Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Motion to Re-Voir Dire the Jury

Text: Prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, the defense submitted a motion to revoir dire the jury, in order to establish that there was good cause for impaneling a new jury for the penalty phase. The motion was based on section 190.4, subdivision (c). In pertinent part, that statute provides: If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider ... the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. The motion requested that the court allow defendant's trial counsel to inquire whether the sitting jurors could keep an open mind. As was the case with a motion for separate juries submitted by defendant at the pretrial stage, the trial court denied the request. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion, because good cause existed to impanel a new jury prior to commencement of the penalty phase. Specifically, defendant asserts that his decision to absent himself from the guilt phase proceedings prior to the giving of closing arguments likely was interpreted as an admission of guilt and prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. Defendant further alleges that certain jurors had preconceived views about the case, that Jurors Oran Pentz and Deborah Wallen related experiences similar to those described at trial, that defendant's penalty phase counsel, Steven Harmon, was absent during the guilt phase, and finally that the prosecution had elected to introduce evidence of a totally new unrelated homicide (Shelah McMahan) at the penalty phase. Defendant maintains that in view of these specific factors, good cause existed to grant the motion. Defendant's argument is unavailing. Section 190.4, subdivision (c), expresses the long-standing legislative preference for a single jury to determine guilt as well as penalty in capital cases. ( People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 738, 276 Cal.Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142; People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1028-1029, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017; People v. Gonzales (1967) 66 Cal.2d 482, 499, 58 Cal.Rptr. 361, 426 P.2d 929.) Although good cause in the context of impaneling a new penalty phase jury is an elusive concept (see People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 27-28, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301), it seems clear that, similar to the situation found in the cases cited, defendant's speculative assertions in the present case were insufficient to impose any duty of inquiry on the part of the trial court. The court explained to the jury that defendant voluntarily had requested to be absent from closing argument, and later admonished the jury prior to the giving of opening statements at the penalty phase that it was customary for one defense attorney to work on the guilt phase and the other on the penalty phase. The subject of the jurors' attitudes had been examined thoroughly during the voir dire examination conducted at the outset of the guilt phase of the trial. There was nothing unusual about the prosecution's properly noticed intention to introduce evidence, at the penalty phase, of an additional, unadjudicated murder. (See, e.g., People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 906-907, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282.) To permit a convicted capital defendant to delay commencement of the penalty phase proceedings on such a speculative basis would contravene the purpose of section 190.4, subdivision (c). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to re-voir dire the jury.