Opinion ID: 2979166
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 106 Guiness Court

Text: As with his argument regarding the search warrant for 1117 Plum Run Road, Montgomery states his argument that the warrant for 106 Guiness Court is invalid in one paragraph of his appellate brief: In the instant case, as relevant to the 106 Guiness Court address, the affidavit obtained was lacking any indicia of probable cause because it failed to contain sufficient evidence to establish that the drugs allegedly procured by the CI, actually came from 106 Guiness Court. The affidavit supporting issuance of the warrant is based upon speculation and unsupported by any material corraboration. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, 49. The government responds that the affidavit contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that drugs would be found at 106 Guiness Court. Giving great deference to the issuing judge’s determination of probable cause, as we must, we agree with the government. The affidavit, signed by the lead investigator, Detective Roby, stated that a confidential informant had purchased three ounces of crack cocaine from Montgomery on March 13, 2007. The CI had informed Detective Roby that Montgomery had left his residence with no crack cocaine in his possession, had traveled to 106 Guiness Court to obtain the crack cocaine, and then returned to his residence where the crack cocaine was sold to the CI. The affidavit recites that Montgomery was followed by the officer from his residence to 106 Guiness Court and back to his residence, and that he made no other stops, corroborating what the CI had told police. The information contained in the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause that crack cocaine would be found at 106 Guiness Court. 19 No. 08-5898 United States v. Montgomery C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Montgomery, while acknowledging the general rule that this court will generally not entertain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, nevertheless urges us to “consider his claims of IAC as contributing to the underlying violation” raised by his direct appeal. The government responds that the record is adequate for us to conclude that Montgomery’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit, and urges us to so hold. We reach ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal only if the record is sufficiently developed to permit us to review the claims. United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243, 255 (6th Cir. 2007). The presumption against resolving an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal “stems from the fact that a finding of prejudice is a prerequisite to a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, and appellate courts are not equipped to resolve factual issues.” United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 363, 368-69 (6th Cir. 2003). “[I]n most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). We conclude that Montgomery’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are best asserted in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Although many of Montgomery’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are premised on claims decided by us in this direct appeal, we believe it better for the matter to be decided after a complete and adequate record on the issues has been developed in the district court. 20 No. 08-5898 United States v. Montgomery