Opinion ID: 2219951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions Pertaining to Mitigation

Text: Defendant next contends that his death sentence is fundamentally unjust because the sentencing jury was never instructed that it could consider the defendant's background of extreme emotional or physical abuse as a mitigating factor. As defendant points out, as part of the death penalty reforms enacted by the General Assembly (see Pub. Act 93-605, eff. November 19, 2003), a new provision was added to section 9-1(c) of the Criminal Code, specifically stating that a defendant's background of extreme emotional or physical abuse shall be considered as a mitigating factor. Although defendant's brief does not acknowledge that this provision was in effect at the time of his trial in May of 2004, it clearly was in effect as of November 19, 2003. We note, initially, that defendant tendered an instruction addressing applicable mitigating factors, and that instruction was given by the trial court; however, the tendered instruction did not include the language which defendant now claims was erroneously omitted. It is well established, by case law and rule, that a defendant may not raise on appeal the failure to give an instruction unless the defendant tendered the instruction at trial. People v. Hopp, 209 Ill.2d 1, 7, 282 Ill.Dec. 173, 805 N.E.2d 1190 (2004); People v. Casillas, 195 Ill.2d 461, 473, 255 Ill.Dec. 382, 749 N.E.2d 864 (2000); People v. Alvine, 173 Ill.2d 273, 286, 219 Ill.Dec. 546, 671 N.E.2d 713 (1996); 155 Ill.2d R. 366(b)(2)(i). The pertinent portion of the instruction tendered by defendant read as follows: Mitigating factors include: First: Any or all of the following if supported by the evidence: The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to the prosecution. The defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity. Second: Any other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Where there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. Obviously, the language that forms the basis of defendant's contention of error was not included in the instruction tendered by defense counselthe instruction the trial court ultimately gave. The issue was not raised in a posttrial motion. Defendant does not claim that trial counsel was ineffective insofar as he tendered an instruction that did not include the language in question. The defendant does not argue plain error. Rather, defendant repeatedly refers to subsection (c)(6) of section 9-1 as recently enacted and new, suggesting that he erroneously believes the statutory provision was not in effect at the time of his sentencing hearing. This inference is supported by a concluding sentence in his original brief: That future defendants will have that benefit, while Andrew Urdiales did not, is `fundamentally unjust.' Subsection (c)(6) was available to defendant; however, trial counsel did not utilize it in their tendered instruction. Defendant does not claim that they were ineffective in that respect; nor does he explain why he believes the statutory provision was not available to counsel. In short, defendant does not address his procedural default in any way. Thus, defendant has forfeited the issue. Although defendant does not cite Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (177 Ill.2d R. 451(c)), we note that rule's exception to the waiver rule for substantial defects applies when there is a grave error or when the case is so factually close that fundamental fairness requires that the jury be properly instructed. Hopp, 209 Ill.2d at 7, 282 Ill.Dec. 173, 805 N.E.2d 1190. Neither factor is a consideration in this case. The instruction the jury received was adequate to encompass consideration of the evidence in question. In addition to specific instructions bearing upon defendant's mental state, the jury was instructed that it could consider, in mitigation, [a]ny other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Continuing, the instruction informed the jury: Where there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. In People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill.2d 502, 252 Ill.Dec. 520, 743 N.E.2d 94 (2000), this court considered the efficacy of an identical catchall instruction. In that case, defendant claimed he was improperly denied a specific instruction pertaining to the likelihood of his rehabilitation. Defendant claimed reversible error because the trial court refused to instruct the jury that mitigating factors include that [t]he defendant may be rehabilitated or restored to useful citizenship. Kirchner, 194 Ill.2d at 554-55, 252 Ill.Dec. 520, 743 N.E.2d 94. In Kirchner, this court determined that a new sentencing hearing was not necessary, holding that the catchall instruction was adequate, under the facts of that case, to apprise the jury that it could consider defendant's potential for rehabilitation. Kirchner, 194 Ill.2d at 556-57, 252 Ill.Dec. 520, 743 N.E.2d 94. In this case, Kendra Moses, defendant's mitigation expert, testified at length about the hardships and abuses defendant suffered in his formative years. Moreover, the jury heard extensive evidence regarding defendant's mental conditionbe it a mental illness or personality disorderand the origins of that condition. At least three of the testifying experts, including the State's expert, believed that defendant's childhood experiences of abuse and/or neglect were contributing factors in the formation of his current mental makeup, a conclusion that few laymen would find surprising. That testimony was inextricably tied to defendant's argument that his mental condition militated against the imposition of the death penalty. We have no doubt that the jury considered defendant's formative experiencesparticularly his mother's temporary withdrawal, his sexual experience with his sister, and childhood teasing and bullyingand, correlatively, his mental condition, and appropriately weighed them against the details of eight brutal murders and the terrorization of J.A. We have thoroughly reviewed the evidence in this case. Assuming, arguendo, that the abuse defendant suffered would qualify as extreme, we are confident that the jury's verdict would not have been otherwise had the instruction been given with the proposed language. See Kirchner, 194 Ill.2d at 557, 252 Ill.Dec. 520, 743 N.E.2d 94, quoting Alvine, 173 Ill.2d at 290, 219 Ill.Dec. 546, 671 N.E.2d 713 (An error in a jury instruction is harmless if the result of the trial would not have been different if a proper instruction had been given).