Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limitation of Questions During Voir Dire

Text: In four separate assignments of error, Juniper contends the trial court abused its discretion by limiting his voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Specifically, Juniper argues he should have been allowed to question potential jurors about (1) the age and sex of their children and grandchildren; (2) their educational coursework in psychology, psychiatry, or law; (3) their military experience, including courts martial; and (4) their philosophical beliefs. Although Juniper argues the trial court abused its discretion, he also relies on the statutory right to examine potential jurors on issues of relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice under Code § 8.01-358. The Commonwealth responds there was no abuse of discretion and that parties only have a right to ask potential jurors questions relevant to the [Code § 8.01-358] factors of relationship, interest, opinion or bias. The Commonwealth contends Juniper's proposed questions were not relevant to any of those factors. The purpose of voir dire is to protect an accused's constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. Amends. VI and XIV; Va. Const. Art. I, § 8.Code § 8.01-358 expands upon these principles by providing, in relevant part: [t]he court and counsel for either party shall have the right to examine under oath any person who is called as a juror therein and shall have the right to ask such person or juror directly any relevant question to ascertain whether he is related to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein.... Even so, parties do not have an unlimited constitutional or statutory right to propound any question to a jury panel. Rather, the questions propounded during voir dire must be relevant to the factors prescribed in Code § 8.01-358. Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 315, 319, 568 S.E.2d 673, 675 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1202, 123 S.Ct. 1300, 154 L.Ed.2d 1043 (2003). Thus, [i]f an answer to the question would necessarily disclose, or clearly lead to the disclosure of the statutory factors of relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice, it must be permitted. Questions which go beyond this standard are entirely within the trial court's discretion. LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984). A party does not have a right to propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum. The court must afford a party a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether prospective jurors stand indifferent in the cause, but the trial judge retains the discretion to determine when the parties have had sufficient opportunity to do so. Id.
Juniper contends the trial court abused its discretion in restricting his voir dire of potential jurors by limiting inquiry about the specific age and gender of their children or grandchildren. This limitation, Juniper argues, had the potential for prejudice in contemplating punishment, because of a parent's protective instincts toward his or her own children in view of the young ages of Shearyia and Nykia. The Commonwealth argues that the question requesting the age and gender of a potential juror's children and grandchildren was unnecessarily intrusive. Furthermore, the Commonwealth avers that the actual voir dire of potential jurors ascertained whether they had children or grandchildren under the age of 14, and, if so, whether those jurors could fairly try the case. Although the trial court did not permit an open-ended inquiry, it did permit the panels of potential jurors to be asked: [D]o [any of] you have children or grandchildren under the age of 14? and Would the fact that those of you who have answered this question in the affirmative have children or grandchildren under the age of 14, given the statement of the case that was read to you by the Court ... prevent you from giving both sides in this case a fair trial and ... basing your verdict on the evidence? The trial court had informed the potential venire that I expect that the Commonwealth will present evidence that the defendant shot and killed ... Nykia Stephens who was four years old and Shearyia Stephens who was two years old. Juniper conceded at trial that a juror would not be struck for cause based solely upon the age or sex of that juror's children. He nonetheless contends the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting his requested inquiry. We disagree with Juniper that the trial court abused its discretion. Juniper had the opportunity to ascertain from all potential jurors if they had a child or grandchild under the age of 14. He did not ask two of the ten panels this question at all, and in two panels only asked one or two of the potential jurors. All potential jurors in the remaining six panels were asked these questions. Furthermore, Juniper had the opportunity, in addition to the trial court's examination on bias, [14] to specifically inquire as to bias on the basis of the age of a juror's progeny. All prospective jurors who responded that having young children or grandchildren would affect their ability to be impartial were struck for cause without objection. Juniper thus had full knowledge of those potential jurors who had not indicated bias or prejudice as a result of having young children or grandchildren and could consider this factor in exercising peremptory strikes if he so chose. Nonetheless, he argues, without citation to authority, that he should have been able to gather further information about the age and gender of the potential jurors' children and grandchildren. As we noted in an analogous voir dire context in LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 582, 304 S.E.2d at 653, [s]uch attitudes might well be interesting to counsel, but they have no relationship to the juror's ability to abide by the court's instructions, to find the facts impartially, and to apply the law to the facts conscientiously. Our jurisprudence according deference to the trial court's discretion in consideration of juror voir dire matters is long-standing. Whether to permit a party to ask a question that goes beyond what is permissible under Code § 8.01-358 is a matter entirely within the trial court's discretion. Powell, 267 Va. at 143, 590 S.E.2d at 559; see also Green, 266 Va. at 96-97, 580 S.E.2d at 843 (When, as here, a trial court affords ample opportunity to counsel to ask relevant questions and where the questions actually propounded by the trial court were sufficient to preserve a defendant's right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, we will generally not reverse a trial court's decision to limit or disallow certain questions from defense counsel.); Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 458, 470 S.E.2d 114, 125, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887, 117 S.Ct. 222, 136 L.Ed.2d 154 (1996) ([S]ince [the accused] had ample opportunity to ask relevant questions, and since the questions asked were sufficient to preserve [the defendant's] right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask additional questions.); LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653. We see no reason not to accord deference to the trial court's ruling on this issue. In addition to our long-standing recognition of deference to the trial court's discretion on matters of voir dire, we find instructive the decision of the Supreme Court of California, which examined a similar issue in People v. Box, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130, 146-47 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 963, 121 S.Ct. 1497, 149 L.Ed.2d 383 (2001). Box involved a multiple homicide, one of the victims being a three-year-old boy. Id. at 142. Defendant's counsel sought to ascertain in voir dire whether the prospective jurors had young children or grandchildren. Id. at 147. The trial court declined to permit that inquiry, but did make specific examination of the potential venire as to any bias based on one of the murder victims being a young child. Id. Finding that the bias these inquiries sought to uncover was adequately addressed by the trial court's voir dire, the California Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion. Id.; see also United States v. Joe, 831 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072, 108 S.Ct. 1043, 98 L.Ed.2d 1006 (1988). In the case at bar, Juniper's counsel was permitted greater latitude of inquiry than in Box, having the ability to ascertain those potential jurors with children or grandchildren under the age of 14. The trial court, and Juniper, made full inquiry as to any bias or prejudice on the part of such potential jurors. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal of Juniper's requested inquiry.
Juniper also contends he should have been able to inquire as to a juror's educational background in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, or law because those studies could lead to impermissible preconceived notions regarding the testimony of Juniper's expert witnesses or on matters of the law. The Commonwealth responds that the specific questions Juniper proposed did not inquire as to whether the potential jurors had earned particular degrees, but whether they had any education in the particular fields. The Commonwealth further questions the relevance of determining that somebody once took Psych 101 to evaluate a juror's potential bias. Juniper's concerns regarding the potential jurors' educational background in psychology, psychiatry, and law were adequately addressed by inquiring about the potential jurors' occupations and, when necessary, for a description of their work responsibilities. Little, if any, relevant information would have emerged from learning the specific coursework of a potential juror outside their particular career. The trial court did not err in barring Juniper's proposed questions. Juniper also assigns error to his inability to question potential jurors regarding their military experience, particularly as to courts martial. He contends that such an inquiry could reveal whether potential jurors had a background in military law enforcement or the military justice system. The Commonwealth argues that a juror's generic military experience is irrelevant because members of the armed forces generally have no role in the investigation or prosecution of crimes. Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends any relevant concern regarding a background in military law enforcement was adequately covered by the trial court's direct inquiry about law enforcement experience. [15] Juniper's concerns were adequately covered by the trial court's direct question to jurors about law enforcement service. A potential juror's military experience would have had little, if any, probative value, as the trial court confirmed that Juniper was never a member of the armed services. To the extent that requesting the potential jurors' military service would have shed light on their law enforcement experience, the trial court's explanation of law enforcement covered any law enforcement experience while in military service. Lastly, we find no merit in Juniper's assertion that the potential jurors should have been directly asked about their philosophical beliefs, which might affect their judgment as jurors. The trial court asked a series of questions designed to alert jurors to possible bias from their opinions or beliefs that could influence their function as impartial triers of fact. Although religious or moral beliefs were specifically addressed in voir dire, the trial court also inquired as to  any opinion or belief that would influence the potential jurors' consideration of sentences of life or death and  any reason whatsoever that would prevent them from affording Juniper a fair trial. (Emphasis added.) Juniper's request is semantic irrelevance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Juniper to ask potential jurors any of the aforementioned questions.