Opinion ID: 1454001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fourth amendment rights of parolees

Text: Johnson contends that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and that it also violated the same rights of Mrs. Morashita, a nonparolee, because the search was performed over her objection.
Johnson moved to suppress the checks at a pretrial hearing, but did not renew his objection when the checks were offered and admitted at trial. The prosecution argues that under State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), Johnson waived his objection to the admissibility of the checks and, therefore, may not raise the issue on appeal. In Lesley, the Court held, [U]nder Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a specific objection is required even where a pretrial motion to suppress has been made. 672 P.2d at 82. The Court reasoned that even though a pretrial motion to suppress evidence had been made and denied, an objection to the admissibility of the evidence at trial should have been made because the trial judge was not the same judge who had ruled on the motion to suppress and there was no indication in the record that an evidentiary hearing on the motion had been conducted. However, the rule in Lesley does not require a defendant to object or to renew his motion to suppress at trial where the trial judge is also the judge who ruled on the pretrial motion and where the record or transcript indicates that an evidentiary hearing was held. Since the trial judge in this case was also the judge who presided at the suppression hearing, the defendant's failure to object at trial did not constitute a waiver of his Fourth Amendment claim.
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983), defined a parolee's Fourth Amendment rights. It held that a parole officer may conduct a lawful search of a parolee's apartment without a search warrant if the parole officer has reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of his parole or committed a crime. Id. at 1260. It is necessary that a parole officer have an articulable reasonable suspicion, which requires no more than that the authority acting be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief in the conclusion mooted  in this instance, that a condition of parole has been or is being violated. Id. at 1260 n. 5 quoting United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir.1982). Thus, to constitute a valid warrantless search, there must be evidence (1) that the parole officer has a reasonable suspicion that the parolee has committed a parole violation or crime, and (2) that the search is reasonably related to the parole officer's duty. Id. at 1260. In the instant case, Officer Shepard was aware that Johnson had committed a parole violation by pawning a stereo. But more significant is the fact that Shepard knew that a warrant had been issued based on probable cause that authorized the arrest of Johnson for the forgery of checks. Those facts provided the basis for an articulable suspicion that Johnson had both committed a crime and violated the terms of his parole. In this case, it is of no consequence that Officer Shepard took no action to search Johnson's quarters until Detective Jones told Officer Shepard of the arrest warrant. Furthermore, Shepard told Mrs. Morashita that he was searching for stolen checks. Johnson claims that the police used Officer Shepard to evade the necessity of obtaining a warrant. Although we have warned that police officers may not use parole officers simply as a means of avoiding the warrant requirements to conduct random searches, [1] that does not mean that police officers and parole officers are precluded from cooperating when the police have obtained an arrest warrant for the parolee. A parole officer has a legitimate parole interest to pursue in conducting a search when he becomes aware that an arrest warrant has issued for a parolee whom he supervises. In Velasquez, this Court stated that a parole officer's search of a parolee's premises is not unlawful just because it is also beneficial to the police. Id. at 1262. That does not, however, sanction unlimited complicity between parole officers and police. [2] The parole officer had a reasonable and articulable basis for conducting a parole search when he learned that probable cause existed to believe that Johnson had committed forgery. The parole search was supervised and conducted by the parole officer, not by Detective Jones. See, e.g., United States ex rel Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2nd Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025, 92 S.Ct. 692, 30 L.Ed.2d 676 (1972) (The mere fact that the police officer was the first to suspect that appellant was engaged in criminal activity and related this fact to the parole officer and was present at the subsequent investigation in no way alters the legality of the parole officer's presence.) The testimony of Jones and Shepard support the trial judge's finding that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police and the parole officers. Consequently, there was nothing improper either in the decision to conduct the warrantless search or in the joint effort between Shepard and Jones.
Johnson also contends that because Mrs. Morashita did not consent to the search, a warrant should have been obtained because they lived together and she was not a parolee and therefore not subject to the lesser protection afforded parolees. This issue was specifically left open in Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1260 n. 3. It is well established that consent provides an exception to the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 (1987); In the instant case, the trial judge made no finding as to whether Mrs. Morashita consented to the search. We assume arguendo that no consent was given. A warrantless search of a parolee may result in an invasion of privacy, at least to some extent, for those living with the parolee. [3] If the Fourth Amendment rights of nonparolees living with parolees were not reduced, a parolee could avoid all warrantless parole searches by living with a nonparolee and asserting the nonparolee's constitutional rights, and thus emasculate one significant feature of the parole system. Russi v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App.3d 160, 170, 108 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (1973); People v. Kanos, 14 Cal. App.3d 642, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 614, 619 (1971). Nevertheless, parolees and their families retain some protection under the Fourth Amendment even though parolees have signed parole agreements expressly allowing warrantless searches. Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The degree to which those rights are diminished is determined by balancing the privacy interests of the parolee and those living with him or her against the legitimate parole objectives of easing the former law breaker into a productive life. State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1259. The California Supreme Court stated in People v. Burgener, 41 Cal.3d at 533-54, 714 P.2d at 1269, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 131: A parole search must therefore be directly and closely related to parole supervision in order to avoid unreasonable invasion of the privacy interests of the parolee and those with whom he resides. When a parolee lives with a nonparolee, courts generally hold that the cotenancy restricts, to some degree, the extent of a permissible consent search. The scope of consent impliedly given by a cotenant is limited to those parts of the premises where the tenants possess common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). In Matlock, the Court stated: The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, ... but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Id. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7. Although the defendant in Matlock was not a parolee, the Matlock doctrine applies with equal force in parole cases. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 118 Ariz. 76, 78, 574 P.2d 1295, 1297, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846, 99 S.Ct. 144, 58 L.Ed.2d 147 (1978); Silva v. State, 344 So.2d 559, 562 (Fla. 1977); People v. Icenogle, 71 Cal. App.3d 576, 586, 139 Cal. Rptr. 637, 642 (1977); Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in search of Defendant's Property or Residence Authorized by One, Other than Relative, Who is Cotenant or Common Resident with Defendant  State Cases, 4 A.L.R.4th 1050, 1067 (1981). It is not necessarily determinative that the nonparolee objects to the search. In People v. Icenogle , the court stated: [E]ven if [the nonparolee] had expressly refused to consent to the officers' search of the apartment, the refusal to give consent ... would have been invalid. 71 Cal. App.3d at 586, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 643. The necessity of preserving the parole system's integrity requires this result. See also United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975). Application of the above principles leads us to conclude that the search of a common area in Mrs. Morashita's residence was lawful. Although the trial court did not determine whether Mrs. Morashita actually consented to the search, consent was not required because the items confiscated were found in a hall closet, a common area, and the search was terminated after they were discovered. The search did not extend into those parts of the residence that were under her sole control or possession and, therefore, did not unlawfully invade her right of privacy. Since the search was pursuant to a legitimate concern that the defendant had violated his parole and was based on a reasonable articulable suspicion, the search was lawful.