Opinion ID: 1937209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Action against the Zoning Board of Appeals

Text: In Russell v. Giles et al., docket number CV-77-102, we hold, contrary to the long-standing and largely unquestioned practice in this state, that the zoning board of appeals of a municipality is not a proper party to an appeal in the Superior Court from its own decision. Analysis of the statutes governing that quasi-judicial body, 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 2411 & 4963, and of the town zoning ordinance, particularly those provisions defining the scope of the board's jurisdiction and powers, leads to the conclusion that the proper parties defendant in cases like the one at bar are either the municipal officers or the building inspector. The landowner having thus failed to bring any proper party defendant before the Superior Court, his complaint should have been dismissed. Nowhere in the statutes dealing with municipal zoning boards of appeals does the legislature specify who shall be named as defendants in an 80B action, [8] nor does the zoning ordinance with which we are here concerned provide an answer to that question. [9] Some courts in other jurisdictions have held that a zoning board of appeals, as an agency of the municipality, represents the public interest in the enforcement of zoning regulations and should therefore represent the municipality in appeals taken from its decisions. E. g., Benes v. Jefferson County Bd. of Adjustment, 36 Colo.App. 131, 537 P.2d 753 (1975); Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of New Castle County v. Dragon Run Terrace, Inc., 216 A.2d 146 (Del. 1965); Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16, 15 A.2d 6 (1940). Other courts, rejecting the agency theory, have held that the municipality rather than its board of appeals is the proper party to such an appeal. E. g., Kelley v. Hopkinton Village Precinct, 108 N.H. 206, 231 A.2d 269 (1967); A. Di Cillo & Sons, Inc. v. Chester Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Ohio St. 302, 109 N.E.2d 8 (1952); Miles v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938). In Di Cillo & Sons, the Ohio Supreme Court, construing a statutory scheme markedly similar to our own, noted that the board was expressly not made a party before itself. Conceding the argument that the board represented the public interest in its decisionmaking process, the court held that it does not follow that the board or any of its members as such may become partisans when one of its decisions is questioned on appeal to a court. 158 Ohio St. at 305, 109 N.E.2d at 10. The reasoning of Di Cillo & Sons is fully applicable to the case at bar. Although the Boothbay Harbor Zoning Board of Appeals serves the public interest, it accomplishes that end in its adjudicatory function  by rendering decisions impartially in the controversies within its limited jurisdiction. It has no responsibility for enforcement as such. Section 4963(1) provides that the board is established . . . for the purpose of hearing appeals (emphasis added). Section 2411(4), which echoes that purpose, specifically withholds from the board jurisdiction over any matter unless the municipality has by ordinance specified the precise subject matter that may be appealed to the board. Various provisions in section 2411(2) are aimed at ensuring the impartiality of the board's members. The Boothbay Harbor ordinance itself confirms the exclusivity of the board's adjudicatory function. On the other hand, the duty of enforcing zoning regulations in Boothbay Harbor is affirmatively reposed in the town officers, and the ordinance directs them to appoint a Code Enforcement Officer (who is also the building inspector), giving that officer specific powers to administer and to enforce its provisions. The ordinance further ensures in a number of provisions that both the town manager and the town official or agency whose decision is being challenged in appeals before the board are made participants in every stage of the proceedings. Absent a positive legislative grant of authority to the board to defend its decisions on appeal, and finding every indication to the contrary in the statutes and in the ordinance, we hold that the board is not a proper party defendant to appeals from its decisions to the Superior Court. Cf. Assessors, Town of Bristol v. Eldridge, Me., 392 A.2d 37 (1978) (assessors of a town not proper party to appeal from abatement decision by county commissioners). The town's interest is properly represented in that forum by the same party that appeared in its behalf before the zoning board  here, the building inspector. Although any action brought only against a municipal zoning board of appeals must be dismissed, we note that in any pending or future litigation where the same error is made, amendment of the complaint will ordinarily be available under M.R.Civ.P. 15(c) to allow the plaintiff to join the proper party defendant. In the instant case, however, even if amendment had been permitted, the merits of the 80B action would be disposed of adversely to plaintiff Russell by our affirmance of the injunction in CV-77-124.