Opinion ID: 2032026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Venire Member Canady

Text: The record reveals the following statements offered by Assistant State's Attorney Rodi for the exclusion of venire member Canady. When Rodi entered the courtroom and heard the judge say Canady's name (pronounced Candy), with that unique spelling, she personally felt that she had met Canady before. Although she could not place him in the court system, she did not believe that she had encountered him in her private life. She stated that if she could have put [her] finger on the case, she would have excused Canady for cause. Rodi did not know whether Canady had been involved previously in a case as a friend of a family member, a defendant, a victim or a witness, but she was convinced that she had known or met him before. She stated that the more Canady sat there and spoke, the stronger her convictions were that she had met him previously. Rodi also pointed to the fact that Canady hesitated when asked if he could sign a guilty verdict. Rodi summarized that she could have met Canady over a variety of causes, not all of them friendly to the State. That, she stated, combined with Canady's hesitation concerning signing a guilty verdict, was the basis for the exclusion of him. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in accepting Rodi's explanation as race neutral. He maintains that Rodi's fuzzy recollection of an encounter with Canady in some unspecified context, at an unspecified time, and at an unspecified place simply does not satisfy Batson 's clear and specific requirement. He complains that Rodi exercised only an intuitive judgment or suspicion in excluding Canady. Defendant contends that Rodi's lack of information along with her failure to tender supplemental questions, the answers to which might have allayed her concerns, were no more than pretexts for racial discrimination. True, for purposes of meeting a Batson challenge, a prosecutor's explanation of the use of a peremptory challenge must be clear and legitimate. However, such explanation need not rise to the level that justifies a challenge for cause. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d at 406. The fact that Rodi could not recall the exact circumstances of her previous encounter with Canady did not render her explanation inherently discriminatory. Absent discriminatory purpose, the exclusion of prospective juror Canady amounted to no more than a valid exercise of a peremptory challenge. `While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable.' (Emphasis omitted.) Batson, 476 U.S. at 135, 106 S.Ct. at 1743, 90 L.Ed.2d at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), quoting Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 220, 85 S.Ct. 824, 836, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 772. See also People v. Aguirre (1993), 242 Ill.App.3d 469, 182 Ill. Dec. 902, 610 N.E.2d 771 (peremptory challenge upheld where the prosecutor explained exclusion of the prospective juror resulting from belief that she had seen the venire member either as a witness or as a friend of a witness in some other case, which she believed possibly involved gang activity). Defendant further argues that Rodi should not have been permitted to cite insufficient information as a basis for exclusion because the lack-of-information explanation has been found to be easily utilized as a pretext for discriminatory challenges. He maintains that Rodi had no information, other than the prospective juror's race, on which to base her challenge. There is absolutely no requirement that a court reject a prosecutor's explanation simply because it rests in part on a lack of knowledge. ( People v. Harris (1994), 164 Ill.2d 322, 333, 207 Ill.Dec. 400, 647 N.E.2d 893.) Rodi recalled that she had had a previous encounter with Canady. Unable to recall the specifics of that encounter, she was unwilling to risk his participation on the jury. Although this court has stated that an explanation based on a lack of knowledge deserves close scrutiny (see People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 188, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357) the court did not suggest that such an explanation may never stand (see Harris, 164 Ill.2d at 334, 207 Ill.Dec. 400, 647 N.E.2d 893). Although further inquiry might have revealed additional information to allay the prosecution's concerns, we cannot say that the failure to further inquire undermined the validity of the proffered explanation. Furthermore, additional inquiry would not have eliminated the prosecution's second race-neutral basis for exclusionCanady's hesitance in answering the guilty verdict question. We have, on more than one occasion, approved the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of an individual's courtroom conduct or demeanor. See, e.g., People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 185 Ill.Dec. 499, 614 N.E.2d 1184 (venireperson properly excluded for hesitant, cavalier and inappropriate answers during voir dire); People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill.2d 231, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (venireperson properly excused where she hesitated in responding to questions regarding her attitude to capital punishment); Harris, 129 Ill.2d 123, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357 (exclusion of venireperson described by prosecutor as being meek and sleepy and who did not answer questions in a forthright manner held proper); see also People v. Talley (1987), 152 Ill.App.3d 971, 987, 105 Ill.Dec. 800, 504 N.E.2d 1318 (peremptory challenge upheld where prosecutor stated he was `not too happy with the [venireperson's] demeanor and how he answered the questions'); People v. Peters (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 310, 98 Ill.Dec. 731, 494 N.E.2d 853 (challenge upheld where venireperson hesitated in responding to questions). Incidentally, defendant invites our reexamination of Andrews, 155 Ill.2d 286, 185 Ill. Dec. 499, 614 N.E.2d 1184. As he reads Andrews, language therein could be interpreted to mean that the mention of one race-neutral explanation coupled with an inherently discriminatory explanation overcomes purposeful racial discrimination. (See Andrews, 155 Ill.2d at 294, 185 Ill.Dec. 499, 614 N.E.2d 1184.) Defendant's concern has been characterized as the dual-motivation peremptory challenge. (See Howard v. Senkowski (2d Cir.1993), 986 F.2d 24.) Senkowski holds that a peremptory challenge based in part on racial motivation may be allowed to stand if the challenging party can prove that the challenge would have taken place despite the improper motivation. In light of our determination that both explanations offered here were race neutral, the dual-motivation analysis has no application. To the extent Andrews approves of such analysis, we reserve reconsideration for an appropriate case. The court's finding with respect to the State's explanation for excusing venire member Canady was not clearly erroneous.