Opinion ID: 812319
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Evidence of Cruz-Sosa’s Guilt

Text: 5 See also United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 259 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he jury is free to draw negative inferences from an untruthful witness’s testimony as long as there is affirmative testimony to supplement or corroborate those negative inferences.”). 14 Case: 11-15436 Date Filed: 11/21/2012 Page: 15 of 17 The government argues that, even if the district court erred in considering Rosillo’s discredited testimony as substantive evidence of guilt, the government’s other evidence alone was sufficient to find Cruz-Sosa guilty. Specifically, the government relies on evidence that: (1) the probation officer received a tip and later the same evening found the gun in a fanny pack in the closet, as described above; and (2) Cruz-Sosa lived in the house and used the bedroom where the gun was found, was in the bedroom when the officers arrived, and, thus, had dominion and control over the bedroom and closet where the gun was found, indicating that he constructively possessed the gun. Therefore, the government contends, the district court’s error was harmless. Indeed, we have stated multiple times that evidence that the defendant had control over the premises where the contraband was found was sufficient to find that the defendant constructively possessed the contraband. See, e.g., United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A defendant’s constructive possession of a substance can be proven by a showing of ownership or dominion and control over the drugs or over the premises on which the drugs are concealed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is undisputed that CruzSosa had control over the premises (the bedroom and closet) where the gun was located. 15 Case: 11-15436 Date Filed: 11/21/2012 Page: 16 of 17 However, control over the premises does not per se, or as a matter of law, constitute constructive possession of the contraband found therein in every case. Rather, control over the premises raises a permissible inference that the defendant possessed the contraband, and it is up to the fact-finder, not the appellate court, to make that inference. See United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he essence of constructive possession is the power to control the contraband itself and . . . control of the premises simply permits an inference of that power.”). The problem for the government here is that the district court’s findings are unclear. It is not entirely clear whether the district court chose to infer, from circumstantial evidence other than Rosillo’s discredited testimony, that Cruz-Sosa constructively possessed the gun found in the closet. The district court stated that: (1) “[u]sually I think people who are right next to a closet in which they keep some of their clothes know what’s in that closet,” and (2) “[b]ut even that probably would not be enough even on a preponderance of the evidence standard.” This statement could mean that (1) the district court permissibly chose not to infer constructive possession from Cruz-Sosa’s proximity to the gun, or (2) the court erroneously believed that the proximity evidence was legally insufficient to raise an inference of constructive possession. See Cochran, 683 F.3d at 1320 (stating 16 Case: 11-15436 Date Filed: 11/21/2012 Page: 17 of 17 that it is the fact-finder’s “choice and responsibility to draw inferences”). Certainly, in finding Cruz-Sosa guilty, the district court appeared to give primary weight to Rosillo’s discredited testimony about the gun, and, as discussed above, this discredited testimony could not be used as affirmative, substantive evidence of possession. We note that the district court also mentioned in its findings the informant’s tip that Cruz-Sosa was carrying a gun, but the court did not give this evidence much weight, stating that “we don’t know the identity of the tipster or any of that.” We do know that the tipster called, and the gun was found the same day. On the other hand, the gun was in a closed fanny pack in the closet with Rosillo’s jewelry, and that pack belonged to Rosillo. Because it is not entirely clear whether the district court chose, or would choose, to infer Cruz-Sosa’s possession of the gun from circumstantial evidence outside Rosillo’s discredited testimony, we remand this case to the district court for a clarification of its findings as to the charge against Cruz-Sosa.6 We reverse the district court’s order of revocation and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. 6 Of course, the district court should not disregard those parts of Rosillo’s testimony that it did find credible, such as the fact that Rosillo owned the gun and the fanny pack. 17