Opinion ID: 2305757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellees' Motion to Dismiss

Text: On March 20, 2007, appellees moved to dismiss Mr. Grayson's complaint pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The appellees maintained that the trial court should dismiss Mr. Grayson's FCA claim for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They argued that the NAUPA newsletter [11] and CCH State Tax Review article placed into the public domain specific `allegations or transactions' on which [Mr. Grayson's] claim rests well before he filed this action, and that Mr. Grayson was not the original source of the information; hence, there was a jurisdictional bar to his complaint. Relying in part on United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 323 U.S.App. D.C. 61, 73, 105 F.3d 675, 687 (1997), appellees argued that the tax and journal reports described in [Mr. Grayson's] complaint disclosed `the questionable legality' of withholding phone card breakage, and . . . [t]hese disclosures placed `enough information in the public domain to identify' with `no trouble' the `allegedly fraudulent transactions' of particular calling card providers. Appellees acknowledged that prior to the filing of Mr. Grayson's complaint, the news media had not reported that the failure to treat breakage as unclaimed property violated the District of Columbia's False Claims Act and/or Consumer Protection Law. But they maintained that similar circumstances existed in Findley, where the court declared that the `ability to recognize the legal consequences of a publicly disclosed fraudulent transaction does not alter the fact that the material elements of the violation already have been publicly disclosed.' [12] Furthermore, appellees claimed in their motion to dismiss that Mr. Grayson could not overcome the public disclosure jurisdictional bar because he was not the original source of the allegations in his complaint. Relying on a similar California case, they asserted that Mr. Grayson did not have direct and independent knowledge of the alleged fraud because he never saw any of the alleged misconduct `with his own eyes,' and even if [his] experience could be construed as providing him with specialized knowledge, such knowledge is insufficient to imbue him with `direct and independent' knowledge. Appellees also moved to dismiss Mr. Grayson's claims under the CPPA, contending that he: (1) lacked standing to bring his CPPA claims; and (2) failed to plead the essential elements of a CPPA claim. Moreover, they argued that the CPPA cannot be used to enforce the UPA. [13]