Opinion ID: 9275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction

Text: 12 Jones and JPM contend that the county and state courts, respectively, lacked jurisdiction to issue final, binding judgments against them. 2 At this point, we reiterate that, while Jones and JPM are co-plaintiffs in the federal court action, only Jones was a party to the county court action, and only JPM was a party to the state court action. 13
14 Jones contends that the county court was not a court of competent jurisdiction. His attacks are numerous; yet, as to most, his response to SYC's summary judgment fails to point to evidence in the record sufficient to create an issue as to the county court's jurisdiction. Once the movant presents a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Rule 56, therefore, saddles the non-movant with the duty to designate the specific facts in the record that create genuine issues precluding summary judgment, and does not impose upon the district court a duty to survey the entire record in search of evidence to support a non-movant's opposition. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994); Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir.1988). Nor is it our duty to so scrutinize the record on appeal. 3 Forsyth, 19 F.3d at 1537. 15 One of Jones' contentions, however, does warrant discussion. Jones argues that the damages sought in his counterclaims exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the statutory county court, and thus the county court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate those counterclaims. Counterclaims are treated as separate suits and must independently comport with the trial court's jurisdiction. Color Tile, Inc. v. Ramsey, 905 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.); Tejas Toyota, Inc. v. Griffin, 587 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Smith v. Clary Corp., 917 S.W.2d 796, 797-98 (Tex.1996) (A counterclaim, whether permissive or compulsory, must be within the court's jurisdiction.); Gimbel v. Gomprecht, 89 Tex. 497, 35 S.W. 470, 470 (1896) (The plea in reconvention filed by the defendants in this case was in effect a suit by them against the plaintiffs, and the amount in controversy was the damages claimed in that plea....). A statutory county court has jurisdiction in civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000, excluding interest, statutory or punitive damages and penalties, and attorney's fees and costs, as alleged on the face of the petition. Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 25.0003(c)(1) (West Supp.1996) (emphasis added). To determine whether Jones alleged claims seeking relief beyond the jurisdiction of the county court, we look to the amount alleged in Jones' pleading. See Kitchen Designs, Inc. v. Wood, 584 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tejas Toyota, Inc., 587 S.W.2d at 776 (citing Gimbel, 89 Tex. 497, 35 S.W. 470 (1896)). 16 Jones argues that his pleadings expressly alerted the county court that he sought relief on his counterclaims in excess of $100,000. 4 Jurisdiction, however, is determined by the amount in controversy at the time the original pleading is filed. Smith v. Texas Improvement Co., 570 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1978, no writ). Jones first raised counterclaims against SYC in his first amended original answer. 5 Def.'s Summ.J.Ex.C. For determining jurisdiction, then, we regard Jones' first amended original answer as the original pleading in his cross action, and we look to its allegations to determine the amount in controversy. 17 In his first amended original answer, Jones alleged: Jurisdiction is not proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the ... amount actually in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $50,000. Def.'s Summ.J.Ex.C at para. 11 (emphasis added). Further, Jones repeatedly contended that SYC's conduct rendered it liable to [Jones] for an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court. Id. at para. 33, 47 (emphasis added). 6 These allegations are ambiguous, at best, as to the amount actually in controversy pursuant to Jones' counterclaims. In this case, such ambiguity works against Jones. 18 In cases of doubt, all intendments of the claimant's pleading will be construed in favor of jurisdiction. Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.1989); Pecos & N. Tex. Ry. v. Rayzor, 106 Tex. 544, 172 S.W. 1103, 1105 (1915). Indeed, unless it is clear from the face of the pleadings that the court lacks jurisdiction of the amount in controversy, the court should retain the case. Id.; Taliancich v. Betancourt, 807 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991, no writ). In other words, to avoid the jurisdiction of the court, the claimant must affirmatively plead[ ] himself out of court. Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 804 (discussing Richardson v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.1967)). See also Pecos & N. Tex. Ry., 172 S.W. at 1105; Taliancich, 807 S.W.2d at 892. Jones' allegations fall far short of affirmatively pleading an amount in excess of the county court's statutory maximum jurisdictional limit, and therefore the county court properly maintained jurisdiction over Jones' counterclaims. 19
20 JPM argues that the state court lacked jurisdiction over it with respect to SYC's intervention because SYC never served JPM with citation and process. Although the plaintiff is charged with notice of all pleadings filed in defense of his suit, he is entitled to notice of interventions and cross-actions affirmatively setting up causes of action against him, and judgments rendered against him upon such interventions and cross-actions, in the absence of notice, waiver, or appearance, will be set aside. Early v. Cornelius, 120 Tex. 335, 39 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1931) (emphasis added). See also Mallia v. Bousquet, 813 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). SYC admits on the face of its intervention petition that no service of process was made on JPM. Def.'s Summ.J.Ex.G at 1. Thus, JPM's claim has merit unless it waived service or entered a general appearance in the intervention. 21 A party makes a general appearance whenever it invokes the judgment of the court on any question other than jurisdiction. St. Louis & S.F. R.R. v. Hale, 109 Tex. 251, 206 S.W. 75 (1918); Fridl v. Cook, 908 S.W.2d 507, 515 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, writ requested); Moore v. Elektro--Mobil Technik GmbH, 874 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1994, writ denied). In determining whether conduct is sufficient to be considered a general appearance, the focus is on affirmative action that impliedly recognizes the court's jurisdiction over the parties. Fridl, 908 S.W.2d at 515. In response to SYC's intervention petition, JPM filed a Motion to Strike Intervention. In its motion, JPM asked the court to deny SYC the right to intervene because to do so would unnecessarily complicate the REG litigation and because SYC's claims should more properly be filed as counterclaims in the pending federal court action. JPM's motion to strike the intervention was an affirmative act recognizing the court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fridl, 908 S.W.2d at 515 (holding that motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation was a general appearance). See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 866 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (We hold a motion to strike a plea in intervention akin to a special exception or to a motion for summary judgment, asserting that, as a matter of law, the opposing party could not have brought the action or would not be able to defeat recovery.). JPM, accordingly, entered a general appearance in the intervention, rendering service unnecessary. See Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. r. 120 (West 1979). Hence, the state court had jurisdiction over JPM with respect to SYC's intervention, and its judgment thereon is valid and binding on JPM.