Opinion ID: 2767608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression claim

Text: “In evaluating [an] appeal of the denial of [a] motion to suppress . . . , we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Brown, 757 F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 229 (2014). “When the district court denies a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572 (2014). 2 “The government bears the burden of proof in justifying a warrantless search or seizure.” Id. A warrantless search may be justified by showing consent to search by “a third party who possessed common authority over . . . the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 306 (4th Cir. 2012). However, “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122-23 (2006). “The government has the burden of proving consent,” and we “review for clear error a district court’s determination that a search [was] consensual.” United States v. Robertson, 736 F.3d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 2013). In determining whether consent to search was freely and voluntarily given, a court is to consider the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the consenter, such as her mental capacity. United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1318 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Here, prior to trial, Ingram moved to suppress evidence seized from the search of his vehicle, arguing that his mother, who had consented to the search, lacked the capacity to do so. He also claimed that, regardless of whether his mother’s 3 consent was voluntary, the search was unreasonable under Randolph. We discern no reversible error in the district court’s determinations that Ingram’s mother did not lack the requisite capacity to consent and that, because Ingram never expressly refused his consent, Randolph does not apply to his case. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ingram’s motion to suppress.