Opinion ID: 1968444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Second Degree Murder Instruction Issue

Text: Bright contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on second degree murder as a lesser included offense. He maintains that [g]iven the speed with which events unfolded, together with the lack of evidence of motive and premeditation, `the jury rationally could have opted for second degree' murder. He cites Shuler v. United States, 677 A.2d 1014, 1018 n. 6 (D.C.1996) in support of his argument. The government argues that Bright's state of mind was not in issue during the trial, and that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation but no evidence to support a second degree murder instruction. The trial judge declined to give the second degree instruction because of the absence of evidence that shows the second degree murder in this case given the nature of what the witnesses have said if the jury believes it occurred in terms of how the shooter approached the two decedents and where he shot the two decedents. The trial judge also stated: The one thing lacking I think in terms of the Government's evidence on those issues is motive although there was some motive evidence that came out that would, if the jury believes established certain elements, help establish certain elements in the charge of first degree murder. I haven't heard anything yet that would lead the Court to conclude that it warrants a lesser-included offense even though I understand as the Court of Appeals has said that the standard is if there's any evidence of second degree murder. I think there are cases where  the standard is not in every first degree murder case that you should give second degree murder. I believe an argument can always be made that a jury has to decide whether its premeditated or deliberation. So for those reasons, I'll deny the request for second degree murder. As we have said previously, [t]o justify a lesser included offense instruction, `there must be evidence to support a finding of guilt on the lesser offense.' Shuler, supra, 677 A.2d at 1017 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence. [However,] the court is not required to put the case to the jury on a basis that essentially indulges and even encourages speculations as to bizarre reconstruction. Id. (citations omitted). Here, the record reveals no dispute regarding Bright's state of mind. His defense theory was misidentification, and thus the only issue regarding the murders was the identity of the assailant. Bright's argument concerning the speed of events and the lack of motive evidence lacks merit. The law requires no particular period of time for premeditation and deliberation. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.17 (4th ed.1993). It may be hours, days, or even longer, or it may cover a span of minutes [or less]. Id. at 276. Hence, speed is not a controlling factor with respect to premeditation and deliberation. Furthermore, motive is not the only way in which premeditation and deliberation may be established. [10] To establish premeditation and deliberation, the government offered evidence that Bright brought a gun to the scene of the crime, emerged from a cut or a path to intercept Peay from behind, killed her with one shot to the head, and then chased Ramsey and shot him three or four times  in his back and head. In addition, Donald Johnson who also stayed in the Providence Street apartment where Bright slept in the living room, testified that he heard Bright complain two or three times prior to the murders that Ramsey owed him some money or something and that he, Bright, was going to f___k [Ramsey] up ... mess [Ramsey] up. Although circumstantial, this evidence, if believed by reasonable jurors, was sufficient to demonstrate premeditation and deliberation. See Hall, supra, 454 A.2d at 317-18; Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 782-83 (D.C.1991). We have said previously that [p]remeditation and deliberation distinguish first and second-degree murder. [F]irst-degree murder, with its requirement of premeditation and deliberation, covers calculated and planned killings, while homicides that are unplanned or impulsive, even though they are intentional and with malice aforethought, are murder in the second degree. Hall, supra, 454 A.2d at 317. On the record before us, we see no evidence of unplanned or impulsive murders. Therefore, the trial judge was not obligated to give a second degree murder instruction. Had the trial judge done so, the jury would have had to disregard the government's evidence and engage in conjecture regarding why and how the two murders might have occurred. As we said in Shuler, supra, the court is `not required to put the case to the jury on a basis that essentially indulges and even encourages speculations as to bizarre reconstruction.' 677 A.2d at 1017. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the request for a second degree murder instruction because there was no evidence to support a finding of guilt on the lesser offense. Id.