Opinion ID: 2640351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of the Hate-murder Special Circumstance

Text: Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the hate-murder special-circumstance finding that he murdered Ly because of Ly's race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(16)). He asserts this alleged insufficiency violates his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sections 1, 7, 12, 15, 16, and 17 of article I of the California Constitution.
Preliminarily, defendant contends this court should employ the independent standard of review to assess whether sufficient evidence supports the hatemurder special-circumstance finding because, assertedly, First Amendment rights are implicated in this case. [12] Defendant claims the evidence of his writings, artwork, literature, and personal correspondence introduced by the prosecution to prove the hate-murder special-circumstance allegation constitutes free expression protected under the First Amendment. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. (1984) 466 U. S. 485, 499 [80 L.Ed.2d 502, 104 S.Ct. 1949], the United States Supreme Court explained that in cases raising First Amendment issues ... an appellate court has an obligation to `make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that `the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.' (Quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 284-286 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 84 S.Ct. 710].) Independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review `in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes' the outcome should have been different. ( Bose, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 514, fn. 31.) Because the trier of fact is in a superior position to observe the demeanor of witnesses, credibility determinations are not subject to independent review, nor are findings of fact that are not relevant to the First Amendment issue. ( Id. at pp. 499-500; Harte-Hanks [Communications v. Connaughton (1989)] 491 U.S. [657,] 688 [105 L.Ed.2d 562, 109 S.Ct. 2678].) As noted above, under the substantial evidence standard, the question is whether any rational trier of fact could find the legal elements satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. ( In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007].) Relying on Bose, we held in In re George T., that when a plausible First Amendment defense is raised, a reviewing court should independently review the entire record in determining the sufficiency of evidence supporting a juvenile court's finding that the minor made a criminal threat within the meaning of section 422. ( In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 631-634.) We explained that independent review of the constitutionally relevant facts is necessary in cases involving First Amendment issues to ensure that a speaker's free speech rights have not been infringed by a trier of fact's determination that the communication at issue constitutes a criminal threat. (33 Cal.4th at p. 632.) Independent review is employed precisely to make certain that what the government characterizes as speech falling within an unprotected class actually does so. ( Id. at p. 633.) (8) Here, there is no such line to be drawn. California's hate-murder special circumstance, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(16), provides that the punishment for first degree murder is death or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole when [t]he victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin. By its terms, this provision provides an enhanced penalty for first degree murder committed because of prohibited bias motivation and is not directed at free expression protected by the First Amendment. (See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476, 485-490 [124 L.Ed.2d 436, 113 S.Ct. 2194] [enhancement statute is properly directed at conduct committed because of prohibited bias motivation and does not punish free speech in violation of the First Amendment]; In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 725 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365] [§ 422.7, one of California's hate crime statutes, properly sanctions bias-motivated conduct and does not implicate a defendant's First Amendment rights].) Accordingly, because we conclude no First Amendment issues are implicated in this case, independent review of the evidence supporting the hate-murder special circumstance finding is not warranted.
Applying the deferential substantial evidence test, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the hate-murder special-circumstance allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 225.) We do not reweigh evidence or reassess a witness's credibility. ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Initially, we note that, contrary to these settled principles, defendant views the evidence in a light unfavorable to the judgment and, in effect, urges this court to reevaluate the credibility of certain witnesses. Section 190.2, subdivision (a), provides that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of first degree murder is death or imprisonment for life without possibility of parole if the trier of fact finds one of the special circumstances enumerated under that provision. The hate-murder special circumstance applies if the trier of fact finds [t]he victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(16).) (9) The because of language in this statute is similar to the language of sections 422.6 and 422.7, the statutes at issue in In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th 698, discussed above. We held that the phrase `because of' means the conduct must have been caused by the prohibited bias. ( Id. at p. 719.) A cause is a condition that logically must exist for a given result or consequence to occur. ( Ibid., citing American Heritage Dict. (2d ed. 1982) p. 249.) [T]he bias motivation must be a cause in fact of the offense, whether or not other causes also exist. [Citation.] When multiple concurrent motives exist, the prohibited bias must be a substantial factor in bringing about the crime. ( In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 719; see also People v. Superior Court (Aishman ) (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P2d 1387] [applying the reasoning on this point from In re M.S., in interpreting similar language in § 422.75].) In People v. Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361 [226 Cal.Rptr. 880], the defendant was convicted of the first degree murder-assassination of the Consul General of the Republic of Turkey, and the jury found true the special circumstance allegation that he killed the victim because of his nationality or country of origin, in violation of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(16). ( Sassounian, at p. 373.) The prosecution primarily relied on the testimony of a jail inmate who claimed the defendant confessed to him that he and others carried out the murder as an act of revenge against the Turkish people for what they had done years before to the Armenians. ( Id. at p. 385.) On appeal, noting it could not reweigh the evidence as the defendant urged, the Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's special circumstance finding on the ground the fellow inmate's testimony was inherently incredible. ( Id. at p. 408.) The defendant later sought habeas corpus relief on the ground the prosecution presented false evidence substantially material or probative on the issue of penalty, namely, the inmate's testimony that the defendant had confessed to him. ( In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 547.) In rejecting this claim, this court held that, even without the inmate's testimony, overwhelming evidenceincluding the defendant's brother's statement to police regarding the defendant's anti-Turkish feelings and viewssupported the reasonable inference that the defendant intentionally killed the victim because he was Turkish and represented Turkey. (Id. at pp. 539, 548-549 & fn. 11.) That the defendant was motivated also by the latter circumstance would not affect the special circumstance finding because [t]here is no requirement of an intentional killing ` solely because of' the victim's `nationality or country of origin.' ( Id. at p. 549, fn. 11.) Defendant suggests that, in order to protect free speech, we should apply with rigor the substantial factor causation test set out in In re M.S. and require that the evidence establishing that a prohibited bias was a substantial factor in bringing about the murder also establish that the prohibited bias was unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific. Specifically, defendant argues that, in the context of the substantial factor analysis, the prosecution's evidence should establish: (1) defendant possessed racial bias; (2) defendant specifically possessed a racial bias against members of the race to which the victim belonged; (3) this bias was significant in determining how [defendant] viewed the world and led his life; and (4) this bias explains why [defendant] murdered [the victim]. Defendant's reliance on In re M.S. for such a proposition is misplaced. In In re M.S., we rejected a contention that section 422.6, prohibiting certain conduct, including a threat of violence because of prohibited bias motive, was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment because it purportedly failed to require that the threat be unconditional, unequivocal, and imminent. ( In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 711-712.) We construed section 422.6 to require proof of a present or apparent ability to carry out the threat and a specific intent to interfere with a person's right protected under state or federal law. ( In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 712-713.) These requirements, we reasoned, help to safeguard against unconstitutional application to protected speech. ( Ibid. ) (10) Here, there is no similar risk of unconstitutional application of the statute defining the hate-murder special circumstance to protected speech, as it applies only to conduct unprotected by the First Amendment: first degree murder committed because of prohibited bias motivation. (See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, supra, 508 U.S. at pp. 484, 487.) Further, we reiterate that the First Amendment does not prohibit evidentiary use of a defendant's protected expression to prove the elements of a crime. ( Wisconsin v. Mitchell, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 489.) For these reasons, we decline to infer any requirement that proof a prohibited bias motivation was a substantial factor in causing the hate-murder special-circumstance murder must also establish that the bias was unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific. Here, the jury reasonably could infer from the evidence that defendant, who is White, was a follower of the White supremacy movement and advocated racial hatred. Sergeant Miller's expert testimony on White supremacy beliefs and culture and the materials police seized from defendant's bedroomdefendant's Bible with references to a White supremacist leader and organization on the last several pages, written and published White supremacy materials, the derogatory Martin Luther King poster, a helmet adorned with a swastika, and a cardboard box adorned with the Nazi SS lightning bolts and swastikasreasonably suggest defendant identified with White supremacists and was motivated to use violence to advance their belief that the White race is superior to all other races. He actively participated in the White supremacy movement. While in custody in Missouri in 1993, he bragged that he was running the White Aryan Resistance (W.A.R.) group in the prison and was using violence to support the national party. He encouraged Dulaney to start his own group but not to associate with any organization that did not say violence or anything of that nature. Defendant also encouraged Dulaney to write to the Nationalist Party of Canada and request literature so that he and Dulaney could start their own party when he was released from custody. In 1995, defendant, Dulaney, and defendant's brother formed their own gang, the ICP, which became involved in the White Power movement. Additional evidence showed defendant's particular racial animus against Asians. He admitted to Ellis that he disliked Asians, purportedly because he was forced to leave Okinawa, and referred to Asians as gooks. Also, Lopez, who worked with defendant at Kmart, testified that within a couple months of Ly's murder, defendant referred to Asian customers as gooks. In his February 23d letter to Dulaney, which Dulaney received approximately one month after Ly's murder, defendant boasted he killed a jap [ sic ]. He provided Dulaney with the details of how he brutally stabbed Ly to death and then added that he was having a ball in tustin wish you were here. During a telephone conversation with Dulaney on the day after Dulaney received defendant's confessional letter, defendant admitted he killed Ly for racial movement. Defendant repeated that he killed the Jap [ sic ], and could not stop stabbing him. He described Ly's murder as giving him `a rush' `like a high.' After defendant was arrested and jailed, he bragged to Villa, a fellow inmate, that he was in custody for stabbing a Nip [ sic ] to death. Defendant also admitted to Villa that he told a friend how easy it is to kill a Vietnamese and get away with it. In his letter to Tammy Shoopman, defendant referred to Ly as a Chino [who] got stabbed to Death and bragged this earned him a 187 ... and Hate crime. From these facts, a jury reasonably could infer that Ly was murdered because of his race or country of origin and that Ly's race or country of origin was a substantial factor motivating the killing, within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(16). (See In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 719; see also People v. Sassounian, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 408.) That the evidence also supports the jury's additional finding that defendant murdered Ly because he wanted to eliminate him as a witness to the attempted robbery (see pt. II.B., ante ) does not invalidate the hate-murder special circumstance. (See In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 549 & fn. 11.) Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's hatemurder special-circumstance finding.