Opinion ID: 200762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Negligence Count and the Inconsistent Verdicts

Text: 7 Hyundai makes two closely-related arguments concerning the negligence count. First, it argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the negligence count. Hyundai believes that the district court should have declined to instruct the jury on this count because the existence of a defect is a determinative factor in both negligent design and strict liability design defect claims, which makes it unnecessary and confusing for the jury to consider both claims. Second, Hyundai asserts that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent because both counts required the jury to find, as an essential element, that the airbag system contained a design defect. 8 Hyundai's claims are not new to this court. We recently decided two cases in which automobile manufacturers raised essentially these same arguments. See Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 320 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 74, 157 L.Ed.2d 250 (2003); Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60 (1st Cir.2002). In those cases, we did not address the manufacturers' arguments de novo because the manufacturers had failed to preserve them. We reviewed the claims only for plain error and permitted the verdicts to stand because the manufacturers had not met the stringent plain error requirements. See Trull, 320 F.3d at 6; Babcock, 299 F.3d at 62-66. 9 Unlike the defendants in Trull and Babcock, Hyundai followed the strictures of Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 and preserved its contention that the district court should have withheld the negligence count from the jury. Accordingly, we will review the district court's decision to instruct the jury on the negligence count de novo. See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 394 (1st Cir.2002). 10 In interpreting New Hampshire law, our task is to ascertain the rule the state court would most likely follow under the circumstances, even if our independent judgment on the question might differ. Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir.1996)). In performing this function, we hew closely to the path established by the state's highest court. See Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 192 (1st Cir.1996) (we are reluctant to extend state law beyond its well-marked boundaries) (internal quotations omitted). We therefore turn to the New Hampshire Supreme Court's case law to determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred by submitting the negligence count to the jury. 11 The New Hampshire Supreme Court has consistently declined to adopt the rule urged by Hyundai — that a trial court may not instruct a jury on both strict liability and negligence counts in a product liability action. Indeed, on several occasions, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has approved of a jury being simultaneously charged on both counts. See Trull, 761 A.2d at 481; Cyr v. J.I. Case Co., 139 N.H. 193, 652 A.2d 685, 693 (1995); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843, 849 (1978). As we observed in Babcock, the most that can be said is that submission of both claims is frowned upon. 299 F.3d at 65 (citing Thibault, 395 A.2d at 849 (While ... both counts are permitted, we do not recommend to plaintiffs that counts in both negligence and strict liability ... be submitted to the jury because of the confusion which is created.)) (emphasis supplied). As this underscored language from Thibault suggests, the decision whether to risk confusion by submitting both counts to the jury rests with the plaintiff, not the trial court. 12 To support its claim that New Hampshire law required the district court to withdraw the negligence count from the jury, Hyundai relies heavily on the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Greenland v. Ford Motor Co., 115 N.H. 564, 347 A.2d 159 (1975). 4 Greenland does not support Hyundai's position. 13 In Greenland, the plaintiffs were injured when their car spun out of control. Id. at 161. They asserted that their injuries were caused by a defective ball and socket assembly in one of the front wheels. Id. at 162. At trial, they proceeded on a strict liability theory of design defect and a negligence theory that the defendant's failure to test the vehicle permitted the design defect to persist. Id. at 163. The trial court permitted the jury to consider the strict liability claim but dismissed the negligence claim. Id. at 162-63. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the jury should have been instructed on both claims. Greenland, 347 A.2d at 162-63. 14 The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the decision to withhold the negligence claim from the jury. Id. It concluded that when a negligence claim is premised on the same design defect as a strict liability claim, the trial court has discretion to exclude the negligence claim because asking the jury to consider both claims could be confusing. Id. at 163. In the course of its discussion, however, the court observed that it is clear that a products liability action grounded on strict liability may be joined with an action grounded on negligence. Id. at 163 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). Thus, Greenland stands only for the proposition that in cases where the negligence claim is premised on a design defect, a trial court may, in its discretion, withhold the negligence claim from the jury. It does not, as Hyundai suggests, establish a rule that a court must keep the negligence claim from the jury in these circumstances. 15 In sum, the New Hampshire Supreme Court permits a strict liability action based upon a theory of defective design [to] be joined with an action grounded in negligence. Trull, 761 A.2d at 481. Thus, the district court did not violate New Hampshire law by instructing the jury on both the strict liability and negligence counts. 16 Having determined that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on both counts, we turn to whether Hyundai is nonetheless entitled to relief because the jury's verdicts finding negligence, but not strict liability, are inconsistent. We note, initially, our substantial reluctance to consider inconsistency in civil jury verdicts a basis for new trials. Kavanaugh v. Greenlee Tool Co., 944 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1987)). Before disregarding a verdict, we must attempt to reconcile the jury's findings, by exegesis if necessary. Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 74 n. 15 (1st Cir.1993). To perform this analysis, we determine whether the jury, consistent with its instructions, could have found negligence but not strict liability under the facts taken in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 91 (1st Cir.1984). 17 The court instructed the jury that the estate had to prove four elements to hold Hyundai strictly liable: 18 One, that the design of the 1995 Hyundai Sonata ... created a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user; 19 Two, the condition existed when the product was sold by a seller in the business of selling such products; 20 Three, the use of the product was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer; And, four, the condition caused Eduardo's death. 21 To find negligence, the court instructed the jury that the estate had to prove only two elements: 22 One, that [Hyundai] failed to exercise reasonable care in designing and testing the airbag in the 1995 Hyundai Sonata, and 23 Two, that [Hyundai's] failure to exercise reasonable care in designing and testing the airbag in the 1995 Hyundai Sonata caused or contributed to the cause of Eduardo's death which would not otherwise have occurred in the accident. 24 There are at least two important differences between the district court's negligence and strict liability instructions. 5 First, for negligence, the estate was not even required to prove that the airbag system contained a design defect. It was required to prove only that Hyundai was negligent in testing or designing the airbag system and that this negligence caused or contributed to Eduardo's death. Second, the instructions for each theory presented different standards for assessing the adequacy of the airbag system's design. To find Hyundai strictly liable, the jury was instructed that it had to perform a risk-utility analysis in which it determined that the magnitude of the danger [of the airbag system] outweighed the usefulness and desirability of the product to the public as a whole. To find Hyundai liable for negligent design, the jury was told that it had to conclude that Hyundai failed to design the vehicle ... to avoid an unreasonable risk of injury to the occupant. 25 Even assuming, as Hyundai argues, that the jury necessarily based its liability verdict on a determination that Hyundai negligently designed the airbag system, the jury, consistent with its instructions and the evidence, could have found negligence without finding Hyundai strictly liable. 6 The jury could have rejected the strict liability count because it decided that, on balance, the benefit to the public of including the overly aggressive airbag system in the Sonata outweighed the danger caused by the airbag system (because the system saved many more lives than it took). 26 At the same time, however, the jury could have concluded that Hyundai was negligent in failing to develop a less aggressive airbag system for the Sonata. The jury heard testimony from an expert witness who testified that the Sonata's airbag system contained an unnecessarily aggressive inflator. The same expert also testified that other cars on the market in 1995 contained less aggressive airbag system designs. In light of this evidence, the jury could have decided that a less aggressive design was readily available and in use by other automobile manufacturers. Under the circumstances, the jury's efforts to apply the instructions were understandable and had some basis in the evidence. Merchant, 740 F.2d at 91. There is nothing before us to suggest that the jury was confused by its task or that it shirked its responsibility. Indeed, it appears from the verdicts that the jury understood that the focus of strict liability is on whether the design itself was unreasonably dangerous whereas in a negligence case the focus is on the conduct of the manufacturer. Trull, 320 F.3d at 7. Thus, we have no reason to reverse the judgment because the jury returned opposite verdicts on the strict liability and negligence counts.