Opinion ID: 198351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Denial of Brown's Motion to Suppress

Text: 6 Brown first argues that his arrest was made in violation of the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of the firearm seized from him at the time of his arrest. In his motion to suppress below, Brown argued that he did not push Officer Black and that the officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop him based solely on the fact that he walked away from officers in plain clothes. On appeal, Brown does not dispute that he pushed Officer Black. Rather, he now argues that he acted reasonably in pushing Officer Black and therefore that there was not probable cause to arrest him even after he did so. This is the first time Brown has advanced this argument. 7 We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. See United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir.1997). We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and review the district court's conclusions of law de novo. See id. However, where a defendant has not first raised an issue below, we review for plain error only. See United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 568, 142 L.Ed.2d 473 (1998). 8 Brown claims that he reasonably feared for his safety and had the right to defend himself when Officer Black followed him into the building. From this, he argues that Officer Black had no probable cause to arrest him for assault and battery on a police officer. This argument fails because Brown's alleged fear for his safety does not negate the probable cause perceived by Officer Black. The inquiry into probable cause to arrest focuses on what the officer knew at the time of arrest. See United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 216 (1st Cir.1997). The fact that Brown may not have known that Officer Black was a police officer may serve as a defense to a subsequent charge of assault and battery on a police officer, see Commonwealth v. Francis, 24 Mass.App.Ct. 576, 511 N.E.2d 38, 40 (1987), but it does not invalidate the arrest because it has no impact on the information possessed by Officer Black at the time of the arrest. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest.). Officer Black was pushed by Brown after having identified himself as a police officer. 2 This clearly provided him with probable cause to believe that Brown had committed an assault and battery on a police officer. 9 Brown also notes that the district court found that there was no valid basis to stop him at any time prior to the incident on the stairwell. The government concedes as much, but this is of no assistance to Brown. There is no claim that Brown was seized until after he pushed Officer Black, nor could there be. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (rejecting contention that a pursuit qualifies as a seizure and stating that a seizure requires either physical force or submission to the assertion of authority); United States v. Sealey, 30 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir.1994) (stating that a seizure occurs when a citizen's liberty has been restrained by means of physical force or a show of authority and holding that no seizure occurred when officers shouted, Hey, Steven, what's up? from a police cruiser). Because the probable cause inquiry focuses on what the officer knew at the time of the arrest, see Bizier, 111 F.3d at 216, it is immaterial whether probable cause to arrest existed prior to the altercation on the stairwell. 10 Brown apparently attempts to argue that Officer Black needed probable cause or reasonable suspicion in order to enter the lobby of the apartment building. However, [i]t is now beyond cavil in this circuit that a tenant 3 lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building. United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.) (internal footnote added) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 566, 142 L.Ed.2d 472 (1998). Therefore, Officer Black's entry into the lobby of the apartment building did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 557-58 (1st Cir.1976) (holding that a person cannot have a reasonable expectation in a common parking garage of an apartment building and therefore that the officers' entry into that garage did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 11 Finally, Brown's counsel argued at oral argument, without any supporting authority, that an officer should not be allowed to manufacture probable cause by accosting a suspect in order to provoke a reaction, which then conveniently provides probable cause to arrest the suspect. While this argument might provide an intriguing question in some contexts, this is clearly not one of those contexts. Officer Black did not violate the Fourth Amendment or otherwise provoke Brown prior to being pushed on the stairwell by Brown; he merely followed Brown into the common area of a building and requested to speak with him. We cannot agree with Brown that his assault on Officer Black was a natural consequence of Officer Black's actions or that Brown had the right to defend himself with impunity once Officer Black asked to speak to him. Nor can we find that an officer has provoked a suspect in order to manufacture probable cause merely by asking to speak with him. As a result, we find no error in the district court's denial of Brown's motion to suppress. 12