Opinion ID: 2595332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 76-5-406.5(1)(h) OF THE UTAH CODE

Text: ¶ 27 The fourth and final challenge Pritchett makes on appeal is to the constitutionality of section 76-5-406.5(1)(h) of the Utah Code (1999), which requires him to admit the offense for which he has been convicted in order to be considered for probation. Specifically, Pritchett claims that this requirement violates his right of due process, protection against self-incrimination, and guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [3] ¶ 28 Section 76-5-406.5(1) provides that a convicted child sex offender can qualify for probation to a residential sexual abuse treatment center if the offender meets twelve statutory requirements that indicate such treatment will have a high probability of success. Among these requirements is that the defendant admit[ ] the offense of which he has been convicted. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(1)(h). In so challenging this statutory requirement, Pritchett's burden is heavy. `A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law, which we review for correctness.... When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.' State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ¶ 5, 31 P.3d 547 (quoting State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 6, 980 P.2d 191). ¶ 29 We note at the outset that in regard to Pritchett's equal protection claim, this court has already stated that child sex abusers do not `generally constitute a suspect class entitled to either a heightened or an intermediate level of scrutiny.' State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1269 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 266 (Utah 1986)). As a result, the child sex offender classification under examination here will stand if it `bears a reasonable and substantial relation to a legitimate state objective.' Id. (quoting State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah 1984)). ¶ 30 Sexual assault of a child is an especially damaging crime, and it is because of the long-term and perhaps lifetime effects upon the victim that [t]he State clearly has a strong interest in protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation. Bishop, 717 P.2d at 267. In fact, in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1073 (Utah 1993), we previously observed that [a] primary purpose of the probation statute [section 76-5-406.5] is to avoid compounding the harm already suffered while protecting the victim from further abuse. In regard to child sex crimes, the State has a clearly legitimate interest: protecting children as current or potential victims, andto the extent that it is possible rehabilitating convicted child sex offenders. The probation statute is very narrowly tailored toward convicted sex offenders who seek to avoid a mandatory prison sentence by qualifying for probation to a residential treatment center by meeting all the requirements. Thus, the statute is directly and substantially related to the State interest. Accordingly, we find no violation of Pritchett's Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection in his treatment as a convicted child sex offender under section 76-5-406.5(1)(h) of the Utah Code. ¶ 31 As to Pritchett's claim that the probation statute violates his Fifth Amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in an analogous case, McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002), that the Constitution does not forbid requiring convicted criminal defendants to make hard choices between constitutional rights, and that in the criminal process [i]t is well settled that the government need not make exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free. Lile, 122 S.Ct. at 2029; see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971) (Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (holding that a criminal defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege prior to arrest may be used to impeach his credibility at trial); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (holding that a criminal defendant may be compelled to disclose the substance of an alibi defense prior to trial or be barred from asserting it). ¶ 32 At issue in Lile was a Kansas state prison program that required convicted sex offenders to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program (SATP) as they neared the end of their sentences or else their prison privileges would be reduced. The SATP required participants to accept responsibility for all prior sex crimes, whether or not they had been charged, and the information thus disclosed was not privileged. Convicted sex offender Robert Lile refused to participate in the SATP, claiming, as does Pritchett, that admitting to his criminal sexual history in exchange for a privilege violated his Fifth Amendment protections. Lile, 122 S.Ct. at 2023. ¶ 33 The Supreme Court held that the consequence of Lile's choice not to participate in the SATPloss of some prison privileges did not amount to compulsion in violation of the Fifth Amendment, stating that [a] broad range of choices that might infringe constitutional rights in free society fall within the expected conditions of confinement of those who have suffered a lawful conviction. Id. at 2026. Thus, requiring Lile to make a choice was not a punishment amounting to compulsion, but was rather part of a legitimate penological interest in the rehabilitation of offenders. Id. The Supreme Court also reasoned, relying on the framework previously set down in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), that the consequences Lile faced if he did not participate in the SATP did not approach the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects, but were closer to the  de minimus harms against which it does not. Lile, 122 S.Ct. at 2029. The Court concluded by noting that accepting Lile's argument would call into question the constitutionality of an accepted feature of federal criminal law: the downward adjustment [of a sentence] for acceptance of criminal responsibility. Id. at 2032; see, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 839, 111 S.Ct. 113, 112 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990) (holding that the denial of a downward adjustment under [federal sentencing guidelines] does not constitute a penalty or an enhancement of sentence under the Fifth Amendment). ¶ 34 In his reply brief on appeal to this court, Pritchett fails to address the analysis the United States Supreme Court made in Lile, making only a single sentence reference to the decision, characterizing it as dealing with post-sentencing prison regulations and thus being inapplicable here. Such a characterization is inaccurate. The Supreme Court clearly based part of its rationale in Lile on the interest the government has in rehabilitating convicted sexual offenders and protecting the public from them when they are outside of prison. ¶ 35 Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation, the Court observed, and when they reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be arrested for a new rape or sexual assault. Lile, 122 S.Ct. at 2024. This same rationale governs Utah's sex offender probation statute. See supra ¶ 30. The Court also observed that [a]n important component of ... rehabilitation programs [for sex offenders] requires participants to confront their past and accept responsibility for their misconduct. Id. Thus, Lile addresses a program that has the same objectives and concerns as the Utah child sex offender probation statute, and it is accordingly analogous and properly applied in this case. ¶ 36 The Lile rationale is, in fact, particularly applicable here, where the Utah statute grants a privilege of probation, while the policy examined in Lile reduces privileges while incarcerated. Indeed, as this court has previously stated, a defendant has no right to be placed on probation, that being within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908, 910 (Utah 1992). Utah's probation statute grants a privilege to which the convicted child sex offender has no automatic rightplacement in a resident treatment facilityin exchange for the offender choosing to admit culpability. Otherwise, the offender can choose to serve out the mandatory term to which he has been lawfully convicted. Thus, the statute clearly falls under the broad range of choices that do not violate the Fifth Amendment under Lile, which are the expected conditions of ... those who have suffered a lawful conviction. Accordingly, we hold that the convicted child sex offender probation statute, section 76-5-406.5(1)(h) of the Utah Code, does not violate Pritchett's right of due process and protection against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.