Opinion ID: 886760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction v. Illegal Sentence

Text: ¶ 21 District courts in Montana are granted jurisdiction by the Constitution and by state statute. Article VII, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution provides: Section 4. District court jurisdiction. (1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony and ... such additional jurisdiction as may be delegated by the laws of the state of Montana. [Emphasis added.] This Court has previously considered the meaning of the term jurisdiction as it relates to district courts. In State ex rel. Johnson v. District Court (1966), 147 Mont. 263, 410 P.2d 933, we defined jurisdiction as the power or capacity of a district court to hear a particular action as well as render a judgment therein: Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the particular action or proceeding as well as to make such orders and render such judgment therein as the law authorizes in the class of actions or proceedings to which it belongs. [Quoting State ex. rel . Lay v. District Court (1948), 122 Mont. 61, 70-71, 198 P.2d 761, 766.] ... Jurisdiction as applied to courts is the power or capacity given by law to a court to entertain, hear and determine the particular case or matter. [Quoting State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner, Governor (1950), 123 Mont. 414, 425, 214 P.2d 747, 753.] Johnson, 147 Mont. at 267, 410 P.2d at 935. In Hagan v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 31, 873 P.2d 1385, we addressed subject matter jurisdictional claims in the context of a sentencing court's ability to accept a guilty plea and impose sentence. We defined jurisdictional claims, in that context, as those defined by United States v. Cortez (9th Cir.1992), 973 F.2d 764. Hagan, 265 Mont. at 36, 873 P.2d at 1388. Jurisdictional claims, Cortez held, are those cases in which the district court could determine that the government lacked the power to bring the indictment at the time of accepting the guilty plea from the face of the indictment or from the record. Cortez, 973 F.2d at 767 (citing United States v. Broce (1989), 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927). ¶ 22 From these principles, we conclude that jurisdictional claims are those which challenge a court's power or capacity to entertain the subject matter of the proceeding and render a determination therein. Thus, although Peña argues that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him to the DOC for more than five years by virtue of §§ 41-5-206(6) and 46-18-201(1), MCA, Peña's argument is not properly characterized as a jurisdictional inquiry. Whether a district court commits a statutory error in imposing a sentence must not be confused with the question of whether the court had the power or capacity to impose the sentence in the first instance. An error in sentencing does not divest a district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case before it. ¶ 23 Here, the sentencing court possessed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Article VII, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution (the district court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to a felony ...), §§ 45-5-102 and 45-6-204, MCA, which defined, respectively, deliberate homicide and aggravated burglary as felonies, with which Peña was charged, and § 41-5-206, MCA, which authorized the transfer of Peña's case to adult court. ¶ 24 Therefore, Peña's assertion that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose the sentence he received is more accurately characterized as a claim that his sentence was illegal as exceeding statutory authority. A criminal sentence is legal if the sentence is within the parameters provided by statute. State v. McLeod, 2002 MT 348, ¶ 12, 313 Mont. 358, ¶ 12, 61 P.3d 126, ¶ 12; State v. Lafley, 1998 MT 21, ¶ 26, 287 Mont. 276, ¶ 26, 954 P.2d 1112, ¶ 26; State v. Goulet (1996), 277 Mont. 308, 312, 921 P.2d 1245, 1247; State v. Nelson (1995), 274 Mont. 11, 18, 906 P.2d 663, 667. [A] district court's authority to impose sentences in criminal cases is defined and constrained by statute. State v. Yorek, 2002 MT 74, ¶ 15, 309 Mont. 238, ¶ 15, 45 P.3d 872, ¶ 15 (citing State v. Nelson, 1998 MT 227, ¶ 24, 291 Mont. 15, ¶ 24, 966 P.2d 133, ¶ 24). Indeed, a district court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority. Nelson, ¶ 24 (citing State v. Hatfield (1993), 256 Mont. 340, 346, 846 P.2d 1025, 1029; State v. Wilson (1996), 279 Mont. 34, 37, 926 P.2d 712, 714). ¶ 25 Peña's claim that he received an illegal sentence does not challenge the sentencing court's ability to entertain, hear and determine the particular case or matter, and, therefore, it is a nonjurisdictional claim for purposes of the postconviction statutes. In light of this conclusion, it is necessary to clarify our holding in State v. Moorman (1997), 279 Mont. 330, 928 P.2d 145, which held that the question of whether a district court possesses the authority to impose a sentence is a jurisdictional issue. In Moorman, where the defendant challenged his dangerous offender designation, we concluded that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose the particular sentence and that § 46-21-105(2), MCA, the issue preclusion provision of the postconviction statutes, did not apply in such cases. Moorman, 279 Mont. at 336, 928 P.2d at 149. However, the question in that case was not whether the court possessed the power or capacity to entertain, hear and determine a matter, but rather whether the particular sentence imposed by the sentencing court was statutorily permissible, and therefore, to the extent that our holding in Moorman characterized and resolved the sentencing issue before it as jurisdictional, that holding was incorrect, and is overruled.