Opinion ID: 546101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process and the Award of Attorneys' Fees

Text: 7 Alizadeh contends that the district court violated her due process rights by not ordering Safeway to plead with specificity its claims for attorneys' fees and by failing to explicate the specific grounds on which its ruling was based, thus denying her notice of those grounds from which she could formulate a specific response. Alizadeh also maintains that the court should have held a hearing on the record at which she could have demonstrated that her claim was not frivolous. As authority for her contention, Alizadeh cites dicta from Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980), a case about the imposition of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 in which the Court stated that attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. Id. 100 S.Ct. at 2464 (footnote omitted). 8 Alizadeh notes that the district court did not actually explain the reasoning for its attorneys' fees ruling 1 until it issued its order and final judgment, in which it referred to the videotape showing Alizadeh taking money from the cash register and stated that no credible evidence existed demonstrating that her dismissal had resulted from prejudice toward her husband. Nevertheless, the court's ruling could not have come as a surprise to Alizadeh. Safeway raised the issue of its recovery of attorneys' fees as early as in its First Amended Original Answer and Counterclaim, in which Safeway asserted that Alizadeh's actions were frivolous, unreasonable and/or without foundation. Alizadeh was again on notice of Safeway's position regarding attorneys' fees as a result of the Joint Pretrial Order, of which both parties were signatories. The order's last contested issue of law was [w]hether Safeway is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs from Plaintiff. The foregoing demonstrates that the attorneys' fees issue was always before the trial court--a fact, we must conclude, of which Alizadeh was always aware. 9 The court's failure to hold a hearing before ruling on the imposition of attorneys' fees also did not work to violate Alizadeh's due process rights. In the context of Rule 11 sanctions, authority exists for the proposition that a hearing is unnecessary when  'the judge's participation in the proceedings provide[s] him with full knowledge of the relevant facts,'  Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note), and little further inquiry [is] necessary. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note; see 2A J. Moore, J. Lucas, & G. Grother, Moore's Federal Practice p 11.02 (2d ed.1989). Further, a hearing is warranted when it would significantly assist the alleged offender in the presentation of his or her defense. 5 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure at 239 (1989 supp.). Generally, there is less reason for a special post-merits hearing on entitlement to attorneys' fees under section 1988 than there is under Rule 11. In this case, a hearing prior to the court's ruling on whether Safeway was entitled to any section 1988 fees pursuant to its request was unnecessary because all the information upon which the ruling would be based was already before the court. Nothing Alizadeh points to demonstrates the necessity of a further hearing on entitlement to fees. Consequently, the failure to hold such a hearing did not deprive Alizadeh of due process of law. 2 10