Opinion ID: 6317019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of V.T.’s father

Text: [47] Morales argues that testimony by V.T.’s father as to certain statements of V.T. is inadmissible hearsay. Because Morales did not object to V.T.’s father’s testimony regarding V.T.’s statements, we review for plain error and determine first if the trial court erroneously admitted the testimony. [48] V.T.’s father testified that V.T. told him that Morales had touched her. On crossexamination, V.T.’s father further stated that V.T. informed him that “Don had touched her in – on her chest and near her butt.” Tr. at 86-87 (Jury Trial, Nov. 14 2018). V.T.’s father explained these conversations happened on the day V.T. returned home from her great-grandmother’s house, after V.T.’s mother had talked to V.T. [49] Given the time lapse between these statements and the initial events, and that V.T. had reported the events to her mother earlier, such statements do not fall under the excited utterance exception to hearsay. And, because V.T.’s father’s testimony relaying V.T.’s statements do not fall under any recognizable hearsay exception, and the People do not argue that any hearsay exception applies, we find the admission of the statement to be error that is clear and obvious under current law. [50] Under the third prong of plain error review, an error must affect a defendant’s substantial rights. De Soto, 2016 Guam 12 ¶ 29. In his appeal, Morales does not demonstrate how V.T.’s father’s specific hearsay testimony prejudiced Morales or affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 20 of 29 Rather, V.T.’s father’s testimony was cumulative and not prejudicial as it included information properly admitted in others’ testimony. Accordingly, Morales has not met his burden in demonstrating how this specific hearsay error affected his substantial rights and has failed to establish plain error. 3. Testimonies of Officer Aguon and Officer Terlaje [51] On direct examination, Officer Aguon answered questions about the substance of an interview he conducted with V.T’s maternal great-grandmother. During this testimony, the People asked Officer Aguon to confirm whether V.T.’s great-grandmother had informed him that Morales and V.T. had been alone in a room together on the morning in question. Officer Aguon responded, “Yes, ma’am.” Tr. at 105 (Jury Trial, Nov. 8, 2018). Morales alleges the statement “corroborated [V.T.’s] statements regarding the place of the incident” and was inadmissible hearsay. Appellant’s Br. at 32. Morales also alleges multiple hearsay statements attributed to V.T. made by Officer Terlaje. Id. During his testimony, Officer Terlaje confirmed that V.T. told him during an interview that Morales touched her stomach. Officer Terlaje also testified that, in a second interview, V.T. informed him that Morales touched her breast, vagina, and stomach, and that Morales used his “pinkie” and placed it in her vagina. Tr. at 73-74 (Jury Trial, Nov. 13, 2018). [52] Morales did not object to the statements made by Officer Aguon or Officer Terlaje, and so we review for plain error and determine whether the officers’ testimonies were admitted erroneously. This court has stated that: A police officer . . . may reconstruct the steps taken in a criminal investigation, may testify about his contact with [a witness], and may describe the events leading up to a defendant’s arrest, but the officer’s testimony must be limited to the fact that he spoke to [a witness] without disclosing the substance of that conversation. There is a clear distinction between an [officer] testifying about the fact that he spoke to [a witness] without disclosing the contents of the conversation and the agent testifying about the specific contents of the conversation which is inadmissible hearsay. People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 21 of 29 People v. Tedtaotao, 2016 Guam 9 ¶ 20 (alterations in original) (quoting People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 19). [53] Here, both Officer Aguon and Officer Terlaje testified about the specific contents of outof-court statements attributed to V.T.’s great-grandmother and V.T. during prior interviews held at the onset of the police investigation. Thus, they appear to be inadmissible hearsay, unless some hearsay exception applies, or the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The People, however, do not argue that any hearsay exception applies or that either of the officers’ hearsay statements was offered for some other purpose during trial. Rather, the nature of the disputed testimony appears intended to demonstrate the truth of the matters asserted. [54] Because the testimonies of Officer Aguon and Officer Terlaje do not fall under any recognizable hearsay exception, and the People do not argue that any hearsay exception applies or that the statements were offered for some other purpose, we find the admission of the officers’ statements to be error that is clear and obvious under current law. [55] Although the testimonies of Officer Aguon and Officer Terlaje were admitted in error, Morales has failed to meet his burden on the third prong of plain error review because: (1) Morales does not demonstrate how the specific hearsay statements prejudiced him or affected the outcome of the proceedings; (2) the evidence was largely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence; and (3) any harm to Morales’s substantial rights, such as prejudicial effects as to Morales’s First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct conviction arising from the hearsay statements, are cured by our reversal of this conviction on other grounds. 4. Cell phone recording of V.T. [56] During V.T.’s mother’s testimony, the prosecution played a recording of V.T. describing the events that had occurred with Morales. Morales argues the recording is inadmissible hearsay People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 22 of 29 and was not authenticated under Guam Rule of Evidence 901. Appellant’s Br. at 30-31. Because Morales failed to object to the admission of the recording during trial, we review for plain error. [57] Rule 901, in pertinent part, states: “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Guam R. Evid. 901. Our review of the record demonstrates the People laid a sufficient foundation for the recording, before its admission, by asking V.T.’s mother various questions about the recording. Defense counsel also listened to the recording before its admission and stated: “Your Honor, I’ve had an opportunity to review the recording. That’s the recording that’s been provided to me. There’s been no alterations. No objections.” Tr. at 51 (Jury Trial, Nov. 8, 2018). Based on these circumstances, the authentication and identification process under Rule 901 was satisfied. [58] While the recording was properly authenticated, its admission presents another potential error because of the hearsay statements contained therein. Inadmissible evidence can be introduced at trial if opposing counsel opens the door for the evidence by creating a misleading impression about its contents or significance. See, e.g., Perez v. Civil Serv. Comm’n (Guam Dep’t of Educ.), 2018 Guam 25 ¶ 29; Finik, 2017 Guam 21 ¶ 43; People v. Ongiil, 2016 Guam 34 ¶ 37. This is because “[w]hen a criminal defendant creates a false or misleading impression on an issue, [courts] have held the government may ‘clarify, rebut, or complete [the] issue’ with what would ‘otherwise [be] inadmissible evidence, including hearsay statements.’” United States v. Spotted Bear, 920 F.3d 1199, 1201 (8th Cir. 2019) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2008)). [59] The admission of such evidence, however, is not without its limitations. See, e.g., State v. Heath, 211 A.3d 458, 463 (Md. 2019) (“[I]n admitting evidence under the ‘open door’ doctrine, People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 23 of 29 ‘the remedy must be proportionate to the malady’ . . . .”); United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Opening the door is one thing. But what comes through the door is another. Everything cannot come through the door.”). A party may admit evidence to counter the inferences made, but it may not expand beyond that to allow a party to “improve his chances of winning by increasing the possibility of erroneous factual adjudication with respect to some other matter.” State v. Adonri, 923 P.2d 658, 661 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (in banc) (quoting Wigmore, Evidence § 15, at 749-50 (Tillers rev. 1983)). The admitted evidence must put the misleading evidence or testimony into context and may generally not “stray beyond the scope of the invitation.” Wells v. State, 319 S.W.3d 82, 94 (Tex. App. 2010); see also State v. Rogan, 864 A.2d 382, 383-84 (N.H. 2005) (holding audio recording admissible under open door doctrine because opposing counsel created misleading impression of recording’s contents). [60] In our review of the record, defense counsel initially raised the recording of V.T. during its cross-examination of V.T.’s mother. Defense counsel asked V.T.’s mother where the recording was, what she did with it, and how the police responded when she offered them the recording. Defense counsel then made statements suggesting the recording was unimportant because the police were not interested in hearing its contents. During the redirect examination of V.T.’s mother, the recording was entered into evidence without objection and played for the jury. In the recording, V.T. repeated the details of the incident with Morales and stated that Morales “put[] his hand inside,” Tr. at 4 (Extract of Proceedings: Ex. 11, Cell Phone Recording, Nov. 8, 2018), but it is unclear what “inside” means. Afterward, defense counsel asked V.T.’s mother additional questions on the contents of the recording. Tr. at 57-60 (Jury Trial, Nov. 8, 2018). [61] Since defense counsel raised questions about the recording, created a misleading impression of the recording’s contents, and did not object to the recording’s admission, defense People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 24 of 29 counsel opened the door for admitting the recording into evidence. Accordingly, the court did not err in admitting the recording. We are mindful, however, that while defense counsel opened the door to admission of the recording, the People should be allowed to introduce the evidence only within a limited scope. That is, to correct any misleading impression created by defense counsel’s inquiry. The People could not go beyond curing this misimpression by allowing for the hearsay statements contained therein to be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.4 However, even if the hearsay statements by V.T. contained in the recording were admitted in error and considered for some other purpose, any error did not affect Morales’s substantial rights because: (1) Morales makes no effort to demonstrate how the specific hearsay statements prejudiced him or affected the outcome of the proceedings; (2) the evidence was largely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence; and (3) any harm to Morales’s substantial rights, such as prejudicial effects as to Morales’s First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct conviction arising from V.T.’s hearsay statements, are cured by our reversal of this conviction on other grounds. 5. Testimony of Dr. Fojas [62] Morales claims that Dr. Fojas testified as to various hearsay statements made by V.T. See Appellant’s Br. at 33. Morales specifically alleges as hearsay a portion of Dr. Fojas’s testimony where Dr. Fojas testified that V.T. verbalized to her she was “touched on her breasts and private 4 In State v. Rogan, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the playing of an audio recording for the jury of an interview with a victim was not prejudicial, as it allowed the jury to assess for themselves “whether the information on the tape rebutted the misimpression created by defense counsel.” 864 A.2d 382, 385 (N.H. 2005). Notably, the Rogan court heavily weighed the trial court’s limiting instruction about the recording, which stated in part: The tape, which has been admitted into evidence, is not admitted as proof of the truth of the statements contained in the tape but as evidence bearing upon the credibility of certain statements . . . . In other words, this tape has been admitted into evidence for a limited purpose. You are not to consider the content of this tape as proof of the truth of the statements contained therein, but only as evidence bearing upon the issues of [the witness’s] credibility in her testimony at trial . . . . Id. at 386. We recognize it is best practice for a trial court to give a similar limiting instruction in relevant circumstances. People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 25 of 29 part” by “Papa Don.” Tr. at 39-40 (Jury Trial, Nov. 7, 2018). Because Morales did not object to the admission of the alleged hearsay statement, we review for plain error. [63] Under Rule 803(4), statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are generally not excluded by the hearsay rule. Specifically, the rule lists as a hearsay exception: “Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Guam R. Evid. 803(4); see also Roby, 2017 Guam 7 ¶ 27. [64] Our review of the record shows that the alleged hearsay statements of Dr. Fojas were admissible under Rule 803(4). Dr. Fojas testified as an expert in pediatrics and was V.T.’s pediatrician. Dr. Fojas stated that she performed a medical examination of V.T. because of a concern about V.T.’s change in behavior around males in her family. During this examination, Dr. Fojas testified that V.T. verbalized she was “touched on her breasts and private part” by “Papa Don.” Tr. at 39-40 (Jury Trial, Nov. 7, 2018). [65] Given the context, content, and scope of the statements, V.T.’s statements to Dr. Fojas regarding how she had been sexually assaulted were admissible under Rule 803(4) since those statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Thus, Morales has failed to establish plain error. 6. Testimony of Dr. Perez [66] Morales claims that Dr. Perez also testified as to various hearsay statements made by V.T. See Appellant’s Br. at 34. Specifically, Morales alleges as hearsay a portion of Dr. Perez’s testimony5 where Dr. Perez testified that V.T. described to her the incident and said that Morales 5 Morales does not specifically allege or raise as hearsay other portions of Dr. Perez’s testimony where she testified as to statements made by V.T. Thus, we decline to consider those statements on appeal. People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 26 of 29 had touched her “private parts.” Tr. at 32-33 (Jury Trial, Nov. 14, 2018). Morales objected to this portion of Dr. Perez’s testimony; therefore, we review the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony for an abuse of discretion. See Chinel, 2013 Guam 24 ¶ 18. [67] As we have addressed, statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are generally not excluded by the hearsay rule under Rule 803(4). See Guam R. Evid. 803(4). In People v. Camacho, we expressed that the hearsay exception under Rule 803(4) applies to psychological injury and statements of a declarant need not have been made to a physician. 2016 Guam 37 ¶ 25. [68] Here, Dr. Perez was certified as an expert in play therapy and social work and testified that she was a licensed professional and mental health counselor, marriage and family therapist, play therapist, and clinical social worker. Dr. Perez testified that V.T. was her client and had been referred to her by Dr. Fojas. Dr. Perez further stated that she treated V.T. over the course of 15 to 20 sessions. Dr. Perez testified that during one of those sessions, V.T. described to her how Morales had touched V.T.’s “private parts.” Tr. at 32-33 (Jury Trial, Nov. 14, 2018). [69] Based on our review of the record, V.T.’s statements to Dr. Perez reflect statements made for the purpose of receiving medical diagnosis or treatment and were thus proper under Rule 803(4). Further, Dr. Perez relied on the statements of V.T. for treatment and to aid V.T.’s emotional healing of her trauma. Because the statements were not excluded by the hearsay rule, their admission did not constitute an abuse of discretion. E. The Evidence Is Sufficient to Convict Morales of Three Counts of Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct [70] Morales claims there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Appellant’s Br. at 23-27. We review this issue de novo. See Song, 2021 Guam 14 ¶ 16 (quoting Aguon, 2020 Guam 24 ¶ 11). In determining whether this is sufficient evidence to sustain Morales’s People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 27 of 29 convictions, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 18 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Wia, 2020 Guam 17 ¶ 35). “This is a ‘highly deferential standard of review.’” Id. (quoting Wia, 2020 Guam 17 ¶ 35). “[T]he People ‘must be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wia, 2020 Guam 17 ¶ 35). [71] “It is not the province of the court, in determining [a motion for a judgment of acquittal], to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.” Id. ¶ 19 (alterations in original) (quoting Wia, 2020 Guam 17 ¶ 36). “The court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight, and this standard remains constant even when the People rely exclusively on circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Wia, 2020 Guam 17 ¶ 36). “[I]f there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find the case was properly submitted to the jury.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Song, 2012 Guam 21 ¶ 29). [72] Because we reverse the First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct conviction on other grounds, i.e., the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence, see supra Part IV.D.1, we need not discuss the sufficiency of the evidence claim for this conviction. [73] Morales argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the three counts of Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct because of the People’s failure to establish that any sexual contact was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Appellant’s Br. at 25. In People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 28 of 29 response, the People argue that the sexual arousal or gratification could be inferred from the circumstances. Appellee’s Br. at 31. We agree with the People. [74] Morales was found guilty of three counts of Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct in violation of 9 GCA § 25.20(a)(1) and (b). Specifically, 9 GCA § 25.20(a)(1) states that “[a] person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if the person engages in sexual contact with another person” and “that other person is under fourteen (14) years of age.” 9 GCA § 25.20(a)(1) (as amended by Guam Pub. L. 32-012:2 (Apr. 11, 2013)) (emphasis added). Sexual contact is separately defined: Sexual Contact includes the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. 9 GCA § 25.10(a)(8) (2005). [75] In People v. Enriquez, we stated: “In determining whether actions are done for sexual arousal or gratification, the trier of fact may infer motivation based on the defendant’s actions.” 2014 Guam 11 ¶ 28 (citing State v. Cobb, 610 N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). “If the trier of fact finds that the ‘defendant was motivated by desires of sexual arousal or gratification, and that the contact occurred, then the trier of fact may conclude that the object of the defendant’s motivation was achieved.’” Id. (quoting Cobb, 610 N.E.2d at 1013). This is because the element of sexual contact is met if the intentional touching “can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification,” even if the actor did not act with the specific purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. 9 GCA § 25.10(a)(8) (emphasis added); see also People v. Warner, 139 P.3d 475, 478-79 (Cal. 2006); People v. Fisher, 257 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1, Opinion Page 29 of 29 [76] Based on the testimony of V.T. and Dr. Fojas, there is sufficient evidence to convict Morales for the three counts of Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct. The testimony of V.T. alone was sufficient to prove the first two counts of Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct. See 9 GCA § 25.40 (for prosecutions under 9 GCA §§ 25.15 through 25.35, “the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated”). V.T. testified, in great detail, that Morales touched her private parts— specifically, her vagina and buttocks—while lying on a bed in a room at her great-grandmother’s home. From V.T’s entire testimony, the jury could reasonably construe the intentional touching of her vagina and buttocks by Morales to be for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification even if the People presented no specific evidence of Morales’s sexual arousal or gratification. Dr. Fojas’s testimony of V.T.’s statements from treatment demonstrate that V.T. was also touched on her breast area, which is sufficient for the third count of Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct. Based on V.T.’s and Dr. Fojas’s testimony, and other testimony by V.T.’s mother and Dr. Perez, we find there is sufficient evidence for each of Morales’s convictions for Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct.