Opinion ID: 374109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Insanity Instructions

Text: 35 Bruce admitted that he committed the robbery, choosing to defend himself solely on the ground that he was legally insane when the event occurred. The district judge gave the insanity instruction announced by this court in Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc), supplemented with an instruction explaining the meaning of wrongfulness as used in Wade. See United States v. Sullivan, 544 F.2d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1975). The relevant part of the charge, with the explanation of wrongfulness emphasized, was as follows: 36 In determining the issue of sanity I further instruct you that a person is considered legally insane, and therefore not responsible for criminal conduct, if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the moral wrongfulness of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 37 Now, for the purposes of the insanity defense, wrongfulness means moral wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness. 38 (Emphasis added). 39 Bruce does not object to these instructions, but he claims that reversible error occurred when the judge failed to include an additional instruction discussed in United States v. Sullivan, supra, 544 F.2d at 1055: 40 You are instructed that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, even if he knows his act to be criminal, but commits it because of a delusion that it was morally justified. 41 The district court rejected this instruction, saying that there had been no evidence that Bruce had acted under a delusion when he had robbed the bank and that the instruction was therefore not proper. On appeal, Bruce vigorously contends that the jury was presented with evidence of delusional behavior by Bruce, giving him the right to the requested instruction. We need not consider whether there was evidence of delusion before the jury. The instruction given was sufficient even if such evidence was presented. 42 Bruce insists on a specific instruction which was approved for fact situations similar to those in Sullivan, but he misconstrues the holding of that case. There we stated that it must be made clear to a jury considering an insanity defense that wrongfulness means moral, as opposed to criminal, wrongfulness. Bruce overlooks that in Sullivan we concluded that either one of two instructions would have been sufficient to meet the Wade standard in that case. 544 F.2d at 1055-56. Bruce complains because one of these instructions was not given here; in fact, as can be seen in the portion of the jury charge emphasized in the text above, the district judge gave the alternative approved instruction. We see no reason to disapprove its use here or to require more. 43 Bruce appears to argue that a delusion that (a criminal act) is morally justified is somehow distinct from lacking substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the moral wrongfulness of (one's) conduct. Thus, if there is evidence of such delusions, he would insist that a delusion instruction must be given in addition to the standard Wade statement. But in Wade we expressly pointed out that a delusion that a crime was morally justified was covered by the insanity instruction we there adopted. 426 F.2d at 71-72. Likewise, we explained in Sullivan that our use in a prior case of the word delusion has added no additional element to the concept of insanity encompassed in the Wade instruction. 544 F.2d at 1055 & n.1.