Opinion ID: 3011078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Taylor Disabled Under the ADA? (Was He

Text: Substantially Limited in the Major Life Activities of Walking and Standing?) Taylor's first theory is that he has a disability under the ADA, which covers impairments that substantially limit a major life activity. EEOC regulations provide, and no one here contests, that walking and standing are major life activities. See 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(1) App. (1996). Substantial limitations are those that render an individual (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or 7 (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1) (1996). The relevant factors are (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration; and (3) the expected or actual permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment. See 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2). The impairment must be severe when compared to the functioning of the general population. The purpose of the ADA would be undermined if protection could be claimed by those whose relative severity of impairment was widely shared. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986). On the other hand, Congress expressed a strong remedial intent in enacting the ADA, and explicitly found that approximately forty-three million Americans were disabled as of 1990, see 42 U.S.C. S 12101(a)(1) (1998), which implies that the definition should not be so restricted that only the most extremely impaired are covered. Taylor testified that he walks with a slight limp and requires ten-minute hourly breaks when standing or walking. His girlfriend, however, testified that he regularly takes walks after dinner and stated that he does not require a cane or crutch. The District Court concluded that Taylor did not have a disability. Taylor objects that the District Court drew incorrect inferences from his girlfriend's testimony. She testified that Taylor takes the car out for one-and-a-half to three hours after dinner, that she did not know how much time he actually spent walking because she was not with him, and that he carries a walking stick. Thus, he argues, a jury could infer that he cannot walk unassisted for long periods of time. Even considering this testimony in the light most favorable to Taylor, the court's conclusion is sensible. The court noted that there was no testimony that Taylor stands or walks, during the fifty minutes per hour that he can, with any less ability than the average person. The EEOC's regulations define a person with a walking disability as 8 someone who can only walk for very brief periods of time. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j) App; cf. Deane, 142 F.3d at 143 n.4 (regulations are entitled to substantial deference). We agree with the District Court that fifty minutes (per hour) is not a very brief period. In Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996), we found that a man who limped as a result of a hip injury, could not walk more than a mile, and had to climb stairs slowly was not disabled. We concluded that the restrictions on his ability to walk were comparatively moderate, citing several district court cases that rejected similar claims. Id. at 106. Pathmark has also cited other cases in which walking problems were found not to constitute covered disabilities. See, e.g., Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1985) (a woman whose varicose veins prevented her from standing or walking for long periods was not disabled under the Rehabilitation Act's similar definition); Penchisen v. Stroh Brewing Co. , 932 F. Supp. 671, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (a woman with a metal plate in her left ankle who could not fully flex her foot or walk with a normal gait was not disabled), aff'd, 116 F.3d 469 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 178 (1997). Taylor argues that Pathmark only allows one break every two hours and that his need for a break every hour makes him function at less than fifty percent of a typical Pathmark employee. The District Court responded that the standard is one of comparison to the average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1) (1996). Taylor presented no evidence that Pathmark employees resembled the general population in average ability, though he did plausibly argue that Pathmark employed people of average ability. The more important point is that Taylor is mixing scales of measurement. That he can only stand for half as long as the average Pathmark employee, or average person, is not necessarily proof that he is substantially impaired in his ability to stand. The relevant question is whether the difference between his ability and that of an average person is qualitatively significant enough to constitute a disability. Because Taylor can stand and walk for fifty minutes at a time, and can continue for longer periods if he takes a break every hour, he can carry out most regular activities 9 that require standing and walking, even though he may not be able to perform Pathmark's jobs without accommodation. We conclude that his ability to walk and stand is not significantly less than that of an average person. Taylor finally argues that the employee in Kelly had no evidence that he used any special device, cane, or crutches to aid in walking. By contrast, Taylor needs a cane or crutch after fifty minutes and uses a prosthetic shoe to ease his pain and discomfort. Under our jurisprudence, the determination whether a disability exists must be made by evaluating a person's impairment as it affects major life activities without the use of mitigating measures, even if the person uses such mitigating measures in regular activity. See Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).2 Taylor contends that the District Court improperly took mitigating measures into account when determining his abilities by failing to note that Taylor needed ameliorative footwear to maintain his present level of mobility. If Taylor had needed a cane or crutch to stand forfifty minutes an hour, his argument would be persuasive. But there is no evidence that Taylor required an assistive device to stand or walk for at least fifty minutes an hour. If he wanted to stand for longer, he needed a cane or crutch, but someone like Taylor who can stand for fifty minutes unassisted is not substantially limited in standing, and thus his need for assistance to improve his performance does not show that he has a disability. As for the air cast/cast type shoe, Pathmark argues that no doctor ever ordered him to use such devices, and that if he did so for his own comfort that cannot prove his disability. See Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (plaintiff used cane or crutches on occasion, but there was no evidence he was medically required to do so, and voluntary use could not meet his burden of proof). We have not been able to find evidence in _________________________________________________________________ 2. The Supreme Court will decide this issue shortly. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999), granting cert. to 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997). 10 the record that a doctor ordered Taylor to use an air cast, and we believe that occasional use of an air cast to diminish discomfort does not raise Taylor's condition to the level of a disability.3 Therefore we will affirm the District Court's judgment on the issue of whether Taylor was actually substantially limited in the major life activity of walking.