Opinion ID: 2977989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conti’s elcra claims

Text: Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” M.C.L. 37.2202(1)(c). This provision includes “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment . . . .” Downey v. Charlevoix County Bd. of County Rd Comm’rs, 576 N.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). - 14 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle Michigan courts have recognized that ELCRA claims generally are to be evaluated on summary disposition in the same manner as Title VII claims, and that both state and federal precedents are relevant. See Harrison v. Olde Financial Corp., 572 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). Like Title VII, an ELCRA discrimination claim may be established by direct or indirect evidence. See Meagher v. Wayne State Univ., 565 N.W.2d 401, 410 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). Thus, in addition to being able to rely on direct proof of intentional discrimination, ELCRA plaintiffs also may rely on the indirect, burden-shifting approach sanctioned in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Meagher, 565 N.W.2d at 410. Direct Proof “The elements of a mixed motive case are (1) the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, (2) an adverse employment action, (3) the defendant was predisposed to discriminating against members of the plaintiff's protected class, and (4) the defendant actually acted on that predisposition in visiting the adverse employment action on the plaintiff.” Wilcoxon v. 3M, 597 N.W.2d 250, 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). Direct evidence of intentional discrimination is “evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor.” Downey, 576 N.W.2d at 718; Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir. 1999). On this approach, a plaintiff must offer “credible, direct evidence of discriminatory animus.” Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111, 114-15 (6th Cir. 1987). “[O]nce the plaintiff has met the initial burden of proving that the illegal conduct . . . was more likely than not a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant’s decision, the defendant has the - 15 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle opportunity to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision without consideration of the protected characteristic.” Harrison, 572 N.W.2d at 683. To establish a case of intentional discrimination, Conti points to four items she contends are direct evidence of discrimination: (1) Dauch’s writings praising gender-biased management styles;4 (2) Dauch’s role as a decision-maker; (3) an alleged statement by Earhart in 2001 that Conti was not promoted to a Director position at that time because she “did not have a penis;” and (4) alleged statements from Conti’s prior supervisor, Roy Langenbach, instructing her not to hire a woman who was overweight or a woman who was a mother. Conti also offers statistical evidence showing that AAM has never had a female executive director or vice president, and that only a small percentage of its executives, all at the lowest salary bands, are female.5 The district court declined to consider evidence from Dauch’s “unsworn writings contained in a book intended for the general public as evidence in this matter of what occurred to Plaintiff while employed with Defendant.” J.A. 2515. As to Conti’s other evidence, the district court concluded that, even accepting these allegations as true, they failed to support a “direct” showing of discrimination. J.A. 2520. In entering summary judgment in favor of AAM, the district court concluded that, although such evidence shows that “gender may have played a roll [sic] in the overall 4 In particular, Conti focuses on Dauch’s statement in a published book that German and Japanese management styles “can teach us a lesson,” while simultaneously acknowledging that women “[do] not get equal consideration or special deference in either.” J.A. 1687-89. 5 The dissent challenges Conti’s statistical evidence as “subjective,” and criticizes it for failing to “analyze any component of AAM’s hiring process.” Dissenting Op. at 6. These criticisms, however, are misplaced, at least at this stage, because we are obliged to interpret the evidence in the light most favorable to Conti and to make all inferences in her favor. - 16 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle management and hiring decisions of Defendant,” it does not “‘require the conclusion’ that Plaintiff’s gender was a motivating factor in employment decisions specifically affecting her.” J.A. 2520. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the district court, we conclude that the record does not permit summary disposition at this time. To the extent that Conti’s claims rely on the role that Dauch and his allegedly biased management style played in her stalled advancement, summary judgment at this point would be premature given that Conti has yet to depose Dauch. Without question, information that Conti obtains during that deposition may be relevant to both her direct and indirect evidence claims. But even setting aside our conclusion regarding the deposition issue, the district court’s grant of summary disposition was inappropriate. Conti testified that Earhart expressly stated that Conti was passed over for a promotion based on her sex. J.A. 2142. If Conti had relied on this statement as evidence of Earhart’s discriminatory attitudes toward Conti, we may agree with the district court’s conclusion that such sentiments cannot support Conti’s claims because it is evident that Earhart played no role in any employment decisions affecting her, see Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Statements by nondecisionmakers . . . [cannot] suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden . . . of demonstrating animus.” (citations omitted)), and because Earhart’s sentiments cannot be imputed to Conti’s superiors, see Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 945-46 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that racial animus by plant manager could not be imputed to upper-level manager who made decision to terminate absent proof of a connection). But Conti does not rely on this statement to show Earhart’s animus, but rather to show his understanding of the motives of other executives who did make the decision not to promote Conti. - 17 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle Taking Conti’s claim as true, as we must at this stage, this statement speaks directly to Conti’s claim that sex was a motivating factor in AAM’s decision not to promote her. Although AAM challenges whether Earhart ever made such a statement, and if he did, whether that statement is credible, that issue is precisely the type of disputed issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. See Harrison, 572 N.W.2d at 681 n.5 (“The defendant’s employees in question deny making the comments, which, in turn, calls into question plaintiff’s credibility. When credibility is at issue, summary disposition rarely is appropriate.”). The other direct evidence on which Conti relies is to the same effect. Taking all of this evidence together, we find it sufficient to survive summary judgment. Although some of Conti’s claims do not relate to adverse employment actions directly affecting her, such a narrow reading of the case law is improper. Michigan courts have held that a plaintiff proceeding on a direct evidence theory must point to allegations that “‘require the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.’” Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 666 N.W.2d 186, 192 (Mich. 2003) (quoting Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir. 1999)). But that merely requires that the plaintiff show that “the defendant’s discriminatory animus was more likely than not a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the decision,” or that defendant’s “discriminatory animus was causally related to the adverse decision.” Id. at 193 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989)). The “requires the conclusion” standard does not imply that every allegation and every piece of evidence pertain directly to the adverse actions taken against the plaintiff. A direct evidence claim may be supported by more generalized evidence, so long as the - 18 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle evidence when taken as a whole requires the conclusion that the defendant’s discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. See Harrison, 572 N.W.2d at 683 (citing Kresnak v. City of Muskegon Heights, 956 F. Supp. 1327, 1335 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (noting that negative statements and racial slurs are sufficient to establish a prima facie case and survive summary judgment even if those comments were not directed at or made about the plaintiff directly) (citing LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1993), and Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Inc., 61 F.3d 1241, 1249 (6th Cir. 1995))). As this Court has noted in a similar context, “[d]iscriminatory statements may reflect a cumulative managerial attitude among the defendant-employer’s managers that has influenced the decisionmaking process for a considerable time. Thus, management’s consideration of an impermissible factor in one context may support the inference that the impermissible factor entered into the decisionmaking process in another context.” Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998). Because Conti’s allegations, when considered together and taken as true, raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her sex was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse actions taken against her, summary judgment is inappropriate. Indirect Proof In the alternative, Conti offers indirect evidence to support her mixed-motive claims. As in the direct evidence context, a plaintiff relying on indirect evidence still must make a prima facie showing of discrimination. To make an indirect “prima facie” case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that she did so “under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Wilcoxon, 597 N.W.2d at 257. The use of the term - 19 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle “prima facie case” in this context, however, may be misleading inasmuch as this threshold showing “does not mean that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to allow the case to go to a jury, but rather that the plaintiff produced enough evidence to create a rebuttable presumption of . . . discrimination.” Meagher, 565 N.W.2d at 410; see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981) (“The phrase ‘prima facie case’ not only may denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff’s burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the Title VII context we use ‘prima facie case’ in the former sense.” (citation omitted)). In other words, a plaintiff’s “prima facie” showing in this context “does not describe the plaintiff’s burden of production, but merely establishes a rebuttable presumption.” Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 628 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Mich. 2001). To survive summary judgment in this context, a plaintiff also must satisfy the additional burdens set out in McDonnell Douglas. See Hazle, 628 N.W.2d at 520-21. Under that familiar framework, “the court then examines whether the defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If that articulation is made, the court next considers whether the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason offered by the defendant was a mere pretext for discrimination.” Harrison, 572 N.W.2d at 682 (internal citations omitted). Conti attempts to makes her “prima facie” showing by pointing to the following alleged adverse employment actions: (1) unlike Earhart, she was not placed in salary band 15 when she was promoted to a co-Director position in 2003; (2) she was demoted in 2003; (3) she was not afforded the same training and advancement opportunities as male co-workers; and (4) she was paid less than - 20 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle her immediate male predecessor, Pannucci, when she took over the New Model Launch department. See Conti Br. at 34. Reading the record in the light most favorable to Conti, these claims certainly demonstrate adverse employment actions that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. For instance, the record does show that AAM promoted Conti’s male co-worker, Earhart, to a vacant director position two years before Conti.6 The record also supports her claim that when she eventually was made a co-Director two years later, she was not elevated to a higher salary band as was Earhart when he was promoted. There also is no dispute that Conti was demoted back to an SEIT position in the summer of 2003, only a few months after her promotion. And the record also is clear that, in 2004 when Conti was promoted to head of the New Model Launch department, she was assigned the title of manager rather than director, a distinction which again precluded her from being eligible for higher executive bonuses. The record also is unequivocal that Conti did not receive the same salary as her immediate male predecessor upon her promotion. Each of these claims is sufficient to allege an adverse employment action. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (recognizing that a “tangible employment action” includes “a denial of a raise or a promotion”); Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[D]enial of money would more than 6 Confusingly, the dissent argues that “Earhart’s role as a Director prior to becoming co-Directors with Conti is not relevant to his later role as co-Director.” Dissenting Op. at 9. But that argument misses the point. While not relevant “to his later role as co-Director,” Earhart’s promotion two years ahead of Conti certainly is relevant to determining whether AAM promoted a lessqualified male employee over Conti based on her sex. The dissent also ignores that, even when she finally was promoted to the same position as Earhart two years later, Conti was not promoted to the same salary band. Again, we must read this evidence in the light most favorable to Conti. - 21 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle amply qualify as a materially adverse action to any reasonable employee for Title VII purposes.”); Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir. 2000) (accepting that the denial of the proper pay increase with the plaintiff’s promotion constituted an adverse employment action). Accordingly, Conti’s claims are sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination. Under McDonnell Douglas, the burden thus shifts to American Axle to demonstrate that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for these employment decisions. If AAM makes such a showing, Conti assumes the burden of showing pretext. Reviewing the record, we conclude that AAM has provided significant, nondiscriminatory reasons for these employment actions, but that Conti has introduced sufficient evidence to raise a material question of fact as to whether these justifications are merely pretext for unlawful discrimination. As to Conti’s delayed promotion and eventual demotion, the company argues that Conti’s management style was abrasive and ineffectual, that her subordinates often complained, and that several of her subordinates either left her section or the company entirely. In response, however, Conti points out that many of these employment reviews are from 1997, see J.A. 354, while a 2000 review, the year immediately prior to Earhart’s promotion, indicates that Conti’s work generally was “commendable” or “competent,” J.A. 1649-51. Conti also points out that, if she was so incompetent, why was she promoted to a co-Director position in 2003, and then again promoted to a manager position in 2004. We cannot merely discount these positive performance reviews and Conti’s other rebuttal evidence, as the district court seems to have done, but instead must read this evidence in the light most favorable to Conti. At a minimum, these conflicting accounts of Conti’s performance - 22 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle raise a triable issue of fact as to whether AAM’s proffered justifications are pretextual, and thus summary judgment is inappropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (“[T]he judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”); Hazle, 628 N.W.2d at 522 n.10 (making clear that, “in response to a motion for summary disposition [in the indirect evidence context], the nonmoving party’s obligation is only to show the existence of a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact’” as to the pretext element). AAM also argues that Conti was not as qualified as many of the male executives to which she seeks to compare herself. Conti rejects that assertion. In comparison to Earhart, Conti claims that she was just as qualified for the promotion. The fact that AAM eventually promoted her to the same position as Earhart, making them co-Directors of the same department, seems to support that contention. In regards to Pannucci, Conti acknowledges that Pannucci had an engineering degree and plant management experience, but disputes whether these are relevant considerations for the head of the New Model Launch department. Again, the record does not provide an answer to this disputed question, and thus summary disposition is improper. Hazle, 628 N.W.2d at 522 (“[F]or purposes of a motion for summary disposition or directed verdict, a plaintiff need only create a question of material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ regarding whether discrimination was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”). Retaliation Conti also alleges that these adverse employment actions were taken in retaliation for her protected conduct in the Van Zoest case. In order to show causation in a retaliatory discrimination case, “plaintiff must show something more than merely a coincidence in time between protected - 23 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle activity and adverse employment action.” West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Mich. 2003). “Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed.” Id. The district court granted summary judgment on this issue because it found that, other than the fact that Conti was demoted a few months after her protected activity, Conti failed to produce any evidence affirmatively showing that her demotion, or any other adverse employment action, was related to her decision to testify about discriminatory hiring practices in the Van Zoest case. As the district court framed the issue, AAM is entitled to summary judgment essentially because Conti failed to show that Shanti, her direct supervisor at the time, was aware of her protected conduct. As discussed above, however, the record does suggest that Dauch likely was aware of Conti’s protected activity and that he maintained a very hands-on management approach. Because Conti has not yet had the opportunity to depose Dauch on this matter, we conclude that it would be premature at this juncture to grant summary judgment as to her retaliation claim. We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court on this claim as well.