Opinion ID: 2822110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bolstering of Witnesses

Text: Defendants first argue that the district court continually questioned witnesses and interjected comments which improperly bolstered their testimony, thus lessening the government's burden and evincing bias towards them. Because no Defendant objected to the district court's practice of asking questions or to any of its specific comments, we review for plain error. United States v. Fernández, 145 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 1998). -43-
During trial, the district court asked witnesses a number of questions and made a variety of comments. These included the following: C During the testimony of cooperating witness Díaz, the district court asked what are your obligations? in relation to the cooperation agreement with the government. In response, Díaz stated that his obligation was cooperation in telling the truth. He also testified that he had been offered safety and security out in the street in exchange for his cooperation. When Juan objected to the government's attempt to elaborate, the district court sustained the objection, stating that it is self-explanatory that he cooperates, he needs security. C During the testimony of cooperating witness Rivas, the district court interjected when the government asked what would happen if Rivas did not tell the truth. The court stated, Do you understand that aside from that point, if you are caught lying, inventing, exaggerating, et cetera, you could face charges for perjury or for obstruction of justice, too? Rivas acknowledged that [e]verything would then be in the hands of the Judge if he was caught lying, to which the district court responded on top of that, you will always be in my hands, you understand me? Finally, when Rivas revealed that he and the government had agreed on a sentence recommendation of sixty months, the district court again interrupted to make clear that it did not necessarily have to follow the recommendation. -44- C When the district court overruled an objection and allowed Officer Eric Rivera Figueroa (Officer Rivera) to testify about how a chip converts a pistol into an automatic weapon, it explained its ruling by stating that [t]his man has been a police officer dealing with firearms and drugs for years. He can tell us whether this is a chip or not. Similarly, the district court explained that it was allowing Rivera to show the jury how to use a magazine because [h]e's in the police force, in the Bayamón Strike Force, deals with these issues every day of his life. C When Officer María Cruz identified an item seized during the search as a cleaning kit, the district court inquired what the kit was designed to clean. C During the testimony of federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Agent Carlos González, the district court asked a number of questions related to the seized firearms. First, it asked what the purpose of shortening the AK-47 was, to which Agent González responded, [t]he shorter you make a firearm, the easier it is to conceal. Second, it asked whether high-capacity magazines like the ones seized were legal to buy, to which the agent responded that they were. It followed this up by asking a curious question regarding the magazines: When you guys go out on an operation, is this the kind of thing you use on your firearms? When the agent responded in the negative, the district court said [n]ot at all, right? C When Officer Rivera described the items he recovered during the search as cylindrical plastic transparent -45- bottles, containers, the district court tried to clarify their description, asking if they were [l]ittle bottles. It's like little bottles, correct? C In response to Officer Abizer Cotto Adorno (Officer Cotto) identifying seized items as cocaine vials, the court interjected, clarifying that the officer did not actually know what was inside the vials.
Witnesses It is well-established that a judge is not a mere umpire and accordingly has a perfect right -- albeit a right that should be exercised with care -- to participate actively in the trial proper. United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 33 (1st Cir. 2008). This includes asking questions to elicit facts to facilitate a clear presentation of the issues. United States v. Meléndez-Rivas, 566 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, a district court needs to be balanced; [it] cannot become an advocate or otherwise use [its] judicial powers to advantage or disadvantage a party unfairly. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). So as long as the court preserves an attitude of impartiality and guards against giving the jury an impression that the court believes the defendant is guilty, it may question witnesses. United States v. RosarioPeralta, 199 F.3d 552, 560 (1st Cir. 1999). -46- Here, Defendants point to the district court's comments during the testimonies of Díaz, Rivas, Officer Rivera, Officer Cruz, and Agent González to support their claim of bias. However, Defendants conveniently ignore the district court's comments and questions to Officer Rivera and Officer Cotto and its question to Agent González regarding the legality of purchasing high-capacity magazines which show a much more balanced approach to questioning. Taken together, these questions and comments show that the district court asked questions which were helpful (and unhelpful) to both sides. For example, it asked Agent González about the purpose of shortening firearms and whether it was common law enforcement procedure to use high-capacity magazines (questions unhelpful to Defendants), but it also asked him whether those same high-capacity magazines were legal to buy (a question helpful to Defendants). And while it questioned Officer Cruz as to the purpose of the recovered cleaning kit (a question unhelpful to Defendants), it also corrected Officer Cotto's statement that he recovered cocaine vials by interjecting that the officer did not actually know what was inside (a question helpful to Defendants). We view these questions as a legitimate attempt to clarify testimony and focus the presentation of evidence, and not an -47- indication of a district court using its powers to unfairly disadvantage Defendants.22 See Meléndez-Rivas, 566 F.3d at 50. We also disagree with Defendants that reminding the cooperating witnesses of their requirement to be truthful was bolstering the prosecution. If anything, these warning should help Defendants, since if the witnesses had a motivation to lie -- which is the focus of the typical cross-examination of a cooperating witness -- the district court's comments could have scared the witnesses into telling the truth. The same can be said for the district court's action of sustaining Juan's objection to the government's attempt to follow up on Díaz's safety comment. Similarly, we fail to see how the district court was bolstering the prosecution by explaining its reasoning for finding Officer Rivera and Agent González qualified to answer the government's questions. There is a difference between objectively stating the officer's qualifications to answer a question on the one hand and suggesting that the officer's testimony is to be given enhanced weight and credibility because of these qualifications on the other. Here, the district did the former while avoiding the latter. 22 We also note that the district court's questioning was isolated, occurring only a handful of times over an eight-day trial. Cf. United States v. Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d 1, 19-20, 25 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding a district court's questioning to not be improper where there were twenty-three comments over four days of an eighteen-day trial). -48- While all of these interjections may have highlighted issues Defendants would rather the jury not have focused on, that does not mean that the district court improper bolstered witnesses, nor does it indicate bias. See Rosario-Peralta, 199 F.3d at 560. Finally, we add that even if the questions did mistakenly give the jury an impression of bias, cf. United States v. RiveraRodríguez, 761 F.3d 105, 121 (1st Cir. 2014), any prejudice was cured by the district court in its closing instructions, where it specifically instructed the jury on this issue: I have an obligation as a judge to get immersed in questioning if I think I should, but you should not ever take from any question that I [m]ake or from anything that I say or do an inclination or indication on my part as to what the result of the case should be. That is not the purpose. The purpose is to try to give you the best quality of evidence possible. You are at liberty to disregard any question, any comment that I may have made in the context of this case. We have previously held that similar jury instructions were sufficient to dispel any impressions that a district court's questioning may have caused, and we see no reason to depart from those holdings here. See Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d at 25, 26; Rivera-Torres v. Ortiz-Vélez, 341 F.3d 86, 100 (1st Cir. 2003); cf. Meléndez-Rivas, 566 F.3d at 51 n.10 (There was, for example, no instruction that the jury should not assume the court had any view on the subject of the court's questions and that the jury could disregard all the court's questions.). -49-