Opinion ID: 1155573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Fleming v. Moore

Text: In January of 1977, appellee W. Bedford Moore, III, sued appellant James N. Fleming for libel arising from an advertisement published a year earlier in The Cavalier Daily, a student newspaper circulated on the campus of the University of Virginia and in the Albemarle County area. Fleming was a black real estate developer and Moore was a white University professor. The dispute, and resulting publication entitled Racism, arose from efforts by Fleming, and others, to develop land in the vicinity of Moore's home situated in the County. Following a 1977 trial, the court below entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding Moore $10,000 compensatory damages and $100,000 punitive damages. On appeal, we reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues. The 1981 Fleming I decision has been summarized in section I(C) of this opinion. The new trial was held in October of 1982 and resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $100,000 compensatory damages and $250,000 punitive damages plus 12 per cent interest on $250,000 from January 16, 1976, upon which the trial court entered judgment in June of 1983. We awarded the defendant another appeal, limited to questions concerning the standard of fault to be applied for recovery of compensatory damages, sufficiency of the evidence to support the punitive award, excessiveness of both awards, and the correctness of prejudgment interest on the punitive award. The evidence presented during the retrial differs to some degree from that produced at the first trial. In the mid-1970s, Fleming, a County native and a successful realtor-appraiser, joined three white business associates in an effort to develop approximately 127 acres of land in the County for residential purposes. The site was within the immediate watershed of the Rivanna Reservoir, a source of drinking water. The planned unit development, called Evergreen, was to house lower and middle-income families of both races. Moore, a resident of the Charlottesville area since 1947, was an assistant professor in the Humanities Division of the University's School of Engineering and Applied Science. Moore lived near the development site. His residence was named Shack Mountain and was described as a Twentieth Century reproduction of an Eighteenth Century Jeffersonian pavilion; it was a small version of Monticello, not a replica. During a period of several years, defendant Fleming sought unsuccessfully to obtain a special permit from county authorities for use of the agriculturally zoned land. Plaintiff Moore and others opposed the development because of concern over the proposed high density (initially, 804 dwelling units were planned) and because of fear that the reservoir would be polluted. A series of public hearings was held before the Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors. The plaintiff and others spoke in opposition to the several plans that were submitted by the defendant. The Planning Commission staff recommended that the first Evergreen proposal be rejected mainly because the planned density was too great. At the time, pollution of the reservoir was also of considerable concern to the planners. The Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors rejected defendant's first proposal, mainly because of the high density projection. The second plan for Evergreen, with a lower proposed density, was likewise turned down by the County because of conservation and environmental factors relating to the reservoir. Eventually, the Board of Supervisors in early 1976 imposed a moratorium on construction within the reservoir watershed until a study in progress dealing with pollution of the reservoir could be completed. The jury has found on disputed facts that race was not a factor in any decisions made by County officials relating to Evergreen and that the plaintiff was not motivated by racial considerations in his opposition to defendant's development. Nevertheless, as the land-use controversy developed, defendant thought that his plans were being frustrated solely on racial grounds. He noticed that white developers were obtaining approval of their plans while his were being denied. Also, he assumed that citizen groups opposing the development were conspiring against him because he was black. In addition, the planning staff had recommended a 100-foot tree buffer to separate the developed area from the Shack Mountain property. The defendant believed that the plaintiff was a leading opponent of Evergreen and that Moore was responsible for imposition of the condition requiring the buffer. Fleming thought Moore was attempting to have the buffer placed on Fleming's property and that Moore somehow would take advantage of a racially restrictive covenant in prior deeds to the property. Consequently, defendant drafted the publication in question. He arranged for it to appear as a paid advertisement in two January 1976 issues of The Cavalier Daily, a campus newspaper read by approximately 15,000 persons. The advertisement is copied verbatim in Fleming I, 221 Va. at 887-88 n. 3, 275 S.E.2d at 634-35 n. 3. It was headlined RACISM and Signed: James N. Fleming. After stating that the author had endeavored to provide pleasant housing for working people, the item said: I do not expect any Farmington members to buy my houses. The tenured position-holders who live off the public dole at the expense of the working people are already well-housed, and could not be expected to live in a racially-integrated neighborhood, anyhow. There is a great deal of irony in the fact that here in Mr. Jefferson's country 200 years after his vision of situating his beloved Monticello upon the hilltop over-looking the developing community we have a replica of Monticello upon the hill overlooking my property which is occupied by a man who wants to deprive working people of the same opportunities that Mr. Jefferson sought for them. Mr. Jefferson even located his slaves' quarters down the hill from his house, but Bedford Moore, the occupant of little Monticello does not want any black people within his sight. The advertisement then referred to a great conflict between the haves and the have-nots and stated that we have created too much financial security for the tenured segment of the economic community whose greed is repeatedly shown by their expression of `I've got minetoo bad about you'. Continuing, the author wrote that he was a lover of liberty and could not stand by to see the have-nots oppressed by the no-growth people who are living off of our work. He next stated: I know that this Country did not achieve the highest living standard in the world by no-growth or by oppression of the working man, and yet today the opportunity to improve one's living standard is being violently opposed by the same people who oppose my proposed neighborhood. Pollution of the reservoir is being used as the current excuse to foster nogrowth. The solution, of course, is to remove the guaranteed incomes of these greedy people and put them in the position of seeing the world through the eyes of one seeking the opportunity to improve his or her living standard. Only then would they admit that the pollution excuse is a sham. The advertisement concluded: I will develop Evergreen, and a lot of people will benefit from it. Relying on Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc ., the defendant contends we should make an independent examination of all issues in this case to insure that the judgment below does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the exercise of free expression. In addition, Fleming argues that the advertisement related to a matter of vital public concern, a land-use controversy, and that New York Times actual malice is the proper standard of liability for compensatory damages. We have addressed these issues already and no further discussion is necessary to explain our rejection of the contentions. The trial court was correct in applying a negligence standard in this case, and in using the principle in a suit against a non-media defendant. We will consider next the question whether the award of compensatory damages is excessive. The defendant argues that the award shocks the conscience in that it bears no relationship to the loss actually sustained by Moore. Moore read the advertisement on both days it was published. In describing the effect of the publication, Moore testified that race had no bearing on his opposition to Evergreen. Rather, he was concerned about pollution of the reservoir, preserving his privacy, and protecting the historic character of his home, which had been placed on the national and state registers of historic places. Consequently, he testified, he was very keenly embarrassed and humiliated by the racial attack because he had been brought up with sort of innocence on the whole subject. He stated that the publication made him conscious of race in a way he deplored because he had been taught to be color blind and considerate in his dealings with all other persons. Moore testified: I was seriously upset to have a man that I disagreed with in public meetings go around behind me and put into the University student newspaper such a malicious attack on me, my character. This was done in front of my colleagues at the University, students, black and white. Describing his concern that the item had been placed in the student newspaper as opposed to some other publication, Moore said: It was very near home and concerned me very much indeed. I felt that he had put a gap in my honor that could only be restored by vindication of my fellow citizens on this jury. The evidence showed that during 1975 and 1976, a number of racial concerns confronted the University. The school was trying to attract minority students and faculty. Tension had developed on campus because of the University President's membership in an exclusive private club, Farmington, and there were demands that he resign his office. The plaintiff proved that publication of the advertisement in the midst of this turmoil adversely affected his teaching and his relationship with his students of both races. Dr. Edgar F. Shannon, Jr., President of the University from 1959 to 1974, testified that the perceived racial attitudes of a professor are important to his relations with his students and materially affect the atmosphere in the classroom. Shannon indicated that he had never known Moore to do or say anything degrading to black persons or the black race. Testimony showed that Moore was very upset by the publication and felt he had experienced a terrible wrong. The evidence showed that other faculty members at the University as well as students made repeated inquiries about Moore and whether the statements in the item were true. Summarizing the damage he suffered, Moore testified, It's not an experience I would visit on most people. It's very unhappy. Moore said the humiliation had not lessened with the passage of time: It still stings. I still feel my honor has been questioned, that's not something you shrug off easily. Ordinarily, damage awards fixed by a jury following a properly conducted trial and approved by the trial judge are held to be inviolate against disturbance by the courts. Smithey v. Refining Company, 203 Va. 142, 145, 122 S.E.2d 872, 875 (1961). But, [a] healthy administration of justice requires that, in a proper case, the courts must take action to correct what plainly appears to be an unfair verdict. This authority is an ancient and accepted part of the common law. Id. at 146, 122 S.E.2d at 875. When there is a claim that the verdict is excessive and it appears that the award is so out of proportion to the damages sustained to suggest that it is not the product of a fair and impartial decision, it becomes the duty of the court to correct the injustice. Id., 122 S.E.2d at 875-76. This is such a case. We agree with the defendant that the amount of the award bears no relationship to the loss actually sustained by the plaintiff. Clearly, Moore suffered damage to his reputation, embarrassment, humiliation, and mental suffering from this defamatory publication made negligently. Nevertheless, the verdict of $100,000 is so out of proportion to the damage sustained as to be excessive as a matter of law. As the defendant points out, Moore experienced no physical manifestation of any emotional distress. Moreover, he sought no medical attention for any condition resulting from the publication. In addition, there was no evidence that Moore's standing with his peers was diminished as the result of the libel. Indeed, the evidence shows that Moore's acquaintances supported him; one indicated that: As far as I personally am concerned, ... he lost nothing. Actually, the evidence showed that Moore continues to be held in high esteem among his community of friends and colleagues. Thus, we find that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable relation to the damages sustained and, therefore, is not supported by the evidence. Hence, the trial court erred in refusing the post-trial motion to set aside the compensatory award as excessive. The court should have granted the motion and then considered requiring the plaintiff to remit a portion of the award or submit to a new trial under the provisions of Code § 8.01-383.1. Section 6 of Article VI of the Virginia Constitution, dealing with the power of this Court upon reversal, modification, or affirmance of a judgment below, provides, in part: In any civil case, [the Supreme Court] may enter final judgment, except that the award in a suit or action for unliquidated damages shall not be increased or diminished. We have interpreted this section: The plain purpose of the provision is to leave to the factfinding tribunalthe jury or the trial court sitting as a jurythe function of fixing the amount of unliquidated damages. It does not deprive this court of the authority to remand the case to the lower court with direction that the plaintiff be put upon terms to remit a portion of an award for unliquidated damages or else submit to a new trial. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 194 Va. 872, 900, 75 S.E.2d 694, 712 (1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025 (1954). Upon rehearing of Bishop v. Webster, 154 Va. 771, 153 S.E. 832 (1930), the Court said that the power long exercised by this and all other courts to put the plaintiff upon terms, and to allow him the option of waiving a portion of his damages or have a new trial, is not affected or diminished in the slightest degree by the foregoing constitutional section. 154 Va. at 787, 155 S.E. at 828. For a case in which this Court diminished a damage award, see Lorillard v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, 760, 104 S.E. 384, 392-93 (1920), decided before the 1928 enactment of the forerunner to the present constitutional provision. Acts 1928, ch. 205, p. 660. Accordingly, we will reverse the compensatory award and remand the case with direction to the trial court to require the plaintiff to remit a substantial part of his recovery or else submit to a new trial upon the issue of damages only. Next, the defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of actual malice to support the punitive award. We do not agree. We have made an independent examination of the record on this issue to be certain that the judgment for punitive damages does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. The trial court properly instructed the jury that the plaintiff was required to establish New York Times malice, that is, that Moore, by clear and convincing evidence, had to prove that Fleming knew the statements were false or that he made them, according to the instruction, so recklessly as to amount to a willful disregard for the truth.... We will assume without deciding that Fleming is correct in his position that Moore failed to prove that Fleming knew the defamatory statements were false. Nonetheless, there was substantial, credible evidence to support the jury's finding that Fleming acted with recklessness that was tantamount to a willful disregard for the truth. On this point, Fleming argues that looking through his eyes at his world as it existed in January 1976 ... the only possible conclusion is that [he] was not motivated by actual malice but by genuine frustration. But evaluation of this element of proof must be from an objective standpoint, not merely from a subjective perspective. Fleming abandoned all judgment and reason in composing and publishing the advertisement. For example, he accused Moore of racial prejudice without possessing any objective basis for the charge. Naming Moore in the publication, Fleming demeaned him as being a tenured position-holder living off the public dole at the expense of working people. There was no evidence that Moore, or any other person in a similar occupation, was being supported to the prejudice of other groups of citizens. There was no proof that Fleming had any legitimate reason to believe Moore wished to deprive working people of any opportunity. Fleming had no proper grounds to suppose that Moore, as one of the so-called no-growth people was oppressing other individuals. Fleming recklessly stated that Moore's opposition to the development on pollution grounds was a sham to conceal his supposed real purpose, i.e., oppression of black citizens and others who would live in the planned community. Finally, Fleming's act of publishing the advertisement in the student newspaper on the campus where Moore taught supports the conclusion that defendant's motive was to intimidate Moore in order to eliminate the voice of a leading opponent to Fleming's development. Next, defendant contends the amount of the punitive award shocks the conscience in that it bears no relationship to the intended purpose of punitive damages, which is to punish the defendant for his conduct and to serve as a warning to others not to engage in similar activity. Defendant says the award of $250,000, plus interest on that amount from January 16, 1976, is unjust and establishes that the jury misconceived the law or the facts or was actuated by passion and prejudice. The independent examination we make on the punitive-damage issue is not limited to proof of punitive liability. The First Amendment implications flowing from the amount of such an award require the reviewing court to consider the effect of approval of such an award on self-censorship in derogation of the right of free speech. Moreover, a jury verdict for punitive damages cannot be allowed to work an injustice and result in oppression. Stubbs v. Cowden, 179 Va. 190, 199, 18 S.E.2d 275, 280 (1942). Where a punitive award is substantially in excess of what ordinarily might be expected as punishment for the particular conduct, the reviewing court has a duty to anull the award unless the circumstances are so egregious as to constitute a sufficient punishment for the wrongful activity. See id. at 200, 18 S.E.2d at 280. We hold that the amount of this award, including the interest factor, constitutes a forbidden intrusion on the exercise of free expression and that it is substantially in excess of adequate punishment for defendant's conduct. Without question, as we have said, Fleming acted with actual malice. Nevertheless, the punishment for this excessive harangue is not merely punitive, it is destructive, even though Fleming estimated his assets at close to one million dollars. While the elements of compensatory damages differ from the requirements to establish punitive damages, many factors apply to both on appeal. For example, the absence of physical manifestation of Moore's emotional distress must be considered. The fact of no substantial reduction in Moore's standing with his associates must not be overlooked. Indeed, Moore was not charged with commission of a crime. The amount of punitive damages awarded should bear some reasonable relationship to the actual damages sustained and to the measure of punishment required; otherwise, the award on its face indicates prejudice or partiality. Id. at 201, 18 S.E.2d at 280. This is such an award and it cannot stand. Consistent with our disposition of the compensatory award, and on the same authority, we will reverse the punitive award, with direction to the trial court to require the plaintiff to remit a substantial part of his punitive recovery or else submit to a new trial upon the issue of damages only. Because the main question regarding interest was not preserved properly in the trial court and because the interest issue may not arise upon remand, we do not address that question. In addition, we deny the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. For these reasons, the judgment below will be affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Record No. 830758 Affirmed. Record No. 830526 Affirmed. Record No. 830651 Affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and final judgment. Record No. 831446 Affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and remanded.