Opinion ID: 1969068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The August 26, 1995 Arrest

Text: On December 28, 1995, when Zimmerman was being tried for the August 26, 1995 DUI charge, the State filed a two page memorandum requesting that upon conviction Zimmerman be sentenced as a fourth-time DUI offender pursuant to the provisions of 21 Del.C. § 4177(d)(4). No defense objection was noted at Zimmerman's February 23, 1996 sentencing, where he was sentenced as a fourth-time DUI offender. Because Zimmerman did not object to the August 26, 1995 DUI conviction being treated as a fourth offense subject to enhanced penalties under 21 Del.C. § 4177(d)(4), we review this issue for plain error. [20] At Zimmerman's sentencing, the sentence imposed for the August 26, 1995 conviction conformed with the applicable statutory minimum sentence for a fourth or subsequent offense occurring any time after three prior offenses. 21 Del.C. § 4177(d)(4). [21] Zimmerman argues that, because he was not convicted of his third offense until December 13, 1995, both his conviction for the June 25, 1995 incident and his conviction for the August 26, 1995 incident should be treated as third offenses for sentencing purposes. In support of his argument, Zimmerman cites to two cases. The first case, Kane v. State , deals with enhanced penalties for drug convictions based upon prior Title 16 violations. [22] The second, Hall v. State, [23] deals with the determination of eligibility for sentencing as an habitual criminal under 11 Del.C. § 4214(b). The State responds to Zimmerman's argument by reference to other cases that have interpreted the enhanced penalty provisions of Title 16 and the Delaware Habitual Criminal Act. [24] Two cases, Lis and Pryor, deal with statutory interpretation of the word convicted as used in 16 Del.C. § 4763. The third case, Buckingham, addresses the construction of the Delaware Habitual Criminal Act, 11 Del.C. § 4214(b). Relying on these cases, the State argues that [i]f the Delaware General Assembly meant for the enhanced penalties of 21 Del.C. § 4177(d)(2-4) only to apply when another DUI offense has been committed after a prior conviction, the Legislature could have utilized the term `conviction' as defined in 11 Del.C. § 222(4), [25] rather than the statutory language of `offenses.' The plain language of § 4177(d) states: (d) Whoever is convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section shall: ... (4) For a fourth or subsequent offense occurring any time after 3 prior offenses, be guilty of a class E felony.... Based on a careful reading of this section we find that the General Assembly intended to equate convictions with offenses. This reading is supported by the definition of offense in the criminal statutes. While 11 Del.C. § 233(a, c) define an offense as both an act forbidden by a statute and as a felony or a violation, 11 Del.C. § 241 states that [t]he punishments prescribed by this Criminal Code or any other statute of a criminal nature may be inflicted only after a judgment of conviction.... The definitions in Chapter 11 of the Delaware Code are applicable to section 4177(d)(4) as section 4177(d)(4) defines fourth offenses as felonies. Therefore, we hold that only when an individual is convicted of a violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177(a), such violation occurring after three prior convictions under section 4177(a), may he or she be sentenced as a fourth-time offender under section 4177(d)(4). [26]