Opinion ID: 760927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions Concerning Mitigating Circumstances

Text: 29
30 Mr. Cooks asserts the trial court erroneously failed to inform the jury it had the option to return a life sentence even if it found the aggravating circumstances to outweigh the mitigating circumstances. He claims Jury Instruction No. 55 misled the jury by implying it was required to find the existence of specific mitigating circumstances before it could sentence [him] to life imprisonment. Jury Instruction No. 55 advised the jury: 31 If you unanimously find that one or more of the aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, unless you also unanimously find that any such aggravating circumstance or circumstances out weigh [sic] the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed. 32 It is important to note Jury Instruction No. 55 was not the only instruction concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court also instructed the jury, in pertinent part: Instruction No. 52 33 . . . . . 34 Should you unanimously find that one or more aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be authorized to consider imposing a sentence of death. 35 If you do not unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances existed, you are prohibited from considering the penalty of death. In that event, the sentence must be imprisonment for life. Instruction No. 53 36 Mitigating circumstances are those which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame. The determination of what are mitigating circumstances is for you as jurors to resolve under the facts and circumstances of this case. 37 We considered, but rejected, the same argument Mr. Cooks makes here, concerning a substantially similar set of jury instructions, in Duvall, 139 F.3d at 789-92. We reach the same result here. Mr. Cooks is correct that under Oklahoma law a jury may avoid the death penalty even if it finds aggravating circumstances to outweigh mitigating circumstances. Duvall, 139 F.3d at 789-90. However, state courts are not constitutionally bound to  'affirmatively structure in a particular way the manner in which juries consider mitigating evidence.'  Id. at 790 (quoting Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 118 S.Ct. 757, 761, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998)). Thus, so long as the court does not preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence, it need not separately instruct the jury of its option to return a life sentence regardless of its finding the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Id. at 790-91. On review, we need only ensure there is no reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevented the consideration of relevant evidence. Id. at 790; see also Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 422, 142 L.Ed.2d 343 (1998). 38 In this case, the instructions, read as a whole, did not preclude the jurors from considering and giving effect to any mitigating circumstances in Mr. Cooks' favor. Nor did they suggest the jury's discretion to avoid the death penalty was limited in any way. Instruction No. 53 expressly permitted the jury to consider any evidence as mitigating evidence. We see no likelihood the jury would have understood they were required to find a particular mitigating circumstance. Instructions Nos. 54 and 55 merely authorized the jury to consider the death penalty if, and only if, it unanimously found one or more aggravating circumstances to outweigh any mitigating circumstances. These instructions cannot fairly be read to have mandated imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, Mr. Cooks is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground. 39
Jury Instruction No. 54 advised the jury: 40 Evidence has been offered as to the following minimum mitigating circumstances: 41
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43 Whether these circumstances existed, and whether these circumstances are mitigating, must be decided by you. 44 Mr. Cooks argues this jury instruction misled the jury into believing these were the only mitigating circumstances that could support a life sentence. Further, because Mr. Cooks claims these circumstances applied only to his co-defendant, he argues the jury effectively was instructed there was no mitigating evidence to support him. According to Mr. Cooks, the prejudice he suffered as a result of Jury Instruction No. 54 was exacerbated by his co-defendant's counsel's closing statements that Jury Instruction No. 54 stated the law and that his client was a young, inexperienced gentleman, led into crime by an older, convicted criminal. 45 As stated above, we review jury instructions pertaining to mitigating evidence only to ensure there is no reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevented the consideration of relevant evidence. Duvall, 139 F.3d at 790. While we appreciate Mr. Cooks' concern Jury Instruction No. 54 specified mitigating evidence that arguably did not apply to him, 4 and referred to the defendant in the singular when in fact the case was being tried against two defendants, we do not believe the instructions, read as a whole, prevented the jury from considering any and all mitigating evidence that might support either defendant. 46 Despite Jury Instruction No. 54's infirmities, the fact remains Instruction No. 53 broadly defined mitigating circumstances as any circumstances that, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame, and then left the determination of what constituted mitigating circumstances in this case to the jury's sound discretion. We fail to see how the specificity of Jury Instruction No. 54 in any way undermined the general directives of Instruction No. 53. Moreover, we see nothing patently erroneous or inappropriate in the closing comments of Mr. Masters' counsel--certainly nothing that rises to the constitutional level necessary to support Mr. Cooks' habeas petition. Consequently, relief is denied on this ground. 47 Mr. Cooks' concerns with Jury Instruction No. 54 appear to stem not so much from the instructions themselves or the remarks of his co-defendant's counsel, but from his own attorney's failure to present mitigating evidence on his behalf, or to offer any alternative or supplemental instructions. We thus proceed to consider Mr. Cooks' ineffective assistance of counsel claims.