Opinion ID: 2584053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: there is substantial competent evidence to support the jury conviction of first degree murder

Text: Sheahan argues that the State did not present credible evidence of premeditation to sustain a conviction of any crime greater than manslaughter.
This Court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson, 136 Idaho 701, 704, 39 P.3d 641, 644 (Ct.App.2001). On appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and the reviewing court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996) (quoting State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 163, 898 P.2d 615, 622 (Ct.App.1995)).
For first degree murder to be proven, it must be shown that the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated. I.C. § 18-4003(a). Direct evidence of a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill is not required; such a purpose may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the killing. State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676, 679, 691 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Ct.App.1984). Additionally, premeditation does not require any appreciable space of time between the intention to kill and the killing; rather, it may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 710, 429 P.2d 836, 840 (1967) (quoting State v. Shuff, 9 Idaho 115, 126, 72 P. 664, 668 (1903)). Sheahan relies on State v. Erwin, 98 Idaho 736, 572 P.2d 170 (1977), for the standard that should be applied when reviewing a jury's conviction of a crime, arguing that if a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstantial evidence must be not only consistent and compatible with the guilt of an accused, but it must also be inconsistent with any reasonable theory of his innocence. Id. at 740-41, 572 P.2d at 174-75 (quoting State v. Wilson, 62 Idaho 282, 284, 111 P.2d 868, 868 (1941)). However, in State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 661-62, 8 P.3d 652, 656-57 (2000) this Court stated the following: We agree with the conclusion of the courts from the growing majority of states that in all criminal cases there should be only one standard of proof, which is beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we hold that once the jury has been properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard of proof, the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence even when all the evidence is circumstantial. Accordingly, we overturn [ State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 594 P.2d 639 (1979)] and its progeny, which held that an additional jury instruction was required in cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Despite the logic of Humpherys, Sheahan says his conviction should be vacated because the circumstantial evidence could have been interpreted in favor of his claim of self-defense or defense of habitat. The argument fails under Humpherys and would fail in any event because the conviction was not based solely on circumstantial evidence. The fact of the killing itself is not based on circumstantial evidence. Sheahan shot Fernquist, and Fernquist is dead. The evidence must be analyzed on the basis of whether there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whether that evidence be direct or circumstantial. There is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Fernquist had been looking for Sheahan for several months prior to the shooting. Sheahan had failed to appear for pretrial conferences and had warrants out for his arrest. He should have known that Fernquist or the police were looking for him. Fernquist had spoken with several of Sheahan's friends and neighbors and left business cards with them. Two of Fernquist's business cards were found in the top drawer of Sheahan's dresser. Sheahan would likely have known Fernquist when he entered his residence as they had met before. Sheahan showed his desire to evade legal action against him by ignoring pretrial conference appointments and evading those that posted bail for him, from which the jury could find his willingness to again try to evade arrest when Fernquist appeared. This inference is supported by testimony that material was taped over the windows in Sheahan's residence and bags had been placed over the lights in his residence. The jury could determine from the incident where Sheahan pointed a gun at the door where an officer stood that he had premeditated or planned to kill anyone who sought to apprehend him on the warrants, including Fernquist. The evidence also shows that Sheahan removed bags from his hands after being taken into custody, despite being told not to by police, from which the jury could find consciousness of guilt and efforts to destroy evidence. The jury could also find from the fact that the pipe lying next to Fernquist's body had no fingerprints on it that Sheahan had put it there to support his claim of self-defense. There is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.