Opinion ID: 854128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Refusal to Instruct on Lesser Included Offenses

Text: McEwen contends that the trial court erred when it refused to give his tendered instructions on reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter. When asked to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, trial courts are to apply the test set forth in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.1995). First, the court must determine whether the lesser offense is inherently or factually included in the crime charged. Id. at 566-67. If it is, the court should give the instruction if (1) there is a serious evidentiary dispute as to the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense; and (2) in view of this dispute, the jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater. Id. at 567. In deference to trial courts' proximity to the evidence, we review the decision whether to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses for an abuse of discretion if the court makes a finding as to the existence or lack of a serious evidentiary dispute on the element in question. Champlain v. State, 681 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind.1997). However, in the absence of a finding on that point, we review the issue de novo. Id. [1] A. Reckless homicide Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. The only element distinguishing the two offenses is the defendant's state of mind: reckless homicide occurs when the defendant recklessly kills another human being and murder occurs when the killing is done knowingly or intentionally. Compare IND.CODE § 35-42-1-5 (1993) with IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1(1) (1993). [2] Reckless conduct is action taken in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. IND.CODE § 35-41-2-2(c) (1993). A person engages in conduct knowingly if the person is aware of a high probability that he or she is doing so. IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2(b) (1993). Accordingly, McEwen was entitled to an instruction on reckless homicide if there was a serious evidentiary dispute permitting the jury to find that he recklessly but not knowingly killed Jackson. The colloquy on the reckless homicide instruction began with the trial court telling defense counsel: I don't understand how you get to reckless. Defense counsel replied that the argument for reckless homicide was pretty weak if based on McEwen's testimony alone, but contended that from the State's witnesses certainly the jury has the right to infer or to conclude that he did something reckless and still not find him guilty of knowingly. The court asked: [B]ut if it was her knife and ... he took it away from her, how could that be reckless? Counsel responded that McEwen could have taken the knife from Jackson in a reckless manner and, alternatively, if the jury credited Arlanda Landers's and Shawn Bowie's testimony, it could reach a verdict of reckless homicide. The court responded: No, [counsel]. The Court disagrees with you. We will not be giving the reckless homicide. It does not appear that the Wright test was brought to the court's attention and it is unclear whether Wright as such was considered in deciding whether the jury would be instructed on lesser included offenses. In any event, the colloquy on reckless homicide reveals that the court considered the evidence to determine whether there was a factual dispute as to McEwen's intent. This is the point of the finding on serious evidentiary dispute that Champlain indicated would be given deference on appeal. Although not using the terminology of Wright, the court made the functional equivalent of a finding on the existence or lack of a serious evidentiary dispute as to McEwen's reckless behavior. Talismanic language is not required. We accordingly review the refusal to instruct on reckless homicide here for an abuse of discretion. Champlain, 681 N.E.2d at 700. We agree with defense counsel's concession that the argument for reckless homicide based on McEwen's account alone was pretty weak. The gist of McEwen's testimony was that the killing occurred somehow during the struggle, essentially by accident. He denied striking her at all that night; thus his version supported only death by accident, not reckless behavior, and the jury was instructed on accident in this case. Any reversible error hinges on the other evidence. Bowie testified that he saw McEwen twice jab or swing at Jackson and return to the house with a knife in his hand. In light of uncontradicted testimony that Jackson died of a stab wound that pierced her heart, the trial court reasonably concluded that Bowie's testimony showed only knowing or intentional not reckless conduct. Arlanda Landers testified that McEwen struck Jackson with the Club device and that the two fought for possibly fifteen minutes, but she also stated that she did not see the stabbing. In sum, the trial court was within its discretion in concluding that the evidence showed that one of two things occurred: (1) an accidental stabbing during the struggle (if McEwen's account is credited); or (2) a knowing or intentional killing (if Bowie's account is credited). Failure to instruct the jury on reckless homicide based on this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. B. Involuntary manslaughter Involuntary manslaughter occurs when the defendant kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit certain crimes that inherently pose[ ] a risk of serious bodily injury. IND.CODE § 35-42-1-4 (1993). Batterya knowing or intentional touching of another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, IND.CODE § 35-42-2-1 (1993 & Supp.1995)can be among these. IND.CODE § 35-42-1-4 (1993). Involuntary manslaughter is not an inherently included lesser offense of murder. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 569. It is factually included only if the charging instrument alleges that the offense was committed by one of the underlying crimes. Id. at 567. Involuntary manslaughter was factually included here because the information alleged that McEwen knowingly killed Jackson by stabbing with a deadly weapon, that is: a knife, at and against the person of Tina Jackson, thereby inflicting mortal injuries upon Tina Jackson, causing Tina Jackson to die. The only element distinguishing murder from involuntary manslaughter is what the defendant intended to dobatter or kill. Lynch v. State, 571 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ind.1991). If the evidence allowed the jury to find that McEwen killed Jackson while committing or attempting to commit battery, it was reversible error not to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. The trial court refused to give the instruction on the sole ground that McEwen sought instructions for what the court believed was an excessively wide range of lesser included offenses. [3] We emphasized in Wright and Champlain that the decision to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses turns on the evidence. This point bears emphasis again today: McEwen was entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter if the evidence, depending on how it was weighed, allowed the jury to convict of that offense. There is no abstract limitation on the number of lesser included offense instructions that may be given. Because the trial court made no finding as to the existence or lack of a serious evidentiary dispute with respect to involuntary manslaughter, we review the evidence de novo to determine whether failure to instruct the jury on that offense was error. Champlain, 681 N.E.2d at 700. McEwen argued at trial that he was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction because Arlanda Landers's and Shawn Bowie's testimony could support a finding of battery or attempted battery. We disagree. Although Arlanda Landers's testimony, if credited, established that McEwen battered Jackson with the Club device, this would not have supported an instruction on involuntary manslaughter because a different battery caused Jackson's death. Elliott v. State, 450 N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (battery underlying an involuntary manslaughter conviction must proximately cause the death). The evidence showed without contradiction that Jackson died of a stab wound that pierced her heart; thus the killing occurred while committing a stabbing, not while committing an assault with the Club device. IND.CODE § 35-42-1-4 (1993). Because Landers testified that she did not see the stabbing, her testimony is not helpful on this issue. Shawn Bowie testified that he saw McEwen twice jab or swing at Jackson, then retreat to his house with a knife in his hand, after which Jackson cried out he stabbed me. Assuming arguendo that Bowie's account is correct, we would have to conclude that McEwen intended only to batter Jackson when he inflicted the stab wound in her chest. Whether instructions should be given on a lesser included offense necessarily depends on the facts of each case and we have often observed that it is prudent to give the instruction if in doubt. Champlain, 681 N.E.2d at 701. Nonetheless, an assault like that Bowie described with a knife or similar sharp objectparticularly to the chest or head regionrarely occurs without awareness of a high probability that death will result. This is a knowing killing amounting to murder; the assault cannot reasonably be found to be a mere touching of the victim and an instruction on involuntary manslaughter is properly refused. Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind.1988) (defendant hit his mother in the head and back several times with an ax); Cardine v. State, 475 N.E.2d 696 (Ind.1985) (defendant killed his girlfriend by stabbing her four times with a knife). In sum, Bowie's testimony presents no basis for finding anything other than a knowing or intentional killing. In conceding that McEwen's testimony was pretty weak support for a reckless homicide instruction, defense counsel also stated that it was even a weaker one for involuntary manslaughter. We agree. Because McEwen testified that he never hit Jackson on the night of her deathin substance a disclaimer of any criminal intent his testimony is inconsistent with a finding that he intended only to batter Jackson. Cf. Lynch, 571 N.E.2d at 538-39 (jury should have been instructed on involuntary manslaughter where fatal gunshot initially entered victim through the arm and the defendant testified that he intended only to injure the victim). McEwen staked everything on a defense of accident. By unequivocally denying that he intended to injure Jackson in any way, he offered an alternative account of events that foreclosed any middle ground as to his intent. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it refused to give McEwen's involuntary manslaughter instruction.