Opinion ID: 1234083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unconstitutional impairment of contract

Text: Article I, section 9 of the California Constitution states, A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. As construed by the majority, section 877.6(c) clearly impairs the obligation of existing contracts and therefore runs afoul of the state Constitution. [8] Therefore, even if the majority's construction of section 877.6 were otherwise correct, application of the proposed rule to the contract at issue in this case (or to any other contract existing at the time of our decision) violates article I, section 9. In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 155 Cal. App.3d 798, the court noted this constitutional restriction as one of the reasons why the court was rejecting the construction of section 877.6 now adopted by the majority. (155 Cal. App.3d at p. 803.) The majority opinion, however, fails even to acknowledge the constitutional restriction. Absent section 877.6 (as construed by the majority), it is undisputed that Bay and Bowen could maintain an action for the alleged breach of an implied warranty in their contract with Home. Stated simply, they would have a remedy for the breach. We long ago made clear that, The remedy, where it affects substantial rights, is included in the term `obligation of contract', and the remedy cannot be altered so as to materially impair such obligations. ( Brown v. Ferdon (1936) 5 Cal.2d 226, 231 [54 P.2d 712]; County of Los Angeles v. Jessup (1938) 11 Cal.2d 273, 280-282 [78 P.2d 1131].) The majority rule will eliminate entirely any remedy because it precludes Bay and Bowen from recovering damages proximately incurred by Home's breach of contract. We recently referred to the  inviolate rights that characterize private contracts. ( Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 830 [258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247], italics added.) Less than one year later, the majority opinion reflects a view that such rights are not worthy of protection. To avoid a construction of section 877.6(c) that renders it unconstitutional, the majority should limit its proposed rule to contracts not yet in existence as of the date of our decision.