Opinion ID: 2032086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Defendant argues that his right to substantive due process was violated when we transferred this case from the appellate court. He contends that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear his post-conviction appeal and that proper jurisdiction lies with the Fourth District Appellate Court. Defendant bases his argument on Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (87 Ill.2d R. 651(a)), which provides in pertinent part: An appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court in any post-conviction proceeding lies to the Appellate Court in the district in which the circuit court is located. Although Rule 651(a) is concerned with post-conviction appeals, we interpret article VI, section 4(b), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b)), the Illinois death penalty statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1 et seq. ), and Supreme Court Rule 603 (87 Ill.2d R. 603) to mandate uniform statewide appellate review of cases in which the death sentence has been imposed, even when those cases reach the post-conviction appeal stage. Article VI, section 4(b), of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: Appeals from judgments of Circuit Courts imposing a sentence of death shall be directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b). Section 9-1(i) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(i)) provides: The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. Supreme Court Rule 603 provides in pertinent part: [A]ppeals by defendants from judgments of the circuit courts imposing sentence of death shall lie directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. All other appeals in criminal cases shall be taken to the Appellate Court. 87 Ill.2d R. 603. Defendant's brief states: Death penalty cases are certainly significant and controversial cases, but they should not be handled on an ad hoc basis. We agree with the defendant that death penalty cases are too important to be handled on an ad hoc basis. It is for this very reason that we cannot accept defendant's position. If we were to allow appeals from post-conviction hearings in death cases to go to the appellate court, those cases might not receive a uniform review. The defendant, as well as this court, is concerned about ad hoc handling of death penalty cases. The defendant argues that at some future date this court, relying on Rule 651, may not take a case directly on a post-conviction appeal, thereby treating a death case on an ad hoc basis. However, if defendant's argument regarding jurisdiction were correct, defendant or some other defendant who has been sentenced to death could lose a post-conviction appeal in the appellate court and this court could then deny the petition for leave to appeal. In this respect there could be ad hoc treatment of a death penalty case. Also, a defendant whose petition for leave to appeal was denied could allege that he was denied equal protection or denied his right to uniform statewide appellate review of his death sentence. The Constitution, the legislature and this court have made special provisions for death cases because of their significance. To treat a post-conviction appeal in a death penalty case differently than a direct appeal in a death penalty case would be inequitable. In two other cases now pending before this court, People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, and People v. Ruiz, No. 60303, we have granted the State's motion to transfer the case from the appellate court to this court. So to date, there has not been ad hoc treatment of any death penalty post-conviction appeal by this court.