Opinion ID: 1706325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in refusing to give a lesser-offense instruction.

Text: ¶ 27. Proposed Instruction D-2 provided that: [t]he Court instructs the jury that an accessory after the fact is one who conceals, receives, aids or assists any person, knowing that such person has committed a felony, with intent to enable such person to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, after the commission of such felony. If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt that [Dampier] concealed, received, relieved, aided or assisted any person, knowing that such person had committed a felony, with the intent to enable such person to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, after the commission of such felony, then you may return a verdict of guilty of accessory after the fact. (Emphasis added). Following the State's objection, the circuit court refused the instruction for lack of evidence to support a verdict of the lesser included. In so finding, the circuit court determined that: all the way through [Dampier's] statement not only did he maintain his innocence that he didn't have anything to do with it, he maintained that he didn't even know that it happened up until that time of that interview. [I]f he takes that position, I don't know what evidence there is in the record that would support the lesser included verdict. ¶ 28. Accessory after the fact is a separate and distinct crime from capital murder and, as such, the issue is whether Dampier is entitled to a lesseroffense, not a lesser-included-offense, instruction. See Byrom, 863 So.2d at 874. The evidentiary standard for lesser-offense instructions is the same as for lesser-included offense instructions. See Gangl v. State, 539 So.2d 132, 136-37 (Miss.1989). To be entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction, [the defendant] must point to evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably find him not guilty of the crime with which he was charged and at the same time find him guilty of the lesser included offense. Ladner v. State, 878 So.2d 926, 932 (Miss.2004) (citing Toliver v. State, 600 So.2d 186, 192 (Miss.1992)), See also Gangl, 539 So.2d at 136 (lesser offense instructions should not be granted indiscriminately, and only where there is an evidentiary basis in the record.). One cannot, be both a principal in the crime and an accessory after the fact. Mangum V. State, 762 So.2d 337, 343 (Miss.2000) (quoting Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 534 (Miss.1996)) (emphasis added). The elements of accessory after the fact are: (1) a completed felony has been committed; (2) the accused concealed, received, relieved, aided, or assisted a felon, knowing that such person had committed a felony; and (3) such assistance or aid was rendered with the intent to enable such felon to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment after the commission of such felony. Byrom, 863 So.2d at 874-75 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-5 (Rev.2006)). To find Dampier guilty of capital murder, the jury did not need to find he was the shooter. See Randall v. State, 716 So.2d 584, 590 (Miss.1998). In fact, [e]very person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the fact, shall be deemed and considered a principal, and shall be indicted and punished as such . . . Miss.Code Ann. § 97-1-3 (Rev.2006) (emphasis added). ¶ 29. Lesser-offense instructions should be granted only where an evidentiary basis exists for them. See Gangl, 539 So.2d at 136-37. In the case sub judice, the evidence presented raises only the issue of Dampier's role as a principal, not an accessory after the fact. According to Dampier's own statement, he discussed going to Five Star with Jermaine on July 6, 2004. Moreover, he stated that he observed the gun on Jermaine on July 8, 2004, but believed Jermaine was not going to use it. He further stated that he became uncomfortable about the incident only later that evening, but remained unaware that any felony had been committed. By contrast, the, State presented evidence, via the combination of Harth's testimony and Dampier's admission of blocking the Five Star gate, driving off the Five Star lot in the Jeep, and filling out the forged title applications, that Dampier was a principal in the crime. In either case, whether Dampier was ignorant; as he alleges, or was a principal by statute, an accessoryafter-the-fact instruction lacked an evidentiary basis. Therefore, this Court concludes that this issue is without merit and the circuit court did not err in refusing Instruction D-2.