Opinion ID: 482088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timely Return of Consideration

Text: 17 In granting summary judgment on this basis, the trial court cited Hinds v. Plantation Pipe Line, 455 F.2d 902, 906 n. 5 (5th Cir.1972), for the proposition that to avoid a release because of fraud, and sue on the underlying action, one must return the consideration within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud. The court also cited Louisville and Nashville Ry. Co. v. Spurgeon, 272 Ala. 197, 129 So.2d 682 (1961), for the proposition that the consideration must be returned within a reasonable time after the defense of release is placed in issue. 18 Applying this law to the facts before it, the trial court held that appellants' offer to return the consideration on January 25, 1984, was patently unreasonable, since the release issue was raised by Dixie National's answer on September 23, 1983, and since it had been briefed by the time the consideration was tendered. 6 19 The proper starting point for countdown to determine whether the tender was timely is September 23, 1983, when the release was first placed in issue. See Louisville and Nashville Ry. Co. v. Spurgeon, 7 272 Ala. at 199, 129 So.2d at 684 (countdown begins when release raised as defense; plaintiff need not anticipate pleading of release as affirmative defense) (cited with approval in Boles v. Blackstock, 484 So.2d 1077, 1083 (Ala.1986)). 20 Once countdown begins, timeliness of tender ordinarily is a question for the jury. McCoy v. Prince, 11 Ala.App. 388, 66 So. 950 (1914). We realize, however, that [t]o say that an issue is a jury question is not to say that the issue should go to the jury in all instances, Carroll Kenworth Truck Sales v. Kenworth Truck Co., 781 F.2d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir.1986), but it is to say that [if] reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment, and allow the issue to be resolved by the trier of facts. Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir.1985) (citations omitted). 21 In other words, unless we can say that reasonable minds could not differ on whether the four month interval between the time the release was placed in issue and the time the consideration was tendered constitutes an unreasonable delay, then we must reverse. 22 We have found only one reported case where an Alabama court has held as a matter of law that tender was untimely. See Kelly v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 154 Ala. 573, 45 So. 906 (1908) (consideration tendered three years after release pled and after case fully tried and reversed by appellate court). If such were the case here, we would agree with the sentiment of the trial court that [t]he plaintiffs waived their right to claim fraud in the inducement by retaining the benefits of the releases while seeking to avoid their burdens, (citing Jehle-Slauson Constr. Co. v. Hood-Rich, Arch. and Consulting Eng., 435 So.2d 716 (Ala.1983). As it is, we cannot agree. 23 In Jehle-Slauson Constr. Co. v. Hood-Rich, Arch. and Consulting Eng., the plaintiffs never offered to return the consideration. The appellants did. Furthermore, it does not seem to us that a four month delay was, as the trial court stated, patently unreasonable. We believe a determination of the fact of the reasonableness of the delay should include a consideration of appellants' doubts as to whether Dixie National would accept a return of the consideration, and appellants' reliance on Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 30 Ala.App. 399, 7 So.2d 314 (1941), 245 Ala. 15, 15 So.2d 713 (1943), for the proposition that in the case of insurance contracts, a plaintiff need not return the consideration before seeking to rescind the release. 8 Even without these factors, we would doubt that four months is a patently unreasonable delay. With them, we are convinced it is not.