Opinion ID: 1057594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Excusing Prospective Jurors

Text: The Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to equal protection of the laws when it excused eleven potential jurors, all of whom were women, without giving the Defendant a chance to rehabilitate them and without making a record of its decision. The State responds that the trial court did not violate the Defendant's constitutional rights and that the trial court properly excused each of the jurors based upon each juror's explanation of how serving as a juror would be a hardship for them. The State points out that many of the female jurors were excused because they were solely responsible for the care of their small children, which has been found by other courts to be a valid reason for being excused, citing Johnson v. United States, 307 F.Supp.2d 380, 387 (D.Conn.2003). Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 22-5-307(a) (2003), a person summoned for jury service must appear at the specified time and place unless excused therefrom or discharged by the judge. In the case under submission, the prospective jurors were excused when they appeared in court based on the court's consideration of the information provided by the jurors to the trial court's inquiries. At the time of the Defendant's trial, the relevant code section provided that any person may be excused from serving as a juror ... when, for any reason, the person's own interests, or those of the public, will, in the opinion of the court, be materially injured by the person's attendance. See T.C.A. § 22-1-104(a) (2003) (repealed 2009). The statute further provided that any person, when summoned to jury duty, may be excused upon a showing that such person's service will constitute an undue hardship. T.C.A. § 22-1-104(b) (repealed 2009). Further, the law in effect at the time of the Defendant's trial provided that the court may discharge from service a grand or petit juror ... for any other reasonable or proper cause, to be judged by the court. T.C.A. § 22-1-105 (Supp. 2008). [1] The Defendant in this case contends that the trial court systematically excluded women from the jury venire. Further, the Defendant states that, had this exclusion been the result of the State's use of peremptory strikes, he could have sought some recourse, but, because it was perpetuated by the trial court, he had no such recourse. The United States Supreme Court has addressed whether peremptory challenges on the basis of gender violate the Equal Protection Clause holding, Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by a state actor violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where ... the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). The Court clarified that intention to exclude based on gender is a requirement for there to be an Equal Protection violation. Even exclusions based on characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one gender could be appropriate, absent a showing of pretext. Id. at 143, 114 S.Ct. 1419. The Court then gives the example that challenging all persons who have had military experience would disproportionately affect men at this time, while challenging all persons employed as nurses would disproportionately affect women. Without a showing of pretext, however, these challenges may well not be unconstitutional, since they are not gender or race based. Id. (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). According to our review of the record, during voir dire the Defendant objected stating: Your Honor, we had 30 jurors come today. Out of those 30 jurors for cause, there w[ere] 12 people that approached Your Honor, asking for a for-cause-excuse; Your Honor granted all of them with the exception of one, Ms. Hanes. Actually, there w[ere] 13 including Ms. Hanes. Out of the 12 of the 30, 11 were females. And, of course, females have certain problems, and the Court addressed it: Children, et cetera. I would like to take exception to the Court's ruling excluding these 11 people. Females are a recognizable class that the courts have held there should be adequate provocation before they're excused. I don't know how many remaining jurors in that 30, were females. But I do know that 11 approached Your Honor. And I know we have lost the opportunity to have at least 11 females on the jury. In total, the trial court excused thirteen prospective jurors based upon an undue hardship before the Defendant's objection, and eleven of those thirteen jurors were female. [2] The trial court asked that the potential jurors who felt incapable of serving due to the necessary five-night sequestration to identify themselves. The trial court then called each potential juror up to the bench and had a private conversation about the person's reasons for not being able to serve by staying in a hotel for five nights. After each conversation, the trial court announced why it was dismissing that potential juror. The following occurred during the questioning of each juror: a. Alberta Hooks The Court: So, Ms. Hooks, we'll just start with you. You want to come up here? (Ms. Hooks complied.) The Court: Yes, ma'am. (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. Hooks and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: She has children problems. A single parent. And thank you. Good luck to you. Ms. Hooks: Thank you. (Ms. Hooks was excused). b. Jennifer Miller The Court: All right. We'll just start here on the front row. And your name is? Ms. Miller: Miller. The Court: Jennifer Miller, should be number 22 (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. Miller and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: She has two children. No one will be able to pick them up. Okay. (Ms. Miller was excused.) c. Tina Foster The Court: All right. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Foster: Tina Foster. The Court: Yes, ma'am. Ms. Foster: I've got children. My husband works all day. I just don't think the youngest one would do well, for five days, without her mamma. The Court: Okay. All right. We'll excuse you then. Ms. Tina Foster. Thank you, ma'am. (Ms. Foster was excused.) d. Frances Smith (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. Smith and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: What's your name? Ms. Smith: Frances Smith. The Court: This is Frances Smith. And she has two children. And no one can help but her. Right? Ms. Smith: Right. The Court: Okay. Ms. Smith, we'll excuse you. Thank you. (Ms. Smith was excused.) e. Sandy Small The Court: All right. Yes, ma'am. (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. Small and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: What is your name, Ms? Ms. Small: Sandy Small. The Court: Sandy Small. She has two children. Her husband works out of town. So we'll excuse you. . . . . (Whereupon Ms. Small was excused.) f. Dena McClellan The Court: All right. Yes, ma'am. (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. McClellan and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: Her daughter graduates from high school. All right. We'll excuse you. Thank you. (Mc. McClellan was excused.) g. Lou Ann Gibbs The Court: Yes, ma'am. What's your name? Ms. Gibbs: Lou Ann Gibbs. . . . . (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. Gibbs and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: Her job is going to take her out of town until next week. So, thank you, ma'am. (Ms. Gibbs was excused.) Ms. Jack: Is that Ms. Gibbs? The Court: Ms. Gibbs. h. Elizabeth Daniels The Court: This is Elizabeth Daniels. . . . . (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. Daniels and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: All right. Two children, 6 and 10. No one's there when they get home from school. Thank you. (Ms. Daniels was excused.) i. Theresa Blocker The Court: All right. Yes, ma'am. (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. Blocker and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: All right. A 7-year-old at home and her husband works nights. Thank you, ma'am. (Ms. Blocker was excused.) General Dicus: What was her name, Judge? The Court: Theresa Blocker. j. Nelda Bone The Court: All right. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Bone: Nelda Bone. The Court: All right. Ms. Bone is number 8. (Whereupon, a discussion took place between Ms. Bone and the Court. And then, the following proceedings were had.) The Court: She's across from her mother-in-law who's ill. Thank you, ma'am. (Ms. Bone was excused.) k. Kimberly Sisk The Court: Kimberly Sisk. All right. She has her grandfather. Thank you, ma'am. (Ms. Sisk was excused.) Upon our detailed examination of the record, the trial court excused each one of these female jurors for reasons other than gender. Each of these jurors requested to be excused and provided the trial court with reasons why serving as a juror would be an undue hardship. It is clear that the trial court acted within its discretion when it excused these jurors based upon their showing that service as jurors would constitute undue hardship. See T.C.A. § 22-1-104(b) (repealed 2009). Further, we find no merit in the Defendant's contention that the trial court's excusing these women amounted to a systematic excusing of women from the jury venire. As previously stated, the trial court correctly applied the hardship provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 22-1-104(b). The fact that such application allows the trial court to excuse mothers who have no alternative methods of childcare is, as other courts have found, perhaps an inevitable result of a hardship exemption. See Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d 332, 345-46 (Ky.2004) (holding that a trial court's application of the hardship provision of the Kentucky statute to excuse mothers with no alternative methods of childcare was perhaps an inevitable result of a hardship exemption); People v. Olson, 60 Ill.App.3d 535, 18 Ill. Dec. 218, 377 N.E.2d 371, 376 (1978) (holding trial court's excusal of women who were unable to make arrangements for the care of their children was not unreasonable); State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387, 400 (Tenn.1989) (holding that proof did not show a systematic exclusion of women in the grand jury selection process where the trial court stated that there were no automatic exemptions granted women but that women would frequently offer compelling reasons for excusal, namely the care of young children); see also Johnson, 307 F.Supp.2d at 387 (holding, Trial courts have long recognized that jurors with young children should be excused for cause when they are unable to obtain child-care for their children); McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972, 975 (Fla.1977) (upholding the constitutionality of a Florida statute excusing from jury service pregnant women and women with small children); State v. George, 476 S.E.2d 903, 906-07 (S.C.1996) (holding that statutory excusals of three women with young children from jury service pursuant to child care exemption did not violate defendant's right to a venire pool reflecting fair cross-section of a community). We conclude that the trial court's actions in the case presently before us do not constitute the sort of [i]ntentional discrimination on the basis of gender by a state actor that violates the constitution. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31, 114 S.Ct. 1419.