Opinion ID: 3038318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stump’s Speech

Text: Stump’s allegations that township officials violated Pennsylvania law clearly touch on matters of public concern. Speech that purports to expose wrongdoing by public officials occupies the highest rung of First Amendment protection. Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198. Accordingly, we reject the Township’s attempt to negate the public nature of Stump’s allegations by arguing that Stump was motivated by personal grievances. 3 Although the job dissatisfaction, employment grievances, and the relationship between Stump and the Township are all quite relevant to our inquiry, the inquiry is not controlled by Stump’s motivation in making the speech. Indeed, it is to be expected that matters of public concern may sometimes only be disclosed because an employee becomes sufficiently upset about something else to finally “blow the whistle.” The Township seeks to compare Stump’s speech with the speech in Connick and Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359 (3d Cir. 1993). In both of those cases, the context of the speech established its private nature. However, the Township ignores several distinctions between Stump’s speech and the speech at issue in those cases. First, the questionnaire in Connick contained only one question relating to a matter of public concern; the other thirteen questions related to purely personal matters regarding an employee’s dissatisfaction over a transfer. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-149. Moreover, the plaintiff in Connick admitted that her speech was motivated by a personal grievance with her supervisor. Id., at 153 (Myers acknowledges that it is no coincidence that the questionnaire followed upon the heels of the transfer notice.) The plaintiff in Versarge also admitted that his speech was motivated by a personal grievance, and the speech did not transcend the grievance. See Versarge, 984 F.2d at 1365 (the record contains affidavits from other volunteer firefighters attesting that, shortly before writing his letter on the remodeling, plaintiff told them that he was going to make trouble for the [fire department] because of [its] . . . position on the street closure 4 issue.) Here, however, Stump testified that he first raised his concerns one month after he began working for the Township. The district court was required to accept that testimony, and Stump’s other allegations, as true for purposes of the Township’s motion for summary judgment. The district court also erred in concluding that the disruption that resulted outweighed Stump’s interest in engaging in the speech. It should not be the least surprising that accusations of impropriety would cause some disruption; that does not necessarily negate the public nature of those accusations. As we explained in O’Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d 1059, 1062 (3d Cir. 1989), an employee’s interest in exposing wrongdoing by public officials outweighs any incidental disruption that follows. “[I]t would be absurd to hold that the First Amendment generally authorizes corrupt officials to punish subordinates who blow the whistle simply because the speech somewhat disrupted the office.” Id. We also explained that disruption, even to the extent of demoralization, is not enough to overcome the First Amendment’s protection of the public nature of such speech. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the speech here was public in nature.