Opinion ID: 170451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Conditional Mootness Order

Text: BCA claims that the district court's conditional mootness order, which rested on its receiving a binding commitment from the government not to revive the Cement Project, justifies a finding that it prevailed. The Supreme Court has clearly spoken on the standards for determining when a litigant should be granted prevailing party status. Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). Buckhannon involved a challenge to state law brought by assisted living facilities in West Virginia. The plaintiff there alleged that state codes, which required that residents of assisted living facilities be capable of self-preservation in the event of a fire or some other danger, ran afoul of the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Id. at 601, 121 S.Ct. 1835. While the case was pending, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills that eliminated the self-preservation requirement, rendering the plaintiff's claim moot. Id. The district court denied the plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, on the grounds that even though plaintiff's suit may have been a catalyst for the West Virginia legislature's actions, the legislative change did not confer prevailing party status upon plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that it had found parties prevailed when they obtained enforceable judgments on the merits or court-ordered consent decrees. Id. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835. But [a] defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. Id. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court thus held that an award of attorneys' fees was improper when the plaintiff had simply fil[ed] a nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be determined), [and had] reached the `sought-after destination' without obtaining any judicial relief. Id. at 606, 121 S.Ct. 1835. BCA argues that it is a prevailing party under the standard issued by Buckhannon because the Forest Service withdrew the Cement Project, and the district judge conditioned his mootness order on the Forest Service's representation that it would not reinstate the project. But while the district judge stated that BCA had obtained a binding commitment from the Forest Service not to reinstate the Cement Project, the commitment made by the Forest Service is not sufficient to qualify BCA for prevailing party status. In finding the case moot, the district court explained: [T]his determination of mootness is conditioned on the government's representation that the Cement Project has been permanently withdrawn and will never be revived. Any new project must begin anew to comply with the mandates of all applicable statutes. The representation that the government made in withdrawing the project was as follows: I am withdrawing the [Cement Project] decision notice and I will make a new decision that takes these changed conditions into account after conducting a supplemental environmental assessment. . . . [I]t is clear that whatever management action is selected, it will not be the same as [the Cement Project]. Certainly, as plaintiff argues, the district judge's mention of the Forest Service's action constitutes a form of judicial recognition. But Buckhannon's requirement that a prevailing party receive some form of judicial imprimatur, see 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835, requires more than a mere judicial statement favoring one party. Instead, in order for a party to prevail, the court's statement must lend judicial teeth to the merits of the case. More specifically, a party is entitled to attorneys' fees only if it could obtain a court order to enforce the merits of some portion of the claim it made in its suit. To illustrate this point, consider the position that the plaintiffs in Buckhannon would have found themselves in had the state legislature in West Virginia reversed course and reinstated the disputed self-preservation rule. Undoubtedly, the plaintiffs in Buckhannon would be able to challenge this new rule once again in court. They would not, however, have the right to ask the court to intervene on their behalf and declare that the new rule violated the FHAA. Having won no judgment on the merits in their previous suit, the plaintiffs in Buckhannon could at most hope for another chance to present their case on the merits to a court. This example illustrates why the Buckhannon court emphasized the need for judicial imprimatur. A judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree indelibly alters the legal landscape between parties. Once such a judgment has been obtained, a party cannot simply change its mind and turn back to its old ways. A party who chose to do so might well be subject to contempt proceedings. Judicial imprimatur, of the sort required in Buckhannon, gives a plaintiff substance it can rely on in enforcing the merits of its case. That is why it is crucial to prevailing party status. Here, the district court's order conditionally dismissing the case as moot gives BCA no rights to enforce the merits of the decision. If the Forest Service were to revive the Cement Project, no portion of the district court's order gives the BCA the ability to enforce the contempt decree. The best BCA could hope is that the district court would withdraw its mootness decision, as that order was conditioned on the government's representation. But the withdrawal of that order would not give BCA the right to seek an injunction or a court order blocking reimplementation of the plan. Instead, if the Forest Service reinstated the Cement Project, BCA would get only a chance to address the Forest Service's claims on the merits. By contrast, a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree would provide BCA with precisely the ammunition that it currently lacks. Under Buckhannon, a court order that favors one party but does not entitle that party to some method of enforcing the merits of the claim is insufficient to qualify that party for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party. The district court's conditional mootness order thus fails to qualify BCA as a prevailing party.