Opinion ID: 2827119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Elections

Text: Defendant claims that his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were violated and are being violated because the trial court judge was, and the justices of this court are, subject to judicial elections. Defendant maintains that judges who are subject to election cannot be impartial because they might be removed from office if they rule in favor of a capital defendant. Defendant cites Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510, 515–517, which reversed a conviction for possessing intoxicating liquor under the Ohio Prohibition Act because the trial was conducted by the mayor of the village. A local ordinance provided that the village would receive half of the $100 fine collected from the defendant and the mayor would ―receive or retain the amount of his costs in each case, in addition to his regular salary, as compensation for hearing such cases.‖ (Id. at p. 519.) The high court recognized ―[t]hat officers acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided . . . .‖ (Id. at p. 522.) The high court noted that the fact 89 that judges are also taxpayers who would indirectly benefit from the collection of fines is not enough to disqualify them because ―the circumstance that there is no judge not equally disqualified to act in such a case had been held to affect the question.‖ (Ibid.) However, disqualification certainly is required if the judge ―has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against [the defendant] in his case.‖ (Id. at p. 523.) Here, any interest stemming from judicial elections is indirect and nonpecuniary, and affects all California judges equally. Defendant also relies upon Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 873, which held that a justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals should have recused himself from an appeal from a $50 million verdict against a coal company because the board chairman of the coal company had contributed $3 million to support the justice‘s election. The high court observed: ―The proper constitutional inquiry is ‗whether sitting on the case . . . ― ‗would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.‘ ‖ ‘ [Citations.] ‗What degree or kind of interest is sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting ―cannot be defined with precision.‖ ‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 879.) The high court noted that each case that had held that a judge must be recused on this basis ―dealt with extreme facts that created an unconstitutional probability of bias.‖ (Id. at p. 887.) No such extreme facts demonstrating a denial of due process are present here.