Opinion ID: 729635
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leadership Responsibility

Text: 20 Local 139B: No former Local 139B official holds an elected or appointed position in Local 600M. The Board found that the only remaining Local 139B officers, President Becht and Jeannette Pickels, were both offered and declined positions with Local 600M after the merger. The Board also found that Becht agreed to serve on Local 600M's negotiating committee, a role he played prior to the merger. The Board noted that negotiations would be accomplished by the union's president, who was not a Sullivan employee, as was true in the past. Thus, according to the Board, the lack of continuity in leadership was caused by the free choice of the leaders themselves, and there was some continuity in the form of Becht's participation on the negotiating committee. 21 We find that the Board's conclusion regarding Becht's role is not supported by substantial evidence. Both Becht and the president of Local 600M testified that Becht had agreed that if he was available, he'd be delighted to be there, but he couldn't commit. (Transcript of hearing before NLRB, Feb. 3, 1994, p. 265). Thus, the commitment to serve on the negotiating committee was tentative at best, and not the agreement the Board describes. See Sullivan I, 38 F.3d at 65. Accordingly, the Board's conclusion that Becht will continue to perform the same leadership role with respect to the [Local 600M's] negotiations with Respondent, Sullivan II, 317 N.L.R.B. at 564, 1995 WL 318651 at  5, is also without a foundation in substantial evidence. Becht's tentative role in the negotiation process, paired with the fact that no Local 139B officer has an official position in Local 600M, precludes finding substantial continuity in leadership. See Garlock Equip. Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 247, 1988 WL 213720, at  11 (1988) (viewing continuity of leadership as a function of whether the unit's employees continue to be represented by the same officers, who are operating under procedures and with a degree of autonomy similar to that which they had earlier). 22 Whether a union [r]etain[s] the same key personnel is important, for '[w]hen the same persons participate in communications with the company with respect to grievances, contract negotiations, and the like, continuity is likely to be preserved.'  Insulfab, 789 F.2d at 966 (quoting St. Vincent Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir.1980)). Nonetheless, our conclusion that there was no continuity of leadership between Local 139B and Local 600M does not end our analysis, as  'there is no requirement that officers of a merged local must become officers of the new local.'  Sullivan I, 38 F.3d at 65 (quoting Service Am. Corp., 307 N.L.R.B. 57, 60, 1992 WL 77803 at  5 (1992)). The Board weighs the totality of the evidence, see, e.g., Central Wash. Hosp., 303 N.L.R.B. 404, 404, 1991 WL 113265 at  1 (1991), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Universal Health Sys., 967 F.2d 589 (9th Cir.1992), and, as it commented here, the situation regarding continuity of the Local 139B leadership is somewhat unusual, Sullivan II, 317 N.L.R.B. at 563, 1995 WL 318651 at  5, because leadership positions were in fact offered to Becht and Pickels, who declined them. Thus the lack of continuity is not due to Local 600M itself--in fact, the lack of leadership was a driving force behind the administrative transfer. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 290 N.L.R.B. 571, 572, 1988 WL 213911 at  3 (1988) (noting, inter alia, that there was no evidence that replacement of officers was a condition of affiliation or result of action by the International union in finding substantial continuity despite turnover in officers), enforced 892 F.2d 792 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925, 110 S.Ct. 2618, 110 L.Ed.2d 639 (1990). 23 Local 109C: The Board adopted the ALJ's finding that there was continued leadership responsibility on the part of Local 109C officials. The ALJ noted that the former president of Local 109C, Boermeester, 24 became an elected executive board member [of Local 600M] on August 5, 1993, and represented the former Local 109C members employed by Respondent in the dispute over Respondent's unilateral changes in a 401(k) plan in a letter sent in his official Local 600M capacity on September 28, 1993, as well as demanding bargaining over new equipment purchased by Respondent. His long-time practice of regular contact with chapel chairmen continued, with regular contacts between [Chapel Chairman Stephen] Wysocki and him over representation of Respondent's employees and Local 600M President Carlsen testified credibly that the Local denoted him for membership on the negotiating committee from Local 600M when it negotiates with Respondent. He represented Local 600M in other negotiations with employers whose employees Local 109C previously represented.... 25 Sullivan II, 317 N.L.R.B. at 572, 1995 WL 318651 at  18 (citation omitted). The ALJ also noted that Chapel Chairman Wysocki retained the same leadership role that he had prior to the merger, and that the president of Local 600M testified that Wysocki will be used as a negotiating committee member in contract negotiations with Sullivan. Finally, it found that two chapel chairmen at another former Local 109C employer will continue in their positions under Local 600M. 26 Sullivan contests the ALJ's conclusion. First, it points out that Boermeester was the only former Local 109C official to hold any of the elected or appointed positions within Local 600M--indeed, Sullivan maintains, he was the only former official who even became a member of Local 600M. 5 Sullivan also relies on the testimony that Boermeester's appointment was not a condition of the merger, that it was not made until the merger was complete, that Boermeester would have to win an election to retain his position, as it was a temporary one to fill an unexpired term, and that Boermeester represented a division that did not contain former Local 109C members. Sullivan adds that Boermeester testified that he agreed to participate in future negotiations only if he had time to, and that, like Becht, even in those negotiations in which he participated, he would not enjoy the same degree of autonomy and authority as he had previously. See Sullivan I, 38 F.3d at 66. Therefore, Sullivan concludes, Boermeester's role cannot be found to satisfy the continued leadership responsibility requirement. 27 We found in Sullivan I that Wysocki's continued stewardship and Boermeester's position on Local 600M's executive board represent some continuity of leadership for their former local; whether they represent substantial continuity is doubtful. 38 F.3d at 66. Our standard of review here is fairly deferential to the Board's decision, while in Sullivan I it was the district court that received our deference. See id. at 63 (noting that we reviewed the court's determination of reasonable cause for clear error, and the decision to deny equitable relief for abuse of discretion). The standard makes all the difference here: applying the pertinent standard, we must affirm the Board's finding that there was continuity of leadership between Local 109C and Local 600M, notwithstanding Sullivan's argument. Cf. City Wide Insulation, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1, 2, 1992 WL 75108 at  3 (1992) (finding substantial continuity of leadership despite fact that business manager who formerly did not report to anyone was required to report to secretary-treasurer of new district council and union counsel was added to negotiating team). The evidence Sullivan points to would allow a factfinder to reach conclusions differing from the Board's--as we intimated in Sullivan I--but our review of the record reveals substantial evidence underpinning the ALJ findings adopted by the Board regarding Local 109C. We will not substitute our judgment for the Board's, even if we might have reached a different conclusion, see Union Builders, 68 F.3d at 522, and so we must affirm the Board's finding in these circumstances.2. Negotiation and Administration of Contracts Proposals 28 In terms of contract proposals, the practice of both Local 109C and Local 139B was to hold informal meetings--at a donut shop or on the shop floor--where members could make proposals. The by-laws of Local 600M, however, state that suggested contract proposals must be submitted to the president, in writing, at least 90 days prior to contract expiration. We agree with Sullivan that, on its face, this is a substantial change. Nonetheless, the case law is firm that what we must weigh is not the rule, but the actual practice followed. See, e.g., Central Wash. Hosp., 303 N.L.R.B. at 404, 1991 WL 113265 at  1. Carlsen testified that the by-laws procedure was not always strictly followed: sometimes Local 600M would hold meetings for proposals, and sometimes employees would send lists that were developed and sent back to them for approval or modification. On this record, the Board concluded that the procedure did not differ dramatically, despite the by-laws provision. 29 Sullivan protests that there was no evidence that the 90 day requirement was not adhered to. But Sullivan bears the burden here of demonstrating that there was no substantial continuity, and it points to nothing in the record demonstrating that the 90-day practice was adhered to, or how far ahead of time the Local 109C and 139B meetings were held. In the end, we are left with evidence that the old locals held meetings sometime prior to the contract's expiration to collect suggestions, and that Local 600M's practice is to sometimes hold meetings at a point prior to expiration, and sometimes to consider lists mailed in. On this record, we find that Sullivan has not met its burden and that we must affirm the Board's finding on this point. Contract Negotiations 30 In negotiating contracts with Sullivan, the practice of Local 139B was for the president and a Sullivan employee to act as the negotiators; most recently, that had been Becht with an employee. According to Carlsen's testimony, Local 600M's practice would be to use a committee formed of the local's president, plus Becht as the former president, Wysocki (because there was no chapel chair from former Local 139B), and an employee, if possible. For Local 109C, the past practice was to use the local's president, vice president, and a chapel chair: only the latter was a Sullivan employee. Again according to Carlsen, the new practice would be to have himself as the president, Boermeester as the former president, Wysocki as chapel chair, and perhaps an employee, serve on the committee. 31 Sullivan argues that there is no substantial continuity here, as the primary responsibility for negotiations have shifted from Becht (who will not necessarily even serve) and Boermeester to Carlsen. Nonetheless, we agree with the Board that there has been no substantial break in continuity. First, neither Boermeester nor Becht were Sullivan employees to begin with, and so both before and after the administrative transfer Sullivan's employees will be represented by a team led by a non-employee president. Second, on both the pre- and post-transfer committees, the Sullivan employees do not make up a majority. Prior to the transfer, employees made up half of the 139B committee, and one third of the 109C committee: assuming Carlsen can find employees to fill his designated spots, they will make up one half of both committees. Based on this record, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board's factual finding of substantial continuity in contract negotiations. 32 Local 600M attempted to extend the bindery contract so that the contracts of both Locals 139B and 109C would expire on the same date, allowing Local 600M to break the established practice of negotiating the contracts individually and bargain for both at one time. Sullivan contends that this would result in a loss of autonomy for the locals, and so contests the Board's conclusion that the attempt did not mark a significant change in negotiation of contracts. The Board based its finding on Carlsen's testimony that he would be willing to conduct separate negotiations if the employees so wished. Without citing support, Sullivan maintains that the very fact that joint negotiations were proposed reveals the lack of substantial continuity present. To the contrary, we find that Carlsen's flexibility on conducting separate negotiations indicates that Local 600M was willing to compromise in order to maintain the continuity of representation: to find otherwise would be to penalize the new local merely for suggesting changes that may, in fact, benefit workers. We have no reason to second-guess the Board's reliance on Carlsen's testimony, and accordingly affirm its findings on this point. Contract Ratification 33 The Board found that the contract ratification procedures remains substantially the same. Prior to the merger, in both locals a proposed contract was ratified only when accepted by a majority of the bargaining unit employees voting in a secret ballot election. The Board found, and Sullivan does not seem to contest, that Local 600M's practice of having only covered employees vote, by secret ballot if requested, is a substantially similar practice. 34 Sullivan focuses instead on the fact that, under Local 600M, the executive board has the right to accept contracts contrary to the membership's vote, thereby opening up the danger of the executive board accepting a contract and imposing it on the bargaining unit employees even though a majority of those employees voted to reject the contract. The Board did not find the change substantial, on the basis that 35 this procedure takes effect only in a very limited situation, i.e., where a unit rejects a contract offer, votes not to strike, and does not accept the executive committee's recommendation. Under these limited circumstances, such a difference does not rise to the level of a significant change. 36 Sullivan II, 317 N.L.R.B. at 564, 1995 WL 318651 at  6. On appeal, the Board reiterates its logic that the executive board can only disregard the employees' wishes when they have brought the bargaining to a gridlock, an unlikely occurrence. Sullivan retorts that employees will frequently reject a contract offer but decide not to strike, and that even if the use of the power is rare, the dramatic change from the old locals' complete autonomy and the lasting consequences on the employees of the use of the executive board's power, represents a meaningful diminution of local autonomy and indicates a lack of continuity. See National Posters, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 468, 479, 1988 WL 213801, at  20 (1988) (If ... the members of the Local possessed the authority before the merger, but did not thereafter, to finally consummate their own bargaining agreements, a question of continuity of identity would be raised.), enforced 885 F.2d 175 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, 110 S.Ct. 1470, 108 L.Ed.2d 608 (1990). 37 We disagree. The case law Sullivan relies on for support involve a veto power that is invoked in every situation, unlike here. See, e.g., Garlock Equip. Co., 288 N.L.R.B. at 254, 1988 WL 213720 at  13 (finding lack of continuity where, inter alia, representative of new district lodge must consent to every contract, creating a de facto veto). We are more persuaded by the Board's reasoning in Seattle-First, 290 N.L.R.B. at 573, 1988 WL 213911 at  4. There, as here, the former practice required ratification of a new contract by the membership, but after merger the new executive council could accept or reject a final contract offer without membership approval. The Board found that, as the executive council's authority was limited to occasions where the membership had rejected a strike or other economic action, as here, the membership did in fact have the opportunity to voice its approval or disapproval of a final offer and the executive council cannot bypass the membership. Id. We accordingly affirm the Board's finding on this issue. Grievances 38 The ALJ found, without comment, that the grievance handling procedures for Local 600M were the same as for Local 109C. The Board adopted that finding, and concluded that, for Local 139B, the limited evidence before it demonstrated no significant difference in grievance handling procedures. Both before and after the transfer, the president of the Local would have the authority to resolve grievances once attempts to solve the problem informally at the shop level were unsuccessful. 39 Sullivan challenges these findings on two bases. First, Sullivan notes day-to-day administration had formerly been the responsibility of a Lowell-area union official, and now the administration would be undertaken by Boston-area President Carlsen. As the administration was never under the control of a Sullivan employee, we fail to see how this change in personnel amounts to a significant change, where the actual practice is the same. Second, Sullivan argues that neither of the former locals transferred its past contracts, arbitration decisions, contract proposals, or grievance resolutions, effectively undermining the preservation of continuity in contract administration. We agree with the Board that, as any informal settlement of a grievance has no precedential value, this is not a point of great significance. Indeed, Sullivan offers no evidence that Local 600M could not, in fact, access such records if a need arises. Finally, Sullivan focuses on the fact that, under Local 139B, a grievance received the direct attention of President Becht, but under Local 600M, an unresolved grievance was to be handled by a pressroom steward, and concludes that Local 600M intended to systematically blur the line between the bindery and pressroom units. We disagree. Local 139B never had a chapel chairman, according to Becht's testimony, because he could not find anyone willing to do the job. In this situation, we agree with the Board that the use of another Sullivan employee who is from the former Local 109C instead of from Local 139B does not mark a substantial difference. Strike Votes 40 With respect to strike votes, the Board found, and we agree, that the basic procedures of the locals are substantially similar. Sullivan's argument to the contrary is based on a Local 600M by-laws provision, which allows the executive board to call a strike in shops with 25 or fewer members without holding any kind of a vote. Before doing so, the executive board must be satisfied that the membership and the International support the strike and that the strike would have no adverse effect on the Local. The Board discounted the danger of this provision, relying on Carlsen's testimony that the actual practice was to have the individual shop affected conduct a vote by secret ballot, with a two-thirds majority necessary to authorize a strike. Sullivan's position is that Carlsen's testimony regarding Local 600M's normal policy regarding strike votes would not apply here, because Sullivan's employees fall within the 25 or fewer exception to the rule. Sullivan points out that Carlsen never stated that the executive board did not have the right to order a strike in such a small shop, or that the executive board never did. 41 We find support for the Board's conclusion in the following testimony by Local 600M President Carlsen: 42 JUDGE BERNARD:.... Are you testifying that in the respects we've just discussed, the strike fund, the binding nature of a strike vote by the Local 600M, these remaining shops, including Sullivan ..., the members there, ... have retained their autonomy? 43 THE WITNESS: They have retained their autonomy as to the right to vote on a contract or take an individual strike, but the Local would support them if they voted to go on strike. 44 If we vote to strike Sullivan Brothers, Sullivan Brothers would also have the facilities of the merged fund. 45 JUDGE BERNARD: Getting down to the bottom line just numbers wise, these shops would not necessarily be able to be outvoted or outflooded by all the other shops in Local-- 46 THE WITNESS: No, sir, the other shops would have nothing to do with it.... 47 (Hearing Testimony, at 223-24). As Sullivan noted, Carlsen never stated that the by-law in question would not be applied. However, Carlsen's statement that the Sullivan shops retained their autonomy as to the right to ... take an individual strike offers evidentiary support for the Board's conclusion that there is, at most, a minimal difference between the two locals' premerger procedures and those of [Local 600M]. Sullivan II, 317 N.L.R.B. at 564, 1995 WL 318651 at  6. The burden is on Sullivan to show that there is a lack of substantial continuity between the locals: here, where the Board can point to evidence that the by-law at issue is not enforced, Sullivan's failure to raise record evidence disproving that assertion requires that we affirm the Board's conclusion. Cf. Seattle-First, 290 N.L.R.B. at 573, 1988 WL 213911 at  5 n. 11 (holding that international's potential authority to impose trusteeship on a local for failure to obtain authorization to strike does not defeat the conclusion that in most situations decisions to strike remain at the local level). But see Sullivan I, 38 F.3d at 67 (The record contains no evidence that that particular provision, or any other provision in question, does not represent the actual practice of Local 600M.). 3. Assets and Records 48 The Board found that Local 139B's assets were transferred to Local 600M and commingled with other funds, but that the evidence indicated that the full resources of the [Local] are available to the former Local 139B unit. Sullivan II, 317 N.L.R.B. at 565, 1995 WL 318651 at  7. As for Local 109C, its assets were transferred into the Local 600M strike or emergency fund, with similar results. We agree with the Board that such commingling is not dispositive, and that it would frustrate a purpose of the Act to find that employee expressions of desire to achieve [increased financial support] through affiliations and mergers automatically raised questions concerning representation. Id. Therefore, although there is a substantial difference in the locals' assets prior to and after the administrative transfer, like the Board we are not disposed to give that fact great weight. 4. Members' Rights and Duties Dues 49 The Board found a slight difference in the dues structure for Local 139B: the transfer resulted in a change from a flat dues rate to a sliding scale, resulting in an overall increase. The ALJ found a similar increase for local 109C members, from $8.00 to $9.22. No initiation fees were charged to members of either local. Sullivan argues now that the change to a sliding scale system based on salary, plus the difference in the dues charged, amounts to a substantial change. We find nothing in its argument or the case law it relies on, however, to convince us that the Board's findings were incorrect. See Central Wash. Hospital, 303 N.L.R.B. at 404, 1991 WL 113265 at  2 n.8 (finding no marked change in dues despite rise from $10.42 to $12.50 per month). Obligations and By-laws 50 The Board recognized that there is a difference between the former locals' by-laws and those of Local 600M, in that the latter set of by-laws restrict members' rights to accept outside employment. The Board, however, citing the lack of evidence that Local 600M ever enforced the restrictions, found no significant change. The Board relied on the premise, cited above, that actual practice, not policy, controls. See Sullivan I, 38 F.3d at 66-67. But there was no evidence here that the by-laws were not followed on this issue: thus, the only evidence we find on this record is the restriction itself. See id. Accordingly, we find that Sullivan has met its burden of showing significant change, and the Board's conclusion lacks substantial evidentiary support. Voting 51 Finally, Sullivan argues that a fundamental difference has been made in the locals' character: Local 109C was comprised exclusively of pressmen, and Local 139B of bookbinders, but Local 600M includes a mix of different printing industry workers. Similarly, while the original locals were limited to the city of Lowell and its environs, the territorial jurisdiction of Local 600M extends throughout eastern Massachusetts and part of New Hampshire. More importantly, Sullivan emphasizes that through the transfer, its employees in Locals 139B and 109C went from being part of locals with 8-10 and 40 members, respectively, to membership in a local of over 700 people. Sullivan concludes that such a dramatic increase in size would result in a severe diminution of voting strength, a factor the Board has considered in finding a question concerning representation has been raised. See, e.g., Pacific Southwest Container, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 79, 80, 1987 WL 109286, at  2 (1987). Sullivan notes that even where a merger is between two locals of the same international, as the administrative transfer is here, the Board has found a lack of continuity where there was a similar disparity of size. See Quality Inn Waikiki, 297 N.L.R.B. 497, 502-503, 1989 WL 224495, at  10 (1989). 52 In making its comparison in substantial continuity cases, the Board generally looks at the local in question immediately before the affiliation, merger, or transfer. See e.g., Seattle-First, 290 N.L.R.B. at 571-572, 1988 WL 213911 at  2. Here, however, the Board, without citing any authority, expanded the period in this case to include the locals' position prior to NADCO's closing. Accordingly, the Board concluded that the merger left the members of the locals in their historical position: a small segment of a larger local representing similar craft employees within the same geographic area under the same International. Sullivan II, 317 N.L.R.B. at 565, 1995 WL 318651 at  7. 6 It argues again now that the proper comparison in terms of size is between the historic size of the locals--about 240 for Local 139B and 125 for Local 109C in 1990--and not their size right before the merger, as membership had been diminished by NADCO's closing. Viewed from that perspective, appellee calculates, prior to NADCO's closing employees of Sullivan constituted about seven percent of the membership of each local; now, Sullivan's employees are 28 of 700, or about four percent, of Local 600M. However, we need not determine here whether the Board erred in considering the pre-NADCO closing figures, for we find that, even assuming Sullivan can establish that there are significant differences in voting power, there is still substantial continuity between Locals 109C and 139B and Local 600M. 53 Whether a merger, transfer, or affiliation substantially changes a local is a question of degree. Our measure of the changes here reveals that it falls somewhere in the gray area between a complete transformation in identity and no change at all. On balance, while we recognize that significant changes have been wrought in the locals' by-laws and assets--and, for Local 139B, in its leadership--the weight of the factors we have examined leads us to conclude that the changes are not sufficiently dramatic to alter the identity of the bargaining representative and raise a question concerning representation. 54 We do not reach this conclusion merely because the majority of the factors we examined weigh in favor of affirming the NLRB's decision: this is not a mathematical analysis. Simply put, we cannot find that the changes here--an increase in assets, a new local by-law restricting outside employment, a change in leadership due to the previous officers' refusal to stay on, and a decrease in immediate voting strength--substantially changed the local when it is governed by the same International constitution and by-laws, when the system for contract proposal, negotiation, and ratification as well as for grievances and strike votes is substantially the same as before, and when even the dues have stayed essentially the same. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's finding of substantial continuity.