Opinion ID: 2559122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Transcript and Videotaped Recording of First Police Interview

Text: We next consider the defendant's argument that the trial court erroneously admitted that portion of the transcript and videotaped recording of his initial police interview in which he expressed his desire to terminate the interview. Because trial counsel did not object to admission of the evidence, the defendant relies on the plain error rule in support of his argument. The State counters that precisely because defense counsel affirmatively stated she had no objection to the admission of this evidence, the defendant cannot now argue for a plain error analysis. Thus, the State asserts that the invited error doctrine precludes the defendant from availing himself of error into which he has led the trial court, intentionally or unintentionally. State v. Goodale, 144 N.H. 224, 227, 740 A.2d 1026 (1999). We disagree with this assertion. In State v. Richard, 160 N.H. 780, 788, 7 A.3d 1195 (2010), we recently determined that the invited error doctrine does not preclude a court from undertaking plain error review. To hold otherwise would remove[] any discretionary remedy from the appellate court's panoply of options and subjugate[] the interests of justice to the demands of a procedural mechanism. Id. at 788, 7 A.3d 1195 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we will consider whether the trial court committed plain error. A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the attention of the trial court or the supreme court. Sup.Ct. R. 16-A. However, the rule should be used sparingly, its use limited to those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. State v. Russell, 159 N.H. 475, 489, 986 A.2d 515 (2009). To find plain error: (1) there must be an error; (2) the error must be plain; (3) the error must affect substantial rights; and (4) the error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. We have looked to federal plain error analysis in applying our plain error rule. Id. at 489-90, 986 A.2d 515. Turning to the first prong of the plain error test, we conclude that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent. It is well-settled law in this jurisdiction that use of pre-arrest silence in the State's case-in-chief, in which the defendant does not testify, is unconstitutional. State v. Remick, 149 N.H. 745, 747, 829 A.2d 1079 (2003). As we noted in Remick, we find instructive the First Circuit's analysis of pre-arrest silence in Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989). In Coppola, the court stated that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. Id. at 1568. The State argues that the instant case is distinguishable from Remick, because there the defendant asserted his right to silence prior to answering a single question from police. Remick, 149 N.H. at 746-47, 829 A.2d 1079 (concluding that a police officer's testimony in the State's case-in-chief that he went over to the defendant to ask him what happened, and at that point he just closed his eyes and wouldn't talk to me, constituted a violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Thus, the State argues, there was no concern in Remick that a jury might be confused by an abrupt cessation in the questioning, or that the jury might, as a result, improperly conclude that the police had failed to allow the defendant adequate opportunity to explain himself. The State argues that where, as here, the defendant has engaged in an extensive interrogation session with police before invoking his right to silence, there are such concerns. Thus, the State asserts that it was proper for the trial court to allow evidence that the defendant terminated the interview in order to prevent confusion or alarm over potentially improper police tactics. In support of this argument, the State cites cases from other jurisdictions, most notably Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 665 N.E.2d 982 (1996), Commonwealth v. Habarek, 402 Mass. 105, 520 N.E.2d 1303 (1988), and United States v. Williams, 556 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972, 97 S.Ct. 2936, 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977). We find these cases distinguishable. Waite and Habarek stand for the proposition that where the defense has created confusion over a police interview, the State is entitled to offer evidence to clarify that confusion, including evidence that the defendant terminated it. Waite, 665 N.E.2d at 988 (finding that evidence of a defendant's pre-arrest silence was admissible because the defendant initiated his confession with police and thus played a role in creating the confusion at trial); Habarek, 520 N.E.2d at 1306 (concluding that evidence of pre-arrest silence was admissible because defense counsel created confusion by raising the topic at trial). Williams concerns testimony elicited from a police officer in order to impeach the credibility of a defendant who chose to testify at trial. Williams, 556 F.2d at 66. Here, however, there is no assertion that either the defendant or his counsel created confusion at trial that would necessitate clarification. Nor did the defendant take the stand and subject himself to impeachment by the prosecution. The State simply introduced into evidence, in its case-in-chief, a transcript and videotaped recording of the defendant's initial police interview, including his specific request to terminate that interview. This was error. We next consider whether the error was plain. Russell, 159 N.H. at 489, 986 A.2d 515. We need not decide this issue because even assuming that the error was plain, we conclude that it did not affect the defendant's substantial rights under the third prong of the plain error analysis. Id. [T]o satisfy the burden of demonstrating that an error affected substantial rights, the defendant must demonstrate that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that it affected the outcome of the proceeding. State v. Lopez, 156 N.H. 416, 425, 937 A.2d 905 (2007). We conclude that, in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, admission of his invocation of his right to remain silent did not affect the outcome of the proceeding. As noted above, the defendant and Jennifer had a tumultuous relationship and the defendant had previously threatened to kill her. He admitted that he was home alone with the victims in the early morning hours before the murders. His neighbor saw him attack Jeremy and drag Jennifer out of the trailer. The defendant admitted killing the victims and asked his neighbor for help in disposing of the bodies. Later that day, the victims were discovered in debris piles behind the defendant's trailer. Their blood was found throughout the defendant's trailer. The defendant's bare footprint was found on a mat covered in Jeremy's blood. The gun used to shoot the victims was discovered in the defendant's home. His finger and palm prints were the only prints on the gun. Bullets from the gun were found in the defendant's trailer. Bullet holes in the refrigerator had been freshly caulked and a tube of caulking was found in the defendant's trash. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidentiary error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights and that it does not warrant reversal.