Opinion ID: 1483191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Before examining the merit issues in any of these appeals, a matter of jurisdiction must be determined. That issue arises from the situation now to be outlined. Judge Davis had conducted these reorganization proceedings from their inception. A Plan had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission and, with accompanying transcript, had been transmitted to the Court. Objections to the Plan were filed and evidence introduced in court. The evidence had been closed and arguments of counsel were being made. After all counsel (except for the Debtor and for Mr. Meyer) had presented arguments in chief, Judge Davis died. Thereafter, Judge Moore took over these reorganization proceedings. Judge Moore called a conference of all counsel to discuss the method of further proceeding in connection with the Plan. The original positions of counsel were as follows: Mr. Meyer urged that he wished and was entitled to a new trial before the court; the other counsel denied that a new trial was a matter of right but was, at most, a matter of discretion in the Court; most of these other counsel urged that the proceedings should not be reopened for additional evidence but should be taken by the Court on the existing record after full reargument by all parties; two of those counsel suggested, not very strongly, that the Court might reopen the case for evidence additional to that presented before Judge Davis. After much argument by all counsel, the Court took the view that a new trial was not a matter of right but that it was discretionary as to reopening the case. Mr. Meyer was the only party desiring to introduce further evidence although other counsel (while opposing reopening) thought that if the case was to be reopened for Mr. Meyer, similar opportunity should be given other parties. Later, it was suggested by counsel that Judge Moore set the case for argument and then have the advantage of the record and all the arguments in determining whether the case should be reopened for further testimony. The comment of the Court thereon was: I assume when I hear the arguments I might know a little bit more about this matter. This is thrown in my lap without any opportunity to know very much about it. Finally, suggestions (in rough form of an order) were made: (1) That the record before Judge Davis be submitted; (2) that oral arguments be heard on a specified date; (3) that during or at the conclusion of such arguments the Court would entertain motions by any party respecting additional testimony or otherwise pertaining to the perfection of the record on the hearing of said plan. It was emphasized by the Court that Mr. Meyer or any party could, under the last suggestion, present any motions to reopen the matter for further evidence. An order was made along the above line (April 23, 1943), including provisions that the record on the Plan of Reorganization as certified to this Court by the Interstate Commerce Commission and on the record as heretofore made before Judge Charles B. Davis be taken as submitted to this Court as of this date and that during or at the conclusion of said oral argument on May 31, 1943, the Court will entertain any motion or motions, if any be made by any party, respecting the taking of additional testimony or otherwise pertaining to the completion of the record on said Plan. From this order, Mr. Meyer took an appeal which he later dismissed. Under the above order, arguments were made and no motion was filed by any party in connection with the arguments. Later, the Court entered an order approving the Plan. Based on the foregoing outlined situation, Mr. Meyer presents the issue that a new trial on the Plan and objections thereto was a matter of right upon the death of Judge Davis and, therefore, Judge Moore had no power to deny such to a party demanding that right. Various parties contend here that Mr. Meyer waived his right, if any, to object to the procedure followed by Judge Moore; and that, absent such waiver, no right to new trial existed but the matter was one of discretion. As to waiver. The parties rely upon any or all of the following: (1) Expressions of Mr. Meyer indicating acquiescence in the procedure adopted by the Court; (2) voluntary dismissal of appeal taken by him from the order of April 23, 1943; (3) participation in the arguments and filing brief at the hearing under that order. There were expressions by Mr. Meyer during the preliminary conference before Judge Moore which, taken alone, might be construed as approaching acquiescence in the procedure adopted; yet, throughout the conference, he made clear his preference for a new trial and, after the Court had announced the lines along which an order would be made, Mr. Chubb stated we are adhering to the position, Your Honor, that we are entitled as a matter of right to a new trial or a rehearing of this matter and Mr. Meyer stated I understand under the law a new trial is necessary and the Court has no power to continue this proceeding. In the light of these statements it is clear that there was no acquiescence by Mr. Meyer in advance of the entry of the order prescribing the procedure but quite to the contrary. This opposition is further evidenced, after the entry of order, by his appeal therefrom. Whether this order was of such finality as to be appealable is, at least, doubtful but we need not resolve that matter since that appeal was later dismissed. Whether the order, when made, was appealable or not, it is clear that it could be challenged in an appeal from the order approving the Plan and it is so challenged on the present appeal. Standing alone, the dismissal of the appeal from the order is not, in this situation, enough to be a waiver of the validity of the order. Nor is participation, by argument and brief, in the hearing under the order sufficient to constitute waiver even though Mr. Meyer did not therein reiterate his right to new trial. There is no solid ground for contending that any party or the Court has acted in the belief that Mr. Meyer, by any or all of these things, was waiving his objection to the action of the Court in entering or in acting under the order defining this method of proceeding. The facts do not support the contention of waiver. Right to new trial. Theoretically and actually, a Court is a continuing and continous institution. Life & Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Wilson's Heirs, 8 Pet. 291, 303, 8 L.Ed. 949, and see Hume v. Bowie, 148 U.S. 245, 254, 13 S.Ct. 582, 37 L.Ed. 438. Normally, matters therein flow uninterruptedly onward to finality. A change in personnel of judges during the course of litigation presents a problem of interruption. Such changes have occurred at different stages of suits and with varying results as to whether the successor judge could go forward or should retrace some of the ground travelled by his predecessor. [4] An examination of the reasoning underlying the opinions and producing their results is convincing that the flow of a suit is interrupted by changes in personality of judges only where justice  for which courts exist  seems so to require. Unless justice demands something else, a different judge takes up litigation where the former judge left off. Where this is not done, it is, broadly, because of something in the past course of the litigation which cannot be found in the status and record existing when the new judge takes hold and which it is necessary for him, in all fairness to the parties, to know. Where it is necessary for him to gain this absent information, he must set back the litigation to the place where he can obtain it. How and by whom is the existence of such necessity to be determined? In some instances, the law speaks through some affirmative legal requirement. Malony v. Adsit, 175 U.S. 281, 20 S.Ct. 115, 44 L.Ed. 163, changed by 31 Stat. 270, 28 U.S.C.A. § 776. In other instances, the successor judge has power, through the exercise of a reviewable judicial discretion, to determine on the situation in which he finds himself. [5] The present situation is similar to cases ruling the power of a successor judge to pass upon a motion for new trial and that power has existed in United States courts since Life & Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Wilson's Heirs, 8 Pet. 291, 303, 8 L.Ed. 949. [6] This situation is, therefore, within that class where the successor judge has such discretion. Hence, this issue resolves itself into whether Judge Moore abused his discretion. That depends upon what he did and the situation in this litigation when he acted. The situation was that all evidence before the Commission had been stenographically reported and Judge Davis had only the paper record as transmitted from the Commission. As to this, Judge Moore was in the same position as was Judge Davis. This brings the matter down to the record on the hearing before Judge Davis. All that occurred before Judge Davis was transcribed and before Judge Moore. The only difference was that Judge Davis had seen the witnesses testify while Judge Moore had not. In short, all that Judge Moore lacked was the opportunity to estimate the credibility of these witnesses from their appearance and demeanor on the stand. There was considerable oral testimony before Judge Davis but even more documentary. Such matters as bore upon credibility arose principally from claimed differences between oral testimony and prior written statements of a witness. Such differences speak from their face and little aid in judging credibility is gained by viewing the witness. For the most part, the principal witnesses were the same as before the Commission. While Judge Davis ruled that the evidence before him would be confined to matters subsequent to the hearing before the Commission, considerable earlier documentary evidence prior to that time was received. Considering this situation, we cannot say that Judge Moore abused his discretion in proceeding upon the record as it came to him.