Opinion ID: 771751
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Contreras's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 23 Contreras filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment in this matter, claiming that Suncast's accommodation policy is a per se violation of the ADA. The district court determined that because Contreras was not a qualified individual with a disability, he did not have Article III standing to challenge Suncast's accommodations policy as facially invalid. Contreras suggests that the district court's opinion is inconsistent, in that it found Contreras to be disabled while at the same time denied him standing under the ADA. First, as we stated above, we do not read the district court's opinion to have determined the disability issue conclusively. The court did not make the requisite analysis that would be necessary in order to find one disabled under the ADA, but rather assumed for the purposes of [the summary judgment] motion . . . that Contreras is disabled under the ADA. Secondly, as the court below noted, even presuming that Contreras is disabled, that is not the only hurdle he must pass in order to have standing to challenge Suncast's accommodations policy. The ADA, by its language, protects qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). A qualified individual with a disability is one who with or without reasonable accommodation, is able to perform the essential functions of his job. The district court determined that Contreras had failed to establish that he was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, in that he did not present evidence that he was both disabled and able to perform the essential functions of his forklift driver job with reasonable accommodations. Thus, the court believed that Contreras could not have established injury in fact as is required for Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 24 We agree with the district court's interpretation that Contreras does not have standing to challenge Suncast's accommodation policy, in that he is not a qualified person with a disability, the type of individual protected by the relevant portions of the ADA. See e.g., Stuckey v. City of Naperville, No. 97 C 7037, 1998 WL 173298 at  (N.D. Ill. April 7, 1998) (Stuckey focuses his attention on a claim that the City's disability policy is a 'per se violation of the ADA' and . . . inexplicably overlooks the fact that he is without standing to contest the City's policy if he is not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. In other words, the potential illegality of the City's policy does not automatically allow Stuckey to proceed with his claim under the ADA.). Contreras's impairment did not bring him within the gamut of those who could challenge the legality of Suncast's accommodations policy, and the fact that he is no longer employed by the company means that there is no risk that he will ever suffer an injury as a result of the policy. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision finding Contreras lacked standing to challenge Suncast's accommodations policy.