Opinion ID: 1906647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plymouth Sedan

Text: Central to this case is One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1251, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture proceedings such as the one involved in that case. In Plymouth Sedan, officers of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board stopped George McGonigle shortly after he drove his 1958 Plymouth sedan across the Benjamin Franklin Bridge into Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The officers, positioned at the foot of the bridge in New Jersey, had followed Mr. McGonigle after observing that the rear of his Plymouth was low in the rear, quite low. Id. at 694, 85 S.Ct. at 1247, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. During the stop, the officers searched the car without a warrant, finding thirty-one cases of liquor not bearing the necessary state tax seals. The officers arrested Mr. McGonigle. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania subsequently filed a petition for forfeiture of Mr. McGonigle's car based on a state statute that proclaimed [n]o property rights shall exist in any ... vehicle ... used in the illegal manufacture or illegal transportation of liquor... and the same shall be deemed contraband and proceedings for its forfeiture to the Commonwealth may ... be instituted.... Id. at 694 n. 2, 85 S.Ct. at 1247 n. 2, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Mr. McGonigle initially moved to dismiss the case, arguing that because the evidence necessary to prove the Commonwealth's case, the thirty-one cases of liquor, had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, they should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. The trial judge granted the motion and dismissed the case. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, holding that even if the instant automobile had been illegally seized, such fact would not preclude the instant civil proceeding of forfeiture. Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 547, 201 A.2d 427, 431 (1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important question of whether the constitutional exclusionary rule enunciated in [ Weeks and Mapp ] applies to forfeiture proceedings of the character involved here. Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 696, 85 S.Ct. at 1248, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (citations omitted). The Court held that the constitutional exclusionary rule does apply to such forfeiture proceedings, and reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. In Plymouth Sedan, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), [3] a case in which it was alleged that crates of plate glass were imported without the payment of the proper customs duty. The statute in that case provided a criminal penalty of $50 to $5000, up to two years imprisonment, and forfeiture of the goods. The government instituted a civil in rem forfeiture action against the imported glass. Addressing the civil nature of the proceeding, the Supreme Court in Boyd explained: If the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment, and to file a civil information against the claimants,that is, civil in form,can he by this device take from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their immunities as citizens, and extort from them a production of their private papers, or, as an alternative, a confession of guilt? This cannot be. The information, though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one.... As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the fourth amendment of the constitution.... Id. at 633-34, 6 S.Ct. at 534, 29 L.Ed. 746, quoted in Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 697-98, 85 S.Ct. at 1249, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. The Plymouth Sedan Court made clear that, although Boyd involved evidence sought by subpoena, that factual difference was irrelevant because the essential question is whether evidence[,] ... the obtaining of which violates the Fourth Amendment may be relied upon to sustain a forfeiture. Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 698, 85 S.Ct. at 1249, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Going on to explain its holding, the Court in Plymouth Sedan reasoned that [t]here is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile. It is only the alleged use to which this particular automobile was put that subjects Mr. McGonigle to its possible loss. Id. at 699, 85 S.Ct. at 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Additionally, a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law. Id. at 700, 85 S.Ct. at 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. The Supreme Court summarized its holding, stating: [W]e conclude that the nature of a forfeiture proceeding, so well described ... in Boyd, and the reasons which led the Court to hold that the exclusionary rule ... is obligatory upon the States under the Fourteenth Amendment ... in Mapp, support the conclusion that the exclusionary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings such as the one involved here. Id. at 702, 85 S.Ct. at 1251, 14 L.Ed.2d 170.