Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Strict Scrutiny and the Present Case

Text: Our cases stand for the proposition that all state action that draws sex-based distinctions, regardless of whether such action directly impos[es] a burden or confer[s] a benefit entirely upon either males or females, id. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838 (opinion of Eldridge, J.), implicates the ERA and must be subjected to strict scrutiny. See In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 279 n. 13, 923 A.2d 115, 122 n. 13 (2007) (This Court has applied a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing gender-based discrimination claims.); Murphy, 325 Md. at 357 n. 7, 601 A.2d at 109 n. 7 (In Maryland, because of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Maryland Constitution . . ., classifications based on gender are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.); Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 293, 554 A.2d at 386 (In [Burning Tree I], . . . a majority of this Court took the position that the enactment of legislation which on its face draws classifications based on sex is state action sufficient to invoke the E.R.A.). Until today, this Court has never shied away from that standard when applying the ERA. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 148, 716 A.2d at 1037 ([T]he [Equal Rights] Amendment can only mean that sex is not, and can not be, a factor in the enjoyment or the determination of legal rights.); id. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037 ([T]he Equal Rights Amendment flatly prohibits gender-based classifications, absent substantial justification, whether contained in legislative enactments, governmental policies, or by application of common law rules.); Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 295, 554 A.2d at 387 (Plainly, under prior holdings of this Court, state action providing for segregation based upon sex, absent substantial justification, violates the E.R.A., just as segregation based upon race violates the Fourteenth Amendment.); Rand, 280 Md. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03 (The words of the E.R.A. are clear and unambiguous; they say without equivocation that `Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.' This language mandating equality of rights can only mean that sex is not a factor.). In a recent case we reviewed the constitutionality of a statutory scheme [50] permitting challenges to paternity, and applied strict scrutiny, In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 279 n. 13, 923 A.2d at 122 n. 13, to hold that the statutes must be construed in a sex-neutral fashion. Id. at 283, 923 A.2d at 124. On its face, Title 5, Subtitle 10 of the Family Law Article contemplated only the right of a man, found not genetically linked to a child, to petition a court to set aside a declaration of paternity. [51] We applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to infer a judicial gloss to a statutory scheme that was silent to the possibility that a gestational mother could challenge maternity. Id. at 278-79, 283-84, 923 A.2d at 121-22, 124-25. Our analysis focused on the unequal application of Subtitle 10 to a particular woman, and was not predicated on a group-by-group comparison. We held that the ERA mandated a focus on the unequal treatment of an individual under the law; just as the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to state-sanctioned discrimination against persons of all races on a purportedly equal basis, Powers, 499 U.S. at 410, 111 S.Ct. at 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d at 425; Loving, 388 U.S. at 8, 87 S.Ct. at 1822, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1016, [52] so too have we held that the equal application of discriminatory laws does not preclude strict scrutiny under Article 46. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 282-84, 923 A.2d at 124-25; Giffin, 351 Md. at 148-49, 716 A.2d at 1037; Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 293-95, 554 A.2d at 386-87; Rand, 280 Md. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05. In the instant case, the State argues on the basis of the equal application theory of the ERA that Section 2-201 does not implicate Article 46. In its brief, the State points to the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Murphy in Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 64, 501 A.2d at 822, to support its view that Section 2-201 passes muster because its prohibitions burden both sexes equally. To bolster its argument, the State quotes from Giffin, 351 Md. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037, which in turn cites the opinion of Chief Judge Murphy in Burning Tree I. The State omits the following key portion from Giffin: [T]he equality between the sexes demanded by the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment focuses on `rights' of individuals `under the law,' which encompasses all forms of privileges, immunities, benefits and responsibilities of citizens. Id. Thus, the passage from Giffin does not support the State's argument; neither does the Court's holding in the case, as I explained previously. Furthermore, as I have explained in great detail, the opinion of Chief Judge Murphy in Burning Tree I was a minority view insofar as its theory of the scope and effect of the ERA was concerned. Therefore, the State's argument is fundamentally misplaced. Likewise, the State's reliance on Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 572 n. 19, 865 A.2d 563, 583 n. 19 (2005), is unpersuasive. Although Cannon was correct about the inapplicability of the ERA to the confidential relationship and concomitant duty to disclose inhering in antenuptial agreements, the reason for the legally imposed duty arises out of fundamental principles of contract law. Id. at 556 n. 8, 570-71, 865 A.2d at 573 n. 8, 582-83 (contrasting antenuptial and post-marital agreements, and noting that the ERA invalidated gender-based classification only in the latter case). To summarize, in a long line of cases extending back to Giffin, Burning Tree I and II, Condore, Kline and Rand, we have consistently interpreted the ERA to require that the rights of any person cannot depend on sex-based classifications, unless the State demonstrates a compelling governmental interest, and then only if the classification is narrowly tailored and precisely limited to achieving that compelling interest. Today this Court denies the commitment to equal rights made by the General Assembly and ratified by the People of this State in 1972. As we said in Giffin, 351 Md. at 148-49, 716 A.2d at 1037, and iterated in In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 281, 923 A.2d at 123-24: The basic principle of the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment, thus, is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or men, so that the treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstance that such person is of one sex or the other[;] that amendment generally invalidates governmental action which imposes a burden on, or grants a benefit to, one sex but not the other one. (emphasis added). Clearly, this language means that the analysis must focus on the individual whose rights are infringed by the sex-based classification, because rights accrue to the individual, not to couples, or to some abstract group entity. We emphasized that equal rights between the sexes are personal, not group, rights: [T]he equality between the sexes demanded by the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment focuses on `rights' of individuals `under the law,' which encompasses all forms of privileges, immunities, benefits and responsibilities of citizens. As to these, the Maryland E.R.A. absolutely forbids the determination of such `rights,' as may be accorded by law, solely on the basis of one's sex, i.e., sex is an impermissible factor in making any such determination. Id. at 281-82, 923 A.2d at 124, quoting Giffin, 351 Md. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037 (alteration in original). The majority in the present case deliberately misconstrues the passage quoted above through selective quotation, conveniently omitting the second sentence, to support its narrowly constrained view of the ERA as somehow permitting separate but equal in matters of sex discrimination. See op. at 258-59, 932 A.2d at 594-95. Its strained interpretation ignores what until today had been well-settled in Maryland: the ERA is intended to address the rights of individuals, not the rights of men and women as classes.  See op. at 259, 932 A.2d at 595 (emphasis in original). Our predecessors stated a similar idea in Rand, 280 Md. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03: The words of the E.R.A. are clear and unambiguous; they say without equivocation that Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex. I repeat: the words of the ERA are clear and unambiguous and can only mean that the rights of any person under the law cannot be abridged because of sex. The majority today pursues a results-based jurisprudence that distorts our case law construing the ERA, and in so doing, dilutes its effect.