Opinion ID: 3063840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Search Warrant

Text: In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (11th Cir. 2008). Such review requires that all facts be construed “in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in the district court[.]” Id. at 1074. Here, the prevailing party was the Government. “It is established law of this Circuit that the admissibility in federal court of the products of state searches and seizures is controlled by federal 2 law.” United States v. Clay, 355 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004). “Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when the totality of the circumstances allow a conclusion that there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence at a particular location.” United States v. Brundidge, 170 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). To prevail on a motion to suppress evidence that was seized pursuant to a search warrant, based on allegations of falsity in the supporting affidavit, the challenging party has the burden of establishing (1) the affiant made the alleged misrepresentations or omissions knowingly or recklessly, and (2) exclusion of the alleged misrepresentations or inclusion of the alleged omissions would have resulted in a lack of probable cause. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 986-87 (11th Cir. 2001). In addition, it is well established that an exception “to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Federal law controls the admissibility of evidence that is the product of a state search and seizure, so Bolden’s arguments based on Georgia law are unavailing. See Clay, 355 F.3d at 1283. After reviewing the record, we find the district court’s conclusion that the search warrant was supported by probable cause was not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, Bolden’s father, the homeowner, 3 consented to the search of the property. For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Bolden’s motion to dismiss the search warrant.