Opinion ID: 1043279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal detainers

Text: Our analysis begins with the statutory language. The Speedy Trial Act provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). The term offense is defined as any Federal criminal offense which is in violation of any Act of Congress and is triable by any court established by Act of Congress, with certain exceptions not relevant here. 18 U.S.C. § 3172(2). Pursuant to the clear statutory language, the Act applies solely to individuals who have been arrested or served with a summons in connection with an alleged federal crime. See United States v. Kelly, 661 F.3d 682, 687 (1st Cir. 2011) (The Act, by its terms, applies only where there is an 'arrest' or service of a 'summons' in connection with the relevant federal charges. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2116 (2011). Thus, only that class of individuals is entitled to the thirty-day arrest to indictment requirement set forth in section 3161(b).7 7 Section 3161(h) sets forth various periods of delay that are to be excluded in calculating the deadline by which an indictment must be filed. Because we conclude that the clock did not begin ticking until October 3, there is no need to address any of these exceptions. -11- The record establishes that the appellant's August 6, 2011, arrest was effectuated by State deputies and resulted in him being charged with violations of State law. Following that arrest, he was held in State custody at the Cumberland County Jail after failing to post bail. Although the State dismissed its charges against the appellant on August 29, 2011, the record is devoid of any evidence that the Cumberland County Jail was notified of the dismissal in a timely manner. To the contrary, one possible conclusion emerges from the record. The Jail was not told the charges had been dismissed. Consequently, the Jail continued to hold the appellant because the Jail officials operated on the assumption he was still facing State charges, and not because of the federal detainer. Indeed, this is precisely what Jail officials told the government prosecutor on September 26, 2011, when she called to inquire about the appellant's continued detention. Clearly, the email exhibits submitted to the district court reveal that the Jail was not aware at all that the State charges had been dismissed until the State prosecutor asked the State court to fax a copy of the dismissal to the Jail on October 3, 2011. The record shows that once this was done, the Jail promptly advised the United States Marshals of the dismissal. The Marshals in turn swiftly arrested and took custody of the appellant -12- and brought him in front of a federal judge for his initial appearance, all of which occurred on October 3. Based on these undisputed facts, we conclude the appellant was in State custody (though perhaps unlawfully) from the time of his August 6, 2011, arrest by State sheriff's deputies through October 3, 2011. During that time, he was subject only to the jurisdiction of the State of Maine. It was not until the United States Marshals Service took custody of the appellant on October 3, 2011, that he was arrested in connection with federal charges. Accordingly, and pursuant to the plain language of the Act, the thirty-day arrest to indictment clock did not begin to count down until October 3, 2011. And the appellant's Speedy Trial Act argument simply cannot be reconciled with the clear statutory language. We have recognized that the Act sets bright-line rules. United States v. Hood, 469 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 2006). Other Circuits have noted that the Speedy Trial Act is intended to mandate an orderly and expeditious procedure for federal criminal prosecutions by fixing specific, mechanical time limits within which the various progressions in the prosecution must occur. United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Shahryar, 719 F.2d 1522, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1983). Consistent with its mechanical nature, the Act sets forth a very clear trigger for the thirty-day time limit: the date on -13- which a defendant is arrested or served with a summons in connection with a federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). The lodging of a federal detainer is conspicuously absent from the list of triggering events. This absence was not an oversight or mistake, as a subsequent provision of the Act specifically addresses federal detainers and the procedures that are to be employed in the event a detainer is lodged against an individual already serving a prison sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j)(1)-(2) (requiring the person with custody of a prisoner against whom a federal detainer has been lodged to advise that person of the charge and the right to demand trial thereon); see also Kelly, 661 F.3d at 685 (The Act . . . addresses individuals charged with federal crimes who are already serving a term of imprisonment.). Given the explicit reference to federal detainers elsewhere in the Act, it is clear Congress was well aware of their existence when it drafted the Act and, specifically, section 3161(b). The dictates of section 3161(b) are clear. Had Congress intended for the lodging of a federal detainer to begin the thirtyday countdown, it would have included detainers as a triggering event along with arrests and summonses. As Congress elected not to do so, it is not for this Court to substitute its judgment for that of Congress and rewrite the statute. -14-