Opinion ID: 2437694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court clearly abused his discretion by unduly rstricting voir dire examintion of jurors by defense counsel.

Text: During the voir dire examination of the petit jurors, defense counsel and the court repeatedly exchanged heated remarks which caused the defense counsel to feel the court was preventing proper voir dire examination. In effect, they argue they were forced to accept a jury in violation of the Witherspoon rule. The extent of the voir dire examination by either counsel is a matter which generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse such discretionary rulings unless it appears there was a clear abuse of discretion. Fauna v. State, 265 Ark. ___, 582 S.W.2d 18 (1979). Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.2 (Repl.1977), states as follows: (a) voir dire examination shall be conducted for the purpose of discovering bases for challenge for cause and for the purpose of gaining knowledge to enable the parties to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. . (b) . The judge shall also permit such additional questions by the defendant or his attorney and the prosecuting attorney as the judge deems reasonable and proper. Therefore, unless we determine that the trial court abused his discretion in limiting the voir dire examination, we must affirm. Even before the trial started, this case was fought vigorously on behalf of the appellant. There certainly was no cessation of defense efforts during the voir dire examination. In almost every instance while a juror was being examined, the court interrupted the defense counsel by stating that the court would declare the law and then proceed to ask the prospective jurors if they would follow the court's reasoning. Although this temporarily interrupted defense counsel, it did not prevent them from coming through the side door or back door and eventually gaining all the information they sought. It appears that both the court and defense counsel were too aggressive in this matter; but, after a careful examination of every one of the objections and interruptions, we conclude that the purposes of voir dire on behalf of the defense were effectively carried out by able counsel. Defense counsel seemed to think they were entitled to use the voir dire for the purpose of getting acquainted with the jurors. They may well get to know a lot about a juror, but they are not free to go in any and all directions for as long as they desire. Even though the trial court attempted to stop voir dire on a number of prospective jurors, they were all questioned rather thoroughly. The alleged errors by the court in curtailing the examination are almost identical with those in Fauna, supra, where we reversed for abuse of discretion. However, in the present case, as previously stated, defense counsel still managed to obtain enough information to make an intelligent decision whether or not to use a peremptory challenge. The fact that the jurors responded to the court that they would follow the law as given by the court was not sufficient to enable the defense counsel to make a proper determination of whether he should exercise a peremptory challenge as to that juror. Counsel should be allowed leeway to develop the prospective jurors' attitude toward a particular defense. In the present case the defense was that of not guilty. The questions and interruptions primarily concerned matters which are customarily given by way of instruction at the close of the case. Had the defense been one of insanity, self-defense, or other specific defenses, the latitude granted the appellant in the voir dire examination would have been greater. Under the particular facts of this case and the defense of not guilty, we do not believe that we can say the court clearly abused its discretion even though the interruptions were more frequent than appeared necessary.