Opinion ID: 2339307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: State's Focus Misplaced

Text: The State argues V.B.'s statements were nontestimonial because they were made to the SANE as a medical professional, not as a government official, and they were made to provide the SANE with information for treatment purposes, not for prosecution. The State also argues that the interview was not subject to any of the formalities and procedures otherwise associated with testimonial hearsay. These arguments might be valid in other circumstances where a SANE assesses the medical condition of a sexual assault victim and provides treatment. For example, in light of the circumstances presented in State v. Miller, ___ Kan. ___, ___, 264 P.3d 461 (2011), this day decided, we held that the statements of a 4-year-old victim to a SANE were nontestimonial because the primary purpose of the questions and statements were medical treatment, not prosecution. That context-dependent conclusion was based on the circumstances of the child victim complaining of discomfort, the victim's mother deciding to seek medical treatment independent of a request by law enforcement officers for an examination, and the SANE providing medical treatment. The same conclusion is suggested by some of the circumstances in this case, primarily the facts that V.B. was taken by ambulance to the hospital and sought and received medical treatment. This case, however, presents the circumstances of the statements being given either (1) to a law enforcement officer and a SANE or (2) in response to questions prepared by the KBI that were asked by the SANE. These factors dictate the outcome of the issue in this In Miller, ___ Kan. at ___ _ ___, 264 P.3d 461, we cite case law from other jurisdictions on the issue of whether statements to a SANE are testimonial. We will not repeat that discussion here but note that in synthesizing those decisions we concluded if a law enforcement officer participates in the questioning, there is a strong trend toward finding the victim's statements testimonial. Miller, ___ Kan. at ___, 264 P.3d 461. We agree with the decisions reaching this result, at least under the circumstances of this case. We further note that these holdings are consistent with our decision in State v. Henderson, 284 Kan. 267, 160 P.3d 776 (2007). In that case, a child victim was primarily interviewed by a state-employed social worker, who was gathering information for potential action related to child protection services. However, a law enforcement officer sat in on the interview, and participated in asking several clarifying questions of [the victim]. Henderson, 284 Kan. at 289, 160 P.3d 776. This participation, along with the officer's continuous involvement in the process and other aspects of the investigation from the start, was an important consideration leading to our holding that the victim's statements were testimonial. See Henderson, 284 Kan. at 289-90, 160 P.3d 776. In this case, the presence of the law enforcement officer during the initial taking of a history from V.B. blurs the primary purpose of the interview. Obviously, one purpose of the interview was for medical purposes; the SANE testified the first step of an examination is to obtain information on exactly what happened to [the victim], so then in turn you can assess for [the] types of injuries that may have been sustained. Yet, the presence of an officer is not necessary for medical purposes. Rather, the officer was listening to V.B.'s account of past events, with an eye toward gathering information relevant to prosecution. The officer, who asked questions, gathered this information in a formal setting at a time when there was no indication of an ongoing public safety or law enforcement emergency; the perpetrator had fled hours before the interview. In this regard, the situation was much like that in Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), where the law enforcement emergency had been resolved and the victim was being asked to recount past facts. The fact the officer interjected questions makes it apparent from an objective viewpoint that the information was also being sought for potential use in a subsequent prosecution. The fact these statements were also heard by a SANE does not alter the objective circumstances that suggest a primary purpose was prosecution, even if there was a dual purpose of assessment for medical purposes. In Miller, ___ Kan. at ___, 264 P.3d 461, we concluded that an analysis of the testimonial nature of statements must at times be analyzed question by question because the purpose of the interview may transition. In this case, we are unable to make such fine distinctions because the SANE's narrative of V.B.'s statements does not distinguish between information given in response to a question asked by the officer or by the SANE. Consequently, because the interview was conducted in concert with the officer who asked questions, V.B. was asked about past events, there was not an ongoing public safety or medical emergency, and the statement was given in a formal setting, we hold the admission of the SANE's testimony about the statements made in the presence of a law enforcement officer violated Bennington's confrontation rights. V.B. made other statements outside the presence of the officer, however, during the second stage of the SANE's interview of V.B. As previously discussed, it was during this second stage that the SANE completed the KBI's questionnaire. The Court of Appeals separately discussed the two phases of the statements and determined Bennington's objection to the admission of V.B.'s second-stage statements had not been preserved. The Court of Appeals explained: Finally, when [the SANE] related this aspect of her work, there was no objection to her testimony; the vague `continuing objection' asserted at the outset of [the SANE's] testimony during step one in the process cannot be construed as applicable to the later and attenuated step two testimony without at least a reminder to the court of the general applicability of the prior `continuing' objection. See In re C.E.M., No. 96,914 [2007 WL 656454], unpublished opinion filed March 2, 2007, rev. denied 284 Kan. 945 (2007) [, slip op. at 6] (vague continuing objection deemed inapplicable to attenuated testimony without reminder of continuing applicability); [see also] State v. Torrez [ Torres ], 280 Kan. 309, 319, 121 P.3d 429 (2005) (a timely and specific objection is necessary to preserve an issue for appeal). The dispute on appeal focuses upon what the victim told [the SANE] during the step one `history.' The distinction between evidence resulting from step one and that resulting from step two is critical to our analysis. State v. Bennington, No. 98,656, ___ Kan.App.2d ___, 2009 WL 981683, at  (Kan.App.2009) (unpublished opinion). Despite this explanation by the Court of Appeals, the source of its insistence that a continuing objection needed to be renewed because V.B. made these second-stage statements in a different location and different phase of the examination is unclear. Until the Court of Appeals' decision, no one had attached legal significance to the stages of the examination. Although we also think the stages are legally significant, we fail to see why a continuing objection to all statements of V.B. on confrontation grounds, reasserted during the SANE's testimony, did not sufficiently preserve an objection to all statements of V.B., regardless of whether made in the initial history portion of the examination or in response to questions on the KBI form. Consequently, we conclude Bennington preserved the issue of whether all V.B.'s statements, including the stage-two statements, were admissible. Nevertheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there is legal significance to the fact these stage-two statements were given in response to questions through which the KBI sought information significant to the investigation and later prosecution of a crime. Even though the questions were verbally posed by the SANE, the source was the KBI and the questions asked who, when, where, and other specifics relating to the elements of potential crimes. These circumstances indicate the primary purpose of the interrogation was to seek information for later prosecution of crimes. Significantly, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 65-448 states, in part: (a) Upon the request of any law enforcement officer and with the written consent of the reported victim, or upon the request of the victim, any physician, a licensed physician assistant, who has been specially trained in performing sexual assault evidence collection, or a registered professional nurse, who has been specially trained in performing sexual assault evidence collection, on call or on duty at a medical care facility of this state, as defined by subsection (h) of K.S.A. 65-425, and amendments thereto, shall examine persons who may be victims of sexual offenses... using Kansas bureau of investigation sexual assault evidence collection kits or similar kits approved by the Kansas bureau of investigation, for the purposes of gathering evidence of any such crime. If an examination has taken place solely upon the request of the victim, the medical care facility shall not notify any law enforcement agency without the written consent of the victim, unless otherwise required by law.... The department of health and environment, in cooperation with the Kansas bureau of investigation, shall establish procedures for gathering evidence pursuant to this section. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the record does not establish whether a law enforcement officer requested the examination or whether V.B. consented to the release of the information to law enforcement. Nevertheless, because the SANE was complying with the protocol established pursuant to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 65-448 and was seeking information in addition to the history that she said she used for diagnostic purposes, her actions reflect that the primary purpose of posing the questions was to gather information for prosecution. Because the record on appeal is silent regarding whether V.B. consented to the information being provided to law enforcement, we decline to project the impact the consent would have had on V.B.'s intent and actions. Even without the consent, from an objective standpoint, a patient would understand questions that ask for a description of the perpetrator and similar information did not need to be asked for purposes of medical treatment. Rather, under the circumstances of this case, V.B. was reporting past events that were not related to an ongoing public safety emergency or to her need for medical treatment. Moreover, when a SANEeven one who is a non-State actorfollows the procedures for gathering evidence pursuant to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 65-448 and asks questions prepared by the KBI, the SANE acts as an agent of law enforcement. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1151 n. 3, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (noting non-State actors may be considered agents for purposes of analysis of whether statements are testimonial); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (same). Again, under some circumstances, there may be a transition to nontestimonial statements. But there is no indication of any such circumstances in this case. As a result, we conclude that V.B.'s statements were testimonial under the circumstances of this case where an officer was present and asked questions of V.B. in stage one and the KBI prepared questions that the SANE asked during stage two of V.B.'s statements.