Opinion ID: 2817717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: John Does

Text: Invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the district court dismissed the John Doe defendants, ruling they were dispensable parties whose diverse citizenship had not been established. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Buckley v. Control Data Corp., 923 F.2d 96, 97-98 (8th Cir. 1991) (observing that under Rule 21, even appellate courts may dismiss dispensable, diversity-destroying parties). The district court reasoned “Lee’s bare allegation[] that none of the John Doe defendants are believed to be citizens of the State of Arkansas is purely speculative” and solely relies on an “affidavit of Lee’s counsel . . . which is itself speculative.” Lee contends he “is not required to allege citizenship of nominal John Doe defendants in a 28 U.S.C. § 1332 diversity action” because 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) requires that we ignore the citizenship of “defendants sued under fictitious names” in removal cases. Lee believes “[i]t would make no legal sense for a plaintiff in a § 1332 case to be treated differently than a party in a case involving Doe defendants under § 1441.” “For almost two centuries the diversity statute has been interpreted to require ‘complete’ diversity of citizenship,” Howell by Goerdt v. Tribune Entm’t Co., 106 F.3d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)), a crucial prerequisite which every plaintiff seeking diversity jurisdiction has the burden of alleging and eventually proving, see Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010). Given this burden, “[t]he general rule . . . has been that, on challenge, the diverse citizenship of the fictitious defendants must be established by the plaintiff defendant in the original complaint, such pleadings must still meet the requirements of Rule 15(c).” Berryhill v. Synatzske, 432 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Ark. 2014) (discussing Rule 15(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which is equivalent to Rule 15(c) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Assuming “the John Doe statute were to apply in this case,” the statute of limitations still bars Lee’s claim, even in Arkansas state court, because he “failed to comply with the strictures of Rule 15 so as to permit the amended complaint to relate back to the time of the filing of the first complaint.” Stephens v. Petrino, 86 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Ark. 2002). -7- in order to continue a federal court action.” 13F Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3642 (3d ed. 2009). Lee looks to equate removed and original federal cases in their treatment of John Does, but just because a plaintiff cannot protect his state action from federal jurisdiction by inserting a fictitious non-diverse John Doe, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1), does not mean a plaintiff seeking federal court can ignore the strictures of diversity jurisdiction, see id. § 1332(a) (omitting language with regard to ignoring fictitious defendants). Lee inadvertently avoids this jurisdictional quandary and satisfies diversity by failing to levy a single claim against a John Doe defendant. In Lee’s amended complaint, the John Does are mentioned precisely twice, and in both instances the complaint states only that the John Does “are persons or corporations or other entities whose identity and whereabouts are unknown at the time of filing this Complaint. None of the John Doe defendants are believed to be citizens of Arkansas.” The John Does are obviously fictional placeholders, and because Lee raises no claim against them, their presence in the complaint is also nominal and, as such, cannot affect diversity jurisdiction. See Midwestern Indem. Co. v. Brooks, 779 F.3d 540, 544 (8th Cir. 2015); Howell, 106 F.3d at 218 (concluding diversity is unaffected where John Does are nominal parties). For the same reason—there being no claim against them—the John Does are irrelevant to the merits of Lee’s case, and they therefore were properly dismissed, without prejudice, with the remainder of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The complaint must allege facts, which, when taken as true, raise more than a speculative right to relief.”); accord, e.g., Moore v. Gen. Motors Pension Plans, 91 F.3d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (ignoring the citizenship of nominal John Does for diversity jurisdiction because no claims were raised against them and dismissing them with the remainder of the case where the claims against the named parties were meritless). -8-