Opinion ID: 1228967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN RULING ON A MOTION UNDER I.R.C.P. 41(b).

Text: Plaintiffs here argue that they made out a prima facie case of fraud, and thus that the trial court erred in dismissing the action. The argument misconceives the nature of a motion for involuntary dismissal which defendant makes at the close of plaintiffs' evidence in a non-jury case, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(b). In pre-Code days, it is true, a plaintiff need only have made out a prima facie case in order to avoid being non-suited, as it was then called. In making such a determination the trial court was instructed that, It is axiomatic that upon motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Bogovich v. Capitol Silver-Lead Mining Co., 71 Idaho 1, 3, 224 P.2d 1078, 1079 (1950). Bogovich was a jury action. Shortly afterwards, in Quinn v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 71 Idaho 449, 232 P.2d 965 (1951), the Court applied the same standard in reversing an order granting a motion for nonsuit in a non-jury case: If the evidence disclose that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief within the issues, it is error to grant a motion for nonsuit. 71 Idaho at 454, 232 P.2d at 967. Similarly, in the non-jury case of Patton & Anderson v. Melior, 78 Idaho 336, 303 P.2d 242 (1956), it was held that, A motion for nonsuit admits the truth of the adversary's evidence, and every inference of fact that may be legitimately drawn therefrom [citing Quinn v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra ]. 78 Idaho at 337, 303 P.2d at 243. This standard was rejected, as to non-jury cases, in Stratton v. Stratton, 87 Idaho 118, 391 P.2d 340 (1964). We there emphasized the fact that Idaho's adoption of the federal rules in 1958 brought about a whole new ball game where there is a Motion for Involuntary Dismissal under Rule 41(b) in a non-jury trial. We held that the prima facie test applicable in jury cases is inappropriate for non-jury cases, ... for if the court, which is the trier of the facts in such cases, determines that the plaintiff has failed in his burden of proof and grants a motion to dismiss, it is a determination of the cause on its merits ... . 87 Idaho at 125, 391 P.2d at 344. The following year Grieser v. Haynes, 89 Idaho 198, 404 P.2d 333 (1965), made it clear that the Stratton decision brought Idaho civil procedure in line with the amended federal rule. The case-law change in Rule 41(b) was codified in 1975 when the federal amendment of the rule was added to the Idaho rule, so that it now reads: Rule 41(b). Involuntary dismissal  Effect thereof.  ... After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a).  (Emphasis supplied). (Italicized words denote the 1975 amendment.) It is thus clear that when defendant moves for an involuntary dismissal at the close of plaintiff's presentation in a non-jury case, the court sits as a trier of facts and is not required to construe all evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to plaintiff. But see, In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 164, 525 P.2d 357, 359: This court has repeatedly held that the testimony of a witness which is not inherently improbable and is not contradicted and impeached may not be disregarded. [Citing cases.] When the trial court grants a defendant's 41(b) motion, the judgment which it renders is a judgment on the merits. The findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 52(a) must be made. Where such findings are lacking, this Court is hampered in the performance of its appellate function. In Paullus v. Liedkie, 92 Idaho 323, 442 P.2d 733 (1968), error was, as here, assigned to the action of the trial court in dismissing on a 41(b) motion. In that case, where there were no findings or conclusions, judgment was reversed and the cause remanded with directions to make findings and conclusions. Similarly, in Fairchild v. Fairchild, 96 Idaho 375, 529 P.2d 771 (1974), dismissal was entered on defendant's 41(b) motion without the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law. Again error was not assigned in that regard, but only with regard to the trial court's dismissal of the action. Citing Paullus, this Court summarily reversed, stating that the assignments of error involved factual issues which could not be properly reached in the absence of findings of fact from the trial court. On the other hand, this Court has on rare occasions gone to the evidentiary record in ruling on appeals from involuntary dismissals when the record was sufficiently clear that the absence of findings of fact did not prevent a complete understanding of the issues. See, Killinger v. Iest, 91 Idaho 571, 428 P.2d 490 (1967); Merrill v. Merrill, 83 Idaho 306, 362 P.2d 887 (1961). A final judgment entered at the conclusion of a plaintiff's case on a 41(b) motion is a determination on the merits, and requires findings of fact and conclusions of law, every bit as much as when the final judgment is entered after both sides have made their presentations. I.R.C.P. 52(a). Defendants who have made successful 41(b) motions should complete the record by reminding the trial court that findings are required. Plaintiffs must ask the trial court to comply with Rule 52(a) as a condition precedent to bringing the case here. Compliance with the rule of writing out specific findings and legal conclusions  as we have recently noted in Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 560 P.2d 861 (1977)  is a salutary practice which requires a trial court to give full consideration to the entire record as the purported justification for its own announced ruling. [2] Although failure to make findings and conclusions is not assigned as error, the defendants urge upon us that the trial court did in fact make the requisite findings. We can only assume that defendants would have us accept the trial court's bench remarks, made in passing upon the motion, as the equivalent of compliance with Rule 52(a) which reads: If an opinion or memorandum decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. The defendants are not on sound ground; there are no findings of fact and conclusions of law; there is no memorandum opinion of the trial court. A trial court's bench remarks are simply that, and nothing more. A trial court in fulfilling the requirements of Rule 52(a) may very well decide to make findings quite different from the indications stated in passing on the motion. Bench remarks, sometimes referred to as tentative impressions of what the evidence shows, do not substitute for nor rise to the dignity of written findings of fact and conclusions of law, either separately stated, or embodied in a written memorandum opinion. The defendants' contention that the trial court made the requisite findings can not be sustained. Nonetheless, the trial judge did carefully explain the ratio decidendi of his conclusion to grant the motion, and he stated his belief that all witnesses had testified truthfully. Although the case was submitted on plaintiffs' evidence only, it did include statutory cross-examination (under Rule 43(b)) of the defendant Rex Adams and his answer to pretrial requests for admissions. For the limited purpose of providing guidance on remand, we point out briefly wherein our views differ from those orally expressed by the trial court in passing upon the motion. We have the benefit of the recorded testimony and considerably more time than was available to the trial court.