Opinion ID: 740
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: IMMAct  602(c)

Text: It is quite evident that IMMAct  602(c) is a more general statutory provision than ADAA  7344(b). IMMAct  602(c) directs generally that revised INA  241 applies without regard to whether the facts, by reason of which an alien is described as removable in [INA  241], occurred prior to IMMAct's enactment. But it does not specifically cover the impact of convictions for crimes generally, or the impact of pre-1988 convictions in particular. ADAA  7344(b), in contrast, narrowly and expressly covered both of these considerations, and, even more narrowly, did so with regard to the aggravated felony ground of deportation only. True, when applied after 1990 to pre-ADAA aggravated felony convictions, the affirmative provision of IMMAct  602(c), which covers all of INA  241, could, read literally, produce [a] differing result when applied to the same factual situation as ADAA  7344(b). Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155, 96 S.Ct. 1989. That is, with the except clause out of the picture, IMMAct  602(c), on its face, could be read to allow deportation for such convictions, while ADAA  7344(b) would not. But, as Radzanower teaches, that ... states the [implied repeal] problem but does not resolve it. Id. at 155, 96 S.Ct. 1989. To resolve the problem, Radzanower and its progeny inform us, we must consider whether, like the preexisting narrow statutes at issue in Lujan-Armendariz and other cases, the earlier and narrower statutory provision hereÔÇöADAA  7344(b)ÔÇömust be construed as a minor exception to the very general language of the later statutory provisionÔÇöIMMAct  602(c). We determine that it must, for several reasons. First, construing ADAA  7344(b) as an exception to the broad reach of IMMAct  602(c) would certainly be a small puncture in a broad shield. Donaldson, 653 F.2d at 418. ADAA  7344(b) addresses only one of many categories of deportable offenses. Aggravated felony convictions constitute one of the approximately thirty grounds for deportation and fourteen categories of deportable criminal offenses that IMMAct  602(a) listed. Further, with the passage of time, the pool of otherwise deportable aliens who committed pre-ADAA aggravated feloniesÔÇöalready a small percentage of all deportable aggravated felonsÔÇöwill continue to shrink. Second, nothing in the text of the IMMAct indicates a clear intention, Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153, 96 S.Ct. 1989, to apply the broad language of IMMAct  602(c) so as to repeal the very precise, narrow directive of ADAA  7344(b). Nor does anything in the text preclude interpreting ADAA  7344(b) as a narrow exception to IMMAct  602. The except clause of  602(c) shows that Congress anticipated some tension between IMMAct  602(c) and INA  241, but, without more, we cannot conclude that this clause shows the requisite congressional intent to repeal a separate provision specifically addressing retroactivity of a small subset of deportation grounds, ADAA  7344(b). [11] Third, when ADAA  7344(b) was enacted, INA  241 already contained a provision nearly identical to the second sentence of IMMAct  602(c). INA  241(d), 8 U.S.C.  1251(d) (1982), provided: Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, the provisions of this section shall be applicable to all aliens belonging to any of the classes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, notwithstanding (1) that any such alien entered the United States prior to June 27, 1952, or (2) that the facts, by reason of which any such alien belongs to any of the classes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, occurred prior to June 27, 1952. At the time of its enactment, ADAA  7344(b) unarguably presented an exception to former INA  241(d), even though it was not an exception specifically provided in this section because ADAA  7344(b) was a freestanding provision never incorporated in INA  241. IMMAct  602(c) performs essentially the same function as former INA  241(d). [12] As ADAA  7344(b) was a freestanding exception to former INA  241(d), then the similar language of IMMAct  602(c), making no mention whatever of ADAA  7344(b), should also be read as compatible with ADA  7344(b), rather than as doing away with that section sub silentio. Fourth, the legislative history of IMMAct  602 is of no additional assistance in demonstrating a clear and manifest intention to repeal ADAA  7344(b). The conference report on the IMMAct makes clear that IMMAct  602(a) was to replace the former INA  241(a) by updating the grounds for deportation and `consolidat[ing]... related grounds in order to make the law more rational and easy to understand.' Matter of Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 371 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-955, at 119, 128 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6793). But neither that conference report nor any other legislative history document we have found discusses IMMAct  602(c) in any regard, or reports the intended effect of the IMMAct on ADAA  7344(b) or similar provisions. Compare Novak, 476 F.3d at 1051-52 (concluding that a statute impliedly repealed another in part because the legislative history showed Congress was aware of the potential conflict between the two laws when the later statute was passed). Fifth and finally, when other provisions of the IMMAct are taken into account, it becomes apparent that Congress did not intend to repeal ADAA  7344(b), because doing so would have produced exceedingly odd results. See generally Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 402 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (courts should strive to avoid attributing absurd designs to Congress). The peculiar outcome we must strive to avoid would result from the interaction of IMMAct  602(c) and IMMAct  501, which amended the definition of the term aggravated felony. [13] Section 501 broadened the definition of the term aggravated felony by, inter alia, adding certain controlled substance trafficking crimes and crimes of violence to the list of qualifying crimes in INA  101(a)(43). IMMAct  501(a), 104 Stat. at 5048. So, like the ADAA, the IMMAct treated the definition of aggravated felony as distinct from the aggravated felony ground for deportation. The IMMAct also separately specified the temporal reach of the new definition: IMMAct  501(b) provided that four of the six amendments added by  501, including the addition of crimes of violence, would apply only to offenses committed on or after the date of the enactment of [the IMMAct]. 104 Stat. at 5048. Two other amendments, including addition of certain controlled substance trafficking offenses, applied as if they had been included in the ADAA's 1988 definition of aggravated felony. Id. Section 501(b)'s reference to the ADAA indicates that Congress considered  7344(b) of that Act as continuing in force. Were  7344(b) impliedly repealed by IMMAct, the provision in IMMAct itself specifying that certain of the amendments contained in  501(a) would be effective as if included in the enactment of section 7342 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 would be pointless. For, if IMMAct  602(c) in fact eliminated ADAA  7344(b), the pivotal provision in the 1988 Act concerning the temporal impact of the aggravated felony definition would no longer exist, and there would be no reason to refer in IMMAct to the ADAA, rather than to  602(c) of IMMAct itself, as the source of effective date provisions concerning amendments to the aggravated felony definition. [14] Moreover, if  501(b) is read as having incorporated the temporal limitations of the ADAA with regard only to some of the IMMAct's definitional amendments, that reading would produce exceedingly peculiar results: For aliens who committed money laundering and crimes of violenceÔÇö first defined as aggravated felonies in IMMAct  501(a)ÔÇöthe new aggravated felony definition would apply prospectively, so that only aliens who committed such crimes after IMMAct's passage in 1990 could be deported as aggravated felons. But aliens who committed the controlled substance or state law offenses referenced in IMMAct  501(b) before 1988, like aliens who committed aggravated felonies included in the ADAA but were convicted prior to the ADAA's passage, would suddenly become deportable with the enactment of the IMMAct. Such a reading would mean that the IMMAct, for no apparent reason, protected from deportation some, but not all, aggravated felons who committed crimes before the aggravated felony ground of deportation was created. This division would make no sense. Instead, in light of IMMAct  501(b)'s reference to the ADAA, and  501(b)'s apparent purpose to limit the instances in which criminal aliens were retroactively categorized as deportable, it becomes evident that the 1990 Congress intended generally to preserve the ADAA's determination that an aggravated felon would be deportable as such only if convicted of the crime in question, at the earliest, after November 18, 1988ÔÇöthat is, after conviction of an aggravated felony became a deportable offense. The dissent argues that the BIA read IMMAct  602(c) as part of a `wholesale revision of 8 U.S.C.  1251 [INA  241], a new statutory scheme, embracing `comprehensive changes,' Dissent at 1082 (quoting Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 374)ÔÇöand thus, as a repeal by way of complete substitution, which is not the sort of implied repeal that is discouraged by our presumption. Id. at 1083 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 663, 127 S.Ct. 2518). The dissent's view of the BIA opinion as properly resting on a complete substitution implied repeal theory and as therefore entitled to deference cannot be right, for three reasons. First, the BIA stated in Lettman that its reading of  602(c)  comports with our understanding that the purpose of  602 of the 1990 Act was to completely revise the deportation grounds. Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 372 (emphasis added). That is, it came to its reading of  602(c) quite apart from the complete revision rationale, namely because it considered  602(c)'s reference to INA  241(a) to encompass ADAA  7344(b) expressly. The BIA never directly addressed the presumption against implied repeals before settling upon its interpretation of  602(c). As we have already shown, ADAA  7344(b) was never a part of INA  241, so whatever the BIA believed about  602(a) being intended to replace former section 241(a) (1998) in its entirety, Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 371, such a complete replacement would not directly have affected the meaning of  602(c). Second, even taking the BIA's decision on its own terms as the dissent suggests we should and presuming that the BIA regarded IMMAct  602(c) as a complete revision of the deportation provisions of the INA, the BIA's statutory construction in Matter of Lettman was not well within the general principles applicable to implied repeals. See Dissent at 5045. Matter of Lettman stated that there would be no point in enacting a new statutory scheme if the intent was to keep the former version of the law in control whenever there was a difference between the old and the new. We cannot conclude that this was the intention of Congress. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 374. The BIA's reasoning, and the dissent's attempt to portray Lettman as properly applying the demanding requirements for an implied repeal, do not work. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 56 S.Ct. 349, 80 L.Ed. 351 (1936) explains: The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored. Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible. There are two well-settled categories of repeals by implicationÔÇö(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general thing, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act[.] Id. at 503, 56 S.Ct. 349 (emphasis added). As we have shown extensively, IMMAct was by no means clearly intended to repeal the ADAA generally, and the dissent fails to identify any clear and manifest congressional intent to do so. Instead, the dissent is forced to infer[ ] a repeal, see Dissent, 1083, contrary to the Supreme Court's directive not to infer a statutory repeal unless the later statute expressly contradicts the original act or unless such a construction is absolutely necessary ... in order that the words of the later statute shall have any meaning at all. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 662, 127 S.Ct. 2518 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Boardmember Rosenberg, dissenting from the majority decision in Matter of Lettman, showed at length why the IMMAct did not replace the aggravated felony provisions of the ADAA, but only redesignated them. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 389-93, 396-97 (Rosenberg, dissenting). [15] Moreover, Matter of Lettman does not discuss IMMAct  501(b) and so does not recognize the inconsistency between that section and a wholesale revision implied repeal theory. Third, Chevron does not apply here in the first place. As explained above, if reading the statutory language in light of the presumption against implied repeals resolves any potential ambiguity, Chevron deference has no role to play. See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749; St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 n. 45, 121 S.Ct. 2271. For all these reasons, we conclude that IMMAct  602(c) did not repeal ADAA  7344(b).