Opinion ID: 2625903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury instruction on the elements of the offense of robbery in the second degree

Text: Although Iuli did not object at trial, Iuli argues on appeal that the jury instructions for robbery in the second degree were plainly erroneous because, in formulating the instructions, the trial court presented the two material elements in two parts rather than three. Relying on Aganon, Iuli contends that, due to the trial court's fundamental misunderstanding of the elements of the offense, the jury instructions on the requisite state of mind and the state's burden of proof were confusing and misleading. We disagree. In Aganon, this court vacated the defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial because the trial court's response to a jury communication erroneously stated that the jury must be unanimous in finding the requisite state of mind with respect to either the defendant's conduct, attendant circumstances, or result of her conduct. Aganon, 97 Hawai`i at 302-03, 36 P.3d at 1272-73. However, this court acknowledged that not all offenses, as defined by the legislature, have all three possible elements. Id., 97 Hawai`i at 303, 36 P.3d at 1273. The court in Aganon also held that, although the jury instruction on second degree murder erroneously listed the requisite state of mind as an element of the offense and listed the conduct and result of conduct elements together, the error did not adversely affect defendant's substantial rights because the instructions as a whole were not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. See id. This court has previously indicated that there are two material elements of the offense of Robbery in the Second Degree, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Haanio, 94 Hawai`i 405, 421 n. 4, 16 P.3d 246, 262 n. 4 (2001); see also Hawai`i Pattern Jury InstructionsCriminal 10.29-10.30 (2002) (pattern jury instructions state that there are two material elements to the offense of Robbery in the Second Degree). The material elements of HRS § 708-841(1)(a) that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are: (1) the attendant circumstances (that the defendant was in the course of committing a theft); and (2) the conduct (that the defendant used force against a person who was present with intent to overcome that person's physical resistance or physical power of resistance). Proof of the result of conduct is not a material element of the offense of robbery in the second degree. [3] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the two statutory elements of the offense of robbery in the second degree as set forth in HRS § 708-841 and that the trial court's presentation of the material elements of the offense in two, rather than three, parts was not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, misleading or inconsistent.
Iuli also contends that, because the court's instructions listing two material elements of robbery in the second degree was improper, and because the trial court instructed the jury on the requisite state of mind with respect to three elements instead of two, the jury instruction on the state of mind became meaningless in the context of the court's description of the elements. The trial court did not instruct the jury as to the specific language of HRS § 702-204, which states in relevant part that a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense. However, the trial court instructed the jury on the requisite state of mind as follows: A person acts intentionally with respect to his conduct when it is his conscious object to engage in such conduct. A person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such a result. The state of mind with which a person commits an act such as intentionally may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Here, although the trial court presented the elements of robbery in the second degree as two material elements, but instructed the jury on the requisite state of mind with respect to three elements, the instructions taken as a whole was nevertheless understandable and did not render the state of mind instructions prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i at 49, 897 P.2d at 976.
Iuli further contends that the jury instructions were insufficient because they did not instruct the jury as to venue, jurisdiction, and timeliness of prosecution. HRS § 701-114 (1993) [4] requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense, and facts establishing jurisdiction, venue, and timeliness. However, where uncontradicted and undisputed evidence of timely prosecution, jurisdiction, and proper venue is contained in the record, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Correa, 5 Haw.App. 644, 650, 706 P.2d 1321, 1325, cert. denied, 68 Haw. 692 (1985). In the present case, the record demonstrates that the prosecution adduced evidence establishing jurisdiction, venue, and timeliness and that the evidence was undisputed. We, therefore, hold that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on these matters was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.