Opinion ID: 2314198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the flaws of carter ii

Text: Unfortunately, the Joggers approach, to which no witness or other affected party has apparently objected for a dozen years, is being replaced by the new Carter II approach, to which many defendants will most assuredly object, and with good reason. [4] The effect of the majority's decision will be to deny a defendant the opportunity to call a witness who has a theoretical Fifth Amendment problem, even if the judge is of the opinion that, in the real world, the practical possibility that the witness will be prosecuted is nil. The harm to the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment is palpable; the benefit to the witness is illusory. I recognize that the new rule does not leave the defendant without any hope at all in the kind of situation which arose here. The government may, in an abundance of generosity, grant a defense witness use immunity under the new Carter II standard. As the majority recognizes, however, the United States Attorney's Manual itself permits such immunization of a defense witness only in exceptional circumstances. With a directive like that, a prosecutor cannot reasonably be expected to go out of his way very often on behalf of his adversary in a vigorously contested criminal case. The government has suggested a debriefing procedure for prospective defense witnesses, and the majority finds merit in the suggestion. Given the majority's basic disposition of the constitutional issue, I suppose that the proposal is a constructive one, and Judge Gallagher has done his best to make it as fair as it can be in a situation in which the prosecutor will be accorded such wide discretion. Realistically, however, I do not think that this procedure will work very well. There is little incentive for a witness to submit to such debriefing, and I suspect that most attorneys will advise their clients to pass such an opportunity by. From the defense point of view, the government's proposal is intrinsically objectionable because it makes the defendant's right to secure the testimony of a witness  even of a witness who is not in any realistic danger of proseuction  contingent upon the willingness of that witness to cooperate in the debriefing procedure. Under Jaggers, if there was no real prospect that the witness would be prosecuted, the witness would have to testify, whether he wanted to or not. Defense counsel's subpoena, in other words, would not have to say please. Under Carter II, the unwillingness of the witness to submit to debriefing ends the defendant's hope of obtaining the witness' testimony, no matter how exculpatory the testimony may be, and regardless of how unlikely it is that the witness will actually be prosecuted. Let us compare the operation of Jaggers with the operation of Carter II in a situation where the choice between the two approaches makes a real difference. Suppose that the judge, after hearing from all concerned, determines that the testimony of a prospective defense witness could legally facilitate his prosecution. The judge further finds, however, after examining the government's uniform practice over a period of years, that the prospects of prosecution are trifling and fanciful, rather than real and substantial. Under Jaggers, 1. the defendant was allowed to present the testimony of the witness; 2. that testimony, having been compelled by the judge, could not be used against the witness; [5] and 3. the government was thus powerless to prosecute the witness on the basis of his testimony. Under Carter II, on the other hand, 1. the defendant can call the witness only if the government discerns exceptional circumstances and grants immunity, or if the court finds misconduct by the prosecution, neither of which is an event likely to happen often; 2. there will be no testimony for the government to use against the witness; 3. the government will thus have no basis for prosecuting the witness. The results of our comparison are apparent. For the witness and for the government, the consequences under the two procedures are essentially the same. For the defendant, however, they are dramatically different. Under Jaggers, the defendant had the opportunity to present the testimony of the witness. Under Carter II, he ordinarily does not. From the perspective of the public interest, the judge and the jury were in most cases in a position to hear relevant evidence under Jaggers, but they will usually be denied access to that evidence under Carter II. Moreover, in what will doubtless be the rare case in which the court concludes that immunity was wrongfully withheld, the remedy may well be the dismissal of the prosecution, which will preclude a disposition of the case on the merits. In one respect, the Carter II rule will be more favorable to the government than the Jaggers rule was. The prosecution will have more leeway in preventing the defense from calling witnesses, simply by refusing to grant use immunity even to those who, if the government's conventional procedures were followed, would not be prosecuted at all. The judge may interfere, under the majority's approach, only if he or she finds prosecutorial over-reaching or deliberate distortion of the fact-finding process. Although the majority's stated test is whether the government has submit[ted] to the court a reasonable basis for not affording use immunity, unreasonableness in this context apparently requires bad intent or its equivalent. [6] Under Jaggers, on the other hand, it was not necessary to explore the depths of the prosecutorial soul for the presence of impermissible motivation. Rather, the judge made an objective determination as to whether the possibility of prosecution was real or illusory. Jaggers had it right, for [i]t is of no consolation to an individual denied [his constitutional rights] that it was done in good faith. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 862, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). [7] III.