Opinion ID: 1138488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the children was violative of due process.

Text: DHS argues that R.D. and B.D. were not appointed a guardian ad litem in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-121(1)(e) (1972). That section provides: (1) The youth court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child: (e) in every case involving an abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding; ... . Sally Garland testified that Chancellor Patterson appointed her as the children's CASA in October of 1992. Linda's counsel objected to Garland's testimony, stating Garland was not a qualified expert and should not be permitted to testify. Special Assistant Attorney General J.D. Woodcock, representing DHS, responded: Your honor, I take the position that Mrs. Garland's position is somewhat as a guardian ad litem and she should be allowed to report to the court. Woodcock likened the situation to Garland actually representing the children. However, the chancellor rejected this contention as no order existed in the court file. He stated that although he had established a CASA program in Copiah County, no such appointment was made in this case. DHS now argues that even having a CASA did not satisfy the statutorily mandated appointment of a guardian ad litem. DHS cites Luttrell v. Kneisly, 427 So.2d 1384, 1388 (Miss. 1983), a case where this Court emphasized that a child shall have a guardian ad litem appointed in actions for the termination of parental rights. Id. at 1388. See, Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-107 (Supp. 1982). In Edwards v. State, the appellant sought to estop the State from belatedly attempting to have his children declared unavailable to testify at his trial for sexual battery. This Court, interpreting § 43-21-121, examined the role of both the State and the guardian ad litem in dealing with the appellant's children. The Court stated: Edwards contends in this appeal that the State should have been `estopped from raising the [availability] issue at such late date' because: (1) FP had already testified during the trial in the dissemination case, and (2) the State failed to timely object to the children being called to testify during the trial in the case sub judice. Edwards' contention is unpersuasive. In this case, the guardian  not the State  was charged with protecting the children's interest. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-121(1)(e) & (2) (1972 as amended) (`The youth court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child ... in every case involving an abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding; ... In addition to all other duties required by law, a guardian ad litem shall have the duty to protect the interest of a child for whom he has been appointed.') Therefore, Edwards is wrong to refer to the State and its failure to object. Id., 594 So.2d 587, at 590 (Miss. 1992) (emphasis in original). This Court, in Luttrell, made clear that the guardian ad litem is the one primarily charged with and looked to for protection of the children's interest when judicial proceedings arise. This Court's most recent pronouncement adhering to this established principle is Loggans v. Hall, 652 So.2d 184 (Miss. 1995). In Loggans, the lower court fully complied with the statute and properly appointed a guardian ad litem to represent a minor child adjudicated as sexually abused. The case involved a problem within the family obviously conflicting with and not in the minor's best interest. This Court, concerned about the representation, or lack thereof, by the guardian ad litem stated: Finally, Mr. Carter, as guardian ad litem for D.K.L., deferred to the therapist's recommendations and stated that he did not have any specific recommendation as to what was in the child's best interest. The court ordered Carter to interview the child and prepare a report for the court to consider. This report is not contained in the record before this Court. In addition, the brief filed by Mr. Carter on behalf of the minor child merely defers to the facts and authority contained in the briefs of Ruth Ann Hall, John Hall and the State of Mississippi. Carter as the guardian for D.K.L., did not have an option to perform or not perform, rather he had an affirmative duty to zealously represent the child's best interest. The record is devoid of any actions on the part of Carter demonstrating such a role. Loggans, 652 So.2d at 188 (emphasis added). This Court ultimately considered the inadequate role of the guardian ad litem to be so egregious that reversal and remand was required. The Court held: The guardian ad litem did not perform as required in such an important role. This failure on the part of the guardian ad litem to fully represent this child's interest necessitates remanding so that someone with only D.K.L.'s best interest in mind can evaluate the family situation ... . . It should be stressed that this additional appointment could possibly have been avoided save for the fact that the guardian ad litem failed to fully represent D.K.L. as illustrated by his on the record statements and submitted brief. Because the guardian ad litem in essence failed to act on behalf of the minor child, this Court must act by remanding the case. Loggans, at 191. A review of cases from other jurisdictions regarding the importance, purpose and role of the guardian ad litem is noteworthy. In Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 (D.Colo. 1990), the court stated that the guardian ad litem investigates, makes recommendations to a court, or enters reports, and hold[s] paramount the child's best interest. In Shainwald v. Shainwald, 302 S.C. 453, 458, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (Ct.App. 1990), the court held: We reject the mother's somewhat novel argument that guardians ad litem should be precluded altogether from giving opinions regarding custody. We think much of the criticism of guardians ad litem stems from the failure of the bar to recognize the proper function of a guardian ad litem. A guardian ad litem is a representative of the court appointed to assist it in properly protecting the interests of an incompetent person. (cites omitted). ... [C]hildren are best served by the presence of a vigorous advocate free to investigate, consult with them at length, marshal evidence, and to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses. ... Judges should also be mindful of the fact that a guardian ad litem is not in the true sense an adversary party and the court has a duty to insure that guardians ad litem perform their duties properly and in the best interest of their wards. The trial judge's duty to assure the child's best interests are protected requires as a minimum that (1) he select a competent person to serve as guardian ad litem; (2) he select a person with no adverse interest to the minor; and (3) the person so selected is adequately instructed on the proper performance of his duties. Shainwald, at 447. This Court, having already expressed its concerns about the importance of the role of the guardian ad litem in Luttrell and Loggans, adheres to the same principles established in Shainwald. We therefore adopt these same three requirements as minimum requirements that the judge must adhere to in the appointment of guardians ad litem representing minors before the courts of this state. In the case at bar, as in Shainwald, we note similar argument of counsel for the mother, objecting to the admission of testimony from CASA and social workers. Dispositional hearings in youth courts are very informal, allowing for hearsay testimony as well as reports from various individuals or agencies who have information concerning the well being and best interest of the minors before the court. Social workers at dispositional hearings should therefore be allowed to give their opinions regarding the best interest of minors based upon their investigations and personal observations. Whether to allow testimony is determined by the sound discretion of the chancellor. On remand, if CASA volunteer Garland is properly appointed as the children's CASA by order of the chancellor, there should be no problem with her being allowed to testify and give an opinion or recommendation at disposition concerning these minors as determined in the sound discretion of the chancellor. Trained, qualified laypersons such as CASA volunteers may be appointed guardian ad litems also if the chancellor deems advisable in his sound discretion. However, a better method might be for the judge in his sound discretion, to appoint a CASA volunteer to assist the children and also appoint a well qualified and competent attorney as guardian ad litem to represent the minors, thus safeguarding the minors legal rights. We note also that the record reflects that for approximately three years R.D. and B.D. were without the services of an attorney or guardian ad litem. These minors were denied the due process right of representation set out in Short, Shainwald, and by this Court in Luttrell and Loggans. This oversight of a mandatory requirement was not satisfied until Jim Kitchens appeared on behalf of the minors at the Motion for Reconsideration. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-121(1)(e) mandates that the youth court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for neglected children involved in judicial proceedings. R.D. and B.D., adjudicated neglected on July 13, 1990 and removed from Linda's custody, were certainly entitled to be appointed a guardian ad litem who would actively represent them in order to protect their best interests. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-121(2). The chancellor apparently was under the mistaken impression that when DHS assumes custody of children, DHS undertakes more than a custodial role and actually legally represents children. The issue of representation, although somewhat suggested by DHS to have been satisfied by Sally Garland, the CASA at the May 24th hearing, was totally rejected by the chancellor. Attorney Kitchens raised the issue again on reconsideration, strenuously arguing that the children were entitled to independent counsel: BY MR. KITCHENS: ... I believe it is raised in the motion in that the children have not had legal counsel up to this point and with that in mind I don't think that their position has been clearly put before the court and that would necessarily involve the court hearing additional evidence from their standpoint. BY THE COURT: Are you telling me that the children are not represented through the Department of Human Services? BY MR. KITCHENS: Your Honor, I think they are entitled to have counsel of their own. I don't work for the Department of Human Services, I'm here representing them and the person that this court appointed to represent their interest. BY THE COURT: Who is that? BY MR. KITCHENS: That's Sally Garland. BY THE COURT: There has been no appointment by this Court. BY MR. KITCHENS: Well, she's characterized in that way in the pleadings, your honor. I have not had the opportunity to see the whole court file or the youth court file, but you characterized that a court appointed person  BY THE COURT: Let me clarify this matter that came up. This court has implemented the CASA program. The court appointed Sally Garland as the director of that program for the Youth Court of both counties. In addition to Mrs. Garland, who is a trained CASA worker, my recollection is that there have been two additional CASA workers in this county trained by Mrs. Garland, but no orders were ever entered in these two cases appointing Mrs. Garland or anyone else in any official capacity, so there is no such order. BY MR. KITCHENS: With that understanding, that's all the more reason, if the children have not heretofore been represented by even a lay person, that they should not be afforded the right to counsel. The record indicates that after the adjudication of neglect by Chancellor Mike Carr, the various orders continuing the custody of the two children in DHS thereafter were entered by Chancellor Donald Patterson. At no time does the record indicate the children were ever appointed a guardian ad litem as mandated by § 43-21-121(1)(e). Further, Attorney Jim Kitchens did not enter into the case until three years after its inception. B.D. and R.D. were left for all intents and purposes wholly unrepresented in these proceedings. Due process considerations certainly are raised by a process which afforded counsel to the mother and to DHS but not to the children whose very future and best interests is at the heart of this controversy. As this Court held in Luttrell, it is mandatory that a guardian ad litem be appointed for children in actions to terminate parental rights. See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-107 (Supp. 1982). The language of § 43-21-121(1)(e) concerning abused and neglected children is no less mandatory. DHS, as the custodians of the children, could and should have pointed to the need for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for R.D. and B.D. far earlier in these proceedings. There was no excuse for DHS waiting until the end of these proceedings when the court issued an order finally restoring custody of these children to their natural mother to raise this issue. Such delay by DHS was certainly not in these children's best interest. Either of the two chancellors should also have recognized the mandatory requirement of the statute and appointed R.D. and B.D. a guardian ad litem. Chancellor Patterson commendably had established a CASA program and Sally Garland apparently had been involved with these minor children for three months prior to the May 1993 hearing. The chancellor could have by order officially appointed Garland as a CASA for the children, or alternatively as guardian ad litem, but clearly did not do so. No order existed and the chancellor emphatically stated that no such appointment occurred. This entire process appears to be mere oversight by the chancellors. Nonetheless, the children's due process rights to representation cannot and will not be ignored by this Court. Whether requested or not, judges have the obligation to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent every minor alleged to be abused or neglected as the statute requires. There is clear support for Attorney Kitchens' position that the children were entitled to independent counsel throughout these proceedings. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-201 provides, in relevant part: (1) Each party shall have the right to be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings. If the party is a child, the child shall be represented by counsel at all critical stages. Even if it is considered that the children were not parties to these proceedings, § 43-21-203 offers further support for the argument that they were entitled to their own counsel. Relevant subsections provide: (6) ... Any person found by the youth court to have a direct interest in the cause shall have the right to appear and be represented by legal counsel.       (8) The youth court may exclude the attendance of a child from a hearing in neglect and abuse cases with consent of the child's counsel. This Court recognizes that a valid argument could be made that DHS never raised the specific issue of lack of representation at the May 24, 1993 hearing, but rather raised it during the Motion for Reconsideration. However, it was clearly raised during the request for reconsideration by both DHS and the two minors through attorney Jim Kitchens. This Court can find manifest error in the chancellor's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the children's best interest. Murphy v. Murphy, 631 So.2d 812 (Miss. 1994) (where manifest error standard of review was applied to a chancellor's decision to hold in abeyance the appointing of a guardian ad litem); Smith v. Jones, 91-CA-01184, Slip Op. at 14; Luttrell v. Kneisly, 427 So.2d 1384, 1387 (Miss. 1983) (Chancellor manifestly erred in not appointing a guardian ad litem which is mandatory and not permissive under statute).