Opinion ID: 537698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: We Won't Allow A Racially Hostile Environment

Text: 11 The trial court's permanent injunction ordered the Company to refrain from maintaining terms and conditions of employment that discriminate on the basis of race or create a racially abusive or hostile atmosphere of employment. 12 A factual determination of a trial court can only be set aside if it is clearly erroneous. Lincoln v. Board of Regents of University System, 697 F.2d 928, 939 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983); see F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 13 The Company contests the trial court's factual findings on the ground that not all racial slurs rise to the level of Title VII violations. The Company stresses the Eighth Circuit's requirement that there be a steady barrage of denigrating racial comments, as distinguished from offensive terms limited to casual conversation among employees, before such slurs rise to the level of a Title VII violation. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir.1981). 14 This was no Bunny Bread situation where the court found that the use of racial terms was infrequent, limited to casual conversation, and not directed at black co-workers. Bunny Bread was poles apart from Beverage Canners. Here the trial court found that racist remarks were frequent, not part of casual conversation and were made to or about black employees. Additionally, the comments were made by the plant manager, not just co-workers. The trial court simply had to find that the racially derogatory remarks were commonplace, overt and denigrating and so pervasive and shocking in this more enlightened day that they altered the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment for blacks. 6 15 The Company, ignoring the fact-finding role of the trial judge, stresses the contrary testimony of management personnel that they knew of no discriminatory conduct and that no such conduct was ever brought to their attention by way of employee complaints. How simple would be race discrimination cases if, as the Company argues, it cannot be held responsible for the remarks of its employees. 16 Despite this testimony, the court found that management was informed about events at the plant. This included testimony, some conflicting, that management was informed on several occasions about the racial hostility at the plant. 17 The trial court, whose role, not ours, was to determine facts, had the advantage of observing all the witnesses to make credibility determinations. It is  'our duty to decide whether the district court could have entered the order that it did.'  Harris v. Amoco Production Co., 768 F.2d 669, 684 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011, 106 S.Ct. 1186, 89 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986), quoting, Brown v. Arlen Management Corp., 663 F.2d 575, 580 (5th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). 18 We uphold the trial court's findings that the numerous racial epithets were not made sporadically, accidentally, or as part of casual conversation and that management was informed but did nothing to correct the situation. The finding of a racially hostile environment was not clearly erroneous and the injunction at the hands of EEOC was fully justified.