Opinion ID: 3047630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lawrence Johnson

Text: We have already rejected Johnson’s Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) arguments. 6 Johnson next argues that the District Court’s admission of certain telephone calls made from prison by his co-appellants violated the Confrontation Clause. The District Court did not err in admitting the telephone calls because the government used the statements attributed to Brown, Johnson, and Mines not to demonstrate the truth of anything asserted, but only to rebut their claims that they did not previously know each other and were randomly arrested in Philadelphia that night. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414–15 (1985) (stating that an out-of-court statement that a co-conspirator used to impeach the defendant’s testimony, rather than to prove the matter asserted, did not violate the Confrontation Clause). Johnson’s penultimate argument is that the government commented improperly on Johnson’s failure to testify. Johnson states that there were two instances of improper argument. At trial, Johnson objected only to the second alleged error. We will review the District Court’s ruling on the second comment for abuse of discretion because Johnson objected at trial. See United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). The plainerror standard, by contrast, will apply to Johnson’s first challenge because he did not object at trial. See id. The prosecution is given “considerable latitude” during closing arguments to argue the evidence and to suggest that the jury may draw permissible inferences. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 25 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1994). The government may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify. E.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 622 (1965). The 7 government is permitted, however, to comment on the uncontradicted nature of particular evidence or a defendant’s failure to call a witness or present exculpatory evidence as long as the evidence could have come from another witness. See United States v. Ashfield, 735 F.2d 101, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1984). Johnson first challenges the government’s request that the jury consider the “undisputed facts with respect to Lawrence Johnson.” The District Court did not plainly err in not sua sponte striking the government’s comment because the government, following that comment, referred to evidence that came from other witnesses. Johnson’s second challenge similarly fails. The government rhetorically asked the jury was there “any evidence that he, that is, Lawrence Johnson, was walking down the street” to see his girlfriend when police arrested him arrested on December 26. Johnson’s theory of the case was that this is what he was doing. If this were so, however, Johnson’s girlfriend could have testified that she was expecting him. Finally, Johnson’s counsel submits that Johnson asked him to argue that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to justify any of his convictions. Counsel, however, stated that his examination of the record convinced him that there is no good-faith basis to make this argument. Johnson’s counsel represented that he understood his responsibilities under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001). We agree that the evidence submitted against Johnson was more than sufficient to support his conviction. 8