Opinion ID: 402169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance and Mistrial Motions

Text: 20 Appellants contend that the district court erred in not granting their numerous motions for severance and mistrial. They argue that severance was necessary because the complexity of the case prevented the jury from considering the evidence on each charge against each individual appellant. 21 Our scope of review is limited and we accord the district court considerable discretion in determining whether or not a severance is warranted. A denial of a motion for severance is not grounds for reversal unless the district court's denial constituted clear prejudice and an abuse of discretion. United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S.Ct. 516, 54 L.Ed.2d 457 (1977). In fact, joinder of defendants charged with conspiracy, as these defendants were, is preferred where proof of the charge is based upon the same evidence and acts. United States v. Brim, 630 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 3121, 69 L.Ed.2d 980 (1981); United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521, 528 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1089, 100 S.Ct. 1052, 62 L.Ed.2d 777 (1980). Severance is required when the proof is such that a jury could not be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to the separate defendants. United States v. Losing, supra, 560 F.2d at 912; United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 525 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985, 97 S.Ct. 1682, 52 L.Ed.2d 379, 431 U.S. 923, 97 S.Ct. 2195, 53 L.Ed.2d 236, 431 U.S. 968, 97 S.Ct. 2928, 53 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1977). 22 This case lends itself to a logical, compartmentalized analysis. Defendant Reeves is charged in all five counts of the indictment. Count I is the conspiracy count which names all four defendants and the remaining four counts each involve a different loan application. Defendants LaMons, Shaw and Klint each recruited a different loan applicant. Each recruitment was the basis of a different indictment count charging the recruiting defendant and Reeves with making false representations on loan applications to an FDIC bank. Count II involves LaMons' recruitment of Beal, Counts III and IV involve Klint's recruitment of McCauley and Miller and Count V involves Shaw's recruitment of Perry. 23 The prosecution's method of presenting its evidence carefully delineated separate events and occurrences and thus protected against confusion by the jury as to the applicability of the evidence to a particular defendant. Also, compartmentalizing the evidence was enhanced by a joint exhibit submitted to the jury by agreement of all parties. The joint exhibit was a chart which listed the count of the indictment, the date and name of the applicant, the common and legal address of the property involved and the defendants charged on that count. The jury could be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as such evidence related to the separate counts of the indictment dealing with different defendants. The issues were not so complicated as to be beyond the jury's ability to consider the evidence as to the guilt of each defendant independent of the evidence as to the guilt of the other defendants. 24 Appellants' argument that the speed in which a verdict was reached (two hours and fifteen minutes) indicates the inability of the jury to compartmentalize the evidence is without merit. A reading of the record discloses overwhelming evidence of the guilt of each of the defendants. Therefore, the deliberation time of the jury does not indicate an inability to compartmentalize but, rather, reflects the compact and persuasive evidence of guilt presented by the prosecution. 25 Additionally, appellants argue that severance was required after the prosecution cross-examined defendant Reeves and defendant LaMons about a post-conspiracy cover-up attempt because such evidence spilled over to and colored the case against all defendants. A related argument advanced by appellants is that severance and mistrial motions should have been granted after defendant LaMons' attorney cross-examined Beal about the post-conspiracy cover-up attempt. Such examination is claimed to have prejudiced defendant Reeves' and defendant Shaw's right to a fair trial. The joint brief of appellants recognizes that appellant LaMons cannot claim prejudice by her own introduction of testimony concerning her own acts and statements. 26 The post-conspiracy cover-up attempt concerns the execution by the loan applicants of property management agreements (PMA) giving Minoco the power to act as the applicant's agent and manage the property forming the basis of the loan. These were back-dated and were prepared by the defendants to explain the loan defaults and lack of improvements to the properties. 4 27 A PMA was first mentioned by Perry in responding to a general question by the prosecutor as to when he was next contacted by any of the defendants. Perry did not refer to it as a management agreement and was describing a phone conversation between himself and LaMons when the prosecutor stopped the discussion and requested that the attorneys approach the bench. The prosecutor explained what the PMA was to the judge and indicated that since it fell outside the indictment period the prosecutor was not going to pursue it. The defense attorneys made no comment and the questioning of Perry was continued along different lines. Later, on redirect, Perry testified that he did not have a management agreement with Minoco before he applied for and received the loan proceeds and that it was not until he returned the proceeds over to Reeves and Shaw that they approached him with a management agreement. No defendants objected to this testimony and no motions were made by the defendants as a result of Perry's above-described testimony. 28 The next reference to a PMA occurred when counsel for defendant LaMons cross-examined Beal directly about signing a PMA. Beal's testimony disclosed that the PMA made Minoco the managing agent for the property and that it was backdated. The only defendant Beal refers to in connection with the PMA is Reeves. During LaMons' attorney's questioning none of the other defendants objected and it was not until some time later when the entire cross-examination by LaMons' attorney was concluded that the other defendants moved for severance on the basis of Beal's testimony concerning the PMA. The court overruled the defense motions and immediately instructed the jury to disregard the testimony relating to the PMA, emphasizing that the PMA was not a part of the case against any of the defendants. 29 The next mention of a PMA occurred several witnesses and one day later when defendant Reeves took the stand. Reeves independently mentioned a PMA in explaining how the loan responsibilities of a Minoco subsidiary differed from those of Minoco. Later the prosecution cross-examined Reeves specifically about the PMA with Beal. However, before that testimony was introduced, the court instructed the jury that evidence regarding the PMA bore only on Reeves' credibility and did not relate to any other defendant. The subsequent testimony by Reeves concerning the PMA with Beal did not refer in any way to any of the other defendants. 30 The next day, and again after several intervening witnesses, the prosecution cross-examined LaMons about her involvement with the PMA regarding the Perry loan. Before this examination, the court carefully instructed the jury that testimony concerning a PMA was only relevant to the witness testifying. 31 The fact that evidence is admissible only as to one defendant and not as to other defendants does not alone require separate trials for the individual defendants. United States v. Knife, 592 F.2d 472, 480 (8th Cir. 1979). By portraying themselves as innocent of any wrongdoing, Reeves and LaMons invited cross-examination concerning the PMAs. The jury had to decide whether or not to believe the defendants' respective versions of the events and the PMAs were relevant to the credibility of Reeves and LaMons. See United States v. McClintic, 570 F.2d 685, 691 (8th Cir. 1978). The jury was cautioned before Reeves and LaMons testified that evidence regarding any PMA was only applicable to the witness testifying and the judge further cautioned the jury in that regard in his final instructions. These instructions were sufficiently strong to preclude the jury from using the testimony of either Reeves or LaMons about a PMA to convict any other defendant. Likewise, the court's instructions to disregard Beal's testimony concerning the PMA were sufficient to obviate any danger. The admonition was given directly after Beal's testimony and the court again admonished the jury not to consider such evidence in its closing instructions. 32 The court's numerous instructions protected the defendants from any improper overflow of evidence from one defendant to another. The final instructions emphasized that the jury should consider the case against each defendant separately. Nothing in the record indicates that the jury was confused or failed to follow the court's instructions. The evidence regarding the PMA is not of such a nature that the jury could not compartmentalize it to the particular defendant's credibility to which it was applicable and disregard it otherwise. The defendants have not demonstrated the strong showing of prejudice necessary to support their contentions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motions for severance and mistrial.