Opinion ID: 1093284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lower court erred in denying appellant the right to a fair and impartial trial by limiting appellant's voir dire of potential trial jurors.

Text: Harris next assigns as error that the court improperly sustained objections to questions he asked prospective jurors. The following questions were allowed without objection by the State: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if his Honor Judge Clements, at the conclusion of the trial, gives you an instruction on self defense and defines what the law of self defense is, can I rely on each and every one of you to read that instruction and to apply that instruction to the testimony and to the evidence in reaching your decision? Can I depend on you to do that? Will each of you do that? If the law tells you that you must acquit, if that be the circumstances, can you acquit the defendant of the charge in the indictment? And the word, acquit means, can you find him not guilty? Can you do that?       Will any of you gentlemen or ladies ignore or put aside the defense of the defendant? And, we are asserting the defense of self defense, but will you consider that defense along with the other evidence and other testimony submitted by the state? Would you consider the defense? Will each of you do that? (Vol. I, pp. 49-50) The questions to which the court sustained the State's objections follow: Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if it is shown by the evidence, that the defendant was confronted with a situation that warranted the use of force in the protection of his well being, and that it was imminent that his life was in grave danger, and that he was justified in using the necessary force to repel his assailant, the deceased, can the defendant depend upon you to bring in a verdict of not guilty? (Vol. I, p. 47) Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if it is shown by the evidence and by the testimony that the defendant had reasonable grounds to apprehend a design on the part of the deceased to do bodily harm, or to take the defendant's life, and the defendant tried in every way possible to avoid the confrontation, but the deceased was persistent in his attacks on defendant to do him bodily harm, thereby placing the defendant in grave danger of his life, and the defendant was justified in using only that force necessary to repel the defendant, can the defendant depend upon you to bring in a verdict of not guilty? (Vol. I, p. 48) Now ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if it is shown by the evidence, by the testimony, that the danger to the Defendant was actual, present, and urgent, and that the Defendant used no more force than was necessary to protect his well being; can the Defendant then depend on you to bring in a verdict of not guilty? (Vol. I, p. 48) If it is shown to you by the evidence, or if there arises from the evidence in this case, a reasonable doubt in your mind that the defendant did not intend to kill the deceased, but merely intended to protect his own life, can the defendant depend upon you to bring in a verdict of not guilty? (Vol. I, p. 48) The trial judge explained his rulings: The Court is telling you that you cannot ask questions of fact couched in hypothetical terms of the law that have not been given to the jury at this point, because it's not limiting the defendant's right in any manner to voir dire the jury as to whether or not they will follow the law as given to them by the Court at the conclusion of the trial as to self defense. The Court further would state for the record, that although the Court does not intend at this juncture, or any other juncture, to tell Counsel how to present his case or practice law, there are ways that questions can be asked to the jury to find out their feelings and their state of mind in the voir dire as to the defense of self defense, but they cannot, in the Court's opinion, be asked in the manner presented here in Chambers. (Vol. I, p. 49) A trial judge in questioning prospective jurors has the essential responsibility of selecting individuals who can impartially evaluate the evidence offered in court and apply the law given through court instructions to what they determine are the facts in the case. [1] The parties' counsel each knows more about the facts of the case and his own client than does the trial judge. It is therefore perfectly proper for counsel to ask further questions beyond the court's inquiries reasonably necessary to assure himself and the court that the jurors selected will give his client the benefit of every right to which he is entitled under the law, as well as to reveal or signify particular antipathies that could prejudice his client before any proposed juror. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579 (1938). All of this is in keeping with the trial objectives of selecting a jury which can even-handedly weigh the adduced evidence and fairly and rationally apply the law given by the court to what they find to be the facts. Governed by a wise and liberal discretion of an experienced trial judge, a wide latitude should be allowed counsel to gain knowledge of jurors' attitudes towards the issues to be tried, and also towards special matters which likely will come up in a trial which reasonably could unduly influence some of the jurors, or indicate bias or hostility. Counsel should also be permitted to ask questions which give some measure of the competency or capacity of jurors to decide the issues in the case. Such questions should be permitted not only to challenge prospective jurors for cause, but to give trial counsel clues from which they will exercise peremptory challenges. Murphy v. State, 246 So.2d 920, 921 (Miss. 1971); Atlanta Joint Terminals v. Knight, 98 Ga. App. 482, 106 S.E.2d 417 (1958). This is the extent of the rights of litigants in the jury selection process. While it is no doubt true that most of the questions asked of prospective juries will be the same, repeatedly asked in hundreds of cases, the selection of a jury should by no means be purely by a rote or boiler plate inquiry by court or counsel. Because the line between a proper and improper question is not always easily drawn, it is manifestly a process in which the trial judge must be given a considerable discretion. Murphy, 246 So.2d at 922. And, while the trial judge should be lenient in seeing that these requirements are fulfilled, no court is required to permit trial tactics which go beyond them. Many able trial attorneys attempt the apocryphal yet sage battle tactics of Nathan Bedford Forrest to git thar fustest with the mostest. Subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, they attempt to get a leg up on the opposing side at the very first opportunity. Thus, in their voir dire questions they emphasize or reiterate points already made, as well as attempt to exact promises or pledges from the jury, and otherwise lead the jury to prejudge the case. A trial court is not required to, nor should it permit voir dire questions which go beyond the basic purposes of the jury selection process. This, in effect, is the meaning and objective of Rule 5.02 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice: Rule 5.02 VOIR DIRE In the voir dire examination of jurors, the attorney shall direct to the entire venire questions only on matters not inquired into by the court. Individual jurors may be examined only when proper to inquire as to answers given or for other good cause allowed by the court. No hypothetical questions requiring any juror to pledge a particular verdict will be asked. Beginning with Phenizee v. State, supra , this Court has repeatedly admonished and condemned attempts in voir dire questioning to exact a promise or commitment from jurors on how they will decide a particular case. Williams v. State, No. DP-56 (Miss. Oct. 7, 1987); Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 938 (Miss. 1986); West v. State, 485 So.2d 681 (Miss. 1985); Murphy, supra ; See also Baxter v. State, 254 Ga. 538, 331 S.E.2d 561 (1985). Bowens v. State, 116 Ga. App. 577, 158 S.E.2d 420 (1967); Palmer v. State, 532 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1975); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 7 (1965). [2] Indeed, in Stringer, supra, we reversed because of an accumulation of several errors, including the error of permitting the prosecution over objection to ask questions seeking a commitment from the jurors. Questions such as these are never necessary to accomplish the basic purpose of securing fair and impartial juries. Defense counsel in this case had no right to particularize what the facts would show and then ask the jurors if they would return a verdict of not guilty. The circuit judge properly sustained the State's objections to such questions. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. As to Part I: PRATHER, GRIFFIN, ZUCCARO and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., dissent by separate written opinion. As to Part II: ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents without written opinion.