Opinion ID: 2772259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contribution Prong

Text: The Court of Appeals in this case stated that the evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the contribution prong. Utter, 176 Wn. App. at 656. It explained, The issue is whether BIAW or BIAW-MSC expected to receive and ultimately did receive the ... funds [contributions] from the local associations. Id. (emphasis added). It then concluded that because BIAW-MSC, not BIAW, ultimately received the contributions in its account and then disbursed them to a registered political committee, ChangeP AC, there was no issue of fact as to whether BIAW expected to receive contributions. Id. But the contribution prong, as the Court of Appeals stated correctly earlier in its opinion, asks whether an organization expects to receive or receives contributions toward electoral goals. Id. at 655 (emphasis added) (citing EFF, 111 Wn. App. at 599). Not whether it expects to receive and receives. That interpretation is in line with the statutory language: 'Political committee' means any person . . having the expectation of receiving contributions or making expenditures. RCW 42.17A.005(37). Expectation clearly applies to contributions (and also expenditures). The plaintiffs therefore have the better of the argument when they say that the ultimate disposition of the funds does not answer the contribution question; the 18 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 expectation is what matters. And here, as plaintiffs explain, they have presented evidence tending to show that BIAW expected contributions. This is clear from the statutory definition of contribution and the plaintiffs' evidence tending to show such contributions. A contribution is defined in part as a pledge, RCW 42.17 A.005(13)(a)(i), and an organization must register as a political committee within two weeks after organization or within two weeks after the date the committee first has the expectation of receiving contributions or making expenditures in any election campaign, whichever is earlier. RCW 42.17 A.205(1 ). The plaintiffs filed multiple contemporaneous documents soliciting pledges for BIAW as well as documents stating that pledges were made to BIAW. E.g., CP at 419, 432, 433, 435. This includes, for example, an e-mail from Daimon Doyle, then BIAW and BIAW-MSC president, dated March 12, 2007, stating, Attached are the following documents: the formal resolution (rossi-lution) that we will be asking our 15 locals to support as well as some talking points .... We ... need to be extra careful ... since Dino is not a declared candidate we can't raise money for him therefore all official references are for a '08 candidate for Governor. CP at 410. The rossi-lution itself stated: WHEREAS BIAW is committing 100% of excess retro dollars to the 2008 gubernatorial election, WHEREAS participation of local associations is necessary for success, NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT, 19 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n ofWash., No. 89462-1 The following local associations pledge that all Retro Marketing Assistance funds received in 2007, beyond the amount budgeted for the year, will be sent to the BIAW and placed in the BIAW 2008 gubernatorial election account, to be used for efforts in the 2008 gubernatorial race. CP at 411. The plaintiffs also point to meeting minutes of local associations that appear to make pledges directly to BIAW. For example, [i]t was MSPU [motion, seconded, passed, unanimous] to give BIAW the excess of budgeted funds ... to help in the governor race in 2008. CP at 433. Numerous additional documents- e-mails, meeting minutes, agendas, and organizational resolutions-also state that BIAW is soliciting funds to support its candidate in the upcoming election. See generally CP at 410-55. The Court of Appeals and BIAW explain that this evidence does not prove anything about BIAW' s intentions or expectations because BIAW submitted evidence that 'BIAW' was used generically to refer to BIAW-MSC, BIAW, or both. Utter, 176 Wn. App. at 656. Therefore, [t]he documents to which Utter and Ireland point fail to create an issue of fact. I d. BIAW' s premise does not lead to its conclusion. Instead, the fact that BIAW could refer to either or both BIAW and BIAW-MSC means that the use of BIAW in the documents at issue does not clarify to which organization the documents refer. The admittedly dual meaning of BIAW means that two 20 Utter eta!. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 interpretations are possible. 7 It leaves an open question of fact about which interpretation is correct in each context. The BIAW' s officers' declarations explaining that BIAW was really asking the local organizations to pledge to ChangePAC, not BIAW, e.g., CP at 153, are not sufficient to support summary judgment in light of the plaintiffs' evidence, either. As the plaintiffs point out, the ultimate collection of the pledged funds and distribution to ChangePAC, which does seem to have been accomplished by BIA W-MSC, occurred after the date that the plaintiffs first filed their complaint with the AG's office. And, as noted above, the legal question is which organization had the expectation of receiving contributions. The ultimate acquisition of such funds may certainly be a fact relevant to determining whether an organization expected to receive funds; similarly, BIAW's practice of using BIAW to refer to both BIAW and BIAW -MSC is also a fact relevant to making that determination. But neither fact is dispositive, since BIAW itself acknowledges that BIAW sometimes really does mean just BIAW. Plaintiffs have established a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment on the contribution prong.