Opinion ID: 2972191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: August 31, 2001 to September 4, 2001

Text: 6 No. 03-2473 Levon first argues that the district court erred in finding that the STA clock began to run on September 4, 2001, the date he pleaded not guilty, as opposed to August 31, 2001, the date he first appeared before the court. However, Levon failed to argue before the district court that the STA clock began to run prior to September 4, and therefore, we agree with the government that he waived the issue and cannot raise it on appeal. The district court’s opinion and order on the STA issue notes that “as confirmed at the hearing, Defendant does not argue that any time before September 4, 2001 counts under the STA.” Levon, 2002 WL 31548623 at  (emphasis added). It is apparent from this language in the district court’s opinion that Levon did not merely fail to raise time before September 4, he affirmatively confirmed for the court that he was not arguing the STA clock started running prior to September 4. This amounts to the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” and therefore constitutes a clear waiver. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).2 Furthermore, even if Levon had properly preserved an argument regarding August 31September 4, we would be bound to reject his claim on the merits. We have previously held that “[t]he plain meaning of the language of the STA requires a not guilty plea to begin the clock running.” United States v. O’Dell, 154 F.3d 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 Levon unconvincingly argues that notwithstanding his express confirmation to the district court that the clock began to run on September 4, the government preserved the running date of the clock for appeal. Levon points to the government’s STA brief to the district court, in which it listed as “Defendant’s initial appearance” the period between August 21, 2001, the date of the indictment, and September 4, 2001, and argued that the entire period was excludable. However, the government never explicitly argued that the clock began to run on August 21, and in making a motion for dismissal under the STA, Levon had the burden of proof. Because Levon conceded that the clock began to run on September 4, we find his argument regarding the government’s district court brief to be totally without merit. 7 No. 03-2473 3161(c)(1)). Defendant did not enter a not guilty plea until September 4, because he was not yet represented by counsel at his first appearance on August 31. Because “the statute expressly applies only to cases in which pleas of not guilty have been entered,” the date on which the defendant pleaded not guilty, rather than the initial appearance without counsel, “started the Speedy Trial Act clock in this case.” United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1985) (cited in O’Dell, 154 F.3d at 361); see also United States v. O’Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that STA clock did not begin to run until defendant appeared before district court with counsel and entered not guilty plea, despite having initially appeared before court several days earlier); cf. United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that because plain language of the STA requires a not guilty plea, STA was not triggered in case where the defendant never entered a not guilty plea); United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1567 (5th Cir. 1994) (STA clock begins to run with indictment or arraignment, whichever comes last). Therefore, even if Levon did not waive the argument, the STA clock did not begin to run until he pled not guilty on September 4, 2001.