Opinion ID: 1588673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cocaine Defense

Text: As to the guilt phase, Knese argues that counsel was ineffective for not investigating and presenting evidence at the suppression hearing, and throughout trial, that Knese was high on cocaine when he confessed to the police. Further, Knese argues that counsel was ineffective for not presenting a substance abuse defense, in order to establish that he lacked capacity to deliberatethereby negating the culpable mental state for first-degree murder. The issue is whether counsel's performance conformed to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney, and whether defendant was prejudiced thereby. Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Mo. banc 2002). To demonstrate prejudice, a movant must show that, but for counsel's poor performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the court proceeding would have been different. Id. at 426. Reasonable trial strategy is not ineffective assistance of counsel because it did not work as hoped. State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 755 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1150, 118 S.Ct. 1171, 140 L.Ed.2d 181 (1998). Neither is it ineffective for counsel to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another, even if the latter is also reasonable. Clayton, 63 S.W.3d at 207-08. Knese argues that counsel should have presented evidence that his Miranda waiver was involuntary, unintelligent, and not knowing because he was high on cocaine at the time of his confession. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding that case and review is based on the totality of the circumstances, taking into account the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1082, 119 S.Ct. 826, 142 L.Ed.2d 683 (1999). Defendant need not understand all possible consequences of the waiver, but only that he did not have to speak without the presence of an attorney, and that his statements could be used against him. State v. Powell, 798 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1991). The record refutes Knese's allegation. Knese's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. There is no evidence of coercion. Over several hours, Knese made detailed, coherent statements to four police officers, after waiving his rights each time. He stated he understood his rights and wanted to speak to the officers. True, statements to the first officer were not introduced, as the officer described Knese's behavior as abnormal and wild. However, the remaining three officers testified that Knese was calm, rational, lucid and coherent at the time of his statements. In fact, Knese initiated conversation with a detective, later testifying that he was just trying to talk to the police and tell them what happened. By deposition, counsel testified that he put on a defense of self-defense. He believed that even if it did not result in an acquittal, it often persuades the jury not to find the maximum. Further, the wounds on Knese's body were physical evidence that supported self-defense. Counsel's strategy was to minimize mention of Knese's cocaine abuse. He did not want to present evidence that Knese's drug use was an excuse for his crime. He believed that an ordinary jury is not the least forgiving of substance abuse, and asking them to ignore Knese's statements would hurt more than it would help. Voluntary substance abuse is inadmissible to negate the required mental state for first-degree murder. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 617. Substance abuse garners little to no sympathy from jurors. State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 262 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1095, 118 S.Ct. 892, 139 L.Ed.2d 878 (1998). Counsel's strategyalthough unsuccessful was reasonable.