Opinion ID: 2442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BIA's Decision Violated Pierre's Due Process Rights

Text: We further conclude that the BIA's sua sponte invocation of subsection U as a basis for finding Pierre removable as an aggravated felon under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA violated Pierre's due process rights. Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, [n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. It is well-established that a lawful permanent resident is entitled to constitutional due process in removal proceedings. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Brown v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 2004). At the core of due process is the right to notice of the nature of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Brown, 360 F.3d at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not hesitate in holding that Pierre sustained a due process violation under the facts of this case. Pierre's NTA charged her as removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) solely on the basis of her conviction for an aggravated felony as defined by subsection M. Despite Pierre's counsel's statement in front of the IJ that the Government needed to charge Pierre with more than a violation of subsection M given her failure to cause any actual loss to the bank and despite the IJ's repeated queries whether the Government desired to amend its NTA to add a charge under subsection U, the Government proceeded under subsection M only. Indeed, the Government expressly disavowed any reliance on subsection U as a basis for finding Pierre removable, adding that it would not amend its NTA to include a charge under subsection U. Thus, having no notice of her removability for an aggravated felony as defined by subsection U, Pierre had no reason to defend against such a charge in front of the IJ. Moreover, when the IJ issued his oral ruling, he found Pierre removable as charged on the basis of her conviction for an aggravated felony as defined by subsection M. Accordingly, when Pierre appealed the IJ's finding to the BIA, she was appealing the IJ's order of removal under subsection M and had no basis for raising a due process challenge in connection with a finding of removability under subsection U. In fact, it was not until after the BIA issued its decision that Pierre's due process challenge arose. [4] We further hold that the BIA's sua sponte invocation of the uncharged, disavowed subsection U as a basis for finding Pierre removable under the INA prejudiced Pierre. See Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (Parties claiming denial of due process in immigration cases must, in order to prevail, allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the challenged process. (internal quotation marks omitted)). As stated earlier, Rule 31(c) provides statutory notice to a criminal defendant that on the basis of the offense charged, the defendant may be found guilty of a necessarily included offense or an attempt. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c). No such corresponding statutory notice exists for an alien charged with removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). The record demonstrates that Pierre's lack of any statutory notice, any actual notice, and any opportunity to be heard in connection with a charge under subsection U precluded her from making any of the arguments she now raises in response to that charge. Accordingly, we hold that Pierre was denied her core due process right of notice and an opportunity to be heard, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In sum, we hold that Pierre was not removable as an aggravated felon as charged under subsection M, because subsection U is not a necessarily included lesser offense of subsection M, and that Pierre was deprived of due process of law when the BIA sua sponte invoked uncharged subsection U as a basis for finding her removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).