Opinion ID: 774796
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subjective Intent and Qualified Immunity

Text: 55 Defendants further urge upon us that subjective intent is per se irrelevant to the inquiry into objective reasonableness. But this argument betrays a fundamental misconception of the application of the qualified immunity doctrine to constitutional claims for which intent is an element. In the usual case where intent is not an element, bare allegations of malice coupled with otherwise legitimate government action do not yield a viable constitutional claim. In such a case, the qualified immunity doctrine focuses only on whether the government official's actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law, without regard for possible subjective malice. See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 587-88, 592. But where a more specific intent is actually an element of the plaintiff's claim as defined by clearly established law, it can never be objectively reasonable for a government official to act with the intent that is prohibited by law. See id. at 589 (Thus, although evidence of improper motive is irrelevant on the issue of qualified immunity, it may be an essential component of the plaintiff's affirmative case.); Sheppard, 94 F.3d at 828 ([T]he employer's actual (subjective) motive is not irrelevant in a qualified immunity inquiry on a First Amendment retaliation claim.). 56 Our own precedents have emphasized this distinction between generalized malice and particularized unlawful intent. For example, in Sound Aircraft Services, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton, 192 F.3d 329, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1999), where the plaintiff alleged that the town board had snubbed his bid for a municipal lease and instead awarded the lease to a competitor, we vacated a denial of qualified immunity based on the district court's perception of a factual issue as to the defendants' motivation. We reasoned that generalized malice of the sort identified by the district court is irrelevant to the qualified immunity inquiry into objective reasonableness, and we criticized the district court for not first pausing to frame the plaintiff's claim to determine whether intent was even an element of the claim. Id. at 334-35. In instructing the district court on remand, we noted that specific illegal intent might well be an element of a properly framed Equal Protection claim, but that the complaint as it then stood was too vague to state such a claim. Id. at 335. 57 To accept defendants' proposed approach in this case would effectively immunize all defendants in cases involving motive-based constitutional torts, so long as they could point to objective evidence showing that a reasonable official could have acted on legitimate grounds. Hoard, 198 F.3d at 218. Moreover, this is precisely the approach rejected by the Supreme Court in Crawford-El when it declined to adopt a heightened evidentiary standard for intent-based constitutional torts. See 523 U.S. at 593-94 (rejecting Justice Scalia's unprecedented proposal to immunize all officials whose conduct is 'objectively valid,' regardless of improper intent) (quoting id. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Hoard, 198 F.3d at 218-20 (discussing Crawford-El and rejecting defendant's attempt to transform a factual question about his motivation into a legal question about the [objective] reasonableness of the discharges challenged by plaintiffs' First Amendment claim). Rather, Crawford-El emphasized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the plaintiff 'put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations' that establish improper motive causing cognizable injury in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment. 523 U.S. at 598 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 58 The Crawford-El standard is entirely consistent with prior precedents from this Circuit that have held a plaintiff need only show 'particularized evidence of direct or circumstantial facts' supporting his claim of unconstitutional motive in order to survive a motion for summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity. Sheppard, 94 F.3d at 828; accord Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1084 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 608 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Under the Court's view, only a factfinder's ultimate determination of the motive with which [defendant] acted will resolve this case.). Indeed, our subsequent case law has continued to adhere to this standard as implicitly consistent with Crawford-El. See, e.g., Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 162 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001); accord Acevedo-Garcia, 204 F.3d at 12; Hoard, 198 F.3d at 219. But see Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1295-96 & nn.25-26 (11th Cir. 2000) ([W]here the facts... show mixed motives (lawful and unlawful motivations) and pre-existing law does not dictate that the merits of the case must be decided in plaintiff's favor, the defendant is entitled to immunity.). 59 In sum, defendants' proposed per se rule flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent as well as our own, and therefore we cannot adopt it. Unlawful intent, a necessary element of plaintiffs' properly framed First Amendment retaliation claim, is an issue on which the district court found a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Because plaintiffs' claim turns on an issue of fact rather than on a question of law, that portion of the present interlocutory appeal pertaining to the First Amendment claim must therefore be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.