Opinion ID: 1450597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Eighth Amendment Jury Instruction to Avoid Any Considerations of Sympathy

Text: Beuke contends that the trial court violated his Eighth Amendment rights by instructing the jury not to consider sympathy when issuing its recommended sentence. At one point during the mitigation hearing, Beuke's father began to weep during his testimony, necessitating a brief recess. Upon recommencement of the hearing, the trial judge stated: Ladies and gentlemen  and we do this because of the unfortunate incident which just happened here a moment ago  in your deliberations  you must not be influenced in your deliberations by any consideration of sympathy or prejudice. The Court will further tell you now, and we will tell you when this matter is finally submitted to you, it is your duty to carefully weigh the evidence, decide all the disputed questions of fact, apply the instructions of the Court to your findings, and render your verdict accordingly. And in fulfilling your duty, your efforts must be to arrive at a just verdict. Consider all the evidence and make your findings with intelligence, impartiality, without bias, sympathy, or prejudice, so that the State of Ohio and this defendant will feel that this proceeding was fairly and impartially tried. The trial court reiterated these sentiments in its jury instructions given at the conclusion of the mitigation hearing. Beuke contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by (1) referring to his father's testimony as an unfortunate incident and (2) instructing the jurors that they must not be influenced. . . by any consideration of sympathy or prejudice. We reject these arguments. First, it is abundantly clear that the unfortunate incident to which the trial court referred was not Beuke's father's testimony, but his father's weeping, which interrupted the hearing. Second, the Supreme Court upheld a similar jury instruction against an Eighth Amendment attack in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987). In Brown, the California trial court instructed the jury not to be swayed by `mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion[,] or public feeling.' Id. at 542, 107 S.Ct. 837. Here the Ohio trial court told the jury not to be influenced by any consideration of sympathy or prejudice. Beuke argues that Brown is distinguishable because the instruction in that case prohibited consideration of mere sympathy, whereas, here, the instruction prohibited any consideration of sympathy. While we acknowledge this minor distinction between the instruction in Brown and the instruction here, we conclude that this distinction is immaterial because the instruction in the present case fully satisfies the constitutional principles expressed in Brown. The Eighth Amendment requires that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (alteration in original). Beuke believes that the instruction at issue here, by prohibiting the jurors from making their findings based on sympathy, violates this constitutional principle. The Court's decision in Brown recognized that when reviewing a jury instruction for constitutional error, we must not only consider the specific language challenged, but must also review the instructions as a whole. Brown, 479 U.S. at 541, 107 S.Ct. 837. The entire instruction here exhorted the jurors to carefully weigh the evidence, apply the instructions of the Court, consider all the evidence, and make . . . findings with intelligence [and] impartiality, [and] without bias, sympathy, or prejudice. When read in the context of the entire instruction, we conclude that a reasonable juror would perceive the court's specific admonition to not be influenced . . . by any consideration of sympathy as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase. Id. at 542, 107 S.Ct. 837. Moreover, a reasonable juror hearing this entire instruction  which emphasized the need to weigh the evidence, apply the instructions of the Court, and consider all the evidence  would logically conclud[e] that [the instruction] was meant to confine the jury's deliberations to consideration arising from the evidence presented, both aggravating and mitigating. See id. at 543, 107 S.Ct. 837. By help[ing] to limit the jury's consideration to matters introduced in evidence, this instruction  far from violating the Constitution  actually fosters the Eighth Amendment's `need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' See id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)). We thus find, relying primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, that the trial court's instructions did not violate Beuke's Eighth Amendment rights. Beuke also contends that the timing of the instruction  in the middle of his father's testimony  and the directive not to indulge any consideration of sympathy effectively communicated to the jurors that they should disregard his father's testimony. We find Beuke's argument to be quite a stretch in light of the entire record; a reasonable juror certainly would not have interpreted the judge's instruction as a directive to disregard the testimony of Beuke's father. The instruction explicitly commanded the jurors to consider all the evidence, which included Beuke's father's testimony. And more importantly, the trial court, after giving this instruction, allowed Beuke's father to continue his testimony, which would indicate to a reasonable juror that his testimony was relevant and worthy of consideration. Had the court intended the jurors to disregard this testimony, or had the court wished to convey such a message, it would have terminated his testimony at that point, and not allowed him to continue. Accordingly, Beuke's claim is without merit.