Opinion ID: 600710
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Postal Service Cases

Text: 83 The Second Circuit has endeavored, as we do here, to preserve all the Postal Service's congressionally authorized options. Time, Inc. v. USPS, 685 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.1982), like the present case, involved the intricacies of the allowance under protest option. The Board had initially permitted certain changes in rates to take effect under protest while sending the recommendation back to the PRC for reconsideration. When the PRC substantially reaffirmed its first recommendation, the Board rejected it, but left intact the rates that had taken effect under protest. Id. at 763. When the PRC issued its third recommendation, the Board revised it under its modification powers. A private party challenging the rates claimed that, when the Board first allowed them to take effect under protest under § 3625(c), it thereby elected to give up its option to modify or reject them under § 3625(d). Id. at 765. 84 The Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that, when responding to further recommendations of the PRC, the Board retains the full panoply of statutory options. Id. at 766. To hold otherwise, said the court, would be in direct conflict with the purposes and policies of the Act, which was intended to create an independent agency 'with the unfettered authority and freedom it [had] been denied for years.'  Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 912, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970)). By including the allowance under protest option, said the court, Congress clearly made every attempt possible to ensure that the Service's cash flow would not be disrupted to ensure the 'prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons.'  Id. at 767 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 101(a)). The court accordingly declined to restrict the allowance under protest option, which it viewed as an element of a carefully designed statutory framework, intended to enable the [Postal] Service to realize additional revenues pending the Board's resolution of its differences with the PRC. Id. We are similarly reluctant to read the statute to eliminate an option--judicial review--provided by this carefully designed statutory framework. 85 The First Circuit, in a context much like the one before us, similarly concluded that congressional intent required preserving the Postal Service's litigation autonomy. In Leonard v. USPS, 489 F.2d 814 (1st Cir.1974), the Postal Service, over the objections of the Department, had settled an employment lawsuit with a disgruntled job applicant. Id. at 815. The Department appealed the trial judge's determination that 39 U.S.C. § 2008(c) 7 gave the Postal Service authority to settle litigation and claims without the Department's consent. Although the court expressly declined to decide whether the Postal Service may represent itself in court without the Attorney General's approval, id. at 816 n. 4, its reasoning is instructive here. It rejected 86 the view that 39 U.S.C. § 409(d) gives the Justice Department authority in all instances to control the conduct of litigation, including complete power over settlement [300 U.S.App.D.C. 61] terms. The shall furnish language and the fact that this section is subject to the provisions of § 411, which speaks of cooperation, indicates to us that, at least under the circumstances presented here, § 409(d) does not give the Attorney General veto power over a settlement approved by the Service. 87 Id. at 817. The court further concluded that the control that the Department sought was incompatible with the independence of the Postal Service. It was the intent of Congress to create an independent Postal Service. It would be anomalous to hold that decisions normally committed wholly to the independent discretion of the Service are made subject to Department of Justice veto power when incident to litigation. Id. at 817-18. 88 Finally, we look to our own court's previous resolution of a dispute between the Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission. Governors of USPS v. United States Postal Rate Comm'n, 654 F.2d 108 (D.C.Cir.1981). This dispute arose as follows: The Postal Service asked the Commission to recommend a decision on a change in the classification schedule that would establish computer-generated mail as a subclass of first class mail. In response, the Commission recommended that the program be approved solely as an experimental service. The Board of Governors rejected this recommended decision and sought the Rate Commission's reconsideration. Id. at 112. When the Commission's further recommendation adhered to its earlier position, the Governors allowed it to take effect under protest and sought judicial review. The Governors claimed that the Commission lacked statutory authority to impose a finite date on a program, and we agreed, referring to the balance of authority Congress established between the two entities: 89 We think the history demonstrates the intention of Congress to vest in the Board of Governors exclusive authority to manage the Postal Service. As a partner of the Board the Postal Rate Commission was assigned the duty and authority to make recommendations with respect to rates and classifications. There is no indication that Congress contemplated that either partner would trench on the functions and prerogatives of the other; on the contrary each was to recognize and be guided by its constitutional and legal responsibilities. Congress did not intend that the Postal Rate Commission regulate the Postal Service: one partner does not regulate another, and authority to assist in ratemaking and classification does not include authority to interfere in management. 90 Id. at 114-15 (footnote omitted). Although the Postal Service's management authority is not directly at stake in the present case, we believe our decision should show similar respect to the congressionally-established and delicate balance between the two partners. See id. at 116 (statute created a carefully constructed system of checks and balances between governmental agencies). An integral part of that balance is the Postal Service's judicial review option.