Opinion ID: 1202216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: qualifications of the court reporter

Text: At the trial level, Menzies argued that because Lee was not licensed in Utah, the transcript she prepared could not be used on appeal. The trial court rejected this argument, ruling that Lee's licensure status did not affect the validity of the transcript because Lee was de facto qualified. On appeal, Menzies claims that this ruling constitutes abuse of discretion. Menzies' argument is based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-15, [10] which provides that no person may be appointed to the position of shorthand reporter nor act in that capacity ... unless he has received a certificate from the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, and on Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(10), which provide for mandatory review of the entire record in every case in which a sentence of death is imposed. Menzies asserts that these statutes and rule 26(10) implicitly provide that only a transcript prepared by a certified reporter may be used to review a capital case. In the alternative, he argues that even if the transcript can be used, the presumption that the record is correct, provided in Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6, should not apply to a transcript that was not prepared by a certified reporter. [11] However, section 78-56-15, section 76-3-206(2), and rule 26(10) neither prohibit the use of transcripts prepared by an uncertified reporter nor revoke the presumption of correctness for transcripts prepared by uncertified reporters. Furthermore, although section 78-56-15 requires a Utah license for the position of court reporter, section 78-56-17 provides for unlicensed court reporters under certain conditions. [12] The rules of statutory construction require that these sections be read together, harmonizing their provisions so that neither section negates a part of the other. [13] Given this rule of construction, section 78-56-15 cannot be read as a total prohibition against the use of transcripts prepared by uncertified reporters. Nor can this section be read as providing that transcripts prepared by uncertified reporters are not entitled to the presumption of correctness. Therefore, Menzies' statutory argument is not compelling. In any event, the trial court's ruling was not based on statutory construction, but on the finding that Lee was de facto qualified to report the case. Utah, along with many other jurisdictions, has adopted the de facto officials doctrine. [14] Under this doctrine, persons who are technically ineligible for a public office may be considered de facto officials if they assume official authority under color of a valid appointment and public acquiescence in the authority. [15] In the interest of justice, the actions of a de facto official are considered valid as to third persons and the public. [16] Utah courts have relied on this doctrine to uphold the actions of administrative committees even though one of their members failed to meet the statutory requirements to sit on the committee; [17] the actions of district judges sitting on the supreme court; [18] and the actions of a county attorney even though the attorney had never posted a required bond. [19] Other jurisdictions have applied the de facto doctrine to myriad actions taken by various public officials, [20] including actions of de facto court reporters. [21] The circumstances of the instant case clearly fall within this doctrine. Lee assumed authority as a court reporter under color of a valid appointment, and the public acquiesced in her authority. Indeed, throughout her tenure as a court reporter, her eligibility for the position was not questioned. Furthermore, the trial court found that on the basis of her training, testing, and experience, Lee was qualified to transcribe Menzies' trial, and Lee believed that she had the certification necessary for the position. Clearly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Lee was de facto qualified to report the case. As a de facto reporter, any transcript which Lee prepared is entitled to the same treatment as a transcript prepared by a court reporter whose eligibility for the position is not questioned. Menzies does not contend that the de facto doctrine should not apply to court reporters; rather, he argues that the trial court erred in finding that Lee possessed the qualifications for the position. In support of this assertion, Menzies points to evidence produced at the hearings which tends to show that Lee did not possess the qualifications of a court reporter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16. [22] Specifically, he asserts that evidence was presented showing that Lee lacked the requisite skill and was of bad moral character. However, the existence of conflicting evidence is not sufficient to set aside a trial court's finding. [23] A trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless an appellate court, giving deference to the trial court's superior position to assess credibility, nevertheless concludes that the finding is clearly erroneous. [24] In the instant case, there was sufficient evidence concerning Lee's training, testing, and experience to support the trial judge's determination that Lee was qualified. Indeed, it was established that if Lee had kept her California certification current, she could have obtained a Utah license without taking the Utah test. [25] It appears, therefore, that if Lee had understood the need and requirements for a Utah license, she could have obtained the appropriate certification as easily as she obtained the national certification. Furthermore, the trial court had sufficient information from the testimony and the court's dealing with Lee to make a determination as to her moral character. In addition to the de facto doctrine, another ground supports the trial court's ruling that the transcript may be used and is entitled to the presumption of correctness. It is clear that, as a matter of law, Lee was a temporary reporter and therefore had the statutory authority to report the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17. Although the trial court did not base its ruling on section 78-56-17, we may uphold a trial court's ruling on any proper ground. [26] Section 78-56-17 provides: If any regularly appointed certified shorthand reporter is disabled from performing his duty or is removed from his position, the judge of the court in which that certified shorthand reporter has been appointed may appoint any substitute he deems competent to act during such temporary disability of the regular reporter and until his successor is appointed. The temporary appointment shall continue only until the next regular examination for certified shorthand reporters held by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. The administrative office of the courts determined that despite the fact that Lee did not have a Utah license, she could work as a temporary reporter pursuant to this section. This determination is undoubtedly correct. The plain language of the statute establishes that a temporary substitute does not have to meet the requirements of a regularly appointed certified shorthand reporter, but only needs to be deemed competent by the trial judge. [27] In the instant case, the record clearly establishes that both the trial judge and the administrative office of the courts found that Lee was qualified for the position. Moreover, it was established that Lee was the only applicant for the position, and she reported Menzies' case between the time she was hired and the time of the next regular examination for certified shorthand reporters. Menzies argues that section 78-56-17 cannot apply in this case because the record does not show that Lee's predecessor was disabled or removed from his position. However, the record reveals that there was a vacancy. The precise reason for the vacancy has no bearing on Lee's status as a temporary reporter. Clearly, the former court reporter must have been either disabled or removed for the vacancy to exist. Therefore, Lee had the statutory authority to report Menzies' case, and pursuant to section 78-56-17, the transcript may be used on appeal and is entitled to the presumption of correctness. Menzies also argues that Lee's use of a note reader precludes the use of the transcript on appeal or, alternatively, prevents the transcript from being presumed correct. As noted above, however, it was established that certified court reporters use note readers and that the note reader Lee used was considered excellent. While Lee did not initially proofread the entire transcript, a general procedure when using a note reader, she did read over all her notes during the proceedings to correct the record. Given these facts, there is no basis for the assertion that Menzies is entitled to a new trial because Lee used a note reader to assist in the preparation of the transcript. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Menzies is not entitled to a new trial by reason of Lee's licensure status and that the transcript Lee prepared is entitled to the presumption of correctness.