Opinion ID: 2618245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 36

Heading: Hitch/Trombetta

Text: Reilly was arrested and booked on May 26, 1981. At that time, police noticed what appeared to be a bloodstain on his left shoe. Reilly explained that the stain was caused by animal blood that dripped from a package of meat he purchased. Police confiscated and tested the shoes. Lee Mann, a police criminalist, found the stain was caused by human blood but he was unable to determine the type of blood (i.e., A, B, or O) because the stain was not concentrated enough to give a result that could be interpreted. Mann testified at the hearing on Reilly's motion to suppress that, in general, a blood sample would be better preserved if it is refrigerated and frozen would be better yet. When asked whether the shoes had been refrigerated in the police property locker, Mann replied, Not to my knowledge. (He noted that the shoes probably were not frozen because the department did not yet have a freezer unit.) On cross-examination, Mann went on to note that the delay between confiscation (May 26) and testing (July 9) was not so long as to preclude successful blood typing, and that some of the enzymes should still be good in a two-month period. He admitted, however, that had tests been performed immediately after police seized the shoes, the likelihood of determining the blood type might have been increased. On redirect examination, Mann opined that even with a long delay, he probably could have determined the stain was human blood. After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied Reilly's motion to suppress evidence of the bloodstain. (39a) Reilly contends his federal due process rights were violated when the police failed to adequately preserve the blood sample on his shoe. In support, he relies largely on People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361] (hereafter Hitch ), and its progeny. In Hitch, we held the People violate a criminal defendant's right to federal due process if they fail to adequately preserve evidence in their possession when there exists a reasonable possibility the evidence would have been material and favorable to the defendant. To redress the constitutional violation, the results of the test could be excluded. ( People v. Moore (1983) 34 Cal.3d 215, 223-224 [193 Cal. Rptr. 404, 666 P.2d 419].) (40) After we decided Hitch, the United States Supreme Court addressed the same due process issue and formulated a different test. Contrary to our decision in Hitch, the high court opined that in order to gain relief, a defendant must show the evidence ... possess[ed] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and ... [was] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. ( California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 489 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 422, 104 S.Ct. 2528] [hereafter Trombetta ].) Trombetta supersedes Hitch ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 512-530 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640]), and applies even to cases  like the present one  where the crime occurred prior to the enactment of the so-called Truth-in-Evidence provision of our state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); see, e.g., Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1234 [ Trombetta applies in 1980 case].) (39b) Application of Trombetta to this case defeats Reilly's claim in two ways. First, it is not clear that failure to refrigerate the sample from May 26 (when it was seized) to July 9 (when it was tested) actually resulted in denigration of the quality of the blood sample so as to prevent blood-typing. Mann testified that he failed to obtain results because the stain was not concentrated enough, and that if it were sufficiently concentrated, a blood type could be determined even two months later. The most Mann could say is that had the test been performed immediately after the shoe was seized, the likelihood of getting a successful test  might have been increased. (Italics added.) Thus, the evidence that police negligently destroyed evidence was extremely thin. [17] Even if we assume police negligently compromised the integrity of the bloodstain by failing to refrigerate or freeze the shoe, there is no evidence police should have realized the bloodstain possess[ed] an exculpatory value before the bloodstain was destroyed. ( Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) To the contrary, it no doubt appeared to police that, if anything, the bloodstain would provide additional evidence against Reilly. Reilly disagrees, claiming that had the shoe been refrigerated, it might have been possible to determine the blood type. This is important, he claims, because his blood is type O. Nancy Morgan's blood type was type B; Mitchell Morgan's was type O. There was no type O blood found at the crime scene, however, only type B. Reilly argues that had he been able to establish the stain on his shoe was type O, he could have argued that he was not at the crime scene or, at least, he waited outside, a story consistent with some of his extrajudicial statements. Reilly's convoluted argument fails to consider that because Mitchell Morgan's blood was type O, evidence that the stain was type O would not have been particularly exculpatory. In any case, we cannot say Reilly's theory, based as it is on the mere possibility that the stain was type O blood, imbued the bloodstained shoe with an exculpatory value that was apparent before police storage procedures allegedly compromised the integrity of the stain. He thus fails to satisfy the Trombetta test. We conclude the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress the bloodstain evidence. [18]