Opinion ID: 1190112
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District's School Uniform Policies Need Only Withstand Intermediate Scrutiny to be Constitutional

Text: The court below concluded that the District's uniform policies did not infringe upon students' rights to engage in pure speech or expressive conduct because the policies withstood intermediate scrutiny. [23] Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 373 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1181, 1185-87 (D.Nev. 2005). Plaintiffs take issue with this analysis from the outset, arguing that applying intermediate scrutiny to student speech is foreclosed by Chandler v. McMinnville School District, 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992). Specifically, they argue that, under Chandler, speech that is neither vulgar, lewd, obscene,[or] plainly offensive nor school-sponsored  like the speech Plaintiffs wish to engage in here  must be analyzed under the stricter standard the Supreme Court utilized in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), [24] and, most importantly, that Chandler leaves room for no other alternative. Plaintiffs' argument is superficially appealing. Chandler laid out three categories of student speech  (1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech, (2) school-sponsored speech, and (3) speech that falls into neither of these categories  and explained that speech in the first category should be analyzed under Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), speech in the second category should be analyzed under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988), and speech in the third category should be analyzed under Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14, 89 S.Ct. 733. See 978 F.2d at 529. As both parties concede, Plaintiffs' speech falls into neither of the first two categories. Plaintiffs thus argue that, just as the policy in Tinker was found unconstitutional because allowing students to wear black armbands in silent protest would not substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students, 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, the policy here (i.e., forbidding students from wearing their choice of clothing to school) should be found unconstitutional because it fails Tinker 's substantial interference test, as well. What Plaintiffs miss  but the district court and one of our sister circuits have correctly recognized  is a key flaw in this logic. See Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 441-43 (5th Cir.2001); Jacobs, 373 F.Supp.2d at 1175-81. While Chandler certainly says that all speech in the third category must be analyzed under Tinker, it does not say that all speech in this category has to be evaluated at the same level of scrutiny as that ultimately used in Tinker. In other words, while Chandler dictates that Tinker must guide our analysis of this case, it does not require us to blindly apply the standard employed therein. We thus start by carefully examining what the Tinker decision does  and, even more importantly, what it does not  say.