Opinion ID: 2634308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Limiting Defense Counsel's Jury Argument

Text: Before the parties presented their penalty arguments to the jury, the court held hearings regarding the boundaries of possible argument. One topic was the extent to which either party could comment on defendant's demeanor during the trial. The prosecutor expressed the belief it would be improper for him to comment on defendant's demeanor because defendant had not testified. Defense counsel, however, stated that they wanted to discuss defendant's apparent reaction to the testimony of some of the defense witnesses. The court asked the parties to provide authorities to help it make a ruling and continued the matter. At the next hearing, the court stated that it interpreted the cases cited to it as allowing comment on a defendant's demeanor only if he testified or put his character into evidence. It believed defendant had not placed his character into evidence and, indeed, had studiously avoided doing so. Defense counsel agreed that they had not placed defendant's general character into evidence, but they argued that they had narrowly presented evidence of defendant's emotional feelings for his family and their feelings for him. They stated they were not seeking to argue demeanor other than what appeared obviously in the courtroom. For example, they wanted to comment that when defendant's niece and nephew testified, the jury could see that there was genuine love on behalf of our client toward those children .... Additionally, they wanted to comment that when a witness named Charles Burwell testified that he and defendant were like brothers, defendant actually broke down significantly and cried, thus showing his love for Burwell. The court ruled that defense counsel could argue about the feelings the witnesses had for defendant and that there must be some redeeming aspect of the defendant that would trigger those expressions by those witnesses. But it disallowed comment on defendant's demeanor. It expressed concern about permitting comment on a nontestifying defendant's demeanor: You mention the defendant's demeanor in a positive frame, but this has been a long trial. What I'm afraid will happen is one of the jurors may have seen some different aspect of his demeanor. And if I let either one of you start talking about demeanor when the defendant has not testified and character is not an issue, then they go back and deliberate about that, I just think that we're asking for some major difficulties. Defendant argues the court erred in not permitting his attorneys to comment on his demeanor in reacting to the testimony of some of the defense witnesses. We agree. As the trial court noted, a number of cases have stated that the prosecutor may comment on defendant's demeanor when the defendant has testified or placed his character into evidence. ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1023, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519 [It is proper for a prosecutor, at the penalty phase at which the defendant has placed his or her character in issue as a mitigating factor, to make references to the defendant's facial demeanor apparent during the court proceedings.]; People v. Wharton (1991)-53 Cal.3d 522, 596, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290; People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1205-1206, 264 Cal. Rptr. 852, 783 P.2d 211; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 197, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) But we have not limited comment on demeanor to those situations. In People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 516, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182, we simply stated that a prosecutor may comment during closing argument on a defendant's demeanor. (See also People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 114, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311 [the prosecutor was entitled to comment on defendant's facial demeanor as he sat in the courtroom]; People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 247, 276 Cal.Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323 [Reference to courtroom demeanor is not improper during the penalty phase.].) Indeed, in People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 977, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131, we said that the prosecutor was entitled to point out that modest behavior in the courtroom was not inconsistent with violent conduct under other less structured and controlled circumstances. In People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395, as one reason for denying the automatic motion to modify the death judgment, the trial court stated that the defendant was emotionally calm during the entire trial. ( Id. at p. 970, fn. 50, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395.) We found the comment proper for reasons that apply here: A defendant's demeanor may reflect remorse, or otherwise arouse sympathy in either jury or judge. Because the jury, and the judge in deciding whether to modify a verdict of death, must be permitted to consider any evidence that is relevant and potentially mitigating [citation], this is relevant to appropriate consideration. ( Id. at pp. 971-972, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395.) Just as negative comment on a defendant's demeanor is permissible, so too is favorable comment. Moreover, the trial court interpreted character evidence too narrowly. Although defendant avoided broad character evidence, he did present evidence of the love between him and some of the witnesses. The court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from arguing that defendant's demeanor during the testimony reflected the love he felt. But the error was harmless. As evidenced by the fact that all cases on point involve defendants challenging the propriety of prosecutorial comments on demeanor, comment on demeanor can be very risky for the defense. The court prohibited both parties from commenting on demeanor. Although legally incorrect in its ruling, it was reasonably concerned that, on balance, comment on demeanor could harm defendant. Moreover, the court did not preclude the jury from considering anything it believed relevant, including defendant's courtroom demeanor. The jury could observe defendant and draw its own conclusions. The court merely limited defense counsel's jury argument in a very narrow fashion. The defense penalty phase argument to the jury was thorough, broad based, and wide ranging. Among many other things, the defense attorney who made the penalty argument urged that the jury should consider in mitigation the evidence from defendant's family and friends about their feelings for defendant and their love for him. She argued that defendant cares about those who love him and discussed how he protected his mother even as a young child. She discussed defendant's brother's testimony that defendant cared about his relatives. She discussed his sister's testimony that defendant sometimes cried when confronted with some of his family's problems. She argued that to others, defendant's life has value, and that even persons not related to him love him. She noted that one witness testified that defendant show[ed] he cared about her and her children, and that another witness testified about a time when defendant was moved to tears after the witness's wife had suffered a stroke. Discussing another witness, she argued that defendant loved her, she loved him. The attorney discussed the testimony of defendant's niece and nephew. Although she was not permitted to comment on defendant's visible reaction to that testimony, she did argue, while apparently referring to a photograph of him with the children that defendant had placed into evidence, that defendant's face and smile unmistakably indicated his love for those children. She discussed in detail Charles Burwell's testimony. She noted that Burwell says that Fred [defendant] calls every other week, that he always talked about others, not about himself, and that he was supportive of other people's problems. She stressed Burwell's testimony that if defendant were executed, it would affect his children and his wife, and it will have a very major impact on me.... And he [Burwell] says, this man [apparently referring to defendant] started to fill that void. And if I lose him, I am losing my brother all over again, and I don't want that to happen. In light of all of these circumstances, we see no reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different if, additionally, defense counsel had commented on defendant's visible reaction to the testimony of his niece, nephew, and Burwell. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 960-961, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 135 P.3d 649.) Stated equivalently ( id. at p. 961, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 135 P.3d 649), the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.