Opinion ID: 68489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kelly Services

Text: The district court found that it was undisputed that Boutwell remained on Kelly Services’ “available list” but that Kelly Services “had no other positions to fill from the time the plaintiff was terminated by Federal-Mogul until June or July of the following year.” Accordingly, because Kelly Services did offer Boutwell a position in July of 2008, the district court found that Boutwell had not presented evidence that Kelly Services had discharged Boutwell, as required for establishing a prima facie case under Ala. Code § 12-16-8.1. On appeal, Boutwell argues that the statute protects her from any “adverse employment action,” not just discharge, and that she did present evidence indicating that Kelly Services had positions to fill during the relevant time. Specifically, she points to the deposition testimony 12 of Lee Sandlin of Kelly Services, who testified that Kelly Services had placed first and second shift temporary employees at Yutaka as early as March of 2008. She asserts, therefore, that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Kelly Services had assignments available within the six months after her discharge from FederalMogul and whether the failure to offer one of these positions to her constituted an adverse employment action. Alabama courts have not defined the term “adverse employment action” in the context of Ala. Code § 12-16-8.1. However, assuming that Kelly Services’s failure to offer available positions to Boutwell can be considered an adverse employment action, we conclude that Boutwell has not presented evidence upon which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Kelly Services subjected Boutwell to this adverse action “solely” because she served on a jury. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Boutwell, after December 13, 2007, Kelly Services did not have available positions in which to place its temporary employees until March of 2008. Boutwell presents no evidence indicating she was qualified for the positions which became available in March and no circumstantial evidence indicating that Kelly Services’s failure to offer these positions to her was related to her jury service. Because three months passed between Boutwell’s jury service in December and the alleged failure to offer her an available position in 13 March, the two events are not “proximate” and there is, therefore, no inference that the two events are connected. See Hatch, – So. 3d at –, 2009 WL 1716967 at . Furthermore, although the evidence indicates that Kelly Services was aware of Boutwell’s service on a jury, this evidence alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that her service was the sole motivating factor in the decision to not offer one of the Yutaka positions to her. Id. at  (holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employee’s protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity). Evidence indicating that three months after Boutwell served on a jury, Kelly Services did not offer her a position which she may or may not have been qualified to fill is insufficient to satisfy Boutwell’s initial burden of presenting “substantial evidence suggesting that [s]he was [suffered an adverse employment action] ‘solely’ because [s]he ‘served’ on a jury.” Norfolk, 740 So. 2d at 396. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Kelly Services is entitled to summary judgment in its favor because Boutwell has not satisfied her initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of retaliation.7 7 Boutwell also asserts that because the position Kelly Services offered in August 2008 was a first-shift position, rather than a third-shift which she preferred, it was an “unvitation” to work. This allegedly adverse action was even more remote in time to Boutwell’s jury service than was the failure to place her in the position available in March. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that this argument is insufficient to support a prima facie case. 14