Opinion ID: 2464109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Appellants contend that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to enforce Hartford's statutory lien, and, therefore, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Hartford against Daves. This point is meritless. Under the Arkansas Constitution, circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all cases where jurisdiction is not expressly vested in another court. Russell v. Cockrill, Judge, 211 Ark. 123, 199 S.W.2d 584 (1947). In order to successfully attack the circuit court's jurisdiction, a party must show that another court has been given exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter. Id. Appellants have not cited any authority for the proposition that Hartford's action to enforce its statutory lien or subrogation rights and recover money damages is cognizable exclusively in equity. Furthermore, it is clear that Hartford's action is cognizable in law. First of all, it is well established that an action for money damages is cognizable in law. See Priddy v. Mayer Aviation, Inc., 260 Ark. 3, 537 S.W.2d 370 (1976). Secondly, this court has allowed statutory liens and subrogation rights to be enforced in circuit court. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Riverside Marine Remfg., 278 Ark. 585, 647 S.W.2d 462 (1983). This court has held that where a defendant raises a defense cognizable only in equity, the case must be heard in equity. See Poultry Growers v. Westark Prod. Credit, 246 Ark. 995, 440 S.W.2d 531 (1969). However, the doctrine of estoppel in pais is available both in law and equity. Branch v. Standard Title Co., 252 Ark. 737, 480 S.W.2d 568 (1972). See also United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 256 Ark. 1047, 511 S.W.2d 659 (1974). Estoppel in pais is the doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his acts or conduct or by failure to act or speak under circumstances where he should do so, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. See Branch, supra . Appellants, in their answer, asserted that Hartford had waived its subrogation rights by not taking steps to procure protection of those rights during the litigation between Daves and Breyel and that Hartford was estopped from bringing any claim for its subrogation interest in that Hartford informed Daves that its interest had been paid by Sentry, prior to the conclusion of the litigation. This is essentially an estoppel in pais argument, which is cognizable in law.