Opinion ID: 213143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Amendment Claim of Retaliatory Arrest

Text: In contrast to its role in the Fourth Amendment context, motive is relevant to Kennedy's claim that Schutzman arrested Kennedy in retaliation for Kennedy's exercise of his First Amendment rights. A retaliation claim essentially entails three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct. [4] Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir.1999) (en banc). A `motivating factor' is essentially [a] but-for cause. . . . Leonard, 477 F.3d at 355. For purposes of asserting qualified immunity, Schutzman has waived any challenge to the first element by omitting it from his opening brief. [5] Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 403 n. 18. Schutzman conceded the second element in the district court and has not contested it on appeal. The only question remaining about whether Kennedy's constitutional right was violated is whether Kennedy's speech motivated the arrest. To defeat Schutzman's qualified-immunity defense, Kennedy must also demonstrate that his right to be free from retaliatory arrest in such a context was clearly established. Because direct evidence of motive is difficult to produce, claims involving proof of a defendant's intent seldom lend themselves to summary disposition and circumstantial evidence may provide sufficient evidence of retaliatory intent to survive summary judgment. Holzemer, 621 F.3d at 525-26 (internal quotation marks and alterations removed). Once a plaintiff raises an inference that the defendant's conduct was motivated in part by plaintiff's protected activity, the burden shifts and [the] defendant,' to obtain summary judgment, must demonstrate that [he] would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity. Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 821 (6th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Schutzman admits that Kennedy was angry with him, but argues that the evidence is silent about Schutzman's own motives. If a plaintiff's motives can create an inference about the defendant's motives, then, says Schutzman, plaintiffs could eliminate the defense of qualified immunity simply by threatening a lawsuit before being arrested. We need not address Schutzman's argument because we disagree with Schutzman's interpretation of the record. Kennedy's deposition reveals more than his own anger. Schutzman came running back in to the building, got in [Kennedy's] face, and arrested Kennedy immediately after Kennedy called Schutzman a fat slob. R. 22 (Kennedy Dep. at 79, 81). At the summary-judgment stage, this evidence suffices to show that the content of Kennedy's speech may have been a motivating factor for Schutzman to arrest Kennedy. Finally, Kennedy's right to be free from retaliatory arrest after insulting an officer was clearly established. See Greene, 310 F.3d at 897 ([The officer] should have known that an arrest undertaken at least in part as retaliation for a constitutionally protected insult to the officer's dignity would be impermissible unless it could be shown that the officer would have made the arrest even in the absence of any retaliatory motive.); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 264 (6th Cir.1997) ([T]he First Amendment right to criticize public officials is well-established.. . . Furthermore, it is well-established that a public official's retaliation against an individual exercising his or her First Amendment rights is a violation of § 1983.). Motivation may be difficult to ascertain after the fact, but once the factfinder determines that protected speech motivated the arrest, the illegality of the arrest becomes readily apparent. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034.