Opinion ID: 2639482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Muslim's October 27, 1989, Statement to the Police

Text: After the defense presented evidence of Muslim's favorable plea bargain, the prosecution sought to rehabilitate him by presenting evidence of a prior consistent statement that he gave to police officers on October 27, 1989, before he had been charged with a crime. The defense objected, citing Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b), which allows admission of prior consistent statements only when the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen. Defendant argues that Muslim feared prosecution for the murder of Herman Weeks at Domino's Pizza, and thus had a motive to put the blame on petitioner as soon as the police contacted him about that murder. The Attorney General replies that Muslim's statement was made before the plea bargain and hence before one of the circumstances providing a motive for him to accuse defendant had arisen. The issue thus posed is whether a prior consistent statement is admissible if made before one of the alleged grounds for bias existed, but after another such ground. We discussed this matter in three previous cases. In People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 210, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285, we upheld the admission of a prior consistent statement, saying that defense counsel's questioning of [the accomplice] raised an implicit charge that the `deal' provided [him] with an additional motive to testify untruthfully. This, in turn, entitled the prosecution to show that [the accomplice's] testimony was consistent with the recorded statement he gave shortly after his arrest but before the `deal' was consummated, that is, before the subsequent, specific motive to fabricate arose. People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 609, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376, described our holding in Andrews: We [there] rejected the defendant's contention that admission of the statement was error because the witness had a motive to fabricate when he made the prior statement. We decided, in effect, that a prior consistent statement is admissible if it was made before the existence of any one or more of the biases or motives that, according to the opposing party's express or implied charge, may have influenced the witness's testimony. (Italics added.) People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160 reached the same result. It said: Although defendant argues that [the accomplice] had a motive to minimize his potential penal liability as soon as [the police] told him that he was liable criminally as a coconspirator, as People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d 577, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376, makes clear, the focus under Evidence Code section 791 is the specific agreement or other inducement suggested by cross-examination as supporting the witness's improper motive. ( Hayes, at p. 630, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) On the basis of these three decisions, we conclude that the trial court here properly admitted the consistent statement of Najee Muslim because it was made before the plea bargain was struck and thus before the existence of one of the grounds alleged in defendant's charge that Muslim's trial testimony was biased. Defendant accuses his counsel of incompetence for not requesting a jury instruction that, before the jury could consider the prior consistent statements of Muslim and Luna, it had to first find that neither Muslim nor Luna had been threatened with prosecution for murder before the police interviewed them. As we have explained, the evidence was admissible because the statements at issue were made before the plea bargains with Muslim and Luna were agreed upon. In deciding what weight to give that evidence, the jury could consider the possibility that even before the plea bargains, Muslim and Luna were under pressure to make statements exonerating themselves and naming defendant as the killer. But the jurors were not required to find the total absence of any motive for bias before they could give any weight to the testimony.