Opinion ID: 2142115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of Abrogation.

Text: The issue immediately before the court relates to the liability of a city for torts. Abrogation of immunity necessarily raises various questions as to the breadth of our determination. One state, for example, limited the abrogation to negligent acts of commission. McAndrew v. Mularchuk (1960), 33 N. J. 172, 193, 162 Atl. (2d) 820, 832. In our opinion, this is an unwise limitation, and we consider that the abrogation should apply broadly to torts, whether they be by commission or omission. Perhaps clarity will be afforded by our expression that henceforward, so far as governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is liabilitythe exception is immunity. In determining the tort liability of a municipality it is no longer necessary to divide its operations into those which are proprietary and those which are governmental. Our decision does not broaden the government's obligation so as  to make it responsible for all harms to others; it is only as to those harms which are torts that governmental bodies are to be liable by reason of this decision. This decision is not to be interpreted as imposing liability on a governmental body in the exercise of its legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions. See Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach (Fla. 1957), 96 So. (2d) 130, 133. Also, the instant decision does not create any liability against a county for acts of a sheriff which are within the provisions of sec. 4, art. VI of the Wisconsin constitution. If the legislature deems it better public policy, it is, of course, free to reinstate immunity. The legislature may also impose ceilings on the amount of damages or set up administrative requirements which may be preliminary to the commencement of judicial proceedings for an alleged tort. See, for example, the notice provisions and the limitation of the amount of damages in sec. 81.15, Stats. Another problem which we foresee regarding the scope of this decision is the determination of what public bodies are within the scope of the abrogation of the rule. The case at bar relates specifically to a city; however, we consider that abrogation of the doctrine applies to all public bodies within the state: The state, counties, cities, villages, towns, school districts, sewer districts, drainage districts, and any other political subdivisions of the statewhether they be incorporated or not. By reason of the rule of respondeat superior a public body shall be liable for damages for the torts of its officers, agents, and employees occurring in the course of the business of such public body. So far as the state of Wisconsin and its various arms is concerned, a careful distinction must be made between the abrogation of the immunity doctrine and the right of a private party to sue the state. The difference between governmental  immunity from torts and the sovereign immunity of the state from suit was recognized in Apfelbacher v. State (1915), 160 Wis. 565, 152 N. W. 144. The California constitution has a similar provision to that of Wisconsin so far as the right to sue the state. In abrogating the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability, the court discussed the distinction between tort immunity and consent on the part of the state to be sued. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961), 55 Cal. (2d) 211, 216, 359 Pac. (2d) 457, 460. Henceforward, there will be substantive liability on the part of the state, but the right to sue the state is subject to sec. 27, art. IV of the Wisconsin constitution which provides: The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state. The decision in the case at bar removes the state's defense of nonliability for torts, but it has no effect upon the state's sovereign right under the constitution to be sued only upon its consent. The constitutional provision has been construed to require the passage of necessary legislation before any suit may be commenced against the state. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. State (1881), 53 Wis. 509, 10 N. W. 560; Houston v. State (1898), 98 Wis. 481, 74 N. W. 111; Schlesinger v. State (1928), 195 Wis. 366, 218 N. W. 440. Although the legislature created sec. 285.01, Stats., which authorized the commencement of suits against the state, this section has been construed to apply only to those claims which would render the state a debtor. Houston v. State (1898), 98 Wis. 481, 487, 74 N. W. 111. However, we do not consider the interpretation of sec. 285.01 before us and express no opinion upon the effect of the abolition of tort immunity upon the construction of this section of the statutes. The matter has not been briefed nor argued by counsel,  and we will reserve this question for subsequent determination.