Opinion ID: 3046749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence Regarding Count Two

Text: Count Two of the indictment alleges a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) which allegedly began in August 1998 and continued “at least through April 26, 1999.” App. at 18. The prosecution’s theory was that Bornman corruptly solicited and accepted certain things of value from Eugene Sardelli, the owner of the Superior Shotcrete Construction Company, with the intent of being influenced in regard to Bornman’s approval of work on a particular HPRP project, the Postle House. The government introduced evidence that on April 26, 1999, Bornman, acting in his capacity as an HPRP official, inspected the Postle House and approved final payment of over $70,000 to Superior Shotcrete, even though work on the project was incomplete. In addition, it introduced evidence from which the jury could have inferred that in February and March of 1999 and while he was working for HPRP, (1) Bornman worked with Sardelli to organize a new company, Pioneer Shotcrete, into which Sardelli intended to transfer much or all of his contracting 11 business; (2) Sardelli promised Bornman employment with Pioneer Shotcrete, provided office space and a cell phone for Bornman, and had business cards printed for Pioneer Shotcrete showing Bornman as its vice president; and (3) Bornman distributed business cards showing him as the vice president. Although Bornman presented an alternative explanation for his behavior – namely, that he discontinued his employment with HPRP in January – the jury could infer that Bornman’s employment with HPRP was ongoing as of April 26, 1999. If the jury drew these inferences, it would have been entitled to conclude that Bornman accepted something of value – i.e., the offer of employment – with the intent, inter alia, of having that relationship influence his remaining official actions with respect to Superior Shotcrete. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Helbing, 209 F.3d at 238, substantial evidence supports the conviction.