Opinion ID: 2979398
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to avoid sentence disparities

Text: Mason argues that her sentence is unreasonable because fifteen other defendants whose crimes caused more financial damage than hers received sentences of no more than 156 months’ imprisonment. As this court has previously stated, “‘it is pointless’ for defendants who receive within-Guidelines sentences to raise unwarranted-disparity claims.” United States v. Vassar, 346 F. App’x 17, 29 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2008)). “The Guidelines exist to help ensure that similarly-situated defendants are punished similarly. Thus, ‘[s]entencing disparities are at their ebb when the Guidelines are followed.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006)). Moreover, the sentencing disparities in this case are warranted because most of the defendants to whom Mason analogizes cooperated with law enforcement and received the benefit of substantial-assistance motions that lowered their Guideline ranges. Cf. United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing cooperation and substantial-assistance motions as a basis for warranted sentencing disparities). It is also unclear -6- No. 09-1287 USA v. Mason whether the sentencing courts applied the terrorism adjustment to those defendants. Because the other defendants were not similarly situated, Mason’s argument necessarily fails. (b) Application of terrorism adjustment U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 Mason then contends that her sentence is unreasonable because the district court improperly applied the terrorism adjustment. Relying on Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009), Mason argues that the district court should have declined to apply the adjustment because the Sentencing Commission promulgated the terrorism adjustment pursuant to congressional directive, not pursuant to empirical research. This argument misconstrues Kimbrough and Spears. Although those cases established that a district court has discretion to vary categorically from the Guidelines based on policy disagreements, neither case held that a district court is required to vary. See United States v. Barron, 557 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that neither Spears nor Kimbrough “hold[s] that a district court must disagree with any sentencing guideline, whether it reflects a policy judgment of Congress or the Commission’s ‘characteristic’ empirical approach”); accord United States v. Aguilar-Huerta, 576 F.3d 365, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Huffstatler, 571 F.3d 620, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2009); cf. United States v. Kosack, 366 F. App’x 642, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that sentences imposed after Kimbrough and before Spears—and therefore before the clarification that categorical variance based on policy disagreement is permissible—should be affirmed if there is “no basis to assume that the district court was unaware of its authority” to vary categorically). Although the district court’s statement that admissions in Mason’s plea agreement “require” the application of the terrorism adjustment might by itself give pause, the court’s further explanation—that the PSR and the -7- No. 09-1287 USA v. Mason indictment contained sufficient allegations to support the terrorism adjustment and that it was aware of its discretion under Kimbrough and Spears—indicates that the district court understood its authority to disagree with the terrorism adjustment, but chose not to do so. The record does not support Mason’s further contention that the district court mechanically applied the terrorism adjustment and gave that adjustment undue weight. The district court recognized that the terrorism adjustment did not provide gradation and then, rather than increasing Mason’s offense level by twelve and sentencing her at offense level thirty-eight, decided to sentence her at offense level thirty-two. (c) Failure to consider factors beyond punishment Mason also asserts that her sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court ignored her arguments on various factors and based its sentencing determination solely on the need to punish. This argument fails because the district court discussed the relevant § 3553(a) factors and did not give unreasonable weight to any one factor. Mason’s argument that general deterrence has no correlation with sentence length and should not have been considered fails. The district court specifically stated that it had considered and rejected the argument, and this court has held that general deterrence is an appropriate consideration at sentencing. See Phinazee, 515 F.3d at 515-16. The sentencing transcript belies Mason’s next contention—that the district court essentially lumped together specific deterrence and the potential for rehabilitation, and therefore did not give due weight to these two factors. The district court discussed general deterrence and stated that the sentence imposed needed to send a clear signal that Mason’s crimes were so violative of societal -8- No. 09-1287 USA v. Mason norms that those convicted would be incarcerated for a substantial period of time. The district court then discussed specific deterrence and stated that it did not believe Mason’s assertions that she was surprised at the scale of the MSU explosion and that she had not violated the terms of her bond by contacting other environmentalist criminals. Mason also argues that the district court ignored her argument at sentencing that there was no need for specific deterrence because these crimes were committed while Mason was involved with one particular co-conspirator, Frank Ambrose (her ex-husband), and after these two individuals separated, neither engaged in any such illegal activity again. The district court does not appear to have addressed this argument directly in imposing the sentence. However, “district courts often (permissibly) reject defendants’ sentencing arguments indirectly when they provide affirmative reasons for imposing a sentence, and we have never required district courts to respond directly to every sentencing argument.” United States v. Steeby, 350 F. App’x 50, 52 (6th Cir. 2009). According to the PSR, Ambrose and Mason’s relationship lasted from 1999 to 2006, and by concluding that Mason had contacted other environmental-activist criminals in violation of the terms of her bond in 2008, the district court seems to have implicitly rejected Mason’s argument that she was not involved in any illegal behavior after she and Ambrose separated. Finally, Mason faults the district court’s reliance on testimony at sentencing that she had contacted individuals involved in criminal activity while on bond and therefore was likely to reoffend. This argument fails because the district court has authority to receive and consider a broad spectrum of information for sentencing purposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661. -9- No. 09-1287 USA v. Mason For the reasons expressed above, we conclude that Mason has not overcome the presumption that her sentence is substantively reasonable.