Opinion ID: 2039061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: William E. McCarthy.

Text: Before trial, counsel for William moved to suppress a statement made by William to two Boston police officers. The motion was denied without prejudice and when the prosecution sought later to place the statement in evidence the motion to suppress was renewed. The judge then excused the jury and held a hearing on the admissibility of the statement. Undisputed evidence showed that the statement was made in Oak Forest, Illinois, on the evening of May 23, 1963, more than six months after the indictment naming William had been returned. The officers who interrogated William were called and testified that they spoke with William for approximately three quarters of an hour before taking William's statement. One of the officers testified that at the time of the interrogation he knew that a Boston attorney represented William. The attorney had stated during a pretrial hearing that he had been retained by William's mother at a time when the whereabouts of William were unknown. The officers also testified that William first asked about legal counsel after he had made his statement to the stenographer. This was contradicted by William who testified that he had requested a lawyer at some time during the discussion prior to the time he made the formal statement. William and the two officers also testified as to facts bearing on whether the statement had been coerced. The judge found that the statement was voluntarily made and that it was admissible against William notwithstanding the claimed deprivation of counsel. The judge instructed the jury to disregard the statement if they found it was not voluntarily given. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368. The case of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, decided after the trial of these defendants, establishes that it was error to admit William's statement. In the Massiah case, the court held that a damaging admission which federal agents had deliberately elicited from the defendant after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel should be excluded in a Federal prosecution since the circumstances in which the admission was obtained contravened the Sixth Amendment guaranty of counsel in Federal prosecutions. Id. at 206. A Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at ... trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant ... in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Id. at 204. The Sixth Amendment guaranty of counsel is obligatory on the States under the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478. In the light of these holdings it may no longer be assumed that the absence of counsel prior to the time when the defendant is brought into court may be disregarded. See Commonwealth v. McNeil, 328 Mass. 436, 438; G.L.c. 276, § 37A; c. 277, § 47. In the Massiah case the defendant did not know that his remarks to a confederate who was cooperating with the authorities were being overheard. But we do not understand the holding to turn on that point. The court in general terms stated a rule against interrogation after indictment in the absence of counsel. This is now a constitutional principle applicable to these cases. The record does not show that William waived his right to counsel. William's statement was plainly prejudicial. He asserted that he and Anderson had planned to lure Sandman to the vacant house for the purpose of robbing him, and that while Robert knew of the plan he thought it a joke. Both William and Robert had been drinking heavily according to William's statement and Sandman when he entered the house wrestled with Robert for a time. According to the statement Robert did not wield either the club or the gun and it was William who beat Sandman with the club and then shot him. In important particulars William did not corroborate this statement in his testimony at the trial. He testified that he was driving with Robert when the latter discovered that the door of his vacant house was open. They entered the house. Robert said that he had had many things stolen. Robert checked the house and noticed that his water tank was near the back door, where it had not been previously. He thought they were trying to take that, too. Robert went out to move his truck planning to come back. He wanted to drop William at Robert's office but William said he would stick around with Robert. They returned with two quarts of beer. The house was dark. Robert said, you check the back, and I will check the front. Robert checked the house again; William heard Robert say, Here they come back. Robert handed him the gun, saying You wait here ... [in the dining room] I will take care of this. William then heard scuffling, he cocked the gun, went into the front room, and saw two forms. The forms came tumbling through the hall and hit him; he fell backwards and he saw Robert get up and leave looking sick. The other person grabbed William who swung the gun, struck out with his fists and hit the person with the gun. William went toward the hallway and got grabbed ... again and as he was going backwards, ... the gun just kept going off. I just pulled the trigger.... I don't know if I pulled the trigger or if the gun was just going off ... I fired the gun ... several times ... I didn't actually mean to shoot the gun.... I was frightened.... On cross-examination William testified that the person grabbed him as he was going to the front door to join his brother outside, there was a struggle and William got hit and twisted and started firing the gun. We are not concerned with whether William could have been convicted without the evidence complained of. We assume that he could. The confession was obtained in contravention of a Federal constitutional guaranty. The question at the very least is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87. Obviously it could have done so as to the charge of murder. We cannot say that it could not have done so as to the charge of unlawfully carrying a firearm. It is uncertain what the testimony at the trial as to the gun would have been if the confession had not been in evidence. We may not apply to this case the alternative holding of Commonwealth v. McNeil, 328 Mass. 436, 438-440, that there is no reversible error where the defendant testified to all the essential facts contained in his confession. We need not consider in what circumstances, if any, a rule of harmless error in respect of confessions would be applicable. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86. [1] Compare Commonwealth v. Palladino, 346 Mass. 720, 725. It was within the judge's discretion not to allow one of the two attorneys who had appeared for both William and Robert to examine defence witnesses after the other attorney had cross-examined witnesses for the prosecution and examined three of the defence witnesses. The only assignments of error other than those already considered that we deem it necessary to notice are those that relate to the attempts of the defendants to show that Anderson's testimony resulted from police coercion. The defendants may cross-examine to show facts that reasonably suggest the untrustworthiness of the testimony of a witness. Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 79. However, much must be left to the discretion of the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 342 Mass. 279, 286, and cases cited. The trial judge permitted cross-examination of Anderson in respect of the claimed pressures and excluded extrinsic evidence. There was no abuse of discretion.