Opinion ID: 213686
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Course of Investigation Exception

Text: In an attempt to justify the state appellate court's treatment of the Lewis statement, the State notes our decisions holding that an informant's out-of-court statement to law enforcement is not hearsay if that statement is offered into evidence as an explanation of why the [subsequent] investigation proceeded as it did. E.g., United States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir.2006). Applying this exception, we have rejected Sixth Amendment claims premised on such statements on the grounds that non-hearsay use of such statements does not violate the Confrontation Clause. See id.; United States v. Akinrinade, 61 F.3d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995). From these decisions, the State argues, the state appellate court could reasonably (if erroneously) have inferred that the introduction of Lewis' statement into evidence to show the course of the investigation did not violate Jones' Confrontation Clause rights. [4] In making this argument, the State has displayed so egregious a misunderstanding of our cases that the subject requires some explanation. United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir.1994) (reversing convictions after district court allowed hearsay confessions implicating defendants on trial). Although an out-of-court statement offered to show the reason a police investigation proceeded as it did could be said not to be [inadmissible] hearsay, the reasons for [an] investigation [are] most assuredly not something the Government [has] to prove to carry its burden of proof in a criminal trial. Mancillas, 580 F.2d at 1309-10. Aside from those limited details necessary to show that the evidence [found] is actually relevant, United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 903 n. 5 (7th Cir.2010), the details of an investigation are generally of only minimal consequence to the determination of the action. Mancillas, 580 F.2d at 1310 (quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 426 (7th Cir.1998) (questioning relevance of such testimony); Reyes, 18 F.3d at 71 (noting that the history of [an] investigation is a useful narrative device, but is not relevant to the guilt or innocence of the defendant); Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 314 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1984) (At heart, a criminal prosecution is designed to find the truth of what a defendant did and, on occasion, of why he did it. It is most unusual that a prosecution will properly concern itself with why an investigating officer did something.); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249 (6th ed.) (The need for this evidence is slight. ...). By the same token, the probative value of a tip on which an investigation was based is marginal, at best, absent perhaps a (relevant) allegation of police impropriety. United States v. Lovelace, 123 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir.2004) (noting in dicta that such a tip may perhaps be relevant to dispel an accusation that the officers were officious intermeddlers staking out [a defendant] for nefarious purposes); Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70 (observing that such evidence might constitute appropriate rebuttal to initiatives launched by the defendant). Even when the police have been accused of acting improperly, however, the relevance of law enforcement's reasons for investigation remains questionable. See Mancillas, 580 F.2d at 1310. While such course of investigation evidence usually has little or no probative value, the dangers of prejudice and abuse posed by the course of investigation tactic are significant. More than thirty years ago, we cautioned that the testimonial repetition of a declarant's out-of-court charge that the defendant would engage or was engaged in specific criminality would seem to create too great a risk of prejudice and confusion than can be justified simply to set forth the background of the investigation. Mancillas, 580 F.2d at 1310. More recently, we pointed out that an unthinking, expansive application of the course of investigation exception would effectively undermine the Confrontation Clause: Allowing agents to narrate the course of their investigations, and thus spread before juries damning information that is not subject to cross-examination, would go far toward abrogating the defendant's rights under the sixth amendment and the hearsay rule. Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020. Consistent with these observations, then, the use of out-of-court statements to show background has been identified as an area of `widespread abuse.' United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 346 (3d Cir.1993); see 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249 (One area where abuse may be a particular problem involves statements by arresting or investigating officers regarding the reason for their presence at the scene of a crime.). Such statements offered to show background or the course of the investigation can easily violate a core constitutional right, are easily misused, and are usually no more than minimally relevant. Courts asked to admit such statements for supposed non-hearsay purposes must be on the alert for such misuse. See Lovelace, 123 F.3d at 653. A trial court should not accept without scrutiny an offering party's representation that an out-of-court statement is being introduced for a material non-hearsay purpose. Sallins, 993 F.2d at 346 (reversing conviction). Our colleagues on the Second Circuit have explained in reversing a conviction on these grounds: the mere identification of a relevant non-hearsay use of such evidence is insufficient to justify its admission if the jury is likely to consider the statement for the truth of what was stated with significant resultant prejudice. The greater the likelihood of prejudice resulting from the jury's misuse of the statement, the greater the justification needed to introduce the background evidence for its non-hearsay uses. Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70. For this reason, the course of investigation exception is most readily applied to admit only those brief out-of-court statements that bridge gaps in the trial testimony that would otherwise substantially confuse or mislead the jury. See Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020 (noting that this exception may apply if a jury would not otherwise understand why an investigation targeted a particular defendant). In Eberhart, for example, we allowed DEA agents to testify that an informant had identified his cocaine supplier as a man known only as E. 434 F.3d at 937. Otherwise, it would have been largely unclear why the agents had asked that informant to call E, who turned out to be defendant Eberhart. Id. at 939 & 940 n. 1. Similarly, in Akinrinade, we allowed testimony regarding an informant's unsuccessful attempt to telephone his accomplices because that testimony helped explain why that informant had been directed ... to place [additional] telephone calls to Nigeria and Chicago. 61 F.3d at 1283. For such limited purposes, however, only a small amount of information is legitimately needed in all but the rarest cases. Under the course of investigation exception, we typically allow only the briefest out-of-court statements. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 569 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir.2009) (finding no plain error in admitting, without any objection, witness' statement that defendant just took a gun across the street to explain officers' actions); United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787, 791-92 (7th Cir.2004) (informant's statement that a `black male with a bald head' [was] dealing drugs from the residence under surveillance); United States v. Martinez, 939 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1991) (government agent's statement that he had information that `a man' had offered to sell an informant one-half kilogram of cocaine). A legitimate non-hearsay purpose most certainly does not open the door for law enforcement officers to narrate the course of their investigations, and thus spread before juries damning information that is not subject to cross-examination. Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020. Nor is it necessary to put before the jury extensive eyewitness accounts of bad acts by the defendant that the jury would not otherwise have heard. United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 210 (3d Cir.2006). Unless the testimony at issue clarif[ies] noncontroversial matter without causing unfair prejudice on significant disputed matters, Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70, the best course of action is to exclude the evidence altogether. If some brief item is truly necessary, the court should redact a lengthy out-of-court statement to the extent needed to ensure that its actual evidentiary function is only the legitimate one for which it is being admitted. Price, 458 F.3d at 210; see 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249 ([A] statement that an officer acted `upon information received,' or words to that effect, should be sufficient.). Although the Indiana Court of Appeals invoked the course of investigation exception to reject Jones' Confrontation Clause claim, it took none of these considerations into account. Certainly, none of the incriminating substance of Lewis' statement was necessary to bridge an otherwise-inexplicable gap in the trial testimony or to prevent the jury from being confused about some material issue. See, e.g., Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020. To whatever extent the prosecution feared that the jury would be confused if it did not know exactly why the police started investigating Jones, that fear could have been assuaged by as little as a bare-boned statement that the police acted on information received from Jeffrey Lewis. See 2 McCormick on Evidence § 249. Yet the trial court made no effort to exclude or redact any incriminatory details of Lewis' double-hearsay statement. See Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020; Price, 458 F.3d at 210. The Indiana Court of Appeals also failed to appreciate that, although it invoked the course of investigation theory, its stated reasons for allowing Lewis' statement into evidence make sense only if that statement was considered for the truth of its contents. As the appellate court majority explained, it felt that Lewis' statement was necessary to prevent the jury from believing Jones' claim that Aaron, whose credibility was in question, was the only source of evidence against him. Jones I, No. 45A03-0407-CR-339, at 9. As Chief Judge Kirsch said so well in his dissent, the majority essentially concluded that because the admissible evidence against Jones was weak, and Jones' counsel noted such fact, it was proper to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence. Id. at 16. If the majority's reasoning were correct, Judge Kirsch continued, any hearsay statement to police during the course of their investigation would be admissible whenever a defendant makes any comment on the evidence. Id. at 17. For all of these reasons, the course of investigation exception could not be reasonably applied to admit the detectives' detailed testimony about what Lewis told them he had heard from Parks.