Opinion ID: 2453721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Standard of Review/Equal Protection Principles

Text: The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws, and the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights § 1 provides virtually the same protection. See State v. Limon, 280 Kan. 275, 283, 122 P.3d 22 (2005). When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged on the basis of an equal protection violation, courts must construe the statute as constitutional if there is any reasonable way to do so. Consequently, in reviewing a statute we presume that it is constitutional and resolve all doubts in favor of its validity. An appellate court conducts unlimited review of this question because it presents a question of law. See State v. Gaudina, 284 Kan. 354, 372, 160 P.3d 854 (2007); Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin, 262 Kan. 840, 844, 942 P.2d 591 (1997). The first step of an equal protection analysis is to determine the nature of the legislative classifications and whether the classifications result in arguably indistinguishable classes of individuals being treated differently. Only if there is differing treatment of similarly situated individuals are the federal and Kansas Equal Protection Clauses implicated. See State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 245, 248, 210 P.3d 635 (2009); Hodges v. Johnson, 288 Kan. 56, 72, 199 P.3d 1251 (2009); see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (guiding principle of equal protection analysis is that similarly situated individuals should be treated alike). Here, as with the previous issue, the parties agree that the KRTA treats arguably indistinguishable classes, i.e., parties responsible for recreational trails, differently by only placing requirements on rail-trails created pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). After determining the nature of the legislative classifications, a court examines the rights which are affected by the classifications. The nature of the rights dictates the level of scrutiny to be applied. Salas, 289 Kan. at 248-49, 210 P.3d 635; Hodges, 288 Kan. at 72-73, 199 P.3d 1251. Federal and Kansas courts have long delineated three levels of scrutiny in equal protection cases: (1) the rational basis standard to determine whether a statutory classification bears some rational relationship to a valid legislative purpose; (2) the heightened or intermediate scrutiny standard to determine whether a statutory classification substantially furthers a legitimate legislative purpose; and (3) the strict scrutiny standard to determine whether a statutory classification is necessary to serve some compelling state interest. Limon, 280 Kan. at 283-84, 122 P.3d 22; see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003) (strict scrutiny); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) (heightened scrutiny); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (rational basis). In this case, Kanza has not argued that either the heightened scrutiny or strict scrutiny standard should be applied; it accepts the application of the rational basis standard. The final step of the analysis requires determining whether the relationship between the classifications and the object desired to be obtained withstands the applicable level of scrutiny. Limon, 280 Kan. at 283-84, 122 P.3d 22. Where, as in this case, a party attacks a statute as facially unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause for failing to satisfy the rational basis standard, the party must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exist that survive constitutional muster. Injured Workers of Kansas, 262 Kan. at 850, 942 P.2d 591. For this reason, it is not enough to [s]imply point[ ] out that [a statute] might not be rationally related to the state objectives sought under one set of facts. Injured Workers of Kansas, 262 Kan. at 851, 942 P.2d 591. Instead, a party asserting the unconstitutionality of a statute under the rational basis standard `ha[s] the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support [the classification].' [Citations omitted.] Peden v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 261 Kan. 239, 253, 930 P.2d 1 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1229, 117 S.Ct. 1821, 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997); see Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, Syl. ¶ 2, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001) (When a statute is attacked on equal protection grounds, the general rule is that the statute is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the party attacking the statute to prove otherwise.). The district court pointed out that Kanza could cite to no other jurisdiction in which an appellate court has held that a state rails-to-trails statutory scheme violated equal protection rights. Further, the court found there is a rational basis for the requirements placed on the parties responsible for rail-trails: [T]he responsibilities imposed upon [Kanza] pursuant to the KRTA in this action have a rational basis in preserving and promoting a safe trail for users, while protecting the private property rights of adjacent landowners. Kanza is dissatisfied with the district court's finding and argues that the court's finding lacks an analysis of how that rational basis is distinguishable from recreational trails established outside of the rails-to-trails context. Kanza argues that there is no rational basis for differentiating between rail-trails and other categories of recreational trails. Further, Kanza turns again to the legislative history of the KRTA and argues that, based on the fact that K.S.A. 58-3215 as it existed at the time this action was filed permitted a city or county to institute procedures for recourse against the responsible party pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1247 (1983) and 49 C.F.R. 1152.29 (1986) upon the failure of the responsible party to comply with the provisions of this act, K.S.A. 58-3215, the Kansas Legislature probably enacted the KRTA to protect Kansans' reversionary property rights in the railbanked right-of-way. Kanza reasons that if interim recreational trail use permits are revoked by the STB for noncompliance with state trail requirements, the railroad right-of-way may be deemed abandoned and the abandoned railroad right-of-way then reverts back to the owner of that property. According to Kanza, the legislature placed oppressively burdensome responsibilities on interim trail operators in order to discourage railbanking and to promote the reversion of the railroad right-of-way to the landowner. The protection of reversionary property interests, argues Kanza, is not a proper rational basis because it contravenes Congress' intent to promote railbanking. Kanza points this court to Jost v. Surface Transp. Bd., 194 F.3d 79 (D.C.Cir. 1999), for support. However, we need look no further than the legislative history to find reasons for distinguishing rail-trails from other categories of recreational trails. Miami County points to references in the legislative history testimony indicating that numerous recreational trails had already been established outside the rails-to-trails context at the time the KRTA was enacted and were already part of maintenance programs in conjunction with local agencies. In addition, as previously discussed, those who testified discussed the buffer that could be and often is provided between other types of recreational trails and adjacent landowners as compared to railroad rights-of-way that are often narrow corridors. This distinction could justify more stringent regulation of matters that could develop into a public nuisance to adjoining landowners such as litter, the use of vehicles, or trespassing. Further, there is no guidance in the federal provisions regarding the upkeep of rail-trails. As observed by the STB, the Trails Act does not require the trail to be `developed' in any particular way. There can be differing types or levels of trail use, and this agency has never become involved in determining the type or level of trail for a specific right-of-way. Central Kansas Railway, L.L.C.Abandonment ExemptionIn Marion and McPherson Counties, KS, STB Docket No. AB-406 (Sub-No. 6X), at 5 n. 10 (STB served May 8, 2001). This lack of federal guidance in the area of safety and land use provides a rational basis for imposing requirements on parties responsible for rail-trails created pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) because, as opposed to other categories of recreational trails where a right-of-way does not need to be preserved for any particular future use, rail-trails are to be maintained in a manner that will facilitate the ability to reactivate rail service in the future. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 18, 110 S.Ct. 914; 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a) (2009). The KRTA imposes this requirement by, for example, requiring maintenance of bridges, culverts, roadway intersections, and crossings on the trail. See K.S.A. 58-3212(a)(11)(A). The district court found that there is no evidence suggesting that the KRTA is intended to accomplish anything other than the purposes of the federal Trails Actin short, preservation of railroad rights-of-way and encouragement of interim recreational trail development. We agree. The district court correctly determined that Kanza failed to show that the KRTA abridges constitutionally protected equal protection rights.