Opinion ID: 770541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reed's Testimony

Text: 14 During Reed's second trial, the government was permitted to read into evidence the entire transcript of Reed's testimony from the first trial. Before we address the merits of Reed's challenge to the district judge's decision to admit this testimony, a review of the procedural history relevant to this issue is in order. On February 23, 1999, prior to the second trial, the government submitted a motion in limine, indicating that it wanted to introduce limited portions of Reed's testimony from the first trial. Then, on June 4, 1999, the government submitted a second motion in limine seeking to preclude Reed (assuming he would not be testifying) from offering any of his testimony from the first trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, which requires such testimony to be offered by a party opponent. On the morning the trial was to begin, the government withdrew its February 23, 1999 motion, and the court granted the June 4, 1999 motion. At trial and without objection, the government introduced into evidence a transcript of Reed's entire testimony from his first trial. 5 15 Reed's prior testimony was admitted as an admission of a party opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2)(A), which provides that a statement is not hearsay and may be admitted when the statement in question is offered against a party and is the party's own statement. Reed now makes two general arguments 16 (1) each of the statements that the government sought to include were not against his interest and (2) the district judge erred when he failed to require redaction of Reed's testimony, so that only the statements against Reed's interest remained. However, neither of these arguments were raised on the record, at trial or during sentencing. As such, on appeal, we review the district judge's decision to permit the reading of Reed's entire testimony for plain error only. See United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 552 (7th Cir. 1999). 17 Reed's first argument fails because, contrary to Reed's assertion, statements admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) need not be inculpatory. See United States v. McGee, 189 F.3d 626, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1999). While Reed acknowledges that admissions need not be inculpatory, he argues that to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), an admission must be contrary to the trial position of the party. This is not the law and Reed has not persuaded us that it should be. Id. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) merely renders a statement non- hearsay if it was made by the party against whom it is offered. As we stated in McGee, the statements need neither be incriminating, inculpatory, against interest, nor otherwise inherently damaging to the declarant's case. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) simply admits those statements made by one party, but offered as evidence by the opposing party. Therefore, the mere fact that the admitted testimony consisted of statements made by Reed, but offered by the government in its prosecution of him, makes Reed's testimony admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). 18 Reed's second argument concerning redaction is equally unpersuasive. Reed suggests that because not all of the statements contained in Reed's prior testimony were against his interest, the court should have admitted only those portions of testimony that were expressly inculpatory and redacted all others. As explained above, Rule 801(d)(2)(A) does not require that any of the statements admitted be inculpatory. The government offered the entire transcript of Reed's testimony from the first trial against him as part of its prosecution. Therefore, admission of the entire transcript was proper under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), and redaction was not necessary. Reed was not unduly prejudiced by the reading of his former testimony, and the district judge did not commit plain error. 19