Opinion ID: 1194592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the breathalyzer test as applied to Pennington

Text: On appeal, Pennington argues that the district court erred by granting Bishop's and Hagar's motion for summary judgment. The defendants contend that the only real issue on appeal is whether there was a violation of Pennington's constitutional rights, because if his rights were not violated, then he has no claim under § 1983. Section 1983 prohibits actions `under color of state law' which deprive an individual of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute. Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344 F.3d 631, 644 (6th Cir.2003). [T]he Constitution forbids . . . not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A person is seized when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave an encounter with police. Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 834 (6th Cir. 2005). In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Whether a breathalyzer test administered to an off-duty police officer amounts to an unconstitutional seizure is an issue of first impression for this court. [P]olicemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures therefore applies to police officers. Moreover, drug or alcohol testing of a governmental employee implicates the Fourth Amendment even though the testing may not be related to enforcement of the criminal law. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (applying drug and alcohol testing to railroad employees for safety reasons). The defendants cited, and the district court relied on, the cases of Grow v. City of Milwaukee, 84 F.Supp.2d 990 (E.D.Wis. 2000), and Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622 (7th Cir.2002). Pennington has not addressed either of these two cases. Grow involved a number of Milwaukee police officers who were required to submit to breathalyzer tests while off duty. The facts surrounding one of the officers, Jean Docter, are strikingly similar to the instant action. Docter was attending a Serbian Day Festival in Milwaukee when a fight broke out. She attempted to intervene in the fight and was injured. Several on-duty officers responded to her 911 call, and Docter approached one of the officers to lodge a battery complaint against the individual who had struck her. The on-duty officers on the scene suspected that Docter was intoxicated. Her supervisors ordered Docter to return to the police station and take a breathalyzer test. When the test determined that Docter's breath alcohol level was 0. 17, she was suspended for five days without pay. The district court held that Docter was seized when she was ordered to submit to the breathalyzer test. Grow, 84 F.Supp.2d at 1004. But the seizure was held to be reasonable because Docter was in a public place [] and might have had to perform police duties. Id. The district court determined that Docter was seized under circumstances where, if intoxicated, [she] would have presented a danger to the public. Id. Two years later, the Seventh Circuit in Driebel called into question the seizure conclusion of Grow. 298 F.3d at 641. Driebel involved claims brought by Milwaukee police officers that they had been unconstitutionally ordered to remain on duty and return to headquarters for questioning related to a criminal investigation into their activities. Id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned as follows: Grow fails to acknowledge that police officers: (1) may reasonably believe, based upon their workplace obligations to comply with department's guidelines and regulations, that their employment relationship will be severed if they refuse or disobey an order, direction, or request to accompany detectives to the department's headquarters; but (2) lack any reasonable basis to feel that they will be restricted by force or a show of lawful authority in their freedom of movement or their ability to terminate the encounter. Id. at 642 (emphasis in original). According to the Seventh Circuit, the possibility or even probability of a future adverse employment actionas opposed to physical detentioncannot enter our analysis of whether the officers in this case were seized. Id. (emphasis omitted). This conclusion is based on the need to distinguish between a police department's actions in its capacity as an employer and its actions as the law enforcement arm of the state. Id. at 637. The court concluded that because the Fourth Amendment does not protect against the threat of job loss, the relevant constitutional inquiry must focus on whether reasonable people in the position of the subordinate officers would have feared seizure or detention if they had refused to obey the commands given by their superior officers. Id. at 642 (emphasis in original). Pennington acknowledges in his brief that he was compelled by the threat of job loss to submit to being taken to Central Station, and given a breathalyzer test. The Supreme Court, however, has held that a person is `seized' only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). A person is not seized simply because he believes that he will lose his job. Driebel, 298 F.3d at 642. Hagar disputes Pennington's assertion that he was not free to leave. Specifically, Hagar testified that if [Pennington] hadn't agreed to take the test, he would have gone home, subject to departmental disciplinary action. During his deposition, Pennington essentially agreed with Hagar's characterization when he testified that if they would have let me leave willingly, I probably would have gotten fired. If they would have exerted authority, I would have probably been put in handcuffs and placed in the back seat of a car. In other words, Pennington was afraid that he would lose his job or suffer disciplinary action if he failed to submit to the breathalyzer test, and he agreed to the test for that reason. Pennington was not handcuffed, he was not placed in the back seat of the police car, he was not read his Miranda rights, and he was allowed to return home without filing his report of the incident. We find the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Driebel to be both persuasive and applicable to Pennington's claim. A reasonable off-duty officer in Pennington's position would not have feared seizure or detention if he had refused to take the breathalyzer test. See Driebel, 298 F.3d at 642. Pennington himself did not appear to fear seizure or detention; instead, he was afraid that he would be terminated or suspended. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, we conclude that Pennington was not seized when he submitted to the breathalyzer test. Moreover, because Pennington submitted to the breathalyzer test, we have no need to decide whether he could have been permissibly discharged if he had failed to comply. We also have no need to determine whether Bishop and Hagar are entitled to qualified immunity. See McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 429 (6th Cir.2005) (stating that as a precursor to the Harlow qualified immunity analysis, a court must first determine whether any constitutional violation occurred, let alone the violation of a clearly established right) (emphasis in original).