Opinion ID: 1124385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Howard: Court of Appeal Decision

Text: In the present case, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Colado, supra, 32 Cal. App.4th 260, and concluded that the trial court had discretion to reduce sentence in a suspended-execution probation-revocation situation. The court acknowledged that rule 435(b)(2) appears to require the trial court, on revoking probation, to impose the exact sentence previously imposed. But the court deemed that rule inconsistent with Karaman 's conclusion that the trial court's jurisdiction continues after sentence is pronounced and entered in the court minutes, until the time the court issues and delivers a commitment document to prison authorities. The Court of Appeal also relied on Karaman 's holding (see Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 352) that strict application of the minute-entry rule would be inconsistent with the court's authority under section 1170, subdivision (d), to recall a sentence within 120 days of its execution. The court below assumed that The `practical' considerations underlying the Karaman holding are also present in every case in which it is finally determined that the defendant will actually be delivered to prison authorities to begin serving sentence but, for some `reason rationally related to lawful sentencing' ( Dix v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 456), the trial court desires to reduce the punishment of a defendant whose sentence has been previously imposed. In such cases, it would be absurd to require the court to delay resentencing until the actual commencement of the defendant's prison term, with the concomitant waste of time and expense. ( Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 352.) The better rule  as stated in Karaman  is that the trial court has the power `at any time prior to execution' to impose a new, lesser sentence within the range of lawful punishment authorized by statute for the offense of which the defendant was convicted. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Karaman was not a probation revocation case, but the court assumed that we intended to apply our holding to those cases. The court also recognized that Karaman was dealing with a sentence that was only briefly stayed and was not yet final on appeal. In the Court of Appeal's view, however, Karaman controlled the present case despite the substantial passage of time following imposition of sentence because the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over defendant probationer in matters of sentencing. The court relied in part on section 1203.3, subdivision (a), a provision giving the trial court authority to modify or change the order suspending imposition or execution of sentence.