Opinion ID: 612140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Sever Defendant Kenneth Lawson

Text: 60 A motion was made by Robert Murr to sever defendant Kenneth Lawson prior to trial, when it appeared that Lawson would not be present for the proceedings. This motion was denied by the district court, and Whited contends that this was in error. 61 A district court's denial for severance is reversible only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 552 (6th Cir.1982). Once defendants have been properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), a 'strong showing of prejudice' is required to justify severance. United States v. Hessling, 845 F.2d 617, 619 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Reed, 647 F.2d 678, 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837, 102 S.Ct. 142, 70 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981)). The jury must be unable to decide fairly and separately the guilt or innocence of each defendant. Moore, 917 F.2d at 220. 62 Whited argues that defendants were harmed because the jury might have inferred that Lawson did not show up for trial because he was guilty, and then concluded that his co-defendants must also be culpable. In addition, Whited asserts that they were prejudiced when the jury was exposed to extensive testimony concerning Lawson's activities, while no one was there to challenge this testimony. 63 As a general rule, persons jointly indicted should be tried together. United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir.1984). This is because there is almost always common evidence against the joined defendants that allows for the economy of a single trial. In the instant case, a large portion of the evidence presented, including that related to Lawson, was applicable to each defendant to show the scope of the charged conspiracy. While Lawson was not there to challenge his alleged participation at trial, his co-defendants had the opportunity to convince the jury that they were not associated with him. Absent a showing of substantial prejudice, spillover of evidence from one case to another does not require severance. Moore, 917 F.2d at 221 (relying upon United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1526 (6th Cir.1985)). Defendants have not made such a showing here. 64 The fact that a defendant sought to escape prosecution is usually relevant in establishing culpability, so we understand Whited's anxiety about transferred guilt due to Lawson's flight. However, the district court neutralized any adversity Lawson may have caused his co-defendants by his actions. It gave a cautionary instruction that each defendant's case was to be considered separately and, further, that Lawson's flight could not be used as evidence against anyone but him. The jury appears to have heeded the court's admonition, as defendant William Baird, allegedly a close companion of Lawson's, was acquitted of conspiracy. Other defendants were acquitted on some of the distribution counts brought against them. Thus, the jury was plainly able to view them as distinct individuals in rendering its verdicts. As this was so, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever Lawson. 65