Opinion ID: 159634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Collection Procedures Available to the United States

Text: 10 Shaw also argues she has standing to invoke collection procedures available to the United States, specifically the right to invoke the FDCPA. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3308. 6 The FDCPA sets forth procedures for the United States to recover a judgment on a debt. 28 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(1). [Aplt. App. at 33] Shaw argues that she falls under the FDCPA definition for Counsel for the United States, and thus has governmental powers to collect the debt owed Shaw by Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 3002(1)(B). An examination of the FDCPA quickly shows why this argument fails. First, debt is defined in the FDCPA as an amount owing to the United States. See id. §§ 3002(3)(A)-(B). The debt at issue in this case is not, however, owing to the United States. It is a judgment for the relator Shaw for her own fees and expenses. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2), (h). Second, the FDCPA defines Counsel for the United States to include any private attorney authorized by contract made in accordance with section 3718 of title 31 to conduct litigation for collection on behalf of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(1)(B). The referenced section in turn refers to the Attorney General's power to contract with private counsel to collect debt owed to the U.S. government. See 31 U.S.C. § 3718(a) & (b). The Counsel for the United States definition in 28 U.S.C. § 3002 cannot be logically extended to include an FCA qui tam or wrongful discharge plaintiff seeking to collect attorney's fees owed to that plaintiff as an individual. Shaw does not acquire the government's standing to assert the FDCPA. 7