Opinion ID: 2519859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Case Law After Venetie

Text: {18} The Tenth Circuit has had two occasions to apply the test articulated in Venetie. See HRI, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir.2000); Roberts, 185 F.3d at 1132-33. In Roberts, the court relied on the Venetie test to determine whether certain criminal offenses occurred in Indian County. Id. at 1132-33. The court held that the property was Indian country because it was validly set-aside for the tribe under the superintendence of the federal government. Id. at 1133. In HRI, the Tenth Circuit relied on Venetie to determine whether two tracts of land were Indian country. HRI, 198 F.3d at 1248-54. Although the court discussed the application of Venetie in determining whether one of the two tracts of land was Indian country, it concluded that the ultimate merits of the dispute were not ripe for resolution. Id. at 1248. As for the other tract of land, the court used the Venetie analysis to determine that it was Indian country under Section 1151(a) and possibly Indian country under Section 1151(b). Id. at 1254. The HRI court, however, decided not to delve into potentially difficult questions regarding the impact of Venetie on the Watchman analysis. Id. In dicta, the Court stated that Venetie did not have the opportunity to address a proper community of reference and that barring en banc review by this court, Watchman continues to require a `community of reference' analysis prior to determining whether land qualifies as a dependent Indian community under the set-aside and supervision requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b). Id. at 1249 (citation omitted). {19} In New Mexico, the Court of Appeals applied the Venetie two-prong test to determine whether the State had jurisdiction to try the defendant for DWI. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062, ¶ 28, 127 N.M. 382, 981 P.2d 796. The Court noted that the Supreme Court disapproved of the Ninth Circuit's six-factor test which essentially used the same factors in Watchman. Id. ¶ 12. It observed that the first prong of Venetie could be seen as precluding the need for a community of reference test. Id. ¶ 14. Furthermore, it reasoned that under Venetie, [t]he federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question is occupied by an `Indian community.'  Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Venetie, 522 U.S. at 531, 118 S.Ct. 948). The Court applied Venetie's two-prong test and concluded that the area of land in question satisfied the test for a dependent Indian community under Venetie. Id. ¶ 28. {20} The Watchman test basically consolidates three of the factors in the Ninth Circuit six-factor test into one. Compare Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1545 (factor two requiring courts to analyze the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants in the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the established practice of government agencies toward the area), with Venetie, 522 U.S. at 525-6, 118 S.Ct. 948 (three factors requiring courts to analyze (1) the nature of the area, (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and the federal government, and (3) the established practice of government agencies toward that area). We agree with Dick's analysis that the six-factor test that was rejected by the Supreme Court in Venetie used essentially the same factors as those in Watchman. {21} Before the Court of Appeals adopted the Watchman test in Frank I, our courts had held that [t]he principal test for determining whether a tract of land is `Indian country' within the meaning of Subsection 1151(a) for the purposes of the Major Crimes Act is whether the land in question has been validly set apart for the use of Indians as such, under the superintendence of the United States government. State v. Ortiz, 105 N.M. 308, 310, 731 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Ct.App. 1986) (recognizing that the New Mexico Supreme Court has observed that the terms of Section 1151(a) largely overlap with the terms of Section 1151(b)); Blatchford v. Gonzales, 100 N.M. 333, 336, 670 P.2d 944, 947 (1983) (The crucial consideration, however, is whether the community or land has been set apart for use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples.) (relying upon McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539, 58 S.Ct. 286). Even when the Watchman court established that a community of reference inquiry was necessary, it acknowledged that [a]ll other courts that have addressed a dependent Indian community issue have done so without having to answer the threshold question of the appropriate community to use. Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1543. The Venetie two-prong test redirects our attention to land and its title and away from the more nebulous issue of community cohesiveness. Frank, 2001-NMCA-026, ¶ 38, 130 N.M. 306, 24 P.3d 338 (Bosson, J., dissenting). {22} In concluding that the district court must still define a community of reference, the Court of Appeals' majority relied on dicta in HRI. Frank, 2001-NMCA-026, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 306, 24 P.3d 338. As the dissent in Frank II correctly states, our courts are not required to adopt the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit. Id. ¶ 44. In light of the clear guidelines in the Venetie opinion, we decline to incorporate a community of reference inquiry into our case law. We agree with the dissent that the majority opinion erred in requiring a community of reference threshold inquiry.