Opinion ID: 798855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wee Care's Claims Against the County Defendants

Text: The Wee Care IV complaint raises four claims against the County Defendants: a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with business relationships, and civil conspiracy. The district court dismissed all four causes of action, finding the LGAA to bar the antitrust claim and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) on the remaining state law claims. The LGAA, enacted in response to the voluminous antitrust litigation against local governments, provides that [n]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees may be recovered [for antitrust violations] . . . from any local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a). Wee Care contends that the County Defendants' actions underlying the antitrust claim were not made in their official capacity because they participated in the allegedly improper zero out scheme and, therefore, asks this Court to deny LGAA immunity. As the question of whether the County Defendants were acting in an official capacity is dispositive to Wee Care's argument, we must first explore the meaning of this requirement. We have not previously defined, for purposes of the LGAA, the phrase acting in an official capacity. However, the Fourth Circuit has reasoned that: Our position [is] that an affirmative grant of explicit authority is not required for an employee or government official to be acting in an official capacity under the LGAA. . . . [T]he phrase `acting in an official capacity' includes those lawful actions, undertaken in the course of a defendant's performance of his duties, that reasonably can be construed to be within the scope of his duties and consistent with the general responsibilities and objectives of his position. Sandcrest Outpatient Servs., P.A. v. Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 853 F.2d 1139, 1145 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.1986)). We agree with the Fourth Circuit that acting in an official capacity should be read broadly for purposes of the LGAA. See Montauk-Caribbean Airways, 784 F.2d at 94 ([T]he phrase `acting in an official capacity' [was intended to] be given broad meaning.). Applying this broad reading, Wee Care's argument that the County Defendants were acting outside the scope of their official capacity when negotiating Title XX funding contracts is untenable. Municipal employees act within their official capacity when conducting duties that are consistent with the general responsibilities and objectives of their positions. Sandcrest Outpatient Servs., P.A., 853 F.2d at 1145. There is no question that the negotiation of Title XX funding contracts falls within the general responsibilities and objectives of the County Defendants' positions. And, to the extent that Wee Care seeks to argue that the County Defendants undertook this general responsibility with an improper motive, that argument fails because [t]he LGAA makes no provision for consideration of a defendant's motives. . . . Id. at 1146. Therefore, the LGAA shields the County Defendants from antitrust liability and the district court properly granted their cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). As Wee Care's one federal claim was properly dismissed, it was likewise proper for the district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); however, the court may decline to do so if, for example, it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.. . . 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This Court reviews the district court's decision to exercise or not to exercise, supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion, Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 892 (6th Cir.1998), and will affirm the district court's decision unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment, United States v. Mack, 159 F.3d 208, 217 (6th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). As § 1367(c)(3) expressly permits the district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction in the event, as was the case here, the federal claims are resolved, there was no abuse of discretion.