Opinion ID: 2051955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Refusal of Trespass Instructions.

Text: Frey proposed two instructions defining trespass and justification of force to prevent trespass under SDCL 22-18-4. [7] The trial court in Instruction 6a advised the jury: Ordinarily, an officer of the law who goes upon private property while investigating a crime is not a trespasser. The general rule is that: Conduct otherwise a trespass is often justifiable by reason of authority vested in the person who does the act, as, for example, an officer of the law acting in the performance of his duty. The trial court's instruction is a verbatim quote of the settled law of this state as set forth in the case of State v. Cook, 319 N.W.2d 809, 812 (S.D.1982). In Cook, we cited and relied upon United States v. Barnett, 492 F.2d 790 (5th Cir.1974); United States v. Knight, 451 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 965, 92 S.Ct. 1171, 31 L.Ed.2d 240 (1972); State v. Van Rees, 246 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1976); State v. Lukus, 149 Mont. 45, 423 P.2d 49 (1967); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass § 43 (1974). We appreciate that this rule is not without limitation. As stated by the Van Rees court: What we have said does not, of course, permit an officer to enter one's home or to conduct a search or make a seizure without a warrant or other authority. 246 N.W.2d at 343. We must observe however that the officers here did not conduct a warrantless search because Frey chose to display the carcasses in a conspicuous manner, thus eliminating any expectation of privacy. [8] Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The constitutional protection against unlawful searches and seizures is accorded to persons, houses, papers, and effects, but does not extend to open fields. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, 446, 68 L.Ed. 898, 900 (1924). An open field may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage of a home, and need be neither open nor a field as those terms are used in common speech. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). In Oliver, the United States Supreme Court also noted that the central component in determining whether a search is within the protected curtilage of the home is whether the area harbors the intimate activity associated with the internal `sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S.Ct. at 1742, 80 L.Ed.2d at 225 quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). The analysis of the curtilage was furthered in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), wherein the Court held that the curtilage of a home could be determined with reference to four factors: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps taken by a resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). Here, the goat carcasses were hung from the raised scoop of a farmhand in an open farmyard and were clearly visible from either of the two county roads which are appurtenant to Frey's property. Only the officers' distance from the animals and the increasing darkness of the evening prevented them from positively identifying the species of the animals. It is clear that an analyses and application of Dunn, Ciraolo, Oliver and our own case of State v. Vogel, 428 N.W.2d 272 (S.D.1988), leads to the conclusion that Frey had absolutely no expectation of privacy in the animals. The officers' entry onto the property for the purposes of identifying the animals' species thus was perfectly legal. Further, the jury, by their verdict, obviously concluded that Roland Frey consented to show Schmeltzer the animals hanging from the farmhand, negating any assertion that the search was involuntary. This question of fact and witness credibility is clearly within the purview of the jury, and we may not disturb it on appeal where the evidence is sufficient to support their verdict. State v. LaCroix, 423 N.W.2d 169 (S.D.1988).