Opinion ID: 774026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Risk of Injury v. Risk of Use of Physical Force

Text: 30 The government argues that the difference, if any, between a risk of injury and a risk of the use of physical force is negligible. We disagree. There are many crimes that involve a substantial risk of injury but do not involve the use of force. Crimes of gross negligence or reckless endangerment, such as leaving an infant alone near a pool, involve a risk of injury without the use of force. Statutes criminalizing the use, possession and/or distribution of dangerous drugs and other controlled substances also underscore the fact that some criminal conduct may involve a substantial risk of injury or harm without at the same time involving the use of physical force. Other courts have also recognized the logical fallacy inherent in reasoning that simply because all conduct involving a risk of the use of physical force also involves a risk of injury then the converse must also be true. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 926; United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992). 31 The United States Sentencing Guidelines recognized the difference between use of force and injury when it broadened the scope of its definition for crimes of violence under the career offender provision in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Before 1989, § 4B1.2(a)(2) referred to 18 U.S.C. § 16 for its definition of a crime of violence. See Parson, 955 F.2d at 864. In 1989, the Sentencing Guidelines removed the reference to § 16 and instead defined a crime of violence by its resultant injury rather than by the use of force. See id. The current version of § 4B1.2(a)(2) provides: 32 (a) The term crime of violence means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that -- 33 ... 34 (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 35 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2000). We agree with the Fifth Circuit that this change counsels against interpreting risk of the use of physical force and risk of injury the same way. See Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 926. 36 Moreover, our conclusion accords with that of the only other circuit that has reviewed de novo the question whether a felony DWI conviction constitutes a crime of violence under § 16(b). Analyzing the Texas DWI statute, the Fifth Circuit in Chapa-Garza held that convictions under the statute failed to satisfy the elements of § 16(b). See 243 F.3d at 927. The court reasoned that the word use as well asthe phrase in the course of committing the offense suggested that § 16(b) contemplates only intentional conduct and refers only to those offenses in which there is a substantial likelihood that the perpetrator will intentionally employ physical force.... not [to] an accidental, unintended event. 243 F.3d at 926. 9 37 Of course, nothing in our decision today in any way underestimates the toll that drunk driving has taken on human life; it is an urgent, nationwide problem of staggering proportion. But by shoehorning such reprehensible conduct into criminal statutes that were not designed to hold it, we risk an equivalent harm of usurping federal and state legislative roles. We are reminded here of what the Supreme Court said years ago in the context of interpreting an immigration law providing for deportation on the basis of crimes of moral turpitude: 38 [D]eportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used. 39 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citation omitted).