Opinion ID: 2630898
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hi-Voltage and Our Construction of Section 31

Text: In 2000, this court considered the validity of a program adopted by the City of San Jose to encourage the participation of minority-owned business enterprises and women-owned business enterprises in public works projects. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 542.) Contractors bidding for city projects were required to fulfill either an outreach or a participation component, and the plaintiffs argued that the program's requirements violated section 31. ( Hi-Voltage, at pp. 543-544.) We agreed, concluding the program's outreach option affords preferential treatment to [minority-/women-owned business enterprise] subcontractors on the basis of race or sex, and the participation option discriminates on the same bases against non-[minority-/women-owned business enterprise] subcontractors as well as general contractors that fail to fulfill either of the options when submitting their bids. ( Id. at p. 560, fn. omitted.) In reaching this conclusion, we reviewed the language of section 31 as well as the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 209. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 559-562.) We noted the measure's language was not limited in any way and effectively prohibited all race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs. ( Id. at pp. 559-560; id. at pp. 591-592 (conc. & dis. opn. of George, C. J.).) Turning to the ballot materials, we concluded the partisan statements and the Legislative Analyst's analysis provided further support for our construction. ( Id. at pp. 560-562.) In particular, we noted the proponents' statements focused on race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs and evinced a clear desire to ban all such programs. ( Id. at pp. 560-561.) This court ultimately concluded the electorate intended to do something more than restate existing law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or sex. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 561 [citing Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at p. 1489].) [18] That something more, the majority reasoned, was a repudiation of case law permitting race- and sex-conscious measures formulated to remediate the lingering effects of past discrimination or conspicuous imbalance in public contracting, employment, and education. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, at p. 566.) We accordingly held that, following the adoption of section 31,  any action that discriminates or grants preferential treatment on the basis of race or sex would be forbidden, including race- and sex-conscious measures that would otherwise be permitted by the equal protection clause. ( Hi-Voltage, at pp. 566-567.) Thus, the practical effect of section 31's ban of race- and sex-conscious measures is limited to just one category of legislation. It has no independent effect on legislation that cannot survive heightened scrutiny because such legislation already violates the Constitution. (See Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 561.) It also has no effect on legislation required by the Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2), when, for example, a public entity seeks to remedy its own past intentional discrimination ( Hi-Voltage, at p. 568). Consequently, section 31's only nonredundant effect is on race- and sex-conscious measures that are permitted, but not required, by the Constitution, i.e., legislation that, despite classifying on the basis of race or sex, can survive heightened scrutiny. For race-conscious programs to do so, they must be narrowly tailored and justified by a compelling interest. ( McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) 379 U.S. 184, 191-192 [13 L.Ed.2d 222, 85 S.Ct. 283].) Under the high court's decisions, this category of legislation has become increasingly narrow. For example, in public contracting, a race-conscious program must be narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past discrimination by the public entity itself or by private sector entities within its jurisdiction. ( Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. (1989) 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 [102 L.Ed.2d 854, 109 S.Ct. 706] ( Croson ).) The Supreme Court has rejected as insufficiently compelling the remedying of societal discrimination ( id. at p. 505) or the attainment of racial balance in an industry ( id. at p. 507). Similarly, in public employment, remedying the effects of past discrimination by the public entity is a compelling interest, while remedying societal discrimination is not. ( Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (1986) 476 U.S. 267, 274 [90 L.Ed.2d 260, 106 S.Ct. 1842] (plur. opn. of Powell, J.).) In the public education context, in addition to remedying the effects of past discrimination, the high court has found compelling the promotion of racial diversity in higher education. ( Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (2007) 551 U.S. 701, 720 [168 L.Ed.2d 508, 127 S.Ct. 2738]; Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) 539 U.S. 306, 325 [156 L.Ed.2d 304, 123 S.Ct. 2325].) Thus, the only real change section 31 makes to existing law is to close an already narrow, albeit significant, window of constitutionally permissible remedial legislation. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 568.)