Opinion ID: 1945864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The authority of the Family Court over child-custody disputes is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1083 (R.I.1991). Whether the Family Court has jurisdiction over a claim is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Sivo, 925 A.2d 901, 916 (R.I.2007). In Rhode Island, subject-matter jurisdiction of child-custody disputes is now set forth in the UCCJEA, which provides rules for determining the proper forum in child-custody proceedings that involve jurisdictional conflicts. But before the General Assembly adopted the UCCJEA in 2003, the UCCJA was the statutory vehicle for avoiding jurisdictional competition and conflict with other state courts in matters of child custody. Glynn v. Meslin, 532 A.2d 554, 555 (R.I.1987). By its very nature, temporary emergency jurisdiction exists only for a limited period. It continues only for as long as the emergency exists or until a court that has jurisdiction to enter or modify a permanent custody order is apprised of the situation and accepts responsibility. Nadeau v. Nadeau, 716 A.2d 717, 725 (R.I. 1998). The drafters of the UCCJEA sought to clarify, among other things, the temporary nature of emergency jurisdiction, and the new act specified certain limitations and procedures for invoking and exercising emergency jurisdiction. [6] Even under the former legislation, the UCCJA, however, this Court consistently had held that emergency jurisdiction is temporary in nature and permits only temporary orders. Ogden v. Rath, 755 A.2d 795, 798 (R.I.2000); Nadeau, 716 A.2d at 723-24. After Beauregard filed her complaint in the Family Court on October 31, 2002, the court asserted its emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA, § 15-14-4(a)(3), the law that then was in effect. Section 15-14-4(a)(3) conferred emergency jurisdiction, only when the child is physically present in Rhode Island and: (i)[t]he child has been abandoned, or (ii)[i]t is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he or she has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse   . On January 29, 2004, after the hearing on Beauregard's complaint, the trial justice exercised emergency jurisdiction under the new UCCJEA, § 15-14.1-16. But, under that law, when a request for relief is made in a child-custody proceeding that had commenced before July 17, 2003, the proceeding is governed by the law in effect at the time the request was made. Section 15-14.1-42. [7] Accordingly, because Beauregard filed her complaint before July 2003, we analyze whether the Family Court properly claimed jurisdiction under the former statute, the UCCJA. Although the old statute is somewhat less specific and less stringent with respect to the temporal limits of emergency jurisdiction, in light of this Court's consistent interpretation of emergency jurisdiction, we believe the analysis of the issues we address in this case would yield the same result under either version of the act.