Opinion ID: 1846581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Text: ¶ 13. We will address these two issues together. Givens claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to object to the eyewitness testimony of Hampton and Foman; (2) failing to question the local authorities as to why a line-up was not performed; and (3) undermin[ing] Givens's line of defense in closing arguments. Because effective assistance of counsel is secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, issues I and II have been combined for complete analysis. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir.1982); Berry v. State, 345 So.2d 613, 615 (Miss.1977); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). ¶ 14. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is well-settled: The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Branch v. State, 961 So.2d 659, 666 (2007). Therefore, for Givens to prevail on his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Givens must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This Court looks at the totality of circumstances to determine whether counsel's efforts were both deficient and prejudicial. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance [is] highly deferential. There is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Only where it is reasonably probable that but for the attorney's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different, will we find that counsel's performance was deficient. Walker v. State, 863 So.2d 1, 22 (Miss. 2003) (citing Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95, 122 (Miss.2003) (quoting Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 989 (Miss.1998))). ¶ 15. As stated supra, there is a rebuttable presumption that counsel's performance was effective. Id. [C]ounsel's choice of whether or not to file certain motions, call witnesses, ask certain questions, or make certain objections fall[s] within the ambit of trial strategy. Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767, 777 (Miss.1995) (citing Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1984)). We find nothing in the record affirmatively showing constitutional ineffectiveness. Furthermore, Givens has failed to show prejudice. Thus, Givens has failed to meet his Strickland burden and we find these two issues to be without merit.