Opinion ID: 1590214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged violation of Batson v. Kentucky.

Text: First, Walker contends that the trial court erred in concluding that he did not present a prima facie case of a violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and, consequently, in not requiring the State to provide race-neutral and gender-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. According to Walker, the trial court based its refusal to find a prima facie case of a Batson violation on the facts that Walker was a white male and three African-American females were seated on the jury. The record reveals that the following occurred after the jury was selected: [Walker's counsel]: By my count, after jurors were taken off for cause, there was fifteen African-American members of the strike panel. The State has used the right of peremptory challenge to remove ten. We contend that [to be] a violation of the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky and the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Branch [, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987),] and Ex parte Thomas [, 659 So.2d 3 (Ala.1994),] and other cases of similar import. THE COURT: Do you have any evidence you want to present in that regard? [Walker's counsel]: Nothing beyond the numerical disparity, Your Honor. THE COURT: Let the record reflect that the defendant is a white male and that there are three African[-American] females on the jury. Any response from the State? [Prosecutor]: Judge all they have given you is the numbers. The Defendant is white. He has not come forward with any questionnaires that we didn't ask questions on the ones we struck. We have reasons. Just numbers is not enough. You asked for evidence. THE COURT: Do you have anything else? [Walker's counsel]: Nothing further. THE COURT: Okay. Generally, it has been my practice to make the State go forward. The Defendant, as I said, is a white male and there are three African-American females on this jury. The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to prove a prima facie case. This Court has stated: The burden of persuasion is initially on the party alleging discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In determining whether there is a prima facie case, the court is to consider `all relevant circumstances' which could lead to an inference of discrimination. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, 622 (Ala. 1987). An objection based on numbers alone, however, does not support the finding of a prima face case of discrimination and is not sufficient to shift the burden to the other party to explain its peremptory strikes. Ex parte Trawick, 698 So.2d 162 (Ala.1997). Here, the trial court did not err in holding that Walker did not present a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory strikes by the State. Walker's objection was based totally on the number of African-Americans the State struck from the jury. When the trial court asked for facts or evidence to support the objection, Walker was unable to provide any. The trial court properly concluded that Walker had not presented a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory strikes. Moreover, Walker does not establish a conflict between the trial court's holding that he did not present a prima facie case and the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). In Powers, the United States Supreme Court stated: A criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded juror share the same races. 499 U.S. at 402, 111 S.Ct. 1364. Walker argues that the trial court's statements on the record that Walker was white and that three African-American females were ultimately seated on the jury provides evidence indicating that the trial court based its ruling on an improper ground. We disagree. Our reading of the statements in the context of the record leads us to conclude that the trial court, in light of the fact that Walker offered no evidence to support his objection, was merely trying to establish a few facts in the record to reflect the makeup of the jury. Thus, Walker has not established a conflict between the trial court's ruling and the Supreme Court's holding in Powers. Lastly, Walker asks this Court to review the record and conclude that plain error occurred because, he says, the record evidences that the State engaged in a discriminatory use of its peremptory strikes. Although he did not object on this basis in the trial court, he now argues that the State failed to strike prospective male and white jurors for the same reasons it used to strike prospective female and African-American jurors. To support his argument, Walker points out what he says is evidence of disparate treatment of venire-members during the voir dire. Plain error is error that is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings. Ex parte Taylor, 666 So.2d 73 (Ala.1995). The, plain error standard applies only where a particularly egregious error occurred at trial and that error has or probably has substantially prejudiced the defendant. Taylor.  Ex parte Trawick, 698 So.2d at 167. Moreover, `[for plain error to exist in, the Batson context, the record must raise an inference that the state [or the defendant] engaged in `purposeful discrimination' in the exercise of its peremptory challenges, See Ex parte Watkins, 509 So.2d 1074 (Ala.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987).' Smith v. State, 756 So.2d 892, 915 (Ala. Crim.App.1998), aff'd, 756 So.2d 957 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Rieber v. State, 663 So.2d 985, 991 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), quoting in turn other cases). We find no plain error in regard to this issue. When the. State exercised its peremptory strikes, it had before it both the jurors' answers to questions on voir dire and their answers to the juror questionnaire as a basis for its peremptory strikes. [1] The questionnaires were not included in the appellate record. See Rule 10(a)(6), Ala. R.App. P. However, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., we requested the circuit court to forward to us the relevant juror questionnaires to allow us to determine if the record supports an inference that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination in its exercise of its peremptory strikes. See Blackmon v. State, [Ms. CR-01-2126, August 25, 2006] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (opinion on application for rehearing) (in which the Court of Criminal Appeals requested the circuit clerk, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., to forward to it juror questionnaires and then conducted a plain-error review of an alleged Batson violation). We have carefully reviewed the record and the relevant juror questionnaires to determine whether an inference can be drawn that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination against African-Americans and females. [2] There is no inference of purposeful discrimination by the State in its exercise of its peremptory strikes; therefore, no plain error exists in this regard.