Opinion ID: 771497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to Challenge Search and Seizure [All Appellants]

Text: 12 The district court did not determine whether the warrant less search of the trailer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it found that the appellants lacked Fourth Amendment standing -that is, that appellants' own Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Appellants challenge this conclusion, maintaining that, as overnight guests of the Carrillos, they had a sufficient expectation of privacy in the trailer to be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. We agree. 13
14 The Fourth Amendment provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . U.S. Const. amend. IV. Because the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), a person claiming a Fourth Amendment violation must, as an initial matter, demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the thing seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). A person's expectation of privacy is deemed legitimate if it is one that society is prepared to recognize as`reasonable.'  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 (concluding that an expectation is reasonable if it derives from a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society). 7 15 Whether or not he can show indices of residency (such as keys to the premises or the ability to come and go and admit or exclude others), an overnight guest in another's home has a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of Fourth Amendment standing. Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 96, 98 (1990); id. at 96 n.4 (We need go no further than to conclude, as we do, that Olson's status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.) (emphasis added). As the Court in Olson explained: 16 To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying overnight in another's home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society. . . . [W]e think that society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home. 17 From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in another's home precisely because it pro vides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. 18 Id. at 98-99. 19 An individual whose presence on another's premises is purely commercial in nature, on the other hand, has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that location. See United States v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). In Carter , the Court held that two drug dealers did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an apartment, already set up for drug manufacturing, that the defendants occupied only for two-and-one-half hours and only for the purpose of packaging drugs for resale, and for the use of which they paid the lessee an eighth of an ounce of cocaine. Id. at 86, 91. Because they were present solely for a business transaction, id. at 90, the defendants in that case had no legitimate expectation of privacy. The Court contrasted their situation with that of the defendant in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960), who had slept [in the apartment] `maybe a night,'  and who did have a legitimate expectation of privacy. 525 U.S. at 89-90; see also id. at 90 (Thus an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.). 8 The Carter Court concluded that the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between [the defendants] and the householder,  made the defendants' situation more akin to that of someone who was merely legitimately on the premises than that of an overnight guest. Id. at 93. 20
21 The pivotal question, then, is whether the situation of the appellants in this case was akin to the overnight guests in Olson or, instead, as the district court held, analogous for Fourth Amendment standing purposes to that of the defendants in Carter. The district court found that each of [the appellants] were backpackers staying at the residence for food and rest with the permission of at least Oscar Carrillo, and possibly Mary Ann as well. That conclusion is fully supported by the evidence. For example, Gamez-Orduno testified that Oscar Carrillo provided appellants with sleeping bags and food and that the trailer was equipped with a refrigerator, a stove, water, and a television. Moreover, appellants testified, and the government does not dispute, that appellants slept in the trailer the night preceding the Border Patrol's arrival. We therefore affirm the district court's factual findings. See United States v. Armenta, 69 F.3d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that district court's factual findings on Fourth Amendment standing issue are reviewable only for clear error). 22 Despite its finding that appellants stayed overnight in the trailer with the Carrillos' permission, the district court saw appellants' situation as similar to that of the defendants in Carter. Stressing that appellants came to the trailer in the course of their drug smuggling activities, the district court held that they were there for a purely commercial purpose, that is, to rest in the course of bringing drugs, transporting drugs, and thus could not establish Fourth Amendment standing. This holding, reviewable de novo, see United States v. Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966, 986 (9th Cir. 1999), was erroneous. 23 The record shows that appellants were overnight guests in the trailer, and that they were there for rest and food, not simply . . . to do business. Carter, 525 U.S. at 90. Resting overnight in a home made available without charge by an identifiable occupant is not commercial activity. And this is true no matter why the guests are away from home and in need of shelter, and no matter whether the relationship between the host and the guests is a social or a business one. 24 The district court's holding to the contrary turned on the court's finding that appellants weren't social guests, . . . friends or acquaintances of the owners of the premises, and reflected the understanding that, under Carter , a social purpose for an overnight stay is a necessary precondition of forming a legitimate expectation of privacy. But Carter neither suggests that the Fourth Amendment's regard for overnight guests depends on whether the visit is purely social in nature nor undermines Olson's explicit holding that status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that[the guest] had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Olson, 495 U.S. at 96-97. 25 Indeed, there is no reason why the nature of the relationship between host and guest should affect the overnight guest's expectation of privacy. A businessman who stays at the home of a business acquaintance when he comes to town for no other purpose than to conclude a deal is still an overnight guest, not engaged in purely commercial  activity while at the home, and has an expectation of privacy while there. See id. at 98 (noting that we stay in others' homes when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure). 26 The dissent accepts this proposition but maintains that this case is different from the one hypothesized because the relationship between the appellants and the Carrillos had no suggestion of friendly hospitality. Post, at 16057. It is doubtful, though, that Rob Olson's hosts in Minnesota v. Olson were motivated by friendly hospitality when the hosts allowed him to spend the night on the floor of their home after he drove the get-away car in an armed robbery, a fact which they apparently knew, and then lied to the police about whether Olson was in the house or not. 495 U.S. at 93-94, 97 n.1. Nor does Olson suggest that the relevant focus is on the motivation of the hosts in permitting an overnight stay. Rather, Olson, understandably, views the expectation of privacy question [f]rom the overnight guest's perspective, 495 U.S. at 99, and focuses on the innately private nature of the personal activities for which one seeks overnight shelter: 27 From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in another's home precisely because it pro vides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep, because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room or the home of a friend. Society expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a telephone booth -a temporarily private place whose momentary occupant's expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable. . . . 28 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 29 The trailer the appellants stayed in was set up as a dwelling place, and, the district court found, the appellants were using it for their private, personal needs, not, as in Carter, as a location for packaging drugs or otherwise engaging in their criminal activity. Whether the appellants were likely to continue their smuggling activities the next day, or were admonished to stay inside to avoid detection, is as irrelevant as whether Rob Olson was likely to leave town by bus the next day to avoid arrest, or was found . . . hiding in a closet, presumably also to avoid detection. 495 U.S. at 93, 94. In both cases, the pertinent fact for purposes of judging the privacy expectation is that appellants were engaging in the necessary, intimate activities of daily life while staying in a dwelling provided by someone else, activities ordinarily conducted in secure, enclosed spaces and which our society regards as private. 30 Moreover, to say of the appellants that [i]n the trailer, as outside it, they were the carriers of forbidden merchandise, and that [t]he only expectation that they could have had was to be arrested if they were discovered, post, at 16058, is not to distinguish them from individuals staying in their own houses -or house trailers -for rest while engaged in a several-day course of criminal activity. In either case, the Fourth Amendment does not protect the criminal from arrest, whether in his own home or in a dwelling provided by another, but does assure that the government must comply with constitutional limitations before coming into a private living space. 31 The government argues to the contrary, maintaining that Armenta, 69 F.3d at 304, supports the district court's holding. Armenta, however, does not suggest that actual overnight guests in a residence may lack a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Armenta, we merely affirmed a finding that the appellant in that case had not established that he was in fact an overnight guest of an identifiable host, noting that the defendant's situation [was] vastly different from that of `overnight guests' who do have legitimate expectations of privacy in their hosts' homes. Id. at 308; see also id. at 309 n.3 (determining that there was no evidence that Armenta's coconspirator owned, rented, or had authority to use the premises or to invite Armenta to do so). In contrast, the district court here found that appellants had an identifiable host, Oscar Carillo, and that in fact, [appellants ] were [in the trailer] with the permission of the Carrillos. 32 In short, the district court's findings of fact establish that, as a matter of law, appellants were overnight guests of Oscar Carillo, and, as such, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trailer while staying there for food and rest. We therefore reverse the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress and remand so that appellants may contest the Border Patrol's search and seizure on substantive Fourth Amendment grounds. 33