Opinion ID: 2318701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Separation Agreement Between the Parties

Text: The point of departure for this analysis of alimony is the parties' Separation Agreement, because the court is bound by that agreement as the agreement relates to alimony. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 11-101(c) of the Family Law Article. If the Langstons' Separation Agreement specifically precludes any court modification, then the court is bound by those terms. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-103(c) of the Family Law Article. The Langstons' Separation Agreement explicitly states that, [t]he alimony provisions of this paragraph are subject to the further order of the court, and may be modified AS TO AMOUNT ONLY based proportionally on any increase or decrease in the Husbands [sic] gross income.... Section V(c) of the Separation Agreement (italicized emphasis added; other emphasis in original). The Separation Agreement establishing the amount and schedule of respondent's alimony payments to petitioner was incorporated, but not merged, into the trial court's order granting the parties an absolute divorce. The terms of a separation agreement which has been incorporated, but not merged, into a divorce decree are enforceable either through contempt proceedings or as an independent contract. See Md.Code, § 8-105(a) of the Family Law Article. [6] Because respondent urges us to consider the Separation Agreement as an independent contract, he argues that its terms should be strictly construed as not prohibiting retroactive modification of his alimony obligation to petitioner. [7] As such, we will apply the basic rules and principles of contract interpretation to the Langstons' Separation Agreement. See Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. 204, 212, 428 A.2d 469, 474 (1981). The in banc panel and the Court of Special Appeals disagreed with respondent and found that the language of the Agreement does not provide for modification of alimony retroactive to the date when [Dr. Langston] first sustained a decrease in income. Langston, 136 Md.App. at 227, 764 A.2d at 391. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals noted that the Settlement Agreement was in fact silent on the issue of retroactive modification, rather than prohibitive in its language. See id. The interpretation by the lower courts of the Settlement Agreement is a question of law, which is subject to de novo review. See Auction & Estate Representatives, Inc. v. Ashton, 354 Md. 333, 341, 731 A.2d 441, 445 (1999); JBG/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601, 625, 697 A.2d 898, 911 (1997). Contract interpretation, like statutory interpretation, begins with the principle of the plain meaning of the contractual terms. See Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 209, 783 A.2d 194, 199 (2001). The terms of a contract must be given their ordinary and usual meaning as utilized within the context of the contract. See Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 766, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1989); Kasten Construction Co. v. Rod Enters., Inc., 268 Md. 318, 329, 301 A.2d 12, 18 (1973). Maryland follows the objective law of contract interpretation. See Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 178, 776 A.2d 645, 653 (2001). The objective law of contract interpretation holds that a written contract will be considered ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one interpretation when examined by a reasonably prudent person, see Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 436, 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999); however, [i]f a written contract is susceptible of a clear, unambiguous and definite understanding ... its construction is for the court to determine. Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 251, 768 A.2d 620, 630 (2001)(quoting Rothman v. Silver, 245 Md. 292, 296, 226 A.2d 308, 310 (1967))(internal quotations omitted). Under the objective law of contract interpretation, the court will give force and effect to the words of the contract without regard to what the parties to the contract thought it meant or what they intended for it to mean. See Auction & Estate Reps., Inc. v. Ashton, 354 Md. at 340-41, 731 A.2d at 445(quoting Calomiris, 353 Md. at 436, 727 A.2d at 363). It is evident from the plain meaning of the words of Section V(c) of the Separation Agreement that the parties anticipated that there may come a point in time where the alimony might be increased or decreased based upon changes in respondent's income. The Agreement specifically states that [t]he alimony provisions of this paragraph are subject to the further order of the court, and may be modified AS TO AMOUNT ONLY.... Section V(c) of the Separation Agreement (emphasis in original). With regard to retroactivity of any modification, the Agreement does not expressly permit retroactive modification, nor does it expressly prohibit either party from seeking retroactive modification through the statutory provisions of Section 11-107(b). The terms of the Settlement Agreement are not dispositive of the issue of whether a trial court has discretion retroactively to modify alimony payments. Langston, 136 Md.App. at 228, 764 A.2d at 391. We now turn to the statutory provisions.