Opinion ID: 2971496
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Past Persecution and Withholding of Removal

Text: The omissions in the BIA and IJ’s conclusions with respect to Gjyzi’s past persecution and eligibility for withholding of removal are equally problematic. Because Gjyzi does not raise his Convention Against Torture claim in his brief before this Court, we consider only his challenge to the BIA and IJ’s denial of his application for withholding of removal pursuant to the INA. To be eligible for withholding of removal pursuant to the INA, an alien must establish that “it is more likely than not” that his or her “life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). We must uphold the BIA's determination denying withholding of removal, unless it is manifestly contrary to the law. Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 533, 552 (6th Cir. 2003). If an alien can establish that he has been subject to past persecution, there is a presumption, subject to rebuttal by the Government, that his “life or freedom would be threatened in the future” in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i). Even under this highly deferential standard of review, we conclude that the BIA’s decision cannot, on this record, be upheld. Both the BIA and IJ fail to state conclusions at all on several important issues. No. 03-3054 Gjyzi v. Ashcroft, et al. Page 5 As discussed, the IJ denied Gjyzi withholding of removal because she found that he was not credible with respect to his claims of past persecution, due to perceived inconsistencies in his testimony and asylum application. The IJ also rejected Gjyzi’s claims of past persecution on the ground that they were not supported by the U.S. State Department Country Report on Albania or the Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions submitted by the Government.1 The BIA overturned the IJ’s adverse credibility findings, but again, without explanation, affirmed the denial of withholding of removal pursuant to the INA. Having voided the rationale that Gjyzi was not credible, the BIA failed to indicate an alternative basis for finding that Gjyzi was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA. It is difficult to conduct meaningful judicial review of the IJ’s decision finding that an alien has “failed to satisfy his burden of proof for withholding of removal” when there is no underlying determination of whether there was past persecution. See El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 204 (1st Cir. 2003); Yatskin v. I.N.S., 255 F.3d 5, at 9 (1st Cir. 2001). It is not discernible whether the BIA’s reversal of the IJ’s adverse credibility finding signaled the BIA’s belief that Gjyzi sufficiently showed past persecution – although that is a logical implication of the BIA’s ruling. If it did signal recognition of Gjyzi’s past persecution, there is a presumption, subject to rebuttal by the Government, that Gjyzi’s life or freedom would be threatened in the future. But there simply is no evidence that Gjyzi’s case was evaluated under that burden-shifting scheme. The BIA purported to affirm the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal, because, as the BIA stated, “the Board’s conclusions . . . coincide with those the Immigration Judge articulated in . . . her decision,” but we know that the IJ never reached the burden-shifting analysis, because it rejected Gjyzi’s claims of past persecution. The absence of reasoned discussion of past persecution undercuts any meaningful review of the BIA’s apparent rejection of the claim that Gjyzi would be subject to future persecution. We do not know whether Gjyzi should have had the benefit of the regulatory presumption of future persecution based on prior events, and if so, whether or not that presumption was employed. Here, we do not suggest that the evidence compels a conclusion either way with respect to Gjyzi’s withholding of removal claim, but in light of the uncertainty as to whether Gjyzi’s case was decided within the prescribed regulatory framework, a remand for further explanation and consideration is required.