Opinion ID: 1675525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The United States Supreme Court Says Death is Different

Text: I begin with the a priori constitutional imperative  that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from any other form of punishment known to our society. The Supreme Court of the United States has in recent years repeatedly recognized the uniqueness of the death penalty. Concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), Justice Stewart wrote: The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity. 408 U.S. at 306, 92 S.Ct. at 3760. This theme, the unique nature of the death penalty, has been repeated time and time again. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 287-289, 92 S.Ct. at 2751, 3752, 33 L.Ed.2d 376-378 (Brennan, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2931, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204-05, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (1977); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2869, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990 (1978); and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2390, 65 L.Ed.2d 392, 393, 403 (1980). Because capital punishment is qualitatively different, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1978) holds that there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment. 428 U.S. at 305, 96 S.Ct. at 2991. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), observes, in a somewhat different context, that the penalty of death is so profoundly different that a greater degree of sentencing reliability is required. 438 U.S. at 604-605, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), posits as the goal of a capital trial a process which insure[s] that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of `reason rather than caprice or emotion.' 447 U.S. at 638, 100 S.Ct. at 2390. That death is different is a fundamental notion that underlies and helps explain much of what we say below.