Opinion ID: 151783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Remedies for Failure to Record and Seal

Text: Section 2518(8)(a) provides a limited exclusionary remedy. It states that [t]he presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefore under subsection (3) of section 2517. Its application thus requires a two-part inquiry: First we determine whether the government complied with the recordation and sealing requirements. If the government has not complied, we determine whether it offered a `satisfactory explanation' for its failure to do so. Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1084. Only if the Government fails to satisfy both parts of the inquiry may the evidence be excluded. See, e.g., id. at 1087-88, 1090 (finding that, although the statute applied, the Government had provided a satisfactory explanation for its failure to comply with the recording and sealing requirements); see also Suarez, 906 F.2d at 983 (finding that the statute did not apply because the technology to record intercepted pager communications did not exist). In this case, as we have held, the evidence of the intercepted pager communications was not sealed in accordance with the statute because handwritten logs are not recordings and thus, cannot be sealed properlyindeed, any such seal placed on the logs would do nothing to insure the integrity or reliability of the information. Moreover, the police could have recorded and properly sealed the pager interceptions had they used the pager recorder available to them in Albany. They did not do so. Nor did the Government provide a satisfactory explanation for the officers' failure to record and properly seal the contents of the intercepted electronic communications. The intercepted pager communications themselves, the only physical evidence of which are the transcriptions in the log book, are thus subject to exclusion under § 2518(8)(a). [3] Although we hold that the documents at issue are not recordings and, for that reason, cannot be properly sealed, their exclusion is still appropriate insofar as they contain the contents of the intercepted communications. In fact, consistent with the language of the statute itself, which specifies that the seal, or a satisfactory explanation for its absence, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, § 2518(8)(a) (emphasis added), we are applying the exclusionary remedy to the contents of the intercepted pager communications. We also observe that precluding admission of these electronic communications under § 2518(8)(a) is consistent with the approach endorsed by the Ninth Circuit: [T]he operative portions of [§ 2518(8)(a)] require, as a precondition to admissibility, (1) that the government record intercepted communications where possible; (2) that the government present such recordings to the district court to be sealed [i]mmediately upon the expiration of the order authorizing the surveillance...; and (3), in the absence of compliance with either of these requirements, that the government offer a satisfactory explanation. Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1084 (emphasis added). We turn now to discuss the type of use and disclosure that must be precluded. While § 2518(8)(a) prohibits the use of the pager communications, it is only the use of such communications as would be allowed under § 2517(3) that will be barred by failure to comply with the sealing requirements. See United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1186 (2d Cir.1995) (By its terms, the sealing requirement applies only to subsection (3) of section 2517 and not to subsection (2) or (1).). The prohibition against their use, therefore, does not apply to nontestimonial uses. Ricco, 566 F.2d at 435 (citing United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 531-32 (2d Cir.1977)). Subsection (3) of § 2517 provides that evidence of intercepted communications may be disclosed while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof. Subsections (1) and (2), by contrast, authorize other uses of intercepted wire, oral and electronic communications: (1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure. (2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom may use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1)-(2). It is subsections (1) and (2) that provide the authorization to use intercepted electronic communications for purposes of establishing probable cause in support of, inter alia, subsequent wiretap warrants, other search warrants, and arrest warrants. And our case law is clear that the prohibition on the use of improperly sealed evidence in sworn testimony will not preclude the use of such evidence either to pursue an investigation or to prove up the fruits of such investigation at trial. United States v. Donlan, 825 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir.1987) (noting that Congress clearly intended that law enforcement officers be able to use untimely sealed conversations in testifying before a judicial officer to obtain an arrest or search warrant). In other words, the prohibition in subsection 2518(8)(a) on derivative use at trial of improperly sealed tapes is not to be applied strictly to prohibit use of all evidence that can be connected through a chain of causation to a wiretap tainted by improper sealing. Id. at 657. The exclusionary remedy in § 2518(8)(a) applies to the unsealed interceptions at issue in this case. As the pager wiretap evidence before us violated the recording and sealing requirements, the proper remedy to address those errors is the prohibition of the use of those interceptions in ways that would otherwise be permitted by § 2517(3). In this regard, the district court did not err in concluding that the Government is prohibited from offering testimonyat trial or in any other proceedingregarding the contents of the pager interceptions. The remedy of exclusion provided for in § 2518(8)(a) does not, however, apply to preclude the use of those interceptions in ways authorized under subsections (1) and (2) of § 2517. Accordingly, the Government is not prohibited from offering evidence obtained through warrants that were based on the pager interceptions. That use of the tainted wiretap evidence does not fall under § 2517(3) and, thus, is not affected by the exclusionary remedy in § 2518(8)(a). The pager wiretap evidence before us, though inadmissible, was not obtained in violation of the Constitution and, therefore, the fruits derived from that evidence may not be suppressed. [4]