Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Intent to Kill Requirement

Text: In 1983, we held that for a felony-murder special circumstance to be found true, subjecting the killer to a death sentence or life imprisonment without possibility of parole (ї 190.2), the prosecution had to prove that the killer intended to kill the victim. ( Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Although we later overruled Carlos v. Superior Court in People v. Anderson, trials for crimes committed in the window period between Carlos and Anderson are controlled by Carlos. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1150, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673; see In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514, 519-522, 252 Cal.Rptr. 418.) Retroactive application of Anderson in these circumstances would deprive defendant of a defense against imposition of the death penalty which the law at the time of the crime plainly permitted. ( Fierro, supra, at p. 227, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) There is no question that the trial court understood that the intent-to-kill requirement applied in defendant's case. It instructed the jury, for each felony-murder special circumstance, that it must be proved that the defendant, Michael James Huggins, intended that a human being, to wit, Sarah Anne Lees, be killed.