Opinion ID: 2065651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: As Compared with Assault

Text: The requisite mental state for murder in the second degree of the intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm variety is distinct from the requisite mental state for assault in the first degree. [12] Maryland courts have held that such acts as spraying an individual in the eyes with pepper spray, or a bite on the arm, resulting in scarring, may constitute first-degree assault. See Handy v. State, 357 Md. 685, 700, 745 A.2d 1107, 1115 (2000) (recognizing that the use of the pepper spray in . . . [that] case did in fact cause the victim to suffer protracted loss or impairment of his vision[,] satisfying the elements of first-degree assault); Thomas v. State, 128 Md.App. 274, 303, 737 A.2d 622, 637 (1999) (holding that a bite wound on the arm that left the victim with a serious permanent or protracted disfigurement was sufficient to constitute serious physical injury within the context of first-degree assault). These acts can cause serious physical injuries, but are not necessarily sufficient alone to establish an intent to commit grievous bodily harm. A person may be guilty of one out of four possible forms of first-degree assault, under Md.Code (2002), § 3-202 of the Criminal Law Article, if he intentionally cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause serious physical injury to another, where serious physical injury means injury which, [c]reates a substantial risk of death. Serious physical injury constitutes a broad statutory concept that by definition covers physical injury that may or may not cause a victim's death. This differs from grievous-bodily-harm murder, and not only in the ultimate result where the victim dies. A person is guilty of the intent-to-do-grievous-bodily-harm form of murder only if he or she has the requisite intent (and malice) to cause such severe harm that death would be the likely result, not merely a possible result. Judge Eldridge illustrated this distinction in a hypothetical, stating: Under the majority's and the trial court's formulation, . . . if an accused directs a knife at the victim's finger, intending to inflict serious bodily harm, and the finger is severed, and, unknown to the accused, the victim is a hemophiliac, and bleeds to death, the accused will be guilty of second degree murder. The formulation of the intent element set forth in Burch, Mitchell, and the pattern jury instructions, would avoid this result. Thornton, 162 Md.App. at 744, 876 A.2d at 157 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A defendant should only be held liable for second-degree murder if death would be the likely result of the harm that he intended. The requisite intent for murder of the intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm modality is a narrow concept. The requisite intent for the statutory crime of assault in the first degree, however, is a much broader concept and embraces at least four separate and distinct modalities.