Opinion ID: 168874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: W rongful Arrest

Text: To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful arrest, a plaintiff must show he was arrested without probable cause. Cottrell v. Kaysville City, 994 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1993). “Probable cause exists if facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense.” Johnson v. Lindon City Corp., 405 F.3d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). In evaluating probable cause, this court applies an objective standard based on the facts available to the arresting officer at the time the arrest occurred. Id. Thus, this court considers “the circumstances as they would have appeared to prudent, cautious and trained police officers.” United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). Applying the correct standard for probable cause to the instant case, this court concludes Kee’s arrest was supported by probable cause as a matter of law. -8- The criminal trespass ordinance under which Kee was arrested provides that “[c]riminal trespass consists of knowingly entering or remaining upon the lands of another knowing that such consent to enter or remain is denied or withdrawn by the owner or occupant thereof.” Farmington, N.M ., City Code § 18-3-11(a). Further, § 18-3-12(a) states that “[a]ny person who enters and remains on the lands of another after having been requested by the owner or authorized agent of the owner to leave is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Based on the uncontroverted testimony that Dance told Ahlm to remove K ee from the bar, a prudent police officer would have had grounds to believe Kee was committing the crime of criminal trespass. At trial, Dance specifically testified that he told Ahlm to remove both Kee and his wife from the bar. W hen the officers entered the bar, Dance then pointed to the Kees as the people he wanted ejected from the bar. From these facts, which were not contested at trial, 3 a reasonable police officer would have had sufficient grounds to believe that Kee had been told to leave the bar by the owner or authorized bar staff and was nevertheless remaining on the premises, knowing his right to do so had been revoked. Contrary to K ee’s assertions, M orales’ 3 Kee spends much of his brief arguing Dance’s credibility was repeatedly challenged at trial and the jury could have therefore disbelieved his version of the events. Although Kee points out issues on which Dance arguably contradicted himself or was contradicted by other w itnesses, none of these challenges goes to the ultimate issue of whether he told Ahlm to remove Kee from the bar. In fact, M orales’ testimony that the officers told him others were involved corroborates this portion of Dance’s testimony. -9- testimony does not undermine the existence of probable cause when judged from the perspective of Ahlm. M orales testified that when the officers asked him who else was involved, he also identified the Kees. Although M orales initially expressed confusion and stated only that the Kees had been asked to take Howe home, there was no testimony that he or anyone else ever told the officers the Kees were permitted to stay in the bar. Given Dance’s prior statement to Ahlm, M orales’ subsequent identification of the Kees actually served to bolster the officers’ conclusion that the bar had revoked Kee’s permission to remain on the premises and that Kee knew such permission had been revoked. The district court erred by considering the question of probable cause from the wrong perspective. Rather than engaging in the proper inquiry of how the situation w ould have appeared to a reasonable officer, based on the facts know n to Ahlm at the time of the arrest, the district court instead examined whether probable cause existed from the perspective of K ee. Essentially, the district court erroneously based its probable cause analysis on whether there was an actual violation of the criminal trespass statute. The district court noted factual questions regarding whether anyone had actually told Kee to leave the bar or informed him he no longer had permission to remain on the premises. It also noted a dispute as to whether Kee possessed the requisite state of mind for violating the statute, in light of his testimony that he believed the officers had no -10- lawful basis to remove him from the bar. On appeal, Kee raises these same factual questions. These factual disputes, however, are irrelevant to the ultimate issue of probable cause. “[P]robable cause does not require certainty of guilt or even a preponderance of evidence of guilt, but rather only reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable person to believe an offense was comm itted.” United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2002). Thus, the only question of significance is w hether Ahlm had “reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable person to believe” Kee was violating the city ordinance. Because it is beyond dispute that Dance told Ahlm to eject Kee and because Kee has pointed to nothing in the record to indicate Ahlm was ever told Kee had permission to stay, there was “no legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for the jury to find probable cause was lacking. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (stating court must credit “evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached” (quotation omitted)). Therefore, the district court erred in failing to grant Ahlm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Kee’s wrongful arrest claim.