Opinion ID: 2581604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of Lead Counsel During Portion of Jury Selection

Text: For less than an hour on March 25 and March 26, 1993, Jeffrey Harbin, who had been appointed pursuant to section 987, subdivision (d) in January 1992, as defendant's cocounsel, conducted the voir dire of prospective jurors while lead counsel Donnalee Huffman was not present in the courtroom. Defendant contends that Huffman's absence was a presumptively prejudicial violation of his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. ( United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 ( Cronic ).) A criminal defendant enjoys the right to counsel under both the state and federal Constitutions (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 339-345, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335). A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, including during jury voir dire ( Gomez v. United States (1989) 490 U.S. 858, 873, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923), gives rise to a presumption that the trial was unfair ( Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039). But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the presumption of prejudice will only stand when counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. ( Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 695, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914; Cronic, at p. 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039.) A trial court has discretion to appoint second counsel for a capital defendant (§ 987, subd. (d); Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108), but a capital defendant is not entitled to the courtroom presence of both appointed counsel at all times ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 376, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708 ( Carpenter ); People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 906, fn. 5, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277). Here, either lead counsel or cocounsel, or both, were present at all times, and defendant does not contend that cocounsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. We will not presume, and defendant does not show, prejudice resulted from lead counsel's absence for less than an hour during jury selection.