Opinion ID: 663465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: imprisonment for federal sentencing purposeses

Text: 19 With respect to his federal sentence, Taylor finally claims that the lower court erred in determining that his state sentence imposed a period of imprisonment that could be legitimately incorporated into the computation of his federal sentence under Guidelines Sec. 4A1.1(b). Specifically, Taylor argues that his incarceration in the Jefferson County Jail cannot be considered imprisonment under the Guidelines for two reasons: 1) a defendant is imprisoned only if he is confined in a state institution; and 2) he was allowed to leave the prison during the period of his incarceration to go to work and attend counseling, thus making his sentence an alternative sentence and not a sentence of imprisonment. Both of these assertions are without merit. 20 Guidelines Sec. 4A1.1(b) provides that a trial court should add two points to a defendant's criminal history category for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not [previously] counted. The Guidelines further announce that [t]he term 'sentence of imprisonment' means a sentence of incarceration and refers to the maximum sentence imposed. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(b). 21 Taylor cites to no authority that instructs us to ignore the plain language of the Guidelines and hold that a sentence of imprisonment may only be served in a state institution. Nothing in the language of the Guidelines gives any justification for limiting the definition to confinement in state institutions alone; and the appellant has provided no valid reason for our doing so. 22 Taylor's assertion that his state sentence should not be counted under Sec. 4A1.1(b) because it was an alternative sentence is similarly without merit. While sentences of confinement to halfway houses or boot camp-type facilities are arguably not imprisonment for purposes of federal sentencing, Taylor was not sentenced to such an institution. Taylor was sentenced to jail. The fact that he was allowed to leave the jail to go to work and attend counselling does not transform his prison sentence into anything other than what it is. Accordingly, the validity of arguments opposing the consideration of alternative sentences in the calculation of a defendant's criminal history category is not at issue here. 23 Taylor was sentenced to five years probation. A condition of this probation was that he spend six months in the Jefferson County Jail. We cannot find that the lower court erred at sentencing by considering this state sentence, as it was a prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days that had not been previously counted. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1(b).