Opinion ID: 155524
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disclosure During Schluck's MSPB Proceedings

Text: 81 During Patrick Schluck's MSPB proceeding, IRS District Director Stephen Taylor, Administrative Officer Stephen Webb, and IRS labor relations specialists Joni Probasco and DeWayne Wicks each gave deposition testimony in which they disclosed information from the ALERTS system and from his personnel records concerning John Pippinger. This deposition testimony was heard by IRS attorney Susan Neiser, and was also heard by a private attorney representing Schluck, a court reporter, and Schluck himself. The district court found that these disclosures did not violate Pippinger's rights under the Privacy Act because they were authorized by either the need to know exception of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1) (1994), or the routine use exception of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1994). See Pippinger, slip op. at 10. 82 Pippinger responds, first, by asserting that there was no need for Webb, Probasco and Wicks to disclose the information about Pippinger's case (especially Pippinger's name) that they disclosed in their depositions. Second, Pippinger claims that disclosure of information obtained from Pippinger's records to the MSPB at Schluck's MSPB proceeding was unauthorized by the Privacy Act. Third, Pippinger claims that deposition testimony is not a routine use of the records kept in the ALERTS system, and that the Privacy Act therefore prohibited any disclosure from Pippinger's records to Schluck, Schluck's attorney, and the court reporter, none of whom were then employed by the IRS. 4 We address each of Pippinger's three arguments in turn. 83 As discussed in Subpart A, supra, Taylor, Webb, Probasco, and Wicks each needed to know the information contained in Pippinger's Appeals, Grievances and Complaint System files and General Personnel and Payroll Records System files, in connection with their duties to investigate the allegations against Pippinger and recommend or implement a disposition. For similar reasons, IRS attorney Neiser also needed to know the record information about the Pippinger/Boak incident. Although Neiser was not involved in investigating Pippinger 's case, Neiser was charged with defending the IRS's actions in Schluck 's MSPB proceeding. The IRS's primary charge against Schluck was that Schluck had presided over disciplinary proceedings in which Pippinger was accused of having a romantic affair with a subordinate, while Schluck himself was in a romantic relationship with a subordinate. The IRS's position with respect to Schluck would have been rendered incomprehensible to Neiser if Neiser had not been apprised of Pippinger's situation. Further, for the reasons discussed in Subpart A, supra, redaction of Pippinger's name from Pippinger's records was not required by the Privacy Act. We thus agree with the district court that disclosures from Pippinger's files to IRS employees Taylor, Webb, Probasco, Wicks and Neiser fell squarely within the Privacy Act's need to know exception. 84 What's more, the routine use exception permits far more disclosure of records than does the need to know exception. See generally Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, What Constitutes Routine Use Disclosure of Employee Records Exempted from Provisions of Privacy Act of 1974 Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3), 107 A.L.R. Fed 857 (1992 & Supp.1995). The routine use exception permits disclosure of an otherwise protected record whenever such disclosure would be for a routine use. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1994). A routine use is defined as the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1994). Agencies that maintain a system of records are required to publish in the Federal Register a notice of each routine use of the records contained in the system, including the categories of users and the purpose of each use. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (1994). Records may be disclosed under the routine use exception only under a routine use published ... for the system of records covering [the disclosed] records. 5 C.F.R. § 293.406 (1997). 85 As discussed in Part I, supra, Pippinger's records, though stored in the ALERTS system, were culled from two systems of records described in the Federal Register: the Appeals, Grievance, and Complaint System; and the General Personnel and Payroll Records System. The routine uses of records in both systems have been defined in the Federal Register to include provid[ing] records and information to the ... Merit Systems Protection Board ... for the purpose of properly administering Federal Personnel Systems in accordance with applicable laws, Executive Orders, and regulations. 57 Fed.Reg. 14,056, 14,057 (Appeals, Grievance, and Complaint System); id. at 14,059 (General Personnel and Payroll Records System). 86 This language is broad enough to authorize the disclosure of Pippinger 's records to the Merit Systems Protection Board during the course of Schluck 's MSPB proceeding, so long as such disclosure is made for the purpose of properly administering Federal Personnel Systems. Id. In the case at bar, Pippinger has presented no evidence suggesting that his records were disclosed to the MSPB for any other purpose. Accordingly, the disclosures made by Taylor, Webb, Probasco, Wicks, and Neiser to the MSPB were authorized, routine uses of Pippinger's records. 87 The disclosures to Schluck, Schluck's attorney, and the court reporter were similarly made in conjunction with the MSPB proceeding and, accordingly, fall within the same routine use exception. One of the published uses for these systems of records is to allow the IRS to disclose relevant, non-privileged information to a court, magistrate, or administrative tribunal, including ... disclosure to opposing counsel or witnesses in the course of civil discovery.... 57 Fed.Reg. 14,056, 14,057 (Apr. 17, 1992) (Appeals, Grievance, and Complaint System) (emphasis added); accord id. at 14,059 (General Personnel and Payroll Records System). To avoid circularity, the qualifier non-privileged can only refer to privileges existing outside of the Privacy Act itself, such as the attorney-client privilege or the doctor-patient privilege. Otherwise, this particular routine use exception could never be invoked. Cf. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885, 888 (D.C.Cir.1987) (analyzing the pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction exception to the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11)) and holding that the Act does not create any additional privileges that would collide with the federal civil rules of discovery); Bosaw v. National Treasury Employees' Union, 887 F.Supp. 1199, 1216 (S.D.Ind.1995)(same). Thus, the disclosures to Schluck, Schluck's attorney, and the court reporter were authorized under the routine use exception to the Privacy Act. 88 Furthermore, we hold that Pippinger has no cause of action against the IRS for two additional reasons. First, Pippinger has presented no evidence indicating that the disclosures to Schluck, Schluck's attorney, or the court reporter, could possibly have had an adverse effect on Pippinger, as required under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (1994); see also Parks v. Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d 677, 682 (10th Cir.1980) (Privacy Act plaintiff must be adversely affected by the violation in order to state a cause of action). Although Schluck no longer worked for the IRS at the time of the disclosure, he had been privy to every event described in Pippinger's records at the time the event occurred. We simply fail to see how disclosure to Schluck of facts already known to Schluck could adversely affect Pippinger. See generally George Chamberlin, Annotation, Applicability of § 3(b) of Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)), Requiring Individual's Consent to Disclosure of Agency Records Maintained on Individual, To Disclosure of Information Otherwise Known to Federal Agency or Official, 52 A.L.R.Fed 579 (1981 & Supp.1995). 89 Similarly, Schluck would certainly have discussed with his attorney the events leading to Schluck's demotion. In doing so, Schluck could not have avoided telling the attorney about the Pippinger affair. Thus, Schluck's attorney, like Schluck, would already have known the disclosed information about Pippinger at the time of the disclosure. Finally, Pippinger has made no attempt to explain how disclosure to the court reporter adversely affected him. Thus, we hold that Pippinger has not satisfied the adverse effect requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (1994). 5