Opinion ID: 2967565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: title vii and section 1981 claims

Text: We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Bryant. Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001). Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by the existence of some factual dispute; rather, [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265. In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we can affirm on any legal basis supported by the record and are not confined to the grounds relied on by the district court. Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F.2d 1318, 1322 (4th Cir. 1993). B. Retaliation, Color and Sex Discrimination Claims In granting Bell Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment, the district court did not address Bryant’s claims of retaliation, and color and sex discrimination. On appeal, Bell Atlantic contends that Bryant 3 A union breaches its duty of fair representation of an individual employee when it acts in a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory manner. DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983). BRYANT v. BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND 9 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to these claims, and consequently these claims are barred. We agree. Before a plaintiff has standing to file suit under Title VII, he must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC. See Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000). The EEOC charge defines the scope of the plaintiff’s right to institute a civil suit. Id. An administrative charge of discrimination does not strictly limit a Title VII suit which may follow; rather, the scope of the civil action is confined only by the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination. Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 491 (4th Cir. 1981). In the present case, Bryant’s EEOC charge alleges that Bell Atlantic discriminated against him based upon his race.4 Bryant’s complaint alleges that Bell Atlantic discriminated against him based upon his color,5 race, and/or sex, and retaliated against him for filing com- 4 On July 3, 1996, Bryant filed a charge of discrimination based on his race and sex for his September 21, 1995 suspension and May 30, 1996 verbal warning. Bryant received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC based on this charge on April 21, 1997. On July 18, 1997, Bryant filed a timely pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland based on this charge. However, the district court dismissed this case, without prejudice, on December 10, 1997, for failure to effectuate service of the summons and complaint within the applicable time limitations. Bryant’s second charge form filed with the EEOC for his March 5, 1997 termination did not charge discrimination based on Bryant’s sex. Therefore, Bryant has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim of sex discrimination for his alleged wrongful termination. Moreover, Bryant’s claim of sex discrimination for his suspension and verbal warning are time-barred because Bryant filed his complaint outside the ninety-day limitations period in which a plaintiff has to file a claim after receiving a right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 5 Color discrimination arises when the particular hue of the plaintiff’s skin is the cause of the discrimination, such as in the case where a darkcolored African-American individual is discriminated against in favor of a light-colored African-American individual. See, e.g., Walker v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403, 406-07 (N.D. Ga. 1989). In his EEOC 10 BRYANT v. BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND plaints of discrimination with the EEOC and MCHR and for filing grievance and arbitration proceedings. Administrative investigation of retaliation, and color and sex discrimination, however, could not reasonably be expected to occur in light of Bryant’s sole charge of race discrimination, and the investigation of the complaint did not touch on any matters other than race discrimination.6 Therefore, because the scope of Bryant’s complaint exceeds the limits set by the allegations of Bryant’s administrative complaint, we cannot analyze the merits of Bryant’s retaliation or color and sex discrimination claims. C. Race Discrimination Claims To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the enforcement of employee disciplinary measures under Title VII,7 Brycomplaint, Bryant did not indicate that he was discriminated against on the basis of his skin color. Rather, Bryant’s allegations in both his second EEOC charge form and his complaint focus exclusively on Bryant’s race and are devoid of any hint that his particular skin tone motivated the alleged discrimination. 6 The written findings of the MCHR, the administrative agency undertaking the investigation of Bryant’s charge, include no reference to retaliation or color or sex discrimination. Quite the contrary, ¶ 15 of the written findings state: Regarding [Bryant’s] allegation that the disciplinary action he received is based on his race, documentation presented reveals a total of thirty-six technicians were disciplined for the same or similar reason as [Bryant]. Of the thirty-five (35) technicians disciplined, only six (6), or 17% were minority employees. Documentation presented also revealed that seven (7) employees were terminated, of which only two (2), or 29%, were minority employees. The written findings conclude by stating, information and documentation presented revealed that [Bryant’s] race was not a factor in the disciplinary action. ¶ 18. 7 The required elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination are the same under Title VII and Section 1981. Gairola v. Commonwealth of Va. Dept. of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985). BRYANT v. BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND 11 ant must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job and his job performance was satisfactory; (3) he was fired; and (4) other employees who are not members of the protected class were retained under apparently similar circumstances. See, e.g., Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1384 (4th Cir. 1995); Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993). Under the now familiar McDonnell Douglas tripartite burden-shifting framework, if Bryant succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to Bell Atlantic, the employer, who must then articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the difference in treatment. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Should Bell Atlantic articulate a non-discriminatory reason, the burden then shifts back to Bryant to demonstrate that Bell Atlantic’s reasons were not true, but instead were merely a pretext for discrimination. Cook, 988 F.2d at 511. The district court held that Bryant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because of his failure to produce any evidence that Bell Atlantic made any decisions regarding him based on his race. While we commend Mr. Bryant for the seriousness with which he takes his child care responsibilities, we hold that his claim fails to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. It is undisputed that Bryant satisfied his burden with respect to the first three elements of his prima facie case. Nevertheless, Bryant is unable to advance proof that other employees who are not members of the protected class were treated differently than Bryant under similar circumstances. The facts demonstrate that between 1995 and March 1997, Bryant failed to work assigned overtime pursuant to the Red Letter Day policy on at least fifteen occasions. Although we view Bell Atlantic’s implementation of its forced overtime policy to be harsh, Bryant is unable to show that Bell Atlantic treated similarly situated employees outside his class more favorably. Bryant attempts to so demonstrate by comparison to four Bell Atlantic employees. None of this evidence, however, supports Bryant’s claim. First, Bryant contends that he believes that Bell Atlantic excused Don Bradford, a Caucasian male, from working his Red Letter Days because his son was ill. The deposition testimony of Bradford, however, contradicts Bryant’s allegation. In particular, Bradford testified that he never asked to be excused from a Red Letter Day, and when 12 BRYANT v. BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND he missed work to care for his terminally ill son, he either used vacation time or Family and Medical Leave time. Second, Bryant contends that Bell Atlantic excused Marian Diggins, a Caucasian female, from working a Red Letter Day. Diggins’s testimony, however, contradicts this allegation. In particular, Diggins states that she was never excused from a Red Letter Day, and with the exception of failing to work one Red Letter Day because she forgot, she worked all of her assigned Red Letter Days. As additional evidence, Bryant claims that Bell Atlantic excused Chris Price, a Caucasian single parent, from working his evening shift because of conflicts with his child care responsibilities, and permitted him to swap with other employees so that he could work his day shift. During his deposition, however, Bryant testified that the circumstances to which he was referring occurred after the Red Letter Day policy was rescinded, and that he did not know whether Price was excused from working his Red Letter Days to accommodate his child care responsibilities or for some other reason. Finally, Bryant contends that Bell Atlantic excused another Caucasian male from working Red Letter Days, despite being caught twice with a prostitute in his company truck. Once again, however, during his deposition, Bryant admitted that he had no personal knowledge of whether the individual ever asked for or was granted permission to not work his Red Letter Days because of child care responsibilities. Thus, none of the employees to which Bryant compares himself demonstrates that Bell Atlantic treated him any differently than members outside Bryant’s class because none of these employees were engaged in the same type of misconduct attributed to Bryant. Bryant also contends that the affidavit testimony of three individuals—Gloria Pack, service representative and vice president of the CWA; John Shickman, Bell Atlantic service technician; and Cedric Lyon, Bell Atlantic service technician—demonstrates that he was discriminated against because of his race.8 These affidavits, how- 8 Bryant also contends that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning: (1) whether he was allowed sufficient time to make child care arrangements; (2) the validity of his excuses to miss his Red Letter Days under the Family and Medical Leave Act; (3) whether he always sought permission to miss his Red Letter Days before he left work; (4) whether the job he was given after he won his arbitration was materially different BRYANT v. BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND 13 ever, amount to no more than subjective beliefs, and such evidence, without more, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to any discriminatory conduct on Bell Atlantic’s part. See, e.g., Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995) (unsupported speculation insufficient to defeat summary judgment). For example, the affidavit of Ms. Pack states, I believe Harry Carver is a racist. He did not apply the Red Letter Day requirements uniformly. Several Black Service Technicians were fired under his supervision, but I am not aware of any White Service Technicians who were. Moreover, when deposed, Pack, Shickman, and Lyon all admitted that Bell Atlantic accommodated Bryant in ways that it did not accommodate other employees, Caucasian or African-American.9 Finally, Bryant contends that the district court failed to recognize and apply the recent standard of proof modification to the burdenshifting framework of Title VII cases established in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Bryant’s argument from the one he held before arbitration; and (5) whether he was made whole as required by the arbitration award. Bryant’s arguments, however, are irrelevant to the question whether Bryant was treated differently than similarly situated employees outside his class. See Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265 (Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.). 9 Bryant also contends that all of Bell Atlantic’s affidavits in the record are defective because they do not state that they are based on personal knowledge and do not affirmatively state that the affiants are competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Therefore, Bryant argues that the affidavits do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bryant’s argument is without merit. We have held that in the Rule 56(e) context, ordinarily, officers would have personal knowledge of the acts of their corporations. Catawba Indian Tribe v. S.C., 978 F.2d 1334, 1342 (4th Cir. 1992). Bell Atlantic’s affidavits contain sufficient information, including a description of the affiants’ job titles and duties, to establish that the affiants’ statements were made based on personal knowledge. In the absence of evidence from Bryant that each of Bell Atlantic’s affiants were not competent to testify, we assume that they were. See In re Apex Express Corp., 190 F.3d 624, 635 (4th Cir. 1999). 14 BRYANT v. BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND misses the mark, however, because Reeves specifically addressed the question whether a plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination . . . combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination. 530 U.S. at 140. Reeves did not alter or amend the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Thus, because the district court held that Bryant failed to establish a prima facie case, a decision with which we agree, Reeves is irrelevant to Bryant’s claims. In sum, because Bryant is unable to demonstrate that Bell Atlantic treated similarly situated employees outside his class more favorably, we hold that Bryant fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Bell Atlantic on Bryant’s Title VII and Section 1981 claims.