Opinion ID: 874877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: R.E. 403 is the controlling authority for the admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence.

Text: This Court addressed the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to present evidence of an alternate perpetrator in Larsen, 91 Idaho 42, 415 P.2d 685. The Court held that a defendant must produce a train of facts or circumstances, as tend clearly to point out some one besides the [defendant] as the guilty party. Id. at 47-48, 415 P.2d at 690-91. It requires more than just conjectural inferences that a party other than the defendant committed the crime. Id. at 48, 415 P.2d at 691. In 1985, the Idaho Rules of Evidence were adopted which established that all relevant evidence is admissible, unless otherwise provided by the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules for the courts of Idaho. [4] I.R.E. 402. These rules govern all actions, cases and proceedings in the courts of the State of Idaho. I.R.E. 101(b). This Court is presented with the inquiry of whether alternate perpetrator evidence is subjected to a different standard for admission than all other evidence; that is, whether Larsen or I.R.E. 403 governs the admission of alternate perpetrator evidence. This Court finds that Larsen was implicitly overruled when the Idaho Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1985. The court of appeals addressed a similar issue in State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 67 P.3d 1283 (Ct.App.2003). There the court stated that a review of excluded evidence requires an inquiry as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho at 675, 67 P.3d at 1287. However, the court ultimately concluded that the evidence offered by the defendant was properly excluded because it was of negligible probative value, and ... the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence pursuant to the `direct connection doctrine' and I.R.E. 403. Id. at 676, 67 P.3d at 1288. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Kerchusky as standing for the proposition that [I.R.E.] 403 thus embodies a concern, reflected in the cases from other states ... and articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in [ Larsen ], that evidence of third party guilt should not be admitted unless there is some evidence directly connecting the third party to the crime in question. Gray v. Klauser, 86 Fed.Appx. 279, 283 (9th Cir.2004) (unpublished opinion) (emphasis added). But, the Ninth Circuit also stated that Idaho courts do not apply a specialized rule in [the admission of alternate perpetrator evidence], but deem third party evidence inadmissible  if it does not meet the requirements of I.R.E. 403. Id. (emphasis added). [5] Therefore, it remains unclear whether the court of appeals of this state applies Larsen, I.R.E. 403, or a combination thereof when reviewing the admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence. As previously stated, this Court adopts an approach which holds that the Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of all evidence in the courts of this State. The Rules of Evidence generally include all relevant evidence, whereas Larsen generally excluded alternate perpetrator evidence regardless of relevance. The Rules of Evidence embody the balancing test which safeguards a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense along with protection of the state's interest in the integrity of the criminal trial process. For instance, I.R.E. 412 employs a two-part test to evaluate whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a defense is violated in light of I.R.E. 412. [6] State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct.App.2003). First, the trial court must consider whether the evidence proffered is relevant. If it is not relevant, the defendant has no constitutional right to present it. If the evidence is relevant, the trial court must ask whether other legitimate interests outweigh the defendant's interest in presenting the evidence. Id. Due to the highly sensitive nature of sex crimes in general, this standard has been found to effectively balance the state's interest in protecting victims of sex crimes from disclosing their past sexual behavior except in limited circumstances and the defendant's interest in presenting a defense for the crimes of which s/he is accused. The Rules of Evidence properly protect the trial court's discretion to limit relevant evidence if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. I.R.E. 403. The Rules effectively address the concerns from Larsen. The Larsen Court was concerned that a defendant will attempt to admit evidence where the sole purpose is to infer that an individual other than the accused committed the crime. If the defendant proffers evidence which merely tends to mislead the jury that another person committed the crime, or the evidence is not relevant because it does not tend to make the defendant's involvement more probable or less probable, then it is within the trial court's discretion to find the evidence inadmissible. Mere inferences that another person could have committed the crime will most likely not be relevant, and if relevant will still be subject to the limitation provisions of I.R.E. 403. A defendant has no right to present irrelevant evidence and even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded in certain cases. Self, 139 Idaho at 722, 85 P.3d at 1121. The Idaho Rules of Evidence effectively safeguard against the admission of conjectural inferences without the lower courts needing to apply the Larsen direct connection doctrine. This Court finds that Larsen was implicitly overruled by the adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. In the present case, the court's ruling does not address whether the evidence is relevant and admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 401, 402 or 403. Instead, the court ruled that any evidence relating to Lane Thomas as an alternate perpetrator was inadmissible pursuant to this Court's decision in Larsen. This finding was in error. The court refused the request of the defense to call Lane Thomas as a witness and any witness which may impeach Lane Thomas' testimony, or to present any evidence which would tend to show that a person other than Meister committed the crime. By excluding all this evidence from being presented in any context throughout the course of trial the district court prevented Meister from presenting potentially relevant facts that may have developed throughout the course of the trial. Meister should be afforded the opportunity to present his complete and full defense, which includes the presentation of all relevant evidence in the context of trial pursuant to any limitations of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The district court erred by applying the wrong standard for admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence, and therefore, abused its discretion. Therefore, this Court grants Meister a new trial.