Opinion ID: 2174566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Suppression of Immunity Bargain

Text: The final error alleged by defendant concerns an agreement granting transactional immunity to Svara by the prosecutor in return for Svara's testimony. At trial, Svara was asked on cross-examination if any type of bargain had been struck in return for his testimony. Svara replied that none had been made. Part of the agreement between Svara's defense counsel and the prosecutor was that Svara was not to be informed of any bargain until after his testimony. At a hearing to determine whether to permit defense counsel to file a belated and supplemental motion to correct errors, James Redwine, the prosecutor, testified that he had informed defense counsel of the agreement. In addition he pointed out that Svara's counsel had been present in the court room during Svara's entire testimony. The position of the defendant is that the prosecutor had an absolute duty to correct Svara's testimony by informing the jury that immunity had been granted Svara in exchange for his testimony. The state argues that defense counsel knew of the agreement prior to trial thereby absolving the prosecutor of any duty to come forward at trial. The duty upon a prosecutor to come forward when testimony is given known by him to be false is well-settled. Alcorta v. Texas, (1957) 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9. As was stated in Napue v. Illlinois, (1959) 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, the duty to come forward is not muted by the fact that the false testimony goes only to the credibility of a particular witness. This Court addressed a similar problem in Newman v. State, (1975) Ind., 334 N.E.2d 684. In that case the attorney who prosecuted the case was not personally aware of any bargain and failed to inform the court, the jury and defense only through inadvertence. Nevertheless, we reversed because the jury had not been informed of the deal. Accord, Giglio v. United States, (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104. The case at bar differs in one important way. Defense counsel knew that immunity had been granted Svara yet he took no action to correct the erroneous testimony. The defendant may not observe an error in the trial, make no objection or attempt to have corrective action taken and then rely upon such error for reversal. Merry v. State, (1975) Ind. App., 335 N.E.2d 249. Secondly, the rationale for requiring disclosure to the jury is absent where the witness, as in this case, is unaware of the immunity agreement. As stated in Napue : The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend. Defense counsel brought out that Svara had not been charged as had his other accomplices. In that way his possible bias had been exposed to the jury. This opinion is not to be read to permit the prosecution to surreptitiously enter into immunity agreements with witnesses' counsel to avoid bringing such information before the jury. However, it is our opinion that the prosecutor has met his burden under the facts of this case when he has fully informed defense counsel of all immunity or leniency agreements. For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and ARTERBURN, DeBRULER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.