Opinion ID: 1385357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PART I. Why is a rehearing needed?

Text: The California Constitution in article VI, section 14 distinguishes between opinions of the Supreme Court and [d]ecisions of the Supreme Court. As to opinions, the only express commands in the Constitution are (1) that the Legislature provide for prompt publication of those the court deems should be published, and (2) that the opinions so selected be available for publication by any person. The command that affects decisions is notably more comprehensive. Whenever decisions determine causes [they] shall be in writing with reasons stated. There are no exceptions. Yet what has happened in this case, apparently, is that the majority while purporting to modify their opinion have in fact modified their decision. Have they stated any reasons? The answer is No. Therefore it seems that they have acted unconstitutionally. (See too Cal. Rules of Court, rule 24(a): ... Where an opinion is modified without change in the judgment ... such modification shall not postpone the time that the decision becomes final ...; but if the judgment is modified ... the period specified herein begins to run anew, as of the date of the modification.) In what critical respects has the decision here been altered? The majority now decide first, that judges serving protected terms should not get a salary that will continue after 1 January 1977 to increase in proportion to the CPI (see the first sentence in fn. 9 of their original opinion, which is being deleted); and second, that a judicial pensioner must suffer correspondingly (i.e., the base for his or her benefit after the expiration of a protected term may not reflect a salary that has increased in proportion to the Consumer Price Index). Also, certain judges and pensioners will be affected by the new holding that a protected term, even when it has not expired by running its course (in the case of trial judges, no later than the first Monday in January 1981 and, in the case of appellate justices, no later than the first Monday in January 1987), nonetheless will be deemed terminated by death of the incumbent, by retirement, by election or removal to another office, or by other departure from office. (See the majority's new fn. 10.) Inexplicably, that is so notwithstanding the phrase a judge elected to an unexpired term serves the remainder of the term that appears in article VI, section 16, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution. [1] No reasons have been put forth to justify those alterations. Thus the Constitution's command that [d]ecisions ... be in writing with reasons stated has been disregarded. Further, this court still does not know exactly who among the judges and pensioners may adversely be affected by the alterations. Yet many of them have not been heard, within the meaning of due process requirements, because they received no notice of any intent so to modify the initial decision. To accord the opportunity to be heard is a compelling reason why rehearing should be granted. We should not pretend that the majority's modifications are inherently or demonstrably uncontestable. [2] In addition we should not pretend that the briefs and other papers received here since March 27 merely restate arguments that were considered by the court prior to issuance of the initial opinions. On the contrary the new focus on practical complexities and inequities, which indeed are troubling, requires thorough reanalysis of the majority's original assumptions and presumptions regarding legislative intent. [3]