Opinion ID: 613084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Linhardt's Trial Testimony

Text: e360 next complains of the district court's treatment of Linhardt's damages testimony. At trial, Linhardt testified that he had estimated e360's damages by calculating the average amount of revenue it would have received for each email sent and multiplying that by the number of emails he believed were blocked by ISPs using the Spamhaus list of known spammers. Linhardt was e360's primary witness and the only witness to testify to damages. After trial, the district court excluded the vast majority of Linhardt's testimony on the grounds that he had attempted to provide expert testimony on matters beyond the scope of his . . . business knowledge. e360 Insight, 2010 WL 2403054 at . (We discuss the one significant exception below in Part E.) The district court noted that Linhardt was not qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify as an expert regarding the valuation of his business or his business's lost profits. Even if Linhardt had been qualified to offer testimony on these matters, the district court explained, his testimony was inherently unreliable. This fact, the court said, is unmistakably demonstrated by the profound differences in claimed damages proffered at various points during these proceedings. Id. At the time of the default judgment, the damages claimed were $11,715,000. During discovery, Exhibit 5 was proffered reflecting damages of $135,173,577. At trial, proffered Exhibit 5(a) showed damages of $122,271,346. During final argument, the claimed amount was $30,000,000. Id. at . Even if those wild swings were set aside, the district court said, it strains credulity that a company that made only a fraction of the profits Linhardt asks for over the course of its five-year lifespan would have garnered profits in the amounts Linhardt set out in his testimony or documentary evidence. Id. at . Because of these systemic problems, the district court concluded that Linhardt's damages testimony was not reliable. Id. at . [6] On appeal, e360 contends that the district court erred because it required Linhardt's testimony to meet the expert witness standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which allows only qualified experts to testify regarding scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. e360's argument misses the point. The district court gave Linhardt's testimony no weight because he was not credible. We see no basis for doubting the district court's credibility finding. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (noting that only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said). We need not determine whether Linhardt should have been treated as an expert or a lay opinion witness.