Opinion ID: 2058058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motivation for Adoption of Section 2951(2)

Text: [¶ 43] In the 1970s and early 1980s the trend in United States Supreme Court decision-making on Establishment Clause/Free Exercise issues strongly disfavored use of public funds for direct or indirect payments to religious institutions, including religious schools. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (holding that Establishment Clause prohibited sending public school teachers into private, religious schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children); [14] Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 53 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (holding provision of instructional materials and transportation services to religious schools is not permitted; therapeutic services could be provided to religious school students off-site; funding for secular textbooks, testing, and diagnostic services upheld), overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 44 L.Ed.2d 217 (1975) (striking down in part a Pennsylvania law that provided loans of educational materials to religious schools), overruled in part by Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530; Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973) (invalidating New York tax laws that provided direct money grants to qualifying non-public schools for maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (invalidating programs that provided salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in religious schools). [¶ 44] This trend in Federal Court decision-making regarding cash payments that would go directly or indirectly to religious institutions, although relaxed somewhat in the late 1980s and early 1990s, [15] continued to influence United States District Court and Court of Appeals decisions, including the lower court decisions in Zelman. [16] [¶ 45] Many of the actions that challenged use of public funds for religious purposes included claims for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, for injunctive relief, and for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. In 1983 actions, attorney fees could be awarded whether a party prevailed on the § 1983 claim or other grounds. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). Further, state and local governments and officials faced a greater risk of liability and attorney fee awards where it could be demonstrated that they were aware that the challenged government actions were violative of constitutional rights and had failed to take corrective action. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (holding school officials liable when they knew action taken would cause a deprivation of students' constitutional rights), overruled in part by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-92, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (upholding imposition of substantial attorney fee award where prison officials failed to correct Eighth Amendment violations that were the subject of a prior court order). [¶ 46] Had the tuition subsidy program continued as it existed in 1980, paying public funds for tuition to religious schools, the program faced a high risk of a successful challenge that could have resulted in disruption of the entire tuition subsidy effort and a costly attorney fee award to be paid by Maine taxpayers. Thus, in the legal climate of 1980, the Maine Attorney General gave good advice regarding the propriety of using public funds to pay tuition at religious schools. The Maine Legislature acted prudently and responsibly in taking that advice and enacting section 2951(2). [¶ 47] The actions of the Attorney General and the Legislature were not motivated by any religious animus and were motivated by a desire to respect and comply with the requirements of the Establishment Clause as then interpreted and applied by the United States Supreme Court.