Opinion ID: 1262661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: harmless error in the sentencing context

Text: We suggest that, given the importance of a correct Guidelines calculation both to the sentencing process that district courts are required to conduct and to our ability to carry out reasonableness review, the use of an erroneous Guidelines range will typically require reversal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f). Nonetheless, under certain, limited circumstances, miscalculation of the Guidelines may be harmless.' The government urges that this is one such time because the correct and incorrect ranges here overlap. We are not so sure. According to our traditional harmless error standard, a non-constitutional error is harmless when it is highly probable that the error did not prejudice the defendant. Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976). `High probability' requires that the court possess a `sure conviction that the error did not prejudice' the defendant. United Stales v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir.1984)); accord United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 44 (1st Cir.2006) (vacating and remanding under the plain error standard because it lack[ed] the `definite and firm conviction' that removal of the inappropriate grounds would not be likely to alter the district court's view of the sentence rightfully to be imposed); United States v. Duckro, 466 F.3d 438, 446 (6th Cir.2006) ([w]here a district court makes a mistake in calculating a Guidelines range for purposes of determining a sentence under section 3553(a), we are required to remand for resentencing `unless we are certain that any such error was harmless-i.e. any such error did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed.') (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has instructed, the proponent of the sentence bears the burden of persuad[ing] the court of appeals that the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous factor. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). For the error to be harmless, it must be clear that the error did not affect the district court's selection of the Sentence imposed. Id. at 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112. Accordingly, we will remand for resentencing unless [we] conclude on the record as a whole . . . that the error did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed. Id. We submit that the improper calculation of the Guidelines range can rarely be shown not to affect the sentence imposed. In the typical case in which an error in the, calculating of Sentencing Guidelines has been held harmless, the sentence was dictated not by the erroneously calculated Guideline, but by a statutory minimum or maximum or another properly calculated Guideline. United States v. Frazier, 213 F.3d 409, 417-18 (7th Cir.2000) (finding that the sentencing court's miscalculation of the defendant's criminal history category was irrelevant to the sentence imposed because his offense level carried a life sentence); see also United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that the erroneous application of an enhancement did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed because defendant qualified as a career offender and as such was subject to categorically prescribed offense and criminal history levels); United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1121 (8th Cir.2005) (The district court's erroneous belief that it could not depart upward did not deprive Long Soldier of any substantial- or even beneficial-right. He was deprived merely of the opportunity to receive an upward departure and, perhaps, a longer sentence. As such, any error is harmless . . .). In such cases, although an error was made, it could not have impacted the ultimate sentence. The government contends that a sentencing error is also harmless where, as here, the sentence imposed falls into the overlap between the incorrect Guidelines range used by the sentencing court and the correct Guidelines range. Although some courts have adopted an overlapping range rationale, we conclude that such an overlap does not necessarily render an error in the Guidelines calculation harmless. Such an overlap, alone, proves too little. The record must show that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence under a correct Guidelines range, that is, that the sentencing Guidelines range did not affect the sentence actually imposed. The overlap may be helpful, but it is the sentencing judge's reasoning, not the overlap alone, that will be determinative. [3] In United States v. Knight, we made clear that we do not agree that an overlap between ranges renders an error harmless. 266 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.2001). In Knight, the District Court erroneously calculated the Guidelines range as 151 to 188 months and imposed a 162-month sentence that fell within the correct Guidelines range of 140 to 175 months. Id. at 205. Under the exacting plain error standard, we held that application of an incorrect Federal Sentencing Guidelines range presumptively affects substantial rights, even if it results in a sentence that is also within the correct range. Id.; see also United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 790-91 (3d Cir.2007) (relying on Knight post-Booker and vacating and remanding); United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 869 n. 3 (3d Cir.1995) (This circuit and others have found that the miscalculation of a defendant's offense level `certainly is error that seriously affect[s] the defendant's rights, and so amounts to plain error.') (citation omitted); United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 90 (3d Cir.1992) (The district court's improper calculation . . ., resulting in a significantly higher Guideline sentencing range, certainly is an error that seriously affected [defendant]'s substantial rights and so amounts to plain error.). We reviewed numerous cases wherein our sister courts of appeals similarly concluded that the selection of an incorrect Guidelines range was plain error even though the actual sentence happened to fall within the correct Guidelines range. Id. at 208-10. Recognizing that some cases had been to the contrary, we decided that our case law was more sound in that it better protects the defendant's right to a sentence imposed pursuant to correctly applied law and better effectuates the Guidelines' purpose to institute fair and uniform sentencing. Id. at 210. We reviewed the record and determined that we would be unable to conclude that it is even reasonably likely that the same sentence would have been imposed if the correct range and history were considered. Id. at 208. Even when the sentence is below the Guidelines range, the record must be unambiguous that the miscalculation of the range had no effect. Accordingly, in United States v. Thayer, we reviewed a sentence where the district court had erred in calculating the range, but had also granted a six-level downward departure to arrive at an 18-month sentence. 201 F.3d 214 (3d Cir.1999). The government argued that remand was unnecessary because, even if the court used the correct Guidelines range and again departed downward six levels, the range would be 12 to 18 months. Id. at 228. It also contended that, irrespective of the Guidelines range, the District Court considered 18 months incarceration the proper sentence in Thayer's case and departed downward six levels in order to obtain that sentence. Id. at 230. We said that, although the court had stated that it would not impose a sentence of probation, it was unclear on the record that it would not again depart six levels and impose an even lower sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. Id. at 230 (stating that the record support for the possibility Thayer would have received a shorter sentence but for the § 2F1.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement is sufficient to require remand). Moreover, when the starting point for the § 3553(a) analysis is incorrect, the end point, i.e., the resulting sentence, can rarely be shown to be unaffected. As noted above, the record must show that the incorrect calculation of the Guidelines did not result in the district court selecting from the wrong guideline range and did not affect the sentence imposed. Williams, 503 U.S. at 202, 112 S.Ct. 1112. Although many of our harmless error cases were decided in the mandatory Guidelines regime, they point in the same direction under an advisory regime: [4] we cannot presume that a district court would have imposed the same sentence, given the opportunity to consider the correctly calculated Guideline. See Pollen, 978 F,2d at 89-90 (noting that speculation would be inappropriate given the nature of a sentencing court's decision); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1183 (11th Cir. 2005) (We cannot presume that, in the absence of those errors, the district court would have decided that a downward departure was warranted in calculating an advisory guideline range.). As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said, what the district court will do upon resentencing absent the illegal presumption `places us in the zone of speculation and conjecture.' United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). An assumption that the sentencing court would have arrived at the same precise sentence is speculation indeed. In the rare case, a district court may choose to disregard the Guidelines as too severe in such a way that we can be certain that the miscalculation had no effect on the sentence imposed. United States v. Flores may be that unusual case where the sentence imposed was not tied to the Guidelines range or a specific departure or variance from the Guidelines, but rather represented a discretionary sentence imposed based on 3553(a)'s parsimony provision. 454 F.3d 149 (3d Cir.2006). There, after calculating an advisory Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months' imprisonment, the district court sentenced Flores to 32 months' imprisonment without granting a formal departure. Id. at 162. On appeal, we concluded that the Guidelines range made no difference: the District Court clearly considered all the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in reaching its sentence and used its discretion in light of these factors, rather than in the application of a specific downward departure, to go below his advisory Guidelines range to identify the appropriate sentence for Flores. Id. Thus, the sentencing court could not be said to have imposed the sentence as a result of any alleged errors in the calculation of the Guideline. In order to conclude that a district court would not have imposed a different sentence, the record must be clear. A blanket statement that the sentence imposed is fair is not sufficient; a district court must determine a Guidelines range without the miscalculation error and explain any variance from it based on § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir.2007) ([T]he record must clearly show not only that the district court intended to provide an alternative sentence, but also that the alternative sentence was based on an identifiable, correctly calculated guidelines range.); United States v. Funk, 477 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir.2007) (If we were to view Funk's sentence simply as a sentence where the district court independently [chose] to deviate from the advisory guidelines range,' we would still need to determine whether the district court adequately justified the extent of this deviation.) (citation omitted). Sentencing in the post-Booker era is a process, not a mere affixing of a point within a mandated range as was previously the case. The dissent urges that we resolve the issue before us by looking to see if the correct range seems close enough to the actual sentence imposed. If so, the argument goes, the sentence is reasonable. However, this ignores the fact that the failure to start with the correct Guideline range is legal error that thwarts reasonableness reviewthat is, it cuts off our review process before we even reach the issue of reasonableness. As part of the sentencing process, error can occur at the outset, as the Supreme Court noted in Gall, and we must determine if such error is harmless. If it does not impact the analysis and ultimate sentence such that we can say that it probably made no difference, then the ultimate sentence may be reviewed for reasonableness. However, if this cannot be said with some degree of comfort, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded. Similarly flawed is the dissent's adoption of a new testis the procedural error insignificant? In Gall, the Supreme Court clearly considered error in the Guideline range to be significant, noting that such errors thwart our reasonableness review and including all such errors in its listing of significant procedural errors. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Moreover, there is no legal test for insignificance. Instead, harmlessness is the appropriate barometer and here it cannot be met.