Opinion ID: 327189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the successor union represent a majority of the respondent's pressroom employees?

Text: 22 § 9(a) of the NLRA provides that 23 Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive (bargaining) representatives of all the employees . . . 24 § 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of § 9(a). 25 Normally a Board supervised election is the preferred route by which a union acquires the status of exclusive bargaining representative. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). However, the Supreme Court in Gissel made it clear that such a Board supervised election is not the only route by which a union may acquire the status of bargaining representative, and acknowledged that 26 Since § 9(a) . . . refers to the representative as the one 'designated or selected' by a majority of the employees without specifying precisely how that representative is to be chosen, it was early recognized that an employer had a duty to bargain whenever the representative presented 'convincing evidence of majority support.'  27 395 U.S. at 596, 89 S.Ct. at 1931. 28 In our view, it is now clearly established that an election (is) not the only predicate for a union claim to majority status, Truck Driver's Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 487 F.2d 1099, 1106 (1973). Thus, despite the fact that neither Austin Local 143 nor Houston Local 43 has ever been certified by the Board as the bargaining representative for the Respondent's pressroom employees, nonetheless the Respondent can be held to have violated § 8(a)(5) in refusing to bargain with the Houston Local. The General Counsel for the Board in unfair labor practice proceedings bears the burden of proving the majority status of a union demanding recognition, however (t)here seems to be no question but that the expiring agreement does give rise to a rebuttable presumption of majority status of the Union, NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1973). The administrative law judge in this case acknowledged that Austin Local 143 would be afforded a presumption of majority status as the incumbent union were it to have demanded that the Respondent bargain with it in July, 1972, but declined to extend the same presumption to the Houston Local because he found the union successorship doctrine inapplicable. Because we agree with the Board that Houston Local was the successor to the bargaining right of Austin Local 143, we believe the normal presumption of majority status which attaches to a previously voluntarily recognized union following the expiration of a contract would apply to the Houston Local's demand to bargain. Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1974); Toltec Metals, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed Stone Co.,474 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Denham, 469 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Cast Optics Corp., 458 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Broad Street Hospital and Medical Center, 452 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327 (3d Cir. 1970). 12 This presumption is rebuttable, and an employer may resist an 8(a)(5) charge if it can produce evidence that the incumbent union in fact no longer represented a majority of the employees, or that it had in good faith, a reasonable doubt as to the union's continuing majority status. The employer may not, however depend solely upon unfounded speculation or a subjective state of mind, NLRB v. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1966). 13 Rather the employer must come forward with evidence casting serious doubt of the Union's (continuing) majority status, NLRB v. Frick Co., supra, 423 F.2d at 1331; NLRB v. Cast Optics Corp., 458 F.2d 398, 407 (3d Cir. 1972). This rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of going forward to the Employer to establish either that the Union in fact no longer represented a majority of the employees, or that there were circumstances affording a reasonable basis for a good faith doubt about the Union's continued majority. NLRB v. Denham, 469 F.2d 239, 244 (9th Cir. 1972). 29 The Respondent has made no effort to prove that Houston Local 43 in fact lacked the majority status it is presumed to have had when it demanded to bargain. Rather it relies solely on the fact that its work force had doubled from February 1, 1972 when the merger took place to July 10, 1972 when Houston Local 43 made its bargaining demand, to prove its good faith in refusing to bargain. 14 30 Whether in fact an expansion in work force alone absent other independent evidence supporting a good faith doubt of a union's majority status establishes an employer's right to refuse to bargain with an incumbent union is a question we do not confront. Here there was convincing evidence rebutting any such inference of good faith which might be drawn from such work force expansion. Although Houston Local 43 obtained new authorization cards from the employees hired after the time of the merger on February 1, 1972, the Employer categorically refused to even look at the cards. Such a refusal has been held to show bad faith, Terrell Machine Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970) cert. denied 398 U.S. 929, 90 S.Ct. 1821, 26 L.Ed.2d 91 (1970). At the very least, such a refusal convincingly disproves any claim by the Employer that it was genuinely concerned for the associational rights of its employees. 15 31 The Respondent failed either to prove that Houston Local 143 lacked majority status, or that it refused to bargain because in good faith it had a reasonable doubt of the Houston Local's majority status accordingly the Board's order should be enforced. 32 Similarly, we reject the Employer's claim that because its work force had expanded once again during the pendency of this litigation, it ought to be absolved of the Board's bargaining order. In any number of similar cases employers have made the claim that delay in completing the Board's unfair labor practices proceedings should prevent a Board bargaining order from being enforced due to turnover and change in the employer's work force. Invariably an employer making such an argument does so in terms of its concern for its employee's rights of free choice. See e. g., NLRB v. Schill Steel Products, Inc., 480 F.2d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 1973). While it is true that the Employer here has not demonstrated the type of extreme hostility to unionization as the respondent in Schill, nonetheless in our view the law is settled that events subsequent to the unlawful refusal to bargain cannot be posed as a defense to a subsequent bargaining order. 16 As the Supreme Court observed in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748, n. 16, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1114, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962) 33 (i)nordinate delay in any case is regrettable, but Congress has introduced no time limitation into the Act except that in § 10(b) . . . . 34 and as the Court emphasized in Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705-6, 64 S.Ct. 817, 819, 88 L.Ed. 1020 (1944), the temporary nature of a bargaining order merely insures that a bargaining relationship once rightfully established (is) given a fair chance to succeed. Thus the general rule is that the presumption of actual majority status continues during the period of litigation of the contemporaneous unfair labor practices, and for a reasonable period of time after they have been remedied, in order to give the bargaining relationship . . . a reasonable chance to operate and succeed without outside interference or improper pressure. NLRB v. Rish Equipment Co., 407 F.2d 1098, 1100 (4th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 1091 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 302 F.2d 342, 346 (7th Cir. 1962). 35 Accordingly we grant enforcement of the Board's bargaining order.