Opinion ID: 2012326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is the monroe township mobile-home park zoning invalid as spot zoning?

Text: The Monroe Township zoning ordinance has no separate classification for mobile homes. Mobile homes are permitted only within districts zoned commercial upon approval by the Board of Appeals on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the ordinance permits: § 9.1(g) A trailer coach park if the Board of Appeals finds such would be constructed and operated in accordance with the State law, but no permit therefor shall be issued until after a public hearing has been had thereon by the Board of Appeals after five days' previous notice in writing thereof has been given to all property owners within 1/2 mile of the perimeter of the site of the proposed Trailer Coach Park, and the Board of Appeals determines after such hearing that the use of the proposed site as a Trailer Coach Park would not be detrimental to the interest of the majority of the property owners within 1/2 mile of the perimeter of the proposed site and subject to such other general limitations and guides as herein established for the Board of Appeals including public notice of such hearing. Plaintiffs contend that such a scheme is invalid as spot zoning. Plaintiffs' property is not in a commercial zone so they have no standing to challenge the validity of such an ordinance, on the one hand. On the other hand, plaintiffs have not in this case challenged the validity of the ordinance on the basis of exclusion, so we are not called upon to consider whether exclusion exists. In any event, we have found the ordinance invalid for lack of a master plan so the case is otherwise disposed of in plaintiffs' favor. VI  CONCLUSION The Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court is affirmed but for a different reason. The Court of Appeals opinion as to which mobile-home park standards apply is vacated for the reasons that this matter was not argued in the trial court and there is no proper record for the Court of Appeals or this Court upon which to make a decision. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs to plaintiffs. M.S. COLEMAN, J. (to reverse). I agree with Justice LEVIN'S two opening paragraphs and with part II of his opinion as they apply to these cases and to Nickola. [1] Had he stopped there, he probably would have sought to reverse the Court of Appeals in each instance and I would have signed his opinion. Part I, however, leads him in each case to affirmance of the Court of Appeals but for a different reason  one with which I am not in accord. He would hold that any request for rezoning which is reasonable must be allowed regardless of zoning ordinances. That conclusion affords neither a workable standard  if it can be called a standard  nor any furtherance of the legislative objectives in zoning enactments. The legislature, acting properly within its competence, has in this case placed the zoning authority in the township. The Court's role is to ascertain that correct procedures are followed and that appropriate standards are employed. We do not sit as a super zoning board  or so we say. Neither do we sit to impose our social policies upon local communities. We should not be so presumptuous as to establish common community denominators by judicial fiat. Neither should we be so disrespectful of properly enacted local ordinances that we undermine community attempts to establish commonality of health, safety, economic, ecological, educational and esthetic interests.