Opinion ID: 2596037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court had jurisdiction to amend its initial order of restitution

Text: ¶ 13 Whether the district court had jurisdiction to amend and increase its initial order of restitution hinges on whether the district court was correcting a clerical error pursuant to rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Once a court imposes a valid sentence and final judgment is entered, the court ordinarily loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct.App.1991). However, pursuant to rule 30(b), [c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time  Utah R.Crim. P. 30(b) (emphasis added). We hold that rule 30(b) applies, and therefore the district court had jurisdiction to amend its restitution order. ¶ 14 The purpose of rule 30(b) and its civil counterpart, rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, [3] is to correct clerical errors so that the record reflects what was actually done or intended. Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ¶ 30, 48 P.3d 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). In our analysis under rule 30(b), we draw a distinction between clerical errors and judicial errors; [t]he distinction ... depends on whether [the error] was made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. Id. ¶ 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect judgment. Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah 1989). To ascertain the clerical nature of the mistake, this Court will look to the record to harmonize the intent of the court with the written judgment. State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988). Finally, `[i]n this broad approach to correctability ..., it matters little whether an error was made by the court clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge himself;' rather the court should focus on whether the error `is clearly a formal error that should be corrected in the interest of having judgment, order, or other part of the record reflect what was done or intended.' Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 30, 48 P.3d 218 (quoting Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983)). Thus, our clerical error analysis generally focuses on (1) whether the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or intended, (2) whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision making, and (3) whether the error is clear from the record. [4]
¶ 15 A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of the court. Thomas A. Paulsen Co., 770 P.2d at 130. Indeed, [t]he correction [of a clerical error] must be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties. Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 32, 48 P.3d 218 (amending jury verdict because accurately recording the intent of the jury in its calculation of the damage award constitutes correction of a clerical error, not a judicial error). While the intent of the parties may be taken into account in the clerical error analysis, it is ultimately the intent of the court or fact finder that is binding. ¶ 16 The State argues that the original order of restitution as recorded did not conform with the intent of the district court and the parties. Specifically, the State argues that when the district court entered the original order of restitution, the intent of the district court as well as both parties was to order Mr. Rodrigues to pay restitution in accordance with the plea agreement. In support of this position, the State directs our attention to (1) the plea agreement, (2) the PSR, (3) the dialogue between the parties and the court at the sentencing hearing, and (4) the district court's original order of restitution. ¶ 17 In May 2005, Mr. Rodrigues entered into a plea agreement wherein he agreed to pay restitution in the amount of the total amount of child support arrears owed for the support of [his] children on both counts from May 1, 1999 through the date of sentencing. The plea agreement further specified that Mr. Rodrigues agreed to calculate child support at the rate of $617.00 per month ($289.00 to Jennifer Falsone and $328.00 to Michele Rodrigues) plus interest. At the time Mr. Rodrigues entered into the plea agreement his sentencing date was set for July 11, 2005. Mr. Rodrigues, however, failed to appear and instead left the state. Mr. Rodrigues was not actually sentenced until more than a year and a half later on March 19, 2007. ¶ 18 The PSR confirms that Mr. Rodrigues owed $289 per month to Ms. Falsone and $328 per month to Ms. Rodrigues. The PSR further indicates that the State sought restitution in the total amount of child support arrears ... owed for both families from May 1, 1999, through the date of sentencing and [a]s of February 2, 2007, that amount totals $63,507.71. While the PSR does not include the total amount owed from May 1, 1999, through March 19, 2007, the actual date of sentencing, it indicates the State's intent to seek restitution through the date of sentencing in conformity with the plea agreement. During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Rodrigues unambiguously indicated that he concurred with the recommendations in the PSR. ¶ 19 The district court's statements at the sentencing hearing further demonstrate that it intended to order restitution in accordance with the plea agreement. The court recited the amount of restitution it believed Mr. Rodrigues owed. The State indicated that the total was actually even higher, because child support payments continued to accrue through today's date pursuant to the plea agreement. Mr. Rodrigues did not object to the State's characterization of the total amount of child support owed. The court then asked, [s]o what do you show as the total? In response, the State indicated that Mr. Rodrigues owed $30,680.96 ... for one, and $24,078.76 ... for the other. The court added the two figures and stated, [s]o it looks like the total arrearage is $54,760. Clearly the district court was under the impression that the $54,760 figure represented the amount of child support arrears owed to both of Mr. Rodrigues's ex-wives from May 1, 1999, through March 19, 2007, pursuant to the plea agreement. ¶ 20 The district court's original restitution order also supports a finding that the court intended to order restitution through March 19, 2007, the date of sentencing, in conformity with the plea agreement; it states that the award of restitution represents child support arrears for [Mr. Rodrigues's] children with [Ms.] Falsone and [Ms.] Rodrigues through March 19, 2007. ¶ 21 We are further persuaded that the district court intended to order restitution in conformity with the plea agreement by the fact that the amount of restitution ordered for Ms. Falsone accurately represents Mr. Rodrigues's child support obligations under the plea agreement, i.e. child support arrears owed to Ms. Falsone from May 1, 1999, through March 19, 2007, the date of sentencing, while the amount of restitution ordered for Ms. Rodrigues does not conform to Mr. Rodrigues's obligations under the plea agreement. We find it unlikely that the court, without reason, would choose to order an inequitable amount of restitution for two similarly situated victims. ¶ 22 In light of the plea agreement, the PSR, the exchange during the sentencing hearing, and the court's original restitution order, it is clear that the intent of the district court and the expectation of the parties was that Mr. Rodrigues would pay restitution through the date of sentencing in accordance with the plea agreement. The figure provided by the State as restitution owed to Ms. Rodrigues did not accurately represent Mr. Rodrigues's child support arrears through the date of sentencing as set forth in the plea agreement. Therefore, the order of restitution as recorded did not conform to the actual intention of the court and this prong of our analysis suggests that the error was clerical. We now address whether the error was the result of judicial reasoning and decision making.
¶ 23 The error in the amount of restitution owed was not the product of judicial reasoning and determination; rather the error was merely one of calculation. [A] judicial error is one made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect judgment. Thomas A. Paulsen Co., 770 P.2d at 130. We have specifically defined a judicial error as the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning and determination. Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike clerical errors, a district court does not have jurisdiction to correct a judicial error after it has entered a valid sentence. ¶ 24 Mr. Rodrigues argues that pursuant to Utah Code section 77-38a-302, (the Restitution Statute) the error must have been the product of judicial reasoning and decision making and therefore rule 30(b) cannot apply. Mr. Rodrigues does not argue that the district court erred in applying or failing to comply with the requirements of the Restitution Statute. He simply argues that its application required judicial reasoning, and therefore the amount of restitution ordered in this case cannot be a clerical error. ¶ 25 We agree that the district court's determination of restitution required judicial reasoning and decision making. However, we disagree that the misstatement of the restitution amount and the subsequent order of restitution based on the misstatement were the deliberate result of that judicial reasoning and decision making. In other words, as demonstrated below, the district court's reasoning and decision making did not result in or lead to the error in question. ¶ 26 Although a district court has discretion to adjust the amount of restitution agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, any adjustment must fall within the conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of [the] plea agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (2008); see also State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ¶ 9, 60 P.3d 582. Mr. Rodrigues appeared before the district court for sentencing based on a plea agreement. As part of the plea the parties agreed that the amount of restitution would accrue from May 1, 1999, through the date of sentencing. In accepting the figures presented by the State, the district court engaged in judicial reasoning and decision making and determined to impose the amount of restitution agreed to by the parties in the plea agreement instead of some other amount. The court then erroneously entered an amount of restitution that did not conform to its judicial determination. ¶ 27 The error in the amount of restitution was not a deliberate result of the court's judicial determination. Instead, the error resulted from a miscalculation and subsequent misstatement by the State in providing the court with an incorrect figure for the amount of restitution owed to Ms. Rodrigues. Further, Mr. Rodrigues never objected to the characterization of the amount of restitution and in fact concurred with the recommendations in the PSR, both of which demonstrate the court's intent to order restitution in conformity with the plea agreement. ¶ 28 The error in this case was not the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and decision making, and was therefore not a judicial error. Rather, the error resulted from a miscalculation and subsequent misstatement on the part of the State. We accordingly turn to the final prong of our analysis-whether the error is clear from the record.
¶ 29 The error in the amount of restitution the district court originally ordered is clear from the record. To ascertain the clerical nature of the mistake, this Court will look to the record to harmonize the intent of the court with the written judgment. Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389. An error is clerical when it is a mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record Stanger, 669 P.2d at 1206 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 30 Mr. Rodrigues argues that the error is not apparent on the record, and therefore rule 30(b) was an improper vehicle for amending the judgment. We disagree and find that the error in this case is apparent based on a review of the record prior to judgment. ¶ 31 The plea agreement states that restitution will be paid in the amount of the total amount of child support arrears owed for support of [Mr. Rodrigues's] children on both counts from May 1999 through the date of sentencing. It further states that the restitution judgment shall accrue interest as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-401(4) (2001). The plea agreement also provides the amount of support Mr. Rodrigues agreed to pay, per month, for each ex-wife: $289 to Ms. Falsone and $328 to Ms. Rodrigues. Therefore, the basic formula to determine the correct amount of restitution can be found within the plea agreement. ¶ 32 Additionally, the PSR provides accurate totals of restitution owed from May 1999 up until February 2, 2007, one month before Mr. Rodrigues's sentencing. [5] The PSR indicates that as of February 2, 2007, Mr. Rodrigues owed Ms. Rodrigues $34,317.82 in restitution. Thus clearly the $24,078.76 requested by the State at the sentencing hearing as restitution for Ms. Rodrigues was in error. ¶ 33 Based on a review of the plea agreement, the PSR, and the previously determined intent of the court to order restitution in conformity with the plea agreement, we find that the error is clear from the record. ¶ 34 In conclusion, the original order of restitution as recorded does not accurately reflect what was intended by the court or expected by the parties. Furthermore, the error in this case was not the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning and determination. Rather, it was an error of computation, unintentionally initiated by the State. Finally, the clerical mistake in the calculation of restitution is clear from the record. We therefore hold that the error in question was merely clerical under rule 30(b), and the district court had jurisdiction to amend the order of restitution to reflect what was intended.