Opinion ID: 1161864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Scope of Hearing Officer's Function

Text: All parties to this action address different aspects of the hearing officer's authority to hear evidence concerning Tammy Ryan's rights. The School District argues that the decision of the hearing officer was beyond his jurisdiction and authority. The State Superintendent and State Board, while also questioning the authority or jurisdiction of the hearing officer in context, dispute the holding as being arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. Tammy Ryan alleges that neither the State nor the School District could dismiss the procedural requirements established by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986) and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500, et seq. (1987), which allows Tammy Ryan, as a recipient of educational services under 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(4) (1987), to present complaints in a formal hearing protesting a change in her present placement status. The continuum of argument is switched from statutory to individualized issues of need by Tammy Ryan. The statutory purpose of the hearing officer is to make determinations as to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,  William S. v. Gill, 536 F. Supp. 505, 510 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (quoting from 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E)) (emphasis in original), with the key word in this quote being child. Tammy Ryan asserts that the complaint filed July 2, 1987, four weeks prior to her twenty-first birthday, entitles her to this designation. However, this argument does not address the fact that any decisions made as to her situation as a handicapped student became effective after she reached adult status on August 5, 1987. A hearing officer addressing a change in educational placement of a school-age child is within the authority granted by law when adjudicating educational rights of a child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986). However, this same language does not apply to an adult when the age of twenty-one is reached which becomes a decision of law. Support for this position can be found not only in federal case law, Honig v. Doe, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 592, 595, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988), (the Act limits eligibility to disabled children between the ages of 3 and 21 (emphasis added)), but also in Wyoming statutes W.S. 21-4-301 and 21-4-302 defining school age children as over six (6) years of age and under the age of twenty-one (21). (W.S. 21-4-302 extends eligibility for attendance in public schools to five year olds.) We find that the hearing officer was without authority or jurisdiction to hear issues affecting this twenty-one year old adult, thus unable to force a continuation of Tammy Ryan's status quo, and could not decide the issues before him on August 10, 1987. In determining that a hearing was required to effect due process with regard to Tammy Ryan's educational rights, the State Superintendent also then misinterpreted the administrative issue presented. [16] As to mootness of any action by an administrative agency or judicial body, we have stated that: We are committed to the rule that an appellate court will dismiss a case if, pending appeal, an event occurs which makes the determination of the issues presented unnecessary and thus renders the case moot.          Appropriate judicial restraint should be exercised when a controversy has been resolved and thus become moot at the time the case is presented to this court. Advisory opinions generally are to be avoided because the adversary system does not function as contemplated in the absence of a case or controversy. In the Interest of AJ, 736 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1987). Appellate courts, including trial courts in an appellate role, will not render decisions which cannot be carried into effect. Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 617 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Wyo. 1980). The decision by the hearing officer, partially based on non-completion of Tammy Ryan's IEP by the School District, forces this court to address some aspects of his opinion as though the School District in complying with the EHA, must fully complete all of the student's IEP to Tammy Ryan's satisfaction. Thus, any decision we make with respect to this opinion, regardless of eligibility for educational services, does not reflect a decree which cannot be carried into effect. Northern Utilities, 617 P.2d at 1085. See also Simons, 741 P.2d 1116. In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion in Honig, in a situation not unlike the facts of this case, discussed the effect mootness has regarding the present rule in federal cases, that an actual controversy must survive at all stages of appellate review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. The Chief Justice contends that actions begun when a case and controversy existed have a right to be heard and that the United States Supreme Court has an obligation to hear these cases, regardless of their current controversy status. Otherwise, an individual may lose some of the rights to which he is entitled. In support of this reasoning, he states that: All agree that this case was very much alive,    when the action was filed in the District Court, and very probably when the Court of Appeals decided the case. It is supervening events since the decision of the Court of Appeals which have caused the dispute between the majority and the dissent over whether this case is moot. Therefore, all that the court actually holds is that these supervening events do not deprive this Court of the authority to hear the case. I agree with that holding, and would go still further in the direction of relaxing the test of mootness where the events giving rise to the claim of mootness have occurred after our decision to grant certiorari or to note possible jurisdiction.       I would leave the mootness doctrine as established by our cases in full force and effect when applied to the earlier stages of a lawsuit, but I believe that once this Court has undertaken a consideration of a case, an exception to that principle is just as much warranted as where a case is capable of repetition, yet evading review. [Emphasis in original.] Honig, 108 S.Ct. at 607-09. The posture of this case in companion petitions by the School District and cross-petition by the State Board and State Superintendent is singularly broader than the one student and her separate education. The comprehensive decision required here will affect all Wyoming public education and, consequently, dismissal for mootness would be unjustified wherein the societal determinants require constitutional, statutory and administrative rule adjudication. The compelling public interest and the outstanding issues in conflict between the state agencies and the local school district require resolution of the basic question presented. Com., Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Dentici, ___ Pa.Cmwlth. ___, 542 A.2d 229 (1988). Cf. Ballard v. Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Com'n of State of Wyo., 750 P.2d 286 (Wyo. 1988). See Natrona County School District No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 1988).