Opinion ID: 161005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fifth Amendment: Voluntariness of Confession

Text: 31 At the hearing on the motion to quash his arrest, Morris also argued a motion to suppress the incriminating statement he gave to agents at 3:00 a.m. The trial court denied his motion, finding Morris's testimony unbelievable and the agents' testimonies credible. Morris appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing his confession was not voluntary. 32 We review the voluntariness of a confession de novo. United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1579 (10th Cir. 1997). This Court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the district court on subsidiary factual questions, such as whether the police intimidated or threatened a suspect or whether a suspect was particularly susceptible to police coercion, unless those factual findings are clearly erroneous. Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1307-08. 33 Morris now asserts that during his first meeting with Agents Nevil and Pritchett in the FBI's Violent Crimes Task Force office he told them he wanted time to think about making a statement and he wanted a lawyer. It is undisputed that the agents then left without reading him his rights. The agents came back three hours later and told him that Toles and Harris were cooperating. They played tapes of Toles's and Harris's confessions. At the hearing, Morris testified that Agent Pritchett demonstrated the difference in prison time he would receive if he cooperated or refused to cooperate by pointing to pictures of past criminals on the wall. He claims Pritchett pointed to one past criminal and said because that criminal did not cooperate he was sentenced to seventy to eighty years; he pointed to two other criminals involved in the same crime and told Morris because they cooperated they were only sentenced to five to ten years. Agent Pritchett does not deny there are pictures of the top 12 biggest baddest robbers on the walls of the Violent Crimes Task Force office and that they occasionally-allegedly three times in three years-use them to illustrate the lesser sentence a defendant may receive if he cooperates. (IV R. at 93-94.) At the hearing, Pritchett testified he could not remember if he used the pictures with Morris. 34 In this appeal, Morris also asserts he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he agreed to make a statement. He further claims that he was told his statement would not be accepted if he requested that an attorney be present and that he requested an attorney both at the 12:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. meetings. Finally, he asserts he made the incriminating statement because he was led to believe the difference in cooperating or not was ten years versus 80 years. (Appellant's Br. at 26.)A suspect may waive his Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination only if two elements are met. 35 First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. 36 United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). Factors that should be considered in assessing whether a statement was voluntarily made include: 37 (1) the age, intelligence, and education of the defendant; (2) the length of the detention; (3) the length and nature of the questioning; (4) whether the defendant was advised of her constitutional rights; and (5) whether the defendant was subjected to physical punishment. 38 Glover, 104 F.3d at 1579. 39 The trial court examined the above factors in concluding that Morris's confession was voluntary. The court found that Morris was given a proper Miranda warning, which he understood, and that he was not threatened with force or violence. Given Morris's age (nineteen), education (through tenth grade), and prior experience with the law (five previous arrests), the court found apparent that Morris was possessed of sufficient intelligence, maturity and sophistication to understand the circumstances in which he found himself. (I R. Doc. 84 at 11.) The court explicitly disbelieved Morris's assertion that he asked for an attorney. Although the court found the officers' testimony regarding the circumstances under which [Morris's] statement was taken to be more credible than Morris' version, the court did not entirely discredit Morris's testimony. (Id. at 12.) For example, despite Pritchett's testimony that he could not remember if he discussed the photos with Morris, the court found Morris was shown the photos and was told about the disparate sentences criminals who had cooperated received compared to those criminals who had not cooperated. Importantly, however, the court concluded the information was presented in the form of fact rather than threat and that Morris was not promised leniency to induce his statement. (Id. at 11-12.) 40 There is nothing to suggest the relevant facts the district court found were clearly erroneous. 6 The standard of review does not permit us, based on a reading of the cold record, to substitute our judgment for the district court's concerning whether the statements made by Pritchett to Morris about the possibility of receiving a lenient sentence were made in a threatening manner or served to intimidate Morris. See Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1307-08. Affording appropriate deference to the trial court's findings of fact, we hold that the district court's legal conclusion concerning the voluntariness of Morris's confession was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.