Opinion ID: 212837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kitzmann’s Claims

Text: With these precepts in mind, we turn to whether Kitzmann’s claims are preempted. Because “[§]301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by [labor contracts], and also claims ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a [labor contract],’” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394, our Court has created a two-step test for determining whether a plaintiff’s claims are preempted by § 301: First, courts must determine whether resolving the state-law claim would require -7- No. 09-6500 Kitzmann v. Local 619-M interpretation of the terms of the [labor contract]. If so, the claim is preempted. Second, courts must ascertain whether the rights claimed by the plaintiff were created by the [labor contract], or instead by state law. If the rights were created by the [labor contract], the claim is preempted. In short, if a state-law claim fails either of these two requirements, it is preempted by § 301. Mattis v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994)). Here, the district court appears to have found that all of Kitzmann’s claims are preempted by § 301. Kitzmann’s claims can be roughly divided into two categories. The first category, Counts I–IV, are claims for declaratory relief that generally attack the validity of the affiliation referendum and the results that flowed from the referendum. The next category, Counts V–VII, are claims for breach of the employment contract that Kitzmann alleges was created by the Local 619 constitution, and claims for damages that flow from that alleged breach. On appeal, Kitzmann states that he has “abandoned” his claims for declaratory relief and only appeals the district court’s judgment that the other claims, Counts V–VII, are preempted by § 301. Appellant Br. at 1. Kitzmann hopes that we will look only to whether there is federal jurisdiction over the breach of contract claims.1 Id. at 5. 1 We have not addressed whether the holding of Wooddell applies to claims for breach of a local union constitution. Prior to Wooddell we held that a suit by a union member for breach of a local union constitution does not fall within the scope of § 301. Corea v. Welo, 937 F.2d 1132, 1144–45 (6th Cir. 1991). However, the rationale behind that holding, that a union member could never sue a union for breach of a union constitution under § 301, was abrogated by Wooddell. 502 U.S. at 102–03. Since Wooddell, some circuits have held that § 301 does not confer federal jurisdiction to suits for breach of a local union constitution. See Korzen v. Local Union 705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1996); Bermingham v. Castro, No. 98-15859, 1999 WL 644342, at  (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 1999). Other circuits have held that § 301 does confer federal jurisdiction for such suits. See Lee v. Cytec Industries, Inc., 460 F.3d 673, 679–80 (5th Cir. 2006); Wall v. Construction & General Laborers’ Union, Local 230, 224 F.3d 168, 178 (2d Cir. 2000). For the reasons explained below, we do not think it is necessary to reach this question. -8- No. 09-6500 Kitzmann v. Local 619-M But there is nothing in the record to show that Kitzmann “abandoned” or dismissed these claims at the district court. This might be a creative way of attempting to defeat federal jurisdiction, but it is not a tactic that we will entertain. A claimant cannot attempt to defeat jurisdiction (and summary judgment) on appeal by “abandoning” the claims that the claimant worries might have established jurisdiction in the first place. Instead, we determine whether federal jurisdiction exists “by examining the complaint as it existed at the time of removal.” Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 201 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 2000)). Looking to Kitzmann’s complaint, Count I seeks a declaration that the Defendants have refused to hear Kitzmann’s grievances, thereby waiving any requirement to exhaust internal grievance procedures. This claim rests on Kitzmann’s allegation that District Council 3 and the International “violated” Section 17 of the International constitution by neither investigating nor holding a hearing on Kitzmann’s challenge to the affiliation. R. 1-2, Complaint, at ¶ 27, 30, 31. Count II seeks a declaration that the affiliation election was void. Kitzmann rests this claim on “District Council 3 and the [International’s] failure to follow their own constitutions,” which he alleges “results in invalidation of the affiliation and merger agreement,” id. at ¶ 32 (emphasis added), as well as District Council 3's preparation of the ballots in contravention to Local 619's bylaws, id. at ¶ 16. Count III seeks a declaration that the Local 619 constitution was not amended, even if the affiliation agreement was approved. This claim rests on Kitzmann’s assertion that the Defendants’ “failure to follow” the procedural requirements of the District Council 3 constitution and Local 619 constitution results in the “invalidation” of any amendment or modification to the Local 619 -9- No. 09-6500 Kitzmann v. Local 619-M constitution. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 39, 42, 44. Count IV seeks a declaration that Kitzmann was improperly denied compensation as president of Local 619, and that the affiliation agreement and District Council 3 constitution do not serve to end his term as compensated president. This claim rests on Kitzmann’s assertion that the District Council 3 constitution does not prohibit compensation of local officers, id. at ¶ 51, and prevailing on either Count II or Count III. Because the International constitution, the District Council 3 constitution and the affiliation agreement are all “contracts between labor organizations,” they fall within the scope of § 301. Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 100. On the face of Kitzmann’s complaint, these claims allege that the Defendants “violated” or “failed to follow” the provisions of one or more of these § 301 contracts. In other words, Kitzmann has alleged that the Defendants breached these § 301 contracts. There is certainly “federal jurisdiction under § 301[] based on the alleged violation of a contract between labor organizations.” Id. at 103. The district court, therefore, at least had jurisdiction over Count I and II under § 301. All of the remaining claims, which arose out of the same series of events—the affiliation election and fallout—fell within the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction, even if they were not preempted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because at least two Kitzmann’s claims are preempted by § 301, and his remaining claims fell within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motion to remand.