Opinion ID: 2816582
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extending Confinement

Text: For example, the district court properly rejected the first claim (extension of confinement to increase profits). As the district court explained, this claim was conclusory. In the complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts—as opposed to mere conclusions—to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See S.E.C. v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014). This plausibility standard governs even though Mr. Ruppert has prosecuted the case without an attorney. See Hall v. Witteman, 584 F.3d 859, 863-64 (10th Cir. 2009). - 4 - In the complaint, Mr. Ruppert alleges that  the New Mexico Department of Corrections and the company operating his facility were “using crime to produce a commodity to feed the private prison sector” and  “in order to maintain the financial structure,” prison officials processed “a high rate of disciplinary misconduct reports to deprive [inmates] of rehabilitation” and enhance sentences. R. at 19. These allegations do not state a plausible claim involving harm to Mr. Ruppert. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, and there is nothing in the complaint to suggest extension of his confinement because of the company’s “financial structure,” “feed[ing]” of the private prison industry, or processing of misconduct reports. b. Denial of the Opportunity to Participate in Rehabilitative Programs The district court also properly rejected Mr. Ruppert’s claim involving his inability to participate in rehabilitative programs. These programs, in themselves, do not implicate constitutional concerns. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Walford v. INS ex rel. Colo., 48 F.3d 477, 478 (10th Cir. 1995). It is true that constitutionally protected interests may sometimes arise from state law. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). But state law can create a protected interest only by imposing “substantive limitations on official discretion.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). - 5 - Mr. Ruppert relies on N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-8-3, which addresses prison industries. This law states: “The purpose of the Corrections Industries Act is to enhance rehabilitation, education and vocational skills of inmates through productive involvement in enterprises and public works of benefit to state agencies and local public bodies and to minimize inmate idleness.” As the district court explained, this language does not limit discretion in the administration of prison programs. Thus, the right to due process is not violated by loss of opportunities to participate in rehabilitative programs. c. Denial of Legal Materials We also reject the claim involving Mr. Ruppert’s alleged inability to access legal materials. The Supreme Court clarified in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996), that prisoners lack “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance,” but do enjoy a right of access to the courts. To plead a violation of this right, a prisoner must allege facts indicating an “actual injury” involving a nonfrivolous legal claim about a conviction or the conditions of confinement. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010). 2 The prisoner’s allegations of actual injury 2 Mr. Ruppert contends that no actual injury need be shown when a “core” means of access is involved, citing Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, (continued) - 6 - must go beyond mere conclusions. See Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 959 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that conclusory allegations of injury will not suffice). We agree with the district court that Mr. Ruppert’s conclusory allegations of injury, which were not tied to the adverse disposition of a particular legal claim, do not satisfy the prejudice requirement in Lewis. Mr. Ruppert insists that because he could not use legal reference material, he did not know how to supplement his pleadings in a related federal case after prison officials filed a Martinez report. Actually, he was able to prepare a supplemental pleading in that case. The district court simply explained that Mr. Ruppert did not need to file anything until prison officials filed a Martinez report. This incident does not suggest an impediment to Mr. Ruppert’s prosecution of his federal suit. 3 1171 (9th Cir. 1989). But Sands was overruled by Lewis v. Casey. See Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 On occasion, Mr. Ruppert attempts to shift the focus of his claim regarding legal materials, arguing that he is complaining about the inability to obtain legal knowledge rather than a lack of court access. This argument is not tenable under Lewis, which requires an actual injury because inmates lack “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Mr. Ruppert relies on (1) 28 U.S.C. § 414, which deals with the transmittal of materials between government officers and their successors, and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 451, which includes various definitions. These provisions lack any bearing on the claims. (continued) - 7 - 3. Additional Claim: Validity of a Term for Life Imprisonment In the complaint, Mr. Ruppert also attacks the validity of his sentence to life imprisonment. According to Mr. Ruppert, New Mexico lacks statutory authority to keep individuals in prison for life after they have spent 30 years in confinement. The district court apparently overlooked this claim in the dismissal order. 4 But the oversight is harmless because this claim would have been invalid under New Mexico law. In New Mexico, life imprisonment was an available sentence for Mr. Ruppert’s murder conviction. When Mr. Ruppert was sentenced, state law designated the crime as a capital felony, creating two possible sentences: the death penalty or life imprisonment. See § 31-18-14(A). 5 New Mexico Mr. Ruppert also alleges restrictions on inmate-to-inmate legal assistance. These allegations are insufficient for two reasons. First, the allegations do not relate to an actual injury. Second, inmates lack a First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to other inmates; such assistance may be restricted by reasonable regulation when (as here) the prison offers alternative means of court access. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 & n.3 (2001); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 950 (10th Cir. 1990). 4 The oversight was understandable, for Mr. Ruppert’s filings were numerous and difficult to understand. The district court did a laudable job of interpreting the complaint. 5 Unless otherwise specified, we have used the New Mexico statutory references as they existed in 1983, when the crime was committed. Mr. Ruppert sometimes refers to laws repealed and replaced prior to 1983. Those versions of the law did not apply to Mr. Ruppert’s case. But the statutory differences are immaterial for our purposes. - 8 - later abolished the death penalty, stating that if someone had been sentenced to death, the sentence would automatically change to life imprisonment. See id. § 31-18-14(B). But that amendment did not affect Mr. Ruppert, for his sentence had always been life imprisonment. That sentence was expressly authorized by New Mexico law both before and after the state’s abolition of the death penalty. Mr. Ruppert also argues that New Mexico law does not adequately define life sentences, which lack determinate minimum and maximum terms of years. It is true that life sentences in New Mexico are not framed by such terms. See Compton v. Lytle, 81 P.3d 39, 43 (N.M. 2003) (stating that life sentences lack a determinate maximum term, refusing to read specification of 30-year parole-eligibility date as creating a determinate minimum term). Rather, such sentences are framed by reference to ● the requirement of “thirty years of imprisonment before the possibility of parole [not release],” 6 and ● the directive that, absent parole, imprisonment continues “until the death of the prisoner.” 7 But that does not leave a life sentence “undefined,” for the meaning of a life sentence is clear: imprisonment for the rest of the prisoner’s life (unless the inmate obtains parole after imprisonment for at least 30 years). 6 State v. Trujillo, 42 P.3d 814, 820 (N.M. 2002). 7 State v. Juan, 242 P.3d 314, 327 (N.M. 2010). - 9 - See State v. Trujillo, 42 P.3d 814, 820 (N.M. 2002) (stating that life imprisonment has been interpreted in New Mexico to mean imprisonment for 30 years before the possibility of parole or good time credits); see also State v. Juan, 242 P.3d 314, 327 (N.M. 2010) (stating that the length of a life sentence cannot be determined until the inmate dies). Mr. Ruppert does not cite any authority suggesting that this understanding of state law renders his life sentence invalid as a matter of state law or suspect as a matter of federal law. In sum, Mr. Ruppert has not demonstrated any error in the dismissal order in Appeal No. 14-2030.