Opinion ID: 1925667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Laws Affecting Public Education

Text: In arguing their respective positions, both sides start from a constitutional source. On one hand, the school committee argues that article 12, sec. 1, of the Rhode Island Constitution vests the General Assembly with authority and control over matters affecting public education. On the other hand, the town maintains that the Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution, set forth in article 13, just as concisely vests the cities and towns of Rhode Island with the right of self government in all local matters. Under the state's constitution, the General Assembly has a responsibility to promote public schools    and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education   . R.I. Const. art. 12, sec. 1. Pursuant to this directive, the Legislature enacted G.L.1956 § 16-2-9(a), which vests school committees with the entire care, control, and management of local schools, as well as enumerating additional rights and duties. [2] Although the statute is silent about the right to retain legal counsel, the school committee suggests that the broad administrative powers conferred include the right to retain its own attorney. Although the Legislature is constitutionally charged with overseeing education in this state, towns and cities are permitted to control local government pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment to our state constitution. R.I. Const. art. 13. The interplay between the Legislature and town governments in regulating public education was discussed in Royal v. Barry, 91 R.I. 24, 160 A.2d 572 (1960). In that case, we explained that no provision affecting education contained within a home rule charter, so called, can effectively regulate the conduct of school committees as agents of the state unless expressly validated by an act of the general assembly. Id. at 30, 160 A.2d at 575. Notwithstanding the right of towns and cities to regulate local matters, we have held previously that [w]hen local laws conflict with general laws of statewide application, the former must defer to the latter. Local No. 799, International Association of Firefighters AFL-CIO v. Napolitano, 516 A.2d 1347, 1349 (R.I.1986) (citing O'Neill v. City of East Providence, 480 A.2d 1375, 1379 (R.I.1984)). This rule, however, does not apply when the conflicting charter provision has been legislatively ratified. Id. In such instances, we view the conflicting charter provision as a special act [that] takes precedence over any inconsistent provisions of the general laws. Id. We agree with the school committee that because most of sec. 6-6 was not ratified by the Legislature, it is not helpful in resolving the issue before us. [3] Thus, if the town charter limits the school committee's right to retain its own attorney, such restriction must be found in the language of sec. 6-4, which was ratified by the Legislature in 1963. [4] See P.L.1963, ch. 187. Consequently, even if we were to conclude that § 16-2-9 empowers school committees to hire independent counsel, the right of the Johnston School Committee to do so would be superceded by sec. 6-4, because under our well-settled jurisprudence, the legislatively-ratified charter provision would take precedence over the general law. Napolitano, 516 A.2d at 1349.