Opinion ID: 7620882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Daughters' Appeal

Text: The daughters contend that the circuit court erred in allowing the personal representatives to reimburse the estate based on the profit, if any, made on the premature compensation rather than awarding interest as this Court ordered in Wehle II . As the daughters note, in Wehle II , this Court concluded:  Section 43-2-509[, Ala. Code 1975,] provides that a personal representative who 'uses any of the funds of the estate for his own benefit ... is accountable for any profit made thereon or legal interest.' Our courts have long held that, pursuant to § 43-2-509 or its precursor, a personal representative must pay interest  from the date he or she pays himself or herself compensation without court approval to the date he or she obtains court approval for the compensation amount at issue. See, e.g., McCraw v. Cooper , 218 Ala. 186 , 190, 118 So. 333 , 337 (1928) (affirming an award of interest against a personal representative who had paid himself compensation without prior approval by the trial court, where the trial court eventually allowed the compensation, 'as to the reasonableness of which in amount there [was no dispute]'); see also, e.g., Walsh v. Walsh , 231 Ala. 305 , 307-08, 164 So. 822 , 824-25 (1935) ('[I]n the case of Kenan v. Graham , 135 Ala. 585 , 33 So. 699 [ (1903) ], the court held that an executor is not entitled to anticipate his fees and use the money. If he does so, he is chargeable with interest for the time the money was thus appropriated to the date of settlement.'). The same legal principle has been applied to other fiduciaries who were required to obtain court approval before paying themselves compensation. See Gordon v. Brunson , 287 Ala. 535 , 542-43, 253 So.2d 183 , 189 (1971) ('[T]rial court erred in charging only 4% simple interest on the wards' money wrongfully advanced by the guardian to himself [for his compensation], and should have calculated such interest at the rate of 6% per annum, compounded annually from date of the advance to the date of the decree....'). 195 So.3d at 940-41 . Elsewhere, we noted that the daughters' claim is based on § 43-2-509, Ala. Code 1975, which specifically provides that,  '[i]f any executor or administrator uses any of the funds of the estate for his own benefit, he is accountable for any profit made thereon or legal interest.'  Id. at 938 . Thus, as the parties have acknowledged and as discussed in this Court's opinion in Wehle II , the Code section under which the daughters were proceeding permits an interest-based award but also provides an alternate method of calculation, namely the award of any profit accruing from the misappropriated funds. Authority cited by the daughters suggests that the election between an award of interest as opposed to the disgorgement of earned profit provided in § 43-2-509 is not within the discretion of the trial court but at the option of the aggrieved party. See Clark v. Knox , 70 Ala. 607 , 618-19 (1881) (For interest received, or profit derived, [the executor or administrator] is liable by the terms of the statute; and if he uses the funds, he is, in any event, liable for legal interest, because the use is, of itself, a conversion-a breach of duty. When employed, the profits derived he is required to disclose, and the parties interested may elect to take either the profits or interest at the legal rate . (emphasis added)), and First Nat'l Bank v. Weaver , 225 Ala. 160 , 162, 142 So. 420 , 421 (1932) (same). See also Wehle II , 195 So.3d at 947 . The daughters have, at all pertinent times, demanded an award of interest as recompense. In keeping with that demand, our mandate to the circuit court on remand in Wehle II was for that court to award[ ] interest against the personal representatives. 195 So.3d at 947 (emphasis added). See Wehle II , 195 So.3d at 937 ( ' Under the doctrine of the 'law of the case,' whatever is once established between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of that case, whether or not correct on general principles, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case. '  (quoting other cases)). 5 Our instruction  left the circuit court no discretion, at this stage, to choose ... between the two options provided by statute nor did it permit the court to consider new evidence aimed at demonstrating the propriety of an alternate option. See 195 So.3d at 938 ( ' Under the law of the case doctrine, '[a] party cannot on a second appeal relitigate issues which were resolved by the Court in the first appeal or which would have been resolved had they been properly presented in the first appeal.'  '  (quoting other cases)). See also Ex parte Edwards , 727 So.2d 792 , 794 (Ala. 1998) (holding that, when an appellate court remands a case, the trial court's authority is limited to compliance with the directions provided by the appellate court). As set out above, the circuit court has not ruled on the amount of interest owed to the daughters. See Kyser v. Harrison , 908 So.2d 914 , 918 (Ala. 2005) ( 'We cannot put a trial court in error for failure to rule on a matter which, according to the record, was not presented to, nor decided by him....'  (quoting Defore v. Bourjois, Inc. , 268 Ala. 228 , 230, 105 So.2d 846 , 848 (1958) )). Therefore, despite our awareness of the long and tortured history of the present litigation, we nonetheless decline the daughters' request to simply render a judgment awarding interest in this matter. The circuit court's judgment on remand awarding profit instead of interest was inconsistent with this Court's mandate in Wehle II . 6 We have no alternative but to again remand this case for the circuit court to comply with this Court's remaining mandate in Wehle II , namely the entry of a judgment awarding interest against the personal representatives. 195 So.3d at 947 . On remand, the trial court shall award interest on the compensation.