Opinion ID: 2548438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Planning Commission Factors

Text: PH devotes a substantial part of its brief before this court to its argument that the city council considered impermissible factors. PH specifically maintains that the Planning Commission is vested with the exclusive authority to administer the Subdivision Regulations regarding the development of land and `provisions of access to lots and parcels.' PH contends that once the planning commission determined that the proposed plat met the minimum requirements under Conway's Subdivision Regulations for an R-1 zoning designation, this court's decision in Richardson v. City of Little Rock Planning Commission precluded the city council from weighing traffic and safety concerns in deciding whether to grant the rezoning request. 295 Ark. 189, 747 S.W.2d 116 (1988). This argument must fail. In Richardson, a landowner submitted a subdivision application to the Little Rock Planning Commission, which was denied. The landowner brought an action in circuit court challenging the denial, and the judge found that, even though certain technical violations of the subdivision regulation were not the basis for the planning commission's denial, nevertheless the commission had the discretion to disapprove the application. This court reversed, holding that [w]hen a subdivision ordinance specifies minimum standards to which a preliminary plat must conform, it is arbitrary as a matter of law to deny approval of a plan that meets those standards. Id. at 191-92, 747 S.W.2d at 117. PH argues in the instant case that the city council's denial of his rezoning petition was an end run around Richardson because the city council expressed traffic concerns that were only to be weighed by the planning commission in determining whether to approve the preliminary plat. We disagree. Nothing in Richardson prevents the city council from considering potential traffic problems or public safety in deciding whether to rezone. In fact, the Richardson case specifically says that if the plat is within the use permitted by the zoning classification and meets the development regulations set forth in the subdivision ordinance, then the plat by definition is in `harmony' with the existing subdivisions. Id. at 192, 747 S.W.2d at 117 (emphasis added). In the instant case, the preliminary plat was not within the use permitted by the zoning classification because the land was still zoned A-1. The fact that the planning commission approved a preliminary plat, in the event the land was rezoned to R-1, does not automatically entitle PH to have the property rezoned. We further observe that PH cites no authority for the proposition that the city council was precluded from considering traffic and safety concerns in assessing its rezoning request. It is well settled that this court requires parties to cite authority for arguments made on appeal. See, e.g., Gatzke v. Weiss, 375 Ark. 207, 215, 289 S.W.3d 455, 461 (2008). The circuit judge's decision that Richardson did not apply in the instant case and that the city council's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable was not clearly erroneous.