Opinion ID: 1375077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: accidental

Text: The second condition for coverage under the policies is the accidental requirement. The insurance companies argue that the term accidental applies to the disposal of pollutants. Kerr-McGee argues that it is the damage caused to third parties that must be accidental, even if the disposal was intentional. The pollution exclusion clauses in the policies state that there is coverage only if the discharge, dispersal, release or escape [of pollutants] is sudden and accidental or, in the words of some policies, if seepage, pollution or contamination is caused by an unintended or unexpected happening. The focus of that language is not on whether the polluter knew its waste could hurt the environment, but rather whether the discharge, dispersal, release or escape was unexpected or unintended. Kerr-McGee's long-term disposal of industrial waste was neither sudden nor accidental. The trial court erred in holding otherwise. Because the terms sudden and accidental in the pollution exclusion clauses are unambiguous, no extrinsic evidence is needed to determine the intent of the parties at the time the policy was issued. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Kerr-McGee and denying summary judgment to the insurance companies. The cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Concur: KAUGER, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ. HARGRAVE, J., Concurs in Result. WILSON, C.J., and OPALA, J., dissent.