Opinion ID: 2521467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: introduction of nfpa 1123 to the jury

Text: After ruling that the doctrine of negligence per se was inapplicable to this case, the trial court refused to allow Pullen to introduce any evidence of NFPA 1123 to the jury. Specifically, the trial court refused to instruct the jury regarding relevant portions of NFPA 1123 regarding class B fireworks displays and refused to permit Pullen's expert, Chuck Thacker, to testify about the application of NFPA 1123 to the incident in this case. Prior to instructing the jury, the trial judge expressed concern about making any references to NFPA 1123 based on its prior negligence per se ruling: Well, what I think would be inconsistent for me to do would be to have made the ruling that I've made up to this point [negligence per se] and then to instruct the jury . . . that there are certain duties imposed upon a landowner, to wit to limit the number of launchings from a tube and to require head, eye and ear protection. That would be basically to create a private cause of action when I have said that there is no such private cause of action. The question we must resolve is whether trial court's exclusion of the pertinent provisions of NFPA 1123 prejudiced the plaintiff and denied him a fair trial. We conclude that the exclusion of such evidence prejudicially affected the jury's determination of fault and had the pertinent provisions of NFPA 1123 been admitted the verdict might very well have been different. Pullen's proposed jury instructions regarding the duty of care included requests consistent with pertinent provisions of NFPA 1123 that the jury consider the cost and inconvenience of requiring proof that the operator was properly licensed and insured and that permits and site inspections were completed as required by state statutes, rules or regulations or local ordinances. Pullen's proposed instructions also provided that he sustained injuries due to the fault of the various defendants in several ways which were specific violations of the Kansas statutes and rules and regulations. For example, relevant to Krehbiel: (1) In failing to obtain the proper fireworks display operator license required by the state of Kansas; (2) In failing to provide proper training in the discharge of the Class B fireworks; (3) In failing to provide proper safety equipment required to discharge the Class B fireworks; (4) In allowing plaintiff to participate in the discharge of the Class B fireworks; (5) In failing to properly supervise the discharge of the Class B fireworks; (6) In failing to warn plaintiff of the degree of danger involved in the discharge of the Class B fireworks; (7) In failing to obtain the proper permit issued by the local authorities as required by the statutes, rules and regulations adopted by the state of Kansas; (8) In failing to have the fireworks display site inspected by the proper local authorities prior to the fireworks display as required by statues, rules and regulations adopted by the state of Kansas; (9) In failing to replace mortars after every 7 launchings; and (10) In failing to abide by all regulations applicable to the discharge of Class B fireworks. Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that the duty owed by an occupier of land was one of reasonable care under the circumstances, which could be determined by considering the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the magnitude of the risks of injury to others, the individual and social benefits of maintaining the land in such a condition, and the cost and inconvenience of providing adequate protection whether incurred by the owner or occupier of the land and/or community. See PIK Civ. 3d 126.02. The jury was also instructed that Pullen claimed that his injuries were sustained due to the fault of the various defendants, as follows: 1. As owner [occupier] of the land and co-sponsor of the Class B fireworks display, failing to exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances surrounding the Class B fireworks display. 2. As owner [occupier] of the land and co-sponsor of the Class B fireworks display, failing to take exceptional precautions to prevent injuries from the Class B fireworks. 3. As owner [occupier] of the land and co-sponsor of the Class B fireworks display, failing to make certain that the launching tubes were changed during the fireworks display. 4. As owner [occupier] of the land and co-sponsor of the Class B fireworks display, failing to provide head protection and eye protection to the shooters. If the jury instructions, read as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the law governing the case and are substantially correct, and the jury could not reasonably be misled by them, the instructions will be approved on appeal. Refusing to give an instruction is not error when its substance is adequately covered in other instructions. Errors regarding jury instructions will not demand reversal unless they result in prejudice to the appealing party. Koser v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 261 Kan. 46, 51, 928 P.2d 85 (1996). Pullen argues the trial court misunderstood the application of NFPA 1123 as it related to proof of the standard of care and his proffered evidence in this case. Pullen contends that NFPA 1123 was admissible as an industry standard and he should have been permitted to present those standards to the jury. Pullen contends that the trial court essentially gutted his case, leaving him to argue without any substantiation or legal support that the defendants had breached a duty of care to him. We agree. In Cerretti v. Flint Hills Rural Electric Co-op Ass'n, 251 Kan. 347, 837 P.2d 330 (1992), a sailboat owner brought personal injury and wrongful death actions against the electric company after his wife was electrocuted and he was injured when the mast of his sailboat contacted a power line strung over a lake. At trial, a copy of the pertinent provisions of the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC) was received into evidence, and the jury was instructed that it was to decide whether the NESC was applicable and if any provisions had been violated. The jury was instructed that evidence of compliance or lack of compliance with applicable safety codes was not conclusive on the question of presence or lack of ordinary care and that proof of compliance was not a defense to a charge of negligence unless such practice is consistent with standards of ordinary care. On appeal, Flint Hills argued that the trial court erroneously imposed negligence per se for an alleged violation of the NESC, because Flint Hills equated the NESC with an ordinance. This court declined to construe the NESC as an ordinance but rather construed it as an industry standard approved by the American National Standards Institute. 251 Kan. at 356. In concluding that the jury instructions conformed with Kansas negligence law, the Cerretti court reasoned: Conformity with the NESC or an industry-wide standard is not an absolute defense to negligence. While it may be evidence of due care, compliance with industry standards, or standards legislatively or administratively imposed, does not preclude a finding of negligence where a reasonable person engaged in the industry would have taken additional precautions under the circumstances. Whether the company is negligent, even though it complied with the code, is usually a question to be determined by the jury under proper instructions by the court. The degree of care required for Flint Hills is that which would be used by a prudent person engaged in the industry, under like conditions and commensurate with the dangers involved and the practical operation of the system, to guard against contingencies which can reasonably be foreseen and anticipated. Flint Hills was aware that persons sailing upon the lake could be seriously injured or killed if a boat's aluminum mast contacted its high voltage power line strung over the lake. The law imposes upon Flint Hills the duty of exercising the utmost or highest degree of care to prevent such injury where people have the right to be upon the property for work, pleasure, or business. Conformity with an industry-wide standard when a high voltage line was originally installed does not preclude a finding of negligence where a prudent person engaged in the industry would have taken additional precautions under the circumstances. 251 Kan. at 356-57. In this case, the 2000 edition of NFPA 1123 was approved as an American National Standard on August 18, 2000, and it superceded all previous editions of NFPA 1123 as the applicable industry standard. (NFPA 1123, p. 1123-1.) Pullen argues that the applicable provisions of NFPA 1123 are admissible to prove the minimum standards of care necessary for the safety of the public and anyone assisting in a class B fireworks display. We agree. Expert testimony concerning customs or industry standards is not relevant, or at least unnecessary, where the jury is competent from its own experience to determine and apply the reasonable care standard. Simon v. Simon, 260 Kan. 731, Syl. ¶ 4, 924 P.2d 1255 (1996). However, without utilizing these standards in this case, the jury was left to determine what reasonable care and extraordinary precautions must be exercised by persons sponsoring and participating in a class B fireworks display. The jury likely had little experience or knowledge regarding commercial fireworks, what types of safety precautions must be taken, and the requirements for operation of displays, operator qualifications, and licenses or permits. See Simon, 260 Kan. 731, Syl. ¶ 3. An example of how difficult this determination would be for the jury is as follows: NFPA 1123 § 2.3.4 requires that the type of mortar tubes used in this case should only be fired up to 7 times during a performance. Evidence was presented at trial that the mortar tubes were used 75 times or more and that one of the mortar tubes used by Pullen was melted or deformed. The jury was simply instructed that Pullen claimed the defendants were negligent by failing to make certain that the launching tubes were changed during the fireworks display. Without any guidance regarding the NFPA requirement, the jury had no way of knowing that the mortar tubes were used 10 times more than the industry standardwhich might have resulted in the deformity to the tube. With this information, a possibility certainly exists that the jury might have assigned more fault to the defendants. Additionally, NFPA 1123 places several requirements upon the operator and sponsors of a fireworks display to ensure safety. NFPA 1123 §§ 7.1 and 7.3 provide that the operator (Krehbiel) was required to be licensed and that the operators, suppliers, or the sponsors (Milo, Laura, & Brian West) were required to obtain a permit. This would have insured operator competency, requiring experience and knowledge of the laws, regulations, and safety practices of the operator, and demonstrated the financial responsibility of the operators, suppliers, or sponsors, requiring proof of liability insurance. NFPA 1123 §§ 5.1.3 and 5.1.3.2 also provide that Krehbiel was primarily responsible for safety and for ensuring that all assistants were fully trained. However, many safety provisions were violated during the display because the shooters did not wear head and eye protection, used cigars although smoking materials are not allowed near the fireworks, or were under the influence of alcohol. See NFPA 1123 §§ 5.1.3.3, 5.1.6, and 5.1.8. Once again, had the jury been instructed regarding these standards, a real possibility exists that the jury would have assigned more fault to the defendants. After ruling that the doctrine of negligence per se was inapplicable to this case, the trial court mistakenly excluded any mention of the requirements of NFPA 1123 to the jury. As noted in Cerretti, `mere proof of failure to comply with a given safety standard does not automatically demonstrate the lack of ordinary care and negligence.' 251 Kan. at 354. Thus, the NFPA 1123 standards were important to Pullen's case so that the jury could evaluate the degree of care owed when sponsoring or participating in a class B fireworks display, and the district court should have so instructed. We have no doubt that the exclusion of the pertinent provisions of the industry standards contained in NFPA 1123 prejudiced Pullen, requiring this court to reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.