Opinion ID: 2161608
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contribution of Attorney Fees in Postdecree Proceedings

Text: We next consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing Judy's petition for contribution of attorney fees as untimely. Steven contends the appellate court erroneously determined that the section 503(j) time for filing petitions for contribution of attorney fees is not enforceable in postdecree proceedings. Judy argues that the appellate court correctly held that section 503(j) is not applicable to postdecree petitions for contribution of attorney fees and that the appellate court's reconsideration of In re Marriage of Konchar, 312 Ill.App.3d 441, 245 Ill.Dec. 224, 727 N.E.2d 671 (2000), harmonized Illinois law on this point. We reiterate the standard of review for construction and application of a statute is de novo. See Donoho, 204 Ill.2d at 172, 273 Ill.Dec. 116, 788 N.E.2d 707. Our primary objective [in construing a statute] is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent   . Perry, 224 Ill.2d at 323, 309 Ill.Dec. 330, 864 N.E.2d 196. [T]he surest and most reliable indicator of [legislative intent] is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Perry, 224 Ill.2d at 323, 309 Ill.Dec. 330, 864 N.E.2d 196. In determining the plain meaning of a statute, we consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. Davis, 199 Ill.2d at 135, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. Collins, 214 Ill.2d at 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262. If the statutory language is ambiguous, we construe the statute to avoid rendering any part meaningless or superfluous. Jones, 214 Ill.2d at 193, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239. We do not depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent. Martinez, 184 Ill.2d at 550, 235 Ill. Dec. 452, 705 N.E.2d 65. Section 508 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2004)) governs attorney fees in postdecree dissolution proceedings. Macaluso v. Macaluso, 334 Ill.App.3d 1043, 268 Ill. Dec. 636, 779 N.E.2d 250 (2002). Section 508(a) provides, in relevant part: The court from time to time, after due notice and hearing, and after considering the financial resources of the parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable amount for his own or the other party's costs and attorney's fees. Interim attorney's fees and costs may be awarded from the opposing party, in accordance with subsection (c-1) of Section 501. At the conclusion of the case, contribution to attorney's fees and costs may be awarded from the opposing party in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503. 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2004). Section 508 specifically references section 503(j). Section 503(j) states, in relevant part: After proofs have closed in the final hearing on all other issues between the parties (or in conjunction with the final hearing, if all parties so stipulate) and before judgment is entered, a party's petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in the proceeding shall be heard and decided, in accordance with the following provisions: (1) A petition for contribution, if not filed before the final hearing on other issues between the parties, shall be filed no later than 30 days after the closing of proofs in the final hearing or within such other period as the court orders. (2) Any award of contribution to one party from the other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this Section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under Section 504. 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2004). Section 508 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2004)) governs attorney fees in post-decree dissolution proceedings. Macaluso v. Macaluso, 334 Ill.App.3d 1043, 268 Ill. Dec. 636, 779 N.E.2d 250 (2002). Prior to 1997, section 508 contained the attorney fee provisions of the Act. In 1997, the legislature amended sections 501, 503, and 508. We begin our analysis with a brief survey of the appellate court's interpretation of section 503(j). In Konchar, 312 Ill. App.3d 441, 245 Ill.Dec. 224, 727 N.E.2d 671, the Second District interpreted section 508(a) to mean that section 503(j) applies to both predecree and postdecree petitions for contribution of attorney fees. In Macaluso, 334 Ill.App.3d at 1046, 268 Ill.Dec. 636, 779 N.E.2d 250, the Third District expressly rejected Konchar's interpretation and held that section 503(j) does not require postdecree petitions for contribution to be filed before final hearings on the other issues between the parties. The First District also rejected Konchar 's interpretation in In re Marriage of Carr, 323 Ill.App.3d 481, 485, 257 Ill.Dec. 1, 752 N.E.2d 1181 (2001), in dicta. In this case, the Second District revisited and disagreed with the prior decision in Konchar by a different panel, and held that section 503(j) is inapplicable to postdecree petitions for contribution of attorney fees. In reviewing the contested statutory sections, section 508(a) provides that [a]t the conclusion of the case, the court may award contribution of attorney fees and costs in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503. 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2004). Section 503, in turn, is captioned Disposition of property and generally addresses distribution of property in the original judgment for dissolution of marriage. Subsection (j) of section 503 addresses contribution toward fees and costs incurred in the proceeding before the final dissolution of marriage judgment. Section 503(j) specifically references the final hearing on all other issues between the parties. (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2004). In Macaluso, a petition for contribution of attorney fees was filed after the trial court issued a ruling in postdecree proceedings. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely under Konchar. The appellate court reversed, holding that the language final hearing on all other issues between the parties in section 503(j) referred to predecree bifurcated hearings and that the timing requirement of section 503(j) was, therefore, limited to predecree proceedings. Macaluso, 334 Ill.App.3d at 1047, 268 Ill.Dec. 636, 779 N.E.2d 250. Contrary to Konchar, the appellate court in Macaluso concluded that section 503(j) did not apply to postdecree petitions for contribution of attorney fees. Macaluso, 334 Ill.App.3d at 1047, 268 Ill.Dec. 636, 779 N.E.2d 250. We agree with the analysis of the court in Macaluso and the appellate court in this case. Section 508 governs attorney fees generally, including petitions for contribution of attorney fees and costs incurred in postdecree proceedings and initial dissolution proceedings. We also agree with Macaluso 's conclusion that section 503(j) governs the procedural requirements applicable to petitions for contribution of attorney fees and costs incurred prior to the entry of final orders for dissolution of marriage. The phrase all other issues, in section 503(j) refers to bifurcated contested trials, when the grounds are tried first and other remaining issues are either settled or tried separately. See 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2004) (providing for bifurcated contested trials on issues of grounds and other remaining issues). Further, in the section 503 context, attorney fees are awarded in view of the total disposition of property and assets, thus justifying the 30-day requirement for filing a petition for contribution of attorney fees. Practically, a judge rarely decides other remaining issues immediately after a contested trial on the remaining issues. The petition for fees must, however, be presented to the judge after close of the evidence, and then attorney fees are decided as part of the overall property and asset distribution. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erroneously dismissed Judy's petition for contribution of attorney fees as untimely. We affirm the appellate court's judgment reversing the trial court's order dismissing Judy's petition for contribution of attorney fees as untimely.