Opinion ID: 1166970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Evidentiary Ruling and for Ruling of Law Prior to Trial

Text: In a related argument, the state complains about the superior court's refusal to rule, prior to trial, generally on the admissibility of enhancement in value evidence, in order that both parties could apply the correct rule of law in preparing their appraisals. We hold that no error was committed. The state originally moved, four months prior to trial, for an evidentiary ruling generally barring evidence of enhancement of value due to the proposed highway projects. The state later moved for a further evidentiary ruling to clarify the extent of the `project' in this case. The superior court denied these motions without prejudice, stating that the motions were premature and could be renewed at trial. The state then filed a motion for ruling of law requesting the court to affirm the principles of condemnation set forth in the state's memoranda accompanying the prior motions. The trial court denied this motion as premature, immediately prior to trial. The basic defect in the state's argument is that it fails to recognize the difficulty the superior court would have had in fashioning the orders requested prior to hearing any evidence. The proposed evidentiary ruling would have barred all evidence of value, including expert testimony of [a] valuation witness, which incorporates such pre-condemnation enhancement in value of the land as was attributable to the proposed project, and would have ordered that the proposed project included both the Geist extension and the Parks Highway. The state requested the court to make this broad exclusionary ruling and these findings of fact without the benefit of any affidavits or other authenticated facts showing why the two projects should be considered as one, save for a single, brief affidavit from the highway department regional road design engineer, stating that the Geist extension had been considered as a connector to the Parks Highway since at least 1968. The request for a ruling of law referred the superior court back generally to the legal memoranda in support of the motion for an evidentiary ruling. These memoranda covered a wide range of eminent domain law pertaining to enhancement of value from public projects. Again, no substantiation or detailed presentation of the evidence expected to be presented was included so that the superior court could narrow its consideration of the applicable law to the facts of the case at hand. The state has not persuaded us that the court should have departed from normal practice and ruled on the admissibility of evidence prior to the time it was offered at trial, when its nature and the purpose for which it is offered could be ascertained. See generally C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 51, at 109-12 (2d ed. 1972). The cases which the state cites in support of its argument are not supportive. State v. Leach, 516 P.2d 1383 (Alaska 1973), and Dash v. State, 491 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1971), call for a liberal approach to the discovery and admission of valuation evidence in condemnation cases. In Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143, 146-48 (Alaska 1971), we vacated an establishment-preclusion order in a condemnation case which would have prevented the landowner from introducing evidence pertaining to the value of his property, much as the proposed order in the case at bar would have. In Babinec v. State, 512 P.2d 563, 568-69 (Alaska 1973), this court held in error a trial court instruction which determined that the properties in question comprised a single unsubdivided parcel for the purposes of valuation, where there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to justify submitting to the jury whether the properties should be valued as more than one parcel. While a clarification prior to trial of the law which the court intended to follow in considering the admissibility of valuation evidence may have assisted in the preparation of appraisals, the state has not presented a convincing argument that it was entitled to a ruling in a broad area of eminent domain law, without the superior court having the benefit of knowing the details of the factual context over which the parties were in dispute.