Opinion ID: 1279670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: death-opposed juror

Text: The defendant next contends that the exclusion of a death-opposed juror from the guilt phase of the trial denied him the right to due process. [3] During voir dire, the State is allowed to excuse venire persons for cause who oppose the death penalty so strongly that they will never vote to impose it. Another way to express it is that such venire persons say that they will refuse to follow death penalty instructions of the trial court. The landmark case on this subject is Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770 (1968). In Witherspoon, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to die by a jury from which the prosecutor had removed for cause all prospective jurors who had conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or [were] opposed to the same.' Witherspoon, at 512. On appeal, the defendant urged that the jury was unconstitutionally biased in favor of both conviction and death. In Rupe, at page 695, commenting on Witherspoon, we stated The [United States] Supreme Court reversed Witherspoon's death sentence but upheld the underlying murder conviction. Concerning the penalty imposed, the Court held it self-evident that if prospective jurors are excused for cause based on general objections to the death penalty or conscientious or religious scruples, the resulting jury cannot speak for the community and is uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die. Witherspoon, at 520, 521. The only prospective jurors who could constitutionally be excused for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. Witherspoon, at 522 n. 21. The Court refused to reverse Witherspoon's conviction for murder. It found the empirical studies tendered on his behalf too tentative and fragmentary to establish that the broad exclusion of death scrupled jurors results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction. Witherspoon, at 517, 518. Witherspoon had specifically declined to present evidence below to support his contention. The Court found, therefore, that it could only speculate as to the precise meaning of terms used in the studies, the accuracy of the techniques employed, and the validity of the generalizations made. We adopt the result and rationale of Witherspoon on the process known as death qualifying a jury. See also State v. Martin, 41 Wn. App. 133, 138, 703 P.2d 309 (1985). In the present case, one venire person was excused for cause because he opposed the death penalty. Defendant joined, however, in the challenge for cause to dismiss this venire person. Defendant cannot make a tactical decision to join in a challenge to dismiss for cause and then on appeal complain about the composition of the jury. We find no error, whether defendant joined in the challenge or not. [4] Defendant makes a second argument regarding the death-qualifying process. He alleges that the process itself makes a person more prone to vote for a conviction during the guilt phase than he would if he was not put through the process of death qualification. This issue was also answered in State v. Rupe, supra , where we held at page 697 that Where, as here, jurors are questioned individually and the trial judge and counsel each carefully emphasize, to prospective jurors, that they may not draw inferences of guilt from the questioning, we believe the possibility of tainting the jury is so minimal that the procedures satisfy due process. Here, each prospective juror was questioned individually. Thus, any adverse effects the process had were minimized. We find no denial of due process.