Opinion ID: 2777784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: A bankruptcy court may issue civil contempt orders. In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc., 108 F.3d 609, 612–13 (5th Cir. 1997). There is no real dispute that the contempt order here was civil, and indeed it clearly was—its purpose was “to coerce compliance with a court order or to compensate another party for the contemnor’s violation.” Id. at 612. That is, the $6,454.50 award was meant to reimburse DDR for having to seek enforcement of the Sanctions Orders, and the $100-per-day award was meant to coerce Garrett into paying the Sanctions Orders timely. A bankruptcy court may exercise full judicial power only in core proceedings. In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1987); see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (giving bankruptcy court full jurisdiction over core matters); id. § 157(c)(1) (giving bankruptcy courts only recommendation authority over noncore matters that are merely “related to” a bankruptcy case). We hold that the bankruptcy court’s issuance of the Contempt Order took place during such a core proceeding. A proceeding is core if it either arises under the Bankruptcy Code or “would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy” proceeding. Wood, 825 F.2d at 96–97. Here, the proceeding was core because holding a party in civil contempt for refusing to follow a bankruptcy court’s valid and binding orders “would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy” proceeding. Again, an order of civil contempt is meant to coerce the contemnor into compliance or provide a remedy for the party injured by noncompliance. Terrebonne Fuel, 108 F.3d at 612. As such, an order of civil contempt is considered part of the underlying case. See In re Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 1517 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[C]ivil contempts generally have been viewed as part of the underlying case.”). Thus, the civil contempt order was issued as part of the bankruptcy case itself, making it a core proceeding that “would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy.” 4 Case: 14-10525 Document: 00512929585 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/06/2015 No. 14-10525 Moreover, the Contempt Order here falls within one of the statutorilyenumerated examples of core proceedings because it was a “matter[ ] concerning the administration of the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). The Contempt Order concerned the orderly administration of White-Robinson’s estate—namely, her attorney’s compliance with federal bankruptcy rules and the orders of the bankruptcy court. See In re Memorial Estates, Inc., 950 F.2d 1364, 1370 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that sanction for attorney’s misconduct during bankruptcy case was core proceeding, without considering whether misconduct occurred during core proceeding, in part because misconduct itself “concern[ed] the administration of the estate” (internal alteration in original)); Jackson v. Wessel, 118 B.R. 243, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that malpractice claims against debtor’s counsel alleging “professional conduct not compatible with obligations imposed by provisions of the bankruptcy law itself—provisions relating to the conduct of practitioners before the bankruptcy court—” concerned “the administration of the estate”). We find unpersuasive Garrett’s claim that the Contempt Order was non-core and unrelated to the bankruptcy case merely because White-Robinson had been discharged from bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court issued its Sanctions Orders to help promote the proper administration of the estate, and therefore the later Contempt Order to enforce the Sanctions Orders still “concern[ed] the administration of the estate.” 2 In the alternative, Garrett argues that the bankruptcy court could not issue its Contempt Order while the Sanctions Orders were being appealed to this court. This argument is clearly foreclosed by our precedent. Unless a bankruptcy court’s ruling is stayed pending appeal, that court retains 2 Rather than discussing whether the Contempt Order was issued during core proceedings, Garrett primarily argues that the Contempt Order was not “related to” WhiteRobinson’s bankruptcy. We do not reach this argument because, once a proceeding is determined to be core, we need not consider whether it is also “related to” a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2605 (2011). 5 Case: 14-10525 Document: 00512929585 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/06/2015 No. 14-10525 jurisdiction to engage in proceedings to enforce its own rulings. United States v. Revie, 834 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir. 1987). Here, Garrett did not obtain a stay of the Sanctions Orders pending appeal. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Sanctions Orders through any appropriate means, including a civil contempt order. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Smith, 53 F.3d 72, 76–77 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Until the judgment has been properly stayed or superseded, the district court may enforce it through contempt sanctions.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).