Opinion ID: 2621100
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Heading: The Kansas Court of Appeals Decisions

Text: Two recent cases, State v. Wellborn, 27 Kan. App.2d 393, and State v. Barber, 26 Kan. App.2d 330, held that failing to give a unanimity instruction was structural error, requiring reversal. Wellborn appealed his convictions for rape and four counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Counts 1 and 2 alleged single acts occurring between May and July 1995; Counts 3 and 4 charged acts between January and June 1996; and Count 5 charged activity in April 1997. The victim testified to numerous incidents. Wellborn requested a unanimity instruction. The State did not elect a specific act for each count, nor did the district court instruct the jury on the need for unanimity regarding the specific act supporting the convictions for each count. The Wellborn court relied upon Barber. 27 Kan. App.2d at 394. In Barber, the defendant was charged with criminal possession of a firearm. The evidence showed that Barber possessed a gun during a disturbance and later that day returned with another gun in his possession. The jury was not instructed that all jurors must agree that the same criminal act, possession of the first gun or the second gun, had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Barber court concluded that State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 289-90, 875 P.2d 242 (1994), implicitly acknowledged [a unanimity] instruction is necessary to insure jury unanimity in multiple acts cases. 26 Kan. App.2d at 331. The Barber court said: [N]o amount of analysis would ever permit us to say the jury unanimously agreed to the underlying act supporting the conviction. Under such circumstances, the trial court's failure to give a multiple acts instruction constitutes structural error.... 26 Kan. App. 2d at 331. Compare State v. Daniels, 28 Kan. App.2d 364, 17 P.3d 373 (2000) (applying the harmless analysis); State v. Banks, 28 Kan. App.2d 829, Syl. ¶ 1, 22 P.3d 1069 (2001) (When the factual circumstances of a crime involve a short, continuous, single incident comprised of several acts individually sufficient for conviction, jury unanimity requires only that the jury agree to an act of the crime charged, not which particular act.); State v. Fulton, 28 Kan. App.2d 815, Syl. ¶ 6, 23 P.3d 167 (2001) (A continuous incident where a victim is alleged to have been cut more than once by the defendant is not a multiple acts situation requiring a unanimity instruction.). Hill also relies upon State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, Syl. ¶ 2, 875 P.2d 242 (1994), where we said: In multiple acts cases, several acts are alleged and any one of them could constitute the crime charged. This statement arose from our discussion of Timley's claim that his case was a multiple acts case, citing State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988). We said: [Kitchen] noted the rule that `[w]hen the prosecution presents evidence of several acts that could form the basis of one count charged, either the State must tell the jury which act to rely on in its deliberations or the court must instruct the jury to agree on a specific criminal act.' 110 Wash.2d at 409. Timley characterizes his case as a `multiple acts' case. What he ignores is the distinction made by the Kitchen court between alternative means cases and multiple acts cases. 255 Kan. at 289. Timley is not controlling here, however, because it is an alternative means case, not a multiple acts case. Timley was convicted of sexual acts under the premise that they were committed when the victim was overcome by force or fear. He argued that his case was a multiple acts case and that the jury instructions deprived him of a unanimous verdict. We found that Timley ignored the distinction between an alternative means case and a multiple acts case. The jury could determine that each sexual act was the result of either force or fear. The district court did not err by including both alternative means in one jury instruction. 255 Kan. at 290. The question of whether to analyze the lack of unanimity instruction in a multiple acts case under a structural error approach or a harmless error approach is obviously unsettled. The Chief Judge of the Washington Court of Appeals concludes in analyzing the cases from his jurisdiction: In those cases in which the defense to charges based on multiple acts is a general denial, differentiation among a number of events is not required of the jury and therefore is not an issue in controversy. The jury either accepts the victim's testimony as to all and convicts, or it accepts the defendant's denial and acquits on all charges. The failure to give a unanimity instruction in those instances is harmless error; it does not relate to an issue in controversy. Sweeney, An Analysis of Harmless Error in Washington: A Principled Process, 31 Gonz. L. Rev. 277, p. 302 (1996). We reject the structural error approach and apply a two-step harmless error analysis to Hill's contention that a unanimity instruction should have been given. In applying a harmless error analysis, the first step is to determine whether there is a possibility of jury confusion from the record or if the evidence showed either legally or factually separate incidents. Incidents are legally separate when the defendant presents different defenses to separate sets of facts or when the court's instructions are ambiguous but tend to shift the legal theory from a single incident to two separate incidents. Incidents are factually separate when independent criminal acts have occurred at different times or when a later criminal act is motivated by a fresh impulse. When jury confusion is not shown under the first step, the second step is to determine if the error in failing to give a unanimity instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to all acts. Here, the record shows that Hill digitally penetrated B.M.'s vagina in the bathroom. B.M. repeatedly told him to stop and managed to push Hill against the bathtub. After that she walked out of the bathroom and into the kitchen. The testimony of Hill again inserting his finger into her vagina surfaced during B.M.'s cross-examination by Hill's counsel. At trial, Hill did not testify, but in his statement to police, Hill said he merely knocked on the front door, found out that B.M.'s father was not there, and immediately left. The Court of Appeals found that these events were not legally or factually separate incidents, essentially concluding that the two penetrations comprised one criminal episode. 28 Kan. App.2d at 36. In Kansas, under these facts, the two acts of penetration were separate incidents of rape. See State v. Zamora, 247 Kan. 684, 693-94, 803 P.2d 568 (1990) (rejecting the argument that a digital penetration followed by penile penetration comprised one count of rape, not two); State v. Long, 26 Kan. App.2d 644, 645-47, 993 P.2d 1237 (1999), rev. denied 268 Kan. 892 (2000) (separate and distinct incidents where the defendant was convicted of four counts of rape and one count of sodomy and the incidents occurred in a 1-to 2-hour period in the victim's apartment). However, until the day before Hill's trial, the State was unaware that an alleged penetration occurred in the kitchen. Thus, Hill was only charged with one count of rape. As in Cooks, 446 Mich. 503, more than one act was presented as evidence of a single criminal offense. Here, materially identical evidence was presented with respect to both acts of rape. Hill did not present a separate defense or offer materially distinct evidence of impeachment regarding any particular act. The defense presented a general denial of participation in any wrongful conduct. We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that jury confusion was not shown here. In applying a harmless error review, since there was no extrinsic evidence to support the charges, the sole issue was the credibility of the victim's account of the two alleged penetrations. The evidence offered no possibility of jury disagreement regarding Hill's commission of either of these acts. By the jury's rejection of Hill's general denial, we can unequivocally say there was no rational basis by which the jury could have found that Hill committed one rape but did not commit the other. In many multiple acts cases, the acts will be materially distinct and will be associated with different defenses, so a specific unanimity instruction will be required. Here, however, any error in omitting such an instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the Court of Appeals' caveat: This holding should not be interpreted to give prosecutors carte blanche to rely on harmless error review, and it is strongly encouraged that prosecutors elect a specific act or the trial court issue a specific unanimity instruction. In many cases involving several acts, the requirement that an appellate court conclude beyond a reasonable doubt as to all acts will not be found harmless. It should be acknowledged that a prior Kansas Supreme Court case leaves open the possible interpretation that in multiple acts cases a general unanimity instruction followed by polling the jury is an effective cure to the lack of a specific unanimity instruction. See State v. Smith, 268 Kan. 222, 230, 993 P.2d 1213 (1999). Polling the jury is insufficient to cure a multiple acts problem unless the jurors are polled specifically to their agreement on the same incident. 28 Kan. App.2d at 36.