Opinion ID: 510631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: co-defendant's guilty plea

Text: 79 One of the potential buyers, Mitchell Goldberg, pled guilty to the attempt charge, and agreed to cooperate with the government and testify at trial in exchange for certain considerations. Appellants argue (1) that the fact of his plea should not have been elicited during Goldberg's testimony; and (2) that the United States Attorney improperly suggested to the jury that the fact of Goldberg's guilty plea could be used to infer criminal culpability on the part of the defendants. 80 Some background is necessary to understand appellants' complaints. During his opening statement, the prosecuting attorney stated: 81 Mr. Goldberg has entered a guilty plea in this Court to the charge of attempted possession with intent to distribute more than 50 kilograms of marijuana. He entered a guilty plea to that count of this indictment that involved him. He was like all of the other co-defendants in this case except for Mr. Dworken. Mr. Dworken is a broker, all the other defendants are buyers, allegedly. 82 Defense counsel understandably took umbrage at the underscored comment, and asked for an admonition and assurance that the government would go no further along this line. The court responded that I'm sure we can trust the government, and instructed the jury as follows: 83 [The prosecutor] misspoke himself in referring to an individual, Mitchell Goldberg, who has, as he has indicated, pleaded guilty to the offense of the attempt charged against him in the indictment, that plea. The fact that he has pled guilty is pertinent only to the question of his guilt, and it may not be taken by you to be any indication whatever of the guilt of any other defendant charged in this indictment. 84 So that, to the extent that what [the prosecutor] said when he misspoke himself, that these other defendants are like Mr. Goldberg, that is not true; he concedes that is not true, that [it] is ultimately for you to determine whether or not on all of the evidence the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that these defendants have committed any offense charged in this indictment. You won't rely in any way upon the fact of Mr. Goldberg's having pleaded guilty himself as being evidence of guilt as to anyone. 85 There was no objection to this limiting instruction. 86 Right before Goldberg was to testify, defendants moved to preclude the government from eliciting the fact of Goldberg's guilty plea. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the plea and its terms were material to the issue of witness credibility. 21 The government was allowed to present evidence of the plea agreement as an anticipatory buffer, i.e., to defuse an anticipated line of cross-examination by revealing in advance that Goldberg was to receive advantages as the result of his testimony. The court instructed the jury that witness credibility was the only purpose for which this information could be used. 87 Goldberg testified about Dworken's attempts to bring him into the Maine scheme; Goldberg was brought up to Portland and shown an unacceptable sample of marijuana. He never met Cunniff and never placed an order. Over defense objection, Goldberg testified that he intended to possess the marijuana he was offered if I could work out a deal. 88 During the government's rebuttal summation, counsel explained to the jury that the fact that Goldberg left Maine without agreeing to a purchase didn't change the fact that [Goldberg] committed a crime. He added that to the extent that [Goldberg] told you what his intent was, that would aid you in determining what the intent of these other defendants was. Defendants' objection to these comments was overruled. The court, in its charge, twice instructed the jury that the fact and details of Goldberg's plea agreement could be used only on the issue of his credibility, and not as evidence of the defendants' guilt. Appellants challenge the prosecution's repeated references to Goldberg's plea, and the insinuation that Goldberg's intent was probative of their intent. 89 We note first that the fact of the guilty plea and the plea agreement properly may be elicited to dampen the effect of an anticipated attack on the witness's credibility. United States v. Louis, 814 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir.1983); United States v. Fleetwood, 528 F.2d 528, 532 & n. 8 (5th Cir.1976). In such a case, [b]ecause of the potential for prejudice, cautionary instructions limiting the jury's use of the guilty plea to permissible purposes are critical. Baez, 703 F.2d at 455. In the present case, such instructions were provided during the government's opening, at the time Goldberg testified, and in the final jury instructions. Therefore, it was not error for the court to allow the government to reveal that Goldberg had pled guilty to the indictment in a deal with the government. 90 A much more difficult question is presented by the prosecution's comments on the implication of that plea. [A] defendant is entitled to have the question of his guilt determined upon the evidence against him, not on whether a codefendant or government witness has been convicted of the same charge. United States v. Miranda, 593 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir.1979) (footnote omitted). See also Louis, 814 F.2d at 856. Hence, it is impermissible ... to emphasize ... the guilty pleas of witnesses as substantive evidence of the guilt of a defendant charged with similar crimes. Id. Such emphasis is but another all-too-common example of the phenomenon that too often in strong cases prosecutors make statements they need not make. United States v. Dougherty, 810 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir.1987). In several cases, convictions have been reversed for plain error in response to such zealous overkill. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986 (10th Cir.1986); Fleetwood, 528 F.2d 528; see also Miranda, 593 F.2d at 594 (stating plain error rule); cf. Dougherty (harmless error analysis sustains conviction). The government's first mistake, in its opening statement, was in following the information of Goldberg's plea with the comment He was like all of the other co-defendants in this case except for Mr. Dworken. One obviously reasonable interpretation of this juxtaposition was that because Goldberg was guilty, the defendants must be guilty for engaging in the same acts. It strongly suggests a logical variant of guilt by association. Fortunately, it immediately was remedied by the court's limiting instruction, to which there was no objection. 91 The statements are more troublesome for what they suggest about the probative value of Goldberg's intent. Goldberg testified that he intended, provisionally, to purchase marijuana. The government, in rebuttal summation, told the jury that this revelation would aid you in determining what the intent of these other defendants was. As to the conspiracy charge, this might in some sense be true--the intent of one co-conspirator can be material in deciding the intent of another, at least as to the objective of the conspiracy. But it is not at all probative on the issue of the intent element of the attempt charge; Goldberg's intent does not in any way indicate another defendant's intent. 92 The prosecution's statements rise to the level of misconduct because the principal issue on the attempt charge was whether criminal intent could be inferred from the actions of the defendants. Immediately preceding its claim that Goldberg's intent was relevant in determining the others' intent, the prosecution stated that Goldberg's refusal to commit to the transaction proposed by Dworken didn't change the fact that [Goldberg] committed a crime. The obvious logical inference is as follows: (1) Goldberg's actions provided the requisite criminal intent for attempted possession, and he even admitted as much in his testimony and through his guilty plea; (2) the other defendants performed the same or greater actions during the same scheme; therefore: (3) the other defendants had the requisite intent, and thus are at least as guilty as Goldberg. 93 This inference is plainly improper. The prosecution, in fact, erred simply in telling the jury that Goldberg's withdrawal from the scheme did not negate guilt. The implication was: if Goldberg is guilty for what he's done, surely those who have done more must be guilty as well. 94 To require a new trial, we must conclude either that, despite the instruction, the misconduct was likely to have affected the trial's outcome, or that sanction is needed to deter future prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Capone, 683 F.2d 582, 585-86 (1st Cir.1982) (citations omitted). We are convinced that this prosecutorial misconduct did not so prejudicially affect the defendants' rights as to deprive them of a fair trial. See Dougherty, 810 F.2d at 767. First, we assume that the jury heeded the court's repeated insistence that the guilty plea not be used to infer the guilt of those on trial. Even in light of the court's refusal to strike the prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal summation, the constant reiteration of the limiting instruction provided sufficient guarantee that the government's underhanded tactic would be unavailing. Second, the jury did not convict Toscano, despite the fact that he took far more substantial steps than Goldberg to consummate the transaction (e.g., specific negotiations with Cunniff). This demonstrates that the jury did not presume intent (and therefore guilt) of all those whose actions were more extensive and unequivocal than Goldberg's. Finally, the evidence against the defendants on the attempt charge was overwhelming, as explained in Section III, supra. Even if the jury had considered Goldberg's guilty plea, whatever slight support for conviction might have been provided by the government's inferential suggestions was but a drop in the ocean relative to the extensive probative evidence elicited from the tapes and from the testimony of Agent Cunniff. 95 We also do not think that the prophylactic of a new trial is necessary as a deterrent to future misconduct. We assume that the government will henceforth heed our admonitions against improper use of a guilty plea. We should not have to remind the United States Attorney that he is the representative 96 not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.... It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 97 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). See also United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 127-28 (1st Cir.1988) (criminal trial should be viewed not as an adversarial sporting contest, but as a quest for truth).