Opinion ID: 161852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bureau of Prisons Memorandum

Text: 7 Mr. McElhiney asserts that the government first violated Brady when it failed to provide the defense with a particular Bureau of Prisons memorandum. After the trial was completed, Mr. McElhiney was inadvertently provided certain documents from the Bureau of Prisons. Aplt's Br. at 9. One of the documents that came into his possession was a memorandum entitled Possible Threats to Inmates [at the Leavenworth Penitentiary], Re: Aryan Brotherhood Extortion/Drug Ring. As noted by the district court, this memorandum discusse[d] possible threats to various inmates in 1995 which caused the inmates to request protective custody. Some of the threats were allegedly made by [inmates] who were witnesses against [Mr. McElhiney] during the trial. . . . One of the inmates who was allegedly threatened [also] testified against [Mr. McElhiney] in the trial . . . . 8 Rec. supp. vol. I, doc. 378, at 1-2 (district court order, filed Mar. 23, 2000). 9 Mr. McElhiney subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. The crux of his argument was that, by failing to provide him with the memorandum, the government acted in violation of Brady. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the memorandum did not violate Brady as it was neither exculpatory nor material. 10 We review de novo allegations of Brady violations. Newsted v. Gibson, 158 F.3d 1085, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show 1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; 2) that the evidence was favorable to the accused; and 3) that the evidence was material. Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep't of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Without actually deciding the issue, we will assume for the purposes of discussion that the memorandum was suppressed and that it contains evidence favorable to Mr. McElhiney. Even so, Mr. McElhiney still must establish that the memorandum was material. The standard of materiality required to set aside a criminal conviction on Brady grounds varies with the specificity of the defendant's request and the conduct of the prosecutor. United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir. 1989). If the defendant makes a request for specific evidence and the prosecutor fails to disclose responsive evidence, then the evidence is material if it might have affected the outcome of the trial. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the defendant, however, either makes no request for evidence or simply makes a general request (e.g., asking for all Brady material or anything exculpatory), then the evidence is material only if it creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We need not decide which standard of materiality is applicable because, even under the more lenient standard, the Bureau of Prisons memorandum was not material. 12 In particular, as to the memorandum's statement that several inmate witnesses who testified for the government were involved in the drug smuggling operation, that involvement was a fact that they had already--and readily-- admitted at trial. Therefore, we agree with the district court that this evidence was cumulative . . . and thus would have provided only marginal additional support for [the] defense. United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir. 1998). 13 As to the materiality of the memorandum in terms of impeaching Mr. Hawley's testimony, Mr. McElhiney points to a statement in the memorandum that a prisoner named Leonard Dirty Red Ternes made a statement in which he denied participation in the prison drug smuggling operation. He notes that, at trial, Mr. Hawley testified that Mr. Ternes was involved in the operation as a mule. 14 On this point, we again agree with the district court's analysis. That is, even if the information in the memorandum had been available to Mr. McElhiney before trial, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different. See id. at 1393 (A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, if introduced at trial, that statement by Mr. Ternes would have contradicted only one part of Mr. Hawley's testimony (which did not even bear directly on Mr. McElhiney). Moreover, Mr. Hawley's testimony was corroborated at trial by other evidence, and the evidence against Mr. McElhiney, apart from Mr. Hawley's testimony, was substantial. To state it simply, the significance of the favorable information in the memorandum was marginal in relation to the record as a whole. See Smith, 50 F.3d at 827 (In making the materiality determination, we view the suppressed evidence's significance in relation to the record as a whole.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the memorandum--even if suppressed and favorable--was not material, Mr. McElhiney has failed to prove a Brady violation.