Opinion ID: 617234
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Pure Categorical Approach

Text: Even assuming arguendo that the generic crime of statutory rape includes a 4-year age difference requirement (or any age difference requirement at all), we determine that any error regarding this element would not be so clear-cut and so obvious that a competent district judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection. Turman, 122 F.3d at 1170. There is (and has been since before the District Court sentenced Gonzalez-Aparicio) some confusion, tension, and possibly even conflict in our own case law as to whether the generic crime includes this particular element. We begin with our ruling in United States v. Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d 599 (9th Cir.2007). In this case, the defendant argued that the district court improperly applied the 16-level enhancement based on a prior conviction under section 261.5(d) of the California Penal Code, which stated, inter alia, that [a]ny person 21 years of age or older who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is under 16 years of age is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony. Id. at 600-03. Affirming the sentencing enhancement, we stated, inter alia, that [t]he term `statutory rape' is ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to mean the unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of consent specified by state statute. Id. at 603(footnote omitted). In support of this definition, we specifically quoted the definitions of statutory rape in Black's Law Dictionary, id. at 603 n. 7 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1288(8th ed.2004)), as well as in an ALR annotation, id. (quoting Susan M. Kole, Annotation, Statute Protecting Minors in a Specified Age Range from Rape or Other Sexual Activity as Applicable to Defendant Minor Within Protected Age Group, 18 A.L.R.5th 856, § 2[a] (1994)). It must be noted that none of these definitions contain any age difference requirement. Id. We returned to the definition of statutory rape in United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d 738 (9th Cir.2007). The defendant challenged the application of the 16-level enhancement based on his prior conviction under section 261(c) of the California Penal Code. Id. at 740. This provision states in relevant part that [a]ny person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony, and California law then defines a minor as a person under the age of 18 years. Id. at 741. In Gomez-Mendez, [w]e went on to define statutory rape as `ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to mean the unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of consent specified by the state statute.' Id. at 745 (quoting Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d at 603). But the Gomez-Mendez panel purportedly did not answer the dispositive question presented here: what is the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the term `minor' in the context of a statutory rape law relied on for a sentencing enhancement? Id. (footnote omitted). The Rodriguez-Guzman panel majority, based on an examination of the Model Penal Code, federal criminal law (specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (Sexual abuse of a minor or ward)), and the approach of the overwhelming majority of the states to the age of consent issue (as addressed in Judge Thomas's concurring opinion in the subsequently vacated panel ruling in Estrada-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.2007)), concluded that the term `minor' in the context of a statutory rape law means a person under sixteen years of age. 506 F.3d at 745 (footnote omitted). We specifically observe that both the Model Penal Code and 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), as quoted in Rodriguez-Guzman, require that the victim be younger than 16 and that there be at least a 4-year age difference between the perpetrator and the victim. Id. In any case, this Court further explained that the prior ruling is ... not in conflict with our decision here because the statutory provision addressed in Gomez-Mendez only criminalizes sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 16. Id. at 745 n. 6; see also, e.g., Aguila-Montes, 655 F.3d at 925 (In [ Rodriguez-Guzman ], we held that the generic definition of `statutory rape' requires that the victim be under the age of sixteen. (citing Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 746)). In 2008, the en banc Court in Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), specifically considered the following question: [W]hether a conviction under any of four California statutory rape provisionsCalifornia Penal Code §§ 261.5(c), 286(b)(1), 288a(b)(1), 289(h)constitutes the aggravated felony `sexual abuse of a minor,' within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). [3] Id. at 1150. This Court (in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Thomas) answered this question in the negative because each California statutory provision defines conduct that is broader than the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor. Id. at 1150-60. We began our categorical analysis by observing that we were [f]ortunately not confronted with an absence of specific congressional guidance with respect to the applicable elements of the crime because Congress has enumerated the elements of the offense of `sexual abuse of a minor' at 18 U.S.C. § 2243. Id. at 1152. Thus the generic offense of `sexual abuse of a minor' requires four elements: (1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a sexual act; (3) with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an age difference of at least four years between the defendant and the minor. Id. We then engaged in a rather lengthy (if purportedly unnecessary) discussion of current criminal law in order to confirm that the congressional definition comports with `the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the words' of the term. Id. at 1152-53(quoting United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.1999)). In the process, we turned, inter alia, to state statutory rape provisions, the Model Penal Code's statutory rape definition, and prior case law (and frequently distinguished between sexual activity with younger children and sexual activity with older adolescents). Id. at 1153-55. In explaining why there was no need for the aggravated felony provision to include an express statutory reference to § 2243, we specifically observed that sexual abuse of a minor offenses under federal and state law define what would, in more common parlance, be referred to as statutory rape. Id. at 1156; see also, e.g., Aguila-Montes, 655 F.3d at 925 (We defined `sexual abuse of a minor' by reference to the federal statutory rape statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2243, and held that this definition contains `four elements: (1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a sexual act; (3) with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an age difference of at least four years between the defendant and the minor. ' (quoting Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1152)). Even outside of the narrow statutory rape context, subsequent panel rulings have proceeded to distinguish this en banc opinion. In the process, we have recognized that there are now two generic federal definitions of sexual abuse of a minor in this Circuit: (1) the so-called statutory rape crimes only definition announced by the en banc Court in Estrada-Espinoza and understood as covering offenses involving both older adolescents and younger children; and (2) the preexisting definition dealing with sexual crimes against younger children, which are considered to be per se abusive. See United States v. Farmer, 627 F.3d 416, 417-22 (9th Cir.2010), pet. for cert. filed, (Mar. 17, 2011) (No. 10-9620); Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1106-08; United States v. Castro, 607 F.3d 566, 567-70 (9th Cir. 2010); Rivera-Cuartas v. Holder, 605 F.3d 699, 701-02 (9th Cir.2010); Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1012-16 (9th Cir.2009); United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 511-16 (9th Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1545, 176 L.Ed.2d 138 (2010). For example, we determined in Rivera-Cuartas v. Holder, 605 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2010), that the Arizona statutory provision at issue here does not satisfy either of these sexual abuse of a minor definitions, id. at 702. In this immigration proceeding, we held that section 13-1405 does not meet the definition for statutory rape crimes set forth in Estrada-Espinoza for two reasons: (1) it lacks the age difference requirement; and (2) is broader than the generic offense with respect to the age of the minor because the statute applies to persons under eighteen years of age. Id. On the other hand, a crime that is not a statutory rape crime under Estrada-Espinoza may still meet the federal generic offense of `sexual abuse of a minor' if (1) the conduct prohibited by the criminal statute is sexual, (2) the statute protects a minor, and (3) the statute requires abuse. Id. (citing Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 513). The abuse element is met if the statute prohibits behavior that causes `physical or psychological harm in light of the age of the victim in question.' Id. (quoting same). Applying this other definition, we held that section 13-1405 lacks the critical abuse element. Id. However, the Rivera-Cuartas panel only considered the aggravated felony statute, whichunlike the Guideline commentary at issue here does not include any express statutory rape language. To date, we have yet to consider whetherand how Estrada-Espinoza should be applied in defining the generic crime of statutory rape under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). In fact, this Court actually amended two recent rulings to eliminate such statutory rape discussions. In United States v. Castro, 607 F.3d 566 (9th Cir.2010), the defendant challenged a 16-level sentencing enhancement because of his prior conviction under section 288(c)(1) of the California Penal Code, which criminalizes lewd or lascivious acts on a child of 14 or 15 years by a person at least ten years older than the child, id. at 567. Applying the two generic federal definitions of sexual abuse of a minor, id. at 567-70, we held that section 288(c)(1) is broader than the generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor and that it therefore is not categorically a crime of violence. Id. at 567-68. In this amended opinion, we also explained that [w]e do not address whether section 288(c)(1) constitutes the generic offense of `statutory rape' and therefore constitutes a `crime of violence,' see U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii), because the parties have not raised that issue. Id. at 570 n. 2. Likewise, in United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 539, 178 L.Ed.2d 396 (2010), the defendant challenged a sentencing enhancement on the basis of a prior conviction under section 9A.44.076(1) of the Washington Revised Code, id. at 1106. This provision provides that [a] person is guilty of rape of a child in the second degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least twelve years old but less than fourteen years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than the victim. Id. We concluded that this conviction fell under the abuse definition of sexual abuse of a minor. Id. at 1106-08. Although the district court ruled that the prior conviction actually qualified as statutory rape, we stated in our amended ruling that, [b]ecause we conclude that Valencia-Barragan's conviction under section 9A.44.076(1) criminalizes conduct that satisfies the first federal generic definition of `sexual abuse of a minor,' we do not address whether his conviction also satisfies the second generic federal definition or whether it constitutes `statutory rape.' Id. at 1107. Gonzalez-Aparicio, although he never raised the issue below, now asks this Court to determine whether his prior conviction under section 13-1405 constitutes `statutory rape' and specifically whether the generic federal definition of statutory rape includes a 4-year age difference element. Id. We acknowledge that this is a difficult issue, further complicated by our own prior case law. For instance, our prior decisions in Gomez-Mendez and Rodriguez-Guzman did appear to offer a generally applicable definition of statutory rape, which in turn lacks any age difference element. However, the respective defendants evidently never raised any age difference issue on appeal (and the statutory provision in Gomez-Mendez actually requires the perpetrator to be at least 21 years of age and the victim to be younger than 16 while the provision at issue in Rodriguez-Guzman contains a 3-year age difference requirement). Nevertheless, we are still unable to conclude that the District Court committed any plain error here. In particular, Estrada-Espinoza actually defined the phrase sexual abuse of a minor as it is used in the immigration aggravated felony context. In contrast, the Guideline commentary at issue here expressly lists both sexual abuse of a minor as well as statutory rape as crimes of violence. In general, courts should attempt to avoid an interpretation rendering language superfluous. Cf., e.g., Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 515(stating that, if we were to define `sexual abuse of a minor' in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 as limited to § 2243, we would eliminate the need for the separate and independent example of `statutory rape' as a `crime of violence.'). The Estrada-Espinoza opinion also never discussed or even cited to our prior statutory rape decisions in Gomez-Mendez and Rodriguez-Guzman. We further add that, even in the limited sexual abuse of a minor context, the en banc ruling and the subsequent line of case law have been the target of criticism. In a special concurrence in United States v. Farmer, 627 F.3d 416 (9th Cir.2010), pet. for cert. filed, (Mar. 17, 2011) (No. 10-9620), Judge Bybee, joined by Judge Noonan, expressed serious doubts about, among other things, the existence of two definitions for the same offense, id. at 424-26 (Bybee, J., specially concurring). In the end, we are confronted here with serious problems that arguably merit en banc consideration and that, at the very least, should be resolved only after the defendant properly raises an objection before the district court and the district court thereby has a real opportunity to make an informed and reasoned ruling that could assist any ultimate resolution. At the very least, it cannot be said that any error here was so obvious under the governing case law at the time of sentencing (or even now) that a competent district judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection. Turman, 122 F.3d at 1170 (citation omitted).