Opinion ID: 1110800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clear and Convincing Evidence of Wanton Conduct

Text: Shiv-Ram contends that the trial court erred in finding that Linda presented clear and convincing evidence of wantonness as required by Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20 and in denying its judgment as a matter of law as to punitive damages. `An appellate court, when reviewing a ruling on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, uses the same standard the trial court used initially in granting or denying the motion.' Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Nicholas, 843 So.2d 133, 135 (Ala.2002) (quoting Bell v. T.R. Miller Mill Co., 768 So.2d 953, 956 (Ala.2000)). Ex parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co., 680 So.2d 245 (Ala.1996), sets out the standard a trial judge is to use when a defendant objects to the submission of the question of punitive damages to the jury: [W]hether there was evidence of such quality and weight that a jury of reasonable and fair-minded persons could find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in [wantonness]. 680 So.2d at 249. Section 6-11-20(a) states, in part: Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action, except in civil actions for wrongful death pursuant to Sections 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff. Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as [c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. `To prove wantonness, it is not essential to prove that the defendant entertained a specific design or intent to injure the plaintiff.' Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas, 731 So.2d 1204, 1211 (Ala.1999) (quoting Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So.2d 1250, 1250 (Ala.1998)). `Clear and convincing evidence' is `[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.' Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4). Hobart Corp. v. Scoggins, 776 So.2d 56, 58 (Ala.2000) (emphasis omitted). Shiv-Ram argues that because it took possession of the motel on the day before Linda was injured, one day of active ownership and control forecloses an opportunity to learn from direct experience about any hazards associated with the motel or any genuine opportunity to correct any hazards that did exist. Although one day of active ownership and control might not have provided Shiv-Ram a full opportunity to learn from direct experience about any and all hazards related to the motel, or to correct any hazards, Shiv-Ram entered into the purchase agreement with AMA approximately four months before the closing date. As noted earlier, that agreement stipulated that Shiv-Ram was purchasing the motel as-is, where is, with no warranties by the Seller as to merchantability, suitability, or fitness for any particular use, and that Shiv-Ram was relying solely on its own inspections of the premises. Shiv-Ram acknowledged in the purchase agreement that it had been given a sufficient opportunity to inspect the property. Thus, the purchase agreement provided Shiv-Ram with four months between the execution of the purchase agreement and the planned seamless transition to inspect the premises and the records related to the premises for the purpose, among other things, of addressing the known deteriorated condition of the motel. Neither Jay Patel nor any other representative of Shiv-Ram attempted to inspect the premises or the records or to meet with any on-site employees. [The defendant] maintains that it did not have actual knowledge of the condition [of its vending machine], and that, therefore, it could not foresee that injury to a third party could occur. However, the test is not what [the defendant] in fact knew, but whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a failure to maintain the vending machine in a safe condition could cause injury to a third party. Lance, 731 So.2d at 1209. Wantonness can consist of `the conscious doing of some act or omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act injury will likely or probably result.' Lance, 731 So.2d at 1211 (quoting Roush, 723 So.2d at 1250) (emphasis supplied). [T]o establish wantonness, the plaintiff must `prove that the defendant caused harm by the conscious doing of some act or the conscious omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury would likely or probably result.' Kmart Corp. v. Peak, 757 So.2d 1138, 1144 (Ala.1999) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added) (punitive-damages award upheld because there was substantial evidence of wantonness and clear and convincing evidence that [the defendant] acted with `a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others' under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3)). The hotel keeper must furnish safe premises for the guest, which they may use in the ordinary and reasonable way without danger; and if any guest, while using the building where she is reasonably expected to go, is injured by a defective condition of the building, the manager is liable for the injuries to his guest that are approximately caused by his negligence in the defective condition. Dye-Washburn Hotel Co. v. Aldridge, 207 Ala. 471, 474, 93 So. 512, 514 (1922). Moreover, a premises owner owes any business invitee `a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition.' Kmart Corp., 757 So.2d at 1144, quoting Norris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 628 So.2d 475, 477 (Ala.1993). We conclude that there was substantial evidence of wantonness and clear and convincing evidence that Shiv-Ram acted with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others in its conscious omission of its duty to furnish safe premises to Linda McCaleb. Had Shiv-Ram pursued any of the opportunities it had to fulfill its duty to furnish safe premises that its guests might use in the ordinary and reasonable way without danger, it would have protected guests such as Linda from what was in fact a prevalent, dangerous defect in the king-sized beds in the motel. Instead, it chose to turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to the situation and to forgo making even the most cursory inspections or inquiries concerning the safety of the guest rooms. Had it made a reasonable inspection, or had it made any inquiry of either Mona Smith or Jarvis Bailey, it would have readily learned of the dangers inherent in the structures of the king-sized bed it was offering its guests. We conclude that Shiv-Ram was sufficiently alerted during the three and one-half months preceding the June 13 closing of the possibility, if not probability, of potential safety hazards in the guest rooms. Shiv-Ram argues that because Ramada itself undertook an inspection of the motel on May 14, 1997, and failed to note any problems with bed frames, Shiv-Ram had no reason to anticipate that a problem existed with the king-sized bed frames. The Ramada inspection covered only 18 of the 98 rooms in the motel, however, and the record does not reflect how many of the inspected rooms contained king-sized beds, which were the beds that had the problem with the bed frames. Rather, Jay simply answered affirmatively when asked by Shiv-Ram's counsel if, [w]ithin these rooms listed, were there king-size beds in those rooms? We know that Linda's room was not included in Ramada's inspection and, for all that appears, only a few of the rooms outfitted with king-sized beds were included in the 18 rooms that were inspected. There were approximately 25 to 30 king-sized beds located throughout the motel. There was ample testimony that the protruding piece of bed frame was not readily observable unless the bedspread was lifted to expose it, and nothing in the record suggests that the inspection by Ramada extended to lifting the bedspreads. Accordingly, the fact that Ramada conducted an inspection would not excuse Shiv-Ram's intentional omission of its independent duty to furnish safe premises to its guests for use in the ordinary and reasonable way without danger. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Thompson, 726 So.2d 651 (Ala.1998), a case relied on by Shiv-Ram as support for its argument that the omissive conduct in question did not constitute wantonness, the Court noted that after Wal-Mart had become aware of two or three reports of merchandise falling from upper shelves in the display area in a store, it had instituted many thorough safety procedures in order to insure the safety of its customers.... [U]sing vigorous safety policies, like these Wal-Mart had in place, to support a claim of wantonness is equivalent to punishing someone for taking precautions to avoid causing injury. 726 So.2d at 653.