Opinion ID: 2823835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Totality of the Circumstances Test

Text: Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Â After reviewing the record and considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Munoz-Gutierrez voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle when he orally consented to the search. Although the troopers did not explicitly state the two factors in section 16-3-310(1)(b), the troopersâ conduct did not overbear Munoz-Gutierrezâs will because their conduct was not sufficiently coercive or deceptive to a person with his characteristics in his circumstances, and thus Munoz-Gutierrezâs consent was voluntary. See Helm, 633 P.2d at 1077 (stating that it is ânot necessary to impose on police officers an affirmative duty to warn persons of their right to refuse consent because other evidence is often adequate to demonstrate that the search was agreed to voluntarilyâ).Â Â Â Â Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In determining that the oral consent was voluntary, we assess the troopersâ conduct in relation to Munoz-Gutierrezâs characteristics and circumstances by evaluating Munoz-Gutierrezâs age, education, knowledge, and perceptions in relation to the location, duration, and environment of the police interaction.Â SeeÂ Magallanes-Aragon, 948 P.2d at 532; Carlson, 677 P.2d at 318. The purpose of the assessment is to see if the troopersâ conduct overbore Munoz-Gutierrezâs will. SeeÂ Magallanes-Aragon, 948 P.2d at 530â31. Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Trooper Romine and Munoz-Gutierrezâs initial contact occurred during a routine traffic stop on the shoulder of Interstate 70. While any contact with the police can be stressful, there is no evidence that Trooper Romine exerted undue influence over Munoz-Gutierrez when he first approached Munoz-Gutierrezâs vehicle. The trial court found that there was âabsolutely no problem with the stopâ and that Trooper Romine followed standard policy in retrieving Munoz-Gutierrezâs documents and returning to his vehicle to check for outstanding warrants.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The trial court noted that Munoz-Gutierrez âhad been in the United States off and on for decades,â and while there may have been some language barrier between Munoz-Gutierrez and Trooper Romine, the two were able to communicate that the trooper needed documents and answers to a few background questions. Munoz-Gutierrez answered Trooper Romineâs questions appropriately and provided the correct documents, and the trial court found that â[t]here was obviously an ability to communicate between [Trooper] Romine and Mr. Munoz-Gutierrez even without the aid of an interpreter or a translator.â Thus, Trooper Romineâs initial communication with Munoz-Gutierrez was brief and routine. Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Despite the fact that Trooper Romine had been able to communicate with Munoz-Gutierrez up to this point, he requested a Spanish-speaking trooper. Trooper Biesemeier arrived and accompanied Trooper Romine to Munoz-Gutierrezâs car to issue him a warning for twice driving outside his lane. Because Trooper Biesemeier was able to provide translations, his involvement enhanced communication. Together, Troopers Romine and Biesemeier asked Munoz-Gutierrez to exit his vehicle; this was done so that the officers could speak to Munoz-Gutierrez without risking a traffic accident or having to speak across the passengerâs side of the vehicle. Trooper Biesemeier then translated Trooper Romineâs words into Spanish for Munoz-Gutierrez so that he understood that he was receiving a traffic warning. Trooper Biesemeier testified that Munoz-Gutierrez was relieved after they explained that he was receiving a warning, and the trial court found that Munoz-Gutierrez was âgrateful that he was only getting a warning ticket.â Trooper Biesemeier also recognized that Munoz-Gutierrez said he was tired in Spanish and suggested that he get a motel room. Again, this encounter was brief, and the troopers adequately communicated to Munoz-Gutierrez that he was receiving a warning. As a result, the trial court found that there was âno coercionâ during the stop when the troopers issued Munoz-Gutierrez a warning. Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â Â After the troopers gave Munoz-Gutierrez the warning, the troopers shook hands with Munoz-Gutierrez and told him that he was free to go. They testified that they concluded this initial contact, based on what they are trained to do, so that any subsequent encounter would be separated from the traffic stop. In so doing, Munoz-Gutierrez would not feel compelled to do anything to avoid receiving a trafficÂ citation. Trooper Romine then inquired whether he could ask Munoz-Gutierrez more questions. Despite being told he was free to leave and knowing he would not receive a traffic ticket, Munoz-Gutierrez said he would answer additional questions. The troopers then asked whether he had anything illegal in the vehicle. Munoz-Gutierrez understood the question and responded that he did not have anything illegal in the car. The trial court found that there was no problem with the troopersâ actions and that Munoz-Gutierrez âclearly complied and answered questionsâ after the troopers reinitiated contact. Hence, the troopersâ decision to reengage with Munoz-Gutierrez did not coerce Munoz-Gutierrez into providing consent to search. Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â After the troopers reengaged with Munoz-Gutierrez and asked him if he had anything illegal in his car, Trooper Romine asked, and Trooper Biesemeier translated, if the troopers could search his car. At the suppression hearing, the troopers testified that Munoz-Gutierrez indicated to them that they could search his vehicle, and the trial court ultimately found that the consent was invalid because the troopers did not articulate the two factors in section 16-3-310 to Munoz-Gutierrez when he provided oral consent. 5 Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In the request for oral consent, Trooper Biesemeierâs participation enhanced communication between the troopers and Munoz-Gutierrez. At the hearing, Munoz-Gutierrez testified that he understood some of what Trooper Romine communicated but understood everything Trooper Biesemeier said because Trooper Biesemeier spoke to him in Spanish. As a result, when Trooper Romine asked, and Trooper Biesemeier translated, âmay we search your vehicle,â the trial court found that Munoz-Gutierrez consented. There is no record that the troopers used the language barrier to coerce or attempt to trick Munoz-Gutierrez into providing consent. Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Trooper Biesemeier spoke sufficient Spanish to communicate with Munoz-Gutierrez. As in Castro, a language barrier is not determinative. Trooper Biesemeier testified that he does not remember Munoz-Gutierrez ever asking him to clarify any questions, and the trial court also found that Munoz-Gutierrez responded appropriately to Trooper Romine when the trooper asked him preliminary questions in a mixture of Spanish and English. Additionally, Munoz-Gutierrezâs lack of formal education does not negate his consent because the troopers did not psychologically coerce him to consent to the search of his vehicle. Helm, 633 P.2d at 1077 (noting that â[b]ecause the defendant does not allege that the officer subjected him to any psychological coercion, his lack of formal education does not negate his consentâ). Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Even if Munoz-Gutierrez did not know he could refuse the request to search his car, this is only a factor in determining voluntariness. Magallanes-Aragon, 948 P.2d atÂ 532. Instead, while the troopers did not comply with the statute, 6 they conveyed that Munoz-Gutierrez had a choice when they asked for consent in a questionââmay we search your vehicleââthat required a yes or no answer. Likewise, while the troopers did not tell Munoz-Gutierrez that he had a right to refuse the request to search, the request for oral consent was immediately preceded by two other questionsâwhether the troopers could ask him more questions and whether he had anything illegal in his vehicleâthat Munoz-Gutierrez testified he understood. As a result, the request for oral consent to search was part of a series of questions that gave Munoz-Gutierrez options. Hence, although the troopersâ failure to comply with section 16-3-310(1)(b) is a factor in determining the voluntariness of the consent, the record shows no evidence of any coercion when the troopers requested permission to search Munoz-Gutierrezâs car. Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Thus, when considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Munoz-Gutierrez provided voluntary oral consent to search his vehicle. Although the troopers did not explicitly comply with the factors in section 16-3-310(1)(b), other evidence, such as the fact that Munoz-Gutierrez and Trooper Biesemeier were able to communicate in Spanish, demonstrates that the troopersâ conduct did not overbear Munoz-Gutierrezâs exercise of free will because the conduct was not sufficiently coercive or deceptive to a person with his characteristics in his circumstances. While the trial court found that the written consent that Munoz-Gutierrez gave wasÂ improperly obtained, we need not reach that issue because the voluntary oral consent was sufficient. 7 We conclude that Munoz-Gutierrezâs oral consent was voluntary.