Opinion ID: 1644822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Error is assigned in the allowance of interest on the awards from August 27, 1958, date of taking possession of the land condemned.

Text: Our decisions hold that except where the landowner alone appeals to the district court and recovers less than the condemnation award he is entitled to interest from the date of taking possession. Beal v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 209 Iowa 1308, 1310, 230 N.W. 302; Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 239 Iowa 149, 155-156, 30 N.W.2d 743, 747; Strange Bros. Hide Co. v. State Highway Comm., 250 Iowa 450, 452-453, 93 N.W.2d 99, 100-101. See also Annotation 36 A.L.R.2d 337, 413 et seq. Here the award was increased upon appeal and plaintiffs are entitled to interest from the date of taking unless one of two contentions defendant makes is accepted. Chapter 318, Acts of the 58th G.A., effective July 4, 1959, repeals section 472.28, Code 1958, I.C.A., which required the sheriff to hold the fund deposited by the condemnor until the appeal was finally determined and section 472.29 which provided the owner's acceptance of the deposit barred his right of appeal. Chapter 318 also states the district court where the appeal is pending, may direct that such part of the amount of damages deposited with the sheriff, as it finds just and proper, be paid to persons entitled thereto. Defendant argues this provision amounts to a statutory tender by it, upon plaintiffs' taking their appeals to the district court, of the amount of the condemnation awards, and since plaintiffs did not apply to the district court for an order for payment of such part of the awards as it found just and proper they are not entitled to interest on the amount of the awards from the time the appeals were taken. The argument cannot be accepted. If defendant desired to stop the running of interest on part of the damages, under chapter 318, it had as much right as plaintiffs to apply to the district court for an order of partial payment. This it did not do. It does appear that on February 3, 1960, Mrs. Murphy and defendant stipulated and the district court ordered $23,000 of the award to her be paid. Also pursuant to stipulation (in effect) of the development company and defendant and order of this court $178,000 of the award to the company was paid on October 17, 1960. We understand it is conceded such payments stopped the running of interest on each amount from the date paid. We think chapter 318, Acts 58th General Assembly, has no other effect on the allowance of interest here. Defendant's remaining contention on the question of interest is that since the value of growing crops on the land taken at the date thereof was included in the award of damages, interest should be computed only from March 1, 1959, traditional end of the 1958 farming season. In considering this contention we may disregard the fact the value of growing crops was improperly allowed the development company as a separate item of damage. This contention, however, is also untenable. No authority that supports it has come to our attention. It is perhaps true, although the record does not so show, the 1958 crops afforded the only source of income from the condemned property during that farming season. But the value of the crops was shown as of the date of the taking, not at the time of maturity or harvest. Even after harvest what remains of corn and beans has some substantial value as feed for livestock. We cannot say plaintiffs' right of possession from August 27 to March 1 was of no value. And they were deprived of it by the taking. X. Defendant's final contention is that the trial court's ascertainment of damages due each plaintiff is excessive. As stated, $380,285.50 was allowed the development company and $38,800 was allowed Mrs. Murphy. Also, as stated, the before-taking value of both entire tracts was found to be $1,500 per acre and the after-taking value of the development company's remaining land was fixed at $139,070. The last amount was testified to by defendant's witness Brandt. While the court accepted this portion of Brandt's testimony if found the before-taking value of the development company tract (before $6,205.50 was added as the value of growing crops) exceeded Brandt's estimate thereof by $188,160. The trial court fixed the after-taking value of Mrs. Murphy's remaining land at the amount stated in her amended petition. The condemnation commissioners assessed the damages due the development company at $197,777 and the amount due Mrs. Murphy at $29,140. The average before-taking value of the development company tract fixed by plaintiffs' three value witnesses, Harris, Hall and Neal, was $657,433. Their average aftertaking value was $92,218, with a difference between the two values of $565,215. The average before-taking value of this tract fixed by defendant's four value witnesses was $294,474, after taking $117,898, with a difference of $176,576. The average before-taking value of Mrs. Murphy's land fixed by plaintiffs' three value witnesses was $61,700, the mean after-taking value fixed by the two who testified thereto was $7,675, with a difference in the estimates of these two witnesses of $50,825. The average before-taking value of Mrs. Murphy's tract fixed by defendant's three witnesses who testified thereto was $27,763, after taking $6,673, with a difference of $21,090. Mr. Harris, the development company's president, fixed the before-taking per acre value of both tracts at $2000, Hall at about $1,750, and Neal at not less than $1,800. It is apparent that while the amounts ascertained by the trial court are large they are well within the amounts testified to by plaintiffs' well qualified value witnesses Harris and Neal. We have often recognized this as quite persuasive. Stortenbecker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 250 Iowa 1073, 1082, 96 N.W.2d 468, 473, and citations. (As stated, the court said it did not adopt Mr. Hall's testimony on values.) It is not contended the decision is the result of passion or prejudice. We conclude defendant's claim the damages are so excessive as to justify interference by us cannot be accepted. Claims of excessive allowances by trial courts in condemnation cases are considered and support for the conclusion we reach is found in Skinner v. Polk County, 250 Iowa 1264, 1267-1268, 98 N.W.2d 749, 751-752; Hostert v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 250 Iowa 253, 93 N.W.2d 773; Danker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 249 Iowa 327, 332, 86 N.W.2d 835, 839; Miller v. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co., 239 Iowa 1257, 1263-1264, 34 N.W.2d 627, 630. The two cases of Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 251 Iowa 39, 99 N.W.2d 284, and 251 Iowa 415, 100 N.W.2d 901, involving claims of inadequate allowances also have application here. Defendant is entitled to a new trial because of the errors herein pointed out. Accordingly the cases are Reversed and remanded. All Justices concur except BLISS, J., who takes no part.