Opinion ID: 544685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sentencing Guidelines and Their Enabling Legislation

Text: 6 Lueddeke's first argument on appeal is that the Sentencing Guidelines are inconsistent with their enabling legislation and are, hence, invalid insofar as they preclude, absent a downward departure, a probationary sentence for a first offender who has committed the nonviolent offenses of perjury and obstruction of justice. He proffers a myriad of precedential, comparative and interpretive arguments in support of this contention, all of which have been considered. Few warrant discussion. 7 Lueddeke points specifically to the enabling language of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(j) in which Congress provided that the Sentencing Guidelines should reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense. Lueddeke argues that the failure of the Guidelines to allow for probation in his case renders the Guidelines inconsistent with the quoted enabling language. This contention has already been rejected by several circuits. United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that the Sentencing Commission followed the congressional directive of Sec. 994(j)); United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 380 (11th Cir.1989) (same); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 827 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that the Commission acted within the broad discretion delegated to it and that the Guidelines' restriction of probation does not violate due process). We accept the analyses of these circuits. 8 In fact, several persuasive arguments lead to the conclusion that the Guidelines are not inconsistent with their enabling legislation. First, it should be pointed out that the Guidelines do, on balance, reflect the general appropriateness of imposing probation in less serious cases. As a district court recently noted, the Sentencing Table (Sentencing Guidelines at 5.2), when read with the probation guidelines (Sec. 5B1.1), permits probation without a confinement condition as a Guidelines sentence for the first six offense levels for a first offender, and permits probation with a confinement condition as a Guidelines sentence for four additional offense levels. United States v. Macias-Pedroza, 694 F.Supp. 1406, 1417-1418 (D.Ariz.1988). This means that a first offender convicted of a nonserious offense will generally be sentenced to some term of probation. 9 Second, in the case before us, the Guidelines are consistent with Sec. 994(j)'s requirement that probation be generally available to first offenders in nonserious cases. Lueddeke argues that he should have received a sentence of probation, in part, because the offenses of perjury and obstruction of justice are not serious within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(j) and other federal felony statutes. This provision, as noted earlier, urges probation for a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense. (emphasis added). We think it beyond question, however, that lying to a grand jury twice as well as producing false documents in support of one's deceit are very serious crimes. 1 The fact that Lueddeke's actions did not involve any overt violence is of no moment. Our judicial system is responsible for administering criminal laws aimed at social control. Hence, we consider crimes that decrease the ability of the courts and grand juries to get at the truth and weed out illegality to be especially insidious. We therefore reject Lueddeke's assertion that his crimes were not sufficiently serious within the meaning of federal criminal law. But see, United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that the facts surrounding a crime of embezzlement dictated a finding that the crime was not serious). 10 Moreover, as the government points out, the argument that the Guidelines as promulgated contravene congressional intent is fatally weakened by the fact that the Guidelines became effective only with the consent of Congress. Appellee's Brief at 13. This fact shows that Congress itself thought that the Guidelines were not inconsistent enough with its mandate on probation so as to require change. In addition, Congress, of course, has the continuing ability, as well as the authority, to disapprove or modify any aspect of the Guidelines it chooses. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(p). For all these reasons, we conclude that no amount of noscitur a sociis (interpreting words by reference to other associated words or phrases) urged by Lueddeke can escape the conclusion that the Sentencing Guidelines comport with their enabling statute in this case.