Opinion ID: 2623133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conviction Under the Tampering Statute

Text: In the companion case of People v. Yascavage, No. 03SC559, 101 P.3d 1090, 2004 WL 2711049 (Colo.2004), we concluded that the general assembly intended section 18-8-707 as a whole to criminalize a wide range of activities related to interference with a witness or victim of a crime. We also held that each subsection of 18-8-707 presents an independent objective prohibited under the Tampering statute. Therefore, to sustain a conviction under section 18-8-707, the subject of the defendant's influence must be a person encompassed by the introductory provision and the defendant's objective must be prohibited in subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c) of section 18-8-707. A witness covered by the statute is not just someone who is subject to legal process. Rather, witness means any natural person: (a) Having knowledge of the existence or non-existence of facts relating to any crime; (b) Whose declaration under oath is received or has been received as evidence for any purpose; (c) Who has reported any crime to any peace officer, correctional officer, or judicial officer; (d) Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of any court in this state, of any other state, or of the United States; or (e) Who would be believed by any reasonable person to be an individual described in paragraph (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection (2). § 18-8-702(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, the introductory portion of the statute contains no limitation that would require proof that the witness or victim be under legal process. Section 18-8-707 then creates three distinct forms of witness tampering, each with different elements required for a conviction. Section 18-8-707(1)(a) prohibits the defendant from inducing or attempting to induce a witness or victim to testify falsely or unlawfully withhold any testimony. Section 18-8-707(1)(b) prohibits the defendant from inducing or attempting to induce a witness or victim to absent himself from any proceeding to which he has been legally summoned; and section 18-8-707(1)(c) prohibits the defendant from inducing or attempting to induce a witness or victim to avoid legal process summoning him to testify.
Our question on certiorari requires us to determine what the prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction under subsection (1)(a) of the statute. The court of appeals concluded that there must be evidence of an attempt to interfere with actual testimony, which it defined as testimony anticipated to be offered at a hearing, trial, or other proceeding where witnesses would be sworn. Cunefare, 85 P.3d at 596. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals relied upon People v. Moyer, 670 P.2d 785 (Colo.1983), and People v. Scialabba, 55 P.3d 207 (Colo.App.2002). In Moyer, the defendant was charged with charitable fraud and witness tampering by grand jury indictment. 670 P.2d at 786-87. The witness tampering charge arose out of the defendant's statement to a potential witness notifying her that if she appeared before the grand jury he would sue her, and any others who appeared, for perjury. Id. at 788. The witness did testify before the grand jury, and also related the defendant's attempt to influence her not to do so. Id. at 790-91. The trial court dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause, and this court reversed, concluding that the statements attributed to the defendant were designed to obstruct justice and were within the ambit of the statute. Id. at 792. In Scialabba, the defendant was charged with assault against the victim and was prohibited from communicating with her. 55 P.3d at 208. The evidence established he wrote a letter and mailed it to the victim's address. Although the defendant used a different name for the victim (which he had used in the past), she believed the letter was intended for her. Id. The letter stated that if she were not to appear in court on the assault charges, the charges would be dropped, thereby making things good with him. Id. A month later, the defendant asked his mother to contact the victim and tell her not to appear in court. Id. at 211. The People added a count of witness tampering to the charges and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on that count. The defendant appealed, arguing in pertinent part that he should have been entitled to an abandonment instruction on the tampering charge. Id. at 210. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the crime of tampering is an intentional attempt to interfere with a witness, without regard to the success or failure of the attempt. Therefore, the crime was complete when the attempt was made. In both Moyer and Scialabba, the witnesses actually testified. However, there is nothing in either case that requires such testimony as an element of tampering. To the contrary, both cases reaffirm the precept that the crime of tampering arises out of the intentional attempt to interfere with a witness's testimony.
To give effect to the intent of the legislature, we first look to the language of the statute itself. The plain language of subsection (1)(a) does not require that the witness or victim actually testify at a proceeding for the crime to occur. Indeed, unlike subsection (1)(b), the language does not even require that the witness or victim have been legally summoned to appear at the proceeding. See generally People v. Yascavage. To sustain a conviction under section 18-8-707(1)(a) the prosecutor is required to prove the defendant attempted to influence a witness or victim to testify falsely or unlawfully withhold testimony. (emphasis added). We first address the meaning of testify or testimony. We interpret words and phrases according to their common usage unless they have a technical definition in the statutes. The general assembly defines testifying or testimony to include[] oral or written statements, documents, or any other evidence that may be offered by or through a witness in an official proceeding. § 18-8-601, C.R.S. (2004) (emphasis added). This definition does not require that a statement be sworn to qualify as testimony. Similarly, it does not require that the witness be in the midst of actual testimony, but rather only that the witness be in a position such that he or she may offer testimony in an official proceeding. We next turn to what unlawfully withhold means in the statute. We have guidance here, in that we have addressed this language in the context of a similar statute dealing with intimidating a witness. That statute provides that: A person commits intimidating a witness or victim if, by use of a threat ... he intentionally attempts to [ ][i]nfluence the witness or victim to testify falsely or unlawfully withhold any testimony. § 18-8-704, C.R.S. (2004). In People v. Proctor, 194 Colo. 172, 570 P.2d 540 (1977), the defendant was charged with violating the intimidation statute. An individual, Mr. Box, had witnessed a ruckus and was listed as a potential witness on the defendant's summons. Id. at 173, 570 P.2d at 541. The defendant told him that if he appeared in court he would be taken care of. Id. At the time of the comment, Box had not received a subpoena, but he was subsequently subpoenaed and did testify at the defendant's trial. The defendant was convicted of intimidating a witness under section 18-8-604, 8B C.R.S. (1973) (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). [2] On appeal, the defendant argued that subsection (1)(a) of the statute was designed to deal solely with the circumstance in which a witness is induced to and actually does testify falsely or withhold material testimony. Proctor, 194 Colo. at 174, 570 P.2d at 541. Because Box did testify and presumably testified accurately, the defendant argued that the statute was inapplicable. The court was not persuaded. Rather, we concluded that all that is necessary to complete this crime is to presently attempt, by threat of harm or injury, to influence someone to withhold testimony at a future time. Id. Hence, the victim or witness did not have to be under subpoena or summons at the time of the intimidation  nor was there any requirement of actual testimony implicit in the statute. We have not even required that the testimony to be withheld be material, relevant, or competent. People v. Francois, 198 Colo. 249, 598 P.2d 144 (1979). [3] Because the language of the intimidation statute is substantially similar to the language we interpret in this case, we hold that the same principles apply here. Reading the introductory portion of the statute together with subsection (1)(a), we interpret testimony and unlawfully withhold to protect statements that may be offered in the future, not just those already sworn or received as evidence. Accordingly, under subsection (1)(a), the witness or victim need not be under subpoena or legal summons at the time of the contact, and the defendant need not succeed in interfering with actual testimony of the victim or witness.
On the tampering charge, the jury was instructed that the elements of the crime were: 1. [T]hat the defendant, 2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, 3. intentionally, 4. attempts, without bribery or threats, 5. to induce a witness or a victim, or a person he believes is to be called to testify as a witness or victim in any official proceeding to, 6. testify falsely or to unlawfully withhold any testimony. The People offered evidence at trial that assault charges were pending against the defendant as to which Ms. Cunefare was the named victim. Ms. Cunefare had given a statement to the police concerning the charges. While those charges were pending, Cunefare contacted Ms. Cunefare and convinced her to sign a letter to the District Attorney on April 6 recanting the charges and stating that the events of that evening on March 21, 1998[sic] never happened. Ms. Cunefare testified that she felt under duress from Cunefare to sign that letter, that the events actually had occurred, and that the recantation was therefore false. She further testified that in August, Cunefare again contacted her and attempted to persuade her to sign a second letter to the District Attorney restating the false recantation. At that time, she declined to sign the letter. Such evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for tampering. Ms. Cunefare was the named victim/witness in the assault proceeding. It is reasonable to conclude from her earlier statements that defendant attempted to induce her to recant her previous truthful statements. Further it is reasonable to infer that the defendant intended for her to continue to claim falsely that the events of March 21st did not happen if the matter went to trial. Thus, reasonable inferences from Ms. Cunefare's testimony support the statutory requirement that at the time of defendant's actions, he believed that the victim/witness may be called to testify in the case and he intentionally attempted to cause that victim/witness to testify falsely. We conclude that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to sustain the tampering conviction.