Opinion ID: 2746461
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Circumstantial Evidence of a Defect

Text: Under New Mexico products liability law, parties may use circumstantial evidence to prove the presence of a defect and to establish causation. Martin v. Unit Rig & Equip. 17 Co., 715 F.2d 1434, 1439 (10th Cir. 1983). But to do so, the circumstantial evidence must support a reasonable inference that a defect caused the alleged injury and that circumstantial evidence “must be capable of convincing a rational juror that the conclusion [of a defect] is more probable than any other alternative.” Andrus v. Gas Co. of N.M., 798 P.2d 194, 197 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Heer, the circumstantial evidence in this case does not satisfy this requirement. Without Mr. Stolz’s expert testimony, the evidence presented to the district court at summary judgment showed the step stool had passed all standard industry performance tests, Ms. Heer had used the step stool fifteen times prior to the accident without incident, Ms. Heer had been reaching upward toward the vent, which was still out of reach when she fell, and Ms. Heer believed she hit the ladder before hitting the ground. In addition, Defendants’ expert offered uncontroverted testimony that the step stool was structurally sound and, despite efforts to replicate the accident, it did not break in the manner Ms. Heer alleged. We agree with the district court that the circumstantial evidence does not support a reasonable inference that the step stool was defective, but instead more strongly supports Defendants’ theory that Ms. Heer tipped the stool over while leaning to reach the vent and collided with it as she fell. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded the circumstantial evidence was not capable of convincing a rational juror that a defect in the design of the step stool was more probable than any other alternative. Because Ms. Heer failed to satisfy her burden of showing a genuine issue as to an essential element of her 18 claims—a defect—the district court correctly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 2. Request for Judicial Notice and Evidence of Other Accidents Ms. Heer also claims the district court erred in failing to rule separately on her request for judicial notice of the Ensley case prior to ruling on Defendants’ summary judgment motion. In her request for judicial notice, Ms. Heer argued the Ensley case was “directly relevant to this matter because it alleges personal injuries arising out of use of the same step-stool at issue in this matter.” Although the district court did not rule separately on Ms. Heer’s request for judicial notice, it discussed both the Ensley case and another allegedly similar lawsuit, the Nickel case, in its summary judgment ruling. As part of that decision, the district court explicitly rejected Ms. Heer’s request to consider the Ensley and Nickels cases, ruling instead that Ms. Heer had not satisfied her burden of demonstrating they were substantially similar to her accident. In ruling that evidence of the Ensley and Nickel incidents was inadmissible and could not form the basis of Ms. Heer’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court implicitly denied Ms. Heer’s request for judicial notice of the Ensley case. See Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he district court's failure to address [a party’s] arguments may be properly construed as an implicit denial of those arguments.”). Where the district court’s implicit rejection of Ms. Heer’s request for judicial notice was readily apparent from its summary judgment ruling, we conclude the district court did not err in failing to rule separately on that request. 19 Ms. Heer also contends the district court erred in requiring the Ensley and Nickel incidents to be substantially similar to her accident. We disagree. Although evidence of other accidents is admissible in products liability cases, the admissibility of such evidence hinges on whether “the other incidents are substantially similar to the incident in question.” U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft, Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule applies to admissibility at trial as well as at the summary judgment stage. See Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[Although] the form of evidence produced by a nonmoving party at summary judgment may not need to be admissible at trial, the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under the substantially similar test, “[t]he degree of similarity required varies depending on how the evidence is used.” U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 582 F.3d at 1148. If the proponent intends to use the evidence to prove the existence of a dangerous condition such as a defect, the proponent must show “a high degree of similarity because it weighs directly on the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.” Id. If, on the other hand, the proponent submits the evidence “to prove notice or awareness of the potential defect,” the requirement “is relaxed.” Id. We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under this test for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1147. Here, Ms. Heer intended to introduce evidence of the Ensley and Nickel cases to prove the step stool was defective. She was therefore required to show a high degree of similarity between her accident and the accidents in the Ensley and Nickel cases. 20 Ms. Heer made no such showing. Apart from explaining that the Ensley and Nickel cases involved the same model Rubbermaid step stool, Ms. Heer presented no evidence that the circumstances surrounding the Ensley and Nickel accidents were similar to the circumstances of her accident. Thus, she failed to meet the requirements of the substantially similar test, and the district court was within its discretion in excluding this evidence from its analysis on summary judgment.7 For these reasons, we conclude the district court correctly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Ms. Heer failed to demonstrate that circumstantial evidence supported an inference that a defect in the step stool was a more plausible cause of the accident than any other theory. The district court also correctly concluded that Ms. Heer failed to show that the Ensley and Nickel incidents were substantially similar to her own.8 We therefore affirm the district court’s summary judgment ruling. 7 In its summary judgment ruling, the district court acknowledged it had previously granted Ms. Heer’s motion to compel discovery regarding the Nickel incident, and that Defendants had not yet complied with that ruling. The district court entered summary judgment based on the information about the Nickel case then available, but alerted Ms. Heer she would have “the opportunity under Rule 60 to seek relief from this judgment” based on new information about Nickel subsequently disclosed. Ms. Heer did not seek relief under Rule 60, but instead, filed this appeal after the district court entered final judgment. 8 We also reject Ms. Heer’s arguments that the district court failed to consider seriously Dr. Quan’s credibility issues and the possibility of foreseeable misuse. The only basis Ms. Heer provides for arguing Dr. Quan was not credible was the fact he did not know the measurements of Ms. Heer’s condominium when he re-created the accident. But Ms. Heer fails to demonstrate how any difference in measurements would undermine Dr. Quan’s test results. Ms. Heer’s foreseeable misuse argument to the district court included a single citation, Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P. 3d 638, 645–647 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), and provided no explanation of how Dr. Quan’s testing supported such a theory. It is 21