Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Time Limitations on Voir Dire

Text: The trial court explained to all parties that it would conduct voir dire in the following manner: 24 prospective jurors would be called and questioned as a group by the court and then by counsel, with counsel for each defendant and the prosecutor allotted 10 to 15 minutes each to question the group; if all the parties passed the group for cause, then peremptory challenges would be directed to the 12 of the 24 seated in the jury box; each prospective juror dismissed on a peremptory challenge would be replaced, in order, by those seated in seat numbers 13 through 24; when the initial group of 24 was reduced to the 12 seated in the jury box, another group of 13 would be called and questioned as a group by the court and then by counsel, with counsel for each defendant and the prosecutor allotted 10 minutes each to question the subsequent group. Subsequent groups of 13 would be called and the process repeated until a jury was impaneled. Using this system, the court predicted that the jury would be selected in five days. Defendant joined in codefendant Richard Avila's general objection to the method of jury selection imposed by the trial court. Although defendant did not specifically object to the time limit imposed by the court for counsel to question prospective jurors, he did argue that it was impossible to select a fair and impartial jury in five days. The court, however, reiterated that it would adhere to its proposed system of jury selection. Counsel for the defendants then opted to pool their time allotment, such that counsel for defendant would have 45 minutes to question the first group of 24 prospective jurors on behalf of all three defendants, counsel for Richard Avila would have 30 minutes to question the second group on behalf of all three defendants, counsel for Jeffrey Spradlin would have 30 minutes to question the third group on behalf of all three defendants, and so on. The court informed counsel that, on request and for good cause shown, it would allow additional time to question prospective jurors. Although the court denied defense requests for sequestered voir dire, it contemplated that some individual voir dire might be necessary because of either publicity that they've heard about concerning the case or because they want to answer some things privately. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court arbitrarily and unreasonably limited the amount of time defense counsel could spend questioning prospective jurors during voir dire in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. We conclude that defendant's general objection to the method of jury selection imposed by the trial court and argument that he could not select a fair and impartial jury in five days preserved the claim for appeal. The claim, however, is without merit. At the time of trial in this matter, Code of Civil Procedure section 223, enacted by Proposition 115 (approved by the electorate effective June 6, 1990), provided for court-conducted examination of prospective jurors in a criminal case, including death penalty cases, in the presence of the other jurors. Upon a showing of good cause, the court could permit the parties to supplement the examination or itself submit to the prospective jurors additional questions by the parties as it deemed proper. Section 223 further provided that the court's exercise of discretion in the manner in which it conducted voir dire would not cause any conviction to be reversed absent a miscarriage of justice, as specified in section 13 of article VI of the California Constitution. [27] Because the court was not required to afford defendant any time at all to question prospective jurors under section 223 as then in effect, it did not abuse its discretion in setting a time limit on counsel-conducted voir dire, either individually or in the aggregate. Defendant's reliance on People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 156 Cal. Rptr. 572 is inapposite. There, the defendant argued that the trial court violated former Penal Code section 1078 in setting a time limit for voir dire. Although the court ultimately held that the defendant was precluded from arguing that the trial court improperly curtailed voir dire examination of prospective jurors because he did not exercise all of his peremptory challenges, it noted that the fixing of an arbitrary time limit for voir dire in advance of trial is dangerous and could lead to a reversal on appeal. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p. 719, 156 Cal.Rptr. 572.) But former section 1078, which had required trial courts to permit reasonable examination of prospective jurors by counsel for the People and for the defendant ( id. at p. 719, 156 Cal.Rptr. 572), was repealed in 1988 (see Stats.1988, ch. 1245, § 36, p. 4155) and thus did not govern defendant's trial. In arguing that the trial court erred in placing time limitations on voir dire, defendant identifies a number of prospective jurors who he contends should have been further questioned. Contrary to defendant's view, we do not agree that the court abused its discretion in restricting further voir dire of these prospective jurors. For example, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his request to further question Prospective Juror T.G. based on her statements during voir dire that she would find it difficult to sit as a juror in a case involving the Bulldog gang, that she did not know if she could be fair to both sides, and that she believed criminal defense attorneys were slime. [28] But the court and the prosecutor explored these matters after defense counsel concluded his voir dire, and T.G. stated that she would give all parties a fair hearing, and would follow the court's instructions and base her decision solely on the evidence presented. In any event, although the court denied the defense's challenge for cause as to T.G., defendant exercised a peremptory challenge against her. In another example, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his request to further question Prospective Juror G.M. based on his statement to the court that his wife was a criminal investigator with the Internal Revenue Service, and that the denial prejudiced him because G.M. was ultimately seated as a juror in this case. [29] The court denied the request as untimely because it was made a day after G.M. had been questioned, and noted that there was no basis for excusing him for cause in any event. Although G.M.'s wife may have been generally aligned with law enforcement, G.M. did not make any responses suggesting he himself may have been so aligned. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for further questioning. As for other prospective jurors defendant contends were inadequately questioned because of lack of time, defense counsel either did not request additional time or did not make a showing of good cause. Defendant concedes, moreover, that the court did, in some instances, allow counsel to ask additional questions upon request. The court thus did not abuse its discretion in restricting defense counsel's examination of prospective jurors. We similarly reject defendant's federal constitutional claim. The United States Constitution does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492; see also People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 613, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1179, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) The trial court, moreover, has a duty to restrict voir dire within reasonable bounds to expedite the trial. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 419, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) The court's logistical planning of voir dire and limitation thereof were reasonable, especially considering the multidefendant nature of the trial. Moreover, as stated, the court's willingness to permit additional time for counsel-conducted voir dire upon a showing of good cause ameliorated any potential concern that the limitation would somehow be unfair or violate the right to an impartial jury.