Opinion ID: 2780607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Good faith and probable cause

Text: ¶19. Bronwyn contends that her contest was based on good faith and probable cause and bases much of her argument on a case from Tennessee which addressed a situation nearly identical to the one before us. In Winningham v. Winningham, 966 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tenn. 14 1998), a father/testator had executed a new will shortly before his death which granted significantly more property to his son than had been granted in previously executed, mutually reciprocal wills made by the father and his wife. The new will contained a forfeiture clause which specifically attempted to eliminate a good-faith challenge to the will by denying benefits to any challengers. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court applied Tennessee’s goodfaith and probable-cause exception, holding that, in Tennessee: a testator cannot eliminate the good faith and reasonable justification exception even by specific language. As stated in Tate v. Camp, “Courts exist to ascertain the truth and to apply the law to it in any given situation; and a right of devolution which enables a testator to shut the door of truth and prevent the observance of the law, is a mistaken public policy.” [Tate, 245 S.W. at 842]. Winningham, 966 S.W.2d at 52 (emphasis added). The court moved on to determine whether the plaintiff’s contest had been made in good faith. In the case before the Court, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the suit was filed by Ms. Winningham in good faith. The previous will had divided the property equally between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant testified that she believed that her father lacked mental capacity at the time he wrote the later will. The 1992 will, which decreases her share in the estate, was written just months before the testator’s death from cancer and while he was receiving debilitating medical treatment. . . . The plaintiff presented no evidence of bad faith. Filing the suit was not “a mere vexatious act” but was based on honest conviction. Id. ¶20. The court then went on to determine whether the plaintiff’s suit was founded on probable cause. The court found that, “on balance, there was reasonable justification for Ms. Winningham’s decision to file the suit, the purpose of which was to establish the testator’s 1981 will as his last will and testament.” Id. at 53. Many of the factors which supported a finding of good faith also supported a finding of probable cause. Id. The plaintiff felt she was 15 entitled to the inheritance that was drawn out in the earlier will and reasonably could have believed that her father’s mental state had become so impaired that he was incompetent to make the new will. Id. ¶21. William argues that Winningham is distinguishable from this case and should not be considered as support for Bronwyn’s position. Winningham was decided in a state where a good-faith and probable-cause exception already existed, whereas here, no Mississippi authority can be found on the subject. Further, the plaintiff in Winningham relied on advice from her attorney that her contest would be successful. Winningham, 966 S.W.2d at 53. William argues that, because Bronwyn was presented with evidence supporting William’s claim before she continued the contest, her contest could not have been made in good faith. ¶22. Bronwyn’s claim was based upon the fact that she understood her parents’ intentions in the mutual reciprocal wills from 1998 to be that she and her brother “share and share alike.” It cannot be disputed that those were the wishes of her mother, Mary, who died shortly after her will was executed. Mary’s will explicitly stated that her children were to inherit equally the remainder of her trust upon the death of B.D. Mary’s and B.D.’s 1998 wills provided that the estate of the latter-deceased parent would be given to William and Bronwyn, “in equal shares, per stirpes.” At least until 2010, Bronwyn was under the impression that the estate would be divided according to the 1998 will. Further, she testified about B.D.’s failing mental and physical health toward the end of his life, and even William testified about B.D.’s alcoholism and use of strong prescription pain killers. Bronwyn knew that Dr. McIntosh had prescribed two drugs used to treat “cognition problems.” Dr. 16 McIntosh’s records state that, when he prescribed those drugs for B.D., B.D. was suffering from “significant dementia.” ¶23. Further, large withdrawals were made from B.D.’s trust account and his private Merrill Lynch account, which were sent directly to William. B.D. also conveyed a large portion of his real estate to William around the time the 2010 will was executed. Bronwyn understandably was worried about these inter vivos gifts. The gifts severely depleted B.D.’s estate, rendering much smaller the amount of property that Bronwyn and William would have shared and shared alike under the 1998 will. Overall, Bronwyn argues that her father’s failing mental state, his erratic behavior, and his dependence on alcohol and pain killers made him vulnerable to the suggestions of William, an unemployed man experiencing a difficult divorce who convinced B.D. to give him large sums of money beyond what he would have received under the provisions of his father’s 1998 will. Several similar circumstances justified a finding of good faith and probable cause by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Winningham. ¶24. We find that Bronwyn’s will contest was brought in good faith and was founded on probable cause. As noted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Winningham, many of the factors which support a finding of good faith support a finding of probable cause, and vice versa. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Bronwyn had a reasonable expectation that her will contest would be successful and has provided significant evidence that she instituted the contest in good faith. B.D. greatly depleted his estate, to William’s benefit, by giving several inter vivos gifts of money and real property to William before B.D. expired. Under the 1998 will, Bronwyn and William would have split the estate equally. Although the 2010 17 will may not have significantly altered the distribution of B.D.’s assets in terms of monetary value, it nevertheless did change the disposition of those assets when considered in combination with the inter vivos gifts from B.D. to William, which Bronwyn sought to void. William clearly benefitted from those gifts, as he ultimately wound up with property that he would not have received under the 1998 will. Bronwyn would, understandably, have been concerned by her father’s actions. The claim was not frivolous or made to cause vexatious litigation. The evidence presented by Bronwyn “would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the challenge would be successful.” Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers at § 8.5 cmt. c. No evidence was adduced that showed bad faith on Bronwyn’s part. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, Bronwyn satisfied her burden of proof to demonstrate that her will contest was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and render judgment in favor of Bronwyn on the forfeiture clause issue. The 2010 will is valid except for the forfeiture clause, and Bronwyn cannot be cut out of the will for bringing her good-faith suit to determine its validity. III. Whether the trial court properly permitted William, as executor of B.D.’s estate, to pay $20,000 to the Tollison Law Firm out of the estate assets. ¶25. On December 9, 2011, William, in his capacity as the executor of B.D.’s estate, filed a Petition for Authority to Liquidate Estate Assets and Pay Estate Liabilities. He requested $14,968.76 to pay the law firm of Stubblefield & Yelverton, $1,387.17 to pay an accounting firm, and $20,000 to pay a retainer to the Tollison Law Firm to represent the estate in the will 18 contest. Bronwyn had no objection to the payments to Stubblefield & Yelverton or to the accounting firm. However, Bronwyn did object to the retainer to Tollison. She argued that William was in an adverse position to the Estate under the 1998 will, and that his position in the will contest was only as an individual, and not as the executor of B.D.’s estate. The chancellor granted William’s petition to liquidate assets and retain the Tollison firm. Bronwyn argues that the chancellor erred, because William was acting in his individual capacity and because he stood adverse to the estate of the 1998 will. ¶26. “[W]here one will has been admitted to probate in common form under the laws of this State as the last will of a deceased testator, it will remain the last will of the testator unless (within the time allowed by law) it is set aside by an order of the chancery court upon a contest and issue devisavit vel non . . . .” Perry v. Aldrich, 251 Miss. 429, 441, 169 So. 2d 786, 791 (1964). William argues that the 2010 will was admitted to probate as the last will of B.D., and, as such, it remained the last will of B.D. unless and until Bronwyn’s will contest was successful. Accordingly, Bronwyn’s will contest was a direct challenge to the estate of B.D. established by the 2010 will, of which William was the executor. “Every executor of a will and administrator with the will annexed must swear that he or she will execute the will according to the wishes of the testator.” Jeffrey Jackson, Encyclopedia of Miss. Law § 33:57 (2001) (emphasis added). As the executor, William had the authority under the will to “employ . . . attorneys . . . and . . . to pay reasonable compensation for their services and to charge same to. . . .” To ensure that the wishes of B.D. as written in his 2010 will were followed, William was acting in his capacity of the executor of the estate when he paid the Tollison Law Firm to represent him–the executor–in the will contest. To hold that 19 this was inappropriate would discourage executors who also are beneficiaries from defending wills because they would have to pay lawyers out of their own pockets. We hold that the chancellor did not err in permitting William to use part of the assets of the estate to defend the will contest. Bronwyn’s claim in this regard is without merit. IV. Whether the trial court erred in failing to remove William as the Executor of B.D.’s estate and appoint a temporary administrator during the pendency of the will contest. ¶27. Bronwyn filed an Amended Petition to Remove William D. Benoist as Executor, arguing that he had substantially drained B.D.’s estate both before and after B.D.’s death through a pattern of undue influence over B.D., whose mind was failing toward the end of his life. She listed several inter vivos gifts from B.D. to William, which included substantial amounts of real property and cash which originally would have been part of the estate split evenly between William and Bronwyn under the 1998 will.11 As the executor, William is in charge of determining what property of the estate will be sold to pay the estate’s debts. Further, as a large amount of B.D.’s assets was given to William via inter vivos gift before B.D.’s death, most of the remaining assets of the estate rightfully would go to Bronwyn under the 2010 will. She fears that William will pay off the estate’s debts with whatever remains of her property in B.D.’s estate. Bronwyn argued to the chancery court that her will contest, combined with William’s depletion of estate assets which properly would have gone to Bronwyn under the 1998 will, rendered William adverse to the estate, and that a neutral 11 These include money spent for William’s own benefit, including $11,640 to a divorce attorney to handle William’s divorce, $139,109.29 to William personally, money for dental work, and money to pay private school tuition for one of William’s children. 20 executor should be appointed. She also requested that an inventory and accounting of the assets of the estate be made. After considering the arguments of the parties, the chancellor denied the petition, stating that there remained “factual issues” which were “strongly disputed between the parties.” The chancellor held that “[t]here [wa]s no uncontested evidence for the Court to remove William D. Benoist as the Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Billy Dean ‘B.D.’ Benoist.” ¶28. “[W]henever a last will and testament shall be contested, the chancery court or chancellor in vacation, on petition of any interested person, may appoint a temporary administrator if it shall appear necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-53 (Rev. 2013). Chancellors have wide discretion in appointing a new executor in a will contest, and this Court “should not reverse his action unless there is clear evidence of abuse of that discretion.” Sandifer v. Sandifer, 237 Miss. 464, 469, 115 So. 2d 46, 48 (1959). On appeal, Bronwyn essentially reiterates the facts that she believes necessitated a finding by the chancellor that a new executor should be appointed–substantial gifts from B.D. to William before B.D.’s death and William’s mismanagement and depletion of estate assets after B.D.’s death. She argues that, because the jury found that William was in a confidential relationship with B.D., there was a presumption of undue influence. ¶29. We find that the chancellor erred as a matter of law in determining that William would remain the executor of the estate. The chancellor stated that there was no “uncontested evidence” that would justify removing William as the executor. It is not required that there be uncontested evidence to justify the removal of an executor. All that is required is that the chancellor determine, in his or her discretion, that it is necessary to remove the current 21 executor to protect the rights of the parties to the will contest. See Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-53 (Rev. 2013). “Nowhere does the statute say that before he may appoint a temporary administrator he must find that the executor named in the will is disqualified or has been guilty of misconduct in office.” Sandifer, 115 So. 2d at 47-48. While chancellors enjoy wide discretion in granting or denying requests to remove an executor, a party is not required to present “uncontested evidence” to succeed in such a petition. ¶30. Because the chancellor applied the wrong legal standard and incorrectly believed that only uncontested evidence was sufficient to remove William as the executor of his father’s estate, we must reverse the chancellor’s decision and remand for a determination of whether a temporary executor should be appointed. On remand, the chancellor must use the correct legal standard, with the understanding that it is within his discretion to remove William as the executor even though Bronwyn’s evidence may be contested. V. CROSS APPEAL: Whether the trial court erred in denying attorney fees to B.D.’s estate and William as provided for in the 2010 will. ¶31. The forfeiture provision of B.D.’s will stated that if any beneficiary instituted a will contest, that beneficiary “shall pay all attorneys fees and court costs associated with the Will contest or related action.” When the chancery court initially held that the forfeiture provision in B.D.’s will was enforceable, it also concluded that Bronwyn was required to pay attorney fees for initiating the will contest. Upon granting Bronwyn’s motion to reconsider, the chancellor held that B.D.’s will could not obligate her to pay attorney fees. The chancellor reasoned that, although the “paramount duty of the court is to ascertain the intent of the testator,” the court still may not give effect to such intent if it is “contrary to law or public 22 policy.” The chancellor reasoned that, in requiring payment of attorney fees, the testator essentially was attempting to dictate the transfer of property that was not his and was beyond his control. The chancellor analyzed Mississippi Code Section 91-5-1,12 which governs the authority of individuals to create wills, and concluded that it did not give persons power over property which was not theirs to begin with. We agree with this conclusion. Section 91-5-1 permits the testator to dispose of and “devise all the estate, right, title and interest in possession, reversion, or remainder, which he or she hath, or at the time of his or her death shall have . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-1 (Rev. 2013). The testator is not empowered to control assets that do not belong to him or her through a will, but may control only those things “which he or she hath, or at the time of his or her death shall have . . . .” Id. This clearly does not contemplate funds of a third party over which the testator had no control during his or her life or at his or her death. Mississippi does not statutorily authorize the payment of attorney fees by an unsuccessful will contestant. Accordingly, William can 12 Every person eighteen (18) years of age or older, being of sound and disposing mind, shall have power, by last will and testament, or codicil in writing, to devise all the estate, right, title and interest in possession, reversion, or remainder, which he or she hath, or at the time of his or her death shall have, of, in, or to lands, tenements, hereditaments, or annuities, or rents charged upon or issuing out of them, or goods and chattels, and personal estate of any description whatever, provided such last will and testament, or codicil, be signed by the testator or testatrix, or by some other person in his or her presence and by his or her express direction. Moreover, if not wholly written and subscribed by himself or herself, it shall be attested by two (2) or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator or testatrix. Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-1 (Rev. 2013). 23 prevail in his claim only if there is an alternative avenue through which an award of attorney fees is appropriate. ¶32. We review a chancellor’s determination of whether to award attorney fees under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Schwander v. Rubel, 221 Miss. 875, 897, 75 So. 2d 45, 54 (1954) (quoting King v. Wade, 175 Miss. 72, 166 So. 327, 330 (1936)) (emphasis added). “[W]hen there is no contractual provision or statutory authority providing for attorney’s fees, they may not be awarded as damages unless punitive damages are proper as well.” Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So. 2d 539, 544 (Miss. 1996). There is no statutory authority for a testator to require the payment of attorney fees, and Bronwyn and William were not parties to a contract which included an attorney fees provision. Bronwyn has not been subject to punitive damages, nor is she in contempt of court. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying attorney fees to William. The chancellor correctly noted that Mississippi does not statutorily authorize the payment of attorney fees by an unsuccessful will contestant. All that is permissible is for the will to detail the disbursement of the testator’s property. The Legislature has not seen fit to grant testators the authority to invoke the power of the courts to compel unsuccessful contestants to pay attorney fees incurred in defending a will contest. As concluded by the chancellor, there are no means by which William can obtain attorney fees in these circumstances.