Opinion ID: 612140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Presence of Government Agents in the Courtroom

Text: 102 Phibbs also asserts that defendants did not receive a fair trial because FBI Special Agent Clyde Merryman and DEA Special Agent Frank Finken, both of whom appeared as witnesses, were allowed to remain in the courtroom throughout the proceedings. 103 Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Exclusion of Witnesses) provides: 104 At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. The rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause. 105 In the instant case, the government sought to designate both Merryman and Finken as its representatives during the trial. After a defense objection, the district court replied: 106 I think the rule provides that anyone that was necessary to assist counsel in the presentation of the case would be--would be permitted to remain in the courtroom. Inasmuch as this is an extended trial, boxes of documents both from the Eastern District of Kentucky and the Eastern District [of] Tennessee, it would be unduly burdensome on the Court and time consuming if we just had one case agent. So the request of the Government is not unreasonable, so the motion is overruled. 107 The court then engaged in a colloquy with one of the counsel for the defense, inviting him to bring contrary authority to its attention before any witnesses were called. Counsel did not do so. 108 Hence, the court initially treated both Merryman and Finken as essential witnesses under Rule 615(3). Later, however, the court requested that the government designate one of the two as its representative pursuant to Rule 615(2); it would then consider whether the other agent was an essential witness. The government responded by selecting Merryman as its representative, and the court found that Finken's presence in the courtroom was also needed for the government to effectively present its case. 109 Phibbs concedes that one of the agents could have stayed in the courtroom, despite the fact that he would later testify. However, he argues that the government had the burden to show that the presence of more than one agent was essential to it laying out its case. See Fed.R.Evid. 615. 110 The district court followed our procedure, as set out in United States v. Pulley, 922 F.2d 1283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Pulley v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 67, 116 L.Ed.2d 42 (1991), to be used when the government seeks to have two agent-witnesses in the courtroom for assistance. Rule 615(2) affords the government the right to designate only one representative for such a purpose. Id. at 1286. However, certain prosecutions may be complex enough that the aid of more than one law enforcement officer is needed to sort through extensive, technical evidence, and to help map out strategy. See United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir.1990). When the government wants to have two agent-witnesses in attendance throughout a trial, it is always free to designate one agent as its representative under subpart (2) [to Rule 615] and to try to show under subpart (3) that the presence of the second agent is essential to the presentation of its case. Pulley, 922 F.2d at 1286. 111 Demonstrating that an additional agent 4 is, in fact, essential is no easy task. Criminal defendants, as do all persons caught up in the legal process, have a substantial interest in discouraging and exposing fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion related to in-court testimony. Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Evid. 615. This interest was recognized in the text of Rule 615, which made the exclusion of witnesses by the parties a matter of right, subject to exceptions that are narrowly defined. 112 The essential witness exception set out in Rule 615(3) contemplates such persons as an agent who handled the transaction being litigated or an expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation. Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Evid. 615. We are persuaded that Finken fell within this category due to the particular circumstances of the case at bar. This was a trial that was scheduled for approximately one month, involving several defendants and a great deal of evidence, not all of which was readily accessible. After Merryman was designated the government's representative in accordance with Rule 615(2), the court determined that Finken, who was intimately familiar with portions of the evidence, was also needed to advise the government in its handling of the prosecution. As Merryman and Finken were, for the most part, responsible for distinct aspects 5 of a far-flung investigation, this was not an abuse of discretion. 113 We note that the district court took steps to guarantee that Merryman and Finken would not parrot each other's testimony. It directed that, when one of them was on the stand, the other was to be outside the courtroom. Such a measure could be taken, not only on the basis of the court's inherent powers of trial oversight, but also in reliance upon Rule 615 itself. See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 654 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156, 102 S.Ct. 1029, 71 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (breach of conditions placed on sequestration constitutes violation of Fed.R.Evid. 615). 114 Phibbs, however, asserts that government counsel really wanted Finken and Merryman in court so that they might be in a position to coach Parks during recesses, or to otherwise guide his testimony. He claims that defendants were prejudiced because Merryman had substantial contact with Parks, and the clear purpose and effect of allowing Agent Merryman to remain in the courtroom was to be able to listen to all of the testimony and to, in fact, cumulatively correct any questionable credibility problems and to bolster the credibility of Mr. Parks[.] As for Finken, he also had the opportunity to sit through this testimony and assist Agent Merryman in the 'correction' of Mr. Parks' testimony. Phibbs offers nothing to support his charges, and we find them to be rank speculation. 115 Despite the possibility of improper influence, Rule 615(2) allows the government to have any law enforcement officer it wants at its counsel table. Similarly, Rule 615(3) does not categorically bar any class of agents from assuming essential witness status. Ordinarily, if there are concerns about coaching by an agent-witness, the court may order him not to discuss the case with any other witness. If the agent fails to adhere to such an order, the court has a variety of remedies at its disposal, ranging from commenting on the transgression to the jury, to holding the agent in contempt, or disqualifying him as a witness, or even declaring a mistrial. 116 In addition, the defense is free to cross-examine both the agent-witness and the alleged object of his coaching efforts, subject to the control of the court. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1335-36, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976). See also M. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6611 at 217-221 (West 1992). Here, defendants engaged in spirited cross-examination of Parks, Merryman, and Finken, touching upon the question of coaching.