Opinion ID: 2679197
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Austal’s Motion for Sanctions

Text: Austal also appeals the denial of its motion for fees and costs as a sanction under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under § 1927, an attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings may be sanctioned for the extra fees and costs incurred because of that conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The defendant must show that the conduct was “‘so egregious that it is tantamount to bad faith.’” Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2007)). We review for abuse of discretion. Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sanction Sullivan’s counsel under § 1927. Austal emphasizes that Sullivan did not respond to some of the claims that the summary-judgment motion addressed. But Austal acknowledges that its motion included claims that Sullivan had not asserted in her complaint. The fact that Sullivan did not respond to the parts of Austal’s motion seeking summary judgment on claims she had not alleged or on claims she had decided not to pursue is not a basis for sanctions under § 1927. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen it becomes apparent that discoverable evidence will not bear out the claim, the litigant and his attorney have 6 Case: 12-11722 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 7 of 7 a duty to discontinue their quest.” (quotation omitted)). Neither this nor Austal’s remaining arguments persuade us that the district court erred in denying sanctions.