Opinion ID: 1742617
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: KRE 404(b); Modus Operandi.

Text: In addition to the evidence pertaining to the 1995 convictions, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of L.A., the victim of the 1989 convictions. L.A. testified that she was fourteen years old in 1988 and that Appellant's sexual activity with her had gone on for some time before the indictment was rendered. The activity usually occurred while her mother was at work or asleep, and Appellant told her that if she ever told anyone, he would kill her and her mother. When asked if Appellant had any weapons, L.A. responded that he had a machete and a sword. She did not testify that he threatened her with a firearm (or with the machete or sword). With respect to the facts of the sexual offenses, her entire testimony was as follows: Q. Did something occur in 1988 or before 1988 that resulted in a criminal prosecution in Louisville against Mr. Dickerson? A. Yes. Q. Did it involve acts of a sexual nature? A. Yes. Q. What if any part of those acts involved what the law calls sodomy  touching of his private areas with your private areas? A. (No response.) Q. These sexual acts, did they involve sodomy? A. Yes. Q. Do you understand what I mean by sodomy, the touching of your rear end, anus, with his private area or the touching of your frontal area with his mouth? A. Yes. Thus, L.A. was not asked and did not testify to any facts constituting the sexual offenses perpetrated against her other than that they involved sodomy. Specifically, she did not testify that Appellant licked her vagina, placed his penis against, but did not penetrate, her anus, or that he ejaculated on her anus. Although she testified to threats, she did not testify that Appellant threatened her with a gun (or even a machete or a sword) to induce her to accede to his wishes. Although she testified that her mother was either at work or asleep when the acts occurred, she did not testify as to where the acts occurred. KRE 404(b) first provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. (Emphasis added.) Thus, we have held that evidence of prior sexual misconduct is inadmissible if it proves only a lustful inclination. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky.1985). However, KRE 404(b)(1) permits the admission of such evidence [i]f offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. This list of other purpose[s] is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29 (Ky.1998). Here, the evidence was offered to prove the corpus delicti, i.e., that the offense, in fact, occurred, by demonstrating a modus operandi. We first discussed the degree of similarity necessary to demonstrate a modus operandi in the pre-Rules case of Adcock v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1986): In every case in which evidence of other crimes is sought to be introduced to establish a pattern or scheme, the real question is whether the method of the commission of the other crime or crimes is so similar and so unique as to indicate a reasonable probability that the crimes were committed by the same person. Id. at 443 (emphasis added). In Billings v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 890 (Ky.1992), we discussed at length the degree of similarity necessary to indicate a reasonable probability that sexual crimes were committed by the same person so as prove the corpus delicti by demonstrating a modus operandi. In the present case  as in many involving charges of sexual crimes  the ascendant issue is the corpus delicti  whether the event occurred at all. And on this issue is the application of the evidentiary rules most problematic. Unless the collateral act has some direct relationship to the charged act, the inference that the charged act occurred is necessarily founded on nothing more than the defendant's character and predisposition as revealed by the collateral act. In cases of this nature, we have long recognized that the degree of similarity between the charged and the uncharged acts is a critical factor in establishing a direct relationship independent of character. As the degree of similarity increases, and a modus operandi appears, inferences are more likely to be drawn from the events' common facts rather than their common criminality. .... The conclusion must be that two acts involving sexual crimes are not necessarily similar. ... [B]ad acts evidence offered to prove the corpus delicti by similarity should meet the same criteria as such evidence offered to prove identity by similarity  that is, it should indicate a modus operandi. .... While the issue of the corpus delicti is primary in these cases, identity of the perpetrator (if any) is not wholly irrelevant. It seems more accurate to say that the latter issue is assimilated into the former. If the act occurred, then the defendant almost certainly was the perpetrator. The two issues are essentially integrated. It is entirely appropriate, we believe, for purposes of assessing the admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes in the present context, to treat the evidence as if offered to prove identity by similarity, and to require that the details of the charged and uncharged acts be sufficiently similar as to demonstrate a modus operandi. Id. at 892-93 (footnote omitted). Thus, it is not the commonality of the crimes but the commonality of the facts constituting the crimes that demonstrates a modus operandi. Although it is not required that the facts be identical in all respects, evidence of other acts of sexual deviance ... must be so similar to the crime on trial as to constitute a so-called signature crime. Rearick v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Ky.1993). Mere evidence that Appellant had previously sodomized C.B. and L.A. proved only a commonality of the crimes and established only Appellant's lustful inclination toward sodomizing females of that age group. No facts were introduced to describe the nature of the acts of sodomy that Appellant perpetrated against C.B. or L.A.  only the conclusory testimony that whatever he did was sodomy. While there was evidence that he sodomized C.B. in the bedroom while her mother was at work, there was no evidence that he threatened her with bodily harm if she did not accede to his advances. While there was evidence that he threatened to harm L.A. and that the sexual abuse sometimes occurred when her mother was at work (but also sometimes when her mother was asleep at home), there was no evidence indicating where the sodomy occurred and no evidence that Appellant used a firearm. Reiterating that the facts need not be identical in all respects, there was an insufficient commonality of facts in these cases to prove a signature crime demonstrating a modus operandi in order to prove that Appellant committed the present offense. This is not to say that there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of sodomizing A.H. A.H.'s testimony alone was sufficient to support his conviction. Nor are we saying that the Commonwealth could not present more detailed evidence of Appellant's prior sexual misconduct upon retrial that would meet the standard established by Adcock , Billings , and Rearick . We hold only that the evidence presented at the March 2003 trial was insufficient to prove a modus operandi and, thus, proved only Appellant's lustful inclination, requiring reversal for a new trial.