Opinion ID: 853804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Statements by Ivy

Text: In response to the prosecutor's question Why did they want to find out [if the men who robbed them were at Love's house]? Hall testified that Ivy stated to get them. Barber contends that the trial court erred in admitting this statement because it is inadmissible hearsay. Barber made a continuing hearsay objection to all statements by Ivy, but made no specific objection to this statement. Hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of a fact asserted in the statement. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). The State argues that the statement, get them, is not hearsay because it asserts no fact that is susceptible of being true or false citing Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Ind.1994), which observed [i]f the statement contains no such assertion, it cannot be hearsay. Taken in context of the question by the prosecutor, however, the statement at the very least is an assertion of Ivy's motive in returning to Love's apartment which is susceptible of being true or false. Accordingly, the statement is not admissible for this reason. A statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay and is therefore admissible. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Barber argues that because the State did not present independent evidence of a conspiracy,i.e., evidence apart from the statement itselfthe statement is not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). For a statement to be admissible under this rule, the State must demonstrate that (1) a conspiracy existed between the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered and (2) the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ind.1997); 13 ROBERT LOWELL MILLER, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE § 801.423 (1995). As we recently stated, the independent evidence requirement is a useful safeguard against abusive use of co-conspirator hearsay, and [the Court] will continue to apply it to evidence proposed for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Lott v. State, 690 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind.1997) (discussing pre-evidence rules requirement of independent evidence). The trial court in this case did not make a determination as to the existence of a conspiracy. Moreover, the State did not point to anything beyond the statement itself in support of the existence of a conspiracy at the time the statement was made and cites none here. Accordingly, the trial court may have erred in admitting the statement. Even if so, [e]rrors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. See Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind.1995); Ind. Trial Rule 61. In this case, there is significant, uncontested evidence of Barber's guilt, including Horton's testimony that within minutes after Barber entered Horton's apartment, Horton heard gunshots, and returned to his apartment to see Barber and Ivy leave the apartment and find Preston lying on the floor in a pool of blood. In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the erroneous admission of Ivy's statement affected Barber's substantial rights. It is not grounds for reversal.