Opinion ID: 1963191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions on Transferred Intent

Text: Cruz first argues that the district court plainly erred by instructing the jury on transferred intent and by including transferred intent language when defining each crime's intent element. While instructing the jury on the elements of first-degree premeditated murder, the court stated: If Defendant acted with premeditation and with intent to cause the death of a person other than the deceased, then the element of premeditation and intent to kill is satisfied even though the Defendant did not inten[d] to kill Heli Hernandez-Leon. Further, in outlining the elements of every intentional murder crime with which Cruz was charged, the court defined intent as acting with the intent to kill Heli Hernandez-Leon or another person. Before we examine for plain error, Cruz must demonstrate there was an error. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d at 730. District courts are given considerable latitude in choosing jury instructions. State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). When this court reviews jury instructions for error, the instructions are reviewed in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d at 916. Only an instruction that materially misstates the law is error. See State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn.2001). Under the statutes for intentional murder, a person must act with the intent to effect the death of the person or of another. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(1). In State v. Sutherlin, this court recognized that Minnesota's homicide statutes, including premeditated murder, incorporate the doctrine of transferred intent. 396 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn.1986). That doctrine, derived from the common law, stands for the principle that `a defendant may be convicted if it is proved he intended to injure one person but actually harmed another.' State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn.2006) (quoting 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice-Criminal Law and Procedure § 44.8 (3d ed.2001)). Cruz argues that the transferred intent doctrine does not apply to this case because there is no evidence to show that any of the victims were accidental, unintended victims. Cruz relies on our decision in Hall, where the defendant and the victim argued at a gas station and then the defendant was attacked by three other men in the parking lot. 722 N.W.2d at 475. The defendant retrieved a gun from his home, and then returned to the gas station and killed the victim. Id. The State attempted to advance a theory that if the defendant left his home intending to kill the men who jumped him, there was enough proof to find he premeditated the victim's death. Id. at 476. But we concluded that transferred intent did not apply; the three men were no longer at the gas station, the defendant had conceded he had intentionally killed the victim, and thus there was no evidence that [the victim] was an unintended victim.... Id. at 478. Cruz's reliance on Hall is misplaced; based on the unique facts of that case, we held that the transferred intent doctrine does not apply where there is no possibility that the victim was unintended. Those circumstances are not reflected here. Cruz shot a semiautomatic weapon multiple times toward several people in close proximity. The evidence, while showing intent to kill and premeditation, does not unerringly show that each fired bullet was intended for the person that it hit. As demonstrated by State v. Holliday, transferred intent allows evidence of an intent to harm someone to transfer to the person actually harmed when there is a possibility the victim was not the intended recipient of the specific act. 745 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Minn.2008). Hernandez Leon's death and the injuries of the other men fall within the rule; thus, the court's instructions on transferred intent was not error.