Opinion ID: 405956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: meaning of the regulation

Text: 9 Phelps Dodge has not challenged the facial validity of the MSHA regulation, 30 C.F.R. § 55.12-16, but, rather, whether MSHA properly applied the regulation in this specific factual setting. The Secretary 2 correctly notes that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to great deference. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Magma Copper Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 645 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 475, 70 L.Ed.2d 247 (1981). However, the application of a regulation in a particular situation may be challenged on the ground that it does not give fair warning that the allegedly violative conduct was prohibited. See Daily v. Bond, 623 F.2d 624, 626-627 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). In all events, we are required to make a careful inquiry to determine the reasonableness of the administrative interpretation and application of the regulation. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, 647 F.2d 60, 66 (9th Cir. 1981). Finally, our standard of review is whether the agency's determination is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 10 Phelps Dodge contends that the regulation has been incorrectly applied in this case because its basic purpose, fairly read, is to protect workers from the hazards of electrical shock, not such hazards as may attend removal of rocks from the chute. On the other hand, the Secretary urges that the regulation does apply. He relies heavily on the ALJ's findings and reasoning. And he asserts that the relevant legislative and regulatory histories establish that the regulation was intended to be applied in this fact situation. 11 Turning to the plain language and meaning of 30 C.F.R. § 55.12-16 and related regulations, we note that section 55.12-16 has been placed under the heading Electricity. It is sandwiched between regulations whose purpose is manifestly to prevent the accidental electrocution of mine workers. The immediately preceding regulations, to illustrate, set out procedures to ensure that workers will not be exposed to energized wires, cables or high potential electrical conductors. 30 C.F.R. §§ 55.12-10 through 55.-12-14. 3 The immediately antecedent regulation, 30 C.F.R. § 55.12-17, requires that power circuits be deenergized before work is done on them. Other regulations in 30 C.F.R. § 55.12 also are directed to abatement of the danger of electrical shock. They simply do not address the hazards arising from the accidental movement of electrical equipment while mechanical work is being done thereon. 4 12 Prevention of electrical shock also emerges from the language of section 55.12-16 itself. It requires that (e)lectrically powered equipment shall be deenergized before mechanical work is done on such equipment. 30 C.F.R. § 55.12-16 (emphasis added). According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language 589 (1971) (unabridged), deenergize means to check the flow of current through an electric device. This mandate to cut off the flow of electric current, particularly when read in conjunction with the other regulations in 30 C.F.R. § 55.12, strongly suggests that protection from electric shock is the regulation's main concern. 13 This conclusion is supported by a related regulation, 30 C.F.R. § 55.14-29. Under the heading Use of Equipment, this regulation provides that: 14 Repairs or maintenance shall not be performed on machinery until the power is off and the machinery is blocked against motion, except where machinery motion is necessary to make adjustments. 15 30 C.F.R. § 55.14-29 (emphasis added). Thus, when the intent is to protect against the danger of machinery motion, the regulation requires that the machinery be blocked against motion, not deenergized. 16 The relevant legislative and regulatory histories, however, provide little comfort either to the petitioner or the MSHA. 5 These merely establish that the general purpose of all regulations promulgated under the enabling statute was to promote safe working conditions for miners. 6 17 We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to apply section 55.12-16 to the facts of this case. The regulation inadequately expresses an intention to reach the activities to which MSHA applied it. Therefore, we join in the observation: If a violation of a regulation subjects private parties to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express. (citations omitted). Diamond Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976). 18 Accordingly, the regulation cannot serve as the basis for issuance of the citation or for the levy of the fine. 19 REVERSED.