Opinion ID: 785198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii)

Text: 14 1. The Arguments. Evangelista argues that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) — an offense described in section 7201 of Title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000 — together with the rule of lenity, require us to interpret that section to render deportable only persons convicted for tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and not those convicted of defeat[ing] a[ ] tax under that section. He contends further that the crime of defeat[ing] a[ ] tax is not a section 7201 crime relat[ed] to tax evasion, under the language of the parenthetical phrase, because `[e]vasion' appears to involve concealment of assets, whereas `defeating' appears to involve improper tax avoidance, unlawfully minimizing one's tax liability, or other refusal to pay tax. Petitioner's Br. at 16. Evangelista urges us to conclude that because only tax evasion and section 7201 crimes related to tax evasion are aggravated felonies under the INA and because the INS did not meet its burden of proof to establish that Evangelista was convicted of tax evasion or a section 7201 crime relating to tax evasion, he is not deportable for commission of an aggravated felony under the INA. 15 The government responds that the language of section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) provides that any conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 is an aggravated felony, as long as the revenue loss to the government exceeds $10,000, because the parenthetical phrase relating to tax evasion is merely descriptive of the offenses set out in 26 U.S.C. § 7201. And, the government continues, even if section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) is restricted to convictions under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 for offenses described in the parenthetical phrase — relating to tax evasion — a conviction for defeat [of a] tax is a conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 that relat[es] to tax evasion because there is no legal distinction between tax evasion and defeat [of a] tax. The government asks us to conclude that Evangelista is removable whether convicted under section 7201 of tax evasion, defeating taxes, or both. 16 2. Analysis. There are, it seems to us, at most four offenses described in 26 U.S.C. § 7201:(1) evad[ing] ... a[] tax; (2) defeat[ing] a[] tax; (3) evad[ing] ... the payment thereof; and (4) defeat[ing]... the payment thereof. Cf. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 354, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965) (As this Court has recognized, § 7201 includes the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the assessment of a tax as well as the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the payment of a tax. (emphasis omitted)). Although Evangelista attempts to distinguish between defeat[ing] a tax and evad[ing] a tax, courts and commentators use the two terms interchangeably. See, e.g., id. at 351, 85 S.Ct. 1004 (As has been held by this Court, the elements of § 7201 are willfulness; the existence of a tax deficiency; and an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax. (citations omitted)); United States v. Schwartz, 325 F.2d 355, 356 (3d Cir.1963) (noting first that the defendant was indicted for tax evasion and then that the substance of the charge is that he willfully attempted to defeat the payment of taxes); Ian M. Comisky, Lawrence S. Feld & Steven M. Harris, Tax Fraud & Evasion ¶ 7.01[2][a] (2004) ([Section] 7201 defines two distinct crimes: (1) the willful attempt to evade or defeat any tax and (2) the willful attempt to evade or defeat the payment of any tax.). We conclude from this that whatever differences there may be between them, defeat [of a] tax is at least relat[ed] to tax evasion, rendering a conviction for it an aggravated felony within section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii). Whether Evangelista was convicted under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 of evading taxes, defeating taxes, or both, according to the accepted usage of the terms, he was convicted of an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii). We therefore agree with the BIA's reading of section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii). 17 This reading of relating to tax evasion obtains whether the parenthetical phrase in section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) has a restrictive meaning, as Evangelista argues, or a descriptive meaning, as the government argues and as the BIA determined. And inasmuch as we see no ambiguity in the scope of section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) as applied to Evangelista, the rule of lenity has no place in our analysis. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (noting the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948) (We resolve ... doubts in favor of [a] construction [of a deportation statute in favor of a habeas corpus petitioner] because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.... [S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used. (emphasis added)). 18 In United States v. Monjaras-Castaneda, 190 F.3d 326 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1194, 120 S.Ct. 1254, 146 L.Ed.2d 111 (2000), the Fifth Circuit took a somewhat different approach in reaching a similar conclusion in a similar case. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N) declares an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title (relating to alien smuggling) to be an aggravated felony. In interpreting the parenthetical phrase as descriptive rather than restrictive, the Fifth Circuit relied on grammatical rules and the structure and context of section 1101(a)(43) as a whole to determine that the parenthetical phrase modifies paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title rather than an offense. Id. at 329-30 (upholding an enhanced sentence that the defendant received for having committed an aggravated felony, as defined by section 1101(a)(43)(N), for his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) of transporting aliens, which is arguably different from smuggling aliens); accord Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 472-73 (3d Cir.2002) (holding, in reliance on Monjaras-Castaneda and other cases, that a habeas petitioner's conviction for harboring an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N), rendering the petitioner deportable); United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 733-34 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a defendant's conviction for transporting aliens is an aggravated felony and that the defendant therefore deserved an enhanced sentence); United States v. Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d 1246, 1247-48 (10th Cir.2001) (same). 19 The Monjaras-Castaneda court reasoned that traditional rules of grammar indicate that the parenthetical phrase in section 1101(a)(43)(N) modifies paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title because of its placement following those words instead of directly after the words an offense. Monjaras-Castaneda, 190 F.3d at 329. It then noted that section 1101(a)(43) contains a long list of aggravated felonies that it references by statutory section. The court concluded that parenthetical phrases found throughout the statute were included to assist readers in identifying the crimes referred to by the statute, without having to endure the long and arduous process of look[ing] up each section number in the Code. Id. at 330. The court then observed that other parenthetical phrases in that section are expressly restrictive. See id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (listing as an aggravated felony a crime of violence (as defined in § 16 of Title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which a term of imprisonment is at least one year) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(J) (enumerating an offense described... in section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) as an aggravated felony)). The Fifth Circuit was of the view that had Congress intended the parenthetical phrase in section 1101(a)(43)(N) to be restrictive, it would have said so, as it had in the other subsections. Id. 20 We are not entirely comfortable with applying the Fifth Circuit's approach to the case before us. Section 1101(a)(43)(L) deems to be an aggravated felony an offense described in: 21 ... 22 (ii) section 421 of Title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents); or (iii) section 421 of Title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents). 23 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(L). The legislative history indicates that the addition of section 1101(a)(43)(L)(iii) to what already included section 1101(a)(43)(L)(ii) served the purpose of add[ing a] new offense[] to the definition relating to ... revealing the identity of undercover agents. IIRIRA, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 223 (1996). Plainly, the parenthetical phrases in subsections (L)(ii) and (L)(iii) distinguish between different parts of section 421 of Title 50 — one relating to undercover intelligence agents and one relating to undercover agents; they therefore do not simply describe 50 U.S.C. § 421. Evangelista argues in his reply brief that the inclusion of both sections 1101(a)(43)(L)(ii) and (iii) as distinct types of an aggravated felony where the parenthetical phrases cannot be read as descriptive indicates that the similar parenthetical phrase in section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) is not descriptive either. Evangelista's objection is sufficiently compelling for us to refrain from adopting the reasoning of Monjaras-Castaneda for section 1101(a)(43)(N) as our analysis of the language of section 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii). 24 We conclude that irrespective of whether Evangelista was convicted of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, he was convicted of an offense relating to tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Evangelista is thus deportable. 2