Opinion ID: 498110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction of the flra

Text: 9 As a preliminary matter, the AFGE once again raises the question of whether the Authority had jurisdiction to deny supervisor-members the right to vote in union elections. The FLRA based jurisdiction to hear the unfair labor practice charge before it on sections 7116 and 7120 of the CSRA. It is undisputed that the FLRA generally has the power to hear unfair labor practices claims. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 93, 104 S.Ct. 439, 442, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983). The petitioner's charge is that section 7120 of the CSRA cannot provide the basis for such a claim. Subsection (e) of that provision states that, [t]his chapter does not authorize participation in the management of a labor organization by a ... supervisor ... if the participation or activity would result in a conflict or apparent conflict of interest. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7120(e); United States Dep't of Labor, supra, 20 F.L.R.A. at 300. The FLRA simply assumed the propriety of its finding that voting is participation pursuant to section 7120 and amounts to an unfair labor practice under sections 7116(a)(1), (3) and 7116(b)(8). 10 Conversely, the AFGE maintains that section 7120 is not a tool which the FLRA may use to prevent unfair labor practices. The Union regards section 7120 as a mechanism to be applied only by the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management Relations and only for the purpose of regulating union elections in the public sector. For support the AFGE relies on section 7120(d) which provides that 11 [t]he Assistant Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this section [7120]. Such regulations shall conform generally to the principles applied to labor organizations in the private sector. Complaints of violations of this section shall be filed with the Assistant Secretary. In any matter arising under this section, the Assistant Secretary may require a labor organization to cease and desist from violations of this section and require it to take such actions as he considers appropriate to carry out the policies of this section. 12 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7120(d). This construction cannot withstand close scrutiny and must be rejected. 13 In Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468, 88 S.Ct. 643, 646, 19 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the Supreme Court noted the unusual character of federal labor laws: 14 [w]e have cautioned against a literal reading of congressional labor legislation; such legislation is often the product of conflict and compromise between strongly held and opposed views, and its proper construction frequently requires consideration of its wording against the background of its legislative history and in light of the general objectives Congress sought to achieve. 15 Such concerns are particularly apt in the instant case. The AFGE argues that subsection (d) of section 7120, literally read, confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Assistant Secretary of Labor to carry out the purposes of section 7120(a)-(f). See Pet. Brief at 9. If this is true, only the Assistant Secretary, an official of the Department of Labor, has jurisdiction to employ section 7120(e) to determine whether voting by supervisor-members constitutes participation in management. In effect, the Union contends that section 7120 is nothing more than a supplement to the LMRDA, prescribing standards the Assistant Secretary may use to regulate union elections. 16 We do not view section 7120's role so narrowly. Several sources belie the Union's position. By its own terms, subsection (e), the subsection at issue, reaches beyond section 7120 to embrace all of Title VII of the CSRA. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7120(e) ([t]his chapter does not authorize participation in management ... (emphasis added)). The Union's neglect of this language violates the canon of construction requiring that  'effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute' so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. In re Surface Min. Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1362 (D.C.Cir.1980) (quoting from 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction Sec. 46.06). 17 Furthermore, in failing to consider subsection 7120(e)'s reach, the Union ignores Congress' general objectives in enacting the CSRA. See Wirtz, supra, 389 U.S. at 468, 88 S.Ct. at 646. Title VII defines the whole of labor-management and employee relations in the federal sector. See 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7101-7135. Toward the end of protecting federal employees' rights and enforcing their obligations to the government, id. at Sec. 7101(a), (b), Congress created the FLRA. Id. at Sec. 7105. It is clearly Congress' will that the Authority shall provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to matters under this chapter. Id. at Sec. 7105(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Authority is further charged with the duty to take such other actions as are necessary and appropriate to effectively administer the provisions of this chapter. Id. at Sec. 7105(a)(2)(I) (emphasis added). These purposes cannot be reconciled with the Union's construction of section 7120, disallowing all FLRA administration of that section. 18 We interpret section 7120 as providing concurrent jurisdiction to the Assistant Secretary of Labor and the FLRA. We further conclude that only the FLRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges under the section. The relevant legislative history manifests an intention by Congress to limit the Assistant Secretary's jurisdiction to breaches of a union's internal standards of conduct, like election procedures and proper nominating requirements. 9 In testimony before the ALJ, the Chief of the Labor Department's Office of Labor-Management Standards Enforcement corroborated this view. He conceded that the Department of Labor is not equipped to redress the kind of grievance stated by Ms. Wuchinich's complaint. 10 See Testimony of Fred Heitmann, Branch Chief of the Office of Labor Management Standards Enforcement for the Department of Labor, Joint Appendix at 77, 82, 86, 89. Construing section 7120 in the manner suggested by the petitioner would deprive union members from obtaining any relief for arguably unfair labor practices arising during the election process. Such an interpretation would contravene Congress' intent in promulgating Title VII generally and section 7120 specifically. Thus, we hold that the jurisdiction of the FLRA was proper.