Opinion ID: 792179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Inadequacy of the Record as to Whether Myers Possesses a Liberty Interest

Text: 32 As discussed above, the Supreme Court has afforded due process protection to parents in making decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Some measure of due process protection also extends to a non-custodial, biological parent who demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985 (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether Myers fits this description remains an open question. He conclusorily advises this Court that, until his arrest in this case, he had played an active role in the life of his son, residing with him, the boy's mother, and her other children. But it appears that no evidence in support of this claim was presented either to the Probation Department for inclusion in the family history section of his Pre-Sentence Report or to the district court at the original May 30, 2003 sentencing or at the June 7, 2004 re-sentencing. We cannot determine whether the sentencing condition represented a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary without knowing whether Myers's relationship with his son is sufficiently established to merit constitutional protection. 33 The Supreme Court has observed that [t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526. Unfortunately, reality sometimes departs from this ideal, and this is one of those sad cases. At the time of Myers's original May 30, 2003 sentencing, the boy in question was not being nurtured by any parent; he was a ward of the State of New York. His father, a diagnosed pedophile, was about to be imprisoned for six and one-half years, and his mother had proven so neglectful of her children's welfare that the state had removed all eight of them from her custody and placed them in foster care. In his pre-sentence interview, Myers stated that he had been attempting to obtain visitation rights to his son, but neither at the original sentencing nor at the re-sentencing on June 7, 2004 did the defendant report that any New York court had recognized him to have such a right. 34 Furthermore, we note that New York State law, in situations where a child is in foster care, prohibits visitation between out-of-wedlock children and a parent whose parental rights have not been adjudicated. See N.Y. Fam Ct. Act § 1084. There is nothing in the record before us that indicates whether any such determination pursuant to applicable provisions of state law has been made so as to give defendant rights to visitation. This in turn highlights the near impossibility of predicting the state of affairs several years from now when the defendant is expected to enter into supervised release. Questions such as who will be the child's custodian at the time and which state court will have jurisdiction over him, and thus over the relationship between the child and the defendant, are unresolved. The ultimate resolution of Myers's attempts to gain visitation rights will also be relevant to this inquiry. 35 Because Myers asserts but does not establish a legally cognizable interest as the parent of a child in foster care born out of wedlock, we cannot determine whether the special condition is appropriately tailored to satisfy the goals of sentencing. If Myers does establish that he has a right to associate with his child, then the district court will need to tailor any sentencing conditions to infringe that right no more than necessary. We do not decide here whether the imposition of the condition itself represented an abuse of discretion, but it was not within the discretion of the district court to impose it without developing an adequate record to support its validity. We must therefore remand for resentencing. 36 There is, of course, a possibility that, on remand, the district court will learn that the Family Court has not yet conclusively determined Myers's parental rights. Because the defendant will be in custody for some years, the Family Court may well have focused its attention to date on the more immediate problem of whether the boy and his siblings can responsibly be restored to their mother. If Myers's parental rights are, in fact, unresolved in state court, the district court might conclude that it will be necessary to revisit the conditions of supervised release at a later date. The trial court may modify conditions of supervised release at any time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), see United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (The trial court, as it sees fit, may modify an individual's conditions of supervised release.); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(c) (generally requiring a hearing before modification of conditions). Myers may also move the trial court for a modification of the conditions if circumstances change. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 60, 120 S.Ct. 1114 (Respondent may invoke § 3583(e)(2) in pursuit of relief.). Facts and relationships may change over the years, and the district court may wish to re-examine the special conditions at a time closer to Myers's release, when more facts will be clear. See Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 193 n. 11 (Were this, however, a case involving supervised release . . . , it might well be prudent for the district court to postpone the determination of supervised release . . . conditions until an appropriate later time, when the district court's decision could be based on then-existing. . . considerations.). 37 We note that, although it would be proper for the district court to postpone determining whether a special condition is necessary, the district court may not improperly delegate this determination to the probation office. See Peterson, 248 F.3d at 85 (2d Cir.2001) (If [defendant] is required to participate in a mental health intervention only if directed to do so by his probation officer, then this special condition constitutes an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the probation officer. On the other hand, if the District Court was intending nothing more than to delegate to the probation officer details with respect to the selection and schedule of the program, such delegation was proper. (internal citations omitted)). If it chooses to impose a special condition, the district court itself must answer the questions we have identified: (1) what the goal of the condition is; (2) if the goal is to protect Myers's own child, whether an adequate record can be developed to support it; (3) whatever the goal of the condition, whether Myers has any constitutionally protected right to a relationship with his child; and (4) what terms of the condition are necessary and not a greater deprivation of any identified liberty interests than reasonable to achieve the sentencing goal. 13