Opinion ID: 510217
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Richards and Lebetkin

Text: 194 Robert Richards, formerly president of Citisource, testified for the government at trial. Before he agreed to cooperate with the government and when he gave testimony before the SEC materially different from his testimony at trial, both Richards and Citisource had been represented by Puccio and Puccio's law firm, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan. 195 Citing our decision in United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.1986), and realizing that any conviction it might obtain against Friedman would be at risk, the government moved on May 8, 1986 to disqualify Puccio. The government's motion stated that Richards had pleaded guilty to federal bribery charges and was expected to testify at trial. The motion also set forth relevant facts concerning Puccio's previous representation of Richards and stated that Puccio had also represented Melvin Lebetkin, an attorney who was being investigated for allegedly paying bribes to Manes and Lindenauer on behalf of yet another PVB vendor, the Standard Collection Agency. In a sealed affidavit, the government stated that Puccio had attempted to gain immunity for Lebetkin by proffering testimony. No such agreement, however, had been reached, although the government stated that it had continued to express an interest in obtaining one. The government speculated that Lebetkin's testimony would harm Friedman by tending to corroborate Lindenauer's testimony regarding Manes. 196 Friedman vigorously opposed the government's disqualification motion. In an opposing affidavit, Puccio questioned the government's good faith in filing the motion, suggesting that it was merely an attempt to delay the trial. Puccio emphasized that the Stroock firm had represented Richards in its role as corporate counsel to Citisource, and that [a]t no time did I confer privately with Mr. Richards or provide him personally with legal advice. Puccio's affidavit also pointed out that when the New York County District Attorney had announced on February 18, 1986 that several officers of Citisource, including Richards, were targets of investigation, Puccio had immediately recommended that each of the Citisource officers obtain independent counsel. Puccio stated as well that there was no realistic possibility that I would be either a sworn or unsworn witness at the trial. With respect to Lebetkin, Puccio stated that Lebetkin's and Friedman's respective relationships with Lindenauer are totally distinct from one another, and that accordingly no conflict of interest existed. 197 Friedman himself submitted an affidavit in opposition to the government's motion. It stated: 198 STANLEY M. FRIEDMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 199 1. I am a member of the bar of this Court and a defendant in this criminal proceeding which has been scheduled for trial before this Court on or about June 2, 1986. 200 2. In January of this year, I retained Thomas P. Puccio, Esq. to represent me in connection with criminal investigations undertaken by the District Attorney of New York County and the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.3. Since January 1986, I have spent hundreds of hours with Mr. Puccio discussing this case; I have paid to Mr. Puccio substantial legal fees; I have the fullest confidence in Mr. Puccio's ability to represent me; I enjoy an excellent client-attorney relationship with Mr. Puccio. In light of the foregoing, I believe that not to be able to continue in this case with Mr. Puccio as my attorney would cause me irreparable harm. Furthermore, I would lose my right to a speedy trial. 201 4. I have read the conflict charges submitted by the United States Attorney against Mr. Puccio. I have also read Mr. Puccio's affidavit in opposition, and related documents, including the May 8, 1986 Transcript of Proceedings before this Court. 202 5. In addition thereto, I have obtained the advice of independent counsel (although I, too, am a practicing attorney) who concurs with me that there is no conflict of interest in Mr. Puccio continuing to represent me. However, if the government's position is correct, I waive the benefit of any purported conflict. 203 WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, I respectfully request that this Court deny the government's motion to disqualify my attorney, Thomas P. Puccio. 204 The district court conducted a hearing on the disqualification motion, at which the court asked both Puccio and Friedman their views on the matter: 205 THE COURT: Do you stipulate that you will not-- 206 MR. PUCCIO: Cross-examine him on that point? 207 THE COURT: Cross-examine him in any way to bring out the fact that he testified inconsistently before the SEC. 208 MR. PUCCIO: Yes, I will stipulate. I have no problem with that. 209 THE COURT: Does Mr. Friedman agree to that? 210 DEFENDANT FRIEDMAN: Yes, your Honor, I agree with Mr. Puccio's position on the cross-examination of Mr. Richards. 211 MR. ROTH [for the government]: If I could interject for a moment? Assuming we are going to try a waiver, [United States v.] Curc[i]o[,] [680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.1982),] set out very explicit procedures for that. 212 THE COURT: Curcio wasn't talking about a defendant who was a lawyer and a waiver which, as I said before, if it wasn't made Mr. Puccio shouldn't be disqualified. Anybody representing Mr. Friedman who brought up this SEC testimony in light of what you said you would do when it was brought up would be a certified idiot. So I don't have to have Mr. Friedman, who is a lawyer, consult another lawyer to find out whether it is all right not to have his lawyer be a certified idiot. 213 The court denied the government's motion on May 21. 214 Friedman, who once served as an Assistant District Attorney for Bronx County, now claims that he did not validly waive any conflict of interest arising from Stroock's representation of Richards. Specifically, Friedman contends that his waiver did not meet the standards set forth by this court in United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d at 59, and United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888-90 (2d Cir.1982), and that his background as a lawyer is irrelevant to the determination of whether his waiver was knowing and intelligent. We disagree. 215 In Curcio, we established procedures to be followed by trial courts in determining whether a criminal defendant has knowingly and intelligently chosen to waive his right to be represented by an attorney who is free from conflicts of interest. We noted that the first task of the trial court is to alert the defendants to the substance of the dangers of representation by an attorney having divided loyalties in as much detail as the court's experience and its knowledge of the case will permit. Id. at 888. We stated that the court must then assess whether the [defendant's] request is ... knowing and intelligent, id., and that the court may perhaps devise a variety of methods for gaining the necessary insights. Id. at 889. Nevertheless, analogizing to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, we observed that questions designed to elicit from the defendant a narrative statement of his understanding are preferable to questions designed to elicit mere 'yes' or 'no' answers. Id. We also noted that the court's inquiry in each instance should take place after the defendant[ ] ha[s] had a reasonable time to digest and contemplate the risks posed by [the conflict of interest.] Id. 216 Though we described our decision in Curcio as prescrib[ing] [a] catechism, id. at 890, we nevertheless recognized that the existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused,'  id. at 888 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (citations omitted)). Under the circumstances of Friedman's case, we have little difficulty in finding a knowing and intelligent waiver despite the departure from the full-blown Curcio catechism. First, Friedman had ample time and opportunity to digest and contemplate the risk posed by his continued representation by Puccio. The government's disqualification motion was filed nearly a week before the hearing was conducted. Friedman thus was not, like the defendants in Curcio, forced into a snap decision during a lunch break, see id. at 889, or like the defendant in Iorizzo, compelled to make a choice on the spot in the middle of a trial. 786 F.2d at 59; see id. at 55-57. Second, Friedman's affidavit stated that he had read the government's submissions and Puccio's response and that he had consulted with independent counsel. He had thus clearly been alerted to the substance of the dangers of representation by Puccio. Finally, Friedman was a lawyer who had already devoted hundreds of hours to the preparation of his defense. We therefore conclude without difficulty that his waiver was knowing and intelligent. We emphasize, however, that departures from the procedures outlined in Curcio and Iorizzo may be justified only in unusual circumstances, such as those in the instant case. 217 With respect to the alleged conflict of interest involving Puccio's representation of Lebetkin, Friedman contends that Puccio cross-examined Lindenauer in a truncated fashion and declined any cross-examination of Sandow in order to avoid the possibility that either witness might give public testimony incriminating Lebetkin. Puccio, however, did ask Lindenauer about the amount of the bribes he received from Lebetkin's firm, Standard Collection Agency. Although Friedman notes accusingly that Puccio mention[ed] Lebetkin's company only in passing and never mention[ed] Lebetkin himelf, we fail to perceive, and Friedman fails to explain, what purpose any further questioning about the subject would have served. The questions about Standard Collection Agency were relevant only to show Lindenauer's propensity to take bribes and to test Lindenauer's memory of corrupt transactions. Puccio's representation of Lebetkin could not have affected other aspects of Puccio's cross-examination of Lindenauer. 218 As to Puccio's failure to cross-examine Sandow, Sandow's testimony did not incriminate Friedman and mentioned him only in passing. Sandow's testimony primarily concerned Shafran, and thus only Shafran's lawyer bothered to cross-examine. Moreover, very little of Shafran's cross-examination of Sandow concerned Sandow's dealings with Lebetkin. In view of the marginal relevance of Lebetkin and Standard Collection Agency to this case, let alone to Friedman's guilt, we fully agree with Puccio's original assessment that a lawyer representing both [Lebetkin and Friedman] would not be required at a joint trial to take contradictory positions in defending both of them. In sum, with respect to Puccio's representation of Lebetkin, Friedman has failed to show either an actual conflict of interest, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), or a lapse in representation, Iorizzo, 786 F.2d at 58 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1708), that together would constitute a denial of his sixth amendment rights.