Opinion ID: 4206792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Parking Ticket

Text: ¶ 31 With respect to the parking ticket, the crux of the plaintiffs’ complaint is that the ticket was misleading in three respects: (1) it erroneously told them they had ten calendar days to schedule a hearing to challenge their parking tickets—when in fact they had twenty days, (2) it misleadingly suggested latepenalties compound at a faster rate than they actually do, and (3) it failed to notify them of their right to seek a hearing in justice court instead of appearing before a hearing officer. ¶ 32 We agree that the statement that the plaintiffs have only ten calendar days to schedule a hearing was misleading. But to have violated the plaintiffs’ due process right to notice, that misstatement must have misled them in such a way that they were effectively deprived of the opportunity for a hearing. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978) (core due process purpose of notice is “to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections” (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314)). Under the circumstances of this case, this misstatement does not rise to that level. This is because the plaintiffs’ allegations do not reflect that they suffered prejudice as a result of only having ten days in which to challenge their parking tickets. Nowhere in the plaintiffs’ complaint do they aver that they forewent their hearings because of the ten-day time limit. Disputing a parking ticket is typically a simple matter that requires virtually no factual investigation or development, and no plaintiff alleges that ten days was inadequate time to adequately prepare a litigation strategy. Cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64–65 (1972) 12 Cite as: 2017 UT 67 Opinion of the Court (upholding landlord-tenant legal regime against challenge that it provides “an unduly short time for trial preparation”—no more than six days, absent the tenant’s posting a bond—where factual and legal issues are simple and each party has “as much access to relevant facts” as the other). Nor do any of the plaintiffs allege that ten days was not enough time for them to arrange their affairs in such a way that they could appear and contest the ticket. We therefore cannot find a deprivation of due process based on the misleading statement that the plaintiffs had ten, instead of twenty, days to challenge their tickets. ¶ 33 The plaintiffs also suggest that, because the notice misleadingly implied late penalties compound at a faster rate than they otherwise do—and failed to notify plaintiffs of their right to ask for a stay of penalty increases pending resolution of a parking case—they were deterred from pursuing a hearing by the prospect of escalating fines. It is, of course, inappropriate to mislead motorists about the penalties associated with an infraction. But to the extent the notice did contain misleading information about penalties, those misleading statements do not rise to the level of a due process violation because they did not sow confusion about the plaintiffs’ right to contest their parking tickets at a hearing. ¶ 34 First, while they were clearly misleading in other respects, we do not believe that the parking tickets contained obviously misleading information about the schedule of penalties. Instead, the structure of the parking ticket’s text reflected that penalties would only increase in the event that a motorist both declined to timely pay and failed to take steps to challenge his or her ticket.3 3 We note the plaintiffs have alleged that Ms. Reed was assessed a penalty when she paid her parking ticket fourteen days after receiving her ticket—even though she also challenged her ticket before the hearing officer. Supra ¶ 11. This suggests to us that the City may not have stayed the imposition of a penalty while Ms. Reed was engaged in the process of challenging her ticket. If true, this is not acceptable. See SALT LAKE CITY CODE § 2.75.030(E) (2010) (amended 2014) (All penalties “are stayed upon filing the request for hearing[] until judgment is rendered in (cont.) 13 BIVENS v. SALT LAKE CITY Opinion of the Court ¶ 35 The back side of the parking ticket began with a prefatory clause stating that the vehicle had “been observed in violation of . . . the Salt Lake City Code.” It explained that this violation subjected the motorist to “a civil penalty” and that “[f]ailure to pay the penalty may result in the filing of a SMALL CLAIMS COURT ACTION and increased penalties.” (Emphasis added.) The parking ticket then laid out two options for motorists. First, they could pay: “[t]o satisfy the Parking Notice, send payment in the amount indicated on the front of this Parking Notice within ten (10) calendar days.” The parking ticket reflected that if a motorist chose payment as an option, but failed to pay timely, “[p]enalties will increase as follows”—followed by the schedule of penalties of which the plaintiffs in this case complain. It further stated that “partial payment will not clear this notice.” ¶ 36 The second option available to motorists was a “hearing[].” The parking ticket reflected that if a motorist chose this option, he or she “must see the Hearing Officer in person within 10 calendar days from the date of this notice.” It then provided the telephone number to call for more information. ¶ 37 Read as a whole, therefore, the parking ticket did not obviously suggest that penalties would increase even if a motorist chose to pursue a hearing. The statement that penalties “will increase” fell under the “payment” option and therefore appeared only to cover motorists who chose to pay their parking fines but did not pay them timely. It did not cover motorists who chose a hearing. ¶ 38 Additionally, even if the parking tickets could have been written more clearly, our conclusion that its misstatements do not rise to the level of a due process violation is bolstered by the fact that the parking tickets provided the motorists with a number to call if they were confused or needed more information. That is, even if the parking tickets were ambiguous about the circumstances under which fees would increase, the plaintiffs were provided with a simple means of clarifying the meaning of the parking tickets. Under the circumstances, this was enough for constitutional notice purposes. the matter.”). But it does not bear on the adequacy of the notice contained on the parking ticket. 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 67 Opinion of the Court ¶ 39 Two federal constitutional cases from the Sixth Circuit help frame this issue. In Herrada v. City of Detroit, 275 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff sued Detroit, claiming that its parking citations violated her due process rights because they misled her about the penalties that would be imposed if she failed to timely pay her parking fine. Id. at 555. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. “Although the citation and overdue notice might have contained false and misleading information regarding the penalties for failure to respond,” the court reasoned, “the citation clearly states that a hearing is available to contest the City’s allegation that the vehicle owner committed a parking violation,” and it also “provide[s] [a] telephone number[] to call for more information.” Id. at 557. Thus, the court concluded, any misleading information about penalties did not violate due process because “[t]he City’s notices were . . . reasonably calculated to inform vehicle owners of the allegations against them and the procedures available to obtain a hearing to contest the allegations.” Id. ¶ 40 Compare Herrada with Zilba v. City of Port Clinton, 924 F. Supp. 2d 867 (N.D. Ohio 2013)—a post-Herrada case in which a Sixth Circuit district court concluded that a motorist had not received adequate notice of his right to challenge his parking ticket. In Zilba, unlike in Herrada, Port Clinton “provided no phone number [to call for more information], no indication the ticket could be challenged, and no indication a recipient could request further information.” Id. at 884. Indeed, Port Clinton’s tickets “provide[d] no dates or indications a hearing [was] available.” Id. at 883. Based on the lack of any semblance of notice, the Zilba court concluded that the motorist’s due process rights had been violated. ¶ 41 Like the Sixth Circuit, we find it important that the parking tickets here both indicated that they could be challenged and provided a telephone number to call for more information. By including an explanation that they could be challenged, the parking tickets accomplished the core due process purpose of notice: providing adequate notice to the plaintiffs of their right to be heard. And the phone number meant that any plaintiff who was confused by the information contained on the parking tickets had a relatively easy way to acquire more information. See Horn v. City of Chicago, 860 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that “notice of an opportunity for hearing was constitutionally 15 BIVENS v. SALT LAKE CITY Opinion of the Court sufficient” when “[a]ny doubts [about information contained on a parking ticket] could have been resolved by contacting the Department of Revenue at the number or address listed” on the parking ticket); In re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding class notice constitutionally adequate in part because “the notice provided a toll-free telephone number to call for more information”). To the extent any of the plaintiffs were concerned that they would be penalized for seeking a hearing, the plaintiffs could have called the phone number on their parking tickets to ask about the possibility of a stay. But there is no allegation that any of them did so. Under the circumstances of this case, due process was not offended by the allegedly misleading statements about the schedule of penalties. ¶ 42 Finally, we do not see constitutional significance in the parking ticket’s omission of the right to challenge a parking ticket in justice court as opposed to before a hearing officer. The plaintiffs have not explained how they believed they were prejudiced by having to appear before a hearing officer instead of in justice court. Absent allegations that they reasonably decided to forfeit their right to be heard based on the requirement that they appear before a hearing officer, we cannot conclude that the fact that this forum was a hearing before a “hearing officer” posed a constitutional problem.4 4 The plaintiffs also passingly suggest that the City may have violated their due process rights because it located the hearing officers in the City’s Finance Division. They argue that “the City’s Finance Department hearing officers acted without statutory authority and thus lacked jurisdiction to hear parking notice challenges at all” because, according to the plaintiffs, all hearing officers must “serve as staff for the justice court”—they should not be located in the executive branch. Because the plaintiffs have failed to explain how locating the hearing officers in the Finance Division deprived them of due process, we do not consider this claim. Cf. Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–61 (1972) (To show that a hearing process poses a structural conflict of interest, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the process is such as to induce “the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might (cont.) 16 Cite as: 2017 UT 67 Opinion of the Court