Opinion ID: 763587
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Named Defendants

Text: 45 Thus far, we have been speaking about the defendants as a group. An examination of their potential culpability as individuals may be useful at this point. Because Defendant Karazim allegedly told X that he was going to make sure that plaintiff [was] moved off the floor, J.A. at 16 (Complaint p 15), indicating to X that he played some part in the decision to move X on base, Karazim is properly a defendant to X's retaliation claim, and possibly to his Eighth Amendment claim (see discussion, infra, Part III.C.). Defendant Blatter avers that Deputy Tamminga--not a defendant to this action--ordered that X be moved and that Blatter showed X a letter to this effect. If true, defendants Graham, Bildner, and Blatter may have been merely executing their superior's orders when they placed X in the cell on base. Although the district court believed this absolved these defendants of liability, we do not agree. Reliance on a superior's orders does not in itself dissipate all liability. Raysor v. Port Auth., 768 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1985) (holding police officer liable for false arrest under § 1983 even though arrest was made at superior's order), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027, 106 S.Ct. 1227, 89 L.Ed.2d 337 (1986); Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851, 854 (8th Cir.1981) (en banc) (rejecting prison officers' argument that since they did not have the authority to alter the [prisoner's security] classification, any consequence of that status cannot be their responsibility); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1216-17 (3d Cir.1979) (rejecting FBI agents' argument that they were merely following the orders of their superior and should not be put to the test of either disobeying authority or being subject to liability because if they knew or should have known that their actions were violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, then they will not be allowed to hide behind the cloak of institutional loyalty), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3147, 69 L.Ed.2d 997 (1981). This result accords with longstanding general and specific tort principles. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 cmt. d (1958) ([D]eputy sheriffs who take part in an unlawful arrest ... are subject to liability together with those for whom they act, except where their good faith creates a privilege in them to act.) (citation omitted). 46 We are mindful that in many situations prison guards must act quickly, with little time to ponder the legality of their actions. Such urgent circumstances are not present in this case and, when they arise in the future, are properly part of a defense of qualified immunity and, where applicable, questions of intent. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). If plaintiffs' allegations are true, each individual defendant may have knowingly participated in actions beyond the pale of acceptable behavior. 47 Plaintiff X also claims that defendants Bildner, Blatter, and Graham not only refused to give him cleaning supplies so that he could clean his allegedly filthy cell but also refused to allow a prison porter to give him the standard cleaning supplies. This allegation may indicate knowledge on the part of the defendants of the unsanitary conditions facing X, potentially an important part of the Eighth Amendment claim, discussed below. 48