Opinion ID: 2365392
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Ott's Objectively Deficient Representation Prejudiced Mr. Ott

Text: ¶ 40 We also hold that Mr. Ott's objectively deficient representation prejudiced him. A defendant is prejudiced by counsel's actions only if the result of the proceedings would have been different absent the claimed deficiency. State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, ¶ 9, 165 P.3d 1185. To show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's errors `actually had an adverse effect on the defense' and that `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's . . . errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' State v. Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 34, ¶ 20, 2007 WL 1095559 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). `A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ¶ 56, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Because' [s]ome errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated trivial effect,' in determining the effect of the error, we `consider the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury.' State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶ 86, 152 P.3d 321 (alterations in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052). ¶ 41 In this case, the record discloses that there is a reasonable probability that but for the admission of the victim impact evidence that addressed Mr. Ott's character and the victims' opinions of the appropriate sentence, Mr. Ott would have received a more favorable sentence. The admission of the evidence sufficiently undermines our confidence in Mr. Ott's sentence. ¶ 42 In State v. Kell , we analyzed the prejudicial effect of victim impact evidence. 2002 UT 106, ¶¶ 52-54, 61 P.3d 1019. [4] Mr. Kell, already incarcerated for murder, was charged with the aggravated murder of Mr. Blackmon, another inmate, and Mr. Kell was convicted and sentenced to death. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. At the guilt phase of the trial, the victim's family testified about the pain, devastation, and anguish the loss of the victim had caused them. Id. ¶ 52 n. 15. We concluded that the victim impact evidence in Mr. Kell's case was not prejudicial. In making that determination, we emphasized that the family's victim impact testimony was [not] particularly inflammatory, moderate in tone, descriptive of the family's loss and mourning but not militant or angry, and made no effort to pressure the jury to impose the death penalty. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. Specifically, a statement prepared by the victim's family and read to the court stated: Concerning the penalty phase for this individual, the family has an abiding conviction that man's laws were written for the unjust and for evildoers. Therefore whatever punishment is meted out by this Court or this jury, whether it be the death penalty or some other sentence, my family will accept that ruling. Id. ¶ 52 n. 15. ¶ 43 In concluding that the admission of the victim impact evidence did not prejudice the defendant, and therefore did not undermine our confidence in the outcome, we found it important to note that the victims' statements did not ask for the death penalty, but left the decision up to the jury in remarkably neutral terms. Id. ¶ 53. In dicta, we also suggested that our inquiry might have been different had the victim impact evidence been introduced in the penalty phase of the trial. Id. ¶ 54 (Absent [the presence of the victim impact evidence] in the penalty phase, we see no possibility that the jury's verdict would have been different.). ¶ 44 The content of victim impact testimony in Mr. Ott's case is dramatically more inflammatory than the evidence admitted in Kell. Here, the testimony was angry in tone, inflammatory in content and contained messages that Mr. Ott was beyond rehabilitation. Additionally, the victim impact evidence was admitted during the penalty phase of the trial and comprised a large portion of the total evidence presented. The existence of these factors, especially considering that Mr. Ott's counsel never uttered a word objecting to the admission of the evidence, undermines our confidence in the outcome. ¶ 45 The State argues mitigation evidence presented by Mr. Ott's counsel ameliorates any prejudicial or inflammatory effect the victim impact evidence had. Our caselaw addressing prejudice under Strickland suggests that deficient counsel that leads to the admission of inflammatory statements is not prejudicial if other mitigating statements or evidence is presented. For instance, in State v. Dunn we held that a defendant was not prejudiced by his counsels' failure to request a jury instruction concerning uncorroborated witness testimony because the county attorney had testified that the witness's testimony was given in exchange for a reduction in his own charge, the witness admitted on the stand to be a pathological liar, and the judge instructed the jury that they may disregard evidence they deemed incredible. 850 P.2d 1201, 1226-28 (Utah 1993). The ameliorating statements mitigated any prejudicial effect the absence of an uncorroborated witness jury instruction may have had on the outcome of Mr. Dunn's trial. Id. ¶ 46 Mr. Ott's case does not present an instance where the mitigating evidence presented negates the prejudicial effect of the unlawful victim impact evidence. The single question before the jury was whether Mr. Ott should receive a sentence of life with parole or life without parole. Implicit in a sentence of life with the possibility of parole is a belief by the jury that Mr. Ott could one day be rehabilitated and re-enter society. Underlying the jury's decision is the large amount of evidence addressing Mr. Ott's mental health, including any mood or personality disorders. ¶ 47 Dr. Egli, the prison psychiatrist who treated Mr. Ott, testified that Mr. Ott was responding positively to medication. Mr. Ott's counsel also presented evidence of Mr. Ott's tumultuous childhood, war experience, and numerous psychiatric hospital stays leading up to the night of the crime wherein he may have been improperly medicated. While persuasive, this evidence does not, in our judgment, neutralize in any meaningful way the prejudicial effect that the characterization of Mr. Ott as a murdering terrorist made by people who directly encountered Mr. Ott on the night of the crime. That he was improving while medicated in prison did nothing to mitigate the numerous statements made that, once released, Mr. Ott would become uncontrollable. In considering `the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury,' Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶ 86, 152 P.3d 321 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052), we must conclude that counsels' failure to object to the inadmissible evidence undermines confidence in the outcome and therefore prejudiced Mr. Ott. ¶ 48 We therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to afford Mr. Ott a new sentencing hearing.