Opinion ID: 895782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: amount of exemplary damages

Text: [¶ 48] Revere contends the amount of exemplary damages awarded is grossly excessive. `The reason for awarding punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer in order to deter him, and others, from repetition of the wrongful conduct.' Delzer v. United Bank, 1997 ND 3, ¶ 22, 559 N.W.2d 531 (quoting Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 68 (N.D.1981)). As we also explained in Delzer, (quoting Dewey v. Lutz, 462 N.W.2d 435, 443 (N.D.1990)): `Punitive damages are excessive when the amount of the award is so great that it indicates passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.' [¶ 49] In ruling on Revere's post-trial motions, the trial court generally assessed the qualifications of the jurors: In this case, however, we had an educated and intelligent jury well-qualified to comprehend the issues and the law. For instance, this case involved financial, tax and contract matters. We had two accountants on the jury. The case involved insurance and we had a person experienced in an insurance agency. Others on the jury were qualified to understand the injury and disability issues involved. Finally, most of them had enough farm background to judge the effect of a physical disability on a farmer's ability to do his work. In short, this was a jury not easily misled or one proven to make emotional judgments. They deliberated for a reasonable time without asking any questions. There is no justification for jumping to the conclusion that this admittedly large verdict was somehow the product of emotion or prejudice rather than thoughtful deliberation by nine qualified individuals. On the amount of punitive damages awarded, the trial court ruled: This was a good jury which gave thoughtful consideration to the award based on the acts of [Revere] and the factors on which they were instructed. It is a large verdict, but it has adequate support in the evidence. The wealth of [Revere] is a consideration and the verdict is proportional to that wealth and [Revere's] actions regarding its handling on this policy claim. As we reasoned in Delzer, 1997 ND 3, at ¶ 22, 559 N.W.2d 531: The trial court observed the witnesses and the jury and was in a better position than we are to determine if the jury's punitive damages award resulted from passion or prejudice. We are unable to conclude that the amount of this punitive damages award is so great that it proves passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. We conclude, therefore, the punitive damages award is not excessive, and it is a reasonable amount in light of its purposes of punishment and deterrence. [¶ 50] Relying on BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), Revere contends it should not be punished, certainly not to the extent of $2.5 million, for rescinding an insurance policy based upon well established legal principles, i.e. for conduct lawful in other jurisdictions. The jury did not award exemplary damages to punish Revere for rescinding an insurance policy based upon well establised legal principles. We are not persuaded that the conduct impelling the jury to award exemplary damages here was lawful conduct anywhere. [¶ 51] The statute authorizing exemplary damages, NDCC 32-03.2-11(4), was amended in 1993 to limit them to two times the amount of compensatory damages or two hundred fifty thousand dollars, whichever is greater. See 1993 N.D. Laws Ch. 324, § 3. Relying on State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D.1986), Revere contends that this new limitation on exemplary damages applies to this case because it took effect before this lawsuit was commenced. A statute is employed retroactively when it is applied to a cause of action that arose prior to the effective date of the statute. Id. at 471. The statute considered in Cummings reduced the mandatory minimum sentence for driving with a suspended license. This court held that, while statutes are not retroactive unless expressly declared so by the Legislature, an exception should be made to this general rule in the case of ameliorating penal legislation. Id. at 472. Cummings was a narrow exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity. Midwest Property Recovery, Inc. v. Job Service, 475 N.W.2d 918, 921 (N.D.1991). [T]here is a presumption against the retroactive application of a statute unless the legislature has clearly indicated such an intent. State ex rel. Younger v. Bryant, 465 N.W.2d 155, 159 (N.D.1991). Revere has not overcome the presumption against retroactivity here. [¶ 52] Revere argues the legislature's passage of the punitive damages cap is persuasive evidence that the award here is excessive. The fact that the Legislature has chosen to reduce the deterrent value of exemplary damages by restricting the extent that wrongdoers may be punished is not persuasive evidence that exemplary damages for conduct occurring before the legislative change are excessive. [¶ 53] We affirm the judgment in all respects. [¶ 54] VANDE WALLE, C.J., and MARING, NEWMANN and SANDSTROM, JJ., concur.