Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ex Parte Hearings

Text: Related to her claim that she was entitled to pretrial discovery from her codefendant, Phillip Sanders, of evidence concerning the jail letters, defendant also contends she was entitled to be present at the hearings in which Phillip‘s attorneys, the prosecutor and the trial court discussed the discovery issue. Her exclusion from these hearings, she claims, violated her constitutional rights to 62 counsel and to due process of law under the state and federal Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) She also contends her exclusion from these hearings violated her statutory right to be present at all critical stages of her criminal trial (§§ 977, 1043), and that holding an ex parte hearing was unauthorized by section 1054.7, violated the California Code of Judicial Ethics (hereafter Code of Judicial Ethics), and deprived her of the effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we reject these claims.11
― ‗Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to be personally present at any proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to prevent ―interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.‖ [Citations.] Due process guarantees the right to be present at any ―stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome‖ and where the defendant‘s ―presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.‖ ‘ [Citation.] The state constitutional right to be present at trial, which is guaranteed by article I of the California Constitution, ‗ ―is generally coextensive with the federal due process right.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. 11 Defendant also mentions, but provides no independent argument regarding, an ex parte hearing held early in the pretrial period for the purpose of appointing separate counsel for witness Christine Kuretich, a housemate of Phillip and Carolyn Sanders, who was expected to be called as a prosecution witness. Defendant makes just a bare mention that an ex parte hearing was held concerning Kuretich, does not describe what happened in the hearing, and then devotes her entire briefing on the question of ex parte hearings to the set of hearings involving Phillip‘s desire not to provide discovery to defendant. The Attorney General does not mention the Kuretich hearing at all. On appeal, we assume a judgment is correct and the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating otherwise. (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881; People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 227.) Under the circumstances, we find defendant has not met her burden of showing statutory or constitutional error with regard to the Kuretich hearing. 63 Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 633.) Defendant contends that her right to due process and a fair trial required the trial court to have given her notice and an opportunity to be heard on the questions of her alleged right to discovery from Phillip. In short, she claims the trial court should not have held the hearings without her. ―Proceedings held in chambers and outside the presence of a party are generally disfavored.‖ (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1299.) Nevertheless, as a general rule, a trial court has discretion to conduct a proceeding in a defendant‘s absence ―to protect an overriding interest that favors confidentiality.‖ (Ibid.; see People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 125 [―ex parte proceedings are permissible if ‗compelling reasons justify them‘ ‖].) Unlike most instances in which a criminal defendant complains of being excluded from a hearing, the ex parte hearing in this case excluded both defendant and her attorneys. We need not decide whether the same rules apply in that situation, however, because we conclude any constitutional error was harmless. As explained, ante, the subject of the ex parte hearings now challenged concerned the letters defendant sent to Phillip Sanders in jail, and Jennifer Lee‘s ability to authenticate those letters. Defendant could not have been taken by surprise by the contents of the letters because she wrote them. She was, moreover, afforded sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Lee regarding her role as defendant‘s amanuensis. Accordingly, the exclusion of defendant and her attorneys from the hearing in question could not have prejudiced her under any standard.
Defendant also argues her exclusion from the hearing on Phillip Sanders‘s discovery obligations violated her statutory rights. With exceptions not relevant here, at the time of defendant‘s trial section 977 provided in pertinent part: ―In all 64 cases in which a felony is charged, the accused [shall be personally] present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused must be present at all other proceedings unless he shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver of his right to be personally present, approved by his counsel, which waiver must then be filed with the court . . . .‖ (Former § 977, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1968, ch. 1064, § 1, p. 2064.) The present version of the statute, section 977, subdivision (b)(1), is essentially the same. (See Stats. 2014, ch. 167, § 1.) Section 1043 is also relevant. It provides that a felony defendant ―shall be personally present at the trial‖ (id., subd. (a)), provides for removal of disruptive defendants (id., subd. (b)(1)), and when read together with section 977, provides that ―a capital defendant cannot voluntarily waive his right to be present during the proceedings listed in section 977.‖ (People v. Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 635.) In other words, section 1043 when read in conjunction with section 977, permits a capital defendant to be absent only in very limited circumstances (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 117–118). Like the constitutional imperative, the statutory requirement that a criminally accused be personally present in court applies to all proceedings where his presence bears a ― ‗ ―reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 959, quoting People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 745–746.) But as with the constitutional claim, we need not decide whether the ex parte hearing now challenged satisfies the ―reasonable, substantial relation test,‖ because no prejudice could have resulted from the exclusion of defendant and her attorneys from the hearing. Again, as defendant was undoubtedly aware of the existence 65 and contents of the letters, as well as Jennifer Lee‘s part in copying them, defendant‘s exclusion from the hearing could not have negatively affected her trial or trial strategy in any meaningful way.
Defendant makes three subsidiary claims. First, she argues that by holding an ex parte hearing concerning Phillip‘s discovery obligations the trial court erred under state law, because section 1054.7 does not authorize ex parte hearings. We find no violation of the statute. Section 1054.7 contains no express prohibition on ex parte hearings, and defendant acknowledges that ―the trial court may hold an ex parte hearing on a discovery matter‖ so long as ―the hearing . . . comport[s] with the general principles of due process.‖ (Cf. People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 466 [―In general, a court ‗has inherent discretion to conduct in camera hearings to determine objections to disclosure based on asserted privileges.‘ ‖].) As defendant had no due process right to pretrial discovery from a jointly tried codefendant, the trial court‘s decision to hold an ex parte hearing was permissible. Nor does City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, which defendant cites in support, alter our conclusion. The propriety of the ex parte hearing in that case concerned the defendant‘s request for discovery from the prosecution. By contrast, the discovery matter at issue here was between the prosecution and Phillip, so the case is inapposite. In any event, the court in City of Alhambra acknowledged that ―ex parte hearings may be necessary to protect a defendant‘s rights‖ (id. at p. 1130); here, the fair trial rights to be protected belonged to codefendant Phillip Sanders. Second, defendant argues she is entitled to relief because, by holding an ex parte hearing on Phillip‘s discovery issue, the trial judge violated the Code of Judicial Ethics. The Code of Judicial Ethics sets forth ethical rules applicable to 66 judges, and one of them addresses ex parte communications: ―A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, that is, communications to or from the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending . . . proceeding . . . except [listing situations inapplicable here].‖ (Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(7).) Further, ―[i]f a judge receives an unauthorized ex parte communication, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.‖ (Id., canon 3B(7)(d) (canon 3B(7)(d)).) Defendant contends the trial court‘s ex parte hearing in her case violated this canon, requiring reversal of her convictions. Misconduct by a trial judge may, of course, be grounds for reversal of a judgment, but even were we to assume the trial court was in violation of an ethical rule, reversal would not be required on these facts. As respondent observes, no case authority holds that a violation of a judicial ethical rule, per se, automatically requires reversal of the ensuing judgment. Defendant cites two cases in support, but neither justifies reversal here. In Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 994, the trial court viewed the defendant corporation‘s training video without plaintiff‘s counsel being present, an apparent violation of canon 3B(7)(d), convincing the appellate court to reverse the resulting judgment. But the Haluck court also explained that the procedure was improper because it created an appearance of impropriety, and its decision to reverse was due to a combination of the trial court‘s multiple ethically questionable acts, not just a single violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. By contrast, the ex parte hearing in this case was designed to address Phillip‘s discovery obligations, and only tangentially and minimally affected defendant‘s rights. Similarly, in People v. Bradford (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1390, which defendant also cites in support, the court reversed a conviction due to the trial 67 court‘s ex parte communications with a deliberating jury. Although such misconduct violates the Code of Judicial Ethics, the Bradford court reversed the judgment because the ex parte contacts violated the defendant‘s constitutional right to a fair trial. By contrast, defendant does not show the ex parte hearing in this case violated her constitutional rights. In any event, as we have concluded the trial court acted properly in excluding defendant and her attorneys from the hearing in which the prosecution and attorneys for codefendant Phillip Sanders discussed his discovery obligations, defendant was not a ―person who [had] a legal interest in the proceeding‖ within the meaning of canon 3B(7)(d). Finally, defendant argues that deciding Phillip‘s discovery matter in an ex parte hearing violated her right to the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The claim fails because she does not demonstrate she had a right to be represented by counsel at a hearing concerning Phillip‘s discovery obligations. Even if she did, no prejudice is apparent, as she could not have been unaware of the contents of the letters under discussion. (See People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 305 [―If petitioner fails to show prejudice, a reviewing court may reject the claim [of ineffective assistance of counsel] without determining whether counsel‘s performance was adequate‖].) 5. Alleged Prosecutorial Failure to Comply with Discovery Defendant next contends the prosecution failed to disclose before trial four pieces of evidence, thereby violating the statutory scheme governing prosecutorial discovery (§1054.1 et seq.), as well as her constitutional rights to confrontation, effective counsel, and a reliable penalty determination under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As we explain, we find no reversible error. 68 a. The Applicable Law As noted, ante, the rules governing discovery in criminal trials underwent a major change on June 5, 1990, by the adoption of Proposition 115, titled the ―Crime Victims Justice Reform Act.‖ (See Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356.) As defendant‘s trial was held in 1992, these new rules applied to her trial. Pursuant to those rules, ―[i]n criminal proceedings, under the reciprocal discovery provisions of section 1054 et seq., all court-ordered discovery is governed exclusively by—and is barred except as provided by—the discovery chapter newly enacted by Proposition 115 [§§ 1054–1054.7].).‖ (In re Littlefield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 129.) Section 1054.1 provides: ―The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and information, if it is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies: [¶] . . . [¶] ―(f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case . . . .‖ Such disclosures must ―be made at least 30 days prior to the trial, unless good cause is shown why a disclosure should be denied, restricted, or deferred.‖ (§ 1054.7.) ― ‗Good cause‘ is limited to threats or possible danger to the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise of other investigations by law enforcement.‖ (Ibid.) Although section 1054.1, subdivision (f) states expressly that the prosecution must disclose ―written or recorded statements of witnesses,‖ at least one appellate court has interpreted this language to apply to oral statements as well. (Roland v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 154.) We previously have had no occasion to decide whether section 1054.1‘s disclosure obligation 69 applies to oral statements in addition to written ones. (See People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 283.) b. Analysis Carolyn Thompson Jones (Carolyn Jones), the victim‘s eldest child, testified she worked for the United States Department of Defense as an investigator and had had four weeks of training on subjects such as ―observing a person‘s body language, their tone of voice, facial expressions and things like that.‖ She was at the hospital after her father was shot and observed defendant there. Jones testified that defendant ―appeared to be very calm at times and then there were other times where she would . . . scream or let out a yell like she was really grieving my father‘s death; but there were never any tears and she only did that when someone was watching her or looking at her but she was never crying, actually crying, like the rest of us were.‖ This evidence tended to bolster the prosecution‘s assertion that defendant‘s expressions of grief were feigned, thus indicating a guilty state of mind. Defendant objected to Carolyn Jones‘s testimony on the ground that the prosecution failed to disclose that it intended to call Jones as an expert witness, but the court overruled the objection. Defendant now contends the failure to provide pretrial discovery of Jones‘s testimony as required by statute violated her constitutional rights entitling her to reversal of her conviction. Respondent notes that defendant‘s true argument seems more aimed at whether the prosecution gave sufficient notice that Jones would testify as an expert, but setting that aside, for two reasons we conclude that, even assuming for argument‘s sake a statutory discovery violation occurred, reversal is unjustified. First, when allegedly first confronted with Carolyn Jones‘s testimony at trial with no previous pretrial discovery, defendant failed to request a continuance 70 to meet the new evidence. This omission is fatal to her contention on appeal. ―It is defendant‘s burden to show that the failure to timely comply with any discovery order is prejudicial, and that a continuance would not have cured the harm.‖ (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 941; see People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 386–387 [quoting Pinholster with approval].) Even now she fails to assert how earlier disclosure of Jones‘s testimony would have made any difference to her defense strategy. Second, any error was harmless, for Jones was not the only one to notice defendant‘s lack of true grief. Tommy Thompson, another of the victim‘s children, testified that when he saw defendant at the hospital, ―she didn‘t show any emotions at all‖ and ―didn‘t cry at all.‖ According to Tommy, defendant was more grief stricken when her pet cat died. And Nancy Rankin testified that when she rode home from the hospital with defendant, she heard defendant say, ―it wasn‘t supposed to happen this way.‖ Accordingly, any discovery violation with regard to Jones‘s testimony was harmless under any standard. Defendant also contends reversal is required because she received no pretrial discovery of Tony DeGreef‘s testimony. DeGreef testified he met with defendant and Isabelle Sanders when negotiating to sell the Hillary Drive house back to defendant, and that defendant told him that her husband ―was very ill to the point of being bedridden in some cases, and it would be much better that I did not speak with him because she did not want to get him more upset in regards to the matter.‖ In short, defendant ―indicated that she did not want [the victim] to know‖ about the negotiations to buy back the house. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing, ―we have absolutely no discovery‖ of DeGreef‘s statements. The prosecutor confirmed for the trial court that ―everything that has been reduced to writing with respect to this witness [had] been turned over‖ to the defense, and that defendant had known all along the 71 prosecution intended to prove the victim was ignorant of the foreclosure on the Hillary Drive house. Further, said the prosecutor, ―We can‘t [provide pretrial discovery for] each and every sentence that the witness is testifying to.‖ The trial court denied the mistrial motion. Even assuming for the sake of argument that some of DeGreef‘s oral statements that were never reduced to writing were nevertheless subject to pretrial disclosure under sections 1054.1 et seq., defendant‘s failure to request a continuance defeats her present claim. (People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 941.) As with Carolyn Jones‘s testimony, defendant does not explain how earlier disclosure of DeGreef‘s oral statements would have made any difference to her defense strategy. Second, any error was harmless, for the enormous web of circumstantial evidence of defendant‘s financial dealings, including forging the victim‘s signature on a deed of trust, failing to make payments and allowing the Hillary Drive house to fall into foreclosure, negotiating to rent the house back from BID Properties and then to buy the house back, all strongly suggest the victim was unaware he no longer owned his own home. Accordingly, any discovery violation with regard to DeGreef‘s testimony was harmless under any standard. Defendant‘s final two instances of alleged discovery violations require less comment. Defendant objected that she had no pretrial disclosure that Tommy Thompson, the victim‘s son, would testify and describe her apparent grief over the death of her pet cat. The prosecutor explained she had just learned that information from a witness during trial, and ―I don‘t think it‘s fair to require us to run to [the defense] every time we hear a sentence.‖ The trial court denied the implied motion for discovery sanctions, explaining: ―The sanction of not letting it in, I‘m not going to exercise my discretion at this point because I don‘t think that a 72 half hour or hour lapse had affected [the] trial or [the defense] preparation.‖ We perceive no error. Finally, defendant complains she had no pretrial discovery regarding Jennifer Lee, who authenticated letters defendant sent to Phillip Sanders while in pretrial detention awaiting trial. Lee was not a prosecution witness, but was called to the stand by Phillip Sanders. As we explain in more detail, ante, parts I.B.3 and 4, no discovery obligation exists as between codefendants being jointly tried. Having found no reversible error for any of the four alleged discovery violations, we have no occasion to decide whether section 1054.1 et seq. apply to oral statements (see People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 283), and also reject the associated claims of constitutional error. 6. Failure to Compel Discovery of Christine Kuretich’s Address Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error under the applicable statutory rules (§ 1054 et seq.) by denying her motion to compel discovery of witness Christine Kuretich‘s address. Defendant also contends the court‘s ruling violated her federal constitutional rights to confront and crossexamine Kuretich, to the effective assistance of counsel, and to a reliable penalty determination. (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) We reject these arguments. That Kuretich was expected to be a key prosecution witness is undisputed. Section 1054.1 provides that ―[t]he prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and information . . . [¶] (a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at trial.‖ That discovery obligation is qualified, however, by section 1054.7, which authorizes a trial court to deny, restrict or defer such disclosure on a showing of good cause. (Alvarado v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 73 p. 1134.) ―We generally review a trial court‘s ruling on matters regarding discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.‖ (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299; see People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 357 [quoting Ayala with approval].) The proper exercise of a trial court‘s discretion under section 1054.7 does not violate a criminal defendant‘s confrontation or due process rights. (Alvarado, supra, at pp. 1134–1135.) Christine Kuretich testified at the preliminary hearing that she lived with Phillip and Carolyn Sanders around the time of the murder and that she overheard them, along with Robert Jones, make incriminating statements suggesting they were in a conspiracy with defendant to kill the victim. For example, she testified that Carolyn asked her if she knew anyone who would kill someone for money, that the intended victim was defendant‘s husband, that the motive was to obtain life insurance proceeds, that Phillip would shoot the victim, and that Robert Jones would obtain the gun and drive Phillip to the victim‘s shop. After testifying at the preliminary hearing, Kuretich left the jurisdiction. The prosecution eventually located her in Kansas, where she had turned her life around. She had stopped doing drugs and drinking, was married and pregnant, and had made plans to buy some land and start a business with her husband. She was brought back to Los Angeles on a material witness warrant and then released to the custody of her parents. The trial court ordered the prosecution to disclose Kuretich‘s address in Kansas to defendant‘s attorneys, subject to a protection order that the address not be revealed to defendant. Defense counsel also sought disclosure of Kuretich‘s current location, i.e., her parents‘ address. Counsel argued he wanted to investigate whether the witness‘s claim of newfound sobriety was true. The prosecution objected that intrusive inquiries by the defense might cause Kuretich to again flee the jurisdiction. 74 The trial court suggested a compromise, asking whether it would satisfy the defense if Kuretich was ―made available in your office for an interview.‖ Defense counsel Wager replied, ―Certainly,‖ adding that he would also like to interview Kuretich‘s parents. The prosecution had no objection to this arrangement, so the trial court ordered the prosecution to make Kuretich and her parents available for an interview. There was no further defense objection. Because defense counsel accepted the trial court‘s compromise, the court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to order disclosure of Kuretich‘s parents‘ address. We thus find no statutory or constitutional error. To the extent defendant argues the trial court‘s ruling compromised her ability to obtain the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, we reject that claim as well, because defense counsel‘s decision to accept the trial court‘s compromise appears on this record to be a reasonable tactical decision that did not fall below prevailing professional norms. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 391.) 7. Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule Christine Kuretich testified at trial that she had overheard Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones make several inculpatory statements. Prior to trial, defendant had moved to exclude the evidence as inadmissible hearsay but the trial court partially denied the motion, ruling most of the evidence was admissible under the hearsay exception for admissions by coconspirators. (Evid. Code, § 1223.) Defendant now contends the trial court erred prejudicially because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence the statements were made during a time when the conspiracy was ongoing, and the evidence therefore did not qualify under the exception for statements by coconspirators. In addition to 75 violating Evidence Code section 1223, defendant also contends the error violated her federal right to due process of law (Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346). We reject these arguments because the record demonstrates the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of an ongoing conspiracy. a. Facts Prior to trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude Kuretich‘s anticipated testimony that she overheard statements—both before and after the murder— uttered by Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones, linking them to both the charged conspiracy and the murder. Defendant made four contentions in her motion: (1) admission of the hearsay statements violated her federal constitutional right to confrontation; (2) the prosecution failed to present sufficient independent evidence a conspiracy to kill existed; (3) assuming there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to kill, the evidence was still insufficient to show a conspiracy to collect insurance proceeds; and (4) assuming there was evidence of a continuing conspiracy, ―no evidence exists to show that any of the post-crime statements . . . [was] in ‗furtherance‘ of the conspiracy as required by law.‖ The prosecution opposed the motion by listing several facts they alleged they could prove to demonstrate the existence of an ongoing conspiracy. Defendant‘s motion for a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 to establish the preliminary fact of a conspiracy was initially denied, but the trial court later changed its mind, explaining that it was concerned that not all of the statements were made during a time of an ongoing conspiracy. The court explained that ―[i]n order for you to be able to get those statements in and have them apply to both defendants, you are going to have to show there was the existence of a conspiracy and both of these defendants were part of this conspiracy at the time the statements were made.‖ The court was reluctant to allow the 76 prosecution to make an offer of proof and decided that Kuretich would be the last of the prosecution‘s witnesses to testify, ―after [the prosecution has] presented before the jury all the evidence you feel shows the existence of the conspiracy at the time the statements were made. The prosecution, in its offer of proof, organized Kuretich‘s intended statements into four categories: (1) Carolyn Sanders‘s question to Kuretich whether she could find someone willing to kill for insurance money; (2) a group of conversations between Phillip and Carolyn Sanders discussing whether they could find someone to commit the murder, the details of the planned killing, their inability to find a suitable hit man, and their decision that Phillip should commit the murder himself because they had already received and spent a partial payment for the killing; (3) conversations between Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones discussing the murder, the agreement that Phillip would commit the shooting and that Jones would drive and provide the gun, and Jones‘s later statement that he had obtained a gun; and (4) Jones‘s statements, after the murder, that he had destroyed the gun by melting it at his uncle‘s truck yard. After the prosecution had presented most of its case-in-chief, the trial court ruled the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to permit the admission of statements in categories No. 2 and No. 3, but that the statements in categories No. 1 and No. 4 would be excluded. According to the trial court, the evidence did not show that at the time Carolyn asked Kuretich whether she knew of someone willing to kill for money, the Sanderses were already participating in a conspiracy with defendant to kill the victim. The court also ruled that Jones‘s statement about melting the gun occurred after the victim was dead and thus was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. (See People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560 [―acts committed by conspirators subsequent to the completion of the crime which is the primary object of a conspiracy cannot be deemed to be overt acts in 77 furtherance of that conspiracy‖].) Kuretich then testified and related for the jury the incriminatory conversations she overheard while living with Phillip and Carolyn Sanders. b. Discussion ―Hearsay evidence is of course generally inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Hearsay statements by coconspirators, however, may nevertheless be admitted against a party if, at the threshold, the offering party presents ‗independent evidence to establish prima facie the existence of . . . [a] conspiracy.‘ ‖ (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 139.) Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223,12 ―[o]nce independent proof of a conspiracy has been shown, three preliminary facts must be established: ‗(1) that the declarant was participating in a conspiracy at the time of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; and (3) that at the time of the declaration the party against whom the evidence is offered was participating or would later participate in the conspiracy.‘ ‖ (Hardy, supra, at p. 139, quoting People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 430–431, fn. 10.) ―[T]he admission of evidence is generally tested by the abuse of discretion standard‖ (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1311), and we have applied this deferential 12 Evidence Code section 1223 sets forth the coconspirator exception and provides: ―Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: ―(a) The statement was made by the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; ―(b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that the party was participating in that conspiracy; and ―(c) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the facts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in the court‘s discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the admission of such evidence.‖ 78 standard to a trial court‘s decision to admit or deny evidence under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 516). At the threshold, we reject respondent‘s argument that defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object to Kuretich‘s testimony at trial. Respondent relies on ―[t]he general rule . . . that ‗when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal . . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 547; see People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 159, quoting Brown with approval.) But we immediately qualified that statement in Brown by recognizing that ―a sufficiently definite and express ruling on a motion in limine may also serve to preserve a claim . . . .‖ (Brown, supra, at p. 547.) This latter exception is well established (see People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1171; see generally People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 188– 190 [discussing the circumstances in which a pretrial motion in limine adequately preserves an evidentiary claim for appeal], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1), and applies here because defendant raised a sufficiently specific in limine motion and raised the same issue on appeal, the motion was aimed at a specific body of evidence (i.e., Kuretich‘s evidence of statements made by Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones), and the trial court ruled on the motion at a time when it could ―determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context.‖ (Morris, supra, at p. 190.) Although the better practice is to renew the objection at trial, when the context of the evidence may be clearer, we conclude defendant did not forfeit this issue by failing to object at trial to Kuretich‘s testimony. Turning to the merits, we conclude that because the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that the hearsay statements in categories No. 2 and No. 3 were 79 made by coconspirators during an ongoing conspiracy to murder Melvin Thompson, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the evidence was admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223. The evidence presented by the prosecution showed the following: (1) On June 14, 1990, eyewitness Michael Lutz observed two men he later identified as Phillip Sanders and Robert Jones drive up in a Plymouth Acclaim and saw Phillip go down the alley next to the victim‘s business, Kayser Service. Lutz then heard gunshots and saw Phillip return to the car and leave. (2) Because Lutz recorded the car‘s license plate number, police were able to trace the car to Phillip and Carolyn Sanders‘s home in Sylmar. Once inside the home, police found circumstantial evidence suggesting a conspiracy: car keys to the Acclaim (linking them to the murder) and a piece of paper with defendant‘s phone number on it (linking Phillip and Carolyn to defendant). From this evidence, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Phillip Sanders and Robert Jones were personally involved in the murder, that Carolyn Sanders was aware of and probably participated in the scheme, and that defendant—who stood to gain the most financially—was also involved. (3) Shortly after police arrested Phillip, Carolyn Sanders called Christine Kuretich and asked her to immediately come home. Because Kuretich was aware of the plot to kill the victim, it is reasonable to infer that Carolyn wanted to discuss with Kuretich how they might prevent discovery of the murder conspiracy. (4) Evidence of telephone records provided evidence of the criminal conspiracy. In the approximately six weeks preceding the murder (May 4, 1990, to June 14, 1990), those records revealed that numerous calls had been placed between Phillip Sanders‘s Sylmar home and Kayser Service, the repair shop where defendant and the victim worked. During this six-week period, the same records also showed several calls between defendant‘s home and Phillip‘s place of 80 employment, Barish Chrysler-Plymouth. The evidence of nearly constant communication between Phillip and defendant in the weeks leading up to the murder suggests an ongoing enterprise between them. (5) When defendant was arrested for murder, she blurted out: ―I hardly knew Phil at all. I only met him once and that was about the sale of a car.‖ But because police had not yet revealed any evidence of Phillip Sanders‘s involvement, defendant‘s volunteered exclamation tended to show she was untruthful about her lack of familiarity or contact with Phillip Sanders, and suggested she was trying to conceal some other, deeper connection. (6) A search of the victim‘s repair shop revealed a letter in defendant‘s handwriting describing the victim‘s appearance and work schedule. Because defendant would have had no need for such information, the trial court could reasonably have viewed this evidence as intended for an accomplice or coconspirator. (7) The prosecution also presented evidence that Phillip Sanders, and to a lesser extent, Carolyn Sanders, had participated in a 1989 financial fraud with defendant. Defendant and Isabelle Sanders presented themselves to Dorothy Reik, a mortgage broker. Defendant and Phillip posed as Mellie and Melvin Thompson in order to refinance the home on South Sycamore Avenue, which was jointly owned by the victim and his ex-wife, Mellie Thompson. When Reik became suspicious of their temporary driver‘s licenses and asked for someone to personally vouch for their identities, Isabelle‘s daughter, Carolyn Moore, did so, claiming Phillip and defendant were Melvin and Mellie Thompson. Phillip was paid several thousand dollars for his part in the fraud. This evidence suggested Phillip and Carolyn Sanders were engaged in a long-running conspiracy with defendant to fleece the victim, defendant‘s husband, of his assets. Such evidence provided evidence of motive for the murder and insurance fraud. 81 (8) Shortly after the murder, defendant assigned the proceeds of the victim‘s life insurance policy to Tony DeGreef of BID Properties so she could repurchase the Hillary Drive home. This evidence, along with evidence of the fraud in refinancing the South Sycamore Avenue home and the murder, suggest defendant was desperate to regain ownership of the house on Hillary Drive. The prosecution, as the proponent of the evidence, was required to lay an evidentiary foundation that the challenged hearsay statements were uttered during an ongoing conspiracy. ―In order for a declaration to be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must proffer sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to determine that the conspiracy exists by a preponderance of the evidence. A prima facie showing of a conspiracy for the purposes of admissibility of a coconspirator‘s statement under Evidence Code section 1223 simply means that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the conspiracy existed at the time the statement was made.‖ (People v. Herrera (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 63.) Applying this test, we conclude the prosecution provided sufficient evidence, independent of the statements themselves, from which the trial court could have found a prima facie case that the statements were uttered by coconspirators engaged in an ongoing conspiracy with defendant to kill Melvin Thompson in order to collect on his life insurance policies. Defendant argues against this conclusion. While conceding the prosecution may rely on circumstantial evidence, and that proof of a physical meeting by the coconspirators is unnecessary, she contends the prosecution‘s evidence failed to demonstrate a conspiratorial meeting of the minds. But the trial court could find such intent by drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence. ―Evidence is sufficient to prove a conspiracy to commit a crime ‗if it supports an inference that the parties positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to commit a crime. 82 [Citation.] The existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy.‘ ‖ (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1135, italics added.) ― ‗The agreement in a conspiracy may be shown by . . . conduct of the defendants in mutually carrying out an activity which constitutes a crime.‘ ‖ (People v. Gonzalez (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1417, disapproved on another ground in People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 182.) Contrary to defendant‘s further argument, reliance on the hearsay statements themselves was unnecessary to draw a reasonable inference that Phillip Sanders, Carolyn Sanders, Robert Jones and defendant were engaged in a criminal conspiracy to murder the victim for his life insurance proceeds. Defendant may be understood to argue the evidence showing the existence of a conspiracy did not show she was a participating member of that conspiracy at the time the challenged statements were uttered. We reject the argument; given the evidence of intense telephone traffic between defendant and the Sanderses in the weeks leading up to the murder, defendant‘s strong financial incentive to kill the victim, the dearth of evidence defendant had withdrawn from the plan, her quick use of the insurance money after the victim was killed, and her blurted-out statement when arrested that she did not know ―Phil,‖ the trial court could reasonably have inferred that defendant was participating in the conspiracy at the time the challenged hearsay statements were made. Although defendant would explain her blurted-out exclamation as referring to her previous fraudulent refinancing of the South Sycamore Avenue home, a scheme in which both Phillip and Carolyn Sanders participated, that explanation was not the only possible one, and the trial court was entitled to draw a different inference: that defendant‘s exclamation revealed her knowledge that Phillip had murdered her husband. 83 We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence in categories No. 2 and No. 3 (see ante, at p. 77) pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223. Finding no state law error, we also reject defendant‘s contention that failure to accord her relief will deprive her of her federal right to due process of law because the state has withheld a nonconstitutional right or benefit guaranteed by state law within the meaning of Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343. (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 439.) We also find any possible error was harmless. Both codefendant Phillip Sanders and Carolyn Sanders testified and were subjected to cross-examination. Moreover, the jury was instructed not to consider the out-of-court statements unless it found, from independent evidence, that a conspiracy existed. (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 895.) Under the circumstances, any error was harmless. 8. Admission of Other Crimes and Bad Acts Evidence Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of her prior financial misconduct to show her motive for committing the charged crimes. She further contends the court erred by admitting other evidence of her prior conduct which tended to portray her as an uncaring wife and dishonest person. Not only was this evidence inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352, she claims, the admission of this evidence violated her federal and state constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and state Constitution analogs. As we explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under state evidentiary law, and no constitutional error is apparent. 84 a. Facts The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of defendant‘s many previous incidents of financial fraud and shady dealings. The first incident concerns her embezzlement of $33,325 from Edith Ann, her former employer. Then, after she agreed to repay the money, defendant—without her husband‘s knowledge—forged his signature on a deed of trust on the home they jointly owned on Hillary Drive and used some of the money to start repaying the debt to Edith Ann. Third, when defendant stopped making payments on the note, the Hillary Drive house went into foreclosure, was purchased by BID Properties, and defendant secretly negotiated with the buyer to rent back the house. Fourth, she entered into negotiations with Tony DeGreef, the co-owner of BID Properties, to repurchase the Hillary Drive home by using Isabelle Sanders to pose as her mother, and falsely communicated to DeGreef that her husband was ill and that she expected to receive money from a (nonexistent) trust that would enable her to buy back the property. Fifth, she obtained false identification to impersonate her husband‘s exwife, Mellie Thompson, and (along with Phillip Sanders impersonating murder victim Melvin Thompson) was successful in refinancing Mellie‘s home on South Sycamore Avenue, a property defendant did not legally own. Defendant used some of the $98,000 she obtained to pay her rent on the Hillary Drive house. Sixth, defendant attempted to repurchase the Hillary Drive home in her maiden name (again without her husband‘s knowledge) and tried to obtain a loan for $475,000 by claiming he had money deposited with ―Community Bank,‖ a nonexistent financial institution. Defendant objected to the introduction of this evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. The trial court excluded evidence of her embezzlement from Edith Ann (but not the fact of the debt), but ruled the balance 85 of the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101 to show motive and possibly even ―scheme and design.‖ The court also denied the Evidence Code section 352 motion, concluding the probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudice. The prosecution also sought to introduce evidence that defendant had a friend remove all the jewelry from her husband‘s body shortly after the funeral, and that defendant pawned the jewelry the day after the funeral and spent the money two days later gambling in Laughlin, Nevada. The prosecution also called to the stand Tommy Thompson, the victim‘s son, who, over objection, testified that defendant did not seem very upset after the murder, and was much more upset when her cat died. The trial court overruled defendant‘s objections, ruling the evidence was admissible to rebut defendant‘s proffered evidence that she and her husband had a loving relationship. Further, the court ruled the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice. b. Discussion The admission of evidence of prior conduct is controlled by Evidence Code section 1101. Subdivision (a) of that section provides, with exceptions not applicable here: ―[E]vidence of a person‘s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.‖ (Italics added.) The admission of such evidence may also be limited by Evidence Code section 352, which authorizes a trial court, in its discretion, to ―exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‖ 86 Here, the prosecution sought to admit the evidence of defendant‘s prior financial misdeeds to prove her likely motivation for murdering her husband. As we recently explained: ― ‗Evidence that a defendant committed crimes other than those for which [she] is on trial is admissible when it is logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference relevant to prove some fact at issue, such as motive, intent, preparation or identity. [Citations.] The trial court judge has the discretion to admit such evidence after weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect. [Citation.] When reviewing the admission of evidence of other offenses, a court must consider: (1) the materiality of the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the probative value of the other crime evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion even if the evidence is relevant. [Citation.] Because this type of evidence can be so damaging, ―[i]f the connection between the uncharged offense and the ultimate fact in dispute is not clear, the evidence should be excluded.‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citation.] ‗ ―We review for abuse of discretion a trial court‘s rulings on relevance and admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 667–668.) Setting aside whether the prior financial crimes were sufficiently similar to the conspiracy and murder involved in the instant case so as to constitute a common plan or scheme within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1101 (see People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402–403), the trial court was on firm ground in concluding the evidence was admissible on the issue of motive. Of course, ―uncharged conduct may be relevant to establish . . . motive.‖ (Id. at p. 402, fn. 6.) ―As long as there is a direct relationship between the prior offense and an element of the charged offense, introduction of that evidence is proper.‖ (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 857.) Although motive is not an element of either of the charged offenses, it was an intermediate fact that was probative of 87 defendant‘s intent, and ― ‗the intermediate fact of motive‘ may be established by evidence of ‗prior dissimilar crimes.‘ (People v. Thompson [(1980)] 27 Cal.3d 303, 319, fn. 23.) ‗Similarity of offenses [is] not necessary to establish this theory of relevance‘ for the evident reason that the motive for the charged crime arises simply from the commission of the prior offense. (Ibid.) The existence of a motive requires a nexus between the prior crime and the current one, but such linkage is not dependent on comparison and weighing of the similar and dissimilar characteristics of the past and present crimes.‖ (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018.) The evidence was relevant to defendant‘s motive and was thus admissible despite the limits set forth in Evidence Code section 1101. People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983 illustrates the point. In that case, the defendant and the victim dissolved their three-year marriage, but he still owed her $700 in child support arrearages and several thousand dollars in a division of their community property. In a trial for his ex-wife‘s murder, the prosecution presented evidence of his precarious financial situation. On the defendant‘s appeal following his conviction, we rejected his challenge to the admission of this financial evidence, explaining that while evidence of poverty is generally inadmissible to prove a motive for robbery or theft, ―[o]nce the debtorcreditor relationship had been established between defendant and the victim, evidence that defendant had a number of other debts, some of which were in arrears, had substantial relevance to show the motive for the murder of defendant‘s creditor, and this relevance clearly outweighed the risk of undue prejudice.‖ (Id. at p. 1024, italics added; see People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1289 [evidence that defendant‘s motive was to avoid capture was relevant to proving murder was intentional and premeditated]; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1119 [admission of evidence murder was motivated by revenge did not violate Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)].) 88 Defendant argues no direct connection existed between the prior financial frauds and the present murder and conspiracy, that the forged deed of trust she gave Edith Ann served only to show her poverty and indebtedness, and that her attempts to buy back the Hillary Drive house conveyed to the jury her dishonesty but lacked any relevance to the murder. The trial court, however, did not abuse its discretion in concluding that evidence of defendant‘s prior financial misdeeds was relevant to showing her motive for killing, and conspiring to kill, her husband in order to collect on his life insurance policies. Although the trial court exercised its discretion to exclude defendant‘s embezzlement from her prior employer, the balance of the evidence was relevant to show how defendant became more and more desperate to regain ownership of the Hillary Drive home, especially after Mellie Thompson became aware of the fraudulent refinancing of the South Sycamore Avenue house. The jury could infer from this evidence that defendant‘s financial house of cards was about to collapse, leading her to believe she had one last option to make a large financial score: killing her husband. That Phillip Sanders assisted her in some of these financial frauds was an additional link between the past acts and present crimes, and further supports our conclusion the trial court‘s ruling was not an abuse of discretion under either Evidence Code section 1101 or Evidence Code section 352. The evidence concerning retrieval of the victim‘s jewelry after the funeral, that defendant pawned it to finance a gambling vacation in Nevada, and that she was more upset when her cat died than when her husband was murdered, was admissible for a different reason. Defendant presented evidence that she and the victim were in a loving relationship. For example, Patricia Ceaser testified that the couple appeared happy and were never seen fighting, and Rene Griffin testified defendant and the victim got along well. Charlotte Wark testified defendant and the victim were a nice couple who never fought or bickered, and 89 defendant appeared ―very distraught‖ and ―visibly upset‖ following her husband‘s murder. The prosecution was entitled to rebut that evidence with its own evidence suggesting that defendant showed no tenderness towards her husband, and that she was not particularly upset after the crime. In other words, to the extent defendant offered evidence of her good character (or lack of motive) in the form of her alleged loving relationship with her husband and her apparent distress at his murder, this evidence opened the door to allow the prosecution to present evidence of her bad character (and motive to kill him). (People v. Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1197, disapproved on another point in People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 391, fn. 3; see also People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 307 [a defendant‘s testimony ―that he felt remorse during the interrogations that took place the day after committing the crimes‖ entitled the People to present a rebuttal witness who ―testified that he saw no sense of remorse at that time‖].) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion, under either Evidence Code section 1101 or Evidence Code section 352, in admitting the challenged evidence. We also reject defendant‘s associated constitutional claims. ― ‗The ―routine application of state evidentiary law does not implicate [a] defendant‘s constitutional rights.‖ [Citation.] As defendant provides no elaboration or separate argument for these constitutional claims, we decline to address further these boilerplate contentions.‘ ‖ (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 194.) 9. Alleged Griffin Error Defense attorney Takakjian announced defendant had chosen not to testify, as was her right. The trial court sought to ensure defendant understood the implications of her decision, noting that it would be irrevocable once the prosecution began presenting its case against codefendant Phillip Sanders because 90 ―they are committing themselves based on her election,‖ and that although she presumably could testify on rebuttal, the scope of such testimony would be necessarily limited. (See People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 169 [―The scope of proper rebuttal depends on ‗the breadth and generality of the direct evidence‘ ‖].) Moreover, if Phillip suddenly rested his case without presenting a defense, ―that‘s it.‖ Counsel affirmed that defendant understood the risks. Later, the following colloquy occurred: ―MR. WAGER [Defense counsel]: Is the record clear to the court, we‘ve had a discussion with Ms. Thompson about her right to testify? ―We discussed it with her and she‘s exercising her right not to testify and she understands it‘s her right? ―THE COURT: Is that correct, Mrs. Thompson? ―DEFENDANT THOMPSON: Yes, it is. ―THE COURT: Okay. [¶] I don‘t know how much clearer it can be.‖ After defendant‘s final witness had finished his testimony, and still in the jury‘s presence, Mr. Takakjian stated: ―Except for the remaining witnesses we discussed, we rest.‖ The trial court then asked: ―You are resting without calling your client?‖ (Italics added.) Mr. Takakjian replied: ―Yes, sir.‖ At sidebar, counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming the court made a prohibited comment on defendant‘s right to remain silent. The court denied the motion. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ―[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,‖ and the high court has interpreted this provision to ―forbid[] either comment by the prosecution on the accused‘s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.‖ (Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615.) The constitutional prohibition against compelled self-incrimination is a right that has been incorporated to apply against the states (Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 91 U.S. 1, 8; see People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 415, fn. 4), and we have accordingly held ― ‗a prosecutor is prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly on an accused‘s invocation of the constitutional right to silence‘ ‖ (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 184). We have also extended Griffin to prohibit comment on a defendant‘s silence by the trial judge. (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 35 [―Under the rule in Griffin, error is committed whenever the prosecutor or the court comments, either directly or indirectly, upon defendant‘s failure to testify.‖ (italics added)];13 People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 755 [same].) The trial court‘s utterance in front of the jury—―You are resting without calling your client?‖—was unquestionably imprudent. We may surmise the court merely wished to impress upon defense counsel that the trial had reached the point of no return for defendant‘s decision whether or not to testify. But by expressing surprise at defendant‘s silence, the court‘s comment—which we assume was audible to the jury—may have inadvertently communicated to the jury that it should (or may) consider defendant‘s silence as evidence of her guilt. Such a message would have trenched on defendant‘s constitutional right to remain silent. In previous cases, when faced with a prosecutor‘s utterance of comments of this type (i.e., short, isolated statements not clearly calling for improper consideration of a defendant‘s silence), we have generally found such comments harmless. ― ‗ ―[I]ndirect, brief and mild references to a defendant‘s failure to testify, without any suggestion that an inference of guilt be drawn therefrom, are uniformly held to constitute harmless error.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 455–456; see People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 419–420.) In 13 People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d 1, was disapproved on another ground in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543, footnote 5. 92 this case, however, the comment came from the trial judge, and it stands to reason that jurors would assign more weight to a judge‘s remark than that of a prosecutor. But even appreciating that difference, we find, for several reasons, the court‘s comment was harmless in these circumstances. First, the trial court‘s comment consisted of just a single short query. Second, the court‘s comment did not directly suggest the jury should draw an inference of guilt from defendant‘s decision not to testify. Third, the jury was instructed that ―[a] defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. You must not draw any inference from the fact a defendant does not testify.‖ We assume the jury followed this instruction. (People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1336.) Considering these circumstances, we conclude that any Griffin error flowing from the trial court‘s comment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) 14 10. Alleged Violation of Evidence Code section 351.1 (Concerning Polygraph Evidence) a. Facts On direct examination by the prosecutor, Christine Kuretich testified she had previously lied to police on several occasions by falsely placing the blame for the murder on Gregory Jones, but she eventually told the truth and implicated Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and defendant. On cross-examination, in response to defense counsel‘s question asking her why she changed her story, Kuretich answered: ―I was nervous. It was just time I told the truth, and [police investigators] mentioned a lie detector so I knew they would know anyway.‖ 14 We reject defendant‘s further claim that Griffin error should not be subject to the harmless error test set forth in Chapman, but should instead be automatically reversible. Indeed, Chapman itself involved Griffin error. 93 Kuretich explained that her conscience and fear of a polygraph examination prompted her to change her story, and that when she did so she told the detective she did not want to take the polygraph examination. In response to further defense questioning, Kuretich acknowledged she never took the polygraph examination. The prosecution did not object to any of this evidence. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Kuretich if she would be willing to take a polygraph test that day. Before the witness answered, defense counsel successfully interposed an objection. Defense counsel also moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. After Kuretich finished her testimony, the trial court, over defendant‘s objection, instructed the jury: ―At the very end of [defense counsel‘s] crossexamination of the witness, he asked her whether or not she had ever taken a polygraph examination. [¶] [The prosecutor] has countered with a question that she just asked a minute ago. [¶] Both of these questions are improper.‖ The court further instructed: ―[Polygraph evidence is] not admissible in a court of law in California and you shouldn‘t take that into consideration at all, whether someone takes a polygraph or they don‘t.‖ The court‘s instruction concluded, ―whether or not this witness has ever taken a polygraph or wouldn‘t take a polygraph is totally irrelevant. You should put that out of your mind.‖ From this relatively brief interplay, defendant makes a series of legal claims. First, citing Evidence Code section 351.1, she argues: (1) defense counsel‘s questions referencing the polygraph examination constituted permissible questioning, (2) the prosecutor‘s question whether Kuretich would be willing to take a polygraph examination was improper, (3) the trial court‘s instruction to the jury failed to cure the prosecutorial error and improperly undermined defense counsel‘s allegedly permissible impeachment of Kuretich, and (4) these errors were prejudicial and require reversal under state law. Second, defendant contends these associated errors violated her constitutional rights under the Sixth and 94 Fourteenth Amendments15 because the trial court improperly undermined defense counsel‘s ability to effectively cross-examine Kuretich, and placed information before the jury that defendant had no opportunity to confront or rebut. b. Discussion Evidence Code section 351.1, subdivision (a), addresses the admission of polygraph-related evidence and states in pertinent part: ―[T]he results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence in any criminal proceeding, . . . unless all parties stipulate to the admission of such results.‖ By extension, Evidence Code section 351.1 also prohibits any reference to the willingness or unwillingness to take a polygraph examination (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 817; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 763–764); we have described Evidence Code section 351.1‘s restriction on the admissibility of polygraph evidence as a ― ‗ ―rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 890). The exclusion of polygraph-related evidence, absent a stipulation by the parties, ―has been uniformly enforced by this court and the Court of Appeal. ‖ (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 663.) As a general matter, we apply ―the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence‖ (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717), and no reason appears why a different standard 15 For this claim, defendant does not mention, and thus apparently does not rely on, the California Constitution. 95 should apply to questions involving the admission of polygraph-related evidence. Applying this deferential standard here, we find no basis for reversal. The first mention of a polygraph test was during cross-examination of Kuretich when defense counsel asked her why she changed her story to police. She replied: ―It was just time I told the truth, and [police investigators] mentioned a lie detector so I knew they would know anyway.‖ Kuretich explained that her conscience and fear of a polygraph examination prompted her to change her story. The prosecutor did not object to this evidence nor was it later stricken or included in the trial court‘s admonition. We observe that this testimony did not constitute ―an offer to take, [a] failure to take, or [the] taking of a polygraph examination.‖ (Evid. Code, § 351.1.) Kuretich may have expressed fear of, or anxiety about, taking the test but did not say she was unwilling to do so. In any event, the evidence was admitted without objection so we have no occasion to question its admissibility. The second reference to a polygraph test presents a different situation. In response to defense questioning, Kuretich testified she never did take a polygraph test. Defense counsel likely elicited this testimony in an attempt to undermine Kuretich‘s testimony implicating defendant and the Sanderses in the murder plot. That is, because Kuretich never actually took a polygraph test, counsel sought to suggest to the jury that Kuretich‘s story was inaccurate or untrue. But whatever counsel‘s tactical reason for eliciting the testimony, the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 351.1 because it constituted evidence of a ―failure to take . . . a polygraph examination.‖ The trial court thus acted within its discretion by striking the evidence and instructing the jury to disregard it. The third reference to a polygraph test was on redirect examination, when the prosecutor asked Kuretich whether she would be willing to take a polygraph examination ―today.‖ Although she never answered the question due to a timely 96 objection, the question sought evidence of the witness‘s willingness to take a polygraph test and was thus improper. (People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 817.) The trial court thus acted within its discretion by striking the question and instructing the jury to disregard it. Defendant argues the curative instruction was both inadequate to redress the erroneous admission of polygraph-related evidence, and also unfairly undermined her legitimate effort to impeach the witness‘s reasons for changing her story. The latter point is meritless, as defendant was able to have Kuretich acknowledge to the jury that she changed her story because of her fear of having to take a polygraph test, and that testimony remained for the jury‘s consideration when weighing the witness‘s credibility. The trial court‘s admonition was directed only to Kuretich‘s additional statement that she never took the threatened test, evidence that was directly barred by Evidence Code section 351.1. We perceive no interference with defendant‘s ability to cross-examine and impeach Kuretich, or to otherwise present a defense. Regarding the efficacy of the trial court‘s admonition, the reason that defendant believes it was inadequate is unclear. Where polygraph evidence has been erroneously introduced, this court has held that ―a trial court‘s timely admonition, which the jury is presumed to have followed, cures prejudice resulting from the admission of such evidence.‖ (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 953.) Defendant cites three cases she claims demonstrates the ineffectual nature of the court‘s instruction, but none compels a contrary conclusion in this case. In People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, the prosecutor violated a preexisting court order not to mention that the main witness had taken a polygraph test. The appellate court held the error, in combination with another more serious error by the trial court, was prejudicial because both errors ―substantially affected the crucial issue in the case—[the main witness‘s] credibility.‖ (Id. at p. 391.) But 97 unlike in Basuta, Kuretich was not the prosecution‘s main witness and no other serious evidentiary errors occurred. Basuta thus does not support a conclusion that the trial court‘s instruction was ineffective to address the admission of improper polygraph-related evidence. People v. Parrella (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 140, on which defendant also relies, is similarly inapposite. In Parella, the appellate court found the error in admitting polygraph evidence was not prejudicial because the trial court had ―carefully, correctly and fully warned the jury‖ not to consider any evidence about the polygraph examination. (Id. at p. 148.) Although defendant contends the court here did not issue such a careful instruction, instead giving a ―confusing and rambling instruction,‖ she fails to explain specifically in what way the instruction was flawed. Her further complaint the court did not ―immediately‖ admonish the jury but did so only ―at a later point,‖ cannot be sustained, for the record shows that, immediately after the polygraph evidence was admitted, the court and parties had a brief discussion in chambers, after which the trial court admonished the jury regarding the evidence. The same reasoning applies to People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th 916. In Cox, this court held the trial court cured the prejudice resulting from the admission of polygraph evidence because ―there was one improper question that was immediately struck, and the jury was given a strong admonition.‖ (Id. at p. 954.) Again, although characterizing the instant trial court‘s admonition as ―confusing and contradictory,‖ defendant does not explain in what way the warning was deficient. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 351.1 in striking part of Kuretich‘s testimony and admonishing the jury. There being no reversible error under state law, we also reject defendant‘s 98 contention the polygraph-related evidence violated her federal constitutional rights. (See People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1094.) 11. The Instruction on Motive Defendant argues the instruction read to the jury concerning motive, patterned after CALJIC No. 2.51, violated her state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process, and a reliable verdict in a capital case. (See U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7 & 15.) That instruction, as read to the jury, stated: ―Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown. However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case. [¶] Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt. Absence of motive may tend to establish innocence. [¶] You will therefore give its presence or absence, as the case may be, the weight to which you find it is entitled. ‖ Defendant asserts this instruction unconstitutionally (1) allowed the jury to determine guilt on motive alone; (2) reduced the prosecution‘s burden of proof by suggesting the terms ―motive‖ and ―intent‖ were interchangeable; and (3) shifted the burden of proof to imply that defendant bore the burden to prove her innocence. None of these arguments has merit. We considered and rejected defendant‘s first contention in People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43. There we explained that ―[i]f the challenged instruction somehow suggested that motive alone was sufficient to establish guilt, defendant‘s point might have merit. But in fact the instruction tells the jury that motive is not an element of the crime charged (murder) and need not be shown, which leaves little conceptual room for the idea that motive could establish all the elements of murder.‖ (Id. at pp. 97–98, italics omitted.) Thus, ―[w]hen CALJIC No. 2.51 is taken together with the instruction on the concurrence of act and specific intent (CALJIC No. 3.31) and the instruction outlining the elements of murder and 99 requiring each of them to be proved in order to prove the crime (CALJIC No. 8.10) [both of which were given here], there is no reasonable likelihood [citation] it would be read as suggesting that proof of motive alone may establish guilt of murder.‖ (Id. at p. 98; see People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 314 [citing Snow with approval].) We also reject defendant‘s argument the standard instruction on motive given in her case would lead the jury inevitably to confuse ―motive‖ with ―intent.‖ Motive is not an element of a crime; rather, ―[m]otive describes the reason a person chooses to commit a crime,‖ which ―is different from a required mental state such as intent or malice.‖ (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 504.) As relevant here, the jury was instructed that a conspiracy to commit murder required the specific intent to agree to commit the murder. Thus, ―the instructions here as a whole did not refer to motive and intent interchangeably, and there was no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the terms to be synonymous.‖ (People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 22.) Finally, we reject defendant‘s argument that CALJIC No. 2.51 impermissibly shifted the burden of proof by implying that defendant had the burden of establishing her innocence. As we explained in People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, the instruction uses the word ―innocence‖ ― ‗as a direction signal or compass. It does not tell the jurors they must find innocence, nor does it lighten the prosecution‘s burden of proof, upon which the jury received full and complete instructions.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 254; see People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 54–55 [CALJIC No. 2.51 ―does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show an alternative motive to that advanced by the prosecution‖].) Accordingly, ―no reasonable juror would misconstrue CALJIC No. 2.51 as ‗a standard of proof instruction apart from the reasonable doubt standard set forth clearly in CALJIC No. 2.90.‘ ‖ (Prieto, supra, at p. 254.) 100 Having found no error under state law, we also reject defendant‘s claim the instruction deprived her of her federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process, or a reliable verdict in a capital case.