Opinion ID: 171541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prison Regulations on Outgoing Mail

Text: Mr. Brown alleges that Sheriff Kochanowshi, with the help of Captain Augestine and Tina Miller, “found a clause in either state or federal guidelines that states . . . D.O.C. has the right as a disciplinary action to monitor all outgoing [mail] except legal mail unless they suspect its not legal, then they can inspect it. Saline County Jail is misusing this clause to have more control and stop the numerous complaints. They . . . use [this clause] as a cover to keep practicing discrimination with our mail.” (R. doc. 22 at 3.) Liberally construing Mr. Brown’s complaint as we must, Mr. Brown’s complaint claims that jail officials are exercising their authority in a “discriminatory” manner and that outgoing mail -8- is monitored as a “disciplinary action,” i.e., as punishment. 8 As with Mr. Brown’s first claim, the district court correctly rejected the access-to-court aspect of this claim because Mr. Brown had not made a showing of prejudice. But, once again, the district court erred when it failed to consider whether Mr. Brown’s allegations could state a First Amendment claim for a violation of his freedom of speech. The district court repeated this error in regard to all of Mr. Brown’s claims, as it never analyzed whether any of Mr. Brown’s allegations implicated a First Amendment right beyond Mr. Brown’s right of access to the courts. While “[c]orrespondence between a prisoner and an outsider implicates the 8 It appears the “clause” Mr. Brown is referring to is paragraph 12 of the section on “Correspondence” in the jail’s inmate handbook, because he placed a “star” next to that paragraph in the inmate handbook, which he attached to his amended complaint. Saline County Jail’s “inmate handbook” provides at paragraph 12 of the section on “Correspondence,” in pertinent part, that: All outgoing mail, with the exception of legal mail, will remain unsealed when given to the Officer. Outgoing personal mail may be inspected for contraband at the specific directions of the Shift Supervisor for security considerations. . . . The Corrections Staff may inspect outgoing mail marked as legal if they suspect it is not legal mail. (R. doc. 22, attachment 2 at 19) (emphasis in original). The handbook does not define legal mail. We note that paragraph 12 only authorizes inspection of outgoing non-legal mail “for security considerations”; the handbook does not authorize inspection as a “disciplinary action” as Mr. Brown alleges. Nonetheless, liberally construing Mr. Brown’s complaint as we must, we treat Mr. Brown’s complaint as alleging that jail officials are monitoring mail as a “disciplinary action.” -9- guarantee of freedom of speech,” Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1996), the Supreme Court has recognized that the control of mail to and from prisoners is a necessary adjunct to penal administration. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989) (acknowledging that prison officials are better equipped than the judiciary to deal with the security implications of interactions between prisoners and the outside world). Prison regulations which restrict a prisoner’s First Amendment rights are “permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and are not an exaggerated response to those concerns.” Wardell, 470 F.3d at 960 (quoting Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006)). Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) set out four factors for assessing reasonableness in this context: First, is there a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it? Second, are there alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates? Third, what impact will accommodation of the asserted constitutional right have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally? And, fourth, are ready alternatives for furthering the governmental interest available? Wardell, 470 F.3d at 960 (quoting Beard, 548 U.S. at 528). The burden is on the prisoner to disprove the validity of prison regulations. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). This Court has held that corrections officers can inspect all outgoing mail if the inspection is reasonably related to substantial government interests. Belville v. Ednie, 74 F.3d 210, 214 (10th Cir. 1996). - 10 - Substantial government interests include threats to prison order and security. Id. Mr. Brown’s complaint claims that jail officials are exercising their authority in a manner arguably unrelated to a substantial government interest – that outgoing mail is monitored as punishment rather than for security. We do not imply that discipline can never be a substantial government interest when the discipline is used to maintain order, control and authority. But, at least at the dismissal stage, Mr. Brown has stated a cognizable constitutional claim that his First Amendment rights were violated by the inspection of his outgoing legal mail. C. Prohibition Against Taking Legal Mail to Larned State Hospital Mr. Brown alleges that “Saline County Jail officers won’t allow inmates to take there [sic] legal mail to Larnered [sic] State Hospital . . . .” (R. doc. 22 at 4.) The district court correctly rejected the access-to-court aspect of this claim because Mr. Brown had not made a showing of prejudice. However, the district court once again failed to address whether the prison regulations unreasonably limited Mr. Brown’s First Amendment rights to freedom of speech. See Wardell, 470 F.3d at 959-963 (prisoner’s claim that prison intercepted legal materials addressed to prisoner touched on First Amendment right of access to courts and First Amendment right to receive mail). Prison regulations which restrict a prisoner’s First Amendment rights are only “permissible if they are reasonably - 11 - related to legitimate penological interests and are not an exaggerated response to those concerns.” Wardell, 470 F.3d at 960 (quoting Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006)). The district court did not consider whether the jail’s prohibition on taking legal mail to the state hospital, during confinement there, was reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives and, therefore, the district court dismissed this claim prematurely. D. Charging for Mail that was Not Processed Mr. Brown alleges that Officer Nalls “was committing postal fraud by charging us for mail that wasn’t going out and trying to delete it on the county computer.” (R. doc. 22 at 2.) Although Mr. Brown advances this claim as a due process violation (see Aplt. Br. at 3), it is more appropriately cast as a state law fraud claim. This claim, however, was not addressed by the district court, and it is appropriate for the district court to consider this claim in the first instance. E. Damages for Depression and Emotional Distress Mr. Brown’s prayer for relief in his amended complaint included a request for damages for depression and emotional distress resulting from the jail’s alleged unlawful practices. Section 1997(e) of title 42 of the United State Code provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while - 12 - in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” Mr. Brown failed to assert any physical injury in his amended complaint; therefore, the district court correctly determined that Mr. Brown’s complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to support a request for damages for depression and emotional distress.