Opinion ID: 2520871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Both the Attorney General's case and Secretary of State's case are original proceedings pursuant to Article VI, Section 3, of the Colorado Constitution. Article VI, Section 3, states in relevant part: The supreme court shall have power to issue writs of ... mandamus, ... injunction, and such other... writs as may be provided by rule of court.... Colo. Const. art. VI, ง 3. Original proceedings are controlled by Colorado Appellate Rule 21(a)(1), which states that: Relief under this rule is extraordinary in nature and is a matter wholly within the discretion of the Supreme Court. Such relief shall be granted only when no other adequate remedy ... is available. C.A.R. 21(a)(1). Although we have discretion regarding the cases we choose to hear, we have established two basic requirements for original proceedings such as these. [3] First, the case must involve an extraordinary matter of public importance. Leaffer v. Zarlengo, 44 P.3d 1072, 1077 (Colo.2002). Second, there must be no adequate conventional appellate remedies. Id.; see also William H. ReMine, Anne Whalen Gill & Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Appeals to the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Original Proceedings ง 15.3, in Leonard P. Plank & Anne Whalen Gill, Colorado Appellate Law and Practice 217 (1999). Both of the cases we decide today satisfy both requirements. We examine the Attorney General's case first. There can be no question that the Attorney General's case involves an extraordinary matter of public importance. Congressional redistricting implicates citizens' right to vote for United States Representatives. This right to vote is fundamental to our democracy. According to the United States Supreme Court, [n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). The frequency of redistricting affects the stability of Colorado's congressional districts, and hence, the effectiveness of our state's representation in the United States Congress. When the boundaries of a district are stable, the district's representative or any hopeful contenders can build relationships with the constituents in that district. Furthermore, the constituents within a district can form communities of interest with one another, and these groups can lobby the representative regarding their interests. These relationships improve representation and ultimately, the effectiveness of the district's voice in Congress. Furthermore, the specific outcome of the Attorney General's case resolves the debate over the shapes of the congressional districts for the 2004 elections. Until this dispute is settled, Colorado citizens and their representatives in Congress will not know whether the 2004 elections will take place under the same districts as the 2002 elections or according to SB 03-352's new districts. The uncertainty surrounding the 2004 congressional districts has forced some voters, local officials, and interest groups to act as if they could be in either one of two districts, and, thus, to expend unnecessary money and effort building relationships with both of their potential representatives and districts. Moreover, this uncertainty carries over to other elected and appointed officials, such as the University of Colorado Board of Regents, whose districts follow the congressional map. In sum, congressional redistricting is a crucial issue, which warrants a decisive and expedient resolution from this court. The second factor in considering whether to exercise our original jurisdiction is whether the parties have an adequate alternative remedy. The remedy may be an action in a trial court or an appeal in an ongoing proceeding. C.A.R. 21(a)(1). As noted above, there is now a case in the federal district court that also challenges SB 03-352. Keller, No. 03-Z-1482(CBS). The Secretary of State urges that this federal case is an adequate remedy to the Attorney General's claims. We disagree. The federal case is not an adequate form of relief for several reasons. An appellate court will often defer to a trial court when a case can be resolved on a ground that makes it possible to avoid reaching a constitutional issue. Here, however, the constitutional question cannot be avoided. In Keller, the plaintiffs did not raise the question of whether Article V, Section 44, of the Colorado Constitution restricts congressional redistricting to once per decade. If the trial court were to hold that SB 03-352 is invalid because of a procedural error in its enactment, as alleged, the question would remain whether the General Assembly could redistrict more than once in a census period. Also, the federal court is not the appropriate forum to decide the frequency of redistricting. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that states have primary responsibility in congressional redistricting and that federal courts must defer to states. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993) (saying reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 1435, 155 L.Ed.2d 407 (2003). Most importantly, this case turns on the Colorado Constitution. The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). Consequently, even if the Keller court were to address the issue of how frequently the General Assembly may draw congressional districts, the federal court would have to turn to this court to answer that question. See S.C. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Riley, 533 F.Supp. 1178, 1180 (D.S.C.1982) (redistricting case in which a federal district court said that only the South Carolina Supreme Court could interpret the state constitution's redistricting provision). Hence, it is illogical for this court to defer to the federal court. In sum, the Attorney General's petition presents an issue uniquely suited for resolution in an original proceeding. In the second case that we decide today, the Secretary of State raises an issue that is also appropriately resolved in an original proceeding. The Secretary is the named respondent in the Attorney General's petition, and she challenges the Attorney General's authority to file such an original proceeding. The Attorney General's authority to sue the Secretary of State is a matter of public importance. Both are constitutional officers of the executive branch, and this is the proper vehicle to resolve their dispute. Thus, we exercise our discretion to decide both original proceedings.