Opinion ID: 1857408
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Heading: Peer Review Documents.

Text: Carolan argues the district court improperly determined the requested documents to be privileged peer review records and erred in overruling his motion to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Forbes. The district court is vested with wide discretion in rulings on discovery matters. Pierce v. Nelson, 509 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 1993). Discovery rules are to be liberally construed to effectuate disclosure of all relevant and material information to the parties. Hutchinson v. Smith Lab., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Iowa 1986). A party may defeat discovery by establishing that the material sought is privileged or irrelevant. AgriVest Partnership v. Central Iowa Prod. Credit Ass'n, 373 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1985). One resisting discovery through assertion of privilege has the burden of showing that a privilege exists and applies. Hutchinson, 392 N.W.2d at 141. An asserted privilege is narrowly construed because it is an exception to our rules governing discovery. Id. However, Iowa has a broad statutory privilege for the writings and other records generated by a peer review committee, explicitly set forth in a 1986 amendment to Iowa Code section 147.135 (1985). Id. When an asserted privilege is based on a statute, the terms of the statute define the reach of the privilege. AgriVest, 373 N.W.2d at 483. Peer review means evaluation of professional services rendered by a person licensed to practice a profession. Iowa Code § 147.1(8). Peer review records are defined as all complaint files, investigation files, reports, and other investigative information relating to licensee discipline or professional competence in the possession of a peer review committee or an employee of a peer review committee. Id. § 147.135(2). The statute explains the extent of the privilege: Peer review records are privileged and confidential, are not subject to discovery, subpoena, or other means of legal compulsion for release to a person other than an affected licensee or a peer review committee and are not admissible in evidence in a judicial or administrative proceeding.... Id. Carolan argues that the statutory privilege of Iowa Code section 147.135(2) is not applicable to Dr. Forbes' reviews because, when reading sections 147.1(8) and 147.135(2) together, peer review records is intended to mean those records relating to the discipline or professional competence of a specific licensee. Therefore, Carolan argues, the documents should be discoverable pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 125(a) because the reviews were not related to a specific licensee. We disagree. Even though Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 125 allows for broad discovery of the facts known, mental impressions, and opinions held by an expert to be called as a witness at trial, there are limitations. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 122(a) limits the scope of discovery to any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.... (Emphasis added.) This rule requires statutory privileges to be honored. Further, the narrow reading of the statutes, urged by Carolan, was not intended by the legislature. We have already held that the statutory privilege of Iowa Code section 147.135 is broad. Hutchinson, 392 N.W.2d at 141. There are several policy reasons for adopting this broad privilege: It allows a physician to consult with peers about his [or her] care and treatment of a particular patient. It also allows critical retrospective analysis of cases to learn better methods of treatment for the future. Similarly, it encourages peers to lodge complaints and initiate disciplinary action against those who are practicing substandard care, without fear of disclosure or retribution. Thomas A. Finley et al., Tort Reform and Medical Malpractice: Iowa's Past, Present, and Future, 36 Drake L.Rev. 669, 676 (1986-87). Peer review privileges encourage an effective review of medical care. If such records were privileged only when directed at a specific licensee, hospitals would have difficulty conducting reviews of their health care departments. Without the broad protections, physicians would be very reluctant to participate, knowing the information could easily be revealed in a court of law. We hold that the statutory privilege of Iowa Code section 147.135(2) covers the documents involved in this case. All of the documents requested by Carolan relate to Dr. Forbes' peer review investigation of the hospital's anesthesia department in 1989, 1991, and 1993. Carolan also argues that the trial judge's in camera review of the documents was inadequate. There is no support in the record to indicate that the trial judge abused his discretion. He examined the records and determined they had no relevance to this action. Finally, Carolan argues that even if the peer review records are privileged, Dr. Forbes' testimony should be excluded because he relied on those documents in forming his opinion. We disagree. The record reflects that Dr. Forbes' opinions were based on a specific review of Carolan's medical records, his experience as an anesthesiologist, and his review of the medical literature search. There is no evidence to suggest that Dr. Forbes relied on the excluded peer review records while testifying at trial.