Opinion ID: 72003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Davis Has Shown a Reasonable Probability

Text: We are not convinced that Davis has met his burden of establishing a reasonable probability that the district court's consideration of an incorrect advisory range affected his sentence, as is required to satisfy the substantial effect prong of the plain error test. The record amply demonstrates that in determining Davis's post-revocation sentence, the district court placed great weight on the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding Davis's violations of the conditions of his supervised release and concluded that the violations merited a significant punishment. The district court noted that Davis was only five months into a five-year sentence of supervised release; was outside the state in which he was required to remain; was in possession of a firearm; and was carrying a bank bag and printed notes that strongly suggested that he intended to resume the same activities for which he initially had been convicted and imprisoned. Commenting on the seriousness of the violations, the district court imposed a 24 month sentence, higher even than the top end of the incorrect advisory range. The court, in short, had ample independent bases for imposing the sentence that it did, and Davis has cited no statements in the record to indicate that the court  which was required only to consider the advisory range indicated by the policy statements and was permitted to impose any sentence within the statutory maximum when determining the sentence  relied on the incorrect advisory range in determining his sentence. [9] Davis contends that we may infer such reliance because the correct and incorrect advisory ranges did not overlap and because there is a significant gap between the correct 6 to 12 month range and the 24 month sentence actually imposed. Davis is correct that we have been willing, in previous cases, to infer reliance where the sentence imposed fell within an incorrect advisory range that did not overlap with the correct advisory range, see United States v. John, 597 F.3d at 286, or when even where there was some overlap, if the gap between the correct advisory range and the sentence actually imposed was significant, see United States v. Price, 516 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir.2008). But none of the cases that Davis cites  and none of the overlap or gap cases that this court has located  involved facts similar to those in the present case, in which the district court imposed a sentence above even the top end of the incorrect advisory range while commenting on the seriousness of the offense. To the contrary, in each of the cases that Davis cites, the court imposed a sentence within the incorrect range and made no comments to suggest that an above-range sentence would be appropriate. [10] In these cases, unlike Davis's, the record created a strong inference that the district court would in fact have imposed a lower sentence had it considered the correct advisory range. The facts of Davis's case are very similar to those that we addressed in United States v. Jimenez, 2010 WL 445620, at , which, though unpublished, provides persuasive authority. In Jimenez, the district court incorrectly determined, in a revocation hearing, that the advisory range of imprisonment under the policy statements was 12 to 18 months. Id. at ___, 2010 WL 445620 at . The correct range was 6 to 12 months. Id. The district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 36 months, the statutory maximum for the violation at issue. Id. at ___-___, 2010 WL 445620 at -2. We concluded that [b]y itself, the district court's erroneous selection of the incorrect guideline range [wa]s not enough to demonstrate that the `substantial rights' prong of the plain error test [wa]s satisfied, given that the district court had supported its upward departure from the guidelines by noting Jimenez's absconding from justice for 18 months and the drug treatment opportunity that a 36 month term would afford. Id. at ___, 2010 WL 445620 at . We held that on these facts, Jimenez ha[d] failed to demonstrate that there [wa]s a `reasonable probability' he would have received a different term of imprisonment but for the guideline calculation error. Id. Here, as in Jimenez, the district court imposed a sentence above even the incorrect advisory range and supported this variance with reasons reflecting the gravity of the offense. Considering the record and our case law, we are skeptical that Davis has met his burden of showing a reasonable probability that, but for the district court's consideration of the incorrect advisory range, his sentence would have been lower.