Opinion ID: 779123
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government Cites Compelling Interests

Text: 111 We do not agree with the district court that the Government failed to demonstrate that there are compelling interests sufficient to justify closure. The Government contends that [c]losure of removal proceedings in special interest cases is necessary to protect national security by safeguarding the Government's investigation of the September 11 terrorist attack and other terrorist conspiracies. See Gov't Brief at 46. 112 Before the district court, the Government provided the affidavit of James S. Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, to explain the types of information that public access to removal proceedings would disclose. In his affidavit, Mr. Reynolds explained the rationale for prohibiting public access to the proceedings as follows: 113 1. [D]isclosing the names of `special interest' detainees ... could lead to public identification of individuals associated with them, other investigative sources, and potential witnesses ... [and t]errorist organizations ... could subject them to intimidation or harm.... 114 2. [D]ivulging the detainees' identities may deter them from cooperating ... terrorist organizations with whom they have connection may refuse to deal further with them ... thereby eliminating valuable sources of information for the Government and impairing its ability to infiltrate terrorist organizations. 115 3. [R]eleasing the names of the detainees... would reveal the direction and progress of the investigation... and [o]fficial verification that a member [of a terrorist organization] has been detained and therefore can no longer carry out the plans of his terrorist organization may enable the organization to find a substitute who can achieve its goals... 116 4. [P]ublic release of names, and place and date of arrest ... could allow terrorist organizations and others to interfere with the pending proceedings by creating false or misleading evidence. 117 5. [T]he closure directive is justified by the need to avoid stigmatizing `special interest' detainees, who may ultimately be found to have no connection to terrorism.... 118 See Detroit Free Press, 195 F.Supp.2d at 946-47. 119 Although the district court specifically invited the Government to articulate any other basis for closing Haddad's deportation hearing, the Government provided the district court no other reasons for closure. Id. at 947 n. 9. 120 The Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism. In addition to Mr. Reynold's affidavit, other affidavits have been provided that justify the Government's interest in closure. 16 According to the additional affidavits, public access to removal proceedings would disclose the following information that would impede the Government's investigation: 121 Bits and pieces of information that may appear innocuous in isolation, but used by terrorist groups to help form a bigger picture of the Government's terrorism investigation, would be disclosed. The Government describes this type of intelligence gathering as akin to the construction of a mosaic, where an individual piece of information is not of obvious importance until pieced together with other pieces of information. J. Roderick MacArthur Found. v. F.B.I., 102 F.3d 600, 604 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985) (recognizing the validity of this model of intelligence gathering); Ingle v. D.O.J., 698 F.2d 259, 268 (6th Cir.1983) (same); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C.Cir.1980) ([E]ach individual piece of intelligence information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.1972) (What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context.). 122 The identifications of the detainees, witnesses, and investigative sources would be disclosed. Terrorist groups could subject these individuals or their families to intimidation or harm and discourage them from cooperating with the Government. 123 Methods of entry to the country, communicating, or funding could be revealed. This information could allow terrorist organizations to alter their patterns of activity to find the most effective means of evading detection. Information that is not presented at the hearings also might provide important clues to terrorist, because it could reveal what the investigation has not yet discovered. The Government provides this example: If the government discloses the evidence it has about a particular member of a terrorist organization, but fails to mention that the detainee is involved in an impending attack, the other members of the organization may be able to infer that the government is not yet aware of the attack. 124 See Gov't Brief at 47-49. 125 Inasmuch as these agents' declarations establish that certain information revealed during removal proceedings could impede the ongoing anti-terrorism investigation, we defer to their judgment. These agents are certainly in a better position to understand the contours of the investigation and the intelligence capabilities of terrorist organizations. Cf. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985) (stating that it is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether the disclosure of information may lead to unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency's intelligence-gathering process.). 126