Opinion ID: 2271694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the relevant principles of statutory construction

Text: `The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.' Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dept. of the Env't, 410 Md. 326, 338, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 212, 973 A.2d 233, 241 (2009)). `Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language.' United States v. Ambrose, 403 Md. 425, 438, 942 A.2d 755, 763 (2008) (quoting Kushell v. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186, 193-94 (2005)). `[W]e neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain language of the statute; nor [do we] construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.' Lonaconing, 410 Md. at 339, 978 A.2d at 709 (quoting Ambrose, 403 Md. at 439, 942 A.2d at 763). This Court reads the statute as a whole to ensure that none of its provisions are rendered meaningless. Id. We will not construe a statute to reach a result 'that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.' Id. (quoting Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. at 215, 973 A.2d at 242). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need look no further than the language of the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condominium, 404 Md. 560, 572, 948 A.2d 11, 19 (2008). When the language of the statute is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous and we usually look beyond the statutory language to the statute's legislative history, prior case law, the statutory purpose, and the statutory structure as aids in ascertaining the Legislature's intent. Id. ; see also Kortobi v. Kass, 410 Md. 168, 177, 978 A.2d 247, 252 (2009); Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135, 747 A.2d 625, 628 (2000). Where a statute is ambiguous, we also consider `the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.' Chesapeake Charter, Inc., 358 Md. at 135, 747 A.2d at 628 (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). With regard to the specific type of statute that we consider in the present case, an exemption from execution of a judgment law `ought to be liberally construed.' In re Taylor, 312 Md. 58, 71 n. 5, 537 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1988) (quoting Muhr v. Pinover, 67 Md. 480, 487, 10 A. 289, 289 (1887)); see also Fowler v. Gray, 99 Md. 594, 599, 58 A. 444, 446 (1904); Darby v. Rouse, 75 Md. 26, 28, 22 A. 1110, 1110 (1891). When construing an exemption from execution statute, this Court gives due consideration ... to the purpose of granting the exemptions and the objectives to be fulfilled by the granting of them. In re Taylor, 312 Md. at 71, 537 A.2d at 1185.