Opinion ID: 786898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plain Error Pervaded the Trial

Text: 21 Inadmissible evidence and highly inflammatory statements came rolling in unimpeded at Moore's trial, without any hesitation by the prosecutor, complaint by defense counsel, or correction by the District Court. Indeed, at only one point when irrelevant but enormously prejudicial evidence and wholly inappropriate statements came before the jury did defense counsel object, 4 and that objection was not at all specific. His failure to object, of course, did not relieve the prosecutor of his duty to comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence and, even more importantly, rules of fundamental fairness. There was a serious break down here. 22 As for the evidence of Moore's Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts, i.e., the Rule 404(b) evidence, which came in principally through Belinda and Brittany Newcomer, let us be quite clear. We are not reviewing the District Court's decision to admit this evidence, because the evidence came in bereft of any motion to admit; bereft of any prior notification of the general nature of the Rule 404(b) evidence the government intended to introduce; bereft of any objection by defense counsel; and bereft of any exercise of control on the part of the District Court. Indeed, Rule 404(b) never once came up during the course of trial until the District Court sua sponte (because neither defense counsel nor the government had submitted a proposed jury instruction as to 404(b)), asked during the charge conference whether there was any need to instruct the jury regarding Moore's prior crimes or bad acts. Counsel both agreed that that would be appropriate. 23 When the instruction was given to the jury, however, the District Court stated that the testimony that Moore committed some acts other than the ones charged in the indictment was permitted only as background to the events at issue here, and could be considered only for that purpose and not as evidence that he committed the crimes with which he was charged. Parenthetically, we are unaware of any case under Rule 404(b) that would permit the use of the type of evidence seen here as background, and the government has proffered none. At the conclusion of the charge, the prosecutor asked the District Court to further instruct the jury, as the government puts it here, that many of [Moore's] statements and actions provided proof of motive for the arson. Appellee's Br. at 11-12. Defense counsel, albeit reluctantly, agreed, and the District Court so instructed the jury. 24 Putting aside the virtual silence as to Rule 404(b) during the course of trial, in order to be admissible under 404(b), (1) the evidence must have a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it must be relevant under Rule 402; (3) its probative value must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) the Court must charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is admitted. United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir.2002) (citing, among others, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). The evidence here, at least that evidence elicited from Belinda, 5 fails each and every one of these requirements. Rather, what is crystal clear is that the evidence came in for one reason and one reason only: to demonstrate Moore's propensity to act in a particular manner, i.e., to be a very violent man, whose violence made the arson and the gun possession more likely. Admitting evidence of other bad acts for this purpose is, of course, prohibited. See, e.g., Ansell v. Green Acres Contr. Co, 347 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir.2003) (Rule 404(b) ... prohibits the admission of other acts evidence for the purpose of showing that an individual has a propensity or disposition to act in a particular manner.). 25 Were there any doubt that admitting evidence of the numerous other bad acts alleged to have been committed by Moore would alone require reversal, the compounding effect of the prosecutor's inflammatory closing argument forecloses any argument that reversal is not warranted. Thus, on the eve of the one year anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the prosecutor called Moore a terrorist. No, said the prosecutor, Moore was not one of those terrorists, but there are very different kinds of terrorists, and I think this defendant is one of them. Why? Because he inflicted terror upon Belinda Newcomer and her family, upon Brittany Newcomer and upon Belinda's son Brandon Newcomer.... [H]e was forcing kids to do drug transactions for him. What kind of person does that? The prosecutor marshaled the most damning of the 404(b) evidence and emphasized it to the jury. Why should the jury convict? Because, he explained, of what Moore did to the Newcomers. He is, in a nutshell, a bad man who should be stopped at all costs. 26 Moore was not, of course, on trial for anything he did to the Newcomers. But yet again, there was no objection from defense counsel, and the District Court did not intervene. Indeed, the Court, in the course of denying Moore's motion for a new trial based on the prosecutorial misconduct inherent in the closing argument, remarked: 27 [T]he government produced ample evidence which, if believed by the jury, would support [the prosecutor's] argument that Defendant used terror to coerce [and the] characterization of Defendant as one who used terror to coerce was within acceptable bounds of advocacy for conclusions the jury could adopt from the evidence presented. 28 But the evidence that the Court found acceptable was prejudicial, administering the death blow to the closing argument, which tracked that evidence. 29 We have reversed convictions where [t]he object, or at least effect, of this disproportionate emphasis by the prosecution ... was to portray [the defendant] as ... violence-prone ... [and] a danger to society and who needed to be removed for the protection of the public. United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 786 (3d Cir.1994). In Himelwright, although operating under an abuse of discretion standard of review, we reversed a conviction due to concerns that the government's emphasis on 404(b) evidence in its closing argument tainted the trial in two regards: First, it had the potential for frightening the jury into ignoring evidence that otherwise might have raised a reasonable doubt.... Second, if the jury was persuaded that [the defendant] was violence-prone by character, it might have inferred that he intended violence in this particular instance. That inference is precisely what Rule 404(b) prohibits. Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 786 n. 8. See also United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 137-38 (3d Cir.1999) (This frontal assault upon the defendant's character is simply not appropriate under our system of laws, and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it.). Plain error was committed here. 30 First, there can be no doubt that error was committed. The Federal Rules of Evidence are clear and unambiguous on this matter: irrelevant and prejudicial evidence is inadmissible. The evidence at issue here — Moore's alleged violence, drug use, and general criminal proclivity — was highly prejudicial and wholly irrelevant to the arson and gun possession charges he faced. Second, the error was plain, stigmatizing Moore for behavior unconnected to those charges. Finally, we are certain that the error affected Moore's substantial rights. We cannot know, given the evidence that came in, whether Moore was convicted because the jury believed him to be an arsonist and the illegal possessor of a gun, or because it thought him to be a violent and dangerous man, a terrorist of sorts. We are inclined to believe the latter. Such uncertainty in the face of plain error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936). See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (discussing plain error).