Opinion ID: 1974989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Pretrial Motion to Sever

Text: On March 31, 1978 Anderson's counsel filed a motion to sever his trial from that of Sabatino pursuant to Rule 14, M.R.Crim.P. [4] The motion for severance stated that only the co-defendants are in a position to know who committed the crime for which they are charged. It further alleged that, from what occurred at a pretrial bail hearing, Sabatino's trial strategy would be to place all blame for the murder on Anderson. Asserting that prejudice from a joint trial was inherently probable, given the possibility of antagonistic defenses, Anderson's counsel prayed that Anderson and Sabatino be tried separately. On April 12, 1978 a hearing was held on the motion. The presiding Justice heard the legal arguments of counsel but received no evidence. The sole ground advanced by Anderson's counsel in support of his motion was the possibility of antagonistic defenses. Although Anderson's argument was based on testimony adduced at a prior bail hearing, the transcript of that hearing was not presented to the Justice hearing the pretrial severance motion until May 1, 1978, eleven days after the presiding Justice denied the severance motion. At no time during the trial did Anderson renew his motion for severance, nor did the trial Justice deem it necessary to grant a severance, sua sponte, to protect the rights of either defendant. [5] We have noted on prior occasions that joint trials are generally favored in the interest of conserving judicial resources, avoiding duplicative trials, minimizing the public expenditure of funds and promptly bringing the accused to trial. See United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 529 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 327, 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971), quoted in State v. Rich, Me., 395 A.2d 1123, 1128 (1978). On the other hand, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront and cross examine all witnesses against him, and this right, secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, may be jeopardized where a co-defendant's extrajudicial statements incriminating the defendant are admitted in evidence, and the declarant does not take the stand at the joint trial. See Parker v. Randolph,  U.S. ____, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In State v. Wing, Me., 294 A.2d 418 (1972), we set out in detail the procedure to be followed, where one defendant demands a severance on the ground that a co-defendant's extrajudicial statements will be admitted at trial, to avoid endangering the defendant's Sixth-Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights. The Wing court approved of the practice proposed by the American Bar Association's Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial § 2.3. [6] No detailed pretrial examination of the substance of co-defendant Sabatino's extrajudicial statements was conducted in this case. The failure to conduct this inquiry, however, is attributable to the failure of Anderson's defense counsel to indicate clearly in his March 31, 1978 severance motion that Sabatino's incriminating extrajudicial statements were at the heart of Anderson's contention that he would suffer prejudice from a joint trial. The mere mention of antagonistic defenses was not sufficient to alert the motion Justice that a potential Bruton problem existed. Thus, we find no error in the motion Justice's denial of Anderson's pretrial severance motion. The record clearly shows, however, that the trial Justice was well aware of the Bruton problem and that he discussed it thoroughly with all counsel before the trial began. The prosecuting attorney explained that he intended to use extrajudicial statements made by both defendants and that each in their respective statements implicated the other. The State intended to avoid any Bruton problem, so he maintained, by demonstrating that each co-defendant affirmed and adopted the extrajudicial statements of the other, thus making them admissible against both defendants, as the admissions of one, and the adoptive admissions of the other. [7] Where the statements of a co-defendant are adopted by the other defendant, the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause is no longer operative, since the defendant's constitutional privilege is to enjoy the right to be confronted with, i. e. to cross-examine, the witnesses against him, not himself. In assessing the trial Justice's decision not to order a severance of the joint trial, we must address the issue, whether or not the trial Justice properly concluded that the extrajudicial statements of co-defendant Sabatino were adopted and affirmed by defendant Anderson.