Opinion ID: 620065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Squishy Bag

Text: What is left then, is to review the post-frisk events concerning the bag in Brake's pocket. Without challenging whether or how long the Terry stop could extend beyond the pat-down, Brake contends that, in all events, his conduct in retrieving the bag from his pocket was not based on his voluntary consent to search. Accordingly, he urges us to hold that the police seizure of the bag -11- violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. A warrantless search does not offend the Fourth Amendment when it is properly circumscribed and stands on a voluntary consent given by a person so authorized. United States v. Chaney, 647 F.3d 401, 405-06 (1st Cir. 2011). Consent is voluntary if it is 'the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.' Chhien, 266 F.3d at 7 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). In determining voluntariness, the focus is often on whether the individual's will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225; United States v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1996). Determining whether an individual's consent was indeed voluntary or instead the product of coercion requires a highly fact-specific inquiry dependent upon a careful scrutiny of the totality of the circumstances, rather than on a mechanical application of legal factors to a factual scenario. See United States v. Vanvliet, 542 F.3d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 281, 286 (1st Cir. 2003). The common list of relevant fact drivers for assessing whether consent was voluntary includes the person's age, education, experience, knowledge of the right to withhold consent, and evidence of coercive tactics. Chaney, 647 F.3d at 407 (internal quotation -12- marks omitted); see Vanvliet, 542 F.3d at 264 n.2 (listing range of pertinent factors). While there is no requirement that the person who gave consent must have been explicitly advised of the right to withhold it, valid consent requires more than mere acquiescence in the face of an unfounded claim of present lawful authority. United States v. Perez-Montañez, 202 F.3d 434, 438 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234 and Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 51 U.S. 33, 40 (1996); Chaney, 647 F.3d at 407-08; Vanvliet, 542 F.3d at 264. Brake argues that he did not voluntarily consent to removing the bag from his pocket, but was acced[ing] to directives from a police officer whom he understood was continuing to detain him. According to Brake, because Mondene did not inform him that he was free to leave after the pat-down search, a reasonable person would have understood that he remained detained, and thus a proper reading of the evidence establishes that [b]efore the frisk he was submitting to the show of lawful authority by Mondene [and] after the frisk he simply continued to do so. This compliance and submission, he says, cannot amount to voluntary consent. The district court found that Brake chose to cooperate with the police of his own free will throughout the encounter, having decided to pursue a strategy of cooperation and ignorance about the origin and contents of the bag. The record supports this finding. In particular, the testimony shows that Brake was -13- cooperative with Mondene from the beginning of their interaction, and indeed he displayed no nervousness or anxiousness of any kind during the entire encounter -- even when Mondene discovered the bag. Mondene testified that when asking about the bag he intentionally shifted to an inquiry mode rather than a more commanding one because in his mind the purpose of the Terry stop had concluded once he conducted the pat-down frisk and found no weapons. Brake provided an immediate account of the bag's origin, and without hesitation complied with Mondene's request: proceeding to display the bag, reveal its contents, and then throw it on the ground while disclaiming any ownership. Although the defendant did not testify, the district court was careful to consider whether the police testimony standing alone was a credible account of the entire interaction and found that it was. Brake does not challenge this credibility finding,2 and on this record, we see no clear error in the district court's determination that Brake voluntarily chose to take a nothing-to-hide stance with the police and to consent to retrieve the bag from his pocket and show its contents. We disagree with the appellant that the factual account leads to the singular conclusion that he was merely submitting to 2 Brake's decision not to challenge the district court's judgment on witness credibility is understandable. Appellate review is especially deferential to such judgments, and we overturn them only if, after reviewing all of the evidence, we have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 214 (1st Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record displays no such mistake. -14- a claim of lawful authority, rather than voluntarily consenting to a search. The legal authority Brake relies on in support of his position does not help him, because Mondene did not represent, either expressly or impliedly, that Brake was required to pull the bag out of his pocket or to reveal its contents. Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 546-50 (1968) (holding that the government cannot satisfy its burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given when homeowner simply stated go ahead in response to police declaration of a warrant to search the residence; [t]he situation is instinct with coercion -- albeit colorably lawful coercion); United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 63 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the defendant produced a drug cache from his person after the police ordered him to submit to a visual body cavity search pursuant to police department policy only because he recognized that otherwise, the search would be performed); United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 786 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that police officer's representation that drugsniffing dog had alerted on the defendants' travel bag communicated the message that probable cause to search existed and they had no choice but to permit it; thus the defendants acquiesced to display of authority rather than voluntarily consenting to the search). That Mondene inquired about the bag in the context of what a reasonable person may have seen as a continuing Terry stop -15- does not, by itself, convert Brake's volitional decisions into coerced compliance. See United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that while the possibility of coercion may be heightened if the person is in custody at the time consent is obtained, custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate coerced consent to search (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1991) (explaining that consent can be voluntary even though detainee does not feel free to leave). Although the lack of any instruction that Brake was free to leave or free to refuse to cooperate may be relevant to a voluntariness inquiry, such circumstances do not automatically render consent invalid. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40 (concluding that an officer conducting a highway stop need not inform driver he is free to go before requesting permission to conduct a search); Chaney, 647 F.3d at 407-08 (noting that police failure to advise a defendant of his right to refuse to consent does not automatically vitiate voluntary consent). Simply put, there is no indication that Brake was coerced in any fashion to pull the bag out of his pocket and open it for the police officer to see its contents. Accordingly, the appellant has not demonstrated clear error.