Opinion ID: 2548406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of Natrona County's Major Land Subdivision Regulation

Text: [¶ 24] Having concluded Pedro/Aspen had standing to challenge the regulations, we now address the merits of its claim regarding the authority of Natrona County to regulate the subdivision of land into parcels greater than thirty-five acres. To properly analyze the question of Natrona County's statutory authority to adopt the major land subdivision regulation, the difference between zoning and subdivision must be understood. The legislature granted Natrona County the authority to regulate the use of land pursuant to § 18-5-201 which provides, [t]o promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the county, each board of county commissioners may regulate and restrict the location and use of buildings and structures and the use, condition of use or occupancy of lands for residence, recreation, agriculture, industry, commerce, public use and other purposes in the unincorporated area of the county. We have held the authority granted by this provision is broad. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, 65 P.3d 720 (Wyo.2003). However, by express statutory language, this broad authority is limited to regulation of the use of land, not the division of it into parcels. For example, the same planning and zoning statute specifies, in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-203 (LexisNexis 2003), that it is unlawful to locate, erect, construct, reconstruct, enlarge, change, maintain or use any building or use any land within any area included in a zoning resolution without first obtaining a zoning certificate from the board of county commissioners and no zoning certificate shall be issued unless the plans for the proposed building, structure or use fully comply with the zoning regulations then in effect. The clear import of this provision is, again, the regulation of the use of land, not its division into parcels. We have defined zoning as the division of land into zones and within these zones the regulation of both the nature of land usage and the physical dimensions of these uses including height setbacks and minimum area. Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo.1985). Natrona County has full authority to regulate the use of Pedro/Aspen's land pursuant to its zoning regulation. [¶ 25] However, the only authority granted to Natrona County by the legislature to regulate the division of land into parcels is § 18-5-301 et seq., the Real Estate Subdivisions Act. (e.g. No person shall subdivide land ... without first obtaining a subdivision permit from the board of the county in which the land is located.) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-304 (LexisNexis 2003). Counties have only those powers granted expressly by statute or necessarily implied in order to execute express powers. Schoeller v. Bd. of County Commissioners of the County of Park, 568 P.2d 869 (Wyo.1977). The specific terms of § 18-5-301 limit the authority it grants to counties. Section 18-5-303(b) states, [t]his article shall not apply to the sale or other disposition of land where the parcels involved are thirty-five (35) acres or larger. Applying the plain meaning of the statute leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the legislature did not give counties the authority to require county approval for subdivision of land into parcels greater than thirty-five acres. [¶ 26] Natrona County attempted to avoid this interpretation by pointing to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-315 (LexisNexis 2003) and suggesting that provision gave it authority to impose more stringent regulations, thus authorizing county regulation of subdivision of land into parcels larger than thirty-five acres. That section provides, [i]f any board has or enacts resolutions or regulations which impose requirements on subdividers or subdivisions which are more restrictive than the provisions of this article, the authority to enact such local resolutions or regulations being hereby granted, the local provisions are not superseded by the provisions of this article. Id. [¶ 27] Two problems exist with Natrona County's reasoning. First, reading the language of § 18-5-315 carefully, the legislature clearly authorized counties to impose more restrictive standards on subdivisions, but did not authorize them to change the explicit exemption of subdivisions in which the parcels are greater than thirty-five acres. Second, if Natrona County's interpretations were correct, the definition of subdivision, as well as the list of ten exemptions, would become meaningless, a result not likely intended by the legislature. In interpreting statutes, we give effect to every word, clause and sentence, and construe them in pari materia. Rawlinson v. Greer, 2003 WY 28, 64 P.3d 120 (Wyo.2003). We avoid construing a statute so as to render a portion of it meaningless. Wyodak Resources Development Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 2002 WY 181, 60 P.3d 129 (Wyo.2002). Reading § 18-5-315 as Natrona County does renders the statutory exemptions meaningless. [¶ 28] Two Attorney General opinions, spanning twenty years, agreed with the conclusion that counties have no authority to require approval of subdivisions involving parcels greater than thirty-five acres. 79 Op. Atty. Gen 35 (Dec. 18, 1979); 99 Op. Atty. Gen. 2 (June 22, 1999). Likewise, courts in other jurisdictions, when presented with similar issues, have reached the same conclusion. In State ex rel. Swart v. Casne, 172 Mont. 302, 564 P.2d 983 (1977), the court rejected a state agency's effort to regulate a division of property which was exempt from that state's subdivision act, stating, They engraft additional and contradictory requirements on the statute in the guise of defining and implementing the evasion of statutory requirements. They frustrate the purpose of the occasional sale exemption of the Act. As such, the DCA regulations are void on their face. Id. at 986. [¶ 29] The court went on to address the agency's argument that it had been given statutory authority to prescribe standards. Where, as here, the Act provides for exemption of occasional sales from the subdivision requirements, DCA cannot prescribe subdivision regulations eliminating the exemption.... An administrative agency is not a super legislature empowered to change statutory law under the cloak of an assumed delegated power. Id.See also Arundel v. Swain, 374 A.2d 317 (Me.1977) (town was without power to change statutory definitions); Stoker v. Irvington, 71 N.J.Super. 370, 177 A.2d 61 (1961) (town was without power to add to or delete from statutory exceptions); and Manalapan Builders Alliance, Inc. v. Township Committee of the Township of Manalapan, 256 N.J.Super. 295, 606 A.2d 1132 (1992) (adoption of township zoning ordinance which deviated from statutory definitions was ultra vires and beyond power of township). [¶ 30] Natrona County argued passionately about the evils of subdivisions such as Pedro/Aspen's, including the potential for inadequate roads, utilities, and other infrastructure. It also cited incompatibility of these subdivisions with the Natrona County land use plan. We have no doubt the problems raised by Natrona County do, in fact, exist. However, the fact that Natrona County has no authority to prevent the subdivision of land beyond that granted by the statute does not render it defenseless against the problems it perceives with subdivisions having parcels larger than 35-acres. Natrona County retains full authority through its zoning powers to regulate the use of those lands by establishing approved uses in certain zones and standards for activities such as building, road construction and sewage disposal. Although we appreciate Natrona County's concern that dealing with many individual owners is more difficult than handling these issues before the land is subdivided, the manner in which these concerns can be addressed by local governments is the business of the legislature. It is not the job of the courts to grant such powers specifically withheld by the legislative branch.