Opinion ID: 1659158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claims of Error in the Sentencing Phase

Text: Judge Kinder ordered a presentence investigation report. Defendant argues that Judge McHenry erred in denying relief because Judge Kinder improperly relied on that report in the sentencing phase. Defendant argues that the presentence investigation report contained hearsay and violated defendant's rights to confrontation and proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty was appropriate. A claim of improper consideration of a presentence investigation report is a claim of trial error. As such, that claim may not be considered in a proceeding for post-conviction relief. Wilkins v. State, 802 S.W.2d at 502. The only basis for our consideration of this claim is that it amounts to plain error in the direct appeal. This Court has held that a trial judge's consideration of a presentence investigation report does not amount to manifest injustice. State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82, 96 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990). Notwithstanding that holding, defendant argues that the report contains improper victim impact statements. [4] The statements found in the victim impact portion of the report are so innocuous that they are unlikely to inflame one of ordinary temperament. In addition, where a judge rather than a jury is the trier of fact, the dangers inherent in victim impact statements are minimized. McMillin, supra . The consideration of the presentence investigation report was not prejudicial.
During the post-conviction deposition of Judge Kinder, defendant's counsel began to inquire regarding mitigation evidence. Judge Kinder interrupted and asked, What mitigation? Tell me what mitigation was presented? Defendant concludes from this single comment that Judge Kinder failed to consider the mitigating evidence. It is questionable whether the mental process of a judge in considering [5] evidence is subject to impeachment by way of a post-conviction deposition. However, that issue need not be decided because here the deposition does not reflect that Judge Kinder failed to consider mitigating evidence. The defendant overlooks Judge Kinder's testimony at the same deposition, where the following exchanges occurred: Q [by defendant's counsel]: So in this specific case the mitigation you would have considered is? A [Judge Kinder]: I'm not going to tell you what I would have considered. I would have heard whatever they put on under the statutory list of items of mitigation. That's what I'm there for. And if they are not there, Mr. Catlett couldn't invent them. I can't fill in the blanks. Q: The question is what Mr. Catlett did present and what he didn't present. And what was available to him and wasn't available to him is an issue that is not related to you, your Honor, or questions that you could answer. A: That's right. And I'm not going to sit and speculate as to what if somebody had presented to me in mitigation, I would have considered it. I would have to consider what they presented in mitigation. Q: In regard to what you would consider statutorily, would you weigh whatever is mitigated against the aggravating circumstances? A: That is what a jury is required to do and that's what I am required to do. The post-conviction court's conclusion that Judge Kinder considered the mitigation evidence presented is supported by substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
Just before Judge Kinder sentenced defendant, he commented regarding the evidence at the penalty phase hearing. In one of those comments, he stated that defense counsel's first excuse for the murders was defendant's drug abuse and that the state just doesn't excuse one crime by another. From that, defendant argues that Judge Kinder held an erroneous notion that only if drug abuse is a legal excuse for murder, may it be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Thus defendant claims he was denied the benefit of mitigating circumstantial evidence, contrary to § 565.030.4. He also argues that Judge Kinder failed to use the statutory words beyond a reasonable doubt in his oral declaration that he found aggravating circumstances. These issues again were not raised before the trial court and were not raised in a post-conviction motion. They are before us only for plain error review in the direct appeal. The premise of defendant's argument is that § 565.030.4 requires specific oral or written findings by a trial judge regarding the evidentiary standard utilized in determining whether to assess the death penalty. The statute makes no such requirement. The argument also assumes that comments regarding drug abuse being no excuse is part of the judgment. Those comments are not part of that judgment. The judgment and sentence is found in the trial court's Warrant of Execution sentencing defendant to death by lethal injection. Among other matters contained in that document is the following: The Court further finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following aggravating circumstances: The defendant has a prior conviction for murder, the murder of Richard and Mildred Hodges was committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of the offense of robbery, and the murder of Richard Hodges was committed while the defendant was also engaged in the murder of Mildred Hodges. The Court further finds that the aforesaid aggravating circumstances outweigh the existence of any mitigating factors and that their existence warrants the imposition of death as punishment for the defendant. Implicit in the judgment is that all essential intermediate factual and legal issues upon which the judgment rests have been resolved consistently with the judgment. The absence of an opinion or declaration of law is not error. See State v. Johnson, 457 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo.1970). The trial judge's comments were merely reflections on how he weighed the evidence of defendant's drug abuse in determining mitigating circumstances. The weight of the evidence is not subject to review by an appellate court. State v. Simmons, 494 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Mo.1973). Here the trial judge heard defendant's statements of prior drug abuse as well as his statements that such abuse would continue if defendant had the opportunity to obtain drugs. On appeal the State's evidence is accepted as true together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and all evidence and inferences to the contrary are disregarded. State v. Ludwig, 609 S.W.2d 417, 417-18 (Mo.1980); State v. Coffman, 647 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Mo.App. 1983). So viewed, there is substantial evidence justifying a conclusion that drug abuse in this case was not a mitigating circumstance but was rather further evidence of defendant's antisocial and criminal behavior. This claim of error is without merit.
Defendant argues the sentencing judge erred in considering the aggravating factor of murder during a robbery where he was precluded from convicting defendant of felony murder. He relies on State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 601 A.2d 175, 177 (1992), which vacated a death sentence. Defendant's reliance on Purnell is misplaced. In that case both the conviction and the sentence were imposed by a jury. In the guilt phase defendant was not permitted to submit a non-capital felony murder instruction. However, the State was permitted to use a robbery committed concurrently with the murder as an aggravating circumstance in the penalty phase instructions. Here, the defendant pled guilty before a judge and the sentencing phase was conducted before the judge. Thus, there was no inconsistency between the guilt and punishment phase and no denial of a fair trial. The judge properly considered the aggravating circumstance of murder during a robbery in the sentencing phase.
Under § 565.035.3(2), this Court reviews whether the evidence supports the judge's finding of statutory aggravating circumstances. Defendant claims that all of the aggravating circumstances are invalid and unsupported by the evidence. The trial court's warrant of execution makes reference to three statutory aggravating circumstances: defendant had a prior conviction of murder, the murders were committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of the offense of robbery, and the murders were committed while the offender was engaged in another unlawful homicide. § 565.032.2(1), (2), (11). In the Report of the Trial Judge, required by Rule 29.08(c), Judge Kinder made reference to the above three aggravating circumstances, and in addition put an X next to the aggravating circumstance that the murders were committed for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value from the victim of the murder. See § 565.032.2(4). Defendant argues that the trial court's judgment was duplicative and arbitrary in considering the factor that the murders were committed for the purpose of receiving money, § 565.032.2(4), and the murder was committed in the perpetration of the felony of robbery, § 565.032.2(11). As previously noted, the judgment of the trial court is found in the Warrant of Execution. The judgment contains no finding that the murders were committed for the purpose of receiving money. The Report of the Trial Judge is inconsistent with the judgment of the trial court in making reference to the aggravating factor described in § 565.032.2(4). To the extent that the report is inconsistent with the judgment, the report is disregarded. Defendant also contends that the trial court could not consider the murder of Mildred Hodges as an aggravating factor in the murder of Richard Hodges in that Mildred Hodges merely died in the course of a robbery, not in the course of a homicide. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that when the robbery went awry, defendant and his accomplice decided to kill both of the Hodgeses, and they carried out this decision. The case is similar to State v. Powell, 798 S.W.2d 709, 715-16 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1991), where two victims were robbed, subject to a continued assault, and then killed. Each murder was an aggravating circumstance of the other. Likewise, the evidence here supports that each murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another unlawful homicide. Finally, the judge found the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed by a person with a prior record of murder. Among the aggravating circumstances that may be considered in a capital murder case is that [t]he offense was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for murder in the first degree, or the offense was committed by a person who has one or more serious assaultive criminal convictions. § 565.032.2(1). Defendant argues that his prior conviction for felony murder is now the crime of second degree murder. See § 565.021.1(2). The defendant's argument fails to acknowledge that § 565.032.2(1) contains two different types of prior convictions that may be considered an aggravating circumstance. The first is a conviction for murder in the first degree, and the second is a conviction for a serious assaultive crime. Defendant's prior conviction for felony murder qualifies as a serious assaultive crime. No error was committed in finding that conviction to be an aggravating circumstance.
Under § 565.035.3(1), this Court considers whether the death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Defendant argues that all the preceding points combined show an arbitrary and prejudicial proceeding. As demonstrated by the analysis of the previous points, defendant's specific claims of prejudice and arbitrariness are without merit. Numerous non-errors cannot add up to error. State v. Leisure, 772 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Mo. App.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 724, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990). A review of the claims and the record confirm that the sentences were not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.