Opinion ID: 2116530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count I of Ackerman's petition states a clear claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under Iowa Code section 554.2314 (1997). Ackerman's petition states in part:

Text: 5. The plaintiff had the herbicide applied to approximately 370 acres of crop ground in 1988, in Butler County, Iowa. 6. At the time of the sale of the herbicide, the manufacturer was aware of the custom of rotation of crops year to year between soybean and corn and represented that the product would not carryover and damage corn planted in a subsequent crop year. .... 10. In selling the Scepter product, the seller impliedly warranted that the product was merchantable. 11. The plaintiff used the herbicide in an ordinary manner and in doing so suffered loss to his corn crop in the subsequent year. 12. The product is not fit for the ordinary purposes for which it was intended in that it carried over to subsequent years and damaged the corn crop which was planted in a rotation after the bean crop. Ackerman contends his claims are not label based, but a direct contention that the product cannot be applied to bean fields in Iowa without causing carryover damage to crops, and hence is not fit for the ordinary purpose for which it is intended. This, he argues, has nothing to do with what the label says or does not say. On the contrary we think the claim has much to do with what the label says or does not say. This was our holding in Clubine where we held a similar claim of breach of implied warranty of merchantability was preempted. Clubine, 534 N.W.2d at 387. It was also our holding in Schuver. Schuver, 546 N.W.2d at 613; see also Taylor, 54 F.3d at 563; Didier, 938 P.2d at 368. We think Ackerman's claim does challenge the label. In essence the claim comes down to this. If the Scepter label had been different, and the waiting period between the application of Scepter and planting of corn had been lengthened, the label would have been merchantable. In other words, American Cyanamid could have avoided liability for breach of implied warranty of merchantability by altering its label in the language regarding safe rotation of crops. We think Ackerman's claim stands on the use of the product in accordance with label instructions and follow crop guidelines. It should be dismissed as preempted. [3] III. The court of appeals determined that some portions of Ackerman's claim were viable because they were dependent on oral representations made by American Cyanamid which were not preempted by FIFRA. Although the court did not refer to any specific oral representation made by American Cyanamid, we assume the court was referring to a count of Ackerman's petition which alleges American Cyanamid represented that the product would not carryover and damage corn planted in a subsequent crop year. There is simply no factual basis in the record for preserving a claim based on oral representations. Ackerman testified he never received any written materials, or spoke to anyone from American Cyanamid concerning the product or its label. IV. Count II of Ackerman's petition states a claim for negligence in marketing Scepter and for failing to warn the customer of carryover on subsequent crops. These are common-law-duty-to-warn claims and are clearly preempted by FIFRA and are not challenged on appeal. See Schuver, 546 N.W.2d at 614. Other portions of Ackerman's petition indicate his negligence claim is premised upon the design and production of Scepter. The petition reads in part: 2. The defendant was negligent in its production and marketing of Scepter in the following respects: a. It failed to design a product which would not carryover and damage corn crops planted in subsequent years. He also alleges that American Cyanamid was negligent in testing the effects of Scepter. Cipollone held that claims for negligent testing which are based solely upon the manufacturer's testing or research practices, not related to advertising or promotion, are not preempted by FIFRA. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-25, 112 S.Ct. at 2621-22, 120 L.Ed.2d at 428; Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir.1993). But merely to call something a design or testing claim does not automatically avoid FIFRA's explicit preemption clause. See Grenier, 96 F.3d at 564. The line between a claim for mislabeling and a claim for a defective product is razor thin, and can turn on whether one could reasonably foresee that the manufacturer, in seeking to avoid liability for the error, would choose to alter the product or the label. Worm, 5 F.3d at 747. American Cyanamid relies heavily on Schuver where we concluded the negligent-testing-and-marketing claim was label-based, and therefore preempted by FIFRA. Schuver, 546 N.W.2d at 614-15. The gist of Schuver 's negligence claim was that the pesticide should not have been used in his county because the soil's pH was not at the appropriate level. Id. at 614. Citing to Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., 127 Wash.2d 67, 896 P.2d 682, 692-93 (Wash.1995), we concluded this sort of caution should go on the label. So the claims of negligence were preempted because they called for additional or different label information from that required under FIFRA. Schuver, 546 N.W.2d at 615. Many federal courts have held that when a plaintiff's negligent-design-and-testing claim does not set forth specific allegations that the product functioned improperly, or that the company was negligent in its manufacturing or testing, the claim is preempted because it is essentially predicated on the product's labeling. See Grenier, 96 F.3d at 564-65; Taylor, 54 F.3d at 561-62; Worm, 5 F.3d at 747-48. State courts from other jurisdictions are in accord. See Barnes v. Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 189 Ariz. 46, 938 P.2d 95, 97 (Ariz.Ct.App.1997); McAlpine, 947 P.2d at 477-78. The majority of courts however have held that FIFRA does not preempt design-and-testing claims. See Lyall v. Leslie's Poolmart, 984 F.Supp. 587, 595 (E.D.Mich.1997); Reutzel v. Spartan Chem. Co., 903 F.Supp. 1272, 1282 (N.D.Iowa 1995); Helms v. Sporicidin Int'l, 871 F.Supp. 837, 841 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Higgins v. Monsanto Co., 862 F.Supp. 751, 757-59 (N.D.N.Y.1994); Jillson v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 857 F.Supp. 985, 991-92 (D.Mass.1994); Bingham v. Terminix Int'l Co., 850 F.Supp. 516, 521-22 (S.D.Miss. 1994); Wright v. Dow Chem., 845 F.Supp. 503, 509-11 (M.D.Tenn.1993); Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 681 So.2d 1057, 1061 (Ala.1996); Romah v. Hygienic Sanitation Co., 705 A.2d 841, 854-56 (Pa.Super.1997); Eide v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 542 N.W.2d 769, 772 (S.D.1996); All-Pure Chem. Co. v. White, 127 Wash.2d 1, 896 P.2d 697, 702 (Wash.1995). There are many factors which militate in favor of finding that Ackerman's negligent-design-and-testing claim is not preempted by FIFRA. Ackerman's claim is distinguishable from Schuver in that Ackerman also alleges a design defect in the production of Scepter. Ackerman's claim does not call for additional or different information on the label from that required by FIFRA. Ackerman also directly assails the design and testing of Scepter. This is illustrated in two ways. First, Ackerman's interrogatory answers indicate the claim is only predicated on the product itself and not the labeling: Interrogatory No. 12: Describe and explain in detail the alleged defect in the Scepter alleged in your petition at law. Answer: The defect in Scepter was that it carried over to the following crop year and negatively affected the corn yield. Interrogatory No. 14: Explain in detail your allegations in your petition at law that defendant American Cyanamid was negligent and the factual basis therefore. Answer: American Cyanamid should have discovered through testing that there was a carryover problem. Second, because this case has already been tried before the court, we have the benefit of trial testimony. Ackerman's expert testified at length concerning the testing and design problems of Scepter. He pointed to numerous studies which indicated American Cyanamid knew Scepter caused carryover damage and was not adequately degradable in certain weather conditions. Yet American Cyanamid rushed Scepter onto the market so farmers would purchase its product rather than that of their competitors. In essence Ackerman does not simply allege that adequate testing would have caused American Cyanamid to alter the Scepter label, but directly asserts that adequate testing and proper design would have caused American Cyanamid to alter the product itself. By recognizing the negligent-design-and-testing claim, we are not requiring information on the Scepter label different from or in addition to the information FIFRA requires. We are simply recognizing an affirmative duty on manufacturers of potentially dangerous chemicals to guard against design or manufacturing defects in their chemicals. This does not interfere with FIFRA's purpose of requiring uniform national standards of labeling. Further, by recognizing claims for negligence such as Ackerman's here, we are only requiring that pesticides such as Scepter be safely designed. This falls neatly within the FIFRA savings clause: A state may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the state, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). Imposition of a commonlaw duty of care in the design and testing of harmful chemical products does not permit any sale or use prohibited by FIFRA, nor does it in any way frustrate the will of congress. FIFRA does not preempt Ackerman's claim for negligent design and testing. V. Dismissal of Ackerman's other claims are not challenged or involved in this appeal. The only surviving one is his claim for negligent design and testing. Dismissal of that claim is reversed and the case is remanded for a determination of its merits on the basis of the record made during the bench trial. We are disinclined to determine, as we did in Clubine, that Ackerman should lose his claim on the merits because testing is so closely superintended by the EPA. See Clubine, 534 N.W.2d at 387-88. Especially under the facts here, where the claims rest on challenges both to design and to testing, a summary resolution by an appellate court is inappropriate. Most, though possibly not all, negligent-design-and-testing claims should turn on their merits. This process would be thwarted if, after holding such a claim is not preempted, we nevertheless dismiss as a matter of law because of EPA supervision. This was not our intent in our dispositional holding in Clubine, and any intimation to the contrary is overruled. In order to justify dismissal at the appellate level, future cases will have to reveal the extent of EPA supervision and disclose how the agency in effect supplanted the manufacturer in matters of design and testing. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.