Opinion ID: 1922618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lockhart's Motion for a Mistrial

Text: [¶ 38] Prior to the emergency room physician assistant testifying, the State and Lockhart stipulated with the court's approval that the physician assistant would limit his testimony to his statement that Andrea told him her husband kicked the door and it flew in and hit her over the left eyebrow. However, when the Assistant Attorney General asked the physician assistant why Andrea had come to the emergency room for treatment, he responded: She was there because she stated she had been assaulted by her husband .... The court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the word assault. At sidebar, Lockhart moved for a mistrial on the ground that the physician assistant's testimony violated the stipulation and was so prejudicial that no curative instruction could adequately remedy it. The court denied the motion and again instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. Further, once subject to cross examination, the physician assistant testified that he had no recollection as to whether Andrea had used the word assault in describing the incident. Following the completion of the physician assistant's trial testimony, the court again issued a second curative instruction, directing the jury to disregard his characterization in response to the prosecutor's first set of questions and to focus instead on the words Andrea actually said, as established by the evidence. [¶ 39] Whether to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is left `to the sound discretion of the trial court.' State v. Melanson, 2002 ME 145, ¶ 11, 804 A.2d 394, 398 (quoting State v. DePhilippo, 628 A.2d 1057, 1058 (Me.1993)). [T]he trial court's determination of whether exposure to potentially prejudicial extraneous evidence would incurably taint the jury verdict or whether a curative instruction would adequately protect against consideration of the matter stands unless clearly erroneous. State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 141 ¶ 18, 697 A.2d 73, 79. Here, the extraneous evidence was generated by a nonresponsive answer to the prosecutor's question and was neither a product of bad faith nor of prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court concluded that the assault testimony would not prejudice Lockhart so long as the jury focused on what Andrea actually said. The court's curative instructions accomplished this result, and we perceive little or no prejudice resulting from the physician assistant's initial unresponsive answer.