Opinion ID: 480959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Gates Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test

Text: 10 Recently, in Illinois v. Gates, 24 the Court abandoned a strict, mechanical adherence to the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test of informant reliability, and eliminated the need to satisfy distinctly and fully the test's double demands. 25 Gates held that an informant's basis of knowledge and his or her veracity should not be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. 26 Rather, these two elements are to be taken only as relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations. 27 The Court eluciated: 11 The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for ... concluding that probable cause existed. 28 12 The Court deemed the totality-of-circumstances standard better suited to the practical task of gauging probable cause, which requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. 29 13 The Gates Court also emphasized the importance of independent police work corroborating the details of an informant's tip. 30 This sort of confirmation may bolster the reliability of the hearsay, and thus increase the likelihood of demonstrating probable cause; in particular cases, it could even be decisive: It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 'corroboration through other sources of information reduce[d] the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,' thus providing 'a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.'  31 The Court observed that its decisions utilizing a totality-of-circumstances analysis have consistently acknowledged the value of police corroboration in making the probable cause determination. 32 14 The Gates Court ruled that probable cause was made out by an anonymous letter indicating that a husband-wife team was currently violating state drug laws and planning future criminal activities, 33 as supplemented by information obtained through an independent police investigation. 34 The Court noted that this information suggested that the Gates were involved in drug trafficking, 35 and thus corroborated the anonymous tip in major part. 36 That the informant's reliability was unknown to the police became far less significant after their investigation tended to confirm key aspects of the tip, 37 and with this degree of verification it was reasonable to conclude that the affiant was probably correct in his claim of illegal activity by the Gates. 38 The Court acknowledged that the information contained in the affidavit might not satisfy the veracity prong of Spinelli, but deemed it sufficient for the practical, common-sense judgment summoned by the need to make a probable cause determination. 39 15 The Gates Court further held that the accuracy of the informant-communicated details of the Gates' forthcoming trip to Florida made it likely that the informant had access to reliable information, including dependable information on illegality. 40 And while the Court recognized that the letter and the subsequent corroboration might not clearly establish the informant's basis of knowledge, it felt that they did make it sufficiently probable that the informant had obtained his information from the Gateses or someone they trusted. 41 Given the anonymous letter, the corroborating police investigation, and reasonable inferences, the Court concluded that the magistrate had a substantial basis for making a finding of probable cause. 42 16 During the term following the Gates decision, the Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. Upton, 43 reiterated its holding that strict adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test was no longer proper. The Massachusetts Supreme Court had found a warrant deficient under Gates' totality-of-circumstances test. 44 Interpreting Gates as merely adding a new wrinkle to the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test by providing that a shortfall on one prong could be overcome by a compelling showing on the other, 45 the Massachusetts court had reasoned that since neither the informant's veracity nor her basis of knowledge appeared adequately in the underlying affidavit, 46 the warrant failed to satisfy even Gates' lower threshold of probable cause. 47 The Supreme Court reversed, asserting that the Massachusetts court had misunderstood the status of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard in determining probable cause. 48 We did not merely refine or qualify the 'two-prong test,'  the Court said, [w]e rejected it. 49 Thus the Massachusetts court erred by judging bits and pieces of information in isolation instead of considering the totality of the circumstances as demanded by Gates. 50 The Court observed that  '[a] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants'  could tend to discourage use of the warrant process, 51 and that [a] deferential standard of review is appropriate to further the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. 52