Opinion ID: 2607714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Arising Under Article V of the United States Constitution

Text: Our discussion of the federal constitutional issues proceeds in three steps. First, we inquire whether the term Legislatures as used in article V refers to the representative body elected to enact the laws of the state  in California, the state Senate and Assembly  or to the whole of the state legislative power, including the reserved power of initiative. Our conclusion that it refers only to the representative body makes it clear that the people cannot by initiative apply directly to Congress for a constitutional convention. We then turn to two remaining questions: whether the people by initiative can (a) compel the Legislature to apply to Congress for a constitutional convention or (b) urge Congress to submit a proposed amendment to the states. (2) We must first, however, address briefly the contention raised by distinguished amici curiae (former Attorney General Griffin Bell, former Senator Sam Ervin, and Professor John Noonan) that none of the federal constitutional issues raised here is justiciable. They cite Coleman v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 433 [83 L.Ed. 1385, 59 S.Ct. 972, 122 A.L.R. 695], in which the court refused to adjudicate the validity of Kansas' ratification of the proposed Child Labor Amendment. The Coleman petitioners first challenged the authority of the lieutenant governor to break a tie vote on ratification; the court divided equally on the justiciability of that issue. They next asserted that having once rejected the amendment, Kansas could not later ratify; the court, relying on the historical precedent of the Fourteenth Amendment, [12] held this to be a political question within the exclusive authority of the Congress. Finally, petitioners argued that Kansas had not ratified the amendment within a reasonable time after it was submitted to the states. The court reaffirmed Dillon v. Gloss, supra, 256 U.S. 368, where it said that an amendment must be ratified within a reasonable time, but held that the timeliness of a particular ratification was also a political question entrusted to the Congress. Four concurring justices went further, asserting that The [amending] process itself is `political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point. (307 U.S. 433, 459 [83 L.Ed. 1385, 1399], conc. opn. of Black, J.) The political question doctrine has undergone considerable change since Coleman v. Miller . (See Powell v. McCormack (1969) 395 U.S. 486 [23 L.Ed.2d 491, 89 S.Ct. 1944]; Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186 [7 L.Ed.2d 663, 82 S.Ct. 691].) Judges and commentators have questioned whether Coleman v. Miller is consistent with the criteria established in these later cases. (See State of Idaho v. Freeman (D.Idaho 1981) 529 F. Supp. 1107, vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 809 [74 L.Ed. 39, 103 S.Ct. 22]; Dyer v. Blair (N.D.Ill. 1975) 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1300-1303; Note, Good Intentions, New Inventions, and Article V Constitutional Conventions (1979) 58 Tex.L.Rev. 131, 158-162.) But assuming that Coleman v. Miller remains controlling authority on the issues it decided  that Congress alone has the power to decide whether a ratification submitted by a state is valid and timely  that holding does not control in the present setting. Hawke v. Smith, No. 1 (1920) 253 U.S. 221 [64 L.Ed. 871, 40 S.Ct. 495, 10 A.L.R. 1504] (discussed at length later in this opinion ( post, pp. 700-701)), is direct authority for the proposition that a court can remove a proposal from a state election ballot on the ground that it does not conform to article V, and by necessary inference that a court has authority to adjudicate that question. Contrary to the suggestion of amici, the majority opinion in Coleman v. Miller did not overrule Hawke v. Smith; it cited the earlier decision favorably on an issue of standing to sue (307 U.S. at pp. 438-449 [83 L.Ed. at pp. 1388-1394]), and never hinted that Hawke v. Smith decided a nonjusticiable issue. In Dyer v. Blair, supra, 390 F. Supp. 1291, Judge Stevens, now a justice of the United States Supreme Court, considered the effect of Coleman v. Miller upon earlier Supreme Court article V decisions. The issue in that case was whether a state could constitutionally provide that more than a simple majority was required to ratify a constitutional amendment. Rejecting the argument that every aspect of the amending process is a nonjusticiable political question, Judge Stevens stated that since a majority of the Court refused to accept that position in [ Coleman v. Miller ] and since the Court has on several occasions decided questions arising under article V, even in the face of `political question' contentions, that argument is not one which a District Court is free to accept. (Pp. 1299-1300.) In deciding questions of federal constitutional law, a state court is equally bound by the controlling Supreme Court decisions. Judge Stevens went on to consider the question of justiciability in light of Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S. 486, Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. 186, and the majority opinion in Coleman v. Miller, supra . He distinguished Coleman v. Miller ; that decision rested on the historical precedent of congressional adjudication of the effect of withdrawing a ratification, and the difficulty of determining what constituted a reasonable time for ratification. Such precedents and problems, he said, had no relevance to the issue in Dyer v. Blair  and, we must add, are equally irrelevant to the issue in the present case. Judge Stevens observed that [d]ecision of the question presented requires no more than an interpretation of the Constitution. Such a decision falls squarely within the traditional role of the ... judiciary.... [¶] The mere fact that a court has little or nothing but the language of the Constitution as a guide to its interpretation does not mean that the task of construction is judicially unmanageable. (Pp. 1301-1302.) He then concluded: We are persuaded that the word `ratification' as used in article V of the federal Constitution must be interpreted with the kind of consistency that is characteristic of judicial, as opposed to political, decision making. (P. 1303.) We are similarly persuaded that the word Legislatures in article V is subject to judicial construction. Concluding, therefore, that the issues here raised are justiciable, we turn to the task of construing the language of article V. The application clause of that article provides that [t]he Congress ... on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments.... No reported decisions have decided whether the term Legislatures in this clause includes the reserved powers of initiative and referendum. [13] The term Legislatures, however, also appears in the portion of article V which specifies that an amendment becomes valid to all Intents and Purposes ... when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, and several cases have construed the meaning of Legislatures in this provision. We turn to examine these decisions. Many of the cases, including Barlotti v. Lyons, (1920) 182 Cal. 575 [189 P. 282], the only California case, concerned the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting the sale of alcohol. When the California Legislature ratified the amendment, Barlotti and other petitioners presented a referendum petition to the registrar of voters. The registrar refused to transmit the petition to the Secretary of State, and petitioners sought mandamus from this court. Our opinion noted two issues: whether the legislative ratification was conclusive under the federal Constitution, and whether the referendum provisions of the state Constitution were intended to apply to resolutions ratifying a constitutional amendment. It addressed only the federal issue, finding it decisive of the case. Chief Justice Angellotti, for a unanimous court, defined the question narrowly, as being simply one as to the meaning of the word `legislatures' as used in the clause `when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states' of article V.... (P. 577.) If by those words was meant the representative bodies invested with the law-making power of the several states, which existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution ... in each of the several states, and which have ever since so existed, as distinguished from the law-making power of the respective states, there is nothing left to discuss, for with that meaning attributed to the term ... the constitutional provision is so plain and unambiguous as not to admit of different constructions. The situation would then be that the people of the United States, in framing and ratifying the constitution ..., `have excluded themselves from any direct or immediate agency in making amendments to it.' (P. 578.) The opinion first examined the ordinary meaning of the term. It certainly is not in consonance with the ordinary acceptation of the term `legislature' to take it as meaning otherwise than a representative body selected by the people of a state and invested with the power of law-making for the state, whatever be the power reserved to the people themselves to review the action of that body or to initiate and adopt laws. (P. 578.) It then examined the California Constitution, in which the word legislature appears frequently, always with the plain meaning of the Senate and Assembly. Even former article IV, section 1, which reserved the right of initiative and referendum, referred to the Senate and Assembly as The Legislature of the State of California. The opinion reviewed the use of the term in the United States Constitution, observing that in almost all cases it clearly referred to a representative body. Consequently, the court concluded that the term Legislatures in article V means some official body of a state as distinguished from the state itself or the people of the state or the whole law-making power of the state. (P. 582.) Chief Justice Angellotti recognized the argument that direct popular vote is a superior method of ascertaining the popular will. He replied that the argument is, in the final analysis, based more upon some present day conceptions of what the law in this regard ought to be, than upon the intention of the framers of the constitution as expressed therein, and, to our mind, expressed so clearly as to preclude any other conclusion than the one we have reached. (P. 584.) The court accordingly dismissed the petition for mandamus, thereby precluding a referendum election on the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. The courts of Maine and Michigan filed opinions agreeing with Barlotti that article V precludes a referendum on the ratification of a constitutional amendment ( Opinion of the Justices (1919) 118 Me. 544 [107 A. 673, 5 A.L.R. 1412]; Decher v. Secretary of State (1920) 209 Mich. 565 [177 N.W. 388]), while Arkansas, Colorado, and Oregon reached the same result on state constitutional grounds ( Whittemore v. Terral (1919) 140 Ark. 493 [215 S.W. 686]; Prior v. Noland (1920) 68 Colo. 263 [188 P. 729]; Herbring v. Brown (1919) 92 Ore. 176 [180 P. 328].) Ohio and Washington, however, upheld referendum elections. ( Hawke v. Smith (1919) 100 Ohio St. 385 [126 N.E. 400]; Mullen v. Howell (1919) 107 Wash. 167 [181 P. 920].) The United States Supreme Court selected the Ohio decision for review and, in a unanimous decision, held unconstitutional a provision of the Ohio Constitution which declared that legislative ratification of a federal constitutional amendment was incomplete until approved by popular referendum. ( Hawke v. Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221.) The opinion by Justice Day follows the same reasoning as that of our court in Barlotti. He first observes that Both methods of ratification, by legislatures or conventions, call for action by deliberative assemblages representative of the people, which it was assumed would voice the will of the people.... [¶] The framers of the Constitution might have adopted a different method. Ratification might have been left to a vote of the people.... [However, the] language of the article is plain, and admits of no doubt in its interpretation. It is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to alter the method which the Constitution has fixed. (Pp. 226-227 [64 L.Ed. at p. 875].) According to Justice Day, The only question really for determination is: What did the framers of the Constitution mean in requiring ratification by `Legislatures' ? That was not a term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for the purpose of interpretation. A Legislature was then the representative body which made the laws of the people. The term is often used in the Constitution with this evident meaning. Article I, § 2, prescribes the qualifications of electors of congressmen as those `requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.' Article I, § 3, provided that senators shall be chosen in each State by the legislature thereof, and this was the method of choosing senators until the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment which made provision for the election of senators by vote of the people, the electors to have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. That Congress and the States understood that this election by the people was entirely distinct from legislative action is shown by the provision of the amendment giving the legislature of any State the power to authorize the Executive to make temporary appointments until the people shall fill the vacancies by election. It was never suggested, so far as we are aware, that the purpose of making the office of Senator elective by the people could be accomplished by a referendum vote. The necessity of the amendment to accomplish the purpose of popular election is shown in the adoption of the amendment. In Article IV the United States is required to protect every State against domestic violence upon application of the legislature, or of the Executive when the legislature cannot be convened. Article VI requires the members of the several legislatures to be bound by oath, or affirmation, to support the Constitution of the United States. By Article I, § 8, Congress is given exclusive jurisdiction over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be. Article IV, § 3, provides that no new States shall be carved out of old States without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned. There can be no question that the framers of the Constitution clearly understood and carefully used the terms in which that instrument referred to the action of the legislatures of the States. When they intended that direct action by the people should be had they were no less accurate in the use of apt phraseology to carry out such purpose. The members of the House of Representatives were required to be chosen by the people of the several States. Article I, § 2. (Pp. 227-228 [64 L.Ed. at pp. 875-876].) [14] Ohio argued that the term Legislatures in article V referred to the legislative power of the state, however divided between representative assemblies and the people. Justice Day responded that the argument was fallacious, because ratification by a State of a constitutional amendment is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word.... [¶] The act of ratification by the State derives its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the State and its people have alike assented. (Pp. 229-230 [64 L.Ed. at p. 876].) The court accordingly reversed the judgment requiring the submission of the ratification to popular referendum. Many years have passed since Barlotti and Hawke were filed, but those decisions remain the unquestioned and controlling authority. (See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, supra, 366 N.E.2d 1226.) Thus in 1975, when the California Attorney General was asked whether the voters by initiative could rescind the Legislature's ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, he cited Barlotti and Hawke, and replied: The California electorate cannot effectively rescind the Legislature's ratification by the initiative process because amendments to the federal constitution are not subject to the initiative or referendum process in California. (58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. (1975) 830, 831.) As we noted earlier, the cited cases refer to the role of the Legislature in ratifying, not in proposing, constitutional amendments. Courts and commentators agree, however, that the term Legislatures bears the same meaning throughout article V. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in holding that a governor cannot veto an application for a constitutional convention, declared that [s]ince the word `Legislatures' in the ratification clause of Art. V does not mean the whole legislative process of the State ..., we are of the opinion that the word `Legislatures' in the application clause, likewise, does not mean the whole legislative process. ( Opinion of the Justices, supra, 366 N.E.2d 1226, 1228.) Senator Ervin, explaining proposed legislation to regulate a constitutional convention, stated that [c]ertainly the term `legislature' should have the same meaning in both the application clause and the ratification clause of Article V. (Ervin, Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution (1968) 66 Mich.L.Rev. 875, 889; see Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention (1969) 39 N.D.L.Rev. 659, 665.) (3) We conclude that when article V refers to an application by the Legislatures of two-thirds of the states, calling for a constitutional convention, it refers to the representative lawmaking bodies in those states. Any application directly by the people, through their reserved legislative power, would not conform to article V. Section 3 of the Balanced Budget Initiative states that the people adopt a resolution calling for a constitutional convention, and provides that, if the Legislature fails to adopt the resolution within 40 legislative days, the Secretary of State shall transmit the resolution so adopted to the Congress. Under the decisions previously discussed, it seems clear that a resolution adopted directly by the people and transmitted to Congress without action by the Legislature would be invalid under article V. The initiative, however, proposes direct action, bypassing the Legislature, only as a last resort. The thrust of the measure is in the provision mandating the Legislature to adopt a resolution applying for a constitutional convention. (4) The question thus arises whether pro forma action by a state legislature, acting under compulsion of an initiative measure, is sufficient to comply with article V. The question itself is one of first impression, but a number of decisions offer guidance. The ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, giving women the right to vote, was challenged on the ground that two state legislatures ratified in violation of state constitutional provisions restricting their freedom of action. The Missouri Constitution provided that the state legislature could not assent to any amendment that would impair the right to local self-government; the Tennessee Constitution provided that the legislature could not act upon any amendment until an election intervened. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that [t]he function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution ... is a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a State. ( Leser v. Garnett (1922) 258 U.S. 130, 137 [66 L.Ed. 505, 511, 42 S.Ct. 217]; see also Trombetta v. Florida (M.D. Fla. 1973) 353 F. Supp. 575; Walker v. Dunn (Tenn. 1972) 498 S.W.2d 102.) If a state cannot constitutionally prohibit its legislature from proposing or ratifying a constitutional amendment, by implication it cannot compel the legislature to do so. Two other cases involve advisory initiatives. In 1928 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was asked to rule upon a proposed initiative requesting the state's congressional delegation to support repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The court held that the measure was not a proper initiative on both state and federal grounds, stating, in connection with the latter ground, that [t]he voters of the several States are excluded by the terms of art. 5 of the Constitution of the United States from participation in the process of its amendment. ( Opinion of the Justices (1928) 262 Mass. 603, 606 [160 N.E. 439].) Fifty years later the Nevada Supreme Court considered an initiative advising the state legislature whether to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. The court distinguished Hawke v. Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221, and Leser v. Garnett, supra, 258 U.S. 130 on the ground that the proposal does not concern a binding referendum, nor does it impose a limitation upon the legislature.... [T]he legislature may vote for or against ratification, or refrain from voting on ratification at all, without regard to the advisory vote. ( Kimble v. Swackhamer (1978) 94 Nev. 600 [584 P.2d 161, 162].) When opponents of the Nevada initiative sought a stay from the United States Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist, sitting as circuit justice, denied the stay with the following order: Appellants' ... contention ... is in my opinion not substantial because of the nonbinding character of the referendum.... Under these circumstances ... reliance [on] ... Leser v. Garnett ... and Hawke v. Smith ... is obviously misplaced.... I can see no constitutional obstacle to a nonbinding advisory referendum of this sort. ( Kimble v. Swackhamer (1978) 439 U.S. 1385, 1387-1388 [58 L.Ed.2d 225, 228, 99 S.Ct. 51].) The Massachusetts and Nevada cases squarely disagree on the validity of a nonbinding initiative, but both cases (and especially Justice Rehnquist's order) clearly imply that a binding initiative would offend article V. Real party in interest, however, cites a decision with contrary implications, In re Opinions of the Justices (1933) 226 Ala. 565 [148 So. 107]. The Alabama Supreme Court was asked to rule on a proposed statute requiring that delegates to a convention to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment pledge to follow the result of a statewide vote. Quoting Hawke v. Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221, 226-227 [64 L.Ed. 871, 875], where the court said the framers of the Constitution assumed that legislatures and conventions would voice the will of the people, the Alabama court reasoned that the function of deliberative bodies in ratifying proposed amendments was merely to ascertain and carry out the popular will. A direct and binding instruction to the delegates, it concluded, would more truly and efficiently fulfill that function. [15] We question whether the reasoning of the Alabama court applies to the act of a legislature in proposing or ratifying an amendment. The analysis of the federal Constitution set out in Barlotti and Hawke indicates that the drafters of that document deliberately chose to vest the power of proposal and ratification in state legislatures instead of the people. The framers were, of course, aware of the difference between a representative body and the electorate as a whole; they knew that a legislature is a deliberative body, empowered to conduct hearings, examine evidence, and debate propositions. Its members may be assumed generally to hold views reflecting the popular will, but no one expects legislators to agree with their constituents on every measure coming before that body. Yet, although undoubtedly aware that the views of a deliberative body concerning a proposed amendment might depart from those of a majority of the voters, the framers of the Constitution chose to give the voters no direct role in the amending process; legislatures alone received the power to apply for a national convention, and legislatures or conventions, as Congress chose, the power to ratify amendments. [16] The only conclusion we can draw from this fact is that the drafters wanted the amending process in the hands of a body with the power to deliberate upon a proposed amendment and, after considering not only the views of the people but the merits of the proposition, to render a considered judgment. A rubber stamp legislature could not fulfill its function under article V of the Constitution. We conclude that a state may not, by initiative or otherwise, compel its legislators to apply for a constitutional convention, or to refrain from such action. Under article V, the legislators must be free to vote their own considered judgment, being responsible to their constituents through the electoral process. The proposed Balanced Budget Initiative, to the extent that it mandates the California Legislature to apply to Congress for a constitutional convention, violates article V of the United States Constitution. The resolution set out in section 1 of the initiative includes language which merely petitions Congress to adopt a balanced budget amendment, and does not attempt to invoke the application process of article V. Since that language does not purport to bind Congress or the state Legislature to undertake any act of legal significance under article V, it is analogous to the advisory initiatives discussed earlier in this opinion. ( Ante, pp. 704-705.) As we there noted, the decisions conflict, with one case ( Opinion of the Justices, supra, 262 Mass. 603) ruling that an advisory initiative violates article V, but a later decision ( Kimble v. Swackhamer, supra, 584 P.2d 616) upholding such an initiative. (5) A resolution, whether by the Legislature or by the people, urging Congress to approve a proposed constitutional amendment is not an act of constitutional significance. Such a resolution does not call for a national convention, propose an amendment, or ratify an amendment. We therefore conclude, in accord with Kimble v. Swackhamer, that such a resolution does not raise any issue under the federal Constitution. It follows that the Balanced Budget Initiative, insofar as it merely adopts a resolution urging Congress to submit a constitutional amendment to the states, and mandates the Legislature to adopt that resolution, does not offend article V. Our conclusion that the crucial provisions of the initiative measure are invalid under the United States Constitution, but that other, subordinate provisions are not, necessarily raises a question of severability. Since the same question arises in connection with our analysis of the state constitutional issues, we defer discussion of the matter until later in this opinion.