Opinion ID: 2011438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Paternity By Estoppel.

Text: The first four argument headings in the GAL's brief read as follows: 1. [S.C.M.]'s Relationship to M.J. is filial; 2. D.M. is estopped to deny that M.J. is [S.C.M.]'s father; 3. M.J. legally is [S.C.M.]'s father; and 4. The order of July 26 effectively terminated [S.C.M.]'s relationship with her parent.... So far as we can discern from the record, none of these contentions has been properly preserved, and the trial judge has never been asked to rule on them. Neither M.J. nor the GAL appealed from the adjudication, based on the H.L.A. test results, that M.J. is not S.C.M.'s biological father. Whenever the results of the tests and report exclude the alleged parent as the parent of the child, that evidence shall be conclusive evidence of nonpaternity, unless contrary results are received. D.C.Code § 16-2343.1(c)(3) (1989). Any argument to the contrary is plainly out of time. Id. § 16-2343.1(b)(1). The GAL and the J.'s contend that the mother told M.J., while she was still pregnant, that he was her child's father. They claim that as a result of these representations, he developed a father-daughter relationship with S.C.M., and that the mother is now estopped from denying his paternity. [9] The GAL cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions, most of which hold that estoppel should operate to preclude a mother from thereafter bastardizing the child for the sole purpose of furthering her own self-interest.... See, e.g., In re Boyles, 95 A.D.2d 95, 466 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764-65 (App. Div. 3d Dep't.1983). No such consideration is present here. Moreover, A.H., who has not been accused of misrepresenting anything to anyone, has been adjudicated S.C.M.'s father. It would not be in the child's interest to have two different men sharing that legal status. Finally, S.C.M. filed a motion to establish paternity in October, 1992, expressing doubt that M.J. was her child's father. Any possible misrepresentation ended more than a year and half before S.C.M. was removed from M.J.'s home. This court has not taken an expansive view of the doctrine of paternity by estoppel, see, e.g., K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 572-74 (D.C.1994); Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1166-69 (D.C.1993), even where that doctrine has been invoked for the plainly beneficent purpose of attempting to secure support for the child. There being nothing in the record to suggest that the equitable estoppel doctrine was presented below, we conclude that it was not plainly wrong for the trial judge to fail to invoke that doctrine on her own initiative when no party ever asked her to do so, and we discern no miscarriage of justice. [10]