Opinion ID: 76258
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary of Supreme Court's Secondary Effects Jurisprudence

Text: 10 This case involves two ordinances, a zoning ordinance and a general public nudity ordinance, both of which are alleged to violate Appellants' First Amendment rights to freedom of expression. To guide our analysis, we begin with a comprehensive summary of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. The discussion is extensive, in part because of the large number of no-clear-majority decisions of the Court in cases of this type. Moreover, our task is complicated because although the Court has formulated distinct standards for evaluating the two kinds of regulation enacted by the County in this case—zoning ordinances and public nudity ordinances—the Court also has sometimes collapsed the two categories into a single, overarching category of regulatory action targeting the negative secondary effects of non-obscene adult entertainment and drawn conclusions about this single category. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). Additionally, the Court has occasionally borrowed specific doctrines developed in one category of case to apply to the other. See, e.g., Alameda Books, 122 S.Ct. at 1736 (plurality opinion) (relying on the Court's holding in Pap's A.M., a case involving a public nudity ordinance, to explicate the evidentiary showing necessary to sustain an adult entertainment zoning ordinance); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 583-84, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (Souter, J., concurring) (relying on the evidentiary standard described in Renton, a zoning case, to explicate the evidentiary showing necessary to sustain a public nudity ordinance). After identifying the applicable standards, we apply them to each of the ordinances at issue in this case. 11
12 The Supreme Court first recognized the existence of First Amendment freedom of expression rights in the adult entertainment context in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). In that case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of state-wide licensing regulations enacted by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control that prohibited sexually explicit live entertainment in establishments licensed to sell liquor. The Court held that California had broad latitude under the Twenty-first Amendment to control the manner and circumstances under which liquor may be sold. 4 The Court acknowledged that at least some of the performances to which these regulations address themselves are within the limits of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118, 93 S.Ct. 390. However, the Court emphasized that the critical fact is that California has not forbidden these performances across the board but merely proscribed such performances in establishments that it licenses to sell liquor by the drink. Id. 13 However, in Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), the Court affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a town ordinance which proscribed topless dancing in bars as well as prohibiting any female from appearing in `any public place' with uncovered breasts. Doran, 422 U.S. at 933, 95 S.Ct. 2561. 5 The Court declared that although the customary `barroom' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized [in LaRue ] that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection in some circumstances. Id. at 932, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The Court held that, unlike the regulations at issue in LaRue, the ordinance in Doran was overbroad because it applied to all commercial establishments, not only those selling liquor by the drink, and thus was not justifiable under the Twenty-first Amendment. 6
14 In Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976), the Court recognized for the first time that regulations of adult entertainment could be justified with reference to its negative effects on the surrounding community. The Court upheld portions of a Detroit Anti-Skid Row zoning ordinance that required adult movie theaters and bookstores to be dispersed throughout limited portions of the city but did not ban them entirely. 7 However, although a majority of the Court agreed that the zoning ordinance was constitutional, no single rationale for the decision enjoyed the assent of five Justices. 15 The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, held that the sexually explicit expression being regulated by the ordinance, though not altogether unprotected, was of lower value than core, political speech. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (plurality opinion) (characterizing society's interest in protecting this type of expression as of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate.). The plurality concluded that the zoning ordinance constituted nothing more than a limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited that was justified by the city's interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods. Id. at 71, 96 S.Ct. 2440. 16 Justice Powell, who provided the fifth vote necessary to sustain the ordinance, rejected the plurality's view that nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated differently under [the] First Amendment. Id. at 73 n. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (Powell, J., concurring). Unlike the plurality, Justice Powell analyzed the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance under the four-part test outlined in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). O'Brien was not an adult entertainment case but involved a Vietnam-era war protester who claimed that the act of burning a draft card was constitutionally protected expression. Rejecting his claim, the O'Brien Court held that government regulation of expressive conduct is sufficiently justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the Government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Applying this test to the Detroit zoning ordinance, Justice Powell found that the ordinance was justified because (1) the ordinance was within the power of the Detroit Common Council to enact; (2) the interests furthered by this ordinance are both important and substantial, since [w]ithout stable neighborhoods... large sections of a modern city quickly can deteriorate into an urban jungle with tragic consequences to social, environmental, and economic values; (3) Detroit has not embarked on an effort to suppress free expression; and (4) based on the evidence presented to the council, the degree of incidental encroachment upon such expression was the minimum necessary to further the purpose of the ordinance. Young, 427 U.S. at 80-82, 96 S.Ct. 2440. 17 Unlike the four dissenters, who found the Detroit zoning ordinance to be content-based, and thus discerned in the Court's holding a drastic departure from established principles of First Amendment law, id. at 84, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (Stewart, J., dissenting), Justice Stevens and Justice Powell agreed that the ordinance was unrelated to the suppression of expression. Although they evaluated the ordinance under different standards, Justices Stevens and Powell also agreed that the ordinance was justified in part by the city's interest in protecting its neighborhoods against certain negative effects associated with adult entertainment. See 427 U.S. at 71, n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (plurality opinion) (noting that the city enacted the ordinance because a concentration of `adult' movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, adding it is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of `offensive' speech.); id. at 83, n. 6, 96 S.Ct. 2440 (Powell, J., concurring) (We have here merely a decision by the city to treat certain movie theaters differently because they have markedly different effects upon their surroundings.). In Young, therefore, a majority of Justices endorsed, for the first time, the notion that zoning ordinances impacting sexually explicit adult entertainment could be justified with reference to its unwanted secondary effects.
18 This concept was not without limits, however, as the Court's next encounter with adult entertainment, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), made clear. Schad involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance brought by the operators of a store selling adult materials who added a coin-operated mechanism enabling customers to watch a live, nude dancer performing behind a glass panel. The ordinance, Mount Ephraim, N.J., Code § 99-15B (1), (2) (1979), described permitted uses in the community's small commercial zone and prohibited all other uses. The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance, which had been construed by the state courts to forbid nude dancing, because it prohibit[ed] a wide range of expression long been held to be within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the municipality's alleged justifications for its blanket prohibition were inadequate. Schad, 452 U.S. at 65, 101 S.Ct. 2176. Writing for the majority, Justice White held that when a zoning law infringes on a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest. Id. at 68, 101 S.Ct. 2176. In this case, none of Mount Ephraim's asserted justifications for its ordinance could withstand this heightened scrutiny, since it had presented no evidence to defend its claims that problems associated with live entertainment, such as parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities were more significant than those associated with various permitted uses, that live entertainment [was] incompatible with the permitted uses, or that the kind of entertainment appellants wish to provide [was] available in reasonably nearby areas. Id. at 73-76, 101 S.Ct. 2176. 19
20 In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), the Court upheld a city's zoning ordinance that unlike the ordinance in Young attempted to regulate the location of adult movie theaters by concentrating them rather than by dispersing them. 8 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist relied on Young but outlined a new analytical framework for evaluating this type of regulation. 21 The Court's analysis involved three steps. First, the Court found that since the Renton ordinance did not ban adult theaters altogether but merely regulated where they could be located, the ordinance was properly analyzed as a time, place and manner regulation. Id. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925. Second, the Court considered whether the ordinance was content-based or content-neutral. The Court noted that content-based ordinances are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny, but found that the Renton ordinance did not fall into that category, since it aimed not at the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community. Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925 (emphasis added). Third, the Court considered whether, as a content-neutral time, place and manner regulation, the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication, id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 925, and found that these conditions were met. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's contention that the city's justifications for the ordinance were conclusory and speculative because the Renton ordinance was enacted without the benefit of studies relating to `the particular problems or needs of Renton. ' Id. Instead, the Court held that the First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses. Id. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925. 22
23 The Court examined the constitutionality of restrictions on adult entertainment again in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991). Unlike Young, Schad, and Renton, Barnes involved a public indecency statute rather than a zoning ordinance. Confronting this issue for the first time, the Court upheld an Indiana indecency statute that had the effect of requiring dancers in adult establishments to wear pasties and G-strings. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572, 111 S.Ct. 2456. However, although five justices agreed that the statute should be upheld, they were again unable to agree on a single rationale. 24 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, recognized that the Court's previous decisions in LaRue, Doran, and Schad implied that nude dancing was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 565, 111 S.Ct. 2456. Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed the Indiana statute in light of the four-part test for expressive conduct established in O'Brien. Applying this test, he found that the statute was justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity. Id. at 567, 111 S.Ct. 2456. 9 25 Justice Scalia and Justice Souter each wrote separately, concurring in the judgment of the Court but upholding the Indiana statute on different grounds from each other and from the plurality. Justice Scalia found that the statute withstood constitutional challenge, not because it survived the O'Brien test, but because as a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. Id. By contrast, Justice Souter agreed with the plurality that nude dancing was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and appropriately analyzed under O'Brien. However, he parted company with them over how to understand and apply O'Brien's second requirement that government regulation of expressive conduct further important or substantial government interests. According to Justice Souter, these interests need not be limited to protecting societal order and morality, as the plurality argued. Instead, like the zoning cases, they should be interpreted to include the State's substantial interest in combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments... [such as] prostitution, sexual assault, and other criminal activity. Id. at 582-83, 111 S.Ct. 2456. 26 Because Justice Souter provided the narrowest grounds for the judgment of the Court in Barnes, his concurrence constitutes the holding of that case under the rule of Marks v. United States for interpreting fragmented Supreme Court decisions. 10 Hence his opinion demands close scrutiny. In identifying secondary effects as an appropriate basis for upholding the Indiana statute, Justice Souter relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decisions in Renton and Young. Though neither of these cases involved nude dancing, Justice Souter reasoned that because nude dancing and the forms of adult entertainment at issue in Young and Renton were plainly of the same character, they were likely to produce the same pernicious effects. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584, 111 S.Ct. 2456. He thus concluded that the Renton Court's recognition that legislation seeking to combat the secondary effects of adult entertainment need not await localized proof of those effects, id., could be applied to the specific case of nude dancing. Indiana could reasonably rely on the findings and experiences of other similar localities in order to conclude that forbidding nude dancing furthered its interest in preventing secondary effects, and, in that case, the state need not justify those restrictions by its own local studies. Id. at 584, 111 S.Ct. 2456. Hence O'Brien's second prong was satisfied. So too was O'Brien's third condition, since the State's interest in banning nude dancing was not related to the suppression of free expression but resulted from a simple correlation of nude dancing with secondary effects. Id. at 585, 111 S.Ct. 2456. Finally, Justice Souter found that O'Brien's fourth requirement was also met, since the restrictions at issue in Barnes were minor. Pasties and a G-string moderate the expression to some degree, to be sure, but only to a degree. Dropping the final stitch is prohibited, but the limitation is minor when measured against the dancer's remaining capacity and opportunity to express the erotic message. Id. at 587, 111 S.Ct. 2456. 27
28 The Court revisited the issue of nude dancing in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). In another splintered opinion, the Court upheld a public indecency ordinance similar to the statute at issue in Barnes. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 283, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Writing for a four-justice plurality, in an opinion stating the holding of the Court under Marks, Justice O'Connor began by clarify[ing] that government restrictions on public nudity ... should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech. Id. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Justice O'Connor then concluded that Erie's ordinance was justified under the four requirements of O'Brien. The first and third of those requirements—that the regulation was within the government's power to enact and that the government's interest was unrelated to the suppression of expression—were easily satisfied. Id. at 296, 301, 120 S.Ct. 1382. In connection with the second O'Brien requirement that the government's regulation further an important or substantial interest, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the evidentiary standard described in Renton and in Justice Souter's concurrence in Barnes was the appropriate measure of whether Erie's ordinance furthered the city's interest in combating the harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing. As she emphasized, that evidentiary requirement was a weak one: 29 In terms of demonstrating that such secondary effects pose a threat, the city need not conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities to demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses. [ Renton ] Because the nude dancing at Kandyland is of the same character as the adult entertainment at issue in Renton, Young ... [and] LaRue, it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that such nude dancing was likely to produce the same secondary effects. And Erie could reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton and [ Young ] to the effect that secondary effects are caused by the presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a given neighborhood. In fact, Erie expressly relied on Barnes and its discussion of secondary effects, including its reference to Renton and [ Young ].... [T]he evidentiary standard described in Renton controls here, and Erie meets that standard. 30 Id. at 296-97, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (internal citations omitted). Finally, Justice O'Conner found that O'Brien 's fourth condition that any incidental limitation on protected expression be no greater than necessary was satisfied, since [t]he requirement that dancers wear pasties and G-strings is a minimal restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests ... [that] leaves ample capacity to convey the dancer's erotic message. Id. at 301, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 31 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that Erie's ordinance was constitutional, but did so on an entirely different basis. Reiterating the view he expressed in Barnes, Justice Scalia deemed the ordinance to be a total ban on public nudity, which was aimed at conduct, not expression, and thus was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. Id. at 307-08, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Meanwhile, Justice Souter filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, agreeing with the plurality that the O'Brien test governed, but dissenting from the Court's judgment in the case because he disagreed with how the plurality applied the second prong of O'Brien. On Justice Souter's view, the record failed to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied, either for the seriousness of the threatened harm or for the efficacy of its chosen remedy. 529 U.S. at 314, 120 S.Ct. 1382. As such, the record did not permit the conclusion that Erie's ordinance is reasonably designed to mitigate real harms. Id. at 317, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Since, on his view, O'Brien's second condition was not satisfied, Justice Souter would have remanded the case to permit Erie to attempt to make that factual showing. 11 32
33 The Court's most recent case involving adult entertainment was City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002), a case in which adult businesses challenged the constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance forbidding two or more such businesses from operating in the same building. The Supreme Court reversed a lower court judgment granting summary judgment to the adult businesses, holding that Los Angeles could reasonably rely, at this stage of the litigation, on a police department study of the effect of adult businesses on crime patterns to overcome summary judgment. Once again, however, no single rationale justifying the result enjoyed the assent of five Justices. 34 The narrow question presented in Alameda Books was the appropriate standard for determining whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest under Renton.  122 S.Ct. at 1733. The plurality opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, found that by relying on a 1977 study showing that concentrations of adult establishments are associated with higher rates of prostitution, assaults, and other secondary effects, Los Angeles had complied with Renton's evidentiary requirement, at least for the purpose of surviving summary judgment motion. Id. Hence the plurality held that summary judgment for the adult businesses should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1738. The plurality explained, however, that Renton 's requirement that a municipality act on evidence reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem of secondary effects does not mean 35 ... that a municipality can get away with shoddy data or reasoning. The municipality's evidence must fairly support the municipality's rationale for its ordinance. If plaintiffs fail to cast direct doubt on this rationale, either by demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual findings, the municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton. If plaintiffs succeed in casting doubt on a municipality's rationale in either manner, the burden shifts back to the municipality to supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance. Id. at 1736. 12 36 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court but wrote separately because he agreed with the dissent that the Los Angeles ordinance was not content-neutral, and because he feared that the plurality opinion might constitute a subtle expansion of Renton. Id. at 1739. On the issue of content-neutrality, the O'Connor plurality took the position that the Court should not decide whether the Los Angeles ordinance was content-neutral since the Ninth Circuit had not yet passed on the matter. Id. at 1737. Justice Kennedy disagreed, joining the four dissenters in characterizing the application of the content-neutral label to secondary effects ordinances like Los Angeles' as a fiction, because whether a statute is content neutral or content based is something that can be determined on the face of it; if the statute describes speech by content then it is content based.... These ordinances are content based and we should call them so. Id. at 1741. Nevertheless, unlike the dissent, Justice Kennedy held that secondary effects zoning ordinances were subject to intermediate scrutiny even though they were content-based. Accordingly, he concluded that the central holding of Renton is sound: A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. Id. 37 With respect to Renton, Justice Kennedy distinguished two questions entering into whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest under Renton: (1) what proposition does a city need to advance in order to sustain a secondary effects ordinance?, id. at 1741; and (2) how much evidence is required to support the proposition? Id. As Justice Kennedy saw it, the plurality gave the correct answer to the second question, but skipped the first, to which more attention must be paid. To justify a content-based zoning ordinance, he argued, a city must advance some basis to show that its regulation has the purpose and effect of suppressing secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact. Id. at 1742. The key issue, in other words, is how speech will fare under the ordinance: 38 [T]he necessary rationale for applying intermediate scrutiny is the promise that zoning ordinances like this one may reduce the costs of secondary effects without substantially reducing speech. For this reason, it does not suffice to say that inconvenience will reduce demand and fewer patrons will lead to fewer secondary effects.... It is no trick to reduce secondary effects by reducing speech or its audience; but a city may not attack secondary effects indirectly by attacking speech. 39 Id. 40 Turning to the second question, Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that very little evidence was required of a municipality to support the claim that its ordinance serves to reduce secondary effects without substantially reducing speech. Id. at 1743. In this case, Los Angeles could reasonably conclude based on its 1977 study that preventing multiple adult businesses from operating under one roof was reasonably likely to cause a substantial reduction in secondary effects while reducing speech very little. Id. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that [i]f these assumptions can be proved unsound at trial, then the [Los Angeles] ordinance might not withstand intermediate scrutiny. Id. Nonetheless, he concluded that these considerations were sufficient to determine that the ordinance was not facially invalid and should survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. Because he concurred in the judgment of the Court on the narrowest grounds, Justice Kennedy's concurrence represents the Court's holding in Alameda Books under Marks. See, e.g., Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 722 (7th Cir.2003) (identifying Justice Kennedy's opinion as controlling); SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 862 n. 1 (8th Cir.2003) (same). 41
42 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that while the Supreme Court has utilized closely related, and at times overlapping, analytical frameworks to evaluate adult entertainment zoning ordinances, on the one hand, and public nudity ordinances, on the other, these two types of regulatory action, both of which may target the perceived secondary effects of adult entertainment, must be distinguished and evaluated separately. Zoning ordinances regulating the conditions under which adult entertainment businesses may operate should be evaluated under the standards for time, place, and manner regulations set forth in Renton and reaffirmed in Alameda Books. Accordingly, a reviewing court must perform a three-part analysis to determine whether the zoning ordinance violates the First Amendment: first, the court must determine whether the ordinance constitutes an invalid total ban or merely a time, place, and manner regulation; second, if the ordinance is determined to be a time, place, and manner regulation, the court must decide whether the ordinance should be subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny; and third, if the ordinance is held to be subject to intermediate scrutiny, the court must determine whether it is designed to serve a substantial government interest and allows for reasonable alternative channels of communication. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-50, 106 S.Ct. 925; Alameda Books, 122 S.Ct. at 1733-34. 43 By contrast, public nudity ordinances, insofar as they are content-neutral, should be evaluated under the four-part test for expressive conduct set forth in O'Brien and utilized by the Court in Barnes and Pap's A.M. According to this test, public nudity ordinances that incidentally impact protected expression should be upheld if they (1) are within the constitutional power of the government to enact; (2) further a substantial governmental interest; (3) are unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) restrict First Amendment freedoms no greater than necessary to further the government's interest. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673; Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567, 111 S.Ct. 2456. 44 The significance of Alameda Books is that it clarifies how the court is to interpret the third step of the Renton analysis as well as the second prong of the O'Brien test, which are, to a certain extent, virtually indistinguishable. In deciding whether a given ordinance is designed to serve ( Renton ) or furthers ( O'Brien ) the government's alleged interest in combating the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment, the standard we apply is the one described in Renton and utilized in Barnes, Pap's, A.M., and Alameda Books. According to this standard, the government need not conduct local studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other municipalities to demonstrate the efficacy of its chosen remedy, so long as whatever evidence [it] relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that [it] addresses.' Pap's, A.M., 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925). However, the government's evidence must fairly support [its] rationale. Alameda Books, 122 S.Ct. at 1738 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1743 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Further, plaintiffs challenging the ordinance after passage must be given opportunity to cast direct doubt on this rationale, either by demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its rationale, or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual findings. Id. 13 45 Having summarized these precedents, we turn now to their application to the two ordinances before us.