Opinion ID: 1356579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982

Text: We first note that it is undisputed that the District Court had jurisdiction and the authority to enter an order of restitution after this Court remanded the cause to the District Court in 2001. The question is thus whether at some point between this Court's remand in 2001 and the entry of the modified restitution order in 2008, the District Court was divested of its authority. The issue of restitution in this case is governed by the VWPA. Although Rossi's conviction occurred after the enactment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, tit. 2(a)(ii), § 205, 110 Stat. 1214, 1229-32, her conduct predated the MVRA and, therefore, the parties have proceeded throughout this litigation with an understanding that the 1995 provisions of the VWPA apply to the present case. Rossi contends that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution in 2008, based on two VWPA provisions. First, she argues that although the present restitution order was entered after she had finished serving her sentence and supervised release period, Appellant's Br. at 15, the VWPA requir[ed] that restitution be imposed at the time of sentence, id. at 16. It is true that the VWPA permits a district court to impose restitution when sentencing a defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (1995). However, we interpret this provision to apply both to a district court's original sentencing of a defendant and to a resentencing ordered by the court of appeals. Any suggestion that the provision applies only to the district court's original sentencing ignores our system of appellate review. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (1995) (If the court of appeals determines that the sentence was imposed in violation of law ..., the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate. ...); id. § 3742(g) (2006) (A district court to which a case is remanded pursuant to subsection (f)(1) ... shall resentence [the] defendant in accordance with ... such instructions as may have been given by the court of appeals....). Here, the restitution aspects of Rossi's original and amended sentences were vacated by Popovic I and Popovic II, respectively, and her case was remanded for resentencing. These remands returned jurisdiction over the case to the District Court. It was on remand that the District Court imposed the new restitution provisions as part of Rossi's resentencing. We therefore see no violation of the when sentencing provision of § 3663(a)(1). Second, Rossi argues that the District Court had no authority to enter a restitution order in 2008, contending that the VWPA provides that the court cannot order that restitution be paid later than ... five years after the end of the term of imprisonment imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(2)(B) (1995). We reject this argument because it relies on a subsection of § 3663(f) [1] that is inapplicable to the order entered by Judge Cote. A reading of § 3663(f) as a whole makes clear that the five-year limitation imposed in subsection (f)(2) applies only to restitution orders that either specify a period during which payment is to be made or provide an installment plan pursuant to which payments are to be made. Subsection (f)(3) provides that if there is neither a specified period nor an installment plan, restitution is to be made immediately; although subsection (f)(3) requires a defendant to make restitution immediately after it is imposed, it includes no time limitation upon when a court may impose that restitution order. The restitution order at issue on this appeal was imposed by Judge Cote without specification of any period during which Rossi is to make payment and without any provision for Rossi to make payments in installments. Accordingly, the present restitution order is governed by subsection (f)(3). Subsection (f)(2) is simply not applicable. We therefore reject Rossi's contention that the restitution order imposed in 2008 was foreclosed simply by the passage of time between our second remand and Rossi's resentencing. Finally, we note that in construing a timing limitation on sentencing under the MVRA, we have indicated that a defendant might be entitled to invoke that time limitation if she could make a clear showing that [her] substantial rights ha [d] been prejudiced by [the] delay. United States v. Zakhary, 357 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2004). Even if we were to extend that analysis of the MVRA and apply it to a matter arising under the VWPA, Rossi has not shown that she was prejudiced by the lapse of time. If anything, the delay has served to benefit her, due to the loss of proof as to the initial amount of damage suffered by the victim companies. Accordingly, we hold that (1) the District Court properly ruled that the passage of time did not divest it of jurisdiction to order restitution following this Court's remand for resentencing, and (2) the District Court correctly entered an order of restitution.