Opinion ID: 1584424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: holding of hearing beyond 20-day limit

Text: Although the ALR hearing was held more than 20 days after Betterman requested it because of the continuances, the district court found that the time limit in § 60-498.01(6)(b) is directory, not mandatory, and that the director did not abuse her discretion by granting the continuances. Betterman assigns this ruling as error. The Court of Appeals has held that the timeframe for holding an ALR hearing is directory, not mandatory. See, Searcey, supra; Randall v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 10 Neb.App. 469, 632 N.W.2d 799 (2001). In Randall, the court concluded that a violation of the regulatory time limit did not invalidate the ALR proceedings unless the motorist could show that he or she was prejudiced by the delay. The court explained: In the instant case, the time limitation in [the regulation] is not `essential to the main objective' of the ALR statutes. [T]he purpose of ALR is to protect the public from the health and safety hazards of drunk driving by quickly getting [driving while under the influence] offenders off the road. At the same time, the ALR statutes also further a purpose of deterring other Nebraskans from driving drunk. State v. Young, 249 Neb. 539, 541-42, 544 N.W.2d 808, 811 (1996), citing State v. Hansen, 249 Neb. 177, 542 N.W.2d 424 (1996). The time limitation in [the regulation] is not essential to the purpose of the ALR statutes, but, rather, the time limitation ensures order and promptness in ALR proceedings. The failure to strictly abide by the time limitation . . . does not interfere with the fundamental purpose of the ALR statutes. The main goal of removing drunk drivers off the roads can still be attained when hearings are held past the . . . time limitation. Therefore, [the regulation] is directory rather than mandatory. Randall, 10 Neb.App. at 477-78, 632 N.W.2d at 806. We agree with the Court of Appeals. The failure to hold a hearing within the time provided in § 60-498.01(6)(b) does not invalidate the ALR proceedings unless the motorist can show that he or she was prejudiced by the delay. Betterman has not shown that he was prejudiced because the hearing was more than 20 days after his request. The delay was minor in length, during which time, Betterman retained his privilege to drive. The district court did not err in finding that the director did not abuse her discretion by continuing the hearing beyond the 20-day limitation.