Opinion ID: 1326759
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Heading: The Contribution Theory

Text: The doctrine of contribution also has its roots in equitable principles. The right to contribution arises when persons having a common obligation, either in contract or tort, are sued on that obligation and one party is forced to pay more than his pro tanto share of the obligation. Tennant v. Craig, 156 W.Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973); Hardin v. New York Central Railroad Company, 145 W.Va. 676, 116 S.E.2d 697 (1960); Brewer v. Appalachian Construction, Inc., 135 W.Va. 739, 65 S.E.2d 87 (1951); 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 1, et seq. (1965). One of the essential differences between indemnity and contribution is that contribution does not permit a full recovery of all damages paid by the party seeking contribution. Recovery can only be obtained for the excess that such party has paid over his own share. In Haynes v. City of Nitro, W.Va., 240 S.E.2d 544 (1977), we extended a right of contribution to a tortfeasor to bring in as a third-party defendant a fellow joint tortfeasor to share by way of contribution on the verdict recovered by the plaintiff. However, it is clear that Haynes did not alter the fundamental theory of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Contribution still rests on their primary joint or common liability to the plaintiff. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Company, W.Va., 256 S.E.2d 879, 886 (1979); Haynes v. City of Nitro, W.Va., 240 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1977). It is this common or joint liability to the plaintiff on the part of joint tortfeasors that gives rise to a cause of action for contribution. However, where, as here, the right of contribution is initially grounded in common liability in tort, courts have held that a joint tortfeasor employer is immune from a third-party contribution suit because he is initially immune from tort liability to his injured employee by virtue of the workmen's compensation statutory bar of such tort actions. Such a provision is contained in W.Va.Code, 23-2-6. [5] This point is summarized in 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation § 76.20 (1981 Desk Ed.): The great majority of jurisdictions have held that the employer whose concurring negligence contributed to the employee's injury cannot be sued or joined by the third party as a joint tortfeasor, whether under contribution statutes or at common law. The ground is a simple one: the employer is not jointly liable to the employee in tort; therefore he cannot be a joint tortfeasor. (Footnotes omitted) See also Kamali v. Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., 54 Hawaii 153, 504 P.2d 861 (1972); Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43 (Me.1969); Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 31 N.J.Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (1954); Cacchillo v. H. Leach Machinery Company, 111 R.I. 593, 305 A.2d 541 (1973); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash.2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978). We have traditionally held that the immunity statute in our Workmen's Compensation Act insulates the employer against liability for damages arising out of injuries or death occasioned by industrial accidents. Canterbury v. Valley Bell Dairy Company, 142 W.Va. 154, 95 S.E.2d 73 (1956); McVey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 103 W.Va. 519, 138 S.E. 97 (1927). However, where the Workmen's Compensation Act provides an express exception from immunity against suits by an employee in a tort area, it follows that a suit grounded on this exception would enable a third party to maintain an action in contribution. This is the precise issue presented in this certified question. We have traditionally recognized that W.Va. Code, 23-4-2, [6] permits an employee to sue his employer for any injury or death arising from the deliberate intention of his employer. Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., W.Va., 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978); Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W.Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934); Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W.Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933). In this case, had the injured employee elected to sue his employer Terrell for a deliberate intent injury under Mandolidis and its companion cases, he could also have joined Unipunch and Niagara, the manufacturers of the punch press, on a products liability claim under Morningstar v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Company, W.Va., 253 S.E.2d 666 (1979). The employer, Terrell, as well as Niagara and Unipunch, then would be joint tortfeasors. The fact that the various tort claims asserted by the plaintiff involve different theories or causes of action does not prevent the defendants from being joint tortfeasors so long as their actions resulted in common liability to the plaintiff. [7] Saltzman v. Heineman, 116 Ill.App.2d 189, 253 N.E.2d 520 (1969); Shonka v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 1178, 152 N.W.2d 242 (1967); Caldwell v. Fox, 394 Mich. 401, 231 N.W.2d 46 (1975); Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976); Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J.Super. 365, 358 A.2d 473 (1976); Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis.2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976). In the present case the injured employee has not sued his employer, Terrell, for a deliberate intent injury under Mandolidis. This fact alone does not preclude the third parties however from being able to claim a right of contribution against the employer and thereby bring the employer into the case under Haynes v. City of Nitro, supra . We hold this because the underlying tort on which the third party seeks contribution is one not barred by our Workmen's Compensation Act. From an abstract factual standpoint, it is possible to conceive of a situation where under Morningstar, supra, the manufacturer of a machine makes it defective such that it has some safety devices but they are inadequate for the safe operation of the machine. This defect is then compounded by the machine owner who removes all of the safety devices and requires his employees to operate the machinethereby creating a potential deliberate intent injury under Mandolidis. The employer-owner would be subject to a suit because of the exemption of W.Va.Code, 23-4-2, under Mandolidis and its companion cases. [8] The employer, Terrell, argues that because the plaintiff-employee did not elect to sue it under a deliberate intent Mandolidis theory this forecloses the third-party suit by the manufacturers. The argument is made that the deliberate intent exception under W.Va.Code, 23-4-2, is open only to injured employees. We do not read the statute so narrowly particularly in light of the language that [the employee, et al.] shall also have a cause of action against the employer as if this chapter had not been enacted. This statutory language is designed to place the deliberate intent injury outside the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It thereby permits the employer to be exposed to a claim of contribution on this tort theory. Our right of contribution before judgment is derivative in the sense that it may be brought by a joint tortfeasor on any theory of liability that could have been asserted by the injured plaintiff. However, it is clear that the amount of recovery in a third-party action based on contribution is controlled by the amount recovered by the plaintiff in the main action. In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Company, W.Va., 256 S.E.2d 879, 886 (1979), we spoke to the underlying policy behind Haynes :  Haynes is designed to moderate the inequity which existed in our law that enabled the plaintiff to cast the entire responsibility for an accident on one of several joint tortfeasors by deciding to sue only him. Here, it seems to us that by allowing the employer to be joined in the suit the Haynes policy is fulfilled. An employer who may have caused a deliberate intent injury under Mandolidis to his employee should not escape some liability for that injury merely because the injured employee has another theory for recovery of his injuries as against a third party. The policy behind Haynes is intended to provide a mechanism whereby all parties who are jointly liable to the injured plaintiff may be brought into the case in order that they may contribute on any verdict that the plaintiff obtains. We, therefore, conclude that the deliberate intent exception contained in W.Va. Code, 23-4-2, permits a defendant to bring a third-party action in contribution against the employer of the injured plaintiff. Whether an ultimate recovery can be obtained in the third-party action will depend on whether the employer was guilty of a deliberate intent injury under Mandolidis. The certified question having been answered, this case is dismissed from the docket. Answered and Dismissed.