Opinion ID: 2258873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructional Requirements

Text: In a criminal trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a requirement of due process. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)) (other citation omitted). While most constitutional errors are subject to a harmless error analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear that an instruction which is constitutionally deficient in describing the government's burden of proof is not amenable to harmless error analysis and will require reversal. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278-81, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081-82, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (citation omitted); [4] see also Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 333-34 (D.C.1994). As the Supreme Court explained in Sullivan, the premise underlying the harmless error review under Chapman, supra note 4, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 is not present where the jury has not reached a verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-81, 113 S.Ct. at 2082. The focus under the Chapman analysis is whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in [the] trial was surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279, 113 S.Ct. at 2081. Where the jury has reached a guilty verdict not based upon the reasonable doubt standard, there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment to which to apply the harmless error analysis. Id. This court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have approved the instruction on reasonable doubt contained in the Redbook which provides a definition for the term. Butler, supra, 646 A.2d at 334; Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792, 793-94 (D.C. 1993); Moore v. United States, 120 U.S.App. D.C. 203, 204, 345 F.2d 97, 98 (1965). Attempts to improve upon the definition all too often fail to achieve the goal of clarity and result in constitutional challenges. [5] See Butler, 646 A.2d at 336 (citing Holland v. United States, supra note 5, 75 S.Ct. at 137-38, 348 U.S. at 140; Taylor, supra note 5, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 356, 997 F.2d at 1558) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 2174, 80 L.Ed.2d 557 (1984). Given the risk of impermissibly lessening the burden of proof or of confusing the jury on an issue central to the determination of guilt or innocence, this court has urged, in the strongest way, that the trial court not deviate from the standard Redbook instruction. Butler, 646 A.2d at 337. [6] In Butler, this court determined that for purposes of analysis in the future we shall consider trial court deviations from [the Redbook] instruction, over defense objection, to be improper  indeed, presumptively erroneous.... Id. Therefore, we begin our analysis in this case with that premise in mind. In determining whether the trial court's deviation from the standard instruction is sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, we consider whether the instruction, viewed in context, creates `a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way' that violates the Constitution. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)) (footnote omitted). In light of these standards, we examine the claimed deficiencies in the instruction asserted by Smith.