Opinion ID: 2086402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues raised in this appeal

Text: Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration: 1. Whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence that Appellant and the investigating officers were aware of the acquittal of alleged accomplice Daniel Freeman, which was offered for the limited purpose of showing the state of mind of Appellant and the motivation of the interrogating officer at the time Appellant purportedly confessed to the crime. 2. Whether the prosecutor's guilt phase closing argument was egregiously improper and violated Appellant's rights to due process and a fair trial. 3. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence because the Commonwealth used its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. 4. Whether the jury instructions on accomplice liability were erroneous and relieved the Commonwealth of its constitutional obligation to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 5. Whether Appellant's convictions and sentence must be vacated because the Commonwealth suppressed exculpatory evidence concerning a deal with its key witness and because it allowed her false testimony to go uncorrected. 6. Whether Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase of his capital trial. 7. Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could not consider Appellant's purported statement against him unless it found that he gave the statement voluntarily, and whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or offer an appropriate instruction. 8. Whether the trial court erred when it gave the jury its opinion as to the appropriate verdict. 9. Whether Appellant was convicted of the crimes of conspiracy and possession of an instrument of crime although those charges were barred by the statute of limitations, and whether the failure of trial counsel and the court to quash the time barred conspiracy charges prejudicially affected the jury's guilt and capital sentencing deliberations. 10. Whether the PCRA Court erroneously denied Appellant's requests for discovery and for funds to obtain expert testimony, depriving Appellant of his rights to due process under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions and the effective assistance of post conviction counsel, and of his right to a full and fair evidentiary hearing on his post conviction claims. 11. Whether, at the penalty phase of Appellant's capital trial, counsel failed to investigate, develop and present evidence in mitigation of the offense and to rebut alleged aggravating circumstances, depriving Appellant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. 12. Whether counsel's performance at the penalty phase of Appellant's capital trial was prejudicially deficient, in violation of Appellant's rights to the effective assistance of counsel under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, in that counsel made affirmatively harmful arguments and failed to object to improper prosecutorial argument. 13. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his sentence of death because the jury instructions and the sentencing phase verdict slip indicated that the jury had to unanimously find any mitigating factor before it could give effect to that factor in its sentencing decision. 14. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his sentence of death because the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury as to the torture aggravating circumstance and the prosecutor made improper argument regarding that aggravator. 15. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his sentence of death because the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury concerning the contract killing aggravating circumstance, because the prosecutor made improper argument in support of it, and because this court construed that aggravator in a way that failed to provide adequate notice and failed to limit the sentencer's discretion. 16. Whether the instructions of the trial court prevented the jury from considering and giving effect to relevant mitigating evidence. 17. Whether all prior counsel were ineffective to the extent that they failed to object to or timely and properly raise each of the above cited errors. 18. Whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence because of the cumulative effect of the above-alleged errors. 19. Whether Appellant's statement to police should have been suppressed because it was not preserved by audio and/or video recording. 20. Whether the trial court's jury instructions regarding the burden of proof were erroneous. 21. Whether the trial court's jury instructions regarding Miranda were erroneous. This Court addressed issues 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 21 in Appellant's direct appeal. See Holloway, supra . Consequently, Appellant is ineligible for PCRA relief on these claims. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). Of the remaining issues, Appellant raised only issue 10 and a portion of issue 6 before the PCRA Court. Thus, all of Appellant's other claims are deemed waived. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 541 Pa. 85, 660 A.2d 1316 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051, 116 S.Ct. 717, 133 L.Ed.2d 671 (1996). Nevertheless, Appellant manages to preserve his claims for relief by alleging, in a most perfunctory manner, that all of his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the above-listed issues. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693 (1998). Accordingly, except for the two issues raised before the PCRA Court, we will treat each of the remaining issues as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Albrecht. To obtain relief on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must establish: (1) that there is merit to the underlying claim; (2) that counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her course of conduct; and (3) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the act or omission challenged, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 175, 683 A.2d 1181, 1188 (1996). Counsel is presumed to be effective and Appellant has the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 534 Pa. 488, 633 A.2d 1100 (1993). Additionally, counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise a claim that is without merit. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 538 Pa. 455, 649 A.2d 121 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1137, 115 S.Ct. 2569, 132 L.Ed.2d 821 (1995). Finally, pursuant to the PCRA, an ineffectiveness claim may provide relief only where it so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 1999 WL 22976 (1999), the prejudice standard applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought on direct appeal is substantively identical to the prejudice standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought on collateral appeal pursuant to the PCRA.