Opinion ID: 1182206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alia Thompson's Medical Expenses

Text: Thompson argues that Better-Bilt owed Alia a legal duty to notify her of the cessation of her medical coverage, and that its breach of that duty makes it liable for her medical expenses. Echoing the dissent in the court of appeals, Thompson argues that such a duty would not result in wide and unreasonably attenuated liability ... because the group of potential plaintiffs is narrowly circumscribed and easily identified. Petition for Review at 10-11. Moreover, the duty would not require the employer to send out an additional notice to the employee's family; only a single notice is required to be sent to the employee, but the liability for failure to comply with the duty extends to the family members as well. Id. at 11. Better-Bilt patterns its argument on the court of appeals' reasoning, phrasing the issue as whether BETTER-BILT owed ALIA THOMPSON a duty to notify Jason Thompson that he was terminated so he could convert insurance coverage to a personal policy. Response to Petition for Review at 8. Better-Bilt argues that the relationship between the employer and members of the employee's family is far too attenuated to justify the imposition of such a duty. Id. at 9. Better-Bilt contends that the broader scope of employer liability suggested by Thompson would work a substantial hardship on employers, subjecting them to wide-spread liability every time an employee includes a family member as a dependent or beneficiary of a company insurance policy. Id. at 10. A cogent argument can be made that an employer has at least a limited duty to the spouse of an employee where, as in this case, the employee has purchased a group health insurance policy through the employer and that policy covers his spouse as an insured. Such a duty would not subject the employer to wide and unreasonably attenuated liability because the group of potential obligees is narrow and readily identifiable. Thompson, mem. dec. at 20 (dissent). Thus, the employer need do no more than it is already obligated to do because of its duty to the employee  provide reasonable notice of the cessation of coverage to the employee, who can then take the necessary steps to secure other coverage for the family. [4] Ultimately, however, we find it unnecessary to decide whether Better-Bilt owed Alia an independent duty because we believe that Thompson can recover Alia's medical expenses as damages for his wrongful discharge irrespective of any such independent duty. Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy gives rise to an action in tort. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 378, 380-81, 710 P.2d 1025, 1033, 1035-36 (1985) (citing Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (employee discharged for filing workers' compensation claim)); see also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 176-78, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335-36, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844-45 (1980). A successful plaintiff is therefore entitled to ordinary tort damages  all damages legally caused by the tort. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 917 (1979) (hereinafter Restatement); see Valley Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 110 Ariz. 260, 264, 517 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1974); see also Potter v. Village Bank of New Jersey, 225 N.J. Super. 547, 543 A.2d 80, 87 (1988) (in wrongful termination that violates public policy, there is no valid reason why the measure of damages should be different for other torts. Generally, compensatory damages are designed to put the injured party in as good a position as he would have been in had the tortious conduct not occurred.); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 n. 5 (1978) (the cause of action [for discharge that violates public policy] is one in tort and ... tort damages would be applicable); Daniel P. Westman, WHISTLE-BLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 115-16 (1991) (With one exception [Wisconsin], every jurisdiction has held that tort damages are available in public policy cases.). See generally Annotation, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Discharge of At-Will Employee, 44 A.L.R.4th 1131 (1986 & Supp. 1991). The analysis of whether an element of damage is legally caused by a tortious act has two prongs. Restatement § 431. [5] First, the tort must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Id. § 431(a); see id. § 433. [6] But see Markiewicz v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 329, 338 & n. 6, 576 P.2d 517, 526 & n. 6 (Ct.App. 1978). Second, even if the tort is a substantial cause of the harm, the legal system may nonetheless relieve a [tortfeasor] from liability because of the manner in which his [tortious act] produces it. Id. § 431(b) cmt. d. For example, the tortfeasor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's [tortious] conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm. Id. § 435(2); see also W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (5th ed. 1984). [7] In this case, if, as the jury found, Better-Bilt wrongfully discharged Thompson, Thompson is entitled to recover damages for Alia's medical expenses. When Better-Bilt discharged Thompson without notice, his group health insurance (which included coverage for Alia) was also terminated. Because Better-Bilt did not give Thompson notice of termination, and arguably concealed that termination, Thompson was not afforded the opportunity to provide replacement coverage for Alia. Before Thompson found out about this discharge and loss of insurance, Alia required medical care. Thompson thus lost coverage for medical bills that would have been covered by insurance had his employment and insurance not been terminated. Under these facts, we have little difficulty concluding that Better-Bilt's tortious act was a substantial cause of Thompson's lack of coverage for Alia's medical expenses, [8] and that these damages are so closely connected to Better-Bilt's tortious conduct as to foreclose any question of liability being barred as a matter of law. [9] See Restatement § 433. Cf. Markiewicz, 118 Ariz. at 338 & n. 6, 576 P.2d at 526 & n. 6. Indeed, the analysis is no different than if the bills had been for Thompson's own medical care. [10] We therefore conclude that the court of appeals erred in holding that Thompson could not recover damages for Alia's medical expenses.