Opinion ID: 1417717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Right to Confront Witness

Text: Appellant asserts that his constitutional right to confront witnesses that testify against him [3] was violated when Dr. Sabet, a pathologist employed by the Office of the Medical Examiner, gave trial testimony concerning the pathology report which was prepared in June 1994 by Dr. Livingston. Dr. Livingston was no longer employed in the Charleston medical examiner's office at the time of trial. [4] Appellant asserts that the State failed to demonstrate its good faith efforts to secure Dr. Livingston's presence at trial in violation of State v. James Edward S., 184 W.Va. 408, 400 S.E.2d 843 (1990). In James Edward S., this Court established a two-prong standard concerning the admission of extrajudicial testimony. Adopting the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), we held that [t]he two central requirements for admission of extrajudicial testimony under the Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution are: (1) demonstrating the unavailability of the witness to testify; and (2) proving the reliability of the witness's out-of-court statement. Syl. Pt. 2, James Edward S., 184 W.Va. at 410, 400 S.E.2d at 845. To demonstrate a witness's unavailability under James Edward S., a proponent of an extrajudicial statement is required to show evidence establishing a good-faith effort towards securing the witness's presence at trial. See id. at 410, 400 S.E.2d at 845, syl. pt. 3. Since the record is devoid of the State's efforts to secure Dr. Livingston's presence at trial, Appellant maintains that the State failed to meet the requirements imposed by James Edward S. for admitting an extrajudicial statement of an unavailable witness. After initially positing that Appellant failed to preserve an objection on Confrontation Clause grounds, [5] the State argues that the law upon which this Court relied in making its rulings in James Edward S. [6] was modified on two separate occasions and no longer supports the holding reached in that decision. The United States Supreme Court first modified its Roberts decision by stating in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986), that Roberts cannot be fairly read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394, 106 S.Ct. 1121. The Court unabashedly explained in Inadi that the Roberts decision was expressly limited to its factsthe admission at trial of the transcript of a probable cause hearing where a witness failed to appear despite being subpoenaed. Id. Later, in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992), the United States Supreme Court reemphasized that Roberts stands for the proposition that the unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding. [7] White, 502 U.S. at 354, 112 S.Ct. 736. Based on the limitations imposed by the United States Supreme Court to the Roberts decision, the State convincingly argues that James Edward S. is no longer valid precedent with regard to Appellant's contention regarding unavailability. We agree. Accordingly, we modify our holding in James Edward S. to comply with the United States Supreme Court's subsequent pronouncements regarding the application of its decision in Roberts, to hold that the unavailability prong of the Confrontation Clause inquiry required by syllabus point one of James Edward S. is only invoked when the challenged extrajudicial statements were made in a prior judicial proceeding. [8] See White, 502 U.S. at 354, 112 S.Ct. 736. Given the fact that the extrajudicial statement in this casethe autopsy reportdoes not involve statements given in a prior judicial proceeding, we conclude that the unavailability analysis pertinent to the Confrontation Clause inquiry under James Edward S. is not applicable. The State persuasively reasons that even without the high court's modifications to Roberts, Appellant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was not invoked by virtue of the admission of the autopsy report. This is because Roberts and James Edward S. both made clear that hearsay evidence that falls under a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or alternatively, when such evidence is accompanied by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, is admissible without any affront to the Confrontation Clause. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (stating that [r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception), [9] accord James Edward S., 184 W.Va. at 410, 400 S.E.2d at 845, syl. pt. 5 (holding that [r]eliability can usually be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception). While Appellant states that he was unable to find a well-rooted hearsay exception which governs the admission of Dr. Livingston's autopsy report, the State argues that the autopsy report falls squarely within the hearsay exception for public records. See W.Va. Rules of Evid. 803(8)(B). That rule provides that the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: Public records and reports.Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel.... W.Va.R.Evid. 803(8)(B). The State posits that since the office of the medical examiner is under a legal duty pursuant to the statutory provisions of West Virginia Code §§ 61-12-10 and 61-12-13 (1997) [10] to perform autopsies and record the results, an autopsy report necessarily falls within the ambit of the public records hearsay exception. And, as the United States Supreme Court announced in Roberts, where the extrajudicial evidence falls within a recognized hearsay exception, the concerns inherent to the Confrontation Clause are clearly avoided. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531; James Edward S., 184 W.Va. at 410, 400 S.E.2d at 845, syl. pt. 5; accord White, 502 U.S. at 356-57, 112 S.Ct. 736 (stating where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied and observing a statement that qualifies for admission under a `firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)); see also United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027 (4th Cir.1996) (upholding use of deceased co-conspirator's grand jury testimony at trial after finding numerous guarantees of trustworthiness), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281, 117 S.Ct. 2468, 138 L.Ed.2d 223 (1997). Numerous courts have recognized the fact that the public records exception is a firmly established exception which satisfies the Confrontation Clause. See e.g., Felzcerek v. I.N.S., 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1996); U.S. v. Wilkinson, 804 F.Supp. 263, 268 n. 6 (D.Utah 1992); State v. Powdrill, 684 So.2d 350, 358 (La.1996); People v. Stacy, 193 Mich.App. 19, 484 N.W.2d 675, 683 (1992). The United States Supreme Court recognized in Roberts that, [p]roperly administered the ... public records exception would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay exceptions. 448 U .S. at 66 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Comment, 30 La. L.Rev. 651, 668 (1970)). In Montgomery v. Fogg, 479 F.Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y.1979), the district court held that [o]fficial reports ... are a recognized exception to the hearsay rule and have long been deemed admissible, notwithstanding the confrontation clause. Id. at 370. With regard to autopsy reports themselves, the court made the following observation in Fogg: The autopsy reports in this case are official records kept in the regular and usual course of the performance by the medical examiner of this official duties. Their reliability is underscored by the rigid requirements of the New York statute that the examiner who performs the autopsy be a doctor of medicine and a skilled pathologist and microscopist, and that he record and specify in detail his findings. Id. At least one federal court has determined that, even if autopsy reports do not fall within the public records exception, because they carry sufficient particularized guarantees of trustworthiness[,] they satisfy the concerns presented by the Confrontation Clause. [11] Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 784 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910, 111 S.Ct. 1695, 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991). Despite Appellant's protestations, Dr. Sabet was properly permitted by the trial court to give testimony based on the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Livingston. This Court has consistently held that one pathologist can give testimony by referencing information provided in an autopsy report completed by another pathologist. See State v. Linkous, 177 W.Va. 621, 625, 355 S.E.2d 410, 414 n. 3 (1987) (citing syl. pt. 5 of State v. Jackson, 171 W.Va. 329, 298 S.E.2d 866 (1982) in which we held that [a]ny physician qualified as an expert may give an opinion about physical and medical cause of injury or death and that [t]his opinion may be based in part on an autopsy report). Accordingly, it is beyond dispute that a medical examiner can testify as to the physical and medical cause of death. See State v. Triplett, 187 W.Va. 760, 767, 421 S.E.2d 511, 518 (1992); State v. Clark, 171 W.Va. 74, 77-78, 297 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1982). Thus, Dr. Sabet was permitted to testify, based on his review of Dr. Livingston's report, concerning the origin of the wounds on the victim's body. Appellant maintains that Dr. Sabet was wrongly allowed to testify regarding the instrument used to inflict stab wounds on the victim's body. Dr. Sabet testified that these wounds were consistent with being inflicted by a screwdriver. While this conclusion was not contained in Dr. Livingston's report, we find no problem with Dr. Sabet's testimony regarding the possible use of a screwdriver. This was a conclusion independently reached by Dr. Sabet and he was available for cross-examination at trial on this issue. [12] After a complete review of Appellant's Confrontation Clause assignment, we find no reversible error.