Opinion ID: 169649
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce

Text: In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990), the Supreme Court revisited the MCFL exemption when it addressed the Michigan Chamber of Commerce's (the Chamber's) as-applied challenge to Michigan's Campaign Finance Act. Id. at 655, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Initially, the Supreme Court rejected a facial overbreadth challenge to the law on the grounds that it regulated closely held corporations that do not possess vast reservoirs of capital. Id. at 661, 110 S.Ct. 1391. The Court determined that although some closely held corporations may not have accumulated significant amounts of wealth, they receive from the State the special benefits conferred by the corporate structure and present the potential for distorting the political process, which justified the law's general applicability. Id. Additionally, the Court held that although the Chamber was a non-profit ideological corporation, it did not qualify as an MCFL corporation under the three factors. Id. at 662, 110 S.Ct. 1391. First, the Court held that although the Chamber engaged in political activities, its primary purposes involved business and economic issues in contrast to MCFL's primary political purpose. Id. Second, the Court observed that: Although the Chamber also lacks shareholders, many of its members may be similarly reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with the Chamber's political expression, because they wish to benefit from the Chamber's nonpolitical programs and to establish contacts with other members of the business community. Id. at 663, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Accordingly, the Court found that the Chamber's members are more similar to shareholders of a business corporation than to members of MCFL.  Id. Finally, the Court remarked that more than three-quarters of the Chamber's members are business corporations, whose political contributions and expenditures can constitutionally be regulated by the State. Id. at 664, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Consequently, recognizing the Chamber as an MCFL corporation would circumvent the purpose of Michigan's campaign finance law. The Secretary suggests that Austin supports his theory that the Court intends a bright constitutional line to exist between MCFL and non- MCFL entities. In fact, the Court's analysis suggests that the Chamber's challenge to Michigan's law failed because it was closer to a traditional corporation than a voluntary political association. Given CRLC's close resemblance to a voluntary political association, much like the one at issue in MCFL, we agree with the district court that CRLC's acceptance of de minimis contributions does not transform it into a potential conduit for corporate funding of political activity. 395 F.Supp.2d. at 1014 (quoting Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, 254 F.3d at 192).