Opinion ID: 4445950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rush’s guilty plea

Text: Having found that Rush’s 2001 Indiana conviction does not qualify as a predicate felony drug oﬀense, this error clearly aﬀected Rush’s substantial rights. If Rush had known that his 2001 Indiana conviction was not a qualifying felony drug oﬀense, it would have changed the calculus and he likely would have proceeded diﬀerently. Without two prior felony drug oﬀenses, Rush did not face a potential mandatory minimum life sentence and instead would have been sen‐ tenced in consideration of a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.6 The binding plea agreement called for a sentence in the middle of that range, 312 months, which the court imposed. In doing so, the sentencing judge noted that the 312‐month term of imprisonment “might be greater than necessary” but that it was “the minimum the [c]ourt [could] give the defendant” because of the plea agreement. Although Rush received a within‐Guidelines sentence— otherwise presumed reasonable on review—given the facts and the sentencing judge’s statements in the record, Rush has 6 Even with only one prior felony conviction, such as the 2010 Indiana conviction, Rush would have been subject to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years, or less than his Guidelines range. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2018). Nos. 18‐2009, et al. 25 met his burden under the plain error standard. He has shown a reasonable probability that, but for the error regarding the 2001 Indiana conviction, the outcome of the proceeding may have been diﬀerent and that he may have received less prison time absent the error. See Molina‐Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016). “Any amount of actual jail time is significant and has exceptionally severe consequences for the incarcerated individual and for society which bears the direct and indirect costs of incarceration.” Rosales‐Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1907 (cleaned up). That error, aﬀecting Rush’s fundamental rights, left uncorrected would undermine the integrity and fairness of judicial proceedings.7 Not every error relating to a plea agreement will demand correction under plain error. But based on the facts of this case, Rush has satisfied his burden. We, therefore, vacate Rush’s plea agreement and remand to the district court for further proceedings. D. Reasonableness of Bennett’s below‐Guidelines sentence Our final co‐defendant in this appeal, Adrian Bennett, ap‐ peals his below‐Guidelines sentence of 225 months’ imprison‐ ment as unreasonable. “We review a district court’s choice of sentence in two steps. First, we assess de novo whether the 7 We do not need to address Rush’s 2010 Indiana conviction because the inclusion of the 2001 Indiana conviction as a qualifying predicate of‐ fense is a plain error that requires remand. We note, however, that Rush treated the definition of methamphetamine as identical between Indiana Code §§ 35‐48‐4‐6.1 and 35‐48‐4‐2. We are not convinced that that assump‐ tion is correct, but the government did not raise the argument that differ‐ ent definitions of methamphetamine applied to the two sections, and thus likely waived the argument on appeal. Regardless, we do not need to de‐ cide the issue. 26 Nos. 18‐2009, et al. court followed proper procedures. If the decision below is procedurally sound, then we ask whether the resulting sen‐ tence is substantively reasonable.” United States v. Mbaye, 827 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2015)). Whether the sen‐ tence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range, we review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A below‐guidelines sentence, like a within‐guidelines one, is presumed reasonable against a defendant’s challenge that it is too high.” United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2009). A defendant can only rebut this presumption of reasonableness “by showing that the sentence does not comport with the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Patel, 921 F.3d 663, 672 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Solomon, 892 F.3d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 2018)). Bennett does not identify any procedural errors. Nor could he. The district judge’s sentencing was procedurally sound. The judge correctly calculated his Guidelines range, consid‐ ered all of the § 3553(a) factors, and adequately explained the reasons for the sentence. The district court then sentenced Bennett to 225 months of incarceration, thirty‐seven months below the low end of his Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. Our only task, then, is to review whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Bennett to 225 months in prison, below the Guidelines range. It did not. On appeal, Bennett simply attempts to reargue the § 3553(a) factors, and makes substantially the same argu‐ ments he did below. But the district court considered all of Bennett’s arguments at sentencing and took them all into Nos. 18‐2009, et al. 27 account in crafting an appropriate sentence. It is not our job to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors. For example, Bennett argues that his sentence creates an unwarranted sentencing dispar‐ ity. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). But other than giving the aver‐ age sentence for a drug traﬃcking oﬀense in the Southern Dis‐ trict of Indiana and nationally across the United States, Ben‐ nett provides nothing more. As the district court stated at sen‐ tencing, Bennett distributed significant quantities of metham‐ phetamine and cocaine throughout Indianapolis and the sur‐ rounding communities. The harmful eﬀects of his conduct cannot go understated. The district judge imposed a sentence that addressed Ben‐ nett’s personal history and characteristics, reflected the seri‐ ousness of the oﬀense, and was suﬃcient, but not greater than necessary. In sum, Bennett fails to identify a specific reason to question the substantive reasonableness of his below‐Guide‐ lines sentence. A below‐Guidelines sentence will almost never be unreasonable, United States v. Trudeau, 812 F.3d 578, 594 (7th Cir. 2016), and it was not here. Bennett’s sentence is af‐ firmed.