Opinion ID: 1533050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: -Merits-

Text: Appellant's assignments of error can best be understood after brief summary of the testimony offered in this case. On April 2, 1976, appellant, Stanley Brown, and his accomplice, Harvey Tabron, agreed to obtain money by robbing an insurance agent working in the neighborhood. Appellant armed himself with a manriki (a two and one half foot chain used as a weapon in the martial arts) and Tabron was armed with a .22 caliber handgun. At approximately 12 noon, John Gallen, an employee of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, was inspecting houses in the 2800 block of Bonsall Street in the City of Philadelphia. Laboring under the mistaken belief that Mr. Gallen was an insurance agent, appellant and Tabron approached him and demanded money. They took from him a camera, two boxes of film, pictures, $16.00 in currency and a wristwatch. They then proceeded to West Sergeant Street. At approximately 1 p.m. on the same day, the decedent, Carmen Falanga, an insurance agent, was collecting debits in the 2400 block of West Sergeant Street. As Mr. Falanga was entering his automobile, appellant grabbed him by the neck with the manriki and pushed him towards Tabron who had a gun drawn. The decedent began to struggle with appellant and drew a gun. The victim fired a shot at Tabron whereupon Tabron returned the fire, striking and killing the decedent. Appellant complains that the testimony relating to the robbery of John Gallen was improperly introduced at his trial. He argues that this testimony was not only irrelevant but also highly prejudicial. `It is a fundamental precept of the common law that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of the defendant's prior criminal conduct as substantive evidence of his guilt of the present charge. It has been succinctly stated that the purpose of this rule is to prevent the conviction of an accused for one crime by the use of evidence that he has committed other unrelated crimes, and to preclude the inference that because he has committed other crimes he was more likely to commit the crime for which he is being tried. The presumed effect of such evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to believe the accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence' . . . . Commonwealth v. Spruill, 480 Pa. 601, 606, 391 A.2d 1048, 1049-50 (1978) quoting Commonwealth v. Terry, 462 Pa. 595, 599-600, 342 A.2d 92, 94-95 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. Clark, 453 Pa. 449, 309 A.2d 589 (1973). However, where the evidence is relevant, the mere fact that testimony of another crime may be prejudicial will not prevent its introduction into evidence. Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464 Pa. 573, 347 A.2d 690 (1973). Thus, evidence of other crimes has been admitted where that evidence tends to prove motive or intent, Commonwealth v. Terry, 462 Pa. 595, 600, 342 A.2d 92 (1975), absence of mistake or accident, Commonwealth v. Peterson, 453 Pa. 187, 197-8, 307 A.2d 264, 269 (1973), common scheme, plan or design (embracing commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to prove the others) Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 82, 114 A.2d 334, 336-337 (1955), and to establish the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial, Commonwealth v. Rose, 483 Pa. 382, 396 A.2d 1221, 1230 (1979). Although it is the prejudicial nature of this evidence that prevents it from being harmless error, Commonwealth v. Spruill, supra [evidence of prior criminal activity . . . is probably only equalled by a confession in its prejudicial impact upon a jury, 480 Pa. at 606, 391 A.2d at 1050-51], when introduced in a trial, its relevancy to the proceeding in question determines its competency. In the instant case, the relevancy of the robbery of John Gallen was readily apparent. The two crimes were committed within a period of approximately one hour and within a few blocks of each other. The appellant was armed in both instances with the same relatively unique weapon. In both instances, the manner of the attacks upon the respective victims was similar. The proceeds of the earlier robbery, i. e., the camera, was found at the scene of the crime in question. Finally, the same individuals participated in both crimes and both instances resulted from the same criminal design. Under these facts, a challenge to the relevancy of the testimony relating to the initial robbery is obviously without substance. Here, there were several legitimate [bases] for the introduction of the evidence other than a mere attempt to establish the accused's predisposition to commit the crime charged. Commonwealth v. Spruill, 480 Pa. at 606, 391 A.2d at 1050. Appellant would next have us find prosecutorial misconduct from statements made by the prosecutor during the course of his closing speech to the jury. The primary guideline in assessing a claim of error of this nature is to determine whether the unavoidable effect of the contested comments was to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility towards the accused so as to hinder an objective weighing of the evidence and impede the rendering of a true verdict. Commonwealth v. McNeal, 456 Pa. 394, 319 A.2d 669 (1974); Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, 483 Pa. 576, 397 A.2d 1173 (1979). In making such a judgment, we must not lose sight of the fact that the trial is an adversary proceeding, Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, E.C. 7-19  7-39, and the prosecution, like the defense, must be accorded reasonable latitude in fairly presenting its version of the case to the jury. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 464 Pa. 138, 346 A.2d 59 (1975). Nevertheless, we do require that the contentions advanced must be confined to the evidence and the legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom. Commonwealth v. Revty, 448 Pa. 512, 295 A.2d 300 (1972). Deliberate attempts to destroy the objectivity and impartiality of the finder of fact so as to cause the verdict to be a product of the emotion rather than reflective judgment will not be tolerated. Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978). The verdict must flow from the respective strengths and weaknesses of the evidence presented and not represent a response to inflammatory pleas for either leniency or vengeance. Commonwealth v. Starks, 479 Pa. 51, 387 A.2d 829 (1978). Where an improper remark is made by the prosecutor, the ultimate test as to whether a reversal of the judgment of sentence is required must depend upon a finding of the reasonable impact of the statement on the jury's factfinding function. Where the remarks are of a nature that would seriously threaten the jury's objectivity and is likely to deprive an accused of a fair trial, curative instructions are inadequate and a trial before another jury is required. Commonwealth v. Williams, 470 Pa. 172, 179 n. 4, 368 A.2d 249, 252 n. 4 (1977). Cf., Commonwealth v. Singletary, 478 Pa. 610, 387 A.2d 656 (1978); Commonwealth v. Garrison, 459 Pa. 664, 669, 331 A.2d 186 (1975); Commonwealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205, 218, 307 A.2d 229 (1973). With these general principles in mind, we will turn to the specific statements that are under attack in this appeal. The prosecuting attorney began his closing statement as follows: Prosecutor: Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury: Before I start my remarks to you I think it would be noteworthy to note that alongside our system of justice it is the type of system that we have  a person is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty. Alongside of that system is a system called the adversary system: that is, one side takes one view and the other takes another. Each trial starts from an adversary position. In this case, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you would not be here if the defendant stood up before the Bar of the Court and said  I am guilty. You would not be here if his attorney stood up in his stead and said  My client is guilty. We start with that basic premise, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. I would say that also [defense counsel] has been an Assistant District Attorney, every client that he has ever represented has stood  Defense Counsel: Objection, Your Honor. The Court: Noted on the record. Prosecutor: He stood before twelve people such as yourself and made the same kind of an appeal  Defense Counsel: Objection, Your Honor. The Court: Noted on the record. Appellant observes that this argument was factually in error because trial counsel had never served as an Assistant District Attorney. Moreover, appellant urges that this misstatement of fact may have confused the jury as to defense counsel's role in this particular case. Appellant charges in his brief: This comment could only serve to have the jury believe that [defense counsel] engages in some type of game when it comes to representing clients in criminal matters. There is nothing in this record to show that this was a deliberate misstatement of fact. Concededly, the comment was gratuitous and of no particular relevance to this lawsuit and was, therefore, ill advised. However, we do not believe that it could have reasonably produced the effect that appellant now seeks to attribute to it. The fact that an attorney at one point in his career has served in the office of the prosecutor does not impugn his integrity or question his sincerity where he is subsequently acting in the capacity of an attorney for the defendant. [4] The other portion of the closing statement which has come under attack appears in the record as follows: Prosecutor: . . . Harvey Tabron is facing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment  mandatory  that means no choice. What is his interest? And I think, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, if you look at the facts of this particular case, Stanley Brown provided you with the answer  We are good friends. He was there along with me. I don't know why he would say I helped him rob two people, and in the second robbery killed another. I will tell you why  because it is the truth. For no other reason  can you get out of Harvey Tabron walking before you, and taking the stand under oath, and destroying any hope for appeal. He testified  I did it. He not only testified here he did it, but he testified at a prior hearing, a habeas corpus proceeding, where he said  I did it. Stanley Brown helped me. The defense tells you it looks beyond that. The defense tells you he was beaten. He told you on direct examination  Question: Were you beaten? Answer: Not exactly. Question: Were you threatened? Answer: Not exactly. Question: Did you in fact shoot Carmen Falanga? Answer: Yes. Question: Did Stanley Brown help you? Answer: Yes. Question: Whose idea was it to rob the insurance man? Answer: Stanley Brown.       Stanley Brown tells you  I don't know why he said I did it. I was at a party. The defense then tells you, Ladies and Gentlemen, there was a party going on  but who does it present? It presents a Mr. Hill, who  try as hard as I might to pin him down as to time or to location  we could not get an answer out of him. He was so wound up and so oriented to give us a story  a rehearsed kind of story  he didn't want to differentiate. But the defense tells you that  We produced the defendant and his friend. The defendant told you what he already told you before  I am not guilty until you say I am. If you look at everything he said  what did he say? He made an attempt, after twelve members of the community, listening to the same evidence and facts, said  Harvey Tabron, you are guilty  Defense Counsel: Objection, Your Honor, ask for a mistrial. The Court: We will take it up later and  Defense Counsel: Highly irregular to tell the jury the  No argument at this point. Prosecutor: But the defendant, Stanley Brown comes before you and tells you They were wrong. He was not there, just like I was not there. What does he say to support that? I ask you the same question  Where are the other people? Appellant charges that the prosecutor misstated the legal position of the witness, Tabron, in an effort to bolster his credibility before the jury. He points to the fact that an individual who has been convicted of a crime and who has testified against a co-conspirator may still have appellate rights. Appellant is correct in his assertion that the witness, Tabron, may conceivably have appellate remedies still available to him. The essence of this argument is that the prosecution used a misstatement of fact to give this evidence unwarranted credence. Although the prosecutor's statement was technically inaccurate, in that it did not exclude all possibilities, there is no showing that there was a deliberate intent to mislead. Moreover, the effect of this argument was no more than to highlight the fact that the witness's statement was against his own penal interest. This in fact was the case. [5] Since the defense had vigorously attacked the credibility of this witness, the argument was not only relevant but appropriate. [6] The next objection to be considered is the relevance of the testimony of Calvin Lesster. Mr. Lesster identified a chain that was found at the scene of the killing as a manriki, a device that is utilized by the Japanese to disarm and apprehend individuals. After establishing his proficiency in the use of this particular weapon, Mr. Lesster attempted to demonstrate to the jury how a manriki is used. The demonstration was cut short by the court who stated, Stop it. Now, cut this charade and this nonsense out. I don't know if he is proficient or not. Suppose it hit [sic] somebody here. I don't want anymore of this nonsense going on . . . . If you want to ask him about demonstration, he can demonstrate without putting anybody's life in danger here. Appellant argues that the testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial and requires the granting of a new trial. Evidence which tends to establish a material fact in the case or which tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, is relevant. Commonwealth v. Scott, 480 Pa. 50, 54, 389 A.2d 79 (1978). Any analysis of the admissibility of a particular type of evidence must start with a threshold inquiry as to its relevance and probative value. Commonwealth v. Jones, 459 Pa. 62, 66, 327 A.2d 10, 13 (1974); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 388, 292 A.2d 286, 289 (1972). We have cited with approval the test for relevance propounded by two leading evidentiary authorities, Wigmore and McCormick, Commonwealth v. Jones, supra ; Commonwealth v. Lippert, 454 Pa. 381, 384, 311 A.2d 586, 587 (1973); Commonwealth v. McCusker, supra . Wigmore defines relevance in the terms of two axioms, None but facts having rational probative value are admissible, and, All facts having rational probative value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 9-10 at 289-95 (3rd Ed. 1940). McCormick suggests the following for determining relevance, . . . [d]oes the evidence offered render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence? . . . Relevant evidence then, is evidence that in some degree advances the inquiry, and thus has probative value, it is prima facie admissible. McCormick, Evidence § 185 at 437-38 (2nd Ed. 1972). Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 218, 360 A.2d 914, 918 (1976). Applying these principles to the facts of the case at hand, it is apparent that Mr. Lesster's testimony was relevant. Evidence had been introduced at trial that a long chain had been found near the body of the deceased. The testimony of the witness, Lesster, described not only the purpose for which this chain is normally used, but also corroborates the testimony of Tabron as to its use in this particular case. Furthermore, any prejudice that may have been engendered by the introduction of this evidence was immediately cured by the trial court's wise decision to prevent a further demonstration of the use of this object. We therefore conclude that the testimony was relevant and that any undue prejudice which may have been inspired by this evidence was prevented by the prompt action of the court. The final claim to be considered is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pre-trial motion to suppress the identification testimony. Specifically, appellant charges that trial counsel should have made an effort pre-trial to exclude the identification testimony of Tyrone Parks, Bruce Ballard and Tanya Harmon. These witnesses testified at trial that they had observed the defendant wearing a salt and pepper colored jacket in the immediate vicinity of the killing, shortly before the incident. They further testified that after hearing shots, they ran to their doors and saw the decedent lying in the street and a man in a salt and pepper colored jacket running from the scene. Appellant argues that trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress because his cross examination cast substantial doubt on their identifications. This argument is based on excerpts from the cross examination which might suggest that they merely assumed that the individual they saw fleeing from the scene was the appellant because he was wearing the same coat they had observed previously. A fair reading of the entire record reveals that each of the three eyewitnesses observed appellant's face while he was in the immediate vicinity minutes before the murder. After hearing the shots, they immediately looked out of their doors and saw defendant in flight. While not observing appellant's full face, Parks and Ballard drew their conclusions from the clothes worn by the fleeing man. In view of the proximity of time and space between the point where the witnesses had originally observed the defendant and the time they saw the individual fleeing from the scene it cannot be said, as appellant attempts to suggest, that this identification was pure conjecture. The witness, Harmon, observed the side of appellant's face as he was leaving the scene and, because of previous and subsequent confrontations, was certain that the individual fleeing was the appellant. The mere fact that the defense counsel's cross examination may have provided some basis for the jury to question the validity of the identification by these witnesses, did not provide a basis for suggesting that there was any reason why this testimony was inadmissible and, therefore, subject to a motion to suppress. The record is devoid of any instance of improper conduct on behalf of the police in obtaining this identification testimony. An officer from the police graphics art unit testified that on the day of the murder, he drew a sketch of the appellant based solely upon the description provided by Parks and later modified this sketch based on Ballard's description. He testified that he did not provide any information to either witness. Another detective testified that he drove Parks and Harmon to the Detention Center where they individually identified appellant during separate lineups. That officer testified that he did not inform either witness that appellant would appear in the lineup nor did he have any other conversations with them concerning their identification. Interestingly, the appellant in this appeal does not challenge the lineup identifications but rather hints at the possibility of suggestiveness from a statement made during the course of the cross examination of Tyrone Parks. Question: (By defense counsel). When you came out of your house and you say the man in the grey coat running, you never saw his face, did you? Answer: No, I did not. Question: So you don't know whether or not this man was the same man that was standing at 24th and Huntingdon, or whether or not he was the same man that was on the same street when you were walking to the store? Answer: No. Question: Your answer is no, is that correct? Answer: Yes. But when I got a description, I knew. Question: You mean that somebody gave you a description? Answer: That's right, somebody gave me a description. It is upon this vague reference to the possibility of hearsay information that the appellant presently predicates his claim of a suggestive identification. It is to be noted that at no point in the record is any further explanation given as to the source of this hearsay information. Moreover, the record is uncontradicted that the information was not received from police sources. There is no evidence of impropriety on the part of the government in this case. It is more likely that this statement of Parks referred to some information that may have been transmitted to him when he was standing in the presence of neighbors at the scene after the shooting. While this complaint may go to the weight to be given to his conclusion that the man fleeing was in fact the person he had seen earlier, it certainly does not provide a basis for suppression. Most importantly, it is clear from the evidence that each of these witnesses had an ample opportunity to observe the defendant prior to the shooting. Their ability from this observation to describe the appellant was confirmed by the description given to police officials by them and the fact that the two of them had no difficulty in selecting the appellant in separate lineups. Thus, the only avenue available for the attack by the defense was the validity of their respective judgment that the person they saw fleeing after the shooting was in fact the person who they had seen earlier and identified as being the appellant. This area was fully explored by artful cross examination conducted by trial counsel. Further, judgment as to the weight of this testimony was properly left to the jury. We, therefore, can find no basis for a claim of ineffective assistance on the part of defense counsel for failing to attempt to exclude testimony where there was no meritorious or even arguable claim that would support such a motion. See Commonwealth v. Musi, 486 Pa. 102, 112, 404 A.2d 378, 383 (1979) (and cases cited therein). Having examined all of appellant's contentions and finding them to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of sentence.