Opinion ID: 2977347
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Our review of agency decisions has two components. First, we determine whether the agency’s chosen action complies with Chevron. 467 U.S. at 842-45; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001); Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA (“Riverkeeper II”), 475 F.3d 83, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). When conducting Chevron review of the Final Rule, we “examine the [Final Rule] against the statute that contains the EPA’s charge.” Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA (“Riverkeeper I”), 358 F.3d 174, 183 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, we must determine whether “the intent of Congress is clear as to the precise question at issue.” Nations Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. “In making [this] threshold determination under Chevron, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2007). If the intent of Congress is clear, “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If, and only if, the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the question at issue, we then move to step two of Chevron review and ask whether “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. If the agency’s Nos. 06-4630; 07-3180/3181/3182/ The Nat’l Cotton Council Page 9 3183/3184/3185/3186/3187/3191/3236 of Am., et al. v. EPA “interpretation is reasonable, we must defer to its construction of the statute.” Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 2005). The second part of our review would require us to consider the Final Rule under the standards set forth by the Administrative Procedure Act section 10(2)(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (the “APA”), under which we are required to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that, among other criteria, are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious where the agency has relied on factors that Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency experience. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Citizens Coal Council, 447 F.3d at 890. When conducting this form of review, we ensure that the agency “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. “The court is required to make a ‘searching and careful review’ in its assessment of the agency action, but ‘the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.’” Citizens Coal Council, 447 F.3d at 890 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).