Opinion ID: 2599073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial misconduct (guilt phase closing arguments)

Text: Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his guilt phase rebuttal closing argument by making improper and disparaging remarks about defendant and defense counsel, and by presenting improper arguments on fingerprint evidence and on the cross-admissibility of evidence in the case. We find no prejudicial misconduct on this record. `The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are well established. `A prosecutor's ... intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.' ( People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199; People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.) Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' ( People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 820, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.)' ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Regarding the scope of permissible prosecutorial argument, `a prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature. [Citation.] A prosecutor may `vigorously argue his case and is not limited to Chesterfieldian politeness' [citation], and he may `use appropriate epithets....'' ( People v. Wharton [(1991)] 53 Cal.3d [522,] 567-568 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].) ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) Finally, a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion  and on the same ground  the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2 ( Samayoa ).) Defendant complains that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his guilt phase rebuttal argument when he told the jury that defense counsel imagined things that go beyond the evidence and told them a bald-faced lie. Although defense counsel lodged objections to these remarks, he failed to further request admonitions that could have cured any harm, thereby waiving the claim on appeal. ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 914, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.) We have examined the record and conclude the prosecutor's remarks were merely responsive to defense counsel's own arguments to the jury on the state of the evidence. Prosecution witness Fred Stewart testified he saw defendant in possession of a buck knife on the night before Rubalcava's robbery murder, that it appeared a little thinner than the buck knife later received into evidence in connection with those crimes (People's exhibit No. 2), and that it did not have a broken tip. Stewart was unwilling to state, on cross-examination, that People's exhibit No. 2 was not the knife he had seen in defendant's possession. Defense counsel's suggestion to the jury that the buck knife in evidence was not the knife Stewart had seen in defendant's possession, and his further suggestion that the knife Stewart described was more like a stiletto, are what prompted the prosecutor, in his rebuttal argument, to tell the jury counsel imagined things that go beyond the evidence, and that he had told them a bald-faced lie. The prosecutor's argument, although intemperate in tone, did little more than urge the jury not to be influenced by counsel's arguments, and to instead focus on the testimony and evidence in the case. (See People v. Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1216, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.) We reach the same conclusion regarding the prosecutor's suggestion to the jury that defense counsel was on an imaginary trip when he summarized the testimony of Lakesha Potts, one of the girls who recovered attempted murder victim Fakoury's wallet moments after defendant fled the scene of that attack. Defense counsel argued to the jury that the witness had described Fakoury's assailant as having no facial hair ... whatsoever. In fact, Potts testified she told a police sketch artist that the man had hair on the face. Although the prosecutor somewhat intemperately suggested defense counsel was on an imaginary trip when summarizing the witness's testimony for the jury, the prosecutor also told the jury, It's for you to resolve. But the point is, is that wherever that came from, that there was no facial hair on that person, it's not the evidence.  (Italics added.) When the court suggested to the prosecutor that it would be more correct to refer to defense counsel's argument as an exaggeration, the prosecutor responded, Fair enough. When the court added, Or an unreasonable inference, the prosecutor replied, That's even better, your Honor. The prosecutor's argument in this regard did not rise to the level of misconduct. Defendant also contends the prosecutor improperly argued facts not in evidence in his attempt to rebut defense counsel's argument that the absence of defendant's fingerprint on one of the knives in evidence established he had not handled the knife. Defendant's failure to object to the argument or seek a curative admonition has waived the claim on appeal. ( Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; People v. Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1215, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.) In any case, the prosecutor was merely expounding on the testimony of the fingerprint expert who testified not everyone who handles an object will leave discernable fingerprints on the object. Defendant also complains that the prosecutor's description of him as cold-blooded, a person with no soul, and someone with no remorse was misconduct that improperly encouraged the jury to find him guilty based on his mere propensity to commit crime. We do not find these comments rose to the level of misconduct given the brutal and violent nature of the stabbing murder and attempted murder, and other violent crimes of which defendant was convicted. Nor do we agree with defendant that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing certain evidence was cross-admissible for the purpose of establishing defendant's guilt of one or more of the other charged offenses. We have explained that the evidence was cross-admissible. In any case, neither claim was preserved for appeal with an appropriate objection. ( Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.)