Opinion ID: 31914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The LISD Was the Responsible State Actor

Text: 12 This court's standard analysis for determining who is the state actor responsible for a constitutional violation in an action arising under § 1983 reaches the same result. In Bush v. Viterna, we identified three key questions that guide our analysis of causes of action arising under § 1983: 13 [T]he first question must be whether a federally secured right has been affected.... The second question that must be asked is whether the alleged deprivation of a federal right has been accomplished by state action.... After one has found a deprivation of a federally secured right and has determined that it resulted from state action, one must ask a third question: Who is the state actor responsible for this violation? 22 14 In this case, because Coggin was deprived of his protected employment right without the due process hearing to which he was entitled and which he did not waive, and because that deprivation involved two state actors, the only question presented is who is the state actor responsible for the violation — the LISD or the Commissioner. 23 This inquiry depends on an analysis of state law. 24 That is, in order to identify the responsible state actor, we must determine how state law distributes government functions. 25 But we do not apply state law; rather, we simply [use] state law to identify the persons responsible for an identified civil rights violation. 26 15 Texas law assigns to the school board, as the governing body of the school district, exclusive policy making authority with regard to employment decisions. The state law is clear that the school board, alone, may terminate a term contract and discharge an employee upon a finding of good cause. 27 Only the school board can determine whether such cause exists and whether an employee should be discharged as a result. 28 Under the explicit terms of the statute, then, the LISD was the final policy and decision maker with respect to Coggin's discharge. 16 By comparison, under Texas law the Commissioner is not vested with any final policymaking authority concerning either the determination of cause to discharge or the actual discharge of school district employees. The Commissioner's role of appointing a hearing examiner upon the timely filing of a request by an employee is ministerial and does not involve or require any policymaking. Consequently, there was no policy authored by the Commissioner that caused the particular constitutional violation at issue. In fact, there was no action taken by the Commissioner that deprived Coggin of his property without due process of law. The Commissioner has no authority to discharge a school district employee or to require the school board to terminate an employment contract. Indeed, the statute even requires that the school board, not the Commissioner, bear the costs of the hearing examiner, the shorthand reporter, and the production of a hearing transcript. In short, the Commissioner could not have been responsible for causing the termination of Coggin's employment contract for cause without a pre-termination hearing because he could not determine cause or discharge Coggin. 17 Consequently, because the school board was the final arbiter of employment disputes under Texas law, it was exclusively responsible for hearing Coggin's arguments against discharge before resolving the questions of cause and discharge. 29 Contrary to the LISD's arguments, Texas law has not removed or separated from the school board the function of providing pretermination due process to its employees. 30 Under well-established federal law, the constitutional minimums for due process require that the final decision maker must hear and consider the employee's story before deciding whether to discharge the employee. 31 The purpose of this is self-evident. It is to provide a meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker ... before the termination takes effect. 32 The Texas law complies with the federal due process requirement by providing that the school board, as the exclusive decision maker with regard to employment termination decisions, shall allow each party to present an oral argument to the board before the board determines cause or discharges the employee. 33 Thus, under the responsible state actor analysis we conclude that the LISD is the state actor responsible for the violation in this case.