Opinion ID: 2994812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deportability Under Section 241

Text: The immigration law in effect at the time the INS instituted deportation proceedings stated: Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (current version at 8 U.S.C. sec. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). The term ’conviction’ means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court . . . . 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(48)(A). If adjudication of guilt has been withheld, then an alien is considered convicted where (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(48)(A)(i), (ii). Sandoval’s original conviction for possession of more than thirty grams would have rendered him deportable under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA. His modified sentence, however, would only be appropriate if the judge had vacated the original conviction and entered a new conviction for possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana. Lack of a court order vacating the original conviction has left the parties disputing the effect of the modified sentence. Sandoval argues that it was a legal modification under Illinois law, and that the modification has to mean that he was convicted of possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, which is not a conviction for immigration purposes. The INS argues that the conviction under 704(d) remains a conviction for immigration purposes and that there is substantial evidence to support the finding that Sandoval was convicted of possession of more than thirty grams. The insufficiency of the state court record is, of course, the heart of the problem. It is the duty of the INS to establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277, 286, 87 S. Ct. 483, 17 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1966); Dashto v. INS, 59 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 1995). In the instant case, the Immigration Judge incorrectly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner. The Immigration Judge concluded that Sandoval was deportable under section 241, in part because Sandoval had not shown that the charging information and the original statement of conviction were inaccurate. The Board did not address this last finding of the Immigration Judge. When the BIA summarily adopts an IJ’s decision, we review the IJ’s analysis as if it were the Board’s. Mousa v. INA, 223 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1998)). We thus examine whether the INS carried its burden of proving that Sandoval is deportable under section 241. In order to show that Sandoval’s original conviction for possessing more than thirty grams of marijuana remained in effect, the INS could have shown 1) that the Illinois judge exceeded his authority under state law, thus rendering the modification ineffective, or 2) that the sentence modification was legal but not effective for purposes of federal immigration law. We find that the INS did not establish either of these factual situations by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.
To demonstrate to the Immigration Judge that Sandoval fell within the category of deportable aliens, the INS relied on the charging information and the original statement of conviction. The subsequent events in state court, however, should have been taken into account. Sandoval’s motion under the Illinois Post- Conviction Act constituted a collateral attack, see People v. Towns, 696 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (Ill. 1998), which is defined as an attack on a judgment . . . whose very purpose is to impeach or overturn the judgment. Black’s Law Dictionary 261 (6th ed. 1990). The involuntary entering of a guilty plea that results from the ineffective assistance of counsel is a constitutional violation that merits attention under the Act. See People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 309-12 (Ill. 1985); People v. Luna, 570 N.E.2d 404, 406- 07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). When a court finds that a motion under the Act is meritorious, the court is authorized to enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such supplemental orders . . . as may be necessary and proper. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 122-6 (1991), now codified as 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/122-6 (West 1992). The Illinois judge was thus acting under authority of state law when he granted Sandoval’s motion for post- conviction relief and modified Sandoval’s sentence. The INS argues that the judge did not vacate Sandoval’s conviction, and therefore Sandoval remained convicted of possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana. If we accept this assertion, we would have to conclude that the state court judge violated Illinois criminal procedure when he gave Sandoval probation under section 710. In other words, if Sandoval’s original conviction under section 704(d) had not been vacated, and the underlying conviction remained, then the judge could not legally have sentenced Sandoval to section 710 probation. As noted earlier, that sentence is available only when the defendant was convicted under section 704(a), (b), or (c), or other provisions not relevant to this case. The INS bears the burden of proving that the judge was acting contrary to Illinois law. See Matter of Kaneda, 16 I.&N. Dec. at 680. Rather than proving that the judge acted illegally, however, the INS maintained that it was possible for the judge to have legally modified Sandoval’s sentence and for Sandoval to still fall within the category of aliens deportable under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i). This would be the case, the INS alleged, if the conviction of December 1991 was Sandoval’s second conviction for possession of cannabis. Under 704(c), if any offense under this subsection (c) is a subsequent offense, the offender shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 56 , para. 704(c) (1991), now codified as 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 550/4(c) (West Supp. 2000). Thus, the judge could have downgraded the sentence from 704(d) to 704(c), yet if it was Sandoval’s second offense, he would not be saved from deportation because he had more than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (current version at 8 U.S.C. sec. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). The INS alleges further that a misdemeanor requires a sentence of less than one year, and because the judge sentenced Sandoval to two years probation, Sandoval must have been convicted of a felony. These arguments appear insufficient to carry the INS’s burden. First, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Sandoval has a prior conviction. The logical assumption from this record is that none exists, and the INS presented no evidence to the contrary. We will not assume facts that have no support in the record to attempt to help the INS satisfy its burden. Second, section 710 probation is only available to first time offenders. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 56 , para. 710(a), now codified as 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 550/10(a) (West Supp. 2000). If Sandoval had previously been convicted of, or placed on probation or court supervision for, any offense . . . relating to cannabis he would not have been eligible for 710 probation. Id. Thus, the judge’s modification of the sentence would still have been illegal under Illinois law. Third, the INS’s assertion that a misdemeanor requires a sentence of less than one year is incorrect. A misdemeanor conviction requires that any imprisonment be less than one year, see Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 1005-1-14 (1991), now codified as 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-1-14 (West 1997), but a judge is authorized to sentence a defendant to probation for up to two years. See id. para. 1005-6- 2(b)(3), now codified as 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-6-2 (West Supp. 2000). The INS did not prove that the Illinois judge exceeded his authority under state law when he modified Sandoval’s sentence. We now turn to the argument that Sandoval’s original conviction remains a conviction for immigration purposes.
on the Operation of the INA The INS argues that Sandoval’s original conviction remains a conviction for immigration purposes because a vacation of that conviction would constitute action under a state rehabilitative scheme. The BIA has held that state rehabilitative statutes, which allow a state court to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction, are of no effect in determining whether an alien is considered convicted for immigration purposes. In re Roldan-Santoyo, Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999), removal orders vacated sub nom. Lujan- Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the reasoning in Roldan-Santoyo, even if a state court expunges a conviction, or withholds adjudication of guilt unless parole is violated, aliens who receive the benefit of these rehabilitation schemes are still considered convicted for the purpose of federal immigration law. See id. The INS concludes this modification was part of a scheme of rehabilitation, and thus the original felony conviction remains a conviction for immigration purposes. The strength of its position has been called into question by the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of much of Roldan- Santoyo’s reasoning. Yet even if the Roldan- Santoyo decision stood undisturbed, it would not lead us to conclude that Sandoval is deportable. The instant case is distinguishable from Roldan- Santoyo because it does not involve a state rehabilitative scheme. Adjudication of guilt was not withheld, nor was an alien’s criminal record cleared; rather, Sandoval was convicted of an offense and sentenced, and then received a modified sentence. Though the insufficiency of the state court record has led to some confusion, the INS has not provided any convincing reason to ignore the most logical conclusion, which is that the Illinois judge must have vacated the original conviction and modified Sandoval’s sentence accordingly. The BIA has found that a conviction vacated pursuant to this type of post-conviction scheme does not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes within the meaning of section 1101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See In re Rodriguez-Ruiz, Interim Decision 3436 (BIA 2000) (distinguishing the NY criminal procedure law on post judgment motions from the statutes implicated under the Roldan-Santoyo decision). Further, in Roldan-Santoyo, the BIA did not address the situation where the alien has had his or her conviction vacated by a state court on . . . grounds relating to a violation of a fundamental statutory or constitutional right in the underlying criminal proceedings. Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999). Because the very purpose of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act is to remedy constitutional violations in the underlying criminal proceedings, the Illinois scheme falls outside the category of statutes discussed in Roldan-Santoyo. See id. The INS also alleges that the modification was entered solely for immigration purposes, and is thus ineffective. This allegation is unfounded. The judge’s modification was in response to Sandoval’s properly filed motion stating a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. That Sandoval may have filed his motion in response to the threat of deportation is irrelevant. Further, even if the state court judge’s decision to modify Sandoval’s sentence was motivated by the consequences of the federal immigration law, that fact would not render the modification ineffective for immigration purposes. See Matter of Kaneda, 16 I.&N. Dec. 677 (BIA 1979); Matter of O’Sullivan, 10 I.&N. Dec. 320, Interim Decision 1294 (BIA 1963).