Opinion ID: 866145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Unrelated Drug Seizures

Text: Díaz-Arias' third claim of error is that, while the indictment charged him with participating in a single, overarching conspiracy with the other twelve co-defendants, the evidence marshaled at trial indicated the existence of multiple independent conspiracies. Specifically, Díaz-Arias maintains that he was only one of [the] many customers of the Pinales organization, and that -34- he only entered into a limited conspiracy with two of the codefendants (presumably Pinales and Heredia) to purchase cocaine from them, and not into the broader conspiracy charged in the indictment. Because of this, Díaz-Arias contends that the district court erred when it allowed the government to introduce evidence pertaining to the seizure of a kilogram of cocaine from Tajh White on September 27, 2004, as well as the seizure of 53 kilograms of cocaine from the stash house stewarded by Heredia at 115 Navarre Street. He claims this caused an impermissible variance to result at trial, which fomented an evidentiary spillover that allowed the jury to transfer the guilt of the other co-defendants to him, thereby abridging his substantial rights. The following is a brief overview of the law in this regard.10 To sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must establish that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Maryea, 704 F.3d 55, 73 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 116 (1st Cir. 2011)). The third element requires a showing that the defendant intended to join the conspiracy and also intended to effectuate its objectives. Id. A tacit agreement to join the 10 Díaz-Arias also seems to challenge the drug quantity attributable to him in this section. For the sake of clarity, we will address said issue in the final section of this opinion. -35- conspiracy is sufficient. United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 (1st Cir. 1999). A prejudicial variance may result when (1) the facts proved at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment; and (2) the error affects the defendant's substantive rights. . . . Maryea, 704 F.3d at 73 (citation omitted). The question of whether the evidence supports the existence of a single conspiracy is a factual one for the jury to determine. United States v. EscobarFigueroa, 454 F.3d 40, 48 (1st Cir. 2006). Assuming the jury was properly instructed on this matter, something which Díaz-Arias does not challenge here, the initial question boils down to one of evidentiary sufficiency. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 116. On review, we frequently regard the totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether the evidence proffered at trial suffices to establish the overarching conspiracy. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7. We must reject Díaz-Arias claims that a variance occurred if a plausible reading of the record supports the jury's implied finding that he knowingly participated in the charged conspiracy. Id. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we first conclude that there was abundant evidence for the jury to determine that Díaz-Arias entered into a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The evidence showed that Díaz-Arias purchased multiple kilograms of cocaine from the Pinales organization on several -36- occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2010)(pattern of drug sales between individuals for redistribution supports conclusion that individuals were involved in drug conspiracy. (citing United States v. Moran, 984 F.2d 1299, 1303 (1st Cir. 1993))). It also established, as reflected in the wiretap recordings, that Díaz-Arias arranged for drug transactions with the core members of the conspiracy using the conspiracy's coded language. Mitchell, 596 F.3d at 24 (use of drug code probative of membership in conspiracy (citing United States v. Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2003))). The drug ledgers also indicated the Díaz-Arias was a recurrent customer of the Pinales organization and that, at one point, he was indebted to the organization by more than $50,000. Id. (drug ledger, containing nicknames of defendant and other conspiracy members, is direct evidence of membership in conspiracy. (citing United States v. Tejada, 886 F.2d 483, 487 (1st Cir. 1989))).11 11 In Mitchell, we rejected a similar argument made by one of DíazArias' co-defendants. 596 F.3d 18. Marcus Mitchell, who was tried separately from Díaz-Arias, also argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish his participation in the conspiracy, although he did so as part of his challenge against the district court's decision to admit wiretap recordings as co-conspirator statements. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). We rejected his argument and found that the government had offered substantial evidence . . . to establish that Mitchell was an active conspiracy member, by a preponderance of the evidence. Mitchell, 596 F.3d at 24. The evidence used against Mitchell was substantially the same as that used against Díaz-Arias, except that a co-defendant, Oscar Rodríguez, testified at Mitchell's trial as a government witness. Id. -37- There was also a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the jury to determine that a single conspiracy existed. In conducting our inquiry as to this issue, several factors are of use, including: (1) the existence of a common goal, (2) interdependence among participants, and (3) overlap among the participants. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 117. No single one of these factors, standing alone, is necessarily determinative. Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 29. As to the common goal requirement, we have found it satisfied when the goal is to sell cocaine for profit or to further the distribution of cocaine. Portela, 167 F.3d at 695; Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 117. Interdependence concerns whether the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme. United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). The final factor, overlap among the participants, can be found to exist when the conspiracy features the pervasive involvement of a single core conspirator, or hub character. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 118 (internal quotation omitted). Here, Díaz-Arias seems to argue that the evidence introduced at trial established the existence of multiple, independent drug trafficking conspiracies instead of the single, overarching conspiracy described in the indictment. He claims that while all the defendants had the purpose of profiting from the -38- distribution of cocaine, that objective was achieved by different methods of operation, at different places, and with different people, which, according to him, suggests there was no interdependence between the parties. Although Díaz-Arias admits he received his supply of cocaine from Pinales, he contends the evidence did not establish that either of them believed that the success of the distribution operation depended on the ventures of the remaining eleven defendants. He also argues there was no evidence presented at trial indicating that he had any interactions with the other members of the conspiracy, thus reflecting a lack of overlap between them. Since it appears that Díaz-Arias concedes the conspiracy had the common goal of selling and distributing cocaine for profit, we address the remaining two factors: whether overlap and interdependency existed among the participants of the conspiracy. The overlap factor is easily established, as the government proved that Díaz-Arias' supply of cocaine came directly from Pinales and Heredia, who spearheaded the organization. Hence, Pinales and Heredia neatly fit into the roles of core conspirators or hub characters of the conspiracy. As to interdependency, we are not convinced by DíazArias' argument that there was no interdependency because his codefendants, who also purchased cocaine in wholesale quantities from the Pinales organization, were independent criminals whose criminal -39- activity was unforeseeable to him. It is well established that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew all of the details of the conspiracy, nor that he participated in every aspect of the conspiracy. Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 29. It also does not have to show that the defendant knew of or had any contact with each and every one of the conspirators. Id. Further, in United States v. Soto-Beníquez, we stated that an example of interdependence is when the success of an individual's own drug transactions depends on the health and success of the drug trafficking network that supplies him . . . . 356 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2003). This is readily apparent here, where the evidence established that Díaz-Arias was a repeat customer of the Pinales organization, purchasing multiple kilograms of cocaine, often on consignment, and regularly paying down debts, amounting to thousands of dollars, to the organization. A rational jury could have inferred that the proceeds the organization obtained from customers such as Díaz-Arias allowed it to continue importing large quantities of cocaine, thus furthering the criminal enterprise. Therefore, it can be said that Díaz-Arias' success as a distributor was predicated upon the success of the other coconspirators; were it not for the combined collective effort of all of them, the Pinales organization would have faltered, possibly leaving Díaz-Arias bereft of a supplier. See Maryea, 704 F.3d at 77 (This interdependence makes it reasonable to speak of a tacit -40- understanding between [a core conspirator] and others upon whose unlawful acts his success depends.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer interdependency, and thus the existence of a single conspiracy. Having determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the existence of a single conspiracy, we must also determine that the district court did not err in admitting the evidence from the cocaine seizures of Tajh White and Heredia's stash house. The evidence proffered by the government tended to establish that White was also a customer of the Pinales organization and that the stash house at 115 Navarre Street was used by that organization as a repository for cocaine. Therefore, the evidence stemming from the cocaine seizures were plainly relevant to proving the existence of the charged conspiracy. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.