Opinion ID: 734913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appellant lafromboise

Text: 15 Appellant LaFromboise challenges both his jury convictions and his sentencing. 16
17 The jury found LaFromboise guilty under Count 1, which alleged a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, marijuana and cocaine. Appellant argues that the evidence and testimony presented at trial were insufficient to sustain this conviction. 18 When reviewing a jury determination of guilt based on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. v. Ouinn, 18 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1242, 114 S.Ct. 2755 (1994); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 19 In order to prove a drug conspiracy, the government must show: (1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, and (2) an intent to commit the unlawful act. U.S. v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 115 S.Ct. 382 (1994); U.S. v. Foster, 57 F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir.1995). This case is controlled by our earlier holding in U.S. v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 856, 115 S.Ct. 162 (1994), where we found that a conspiracy to distribute drugs requires proof of 'an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.'  Id. at 819 (citing U.S. v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 347 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993)). Evidence that the supplier sold a large quantity to the alleged co-conspirator can give rise to an inference that such drugs were being distributed, but cannot, without more, sustain a conviction for conspiracy. Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 347; U.S. v. Delgado, 4 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir.1993). Evidence that the alleged co-conspirator provided muscle for the operation also supports the finding of a conspiracy. U.S. v. Power, 881 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir.1989); U.S. v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir.1976). Evidence was introduced at trial from which the jury could have concluded that LaFromboise was selling for Ehrlich instead of on his own account, that he worked for Ehrlich and collected debts and stolen property for Ehrlich, and that he came to the warehouse to help Ehrlich protect it against Estrada, all of which tend to show a joint enterprise. The Court finds that the evidence in this case shows more than a mere buy-sell relationship. A reasonable jury could have found that Ehrlich and LaFromboise had an on-going agreement that Ehrlich would be a regular supplier for LaFromboise's distribution business. Ehrlich fronted drugs to LaFromboise, LaFromboise acted to protect the conspiracy, and he collected drug debts for Ehrlich. There is sufficient evidence in this record to support LaFromboise's conviction for conspiracy to distribute.
20 LaFromboise was also convicted on multiple counts alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which provides mandatory additional imprisonment for an individual who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm. There are two elements which must be shown to support a conviction under Section 924(c): (1) an underlying predicate offense, and (2) using and/or carrying a firearm. U.S. v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 765 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1041, 114 S.Ct. 1564 (1994). In order to establish liability for violations of Section 924 by co-conspirators, the government can rely on the use and/or carry of weapons by co-conspirators. Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640 (1946); U.S. v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761 at 765. 21 Appellant challenges the Section 924(c) convictions primarily on the grounds that: (1) the several gun convictions were based on the same underlying predicate offense, the Count 1 conspiracy conviction, in violation of the rule announced by this Court in U.S. v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.1991), and (2) that the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. U.S., --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), which reinterpreted the meaning of the term use for purposes of Section 924, rendered the jury instruction in this case incorrect. The arguments regarding the gun convictions were not raised in the district court. Where objections are not raised in the district court, the appeals court reviews any deficiencies in the underlying proceedings only for plain error. U.S. v. Gaudin, 997 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1087, 115 S.Ct. 745 (1995). 22
23 In U.S. v. Smith, 924 F.2d at 894, the we found that a conviction on an underlying predicate offense can only support one conviction under Section 924. We found that, each 924(c)(1) count must be supported by a separate predicate offense. Id.; see also U.S. v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991); U.S. v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.1989); U.S. v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992). In this case, all of the Section 924 convictions rested on the same underlying predicate offense, the Count 1 conspiracy. Appellant was sentenced, however, with respect to only one of the Section 924 convictions. Our holding in U.S. v. Martinez, 7 F.3d 146 (9th Cir.1993), indicates that the district court proceeded properly. The Martinez court specifically suggested two ways to handle the Smith directive: 24 the district court should either (1) submit separate counts under section 924(c)(1) to the jury, and, if there is more than one conviction, merge those convictions after the trial, or (2) submit one section 924(c)(1) charge to the jury with special interrogatories requiring the jury to specify which weapon or weapons the defendant used or carried. 25 Martinez, 7 F.3d at 148 n. 1; see also U.S. v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 719-20 (9th Cir.1996) (upholding more than one Section 924 conviction based on the same underlying offense, but directing that defendant should be sentenced as to only one); U.S. v. Melvin, 27 F.3d 710, 716 (1st Cir.1994) (following Martinez ). The district court properly followed the Martinez rule in this case, and LaFromboise's convictions are not improper on that ground. 26
27 After the conclusion of this trial, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bailey v. U.S., --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), which changed the interpretation of the term use for purposes of Section 924. This reinterpretation, which effected a change in Ninth Circuit law, requires a reversal of appellant's Section 924 convictions. 2 Jury Instruction No. 39 in this case states: 28 a firearm is considered to be used/carried during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime if the firearm is present for protection and to facilitate the likelihood of success, whether or not it is actually used. Where a firearm is found in direct relation to narcotics, it is considered to be used/carried during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime even where the defendant is not present when the firearm is found by law enforcement officials. 29 This instruction, while correct under prior Ninth Circuit law, is no longer correct in light of Bailey. See, e.g., U.S. v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d at 1257; U.S. v. Willett, 90 F.3d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1996). Where the jury could have based its conviction on an improper understanding of the term use, the conviction must be overturned. U.S. v. Gonzalez, 93 F.3d 311 (7th Cir.1996); U.S. v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir.1996). The evidence regarding the firearms, particularly the machine gun, indicates that the jury may have relied on mere storage or proximity of the weapon. Thus, the convictions on Counts 2, 8, and 28 cannot be upheld. 30
31 LaFromboise also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts but Counts 1, 7, and 28, which he made at the close of the government's case. LaFromboise based this motion on his argument that the government had not shown that he could be held liable for the actions of his co-conspirators which took place after he withdrew from the conspiracy and after he was in custody. The district court denied the motion. Generally speaking, once a conspiracy is found, all co-conspirators are liable for all actions taken by other co-conspirators which are (1) in furtherance of the conspiracy and (2) reasonably foreseeable. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-48; U.S. v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir.1987). However, a conspirator can withdraw from a conspiracy and thereby relieve himself of liability for subsequent acts of the conspiracy. Levine v. U.S., 383 U.S. 265, 266 (1966); U.S. v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 913 (1993); U.S. v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1021 (1st Cir.1992). A conspirator accomplishes a withdrawal by taking steps inconsistent with the conspiracy and communicating those acts in a manner reasonably calculated to reach the co-conspirator. U.S. v. Butler, 41 F.3d 1435, 1446 (11th Cir.1995); U.S. v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 906 (9th Cir.1992), modified on other grounds, 969 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.1992). 32 LaFromboise argues that he withdrew from the conspiracy by robbing Ehrlich's warehouse. There was evidence, however, of continuing communications and conduct between LaFromboise and Ehrlich from which a jury could have inferred that they had patched up their differences and decided to continue working together. Thus, although the jury was properly prepared to consider the possibility of withdrawal, they apparently chose not to accept it. We find that the district court's denial here was based on correct instructions and the evidence and should therefore be upheld.
33 LaFromboise also challenges his sentence on the Section 924 count on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the sentence received by Ehrlich. As appellant's Section 924 conviction is being vacated on other grounds, the Court need not reach this issue.