Opinion ID: 2525464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: The instruction on deliberation and premeditation (and the limited holding in Lozada v. State )

Text: Evans's counsel argued at trial and on direct appeal that the jury instruction on deliberation and premeditation was erroneous. [79] Nevertheless, Evans asserts that his counsel did not fully and competently address the issue. He also asserts that this court erred in deciding the issue on direct appeal and that this error constitutes good cause under Lozada v. State [80] to raise the issue again in a habeas petition. The jury in this case received the Kazalyn v. State, 108 Nev. 67, 825 P.2d 578 (1992) instruction on premeditation and deliberation, which this court recently abandoned in Byford v. State. [81] Evans does not explain how his counsel were deficient in challenging the jury instruction. Thus this claim lacks specific allegations that if true would warrant relief. Evans simply argues that under Byford the use of the Kazalyn instruction was error and that this court is wrong to refuse to apply Byford retroactively. We have held that with convictions predating Byford, neither the use of the Kazalyn instruction nor the failure to give instructions equivalent to those set forth in Byford provides grounds for relief. [82] Byford was decided after Evans was convicted and therefore provides him no relief. Relying on Byford, Evans also faults his counsel for failing to challenge the constitutionality of Nevada's death penalty scheme as providing at the time of his trial no meaningful distinction between first- and second-degree murder. This is simply the same issue in different clothing, and we reject it. Incidentally, we note that the proof here that the murders were deliberate and premeditated was ample: the evidence shows that Evans and Powell planned to murder Scotti and that after Evans arrived at the apartment he considered his actions and determined to kill the other adult occupants as well. Evans also tries to extend our decision in Lozada inappropriately as authority to circumvent the doctrine of the law of the case. In his briefs, he repeatedly argues that this court erred on direct appeal and therefore good cause exists under Lozada to overcome habeas procedural bars. In Lozada, this court held that its own error in rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an earlier habeas petition constitutes an external force which excuses the filing of a successive petition. [83] However, this court recognized its error not because it abandoned the doctrine of the law of the case and reconsidered its decision at Lozada's urging. Rather, it did so because the federal courts, in considering Lozada's federal habeas petition, ruled in his favor and contrary to this court's earlier decision. [84] Thus, Lozada is limited by its facts and does not provide a general license to question this court's holdings: unless a federal court concludes that a determination by this court is erroneous, Lozada is inapplicable, and the parties and district court should respect the law of the case as pronounced by this court.