Opinion ID: 365933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vagueness of Section 1153

Text: 10 Broncheau argues that § 1153 is impermissibly vague because it does not define the term Indian and thereby permits arbitrary prosecutorial discretion in the prosecution of individuals for § 1153 crimes. 11  It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 714, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (citation omitted); Accord, United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978), Cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 257, 58 L.Ed.2d 243 (1978); United States v. Ocegueda, 564 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1975). Thus, the test is not whether the statute is vague in the abstract but whether it is vague as applied in the particular circumstances of the case. Id. Moreover, if judicial explication makes a statute clear so that fair notice is afforded, vagueness may not be imputed. United States v. Fithian, 452 F.2d 505, 506 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1971). 12 Unlike the term Indian country, which has been defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the term Indian has not been statutorily defined but instead has been judicially explicated over the years. The test, first suggested in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1845), and generally followed by the courts, considers (1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian. United States v. Dodge,538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099, 97 S.Ct. 1118, 51 L.Ed.2d 547 (1977) (enrollment and one-fourth Indian blood); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 3 (1942); See United States v. Indian Boy X,565 F.2d at 594 (enrollment and residence); United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976) (enrollment and three-fourths Indian blood); Azure v. United States, 248 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1957) (enrollment). 13 We therefore believe that the term Indian, as judicially developed from 1845 to the present, has a meaning sufficiently precise for a man of average intelligence to 'reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed.'  United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 553, 95 S.Ct. at 715-716. Moreover, we note that Broncheau admitted that he was an enrolled Indian at the time his guilty plea was entered and has never suggested that he did not understand the term Indian as it applied to him. In addition, the record shows that the district judge, who had lived in the community and was acquainted with the Broncheau family, identified Broncheau as an Indian. As in United States v. Mazurie, the distinction between Indians and non-Indians was commonly understood and readily made by all concerned. Id. at 553 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 710. 14 Contrary to Broncheau's assertion, merely because the term Indian has been judicially defined on a case-to-case basis does not render § 1153 impermissibly vague as applied to him. The standard for determining who is an Indian has been adequately established by judicial decision. The prosecution of Broncheau was neither arbitrary nor irrational under the circumstances.