Text: As we have explained, all three appellants filed suit under Section 1983 premised on violations of Section 926A. The district court concluded that a violation of Section 926A cannot be enforced though Section 1983, and we affirm. Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and allows parties to seek damages against state actors for alleged violations of federal rights. It is enforceable only for violations of federal rights, not merely violations of federal laws. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-90, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106, 110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989). The three  Blessing factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone are traditionally used to determine the existence of a federal right enforceable under Section 1983: First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms. 520 U.S. 329, 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997) (citations omitted). This Court, however, has cautioned against applying these factors too strictly, explaining that: courts should not find a federal right based on a rigid or superficial application of the Blessing factors where other considerations show that Congress did not intend to create federal rights actionable under § 1983. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 322 (2d Cir.2005); see also Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 291, 122 S.Ct. 2268 ([S]tatute books are too many, the laws too diverse, and their purposes too complex, for any single formula to offer more than general guidance.) (Breyer, J., concurring). With these guidelines in mind, we turn to the firearm law implicated in this case. Section 926A states: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter [18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.] from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver's compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. 18 U.S.C. § 926A. The district court determined Section 926A satisfies the first Blessing factor because it is phrased in terms of the persons benefitted, and we agree. See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 284, 122 S.Ct. 2268. Indeed, Congress explicitly entitle[d] persons to transport firearms under the terms of Section 926A. The district court concluded, however, that Section 926A failed to meet the second Blessing factorthat the right protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence: In authorizing interstate transport of firearms for any lawful purpose from any place where [a traveler] may lawfully possess and carry such firearm, [Section 926A] offers no standard by which an officer can determine whether the interstate transport is lawful. It would require a local officer, faced with clear evidence of a gun carried in violation under local law, to know the law of all 50 states and their localities to evaluate whether firearms possession in the departure and destination states is lawful and thus preempts local law, an unworkable requirement. Appellants argue that this analysis erroneously focused on the practical problems involved for police officers complying with Section 926A instead of the competency of the judiciary. Appellants are correct that the language of the second factor focuses on whether the rights conferred would be difficult for the judiciary, as opposed to law enforcement officials, to identify and enforce. This rigid and superficial application of the Blessing factors, however, is insufficient. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (stating that the benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights which were not beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce) (emphasis added). These practical problems, and the accompanying possibility that the fear of increased liability could chill enforcement of firearm regulations, undermine the argument that Congress granted a benefit that was intended to be a individual right. We find no evidence either in the text or structure of Section 926A that would indicate that Congress intended that police officers tasked with enforcing state gun laws should be liable for damages when they fail to correctly apply Section 926A. See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 286, 122 S.Ct. 2268 ([W]here the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit ... under § 1983.). Appellees explain this point well: [I]f, as Blessing teaches, the Supreme Court believes that judicial difficulty in applying a federal statute in the courthouse is a strong indicator that Congress did not intend to create a damages remedy for violation of that statute, then certainly it is reasonable to presume that a statute such as § 926A, which requires a police officer to know the applicable firearm laws of at least two states in each encounter and apply them at the airport ticket counter, was not intended by Congress to create a damages remedy for its violation, especially given the absence of any indication in the statute's text, structure, or legislative history that such a remedy was necessary or desired. Applying Section 926A to Weasner's and Torraco's claims illustrates the difficulties, faced by judiciary and law enforcement officers, inherent its application. Prong one of Section 926A asks whether a person is not otherwise prohibited by [the Firearms Chapter] from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 926A. Section 922(g) describes various categories of individualsincluding felons, fugitives from justice, and unlawful aliens, among otherswho are not permitted under the Firearms Chapter to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Problematically, however, Section 926A is silent as to how a police officer encountering an unlicensed person with a firearm is to ascertain that this prong of the statute is met, i.e., that said person is not prohibited by the Firearms Chapter from transporting the firearm. Both Weasner and Torraco claim that the laws of their states of residence, Ohio and Florida, do not require a license for gun possession and that their possession was not prohibited by the Firearms Chapter. Asked to produce documentation of lawful possession, however, neither could. Appellants would have us conclude that Congress intended that a police officer faced with this factual scenario must mutely accept appellants' assurances that their possession is lawful, or potentially be subject to suit for damages. Similarly, whether Weasner and Torraco satisfied factor three of Section 926A, that the guns were lawful in the state of origin, is, contrary to what one might expect, no simple matter. Because both Weasner and Torraco began the pertinent legs of their travels in New Jersey, their possession and carriage of the firearms in that state needed to be lawful. The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice makes it unlawful to carry a handgun without a permit. See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5. The code provides certain narrow exceptions to the permit requirements including that a person may keep a firearm in his residence, premises or other land owned or possessed by him without a permit, or may carry said firearm between one ... residence and another when moving. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(e). That law further provides that guns being carried under subsection (e) in the course of travel shall include only such deviations as are reasonably necessary under the circumstances. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(g). Thus, in Weasner's case, a police officer's liability could turn on the correctness of his on-the-spot determination about whether Weasner's hotel in New Jersey constituted a residence, and whether his trip to Ohio constituted a move. In Torraco's case, a police officer would be obligated to speculate whether Torraco's brief stop in New York prior to proceeding to the airport was reasonably necessary under the circumstances. And of course this complexity, though illustrated by, is not limited to the facts of this case. As the district court astutely observed, Multiply the fluidity of that scenario by 50 jurisdictions (putting aside issues that might arise as a result of international travel with interim domestic stopovers), and nearly a billion passengers moving through U.S. airports per year, and it becomes apparent that providing a damage remedy under § 1983 for a failure to adequately apply § 926A would be unworkable. Torraco v. Port Auth., 539 F.Supp.2d 632, 646 (E.D.N.Y.2008). Given this complexity and uncertainty, we conclude that Congress did not intend to create federal rights in Section 926A actionable under Section 1983. We are unconvinced by appellants' response that Section 926A creates a presumption of lawfulness, and is therefore quite simply applied, making a damages remedy under Section 1983 workable. They contend that Congress intended a per se rule that such travel is lawful under § 926A unless probable cause exists to believe otherwise. Appellants seem to suggest that officers encountering an individual checking a gun at the airport in a state that does not permit unlicensed gun possession should not even inquire as to whether possession is lawful so long as the individual complied with the carrying case and unload requirements. Section 926A does not state that it is creating any such presumptionit merely provides that gun owners may travel interstate with their guns unloaded and in carrying cases, as long as a number of other conditions are metand we decline to read a presumption into the statute. Moreover, the Firearms Chapter explicitly cautions against finding that Congress intended Section 926A to operate at the exclusion of state gun laws: No provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such provision and the law of the State so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together. 18 U.S.C. § 927. As both the district court and this court conclude that the second Blessing factor prevents the plaintiffs from showing the existence of an individual right, we need not discuss the third factor.