Opinion ID: 2611904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A More Appropriate Definition of Occupant.

Text: In determining the meaning of occupant, we are constrained to follow the rule that ambiguities in ANCSA are to be resolved in favor of Natives. Hakala v. Atxam Corp., 753 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Alaska 1988) (citing United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132, 1138-39 (9th Cir.1980); Alaska Public Easement Defense Fund v. Andrus, 435 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.Alaska 1977)). Although the court is mindful of the rule, it explicitly declines to follow it. [6] I do not know what the court means by this. If there is no ambiguity, the rule does not apply. If there is an ambiguity, the court must follow the rule. The rule requires that the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of Natives. This should not mean that the Natives must provide the best resolution of the ambiguity, else the rule is meaningless. I suggest that the Natives must advance an interpretation that is reasonable. For the reasons set forth in supra note 3, I conclude they have done at least that. Persons entitled to assert occupancy rights under the Townsite [7] and Native Townsite Acts [8] were not required to have a patent, lease, contract, permit, right-of-way, or easement. In other words, they had no Section 14(g) valid existing rights. The protection for such users has to come from elsewhere. It comes from Section 14(c). According to David S. Case, The Special Relationship of Alaska Natives To The Federal Government (1978), The Native Townsite Act was administered in the same way and according to the same regulations as an earlier 1891 Act which granted citizens (usually non-Natives) the right to establish townsites in Alaska... . These procedures made no distinction between Native and non-Native in townsite administration. Prior to 1959, it was possible for both Natives and non-Natives to be deeded lots within the subdivided portion and to occupy land in the unsubdivided portion of the same townsite... . The Townsite Act was repealed in 1976, and Section 14(c) of ANCSA provides an alternative for municipalities to acquire municipal lands. However, the townsites established under the 1926 Act were not eliminated either by ANCSA or the 1976 repeal of the Native Townsite Act... . Non-Natives can continue to establish new occupancy rights under the 1926 Act on the same types of land for which ANCSA supposedly prohibited occupancy rights as of December 18, 1971. Id. at 60 (citations omitted). ANCSA is a coherent act. Section 22(b) protects existing rights that might eventually lead to title, such as homesteads and mining claims. Section 14(g) protects the existing rights of those temporarily on the land. [9] Section 14(c) protects the rights of those without existing rights, such as those who but for ANCSA, and its repeal of the Native Allotment Act, [10] may have had reasonable expectations that entry could be made under the Townsite and Native Townsite Acts, following which they would obtain title. [11] In my view a more suitable definition of occupant would be a user whose continued use 1) is not protected by another section of ANCSA, and 2) is reasonably expected to continue without interference by the United States. This definition would bring within its ambit persons living in a community which could have gained de jure status under the Townsite and Native Townsite Acts, and whose entitlement under those now repealed acts is not clear. The concept of title to land as we understand it is one grounded in common or civil law. It is not a concept of Native culture. However, if the Native concept of continued use is kept in mind, the definition is appropriate to the purpose of ANCSA. Congress' use of the term occupied becomes more understandable when considered in the context of its traditional use in Native legislation. The term has typically been applied in the context of Native aboriginal title rights. See David S. Case, Alaska Natives and American Laws 56-75 (1984) (providing a legal history of the aboriginal title rights of Alaska Natives; occupy terminology occurs frequently). [12] A basic tenet of statutory construction is a presumption that words that have acquired special meaning in the law carry that meaning in new legislation. See O'Callaghan v. State, 826 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Alaska 1992). ANCSA extinguished aboriginal title in Alaska. However, the purpose of Section 14(c) is to protect existing users or occupants. The passage of ANCSA did not change the use occupants made of the land, often the very use that aboriginal title was crafted to encompass. Finally, the practical effect of a conveyance from the Village Corporation is important to keep in mind. Unlike the regional corporations, a village's pool of land shrinks every time land is conveyed. [13] This land was not a gift from the government, but rather was payment given in exchange for an arguably legally enforceable right. Given this historic fact, and ANCSA's purpose, the court should not interpret ANCSA to defeat the manifest intent of Congress. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir.1980).