Opinion ID: 514593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the plain error standard

Text: 9 Walker admits in his brief that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the jury verdict under Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). 4 Walker argues, however, that the evidence was close, and that the jury would have viewed it differently had they 10 understood that the defendant is presumed innocent throughout the deliberations, i.e., the presumption of innocence remained with the defendant even as the judge instructed the jury and, beyond, into the jury room--unless and until the jury became convinced that Mr. Walker was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 Walker Brief at 5. 12 At the outset, we note that defense counsel raised no objection to the instruction at trial. Consequently, this Court must review the judgment under the plain error standard. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.1974). To warrant reversal, the error must be both prejudicial and clear, as well as affect substantial rights of the defendant. 13 It is clear that the giving of the instruction, particularly in light of the entire charge, did not constitute plain error. This Court has stated that 14 [a] failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence.... must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances--including the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors. 15 United States v. Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 274 (5th Cir.1982) (citing Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 2090, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979)). 16 Here, the issue is not the failure to give a requested instruction, but the adequacy of the instruction given. No greater standard than that set out in Ruppel is required. Plain error does not exist when the relevant factors are considered. For example, the charge as a whole indicates that the presumption of innocence exists and that the Government has the burden of proof. 5 Furthermore, the defense counsel argued the presumption to the jurors, and the evidence was sufficient to convict. 17 The Eighth Circuit faced a similar dilemma in United States v. Hollister. 6 In Hollister, the court determined that the defendant was not denied his due process rights when the pattern jury charge for the Fifth Circuit was used. The Hollister court, applying the plain error doctrine, noted that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's rights were not violated where the defendant's counsel argued adequately [his] defense, and the prosecutor did not attempt to make improper arguments to the jury ... the weight of the evidence against [him] was strong; a jury could reasonably have found that defendant was guilty. Id. at 424. 18 Like the defendant in Hollister, Walker has not suffered a blow to his due process rights. The pattern jury instruction on the presumption of innocence which is used in this Circuit is clearly sufficient when examined under the plain error standard. The relevant factors are such that we determine that substantial rights of Walker have not been offended. 19