Opinion ID: 2166394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: interference with counsel

Text: The defendant's next argument is that as a result of State interference, he was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Bailey contends that prison officials interrupted his telephone calls with his attorney and destroyed materials that Bailey had prepared to present to his attorney prior to his fourth trial for the purpose of trial preparation. The right of an accused person to have the assistance of counsel for his defense is fundamental to our system of justice and is meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-797, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The denial of the assistance of counsel to a criminal defendant is a denial of due process of law, under both the federal and Delaware Constitution. Merritt v. State, Del.Supr., 219 A.2d 258 (1966). Courts have been responsive to proven claims that certain governmental conduct has rendered counsel's assistance to the defendant ineffective. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). However, without detracting from the fundamental importance of the right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases, the necessity of preserving society's interest in the administration of criminal justice has also been recognized. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, or the substantial threat of prejudice, the dismissal of an indictment against an accused has found to be inappropriate even though there may have been a deliberate interference with the right to counsel. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) reh. den. 450 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 1420, 67 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981). Situations involving interference with the assistance of counsel are subject to the general rule that the remedy should be tailored to the injury suffered and should not unnecessarily infringe upon society's competing interest in the administration of criminal justice. [21] Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665. With these parameters in mind, we examine the facts, circumstances, and rulings of the trial court in the present case. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. den. 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). Prior to his fourth trial, not only did Bailey remain incarcerated, but he was placed in the maximum security unit at the Delaware Correctional Center. Bailey alleged that confinement in the maximum security unit impeded his ability to prepare for trial. In fact, Bailey filed a motion to be removed from the maximum security unit. On March 12, 1985, the Superior Court denied Bailey's motion to be removed from the maximum security unit but entered a detailed order permitting Bailey unlimited access to his attorney, free access to writing and legal material necessary to assist his attorney and liberal telephone privileges for discussions with his attorney. [22] Problems concerning the implementation of the Superior Court Order arose almost immediately. On March 22 and March 23, 1985, Bailey personally sent two letters to the Superior Court Judge alleging that legal papers relating to the preparation of his defense had been taken, that he been denied unlimited access to a telephone to speak with his attorney and that on one occasion prison officials had interrupted his phone call with his defense counsel. Bailey's attorneys reiterated his pro se concern on March 25, 1985 by filing a motion to dismiss the charges due to the State's interference with the preparation of the defendant's case and by also filing a petition for a rule to show cause to be issued against a correctional officer for removing legal documents and other legal materials from Bailey's prison cell. These motions were of such concern to the Superior Court that a hearing on the motions was scheduled for March 29, 1985, with the defendant present. At the hearing on March 29, 1985, Bailey testified that legal papers necessary for the preparation of his defense had been taken during a routine shakedown i.e. a prison cell inspection to search for contraband. Bailey also testified that the Court order granting him access to legal materials, that had been posted on his prison cell wall, had been torn down. According to Bailey, the trial preparation materials which were not missing had been scattered on the floor of his cell by correctional officers. Bailey also testified that despite the Superior Court order, he was not given unlimited telephone access to his lawyer and that on one occasion, prison officials had interrupted a telephone conversation between Bailey and his defense counsel. The correctional officer who performed the shakedown was called by Bailey to testify. That officer specifically denied removing any papers. At the conclusion of Bailey's presentation on March 29, 1985, the State, without presenting any independent evidence requested the Superior Court to deny Bailey's motion and to deny Bailey's petition. The Superior Court concluded that even if there had been some disappearance of materials from Bailey's prison cell, it was not unknown material and could presumably be resurrected or reassembled in a useable form within one week. The court ruled that it was not persuaded there should be a dismissal of the action based on what I heard or there should be a rule to show cause issued or that the case should be continued. However, immediately following that ruling, the Superior Court made it clear to the State that photographs previously requested by Bailey should be delivered to him immediately to assist him in preparation for trial, and that the Court itself had already talked to prison officials to make sure there would not be a problem in getting Bailey's sketch pad returned. The Court was also assured by the prosecutor that Bailey's telephone calls to counsel would not be cut short by the prison officials. [23] Finally, the Court put the State on notice that if there were any more problems along those lines that the Court would give serious consideration to the issuance of a contempt citation. Finally, the Court recognized Bailey's and Bailey's attorneys vested interest in the manner in which they presented the defense. [24] We find that the manner in which the trial judge handled Bailey's claim of interference with counsel was exemplary and a model for the consideration of similar claims in the future. The Superior Court began its evaluation of Bailey's claim by not only expressing grave concern about the serious nature of the allegations but by promptly scheduling a hearing on Bailey's motion and petition. Bailey was present at the hearing, testified personally, and called witnesses to testify in support of his position. The testimony of the witnesses conflicted. The trial court resolved the conflicting testimony contrary to Bailey and denied his applications. This court has held that it will not disturb conclusions of fact made by a trial judge that are supported by competent evidence. State v. Rooks, Del.Supr. 401 A.2d 943, 949 (1979). See also State v. Rooks, Del.Supr. 411 A.2d 316. Moreover, even though the Superior Court denied Bailey the specific relief that was requested (a dismissal or a contempt citation) the trial court properly assessed the prejudice to Bailey and fashioned a remedy which was appropriate to the injury Bailey had sustained. The Court found that material had, in fact, disappeared but could be resurrected or reassembled in a short time and without undue prejudice. Thereafter, the Court specifically ordered the State and the officials of the correctional institution to comply with the prior order of the Court and take immediate action to return Bailey's materials to him and to guarantee Bailey unrestricted access to his attorney or be held in contempt. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665. Bailey argues that although he was able to reconstruct most of the material that had been damaged or destroyed, the fact that the occurrence took place only one week before trial frustrated him in the preparation of his defense. Specifically, Bailey argues that he was unable to adequately assist his attorney without the written material, thereby causing his attorney to be unprepared for proper cross-examination of State's witnesses and proper direct examination of defense witnesses. The record reflects that this concern was made known to the Superior Court before the trial commenced. The trial court indicated a willingness to grant the defense additional time or preparation during the course of the trial, if such a need became evident. [25] Once again, the trial judge wisely fashioned a remedy to meet the need which was identified. The record does not reflect that the defense requested any additional time for preparation during the course of the trial. [26] In the absence of demonstrable irreparable prejudice, dismissal of an indictment is inappropriate, even though there has been interference with the right to be assisted by counsel. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665. The trial court in this case concluded that some material had disappeared but that the defendant was not unduly prejudiced. We are concerned and do not condone interference with a defendant's right to counsel by prison officials or correctional officers. We are particularly concerned about the alleged conduct in this case which can only be characterized as egregious if it occurred despite the entry of a specific order by the Superior Court to protect Bailey's right to effective assistance of counsel. However, we find that the solution of the Superior Court was appropriate and its willingness to enforce its orders through its contempt powers entirely justified. We affirm the Superior Court's decision not to dismiss the charges against Bailey on the grounds that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to State interference. We find that the Superior Court's conclusions and corrective action were proper and are supported by the facts in the record.