Opinion ID: 1195464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the adverse possession claims

Text: Mr. Young bases his claim on adverse possession under two statutes, AS 09.10.030 [23] and AS 09.25.050. [24] The essential difference between the requirements for a claim under color of title and one without such color of title is in the number of years of possession required. In both cases, there must be uninterrupted, adverse and notorious possession, but only seven years is required under AS 09.25.050 as opposed to ten years under AS 09.10.030. The activities of Mr. Young occurred over a considerably longer period than ten years, so that the distinction between the statutes is immaterial. The question presented is whether the nature of his activities was such as to establish a right to the land in question by reason of adverse possession. The property was of semi-wilderness nature, isolated and at a substantial distance from the nearest settlements. We have extensively discussed the legal requirements for adverse possession under such circumstances in our recent opinions, Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826 (Alaska 1974), and Alaska National Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049 (Alaska 1977). Our standard of review of the trial court's decision that Mr. Young's claim of adverse possession had been established will be that applied to legal conclusions. There are no material factual disputes as to the activities Mr. Young undertook with reference to the land. The dispute is as to the legal effect of those acts. As we stated in Peters : In the present case, however, our decision depends primarily upon the validity or invalidity of the trial court's legal analysis, not its factual findings. The content of a particular legal doctrine, and what the facts of this case establish under such doctrine is the central issue in the case. Appellant Peters does not for the most part seek a reweighing of the evidence, but rather a reversal for failure to apply the proper standard of law. On questions of law, this court is not bound by the lower court's view, and consequently, we do not apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. 519 P.2d at 833-34. The property involved in Peters was semi-wilderness, but more accessible than that of U.S.S. 691. The testimony indicated that Peters visited it every weekend. He lived on the property every year during seal hunting season and constructed a bench for scraping seal hides. He repaired boats there and kept the beach free of rocks. He used the property as a base for hunting deer and smoking fish. He planted a garden and dug clams. Apart from these activities, there were several structures on the property indicating Peters' occupancy, and he had placed and maintained a bronze marker on one boundary and had the remains of a cabin on the other side. We stated: From the standpoint of the true owner, the purpose of the various requirements of adverse possession  that the nonpermissive use be actual, open, notorious, continuous, exclusive and hostile  is to put him on notice of the hostile nature of the possession so that he, the owner, may take steps to vindicate his rights by legal action. 519 P.2d at 832. The judgment of the superior court denying Mr. Peters' adverse possession claim was reversed. In Alaska National Bank v. Linck, supra , we upheld a finding that Mrs. Linck had adversely possessed an undeveloped parcel near the Richardson Highway about sixty miles southeast of Fairbanks. The record showed numerous acts of possession supporting Mrs. Linck's claim. Apparently, Mrs. Linck did not live on the land. However: Mrs. Linck's father planted a sizeable garden on the property for two years beginning in 1956 or 1957. She and her father erected in 1957 and maintained thereafter a barricade to prevent persons from crossing the property to gain access to a nearby Boy Scout camp. They posted a sign prohibiting hunting on the land. 559 P.2d at 1051. Additionally, Mrs. Linck acted as owner of the property with respect to state and local officials  negotiating for easements, complaining about alleged trespasses and paying taxes. She granted an easement over the property resulting in clearing of the land and construction of a power line. Finally, she visited the property several times a year to inspect it and pick up litter. In Linck, we discussed the three basic requirements for adverse possession: (1) The possession must have been continuous and uninterrupted; (2) the possessor must have acted as if he were the owner and not merely one acting with the permission of the owner; and (3) the possession must have been reasonably visible to the record owner. 559 P.2d at 1052-53. It is with the third requirement that we have difficulty here. We explained this requirement in Linck as notorious possession so that if the owner visits the property, he would be put on notice and be able to assert his rights. The owner need not know about the presence of an adverse possessor, [w]hat a duly alert owner would have known, the owner is charged with knowing. [25] We stated that: [w]here possession is otherwise proven, courts generally recognize that community repute as well as physical visibility is relevant evidence that the true owner has been put on notice. (emphasis added) Id. Here it is contended that Mr. Young was known in the community of Ketchikan as owner. It was indicated in Linck, however, that such repute, without evidence of possession on the land, is not alone sufficient. We also stated in Linck that the character of the land must be considered with reference to the requirement of sufficient notoriety. The same acts are not required for uninhabited and forested land as for urban lots. Nevertheless, we referred to the fact that adverse possession must be such that the owner could see that a hostile flag was being flown over his property. In Linck, we found such notoriety based in part on a garden that existed during part of the time in question; a barricade to keep people from crossing the property; an electric power line; land cleared for and an access road to maintain the line. Finally, it should have been evident that someone had been picking up litter from the property. In contrast, Mr. Young's activity gave no indication that a hostile flag was being flown over the property. Flying over property in an airplane gives no notice of possession. Being on the property at least once a year for a half or full day and walking the boundary lines hardly would give indication to the owner that there was a hostile claim. Yet testimony was limited to those acts on the property. Significantly, there was no clearing of land, construction of buildings or fences, placing of signs or any other physical evidence on the property indicating a hostile claim. Assuming that Mr. Young regarded himself as owner and was the reputed owner in the Ketchikan area, had paid taxes in 1949 and 1950, [26] filed for and obtained water rights and filed a statement of real property ownership, those actions are not tantamount to indicating a hostile claim on the land. Even considering the wilderness condition of the property, some evidence of his claim on the land was necessary. Although we did regard payment of taxes as a critical factor in Linck, we did so only in connection with a visible physical presence on the land. Thus, we cannot find such payment determinative in this case. Here, no hostile flag was hoisted, and the adverse possession claim as to the six blocks must fail. The case is remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of Mr. Shilts as to the six blocks conveyed to his predecessor in title. [27] REVERSED AND REMANDED. ERWIN, J., not participating.