Opinion ID: 2162204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Direct Victim

Text: [¶ 5] Champagne first contends that her notices of claim stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and that the existence of genuine issues of material fact concerning her NIED claim precluded the entry of summary judgments. In reviewing a summary judgment, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party to determine whether the record supports the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Petillo v. City of Portland, 657 A.2d 325, 326 (Me. 1995). In testing the propriety of a summary judgment, we accept as true the uncontroverted facts properly appearing in the record. See Gerber v. Peters, 584 A.2d 605, 607 (Me.1990) (citing FIELD, McKUSICK & WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE § 56.4 at 357 (2d ed. Supp.1981)). [¶ 6] We have recognized that the victim of negligent conduct has a legally protected interest in her psychic health, with different rules governing recovery depending on whether she is characterized as a direct or an indirect victim. See Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 280-81 (Me.1992). A plaintiff is a direct victim if she was the object of the defendant's negligent conduct. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me.1987) (plaintiff who discovered severed human leg in bag that he thought contained his recently deceased father's belongings was direct victim of hospital's and funeral home's alleged negligent conduct). In contrast, a plaintiff is an indirect victim if the claimed negligence underlying the NIED claim was directed not at her, but instead at someone she loved and to whom she was close. See Nelson v. Flanagan, 677 A.2d 545, 547 n. 3 (Me.1996); see, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me.1982) (mother who observed her child choking on a foreign object in baby food manufactured by defendant was indirect victim of defendant's negligent conduct). [¶ 7] Relying on Gammon, 534 A.2d 1282, Champagne argues that she was a direct victim of the Defendants' negligence in allowing Makita to nurse from the wrong mother. This claim is unpersuasive. The Defendants' negligence in allowing Makita to be nursed by the wrong mother was directed towards Makita, not his mother. The fact that Champagne had recently given birth to Makita cannot transform her status to that of a direct victim, and her reliance on Gammon as a basis for recovery is misplaced. See, e.g., Gendek v. Poblete, 139 N.J. 291, 654 A.2d 970, 974-75 (1995) (mother cannot be characterized as a direct victim of provider's negligent treatment of newborn shortly after birth). [¶ 8] Although the gravamen of Champagne's notices of claim concerns the Defendants' act of allowing Makita to nurse from the wrong mother, her notice of claim against Hutchins [4] contains an allegation that Hutchins failed to inform Champagne of the potential risks posed by the breast-feeding incident. Thus, although Champagne cannot be characterized as a direct victim of the Defendants' negligence in taking Makita to the wrong mother, Champagne does cast herself as a direct victim of the discrete failure to inform conduct. Assuming without deciding that Hutchins owed a duty to inform Champagne of the risks posed by her son's exposure to another patient's breast milk, we nevertheless conclude that Champagne failed to produce sufficient evidence of causation on her failure-to-inform NIED claim to withstand summary judgment. [¶ 9] Where a plaintiff will have the burden of proof on an essential issue at trial, and it is clear that the defendant would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law at trial if the plaintiff presented nothing more than was before the court at the hearing on the motion for a summary judgment, the court may properly grant a defendant's motion for a summary judgment. See Town of Lisbon v. Thayer Corp. 675 A.2d 514, 517 (Me.1996); Gerber, 584 A.2d at 607; see also M.R. Civ. P. 50(a). To avoid a judgment as a matter of law for a defendant, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of her cause of action. See Fleming v. Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me.1995). A judgment as a matter of law in a defendant's favor is proper when any jury verdict for the plaintiff would be based on conjecture or speculation. See id.; Barnes v. Zappia, 658 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me.1995). [¶ 10] All actions sounding in negligence, including NIED, require a plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's negligent conduct was a proximate cause of her injuries. See PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS §§ 30, 38 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, to warrant submission of her case to a factfinder and to avoid judgment as a matter of law in the defendant's favor, a plaintiff seeking to recover for a defendant's negligence must first establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action, including causation. The mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. a, at 442 (1965); see also Unobskey v. Continental Ins. Co., 147 Me. 249, 257-58, 86 A.2d 160, 164 (1952) (Conjecture, choice of possibilities, or quantitative probability is not proof. There must be something more to lead a reasoning mind to one conclusion rather than to the other.) (quotations omitted). [¶ 11] In addition to alleging throughout her notices of claim that MMMC and Hutchins were negligent in allowing Makita to be breast-fed by the wrong mother, Champagne alleges in paragraph six that Hutchins was negligent in informing and educating [Champagne] about the risks and consequences of the incident. By deposition and affidavit, Champagne alleged, inter alia, that she suffered periodic crying spells; that she did not eat or sleep regularly for several months; and that she felt humiliated, angry, dirty, extremely violated, confused, very upset, and very worried after the incident. [5] The evidence before the court at the time of the summary judgment motions, however, did not provide any basis for a factfinder to determine whether these feelings were attributable to Hutchins' act of allowing Makita to breast-feed from the wrong mother, for which Champagne has no cause of action for direct NIED, or whether these feelings were attributable to Hutchins' failure to inform her of the risks posed by the breast-feeding incident, for which we assume without deciding that there is a possibility of a direct NIED claim. [6] [¶ 12] If a plaintiff makes an undifferentiated claim of injuries based on two discrete acts, and one of the acts cannot provide a basis for recovery as a matter of law, a factfinder cannot speculate about the causal link between the surviving act and the injuries alleged. Cf. Unobskey, 147 Me. at 257-58, 86 A.2d at 164. In the absence of evidence attributing Champagne's injuries to actionable conduct rather than nonactionable conduct, a trier of fact would be required to resort to mere guesswork to return a verdict in her favor. In these circumstances, we conclude that Champagne failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the causal relationship between Hutchins' alleged failure to inform her of the risks created by the breast-feeding incident and the emotional distress she claims.