Opinion ID: 1897353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Petition for Removal

Text: Section 12-11-41, Code of Alabama (1975), allows removal of the administration of the estate at any time before a final settlement. The parties were in the midst of the trial on petitioners' breach of warranty claim against the estate when the administratrix of the estate petitioned for removal to circuit court. The administratrix had appeared in probate court and was actively participating in the trial at the time she petitioned for removal. Petitioners have not argued that commencement of the trial on the claim against the estate constituted a final settlement of the estate, nor does this Court conclude that it was a final settlement. The language of the statuteat any time before a final settlementis broad and allows removal at any time. § 12-11-41, Code of Alabama (1975). The only limitation on removal occurs once the probate court has taken steps toward a final settlement, or has, in fact, made a final settlement. Mobbs v. Scott, 233 Ala. 70, 169 So. 698 (1936); Ex parte McLendon, 212 Ala. 403, 102 So. 696 (1924). Nonetheless, this rule does not apply if the probate court lacks the authority or jurisdiction to render adequate relief in equity. Crossland v. First National Bank of Montgomery, 233 Ala. 432, 172 So. 255 (1937). Final settlement has a distinct meaning. Section 43-2-502, Code of Alabama (1975), states what actions constitute a final settlement: In making settlements of an administration, the executor or administrator must proceed as follows: He must make out an account between himself and the estate he represents, ... which account, verified by his oath, must be filed with the judge of probate of the court having jurisdiction. With such account he must also file the vouchers and written evidence in his possession, ... file a statement, on oath, of the names of the heirs and legatees of such estate.... He must state the sum of funds of the estate which he has used for his own benefit.... Furthermore, this Court has previously held that [j]urisdiction for final settlement in the probate court begins upon filing accounts and vouchers with statement of the heirs invoking the court's jurisdiction for such settlement and an order entered setting day, directing notice, etc. McLendon, supra, 212 Ala. at 405, 102 So. 696, citing §§ 5901, 5904, Code of Alabama (1923), now §§ 43-2-501 and 43-2-502, Code of Alabama (1975). Finally, the administratrix's petition for removal of the administration of the estate must be considered separate and distinct from petitioners' claim against the estate. If, for instance, an heir of the estate who was uninvolved in the claim against the estate for the breach of warranty, rather than the administratrix, had petitioned for removal at precisely the same time, the petitioners would have little basis for arguing that the petition for removal was based on what occurred at the trial. Administration of the estate is a broad concept involving all matters necessary to reach a final settlement of the estate. Petitioners' breach of warranty claim is but one aspect of the administration of the estate, and it is treated as a possible debt owed by the estate that must be decided before the court can order a final settlement. This concept is further illustrated in § 43-2-501, Code of Alabama (1975), which states when final settlement can occur: Final settlement may be made at any time after six months from the grant of letters, if the debts are all paid and the condition of the estate in other respects will admit of it. [Emphasis added.] If petitioners' claim is for a debt owed by the estate, then final settlement cannot occur until that claim has been decided. If that is true, then it is impossible for the trial on petitioners' claim for breach of warranty to constitute a final settlement of the estate. Petitioners argue that once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, a decree or decision by the probate court is conclusive. Petitioners cite Culp v. Godwin, 295 Ala. 316, 329 So.2d 88 (1976), holding that once the probate court has reached a final judgment on a claim against the estate, the only remedy is an appeal, even if the case is later removed to circuit court. Wilkerson v. Hagan, 265 Ala. 515, 92 So.2d 901 (1957). In other words, petitioners argue, once the probate court decides a claim and the time for appeal has passed, a subsequent removal of the administration of the estate to circuit court has no effect on the judgment of the probate court on the claim against the estate. Culp, supra ; Wilkerson, supra . Culp, supra, is not applicable to the facts of this case. When the administration of the estate is removed, all aspects of the administration must be removed. Johnson v. Johnson, 252 Ala. 366, 41 So.2d 287 (1949); Brewer v. Brewer, 250 Ala. 658, 35 So.2d 557 (1948). It would be improper to allow the probate court to have jurisdiction over petitioners' claim and the circuit court to retain jurisdiction over all other aspects of administration. In Culp, supra, the probate court had already reached a final judgment prior to removal of the administration of the estate. At that point, it was unnecessary and improper to retry the claim against the estate. White v. Hilbish, 282 Ala. 498, 213 So.2d 230 (1968). Clearly, in the case of petitioners' claim, there had been no final settlement on the claim by the probate court, but petitioners argue that allowing removal once the trial on their claim has begun is inherently unfair. Specifically, petitioners argue that this permits the administratrix to preview the case, harass the petitioners, or simply conclude that the hearing in probate court was not going in their favor. In addition, they say, allowing removal in the middle of trial is a waste of time and expense. Petitioners' arguments are reasonable. However, if removal is allowed at any time before final settlement of the estate, and the claim against the estate has not led to a final settlement, then § 12-11-41, Code of Alabama (1975), permits removal even in the midst of trial. See Culp, supra . Petitioners' arguments would be legitimate as applied to parties involved in the final settlement of the estate, since § 12-11-41, creates uncertainty in the sense that an administrator or heir and other parties specified in the statute can arguably petition for removal at any time prior to final settlement. However, as it applies to final settlements, this Court has already limited removal once the court has taken steps toward final settlement. See Mobbs, supra, and McLendon, supra . Furthermore, though that is an important issue, it is not the question before this Court. The facts of this case do not support a finding that the trial was part of the final settlement of the estate. Even if it were, this Court would only have the power to interpret the legislation, not rewrite it. Based on the foregoing, we find no basis for concluding that the trial on petitioners' claim constituted a step toward final settlement; therefore, we find that the petition for removal in the midst of trial on the claim against the estate was timely.