Opinion ID: 2443972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Jurisdiction of the Virginia Court on Child Custody Issues

Text: Upson argues that the April 2, 2007, July 13, 2007, and February 24, 2008 orders erroneously dismissed her requests for custody and visitation for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Throughout her brief on appeal, and as she has for much of the history of this case, Upson argues that Virginia lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate custody since she and Georgiana moved from the Commonwealth into the District of Columbia in April of 2005. She argues that the District of Columbia, as the residence of all interested parties since April of 2005, was and is the proper place to adjudicate custody of Georgiana. We review this issue of law de novo. Keeton, supra, 987 A.2d at 1121 n. 5. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), codified in the District of Columbia at D.C.Code §§ 16-4601.01 to -4605.03, enumerates the requirements for a state to exert subject matter jurisdiction over a child custody dispute. [28] Under the UCCJEA, a state may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a custody matter if it is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding. See D.C.Code § 16-4602.01(a)(1) & (2). The home state is the state in which a child lived with a parent . . . for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. See D.C.Code § 16-4601.01(8). The jurisdiction of the court is determined at the onset of the custody proceeding, and continues until a court of competent jurisdiction determines that it no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. See D.C.Code §§ 16-4602.01(a)(1) & (2), -4602.02(a); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 202 comment (1997), 9 U.L.A. (Part IA) 675 (1999) (Jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of a proceeding. If State A had jurisdiction under this section at the time a modification proceeding was commenced there, it would not be lost by all parties moving out of the State prior to the conclusion of proceedings.). Pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-4602.06(a): [A] court of the District may not exercise its jurisdiction under this subchapter if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of the District is a more convenient forum under section 16-4602.07. Although Upson and Georgiana moved to the District of Columbia in April of 2005, under the UCCJEA, Virginia was the home state of the child when Wallace initiated a custody proceeding in the Commonwealth on March 2, 2005, because Georgiana had lived in Virginia since her birth on May 30, 2004. Since Virginia had jurisdiction at the outset of the custody proceedings, Virginia continued to have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA until the conclusion of the custody matter, despite the fact that Upson and Georgiana ceased to live there. See D.C.Code §§ 16-4602.01(a)(1) & (2), -4602.02(a). When Upson filed the 2007 Complaint for Custody, an interim custody decree had been issued in Virginia, but the final custody order had not. The District could not exercise jurisdiction over the custody matter under D.C.Code § 16-4602.06(a) because the Virginia proceeding was never stayed, since Upson's Notice and Motion to Determine that Virginia is an Inconvenient Forum and/or no Longer has Continuing Jurisdiction was denied by the Virginia court, and a final custody order had not yet been issued. [29] Although Upson's August 16, 2004 petition for child support and child custody was the first filing in either the District or in Virginia, Upson voluntarily withdrew her request for child custody in the District and began litigating in the Virginia custody action initiated by Wallace. The UCCJEA is intended to prevent competing custody proceedings in different states, and its operation in this case did just that, allowing for a custody determination to proceed to its conclusion in Virginia. [30] Because Virginia was the home state of Georgiana when the Virginia custody proceedings began, and the proceedings were not stayed or terminated, the District of Columbia did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate custody, and the three orders on appeal were properly dismissed by the District of Columbia Superior Court.