Opinion ID: 1196435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mary Lou's Claims

Text: Mary Lou challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke on Mary Lou's substantive due process claim and certain evidentiary rulings the district court made during the jury trial on Mary Lou's state law claim against Chief Locke. We will address the evidentiary issues first because, as explained below, our resolution of the evidentiary issues impacts our resolution of the substantive due process claim.
Mary Lou asserts the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence at trial of the circumstances of Chief Locke's encounter with the Cavataios, including: (a) Chief Locke's violence against William Cavataio, and (b) the rest of the totality of the circumstances. Mary Lou argues exclusion of this evidence was an abuse of discretion because that evidence made the squeezing of Mary Lou Cavataio's breast more probable than not, and in a case turning on credibility[,] the exclusion of that evidence was prejudicial. A district court is possessed with broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings made at trial, and we will reverse only if they amount to `a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.' Gill, 546 F.3d at 562 (quoting Lovett ex rel. Lovett v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 201 F.3d 1074, 1081 (8th Cir.2000)). `Only when the evidence excluded is of such a critical nature that there is no reasonable assurance that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the evidence been admitted has a district court so abused its discretion.' Id. (internal marks omitted) (quoting Stephens v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 220 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir.2000)). Before the trial began, the district court granted Chief Locke's motions in limine, excluding evidence, testimony, and argument relating to (1) William's claims against Chief Locke, (2) William's alleged injuries and medical treatment, and (3) the traffic tickets issued to Mary Lou. On the morning the trial began, Mary Lou's counsel requested that the district court reconsider its rulings. Mary Lou's counsel proposed to have William and Chief Locke briefly testify to the events that led up to Mary Lou's allegations, including testimony that an ambulance was called to the Cavataios' residence. Mary Lou's counsel also requested permission to present evidence of the tickets Chief Locke issued to Mary Lou. Counsel for both Mary Lou and Chief Locke agreed it was appropriate to inform the jury of William's arrest. The district court ruled the subsequent issuance of tickets to Mary Lou was not admissible, because this evidence was not relevant to Mary Lou's indecent assault and battery claim. However, the district court allow[ed] the evidence to come in that [William] was going to a hospital but not for anything having to do with an arrest or any conflict that [William] may have had with [Chief Locke] in any way. Despite the district court's rulings, the jury was informed of the totality of the circumstances leading up to Chief Locke's alleged indecent assault and battery of Mary Lou. For instance, during Mary Lou's testimony, when asked when she first learned of the dispute regarding the materials on her driveway, Mary Lou volunteered the following information: August 19th when [Chief Locke] came up and... attacked my husband. Mary Lou also testified that when she came outside of the house that day, she saw William sitting in the back seat of the police cruiser very uncomfortably looking, like leaning back. Mary Lou stated William was complaining of a sore back and laid down on the grass [because] his back was hurting so bad after Chief Locke took off the handcuffs. Mary Lou testified she retrieved an ice pack from the house to put on William's sore back and decided she would drive William to the hospital due to William's back pain. Likewise, William testified that when Chief Locke placed William in the patrol car, [Chief Locke] kind of got me off balance and I was halfway, hurt my back. William gave the following testimony regarding Chief Locke's actions while Mary Lou and William sat in the Cavataios' vehicle: He was outside the door, I was sitting there in the car and passenger seat and he asked if he hurt me. We first note counsel for the Cavataios conceded at oral argument that counsel did not make an offer of proof at trial of the additional evidence and testimony counsel would have offered absent the district court's adverse ruling on Chief Locke's motion in limine. This failure to make an offer of proof constitutes a failure to preserve the issue for our review. See Murphy v. Mo. Dept. of Corr., 506 F.3d 1111, 1117 (8th Cir.2007) (One of the most fundamental principles in the law of evidence is that in order to challenge a trial court's exclusion of evidence, an attorney must preserve the issue for appeal by making an offer of proof.) (quoting Dupre v. Fru-Con Eng., Inc., 112 F.3d 329, 336 (8th Cir.1997)). Even if counsel had made an appropriate offer of proof, we nevertheless would conclude the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in excluding evidence of Chief Locke's alleged violence against William and the totality of the circumstances. Based on the above testimony, the only totality of the circumstances evidence the jury did not hear was that an ambulance was called to the Cavataios' residence and Chief Locke subsequently issued three tickets to Mary Lou. This evidence was minimally relevant, if relevant at all. Mary Lou fails to demonstrate a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, Gill, 546 F.3d at 562, as a result of the district court's exclusion of this evidence, because the evidence simply was not of such a critical nature to Mary Lou's indecent assault and battery claim that no reasonable jury would have reached the same conclusion had the evidence been admitted. See id.
Mary Lou next argues the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony of Lieutenant Russo. We review the district court's decision to exclude expert testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 570 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)). Mary Lou concede[s] that expert testimony [was] not required for a jury to figure out that a policeman should not squeeze an elderly woman's breast, but Mary Lou maintains Lieutenant Russo's testimony would have assisted the trier of fact in understanding the totality of the circumstances. We agree Lieutenant Russo's testimony was not necessary to prove Mary Lou's claim, and the testimony was not helpful to the trier of fact on any material issue. Because we concluded above that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the totality of the circumstances evidence, we similarly find the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Lieutenant Russo's testimony.
Mary Lou also appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke on Mary Lou's substantive due process claim. In the order granting summary judgment, the district court stated, [W]hile the Court is disturbed by Locke's conduct as it is alleged, it does not rise to the level of that afforded Constitutional protection. The district court determined Mary Lou's claim could adequately be addressed pursuant to state law. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mary Lou, to determine whether there were any material issues of fact precluding summary judgment. See Reed, 561 F.3d at 790. The Eighth Circuit has recognized a substantive due process violation in some instances of sexual misconduct by police officers. Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 574 (citing Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir.1998)). The standard for evaluating a substantive due process claim is whether the alleged `behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.' Id. (quoting Rogers, 152 F.3d at 797). The Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the protections afforded by substantive due process `because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended,' and it has only done so with the `exercise [of] the utmost care.' Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 780-81 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)). [T]he Due Process Clause `does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society.' Collins, 503 U.S. at 128, 112 S.Ct. 1061 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). Mary Lou suggests the facts in her case are similar to the facts from two prior opinions of our court, Rogers, and Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720 (8th Cir.1997), wherein our court found police officers' conduct met the shocks the conscience standard. In Rogers, a police officer stopped a woman for a broken tail light. Rogers, 152 F.3d at 793. When the woman told the officer her proof of insurance was at her house, the officer followed her home and entered her house. Id. The officer told the woman he would let her off but that she owed him one, and the officer told her to undress, pushed her onto the bed and had sexual intercourse with her. Id. at 793-94. The Rogers court held the district court did not err in finding the officer's actions in Rogers were shocking to the conscience. Id. at 797. The court explained that Rogers involve[d] an egregious, nonconsensual entry into the body which was an exercise of power without any legitimate governmental objective. Id. In Haberthur, an officer followed a woman to her house in a marked vehicle and told the woman he should give her a ticket for speeding, but the officer drove away without issuing a ticket. Haberthur, 119 F.3d at 721. The next month, the officer, in uniform, showed up at her place of work, reminded her of their encounter, and told her he would wait for her and give her a ticket when she left work. Id. Later that month, the officer, while on duty in his uniform, again showed up at the woman's place of work. Id. The officer went up to the woman, placed his hands under her sweatshirt and fondled her breasts, ran his arms down her sides, placed his arm around her neck, and asked her to go into the back room with him. Id. Following the incident at her place of work, the officer repeatedly drove past the woman's house, sometimes driving a police car. Id. The Haberthur court found the officer's conduct was sufficiently egregious to shock the conscience and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the officer on the substantive due process claim. Id. at 722, 724. The court stated, The conduct that [the woman] alleged in her complaint, that [the officer] reached his hand underneath her shirt and fondled a private erogenous area and moved his hands along and caressed her body while making sexually suggestive remarks, was intrusive, demeaning, and violative of her personal integrity. The implication for further sexual contact was in the larger context of threatening adverse official action by way of a ticket and following her in his police car. Id. at 724. The Haberthur court distinguished the facts in Haberthur from the facts in Reeve v. Oliver, 41 F.3d 381, 382 (8th Cir.1994), wherein our court found an animal control officer's rubbing of a woman's back while staring at her chest did not amount to a constitutional violation. Haberthur, 119 F.3d at 723. We need not determine whether the district court erred in finding Mary Lou's allegations did not meet the shocks the conscience threshold, because counsel for the Cavataios conceded at oral argument that if we were to affirm the district court's summary disposition of William's excessive force claim, and the district court's exclusion of the totality of the circumstances evidence, Mary Lou would be precluded from bringing her constitutional claim. Counsel acknowledged that Mary Lou's burden of proof on her state law indecent assault and battery claim was lower than the burden of proof on her constitutional claim. Because the jury found Mary Lou did not meet the lower burden of proof on her state law claim, counsel further admitted Mary Lou could not succeed on her constitutional claim without the excluded evidence. Mary Lou's substantive due process claim arose out of the same allegations as her indecent assault and battery claim, and the evidence to support Mary Lou's substantive due process claim would have been the same evidence offered at trial. At the close of evidence, the district court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict in favor of Chief Locke on Mary Lou's indecent assault and battery claim, unless: First, defendant Chief Edward Locke, Jr. intentionally squeezed Mary Lou Cavataio's breast, and; Second, that conduct would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity; and Third, defendant Chief Edward Locke, Jr. took such liberty without plaintiff Mary Lou Cavataio's consent and against her will, and Fourth, plaintiff Mary Lou Cavataio was thereby damaged. The jury found Mary Lou did not meet her burden of proof and found in favor of Chief Locke. Failing to meet her state indecent assault and battery claim burden of proof, Mary Lou likewise should fail to meet her substantive due process claim burden of proof. Assuming for the sake of argument that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke on the substantive due process claim, the jury's verdict in favor of Chief Locke on the state law claim indicates the jury would not have found in favor of Mary Lou on her substantive due process claim. Mary Lou cannot demonstrate she was prejudiced by the district court's grant of summary judgment, and any error in granting summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke was harmless. See Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 244 F.3d 684, 691 (9th Cir.2001) (Plaintiffs fail to articulate how they were prejudiced by this [summary judgment] ruling. Their intentional infliction of emotion[al] distress claims are predicated on the same facts and similar legal inquiries as their sexual harassment claims. Considering that the jury found against Plaintiffs on their sexual harassment claims, it is highly unlikely the jury would have found in favor of Plaintiffs on their intentional tort claims. As such, any error committed by the trial judge was harmless.); Fite v. Digital Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir.2000) (We see no reason to reenter this morass, since it is perfectly clear that, even if [plaintiff's] state discrimination claims should not have been dismissed on partial summary judgment, any such mistake was harmless, given the jury's verdict in [defendant's] favor on the federal discrimination claims addressed to the very same discharge.). We affirm the district court's partial summary judgment.