Opinion ID: 715844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Armed Career Criminal Sentence

Text: 46 Mr. Spring was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (ACCA). Section 924(e)(1) imposes a fifteen year minimum mandatory sentence for a defendant who is convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1) and has three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense. Violent felony is defined to include burglary. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2158, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) the Supreme Court held that for § 924(e) purposes, burglary means the generic, contemporary meaning of burglary which contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. To determine whether Mr. Spring's Texas burglary convictions can be used to enhance his sentence under § 924(e) we use a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. at 2159; see also United States v. Green, 55 F.3d 1513, 1515 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 324, 133 L.Ed.2d 225 (1995). If a state statute on its face defines burglary more broadly than Taylor, 'then a conviction obtained under such a statute may not, except in narrowly defined circumstances, be counted toward enhancement.'  United States v. Hill, 53 F.3d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 258, 133 L.Ed.2d 182 (1995). We review sentence enhancement under the ACCA de novo, and the government must prove sentence enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Where, as here, the defendant fails to object to the sentence enhancement, we review for plain error. See United States v. Smith, 919 F.2d 123, 124 (10th Cir.1990). 47 Mr. Spring had, inter alia, three convictions for burglary of a habitation, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 30.01(1). 10 The Texas Code defines burglary as follows:§ 30.02. Burglary 48 (a) a person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he: 49 (1) enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a felony or theft; or 50 (2) remains concealed, with intent to commit a felony or theft, in a building or habitation; or 51 (3) enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft. 52 Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a). Habitation is defined as a structure or vehicle that is adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons. Texas Penal Code § 28.01. 53 We conclude that the statutory elements of burglary of a habitation under Texas law substantially correspond to the generic elements of burglary contained in Taylor. Other courts addressing this issue have so held. See United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 162 (5th Cir.) (Section 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code is a generic burglary statute, punishing nonconsensual entry into a building with intent to commit a crime.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 887, 113 S.Ct. 250, 121 L.Ed.2d 182 (1992); United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir.1991) ([Defendant's] conviction for 'burglary of a habitation' [under Texas law] clearly constitutes a conviction for burglary within Taylor 's generic definition.). 54 Mr. Spring argues that, because the Texas statute, for purposes of the crime of burglary of a habitation, includes vehicles within its definition of habitation, it cannot qualify under Taylor as a generic burglary statute. We disagree. It is true that the Supreme Court in Taylor did note that some states define burglary more broadly than its generic definition, and gave as an example those statutes which include places, such as automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. at 2158. However, the Texas Code definition of habitation does not include vehicles in the sense in which Taylor intended. Only vehicles which are adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons qualify as habitations. Tex. Penal Code § 30.01(1). The Ninth Circuit in Sweeten considered this very argument, and we agree with its analysis: 55 Given Congress's intent to define burglary broadly, it is implausible to suggest that [defendant's] burglary of a habitation, as defined under the Texas statute, is not a burglary within the meaning of section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The burglary of a mobile home or vehicle adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons is not analogous to the theft of an automobile or to the other property crimes whose relative lack of severity the Taylor Court (and presumably, Congress) meant to exclude from its generic definition. Rather, it is analogous to the burglary of a building or house. Indeed, the burglary of a mobile home or camper is often likely to pose a greater risk of violence to the occupant or owner than the burglary of a building or house because it is more difficult for the burglar to enter or escape unnoticed. In light of these considerations, we hold that the burglary of a habitation, as defined to mean the burglary of a structure or vehicle adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons, constitutes the burglary of a structure within the generic definition of Taylor and thus within the meaning of section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 56 Sweeten, 933 F.2d at 771. Mr. Spring was correctly sentenced as an armed career criminal.