Opinion ID: 1262911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exhaustion of Contractual Remedies

Text: The superior court struck Beard's claims for constructive discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and denial of due process on the ground that he failed to exhaust the grievance procedures specified in the CBA. We have held that an employee must first exhaust his contractual or administrative remedies, or show that he was excused from doing so, before he may pursue a direct judicial action against his employer. [2] If we determine that Beard is excused from exhausting his contractual remedies, we still may affirm the superior court's decision to strike the claim from the amended complaint if there is another legal basis for doing so. See Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345, 1351 n. 6 (Alaska 1988). Under the CBA, Beard was required to submit any dispute with management to the grievance procedures. [3] Beard is excused from grieving his constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims under the CBA because Senkow, his union representative, refused to file a grievance for Beard's allegations of harassment underlying these claims on Beard's behalf. Under the collective bargaining agreement at issue in Casey v. City of Fairbanks, 670 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1983), Casey could not pursue his grievance without the cooperation of his shop steward. 670 P.2d at 1135 n. 1. The evidence showed that Casey initially discussed his termination with his shop steward and reported his grievance directly to the union business agent after he was terminated. 670 P.2d at 1135. We held that Casey was excused from exhausting his remedies under a collective bargaining agreement because he made a good faith effort to grieve his termination claim through his union and his union refused to represent him. 670 P.2d at 1136-37. In this case, Senkow testified that Beard complained to him that his supervisors were harassing him to make his work environment intolerable. Senkow told Beard that he could not pursue the grievance because the actions Beard complained of fell under management's prerogative under Article 5 of the CBA. Under the CBA grievance procedures, Beard could not pursue his grievance past the initial steps without the cooperation of an APEA representative. [4] Like Casey, Beard could not comply with the grievance procedures established by the CBA because his union representative refused to represent him. Any such attempt would have been futile. Under these circumstances, we hold that Beard is excused from exhausting his remedies under the CBA for his claims of constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Since the superior court erred in concluding that Beard was not excused from exhausting his contractual remedies as to each of these claims, we must reverse the superior court's decision striking the claims unless they are not legally viable. See Alaska R.Civ.P. 12(b), (f). Beard's claim for constructive discharge is legally viable. Federal courts unanimously have recognized a claim for constructive discharge to prevent employers from avoiding their legal obligations with respect to a formal discharge when they create working conditions so intolerable as to force an employee to resign. [5] We implicitly recognized a cause of action for constructive discharge in Klondike Industries Corp. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161, 1166 n. 5 (Alaska 1987). Today, we make explicit that where an employer makes working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation, the employer is as liable for any illegal conduct involved therein as if it had formally discharged the employee. In this case, Beard's claim is that by creating conditions so intolerable as to force him to resign, the state violated its duty under Article 5(c) of the CBA to discharge him only for just cause. The state is as liable for violating this duty if Beard was constructively discharged as it would be if it had formally discharged him without just cause. Since Beard has alleged harassment, his constructive discharge claim is legally viable. Therefore, the superior court erred in striking this claim from Beard's complaint. Beard's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim may be legally viable. We recently reaffirmed our adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts' elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress: Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Oaksmith v. Brusich, 774 P.2d 191, 200 (Alaska 1989). In light of the difficulty of establishing these elements, we have required that the trial court make a threshold determination whether the severity of the emotional distress and the conduct of the offending party warrant a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985). To be legally viable, Beard's claim must meet this standard, and not the lower standard of Civil Rules 12(b) and 12(f). Since Beard has presented evidence of harassment and of emotional distress, his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be legally viable. Therefore, the superior court may have erred in dismissing the claim. On remand, the court should evaluate this evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support Beard's claim. See King v. Brooks, 788 P.2d 707, 710-11 (Alaska 1990). The final claim that the superior court struck from Beard's complaint is denial of due process. Beard alleges that his supervisors' conduct constituting a constructive discharge deprived him of due process of law because he was not given a pre-termination hearing. This claim has no legal basis. Beard's due process claim depends on his having a property right in continued employment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). In this case, the just cause requirement in Article 5(c) of the CBA gives Beard a property interest in continued employment. See 470 U.S. at 538-39, 105 S.Ct. at 1491-92. Beard's due process rights, however, are only triggered if that interest is deprived, that is, if he is discharged. In this case, the question of discharge is the very subject of dispute. Whether Beard was deprived of his property interest in his job depends on the merits of his constructive discharge claim, that is, whether the appellees engaged in such harassing conduct as to constitute a constructive discharge. Beard does not have a due process right to a hearing to determine whether his due process rights themselves are triggered. [6] To require such a hearing effectively would decide the question of constructive discharge in Beard's favor. The state is entitled to judgment on Beard's due process claim as a matter of law. Therefore, the superior court properly dismissed the claim.