Opinion ID: 1356674
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Mental Health Requirement

Text: Heckman also challenges the mental health condition imposed on him by the District Court as an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the United States Probation Office. The challenged condition states: The defendant shall participate in a mental health program for evaluation and/or treatment as directed by the United States Probation Office. The defendant shall remain in treatment until satisfactorily discharged and with the approval of the United States Probation Office, including sex offender treatment. App. 6. There is ample support for this special condition in the record. For instance, Heckman's extensive criminal history of exploiting children alone demonstrates a proclivity for committing sexual offenses involving minors and child pornography and [an] apparent inability to control himself. Id. at 56-57. Such a proclivity undoubtedly justifies a mental health treatment program. The question remains, however, whether the challenged condition delegates too much authority to the Probation Office. We think not in this case. In challenging that condition, Heckman relies heavily on our decision in United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005). The special condition we rejected there seems on its face similar to the one here. It read: The defendant shall participate in a mental health treatment program at the discretion of the probation officer. [13] Id. at 248. Even while striking down this condition, we conceded that probation officers must be allowed some discretion in dealing with their charges, as courts cannot be expected to map out every detail of a defendant's supervised release. Id. at 250. The principle is that we must balance[] the need for flexibility with the constitutional requirement that judges, not probation officers, set the terms of a sentence. Id. at 251. It works out practically as follows: If [the defendant] is required to participate in a mental health intervention only if directed to do so by his probation officer, then this special condition constitutes an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the probation officer. On the other hand, if the District Court was intending nothing more than to delegate to the probation officer the details with respect to the selection and schedule of the program, such delegation was proper. Id. ( quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.2001)). There were special, fact-specific circumstances in Pruden that led us to reject the latter reading of the condition. The mental health condition was not recommended in the [Presentence Report] or requested by the government, id. at 245; there was no evidence of, and no findings for, the need for mental health treatment, id. at 249, 251 n. 5; and, to seal the matter, at oral argument the [G]overnment conceded... that the District Court did not intend the probation officer's discretion to extend only to the choice of particular programs. Id. at 251 n. 5 (emphasis added). In our case, however, Heckman's extensive history of exploiting children certainly supports reading the condition as a permissible form of delegation. Furthermore, unlike in Pruden, the Government here did not concede that the probation officer's discretion in our case extended past the choice and scheduling of particular mental health programs. For instance, when Heckman requested a specific correctional facility at his sentencing hearing, the Government emphasized the importance of providing mental health treatment during the time of his incarceration, insisting that Heckman be housed in a facility with some type of sex offender treatment. App. 41-42. Finally, we concede that, taken in isolation, it is possible to read the phrase shall participate in a mental health program for evaluation and/or treatment as allowing the Probation Office to order evaluation but not treatmenta potentially impermissible delegation of authority under Pruden. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). The second sentence of the release condition, however, leads us to reject such a reading, as Heckman  shall remain in treatment ..., including sex offender treatment, a clause most naturally read as requiring mandatory treatment and thus limiting the Probation Office's discretion. Id. (emphasis added). In this context, we read Heckman's provision as permissibly `delegat[ing] to the probation officer the details with respect to the selection and schedule of [the defendant's mental health treatment] program.' Pruden, 398 F.3d at 251 ( quoting Peterson, 248 F.3d at 85). Participation in the mental health treatment program itself is mandatory, and only the details are to be set by the Probation Office. Thus, we see no plain error in imposing Heckman's mental health condition of supervised release.