Opinion ID: 1984823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Character Evidence

Text: The defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in excluding his proffered character witness testimony. He contends that this testimony would have established that he has a reputation for trustworthiness in the community and, in particular, that he is a trustworthy person with children. See State v. Benoit, 697 A.2d 329, 331 (R.I.1997) (per curiam) (concluding that evidence of trustworthiness with children might well be pertinent and share a nexus with the crime of child molestation). We have stated previously that [r]arely and only upon a clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion will appellate courts disturb the ruling of trial courts in the matter of character evidence testimony. State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 869 (R.I.1987) (quoting United States v. Trollinger, 415 F.2d 527, 529 (5th Cir.1969)). [A] defendant [is] entitled to present opinion evidence concerning his character for truthfulness [where] his character on this subject ha[s] been attacked by an incisive cross-examination. Benoit, 697 A.2d at 330 (citing State v. Bowden, 439 A.2d 263, 268-69 (R.I.1982)). Pursuant to Rule 404(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, character evidence of a defendant generally is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he or she acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Subsection (1) of Rule 404(a) permits an exception to that rule and [e]vidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's character offered by an accused is admissible. [T]he word `pertinent' is not necessarily synonymous with `relevant' but depends upon whether such evidence would `logically influence the issue.' Benoit, 697 A.2d at 331 (quoting Oliveira, 534 A.2d at 869). Thus, evidence of good character offered by an accused must be pertinent to the charge with which the accused is faced. Id. (citing Oliviera, 534 A.2d at 868-69). Character evidence offered by an accused may be proven by `testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.' Benoit, 697 A.2d at 331 (quoting R.I. R. Evid. 405(a)). See also State v. Cote, 691 A.2d 537, 540 (R.I.1997) (recognizing that [i]t has long been recognized that testimony of a character witness called for the purpose of establishing another witness's reputation in the community for veracity is generally admissible). However, [n]otwithstanding the relevance of reputation evidence    a witness may not testify to the reputation of another witness unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Cote, 691 A.2d at 540 (citing R.I.R.Evid. 602). In addition to the requirement of personal knowledge, this court has indicated that `[t]he crucial time when the character of the witness under attack has its influence on his [or her] truth-telling is the time when he [or she] testifies.' Cote, 691 A.2d at 541 (quoting State v. Sepe, 122 R.I. 560, 568, 410 A.2d 127, 132 (1980)). Testimony concerning a witness's reputation for truthfulness as of any time before trial is admissible if the trial justice determines the evidence not too remote to be significant. Id. In Benoit, we stated that: We believe that evidence of good character on the part of an accused may well be a significant element in his or her defense. Generally the crime of sexual molestation depends upon the credibility of the complaining witness as opposed to the credibility of the defendant. Therefore, excluding evidence of good character in respect to a pertinent trait cannot generally be considered harmless. Benoit, 697 A.2d at 331. In that case, we remanded for reconsideration the issue of whether, under Rule 404(a)(1), evidence of trustworthiness with children or other pertinent character traits should have been admissible after the laying of an appropriate foundation. Benoit, 697 A.2d at 331. We instructed the trial justice in that case to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the proffered witness has sufficient knowledge and acquaintance with the defendant to offer an opinion on this pertinent character trait. Id. In the present case, after conducting the requisite preliminary hearing, the trial justice permitted only Domenic to testify about the defendant's character. He excluded the proffered character witness testimony of the Valenti family members, Florence, Albert and Edward. In so ruling, the trial justice found that these witnesses had failed to provide sufficient foundation from which to form an opinion of the defendant's reputation in the community. He noted that Edward testified that he had never discussed the defendant's reputation in the community with anyone; Albert had discussed the defendant's reputation only with a few of his own relatives; and Florence could recall the name of only one person with whom she had discussed the subject. Considering that a witness must establish that he or she has personal knowledge of another person's reputation before he or she can proffer an opinion concerning that reputation, we cannot conclude that the trial justice abused his discretion in excluding the proffered reputation evidence. The defendant also contends that the trial justice abused his discretion by excluding testimony from the witnesses concerning their opinion of the defendant's trustworthiness with children. The trial justice specifically noted that the childhood experiences of Albert and Edward were far too remote to be significant. We note that the record reveals that Albert and Edward testified at the preliminary hearing that when they themselves were young boys, the defendant neither made sexual advances toward them nor acted inappropriately while in their presence. We note also that at the time of trial, both Albert and Edward, now mature adults in their late twenties, had no knowledge concerning the defendant's current interaction with children. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding the character evidence testimony of Florence, Albert and Edward.