Opinion ID: 1181055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal to Instruct on Lesser-related Offenses and Aider-abettor Liability

Text: In reliance on our opinion in People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510 [199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303, 50 A.L.R.4th 1055], defendant contends it was error to refuse his requested instructions on the lesser-related offenses of assault with a deadly weapon, battery, and simple theft. Recognizing that we expressly declared the rule in Geiger to be prospective only ( id., at p. 532, fn. 13), he nevertheless urges that a narrow exception of retroactivity should be carved for capital appellants. We decline the invitation. We explained in Geiger that the purpose of instructing on related offenses is primarily prophylactic.... ( Ibid. ) Moreover, these facts do not support the possibility that the jury would have convicted defendant of the lesser-related offenses under the refused instructions. We further reject defendant's claim that it was prejudicial error to refuse his requested instructions on aider-abettor liability. (CALJIC Nos. 3.00-3.02.) The court refused to so instruct the jury because the People had elected to proceed on an uncharged conspiracy theory of vicarious liability. Belmontes's hollow defense would have fared no better under aider-abettor instructions. Under conspiracy law the People had a higher burden of proof; having to establish specific intent to conspire and commit the burglary, as well as completion of overt acts in furtherance thereof. Moreover, in order to withdraw from the planned burglary as an aider-abettor, defendant would have had to have notified his accomplices and further done everything in his power to prevent commission of the crime. (CALJIC No. 3.02.) In contrast, to withdraw from a conspiracy, one need only make an affirmative repudiation communicated to his coconspirators. (CALJIC No. 6.20.) Defendant proferred no facts suggestive of his withdrawal under either theory. In any case, given the evidence and special findings made by the jury, any error in refusing the requested aider-abettor instructions was necessarily harmless.

(29) Defendant urges that we strike the special circumstance under authority of Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], wherein we held that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special circumstance of the 1978 death penalty law, whether applied to accomplices or to actual killers. ( Id., at pp. 153-154.) His contention must be rejected. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that felony murderers who personally killed may properly be subject to the death penalty in conformance with the Eighth Amendment  after proper consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances  even where no intent to kill is shown. ( Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 386-387 [88 L.Ed.2d 704, 716-717, 106 S.Ct. 689, 697]; see Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 152 [95 L.Ed.2d 127, 141, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 1685].) Subsequently, [i]n People v. Anderson [(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306]], we held that with respect to the actual killer, the court need not instruct on intent to kill in connection with felony-murder special circumstances. Such an instruction is required only when there is evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual killer. ( People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1193 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) Here the jury made express findings that defendant personally committed an intentional, wilful, deliberate, premeditated murder; that the killing was the result of the commission or attempted commission of the burglary; and that defendant was the actual killer and had harbored specific intent to kill. We have rejected the several grounds upon which defendant urges that these special findings were procedurally defective. ( Ante, at pp. 793-794.) The evidence supports the jury's findings beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant personally and intentionally killed McConnell  and its rejection of his claim that Vasquez was in the house at the time and must have killed her while he (defendant) was busy ransacking the house. [18]
(30) Defendant urges us to construe the felony-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) as limited to premeditated and deliberate intentional murders. Such was the requirement under the former 1977 death penalty legislation. ( Carlos, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 138-143.) In Carlos we recognized that [t]he 1978 initiative repealed provisions of the 1977 act requiring physical presence and a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing before the jury could find a felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id., at p. 143.) The United States Supreme Court has since made it clear that the Eighth Amendment too does not compel such limitations upon death-qualifying felony murders. ( Cabana v. Bullock, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 386-387 [88 L.Ed.2d at pp. 716-717, 106 S.Ct. at p. 697]; see Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 152 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 141, 107 S.Ct. at p. 1685].)
Defendant renews his assertion that the only evidence of his intent to kill came from the uncorroborated accomplice testimony of Bolanos. He argues such as a separate ground for reversal of the special circumstance finding. Section 190.4, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part that: Wherever a special circumstance requires proof of the commission or attempted commission of a crime, such crime shall be charged and proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime. We have already rejected defendant's claims that Bolanos's testimony was the sole source of evidence of defendant's intent to kill, and that Bolanos's testimony in this regard went uncorroborated. ( Ante, at p. 782.) By parity of reasoning we find the instant claim to be without merit. (Cf. People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 378 [208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011] [construing § 190.4 in the context of double jeopardy principles]; People v. Mattson (1984) 37 Cal.3d 85, 93-94 [207 Cal. Rptr. 278, 688 P.2d 887] [construing § 190.4 in the context of the corpus delicti requirement].)