Opinion ID: 1174888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: validity of the gag order

Text: Mother challenges the constitutional validity of a pretrial protective order entered by Judge Ripley, set forth in full in the margin. [8] Resolution of this issue requires balancing competing interests of free speech with the possible adverse effect on the child of publicity of the details of this action. The Alaska Constitution guarantees to every person the right to speak freely. [9] However, a court may close child custody proceedings if closure is in the best interests of the child. [10] Compelling justification is required to uphold an order infringing the right of free speech. As we have noted, where such fundamental rights as freedom of speech and association are involved, only compelling government interests will justify their encroachment. Mickens v. City of Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818 (Alaska 1982); Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1981). An essential aspect of this test is an inquiry into whether less restrictive alternatives will adequately protect those interests. Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1982). Since the state clearly has a compelling interest in protecting the child, the question before us is whether a less restrictive protective order would adequately shield him from the adverse effects of undue publicity. We conclude that the order is overbroad. A protective order arises from and must be tailored to fit the circumstances of a particular case; it is difficult to establish a general test for constitutional validity. However, an order which goes beyond assuring confidentiality of the file and anonymity of the parties must be justified by compelling circumstances and drawn as narrowly as possible to protect against particular evils. Instead, Paragraphs 3 and 4 create a blanket prohibition against all communication with persons not specified in the order, and expressly limit the scope of permissible communication with the persons specified. As Mother correctly points out, Paragraph 3 prevented both parents from discussing the case with spouses or partners except in their capacity as potential witnesses, and then only as necessary to further the presentation of the case. It apparently precluded Mother and Father from seeking professional counseling about the proceedings had they so desired. It prevented counsel from obtaining assistance from or providing assistance to other lawyers handling similar cases. Paragraph 3 could have been more narrowly drawn, allowing a wider circle of communication, without endangering the best interests of the child. Absent careful scrutiny by the trial court revealing compelling justification for such a broad infringement on freedom of expression, the order cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the protective order of August 8, 1983 are VACATED.