Opinion ID: 36501
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wake Vortex Effects

Text: Petitioners also allege that the Air Force and FAA failed to take a “hard look” at the effects of wake vortices (trails of disturbed air) that would be 24 Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1241-42 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding Air Force’s conclusion that decreased land values were not reasonably foreseeable and would be minimal based on prior airspace use and dispersion of flight paths reasonable); Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, Inc. v. Dalton, 48 F. Supp. 2d 582, 598 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff’d without opinion, 217 F.3d 838 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Norfolk v. U.S. EPA, 761 F. Supp. 867, 887-88 (D. Mass. 1991) (upholding EIS that did not quantify property value decline due to proposed action where EIS stated that such decline was unquantifiable), aff’d without opinion, 960 F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 1992). 25 See 354 F.3d at 1241-42. 13 generated by aircraft training in the RBTI. Petitioners argue that wake vortices damage ground structures like the windmills used by ranchers to provide water to livestock and wildlife. The Air Force responds that the EIS’s discussion of wake vortex effects is adequate, because it “provides a narrative description of what causes vortices and points out that actual, not modeled, B-52 aircraft flying as low as 300 feet [above ground level] ... would generate a surface wind speed of less than 4 mph.” Although CEQ regulations require agencies to “make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific and other sources relied upon for conclusions in the statement,”26 the EIS does not reveal the source of this data. Petitioners point out that the information came from an e-mail from the Boeing Company, stating that tests conducted between 1970 and 1986 “at flight level 300” resulted in “[n]o effect on the ground from the B-52 vortexes.” The Air Force presumably contends that “flight level 300 refers to 300 feet above ground level. In fact, it refers to 30,000 feet above ground level.27 It is not clear whether the Boeing e-mail was a miscommunication, because the Air 26 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24. 27 Petitioners note that “flight level” is defined at 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 as “three digits that represents hundreds of feet. For example, flight level 250 represents a barometric altimeter indication of 25,000 feet ...” This court also found the term’s definition through a simple internet search. See http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Flight%20level. 14 Force did not include the actual Boeing study in the administrative record. Therefore, the e-mail alone cannot provide an adequate basis for the Air Force’s conclusion that flights at 300 feet above ground level would generate low surface winds. To uphold that conclusion, we must find a more satisfactory basis than the Boeing e-mail. The Air Force also relied on a graph providing a “rough estimate” of B1-B wake vortex effects at low altitudes. The administrative record shows that the equation used to generate the chart came from a 1949 aerodynamics text by James Dwinnell, but the Air Force did not include the equation or its inputs in the EIS or administrative record.28 Petitioners urge this court to consider two extrarecord documents - excerpts from the Dwinnell text and its expert’s declaration - to determine whether the Air Force’s chart was reliable and thus constituted a hard look at wake vortex effects. Generally, the “record rule” limits judicial review of agency action to the administrative record before the agency at the time of its decision.29 This court 28 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 states: “Agencies shall insure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses in environmental impact statements. They shall identify any methodologies used ... for conclusions in the statement.” 29 Fla. Power & Light v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985). 15 has recognized an exception to the general rule, however, where examination of extra-record materials is necessary to determine whether an agency has adequately considered environmental impacts under NEPA.30 In the present case we find it necessary to look at the Dwinnell text to determine whether the Air Force’s use of the equation therein was sound. Because we lack technical expertise in aerodynamics, we also consider extra-record materials to aid our understanding of the science involved.31 Our review of the Dwinnell text and the declarations of petitioners’ and the Air Force’s experts reveal that the Air Force failed to take a hard look at the possible effects of wake turbulence on ground structures. Although an illustration in the EIS shows that the wake turbulence of an airplane at 300 feet above ground would generate wind speed around two mph at thirty-five feet (the height of a windmill as depicted on the illustration), the Air Force’s own expert, Dr. Ojars Skujins, admits that a B1-B at this altitude could generate wind speeds 30 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds on reh’g, 228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2000); Sabine River Auth. v. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 1992); accord Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1997). 31 Friends of Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts may consider extra-record evidence when “necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter.”). 16 as high as forty-seven mph just twenty-two feet above ground. Dr. Skujins also declares that the chart generated by the Air Force based on the Dwinnell equation is “oversimplified” and “does tend to underestimate the maximum vortex strength.” Dr. Skujins concludes, however, that the Air Force was correct in finding that vortices would not create a significant impact, because average wind speeds in the RBTI area are similar to wind speeds generated by wake vortices. The Air Force is entitled to rely on its own qualified experts’ reasonable opinions in determining the significance of impacts.32 The Air Force did not rely on Dr. Skujins’s opinion, however, in addressing the wake vortex issue in the EIS process, but rather relied on the Boeing e-mail and the chart generated from the Dwinnell equation. As discussed above, neither document presents a reliable picture of the impact of wake vortices on surface structures, misinforming both public participation and the Air Force’s conclusion.33 The Air Force’s reliance 32 Sabine River Auth., 951 F.2d at 678. 33 See Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 349. Although the Air Force now argues that wake vortex effects would be speculative and thus need not be discussed in the EIS, during the NEPA process they took the position that wake vortex effects would not be significant based on the two pieces of evidence discussed. Courts may only uphold agency action on the bases articulated by the agency at the time of the action, and may not consider appellate counsel’s “post hoc rationalizations.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 49-50. 17 on this data cannot satisfy the hard look requirement of NEPA and thus this portion of the EIS is inadequate.34 This determination applies equally to the FAA, which, as an adopting agency, was required to satisfy itself that the wake vortex discussion in the EIS complied with NEPA.35