Opinion ID: 1617003
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Heading: Should Trial Court Have Directed a Verdict for Defendants on Appliance Center's Claim for Tortious Interference With Prospective Contractual Relations?

Text: The Appliance Center's petition alleged: That the manufacture and installation of said computer and the interference resulting therefrom has damaged the Plaintiff by the loss of sales of television sets and other appliances in the past, thus loss of profits, and will continue to damage the Plaintiff through loss of sales and loss of profits in the future and damage to Plaintiff's business reputation. We have described the tort Appliance Center pled and attempted to prove as an interference with prospective business advantage. Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc., Duncombe v. The State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 679 (Iowa 1975); see also Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Iowa 1970). Recognition of such actionable tort protects the expectancies of future contractual relations, such as the ... opportunity of obtaining customers. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 130, at 950 (4th ed. 1971). In our decisions examining this tort, however, we have held a purpose on defendant's part to financially injure or destroy the plaintiff is essential. Farmers Cooperative, 236 N.W.2d at 681 (To give rise to a viable cause of action ... the actor must have as at least one of his objects the purpose to injure or destroy the plaintiff.); see also Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 799-800 (Iowa 1984); Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d at 213-14; Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 114-16, 143 N.W. 482, 485-86 (1913); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 626-27, 132 N.W. 371, 374-75 (1911). Although the Restatement's current position softens this requirement in this developing field of the law, compare Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tentative Draft 14) § 766A comment d, quoted in Farmers Co-operative, 236 N.W.2d at 681-82, with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 comment on clause b (1979), we are not inclined to depart from our long-established rule. [1] That defendant act with the purpose to financially injure or destroy is still the prevailing requirement in this kind of case. See W. Prosser, § 130, at 952 (No case has been found in which intended but purely incidental interference resulting from the pursuit of the defendant's own ends by proper means has been held to be actionable.). This is not a situation involving a specific contractual relationship or expectancy, in which the rule appears to impose liability on one who intentionally and unjustifiably interferes in pursuit of another objective, causing damage. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 402-03 (Iowa 1982); Stoller Fisheries, Inc. v. American Title Insurance Co., 258 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Iowa 1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766, 766A. Both rules operate to avoid opening the door to virtually limitless suits of a highly speculative and remote nature. See Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Iowa 1984). Defendants' motions for directed verdict raised this purpose issue. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Appliance Center, we hold it did not introduce substantial evidence of a purpose on the part of either defendant to injure or destroy the Appliance Center's business. See Farmers Cooperative, 236 N.W.2d at 682. At the most, defendants' actions or lack of action can only be interpreted as showing a total disregard for the success of the Appliance Center's enterprise. The motions for directed verdict on this count should have been granted.