Opinion ID: 3062103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review and Deference

Text: The BIA interpreted the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” used in § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) to include petitioner’s conviction for obstruction of justice. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1019 and n.5 (10th Cir. 2007), giving deference, when appropriate, to the agency’s interpretation of ambiguous or unclear statutory terms, Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 2011). More specifically, under the 1 The IJ also determined that petitioner’s domestic violence conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner also appealed that determination to the BIA, but the BIA concluded that it did not need to address that question because its determination on the obstruction-of-justice conviction rendered petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, that issue is not before this court. -3- Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we have observed that “a court gives deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute Congress charged it with administering if the statute is silent or ambiguous on the question at hand and the agency’s interpretation is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Efagene, 642 F.3d at 920. “An agency interpretation only qualifies for deference . . . when the agency acted in its ‘lawmaking pretense.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001)). “When the interpretation occurs in an adjudication, the agency acts in a lawmaking capacity if the decision is binding precedent within the agency.” Id. In this case, the Board’s decision was issued by a single Board member and “a single member lacks the authority to create rules of law that bind the agency in other cases.” Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2010). This court has held, however, that “Chevron deference may apply to a non-precedential BIA decision if it relies on prior BIA precedent addressing the same question.” Efagene, 642 F.3d at 920. The Board’s decision in this case is not entitled to Chevron deference, however, because it did not rely on a prior precedential decision addressing the same question. If Chevron deference is not appropriate, we then consider whether the Board’s decision is entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). In doing so, we assess whether the Board’s decision “has the power to persuade.” Carpio, 592 F.3d at 1098 (internal quotation marks omitted). This -4- involves examining “the thoroughness evident in the BIA’s consideration, the validity of its reasoning, and its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.” Damaso-Mendoza v. Holder, 653 F.3d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011).