Opinion ID: 1888073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence on the defendant

Text: ¶ 10. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. The Mississippi Constitution, Article 3, Section 28 provides: Cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted, nor excessive fines be imposed. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is well settled. In 1980, the United States Supreme Court issued its mandate in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the United States Supreme Court found that the sentence imposed on the petitioner was not in violation of the Eighth Amendment and stated that with the exception of capital punishment cases, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133. Rummel states, [O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction... the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274, 100 S.Ct. 1133. ¶ 11. In 1986, this Court clearly upheld the constitutionality of our habitual offender statute while recalling our adoption of Rummel in 1981. Bridges v. State, 482 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Miss.1986) (citing Baker v. State, 394 So.2d 1376 (Miss.1981)). We stated in Baker: We have long held that a sentence which does not exceed statutory limits is not cruel or unusual punishment. McAdory v. State, 354 So.2d 263 (Miss.1978); Ainsworth v. State, 304 So.2d 656 (Miss. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 2637, 45 L.Ed.2d 676 (1975); Clanton v. State, 279 So.2d 599 (Miss.1973). These decisions and numerous others recognize the principle of legislative discretion in determining the proper punishment for criminal offenders and we think this accords with Rummel .... Baker, 394 So.2d at 1378. ¶ 12. In Barnwell v. State, 567 So.2d 215, 219 (Miss.1990), we discussed Rummel and a distinctive United States case, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), and held: In cases factually similar to Rummel, Rummel provides the rule. Apart from the factual context of Solem -a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole-or a sentence which is manifestly disproportionate to the crime committed (e.g. life sentence for overtime parking, see, Rummel 445 U.S. at 274 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. at 1139 n. 11) extended proportionality analysis is not required by the Eighth Amendment. Barnwell, 567 So.2d at 221 (citations omitted). We upheld our adoption of the Supreme Court's theme of deference to the legislature in determining punishment and to the trial court in sentencing. Id. at 222. The United States Supreme Court later overruled the bulk of the law created in Solem when it stated: ... we have addressed anew, and in greater detail, the question of whether the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guarantee with particular attention to the background of the Eighth Amendment (which Solem discussed in only two pages, see 463 U.S., at 284-286 [103 S.Ct. 3001]) and to the understanding of the Eighth Amendment before the end of the 19th century (which Solem discussed not at all). We conclude from this examination that Solem was wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). ¶ 13. We reiterated our stance in 1996 stating: `This Court has consistently held that a sentence will be upheld if within statutory limits. Also, where a sentence does not exceed statutory limits, it does not constitute cruel and inhuman treatment.' Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663 (Miss.1996)(quoting Adams v. State, 410 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Miss.1982)). ¶ 14. We agree with the United States Supreme Court that `Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.' Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-75, 100 S.Ct. 1133 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977)). ¶ 15. In keeping with our prior decisions, we find no excessive sentencing error since Roger's sentence was within the statutory limits of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-25. Within the statutory framework, sentencing is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The constitutionality of the statute itself is the only remaining issue. If the statute is valid, its appropriate application will also be valid. We find no viable challenge to the constitutionality of Miss Code Ann. § 97-3-25. ¶ 16. Roger argues that the court should have considered alternative sentencing since he was a juvenile; however, no statute mandates that alternative sentences for juveniles be considered. Absent such a statutory mandate, we find no error.