Opinion ID: 529763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Boykin/Burgett Claim

Text: 9 One of Moore's prior convictions was based upon a guilty plea, the other upon a plea of nolo contendere. Her petition asserts that neither plea was knowingly and voluntarily made within the meaning of Boykin v. Alabama and that, therefore, the trial court's consideration of those convictions at sentencing violated the fourteenth amendment's due-process clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Burgett v. Texas. 8 10 The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on Moore's Boykin/Burgett claim. Nor did it cite any state-court determination that Moore's prior pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made. 9 Instead, the district court disposed of this claim by stating that there is no apparent precedent supporting Petitioner's theory that the misdemeanor pleas were presumptively involuntary merely because she was not represented by counsel. Moore v. Jarvis, No. 1:87-cv-1473-ODE, mem. op. at 6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 1988). 11 The district court's holding indicates to us that the court believed that Moore's petition raised only the purely legal argument that uncounseled guilty or nolo contendere pleas are presumptively unknowing and involuntary and that, consequently, no determination whether Moore's prior pleas actually were knowingly and voluntarily made was necessary to dispose of her Boykin claim. We disagree. Although Moore's petition fairly may be read to suggest the existence of such a presumption, her Boykin/Burgett claim raises more than this purely legal question. 12 Moore's petition and supporting papers affirmatively allege that her prior pleas actually were unknowingly and involuntarily made, that she raised this issue in the motion in limine and at sentencing, that she testified at the hearing on the motion that she was neither sworn, nor represented by counsel, nor brought before a judge, nor informed of her rights in either of the prior cases, and that the State failed to introduce any evidence, either at the hearing on the motion in limine or at sentencing, tending to show that Moore's prior pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made. In fact, the petition and supporting papers assert that the evidence before the trial court at the hearing on the motion in limine demonstrated affirmatively that her prior pleas were not valid under Boykin. The brief filed in this court on her behalf also makes these points. Indeed, from the record before us, it appears that, although the trial court and the Georgia Court of Appeals failed to address the point explicitly, Moore made this contention at trial and at each stage of direct and collateral review. 10 13 In light of these allegations, we hold the district court's disposition of Moore's Boykin/Burgett claim to be insufficient. Although we agree with the district court that uncounseled pleas are not presumptively involuntary and unknowing, the district court's rejection of the presumptively involuntary prong of Moore's argument left unaddressed Moore's claim that her prior pleas were actually unknowingly and involuntarily made and that the trial court's consideration of those pleas at sentencing denied her due process of law. 11 Therefore, we remand the case for an evidentiary hearing and such further consideration of Moore's Boykin claim as the district court deems necessary. 12 On remand, we suggest that the district court give particular consideration to Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983), which sets forth the proper analysis for evaluating a habeas petitioner's claim that a state trial court improperly considered a prior conviction based upon a plea not knowingly and voluntarily made within the meaning of Boykin. 13