Opinion ID: 771682
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) Constitutional?

Text: 82 Having determined that CRLC and CRG have standing to challenge 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) on constitutional grounds, we now consider the merits of those claims. We review questions of constitutional law de novo. United States v. Wynne, 993 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1993). Although Plaintiffs characterize their argument as an overbreadth challenge, CRLC et al. Br. at 22-25 (Dec. 16, 1999), we must consider the Supreme Court's admonition that overbreadth analysis is strong medicine, to be applied sparingly and only as a last resort. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The Court has recently affirmed that the overbreadth doctrine enables litigants 'to challenge a statute, not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.' Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2497-98 (2000) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612) (emphasis added). In this case, it is unnecessary to employ the overbreadth doctrine because the challenged definitions are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs CRLC and CRG. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (noting that one of the cardinal rules governing the federal courts is never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied) (quotations and citation omitted). The phrases which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office in 103(7), and or unambiguously refers to such candidate in 103(11), each extend the reach of the FCPA's substantive provisions to advocacy with respect to public issues, which is a violation of the rule enunciated in Buckley and its progeny. Vt. Right to Life Comm., 221 F.3d at 387. 83 We must next inquire whether the definitions, though unconstitutional as written, can be saved. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy.). Courts employ two mechanisms to preserve unconstitutional statutes from wholesale invalidation. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 177 (3d Cir. 2000). First, if a statute is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction that will remedy the constitutional infirmity, the statute will be upheld. Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 397. If the language is not readily susceptible to a narrowing construction, but the unconstitutional language is severable from the remainder of the statute, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502 (quotations omitted). 84
85 In order to save the definitions, they must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that contain explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. It is well-settled that a federal court must uphold a statute if it is 'readily susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional . . . . The key to application of this principle is that the statute must be 'readily susceptible' to the limitation; we will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements. Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 397 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Even the Supreme Court is without power to adopt a narrowing construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2616 (2000) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (statute must be genuinely susceptible to narrowing construction); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987) (fairly or obviously susceptible); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (easily susceptible). 86 In order to narrow 103(7) and (11) so that they are consistent with Buckley, we would not only have to add qualifying language (indicated with an underline), but would also have to disregard entire phrases (indicated by 87 103(7) Independent expenditure means payment of money by any person for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, which expenditure is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. 'Independent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages . . . . 88 103(11) Political message means a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which expressly advocates the election or defeat of any candidate. 8 89 To rewrite the statutes in this manner would exceed the power and function of the court, and would fail to bind state prosecutors, leaving the citizens of Colorado vulnerable to prosecutions under the actual language of the statute. See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2616; Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 397. Accordingly, we decline [Colorado's] invitation to give the statute[s] a construction more restrictive than that provided by [their] plain language. Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 948 (10th Cir. 1987). As written, 103(7), (10), and (11) are not susceptible of a narrowing construction. As explained below, however, we can sever the problematic language from the definitions and then narrowly construe the remaining text. 90
91 Although we cannot save the definitions with a narrowing construction, we need not invalidate the entire statutory scheme. In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's facial invalidation of a state obscenity statute according to the normal rule that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course. Id. at 504. The statute at issue codified the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), including the requirement that the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find [that the material], when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . . Brockett, 472 U.S. at 493 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 7.48A.010(2)(a) (1983)). Unlike Miller, which left the word undefined, the Washington statute defined prurient as that which incites lasciviousness or lust. Id. (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 7.48A.010(8)). The Court assumed without deciding that the Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that the inclusion of lust rendered the definition overbroad, see id. at 500-01 & n.10, but held that [f]acial invalidation of the statute was nevertheless improvident. Id. at 501. 92 Noting that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, the Brockett Court held that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. Id. at 502 (quotations and citations omitted); accord Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). [T]he rule that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case before it applies with equal force in the First Amendment context. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502. In order to determine whether partial invalidation of a state statute is appropriate, federal courts look to state law. Id. at 506-07. 93 The FCPA contains the following severability clause: 94 If any provision of this article or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the article which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this article are declared to be severable. 95 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-118 (2000). Under Colorado law, a severability clause creates a presumption that the legislature would have been satisfied with the portions of the statute that remain after the offending provisions are stricken as being unconstitutional. People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 371 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted), cited with approval in People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181, 190 (Colo. 1992) (en banc). The presumption of severability raised by the clause is dispelled only if what remains is so incomplete or riddled with omissions that it cannot be salvaged as a meaningful legislative enactment. City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52, 70 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (quotations, alterations, and citation omitted), cited with approval in People v. District Court, 834 P.2d at 190; accord Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 928 P.2d 796, 798 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). 96 In this case, the constitutionally problematic portions are discrete and their removal would not compromise the integrity or coherence of the statute in any way. The presumption of severability raised by 118 is therefore controlling. We conclude that the unconstitutional phrases are severable, and we hereby declare subsections (7), (10)(a), and (11) of 103 invalid only insofar as they reach beyond that which may constitutionally be regulated. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504. Specifically, we strike only the language indicated below: 97 103(7) Independent expenditure means payment of money by any person for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, which expenditure is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. Independent expenditure includes expenditures for political messages . . . . 98 103(11) Political message means a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate. 99 Without the stricken phrases, the remainder of the definitions are readily susceptible to an interpretation that is consistent with Buckley and MCFL i.e., that a political message is a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which [expressly] advocates the election or defeat of any candidate, and that an independent expenditure is payment of money . . . for the purpose of [expressly] advocating the election or defeat of any candidate . . . . E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.