Opinion ID: 1959972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ALLEGED ARBITRARINESS OF COMMONWEALTH'S OBJECTION TO PRETRIAL DIVERSION IN ELLIOTT v. COMMONWEALTH

Text: Appellee Elliott argues that, regardless of whether the Commonwealth's agreement is a precondition to the trial court's authority to grant pretrial diversion, the trial court properly approved his diversion application after the Commonwealth arbitrarily denied a favorable recommendation. It appears from the record that the primary basis of the Commonwealth's decision to oppose Appellee Elliott's application for pretrial diversion was the Kenton County Commonwealth Attorney's policy of opposing pretrial diversion in cases of employee theft. Appellee Elliott alleges that the Commonwealth acted arbitrarily by objecting to his pretrial diversion application without an individualized determination and under a policy which has the effect of excluding an entire class of eligible applicants. We observe, however, that even if we were to agree with Appellant Elliott's premise that the Commonwealth's recommendation as to his pretrial diversion application was arbitrary, the Kenton Circuit Court still lacked the authority to approve the application over the Commonwealth's objection. Although the trial court could have ordered the Commonwealth to reconsider its recommendation without regard to the policy, for reasons outlined previously, the Kenton Circuit Court had no power to approve the application without the Commonwealth's agreement. In any event, however, we are not persuaded by Appellee Elliott's claim of arbitrary treatment. The appellate courts of Kentucky have recognized that `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.' [37] Because the Commonwealth did not utilize any constitutionally impermissible standard in differentiating employee-theft defendants as a class of offenders for whom it would oppose pretrial diversion, Appellee Elliott cannot establish a claim of arbitrariness. We further observe that the General Assembly has directed Commonwealth's Attorneys to [c]onduct any other investigation ... with regard to ... the circumstances of the crime so as to enable him or her... to make a decision whether to recommend pretrial diversion. [38] Thus, because the policy addresses itself to the circumstances of a class of theft crimes, we find nothing arbitrary about the Commonwealth's categorical determination that it will not exercise its discretion to recommend pretrial diversion for offenders who have stolen from their employers.