Opinion ID: 2982356
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Neileigh Regets

Text: Regets claims that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by arresting her without probable cause. A false arrest claim under federal law requires a plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. “Whether probable cause exists depends on the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 380–81 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “Probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A [police officer] is entitled to qualified immunity” on a false arrest and false imprisonment claim “if he or she could reasonably (even if erroneously) have believed that the arrest was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed at the time by the [police officer].” Kennedy v. City of Vila Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 214 (6th Cir. 2011). Thus, a court should grant the officer qualified immunity, “even if a factual dispute exists about the objective reasonableness of the officer’s actions,” if when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “an officer reasonably could have believed that the arrest was lawful.” Id. When viewing this claim, - 13 - Case No. 13-1574, Regets v. City of Plymouth “state law2 defines the offense for which an officer may arrest a person, while federal law dictates whether probable cause existed for an arrest.” Id. at 215. Regets sets forth the same arguments in her false arrest/false imprisonment claim as she does in her improper search and seizure claim—namely, that there was not probable cause to obtain her warrantless arrest. As outlined in our analysis of Regets’s search-and-seizure claim, Defendants had probable cause to arrest Regets based on the information they possessed at the time of her arrest. They reasonably could have believed her arrest was lawful based on Kish’s statement. “Probable cause to make an arrest exists if the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense.” Arnold v. Wilder, 657 F.3d 353, 363 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if a reasonable official could have concluded that there was a “fair probability” that Regets committed or was about to commit a crime, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, Ky, 635 F.3d 210, 214 (6th Cir. 2011); Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2002). 2 The relevant criminal statute at issue, Michigan Code Law Section 750.329a provides: (1) A person who knows that an individual intends to kill himself or herself and does any of the following with the intent to assist the individual in killing himself or herself is guilty of criminal assistance to the killing of an individual, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both: (a) Provides the means by which the individual attempts to kill himself or herself or kills himself or herself. (b) Participates in an act by which the individual attempts to kill himself or herself or kills himself or herself. (c) Helps the individual plan to attempt to kill himself or herself or to kill himself or herself. M.C.L. § 750.329a. - 14 - Case No. 13-1574, Regets v. City of Plymouth Defendants assert that, based on their knowledge at the time, there was a fair probability that Regets had committed or was about to commit criminal assistance to suicide. And their knowledge was based, in large part, upon Kish’s sworn statement. The law was aptly summarized recently in United States v. Watkins, No. 3:12-cr-00085, slip op. at  (W.D. Ky. April 10, 2013): When an informant’s tip is used to establish probable cause, the Court must assess whether probable cause necessary to justify the arrest existed based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3 707, 717 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–31). Probable cause to arrest may be based solely on an informant’s tip “if the tip appears reliable under the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Cooper, 1 F. App’x 399, 403 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). And, “[u]nlike a tip from an anonymous informant, a ‘tip from a known informant who reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if [his] allegations turn out to be fabricated’ is far more trustworthy.” United States v. Tillman, 404 F. App’x 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1541 (2011). Kish provided Defendants with a detailed account of the alleged plan to accomplish Steiner’s suicide. His initial statement was given both orally and in writing, and it included a handwritten diagram indicating where he had personally seen the medications that Regets would allegedly use to assist Steiner in committing suicide. As a cautionary step, Defendants contacted the prosecutor’s office for assistance in evaluating the information provided to them. At the prosecutor’s office, Kish repeated his statement under oath, and even when questioned by Stevens, Kish did not deviate from his initial statement. Thus, Kish’s statement appeared reliable under the “totality of the circumstances,” and Defendants’ knowledge was “sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [Regets] had committed or was committing an offense.” Arnold, 657 F.3d at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). For her false arrest and false imprisonment claim, Regets relies on Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2005) to support her assertion that Kish’s testimony alone - 15 - Case No. 13-1574, Regets v. City of Plymouth was insufficient for probable cause. In Radvansky, the plaintiff was arrested while breaking into his apartment after his landlord changed the locks and told the police that the plaintiff had abandoned the property and had no privilege to re-enter. Id. at 298, 304. We held that probable cause to arrest the plaintiff did not exist when the police relied on the landlord’s statement alone and ignored substantial exculpatory evidence indicating the plaintiff did live in the apartment.3 Id. at 305–06. In contrast, as described above, Kish signed a written statement under penalty of perjury and was questioned under oath about his statement. The officers sought advice from the prosecutor’s office and obtained a search warrant from the magistrate judge. Kish provided the identical story to officers twice. This case is distinguishable from Radvansky, where officers relied solely on the landlord’s unsworn statement and ignored significant exculpatory evidence showing that the tenant lived on the premises, including that both the tenant’s driver’s license and social security number indicated that he lived at the address. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because they could have reasonably believed probable cause existed and they did not find significant exculpatory evidence at Regets’s house or Steiner’s hotel contradicting Kish’s allegations.