Opinion ID: 1928842
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: commissioner's power to base overtime rates on regular hourly wage rather than basic minimum wage

Text: The court below felt this question was prematurely posed since none of the petitioners had demonstrated they actually paid more than the minimum rate provided in Mandatory Order No. 10. We think, however, the query was within the orbit of the issues raised and should have been decided on the merits. Although a petition for declaratory judgment under R.R. 4:88-10 is brought to review quasi -legislative action in lieu of the former practice of a writ of certiorari, see Carls v. Civil Service Comm. of N.J., 17 N.J. 215, 219, 220 (1955), the principles pertaining to the rendering of judgment in an action for a declaratory judgment are nonetheless instructive. See Wagner v. Ligham, 37 N.J. Super. 430 ( App. Div. 1955). In contrast to the narrow view predominant at the inception of this mode of action, declaratory judgments now, in general, receive favorable treatment on the part of our courts when asked to exercise jurisdiction. See National-Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Camden Trust Co., 21 N.J. 16 (1956); Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Assn., 13 N.J. 528 (1953); Blackman v. Iles, supra ; New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235 (1949). Here, resolving the rights and duties of the parties before further damage ensues by reason of the Commissioner's order may prevent extensive subsequent litigation. The appellants are the direct objects of the Commissioner's order and have a vital interest in ascertaining its validity. In our economy wages frequently fluctuate in response to labor market conditions, and the petitioners' freedom to bargain may be impinged upon by their uncertainty as to whether or not a regular wage in excess of the minimum ordered by the Commissioner is the gauge of overtime rates. Until this is determined, they can make no accurate forecast as to their labor costs. Then too, if the matter is not decided now, the petitioners could reinstitute this action with respect to the point under discussion merely by raising the wages of the employees involved a few cents above the minimum. The necessity for such a circuitous process of attaining justice was one of the objectionable features we hoped our new court system had successfully abolished. We think the controversy is seasonably ripe for judicial determination. See Wagner v. Ligham, 39 N.J. Super. 13 ( App. Div. 1956), for a very liberal application of R.R. 4:88-10. On the merits, we conclude the Commissioner's action should be sustained as within the scope of his authority delineated by statute. Overtime rates based on the wage actually paid reasonably subserve the purposes of the enactment in helping to secure a fair and reasonable compensation for services rendered and a minimum living wage. They obviously serve to distribute work and to prevent impairment of health in a manner impossible to accomplish using the minimum wage. The question as to the authority of the Commissioner to fix overtime rates at time and one-half regular pay was called troublesome by the tribunal below, apparently because a literal reading of the language employed in R.S. 34:11-47 might possibly be interpreted as restricting the allowable increase for overtime work to a percentage of the established minimum rate. Any such approach, however, is obliterated by the history of the enactment, its purposes, the administrative action with reference to it over the many years, and the common practices of both labor and management. As stated previously, it is usual to pay at one and one-half times the regular wage. The practice is so universal that when an employee is retained and told he will receive time-and-a-half as overtime, he automatically assumes it will be computed upon his regular hourly wage. No inquiry is customarily made as to the possible utility of any other standard. For 17 years the Commissioner has construed the act as delegating to him the power to base overtime rates on the regular rate where such is deemed appropriate in the occupation being considered. Commissioner, Mandatory Orders Nos. 2, 3 and 9. The principle is well established by a wealth of authority that resort may be had to long usage and practical interpretation in construing statutes to ascertain their meaning, to explain a doubtful phrase or to illuminate any obscurity. See, e.g., State Department of Civil Service v. Clark, 15 N.J. 334, 341 (1954); Swede v. City of Clifton, 39 N.J. Super. 366 ( App. Div. 1956), affirmed 22 N.J. 303 (1956); Kaske v. State, 34 N.J. Super. 222, 225-226 ( App. Div. 1955); Walsh v. Department of Civil Service, 32 N.J. Super. 39, 48-49 ( App. Div. 1954). Furthermore, this administrative construction has, inferentially at least, received legislative approval when, after the promulgation of Mandatory Orders Nos. 2 and 3, the Legislature amended the very section under discussion, R.S. 34:11-47, in 1941 ( L. 1941, c. 321, § 2, p. 862), but imposed no new limitations upon the Commissioner's powers. See Harper v. New Jersey Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 1 N.J. 93, 99 (1948). Additionally, a statute should be interpreted by a mind sympathetic to its aims which recognizes the difficulties inherent in formulating a precise expression of legislative intent in light of the diversity of circumstances to be covered. As was said in Waters v. Quimby, 27 N.J.L. 296, 311 ( Sup. Ct. 1859), affirmed 28 N.J.L. 533 ( E. & A. 1859), and repeated in Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 22 N.J. 200, 205 (1956): When the words of a statute are susceptible of two meanings, the one favorable, and the other hostile to its principal design, the former should prevail and control the construction. Where the words are clear, and the difficulty is made by critical exposition, that exposition should not be adopted in clear contravention of the scope and policy of the act. Few statutes would stand if tried by the strictest standards of logic, grammar, or rhetoric. See also DeFazio v. Haven Savings & Loan Ass'n, 22 N.J. 511, 518 (1956), and Caputo v. Best Foods, Inc., 17 N.J. 259, 263-264 (1954). We conclude the Commissioner's determination to establish overtime rates based upon the regular hourly wage, as stated in Mandatory Order No. 10, must be sustained as a valid exercise of a properly delegated authority. As modified and expanded, the judgment below is affirmed. Justice HEHER votes to affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division according to the opinion of Judge CLAPP. For affirmance  Chief Justice VANDERBILT, and Justices HEHER, OLIPHANT, WACHENFELD, BURLING, JACOBS and WEINTRAUB  7. For reversal  None.