Opinion ID: 496991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Checks and Balances

Text: 62 The eleventh amendment reflects our system of checks and balances by limiting the power to abrogate sovereign immunity to the freely elected legislative branch. This design permits the legislative branch limited power to abrogate state immunity pursuant to grants of constitutional authority, while preventing the judiciary from independently using Article III to do the same. By adopting the eleventh amendment Congress and the states expressed their desire to limit judicial action. Congress, however, never meant to curtail its own power to limit sovereign immunity where appropriate. Indeed, holding that states maintain their immunity in the face of national control is inconsistent with the constitutional plan. Tribe, 89 Harv.L.Rev. at 694-95 (footnotes omitted). 63 This dichotomy between the power of the judiciary and the Congress is particularly significant in the area of commerce clause regulation. In this regard, it is pertinent that CERCLA is a commerce clause regulation. As Justice Brennan has stated in dissent, judicial interpretation of our Constitution settled since the time of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall ... postulate[s] that the Constitution contemplates that restraints upon exercise by Congress of its plenary commerce power lie in the political process and not in the judicial process. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 857, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2476, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissenting position, which mirrors the majority position in the case overruled by Usery, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968), has again come to be the law of the land. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550-52, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1017-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). In contrast, our system of checks and balances dictates that the unelected federal judiciary, isolated from the political pressures that inhere in the need for reelection, must be constrained by such a constitutional restriction from abrogation of sovereign immunity. 64 In addition, the requirement of a clear statement before Congress may override the eleventh amendment assures that congressional intent will be followed, see Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th Cir.1979), and serves to check judicial interpretation of statutes. See Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2946; cf. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 542, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation....). To extend the eleventh amendment to render nugatory a clear expression of congressional intent to abrogate state immunity would thwart the Constitution's plan by ignoring the representative nature of Congress. 65 The scope of Congress' power to abrogate the eleventh amendment under Article I is also limited by states' representation in Congress. The Congress, comprised wholly of delegates chosen by states (through their subdivisions), will respond to state needs and therefore does not require the eleventh amendment limitation. The Supreme Court in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550, 105 S.Ct. at 1018, observed that the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the Federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. And, as Professor Tribe notes, it has generally been recognized that the states are represented in Congress and that Congress will be attentive to concerns of state governments as separate sovereigns. Tribe, 89 Harv.L.Rev. at 695 (footnote omitted).