Opinion ID: 2651618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Visitation Schedule

Text: This Court also finds no merit in Kimberly S.’s second assignment of error concerning the circuit court’s modification of her temporary visitation schedule. Kimberly S.’s visitation with her daughter, twice per week and every other weekend, was established on a temporary basis by the Family Court. The Family Court specified that it would review the issue of visitation at a final hearing. During sentencing in Kimberly S.’s criminal case, the circuit court was informed that the issue of visitation was pending before the Family Court. However, the circuit court modified and reduced Kimberly S.’s temporary visitation to one day per week and four hours on Sunday. As justification for the change, the circuit court stated: West Virginia Code 62-12-9(a)(4) does allow the Court to monitor visitation under certain circumstances. This set of facts and this crime does not fall under that code section; however, it does – I don’t think that it says that I cannot impose a similar term if deemed appropriate. Chapter 62, Article 12, of the West Virginia Code concerns probation and parole, and W.Va. Code, 62-12-9(a)(4) [2001], provides: (a) Release on probation is conditioned upon the following: . . . . 11 (4) That in every case wherein the probationer has been convicted of an offense defined in section twelve, article eight, chapter sixty-one of this code or article eight-b or eight-d of said chapter, against a child, the probationer may not live in the same residence as any minor child, nor exercise visitation with any minor child and has [sic] no contact with the victim of the offense: Provided, That the probationer may petition the court of the circuit wherein he or she was convicted for a modification of this term and condition of his or her probation and the burden rests upon the probationer to demonstrate that a modification is in the best interest of the child. None of the enumerated provisions in that subsection apply in this case: W.Va. Code, 61-8-12 [1994] (concerns incest); W.Va. Code, 61-8B-1 [2007], et seq. (concerns sexual offenses); and W.Va. Code, 61-8D-1 [2005], et seq. (concerns the offenses addressed in section A. of this opinion which are different from W.Va. Code, 49-7-7 [1990], under which Kimberly S. was convicted).6 Although citing W.Va. Code, 62-12-9(a)(4) [2001], in its ruling, the circuit court acknowledged that its provisions are not controlling in the circumstances pertaining to Kimberly S. and her daughter. Moreover, as stated above, the Family Court conducted a hearing prior to establishing visitation on a temporary basis, and a final hearing is to be conducted by the Family Court on the visitation issue. Nevertheless, in modifying Kimberly S.’s temporary visitation schedule, the circuit court had before it, inter alia, her plea of guilty to contributing to the neglect of her daughter and the pre-sentence report completed by the probation department. In those circumstances, 6 W.Va. Code, 62-12-9 [2001], was amended in 2013. However, the amendment is neither applicable nor relevant to the current matter. 12 two other statutes provided the circuit court with authority to determine the temporary custody of Kimberly S.’s daughter. W.Va. Code, 49-7-11 [1936], provides: “Where a person is found guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a child, the court or judge may place the child in the temporary custody of the state department or of some responsible person or approved institution.” More specifically, W.Va. Code, 49-7-12 [1936], provides: If the guilty person had custody of the child prior to conviction, the court or judge may, on suspending sentence, permit the child to remain in the custody of the person, and make it a condition of suspending sentence that the person provides whatever treatment and care may be required for the welfare of the child, and shall do whatever may be calculated to secure obedience to the law or to remove the cause of such delinquency.7 With regard to the latter statute, the circuit court suspended Kimberly S.’s one year sentence, directed that she serve a short jail term with probation to follow, and set forth a modified, temporary visitation schedule. 7 While W.Va. Code, 49-7-11 [1936], and W.Va. Code, 49-7-12 [1936], refer to “delinquency,” the statute under which Kimberly S. was convicted, W.Va. Code, 49-7-7 [1990], also refers to “delinquency,” i.e., a person “who by any act or omission contributes to, encourages or tends to cause the delinquency or neglect of any child[.]” See n. 1, supra. 13 In addition to those statutes, this Court has consistently held that a court has inherent authority to protect a child and “retains the ultimate power of disposition,” with the best interests determination to be rendered by the court “exercising its independent judgment.” State ex rel. Jeanne U. v. Canady, 210 W.Va. 88, 97, 554 S.E.2d 121, 130 (2001). Furthermore, W.Va. Code, 49-5-4 [1998], states that “[a] person under the age of eighteen years who appears before the circuit court in proceedings under this article shall be considered a ward of the court and protected accordingly.” In In re Samantha M., 205 W.Va. 383, 518 S.E.2d 387 (1999), the following observation was made: Our statutes are clear that whenever a child appears in court, that child is a ward of that court. That court has both a right and a responsibility to see to it that the child is protected. See Julie G., 201 W.Va. at 776, 500 S.E.2d at 889 (Workman, J., dissenting) (“Furthermore, whenever a child appears in court, he is a ward of that court. W.Va. Code § 49-5-4 (1996); Mary D. v. Watt, 190 W.Va. 341, 438 S.E.2d 521 (1992). Courts are thus statutorily reposed with a strong obligation to oversee and protect each child who comes before them.”) 205 W.Va. at 392, 518 S.E.2d at 396 (Workman, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.) As long settled, the best interests of the child is the “polar star” by which decisions must be made which affect children. See State ex rel. Jeanne U., supra, 210 W.Va. at 97, 554 S.E.2d at 130. See also, syl. pt. 7, In the matter of Brian D., 194 W.Va. 623, 461 S.E.2d 14 129 (1995) (“Cases involving children must be decided not just in the context of competing sets of adults’ rights, but also with a regard for the rights of the children.”). This Court’s opinion in State ex rel. Jeanne U. makes clear: “While many of this Court’s prior opinions discussing the ‘polar star’ involve child custody, abuse and neglect, or paternity determinations, the concept is equally applicable to matters in which visitation with children is being adjudicated.” (emphasis added) 210 W.Va. at 97 n. 10, 554 S.E.2d at 130 n. 10. Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the circuit court in this case had inherent power to modify Kimberly S.’s visitation schedule on a temporary basis, pending a full hearing in the Family Court. The circuit court’s temporary order is necessary based on the reality that the final hearing before the Family Court may not occur immediately and that the issues of custody and visitation must not languish in uncertainty. Consequently, this Court concludes that the circuit court did not commit reversible error in modifying Kimberly S.’s temporary visitation schedule during the sentencing hearing in her criminal case. Nevertheless, this Court directs that a final resolution of the visitation issue shall be made by the Family Court on an expedited basis. 15