Opinion ID: 1959497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Merger of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 with 2C:35-9

Text: Defendant Rodriguez argues that his conviction for distributing drugs near school property in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 should be merged with his section 9 drug death conviction. We address this claim now while noting that it is of little practical significance to this defendant. [7] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2090, 109 L.Ed. 2d 548, 561 (1990). State constitutional protection against double jeopardy is co-extensive with the Federal Constitution. State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 102, 527 A. 2d 1355 (1987). We recently described the two-step test for determining when multiple punishment violates double jeopardy: The first step requires the court to consider whether the legislature intended to impose multiple punishments.... If, however, the legislative intent to allow multiple punishment is not clear, the Court must then apply the test articulated in Blockburger [v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932)], to determine whether the defendant is unconstitutionally faced with multiple punishment for the same offense. Under Blockburger, two offenses are the same unless each [offense] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182, 76 L.Ed. at 309. [ State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 47-48, 601 A. 2d 1149 (1992) (second alteration in original).] Turning, thus, to legislative intent, three statutory provisions are potentially relevant to the merger question here. The first two are the specific anti-merger provisions found in the drug death and school zone statutes; the third in the Code of Criminal Justice's general statement of merger principles. Neither specific anti-merger provision precludes merger of the two offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9d provides that notwithstanding the general merger statute, a section 9 conviction shall not merge with a conviction for ... unlawfully manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense the CDS that caused the victim's death. [8] N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9. The school zone statute prohibits the merger of that offense only into convictions under sections 5 and 6 of the Act. [9] N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; Dillihay, supra, 127 N.J. at 51, 601 A. 2d 1149. Because neither of the specific provisions demonstrate a clear intent to impose multiple punishment, we turn to the Code's general merger statute: a. Prosecution for multiple offenses; limitation on convictions. When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (1) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection d. of this section; (2) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit the other; (3) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (4) The offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct....         d. Conviction of included offense permitted. A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged whether or not the included offense is an indictable offense. An offense is so included when: (1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (2) It consists of an attempt or conspiracy to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or (3) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8.] Applying the general merger statute to Rodriguez's convictions, we conclude it neither prohibits separate punishments for the two offenses nor evinces a clear legislative intent to impose multiple punishments. The statute generally allows conviction for multiple offenses but provides for certain exceptions. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a. Rodriguez's convictions at issue here do not fall within any of the exceptions. They do not come within the included offense exceptions, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a(1), because neither offense is included in the other. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8d. The two offenses require proof of different facts: the school zone offense requires proof that the defendant was within 1000 feet of school property, while the drug death statute does not; the drug death statute requires proof that someone died while the school zone offense does not. Compare N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 with N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9. Nor do they involve conspiracy, inconsistent factual findings, or a general-specific prohibition scheme. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a(2)-(4). Because we cannot ascertain legislative intent with certainty from the statutes, we follow the Dillihay two-step protocol to the Blockburger inquiry: Has Rodriguez been sentenced twice for the same offense? We have already given the answer. Each offense requires proof of an element the other does not. Thus we answer the Blockburger question in the negative: multiple punishments in this case does not violate double-jeopardy principles. This answer comports with the flexible analysis found in some of our other cases. E.g., State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 81, 342 A. 2d 841 (1975). For example, we can look at whether the offenses are designed to protect the same interests. State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 116, 527 A. 2d 1362 (1987). They are not: the school zone statute aims to protect children by reduc[ing] drugs around school, Ivory, supra, 124 N.J. at 595, 592 A. 2d 205, while the drug death statute is more broadly intended to deter all drug manufacturers and dealers from committing inherently dangerous crimes. Commentary, supra at 23. Imposing two different sentences on defendant Rodriguez does not violate principles of double jeopardy. Neither legislative intent nor constitutional limitations requires that convictions for violation of the school zone statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, and the drug death statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9, be merged.