Opinion ID: 6986365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Hearing

Text: The IDEA requires any State educational agency that receives federal assistance to establish and maintain procedures to safeguard the right of children with disabilities to a free, appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (emphasizing the importance of the procedural safeguards). Among the required procedures is an opportunity to present complaints regarding “the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E). Whenever a complaint has been received under subsection (b)(1)(E), “the parents or guardian shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency ... as determined by State law or by the State educational agency.” Id. § 1415(b)(2); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(a)-(b). Section 1415(d) further provides that “[a]ny party to any hearing conducted pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be accorded — ... (2) the right to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a)(2). Although the language of the statute regarding due process hearings is mandatory, the purpose of an adversarial hearing is to resolve disputed issues of fact. Issues of law reside where they always have— with the adjudicator, whether an administrative or judicial officer. Nothing in the legislative history of the IDEA suggests that Congress intended to require an evi-dentiary hearing when the material facts are already established by ample affidavits and documents. In those situations, an adversarial hearing would be duplicative and a waste of administrative resources. While not dispositive, we find it persuasive that summary disposition procedures are frequently used to decide IDEA claims that involve no disputed issues of fact. See, e.g., James v. Upper Arlington City Sch. Dist., 987 F.Supp. 1017, 1018 (S.D.Ohio 1997)(granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings); Worcester Pub. Schs., 28 IDELR 1082 (Mass. Aug. 4, 1998) (granting summary judgment for parents); Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 1169 (Tx. Apr. 3, 1997) (granting partial summary judgment for the school district); District City 1 and Dist. City 2 Pub. Sch., 24 IDLER 1081 (Minn. Aug. 6, 1996) (collecting cases and noting that summary judgment motions are regularly applied in IDEA hearings in Minnesota). Thus, where the parties have had a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and the non-moving party is unable to identify any genuine issue of material fact, the use of a summary judgment procedure is entirely proper. Here, the uncontested facts based on sworn affidavits, a cumulative student record, and a psychological evaluation show that, notwithstanding J.D.’s emotional-behavioral disability, his basic skills consistently matched or exceeded those of his age cohorts; indeed, J.D.’s parents placed him in a private boarding school not because his basic skills were lagging, but so that he may be among his intellectually gifted peers. 4 The views of his advocate— Dr. Meisenhelder, some of his teachers, and his parents — are in the record and do not controvert the defendants’ position that J.D. performed satisfactorily or better in each of the basic skill areas relative to his peers. Accordingly, the district court properly held that the State hearing officer did not violate J.D.’s rights under § 1415(b)(2) by deciding the case on summary judgment.