Opinion ID: 2982993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Spoliation Evidence

Text: Beckman next challenges the admission of his alleged attempts to destroy a flash drive, and to have his work-assigned Lenovo laptop and Blackberry cell phone wiped clean. He argues that this evidence was irrelevant because the Government failed to lay the necessary foundation, i.e., that he possessed the flash drive (and that it existed at all), and that he attempted to have the Lenovo wiped clean after he was notified of the investigation. Lastly, Beckman argues that the Government presented “convoluted evidence” that he tried to have the contents of his Blackberry wiped clean. 4 For example, during chats between Beckman and openmindedsinglemommy Beckman said he had “jerked [his son] on cam for a lady/mom who was masturbating.” Openmindedsinglemommy asked Beckman if she could see “your boy on cam,” and, after she sent Beckman photos, he asked, “you want to see sons cock on cam?” Openmindedsinglemommy wrote, “I can see you . . . cool.” 5 The record is clear that, in the end, the Government did not rely on the co-conspirator statement exception as a basis for admission of any chats. 7 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman The district court did not abuse its discretion.6 United States v. Jenkins, 593 F.3d 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2010). The Government introduced no evidence that Beckman attempted to destroy a flash drive; rather, the expert who performed a forensic analysis of the Lenovo testified that user J_Beckman had accessed an external drive that held a folder named “Jim,” and that folder contained videos with file names suggesting child pornography. Beckman did not object, and admitted having a number of external drives and keeping pornography on them at times. As to Beckman’s work-assigned Lenovo laptop, the Government laid the necessary foundation, contrary to his contention. Trooper McDonald went to Beckman’s home and collected evidence and items including his Blackberry, and the two then went to Beckman’s workplace, where Beckman turned over an HP computer, but not the Lenovo laptop. The record is clear that after Trooper McDonald left Beckman’s office, Beckman took the Lenovo to his employer’s IT department to have it scanned for viruses. The record is also clear that after police seized his Blackberry, which he had used to communicate with Hughes, Beckman falsely reported the device lost or stolen to the IT department so that its contents would be wiped clean remotely, as IT staff had told Beckman it would. The evidence that after Trooper McDonald left his office, Beckman took the Lenovo to the IT department to be scanned for viruses, and falsely reported to IT that his Blackberry was lost or stolen so that IT would wipe its contents clean was relevant and properly admitted. United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 768 (6th Cir. 2006) (spoliation evidence is admissible to show consciousness of guilt). And, the district court properly instructed the jury on use of this evidence. 6 Beckman’s “Anticipated Objections to Proposed Government Evidence Contained in its Trial Brief” included an objection to admission of his alleged attempts to conceal or destroy evidence as irrelevant and inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. 8 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman V. Admission of Summary Exhibits under Fed. R. Evid. 1006 Beckman challenges the admission of summaries created by the Government of alleged Yahoo! Messenger conversations, arguing that the underlying documents were not so voluminous that they could not be conveniently examined in court and that the summaries were prejudicial and inaccurate because they emphasized so-called “video calls.” Review of the admission of summary exhibits is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 409 (6th Cir. 2005). As pertinent here, admission of the summaries under Fed. R. Evid. 1006 is proper if the Government shows that the underlying data is so voluminous that it cannot be conveniently examined in court and the summary is accurate and presented in a non-prejudicial manner. Id. “Summary testimony is appropriate to aid the jury in the examination of testimony and documents in evidence”; however, the summary “should be accompanied by a limiting instruction which informs the jury of the summary’s purpose and that it does not constitute evidence.” United States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 401, 412 (6th Cir. 2007).
Forty pages of records obtained from Yahoo! were in a raw format and contained technical data that included metadata.7 The underlying raw data was admitted into evidence and was available for the jury to examine. Beckman did not object to the introduction of the underlying raw data but, without citing authority, argued that, to be voluminous, the data had to be “unwieldy and virtually impossible . . . to present.” Below is a sample taken from one of the forty pages of raw data: “NSTANT”},{“from”:“sttace1324”,“txt”:“no”,”ts”:133930280,”cloud_id”:0,”clt_ msg_context”:“896f9057804d6ddd45e4a2ad90277cbd”,“etype”:“INSTANT”},{“ from”:“jimmyab2010”,“txt”:“He was watching and jerking some”,“ts”:1333930 288,”,“clt_msg_context”:“XLxs8ujp/n0aDeeysi15kGnFQXjw4g==”,“etype”:“c7b 7 Metadata is “data that describes and gives information about other data.” Oxforddictionaries.com (2015 Oxford University Press). 9 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman fc5720f171418f0e8f172faa15767”,“etype”:“INSTANT”},{“from”:“sttace1324”,“ ts”,133393026,”call_duration”:0,“event”:“MISS”,“cal1_type”:”PC2PC”,“call_voi cemail”:0,“etype”:“VIDEO”},{“from”:“sttace1324”,“txt”:“try sendin it again”, “ts”:1333930318,”cloud_id”:0,“clt_msg_context”:“eb09833fd92c40191f8ba5d39 933e89”,“etype”:“INSTANT”},{“from”“sttace1324”,“ts”:133393062,“call duration”:88,“event”:“IN”,“call_type”:”PC2PC”,“call_voicemail”:0,“etype”:“VI DEO”},{“from”:“sttace1324”,“txt”:“is he hard 2 bb”,“ts”:1333930471,“cloud _id”:0,“clt_msg_context”:“65788f25b78a125946ceab381abf58ec”,“etype”:“INST ANT”},{“from”:“sttace1324”,“see if u can get him to compare for a lil”,“ts”:1333930485,“cloud_id”:0,“clt_msg_context”:“3f159d4c8da8eaeb607b47 b5f24abf68”,“etype”:“INSTANT”},{“from”:“jimmyab2010”,“txt”:“He did”,“ts”: PID 388. Rule 1006 requires only that the in-court examination of the underlying material be inconvenient, and the need for a summary increases when, as here, the underlying material involves hard to understand technical data. See United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1381 (6th Cir. 1988). The densely packed single-spaced pages of text consisting of abbreviations, numbers, and words without clear beginning or end would be incomprehensible to most laypersons and jurors; thus the summaries were properly admitted to assist the jury in understanding the raw data. Id.
Beckman also argues that the summaries were insufficiently accurate because they emphasized video calls. But the Government’s own expert testified that video calls were nothing more than a Yahoo! Messenger tag that did not necessarily establish that a web cam was used during the call. Beckman cites three pages of his counsel’s voir dire examination of FBI Agent Kovac to support his inaccuracy argument. When asked who ensured that the summaries were accurate Agent Kovac responded, “I looked at every single one.” When asked the primary purpose of the summaries, Kovac answered, “To show when video and voice calls are completed or attempted.” 10 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman PID 2392. When Beckman’s counsel finished Kovac’s voir dire examination, the following colloquy took place: MR. MARKOU: [S]ubject to the objection I made prior to trial about the summaries, I have, I think they have laid an otherwise sufficient foundation today. THE COURT: I think you need to put that briefly on the record, your exact objection, Mr. Markou. MR. MARKOU: My objection before trial was that these were not sufficiently voluminous to warrant a summary exhibit, and there was a second issue about accuracy. The accuracy one was still left for the Court to decide. The Court had already made a decision on the voluminous nature of this. I just want to make sure I reiterate that particular objection regarding the accuracy. I think she has testified to, to at least some steps that were taken to ensure the accuracy. THE COURT: Thank you. Those exhibits are admitted. PID 2393. Because Beckman advances no specifics regarding the alleged inaccuracies of the summaries and Kovac’s testimony supports that the summaries are accurate, admission of the summaries was not an abuse of discretion. VI. As-Applied Challenge to Sexual Exploitation and Coercion and Enticement Statutes Beckman contends that his attempt convictions (under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2242(b)) cannot stand because they were “based on speech alone.” He challenges the statutes as applied. “An as-applied challenge consists of a challenge to the statute’s application with respect to the party before the court.” United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 891, 905 (6th Cir. 2014). Our review is de novo. United States v. Watkins, 509 F.3d 277, 280 (6th Cir. 2007). A. Section 2251, titled “Sexual exploitation of children,” provides in pertinent part: (a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, . . . with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished . . . if such person knows or has reason to know 11 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate . . . commerce . . . , if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been . . . transported in or affecting interstate . . . commerce by any means, including by computer . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Section 2422, titled “Coercion and enticement,” provides in pertinent part: (b) Whoever, using . . . any facility or means of interstate . . . commerce . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined . . . and imprisoned . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (emphasis added). Beckman relies principally on Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which struck down statutory provisions8 that criminally proscribed virtual child pornography, that is, sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but were produced without using any real children. The Ashcroft Court concluded that such prohibition “abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech” that is neither obscene nor child pornography. 535 U.S. at 240. Beckman maintains that because the jury acquitted him of actually sending live images of child pornography via the internet, only his words remain; if virtual child-pornography images cannot be prosecuted, he argues, neither can his graphic sexual speech. But Ashcroft is of no help to Beckman, as it neither supports that proposition nor addresses whether criminalizing attempted sexual exploitation or attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity offends the First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 8 At issue was the prohibition of virtual child pornography in the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq. Section 2256(8)(B) prohibited any visual depiction that is or appears to be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Section 2256(8)(D) defined child pornography to include “any sexually explicit image that was . . . distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression” that it depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241–42. 12 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman 1141 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding of Ashcroft is limited to the constitutionality of §§ 2256(8)(B) and (D) of the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA), that is, the CPPA definitions that prohibited possessing and distributing images that were not produced using real children); see also United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1063–64 (11th Cir. 2002). The district court properly denied Beckman’s pre-trial motion to dismiss the superseding indictment’s attempt counts under the First Amendment on the basis that Beckman was not arguing that the First Amendment permitted him to engage in the charged conduct, but rather, that he did not commit the charged offenses. Beckman’s conviction of ten counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a child, 18 U.S.C. § 2251, required a finding that Beckman intended to produce child pornography and took a substantial step toward doing so. See United States v. Sims, 708 F.3d 832, 835 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that to convict of attempted production of child pornography, the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to create child pornography and took a substantial step toward creation of child pornography.) The conviction of Count 5, attempted coercion and enticement of a child, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), required a finding that Beckman intended to coerce and entice a child and took a substantial step towards doing so. Id. As the Government asserts, neither type of conduct is protected by the First Amendment. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982) (noting that the legislative judgment of virtually all states and the United States proscribing the production of child pornography easily passes muster under the First Amendment.); United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000)9 (concluding that section 2422(b) only applied to those who 9 This court rejected a challenge to § 2242(b) as infringing constitutionally protected speech in United States v. Bailey, where the defendant argued that the statute “requires the specific intent to commit illegal sexual acts rather than just the intent to persuade or solicit the minor victim to 13 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman knowingly persuaded or enticed, or attempted to persuade or entice, minors, and thus affected only those with intent to target minors, and any limited or incidental effect on speech did not infringe on constitutionally protected rights of adults.) Other circuits have similarly held. See e.g., United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Speech attempting to arrange the sexual abuse of children is no more constitutionally protected than speech attempting any other type of crime.”); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a First Amendment overbreadth as-applied challenge to § 2422(b) when applied to situations involving an actual adult, observing that “there is no otherwise legitimate speech jeopardized by § 2422 because the statute only criminalizes conduct, i.e., the targeted inducement of minors for illegal sexual activity. Here, speech is merely the vehicle through which a pedophile ensnares the victim.”). B. Beckman also challenges his conviction on Count 5, attempted coercion and enticement of a child, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), on the basis that no actual child was involved. Count 5 involved Schrode, who pretended that he was a woman with a six-year-old daughter, using screen names including “pizzagirl12891.” Chats between Schrode and jimmyab2010 were admitted at trial and Schrode testified that he chatted with jimmyab2010 20 to 30 times, sent him child pornography, and received live transmissions of jimmyab2010 giving oral sex to his son. Schrode told jimmyab2010 during a chat that jimmyab2010 “can tell me what to do when I get in commit sexual acts,” and that “to hold otherwise, would criminalize mere sexual banter on the internet, or would criminalize content-based speech in violation of the First Amendment.” 228 F.3d 637, 638 (6th Cir. 2000). This court concluded that § 2242(b) only applied to those who knowingly persuaded or enticed, or attempted to persuade or entice, minors, and thus affected only those with intent to target minors, and any limited or incidental effect on speech did not infringe on constitutionally protected rights of adults. “Put another way, the Defendant simply does not have a First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex acts.” Id. at 639. 14 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman the room with my daughter,” and jimmyab2010 responded, “likewise,” and “you can pull pants down like I will my son[,] I stroke him you finger her some.” Over Beckman’s objection, the district court instructed the jury that an actual child need not be involved, in accordance with United States v. Hackworth, 483 F. App’x 972, 976–78 (6th Cir. 2012) (“the absence of an actual minor does not preclude Hackworth’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)”), and United States v. Hart, 635 F.3d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 2011) (to convict under § 2422(b), the jury had to unanimously agree that Hart used interstate commerce in an attempt to knowingly persuade an individual under the age of 18 to engage in sexual activity and “that Hart believed that such an individual was less than 18.”) Beckman claims that Hackworth contravenes Ashcroft, but Ashcroft nowhere addresses whether an actual minor is required to convict under § 2422(b) or whether attempting to coerce and entice a minor constitutes protected speech. In fact, the Ashcroft Court observed that the issue before it did not involve attempt, incitement, solicitation, or conspiracy. 535 U.S. at 253. This court has held that an actual minor need not be involved in order to convict under § 2422(b), Hart, 635 F.3d at 855; Hackworth, 483 F. App’x at 976–78, as have other federal courts of appeals, see United States v. Slaughter, 708 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2013) (“a violation of § 2422(b) does not require an actual minor due to its attempt clause.”); United States v. Davis, 165 F. App’x 586, 588 (10th Cir. 2006) (“we reject Davis’s argument that § 2422(b) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it encompasses prosecutions for adults posing as minors,”; . . . because an actual minor victim is not required for an attempt conviction under § 2422(b).); Meek, 366 F.3d at 718–19 (“The attempt provision [of § 2422(b)] is no different than an attempted solicitation of prostitution, where the criminal conduct is the knowing effort to solicit an individual for prostitution. That the individual turns out to be a decoy undercover officer does 15 Case No. 14-2058 United States v. Beckman not vitiate the criminal conduct”). Beckman fails to support his argument that an actual child must be involved in order for an attempt conviction under § 2422(b) to stand and his as-applied challenge to sections 2251 and 2422(b) fails.