Opinion ID: 2679964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Authorization by the Probate Judge

Text: [¶16] George contends that John’s suit suffered a second jurisdictional defect: John failed to acquire the probate judge’s authorization prior to commencing suit in the Superior Court as required by 18-A M.R.S. § 8-313. Section 8-313 concerns the probate judge’s discretion to authorize an action on the bond for the benefit of the estate: The judge of probate may expressly authorize or instruct a personal representative or other fiduciary, at the judge’s discretion or on the complaint of any interested person, to commence an action on the bond for the benefit of the estate. 18-A M.R.S. § 8-313 (emphasis added). Although the statute employs the word “may” instead of “shall,” thus implying that authorization is not required, George contends that the word “may” refers not to the permissiveness of the authorization but, rather, to the probate judge’s discretion to give or not give the required authorization. Where statutory language is ambiguous, we look to legislative history to aid in the interpretation of a statute. Cent. Me. Power Co., 2013 ME 37, ¶ 8, 68 A.3d 1262. Here, because we find that the statutory language is 10 ambiguous, we look to the history of section 8-313 and conclude that probate judicial authorization is not required. [¶17] The former Probate Code, even as it mandated that actions on bonds be brought in the name of the probate judge,6 did not require a plaintiff to obtain the judge’s permission prior to bringing suit: Any person interested personally or in any official capacity in a probate bond . . . may originate an action on such bond . . . without applying to the judge whose name was used in the bond . . . . 18 M.R.S.A. § 451 (1964).7 A separate provision contained language similar to the current section 8-313 regarding the probate judge’s discretion to grant authorization: “The judge of probate may expressly authorize or instruct an administrator . . . to commence an action on a probate bond for the benefit of the estate . . . .” 18 M.R.S.A § 501 (1964).8 The former Probate Code thus made clear that probate judicial authorization was permissive, not mandatory, for a suit on bonds. See id. § 451. 6 “Actions on probate bonds of any kind payable to the judge shall be originally commenced in the Superior Court for the county where said judge belongs and in his name . . . .” 18 M.R.S.A. § 401 (1964). This section was repealed and replaced by P.L. 1979, ch. 540, §§ 1, 24-C (effective Jan. 1, 1981) (codified at 18-A M.R.S. § 8-309 (2012)). 7 Title 18 M.R.S.A. § 451 (1964) was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 540, § 24-C (effective Jan. 1, 1981). 8 Title 18 M.R.S.A. § 501 (1964) was repealed and replaced by P.L. 1979, ch. 540, §§ 1, 24-C (effective Jan. 1, 1981) (codified at 18-A M.R.S. § 8-313 (2012)). Section 8-313 was amended by P.L. 2003, ch. 618, § B-16 (effective July 1, 2005), though not in any way that affects this appeal. 11 [¶18] The current Probate Code, enacted in 1979, did not change this statutory structure. Nothing in the current Code’s legislative history supports George’s contention that judicial authorization by the probate judge is mandatory in every case, and George offers no authority to the contrary. We therefore conclude that section 8-313 does not require the probate judge’s authorization before a suit on the bond can be brought in the Superior Court. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: David Glasser, Esq., Camden, for appellant George Jennings Christopher K. MacLean, Esq., Elliott & MacLean, LLP, Camden, for appellee Estate of John Jennings At oral argument: David Glasser, Esq., for appellant George Jennings Sarah I. Gilbert, Esq., Elliott & MacLean, LLP, Camden, for appellee Estate of John Jennings Waldo County Superior Court docket number CV-2008-35 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY