Opinion ID: 1755365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Florida Privacy Case Law

Text: Our own prior case law fully reflects the concern for personal autonomy elaborated by Brandeis and those who have followed him. In Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, Inc., 500 So.2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457-58, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2797-98, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977)), the Court found that, among other things, the right to privacy encompasses ... the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. More recently, in Shaktman v. State, 553 So.2d 148, 150-51 (Fla. 1989), we emphasized: One of [privacy's] ultimate goals is to foster the independence and individualism which is a distinguishing mark of our society and which can thrive only by assuring a zone of privacy into which not even government may intrude without invitation or consent. ... . [T]he parameters of an individual's privacy can be dictated only by that individual. The central concern is the inviolability of one's own thought, person, and personal action. The inviolability of that right assures its preeminence over majoritarian sentiment and thus cannot be universally defined by consensus. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Indeed, an individual's expectations of privacy are protected whether or not society recognizes them as reasonable, provided these expectations are not spurious. Id. at 153 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially). These comments echoed Justice Shaw's observation some two weeks earlier that the Florida right of privacy protects `individual dignity and autonomy.' T.W., 551 So.2d at 1193 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986)). Similarly, in Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1989), this Court found that privacy involves a deeply imbedded belief, rooted in our constitutional traditions, that an individual has a fundamental right to be left alone so that he is free to lead his private life according to his own beliefs free from unreasonable governmental interference. Wons, 541 So.2d at 98 (quoting with approval Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So.2d 679, 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (emphasis added)). In the same opinion, then-Chief Justice Ehrlich cited the following rationale of our Sister Court in Massachusetts: The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice.  Wons, 541 So.2d at 100 (Ehrlich, C.J., specially concurring) (quoting with approval Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742-44, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977)) (emphasis added). Accord Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), approved, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (right of terminally ill patient to die with dignity). In the recent case of In re Guardianship of Estelle M. Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (1990), we echoed all the case law quoted above. There, we stated that privacy has been defined as an individual's `control over or the autonomy of the intimacies of personal identity'. Id. at 10 (quoting Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 233, 281 (1977)). So important is the right of privacy that it is protected by the most exacting standard of judicial review. As we stated in Winfield, [t]he right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least intrusive means. Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1980)). Indeed, the personal autonomy aspect of privacy is so strong an interest that few governmental infringements of that right have survived judicial scrutiny in this state. T.W., 551 So.2d at 1192 (citing cases).