Opinion ID: 2459921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mr. Cooper's defense was that he did not know a shooting would occur when he drove Gordon and Moten to the parking lot. He argues there was no evidence that he entertained any premeditation which is an element of capital murder as charged, so his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. As the State points out in response, Cooper's liability for the crime is as an accomplice, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-403 (Repl.1993), and the evidence need only be sufficient to show he encouraged or aided in the commission of the crime. Riggins v. State, 317 Ark. 636, 882 S.W.2d 664 (1994). A motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995); Evans v. State, 317 Ark. 449, 879 S.W.2d 409 (1994). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Evans v. State, supra ; Thomas v. State, 312 Ark. 158, 847 S.W.2d 695 (1993). Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or another, and in determining whether substantial evidence exists, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. Evans v. State, supra ; Coleman v. State, 314 Ark. 143, 860 S.W.2d 747 (1993). Mr. Cooper drove to the scene of the crime with two men who exited his car and drew weapons. One or both of them fired at the victim who, according to an eye witness, was eventually killed by one of them. Cooper then fled the scene with one of the shootists and allowed the second to enter his car shortly thereafter. When the evidence tending to prove those facts is combined with the evidence that Mr. Cooper had a strong motive to injure or kill Mr. Webster we can hardly conclude the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice.