Opinion ID: 1289106
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bryson's Disability-Discrimination Claim

Text: One of the factors that is relevant to determining whether an impairment amounts to a disability is whether it is permanent or long-term. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 (stating that [t]he impairment's impact must also be permanent or long-term) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii)). Here, the record evidence casts doubt on whether Bryson's knee condition satisfies this requirement. In a letter to Bryson's counsel, dated May 27, 2005, Dr. Hester opined that, As of January 18, 2005, it was felt that [Bryson's] knee had improved considerably and was well resolved. (JA 186.) He reiterated this view at his deposition in August 2005, where he testified that Bryson's RSD had been brought pretty well under control by January 2005 and that Bryson was not under any restrictions in terms of her ability to work as of that time. (JA 183-84.) Furthermore, at her deposition, Bryson testified that she did not refrain from engaging in any activities as a result of her RSD: I can perform everythingactually, the only thing that it restricts me from, it makes it harder to sleep. Basically . . . I still do everything else. (JA 153.) The testimony of Dr. Hester and Bryson herself suggests that the impairment caused by Bryson's knee surgery and her RSD was not permanent or long-term. Nonetheless, because Bryson also testified that her RSD condition is chronic and will never go away, (JA 950), and because Dr. Hester testified that RSD develops into quite a debilitating condition, (JA 183), we proceed to evaluate whether Bryson has adduced sufficient evidence to show that she is substantially limited in the major life activities of standing, walking, and working.
An impairment that only moderately or intermittently prevents an individual from performing major life activities is not a substantial limitation under the ADA. Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 590-91 (6th Cir.2002). The record here shows that Bryson cannot stand or walk for as long as she was able to prior to her knee surgery and the onset of her RSD. But, she is not altogether precluded from standing and walking either. Indeed, Bryson testified that she can stand for fifteen to twenty minutes at a time and sometimes for a[n] hour, an hour and a half, two hours. . . . (JA 931.) Bryson simply cannot stand all day like [she] used to. (JA 931.) This is insufficient to establish that she is substantially limited with respect to standing and walking. See Mahon, 295 F.3d at 591 (holding that the plaintiff was not substantially restricted in his ability to sit, stand, bend, stoop, walk, climb, or lift even where the record established that the plaintiff's back impairment causes him distress and limits him in performing some activities); Penny v. UPS, 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir.1997) (stating that although the claimant suffers an impairment that affects to some degree his ability to walk, he has not `adduced sufficient evidence from which a factfinder reasonably could conclude that the nature and severity of his injury significantly restricted his ability to walk as compared with an average person in the general population') (quoting Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir.1996)).
In Sutton, the Supreme Court held that [t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 527 U.S. at 493, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). The Court held that the petitioners' poor eyesight did not substantially limit their ability to work, even if it meant that they were precluded from working as airline pilots. Id. Thus, it is not enough for Bryson to present evidence showing that she can no longer work as a Supercuts manager. She must instead show that she is significantly restricted in ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Bryson has failed to meet this standard. She has not established that her medical condition bars her from working in all jobs within the cosmetology field, or that it prevents her from holding a large number of jobs in other categories of employment. See Olds v. UPS, Inc., 127 Fed.Appx. 779, 782 (6th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (stating that the plaintiff's lifting restriction prevents him from working as a delivery driver and from performing other jobs at UPS specifically, but there is no evidence in the record that it prevents him from engaging in a broad class of jobs). Moreover, the testimony of both Dr. Hester and Bryson contradict any such finding. Dr. Hester testified that as of January 2005, Bryson was under no limitations with respect to her ability to work. Bryson agreed, testifying that she can still work full-time. (JA 938.) We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Regis on Bryson's disability-discrimination claim.