Opinion ID: 182334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Warden Roper's Appeal

Text: Warden Roper appeals the district court's ruling that Worthington's attorneys were ineffective during the penalty phase because they failed to investigate adequately his social history and medical history, including his family's background, and pursue a psychological mitigation strategy based on expert testimony. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions, Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir.2004), including its application of the standards of review imposed by AEDPA, Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 605 n. 6 (3d Cir.2002). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Armstrong, 365 F.3d at 626. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a decision by a state court with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings is entitled to deference by the federal courts. [W]hen a state prisoner files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court we are directed to undertake only a limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions. Collier v. Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 421 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting Morales v. Ault, 476 F.3d 545, 549 (8th Cir.2007)). AEDPA instructs that habeas relief cannot be granted unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it either arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or decides a case differently than th[e] [Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if it identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e] [Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A federal court may not issue the writ simply because it `concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.' Lyons v. Luebbers, 403 F.3d 585, 592 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495). The language of § 2254(d) plainly limits the applicability of AEDPA's deferential standard to claims that have been adjudicated on the merits in state court. Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 460 (8th Cir.2004) (en banc). Absent state court adjudication, a federal habeas court will apply de novo review. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)). As a threshold matter, then, we must determine whether the Missouri courts adjudicated the merits of Worthington's claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate adequately his background and present effective psychological mitigation expert testimony at the penalty phase. Neither party argues that the Missouri Supreme Court adjudicated the claim's merits. [2] Rather, Warden Roper contends that the district court should have looked through the silent supreme court opinion and applied AEDPA's deferential review to the postconviction trial court decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); Mark v. Ault, 498 F.3d 775 (8th Cir.2007). This contention requires two related inquiries. First, did the postconviction trial court adjudicate the merits of Worthington's claim? Second, if the postconviction trial court did adjudicate the merits, should a federal habeas court look through the Missouri Supreme Court's decision and evaluate the postconviction trial court's reasoned decision under the deferential AEDPA standard? As to the first inquiry, we conclude that Worthington's claim was indeed adjudicated on the merits by the postconviction trial court. That court correctly recognized Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), as requiring proof that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Worthington, No. 00-12558, slip op. at 7-12. The court also determined that [t]rial counsel's pre-trial conduct in having [Worthington] examined by two mental health professionals and consulting with and calling as a witness . . . a doctor of pharmacy, was a reasonable and thorough investigation. Id. at 10. Concluding that Worthington had failed to satisfy either Strickland prong, the court stated: [T]rial counsel did conduct a reasonable investigation and made a reasonable decision that made further investigations unnecessary. The court further finds that [Worthington] has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise under substantially similar circumstances and that he was thereby prejudiced. Id. at 11. Despite the postconviction trial court's treatment of his ineffective-assistance claim, Worthington now argues that it did not adjudicate this portion of his claim because it did not adequately scrutinize his allegation that counsel performed ineffectively at the penalty phase by failing to supply experts with comprehensive background information. This argument fails to persuade, however, because a review of the postconviction trial court's decision leaves no question that it rejected Worthington's ineffective-assistance claim in toto. [3] AEDPA's requirement that a petitioner's claim be adjudicated on the merits by a state court is not an entitlement to a well-articulated or even a correct decision by a state court. Weaver, 438 F.3d at 839 (quoting Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir.2005)). Accordingly, the postconviction trial court's discussion of counsel's performancecombined with its express determination that the ineffective-assistance claim as a whole lacked meritplainly suffices as an adjudication on the merits under AEDPA. As to the second inquiry, when a state appellate court affirms a lower court decision without reasoning, we look through the silent opinion and apply AEDPA review to the last reasoned decision of the state courts. See Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1038 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590); cf. Mark, 498 F.3d at 783 (looking through to Iowa Court of Appeals decision where Iowa Supreme Court denied discretionary review) (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590). This is so regardless of whether the affirmance was reasoned as to some issues or was a summary denial of all claims. See Winfield, 460 F.3d at 1038 (citing Steward v. Cain, 259 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir.2001)); see also Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289 (3d Cir.2008) ([W]e should review the [postconviction trial court] decision since it either represents the state courts' last reasoned opinion on this topic or has not been supplemented in a meaningful way by the higher state court.). Worthington urges this court to limit the look through doctrine to its original application by the Supreme Court in Ylst determining whether an independent state ground procedurally bars a petitioner from seeking federal habeas review. However, Worthington's narrow reading is foreclosed by our decision in Mark, where we used the AEDPA standard to review the merits of an intermediate state court decision. 498 F.3d at 783 (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590). Indeed, other courts likewise have employed AEDPA to review the merits of lower court decisions in the absence of a reasoned affirmance by a state's highest court. See Malone v. Clarke, 536 F.3d 54, 63 n. 6 (1st Cir.2008) (The highest state court . . . summarily denied Malone's habeas claim, therefore, we `look through' to `the last reasoned decision,' which is the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court.) (citing Gunter v. Maloney, 291 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir.2002)); Bond, 539 F.3d at 289 (reviewing the state trial court decision where the state supreme court decision did not add further reasoning than that provided by the [postconviction trial court]); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir.2006) ([T]he decision we review is that of the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion on the issue.) (quotation marks omitted); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 n. 3 (9th Cir.2002) (where state appellate courts denied habeas petition without comment, a federal habeas court must look to the last reasoned decision of the state court as the basis of the state court's judgment). Applying the deferential AEDPA standard of review to his claim that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to investigate and pursue mitigating psychological evidence, we now consider whether Worthington is entitled to federal habeas relief. [4] Because the postconviction trial court correctly identified Strickland as the controlling authority for ineffective-assistance claims, we address whether the state court unreasonably applied that precedent and whether the state court unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented. Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir.2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As discussed above, to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Worthington had to demonstrate both that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Failure to establish either Strickland prong is fatal to an ineffective-assistance claim. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The first prong of Strickland requires a showing that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. [C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Although in assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance the Supreme Court has looked to sources such as the ABA Capital Sentencing Guidelines, see, e.g., Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387, 125 S.Ct. 2456; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527, [n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court also has emphasized that hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to `counsel's perspective at the time' investigative decisions are made, and by giving a `heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgment.' Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052). As a result, review of the state court's determination that Worthington has not proved an ineffective-assistance claim is twice deferential: we apply a highly deferential review to the state court decision; the state court, in turn, is highly deferential to the judgments of trial counsel. Link v. Luebbers, 469 F.3d 1197, 1202 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Nooner v. Norris, 402 F.3d 801, 808 (8th Cir.2005)). The second prong of Strickland prejudicerequires a showing of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's ineffectiveness, the result of the penalty phase would have been more favorable to the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Merely showing a conceivable effect is not enough; a reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Worthington relies heavily on three Supreme Court cases decided after Strickland that have further defined the contours of counsel's duty to investigate at the penalty phase: Williams v. Taylor , Wiggins v. Smith , and Rompilla v. Beard . [5] In Williams, the Court ordered habeas relief under AEDPA, concluding that counsel's performance fell well outside the bounds of effective assistance. 529 U.S. at 398-99, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Williams's counsel did not begin to prepare for th[e] [penalty] phase . . . until a week before the trial, id. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495, and failed to introduce any evidence of Williams's exemplary prison behavior, his role in helping to break up a prison drug ring, or his borderline mental retardation, id. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Furthermore, counsel also neglected to uncover extensive records describing Williams's nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. Id. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Court in Wiggins likewise held that counsel's decision to limit the scope of investigationand their resulting failure to introduce any of Wiggins's personal history as mitigation evidencewas constitutionally deficient. 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The state court decision to the contrary, the Court held, reflected an unreasonable application of Strickland.  Id. at 528, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Counsel had abandoned any form of mitigation argument based on personal history after having acquired only the presentence investigation reportwhich included a one-page account of Wiggins's backgroundand city social service records documenting his placements in the state foster care system. Id. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The Court determined that counsel's failure to expand their search after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of [Wiggins's] history from a narrow set of sources fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (citing ABA Guidelines). While  Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing, id. at 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527, the Court concluded that counsel nonetheless had been ineffective. `[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable' only to the extent that `reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Finally, in Rompilla, the petitioner argued that trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to investigate his school records, juvenile records, evidence of alcohol dependence, andmost significantlythe court file of his previous conviction. 545 U.S. at 382-83, 125 S.Ct. 2456. With regard to the school and juvenile records and the alcoholism evidence, the Court acknowledged that there is room for debate about trial counsel's obligation to follow at least some of those potential lines of enquiry. Id. at 383, 125 S.Ct. 2456. Reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste. Id. (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2052). However, the Court determined that counsel had performed deficiently in failing to examine the easily accessible court file on Rompilla's prior conviction, id., because they were fully aware of the prosecution's plan to introduce evidence of the conviction at sentencing, id. at 389-90, 125 S.Ct. 2456. Entries in the file, the Court observed, would have destroyed the benign conception of Rompilla's upbringing and mental capacity that Rompilla's trial counsel and mental health experts had entertained. Id. at 391, 125 S.Ct. 2456. Here, Worthington argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate adequately his background and pursue a psychological mitigation strategy based on expert testimony. Specifically, Worthington faults trial counsel's failure to interview family members and acquaintances, to procure his records from the Illinois Department of Corrections, and to obtain the psychiatric and medical records of Worthington's mother, father, uncle, grandmother, and grandfather. This additional history, he alleges, would have supported mitigating expert testimony regarding his mental health. The state court concluded that trial counsel made a reasonable decision not to pursue the mental-health strategy further and thus acted reasonably in not pursuing further psychological evidence. Worthington, No. 00-12558, slip op. at 10, 11. As we have noted, counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable determination that an investigation is unnecessary. Link, 469 F.3d at 1203 (citing Sidebottom v. Delo, 46 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.1995)). Ordinarily, we consider strategic decisions to be virtually unchallengeable unless they are based on deficient investigation. Id. at 1204. Therefore, our analysis of Worthington's claim entails two inquiries: whether the state court reasonably decided that counsel had conducted an adequate investigation, and whether the state court reasonably decided that counsel's resulting decision to refrain from further investigating and presenting psychological mitigation evidence was reasonable. Worthington's claim rests heavily on his contention that attorney Joseph Green performed an unreasonably cursory investigation before deciding against pursuing further psychological evidence. In particular, Worthington asserts, Green's testimony demonstrates that he had no strategic reason not to further investigate Worthington's background and pursue further psychological evaluations. Green had been subcontracted by attorney Scott Rosenblum to handle much of Worthington's penalty phase. During his post-conviction deposition, Green acknowledged that he had not hired a mitigation specialist even though mitigation specialists usually are employed in death penalty cases. He testified, though, that the records compiled by Dr. Givon during his 1996 examination (discussed further below) were consistent with the type of records that a mitigation specialist would have obtained. Green spoke to Worthington's mother only briefly, but he found that she was preoccupied with portraying herself as a good mother. He also contacted Carol Tegard, Worthington's aunt, who later testified as a mitigation witness during the penalty phase. Despite having the names of other family members and acquaintances, Green did not contact them or travel to Peoria, Illinois, Worthington's home town. [6] Green also did not procure records other than those acquired by Dr. Givon. While the extent of Green's preparation for the penalty phase was not ideal, in assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance, we cannot disregard the efforts of attorney Rosenblum. See Bucklew, 436 F.3d at 1019 (It is not deficient performance for a team of attorneys to divide among them the workload of a case in a rational and efficient manner.). The record reflects that Rosenblum assumed the role of undermining Dr. Givon's testimony that Worthington was a malingerer and had only antisocial personality disorder, not a mental disease or defect. Although, based on the record, it is impossible to determine the level of Green's involvement in the relevant decision-making, [7] it is clear that Rosenblum investigated the possibility of a psychological mitigation argument at the penalty phase and made a reasoned strategic determination not to pursue such an approach. Rosenblum's testimony establishes that he retained Dr. Miller, a psychiatrist, in early August 1998, initially for the purpose of exploring the feasibility of a diminished-capacity defense at trial. Dr. Miller met with Worthington twice, on August 6 and August 19. He also was provided with police investigative reports and partial records of Worthington's 10-day psychiatric hospitalization at the Methodist Medical Center of Illinois in 1994, along with Dr. Givon's 1996 report. Dr. Givon also had interviewed Worthington twice and had administered an MMPI-2 psychological test. As noted above, Dr. Givon's report diagnosed antisocial personality disorder, malingering, cocaine-dependence, and alcohol abuse. In addition, the report summarized a substantial collection of records regarding Worthington's background and medical history, including a school psychological evaluation performed at age fourteen; a 1989 psychological evaluation; records from the Illinois Department of Corrections, Youth Division; a 1994 report from White Oak Knolls Rehabilitation Center; records from Worthington's hospitalization at the Methodist Medical Center; and notes from two 1995 counseling sessions. Rosenblum did not provide Dr. Miller with every record on which Dr. Givon's report was based, but he invited Dr. Miller to request the materials from Dr. Givon directly. In his postconviction deposition, Rosenblum explained that he adopted a similar approach in previous cases because Dr. Givon provide[d] his records generally pretty easily without much of a problem. Dr. Miller never requested further records from Rosenblum. Nor is there any indication that he contacted Dr. Givon. This case is not one where the record is clear that no reasonable attorney . . . would have failed to pursue further evidence. Link, 469 F.3d at 1203. Indeed, we have repeatedly observed that [w]here counsel has obtained the assistance of a qualified expert on the issue of the defendant's sanity and nothing has happened that should have alerted counsel to any reason why the expert's advice was inadequate, counsel has no obligation to shop for a better opinion. Marcrum v. Luebbers, 509 F.3d 489, 511 (8th Cir.2007) (citing Sidebottom, 46 F.3d at 753); see also Winfield, 460 F.3d at 1041. Cases in which the Supreme Court has held counsel's failure to investigate to be constitutionally ineffective involved a level of deficiency absent from the present case. Counsel in Williams neglected to prepare for the penalty phase until one week before the hearing and erroneously believed that state law barred access to their client's records. 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Counsel in Wiggins based their decision not to present any mitigating evidence solely on one page in a presentence investigation report and a collection of social service records that documented their client's placement history in the foster care system. 539 U.S. at 524-25, 123 S.Ct. 2527. And counsel in Rompilla failed to examine a readily available court file that they knew the prosecution planned to introduce as evidence of aggravating factors. 545 U.S. at 389-90, 125 S.Ct. 2456. In light of Supreme Court precedent, then, we cannot say that the state court's determination that counsel conducted a reasonable investigation into psychological mitigating evidence constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Counsel based the decision not to pursue a psychological mitigation strategy on the opinions of two mental-health professionalsDrs. Givon and Millereach of whom had interviewed Worthington twice. Dr. Givon had reviewed a substantial collection of records pertaining to Worthington's social and medical history. Likewise, Dr. Miller demonstrated significant familiarity with many of the records documenting Worthington's background. See State App. 494 (noting Dr. Kessler's report); id. (noting Dr. Legan's report); id. (noting reports from the Illinois Department of Correction, Youth Division); id. 494-95 (noting records of Dr. Ryall's sessions). Further, Dr. Miller was aware of the physical and sexual abuse that Worthington suffered as a child. See id. 493. He also knew that Worthington's grandmother was chronically hospitalized for schizophrenia and that both of Worthington's parents had been in psychiatric hospitals and rehabilitation programs. See id. 496. We cannot conclude, therefore, that the opinions of Drs. Givon and Miller were so lacking in factual basis that the state court unreasonably concluded that counsel had conducted an adequate investigation. [8] Having determined that counsel reasonably investigated the potential for a psychological mitigation strategy, we now examine the state court's decision that counsel reasonably decided against further investigating and presenting expert psychological evidence at the penalty phase. Because Worthington has failed to show that his attorneys' investigation was deficient, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (Questioning a few more family members and searching for old records can promise less than looking for a needle in a haystack, when a lawyer truly has reason to doubt there is any needle there.). Rosenblum's testimony demonstrates that counsel's decisionmaking in this case fell well within the bounds of reasonable trial strategy. After a rather lengthy [telephone] conversation with Dr. Miller, Rosenblum decided against pursuing a psychological mitigation strategy. Dr. Miller corroborated Dr. Givon's diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, which Rosenblum considered very damaging. Additionally, Rosenblum expressed concern that [s]ome of [Worthington's] self reporting . . . was not consistent under hypnosis. This inconsistency, he feared, would undermine efforts to challenge Dr. Givon's diagnosis of malingering, especially in light of Dr. Miller's inability to refute Dr. Givon's conclusion. The beneficial nuggets in Dr. Miller's diagnoses were far outweighed by the substantial negative impact his testimony would have had. For these reasons, counsel decided not to present testimony regarding Worthington's mental health at the penalty phase. Instead counsel presented a meaningful mitigation case that focused on Worthington's abusive background and persuaded the sentencing court to find as mitigating factors his dysfunctional family life, his abuse and neglect as a child, and his history of drug abuse. Taking into account the leeway given to counsel under the Strickland standard and that given to the state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), Marcrum, 509 F.3d at 501, we conclude that Worthington has not overcome the strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably in deciding against pursuing an expert psychological mitigation strategy, see Link, 469 F.3d at 1204. [9] As a result, we reverse the district court's grant of habeas relief on this claim.