Opinion ID: 1631946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentence Under Section 903B. 1.

Text: The defendant claims the application of section 903B.1 to him violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. [4] See Iowa Const. art. 1, § 21 (No . . . ex post facto law . . . shall ever be passed.). An ex post facto law includes one that makes the punishment for a crime more burdensome after its commitment. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 759 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 2009). Thus, two elements must be present for a criminal law to operate as an ex post facto law. Id. First, the law `must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment.' Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 23 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1602 n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d 588, 595 n. 3 (1995)). Second, it must `alter[] the definition of criminal conduct or increase[] the penalty by which a crime is punishable.' Id. at 797 n. 5 (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1602 n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d at 595 n. 3). Before we discuss whether these elements exist, we first consider whether the statute imposing lifetime parole is a criminal or penal law. A. Is Section 903B.1 a Criminal or Penal Law? The State suggests section 903B.1 does not impose punishment. This issue is a question of legislative intent. See State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa 1997). We must ask `whether the legislative aim was to punish [the] individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation.' Id. (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109, 1120 (1960)). If the legislature intended the statute to impose criminal punishment, this intent controls, so the law is considered to be punitive in nature. Formaro v. Polk County, 773 N.W.2d 834, 843 (Iowa 2009). In examining pertinent indicators of legislative intent, we conclude the statute imposing lifetime parole was intended to be punitive in nature. The bill in which this statute was enacted is entitled Criminal Justice  DNA Sampling, Sex Offenders and Offenses, and Victim Rights. 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158. This bill includes the following summary of its content: AN ACT relating to criminal sentencing, victim notification, and the sex offender registry, by establishing a special sentence for certain offenders, requiring DNA testing of certain offenders and lengthening the time an information or indictment may be found in certain offenses where DNA evidence is available, requiring sex offender treatment in order to accumulate earned time, restricting certain persons from residing with sex offenders, establishing a sex offender treatment and supervision task force, providing penalties, and providing effective dates. Id. (emphasis added). The specific section that imposes lifetime parole on offenders such as the defendant appears in division III of the act, entitled Enhanced Criminal Penalties and Statute of Limitations. Id. ch. 158, §§ 35-43. The lifetime-parole provision was codified in Iowa Code chapter 903B, entitled Special Sentencing and Hormonal Intervention Therapy for Sex Offenders. Iowa Code ch. 903B. Section 903B.1 is labeled Special sentence  class B or class C felonies, and the statute itself refers to lifetime parole as a special sentence. Id. § 903B.1. A sentence is generally understood to be the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer. Black's Law Dictionary 1393 (8th ed. 2004). Moreover, the legislature's use of parole as the framework for this special sentence is also significant, as we have held that [p]arole is a lenient form of punishment that monitors a person's activities to ensure the person is complying with the law. State v. Tripp, 776 N.W.2d 855, 858 (Iowa 2010) (emphasis added). We think the legislative history of this statutory provision, as well as the language of the statute, provide clear evidence of legislative intent that lifetime parole is an additional punishment imposed on certain sex offenders. Courts from other states have similarly concluded that the imposition of lifetime parole on criminal offenders is punishment. [5] See State v. Payan, 277 Neb. 663, 765 N.W.2d 192, 203 (2009) (holding legislature intended to establish an additional form of punishment for some sex offenders), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1708, 176 L.Ed.2d 195 (2010); Palmer v. State, 118 Nev. 823, 59 P.3d 1192, 1195 (2002) (holding post-release supervision increases the maximum range of an offender's sentence, thereby directly and immediately affecting the defendant's punishment); State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J.Super. 220, 832 A.2d 360, 362 (2003) (concluding community supervision for life . . . is a penal and not a collateral consequence of the sentence); see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2198, 165 L.Ed.2d 250, 258 (2006) (holding parole is punishment, noting `parole is an established variation of imprisonment of convicted criminals' (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2598, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 492 (1972))). The Nebraska Supreme Court's analysis is particularly instructive. In Payan, the Nebraska court concluded the legislature's intent that lifetime supervision be penal in nature was shown, in part, by the fact that supervision was provided by the parole office of the department of correctional services. 765 N.W.2d at 202. In addition, the provision imposing lifetime supervision was placed in the code chapter pertaining to correctional services and parole. Id. (noting [t]he term `parole' has a distinctively penal connotation). The court also found it significant that lifetime supervision began upon completion of the offender's term of incarceration or release from civil commitment and persons under lifetime supervision were subject to affirmative restraints and disabilities similar to and arguably greater than traditional parole. Id. at 203. Finally, the court pointed out lifetime supervision was imposed without any finding that the offender poses a risk to the safety of others at the time he or she completes a period of incarceration or civil commitment. Id. Under these circumstances, the court held, the legislative intent . . . was to establish an additional form of punishment. Id. The same factors found persuasive by the Nebraska Supreme Court exist here with respect to section 903B.1. A defendant subject to a sentence of lifetime parole is committed to the custody of the director of the Iowa department of corrections for the rest of the person's life. Iowa Code § 903B.1. [T]he person shall begin the sentence under supervision as if on parole,  and is subject to the same procedures and rules adopted for persons on parole. Id. (emphasis added). As in Nebraska, this special sentence commences upon completion of the sentence imposed for the underlying criminal offense without any showing that the offender poses a safety risk. Id. Based on these factors, we are convinced that the imposition of lifetime parole was intended by the legislature to be additional punishment for certain sex offenders. Therefore, this statute is subject to the restrictions imposed by the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. B. Was Section 903B.1 Applied Retrospectively? In determining whether a new law is retrospectively applied, we ask `whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.' Iowa Dist. Ct., 759 N.W.2d at 798 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965, 67 L.Ed.2d at 24). Thus, we must determine whether the sentence of lifetime parole was applied to an offense committed before the effective date of this new law. Section 903B.1 became effective on July 1, 2005. See Iowa Code § 3.7(1); 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 39. The amended trial information in this case alleged the defendant committed the prohibited sex acts with the victim between June 2005 and September 2005. Evidence admitted at trial included testimony by the victim that she had sex with the defendant soon after they began dating in March 2005. In addition, two witnesses testified to a specific sexual act occurring between the defendant and the victim in June 2005. The jury was instructed that, to establish the defendant committed sexual abuse in the third degree, it must find, among other facts, that, [d]uring the months of June through September 2005, the defendant performed a sex act with [the victim]. The jury returned a general verdict finding the defendant guilty of the crime of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree as charged in the Trial Information. The general verdict form used by the jury did not require it to make a determination of or specify the dates on which the illegal sex acts occurred. When circumstances make it impossible for the court to determine whether a verdict rests on a valid legal basis or on an alternative invalid basis, we give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and assume the verdict is based on the invalid ground. See, e.g., State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558-59 (Iowa 2006) (reversing defendant's conviction because general verdict did not reveal whether it rested on ground found to be legally flawed); State v. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871, 881 (Iowa 1996) (reversing conviction based on general verdict of guilty, where three theories were submitted to jury but only one was supported by substantial evidence, because there was no way of determining which theory the jury accepted); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 354-56 (Iowa 1976) (holding conviction must be reversed when general verdict did not specify upon which sodomy alternative the verdict rested and one of the alternatives was unconstitutional); cf. State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990) (Statutes that are penal in nature are to be strictly construed, with any doubt resolved against the State and in favor of the accused.). We recently considered the application of this rule in State v. Cowles, 757 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 2008), a case involving an ex post facto claim. In Cowles, the defendant was charged with twenty counts of second-degree sexual abuse occurring between April 1996 and February 1997. 757 N.W.2d at 615 & n. 1. He pled guilty to one count. Id. at 615. The resulting sentence included a mandatory minimum sentence required by Iowa Code section 902.12, a statute that did not become effective until July 1, 1996. Id. at 616. In rejecting the defendant's ex post facto challenge to the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence, we noted that at the plea hearing the defendant expressly admitted he committed the illegal sex act between April 9, 1996, and February 2, 1997. Id. at 617. Moreover, prior to pleading guilty, the defendant was advised he would be required to serve the mandatory minimum. Id. Under these circumstances, we found an implicit admission by the defendant that he committed the offense after July 1, 1996. Id. Therefore, the statute was not applied to conduct occurring before its enactment, and there was no violation of the ex post facto clause. Id. We expressly distinguished cases in which a general jury verdict of guilt leaves the court with uncertainty as to whether the verdict is based on a valid factual or legal basis, or on an alternative invalid theory submitted to the jury. Id. We noted that, [i]n such cases of uncertainty, a conviction cannot stand. Id. We have such a case of uncertainty here. There is no way to determine whether the jury based its verdict on conduct that occurred before or after the effective date of the law imposing a sentence of lifetime parole. Therefore, we must presume the verdict rests on conduct that occurred before the enactment of the lifetime-parole law. Consequently, section 903B.1 has been applied retrospectively in this case. C. Has the Retroactive Application of Section 903B.1 Increased Defendant's Punishment? The second element of the ex post facto analysis is whether the statutory change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1602 n.3, 131 L.Ed.2d at 595 n. 3; accord Iowa Dist. Ct., 759 N.W.2d at 797 n. 5; State v. Smith, 291 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa 1980) (`[A] punitive measure is ex post facto if it . . . increases the malignity of or possible penalty for past conduct which was criminal when it occurred.' (quoting State v. Quanrude, 222 N.W.2d 467, 469-70 (Iowa 1974))). In the context of this statute, we must decide whether a sentence of lifetime parole increases the penalty by which [the defendant's] crime is punishable. Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1602 n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d at 595 n. 3. We think it clearly does. As we have discussed above, lifetime parole is a form of punishment; it is an additional sentence on the specified sex offenders. As such, it increases the penalty for the defendant's crime. Accordingly, the inclusion of lifetime parole in the defendant's sentence for conduct occurring prior to the effective date of section 903B.1 violates the ex post facto clause of the Iowa Constitution. See State v. Simnick, 279 Neb. 499, 779 N.W.2d 335, 340-42 (2010) (holding statute authorizing lifetime supervision was an impermissible ex post facto law as applied to the defendant whose crime was committed before the effective date of the statute). We vacate this part of the defendant's sentence.