Opinion ID: 173414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preservation of Argument

Text: As an initial matter, WildEarth contends Safari Club did not adequately assert its interest in defending the NPS's hunting and culling proposals before the district court. Failure to raise an issue in the district court generally constitutes waiver. Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1209 (10th Cir.2005); see also Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721 (10th Cir.1993) (requiring that an issue first be presented to, considered[, and] decided by the trial court) (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree with WildEarth's contention. Reading WildEarth's complaint and Safari Club's motion to intervene, supporting memorandum, and reply brief in conjunction with one another makes clear Safari Club sufficiently articulated all of the interests it asserts on appeal. In its complaint, for example, WildEarth contended the enabling acts of individual national parks govern when they conflict with the Organic Act. WildEarth argued the Organic Act does not permit hunting in a national park unless the park's unique enabling language expressly allows it. WildEarth asserted the NPS's elk management plan violates the RMNP Act, which forbids hunting. Based on those contentions, WildEarth sought declarations that culling is hunting and that the NPS's failure to prohibit hunting at RMNP violated the language and logic of the Organic Act and the park's enabling legislation. Safari Club filed its motion to intervene in direct response to WildEarth's complaint. In its memorandum in support of its motion, Safari Club stated that, if WildEarth obtains the declaratory relief it seeks, Safari Club members will be deprived of the opportunity to participate in sustainable use wildlife management activities at RMNP, J.A., Vol. I, at 42, and federal agencies . . . could stop qualified hunters from participating in future wildlife management activities on federally administered lands, seriously interfer[ing] with wildlife management throughout the United States and . . . depriv[ing] hunters and outdoor enthusiasts of safe and productive wildlife oriented opportunities, id. at 33. Further, Safari Club asserted that WildEarth seeks the elimination of the culling aspect of the NPS's plan by virtue of WildEarth's interpretation of the RMNP Act. Finally, in its reply brief, Safari Club stated its interest in hunting near RMNP, as well as on or near other federal lands, could be affected by a broad district court ruling: [Safari Club's] ability to participate in the management of elk [at Rocky Mountain National Park] and [its] ability to continue to enjoy hunting and other recreational activities in the vicinity of [the park] as well as within and around other federally administered lands are . . . at risk from [WildEarth]'s litigation challenges. J.A., Vol. I, at 110. [6] When considered in the context of WildEarth's complaint, the totality of Safari Club's statements sufficiently identified Safari Club's interest in protecting wildlife management techniques that incorporate hunting and culling. See Stone v. First Wyo. Bank, 625 F.2d 332, 348 (10th Cir. 1980) (giving a liberal reading to pleadings and motions submitted to the trial court and finding that the issue in question had been sufficiently preserved). Having concluded that Safari Club adequately identified its claims before the district court, we turn to the requirements for intervention as of right.