Opinion ID: 2156762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Request to Discharge Counsel

Text: A defendant's request to discharge counsel implicates two fundamental rights that are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: [3] the right to the assistance of counsel and the right of self-representation. See State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 412-13, 676 A.2d 513, 517 (1996); Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 589, 536 A.2d 1149, 1151 (1988); Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 262-63 523 A.2d 597, 598 (1987); Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 119, 486 A.2d 163, 166 (1985); Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 123, 406 A.2d 98, 99 (1979). The right to counsel may be waived by the defendant provided that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open. Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 589, 536 A.2d at 1151 quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268, 275 (1942). A waiver of the right to counsel must ordinarily [be] an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Leonard, 302 Md. at 119, 486 A.2d at 167. In circumstances where a defendant elects to forego the assistance of counsel to represent himself, the court must permit the defendant to proceed pro se if the request is timely and unequivocal. See Brown, 342 Md. at 413-14, 676 A.2d at 518; Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 589, 536 A.2d at 1151, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Because a defendant, by choosing to represent himself, is waiving the right to counsel, the court must conduct an inquiry to ensure that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent. See Brown, 342 Md. at 414, 676 A.2d at 518, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 589, 536 A.2d at 1151; Snead, 286 Md. at 130, 406 A.2d at 102. Alternatively, a defendant may elect to discharge his counsel to obtain substitute counsel. Under these circumstances, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to explain the reasons for the request and only may substitute counsel if good cause is shown, although the defendant is not entitled to substitute a specific appointed attorney if represented by the Office of the Public Defender. See Brown, 342 Md. at 414, 676 A.2d at 518; Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 199-204, 670 A.2d 398, 410-11 (1995); Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 605, 536 A.2d at 1159. In this case we first must decide whether Campbell's statements should have been construed as a request to discharge counsel. Maryland Rule 4-215(e) outlines the procedures a court must follow when a defendant desires to discharge his counsel to proceed pro se or to substitute counsel: If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel. If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(1)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or files does [sic] not reflect prior compliance. [4] The Rule was designed to protect both the right to counsel and the right to self-representation and ensures that decisions to waive counsel would pass constitutional muster. Brown, 342 Md. at 424, 676 A.2d at 523. The Rule, however, is silent as to what level of discourse is required to discharge counsel. This Court addressed that issue in Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 406 A.2d 98 (1979), in which we considered whether a defendant's statements were sufficient to invoke the right of self-representation. At trial, the defendant, Richard Lee Snead, filed a motion for continuance and also orally expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney by stating: I feel as though that [sic] I would like to get a delay in this case to get my nephew and my family time to get another attorney. From my understanding, [my attorney], the way he is talking, I am guilty before I even come in the courtroom. Id. at 125, 406 A.2d at 100. The trial court denied Snead's motion for continuance and stated that his attorney would not be discharged, after which the following dialogue occurred: [SNEAD]: He told me every time he come to see me, he tell me I am guilty before I come in the courtroom. Why should I have a man  he feels that way, before I come into the courtroom. THE COURT: Make your mind up [your attorney] is going to represent you. [SNEAD]: I can't get time for my people to get me no attorney? THE COURT: No, sir. [SNEAD]: I don't want no attorney then. Id. at 126, 406 A.2d at 100. Snead was convicted, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but this Court reversed, reasoning that, any statement by the defendant from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant desired self-representation would be sufficient. Id. at 127, 406 A.2d at 101. In so holding, we found that Snead's statements were sufficient to require an inquiry by the trial court as to whether the defendant wanted to represent himself. Id. We iterated this conclusion in Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 486 A.2d 163 (1985), in which, the defendant, Leonard, requested a continuance to discharge his attorney and proceed pro se: THE COURT: I understand you want to conduct your own defense. [LEONARD]: That's the only choice I got. THE COURT: I take it your answer is yes. [LEONARD]: It's got to be yes. It's the only choice I have. THE COURT: Alright. I'm going to allow [your current attorney] to stay.... [LEONARD]: I don't want you to allow him to do nothing. I have a right to do it [ ]. Id. at 125, 486 A.2d at 170. Leonard further stated that his attorney was no legal advisor for [him] and that he did not want his attorney at the defense table. Id. The judge denied Leonard's request to represent himself, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, id. at 118, 486 A.2d at 165, but this Court reversed, holding that Leonard's statements were an obvious expression of his desire or inclination to represent himself. Id. at 125, 486 A.2d at 170. Quoting from Snead, we stated that [a]ny statement by the defendant from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant desired self-representation would be sufficient. Id. at 124, 486 A.2d at 169. Moreover, we explained that a defendant is not required to utter a talismanic phrase so as to place the court on notice that he desires self-representation. Id. Further, in State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 676 A.2d 513 (1996), statements made by defense counsel were treated as a request to discharge counsel. The defendant stood indicted on various counts of drug distribution and possession, id. at 409-10, 676 A.2d at 516, and prior to testimony by the State's first witness, the following dialogue occurred: [DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: My client wishes to dismiss me at this point in time. THE COURT: For what reasons? [DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: I guess on the advice of his father. [DEFENDANT'S FATHER]: You can't represent him. You don't know nothing about his case, sir. THE COURT: We are in the middle of the trial. We will proceed. Go ahead. [DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: AmI  THE COURT: You are still counsel, yes. Id. at 429-30, 676 A.2d at 526. The judge denied the request to discharge counsel, which was reversed by the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 411, 676 A.2d at 516. This Court held that the trial judge was required to conduct an inquiry as to why the defendant made the request once the defendant indicate[d] a desire to dismiss counsel. Brown, 342 Md. at 425, 676 A.2d at 523 (emphasis added); see also Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 536 A.2d 1149 (1988) (holding that the defendant's statements that his counsel did not have the true evidence, and his comments, I don't think she is any help to me anyway. If possible I would rather get rid of her, get a new attorney were sufficient to warrant the trial court's inquiry of the defendant's desire of self-representation); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 264, 347 A.2d 219, 224 (1975) (finding that the appropriate inquiry was made by the trial court when the defendant expressed no confidence in trial counsel and requested different counsel). [5] In the case sub judice, Campbell's statement regarding his dissatisfaction with his attorney, if timely, should have triggered an inquiry by the court as to whether Campbell wanted to discharge his counsel. Campbell made several statements to the court about his dissatisfaction with his attorney: I don't like this man as my representative; We had conflicts way before this ever started, man in the first trial; The man told me he ain't going to represent me; He ain't have my best interest at heart; [Y]ou all wouldn't let me fire him. As we noted in Snead and Leonard, Campbell's request did not need to be a talismanic phrase or artfully worded to qualify as a request to discharge, so long as a court could reasonably conclude that Campbell sought to discharge his counsel. See Snead, 286 Md. at 127, 406 A.2d at 101; Leonard, 302 Md. at 124, 486 A.2d at 170. Based upon Campbell's expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney, a court reasonably could deduce that Campbell sought to discharge his counsel. See Brown, 342 Md. at 429-30, 676 A.2d at 526; Snead, 286 Md. at 127, 406 A.2d at 101; Leonard, 302 Md. at 124, 486 A.2d at 170.