Opinion ID: 2497751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Summary Denial of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Pertaining to Prosecutorial Comment

Text: Franqui alleged in his motion for postconviction relief that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to numerous comments made by the prosecutor in both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of his trial. The trial court summarily denied the claim, stating that [t]he Defendant's allegations that the prosecutor made improper comments throughout the guilt and penalty phases of the trial could have or should have been raised on direct appeal. This claim is procedurally barred. However, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not [generally] cognizable on direct appeal. Eaglin v. State, 19 So.3d 935, 945 (Fla.2009) (citing Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 (Fla. 2001)). In Bruno, we explained the distinction between claims that are cognizable on direct appeal and claims that are cognizable in postconviction: Whereas the main question on direct appeal is whether the trial court erred, the main question in a Strickland claim is whether trial counsel was ineffective. Both claims may arise from the same underlying facts, but the claims themselves are distinct andof necessity have different remedies: A claim of trial court error generally can be raised on direct appeal but not in a rule 3.850 motion, and a claim of ineffectiveness generally can be raised in a rule 3.850 motion but not on direct appeal. Id. at 63 (footnotes omitted). Although we agree with Franqui that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to failure to object to prosecutorial comments are not procedurally barred, and were properly raised in his post-conviction motion, we find that his claims are without merit. [14] As to the prosecutorial comments cited as improper in both the guilt phase and penalty phase, we first note that the amended motion filed by Franqui failed to establish how these alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced himmere conclusory allegations are not sufficient. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000). In addition, the majority of the prosecutorial argument alleged to be improper was fair comment on the evidence or inferences arising from the evidence, or was proper response to argument of defense counsel, and will not be discussed in detail. We do find that several of the comments cited by Franqui were improper under the circumstances. However, as we explain below, trial counsel's failure to object to them does not mandate reversal for a new trial or new penalty phase. During the guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor stated: The lessers are a joke in this case . . . but they have to be read to you by law. The State contends that this statement was proper because the prosecutor was simply pointing out that the lesser included offenses were inconsistent with the facts of the case. The statement, however, goes beyond that and may reasonably be understood to be an attempt, through sarcasm, to diminish the jury's obligation to follow the law. However, because the trial court properly and fully instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses, we find that Franqui has not met the prejudice prong of Strickland. See Anderson v. State, 18 So.3d 501, 517-18 (Fla.2009) (holding that the prejudice prong of Strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutor's misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury). There is no reasonable probability that but for counsel's error in failing to object to this comment, the result of the proceeding would have been differenta reasonable probability being one sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Next, in the penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statements: (a) Yes it is much easier for Mr. Franqui to put a gun to somebody's head and demand their money, you don't have to work as hard to get the money, that's Franqui's way, (b) It's a little easier to put a gun to somebody's head and pistol whip them and terrorize them and take their hard earned money, (c) Why? Because to kill somebody for money is probably the most basic, the most vile of all motives, and (d) There is no more vile motive than to kill somebody for money. The State contends that these statements were proper argument with respect to why the pecuniary gain and the CCP aggravators were entitled to great weight. The statements, while somewhat inflammatory, are relevant to the pecuniary gain aggravator and do not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase, despite counsel's failure to object. Additionally, in the penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statements: (a) Now you know the shocking unbelievable nature of their criminal records, and (b) You know now that this was not an isolated incident, you know now that this was the middle incident of an unbelievable crime spree that terrorized five separate human beings in a little over a month between November 29, 1991 and January 14, 1992. The State contends that both statements were proper argument with respect to the prior violent felony aggravator. We agree that Franqui's prior violent felony convictions submitted by the State in aggravation were a legitimate subject of prosecutorial comment in the penalty phase, but the words shocking and terrorized are unnecessarily inflammatory. Even so, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined by counsel's error. We have found similar comments either not improper or harmless under the circumstances. See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 377 (Fla.2008) (finding prosecutor's use of the word terrorizing in reference to the burglary aggravating offense was not improper); Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 418 (Fla.1996) (finding prosecutor's use of the word exterminate in the context of the case improper but harmless); cf. Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 905 (Fla.2000) (reversing for a new penalty phase for cumulative error where prosecutor made repeated comments about the violent and vicious nature of the defendant as well as numerous other improper comments). Again, we conclude that the prejudice prong of Strickland is not met by these comments and, accordingly, Franqui is not entitled to relief on this claim. Also in the penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statement, which was not objected to by trial counsel: The lawyers that are arguing here before you this afternoon are the same lawyers in the other phase of the trial who told you that their clients confessed to a crime they didn't commit. The State contends that the comment was fair rebuttal to Franqui's attempt during the penalty phase to use the fact that he had confessed to the crime as a mitigator. The statement, however, is actually an attempt to impugn the integrity and credibility of defense counsel. This is improper. See Brooks, 762 So.2d at 904-05 (finding prosecutor's attack on defense counsel's credibility to be improper). Even if counsel was deficient in failing to object to this comment, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined when we consider the other extensive evidence of aggravation presented to the jury. Any omission on counsel's part in this regard cannot reasonably be viewed as so affecting the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 933 (Fla.1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Thus, based on Strickland and Maxwell, we find that the record conclusively shows Franqui is not entitled to relief on this claim. Finally, in the penalty phase, the prosecutor made comments that tended to disparage Franqui's mitigation. The prosecutor argued, That's the world of Dr. Toomer [Franqui's mental mitigation expert], folks. Through the looking glass at Disney World. Make believe. Use your common sense. This comment, suggesting that the mental mitigation is make-believe or a fantasy, is improper. See, e.g., Brooks, 762 So.2d at 904 (holding that prosecutorial denigration of a defendant's mitigation by suggesting it is phantom is improper). We have long recognized that a prosecutor cannot improperly denigrate mitigation during a closing argument. Williamson v. State, 994 So.2d 1000, 1014 (Fla.2008). Even though the prosecutor's comment in this instance was improper, we conclude that under the prejudice prong of Strickland, based on the extensive aggravation present in this case, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined. Thus, relief is not warranted based on counsel's failure to object to these comments. Although all the above statements may be read as calling for objections by defense counsel, any omission on counsel's part in this regard does not rise to the level of a deficiency that so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Maxwell, 490 So.2d at 932. The State presented extensive evidence of guilt and of aggravation. When viewed as a whole, the record shows that the above statementseither individually or cumulativelyare not so prejudicial as to affect the outcome of the guilt or penalty phases of the trial under the standard set forth in Strickland. Because our confidence in the outcome of both the guilt and penalty phases is not undermined by counsel's failure to object to any of the prosecutorial comments cited here, we conclude that the trial court did not err in summarily denying this claim.