Opinion ID: 2995434
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the prosecutor misstated the

Text: evidence, (2) whether the remarks implicate specific rights of the accused, (3) whether the defense invited the response, (4) the trial court’s instructions, (5) the weight of the evidence against the defendant, and (6) the defendant’s opportunity to rebut./11 These factors, however, are not to be applied in a rigid manner, but should be used as a guide to determine whether there was fundamental unfairness that infected the bottom line. For that reason, we often have characterized the weight of the evidence as the most important consideration. United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 85, 90 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Gramley, 225 F.3d at 793. The Supreme Court of Indiana did not recite with precision the factors set forth in Darden, but evaluated the impact of the prosecutor’s arguments using the common rubric of Indiana law. The court asked whether the prosecutor’s comments placed Mr. Hough in grave peril. Grave peril is measured, in large part, by the probable persuasive effect of any misconduct on the jury’s decision. Hough, 690 N.E.2d at 271 (quoting Lowery, 640 N.E.2d at 1038). The Supreme Court of Indiana determined that, because of the presence of three substantial aggravating factors, Mr. Hough’s trial was not compromised, and he was not placed in grave peril. We cannot fault the Supreme Court of Indiana for its conclusion. Essentially, the court focused on the Darden factor that we have characterized as the most important. See Gramley, 225 F.3d at 793./12 We note, moreover, that only a few of the remaining Darden factors can be said to weigh in Mr. Hough’s favor: Mr. Hough’s counsel did not invite, and did not have an opportunity to rebut, some of the prosecutor’s remarks. Significantly, more of the remaining Darden factors suggest that the prosecutor’s arguments did not affect the result. First, the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence, nor was a specific right, such as the right to remain silent, implicated. In addition, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that [a]rguments, statements and remarks of counsel were intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the law, but are not evidence. Any argument, statement or remark had no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard that argument, statement or remark. Tr. 1349. Consequently, the jury was on notice that the arguments were nothing more than counsel’s interpretation of the evidence. Furthermore, defense counsel did have an opportunity to rebut at least some of the prosecutor’s questionable statements in his closing argument. See Tr. 1334 (replying to the prosecutor’s arguments that a penalty less than death would depreciate the seriousness of the crime). Finally, the jury was presented with overwhelming evidence of three aggravating factors compared to sparse evidence in mitigation. Because the prosecutor’s comments do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation as set forth in Darden, defense counsel’s failure to object to those arguments cannot be considered prejudicial for purposes of the Strickland analysis.