Opinion ID: 1390193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The court's principles

Text: My disagreement with the court derives, in substantial measure, from the principles the court identifies and relies upon to determine whether the District Court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing. The court frames the standards governing Goldblum's contention as follows: Goldblum . . . contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under section 2254(e)(2) because the state court did not permit him to develop the record fully as the court precluded the testimony of two forensic experts who would have provided expert opinions similar to those of Dr. Wecht. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), [i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that (A) the claim relies on  (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. Thus, under section 2254(e)(2), if an applicant has developed the factual basis of his claims in the state court, he is not entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, even if the factual basis is not sufficiently developed, a petitioner must demonstrate that his case falls within the very limited circumstances listed in section 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B), and only then is the district court permitted under the AEDPA, though not required, to grant an evidentiary hearing. See Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286-87 (3d Cir.2000). We reiterate that the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing is left to the sound discretion of district courts. Schriro, 127 S.Ct. [1933,] 1939 [2007]. Additionally, the Supreme Court has made clear that an evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court record, as [i]f district courts were required to allow federal habeas applicants to develop even the most insubstantial factual allegations in evidentiary hearings, district courts would be forced to reopen factual disputes that were conclusively resolved in the state courts. Id. at 1940 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court then notes its position that section 2254(e) makes clear that it applies in all proceedings `instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)), and goes on to state: with these principles in mind, we review Goldblum's evidentiary hearing contention. Thereupon the court identifies the respects in which, measured against the principles stated by the court, Goldblum's contention comes up short.
The first of the court's principles that I believe is an inapposite statement of the law is the court's pronouncement  after quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)  as follows: Thus, under section 2254(e)(2), if an applicant has developed the factual basis of his claims in the state court, he is not entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing. [26] Section 2254(e)(2) does not speak in terms to the situation to which the court refers  the situation in which an applicant has developed the factual basis of his claims in the state court. Section 2254(e)(2) speaks in terms to the obverse situation  the situation in which the applicant has, as the statute puts it, failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, with the result that the applicant is barred from an evidentiary hearing in the district court unless the applicant can satisfy the very demanding requirements of subsections (A) and (B). There is no rule  whether of formal logic, or of semantics, or of statutory construction  which would require that § 2254(e)(2)'s preclusion of a federal evidentiary hearing for the applicant who has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings should bar a federal evidentiary hearing for the applicant who has been able to present the factual basis of his claims in a state court. To be sure, in most of the situations in which the applicant has been able to present the elements of his claim in a state court, it is unlikely that a further evidentiary hearing will be needed. But there are occasional circumstances where a supplementary federal evidentiary hearing may be called for  e.g., where the state court's hearing, while encompassing the factual basis of a claim, was not full and fair. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); see also Randy Hertz and James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 20.3e (5th ed. 2005) (identifying instances of unfair hearings). And § 2254(e)(2) is not a bar to such a hearing. In cases where an applicant for federal habeas relief is not barred from obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the decision to grant such a hearing rests in the discretion of the district court. Schriro v. Landrigan, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1937, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007).
What I think to be the court's second mis-stated principle follows right after the first: Furthermore, even if the factual basis is not sufficiently developed [in a state court], a petitioner must demonstrate that his case falls within the very limited circumstances listed in section 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B), and only then is the district court permitted under the AEDPA, though not required, to grant an evidentiary hearing. The court's formulation omits a crucial point. Section 2254(e)(2) bars a federal evidentiary hearing for a habeas petitioner who has not made a sufficient factual demonstration in a state court only when the inadequacy of the state court demonstration was the fault of the petitioner. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429-37, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).
The court, in my view, runs counter to circuit precedent in advancing a third principle: [S]ection 2254(e) makes clear that it applies in all proceedings `instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). This court ruled, in Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 413 (3d Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 897, 123 S.Ct. 195, 154 L.Ed.2d 166 (2002), that [s]ection 2254(e)(2) was not intended to govern all evidentiary hearings. In Cristin, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on whether a habeas petitioner's allegation of actual innocence was sufficient to excuse a procedural default, thus allowing the court to reach the petition's merits. Section 2254(e)(2), which applies when an applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, would, if applicable, have foreclosed the hearing. The Cristin court, determining that it was proper for the district court to hold a hearing, concluded that the plain meaning of § 2254(e)(2)'s introductory language does not preclude federal hearings on excuses for procedural default at the state level. Id. ; accord Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 716 (3d Cir.2004) (applying Cristin ). A contrary interpretation of § 2254(e)(2), as the Cristin court recognized with respect to evidentiary hearings on whether a prisoner's procedural default precludes a federal court from adjudicating his habeas petition, see 281 F.3d at 415-17, would severely handicap federal courts seeking to determine their subject matter jurisdiction. [27] The Supreme Court instructs that allegations of actual innocence made for the purpose of excusing procedural default or a successive petition, are procedural, rather than substantive because the claim of innocence does not by itself provide a basis for relief. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). That is, the claim of innocence is a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim decided on the merits. Id. (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993)). State courts have no institutional interest in developing records on this issue of federal procedure. Cristin recognizes that it is therefore unreasonable to require a habeas petitioner to rely solely on the state record in attempting to pass through this gateway: [S]ometimes a petitioner will develop facts in state court that later prove relevant to excusing a procedural default during federal proceedings. These occurrences, however, are coincidental, for it is rare that a state court intentionally provides a forum in which the petitioner can develop facts that might one day excuse his procedural default. It would be unreasonable to require a petitioner to rely on such coincidences to receive an evidentiary hearing on his procedural default. Cristin, 281 F.3d at 416 n. 13. Although Cristin concerned an issue of procedural default, its observations are no less apt with respect to hearings on a prisoner's second habeas petition. Following Cristin, I conclude that the bar on evidentiary hearings in § 2254(e)(2) is inapplicable where a petitioner seeks a hearing to establish a showing of actual innocence under Schlup. Indeed, as addressed below, the inadequacy of the state court record in this case precisely illustrates the concerns that animate Cristin.