Opinion ID: 792077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent in Battery and Informed Consent/Malpractice Claims.

Text: 23 To recover for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that her doctor deviated from the standard of care practiced by reasonably prudent doctor[s] in her locality. Nestorowich v. Ricotta, 97 N.Y.2d 393, 740 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671, 767 N.E.2d 125 (2002). However, even where the doctor adhered to the requisite standard of care in performing a procedure or conducting an examination, the patient may recover for injuries she suffered as a result of the procedure or examination if the doctor failed to obtain her informed consent and the claim is not barred by failure to demonstrate one of the several showings required by New York Public Health Law § 2805-d. See Suria v. Shiffman, 67 N.Y.2d 87, 499 N.Y.S.2d 913, 918, 490 N.E.2d 832 (1986). 24 For the convenience of the reader, we set forth the relevant portions of Section 2805-d. 25 § 2805-d. Limitation of medical, dental or podiatric malpractice action based on lack of informed consent 26 1. Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical, dental, or podiatric practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation. 27 2. The right of action to recover for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice based on a lack of informed consent is limited to those cases involving either (a) non-emergency treatment, procedure or surgery, or (b) a diagnostic procedure which involved invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body. 28 3. For a cause of action therefor it must also be established that a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have undergone the treatment or diagnosis if he had been fully informed and that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury or condition for which recovery is sought. 29 N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-d. 30 Battery lies against a person who intentionally touches another person, without that person's consent, and causes an offensive bodily contact. . . . The intent required for battery is intent to cause a bodily contact that a reasonable person would find offensive. Jeffreys v. Griffin, 1 N.Y.3d 34, 769 N.Y.S.2d 184, 189 n. 2, 801 N.E.2d 404 (2003) (quoting New York Pattern Jury Instructions 2d 3:3 (2003)). 31 Thus, a completely unpermitted touching by a medical practitioner of a patient is a battery as distinct from a Section 2805-d claim. See, e.g., Cross v. Colen, 6 A.D.3d 306, 775 N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (1st Dep't 2004) (claim sounded in battery where plaintiff's only claim is that she simply did not consent to the procedure, and indeed expressly rejected it); Laskowitz v. CIBA Vision Corp., 215 A.D.2d 25, 632 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (2d Dep't 1995) (A problem in informed consent arises when a physician or other therapist obtains a consent to treatment adequate to insulate him from prosecution for criminal assault and from liability in a civil assault or battery action, but when, nonetheless, the patient contends that consent would have been withheld if an adequate disclosure had been made concerning his condition as well as the potential dangers of and alternatives to the proposed procedure or therapy.) Based on these decisions, we conclude that battery applies in the medical context only where the patient or her guardian gives no consent and the doctor intends to cause a bodily contact that a reasonable person would find offensive. Jeffreys, 1 N.Y.3d 34, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 41 n. 2, 801 N.E.2d 404. On the other hand, an informed consent violation occurs when the doctor obtains consent without giving the patient appropriate information concerning risks and alternatives. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-d. 32