Opinion ID: 779950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Peters Was a Qualified Individual With a Disability

Text: 37 Even if we were to assume, as the district court did in awarding summary judgment, that the City regarded Peters as disabled, Peters' still does not fit the statutory definition of a qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The first step in determining whether Peters was a qualified individual with a disability requires this Court to determine whether Peters satisfies the prerequisites of the job, in terms of skills or experience. If he does, then we must determine whether he can perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. Bombard, 92 F.3d at 563. The City does not argue that Peters was unqualified for the job. So, the only issue is whether Peters can perform the essential functions of the Operator's job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 38 Peters first argues that the district court improperly held that the heavy lifting from which Dr. Hoeft restricted him is an essential function of the Operator's job. The City, not surprisingly, asserts that such lifting is an essential function because the Operator must be able to perform all of the daily operational and construction tasks assigned to Laborers, which include all kinds of lifting and carrying. Because we do not second-guess the employer's judgment as to the essential functions, we affirm the district court's determination that lifting, heavy or otherwise, is an essential function of the Operator's job. DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.1998). Even Peters admits that heavy lifting is required at times, and his argument that such lifting is infrequent does not preclude it from being an essential function of the job. See Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir.2001) (an essential function need not encompass the majority of an employee's time, or even a significant quantity of time, to be essential). 39 We now turn to Peters' requested accommodations. Peters requested two possible accommodations, neither of which this Court finds reasonable. Peters first requested that someone else do the heaviest lifting for him if he could not handle it, which the district court found unreasonable. We agree and hold that such a request is unreasonable because it requires another person to perform an essential function of Peters' job. See Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523-24 (7th Cir.2000) (stating that an employer need not create a new job or provide a helper as an accommodation to a disabled employee); Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir.1997) (to accommodate him [the employer] would have to hire someone else to help perform some duties. That clearly was beyond a reasonable accommodation.); Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir.1996) (hiring a helper to perform the overhead work would mean the helper would de facto perform [the] job. We cannot agree that [an employee] would be performing the essential functions of his job with a helper.). 40 Second, though the district court did not address this issue, we hold that Peters' proposed try and see request is also unreasonable. Allowing the employee to return to work to see if he can complete the job is the wrong test as to whether an accommodation is reasonable. See Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.1999). The employer is not obligated to allow the employee to try the job out in order to determine whether some yet-to-be requested accommodation may be needed. While the law gives the disabled employee the right to perform the job without a reasonable accommodation, the City determined that Peters could not safely perform the tasks assigned to an Operator because of his permanent, physician-imposed lifting restrictions. Given the permanent nature of those lifting restrictions at that time, we cannot say that Peters would have been able to complete the job without a reasonable accommodation. Absent any other reasonable request for an accommodation, the City need not incur additional liability to try and see whether Peters can handle the job despite his permanent lifting restrictions. 41 Accordingly, we hold that Peters failed to request any reasonable accommodation and he does not meet the statutory definition of a qualified individual with a disability. Summary judgment in favor of the City is appropriate, and we AFFIRM the district court's decision.