Opinion ID: 1088560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the court erred in allowing dr. henry a. maggio to testify on the issue of insanity.

Text: Appellant's first complaint under this assignment is that he was not notified of Dr. Maggio's testimony in accordance with Rule 4.08 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. During his case in chief, appellant put on a prima facie case of insanity and then the state introduced two expert witnesses in rebuttal. One of these witnesses was Dr. Maggio. Appellant objected to the testimony of Dr. Maggio and in overruling the objection the trial court made the following remarks: BY THE COURT: As far as the rule is concerned, it has been complied with as to Dr. Anderson and Dr. Maggio, who have already been in Court on this case, on the same question, and cross-examined by Defense counsel. I will overrule the objection. Dr. Maggio had in fact testified at the October 18-20, 1982, suppression hearing on the issue of insanity. There the appellant was given ample opportunity to cross-examine the doctor and did so. It is difficult to imagine how, under these circumstances, Dr. Maggio's appearance as a witness at this stage of the proceedings surprised or prejudiced the appellant. In Dycus v. State, 440 So.2d 246, 254 (Miss. 1983), we held that the testimony of unanounced witnesses was not error where appellant was not taken by undue surprise, was not denied any exculpatory evidence, and was not denied meaningful cross-examination. We further point out that Rule 4.08 does not mandate that the trial judge exclude the testimony of the witness under these circumstances and further even provides that the trial court may grant an exception to the requirements for good cause shown. The trial court correctly declined to grant the sanctions sought in this instance. It is further argued that Dr. Maggio should not have been allowed to testify because he did not examine the defendant for the purpose of determining his state of mind at the time of the alleged crime; that his examination of the defendant was very limited in scope and time; that at the trial, he drastically changed his diagnosis from paranoid schizophrenia to schizophrenia form disorder; and that this psychiatrist routinely testified for the state. As a general rule the question as to whether or not the opinion of an expert is based on, and supported by, sufficient facts or evidence to sustain it, is a question of law for the court. Gulf Insurance Company v. Provine, 321 So.2d 311, 314 (Miss. 1975). We will not reverse on the question of determining the qualifications of an expert, absent a showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. A similar issue as that raised by appellant here was addressed by the Court in Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342 (Miss. 1977), appealed after remand, 375 So.2d 994, cert. den. 446 U.S. 988, 100 S.Ct. 2975, 64 L.Ed.2d 847. In Gray, the psychiatric examination included a 20-minute interview by one doctor and three or four five-minute interviews conducted at the State Hospital at Whitfield. There too in reliance upon Hill v. State, supra , the appellant contended his psychiatric examination was insufficient. In response, this Court said, Defendant relies on Hill v. State, 339 So.2d 1382 (Miss. 1976) as authority for his contention that his psychiatric examinations were insufficient. In Hill the first psychiatrist who examined Hill recommended further psychiatric examination. Because of that fact, we ordered further psychiatric examination of defendant in Hill. Unlike Hill, in this case, there was no recommendation for further psychiatric examination so no error was committed by the court when it did not order further psychiatric examination. 351 So.2d at 1348. Dr. Maggio testified that he based his opinion on a 1-hour interview, Billiot's overall personality, and the fact that Billiot indicated that he fled the scene of the crime and that he contemplated turning himself in the next day. Dr. Maggio did not indicate that any further examination was required. We cannot say on this basis that the trial court abused his discretion on this point. Inasmuch as the remaining points of argument on this assignment go to the weight to be accorded to Dr. Maggio's testimony and not to its admissibility, we find the trial court did not commit error under this assignment.