Opinion ID: 692986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: abstention and discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction

Text: 28 Colorado River abstention is to be used only sparingly, see Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. at 1244, and this case is a poor candidate. The district court acknowledged that several of the [Colorado River ] factors are either neutral or weighing in favor of the exercise of [federal] jurisdiction. It rested its decision on two concerns: that remanding only the class members' claims would split the action, and the novel and complex questions of state law. 29 The first of these two concerns--the risk of piecemeal litigation--is a problem only under the district court's view of abstention. The second consideration--that novel and complex state law issues govern the action--has more merit. Cf. Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 23-24, 103 S.Ct. at 941 (disfavoring abstention where federal question controls). These state law issues included whether indirect purchasers can state a claim under Louisiana antitrust law, and whether the claims in this case were preempted by federal antitrust law. 30 We agree that these may prove to be difficult questions. Standing alone, however, the novelty or complexity of state law issues is not enough to compel abstention. See, e.g., Rougon v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 575 F.Supp. 95, 97 (M.D.La.1983) (denying motion to remand to state court even though the issues presented, involving previously undecided matters of Louisiana ... law, are peculiarly suited to disposition by the state courts of Louisiana). Only  'exceptional' circumstances, the 'clearest of justifications,' ... can suffice under Colorado River to justify the surrender of [federal] jurisdiction. Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 25-26, 103 S.Ct. at 942 (emphasis omitted). This is not one of those truly rare and exceptional cases in which Colorado River abstention is proper. 31 The district court remanded the claims of other class members because they presented novel issues of state law, including whether indirect purchasers could state a claim under Louisiana antitrust law and whether the antitrust claim was preempted by federal law. 32 Refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the unnamed plaintiffs' claims reflects respect for considerations of comity, but it assumes that the claims of the class representatives were to be remanded to state court. The court must now adjudicate claims of the class representatives--including the same novel and complex state law issues the district court preferred to leave to Louisiana. So the interests of comity will not be served by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the class members whose claims do not meet the jurisdictional amount. 33 In short, the entire case should remain in federal court. The district court had diversity jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs' claims; Sec. 1367 granted it supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs; and, considering that it must try the named plaintiffs' claims, it abused its discretion on the facts here in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the unnamed plaintiffs' claims. It is not necessary to decide the problematic contention that the district court also had federal question jurisdiction, and we do not. We VACATE the district court's remand order, and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings. The petition for mandamus is DENIED.