Opinion ID: 904139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of partial summary judgment motion

Text: May first argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for partial summary judgment because “there was undisputed evidence that the MDOC’s articulated rationale for denying May employment, (i.e., the drug screening results) was illegal on its face.” She asserts that MDOC’s drug testing 5 Case: 12-60868 Document: 00512282270 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/20/2013 No. 12-60868 procedures violated Mississippi’s employee drug testing statute,3 and that federal law provides that an “employee’s prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted [only] if the employer articulates lawful reasons for the action.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981) (emphasis added). According to May, because MDOC provided no lawful reason for its hiring decision, she was entitled to partial summary judgment. Ordinarily, “an interlocutory order denying summary judgment is not to be reviewed where final judgment adverse to the movant is rendered on the basis of a subsequent full trial on the merits.” Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1994). This rule rests on the notion that “it is particularly difficult to understand how the ends either of justice or of orderly procedure would be furthered were we to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment when the facts adduced at the full trial on the merits adequately support the findings and judgment for the defendants.” Id. at 571 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the general rule is that, once trial begins, summary judgment motions effectively become moot. Id. In Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., however, we recognized a narrow exception to this rule. 586 F.3d 358, 365 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009). There, we explained that, following a bench trial, we would review the denial of summary judgment because the district court’s ruling on the related motion concerned only an issue of law. Id. (“Because [the appellant] appeals the district court’s legal conclusions in denying summary judgment, and the case was a bench trial, review of the denials of summary judgment is appropriate.”). Underlying our approach in Becker was our recognition that, because motions for judgment as a matter of 3 In particular, May submits that McDonald was not qualified to collect the sample; that a second, confirmatory test was not conducted after the first one yielded inconclusive results; and that she was denied employment without a positive confirmed test. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 71-7-1, et seq. May also alleges that MDOC’s testing methodology did not comply with the department’s own policy. 6 Case: 12-60868 Document: 00512282270 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/20/2013 No. 12-60868 law “are not required to be made following a bench trial, it is appropriate to review the court’s denial of summary judgment in this context.” Id. May relies on Becker in arguing that it is proper for us to review the district court’s denial of her summary judgment motion because, according to her, the motion was denied solely on the basis of a question of law. In advancing this argument, though, May neglects the posture of the instant case and how it differs from that presented in Becker. In particular, unlike Becker, this case was not a bench trial, and motions for judgment as a matter of law therefore were required (and made). This case thus is squarely governed by the rule announced in Black, wherein we held that it is inappropriate for us to review an interlocutory order denying summary judgment where, after a full trial on the merits, final judgment was entered against the movant.4 Accordingly, we decline May’s invitation to reverse the district court’s denial of her motion for partial summary judgment.