Opinion ID: 770527
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Abrogation Exception

Text: 28
29 As a preliminary matter, we note that Popovich's claim arises under Title II, Part A, of the ADA. Title II, Part B, of the ADA governs public transportation, and we have not had occasion to consider the provisions of Part B in this case. We intend our references to the ADA in this opinion to refer solely to Title II, Part A, of the ADA. 30 To determine whether Congress validly abrogated State immunity under Title II of the ADA, we must resolve two issues: (1) whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity; and (2) if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel v. Florida Bd. OfRegents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640 (2000). As to the first question--whether Congress unequivocally stated its intent to abrogate the immunity under Title II--there is no question that it did. See Nelson, 170 F.3d at 647 n.6. In 42 U.S.C. § 12202, Congress expressly stated: A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of the ADA. Id. In addition, Title II's substantive requirements govern the conduct of any public entity, defined to include any State or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) (emphasis added). 31
32 The second prong of the abrogation exception--whether, in abrogating the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority--is more complicated. We recently explained that this prong involves two inquiries: (1) whether Title II of the ADA was 'passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate'; and (2) whether the substantive provisions of the ADA are a valid exercise of Congress's [enforcement] power under the relevant constitutional provision. Nelson, 170 F.3d at 648 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59). The Supreme Court has made clear that the Commerce Clause is not a source of authority for Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. However, the Court has said that Congress does derive such authority from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 59. The Amendment provides, in relevant part: 33 Section 1. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 34 . . . . 35 Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 36 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. Congress invoked Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as one of its sources of authority in enacting the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). Thus, Title II was passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate. Nelson, 170 F.3d at 648. 37 The current debate over Eleventh Amendment immunity focuses not on the source of Congress's abrogation authority, but the scope of that authority. See id. Over the past three years, the Supreme Court has addressed the scope of Congress's enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment on several occasions. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. 631; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). This jurisprudence guides our analysis, and we pause to summarize its most salient features. 38 Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644. On the other hand, authority to determine 'what constitutes a constitutional violation' resides solely with the courts--not with Congress. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 519). In other words, Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. The Court has acknowledged that this simple distinction is not easy to apply. [T]he determination whether purportedly prophylactic legislation constitutes appropriate remedial legislation, or instead effects a substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue, is often difficult. The line between the two is a fine one, and Congress has 'wide latitude' in deciphering that line. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644 (citations omitted). To aid courts in this delicate analysis, the Supreme Court has adopted the following principle: Congress properly exercises its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority where there is 'a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.' Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520). 39 Two recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the application of the congruence and proportionality test. The Court first adopted the test in City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. There the Court held that Congress exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The RFRA prohibited governments, including States, from 'substantially burden[ing]' a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden '(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.' Id. at 515-16 (citations omitted). The proponents of the RFRA argued that the statute's focus on the effects of a challenged ordinance, rather than deliberate or overt discrimination, fell within Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent and remedy constitutional violations. Id. at 517. 40 In applying the congruence and proportionality test, the Court looked to the legislative history for evidence of conduct violating the Fourteenth Amendment--in other words, evidence of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. Id. at 530. The RFRA's legislative history is devoid of such evidence. In fact, the legislative history indicates that Congress' concern was with the incidental burdens imposed, rather than the object or purpose of the [challenged] legislation. Id. at 531. The lack of evidence of a constitutional violation, however, was not the RFRA's most serious shortcoming. Id. The Court concluded: 41 RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections. Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws [or conduct] may be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws [or conduct] affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional. . . . 42 RFRA is not so confined. 43 Id. at 532. 44 While Popovich's case was pending, the Supreme Court extended its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in Kimel, 120 S. Ct. 631, a case that is analogous in many respects to this case. In Kimel, several groups of plaintiffs filed suit against their State employers claiming protection under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). After finding that Congress had unequivocally expressed its intention to apply the ADEA to the States, the Court proceeded to apply the congruence and proportionality test and held that Congress exceeded its authority to abrogateEleventh Amendment immunity in applying the ADEA to the States. Id. at 637. 45 The Court began its analysis by observing that age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 646. Thus, a State may discriminate on the basis of age if age is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. This, of course, is a fairly low hurdle to clear. The Court 'will not overturn [government conduct] unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government's] actions were irrational.' Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)). It makes no difference that age is an imperfect proxy for characteristics relevant to the State's legitimate interests. Id. The Constitution permits States to draw lines on the basis of age when they have a rational basis for doing so at a class-based level, even if it 'is probably not true' that those reasons are valid in the majority of cases. Id. at 647. 46 The Court then evaluated the substantive provisions of the ADEA against the backdrop of the Fourteenth Amendment requirements. The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of age, with only a few narrow exceptions. The Court found that the law, through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard. Id. The Court also rejected the petitioners' reliance on the statutory exceptions under the ADEA, reasoning that even with those exceptions the law restricted the States' conduct far more than the rational basis test. Id. For example, the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception imposed a burden on the employer to prove reasonable necessity for using an age classification, which the Court described as a far cry from the rational basis standard we apply to age discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The Court concluded that the ADEA was 'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.' Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). 47 The Court also recognized Congress's power to enact prophylactic legislation. Id. at 648. The Court held, however, that the ADEA was not properly characterized as remedial because Congress did not have evidence of a significant problem of constitutional dimension requiring prophylactic legislation. Id. at 648-49. As it had in City of Boerne, the Court relied on the legislative history as a means to evaluate whether a significant evil justified Congress's strong remedial measures. Id. at 648; see also Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207-11. 48 Our examination of the ADEA's legislative record confirms that Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem. Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation. The evidence compiled by petitioners to demonstrate such attention by Congress to age discrimination by the States falls well short of the mark. That evidence consists almost entirely of isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports. 49 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 648-49. The Court rejected the petitioners' reliance on Congress's findings of age discrimination in the private sector, reiterating Congress's failure to identify a widespread pattern of age discrimination by the States. Id. at 649. The Court concluded: 50 In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread andunconstitutional age discrimination by the States, we hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 51 Id. at 650.