Opinion ID: 3063288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence Per Se Ruling

Text: Defendants admitted that Rowe pleaded guilty to violation of the Georgia statute requiring the driver of a vehicle to leave unobstructed a width of highway opposite a standing vehicle and to leave a clear view of the stopped vehicle from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon the highway. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-202. They also admitted that Rowe did not place reflective triangles behind his tractor when it became dark, as required by federal regulations. Based upon these admitted violations of the motor vehicle code and federal regulations, the district court granted McPherson’s Rule 50 motion and instructed the jury that Defendants were negligent. Defendants argued in the trial court, as they do here, that Rowe’s conduct was not negligence per se because he parked the tractor legally in the daylight and his violation was unintentional in that he did not mean to sleep past dark, when he was required to post reflective triangles behind his tractor. The district court did not err in holding that a violation of the statute need not be intentional to constitute negligence per se. See Butgereit v. Enviro-Tech Envtl. Servs., Inc., 586 S.E.2d 430 7 (Ga. App. 2003). The case Defendants cite is not to the contrary or applicable on the facts of this case, where Rowe intentionally parked and did not mark his vehicle with reflective triangles. Id. at 432-33 (a defendant can rebut the presumption of negligence per se by proving that the conduct to which he pleaded guilty was unintentional and in the exercise of ordinary care.).