Opinion ID: 3165006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Bar the Death Penalty

Text: Appellant contends the trial court committed legal error and abused its discretion by denying his pre-trial motion to bar the death penalty. He notes 17 years have passed from his May 1995 conviction to final sentencing in June of 2012, which, he argues, violated his rights to due process and a speedy trial. Further, he argues this delay amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant states several of his potential witnesses died between the 2002 PCRA proceedings and the 2012 new penalty-phase hearing. Moreover, appellant asserts Detective Lawrence Crews, who investigated the victim’s death in appellant’s 1980 voluntary-manslaughter case, could not recall certain facts regarding that conviction, depriving him of details which would have been helpful to the defense. The trial court found appellant’s argument was a matter of first impression and looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. Specifically, the trial court looked to State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. 2007), where the Supreme Court of Indiana applied the [J-70-2014] - 3 balancing test used by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to determine whether the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial and due process were violated. In Azania, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but the case was remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing. Azania, at 997. At the new penalty-phase hearing, 13 years after conviction, the jury returned a death sentence, which was affirmed. Id. The death sentence was again vacated, and, at the new penalty-phase hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to bar the death penalty. Id. The state appealed. Id. The Supreme Court of Indiana, applying the Barker3 test, held the 13-year delay did not prejudice the defendant or violate his due process rights. See Azania, at 1005, 1010. The court noted any prejudice suffered by the defendant due to the passage of time did not rise to the level of violating due process. Id., at 1010. The defendant had the opportunity to present evidence, and the jury could consider any impact the passage of time had on a witness’s ability to testify. Here, the trial court likewise applied Barker, and found the delay did not prejudice appellant or violate his due process rights. Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 6-12. The court focused much of its analysis on the fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant. Addressing appellant’s claim that he was prejudiced by the delay because multiple witnesses died through the passage of time, the court found he did “not specify which [potential witnesses] would have testified I on his behalf.” Id., at 8. Further, appellant 3 In Barker, the United States Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine whether there was a violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial and due process. Barker, at 530-33. The Court noted four factors to consider: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. Although the High Court did not regard any of the four factors as either a “necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial[,]” it opined courts are still required to engage in a “difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Id., at 533. [J-70-2014] - 4 did not describe any additional testimony they would have provided to assist him. Id. The court noted the testimony of these individuals was preserved by transcripts, which were read to the jury. Id. “[W]ithout more specific allegations as to what testimony was eliminated by the passage of time, the mere general allegation that the read transcripts from prior testimony was not as powerful as live testimony is insufficient to establish sufficient prejudice to [appellant].” Id., at 8-9. The trial court also addressed appellant’s claim that witnesses could not recall helpful details regarding his 1980 voluntary manslaughter conviction. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/18/12, at 80-82. Specifically, Detective Crews could not recall specific actions he took during that investigation. See id., at 87-88. The court concluded appellant again did not offer any specific mitigating information that was not provided by Detective Crews’s testimony. Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 10. Appellant merely claims the detective’s loss of memory prejudiced him, without discussing how any unstated information would have benefitted the defense. The trial court made the same conclusion regarding the testimony of Sonya Rollins, the sister of the victim in the 1980 homicide. In particular, Rollins could not recall specifics surrounding her brother’s death. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/18/12, 46-47, 50, 58-59. The court held a more “vivid recollection of the more horrific aspects of the underlying crime” would not have “assisted [appellant] in any manner.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 10. Appellant made no specific arguments regarding any mitigating evidence that was lost, and the court found no prejudice. The trial court also found appellant’s complaint that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated was without merit, holding “the Eight[h] Amendment does not protect against delaying a sentence of death because those delays are designed to afford a defendant his constitutional right to appeal and cannot become grounds for an additional [J-70-2014] - 5 appealable issue.” Id., at 10-11 (citing People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (Ill. 2000)). The court noted appellant invoked his right to appeal and continued those appeals on multiple occasions. Id., at 12. “Therefore, [appellant]’s complaint that the delay in his sentencing violates his due process rights, as well as his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments is unsubstantiated.” Id. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s decision regarding this issue. Prior testimony was preserved, absences and lapses in memory have not been shown to involve identifiable exculpatory, mitigating, or even helpful information, and in the end, appellant has not demonstrated legal prejudice. A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1162 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). Upon such review, we affirm the determinations and ruling of the trial court. Additionally, appellant asserts he was prejudiced by the length of time he has spent on death row. Appellant has been on death row for over 18 years, and he argues his time spent there waiting to be executed constitutes a “wanton infliction of harm in violation of the Eight[h] Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18.