Opinion ID: 187522
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellants' Other Arguments

Text: Appellants offer three other arguments, none of which warrant reversal. Appellants first argue that [l]ack of an actuarial cost review was not a central theory of the Overbys' case. Appellants' Br. 18. They assert that the plaintiffs did not rely heavily on the theory that a lack of actuarial cost review made the amendment invalid. Id. (emphasis added). They argue in a single paragraph that the Overbys' main theory was that no vote on the amendment took place at all. While this is at least arguably true, it is without legal effect. While it is no doubt true that the complaint and the evidence of a plaintiff must be sufficient to put defendants on notice of any theory of recovery upon which the plaintiff is relying, this does not preclude the possibility of plaintiffs arguing alternative theories, nor the possibility of the court's relying upon a lesser alternative in its decision. Appellants offer no authority for a contrary position, nor have we independently found any. The complaint, the discovery, the evidence at trial, and the complete record established in the district court taken together  indeed taken separately  provided defendants with ample notice that plaintiffs sought to have the amendment invalidated because of the trustees' failure to follow the plan's amendment procedure in the adoption of the disputed amendment. More specifically, the Overbys asked for discovery on the actuarial review. Appellants' counsel admitted on appeal that these requests for admissions were in the record and that the actuarial review came up in testimony as well. See Trial Tr. at 130. It is abundantly clear that appellants were on notice that this argument was before the district court and could have presented evidence at trial that NALC complied with the amendment procedures if any such evidence existed. We have no precedent for requiring any more. Appellants further offer two brief arguments. They first contend that the amendment to the plan was necessary to comply with a change in the law required by an amendment to the governing statute effected in the Retirement Equity Act of 1984. That amendment required plans qualifying under ERISA to include a married at commencement eligibility requirement. Again, this is inarguably true. See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426. This amendment did not, however, require the deletion of pre-existing one year at death language, nor free the trustees from complying with the amendment procedures required by the plan. Whether the resulting invalidity of the amendment means that the two methods of qualification must coexist or that the amended statute mandates further amendment to the plan is not before us. Appellants are no doubt correct that such coexistence will increase the financial burden on the plan. That well illustrates a problem that could have been addressed by the submission of the proposed amendment for review by the actuaries as required by the amendment procedures of the plan. Last, appellants argue that the district court should have narrowly tailored the relief ordered in the judgment. That is, they contend that the court should have limited the effect of its findings and holdings to the claims of the Overbys, leaving the questions of the validity of the amendment to other annuitants for later cases. We cannot conclude that the court erred in granting the relief it provided. The district court performed its Article III function. The judge decided the case before her. The precise breadth and strength of the preclusive effect of that judgment on later litigants can await cases in which that preclusive effect is at issue.