Opinion ID: 194534
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 3(c), 47 Fed. Reg. at 14876.

Text: When, as here, Exemptions 1 and 3 are claimed on the basis of potential disclosure of intelligence sources or methods, the standard of reviewing an agency's decision to withhold information is essentially the same.7 Hrones v. CIA, 685 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1982); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 736-37 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Exemption 3 and 1 provide overlapping protection in cases involving intelligence sources and methods); see Sims, 471 U.S. at 190 n.6 (Marshall, J., concurring) (current Executive Order 12356 moves Exemption 1 closer to Exemption 3 than its predecessor Executive Order 12065). Courts, therefore, accord substantial deference to the CIA's determination that information must be withheld under Exemption 1, and will uphold the agency's decision so long as the withheld information logically falls into the category of the exemption indicated, and there is no evidence of bad faith 7. Although the standards are substantially identical, courts, in reviewing Exemption 1 claims, state that their review is de novo. E.g., Goldberg v. United States Dept. of State, 818 F.2d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988). In carrying out this de novo review, courts accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record. S. Conf. Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290. -14- on the part of the agency. E.g., Bell v. United States, 563 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1977); King v. United States Dep. of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As already stated, the information withheld by the CIA in this case arguably or logically pertains to intelligence methods. There is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency.8 The redacted paragraph is, therefore, exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 1 as well as under Exemption 3.9 8. Plaintiff contends that the district court improperly denied discovery, which could have revealed agency bad faith. To support this argument, plaintiff cites Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 1980), in which the D.C. Circuit noted that discovery may be appropriate when the adequacy of an agency's search is in doubt. As discussed below, the agencies' affidavits demonstrate that their searches here were adequate. See Gillin v. IRS, No. 92-1803, slip. op. at 10 (1st Cir. December 7, 1992) (citing Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (absent showing of bad faith sufficient to impugn agency's affidavit demonstrating adequacy of search, district court has discretion to forego discovery), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). In any case, plaintiff's claims that the district court abused its discretion by denying her discovery are devoid of merit. See infra at 42-43. Thus, Weisberg is inapposite. 9. As with Exemption 3, the passage of some thirty years does not, by itself, invalidate the CIA's showing under Exemption 1. Executive Order 12356 provides, without time limit, that [i]nformation shall be classified as long as required by national security considerations. 1.4(a), 47 Fed. Reg. at 14877. Unlike its predecessor Executive Order 12065, Executive Order 12356 does not create a presumption favoring disclosure of information once it reaches a certain age. Courts have recognized that it would be extremely difficult for the judiciary to set particular time limitations upon Exemption 1, at least within time parameters of the duration we are discussing here. Bonner v. United States Dept. of State, 724 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 n.15 (D.D.C. -15-