Opinion ID: 1671742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING McFARLAND'S MOTION FOR INDIVIDUAL SEQUESTERED VOIR DIRE.

Text: ¶ 6. During the course of voir dire of potential jurors, it became apparent that many venire persons had seen media coverage of the election challenges and vote fraud cases in the county. Defense counsel requested that he be permitted to conduct individual sequestered voir dire of the jurors, which request the trial court denied. Later, during jury selection, the following exchange occurred: MR. SWEET: And I say this wholeheartedly, Your Honor, and I'm only trying to select a fair jury. Your Honor, I asked about going to a sequestered, you know, and I asked the Court about that  THE COURT: I know you did, and I said it wasn't necessary. MR. SWEET: So, Your Honor, I couldn't go into everything that they've heard. But when  THE COURT: I think it's been gone into by the Court and counsel for both cases, that the news media, they've seen it in the newspapers; it's been repeatedly in the newspapers, and the Court takes judicial knowledge of that fact. McFarland argues that in light of the extensive pretrial publicity about election challenges and vote fraud cases, the trial court erred in denying his motion for individual sequestered voir dire. ¶ 7. At the time of trial, the manner in which voir dire shall be conducted in criminal cases was governed by Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rule of Circuit Court Practice 5.02, [1] which provided: In the voir dire examination of jurors, the attorney shall direct to the entire venire questions only on matters not inquired into by the court. Individual jurors may be examined only when proper to inquire as to answers given or for other good cause allowed by the court. No hypothetical questions requiring any juror to pledge a particular verdict will be asked. We have held that this rule allows a circuit court, in its own discretion, to utilize individualized, sequestered voir dire. Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 842 (Miss. 1995). We have further held, however, that the rule does not require more than what it states on its face, and that trial judges who denied individual sequestered voir dire acted within their discretion granted by the rule. Carr, 655 So.2d at 842; Russell v. State, 607 So.2d 1107, 1110 (Miss. 1992); Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 126 (Miss. 1991). In fact, we have never found error where a trial judge denied a motion for individual sequestered voir dire. ¶ 8. In the capital murder case of Carr v. State, supra , the trial court denied the defense's request for individual sequestered voir dire regarding the jurors' exposure to extensive pretrial publicity. 655 So.2d at 842. On appeal, we noted that in Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1906, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), the Supreme Court stressed the wide discretion trial courts enjoy in conducting voir dire with respect to the issue of pretrial publicity. Carr, 655 So.2d at 843. The Supreme Court stated in Mu'Min: Particularly with respect to pretrial publicity, we think this primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense. The judge of that court sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect and brings to his evaluation of any such claim his own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that might influence a juror. The trial court, of course, does not impute his own perceptions to the jurors who are being examined, but these perceptions should be of assistance to it in deciding how detailed an inquiry to make of the members of the jury venire. 500 U.S. at 427, 111 S.Ct. at 1906. ¶ 9. In Carr, the trial court asked the collective venire about the effect of pretrial publicity or information about the case, and asked if there was any reason that a juror felt that he or she could not be fair and impartial. 655 So.2d at 843. Any juror who responded affirmatively was further questioned, and those who stated that they had already formed an opinion in the case were excused. Id. We found no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of individual sequestered voir dire. Id. ¶ 10. In the case sub judice, the trial judge inquired of the entire venire concerning pretrial publicity and knowledge of the case. Two jurors raised their hands, and the judge questioned them further to determine whether their knowledge might affect or prejudice them in any way. When the jurors indicated that they could not be fair and impartial, they were excused. The attorneys then conducted extensive examination of the venire regarding exposure to pretrial information, and every juror who indicated an inability to be fair and impartial was excused. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McFarland's motion for individual sequestered voir dire.