Opinion ID: 4530911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Background – Fourth Amendment

Text: This case concerns three areas of Fourth Amendment law: (1) what constitutes a search, (2) the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, and (3) the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. We address each in turn. Search The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable government searches of their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The government conducts a search “when it infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy.” United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016). To establish a Fourth Amendment search, a defendant must show both “a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged [intrusion],” and that “society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); accord Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007). “[A]n individual’s privacy interest in her automobile is constitutionally protected.” Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985)). “[T]his protection clearly extends to a car’s trunk.” Id. It is, therefore, “well settled that a trooper’s opening of a car trunk is a search . . . .” United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2011). The Warrant Requirement and the Community-Caretaking Exception A search typically requires a warrant based on probable cause. See United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1127 (10th Cir. 2019). “Searches conducted without a warrant 6 are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).3 Although “the defendant bears the burden of proving whether and when the Fourth Amendment was implicated,” Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1263 (quotations omitted), “[t]he government then bears the burden of proving that its warrantless actions were justified [by an exception],” United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1994). If the government establishes that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, the search is constitutional. See United States v. Maestas, 2 F.3d 1485, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1993). The Government relies on the community-caretaking exception here.4 The community-caretaking exception allows the government to introduce evidence obtained through searches that are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. 3 Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, “police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). Deputy Clinton did not have probable cause to open the camper, so the automobile exception does not apply. 4 The Government also invokes the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. When an officer “is lawfully positioned in a place from which an object can be plainly viewed,” . . . the “incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent,” and “the officer has a lawful right of access to the object,” the officer may seize the object without a warrant. United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 64, 71 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). As we explain below, however, the plain view exception does not apply because the community-caretaking exception does not apply. 7 Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).5 “Noninvestigatory searches of automobiles pursuant to this function . . . do not offend Fourth Amendment principles so long as such activities are warranted in terms of state law or sound police procedure, and are justified by concern for the safety of the general public . . . .” United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted). The government must also point to “specific and articulable facts which reasonably warrant an intrusion into the individual’s liberty,” and must show that “the government’s interest . . . outweigh[s] the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary governmental interference.” United States v. Garner, 416 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted and alterations incorporated). Although officers are entitled to “some latitude in undertaking their community caretaking role,” their actions must be “reasonably related in scope” to the underlying justification. Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Garner, 416 F.3d at 1213 (explaining that the “scope [of a community-caretaking detention] must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification”). The Supreme Court applied the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement when law enforcement, for safety purposes, removed a defendant’s damaged car from the highway and later searched the car, including the trunk, under standard 5 Although the district court reasoned that Deputy Clinton “was not conducting a search” because he was community caretaking, ROA at 39, we have treated community caretaking as an exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomson, 354 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003). 8 police procedure. Cady, 413 U.S. at 448. We applied the exception when officers detained a man for questioning after finding him lying in a field and possibly in need of medical help. Garner, 416 F.3d at 1214. By contrast, when an officer found cocaine under an interior door panel while conducting an inventory search of a damaged car, we declined to apply the exception because the officer testified to no public danger justifying his removal of the panel. Lugo, 978 F.2d at 636. Because the officer cited no suspicion that the compartment contained a weapon, opening it was not community caretaking. Id. We also declined to apply the exception when, in response to a neighbor’s call regarding a loud argument between a man and his spouse, police ordered the man to step outside and arrested him when he declined. Storey v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 987, 996 (10th Cir. 2012). We explained that “no specific and articulable facts” indicated that seizing the man was “necessary to protect the safety of [him], his wife, the officers, or others.” Id. (quotations omitted). We concluded that, “[a]bsent additional facts indicating a greater possibility of violence, a loud argument between spouses does not suffice to justify a warrantless seizure within the home.” Id. at 997. The Exclusionary Rule and the Inevitable Discovery Exception When the government obtains evidence though an unconstitutional search, the evidence is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule unless an exception applies. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-58 (1961); United States v. Knox, 883 F.3d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 2018). “In addition, a defendant may also suppress any other evidence deemed to be 9 ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ (i.e., evidence discovered as a direct result of the unlawful activity), by showing the requisite factual nexus between the illegality and the challenged evidence.” United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). One of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery doctrine. United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005). “Although a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable if the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). “[T]he government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence in question would have been discovered in the absence of the Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 1995). The government may carry its burden by showing that if police officers had not violated the Fourth Amendment, they still would have discovered the evidence through a lawful inventory search of the car. See United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th Cir. 1992). “In determining whether the government has met its burden of proof, we consider ‘demonstrated historical facts,’ not ‘speculative elements.’” United States v. White, 326 F.3d 1135, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984)); accord United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 153 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule cannot be invoked because of [a] highly speculative assumption of ‘inevitability.’”). 10