Opinion ID: 852621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Peremptory Strikes Based on Religion or Occupation

Text: Higher argues that the State's other proffered race-neutral reason for its peremptory challenge of Juror 92  that the juror was a pastor and therefore more forgiving  amounts to a strike based on the juror's religion and therefore violates the juror's rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State's explanation of its justification for striking Juror 92 was: in [Juror 92's] profession he's a Pastor and I never take any Pastors, Ministers, Reverends, [or] Priests on my jury panels. The Court of Appeals concluded that, the State did not strike Juror 92 because he held a particular religious belief or affiliation. Rather, the prosecutor struck the juror in question, in part, because he is a pastor. Highler, 834 N.E.2d at 194. Thus, the Court of Appeals framed this issue as whether it is proper to use a peremptory challenge to exclude members  in this case leaders  of a religious group or those perceived as having religious affiliations from the jury, without regard to the particular group or affiliation. Id. The Court of Appeals thoroughly explored the use of a peremptory challenge based on religious affiliation or religious leadership and concluded that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibits the exercise of a peremptory challenge to excuse a venire person because of his or her religious affiliation. Highler, 834 N.E.2d at 197. The Court of Appeals explained that, [a]lthough one's religious beliefs may render a prospective juror unsuitable for service in a particular case, one's religious affiliation, like one's race or gender, bears no relation to that person's ability to serve as a juror. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) (In our heterogenous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption  as a per se rule  that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion.)); see also State v. Clark, 128 N.M. 119, 990 P.2d 793, 803 (1999) (finding that a juror was properly struck because his religious beliefs prevented him from imposing the death penalty). [1] Although the issue is not yet resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States, we think the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that religious affiliation, like race and gender, is an impermissible basis for striking a prospective juror. [2] Despite its view that a strike based on religious affiliation was impermissible, the Court of Appeals affirmed Highler's conviction because it found that the prosecutor's primary motivation in striking Juror 92 was Juror 92's concern for the criminal justice system. As we held in McCormick, if the prosecutor cites multiple reasons, some of which are permissible and others not, a Batson violation is established. 803 N.E.2d at 1112-13. We therefore disagree with that rationale of the Court of Appeals for affirming the trial court. Although we agree with the Court of Appeals that strikes based on religious affiliation are impermissible, we believe that Judge Robb was correct in upholding the trial court's ruling because the State's justification for striking Juror 92 was not his religious affiliation, but his occupation. Id. at 99 (Robb, J., concurring). As a general proposition, striking a juror because of the juror's occupation is not unconstitutional. See United States v. Colon, No. 00-3744, 2002 U.S.App. LEXIS 3350, at  (3d Cir. Feb. 26, 2002) (finding constitutional in a cocaine distribution case strike of prospective juror who worked for Department of Human Services and had client mothers who were on the verge of losing their kids because of drugs and alcohol); Looney v. Davis, 721 So.2d 152, 166 (Ala.1998) (Employment is accepted as a legitimate reason for peremptory strikes where it under the circumstances of the case, might make the potential jurors sympathetic to, or able to more easily identify with a particular party. (quoting Olsen v. Rich, 657 So.2d 875, 879 (Ala. 1995))). Specifically, peremptorily striking religious leaders from juries because they may be sympathetic to defendants generally has been upheld as constitutional. See McKinnon v. State, 547 So.2d 1254, 1257 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (affirming excusal of African American, evangelic minister based on the prosecutor's policy to excuse people in the religious profession because they are overly sympathetic); King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783, 795 (2000) (finding permissible blanket strike of ministers from jury because they are more apt to forgive people). Finally, we have addressed the foregoing issues to give guidance to trial courts because the Court of Appeals has addressed them and we believe they are likely to recur. However, Highler's challenge to the peremptory strike, whether characterized as based on occupation or religion, was waived because he did not object on either ground in the trial court. Highler's objection to the State's strike of Juror 92 was based solely on a claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination. By failing to identify his objection to the peremptory strike on religious or occupational grounds, Highler failed to preserve these questions for appeal.