Opinion ID: 703968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Batson Inquiry

Text: 10 In Batson, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes in even a single case to remove blacks from the jury on account of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). That principle was extended to defense peremptory strikes in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). The Supreme Court has established a framework for evaluating Batson challenges. [I]f the State demonstrates a prima facie case of racial discrimination by the defendants, the defendants[ ] must articulate a racially neutral explanation for peremptory challenges. Id. at 59, 112 S.Ct. at 2359. Once the Batson challenger demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination and the opposing party offers an explanation for the challenged strikes, the trial judge determines, in light of all the facts and circumstances, whether the [Batson challenger] has established the existence of purposeful discrimination. United States v. Jiminez, 983 F.2d 1020, 1023 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 330, 126 L.Ed.2d 276 (1993). 11 When we review the resolution of a Batson challenge, we give great deference to the district court's finding as to the existence of a prima facie case. See United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 486 (8th Cir.1990) (The trial judge ... is in by far the best position to make the Batson prima facie case determination.... De novo review of the record by this Court would be inappropriate....); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Once past the prima facie case step, the district court's determination concerning the actual motivation behind each challenged strike amounts to pure factfinding, and for that reason we will reverse the district court's determination only if it is clearly erroneous. See Hollingsworth v. Burton, 30 F.3d 109, 112 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 944, 130 L.Ed.2d 888 (1995); United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1542 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 952, 130 L.Ed.2d 895 (1995). 12 We reject the defendants' suggestion that a stricter standard of appellate review should apply to cases where the Batson issue involves defense strikes instead of prosecution strikes. A defendant's misuse of the power of the court to deny a citizen her right to participate on a jury because of race is as reprehensible as a prosecutor's, and the effect on the excluded juror is the same. Moreover, a district court's superior ability as a Batson factfinder stems from two advantages it has over an appellate court: the positional advantage of being there among the facts as they unfold, and of seeing and hearing the explanations as they are given; and the experiential advantage of regularly being in the business of factfinding, which an appellate court is not. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make determinations of credibility. The trial judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.). Because neither of those two advantages vary depending upon which side has exercised the peremptory strike being challenged, the standard of review does not vary, either. 13 Under the Batson framework, the district court first determines whether the party challenging the peremptory strikes has established a prima facie case of discrimination. If so, the court requires the striking party to explain its reasons for the strikes in question, and then proceeds to determine whether those strikes were based upon the venire members' race or instead upon raceneutral reasons. Our review of the district court's action in sustaining the government's challenge to the defendants' strike of Ms. Robertson follows that same route. First we review the district court's prima facie case finding, and then we review its finding that the defense strike of Ms. Robertson was based upon her race. 14
15 The defendants argue that the government failed to establish a prima facie case of a Batson violation, and the government argues that because the defense was required to and did offer explanations for its strikes the prima facie case issue is moot. We disagree with both the government and the defendant--the prima facie case issue is not moot, but the government did make the necessary showing. 16 The government's argument that the prima facie case issue becomes moot once the striking party proffers reasons for the challenged strikes is based upon the following language from Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion): Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. For a number of reasons, we do not feel compelled by that language to hold that the prima facie showing is moot in this case. First, that language from Hernandez is from a plurality opinion, and plurality opinions do not bind this Court. E.g., Foster v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, Ala., 872 F.2d 1563, 1569 n. 8 (11th Cir.1989). Second, the language is dictum, at least for the purpose the government would use it. In Hernandez, the striking party, the prosecutor, defended his use of peremptory strikes without any prompting or inquiry from the trial court, with the result that the trial court had no occasion to rule that [the defendant] had or had not made a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination. 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. In this case, by contrast, the district court did have occasion to rule on whether the objecting party had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, and it did require the striking party to explain the reasons for the strikes. 17 Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled in Hernandez that the trial court had not committed clear error by concluding that the peremptory strikes in question had not been used in a racially discriminatory manner and by rejecting the Batson challenge. Id. at 369-70, 111 S.Ct. at 1871-72. Thus, the Supreme Court did not decide the question we face in this case: when a trial court has found that a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes has been made, has required the striker to explain the challenged strikes, and has disallowed one or more strikes, may an appellate court uphold the trial court's action without reviewing its prima facie case determination. We hold the answer is no. 18 In Batson and its progeny, the Supreme Court has repeatedly described the prima facie showing as a hurdle the party making a Batson challenge must clear before the striker is required to proffer any explanation for the challenged strikes. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1429, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (As with race-based Batson claims, a party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is required to explain the basis for the strike.); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59, 112 S.Ct. at 2359 (Accordingly, if the State demonstrates a prima facie case of racial discrimination by the defendants, the defendants must articulate a racially neutral explanation for peremptory challenges.); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629-31, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2088, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) (It remains to consider whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination has been established in the case before us, requiring Leesville to offer race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges.); Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358, 111 S.Ct. at 1866 (First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.... Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor....); Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.). 19 To ignore the prima facie showing requirement when reviewing a trial court's Batson holding would be to ignore the Supreme Court's repeated descriptions of that requirement as an integral part of any Batson analysis. No party challenging the opposing party's use of a peremptory strike--whether that party be the government, a criminal defendant, or a civil litigant--is entitled to an explanation for that strike, much less to have it disallowed, unless and until a prima facie showing of racial discrimination is made. Accordingly, unless it concludes that a prima facie showing was made, an appellate court should neither reverse a trial court's action refusing to disallow challenged strikes, nor should it affirm a trial court's action disallowing strikes. No decision of the Supreme Court or of this Court is inconsistent with that principle, which flows directly from the language of Batson and its progeny. 20 We turn now to a review of the district court's prima facie case determination in this case, a determination to which we owe great deference. See p. 924, above. After the government made the Batson challenge, the district court noted that all but one black juror had been stricken by the defendants, and later explained: Let me say that I think the number of strikes against the members of the black race raises an inference at least that the reasons were--that they were struck because of their race.... In Batson, the Court explained that in order to determine whether a prima facie case has been established: 21 the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a pattern of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the [party's] questions and statements during voire dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voire dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the [party's] use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. 22 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Although no particular number of strikes against blacks automatically indicates the existence of a prima facie case, here the defendants struck seventy-five percent of the black venire members, which amounted to all but one of them. Moreover, Batson teaches that a prima facie case determination should include an examination of all relevant circumstances. Among the relevant circumstances is the subject matter of the case being tried. Here the defendants were being prosecuted for a racially motivated hate crime against blacks. 23 The defendants argue that the district court's finding that a prima facie showing had been made is error because: the district court ultimately allowed two of the three challenged strikes; the disallowed strike did not alter the racial composition of the jury, but instead merely replaced one black juror with another; and, the defendants' failure to strike one of the four black jurors should have prevented any prima facie case determination. We address each of these arguments in turn. To begin with, once a prima facie showing has been made and explanations for the challenged strikes have been required, a trial court's ruling on the validity of those explanations does not retroactively affect the correctness of its prima facie case determination. Batson and its progeny prescribe an orderly step-by-step process for resolving issues involving allegations of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes, and that process is linear, not circular. The trial judge should not revisit the first step in the process after each additional step, nor will we. 24 With regard to the defendants' second argument, it is true that application of Batson did not ultimately alter the racial composition of the jury in this case, but that fact does not undermine the validity of the district court's earlier prima facie case determination. As we have explained, the prima facie case determination is the self-contained, first step in a one-direction process, which is not affected by events or determinations that occur thereafter. Moreover, any implication that there was no point in applying Batson in this case because the numbers did not change is wrong. Batson is not about numbers per se. It is about ending racial discrimination against people such as Ms. Robertson who, if the district court had not acted, would have been excluded from the jury because of her race. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48, 112 S.Ct. at 2353 (While an individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, ... he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)). 25 The defendants' third and final argument on this issue is that a prima facie case did not exist because they did not strike one black venire member, Ms. Carter, who would have served on the jury had Ms. Robertson not displaced her. We have said before that although the seating of blacks on the jury is a significant fact, it does not bar a finding of racial discrimination. Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1412 (11th Cir.1995). 26 We hold that the district court did not err in finding that the government had made the necessary prima facie showing, requiring the defendants to justify each of the challenged strikes on race-neutral grounds. 27
28 The district court credited the defendants' explanations for two of their three strikes against black venire members but did not credit their explanations for the third strike, the one used against Ms. Robertson. The defendants first proffered that they had struck Ms. Robertson because they, who were from rural Alabama, wanted to exclude urbanites from the jury. Ms. Robertson resided in metropolitan Birmingham. Although this would have been a race-neutral reason, we are not surprised that the district court was skeptical about it being the real reason for the strike. As the district court found, several unstruck white jurors were from metropolitan areas or did not reside in the part of Alabama close to the defendants' homes. 29 Second, the defendants proffered that juror Robertson was undesirable from their perspective, because she works for Blue Cross, and she had a math degree which tells me she's an--my experience with math majors and people who deal with exact figures is that they need exact answers, and they intend [sic] to get hung up when dealing with generalities and things such as human error. However, as the district court noted, the defendants failed to explain adequately why they did not strike white venire members who worked with numbers, such as one who was a bank accountant, and another who worked as an adjustor for Ford Motor Credit. 30 We recognize that failing to strike a white juror who shares some traits with a struck black juror does not itself automatically prove the existence of discrimination. See Hollingsworth v. Burton, 30 F.3d 109, 112-13 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 944, 130 L.Ed.2d 888 (1995). But we are also mindful that we review the district court's findings about whether a particular strike was racially motivated only for clear error, and [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511. In this case the district court conducted a thorough examination of the proffered reasons and did not commit clear error in finding that the real reason the defendants struck Ms. Robertson was her race. 31 Because the district court did not err in finding that the government had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the defendants' use of their peremptory strikes, and because it did not err in finding that Ms. Robertson was struck because of her race, we reject the defendants' contention that the court erred in disallowing that strike.