Opinion ID: 749872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relationship Between State and Plaintiff--Foreseeable Plaintiff.

Text: 34 The third element of the Kneipp test asks whether there existed some relationship between the state and the plaintiff. In Mark, when we initially identified this as an element of the state-created danger theory, we explained that the cases which had found liability were based on facts where the state acted in such a way as to leave a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to a foreseeable injury. 51 F.3d at 1153. In Kneipp we found there was a relationship between the state and [Ms. Kneipp] ... during which the state place[d] the victim in danger of a foreseeable injury. We then distinguished this relationship element of the state-created danger theory from that required under the special relationship theory of DeShaney, noting that the relationship requirement under the state-created danger theory contemplates some contact such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts in a tort sense. 95 F.3d at 1209 n. 22. 35 The district court here interpreted the foreseeable plaintiff element 11 of Kneipp and Mark to require that a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that there was a particular danger to the victim of the resulting harm. Morse, 1996 WL 677514, at  2. The district court traced the progression of the foreseeable plaintiff requirement from its origins in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). Martinez involved a § 1983 action brought by the parents of a young girl who was murdered by a parolee five months after his release from prison. Plaintiffs alleged that the officials responsible for granting parole were liable for their daughter's death. In rejecting plaintiffs' claims, the Supreme Court stated that the parole board was not aware that appellant's decedent, as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special danger. 444 U.S. at 285, 100 S.Ct. at 559. The district court read this language to require that the state actor be aware that it is creating a risk of harm to a particular plaintiff. 36 Our decision in Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir.1987) also addressed the issue of who qualifies as a foreseeable plaintiff. In that instance a suit was filed on behalf of a couple murdered by an escaped inmate, alleging that breaches in the prison's security resulted in the prisoner's escape and, ultimately, the couple's death. We held that prison officials were not liable on the grounds that, inter alia, they could not have known that decedents faced any particular threat greater than that faced by the public at large. Id. at 16. Once again, the district court here read this case as requiring plaintiffs employing the state-created danger theory to allege they faced a particular threat of harm which set them apart from the general public. 37 The district court next examined our decision in Mark v. Borough of Hatboro. As we have noted, the actor in that case was a volunteer firefighter who set fire to and destroyed the plaintiff's auto repair business. The plaintiff contended the municipality was liable to him for arson damage under the state-created danger theory. We declined to address the viability of the theory at that time, ruling that in any event a constitutional violation could not be made out under the facts of the case. As we stated: 38 When the alleged unlawful act is a policy directed at the public at large--namely a failure to protect the public by failing adequately to screen applicants for membership in a volunteer fire company, the rationale behind the rule disappears--there can be no specific knowledge of the particular plaintiff's condition, and there is no relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. 39 51 F.3d at 1153. Focusing on this language, the district court interpreted the third prong of the Kneipp test to require an allegation that the state actor was aware of a danger to a specific individual. Because the complaint did not allege this, the district court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the state-created danger theory. 12 40 We analyze the foreseeable plaintiff prong somewhat differently than the district court. It seems evident that the Supreme Court's public at large language in Martinez, as well as our statements in Commonwealth and Marks, exclude from the reach of the state-created danger theory those instances where the state actor creates only a threat to the general population. This is in keeping with the Court's decision in DeShaney, and the general rule that the state is not obligated to protect its citizens from the random, violent acts of private persons. But it does not appear this limitation necessarily restricts the scope of § 1983 to those instances where a specific individual is placed in danger. Another view of these cases would allow a plaintiff, in certain situations, to bring a state-created danger claim if the plaintiff was a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions. Stated differently, depending on the facts of a particular case, a discrete plaintiff may mean a specific person or a specific class of persons. The primary focus when making this determination is foreseeability. 41 Some of the cases that have applied the state-created danger theory have held state actors liable for creating a risk to a definable class of persons. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.1993), is illustrative. In that case, police officers arrested the driver of a vehicle, Cathy Irby, and left behind her intoxicated passenger, Larry Rice, with the keys to the car. A few hours later Rice, while driving Irby's car, collided head on with plaintiff's vehicle, killing plaintiff's wife and pre-natal son, and injuring the plaintiff, his two daughters and his inlaws. The court of appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's state-created danger claim, noting that it was the police action in removing Irby, combined with their knowledge of Rice's intoxication, which creates their liability for the subsequent accident. 13 Clearly the act of placing a drunk driver at the wheel of the car did not create a danger to the Reed family specifically. The court of appeals found that the act rendered the Reeds and the other motorists on Route 130 vulnerable to a dangerous driver. Id. at 1127 (When the police create a specific danger, they need not know who in particular will be hurt. Some dangers are so evident, while their victims are so random, that state actors can be held accountable by any injured party.). 42 It is evident that the case law in this area is not uniform on the necessity to allege a specific plaintiff as opposed to a specific class of plaintiffs. What is clear is that a member of the general public may not qualify. Of course, DeShaney involved a discrete, individual plaintiff, and as the source of the state-created danger theory, can be read to restrict who may sue under this theory. But in other situations, requiring the plaintiff to be part of an identifiable and discrete class of persons subject to the harm the state allegedly has created also fits within the purposes of the state-created danger theory. 43 For this reason, it would not appear that the state-created danger theory of liability under § 1983 always requires knowledge that a specific individual has been placed in harm's way. Although it is appropriate to draw lines here, there would appear to be no principled distinction between a discrete plaintiff and a discrete class of plaintiffs. The ultimate test is one of foreseeability. 44 The issue here is whether Diane Morse, and all those present in Lower Merion High School, were a sufficiently discrete group of persons who could have been foreseeable victims of an armed and dangerous intruder. This is by no means an easy question, for the reasons we have expressed. But we need not decide this issue here because we hold that plaintiff cannot satisfy the other three prongs of the Kneipp test.