Opinion ID: 1535099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: claims against the municipality

Text: [¶ 37] Richards claims that the Town of Eliot, in addition to Godfrey, and Stacy, violated her constitutional rights by unlawfully arresting her and using excessive force against her. She also brings her state law claims of illegal arrest, excessive force, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of section 704 against the Town. In addition, she claims that the Town negligently supervised and trained Godfrey and Stacy.
[¶ 38] [A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Therefore, because the section 1983 claims of illegal arrest and excessive force are based solely upon the actions of the Town's employees, the Town is not liable. Summary judgment on behalf of the Town is appropriate on Richards' section 1983 claims for illegal arrest and excessive force. [¶ 39] A municipality can be liable under section 1983 for inadequate police training, but only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. Id. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (emphasis added). None of the statements of material fact provided by Richards in her Rule 7(d) statement allege any facts from which it could be inferred that, to the extent the Town failed to train or supervise its police officers, such failure rose to the level of deliberate indifference. Her statement recites that Stacy received minimal training on probable cause, the use of nondeadly force, and how to diffuse a situation. Although Richards alleges that the Town does not enforce its policy of reporting the use of force by officers, this does not amount to deliberate indifference, particularly in light of the fact that no other incident of excessive force is alleged, whether by these police officers or other Town officers. Generally speaking, a single incident of excessive force is insufficient to impose section 1983 liability on a municipality. See City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). Richards presents insufficient evidence to support her claims of municipal liability based on the alleged inadequate training and supervision of Officers Stacy and Godfrey.
[¶ 40] The state law claims against the Town for illegal arrest, excessive force, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of 15 M.R.S.A. § 704 are all based upon respondeat superior. We have determined that Richards did not present sufficient evidence to defeat the officers' motion for summary judgment on the illegal arrest and section 704 claims, and we have concluded that any claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is subsumed in the excessive force claim. It follows, therefore, that Richards cannot show liability of the Town for the officers' actions on those claims. [¶ 41] With regard to the claim of excessive force, we must determine whether the Town can be liable for the acts of its two employees. Likewise, we must determine whether the Town is entitled to immunity on Richards' claim of negligence based on the Town's inadequate training and supervision of the police officers. [¶ 42] Pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act, towns are immune from suit on tort claims unless the Act expressly removes immunity. 14 M.R.S.A. § 8103(1) (1980); Danforth v. Gottardi, 667 A.2d 847, 848 (Me.1995). There are two provisions of the Act that provide exceptions to the immunity of a municipality. Section 8104-A lists various exceptions to immunity, but none are relevant to Richards' claims. 14 M.R.S.A. § 8104-A (Supp.2000). The other possible exception to immunity is section 8116, which provides that, to the extent a municipality has obtained insurance for tort claims against it, the municipality is liable to the limits of the insurance coverage. 14 M.R.S.A. § 8116 (Supp. 2000); Napier v. Town of Windham, 187 F.3d 177, 191 (1st Cir.1999); Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 614-15 (Me. 1991). Richards did not argue either to the Superior Court or this Court that section 8116 is applicable to this case, and, therefore, we decline to examine whether the Town may have waived its immunity. The Superior Court correctly granted summary judgment to the Town of Eliot. The entry is: Judgment, as against the individual defendants, vacated on the excessive force claims. Judgment affirmed in all other respects.