Opinion ID: 2610062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Rezoning

Text: Plaintiffs comment that although the point is not a matter within the appeal the 1968 rezoning of Lots 9 and 10 for business purposes was relevant and the trial court properly admitted evidence thereof over defendants' objections. To substantiate this statement they quote from Brideau v. Grissom, 369 Mich. 661, 120 N.W.2d 829, 832: The change in the zoning ordinance cannot operate to destroy the obligations involved in the restrictions   . Such change is only a factor to be considered in determining whether a change of circumstances has occurred that an equity court will not enforce the restrictions.    They also rely upon Wolff v. Fallon, 44 Cal.2d 695, 284 P.2d 802; and Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App.2d 745, 343 P.2d 959. We think this philosophy should not go unchallenged since it relates in a measure to the basis of plaintiffs' position. While an examination of the mentioned cases shows none of the three sufficiently analogous to have a bearing on the present litigation, each indicates that rezoning after establishment of the restriction may be a factor for consideration in a suit to void the covenant if such rezoning as a matter of fact created a change of conditions so fundamental or radical as to defeat the original purpose of the covenants. However, it is well settled that zoning ordinances cannot override, annul, abrogate, or relieve land from building restrictions or covenants placed thereon. 2 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, p. 453 (1965). We think the trial court here was most generous in admitting evidence which related to the 1968 rezoning of the lots for business since shortly after plaintiffs purchased them in 1963 for speculation, at a figure which they state as many times less than the value of the lots for business, they twice made unsuccessful efforts to have the land rezoned for business by the City. Shortly before this action they made a third attempt by indicating to the city authorities that they desired the rezoning in order that the legal status of the lots might be determined by the court. [2] Under such circumstances the rezoning could not by any liberality of interpretation be said to have effected a change so as to defeat the original purpose of the covenant.