Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to give victim impact instruction.

Text: As noted above, the prosecution presented one victim impact witness, Sarah LaChapelle's son Anthony. He testified that the victim's death had hit both him and his children hard. As a result of the murder, he said, he became an instant mental case, developed a serious drinking problem, lost the ability to run the construction business he inherited from his father, and thereafter never really got [him]self together. According to Anthony, he still dreamed about his mother and still needed help with decisions he should be able to make on his own. He was gently admonished by the court when, at the conclusion of his direct testimony, he stated, And now I still want to get this guy. I want him to die. So I hope the law gets him for me. The trial court gave all the standard penalty phase instructions, including those that set forth the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors (CALJIC No. 8.85), describe the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence by which the penalty verdict should be reached (CALJIC No. 8.88), and admonish that the jury must [not] be influenced by bias [or] prejudice against the defendant (CALJIC No. 8.84.1). The court refused a defense instruction that while evidence had been introduced to show the specific harm caused by the defendant's crimes, such evidence was not to divert [the jury's] attention from [its] proper role of deciding whether defendant should live or die. Relying on several out-of-state decisions, defendant contends that, under both state law and the Eighth Amendment, the trial court should have instructed on the proper use of victim impact testimony. A proper instruction, he suggests, would have told the jurors the following: They could consider victim impact evidence, which shows that the victim was a unique individual, as a circumstance of the capital crime. However, the law deems no one life more valuable than another. Thus, the jurors must confine themselves to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence. Further, they must not consider the opinions of the victim's survivors, or any other members of the community, as to the appropriate punishment. (19) However, we have repeatedly held that it is not error to refuse an instruction substantially identical to that defendant offered below, or to fail, sua sponte, to give an instruction substantially identical to the one defendant proposes on appeal. We have explained that the proffered instructions are misleading insofar as they suggest the jury may not be moved by sympathy for the victims and their survivors, and that the standard instructions adequately convey to the jurors the proper consideration and use of victim impact evidence. (E.g., Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198; People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1245 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, 210 P.3d 1171]; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105]; People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 310 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351]; Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th 398, 455; see People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1195 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353].) We adhere to these conclusions here.