Opinion ID: 399393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exemption (k)(5) of the Privacy Act

Text: 14 The Privacy Act came into being in conjunction with 1974 legislation amending the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 23 It had its genesis in a growing awareness that governmental agencies were accumulating an ever-expanding stockpile of information about private individuals that was readily susceptible to both misuse and the perpetuation of inaccuracies that the citizen would never know of, let alone have an opportunity to rebut or correct. In response to fear that the secret gathering of information on people or the creation of secret information systems or data banks on Americans by employees of the departments and agencies of the executive branch 24 could soon make Orwell's vision of 1984 25 a reality, Congress designed the Privacy Act to prevent the kind of illegal, unwise, overbroad investigation and record surveillance of law-abiding citizens produced in recent years from actions of over-zealous investigators, and the curiosity of some government administrators, or the wrongful disclosure and use, in some cases, of personal files held by Federal agencies. 26 15 In providing for divulgence of the contents of agency records to individuals to whom they pertain, the structure of the Privacy Act is similar to that of the Freedom of Information Act. 27 One of the Privacy Act's fundamental premises is that all records compiled on an individual must on request be revealed to that individual unless they fall within one or more specifically enumerated exemptions. 28 This litigation implicates Exemption (k)(5), which protects from disclosure. 16 investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or access to classified information, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. 29 17 The statutory language most critical to the case at bar refers to an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. Its significance is a question of first impression for a court of appeals, and only one district court seems to have addressed it directly. In Nemetz v. Department of Treasury, 30 a case similar in many respects to the one now before us, 31 the court refused to award summary judgment for the agency, stating: 18 We find that the defendant's general averments of promises of confidentiality are insufficient to support an award of summary judgment on their behalf. To fulfill the Privacy Act's purpose of granting access to an individual's government records, ... any exemptions must be narrowly construed and the requirements strictly met. In cases where exemption is sought under Section 552a(k)(5), this standard requires finding a promise of confidentiality as to each source sought to be withheld. General allegations concerning policy are insufficient. Evidence must be presented based on personal knowledge that an express or implied promise of confidentiality was given as to each source sought to be exempted under this provision. 32 19 We think that this approach is eminently correct. To allow an agency to withhold information simply by asserting that all background investigations conducted prior to the effective date of the Privacy Act must be deemed to have been undertaken under implied promises of confidentiality is to defeat the congressional intent underlying the design of the statute. In response to concern that agencies such as the FBI would be hampered in their law enforcement efforts by the Privacy Act's disclosure mandate, Congress specifically exempted information held by these entities for law enforcement purposes. 33 After weighing the competing interests in information gathered on prospective federal employees, however, Congress struck an entirely different balance. In this area, Congress plainly determined that the Government's stake in nondisclosure was far less important than it is in the context of law enforcement operations, 34 and it is evident that the citizen's interest in access to personal data affecting his ability to earn a living is of a very high magnitude. Consequently, Congress authorized withholding of identities of sources of such information, when gathered after the effective date of the Privacy Act, only upon a showing of an express promise of confidentiality. 35 Identities of persons who supplied information on prospective federal employees prior to that time were to be accorded somewhat greater protection, but certainly not an absolute exemption from disclosure. On the contrary, their identities were to be shielded only upon demonstration of an implied promise of confidentiality. 36 20 The Wroblewski affidavit does not suffice to establish that the Londrigan interviewees were all, or indeed in any particular instance, impliedly assured of confidentiality. Wroblewski reveals nothing unique, in terms of need or desire for confidentiality, about this group of persons or their comments; rather, he asks the courts to do what Congress has already refused to do-except all pre-1975 investigative files from disclosure. To do so would put this court in a legislative rather than a judicial role, a transposition of functions we cannot accept. By the same token, an examination of documents which reveals merely that they contain information about a prospective employee's character, ability and other traits, and that these data were supplied by acquaintances, business associates, and record custodians, does not furnish enough of a foundation for upholding an agency's refusal to disclose the identities of the sources. Nor is the fact that the FBI collected the materials dispositive. These are elements common to nearly every file maintained on candidates for federal employment, and factors of which Congress was well aware. 37 21 To rest a holding that nondisclosure is justified solely on identification of these ingredients is to abdicate the responsibility vested in the courts to ensure that the Privacy Act is obeyed. If Congress had intended to require no more than a showing as minimal as that accepted by the District Court in this case, it could simply have enacted a blanket exemption for files containing information on a federal job-applicant's qualifications. Since Congress did not insert such an exception to disclosure in the Privacy Act, it surely must have expected a stronger demonstration of an implied promise of confidentiality than is portrayed by either the Wroblewski affidavit or the District Court's observations on the nature of the documents lodged in Londrigan's FBI file. 22 The legislative history of the Privacy Act provides clear support for the conclusion that neither a conclusory affidavit nor a general examination of documents suffices to validate a finding of an implied promise of confidentiality. While neither the House nor the Senate committee report is particularly helpful on this point, the debates are most informative. Exemption (k)(5) originated as an amendment to H. 16373, the House bill that later became the Privacy Act. 38 The amendment was introduced by Representative Erlenborn in order to protect the identities of persons who without an expectation of confidentiality would not have supplied information to the agency collecting it. According to Representative Erlenborn, 23 (i)n the past there has been lawfully expressed an implied promise of confidentiality given to those who have made statements to investigators. 24 The functions of this bill, if it is not amended by the Erlenborn amendment, will be to open up all of those old files so that those statements that were given in confidence will now be made available to the individual. 39 25 The introduction of this proposed addition to the bill sparked a somewhat heated discussion. Objections were raised on the theory that it would insulate from disclosure far too much of the information contained in files theretofore compiled prior. 40 Representative Fascell questioned even the notion of an implied promise of confidentiality; he related, never have I had any Government agency or agent say to me, '(s)ir, the information you give me is classified' or '(t)he information will be kept confidential.'  41 In response, Representative Erlenborn was at pains to point out that the exemption was intended to be very narrow:The gentleman from Florida says that he has never had any promises, express or implied. In that case, his name will be made available if he is not one who has given such a statement, because the only thing that would be protected are those confidential sources. 42 26 Representative Erlenborn also indicated, in answer to a question from Representative Goldwater, that access to the courts would provide the necessary check and balance on agency discretion with respect to the determin(ation) whether in fact information is included, or whether in fact third parties should be made available. 43 27 The import of this excerpt from the legislative history is plain, and it is precisely in line with our own conclusions and those of the Nemetz court. 44 Confidentiality is not to be inferred simply from the circumstance that the information was solicited by and given to a governmental agency; an adequate basis for implication of a promise of confidentiality must be shown. Something more is necessary than a general averment that all information compiled by the agency prior to 1975 was acquired pursuant to implied pledges of that sort. Verification of the fact of such a promise may vary in extent depending on the type of information, the circumstances under which it was gathered, and other factors, but some effort beyond mere observations that the documents contain comments on a prospective employee's character and other personal assets or shortcomings, and that they were supplied by acquaintances and business associates, must be made to enable a determination of exactly what kinds of assurances, if any, were given to providers of the information. An implied promise of confidentiality is established only as a logical deduction from the circumstances shown, and from one set to another the result indicated expectably may differ. In the instant case, for example, Wroblewski observed that one document notes an express request that the data therein be kept confidential, and clearly the identity of that source should not be disclosed. 45 The fact that the request was recorded, however, cuts against the agent's assertion that people naturally and invariably assumed that information they furnished the FBI would be held in secrecy. Similarly, while the supplier's relationship to the subject of the investigation may have significance for the outcome, the mere fact that he is a public or school official would not in itself seem to require withholding of his name, much less his position at the time the information was obtained. 28 It follows that this case must be remanded to the District Court for further investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the information contained in the FBI's file on Londrigan. In order to facilitate this process, there are several steps that the District Court appropriately may take. First, a careful review of each document should be undertaken to determine the nature of the source-for example, record custodian, personal acquaintance or the like-and whether any statement contained in the document indicates an expectation of confidentiality. 46 Second, while the FBI cannot realistically be expected to contact the interviewees themselves, at least some of the available investigating agents might be consulted to determine whether any promises or assurances were expressly given or impliedly arose in Londrigan's instance. 47 Third, FBI policies prevalent in 1961 may be considered, but great care should be taken to avoid confusion of internal agency rules with specific practices actually pursued with persons interviewed. 48 29 The District Court may find other indicia of the presence or absence of promises of confidentiality, and the court should feel free to weigh them, but we hasten to point out that the mere fact that the FBI conducted the investigation or that the comments were of a personal nature does not dictate the result. 49 With that, we now turn to the District Court's dispositions of Londrigan's Rule 56 motions, and the need for their reconsideration on remand.