Opinion ID: 163583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review and Overview of Applicable Law

Text: 11 In criminal cases other than child crimes and sex offenses, a sentencing court may depart from the applicable guideline range if the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (emphasis added). In reviewing a district court's sentencing determination, we accept the district court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). Further, we generally give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. Id. Where the district court departs from the sentencing guidelines, however, we review de novo the district court's determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(A) and (B). Id. 12 Application of the de novo standard of review in sentencing-departure cases represents a shift from our earlier case law. Prior to the enactment of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, we reviewed sentencing departures under a unitary abuse of discretion standard, applying the four-part test set forth in United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (10th Cir.1997). The amendments contained in the PROTECT Act 5 modify the unitary abuse of discretion standard; the applicable analytical framework, however, remains generally consistent with the four-part test set forth in Collins. 13 In light of the PROTECT Act's amendments, our review of the district court's sentencing departure shall proceed as follows. First, we must ascertain whether the district court set forth, in a written order of judgment, its specific reasons for departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). Second, we must consider whether the factors the district court relied upon advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2), 6 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(i), and ensure that the district court's reliance on those factors did not violate any specific prohibition in the Guidelines, Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 106, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). Our review under this second prong of the analysis is de novo. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) 7 ; Collins, 122 F.3d at 1302-03. Third, we must consider whether the factors the district court relied upon were authorized under section 3553(b) 8 and justified by the facts of the case. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii). To determine whether the factors are authorized, we look to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which provides that a district court may depart if there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. This third step in the analysis is commonly called the heartland determination. See Collins, 122 F.3d at 1303 (reviewing court must determine whether the departure factors relied upon by the district court remove the defendant from the applicable Guideline heartland [sufficient to] warrant[] a departure). We review de novo this application of the guidelines to the facts under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B). 9 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). Finally, we must ask whether the district court's sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(C); accord Collins, 122 F.3d at 1303 (reviewing court must determine whether the degree of departure is reasonable). In reviewing the degree of departure, we give due deference to the district court, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), and will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Goldberg, 295 F.3d 1133, 1138, 1141 (10th Cir.2002). 14 We proceed to consider the district court's sentence in this case, in light of the preceding framework.