Opinion ID: 1259078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reorientation Alimony

Text: Rita's trial brief requested an award of rehabilitative alimony to assist her in completing a bachelor's degree in labor management. The trial court awarded Rita four years of rehabilitative support to allow her a chance to gain a degree in accounting or business, as well as an additional amount for reorientation alimony. After reconsideration, however, the court concluded that it erred in its determination that both rehabilitative and reorientation alimony should be awarded. The court ordered Robert to pay reorientation alimony for four years, with payments of $800 per month for the first two years and $700 per month for the second two years. The court stated that the purpose of the award was to aid [Rita] to adjust to new financial circumstances and a new life style. This award will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Money v. Money, 852 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Alaska 1993). Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(2) directs the trial court to fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce by considering certain factors, among which are the parties' earning capacities, educational backgrounds, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage. To this end, the court is expressly empowered to order alimony as may be just and necessary without regard to which of the parties is in fault[.] [2] Our decisions have recognized reorientation alimony as appropriate to allow the requesting spouse an opportunity to adjust to the changed financial circumstances accompanying a divorce. Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1215 n. 6 (Alaska 1989) (citing Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Alaska 1987)). We have indicated, however, that reorientation alimony should ordinarily be awarded only when the property settlement will not adequately meet the parties' reasonable needs. Id. Furthermore, given its inherently transitional nature, reorientation alimony may properly be awarded only for relatively short periods of time. [3] Our decisions have also recognized that a separate form of temporary support, rehabilitative alimony, may be appropriate in some cases for a specific purpose and a short duration even with an adequate property division[.] Id. at 1215 (citing Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1223-24 (Alaska 1981)). While an award of rehabilitative alimony need not be predicated on a finding that the parties' needs cannot be met through the division of marital property, this form of alimony is narrowly restricted to job training or other means directly related to entry or advancement within the work force, and [t]he party seeking rehabilitative alimony must intend to use it for such purposes. Id. (citing Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1986), and Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165 (Alaska 1987)). Although reorientation and rehabilitative alimony serve separate goals, require different findings, and are consequently distinct forms of temporary support, they are not mutually exclusive; in some instances, when supported by the record, both may be appropriate. See Money, 852 P.2d at 1164 (approving award involving both rehabilitative and reorientation support although the trial court designated award as only rehabilitative). In all cases, however, an award of alimony must be accompanied by adequate findings, particularly with respect to the financial needs and abilities of both parties: A trial court is required to make specific findings to support a determination that an award of alimony is just and necessary. Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173, 1179 (Alaska 1992)... . Although a trial court need not make findings regarding every factor, we have remanded awards of alimony when there is an insufficient analysis of the needs of the alimony recipient or the means of the paying party. Jones, 835 P.2d at 1179; Renfro v. Renfro, 848 P.2d 830, 834 (Alaska 1993). Gallant v. Gallant, 876 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Alaska 1994). In the present case, the trial judge made findings regarding the earning capacity, job skills, and educational background of each party. At the time of trial in August 1992, Rita was forty-three years old and Robert was forty-six years old. Rita's yearly salary was approximately $21,000 plus a twenty-five percent non-taxable COLA, yielding $1,516 in net monthly pay. Robert's yearly salary was $49,290 plus a twenty-five percent non-taxable COLA, yielding $3,200 in net monthly pay; in addition, he received $270 per month in disability pay and $639 per month in military retirement, for total monthly earnings of $4,109. Rita delayed her career plans during the marriage in the interests of raising her children and subordinated her career to Robert's. During the marriage, Robert received a number of higher educational degrees while Rita received an associate's degree. At the time of trial, Rita was studying for a bachelor's degree, which she expected to complete in five years at the current rate of taking two classes per semester while working full time. She could not advance in her current job without higher education. The trial court found that Rita left the marriage with vastly inferior job skills and earning power than Robert. The court's finding of economic disparity is amply supported by the record. This is precisely the economic impact of divorce which AS 25.24.160(a)(2) directs the trial court to consider in awarding spousal support. The trial court further found that [the] parties do not have sufficient liquid assets, nor property which can be converted to liquid assets to properly allocate an equitable division of property between plaintiff and defendant. Although the property division, including the granting of the parties['] residence to plaintiff, is more favorable to plaintiff, the equities are still not in her favor. This finding is also supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous. Based on these findings, the court concluded that Rita was entitled to reorientation alimony and ultimately ordered Robert to pay Rita $800 per month for two years and $700 per month for two additional years. Nevertheless, in issuing its order, the court did not specifically address Rita's needs: while generally indicating that the alimony was meant to aid Rita to adjust to new financial circumstances, the court did not specify the nature of the financial circumstances Rita would face or the scope of the adjustment she would be required to make. More particularly, the court failed to explain why it selected the monthly payments specified in its order, and how it concluded that the duration of those payments should be fixed at four years. Nor did the court specifically address Robert's financial needs, his ability to pay the ordered alimony, or the impact that the payments could be expected to have on his own financial circumstances. Finally, the trial court did not adequately explain its decision, on reconsideration, to eliminate rehabilitative alimony in favor of an increased award of reorientation alimony. Rita had expressly requested rehabilitative alimony to assist her in obtaining a college degree and had provided specific information to support her request. Relying on this information, the trial court originally awarded rehabilitative alimony. On reconsideration, however, the court rescinded the award, stating, without further clarification, only that [t]he court apparently erred in its determination that both rehabilitation and reorientation alimony should be awarded. [4] The trial court's failure to address the foregoing issues with specificity in its findings precludes informed appellate review by this court of the disputed alimony award. For this reason, we must remand to the superior court for additional consideration of and findings on the issue of alimony.