Opinion ID: 1687133
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony from a prosecution witness concerning details of the alleged sexual battery.

Text: Donna Davis, a near neighbor of the Gill family, was called as a witness for the State. Lynn Gill came to Mrs. Davis home immediately after the incident on October 9, 1982, and it was Mrs. Davis who called the police. She testified that Jessica said my father or stepfather tried to rape me and I'm not going back. Defense counsel objected to the testimony as hearsay, and the objection was overruled by the court. In Anderson v. State, 82 Miss. 784, 788, 35 So. 202, 203 (1903) the Court said: Ordinarily any and all statements made by a party assaulted after the commission of the crime is hearsay, and not admissible. An exception is made in the case of rape alone, but even in that case no statements made by the prosecutrix are admissible except her complaint that she had been ravished. The details of the transaction, the name of the party accused, the place where it is said to have occurred, the time of the alleged offense, cannot be proven by a repetition of the words of the prosecutrix. This rule is in keeping with the cases cited by appellant, Redding v. State, 211 Miss. 855, 53 So.2d 7 (1951) and Kirkland v. State, 371 So.2d 402 (Miss. 1979). However, this rule had been modified to allow this type testimony. The evolution of the rule can be found in Cunningham v. State, 467 So.2d 902 (Miss. 1985). In Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 100 (Miss. 1983) this Court adopted the following rule from the Michigan Court of Appeals: Hearsay testimony concerning the details of a complaint of sexual assault is admissible where the complainant is of tender years if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufacture, and if any delay in making the complaint is excusable insofar as it is caused by fear or other equally effective circumstances. (Emphasis added). ( People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 116, 269 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1978)). 427 So.2d at 102-103. In Cunningham we went further and dropped the requirement that prosecutrix be of tender years or under the age of twelve (12). The prosecutrix in the case sub judice was twelve (12) at the time of the incident. In Cunningham the prosecutrix was an adult and made a spontaneous statement to a law enforcement officers; there was no indication that her accusation was manufactured. The rule was modified so that when a prosecutrix states the name of her attacker, and the statement appears to be spontaneous and without indication of manufacture, it should be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. 467 So.2d at 906. Appellant attempts to distinguish this case from the Cunningham case based on the prosecutrix's failure to complain to her mother as the prosecutrix ran by her mother on the steps. Appellant also argues that sufficient time elapsed during the time the prosecutrix ran from the Gill's home to Donna Davis' home for the prosecutrix to have manufactured a sexual attack. Neither of these arguments is persuasive enough to warrant reversal on this point. There is no indication in the record that the prosecutrix had an opportunity to speak to her mother or that there was any delay in making the complaint to Donna Davis. We can find no error in allowing this testimony.