Opinion ID: 1685369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State v. Camacho

Text: ¶ 72. In 1993 this court determined the standards for raising self-defense in Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d 860, a case involving the crime of attempted first-degree murder under the pre-revision homicide statutes. [8] Camacho shot a deputy sheriff four times after the deputy had stopped his vehicle as it traveled on the highway. Id. at 865. Camacho, an illegal alien, informed the deputy that he did not have a driver's license. Id. at 865-66. The deputy returned to his squad car and verified that Camacho had no driver's license, and then again approached Camacho's car. Id. at 866. According to the deputy, when he leaned in towards Camacho's open window, Camacho grabbed an automatic weapon and shot him four times. Id. ¶ 73. Camacho's version of the events differed significantly from the deputy's. He testified that the deputy had approached his car with his gun drawn, reached through the window and grabbed Camacho by the hair, and pointed his gun at Camacho's face. Id. Camacho asserted that he pulled away from the deputy and grabbed his own gun. Id. He admitted that he then shot the deputy. Id. ¶ 74. The State impeached Camacho's testimony at trial by presenting evidence of his prior statements to the effect that he was angry with the deputy because the deputy had allegedly called him crazy, but that the deputy had not pointed his gun at Camacho. Id. ¶ 75. The circuit court instructed the jury on attempted first-degree murder, self-defense, and attempted manslaughter. Id. at 867. The court did not read the standard jury instructions but instead instructed the jury that, as to perfect self-defense, if Camacho's conduct was not in self-defense or the defendant was not entitled to use self-defense and the belief by the defendant that he was entitled to use self-defense was unreasonable, then the defendant is guilty of the crime of attempted first degree murder. Id. The court also instructed the jury on attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter, stating that to find Camacho guilty it must find that Camacho intended to kill the deputy, and  was entitled to believe under the facts in this case that he was acting in self-defense, but the amount of force used was unnecessary or excessive. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 76. The jury found Camacho guilty of attempted first-degree murder. Id. at 868. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the instructions submitted to the jury by the circuit court seriously misstated the law and constituted prejudicial error. Id. (quoting State v. Camacho, 170 Wis. 2d 53, 59, 487 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1992)). ¶ 77. This court reversed the court of appeals, holding that a defendant charged with first-degree murder must show a reasonable belief that he was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person before he can obtain a conviction of imperfect self-defense manslaughter. Id. ¶ 78. The Camacho court stated that the absolute privilege of perfect self-defense is applicable when a defendant shows all three of the following elements: (1) the defendant reasonably believed that he was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person; (2) the defendant reasonably believed that force or threat thereof was necessary to prevent or terminate the interference; and (3) the defendant reasonably believed that the actual amount of force used was necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. Id. at 869. Therefore, to acquit on the grounds of perfect self-defense, a jury must be able to believe that all three beliefs were reasonable. ¶ 79. The court stated that according to Wis. Stat. § 940.05 (1985-86), imperfect self-defense manslaughter applies when a defendant causes the death of another human being `in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense.' Id. at 871. Noting that Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1) (1985-86) provided in part that [a] person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what he reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his person by such other person,  the court determined that a person is privileged to act in self-defense only if that person reasonably believes that he is preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person. Id. at 871-72. The court concluded, after reading former Wis. Stat. § 940.05 together with § 939.48, that for an intentional killing to constitute imperfect self-defense manslaughter, a defendant must show that he was exercising his privilege of self-defense. Id. Thus, a jury could not convict a defendant on the lesser charge of imperfect self-defense manslaughter without first finding that the defendant had met the threshold showing that the defendant's belief in the existence of an unlawful interference was reasonable. Id. ¶ 80. The Camacho decision was based on the 1985-86 version of the Wisconsin Statutes. Id. at 871 n.3. In its decision, however, the Camacho court also addressed the 1988 revision of the statutes, concluding that the legislature did not alter the crime of imperfect self-defense manslaughter, which still consists of an objective threshold element and two subjective elements even though the Legislature changed the language of the statute. [9] Id. at 882-83. The court concluded that under the revised statutes, a defendant must first show an objectively reasonable belief that she was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with her person. Id. at 883. Once a defendant passes this first hurdle, he is then entitled to a conviction of imperfect self-defense manslaughter if: (1) he had an actual, but unreasonable, belief that force was necessary because the unlawful interference resulted in an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; or (2) he possessed a reasonable belief that force was necessary because the unlawful interference resulted in an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm but his belief regarding the amount of force necessary was unreasonable. Id. ¶ 81. Although the Camacho decision states that the old requirements for raising imperfect self-defense are applicable to the revised homicide statutes, these new statutes were not in play before the court. [10] Therefore, to determine whether a defendant must still meet the same objective threshold to assert imperfect self-defense after the 1988 revision, we will re-examine and interpret the statutes in question.