Opinion ID: 4198315
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Powell Testimony

Text: Petrocelli contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Powell’s testimony as fruit of a Miranda and Edwards violation. As recounted above, Powell was a PETROCELLI V. BAKER 23 used car salesman from whom Petrocelli had stolen a car during a test drive, in a manner similar to his theft of the truck in Nevada. The prosecution learned of the prior vehicle theft during the April 19 interrogation when Petrocelli admitted he had stolen a vehicle from a “Dub Peterson” dealership in Oklahoma City. To show ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant must show that his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Id. at 687–88. A failure to make a motion to suppress that is unlikely to succeed generally does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011); see also Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that failure to make a motion to suppress which would “be meritless on the facts and the law” does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). Before beginning the interrogation on April 19, the police officers advised Petrocelli of his Miranda rights, and Petrocelli signed a statement indicating that he understood them. The officers then began questioning Petrocelli. For some time he answered questions freely. When he later became evasive, one of the officers observed, “I thought . . . you wanted to talk to us about this.” Petrocelli responded, “I do,” and continued answering questions. Shortly afterwards, Petrocelli stated, “I’d sort of like to know what my . . . lawyer wants me to do.” (Ellipsis in original.) When the officer asked if Petrocelli had understood his rights, he answered that he did. Later in the questioning, Petrocelli stated, “I even have a . . . part-time attorney and just to answer questions for me.” (Ellipsis in original.) The officer then asked, “Is it . . . 24 PETROCELLI V. BAKER what you’re telling me is you don’t want to answer any questions without an attorney?” (Ellipsis in original.) Petrocelli responded, “No. I just need to have something answered. That’s all.” The officer told him, “Well, we don’t have an attorney . . . present with us right now. Like I indicated before if at any time you don’t want to . . . answer any questions or make any statements you don’t have to.” (Ellipses in original.) The officer resumed questioning, and Petrocelli confessed to stealing cars by going to car lots and taking them for test drives. He mentioned one particular theft from a “Dub Peterson” dealership in Oklahoma City. This led the police to Powell, who testified at Petrocelli’s trial. When a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. Police may not continue questioning a suspect without counsel present “unless the accused himself initiates further communication.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. Only an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel triggers protection under Edwards. An invocation is unambiguous if the accused “articulate[s] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). Applying this test, the Supreme Court held in Davis that the statement, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was ambiguous and did not constitute a request for counsel. Id. at 462. Under Davis, Petrocelli’s language was insufficient to constitute an unambiguous invocation of counsel. Because Petrocelli failed to invoke his right to counsel unambiguously, the April 19 interrogation was not conducted PETROCELLI V. BAKER 25 in violation of Miranda or Edwards. Petrocelli’s trial counsel was therefore not ineffective in failing to move to suppress Powell’s testimony as fruit of the interrogation.