Opinion ID: 2087829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Initiation of Contact with Police and Defendant's Waiver of his Rights

Text: In determining the admissibility of a confession by a defendant who initially has invoked one or more of his or her Miranda [2] rights, two factors must be considered: (1) whether the defendant initiated conversation with the authorities; and (2) whether, considering the totality of the circumstances,defendant waived his or her right to counsel and to remain silent. State v. Lionberg, 533 A.2d 1172, 1177 (R.I.1987). In this case defendant not only initiated contact with police, but he also expressly waived his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent immediately before he confessed to the crimes in question. The evidence offered at the suppression hearing in this case amply supports the conclusion that defendant initiated the meeting with the police during which he confessed to the crimes in question. Even though a defendant initially invokes his or her constitutional rights, this circumstance does not preclude the defendant from subsequently changing his or her mind and offering to speak with the police, in which event any resulting statement may be considered voluntary. See id. Such an initiation of contact with the authorities must indicate a willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about the crimes at issue. Id. (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 412 (1983)). In Lionberg, the defendant was arrested in Kansas and initially invoked his right to counsel after being informed of his Miranda rights, at which point the police officers ceased further questioning. Id. at 1176. The police thereafter placed the defendant in a cell, and some time later he asked one of the officers when he was going to be extradited to Rhode Island. Id. When the officer responded that he was not sure the defendant would be extradited because he did not know why the defendant was wanted in Rhode Island, the defendant responded, [T]hey want me because I killed that old lady and stole her car. That's murder one and grand theft auto. Id. This Court held that although a criminal suspect initially may invoke his or her rights and then terminate police questioning, such an event does not preclude the trial court from admitting into evidence the suspect's later confession after the suspect has changed his or her mind, has initiated police contact, and has engaged in conduct that effectively waives his or her rights to obtain legal counsel and remain silent. Id. The only witnesses who testified at the suppression hearing in the present case were Officer Philip Martin (Officer Martin) and Detective George Arruda (Det. Arruda). Their uncontradicted testimony was that defendant, through his wife, initiated contact with them while defendant was being detained at the ACI. Detective Arruda had initially advised defendant of his rights in the early morning hours of March 28, 1992, several hours after defendant's arrest. At that time, defendant did not wish to give the police a statement. However, when testifying about the courthouse meeting with defendant on March 31, Det. Arruda described the post-arrest events that indicated that defendant had changed his mind: Q And who initiated the meeting between you and this Defendant on the 31st? A His [defendant's] wife. Q And you were not prepared to take a statement that morning, is that correct? A Not at all, sir. I never expected to speak to that gentleman. Q And only because of his wife having contacted the Little Compton Police did you go and meet with him, is that correct? A That's correct, sir. Likewise, Officer Martin testified that a member of his department received a phone call on March 29, 1992, from defendant's wife, Gail Brouillard. Officer Martin further testified that as a result of Gail Brouillard's call, he and Det. Arruda met with defendant because [defendant] wanted to speak with us concerning the robberies that had occurred. Such an invitation from defendant's wife certainly indicated to the police that defendant possessed a willingness to discuss the crimes in question. Lionberg, 533 A.2d at 1177. Furthermore, defendant admits that he instructed his wife to call the police while he was incarcerated at the ACI because he wanted to talk with them. Once defendant initiated this contact, the police responded appropriately by meeting again with defendant and taking his statement. See State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1151 (R.I.1980) (holding that a defendant who initially requested anattorney and later waived his rights by informing police he wanted to give a statement knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right[s]). In this case, without any police prompting or encouragement, much less coercion, defendant simply changed his mind after initially invoking his Miranda rights. Nevertheless, defendant contends that his waiver of rights was involuntary because of his medical condition at the time he met with police at the Newport courthouse. He claims that he was suffering from alcohol withdrawal symptoms that impaired his capacity for rational functioning. For the reasons set forth below, however, we disagree with defendant's contention that his confession should have been suppressed. First, defendant's impaired mental state, if it was impaired, was irrelevant to the question of the voluntariness of his confession because it was not induced by the police or by any other state actor. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that a confession of a mentally ill defendant induced by God's command to confess or commit suicide, while involuntary in the broader sense of the term, was not involuntary within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment when the coercion alleged was not due to impermissible police conduct). In this case defendant's alleged alcohol-withdrawal symptoms were a product of his own tippling tendencies and not of any coercive state action. Moreover, defendant's mere detention in the prison hospital ward pending his arraignment did not amount to improper state action or police coercion. Hence, defendant's alcohol-related problems do not constitute grounds for claiming that his waiver of rights and subsequent confession were involuntary. Second, the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant's waiver of his rights also belies his assertion of police coercion. At the suppression hearing, Officer Martin testified that when he andDet. Arruda finally met with defendant on March 31, defendant appeared not to have any problems out of the ordinary. He seemed to be, the best way to put it, would be normal as far as I could tell. According to Det. Arruda, defendant was coherent. He well knew what he was doing. These statements were uncontradicted because they came from the only two witnesses who testified during the motion to suppress defendant's confession. The defendant's medical records from the ACI constituted the only evidence defendant introduced at the suppression hearing to support his contention of mental incapacity. Although defendant introduced these records in an attempt to show that he was unable to confess voluntarily because of his medical condition on that date, the medical records do not support that conclusion. The notes from March 31, 1992, the day defendant confessed, indicate that defendant was not experiencing any tremors; that he was alert, oriented, and had slept well; and that, in his own words, he [felt] o.k. The notes for that day also indicated that the medication he had been receiving was withheld because of his court appearance. Thus, as in State v. Page, 709 A.2d 1042, 1044 (R.I.1998), defendant's assertion [that he was incapacitated due to alcohol withdrawal symptoms] was belied by the undisputed fact that he was coherent and responsive during the police interview. It is also undisputed that defendant received his Miranda rights for a second time on March 31, just before giving his statement. Officer Martin testified as follows: I asked [defendant] if he wished to speak with us. He said that he did. At that point I read him his Miranda rights which are clearly printed on a Miranda sheet. I read each right to him and I also let him read them himself. I then asked him if he understood all of the rights. He said that he did. I asked him if he would sign the rights form and initial it, and he did. Officer Martin further testified that after receiving and waiving his rights, defendant indicated that he wished to give a statement. The defendant never requested an attorney and he never asked for the questioning to cease. After acknowledging that he was advised of his rights and wished to waive them, defendant responded to this question: Joseph, in your own words, can you tell the police what you and Kenneth Brouillard have been doing recently regarding robberies in Tiverton, Little Compton, Rhode Island and Westport areas? The defendant then proceeded to provide the police with a single-spaced statement, which was about five pages long confessing to the crimes. Because the trial justice was waiting to arraign defendant formally, the officers finally interrupted him, which prompted defendant to complain that he was being rushed and that he had many more details to share. Thus, it is abundantly clear to us that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, defendant was eager to talk to the police and did so after knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the trial justice's finding that knowingly, understandingly and without any coercion this individual waived his rights.