Opinion ID: 1941185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: did the chancellor err in excluding evidence as to the claims of ownership of eddie and the appellant?

Text: While the appellant admits that there is substantial and considerable other evidence in the record to reflect the true situation, appellant still contends that the court committed reversible error in three specific instances on the question of whether or not Eddie ever claimed the property as his own. In the first instance, the appellant was asked whether Eddie claimed ownership of the property. This question was met with an objection based on the fact that Eddie was deceased and that the answer would be hearsay. It was argued that Eddie's claim of the property was an important element as to adverse possession. The chancellor recognized that in order to properly address the objection it must be determined whether the appellant was asserting a claim on behalf of the estate or in her own right. The chancellor decided to regard this as a claim by the appellant as an heir to the property. The appellees then objected to any transactions, conversations, or actions affecting the use of this land prior to the time that Henry died, as being barred by the deadman's statute. Appellees argued that the statute should apply, since the appellant is asserting a direct claim against an asset of Henry's estate. The chancellor correctly noted that the estate of Henry was not a party to the action but the appellees argue that that does not matter as long as the property was a part of the estate when Henry died. The chancellor allowed the appellant to testify as to what she did and saw her husband do, but did not allow her to testify as to any statements that Eddie made because of the hearsay rule. This determination the chancellor made in reliance upon our decision in Mizell v. Black, 369 So.2d 755 (Miss. 1979). The next point argued by appellant took place during the testimony of Jerry Harris. Harris's answer that Eddie did all of the things that would normally be associated with ownership of property was met with an objection on the basis of a conclusion by a witness and hearsay. The chancellor overruled the objection, but sustained that part dealing with hearsay. The third instance revolved around Wally Cox's testimony when he was asked whether Eddie claimed ownership of the property. An objection was made and sustained. In Mizell v. Black, supra , Mizell filed a complaint alleging that she was the owner, based on adverse possession, of 78 acres, rather than Black, who claimed the property under a quitclaim deed. Mizell attempted to testify as to what she had seen her deceased husband do in regard to the 78 acres. An objection was made to this testimony based upon Mississippi Code Annotated § 13-1-7 (1972), the so-called deadman's statute. This Court reversed the chancellor's finding, and stated, The excluded evidence of [Mizell] did not relate to statements made by her deceased husband or anything other than what she saw her husband do over the years and what she assisted him in doing. The question of hearsay testimony is not involved. 369 So.2d at 756. Thus, under Mizell, the chancellor was correct in allowing some of the testimony but excluding that testimony that would be hearsay. We further point out, however, that the chancellor did allow Esther Rockwell to testify that the reputation and tradition of the property over the years was that it was Eddie Han's place. We point out that, while appellant strongly urges in her brief that statements or declarations of Eddie should have been admitted, none were offered. It appears that the appellant was less than slightly wounded by the chancellor's rulings and that under the authority of Mizell, and Stennis v. Stennis, 218 So.2d 716 (Miss. 1969), which deals with self-serving statements of decedent, and the further fact that other testimony involving Eddie's claim and actions in regard to the property were admitted into evidence, that this assignment is without merit.