Opinion ID: 400065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Time Claimed For Work On The Case-In-Chief

Text: 54 The EDF Motion claims a total of 837.4 hours for the three attorneys who were assigned to and worked on the litigation in EDF v. EPA, broken down as follows: 55 Category of Legal Work Hours 56 W. Butler J. Warren D. Lennett Analysis of Final Regulation; Identification of Issues for Judicial Review; and Preparation of Petition for Review 42 Preparation of Motion to Defer Filing of Appendix; Review of Motions for Leave to Intervene and Consideration of Response 12 Preparation of Response to ALCOA Motion for Stay of Proceedings 7 Analysis of Record; Preparation of EDF Brief 226 Preparation of EDF Reply Brief; Preparation of Joint Appendix; and Preparation for Oral Argument 330 Monitoring of Post-Decision Petitions for Rehearing 16 Preparation for and Attendance at Negotiations w/Respondent and Industry Regarding Stay of Decision Pending Further Rulemaking; Participation in Joint Petitions for Stay of Mandate 174.4 Preparation of Materials to Request Attorneys' Fees 30 ----- --- -- TOTAL 190.4 617 30 57 See EDF Motion, EDF Supplementary Motion and EDF Reply. In an Affidavit of Jacqueline M. Warren, accompanying the EDF Motion, it is indicated that Ms. Warren was a senior staff attorney at EDF, where she worked from June of 1973 until November of 1980. She graduated from Smith College in 1963 and from George Washington University National Law Center in 1972, where she ranked third in her class. At EDF, she was the principal staff attorney for the Toxic Chemicals Program, and participated in many administrative and judicial proceedings concerning toxic chemicals. Id. at 1, 7-8. 58 William A. Butler was General Counsel of EDF when he participated in this case. He obtained a B.A. degree from Stanford University in 1963, a Master's degree from Oxford University in 1965, a J.D. degree from Yale University in 1969 and a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1971. Mr. Butler was employed at EDF from 1970 until 1981 and, during that time, he initiated, prepared and ultimately supervised the considerable amount of environmental litigation undertaken by EDF in federal district court and in courts of appeals. Id. at 9. 59 David J. Lennett graduated from George Washington University National Law Center in 1979, and has been employed as a staff counsel at EDF ever since then. Prior to his graduation, Mr. Lennett worked part time at EDF and assisted with environmental litigation. Following graduation, he became the principal EDF attorney on hazardous waste matters. Id. at 10. 60 In the extensive descriptions of the work performed by these three EDF attorneys, their hours on EDF v. EPA are broken down as follows: 61 NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE TABLE 62 See EDF Motion (Memorandum of Points) at 4, EDF Supplementary Motion, and EDF Reply. The EDF Supplementary Motion (which contains a lengthy document entitled Supplementary Declarations In Support of Petitioner EDF's Motion For Attorneys' Fees) sets forth in great detail the attorneys' time logs and narrative descriptions of all legal work done by each attorney. 63 Following the guidelines set forth in Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc), discussed infra in section III-B, EDF has made the following claim for attorneys' fees: 64 Attorney Experience Hours Rate/Hr. Total -------------------------------------------------------------- William A. Butler 11 yrs. 190.4 $110 $ 20,944.00 Jacqueline M. Warren 9 yrs. 617 $ 90 $ 55,530.00 David J. Lennett 2 yrs. 30 $ 55 $ 1,650.00 ----------- Lodestar = $ 78,124.00 Lodestar Amplification = $156,248.00 B. The Decision In Copeland v. Marshall 65 In submitting a claim of $156,248.00 for attorneys' fees for work done on the case in chief, EDF relies heavily on the decision in Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc). 5 Under Copeland, the attorneys' fee is computed by first determining the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The lodestar fee may then be adjusted up or down to reflect the quality of representation and the contingent nature of success. Id. at 891-94. 66 As to the factor of hours reasonably expended, Copeland states that: 67 Compiling raw totals of hours spent ... does not complete the inquiry. It does not follow that the amount of time actually expended is the amount of time reasonably expended .... Thus, no compensation is due for nonproductive time. For example, where three attorneys are present at a hearing when one would suffice, compensation should be denied for the excess time .... 68 .... 69 The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work .... (A) reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors(:) ... the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney's reputation, and the undesirability of the case. It follows that there may be more than one reasonable hourly rate for each of the attorneys, and for each of the kinds of work, involved in the litigation. 70 641 F.2d at 891-92 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 71 Concerning adjustments to the lodestar attributable to the contingent nature of success, 641 F.2d at 892, the decision in Copeland observes that: 72 Under statutes like Title VII, only the prevailing party is eligible for a court-awarded fee. An attorney contemplating representation of a Title VII plaintiff must recognize that no fee will be forthcoming unless the litigation is successful. An adjustment in the lodestar, therefore, may be appropriate to compensate for the risk that the lawsuit would be unsuccessful and that no fee at all would be obtained. 73 It is important to recognize that the contingency adjustment is designed solely to compensate for the possibility at the outset that the litigation would be unsuccessful and that no fee would be obtained. 74 641 F.2d at 892-93. Since, as has already been indicated, attorneys' fees may be awarded to prevailing, substantially prevailing or non-prevailing parties under TSCA, this portion of the contingent nature of success factor discussed in Copeland is irrelevant in this case. 75 The court in Copeland also included a factor of delay under the heading of contingent nature of success. On this point, Copeland states: 76 The delay in receipt of payment for services rendered is an additional factor that may be incorporated into a contingency adjustment. The hourly rates used in the lodestar represent the prevailing rate for clients who typically pay their bills promptly. Court-awarded fees normally are received long after the legal services are rendered. That delay can present cash-flow problems for the attorneys. In any event, payment today for services rendered long in the past deprives the eventual recipient of the value of the use of the money in the meantime, which use, particularly in an inflationary era, is valuable. A percentage adjustment to reflect the delay in receipt of payment therefore may be appropriate. 77 Id. at 893. 78 Finally, regarding adjustments to the lodestar for quality of representation, Copeland holds that: 79 A quality adjustment is appropriate only when the representation is unusually good or bad, taking into account the level of skill normally expected of an attorney commanding the hourly rate used to compute the lodestar. In other words, 80 the court must recognize that a consideration of quality inheres in the lodestar award: counsel who possess or who are reputed to possess more experience, knowledge and legal talent generally command hour rates superior to those who are less endowed. Thus, the quality of an attorney's work in general is a component of the reasonabl(e) hourly rate; this aspect of quality is reflected in the lodestar and should not be utilized to augment or diminish the basic award under the rubric of the quality of an attorney's work. 81 Lindy I, then permits an adjustment to the lodestar-up or down-based on the all-around performance of counsel in the specific case: Any increase or decrease in fees to adjust for the quality of work is designed to take account of an unusual degree of skill, be it unusually poor or unusually good. 487 F.2d at 168.... 82 Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117-18 (emphasis in original). 83 Until now the calculations have entirely ignored the results of the litigation. Success was a threshold inquiry relevant to the entitlement vel non to a fee, but the amount or nature of recovery was not considered in setting the lodestar. These latter factors should be considered now, under the rubric of quality of representation. 84 Where exceptional results are obtained-taking into account the hourly rate commanded and number of hours expended-an increase in fee is justifiable.... 85 Quality adjustments may be upward or downward. Thus, if a high-priced attorney performs in a competent but undistinguished manner, a decrease in the lodestar may be necessary under the quality of representation rubric because the hourly rate used to calculate the lodestar proved to be overly generous. 86 641 F.2d at 893-94. 87 In considering the relevance of Copeland, there is one point that must be emphasized. As noted above, Copeland involved a claim for fees under Title VII, a statute under which the prevailing party may seek a reasonable attorney's fee as a part of costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). TSCA, on the other hand, allows for reasonable attorneys' fees if the court determines such an award is appropriate. 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d). The legislative history of this provision indicates that the attorneys' fee provision in TSCA is not restricted to ... successful parties, and that an award of attorneys' fees may be appropriate where such award is in the public interest without regard to the outcome of the litigation. Legislative History at 728-29. Thus, while success in litigation may be a factor in determining whether an adjustment to the lodestar is due, it is not determinative of the question of whether any fee is due. Excluding this point, we believe that Copeland is a controlling precedent that must be followed in this case. 88 C. EPA's Opposition To The Claim For Attorneys' Fees 89 As noted at the outset of this opinion, EPA principally argues that EDF's claim should be strictly scrutinized, that the estimated lodestar fee is exaggerated, and that no upward adjustment to the lodestar is warranted. There is no serious claim that EDF is not entitled to some amount of attorneys' fees. 90 Specifically, EPA has raised the following issues: 91 (1) (A) substantial portion of Ms. Warren's hours must be deemed as  unproductive time because it was devoted to pursuit of 2 of 4 claims upon which EDF did not prevail. EPA Response at 14. 92 (2) Ms. Warren's and Mr. Butler's hours should be discounted because portions of both were devoted to EDF efforts relating to issues raised by the industry intervenors. Id. 93 (3) EPA should not be taxed with attorneys' fees relating to post-decision negotiations. Id. at 17. 94 (4) Should the Court disagree that Mr. Butler's hours for participating in settlement negotiations be entirely disallowed, it should still substantially reduce the total of these 176 hours as being unnecessary to a fair pursuit of the matter. Id. at 18. 95 As an alternative proposal to EDF's claim on hours, EPA suggests that the following time should be excluded from the lodestar: 96