Opinion ID: 688699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Allocation of the Costs of the Joint Remedial Plan

Text: 65 The State also argues that the district court erred by requiring the State to fund all of the costs of the joint remedial plan except for those costs falling within the traditional role of County detention facilities. Specifically, the State contends that the court: (1) should not have imposed a remedy at odds with the statutes implementing the settlement agreements in the state court lawsuits; and (2) should not have specifically requir[ed] [the] State defendants to fund the creation of alternatives to incarceration in Harris County. We reject both of these arguments. 66 The State's first contention is disposed of easily. As noted above, we have found, on multiple occasions, that neither state law nor the state court settlement agreement affects the State's liability for the unconstitutional conditions in the Harris County jails caused by the State's refusal to accept transfer-ready felons. In prior proceedings of this case, we have held that state law imposes a responsibility on the State for those transfer ready-felons, and we have affirmed the district court's findings that the State acted with conscious disregard in shirking that responsibility. Consequently, we also have affirmed the district court's findings that the State was liable--the settlement agreement and state law notwithstanding--for the unconstitutional conditions that it helped to create and to maintain in the county jails. We find no error in the court's conclusion that the primary responsibility [for the unconstitutional prison conditions], and therefore the primary financial burden [to alleviate those conditions], falls on the state. See Alberti I, 937 F.2d at 997 (upholding the district court's determination that State law clearly places the primary responsibility for the confinement of felons on the state). 67 As to the State's second argument, we disagree with the contention that the district court's order allocating the costs of the joint plan improperly infringed upon the State's ability to manage its prisons. Cf. Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1148 (finding that a court order mandating the use of specific programs to relieve overcrowding in state prisons unnecessarily invade[d] the management responsibility of state officials). The district court did not mandate programs for the State to institute; instead, it merely required that the State pay for programs which the State itself, in conjunction with the County, developed as part of the joint remedial plan to correct the overcrowding situation in the county jails. This did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 68 The district court order requires the State to fund programs to relieve the overcrowding for which it is in part responsible. In earlier proceedings in this case, we rejected the State's argument that the district court is forbidden from ordering monetary relief; we stated in Alberti I that the plaintiffs established a federal constitutional violation, and the state is a responsible party. The required payments are thus 'a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive federal question determination.'  Alberti I, 937 F.2d at 1001 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1358, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). The order in this case is similar. 69 The district court found that the State's actions were the primary cause of the constitutional violations at the county jail. The court also noted that without state-funded action, the constitutional violations would continue. 12 Because the payments are to ensure that the State's future treatment of transfer-ready felons is constitutional, the district court's order regarding the funding of the joint remedial plan is well within the power of the district court and the contours of the Constitution. See id.; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-68, 94 S.Ct. at 1356-58.