Opinion ID: 1813839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hutchinson Parties

Text: The trial court held that the quitclaim deed executed in favor of Defendant George Hutchinson is, in fact, an equitable mortgage and that a summary judgment was due to be entered, giving him and/or his assigns ... a secondary lien on the [apartments]. (Emphasis added.) For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the trial court correctly characterized the transaction between Hutchinson, Smith, and the Enterprises as giving Hutchinson a mortgage on the apartments (hereinafter referred to as the quitclaim mortgage). Walden contends that neither of the Hutchinson parties has an interest in the quitclaim mortgage. This is so, because, she argues, Hutchinson is judicially estopped to claim an interest, and because, according to her, there is not substantial evidence of a valid transfer of Hutchinson's interest to the Hutchinson trust. We first address the judicial-estoppel argument.
According to Walden, Hutchinson is judicially estopped from claiming an interest in the apartments. This is so, because, she argues, Hutchinson failed to claim the quitclaim mortgage as an asset, either incident to his divorce or in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. We agree. Recently, we said: [T]he purpose of judicial estoppel is `to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.' New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982), and United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir.1993)). Simply stated, `judicial estoppel prevents parties from playing `fast and loose with the courts,'' New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, 121 S.Ct. 1808 (quoting Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953), quoting in turn Stretch v. Watson, 6 N.J.Super. 456, 469, 69 A.2d 596, 603 (1949)), and prevents `the system from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants.' Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d 104, 108 (6th Cir.1997). Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So.2d 53, 59 (Ala.2007). In support of her motion for a summary judgment filed on November 28, 2005, Walden presented the affidavit of her attorney, Gatewood Walden, who stated: 18. In addition, Mr. Hutchinson is judicially estopped from claiming an interest in [the apartments] in the instant case because he did not claim an interest in [the apartments] in either his divorce case, or in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. 19. I have personal first hand knowledge of the contents of the official records pertaining to Mr. Hutchinson's divorce from his former wife ..., and I also have personal firsthand knowledge of the contents of the official records of Mr. Hutchinson's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.... .... 21. However, according to the official court records, Mr. Hutchinson's purported interest in [the apartments] was not listed as an asset in either the divorce case or in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  (Emphasis added.) Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., generally requires that `[s]worn or certified copies' of documents referred to in an affidavit offered supporting or opposing a motion for a summary judgment be attached to the affidavit. However, if an affidavit or the documents attached to an affidavit fail to comply with this rule, the opposing party must object to the admissibility of the affidavit or the document and move to strike. Ex parte Elba Gen. Hosp. & Nursing Home, Inc., 828 So.2d 308, 312-13 (Ala.2001) (noting that a party must object to evidence submitted in support of a motion for a summary judgment that does not comply with Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.); Chatham v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1993) ('A party must move the trial court to strike any nonadmissible evidence that violates Rule 56(e). Failure to do so waives any objection on appeal and allows this Court to consider the defective evidence.'). Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So.2d 1, 4-5 (Ala.2007) (footnote and emphasis omitted); see also Ex parte Unitrin, Inc., 920 So.2d 557, 560 (Ala.2005) (citing Berry Mountain Mining Co. v. American Res. Ins. Co., 541 So.2d 4 (Ala.1989), for the proposition that defendants' failure to move to strike unauthenticated documents attached to plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment waived any objections to the trial court's reliance on those documents). Hutchinson did not move to strike the affidavit in the trial court. In fact, he does not challenge it, or its contents, in this Court. Thus, we consider it. Indeed, Hutchinson makes only two arguments against the application of judicial estoppel. First, he contends that the doctrine does not apply, because, he insists, Walden has failed to show that she changed her position to her prejudice. Hutchinson's brief, at 22. In that respect, Hutchinson misapprehends the elements of judicial estoppel in this State. `[R]eliance is not an element of judicial estoppel' in Alabama. Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1244 (Ala.2003) (holding that judicial estoppel was successfully invoked against a litigant who took inconsistent positions in prior divorce and bankruptcy proceedings and quoting with approval Rand G. Boyers, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1244, 1249 (1986)). `Reliance is not a factor because any inconsistent statement violates the sanctity of the oath and injures the integrity of the judicial process, whether or not some party relied on the first statement. The inconsistency itself damages public confidence in the purity ... of judicial proceedings.' 883 So.2d at 1244 (quoting Boyers, 80 Nw. U.L.Rev. at 1249 (emphasis added in Ex parte First Alabama Bank )). Hutchinson presented no evidence in opposition to Walden's summary-judgment motion on the ground that he is judicially estopped from claiming an interest in the apartments. Thus, we hold that Hutchinson is judicially estopped from claiming that he owns the quitclaim mortgage on the apartments, and the trial court erred in denying Walden's summary-judgment motion against Hutchinson.
Hutchinson, however, also makes, in effect, an alternative argument applicable to the Hutchinson trust, namely, that the trustee now holds the quitclaim mortgage. Although he contends, at one point in his brief, that the [trial] court correctly determined the existence of an equitable mortgage in favor of George Hutchinson,  Hutchinson's brief, at 17 (emphasis added), elsewhere in his brief, he contends that he created the George Hutchinson, Junior, present interest trust [No.] 1 on August 20, 1999, ... and transferred the Smith mortgage to it.  Hutchinson's brief, at 20 (emphasis added). The basis for Hutchinson's argument that he assigned an interest in the apartments to the Hutchinson trust is a document executed by Hutchinson on August 26, 1999, which states, in toto: SCHEDULE `A' ADDITIONS BY GIFT TO THE GEORGE ELLIS HUTCHINSON, JR. PRESENT INTEREST TRUST (1) The undersigned Grantor hereby gives and transfers to George Ellis Hutchinson, Jr. Present Interest Trust No. 1 the following: Stock in Auburn Medical Center, Certificate Number(s): 19, 31, 35, and 36. Any and all present and future assets, funds, payments of receivables, shares of stock, tangible and intangible properties of any kind as described in a statement dated August 20, 1999, signed by the President of the Auburn Medical Center, Inc., and attached hereto. /s/ George Ellis Hutchinson George Ellis Hutchinson Dated: August 26, 1999 The undersigned, Donald Ray Hutchinson, as Trustee, hereby accepts the foregoing additions to Trust, this the 26th day of August, 1999. /s/ Donald Ray Hutchinson Donald Ray Hutchinson (Emphasis added.) This writing was accompanied by a document signed by Benny H. Sanders, as president of AMC. It stated: It is understood that George E. Hutchinson has transferred all of his stock in Auburn Medical Center, Inc. (AMC), either that stock already received or that stock to be issued, to a trust set up for his son on August 20, 1999. All monies advanced to AMC or its lawyers or funds used for any purpose for AMC and provided by George E. Hutchinson, are the property of said trust, including any stock owned by said trust. Any and all funds provided to AMC by any entities of George E. Hutchinson are to be repaid to the Trustee of the George Ellis Hutchinson, Jr., Trust. Further, any and all dividends due from AMC are to be paid to the said trustee for the benefit of George Ellis Hutchinson, Jr. (Emphasis added.) Both documents are hereinafter collectively referred to as Schedule A. Walden contends that Schedule A is insufficient, as a matter of law, to transfer the quitclaim mortgage to the Hutchinson trust. In particular, she states: The documents Mr. Hutchinson relies on as proof of his conveyance to a trust contain no legal description of any real property whatsoever, much less, a legal description of [the apartments]. Nor do they comply with various other statutory requirements of a conveyance.  Walden's reply brief to Hutchinson's brief, at 4-5 (emphasis added). However, she cites no legal authority that supports this argument. Indeed, she merely cites an inapposite statute, namely, § 35-4-21, Ala.Code 1975. Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., requires that arguments in an appellant's... brief contain `citations to the cases, statutes, [and] other authorities ... relied on,' University of South Alabama v. Progressive Ins. Co., 904 So.2d 1242, 1247 (Ala.2004), and the effect of noncompliance with this rule is well established. `[W]here no legal authority is cited or argued, the effect is the same as if no argument had been made. ' Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So.2d 488, 493 (Ala.2005) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 506 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Ala.Civ.App.1987) (emphasis added in Steele )). This is so, because it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform an appellant's legal research. City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722 So.2d 747, 752 (Ala.1998). Because of the absence of a legally supported argument against the efficacy of Schedule A, the trial court's judgment that the Hutchinson trust has a valid secondary lien on the subject property is essentially unchallenged on appeal. We, therefore, affirm the judgment to the extent of that holding.