Opinion ID: 1427246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Zoning Ordinance and Eisner-Stewart General Plan in Determining Just Compensation

Text: Under article 1, section 8 of the Nevada Constitution, private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation. The term just compensation requires that the market value of the property should be determined by reference to the highest and best use for which the land is available and for which it is plainly adaptable. Skyland Water v. Tahoe Douglas Dist., 95 Nev. 289, 593 P.2d 1066 (1979); Sorenson v. State ex rel. Dep't of Hwys., 92 Nev. 445, 552 P.2d 487 (1976). Every factor which affects the value of the property and which would influence a prudent purchaser should be considered. Tacchino v. State ex rel. Department of Highways, 89 Nev. 150, 152, 508 P.2d 1212 (1973). As a restriction on land use, an existing zoning ordinance is generally regarded as a proper matter for the jury's consideration. United States v. Eden Memorial Park Asso., 350 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.1965). In the proceedings below, the county was prevented from introducing various county ordinances which indicated that the Alper parcel fell entirely within the setback lines of Flamingo Road. The county argues on appeal that Flamingo Road is either a class `C' highway or a section line road under the provisions of Clark County Code sections 29.064.040(A)(3) and 29.064.040(B) and that it was therefore error for the district court not to have allowed the jury to consider zoning restrictions that are applicable to the Alper parcel as well as all similar parcels abutting Flamingo Road. [2] In reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court properly refused to allow these ordinances to be considered by the jury. In order for the setback provisions of Clark County Code section 29.64.040(A) to apply, a street that the property abuts must be designated on the master plan of streets and highways or by ordinance as a class `A,' `B' [or] `C' highway... . Clark County Code § 29.64.040(A). No evidence was presented to the court below indicating that Flamingo Road had ever been designated on a master plan or by county ordinance as a class `C' highway. Moreover, the county admits that Flamingo Road lies approximately 200 feet south of the actual section line, and it is, therefore, not a section line road under Clark County Code section 29.64.040(B). Since the county has failed to demonstrate that the ordinances apply, they must be considered to be irrelevant to the present controversy. In respect to this matter, the district court is affirmed. The county additionally argues that even if Flamingo Road is not deemed to be a Section Line Road or a Class C Highway, it falls within the setback requirements of Clark County Code section 29.064.040(E). Under this ordinance, property that abuts any street is subject to a 30-foot setback from the center line of the road. [3] The district court improperly held this ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague on the basis that one would have to guess at where the centerline should be located. Zoning ordinances carry with them a presumption of validity. McKenzie v. Shelly, 77 Nev. 237, 362 P.2d 268 (1961). In construing the present ordinance, it is clear that the centerline must be determined before the street was widened, not after, as the county contends. A contrary interpretation would lead to the unacceptable conclusion that the centerline would be subject to repeated change upon each successive expansion of the roadway. Since the centerline of Flamingo Road was located 20 feet north of the Alper parcel before the 1967 expansion, Clark County Code section 29.64.040(E) imposes a 10-foot setback on the northern 1,000-foot border of the Alper's land. It was therefore error for the district court not to have let this ordinance be considered by the jury in valuing the property. Nevertheless, although the county was not allowed to introduce Clark County Code section 29.064.040(E), it was permitted to introduce the general zoning restrictions that apply to all lots in an H-1 zoning district as well as setback restrictions that apply to all lots bordering Las Vegas Boulevard South. According to testimony by Greg Borgel, a principal planner employed by Clark County, since the western 50-foot border of the Alper parcel is contiguous with Las Vegas Boulevard South, no structure could be built within 72 feet from the boulevard's curbline. Additionally, under Clark County Code section 29.30.070, no building or structure may cover over 60 percent of the area of a lot located in a H-1 zoning district. Therefore, any effect that the 10-foot setback requirement would have had on the value of the parcel is non-existent or de minimus in comparison to the zoning restrictions that the jury was entitled to consider. The failure to submit Clark County Code section 29.064.040(E) to the jury was therefore harmless. In their cross-appeal the Alpers claim that the district court erred in allowing the county to produce expert testimony that the land in question had only a nominal value of $10,000 since no legal economic uses could be made of the property. The expert's appraisal was based largely on information contained in the Eisner-Stewart General [Master] Plan and the Las Vegas Valley Transportation Study indicating that Flamingo Road, which traversed the northern 1,000-foot long boundary of the Alper parcel, would eventually be widened to alleviate the traffic congestion anticipated from the continual growth of the Las Vegas community. [4] Under the county's planning guides, the Alper's parcel fell entirely within the future width lines of the Flamingo Road expansion project. From this information, the expert concluded that, in all likelihood, neither the county planning commission nor the county commissioners would authorize a building permit or a conditional use permit for the development of the property and that, therefore, the property has only a nominal value. The Alpers contest the county's nominal value theory on the ground that it is based on constitutionally impermissible evidence. We agree. Ordinarily, zoning restrictions permitting a viable economic use of the property may be considered for valuation purposes. See United States v. Eden Memorial Park Asso., 350 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.1965). However, as noted in United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636, 81 S.Ct. 784, 792, 5 L.Ed.2d 838 (1961), it would be manifestly unjust to permit a public authority to depreciate property values by a threat of a construction of a government project and then to take advantage of this depression in price when the property is eventually condemned. See Lower Nueces River Water Supply District v. Collins, 357 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962); Board of Comm'rs of State Inst. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So.2d 74 (Fla.App. 1958). The court must therefore exclude any evidence of the depreciation in value caused by the prospective taking once the government has announced its commitment to the project. State Dept. of Highways v. Cooper Mountain, 624 P.2d 936 (Colo. App. 1981); Dade County v. Still, 377 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1979); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345 (1972); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., above; see also Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 901 (1966). [5] In the case at hand, Clark County obtained a 52-year easement from Bonanza Hotel for the purpose of putting the Eisner-Stewart General Plan and the Las Vegas Valley Transportation Study into effect. The adoption of the general plan and the transportation study by the county commissioners was equivalent to a public announcement that the Alper parcel would be subject to the future widening of Flamingo Road. Based on these planning guides, it would be apparent to the prudent purchaser that the county would not approve any use or development which is inconsistent with the widening project or which would not alleviate the traffic congestion. Since the adoption of the planning guides by the county commissioners was merely a preliminary step to the actual taking, it was error for the trial court to have allowed the county's expert to base his opinion in part on either the general plan or the transportation study. Nevertheless, in reviewing the record before us, it is clear that the jury, in awarding more than one million dollars for the value of the Alper parcel, rejected the appraiser's testimony that the land was only worth $10,000. We, therefore, consider the introduction of such testimony to be harmless. In conclusion, when determining the market value of a parcel of land at its highest and best use, due consideration should be given to those zoning ordinances that would be taken into account by a prudent and willing buyer. [6] Nevertheless, the impact on the fair market value that resulted from the taking itself should be excluded. The property is to be valued as if the government project that resulted in the taking was neither contemplated nor carried out. In the present appeal, although the county's appraisal was based on community planning guides which ultimately were carried into effect when Flamingo Road was enlarged, the introduction of such evidence was harmless. The trial court is therefore affirmed on these issues.