Opinion ID: 164367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: These cases arise from a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy Mr. Novak filed on June 23, 1995 in the District of Kansas. In his bankruptcy, Mr. Novak asserted debts of over $400,000 and assets of only about $11,000. United States v. Novak , 217 F.3d 566, 573 (8th Cir. 2000) (criminal proceeding describing David Novak’s bankruptcy proceedings). 2 He paid his unsecured creditors nothing, and received a discharge order on October 24, 1995. Id. The government subsequently convicted him of five counts of concealment of assets and false oaths and claims, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 2; one count of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I); and one count of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Novak , 217 F.3d at 573-74. These convictions resulted from his attempts, with Alfred Novak, to hide property from his creditors and/or the United States Trustee in his bankruptcy. After a jury trial, on May 20, 1999, Judge Laughrey, of the United States District Court for the Western District 2 Venue in the bankruptcy case was at one point transferred to the Western District of Missouri, where the criminal adjudication also took place. Apparently, venue was transferred back to the District of Kansas when the bankruptcy case was reopened. -3- of Missouri, sentenced David Novak to 63 months’ imprisonment for these crimes. The United States later filed an application for writ of execution, seeking to obtain legal possession of a red two-door Dodge Viper allegedly belonging to Mr. Novak that it had seized. Mr. Novak repeatedly disclaimed any interest in the Viper, but Alfred Novak requested a hearing on the writ of execution, asserting that he was the vehicle’s true owner. Alfred Novak next filed a motion in his son’s criminal case under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e), seeking return of the Viper. Alfred Novak died in late 1999 or early 2000, during the Rule 41(e) proceedings, and the Alfred Novak Living Trust was substituted for him by consent of the parties prior to judgment. Judge Laughrey denied the Rule 41(e) motion. She concluded that although the Viper had been titled in the name of the Alfred Novak Living Trust, it actually belonged to David Novak. On July 14, 2000, the United States Trustee moved to reopen Mr. Novak’s bankruptcy case in the District of Kansas. The Trustee asserted that the Viper should be sold to pay a portion of the restitution owed by Mr. Novak in his criminal case. The district court granted the motion to reopen the bankruptcy, and the Trustee’s motion to sell the Viper, over Mr. Novak’s objection. Mr. Novak filed two notices of appeal to the district court, one as debtor (No. 02-CV-2210) and one as “authorized agent” of the Dr. Alfred Novak estate -4- (No. 02-CV-2209). He also brought several petitions for writ of prohibition and mandamus in district court against Bankruptcy Judge Flannagan that were docketed under the same district court case numbers as his appeals, No. 02-CV-2209, R. Doc. 2; No. 02-CV-2210, R. Docs. 3, 6, 7. In these petitions Mr. Novak sought, on behalf of himself and the estate of Alfred Novak, to compel Judge Flannagan to retract his order authorizing the sale. On January 23, 2003, the district court entered an order disposing of both of the appeals and all of the pending writ petitions. Relying on the findings of the Western District of Missouri in the Rule 41(e) proceeding, it determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented Mr. Novak and Alfred Novak’s estate from challenging the bankruptcy court’s finding that Mr. Novak was the owner of the Viper.