Opinion ID: 1834912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: chapter 119 disclosure

Text: On November 13, 1989, the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit made a written request to CCR, pursuant to section 119.06, for access to public records relating to Mr. Kight's postconviction litigation. CCR refused to disclose the records. The state attorney then filed a motion to compel disclosure. CCR took the position that the files requested were not subject to chapter 119 disclosure because they are not the files of a government agency, but rather are the files of a private individual, Mr. Kight. CCR also maintained that the records requested were specifically exempt under section 119.07(3)( o ) because they were prepared in connection with active litigation. The trial court granted the motion but limited the scope of the files to be disclosed to those prepared by Kight's trial counsel relating to the capital trial. CCR objected to the order and requested that the issuance of the order be stayed pending appeal. The request was denied. CCR states that the state attorney was provided access to the files prepared by Kight's trial counsel. However, the state maintains that since the files were not delivered to the state attorneys handling the case in Jacksonville the order requiring disclosure had no effect on the rule 3.850 hearing. We agree with CCR that although the files have been disclosed in this case, thereby rendering the issue moot, this Court should address the issue because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 601, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); see In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). Recently, in State v. Kokal, 562 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1990), this Court addressed whether files of the state attorney pertaining to the prosecution of a defendant seeking postconviction relief are subject to disclosure under chapter 119. In Kokal, we rejected the state attorney's position that these files were exempt from public disclosure under sections 119.07(3)(d) (active criminal investigative information) and 119.07(3)( o ) (active litigation), reasoning that criminal investigative information and litigation do not remain active after a conviction and sentence becomes final on direct appeal. In Kokal, there was no question that the records sought were public records under chapter 119; the only issue presented was whether the records at issue were otherwise exempt from disclosure. In contrast, the sole issue presented in the instant case is whether the files prepared by defense trial counsel which are in the possession of CCR are public records subject to disclosure under Florida's public records act. We agree with CCR that chapter 119 was enacted to insure free access to governmental records. See Lorei v. Smith, 464 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 475 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1985). As we explained in City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 468 So.2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1985), [t]he legislature has the constitutional power to regulate disclosure of public records of the state and its political subdivisions and has done so through chapter 119. (Emphasis added.) We also agree that although the records of defense counsel were received... in connection with the transaction of official business [1] by CCR, the records ordered disclosed are not governmental records for purposes of Florida's public records act; they are the private records of Mr. Kight. See id. (communications between attorney and government-entity client belong to the client, not the lawyer). The records at issue were initially prepared and maintained by defense counsel for the sole purpose of aiding in the defense of the accused and came into the possession of CCR because of its representation of Mr. Kight in these collateral proceedings. While representing a client, CCR, like the public defender, performs essentially a private function by advancing `the undivided interests of [the] client.' Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19, 102 S.Ct. 445, 449-50, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (public defender does not act under color of state law, for purposes of Civil Rights Act, when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to defendant in a criminal proceeding); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2256, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (public defender's professional and ethical obligations as an attorney require him to act in a role independent of and in opposition to the state). We, therefore, hold that files in the possession of CCR in furtherance of its representation of an indigent client are not subject to public disclosure under chapter 119. To hold otherwise would subject the records of a defendant who is unable to retain private collateral representation to public disclosure while those of a defendant represented by private counsel would be immune from such disclosure.