Opinion ID: 3006521
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Seventh Question

Text: ¶ 55 Finally, the prosecutor inquired about the proceeds of the robbery—the guns stolen from Mr. Mortensen’s house: Question 7 “Isn’t it true that you didn’t get any guns or anything or any, or you didn’t get paid, you didn’t receive anything, that’s what you told the police, [that] you didn’t receive anything at all?” ¶ 56 Through Mr. Bond’s jail notes and his interview with police, the jury had already learned that Mr. Rettig left all of the 24 STATE v. BOND Opinion of the Court stolen guns with Mr. Bond after the murder. And in ruling on the mistrial motion, the trial court observed that “there was . . . substantial evidence already in the record to establish that Mr. Rettig had not received any sort of financial or other benefit from this event.” Therefore, because the jury already heard evidence that Mr. Rettig did not receive the guns, we conclude that this question would have had little impact on the jury. ¶ 57 For each of the seven questions, Mr. Bond has failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s assertions that would undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict. Because he has not met his burden to show prejudice, we reject his claim of plain error. B. Mr. Bond Has Failed to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Counsel’s Failure to Move for Mistrial Based on a Confrontation Clause Violation ¶ 58 Mr. Bond argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel did not move for a mistrial based on an alleged Confrontation Clause violation. He contends that counsel’s performance was deficient because there was “no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy” for failing to move on this ground. State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). Moreover, he claims he was prejudiced because the trial court would have been compelled to grant a mistrial based on the alleged Confrontation Clause violation. We determine, however, that no prejudice resulted from counsel’s actions, and Mr. Bond’s claim accordingly fails. ¶ 59 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the “Assistance of counsel for his defense,” meaning that he has “the right to effective assistance of counsel,” State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, Mr. Bond must satisfy a two-part test to demonstrate that he has been denied counsel’s effective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Mr. Bond must show that “his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.” Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 38, 267 P.3d 232 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, he must show that “counsel’s performance prejudiced” him, meaning that there is “a reasonable probability 25 Cite as: 2015 UT 88 Opinion of the Court that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. ¶¶ 38, 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we first turn to the prejudice element of Mr. Bond’s claim and determine that he has failed to establish there is “a reasonable probability” that the “result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. ¶ 40. ¶ 60 In much the same way that Mr. Bond failed to show prejudice under plain error, see supra ¶¶ 49–57, he has also failed to demonstrate prejudice under the ineffective assistance of counsel test in Strickland. Even assuming there was a Confrontation Clause violation, Mr. Bond did not establish that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s leading questions. Because there was no harm from the questions, he also has not shown “a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different,” meaning, in this case, that the trial court would have granted the motion for mistrial had counsel moved on that ground. Archuleta, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 40. Therefore, we hold that Mr. Bond has not established that defense counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial based on his Confrontation Clause right constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.