Opinion ID: 465035
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Union Member's Interest

Text: 34 By contrast, the interest of the employee or union member is qualitatively enhanced in a Title I case. It is an interest created by specific statute, recognizing a national policy. Under the hybrid claim there are no such specifically identified rights. In some ways the contrast resembles that between a plaintiff with a federal civil rights claim and a plaintiff with a contract claim. 35 The legislative history gives emphasis to this observation. The Congressional debate on the LMRDA includes repeated references to Title I as a bill of rights akin to that in our federal constitution, and the concern expressed was for individuals in relation to their government. Representative Griffin, who coauthored one version of the LMRDA, gave the following description of the bill of rights provision: 36 These basic guarantees are hardly new or novel--they are essential and fundamental rights which every American citizen is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. 37 As the senior Senator from Arkansas has said: 38 'There is no reason why a union man should be required to leave the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States at the door when he goes into a union meeting.'  39 105 Cong.Rec. 14,193 (1959). 40 See also 105 Cong.Rec. 5,806 (1959); id. at 6,478; H.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959); cf. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 2564, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 ( 'Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision ... in order to promote union democracy.' ). 6 41 We thus draw from this history the sense that claims under Title I's bill of rights provisions were viewed primarily as civil rights matters rather than as labor matters. It was not coincidence that Title I was labelled a bill of rights, and we believe it therefore is more logical to derive a statute of limitations for pure Title I claims from a civil rights statute than from an unfair labor practices statute. 42 The legislative history also suggests the inapplicability of section 10(b)'s limitations period for a different reason. Section 411(a)(4) of Title I protects the union members' rights to sue their union under the LMRDA or any other statute, but requires that they exhaust internal procedures for up to four months before filing suit. When Senator McClellan first introduced the bill of rights on the floor of the Senate, the internal exhaustion requirement was three months. 105 Cong.Rec. 5,810 (1959). It was changed to six months before the bill left the Senate. Id. at 9,108. In the House, legislators focused on how the six month provision would bar suits under the NLRA because of that statute's six month limitations period. See id.; id. at 13,880; id. at A8510. The problem was that union members who exhausted remedies for the required six months would find their NLRA claims time-barred at the end of that period. There is no indication that the members of Congress felt a similar concern about union members losing suits under the LMRDA. While this history is not equivalent to an express intent that the limitations period for the LMRDA be greater than six months, we do view it as some support for the argument that Congress expected that LMRDA plaintiffs would have more time to bring their suits. 7 43 Given the importance of the rights assured by the LMRDA, the concern voiced by the Court in DelCostello over the problems faced by an employee in bringing a hybrid suit becomes more serious. 462 U.S. at 166, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. The Court pointed to the difficulties of evaluating the adequacy of union representation, retaining counsel and investigating hybrid cases. And yet, it may well be that the general run of hybrid cases may be brought with less difficulty than LMRDA claims. They may be more a part of the law of the shop and familiar to the employee. Filing an unfair labor practice claim is, without doubt, more easily accomplished. A union member need only file a one-page charge form with the Board. 44 Whether or not LMRDA claims or unearthing the facts to support them are more complex or difficult than hybrid or unfair labor practice claims, there are other differences weighing in favor of a longer period for bringing labor-related civil rights claims. In most cases a Title I plaintiff will be a union member who, unlike many unfair labor practice claimants, has not lost his job but wishes to remain a member. To decide to sue one's co-workers and superiors who may have much to do with one's future fate even if one is successful gives pause. Such a decision is not lightly taken; the pressures on such a plaintiff to collect facts, retain an attorney and reflect suggest the inappropriateness of a six month period. Moreover, the objective sought in the typical hybrid case is a purely personal victory in the form of restoration of job, pay, or promotion. In contrast, the objective of LMRDA cases is to increase union democracy, which is a benefit to all union members and the public at large. We therefore conclude that the interests of the union member with a free standing LMRDA claim are such as to tilt against applying the six month section 10(b) limitation. 45