Opinion ID: 2648014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effective Consent

Text: The more difficult issue is whether the victim’s invitation to the Defendant to enter the residence precluded the aggravated burglary conviction. A person commits aggravated burglary when, “without the effective consent of the property owner[, the person e]nters a [habitation] with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14402(a)(1), -403(a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 39-14-401(1)(A) (2010) (defining a “habitation” as “any structure . . . designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons”). “‘Effective consent’ means assent in fact, whether express or apparent, including assent by one legally authorized to act for another. Consent is not effective when . . . [i]nduced by deception . . . .” Id. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (2010 & Supp. 2013). An aggravated burglary may, therefore, be committed by deception, which takes place when (A) . . . a person knowingly: (i) Creates or reinforces a false impression by words or conduct, including false impressions of fact, law, value or intention or other state of mind that the person does not believe to be true; [or] .... (iii) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact the person knows to be false and:

.... (B) “Deception” does not include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed[.] -7- Id. § 39-11-106(a)(6)(A), (B) (emphasis added). In this instance, the trial judge, when providing the definitions relevant to the charge of aggravated burglary, instructed the jury that “‘[e]ffective consent’ means assent in fact, whether express or apparent, including assent by one legally authorized to act for another. Consent is not effective when induced by deception or coercion.” (Emphasis added.)2 The trial judge did not, however, instruct the jury as to the statutory definition of “deception” or the limitation in subsection (B). As noted, neither the State nor the Defendant objected at trial to the instructions, and the omission of the statutory definition of “deception” has not been presented or argued in this appeal. Nevertheless, we must consider the ultimate question of whether the evidence presented at trial sufficiently established that the Defendant committed an aggravated burglary as defined by statute. See State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 609 & n.9 (Tenn. 2013) (explaining why, as a matter of due process, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence depends upon the jury receiving instructions as to each and every element of the crime). More specifically, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact, if given the complete and accurate statutory definition, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant gained entry by “deception”—either by words or conduct creating or reinforcing “false impressions of fact, law, value or intention or other state of mind,” or by failing to correct “a false impression of law or fact.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(6)(A)(i), (iii). By the unambiguous terms of our statute, deception may involve an affirmative act by a criminal actor—as when a person creates or reinforces a false impression of law, fact, value, intention, or other state of mind—but also may involve a passive act, as when a person fails to correct a false impression of law or fact. There is a key distinction, however, in the statutory language as to the types of affirmative acts that may qualify as deception and the types of passive acts that may qualify as deception. An affirmative act of deception may occur when a person uses words or conduct to create or reinforce “false impressions of fact, law, value or intention or other state of mind.” Id. § 39-11-106(a)(6)(A)(i) (emphasis added). A passive act of deception, on the other hand, only occurs if a person fails to correct “a false impression of law or fact.” Id. § 39-11-106(a)(6)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). Noticeably absent is a failure to correct a false impression of intention or other state of mind. Based 2 “Coercion,” which is not at issue in this case, means a threat, however communicated, to: [c]ommit any offense; [w]rongfully accuse any person of any offense; [e]xpose any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; [h]arm the credit or business repute of any person; or [t]ake or withhold action as a public servant or cause a public servant to take or withhold action[.] Id. § 39-11-106(a)(3)(A)–(E). -8- upon our principles of statutory construction, we must presume that the General Assembly’s exclusion of “value or intention or other state of mind” in subsection (iii), which is included in subsection (i), was purposeful. See Hawk, 170 S.W.3d at 551; Loden, 920 S.W.2d at 265. Tennessee is one of few states that has a statutory definition of “deception,” in the context of a burglary offense, which includes a passive act—a failure to correct a false impression that induces the property owner’s consent at the time of entry. Cf. Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 11.46.180(a), 11.81.900(b)(18)(B) (West 2013) (defining “theft by deception” to include the failure to correct a false impression that the defendant has previously created or confirmed). Other state courts have interpreted the term “deception,” or its equivalent, to require an affirmative act—words or conduct inducing the property owner’s consent at the time of entry. See Commonwealth v. Starkes, 407 A.2d 853, 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (reversing a burglary conviction because the victim allowed the defendant to enter her residence upon the belief that he was an acquaintance of her boyfriend and because it was cold outside, and there was no evidence that the defendant misrepresented his identity, misstated his purpose, or otherwise deceived the victim); see also State v. McGinnis, 317 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (finding deception where the defendant lied to the victim about her husband’s whereabouts in order to gain access to the residence); State v. Thomas, 70 S.W.3d 496, 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (finding deception where the defendant “gained access through artifice, i.e., by telling [the] victim that he needed to use her phone when that clearly was not his intention”). Texas, which has a statute similar to our own and renders consent ineffective when “induced by force, threat, or fraud,” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(19) (West 2013), requires a fraudulent act on the part of the defendant. See Eppinger v. State, 800 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that the defendant did not engage in fraudulent or deceptive behavior when the victim allowed him to enter upon the mistaken belief that the defendant was a friend). The Court of Criminal Appeals, affirming the aggravated burglary conviction in this case, relied in great measure on its ruling in State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), a case involving affirmative acts of deception. In that case, Holland went to a residence where several workers had been hired to paint. By informing the painters that he had been employed to work in the yard and giving the impression to the owner of the residence that he worked with the painters, Holland gained entry to the residence on several occasions throughout the day. Id. at 55-56. Because the evidence established that Holland had actively created a false impression and otherwise he would not have been allowed inside the residence to “accomplish[] the felonious deed which prompted his entry,” the aggravated burglary conviction was upheld on appeal. Id. at 58-59. Holland, while instructive, is distinguishable from the case before us on the facts. Holland misrepresented to the painters that he had been hired to perform yard work and, by -9- his actions during the course of the day, was able to convince the owner that he was a legitimate part of a crew employed to paint the residence. At the end of the work day, he was permitted to re-enter the residence because he told the owner that he needed to retrieve a set of keys. Id. at 56. Later, when he returned to the residence and asked permission to again go inside, this time “to watch television,” the owner of the residence asked him to leave. Id. All of these actions qualify as “affirmative acts” by which Holland created and then reinforced a false impression of fact (that he was a member of the painting crew) and false impressions of intention (that he wanted to enter the residence in order to retrieve the keys and to watch television). Id. at 58. Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the jury could have reasonably inferred that the Defendant “failed to correct the victim’s false impression that he was entering the victim’s residence to conduct business as he had several times previously[ and, h]ad it not been for this false impression, the victim would not have allowed him entry.” State v. Pope, No. W2012-00033-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5385206, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2012). This conclusion—that the Defendant failed to correct the victim’s false impression of his intentions for entering the residence—overlooks two key points. First, the intermediate court did not address the statutory distinction between affirmative and passive acts of deception. As noted, by the language of our statute, failing to correct a false impression of intention, a passive act, does not qualify as deception. Moreover, the State has been unable to produce evidence of an affirmative act by the Defendant—a misstatement of his actual intentions. Second, the intermediate court overlooked the fact that there was no testimony over the course of the trial that either the Defendant or his companion had been inside the residence on any prior occasion. Although the victim testified that, on the day of the robbery, he had extended the invitation to enter his residence because the Defendant had gained his trust, there was no evidence that the Defendant or his companion had asked to come inside in order to purchase a drink or for any other reason. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has reversed a burglary conviction on facts nearly identical to those before us. In Commonwealth v. Starkes, the victim was in her residence when she heard a knock on her front door. 407 A.2d at 854. A man whom the victim recognized as an acquaintance of her boyfriend, Butch, asked if Butch was at home. The victim opened the door and allowed the man to enter her residence because she recognized him and because it was cold outside. Id. After she closed the door, the victim heard other people on her front porch. Upon learning that they were acquaintances of the man inside the residence, the victim opened the door again and allowed the other men to enter. Id. Once inside, the men aimed a gun at the victim and stole several items from the residence. A jury found them guilty of burglary, id., but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction on appeal, id. at 856. -10- The statute at issue in Starkes varied slightly from our state’s definition of burglary. In Pennsylvania, “[a] person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.” Id. at 855 (emphasis added); see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3502(b) (West 2013). Acknowledging the lack of a statutory definition of “the terms License and Privilege,” the court in Starkes considered how the burglary statute had been applied to the factual circumstances of prior cases and concluded that “the element of license and privilege, in the particular context of the instant case, is quite similar to [the] defense of consent. [L]ike consent, license and privilege can be vitiated if they are ‘induced by force, duress or deception.’” 407 A.2d at 855-56; see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 311(c)(4) (West 2013). Applying this interpretation of the statute to the facts in that case, the court held that [r]egarded in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence shows that [the victim] “let in” the first man because she recognized him as her boyfriend’s acquaintance and because it was cold outside. When the first man acknowledged that [the defendant] and another man were with him, [the victim] opened her door and let them in too. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the three robbers asked to enter in order to visit or to wait for Butch, misrepresented their identity, stated, much less misstated their purpose, or otherwise deceived [the victim] into allowing them to enter. The only conclusion supportable by the evidence is that [the victim] permitted the men to enter because she recognized one man and wished to be hospitable to him and those with him. No evidence suggested that any of the robbers inveigled or deceived [the victim]. We hold, therefore, that the evidence was insufficient to prove [the defendant’s] unlicensed or unprivileged entry. Starkes, 407 A.2d at 856 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). While our General Assembly, unlike other state legislatures, has included passive acts as a manner of deception, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(6)(A)(iii) is limited to a “[f]ail[ure] to correct a false impression of law or fact.” If there was any evidence that the Defendant created a false impression of his intention, such as by knocking on the victim’s door and asking to be allowed inside in order to purchase a drink or escape the heat, then a conviction for aggravated burglary might be permissible. See, e.g., Eppinger, 800 S.W.2d at 654 (acknowledging that deception could have been found “if, for example, [the defendant] had knocked on [the victim’s] door and, through the screen, asked for a cigarette”). The facts of this case, however, do not support that conclusion. Likewise, if there was any evidence that the Defendant reinforced a false impression of intention or failed to correct a false impression of fact that influenced the victim to open his door, the -11- conviction could stand. But because the Defendant knew that the victim typically served products through his window and did not allow customers to enter his residence, and because neither the Defendant nor his companion had entered the residence at any time prior to or on the day of the robbery, the evidence cannot sustain a conviction for aggravated burglary. In our view, no rational trier of fact could have concluded that the Defendant deceived the victim either by reinforcing a false impression of intent to enter the residence in order to purchase a drink, or by failing to correct a false impression that he was a legitimate customer. Under these circumstances, the only conclusion supportable by the evidence is that the victim permitted the Defendant to enter the residence because he recognized and trusted him and offered to extend exceptional hospitality to him. Further, even if the victim could have formed a false impression that the Defendant intended to enter his residence for the purpose of purchasing a drink, our statute does not allow for a conviction based upon the Defendant’s failure to correct the victim’s false impression of his intention. To hold otherwise would mean that in order to obtain “effective consent” from a property owner, a defendant would have to announce his or her criminal intent prior to obtaining the owner’s permission to enter a habitation. Such a construction would “ignore[] the statutory definition of ‘effective consent’. . . [and] every felony committed within a building or habitation would also constitute burglary. Our legislature did not intend such a result.” State v. Flamini, No. E2008-00418-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1456316, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2009). We have concluded that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to establish the offense of aggravated burglary because the Defendant entered the residence with the effective consent of the victim. For the same reason, a conviction for burglary cannot stand. Under similar circumstances, we have modified a conviction to a lesser included offense that was charged to the jury. See, e.g., State v. Swift, 308 S.W.3d 827, 831-32 (Tenn. 2010) (modifying a conviction for aggravated robbery to “the first offense listed in the jury instructions that [wa]s supported by the evidence,” the lesser included offense of aggravated assault). Here, in addition to aggravated burglary and burglary, the jury was also instructed as to aggravated criminal trespass and criminal trespass. However, the pattern jury instructions provided at trial did not accurately track the statutory language.3 Under these 3 Aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, a Class A misdemeanor, is committed by a person who enters or remains on property when: (1) The person knows the person does not have the property owner’s effective consent to do so; and (2) The person intends, knows, or is reckless about whether such person’s presence will cause fear for the safety of another. (continued...) -12- circumstances, we believe that the better course is to remand for a new trial on the lesser included offenses with proper instructions.