Opinion ID: 744479
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The administrative argument.

Text: 48 Correctly anticipating that we might hold the EPA's interpretation of (B) and (C) not inconsistent with the statute on the question of exposure, appellants put forth a fallback position. They argue that even if the interpretation was not substantively erroneous, its adoption was procedurally flawed. 49 The EPA expressed its policy regarding consideration of exposure in the preamble to its final rule. 59 Fed.Reg. 61,432, 61,440-42. In that preamble, the agency notes that it has received many comments concerning the issue of whether the statutory criteria include an implicit exposure and thus risk component. Id. at 61,441. The agency then states that it has reviewed its positions in [that] area, and expresses its agree[ment] with many of the commentators that there are limited circumstances under which it is appropriate ... to consider exposure factors for listing decisions under § 313(d)(2). It lists the circumstances under which exposure considerations are appropriate as including only determinations under subsection (A), under subsection (B) for chemicals of low to moderately low toxicity, and those under subsection (C) that are low or moderately ecotoxic without certain described serious adverse effects. 50 NPG mounts a two-front assault on the statements regarding exposure analysis in the preamble. First, it contends that the EPA's position amounts to a change in policy without a reasoned justification. Second, it argues that the preamble is a legislative rule that had not been properly promulgated. On review, we uphold the district court's determination that the EPA's policy expressed in the preamble survives both challenges. 51 First, NPG argues that the EPA's exposure policy pronouncement in its preamble constituted a change in agency policy. Appellants remind us that an agency is obligated not to depart without reasoned explanation from its prior conclusions. National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665, 669 (D.C.Cir.1988) (internal punctuation omitted). This is undeniably correct. As the Supreme Court stated in an analogous context, an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first place. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). Were the EPA to abandon a long-held exposure policy and take a new direction we would, as urged, require a thorough explanation of its reasons for doing so. Yet, the EPA's pronouncement in its preamble of its exposure policy is not a change in course. With one exception, the EPA has consistently stated, as it does in this rulemaking, that it will consider exposure under subsection (B) only when the chemical was of low to moderately low toxicity. The EPA concedes that in one case the agency denied a petition to add inorganic fluorides to the list based in part on the insignificance of industrial releases of the chemicals. The agency stated, EPA has concluded that potential exposure must be a consideration in making decisions to add chemicals to the list. 52 Fed.Reg. 20,142, 20,145 (May 29, 1987). While some inorganic fluorides cause serious chronic health effects at high doses, the EPA determined that the exposure required for such effects to occur was not likely to result. 52 Whatever the reasons for the EPA's determination in that case, the agency has long maintained that it would consider exposure under subheading (B) only for low toxicity chemicals. The inorganic fluorides petition was denied over ten years ago. Since that time, the agency has made several dozen listing and delisting decisions under EPCRA. The inorganic fluorides case was the only instance in which the agency articulated a policy contrary to the one explicated in this rulemaking. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the agency has departed from prior practice in a way that requires more explanation than was provided. If anything, the inorganic fluorides case constituted such a departure, but that is not before us. 53 We also reject NPG's argument that the exposure policy amounts to a legislative rule that should have been issued for notice and comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553. The APA excludes general statements of policy from the requirements of section 553. The precise distinction between a general statement of policy and a legislative rule is often elusive, but in seeking it we have found useful a two-part inquiry put forth in American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525 (D.C.Cir.1980). There we said that, first, a general statement is one that does not impose any rights and obligations and, second, that a policy statement generally leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion. Id. at 529. See also Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C.Cir.1987). A legislative rule, in contrast, is one that: (1) supplements a statute; (2) effect[s] a change in existing law or policy; or (3) grant[s] rights, impose[s] obligations, or produce[s] other significant effects on private interests. National Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 237-38 (D.C.Cir.1992). See also Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701-02 (D.C.Cir.1980); Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 469 (D.C.Cir.1980). We will also consider an agency's characterization of its own actions, although that characterization is not dispositive. See Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C.Cir.1986). Applying these principles we conclude that the EPA's exposure policy was exempt from the notice and comment requirements of section 553. The EPA's exposure policy merely informed the public that the agency would exercise its discretion by considering exposure only for low toxicity chemicals. The EPA did not thereby curtail this discretion; it did nothing more than clarify its own position. The policy does not impose rights or obligations or bind the agency to a particular result. Chemicals of low toxicity may be added despite the policy, just as chemicals of moderate or high toxicity are not necessarily added because of it. 54 Having disposed of appellants' general objections to the rulemaking, we will address the chemical-specific objections in turn.