Opinion ID: 2529268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Compliance With Industry Standards

Text: ¶ 90 Ford initially argues that its compliance with industry standards alone is dispositive of its duty in a negligent-design claim. Ford relies on the proposition of law in Blue, that a claim for negligent design requires proof that the defendant deviated from the standard of care that other manufacturers in the industry followed. Blue, 215 Ill.2d at 96, 293 Ill. Dec. 630, 828 N.E.2d 1128 (plurality op.). As we explained, this view does not represent the appropriate duty analysis in a negligent-design claim. ¶ 91 Although the plurality opinion in Blue suggests that conformance to an industry standard is dispositive on the issue of negligence (see Blue, 215 Ill.2d at 100, 293 Ill.Dec. 630, 828 N.E.2d 1128), as we explained in Calles, that language is not binding authority ( Calles, 224 Ill.2d at 269, 309 Ill.Dec. 383, 864 N.E.2d 249) and is contrary to well-settled law in Illinois and throughout the country. Rather, we have previously held that evidence of industry standards is a factor to be considered in the balance and has always been relevant to determining whether a defendant has exercised reasonable care in designing a product. See Ruffiner v. Material Service Corp., 116 Ill.2d 53, 58, 106 Ill.Dec. 781, 506 N.E.2d 581 (1987); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326, 331, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965); see also Cornstubble v. Ford Motor Co., 178 Ill.App.3d 20, 39, 127 Ill.Dec. 55, 532 N.E.2d 884 (1988) (Calvo, J., dissenting); Nave v. Rainbo Tire Service, Inc., 123 Ill.App.3d 585, 591-92, 78 Ill.Dec. 501, 462 N.E.2d 620 (1984); Denniston v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 Ill.App.3d 1054, 1068, 6 Ill.Dec. 77, 362 N.E.2d 712 (1977); McNealy v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 43 Ill.App.2d 460, 469-70, 193 N.E.2d 879 (1963). ¶ 92 However, the mere fact that a manufacturer adhered to all relevant industry standards does not require judgment as a matter of law. It is well settled that conformance to industry standards is relevant, but not dispositive on the issue of negligence. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A (1965); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 164, at 397 (2001); Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 33, at 195 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). See also Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470, 23 S.Ct. 622, 47 L.Ed. 905 (1903) (What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.). Similarly, evidence of a violation of industry standards is considered probative of, but not conclusive on, the question of negligent design. The standard remains whether the conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Calles, 224 Ill.2d at 270, 309 Ill.Dec. 383, 864 N.E.2d 249; Modelski v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 302 Ill.App.3d 879, 887, 236 Ill.Dec. 394, 707 N.E.2d 239 (1999). ¶ 93 Moreover, we note that Ford understood this to be the standard. During the motions in limine conference, plaintiffs sought to limit Ford from introducing evidence regarding governmental safety standards. In arguing the motion, Ford stated: We do not intend to say [to] the jury that because [we] complied with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, therefore we win the case, okay. It is, we are entitled to show the standard, what it is, that we complied with it. And it is    evidence of due care. And it is evidence, but it is not dispositive and we are not going to argue it is dispositive. ¶ 94 Additionally, in opening statements Ford acknowledged that compliance with industry standards was not conclusive evidence of reasonableness but, rather, that it used the federal standards as one of their criteria. Ford stated that this doesn't dispose of the issue, but it is an indication. Accordingly, Ford's contention that compliance with industry standards is dispositive of a negligent-product-design claim lacks merit.