Opinion ID: 2584774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Developmental Disability and Competence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process when it did not on its own initiative suspend the criminal proceedings because there was sufficient evidence to raise a doubt as to whether defendant was developmentally disabled. We disagree. (13) Section 1367, subdivision (a) prohibits trying a person who is mentally incompetent. Mental incompetency exists if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. ( Ibid. ) If the trial court has a doubt as to the mental competency of the accused, it must suspend proceedings until the issue of mental competency has been determined. At the penalty phase, defense Psychologist Nancy Kaser Boyd testified that defendant was mentally deficient, that the deficiency arose before defendant was 18 years of age, and that the deficiency constituted a substantial disability. This testimony, defendant asserts, provided evidence of his developmental disability, triggering the trial court's duty to declare a doubt as to defendant's mental competency and to suspend the criminal proceedings. (14) A trial court's duty to suspend criminal proceedings, however, arises only when there is a doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial (§ 1368, subd. (a)), not when there is merely a doubt as to the existence of a mental disorder or developmental disability that does not implicate a defendant's competency to stand trial. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1047 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775].) The trial court's obligation arises when there is a doubt as to the mental competence of the defendant.... (§ 1368, subd. (a).) Here, defendant concedes that the evidence did not raise a doubt on the issue of mental competence.