Opinion ID: 2808901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: B.2, at 109.

Text: In view of the disagreement surrounding breed-specific presumptions, it is clear to us that the viciousness or dangerousness of any breed within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 is not a simple factual matter of which a magistrate or circuit court can take judicial notice. See Rivers v. New York City Hous. Auth., 694 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (concluding that the court below had erred by taking judicial notice of “the vicious nature of pit bulls”); Carter v. Metro North Assocs., 680 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“On the subject of the propensities of pit bull terriers as a breed there are alternative opinions that preclude judicial notice such as was taken by the Court.”); Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075, 1091 (Md. 2012) (Greene, J., dissenting) (“[W]hy should appellate courts even consider taking judicial notice of facts relating to dog bite statistics that are clearly in dispute?”); cf. syl. pt. 2, Johnston v. Mack Mfg. Co., 65 W. Va. 544, 64 S.E. 841 (1909) (“The habits and propensities of domestic animals are matters of common knowledge to all men, and expert testimony to prove the vicious propensities of a particular kind of animals in general, after they become a certain age, is began to grow among those looking for tough guard or status dogs that could be trained to attack. Pit bulls have become the current villains of the dog world . . . . Hussain, supra note 2, 2853–54 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 inadmissible for the purpose of proving that the owner of an animal of that class had knowledge of his vicious propensity.”). Given the conflicting positions with regard to breed-specific presumptions and the public policy underlying such presumptions, it is apparent to us that the Legislature is far better equipped than the judiciary to consider the adoption of a breed-specific presumption applicable to W. Va. Code § 19-20-20. The Legislature is capable of scrutinizing the plethora of scientific and statistical evidence10 associated with the propensities for viciousness or dangerousness in any individual breed. With regard to pit bull breeds specifically, the Legislature is also better able to delineate the particulars of a breed-specific presumption, such as what dog breeds or breed mixes qualify as pit bulls11 and how those dogs should be identified to be subject to the 10 “Although pit bulls are implicated in a disproportionate number of serious and fatal attacks, critics contend that these statistics are incorrect and misleading . . . .” Hussain, supra note 2, at 2870. Critics assert that some dogs are prescribed to the “pit bull” category generally instead of a specific breed, and dogs may be classified as a pit bull breed based on subjective identifications that may be incorrect. Id. Critics also contend that “statistics may not accurately convey the danger posed by” pit bulls breeds because of the difficulty in ascertaining the actual population of different dog breeds in the examined areas. Id. at 2870–71; see also Swann, supra note 2, at 851–52 (suggesting that a disproportionately high pit bull population countervails the inference that multiple bite incidents involving pit bulls indicates that pit bulls are inherently dangerous); Larry Cunningham, The Case Against Dog Breed Discrimination by Homeowners’ Insurance Companies, 11 Conn. Ins. L.J. 1, 17–37 (2004) (describing in great detail how dog-bite statistics may not accurately present the nature of the dog bite problem because of how data is collected, what data is collected, and how data is analyzed). 11 See supra text accompanying note 2. 28 presumption.12 Thus, we conclude that the circuit court clearly erred by adopting a presumption that pit bull breeds are vicious, dangerous, aggressive, a public health hazard, and unpredictable in nature within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 19-20-20.13 2. The Circuit Court’s Legal Conclusion that Tinkerbell is Vicious, Dangerous, and in the Habit of Biting People The circuit court concluded that Tinkerbell is “vicious, dangerous, and in the habit of biting people” within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 19-20-20. Aside from its finding of a breed-specific presumption, the circuit court relied on its findings that “‘Tinkerbell’ did bite a child,” that the dog “caused severe injuries to the child,” and that “one attack such as this one is sufficient to declare a dog to be vicious and dangerous, and in the habit of biting people.” The Blatts dispute the determination that Tinkerbell is vicious, dangerous, and in the habit of biting people, arguing that the circuit court’s 12 “Other breeds share some of the hallmark features of pit-bull-type dogs,” which can make establishment of parameters for determining what dogs are subject to a breedspecific presumption difficult. Swann, supra note 2, at 854–55; see also Hussain, supra note 2, at 2852 (stating that “variations among and within” the pit bull breeds recognized by the American Kennel Club and the United Kennel Club make it difficult “to determine whether a particular dog should be characterized as a pit bull and to differentiate between pit bulls and other breeds”). 13 While the case before the Court is not an appeal of a conviction under W. Va. Code § 19-20-20, we believe it is important to recognize that the application of a breedspecific presumption in a criminal proceeding prosecuted pursuant to this statute would be unconstitutional. This Court has held that “‘“[i]t is unconstitutional to shift the burden of proof to a defendant on any element of a crime[ ].”’ State v. Jenkins, 191 W.Va. 87, 93, 443 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1994) (quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510[] (1979)).” Pullin v. State, 216 W. Va. 231, 235, 605 S.E.2d 803, 807 (2004). 29 conclusion of law is unsupported by the facts presented below. The State argues that the circuit court’s decision was proper and that “one unprovoked attack of a child is sufficient evidence that the dog is vicious.” Upon our de novo review, we determine that the circuit court’s conclusion that Tinkerbell is vicious, dangerous, and in the habit of biting people under W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 is error. The authority of the Legislature to enact a statute that regulates personal property—in this case, dogs14 that are vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking people or animals—is derived from the State’s police power. See, e.g., Quesenberry v. Estep, 142 W. Va. 426, 436, 95 S.E.2d 832, 838 (1956) (“The police power of the State is vested in the legislative branch of the government. It may be employed or delegated by the legislature subject only to the control of the courts to the extent that they may properly act, and under the police power the legislature may provide for the protection of the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the people.”). The destruction of dogs that are vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking people or animals pursuant to W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 is justified by the State’s interest in protecting the public from such animals. See Woods v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476, 482, 47 14 Dogs are declared to be personal property in West Virginia by W. Va. Code § 19-20-1 (1975). See also syl. pt. 5, Carbasho v. Musulin, 217 W. Va. 359, 362, 618 S.E.2d 368, 371 (2005) (“Dogs are personal property and damages for sentimental value, mental suffering, and emotional distress are not recoverable for the negligently inflicted death of a dog.”). 30 S.E. 275, 278 (1904) (“The legislature may determine when that which is otherwise property shall cease to be such if kept against law. It is subject to police power.”); Peoples Program for Endangered Species v. Sexton, 476 S.E.2d 477, 479 (S.C. 1996) (“Property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and dogs may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulation by the state . . . .”); Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 704 (1897) (“Even if it were assumed that dogs are property in the fullest sense of the word, they would still be subject to the police power of the State, and might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in the judgment of the legislature is necessary for the protection of its citizens. That a State, in a bona fide exercise of its police power, may interfere with private property, and even order its destruction, is as well settled as any legislative power can be which has for its objects the welfare and comfort of the citizen.”); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals § 19 (2015) (“Legislators may permit dogs to be destroyed or otherwise regulated for the safety and protection of citizens.”). However, the Court has long recognized that this type of exercise of the police power—the destruction of property without compensation—is “harsh in operation . . . and hence subject to strict[] limitations.” State ex rel. Austin v. Thomas, 96 W. Va. 628, 633, 123 S.E. 590, 592 (1924); see also State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 185, 10 S.E. 285, 287 (1889), overruled on other grounds by White v. Raleigh Wyo. Min. Co., 113 W. Va. 552, 168 S.E. 798 (1933) (“[I]n cases of great emergency, engendering overruling necessity, property may be taken or destroyed without compensation.”). 31 As we recognized above, W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 does not contain a breed-specific presumption, and neither magistrates nor circuit courts may take judicial notice of a breed-specific presumption under this statute. Thus, a circuit court or magistrate is limited to considering a dog’s past behavior in determining whether that dog poses a risk of future harm to the public such that the risk warrants exercising the State’s police power to destroy the dog. Cf. State v. George K., 233 W. Va. 698, 708, 760 S.E.2d 512, 522 (2014) (“The examination of crimes that have allegedly been committed indicates whether the incompetent defendant poses a future risk of harm.”).15 That risk is expressed in the terms of viciousness, dangerousness, or whether a dog is in the habit of biting or attacking people or animals. Where a dog’s behavior does not constitute a risk of future harm, the State may not exercise its police power to destroy that dog. See Goodwill, 33 W. Va. at 185, 10 S.E. at 287 (“[I]f [the Legislature] passes an act ostensibly for the public health or safety, and thereby destroys or takes away the property of a citizen . . . then it is for the courts to determine whether it is a proper and reasonable 15 In a dissent to the majority decision in Martin v. Williams, Judge Haymond suggested that the power to abate a public nuisance—“an act or condition that unlawfully operates to hurt or inconvenience an indefinite number of persons,” Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 127 W. Va. 586, 595, 34 S.E.2d 348, 354 (1945)—should never be exercised “when the power to regulate will accomplish the same end without the destruction of property.” 141 W. Va. 595, 627, 93 S.E.2d 835, 852 (1956) (Haymond, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also State Fire Marshal v. Sherman, 277 N.W. 249, 251 (Minn. 1938) (“When the police power of the state is exerted against property, it is ordinarily to regulate its use, not to destroy it. Destroying or depriving the owner thereof is a last resort, unless the property is of such nature that its use or possession cannot be other than for evil.”). 32 exercise of the power, and, if not, declare it void.”). With this in mind, we proceed by examining the circuit court’s conclusions that Tinkerbell is vicious, dangerous, and in the habit of biting people. Initially, we determine that the facts presented during the two hearings below do not support the circuit court’s conclusion that Tinkerbell is “in the habit of biting people” within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 19-20-20. Upon examining the entirety of the appendix record, we can find evidence of only one instance in which Tinkerbell has bitten any human: the bite giving rise to this case. Thus, we conclude that the circuit court’s finding that Tinkerbell is in the habit of biting—a “habit” requiring repeated behavior—is in error. In proceeding to evaluate the viciousness and dangerousness of Tinkerbell pursuant to W. Va. Code § 19-20-20, we note that while these concepts have not been significantly explored under this statute, they have been examined by this Court and the courts in other jurisdictions with regard to tort liability. In syllabus point 2 of Jividen v. Law, 194 W. Va. 705, 461 S.E.2d 451 (1995), we held that to maintain an action for strict liability in tort for an injury caused by an animal, the injured party must show that the animal had “a dangerous or vicious propensity” and that the owner knew of that propensity. Although this Court has not explicitly delineated behavior establishing a dangerous or vicious propensity in this context, it did state in Jividen that “[w]hile we are 33 aware of authority to the contrary, . . . traits like rambunctiousness and friskiness are insufficient to impose strict liability.” 194 W. Va. at 715, 461 S.E.2d at 461. In syllabus point 2 of Butts v. Houston, 76 W. Va. 604, 86 S.E. 473 (1915), the Court held that in tort, viciousness can be determined by repeated vicious acts committed by the animal at issue upon the person or property of others. Other jurisdictions have recognized that the dangerousness or viciousness of an animal in tort actions can be established from the incident giving rise to the cause of action, even where that incident occurs during play. For instance, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has held: The owner or keeper of a domestic animal is bound to take notice of the general propensities of the class to which it belongs, and also of any particular propensities peculiar to the animal itself of which he has knowledge or is put on notice; and insofar as such propensities are of a nature likely to cause injury he must exercise reasonable care to guard against them and to prevent injuries which are reasonably to be anticipated from them. In this respect, a vicious or dangerous disposition or propensity may consist of mere mischievousness or playfulness of the animal, which, because of its size or nature, might lead to injury, for it is the act of the animal, rather than its state of mind, which charges the owner or keeper with liability. Syl. pt. 6, Farrior v. Payton, 562 P.2d 779 (Haw. 1977); see also Alex v. Armstrong, 385 S.W.2d 110, 114–15 (Tenn. 1964) (“‘[T]he law makes no distinction between an animal dangerous from viciousness and one merely mischievous or dangerous from playfulness.’” (quoting Owen v. Hampson, 62 So. 2d 245, 248 (Ala. 1952))). However, 34 not all jurisdictions impose liability for injuries resulting from playfulness. See, e.g., Bitonti v. McGeever, 2 N.Y.S.3d 882, 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (“[E]vidence of ‘normal canine behavior’ . . . is insufficient to demonstrate vicious propensities . . . .”); Clark v. Brings, 169 N.W.2d 407, 412–13 (Minn. 1969) (determining that a bite inflicted by a cat during play did not constitute evidence of viciousness). While dangerousness and viciousness are concepts that have been explored in tort actions in both this and other jurisdictions, we observe that these actions are designed to compensate an injured party and do not involve the destruction of personal property and the lawful exercise of the police power. Comparing the operation of these concepts in tort to the operation of the concepts pursuant to W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 is like comparing apples to oranges. If this Court applied those concepts equally, all dogs that cause injury during play, regardless of whether the injury was caused inadvertently, could be found to be dangerous or vicious under the statute and could be subject to destruction.16 As we discuss more fully below, this result would be contrary to the legislative intent behind the statute. Thus, the tort cases discussing viciousness and dangerousness are not particularly persuasive in determining what animal behavior 16 We note that the dangerous dog statutes in Florida and Pennsylvania provide explicit direction as to what constitutes behavior that would warrant destroying a dog. The standards set forth in the destruction statutes are not equivalent to those applied in tort cases. Thus, while an incident involving a dog may give rise to liability for damages in these jurisdictions, the incident may not warrant criminal sanction or the destruction of a dog. See Fla. Stat. §§ 767.04, .11, .13; 3 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 459-101 to -1101. 35 constitutes viciousness or dangerousness within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 19-20­ 20.17 In determining whether Tinkerbell is vicious under the statute, we look to the common understood meaning of the word. The word “vicious” is commonly understood to mean “dangerously aggressive.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1393 (11th ed. 2005); see also Cynthia A. Mcneely & Sarah A. Lindquist, Dangerous Dog Laws: Failing to Give Man’s Best Friend a Fair Shake at Justice, 3 J. Animal L. 99, 105 (2007) (“[S]ome aggressive dog behaviors are normal, and even desirable by humans.” (citing Otto H. Sigmund, D.V.M, Merck Veterinary Manual, at 1176–77 (Susan B. Aiello, D.V.M, ed., 8th ed. 1998))). The circuit court concluded that Tinkerbell is vicious, and it premised this finding on the presumption that pit bulls are inherently vicious and aggressive and that Tinkerbell is a pit bull. The circuit court’s only finding of fact that supports its conclusion that Tinkerbell is vicious is its breed-specific presumption. Because we determined in Part III.B.1, supra, that this finding of fact was in error, it cannot support the circuit court’s conclusion that Tinkerbell is vicious. Further, upon our review of the facts in the record, we do not believe that the evidence establishes satisfactory proof that Tinkerbell’s behavior constituted an 17 We emphasize that our review herein is strictly limited to the meaning of dangerousness and viciousness within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 19-20-20. 36 “unprovoked attack” that was “intended to dominate or master” the injured child. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 24 (11th ed. 2005) (defining “aggression”). We believe it just as likely, if not more so, that the child was accidently bitten during what both the dog and child perceived as the course of play. Mr. Blatt testified that Tinkerbell loves to fetch and chase balls, and the only witness to the incident who testified, N.B., stated that L.L. took the ball from the dog, that L.L. held the ball as if to throw it, and that the dog “accidently” bit L.L. in an attempt to get the ball. None of the witnesses at either hearing testified that they observed any aggressive behavior on Tinkerbell’s part before or after the bite.18 Moreover, both Mr. Blatt and N.B. testified that Tinkerbell ran into the Blatts’ home directly after L.L. was bitten. Thus, because the facts do not adequately 18 Published works on dog behavior suggests that “[a]n aggressive dog considering biting will have raised hackles, curled lips, and bared teeth.” Mcneely & Lindquist, supra, at 105 (citing John W.S. Bradshaw & Helen M.R. Nott, Social and Communication Behaviour of Companion Dogs, in The Domestic Dog: It’s Evolution, Behaviour and Interactions with People, at 118 (James Serpell ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). Furthermore, while we reiterate our conclusion in Part III.B.1, supra, regarding breed-specific presumptions, we do note that some courts supporting such presumptions have taken judicial notice that “pit bull terriers are known to have the capacity to continue an attack until forced to stop,” Cleveland v. Johnson, 825 N.E.2d 700, 704 (Cleveland Mun. Ct., Ohio 2005) (citing City of Akron v. Tipton, 559 N.E.2d 1385, 1387 (Akron Mun. Ct., Ohio 1989), and that “the Pit Bull bites to kill.” Starkey v. Twp. Of Chester, 628 F. Supp. 196, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that an ordinance providing that pit bulls are dangerous was constitutional because the Township could reasonably determine that pit bulls are dangerous based on testimony from the Township’s Health Officer.). In the present case, there is no evidence that Tinkerbell had raised hackles, curled lips, or bared teeth directly prior to biting L.L., and the evidence shows that Tinkerbell retreated from L.L. directly after administering a single bite. 37 support the circuit court’s conclusion that Tinkerbell is vicious or aggressive, the court’s conclusion is in error. Finally, we determine that the facts do not support the circuit court’s conclusion that Tinkerbell is dangerous. Any dog may certainly be considered “dangerous” in that all dogs are “able or likely to inflict injury or harm.” Merriam­ Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 315 (11th ed. 2005); see Pratt, supra Part III.B.1, at 858 (“[A]ny dog can be dangerous.”); Hussain, supra note 2, at 2848 (“[A]ll breeds of dog can and do inflict severe injury and death . . . .”). Indeed, “[i]t is common knowledge that horses buck, cattle roam, cats stray and dogs bite.” Blaha v. Stuard, 640 N.W.2d 85, 88 (S.D. 2002); see Sylvester v. Maag, 26 A. 392 (Pa. 1893) (“[I]t is the original nature of the horse to run and for a dog to bite.”). The fact that biting is part of a dog’s nature should be a surprise to no one; as nine-year-old witness N.B. aptly noted, dogs have no hands, and so they must use their mouths to take hold of things. Because biting involves sharp teeth and pressure, an object or person on the receiving end of a bite may be harmed. See Mcneely & Lindquist, supra at 136 (“Dogs generally cause harm by using their elongated snouts and numerous sharp teeth to bite. . . . A dog also can engage crushing power with his jaws . . . .”). Surely, the Legislature, in enacting W. Va. Code § 19-20-20, did not intend to deem every dog as dangerous for engaging in behavior that is a part of its inherent 38 nature: biting. See syl. pt. 2, in part, Click v. Click, 98 W. Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925) (“It is . . . the duty of a court to disregard a [statutory] construction . . . when such construction would lead to injustice and absurdity.”). Even the State’s counsel conceded during oral argument that he did not believe the Legislature intended that every dog that bites a child be destroyed. Instead, we find that the statute requires circuit courts and magistrates to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding an incident involving a dog—in this case, a bite—to determine whether a dog is dangerous and deserving of destruction pursuant to the statute. Upon reviewing the facts and circumstances surrounding the bite in this case, we conclude that they do not support the circuit court’s determination that Tinkerbell is dangerous within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 19-20-20. The facts do not establish satisfactory proof that Tinkerbell exhibited behavior outside that which might be expected of a dog during play. While this incident clearly illustrates that Tinkerbell— or any dog—can cause harm, we do not believe that the facts in the record establish the likelihood that Tinkerbell poses such a risk of future harm to the public that the risk would warrant her destruction.19 To the extent that the circuit court determined otherwise, the court has erred. 19 As we observed above, every dog can be dangerous. The harm dogs can pose can range from injuries occurring as the result of normal dog behavior to vicious attacks causing death, and this spectrum of harm is not limited by a dog’s breed. See Pratt, supra (continued . . .) 39