Opinion ID: 4561253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agent Kuc’s Testimony

Text: Walker challenges the admission of Agent Kuc’s testimony on two grounds: (1) that Agent Kuc testified as an expert without prior notice;13 and (2) that the testimony as to his past experiences was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. We disagree.14 As relevant here, when asked generally about controlled deliveries, Agent Kuc testified that there were safety concerns that must be accounted for and concerns that “the defendant . . . would become aware of law enforcement’s involvement and try not to receive the package.”15 He further testified that he had seen this happen “ a lot of times, the people that we’re trying to deliver to . . . will move drop locations . . . from one spot to another” and “[o]ftentimes, savvy . . . targets will move the location somewhere else, that they’d control and we don’t have that control.”16 Agent Kuc also testified that Walker changed the location of the meeting with the mail carrier, but he did not provide an opinion as to why Walker had done so. Walker now argues that Agent Kuc’s “testimony regarding the meeting place change predilections of persons in drug investigations constituted expert testimony without being qualified by the Court to so testify.”17 13 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G). 14 Because Walker did not challenge Agent Kuc’s testimony on the basis that it was improper expert testimony at trial, the challenge is reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Polishan, 336 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2003). We may reverse a district court for a plain error only if we conclude (1) an error was committed, (2) it was plain, and (3) it affected the outcome of the proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1993). His preserved evidentiary challenge to the relevance of the testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 440 (3d Cir. 2013). 15 App. 282–83. 16 App. 283–84. 17 Walker Br. 31. 7 Contrary to Walker’s characterization of Agent Kuc’s testimony, we find that the testimony was permissible lay testimony. Rule 701 permits lay witnesses to testify concerning their opinions if those opinions are “rationally based on the witness’s perception,” are “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue,” and are “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”18 However, “we have [] clarified that . . . ‘[w]hen a lay witness has particularized knowledge by virtue of her experience, she may testify—even if the subject matter is specialized or technical—because the testimony is based upon the layperson’s personal knowledge rather than on specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.’”19 We will not reverse a district court’s ruling to admit lay testimony unless “no reasonable person would adopt [its] view.”20 Agent Kuc’s testimony was based on his personal knowledge of the investigation against Walker and experience in controlled deliveries. The testimony was helpful to the jury in understanding the circumstances surrounding the attempted controlled delivery, including reasons for delay in moving from one location to another. Further, Agent Kuc did not ultimately provide an opinion as to why Walker changed the meeting location; instead, he allowed the jury to draw its own conclusions. And the testimony did not involve any specialized or technical knowledge, rather Agent Kuc made commonsense 18 Fed. R. Evid. 701. 19 United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 301 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 81 (3d Cir. 2009)). 20 See United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Corp., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003)). 8 observations based on his personal experience. Thus, the testimony was properly admitted as lay testimony.21 In any event, even if we were to find that Agent Kuc testified as an expert, the error certainly does not meet the standard for plain error. The point at which lay testimony becomes expert testimony is hazy and there is no clear guidance on when a law enforcement officer’s testimony based on his personal experience becomes expert testimony. Thus, any error “would not have been ‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’”22 Further, under the circumstances of this case, Agent Kuc’s testimony was certainly relevant. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”23 At issue in this case is whether Walker knowingly attempted to possess the packages containing marijuana. Agent Kuc testified that suspects sometimes move a meeting location to avoid law enforcement and maintain control over the drug meet. From this testimony, and testimony that Walker did in fact change meeting locations several times, the jury could infer that Walker moved the meeting 21 See United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 50–51 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that the agent’s testimony “that traffickers often list unrelated third parties as their telephones’ subscribers, and that, in this case, the phone account at issue was organized under a similar scheme” was proper lay testimony under Rule 701 because it was based on the officer’s personal experience in prior drug investigations and did not require technical or scientific expertise). 22 Fulton, 837 F.3d at 302 (quoting United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010)). 23 Fed. R. Evid. 401. 9 location in an attempt to evade law enforcement and take possession of the illegal drugs. The testimony was thus relevant. Walker also asserts that the challenged testimony was unfairly prejudicial because it led the jury to believe that Walker moved the meeting location to avoid detection. We again disagree. While “Rule 403 allows relevant evidence to be excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice,”24 we cannot find that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony. Walker’s arguments amount to a mere complaint that the challenged testimony might have caused the jury to believe he was guilty of attempting to possess illegal drugs. But that is not unfair prejudice. We have explained that “[v]irtually all evidence is prejudicial.”25 “[T]he prejudice against which the law guards is unfair prejudice— prejudice of the sort which clouds impartial scrutiny . . . . [T]he fact that probative evidence helps one side prove its case obviously is not grounds for excluding it under Rule 403.”26 Walker fails to show that the challenged evidence was unfairly prejudicial, and nothing in the record suggests that the District Court erred in admitting the testimony. 24 United States v. Lacerda, 958 F.3d 196, 223 (3d Cir. 2020). 25 Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 n.14 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977)). 26 Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 670 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 217 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original)); see also Starnes, 583 F.3d at 215 (discussing same). 10 C. Authenticity of Personnel File and Tracking Records Finally, Walker argues that the District Court erred in admitting the mail carrier’s United States Postal Service personnel file and a package delivery printout because the Government failed to sufficiently authenticate the documents. We disagree. Under Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”27 “We have repeatedly noted that ‘[t]he burden of proof for authentication is slight.’”28 The Government introduced the documents Walker challenges through the testimony of Postmaster Carrozza. At the time of trial, Postmaster Carrozza had worked for the United States Postal Service for twenty-five years. He testified as to his familiarity with the creation and maintenance of employment files and package tracking records. Based on his numerous years of experience, including the retrieval and review of personnel files for his own employees, Postmaster Carrozza’s testimony was sufficient to support the Government’s claim that the records constituted the mail carrier’s personnel file and a package delivery printout.29 27 Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). 28 Lexington Ins. Co. v. Western Penn. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 328 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 928 (3d Cir. 1985)). 29 See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 927 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that documents were properly authenticated under Rule 901 where there was testimony demonstrating “knowledge that the materials were what appellees claimed them to be”); see also United States v. Estrada-Eliverio, 583 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that agent’s testimony was sufficient to authenticate documents from defendant’s 11 Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting both exhibits.