Opinion ID: 168303
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: OCCA Rationale — Contrary to Supreme Court Precedent?

Text: 72 In upholding Maynard's waiver, the OCCA did not cite any federal law, citing instead its own opinion in Braun v. State, 909 P.2d 783, 788-89 (Okla.Crim. App.1995). This omission by itself is not fatal because [e]ven if a state court resolves a claim in a summary fashion with little or no reasoning, we owe deference to the state court's result. . . . Unlike full de novo review, [our] independent review, is deferential because we cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is legally or factually unreasonable. Paine v. Massie, 339 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted). 73 Our review of Braun suggests that the OCCA essentially required the trial court, as a matter of law, to satisfy the two-part inquiry set forth in Godinez: (1) competence to waive counsel and (2) knowing and intelligent waiver. Under Braun, 74 the trial court is required to determine whether the accused has the capacity to make a valid waiver of counsel. The court must then examine the defendant and determine whether the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In doing this, the trial judge must clearly explain to the defendant the inherent disadvantages in such a waiver. 75 909 P.2d at 787. This determination must be made from the total circumstances of the individual case including background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Id. at 788. 76 We find that this rule does not contradict[] the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495. To the contrary, it is in perfect harmony with the precedent discussed above. We thus cannot say that the OCCA determination was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 77