Opinion ID: 1424060
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Critical to the Defense

Text: The excluded evidence was not critical because the testimony from the victim's father had little, if any, probative value, and the exclusions did not undermine any elements of Flood's defense. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (recognizing that an exclusion of evidence is unconstitutional when it significantly undermine[s] fundamental elements of the accused's defense). Furthermore, the victim's statement that Flood made her touch his penis and her question of whether would Flood still have to go to jail if someone else were caught are not the type of evidence that has previously been recognized as critical. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038; Brown, 29 S.W.3d at 434-36; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979). In Chambers , the trial court limited the defendant in his cross-examination of McDonald who had confessed to the crime for which the defendant was being tried. 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The defendant was prohibited from cross-examining McDonald on the basis of a common-law rule that a party may not impeach his own witness. Id. The trial court also excluded as hearsay the testimony of three witnesses, who would have testified that they heard McDonald confess to the crime. Id. at 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The United State Supreme Court held that the excluded evidence was critical to the defense because it implicated constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. In Brown, the defendant was indicted on four counts of sexual abuse of an eleven-year-old family member. 29 S.W.3d at 429. The trial court excluded hearsay testimony that the victim stated that she had sexual intercourse with an adolescent male during the same time period that the defendant allegedly committed the rape, which the defendant presented to explain the tears in the victim's hymen. Id. We concluded that the evidence was critical because it rebutted the State's medical proof and offered an alternative explanation for the hymenal injury. Id. at 435-36. While previous cases are instructive, we note that whether excluded evidence is critical to a defense is a fact-specific inquiry. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.). Assuming that the excluded statements have some probative value to rebut the victim's testimony that Flood put his penis in her mouth or to suggest that another person is responsible for the crimes, the statements are not clear enough to make the evidence critical to the defense under the facts and circumstances of this case. The statements made by the victim in this case are unlike the hearsay testimony of additional confessions that was excluded in Chambers , see 410 U.S. at 298, or the testimony rebutting the State's medical proof that was excluded in Brown, see 29 S.W.3d at 434. Here, the excluded statements, even if admitted for their substantive truth, are not exculpatory. They have little probative value to either implicate another in the crime or to rebut the victim's testimony that oral penetration occurred. In fact, it could be argued that the excluded statements tend to support the prosecution as much they tend to support the defense. Flood was excluded from introducing the victim's question to her father on the way to the hospital that if someone else were caught, would Flood still have to go to jail. While the question might tend to implicate someone else, it also tends to show the concerns of an eight-year-old girl for her older cousin. The victim's statement that Flood made her touch his penis might tend to rebut the victim's testimony, but it also tends to corroborate it. In light of the victim's other testimony that identified Flood as the person who placed his penis in her mouth on four occasions, we conclude that the excluded statements were not critical to Flood's defense. See Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 673-74; Rogers, 188 S.W.3d at 614; State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 396-97 (Tenn.2003). We also note that Flood is unlike the defendant in Chambers because Flood was not totally foreclosed from presenting the proffered evidence by the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The victim was available for cross-examination. Flood could have asked the victim about the statements. If the victim denied making the statements, Flood could have introduced the statements into evidence through the victim's father pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 613. Flood had the opportunity to question the victim about the statements but did not do so. Generally, the right to present a defense is not denied when a defendant does not pursue a line of questioning during cross-examination. We disagree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the lack of physical evidence made the excluded testimony of the victim's father critical. Flood's defense consisted of five witnesses who testified that Flood did not have an opportunity to sexually abuse the victim on any occasion and who testified that Flood was not at Deborah Flood's house to abuse the victim on July 3, 1999. The State presented two rebuttal witnesses who testified that Flood was at the house with the victim on July 3, 1999. Flood argues that the statements made by the victim to her father were critical because they rebutted the victim's testimony. To an extent, all five witnesses presented by Flood rebutted the testimony of the victim because she testified that Flood sexually abused her on four occasions and in particular on July 3, 1999. Hearing all of this testimony, the jury convicted Flood of four counts of rape of a child. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that the excluded statements made by the victim to her father were not critical to Flood's defense.