Opinion ID: 613537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of a Firearm in Furtherance of Drug Distribution

Text: The Walkers both argue that insufficient evidence supported their convictions under Count III for the possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking during the weeks before May 31, 2007, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In reviewing a motion for a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, we apply a particularly deferential standard ... because a reviewing court `must be ever vigilant ... not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence.' United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 845 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir.2010)). Accordingly, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and sustain the verdict unless it is clear that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing United States v. Cunningham, 517 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir.2008)). We examine the totality of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), and only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will we reverse a jury verdict for insufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir.2005). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), it is a crime if an individual uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, or possesses a firearm in furtherance of such a crime. [8] To obtain a conviction under § 924(c), the `mere presence' of a gun is not enough. Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853. Rather, the government must present evidence specific to the particular defendant, showing that his or her possession actually furthered the drug trafficking offense. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the government must show that the defendant possessed the firearm `to advance or promote criminal activity.' United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir.2006)). In determining whether a firearm was possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking, we have looked to the following nonexclusive factors: the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun is found. Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853 (3d Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir.2000)); see also Bobb, 471 F.3d at 496-97 (applying Sparrow factors). We have also recognized that § 924(c) may be violated through the constructive possession of a firearm. See Cunningham, 517 F.3d at 178. We have defined constructive possession as follows: Constructive possession exists if an individual knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons. Constructive possession necessarily requires both dominion and control over an object and knowledge of that object's existence. Id. (quoting United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir.1992)). Constructive possession may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence, and it need not be exclusive to a single person. Iglesias, 535 F.3d at 156. We hold that the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to sustain both Walkers' § 924(c) convictions. The strongest evidence supporting these charges was the testimony of Skylar Rhoades, the confidential informant, who stated that he observed Barry Walker in actual possession of a gun during a drug sale in which the Walker brothers participated: I was with Jason McNeil.... We drove up. I looked into the [Walkers'] Expedition. I see Barron and Barry Walker both inside the Expedition. Barry gets out. I could see the gun on his waistband, and I could see Barron with crack cocaine on his lap. They g[a]ve ... John McNeil about a quarter to an eightball of crack cocaine, and then that's when I took down the license plate to the Expedition to [transmit] it back to [law enforcement.] Based on this direct eyewitness testimony, a rational juror could readily conclude that Barry Walker `actually possessed a firearm at the time of the cocaine sale. [9] Further, a rational juror could infer that Barry Walker possessed the firearm in order to advance or promote the illegal sale. Iglesias, 535 F.3d at 157. Several of the Sparrow factors favor such an inference: Barry Walker, together with his brother, engaged in the sale of crack cocaine, an illegal and dangerous drug; the firearmlocated on Barry's hipwas readily available in the event he needed it for protection during the sale; the firearm was in close proximity to the cocaine that was handed to John McNeil; and the firearm was in Barry Walker's possession throughout the course of the transaction. See Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853. While there is no evidence in the record concerning certain factorsit is uncertain, for example, whether Barry Walker's gun was stolen and whether it was loaded during the saleour prior decisions have not required that every single factor must weigh in favor of conviction. See Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853-54 (upholding conviction where many of the ... factors are satisfied and holding that immediate accessibility at the time of search or arrest is not a legal requirement for a § 924(c) conviction); Bobb, 471 F.3d at 496 (upholding conviction where the evidence was sufficient to find a nexus between the possession of the gun and the drug trafficking, and to satisfy many of the [ Sparrow ] factors). Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecution presented enough evidence that a rational jury could conclude that Barry Walker not only actually possessed a firearm, but did so in furtherance of drug trafficking. The evidence against Barron Walker on the § 924(c) charge was also sufficient to sustain his conviction. Barron's conviction was supported by the testimony of both Jason McNeil and Skylar Rhoades. [10] While being questioned by the prosecution, McNeil testified that he accompanied the Walkers as they drove through Harrisburg and made five to ten deliveries of crack cocaine to customers. McNeil then explained that he saw the Walkers with firearms during these deliveries. When asked who had a firearm, he said I think it was Barron. When questioned further on cross-examination, he admitted that he was not positive that Barron actually possessed the firearm. Standing alone, this testimony might be insufficient to sustain Barron's conviction, because the witness himself had some doubt about whether Barron had the firearm on his person. However, this evidence does not stand alone: Skylar Rhoades testified that he saw Barron and Barry arrive together in the same vehicle, that Barron had cocaine in his possession, and that Barron and Barry jointly made a cocaine sale while Barry wore a gun on his hip. A rational juror, considering the testimony of Rhoades and McNeil together, could conclude that Barron at the very least had constructive possession of a firearm during the brothers' drug sales. During the cocaine sale witnessed by Rhoades, the gun on Barry's hip was readily visible to Rhoades, supporting the inference that it was also visible to Barron, who was a joint participant in the sale. Accordingly, the jury could rationally have concluded that Barron knew that Barry possessed the firearm, rendering this case distinguishable from our § 924(c) decisions involving guns in closed containers. See Cunningham, 517 F.3d at 179 (holding that defendant did not constructively possess gun in his companion's backpack where the evidence did not demonstrate that [the defendant] knew about the gun (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir.1999) (holding that defendant who was unaware that his co-defendants possessed a firearm in a black bag did not constructively possess it). The jury could likewise have reasonably concluded that Barron had the intention to exercise dominion over the firearm through Barry, because the firearm provided protection to both of them during their sales. See Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 96 (constructive possession exists if an individual knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons (emphasis added)). Moreover, as we noted in Iafelice, [c]ommon sense counsels that an owner and operator of a vehicle usually has dominion and control over the objects in his or her vehicle of which he or she is aware. Id. at 97. In this case, Barry was observed with the gun as he exited the Walkers' vehicle, strengthening the conclusion that Barron was both aware of the gun and exercised a level of indirect control sufficient to support the verdict. [11] For similar reasons, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Barron's constructive possession of a firearm was in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. During the sale witnessed by Rhoades, Barron had cocaine in his lap, and then jointly participated in a sale of cocaine with Barry while Barry was carrying a gun. The firearm on Barry's hip was easily accessible in case both Walkers needed it for protection. Barron and Barry arrived in the same vehicle, putting Barron in close proximity to the firearm both before and during the sale. Because Rhoades was able to see the gun on Barry's hip, the jury could infer that the gun was also visible to Barron. Together, this evidence was enough to show that Barron's constructive possession of the gun advanced his illegal drug activity. See Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853 (noting relevance of the type of drug activity that is being conducted, the accessibility of the firearm, and the proximity to drugs or drug profits). Accordingly, while the prosecution's case on these charges was not overwhelming, we conclude that the evidence presented on the § 924(c) charges was sufficient to sustain the defendants' convictions.