Opinion ID: 64035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Buchner

Text: We begin our analysis with Buchner v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 816 (5th Cir.1993), which TAC cites for the proposition that federal district courts do not, under [section] 1441(c), have discretion to remand claims arising under federal question jurisdiction. In Buchner, the FDIC sued Donald Buchner and others (collectively, the Buchners) in state court to collect money owed to a bank in receivership. 981 F.2d at 817. The Buchners asserted counterclaims against the FDIC, and four months after those claims were severed from the collection action, the FDIC removed them to federal court. Id. The FDIC's removal was untimely, and the district court granted a motion to remand the claims. Id. The case continued in state court, and there it would have remained but for a sanctions motion the Buchners filed against the FBI and one of its agents conducting a criminal investigation in connection with the failure of the bank in receivership. See id. The agent removed the entire case, including the previously remanded claims, to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1) and 1446(b). Id. The Buchners dismissed their sanctions motion against the FBI and its agent and moved for a second remand of the case to state court. Id. at 818. The FDIC opposed the remand motion, arguing that the federal district court had no choice but to retain jurisdiction over the case because it involved federal claims and the FDIC was a party. Id. Without addressing the merits of the FDIC's opposition, the district court granted the motion to remand, ruling that the FDIC had waived its right of removal on those bases long ago. Id. On appeal, we rejected the district court's waiver analysis, holding that [t]he fact that the FDIC waived its right to remove the instant case is irrelevant to the determination of whether the case should have or could have been remanded once it had been properly removed by another party who had not waived the right to remove. Id. We then proceeded to consider the merits of the FDIC's opposition to the Buchners' motion to remand, and in doing so, discussed whether the district court had discretion under section 1441(c) to remand the case. We held that it did not: [I]f a case is removed from state court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and that case also includes state law claims, § 1441(c) allows the district court to decide the entire case or, in its discretion, to remand all matters in which state law predominates. As the FDIC is a party to the present suit, all of the component claims are conclusively deemed to have arisen under federal law. And, as § 1441(c) authorizes the federal district court to remand only those matters in which state law predominates, this discretionary remand provision is inapplicable to the instant action. Id. at 819 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding TAC's reliance on Buchner, this holdingthat section 1441(c) is inapplicable to cases comprised entirely of federal claimsdoes not resolve the question dispositive of the present appeal: whether section 1441(c) authorizes remand of claims conferring removal jurisdiction that are part of a case in which state law predominates. We thus must look elsewhere in our precedent for guidance.