Opinion ID: 2381446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Discussion of Sanction

Text: The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has at least twice warned the Bar that it views commingling of client's funds with personal funds as a serious offense because of `possibility in many cases, and the danger in all cases, that such commingling will result in the loss of the clients' money.' In re Hessler, 549 A.2d 700, 702 (D.C.1988). In Hessler, the Court emphasize[d] the ban against commingling to alert the bar that in future cases of even `simple commingling,' a sanction greater than public censure will be imposed.' Id. at 703. The Court's decisions in In re Gilchrist, 488 A.2d 1354 (D.C.1985), and In re Artis, No. M-103-81 to publicly censure the respondents, who had engaged in simple commingling, were issued prior to its Hessler warning. In In re Ingram, 584 A.2d 602 (D.C.1991), a simple commingling case, the Court with considerable hesitation issued a public censure rather than a suspension primarily because the commingling by the respondent ended well before issuance of this court's admonition in Hessler regarding future cases of commingling. Id. at 603. The most recent post- Hessler case decided by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is In re Ross, supra . There, the respondent commingled funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and also violated Rule 1.15(b), which requires an attorney to advise a third party of settlement proceeds in his or her possession and to pay over those proceeds promptly upon settlement. The hearing committee in Ross recommended that the respondent be publicly censured. However, this Board, relying on Hessler and Ingram, recommended a thirty-day suspension. The Court noted that, in Hessler, it had emphasized the seriousness of commingling a client's funds with a lawyer's funds, and referred again to its warning with respect to the sanction that could be expected even in simple commingling cases. We explained that the purpose of the rule against commingling was not only to prevent the most serious offense of misappropriation, but also to avoid the possibility of unintentional loss of a client's funds to circumstances beyond the control of the attorney. Id. at 702. As we said in an earlier case, `[i]t strains common sense to think that [an experienced practitioner] would be unaware of the prohibition against commingling,' and in any event ignorance is not a defense to a commingling charge. In re Harrison, 461 A.2d 1034, 1036, n. 3 (D.C.1983) (Slip Op. at 5) The Court found it to be significant that the respondent's misconduct took place more than two and a half years after Hessler, and pointed out that  Hessler makes clear that the `action [of commingling] alone puts the client's funds at risk regardless of the adequacy of the balance.' Ibid. The Court also noted that Ingram, supra, involved no disciplinary violation other than commingling, whereas the respondent in Ross violated both Rule 1.15(a) and 1.15(b). The Court concluded, after giving deference to the Board's recommendation, and in light of our admonition to the Bar almost seven years ago in Hessler,  that there was no basis for leniency, and that, accordingly, an order suspending the respondent for thirty days should be entered. In the Board's view, the Court's decision in Ross controls the instant case. Both cases involved more than simple commingling. The commingling in each case occurred long after the Court's admonition in Hessler. Accordingly, we believe a sanction greater than reprimand by the Board should be issued by the Court.