Opinion ID: 1135482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Police Report and Memorandum

Text: Parker argues that during the penalty phase the district court erred in refusing to admit a police inter-office memorandum and a police report into evidence. The memorandum and report refer to an informant, known as William, Billy, or Willie, who contacted Oscars' mother on several occasions with information about Oscars' murder. The police tried to establish contact with this person, but were unable to meet with him, or even confirm his name or identity. Parker asserts that the police memorandum and report were relevant to sentencing because they suggested that Parker was merely an accomplice and that his participation in the murder was relatively minor. Under NRS 200.035, evidence that a defendant was an accomplice or a minor participant in the crime may constitute a mitigating circumstance. Evidence not ordinarily admissible during the guilt phase may be presented at the penalty phase if it is relevant to sentencing. NRS 175.552; Pellegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 630, 764 P.2d 484, 489 (1988). Additionally, the jury cannot be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record or any circumstance of the case. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 171, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2326, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). However, in Franklin, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that the jury need not revisit the issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 173, 108 S.Ct. at 2327. Parker's efforts to introduce the police memorandum and report basically constitute an attempt to make the jury reconsider Parker's guilt or innocence. During the guilt phase, Parker extensively questioned at least seven witnesses with respect to the identity of the informant, including the investigating police officers. The jury heard extensive evidence regarding the identity of the informant during the guilt phase. Furthermore, the trial court should not admit evidence which is impalpable or highly suspect in the penalty phase. Young v. State, 103 Nev. 233, 237, 737 P.2d 512, 515 (1987). Also, the trial judge may not admit evidence that is dubious or tenuous. Allen v. State, 99 Nev. 485, 488, 665 P.2d 238, 240 (1983). The police were never able to identify this informant. Therefore, there was no evidence at trial regarding the informant's identity or purpose or motive in providing this information. Consequently, this evidence was highly suspect. Even though evidence not ordinarily admissible during the guilt phase of trial may be presented during the penalty phase, it must have some reliability. This court has held that [t]he decision to admit particular evidence during the penalty phase is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. Pellegrini, 104 Nev. at 631, 764 P.2d at 488. We conclude that the police memorandum and report are dubious and tenuous evidence, and furthermore, that the substance of the report had already been introduced by Parker in the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the police memorandum and report during the penalty phase.