Opinion ID: 174346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioner John Mannix

Text: In the early morning hours of February 26, 2000, in a Manhattan bar, Mannix got into a heated exchange with an individual named Matthew Torruella. Mannix v. Phillips, 390 F.Supp.2d 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Eventually, the two men ended up in a physical altercation. Id. The dispute appeared to come to an end when Mannix pinned Torruella up against a wall and the two men then separated. Id. However, as Mannix was backing away, Torruella sucker-punched him in the face. Id. Apparently recognizing that Mannix was angry, Torruella's companion pulled Torruella into the ladies' room at the back of the bara one-person restroom, approximately four feet by eight feet in sizeand locked the door. Id. Moments later, Mannix followed. Id. According to witnesses, Mannix kicked and pounded the bathroom door for between thirty seconds and two minutes. Id. At this point, as least one witness indicated that she heard something that sounded like a gunshot while Mannix was still in front of the door. Id. at 283-84. Others testified to hearing loud pounding noises and something that sounded like someone throwing himself against a door. Id. Mannix fatally shot Torruella in the chest through the bathroom door. Id. at 284. Mannix then left, but later called the bar and asked if he had hit anyone. Id. When he was told that he had, he responded, good, and hung up. Id. An investigating officer determined that the bullet hole in the bathroom door was dead center in the middle of the door at approximately chest level. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mannix was charged with depraved indifference murder, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2), and the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter, id. § 125.15(1). The court explained to the jury that, if it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it could find him guilty of only one of these crimes. Trial Tr. 1067:17-19. The judge informed the jury that a person is guilty of depraved indifference murder when under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of that person. [2] Trial Tr. 1068:9-12. The court made it clear that in order for the jury to find Mannix guilty of depraved indifference murder, it had to decide whether the circumstances surrounding his reckless conduct when objectively viewed, made it so uncaring, so callous, so dangerous and so inhuman as to demonstrate an attitude of total and utter disregard for the life of the person or persons endangered. Trial Tr. 1069:17-21. The judge further instructed: Under our law a crime committed recklessly is generally regarded as less serious and blameworthy than a crime committed intentionally. But when reckless conduct is engaged in under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, the law regards that conduct as so serious, so egregious as to be the equivalent of intentional conduct. Conduct evincing a depraved indifference to human life is much more serious and blameworthy than conduct which is merely reckless. It is conduct which beyond being reckless is so wanton, so deficient of moral sense and concern, so devoid of regard for life or lives of others, as to equal in blameworthiness intentional conduct, which produces the same result. Trial Tr. 1069:1-14. The judge instructed that if the jury did not find Mannix guilty of depraved indifference murder, it should next consider whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of reckless manslaughter. The judge explained that a person is guilty of [reckless] manslaughter ... when that person recklessly causes the death of another person. Trial Tr. 1070:17-19. On November 13, 2000, the jury found Mannix guilty of depraved indifference murder. [3] N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2). Mannix appealed, and the appellate division affirmed his conviction. People v. Mannix, 302 A.D.2d 297, 756 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (1st Dep't 2003). The appellate division held that, [c]ontrary to [Mannix's] contention, Penal Law § 125.25(2), which defines `depraved indifference' murder, is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. The court stated that depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter were separate crimes, both facially and as interpreted. Id. The appellate division further noted that, [i]n any event, the Supreme Court of the United States `has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the [g]overnment may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.' Id. (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)). The appellate division also found that [t]he verdict convicting [Mannix] of depraved indifference murder was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. Id. The New York Court of Appeals denied Mannix's application for leave to appeal. People v. Mannix, 100 N.Y.2d 622, 767 N.Y.S.2d 406, 799 N.E.2d 629 (2003). Mannix filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of New York. Mannix, 390 F.Supp.2d at 282. Judge Casey referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Gorenstein, to whom Mannix argued that the difference between depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter is no longer `well understood' in New York, that the depraved indifference murder statute does not prohibit the proscribed conduct `with sufficient definiteness,' and that, therefore, the depraved indifference murder statute is unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 288. Mannix also maintained that his conviction for depraved indifference murder was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Id. at 293-295. In a report and recommendation dated May 25, 2005, the magistrate rejected Mannix's argument that the alleged congruence between the depraved indifference murder and the reckless manslaughter statutes rendered his conviction constitutionally infirm. Id. at 292. The judge reasoned that, [e]ven assuming arguendo that there is no distinction at all between the conduct covered by the depraved indifference murder statute and the conduct covered by the manslaughter statute, there is no clearly established federal constitutional principles permitting [the district court] to grant habeas relief. Id. The court further held that the appellate division's conclusion that legally sufficient evidence supported Mannix's conviction was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Id. at 295. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that the petition for habeas corpus be denied. The magistrate judge provided notice to the parties that they had ten days during which they could object to his report. Id. at 296; see also id. at 282. No objections were filed within that period. The district court, finding no clear error, accepted the magistrate's report and recommendation. Id. at 282. On May 18, 2007, Mannix filed a motion for a certificate of appealability in this Court, and included a document entitled Petitioner's Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. The document, and an accompanying certificate of servicenever docketed in the district courtare dated June 3, 2005. Had Mannix's objections been received by the district court on that date, they would have been considered timely. On July 9, 2009, a panel of this Court granted, in part, Mannix's motion for a certificate of appealability and certified three questions for appeal: (1) whether the depraved indifference murder statute was unconstitutionally vague at the time petitioner's conviction became final; (2) whether petitioner properly objected to the magistrate's report when the district court did not refer to his objections, but where petitioner attached a copy of his objections to his certificate of appealability papers; and (3) whether petitioner's conviction rests on legally sufficient evidence. [4]