Opinion ID: 1910282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficient Jury Instructions on Mitigating Circumstances

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred at the penalty stage because it did not offer guidance to the jury as to how to consider the defense's evidence in mitigation. As the factual basis of his assertion, he targets two circumstances in mitigation: evidence of good conduct in jail while awaiting this trial and participation in a leadership role in a class action prisoner litigation aimed at eliminating allegedly bad conditions for segregated prisoners. He readily admits, however, that both pieces of evidence were introduced without limitation to the penalty jury. His repetitious complaint, nevertheless, is that in the case instantly (sic), the lower court allowed the evidence, but offered no guidance to the jury as to how it was to consider the evidence. (Appellant's Brief, p. 27). His more specific meaning is that these two mitigating considerations are not enumerated as such, but arise generally under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) (any other evidence of mitigation). He argues that the court was remiss in not instructing the jury that, although unenumerated, these considerations should have been given equal weight and quality as other mitigating circumstances. He concludes that where the proffered evidence is offered in mitigation of the penalty of death, the Supreme Court has consistently condemned the erection of barriers to the jury's full consideration of mitigating evidence. (Appellant's Brief, p. 30). In support of his claim, he marshalls the standard array of federal cases which embody the rules applicable to consideration of mitigating circumstances: Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Additionally, Appellant points to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), and Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). To the extent that Appellant employs these cases to prove his instant allegation, he is simply mistaken in his reading of them. All of the above precedents involved barriers to the unfettered freedom of a sentencer to consider any mitigating factors. Lockett and Eddings dealt with statutory limitations, while Skipper struck down an evidentiary ruling which precluded consideration of any mitigations. Franklin and Penry ruled on state sentencing schemes, such as the Texas code, for example, which establishes a two-step system in imposing a death sentence wherein after all mitigating evidence is put in, the penalty jury is then required to answer affirmatively or negatively to special issues such as whether the jury firmly believes that the killing was deliberate (the so-called residual doubt issue) and that the defendant is a danger to society. Depending on the jury's response, the result could be either a death sentence or life in prison. The defendants in those cases argued on appeal that such systems act as a barrier to full consideration of the independent effect to be given to any submitted mitigating evidence in violation of Lockett and subsequent cases. Those problems obviously have no relevancy to our statute, § 9711(e)(8). Typical of most American jurisdictions, Pennsylvania requires the jury to consider any other evidence in mitigation without any barriers whatsoever. To seek to obligate a court, moreover, to specify to a jury that anything in mitigation must be an equal part of the other remaining enumerated mitigating circumstances is to engage in frivolous doubletalk. For in the most elementary and plain sense, any other is itself an enumerated consideration as the jury was instructed, and by any other we mean any other in any language which is spoken on the face of the earth, including especially ordinary English. That is to say that our statutory scheme employs no tricks, gimmicks or barriers of any sort designed to frustrate the full presentation of mitigating evidence which is balanced against aggravating circumstances by an unbound jury. And that is what took place on the record here. Tracking the language of the statute, a preferred method under Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984), the trial court instructed the jury as follows on the exact statutory language: Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense. (T.T., 3/20/88, p. 1017). We find no merit to this allegation.