Opinion ID: 150472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CFRA's Contribution Bans

Text: We first consider whether the provisions of the CFRA that prohibit state contractors, lobbyists, and associated individuals from making campaign contributions to candidates for state office violate the First Amendment.
In a long line cases beginning with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Supreme Court has distinguished laws restricting campaign expenditures and campaign-related speech from laws restricting campaign contributions. The Court has determined that laws limiting campaign expenditures and campaign-related speech impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do laws limiting campaign contributions. Id. at 23, 96 S.Ct. 612. As a result, the Court has evaluated laws limiting campaign expenditures and campaign-related speech under the strict scrutiny standard, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 898, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, ___ (2010) (quotation marks omitted). For laws limiting campaign contributions, by contrast, the Court has conducted a relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161, 123 S.Ct. 2200. Such laws, the Court has concluded, are merely `marginal' speech restrictions, since contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression. Id. Thus, instead of requiring contribution regulations to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, a law limiting contributions passes muster if it satisfies the lesser demand of being `closely drawn' to match a `sufficiently important interest.' Id. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000)) (some quotation marks omitted); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court has always applied that lower standardoften referred to as the closely drawn standardto evaluate First Amendment challenges to laws restricting campaign contributions. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 253, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (plurality opinion); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 138 n. 40, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 913; Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161, 123 S.Ct. 2200. The Court has applied the closely drawn standard even when the law in question imposed an outright ban on contributions. In Beaumont, for instance, the Court applied the closely drawn standard in upholding a federal law that banned all campaign contributions made by corporations. See id. at 149, 161-62, 123 S.Ct. 2200. Although the Court's campaign-finance jurisprudence may be in a state of flux (especially with regard to campaign-finance laws regulating corporations), Beaumont and other cases applying the closely drawn standard to contribution limits remain good law. Indeed, in the recent Citizens United case, the Court overruled two of its precedents and struck down a federal law banning independent campaign expenditures by corporations, but it explicitly declined to reconsider its precedents involving campaign contributions by corporations to candidates for elected office. See 130 S.Ct. at 909 (Citizens United has not made direct contributions to candidates, and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.). We will, therefore, evaluate the contribution bans imposed by the CFRA under the closely drawn standard. We will uphold the statutory bans against plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge only if they are closely drawn to achieve a sufficiently important government interest. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we reject plaintiffs' argument that we must apply strict scrutiny because the provisions at issue here are bans, as opposed to mere limits. Such an argument was explicitly rejected in Beaumont (which, as discussed above, remains binding precedent). See id. As Beaumont concisely explained: It is not that the difference between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself. Id. Accordingly, the closely drawn standard applies to the bans on contributions imposed by the CFRA. As we discuss in greater detail below, however, the fact that the provisions impose outright bansand not limitson contributions is a factor we will consider when we apply [] scrutiny at the level selected and determine whether the provisions are, in fact, closely drawn to achieve the state's interests. Id.
In assessing the CFRA's ban on contributions by contractors and associated individuals, we first determine whether the ban furthers a sufficiently important interest; we then determine whether the ban is closely drawn to achieve that interest. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200
As set forth above, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions in response to a series of scandals in which contractors illegally offered bribes, kick-backs, and campaign contributions to state officials in exchange for contracts with the state. The ban was designed to combat both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption caused by contractor contributions. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 303. Such an anticorruption interest, see Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 903, 130 S.Ct. 876, has been recognized as a legitimate reason to restrict campaign contributions. Beginning with Buckley, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that laws limiting campaign contributions can be justified by the government's interest in addressing both the actuality and the appearance of corruption. 424 U.S. at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612; accord McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143, 124 S.Ct. 619 (Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.). The record before us, moreover, shows that the General Assembly had good reason to be concerned about both the actuality and the appearance of corruption involving contractors. Connecticut's recent corruption scandals showed that contributions by contractors could lead to corruption. And it took no great leap of reasoning to infer that those scandals created a strong appearance of impropriety in the transfer of any money between contractors and state officialswhether or not the transfer involved an illegal quid pro quo. The scandals reached the highest state offices, leading to the resignation and eventual criminal conviction and imprisonment of the state's governor. They were, as a result, covered extensively by local media and garnered the attention of national media outlets as well. See Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 307 n. 9 (providing examples of newspaper articles covering Connecticut's corruption scandals). Thus, corruption spurred by state contractors became a salient political issue in Connecticut, and there arose an appearance of impropriety with respect to all contractor contributions. See Meadow Decl. ¶ 30 (May 24, 2007) (describing a public opinion poll in which 76% of Connecticut voters believed that campaign contributions Governor Rowland received influenced him in awarding government contracts). Accordingly, we conclude that the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions furthers sufficiently important government interests. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200. There is sufficient evidence in the record of actual corruption stemming from contractor contributions, and in light of the widespread media coverage of Connecticut's recent corruption scandals, the General Assembly also faced a manifest need to curtail the appearance of corruption created by contractor contributions.
The more difficult question, however, is whether each aspect of the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions is closely drawn to achieve the state's anticorruption interest. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200. We first describe the standard for determining whether a statute is closely drawn to achieve the state's interest, and we then apply that standard to the provisions of the CFRA banning contributions of state contractors, prospective state contractors, principals of state contractors, and the spouses and dependent children of state contractors.
On only one occasion has the Supreme Court held that a contribution limit was not closely drawn to the government's interests. In Randall v. Sorrell , the Supreme Court applied a multifactor test and struck down a Vermont law that limited the amount of money that any single individual could contribute to a campaign for state office. See 548 U.S. at 253-62, 126 S.Ct. 2479. A plurality of the Court found the law too restrictive because, among other things, its limits were so low that they prevent[ed] candidates from `amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.' Id. at 248, 253, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612) (second alteration in Randall ). The District Court relied extensively on Randall's multifactor test in determining whether the CFRA's contribution bans were closely drawn to the asserted government interests. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 309-16. We disagree with that approach. Randall addressed general contribution limits that applied to all citizens. The law in Randall, for instance, prohibited any Vermont resident from contributing more than $400 to a candidate for governor. See 548 U.S. at 238, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Thus Randall's multifactor test was concerned primarily with the effect the contribution limits would have on the electoral system as a whole. See, e.g., id. at 248-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479 ([C]ontribution limits that are too low can ... harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. (emphasis added)). Here, however, plaintiffs are not challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose general contribution limits on all Connecticut citizens. See generally Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-611 (imposing, for instance, a limit of $3500 on any individual's contributions to a gubernatorial campaign). Rather, plaintiffs are challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose contribution bans on discrete groups of Connecticut citizens. And unlike the situation in Randall, there is no serious argument here that the challenged contribution bans will harm the electoral process by stifling candidates' ability to raise sufficient campaign funds. See 548 U.S. at 248-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Indeed, contributions by contractors and lobbyists have, in the past, made up only a small fraction of the total amount of money given as campaign contributions in Connecticut. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 316. Accordingly, the First Amendment inquiry in this case does not focus on the electoral process, for the issue is notas it was in Randall whether the law in question prevent[s] candidates from `amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.' Randall, 548 U.S. at 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612) (second alteration in Randall ). We will not, therefore, look to Randall's multifactor test as a means of evaluating whether the CFRA's ban on contributions is closely drawn to the state's interests. The issue, instead, is whether the CFRA's contribution bans impermissibly infringe the First Amendment rights of the discrete groups of citizens it regulatescontractors, lobbyists, and associated individuals. To address that issue, we are required to examine how the CFRA applies to the different groups of individuals it regulates and determine, in each case, whether the law is closely drawn to the state's interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption. The CFRA's ban on contractor contributions, in particular, applies not only to individuals who currently have contracts with the state, but also to prospective state contractors who seek (but do not currently have) state contracts. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(E), (2)(A)-(B). It also applies to any principal of an entity that has (or is seeking) contracts with the state, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B), and it applies to any spouse or dependent child of a covered individual, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B). To survive First Amendment scrutiny, the CFRA's contractor contribution bans must be closely drawn to the state's anticorruption interest with respect to each of those groups of individuals.
The CFRA applies to contributions made by any current state contractor, as well as any prospective state contractor, id. § 9-612(g)(2)(A)-(B), which is defined to include, in essence, any individual or entity that submits a response to a call for bids on state contracts, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(E). That aspect of the CFRA is, without question, closely drawn to meet the state's interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption. It is undisputed that nearly all of the corruption scandals that gave rise to the CFRAincluding the scandal involving Governor Rowlandinvolved both current and prospective state contractors offering bribes in exchange for assistance in winning new state contracts. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 304-06. Contributions by current and prospective state contractors, therefore, lie at the heart of the corruption problem in Connecticut. Thus, insofar as it applies to campaign contributions made by both current and prospective state contractors, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(D)-(E), (2)(A)-(B), the CFRA is closely drawn and survives First Amendment scrutiny.
If an artificial entity, rather than an individual, is awarded (or seeks) a state contract, the CFRA bans contributions made by any principal of that entity. [10] See id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B). A principal is defined to include, among other things, (1) any member of the entity's board of directors, [11] (2) any individual who has an ownership interest of five per cent or more in the entity, (3) the president, treasurer or executive vice president of the entity, [12] and (4) any officer or employee of either a business entity or a nonprofit organization who has managerial or discretionary responsibilities with respect to a state contract. [13] The definition of principal sweeps broadly and prevents a wide range of individuals from contributing to campaigns for state office. We have some doubts, therefore, as to whether the provision is indeed closely drawn to achieve the state's anticorruption interest. Nonetheless, we are mindful of the teachings of the Supreme Court that we, as judges, cannot consider each possible permutation of a law limiting contributions, and thus we cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute's legitimate objectives. Randall, 548 U.S. at 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Moreover, in light of the troubling episodes involving state contractors in Connecticut's recent history, we are reluctant to second-guess the judgment of the General Assembly when it defines which individuals associated with an artificial entity are likely to attempt to exert improper influence over a state official. We will, therefore, follow the ordinar[y] approach in evaluating the ban on principal contributions and defer[ ] to the legislature's determination of such matters. Id. The ban on principals' contributions strikes us as bordering on overboard, but the record shows that the dangers of corruption associated with contractor contributions are so significant in Connecticut that the General Assembly should be afforded leeway in its efforts to curb contractors' influence on state lawmakers. We thus conclude that, insofar as it applies to campaign contributions made by principals of state contractors or prospective state contractors, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B), the CFRA is closely drawn and withstands First Amendment scrutiny.
The CFRA not only bans contributions by contractors, prospective contractors, and the principal of any contractor or prospective contractor; it also bans contributions by the spouse or dependent child of any of those covered individuals. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B). Defendants do not attempt to justify the ban on family-member contributions by arguing that a contractor's family members will themselves attempt to exert improper influence over a state official. See Appellees' Br. 80-83, 98. That is for good reason, as there is no record evidence to suggest that the spouses or dependent children of state contractors have been in any way involved in Connecticut's recent corruption scandals (or, for that matter, any other corruption scandals of which the parties have made us aware). Rather, defendants attempt to justify the ban on family-member contributions by arguing that it is a reasonable measure to avoid circumvention of the prohibition of contributions by [contractors]. Id. at 80. That is, defendants argue that contractors and other covered individuals will avoid the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions by siphoning their improper contributions through their spouses and children. The Supreme Court has recognized that, in regulating campaign contributions, the legislature must be given room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155, 123 S.Ct. 2200. Nonetheless, the Court has struck down so-called anti-circumvention provisions where the government has put forward only scant evidence of a particular form of evasion. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232, 124 S.Ct. 619. Here, the record in support of the ban on contributions by contractors' spouses and dependent children is by no means overwhelming. There is little direct evidence suggesting that contractors will use their spouses or children to circumvent the CFRA's contribution bans. Nevertheless, the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut have shown that contractors are willing to resort to varied forms of misconduct to secure contracts with the state. That, we think, is far more than the scant evidence required by McConnell. See id. In light of the recent corruption scandals, therefore, the General Assembly must be given room to anticipate and respond to concerns about the circumvention of the bans on contractor contributions. Id. at 137, 124 S.Ct. 619. Indeed, were we to affirm the ban on contributions by contractors but strike down the ban on contributions by their family members, we would invite the very circumvention that the General Assembly was trying to prevent. Thus, we conclude that the CFRA's ban on contributions by contractors' spouses and dependent children, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B), is closely drawn to avoid the circumvention of the ban on contractor contributions.
Finally, we consider the fact that the CFRA imposes an outright bannot a mere limiton contributions made by contractors, prospective contractors, and their principals. That fact, as discussed above, does not require us to review the law under the strict scrutiny standard. But we must nevertheless determine whether an outright ban on contractor contributions is closely drawn to the state's anticorruption interest. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (It is not that the difference between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself.). The majority of campaign laws reviewed by the Supreme Courtand other courtshave involved limits on contributions, not bans. See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 246, 126 S.Ct. 2479; Nixon, 528 U.S. at 381, 120 S.Ct. 897; Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 184, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court has, however, upheld the longstanding federal ban on direct corporate contributions. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154, 123 S.Ct. 2200. That is enough to demonstrate that laws banning contributions by a discrete group are not unconstitutional per se. Yet a ban is a drastic measure. A limit on contributions causes some constitutional damage, as it  restrict[s] `one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association.' Randall, 548 U.S. at 246, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25, 96 S.Ct. 612) (emphasis added). But a ban on contributions causes considerably more constitutional damage, as it wholly extinguishes that aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. A limit, moreover, leaves intact the contributor's right to make the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution. Id. at 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). But a ban infringes that constitutional right, as it precludes the symbolic expression that comes with a small contribution. There are, therefore, undoubtedly many situations in which a strict contribution limitas opposed to an outright contribution banwill adequately achieve the government's objectives. In those situations it will be difficult for the government to establish that a contribution ban is closely drawn to its asserted interests. Instead, such a ban risks being struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad. Here, for example, a limitas opposed to a banwould likely be sufficient to address the General Assembly's interest in addressing actual corruption. If, for example, the CFRA were to allow contractors to make small contributions (say, $50 per election) to state officials, it is unlikely that a contractor could exert any influence over an official with the promise of such a modest sum. Yet such a limit would not wholly extinguish a contractor's associational rights, and it would allow the contractor to make the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution. Id. at 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). Thus, if the state's only interest in this case were combating actual corruption, the CFRA's outright ban on contractor contributions would likely be held overbroad. Combating actual corruption, however, is not the state's only interest here; the CFRA is also meant to address the appearance of corruption caused by contractor contributions. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 303. As discussed above, Connecticut's recent corruption scandals were widely publicized, and corruption involving state contractors became a major political issue in Connecticut in recent years. See subsection I.B.1, ante. A limit on contractor contributions would have partially addressed the perception of corruption created by those incidents, but such a limit still would have allowed some money to flow from contractors to state officials. Even if small contractor contributions would have been unlikely to influence state officials, those contributions could have still given rise to the appearance that contractors are able to exert improper influence on state officials. The CFRA's ban on contractor contributions, by contrast, unequivocally addresses the perception of corruption brought about by Connecticut's recent scandals. By totally shutting off the flow of money from contractors to state officials, it eliminates any notion that contractors can influence state officials by donating to their campaigns. Thus, although the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions is a drastic measure, it is an appropriate response to a specific series of incidents that have created a strong appearance of corruption with respect to all contractor contributions. We hold, as a result, that in light of Connecticut's recent experience with corruption scandals involving state contractors, the CFRA's imposition of an outright ban on contributions by contractors, prospective contractors, and their principals, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g), is closely drawn to the state's interest in combating the appearance of corruption.
The CFRA's ban on contributions by lobbyists presents markedly different considerations than the CFRA's ban on contributions by contractors. The distinction centers on the fact that the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut in no way involved lobbyists. See, e.g., Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 321 ([L]obbyists ha[ve] not been directly linked to the pay-to-play scandals, which primarily involved state contractors offering bribes in exchange for preferential treatment .... (emphasis added)). As a restriction on campaign contributions, not campaign expenditures, we review the CFRA's ban on lobbyists contributions under the closely drawn standard. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200; subsection I.A, ante. We will uphold the ban against plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge only if it is closely drawn to achieve sufficiently important government interests. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200. Defendants seek to justify the ban on lobbyist contributions as necessary to combat both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption. We decline to decide whether those interests are sufficiently important in this context, see id., for [e]ven assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an important interest, McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232, 124 S.Ct. 619, the CFRA's ban on lobbyist contributions is not closely drawn to the asserted interests. As set forth above, see subsection I.B.2.e, ante, an outright ban on contributions is a drastic measure that substantially infringes one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. Randall, 548 U.S. at 246, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25, 96 S.Ct. 612). As opposed to a contribution limit, which merely restricts those First Amendment freedoms, see id., a contribution ban utterly eliminates an individual's right to express his or her support for a candidate by contributing money to the candidate's cause. Indeed, a contribution ban cuts off even the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a small contribution. Id. at 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). Thus, if the state's interests in this case can be achieved by means of a limit on lobbyist contributions, rather than a ban, the ban should be struck down for failing to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. [14] We have upheld the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions because the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut have created an appearance of corruption with respect to all exchanges of money between state contractors and candidates for state office. We have held that an outright ban on contractor contributions was justified ( i.e., closely drawn to meet the state's anticorruption interest) because even a severe limit on contractor contributions would allow a small flow of contributions between contractors and candidates and would, as a result, likely give rise to an appearance of corruption. The situation is different with lobbyists. The recent corruption scandals had nothing to do with lobbyists, see Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 321, and thus there is insufficient evidence to infer that all contributions made by state lobbyists give rise to an appearance of corruption. Plaintiffs have submitted some evidence suggesting that many members of the public generally distrust lobbyists and the special attention they are believed to receive from elected officials. See, e.g., Meadow Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, 26. But as the Supreme Court has recently clarified, the anticorruption interest recognized by Buckley and other cases is limited to quid pro quo corruption and does not encompass efforts to limit [f]avoritism and influence or the appearance of influence or access. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 909-10 (quotation marks omitted). The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt, and favoritism and influence are [un]avoidable in representative politics. Id. at 910 (quotation marks omitted). Influence and access, moreover, are not sinister in nature. Some influence, such as wise counsel from a trusted advisoreven if that advisor is a lobbyistcan enhance the effectiveness of our representative government. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that all lobbyist contributions give rise to an appearance of corruption, and the evidence demonstrating that lobbyist contributions give rise to an appearance of influence, see, e.g., Meadow Decl. ¶ 26, has no bearing on whether the CFRA's ban on lobbyist contributions is closely drawn to the state's anticorruption interest. We conclude, as a result, that on this record, a limit on lobbyist contributions would adequately address the state's interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption on the part of lobbyists. [15] The CFRA's ban on lobbyist contributions, therefore, is not closely drawn to achieve the state's anticorruption interest. Thus, we hold that the CFRA's ban on lobbyist contributions, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-610(g), violates the First Amendment. [16]