Opinion ID: 2184350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of Trial Transcripts

Text: After Greene was initially sentenced to death, we affirmed his guilt but reversed his death penalty for a new hearing. Greene I, supra . After being resentenced to death, we again found error in the proceedings and reversed Greene's death penalty for a new hearing. See Greene II, supra . At his rehearing, Greene's counsel submitted transcripts of prior testimony as mitigating evidence pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-616(a)(4)(Repl.1997). Greene now argues that counsel's decision to use the transcripts and failure to seek live mitigating testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court ruled that counsel's decision was a matter of trial strategy and that there was no reasonable probability that live testimony would have resulted in a different result. That ruling was not clearly erroneous, and we affirm. Greene argues that he was clearly entitled to the physical presence of mitigation witnesses by virtue of his Sixth Amendment right of compulsory process, along with the analogous state guarantees in Article 2 § 10 of the Arkansas Constitution and the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases, codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-43-401, -09 (Repl.1999). Counsel suggests that [h]ad counsel made the proper request, it would have been granted or the sentence would have been summarily reversed. Then, Greene explains the substance of the mitigating testimony submitted by transcript and the jury's conclusions with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Nevertheless, after trumpeting the constitutional guarantees, Greene concedes that trial counsel was permitted to use the transcripts, but contends that counsel should not have made that choice. It is clear that in Arkansas, matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, fall within the realm of counsel's professional judgment and are not grounds for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. Simpson v. State, 355 Ark. 294, 138 S.W.3d 671 (2003). In Greene's second punishment hearing, the testimony from his mitigation witnesses was elicited with virtually no cross-examination by the State. In preparing the mitigating evidence for Greene's third punishment hearing, counsel may have considered the potential that the State would more vigorously cross-examine the mitigation witnesses. Of particular note was the State's prior inability to cross-examine the witnesses concerning allegations that Greene murdered his brother in North Carolina. Furthermore, the record reflects that counsel did attempt to secure live testimony. Specifically, counsel filed a motion to subpoena ten out-of-state witnesses pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-43-403. The jury unanimously found that two mitigating circumstances probably existed, and mitigating evidence presented by Greene's counsel was clearly considered by the jury without the live testimony. Greene has failed to meet the first prong of the Strickland test requiring a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Additionally, it cannot be said that, had the jury heard live testimony from the witnesses, the outcome of the hearing would have been different. Furthermore, mere errors, omissions or mistakes, improvident strategy or bad tactics will not suffice to require an evidentiary hearing. Hayes v. State, 280 Ark. 509, 660 S.W.2d 648 (1983).