Opinion ID: 1103678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Plaintiffs' Charges 12 and 13.

Text: The Power Company and Cosby argue that the court erred in giving plaintiffs' requested Charges 12 and 13 which recite as follows: No. 12. I charge you, gentlmen of the jury, that the employer is responsible for negligent acts or ommissions of his employee is the course of his employment, and if you find from the evidence that John Smedley was an employee of C. Pierson Cosby while operating the crane at Hudson High School at the time Earl Smith was killed and that his operation of said crane was in the line and scope of his employment with C. Pierson Cosby, then C. Pierson Cosby would be responsible for any negligent acts or negligent omissions of John Smedley in the operation of said crane. No. 13. I charge you that the employer is liable for the negligence of his employees' acts within the line and scope of his employment, though not done under the employer's direction. It is argued that these charges are bad because they omit any mention of proximate causation and instruct that the master is answerable for all negligent acts of the servant, whether such acts be the proximate cause of injury or not. Charges 12 and 13 are not unlike portion 19 of an oral charge which was considered in Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith, 221 Ala. 273, 128 So. 228, and which recites as follows, to wit: 19. `A defendant would be held liable for the torts or wrongs done by its agent, servant or employee if at the time the tort or wrong was done the agent, servant or employee was acting within the line and scope of his employment as such agent, servant or employee.' (221 Ala. at page 275, 128 So. at page 230) Both Charges 12 and 13 and portion 19 in the Smith case, supra, are expressions of the doctrine of the master's liability for the acts of his servant, and all three statements omit mention of proximate cause. We have noted that portion 19 is from an oral charge while Charges 12 and 13 are requested charges. As to portion 19, however, this court said:    The third, No. 19, is but the statement of an elementary principle which applied to most every tort action, where the wrong is committed by an agent of defendant. Each contains no misstatement of law. (221 Ala. at page 278, 128 So. at page 232) If portion 19 contains no misstatement of the law, then neither Charge 12 or Charge 13 contains misstatement of the law. If, however, Charges 12 and 13 be deemed incomplete and, therefore, misleading, giving them was not reversible error. It is not necessarily reversible error to give ambiguous or misleading charges; proper explanatory instructions should be given at request of party supposing himself prejudiced thereby. Birmingham Southern R. Co. v. Harrison, 203 Ala. 284, 291, 82 So. 534, 541. Concerning a given charge which allegedly imposed on defendant a duty greater than that required by law, this court said: If defendant considered charge 7 to be misleading or not a full statement of the applicable law the remedy was to request explanatory or additional charges. In fact, it seems to us that several of the given charges requested by defendant, and also the oral charge, adequately dealt with the question of plaintiff's duty to exercise reasonable care for her own safety. First National Bank of Mobile v. Ambrose, 270 Ala. 371, 374, 119 So.2d 18, 21. In the instant case, subsequent to giving plaintiffs' requested charges, the court gave at Cosby's request his Charge 16 as follows: 16. I charge you, Gentlemen of the Jury, that if you find from the evidence that the defendant, John Smedley, was not guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the electrocution or death of Earl Smith as averred in said complaint, then you must find your verdict in favor of the defendant, C. pierson Cosby.; and at the Power Company's request its Charge 9 as follows: 9. I charge you that before you can return a verdict for the plaintiffs against Alabama Power Company in this case, you must be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that Alabama Power Company was guilty of an act of negligence charged in the complaint, as amended, and you must be further reasonably satisfied from the evidence that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiffs' intestate. For the reasons stated, we are of opinion that the court did not err to a reversal in giving either Charge 12 or Charge 13.