Opinion ID: 1965447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

Text: In support of its claim that the erroneous admission of evidence of the show-up was harmless, the government argues that the courtroom identifications of Ellis by Officer Commodore and Investigator Norris were reliable, because both officers had ample opportunity to observe Ellis, and because both men were trained observers. We do not doubt that the officers' in-court identifications, albeit patently suggestive, would have been sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) (evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill); United States v. Hunter, 692 A.2d 1370, 1374 (D.C.1997) (in all but exceptional cases, it is the function of the jury to determine whether eyewitness identification is reliable). Sufficiency, however, is not the issue in this case. As the en banc court recently explained in Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 844 (D.C. 2006) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 2248, 167 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2007), [m]ere sufficiency of the evidence does not dictate a finding of harmless error. Bell v. United States, 801 A.2d 117, 129 (D.C.2002). Even under the less rigorous standard of Kotteakos, [10] analysis under the harmless error doctrine should not be limited to superficial inquiry as to whether the same verdict would have been possible absent the tainted evidence. [ Raymond] Brooks v. United States 367 A.2d 1297, 1309 (D.C.1976); see also Clark v. United States, 593 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C.1991). To conclude that an error is harmless, we must find it highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict. United States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58, 67 (2d Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Corey, 566 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir.1977)); Clark, 593 A.2d at 192; see also In re Ty.B., 878 A.2d 1255, 1267 (D.C.2005). In the present case, as we have seen, the issue is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the foregoing authorities apply a fortiori in [the appellant's] favor. Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is an exacting standard indeed. The properly admitted evidence against the defendant must be overwhelming. McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 212 (D.C.2006). The government must show that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824. Indeed, the inquiry [under Chapman] . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (emphasis added). The government's argument boils down to the proposition that the courtroom identification of Ellis by the officers, almost exactly a year after the offense was committed, was so overwhelming that the show-up identification, minutes after the officers' observation of Ellis, did not contribute to the verdict in any way. We rejected an almost identical argument in T.L.L., 729 A.2d at 343: The District contends that, even if the show-up identification should have been suppressed, this court should affirm the adjudication of guilt on the strength of Hatcher's identification of T.L.L. in the courtroom. The District relies primarily on United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). We do not agree with the District's position. The trial judge's error in admitting evidence of the show-up identification in violation of the Fourth Amendment was constitutional in nature. The courtroom identification was made ten months after the robbery, and we cannot conclude, without further findings by the trial judge, that the admission of the earlier identification, made less than an hour after the offense, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824). We therefore reversed T.L.L.'s adjudication of guilt, and we directed the trial court to consider, on remand, and in advance of any new trial, whether the courtroom identification rested on the [witness'] independent recollection of the initial encounter and was not a fruit of the earlier, constitutionally flawed identifications. Id.; accord, People v. Jackson, 74 N.Y.2d 787, 545 N.Y.S.2d 95, 543 N.E.2d 738, 739 (1989) (where the lineup testimony of two prosecution witnesses should have been suppressed, . . . there must be a reversal and a retrial. Should the People elect to seek admission at the new trial of the in-court identification testimony of the two witnesses who viewed the lineup, they will be entitled to a hearing at which they have the opportunity to establish an independent source for that testimony.). The notion that, on a record such as this one, the jurors relied solely on the in-court identifications and were not influenced at all by the testimony regarding the show-up identification, is contrary to common experience and, indeed, flies in the face of common sense. Unsurprisingly, juries are inclined to be skeptical of courtroom identifications, In re WK, 323 A.2d 442, 444 (D.C.1974), on account of the inherent suggestiveness in a defendant's location next to his counsel at trial. Jackson v. United States, 395 A.2d 99, 105 (D.C. 1978). [11] A show-up identification shortly after the witness has observed the defendant, on the other hand, is routinely admitted, notwithstanding a measure of suggestiveness, because its promptness substantially reduces the likelihood that the witness will identify the wrong person. Hunter, 692 A.2d at 1375 (citing authorities). As we noted in Hunter, [t]he admission of evidence of such identification is consistent with common sense and sound practice; a prompt showup enhances the reliability of an identification and may, as in this case, exonerate an innocent person who has been mistakenly apprehended. Id. Indeed, we have stated that an immediate on-the-scene confrontation has uniquely powerful indica of reliability which more than counterbalance any suggestivity, absent special elements of unfairness. Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1068 (D.C.1978) (emphasis added); see also Hunter, 692 A.2d at 1375 (quoting Singletary ). We do not believe that these uniquely powerful indicia of reliability will ordinarily be lost on a conscientious and intelligent juror. Moreover, in his closing argument, the prosecutor focused heavily on the show-up identification: Five minutes after this transaction [was] completed, after the detective had gone to his car, field tested the drugs, the arrest team moved in. . . . . The defendant had gone back up on Georgia[] Avenue[.] [T]he arrest team moved in[.] [W]ithin five minutes Detective Commodore did this drive-by and said, you got him. That's him. You got him. Let me ask you, ladies and gentlemen, five minutesYou have an opportunity now to observe me, see what I'm wearing, look at my face. If I were to walk out of this courtroom for five minutes and walk back in, would you recognize me, because it happened several times yesterday. Maybe I wasn't out of the court for five minutes. I stepped out to retrieve a witness, maybe I was 45 seconds or a minute, I came back in. Were you confused about my identity or did you recognize me? The prosecutor's concentration on the brief time that elapsed between the offense and the show-up reveals that he regarded the show-up as extremely persuasive evidence. [A] prosecutor's own estimate of his case, and of its reception by the jury at the time, is, if not the only, at least a highly relevant measure now of the likelihood of prejudice, Andrews v. United States, 922 A.2d 449, 461 (D.C.2007) (quoting Garris v. United States, 129 U.S.App. D.C. 96, 100, 390 F.2d 862, 866 (1968)), and it bears heavily on the centrality of the error. Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 448 (D.C.2004). It is, of course, possible that Ellis would have been convicted even if the prosecutor had not introduced, and if the trial judge had not admitted, evidence of the show-up identification. The existence of such a possibility, however, is not equivalent to proof that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Ellis' conviction of distribution of heroin in a drug-free zone (No. 05-CF-302) is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Ellis' conviction of willful failure to appear (No. 05-CF-376) is affirmed. So ordered. [12]