Opinion ID: 1267398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: does the bank's conduct justify a punitive damage award?

Text: The type of conduct which gives rise to punitive damages in West Virginia was first formulated in Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W.Va. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895), where the Court stated in Syllabus Point 4: In actions of tort, where gross fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton, willful, or reckless conduct or criminal indifference to civil obligations affecting the rights of others appear, or where legislative enactment authorizes it, the jury may assess exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages; these terms being synonymous. Although there are tempting shorthand phrases to characterize the type of conduct which warrants punitive damage consideration, for example, conscious indifference, Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir.1991), reh'g denied, 951 F.2d 347, cert. denied Celotex Corp. v. Glasscock, 503 U.S. 1011, 112 S.Ct. 1778, 118 L.Ed.2d 435 (1992); reckless, willful and wanton, Defender Industries, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 505 (4th Cir.1991); particularly egregious Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377, 1382 (5th Cir.1991), we are still committed to the traditional rule announced in Mayer and cited with approval in a number of subsequent cases. See Syllabus Point 1, Goodwin v. Thomas, 184 W.Va. 611, 403 S.E.2d 13 (1991); Syllabus Point 1, Wells v. Smith, 171 W.Va. 97, 297 S.E.2d 872 (1982), overruled, in part, on other grounds by Syllabus Point 1, Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991). See also Davis v. Celotex Corp., 187 W.Va. 566, 420 S.E.2d 557 (1992); Syllabus Point 9, Cook v. Heck's Inc., 176 W.Va. 368, 342 S.E.2d 453 (1986); Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Raines Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 174 W.Va. 115, 323 S.E.2d 596 (1984); Bond v. City of Huntington, 166 W.Va. 581, 591 n. 8, 276 S.E.2d 539, 545 n. 8 (1981); Syllabus Point 3, Stevens v. Friedman, 58 W.Va. 78, 51 S.E. 132 (1905). Do the facts and inferences in this case point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the Bank to the extent that it did not act so maliciously, oppressively, wantonly, willfully, recklessly, or with criminal indifference to civil obligations that no reasonable jury could have reached a verdict against the Bank on the issue of punitive damages? We are convinced after reviewing this entire record that the facts and inferences do not point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the Bank to the extent that no reasonable jury could have reached a verdict against the Bank. After scrutinizing the proof and inferences derivable therefrom in the light most hospitable to Mr. Alkire, we are convinced that the evidence of the Bank's misconduct both before and after the recovery of the missing deposit was such that a reasonable trier of fact could have easily reached a decision which punishes the Bank and returns a punitive damage award in favor of Mr. Alkire. This record is replete with evidence to the extent that for some inexplicable reason the Bank was determined not to do all that it could have reasonably done to prevent the disintegration of Mr. Alkire's good name and reputation in the community of Parsons. Mr. Alkire was branded in this small Tucker County community as a thief. The Bank had the opportunity to remove the cloud of suspicion, but it exercised a meaningful choice to misrepresent the status of the search for the missing deposit, and thereafter concealed its recovery which could have immediately restored Mr. Alkire's good reputation in the community. [9] We learn from reviewing this transcript that the jury heard testimony of a deliberate decision by the Bank to misinform the Alkire family after they repeatedly requested that representatives of the manufacturer of the night depository (Mosler) be retained to determine if the missing deposit was lost within the system and for some mechanical reason could not be found. The jury was told that the Alkire family was willing to pay for this type of investigation. The Bank informed the Alkires that such an investigation had been completed and produced no results. The Bank was not telling the truth. Further, the jury was told that once the deposit was recovered, the Bank chose not to inform Mr. Alkire of the discovery, and but for an anonymous telephone call to the Alkire family, there was a reasonable likelihood that the recovery of the missing deposit never would have been made public, thus permanently condemning Mr. Alkire for an act of which he was completely innocent. When we analyze the evidence of the Bank's conduct in a light most favorable to Mr. Alkire, we determine that a reasonable fact finder could have reached the conclusion that Mr. Alkire was entitled to a judgment of punitive damages.