Opinion ID: 1135610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: plaintiff's taking and forum contentions

Text: Plaintiff contends that compelling it to provide a forum on its private property is a taking under both Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution provides: Private property shall not be taken for public use    without just compensation[.] The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.  (Emphasis added.) By the Fourteenth Amendment, the rights of persons as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment are made applicable to the states. Plaintiff does not suggest any different analysis under the Oregon Constitution than under the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that the analysis would be the same under both constitutions. See Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568, 572 n. 4, 825 P.2d 641 (1992), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 467, 121 L.Ed.2d 374 (1992) (making that assumption). In addition, as held in Hughes v. State of Oregon, 314 Or. 1, 34, 838 P.2d 1018 (1992), [n]ot every acquisition of a private property interest by the state constitutes a taking under section 18[.] In a previous case involving the Lloyd Center, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States did not confer upon persons seeking to distribute handbills within the Lloyd Center the right to do so. [1] But in the later case of PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81-83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980), the Court held: Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.       here there has literally been a `taking' of that right [to exclude others] to the extent that the California Supreme Court has interpreted the State Constitution to entitle its citizens to exercise free expression and petition rights on shopping center property. But it is well established that `not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a taking in the constitutional sense.' Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1568, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). Rather, the determination whether a state law unlawfully infringes a landowner's property in violation of the Taking Clause requires an examination of whether the restriction on private property `forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' Id., at 49, 80 S.Ct., at 1569. This examination entails inquiry into such factors as the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.    Here the requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property rights under the Taking Clause.  (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, supra , involved a large shopping center in California. Again, assuming that the analysis under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution is the same as the analysis under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the result under Article I, section 18, is the same as the result in PruneYard. Accordingly, we hold that there is no taking in this case in violation of the Takings Clause of the Oregon Constitution or the Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiff contends, in addition, that compelling it to provide a forum for positions with which it disagrees or wishes to remain neutral violates its rights and those of its tenants under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution [2] and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Again, plaintiff does not suggest any different analysis under the Oregon Constitution than under the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that the analysis would be the same under both constitutions. Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg, supra, 312 Or. at 572 n. 4, 825 P.2d 641. Requiring the Lloyd Corporation to permit persons seeking signatures on initiative petitions to have reasonable access to the common areas of the Lloyd Center would not, as contended by Lloyd Corporation, [c]ompel[] the Lloyd Center to provide a forum on its private property for positions with which it disagrees or on which it wishes to remain neutral[,] violat[ing] its rights and those of its tenants under Article I, Section 8 of the Oregon Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Again, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, supra, 447 U.S. at 85, 100 S.Ct. at 2043, the Supreme Court of the United States considered and decided this same question and stated that: Appellants finally contend that a private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others. After discussion of that contention, the Court held: We conclude that neither appellants' federally recognized property rights nor their First Amendment rights have been infringed by the California Supreme Court's decision recognizing a right of appellees to exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellants' property. Id. at 88, 100 S.Ct. at 2044. Again, assuming that the analysis under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution is the same as the analysis under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the result under Article I, section 8, is the same as the result under the First Amendment in PruneYard. Plaintiff makes no separate or different contention. Plaintiff's constitutional rights to free expression are not infringed by the activities permitted to defendants in this opinion.