Opinion ID: 3049934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: swann’s sentence

Text: Swann was sentenced to 102 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release, on one bribery conspiracy count (Count 51), six substantive bribery counts (Counts 52-54, 57, 58, and 60), and eleven counts of honest services mail fraud (Counts 90-100). The district court ordered Swann to pay restitution of $355,533 and a fine of $250,000. On appeal, Swann challenges confrontation in the Sixth Amendment. We disagree. The district court never mentioned Lawson, let alone relied on his statement as the basis for restitution. In any event, this Court has held that “Crawford dealt with trial rights and we see no reason to extend Crawford to sentencing proceedings. The right to confrontation is not a sentencing right.” United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005). 113 McNair received no fine while some co-defendants had significant fines, such as Roland Pugh ($250,000), PUGH ($19.4 million), Bobby Rast ($2.5 million), Danny Rast ($1 million), RAST ($1,702,500), Swann ($250,000), FWDE ($3,830,760), and Dougherty ($750,000). 135 the imprisonment and his fine but not the restitution.
The PSI: (1) assigned Swann a base offense level of 10, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 (2003); (2) added 2 levels because Swann’s conduct involved more than one bribe, pursuant to § 2C1.1(b)(1); (3) added 22 levels because the net profit or benefit ($42,460,880)114 to the contractors in connection with their bribes of Swann was between $20 million and $50 million, pursuant to §§ 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) and 2B1.1(b)(1)(L); and (4) added 2 levels for obstruction of justice, pursuant to § 3C1.1.115 A total offense level of 36 and a criminal history category of I yielded an advisory guidelines range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. The PSI provided a detailed financial analysis of Swann’s assets, including his cash, checking and savings accounts, savings bonds, deferred compensation account, debt, investments, income, and living expenses. The PSI reported Swann had $118,194 in assets, including $109,380 in deferred compensation, $95,000 in 114 Swann’s PSI calculated this $42,460,880 in profit as follows: (1) from September 1998 to October 2002, RAST received $127,182,375 through County contracts and earned an average profit of 17.5%, yielding $22,256,740 in profit; (2) from September 1998 to November 2002, FWDE received $23,884,498 through County contracts and earned an average profit of 12%, yielding $2,866,139 in profit; and (3) PUGH’s total profits for 2001 and 2002 amounted to $17,338,000. We recognize that McNair’s PSI showed total contractor profits of $67,980,043, but McNair’s PSI included $3,360,686 in USI profits and $47,541,731 in PUGH profits (based on a longer time span of almost four years from August 1999 to March 2002). See supra note 96. 115 The PSI for Swann used the November 1, 2003 edition of the Sentencing Manual. 136 debt (taxes and attorneys’ fees), and a net worth of $23,194. The PSI stated Swann’s monthly income was $6,729 ($6,604 in Jefferson County pension and $125 salary for niece’s trust fund). Thus, at the time of the PSI, Swann had an annual income of $80,748. The PSI reported that Swann’s total monthly expenses were $6,971, calculated as follows: Necessary Living Expenses Home Mortgage/Equity Line (645 Winwood) $2,321.00 Home Mortgage/Equity Line (641 Winwood) $1,201.00 Groceries/Supplies/Transportation $1,435.00 (Includes all credit card purchases other than non-copay medical expenses.) Utilities $452.00 Telephone $118.00 Auto Insurance $122.00 Life Insurance $395.00 Home Maintenance Insurance $36.00 Clothing $20.00 Medical $488.00 Printing/Copying/Postage $60.00 Dry Cleaning $10.00 Pest Control/Termite Bond $48.00 OTC Medications/Personal Grooming $122.00 Lawn Maintenance $120.00 Internet Service $23.00 Total Expenses: $6,971.00[116] The PSI noted (1) Swann’s wife was retired from Bellsouth, (2) their newly 116 Swann also submitted other expenses as “necessary,” which the PSI did not include in the above calculations as “necessary”: meals out $75; entertainment $30; and newspaper $12.40. 137 remodeled home at 645 Winwood Drive was in her name, and (3) she owned their former home, at 641 Winwood Drive two doors down, jointly with her mother and paid that mortgage.117 According to the PSI, Swann’s wife had refused to provide any additional financial information for the PSI. Swann claimed he had no knowledge of the value of his wife’s investments, nor of the income generated from her investments or retirement. In calculating Swann’s fine under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d),118 the PSI stated the “gross loss” amount was the $42,460,880 benefit the contractors received. Based on this information, the PSI determined the guidelines fine range was $20,000 to $84,921,760 (i.e., double the gross loss amount pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2). The PSI stated: “Based on his financial condition it appears that the defendant [Swann] could pay a fine within the guideline range or make a lump-sum payment toward restitution shortly after sentencing through use of liquid assets.” The PSI noted that Swann’s “future ability to make payments on an installment basis will 117 Swann filed no objections to ¶¶ 153-159 of the PSI that set forth all of this financial information. 118 Section 3571(d) provides: If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). 138 be dependant [sic] on several factors including the sentence in this case, his family situation, and his ability to contain monthly expenses.” The PSI stated that restitution was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (the MVRA) and that the County had requested restitution. Swann objected to the 22-level increase to his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A), arguing his offense level should be based on the amount of bribes ($355,533) rather than the net profits or benefits ($42,460,880) the contractors received. Section 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) provides: If the value of the payment, the benefit received or to be received in return for the payment, or the loss to the government from the offense, whichever is greatest (i) exceeded $2,000 but did not exceed $5,000, increase by 1 level; or (ii) exceeded $5,000, increase by the number of levels from the table in §2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to that amount. U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) (2003).119 Swann argued there was no evidence of a causal connection linking any bribe to the award of any contract, and therefore, the 22-level adjustment under § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) was improper. Even if a quid pro quo is not required for a § 666 conviction, Swann claimed evidence of a quid pro quo was necessary under § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) to increase his offense level.
119 The guidelines provide that for an offense where the benefit received or loss to the government is more than $20 million but not more than $50 million, a defendant’s offense level will increase by 22 levels. U.S.S.G. §§ 2C1.1(b)(2)(A), 2B1.1(b)(1)(L). 139 At sentencing, Swann objected to the PSI on the ground that co-defendants RAST, Bobby Rast, and Danny Rast’s offense levels were based on the amount of bribes given, not the financial benefit or profit to them. Swann also objected to any obstruction of justice enhancement. The district court sustained Swann’s objection to the obstruction enhancement.120 The district court, however, concluded the benefit, not bribe, amount should be used under § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) and found the evidence was “absolutely clear that there is at least 20 million dollars that was benefit” to the bribe-payor contractors. As support for the $20 million figure, the district court cited instances where Swann (1) decided not to invoke the performance bond against RAST, (2) allowed RAST to rebid the Valley Creek job for an additional $23.927 million, and (3) was involved in granting RAST a $2.677 million change order when RAST’s boring machine became stuck. The district court found that a preponderance of the evidence established that the $20 million benefit to the bribe-payors “was a direct result of that influence of [RAST’s] bribes.” The court also pointed out that Swann 120 Because some of Swann’s co-defendants were sentenced under an earlier guidelines edition and that edition would result in a lower guidelines range for him, Swann urged the court to use the earlier edition to avoid a sentencing disparity with his co-defendants. The district court overruled that objection. On appeal Swann does not challenge the applicability of the 2003 guidelines edition to the calculations of his advisory guidelines range. Rather, as discussed later, Swann claims his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the use of different editions as to co-defendants caused disparities in his and his co-defendants’ sentences that are unwarranted. We address that issue later. 140 granted PUGH’s joint venture a 180-day extension just days after PUGH’s Yessick hired a landscaper for Swann’s property, saving PUGH’s joint venture $180,000 in liquidated damages. At sentencing, the district court expressly found a direct connection between the bribes to Swann and the financial benefit to the bribepayor contractors, stating: I think it is absolutely clear that there is at least 20 million dollars that was benefit, for instance, to [RAST], two change orders being 2.677 million of the digging out of the boring machine and pulling out a boring machine and rebid of that job, 23.927 million. The testimony as I recall it at trial and the testimony that was presented today, I conclude, based on the burden of proof that’s required, not beyond a reasonable doubt but by a preponderance of the evidence, that that is due to be calculated at 2B1.1 as a gain of over 20 million dollars, that because of the decision by Mr. Swann that I believe was a result of the bribes and stuff that was provided him by RAST, I think that that was a direct result of that influence of those bribes. And I am not going to go through the others. Like for instance, the extensions, just one example is with regard to exhibit 36, the 180 extension that was granted to PUGH. A thousand dollars a day is what I recall the evidence to be that it would have been if they weren’t granted that extension and that’s $180,000. I am not even necessarily having to go to the aspect of whether or not because Mr. Swann was Mr. Wilson’s supervisor the effect of the contracts or the approval of the committee because I find I am going to, for calculation of fine purposes, set that amount at 20 million and one dollars. More than 20 million, I am going to set it at 20 million and one dollars as clearly – in fact, actually I think I figured it at 26 million at the bottom end, but I am going to set it at 20 million and one dollars for the purpose of calculating the fine range, and I will ask him that you do that for me, and we’ll need to recalculate the other. The district court found that Swann’s base offense level was 10, added 2 levels because Swann’s offenses involved multiple bribes, and added 22 levels 141 because the benefit to the bribe-payor contractors was between $20 million and $50 million, resulting in a total offense level of 34. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2C1.1(b)(2)(A), 2B1.1(b)(1). This total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I yielded an advisory guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. In considering the § 3553 factors, the district court found that Swann (1) was not credible in stating his wife was the one responsible and he did not know that these contractors were doing the work and what was going on, (2) had “not indicated any remorse whatsoever,” and (3) refused to accept responsibility. The district court also considered that it was “bribery on a large scale of a public official” that had affected many people. The court noted “the need to reflect the seriousness of this offense and to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for this offense.” The court also commented that, because Swann held a position of public trust, he was different than the contractor-defendants that were bribing him. The district court stated it had considered all of the § 3553 factors. Citing Swann’s “history” and “character,” the district court varied downward from the 151 to 188 months’ range and imposed a sentence of 102 months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ supervised release.121 121 As to Counts 51 and 90 to 100, the district court imposed a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrently. As to Counts 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, and 60, the district court 142 Importantly, the district court also stated that, even if it had adopted Swann’s view that the U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) calculation should be based on the bribe amount Swann received (instead of the net benefit to the contractors) and even if Swann’s total offense level was 24 and his guidelines range was 51 to 63 months, it would nonetheless vary upward on Swann’s sentence, explaining: [C]ounsel has urged me to utilize the guideline range that would result from considering the bribes of $355,533 in calculating your sentencing range and indicated that if I used that, it would result in a guideline offense level, criminal offense level of 24 when combined with a criminal history category of roman numeral one would result in imprisonment range of 51 to 63 months. I am going to state for the record that if I used that, I would nonetheless vary upward because I would believe that would not be sufficient to account for the other factors in [18 U.S.C. § 3553] that I am charged with the responsibility of weighing, including the nature and circumstances of this particular offense, as well as the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide respect for law. I would have varied upwards, in other words, on that sentence. So if the Eleventh Circuit has any question about that when they get this on appeal which I suppose they will, if they ask or wonder what I would have done had I went that way, that’s what I would have done. I believe that’s appropriate and I have given that weight. I have actually considered that, and I started to just go ahead and do that. But I thought it appropriate in this instance because I think it is very clear that at least the 23 million dollars that I discussed earlier was a correct calculation. (Emphasis added). Although the district court did not say the precise words — “I would impose the same 102 months sentence” — the record is patently clear that is imposed a sentence of 102 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrently. The sentences for all 18 counts thus run concurrently. 143 what the district court meant. As to restitution, Swann disputed that the amount of the bribes paid was $355,533, but conceded that, if restitution was owed, it should be based on the amount of bribes paid. Based on the evidence, the district court found the total bribe amount Swann received was $355,533. The district court rejected Swann’s argument that restitution should be only the total $93,680 bribe amount referenced in the conviction counts (Counts 52-54, 57-58, 60, 90-100) that the jury found Swann received beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court ordered Swann to pay restitution of $355,533122 to the “Jefferson County Commission.” As to the fine, Swann pointed out he “has no money,” that his house was transferred to his wife’s name before he became aware of the subpoenas in the investigation, and that he lost the respect of his community and thereby lost his ability to earn a living. Swann argued for a reduced fine but did not propose any specific fine amount. 122 This $355,533 consisted of: (1) $149,102 from PUGH ($7,422 for waterfall and koi pond, $1,000 in gift certificates to Alabama Book Smith, and $140,680 in landscaping by Guthrie); (2) $55,885 from RAST ($4,441 for concrete work; $3,535 for flooring; $1,054 in brick work; $8,940 in plumbing; $9,733 for painting; $6,300 to Derek Houston for supervision; $18,867 in labor for miscellaneous employees; and $3,015 for Swann’s trip to England and Scotland); and (3) $150,929 from FWDE ($28,839 to Stanger for supervision; $94,090 to Hendon for supervision; and $28,000 to Dudley Davis for framing). The sentencing court and its judgment use $355,533, and we do too. But these amounts total $355,933. 144 After determining the advisory guidelines fine range was $17,500 to $40,000,002, the court imposed a $250,000 fine and a $1,800 special assessment. As to the $250,000 fine, the district court stated: You are ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $250,000. I don’t know whether that’s collectable or not. I don’t think it is, but I think it’s appropriate considering the circumstances.
On appeal Swann claims the district court improperly calculated his guidelines range because “[t]he court utilized a ‘net benefit’ approach instead of the amount of the alleged bribes in calculating the base offense level.” This is a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of Swann’s 102 months’ imprisonment sentence.123 As noted earlier, the bribery offense level is calculated using the greater of the value of the bribe payment or the benefit received in return. See U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A). “The value of ‘the benefit received or to be received’ means the 123 In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard using a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2008) (relying on Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)). First, we look at whether the district court committed any significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the advisory guidelines range, treating the guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain adequately the sentence. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. Then we look at whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. 145 net value of such benefit.” § 2C1.1 cmt. n.2.124 “The net value of the improper benefit need only be estimated, and the bribe amount should be used only when the net value cannot be estimated.” DeVegter, 439 F.3d at 1303. The net value “need only be a reasonable estimate given the information available to the government.” United States v. Cabrera, 172 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999).125 On appeal Swann does not claim that the bribe amount ($355,533) he received was greater than the net benefit amount (over $20 million) the contractordefendants received.126 Rather, Swann argues that, to use the net benefit approach, the government first must show a connection (i.e., a quid pro quo) between a 124 The Commentary to § 2C1.1 gives the following examples of net value: “(1) A government employee, in return for a $500 bribe, reduces the price of a piece of surplus property offered for sale by the government from $10,000 to $2,000; the value of the benefit received is $8,000. (2) A $150,000 contract on which $20,000 profit was made was awarded in return for a bribe; the value of the benefit received is $20,000.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. n.2. The Commentary to § 2C1.1 also provides: “[F]or deterrence purposes, the punishment should be commensurate with the gain to the payer or the recipient of the bribe, whichever is higher.” Id. cmt. Background. 125 In United States v. DeVegter, 439 F.3d at 1304, this Court adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach to calculating net value under § 2C1.1 as set forth in United States v. Landers, 68 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit in Landers concluded that the profit on a contract, not the gross revenue or value, is to be used to determine net value. We stated in DeVegter, “[w]e agree with the Fifth Circuit’s approach [in Landers] which subtracts direct costs, but not indirect costs, from profits to determine the net improper benefit.” DeVegter, 439 F.3d at 1304. 126 Swann’s appeal brief refers to the $20 million as the “net benefit” and does not argue that the district court erred by using $20 million in its calculation of net benefit. Although the district court’s finding that the benefit was $20 million to the contractor-defendants appears to be based on gross revenue received by the contractor-defendants and not their net profit, other portions of the trial record amply support total profits in excess of $20 million to the contractordefendants RAST, PUGH, and FWDE, and thus a net benefit in excess of $20 million. This may be why no remand was requested on this issue. 146 particular bribe and a particular contract or action by a public official. Swann claims the government’s evidence failed to show the requisite causal connection. In this regard, Swann first argues there is no connection between the bribes he received and the contractors’ revenue because he had no authority to award the sewer or engineering contracts. Alternatively, Swann claims, “there was no tie or connection of any kind between any alleged bribe and any contract awarded even if Appellant Swann could have influenced the award of the contract.” Therefore, Swann says, “the proper loss amount to be utilized under § 2C1.1 was the amount of the alleged bribes paid to Appellant Swann and the court erred in failing to utilize said amount.” Swann points out that had the $355,533 bribe amount been used (as opposed to the $20 million benefit amount), the district court would have added only 12 levels (not 22) under § 2C1.1, resulting in a total adjusted offense level of 24 (not 34). This Court has not addressed what type of connection under § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) the government must establish between the bribe given and the benefit received. Section 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) does speak in terms of “the value of . . . the benefit received or to be received in return for the payment . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A). Other circuits have held that the threshold for establishing a causal connection under § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) is low. See United States v. Sapoznik, 147 161 F.3d 1117, 1119 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that “[t]o show that the bribes benefitted the people paying them [the bar owners/illegal gambling], . . . it is enough for the government to show that the bribes facilitated the gambling operations”); United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating “[t]he threshold for the causation inquiry for § 2C1.1 calculations is relatively low”). In Sapoznik, the Seventh Circuit explained that the question of causation between the bribe and the benefit is different from the question of quantification of the actual benefit received, concluding the government had established a causal connection between the bribe and the benefit even though it had not shown the precise amount of the benefit to the bribe-payor. Sapoznik, 161 F.3d at 1119. And the bribes need only contribute or facilitate the business activity involved. Id. Here, given the wealth of evidence in the record, we readily conclude the district court did not clearly err in finding that the benefits the contractors received (such as the RAST revenue from the $2.6 million change order, the RAST job rebid for an additional $23,837,350, and the PUGH time extension on the Vestavia Trunk Sewer Replacement project) were a result of the corrupt bribes to Swann. This amply satisfies any causal connection requirement in § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A).127 127 We review the district court’s findings of fact in sentencing for clear error. DeVegter, 439 F.3d at 1303. We do not find clear error unless “‘we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . [T]he clear error standard is purposefully deferential to the district court, . . . [but r]eview for clear error does not mean no review.’” Id. 148 Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the district court’s calculations adding 22 levels under § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) to Swann’s offense level. The district court alternatively stated that even if it used the bribe amount approach and not the net benefit approach, it would vary upward from the lower range (51 to 63 months) urged by Swann based on “other factors in 18 USC Section 3553 that I am charged with the responsibility of weighing.” Therefore, we also conclude any error in the guidelines calculations as to Swann was harmless. See United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Where a district judge clearly states that he would impose the same sentence, even if he erred in calculating the guidelines, then any error in the calculation is harmless.”); United States v. Dean, 517 F.3d 1224, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008), aff’d, Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009); United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2006).
Swann also argues his 102-month sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court impermissibly considered that (1) Swann showed no remorse, and (2) because he was a public official, Swann was more culpable than the contractors and, without his conduct, the bribe-payors could not have (quoting United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1177 (11th Cir. 2005)). We review questions of law arising under the federal Sentencing Guidelines de novo. Id. 149 committed the crime.128 This Court considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed by inquiring whether the sentence is supported by the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 56, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007).129 The district court need not discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[N]othing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the section 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the section 3553(a) factors.”) (quotation marks omitted). The district court’s acknowledgment that it considered the defendant’s arguments and the factors in § 3553(a) is sufficient. Id. The district court’s consideration of Swann’s lack of remorse was not improper. A district court is permitted to consider lack of remorse in its § 3553(a) 128 Swann claims these were improper factors (1) for not varying even lower than 102 months from the 151 to 188 months guidelines range and alternatively (2) for varying upward to 102 months from the 51 to 63 months guidelines range. 129 The § 3553(a) factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We review de novo whether the district court considered an impermissible factor. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). 150 analysis as to several factors, such as the characteristics of a defendant, the need to promote respect for the law, and the need to protect society. See United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1318 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating “district court did not abuse its discretion by considering . . . [defendant’s] lack of remorse” and affirming where district court found “upward variance was necessary to protect society because it was unlikely that [the defendant] would be rehabilitated given his attitude and lack of remorse”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1315 (2010); United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 527 F.3d 231, 236-37 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding consideration of lack of remorse as a permissible factor under § 3553(a)(1) as to the characteristics of a defendant, under § 3553(a)(2)(A) to promote respect for the law, and under § 3553(a)(2)(C) to protect the public from future crimes of the defendant). The district court also did not err in considering Swann was a public official, another characteristic of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Swann further argues there was an unwarranted disparity between his 102month sentence and those of his co-defendants Bobby Rast (51 months), Danny Rast (41 months), and Dougherty (51 months). Swann claims Bobby and Danny Rast received lower sentences because the district court sentenced them using the bribe amount (not the net benefit amount) in calculating their guidelines ranges 151 under § 2C1.1.130 Swann argues that in using the net benefit in his case, the district court created sentencing disparity with similarly situated co-defendants because it had utilized different methods to calculate the guidelines range for various codefendants. This ignores a number of factors that differentiate Swann from these particular co-defendants: (1) Swann was a public official and the private contractors were not, (2) Swann took bribes not just from the Rast defendants but also from the Pugh and Dougherty defendants, (3) the district court found Swann not credible in stating he did not understand the home remodeling work was intended to influence him, and (4) Swann showed a lack of remorse. Simply put, Swann has not proved he and these particular co-defendants are similarly situated. As to FWDE and Dougherty, Swann also argues they received lower sentences because the district court applied an earlier edition of the sentencing guidelines. As to FWDE, Swann is incorrect because the PSI and the district court applied the 2003 guidelines to calculate FWDE’s sentence. As to Dougherty, the 2000 guidelines were used. Under the 2000 guidelines, a $20 million net benefit resulted in a 16-level increase, rather than the 22-level increase in the 2003 version. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(Q), (R) (2000) with § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L), 130 Judge L. Scott Coogler conducted the Swann and Wilson trials and sentenced Swann on March 30, 2007, the Rast defendants on March 29, 2007, and the Dougherty defendants on March 28, 2007. Different judges sentenced McNair and PUGH. 152 (M) (2003).131 That a district court may have used the wrong version of the guidelines in a co-defendant’s separate sentencing (to the benefit of a defendant) does not make another defendant’s sentence under the correct version unreasonable in any way. In addition, the Dougherty defendants’ profits were much lower than the Pugh and Rast defendants, who also gave bribes to Swann. Also, Swann ignores the fact that the district court granted a downward variance to 102 months from his advisory guidelines range of 151-188 months. Swann has shown no reversible error in his 102-month sentence based on disparity with his codefendants.
The district court ordered that Swann pay a fine of $250,000, based on a fine guidelines range of $20,000 to approximately $84 million. See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2. Swann argues that the district court erred in not considering any of the fine guidelines factors, including Swann’s ability to pay. The sentencing guidelines require courts to “impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). The defendant has the burden 131 With a 16-level increase, Swann’s total offense level would be 28, which, with a criminal history category of I, would yield an advisory guidelines range of 78 to 97 months under the 2000 guidelines. For Dougherty, the PSI used the 2000 edition, and, apparently, there was no objection by the government. 153 of proving inability to pay a fine. United States v. McGuinness, 451 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006).132 After determining a fine is appropriate, the district court shall consider these factors in fixing the amount of the fine: (1) the need for the combined sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense (including the harm or loss to the victim and the gain to the defendant), to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and to afford adequate deterrence; (2) any evidence presented as to the defendant’s ability to pay the fine (including the ability to pay over a period of time) in light of his earning capacity and financial resources; (3) the burden that the fine places on the defendant and his dependents relative to alternative punishments; (4) any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made or is obligated to make; (5) any collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from the defendant’s conduct; (6) whether the defendant previously has been fined for a similar offense; (7) the expected costs to the government of any term of probation, or term of imprisonment and term of supervised release imposed; and (8) any other pertinent equitable considerations. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d). “While some circuits require that the district court make specific findings, we have adopted the less rigid approach, and do not require the sentencing court to make specific findings of fact with respect to the Sentencing Guideline factors as 132 This Court reviews a district court’s decision that a defendant can pay a fine for clear error. United States v. Gonzalez, 541 F.3d 1250, 1255 (11th Cir. 2008). 154 long as the record reflects the district court’s consideration of the pertinent factors prior to imposing the fine.” United States v. Hernandez, 160 F.3d 661, 665-66 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Lombardo, 35 F.3d 526, 530 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that where the record contains sufficient information with respect to the factors to permit us to find that the district court did not clearly err in imposing or in setting the amount of the fine, we will not reverse merely because the district court failed to make specific findings on each of the factors). “Explicit findings on these factors are not required . . . .” United States v. Khawaja, 118 F.3d 1454, 1459 (11th Cir. 1997). We have applied this rule to uphold a fine where the district court did not make explicit findings of fact as to the defendant’s ability to pay. United States v. Long, 122 F.3d 1360, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997). However, “[i]f the record does not reflect the district court’s reasoned basis for imposing a fine, we must remand the case so that the necessary factual findings can be made.” United States v. Gonzalez, 541 F.3d 1250, 1256 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Swann claims the PSI said Swann could pay a fine within the guidelines range or make a lump-sum restitution but not both. That is not correct. We quoted the PSI earlier as it (1) says that Swann could pay a fine or make a lump-sum payment toward restitution shortly after sentencing with liquid assets, and then (2) 155 states it does not determine Swann’s future ability to pay a fine or further restitution on an installment basis. Furthermore, the district court adopted the factual findings in the PSI, which included numerous findings relevant to Swann’s current income and future earning capacity. The PSI set forth Swann’s net worth, educational background, work history, and monthly income of $6,729, yielding $80,748 annually. Swann holds two bachelors degrees, one in civil engineering and one in textile management, and a masters degree in sanitary engineering. Swann has retired from Jefferson County but submitted no evidence to show he had tried and failed to gain employment. Swann already has an annual retirement income of $80,748 even without social security or future wages from working.133 Although Swann makes two mortgage payments on the two Winwood Drive residences and pays over $658 in monthly home utility, lawn, pest control, and maintenance expenses, the homes are in his wife’s name and she lives there too. The record shows Swann can pay at least some fine. The record also shows Swann’s counsel argued for a reduced fine and the district court considered the pertinent factors. As the district court reviewed the PSI before imposing the fine and heard argument of counsel about the fine, “we infer without hesitation that the 133 The PSI, dated February 5, 2007, did not show Swann drawing any social security. In 2010, Swann is now 64. 156 district court considered the pertinent factors prior to imposing the fine.” Khawaja, 118 F.3d at 1459. Although Swann has shown no clear error in the district court’s imposition of some fine, the record is not sufficient to permit us to say there is no error in the amount of the fine. As to the $250,000 amount, the district court remarked: “I don’t know whether that’s collectable or not. I don’t think it is . . . .” We cannot glean from the record the basis for this statement or how the court determined that the fine should be $250,000 as opposed to $150,000 or $750,000, especially given the fine guidelines range goes up to $84 million. Thus, we vacate and remand as to the amount of the fine. See Khawaja, 118 F.3d at 1459-60 (requiring remand where record does not reflect court’s reasoned basis for amount of $175,000 fine).