Opinion ID: 2259190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert Testimony on Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse

Text: Floray contends that the Superior Court erred when it refused to allow Lawrence Raifman, Ph.D., to testify as an expert witness concerning the susceptibility of young children to be programmed to falsify abuse information about fathers in hostile custody and visitation situations. [1] Dr. Raifman proposed to testify: as to general principles of social and behavioral sciences to assist the jury in determining each of the two alleged child victim's credibility concerning their claims that the Defendant sexually abused them in the face of the Defendant's denials [and] that the jury must be particularly careful in judging the credibility of the alleged victims in this case because the circumstances surrounding their relationship with the Defendant, their parents, the social workers, and prosecution and state agents lends itself to fabricating allegations of sexual abuse. [2] The Superior Court denied the motion in limine of Floray whereby he requested the admission of the expert psychological testimony, finding that Floray had not established any behavior of the alleged victims that was inconsistent with the charge of sexual abuse, such as recantation or delay in reporting or any other behavior that required expert testimony to aid the jury's understanding of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. [3] The Court concluded that because no special nexus was shown between the evidence of common behavior and the facts of the case, the use of such common behavior evidence [was] highly prejudicial. [4] Additionally, because Floray had not shown that the proffered expert testimony would amount to anything more than an attack on the alleged victims' credibility, the probative value of the expert testimony was limited. [5] The Court therefore found that any probative value of the expert testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the State and would likely result in confusion of issues to the jury. If the trial court, under the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence (D.R.E.) 403, excludes evidence because of the concern of unfair prejudice to a party or confusion of the issues to the jury, we review for abuse of discretion. [6] If however, the evidence in question was offered for a permissible purpose, but excluded, we review de novo. [7] This Court has previously addressed the extent that expert testimony can be used to assist the trier of fact in evaluating the testimony of a child sexual abuse victim. [8] The general rule is that the common experience of the jury provides a sufficient basis to assess the credibility of the child-witness and the testimony of an expert witness is not necessary to assist the jury. [9] In intrafamily child sexual abuse cases, however, this Court has recognized an exception to the general rule. Expert testimony is admissible to help the jury understand the child-victim's behavior when the child has displayed behavior (... delay in reporting) or made statements (. . . recantation) which, to [an] average [lay person], are superficially inconsistent with the occurrence of sexual abuse and which are established as especially attributable to intrafamily child sexual abuse rather than simply stress or trauma in general. [10] The use of expert evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions is limited to assist the finder of fact, whether judge or jury, in evaluating the psychological dynamics and resulting behavior patterns of alleged victims of child abuse, where the child's behavior is not within the common experience of the average juror. [11] In such a case, expert testimony must be given in general terms and directed to behavior factors in evidence... [and may not attempt] to quantify the veracity of a particular witness or provide a statistical test for truth telling. [12] The purpose of the expert testimony is only to provide the trier of fact with background concerning the behavior of the alleged child abuse victim based on the expert's experience and training so that the jury or judge, may place the child witness' testimony in a behavioral context. [13] Conditions are therefore imposed to safeguard the limited use of such testimony. [14] In this case, the Superior Court was correct in holding that the recognized exception did not apply to the ten-year-old victim because she was not a family member. Additionally, Floray failed to establish any evidence as to behavior that the jury needed assistance in understanding. The issue was the credibility of the alleged child victims and was properly left to the jury. The expert testimony, therefore, was not admissible for a permissible purpose and the Superior Court did not err or abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Raifman's testimony.