Opinion ID: 844288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Error in Admission of Victim Impact Evidence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting, over his objection, a videotape depicting Ronald Lee singing and dancing, activities at which he was accomplished and in which he took great pleasure. Defendant further contends the trial court abused its discretion in permitting four witnesses to testify regarding the impact of Lee's murder on them, although with but one minor exception he made no objection to their testimony at trial. The asserted errors in admitting this evidence, defendant argues, deprived him of the due process of law. As we shall explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (31) Admission of victim impact evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial is permissible under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597]), and such evidence is admissible as a circumstance of the offense under section 190.3, factor (a) ( People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 573), provided it does not invite a purely irrational response from the jury ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775]). Victim impact evidence is designed to show ... each victim's `uniqueness as an individual human being.' ( Payne, at p. 823, italics omitted.) (32) We have held that courts should be cautious about admitting videotapes featuring the victim, noting that [p]articularly if the presentation lasts beyond a few moments, or emphasizes the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by stirring music, the medium itself may assist in creating an emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond what the jury might experience by viewing still photographs of the victim or listening to the victim's bereaved parents. ... In order to combat this strong possibility, courts must strictly analyze evidence of this type and, if such evidence is admitted, courts must monitor the jurors' reactions to ensure that the proceedings do not become injected with a legally impermissible level of emotion. ( People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1289 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015].) The determination whether and to what extent to admit a videotape of the victim's life at the penalty phase of a capital case is within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 801 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548] (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see also People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 579 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 236 P.3d 312] [admission of a brief `home movie' videotape depicting the victim during a family holiday celebration and a family trip did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion].) In the five-minute videotape, which the trial court viewed before admitting and which we too have viewed, Ronald Lee is seen singing, dancing, and rapping in three musical numbers with relatives, including his cousin Littell Williams, Jr.; in a fourth number, Lee and several other young people perform before a crowd in a high school auditorium. The videotape is of home movie quality, without added music, narration or visual techniques, or staged or contrived elements; it is not a tribute or eulogy, and there is nothing particularly dramatic or emotional about the performances. (See People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 785 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 209 P.3d 1].) The videotape depicts Lee at an age only about two years younger than he was at the time of his death at age 20, and thus presumably very nearly as he was when defendant shot him. The depiction of Lee's singing and dancing was relevant to show what he was like. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 798.) We agree with the trial court that the videotape contained nothing inflammatory that would divert the jury from [its] proper function, and nothing in the record suggests the jury in fact reacted emotionally to the playing of the videotape. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. Defendant also contends the testimony of the four witnessesAndrea Clayton, Diane Williams, Littell Williams, Sr., and Littell Williams, Jr. regarding the effect of Ronald Lee's murder on them exceeded the proper scope of victim impact evidence under state and federal law and was so prejudicial as to require reversal of the death judgment. Andrea Clayton, the mother of Ronald Lee's child, testified she met Lee when she was 15 years old and, although they were no longer boyfriend and girlfriend at the time of his death, they had agreed to be supportive of each other. At the time of trial, their son was three years old, and Clayton had told him mean people had shot his daddy, who was in heaven with Jesus now. She wondered how their relationship would be and what their family would be like if Lee had lived. She missed Lee's companionship and everything about him. Diane Williams, Lee's legal guardian and the mother figure in his life, testified Lee was a joy, a well-mannered, friendly, and helpful boy. She described the shock of learning of Lee's death, the difficulty she had in coming to terms with it, and the emptiness it left in their family. Littell Williams, Sr., Lee's mother's uncle, knew Lee all his life. Lee was a good, helpful, ambitious young man with a lovely voice. Williams, Sr., missed Lee's presence, particularly at the church they both attended. Littell Williams, Jr., Lee's cousin, testified he and Lee grew up together and were like brothers. They had a strong bond and did everything together; Williams, Jr., confided in Lee in a way he could not do with anyone else. They had formed a singing group and made a recording under a contract with a Los Angeles company. Williams, Jr., described the shock of learning of Lee's death and his difficulty in accepting it. Lee's death had taken a toll on Williams, Jr., and his family, and holidays were never the same afterward. As noted, [u]nless it invites a purely irrational response, evidence of the effect of a capital murder on the loved ones of the victim and the community is relevant and admissible under section 190.3, factor (a) as a circumstance of the crime. [Citation.] The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. ( People v. Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 574; see also People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 258 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348, 212 P.3d 639].) Here, as in Burney, the witnesses' testimony was brief, amounting to fewer than 40 pages of reporter's transcript, and, as far as we can discern from the record, was delivered without excessive emotion. The victim impact evidence in this case was typical of this type of evidence that we routinely have allowed, and came within the limits established for such evidence. ( Burney, at p. 258.) Its admission, therefore, was proper under state law and did not violate defendant's federal constitutional rights.