Opinion ID: 1212854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Computer Restriction

Text: The District Court's rationale for imposing the computer restriction is self-evident. Even a cursory reading of the record (and the reproduced sample of the June 11, 2006 chat, supra ) and the evidence acknowledged by Thielemann when he pleaded guilty, reveal that the offenses in this case evolved from the use of a computer and the internet. The District Court clearly and properly imposed the computer condition to deter future crimes via the internet and to protect children. The issue is whether this restriction was reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors and involve[d] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to meet those goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)(2). An analysis of two of our prior cases is instructive in this regard. In United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir.1999), the defendant met a teenager on the internet and traveled across state lines to take photos of their sexual encounter. Crandon pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography and the District Court imposed a three-year ban prohibiting him from using any computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers without permission from the Probation Office. Id. at 125. We upheld the provision because Crandon used the internet to exploit a child, and the restriction would deter him from future crimes and protect the public. As noted above, in Voelker, the defendant challenged a lifelong ban on using computers and the internet consequent to a guilty plea to receipt of child pornography. We held that the restriction was not narrowly tailored because it was lifelong, contained no exceptions, and ignored the ubiquitous presence of the internet. 489 F.3d at 144-46. The terms of Thielemann's supervised release are more analogous to those we upheld in Crandon. See also United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167-70 (5th Cir.2001). Admittedly, [c]omputers and Internet access have become virtually indispensable in the modern world. Voelker, 489 F.3d at 148 n. 8 (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, Thielemann can own or use a personal computer as long as it is not connected to the internet; thus he is allowed to use word processing programs and other benign software. Further, he may seek permission from the Probation Office to use the internet during the term of his ten-year restriction, which is a far cry from the unyielding lifetime restriction in Voelker. The parameters of the computer restriction in this case are far less troubling than those in Voelker. Moreover, the restriction is not disproportionate when viewed in the context of Thielemann's conduct. Thielemann did more than simply trade child pornography; he utilized internet communication technologies to facilitate, entice, and encourage the real-time molestation of a child. The restriction on computer and internet use therefore shares a nexus to the goals of deterrence and protection of the public, and does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary in this case. There was no plain error.