Opinion ID: 3134358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ill Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 20, 1993, at

Text: 167-68. If the victim does not have to be a member of a protected class, then the legislature would not have needed to amend the statute to include this language because the status of the victim would not be at issue. The majority determines that the actual or perceived language is ambiguous and requires judicial construction. With due respect, it sounds as if the plain language of the statute was subjected to judicial deconstruction: Inclusion of the phrase `actual or perceived' as a modifier of race and of the other enumerated classes indicates, however, that the race, color, religion, etc., of the individual or group that provides reason for the offense is capable of being perceived by an accused. This suggests that such individual has actual contact, or has had actual contact, at the least, with the accused so that his or her race, religion, etc., is perceivable. Slip op. at 5-6. I do not agree that the words actual or perceived were really intended by the legislature to ensure that the protected class of some individual who may not be the victim is capable of being perceived. I am not even exactly sure what that means. The majority also reasons that it is within the purpose of the hate crime statute to punish a perpetrator who selects a victim because of the victim's support or association with some protected class. I wholeheartedly agree that the statute should be drafted to include these situations as a matter of good public policy. However, the statute as written does not reach these circumstances and any such change in the statute must come from the legislature, not this court. I will not judicially rewrite the statute under the guise of statutory construction. Furthermore, I am constrained by law to interpret criminal statutes in a lenient manner. People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon, 65