Opinion ID: 867387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 7 We invited the parties to address whether this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal is exclusive or concurrent with that of the court of appeals. When jurisdiction is concurrent and an appeal is initially filed with this Court, our long-established practice has been to transfer the case to the court of appeals. Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 382, 825 P.2d 1, 3 (1992); Ariz. Podiatry Ass'n v. Dir. of Ins., 101 Ariz. 544, 549, 422 P.2d 108, 113 (1966). In election matters, when there is concurrent appellate jurisdiction, [i]n the ordinary course, appeals . . . should be to the court of appeals. If special circumstances exist that require that this Court hear the appeal directly, a motion for transfer may be filed under ARCAP 19. Hancock v. Bisnar, 212 Ariz. 344, 346 n. 3 ¶ 7, 132 P.3d 283, 285 n. 3 (2006). ¶ 8 Section 19-121.03(B) provides that in actions challenging the certification of signatures for a ballot measure [e]ither party may appeal to the supreme court within ten calendar days after judgment. Another statute, however, more generally affords appellate jurisdiction to the court of appeals in all actions and proceedings originating in or permitted by law to be appealed from the superior court, except criminal actions involving crimes for which a sentence of death has actually been imposed. A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003); see also id. § 12-2101(B) (2003) (allowing appeals to court of appeals from final judgments entered in superior court). Thus, the issue is whether § 19-121.03(B) gives this Court jurisdiction exclusive of that which otherwise exists in the court of appeals under its general jurisdictional statutes. ¶ 9 We dealt with a similar issue in Perini. There we held that this Court and the court of appeals have concurrent jurisdiction over referendum appeals under A.R.S. § 19-122(C). 170 Ariz. at 382, 825 P.2d at 3. In actions challenging the legal sufficiency of ballot measures, § 19-122(C), which has not been amended since 1992, provides that [e]ither party may appeal to the supreme court within ten days after judgment. We held that this language, which predated the creation of the court of appeals in 1964, did not give this Court exclusive jurisdiction, [i]n light of the broad appellate jurisdiction vested in the court of appeals. Perini, 170 Ariz. at 382, 825 P.2d at 3 (citing Ariz. Podiatry, 101 Ariz. at 547, 422 P.2d at 111). Absent any expressed intent to give this Court exclusive jurisdiction, we did not interpret the statutes vesting appellate jurisdiction in this Court as limiting the jurisdiction that A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101 separately vest in the court of appeals. See id. ¶ 10 This case involves A.R.S. § 19-121.03(B), which addresses challenges to the certification of ballot measure petition signatures. Much like the statute involved in Perini, it provides that [e]ither party may appeal [the superior court's decision] to the supreme court within ten calendar days after judgment. Id. Section 19-121.03(B), however, was enacted after the legislature created the court of appeals. [1] Nonetheless, as in Perini, the constitutional and statutory grants of jurisdiction indicate that this Court and the court of appeals have concurrent appellate jurisdiction. See 170 Ariz. at 382, 825 P.2d at 3; see also Ariz. Podiatry, 101 Ariz. at 547, 422 P.2d at 111. ¶ 11 As we explained in Arizona Podiatry, [i]t has long been a general rule of law that a grant of jurisdiction to one court does not, in the absence of an express provision to that effect, imply that the jurisdiction is to be exclusively vested in that court. 101 Ariz. at 548, 422 P.2d at 112. Thus, unless the legislature has made clear that our jurisdiction is exclusive, our appellate jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the court of appeals. ¶ 12 There are very few instances in which this Court has been granted exclusive jurisdiction. The first is over causes between counties. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(2) (providing for original and exclusive jurisdiction in this Court over such matters). We also have exclusive jurisdiction over death penalty appeals, as A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) specifically exempts those cases from the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Finally, in the context of candidate nomination petition challenges, the legislature has specifically provided that the superior court's decision shall be appealable only to the supreme court. A.R.S. § 16-351(A) (2006) (emphasis added). Because § 19-121.03(B) does not similarly provide an express grant of exclusive jurisdiction to this Court, we do not infer one. See Ariz. Podiatry, 101 Ariz. at 548, 422 P.2d at 112. ¶ 13 Consequently, we hold that we have concurrent jurisdiction with the court of appeals over appeals taken under § 19-121.03(B). We further reiterate the rule set forth in Perini that [a]lthough we have concurrent jurisdiction with the court of appeals[,] . . . a party should file any future action [pursuant to § 19-121.03(B) ] in the court of appeals. 170 Ariz. at 382, 825 P.2d at 3. ¶ 14 Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, we will exercise our jurisdiction to decide this appeal. Each side urges us to do so, and we have not previously held that our jurisdiction over this type of appeal is concurrent rather than exclusive. It is also important that the parties obtain a timely determination whether the proposed initiative will be on the ballot for the next city election. Finally, this case presents an issue of general importance because at least one other city allows the supplementation of petition signatures after a determination of insufficiency. See Tucson City Code § 12-59.