Opinion ID: 1940896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Isiocha Made a Timely Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.

Text: Teague contends that Dr. Isiocha made an untimely motion challenging Dr. Siegal's competency to testify on the standard of care applicable to a family physician. Interestingly, on appeal, Teague does not question that Dr. Siegal, as a cardiologist/internist, cannot opine on the standard of care applicable to a family physician in the circumstances of this case. Teague contends that he properly identified Dr. Siegal as his standard of care and causation expert pursuant to Delaware Superior Civil Rule 26(b)(4) and that Dr. Isiocha's counsel had deposed Dr. Siegal for discovery purposes well in advance of trial. Teague further contends that, if Dr. Isiocha questioned Dr. Siegal's competency, then Dr. Isiocha should have moved to disqualify him pretrial or challenged Dr. Siegal before or at the time of Dr. Siegal's testimony regarding the applicable standard of care. Had Dr. Isiocha objected earlier, Teague claims, he would have been on notice that Dr. Isiocha intended to challenge Dr. Siegal's opinion, and would have been able sufficiently to address Dr. Siegal's competence to speak to the applicable standard of care during his direct testimony. Dr. Isiocha counters that he did move timely because he first became aware of Dr. Siegal's inability to testify about the applicable standard of care during Dr. Siegal's direct examination. Dr. Isiocha, unsurprisingly, agrees with the trial judge's conclusions that, without that crucial testimony, Dr. Siegal could not opine on the relevant standard of care and causation and that Teague failed to meet his burden under Section 6854. Dr. Isiocha is technically correct that he did not need to question Dr. Siegal's competency to opine on standard of care and causation until cross examination. Dr. Isiocha did not base his motion on mandatory discoverable pretrial information, i.e. experts credentials or a lack of the necessary discoverable items under Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(4). Rather, Dr. Isiocha moved for a judgment as a matter of law, relying on Dr. Siegal's direct testimony that raised for the first time Dr. Siegal's ambiguously expressed reluctance to address emergency room or family practice issues. We note that parties may stipulate in a pretrial order to an end date for objections to opposing experts' competence to testify about the applicable standard of care. [7] Such a stipulation would have prevented the problem that occurred in this case by forcing the issue before the expense of trial. Rule 16, however, neither requires that parties object pretrial nor that trial judges impose a deadline for objections. [8] Teague insists that AMI Sebastian Hall v. Radnich [9] holds that a failure to object to an expert in the pretrial stipulation or deposition waives the right to object when the expert testifies at trial. Teague's reliance on AMI is misplaced. The trial judge in AMI referred to that issue in dicta, implicitly suggesting that the issue of the expert's competency to testify on the applicable standard of care would have been clearly drawn pretrial. Here, however, the issue did not arise until Dr. Siegal introduced it by his remarkable disclaimer seemingly limiting his own professed ability to address family and emergency room practice issues. [10] There can be no question that Dr. Siegal testified about his ability to opine on the applicable standard of care somewhat ambiguously. Teague should have realized that Dr. Siegal's direct testimony obscured the standards applicable to cardiologists, internists and family practice physicians and that further foundational questions on direct examination were necessary. Furthermore, Teague could have used his redirect examination to clarify Dr. Siegal's statement that: I'm here as an expert on the treatment of patients with cardiovascular risk factors who present with chest pain; not any other emergency room issue or family practice issue. Teague did nothing to rehabilitate Dr. Siegal until his unsuccessful attempt to seek telephonic voir dire after the case closed, and after Dr. Isiocha's counsel had moved for judgment as a matter of law. A motion for judgment as a matter of law is proper when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the plaintiff] on that issue. [11] When Teague's expert's testimony on standard of care and causation failed to identify and define the standard of care applicable to a family care physician under the circumstances presented, the jury had no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for Teague on his claim that Dr. Isiocha acted negligently by breaching the applicable standard of care in a manner that caused Gloria's death. Dr. Isiocha made a timely motion after Teague had completed his case in chief. The procedural rules do not compel him to do so earlier to afford Teague an opportunity to rehabilitate Dr. Siegal before the trial judge's ruling. [12] We acknowledge that the legal issues presented here arose under unusual circumstances. Although the trial judge possessed all of the necessary facts to rule on Dr. Isiocha's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the end of Teague's case in chief, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by waiting until the end of the defense case. Similarly, although Dr. Isiocha could have sought to exclude Dr. Siegal's testimony before trial if he had some reason to anticipate Dr. Siegal's testimony on direct, Dr. Isiocha was not required to time his motion for judgment as a matter of law to his own prejudice.