Opinion ID: 670806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reduction for limited success

Text: 14 Defendant-appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiffs full attorney's fees, given plaintiffs' very limited success. Defendant-appellant emphasizes that plaintiffs recovered only $24,006 out of the $1,000,000 they originally sought. Furthermore, only three defendants out of the 45 named in the complaint were found liable. 15 Defendant-appellant relies primarily on Farrar v. Hobby, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). In Farrar, a plaintiff had sought $17 million in damages from six defendants, but was awarded only $1 in damages against one defendant. Nonetheless, the district court awarded $280,000 in Sec. 1988 attorney's fees. The Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 575. The Court explained that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee award is the degree of success the plaintiff achieved. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 574; see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 1943 ([T]he extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988.). Having obtained only one-seventeen-millionth of what the plaintiff sought after ten years of litigation, which included two trips to the Court of Appeals, any award would be unreasonable. Farrar, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 575; id. at 575 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Accordingly, defendant-appellant concludes that similarly, full attorney's fees would be unreasonable here, given that plaintiffs obtained only a small fraction of what they originally sought. See also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 1943 (A reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.). 16 We agree. We remand to provide the district court the opportunity to reconsider the issue in light of Farrar which was not yet decided when the district court issued its September 1992 order. The district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940; see LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees must be reduced to reflect the limited degree of his success); Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690 (9th Cir.1993) (affirming a district court's award that reduced the number of hours reasonably worked by 33% from 550 hours to 370 hours because plaintiffs achieved only limited success). 17 On remand, the district court must recalculate an attorney's fee award. The district court should give primary consideration to the following: (1) the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount of damages sought is minimal, Farrar, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 575; and (2) the number of defendants found liable as compared to the number of defendants sued is insignificant, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 578 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1461 (Because [plaintiff] prevailed on only a few issues, his reasonable attorney's fees must be reduced to reflect the limited degree of his success.); Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 417 (9th Cir.), amended (9th Cir.1993). 18 Furthermore, the district court should articulate a clear explanation of its reasoning when it recalculates the attorney's fee award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941; Corder I, 947 F.2d at 380; Chalmers v. Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir.1986), amended, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987); Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d at 1151. We note that the district court did not address the limited success issue at all, except to note that the Ninth Circuit had found it clearly erroneous to reduce the initial lodestar figure because plaintiffs achieved limited success in light of plaintiffs' rejection of the $45,000 settlement offer. The district court should have stated its reasons why a reduction based on other grounds was not warranted. See, e.g., Rivera v. Riverside, 763 F.2d 1580, 1582 (9th Cir.1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986); Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir.1983).