Opinion ID: 2371536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Hear From E.J.

Text: Appellant next argues that the court abused its discretion in affirming the TPR order where the trial court failed to hear directly from E.J., who was nearly twelve years old at the time of the TPR hearing. [6] Appellant contends that the court's hearing from E.J. would have added to the weight of testimony by E.J.'s therapist, Mr. Bazemore, that reunificiation with appellant was a conceivable goal for E.J., and would have countered the testimony of other experts, including that of Dr. Missar, who testified that E.J.'s desire for reunification with appellant was based on unrealistic expectations of L.J.'s ability to provide care for him. The court was required, under D.C.Code § 16-2353(b)(4), to consider, to the extent feasible, E.J.'s opinion about his own best interests. However, while it is preferable for judges to hear directly from the children involved in such proceedings if it is at all feasible to do so, In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072,1080 (D.C.2005) (internal citation and quotation omitted), [t]he statute does not say the judge must derive this opinion even partly from questioning of the child himself. In re T.W., 623 A.2d 116, 117 (D.C.1993); see also In re I.B., 631 A.2d 1225, 1232 (D.C.1993). Thus, as appellant acknowledges, the trial court had no per se duty to ascertain E.J.'s opinion through the child's direct testimony or statements. As we noted in T.W., common sense suggests that in many cases the most probative evidence of the child's opinion may lie in statements the child has made to others such as psychologists or in the child's past behavior, rather than in testimony given in the formal surroundings of a court proceeding. 623 A.2d at 117. As Judge Christian noted, there was testimony from social workers, therapists and foster parents, which the trial court credited, from which the court could ascertain E.J.'s opinion as to his best interests. Judge Christian took note of the trial court's statements recognizing that E.J.'s opinion carries more weight than that of a much younger child, and that E.J. has expressed an interest in reunification with his mother. Further, Judge Christian noted that during the TPR hearing, appellant never requested E.J. to testify. We note that Judge McCabe recognized explicitly that E.J. harbors hopes of a happy home life with his mother and was particularly anxious about the situation because he knows that his two older siblings are now living with [appellant]. At the same time, Judge McCabe took into account testimony from a social worker that indicated that E.J.'s interest in reunification with appellant was secondary to his interest in staying with [his foster mother]. Judge McCabe observed that [a]ccording to [a social service worker who testified at trial,] E.J. said that if he was unable to stay with [his foster mother], th[e]n he would like to go with his mother. The trial court weighed E.J.'s views against evidence that appellant had been unable to even commit herself to regularly visiting E.J. throughout this case and unable during the seven-year history of the case to adequately address her drug addiction or to maintain a household free of domestic violence. The court also noted that Dr. Bazemore, who may not have been aware of the extent of [appellant's] history of drug, mental health, domestic violence, and other problems, himself had observed the detrimental emotional impact on [E.J.] of [appellant's] repeated failures to consistently maintain contact with him. [7] The court found that appellant did not have the ability to meet E.J.'s needs and that, despite E.J.'s expressed wishes, it would be in E.J.'s best interests to have appellant's parental rights terminated, because further attempts to encourage contact between E.J. and [the appellant] will inevitably lead to additional disappointment and emotional trauma to him. On this record, we agree with Judge Christian that it was not an abuse of discretion or an error in law for the Magistrate Judge to not take testimony from [the children] given the ages of the [children], the potentially feckless testimony that would have been elicited . . . and the volume of testimony from other witnesses as to the best interests of the [children]. [8]