Opinion ID: 736984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiffs' Reasons for Failure to Exhaust

Text: 27 The plaintiffs point out that they did not simply fail to avail themselves of the internal procedures, but rather made mistakes while attempting to find their way through those procedures. See Lewis, 750 F.2d at 1380 (no attempt to utilize internal procedures); Sosbe v. Delco Elecs. Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 830 F.2d 83, 85 (7th Cir.1987) (same). It is not apparent, at least on the face of things, that the plaintiffs' mistake was unreasonable or inexcusable. The Union Constitution provides a two-path appellate procedure. It is not obvious that a grievant must elect only one path, nor is it obvious which path the plaintiffs should have chosen in this case. One path prescribed appeal from the Chairperson to the Committee. The other prescribed appeal of a constitutional matter to the President, and from a constitutional ruling made by the International President to the Board of Directors. 28 The plaintiffs also point out that G.C. Thompson responded to their petition addressed to the Committee (purportedly filed in an improper forum) without ever indicating that the plaintiffs had chosen the wrong path for their internal appeal. Nor did President DuBose, when the request was to him, plainly and explicitly indicate that he was making a constitutional interpretation. Nowhere in his letter to the plaintiffs does he even reference a particular article of the constitution. 29 Finally, the plaintiffs assert that the Union failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs could have received relief through internal procedures that was substantially comparable to that afforded by a § 301 suit. The burden with respect to this matter is on the plaintiffs, however, not on the Union. Lewis, 750 F.2d at 1380-81 (In a case involving failure to exhaust, the plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts showing that the intra-union procedures are inadequate under Clayton.). Regardless of the burden, however, there is a dispute of fact here whether the internal union procedures can provide the plaintiffs with the relief they seek. See Lewis, 750 F.2d at 1381 (discussing the liberal pleading rules and the court's policy of determining actions on their merits). 30 The Union relies heavily on two pre-Clayton Seventh Circuit cases, Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir.1974), and Baldini v. Local Union 1095, United Auto. Workers, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir.1978). These two cases indicated that a court in appropriate circumstances was obliged to require employees to exhaust internal union procedures before seeking relief in the courts. Clayton decided that courts have discretion to decide this issue. In fact, the Supreme Court in Clayton cited Baldini as indicating a conflict in the circuits, and the Court ultimately rejected the Baldini and Newgent reasoning. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 685 n. 6, n. 8, 101 S.Ct. at 2093 n. 6, n. 8. Since Clayton we have specifically overruled both cases on this very point. See Rupe v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 679 F.2d 685, 690 n. 3 (7th Cir.1982) (To the extent our holding on this point overrules this court's prior analyses of the exhaustion requirement in ... Baldini v. Local Union 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir.1978); ... and Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir.1974), this result is mandated by Clayton.). The Union would be well advised to rely on the plentiful and instructive precedent interpreting Clayton rather than on those cases that Clayton definitively overruled.