Opinion ID: 778366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Evidentiary Hearing on Extension of the Judgment

Text: 20 The terms of the Judgment govern the timeliness of motions to extend the district court's jurisdiction. The proper scope of the evidentiary hearing on extension is therefore a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 530 (9th Cir.1995). However, we must also `give deference to the district court's interpretation[of the Judgment] based on the court's extensive oversight of the decree from the commencement of the litigation to the current appeal.' Id. (quoting Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 934 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir.1991)). That principle applies here, where the same judge has overseen this litigation since 1994. 21 Under the terms of the Judgment, the district court's continuing jurisdiction was to expire on January 12, 1999, unless extended in the manner established by the Judgment itself: 22 This Court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Stipulation and Judgment for four years following the date of its entry by this Court. Except as provided below, at the conclusion of this period the Court's jurisdiction shall terminate, this Stipulation and Judgment shall be vacated, and this case shall be dismissed. 23 As noted, the date of entry of the Judgment was January 12, 1995. The procedure for extending the court's jurisdiction was specific: 24 1. By no later than three years following the date of entry of this Stipulation and Judgment, Plaintiffs shall serve upon Defendants written notice of their intent to seek an extension; and 25 2. In the written notice described in paragraph (1) above, Plaintiffs shall identify with particularity the areas in which they allege Defendants have not substantially complied with the conditions of this Stipulation and Judgment[.] 26 Thus, Plaintiffs had only until January 12, 1998, to provide Defendants with written notice of their intent to file a motion to extend jurisdiction. 27 The district court did not err when it ruled that Plaintiffs complied with that notice procedure only as to some of the claims that they now seek to raise. Although Plaintiffs did give timely and sufficient notice of their intent to seek an extension of the mental health and dental provisions of the Judgment, they failed to do so with respect to the provisions governing other medical services at the Prison. 28 Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to Defendants on December 16, 1997, which read in part: [P]laintiffs plan to ask the court to extend jurisdiction as allowed under the decree. We believe that defendants are not yet in compliance with the mental health and dental portions of the decree and that additional time is required to monitor those areas. (Emphasis added.) The following day, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a second letter: 29 In the letter I sent to you yesterday I inadvertently omitted the words at least before describing the areas of non-compliance on which plaintiffs will base an extension of jurisdiction motion. What I intended to say is that plaintiffs believe that defendants are not in compliance with at least the dental and mental health portions of the Hallett decree. 30 We are presently reviewing the documents you recently sent, talking to clients, and may engage expert(s) on the question of compliance in all areas of the decree. In January we plan to provide you with more specific notice of plaintiffs' areas of concern, which we now know will include, at a minimum, dental and mental health. And we anticipate at this time seeking an extension of court jurisdiction over the decree. 31 Contrary to the assurance in the second letter, Plaintiffs did not provide Defendants with more specific notice of areas of concern until after the period for timely notice had expired. 32 The Judgment required Plaintiffs to identify with particularity the alleged deficiencies in Defendants' compliance. As the district court explained, the words at least were simply not sufficient to put defendants on notice with particularity of any areas in addition to mental health and dental care in which plaintiffs were alleging that defendants had not complied with the conditions of the 1995 Stipulation and Judgment. Neither did the bare promise of more detail in the future suffice to substitute for actual timely detail. 33 Plaintiffs offer four reasons why the notice sufficed with respect to all areas of health care covered by the Judgment, and not just mental health and dental care. None persuades us. 34 First, they argue that Defendants had constructive notice of the additional areas of alleged deficiency because of adverse reports from the professional consultants who had been monitoring compliance with the Judgment and letters of complaint from prisoners. The district court found, however, that the experts had noted with satisfaction the significant progress that had been made in all areas that they had identified as needing improvement. Those findings are not clearly erroneous. Because the experts' reports pointed to improvements, not just to deficiencies, the reports did not provide constructive notice even if, in theory, they could have done so under the terms of the Judgment. The prisoners' complaint letters are insufficient because complaints from individual prisoners are not the same thing as notice that the class as a whole intends to seek extension of the Judgment based on certain grounds. 35 Second, Plaintiffs argue that they did not have to provide more detailed notice because Defendants themselves had moved for termination of the entire Judgment under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b). That theory is unavailing because of the terms of the Judgment itself. To the extent that Plaintiffs did not timely move for an extension of the medical services provisions, those parts of the Judgment expired by their own terms. The district court did not need to rule on Defendants' motion to terminate these already expired provisions. See Taylor v. United States, 181 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no ... consent decree left to be terminated). 36 Third, Plaintiffs contend that more specific notice was unnecessary because the provisions of the Judgment pertaining to mental health, dental, and other medical services are closely related. In a general sense that may be so, but it is readily possible to separate health care services by discipline. Indeed, the fact that Plaintiffs themselves isolated mental health and dental services in the two communications that they sent to Defendants refutes their own argument. 37 Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants were not prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. Assuming that prejudice is relevant under the terms of the Judgment, Plaintiffs' failure to specify perceived deficiencies outside the areas of mental health and dental care deprived Defendants of the opportunity to correct those deficiencies within the four-year period during which the Judgment was in effect. By requiring that notice be given one year before the expiration of the Judgment, the Judgment clearly contemplated that Defendants should have such an opportunity. 38 In summary, we hold that the district court did not err in limiting the scope of the hearing to evidence regarding mental health and dental services at the Prison. 39