Opinion ID: 2634596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: K.S.A. 44-5,120(d)(4)(A) (1993 Furse)

Text: The plain language of the statute defines what fraudulent or abusive acts or practices are for purposes of the workers compensation act.  K.S.A. 44-5,120(d) (1993 Furse) (Emphasis added.) The statute defines fraudulent or abusive acts or practices in a nonexclusive list. Excel Corp. v. Jimenez, 269 Kan. 291, 295, 7 P.3d 1118 (2000); see also Elliott v. Dillon Companies, 21 Kan. App. 2d 908, 913, 908 P.2d 1345, aff'd 260 Kan. 411, 918 P.2d 1305 (1996) (distinguishing a case that rejected a claim that employees could bring common-law actions for fraud in interpreting K.S.A. 44-5,121 (1993 Furse) because it did not interpret a statute which authorizes a cause of action to recover economic loss resulting from fraudulent or abusive conduct). In the case we now consider, the district court concluded that Butanda willfully and intentionally committed one of the 20 fraudulent or abusive acts enumerated in the statute. Thus, for the purposes of the Act, Butanda's false statements fit within the provisions of K.S.A. 44-5,120(d)(4)(A) (1993 Furse). Butanda argues that the test under the statute is whether she testified falsely or concealed or misrepresented a material fact solely to obtain or attempt to obtain benefits that she was not entitled to under the Act. Butanda relies upon the traditional definition of fraud, which requires proof that: (1) An untrue statement known to be untrue by the party making it and made with the intent to deceive; (2) reasonable and justifiable reliance by the victim on the truth of the statement; and (3) damages as a result of that reliance. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, Syl. ¶ 2, 738 P.2d 1210 (1987); Nordstrom v. Miller, 227 Kan. 59, Syl. ¶ 6, 605 P.2d 545 (1980); Robinson v. Shah, 23 Kan. App. 2d 812, 819, 936 P.2d 784 (1997). It must be emphasized again that K.S.A. 44-5,120(d) (1993 Furse) defines what fraudulent or abusive acts or practices are for purposes of the workers compensation act.  The making of the false statements by Butanda in obtaining workers compensation benefits is for purposes of the Act defined as fraudulent. The Workers Compensation Act is substantial, complete, and exclusive, covering every phase of the right to compensation and of the procedure for obtaining it. Acosta, 273 Kan. at 396. Thus, an intent to deceive and damages normally associated with fraud, indicated by Butanda's authority, are not included in the statutory definition. Assuming arguendo that the case law definition of fraud applies to Butanda's false statements, her statement also fit the definition of abusive as that term is defined by K.S.A. 44-5,120 (1993 Furse). Although the district court did not make this distinction in finding Butanda's actions were fraudulent and abusive, it affirmed the final order of the Department of Human Resources, which concluded: At the very least, Petitioner's repeated acts of intentionally lying under oath while attempting to obtain payment of workers compensation benefits constituted an abuse of the workers compensation system. (Emphasis added.) Thus, making false statements by lying under oath in workers compensation proceedings are abusive notwithstanding Butanda's legal entitlement to the benefits obtained. We conclude that the district court determination that Butanda's actions in lying to obtain benefits under the Act were fraudulent and abusive acts under K.S.A. 44-5,120 (d)(4)(A) (1993 Furse) is correct.