Opinion ID: 3030393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert Requirement

Text: We have held previously that expert testimony is required in legal malpractice actions. See Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480–83 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming District Court’s involuntary dismissal of a legal malpractice action where the plaintiff did not present expert testimony to establish the relevant standard of care); see also Storm v. Golden, 538 A.2d 61, 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (expert testimony required for fact-finder to assess the “reasonable degree of care and skill related to common [legal] professional practice in handling real estate transaction[s]”). In Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 1985), we upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant when the plaintiff failed to present expert testimony. We stated: the burden devolved upon [the plaintiff] to oppose [the defendant’s] factual averments [in his motion for summary judgment] with expert evidence demonstrating that the [defendant’s] conduct failed to meet the appropriate standard of care . . . [and when the p]laintiff failed to discharge this critical burden . . . he did not create a factual dispute as to the applicable standard of care [necessary to survive summary judgment]. Id. The only exception is where the issues are simple and within a layperson’s comprehension. See Lentino, 611 F.2d at 48 (finding an exception to the expert requirement “where the matter under investigation is so simple, and the lack of skill so obvious, as to be within the range of the ordinary experience and comprehension of even non-professional persons”); see also Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 66–67 (Pa. 1989) 7 (finding expert not required to establish standard of care for an attorney’s disclosure of settlement offers to his client or fiduciary transactions with his client); Bannar, 701 A.2d at 249 (holding, in a Dragonetti case, expert testimony not required in actions where “[a]ppellants make no contention the issues were complex or beyond the knowledge of the average person”). The District Court here found that a “Dragonetti action against an attorney is analogous to a legal malpractice action.” On the basis of the facts, the court held that Dr. Schmidt should have produced expert testimony to survive summary judgment. Schmidt, No. 04-4233, 2005 WL 3418461, at –7. We agree. Expert testimony assists the jury in its determination of a defendant’s conformity to the relevant standard of care when the standard is one that requires special expertise to comprehend. See Lentino, 611 F.2d at 481 (“The expert witness in professional malpractice is necessary to . . . assist the jury in its determination of defendant’s conformity to the relevant standard [of care].”); Nat’l Cash Register v. Haak, 335 A.2d 407, 410–11 (1975) (requiring expert testimony for a subject that “requires special experience” for a jury to adequately comprehend); Storm, 538 A.2d at 64 (“[W]hen dealing with the higher standards attributed to a professional in any field a layperson’s views cannot take priority without guidance as to the acceptable practice in which the professional must operate.”); Rizzo, 555 A.2d at 66 (“[E]xpert testimony is essential where it would help the finder of fact understand an issue that is beyond the knowledge of the average person.”). 8 The issue in this case is not “a simple one of credibility,” as Dr. Schmidt contends. Rather, a jury would have to navigate the contours of professional legal judgment and determine whether defendants made a proper assessment whether to initiate or continue a civil action against the plaintiff in the underlying action. In Dragonetti actions against attorneys, Pennsylvania courts have applied Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. d (1977), which elucidates the distinction between an attorney’s liability for wrongful use of a civil proceeding and an attorney’s responsibility to present a claim to a court for adjudication. See Meiksin, 590 A.2d at 1305; see also Shaffer v. Stewart, 473 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Gentzler v. Atlee, 660 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Bannar, 701 A.2d at 248–49. Section 674, comment d, states: An attorney who initiates a civil proceeding on behalf of his client or one who takes any steps in the proceeding is not liable if he has probable cause for his action (see § 675); and even if he has no probable cause and is convinced that his client’s claim is unfounded, he is still not liable if he acts primarily for the purpose of aiding his client in obtaining a proper adjudication of his claim (see § 676). An attorney is not required or expected to prejudge his client's claim, and although he is fully aware that its chances of success are comparatively slight, it is his responsibility to present it to the court for adjudication if his client so insists after he has explained to the client the nature of the chances. If, however, the attorney acts without probable cause for belief in the possibility that the claim will succeed, and for an improper purpose, as, for example, to put pressure upon the person proceeded against in order to compel payment of another claim of his own or solely to harass the person proceeded against by bringing a claim known to be invalid, he is subject to the same liability as any other person. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. d (1977). Accordingly, an attorney must balance several factors when deciding whether to pursue a client’s claim. 9 Here, an expert would have provided a framework of acceptable legal practice. Without this expert guidance, a jury would not have the tools to make this determination, as members of a jury are usually without the special training, experience or observation to make an assessment under § 674. Unless the facts in dispute are so simple and the lack of probable cause, gross negligence, or improper purpose so clear, the layperson exception would not apply. See Bannar, 701 A.2d at 246–47, 249. In contesting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dr. Schmidt failed to produce an expert witness to testify about defendants’ conformity to the applicable standard of care. Accordingly, a fact-finder could not assess whether the defendants’ actions fell below any such standard in initiating and continuing the underlying action. Dr. Schmidt did not create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat the summary judgment motion. Because the defendants’ initiation or continuation of the underlying legal action is not a simple matter easily comprehended by laypersons without the guidance of expert testimony, we agree with the District Court that Dr. Schmidt’s failure to provide expert testimony entitles defendants to summary judgment in their favor.