Opinion ID: 2044344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to review of administrative determinations

Text: Mixmill contends that denial of jurisdiction in the Tax Court would deprive it of its constitutional right to review of administrative procedures. The Tax Court agreed that under the statutes, inaction by a County could effectively eliminate a taxpayer's ability to get review of administrative tax determinations. Although neither Mixmill nor the Tax Court cites a specific provision of the Indiana Constitution supporting a right to review, Mixmill points to Bielski. In Bielski, 627 N.E.2d at 886, the Tax Court cited State ex rel. State Bd. Of Tax Comm'rs v. Marion Superior Court, 271 Ind. 374, 378, 392 N.E.2d 1161, 1165 (1979), for the proposition that in Indiana, there is a constitutional right to review of administrative actions. That case in turn drew this proposition from Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940). In Warren, this Court determined that the orders of an administrative body are subject to judicial review; and that they must be so to meet the requirements of due process. 217 Ind. at 105, 26 N.E.2d at 404. Although referring to due process, a term from the federal constitution, it is clear that the Warren opinion was grounded in Article I, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides: All courts shall be open; and every man, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. The statutes involved in this case provide for review. The problem is that the County officials have not yet taken the action, as they are required to do by statute, to permit full review. As we held in Clifft v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, dealing with a contention of undue delay under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment: [W]here property rights are involved, mere postponement of the opportunity to be heard is not a denial of due process if the opportunity ultimately given is adequate. 660 N.E.2d 310, 318 (Ind. 1995) (citing Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 631-32, 96 S.Ct. 1062, 47 L.Ed.2d 278 (1976)). We are not presented with a deprivation of property without any remedy. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (the state's dismissal of an employee's timely filed claim because the Commission failed to hold a hearing within the statutory time frame was unconstitutional because the dismissal, without an alternative remedy, deprived the employee of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 50 S.Ct. 451, 74 L.Ed. 1107 (1930) (a state court's order that a taxpayer first seek an administrative remedy, when in fact none was available, violated the Fourteenth Amendment). Rather, this case presents delays in processing that presumably are the product of the legislature's decision to require administrative review and the county's level of service in fulfilling that obligation. There is no reason to believe that relief, although delayed, is not wholly obtainable. The remedy of mandamus, although cumbersome, is available to the taxpayers unwilling to wait in line. That is enough to render the statutory scheme constitutional, if unwieldy. The General Assembly may wish to address Mixmill's very legitimate concerns. However, this Court cannot legislate a remedy for an awkward but nonetheless constitutional method of reviewing taxpayer protests.