Opinion ID: 2070601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective Application of Statutes

Text: At the time of trial in the Family Court, a postadoption visitation agreement was inconsistent with the then-existing statute on adoption, although, in view of the subsequently enacted amendment, § 15-7-14.1, was not necessarily repugnant to public policy. This Court has explained that [i]n carrying out our duty as the final arbiter on questions of statutory construction, `[i]t is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.' State v. Flores, 714 A.2d 581, 583 (R.I.1998) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)). Moreover, when we examine an unambiguous statute, there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written. State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I. 1998) (quoting In re Denisewich, 643 A.2d 1194, 1197 (R.I.1994)). Adhering to this standard, we have held repeatedly that statutes will be given prospective application unless otherwise provided. Spagnoulo v. Bisceglio, 473 A.2d 285, 287 (R.I.1984). Only when the Legislature, by express language or necessary implication, manifests its intent that a statute be given retroactive effect, will the courts apply it retrospectively. Id.; Murphy v. Murphy, 471 A.2d 619, 623 (R.I.1984). We therefore must look to the statutory language to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Section 2 of the amendment directs that [t]his act shall take effect upon passage. P.L.1997, ch. 178, § 2. In the absence of any express language or implicit indication that the statutory amendment should be applied retroactively, we agree with the Family Court justice's decision that any agreement between respondent and adoptive parents was not subject to the provisions of § 15-7-14.1. The question of enforceability of visitation agreements between biological and adoptive parents has not yet been decided by this Court. In her argument, respondent cited several cases from other states, which although not binding on this Court, are helpful in illuminating the issue of open adoption agreements. [2] We note that five states still hold the view that adoption precludes visitation based on thefinality of the adoptive process, even in cases with an existing visitation agreement. [3] Jurisdictions that do permit postadoptive visitation follow the general view that courts may grant such visitation rights to a natural parent to promote the best interests of the adopted child. See, e.g., Michaud v. Wawruck, 209 Conn. 407, 551 A.2d 738 (1988); In re Adoption of a Minor, 362 Mass. 842, 291 N.E.2d 729 (1973); Weinschel v. Strople, 56 Md.App. 252, 466 A.2d 1301 (Ct.Spec.App.1983). In reviewing the Family Court justice's decision in the present case, we take into consideration the precedent at the time of Alicia's adoption. The then-existing case law interpreted the legislative purpose of the statutory process of adoption as creating a stable environment in which the child can grow and develop into a healthy and productive member of society. In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203, 206, 397 A.2d 511, 512 (1979). In furtherance of this aim, this Court stated that the physical welfare and emotional stability of [the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and the child] require that there be some assurance as to the finality of an adoption decree. In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 109 R.I. 443, 451, 287 A.2d 115, 119 (1972). In the case of In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d at 1360, we held that parents whose parental rights are terminated have no further legal rights in respect to the adopted child. Here, respondent consented to the adoption of her biological daughter, which act concluded her status as the child's parent. Once the adoption had taken place, all the respondent's parental rights were obliterated and any alleged agreement vanished.