Opinion ID: 170135
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Disputes of Fact

Text: The Appellant argues two genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment in this case. First, it argues Officer Murr provided inconsistent testimony about the circumstances of the shooting, and second, the distance separating Officer Murr from Larsen is subject to dispute. But the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1776 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Neither of the alleged disputes of fact is material to the totality of the circumstances we considered above. Murr's Testimony. Appellant suggests Officer Murr provided inconsistent testimony immediately after the shooting and at a later deposition. Appellant argues the discrepancies in Murr's testimony create a genuine dispute regarding whether Murr's use of force was reasonable. At a debriefing interview the morning of the shooting Murr told investigators, Once he turned an' pointed the knife at me an' faced me, I shot twice. Aplt.App. 42-43. Later, during a deposition, Murr testified that Larsen, after first appearing to comply with the order to drop the knife, stood back up with the knife in his right hand, raise[d] the knife up past his chest above his shoulder, turned towards me looked at me and took one step towards me. Id. at 85. The debriefing interview statement is hardly inconsistent with Murr's later testimony that Larsen took a step toward him. For one thing, the deposition testimony responded to detailed questions and painted a moment-by-moment description of the shooting. The debriefing interview, in contrast, provided a broad brush review of the shooting, with the officer responding to open-ended questions. Neither statement precludes the other. Both of Murr's statements, moreover, are entirely consistent with the contemporaneous statement of Officer Brase the morning of the shooting. Brase said he saw the blade come up again . . . an' he [Larsen] turned towards Corporal Murr. . . . And then I could see this movement going in that direction . . . an' then I heard two gunshots. Id. at 45. Even if we could see a conflict among these statements, a minor discrepancy does not amount to a dispute of material fact for the jury precluding summary judgment. Distance from Larsen to Murr. Officer Murr testified the distance between him and Larsen was between 7 and 10 feet, but Appellant points to a deposition exhibit that suggests the distance might have been as far as 20 feet. Based on this uncertainty, Appellant argues that taking the facts in the light most favorable to it, the distance was so great that  as a matter of law  no reasonable officer would have used deadly force. In assessing objective reasonableness, we employ no bright line rules, and in a totality of the circumstances analysis, distance is but one factor of many. Our cases decline to adopt a per se rule where distance alone would create a fact question as a matter of law. The district court considered distance in its totality of the circumstances analysis, properly crediting the facts most favorable to Appellant, [2] and concluded the totality supported the use of force as a matter law. We agree. Appellant relies on two cases involving fatal police shootings. These cases illustrate why we consider the totality of the circumstances, but neither supports the proposition that any particular distance makes the use of force unreasonable. In the first case, Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273 (10th Cir.1989), we concluded summary judgment was improper where disputed facts called into question the immediacy of the threat facing the officer. One witness, for example, claimed that the distance between the officer and a knife-wielding decedent was only three and a half feet. Id. at 275. But another witness testified the officer and the decedent were 10 to 12 feet apart at the time of the shooting. Id. Other factual disputes involved whether the officers could reasonably think the decedent was armed when he in fact was holding fingernail clippers, whether the decedent had made a stabbing motion, and whether the officers had warned the decedent to drop his weapon. Id. In a second case, Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1160 (10th Cir.2006), we also found fact questions remained regarding the level of threat facing officers responding to a knife-wielding suspect. One fact supporting the absence of a threat was the distance of more than 21 feet between the officer and the decedent. Id. at 1144-45, 1158. But the plaintiff also presented disputed evidence that the scene was bright enough for officers to see clearly, that the decedent's weapon was a two-inch blade, which he was holding against his own wrist, that the officers issued no warnings, that the decedent was not behaving aggressively and was not facing the officers, and that officers knew the decedent was suicidal but not homicidal. Id. at 1157-59. In both Zuchel and Walker, the totality of the circumstances presented a factual dispute about whether the officer reasonably perceived a threat. Eyewitnesses contested the degree of danger facing the officer at the time deadly force was exercised. Admittedly, one of the disputed facts in Zuchel and Walker involved the distance between the officer and the decedent, but while distance is one factor in assessing the immediacy of threat, it is not the only one. In this case, the question of distance is unpersuasive when we consider the other undisputed facts in their totality. [3]