Opinion ID: 1390030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Evidence Tampering and Withholding of Evidence

Text: Petitioner contends his constitutional rights were violated when law enforcement tampered with key pieces of evidence, presented misleading and false testimony, and withheld material exculpatory evidence. (Pet. at 29, 31-43.) Petitioner fails to meet his burden and the Court DENIES these claims on the merits and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
Petitioner alleges planting of or tampering with items of evidence. Petitioner's claims of evidence tampering were rejected after a post-conviction evidentiary hearing in 2003. In a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the Honorable William Kennedy of the San Diego Superior Court concluded that there was no merit to Petitioner's claim of evidence tampering. (92-CV-427 NOL filed Jan. 23, 2004, Ex. 6, Judge Kennedy Order dated July 2, 2003 at 10.) Petitioner's complaints about the handling of A-41 is repetitive of his complaints that were litigated during trial, on direct appeal, in post-conviction motions and in previous habeas petitions. (Pet. at 33-34.) Petitioner's expert at trial, Dr. Edward T. Blake, had no complaint about the results presented at trial by the prosecution regarding A-41. (105 RT 7559-60.) Defense trial counsel stated in a declaration that in hindsight he would have presented another expert at trial because Dr. Blake confirmed the validity of the prosecution's evidence regarding A-41. Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Amended Pet., Ex. T at 560(The district attorney was able to bring out the fact that [Dr. Blake] believed that A-41 had been tested in a proper manner and the results were accurate.) Moreover, Petitioner ignores the fact that the post-conviction testing on A-41 was done with the assistance of Petitioner's own nationally recognized DNA experts, Dr. Blake and Christopher Plourd. Petitioner offers no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness that attaches to the state court's express factual findings that there was no tampering with A-41 at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). Additionally, at trial, the defense knew about the testing of the UU series. Brian Wraxall testified that he reviewed the evidence series from UU-1 through UU-16 and explained his results. (94 RT 4726.) The defense knew about Mr. Wraxall's testing and results of the UU series since the trial and after trial. (94 RT 4726.) Since Petitioner was on notice as to the existence of material evidence, there is a lack of diligence in raising a Brady violation. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 435-38, 120 S.Ct. 1479. As to the T-shirt, found on Peyton Road, it was never used as evidence against Petitioner and cannot be considered as affecting the result in Petitioner's trial. The T-shirt was introduced by the defense and never used to inculpate Petitioner. The San Diego County Superior Court took evidence on Petitioner's tampering claim with respect to the T-shirt, and expressly found that the testimony proffered by the prosecution that no tampering had occurred was credible and unrebutted by a complete absence of evidence by Petitioner. (92-CV-427 NOL filed Jan. 23, 2004, Ex. 6, Judge Kennedy Order dated July 2, 2003 at 10.) The state court's findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The California Supreme Court's denial of Petitioner's writ of mandate relating to the denial of his post-conviction DNA motion does not rest on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and is consistent with federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In this petition, Petitioner has not presented any clear and convincing evidence that would overcome the presumption that attached to the state court's factual findings. Petitioner's allegations about the cigarette butts, the rope, and the hatchet sheath are also without merit. Petitioner was represented by an experienced and capable attorney. Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 8. The cigarette butts, the rope, and the hatchet sheath were all used as evidence against Petitioner, and defense counsel was focused on that evidence. ( See, e.g., 106 RT 7788, 7790, 7794 (defense closing argument).) The state court rejected Petitioner's claims of evidence tampering after an evidentiary hearing in 2003. Finally, EDTA preservative testing of the T-shirt has not undermined the post-conviction DNA testing results confirming Petitioner's guilt. In addition Petitioner's claims are undermined because he had a very able and skilled defense attorney representing him. Indeed, this Court and the California Supreme Court both made express findings that Petitioner received an extraordinarily vigorous and able defense. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d at 824, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865; Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 8. Defense trial counsel David Negus' extensive educational and prior litigation experience were developed at the evidentiary hearing conducted by this Court regarding Petitioner's first federal habeas petition, Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 8, and he had the benefit of able post-conviction counsel. This weighs against Petitioner's vague suggestions that the evidence introduced against him at trial suffered from any deficiencies beyond those thoroughly litigated and developed in the trial court and in post-conviction evidentiary proceedings. Accordingly, the Court concludes there is no merit to Petitioner's tampering allegation and the state court's rejection of Petitioner's vague and unsubstantiated accusations over two decades after the crimes that evidence was planted is not contrary to federal law, nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
If Petitioner has previously adjudicated a claim relating to the withholding of evidence, planting of evidence, failure to collect evidence, and false testimony, then his pending claims must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The gravamen of claims of withholding evidence, failure to preserve evidence, and false testimony is the same, regardless of whether Petitioner presents new and different legal arguments or different factual allegations. See Babbitt, 177 F.3d at 746. Even if Petitioner's claim were not subject to mandatory dismissal based upon § 2244(b)(1), his claim is still denied because he could have presented the legal and factual basis of his pending claim previously with due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). As to the cigarette butts, the defense knew about the testing of the cigarette butts by Mr. Wraxall prior to trial and at the time of trial. Mr. Wraxall testified at trial about his testing of V-12 and V-17. (94 RT 4702-43.) He testified he and Dr. Blake, Petitioner's expert, shared the same facility. (94 RT 4730.) Mr. Wraxall stated he conducted testing of the cigarette butts in consultation with Dr. Blake and Dr. Blake had full access to Wraxall's notes and results. (94 RT 4732.) As a result, Petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Petitioner is simply making unsubstantiated allegations of tampering as to evidence that was used against him at trial, or that subsequently confirmed his guilt from post-conviction DNA testing. The defense presented a comprehensive pretrial motion in an effort to exclude evidence based on allegations the crime scene had not been properly managed, and that evidence was not collected or mishandled. Petitioner was represented by an experienced and capable attorney at trial. Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 8. Petitioner's allegations have already been addressed at trial, on appeal, and in his first federal habeas petition. Petitioner could have discovered any of the alleged deficiencies with respect to the chain of custody of evidence, mishandling of evidence, or tampering with evidence previously with due diligence. The same is true as to the purported false testimony and withholding of evidence. Petitioner had excellent post-conviction counsel, and Petitioner could have raised the same allegations he chose to present in the eleventh hour of this case previously with due diligence. Beyond the due diligence showing, Petitioner would be required to demonstrate that the facts underlying his claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of the Ryen/Hughes murders. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Petitioner does not meet this requirement. Petitioner's guilt was demonstrated by overwhelming evidence at trial, and has been reaffirmed through post-conviction DNA testing. Therefore, the Court DENIES these claims.