Opinion ID: 2585200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claimed collateral estoppel effect of Brian Seabourn's acquittal of first degree murder charge

Text: Defendant argues that, under the collateral estoppel principles articulated in People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622, his conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances and conspiracy to commit murder must be reversed because his criminal liability was predicated on the actions of the actual killer, Brian Seabourn, who, after defendant's trial, was convicted of only second degree murder (and thus implicitly was acquitted of first degree murder). [24] In People v. Taylor , we reiterated the rule that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue decided at a previous trial if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and if (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior trial. ( Taylor, supra, at p. 691, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622.) We identified the purposes of the collateral estoppel doctrine as promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments that undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and providing repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation. ( Id. at p. 695, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622.) Taylor expressly limited the application of the doctrine to the particular circumstances of the instant case where an accused's guilt must be predicated on his vicarious liability for the acts of a previously acquit[t]ed confederate. ( Id. at p. 698, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622.) Taylor does not support reversal of defendant's conviction in the present case. `[I]n cases where there are multiple defendants, or in multiple cases arising out of the same offense, the mere fact standing alone that verdicts are, or appear to be, inconsistent, does not give rise to collateral estoppel. Specific issues may be decided differently in different cases. [Citation.] Likewise, a judgment acquitting one defendant does not generally bar subsequent criminal liability of a codefendant.'  ( People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 412, fn. 13, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279, quoting People v. Mata (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 233, 237, 149 Cal.Rptr. 327; see also People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 866, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 13, 15 P.3d 234.) Defendant cites various decisions to the contrary ( United States v. Smith (D.C.Cir. 1973) 478 F.2d 976, 979; United States v. Shuford (4th Cir.1971) 454 F.2d 772, 779; United States v. Prince (4th Cir.1970) 430 F.2d 1324, 1325 (per curiam); Schmidt v. State (1973) 261 Ind. 81, 300 N.E.2d 86, 87-88; State v. Spencer (1973) 18 N.C.App. 499, 197 S.E.2d 232), but because they lack any reasoning in support of the rule they articulate, we find them unpersuasive. Defendant contends his liability for Stewart's murder is wholly derivative of that of Seabourn, the actual killer, and he argues he therefore cannot be guilty of a greater crime than Seabourn. First, we note that, as a factual matter, the prosecution argued defendant's guilt on the theories that he both conspired with and aided and abetted Brian Seabourn. Thus, relevant to defendant's liability were his own actions and state of mind, not solely those of Seabourn's, and it would be inaccurate to characterize defendant's liability as wholly derivative of Seabourn's. Second, we have recently rejected his contention as a matter of law. ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210.) Finally, defendant argues, How can [defendant's] verdict be deemed reliable under the Eighth Amendment when the actual killer, represented by counsel and facing essentially the same evidentiary hurdles, is acquitted of the death qualifying counts for which [defendant] was previously convicted? Whether or not Taylor and the principle] of collateral estoppel literally apply to this case is not as critical as what the inconsistency shows about the arbitrariness and unfairness of [defendant's] sentence. Contrary to defendant's argument, however, merely demonstrating that Seabourn was subsequently convicted of a lesser offense and therefore received a lesser sentence does not establish that defendant's sentence was either arbitrary or unfair. The respective juries in the two cases might have differently assessed the two men's culpability in light of defendant's role as instigator of the offense and as the person who furnished the weapon used and payment for the crime, and Seabourn's jury's failure to find the murder was for financial gain may simply reflect lenity. As the Attorney General argues, the different verdicts may reflect the belief that Seabourn would not have murdered Stewart but for defendant's desire, motive, weapon and payment. We cannot conclude that the different verdicts in the two cases render defendant's verdict constitutionally infirm. VI. Penalty phase issues
Defendant complains the jury considered, as an improper aggravating factor, evidence that in 1978 he assaulted a police officer with a firearm, when in fact, unknown to the jury, he had been found not guilty by reason of insanity of that offense. Defendant suggests the error violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and thus requires reversal. First, we note it was defendant who elicited the facts of the incident during his examination of Dr. Berg, the prosecution having neither charged nor argued the incident in its case in aggravation. Thus, as the Attorney General argues, defendant invited any error that occurred. ( People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 878, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) In any event, we reject defendant's premise that the jury was not informed of the finding of insanity in the earlier case. In the course of his examination concerning the incident, defendant asked Dr. Berg: How did all this lead to my being found legally insane? Dr. Berg summarized for the jury the findings of the psychiatrists who had examined defendant at the time of the trial on the 1978 assault: Both of them diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia. Both of them said you were delusional. That you had loose associations. That you were not able to connect your ideas properly, and that you had a long history of mental disturbance. Dr. Berg added that one of the psychiatrists had found defendant legally insane. Defendant further elicited from Dr. Berg that, as a result, he was committed to Atascadero State Hospital, where he spent four years before his release on a successful petition for restoration of sanity. Thus, although the jury was not informed in technical terms of the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in the 1978 case, it did learn defendant had been found legally insane and had spent four years in a mental hospital as a consequence. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that [i]n determining which penalty is to be imposed on Dennis Lawley, you should consider, take into account and be guided by all of the mitigating factors you deem to be applicable, including but not limited to any aspect of his mental condition. Any mental or psychiatric disability that you find is currently present in Mr. Lawley or you find was present at the time of the commission of the offenses charged in this case, may be considered by you as a circumstance in mitigation. [¶] Evidence of the existence of any such mental or psychiatric disability may never be considered by you as a circumstance in aggravation. In the circumstances, we find it not reasonably possible the jury improperly considered the 1978 brandishing incident in aggravation. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.)
The trial court refused defendant's requested instruction defining the concept of lingering doubt and informing jurors that if any of them entertained a lingering or residual doubt concerning whether defendant had hired someone to kill Stewart, he or she must consider such doubt as a mitigating factor. Defendant contends the refusal violated his rights under article I, sections 7 and 17 of the California Constitution and the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We have previously held that there is no requirement, under either state or federal law, that the court specifically instruct the jury to consider any residual doubt of defendant's guilt. ( People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 77, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129, italics omitted, citing, inter alia, Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 173-174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155.) While acknowledging cases so holding, defendant distinguishes them on the basis that defense counsel, in those cases, argued the concept of lingering doubt to the jury. Here, he asserts, he made no lingering doubt argument but instead gave a long summation extolling Brian Seabourn. Thus, the absence of the instruction, coupled with the absence of argument, meant the jury was never introduced to the concept of lingering doubt, resulting in prejudice. As the Attorney General reasons, however, defendant, having sought the instruction, was well aware of the concept of lingering doubt and could have argued it had he believed it beneficial to himself. That he failed to do so cannot convert the trial court's ruling into error. The jury was instructed, moreover, that it could consider the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)), any other circumstances that extenuated its gravity (§ 190.3, factor (k)), and any sympathetic or other aspect of defendant's character or record that suggested a sentence other than death (CALJIC No. 8.85). This instruction, as we have noted (e.g., People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 77-78, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129), is sufficiently broad to encompass any residual doubt any jurors might have entertained.
Defendant raises a variety of constitutional challenges to the death penalty law and related instructions, many of which, he acknowledges, we have previously rejected. First, he contends the instruction pertaining to the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a) (factor (a)); CALJIC No. 8.85) failed to adequately guide the jury's sentencing discretion, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. To the contrary, factor (a) is not unconstitutionally vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 563-564, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Defendant contends the prosecutor's closing argument, commenting with respect to factor (a) that the jury could consider the fact of Stewart's murder and the financial-gain special-circumstance finding, created a factor that was so vague as to encourage arbitrary and capricious decision making. We are unable to discern how the brief remark defendant cites could have had such an effect. Defendant further argues that the instruction pertaining to prior criminal activity involving the express or implied threat to use force or violence (§ 190.3, factor (b) (factor (b))) was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous because it permitted the jury to consider in aggravation situations in which defendant was merely reacting to real or imagined attacks upon himself or to circumstances he did not cause. He thus characterizes as merely reactive his conduct in the Gary's Drive-In incident, where he brandished a knife and threatened to stab a man who approached him as he sat in his car; the Savemart store incident, where he kicked a store employee; and the Harris incident, in which he punched Danny Wisner in the eye, after having kicked the three-year-old son of Michael Harris while in the grip of what he now terms an insane delusion. As the Attorney General argues, defendant's characterization of these incidents is not the only or necessarily the most reasonable one. Contrary to defendant, the factor (b) instruction was not vague ( Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 976-977, 114 S.Ct. 2630; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 703-704, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640) and did not preclude the jury from according these incidents the weight it believed appropriate in the circumstances. Defendant further argues that the portion of CALJIC No. 8.85 directing the jury to consider all the evidence received during any part of the trial of the case, except as it was otherwise instructed, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in permitting the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating evidence. Defendant failed, however, to preserve his claim of error, in that he did not request a limiting instruction. ( People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788.) In any event, immediately after hearing the instruction he challenges, the jury was told: You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable, followed by a listing of each of the sentencing factors, section 190.3, factors (a) through (k). We conclude the jury was properly guided in the exercise of its sentencing discretion. (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 770-771, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 [trial court did not err in failing to specify sua sponte the irrelevant evidence the jury should ignore].) Defendant next contends section 190.3, factor (d) (factor (d)), together with the related instruction, advising the jury it must consider whether or not the offense was committed while defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, is unconstitutionally vague because it gives the jury no direction as to whether such evidence is aggravating or mitigating. We have previously rejected the contention, as well as defendant's related argument that in referring to extreme mental or emotional disturbance, factor (d) precludes consideration of other, less extreme forms of disturbance. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 698-699, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Defendant also contends the prosecutor, in closing argument dismissing his delusional condition as merely eccentric, converted factor (d) into an aggravating factor in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We do not so read the challenged portion of the prosecutor's argument, which, after expressly advising the jury that factor (d) is a factor in mitigation, simply sought to persuade the jury to accord the defense evidence on the subject of defendant's mental disturbance little weight. Defendant further asserts that all the remaining sentencing factors contained in section 190.3 and reflected in CALJIC No. 8.85 are unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary and result in unreliable sentences, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He fails, however, to present any specific argument or authority for the assertion, and we reject it. None of the factors is shown to lack a commonsense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of understanding. (See Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 975, 114 S.Ct. 2630.) Defendant further contends the instructions given in his case violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by failing to require the jury to find aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and to find that any such proven aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. We have previously rejected these contentions, and defendant cites no reason to depart from our prior decisions. ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 782, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 79, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118.) Nor do the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the jury base its sentencing decision on written findings specifying the aggravating factors on which it relied. ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 848, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249.) Contrary to defendant's argument, the provisions of California's death penalty statute do not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by the lack of comparative or intercase proportionality review. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 156, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Defendant argues that the absence of procedural safeguards employed by other states in the operation of their death penalty laws renders this state's law unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. As defendant acknowledges, however, we have previously rejected this argument (e.g., People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1251-1252, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163), and he fails to convince us to reconsider this conclusion. Because we have found no error in the sentencing factors and instructions given in this case, defendant is not entitled to reversal of his sentence on the grounds asserted.
Defendant urges reversal of the judgment as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution due to his insanity at the time of trial and at the time of the incident involving the young child offered in aggravation. [25] We have previously addressed defendant's claims concerning his competency to stand trial ( ante, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 634-645, 38 P.3d at pp. 478-487) and, because he fails to elaborate on the concept of insanity at the time of trial, we devote no further analysis to the latter point. We therefore focus on the contention that the judgment must be reversed because defendant was insane at the time of the aggravating incident. The test of legal insanity in California is the rule in M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210 [8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722], [26] as adopted by the electorate in June 1982 with the passage of Proposition 8. That measure added section 25, subdivision (b), which provides: In any criminal proceeding ... in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. Despite the use of the conjunctive and instead of M'Naghten's disjunctive or, this court has interpreted the statute as recognizing two distinct and independent bases on which a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity might be returned. ( People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 769, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752; accord, People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 533, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.) With respect to the incident involving the young child introduced in the penalty phase, defendant argues the evidence sufficiently demonstrated his insanity so as to render his sentence unreliable. For this proposition, defendant relies on the evidence that he accused Michael Harris, the father of the three-year-old boy, of teaching his son to go around sucking guys' penises. We observe that defendant failed to object at trial to the admission of this evidence on the basis he now advances and thus has forfeited the claim. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 979-980, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) Even were we to address the claim, moreover, it lacks merit. While defendant's bizarre accusation does dovetail with the homophobic views he aired repeatedly during the trial and suggests the operation of a paranoid or delusional mind, it does not fairly reflect the whole incident. When initially confronted about why he had kicked the boy, defendant told Michael Harris he did not like children and Harris should keep his son out of defendant's yard or he would kick him again. Then, while defendant, Michael Harris, Danny Wisner and Sammy Wisner were discussing the incident, defendant suddenly flew into a rage and hit Danny Wisner in the eye. A sheriffs officer arrived and took defendant to county jail. A week later, Michael Harris and Danny Wisner were in Harris's backyard when defendant, from over the fence, pointed a revolver at them and warned: I'm going to get you guys for what you've done to me. I'm going to get your family. As the Attorney General observes, the evidence tended strongly to show that defendant acted out of anger and vengefulness rather than an insane delusion. Defendant fails to show that he was insane at the time of the incident and thus to cast doubt on the reliability of the judgment.
Defendant contends his death sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offense and thus violates the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment contained in article I, section 17 of the California Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant emphasizes he was not the actual killer of Kenneth Stewart, and he argues at length what he terms the problematic aspects of the evidence in this case, suggesting he is not guilty of murder despite his conviction. Defendant further argues Brian Seabourn had a more serious history of criminal violence than he, and that the violent incidents in his own past must be understood in light of his longstanding mental illness. While acknowledging that the punishment meted out to coperpetrators is not normally relevant to intracase proportionality review ( People v. Alias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 193, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980), he insists that, in this case, the disparity between his sentence and Seabourn's reflects arbitrary application of the death penalty in violation of the state and federal Constitutions. Although defendant's crime is not the most heinous ever to be subjected to the ultimate penalty, we cannot say as a matter of law that his punishment is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense. The jury reasonably might have believed the sorry events in this case never would have occurred but for defendant's desire for vengeance, his furnishing of the murder weapon, and his provision of a material incentive to the killer. Defendant's contention that facts outside the record would cast doubt on this conclusion cannot be resolved on appeal but must await resolution in collateral proceedings.
Defendant contends his sentence of death as to count II, conspiracy to commit murder, must be vacated as an unauthorized sentence for that crime. (See §§ 182, subd. (a) [punishment for conspiracy to commit murder is that prescribed for first degree murder], 189 [defining degrees of murder], 190.2 [providing for death penalty in case of first degree murder with one or more special circumstance findings].) Defendant further contends section 654 bars sentencing on a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder when sentence has been imposed on the murder itself, the only object of the conspiracy. ( People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal. App.3d 811, 819, 179 Cal.Rptr. 726.) The Attorney General, while noting the trial court did stay the sentence on count II pursuant to section 654, acknowledges the imposition of a death sentence on the conspiracy count was unauthorized. We therefore shall vacate the special circumstance alleged and found true as to count II and vacate the death sentence imposed for that count. Under our statutory power to modify an unauthorized sentence (see § 1260), [27] we shall direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the appropriate sentence for conspiracy to commit murder, which the Attorney General in this case agrees is imprisonment for 25 years to life (see § 182; People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1226, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537; cf. People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 258, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 949 P.2d 31 [assuming that a reviewing court has the power [under § 1260] when a trial court has made a mistake in sentencing, to remand with directions that do not inevitably require all of the procedural steps involved in arraignment for judgment and sentencing]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1080, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388 [in exercising its power under § 1260, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact with respect to discretionary sentencing decisions; by implication limiting exercise of statutory power to nondiscretionary correction of judgment]).