Opinion ID: 6499827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Champion

Text: [47] Caso alleges three instances where Officer Champion provided hearsay testimony. People v. Caso, 2022 Guam 6, Opinion Page 20 of 27 a. Officer Champion’s statement relating to Caso as Brewer’s source [48] First, Caso claims that Officer Champion gave hearsay testimony identifying Caso as Brewer’s source of the methamphetamine. Officer Champion testified that Brewer “identified Mr. Caso as her source” of a substantial amount of methamphetamine. Tr. at 7 (Jury Trial, Feb. 26, 2019). The People claim this statement was not hearsay as the purpose of the statement was “to help the jury understand Officer Champion’s thinking when preparing the plan of investigation and controlled buy for the future operation against Caso.” Appellee’s Br. at 24. The People argue that this case presents a situation like that in People v. Camaddu, 2015 Guam 2, where a nurse provided non-hearsay testimony on what a sexual assault victim told her because that conversation led the nurse to conduct an examination. Id. (citing Camaddu, 2015 Guam 2 ¶ 68). The People argue this statement by Officer Champion was submitted to show why he conducted an operation against Caso. The People also claim that the statement is non-hearsay under GRE 801(d)(1)(C), which defines a statement of identification of a person made after perceiving the person as nonhearsay. [49] When a statement is offered for its effect on the listener, rather than offered for its truth, that statement is non-hearsay. See United States v. Torres, 794 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The Advisory Committee Note clarifies that the effect of the ‘statement’ definition is to ‘exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an assertion. The key to the definition [of a statement] is that nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one.’” (alteration in original) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (a) of the 1972 Proposed Rules)). In Camaddu, we held that a nurse’s testimony about a victim’s claim of penetration was offered to explain why the nurse conducted an examination of the victim, rather than to prove that penetration had occurred. 2015 Guam 2 ¶ 68. People v. Caso, 2022 Guam 6, Opinion Page 21 of 27 In contrast, we found in Tedtaotao that a police officer’s testimony about statements made to him by the victim of a robbery were not being presented for “the limited purpose of providing background or explaining the course of [the officer’s] investigation.” 2016 Guam 9 ¶ 21.4 [50] Here, it is clear that the statement was being offered as part of the explanation as to why the police officers undertook their investigation rather than to prove that Caso was Brewer’s source. The prosecution posed the question: “And how did the defendant come to your attention on September 25, 2018?” Tr. at 6 (Jury Trial, Feb. 6, 2019). Officer Champion responded, “He came to our attention through a source of information.” Id. at 6-7. The prosecutor then asked, “And what about the source of information led to Mr. Caso?” Id. at 7. Officer Champion replied that “[Brewer] was found to be in possession of -- what I consider to be a substantial amount of methamphetamine; basically, she identified Mr. Caso as her source.” Id. In context, Officer Champion’s testimony was describing how Caso became the target of the investigation. As there was no objection to Officer Champion’s testimony, the prosecutor did not clarify specifically whether it was offered for the truth or for background information. However, the context surrounding the line of questioning demonstrates that the statement was elicited to explain the background of events that led to the controlled buy. Thus, this statement was non-hearsay as it was introduced for the effect on the listener. b. Officer Champion’s statement relating to the relationship between Caso and Brewer [51] Second, Caso claims that Officer Champion provided inadmissible hearsay about the relationship between Caso and Brewer. Specifically, Officer Champion testified that “[Brewer] 4 In People v. Tedtaotao, 2016 Guam 9, we acknowledged that, in some cases, “law enforcement testimony regarding a declarant’s out-of-court statement is not hearsay if used for the purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken or as background to explain an officer's state of mind and actions.” 2016 Guam 9 ¶ 20 (citing cases). People v. Caso, 2022 Guam 6, Opinion Page 22 of 27 also expressed some regret at wanting to execute a controlled buy against Mr. Caso as, I guess . . . they were rather -- rather close.” Tr. at 8 (Jury Trial, Feb. 26, 2019). Because Caso did not object to Officer Champion’s testimony, we again apply the plain error test. [52] While Officer Champion is repeating the declaration made by Brewer, it is unclear for what purpose the prosecution sought to admit the statement. The transcripts show that the prosecutor asked Officer Champion how “eager” Brewer was to participate in the controlled buy. Id. at 7-8. But it is unclear how such a statement, even if offered to prove that Brewer was eager to participate in the controlled buy, would prejudice Caso. While the admission of the statement does seem to be in error, Caso has not attempted to show how this statement was prejudicial beyond adding to alleged cumulative effect of evidentiary errors by the trial court. [53] The trial court erred in admitting this statement as it was hearsay not within any exception. But Caso failed to argue how the admission of this statement was prejudicial error, and it is not apparent how Caso was prejudiced by its admission. We conclude that Caso’s substantial rights have not been affected as there appears to be no prejudice resulting from the admission of Officer Champion’s statement about the relationship between Caso and Brewer. Thus, we find no plain error. c. Officer Champion’s statement identifying Exhibit 13 [54] Third, Caso argues that Officer Champion provided hearsay testimony identifying Exhibit 13. Caso challenges two statements. Officer Champion testified, “[Brewer] relinquished custody, I believe, it was 1.2 grams of suspected methamphetamine.” Tr. at 15 (Jury Trial, Feb. 26, 2019). Officer Champion also testified, “The suspected methamphetamine was field tested and presumptive positive reading for methamphetamines was obtained.” Id. As above in Part IV.A.1, Caso argues that Officer Champion had no personal knowledge of the field testing of Exhibit 13, People v. Caso, 2022 Guam 6, Opinion Page 23 of 27 and thus his statements were “based upon inadmissible hearsay in violation of Rule 802.” See Appellant’s Br. at 20-21, 23-24. The People counter that Officer Champion’s knowledge of the drugs in Exhibit 13 was not solely based on hearsay. The People assert that Officer Champion testified that he observed the item taken from Brewer on the day of the controlled buy and identified that in court. The People also assert that Officer Champion testified to the characteristics of methamphetamine based on his experience as a police officer. The People conclude the testimony was based on Officer Champion’s personal knowledge, which is allowable under GRE 602. [55] “A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. . . . This rule is subject to the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.” Guam R. Evid. 602. “Personal knowledge means knowledge produced by the direct involvement of the senses.” United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 6.6 (3d ed. 2012)). In United States v. Lopez, a border agent testified to the defendant’s deportation at the border of the United States and Mexico, an element of the offense the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 856-57. The border agent testified on the process normally conducted on deportation, but the agent was not physically present for the defendant’s removal at the border. Id. at 857. The court found that the border agent could not have testified based on his personal knowledge as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 602. Id. at 863. The border agent was also not qualified as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and could not provide expert testimony on how removals normally occur. Id. at 857. Ultimately, the court determined that error was harmless because of the introduction of a properly People v. Caso, 2022 Guam 6, Opinion Page 24 of 27 authenticated verification form which the court found “legally sufficient to support a finding of physical removal beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 865, 867. [56] Here, as in Lopez, the record does not reflect that Officer Champion had personal knowledge of the results of the field test. Despite the People’s contention that Officer Champion stated he observed the substance in Exhibit 13 on the day of the controlled buy, the record does not reflect when or where that may have occurred. Officer Champion testified that he did not follow Brewer to the pre-arranged spot after the controlled buy. Officer Champion stated that Brewer was followed by Officers Igros and Terlaje, and that he was unsure who performed the field test. Officer Terlaje testified that only two officers, neither of whom was Officer Champion, were present at the pre-arranged location to meet Brewer after the controlled buy. Nor is there any testimony that Officer Terlaje interacted with Officer Champion after performing the field test and submitting the evidence to the GPD Crime Lab. Further, Officer Terlaje authenticated the evidence forms and provided the testimony which established the chain of custody for Exhibit 13 at trial. It is unclear on what basis Officer Champion could claim personal knowledge of the field testing. Thus, we conclude that Officer Champion lacked the personal knowledge to testify about the field testing. [57] As Caso did not object to Officer Champion’s testimony at the time of trial, the admission of these hearsay statements is reviewed for plain error. See Lopez, 762 F.3d at 859. The error was clear, but Caso’s substantial rights were unaffected. As in Lopez, the testimony provided by Officer Champion about the results of the field testing and the chain of custody of Exhibit 13 were properly authenticated by another means. Officer Terlaje testified about both the field testing of the substance received from Brewer, the results of her field test on the substance, and the submission of that substance into evidence with the GPD Crime Lab. Therefore, Caso was not People v. Caso, 2022 Guam 6, Opinion Page 25 of 27 prejudiced by the trial court’s error as the substance of Officer Champion’s hearsay statements was also introduced by a witness with personal knowledge. [58] Though several of Officer Champion’s statements were hearsay, Caso’s substantial rights were not affected as other evidence was properly admitted which established the claims made by Officer Champion.