Opinion ID: 1236784
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Control and Ownership

Text: Much of the district court's analysis relies on the factual determination that spills would necessarily occur during the transfer of Shell's chemicals to B & B. Shell maintains that this finding was inadequate, because Shell did not itself transport the chemicals or participate in transferring the chemicals to B & B's containers. Central to this contention is Shell's insistence that it lacked ownership and control of the chemicals at the time of transfer and so could not be an arranger. We do not agree that the district court's findings about Shell's involvement were insufficient to support arranger liability. There was evidence before the district court that: (1) Spills occurred every time the deliveries were made; (2) Shell arranged for delivery and chose the common carrier that transported its product to the Arvin site; (3) Shell changed its delivery process so as to require the use of large storage tanks, thus necessitating the transfer of large quantities of chemicals and causing leakage from corrosion of the large steel tanks; (4) Shell provided a rebate for improvements in B & B's bulk handling and safety facilities and required an inspection by a qualified engineer; (5) Shell regularly would reduce the purchase price of the D-D, in an amount the district court concluded was linked to loss from leakage; and (6) Shell distributed a manual and created a checklist of the manual requirements, to ensure that D-D tanks were being operated in accordance with Shell's safety instructions. The parties vigorously dispute whether, given these facts, Shell owned the pesticide during the transfer and controlled the transfer process. Although the district court addressed these questions and resolved them against Shell, we do not enter this controversy. The text of the statute does not require that the arranger own the hazardous wastes, either at the time the arranger arranged for the transaction or at the time of transfer of ownership. See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1081. Indeed, to require ownership at the time of disposal would make it too easy for a party, wishing to dispose of a hazardous substance, to escape by a sale its responsibility to see that the substance is safely disposed of. Catellus, 34 F.3d at 752. Nor is control a statutory requirement, Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565, although it has been viewed as a pertinent consideration in cases quite different from this one. Where an owner of hazardous substances directly arranges for disposal  by, for example, using a hazardous substance disposal company  that owner is plainly an arranger even if it has nothing more to do with disposal. See, e.g., Catellus, 34 F.3d at 752. In broader arranger liability cases, however, we have tended to view control as a crucial element in determining whether the party arranged for disposal. Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1055. We also have viewed ownership of hazardous substances at the time of disposal as an important factor in nontraditional, indirect arranger liability cases. See Jones-Hamilton, 973 F.2d at 695 ( relying on Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380). None of these cases, however, indicates that ownership or control at the time of transfer are the sine qua non of nontraditional arranger liability. Instead, ownership and control at time of disposal are useful indices or clues toward the end of look[ing] beyond defendants' characterizations to determine whether a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for the disposal of a hazardous substance. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381. In Shell Oil, for example, the government never owned the chemicals before disposal occurred, so control over the substances was an important factor in determining whether or not the government could have arranged for disposal. Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1057-59. Here, ownership at the time of disposal is not an informative consideration, and control is informative only in light of additional considerations. Unlike in Shell Oil, where the absence of any ownership or control was a clue concerning whether the sales transaction necessarily contemplated disposal as an inherent part of the transaction, Shell here owned the chemicals at the time the sale was entered into. The statute requires nothing more in terms of ownership. We therefore need not determine the precise moment when ownership transferred to B & B. As to the control question, the district court's findings, recited above, demonstrate that Shell had sufficient control over, and knowledge of, the transfer process to be considered an arranger, within the meaning of CERCLA, for the disposal of the chemicals that leaked.