Opinion ID: 619929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants' FISA Challenge

Text: Defendants challenge their convictions on the ground that the government's case was tainted by its reliance on evidence procured pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., as amended by the 2001 Patriot Act. [2] The Patriot Act revised a provision of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1804, to require a national security officer to certify that a significant purpose, rather than the purpose, of surveillance the officer seeks to conduct under FISA is to obtain foreign intelligence information. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2008) with 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000). Before the Patriot Act amendment, courts routinely interpreted that provision to require certification that foreign intelligence collection was the primary purpose of a FISA search. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir.1984) (The requirement that foreign intelligence information be the primary objective of the surveillance is plain ... from the requirements in § 1804 as to what the application must contain.). Defendants contend that FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, violates the Fourth Amendment in two ways. They urge that FISA's post-Patriot Act significant purpose test does not appropriately balance individual privacy interests against the government's interests in foreign intelligence gathering and, therefore, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Defendants also argue that FISA unconstitutionally authorizes the government to conduct searches for criminal prosecution purposes that do not satisfy typical Fourth Amendment requirements. Most significantly, they complain that [t]he requirements under FISA do not include probable cause of a crime being committed. [3] Appellants' Opening Br. 58. Defendants maintain that we must reverse their convictions because the government used unlawful FISA-derived evidence throughout the trial; [4] the FISA-derived evidence resulted in their convictions; and, without that evidence, the government cannot prove the charges against them. Aligning with all of the other courts of appeals that have considered this issue, however, we reject defendants' constitutional challenge. We conclude that FISA's amended significant purpose requirement is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, that the government's use of FISA-derived evidence in its case against defendants was lawful. We also observe that, even if we were to hold the statute unconstitutional, defendants still would not be entitled to have their convictions reversed. Defendants' argument for reversal depends on the assumption that, if FISA is declared unconstitutional, then the exclusionary rule would preclude the use of FISA-derived evidence in their case. Not so. Where, as here, the challenged search was conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on a duly authorized statute, the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not preclude the admission of the fruits of the search. [5]

FISA, as originally enacted in 1978, empowered the Chief Justice of the United States to establish a special court (now known as the FISA court), staffed by district court judges, with jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance related to foreign intelligence. 50 U.S.C. § 1803. As relevant here, [FISA] authorizes a judge on the FISA court to grant an application for an order approving electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information if there is probable cause to believe that ... the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that each of the facilities or places at which the surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 722 (Foreign Intel.Surv.Ct.Rev.2002) (per curiam) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)). Among other things, the statute defines a foreign power as a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4), and an agent of a foreign power as (a) a non-United States person (i.e., non-U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident) who engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore [ sic ], id. § 1801(b)(1)(C); see also id. § 1801(i) (defining United States person), or (b) any person who knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power, id. § 1801(b)(2)(C), (i). [6] The relevant provision in this case, 50 U.S.C. § 1804, sets forth the elements of an application for [such] an order. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723. The original version of § 1804 required a national security official in the Executive Branchtypically the Director of the FBIto certify that `the purpose' of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information. Id. (quoting former 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B)). In 2001, as part of the Patriot Act, Congress revised that requirement so that it now requires the official to certify that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (emphasis added).
At its most basic level, defendants' argument is that FISA's significant purpose standard is unconstitutional because it allows the government to conduct electronic surveillance upon a lesser showing than the ordinary criminal requirement that searches conducted pursuant to a warrant must be supported by a reasonable belief that the target of the search has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.); see also Appellants' Joint Opening Br. 58-59 (citing and quoting Berger and Mayfield v. United States, 504 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D.Or.2007)). [7] While that requirement certainly applies to searches that are conducted solely for law enforcement purposes, the Fourth Amendment is more flexible than defendants' argument allows. Specifically, the Supreme Court has indicated that the standards governing a warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Supreme Court has explained that, [i]n cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, `probable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). In other words, the critical Fourth Amendment requirement, for purposes of this case, is that the statutory standard for obtaining a warrant must be reasonable. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 122 (2d Cir.2010) (The benchmark for judicial review of the constitutionality of warrant requirements established by Congress is reasonableness....). What is reasonable, in turn, depends on the nature of the search: [t]o apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35, 87 S.Ct. 1727. So, for example, in the criminal context, where the objective of a search may be to recover specific stolen or contraband goods, a warrant to search for such goods is `reasonable' only when there is `probable cause' to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535, 87 S.Ct. 1727. But in the administrative context, where searches might be aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for private property, id. at 535, 87 S.Ct. 1727, the reasonableness of the warrant will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge related to a particular property, id. at 539, 87 S.Ct. 1727; it may be based, instead, on a judicial determination that the city has adopted a reasonable system of inspections and is not targeting citizens for irregular or malicious reasons, United States v. Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir.2006) (describing Camara ). The government's interests in security and intelligence are entitled to particular deference. As the Supreme Court has explained, [w]here ... the risk against which the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). Thus, the Court has indicated that mandatory, suspicionless searches of passengers and luggage at airports may be deemed reasonable `so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or other like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.' Id. at 675 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir.1974)); see also United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179-80 (3d Cir.2006) (holding airport checkpoint searches constitutional, in part because there can be no doubt that preventing terrorist attacks on airplanes is of paramount importance and such searches advance the public interest (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has not addressed the reasonableness of the standards set forth in FISA (or of any searches conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence), but it has specifically suggested that different probable cause standards for intelligence surveillance may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 2125. As in the above examples, the key is whether such standards are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. Id. at 322-23, 92 S.Ct. 2125. Thus, we must determine whether FISA's significant purpose standard is reasonable given the government's special interest in collecting foreign intelligence information. On that key question, we do not write on a blank slate.
Probable cause standards other than the typical requirement for belief regarding the commission of a crime have been determined to be appropriate and reasonable in the foreign intelligence context. The Supreme Court's decision in Keith provides a useful starting point in this area. While discussing the standards that apply to electronic surveillance for domestic security purposes, the Court there observed that certain policy and practical considerations differentiate domestic security investigations from ordinary criminal investigations:  The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information.  The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of crimes....  Often, ... the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 2125. In sum, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime. Id. In light of these considerations, the Court stated that Congress may wish to consider protective standards for domestic security surveillance warrants that differ from those prescribed in ordinary criminal cases. Id. In particular, it suggested that Congress might judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause for such surveillance should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases. Id. at 323, 92 S.Ct. 2125. Because the same policy and practical considerations highlighted by the Keith Court apply equally, or perhaps even to a greater extent, to foreign intelligence gathering, the Court's comments provide important guideposts for our analysis in this case. After Keith, several courts of appeals, including our own, have examined the Fourth Amendment's application to electronic surveillance conducted under the guise of the President's executive authority to collect foreign intelligence information. These courts almost uniformly have concluded that the important national interest in foreign intelligence gathering justifies electronic surveillance without prior judicial review, creating a sort of foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980) ([B]ecause of the need of the executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance.); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.1974) (en banc) (holding, in light of the strong public interest in uninterrupted foreign intelligence collection, that the Fourth Amendment does not require prior judicial authorization of surveillance conducted and maintained solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information). See generally Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72 (summarizing foreign intelligence exception cases). Admittedly, FISA changed the landscape by instituting a procedure by which the executive branch could seek advance judicial review of, and procure a warrant-like order for, electronic foreign intelligence surveillance. Given the prevailing pre-FISA conclusion that the executive branch could conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without a warrant, it was perhaps predictable that the courts of appeals that have reviewed FISA, both before and since the Patriot Act amendments, all would conclude that FISA's standards and procedures for authorizing foreign intelligence surveillance orders are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 128-29; Wen, 477 F.3d at 898-99; United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 573 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790-91 (9th Cir.1987); Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72-74; see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.
Defendants do not ignore all of this history. Instead, they focus on the Patriot Act's revision of what is now 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) to require a national security officer to certify that a significant purpose, rather than the purpose which courts had interpreted to mean the primary purposeof the surveillance the officer seeks to conduct under FISA is to obtain foreign intelligence information. They urge that the Patriot Act amendment violates the Fourth Amendment by bringing the standard below this primary purpose threshold. In fact, however, the pre-FISA and pre-Patriot Act amendment foreign intelligence cases do not control this case. Those cases do not establish the primary purpose requirement as a sine qua non of FISA's constitutionality, and, even if they did, we would hold that application of the reasonableness test set forth above counsels a different result. The notion of a primary purpose requirement arises in pre-FISA foreign intelligence surveillance cases. Defendants, understandably, focus on United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605-06 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), in which our Court held that the executive branch need not secure prior judicial authorization for foreign intelligence surveillance, but commented in dicta that, [s]ince the primary purpose of these searches is to secure foreign intelligence information, a judge, when reviewing a particular search [after the fact] must, above all, be assured that this was in fact its primary purpose and that the accumulation of evidence of criminal activity was incidental. That comment has little bearing here, however, because it arose out facts specific to Butenko, not out of a reasoned analysis of what minimum standards would satisfy the Fourth Amendment. [8] See id. at 606. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has come closer to suggesting a link between a primary purpose requirement and the constitutionality of foreign intelligence surveillance. In United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.1980), it explicitly balanced government and private interests under a series of different standards and concluded that the executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when the surveillance is conducted `primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons. Id. at 915. But Truong also does not control our analysis. It involved the scope of presidential authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 121. Here, we consider the constitutionality of a program approved by Congress that requires an executive officer to apply to the judicial branch for a warrant-like order. These features distinguish our case from Truong in important ways: Whatever purpose limits might be placed on the president's authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to ensure that the exception does not extend beyond the constitutional ground for its recognition, it does not follow that the Fourth Amendment demands the same limitation when, as under FISA, the powers of all three branches of governmentin short, the whole of federal authorityare invoked in determining when warrants may reasonably be sought and issued for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information. Id. FISA cases before the Patriot Act amendments often incorporated a primary purpose standard without much discussion or analysis, typically by assuming, or even asserting outright, that it was a statutory requirement. See, e.g., Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572 (affirming district court determination that FISA surveillance was lawful in part because it is clear that the primary purpose of the government's FISA applications was to obtain foreign intelligence information, not to collect evidence for any criminal prosecution of appellants); Pelton, 835 F.2d at 1075 (rejecting defendant's argument that FISA surveillance was conducted primarily for the purpose of his criminal prosecution, and not primarily `for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information' as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b)); [9] Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77 (The requirement that foreign intelligence information be the primary objective of the surveillance is plain not only from the language of § 1802(b) but also from the requirements in § 1804 as to what the application must contain.). Those cases did not expressly link the primary purpose standard to an analysis of whether FISA satisfies the Fourth Amendment or consider whether FISA would be constitutional if it incorporated a lower standard instead, which is the question we face now. Cf. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727 (concluding that there was not much need for courts reviewing pre-Patriot Act amendment FISA cases to focus on the constitutional significance of the primary purpose test). In all events, we do not believe that the Fourth Amendment compels a primary purpose test. The dispositive issue is whether the significant purpose test is reasonable. Because we conclude that it is for the reasons set forth below, surveillance based on that standard satisfies the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with our sister courts of appeals and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that amended FISA's significant purpose standard is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, for three reasons. First, the significant purpose standard reflects a balance struck by Congress between the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. Keith, 407 U.S. at 323, 92 S.Ct. 2125. The legislative history reveals that Congress was keenly aware that [the Patriot Act's amendment to what is now § 1804(a)(6)(B)] relaxed a requirement that the government show that its primary purpose was other than criminal prosecution. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732. By adopting the amendment, Congress signaled its determination that the new standard was needed to promote coordination between intelligence and law enforcement officials in combating terrorism, acknowledging that, as a practical matter, these functions inevitably overlap. [10] While Congress's conclusion in that regard of course is not dispositive, nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Keith suggested that congressional judgment has an important role to play in weighing government interests and determining reasonable protective standards related to intelligence. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23, 92 S.Ct. 2125. We therefore view Congress's actions in this area with some additional measure of deference. Second, even leaving Congress's judgment aside, we conclude that FISA's significant purpose standard is reasonable in light of the government's legitimate national security goals. We are mindful of the high stakes involved and emphasize the Supreme Court's admonition that [w]here, as here, the possible harm against which the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674-75, 109 S.Ct. 1384; see also id. at 675 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (approving Second Circuit Court of Appeals' conclusion that `[w]hen the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, that danger alone meets the test of reasonableness so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking' and other safeguards are in place (quoting Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500)). Replacing the primary purpose standard with a significant purpose test reasonably furthers the government's national security goals. As other courts, and Congress, have observed, the status quo ante proved difficult to administerin complex national security investigations, it was often difficult to say whether intelligence or law enforcement, or neither of them, was the primary objectiveand resulted in a rigid, artificial separation between intelligence and law enforcement investigations that prevented cooperation and, ultimately, imposed a cost on national security. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 124-25; see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732-33, 743-44 & nn. 27-29. The significant purpose standard, which reflects a negotiated compromise between those in Congress who wished to keep the law the same and officials in the executive branch, who wished to virtually eliminate the foreign intelligence standard, 147 Cong. Rec. S10,591 (Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 125-26; Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732, alleviates those practical concerns by doing away with the problematic primary purpose test. It also retains key protections for individuals. In particular, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review has held that the statute, as amended, require[s] `that the government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes' and `excludes from the purpose of gaining foreign intelligence information a sole objective of criminal prosecution,' even for foreign intelligence crimes. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 128 (quoting Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735); see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736 ([T]he FISA process cannot be used as a device to investigate wholly [non-foreign-intelligence related] ordinary crimes.). Finally, and importantly, FISA contains significant procedural safeguards against abuse. As amended, FISA requires a senior government official (typically the Director of the FBI, see Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736) to certify that obtaining foreign intelligence information ... is a bona fide purpose of the surveillance and the Attorney General (or a senior-level designee, see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(g)) to approve each FISA application. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 127. That senior Justice Department officials must approve every FISA application gives us additional comfort that this process does not provide an end run around the more stringent Fourth Amendment standards that apply in ordinary criminal cases. The statute also provides for appropriate, albeit limited, judicial review. An Article III judge sitting on the FISA court reviews every application, makes particularized findings concerning the application's compliance with the statute's requirements, and issues an order specifying the parameters of the government's surveillance authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a), (c). The FISA judge may demand further inquiry into the certifying officer's purposeor perhaps even the Attorney General's or Deputy Attorney General's reasons for approval of the application, and should deny the application if he or she conclude[s] that the government's sole objective [is] merely to gain evidence of past criminal conducteven foreign intelligence crimesto punish the agent rather than halt ongoing espionage or terrorist activity. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735-36. These safeguards confirm that FISA's significant purpose standard is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Underlying defendants' argument that FISA's significant purpose test is unconstitutional is the notion that the government should not be allowed to introduce in a criminal prosecution evidence not gathered in compliance with the minimum procedural requirements the Fourth Amendment typically imposes on criminal investigations. While that notion may be appealing, it does not reflect the law. Instead, it is clear that the government may use evidence derived from non-law-enforcement searches (i.e., searches not based on a reasonable belief regarding the commission of a crime) that otherwise satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement to prosecute crimes. Thus, in the administrative context, [i]nspectors lawfully on the premises ... may report any violations of law that they find. Wen, 477 F.3d at 898. Likewise, the government may prosecute a defendant for possession of drugs uncovered in the course of a routine airport search. See Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 181; see also id. at 181 n. 13 ([T]he fruits of the search need not be suppressed so long as the search itself was permissible.). Here, we have concluded that searches in the form of surveillance conducted pursuant to FISA's significant purpose requirement are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we join other courts of appeals in holding that evidence derived from duly authorized FISA surveillance is admissible in a criminal case. See Wen, 477 F.3d at 898 (holding that if, in the course of conducting FISA-authorized surveillance, agents discover evidence of a domestic crime, they may use it to prosecute for that offense, even if the agents knew or may have known when they applied for the FISA order that they were likely to hear evidence of domestic crime); see also Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78 (noting that otherwise valid FISA surveillance is not tainted simply because the government can anticipate that the fruits of such surveillance may later be used, as allowed by [50 U.S.C.] § 1806(b), as evidence in a criminal trial and holding that the fact that domestic law enforcement concerns may also have been implicated in government's decision to seek a FISA order did not eliminate the government's ability to obtain a valid FISA order).