Opinion ID: 8704092
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D)

Text: Exemption 7(C) protects from disclosure information in law enforcement records that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). In determining whether this exemption applies to particular material, the Court must balance the privacy interests of individuals mentioned in the records against the public interest in disclosure. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2011) (“In deciding whether the release of particular information constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy under Exemption 7(C), we must balance the public interest in disclosure against the [privacy] interest Congress intended the Exemption to protect.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007). The privacy interest at stake belongs to the individual, not the government agency, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-65, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989), and “individuals have a strong interest in not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity.” Stern v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C.Cir. 1984). “[T]he only public interest relevant for purposes of Exemption 7(C) is one that focuses on ‘the citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to.’ ” Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468). Under Exemption 7(C) the FBI has withheld the names and identifying information of “dozens of individuals,” most of whom were inmates, “interviewed by the FBI during the course of the Randall Anderson murder investigation,” Hardy Deck ¶ 34, “Federal Bureau of Prisons special investigative agents, guards, a probation officer, and Assistant U.S. Attorney, and a federal public defender,” id. ¶ 37, third parties “of investigative interest to the FBI,” id. ¶ 39, FBI Special Agents who conducted, supervised, or maintained the activities reported in the responsive records, id. ¶ 41, and “third parties merely mentioned in the FD-302s created in connection with the ... murder investigation,” id. ¶ 42. In no circumstance does the declarant identify' a public interest sufficient to outweigh the recognized privacy interests of these third parties. See id. ¶ 33. Exemption 7(D) protects from disclosure the records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes that: could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source ... [who] furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation ..., information furnished by a confidential source. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). “A source is confidential within the meaning of [Exemption 7(D) if the source provided information under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which such an assurance could be reasonably inferred.” Williams v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 69 F.3d 1155, 1159 (D.C.Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[E]xpress confidentiality is relatively easy to spot,” Brown v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 873 F.Supp.2d 388, 406 (D.D.C.2012), and may be shown by “notations on the face of the withheld document.” Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 34 (D.C.Cir.1998). Confidentiality may be inferred in circumstances such as those arising from the Anderson murder investigation. See Holt v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 734 F.Supp.2d 28, 45 (D.D.C.2010) (withholding information provided by eyewitnesses to murder for which requester was prosecuted); see also Parton v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 727 F.2d 774, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1984) (withholding under Exemption 7(D) identities of prison officials and inmates interviewed by FBI agents conducting investigation of complaint brought by requester who allegedly was beaten and abused by prison officials, noting that through disclosure of prison officials’ identities “not only could future investigations be hindered, but, there is a high probability of reprisal for those who chose to cooperate in the investigation”). Here, the FBI withholds under Exemption 7(D) “the identities of, and information received from, individuals who provided information to the FBI during the course of the Randall Anderson murder investigation ... under circumstances from which an assurance of confidentiality may be implied.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 47. The topics of the interviews include the murder itself as well as the events leading to and following after the murder, which is described as “an extremely violent stabbing of a prison inmate by other inmates” and was “likely motivated by prison affiliations.” Id. Also withheld under Exemption 7(D) are the name of, identifying data about, and information provided by a third party to whom the FBI expressly granted confidentiality by promising him that neither his identity nor the information he provided would be disclosed, and by inserting the term “ ‘Protect Identity’ in the body of the FD-302.” Id. ¶ 48. The Court construes plaintiffs opposition as a challenge to the withholding of information under both Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 7(D). Plaintiff disclaims any interest in “personal information ... about anybody,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, and he characterizes his FOIA request as one for “simply the witness statements of hundreds of federal prisoners from over 15 years ago,” id. at 3. He argues that information can be withheld under Exemption 7(C) “only when revelation ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’ ” Id. at 2-3 (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 769, 109 S.Ct. 1468). With respect to Exemption 7(D), plaintiff argues that “ ‘confidential sources’, not generalized information,” is exempt from disclosure, id. at 3. In other words, “[w]ho the witness is, not what that witness observed and reported, is protected.” Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff claims that “the FBI’s sweeping redaction of every single relevant fact defies ‘common sense and probability.’” Id. In plaintiffs view, the FBI acts in “bad faith” by “pretending that [he] can magically identify hundreds of witnesses simply by reading the content of reports made to the FBI in 1996.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs arguments, however, are meritless. The D.C. Circuit has held “categorically that, unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991). Plaintiff neither articulates a public interest nor provides any support for his assertion of agency bad faith. See Boyd v. Crim. Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 387 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Nat’l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004)) (“If the public interest is government wrongdoing, then the requester must ‘produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.’ ”). And once a source’s confidentiality is determined, “almost nothing can eviscerate Exemption 7(D) protection.” Reiter v. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 96-0378, 1997 WL 470108, at  (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 1997), aff'd, No. 97-5246, 1998 WL 202247 (D.C.Cir. Mar. 3, 1998). Exemption 7(D) permits the FBI to withhold not only the source’s identity but also the information provided by that source. See Parker v. Dep’t of Justice, 934 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C.Cir.1991). The Court concludes, therefore, that the FBI properly has withheld the names of, identifying information about, and information provided by third parties under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D).