Opinion ID: 2517832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Federal Cases Applying Leon

Text: Additionally, a reading of Leon as not requiring a substantial basis for probable cause in order for the good faith exception to be applied is bolstered by decisions of the federal courts. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1007 n. 1 (10th Cir.2000), noted the defendant argue[d] the good-faith exception does not apply . . . `[i]f the affidavit does not provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.' While one of our sister circuits applies this language in its good-faith analysis, see United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir.1996), this court utilizes the `substantial basis' language solely in the probable cause context. See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1204 (10th Cir.1998). The Tenth Circuit noted that this standard was consistent with the law set forth in Leon. 229 F.3d at 1006-07. Subsequent to Danhauer, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has changed the approach which led to the Tenth Circuit's criticism. Now, the Fourth Circuit recognizes that Leon set out different standards for approaching the probable cause question on the one hand and the good faith exception question on the other. In United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir.2002), the federal appellate court noted the district court had blurred the distinction: In holding that the third circumstance described by the Leon Court barred application of the good faith exception in this case, the district court misidentified when this circumstance occurs. Thus, the court stated that `[t]he good faith exception . . . does not apply' when the affidavit fails to provide `a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.' [Citation omitted.] `Substantial basis' provides the measure for determination of whether probable cause exists in the first instance. [Citation omitted.] If a lack of a substantial basis also prevented application of the Leon objective good faith exception, the exception would be devoid of substance. In fact, Leon states that the third circumstance prevents a finding of objective good faith only when an officer's affidavit is `so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' [Citation omitted.] This is a less demanding showing than the `substantial basis' threshold required to prove the existence of probable cause in the first place. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also has adopted this understanding in United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2004), and again in United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 752 (6th Cir.2005). In Laughton, the Sixth Circuit stated: Affidavits that are `so lacking in indicia of probable cause' have come to be known as `bare bones' affidavits. [Citations omitted.] Such an affidavit contains only `suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions, without providing some underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. . . .' [Citation omitted.] In our recent opinion in Carpenter, we adopted the Fourth Circuit's understanding of the `so lacking' language, ruling that the standard by which an affidavit should be judged for purposes of the good faith exception `is a less demanding showing than the `substantial basis' threshold required to prove the existence of probable cause in the first place.' Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 595 (quoting United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 [4th Cir.2002]). If good faith reliance were judged by the substantial basis standard, we observed, `the exception would be devoid of substance.' [Citation omitted.] In the present case, the district court found that the deputy's application was `inadequate to establish probable cause, but . . . [was not] so inadequate as to be deemed a bare bones affidavit,' based upon the fact that the deputy had taken the information to a magistrate and was `able to furnish more than what has been deemed bare bones or a mere conclusion. . . .' 409 F.3d at 748-49. In other words, the federal cases are in accord in applying the substantial basis test for probable cause only to the determination of whether the warrant was valid; the test does not apply to the determination of whether the good faith exception applies. If the warrant is invalid, the probable cause test to be applied to see if the fruits of the search can nevertheless come under the good faith exception is whether the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official reliance unreasonable.