Opinion ID: 196785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Travel Act Counts

Text: 81 The government charged Sawyer with knowingly and wilfully travelling and causing others to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to promote, carry on and facilitate the promotion and carrying on of unlawful activity, to wit, illegal gratuities in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, § 3, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act). 19 The government asserted that Sawyer violated the Massachusetts gratuity statute subsequent to interstate travel to the following destinations: Tulsa, Oklahoma; Orlando, Florida; Savannah, Georgia; Scottsdale, Arizona; Key Largo, Florida; Charleston, South Carolina; Amelia Island, Florida; and Puerto Rico. 82 Sawyer argues that his Travel Act convictions must be reversed because: (1) the court erroneously instructed the jury on the gratuity statute; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish the gratuity offenses; (3) the court barred him from presenting evidence crucial to his defense; and (4) the court improperly admitted summary evidence introduced by the government. Although we discuss and reject each of these arguments in turn, we nonetheless reverse his conviction on these counts because the district court's instructions on the meaning of bribery, for the purposes of the Travel Act, were fatally flawed.
83 Because the Travel Act convictions rely upon violations of the Massachusetts gratuity statute, we now address an additional state-law aspect of the gratuity statute about which the parties disagree. 84 The gratuity statute requires that the item of substantial value be given for or because of any official act performed or to be performed. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, § 3(a). An official act is defined as: any decision or action in a particular matter or in the enactment of legislation. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, § 1(h). 20 Here, Sawyer allegedly bestowed gratuities upon legislators who were members of the Insurance Committee. Thus, for purposes of this discussion, we proceed on the theory that the government had to prove that Sawyer gave the gratuities for or because of ... any decision or action in the enactment of legislation. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, §§ 3(a), 1(h). 85 The parties' interpretations of the gratuity statute differ with respect to the scope and character of the connection required between the gratuity and the official act. Sawyer contends that the gratuity must be linked to a specific, identifiable official act. The government argues that it is sufficient to prove that the gratuity would not have been given but for the legislator's ability to take official action favorable to Sawyer. In a pretrial ruling on Sawyer's motions to dismiss, the district court agreed with the government's interpretation, and instructed as such. 21 86 No Massachusetts court decision has yet interpreted the operative for or because of any official act language in ch. 268A, § 3(a). To support their respective positions, the parties present differing arguments regarding the statutory language, legislative history, comparable statutes, and State Ethics Commission rulings. We consider these sources separately.
87 The gratuity statute prohibits the giving of gratuities for or because of any official act performed or to be performed. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, § 3. The statute does not read for or because of the official's position. Rather, it forbids gratuities motivated by any official act and further defines, rather meticulously, official act. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, §§ 1(h) & (k). Thus, on the face of the statute, it does not appear that the unlawfulness of the gratuity could be established by proof that it was motivated solely by the official's position. In other words, proof of the offense requires something more than a simple showing that but for the official's authority, the gratuity would not have been given. 22 88 This observation, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the gratuity must be shown to be motivated by a specifically identified official act. As noted supra, a gratuity offense is essentially a bribery offense without proof of corrupt intent. The concern behind the gratuity statute, like the bribery statute, is the potential undermining of official integrity. A gratuity does not compromise this integrity because of its possible effect on the official's position; rather, the danger is in its ability to affect the official's performance of duties, i.e., official acts. It is not surprising, then, that the statute proscribes gratuities motivated by official acts rather than official position. 89 Thus, the use of the term official act appears to ensure that the gratuity would be deemed unlawful only when the giving of an item of substantial value is linked to the official's performance of duties. The connection between the gratuity and the performance of official duties, however, does not necessarily require the identification of a specific official act, and we find nothing in the statutory language to require such a demonstration.
90 The gratuity statute was based, in part, upon a bill drafted by a 1962 Massachusetts Special Commission on Code of Ethics. See Report of the Special Commission on Code of Ethics, 1962 House Doc. No. 3650, p. 8. Nothing in the Commission's Report, however, assists us in resolving the instant question. It states only: It should be noted that to constitute a criminal act, the giving or receiving of the item of such 'substantial value' must be 'for or because of' an official act. Id. at 11; see Commonwealth v. Famigletti, 4 Mass.App.Ct. 584, 354 N.E.2d 890, 893 (1976) (noting same language in the report). The Report neither parses out what these terms mean, nor gives examples of what was intended. From this we discern only that the Commission was concerned that innocent gifts to officials would not fall within the gratuity statute's purview. 91 The Commission's report does tell us that [m]uch of the language of the proposed legislation is taken and adapted from [a proposed federal bribery/gratuity bill]. Report of Special Commission, supra at 8; see Dutney, 348 N.E.2d at 822 n. 16. As discussed below, however, the comparable federal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), is also unhelpful in resolving the question before us.
92 In support of its position, the government relies on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of a different statute in Commonwealth v. Lapham, 156 Mass. 480, 31 N.E. 638 (Mass.1892), and on federal cases interpreting the federal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). 93 Lapham involved a milk dealer who attempted to bribe a city milk inspector and was convicted under a statute punishing anyone who: 94 corruptly gives, offers or promises to any executive, legislative ... or judicial officer ... any gift or gratuity whatever, with intent to influence his act, vote, opinion, decision, or judgment on any matter, question, cause, or proceeding, which may be then pending, or may by law come or be brought before him in his official capacity. 95 Mass. Pub. St. ch. 205, § 9 (Ch. 349 Revised May 21, 1891); see Lapham, 31 N.E. at 638-39. The milk dealer argued that the indictment was insufficient because it did not aver a particular matter to be influenced. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, reasoning as follows: 96 Nor is it necessary in an indictment under [ch. 205, § 9] to aver that the corrupt intention to influence the act, opinion, decision or judgment of the inspector was in relation to any specific and particular matter then pending before him, or which was then expected to come before him. It is enough to aver a corrupt intention so to influence him in any matter which may then be pending, or which may by law come or be brought before him. If for example an executive, legislative or judicial officer is bribed corruptly to favor a particular person in any and all matters affecting that person which may come before such officer, without specification or knowledge of the particular matters likely to come up, the statute is broad enough to include such a case. A narrower construction of a similar statute has been adopted in Alabama, but we cannot follow it. Barefield v. State, 14 Ala. 603 [1848]. 97 Id. 31 N.E. at 639. 98 The difficulty with the government's reliance on Lapham is, of course, the fact that it involved a differently worded statute. The Lapham statute proscribes a corrupt gift to influence an official act on any matter ... which may be then pending or may by law come or be brought before him in his official capacity. Mass. Pub. St. ch. 205, § 9 (Ch. 349 Revised May 21, 1891) (emphasis added). In holding that an averment of a specific matter was not necessary, the Lapham court repeatedly used the word may. See, e.g., id. (It is enough to aver a corrupt intention so to influence him in any matter which may then be pending, or which may by law come or be brought before him.) (emphasis added). 99 The question is whether the absence of the word may in the present gratuity statute, see Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, §§ 3, 1(h) & (k), signifies, by negative implication, the requirement of a specific official act. The reasoning in Lapham does seem to indicate some relationship between the word may and the absence of a specificity requirement. We think, however, that it does not follow that the word may is the only manner in which to indicate that particular official acts need not be shown to establish a gratuity offense. 100 The present statute proscribes a gift for or because of any official act performed or to be performed, 23 and further defines official act as any decision or action in a particular matter or in the enactment of legislation. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, §§ 3(a), 1(h) (emphasis added). Use of the broad term any is consistent with a legislative intent to proscribe gifts motivated by unidentified official acts. Most importantly, given the reasoning set forth in Lapham, we think that if the Massachusetts Legislature had wanted to drastically narrow the scope of the gratuity offense by requiring specifically identified official acts, it would have spoken more clearly than it has. In the end, the Lapham case supports the conclusion that a gratuity offense may be established without proof that a specific official act was the motivation for the gratuity. 101 The government also relies on cases interpreting the similarly worded federal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), 24 that indicate that a conviction under that statute does not require a showing that the gratuity was linked to a specific official act. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir.) (it is sufficient for the government to show that the defendant was given the gratuity simply because he held public office), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 473, 133 L.Ed.2d 402 (1995); United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 68-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980, 99 S.Ct. 567, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978); United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1080 (3d Cir.1979) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980). The government reasons that because much of the Massachusetts gratuity statute's language was based upon the federal statute, see Dutney, 348 N.E.2d at 822 n. 16, and because some federal cases hold that specific acts need not be shown, a similar interpretation of the state law should obtain. 102 Reliance on those cases, however, is undermined by the fact that the First Circuit has expressly reserved ruling on the question of whether or not a gratuity prosecution under the federal statute requires proof of a causal relation to any 'specific, identifiable act.'  United States v. Previte, 648 F.2d 73, 82 n. 8 (1st Cir.1981) (quoting Niederberger, 580 F.2d at 68-69). Sawyer, on the other hand, cites no federal gratuity cases (or state gratuity cases, for that matter) squarely holding that specific acts must be shown; although, he does cite cases in which specific official acts were shown, see e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 99-100 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052, 109 S.Ct. 1312, 103 L.Ed.2d 581 (1989); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 77-78 (D.C.Cir.1974). This is not the proper case for us to decide the federal issue. Thus, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to take any guidance here from cases interpreting the federal gratuity statute.
103 The Massachusetts State Ethics Commission is the primary civil enforcement agency for violations of the gratuity statute. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268B, § 3(i). The Ethics Commission has the power and duty to investigate alleged gratuity offenses, initiate appropriate adjudicatory proceedings, and order civil penalties if it concludes that a violation has occurred. Id. § 4. Upon the petition of any party, a final action of the Ethics Commission is subject to review by the Massachusetts superior court, which may enforce, modify or set aside the order. Id. § 4(k). 104 The Ethics Commission has repeatedly interpreted the gratuity statute as forbidding gifts motivated generally by the official's authority to act favorably for the donor. See In Re Charles F. Flaherty, 1990 SEC 59 (Disposition Agreement) ( 'All that is required to bring [the gratuity statute] into play is a nexus between the motivation for the gift and the employee's public duties'  (quoting In Re George A. Michael, 1981 SEC 59, 68)); SEC Commission Advisory No. 8 Free Passes (May 14, 1985) (noting that even in the absence of any specifically identifiable matter that was, is or soon will be pending before the official, [the gratuity statute] may apply) (citing United States v. Standefer, 452 F.Supp. 1178, 1183 (W.D.Pa.1978)). 105 We give the Ethics Commission's interpretation some deference. See Olszewski v. Berube, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 297, 1995 WL 808889 (Mass.Super.No. 922666) (Jan. 27, 1995) at  2 (stating that although the Ethics Commission's decision on matters within its competence is to be given great weight, the courts are the final interpreter) (citing Finkelstein v. Board of Reg. in Optometry, 370 Mass. 476, 349 N.E.2d 346, 348 (1976)). That deference, however, is tempered not only by the fact that no Massachusetts court has passed on the Ethics Commission's interpretation, but also because this is a criminal case and the Ethics Commission is charged only with civil enforcement. The Commission may very well have valid reasons for adopting a broad, prophylactic interpretation of the statute in its civil dispositions of individual transgressions; its interpretation is easier to prove and the offender is more likely to settle with the Commission if she does not have to admit to more egregious wrongdoing. 106 Nonetheless, we note that the Ethics Commission's interpretation of the gratuity statute has been left undisturbed by the Massachusetts Legislature, and its interpretation is not arbitrary, unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute. Finkelstein, 349 N.E.2d at 348. Thus, the Ethics Commission's opinion on the matter further supports the conclusion that a specific official act need not be identified in a gratuity offense.
107 The absence of a Massachusetts court decision on this issue is troubling. We have carefully considered, however, all of the authority and arguments on Sawyer's behalf, and none of them is availing. We also take note of the fact that Sawyer does not cite a single gratuity case, either federal or state (and we have found none), holding that a specific official act must be linked to the unlawful gratuity. Thus, we conclude that the Massachusetts gratuity statute does not require proof that the offender gave the item of substantial value because of a specifically identified official act. Of course, the identification of certain official acts in relation to the gratuity might make a gratuity offense easier to prove, and we suspect that most cases will include such proof although it is unnecessary.
108 In cases such as this one, it becomes clear why particular official acts need not be shown. The evidence at trial showed that Sawyer gave items (that could be found to be of substantial value) to Massachusetts legislators who had the ability to take official action favorable to Hancock, and that those gifts effectively ceased after the legislators left office. While the government did not detail all of the legislators' acts that were favorable to Hancock, the government did show that Sawyer had a long-term, ongoing interest in the official acts of the legislators, and that he knew his gratuities were unlawful. From this evidence, the jury could rationally infer that the gratuities were motivated by the legislators' performance of official duties, i.e., that they were given for or because of any official act, within the meaning of the Massachusetts gratuity statute, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 268A, § 3.

109 Sawyer contends that the court unduly restricted the presentation of evidence that he entertained lawmakers solely out of friendship and goodwill and he believed that this did not violate the gratuity statute. 25 Specifically, he appeals the court's exclusion of a document, written by Bruce Skrine, memorializing Skrine's interview with Sawyer after the Boston Globe's inquiry into the Puerto Rico trip. That document reflects Sawyer's assertion that such entertainment, while perhaps excessive in Puerto Rico, was commonly done and that, [the] legislators were all friends of his and that they were not in anyway [sic] discussing legislation or lobbying. 110 At trial, Sawyer did not attempt to offer this document to prove his state of mind with respect to his expenditures. In fact, he indicated to the court that its admission was not necessary because he had already elicited the desired testimony from Skrine. Later on, however, pointing out that the document did not mention that he entertained to gain access to legislators, Sawyer offered it to impeach Skrine. The court did not permit its admission on that basis, but it did allow Sawyer to cross-examine Skrine on that very issue. Because Sawyer did not offer the document for the purpose he now asserts on appeal, he has forfeited this claim. See United States v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296, 1302 (1st Cir.) (explaining that evidence must have been offered for the purpose asserted on appeal to preserve issue) (citing Tate v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 790 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.1986)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 378, 498, 499, 532, 130 L.Ed.2d 328, 408, 435 (1994). But because the issue may again arise on remand, we further hold that because Sawyer was able to obtain the desired testimony on the issue he now asserts, we would find no abuse of discretion in its exclusion. See United States v. Newman, 49 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.1995) (reviewing court's exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion). 26
111 Sawyer assigns reversible error to the district court's admission of five charts, Exhibits 1, 1Q, 1R, 1S and 1T, proffered by the government. Exhibit 1 was a forty-nine page computer printout summarizing 612 expenditures, occurring between January 1, 1986 and March 31, 1993, that were recorded in Sawyer's appointment calendars, expense records and other admitted documents. Exhibits 1Q, 1R and 1S are extracts of Exhibit 1 that isolate the expenditures for Representatives Woodward, Howarth and Emilio. Exhibit 1T contrasts the amount spent on those three Representatives while they were members of the Legislature with the amount spent on them after they left that office. Sawyer contends that these charts were admitted on an insufficient foundation and that they were misleading, argumentative and prejudicial. 112 Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 provides, in pertinent part: 113 The contents of voluminous writings ... which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals or duplicates shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by [the other party]. 114 Before admitting such evidentiary presentations, the court must first ensure that each is grounded upon a sufficient factual basis, i.e., upon independently established evidence in the record, and that possible prejudice or confusion does not outweigh their usefulness in clarifying the evidence. United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 25 (1st Cir.1984) (citing J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 1006 (1983)); see United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1125 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005, 110 S.Ct. 1300, 108 L.Ed.2d 477 (1990); United States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 884 (1st Cir.1984). When a court admits such summaries, 115 [c]are must be taken to insure that summaries accurately reflect the contents of the underlying documents and do not function as pedagogical devices that unfairly emphasize part of the proponent's proof or create the impression that disputed facts have been conclusively established or that inferences have been directly proved. 116 Drougas, 748 F.2d at 25 (citing Weinstein's Evidence, supra § 1006). We review the admission of summaries for abuse of discretion. Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1126. 117 Sawyer contends that the district court improperly admitted the summaries because they did not include evidence of his expenditures on legislators before and after the time period covered in the summaries, or his expenditures of personal funds. He argues that this was unduly misleading because it created a false impression as to the date the alleged conspiracy began, and falsely implied that the expenditures ended after the three named representatives left office. We disagree. 118 The summaries were based on evidence that was already independently admitted and that was relevant to Sawyer's questionable expenditures during the indictment period. Sawyer had the opportunity, on cross-examination, to place the summaries in context with his total financial activity. See Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1125 (concluding that argument that summaries failed to, inter alia, reflect total financial activity affect[s] weight rather than the admissibility). On the matters to which Sawyer assigns undue prejudice, he had ample opportunity to explore them on cross-examination, which he did. He also could have offered his own contrary evidence, including his own summary (which he did not do). As we stated in Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1126: 119 So long as the government, exercising due diligence, collects whatever records are reasonably available and succeeds in introducing them, it may be permitted (subject, of course, to relevancy and perscrutation under Fed.R.Evid. 403) to summarize the data it has managed to obtain. If defendants possessed exculpatory records not in the government's files, they could have offered them at trial or prepared their own summary. By the same token, if there were gaps in the charts, the defense ... had every opportunity to exploit them. In the last analysis, completeness of the underlying records was for the jury. 120 We conclude that the summaries were based on a sufficient foundation and that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them.D. Protective Instruction 121 Having rejected all of Sawyer's arguments, we think there is one flaw in the proceedings that does have to be addressed in the interests of justice and especially in light of the possibility of future prosecutions of this kind. Our concern arises from the close relationship between lobbying activities that are lawful from the standpoint of federal law, even if deplorable, and associated or slightly more extreme versions of such conduct that can constitute federal violations. The problem is, in some respects, novel; the reason for its novelty is that it appears that prosecutions on facts like these have not generally been brought. 122 A review of pre-McNally theft of honest services cases and of bribery and gratuity cases under the counterpart federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, indicates, as we have already noted, that most involved straightforward corruption--most often, quid pro quo bribery or blatant conflict of interest. While the issue in those cases was typically whether or not the conduct actually occurred, in most of them the alleged conduct was blatantly illegal. This case is distinct in that the conduct itself may not be very different, except possibly in degree, from the kind of routine cultivation of friendship in a lobbying context that, while arguably very unattractive, is not bribery within the meaning of the Travel Act. 123 The practice of using hospitality, including lavish hospitality, to cultivate business or political relationships is longstanding and pervasive. The government does not argue, and we do not believe, that payments for entertainment, lodging, golf, sports events, and the like would constitute violations of the Travel Act (or the mail and wire fraud statutes) if the aim of the lobbyist were simply to cultivate a business or political friendship with the legislator. It may well be that all such hospitality should be flatly prohibited by law, but if Sawyer had this limited intent--to cultivate friendship rather than to influence an official act--the federal statutes here involved would not be violated. 27 124 The charge to the jury in this case followed the conventional formula for prosecutions involving political corruption. But where the difference between lawful and unlawful turns primarily on intent, and the lawful conduct is itself most unattractive, we think the jury needs to be told specifically that the defendant has not violated the bribery component of the Travel Act (or committed honest services fraud) if his intent was limited to the cultivation of business or political friendship. Only if instead or in addition, there is an intent to cause the recipient to alter her official acts may the jury find a theft of honest services or the bribery predicate of the Travel Act. Absent some explicit explanation of this kind, the conventional charge will be slanted in favor of conviction. 28 125 In reaching this conclusion, we intend no criticism of the able district judge who was coping with a somewhat novel foray by the government. But where, as here, the line between the merely unattractive and actually criminal conduct is blurred, the court must take pains to explain the difference to the jury. The Second Circuit took this same view in a closely related context, saying: When an elected official who has received campaign contributions is charged with extortion and with receiving bribes, the charge must carefully focus the jury's attention on the difference between lawful political contributions and unlawful extortionate payments and bribes. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 695-96 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1102, 113 L.Ed.2d 213 (1991). 126 Having concluded that the jury charge was mistaken, we must consider whether Sawyer should get the benefit of the error. This is a close call. On the one hand, Sawyer did not explicitly ask for the sort of language we think appropriate. Ordinarily, the failure to make an explicit objection requires the defendant to satisfy the plain error test of United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). On the other hand, a number of Sawyer's objections were closely related in that they sought in several different ways--which we do not accept--to protect one engaged in good faith lobbying from prosecution. 127 On balance, we think that the Travel Act counts, as well as the mail and wire fraud convictions, ought to be reversed and retried under proper instructions. Although the evidence here would be adequate to infer improper intent, the issue is close and an explanatory instruction could well affect the outcome. Also, the fact that the prosecution was novel makes us look more tolerantly on Sawyer's failure to articulate precisely the shape of the necessary protective instruction. 128 Apart from the expense of retrial, the government has very little to complain about in this result. We have agreed that the Massachusetts gratuity statute does not require the government to link the gratuity to a specific official act. We have also found that the evidence here is sufficient to convict (although we can imagine reasonable people thinking otherwise). And while we are somewhat concerned about the lack of fair warning of a prosecution such as this one, we see no legal basis for precluding the government from embarking on what is in practical terms an expansive reading of the federal statutes. Against this backdrop, we think it even more important that Sawyer get the benefit of the few protections that remain.