Opinion ID: 3034224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: M&M III’s Use of Patent Law Principles

Text: IPC devotes much of its argument to asserting that M&M III improperly weighed the public interest underlying patents instead of one underlying certification marks. While M&M III analogized the public interest underlying certification marks to that underlying patents, it went on to analyze certification 5 IPC mentions in passing that the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to challenge the validity of certification marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064. It offers no further analysis, however, and one is left to wonder what resources, if any, the FTC devotes to policing the behavior of certification mark holders. A search of Westlaw’s “ALLFEDS” database returns 8 cases containing the terms “certification mark” and “Federal Trade Commission.” None of the 8 cases involves an FTC challenge to a certification mark. Similarly, none of the 33 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decisions containing the term “certification mark” involves challenges by the FTC. IDAHO POTATO COMMISSION v. G&T TERMINAL 13933 mark policies rooted in the Lanham Act’s certification mark provisions. See 335 F.3d at 138-39. We thus reject IPC’s contention that M&M III improperly considered the patent law policy goals articulated in Lear instead of those underlying certification mark law. IPC also contends that M&M III should not have applied the Lear balancing test at all. It acknowledges, however, that other courts have balanced the public interests in trademark cases involving no-challenge clauses. See M&M III, 335 F.3d at 136 (citing MWS Wire Indus., 797 F.2d at 803; VISA Int’l Serv. Assn. v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1473 (9th Cir. 1986); T & T Mfg., 587 F.2d at 538; Beer Nuts, 477 F.2d at 329). Because IPC offers no persuasive reason for why it is improper to use Lear balancing in Lanham Act cases, we adopt M&M III’s approach.