Opinion ID: 6337965
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: We review a district court's grant or denial of habeas corpus de novo, and the underlying findings of fact for clear error. Rubin v. Garvin, 544 F.3d 461, 467 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 389 (2d Cir. 2008)). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, enacted in 1996: An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Id. § 2254(d). A claim is adjudicated on the merits if the state court ruled on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural ground. Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 12 20-3317-cv Jordan v. Lamanna Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Id. A writ cannot be granted simply because . . . the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Id. at 411. Rather, whether a decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law is a substantially higher threshold than mere incorrectness. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). AEDPA does not require state courts to extend [the Supreme Court's] precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014) (emphasis in original). The writ should be granted on grounds of unreasonableness only if the state court's ruling on the claim . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). In other words, the 13 20-3317-cv Jordan v. Lamanna existence of reasonable arguments on both sides is all [the government] needs to prevail in [an] AEDPA case. White, 572 U.S. at 427.