Opinion ID: 2757505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sanchez’s Substantial Rights

Text: The Government’s argument regarding the substantial rights prong rests primarily on our previous case, United States v. Deandrade, 600 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2010). In Deandrade, the defendant similarly argued that a prior juvenile conviction did not constitute a prior felony conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A). We did not reach the merits of that argument, however, because we concluded it was “clear that the sentence was unaffected by Deandrade’s juvenile drug offense.” Id. at 120. We concluded that that was so because [t]he Guidelines sentence, correctly calculated by the court, was 360 months to life—independent of any consideration of the contested juvenile adjudication. . . . The 300‐month sentence actually imposed exceeded (by 60 months) the 20‐year mandatory minimum prescribed by § 841(b)(1)(A). It is hard to see how any consideration of the juvenile adjudication—which mattered only as to that mandatory minimum—contributed to the sentence imposed. Id. (emphasis in original). The holding of Deandrade was, therefore, that an error in calculating the mandatory minimum must have made a difference in the defendant’s sentence in order to affect a defendant’s substantial rights. Cf. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (“Accordingly, in determining whether a remand is required under § 3742(f)(1), a court of appeals must decide whether the district court 8 No. 11‐2429‐cr would have imposed the same sentence had it not relied upon the invalid factor or factors.”). To determine whether the District Court’s erroneously‐calculated mandatory minimum affected Sanchez’s sentence, we are required to look to “the record as a whole.” Id. In Deandrade, we found it clear from the entirety of the record that the error did not make a difference to the sentence, because the defendant’s Guidelines range was well above the mandatory minimum, and because the District Court specifically stated that the mandatory minimum was irrelevant to the sentence it imposed. 600 F.3d at 120. Here, by contrast, the record reflects that the erroneously‐ calculated mandatory minimum did affect Sanchez’s sentence. Unlike in Deandrade, where the District Court said it was imposing sentence that was “greater than 20 years without regard to the mandatory minimum,” 600 F.3d at 120, the District Court here made no such statement. And although the District Court did not mention the mandatory minimum, the assumption of a 20‐year minimum sentence permeates the record. Indeed, throughout the sentencing hearing, Sanchez’s counsel argued that the range for the District Court to consider was between the mandatory minimum sentence (which he believed to be 20 years) and 30 years.3 The Government, too, invoked the mandatory minimum, arguing “if the Court is considering imposing a non‐guideline sentence, . . . we urge the 3 Although the Guidelines range was 360 months’ to life imprisonment, as a practical matter, the “ceiling” for Sanchez’s possible term of imprisonment was at the very bottom of that range, because of the Government’s agreement not to seek a sentence higher than 360 months. See text following note 2, supra. 9 No. 11‐2429‐cr Court to impose a sentence above the mandatory minimum in the case.” Joint App’x 119; see also id. at 117 (arguing that the District Court should not “reward” Sanchez with a sentence of the mandatory minimum of 20 years). Thus, both parties relied on the (mis‐)calculation of a 20‐year mandatory minimum in their arguments, and the District Court ultimately sentenced Sanchez to 288 months’ imprisonment—a sentence closer to 20 years than to 30. Sanchez appears to agree with the Government that, under our Court’s existing precedent, his appeal should fail on plain error review. See, e.g., Appellant’s Reply Br. 2. As noted above, however, we disagree with the broad reading of Deandrade subscribed to by both the Government and Sanchez. See, e.g., id. (“Prior to [Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)], this Circuit held that a defendant is not prejudiced by an incorrect mandatory minimum when the defendant’s Guidelines range is not impacted, and the defendant receives a sentence above the incorrect mandatory minimum.”). We have never adopted such a bright‐line test, either in Deandrade or in subsequent cases. The sole basis for our decision to affirm the sentence in Deandrade was that the erroneously‐ calculated mandatory minimum “had no influence on the sentence that was imposed.” 600 F.3d at 120. Here, our review of the record leads us to the opposite conclusion—that the error in calculating the mandatory minimum did affect Sanchez’s sentence. The other two cases relied upon by the Government are not to the contrary. In Sapia v. United States, we declined to remand solely because there was “no indication that any error affected the 10 No. 11‐2429‐cr sentence.” 433 F.3d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 2005). And in United States v. Dominguez, the Government conceded that the mandatory minimum was miscalculated, but we concluded that that error too was harmless. 393 F. App’x 773, 779 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order). Although the dicta in Dominguez—a non‐precedential summary order—was perhaps phrased more broadly than necessary, the sole basis for our holding was that the error had not affected the sentence imposed. Again, in this case, unlike in Sapia and Dominguez, we have concluded that the error in calculating the mandatory minimum did affect Sanchez’s sentence and that, therefore, a remand is required.4 Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we conclude that Sanchez has met his burden under plain error review to establish that his substantial rights were affected. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). B. The Fairness and Integrity of Sanchez’s Sentence We next assess whether this error seriously affected the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262; see also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); Tarbell, 728 F.3d at 126. Because we conclude that a remand is required under our precedents, 4 we do not address Sanchez’s primary argument—that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), requires us to find prejudice whenever a sentencing judge miscalculates the mandatory minimum sentence. 11 No. 11‐2429‐cr As stated above, the assumption of a 20‐year minimum sentence permeates the record, and the District Court never stated affirmatively that it had not considered the miscalculated mandatory minimum in imposing its 288‐month sentence. Indeed, the record strongly suggests that the District Court relied on the incorrect minimum in imposing sentence. If this error were to stand uncorrected, Sanchez might face a longer sentence—perhaps substantially longer—than he otherwise would. We therefore conclude that the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings were seriously affected by the District Court’s error. Cf., e.g., United States v. Folkes, 622 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (vacating and remanding sentence affected by inflated Guidelines range on plain‐error review). Accordingly, we vacate and remand for resentencing. We of course intimate no view as to the sentence that should be imposed on remand or as to the substantive reasonableness of the 288‐month sentence the District Court imposed.