Opinion ID: 2312412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Batista

Text: Batista argues that he was denied due process of law when at least one juror allegedly slept through parts of his trial. Because the District Court is uniquely able to `continuous[ly] observ[e] ... the jury in court,' we ordinarily review the Court's `handling of alleged juror misconduct... for abuse of discretion.' United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 78 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 457 (2d Cir.1976)). In this case, however, because defense counsel never requested that the juror be removed from the panel, we review the Court's decision not to excuse the juror sua sponte for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez-Hernandez, 652 F.3d 56, 75 (1st Cir.2011) (where defense counsel alerted the trial court that a juror was falling asleep, but failed to raise any due process objection at the time, the trial court's failure to remove the juror sua sponte was subject to plain error review) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. United States v. Simels, 654 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir.2011). An action is plainly erroneous where there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). If we find that an action is plainly erroneous, we may then exercise [our] discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The error alleged by Batista was waived at trial. [11] Even if the error had not been waived, however, the District Court did not plainly err in the way it handled the allegedly sleeping juror. The juror's inattentiveness was brought to the attention of the District Court several times, and the Court closely monitored the situation throughout the trial. The Court repeatedly addressed the issue with the parties on the record, and it interviewed the juror at least once. Both the government and defense counsel had ample opportunity to request the juror's removal; defense counsel in fact was invited by the government to object to the juror's conduct, and declined to do so, on at least two occasions. Defense counsel may simply have concluded that the risk that the juror might have missed important exculpatory testimony was a tolerable one. See United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 282 (2d Cir.2011) ([O]ur review for plain error is more rigorous where the failure to object was a strategic decision.... (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir.1994) (It is proper to hold a defendant accountable ... [for] strategically with-holding an objection in order to seek reversal on appeal.), abrogated on other grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997). We decline to disturb the Court's careful and considered judgment on this issue. See Diaz, 176 F.3d at 78 (upholding conviction where the court had, from the moment the sleeping juror allegation was raised, investigated the matter and carefully observed the juror in question throughout the trial). The District Court's decision to permit the juror to continue and to deliberate was not an abuse of discretion, much less plainly erroneous.
Batista also contends that the District Court violated the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1827, by instructing the court interpreter to employ a particular translation of a Spanish slang phrase that Hiciano testified that Batista had used to warn him of police activity. Because Batista did not object to the Court's instruction at the time, he has waived the argument for purposes of appeal. [12] Even if the argument were not waived, we would find that the District Court did not plainly err. The controversy arose when Hiciano, in testimony regarding a code he had worked out with Batista to signal police presence in Bushwick, stated that Batista would use the phrase  loco cuídate  to warn of imminent police action. The meaning of the phrase is arguably ambiguous: it could mean either take care, dudeperhaps innocuous enoughor be careful, dude, which was perhaps less innocuous given the context in which the phrase was uttered. [13] Faced with a potentially decisive issue of translation, the District Court suggested that the witness himself, who was evidently conversant in both English and Spanish, could clarify what he understood Batista to mean by  loco cuídate  and thereby establish the interpretation to be used by the court interpreter. The Court therefore, with the permission of the parties, elicited testimony from Hiciano, outside the presence of the jury, regarding his intended meaning. Hiciano confirmed that he understood Batista to mean be careful, not take care and that Hiciano appreciated the difference between the two meanings. The Court then inquired of counsel for both sides whether they objected to the translation given by the witness, and both sides declared that they had no objection. Only then did the Court instruct the interpreter to use the agreed-upon translation. The Court's action was entirely reasonable; it was not erroneous, much less plainly erroneous. [14]
In the appendix to his opening brief, Batista compiles thirty statements made by the government in its summation, each of which, he contends, was improper. Of the thirty statements listed, Batista objected at trial to only two. We therefore address principally those two statements, and review the government's summation for egregious misconduct. [15] United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 945 (2d Cir.1993) ([T]he misconduct alleged must be so severe and significant as to result in the denial of [the defendant's] right to a fair trial.). A defendant alleging prosecutorial misconduct ordinarily bears a heavy burden. Locascio, 6 F.3d at 945. In this case, because the two objections asserted by defendant's counsel were sustained and the District Court promptly provided the jury with curative instructions, and because we presume that a jury follows the instructions of the court, the burden is even higher. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) ([E]ven if there were some risk of prejudice, here it is of the type that can be cured with proper instructions, and `juries are presumed to follow their instructions.' (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987))). Upon consideration of the two challenged comments in the context of the entire record, including the trial transcript, see United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir.1975), it is clear to us that neither statement rose to the egregious level required to overturn a jury verdict, see Elias, 285 F.3d at 190. The first commentan observation that Batista's co-worker and alleged co-conspirator William Valerio had pleaded guilty to bank fraud referred to a fact already in the record (albeit in a different context). The second, in which the government apparently attempted to appeal to the jury's sense of public duty, was immediately cured by the District Court: it reminded the jurors that their role was not to make a public policy determination, but to decide whether the government had met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the charged crimes. Although perhaps inappropriate, neither comment by the prosecutor, in context, was so severe and significant as to deny Batista his right to a fair trial. Locascio, 6 F.3d at 945.
Batista argues that the District Court improperly applied a two-level enhancement to his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. The imposition of a sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) involves questions of fact that we review for clear error. United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1188 (2d Cir.1993) (The sentencing court's finding that a firearm was possessed in connection with a drug offense for purposes of § 2D1.1 will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.). In order for a defendant's projected Guidelines sentence to be enhanced under § 2D1.1(b)(1), `[t]he defendant need not have had personal possession, or even actual knowledge of the weapon's presence; the enhancement is required so long as the possession of the firearm was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.' United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 677 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Stevens, 985 F.2d at 1188) ( abrogated on other grounds by Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998)). Accordingly, if one member of a narcotics conspiracy possessed a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, the other members of the conspiracy who reasonably could have foreseen such possession are chargeable with possession under § 2D1.1(b)(1). United States v. Soto, 959 F.2d 1181, 1186-87 (2d Cir.1992). Batista argues that imposition of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm is inappropriate because a firearm was not found in physical proximity to him, and because Hiciano never informed him that a member of the narcotics conspiracy possessed a firearm. This argument is unavailing. As we have recognized in the past, to substantial dealers in narcotics, firearms are as much tools of the trade as are the commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia. United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir.1987); see also United States v. Bermudez, 529 F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir.2008) (It is axiomatic that drug dealing and guns go hand in hand.). Although a physical nexus between the defendant and the firearm is often useful in determining possession, such a nexus is by no means required in order for a court to impose the enhancement. Rather, courts should determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidenceincluding evidence relating to a defendant's specialized knowledge regarding the activities of drug gangspossession of a firearm in connection with the offense was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. As the District Court found, Batista was an experienced narcotics detective with the NYPD, who had conducted extensive undercover operations infiltrating illegal narcotics operations, and who was well aware that drug dealers are often armed. United States v. Batista ( Batista III ), 732 F.Supp.2d 82, 98 (E.D.N.Y.2010). Batista knew the general size and scope of Hiciano's drug ring, and he could easily have foreseen that someone would possess a firearm in relation to the illegal activities of the ring. Indeed, Hiciano himself kept a firearm in an apartment in 441 Wilson Avenue [16] in order to protect his drug trade. Although no evidence was adduced to show that Hiciano had expressly told Batista that he or one of his associates possessed a firearm, the District Court did not err, much less commit clear error, when it found that it was reasonably foreseeable to Batista that a firearm would be used in the course of the conspiracy. Id. at 96.
The majority of Batista's remaining arguments on appeal were addressed by the District Court in four thorough and well-reasoned opinions spanning the lifetime of the case. See Batista III, 732 F.Supp.2d 82 (addressing sentencing issues including minimal/minor role reduction and obstruction of justice enhancement); Batista II, 2010 WL 1193314 (rejecting in part Batista's motion for a judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, rejecting entirely his motion for a new trial under Fed. R.Crim.P. 33, and holding that the government had presented sufficient evidence at trial to support a guilty verdict on all counts other than conspiracy to obstruct justice); United States v. Batista, No. 06-CR-265 S-5, 2009 WL 3134561 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2009) (addressing admission of evidence challenged as unduly prejudicial); Batista I, 2009 WL 910357 (addressing the suppression and Franks hearing issues). We find no error in any of the District Court's holdings, and we affirm the judgment of the District Court as to Batista.