Opinion ID: 1153724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: major contentions

Text: Defendant raises two issues for our consideration. A. (1) Access to Legal Materials. About three weeks before trial, defendant moved to continue the trial date on the ground that he had not had adequate access to law books. He had first raised the question of access to legal materials a month earlier when the court denied his motion for the appointment of a legal research firm. Defendant claims that his lack of access to law books prevented him from preparing a defense and denied him due process. As the record makes markedly clear, however, defendant had access to a law library, including CALJIC; due process does not require more. We note that defendant had been using the jail law library and the Orange County law library almost daily for three months before raising this issue. During those three months, defendant appeared in court at least five times. Defendant's actions suggest that he delayed raising this issue until it appeared that his trial was at hand. After defendant moved to continue the trial date, Judge Fitzgerald, in an admirable display of concern for the possible limitations placed on defendant, held an evidentiary hearing and an in camera proceeding to determine defendant's access to legal materials. Those hearings, reflected in some 46 pages of transcript, featured the testimony of 3 sheriff's deputies called by defendant and numerous exhibits such as lists of books and book request slips. The stack of defendant's request slips for books he actually received was approximately three inches high. The testimony showed that books circulated from the jail library several times a day and that a deputy made a daily run to the Orange County law library. Defendant requested approximately two or three books per day, five days a week from the time he first assumed pro. per. status. Defendant could copy any noncirculating book through his runner. Defendant, in camera, requested the judge to subpoena certain inmates who resided near defendant's cell to testify as to the availability of books. He also sought the testimony of lawyers: The Defendant: I plan to call a couple of attorneys, any attorney, that's in the building that day and a couple of district attorneys, any district attorneys that are in the building that day and the reason why I want two of each of them is because I want one that specializes in trial and I want one that specializes in research on both attorneys for defense and district attorneys. And I'm going to ask them if they could pursue their cases with diligence and competency without the assets of ... a CALJIC fourth edition with supplements. Defendant also stated that he would need CALJIC for at least 30 days before I went to trial, access to it for three or four hours a day ..., to which the judge responded that the average attorney probably doesn't spend more than 15 minutes on jury instructions. Finally, defendant requested the court to convene in the jail library to view the conditions there. The judge denied those requests. At the conclusion of the hearing and in camera proceeding, the judge specifically found that the library facilities were fully available to defendant either through the daily runs or his runner and, more particularly, that defendant had access to all law books necessary to any defense. Faretta simply requires that a pro. per. defendant be given the same treatment as an attorney. The judge here made that clear at defendant's Faretta hearing: The Court: You understand that during the course of a trial, if you represent yourself, you have to conduct yourself as a lawyer by all the standards of a person who is schooled in the law? [¶] The Court does not have a responsibility to school you in the law.... The defendant: In general, it's just cut and dry, if I just wanted to go pro per just for the sake of representing myself, because I think that I can, at my best, I think I can do a better job than my public defender at his best. In fact, defendant was specifically aware of the difficulties in obtaining law books at his Faretta hearing: Mr. Smith: ... [S]ometimes there's problems in getting law books from the Orange County Law Library insofar as rules of jury trials, because the law library at the County jail is a little bit incomplete.... [¶] It's pretty good for motions and as far as that.... Defendant does not assert that he was treated any differently from an attorney. The materials he requested but did not receive were either checked out or did not circulate. Defendant's mother was appointed as his runner to photocopy noncirculating materials from the county law library. Defendant had exactly the same access to all materials as any member of the bar or the public and never claimed that he had been forbidden to obtain or copy any book. Neither Faretta, nor any case we have found, requires more. At the end of his trial, defendant renewed his motion to continue based on inadequate access to books. Specifically, defendant claimed that he had not had an opportunity to examine CALJIC and so had not had a chance to prepare jury instructions. The trial ended sooner than the prosecutor expected, because defendant did not cross-examine any prosecution witnesses and did not call any witnesses of his own. For that reason, a two-hour recess was called while the prosecutor finished preparing her jury instructions. When court reconvened, defendant and Judge Lee first saw the proposed jury instructions. The judge loaned defendant his copy of CALJIC and proceeded to consider the instructions. The court refused certain instructions and made modifications in other proposed instructions. At no time did defendant object to, or question the propriety of, particular instructions, or suggest additional ones. As the court found at the elaborate hearing, defendant had access to CALJIC through his runner from the moment he assumed pro. per. status. Defendant himself admitted in open court six weeks before trial that he knew of CALJIC's existence and that he desired to use it. Defendant knew that CALJIC did not circulate (and would have to be photocopied) no later than three weeks before trial. Defendant's claim that he was denied access to CALJIC is simply without foundation. Even if we were to accept defendant's contention that he was denied the opportunity to examine CALJIC until the conference on jury instructions, he has not shown any prejudice to his case. The trial judge did not simply accept the instructions proffered by the prosecution. Instead, he independently evaluated the proposed instructions, modifying or refusing almost one-quarter of those proposed. During this process, which took place on the record, defendant had a copy of the proposed instructions. The charge against defendant was quite simple and straightforward. Defendant presented no witnesses nor did he suggest or present any defense. Accordingly, the trial judge did not need to consider or craft instructions that would accurately instruct the jury on any defenses. Significantly, defendant is unable to point to any error in the instructions as given, nor does he assert that, had he studied CALJIC, he would have proposed proper instructions that were not given. In sum, the trial judge's instructions were complete and appropriate in light of the simple nature of the charges and the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. B. (2) Lack of Opportunity for Sleep. On the morning of trial, defendant requested a continuance on the ground that he had not been allowed eight hours of sleep and was too tired to present a case. He asserts that the trial judge erred by refusing to hold a hearing as to whether he had the opportunity for eight hours of sleep and that his due process rights were violated because he could not adequately defend himself due to lack of sleep. Defendant's position is unsupported both factually and legally. Factually, the record reflects that defendant was attentive, lucid, and articulate throughout his trial. He renewed, at some length, his motion for continuance based upon denial of access to law books and registered other desultory complaints about his treatment, all before the veniremen were present. Defendant also presented a lengthy argument in which he asserted that the law required the opportunity for eight hours of sleep. Defendant fully participated in voir dire, exercising five peremptory challenges and stipulating to the exclusion of two other veniremen for cause. Although Judge Lee refused to hold a separate hearing on the morning of trial, he entered an order requiring the sheriff's department to allow defendant the opportunity for eight hours of sleep. Judge Lee also asked the prosecutor to investigate and report on the opportunity for sleep given to Orange County jail inmates the night before court appearances. She did so. Her oral report, although hearsay, was that defendant was given the opportunity for approximately seven hours of sleep. The flavor of the proceedings is captured by this exchange: The Court: Mr. Smith, would you like to make an opening statement? Mr. Smith: No. The Court: There was [a] cough, and I didn't hear the defendant's answer. Mr. Smith: I'm too tired. After the prosecution's direct examination of its first witness defendant declined to cross-examine. The trial judge, in what can only be considered an act of supererogation, offered five times to have the witness return the next day for cross-examination. The defendant's responses were argumentative and nonresponsive but in no way support his allegation that he was too tired to proceed. [1] After the prosecution's second witness testified on direct examination the following exchange took place: The Court: Mr. Smith, do you have any questions? Mr. Smith: Do you want me to tell you some more about my constitutional rights? The Court: I'm going to give you plenty of time to talk about your constitutional rights when the jury isn't here. Mr. Smith: That's all I'm going to talk to you about. The Court: Do you want to ask any questions? Mr. Smith: You don't want me to tell you some more about my constitutional rights. The Court: The witness may step down. The next morning, when trial continued, defendant moved to replace the investigator that had been appointed for him and again complained about his lack of sleep. Specifically, he claimed that he had gotten more than five, but less than six hours of sleep. Defendant also requested the court to call seven other prisoners as witnesses to the fact that inmates were being denied the opportunity for eight hours of sleep. Those motions were denied. Defendant again refused to cross-examine the final prosecution witness. When the prosecution rested, defendant moved to subpoena an inmate from San Quentin. The court noted that the request was untimely and denied it. Defendant presented a rambling closing statement in which he admitted making the statement, You got me, what more do you want? and characterized that as a confession. Defendant points to his failure to cross-examine and failure to present a defense as evidence that he was too tired to conduct his case. Given an eyewitness identification, defendant's arrest in the getaway car with the stolen property, and his own admission that he made an incriminating statement (which he himself characterized as a confession), we must conclude that defendant failed to present a defense because none was available. The record abundantly reflects that defendant fully participated in the proceedings to the extent he desired. Defendant at trial relied on Stewart v. Gates (C.D.Cal. 1978) 450 F. Supp. 583 (remanded (9th Cir.) 618 F.2d 117), and Rutherford v. Pitchess (C.D.Cal. 1978) 457 F. Supp. 104. Both cases involved challenges to certain jail conditions ( Stewart involved the Orange County jail, where defendant was held) and resulted in orders requiring, among other things, that prisoners be given the opportunity for eight hours of sleep before court appearances. Neither case required the trial judge here to hold a hearing or to suspend trial. No evidence suggests that Orange County jail officials were deliberately flouting the orders in Stewart. The concern of the district judge in both Stewart and Rutherford was not with affording prisoners the opportunity for eight hours of sleep, but ensuring that no defendant is so worn out ... that he lacks the alertness to help his attorney or to try to `put his best foot forward' in the presence of the trier of fact. ( Rutherford, supra, 457 F. Supp. at p. 114.) It is clear that defendant was awake, capable of participating in the proceedings and that he did so. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in denying defendant's motion for a continuance.