Opinion ID: 787516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FISA Materials

Text: 40 At trial, the Government introduced into evidence several recorded telephone conversations between Hammoud and others. These recordings were obtained through a wiretap pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1862 (West 2003 & Supp.2004). Hammoud argues that the wiretap authorization was not based upon probable cause; that the official certification that the wiretaps were seeking foreign intelligence information was clearly erroneous; and that the Government failed to take adequate measures to ensure that the invasion of Hammoud's privacy was no greater than necessary. 41 FISA was enacted to create a framework whereby the Executive could conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without violating the rights of citizens. See United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 552 (4th Cir. 2000). FISA created a special court composed of district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States; with certain exceptions not relevant here, a FISA judge must approve in advance all electronic surveillance of a foreign power or its agents. See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1802, 1804.
42 Before authorizing surveillance, a FISA judge must determine that there is probable cause to believe that, as is relevant here, the target of the electronic surveillance is ... an agent of a foreign power and that each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by... an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(3). A foreign power includes a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor. Id. § 1801(a)(4). An agent of a foreign power is any person who ... knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(C). Hammoud concedes that Hizballah is a foreign power under FISA, but he argues that the Government did not have probable cause to believe that he was an agent of Hizballah. 43 [P]robable cause is a fluid concept —turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In evaluating whether probable cause exists, it is the task of the issuing judge to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . ., there is a fair probability that the search will be fruitful. Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see Mason v. Godinez, 47 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir.1995) (Probable cause means more than bare suspicion but less than absolute certainty that a search will be fruitful.). 44 Hammoud's motion to suppress the FISA evidence was referred to a magistrate judge, who reviewed the FISA applications and supporting materials in camera and concluded that there was probable cause to believe that Hammoud was an agent of a foreign power. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(f). The magistrate judge therefore recommended denial of the motion to suppress. The district court adopted this recommendation after considering Hammoud's objections to the report and recommendation, independently reviewing the materials, and conducting a hearing. 45 Having conducted our own de novo review of the materials, see Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 554, we reach the same conclusion as the magistrate judge and the district court. Further, upon review of the materials we are satisfied that the probable cause finding was not based solely upon... activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(3)(A). We will not elaborate on the contents of the materials in light of the Attorney General's assessment that disclosure of the information contained in the application and supporting documents would endanger national security.
46 An application for a FISA warrant must include a certification by an executive branch official stating, inter alia, that the information sought is foreign intelligence information and that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain such information. 6 See id. § 1804(a)(7). When the target of surveillance is a United States person, the FISA judge must find that the certification is not clearly erroneous before issuing a warrant. See id. § 1805(a)(5). A finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). 47 Hammoud asserts that the certification was clearly erroneous for two reasons. First, he maintains that the Government failed to demonstrate that the information it sought to obtain through the proposed electronic surveillance was foreign intelligence information. Second, he claims that obtaining foreign intelligence information was not the primary purpose of the surveillance; rather, the purpose of the surveillance was to obtain evidence for use in the criminal investigation. Cf. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th Cir.1980) (suppressing fruits of electronic surveillance after date that investigation of defendant became primarily a criminal investigation).
48 FISA defines foreign intelligence information in pertinent part as 49 information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against— 50 (A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 51 (B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or 52 (C) clandestine intelligence activities by ... an agent of a foreign power.... 53 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(e)(1). We reject Hammoud's contention that there is no evidence to support the Government's certification regarding the character of the information sought to be obtained through electronic surveillance of Hammoud. The materials submitted in connection with the FISA application warrant a conclusion that the certification was not clearly erroneous.
54 The Government disputes that FISA requires the collection of foreign intelligence information to be the primary purpose of electronic surveillance. Among other things, it notes that Truong, in which this court first articulated the primary purpose test, was a pre-FISA decision. See generally In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 722-27 (Foreign Int.Surv.Ct.Rev.2002) (per curiam) (tracing history of primary purpose requirement and concluding that requirement is not supported by text or legislative history of FISA). However, even if the primary purpose test applies, it is satisfied here. The information in the affidavit supports a conclusion that the FBI was primarily interested in obtaining foreign intelligence information. 7
55 In his last challenge to the FISA evidence, Hammoud argues that the Government failed to minimize the surveillance of him, as FISA requires. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(4); id. § 1801(h)(1) (defining minimization procedures as specific procedures... that are reasonably designed... to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons). Hammoud's entire argument on this point consists of two assertions: that [t]he surveillance records contained no foreign intelligence information and that the records contain many conversations about personal matters unrelated to any crime. Br. for Appellant Mohamad Y. Hammoud at 51. We take Hammoud's argument to be that the minimization procedures must have been inadequate because many personal conversations were recorded and obtained during the course of the surveillance. 56 In enacting FISA, Congress recognized that no electronic surveillance can be so conducted that innocent conversations can be totally eliminated. S.Rep. No. 95-701, at 39 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4008. The minimization requirement obligates the Government to make a good faith effort to minimize the acquisition and retention of irrelevant information. See id. at 39-40. However, it is not always immediately clear into which category a particular conversation falls. A conversation that seems innocuous on one day may later turn out to be of great significance, particularly if the individuals involved are talking in code. Cf. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 154 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (noting that two conspirators involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York referred to the plot as the study and to relevant materials as university papers). In view of these considerations, the mere fact that innocent conversations were recorded, without more, does not establish that the government failed to appropriately minimize surveillance.