Opinion ID: 853151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Withdrawal of Davis' Guilty Plea

Text: Finally, Davis claims the trial court erred in not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea to the habitual offender charge. Davis asserts that because he was mentally exhausted as a result of the long day of trial that preceded his plea, it was unfair and unjust to prevent him from changing his mind later. Indiana Code § 35-35-1-4 provides the standard to apply when a defendant pleads guilty and then requests to withdraw the plea: After entry of a plea of guilty ... but before imposition of sentence, the court may allow the defendant by motion to withdraw his plea ... for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.... The ruling of the court on the motion shall be reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. However, the court shall allow the defendant to withdraw his plea... whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-1-4(b) (West 1998) (emphasis added). Trial court rulings on such requests are presumptively valid, and parties appealing an adverse decision must prove that a court has abused its discretion. Weatherford v. State, 697 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ind.1998). A trial court abuses its discretion only when the failure of the trial court to grant the motion would result in... a manifest injustice. Id. Before sentencing, Davis moved to withdraw his plea. After hearing evidence on Davis' motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court stated: The Defendant does have [the] burden to show that the plea of true or plea of guilty to this charge was not made freely and voluntarily or otherwise without full understanding of the advisement of rights or without factual basis. (R. at 945-46.) This was an incorrect standard for the trial court to apply. Instead, Davis was required to demonstrate (1) a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea and (2) no reliance by the State that resulted in substantial prejudice. Nevertheless, Davis does not overcome the presumption that the trial court correctly denied the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Davis asserts that he was tired, confused, and upset because the jury had recently found him guilty of the charged offenses. This is not enough to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although Davis vacillated between pleading guilty and contesting the charge, (R. at 893, 896), the court questioned Davis thoroughly on his understanding of the plea, (R. at 893-909). Judge Murray asked Davis whether he suffered from mental or emotional disabilities that interfered with his ability to understand the plea. (R. at 895.) Davis answered, no. ( Id. ) She asked whether he understood the rights he was forfeiting regarding trial and appeal. (R. at 895-903.) She asked whether he understood that he could receive up to thirty years' incarceration for the guilty plea. (R. at 903-04.) She asked whether he had consulted with his attorney on the matter. (R. at 904.) To each of these questions, Davis answered yes. [6] While Davis could understandably have been disappointed by the jury's findings, the record does not demonstrate that permitting withdrawal of the plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.