Opinion ID: 664147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Court's Sec. 1292(b) Certification and

Text: Homeland's Motion to Raise Related Issue 9 We first address Homeland's motion that it be permitted in this interlocutory appeal to raise the issue of whether injunctive relief is available against the RTC. The motion is denied. 10 Our jurisdiction to hear this appeal arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b). Under Sec. 1292(b), a district court may certify for appeal an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order if the court determines that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Id. In this case, the question of law the district court intended to certify is whether federal court jurisdiction over Homeland's claims against the RTC is barred under 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D). The district court, however, explicitly refused to certify the additional question of whether injunctive relief is available against the RTC, though the court discussed that issue in the same order in which it ruled on jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Homeland asks us to address the question of the availability of injunctive relief. 11 The district court certification requirement of Sec. 1292(b) is to be taken seriously. It was not included in the original Sec. 1292(b) legislation as proposed but specifically was added to the final version as a necessary screening mechanism for interlocutory appeals. 16 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3929, at 138 (1977). However, Homeland correctly points out that it is the district court order that is certified under Sec. 1292(b) and not the specific question of law deemed controlling by the district court. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 677, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 3060, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987). Homeland contends that, because the certified order discussed the question of injunctive relief along with the question of federal jurisdiction, we can and should address the injunctive relief issue in this appeal. We disagree. 12 If we find that a particular question other than the question specifically identified by the district court controls the disposition of the certified order, we may, and indeed should, address that question. See id.; Ivy Club v. Edwards, 943 F.2d 270, 275 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917, 108 S.Ct. 268, 98 L.Ed.2d 225 (1987). In this case, however, whether injunctive relief is available against the RTC is not such an alternate controlling question. The order appealed from concerns whether Homeland's complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Homeland's request for injunctive relief is only as a specific type of remedy for its breach of contract claims. Because we hold (in Section III below) that Homeland's complaint does state a claim and, at minimum, relief would be available in the form of damages at law, we need not decide on the availability of any specific type of alternate relief here. Thus, we do not address the question of the availability of injunctive relief. 1