Opinion ID: 1777258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to avoid mistake

Text: Under the authority of Stringfellow, the movant pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) must make an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances to justify the failure to avoid mistake or inadvertence. 451 So.2d at 221. Ignorance, incompetence, or carelessness will not suffice. Id. Undeniably counsel for the movant was aware on July 25, 1986, that the Order imposed joint and several liability. She admitted this fact. Nonetheless, she approved the order as to form prior to the chancellor affixing his signature. Counsel subsequently stated that she signed the Order as to form only because she did not know at that time that [Simmons] had any intention of executing on that judgment during the pendency of an appeal. Notwithstanding the fact that Rule 59(e), Miss.R.Civ.P. would have been the proper avenue to alter or amend the judgment as to Newman and Accredited Surety, and further notwithstanding that Newman and Accredited Surety have not offered sufficient explanation for failing to avoid the mistake or seek its correction sooner in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b)(2), we are of the opinion that the action of the chancellor was not an abuse of his discretion. We must keep in mind the equitable purpose of Rule 60 as well as the spirit by which procedural rules must be interpreted. The primary purpose of our Rules of Civil Procedure is to secure the just ... determination of every action and promote the ends of justice. Miss.R.Civ.P. 1, Comment. Against this backdrop, the chancellor acted within his discretion when he sustained the Motion of Newman and Accredited Surety for relief from the July 25, 1986 judgment. No amount of procedural gymnastics can alter the fact that Ruth Newman d/b/a A-Bonding Company acted solely as agent for Accredited Surety, and consequently, was not jointly and severally liable on the Ne Exeat Bond. It would appear that since Newman perfected an appeal in her own behalf, that the joint and several liability issue can be argued on that appeal. However, that appeal is from the July 25, 1986 judgment. Therefore, the record on appeal would reflect only those matters occurring on or before July 25, 1986. As a result, Newman and Accredited Surety would have no proof in the record on the issue of joint and several liability since that issue was presented to the lower court for the first time on September 10, 1986. To deny them relief from judgment on that issue would be, as the chancellor stated, to act inequitably with regard to the surety company which signed the bond. The Rule 60 motion was made within a reasonable time. However, the motion was argued on the basis of Rule 60(b)(2), and on that basis the movant failed to establish any exceptional circumstances justifying 60(b)(2) relief. However, it is well established in our jurisprudence that the right result reached for the wrong reason will not be disturbed on appeal. The action of the chancellor can be upheld under Rule 60(b)(6) which provides for relief from judgment for any other reason justifying relief ... We have previously taken note that 60(b)(6) stands as a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case when relief is not warranted by the preceding clauses, or when it is uncertain that one or more of the preceding clauses afford relief. Bryant, Inc. v. Walters, 493 So.2d 933, 939 (Miss. 1986). The chancellor simply granted relief without assigning a particular prong of Rule 60(b) as his basis. Notwithstanding that, the chancellor reached the correct decision, and therefore, should be and is affirmed. Fultz v. Doss by Doss, 507 So.2d 891 (Miss. 1987); Allgood v. Bradford, 473 So.2d 402, 411 (Miss. 1985). The chancellor did not transcend the boundaries of discretion, and Simmons' cross-assignment is without merit.