Opinion ID: 2966237
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Woodard's motions for substitution of counsel

Text: Woodard first argues that the district court erred in denying her motions for substitution of counsel. We review the denial for abuse of discretion. Proctor , 166 F.3d at 401. (2) We accord extraordinary deference to the district court's decision where, as Woodard concedes here, the allowance of the motion would necessitate a last-minute continuance. United States v. Pierce , 60 F.3d 886, 891 (1st Cir. 1995). In Allen , 789 F.2d at 92, we set forth the principles governing cases in which a criminal defendant asks that appointed counsel be replaced. When a defendant voices objections to counsel, the trial court should inquire into the reasons for the dissatisfaction. Id. In evaluating whether a district court's denial of motion for substitution of counsel constituted an abuse of discretion, we consider the following factors: the timeliness of the motion, the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint, and whether the conflict between the defendant and his counsel was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. Id. As an initial matter, we have some question about the applicability of the Allen factors to this case. Here, Woodard was represented by private counsel. Unlike a defendant with appointed counsel, she was not dependent on the court's permission to replace Hakala. We see no reason why, if dissatisfied with his representation, she could not have simply fired him and retained a different lawyer before trial was scheduled. This would have presented the trial court faced with a motion by counsel to withdraw with a more palatable alternative. Even assuming that the Allen test applies, Woodard does not sufficiently demonstrate any abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. First, her request for new counsel was not timely. The issue was first raised at the status conference on January 3, 2001, thirteen days before the trial date set by the district court. After Hakala raised the issue of Woodard's desire for different counsel, the district court inquired as to why. Woodard's reason for her dissatisfaction with Hakala was that their relationship was strained, that it was not working out, and that she would just feel a little bit more comfortable with another relationship. Hakala took it upon himself to elaborate, but added little in the way of substantive explanation. All told, the reasons presented to the district court in support of substitution of counsel on January 3 did not adequately support Woodard's motion. See Allen , 789 F.2d at 93 (requiring defendant to provide the court with a legitimate reason for his loss of confidence). (3) Woodard did not provide more explicit reasons for her desire for new counsel -- e.g., her conflict with Hakala over the motion to suppress -- until January 16, the first day of trial. We have consistently held that requests for substitution of counsel made on the day of trial are untimely. E.g. , Richardson , 894 F.2d at 497-98; Tuitt , 822 F.2d at 172; Allen , 789 F.2d at 93. More specifically, the record indicates that the conflict between Woodard and Hakala about the motion to suppress was several months old and that their communication difficulties had existed for months; yet Woodard offered no explanation for why she did not complain earlier. See Richardson , 894 F.2d at 497-498 (in determining that a request for new counsel made the morning of trial was untimely, court noted that defendant had two months to express dissatisfaction with appointed counsel); United States v. Mangual-Corchado , 139 F.3d 34, 42 n.18 (1st Cir. 1998) (in affirming denial of motion to replace counsel, court stated that defendant failed to act until three weeks before trial, even though he claimed that counsel had kept him waiting five or six months for documents). Second, we hold that the district court's inquiry was adequate under the circumstances. The extent and nature of the inquiry may vary in each case; it need not amount to a formal hearing. See United States v. Prochilo , 187 F.3d 221, 229 n.8 (1st Cir. 1999). Here, after Woodard raised the issue of her dissatisfaction with Hakala, the district court immediately inquired as to the reasons for the dispute; determined that Hakala was prepared to proceed to trial; and asked Woodard what she believed the problem was. We have affirmed comparable inquiries as adequate. E.g. , Richardson , 894 F.2d at 497 (district court questioned lawyer and client regarding nature of dispute and preparedness for trial); United States v. Torres , 793 F.2d 436, 438 (1st Cir. 1986) (court questioned defendant on the reasons for his dissatisfaction); Allen , 789 F.2d at 93 (court invited appellant to make a statement, listened to his reasons for being dissatisfied with his counsel, and found them to be without merit). Third, we are not convinced that Woodard demonstrated a total lack of communication that would establish good cause for substitution of counsel. See Allen , 789 F.2d at 92. Good cause cannot be determined solely according to the subjective standard of what the defendant perceives. Id. at 93 (quoting McKee v. Harris , 649 F.2d 927, 932 (2d Cir. 1981)). Loss of trust, standing alone, is insufficient; rather, [t]he defendant must provide the court with a legitimate reason for his loss of confidence. Id. Here, Woodard's primary argument in support of good cause was Hakala's failure to file a motion to suppress. The district court determined that Woodard sought to suppress the evidence seized from her house on the ground that a detective included information in the search warrant affidavit that he knew to be false. The court also considered her claim that she was being prosecuted merely because she had traveled to Jamaica. Only then did it deny Woodard's request. Without more, Hakala's failure to file a suppression motion that he considered to be meritless does not constitute good cause for substitution of counsel. An attorney is not obligated to pursue weak options when it appears, in light of informed professional judgment, that a defense is implausible or insubstantial. Tuitt , 822 F.2d at 172 (quoting Cepulonis v. Ponte , 699 F.2d 573, 575 (1st Cir. 1983)). (4) In sum, after consideration of the Allen factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for substitution of counsel.