Opinion ID: 694553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 17 We must reverse EPA's decision to require renewable oxygenates in its final rule if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. EPA, 768 F.2d 385, 389 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986). Also, under the CAA, agency action may be reversed by the court if it is not in accordance with law, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7607(d)(9)(A), or is in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7607(d)(9)(C). To determine whether EPA's action is contrary to law, we must look to the CAA. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C.Cir.1992). If, using the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the meaning of section 7545(k)(1) is clear, then the court must give effect to that meaning. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n. 9. If the statute is ambiguous, the court must then defer to EPA's interpretation, as long as it is reasonable. Id. at 843-45, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-83. 18 We conclude that the plain meaning of section 7545(k)(1) precludes the adoption of RFG rules that are not directed toward the reduction of VOCs and toxics emissions, and, since the statute is unambiguous, EPA improperly interpreted the section as giving it the broader power to adopt the ROR. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 471-72, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (It is axiomatic that an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.). The sole purpose of the RFG program is to reduce air pollution, which it does through specific performance standards for reducing VOCs and toxics emissions. EPA admits that the ROR will not give additional emission reductions for VOCs or toxics, see 59 Fed.Reg. at 39,283, and has even conceded that use of ethanol might possibly make air quality worse. Id. at 39,268. 19 While EPA relies on the first sentence of section 7545(k)(1) for its broad authority to impose requirements for RFG that are independent of and in addition to the obligation to require the greatest achievable VOC and toxics emissions reductions under the second sentence of Section [7545(k)(1) ], 58 Fed.Reg. at 68,351, neither that sentence alone nor in conjunction with the rest of the section grants EPA authority to require the use of oxygenates that will not reduce, and may increase, VOCs and toxics emissions. As the court found in Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 455 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 3571, 82 L.Ed.2d 870 (1984), EPA cannot rely on its general authority to make rules necessary to carry out its functions when a specific statutory directive defines the relevant functions of EPA in a particular area. Also, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Reilly, 976 F.2d at 41, the court observed that the general grant of rulemaking power to EPA cannot trump specific portions of the CAA and that EPA cannot use the general rulemaking authority under section 7601(a)(1) as justification for adding new factors to a list of statutorily specified ones. See also United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 2182, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (court must not be guided by a single sentence of a statute but must look to the provisions of the whole law and to its object and policy). Thus, EPA cannot uncouple the first sentence of section 7545(k)(1) from the rest of the section in order to expand its authority beyond the aims and limits of the section as a whole. 20 In effect, EPA argues that because Congress has not explicitly limited its authority to promulgate a renewable oxygenate requirement, its interpretation of section 7545(k)(1) thus passes Chevron 's first step, and this court must then defer to its expansive interpretation of the section under Chevron 's second step. To suggest, however, that Chevron step two is implicated any time a statute does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative power (i.e. when the statute is not written in 'thou shalt not' terms), is both flatly unfaithful to the principles of administrative law ..., and refuted by precedent. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C.Cir.1994) (in banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1392, 131 L.Ed.2d 243 (1995). Thus, we will not presume a delegation of power based solely on the fact that there is not an express withholding of such power. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060-61 (D.C.Cir.1995). 21 Section 7545(k)(1) authorizes the adoption of regulations to achieve the greatest reduction in emissions of VOCs and toxics and the consideration of nonair-quality factors listed in the section is only to ensure that any emission reduction steps do not have inordinate economic, environmental, or energy effects. The overriding goal is air quality, and the other listed considerations are subordinate to that goal. Once EPA has taken the factors into consideration in the context of attaining the greatest reduction in VOCs and toxics emissions achievable, the statute does not authorize it to use these factors as a basis for imposing any additional restrictions on RFG, even if the additional restrictions would yield some benefit among the factors to be taken into consideration. Accordingly, since EPA must consider factors such as energy requirements only as subordinate concerns to clear goals of the RFG program, it lacks the authority to promulgate the ROR, which advances the use of renewable oxygenates not in furtherance of, and perhaps at the expense of, reductions in VOCs and toxics emissions. 22 Our conclusion is supported by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7545(c), which authorizes EPA to control or prohibit the manufacture or sale of fuels or fuel additives if the agency finds that such fuels or fuel additives cause or contribute to air pollution or impair the performance of emission control devices. 1 Before it can prohibit a fuel or fuel additive, EPA must do several things, including publish a finding that such prohibition will not cause the use of any other fuel or fuel additive which will produce emissions that will endanger the public health to the same or greater degree than use of the fuel or additive to be prohibited. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7545(c)(2)(C). In American Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d at 834-36, the court determined that EPA must comply with this section to ban or control a specific gasoline blend that is already in commerce. Moreover, in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 744-46 (D.C.Cir.1974), the court considered an EPA regulation that required outlets whose sale of gasoline exceeded a certain volume to sell at least one grade of unleaded gasoline. The court concluded that this regulation was a control on the sale of leaded gasoline since it effectively precluded certain retailers from selling leaded gasoline unless they also sold unleaded gas. Id. at 744. Accordingly, the court found that EPA had the power to promulgate this regulation under section 7545(c) of the CAA. Id. 23 There is a clear parallel between Amoco Oil Co. and the instant case since the ROR's mandate to use renewable oxygenates necessarily controls the use of nonrenewable oxygenates. This suggests that EPA's power to control a fuel or fuel additive already in commerce is controlled by section 7545(c) and that EPA does not have an independent source of authority to control or prohibit nonrenewable oxygenates springing from the considerations enumerated in section 7545(k)(1). Tellingly, in promulgating the regulations establishing the RFG program, EPA relied on section 7545(c) to impose an additional requirement on RFG that reduced oxides of nitrogen, which was directed at a reduction in ozone formation. 59 Fed.Reg. at 7,745. Finally, the authority to set a standard under the CAA does not authorize EPA to mandate the manner of compliance or the precise formula for compliance without additional explicit authority. See Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 286-89, 98 S.Ct. at 573-75; PPG Indus., Inc., 660 F.2d at 636. 24 In light of our conclusions above, we need not address petitioners' remaining arguments about the ROR.