Opinion ID: 1294280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Product Exposure

Text: Appellants argue: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on product exposure to Uniroyal, Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Abex, and Rayloc; and (2) a jury question exists as to exposure in relation to Kenworth, Freightliner, Paccar, and International Truck. We disagree. The Door Closing Statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 15-5-150, provides: An action against a corporation created by or under the laws of any other state, government or country may be brought in the circuit court: (1) By any resident of this State for any cause of action; or (2) By a plaintiff not a resident of this State when the cause of action shall have arisen or the subject of the action shall be situated within this State. At trial, the Respondents argued Mr. Henderson had no exposure within South Carolina to their asbestos containing products and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the Door Closing Statute and Rule 12(b)(1), SCRCP. Noting Mr. Henderson was admittedly not a resident of South Carolina, the trial court focused on whether the cause of action arose in South Carolina, relying on Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 346 S.C. 37, 550 S.E.2d 589 (Ct.App.2001), overruled on other grounds by Farmer v. Monsanto Corp., 353 S.C. 553, 579 S.E.2d 325 (2003) (Because § 15-5-150 does not involve subject matter jurisdiction but rather determines the capacity of a party to sue, we overrule these cases to the extent they hold otherwise.). In Murphy, the Court of Appeals held: In applying the Door Closing Statute, the manifestation of injury through diagnosis, while relevant, is not dispositive in every case for the purpose of determining whether a cause of action shall have arisen in South Carolina. Murphy, 346 S.C. at 48, 550 S.E.2d at 594-95. Finding the exposure to asbestos originated in South Carolina, the Court of Appeals held plaintiff's claims arose in this State even though they did not accrue until the mesothelioma was diagnosed. Id. at 48, 550 S.E.2d at 594. The Court of Appeals, therefore, found the Door Closing Statute did not bar plaintiff's claims because there was a sufficient connection to South Carolina when the acts which gave rise to the cause of action occurred in this State. Id. at 48, 550 S.E.2d at 595. Following the trial court's order in this case, this Court affirmed Murphy and held: [T]he proper inquiry is whether the foreign corporation's activities that allegedly exposed the victim to the injurious substance, and the exposure itself, occurred within the State. If so, then the legal wrong was committed here. 356 S.C. 592, 598, 590 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2003). Appellants failed to meet the Murphy test because they failed to show Respondents' products contained asbestos, and they failed to show any actionable exposure in South Carolina. In determining whether exposure is actionable, we adopt the frequency, regularity, and proximity test set forth in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir.1986): To support a reasonable inference of substantial causation from circumstantial evidence, there must be evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked. We agree with the trial court that presence in the vicinity of static asbestos is not exposure to asbestos, and find Appellants failed to present evidence of regular and frequent exposure to asbestos containing products in proximity to where Mr. Henderson worked. Due to the lack of evidence Mr. Henderson was exposed to the Respondents' asbestos containing products in South Carolina, we affirm the trial court's holding.