Opinion ID: 1687713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plea of Unconstitutionality

Text: District Attorney Perez's plea of unconstitutionality rests, first, on the contention that C.Cr.P. 680 constitutes a legislative restriction, enacted without constitutional authorization, of the plenary powers granted to district attorneys by Article 5, § 26 of the Constitution, which provides: (B) Powers. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, a district attorney, or his designated assistant, shall have charge of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district, be the representative of the state before the grand jury in his district, and be the legal advisor to the grand jury. He shall perform other duties provided by law. It is true that the other methods of limiting the prosecutor's powers, i. e. intervention or supersession by the attorney general, impeachment, removal, and recall, are specifically provided by the Constitution, while there is no specific constitutional provision for recusation. It is also true, however, that Article 1, § 2 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law, and that this court has defined the essence of due process as protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action. Babineaux v. Judiciary Commission, 341 So.2d 396, 400 (La.1976). Due process is also defined by the Constitution itself to require impartiality. Article 1, § 22 provides: All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights. We find, therefore, that C.Cr.P. 680's provision for recusation is not only provided for but required by the constitutional guarantee of the fair and impartial administration of justice. District Attorney Perez also contends that article 680 may not constitutionally provide for a district attorney's recusation from investigatory proceedings in which he is acting as legal advisor to, and the state's representative before, a grand jury. He bases this contention on the allegation that the secrecy accorded to grand jury proceedings by Article 5, § 34 of the Constitution [4] and C.Cr.P. 434 [5] would be violated by the evidence introduced in support of a motion for recusation. A potential conflict with the constitutional and statutory provisions for secrecy of grand jury proceedings will not invalidate the recusal article. There is an adequate remedy for a potential violation of grand jury secrecy in the assertion of the privilege implicitly created by the secrecy provisions of C.Cr.P. 434, at the time the secrecy is threatened. The plea of unconstitutionality was therefore properly denied.