Opinion ID: 3160872
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Union Goes to Court

Text: On October 19, 2010, the Union filed a complaint in the Northern District of Alabama pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. In the sole count of the complaint, the Union alleged that the Company “violated the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to arbitrate the COLA reset grievance” and requested “that the Court order the Company to submit the grievances to arbitration as provided under the collective bargaining agreement and for any other legal and/or equitable relief the Court deems appropriate.” The Union made no other requests for relief in its complaint. In response, the Company answered that the grievance was not arbitrable because it was untimely under the CBA. It also raised, as a defense, that the lawsuit to compel arbitration was untimely under the statute of limitations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Citing the relevant six-month statute of limitations on actions to compel arbitration, the Company argued that the Union’s lawsuit was barred because the Company “unequivocally refused” to arbitrate the grievance in its October 20, 2009, letter. The Company also contended that even if not barred by the limitations period, the grievance was not arbitrable because it was untimely, and timeliness is not a matter for arbitration. In response, the Union asserted that timeliness of the grievance was, in fact, a matter for arbitration. Plus, in any event, the Union urged, the grievance was 9 Case: 14-15744 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Page: 10 of 37 timely because the Company’s refusal to apply the cost-of-living adjustments to each paycheck was a continuing violation. The Union also countered the statuteof-limitations argument by asserting that the Company had not unequivocally refused arbitration until its July 28, 2010, letter. The district court agreed with the Union and granted summary judgment compelling arbitration on June 15, 2012. Wise Alloys, 2012 WL 2357738, at . Ultimately, the court rejected the notion that timeliness was inappropriate for arbitration. Id. Instead, the court found that the “parties’ dispute is a dispute over the application of the time limitations in the grievance procedure contained within the contract, rather than a dispute over the arbitrability of the grievance.” Id. Turning to the question of whether the Company had made an unequivocal refusal to arbitrate, the court recognized that the Company need not have expressly used the language “refuse to arbitrate.” Id. at -9. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the October 20, 2009, letter “is best construed as a statement expressing [the Company’s] position in response to [the Union’s] grievance—i.e., [the Company’s] reason for denying the grievance. It does not indicate—either expressly or impliedly—that [the Company] would not agree to arbitration.” Id. And, because the district court concluded that the timeliness of the grievance was arbitrable, it reasoned that the Company’s “statement could be reasonably construed as indicating that [the Company] would assert before the arbitrator that 10 Case: 14-15744 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Page: 11 of 37 [the Union’s] grievance should be denied because it was not timely filed, rather than asserting that [the Company] refused to engage in arbitration.” Id. at . In concluding its order, though, the district court—apparently sua sponte— expressed its “opinion that the case should be stayed, rather than dismissed, pending a final resolution following arbitration.” Id. at . Citing section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 3, and Circuit case law, the district court apparently determined that it was required to stay the case when compelling arbitration. Id. Accordingly, the district court stayed the case but also administratively closed the case file. Id. In doing so, the court noted that “[t]his action will have no effect on the court’s retention of jurisdiction, and the file may be reopened, on either party’s motion, for an appropriate purpose such as dismissal following settlement, entry of judgment, vacatur, or modification of an arbitrator’s award.” Id. The court also directed the parties to notify the court of any settlement or arbitration determination. Id. at .