Opinion ID: 1727423
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Finally, before reversing and remanding for a new trial we analyze the sufficiency of the evidence because if there is insufficient evidence on which to convict McDuffie of these murders, it is our obligation to reverse the convictions with directions to grant judgments of acquittal. The trial court denied the defense motions for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief and at the conclusion of all the evidence. We must review the evidence to determine if either of these rulings was error. A de novo standard of review applies. See Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002). In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts in this case, McDuffie characterizes substantially all the evidence presented by the State as circumstantial, requiring the special standard of review applicable to wholly circumstantial cases. The State counters that the evidence cannot be considered wholly circumstantial because the eyewitness testimony of Matias placed McDuffie at the Dollar General at 9:27 p.m., which is inconsistent with McDuffie's testimony that he left the store before 9 p.m. The State also argues that McDuffie essentially waived the circumstantial nature of the case by calling Michael Fitzgerald to testify, during which Fitzgerald said that while in jail he heard McDuffie confess to the crimes. We have held, however, that if the State fails to present a prima facie case and the defendant makes a sufficient motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence at that point is not waived by later introduction by the defense of evidence which supplies the missing element. State v. Pennington, 534 So.2d 393, 395-96 (Fla.1988); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.380(b). For this reason, we first review the evidence as it stood at the close of the State's case to determine if, at that time, the State had carried its burden of presenting sufficient evidence upon which the jury could convict McDuffie. McDuffie contends that the State's evidence should be reviewed under the special standard applicable to wholly circumstantial cases, as set forth in Reynolds v. State, 934 So.2d 1128 (Fla.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 943, 166 L.Ed.2d 721 (2007): [W]here a conviction is based wholly upon circumstantial evidence, a special standard of review applies. Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145, 155 (Fla.2002). As stated in Darling: Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will not reverse. Id. at 1145-46. However, even in a purely circumstantial case [the court's] view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the state. The state is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events. Once that threshold burden is met, it becomes the jury's duty to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1996) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla.1989)) (alterations in original). For purposes of our review, we will first consider the sufficiency of the State's evidence at the close of its case-in-chief as if wholly circumstantial, and will apply the special standard for such cases. We will then review the sufficiency of the evidence as it stood at the conclusion of the trial.
We are aware that no physical evidence of hairs, fibers, or DNA was found to link McDuffie to the robbery and murders. The gun was never recovered. The money, checks and bank bag were never located. Although McDuffie's DNA was found on a Pepsi bottle sitting on a box that also bore a spot of Schneider's blood, no evidence indicated when the bottle was placed there, and the fact that McDuffie worked in the store all week militates against that DNA on the Pepsi bottle being probative of these crimes. At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, evidence had been presented that McDuffie's palm print was found on the duct tape binding Beauregard's wrists. The duct tape was identical to that sold at the Dollar General store. The State presented no evidence as to when the print was placed there, but did submit forensic evidence that the print was in a location on the tape which the jury could reasonably find would not have resulted from McDuffie simply handling the roll of duct tape in the course of his employment. Marta Strawser, Florida Department of Law Enforcement senior crime lab microanalyst, testified that the cut and torn pieces of tape taken from Beauregard's hands were microscopically reconstructed into a continuous strip. Ms. Strawser found that McDuffie's palm print was located no closer than thirty inches to one end of the reconstructed strip and forty-one inches from the other. The rolls of duct tape sold at Dollar General were at most seventeen inches in circumference. The State's latent fingerprint specialist did concede, however, that a print can be transferred from one location on a piece of tape to another when the tape is pressed together, as it had been in this case. The State also presented the testimony of Alex Matias. He identified McDuffie as the man he saw going into and out of the Dollar General around 9:27 p.m. on the night of the murders. This was important testimony because McDuffie had previously told investigators that he left the store around 8:45 p.m. and drove directly to the Aaron's rental center to make a payment in the drop-off box, a trip that takes about forty minutes. A videotape of the Aaron's rental center driveway shows no cars entering between 9:10 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., when headlights are first seen. McDuffie also told investigators that he proceeded directly from Aaron's to a nearby McDonald's restaurant and was there about 9:35 p.m. However, a videotape from the McDonald's that night showed McDuffie inside McDonald's at 10:34 p.m. This evidence was sufficient to support the jury's rejection of McDuffie's reported timeline of events that evening and to rebut the suggestion of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the defense sought to establish during the State's case-in-chief. The State also presented evidence demonstrating that McDuffie had serious financial troubles, which the State argued provided a motive for the crimes. McDuffie had recently been evicted and had to rent a new home; he owed back rent, current rent and fees; he had been unemployed for a period of time; and one of his cars had been repossessed. The jury heard that on October 23, 2002, McDuffie advised his new landlord that he did not have the $1,450 that was due, but would have it soon. The landlord picked up the rent and security deposit from McDuffie's home on October 27, 2002. The payment of $1,450 was in the form of three money orders that McDuffie purchased early on October 26, 2002, the day after the crimes. Even if this case were entirely circumstantial, the State would not be required to rebut every possible variation of events, but must only present evidence inconsistent with the defendant's reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Delgado v. State, 948 So.2d 681, 690 (Fla.2006). We conclude that the State met its threshold burden of presenting evidence during its case-in-chief which is sufficiently inconsistent with McDuffie's version of events, and with the hypothesis of innocence suggested by the defense during the State's case-in-chief, to create a jury question. See Law, 559 So.2d at 188-89. Because the State presented prima facie evidence of inconsistency as to McDuffie's theory of events in its case-in-chief, the question is for the finder of fact to resolve. Orme, 677 So.2d at 262. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief.
McDuffie presented evidence during the defense's case in an attempt to rebut the inconsistencies disclosed by the State's evidence and to further attempt to prove his reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We will review the sufficiency of the evidence as it stood after the defense presented its case to determine if, at that point, the trial court erred in denying the renewed motion for judgment of acquittal. McDuffie testified in his own defense, denying commission of the crimes and insisting that he left the store shortly after Carol Hopkins. He explained the inconsistency in the timeline by testifying that traffic and road construction must have caused his trip to take longer than expected that night. He demonstrated for the jury his hypothesis of how his palm print could have been placed innocently on the duct tape while he handled the tape that day helping a customer tape up some boxes. He presented evidence of money innocently received in October to account for the money he had shortly after the murders. His expert testified that the number of weapons used in the crimes, the difficulty of one man handling two victims, and the unidentified blood and hair on the scene pointed to two perpetrators, not one. The defense also presented jail inmate Kevin Ingram, who testified that another inmate, Michael Fitzgerald, had confessed that Fitzgerald and a black male (not McDuffie) were responsible for the robbery and that the black male had taken care of the employees at the Dollar General after Fitzgerald left the store with the money. The defense, however, also presented the testimony of jail inmate Michael Fitzgerald who, during cross-examination, denied involvement in the crimes and said that while in jail he heard McDuffie confess to the murders. At this point, direct evidence was presented upon which the jury could find McDuffie guilty. Appellate courts review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal under the de novo standard, and must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. Fitzpatrick, 900 So.2d at 507. Where the State has presented competent, substantial evidence of the crimes charged, the trial court does not err in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal and submitting the case to the jury. Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 943 (Fla.2003). We conclude that the totality of the evidence, including evidence elicited in the defense's case, was sufficient to overcome the motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of all the evidence and to support the verdicts of the jury.