Opinion ID: 2514037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: propriety of attorney fees in gildea i

Text: ¶ 8 The Gildeas and Marsh argue that their appeal in Gildea I did not merit the imposition of attorney fees and costs under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and that, therefore, the district court's award of attorney fees on remand must be reversed. Guardian contends, however, that this argument must be rejected because Marsh and the Gildeas cannot attack by way of a second appeal this court's award of attorney fees in a previous appeal. ¶ 9 Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this court on appeal bind the trial court on remand, and generally bind this court should the case return on appeal after remand. See, e.g., Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995); Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990); see also 5 C.J.S Appeal & Error § 849 (1993). The doctrine was developed to promote the obedience of inferior courts as well as to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in the same case. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037. The effect of abandoning the doctrine in the context of a postremand appeal to the appellate court would not be inconsequential, because considerable inefficiencies would result if parties were free to relitigate after remand issues decided in an earlier ruling of this court. The doctrine, however, is not applied inflexibly. Id. at 1038; see also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 149(b) (1990). Indeed, this court need not apply the doctrine to promote efficiency at the expense of the greater interest in preventing unjust results or unwise precedent. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1039. Accordingly, the doctrine will generally not be enforced under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. Id.; see also 18 Charles Allen Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478, at 790 (1981). Therefore, although the doctrine is not an inexorable command that rigidly binds a court to its former decisions, it is waived only for the most cogent of reasons. ¶ 10 Here, this court determined in Gildea I that the Gildeas' claims against Guardian were frivolous, and consequently awarded Guardian its costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal pursuant to rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in an amount to be determined by the district court. See Gildea I, 970 P.2d at 1272. Thereafter, in accordance with rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Marsh and the Gildeas filed a petition for rehearing, asking this court to reconsider our ruling awarding costs and attorney fees to Guardian under rule 33, which this court denied. Despite the above, the Gildeas and Marsh now seek to relitigate in this appeal the issue of whether their appeal in Gildea I was frivolous. However, the Gildeas and Marsh have failed to make any showing that there has been an intervening change of controlling authority, that new evidence has become available, or that this court's prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. Therefore, in the interest of avoiding the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in the same case, Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037, we decline, under the law of the case doctrine, to consider the Gildeas' argument that the former appeal of this case did not merit the imposition of attorney fees under rule 33. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order awarding $5136.02 in attorney fees and costs against the Gildeas and Marsh, as per this court's decision in Gildea I. [1]