Opinion ID: 1060090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preemption of Claims Against Common Carriers

Text: Exercising its authority under the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, the federal government has retained for itself the power to regulate and supervise the activities of common carriers operating across state lines. The principal medium for enforcing this authority has been the Interstate Commerce Act. In 1906, legislation which has become known as the Carmack Amendment included in the Act provisions for liability of common carriers arising under receipts or bills of lading. Although the carrier is not an insurer under the Carmack Amendment, the shipper need only prove, in essence, that the goods were received by the carrier at the point of origin but were delivered at the destination in a damaged condition or with a portion or all of the goods missing. The liability [of the carrier] arises under a theory similar to res ipsa loquitur. United States v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 384 F.Supp. 1103, 1106-07 (E.D.Va.1974) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In Adams Express Company v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913), the United States Supreme Court determined that the Carmack Amendment superseded all state regulation with respect to claims arising out of such liability. Id. at 505-06, 33 S.Ct. at 151-52; see also Manieri v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 147 Va. 415, 420, 137 S.E. 496, 498 (1927). Since state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims controlled by the Carmack Amendment, see Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412, 421, 34 S.Ct. 790, 794, 58 L.Ed. 1377 (1914), a case against common carriers asserting liability for loss or damage may properly be heard in the Virginia circuit court on the merits, applying federal law.