Opinion ID: 2584741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Effect of Miller-El II and Snyder on Our Comparative Juror Analysis Practice

Text: Neither Miller-El II nor Snyder changed the Batson standard. An advocate's jury selection decisions remain a discretionary prerogative, but race-based decisions are not constitutionally tolerable. ( Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 237-240.) Both court and counsel bear responsibility for creating a record that allows for meaningful review. (See id. at pp. 251-252; Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1209].) Review is deferential to the factual findings of the trial court, but that review remains a meaningful one. As the high court described it, `[d]eference does not by definition preclude relief.' ( Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 240.) When reasons are given for the exercise of challenges, an advocate must stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives. ( Id. at p. 252.) The plausibility of those reasons will be reviewed, but not reweighed, in light of the entire record. (See id. at pp. 265-266.) (4) In reviewing the plausibility of the prosecutors' reasons for their strikes, the Miller-El II court considered various kinds of evidence, including a comparison of panelists' responses. It stated: If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson 's third step. ( Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 241, italics added.) Miller-El II quoted Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 133 [147 L.Ed.2d 105, 120 S.Ct. 2097], an employment case, in which the high court stated that [p]roof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. ( Id. at p. 147; see Miller-El II, at p. 241.) As the Batson court observed, In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake `a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.' [Citation.] ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 93.) In Snyder, the high court recognized the potentially misleading nature of a retrospective comparative juror analysis performed on a cold record, but nevertheless relied on this evidence as bearing on the question of the prosecutor's credibility. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. ___ - ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1211-1212].) (5) Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. 231 and Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. 1203] demonstrate that comparative juror analysis is but one form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, on the issue of intentional discrimination. These cases stand for the proposition that, as to claims of error at Wheeler/Batson' s third stage, our former practice of declining to engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal unduly restricts review based on the entire record. [15] As the high court noted in Snyder, In Miller-El v. Dretke , the Court made it clear that in considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted. ( Snyder, at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1208], italics added.) Thus, evidence of comparative juror analysis must be considered in the trial court and even for the first time on appeal if relied upon by the defendant and the record is adequate to permit the urged comparisons. Nevertheless, like the Snyder court, we are mindful that comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record has inherent limitations. (See Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1211].) Experienced trial lawyers recognize what has been borne out by common experience over the centuries. There is more to human communication than mere linguistic content. On appellate review, a voir dire answer sits on a page of transcript. In the trial court, however, advocates and trial judges watch and listen as the answer is delivered. Myriad subtle nuances may shape it, including attitude, attention, interest, body language, facial expression and eye contact. Even an inflection in the voice can make a difference in the meaning. The sentence, `She never said she missed him,' is susceptible of six different meanings, depending on which word is emphasized. ( Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight ) (Ct.App. 1988) 108 N.M. 124 [767 P.2d 363, 366].) [T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record. ( Reynolds v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 156-157 [25 L.Ed. 244].) For example, two panelists may each state he or she was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and pled guilty. In response to questions by the prosecutor, each may state he or she harbors no ill feeling against the police as a result of the incident and will not hold that experience against the prosecution. One panelist may deliver that answer in a way that conveys embarrassment, remorse and authenticity of response. The other panelist may answer with a tone of voice, gesture, expression or hesitation that conveys strong negative feelings about the experience and belies the truthfulness of the answer. A transcript will show that the panelists gave similar answers; it cannot convey the different ways in which those answers were given. Yet those differences may legitimately impact the prosecutor's decision to strike or retain the prospective juror. When a comparative juror analysis is undertaken for the first time on appeal, the prosecutor is never given the opportunity to explain the differences he perceived in jurors who seemingly gave similar answers. Moreover, the selection of a jury is a fluid process, with challenges for cause and peremptory strikes continually changing the composition of the jury before it is finally empanelled. As we noted in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194 [255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]: [T]he particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks may, and often does, change as certain jurors are removed or seated in the jury box. It may be acceptable, for example, to have one juror with a particular point of view but unacceptable to have more than one with that view. If the panel as seated appears to contain a sufficient number of jurors who appear strong-willed and favorable to a lawyer's position, the lawyer might be satisfied with a jury that includes one or more passive or timid appearing jurors. However, if one or more of the supposed favorable or strong jurors is excused either for cause or [by] peremptory challenge and the replacement jurors appear to be passive or timid types, it would not be unusual or unreasonable for the lawyer to peremptorily challenge one of these apparently less favorable jurors even though other similar types remain. These same considerations apply when considering the age, education, training, employment, prior jury service, and experience of the prospective jurors. ( Id. at p. 1220.) Ultimately, an advocate picking a jury is selecting a committee to decide the case. In addition to each panelist's individual characteristics, the group must be able to work together with courtesy and dispassion to reach a complex result with substantial consequences. An advocate is entitled to consider a panelist's willingness to consider competing views, openness to different opinions and experiences, and acceptance of responsibility for making weighty decisions. Once empanelled, the jury wields tremendous power over the outcome of the case. Even the opportunity to question each panelist individually for the few minutes allotted provides only a glimpse into the panelist's thoughts, decisionmaking ability, experiences, and willingness to discharge the panelist's important duty. Each juror becomes, to a certain degree, a risk taken. Voir dire is a process of risk assessment. As the Supreme Court observed, potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters. ( Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 247, fn. 6.) Two panelists might give a similar answer on a given point. Yet the risk posed by one panelist might be offset by other answers, behavior, attitudes or experiences that make one juror, on balance, more or less desirable. These realities, and the complexity of human nature, make a formulaic comparison of isolated responses an exceptionally poor medium to overturn a trial court's factual finding. (6) For these reasons, comparative juror evidence is most effectively considered in the trial court where the defendant can make an inclusive record, where the prosecutor can respond to the alleged similarities, and where the trial court can evaluate those arguments based on what it has seen and heard. Contrary to assertions by amici curiae, advocates can object to disparate treatment of similarly situated jurors at trial without having reviewed voir dire transcripts. Wheeler/Batson motions are routinely argued based on the voir dire notes and memory of the prosecution, defense, and trial court. Comparative juror analysis is no different. Defendants who wait until appeal to argue comparative juror analysis must be mindful that such evidence will be considered in view of the deference accorded the trial court's ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent. (See Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 365.) Additionally, appellate review is necessarily circumscribed. The reviewing court need not consider responses by stricken panelists or seated jurors other than those identified by the defendant in the claim of disparate treatment. Further, the trial court's finding is reviewed on the record as it stands at the time the Wheeler/Batson ruling is made. If the defendant believes that subsequent events should be considered by the trial court, a renewed objection is required to permit appellate consideration of these subsequent developments. The inherent limitations of comparative juror analysis can be tempered by creating an inclusive record. Miller-El II and Snyder demonstrate that an adequate record is critical for meaningful review. Counsel and the trial court bear responsibility for creating such a record. Miller-El II admonishes prosecutors faced with a Wheeler/Batson claim to provide as complete an explanation for their peremptory challenge as possible. The high court stated: It is true that peremptories are often the subjects of instinct, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, [476 U.S.] at 106 ..., (Marshall, J., concurring), and it can sometimes be hard to say what the reason is. But when illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives. A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as false. ( Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 252.) The high court cautioned that efforts by a trial or reviewing court to substitute a reason will not satisfy the prosecutor's burden of stating a racially neutral explanation. ( Ibid. ) For this reason, trial courts must give advocates the opportunity to inquire of panelists and make their record. If the trial court truncates the time available or otherwise overly limits voir dire, unfair conclusions might be drawn based on the advocate's perceived failure to follow up or ask sufficient questions. Undue limitations on jury selection also can deprive advocates of the information they need to make informed decisions rather than rely on less demonstrable intuition. [16] (7) As to trial judges, the court in Miller-El II emphasized that it is the trial court's duty to assess the plausibility of the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking a potential juror in light of all evidence with a bearing on it. ( Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 252.) The Snyder court stated that the trial court bears a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims, for the trial court must evaluate the demeanor of the prosecutor in determining the credibility of proffered explanations, and the demeanor of the panelist when that factor is a basis for the challenge. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1208].) It should be discernable from the record that (1) the trial court considered the prosecutor's reasons for the peremptory challenges at issue and found them to be race-neutral; (2) those reasons were consistent with the court's observations of what occurred, in terms of the panelist's statements as well as any pertinent nonverbal behavior; and (3) the court made a credibility finding that the prosecutor was truthful in giving race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges. As to the second point, the court may not have observed every gesture, expression or interaction relied upon by the prosecutor. The judge has a different vantage point, and may have, for example, been looking at another panelist or making a note when the described behavior occurred. But the court must be satisfied that the specifics offered by the prosecutor are consistent with the answers it heard and the overall behavior of the panelist. The record must reflect the trial court's determination on this point (see Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1209]), which may be encompassed within the court's general conclusion that it considered the reasons proffered by the prosecution and found them credible. (8) In terms of appellate review, Miller-El II emphasized that the question of purposeful discrimination continues to involve an examination of all relevant circumstances. Comparative juror analysis was only one part of the Supreme Court's exhaustive review in an egregious case. The court did not rule that comparative juror analysis, standing alone, would be sufficient to overturn a trial court's factual finding. Instead the court emphasized: The case for discrimination goes beyond these [juror] comparisons to include broader patterns of practice during the jury selection. ( Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 253.) Viewing the evidence in its totality, the court stated: It blinks reality to deny that the State struck Fields and Warren ... because they were black. The strikes ... occurred during a selection infected by shuffling and disparate questioning that race explains better than any race-neutral reason advanced by the State. The State's pretextual positions confirm Miller-El's claim, and the prosecutors' own notes proclaim that the Sparling Manual's emphasis on race was on their minds when they considered every potential juror. ( Id. at p. 266.) Likewise, in Snyder, comparative juror analysis was an additional form of evidence considered by the Supreme Court in its review of the record. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1211].) The Supreme Court reiterated that reviewing courts must accord significant deference to the factual findings on the question of discriminatory intent. ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. ___ - ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1207-1208]; Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 240; Miller-El I, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 339-340.) When an advocate's peremptory strike is challenged, the trial court must determine whether the advocate allowed his or her calculus to be infected by racial bias and then lied to the court in an attempt to get away with it. As a reviewing court, we presume the advocate uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner, and defer to the trial court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282.) It is the trial court which is best able to place jurors' answers in context and draw meaning from all circumstances, including matters not discernable from the cold record. As we emphasized in People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th 1302: `[T]he trial judge's unique perspective of voir dire enables the judge to have first-hand knowledge and observation of critical events. [Citation.] The trial judge personally witnesses the totality of circumstances that comprises the factual inquiry, including the jurors' demeanor and tone of voice as they answer questions and counsel's demeanor and tone of voice in posing the questions. [Citation.] The trial judge is able to observe a juror's attention span, alertness, and interest in the proceedings and thus will have a sense of whether the prosecutor's challenge can be readily explained by a legitimate reason.... [¶] The appellate court, on the other hand, must judge the existence of a prima facie case from a cold record. An appellate court can read a transcript of the voir dire, but it is not privy to the unspoken atmosphere of the trial courtthe nuance, demeanor, body language, expression and gestures of the various players. [Citation.]' ( Id. at pp. 1320-1321, quoting Tolbert v. Page (9th Cir. 1999) 182 F.3d 677, 683-684.) [17] Under our deferential standard, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusions. ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 341-342.) Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value. ( People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738].) Comparative juror analysis is a form of circumstantial evidence. (See Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 241.) The law has long recognized that particular care must be taken when relying on circumstantial evidence. For example, jurors in criminal cases are instructed that before they can rely on circumstantial evidence to find a defendant guilty, they must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you must accept the one that points to innocence. (Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Instns. (2006) CALCRIM No. 224.) This principle has been part of our jurisprudence since at least 1945. (See People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 174-176 [163 P.2d 8], overruled on other grounds in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666].) The rationale behind the rule is that, unlike direct evidence, circumstantial evidence does not directly prove the fact in question. Instead, circumstantial evidence may support a logical conclusion that the disputed fact is true. But information may often be open to more than one reasonable deduction. Thus, care must be taken not to accept one reasonable interpretation to the exclusion of other reasonable ones. With regard to an appellate court's review of circumstantial evidence, we have observed: `If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.' ( People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933 [251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996].) This same principle of appellate restraint applies in reviewing the circumstantial evidence supporting the trial court's factual findings in a Wheeler/Batson holding.