Opinion ID: 164751
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suspension of the Test

Text: In arguing that the test was pretextual, Sergeant Stahl first points to the County’s suspension of the test following the filing of this lawsuit. She maintains that the district court erred in ruling that the suspension of the test was inadmissible under F ED . R. E VID . 407. According to Sergeant Stahl, because the suspension of the test constituted evidence of pretext, Rule 407 is inapplicable. This argument involves the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and we thus examine it de novo. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1136 (10th Cir. 1999). Although the application of Rule 407 here is perhaps not in the traditional context, we agree with the district court that precedent allows the conclusion that the County’s suspension of the physical fitness test is inadmissible. Rule 407 provides: -10- When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. F ED . R. E VID . 407. As the County notes, there are two primary grounds for the exclusion of evidence under Rule 407: (1) the limited probative value of subsequent remedial measures; and (2) “[the] social policy of encouraging people to take . . . steps in furtherance of added safety.” Hull v. Chevron, U.S.A., 812 F.2d 584, 587 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting F ED . R. E VID . 407 advisory committee’s note). Applying this rule, courts have excluded “repairs, changes in construction, installation of new safety devices . . . , changes in rules and regulations, [and] changes in the practice of the business.” 23 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 5284, at 105 (2d ed. 1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, as the district court concluded, the County’s suspension of the fitness test is inadmissible under Rule 407. The test is the subject of this lawsuit, and as a result, its suspension is a measure that “if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur.” F ED . R. E VID . 407; cf. Hickman v. Gem -11- Ins. Co., 299 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that an insurance company’s “discontinu[ation] [of] its practice of limiting payment of hospital room and board charges,” which was the subject of an ERISA claim, was “not admissible to establish liability because it is evidence of a subsequent remedial measure under Rule 407”). Moreover, Sergeant Stahl seeks to offer the suspension of the test as evidence that the test itself was a pretext for discrimination, thus seeking to prove “culpable conduct” in a manner forbidden by Rule 407. Additionally, and even more basic, is the fact that even if the suspension of the test were admissible, Sergeant Stahl has failed to establish that this evidence supports the particular claim she asserts here. Sergeant Stahl is now challenging only the manner in which the test was administered, not the test itself. Thus, the fact that the County suspended the test in January 2001—which it might have done for a number of reasons—does not indicate that the specific practice of which Sergeant Stahl complains (refusing, in October and November 2000, to grant her more time to prepare for the test) was discriminatory.