Opinion ID: 6929859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Upward Adjustments for More Than Minimal Planning

Text: Defendants Granoff, Ward and Landman argue that the district court committed clear error by imposing a two-level increase in their offense levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(2)(A), for more than minimal planning. 84 “More than minimal planning” is defined as: [M]ore planning than is typical for commission of the offense in a simple form. “More than minimal planning” also exists if significant affirmative steps were taken to conceal the offense. “More than minimal planning” is deemed present in any case involving repeated acts over a period of time, unless it is clear that each instance was purely opportune. Consequently, this adjustment will apply especially frequently in property offenses. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment note 1(f). We review the district court’s minimal planning assessment only for clear error. United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1993). We are not inclined to reverse a finding of more than minimal planning unless the evidence compels the conclusion that defendant’s actions were purely opportune or “spur of the moment.” Gregorio, 956 F.2d at 343; United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357, 361 (1st Cir.1989) (“We cannot conceive of how obtaining even one fraudulent loan would not require more than minimal planning.”). In light of the rather complex and sophisticated scheme involved in this case, we find any assignment of error to the sentencing judge’s ruling that the defendants engaged in more than minimal planning to be rather far-fetched. In any event, the judge made more than adequate findings based on the record to support his decision. The judge found that Ward took the initiative to find buyers for the scheme and helped falsify down payments which constituted “repeated acts” over a period of time. Ward protests that there is no evidence that he “initiated” any of the contacts with the buyers. This is mere quibbling. Ward was actively involved in the recruitment process, he told buyers no down payments were required, he told buyers to provide down payments checks that he knew would not be negotiated, and he provided buyers with rebates for their purchases. Any one of these facts would support a finding of more than minimal planning. As for defendant Granoff, the district court found that the scheme to defraud Bay Loan involved more planning than is typical for commission of the offense in its simple form. Looking at the scheme as a whole, this fact is indisputable. But this fact is also true when viewed from the perspective of Granoffs specific involvement. Granoff first met with Brandon in the summer of 1987 to discuss the condominium project and eventually he agreed to purchase some units and to fund buyer down payments. Pursuant to this agreement, Granoff purchased four units in August of 1987 in which funds were recycled via a sophisticated arrangement. Five months later, he provided $470,000 to Dean Street on the understanding it would be returned to him after it was used to fund buyers’ down payments. Granoff also formed a partnership with Gauvin to invest in the Dean Street project. All of these activities reflect a significant level of involvement in the scheme. We therefore find no error in his case. Finally, the sentencing judge found that Landman engaged in “repeated acts” during the scheme in his role as escrow agent or closing attorney for most of the loan transactions. There is no basis for any error in his case.