Opinion ID: 4017407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dangerous Weapons Enhancement

Text: On appeal, Medina contends that the district court erred in applying a twolevel dangerous weapons enhancement when calculating his guidelines range. We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Smith, 480 F.3d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 2007). “The federal Sentencing Guidelines provide that, if a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed during a drug-trafficking offense, then a defendant’s offense level should be increased by two levels, unless it is clearly 5 Case: 15-12346 Date Filed: 07/20/2016 Page: 6 of 16 improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense.” Id.; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). A court may apply this enhancement even if the defendant was not himself in possession of a weapon as long as his co-conspirators were. See United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006). For the enhancement to apply in those circumstances, the government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) the possessor of the firearm was a co-conspirator, (2) the possession was in furtherance of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time of possession, and (4) the co-conspirator possession was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the government demonstrates that a firearm was present, “the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to show that a connection between the firearm and the offense is clearly improbable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For sentencing purposes, whether a firearm was possessed is a factual finding, which we review for clear error. United States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006). Regarding the reasonable foreseeability of a firearm’s possession, “we have noted that numerous cases have recognized that guns are a tool of the drug trade. There is a frequent and overpowering connection between the use of firearms and narcotics traffic.” Id. at 1246 (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, however, “the mere fact that a drug offender possesses a firearm does not 6 Case: 15-12346 Date Filed: 07/20/2016 Page: 7 of 16 necessarily give rise to the firearms enhancement.” Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1221. “The government must show some nexus beyond mere possession between the firearms and the drug crime.” Id. In other words, the government must demonstrate that a firearm had “some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence.” Id. at 1220 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not clearly err in applying the firearms enhancement to Medina. Possession of firearms by Medina’s co-conspirators was reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy. While Medina was not personally found with a firearm, law enforcement officials seized multiple firearms while apprehending his co-conspirators. 1 These firearms were found in close proximity to narcotics, suggesting that their possession was in furtherance of the 1 It is not entirely clear from the record whether and which of these weapons were loaded when law enforcement officers seized them. Medina contends that the government’s failure to demonstrate that the guns were loaded makes the enhancement improper because it casts doubt on whether possession of the firearms was in furtherance of the conspiracy. But even assuming the guns were not loaded, we see no clear error in concluding that possession of those guns by Medina’s co-conspirators was in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable by him. See Pham, 463 F.3d at 1241 (affirming district court’s application of dangerous weapons enhancement after police seized unloaded gun at co-conspirator’s residence). Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, counsel for the government stated that he had found a report confirming that at least one of the guns seized was loaded. Although it is not clear to what report counsel was referring, Medina’s attorney acknowledged seeing the report and stated he did not “have any reason to disbelieve the contents of that report.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 24 (Doc. 90) (“Doc.” refers to the docket entry in the district court record in this case.) On appeal, Medina argues that this report is hearsay, but we have repeatedly concluded that “reliable hearsay can be considered during sentencing.” United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1031 (11th Cir. 2001). And Medina’s counsel acknowledged that he had no reason to think the report unreliable. Indeed, speaking more broadly, Medina provides no reason to believe that this gun, or any other seized by law enforcement officials, was not loaded. 7 Case: 15-12346 Date Filed: 07/20/2016 Page: 8 of 16 overall trafficking conspiracy. See United States v. Fields, 408 F.3d 1356, 1359 (11th Cir. 2005) (evidence that firearms were present at locations where drugs were sold supported the conclusion that possession of the firearms was in furtherance of the drug conspiracy). Moreover, given that the conspiracy itself involved trafficking large amounts of valuable narcotics and proceeds from drug sales, it is reasonably foreseeable that Medina’s co-conspirators “felt the need to protect their inventory and proceeds.” Id.; see also Pham, 463 F.3d at 1246 (“[W]e have found it reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator would possess a firearm where the conspiracy involved trafficking in lucrative and illegal drugs.”). “In light of the vastness of the conspiracy and the large amount of drugs and money being exchanged in this case, the district court did not clearly err by finding that it was reasonably foreseeable that a firearm would be possessed by a co-conspirator.” Pham, 463 F.3d at 1246. Medina also argues that the district court’s application of the enhancement was inappropriate because he did not plead guilty to any firearms offense. But this argument “misperceives the distinction between a sentence and a sentence enhancement.” United States v. Martinez, 924 F.2d 209, 211 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether to apply a sentencing enhancement, a district court is permitted “to consider relevant conduct for which the defendant was neither charged nor convicted, so long as proof of that conduct 8 Case: 15-12346 Date Filed: 07/20/2016 Page: 9 of 16 is supported by reasonable indicia of reliability.” Id. And Medina never argues that the evidence on which the district court relied when sentencing him was unreliable. In sum, we see no clear error in the district court’s application of a dangerous-weapons enhancement to the calculation of Medina’s guidelines range.