Opinion ID: 2400452
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Heading: Pine Street v. Farrell Lines, Inc.

Text: Pine Street's claim against Farrell Lines is based upon Farrell Lines' alleged negligence in permitting the bags of antimony ore to be discharged from its vessel, the African Dawn, in an unsound condition. Pine Street alleges, and there was evidence showing, that Farrell Lines knew or should have known that some of the bags were already ruptured prior to discharge, that others became ruptured during discharge, and that this might well lead to the contamination of the cargo of sugar on the pier. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Farrell Lines at the conclusion of Pine Street's case, and Pine Street has challenged that action on appeal. A threshhold issue is whether or not the alleged negligence of Farrell Lines constitutes a maritime tort so as to fall within the scope of maritime jurisdiction. Historically, admiralty jurisdiction over torts depended not upon where the tortious act or omission occurred, but rather where the damage was consummated. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra, 404 U.S. at 205-207; The Troy, 208 U.S. 321, 28 S.Ct. 416, 52 L.Ed. 512 (1908); The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 33, 18 L.Ed. 125 (1866); Penn Tanker Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 514, 518 (5th Cir.1969); Firemen's Fund American Ins. Co. v. Boston Harbor Marina, 406 F.2d 917, 919 (1st Cir.1969); State, Department of Fish and Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969). Thus, in cases of so-called ship-to-shore torts involving injury caused by a vessel on navigable water but done or consummated on land, no maritime jurisdiction existed. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra, 404 U.S. at 207; Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388, 7 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed. 447 (1886); The Plymouth, supra; The Troy, supra . In 1948 Congress enacted the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. 740, in order to cure the inequities that resulted from strict application of the locality test of maritime jurisdiction. Section 740 provides, in pertinent part: The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land. In the instant case, it seems clear that the claimed negligence of Farrell Lines in allegedly permitting defectively contained cargo to be discharged from its vessel, thereby causing damage to Pine Street's cargo on the pier, is a maritime tort within the scope of maritime jurisdiction, as enlarged by 46 U.S.C. 740. [1] Farrell Lines does not dispute the maritime character of its alleged tortious conduct. Rather, it asserts that under 46 U.S.C. 740, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 83 S.Ct. 1185, 10 L.Ed.2d 297 (1963), Pine Street had to establish that the damage complained of was the result of some negligent activity on the part of the ship's [the African Dawn ] personnel at a `time and place' within the limits of Farrell's presence and control. According to Farrell Lines, the Irish Poplar sugar was located on the opposite side of the pier from where the African Dawn was berthed, and was not contaminated by the antimony ore dust until the African Dawn had already left the pier. Furthermore, Farrell Lines argues, the Irish Spruce sugar did not arrive on the pier until six days after the African Dawn sailed from the pier. Farrell Lines concludes that it was entitled to a directed verdict because the time and place limitations for liability for tortious conduct under 46 U.S.C. 740, as set out by Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra , were not met. In Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra , a longshoreman who was in the process of unloading a ship slipped on some loose beans which had spilled onto the dock out of broken bags in which the beans were contained. The shipowner argued that admiralty jurisdiction did not exist because the impact of its alleged lack of care or unseaworthiness was felt on the pier rather than aboard ship. 373 U.S. at 209. It argued that 46 U.S.C. 740 was limited to injuries actually caused by the physical agency of the vessel or a particular part of it  such as when the ship rams a bridge or when its defective winch drops some cargo onto a longshoreman. Id. at 209-210. The shipowner also raised, as described by the Supreme Court, [v]arious far-fetched hypotheticals, such as a suit in admiralty for an ordinary automobile accident involving a ship's officer on ship business in port, or for someone's slipping on beans that continue to leak from these bags in a warehouse in Denver [the accident occurred in Puerto Rico]. Id. at 210. The Supreme Court rejected the shipowner's contentions in Gutierrez, holding that 46 U.S.C. 740 did operate to confer maritime jurisdiction in that case: We think it sufficient for the needs of this occasion to hold that the case is within the maritime jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. § 740 when, as here, it is alleged that the shipowner commits a tort while or before the ship is being unloaded, and the impact of which is felt ashore at a time and place not remote from the wrongful act. ( Ibid. ) Farrell urges that under Gutierrez the damage to Pine Street's cargo must have occurred while the African Dawn was still at the pier; otherwise the place of impact would have been too remote. We disagree. As Gutierrez states, the shoreward impact of the tort allegedly committed must be felt at a place not too remote from the wrongful act. In this case, the wrongful act, viz. discharging defectively contained cargo, occurred while the ship was still at the pier. In our view, when a vessel commits a wrongful act while in the course of discharging cargo, and the impact of that act is felt at the same pier and within 300 feet of the point of discharge, there is a sufficient relationship between the wrongful act and the place of impact to establish jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. 740. Farrell Lines, Inc., further asserts that the time limitations of Gutierrez were not met in this case. The sugar from the Irish Poplar was already on the pier when the cargo of antimony was discharged on May 7, 1970, and the contamination of that sugar could have occurred soon thereafter. The sugar from the Irish Spruce arrived on May 13, 1970, only six days after the discharge of the antimony. The sugar cargo from both vessels was found by an FDA inspector to be covered with antimony dust on May 18, 1970, and was officially detained on May 20, 1970. The discovery by the FDA of antimony on the sugar was, therefore, only eleven days after the antimony was discharged; thus the entire damage to the sugar had occurred sometime within eleven days from the time that Farrell had allegedly permitted leaking bags of antimony to be unloaded. No clear precedent in the maritime cases has been brought to our attention as to the extent of the time limitations for recovery for maritime torts under 46 U.S.C. 740. It is therefore proper to look to the general tort law. Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949, 84 S.Ct. 965, 11 L.Ed.2d 969 (1964); David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-Ship Company, supra, 223 F. Supp. at 284. In other areas of tort law, [r]emoteness in time or space undoubtedly has its importance in determining whether the defendant has been a substantial factor in causing the harm. Prosser, Torts § 43 (4th ed. 1971). However, courts have been extremely reluctant to allow the mere passage of time to defeat recovery. Thus, a period of seven months between the negligent act and resultant injury, Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 26, 50 N.W. 927 (1892), or even of ten years, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Preston, 254 F. 229 (3d Cir.1918), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 585, 39 S.Ct. 182, 63 L.Ed. 433 (1919), has not prevented recovery. We do not believe that the time span between Farrell Lines' allegedly negligent conduct and the resultant injuries render Farrell Lines' tortious acts a remote cause of the injuries under Gutierrez. In Gutierrez the Supreme Court did not attempt to announce time and place limitations for recovery in all actions under 46 U.S.C. 740. The Court held only that for the needs of this occasion the shipowner's torts must not be felt at a time too remote from the wrongful act. 373 U.S. at 210. It is instructive that the instant facts bear no resemblance to the far-fetched hypotheticals noted in Gutierrez. The impact of the allegedly tortious acts in this case was felt at the same pier and within a relatively short time span from the occurrence of the acts. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Farrell Lines' further argument that, in order for it to be liable, it must be shown that Farrell Lines operated or controlled the pier where the damage to the sugar cargo was sustained. The Supreme Court in Gutierrez stated in language fully applicable here (373 U.S. at 211-212): The force of these fact findings is not lessened by the contention that respondent did not control the pier or have `even a right to control that locus,' 301 F.2d, at 416. We doubt that respondent had no license to go upon the pier at which it was docked and clean up the loose beans, if it had wanted to; the beans were its cargo that it was unloading onto the pier. But we may put this aside, since control of the impact zone is not essential for negligence. The man who drops a barrel out of his loft need not control the sidewalk to be liable to the pedestrian whom the barrel hits. See Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722 (Exch.). And the same holds for the man who spills beans out his window, on which the pedestrian slips. Respondent allowed the cargo to be discharged in dangerous and defective bagging, from which beans were leaking before discharge of the cargo began. It had an absolute and nondelegable duty of care toward petitioner not to create this risk to him, which it failed to meet. When this lack of care culminated in petitioner's injury, respondent became legally liable to compensate him for the harm. In light of the evidence that Farrell Lines knew or should have known that some of the antimony bags were ruptured prior to discharge and that others began to leak during discharge, and the foreseeability that the leaking antimony dust might come into contact with other products on the pier, a directed verdict should not have been granted in favor of Farrell Lines.