Opinion ID: 1162726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Cunningham Incident

Text: The facts relevant to this incident are set forth in detail in Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev. 551, 729 P.2d 1328 (1986). A certified copy of that decision was admitted into evidence at the formal commission hearing, along with an exemplified copy of appellant's written order holding Commander Cunningham of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in contempt of court. Additionally, appellant testified at length respecting this incident at the formal hearing and submitted as evidence a transcript of the pertinent proceedings conducted in appellant's court on October 10, 1986. In Cunningham, this court vacated as void appellant's order holding Commander Cunningham in direct contempt of court and confining Commander Cunningham in the Clark County Jail. As that opinion relates, certain video tapes were seized by the police during a investigation of a bizarre set of circumstances involving an individual who had jumped to his death from an airplane. A television reporter subsequently contacted Commander Cunningham to request the release of the video tapes to the media. Because he considered them as evidence in a death investigation, Commander Cunningham declined the request. The reporter then contacted appellant to discuss the release of the tapes, and appellant subsequently telephoned the police department late in the afternoon of October 8, 1986, demanding to speak to Commander Cunningham. Upon being informed that Cunningham was not in his office, appellant told Cunningham's secretary that if Cunningham did not appear at the courthouse in ten minutes, he would have Cunningham arrested. Thereafter, the secretary was able to contact Cunningham before he left the police station for the day, and informed him of this telephone call. As the Cunningham opinion explains, according to the secretary, appellant did not properly identify himself [28] or the purpose of his call, did not state that the call was in relation to any specific case pending before the district court, was rude and belligerent on the telephone, and hung up abruptly without allowing the secretary to verify his name and without leaving a number at which Cunningham could return the call. Consequently, Cunningham did not attempt to respond to the telephone call at the time. Id. at 554, 729 P.2d at 1330. [A]lthough no civil action whatever involving the video tapes was presently pending before his department, appellant issued an order the following day directing Commander Cunningham to appear in appellant's courtroom and show cause why he should not be `adjudged guilty of civil contempt for failure to obey [appellant's] order of October 8, 1986, to appear in chambers.' Id. at 557, 729 P.2d at 1332. Appellant's order further indicated that appellant had ordered `Cunningham to appear in the Chambers of Department X ... to respond to inquiries concerning a videotape in the possession of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,' and that the Commander had `failed to appear as ordered.' Id. The transcript of the subsequent show cause hearing before appellant reads in material part as follows: THE COURT: I believe this is Detective Cunningham, is that right? Commander Cunningham. All right. Appearance of counsel for  MR. HAUSER: Chuck Hauser on behalf of the police department. THE COURT: Thank you, sir. On behalf of Channel 8, who is that, please? MR. BYRD: Christopher Byrd on behalf of Channel 8 with Mark Fierro. He is here as well, your Honor. THE COURT: For purposes of the record, this Court ordered Mr. Byrd to prepare an Order to Show Cause to be served on Commander Cunningham for his failure to appear to this Court's order of the other day, and, Mr. Cunningham, is there anything you wish to say, sir? COMMANDER CUNNINGHAM: I did not fail to appear to any lawful Court order would be my position. THE COURT: Your position is my order was not lawful; is that correct, sir? COMMANDER CUNNINGHAM: My position is I did not recognize your phone call which was relayed to me as one who was irrational, rude and would not wait for feedback as to phone numbers and as to really who you were. That is not something that I recognize as a lawful order of any Court. THE COURT: All right, sir. Sheriff, you are here as a courtesy only; is that correct? SHERIFF MORAN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I find you in direct contempt and put you in jail right now for 48 hours or until further order of the Court, whichever occurs last. COMMANDER CUNNINGHAM: Do I have a  MR. HAUSER: For the record, could we ask that this be transferred to a neutral judge to have a hearing on the matter? THE COURT: That objection is not timely, Counsel. He is remanded to custody forthwith. MR. HAUSER: For the record also, your Honor, we believe there was no direct order because there was no case in front of the Court. So, there is no contempt. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: You may make your observations clear for the record. Ma'am, you will transcribe these remarks immediately. Thereupon, Commander Cunningham was arrested, handcuffed and led to the jury box where he was required to sit with other prisoners for approximately thirty minutes while appellant completed his calendar. He was then transported to the Clark County Detention Facility where he was photographed, fingerprinted and booked. The booking slip delivered to the jail conveyed appellant's directive: No bail, no writs. Cunningham was held in custody for approximately five hours until his release was secured pursuant to an order of this court staying appellant's order. Id. at 558, 729 P.2d at 1332. In vacating appellant's order as void, this court held that Cunningham's actions did not fall within any of the acts or omissions which constitute contempt pursuant to NRS 22.010 and NRS 199.340. Further, this court ruled: Cunningham was not disorderly, contemptuous or insolent. No breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance took place. Cunningham did not abuse the processes or proceedings of the court, nor was there a showing that he deliberately or recklessly disregarded his duties with respect to the court. Further, Cunningham did not disobey or resist any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the court. As Cunningham noted in his comments at the show cause hearing, the district court did not issue any lawful order to Cunningham to appear at the courthouse on October 8, 1986. Id. at 559, 729 P.2d at 1333. This court further observed: More importantly, it is apparent that Judge Goldman acted in excess of his jurisdiction not only when he ordered Commander Cunningham to appear in his chamber within ten minutes, but later when he issued the show cause order, and when he held Commander Cunningham in contempt of court. No civil or criminal action was pending before Judge Goldman during this time upon which such orders might lawfully issue. A district judge has no authority, inherent or otherwise, to issue an order to anyone to appear before him except as expressly provided by law. Because no criminal or civil action involving the right to possess the video tapes was pending before Judge Goldman, he lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. Furthermore, because nothing remotely resembling a proper order had been issued and served upon Cunningham, in regard to any proper proceeding, Judge Goldman had no personal jurisdiction whatever over Cunningham. Even if the necessary action had been properly before Judge Goldman, a district judge lacks jurisdiction to order anyone to appear without cause and without reasonable notice, or outside the ordinary process of the court. Such orders, entered without jurisdiction, constitute an abuse of judicial power. Id. at 560, 729 P.2d at 1334. Notwithstanding this court's holding in Cunningham, in his testimony at the formal hearing, appellant continued to insist that his actions with regard to Commander Cunningham were quite proper under the circumstances. In particular, appellant testified that a telephone call from a judge to a police officer, under those circumstances, constitutes an order, and that Cunningham's failure to recognize appellant's telephone call as a lawful court order was erroneous. [29] Based upon this evidence, the commission found that appellant abused his power of contempt. Our review of the record as a whole reveals clear and convincing evidentiary support for the commission's finding of a long-standing pattern of abuse of the power of contempt. We are not persuaded, however, that sufficient evidence was adduced at the formal hearing to support the commission's specific findings respecting the Gordon Yach and the Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital incidents. More specifically, without the testimony contained in the transcript of the probable cause hearing, which the commission expressly declined to consider at the formal hearing, the evidence of record regarding Mr. Yach and the hospital established little more than the fact of appellant's entry of show cause orders. Moreover, the record reflects that appellant was not questioned and did not testify at the formal hearing about either of these matters. We conclude that, as a matter of law, the show cause orders standing alone are insufficient to establish that appellant abused his power of contempt on these specific occasions. Sufficient clear and convincing evidence, however, does support the findings of abuse relating to the remaining incidents. Appellant nonetheless contends that the documentary evidence supporting the commission's findings was improperly admitted and considered at the formal hearing and, therefore, the evidence should be deemed insufficient. Specifically, appellant argues that the transcripts of the hearings that appellant conducted, the show cause orders and orders of contempt that he entered and the opinions of this court that reversed his orders of contempt were all erroneously admitted and considered because absolutely no evidentiary foundation [was] laid for the introduction of these exhibits or for the hearsay contained therein upon which the Commission apparently placed heavy reliance. Appellant also asserts without further explanation that the admission of this documentary evidence was intensely prejudicial. We disagree. At the time of the formal hearing, Interim Rule 14(a) provided: The commission is not bound by technical rules of procedure, and may conduct its inquiries and hearings according to such rules as it may determine expeditious and fair. In doing so, the commission shall endeavor to confine the receipt of evidence to that which is admissible under the Nevada Evidence Code; provided, that no error in the admission of evidence will be considered grounds for appeal unless made to appear prejudicial to the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. As the special prosecutor persuasively argues, in conducting its proceedings fairly and expeditiously, the commission appropriately took judicial notice of the opinions of this court and the other certified and exemplified public court documents in issue. See NRS 47.130(1) (court may take judicial notice of facts in issue or facts from which facts in issue may be inferred); NRS 47.130(2) (a judicially noticed fact must be generally known within the jurisdiction or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned). Additionally, at the time of the proceedings, Interim Rule 34 provided: The commission may examine a decision or opinion of a judge to the extent that such a decision or opinion is incident to a charge of misconduct or disability. Such examination shall not constitute appellate review. Thus, appellant's orders and the other district court documents relating to appellant's contempt decisions were properly admitted and considered by the commission. Moreover, in its final judgment, the commission noted that appellant was given an opportunity to and did explain to the Commission the circumstances and reasoning underlying his issuance of the show cause orders and contempt citations. We therefore perceive no error that could be considered prejudicial to the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Next, appellant contends that because he was not given pre-hearing notice as required by Interim Rule 11(a), the commission improperly admitted and considered a transcript of proceedings during which appellant ordered Ms. Bowman to appear and show cause why her deputy did not remove an item from the court's calendar. Pursuant to Interim Rule 11(a)(2), the special prosecutor was required to disclose to appellant any written or recorded statements in the special prosecutor's possession or control within twenty days after service of notice of the formal hearing. Although such notice of the transcript in question was not provided, our review of the record reveals that the transcript merely supplemented appellant's testimony at the formal hearing and the other, properly admitted documentary evidence relating to this incident. Accordingly, we conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice to the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. See Interim Rule 14(a). Appellant also contends that the commission's order of formal complaint provided him with inadequate notice to defend against the charges relating to the show cause orders appellant issued in the Gordon Yach incident, the Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital incident, and the second and third Loretta Bowman incidents. [30] See Interim Rule 15(a) ([a] respondent shall have the right and reasonable opportunity to defend against the charges ...); Interm Rule 9(b) (notice of the hearing shall specify in ordinary and concise language the charges against the respondent and the alleged facts underlying the charges ...); Interim Rule 1.3 (where probable cause for disciplinary action is found, the special prosecutor has the duty to sign and file with the commission a formal statement of charges). As the special prosecutor observes, however, appellant had reasonable notice that his orders to show cause would be at issue in the proceedings before the commission. The order of formal complaint advised appellant that it appeared that he had abused his contempt power by holding or threatening to hold individuals in contempt of court under circumstances clearly not warranted by law. (Emphasis added.) Further, the order of formal complaint specifically cited numerous contempt orders issued by appellant against Loretta Bowman. Therefore, we agree with the special prosecutor that, under the totality of the circumstances, appellant was provided a reasonable opportunity to defend against the commission's findings relating to the show cause orders concerning Loretta Bowman. Appellant further contends that the evidence in the record does not support the commission's findings that he abused his contempt power with respect to the incidents involving Commander Cunningham, Mr. Kennard, the District Attorney, and Ms. Bowman. Specifically, appellant asserts that Commander Cunningham's allegedly insolent behavior and Kennard's alleged responsibility for the disturbance on the roof of the courtroom constituted valid predicates for his orders of contempt. See NRS 22.010(1) (disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward a judge while the judge is holding court shall be deemed a contempt). Similarly, appellant continues to maintain in this appeal that his orders adjudging Ms. Bowman and the Clark County District Attorney in contempt constituted a valid and proper exercise of his power to issue contempt citations where there have been violations of court rules. See NRS 22.010(3). As noted above, however, we have concluded that the commission properly admitted and considered as evidence this court's prior opinions in Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev. 551, 729 P.2d 1328 (1986); Bowman v. District Court, 102 Nev. 474, 728 P.2d 433 (1986); and Clark Cty. Dist. Atty. v. District Court, 101 Nev. 843, 710 P.2d 1384 (1985). The contentions appellant here advances were emphatically rejected in those decisions. Further, although the Kennard incident was not the subject of any prior opinion of this court, the documentary and testimonial evidence pertaining to that matter clearly establishes that appellant's conduct deprived Mr. Kennard of any opportunity whatsoever to explain his position or respond to appellant's concerns prior to appellant's issuance of the order jailing Mr. Kennard. See Ryan v. Com'n on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724, 732 (Cal. 1988) (court found judge abused contempt power and committed willful misconduct when, in contempt proceedings, judge completely ignored proper procedures and never gave the individual a chance to respond prior to ordering her incarceration); see also Nev. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(A)(4) (a judge should accord every person who is legally interested in a proceeding full right to be heard according to law). Thus, contrary to appellant's contentions, documentary and testimonial evidence properly adduced at the commission's formal proceedings demonstrated conclusively that appellant abused his power of contempt on these occasions. Appellant also contests the commission's conclusion that his show cause orders and contempt rulings constituted willful misconduct warranting his removal from office. Appellant observes that, even assuming that his contempt rulings were erroneous, absent a finding of bad faith, his erroneous legal rulings cannot form the basis for discipline in the form of removal for `willful misconduct.' See, e.g., Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 358 (Ala. 1985) (judge could not be disciplined for contempt ruling which he later rescinded absent a showing of bad faith or a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will); Matter of Johnson, 395 A.2d 1319, 1326 (Pa. 1978) (judges acting in pressure-laden situations should not be required to fear automatic discipline because a contempt ruling might later be reversed on appeal). See also Comm. Rule 9. [31] Thus, appellant maintains, because there is no clear and convincing evidence to show [appellant] to have been motivated by malice, ill will, or bad faith, the commission's conclusion that he committed willful misconduct warranting removal from office must be reversed. It is true, of course, as Comm. Rule 9 currently reflects, that the commission may not function as an appellate body and is a singularly inappropriate forum in which to correct erroneous judicial decisions made in good faith. See Matter of Hague, 315 N.W.2d 524, 531 (Mich. 1982). Indeed, bad faith is an element essential to a finding of willful misconduct arising out of the issuance of a judicial decision. Contrary to appellant's contention, however, in this instance the commission neither undertook to function as an appellate body, nor was its finding of willful misconduct unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of appellant's bad faith. Rather, the commission correctly concluded that erroneous contempt rulings, which also demonstrate a long-standing abuse of contempt power, may be properly considered as willful misconduct. See, e.g., Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal.3d 678, 122 CalRptr. 778, 537 P.2d 898 (Cal. 1975); Matter of Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. 1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1029 (1978); Matter of Yengo, 371 A.2d 41 (N.J. 1977). See also, Hague, 315 N.W.2d at 533 (abuses of the awesome power of contempt, including unjustified threats to hold persons in contempt, constitute misconduct warranting discipline). As the evidence detailed above illustrates, Judge Goldman was an experienced judge who continued to ignore binding precedent reversing his contempt rulings and emphasizing the importance of a district court's strict adherence to the provisions of NRS 22.010 and NRS 199.340. An experienced trial judge's ignorance of proper contempt procedures, without more, has been held to constitute the bad faith necessary to a finding of willful misconduct. See Cannon, 537 P.2d at 909. See also Furey v. Com'n on Judicial Performance, 743 P.2d 919, 929 (Cal. 1987) (willful misconduct found where judge seemed to have learned nothing from fact that several prior contempt orders had been set aside and continued to engage in a pervasive course of conduct of overreaching his authority). Additionally, by ordering Commander Cunningham to appear in his court when no matter requiring Cunningham's attendance was pending in appellant's department, appellant committed a serious misuse of his judicial office warranting a finding of bad faith and willful misconduct. See Cannon, 537 P.2d at 913-15 n. 19. See also Kloepfer v. Com'n on Judicial Performance, 782 P.2d 239, 257 (Cal. 1989). The California Supreme Court has also held that a finding of bad faith is warranted where, as here, the evidence discloses the commission of acts which the judge knew or should have known were beyond the judge's power for a purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties. See Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 630 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1981). The commission specifically found that appellant's behavior resulted from his inaccurate perception of his role as a judge, and from his unwillingness to tolerate actions by others which are not in harmony with his apparent belief that those who do not meet or respond to his demands and expectations are subject to imprisonment and punishment under the court's contempt power. Appellant's testimony with respect to the incidents in issue  particularly the Loretta Bowman incidents and the Kennard incidents  clearly and convincingly supports this finding and demonstrates that appellant acted for a purpose other than the faithful discharge of his duties. Such behavior constitutes precisely the bad faith contemplated by Comm. Rule 9. As one court has observed: By bad faith, we do not mean to imply that petitioner sought to harm the interests of the defendants involved. Rather, we mean that in indulging his petty animosity toward deputy public defenders, and in culmination of a pervasive course of conduct of overreaching his authority over subordinates, petitioner intentionally committed acts which he knew or should have known were beyond his lawful power. The resulting misconduct entailed the most insidious kind of official lawlessness  disregard for the statutory and constitutional rules by which a society of millions and a heritage of centuries have sought to preserve fundamental fairness with a legal system which cannot escape the inherent imperfections of mankind. Geiler, 515 P.2d at 11. See also Ryan, 754 P.2d at 732 (failure to know of or research proper contempt procedures constituted bad faith under two-prong Wenger test). We are constrained to add that appellant's continued failure to acknowledge either the impropriety of his actions or the binding authority previously enunciated by this court reveals, in our view, a disturbing predilection toward a personal brand of justice in which the judge becomes a law unto himself... . See Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d 858, 861 (Me. 1981). A judge who may disagree with the appellate authority must, nevertheless, lay aside his own opinion of the validity of the law and dispose of the cases before him in accordance with the precedent. Whatever his contrary personal view of appellate authority, a judge is not free to disregard it. Hague, 315 N.W.2d at 532; see also Nev. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(A)(1) (a judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence). In our view, the widespread publicity that attached to appellant's repeated and defiant abuse of his contempt power, even in the face of settled and binding case precedent, seriously endangered public esteem for the judiciary. [U]nable to see that he was the servant of law and not its embodiment, the evidence indicates that appellant sought to set himself above it. Hague, 315 N.W.2d at 536.
The commission found that appellant violated Canon 3(A)(6) of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct by making public comments concerning pending and impending litigation. [32] The commission found that such violations of the code occurred in October 1986, and in April and May of 1987. Accordingly, the commission concluded that appellant had engaged in a pattern of making improper comments to news media concerning pending and impending litigation. Further, in light of their persistent and improper nature, the commission concluded that appellant's improper public remarks must be deemed willful misconduct constituting an independent basis for removal. Appellant contends that the commission's findings and conclusions respecting the comments appellant made in April and May of 1987 cannot be sustained and must be reversed. [33] We agree. All the remarks in question were made by appellant and reported in the media after the commission conducted its probable cause hearing and after the commission entered its order of formal complaint. The special prosecutor did not thereafter attempt to amend the formal complaint to allege that these remarks constituted misconduct, nor did he provide notice to appellant that the exhibits (newspaper articles) pertaining to the comments in question would be submitted as evidence at the formal hearing. See Interim Rule 9(b) (notice must be provided to judge of charges against him and the alleged facts underlying the charges); Interim Rule 11(e) (the special prosecutor shall promptly provide discovery of any additional materials or information subject to disclosure). Consequently, no evidence of these remarks was admitted at the probable cause hearing, nor did the commission's order of formal complaint impart notice sufficient to provide appellant with a reasonable opportunity to defend against the charges. See Interim Rule 15(a). See also Kennick v. Com'n on Judicial Performance, 787 P.2d 591, 598 (Cal. 1990) (court refused to adopt commission determinations based upon findings outside scope of a notice of formal proceedings). Under these circumstances, and despite appellant's failure to request a continuance, we conclude that it was fundamentally unfair to require appellant to defend against these charges at the formal hearing. We therefore vacate the commission's findings respecting these remarks. In so doing, we necessarily reject the commission's determination that appellant engaged in a pattern of making improper comments. As noted above, however, the commission also found that appellant improperly commented on pending litigation, the Cunningham matter, in October of 1986. We have considered appellant's contentions respecting this finding, and we conclude that they are without merit. Further, we conclude that, when coupled with appellant's willful misconduct relating to his long-standing abuse of the judicial contempt power, sufficient willful misconduct was established on this record to warrant the sanction of removal.
In each instance in which the commission determined that appellant's conduct constituted willful misconduct, the commission further determined that appellant had engaged in habitual intemperance. Prior to the formal hearing, appellant moved the commission to strike the reference to habitual intemperance contained in the order of formal complaint because, appellant maintained, the term generally connotes alcohol abuse. Appellant noted that no evidence had been presented to the commission implicating appellant's indulgence or overindulgence in alcohol. In rejecting appellant's contention, the commission ruled: As used in our order, however, habitual intemperance is extreme or excessive behavior, marked by a lack of moderation, conduct that is not temperate. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1214 (1983) (definition of temperate); see also Matter of Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. 1977) (a judge should be temperate, patient, courteous, and considerate to counsel and others appearing before him; proper judicial temperament is displayed when a judge discharges his duties in a professional manner with patience, courtesy and dignity). On appeal, appellant renews his contention and asserts that, as a ground for judicial discipline, the term habitual intemperance should be limited in its scope to the abuse of alcohol. See Matter of Mikesell, 243 N.W.2d 86, 94-95 (Mich. 1976) (a charge of habitual intemperance cannot be sustained without a finding of abuse of alcohol). Consequently, appellant argues, because there is no evidence in the record to support even an inference of his abuse of alcohol, the commission's finding of habitual intemperance must be reversed. We agree. Although the Interim Rules governing the commission proceedings against appellant did not define the term habitual intemperance, this court has since defined the term in procedural rules which became effective on April 29, 1988. Specifically, Comm. Rule 2(6) now provides: `Habitual intemperance' means habitual, excessive use of alcohol, or chronic abuse of any other substance which affects mental processes, awareness, or judgment. In our view, this definition more closely comports with the widely accepted meaning of the term. We therefore reject the special prosecutor's contention that a finding of habitual intemperance is justified when a judge's conduct demonstrates a pattern of conduct and temperament totally unbecoming a member of the judiciary. Conceptually and under our constitution and rules, conduct demonstrating a pattern of judicial temperament wholly unbecoming a member of the judiciary more appropriately falls within the term willful misconduct. See Comm. Rule 2(7); Comm. Rule 11. Thus, although a finding of habitual intemperance, as the term was defined by the commission, is supported by the evidence in the record, such a finding appears to focus on the same conduct that underlies the commission's additional findings of willful misconduct. See Furey, 743 P.2d at 923 (court declined to consider overlapping charges). Accordingly, we vacate the commission's determination that appellant engaged in habitual intemperance.
The commission found and concluded as follows: 1. [Judge Goldman's] own physician, Dr. Mayor, testified that he can determine no organic basis for claimed disability. 2. [Judge Goldman's] own physicians do not identify, to the satisfaction of this Commission, any mental or physical condition which would explain his persistent abuse of contempt power or the other events of misconduct described above. While Dr. Thornton, one physician who examined [Judge Goldman] on behalf of the special prosecutor, agreed [Judge Goldman] was suffering from depression and stress, which Dr. Thornton thought contributed to [Judge Goldman's] inappropriate acts, there is no suggestion in the testimony of either [Judge Goldman's] expert witnesses or in the testimony of Dr. Thornton that [Judge Goldman] at any time did not know the difference between right and wrong or that he failed to understand the nature and quality of his actions. 3. The Commission is persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Gerow that [Judge Goldman's] actions are not adequately explained or justified by the fact that he may be temporarily depressed, and the Commission determines as a matter of fact that Dr. Gerow has accurately testified to the facts concerning [Judge] Goldman's behavior. 4. In weighing the testimony of various experts and in according credit to the testimony of Dr. Gerow, the Commission has noted and finds as a fact that numerous incidents of abuse of power and improper public statements reflect conscious deliberation and planning inconsistent with any claim that [Judge Goldman] was either acting pursuant to an irresistible impulse or that he did not know the difference between right and wrong or know the nature and quality of his actions. 5. Furthermore, the Commission finds as a fact, that [Judge Goldman's] various abuses of power and other misconduct have extended over a long period of time during which [Judge Goldman] has been quite functional in other areas of his life and judicial activities, which fortifies the Commission in its determination that [Judge Goldman] has the capacity to tell the difference between right and wrong. The Commission believes [Judge Goldman] understood the nature and quality of his actions, and that he could control his conduct were he so disposed. 6. Based on [Judge Goldman's] testimony and behavior on the witness stand as perceived by the Commission, and based on the testimony of Dr. Gerow, the Commission finds, as a fact, that [Judge Goldman] has failed in his burden of proving that his various inappropriate actions, as referred to in the above findings, resulted from disability. The Commission also finds affirmatively that the Commission's counsel has demonstrated clearly and convincingly such inappropriate conduct did not result from any disability which can be deemed to excuse his conduct. 7. To the extent that the Commission can discern reasons for [Judge Goldman's] misbehavior, the Commission finds, as a fact, that [Judge Goldman's] behavior has resulted from [his] inaccurate perception of his role as a judge, and from his unwillingness to tolerate actions by others which are not in harmony with his apparent belief that those who do not meet or respond to his demands and expectations are subject to imprisonment and punishment under the court's contempt power. 8. Based on the foregoing findings, the Commission further finds that [Judge Goldman's] misconduct, as described above, is not excused, and must, therefore, be deemed willful misconduct... . Our review of the record reveals clear and convincing evidentiary support for the commission's findings. In particular we note that, when questioned whether specific instances of alleged misconduct may have been due to depression, appellant insisted, I don't excuse any conduct because of depression. I excuse my conduct because it was right. Additionally, in his motion to amend and strike certain portions of the commission's order of formal complaint, appellant maintained that he had not tendered the issue that my allegedly improper conduct was the product of any disability, either directly or indirectly. [34] These statements, when coupled with the failure of appellant's counsel and experts to establish any correlation between appellant's condition and his willful misconduct, provide more than adequate support for the commission's finding that appellant failed in his burden to show that any misconduct resulted from or was excused by disability. Even discounting appellant's statements, however, our review of the record reveals that, although Dr. Thornton indicated that some of appellant's misconduct could have been a manifestation of his depression, Dr. Gerow emphatically testified that it was absurd to raise [the] possibility that depression was the cause of any of the allegations of misconduct in question. Assuming without deciding that serious physical or mental disability could have even constituted a defense with respect to appellant's removal, [35] Dr. Thornton's equivocal statement was insufficient to establish a direct relationship between the misconduct in issue and appellant's physical or mental condition. See Matter of Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3, 30 (N.J. 1985) (court rejected judge's contention that medical condition constituted mitigating circumstance sufficient to excuse unethical conduct where medical evidence did not directly relate to judge's motive or intent). Accordingly, we conclude that appellant not only failed to fulfill his burden of proof but also that the evidence affirmatively established that appellant's misconduct was neither mitigated nor excused by a disabling condition.
The commission specifically found and concluded: 1. [Judge Goldman] has not performed the duties of his office since October 19, 1986. He is not presently performing any of his judicial duties. He has not offered to perform those duties, and has not requested the Supreme Court to vacate the order relieving him of judicial authority, which he solicited. Indeed, he stated at the hearing on June 12, 1987, that he has no desire to return to work, he claims he is unable to work as a judge, and he asserts that he has no intention of ever returning to the bench. 2. By written declaration to the Governor, [Judge Goldman] first asserted his intention to relinquish his office on October 30, 1986, and has performed no further judicial service since that time.[ [36] ] 3. By written declaration to the Governor, subsequently placed in evidence with this Commission, by public declarations to the news media, by written pleadings to the Commission, and by testimony to this Commission, [Judge Goldman] has announced his irrevocable intention to abandon his judicial office and his clear intention not to resume performance of his judicial duties. 4. The Commission concludes, therefore, that [Judge Goldman] has voluntarily abandoned and relinquished his judicial office, and that, therefore, it must declare the office vacant. Our review of the record reveals clear and convincing evidentiary support for the commission's findings. Appellant's unequivocal testimony before the commission that he had no desire whatever to return to being a judge and the additional statements and declarations in appellant's letter to the governor and in appellant's formal answer dispel any question as to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the commission's findings. Moreover, based upon these findings, the commission properly concluded that a formal declaration of vacancy was warranted. For all practical purposes, appellant's office had remained without an active, full-time presiding judge for approximately nine months. There was an evident need for the full complement of judges in the Eighth Judicial District, a judicial district which has experienced a steady and extraordinary increase in population in the last decade. Confronted with such an imperative, together with appellant's insistence that he believed himself incapable of performing any of the functions of his office and that he had no intention whatever of returning to the bench, we conclude that the commission's action was necessary and proper. Indeed, declaring appellant's office vacant on this ground minimized the prospect that an appeal challenging the commission's remaining findings respecting disability retirement or removal for misconduct might needlessly delay or confuse the process of selecting a successor judge, notwithstanding appellant's stated intention never to return to the bench. Appellant has asserted on appeal, however, that pursuant to NRS 3.080(1), only the governor may declare a vacancy in the office of district judge and, therefore, the commission lacked jurisdiction to take such action. [37] We disagree. The commission did nothing more than acknowledge a de facto vacancy of long duration which appellant's own testimony and actions unequivocally confirmed. We recognize, of course, that appellant never sought to retire unconditionally. Quite to the contrary, appellant sought an early, enhanced disability retirement that was vastly more advantageous financially than the normal retirement he had earned and which the commission ultimately found to be his only entitlement. Nonetheless, appellant never indicated that, in the absence of a finding that he was entitled to a disability pension, he would attempt to remain on the bench. Nor did he offer or request permission to resume his duties in a limited capacity with a reduced workload designed to accommodate his circumstances. Rather, appellant's statements and actions evidenced a clear intention never to resume any judicial functions under any circumstances. Consequently and in light of the commission's remaining findings, we fail to discern how appellant was prejudiced, even assuming that the commission exceeded its authority by declaring appellant's office vacant. In any event, the Nevada Constitution specifically empowers the commission to remove a judge from office for willful misconduct, willful or persistent failure to perform the duties of his office or habitual intemperance... . See Nev. Const. art. 6 § 21(6)(a). Further, the commission is authorized to retire a judge for advanced age or for a disabling mental or physical condition that is likely to be permanent in nature. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 21(6)(b). The power to adjudicate and order the removal or retirement of a judge must necessarily imply the power to declare the office vacant. See generally Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). To the extent that the commission's exercise of this implied authority may have conflicted with any express ministerial duty imposed upon the governor by the legislature, the commission's power was clearly preeminent. See Goldman v. Bryan, 106 Nev. 30, 37, 787 P.2d 372, 377 (1990) (citing Robison v. District Court, 73 Nev. 169, 175, 313 P.2d 436, 440 (1957)). To hold otherwise would elevate form over substance. Accordingly, we conclude that the commission acted entirely within the ambit of its lawful authority. Appellant further complains that he was deprived of due process of law because the commission failed to provide him with fair and sufficient notice of the charge of his allegedly having `voluntarily abandoned and relinquished his judicial office.' [38] See generally, In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). We note, however, that both the commission's order clarifying issues and its earlier order of formal complaint adequately apprised appellant that the commission considered appellant as having acknowledged that he would not continue in judicial office. The order clarifying issues not only indicated that the facts and circumstances surrounding this issue constituted one of three distinct issues then pending in the proceedings, but also that, under these circumstances, the commission considered appellant to have vacated his office. Moreover, as noted, the matter was initially placed in issue by the only evidence appellant submitted at the probable cause hearing, i.e., appellant's letter to the governor declaring that he was unable to perform the duties of his office. The statements and declarations in appellant's own verified answer further served to focus the issue, and at no time did appellant register any concrete objection to the commission's stated intention to declare his office vacant at the formal hearing. Thus, appellant had adequate notice that this matter was in issue, well in advance of the formal hearing. Consequently, we perceive no procedural irregularity. See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Nor do we perceive any actual prejudice that may be attributed to the purported irregularity. See In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1972).
Nevada Supreme Court JUSTICE CHARLES E. SPRINGER sat as a member of the commission in this matter. At the commencement of the probable cause proceedings, Justice Springer made the following statement on the record: I would like the record to reflect that I communicated with Mr. Cobeaga and told him that because I have been [a] political adversary, for lack of a better expression, of Judge Goldman, that I offered to disqualify myself voluntarily, without cause. And I was advised by Mr. Cobeaga that I would not be challenged and that Judge Goldman had no objection to my serving on the Commission in his case. And I just wanted that to be a matter of record. In response, appellant's counsel Mr. Cobeaga confirmed, That's correct, Your Honor. Notwithstanding appellant's rejection of JUSTICE SPRINGER'S offer to remove himself from the commission, one week prior to the scheduled formal hearing, appellant moved the commission to disqualify JUSTICE SPRINGER from further participation in the proceedings. Appellant asserted that new information had come to his attention, after he initially assented to JUSTICE SPRINGER'S participation, which revealed that in October of 1986, JUSTICE STEFFEN had conducted an inquiry on behalf of this court into appellant's behavior on the bench. At the formal hearing, the special prosecutor opposed appellant's motion and read a statement from JUSTICE SPRINGER into the record. The statement explained that JUSTICE SPRINGER was not biased, that he harbored no ill will nor ill feelings against Judge Goldman, and that he felt he could sit impartially in this matter. Further, JUSTICE SPRINGER explained that he had played no role in JUSTICE STEFFEN'S initial tentative inquiry. The five other members of the commission subsequently denied appellant's motion. More specifically, the other commission members concluded as follows: At the outset of the hearing on June 12, 1987, [Judge Goldman] belatedly attempted to challenge the participation in the proceedings of a Commission member whose participation [Judge Goldman] had previously accepted and stipulated to. The five other members of the Commission voted unanimously to deny [Judge Goldman's] motion as tardy and without merit. However, the five other sitting members of the Commission, whose participation has not been challenged and who constitute a quorum to take action herein, have further determined that their deliberations and votes in this matter, as set forth herein, would be the same, and would have been the same without the participation and votes of the Commission member whom [Judge Goldman] belatedly attempted to challenge. On appeal, appellant contends that the commission's refusal to disqualify JUSTICE SPRINGER from the proceedings constitutes prejudicial error. Appellant alleges that, at the time he initially rejected JUSTICE SPRINGER'S offer of recusal, he was unaware that JUSTICE STEFFEN, on behalf of the supreme court, had conducted an investigation into appellant's fitness to remain on the bench. Further, appellant asserts that his knowledge of the supreme court's role was radically altered by new information he received on May 4, 1987, well after he agreed to JUSTICE SPRINGER'S participation, when he first became aware of information contained in a Certificate In Lieu of Record, authored by JUSTICE STEFFEN. Appellant maintains that the certificate revealed to him for the first time that this court had conducted an administrative inquiry into his behavior. See Goldman v. Bryan, 104 Nev. 644, 764 P.2d 1296 (1988). Thus, appellant maintains, he initially assented to JUSTICE SPRINGER'S participation only because he had no knowledge of the facts detailing the extent of the supreme court's inquiry into his fitness. Appellant also argues that the facts revealed by the certificate raise an appearance of partiality in the mind of a reasonable observer sufficient to require JUSTICE SPRINGER'S disqualification from the commission under Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1)(a). [39] We disagree. First, as the special prosecutor observes, JUSTICE STEFFEN'S certificate indicates that, as early as October 16, 1986, two of appellant's counsel knew that JUSTICE STEFFEN was investigating, on behalf of the supreme court, events that had become public knowledge bearing on appellant's fitness to remain on the bench. Further, on March 30, 1987, appellant's counsel specifically confirmed on the record that appellant had no objection to JUSTICE SPRINGER serving as a member of the commission in this case. Thus, the record establishes that, in October of 1986, appellant's counsel knew the facts subsequently asserted in support of the allegations contained in the motion to disqualify, and thereafter expressly waived any objections to JUSTICE SPRINGER'S participation. Moreover, appellant formally raised the allegations of impropriety only after learning of the outcome of the probable cause proceeding. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant waived his right to challenge JUSTICE SPRINGER'S participation on the commission. See Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 259-60, 774 P.2d 1003, 1019 (party waived right to raise allegations of bias where party's counsel knew the subsequently asserted factual basis for allegations and did not promptly tender an objection but remained silent and gambled on the outcome of the proceeding), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989). Second, this court has previously rejected a similar challenge by appellant to JUSTICE STEFFEN'S participation in this very appeal. See Goldman v. Bryan, 104 Nev. 644, 764 P.2d 1296 (1988). Although JUSTICE SPRINGER was not the subject of the specific motion to disqualify resolved in that opinion, the court's reasoning nonetheless provides persuasive support for the conclusion that a motion for disqualification which is based upon the facts detailed in JUSTICE STEFFEN'S certificate does not raise legally cognizable grounds for JUSTICE SPRINGER'S disqualification from the commission. Nor does it constitute a disqualifying appearance of impropriety under the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct. If the facts revealed by JUSTICE STEFFEN'S certificate did not require his disqualification from participation in this appeal, neither can it be said to require JUSTICE SPRINGER'S disqualification from the commission. This is especially true in light of JUSTICE SPRINGER'S statement that he played no role in JUSTICE STEFFEN'S initial tentative inquiry. Third, it is clear from the commission's order that appellant suffered no prejudice whatsoever from JUSTICE SPRINGER'S participation, even assuming that some cause for disqualification or recusal existed. A duly constituted quorum of the commission stated specifically that its deliberations and votes in this matter would be and would have been the same even without the voting participation of JUSTICE SPRINGER. Accordingly, we reject appellant's contentions of prejudicial error as wholly without merit.
The commission correctly concluded that appellant committed willful misconduct in office unexcused by any claimed physical or mental disability. Upon the several modifications specified above, we affirm the commission's determination that willful misconduct warranted appellant's removal from office. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 21(6)(a). We reverse and vacate the commission's determination, however, that appellant engaged in habitual intemperance. We further affirm the commission's determination that appellant voluntarily relinquished and abandoned his office, and we conclude that the commission acted entirely within the ambit of its lawful authority by declaring appellant's office vacant on this basis. Finally, we affirm in all respects the commission's determinations that appellant was not entitled to an early, enhanced disability pension. STEFFEN and YOUNG, JJ., ZENOFF, Sr. J., [40] ROBISON, D.J., [41] and WHITEHEAD, D.J., [42] concur.