Opinion ID: 867796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Maximum

Text: The district court misadvised Alvarado-Casas that he faced a maximum of ten years of imprisonment, when, in fact, conspiracy to commit aggravated alien transporting carries a statutory maximum of twenty years of imprisonment, § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii). The error was compounded, Alvarado-Casas argues, by defense counsel’s “promise[] that the sentence impose[d] by the court w[ould] not be more than 10 years.” Alvarado-Casas asserts that if he had known that he faced a statutory maximum of 20 years of imprisonment, he would not have pleaded guilty. The government’s principal response is that the error, if any, had no effect on Alvarado-Casas’s decision to plead guilty. As evidence, the government points out that (1) the PSR, which Alvarado-Casas reviewed and discussed with counsel before sentencing, correctly stated that he faced a statutory maximum of 20 years of imprisonment, (2) Alvarado-Casas did not object to that aspect the PSR, and (3) Alvarado-Casas did not immediately object to the sentence imposed, even though it exceeded the 10-year maximum he purportedly believed was the extent of his sentencing exposure. 11 Case: 12-40295 Document: 00512240551 Page: 12 Date Filed: 05/14/2013 No. 12-40295 We agree with Alvarado-Casas that it was error for the district court to inform him that he faced only a ten-year maximum sentence, and that the error was clear and obvious. See United States v. Still, 102 F.3d 118, 123 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A] plain reading of Rule 11 requires the district court to inform the defendant of the . . . maximum possible penalty applicable to each count to which the defendant is pleading guilty.”); see also United States v. Toruno, 229 F. App’x 296, 297 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“The parties do not dispute that the district court incorrectly admonished [the defendant] regarding the maximum term of imprisonment and that the error was clear and obvious.”). We disagree, however, that Alvarado-Casas has carried his burden of establishing a reasonable probability that but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty. Alvarado-Casas does not point to record evidence that he was prepared and willing to go to trial, United States v. Molina, 469 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming guilty plea conviction, despite Rule 11 error, because the defendant “d[id] not direct this court to any portion of the record supporting the proposition that the maximum sentence for count three affected his plea decision”), and the PSR, which he acknowledged reviewing, corrected any misapprehensions he may have had about his sentencing exposure, United States v. Vasquez-Bernal, 197 F.3d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming guilty plea conviction, despite Rule 11 error, in part because “the presentence report specifically detailed the punishment range applicable to [the defendant]’s crime”). It is true, as Alvarado-Casas points out, that “the 190-month prison sentence actually imposed is 70 months greater than the 10-year maximum possible prison sentence of which his counsel and the district court advised him,” and that one consideration in our inquiry is the extent to which a defendant’s perceived sentencing exposure diverges from his true sentencing exposure, United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996). But it oversimplifies the matter to focus on this discrepancy alone, and ignore other factors that 12 Case: 12-40295 Document: 00512240551 Page: 13 Date Filed: 05/14/2013 No. 12-40295 loomed large in the decisional calculus. In exchange for his guilty plea, Alvarado-Casas received three acceptance-of-responsibility points, which lowered his Guidelines range from 262–327 months to 188–235 months, a decrease of six to seven years at both ends. Moreover, as part of the plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss twelve substantive counts of aggravated alien transporting, each of which carried a sentencing exposure of twenty years of imprisonment. Thus, even if Alvarado-Casas were prepared to go to trial, it is not reasonably probable that he would have declined the plea deal and exposed himself to a higher potential Guidelines range and maximum sentence. See Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d at 76 (holding that even if the district court erred in accepting defendant’s guilty plea without a factual basis, there was no reasonable probability that but for the alleged error the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, in light of the “extremely favorable plea deal” that was “structured to find a significantly less serious offense to which he could plead”). Our conclusion is buttressed by Alvarado-Casas’s decision not to move under Rule 11(d)(2) to withdraw his plea after the PSR made him aware of his true sentencing exposure. In summary, although Alvarado-Casas can show clear error in this regard, it does not entitle him to relief because he has not satisfied his burden of showing that but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty. See Molina, 469 F.3d at 412; Vasquez-Bernal, 197 F.3d at 171; Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d at 76.