Opinion ID: 1043839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Factual Findings

Text: The Copleys’ second attack is upon the factual findings on which the trial court based the contempt findings.19 Specifically, the Copleys contend that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings that: (1) Mrs. Copley violated the Agreed Order; and (2) that any violation was willful. The Lovlaces contend that the evidence supports the trial court’s contempt findings and actually preponderates in favor of finding against Mrs. Copley on the other twenty-one contempt allegations in their Second Amended Petition. Civil contempt claims based upon alleged willful disobedience of a court order20 have four essential elements: (1) the order alleged to have been violated must be “lawful”; (2) the order alleged to have been violated must be clear, specific, and unambiguous; (3) the person alleged to have violated the order must have actually disobeyed or otherwise resisted the order; and (4) the violation of the order must have been “willful.” Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354-55. Whether a party violated an order and whether a violation was willful are factual issues, which appellate courts review de novo, with a presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s findings. Id. at 356-57. We conclude that, in this case, the trial court failed to make sufficiently specific findings on the disputed facts necessary to find civil contempt. Effective July 1, 2009, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 was amended to require trial courts to make specific findings of facts and conclusions of law in all bench trials: In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment . . . . If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rules 41.02 and 65.04(6). 19 Once again, this issue is not listed in the appropriate section of the Copleys’ brief, but because the Copleys’ assertion, if correct, also would dispose of the remaining issue regarding the award of attorney’s fees, we address the issue. 20 Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) (2012) (“The power of the several courts to issue attachments, and inflict punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construed to extend to any except the following cases: . . . [t]he willful disobedience or resistance of any . . . person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of such courts . . . .”). -36- Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.21 Requiring trial courts to make findings of fact and conclusions of law is generally viewed by courts as serving three purposes. 9C Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571, at 219-223 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter 9C Federal Practice and Procedure]. First, findings and conclusions facilitate appellate review by affording a reviewing court a clear understanding of the basis of a trial court’s decision. See Estate of Bucy v. McElroy, No. W2012-02317-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1798911, at -4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2013) (noting that the Rule 52.01 requirement facilitates appellate review); Hardin v. Hardin, No. W2012-00273-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6727533, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2012) (same); In re K.H., No. W2008-01144-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1362314, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2009) (recognizing that without findings and conclusions appellate courts are left to wonder about the basis of a trial court’s decision); In re M.E.W., No. M2003-01739-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 865840, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (same); 9C Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571, at 219 (recognizing that specific findings by the trial court facilitate appellate review). Second, findings and conclusions also serve “to make definite precisely what is being decided by the case in order to apply the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata in future cases and promote confidence in the trial judge’s decision-making.” 9C Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571, at 221-22. A third function served by the requirement is “to evoke care on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining and applying the facts.” Id. at 222. Indeed, by clearly expressing the reasons for its decision, the trial court may well decrease the likelihood of an appeal. Hardin, 2012 WL 6727533, at . In this case, the trial court declined to make specific findings of fact as to the contempt.22 Although the trial court’s final order includes some findings regarding the five 21 Before July 1, 2009, specific findings of fact and conclusions of law were not required except “upon request made by any party prior to the entry of judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (amended 2008); see also Poole v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 337 S.W.3d 771, 791 n.12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (noting the amendment). 22 At the beginning of the September 28, 2010 hearing on attorney’s fees, the trial court denied the request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law made by counsel for the Lovlaces, stating: It’s certainly not an unreasonable request, but to be blunt, the [c]ourt did the best it could on the day of trial in announcing its decision. To go back at this time and try to recreate basically the [c]ourt’s ruling and make specific findings, the [c]ourt is going to simply rely on the transcript of its findings, good or bad. I don’t think there’s anything to gain by going back and trying to recreate that. Again, it may be cleaner for the appeals process, and the [c]ourt accepts that this is probably going to be appealed, regardless; but with that being said, obviously my court is not here to try to make it easier and make the rulings more clear for the Court of Appeals. Truly, I think my job here is just simply to do the best I can in (continued...) -37- allegations held to constitute contempt, the order does not include sufficiently specific findings on the disputed facts that were crucial to determining the elements of civil contempt. See Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354-55. There is no bright-line test by which to assess the sufficiency of factual findings, but “the findings of fact must include as much of the subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose to the reviewing court the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.” 9C Federal Practice and Procedure § 2579, at 328. Courts need not make findings on stipulated or undisputed facts, unless conflicting inferences can be drawn from undisputed facts. Id. at 332-33. This is not a case involving undisputed or stipulated facts. The parties here disputed whether Mrs. Copley’s conduct amounted to a violation of the Agreed Order and disagreed as to whether any violation was willful. Disputes about these issues existed as to each of the five contempt findings.23 In this bitterly fought case, involving many factual disputes, it is difficult to overstate the importance of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court’s findings were not sufficiently specific to resolve these disputes. One remedy appellate courts typically apply when a trial court’s factual findings fail to satisfy the Rule 52.01 requirement is to remand the case to the trial court with directions to issue sufficient findings and conclusions. See, e.g., Pandey v. Shrivastava, No.W201200059-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 657799, at -6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2013); Hardin, 2012 WL 6727533, at -6; In re Connor S.L., No. W2012-00587-COA-R3-JV, 2012 WL 5462839, at -5,  (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2012); Simpson v. Fowler, No. W2011-02112-COA-R3- (...continued) deciding the case. I think I’ve done that. In some cases the [c]ourt obviously believes it needs to take the time to write out its order, conclusions of law and findings of fact; but in this case, the [c]ourt thinks it made specific-enough finding[s] on the day of, and I think we’re ready to go forward with the hearing. 23 The trial court based its findings of contempt on five specific incidents: January 2007, February 17, 2007, June 2007, and two incidents in July 2007. The trial court failed to make specific findings resolving the disputed facts concerning each of these incidents, including the disputes about whether any noncompliance with the Agreed Order was willful. The trial court’s finding regarding the June 2007 contempt states that the Lovlaces’ “visitation was missed without cause.” However, the Lovlaces alleged a scheduling conflict, not missed visitation, in June 2007. Although the Lovlaces’ Second Amended Petition for Contempt erroneously identified June 23, 2007, as a date when they missed Saturday visitation, the parties later entered an agreed order correcting the Petition to reflect June 23, 2008, as the date of the alleged missed Saturday visitation. The Lovlaces’ proof at trial also clearly identified June 23, 2008, not June 2007, as the date of the missed Saturday visitation. Thus, the trial court’s finding regarding the June 2007 contempt is inconsistent with the allegations and proof in the record. -38- CV, 2012 WL 3675321, -5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2012). Alternatively, an appellate court may choose to remedy the trial court’s deficient factual findings by conducting a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, No. M2012-01184-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 3198157, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2013); see also Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002) (applying de novo review when the trial court’s factual findings were insufficient); Brooks v. Brooks, 992 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tenn. 1999) (same). Neither of these typical remedies is workable in this case. Remanding to the trial court for sufficiently specific findings would only further prolong this already protracted, contentious, and expensive litigation, and potentially result in a second appeal. A remand would undermine the goals, expressed in the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, of securing “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on the merits” and of avoiding needless litigation. Tenn. R. App. P. 1, 13. A remand for additional proceedings would serve neither the interests of justice nor the interests of the parties. Cf. S. Abraham & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 677 N.W.2d 31, 43 n.11 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that the trial court’s contempt findings were inadequate but refusing to remand “because numerous procedural defects tainted the contempt ‘hearing’”). Conducting a de novo review of the record on appeal to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies also is not feasible. This is true because appellate courts are ill-equipped to make the type of credibility determinations that would be necessary to resolve the factual disputes surrounding each of the five contempt findings.24 The typical remedies of a remand and de novo review are not the only options available to this Court. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a) authorizes appellate courts to grant “the relief on the law and facts to which the party is entitled or the proceeding otherwise requires.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (emphasis added). “This subdivision makes clear that the appellate courts are empowered to grant whatever relief an appellate proceeding requires.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) advisory commission cmt. This Court has not often relied upon Rule 24 For this reason, we also decline to address the Lovlaces’ request to review the record, make additional findings of contempt, and order make-up visitation. Additionally, even if resolving this request would not require credibility determinations, we would decline to address it. The Lovlaces failed to raise these issues in their Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application for permission to appeal, failed to list these issues in the appropriate section of their supplemental brief, and failed to provide any significant argument regarding these issues in the argument section of their briefs in this Court. The issues are therefore waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 11, 27(a)(4), (a)(7); Hodge, 382 S.W.3d at 335; see also Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 615. -39- 36(a) as a basis for granting appropriate relief.25 Based on its unique facts and procedural posture, we have determined that this is an appropriate case for the exercise of this discretion. We therefore invoke Rule 36(a) and provide the relief on the law and the facts that this proceeding requires. We vacate the trial court’s judgment finding Mrs. Copley in contempt and dismiss the Lovlaces’ allegations of contempt. This relief not only corrects the judicial error that precluded effective appellate review but also provides closure and finality to the Lovlaces, the Copleys, and the minor child—very important considerations in legal proceedings involving children. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s judgment finding Mrs. Copley in contempt and dismiss the Lovlaces’ allegations of contempt. As a result, we also vacate that part of the trial court’s judgment ordering Mrs. Copley to pay a portion of the Lovlaces’ attorney’s fees.26 Our decision to grant this relief should in no way be understood as condoning the acrimonious and uncooperative relationship that has existed between the Copleys and the Lovlaces or suggesting that their future willful failure to abide by the visitation arrangement in the January 5, 2011 order will not result in serious consequences. Their hostility towards each other and unwillingness to work together has resulted in each side incurring thousands of dollars of attorney’s fees, in addition to the emotional turmoil this litigation has undoubtedly produced. Unfortunately, the record on appeal suggests that the Copleys and the Lovlaces have lost sight of the fact that the paramount consideration in this case, as well as all other legal proceedings involving child custody and visitation, is the welfare of the child. Luke v. Luke, 651 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn. 1983). The interests and desires of adult parties are secondary to this paramount concern. Boyer, 238 S.W.3d at 255; Dantzler v. Dantzler, 665 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). We urge the Copleys and the Lovlaces to 25 See, e.g., State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 96 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that the defendant’s statements to the police were not admissible against him and relying on Rule 36(a) to remand to the trial court to allow the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, which was entered when he mistakenly believed that the statements were admissible evidence against him); Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 322 (Tenn. 1995) (relying on Rule 36(a) to allow the pro se litigant to file a petition in the appropriate court because the trial court where the petition was filed failed to transfer the pro se petition to the appropriate court). 26 Because we have vacated the trial court’s judgment, we need not address the Court of Appeals’ conclusions regarding the inadequacy of the findings to support the attorney’s fees award. For the same reason, we need not address Mrs. Copley’s argument that the trial court lacked authority to award attorney’s fees as a sanction for civil contempt. We note, however, that this Court has previously discussed the circumstances under which monetary damages may be awarded as a sanction for civil contempt. See Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, 172 S.W.3d 507, 510-11 (Tenn. 2005) (stating that damages are available to a party injured by a contemnor’s acts in violation of a court’s order and describing the measure of damages as “the actual injury sustained as a result of the contempt,” id. at 511 (citations omitted)); see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-9-104, -105 (2012) (describing the availability of “damages” in contempt proceedings). -40- refocus on how best to foster the welfare of the child they all dearly love and allow this goal to guide their future interactions with each other.