Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Batson-Wheeler Claims (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants contend that by failing to grant their motions challenging the prosecution's excusal of seven Black male prospective jurors, made over defense objection, the trial court violated the federal constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws ( Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson )), and the state constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 ( Wheeler ).) [9] A prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias  that is, bias against members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds  violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the state Constitution. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 553, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) Such a practice also violates the defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; see People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622; People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 732, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and standard trial courts should use when handling motions challenging peremptory strikes. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citations.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' [Citation.] ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416, 162 L.Ed.2d 129, fn. omitted.) We review the trial court's ruling on purposeful racial discrimination for substantial evidence. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971, 123 Cal. Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) It is presumed that the prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner. We defer to the court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) As long as the court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. ( Ibid. ) We now turn to defendants' contentions regarding the seven prospective jurors. Defendants assert the prospective jurors were subjected to peremptory challenge in violation of Batson and Wheeler. The trial court disagreed. We will sustain its rulings.
There were four Batson-Wheeler motions. The first expressly covered three Black males against whom the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges: L.W., L.T., and C.W. (See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 549, 552, 43 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076 [scope of motion affects scope of inquiry into reasons for excusal].) The trial court stated that it saw nothing amounting to a prima facie case of improper group bias, but directed the prosecutor to explain her reasons for the challenges. After hearing these explanations, the court denied the motion without elaboration. In their second Batson-Wheeler motion, defendants expressly challenged the excusals of L.B. and K.B. The trial court found a prima facie case of improper group bias, but denied relief after hearing the prosecutor's reasons. It accepted without elaboration the prosecutor's reasons regarding L.B. With regard to K.B., the court commented that he showed an anti-capital punishment bias throughout the process. In their third Batson-Wheeler motion, defendants expressly challenged the excusal of V.H. The trial court first granted the motion, but changed its mind and denied it the next day. The court did so following an extensive hearing in which the prosecutor insisted that she had no reason or desire to discriminate, and argued that [no] prosecutor would allow a man like [V.H.] to sit on this jury. The court observed that all 6 of the People's peremptories have been of male Blacks. The court nonetheless concluded, I don't see anything that appears to be inherently racial in the prosecutor's reasons for excusing prospective jurors, and that the prosecutor had excused V.H. for a race neutral reason. In their fourth Batson-Wheeler motion, defendants expressly challenged the excusal of N.S. The trial court denied this motion too, with little discussion, stating, I accept the prosecution's explanation and reason as valid. The parties agreed that several Blacks served on the jury. The prosecutor also asserted, in response to the Batson-Wheeler motion concerning V.H., that the defense had peremptorily challenged three Black prospective jurors and sought stipulations to the excusal of another three. The foreperson of the jury at the guilt phase was a Black man, and the foreperson of the jury at the penalty phase was a Black woman.
We assume solely for purposes of argument that, for each prospective juror, we must proceed to the third step of the Batson-Wheeler inquiry, i.e., whether substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that the prosecution had articulated a permissible, race-neutral reason for the excusal. (See People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 200-201, 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717.) In each case, it is plain that there was. As noted, the first Batson-Wheeler motion expressly challenged the excusals of L.W., C.W., and L.T. Prospective Juror L.W. testified that a half-brother had been in and out of jail in Oklahoma since age 15 and was currently in state prison there. L.W. asserted he was once stopped by police on false pretenses. The police cited him for running a red light but he denied having done so. In his view, the police stopped him to see if he might have been driving a stolen car, and the citation was pretextual. He denied that this experience would cause him to tend to disbelieve police testimony. The prosecutor stated that the juror questionnaire and voir dire of L.W. warranted a peremptory challenge. For example, he had the brother in the Oklahoma prison. He indicated that his brother was in and out of jail. . . . Also, L.W. had a difficult time with the questionnaire in terms of understanding some of the legal concepts. And he gave me a bad feeling . . . right from the start, especially when he indicated he was . . . stopped for running a red light, [and] felt that the police simply used an excuse to stop him because they actually thought he was driving a hot car. And it was definitely my feeling that he thought he was being discriminated against because he was Black. [¶] I did not believe him when he said that he would not hold that against us. Everything about his demeanor . . . was very negative. I didn't feel like there was any hope the People had of getting a fair trial from him. On this record, it is apparent that the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that L.W. would be fair to the People. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse him. C.W. seemed to have trouble hearing two of the trial court's initial questions. Also, voir dire began with C.W.'s admission that he would rather not have been called to the stand. He later explained that he might have to help his disabled daughter-in-law, and that the possibility of having to do so might distract him during trial. In a conflicting response, however, he insisted he could give full attention to the case if on the jury. C.W. and members of his family had been crime victims, and he felt that the police response to crime reports in general is slow when the victims are poorer. Many years before, he had spent a couple of hours in jail after being arrested for drinking in a night spot after legal hours. The charges were dismissed. One son was once charged with burglary but not convicted (C.W. believed his son was innocent), another son had died of a drug overdose, and his daughter was charged with shoplifting and was convicted. The police had beaten one of his sons in a county facility. None of these incidents, he testified, would affect his ability to be fair in a trial of defendants, including his ability to impose the death penalty if warranted. Finally, C.W. was familiar with the Mount Olive Church or at least the surrounding area, though he was not aware of the murders that had occurred there. The prosecutor explained that given C.W.'s testimony, he would be unduly reluctant to convict the defendants. [H]e indicated that he feels the police serve the rich . . . better than the poor. . . . He himself, his son and his daughter have all been busted. . . . He himself, his son was beaten in custody by police officers. [¶] He is familiar with the area of the Mount Olive Church. He has a concern about having to go and take care of his son's wife, who is apparently paralyzed. He also indicated that he visited his son in L.A. County Jail, his son's case was thrown out. He felt that his son was innocent. [¶] This would definitely give somebody a feeling that somebody who is in court might well be innocent as well as in occasions where defendants are poor, it would definitely bias them in their favor given his feeling about law enforcement[,] given the fact he and his son were beaten by the police. [10] Despite C.W.'s contrary assurances, the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that he would be fair to the People. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse him. L.T. circled an answer on his juror questionnaire that justice was not served in the Rodney King beating case in which police officers were acquitted and declined to explain why. On voir dire, L.T. stated that he felt that police officers could be both good and bad. A friend of his was once wrongfully accused of starting a fire that was large enough to be seen from a freeway. L.T. commented on then recent events involving Rodney King and Reginald Denny, who was beaten by one or more rioters following the police beating of King. He stated that justice had not been served because the King incident had been treated differently from the Denny incident. He felt that the respective incidents showed that the law applied differently to Blacks than to Whites, now and then. The prosecutor explained that she challenged L.T. because he has a very large chip on his shoulder as was evidenced by the fact he felt the King verdict was unjust. . . . [¶] He feels that the death penalty is imposed more often on Blacks than on Whites. He feels that he got bad treatment from the police. And he was probably the most strident [prospective] juror we heard from yet with respect to the King case and the racial issues involved. Here again, the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that a prospective juror would be fair to the People. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse him. [11] As noted, defendants' second Batson-Wheeler motion expressly challenged the excusals of L.B. and K.B. L.B. began voir dire by explaining that his brother was in confinement for a pending robbery charge, even though the prosecution did not have enough evidence to convict him. He testified that the police told their mother that his brother should turn himself in or they would shoot him. His own experiences with police officers had been mixed: you have some good ones, you [have] some bad ones. In general, he expressed a willingness to be fair in the case against defendants. The prosecutor said that L.B.'s answers about his brother and the police showed a hostility to the state that warranted a peremptory challenge. I could not imagine him possibly being fair in any way in which a defendant who was Black was being tried for a crime. She also said, It's obvious that he feels unhappy about the situation his brother finds himself in. Despite L.B.'s assurances, the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that the prospective juror could be fair to the People. She was entitled to excuse him. In his questionnaire, K.B. said that he would find it difficult to serve on a jury in a capital case and could not be objective. Elsewhere on his questionnaire, he suggested that he would always reject the death penalty and vote for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. He agree[d] somewhat that anyone who intentionally kills another should never get the death penalty. He would prefer not to serve on the jury out of sympathy. On voir dire, K.B. testified that although he had expressed reservations about the death penalty on his questionnaire, he was more comfortable with it now, evidently from having observed the voir dire proceedings. He, too, expressed a willingness to be fair in the case against defendants. But the record reflects a rote quality to his answers about his open-mindedness, and the prosecutor began her questioning of him by commenting that I feel like sometimes we get to the point where we start programming your responses and people start to try to conform to what everybody else says. . . . She then asked him if he was disavowing a prior statement that his religious scruples would make it difficult to sit in judgment of another in a capital case. K.B. replied that he did not realize then that the trial court would tell the jury what to do regarding the penalty phase, and the prosecutor explained that his first instinct was correct: the court would not tell the jury what sentence to impose. K.B. gave a vague response, and the prosecutor pressed, how does that make it easier? K.B. replied: I'm just more at ease after listening to everything and after she [the court] said everything, explained everything to us and just listening to her. The prosecutor then asked K.B. about two other questionnaire responses: his feelings about the death penalty would interfere with his objectivity at the guilt phase, and he could never see himself voting for death. K.B. essentially disavowed those responses. The prosecutor stated with regard to K.B., I just don't believe a word this man said. His questionnaire is so completely down the line anti-death penalty and every single answer is consistent, anti-death, anti-death, `I can't be fair,' anti-death. Then he when questioned says no, everything is fine, everything has changed. On this record, it is apparent that the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that K.B. would be fair to the People. His juror questionnaire showed considerable antipathy toward the death penalty and suggested that he would automatically vote for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. His answers on voir dire did not persuasively convey a different impression. On this basis, the prosecutor was entitled to excuse him. As noted, defendants' third Batson-Wheeler motion expressly challenged the excusal of V.H. V.H. had recently served on a jury that acquitted someone else of rape. The jury did not believe the victim. V.H.'s son had had trouble with the law at least since age 15 and was currently incarcerated. Despite this, neither was bitter toward the state, and V.H. had encouraged his son to do his time without complaining. He generally professed an ability to be fair in the case against defendants. The prosecution explained that she found V.H. very acceptable until she learned he had voted to acquit someone on a rape charge. Unfortunately, it is my feeling that once a juror has had the experience of acquitting a defendant, it does create a certain mind set and the readiness to acquit. It certainly shows that he was able to reject the prosecutor's argument, reject the People's proof and reject the word of a woman. [¶] In this trial, we will have women testifying to the history of abuse by one of the defendants. Their believability and credibility will become crucial with this case. The prosecutor noted that the defense had properly exercised a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror for having rendered a verdict of death in another case, and [t]hat's what a peremptory challenge is all about. In light of V.H.'s vote to acquit another criminal defendant of rape, rejecting the testimony of a female victim of violence, the prosecutor had reason to be skeptical about V.H.'s willingness to be fair in this case, in which the testimony of female victims of violence would be crucial. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse him. As noted, defendants' fourth Batson-Wheeler motion challenged the excusal of N.S. This individual had a brother in the custody of what is now called the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. His brother would not reveal the nature of the offense, and N.S. did not know what it was. He believed his brother was fairly incarcerated, and that circumstance would not affect N.S.'s ability to be fair in the case against defendants. N.S. testified that because a prisoner dies in prison whether sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, he viewed the two penalties as equal. He added that for a Black person a life sentence to prison would be like death, according to what his brother had told him. He thought that because Robert Alton Harris (see People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240) was White, his case had gotten better treatment from the courts than a condemned Black man who had been executed for killing a San Francisco cop. I don't feel he was guilty. They had to drag him away screaming. No one looked into his case after he was convicted. If they did, they probably would have found him innocent. N.S. assured the trial court that despite these views he could be fair to both sides in the trial against defendants. The prosecutor explained that she believed N.S. felt the death penalty and life without would be torture. . . . This is a juror whose beliefs concerning the death penalty are at the very least bizarre, but most likely not fair, I believe, to the People. She also explained that his comments contrasting Robert Alton Harris and the Black condemned prisoner reflected that he did not feel that Blacks receive justice in the justice system. He does have an agenda. He does not like the death penalty, that reason alone. Earlier, in presenting a challenge for cause against N.S., the prosecutor said, the truth of the matter is he could not be fair based on his feelings, his racial bias in terms of what he thinks a Black man goes through in prison, and what he thinks might happen if [giving] the death sentence in terms of the possibility of finding later on he was innocent. [H]e has a clear racial bias in favor of any Black defendant that would prevent him from fairly convicting or sentencing someone to death. The prosecutor had reason to be skeptical about the willingness of N.S. to convict defendants and vote for a verdict of death in this case. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse the prospective juror. Defendants further contend that the prosecution's reasons could hardly be race neutral insofar as the prosecutor commented on the racial attitudes of three prospective jurors: L.W., L.B., and N.S. In particular, defendants insist that it is unconstitutional to exercise peremptory challenges against prospective jurors because they harbor views gleaned from their individual experiences as Black persons or carry attitudes representing viewpoints that predominate or are held more widely in their community than in society at large. Lewis admits that [t]he prosecutor without a doubt identified factors relating to each of the excluded [prospective] jurors that made them less desirable from her perspective, and that her conduct does not appear to be a vendetta against black skin per se. But he argues that when a prosecutor strikes a minority [prospective] juror because [he or she] has in fact had an experience or expresses an opinion reflective of the minority perspective, the prosecutor cannot constitutionally seize upon that experience or opinion as an `individualized' reason for striking [him or her] .... even if [his or her] attitude or experience might be ... suggestive of a less conviction-prone attitude than [that of] other jurors from different backgrounds. Under Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, a party cannot assume in exercising its peremptories that because a prospective juror belongs to a cognizable minority group, that person holds biased views common to that group, and therefore is undesirable as a juror. ( Batson, supra, at pp. 86, 91, 96, 97, 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) But the prosecutor may excuse prospective jurors, including members of cognizable groups, based on personal, individual biases those individuals actually express. ( Wheeler, supra, at p. 277 & fn. 18, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) That is so even if the biased view or attitude may be more widely held inside the cognizable group than outside of it. Batson and Wheeler are intended to limit reliance on stereotypes about certain groups in exercising peremptory challenges. Defendants invoke Batson and Wheeler to preclude the excusal of a member of a cognizable group who expresses personal biases  and thus to foreclose individualized treatment of that prospective juror  if the biases expressed are presumably common to that group. Such an approach stands the law on its head, and promotes the very group stereotyping that Batson and Wheeler forbid. A party does not offend Batson or Wheeler when it excuses prospective jurors who have shown orally or in writing, or through their conduct in court, that they personally harbor biased views.
Defendants further seek to show the pretextual nature of the prosecutor's excusals of the Black prospective jurors by comparing their questionnaires and voir dire responses with those of prospective jurors, both Black and non-Black, whom the prosecutor did not challenge. [12] Defendants present an array of comparisons among the two groups in an effort to show that they were similarly situated. Oliver emphasizes, though not to the exclusion of other factors, prospective jurors' attitudes toward then recent events involving the Rodney King beating case. The King beating case lies in the background of the proceedings. On May 4, 1992, the trial court granted Oliver's mistrial motion following the verdicts of acquittal of police officers in that case, which involved the beating of Rodney King, a Black man, and the subsequent civil unrest in Los Angeles since April 29, 1992, which included a well-publicized assault on Reginald Denny, a White man, by rioters. On May 7, the court granted Lewis's mistrial motion on the same grounds, and dismissed the original jury venire as to both defendants. Because the King beating case had so recently ended when the new venire was summoned, some prospective jurors mentioned the case in answer to the questions, What serious criminal case have you followed in the media within the last five years? and Do you feel justice was served[?] Defendants did not engage in a comparative prospective juror analysis in the trial court. In earlier cases, we have declined to engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, stating that such an analysis was unreliable in evaluating the prosecutor's justifications for excusing minority prospective jurors. ( People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1190, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 76, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-1221, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) Since then, of course, the United States Supreme Court has issued its decision in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 ( Miller-El ), which conducts a comparative juror analysis, albeit not on direct appeal. In Miller-El, the United States Supreme Court held that, in the context of a challenge of a Black prospective juror, the defendant had established purposeful discrimination under Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and was entitled to relief on that ground in federal habeas corpus proceedings (28 U.S.C. § 2254). ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2322.) In so holding, the high court observed: If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step. ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2325.) Assuming, without deciding, that comparative juror analysis must be undertaken for the first time on appeal in the present case, we conclude that defendants' proffered analysis fails to demonstrate purposeful discrimination. Defendants urge, in essence, that one of the prosecutor's stated reasons for excusing L.T., who said justice had not been served because the Rodney King incident had been treated differently from the Reginald Denny incident, showed evidence of pretext because the reason applied equally to prospective jurors M.C. (a White man), A.R. (a White woman), M.R. (a Hispanic man), and M.J. (a Black woman), whom the prosecutor did not challenge. They also assert that the prosecutor asked no questions of M.C., A.R., or M.R. about the King beating case. ( See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2328; id. at p. ___, fn. 8, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2330, fn. 8 [failure to engage in meaningful voir dire on a subject a party claims is important suggests the stated concern is pretextual].) As will appear, however, none of the foregoing prospective jurors was similarly situated to L.T. [13] M.C., A.R., M.R., and M.J. mentioned the Rodney King beating trial verdicts on their questionnaires. Unlike L.T., who condemned the trial outcome as the unjust product of a race-based double standard, who circled no on the question asking whether justice was served and declined to explain why, and whom the prosecutor accordingly evaluated as strident ... with respect to the King case, M.C. and A.R. believed that the trial's outcome was a fair result and gave written answers that obviated the need for follow-up questions on oral voir dire. (See People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 235, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995 [failure to ask questions of prospective jurors did not show any impropriety].) [14] Specifically, M.C. wrote that although he was surprised at the verdict, the jury in the Rodney King case did its job in acquitting the accused police officers. He circled yes in answer to a question whether justice had been served. A.R. criticized media sources that, in her view, manipulated her emotions in an effort to make the verdict in the King case look not just. By inference, she felt that it was just. Also, A.R. stated on her questionnaire that her opinions were provisional, i.e., based on incomplete information and subject to change. A.R. declined to circle either answer to the was-justice-served question and explained, I really cannot make a judgment[;] I was not in the court listening to the evidence, even though the media exposed some facts. Their answers were markedly unlike those of L.T. Also, the questionnaires and voir dire of M.C. and A.R. showed pro-prosecution views that L.T. did not share or shared only in certain respects. In general, during his brief voir dire as an alternate prospective juror, M.C. showed willingness to support the prosecution's position if the evidence warranted it, to be open-minded and fair, and to follow the law. He understood and accepted the concept of accomplice liability, and agreed that a nonshooter could receive the death penalty. [15] A.R. showed a willingness to follow the law and be open-minded and fair to both parties, including the People. She said, for example, I feel very comfortable with weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved in the penalty phase. She had no problem with accomplice liability, even if it led to imposing the death penalty on a nonshooter. She had a friend in a district attorney's office. M.R. circled an answer that justice was not served in the King beating case, but, like A.R., made clear that this was a tentative conclusion based on imperfect information. He wrote that his view of the outcome was based on media accounts and that [p]erhaps if I knew all the facts or most of the fact[s] I could give a more intelligent answer. M.R. also indicated familiarity with the Reginald Denny beating case but did not opine that justice was not served in that case. M.R.'s responses were thus unlike those of L.T. in significant respects. Also, the questionnaire and voir dire of M.R. showed pro-prosecution views that L.T. did not share or shared only in certain respects. M.R. showed a willingness to support the prosecution's position if the evidence warranted it, and generally to be fair, open-minded, and follow the law. He understood and accepted the concept of accomplice liability, and agreed a nonshooter could receive the death penalty. Expressing views that strongly contrasted with those of L.T., M.R. wrote on his juror questionnaire, I feel very confident & comfortable with our Law Enforcement, and opined, I feel very strongly about our judicial system. Without it we would be [in a] mess. With regard to the death penalty, he wrote that the punishment should fit the crime. As for M.J., because she was Black, even if one of the prosecutor's stated justifications for striking L.T. applied to her, that is not evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. (See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2325.) Moreover, although M.J. opined that the police officers in the Rodney King beating case were guilty and that justice was not served, she generally held pro-prosecution, pro-death penalty attitudes. She wrote on her questionnaire, I believe in the death penalty because I feel if you take a life that your life should be taken also. She added in response to another question on the death penalty, I just believe that a person will reap what they sow. She would want anyone who murdered one of her family members to receive the death penalty. She appeared to be open-minded, fair, and willing to follow the law. Viewed as a whole, her attitudes were markedly different from those of L.T., who believed that the justice system was unjust. In sum, a side-by-side comparison of the prospective jurors in question reveals that they were not similarly situated. ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2329.) Defendants further urge in essence that one of the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking L.W., C.W., L.B., V.H., and N.S., i.e., that they had family members or loved ones with criminal histories, applied equally to Prospective Jurors A.C. (who was Black, and also Hispanic), M.C., V.R. (who was Hispanic), T.F. (who was White), and M.J. But, as will appear, the prospective jurors were not similarly situated. As stated, A.C. and M.J. were Black, so defendants' attempted comparison is inapposite from the beginning. Even if one of the prosecutor's stated justifications for striking L.W., C.W., L.B., V.H., and N.S. applied to A.C. or M.J., that is not evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. (See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2325.) In any event, a side-by-side comparison of the prospective jurors in question reveals that they were not similarly situated ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2329). A.C. was different in notable respects from the aforementioned prospective jurors whom the prosecutor peremptorily challenged. To be sure, A.C. stated that her brother had a criminal and gang-involvement history, had been in prison for manslaughter, and later was killed in a drive-by shooting, and yet the prosecutor did not peremptorily challenge her. A.C. stated, however, that her brother had been treated fairly by the law and that she had no complaint, which would give the prosecutor less reason to be concerned about a relative's criminal history, and although V.H. and N.S. voiced similar sentiments, L.W., C.W. and L.B. did not. Also, A.C.'s brother had committed the crime 25 to 35 years before she filled out the questionnaire, had been released from prison decades ago, and had died in the drive-by shooting 25 to 30 years before she filled out the questionnaire. Thus, unlike the family members of L.W., L.B., V.H., N.S., and possibly C.W., the criminal history of A.C.'s brother was remote in time. A.C. distanced herself from her brother. She was not close to him, and events involving him were over with and done. More generally, and of paramount importance from the prosecutor's point of view, A.C. consistently appeared willing to impose the death penalty in a proper case, unlike L.W., C.W., L.B., V.H., and N.S. (hereafter L.W. et al.), and yet to be fair and follow the law. She wrote, If the person is guilty they should [accept] the punishment the law gives. Her uncle was a sheriff in Louisiana. She had never had any unpleasant experiences with law enforcement officers. She said she would be able to impose the death penalty on a nonshooter in a capital crime under a theory of accomplice liability. As noted, M.C. was a prospective alternate juror. His brother was serving a 10-year sentence in Michigan for selling cocaine. M.C. offered only mild criticism of his brother's sentence, stating that it [s]eems ... long .... On voir dire, he said his brother, a habitual offender, was treated fairly. Despite the one superficial commonality in the situations of M.C. and those of L.W. et al., those prospective jurors were not similarly situated because, as stated above, M.C. showed pro-prosecution views that differed from those of the other prospective jurors in question, and he was an prospective alternate juror. As for V.R.'s purported similar situation to L.W. et al., the record shows that she also was not similarly situated to those other prospective jurors. To begin with, she was a prospective alternate juror. To be sure, two of V.R.'s six brothers had convictions for driving under the influence, a relatively minor offense. Nonetheless, V.R. had vigorous pro-prosecution views. She stated her brothers were treated fairly; in fact, she insisted that they were guilty even though she predicted they would deny it. She showed a willingness to follow the law and be open-minded and fair to both parties, including the People, writing on her questionnaire, I don't believe in an eye for an eye but if evidence shows premeditated guilt I do believe in [the] death penalty. When a person plans another['s] death they should think what is going to happen to them. I think people should think twice before taking another['s] life. The higher power did not make them judge & jury. She held these views even though her church opposed capital punishment  a view she flatly rejected. She accepted the concept of accomplice liability. In sum, V.R.'s pro-prosecution views set her apart from L.W. et al. It is not surprising that the prosecutor did not challenge V.R. She was not similarly situated to the prospective jurors in question whom the prosecutor did challenge. T.F. was another prospective alternate juror, which set her apart from L.W. et al. Defendants note that T.F.'s former boyfriend had been convicted of driving under the influence two years beforehand and that she had visited him in custody. Defendants complain that the prosecutor asked no questions of T.F. about the conviction. However, T.F. showed a pro-prosecution attitude that obviated any need to do so. Both in her questionnaire and on voir dire, T.F. emphatically renounced her former boyfriend. She wrote, I feel that he was a potential danger, not only to himself, but to the public while driving drunk and he deserved what he got. She said the same on voir dire. On her questionnaire, she wrote, when a crime has been committed that is so serious, such as taking someone else's life, a punishment must be reached that would stop that person from again committing that crime and also serve justice for the families and victims left behind. With regard to the death penalty, she wrote, I am a firm believer in what comes around must go around. She expressed a general willingness to follow the law and to be fair and open-minded toward both parties, including the People. She believed in the concept of accomplice liability sufficiently to volunteer in writing, If the person who aids knowingly is doing so and consents to helping  [he or she is] therefore causing a crime, and she could impose the death penalty on a nonshooter who was an accomplice. Again, it is not surprising that the prosecutor did not challenge T.F. She was not similarly situated to L.W. et al. The same may be said of M.J., who, as described, held pro-prosecution views, an attitude that set her apart in significant respects from L.W. et al. Lewis urges that a prospective juror whom the prosecutor did not challenge, T.M., a Black woman, was similarly situated in numerous respects to K.B., whom she did. For example, both had friends in law enforcement, both knew people who had died by violence, and both were employed by well-established businesses. Moreover, T.M., like L.W. et al., had a relative with a criminal history. As is the case with M.J. and A.C., because T.M. was Black, even if one or more of the prosecutor's stated justifications for striking the other prospective jurors in question applied to her, that is not evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. (See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2325.) In any event, in important respects the other prospective jurors in question were not similarly situated to her. Although T.M.'s brother had been in custody for a drug offense, she did not think he had been treated unfairly, and unlike the other prospective jurors in question, she had pro-prosecution views. She wrote, Depending upon the nature of the crime I would be inclined to support the death penalty.... I would support the death penalty for a mass murderer for sure. She had a friend in the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office. She understood and accepted the concept of accomplice liability. Her views caused the defense to peremptorily challenge her. Thus, the prosecutor could conclude that T.M. was acceptable and not feel the same way about the other prospective jurors. [16] Defendants further urge that S.P. (who was perceived as possibly Hispanic), like V.H., had served on a jury that tried a criminal case, and yet the prosecutor did not peremptorily challenge her or attempt to learn whether her jury voted to acquit the defendant, which was a stated reason for peremptorily challenging V.H. But the two prospective jurors were not similarly situated. The charges in the case in which S.P. participated consisted of trespassing and assault. She expressed a willingness to be fair and open-minded toward both parties, including the People, and was willing to follow the law, except that she would hold the prosecution to a higher standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt in a capital case. [17] Although the prosecutor stated she found V.H. acceptable until she learned he voted to acquit another defendant of rape, and did not inquire about the verdict S.P.'s jury returned, nevertheless the two were not similarly situated. As the prosecutor emphasized, V.H.'s case involved rejecting the allegations of a woman who had been the subject of a violent and felonious assault against her, whereas the case S.P. heard does not appear on this record to have been similarly serious. As described, the prosecutor stated of V.H. that his vote to acquit someone charged with rape shows that he was able to reject the prosecutor's argument, reject the People's proof and reject the word of a woman. [¶] In this trial, we will have women testifying to the history of abuse by one of the defendants. Their believability and credibility will become crucial with this case. The prosecutor's concern with prospective jurors who had served on rape trials extended to others. On learning that M.J. had served on a jury trying a rape case, that the jurors disagreed on the verdict, and that the disagreement centered on the alleged victim's credibility as a witness, the prosecutor wanted to know which way M.J. had voted. Defense counsel objected and the trial court sustained the objection. Nevertheless, the prosecutor asked numerous questions of M.J. concerning the rape case jury on which she had previously served. On this record, S.P. does not appear similarly situated to V.H. We emphasize that, unlike the Black prospective jurors whom the prosecutor peremptorily challenged, the unchallenged prospective jurors showed by their questionnaires and voir dire answers that they were comfortable serving on the jury, were open-minded and dedicated to following the law, including possibly imposing the death penalty if the evidence warranted it, gave written answers consistent with their oral voir dire, and did not appear to have difficulty understanding questions. In conclusion, a side-by-side comparison of the Black prospective jurors in question whom the prosecutor peremptorily challenged and those, Black and non-Black, whom she did not reveals that they were not similarly situated. ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2329.) Defendants are not entitled to relief on the basis of a comparative prospective juror analysis for the first time on appeal, assuming for purposes of discussion that such an analysis is required. [18]