Opinion ID: 6323357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Function-based Approach

Text: [¶25] To correct this limited and narrow view of what constitutes an appurtenance, we should adopt a more sensible and practical function-based approach. I recognize that we have previously rejected this approach. In Sanford, we “decline[d] to adopt a function-based approach and rel[ied] instead on a more restrictive understanding of the term,” despite “acknowledg[ing] that the function-based definition employed by the Superior Court . . . [was] sensible and offer[ed] a practical standard.” 2004 ME 73, ¶ 8, 850 A.2d 325. An examination of the plain language of the MTCA requires us to revisit our rejection of the function-based approach. 17
[¶26] As the Court notes, our main objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the will of the Legislature. Desgrosseilliers v. Auburn Sheet Metal, 2021 ME 63, ¶ 8, 264 A.3d 1237. We achieve this objective by first examining the plain language of the statute. Wuori v. Otis, 2020 ME 27, ¶ 6, 226 A.3d 771. When we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, we “have often relied on dictionaries to determine such meanings.” Rockland Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Rockland, 2001 ME 81, ¶ 12, 772 A.2d 256; see Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2010 ME 79, ¶ 11, 2 A.3d 289. We also interpret statutory language to avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results. Jackson Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Rockwell Homes, LLC, 2022 ME 4, ¶ 10, 266 A.3d 288. [¶27] The public building exception to immunity provides that “[a] governmental entity is liable for its negligent acts or omissions in the construction, operation or maintenance of any public building or the appurtenances to any public building.” 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2). The Legislature did not define the term appurtenance in the MTCA. [¶28] I note here that in our jurisprudence we have inconsistently applied a rule of statutory construction when interpreting this undefined term. 18 In Searle, we said that “[a]s a general rule, words and phrases that are not expressly defined in a statute must be given their plain and natural meaning and should be construed according to their natural import in common and approved usage.” 2010 ME 89, ¶ 8, 3 A.3d 390 (quotation marks omitted). In Sanford, however, we said that “because the MTCA employs appurtenance as a technical term, we are guided by the rule that technical words and phrases and such as have a peculiar meaning convey such technical or peculiar meaning.” 2004 ME 73, ¶ 10, 850 A.2d 325 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). The Sanford Court did not explain why it thought the MTCA employed appurtenance as a technical term, nor does either party here, so “the plain meaning of [this undefined] term controls.” State v. York, 1997 ME 209, ¶ 9, 704 A.2d 324; Ethyl Corp. v. Adams, 375 A.2d 1065, 1075 (Me. 1977) (“Since we find no indication that the Legislature intended that the [statutory term] be given a peculiar or technical meaning, we construe it according to the common meaning of the language.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶29] To begin with, the Legislature used the term appurtenances, not fixtures. See Court’s Opinion ¶ 9. We can assume that the Legislature knew the difference between an appurtenance and a fixture. “Fixture” is defined as “[p]ersonal property that is attached to land or a building and that is regarded 19 as an irremovable part of the real property . . . .” Fixture, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); cf. Personal Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Any movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property.”). In contrast, we have noted that appurtenance is defined as “‘something that belongs or is attached to something else.’” Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 9, 850 A.2d 325 (quoting Appurtenance, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). By the plain meaning of the word, then, something can be an appurtenance in one of two ways: either it belongs to something else or it is attached to something else. A plain reading of the term does not support the conclusion that an appurtenance can be only a fixture. [¶30] Furthermore, I note that the Court relies on the rule of statutory construction that says that we consider the entire scheme when construing a statute’s plain language. Court’s Opinion ¶ 7. Accordingly, we have narrowly construed exceptions to immunity and restrictively defined the term appurtenance to give effect to the structure of the MTCA, which “employs an exception-to-immunity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach.” Est. of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 8, 997 A.2d 84 (quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, this construction is not consistent with the balance between immunity and liability that the Legislature 20 diligently crafted. A function-based approach is much more attuned to striking this balance than a fixture-based approach.
[¶31] A function-based approach begins with the dictionary definition of appurtenance that we cited in Sanford: a thing belongs to—and, thus, is appurtenant to—a public building if that thing is “integral” or “significantly connected” to the building’s function or purpose.3 2004 ME 73, ¶¶ 5, 9, 850 A.2d 325. We recognized in Sanford that appurtenances must be something other than personal property, but we mistakenly limited the definition to fixtures without considering that a parking lot, or similar realty, may be an appurtenance to a building. Id. ¶ 11. We explained: Appurtenances are things belonging to another thing as principal and which pass as incidents to the particular thing . . . . The term is commonly employed in connection with land conveyances to describe objects or things that pass to a grantee as an incident of the transfer. As used in conveyances, the term passes nothing but the land and such things as belong thereto and are a part of the realty. Alternatively, a thing may be an appurtenance if it is attached to a public building. See Sanford v. 3 Town Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 9, 850 A.2d 325. To determine if an object is attached to a public building under a function-based approach, follow the fixture analysis outlined in Searle. 2010 ME 89, ¶¶ 16-21, 3 A.3d 390. 21 Id. ¶ 9 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 99 (1977)). In other words, an appurtenance belongs to a principal thing if it is incidental to the principal thing. In this context, “incident” means “[d]ependent upon, subordinate to, arising out of, or otherwise connected with.” Incident, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). An appurtenance is integral or significantly connected to a principal thing if it serves that principal thing’s essential purpose. [¶32] Our recent decision in McDonald highlights the practicality of a function-based approach, which we essentially employed to determine whether a plaza was a fixture. See 2020 ME 119, ¶ 16, 239 A.3d 662. We used the definition of fixture to determine whether a plaza “‘belong[ed]’ to” the Portland Police Department and, therefore, was an appurtenance to that public building. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15. We held the plaza was an appurtenance because it was (1) annexed to the Department, serving as the roof to a portion of the building; (2) “necessary for the proper function of the building” because the “lobby would be wholly inaccessible without the plaza”; and (3) “‘an irremovable part’” of the building as shown by “the annexation and essential nature of the plaza to the functioning of the Department building.” Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 22, 3 A.3d 390). 22 [¶33] This result was correct under our precedent only because we used a fixture-based approach, but the fact remains that a plaza is obviously not a fixture. As noted above, a fixture is “[p]ersonal property that is attached to land or a building and that is regarded as an irremovable part of the real property.” Fixture, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The plaza was intended to be irremovable not because of the purpose it serves when attached to the building, but because it is actually a part of the building. See McDonald, 2020 ME 119, ¶ 5, 239 A.3d 662. It never was and never could become freely movable personal property, and therefore it could never become a fixture as that term is commonly understood. But our reliance upon a fixture-based approach forced us to pretend otherwise. [¶34] In contrast, under a function-based approach, we would be free to hold that the plaza was an appurtenance not because it was a fixture but because it served the building’s essential purpose by enabling access and acting as a roof to a portion of the building. See id. ¶ 14 (“Our caselaw suggests that whether the plaza is an external part of the building or an appurtenance to the building is a distinction without a difference.”). It is integral to the building’s essential purpose because of its function, not because of the legal fiction that it 23 is a fixture. A function-based approach avoids the absurd fiction that we created in McDonald—that a plaza is a fixture. [¶35] Contrary to what this Court has previously said, a function-based approach does not “expand governmental liability by including personal property integral to the activities undertaken at a public building without regard to whether the property belongs or is attached to the building.” Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 11, 850 A.2d 325. Rather, a function-based approach confers the exact degree of liability the Legislature intended by immunizing governmental entities from negligent acts for which insurance is unavailable or too expensive while simultaneously affording citizens a remedy for injuries suffered through no fault of their own. 2 Legis. Rec. 1827 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Collins). A judicially-created, narrowly construed fixture-based approach to the public building exception to immunity results in an interpretation that contradicts the plain meaning of the statute and the clear intent of the Legislature. It expands immunity for the government and frustrates citizens who seek a remedy for injuries caused by the government’s negligence. Those fortunate enough to be injured in the government’s building will be compensated, while those injured in the government’s parking lot will not. 24