Opinion ID: 1285369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testing in Fenney

Text: In the case before us, only the protein PGM differentiated Armendariz's blood from Fenney's. The PGM protein that was consistent with Armendariz's blood was found on all three items of Fenney's clothing that had been in his backpack: a sock, shirt and blue jeans. At least 76 different enzymes detectable by electrophoresis have been cataloged. Note at 784 n. 66. The BCA tests for only six common types that are considered reliable and important enough in the differentiation of blood samples. The BCA used the single testing process called isoelectric focusing on PGM, which eliminated the problem encountered in multi-system testing where the dye filter paper absorbs PGM molecules. Both witnesses called for the mid-trial Frye hearing testified extensively on the control protocols used by the BCA and followed in this instance. Mr. Ronald Enzenauer, who examined the samples in question here, had been working with serological electrophoresis for five years. He underwent one year of training before being authorized to read electrophoresis slides. He has examined hundreds, if not thousands of samples and has testified as to electrophoretic test results in approximately 30 cases in Minnesota. His readings were controlled by a second reading, as required by protocol. His training, in combination with the type of test used and the controls requiring second readings, assured accurate, reliable results. Considering the evidence of reliability and accuracy presented by expert testimony, the extent of the shared belief of the experts in that reliability, and taking note of decisions in other jurisdictions, we hold that electrophoretic typing of aged, dried blood samples as performed by competent analysts using sufficient controls are admissible under the Mack/Frye standard. 2. Defendant also alleges that evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support the jury verdict. The evidence of guilt included evidence of (1) unexplained blood stains consistent with Armendariz's blood but inconsistent with Fenney's, (2) Fenney's footprint in blood on the floor of the Armendariz trailer, (3) his fingerprints on beer cans found at the scene, (4) the condition of Armendariz's body when found, (5) Fenney's activities that night, and (6) inconsistencies in Fenney's own testimony. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and assuming the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence, we hold that the evidence was sufficient. 3. Defendant raises as a third point of error that the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting identification testimony based on an impermissibly suggestive one-person photograph of Fenney shown to one of the witnesses. A threshold question, however, is whether the defense properly preserved this issue for appellate review. Pursuant to Minn.R. Evid. 103(a)(1), Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits    evidence unless    a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record   . For an objection to admission of testimony based on a one-man photographic identification to be timely, it must be made as soon as the grounds for it appear. State v. Senske, 291 Minn. 228, 231, 190 N.W.2d 658, 661 (1971). Otherwise, [it] is deemed waived since it is impossible for the trial court subsequently to erase from the jury's memory the effect of the testimony. Id. Consequently, the claim of error was not preserved for appeal. Nevertheless, where the error is an error in fundamental law or plain error affecting substantial rights, we are free to consider an improperly preserved claim on appeal. State v. Malaski, 330 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Minn.1983) (quoting in part Minn. R.Evid. 103(d)). Under the standard set forth in State v. Marhoun, 323 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn.1982), we hold that in this case there was no likelihood of irreparable misidentification. The witness had seen Fenney with his blue backpack in the trailer park at 5:00 p.m. the day before the murder. She described him to authorities on the following day. Upon being shown a one-person photograph of him, she recognized him as the person she had seen the previous day. Testimony reflected no doubt that Fenney was the person she had seen. Only a one day delay occurred between seeing Fenney in person and in the photograph. As we stated in Marhoun, it is proper for police to take a picture of a person whom they strongly suspect of having committed a crime and show it to people who might have seen the person in the area of the crime   . Marhoun, 323 N.W.2d at 733. Defendant also assigns as reversible error opinion testimony as to Fenney's demeanor upon being told he was accused of murder and evidence mentioning the work of polygraph testing. It has long been the rule that the results of polygraph tests as well as any direct or indirect references to the taking of or refusal to take such a test are inadmissible. State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 220-22, 52 N.W.2d 458, 464-66 (1952); State v. Perry, 274 Minn. 1, 12-13, 142 N.W.2d 573, 580 (1966). In the instant case, reference to polygraph testing occurred in the context of laying a foundation for opinion testimony as to Fenney's reaction to being accused of murder. Both the polygraph testimony and demeanor testimony were wrongly admitted. Testimony that the defendant's reaction upon being charged with murder was very unusual and that he did not respond with emphatic denial had no real probative value and the potential for unfair prejudice was high, particularly in light of the impermissible bolstering of Agent Luttring's testimony by reference to his experience administering polygraph tests. See Minn.R.Evid. 403; cf. State v. Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42 (Minn.1984). Although wrongly admitted, under the facts of this case the error was not reversible error. 5. Error is also asserted because the trial court did not permit the defense, whose theory of the case was that someone other than defendant had committed the murder, to cross-examine Steven Sack regarding knife threats made toward people other than the victim. This court has permitted the admission of evidence tending to prove another's guilt in a murder case where the issue is whether the defendant did in fact commit the murder, but a proper foundation must first be laid. State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158-59 (Minn. 1977). Where the desired cross-examination did not relate to incriminating acts by Sack against the victim and the only conceivable, rational foundation connecting the witness to the crime was his presence in the trailer court that night and his possession of a knife which was too large to have been the weapon used in the murder, the defense failed to provide the necessary foundation. The trial court did not err in refusing to permit the cross-examination regarding knife threats. 6. Finally, defendant claims the trial court erred in denying a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This court reviews an appeal of a post conviction denial of a new trial under the abuse of discretion standard, examining the evidence in light of the test set out in Race v. State, 417 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1987) and noting that the burden is on the defendant to establish the facts by a preponderance of the evidence as required by Minn.Stat. 590.04, subd. 3 (1988). Examining the evidence as a whole, the defense did not meet the test. True, three items of new evidence were presented: (1) hearsay testimony that Joshua, Armendariz's son, told his child therapist in February 1988, that another woman had been in the Armendariz trailer the night of the murder, (2) testimony by Wade Abraham that a year after the murder a woman had told him she had been in the Armendariz trailer the night of the murder and that she and named others had committed the murder, and (3) testimony by a witness who had picked Fenney up hitch-hiking at 9:30 a.m. the morning of the murder that Fenney spoke of the murder to him at that time which was prior to discovery of the body. A reading of the transcript, however, confirms that the first two items were doubtful. Expert testimony revealed that Joshua's testimony was unreliable and contaminated. Wade Abraham's testimony was tainted by bias, his own doubts about its validity, and lack of corroboration. The third item supported the verdict against Fenney by showing that he knew of the murder even before the body was discovered by the authorities. The defense did not meet its burden that the evidence would probably produce an acquittal or a verdict more favorable to defendant. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial. Affirmed.