Opinion ID: 1394991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: 7-Eleven Incident

Text: (8a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting testimony and a videotape concerning events which took place at the 7-Eleven store immediately prior to the robbery-murder. Defendant maintains the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) as impermissible evidence of an uncharged attempted robbery. The challenged evidence disclosed that minutes before the killing, defendant and codefendant Gonzales were at a 7-Eleven store. After being denied the purchase of beer, defendant asked the store clerk, Bencomo, if I was to rob you, would you give me your money? Defendant then pulled up his shirt and grabbed a handle of some sort. Bencomo warned defendant that there was someone in the back of the store with a shotgun who would blow your head off. Defendant thanked him for the information. Bencomo also told defendant he might be able to buy beer at the mini-market down the street. Defendant and Gonzales then immediately drove to the mini-market where the shooting occurred. (9) Evidence of other crimes or prior bad acts is inadmissible solely to prove an accused had the predisposition to commit the charged offense. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a); People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126]; People v. Willoughby (1985) 164 Cal. App.3d 1054, 1062 [210 Cal. Rptr. 880].) However, the evidence may be admitted when it is relevant to prove another issue in the case such as opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Because of its inflammatory impact, evidence relevant on one of these theories should be excluded when it is not relevant to an issue expressly in dispute [citation], ... `merely cumulative ...' [citations], or ... more prejudicial than probative under all the circumstances. [Citations.] ( People v. Alcala, supra, at pp. 631-632. Accord, People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 314-318 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) (8b) At trial the prosecutor argued the evidence of the events at the 7-Eleven store was relevant to show codefendant Gonzales's state of mind and degree of participation in the robbery. The trial court agreed and overruled defendant's objections to the evidence. The Attorney General similarly maintains the evidence was properly introduced to establish the active, conscious and intentional participation of codefendant Gonzales in the robbery murder. He impliedly concedes that the evidence was not admissible against defendant since the evidence was entirely cumulative on the issue of defendant's identity and state of mind. The jury, however, was never instructed on the limited admissibility of the evidence. At trial, defendant requested that the court give a limiting instruction in connection with Bencomo's testimony. After lengthy discussion, the trial court agreed that such an instruction was proper. Immediately prior to Bencomo's testimony, the court told the jury that the evidence which you are about to receive is offered for a limited purpose, and you will receive further instructions on that at the conclusion of the case. However, at the conclusion of the trial, the trial court failed to so instruct the jury. Since the 7-Eleven evidence was admissible as to only one defendant, the trial court's failure to give a requested limiting instruction constitutes error. (Evid. Code, § 355; see People v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Cal.2d 27, 42-44 [9 Cal. Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 1049]; 1 Witkin, Evidence (3d ed. 1986) § 313, pp. 285-286.) Such error, however, is clearly harmless in the instant case. The case against defendant was virtually airtight. Chandler's eyewitness testimony, Navarro's identification testimony, the mini-market videotape and soundtrack, and defendant's own testimony established without a doubt that defendant was guilty of the charged crimes. It is not reasonably probable that in the absence of the 7-Eleven evidence a result more favorable to the defendant would have resulted. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)