Opinion ID: 1119388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alaska Statute 28.15.166(g) Prohibits an Inquiry into Whether the Accused Was Driving.

Text: The State argues that this court should construe subsection.166(g) in a way that would save its constitutionality and allow an inquiry into whether the arrestee actually drove. We believe that to do so would impermissibly rewrite the statute. The substance of the State's argument is two-fold: first, that the legislature did not intend the restricting language of subsection .166(g) to apply to revocation proceedings where the arrestee took and failed a breath test; second, and alternatively, that the reference in subsection .166(g) to the implied consent statutes, AS 28.33.031(a) and AS 28.35.031(a) and (g), requires an inquiry into whether such consent was actually given, which in turn might require an inquiry into whether the person actually drove. The first line of analysis offered by the State fails. The State cannot point to any evidence that the legislature intended the limitation not to apply when it amended the statute in 1983 to include failure of a breath test as grounds for license revocation. See ch. 77, § 3, SLA 1983. It boldly speculates that the legislature must have intended to alter this limitation and concludes that nothing other than mere inadvertence can explain the legislature's failure to require proof of this fact [that the person was the driver]. Yet even if this tenuous supposition is correct, we can find no textual basis for a reading which could allow an inquiry into whether a person drove. The statute is clear: the scope of the hearing is limited to (1) whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was DWI, and (2) whether the person either refused to take a breath test or took a breath test and failed it. AS 28.15.166(g). We cannot interpret an inquiry expressly limited by statute to the reasonableness of an officer's beliefs to include an examination of the objective truthfulness of the officer's conclusion. The State's second suggested reading fares no better. The suggestion is that the statute limits the scope of the hearing to whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was DWI and to whether the person refused to take a test authorized under the implied consent statutes or the person submitted to a test administered under the implied consent statutes. The statute might, then, be read in such a way as to include an inquiry into whether the implied consent statutes were actually triggered, i.e., whether the test given or refused was actually administered or authorized under those statutes. If a person who is not driving has not impliedly consented to such a test, then an inquiry into whether the test was authorized under the implied consent statutes could include in its scope whether the person was actually driving. We accept for purposes of this argument that, under the implied consent statutes, a person may be deemed to have consented to a test only by actually driving. [3] However, the State's argument fails in its interpretation of subsection .166(g) itself. The focus of subsection .166(g)(1)-(3) is clearly on the result of the test or the fact of refusal to take the test. Reading subsection .166(g)(1)-(3) to encompass an inquiry into the underlying facts that justify administration of the test would render the first part of subsection .166(g), regarding the issue of whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle, almost meaningless. The statute offers very precise limiting language for the issues that are to be considered. There is no reason to believe that the reference to the implied consent statutes is anything more than a descriptive tool used to identify the chemical test named in each instance. [4] Thus, we conclude that AS 28.15.166(g) cannot be interpreted constitutionally.