Opinion ID: 63364
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Extrinsic Acts Evidence

Text: The district court permitted the admission of testimony of a similar cocaine transaction that had occurred in December 2005 or January 2006. Codefendant Arias stated that on that occasion, he drove from New York to Houston in a rented van and was picked up by middleman Hernandez, who brought him to Osorio’s apartment. Percel and Vasquez were already there with fifteen kilograms of cocaine. Arias testified that he had not met Osorio prior to the transaction. The three purchasers packaged the thirty-three pounds of cocaine to be transported from Osorio’s apartment to Boston. Osorio was present in the apartment, but watched television during the sixty to ninety minutes that his co-defendants were wrapping the cocaine and moving it from Osorio’s 4 No. 07-20464 apartment to Arias’s rented minivan. Arias did not testify that Osorio arranged this prior drug transaction, participated in it, or knew that it took place in his apartment. There was no evidence regarding the size of Osorio’s apartment. In permitting Arias’s testimony, the district court applied the two-pronged test set forth in United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The court held that the testimony was admissible as probative of Osorio’s “intent, motive, opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident,” and determined that a limiting instruction would alleviate any unfair prejudice. Defense counsel raised a number of objections, which were overruled. At the conclusion of Arias’s testimony on direct examination, the district court provided a limiting instruction, informing the jury that it may only use the prior conduct to establish, “first, whether the Defendant had the state of mind or intent necessary to commit the crime charged in the indictment or, second, whether the Defendant had a motive or the opportunity to commit the acts charged in the indictment or, third, whether the Defendant acted according to a plan or in preparation for commission of a crime or, fourth, whether the Defendant committed the act for which he is on trial by accident or mistake.” The district court also provided a similar limiting instruction, adopted from the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, in its jury charge. Osorio contends that the admission of this extrinsic evidence constitutes reversible error. We review a district court’s admission of extrinsic acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) with a heightened abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Jackson, 339 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2003).3 “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly 3 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in relevant part, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .” 5 No. 07-20464 erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United States v. Insaulgarat, 378 F.3d 456, 464 (5th Cir. 2004). Even if the district court abused its discretion, we do not reverse if the error was harmless. Id. In evaluating the admission of extrinsic acts evidence, we apply the twopronged test for 404(b) evidence set forth in Beechum, 582 F.3d at 911. First, the extrinsic evidence must be “relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character.” Id. Second, the evidence must have probative value that is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice and must otherwise be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Id. We have repeatedly held, and Osorio acknowledges, that a prior drug transaction is relevant to intent in a drug conspiracy case. See, e.g., United States v. Pompa, 434 F.3d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 2005) (“In a drug-trafficking case, the issue of intent is always material.”). However, Osorio argues that the evidence should have been barred as irrelevant because there was insufficient proof that he was an active participant in the prior drug transaction. “In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). Although a preliminary judicial finding under Rule 104(a) that the extrinsic act occurred is not required, relevancy does command the proponent of the 404(b) testimony to tender sufficient proof to permit a reasonable jury to find the existence of the conduct by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 688-90; United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1269 (5th Cir. 1991). The standard of proof of such preliminary facts is “relatively light.” Anderson, 933 F.2d at 1269; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lira, 936 F.2d 184, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1991) (The Government must “at least provide some evidence that the defendant committed the prior bad act.”). 6 No. 07-20464 Certainly, Arias’s testimony did not provide dispositive evidence that Osorio had brokered the prior drug deal. The sum of the extrinsic evidence was that in late December or early January of 2005, Osorio was present during the sixty to ninety minutes when four of his co-defendants (including a total stranger) packaged and removed thirty-three pounds of cocaine from his apartment. Although this is a close question, we do not find that the trial judge abused her discretion in determining that a reasonable jury could conclude that, more likely than not, Osorio committed the prior bad act. The jury is permitted to consider the totality of evidence and apply common sense. Here, the jury could have concluded that an individual is usually aware of, and involved in, a sixty to ninety minute transaction occurring in their own home, which included a total stranger, that results in the packaging and removal of thirty-three pounds of cocaine. When considered in light of DeLeon’s testimony that Osorio took a largely passive role when he brokered the later narcotics deal from his home and the other evidence that Osorio’s role in the conspiracy was as a broker between the sellers and out-of-town buyers, the connection between Osorio and the earlier transaction does not appear so weak as to bar a reasonable jury from concluding that, more likely than not, he committed the prior bad act. Accordingly, we find that the extrinsic evidence was sufficiently established and relevant to the issue of Osorio’s knowledge and intent. Although relevant, extrinsic acts evidence must nonetheless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. The Beechum court explained, [T]he more closely the extrinsic offense resembles the charged offense, the greater the prejudice to the defendant. The likelihood that the jury will convict the defendant because he is the kind of person who commits this particular type of crime or because he was not punished for the extrinsic offense increases with the increasing likeness of the offenses. 7 No. 07-20464 Id. at 915 n.20. Generally, probative value is determined by considering whether the defendant’s unlawful intent is established by other, non-extrinsic evidence. Id. at 914-15. “Thus, if the Government has a strong case on the intent issue, the extrinsic offense may add little and consequently will be excluded more readily.” Id. at 914. On the other hand, probative value is increased where little independent evidence exists to otherwise establish intent. Id.; United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The probative value is augmented if there is slight direct evidence.”). Little evidence existed to tie Osorio to the charged conspiracy independent of his co-conspirators’ testimony, which was challenged as suspect. Indeed, Osorio’s defense was that there was no direct evidence of his guilt, because he arrived at Escobar’s residence after the cocaine had been packaged, spent his time in the house talking and watching television, and was not near the van other than when he got into and out of it. That his visiting co-defendants (including a complete stranger) were alleged to have conducted a lengthy transaction which resulted in the packaging and transport of over thirty pounds of cocaine from his apartment a few months earlier is probative of his participation in the conspiracy and would support the testimony of DeLeon, a cooperating defendant. Certainly, the extrinsic evidence was probative as to the role of each conspirator, the modus operandi of the conspiracy, the introduction of Arias into the conspiracy, and the intent of the two individuals standing trial with Osorio, both of whom actively participated in the earlier transaction. As to prejudice, the district court provided a detailed limiting instruction to the jury after the receipt of evidence of the extrinsic acts, and then again in its charge to the jury. This court has repeatedly held that such a limiting instruction is sufficient to cure any impropriety in the admission of prior bad acts evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 6 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 1993) 8 No. 07-20464 (stating that “[t]he danger of unfair prejudice to [the defendant] was minimized by the district court’s careful instructions to the jury, which made it clear that the prior convictions could not be considered unless and until the jury first found that [the defendant] had participated in the charged acts, and, even then, could be considered only for the purpose of determining whether [the defendant] had the state of mind or intent necessary to commit the crime . . .”), overruled on other grounds by Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Indeed, in United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1174 (5th Cir. 1986), this court observed that the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting extrinsic evidence need not be reached, because the trial judge provided a proper limiting instruction adopted from the Fifth Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instructions.