Opinion ID: 1126385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: J.E.B. Claims[3]

Text: In the defendant's only meritorious assignment of error, he asserts that the state impermissibly struck potential male jurors because of their gender. Specifically, he argues that the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to strike all but one man from the jury clearly established a prima facie case of gender discrimination and that the trial court erred by not requiring the district attorney to give gender-neutral reasons for the use of those challenges. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88-89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1718-19, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the use of peremptory strikes to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or the assumption that members of a certain race will be unable to impartially consider the case before them. The Court concluded that such discriminatory practices in the use of peremptory challenges denies a defendant equal protection of the law and unconstitutionally discriminates against the potential juror in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 84-89, 106 S.Ct. at 1716-19. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the Supreme Court extended its holding in Batson and instructed that the Equal Protection Clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender. The Court found that the same reasoning it had employed in Batson to determine that racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges violates the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equality under the law and the equal right to participate in our democratic process naturally extended to the context of gender discrimination in juror selection. Id. at 140-42, 114 S.Ct. at 1427-28. In conclusion, the Court in J.E.B. stated that [f]ailing to provide jurors the same protection against gender discrimination as race discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson itself. Id. at 145, 114 S.Ct. at 1430. The Supreme Court has established a three-step analysis to be applied when addressing a claim that peremptory challenges were exercised in a manner that violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Batson, supra; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). First, the party challenging the peremptory strike must make a prima facie showing of discrimination in the use of the strike. If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the opposing party to articulate a gender-or race-neutral explanation for the strike. Then, the trial court must determine whether the party challenging the strike has carried the ultimate burden of proving purposeful discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-95, 106 S.Ct. at 1721-22; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59, 111 S.Ct. at 1865-66. The combination of factors needed to establish a prima facie case are: (1) the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor's challenge was directed at a member of a cognizable group; (2) the defendant must then show the challenge was peremptory rather than for cause; and (3) finally, the defendant must show circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor struck the venire person on account of being a member of that cognizable group. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The Batson Court also noted that relevant facts or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent include proof of disparate impact and a pattern of strikes against jurors, as well as questions and statements made during voir dire. Id. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. In State v. Green, 94-0887, p. 25 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 288, this court held that the sole focus of the Batson inquiry is upon the intent of the prosecutor at the time he exercised his peremptory strikes. The court went on to outline several factors that could lead to a finding that a prima facie case has been made pursuant to Batson and J.E.B.: The defendant may offer any facts relevant to the question of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent to satisfy this burden. Such facts include, but are not limited to, a pattern of strikes by a prosecutor against members of a suspect class, statements or actions of the prosecutor which support an inference that the exercise of peremptory strikes was motivated by impermissible considerations, the composition of the venire and of the jury finally empaneled, and any other disparate impact upon the suspect class which is alleged to be the victim of purposeful discrimination. Id. If the defendant fails to make out a prima facie case, then the challenge fails, and it is not necessary for the prosecutor to articulate neutral explanations for the strikes. Id. at 287-88. The focus in this case, then, is whether the defendant presented a prima facie case of gender discrimination by the prosecutor in her exercise of peremptory challenges to strike all but one male from the jury, thereby requiring the prosecutor to articulate gender-neutral explanations for the strikes. Initially, it must be noted that the record does not contain a full transcript of voir dire. However, it does contain the defendant's objections to the prosecutor's allegedly discriminatory strikes and reflects the prosecutor's pattern of striking male jurors. The record reveals that in the first group of jurors, defense counsel exercised a cause challenge against a male juror who favored the death penalty for rape. The trial court denied the challenge, and the defense used a peremptory challenge to remove the potential juror. The next prospective juror, Mr. Harris, was first accepted by the prosecutor and then the defense. However, the prosecutor suddenly changed her mind and back-struck Mr. Harris from the panel, leaving five female jurors. In the next group of jurors, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against another male juror, Mr. Wilfred. The next male juror, Mr. Sylve, was accepted by the prosecutor and then by the defense. Again, after the defense accepted him, the prosecutor struck him from the panel. At that point, the defendant lodged his first objection pursuant to J.E.B., based on the prosecutor's exclusion of three potential male jurors and the fact that, thus far, the jury was made up of six females. The district attorney countered that she had accepted one male, but the defense had struck him. [4] The trial court denied the defense's challenge without discussion. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor struck another potential male juror. Defense counsel reurged his challenge and offered to do the surrumold fiscious hypo geometric distribution (spelled phonetically). [5] The trial court again denied the challenge without discussion, apparently ignoring defense counsel's attempt to prove his claim statistically. Subsequently, the prosecutor and defense counsel accepted one male juror, Mr. Bundy, and then the prosecutor struck its fifth male juror peremptorily. Defense counsel, once again, objected on J.E.B. grounds, and the prosecutor argued that she had accepted a male juror, Mr. Bundy. The trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor and the defense accepted another male juror, Mr. Jones. After the defense then backstruck Mr. Bundy, the prosecutor used a back-strike to remove Mr. Jones. The following exchange occurred: Defense: Your honor, I object to that. That's the last remaining male on the panel, I believe. State: I accepted Mr. Bundy and Mr. Smith back-struck him. I am now back-striking Mr. Jones. Defense: Which leaves an all female jury. The defense would re-urge its objection. Court: The Batson [ J.E.B. ] challenge is denied. The empaneled jury consisted of one man and eleven women. One of the two alternates was also a man. The limited record reveals that, in all, the defense struck nine women and two men and the prosecutor struck seven women and six men. The trial court never required the prosecutor to provide reasons for any of the peremptory challenges it exercised against potential male jurors. Nor did the trial court articulate its reasons for denying the defendant's J.E.B. challenges. Therefore, we can only presume that the trial court did not find that the defense had established a prima facie case of discrimination. However, because the trial court did not explain its decision, there is no way for us to review its reasoning. This court recently addressed the same problem in the context of Batson challenges in State v. Myers, 99-1803 (La.4/11/00), 761 So.2d 498, where we discussed the necessity for the trial judge to address these challenges when made by the defendant. In that case, the court explained that: [T]he issue of purposeful ... discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is a matter of utmost seriousness affecting not only the trial itself, but the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole. The trial judge observes first-hand the demeanor of the attorneys and venire persons, the nuances of questions asked, the ... composition of the venire, and the general atmosphere of the voir dire that simply cannot be replicated from a cold record. Thus, when a Batson challenge is made, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to address the challenge, either by ruling on whether a prima facie case of discriminatory intent has been made or by requiring raceneutral reasons for the strikes. Id. at 502 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. at 1866). Much like the present case, in Myers, the trial judge failed to address the question of whether the pattern of strikes by the prosecutor was enough to establish a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent. In that case, the final jury was composed of eleven Caucasians and one African-American, and there were no obvious reasons for the state's peremptory challenges apart from race. Id. at 502-03. This court found that the trial judge failed to make the necessary observations and rulings that are integral to a review of a Batson challenge. Id. at 503. The court reversed the defendant's conviction in that case and ordered a new trial, because it was impossible to remand for a meaningful hearing on the issue of the defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination during voir dire as the trial judge had since passed away. Id. Similar to Myers, there is no obvious reason for the prosecutor's strikes in this case other than gender. The defendant has presented enough evidence to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based on the fact that the prosecutor struck six male jurors for no apparent reason, three of whom were backstruck after being accepted by the defense, with the resulting jury composed of eleven women and one man. These facts evidence a pattern of strikes against male jurors and a disparate impact on the final composition of the jury. Therefore, the trial court should have required the prosecutor to offer gender-neutral explanations for the strikes. Because it is impossible to meaningfully review whether the defendant proved his claim that the prosecutor impermissibly struck male jurors solely because of their gender, we find it necessary to remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing at which the court is to require the prosecutor to present gender-neutral reasons for the strikes. The trial court is then to make a final determination of whether the defendant has met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. If the trial court finds that the defendant cannot meet his burden under the applicable law, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. In the event that the trial court determines that the prosecutor did exercise the peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the trial court is to grant the defendant a new trial. Both parties' right to appeal from any adverse decision regarding the J.E.B. claims is reserved.