Opinion ID: 537173
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: expert testimony on modus operandi

Text: 12 The government submitted an MPD expert in the distribution and packaging of narcotics, particularly crack or cocaine base, in Washington, D.C. Baxter stipulated to the witness's expertise on these matters. 13 Baxter now objects to two elements of the expert's testimony. First, he contends the expert used examples of distribution patterns from a section of D.C. in which the bus station is not located. Second, he objects to the expert's opinion that a person arrested possessing cocaine base and a return airline ticket was a mule, i.e., one who transports drugs from one jurisdiction to another. 14 Trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and whether that testimony would be relevant and not overly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See United States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C.Cir.1988). Testimony about modus operandi in narcotics operations is common, and useful to jurors unfamiliar with the methods which drug dealers use. See United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 387-88 (D.C.Cir.1989). 15 The expert's testimony in this case about the likely function of a person found in possession of a substantial amount of cocaine and an airline ticket was consistent with the scope of his expertise in the distribution and packaging of cocaine in D.C. as stipulated to by Baxter. Moreover, the district court properly found that such testimony was relevant and proper in assisting the jury in understanding the significance of the quantity and quality of narcotics seized. Accordingly, we find no error in the expert's testimony in this case.