Opinion ID: 1368589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: health care practitioner

Text: In order to resolve the issue, our task is one of statutory construction. We must interpret Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b) (Supp.1999) to determine whether EMTs are included within the language health care practitioner[s]. To aid us in our work, there are a number of principles of statutory construction, among which is the most basic rule of statutory construction: `to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.' Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn.2000) (quoting Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State Dep't. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn.1993)). However, the court must ascertain the intent without unduly restricting or expanding the statute's coverage beyond its intended scope. State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn.1993). See also Gleaves, 15 S.W.3d at 802; Worley v. Weigels, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn.1996); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995). The legislative intent and purpose are to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, without a forced or subtle interpretation that would limit or extend the statute's application. State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200, 210 (Tenn.2000) (citing State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Tenn.1999)). Courts are not authorized to alter or amend a statute. Gleaves, 15 S.W.3d at 803. The reasonableness of a statute may not be questioned by a court, and a court may not substitute its own policy judgments for those of the legislature. Id. (citing BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997)). [C]ourts must `presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.'  Id. (quoting BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 972 S.W.2d at 673). When the foregoing principles of statutory construction are applied to the language of Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b) (Supp.1999), we have no difficulty concluding that EMTs are health care practitioners. EMTs are licensed under the Emergency Medical Services Act of 1983. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 68-140-501 to XX-XXX-XXX (1996 & Supp.1999). Under the Act, an EMT is defined as an individual licensed to practice emergency medical care. Tenn.Code Ann. 68-140-502(12) (Supp.1999). An emergency medical technician-paramedic (EMT P) is defined as an individual licensed to practice advanced emergency medical care. Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-140-502(13) (Supp.1999). Emergency medical services are defined as those services utilized in responding to the perceived need for immediate medical care in order to prevent loss of life or aggravation of illness or injury. Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-140-502(11) (Supp.1999). Applying the foregoing statutes to the facts in this case, the defendant EMTs were licensed under this Act. The proof shows that the two defendant-EMTs had received specialized training to become licensed as emergency medical technicians and that they provided specialized medical care to Mooney based upon their training. The defendant-EMTs testified that they went to the accident scene and assessed the injuries the patient had and then began treating him until the time he was released to the hospital. Because the defendants were licensed as emergency medical technician-paramedics under this Act, they were by definition practic[ing] advanced emergency medical care. Thus, they were clearly health care practitioners. In so holding, although we agree with the Court of Appeals' result, we decline to adopt the definition adopted in Todd v. Weakley County, No. 02A01-9708-CV-00197, 1998 WL 395172 (Tenn.Ct.App., filed July 16, 1998) [4] , which defines health care practitioners as those licensed by Title 63 of Tennessee Code Annotated. The legislature did not elect to define health care practitioners by those professions governed by Title 63, although it easily could have done so. We view the Todd definition as both too broad and too narrow. By defining health care practitioner to be one who is engaged in the exercise or employment of a health care vocation or occupation ... which requires licensure or certification under the provisions of Title 63, the Todd definition includes: podiatrists; chiropractors; dentists; physicians; nurses; optometrists; osteopathic physicians; pharmacists; psychologists; veterinarians; occupational and physical therapists; dispensing opticians; nursing home administrators; communication disorder specialists (speech pathologists & audiologists and hearing instrument specialists); massage therapists; physician assistants; professional counselors, marital and family therapists, and clinical pastoral therapists; social workers; athletic trainers; dieticians & nutritionists; electrologists; respiratory care practitioners; and clinical perfusionists. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 63-1-101XX-XX-XXX (1997 & Supp.1999). This case does not require us to decide which of these occupations are health care practitioners for purposes of the Governmental Tort Liability Act. However, we note that Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b) (Supp.1999) only applies to claims for medical malpractice brought against a health care practitioner; consequently, the term health care practitioner must be construed in the context of those individuals who are subject to being sued for medical malpractice. [5] Because the Todd definition includes all health care practitioners who are licensed under Title 63, some of whom cannot be sued for medical malpractice, that definition is too broad. The Todd definition is also too narrow. By defining health care practitioner as those practitioners licensed pursuant to Title 63, the definition omits any health care practitioners who are licensed under a separate title, specifically EMTs, who are licensed under Title 68. As we have concluded above, EMTs are clearly health care practitioners for purposes of the GTLA. We likewise decline to adopt the definition urged by the defendant-EMTs. They would have us construe health care practitioner to mean only those individuals who practice medicine, i.e., licensed physicians. We believe, however, that the EMTs at issue in this case are engaged in the exercise of the profession of providing emergency medical services and, thus, are health care practitioners. If the legislature had intended to limit the exception to licensed physicians, it clearly could have done so. Since it did not do so, we must conclude that the definition includes others who provide specialized medical care to patients. Finally, the defendant-EMTs argue that public policy supports the providing of immunity to government employees who provide emergency medical services. They assert that Tennessee is the only state to specifically impose unlimited, personal liability upon emergency medical technicians. Furthermore, they assert that a decision that EMTs are health care practitioners will subject low-salaried government employees to unlimited liability and will limit the delivery of emergency services to the public. These public policy arguments are persuasive, but they must be made to the General Assembly. It is not the function of this Court to substitute its own policy judgments for those of the legislature. See Gleaves, 15 S.W.3d at 803. [6]