Opinion ID: 2504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial Counsel's Performance Was Objectively Unreasonable, and It Was an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law for the State Court To Conclude Otherwise.

Text: Wilson's petition notes five alleged errors that he maintains are objectively unreasonable. Magistrate Judge Levy agreed entirely with Wilson's position, whereas Judge Trager concluded that only four out of the five purported errors were objectively unreasonable. However, both the Magistrate Judge and the District Judge determined that the performance of GaNun, Wilson's counsel at trial, was objectively unreasonable. Our reading of the record supports this conclusion. As noted above, Wilson argues that GaNun committed five devastating errors that allowed prejudicial information to cloud the jury's fact-finding. Pet'r Br. 4-5. Listed chronologically, they are: (1) eliciting testimony from Erra, the complainant and eyewitness, that he feared Wilson would retaliate against him for testifying; (2) opening the doorby attacking the police investigation of the robberyto the admission of the Erra's identification of Wilson's mug shot from a mug book on the day of the robbery; (3) not objecting to the prosecutor's characterization of Wilson's photograph as a mug shot and not requesting the redaction of Wilson's mug shot, which showed him with a booking plate hung around his neck; (4) moving into evidence an unredacted police report describing Wilson's October 1994 arrest for an armed shake-down at a construction site; and (5) opening the door to the admission of Wilson's prior convictions for drug possession and physical harassment by eliciting testimony from Younger regarding Wilson's good character. First, GaNun elicited testimony from Errathe only eyewitness to testify at trialthat he feared reprisals from Wilson. Remarkably, after confirming that Erra had not been threatened in any manner or in any way, and after stating that his examination was complete, GaNun asked Erra, [w]ere you in fear of this defendant, George Wilson? Erra responded, Yes. GaNun then asked: And why were you in fear of this defendant, George Wilson? Erra answered: Reprisals. Trial Tr. 492:21-25, Sept. 21, 1995. At the July 13, 2005 hearing before Magistrate Judge Levy, GaNun justified his cross-examination on the ground that he had wanted to show that Erra was a puppet of the police and had thought it was possible that Erra would testify that he did not fear reprisals from Wilson. Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . Judge Trager observed that this possibility seemed unlikely given [the eyewitness's] earlier testimony on cross-examination, id., in which he had expressed fear for my family, . . . [and] fear for myself, id. 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . Nevertheless, Judge Trager concluded that GaNun's questioning was not so far-fetched, given the vagueness of Erra's earlier testimony, to be completely unreasonable. Id. 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . We disagree. It was objectively unreasonable for GaNun to ask Erra whether he feared Wilson and even more unreasonable, after Erra replied in the affirmative, to ask the open-ended question why? Before GaNun elicited this testimony, the jury had not heard any suggestion that fear of Wilson accounted for Erra's failure to appear. To ask these questions on the theory that Erra might say that he was not afraid of Wilson was reckless and objectively unreasonable. [11] Second, by attacking the police investigation, GaNun opened the door to the admission of the eyewitness identification from a photograph array on the day of the robbery. Under New York law, evidence that an eyewitness identified Wilson from a photograph album on the day of the robbery was inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, but could be used as rebuttal evidence if defense counsel challenged the adequacy of the investigation. Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at -14, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at ; see also People v. Lindsay, 42 N.Y.2d 9, 12, 396 N.Y.S.2d 610, 364 N.E.2d 1302 (1977) (It is settled [under the law of New York]. . . that a witness may not testify regarding a photographic identification of the defendant. . . .); People v. Hamilton, 33 A.D.3d 937, 826 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (2d Dep't 2006) (While a witness is generally not permitted to testify to an extrajudicial identification of a photograph of the defendant, such testimony is appropriate when the defendant opens the door to this type of inquiry during cross-examination of the witness. (internal citations omitted)); People v. Hines, 112 A.D.2d 316, 491 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (2d Dep't 1985) (explaining that the purpose of the rule is to avoid improper bolstering.). GaNun was warned by the state trial judge, after he made an opening statement attacking the investigation, of the consequences should he press this argument on cross-examination. See Trial Tr. 392:7-12, Sept. 20, 1995. Nevertheless, on his cross-examination of Erra, GaNun inquired into the adequacy of the investigation, asking, for example, whether diagrams were made, and photographs were taken, of the crime scene. See Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at  13-14, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at ; Trial Tr. 460:24-461:7, Sept. 21, 1995. GaNun also asked Erra if he knew whether the police had spoken to other possible witnesses. Trial Tr. 487:23-488:16, Sept. 21, 1995. At a sidebar held to determine whether the prosecution would be permitted to introduce evidence of the photographic identification to rebut GaNun's attacks on the adequacy of the investigation, GaNun appeared to misunderstand the legal issue. In opposing the prosecution's motion to admit the identification, GaNun argued: [T]he door wasn't open, number one . . . because the statement `poor investigation' doesn't relate to anything about photographic identification. Secondly, your Honor, in regard to the cross-examination of Mr. Erra, at no time did I go near the issue of photographic identification. Id. at 508:21-509:4. The trial court responded: This door has been opened so wide, I've never seen a wider open door. Id. at 516:18-19. Not surprisingly, the court ruled in favor of admitting the photograph-array identification. At the hearing before Magistrate Judge Levy, GaNun testified that he thought only questions specifically about the photograph-array identification would open the door to the admission of that identification. Hr'g Tr. 60:11-22, July 13, 2005. This mistaken belief was entirely unreasonable. Before Erra ever took the stand, the trial court warned GaNun that questioning the adequacy of the investigation would trigger the admission of the identification evidence. This warning was more than sufficient to dispel any misunderstanding on GaNun's part regarding the consequences of challenging the adequacy of the investigation. Third, after the state trial court determined that the photograph-array identification was admissible, the prosecutor referred multiple times to the photographs of Wilson as mug shots, without objection from GaNun, before moving the photographs into evidence. Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at -58. At that time, the court remarked, there is no way that this jury is going to see the [booking plate] in front of the defendant's body showing a number NYCPD; that's out, that's going to be redacted. Trial Tr. 536:24-537:3, Sept. 21, 1995. GaNun objected to the photographs on the ground that the jury would infer that the photographs were mug shots. The trial court reminded GaNun that the prosecution had already referred to the photographs as mug shots without objection. GaNun responded that he must not have heard those words. The court then offered defense counsel a chance to redact the photographs, but GaNun declined the offer, and the photographs were admitted in unredacted form. At the hearing before Magistrate Judge Levy, GaNun offered no strategic explanation for (1) his failure to object to the characterization of the photograph of Wilson as a mug shot, suggesting Wilson's criminality, or (2) his decision not to redact the portion of the photographs showing Wilson's booking plate. GaNun stated only that he wanted to get on with the case in chief. Hr'g Tr. 67:6, July 13, 2005. GaNun's refusal of the trial court's offer to redact the photographs, so as to mitigate, even if only slightly, their prejudicial effect, is incomprehensible. As Judge Trager stated, the fact that the [trial] court offered to redact the photo makes it difficult to understand GaNun's behavior. It appears from the trial record that GaNun, who had just had his objections overruled, was simply being obstinate with the court. Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . We agree with Judge Trager's assessment; defense counsel's decisions regarding the mug shots were unreasonable. Fourth, GaNun introduced evidence of Wilson's prior arrest on unrelated charges. Specifically, GaNun introduced at trial a non-redacted copy of a police report arising from Wilson's arrest in 1994. The trial court's astonishment is manifest from the record: THE COURT: . . . I'm going to ask the defense, do you really want this in evidence? MR. GaNUN: Absolutely. THE COURT: All right. It's your choice. You're not asking for redaction or anything else? MR. GaNUN: No, your Honor. THE COURT: That's not a problem as long as we all fully understand what we're doing here, I'm sure you do, I'm not going to ask you what your theory of defense is. All I'm going to say to you is, I would not let the jury see this in ten million years unless you specifically wanted it. It's as simple as that. You realize, of course, that it contains a complaint of certain conduct. It's hearsay basically, but if you want it in, I'll put it in. Trial Tr. 662:6-25; 664:16-17, Sept. 27, 1995. At the June 13, 2005 hearing before Magistrate Judge Levy, GaNun stated that he wanted the entire, unredacted arrest report entered into evidence because he had wanted to show that the 1994 arrest was baloney and that he was being honest with the jury. Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . These purported reasons are, as Judge Trager stated, incomprehensible. Id. 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . Furthermore, it is apparent from GaNun's testimony that he did not even realize that the report contained prejudicial information, even though it linked Wilson to allegations of prior threatening and violent activity. Id. 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . We agree with Judge Trager that it was objectively unreasonable for defense counsel not to redact the prejudicial information contained in the police reports. Fifth and finally, GaNun opened the door to the admission of Wilson's criminal history by calling a witness to testify about Wilson's reputation in the community. Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . The trial court warned GaNun sua sponte that if he elicited character testimony, the prosecution would be able to introduce Wilson's criminal record as rebuttal evidence. The record indicates that, despite these warnings, GaNun apparently failed to understand that by eliciting this testimony, he would open the door to Wilson's criminal history. Indeed, at the July 13, 2005 hearing before Magistrate Judge Levy on defense counsel's effectiveness and strategy, Wilson's appointed counsel specifically said to GaNun, [w]hat I'm asking is whether you called [the witness] with a trial strategy in mind of opening the door to Mr. Wilson's prior criminal record? and GaNun responded, [n]o, I would say that I had no intention of doing that. If it happened, it happened. Hr'g Tr. 106:8-12, July 13, 2005. In light of GaNun's testimony, Judge Trager concluded that [e]ven if it is assumed that GaNun's actions and decisions concerning Younger's testimony were conscious and not the result of errors and unreasonable misunderstandings of the trial court's rulings . . . it is unlikely that GaNun properly weighed the risks of his `strategy.' Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . We fully agree. As a result of GaNun's actions, the jury heard testimony that Wilson had been previously convicted of drug possession and had pleaded guilty to punching a woman and taking her necklace. It was objectively unreasonable for defense counsel, particularly in the face of the trial court's warnings, not to have understood that eliciting reputation testimony would lead to the introduction of Wilson's criminal history. In sum, none of the five errors identified by Wilson are justified by any strategy that GaNun set forth at trial or at the July 13, 2005 hearing before Magistrate Judge Levy. The record indicates that defense counsel misinterpreted and misunderstood the law, failed to pay attention, acted recklessly, and did not appreciate the consequences of his decisions, even though in many cases he was explicitly warned of the risks by the trial court. Indeed, the trial court cited several of these errors and stated on the record, after sending the jury out of the room: I have very serious problems with this case right now. The alarm bells are ringing in my head and I'm going right on the record. And the question concerns representation of the defendant. I'm sorry, there is no other way I can put it. Trial Tr. 753:19-25, Sept. 27, 1995. The trial court resolved its concerns by simply asking GaNun whether he had a strategyany strategyin mind as he was pursuing his case. GaNun answered affirmatively, and the trial court stated [t]hat's sufficient for me. Id. at 755:6. In light of our review of the full record including GaNun's testimony at the July 13, 2005 hearing regarding his actual strategyit is plain that defense counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable. To conclude otherwise would be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.