Opinion ID: 2162163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Restitution Amount Proportionate to Crime

Text: Benton argues that the amount of restitution ordered by the Superior Court should be evaluated by this Court as a fine. Based upon that premise, Benton contends that the $21,450.65 in restitution she was ordered to make was so disproportionate to the crimes for which she was convicted that it violated the prohibition against excessive fines in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Eighth Amendment provides: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. [22] The Excessive Fines Clause in the Eighth Amendment was taken verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. [23] When the Eighth Amendment was adopted the word `fine' was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense. [24] Accordingly, the Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind `as punishment for some offense.' [25] Until this week when it decided Bajakajian, the United States Supreme Court has only occasionally interpreted and never actually applied the Excessive Fines Clause. [26] In Bajakajian, for the first time in history, a fine was held to be excessive under the Eighth Amendment. [27] The majority and dissenting opinions in the 5-4 Bajakajian decision have provided timely guidance for this Court. The record reflects the order of restitution in Benton's case was neither punitive nor to be paid for the benefit of a sovereign. The purpose of the order of restitution was remedial and compensatory. It was intended to protect the innocent victim of Benton's criminal conduct from financial loss rather than to vindicate public justice. [28] Accordingly, we have concluded that the Superior Court's order of restitution was not a punitive fine at all and a fortiori was not imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [29] Alternatively, we will assume arguendo that the order of restitution in Benton's case did constitute punishment and was a fine within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Bajakajian, the majority concluded that [t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. [30] Therefore, the United States Supreme Court held that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of a defendant's offense. [31] The Superior Court's restitution order was based directly on the actual losses caused to the Association by Benton's criminal acts. The order of restitution in Benton's case compensated the innocent victim of her crime, albeit paid through the probation office of the government, for: the amount of money she had embezzled; the ancillary costs to the Association in detecting her crimes; and costs to the Association for restoring the property damage that was caused by Benton's criminal acts. [32] As a result, the Superior Court's restitution order was proportionate to Benton's conduct: Where the amount of restitution is geared directly to the amount of the victim's loss caused by the defendant's illegal activity, proportionality is already built in to the order . . . . By choosing [the] target, the defendant is the one who essentially determines [the] restitution obligation. [33] Accordingly, we hold that the Excessive Fine Clause was not violated by ordering Benton to repay not only the full amount of money that she had embezzled from the Association but also the out-of-pocket expenses sustained by the Association as a direct consequence of Benton's criminal conduct. [34]