Opinion ID: 1808191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: due process at sentencing

Text: Bunner next contends that, since there was no evidentiary hearing in his case to ascertain whether the victims sustained serious personal injury, the sentencing court had no information for consideration in determining the sentences to be imposed for convictions of first degree sexual assault, notwithstanding the directive in § 28-319(2) that [t]he sentencing judge shall consider whether the actor shall have caused serious personal injury to the victim of the sexual assault for which the defendant has been convicted. As Bunner sees the situation, there were insufficient grounds to be considered in reference to serious personal injury sustained by Bunner's victims. Bunner's perspective of the consequences to a victim of sexual assault apparently results from a lack of understanding of, disdain for, or indifference to the nature of first degree sexual assault, formerly and commonly known as rape by force or forcible rape. As one writer has expressed regarding rape by force and what has come to be known as the rape trauma syndrome: In the first phase, the victim experiences disorganization in lifestyle. Emotional reactions range from fear, humiliation, and embarrassment to anger and a desire for revenge. Although fear of physical violence and death dominates the victim's feelings, self-blame is also very prominent. During this phase, when the victim feels the impact of the rape most severely, she may exhibit one of two widely divergent emotional styles. In the expressed style, feelings of fear, anger, and anxiety are manifested through crying, sobbing, smiling, restlessness, and tenseness. In the controlled style, feelings are masked by a calm, composed, or subdued demeanor. The second phase involves a long-term process of physical and emotional reorganization. This phase often begins about two to three weeks after the attack. Symptoms may include change in residence, travel to sources of support in other cities, nightmares, and various phobic reactions. [These reactions include fear of indoors and outdoors (depending on where the rape occurred), fear of being alone, fear of crowds, and sexual fears.] Although all victims do not experience the same symptoms in the same sequence, victims consistently experience the disorganization phase. Many victims thereafter experience mild to moderate symptoms in the reorganization process. Few victims report no symptoms. Note, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument for Limited Admissibility, 63 Wash.L.Rev. 1063, 1064 (1988). Another author notes: Those who were attacked while alone reported fear of being alone and those who were attacked while sleeping in bed reported fear of being indoors. Others developed fear of crowds, fear of people walking behind them, or fear of the outdoors, depending on the circumstances of their assaults.... .... ... [T]he victim experiences feelings of shock, fear, humiliation, vulnerability, powerlessness, anxiety, and disgust.... [W]hen she attempts to reorganize her life ... she may continue to experience fear, nightmares about the assault, depression, avoidance responses to people and situations that take the form of phobias, changes in lifestyle, anxiety, and sexual and interpersonal dysfunctions. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 Minn.L.Rev. 395, 426-28 (1985). Addressing various phases in consequences of a sexual assault with force, another commentator relates that a victim experiences the fear of physical injury, mutilation, and death, caused by the threat of being killed, which is inherent in most rape assaults. Other typical symptoms ... include feelings of humiliation, degradation, guilt, shame, embarrassment, anger, and revenge, as well as mood swings and irritability caused by intrusive recollections of the incident. [Another phase] is characterized by a change in lifestyle, dreams, nightmares and other sleep disturbances, depression, and the development of fears and phobias related to the specific circumstances of the attack. Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 Am.U.L.Rev. 417, 427 (1984). Still another author has observed: In essence, all victims of rape react to the assault as a stressful, violent, and life-threatening experience.... [A] rape victim's psychological sequelae mirror those of victims of other violent crimes. Note, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 Va.L.Rev. 1657, 1670 (1984). Consequently, it is all too evident that one need not be specially trained in medicine or psychology to recognize and appreciate the injury from a forceful sexual intrusion into another's body and invasion of the mind and very personality of another human being. The nature of a sexual assault through force, a crime which Bunner has admitted by his guilty pleas, furnished a basis for a judicial determination that a sexual assault victim sustained serious personal injury in the form of extreme mental anguish or mental trauma. See § 28-318(4). Regarding the type of information properly available to a sentencing court, at the outset we note that the Nebraska Evidence Rules, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 27-101 to 27-1103 (Reissue 1989), are inapplicable to a sentence hearing. See, Neb.Evid.R. 1101(4), § 27-1101(4) (Nebraska Evidence Rules do not apply to [p]roceedings for ... sentencing); State v. Dillon, 222 Neb. 131, 382 N.W.2d 353 (1986). In State v. Jackson, 225 Neb. 843, 859, 408 N.W.2d 720, 731 (1987), we expressed: In a sentence hearing, a court, generally, has broad discretion concerning the source of information and the type of information to be considered. This court, in State v. Porter, 209 Neb. 722, 723-24, 310 N.W.2d 926, 927 (1981), observed: We have gone so far as to say that the latitude allowed a sentencing judge in such instances is almost without limitation as long as it is relevant to the issue. A sentencing judge may consider relevant information contained in a presentence report on the defendant to determine an appropriate sentence within the statutorily authorized penalty, punishment, or disposition applicable to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. See, State v. Goodpasture, 215 Neb. 341, 338 N.W.2d 446 (1983); State v. Porter, supra ; State v. Rose, 183 Neb. 809, 164 N.W.2d 646 (1969). Concerning basic fairness necessary for due process in sentencing, we have stated: [A] convicted defendant, even in a noncapital case, has a due process right to inquire into an incorrect assumption by the sentencing judge, untrue information materially affecting a prospective sentence, or other misinformation which a court may use in determining what sentence will be imposed. State v. Barker, 231 Neb. 430, 435, 436 N.W.2d 520, 523 (1989). The relevant factual information in the presentence report on Bunner and the very nature of the crime committed supplied the sentencing judge with a sufficient basis for the conclusion that Bunner's victims had sustained serious personal injury, that is, extreme mental anguish or mental trauma, as the result of sexual assault by Bunner. See § 28-318(4). Bunner did not dispute any of the information supplied to the sentencing court and has failed to indicate any incorrect or untrue information which affected the sentences imposed on Bunner. Regarding allocution as a part of Nebraska's criminal procedure, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2201 (Reissue 1989) provides: Before the sentence is pronounced, the defendant must be informed by the court of the verdict of the jury, and asked whether he has anything to say why judgment should not be passed against him. At the time of allocution, Bunner offered no reason why sentence should not have been imposed upon him. In State v. Barker, supra , we said: As one commentator has observed: `Today the most practical rationale underlying allocution is that it provides an opportunity for the offender and defense counsel to contest any disputed factual basis for the sentence....' A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 72 at 232 (1978). 231 Neb. at 436, 436 N.W.2d at 524. Thus, the balance of Bunner's argument about his sentence is based on the fallacy that the sentencing court lacked sufficient information concerning personal injury to Bunner's sexual assault victims. A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal unless the sentencing court has abused its discretion in the sentence imposed. State v. Kitt, 232 Neb. 237, 240, 440 N.W.2d 234, 236 (1989). See, also, State v. Dillon, 222 Neb. 131, 382 N.W.2d 353 (1986). Bunner's assignments of error are without merit. Bunner's convictions and sentences are affirmed. AFFIRMED.