Opinion ID: 2624872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applicability of Terry v. Ohio

Text: A few months prior to the officers' detention of Duncan, the Legislature amended RCW 66.44.100, relating to the opening or consumption of liquor in a public place, decriminalizing such conduct from a misdemeanor to a civil infraction under chapter 7.80 RCW, effective July 25, 1999. By amending RCW 66.44.100, the Legislature effectively decriminalized SMC 12A.24.025 as well, making a violation of this code provision a civil infraction. [2] To effectuate the public policy of preventing criminal activity in progress, Terry and its progeny have predominantly analyzed the reasonable suspicion of an ensuing crime. In State v. Pressley, 64 Wash.App. 591, 593, 825 P.2d 749 (1992), for example, a law enforcement officer suspected that he was witnessing a drug transaction. The officer was in a well-known area for drug trafficking and gang activity. Id. He observed the respondent and a companion huddled together looking at an object in the respondent's hand, which he suspected was crack cocaine or another narcotic. Id. at 594, 825 P.2d 749. When the officer approached in a marked vehicle, the respondent exclaimed, `Oh Shit' and she and her friend quickly dispersed. Id. Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the officer had articulated a specific justification for the reasonable suspicion of potential or actual criminal activity. Id. at 598-99, 825 P.2d 749. Essentially the only circumstance where, absent a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, Terry has been applied is to stops incident to traffic violations. [3] See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 350-51, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). The State would have us extend the Terry stop exception further to include all civil infractions. We decline to do so. Traffic violations create a unique set of circumstances that may justify this extension of Terry, but which may not be appropriate for other civil infractions. For example, this court has acknowledged the diminishment of privacy interests due to the law enforcement exigency created by the ready mobility of vehicles and governmental interests in ensuring safe travel, as evidenced in the broad regulation of most forms of transportation. State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 454, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985)). Detentions for traffic violations have a broader scope than detentions for other civil infractions. When issuing notice of a civil infraction, an officer may briefly detain a person long enough to check his or her identification. RCW 7.80.060. [4] In contrast, our Legislature has specifically authorized: Whenever any person is stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction. RCW 46.61.021(2). Thus, the traffic violation exception to the application of Terry stops for criminal violations is distinguishable from the civil infraction before the court. We decline to extend the Terry stop exception under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution to nontraffic civil infractions. In declining to extend Terry to general civil infractions, we also consider the valid public policy principles behind permitting a Terry stop. In Terry the Court reasoned that the lesser Fourth Amendment burden imposed by the protective frisk was justified by the strong government interest in police officer safety: We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded. 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868. We interpreted the application of this safety principle in State v. Belieu, 112 Wash.2d 587, 773 P.2d 46 (1989), stating, courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of police officers in the field. `A founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine that the [frisk] was not arbitrary or harassing.' Id. at 601-02, 773 P.2d 46 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.1966)). The policy concerns for police safety are in tension with the constitutional guarantees of personal privacy. The exclusionary rule mandates the suppression of evidence gathered through unconstitutional means. State v. Putman, 65 Wash.App. 606, 612, 829 P.2d 787 (1992). In Rife, we articulated several policy considerations in support of the exclusionary rule: to protect the privacy interests of individuals against unreasonable government intrusions, to deter law enforcement officers from unlawfully obtaining evidence, and to preserve the dignity of the judiciary by providing a mechanism for the courts to refuse to consider unlawfully obtained evidence. 133 Wash.2d at 148, 943 P.2d 266 (citing State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 581, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)). Applying these competing interests, the United States Supreme Court has held that on occasion law enforcement interests will outweigh an individual's interest in freedom from being stopped and detained. In Hensley, for example, the Court addressed the situation where a police officer stopped and detained an individual based on a wanted flyer issued following an armed robbery. The Court specifically balanced the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. 469 U.S. at 228, 105 S.Ct. 675 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698-701, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)). The Court noted the interests of effective crime prevention and detection and exigent circumstances, which may support a reasonable Terry stop. Id. at 228, 105 S.Ct. 675. It recognized that some of these same concerns may not be present when dealing with a past crime. Id. However, to support the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice the Court held that a Terry stop may be permissible when investigating a completed felony. Id. at 229, 105 S.Ct. 675. The Court's focus on preventing crimes, and promoting the interests of justice in arresting felons in Hensley, suggests that the interest in preventing civil infractions may not be accorded the same weight. The Washington constitution affords greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment. See generally Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 909 P.2d 293; Mendez, 137 Wash.2d at 218, 970 P.2d 722. Article I, section 7 states, No person shall be disturbed in [that person's] private affairs, or [the person's] home invaded, without authority of law. Privacy interests protected include, `those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.' Johnson, 128 Wash.2d at 446, 909 P.2d 293 (quoting Boland, 115 Wash.2d at 577, 800 P.2d 1112 (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984))). Furthermore, this court has cited favorably the common law rule requiring a warrant prior to arresting an individual for the commission of a misdemeanor. State v. Hornaday, 105 Wash.2d 120, 123, 713 P.2d 71 (1986). [A] police officer, even with probable cause, may not arrest a person for a misdemeanor committed outside the presence of the officer, unless the officer has a warrant. Id. (citing State v. Bonds, 98 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831, 104 S.Ct. 111, 78 L.Ed.2d 112 (1983)). This rule illustrates the higher burden this court imposes upon officers when investigating lesser crimes. Accepting the presumption that more serious crimes pose a greater risk of harm to society, we place an inversely proportional burden in relation to the level of the violation. Thus, society will tolerate a higher level of intrusion for a greater risk and higher crime than it would for a lesser crime. By logical extension this reasoning applies when a civil infraction is committed, as in this case. When investigating a civil infraction an officer is not seeking to arrest an individual, but rather to issue a citation. In light of the lower risk to society involved with civil infractions, the common law principle recognized in Hornaday suggests that a less intrusive procedure would be more acceptable than with the commission of a felony or even a misdemeanor. This rationale is also supported by the reasoning behind the United States Supreme Court's allowance of the Terry stop. The Court in Terry, permitted a limited search when an officer reasonably believed that a crime was about to occur. The officer in Terry observed two men pacing back and forth along an identical route, stopping to stare at the same store window and then conferring with each other and a third accomplice. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Based on more than 30 years of experience in the field, the officer suspected that the men were casing a potential armed robbery. Id. at 5-7, 88 S.Ct. 1868. When the officer approached the men and one of them mumbled an inaudible comment, he patted them down for weapons and recovered a .38 caliber revolver. Id. The situation in Terry, where the officer had reason to suspect a potential armed robbery contrasts starkly with Renihan's and Hockett's suspicion of an open container violation, an infraction that by its nature would not obviate the possession of a weapon. Balancing the competing interests expressed in Terry and its progeny, therefore, a stop and frisk should not be permissible in the context of two officers observing a man with a bulky jacket standing next to a bottle at a public bus stop.