Opinion ID: 1383469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jones' Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Text: Jones next argues that the circuit court erred in prohibiting Jones from introducing any evidence concerning the death of Jones' mother. In his complaint, Jones included negligent infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action. [2] We have stated the elements a plaintiff must prove to recover for the personal injury of negligent infliction of emotional distress: A plaintiff's right to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, after witnessing a person closely related to the plaintiff suffer critical injury or death as a result of defendant's negligent conduct, is premised upon the traditional negligence test of foreseeability. A plaintiff is required to prove under this test that his or her serious emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable, that the defendant's negligent conduct caused the victim to suffer critical injury or death, and that the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress as a direct result of witnessing the victim's critical injury or death. In determining whether the serious emotional injury suffered by a plaintiff in a negligent infliction of emotional distress action was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, the following factors must be evaluated: (1) whether the plaintiff was closely related to the injury victim; (2) whether the plaintiff was located at the scene of the accident and is aware that it is causing injury to the victim; (3) whether the victim is critically injured or killed; and (4) whether the plaintiff suffers serious emotional distress. Syllabus Point 2, Heldreth v. Marrs, 188 W.Va. 481, 425 S.E.2d 157 (1992). State Farm contends that Jones should not have been permitted to present evidence on his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because any damages resulting from this claim were included in the settlement of the claim made by the estate of Jones' mother. State Farm argues that under the settlement reached between Sanger and the estate of Edith Jones, appellant Jones received emotional distress damages through the Wrongful Death Act, W.Va.Code, 55-7-6(c)(1) [1992], including damages for [s]orrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice[.] W.Va. Code, 55-7-6(c)(1) [1992]. We have held that damages recoverable in a wrongful death action for sorrow, mental anguish and solace are separate from damages recoverable by an individual in a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. We have stated: An action for death by wrongful act brought pursuant to W.Va.Code § 55-7-5 (1931) and W.Va.Code § 55-7-6(c)(1)(A) provides damages for mental anguish, is not duplicative of an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because each action provides for recovery of damages for a different injury. Therefore, both an action for death by wrongful act and an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress may arise from the same event. Syllabus Point 4, Stump v. Ashland, Inc., 201 W.Va. 541, 499 S.E.2d 41 (1997). [3] Syllabus Point 2 of Heldreth, supra, requires a plaintiff, in order to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, to prove three things: that the defendant's negligent conduct caused a victim (a person closely related to the plaintiff) to suffer a critical injury or death; that the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress as a direct result of witnessing a victim's critical injury or death; and the emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable. Reasonable foreseeability is evaluated under Heldreth by looking at four factors: (1) whether the plaintiff was closely related to the injury victim; (2) whether the plaintiff was located at the scene of the accident and was aware that it was causing injury to the victim; (3) whether the victim was critically injured or killed; and (4) whether the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress. In accordance with Heldreth, supra, we hold that evidence relating to the death of Jones' mother was admissible in support of Jones' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Jones should have been permitted to introduce evidence that appellee Sanger's negligent conduct caused his mother's death, and that as a direct result of witnessing his mother's death, Jones suffered serious emotional distress. The test set out in Heldreth, supra, was satisfied. Jones was related to his mother; Jones was present and conscious at the scene; Jones was laying in his mother's lap while she died and while both were trapped in the car; Jones was aware of his mother's dying; the victim, Jones' mother, was killed as a result of appellee Sanger's allegedly negligent conduct; and as a result of his mother's death, Jones allegedly suffered serious emotional distress. Because the circuit court did not allow the introduction of evidence of the events surrounding the death of Jones' mother, Jones was essentially precluded from pursuing his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in not permitting Jones to present evidence surrounding the events relating to his mother's death.