Opinion ID: 3018121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Standards for Establishing Employment

Text: Discrimination
Two principles guide our analysis. First, Title VII is a remedial statute, so it must be interpreted broadly. See 42 U.S.C. § 1604.34 (“These rules and regulations shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose and provisions of Title VII . . . .”); see also Slagle, 435 F.3d at 267 (citing Bowers v. NCAA, 346 F.3d 402, 431 n.24 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We recognize that []Title VII is clearly remedial civil rights legislation . . . .”)); Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that we must construe remedial statutes liberally). Second, there is a low bar for establishing a prima facie 9 case of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1993) (“In Title VII cases involving a dispute over subjective qualifications, we have recognized that the qualification issue should often be resolved in the second and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas . . . analysis [discussed below], to avoid putting too onerous a burden on the plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case . . . . Because the prima facie case is easily made out, it is rarely the focus of the ultimate disagreement.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas . . . was never intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.”) (internal citations omitted).
To prevail on a claim for gender discrimination under Title VII and its analogous provision under the PHRA,5 Scheidemantle must satisfy the three-step burden-shifting 5 We construe Title VII and the PHRA consistently. See Atkinson v. LaFayette College, 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); Slagle, 435 F.3d at 262; Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996); Gomez v. Allegheny Health Serv., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995). 10 inquiry laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). First, she must establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination. To do that, she must demonstrate that (a) she was a member of a protected class, (b) she was qualified for the locksmith job to which she applied, and (c) another, not in the protected class, was treated more favorably. See id. at 802–03. If she succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the University to establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote her. Id. at 804–05. If the University is able to provide such a reason, Scheidemantle must then show that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for actual discrimination. Id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).