Opinion ID: 793922
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Color of Official Right

Text: 33 Relying on United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir.1978), abrogated on other grounds by McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, Foster argues there was insufficient evidence he was acting under color of official right, because there was no issue pending before the Council at the time he accepted the money. 34 Foster's reliance on Rabbitt is misplaced. First, there is no requirement under the Hobbs Act that the official must be acting in response to a pending issue; rather, an official's conduct controls an undertaking for purposes of the Hobbs Act when the property is accepted. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 265-68, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) (concluding the under color of official right element does not require an affirmative act of inducement by the official, and the offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts); United States v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir.1993) (When a public official accepts money and `asserts that his official conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertaking,' that official has received money `under color of official right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.' (quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991))). 35 Second, Rabbitt is distinguishable from the present case. In Rabbitt, we reversed one count of a Hobbs Act conviction against a councilman for accepting a fee for introducing an architectural firm to a potential state contractor. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d at 1019, 1028. We concluded the government had not shown the councilman was acting in his official capacity when he introduced the parties, because the councilman did not have the authority to award contracts, nor did the architectural firm reasonably believe he had such authority. Id. at 1028. 36 The evidence supports the opposite conclusion in the present case. Foster testified that in his capacity as alderman, he voted on issues brought before the Council. Foster also testified he knew McDougal needed a favorable vote from the Council to proceed with the Project. McDougal testified he believed Foster could influence the Council's vote. Foster guaranteed McDougal four votes in exchange for money to help Freeman. The jury heard audio and videotape recordings of Foster telling McDougal that as long as his boy Billy Freeman was happy, he was happy. Another videotape showed Foster taking money from an undercover FBI agent posing as an investor from Dallas, as they discussed the Council's votes. The same videotape showed Foster handing the undercover agent his business card which displayed Foster's position as alderman on the Council, and Foster telling the FBI agent he (Foster) and Freeman were going to do what they needed to do. During a post-indictment FBI interview, Foster admitted receiving between $1,000 and $10,000 to help Freeman in exchange for Council votes. Foster also admitted knowing Freeman received money to pay the city of Pine Bluff in exchange for securing Council votes. Foster further admitted telling McDougal that if Freeman was happy, he was happy. We have no trouble concluding the government presented sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find Foster accepted money under color of official right.