Opinion ID: 352316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Instruction on Termination

Text: 49 Defendant also contends that the district judge's attempt to instruct the jury on the duplication of damages resulted in an instruction that improperly allowed the jury to find that the termination of plaintiff's contract occurred for anti-competitive purposes if defendant was guilty of any antitrust violation. Initially, during an in-chambers conference, in response to the district judge's concern that the jury might award plaintiff damages both for breach of contract and for termination in violation of the Sherman Act, plaintiff tendered to the court an instruction which is substantially identical to part of the instruction eventually given. As finally given, the instruction read: 50 Now if you find that the defendant has violated the antitrust laws, if you do find that, then, in effect, you have found that the termination of the plaintiff's contract occurred for anticompetitive purposes. 51 To put it another way, if the antitrust laws are violated, then it is implied that that contract was breached for anticompetitive purposes. 52 Despite his participation at the conference in formulating the instruction, just before the jury retired defense counsel first objected to this instruction for its failure to tell the jurors that before you determine that the termination of the distributorship contract was in violation of the antitrust laws, you must find that the intended effect of such termination has created unreasonable restraint of trade (Tr. 1193-1194; see also Tr. 1196). 53 In the opinion accompanying the order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court held that defendant had waived this objection by failing to raise it properly under Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the waiver provision of Rule 49(a) is inapplicable here because it applies when, in submitting the issues to the jury, the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence. Defendant's objection did not request the introduction of a new factual question or even the alteration of the verdict form but rather requested a clarifying instruction about the form and is therefore governed by Rule 51. Cf. McDonnell v. Timmerman, 269 F.2d 54, 58 (8th Cir. 1959). Indeed plaintiff recognizes that Rule 51 governs (Br. 45, 47) and does not attempt to justify the district judge's ruling under Rule 49(a) (cf. Br. 39, 48). 54 Under Rule 51 there is no argument that defendant's objection was not timely, but plaintiff does argue that the defendant is bound by the instruction because the defendant participated in the conference where it was formulated. This argument, however, was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 140 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1944), and the result reached in that case has been accepted by the principal commentators. See 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2558; 5A Moore's Federal Practice P 51.05. Plaintiff further argues that when read in context the instruction could not be interpreted by the jury to require a finding of anti-competitive termination if they found defendant guilty of any antitrust violation. If the challenged instruction were in the middle of several contrary instructions this argument might have merit, but since this instruction came at the tail-end of the court's charge, it cannot be said that it was cured by prior correct instructions. 55 Even plaintiff does not argue that the instruction as given properly states the law. As defendant's counsel put it, the basis for the objection is that under such an instruction, the jury could find under the evidence that a violation of the antitrust laws occurred without also finding that the contract was terminated for anti-competitive reasons (Defendant's App. 53). The trial court conceded this interpretation was possible in its decision denying defendant's motion for a new trial (Defendant's App. 22; Plaintiff's Br. 39). Although improper purpose need not be proven if the specific offense charged is per se illegal, when the specific offense is not illegal per se we have been presented with no authority for conclusively implying improper purpose only from the fact that possibly per se offenses are also charged. See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., supra. At the next trial, such an instruction must be omitted and the verdict form should be redrawn to avoid the problem.