Opinion ID: 746430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions for the Mail and Wire Fraud Convictions

Text: 38 The district court instructed the jury that to convict the defendants of mail fraud or wire fraud, the jury had to conclude that there was a scheme to defraud, that the defendants devised or participated in that scheme, that the defendants acted with an intent to defraud, and that the defendants used the mails or wires. Defendants challenge the district court's instruction on the element of intent to defraud, arguing that the court incorrectly defined both the necessary intent to harm and the concept of conscious avoidance. Defendants concede that they did not raise these arguments below, and, therefore, they can prevail only if the district court's instructions constituted plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 39 An appellate court can reverse based on an argument not raised below if there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Johnson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quotations and internal alteration omitted); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-78, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1549 (quotations and internal alterations omitted); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-37, 113 S.Ct. at 1778-80. We consider defendants' arguments in light of this standard.
40 To establish mail fraud or wire fraud, the government must prove, inter alia, that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud); United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 283 (2d Cir.1996) (mail fraud and wire fraud). To establish an intent to defraud, the government must prove that defendants contemplated some actual harm or injury to their victims. Only a showing of intended harm will satisfy the element of fraudulent intent. United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1987) (emphasis added and deleted); see also In re The Seizure of All Funds in Accounts in the Names Registry Publishing, 68 F.3d 577, 580 (2d Cir.1995) (In order to establish that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud, the government must show that some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the schemer.) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir.1994); Dinome, 86 F.3d at 283. 41 Here, as to the intent to harm, the district court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, that 42 a defendant acts with a[n] ... intent to defraud if he participates in the fraudulent scheme with some realization of its fraudulent or deceptive character and with recognition of its capacity to cause harm to the victims of such deception. The Government need not prove, however, that the intended victims were actually harmed, only that such harm was contemplated. 43 (emphasis added). 44 Defendants argue that the quoted charge on intent to harm was insufficient. Defendants contend that because the instructions require only that they have some realization that the scheme was fraudulent and recogni[ze] that the scheme had the capacity to cause harm, the instructions did not require the jury to find that they intended to cause harm. We agree. Consider, for example, that Gabriel's secretary may have had some realization that a fraud was being perpetrated and may have recogni[zed] the fraud's capacity to cause harm. Nevertheless, the secretary may not have intended to cause harm. 45 Nor does the portion of the charge stating that the government must prove that harm was contemplated  save the charge. Contemplate is subject to at least two possible meanings--it could mean to think about or it could mean to have in view as a purpose ... [to] intend. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 491 (1971) (capitalization altered). Our prior decisions have indicated repeatedly that a defendant must have contemplated harm, and when we have used that term, we have clearly meant the latter definition (to intend) rather than the former (to think about). See, e.g., Starr, 816 F.2d at 98 (government must prove that defendants contemplated some actual harm or injury to their victims. Only a showing of intended harm will satisfy the element of fraudulent intent. (second emphasis added)); Dinome, 86 F.3d at 283-84 (indicating that contemplated harm is required and approving portion of jury instruction that stated that  'Intent to defraud' means to act ... with ... the purpose of causing some financial or property loss to another (emphasis omitted)). If the term contemplate was interpreted to mean to think about, the term would be essentially synonymous with to realize or to recognize--and so understood, the term misstates the law (consider that Gabriel's secretary may have thought about, but not intended, harm). We do not believe that a jury would interpret contemplate to mean to think about if the jury instructions otherwise made clear that defendants must have intended harm. Here, however, immediately before the instructions stated that the government must prove that defendants contemplated harm, the instructions stated that the government had to prove that defendant had some realization that the scheme was fraudulent and recogni[zed] that the scheme had the capacity to cause harm. The instructions therefore indicate to the jury that contemplate should be interpreted synonymously with realize or recognize--which is an error. 46 We therefore conclude that there was an error in the jury instructions. However, we need not decide whether the error was plain because we conclude that the error did not prejudice defendants. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35, 113 S.Ct. at 1777-78 (whether an error affects substantial rights generally turns on whether the error was prejudicial). To have convicted defendants under the charge given by the district court, the jury must have concluded that there was a scheme to defraud, that defendants devised or participated in that scheme, and, under the district court's erroneous intent to defraud definition, that defendants realized that the scheme was fraudulent and recognized its capacity to cause harm. Having reached each of these conclusions, the jury necessarily would have concluded that defendants intended to cause harm. This is not a case like the innocent secretary example discussed above. Rather, both defendants were executive vice presidents at CRT and both participated as principals in the decisionmaking relating to their respective fraud convictions. As such, once the jury concluded that defendants were participating as principals in a fraudulent scheme that they realized was fraudulent and that they recognized could cause harm, the jury would have certainly concluded that defendants intended to cause harm. Accordingly, we conclude that the error in the instruction did not prejudice defendants. 47
48 In addition to the district court's definition of intent to defraud, the district court also instructed the jury on the concept of conscious avoidance. We have stated: 49 Conscious avoidance is a concept that deals most directly with knowledge. A conscious-avoidance instruction is appropriate when a defendant claims to lack some specific aspect of knowledge necessary to conviction but where the evidence may be construed as deliberate ignorance. Nonetheless, conscious avoidance is not irrelevant to intent, for knowledge is one component of intent. Without the knowledge, the intent cannot exist. Thus even in a ... case[ ] in which specific intent must be proven, use of a conscious-avoidance instruction may be appropriate with respect to the defendant's knowledge of the objectives of the conspiracy[.] The same is true of mail fraud cases. 50 .... 51 ... Thus, we would urge the trial court in each case to clarify for the jury ... that the conscious-avoidance concept is pertinent to knowledge or sincerity of belief or to the knowledge component of intent, but that a finding of conscious avoidance could not alone provide the basis for finding purpose or for finding intent as a whole. 52 United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1195-96 (2d Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 53 Here, the district court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, that: 54 As with proof of the other states of mind, direct proof of fraudulent intent is not required. Fraudulent intent may be established by circumstantial evidence, based upon a person's outward manifestations, his words, his acts and all surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom. 55 Inferences may also be drawn from a failure to act. For example, if you find that a defendant deliberately and purposely avoids learning obvious facts--if, as the saying goes, he puts his head in the sand to avoid seeing what is plainly to be seen--you may infer that he does so because he secretly knows that there is a high probability that what he will see if he does not deliberately turn away are facts that will give the lie to his own representations. From such circumstances ... you may, if you wish, infer fraudulent intent. 56 Defendants argue that the last sentence in the second paragraph indicates to the jury that it may infer fraudulent intent from conscious avoidance, and that therefore, the district court erred in giving the instruction. See id. at 1196 (a finding of conscious avoidance could not alone provide the basis for ... finding intent). In contrast, the government argues that the circumstances referred to in that sentence refer to all the circumstances, including those discussed in the first paragraph. The government argues that if the instruction is interpreted as it suggests, the instruction conveys the notion that conscious avoidance, along with other circumstances, is sufficient to infer intent. See id. (conscious avoidance is relevant to intent). 57 We assume, without deciding, that defendants are correct--that the instruction erroneously indicated to the jury that a finding of conscious avoidance was sufficient to infer intent. We nevertheless conclude that the error did not prejudice defendants. 58 Defendants do not challenge the district court's definition of conscious avoidance; rather, they simply contend that the court should have instructed the jury that conscious avoidance was sufficient to infer knowledge, but not intent. Therefore, assuming that the jury here relied on conscious avoidance to infer intent to defraud (which is the only way defendants could have been prejudiced by the instruction), it is fair to assume that if the jury had been properly instructed, it would have relied on conscious avoidance to infer the lesser mental state of knowledge of the fraud. If we combine a finding of knowledge of the fraud with the other findings this jury must have made to have convicted defendants, we see that if the jury had been properly instructed, it would have found that there was a scheme to defraud, that defendants participated in that scheme, and that defendants knew that a fraud was being perpetrated. Having reached each of these conclusions, the jury necessarily would have concluded that defendants intended to defraud. As discussed above, this is not a case like our innocent secretary example. Rather, both defendants were executive vice presidents at CRT and both participated in the decisionmaking relating to their respective fraud convictions. As such, once the jury concluded that defendants were participating in a fraudulent scheme that they knew was fraudulent, the jury certainly would have found that defendants intended to defraud. Accordingly, we conclude that any error was not prejudicial. 59 D. False Statements to the FAA Relating to the LPT Case Scheme--Aider and Abettor Liability 60 Based on the false statement on the LPT case's packing slip (that the LPT case was serviceable), Gabriel was convicted of making a materially false statement within the jurisdiction of the FAA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Gabriel contends, and the government seemingly concedes, that there was no evidence that Gabriel prepared the slip himself. 61 Accordingly, to establish Gabriel's guilt, the government relied on 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), 4 which states: Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. As we have stated previously, the purpose of section 2(b) is to punish a person who causes the doing of an act which if done by him directly would render him guilty of an offense against the United States. It [establishes that one who] ... causes the commission of an indispensable element of the offense by an innocent agent ... is guilty as a principal. United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 383 (2d Cir.1992) (quotation and emphasis omitted, and paragraph structure altered). Generally, to establish a conviction through the use of section 2(b), the government must prove that the defendant had the mental state necessary to violate the underlying criminal statute and that the defendant willfully caused another to commit the necessary act. See 18 U.S.C § 2(b). 62 On appeal, Gabriel challenges his conviction on two grounds. First, Gabriel contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he caused another to prepare the slip. Second, Gabriel contends that because section 2(b) requires a defendant to have acted willfully, the jury should have been charged that it could convict Gabriel only if he knowingly violated the law. 5 We reject both arguments. 63 Gabriel's first argument is disposed of easily. By Gabriel's own admissions, he knew that CRT sent packing slips with repaired parts and that the packing slips contained a description of the work that CRT had performed. If the packing slip here stated the truth, that the LPT case was irreparable scrap, the LPT case scheme quite obviously would have failed. Gabriel therefore had a strong incentive to ensure that the packing slip falsely stated that the LPT case was serviceable. Moreover, although Gabriel was in CRT's production department and the packing slip was prepared by quality control, there was overwhelming evidence that the two were entangled. For example, when a CRT quality control inspector resisted approving the LPT case, Gabriel persuaded him to approve the case, stating to him that [w]e can't all be pussies about this. Therefore, although no evidence directly indicates that Gabriel caused quality control to prepare the false packing slip, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Gabriel had some influence over quality control and that Gabriel used that influence to cause quality control to prepare the false slip. 6 64 Gabriel's more substantial argument is that under Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994), the jury should have been charged that section 2(b)'s use of the term willfully means that the government was required to prove that Gabriel knowingly violated the law. In Ratzlaf, the Supreme Court held that the term willfully, as used in 31 U.S.C. § 5322, established that the government was required to prove that a defendant knowingly violated the law. Id. at 136-37, 114 S.Ct. at 656-57. However, the Court did not hold that the government had to prove a knowing violation of the law every time a statute used the term willful. Rather, the Court stated that [w]illful ... is a word of many meanings, and its construction is often ... influenced by its context. Id. at 141, 114 S.Ct. at 659 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We therefore examine section 2(b) below to determine what willfully means within that section. 65 Before we do so, however, we pause to discuss why we will not follow the approach taken by the Third Circuit in United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir.1994). In Curran, the defendant was convicted of submitting false reports to the Federal Election Commission, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Id. at 562. Although the government could not prove that the defendant prepared or submitted the false reports, the government could prove that the defendant caused others to do so. Id. at 563. Accordingly, the government used section 2(b) [t]o bridge the gap. Id. at 567. On appeal, the issue was whether section 2(b)'s use of the term willfully established that the government was required to prove that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful. Id. at 567-68. 7 66 The court indicated that its research has not revealed any controlling case law expounding on the proper construction of 'willfulness' required for a [jury] charge under section 2(b) linked with section 1001 in an Election Campaign Act case. Id. at 568. After discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf, the Curran Court stated that similarities between the Ratzlaf case and the case before it persuaded it that the government had to prove a knowing violation of the law under section 2(b). Id. at 568-69. Specifically, the court relied on the facts that (1) like the statutes in Ratzlaf, the election laws involved reporting obligations; (2) like the conduct at issue in Ratzlaf, the election law violations were not obviously evil or inherently bad; and (3) like the statutes at issue in Ratzlaf, the election laws were a regulatory scheme. Id. at 569. Accordingly, the court concluded that a proper charge for willfulness in cases brought under sections 2(b) and 1001 in the federal election law context requires the prosecution to prove ... that [the defendant] knew his conduct was unlawful. Id. 67 In interpreting section 2(b), the court focused its attention almost exclusively on the federal election laws and explicitly limited its decision to cases brought under sections 2(b) and 1001 in the federal election law context--indicating that in other contexts, the court might interpret section 2(b)'s willfully requirement differently. Therefore, as we understand the court's decision, if a defendant was prosecuted under sections 2(b) and 1001, whether section 2(b) required a knowing violation of the law would turn on the context in which the statement was made. Moreover, if a defendant was prosecuted under section 2(b) and a criminal section other than section 1001, whether section 2(b) required a knowing violation of the law would turn not only on the nature of the other section, but also on the context of the alleged violation of that section (the court did not limit its analysis to sections 2(b) and 1001, but moved on to consider the context in which the alleged violation occurred--the federal election laws). 68 Aside from the obvious interpretative difficulties that this approach would create, this sort of approach was rejected by the Supreme Court in Ratzlaf. The section at issue in Ratzlaf, 31 U.S.C. § 5322, makes it a crime to willfully violate a number of other sections. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136, 114 S.Ct. at 656-57. The issue before the Ratzlaf Court was whether section 5322's willfully element required the government to prove a knowing violation of the law when a person was accused of violating section 5324. 8 Id. at 136-37, 114 S.Ct. at 656-57. The Court noted that section 5322's willfully element had been consistently interpreted to require a knowing violation of the law as it applied to sections other than section 5324, and the Court stated: A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears. We have even stronger cause to construe a single formulation ... the same way each time it is called into play. Id. at 141-43, 114 S.Ct. at 659-60 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that however willfully is to be interpreted under section 2(b), it should be interpreted consistently. 69 We turn then to the task at hand, interpreting the willfully requirement of section 2(b), and conclude that the government need not prove a knowing violation of the law under that section. The principal reason for our conclusion is simple. The general rule in criminal cases is that the government need not prove a knowing violation of the law--we see no reason that Congress would change that rule simply because a person caused an innocent intermediary to act. 9 The most natural interpretation of section 2(b) is that a defendant with the mental state necessary to violate the underlying section is guilty of violating that section if he intentionally causes another to commit the requisite act. See United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1451-52 (10th Cir.1992) (section 2(b) does not require a knowing violation of the law); cf. United States v. Jordan, 927 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir.1991) (under section 2(b), a defendant is as liable for [a crime] as she would have been if she had physically [committed it herself]); American Surety Co. of New York v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir.1925) (L.Hand, J.) (The word 'willful' ... means no more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing. It does not mean that, in addition, he must suppose that he is breaking the law.). 70 Moreover, the considerations that led the Ratzlaf Court to interpret willfully to require a knowing violation of the law under section 5322 are of little aid in interpreting section 2(b). The Ratzlaf Court indicated that if it did not interpret willfully to require a knowing violation of the law, the word would be mere surplusage. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140-41, 114 S.Ct. at 658-59. Here, there is no such problem. If willfully is interpreted to mean intentionally, it has a role to fill--the government must prove that defendant intentionally caused another to act. The Ratzlaf Court also was influenced by the complex of provisions in which [section 5322 is] embedded. Id. at 141, 114 S.Ct. at 659; see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-01, 111 S.Ct. 604, 609-10, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (because the tax laws are so complex, their use of the term willfully indicates that a knowing violation of the law is required). Here, in contrast, section 2(b) is quite uncomplicated. The Ratzlaf Court's third reason was, as is discussed above, that the term had been consistently interpreted as requiring a knowing violation of the law in other contexts. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141-43, 114 S.Ct. at 659-60. Here, we could not find any binding precedent interpreting section 2(b)'s willfully requirement. Finally, the Ratzlaf Court stated that the conduct at issue was not inevitably nefarious, and the Court gave some examples of occasions in which a person might engage in that conduct for legitimate reasons. See id. at 144-45, 114 S.Ct. at 660-61. That the conduct was not inevitably nefarious seemed to indicate to the Court that the term willfully should be interpreted to require a knowing violation of the law. See id. at 144-46, 114 S.Ct. at 660-62. Here, because a defendant will be convicted through section 2(b) only if the defendant had the mental state necessary to violate the underlying criminal statute, it is inevitable that the defendant had criminal intent. 71 Accordingly, we conclude that the government is not required to prove a knowing violation of the law under section 2(b). E. Witness Tampering 72 As discussed above, even though a CRT inspector concluded that the LPT case was unserviceable scrap after it had been repaired, Gabriel falsely represented to Qantas that the part was 100% serviceable. Eventually, the grand jury and CRT's investigators began to suspect that the repair work had been fraudulently performed. When CRT's investigators asked Gabriel about the repair, Gabriel falsely stated that he had previously disclosed the faults in the LPT case to Qantas. Further, in an attempt to support that story, Gabriel sent the fax to Donald Mealing, the Qantas representative with whom Gabriel had dealt, quoted earlier in this opinion. 73 Gabriel was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), which makes it a crime to corruptly persuade[ ] another person, or attempt[ ] to do so, or engage[ ] in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to--influence ... the testimony of any person in an official proceeding. The government's theory was that Gabriel was attempting to mislead Mealing into believing that Gabriel had previously disclosed that the LPT case was only partially serviceable, and that Gabriel intended to have Mealing believe that lie and repeat it to the grand jury. See United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir.1986) (section 1512(b) applies to the situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness believe the story and testify to it before the grand jury). 10 74 On appeal, Gabriel contends, as he did unsuccessfully below, United States v. Gabriel, 920 F.Supp. 498, 500-02 (S.D.N.Y.1996), that the government was required to prove that his actions were likely to affect Mealing's grand jury testimony. Gabriel further contends that because Mealing was in Australia and beyond the grand jury's subpoena power, there was insufficient evidence to prove that Mealing was likely to testify, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to prove that Gabriel's actions were likely to affect Mealing's testimony. However, our decision in United States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56 (2d Cir.1995), undercuts that argument. 75 In Romero, the defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), see id. at 58, which makes it a crime to kill a person with intent to--prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer ... of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense. On appeal, we rejected the argument that the government had to prove that the victim was willing to cooperate or that an investigation was underway. Id. at 62. Rather, we held that: 76 The government need prove only an intent to kill for the purpose of interfering with communication with federal law enforcement officials. The victim need not have agreed to cooperate with any federal authority or even to have evinced an intention or desire to so cooperate. There need not be an ongoing investigation or even any intent to investigate. Rather, the killing of an individual with the intent to frustrate the individual's possible cooperation with federal authorities is implicated by the statute. 77 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (intent to interfere with potential communication falls within section 1512(a)(1)(C)); United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C.Cir.1994) (Section 1512(b) requires that the jury be able reasonably to infer from the circumstances that [defendant], fearing that a grand jury proceeding had been or might be instituted, corruptly persuaded persons with the intent to influence their possible testimony in such a proceeding. (emphasis added)). 78 The elements of subsection (b)(1), which Gabriel was convicted of violating, are similar to the elements of subsection (a)(1)(C) that we construed in Romero. Compare 18 U.S.C § 1512(b)(1) with § 1512(a)(1)(C). Both sections make it illegal to engage in certain conduct (corruptly persuading/misleading or killing) with an intent to achieve a specified result (influencing testimony in an official proceeding or preventing the communication of crimes to federal authorities). Further, both sections serve the same basic purpose--the prevention of [t]ampering with a witness ... or an informant. See id. Accordingly, we base our interpretation of section 1512(b)(1) on our decision in Romero, and conclude that the government was not required to prove that Mealing was likely to testify or that Gabriel's actions were likely to affect Mealing's testimony. Rather, the government was required to prove only that Gabriel endeavored corruptly to persuade or mislead Mealing with the intent of influencing Mealing's potential testimony before a grand jury. 79 Gabriel contends, nevertheless, that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995), which was decided after we decided Romero, requires that a likely to affect requirement be incorporated into section 1512. In Aguilar, a grand jury was investigating the defendant, and when FBI agents questioned the defendant about his involvement in the subject of the grand jury's investigation, the defendant lied about that involvement. Id. at 597, 115 S.Ct. at 2361. For that lie, the defendant was convicted of violating the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which makes it a crime to corruptly ... endeavor[ ] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice. Id. at 598, 115 S.Ct. at 2361. As in this case, the government's theory in Aguilar was that the defendant lied to the FBI agents with the intent that the FBI agents would believe the lie and repeat it to the grand jury. Id. at 600, 115 S.Ct. at 2362. 80 Although the omnibus clause of section 1503 does not contain a likely to affect requirement, the Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the government had to prove that the defendant's actions were likely to affect a judicial proceeding. Id. at 599-600, 115 S.Ct. at 2362. Because there was no evidence that the FBI agents were to testify before the grand jury, the Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant's actions were likely to affect a judicial proceeding. Id. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it reversed the conviction under section 1503. 81 Although the facts in this case and in Aguilar are similar--each defendant was convicted for telling a lie to a potential witness with the intent that the witness would believe the lie and repeat it to a grand jurythat is where the similarity between these two cases ends. A comparison of the statutes that underlie the convictions demonstrates that the likely to affect requirement that the Aguilar Court incorporated into section 1503 should not be incorporated into section 1512. 82 As mentioned above, the omnibus clause of section 1503 makes it a crime to corruptly ... endeavor[ ] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice. The Aguilar Court plainly was concerned about the very broad language of this clause. Id. at 599, 115 S.Ct. at 2362. Further, the Court indicated that without a likely to affect requirement, the provision would not provide fair warning ... to the world ... of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. Id. at 599-600, 115 S.Ct. at 2362 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695-96 (10th Cir.1993) (a natural and probable effect requirement was necessary ... because particular acts, although arguably interfering with some aspect of the administration of justice, may be beyond the scope of § 1503 because the nexus ... is too attenuated and the statutory construction ... too strained (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Aguilar Court incorporated a likely to affect requirement into section 1503. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. at 2362. 83 Here, unlike the omnibus clause of section 1503, section 1512(b) uses language that provides fair notice to the world of what line cannot be crossed. Section 1512(b) has two elements that are germane to the offenses charged: (1) that the defendant engaged in misleading conduct or corruptly persuaded a person, and (2) that the defendant acted with an intent to influence the person's testimony at an official proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). Both of the alternative possibilities in the first element provide fair notice--misleading conduct is defined with particularity in a later section, see id. § 1515(a)(3), and we previously have held that corruptly persuade is not unduly vague, see United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir.1996). 11 Further, the second element, intent to influence a person's testimony at an official proceeding, is also reasonably specific. Accordingly, there is no reason to narrow section 1512(b) by incorporating a likely to affect requirement as the Aguilar Court did to section 1503. 84 Moreover, the Aguilar Court held that the likely to affect requirement was not satisfied by making a false statement to a potential witness who might testify before a grand jury that was already impaneled and investigating Aguilar. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600-01, 115 S.Ct. at 2362-63. It stands to reason, therefore, that uttering a false statement to a person who might testify before a grand jury that might be impaneled would not satisfy the likely to affect requirement either. Therefore, if a likely to affect requirement were incorporated into section 1512(b), an official proceeding would have to be pending at the time of the defendant's conduct to warrant a conviction. However, section 1512(e)(1) specifically provides that an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. Therefore, if a likely to affect requirement were incorporated into section 1512(b), it would create a direct conflict with section 1512(e)(1)--indicating that a likely to affect requirement should not be incorporated into section 1512(b). 85 Finally, Gabriel's basic argument--that section 1512 and the omnibus clause of section 1503 are closely related, 12 and that therefore, the omnibus clause's likely to affect requirement should be incorporated into section 1512--would seem to require incorporating the likely to affect requirement into other sections that are also closely related to the omnibus clause. This would require incorporating a likely to affect requirement into numerous other sections which are also designed to protect the due administration of justice. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1514. Incorporating a likely to affect requirement into these sections would work a major and unwarranted overhaul of the statutory scheme. 86 Accordingly, despite the factual similarity between this case and Aguilar, we conclude that the government was not required to prove that Gabriel's actions were likely to affect Mealing's testimony before the grand jury. Rather, the government was required to prove only that Gabriel misled or corruptly persuaded Mealing with the intent to interfere with Mealing's potential testimony before the grand jury. See Romero, 54 F.3d at 62. 87 Here, the jury reasonably could conclude that Gabriel acted with the requisite intent. Gabriel concedes that he sent the fax to Mealing with the intent to interfere with CRT's internal investigation, but Gabriel argues that the fax would not support an inference that he intended to interfere with the grand jury investigation. From the body of the fax, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Gabriel's sole intention was to interfere with CRT's investigators. If the jury had so concluded, it would have been compelled to find Gabriel innocent because section 1512(b)(1) prohibits interference only with official proceedings. See United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir.1991). However, the jury also reasonably could have concluded that Gabriel intended to interfere with the grand jury investigation. Gabriel knew that there was an ongoing grand jury investigation at the time he sent the fax and Gabriel knew that Mealing could be a damaging witness. Further, although the body of the fax discussed only the CRT investigation, the fax was headed ONGOING GOVT INVESTIGATION AT CRT. From these facts, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Gabriel sent the fax with the intent, at least in part, of interfering with Mealing's potential testimony before the grand jury. 13 F. Retroactive Misjoinder 88 Gabriel contends that his conviction for making false statements on a document relating to the bearing seal scheme was tainted by retroactive misjoinder. Retroactive misjoinder arises where joinder of multiple counts was proper initially, but later developments--such as a district court's dismissal of some counts for lack of evidence or an appellate court's reversal of less than all convictions--renders the initial joinder improper. United States v. Vebeliunas, 76 F.3d 1283, 1293 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 362, 136 L.Ed.2d 253 (1996). Here, because each of Gabriel's convictions has been affirmed, his retroactive misjoinder argument is moot. G. Gabriel's Sentencing 1. Trial Perjury 89 At sentencing, the district court increased Gabriel's offense level by two for committing perjury at trial. We have held that for sentencing purposes, trial perjury must be found by clear and convincing evidence. United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir.1993). Here, the district court stated that although I would not have concluded that [Gabriel] perjured himself beyond a reasonable doubt, on a preponderance standard, I would have to conclude that he had. Gabriel argues, and the government concedes, that the case should be remanded for the court to consider whether Gabriel committed trial perjury by clear and convincing evidence. We agree that resentencing is required on this issue. 14 2. Restitution 90 At sentencing, the district court ordered Gabriel to pay the cost to repair the LPT case, $35,628, to Qantas or to any person who paid Qantas for the cost of that repair. CRT paid Qantas, and, therefore, the district court's order required Gabriel to repay CRT. 91 On appeal, Gabriel and the government dispute whether Gabriel can be forced to repay CRT under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(e)(1). However, in the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), Congress repealed section 3663(e)(1) and enacted or amended numerous other sections relating to victim restitution. See MVRA, Pub.L. No. 104-132, §§ 201-211, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227-1241 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3611-3613A, 3663-3664). The MVRA states that it shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment of this Act. MVRA, Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 211, 110 Stat. 1241. The MVRA was enacted on April 24, 1996, about two weeks before Gabriel was convicted, and therefore, the MVRA was in effect for Gabriel's sentencing to the extent constitutionally permissible. Because the parties have not addressed the MVRA on appeal, we remand for the district court to reconsider issues relating to ordering Gabriel to make restitution. See United States v. Malpeso, 126 F.3d 92 (2d Cir.1997).
92 Finally, the district court sua sponte departed upward from the Guidelines' fine range and imposed a $500,000 fine on Gabriel. Gabriel contends, and the government concedes, that the fine should be vacated and that he should be resentenced because he did not receive notice that the district court was going to depart upward. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(A)-(C); United States v. Sisti, 91 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir.1996) (under Rule 32, a defendant must be provided with notice before a court can depart upwards); Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 135-38, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2185-97, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991). We agree that resentencing is required on this point.