Opinion ID: 2789949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supremacy

Text: Petitioners contend that applying the LGTCA damages cap to “limit remedies for constitutional violations runs afoul of the supremacy of the state constitution.” In essence, Petitioners argue that because their constitutional claims are self-executing, meaning that they arise directly from the state constitution,12 those claims, and the remedies that flow from them, may not be limited or restricted by statute. In addition, Petitioners contend that limiting the local government’s liability would clearly and impermissibly impair their cause of action arising from Art. 24, which would, again, impair their self-executing rights under Art. 24. Petitioners cite, rather cursorily, to several out of state cases which stand for the proposition that self-executing rights may not be “restricted,” “destroyed,” or “limited” by statute. Upon review, however, we find these cases wholly inapposite and unpersuasive. Petitioners, for instance, cite to the Supreme Court of Colorado’s 1950 opinion in Baker v. 12 As we explained above, “self-executing” means only that the “provision is so complete, [that] it may be enforced by the courts without the need of further legislative authority or direction.” Benson, 389 Md. at 629, 887 A.2d at 533 (citation omitted). 20 Bosworth, 222 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1950). In Baker, the court was asked to consider whether the legislature, by itself, could alter a provision in the state constitution providing that eight percent of the legal voters were needed to propose any law by referendum, when the constitution expressly reserved the power to propose constitutional amendments to the people, “independent of the general assembly.” Id. at 417. The court concluded that the legislature’s attempt to raise the referendum requirement to fifteen percent was plainly unconstitutional as it conflicted with the express language of the state constitution vesting all power to amend the constitution in the people. Id. at 417-19. In the present case, there is no such conflict. Apart from Article 19, discussed infra, Petitioners cite to no provision of our state constitution that is being contravened in a similar manner. Moreover, of the numerous cases Petitioners rely upon, none involve a finding that a limitation on liability for damages in tort is unconstitutional on supremacy grounds. Indeed, the cases cited by Petitioners involve issues irrelevant to our discussion. See, e.g., Shell v. Jefferson Cnty., 454 So. 2d 1331 (Ala. 1984) (addressing the validity of a statute limiting the County’s authority to set sewer services rates, where such authority was unrestricted under the state constitution); Loonan v. Woodley, 882 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1994) (reviewing a challenge to an initiative petition “that would require parental notification of an unemancipated minor’s decision to have an abortion” for failure to collect a sufficient amount of signatures); In re Inter-Faith Villa, L.P., 185 P.3d 295 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) abrogated by In re Mental Health Ass’n of Heartland, 221 P.3d 580 (Kan. 2009) (reviewing 21 a decision of the Kansas State Board of Tax Appeals denying appellants’ application for exemption from ad valorem taxes); Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 184 P.3d 546 (Okla. 2008) (reviewing a challenge concerning the authority of a multicounty grand jury to investigate illegal activity occurring in one county). Apart from relying upon inapplicable, out of state cases, Petitioners cite to our opinion in Longtin for the proposition that the application of the damages cap to a constitutional claim is violative of the supremacy of the state constitution because it “impairs” a plaintiff’s cause of action. We find this reliance misplaced. In Longtin, this Court held that the retroactive application of the LGTCA damages cap was unconstitutional, because “Longtin had a vested right in bringing his cause of action—with no statutory cap on damages—prior to the enactment of the LGTCA revisions.” 419 Md. at 489-90, 19 A.3d at 883. In other words, in that case, the retroactive application of the cap would “impair” Longtin’s right to bring a cause of action, as it existed at the time his injury accrued. Id. This is plainly not at issue here. Thus, Longtin provides no support for Petitioners’ position. In our view, application of the LGTCA damages cap to state constitutional claims does not violate the supremacy of the state constitution.