Opinion ID: 1377307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Kensinger Decision

Text: As previously noted, both sides agree that the one-year limitations period of section 340, subdivision (3) applies to this case. (1) Both sides also agree that the common law rule, that an action accrues on the date of injury ( Lambert v. McKenzie (1901) 135 Cal. 100, 103 [67 P. 6]), applies only as modified by the discovery rule. The discovery rule provides that the accrual date of a cause of action is delayed until the plaintiff is aware of her injury and its negligent cause. [4] ( Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital, supra, 18 Cal.3d 93, 99.) A plaintiff is held to her actual knowledge as well as knowledge that could reasonably be discovered through investigation of sources open to her. ( Id. at p. 101.) The parties differ as to what constitutes sufficient knowledge to start the statute running. The Court of Appeal applied Kensinger, supra, 171 Cal. App.3d 376, a factually similar case, and found that it was a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations began to run more than one year before plaintiff Jolly filed her complaint. The Kensinger court acknowledged the well established rule that ignorance of the legal significance of known facts or the identity of the defendant would not delay the running of the statute  only ignorance of one or more critical facts could have that effect. (171 Cal. App.3d at p. 383.) However, the key point in Kensinger was its determination that one critical fact was knowledge of some wrongful conduct. Specifically, the court held that a plaintiff may have no knowledge of facts indicating wrongdoing by a particular defendant. In such a situation, litigation might be premature for lack of knowledge of any factual basis for imputing fault to a manufacturer rather than ignorance of supportive legal theories.... [¶] Knowledge of the occurrence and origin of harm cannot necessarily be equated with knowledge of the factual basis for a legal remedy.... (171 Cal. App.3d at pp. 383-384; italics added.) Accordingly, the Kensinger court held that the statutory clock did not begin to tick until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the facts constituting wrongful conduct, as well as the fact of her injury and its relation to DES. [5] The Court of Appeal, applying Kensinger, held that it could not be said that as a matter of law Jolly was or should have been aware of facts establishing wrongdoing, e.g., either failure to test or failure to warn, until within one year of the date she filed suit. (2) The rule proposed in Kensinger goes too far. [6] Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her. [7] As we said in Sanchez and reiterated in Gutierrez, the limitations period begins once the plaintiff `has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry. ...' ( Gutierrez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 896-897, quoting Sanchez, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 101 (italics added by the Gutierrez court).) A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific facts necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her. For example, in Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868 [191 Cal. Rptr. 619, 663 P.2d 177], we held that plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations from pursuing her suit for fraud, even though she filed suit soon after she discovered facts confirming her long-held suspicion that her former husband had concealed the true worth of his assets during dissolution negotiations. We noted that the plaintiff had doubts at the time she signed the dissolution agreement as to the actual value of her husband's Bechtel stock. However, neither she nor her attorney took adequate steps then to investigate the matter. Years later, when the stock was sold for an amount well beyond that stated during the dissolution discussions, plaintiff brought suit. We held that her early suspicion put her on inquiry notice of the potential wrongdoing, which an investigation would have confirmed. Her failure timely to investigate barred the action. This conclusion was reached over a strong dissent, in which it was argued that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until plaintiff discovered the facts constituting the misconduct  her mere suspicion was not enough. ( Id. at p. 876 et seq. [Bird, C.J., dissenting].) Another case in point is Gray v. Reeves (1978) 76 Cal. App.3d 567. In Gray, a plaintiff suffered an allergic reaction to a drug in 1971, but delayed filing suit against the prescribing doctor and manufacturer until 1973. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of summary judgment for defendants based on the statute of limitations. The court noted plaintiff's admission that in 1971 he knew that defendants did something wrong. ( Id. at pp. 576-577.) Even without specific facts as to why the drug was defective, plaintiff was on notice at that time that he had a potential cause of action. ( Id. at p. 577.) (See also Graham v. Hansen (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 965, 972-973 [180 Cal. Rptr. 604] [If plaintiff believes because of injuries she has suffered that someone has done something wrong the statutory period begins].) The foregoing is fully consistent with the policy of deciding cases on the merits as well as the policies underlying the statute of limitations. In Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 512 [121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161, 79 A.L.R.3d 807], we held that the fundamental purpose of the statute is to give defendants reasonable repose, that is, to protect parties from defending stale claims. A second policy underlying the statute is to require plaintiffs to diligently pursue their claims. Because a plaintiff is under a duty to reasonably investigate and because a suspicion of wrongdoing, coupled with a knowledge of the harm and its cause, will commence the limitations period, suits are not likely to be unreasonably delayed, and those failing to act with reasonable dispatch will be barred. At the same time, plaintiffs who file suit as soon as they have reason to believe that they are entitled to recourse will not be precluded. [8] (3) While resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact, where the uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper. ( Christ v. Lipsitz (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 894 [160 Cal. Rptr. 498].) (4) In this case it is clear that application of the discovery rule supports the trial court's judgment. Plaintiff stated that as early as 1978 she was interested in obtaining more information about DES because she wanted to make a claim; she felt that someone had done something wrong to her concerning DES, that it was a defective drug and that she should be compensated. [9] She points to no evidence contradicting her candid statements. Thus, plaintiff is held to her admission; she suspected that defendants' conduct was wrongful during 1978  well over a year before she filed suit. This suspicion would not have been allayed by any investigation. To the contrary, a timely investigation would have disclosed numerous articles concerning DES and many DES suits filed throughout the country alleging wrongdoing. [10] Plaintiff's contention that our decision in Sindell redefined causation and wrongful, providing the crucial fact necessary for her to suspect wrongdoing, is without merit. Sindell, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588, is fully discussed below. At this point it is necessary only to point out the oft-stated rule that it is the discovery of facts, not their legal significance, that starts the statute. (See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 898.) All of the facts set out in Sindell that are relevant to plaintiff's case were either already known by her in 1978 or could have been discovered through a reasonable investigation. [11] Indeed, plaintiff admits that she learned of no new facts between 1978 and 1980. [12] In sum, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff suspects, or should suspect, that she has been wronged. Here, plaintiff suspected as much no later than 1978. Because she did not file suit until 1981, her suit, unless otherwise saved, is time-barred. [13]