Opinion ID: 2005211
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Purpose and Flagrancy of Official Misconduct.

Text: This factor is considered the most important factor because it is directly tied to the purpose of the exclusionary ruledeterring police misconduct. Simpson, 439 F.3d at 496; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427 (The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. (Emphasis added.)); McCoy, 692 N.W.2d at 24 (same). Purposeful and flagrant conduct exists when (1) the impropriety of the official's misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope that something might turn up. Simpson, 439 F.3d at 496 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d at 428). [5] The State concedes the officer's entry into the Hoffert garage was illegal because it failed to preserve this issue on appeal. Despite having probable cause to arrest Hammer, no exigent circumstances were present for the police to enter the garage. This suggests that the officer's illegal entry into the garage was flagrant. In addition, the record reflects that when Oster arrested Lane, Oster held up his badge and said it gave him the right to do anything he wanted. Thus, the flagrancy of the police misconduct, at first glance, suggests Hogan's consent was obtained through exploitation. The purposes of the police conduct, however, suggest otherwise. In Brown the Court recognized the police misconduct was obvious, but the Court added the arrest, both in design and execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up. 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d at 428. This was not the case here. Oster and Pohlman entered the garage to arrest Hammer, whom they had probable cause to arrest for driving while barred. Their sole purpose in entering the garage was to arrest Hammer. Their purpose was not investigatory nor was it to arrest Lane. They did not even know Lane was inside. Moreover, the unique facts of this case as applied to the purpose and flagrancy factor further militate against exploitation. In Brown the Court noted [t]he manner in which [the defendant's] arrest was affected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d at 428. This, the Court noted, was important because it showed the execution of the arrest furthered their investigatory objectives. Id. In this case, the facts do not conclusively indicate the officers intended to cause surprise, fright, and confusioni.e. a situation whereby consent would be more easily obtained. See id.; see also Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 684 (finding evidence of surprise, fright and confusion when at least five officers broke down the door and upon entering brandished guns and ordered the occupants to lie down on the floor); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1457 (10th Cir.1989) (finding evidence of surprise, fright and confusion when the defendant felt dizzy and vomited during his interrogation); State v. Monteleone, 138 N.M. 544, 123 P.3d 777, 783 (Ct.App.2005) (noting the knocking on windows and doors at night and awakening the defendant by such means causes surprise, fright and confusion), cert. granted, 138 N.M. 587, 124 P.3d 565 (2005). Oster waited for Pohlman to arrive, and then they both walked toward the garage. The officers did not enter the garage until they confronted Hedlund. No doubt those inside were surprised by the officers' arrival, and their arrival may have caused them fright and confusion. Most important, however, is that the circumstances relating to the arrest of Lane, if they did in fact cause surprise, fright, and confusion, did not have any significant impact upon Hogan's consent. See People v. Boyer, 48 Cal.3d 247, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610, 626 (1989) (finding that even where the defendant spoke with his girlfriend after police misconduct was visited upon him, that the girlfriend's subsequent consent was not an exploitation of the prior misconduct). While there may have been surprise, fright and confusion at the Hoffert garage, none of this carried over into the police's encounter with Hogan. This is critical to keep in mind because the factors are used to help determine if the police exploited one event (the official misconduct under this factor) to achieve a second event (the voluntary consent). Here, the flagrancy of the police misconduct is not a factor to support exploitation because it was not further used by police to obtain the consent, nor did it otherwise influence Hogan in any way to give her consent. Thus, this is not a case where in design and execution the police had gone fishing for evidence or for the consent of Hogan.