Opinion ID: 1165768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: conversion of the hesketh truck and trailer

Text: The basis of this cause of action is duress practiced upon the plaintiff while he was in jail. The complaint alleged that the conversion took place on September 1, 1959. The alleged fraud in obtaining from the plaintiff his signatures to motor vehicle powers of attorney is also set forth, though it is incorrectly alleged that this episode occurred prior to said wrongful taking, whereas the evidence shows that it occurred on September eighteenth and that previously Baird had taken possession of the Hesketh truck and trailer. The defendants moved jointly for a judgment of nonsuit and a directed verdict. Heider made like motions separately on the ground of failure to prove that Baird was his agent. As to the latter motions, what we have heretofore said on the question of Baird's agency disposes of this contention as applied to this cause of action. The assignments of error in the defendants' brief directed to the denial of the joint motions raise the following questions: (1) The evidence shows that on September twenty-sixth, eight days after Gowin was released from jail, Baird saw him in Halsey, Oregon, where he was working for Halsey Auto Wreckers and obtained his signatures to powers of attorney covering the Hesketh truck and trailer. The reason for obtaining these instruments, according to Baird, was that Peerless Trailer and Truck Service, which had a lien against the Hesketh trailer, required them in order to clear the title. It is not disputed that Gowin signed these documents freely and voluntarily upon the mere request of Baird, and the contention is that this evidence demonstrates that Gowin's written authorization to his wife to deliver these vehicles and the other property in question to Baird's agent was not the result of fraud or duress, but was freely given. 27, 28. The classic definition of conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over one's property in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it. Montgomery v. U.S. Nat'l Bank et al, 220 Or 553, 568, 349 P2d 464. It is a conversion to obtain chattel property from another by duress, 89 CJS 549, Trover and Conversion § 40, or by fraud, ibid 559, § 55. See, also, Restatement, 1 Torts 638, § 252, comment d. 29. It is our opinion that the conversion, if there was one, occurred when Baird's agent took possession of the Hesketh truck and trailer. As we have indicated in the part of this opinion dealing with the cause of action for malicious prosecution, there was evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the question whether Gowin's consent to Baird taking the property in Idaho was the product of duress. If so, the defendants' subsequent alleged fraud in obtaining the powers of attorney from Gowin on September eighteenth becomes relatively unimportant to the issues involved in this cause of action. Gowin's conduct in signing the powers of attorney after he was released from jail when he was free from compulsion and acting under no fraudulent representations is competent evidence that his surrender of the property, in the first instance, was not induced by duress but by some other motive. It cannot, however, be held to be conclusive on that question. It was simply evidence to be weighed by the jury which, by its verdict, evidently determined the issue in accordance with the plaintiff's contention. 30, 31. (2) The defendants contend that there is no proof of a demand and that a demand is necessary in this type of action. This was not one of the grounds specified in support of the motions under consideration and the objection might therefore properly be ignored. Assuming, however, that the question is before us, it is sufficient to say that where a conversion has actually occurred there is no necessity of alleging and proving a demand and refusal. Daniels v. Foster & Kleiser, 95 Or 502, 507, 187 P 627. As numerous cases cited in the Annotation, 95 ALR 615 illustrate, when possession of goods is obtained by fraud, a conversion has taken place and the plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action of trover without previous demand. This is because there has been an original tortious taking by the defendant as opposed to the case of an original lawful possession in the defendant. Genova v. Johnson, 213 Or 47, 55, 321 P2d 1050. The same rule, of course, applies where chattels are obtained by duress. See Restatement, 1 Torts 638, § 252, comment d. (3) It is contended that the evidence of damages is insufficient. Here, again, defendants urge that the testimony of the plaintiff as to value is incompetent. For the reasons hereinbefore given the contention cannot be sustained. 32. (4) It is argued that the evidence of fraud is not clear and satisfactory. We think that it was sufficient for submission to the jury. In connection with this contention defendants assert that it is not claimed that any pressure was put upon the plaintiff to obtain the authority from him to secure possession of the Hesketh truck and trailer. Such pressure was not specifically alleged in the complaint, but it was testified to by the plaintiff and was an issue for the jury. The motions for nonsuit and directed verdict were properly denied.