Opinion ID: 1834309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Tortious-Interference Claim.

Text: The court of appeals concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the bank intentionally and improperly interfered with the feed purchase contracts existing between the Beuthiens and the feed store. It thus reversed the district court's contrary finding. We conclude that the district court's ruling was well founded and should not have been disturbed on appeal. We have recognized that, in order to be actionable as a tort, intentional interference with an existing contract between other persons must be improper. Jackson v. State Bank of Wapello, 488 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Iowa 1992). In Nesler v. Fisher & Co., 452 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1990), we determined that to establish improper interference a showing is required that the actor's predominant purpose was to injure or destroy the plaintiff's business. Id. at 199. In the present case, we have already determined that the bank was not contractually obligated to subordinate its interests to those of the feed store. It appears that in dealing with the Beuthiens the bank was only acting to protect its own financial interests. Even when the summary judgment papers are viewed most favorably to the Beuthiens, as they must be, there is no evidence that would permit a rational finder of fact to conclude that the bank's predominant purpose was to injure or destroy the feed store. Support for our conclusions in this regard is found in Jackson, 488 N.W.2d at 157, and Preferred Marketing Associates v. Hawkeye National Life Insurance Co., 452 N.W.2d 389, 396 (Iowa 1990), both of which determined that a party does not improperly interfere with another's contract by exercising its own legal rights in protection of its own financial interests. The feed store urges that the bank's legal entitlement to proceed against the Beuthiens' assets had been compromised. It argues that the bank approved a course of dealing in which the Beuthiens were allowed to sell their hogs free and clear of the bank's lien without prior approval. Thus, the feed store argues, the lien had been waived under principles recognized in Hedrick Savings Bank v. Myers, 229 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1975), and Ottumwa Production Credit Association v. Heinhold Hog Market, 340 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Iowa App.1983). The feed store's argument is without merit. The cases upon which it relies were concerned with whether a secured party's lien continues to exist on collateral that the debtor has sold to a third party. In sharp contrast, the present case is one in which ownership of the security was transferred to the secured creditor in settlement of the secured obligation. This was done by agreement between the debtor and the secured creditor. As a result of the Beuthiens' default on obligations owed to the bank, the latter could have achieved a similar result acting unilaterally. See Iowa Code §§ 554.9503,.9504, .9505 (1989). Because the feed store at no time had any lien on the Beuthiens' hogs or any of the other assets that were transferred to the bank, it has no basis to challenge the bank's action with respect to the collateral. [3]