Opinion ID: 879939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of a weapon.

Text: Section 45-5-202(2)(b), MCA, provides that a person commits the offense of felony assault if he purposely or knowingly causes reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury in another by use of a weapon ... This is the provision under which Crabb was charged and convicted. Crabb contends he did not actually use his revolver. Crabb states there is no claim that the weapon was ever fired and concludes one does not use a weapon unless it is fired or used as a club. Therefore, Crabb argues that the State failed to prove a necessary element of the offense. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that evidence demonstrates that Crabb purposely or knowingly pointed a loaded .44 magnum revolver with an eight inch barrel at Howard's face from a distance of approximately six feet and threatened to kill Howard. It is ludicrous for Crabb's counsel to argue that such an action does not qualify as the use of a weapon causing a reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury. Crabb's counsel contends that it would have been more appropriate to charge Crabb with misdemeanor assault. We recognize that under a different factual situation the mere pointing of a firearm in the direction of another might be more properly charged as a misdemeanor assault. The statutory provision of misdemeanor assault makes this obvious because it provides, in part: (1) A person commits the offense of assault if he: ..... (d) purposely or knowingly causes reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in another. The purpose to cause reasonable apprehension or the knowledge that reasonable apprehension would be caused shall be presumed in any case in which a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the offender believes the firearm to be loaded. Section 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA. However, it is too large a leap in logic to say that this is the only provision which speaks to such conduct. The statute does not make it exclusive. More importantly, § 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA, and § 45-5-202(2)(b), MCA, address differing conduct and require differing elements of proof. Section 45-5-201(1)(d), MCA, addresses the reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, as opposed to the reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury which is addressed by § 45-5-202(2)(b), MCA. The statutory terms of serious bodily injury and bodily injury carry drastically different definitions. Compare, § 45-2-101(5) and (59), MCA. Under the facts of this case, there is sufficient evidence to support the proposition that Crabb purposely or knowingly used a weapon to cause a reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury, and it was therefore appropriate to charge Crabb with felony assault.