Opinion ID: 4457543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Rights Were Clearly Established

Text: Having determined that, construing facts favorably to Soto, the evidence supports finding that his rights were clearly violated, we next consider whether his rights were clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. “A right is clearly established when ‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones v. Lowndes Cty., 678 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2012)). For a right to be clearly established, its contours must be “sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would 6 Case: 18-40568 Document: 00515207543 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/20/2019 No. 18-40568 have understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014). Courts must not “define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” as “[t]he dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). It is not required that the “very action in question has previously been held unlawful.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Instead, “in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. In this case, the specific right at issue was clearly established. At the time of the alleged violation, the law made clear that (1) due process safeguards—specifically, notice of why the letter was rejected and an opportunity to appeal the decision—are required when a prisoner’s letter is rejected, and (2) the fact that Soto’s son was a minor does not change the analysis. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 417–19; Prison Legal News, 683 F.3d at 224; Austin, 328 F.3d at 208–09. Thus, a reasonable official would have understood that failing to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to appeal after rejecting a letter sent to a minor detained in a boot camp would violate the sender’s constitutional rights. Finally, Brock contends that she acted reasonably by preventing Soto’s contact with A.M.S. because Soto was not authorized to contact A.M.S. pursuant to the Cadet Contact Authorization form that A.M.S.’s mother signed. Again, Brock’s authority to allow contact is in dispute, since there is evidence she claimed to have the power to make that decision. But even if Brock was constrained by policy and therefore acted reasonably by initially withholding Soto’s letter, she was required to afford Soto procedural due process. See Johnson v. El Paso Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 92-8514, 1995 WL 152720, at  (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 1995) (noting that the rejection of correspondence and notification of the rejection are separate constitutional 7 Case: 18-40568 Document: 00515207543 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/20/2019 No. 18-40568 inquiries). That is, even if it was objectively reasonable for Brock to reject Soto’s correspondence based on the contents of A.M.S.’s Cadet Contact Authorization form, it is clearly established that due process required Brock to provide Soto with notice of the decision and an opportunity to respond.