Opinion ID: 1175478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: instructions on inapplicable mitigating factors

Text: (26) The trial court instructed the jury to consider all the aggravating and mitigating factors which section 190.3 directs the trier of fact to take into account if relevant in determining the penalty. Defendant contends that the instruction should have omitted, as clearly not relevant, the following four factors specified in section 190.3: (e) (participation or consent of victim), (f) (moral justification or extenuation reasonably believed by defendant), (g) (defendant under extreme duress or substantial domination), and (j) (defendant's participation limited to minor role as accomplice). The instruction told the jury to consider the factors only if applicable to the case. As we recently held, the jury is capable of deciding for itself which factors are applicable in a particular case, and the instruction was therefore appropriate. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 777.) (27) Defendant contends that even if the instruction was proper, he was prejudiced by prosecution arguments that the absence of each of the four factors constituted an aggravating factor. The prosecutor commenced his argument by indicating that the jury should be guided by all of the section 190.3 factors if you feel them to be applicable in this case. He then took up each factor seriatim. His comments on each of the factors challenged here were as follows: Factor (e): Was the victim participating in any way in this conduct or consented [ sic ] in any way? No, she was killed trying to defend her own home and her arms were full of โ she had her purse and briefcase and the grocery bag, or the paper bag with the dinner in it. Factor (f): Did the defendant have a reasonable belief that he was morally justified in what he did? I think not. This is not a case where someone is killed on a mistaken belief or unreasonable belief that he's acting for some higher purpose, like defending a friend or family or something like that. This was a killing simply done to carry out his original plan, and that was to steal from the ladies. Factor (g): Was he acting under any extreme duress or domination of another person? I think that factor is somewhat ironic in this case. It was obvious that he was the one that had the ladies under duress and under his domination. Factor (j): Obviously he wasn't an accomplice, he was the only person that was involved in this case, and he is responsible. The argument contained no further express references to these factors. Although [w]e recently held [in People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 (221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861),] that `in the future' prosecutors should refrain from arguing to the jury that the very absence of a mitigating factor would constitute an aggravating one to be weighed against the defendant ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 775), [n]o good reason appears for depriving the prosecutor of the opportunity to argue that certain other otherwise mitigating factors are not present in the case [citing People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 790 (230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113)] ( ibid. ). Here, [t]he prosecutor simply observed in his jury argument that many of the statutory mitigating factors were inapplicable to this case. This is not an unfair or improper technique, given defense counsel's opportunity to assert appropriate contrary argument and analysis. ( People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 620 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854].)