Opinion ID: 166160
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statutory limit on jurisdiction

Text: 15 We have jurisdiction over petitions for review of final orders of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), but that jurisdiction is limited. In particular, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) deprives us of jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under several sections of the INA, including the ones under which Petitioner seeks relief— §§ 1229b and 1255. 16 The Government assumes that this limitation applies only to judgments resting on discretionary grounds, and Petitioner unsurprisingly does not contest this interpretation. Although the matter is not without doubt, we need not resolve it in this appeal because even adopting the Government's assumption, we lack jurisdiction. See Morales v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.2003) (noting that this provision seems to foreclose judicial review completely, but holding that in any event, the decision on appeal rested on discretionary grounds). The IJ held that even were Petitioner eligible for any of the relief she sought, he would deny relief (on the Attorney General's behalf) as a discretionary matter. Because the final order of review rests on discretionary grounds, it appears that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) denies us jurisdiction to review it. 17 We recognize that one of the grounds relied upon by the IJ was not discretionary—the denial based on Petitioner's having falsely claimed citizenship. But if there are two alternative grounds for a decision and we lack jurisdiction to review one, it would be beyond our Article III judicial power to review the other. Absent authority to review the discretionary ground, any opinion of ours reviewing the nondiscretionary ground could not affect the final order's validity and so would be advisory only. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. United States EPA, 225 F.3d 1144, 1148 n. 4 (10th Cir.2000) (This court would violate Article III's prohibition against advisory opinions were it to ... issue a mere statement that the EPA's interpretation and application of the law was incorrect without ordering some related relief.). There is no contention in this case that the IJ's decision on the nondiscretionary issue affected his exercise of discretion. 18 Nevertheless, there remains a challenging question to resolve before we can conclude that we lack jurisdiction. Does the IJ's exercise of discretion defeat jurisdiction if the actual (but unexpressed) ground for the BIA's summary affirmance was the IJ's alternative nondiscretionary ground?