Opinion ID: 1753624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Walker Understood His Miranda Rights

Text: When questioned by Kanger and Perna, Walker confessed to participating in the robbery and to shooting Thompson and killing Carter. He argues that these statements were given in violation of his right to counsel and that thus, his confession was not freely and voluntarily given in violation of his 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and by article I, §§ 11 and 12, of the Nebraska Constitution. Walker argues that his confession should have been suppressed because during the interview, he asked if statements he made would be used against him. He contends that this shows he did not understand his Miranda rights and that questioning should have ceased. He contends that it was only after he asked if his statements would be used against him that he admitted the crimes. He primarily relies on the following exchange during the interview: [Perna]: No, no. Why'd you go over the house? To get the money? Or was it. . . . The truthful reason. [Walker]: The truthful reason was. . . . You sure the other stuff won't be used against me, right? Q: No. What stuff? The stuff that you originally told us? A: Yeah. About the, the drug. Q: Why? Now. . . . I'm not worried about the drug. We wanna know why. . . . A: The reason why. Okay. And even pay me from last time. Q: Okay. A: I told him I'm gettin' 'em some drugs. (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court found that Walker had voluntarily accompanied an Omaha police officer to police headquarters to talk about the events of September 3, 2003. [Walker] was read his Miranda rights, and verbally and physically acknowledged his understanding of those rights. [Walker] never asked for further clarification of those rights, never requested that he have counsel present, never refused to answer a specific question and never cut off questioning. Instead, [Walker] sat and talked with Perna and Kanger for over four hours and eventually confessed to shooting Carter and Thompson. . . . Because the record demonstrates that [Walker] understood his constitutional rights and voluntarily waived those rights, the Court finds that it cannot grant [Walker's] requested relief because [he] never invoked his right to remain silent. [4-6] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), prohibits the use of statements derived during custodial interrogation unless the prosecution demonstrates that its agents used procedural safeguards that are effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. See, State v. Ball, 271 Neb. 140, 710 N.W.2d 592 (2006); State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003). Miranda rights can be waived if the suspect does so knowingly and voluntarily. State v. Ball, supra . A district court's finding and determination that a defendant's statement was voluntarily made will not be set aside on appeal unless this determination is clearly erroneous. State v. Williams, 269 Neb. 917, 697 N.W.2d 273 (2005). [7] A valid Miranda waiver must be both 'voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice' and 'made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S. Ct. 851, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987). In determining whether a statement is voluntary, we apply a totality of the circumstances test. State v. Williams, supra . Factors to be considered include the suspect's age, education, intelligence, prior contact with authorities, and conduct. See, White v. Massachusetts, 382 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D. Mass. 2005) (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979); Toste v. Lopes, 701 F. Supp. 306 (D. Conn. 1987). Here, the police advised Walker of his Miranda rights, and he acknowledged that he understood those rights. He then waived those rights by not remaining silent or requesting a lawyer. Walker asked a question later during his interrogation, which he claims shows that he did not understand that what he said could be used against him. But, his statement could also be construed that he did understand his rights. When he asked, You sure the other stuff won't be used against me, right? he was referring to previous statements he had made regarding drugs. The trial court could reasonably infer that Walker was aware the information he provided regarding the murder would be used against him. Moreover, other factors support a finding that Walker understood his Miranda rights. The record shows no indication that Walker's age or intelligence would hinder his understanding of his rights. Further, Walker is familiar with the criminal legal process, having been convicted of 30 crimes, including 11 felonies. His experiences with law enforcement bolster the trial court's determination that he was aware of his rights and understood the significance of waiving them. See, United States v. Hall, 724 F.2d 1055, 1059 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that defendant was not 'a newcomer to the law' in determining whether he understood his rights, quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976)); United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858, 862 (2d Cir. 1978) (observing appellant's rather considerable prior experience with law enforcement officers in upholding the trial court's ruling that he understood his rights). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Walker understood his Miranda rights and knowingly waived them.