Opinion ID: 437355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Search Of The Vessel

Text: 36 Appellant Bain challenges the warrantless search of the Princess Dean II and argues that evidence of any pills found on board should be suppressed. He admits that the officers had authority to board the vessel and examine its customs documents. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2582, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983); 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(a) (1976). Bain contends, however, that the authority was limited to inspecting documents in a public area of the vessel and did not permit a search of the private cabins and Mrs. Dean's purse. We agree that the initial boarding was limited to the inspection of documents, but we hold that lawful observations by the officers in the course of their inspection engendered sufficient probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances to justify the further search. 37 It is clear that the officers were authorized to make the initial boarding. In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court held that Customs officials, acting pursuant to 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(a) and without any suspicion of wrongdoing, may board for inspection of documents a vessel that is located in waters providing ready access to the open sea. 103 S.Ct. at 2575, 2582. In the present case, the original boarding by Officers Alaimo and Leon was for the purpose of inspecting documents. At the time, the Princess Dean II was located in Miami harbor which provides ready access to the sea. The requirements of Villamonte-Marquez were met. 13 38 While customs officials are making such an inspection, they may observe evidence which is in plain view around them. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2577 (officer smelled marijuana and spotted burlap-covered bale through open hatch); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir.1978) (officer looked through hatch and saw woman hiding in a corner). If such evidence gives the officer probable cause to believe that the vessel contains illegal contraband and if there are exigent circumstances, the officers may conduct a search of the private areas of the vessel. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2577; United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir.1983); see also United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 342 (5th Cir.1976) (search by Coast Guard officers pursuant to 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89(a)). 39 The observations and knowledge of Officers Alaimo and Leon gave rise to probable cause. They approached the vessel knowing that a confidential informant had reported suspicious activities on board. They knocked once on the side of the vessel and, receiving no answer, had to knock again on the door before Bain appeared. Once inside the cabin, they discovered that Captain Dean had no customs documents. This was unlawful in itself and raised suspicions that the vessel was carrying cargo subject to customs enforcement. The officers also noticed that the vessel was unusually plush for a fishing vessel. Finally, when Bain was sent below to roust out the crew, he did not reappear for several minutes and was seen moving suspiciously back and forth between the same cabins several times. 40 The totality of these facts created probable cause to believe that there was illegal contraband on board. Cf. United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir.1976) (suspicious acts by captain, lack of fishing equipment on vessel, and officers' sight of burlap bags in cargo area created probable cause). 41 There were also exigent circumstances justifying the immediate search of the vessel. Officer Leon's original decision to go below was supported by a reasonable fear that the crewmen were collecting weapons or destroying evidence. See United States v. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d 655, 665 (11th Cir.1982) (possibility that suspects are armed and dangerous or that they are disposing of narcotics justifies protective sweep). 14 Furthermore, even after the crewmen and Mrs. Dean were rounded up, the mobility of the vessel was an exigent circumstance justifying an immediate search. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2162-63, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1927); United States v. Freeman, supra, 579 F.2d at 948. The search of the entire vessel was constitutionally permissible because of the combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id.