Opinion ID: 1425371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Where Does Barneys' Case Fall on the Unauthorized Practice Continuum?

Text: In four of the six unauthorized practice cases discussed supra, we expressly identified deterrence as one objective of the imposed sanctions ( Harris-Smith, Harper and Kemp, Johnson, Briscoe ). In Respondent's case, we would fail to achieve this goal, and be inconsistent with the clear majority of our prior cases, were we to adopt Respondent's proposed sanction or merely suspend him. Of the prior cases where attorneys were found to have violated MRPC 5.5(a), only in Harris-Smith was the attorney spared disbarment. Her case, however, is significantly different from the others. The major difference is that she was the only attorney who never actually represented a client in a Maryland state court proceeding. Respondent, however, represented at least five clients in Maryland state courts-equal to the number in Johnson, and more than in Briscoe. Were we to adopt Respondent's recommendation for sanction or suspend him, he would be the first non-admitted attorney to evade disbarment after having represented clients in Maryland state courts in violation of MRPC 5.5(a). The second distinguishing factor of Respondent's case from Harris-Smith is the absence here of a federal overlay. The federal overlay factor is significant because it provides at least some plausible reason why an attorney might believe that he or she is within his or her rights in maintaining a practice or office in Maryland. In fact, we gave one example in Kennedy of how an attorney legitimately might maintain an office in Maryland for the purpose of practicing federal law without running afoul of MRPC 5.5(a). See supra at 19. In Respondent's Recommendation for Sanction, Respondent claimed to be unaware that he was not permitted to maintain a secondary office in Maryland (his main office being in the District of Columbia). He is unable, however, to resort to the federal overlay exception to justify this assertion because he is not admitted to the Maryland federal court. Furthermore, Harper and Kemp demonstrates that the mere existence of another office in a jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted does not insulate the attorney from sanctions for the unauthorized practice of law in Maryland. The third distinguishing factor between Respondent's case and Harris-Smith is that, unlike Respondent, Harris-Smith endeavored to practice law within her arguable jurisdictional limits, a point relied on by the Harris-Smith Court. See supra at 16. Besides refraining from representing clients in Maryland state courts, Harris-Smith ceased to hold herself out as a Maryland attorney when she corresponded with the firm's clients, using letterhead that properly indicated her jurisdictional limitations. Respondent, on the other hand, held himself out as an authorized Maryland attorney by means of his business cards, his letterhead, and signs in the building and immediately outside his office suite. Respondent claims that he has cooperated fully with the Attorney Grievance Commission by voluntarily closing his Maryland office and operating from his office in the District of Columbia since approximately May 1999. The voluntary nature of Respondent's act is tempered, however, as he closed his office only after his involvement in the Sanchez case was discovered and he was threatened with an injunction action. Had his misconduct not been discovered then, there is nothing in the record to suggest Barneys would not have continued or even expanded his illegal activities. In our view, it seems that Respondent, at best, cooperated with the investigation (to the extent he did) only when he had little real choice to do otherwise. [21] In addition, even if Respondent's ultimate termination of misconduct was viewed as voluntary, this alone would not warrant necessarily a sanction less than disbarment. Although Harris-Smith, who was suspended, terminated her practice of law in Maryland when the investigation by Bar Counsel commenced, Harper, who also ceased his misconduct upon its discovery, was not spared disbarment. Although remorse and regret are recognized as mitigating factors ( see Johnson, 363 Md. at 632, 770 A.2d at 150 (discussing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. O'Neill, 285 Md. 52, 53, 400 A.2d 415, 416 (1979)); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d 467, 468 (1991)), we find it impossible to parse with sufficient certainty whether Respondent's claimed remorse is sincere, mere lip service, or simply damage control. Overall, our review of the unauthorized practice cases resulting in disbarment leads us to believe that they have more elements in common with Respondent's case than does his case with Harris-Smith. For example, although Harper seemed to have represented many more clients than Respondent, the cases share at least two common features. First, both attorneys held themselves out as admitted in Maryland, in violation of MRPC 7.5. In fact, one of Harper's regular letterheads indicated his jurisdictional practice limitations, while none of Respondent's letterheads did. Second, the description of the misconduct as deliberate and persistent, relied on by this Court in Harper and Kemp and cited again in Johnson, appears to be an apt description of Respondent's conduct, wrongfully representing five clients in Maryland state court proceedings and pretending to represent Sanchez in a workers' compensation matter when he did not. Respondent's conduct regarding Mr. Sanchez also highlights his deceptive tendencies, [22] making his case like Johnson, where we found the attorney repeatedly engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. Both Johnson and Respondent forged signatures of purported clients, and both caused significant damage to third parties; in Respondent's case, the losses incurred by Gates Bail Bonds and Ms. Gates. In addition, whether the facts of a particular case sustain related or companion violations of MRPC 8.4 seems also to be an influencing factor in our choice of sanction in at least some of the unauthorized practice cases under MRPC 5.5(a). Specifically, in Harris-Smith we found that attorney's conduct did not reach the level of a MRPC 8.4 violation, which would be [a] serious violation going to the attorney's integrity. By comparison, Harper was found in violation of MRPC 8.4(b) and (d), and Johnson in violation of MRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Both were attorneys who, like Respondent, had not been admitted in Maryland previously, and who, like Respondent, undertook actual representation of clients in Maryland state court matters. Because Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(b), (c), and (d), violations that are arguably more serious than in either Harper and Kemp or Johnson, we should not shy away from disbarment Finally, suspending Barneys rather than disbarring him would give the impression that we view his conduct as more similar to the conduct of attorneys who violate MRPC 5.5(b), rather than 5.5(a). Respondent, however, did not assist another attorney in the unauthorized practice of law; he committed the violations directly and without valid excuse or justification.