Opinion ID: 775767
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Donna Fuller's Letters

Text: 50 We agree with appellant that the Vermont Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply federal law when it held that the exclusion of Ms. Fuller's letters was harmless. Even assuming there had been a violation of the Confrontation Clause when the trial court excluded cross- examination of Donna Fuller about her letters, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Vermont court reasoned that the letters had limited independent probative value, given Ms. Fuller's explanation during a hearing that her fear of the prosecutor stemmed from a false, exculpatory statement she intended to make to the defense attorney's private investigator, and not to any inculpatory statements she had already made to the police. Fuller, 721 A.2d at 484. Second, the Vermont Supreme Court found compelling Fuller's concession on re-cross- examination that he did not think that Ms. Fuller invented the allegations against him. See id. at 484. Third, S.E.'s testimony about the events was unwavering at trial and independently inculpated Fuller. Finally, we agree with the Vermont Supreme Court's assessment that the defendant had the opportunity at trial to impeach Ms. Fuller's credibility with ample other evidence showing that she had made inconsistent statements about the sexual assault. Accordingly, the damaging potential of the cross-examination Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, was limited, and even if fully realized, id., would not affect the trial's outcome. Thus, we are unable to conclude that the Vermont Supreme Court unreasonably applied the Chapman harmless error standard in this case: We think it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuller would have been found guilty even if cross-examination on the proffered letter evidence had been allowed. See id.