Opinion ID: 874106
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The magistrate judge erred in granting Michell the right to care for the children in Jimmy's home on certain school-day mornings.

Text: As already set forth, the visitation schedule gave Michell the right to care for the children at Jimmy's home early in the morning in order to get the children prepared for school on those days Jimmy has to work (Monday through Thursday and sometimes on Friday). Michell argues that the magistrate judge exceeded his authority in awarding this visitation right and argues that this award shows that she is a capable parent. Jimmy agrees with Michell that allowing her to care for the children at his home on workday mornings is an unusual decision and states that he has not found any authority supporting the court's ability to require a custodial parent to allow access to their separate property residence, post-divorce, so that the non-primary custodial parent can spend time with the children before school. Furthermore, Jimmy testified that he has four family members (his mother, stepfather, sister and niece) who are willing and able to care for the children on the mornings that he works. [2] The magistrate judge awarded Michell the right to come to Jimmy's separate property without his permission. This arrangement is novel and has not been specifically addressed by this Court, but there is an analogy to be found in this Court's decisions concerning the award of separate property in divorce proceedings. Idaho Code §§ 32-712 to -714 govern the distribution of property upon divorce. In Heslip v. Heslip, 74 Idaho 368, 372, 262 P.2d 999, 1002 (1953), we explained that the court has the power under [I.C. § 32-712] to divide the community property between the parties, but has no power or authority to award the wife's separate property, or any part of it, to the husband. And in Radermacher v. Radermacher, 61 Idaho 261, 273-74, 100 P.2d 955, 961 (1940), we stated that a judge is without power to award the separate property of the husband to the wife, either permanently or temporarily. While we have acknowledged that a judge may impose a lien against separate property, Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954), and that a judge may order a sale of community property containing a separate equity, Nichols v. Nichols, 84 Idaho 379, 382, 372 P.2d 758, 760 (1962), we continue to abide by this principle that the Idaho Code grants the courts the power to divide community property but does not authorize the courts to award one spouse's separate property to the other spouse. See Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844 (1974) (declining to make equitable award of separate property). See also Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 1028-29, 712 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Ct.App.1985) (holding that a court may not compel one spouse to sell his or her separate property to the other spouse as part of a divorce decree). By awarding Michell the right to care for the children on certain mornings at Jimmy's home, the magistrate judge in effect awarded her the right to enter and use Jimmy's separate property. We hold that this arrangement offends the policy set forth in cases like Heslip, Gapsch, and Simplot that a court has no power or authority to award all or any part of one spouse's property to the other spouse as part of the divorce decree. Therefore, the case is remanded for the limited purposes of: (1) eliminating the provision of the visitation schedule which grants Michell the right to care for the children in Jimmy's home on certain mornings and (2) adjusting the visitation schedule, if necessary, in light of the effect this change has on the magistrate's time computation for visitation.