Opinion ID: 4551546
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: willfully threatening to commit a crime

Text: that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person; (2) specific intent that the statement be taken as a threat; (3) the threat was “on its face and under the circumstances so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat”; (4) the threat “caused the victim to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety”; and (5) the “victim’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 1160 (quoting People v. Jackson, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 539, 543 (Ct. App. 2009)). We proffered three independent reasons for why the offense was a CIMT. First, we explained that “the underlying conduct threatened is itself a [CIMT],” and a § 422 conviction “require[d] both proof of the specific intent to injure required of [CIMTs] as well as proof of a threat of death or serious bodily injury made with the specific intent 18 ORELLANA V. BARR that the victim believe the threat will be carried out.” Id. at 1161–62 (internal quotation marks and original alteration omitted). Second, we determined that the statute “criminalize[d] only that conduct which results in substantial harm,” specifically noting “that the person threatened [must] be in sustained fear or immediate danger to his or his family’s safety.” Id. at 1162 (emphasis added). Finally, we underscored that the statutory mens rea “constitute[d] the evil intent” necessary for a CIMT, which, in that case, was “[t]he intent to instill great fear of serious bodily injury or death in another[.]” Id. at 1163. Although we recognize that § 646.9(a) is not identical to the § 422 threat offense that we considered in Latter-Singh, we conclude that § 646.9(a) is more like that statute than the statutes that we considered in Fernandez-Ruiz and Uppal. Enacted in 1990, § 646.9 was the nation’s first criminal stalking statute. People v. Carron, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 332 (Ct. App. 1995). 8 The California Legislature enacted the statute as a response to the shooting of an actress and the murders of four Southern California women within a month and a half, each of whom had obtained restraining orders and communicated to their families that they believed they were going to be killed. Id. “Existing criminal statutes were inadequate,” including § 422. Id. (noting that “[s]ection 422 required an ‘unequivocal, unconditional, immediate’ threat of death or great bodily injury”). Although § 646.9 contained the words “death or great bodily injury,” as 8 Nearly all states followed suit with California and enacted criminal stalking statutes. See Note, Robert N. Miller, “Stalk Talk”: A First Look at Anti-Stalking Legislation, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303, 1303 & n.7 (1993) (explaining that 48 states, including Michigan, enacted criminal antistalking statutes in the wake of California’s statute). ORELLANA V. BARR 19 originally enacted, the California Legislature removed these words in 1993 to “strengthen[]” the statute by focusing on “a threat to a person’s safety.” Id. at 333. Orellana implicitly recognizes that if the statute were still limited to threats of death or great bodily injury, then the statute would categorically be a CIMT. Latter-Singh would compel that conclusion. We do not think, however, that the absence of “death or great bodily injury” from § 646.9(a) means that the statute criminalizes non-turpitudinous conduct, such as mere threats. Although § 646.9(a) is not limited to threats of death or great bodily injury, it has material similarities with the statute in Latter-Singh. Like the statute in Latter-Singh, § 646.9(a) “does not punish mere angry or emotional speech,” People v. Halgren, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 180 (Ct. App. 1996), nor does it “encompass every kind of threat,” People v. Borrelli, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851, 861 (Ct. App. 2000). See Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 1162 (observing that § 422 does not criminalize “emotional outbursts or mere angry utterances or ranting soliloquies, however violent, but rather proscribes a narrow category of speech that instills fear in others” (citations, internal quotation marks and internal alterations omitted)). Instead, § 646.9(a) criminalizes only “true threats,” which means threats that are “unambiguous and have such immediacy that they convincingly express an intention of being carried out.” Falck, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629. That conclusion follows from § 646.9(a)’s elements which, when read together, “limit[] its application to only such threats as pose a danger to society[.]” Id. at 630. Like the statute in Latter-Singh, § 646.9(a) proscribes only “credible threat[s]” that cause the targeted individual to “reasonably fear for his or her safety” or his or her family’s safety, those made with 20 ORELLANA V. BARR “the apparent ability to carry out the threat,” and those which the perpetrator specifically intends to cause such fear in the targeted person. Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(g) (emphasis added); see also Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 1162 (distinguishing Fernandez-Ruiz as lacking “a similar requirement that the person threatened be in sustained fear of immediate danger to his or his family’s safety.” (emphasis in original)). This conduct is more like the conduct proscribed by the § 422 threat offense that we deemed to be categorically a CIMT in Latter-Singh than the conduct proscribed by the simple assault offenses in Fernandez-Ruiz and Uppal. Further, “[t]he BIA has emphasized that ‘evil or malicious intent is . . . the essence of moral turpitude,’ and, therefore, one test ‘to determine if a crime involves moral turpitude is whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind.’” Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 1161 (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980); then quoting Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 950). We have affirmed that “[t]he BIA is entitled to place great weight on the presence or absence of a mens rea element when determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude.” Id. at 1162 (emphasis added); see also Castrijon-Garcia, 704 F.3d at 1213. Although § 646.9(a) may not expressly require the threat of death or bodily injury, the BIA was entitled to place greater emphasis on the evil intent or corrupt mind that § 646.9(a) requires to conclude that the statute proscribes conduct that is categorically morally turpitudinous. Pursuant to our review of the statutory text and in light of our CIMT precedents, we conclude that § 646.9(a) does not “plainly and specifically criminalize[] conduct outside the contours of the federal definition” of a CIMT. Cerezo v. ORELLANA V. BARR 21 Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008). By extension, we conclude that a § 646.9(a) conviction is categorically a CIMT. II. The BIA Reasonably Concluded that Orellana’s Two § 646.9(a) Counts of Conviction Do Not Arise Out of a Single Scheme of Criminal Misconduct To be removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), Orellana’s two counts of conviction must also “not aris[e] out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The INA does not define “single scheme of criminal misconduct.” Szonyi v. Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 892 (9th Cir. 2019). We conclude that the BIA’s interpretation of this phrase here was reasonable for two reasons. First, the BIA’s determination accords with its precedential decision in Matter of Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506, 509 (B.I.A. 1992), to which we accord Chevron deference. Szonyi, 942 F.3d at 890. In Adetiba, the BIA construed the phase to mean that an alien is removable “when an alien has performed an act, which, in and of itself, constitutes a complete, individual, and distinct crime, . . . even though one may closely follow the other, be similar in character, and even be part of an overall plan of criminal misconduct.” 20 I. & N. Dec. at 509. Applying that construction, the BIA determined that the alien there had committed “separate and distinct crimes each time he used a different credit card and obtained through its unauthorized use” something of value. Id. at 512 (emphasis added). The BIA reasoned that “[t]he use of additional cards did not flow from and was not a natural consequence of a single act of criminal misconduct,” noting that “[a]fter use of any one credit card, the alien had the opportunity to dissociate 22 ORELLANA V. BARR himself from his enterprise and reflect on what he had done.” Id. Here, the BIA relied in part on Adetiba to conclude that Orellana was convicted of two CIMTs not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. 9 Count 1 of the state felony complaint involved Orellana willfully and maliciously following and harassing one person between June 1, 2015 and April 26, 2017. Count 2 involved the same conduct by Orellana against a different person between March 1, 2017 and April 26, 2017. Relying on Adetiba, the BIA concluded that Orellana’s criminal offenses, which occurred on different dates over different periods of time, did not arise out of a single scheme. That was not a misapplication of Adetiba. And, like the offenses at issue in Adetiba, Orellana’s stalking in Count 1 was not a natural consequence of Orellana’s stalking of a different person in Count 2. 20 I. & N. Dec. at 512. He had the opportunity to dissociate himself from stalking the first person before stalking the second. Thus, the BIA reasonably determined that Orellana’s two § 646.9(a) counts of conviction did not arise out of single scheme of criminal misconduct pursuant to Adetiba. The BIA also relied in part on our decision in Leon- Hernandez v. U.S. I.N.S., 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1991) to conclude that Orellana’s two counts of conviction did not arise out of a single scheme. In Leon-Hernandez, we observed that the then-applicable statutory text provided that “[a]n alien may be deported if ‘convicted of two crimes . . . 9 Orellana objects that the Government misstated Adetiba in its briefing during removal proceedings. Our review, however, is of the BIA’s decision, not the Government’s briefing before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. ORELLANA V. BARR 23 regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial.’” Id. at 904 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988)) (emphasis and ellipsis in original). That text remains in the provision. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The BIA properly recognized that Orellana’s simultaneous convictions did not render the statute inapplicable. Leon-Hernandez recognized a rebuttable “presumption of separate crimes created by the fact that the crimes were committed on different dates[.]” 926 F.2d at 905 (citing Khan v. Barber, 253 F.2d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958)). Because this presumption applies “[i]n the absence of evidence of a more conscious, coherent plan or program of future action, the BIA’s determination that [the alien’s] crimes did not arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct is reasonable.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence before the BIA presumptively showed that Orellana’s two § 646.9(a) counts of conviction did not arise out of a single scheme because they occurred on different dates. Orellana never argued to the BIA that his counts arose out of a coherent plan or program, nor has he raised that argument here. We therefore have no basis to consider that issue. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review issues not raised to the BIA). Accordingly, we uphold the BIA’s determination that Orellana’s two § 646.9(a) counts of conviction did not arise out of single scheme of criminal misconduct for the additional reason that the conclusion aligns with our precedent.