Opinion ID: 1194959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Montrose Case

Text: DOC requests that we find the Montrose court's order to be invalid because the court cannot disregard a sentencing statute or `interfere with the executive ... in the performance of its statutory duties'. DOC Response to Order to Show Cause at 4-5 (quoting Kort v. Hufnagel, 729 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo.1986)). Separation of powers operates to prohibit the judiciary from preempting an executive agency from exercising powers properly within its own sphere. Hufnagel, 729 P.2d at 373. The DOC is part of the executive branch and the executive's function is to see that the laws are faithfully executed. State v. Pena, 911 P.2d 48, 55 (Colo.1996). In carrying out that function, the DOC is required by law to take custody of state-sentenced prisoners, see id., including those prisoners whose parole terms have been revoked. See § 17-22.5-303(7), 6 C.R.S. (1997) (if parole is revoked, board of parole shall order the return of the offender to the institution in which he was originally received). This court has held that `for the limited purpose of taking custody of prisoners as directed by the mittimus', DOC officials are `officers of the court'. Pena, 911 P.2d at 56 (quoting People v. Lockhart, 699 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Colo.1985)). When a prisoner's sentence has been served, or when a sentence has been declared completed by a final and effective court ruling, the DOC must obey a judicial order for discharge that is not subject to appeal. While this court has acknowledged that a trial court may lack the authority to supervise an executive agency, we have also noted that where an executive officer fails to comply with a final order of a trial court, such court may take appropriate steps to enforce its order. Pena, 911 P.2d at 56. Without this power, the role of the courts as a separate and independent branch of government would be meaningless. For example, if the courts could not enforce the sentences they impose by directing the DOC to take custody of prisoners, the courts' power and duty to order punishment of convicted criminals would be ineffectual. See id. In Colorado, sentencing is predominantly a matter of discretion with the trial court. People v. District Court, 673 P.2d 991, 995 (Colo.1983). Here, upon review of the facts of its case, the Montrose court declared the sentence it imposed to have been completed in accordance with a plea agreement made by the state for a total of two years in prison. Its order clearly states that Bullard's sentence is hereby deemed completed including any parole period. (Emphasis added.) The Montrose court had the authority to review the circumstances of Bullard's plea agreement and sentence in case number 95CR31. See, e.g., St. James v. People, 948 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Colo.1997) (plea agreement is subject to enforcement by trial court); People v. McCormick, 859 P.2d 846, 858 (Colo.1993) (determination of breach of plea agreement is question for trial court). The state chose not to appeal the court's order. Thus, the order for release as to case number 95CR31 is final and effective. In the absence of an appeal, we do not reach the propriety of the district court's application of the Sandoval case to Bullard's plea agreement. See People v. Sandoval, 809 P.2d 1058 (Colo.App.1990) (where mandatory parole term added time to sentence defendant bargained for, court should have informed defendant before accepting plea, and remedy was to reduce sentence to conform with maximum that defendant bargained for). The Montrose court construed its sentence as imposing no incarceration and two years of mandatory parole in order to avoid a sentence which illegally ignored the statutory parole period. While the parole period in section 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(A) is mandatory, the minimum and maximum sentences are presumptive ranges. § 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(A), 6 C.R.S. (1997).