Opinion ID: 1158185
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Photographic Lineups

Text: Defendant moved prior to the guilt phase trial to suppress the results of two photographic lineups which he claimed were impermissibly suggestive and therefore violated his state and federal due process rights. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which the following facts emerged: Several days after the killings, the police visited Merle Wellman, Shelly and Philip's neighbor, who helped to create a composite or Identikit picture of the man she had seen walking on Tesla Road the day of the murders. A few days later, the police returned and asked Mrs. Wellman if she could identify the man from a photographic lineup. She chose defendant's photograph almost immediately and was quite certain of her identification. The officer then informed her that she had selected the photograph of the murder suspect. Several weeks later, the police called to inform Mrs. Wellman that the person she had selected, Mr. Wash, was in custody. Timothy Gonser, the Wellmans' employee, saw the police and Mrs. Wellman working on the composite. He informed the police that he had also seen a man near the Sundial Ranch on the day in question. A few days later, the police returned and asked Gonser to view a photographic lineup. Although he focused initially on two photographs, he quickly selected one, that of defendant, as the man he saw on the road. After the police left, Gonser spoke with Mrs. Wellman. He could not recall exactly, but believed the police informed him that he and Mrs. Wellman had selected the same photograph. Several weeks later, the police called Mr. Gonser to clarify certain other information and informed him that the person he had chosen was in custody. Defendant argued at the suppression hearing that the photographic identifications were impermissibly suggestive in several respects. He claimed that defendant's photograph was substantially different from the other five photographs in the lineup. [10] He argued that informing Mrs. Wellman immediately after her selection that she had chosen the right photograph was improper. And he claimed that informing Gonser and Wellman several weeks later that the suspect was in custody was inappropriate. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the lineups were not impermissibly suggestive and denied the motion. Both Mrs. Wellman and Mr. Gonser subsequently testified at trial about the circumstances of the photographic lineups and identified the photograph of defendant as the one they had selected. Neither made an in-court identification of defendant. (10a) Defendant renews his claim here that the photographic lineups were impermissibly suggestive. (11) In deciding whether an extrajudicial identification is so unreliable as to violate a defendant's right to due process, the court must ascertain (1) whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1242 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) (10b) As will appear, we find no error in the trial court's determination that no aspect of the identification was impermissibly suggestive. Defendant first contends that Wellman and Gonser improperly collaborated in creating the Identikit picture, thereby influencing their individual selections during the subsequent photographic lineups. Defendant did not advance this argument at the suppression hearing and therefore may not raise it for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 508.) In any event, the record discloses that Gonser merely encountered the police while they working with Mrs. Wellman on the composite. There is no evidence that he participated in the Identikit procedure or pooled his recollections with those of Mrs. Wellman. Accordingly, there is no merit to the claim that the subsequent identifications were tainted by the creation of the composite. Defendant also renews his argument that defendant's photograph was substantially different from the others in the lineup shown to Mrs. Wellman. The trial court viewed the photographs and concluded otherwise. We have independently scrutinized the photographs as well, and concur with the trial court's assessment. ( People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 572 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418].) [11] The lineup was not impermissibly suggestive in this regard. Relying on People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, defendant asserts that informing Mrs. Wellman she had selected the suspect's photograph, and later informing her that the suspect was in custody, tainted her subsequent trial testimony. Gordon, however, is not helpful to defendant's claim. There, the witness had stated that the suspect's photograph `looks familiar, but I'm not certain.' Shortly thereafter, the police informed her that she had `picked the right person.' ( Id. at p. 1241.) We held that the trial court had properly barred any identification subsequent to the call, but that the witness could testify to her identification of the defendant before she spoke with the police. Here, the witness expressed no uncertainty about her initial identification. Moreover, at trial she merely identified the photo that she had selected from the lineup, which occurred before the confirming statements by the police. Accordingly, there is no possibility that her testimony was impermissibly influenced. For similar reasons, we reject defendant's claim that informing Mr. Gonser he had selected the same person as Mrs. Wellman, and later informing him that the suspect was in custody, tainted his in-court identification. Mr. Gonser's trial testimony was confined to recounting the circumstances of the photographic lineup and identifying the photograph he selected, all of which occurred before any confirming comments by the police. Accordingly, there was no denial of due process. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1244.) [12]