Opinion ID: 1175961
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Heading: How Many Accidents

Text: The issue here is how many accidents occurred. The Court of Appeals assumed there was but one. [4] The parties did not focus on whether there were two accidents until explicitly asked to do so by this court pursuant to RAP 12.1, at which point the parties submitted briefing on the issue. As a threshold matter, PEMCO asserts this court may not address the issue of how many accidents because that issue was not argued below. Generally this court does not consider issues not raised below. See RAP 2.5(a); Obert v. Environmental Research & Dev. Corp., 112 Wash.2d 323, 333, 771 P.2d 340 (1989). However, this court has express power to do so on its own motion pursuant to RAP 12.1 which provides: (a) Generally. Except as provided in section (b), the appellate court will decide a case only on the basis of issues set forth by the parties in their briefs. (b) Issues Raised by the Court. If the appellate court concludes that an issue which is not set forth in the briefs should be considered to properly decide a case, the court may notify the parties and give them an opportunity to present written argument on the issue raised by the court. We have repeatedly held that RAP 12.1(b) means exactly what it says: This court may raise issues sua sponte and may rest its decision thereon. See, e.g., Obert v. Environmental Research & Dev. Corp., 112 Wash.2d 323, 333, 771 P.2d 340 (1989); Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash.2d 424, 429, 759 P.2d 427 (1988); Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash.2d 607, 616, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976). See also 3 Lewis H. Orland & Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice, RAP 12.1 cmt. 3, at 309-10 (4th ed.1991). In the present case this court determined resolution of the issue of multiple accidents was necessary for the proper resolution of the case and, citing RAP 12.1(b), formally directed the parties to brief the issue. The parties have complied and the issue is now before us. In her supplemental brief Ms. Greengo asserts she was involved in two `accidents' for purposes of her PEMCO policy because two drivers proximately caused her injuries in two collisions. Pet'r's Informal, Additional Br. Pursuant to RAP 12.1(b), at 1. We have previously considered situations involving two or more collisions to determine whether there were two or more accidents for insurance purposes. [5] Where there were two collisions, we look to see if each has its own proximate cause. If so then there are two accidents. As an Illinois court explained, A majority of foreign courts have concluded that the number of occurrences is determined by referring to the cause or causes of the damage (the `cause' theory), as opposed to the number of individual claims or injuries (the `effect' theory). Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Szczepkowicz, 185 Ill.App.3d 1091, 542 N.E.2d 90, 92, 134 Ill.Dec. 90 (1989). Washington follows the cause theory. Under our approach if each accident, collision, or injury has its own proximate cause then each will be deemed a separate accident for insurance policy purposes even if the two accidents occurred coincident, or nearly coincident, in time. For example, in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rawls, 404 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.1968), the Fifth Circuit found two separate accidents where one car was involved in two collisions two to five seconds apart and 30 to 300 feet apart. If, however, the collisions or injuries were all caused by a single, uninterrupted proximate cause, then the multiple collisions or injuries will be deemed a single accident. Two Washington cases outline our approach and control our analysis. In Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde, 49 Wash.2d 465, 303 P.2d 659, 55 A.L.R.2d 1288 (1956), the insured was driving his car and veered across the median into the oncoming lane where he struck, in quick succession, three motorcycles riding in echelon formation. The trial court found there were three separate accidents for insurance purposes. This court reversed, concluding there was but one accident. This court based its holding on a finding that there was but one proximate cause for all three collisions, the driver's negligence in losing control and veering across the median. Id. at 471, 303 P.2d 659 (There was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damage.). In Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Public Utils. Dists., 111 Wash.2d 452, 760 P.2d 337 (1988), the issue was whether a set of losses following a bond default by a public utility district (PUD) constituted a single occurrence or accident for insurance policy purposes. The PUD alleged there was more than one proximate cause to the losses and, therefore, more than one accident or occurrence for insurance purposes. Id. at 466, 760 P.2d 337. This court agreed and held that if the PUD's allegations were correct then there would be more than one accident or occurrence for insurance purposes. Id. Transcontinental explained the collisions in Rohde resulted from one proximate, uninterrupted cause, the driver's loss of control, [and thus] only one occurrence took place. Transcontinental, 111 Wash.2d at 466, 760 P.2d 337 (citing Rohde, 49 Wash.2d at 471, 303 P.2d 659). Transcontinental thus articulated the rule: [T]he number of triggering events [for insurance policy purposes] depends on the number of causes underlying the alleged damage and resulting liability. 111 Wash.2d at 467, 760 P.2d 337. We reaffirm and follow this approach today. Both parties here agree on the legal standard. See Supplemental Br. of Resp't at 7 ( Rohde makes clear that the critical issue for purposes of determining the number of accidents is the number of proximate causes.); Pet'r's Informal, Additional Br. Pursuant to RAP 12.1(b), at 4 (the number of `accidents' is determined by the number of causes underlying the injury and resulting liability). The question, therefore, is whether the two collisions had separate proximate causes. Ms. Greengo references the police report which states that Ferulli first crashed into a slowing car in front and then Hampshire subsequently slammed into Ferulli. The report also states both Ferulli and Hampshire were following too closely. If the events occurred as described in this police report, both Ferulli and Hampshire were separately negligent and each of the two collisions has its own separate proximate cause. Under Transcontinental the two collisions would then constitute two separate accidents. PEMCO however does not concede Ms. Greengo's version of events and contests Ferulli's negligence. The record below was not factually developed on this point as that proceeding concerned legal issues of coverage based on the exclusion. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings. See Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co., 133 Wash.2d 954, 963, 948 P.2d 1264 (1997) (summary judgment appropriate only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact). If it is determined on remand that the two collisions resulted from separate proximate causes, there would necessarily be two accidents for policy purposes. In such case it would then be necessary to establish that both Ferulli and Hampshire were underinsured. Such would require a finding that the liability insurance of each was insufficient to cover the damage sustained by Ms. Greengo. See Jain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Wash.2d 688, 692, 926 P.2d 923 (1996). PEMCO, in its answer, formally concedes that Hampshire is underinsured. CP at 10 (Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, para. V.). Thus, such finding need be made only as to Ferulli. Upon such finding, Ms. Greengo would be entitled to recover up to $100,000 in UIM benefits from PEMCO under her PEMCO policy for the second collision. Ms. Greengo correctly points out she received $100,000 in UIM from Unigard under Carfrae's Unigard policy for one of the accidents and because of the anti-stacking clause is not entitled to further UIM from PEMCO for that accident. However, if there was a second accident Ms. Greengo did not receive any UIM benefits for that second accident from any source and would therefore be entitled up to the $100,000 limits of the UIM coverage in her PEMCO policy.