Opinion ID: 407635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for Release of Transcripts

Text: 49 On October 21, three weeks after the close of voir dire, one week after the denial of the motion to suppress, four days after the decision on the motion regarding availability of the interview tapes, and while the trial was still in progress, Blake and Times Mirror filed a motion seeking an order releasing the transcripts of the three closed hearings, and requiring that no further hearings be closed until the media were given notice and afforded an opportunity to be heard. 50 After hearing counsel, the court ruled that the transcripts of the closed portion of the voir dire and the transcript of the closed hearing on the motion for access to the tapes would not be released until the trial was completed. The court stated that the motion for release of the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress would become moot when the defendant's statement was admitted in evidence. Finally, the court held there was no authority establishing a legal right in the media to notice and an opportunity to be heard, but stated that when it was announced the courtroom would be cleared those present would have an opportunity to object and the court would listen to the reasons for the objection. 51 Even where denial of access is appropriate, it must be no greater than necessary to protect the interest justifying it. Globe Newspaper, supra, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 102 S.Ct. at 2620-23; Sacramento Bee, supra, 656 F.2d at 482, 483. Thus, transcripts of properly closed proceedings must be released when the danger of prejudice has passed. Gannett, supra, 443 U.S. at 393, 99 S.Ct. at 2912; id. at 400, 99 S.Ct. at 2916 (Powell, J., concurring). Indeed, the denial of the motion to release the transcripts was in itself a denial of the right of access protected by the first amendment. It must be tested by the same standard and must satisfy the same procedural prerequisites as the initial closure. 52 Petitioners were afforded sufficient opportunity to present their reasons for unsealing the transcripts, but the court's findings were not sufficient to demonstrate the court made the determinations necessary to justify denial of access to the transcripts. 53 The court at first stated it intended to open the transcript of the closed portion of the voir dire. Defense counsel argued there was no newsworthy purpose in reporting reactions of particular jurors to questions posed by counsel, and that release of the transcript is only going to cause them to be contacted by families, friends, exposing them to some pressure, at least the possibility exists. The court properly rejected counsel's suggestion that closure could be based on the court's judgment as to the newsworthiness of the information contained in the transcript, but continued, I understand what you are saying with regard to the possibility of influence on these jurors, through family members and others, who might indeed read some of these news accounts at this time. The court concluded, I think it might be more advisable, in terms of protecting the rights of these defendants, not to release it at this time, but to wait and release it after the trial has ended. 54 The only prejudice from opening the transcript of the voir dire identified by the court was possible pressure upon jurors from family and friends based upon news accounts of the jurors' responses during voir dire. It is not at all clear from examining the transcript itself what pressure the court feared. Moreover, counsel in advancing the argument and the court in adopting it stated only that there was a possibility of such pressure: There was no finding that the danger was sufficient to create a substantial probability that defendants' rights to a fair trial might be compromised. Nor did the court find a substantial probability that alternatives to continuing closure would not adequately protect defendants' rights. Only sequestration was mentioned and rejected as an alternative, though admonitory instructions to the jurors or voluntary agreement by the media as to scope and timing of coverage seem obvious candidates. Sacramento Bee, supra, 656 F.2d at 482-83. 55 With respect to the transcript of the suppression hearing, the court noted it had denied the motion to suppress defendant's statement and said, I don't think that in fairness to these defendants it ought to be released before indeed the jury itself gets to hear the testimony. The question was not whether the defendant's inculpatory statement should be disclosed, but rather whether the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence of that statement should have been unsealed. The two are not the same. As we have noted, much of the transcript of the suppression hearing could have been made available without disclosing the contents of defendant's statement. At the least, a statement of the reasons for rejecting this and other possible alternatives to complete denial of the motion for access to the transcripts-disclosure accompanied by admonitory instructions to the jury, for example, or a voluntary agreement to the media to limit publicity-should have been articulated in findings. 56 Finally, with respect to the transcript of the hearing regarding access to the interview tapes, the court noted that it was only attempting to protect the owner of the tapes, and suggested the media consult with the owner and his counsel regarding access to them. But again, access to the transcripts was at issue, not access to the tapes, and it was the court and not the tape owner that denied petitioners access to the transcript. Even if the content of the transcript could not be disclosed without also disclosing the content of the tapes, the court could not absolve itself of the obligation to recognize the public's first amendment right to access to the transcript by delegating the authority to resolve that issue to the owner of the tapes. It was the court's duty to satisfy the procedural prerequisites, weigh the conflicting interests, and decide whether and to what extent petitioners' first amendment rights must be subordinated to the owner's property interest. 57 In view of the authorities discussed earlier, the district court also erred in concluding petitioners had no legal right to an opportunity to be heard before exclusion was ordered. Petitioners also had a legal right to notice, but only to the extent we have indicated earlier.