Opinion ID: 1148283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: excessive award of actual damages; evidentiary rulings on proof of damages

Text: MONY argues on this assigned error that the testimony of Dr. Charles Dennis, who qualified as an imminent economist, was total and complete speculation. His expertise in economic loss due to business damage or injury was completely established. He testified as to his method of calculating the future lost profits of Corporate Planning. Although Dr. Dennis' method is not a guaranteed exact measurement, it was probably the best yardstick and rule that could have been presented. Decisions in other jurisdictions upheld the method employed by Dr. Dennis. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Gutowski, 195 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.1952); Lucky Auto Supply v. Turner, 244 Cal. App.2d 872, 53 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1966); Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980); Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1977); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 261 N.W.2d 358 (1978); Wilko of Nashua, Inc. v. Tap Realty, Inc., 117 N.H. 843, 379 A.2d 798 (1977); Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973). In Nichols v. Stacks, 485 So.2d 1034 (Miss. 1986), the Court discussed a similar question of damages: In Merritt v. Dueitt, 455 So.2d 792, 793 (Miss. 1984), we stated: The rule that damages, if uncertain, cannot be recovered applies to their nature, and not to their extent. If the damage is certain, the fact that its extent is uncertain does not prevent recovery. In Cain v. Mid-South Pump Co., 458 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Miss. 1984), Justice Prather, speaking for this Court, further refined this rule in stating: ... [W]here it is reasonably certain that damage has resulted, mere uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude the right of recovery or prevent a jury decision awarding damages. This view has been sustained where, from the nature of the case, the extent of the injury and the amount of damage are not capable of exact and accurate proof. Under such circumstances, all that can be required is that the evidence  with such certainty as the nature of the particular case may permit  lay a foundation which will enable the trier of facts to make a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damage. The plaintiff will not be denied a substantial recovery if he has produced the best evidence available and it is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for estimating his loss. [Emphasis added]. As noted in Cain, and emphasized in Thomas v. Global Boat Builders & Repairmen, Inc., 482 So.2d 1112 (Miss. 1986), a plaintiff under this rule cannot ignore information, methods and procedures available to him whereby he can accurately prove the amount of monetary damages and make a jury issue simply by testimony that he did suffer property damage. On the other hand, a plaintiff who has unquestionably suffered a pecuniary loss, and has produced the best evidence available to him, should not be denied recovery because the amount cannot be ascertained with the same precision as an ordinary claim for damages. Under these circumstances he is only required to put on sufficient proof to enable the fact finder to reach a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages. 485 So.2d at 1038. Testimony from Caleb Dortch, MONY's Mississippi executive, indicated that wrongful acts asserted and proved against MONY could damage the reputation of Corporate Planning, its agent. Mr. Matt Ballew, a Corporate Planning stockholder, and Wimberly, testified that their business relies on referrals from professionals such as doctors, lawyers and accountants, and that their reputation is critical to obtain these referrals. Stephen Stewart, a partner at Moore & Powell, C.P.A., on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, testified that he has not in the recent past referred any potential client to Corporate Planning due to the circumstances in which Corporate Planning and MONY were involved. Such testimony was an indication of future profits unrealized by Corporate Planning due to its damaged reputation caused by MONY's wrongful refusal to pay the Wesson death claim. MONY asserts that Instruction No. 11, which stated in part: Such damages may include damages from mental anguish or emotional distress that W.A. Wimberly has suffered or is reasonably certain to suffer in the future, as a proximate result of MONY's wrongful conduct, if any you find pursuant to the instructions of the Court, was error. It cites Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898 (Miss. 1981), wherein the Court held that in the absence of physical injury, damages for mental distress are not appropriate unless the cause was attended by such acts that would ordinarily warrant a punitive damage instruction. Corporate Planning and Wimberly argue that T.G. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So.2d 481 (Miss. 1972) supports the jury instruction here. The Eshee Court held that the giving of a similar instruction which included the word negligence instead of fraud or wrongful acts did not require reversal, citing Miss. Sup.Ct. Rule 11. Without considering mental anguish, the testimony indicated Corporate Planning and Wimberly sustained approximately five hundred thirty-seven thousand seven hundred forty dollars ($537,740) in actual damages, with one hundred seventy-five thousand dollars ($175,000) loss of existing business and attorney's fees uncontradicted. The jury verdict was for $350,000 actual damages, with no award for punitive damages. This assignment of error is rejected. D.