Opinion ID: 1058243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instructions Concerning Malice

Text: Thomas argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's denial of her pre-trial motion to quash, the trial court's denial of her jury instruction on malice, and the trial court's grant of jury instructions on an inference of malice. While Thomas acknowledges that current Virginia law entitles the Commonwealth to jury instructions on an inference of malice, she argues that such an inference is an unconstitutional presumption under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), and that giving the malice jury instructions is reversible error. We have previously addressed all of Thomas' arguments with regard to the constitutionality of instructing the jury on an inference of malice in a murder case. See Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 495-96, 404 S.E.2d 227, 235-36 (1991); Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 263-64, 389 S.E.2d 871, 872 (1990). Specifically, we held constitutional in Strickler jury instructions that stated, that malice could be `inferred from any deliberate wilful [sic] and cruel act against another, however sudden,' and jury instructions that stated a jury `may infer malice from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon unless, from all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether malice existed.' 241 Va. at 495-96, 404 S.E.2d at 235-36. Here, the trial court granted three jury instructions on malice. Instruction Number 9 read: Malice is the state of mind which results in the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal excuse or justification, at a time when the mind of the actor is under the control of reason. Malice may result from any unlawful or unjustifiable motive including anger, hatred or revenge. Malice may be inferred from any deliberate willful and cruel act against another, however sudden. Instruction Number 10 read: You may infer malice from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, unless, from all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether malice existed. A deadly weapon is any object or instrument, not part of the human body, that is likely to cause death or great bodily injury because of the manner and under the circumstances in which it is used. Instruction Number 11 read: Once the Commonwealth has proved there was an unlawful killing, then you are entitled to infer there was malice unless, from all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether malice existed. The trial court did not err in granting these jury instructions. Instructions 9 and 10 are verbatim the instructions we held in Strickler were constitutional and not error to grant. 241 Va. at 495-96, 404 S.E.2d at 235-36. Instruction 11 is within the holding of Hodge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 338, 344, 228 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1976), that an inference of malice arising from the commission of an unlawful homicide is clothed with the due process safeguards required and that the inference must be sufficient for a rational juror to find the presumed or inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in denying Thomas' pretrial motion to quash or dismiss Thomas' murder charge because the Commonwealth is entitled to an inference on malice. See Strickler, 241 Va. at 495-96, 404 S.E.2d at 235-36; Smith, 239 Va. at 263-64, 389 S.E.2d at 882; Hodge, 217 Va. at 344, 228 S.E.2d at 696-97.