Opinion ID: 2810515
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Employee Terminations

Text: “An employer violates § 8(a)(1) by discharging a non-union employee for organizing or implementing a collective walkout to protest working conditions.” JCR Hotel, Inc. v. NLRB, 342 F.3d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 2003). To establish a violation, the General Counsel must prove that this protected activity was a motivating factor in the -5- discharge, which necessarily requires proof that the employer knew the employee was engaged in protected activity. NLRB v. RELCO Locomotives, Inc., 734 F.3d 764, 780 (8th Cir. 2013). “Because these are fact-intensive issues, we must enforce the Board’s order if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” JCR Hotel, 342 F.3d at 841. “Put differently, we must decide whether on this record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the Board’s conclusion.” Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1998). Motivation “is a question of fact that may be inferred from both direct and circumstantial evidence.” Concepts & Designs, Inc. v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 1243, 1244 (8th Cir. 1996). In this case, the ALJ resolved conflicts in the testimonies of the terminated employees and supervisors Correa and Garcia about the events on the morning of May 14, 2012. “[A]n ALJ’s credibility determinations are considered with the rest of the NLRB’s factual findings under the general substantial evidence test derived from Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 [] (1951).” Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1997). “[T]he question of credibility of witnesses is primarily one for determination by the trier of facts, and findings in this area are reversed only in extraordinary circumstances.” Chemvet Labs., Inc. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 445, 449 (8th Cir. 1974) (quotation omitted). The ALJ found “the discriminatees’ account of what transpired on May 14 to be far more credible than that of Correa and Garcia.” The ALJ cited several factors that tended to discredit testimony by Correa and Garcia as to why the three employees were terminated: “virtually simultaneous discharge of three employees for ostensibly unrelated reasons”; the implausibility of terminating employees for misconduct Greater Omaha had tolerated for years; the “precipitous discharge” of Salgado, who had a clean disciplinary record; and the sparse explanation for the terminations on the employees’ records. The ALJ found it implausible that Degante and Salgado “would simply dig in their heels” when supervisors demanded that they abide by plant rules, -6- and that the supervisors would summarily terminate Salgado for violating company policy, rather than giving a warning, as Degante had previously been given. The ALJ found that Zamora was terminated for engaging in the protected activity of complaining with other employees about the speed of the conveyor chains. The ALJ credited the employees’ testimony that there was a planned 10AM work stoppage on May 14 and found that Correa and Garcia knew of the plan. They terminated Degante because they suspected he was behind the planned stoppage and Salgado because she too was suspected of playing a significant role in the plan. The ALJ concluded the stoppage did not occur because the abrupt absence of three leaders of their protected activity likely deterred others from taking action. Greater Omaha filed exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, objecting to many findings of fact, the credibility determinations, the inferences from the facts, the conclusions of law, and the remedy. The Board upheld the wrongful termination rulings. Accepting the ALJ’s credibility findings, the Board determined that “the discriminatees previously had engaged in protected activity and the Respondent terminated them because it perceived they would continue to do so.” On appeal, Greater Omaha argues the General Counsel failed to prove that the employees’ alleged protected activity was a motivating factor in their terminations. There is no substantial evidence that Greater Omaha had knowledge of the protected activity, Greater Omaha contends, and therefore the record does not support the inferences of wrongful motive drawn by the ALJ and by the Board. In support of this contention, Greater Omaha emphasizes that no witness testified that any supervisor was told about the planned work stoppage, the involved supervisors testified they had no knowledge of any alleged stoppage, and no stoppage in fact occurred on May 14. The Board responds: (i) the General Counsel was not required to prove how Greater Omaha’s supervisors learned of the planned work stoppage for the record to -7- permit the ALJ and the Board to reasonably infer that Greater Omaha knew of the protected activity; (ii) there was direct evidence of employer knowledge because the supervisors knew of Zamora’s participation in similar protected activity in April and accused Degante and Salgado of planning a work stoppage on May 14; and (iii) the suspicious timing and pretextual reasons given for the abrupt firing of three suspected protected activity leaders supported the inference drawn by the ALJ and the Board that the protected activity was a motivating factor in the discharges. We agree with the Board that substantial evidence clearly supports its conclusion that Greater Omaha violated Section 8(a)(1) in terminating the three employees. All three terminated employees testified to the planned work stoppage, and two testified that Correa and Garcia accused them of organizing the concerted activity in the termination meetings. Greater Omaha urges us to discredit this “uncorroborated self-serving testimony.” But all testimony relating to what was said at those meetings came from interested witnesses whose testimony would typically be denigrated by opposing lawyers as “self-serving.” “When the Board is faced with conflicting testimony, it is the sole prerogative of the ALJ to make credibility findings,” and it is our more limited task to assess “whether substantial evidence, on the record as a whole, supports the Board’s findings.” DeQueen Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 744 F.2d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1984). Here, there are no “extraordinary circumstances” causing us to question the ALJ’s well-supported credibility findings. Crediting the employees’ testimony, there was substantial direct and circumstantial evidence that Greater Omaha’s knowledge of the protected activity in April and its planned continuation on the morning of May 14 was a motivating factor in the precipitous terminations of Zamora, Degante, and Salgado that morning. That no work stoppage occurred on May 14 is nearly irrelevant. Section 8(a)(1) prohibits an employer “from discharging an employee for conduct the employer believes to be protected concerted activity . . . . even if the employer misjudged what the fired employee had done.” JCR Hotel, 342 F.3d at 841. Moreover, the ALJ and the Board -8- reasonably inferred that the abrupt discharge of three plan leaders may well have persuaded other employees to scuttle the plan. We deny the petition to review and grant the petition to enforce this portion of the Board’s Order.