Opinion ID: 2650
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Thirty Day Period: Starting Date

Text: Plaintiff next argues that the letter's statement that further action would be taken unless payment or a notice of dispute was submitted within 30 days casts doubt on the starting date for the thirty-day period. A recipient, Jacobson asserts, would be uncertain as to whether the thirty-day period for submitting a notice began on the date of the letter (July 13, 2004), or instead started on the date Jacobson received it, which, the parties agree, was some days later. If that were so, the letter would violate the statute, for the latter date is the correct one under the Act. Section 1692g(a)(3) requires the validation notice to state that the debtor may dispute the debt within thirty days after receipt of the notice  (emphasis added). We agree with the district court, however, that on the facts of this case, even the least sophisticated consumer would understand that the thirty-day period began only when the notice was received. The first case Jacobson cites in support of his second argument, Cavallaro v. Law Office of Shapiro & Kreisman, 933 F.Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y.1996), is not on point. The validation notice in that case stated explicitly that the debt would be assumed valid unless the recipient disputed the debt within thirty (30) days from the date of this notice.  Id. at 1151 (emphasis added). The district court quite rightly found a violation of the statute, for the notice expressly stated the wrong starting date. Id. at 1154. Here, by contrast, the contested statement says simply that payment or a notice must be submitted within 30 days, without specifying when the period starts running. While the letter is, therefore, perhaps ambiguous as to when the thirty-day period begins, the validation notice clarifies any possible ambiguity. It contains a clear and accurate statement of the starting date, informing Jacobson that he has 30 days from receiving this notice to submit the notice of dispute. In this respect, the debt collector's statements  taken together  resemble those considered by this Court in McStay v. I.C. System, Inc., 308 F.3d 188 (2d Cir.2002), where we rejected a similar claim of overshadowing. In McStay, the letter threatened further action if the recipient had not paid the debt after 30 days. Id. at 189. The front of the McStay letter contained no reference to the debtor's right to dispute the debt, but directed the reader's intention to important information on the reverse side. There, the debtor would find an explanation of her rights, which comported with § 1692g(a). On these facts, the Court found that any confusion created by the ambiguity on the front of the letter dissipates when read in conjunction with the language on the back. Id. at 191. We agreed with the district court in McStay that the least sophisticated consumer [was] not liable to conclude that the thirty-day period commenced on the date the . . . letter was, written as opposed to received. McStay v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 174 F.Supp.2d 42, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y.2001). The same reasoning applies to this case. The validation notice adequately clears up any ambiguity created by the letter as to the starting date for the thirty-day period. Indeed, McStay was a closer case. There, the clarifying language was on the back of the notice; here, it is just two inches further down on the same page as the arguably ambiguous original statement. Accordingly, we find that even the least sophisticated consumer, reading the document in its entirety, would understand that the thirty-day dispute period started running from the day she received the letter, rather than from the date the letter was written. We therefore affirm the district court's decision to reject Jacobson's second argument.