Opinion ID: 3134950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of the Admonishments

Text: The defendant first argues on appeal that the trial judge improperly admonished him that the maximum sentence for the murder offenses in counts I and II (the intentional and knowing counts) of the indictment was a term of imprisonment rather than death. In order to satisfy due process, a guilty plea must be affirmatively shown to have been made voluntarily and intelligently. People v. Burt , 168 Ill. 2d 49, 64 (1995), citing Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) was adopted to ensure compliance with these due process requirements. Burt , 168 Ill. 2d at 64. The rule provides in relevant part that a court may not accept a guilty plea until a defendant has been admonished as to the “minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences.” 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(2). The defendant acknowledges that the trial judge properly admonished him that the maximum sentence for felony murder, count III of the indictment, was death, but he contends that the judge helped to confuse him by characterizing that felony-murder count as “capital murder.” The defendant maintains that the judge’s improper admonishment combined with the reference to “capital murder” misled him to believe that his plea to felony murder alone established all of the elements necessary to satisfy his eligibility for the death penalty. In response, the State initially argues that because the defendant did not allege in either of his post-sentencing motions a deficiency in the admonishments provided to him at the time of his guilty plea, the defendant has waived the issue on appeal. Under Supreme Court Rule 604(d), any issue not raised in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is waived. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). However, if a trial court fails to give the defendant the admonishments required by Rule 402, it is possible that this action can amount to plain error, an exception to the waiver rule, as set forth in Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). Before invoking the plain error exception, however, we determine whether any reversible error occurred. People v. Chapman , 194 Ill. 2d 186, 226 (2000). The failure to properly admonish a defendant, standing alone, does not automatically establish grounds for reversing the judgment or vacating the plea. People v. Davis , 145 Ill. 2d 240, 250 (1991). Substantial compliance with Rule 402 is sufficient to establish due process. Burt , 168 Ill. 2d at 64. Moreover, whether reversal is required for an imperfect admonishment depends on whether real justice has been denied or whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment. Davis , 145 Ill. 2d at 250. Additionally, we may consider the entire record in order to determine whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him. Burt , 168 Ill. 2d at 64. In the present case, the defendant argues that the maximum penalty for first degree murder is death, while the State contends that for admonishment purposes, the maximum sentence for the crime is a term of imprisonment when the State is not seeking the death penalty on the particular count of murder in question and there are no aggravating factors that would arguably make the defendant eligible for the death penalty on that count. Neither party cites any case law in support of their respective positions. Section 5–8–1(a)(1)(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) provides the following: “Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations: (1) for first degree murder, (a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years[.]” 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(a) (West 1996). Pursuant to section 5–8–1(a)(1)(b) of the Code, a defendant can receive a life sentence if “the court finds that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9–1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 are present .” 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(b) (West 1996). A defendant can receive life imprisonment under section 5–8–1(a)(1)(c) only in a case where the death penalty is not imposed, and only if previously convicted of murder, or if found guilty of murdering certain enumerated classes of individuals. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c) (West 1996). Furthermore, a defendant can receive the death penalty for a conviction on a murder count only upon a finding of at least one statutory aggravating factor listed in section 9–1(b) of the Criminal Code. 720 ILCS 5/9–1(b) (West 1996). Additionally, under section 5–8–2(a) of the Code, a defendant can be sentenced to an extended-term sentence for murder. That section provides: “A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by Section 5–8–1 for the class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted unless the factors in aggravation set forth in [section 5–5–3.2(b)] were found to be present.” 730 5/5–8–2(a) (West 1996). Section 5–5–3.2(b) of the Code provides in relevant part: “The following factors may be considered by the court as reasons to impose an extended term sentence under Section 5–8–2 upon any offender: