Opinion ID: 1539320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutional questions of due process and equal protection

Text: These questions raised in three of petitioner's eight points center, according to petitioner, upon the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 6 of the constitution of the State of Maine. [3] The reference section in the Maine constitution does not apply. In considering the applicability of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution to the plaintiff's situation, we study it in the light of the following considerations. Of the basic rights enumerated in the United States Constitution the one with which we are here dealing is the right to liberty unhandicapped except by due process of law. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to formularize it.    (U)nlike some legal rules, (it) is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.    [It] cannot be imprisoned within the    limits of any formula. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 643, 95 L.Ed. 817. (Concurring opinion) Our fourteenth federal constitutional amendment although voiced nearly 100 years ago, governs and must be applied to contemporary problems; interpretations change with the passage of time. In 1871 it was declared that a convicted felon has, as a consequence of his crime not only forfeited his liberty, but all of his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796. Today there is a growing recognition that [a]prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law. (Emphasis added) Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445, 155 A.L.R. 143 (6th Cir., 1944) We honor this juristic approach. The necessity on the one hand and the difficulty on the other of reconciling these conflicting factors has been recognized and expressed by a Federal Court which concluded that (t)here must be some middle ground between these extremes. U. S. ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F.Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y.1953) These two metaphysical poles are likewise fully recognized in text law where in speaking of liberty it has been said to embrace every form and phase of individual right that is not necessarily taken away by some valid law for the common good.   (I)t is deemed to embrace the right of men to be free in the enjoyment of    (his) faculties    subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.  (Emphasis added) 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law § 329, Pages 1134, 1135. At the same time the law recognizes reality and the fact that those persons charged with the administration of a prison, wherein resides by commitment a segment of the State's population which has been unwilling or unable to meet its obligations to an orderly society, varying as individuals from the one-time offender to the sociopath, have a grave responsibility within and on behalf of the Executive branch of government (Chapter 27 §§ 1, 27, R.S.1954). The management, control, and maintenance of the physical plant and its inmates and, hopefully, rehabilitation of the latter inherently require a supervisory atmosphere which, of necessity, withdraws from the prisoner many privileges and, in instances, authorizes the transfer of those inmates who do not adjust to its program. These withdrawals, these restrictions are for the common welfare. These restraints, both the physical segregation of the convict from society and the discipline required within the prison, represent due process for society. Governmental fair play (State v. Munsey, 152 Me. 198, 201, 127 A.2d 79) must be exercised for the benefit of all. This responsibility dictates reluctance on the part of courts to interfere with penal control and management. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U.Pa.L.Rev. 985 (May 1962). See also McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J.Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881, 885 (under notes 3-5) (N.J.1957) and Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (headnotes 14, 15). Searches by the courts to find and describe the middle ground mentioned in Yaris have not been infrequent and the constitutional issues which plaintiff raises have been judicially considered. The administrative transfer of a prisoner from one institution to another within the State, without a hearing to determine the justification for such transfer, is neither a denial of due process (Sheehan v. Superintendent of Concord Reformatory, 254 Mass. 342, 150 N.E. 231, 233 (Col. 2) (Mass.1926); Uram v. Roach, 47 Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793, 795, 95 A.L.R. 1448 (Col. 1) (Wyo.1934); Ex parte Zienowicz, 12 N.J. Super. 563, 79 A.2d 912, 917 (under headnotes 6, 7) (N.J.1951); Long v. Langois, 170 A.2d 618, 619 (Col. 2) (R.I.1961); and Duncan v. Madigan, 278 F.2d 695, 696 (9th Cir.Ct.App.1960) certiorari denied 366 U.S. 919, 81 S.Ct. 1096, 6 L.Ed.2d 242, re-hearing denied 366 U.S. 947, 81 S.Ct. 1675, 6 L. Ed.2d 858) [4] nor failure to extend equal protection of the law (People v. Scherbing, 93 Cal.App.2d 736, 209 P.2d 796, 799 (under headnotes 4, 5-7) (Dist.Court of Appeal Cal.1949); Com. ex rel. Bozzi v. Myers, 186 Pa.Super. 42, 140 A.2d 375, 376 (Pa. 1958); and Duncan, supra). Intrastate administrative transfer of a prisoner is not a trespass on judicial power. State ex rel. Kelly v. Wolfer, 119 Minn. 368, 138 N.W. 315, 317, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 978 (under headnote 4 p. 319) (Minn. 1912); Sheehan, supra, 150 N.E. p. 233 (Col. 2); Uram, supra, 37 P.2d p. 795 (Col. 2); Mellot v. State, 219 Ind. 646, 40 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ind.1942); Moffett v. Hudsbeth, 165 Kan. 656, 198 P.2d 153, 154 (Kan.1948); Scherbing, supra, 209 P.2d p. 799 (under headnotes 4, 5-7); Ex parte Burns, 88 Okl. Cr. 270, 202 P.2d 433, 436 (under headnote 9) (Okla.1949); Zienowicz, supra, 79 A.2d p. 917 (under headnote 8); Com. ex rel. Marsh v. Cavell, 388 Pa. 571, 131 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa.1957); The People ex rel. Latimer v. Randolph, 13 Ill.2d 552, 150 N.E.2d 603, 605 (under headnotes 3-5) (Ill.1958); and Long, supra, 170 A.2d p. 619 (under headnote 2). See also Green v. Robbins, 158 Me. 9, 176 A.2d 743. Intrastate administrative transfer within the official discretion of one person is not constitutionally offensive. Ex parte White, 10 N.J.Super. 600, 77 A.2d 818 (N.J. County Ct.Law Div.1950); Zienowicz, supra; The People of the State of New York ex rel. Sacconanno v. Shaw, 4 A.D.2d 817, 164 N.Y.S.2d 750 (S.Ct.App.Div. 1957); Latimer, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Reed v. Maroney, 194 Pa.Super. 514, 168 A.2d 800 (1961); and Long, supra. Additional courts, without discussion, have held that an intrastate administrative transfer poses no constitutional question. Sheehan, supra, 150 N.E. p. 234; Moffett, supra, 198 P.2d p. 154 (under headnote 1); Ex parte White, supra, 77 A.2d p. 820; Duncan, supra; and People v. Shaw, supra. Generally see also 26 Am.Jur., Houses of Correction § 7; 15 Am.Jur., Criminal Law § 555; 41 Am.Jur., Prisons and Prisoners § 6; 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 19b. Page 876. Some of the authorities cited above have made it a point in opinion that the statutory provisions in their states for administrative transfer were as much a part of the sentence as if it (provision for transfer) had been extended at length on the record of the court. Sheehan, supra, 150 N.E. p. 233 (Col. 2). To the same effect Mellot, supra, 40 N.E.2d p. 657 (under headnote 3); Zienowicz, supra, 79 A.2d p. 917 (under headnote 8); Bossi, supra, 140 A.2d p. 376 (under headnote 3, 4); Uram, supra, 37 P.2d p. 795; and Kelly, supra, 138 N.W. p. 318 (Col. 2). We are aware that the precedents cited deal with intrastate transfers, but the constitutional questions raised and decided are the same. It is our decision that the due process clause has not been violated. Plaintiff urges that he has not been extended protection equal to other persons of the category in which he finds himself, and bases this contention upon the fact that in Chapter 27 of the 1954 Revised Statutes Section 75 provides that for transfer from the Reformatory for Men to the State Prison a transfer board consisting of the Commissioner (of Institutional Service) the Warden of the State Prison and the Superintendent of the Augusta State Hospital must give unanimous approval. From the fact of a board plaintiff assumes that the prisoner has a right to be heard by that board before the transfer can be executed. The statute does not so provide. Under Section 32-A no transfer board is required. Plaintiff misunderstands the equal protection clause. All persons faced with an administrative transfer under Section 75 must be used alike. All persons transferred under Section 32-A must be used alike. Equal protection constitutionally does not mean that every person faced with an administrative transfer from any institution to any other must be processed alike. As between Section 32-A and Section 75 the category of persons involved is not the same. See Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655. It is our decision that the plaintiff's constitutional right for equal protection has not been violated. It being our decision that Section 32-A violates neither the due process nor equal protection clauses of the Constitution we record no comment on petitioner's contention that affording notice and a hearing to an inmate pre-transfer under Section 32-A would not substantially affect the rights of the state or the public. If a prisoner were constitutionally entitled to a pre-transfer notice and a hearing the administrative inconvenience and expenses of such procedure would be immaterial. While our finding that there has been no violation of plaintiff's rights under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution disposes of the underlying legal basis of his petition we choose to point out that some of the phases of factual prejudice which he alleges may follow from transfer, expressed in the subparagraphs under I, supra, have been likewise considered judicially. In addition to the comment in the cases already cited, it has been judicially determined that a convict is not entitled to a transfer whereby he might confer with attorneys or to be visited by relatives, People v. Hoffner, 191 Misc. 345, 76 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Queens County Ct.1947) and by analogy we hold that being transferred away from family, friends, and legal counsel is violative of no constitutional rights. There is complaint that such transfer impairs opportunity to obtain parole. Section 32-A specifically provides that such person shall not be deprived of his rights to parole and, even without that provision here protective to the prisoner, no substantive rights of prisoner would have been violated. Stillwell v. Looney, 207 F.2d 359 (10th Cir.1953); Aderhold v. Lee, 68 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.1934). As to the complaint that the transfer results in alienation from family and friends it must be pointed out that plaintiff is speaking of a privilege and not a right. Visiting privileges extended an inmate of a State institution of necessity must be subordinated to the orderly administration of the institution, the presence of suitable facilities for visitation, co-operative conduct by the visitor and the visitee and other similar administrative consideration. Such visitation is entirely an administrative concession within the discretion of the officer in charge, and no constitutional question is involved. Transfer under Section 32-A impairs no right to commutation and pardon. Constitution of Maine Article V, Part I, Section 11, and Section 32-A in Footnote 1. It is urged that a transfer under Section 32-A to federal physical custody exposes the petitioner to more onerous rules regarding deduction of sentence for good behavior, commonly termed good time. It is true that the application of the Maine and federal statutes extending time credit for good behavior of a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence is not the same, the Maine statute crediting good time to the minimum term (§ 28, Chapter 27, R.S., 1961 Cum.Supp.) and the practice under the federal statute (U.S.C.A., Title 18, § 4161 formerly § 710) crediting good time to the maximum term (Ware v. Hill, 28 F. Supp. 346 (D.C.Pa.1939)). We subscribe to the principle of the decision in U. S. ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, D.C., 52 F.Supp. 265, 280 which, applied to the present case, would suggest, and we hold, that any good time earned by the petitioner while in federal physical custody will, by Maine, be credited consistently with the Maine law, to the minimum term of his indeterminate sentence. This is not only proper but necessary under the provisions of Section 32-A whereby a prisoner shall be subject to the terms of his original sentence as if he were serving the same within the confines of the Maine State Prison,not because entitlement to good time is a part of the sentence, for indeed it is not, but because the prisoner is being held on behalf of the State of Maine and is entitled to good time under the Maine law as an incident to his legal custody by the State of Maine. Petitioner's contention that the application of Section 32-A attaches a badge of infamy to the prisoner merits no legal consideration.