Opinion ID: 1959339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: murray v. allen

Text: This Court, on several occasions, has been asked to reconsider its definition of accrue as set forth in Murray. See Capron v. Romeyn, 137 Vt. 553, 409 A.2d 565 (1979); South Burlington School District v. Goodrich, 135 Vt. 601, 382 A.2d 220 (1977). South Burlington School District v. Goodrich, supra , involved an action in negligence in which the statute of limitations set forth in 12 V.S.A. § 511 was applicable. [4] In that case, we were asked, in construing the term accrue, to adopt a so-called discovery rule, applied by some of our sister states, so that a cause of action accrues when a party discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, his or her injury. This Court declined to do so, thereby retaining the rule set forth in Murray, because the legislature had enacted discovery rules only in regard to two other statutes of limitation: 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) (Supp.1984) (amended by 1975, No. 248 (Adj.Sess.), § 2); and 12 V.S.A. § 518(a) (added by 1967, No. 32, § 1). [5] Our reason for refusing to overrule the definition of accrue in 12 V.S.A. § 511, as set out in Murray, was that the General Assembly had been exposed to this issue previously and had chosen only to amend Vermont law in a limited way. South Burlington School District, supra, 135 Vt. at 605, 382 A.2d at 222 (footnote omitted). In Capron v. Romeyn, supra , this Court addressed the definition of accrue in the context of 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) (1959), as we had in Murray. This Court decided not to change the rule announced in Murray, based upon the legislature's failure to make the discovery rule, enacted through its amendment of 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) (Supp. 1984), retroactive to existing causes of action. Capron, supra, 137 Vt. at 555, 409 A.2d at 566. In Stewart v. Darrow, supra, this Court again considered the viability of the rule, set forth in Murray, in the context of 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) (1973). [6] We again declined to overrule the rule in Murray, basing our refusal on the failure of the parties in Stewart to address that issue on appeal. Stewart, supra, 141 Vt. at 249 n. 1, 448 A.2d at 788 n. 1. The reasons given in South Burlington School District, supra, and Stewart, supra, for declining to overrule the holding of Murray are not present in the case at bar. We now expressly overrule Murray, supra, 103 Vt. at 376, 154 A. at 679, where, applying the provisions of a statute of limitations in a personal injury negligence case, it held that the right of action accrued when the negligent act upon which the action is based took place .... See South Burlington School District, supra, 135 Vt. at 608-10, 382 A.2d at 224-25 (Billings, J., concurring and dissenting); Capron, supra, 137 Vt. at 556, 409 A.2d at 567 (Billings, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Stewart, supra, 141 Vt. at 253-54, 448 A.2d at 790-91 (Billings, J., dissenting, Underwood, J., dissenting); see also Anderson v. McKee, 136 Vt. 623, 383 A.2d 273 (1978) (Billings, J., and Hill, J., dissenting). Having discarded the rule set forth in Murray, we now turn to the question of what rule to apply in its place in the case at hand.