Opinion ID: 1885183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: The August 13, 1991, Order

Text: The trial court in this case lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and no justiciable controversy existed; therefore, this Court should examine the rulings actually finalized in this case. On January 22, 1991, the plaintiffs moved for a partial summary judgment on their claim that Amendment 111 of the Alabama Constitution was adopted in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court declared on August 13, 1991, that Amendment 111 was void in its entirety because one portion of the Amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The court also held that § 256 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 was in effect to the extent that it provides: The legislature shall establish, organize, and maintain a liberal system of public schools throughout the state for the benefit of the children thereof between the ages of seven and twenty-one years, but that the second and third sentences of § 256 were void, also as violating the Fourteenth Amendment. This ruling set the table for the Liability and Remedy Orders, because it opened the door for the trial court to impose its own requirements on the Legislature concerning public education, rather than those of Amendment 111. That August 13, 1991, order has never been appealed to this Court, and this Court has never issued an opinion addressing the question of the plaintiffs' standing to file the action or the legitimacy of the trial court's order determining that Amendment 111, to the extent it amended § 256, was unconstitutional. The trial judge's method of constitutional interpretation leaves much to be desired, [47] but because of the jurisdictional problems in this case, it would not be essential to a ruling by this Court dismissing the case. In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought [a] declaration that Amendment 111 of the Constitution of Alabama violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The basis for this declaration, the complaint explained, was that Amendment 111 has a racially discriminatory purpose and effect. The plaintiffs, however, never alleged in their complaint that they were the victims of racial discrimination. In fact, none of the plaintiffs even mentioned their race in the complaint. [48] Unless the plaintiffs showed that the Legislature authorize[d] the parents or guardians of minors, who desire that such minors shall attend schools provided for their own race, to make election to that end, there can be no injury to anyone based on Amendment 111. No one in this case ever alleged that he or she was a victim of a violation of the United States Constitution based on a racially discriminatory application of § 256 or of Amendment 111, Ala. Const.1901. Thus, although a certain section of Amendment 111 appears on its face to be discriminatory, because no plaintiff in this case alleged that he or she suffered an injury under this section, no case and controversy was ever presented to the trial court to invoke its jurisdiction. Amendment 111 had substantially amended § 256, and the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Brown effectively prohibited either Amendment 111 or § 256 from being interpreted to allow any racial discrimination. Declaratory judgments are issued pursuant to § 6-6-222, Ala. Code 1975. [49] There must be a bona fide existing controversy of a justiciable character to confer upon the court jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under the declaratory judgment statutes.... State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 69, 73, 300 So.2d 106, 110 (1974). In fact, the [complaint] must show such a controversy to exist before the court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. City of Mobile v. Jax Distrib. Co., 267 Ala. 289, 290, 101 So.2d 295, 296 (1958). As I stated above, the plaintiffs made no allegations of racial discrimination in their complaint. The racially discriminatory portion of Amendment 111 was not, when this action was filed, and is not now, applied in this State, nor did the plaintiffs allege that they had been discriminated against on the basis of this provision. [50] Because the plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint that they were harmed through racial discrimination resulting from the application of Amendment 111, they lacked standing to move for a declaration of unconstitutionality. `To present a justiciable case or controversy, the individual plaintiff must have standing to sue; to have standing, the individual must allege an injury directly arising from or connected with the wrong alleged. The standing requirement applies whether the plaintiff sues individually or on behalf of a class.' Ex parte Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 582 So.2d 469, 474 (Ala.1991) (quoting 1 Newberg on Class Actions, p. 190 (1977)). When a party without standing purports to commence an action, the trial court acquires no subject-matter jurisdiction. Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation District, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (`Standing is a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction'). See also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995) (`standing `is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines''); National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994) (`Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the litigation.'); Romer v. Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Pueblo, supra, 956 P.2d [566] at 585 [(Colo.1998)] (`standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to every case and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings') (Martinez, J., dissenting); Cotton v. Steele, 255 Neb. 892, 587 N.W.2d 693 (1999). State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Ala.1999). In their briefs filed in response to the January 10, 2002, order of this Court and in answer to four questions propounded by this Court to the parties, the plaintiffs allege, without supporting proof, the following injurious effects of Amendment 111: continuing existence of all-white academies, a reduction of the white population in the public schools as a result of the existence of such academies, and the lack of public support for public education as a result of private schools. For the first time since this case has been litigated, the plaintiffs tell us that [m]any of the plaintiff parents and schoolchildren are black. ACE Brief, p. 50. For a plaintiff to have made a claim that Amendment 111 is racially discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional, without even identifying the plaintiff's race, is a significant omission. Nevertheless, even with that belated addition of a most critical element of a racial-discrimination claim in the plaintiffs' latest briefs to this Court, it remains that they have not shown any actual particularized injury or harm that has occurred to black plaintiffs caused by Amendment 111. Such a showing is essential to establish standing for the plaintiffs to file such an action. [51] In view of the fact that the Legislature never used Amendment 111 to discriminate against any school students and the inability of any student plaintiffs to show an actual injury resulting from Amendment 111, plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this case. The plaintiff school boards claim standing because they are charged with supervising the educational interests of each county and with maintaining a uniform and effective system of public schools throughout their respective counties. They argue that the State's method of disbursing funds prevents them from performing this duty. However, the Alabama Constitution grants to the Legislature the supervision and maintenance of public schools; the Legislature has delegated some of that power to the school boards, but nowhere does a statute or a constitutional provision give county school boards the power of initial disbursement of taxpayer funds. More importantly, the school boards are an entity created by the Legislature and are a part of the State itself. The State cannot sue itself. Because the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue on the issue of racial discrimination, the very reason the trial court declared Amendment 111 unconstitutional, that claim was not ripe for adjudication and the trial court should not have entertained it. The declaratory judgment statutes do not empower courts to decide moot questions, abstract propositions or to give advisory opinions, however convenient it might be to have the questions decided for the government of future cases. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. City of Huntsville, 275 Ala. 184, 192, 153 So.2d 619, 626 (1963). Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare Amendment 111 unconstitutional, the court's revival of the original § 256 was also unnecessary and improper. The plaintiffs' core claim was that the Alabama public school funding structure is economically detrimental to the State of Alabama and irreparably damaging to the education of its schoolchildren. A declaration of unconstitutionality with regard to Amendment 111 was requested to rid the plaintiffs of the Amendment's declaration that nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as creating or recognizing any right to education or training at public expense, nor as limiting the authority and duty of the legislature, in furthering or providing for education, not to dispose of a racially discriminatory provision. A constitutional provision granting the Legislature complete discretion in formulating an education system prevents any lawsuit complaining about inequitable funding in that system. If the plaintiffs had presented a document, similar in content to the March 31, 1993, Liability Order, to the Legislature or to a legislative committee charged with education funding, it would have been appropriate as a lobbying tool to accomplish the plaintiffs' goals. Instead, they sought to employ the judiciary to force the Legislature's hand. This is contrary to the proper purposes of a lawsuit. Though the Liability Order may contain many laudable goals for education in Alabama, this Court cannot allow good intentions to stand in place of the rule of law. Where the Legislature has been given discretion by the people, it is not the place of the courts of this State to interpose their own will in the stead of the voters. If ever the State of Alabama uses the provisions of Amendment 111 and § 256, Ala. Const.1901, to discriminate against citizens of this State on the basis of race and a party with standing exercises a challenge to those provisions seeking a declaratory judgment, then, on appeal, this Court can review that case and analyze those parts of the constitution under appropriate legal guidelines. But the trial court in this case did not have before it a party alleging injury caused by Amendment 111 or by § 256, and the August 13, 1991, order was too intimately bound in purpose with and as a basis for the rest of the rulings entered in this case. Therefore, the trial judge lacked jurisdiction over the entire case, including those issues addressed in the August 13, 1991, order.