Opinion ID: 1891497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: relevance is essential

Text: To be admissible . . . evidence must be relevant, and the admission of evidence is within the trial court's wide discretion. Chandler v. State, 534 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1988) (citations omitted); see also LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.2001) (stating the admissibility of evidence generally turns on relevance). The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's determination will not be disturbed on appellate review absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181, 188 (Fla.2005). That is, the court's ruling must be unreasonable or arbitrary. See Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla.1990). The evidence Rodgers sought to admit consisted of various weapons and books, none of which were used in the murder but which were found on codefendant Lawrence's property. See majority op. at 1217-18 (listing items). Rodgers argued that the evidence supported two statutory mitigating factors: minor participation in the murder and acting under the substantial domination of another. See § 921.141(6)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. (1997). The trial court concluded, however, that the items were not relevant to these factors. I acknowledge that courts must allow defendants facing a possible death penalty to introduce all evidence of possible mitigation. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. But the requirement of relevance applies just as much to mitigation evidence as to any other. After Lockett, the Supreme Court emphasized that [j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (second emphasis added). We have held that Lockett requires the admission of evidence that establishes facts relevant to the defendant's character, his prior record, and the circumstances of the offense in issue. Hess v. State, 794 So.2d 1249, 1269 (Fla.2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Herring v. State, 446 So.2d 1049 (Fla.1984)). Thus, in the penalty phase, a defendant has a right to present evidence that is relevant to the nature and circumstances of the crime, such as evidence that the defendant played a relatively minor role in the murder compared to the other participants. Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 917 (Fla.2000) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Gore v. Dugger, 532 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla.1988) (finding that evidence of a cousin's longtime influence on the defendant was irrelevant on the issue of substantial domination under facts of the case, but under Lockett concluded that it was [not] totally unrelated to [Gore's] character). [T]he defendant can also introduce evidence that is relevant to any of the statutory aggravating circumstances the State seeks to establish or to any statutory or nonstatutory mitigation. Way, 760 So.2d at 917 (emphasis added). These cases teach that, while the defendant must be allowed to introduce all mitigating evidence, the penalty phase is not a free-for-all. The judge retains a gatekeeping role, ensuring that evidence offered to support mitigation is actually relevant to that issue. In this case, Rodgers offered the evidence found in Lawrence's home to support the mitigating factors of substantial domination by another and that Rodgers played a comparatively minor role and was therefore less culpable in the murder. Rodgers failed to connect the books and weapons found in Lawrence's home to his claim that Lawrence coerced, threatened, or intimidated him or that Rodgers was less culpable. The majority notes our approval of the admission of this same material from Lawrence's residence during Lawrence's Spencer hearing, majority op. at 1218, suggesting that if it was admissible there, it should be admissible here. This comparison is flawed. First, the evidence from Lawrence's case was not the same. In our opinion in Lawrence, we discuss books, not weapons, that were admitted. 846 So.2d at 448. Lawrence's books on serial killers and snipers were admitted to rebut his claim that Rodgers dominated him in the Robinson murder. We concluded the evidence was relevant because it reveal[ed] Lawrence's interests and support[ed] the State's contention that he would have actively participated in the murder. Id. at 449 (quoting trial court's order). In other words, the evidence was relevant to show that Lawrence voluntarily participated in the murder and was not acting under duress, threat, or coercion. Id. Evidence suggesting that Lawrence acted voluntarily, however, and that Rodgers did not dominate him, does not support the converse inference that Lawrence instead dominated Rodgers. Further, there is no evidence that Rodgers even knew about the books or the weapons, that Lawrence discussed them with Rodgers, or that they influenced Rodgers's behavior in the murder. The majority also concludes that the evidence was relevant to show that Rodgers was less culpable than Lawrence in Robinson's murder. Majority op. at 1219. Again, however, I see no link between Lawrence's possession of books on snipers and serial killers, and his possession of various weapons, and Lawrence's and Rodgers's comparative roles in the murder. That Lawrence had a sick fascination with killing, as Rodgers states in his brief, does not make Rodgers himself less culpable. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.