Opinion ID: 152917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The DNA Profile

Text: Under the DNA Act, DNA profiles currently function as identification records not unlike fingerprints, photographs, or social security numbers. To create a DNA profile, the FBI uses short tandem repeat (STR) technology to analyze repeating sequences found at thirteen specific regions, or loci, on an individual's DNA. See Weikert, 504 F.3d at 3; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818. Each of the targeted loci are found on so-called `junk DNA'DNA that differs from one individual to the next and thus can be used for purposes of identification but which was `purposely selected because [it is] not associated with any known physical or medical characteristics' and `do[es] not control or influence the expression of any trait.' Weikert, 504 F.3d at 3-4 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323 (2000), 2000 WL 1420163 (letter of Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee)). Thus, the resulting DNA profile `provide[s] a kind of genetic fingerprint, which uniquely identifies an individual, but does not provide a basis for determining or inferring anything else about the person.' Id. at 4 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27). This genetic fingerprint, represented as a series of digits, see Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA A Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (And Will) The Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 165, 169 (2006), is then loaded into CODIS without any associated information other than `an agency identifier for the agencies submitting the DNA profile; the specimen identification number; ... and the name of the DNA personnel associated with the DNA analysis.' Weikert, 504 F.3d at 4 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27). CODIS is a powerful identification and investigation tool, permitting state and local forensic laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to link evidence from crime scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the system. H.R. Rep. 106-900(I), at 8, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2324 (2000), 2000 WL 1420163. CODIS is currently used to run a weekly comparison of all DNA profiles in the national database and automatically return the resulting profile matches to the laboratories that submitted them. See United States Dep't of Justice, DNA Initiative, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/ codis (last visited Aug. 5, 2010). The DNA Act restricts the use of retained DNA profiles to limited purposes, including by criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes, in judicial proceedings if otherwise admissible, and for criminal defense purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3). [4] The unauthorized disclosure or use of a DNA profile is punishable by a fine of up to $250,000 or imprisonment of up to one year, id. § 14135e(c), and by cancellation of the user's access to the CODIS database, id. § 14132(c).
Given the DNA Act's stringent limitations on the creation and use of DNA profiles, CODIS currently functions much like a traditional fingerprint database, permitting law enforcement to match one identification record against others contained in the database. See, e.g., Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C.Cir. 2006) (CODIS functions much like an old-fashioned fingerprint database (albeit more efficiently)); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir.2007) ([Statutory] restrictions allow the Government to use an offender's DNA profile in substantially the same way that the Government uses fingerprint and photographic evidence-to identify offenders, to solve past and future crimes, and to combat recidivism.); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir.2005) ([W]e see the intrusion on privacy effected by the statute as similar to the intrusion wrought by the maintenance of fingerprint records.). It is well established that identification records of convicted felons, such as fingerprints or mugshots, are routinely retained by the government after their sentences are complete and may be expunged only in narrowly defined circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (requiring the Attorney General to acquire, collect, classify and preserve  criminal identification records (emphasis added)); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 49-50 & n. 4 (1st Cir.2007) (discussing limited grounds for expungement of criminal records); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir.2007) ([I]t is well established that the state need not destroy records of identificationsuch as fingerprints, photographs, etc.of convicted felons, once their sentences are up.). Other precedents hold that the government's matching of a lawfully obtained identification record against other records in its lawful possession does not infringe on an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1151-53 (9th Cir.2007) (running computerized check of individual's lawfully obtained license plate and driver's license identification numbers in government databases, which revealed information about subject's car ownership, driver status, and criminal record, was not a search under the Fourth Amendment); Willan v. Columbia County, 280 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir.2002) (police query of FBI's computerized national crime records database to reveal record of mayoral candidate's earlier conviction in another state was not a Fourth Amendment search). These long-standing practices and precedents on the retention and matching of offenders' identification records inescapably inform a convicted offender's reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his or her DNA profile. As with the matching of records in a fingerprint database, the government's use of CODIS to match Boroian's profile against other profiles in the database is limited to a comparison of the identification records already in its lawful possession and does not reveal any new, private or intimate information about Boroian. Moreover, the government's comparison of Boroian's DNA profile with other profiles in CODIS is precisely the use for which the profile was initially lawfully created and entered into CODIS under the DNA Act. Boroian suggests that the government does not need his DNA profile for identification purposes because it already has other means of identification, such as his fingerprints and social security number. However, the fact that the government may lawfully retain and access these more traditional means of identifying Boroian only emphasizes that the government's retention and matching of his DNA profile does not intrude on Boroian's legitimate expectation of privacy. At present, Boroian's DNA profile simply functions as an additional, albeit more technologically advanced, means of identification. Therefore, we join the other courts to have addressed the issue in holding that the government's retention and matching of Boroian's profile against other profiles in CODIS does not violate an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, and thus does not constitute a separate search under the Fourth Amendment. [5] See Johnson, 440 F.3d at 499 ([W]e conclude that accessing the DNA snapshots contained in the CODIS database does not independently implicate the Fourth Amendment.); accord Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir.2008) (stating that claim based on the government's retention and use of DNA profile does not implicate the Fourth Amendment); Amerson, 483 F.3d at 86 (acknowledging that offenders' DNA profiles will be retained and potentially used to identify offenders after probation terms have ended, but concluding that we do not believe that this changes the ultimate analysis); see also Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ind.2001) (holding that the comparison of a lawfully obtained DNA profile with other DNA profiles in government database does not constitute a separate search under the Fourth Amendment and collecting other state appellate decisions in accord). Boroian has not cited, and our research has not revealed, any decisions holding to the contrary. [6]
We do not hold, as some courts have suggested, that once a DNA sample is lawfully extracted from an individual and a DNA profile lawfully created, the individual necessarily loses a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to any subsequent use of that profile. See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai`i 38, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (2003) (citing state appellate decisions for the proposition that once a DNA profile has been lawfully procured from an offender, no privacy interest persists in the profile); see also Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir.2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating, in challenge to state DNA collection statute, that lawfully obtained DNA sample may be put to various uses because the fourth amendment does not control how properly collected information is deployed). Instead, we narrowly hold that once a qualified federal offender's profile has been lawfully created and entered into CODIS under the DNA Act, the FBI's retention and periodic matching of the profile against other profiles in CODIS for the purpose of identification is not an intrusion on the offender's legitimate expectation of privacy and thus does not constitute a separate Fourth Amendment search. We recognize, as we did in Weikert, the possibility that the government may eventually seek to put Boroian's retained DNA profile to uses that go beyond the mere matching of identification records, thereby making the fingerprint analogy less powerful and providing the basis for an argument that a new search has occurred. [7] For example, scientific advances might make it possible to deduce information beyond identity from the junk DNA that forms the thirteen-loci profiles stored in CODIS. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12-13. Future government uses of the DNA profiles in CODIS could potentially reveal more intimate or private information about the profile's owner and depart from the uses for which the profiles were originally lawfully created and retained. In this case, however, these are merely hypothetical possibilities. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) ([W]e have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.). Although Boroian points to ongoing research on the possible functions of so-called junk DNA, he concedes that none of the genetic markers at the thirteen CODIS loci have, to date, been found predictive for any physical or disease traits. Moreover, as we have described, uses of DNA profiles are restricted by statute to law enforcement identification purposes and other limited uses. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (emphasis added). As in Weikert, the possibility that junk DNA may not be junk DNA some day ... does not significantly augment [Boroian's] privacy interest in the present case. 504 F.3d at 13. Although CODIS is designed to conduct comparisons of the profiles in the national database and automatically report exact profile matches, Boroian further argues that in some cases CODIS may report a partial match. A partial match occurs when two profiles are similar but do not match exactly at all thirteen loci. Because we share more of our genetic material with biological relatives than with others, a partial match can suggest that the source of a crime scene sample is a close biological relative of the individual whose DNA profile partially matches the crime scene profile. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 309, 319 (2010). Boroian thus contends that through the process of partial matching, DNA profiles, unlike fingerprints, can be used to reveal biological relationships between individuals. Arguably, the government's use of CODIS to discover partial matches could raise privacy concerns not raised by a traditional fingerprint database. See, e.g., id. at 342-68 (discussing ways in which partial matching could implicate the privacy interests of both the offender whose profile yields a partial match, and the offender's relatives who could be subjected to law enforcement scrutiny as a result of the partial match). However, we need not address these hypothetical concerns here. To the extent that Boroian seeks to suggest that his own privacy interests are infringed by partial matching, he has not alleged any present or imminent use of CODIS to check his DNA profile for partial matches. He relies solely on a 2006 CODIS Bulletin, which states that the occurrence of a partial match in the national database is an exceptional event and that even if a partial match does occur an offender's personally identifiable information may be disclosed only in narrowly specified circumstances. [8] The record contains no other information shedding light on how frequently partial matches occur in the national database, exactly what they reveal, or what kind of follow-up investigation is done when a partial match arises. Thus, any potential invasion of Boroian's privacy due to a partial match with his DNA profile is at this point purely speculative. To the extent that Boroian seeks to invoke the privacy interests of a familial relation who might someday be subjected to law enforcement scrutiny based on a partial match with Borian's profile, that claim is similarly speculative.