Opinion ID: 1440962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: [¶ 2] Scott G. Provencher and Jennifer A. Provencher were divorced in July of 2005. Neither party was represented by counsel during the divorce proceedings. The final divorce judgment awarded the parties shared parental rights and responsibilities and shared residential custody of their minor children, one of whom was born in 1993 and the other in 1996. The divorce judgment stated that [t]he parties agree that Jennifer Provencher is the biological mother and that Scott Provencher is the biological father of said child(ren). The incorporated child support order required no child support payments because the parties shared equal residential custody. [¶ 3] Subsequently, Scott decided he wanted to change the nature of his relationship with the oldest child who, as Scott had always been aware, was not in fact his biological son. Scott determined that ending his relationship with the boy was best because he and Jennifer had major differences of opinion regarding how to parent the boy, who suffers from ADHD and has behavioral problems, which caused conflict and stress for Scott and Jennifer. In June 2006, Scott moved for relief from the divorce judgment, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), (5), and (6), arguing primarily that his acknowledgement of paternity of the boy was not sufficient to bind him legally and that the divorce judgment was, therefore, void. [1] [¶ 4] In March of 2007, the court denied Scott's motion for relief from judgment, finding that the language in the divorce judgment regarding Scott's paternity of the boy did not matter because father has a variety of meanings, and in this case, Scott was the boy's father in every way except genetically. The court found that Scott was the only father the boy had ever known, that Scott lived in the boy's household for eleven years, and that, until recently, the boy was unaware that Scott was not his biological father. The court concluded that it would not be in the child's best interest to grant the motion, and that even if Scott's legal obligation is only a financial one, that is still an important obligation that [Scott] has. [¶ 5] After a hearing in April of 2007, the Family Law Magistrate ( Carlson, M. ) ordered Scott to pay Jennifer, for the support of the boy, $69 per week for forty-nine weeks in retroactive child support and $70.89 per week in prospective child support. Scott then filed this appeal.