Opinion ID: 175571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the scope of sections 054 and 057

Text: We begin with the scope of the statutes. In construing the reach of sections 054 and 057, our role is to interpret the law as would the [Oregon] Supreme Court. Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 925 (9th Cir.2004). This process is a different undertaking than construing a federal statute. Under Oregon rules of construction, we first consider text and context together. State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050-51 (2009). We may also consider legislative history proffered by a party to the extent that it is useful. Id. If the scope of the statute remains ambiguous at that point in the analysis, we may then turn to general maxims of statutory construction to resolve our uncertainty. Id. The Oregon approach contrasts with the standard federal statutory construction, which looks first to the text and then, in the case of ambiguity, employs the canons of construction and, in light of the debate over its significance, may or may not involve a reference to legislative history. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005). On their face, the liability provisions of sections 054 and 057 cover a range of material. Section 054(1) criminalizes furnishing sexually explicit material to children. The definitions provision of the statute, § 167.051, specifically defines sexually explicit material as material containing visual images of: (a) Human masturbation or sexual intercourse; (b) Genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals; or (c) Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object other than as part of a personal hygiene practice. Id. § 167.051(5). Section 057(1) criminalizes furnishing a minor or us[ing] a visual representation or explicit verbal description or narrative account of sexual conduct with a minor. [8] Sexual conduct is defined as the same acts depicted in sexually explicit material, except it adds the [t]ouching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female or of the breasts of the human female. Id. § 167.051(4). The definition of sexual conduct is also narrower in that it excludes [p]enetration of the vagina or rectum by any object where part of a medical diagnosis or as part of a personal hygiene practice, whereas the definition of sexually explicit material only excludes such penetration when part of a personal hygiene practice. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 167.051(4)(c) with OR. REV. STAT. § 167.051(5)(c). The state chiefly seeks to limit the breadth of sections 054 and 057 based on the exemption from liability that appears in both provisionsthat is, the exemption for materials whose sexual content form[s] merely an incidental part of an otherwise nonoffending whole and serves some purpose other than titillation. See OR. REV. STAT. § 167.054(2)(b); see also id. § 167.057(2). In the state's view, this exemption narrows the statutes to bar the dissemination only of hardcore pornography to children and minors. This argument is unavailing. The text and context show that the statutes cover far more than what might qualify as hardcore pornography. The statutory text makes no mention of hardcore pornography, but rather refers to sexually explicit material and a visual representation or explicit verbal description or narrative account of sexual conduct. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.054(1), 167.057(1)(a). As the materials in the record show, whatever the precise boundaries of hardcore pornography may be, the statutes clearly extend beyond them. Powell's Books submitted a wide array of books to illustrate its argument. Consider, for example, the well-known drawings of sex acts in The Joy of Sex; the cartoon depictions of sexual intercourse in the children's book, Mommy Laid an Egg, or Where Do Babies Come From? by Babette Cole; or the fantastical sex scene between Charlotte and Lord Griffin in Kentaro Miura's manga, Berserk. All are visual depictions of sexual intercourse under section 054, yet they hardly count as hardcore pornography. Similarly, the references to the visual representation and explicit verbal depictions of sexual conduct in section 057 are not synonymous with hardcore pornography. Section 057 reaches representations of activity, including the touching of breasts or buttocks, that are commonly seen or read outside of pornographic materials, hardcore or otherwise. Examples include the books listed above, along with the scenes of sexual conduct that appear in a work like Margaret Atwood's classic and frequently-taught novel, The Handmaid's Tale. To be sure, the exemption constrains the statutes' reach to a certain extent. It does not, however, limit their application to materials that fall outside constitutional protection. Again the text and context make this clear. As a preliminary matter, we note that the requirement of a non-titillating purpose refers to the explicit portion of the materials, and not the work as a whole. In section 054, the word serve agrees grammatically with sexually explicit portions, not with the nonoffending whole. See OR. REV. STAT. § 167.054(2)(b) (referring to material the sexually explicit portions of which form merely an incidental part of an otherwise nonoffending whole and serve some purpose other than titillation). Similarly, in section 057, the word serves agrees with representation, description or account of sexual conduct. See id. § 167.057(2) (referring to a representation, description or account of sexual conduct that forms merely an incidental part of an otherwise nonoffending whole and serves some purpose other than titillation). Thus, the exemption considers whether the explicit portion of the material, and not the work as such or as a whole, serves some purpose other than arousal. The state bases its hardcore pornography argument on a disjunctive reading of the exemption. In the state's view, a work may provide the basis for prosecution unless its explicit portions form merely an incidental part of an otherwise nonoffending whole or serve some purpose other than titillation. To put this the other way around, the exemption ostensibly protects a work from giving rise to liability unless its sexually explicit portions form more than an incidental portion of the work as a whole and solely intend to titillate. Thus, the state argues, the statutes only cover hardcore pornography. [9] The problem, however, is that the statute does not say orit says and. The two conditions for exemption from prosecution are plainly written in the conjunctive: a defendant must satisfy both conditions in order to avoid prosecution. Thus, a work might still give rise to liability if its sexually explicit portions solely intend to titillate but are only an incidental part of the work as a whole (e.g., arguably, some of the sex scenes in Berserk ). Likewise, a work might give rise to liability if its sexually explicit portions are more than an incidental part of the work, but do not solely intend to titillate (e.g., The Handmaid's Tale ). Neither work, on the state's definition, constitutes hardcore pornography, yet they still potentially run afoul of the statutes. [10] The state makes two related arguments that we decline to embrace. First, the state relies heavily on State v. Maynard , a decision by the Oregon Court of Appeals construing the predecessor provision to the exemption. In Maynard, the court addressed a statute that criminalized furnishing minors any visual representation of a person or portion of the human body that depicts nudity, sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct or sexual excitement. OR. REV. STAT. § 167.065(1)(a) (repealed 2007). The statute provided an affirmative defense that is essentially identical to the exemption in sections 054 and 057: namely, a defense for so-called contraband that was merely an incidental part of an otherwise nonoffending whole, and serving some purpose therein other than titillation[.] OR. REV. STAT. § 167.085 (amended 2007). [11] Reading these provisions together, the court in Maynard construed the statute as seek[ing] to prevent harm to children by prohibiting attempts to titillate them by means of sexually explicit materials and to protect[] children from the harmful effects of viewing hardcore pornography. Maynard, 5 P.3d at 1147, 1148 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court especially based its interpretation on the defense in former § 167.085, which plainly . . . applie[d] to those materials not primarily intended to titillate the victim. Id. at 1147. The state argues that Maynard requires construing sections 054 and 057 as limited to hardcore materials. Maynard, however, is of limited relevance and does not authorize reading the exemption in the state's expansive manner. In holding that the statute was aimed at the effects of exposure to hardcore pornography, Maynard did not construe the scope of the statute, but rather addressed the threshold issue, under Oregon free speech doctrine, of whether the statute sufficiently identified the harmful effects it sought to prevent. Id. at 1146. [12] Indeed, upon turning to the scope of the material covered, the court went on to strike down the statute as overbroad. See id. at 1150-51. [13] Thus, even assuming that, under Maynard, sections 054 and 057 similarly aim at effects the legislature deemed harmful, that does not determine what materials actually fall within their reach. As a second line of defense, the state cites legislative history that likewise reflects the legislature's concerns about minors' exposure to hardcore pornography. In the state's view, the legislature was highly cognizant of state court decisions striking down previous laws on sharing explicit materials with minors as overbroad and endeavored to draft a statute focused narrowly on hardcore pornography. [14] However, [w]hen the text of a statute is truly capable of having only one meaning, no weight can be given to legislative history that suggestsor even confirmsthat legislators intended something different. Gaines, 206 P.3d at 1051. Regardless of any contrary suggestions in the legislative history, the statutory text is plainly not limited to offending pornographic materials that the state hoped to target. In short, good intentions cannot trump the language of the statute.