Opinion ID: 1208626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Motion for Summary Judgment and the Decision of the District Court

Text: Relying upon affidavits as well as depositions and other materials obtained during discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment in the District Court. They contended that the clothing exchange procedure did not entail a strip search, that inmates were allowed to preserve their privacy in various ways during the exchange, and that established Jail policy permits a strip search only on reasonable suspicion. Defendants also raised the defense of qualified immunity in the motion. Plaintiffs responded that the clothing exchange process requires a visual examination of each inmate during disrobing and that such examination constitutes an unreasonable search for Fourth Amendment purposes when conducted without reasonable suspicion. In a written opinion denying the motion for summary judgment, [1] the District Court stated as follows: Defendants have not met their burden to prove that there is no issue of material fact as to whether [the jail's] policies and practices require COs to observe inmates as they remove their street clothes. However, a question remains: if a CO w[ere] required to observe an inmate undress, would this procedure constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution? Kelsey, 2007 WL 603406, at . Consistently characterizing the clothing exchange as the Exchange/Strip Search Process throughout its opinion, the District Court examined the record and concluded that the observation of a newly admitted inmate in the process of disrobing is a search for contraband. Id. at . The District Court also noted the defendants' contention that the presence of a corrections officer serves as a deterrent to the transfer or destruction of contraband. Id. at . The District Court concluded: If this admission is accurate, it can mean only one thing: that the exchange/strip search process is meant to serve as a search for contrabandeven when there is no reasonable suspicion to do so. Id. at . As the District Court correctly noted, a strip search without reasonable suspicion is prohibited by our precedent. However, the court made no final pronouncement on the constitutionality of the search it had identified: [T]his Court cannot grant summary judgment to the Defendants while there is credible conflicting evidence in the record regarding the nature of the CO's observation of inmates as they disrobe. Id. The District Court thus did not find that the challenged searches were unreasonable. The court did find, however, that the defendants were amenable to suit individually [a]s a consequence of their involvement in the maintenance of [the jail's] policies and practices. Id. Finally, the court briefly addressed the qualified immunity defense as follows: There remains a dispute regarding material facts related to the constitutionality of the exchange/strip search process. As a result, it would be premature to determine whether Defendants Bates and Hazzard are responsible for violating clearly established constitutional law or are immune from suit under the qualified immunity doctrine. Defendants Bates and Hazzard may renew their defense at the proper time. Id. at .