Opinion ID: 2228560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutional Requirements

Text: Article V, § 6 of the New York Constitution provides: Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state and all the civil divisions thereof    shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive. This mandate, and the laws passed pursuant to it, ensure that a reasonable basis exists for determining merit and fitness for civil service positions throughout New York State. What, however, does competitive mean in the context of an oral examination? This Court first addressed this question in Matter of Fink v Finegan (270 NY 356, supra ). In that case the oral examination at issue constituted part of a competitive examination held for the purpose of preparing an eligibility list for several medical positions in different departments in the City of New York. Petitioner passed the written test and thereafter took an oral examination consisting of technical questions of a medical nature, all of which he answered correctly. He nevertheless failed the oral exam because he lacked executive ability. In the opinion of the examiners, although petitioner was pleasant in manner and bearing and in comprehension fairly quick, he lacked force and executive ability and was altogether too mild ( Matter of Fink v Finegan, supra, at 359). The Court vacated the results of the test, concluding that there was no showing that executive ability was a quality necessary for the positions, nor did the notice of the examination alert petitioner that this quality would be tested. Furthermore, there were no objective standards set forth for measuring the petitioner's executive ability, nor was there any showing that such standards could not be established. We noted: An examination cannot be classified as competitive unless it conforms to measures or standards which are sufficiently objective to be capable of being challenged and reviewed, when necessary, by other examiners of equal ability and experience. Some positions in the civil service may require that the person who fills them have certain qualities which cannot be measured by existing objective tests    The Constitution requires that the examination be competitive as far as practicable. Thus, for such positions, the examination should be competitive except for the testing of the qualities not measurable by objective tests (Matter of Fink, supra, at 362-363 [citation omitted] [emphasis added]). Because the test had no objective standards for the ability actually examined, it fell short of the competitive mandate of our Constitution. The Court cautioned that [n]on-competitive examinations may readily be manipulated by the unscrupulous with little likelihood of detection. Politics, passion and friendship may play their part ( id., at 363). Two years later, in Matter of Sloat v Board of Examiners (274 NY 367, supra ), the Court explored the practical difficulties involved in devising a wholly objective oral exam. Petitioner applied for a teaching license and took a variety of tests, including an interview test and a teaching test. She failed these tests and was denied a license. Petitioner attempted to have the results set aside on the ground that the test was not objective, as required by Matter of Fink. The Court concluded that her reliance on Matter of Fink was misplaced. The Court observed that in Matter of Fink we took pains to point out that we were not condemning, in advance, all oral examinations or tests where evaluation of results must depend in greater or lesser degree upon the opinion of the examiners ( Matter of Sloat v Board of Examiners, supra, at 372). The Court went on to hold that in certain cases a test cannot be wholly objective and to the extent that it is subjective the result may depend as much upon the fitness of the examiners as upon the fitness of the candidate. That is a risk inherent in all systems of examination ( id., at 373). The essence of both Matter of Fink and Matter of Sloat is that oral examswhether testing personality, teaching skills, language proficiency or some other attributeshould employ objective standards as far as practicable. Where completely objective examinations are not possible, an exam should be devised in a way that demonstrates that it tests merit and fitness and is not based upon the unfettered (and perhaps concealed) preferences of the examiners. Contrary to the Appellate Division's holding, there were objective standards to govern the test at issue in this case. Indeed, unlike the examination that occurred in Matter of Fink, where the examiners disclosed only their conclusions that the candidate lacked imponderable and undefined qualities without which a candidate was not fit for appointment, here the standards used to evaluate candidates, the abilities for which candidates would be tested and the substance, form and method of the oral exam were all clearly delineated. Petitioner was tested along with eight others by the same examiner using the same grading system. Pre-existing factors were identified for evaluating the candidates' performance. Each factor was evaluated on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 points. The examiner completed the rating sheet, which contained separate columns for each graded factor, and rated petitioner according to the scale provided by the Department. The examiner substantiated the ratings by noting specific elements that went into his evaluation. Moreover, the Department's oral language proficiency exam conforms to measures or standards which are sufficiently objective to be capable of being challenged and reviewed, when necessary, by other examiners of equal ability and experience ( Matter of Fink v Finegan, supra, at 362). Petitioner herself hired another Spanish linguist to review the exam. Although the examiner reached a different conclusion, she re-tested and re-evaluated petitioner using the same standards and a similar rating sheet as that utilized by the Department. The oral language exam tested grammar, pronunciation, and vocabulary in the context of a 15-minute extemporaneous conversation. These qualities cannot be measured solely by objective criteria. Although some subjective elements, of necessity, entered into the evaluation, the fact that a subjective element may have been involved to some degree in petitioner's rating is not sufficient in and of itself to invalidate the Department's ultimate determination: The mandate of the Constitution for the ascertainment of merit and fitness, so far as practicable, by competitive examination, may not be transformed into an interdict against the examinations which are best adapted for the demonstration of fitness. It would be impossible to formulate a standard by which such qualities may be defined or measured with entire objectivity ( Matter of Sloat v Board of Examiners, supra, at 373). The Constitution does not require rigid adherence to some unrealistic principle of objectivity; the law does not require the impossible or forbid the reasonable ( id., at 373).