Opinion ID: 76559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: New Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: 46 Although the 1999 affidavits bolster Lynn's witness sequestration claim, it is certainly arguable that the government's alleged complicity — in the witnesses' tailoring their testimony and testifying to facts learned from other witnesses or government agents — creates a new and separate claim of prosecutorial misconduct. To the extent Lynn raises a new claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that the district court properly denied this claim as well. 24 47 As outlined above, Eyster and Marshall raised a similar witness sequestration claim in their direct appeals that asserted that witnesses Sheehy and Purvis discussed their testimony with other witnesses and tailored their testimony to conform with each other's. Eyster and Marshall's claim, in effect, was that Sheehy and Purvis perjured themselves by testifying to events not within their personal knowledge but learned from other prosecution witnesses. 48 In his 1999 motion to amend his § 2255 motion, Lynn claims that Sheehy and Purvis not only learned information from other witnesses but that the two men were fed information from government agents. Lynn claimed that he was able to learn of the government's involvement in this perjurious testimony only after additional interviews with Sheehy and Purvis. Lynn asserts that this newly discovered evidence of the government's involvement in the perjurious testimony constitutes a new claim of prosecutorial misconduct that was not available on direct appeal. 49 As discussed above, there are five requirements that Lynn must satisfy in order to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) the evidence must be discovered after trial; (2) the failure of the defendant to discover the evidence must not be due to a lack of diligence; (3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence must be material to issues before the court; and (5) the evidence must be such that a new trial would probably produce a different result. Id. The government contends that Lynn has not satisfied the five requirements and that Lynn has not shown cause for failing to raise this prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal. For example, the government challenges Lynn's due diligence, the second requirement, and asserts that Lynn has not explained: (1) why the information was not tendered until ten years after trial; (2) whether he took steps to investigate that matter during the ten-year period between trial and the tendering of the new affidavits; (3) how the government prevented the information from being available on direct appeal; and (4) the discrepancy ... between the first and second set of [Purvis and Sheehy] affidavits.... There is also a substantial question whether Lynn has satisfied the fifth requirement that his new evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a different result. 50 Even assuming arguendo that Lynn's newly discovered evidence satisfied all five requirements and that Lynn has established cause for his procedural default, Lynn's new claim of prosecutorial misconduct still fails on the merits because the 1999 affidavits contain nothing more than conclusory allegations. In articulating its concerns with the 1999 affidavits, the district court correctly pointed out that the affidavits do not name any government agents or investigators and do not give details or a single example of what testimony or statements were tailored or conformed to be consistent or were based on information fed from government agents. Furthermore, neither 1999 affidavit identified any statement that was made without the witnesses' personal knowledge. Because the 1999 affidavits submitted by Lynn amount to nothing more than mere conclusory allegations, the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues and correctly denied Lynn's § 2255 motion. Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir.1991) (A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing ... when his claims are merely conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics.... (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 899 (11th Cir.1990) ( en banc ) (The petitioner will not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing when his claims are merely `conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics' .... (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977))); United States v. Jones, 614 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir.1980) (When claims for habeas relief are based on unsupported generalizations, a hearing is not required. (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Scott v. United States, 598 F.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir.1979) (Contrary to [the movant's] assertions, ... the right to a hearing is not established simply by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. When claims for habeas relief are based on unsupported generalizations, a hearing is not required.).