Opinion ID: 4512415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We review jurisdictional questions de novo. See United States v. Rollins, 301 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). The federal criminal code does not contain a general attempt statute; attempts to commit a crime are punishable only if the statutory definition of the crime itself proscribes attempts. United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1985). Many federal criminal statutes expressly cover attempts, but the one at issue here does not. Section 1028A(a)(1) mandates a 24-month consecutive prison sentence for anyone who “during and in relation to [a specified felony offense], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” 18 U.S.C. 8 No. 18-3690 § 1028A(a)(1). Attempts to commit the crime are not included. Nonetheless, counts two through four of the indictment inexplicably alleged that Muresanu attempted to commit acts constituting aggravated identity theft. He argued below and reiterates here that this type of defect in an indictment—the failure to allege an actual federal offense—is jurisdictional. The Supreme Court’s decision in Cotton controls this question. The defect at issue in Cotton arose under Apprendi. A grand jury indicted the defendants for conspiracy to distribute a “detectable amount” of cocaine and cocaine base, but the indictment did not contain specific drugquantity allegations. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627–28. A jury found the defendants guilty, and at sentencing the judge made drug-quantity findings and imposed enhanced penalties under the statutory scheme specifying longer prison terms for offenses involving larger drug quantities. Id. at 628. While the defendants’ appeal was pending, the Court ruled in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000), that any fact that increases the statutory penalty must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the defendants had not preserved an Apprendilike argument in the district court, the court of appeals held that the defect in the indictment—its failure to allege drug quantities as required by Apprendi—was jurisdictional and thus could not be waived. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a defective indictment” does not “deprive[] a court of jurisdiction.” Id. at 631 (overruling Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887)). No. 18-3690 9 The circuits are split on the proper interpretation of Cotton. The Eleventh Circuit reads the Court’s holding as limited to defective indictments that omit necessary allegations but nonetheless charge some federal crime. United States v. McIntosh, 704 F.3d 894, 901–03 (11th Cir. 2013). On this view, the rule announced in Cotton does not apply if an indictment fails to allege any federal crime at all. Id. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits read Cotton more broadly, applying it even when an indictment fails to state an offense; on this view, defects in an indictment—of whatever kind—are not jurisdictional. United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1148– 49 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 2002). We think the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have the better reading. Cotton used general language, broadly holding that “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.” 535 U.S. at 630. The Eleventh Circuit’s narrow interpretation is hard to reconcile with this expansive language. It also doesn’t fit well with the Court’s reasoning. Cotton relied in part on Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916). In that case the defendant was charged with impersonating an officer of the United States with intent to defraud; the indictment alleged that he falsely held himself out to be a congressman. Id. at 64. The defendant argued that because a congressman is not an officer of the United States, the indictment did not charge an actual federal offense, and this defect deprived the court of jurisdiction. Id. The Court disagreed, ruling that subject-matter jurisdiction was unaffected by the defect in the indictment. Rather, “[an] objection that the indictment does not charge a crime against the United States goes only to the merits of the case.” Id. at 65. 10 No. 18-3690 Cotton also relied on United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951), another case that similarly dealt with a contention that the conduct alleged in an indictment was not covered by the relevant criminal statute. The Williams defendants were police officers convicted of perjury for giving false testimony at their criminal trial on charges of conspiring to oppress persons in their custody in the exercise of rights secured to them by the Fourteenth Amendment, violating 18 U.S.C. § 241. Id. at 58–59. On direct appeal from the judgment in the underlying conspiracy prosecution, the court of appeals reversed the convictions and quashed the indictment, ruling that § 241 “d[oes] not apply to the general rights extended to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 58. The defendants then challenged their perjury convictions, arguing that the defect in the § 241 indictment meant that the court in the earlier case lacked jurisdiction; and this, in turn, meant that they could not be convicted of perjuring themselves at the conspiracy trial. The Court rejected this argument, reaffirming that even when the indictment fails to state an offense, the court is not deprived of jurisdiction: “Though the trial court or an appellate court may conclude that … the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a crime … , it has proceeded with jurisdiction[,] and false testimony before it under oath is perjury.” Id. at 68–69. Lamar and Williams support the Fifth and Tenth Circuits’ broader understanding of the rule announced in Cotton: defects in an indictment do not deprive the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction, and this is so even when the defect is a failure to state a federal offense. See De Vaughn, 694 F.3d at 1148–49. Because indictment defects go to the merits of the case—not the court’s power to hear it—an objection to a defective indictment may be waived. No. 18-3690 11 Under Rule 12(b)(3)(B) an objection to “a defect in the indictment” must be made “by pretrial motion.” The rule contains an illustrative list of defects that are subject to this requirement; the list expressly includes “failure to state an offense.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). So the district judge correctly held that Muresanu waived his objection to the defective indictment by failing to raise the matter in a Rule 12(b)(3) motion.