Opinion ID: 2812904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Overview of Issues Presented on Appeal.

Text: In her challenge to Instruction No. 15, Rivera maintains that a plaintiff seeking to prove wrongful discharge in violation of public policy does not need to prove that the employer lacked an overriding business justification. In support of her argument, Rivera cites Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 3100.1, which in turn cites Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1990), and Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988). Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 3100.1 (2012). Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 3100.1 does not contain an overriding-business-justification element. See id. From this premise, Rivera argues the fourth sentence of the instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof to her to show the employer lacked an overriding business justification for her termination. While recognizing that the element of an overriding business justification has been referred to in some of our cases, see, e.g., Davis v. Horton, 661 N.W.2d 533, 535–36 (Iowa 2003) (citing Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 281–82 & n.2 (Iowa 2000)), Rivera argues the element is not appropriate in light of the heightened but-for burden of causation that this court has required in wrongful-discharge-in-violationof-public-policy claims, see, e.g., Teachout v. Forest City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 584 N.W.2d 296, 301 (Iowa 1998). Rivera traces the derivation of the overriding-business-justification element to a treatise writer, Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. See 2 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal Law and Practice § 7.24, at 66–67 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter Perritt I]. She contends Professor Perritt clarified his position in later versions of his treatise to note that the fourth element is only applicable in cases in 9 which the employer concedes the wrongful motive played a part in the employment decision. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal Law and Practice § 7.08, at 7-100.1 (5th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2014) [hereinafter Perritt II]. Rivera notes the issue was extensively reviewed in Hagen I. In Hagen I, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa canvassed the development of Iowa law regarding wrongful discharges in violation of public policy. 964 F. Supp. 2d at 972–76. The court noted that under Iowa law, the causation requirement in a wrongful-dischargein-violation-of-public-policy claim is a heightened “determining factor” standard rather than a lower “motivating factor” standard ordinarily utilized in civil rights claims. Id. at 975–76. In light of the heightened causation standard, the court concluded the lack of legitimate business justification was not an additional element in the plaintiff’s case. Id. at 976. Although the court certified the question to this court, we declined to rule because we were equally divided on the question of whether a public policy was implicated in Hagen I. See Hagen v. Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. (Hagen II), No. 13–1372, 2014 WL 1884478,