Opinion ID: 186988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Faulty Photographs of the Re-Created Crime Scene

Text: At trial, Lawson argued that no sale of drugs to Aubrey Canarte took place. In an effort to show that Officer Wallace could not have observed the transaction from where he sat in his car, Lawson attempted to submit into evidence two photographs that depicted his attempt to re-create the scene. The photographs showed a car placed in the same spot that Lawson had occupied and a man on a bicycle in two different positions relative to the car. The car in the photographs was not Lawson's. The district court refused to admit the photographs into evidence because, according to Wallace, they did not accurately represent what he had seen: the bicycle did not appear in the exact position he had recalled seeing it. The court explained that the proper way to use a photographic re-creation for trial would have been to ask the court to order the officer to go out and position the bike and the person in a manner consistent with what he saw. 9/8/05 Tr. at 104. Lawson's counsel then asked Wallace on the stand to draw a picture on the photographs depicting the car and the bicycle. When Wallace protested that he was no artist and thus felt uncomfortable trying to draw the scene, the court stopped this line of inquiry. Lawson's counsel next attempted to present evidence that Lawson's car was unavailable for the photographs because it had been seized in civil forfeiture, but the court rejected this argument, holding that once the photographs were excluded, any evidence that the car had been seized was irrelevant. The court reminded Lawson's counsel that the photographs were excluded because they could not be authenticated by Wallace. The fact that the car was not Lawson's was, according to the court, irrelevant. On appeal, Lawson argues that the court abused its discretion by (i) excluding the photographs, (ii) prohibiting Lawson's counsel from seeking Wallace's drawn corrections to the photographs, and (iii) not allowing counsel to present evidence that Lawson's car had been taken into police custody. This Court reviews a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Watson, 409 F.3d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2005). To be admissible, evidence must be relevant, and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury. See FED. R. EVID. 402, 403. As a general rule, tangible evidence such as photographs must be properly identified or authenticated before being admitted into evidence at trial. United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing FED. R. EVID. 901(a)). A photograph may be authenticated if a witness with knowledge of the scene testifies that it accurately depicts the scene it purports to represent. See, e.g., Am. Wrecking Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 351 F.3d 1254, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1)). Lawson's proffered photographs were properly excluded from evidence because they could not be authenticated. According to the testimony of Wallacethe only witness at trial with knowledge of the scenethe photographs did not accurately reflect what he saw. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in preventing Lawson's counsel from forcing Wallace to draw the scene on the photographs. Given Wallace's own professed lack of artistic ability, there was a danger that the potential prejudicial effect of any compelled depiction might substantially outweigh its probative value. Lawson lacked relevant, reliable photographs to submit as evidence. He cannot fault the district court for failing to force Wallace to salvage the faulty photographs. [2] Once the faulty photographs were excluded, the district court did not abuse its discretion in preventing Lawson's counsel from explaining the unavailability of Lawson's car to re-create the scene. The civil forfeiture of Lawson's car was irrelevant as the obstacle to admissibility ha[d] nothing to do with the car. 9/12/05 Tr. at 78. Any similar vehicle would have sufficed to stage the re-creation. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in its evidentiary rulings.