Opinion ID: 1736643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the lower court erred in denying appellant an agee hearing to challenge the voluntariness of his confessions.

Text: Appellant challenged by pretrial motion the voluntariness of his December 25 and 27, 1982, confessions and requested an evidentiary hearing. The motion was denied by the trial judge on the basis that, since the issue of voluntariness had been determined at appellant's first trial, and the Mississippi Supreme Court had expressly found no error in that ruling, the determination made in the first trial was binding. Thus, there was no need to investigate the issue further. Appellant stated his desire to introduce new evidence not considered at the first trial, including a handwriting expert who would provide testimony as to whether or not the signature on the confession was that of the appellant. He also proposed to introduce a pharmacologist to testify as to whether the appellant's drug use affected his mental state. During the trial on West II, appellant objected to the introduction of the confessions and again requested an Agee hearing which was denied for the above-stated reasons. Appellant argues here that, since both the conviction and the sentence were reversed on his first appeal, this Court intended to remand the cause for a new trial on all issues and that [T]o completely bar the defendant from contesting the voluntariness of his confessions at a new trial simply because they are admitted into evidence at his first trial is to assume that the defense counsel in his new trial would ask the exact questions as defense counsel in West I and that the witnesses would give the exact same responses as in the previous record. (Appellant's Brief at 16). In Jones v. State, 517 So.2d 1295 (Miss. 1987), appellant's conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. In the appeal on the first conviction, Jones argued the issue of (1) the legality of his arrest, (2) the voluntariness of his confession, and (3) the sufficiency of the indictment. Although the conviction was set aside, this Court resolved those three specific issues adversely to appellant Jones. In the second trial, Jones again raised the issues. However, on the voluntariness of the confession, Jones incorporated a transcript of the suppression hearing at the first trial into the record of the second trial. No new evidence was offered on any of the issues, and Jones simply advanced the same argument which he had asserted on the appeal from his first conviction. We held that the trial court correctly rejected the identical argument on the same evidence at the second trial. The decision was based not upon the fact that the issues had been raised in a prior appeal, but because Jones' arguments advancing the issues were supported by the evidence and law argued and rejected in the first appeal. Therefore, the distinction between Jones and West is clear. We hold that, where the case has been reversed and remanded for a new trial, a trial de novo follows. The trial court hears the case as if for the first time and considers all matters as though there had been no prior trial. See Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963); State v. Darwin, 161 Conn. 413, 288 A.2d 422 (1971); United States v. Akers, 702 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir.1983). See also Commonwealth v. Oakes, 481 Pa. 343, 392 A.2d 1324 (1978); where the Court held that the defendant is entitled to a wholly new trial, whether before the same or a different judge, unfettered by the rulings, pro or con, made at the first trial, and with the right to have new rulings on the evidence, points for charge and other matters which arise in the course of a trial. 481 Pa. at 348, 392 A.2d at 1327. This Court has decided the question in civil cases that, as a general rule, when the Court reverses and remands the case is to be tried de novo on all issues. Weems v. American Security Ins. Co., 486 So.2d 1222, 1226 (Miss. 1986). Further, regarding cases where the trial judge grants a motion for new trial, the old trial is out of the picture for all purposes. Its verdict is as though it had never been. Gill v. W.C. Fore Trucking, Inc., 511 So.2d 496 (Miss. 1987). We are of the opinion that the refusal of the lower court to grant a suppression/ Agee hearing on the voluntariness of the confessions constituted reversible error.