Opinion ID: 1282491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Arguments of the Commonwealth Attorney.

Text: Clanton says that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard improper arguments of the prosecutor. During closing argument in the guilt phase of the trial, the Commonwealth Attorney asserted that, in order to do what the defense attorney asked, the jury would have to say that three named police officers were lying. When Clanton objected, the court suggested that it was not necessary to put it in that perspective exactly, and the prosecutor indicated his acquiescence, but a colloquy ensued between the court and opposing counsel. The prosecutor agreed with the court's stated assumption that in the argument in question he was referring to Lawrence's testimony that she gave a statement incriminating Clanton only because of police harassment, and the testimony of three police officers denying such harassment. The trial court then stated that although as argument on the credibility of opposing witnesses the prosecutor's statement was correct, since there was other evidence in the case, he would instruct the prosecutor not to argue in that manner. After the jury had retired to consider its verdict, Clanton's counsel stated for the record that he had approached the bench at the conclusion of the prosecutor's argument and requested the court to instruct the jury to disregard the argument to which he had objected, but that the court, concluding that such an instruction was unnecessary, had declined to give it. Clanton says that the argument of the prosecutor created the erroneous impression that Clanton could not rely upon the presumption of innocence, and that to acquit the defendant the jury would have to determine that the testimony of the three police officers was false. Therefore, Clanton argues, it was the duty of the trial court sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard the improper argument and to point out the correct law to be applied. We do not agree. The first written instruction given by the court, without objection, explained the presumption of innocence and the burden on the Commonwealth to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The admonition given by the trial court to the prosecutor, even though couched in general terms, and the ensuing colloquy explained that the argument was directed only to the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, we find no merit in Clanton's contention that the prosecutor's argument improperly injected his personal opinion into the case. He was responding to argument made on behalf of Clanton which relied heavily on Lawrence's testimony. Clanton further objected to this part of the prosecutor's argument in the sentencing phase of the trial: It is a life of violence. Mr. Clanton tells you that he has found religion since he's been in the jail, and I don't mean to belittle it, but again, that's something that you hear quite frequently. Quite frequently. He knew he was facing a possible death sentence. The trial court overruled the objection, stating that the prosecutor could suggest what may have happened, but that the jury did not have to accept the argument. Again, we reject Clanton's contention that this argument was an impermissible expression of the personal opinion of the prosecutor. Clanton had been convicted of two violent crimes in addition to the capital murder, thus justifying the prosecutor's characterization of his life as one of violence. The prosecutor also could invite the jury to infer that Clanton's interest in religion may have been feigned because of his impending trial for capital murder and his knowledge that, if convicted, he might be sentenced to death. Clanton says, however, that the most objectionable argument of the prosecutor in the sentencing phase of the trial was the following: Ladies and gentlemen, do not sentence do not sentencethe other inmates of the Virginia State Prison to death at the hands of Earl Clanton. Don't give him the chance to take somebody else's life. Just because he's in prison When Clanton's counsel interrupted and objected, the trial court directed the prosecutor to refrain from that type of argument. Defense counsel did not ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard the argument. Rule 5:21. Nevertheless, the admonition of the trial court in the presence of the jury made it known to the jury that the court was not satisfied as to the propriety of the argument. We hold that there was no duty on the part of the trial court to instruct the jury sua sponte to disregard this portion of the prosecutor's argument. It is the duty of defense counsel to move for a cautionary instruction where such an instruction is deemed necessary. The propensity of the defendant to commit crimes of violence, however, is an important factor for the consideration of the jury in fixing punishment in a capital murder case. There was evidence of Clanton's commission of three violent crimes. It was not beyond the bounds of propriety, therefore, for the prosecutor to suggest that Clanton might kill an inmate if he were sentenced to life imprisonment.