Opinion ID: 697653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Tort Claims8

Text: 25 Clarke contends that the district court erred in ruling that the three remaining common law claims--alleging negligence in hiring, supervising and retaining the offending KFC employees--were preempted by the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Act, Mass.Gen.L.Ann. ch. 152, Sec. 24. We briefly reprise the legislative history relating to recent amendments to the workers' compensation statute. 26 From the start, section 24 of the Massachusetts workers' compensation statute included a comprehensive preemption provision precluding injured workers from instituting tort actions in respect to an [employment-related] injury that is compensable [through the payment of disability benefits] under this chapter. Mass.Gen.L.Ann. ch. 152, Sec. 24 (emphasis added). 9 Until 1985, employment-induced emotional disabilities were considered fully compensable injuries under the workers' compensation statute, without regard to whether the disability resulted from employer negligence. See Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711, 714-15 (1980). 27 Clarke concedes that her negligence-based claims against KFC allege employment-induced emotional injury and, thus, would have been preempted under the pre -1985 workers' compensation statute. In 1985, however, the SJC held that employment-related emotional injuries likewise were compensable under the workers' compensation statute, even though the emotional injury resulted from such bona fide employer decisions as layoffs and interdepartmental transfers. Kelly's Case, 394 Mass. 684, 477 N.E.2d 582, 584-85 (1985) (noting that disallowance of workers' compensation for such emotional injuries is a policy decision for the Legislature, not the courts). 28 The ensuing uproar from the Massachusetts business community over the implications of Kelly's Case prompted the Legislature to amend the personal injury definition in chapter 152 to read: 29 Personal injuries shall include mental or emotional disabilities only where the predominant contributing cause of such disability is an event or series of events occurring within any employment.... No mental or emotional disability arising principally out of a bona fide, personnel action including a transfer, promotion, demotion, or termination except such action which is the intentional infliction of emotional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury within the meaning of this chapter. 30 See 1985 Mass. Acts 572 (Workers' Compensation Reform Act); 1986 Mass. Acts 662 (codified at Mass.Gen.L.Ann. ch. 152, Sec. 1(7A)). Although ostensibly a pro-employer enactment, serendipitously the 1985 amendment also presented claimants like Clarke with a basis for attempting to circumvent the broad preemption provision in section 24 of the workers' compensation statute. From the beginning, section 24 had preempted tort actions at common law, but only in respect to injuries compensable by disability benefits under the workers' compensation statute. See Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 152, Sec. 24. After the 1985 amendment, however, emotional injuries caused by an employer's bona fide [ ] personnel action[s]--[hereinafter otherwise: BFPA]--literally became noncompensable under the workers' compensation statute. Consequently, Clarke argues, if it can be established that her emotional injuries were caused by a good faith, albeit negligent, personnel decision on the part of KFC--for which she would not be entitled to workers' compensation benefits under chapter 152, amended section 1(7A), see supra p. 28--she would be entitled to redress her negligence-based tort claims in the courts by virtue of the noncompensability exception to section 24 preemption. 31 Clarke's argument cannot succeed, however, unless she can demonstrate both that (1) the decision not to screen KFC hirees, nor alter their working conditions to minimize the risk that Clarke be emotionally harmed by sexual harassment, constituted a bona fide personnel action within the meaning of amended section 1(7A); and (2) the 1985 Legislature, in rendering all BFPA-induced emotional injuries noncompensable under the workers' compensation statute, intended to deny BFPA claimants like Clarke the right to collect workers' compensation benefits, and, as an offsetting form of relief, to save their common law tort remedies from preemption under section 24. Since Clarke's argument plainly founders on the second prong, we simply assume, arguendo, that the personnel actions at issue qualify as BFPAs under amended section 1(7A). 32 Although there is no SJC decision directly in point, the interpretation Clarke urges was rejected recently by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Catalano v. First Essex Sav. Bank, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 377, 639 N.E.2d 1113, review denied, 419 Mass. 1101, 644 N.E.2d 225 (1994). The Catalano court noted that the 1985 amendments to the workers' compensation statute were in direct response to an invitation the SJC extended to the Legislature in Kelly's Case: to determine, as a matter of public policy, whether one of the costs of doing business in this Commonwealth shall be the compensation of those few employees who do suffer emotional disability as a result of being laid off or transferred. Id. 639 N.E.2d at 1115 (quoting Kelly's Case, 477 N.E.2d at 584-85): 33 It is obvious that the Legislature wished to protect the employer from liability under the [Workers' Compensation] Act for claims arising out of bona fide personnel actions unless motivated by an intent to inflict emotional distress. In those circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Legislature intended to preserve a civil action for claims based on negligent infliction of emotional distress that arise from a bona fide personnel action. To do so would negate ... the purpose of relieving employers from the financial burdens of such claims.... 34 Id. 639 N.E.2d at 1116. 35 Clarke correctly points out that the Catalano analysis constitutes dicta because the court dismissed the appeal on an alternate ground. Id. Nevertheless, persuasive, reasoned dicta may provide a valuable guide to statutory interpretation. See Gibson, 37 F.3d at 736 (absent explicit ruling by state's highest court, federal court sitting in diversity may consult considered dicta) (citing Michelin Tires, 666 F.2d at 682); see also Bank of New England Old Colony, N.A. v. Clark, 986 F.2d 600, 603 (1st Cir.1993) (relying on persuasive dicta of United States Supreme Court); cf. also Sainz Gonzalez v. Banco de Santander-Puerto Rico, 932 F.2d 999, 1001 (1st Cir.1991) (declining to credit dicta unsupported by reasoned analysis); United States v. Rivera, 872 F.2d 507, 509 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S.Ct. 71, 107 L.Ed.2d 38 (1989). Moreover, the Catalano analysis was prompted by the appeals court's express desire to resolve the alleged uncertainty and confusion that purportedly exists among the members of the [Massachusetts] bar and public concerning the initiation of legal proceedings involving the claims raised in this appeal, Catalano, 639 N.E.2d at 1115, and the SJC summarily denied review. 36 The original workers' compensation statute effectively preempted a broad range of civil actions based on employment-related emotional injury, see supra p. 27, and one would expect any significant retreat from this longstanding legislative policy to be heralded with considerably greater clarity than is discernible in Mass.Gen.L.Ann. ch. 152, Sec. 1(7A). We agree with the appeals court that it would strain credulity and common sense to presume that the Legislature chose to limit employers' collective liability under the workers' compensation scheme, only to expose individual employers to greater liability in common law negligence suits based on bona fide personnel actions. III