Opinion ID: 2639478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidence pertinent to preempted theories of negligence

Text: ¶ 30 Although the COCA correctly determined that Pearl's claims based on inadequate warnings, excessive train speed and local hazard conditions/local safety hazard [26] were preempted by federal law, it erred in its holding that evidence pertinent to these theories was admissible on the issues of Pearl's comparative negligence [27] and punitive damages. [28] ¶ 31 The express preemption provision contained in the FRSA calls for nationally uniform laws related to railroad safety, but permits states to adopt or continue in force a law, regulation or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that where the federal regulations at 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) and 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 apply, they cover the subject matter of the relevant state law relating to railroad safety. CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 665, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). [29] ¶ 32 Specifically with respect to preemption of state law on the subject of adequacy of warning devices, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that [w]hen the FHWA approves a crossing improvement project and the State installs the warning devices using federal funds, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) establish a federal standard for the adequacy of those devices that displaces state tort law addressing the same subject. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 357, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) (emphasis added). Further, Easterwood provided that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4)  displace state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670, 113 S.Ct. 1732. (emphasis added). In short, for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. Id. at 671 (emphasis added). ¶ 33 Likewise, with respect to the evidence regarding excessive train speed, the provisions of 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 establish the maximum speeds trains are permitted to travel given the classification of the track on which they operate. The U.S. Supreme Court has held the federal speed limits must be read as not only establishing a ceiling, but also precluding additional state [law] such as the common-law duty to operate [a train at] a moderate and safe rate of speed. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 674, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (emphasis added). Further, regarding the scope of federal preemption, Easterwood held that § 213.9(a) cover[s] the subject matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including the conditions posed by grade crossings. Id. at 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732. ¶ 34 Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's guidance as to the broad scope of federal preemption as expressly provided in Shanklin and Easterwood and contrary to the express preemption language of the FRSA, the COCA narrowly construed the scope of federal preemption to extend no further than negligence claims. The U.S. Supreme Court has not limited the scope of federal preemption under the FRSA to mere negligence claims, but rather, has determined that preemption extends to state tort law and to the legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 352, 357, 120 S.Ct. 1467; Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732. This Court has held that federal preemption extends to preempt the state-tort-law theories based upon adequacy of warning devices, excessive train speed and kindred theories of liability. Myers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 2002 OK 60, 52 P.3d 1014. Furthermore, in Myers, we affirmed the trial court's ruling that federal law preempts evidence of the need for additional warning devices [and] that federal law preempts evidence that the train was traveling at an excessive speed. Myers, 2002 OK 60, ¶ 1, 52 P.3d at 1019, n. 2. Additionally, we held that  any state-tort-law claim [30] against a railroad based on a theory of excessive speed is preempted so long as the train in question was operating within the federally approved speed limit. Id. at ¶ 19, 1023 (emphasis added). ¶ 35 Pursuant to these authorities, we hold that federal law preempts evidence regarding adequacy of warning devices, excessive train speed and/or the alleged local hazard conditions, [31] which is offered for the purpose of proof of a state law tort claim for punitive damages and/or the issue of comparative negligence. Such evidence is part of the relevant state law substantially subsumed by federal regulations regarding railway safety and is thereby preempted. ¶ 36 If we were to permit Pearl to introduce evidence at trial regarding the adequacy of warning devices on the issue of the Railroad's comparative negligence defense and/or punitive damages claim, this would amount to an impermissible challenge of the federal standard of adequacy of warning devices. [32] If Pearl were likewise allowed to challenge the federal maximum speed limit by submission of evidence regarding the train's alleged excessive speed on the issues of comparative negligence and/or punitive damages, the jury would be permitted to improperly supplant its determination of train speed limits for that of the Secretary of Transportation. Allowing the jury to apportion the parties' relative fault and/or determine the propriety of punitive damages on the basis that the train was traveling at an excessive rate of speed would completely deprive the Secretary of the power to preempt state common law. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732. ¶ 37 To allow Pearl to admit evidence that would permit the jury to apportion the Railroad's fault on the basis of such a challenge is akin to allowing Pearl to improperly submit a claim for negligence based upon adequacy of warnings, excessive train speed and alleged dangerous conditions of the crossing. [33] Where such negligence claims are preempted, evidence pertinent to such claims is likewise inadmissible when offered for purposes of proof of culpability. [34] See Mickelson v. Montana Rail Link, Inc., 299 Mont. 348, 999 P.2d 985 (2000); See also Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558, 1561 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that evidence regarding subsequent remedial measures inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct, but admissible to rebut contributory negligence defense where it would otherwise be impossible for [plaintiff] to rebut defendant's argument that [plaintiff] was contributorily negligent.). This case is distinguishable from Pitasi, as the possibility remains for Pearl to rebut the Railroad's affirmative defense of comparative negligence despite the exclusion of evidence pertinent to warnings, train speed and alleged local hazard conditions. Pearl may still offer evidence pertinent to the vegetation claim in rebuttal to the Railroad's comparative negligence defense. ¶ 38 Finally, to allow Pearl to admit evidence regarding the adequacy of the warning devices and excessive train speed on the issue of punitive damages would permit the jury to punish a Railroad for complying with the applicable federal standards for warning devices at crossings and train speed. This not only offends logic, it is contrary to the law of federal preemption.