Opinion ID: 182627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The substance of Ashraf's alleged good faith based on his immigration status and firearms conviction

Text: In addition to Ashraf's proposed goodfaith exception having no legal basis, his argument fails for lack of factual merit because he had no legitimate reason to believe that he was a permanent resident when his firearms were seized. Even the 2002 INS memorandum, which Ashraf argues would support a new Brady claim regarding his firearms conviction, does not provide evidence of his alleged good-faith belief because the memorandum in no way suggests that his application for permanent residence had been granted. The memorandum simply reveals that an immigration officer thought that Ashraf's application for permanent residency should have been granted, which clearly indicates that this change of status had not yet occurred. According to the INS memorandum, Ashraf was also told that he should refile his application for permanent residency, further indicating that he was not a permanent resident at that point in time. Ashraf therefore did not have a goodfaith reason to believe that he could lawfully possess either firearms or ammunition when his house was searched in 2001. This deprives him of any legitimate basis to contest his firearms conviction or his subsequent removal that was predicated on the conviction. Furthermore, this court denied Ashraf's emergency motion to stay his removal because he failed to demonstrate that he had any means to challenge the removal order or any likelihood of success in having that order overturned. United States v. Ashraf, No. 09-4002, at 2 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2010). The district court also properly ruled that Ashraf cannot relitigate his firearms conviction in the present case. Ashraf's conviction, which has already been affirmed on both direct and collateral appeal, is not subject to further review here. See, e.g., Al-Najar v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 708, 714 (6th Cir.2008) (holding that an alien petitioner may not challenge his or her removal by collaterally attack[ing] a criminal conviction that serves as the basis for the DHS's initiation of removal proceedings against the alien, regardless of whether the attack is raised in a habeas petition or, as it is here, on review from a decision of the BIA). Moreover, even if Ashraf were allowed to separately challenge his firearms conviction through yet another successive habeas petition based on his alleged actual innocence in light of the newly discovered INS memorandum, such a claim would fail because, as explained above, this new evidence does not suggest that Ashraf had any reason to believe that he was a permanent resident when his firearms were seized in October 2001. Nor does Ashraf's mistaken belief that he was served with a final order of removal in May 2008rather than with a preliminary notice of the government's intent to remove himhelp his case. Even if such a belief were relevant to his claims, both of the individual incidents that gave rise to Ashraf's conviction in the present case occurred after his removal order was in fact final. He was thus under no misimpression regarding the status of the removal order at the time of the events that led to his conviction for willfully failing to sign travel documents. In sum, the government presented significant evidence on all of the elements of an 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(B) offense: (1) that a final order of removal was outstanding against Ashraf; (2) that he was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a); and (3) that Ashraf willfully failed or refused to make a timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary for his departure. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Finally, Ashraf argues that the district court improperly excluded evidence that he proffered at trial. We review that court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Hart, 70 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 1995). This deferential standard of review applies to a district court's determinations of the relevance of evidence under Rule 401, as well as determinations under Rule 403 that the prejudicial value of evidence outweighs its probative value. Id. (citations omitted). District courts have broad latitude in deciding whether to admit expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Such decisions are similarly reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 620 (6th Cir.2001). Ashraf argues that the details of his interactions with the various immigration agencies, his applications for permanent residency, and his asserted defenses to his firearms conviction form the basis of his defense against the mens rea element of the charges against him. He also contends that the government partially opened the door to the prohibited evidence when it elicited testimony from USCIS agent Zarlenga about Ashraf's immigration history pre-dating the alleged offense conduct in the indictment in the instant case. Although the district court agreed that the government partially opened the door and therefore allowed cross-examination regarding [m]ost of the circumstances surrounding the denial of Ashraf's first application for permanent residence, the court still denied questioning of Ms. Zarlenga concerning whether or not Mr. Ashraf had a right to appeal the February 9, 2009, denial of Mr. Ashraf's application for permanent residency. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding Ashraf's immigration status and his firearms conviction. It correctly ruled as a matter of law that there is no good-faith defense to Ashraf's willful failure to obtain the documents that were necessary for his departure, and that Ashraf's attempts to contest his removal did not obviate his obligation to obtain such documents. The circumstances surrounding Ashraf's immigration status were thus irrelevant to whether he complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(B)'s requirements. Moreover, Ashraf acknowledges that the district court ended up permitting cross-examination on most of these issues because the government opened the door to them. As the government points out in its brief, there were also a number of other instances at trial where the court allowed testimony or discussion of these issues. Ashraf further argues that the facts surrounding his firearms conviction should have been considered insofar as they establish that he had a good-faith basis for refusing to sign his travel documents. But because there is no good-faith exception for his failure, the details surrounding his firearms conviction are not relevant to whether he willfully refused the ICE agents' repeated requests to sign. Moreover, Ashraf has offered no evidence showing that he had reason to believe that he was a permanent resident when the firearms were seized from his home in 2001. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that these matters should be excluded because they are irrelevant to the present case and because their introduction could have confused the jury. Ashraf finally contends that his proposed expert should not have been precluded from testifying about how a person in Mr. Ashraf's position might reasonably believe he had a remedy against his removal. Because this alleged reasonable belief is irrelevant to whether Ashraf was guilty of the charges against him, however, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Ashraf's expert could not testify about the legal complexity of the very same issues that the court had already excluded as irrelevant or confusing. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (explaining that the subject matter of an expert's testimony must be relevant to the case).
For all of the reasons set forth above, we DENY the government's motion to dismiss and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.