Opinion ID: 1767064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Strong's Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to Prior Conviction

Text: Strong filed a motion in limine to exclude any testimony regarding his criminal record. The circuit court denied this motion, noting that the only prior conviction at issue was a felony-theft conviction within the ten-year time limitation. The court ruled that, pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 609 (2007), Strong's testifying would put his credibility at issue and would thus permit the introduction of such a conviction. In light of our abuse-of-discretion standard for review of evidentiary rulings, we conclude that the circuit court did not err. Rule 609 provides, in pertinent part: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one [1] year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party or a witness, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. Ark. R. Evid. 609(a). The rule also states that evidence of a conviction is inadmissible if more than ten years have elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date. Ark. R. Evid. 609(b). We have upheld the use of this rule for purposes of impeachment of defendants who testify and have stated that a defendant who takes the witness stand in his or her own behalf places his or her credibility in issue. Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 518, 868 S.W.2d 85 (1994). The evidence admitted here was a judgment and commitment order, dated May 19, 1999, showing that Strong was convicted of one count of felony theft of property and sentenced to thirty-six months' imprisonment. It was obviously introduced to attack Strong's credibility as a witness, as it was introduced at a time when counsel for the State was questioning Strong about whether he had told the truth on direct examination. In addition, Strong's defense was a general denial, which made his credibility a central issue. The conviction clearly falls within the ten-year time limitation imposed by Ark. R. Evid. 609(b); while the date of Strong's release from confinement for the conviction is unknown, it obviously would have been sometime between 1999 and 2006, the date of the jury trial in the case at bar. Furthermore, felony theft of property was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which Strong was convicted. Finally, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in finding that the probative value of admitting this conviction outweighed any prejudicial effect. We have stated that the circuit court has considerable discretion in determining whether the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect, and that decision will not be reversed absent abuse. Thomas v. State, supra . We have also recognized that admissibility under Ark. R. Evid. 609 must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. Factors to be considered in the determination include: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the date of the conviction and the witness's subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the prior conviction and the crime charged; (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. Id. ( citing Sims v. State, 27 Ark.App. 46, 766 S.W.2d 20 (1989)). Here, the prior conviction was relatively recent, the prior crime and the crime charged were dissimilar, and the issue of Strong's credibility was central, as previously noted. See Sims v. State, supra . Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this conviction for purposes of impeachment, and an appeal of this ruling would be meritless.