Opinion ID: 1860641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant duncan's motions for continuance

Text: ¶ 13. Duncan moved for a continuance on the first day of trial after Dr. Chouteau objected, during Duncan's opening statement, to the reference made and the use of Dr. Abrams's testimony concerning certain tests that should have been performed. After much discussion, the judge denied the motion to continue, opening statements were completed and Dr. Chouteau's testimony began. The next morning before the jury came into the courtroom, Duncan again requested a continuance arguing that she was going to be severely prejudiced in the presentation of the case because she was being forced to call her expert witness out of preferred order since the trial began a day late and her expert had to return to her home state. The trial judge denied the motion. ¶ 14. In Cherry v. Hawkins, 243 Miss. 392, 397, 137 So.2d 815, 816 (1962), we clearly stated that a denial of continuance will not be reversed unless a prejudice resulted. We have also held that [t]he granting of a continuance is largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from a denial, this Court should not reverse. Morgan v. Greenwaldt, 786 So.2d 1037, 1045 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted). Further, we have said that the trial court may exercise `reasonable latitude' in the setting and continuance of cases. Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 15. We find nothing to substantiate Duncan's claim that she suffered injustice or prejudice from the denial of her motions for continuance. Trials are delayed and witnesses are called out of order on a regular basis in trial courts. Litigants are entitled to a fair trial, but not a perfect trial. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of said continuances.