Opinion ID: 2994727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Quantity of Drugs Challenge

Text: We now reach Albarran’s last challenge. He contends that the district court improperly included in determining his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines the drugs discovered in Apartment 114 on 1555 West Hollywood Avenue. The district court’s decision regarding the quantity of drugs that Albarran is responsible for is a finding of fact that we review for clear error. Pagan, 196 F.3d at 891. One can prove clear error if the sentencing calculation rests on an inadequate evidentiary basis. Id. The record before the court must be sufficient in nature at sentencing to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Therefore, if the district court’s conclusion rests on reliable evidence in the record, we will not second-guess the way that the court weighed the evidence, nor will we upset its credibility determinations. Id. We will overturn a factual determination if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Garcia, 69 F.3d 810, 819 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Albarran is contesting the district court’s decision to attribute the drugs found in Apartment 114 to him as part and parcel of his involvement with the greater drug conspiracy. Although this argument rests upon the notion that such drugs were not a reasonably foreseeable part of the alleged conspiracy that Albarran agreed to partake in, we are really dealing with yet another sufficiency of evidence question that rehashes several of the facts and arguments raised before. As a co-conspirator, a defendant can be held accountable for transactions in which he or she did not personally participate if such a deal was reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Pigee, 197 F.3d 879, 889-90 (7th Cir. 1999). The Sentencing Guidelines state that one’s offense level can be based on all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (Nov. 1998). Comment 2 to U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3 notes that a defendant in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, [is accountable for] all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. Albarran claims that even if he was involved in delivering one kilogram of cocaine, the drugs found in the apartment were not within the scope of the agreement that he allegedly entered into with the other defendants in this case. Albarran once again challenges the circumstantial evidence presented by the government that connects him to the drugs found in the apartment. He argues that several people had access to Apartment 114, and other than the suitcase that had within it a brown substance, none of the other drugs discovered in the apartment were in plain view. Also, there is no evidence as to when the suitcase was brought into the apartment and Albarran reminds us that his fingerprints were not found on the suitcase. More importantly, according to Albarran, there is no evidence that he was inside the apartment on May 12, 1999 until he was arrested. On the morning of his arrest, Albarran went to the hospital and arrived back at his apartment right before his arrest. Furthermore, Albarran points out that Agent Stanley M. Grobe testified that a stash house is utilized for a limited period of time. Grobe said that the processing of a kilo can be done in a matter of hours and generally the people who touch the wooden press are mainly responsible for the processing of the cocaine. In this case, Albarran’s fingerprints were not on the microwave, block press, or cutting agents and Albarran believes this indicates that he did not participate in processing the drugs discovered in the apartment. According to Albarran, although the drugs were recovered from the apartment, there is no evidence that he negotiated for this particular amount of drugs, that he expected to profit from them, and he was not considered to be a leader or organizer in the drug processing. From Albarran’s perspective, there is a lack of evidence connecting him with the scheme of selling the drugs found in Apartment 114. It is difficult to reconcile Albarran’s theory of what transpired at the apartment with the district court’s conclusions regarding this matter. First, it does not aid Albarran’s case that the district court found that he had provided false testimony concerning his knowledge of what was located within Apartment 114. Second, the district court judge did entertain commentary about the drugs found within the apartment and how this would affect Albarran’s offense level. After listening to arguments from both sides, the district court did concede that the evidence connecting Albarran to the drugs in the apartment was circumstantial, but the evidence is very strong from the standpoint of it being circumstantial evidence. I won’t reiterate it all, but the fact that Mr. Albarran had a key, the fact that Mr. Albarran had clothing and other items in the apartment, the fact that Mr. Albarran had admitted on the witness stand that he did see [a] microwave on the bed, [which] could be construed as drug paraphernalia, indicates to me that this was not a situation where someone unbeknownst to Mr. Albarran brought in the drugs that very day in Mr. Albarran’s absence and then involved Mr. Albarran in the criminal activity, keeping Mr. Albarran in the dark about the circumstances of that drug activity or the extent of it. The circumstantial evidence, as illustrated from the district court’s comments, sufficiently proved that Albarran knew of the drugs found in the apartment and that he was not an innocent person who was wrongfully caught up in the situation. The district court did not commit clear error when it included the drugs discovered in the apartment in its calculation of Albarran’s offense level and therefore we affirm its determination regarding the drug quantity in Albarran’s case.