Opinion ID: 719627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the order of witnesses

Text: 10 McCall next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the government to recall Agent Phillips in an attempt to impeach Phyllis Brown's alibi testimony. McCall cites Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b), which provides in pertinent part: Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. According to McCall, the government's failure to present the evidence when Phillips first testified during the case in chief or to confront Brown on cross-examination denied Brown the opportunity to explain or deny the same. 11 We addressed a similar claim in United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S.Ct. 1866, 85 L.Ed.2d 159 (1985), where we noted that the prosecution should have confronted the [non-party] witness with the alleged prior inconsistent statement on cross-examination, but we ultimately held that the district court's procedure was not reversible error because the defense could have recalled its witness as a surrebuttal witness. This is consistent with the advisory committee notes to Rule 613(b), which explain: The traditional insistence that the attention of the witness be directed to the statement on cross-examination is relaxed in favor of simply providing the witness an opportunity to explain and the opposite party an opportunity to examine the statement, with no specification of any particular time or sequence. Fed.R.Evid. 613 advisory committee notes. Because the defense in this case elected not to recall Phyllis Brown as a surrebuttal witness, arguing instead that the government's impeachment attempt was a failure, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion.