Opinion ID: 3012797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fair Housing Act and Other Civil Rights Claims

Text: The Koorns argue that the District Court erred in not recognizing their claims under any of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. They “rely substantially upon the McDonnell Douglas presumption” 9 with respect to those claims. Because the Koorns do not make out cognizable claims under these statutory provisions and do not qualify for the McDonnell Douglas presumption, the District Court correctly granted the Township’s summary judgment motion on those claims.
Under the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–31, it is unlawful for any person to refuse to sell or otherwise make unavailable a dwelling to any person on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). It is also unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of” that person’s right to have a dwelling. Id. §§ 3617, 3604. “Dwelling” means a “building . . . designed for occupancy as a residence by one or more families.” Id. § 3602(b). 9 See discussion at subsection D.3 infra. 12
To make out a claim under § 3604(a), the Koorns must assert, first, that the Township denied or made housing unavailable to them and, second, that the Township’s actions were based on the Koorns’ race. Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1989). The Koorns’ FHA claim is deficient in that (1) Township did not “otherwise make unavailable” the Koorns’ dwelling, and (2) the Township’s actions were not made “on the basis of race.”
The Koorns claim that the actions of Township officials, “including without limitation the enactment of the Ordinance, were committed with the deliberate intent of harassing, intimidating, and coercing plaintiffs, and to deprive them of the use and enjoyment of their home, and for the purpose of creating such a hostile living environment that plaintiffs would decide to leave their home, and perhaps the Town.” However, in limiting the number of dogs a person may keep at a dwelling, the Ordinance does not “make unavailable” the Koorns’ right to have a dwelling in which to reside. As such, the enactment and enforcement of the Ordinance does not violate the FHA.
“A Title VIII claim must rest, in the first instance, upon a showing that the challenged action by a defendant had a racially discriminatory effect.” Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977). Discriminatory effect may be proved by 13 showing either “adverse impact to a particular minority group” or “harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of segregation.” Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). The Koorns make no showing that the Ordinance affects “a particular minority group.” The Ordinance affects all Township citizens, white and minority alike. Nor is there any evidence that the Ordinance is likely to affect the Township’s citizens along racial lines. As the District Court stated, “the fact that the first person an Ordinance affects is a person of color does not negate the fact that such Ordinance is a legitimate governmental exercise.” Koorn v. Lacey Township, No. 01-79, at 4 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2002). As a result, the Koorns cannot sustain a claim under § 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act.
The Fair Housing Act also makes it unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by” various sections of Title VIII, including Section 3604, which secures a person’s right not to be denied a dwelling on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. As discussed above, the Township’s enactment of the Ordinance limiting the number of dogs that a person may keep at a dwelling does not interfere with the Koorns’ right to have a dwelling nor does it discriminate on the basis of race. For these same reasons, the Koorns do not successfully make out a claim under § 3617. 14
The Koorns claim that the actions of the Township officials “denied them equal benefits of the law in the security of their persons and property, and to make and enforce contracts, under 42 U.S.C. 1981” and “their equal rights to own real property under 42 U.S.C. § 1982.” They do not identify a distinct claim under either statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides: “All persons . . . shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1982 mandates that “[a]ll citizens shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as in enjoyed by white citizens thereof, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” The Ordinance limits the number of dogs that the Koorns can keep at any one dwelling. It does not foreclose them from owning any number of dogs or from owning any particular dwellings. For sure the Ordinance does not affect their right to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, or convey real or personal property.” Nor does it infringe on the Koorns’ right to make and enforce contracts. Furthermore, the Ordinance does not deny the Koorns any right that is “enjoyed by white citizens thereof.” The Ordinance forecloses white citizens from keeping more than six dogs at a dwelling, just as it forecloses the Koorns. Thus the enactment of the Ordinance does not violate §§ 1981 or 15 1982. Nor do the Koorns demonstrate how any other acts of the Township officials infringe on their §§ 1981 and 1982 rights.
The Koorns allege, with respect to their FHA, §§ 1981, 1982 claims, that they are entitled to the burden-shifting presumption of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case for discriminatory effect can shift the burden to defendants for justification of acts with discriminatory effects. Resident Advisory Board, 564 F.2d at 149. A prima facie case consists of proof that (1) plaintiffs are in a protected class, (2) they applied for and were qualified to rent or purchase housing, (3) they were rejected, and (4) the housing opportunity remained available. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979). While the Koorns establish that they are racial minorities and that they are qualified for the ownership of their home, they admit that the third and fourth elements have not been satisfied. (J.A. at 348). The Ordinance limiting the number of dogs they may keep does not reject them from their dwelling. And even if it did, there is no way the Koorns could predict that their house would “remain available.” Accordingly, the Koorns cannot rely on the McDonnell Douglas presumption to establish a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act or 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.