Opinion ID: 1366593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony By Ms. Pat Price

Text: The Appellant also contends that the lower court erred in admitting a particular portion of the testimony of the decedent's aunt, Ms. Pat Price. In a statement provided to police officers, Ms. Price apparently indicated that someone had told her that the Appellant had previously threatened the decedent with a gun at some unknown previous time. The officer transcribing Ms. Price's statement mistakenly wrote that the decedent and his wife Angie had told Ms. Price that the Appellant had threatened the decedent with the gun. During trial, counsel for the State cross-examined Ms. Price and asked her if the decedent had confide[d] in [her] ever from time to time about the problems he had with his family. Ms. Price explained that he had hinted at problems. The State continued: In fact, he complained to you once about being threatened by Dewey Winebarger, didn't he, with a gun? Ms. Price answered: No, he never complained to me about being threatened. He never  He never said anything to me about being threatened, not to me. Testimony continued as follows: [The State]: Did you hear that from somebody else? MR. COLOSI [counsel for Appellant]: Objection. THE WITNESS: There was one time  MR. COLOSI: (Interposing) Objection. Objection to what she heard, if she heard anything. MR. BELL [counsel for State]: I'm not asking what she  THE COURT: Rephrase your question. BY MR. BELL: Q. Well, you recall you gave a written statement to Deputy Blankenship, didn't you? A. Right, right. Q. You don't recall putting in that written statement that you were informed that he had threatened Kenny with a gun? MR. COLOSI: Objection. THE WITNESS: That's because somebody came into the bar and told me that he was threatened with a gun; that Dewey had a gun. I never saw a gun. MR. COLOSI: Objection. THE COURT: Objection is sustained. The jury will disregard and not consider it. Almost immediately after that exchange, however, counsel for the Appellant attempted to elicit additional information from Ms. Price on redirect examination regarding the statement to police. The testimony progressed as follows: [MR. COLOSI]: Did Deputy Blankenship put some things in your statement that you did not say? A. There was one statement towards the end where I think was written down that  Q. I'm not asking you what was said, okay? I'm just asking you if there was a portion of your statement  Do you recognize this statement? A. Yes. Q. Is this your statement? A. Yes. MR. BELL: Your Honor, I object to it being confusing and misleading if she can't explain what in there was inaccurate. THE COURT: What was your question? What were you going to ask her? MR. COLOSI: I'm going to ask her if Deputy Blankenship put something in her statement that she did not say that wasn't true. THE COURT: Okay, she can answer that. BY MR. COLOSI: Q. Now, referring to this second page, did Deputy Blankenship put something in your statement that wasn't true; that you did not say? A. There's  Q. You can answer that yes or no. A. Yes. Q. Okay. MR. COLOSI: Nothing further. On re-cross examination of Ms. Price, counsel for the State continued the attempt to clarify the apparent confusion between Ms. Price and the officer who transcribed her testimony and asked Ms. Price to explain. Counsel for the Appellant objected, stating [t]hat's what you just ruled that's not admissible. The lower court overruled the objection and allowed the witness to answer. Ms. Price then explained as follows: There was a part in the last part of the statement where I said that someone had said that Kenny  that Dewey [the Appellant] had pulled a gun on Kenny [the decedent]. My statement reads that Kenny and Angie told me that Dewey pulled a gun. I didn't say, Kenny and Angie. I just said, They told me. Not referring to Kenny and Angie. Counsel for the Appellant thereafter moved for a mistrial, and the lower court denied that motion. On appeal of that issue, the State maintains that the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, since it was simply offered to clarify the issue of whether the investigating officer had included inaccurate information in the transcript of Ms. Price's police statement. [9] Further, an objection by counsel for the Appellant was initially sustained, and that line of questioning was abandoned by the State. It was counsel for the Appellant who thereafter resurrected that issue by requesting further explanation by Ms. Price. In State v. Crabtree, 198 W.Va. 620, 482 S.E.2d 605 (1996), this Court addressed hearsay evidence inadvertently introduced during testimony. The defendant had argued that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of one individual regarding another individual's corroborating statement to a third individual regarding the time of the defendant's arrival at a home on the night of the alleged crime. 198 W.Va. at 626, 482 S.E.2d at 611. This Court explained: While the defendant is correct in his assertion that neither Rule 805 nor Rule 806 allows inadmissible hearsay within hearsay for impeachment purposes, see State v. Sutphin, 195 W.Va. 551, 466 S.E.2d 402 (1995), we hold that in this instance the error was forfeited under the invited error doctrine. In other words, we find the hearsay evidence was either invited by or in response to questions by defense counsel. Where inadmissible evidence is introduced solely as a result of the rigorous examination of the complaining party, the error is deemed invited error. State v. Hanson, 181 W.Va. 353, 363, 382 S.E.2d 547, 557 (1989); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 137, 304 S.E.2d 39, 42 (1983). 198 W.Va. at 626-27, 482 S.E.2d at 611-12. [10] We find that any error in admitting the questionable portion of Ms. Price's testimony was invited by counsel for the Appellant's continued insistence upon eliciting an explanation from Ms. Price. When the State first raised a question likely to evoke an answer containing hearsay, counsel for the Appellant promptly objected, and such objection was sustained by the lower court. The inquiry could have ended there. Counsel for the Appellant sought further explanation, and more extensive damaging information was elicited. Further, we find that any error in admitting the questionable testimony of Ms. Price was harmless in light of the voluminous evidence against the Appellant. In Phillips, this Court explained: When dealing with the wrongful admission of evidence, we have stated that the appropriate test for harmlessness is whether, after stripping the erroneous evidence from the whole, we can say with fair assurance that the remaining evidence independently was sufficient to support the verdict and the jury was not substantially swayed by error. State v. Atkins, 163 W.Va. 502, 261 S.E.2d 55 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1081, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1980). 194 W.Va. at 585-86, 461 S.E.2d at 91-92. We further find no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision to deny the Appellant's request for a mistrial over the issue of Ms. Price's testimony. In State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295, 305 S.E.2d 251 (1983), this Court explained as follows: The decision to declare a mistrial, discharge the jury and order a new trial in a criminal case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Craft, 131 W.Va. 195, 47 S.E.2d 681 (1948). A trial court is empowered to exercise this discretion only when there is a manifest necessity for discharging the jury before it has rendered its verdict. W.Va.Code § 62-3-7 (1977 Replacement Vol.). This power of the trial court must be exercised wisely; absent the existence of manifest necessity, a trial court's discharge of the jury without rendering a verdict has the effect of an acquittal of the accused and gives rise to a plea of double jeopardy. See State ex rel. Brooks v. Worrell, 156 W.Va. 8, 190 S.E.2d 474 (1972); State ex rel. Dandy v. Thompson, 148 W.Va. 263, 134 S.E.2d 730, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 819, 85 S.Ct. 39, 13 L.Ed.2d 30 (1964); State v. Little, 120 W.Va. 213, 197 S.E. 626 (1938). 172 W.Va. at 304, 305 S.E.2d at 260. We find no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision that manifest necessity did not exist in the present case, and the failure to grant a mistrial was not error. Having thoroughly reviewed arguments of counsel, briefs, the record, applicable rules, and applicable precedent, we affirm the lower court in all respects. Affirmed.