Opinion ID: 49492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Prong of the Prima Facie Case – Disability

Text: The ADA defines disability as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The term “major life activities” is defined as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The Supreme Court has held that these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). The district court held that Fornes failed to establish this first prong of the prima facie case. Fornes argued that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of running. The district court held that running was not a major life 4 activity. We need not decide this issue, because even if running is a major life activity, Fornes fails to establish the second prong, that he is a “qualified individual.”1 C. Second Prong of the Prima Facie Case – “Qualified Individual” For the second prong of a prima facie case, the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability,” defined as an “individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). If the individual “is unable to perform an essential function of his . . . job, even with an accommodation, he is, by definition, not a ‘qualified individual’ and, therefore, not covered under the ADA.” Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). “In other words, the ADA does not require [the employer] to eliminate an essential function of [the plaintiff’s] job.” Id. (citation omitted). “Whether a function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors.” Id., 205 F.3d at 1305. In making this determination, the statute provides, “consideration shall be given to the employer’s 1 In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, we may affirm on any adequate ground, regardless of the ground the district court relied upon. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 613 (11th Cir. 1995). 5 judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997). Factors to consider under the ADA include, (1) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (2) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, (3) the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, (4) the work experience of past incumbents in the job, and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). Fornes and OCSO skirmish over whether this court should look to the job requirements of a deputy sheriff generally, or to those of a technical services sergeant, which was Fornes’s particular assignment when he was terminated. Fornes, however, cannot establish that he is a “qualified individual” even if the essential functions of his job are limited to those of a technical service sergeant. Fornes contends that the essential functions of his job are limited to those of technical service sergeant as described in OCSO’s job description. Fornes is correct that the job description used by OCSO should be given consideration in determining the essential functions of a position. See Holbrook, 112 F.3d at 1526. However, Fornes’s focus on only part of the job description–the limited 6 importance of running–is misplaced. Regardless of the low import of running, there are essential functions in the job description he could not perform, namely, standing for a prolonged period and heavy lifting. In the official job description standing received an “extremely-important” ranking and heavy lifting received an “important” ranking. According to Dr. Littel’s note, based on information that Fornes provided him, Fornes could not perform these activities. Dr. Littel’s note stated that Fornes was restricted from running, standing for long periods, heavy lifting, and repetitive actions. Therefore, even assuming that Fornes need only perform the essential functions of a technical service sergeant, he still could not perform all of these functions. In conclusion, looking at the record in the light most favorable to Fornes, we conclude that Fornes’s inability to run, stand for prolonged periods, or lift heavy objects shows he was not a qualified individual with a disability. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. AFFIRMED.2 2 Appellant’s request for oral argument is DENIED. 7