Opinion ID: 47918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Discussion of the District Court's Remedy

Text: 49 As we read the district court's judgment, it enjoins the issuance of a dredge and fill permit until an EIS is completed. The judgment states only that the district court has ENJOINED the § 404 permit .... But in the conclusion of its Memorandum Opinion, the Court stated, 50 The Corps acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or abused its discretion by issuing the § 404 permit without preparing a full EIS as required by NEPA. In light of the long-term and irreversible environmental impacts associated with this project, the Corp's [ sic ] action is wholly at odds with NEPA. Because the permit was issued without an EIS in violation of NEPA, Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction .... Accordingly; . . . the § 404 permit ... issued by the Department of the Army is hereby ENJOINED. 51 O'Reilly, 2004 WL 1794531 at . 52 Both the Corps and Mr. Bopp contend that the district court's injunction effectively and erroneously mandated that the Corps complete an EIS for the proposed project. They argue that the court, instead, should have remanded the case to the Corps with instructions to the agency to reconsider whether an EA or an EIS is appropriate. 53 We review a district court's decision to issue a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. VRC, LLC v. City of Dallas, 460 F.3d 607, 611 (5th Cir.2006) (citing N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San Juan, Tex., 90 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir.1996); Thomas v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 396 (5th Cir.2000)). `The district court abuses its discretion if it (1) relies on clearly erroneous factual findings when deciding to grant or deny the permanent injunction, (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law when deciding to grant or deny the permanent injunction, or (3) misapplies the factual or legal conclusions when fashioning its injunctive relief.' Liberto v. D.F. Stauffer Biscuit Co., Inc., 441 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2006) (quoting Peaches Entm't Corp. v. Entm't Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir.1995)). 54 Where, as here, a court determines that an agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the APA permits the court to hold unlawful and set aside that action. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). As a general rule, when an agency decision is not sustainable on the basis of the administrative record, then `the matter should be remanded to [the agency] for further consideration.' Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 905 (5th Cir.1983) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973)); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). Only in rare circumstances is remand for agency reconsideration not the appropriate solution. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985) (. . . the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.). We have previously addressed this precise question within the NEPA context: 55 It is also clear that a decision to forego preparation of an EIS may be unreasonable for at least two distinct reasons: (1) the evidence before the court demonstrates that, contrary to the FONSI, the project may have a significant impact on the human environment, see, e.g., Lee, 758 F.2d at 1085, or (2) the agency's review was flawed in such a manner that it cannot yet be said whether the project may have a significant impact, see, e.g., La. Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1053 (5th Cir.1985); Found. on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 154 (D.C.Cir.1985). The appropriate relief, moreover, depends upon which of these findings the district court makes. If the court finds that the project may have a significant impact, the court should order the agency to prepare an EIS. Lee, 758 F.2d at 1085; Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir.1973). If the court finds, on the other hand, that the EA is inadequate in a manner that precludes making the determination whether the project may have a significant impact, the court should remand the case to the agency to correct the deficiencies in its analysis. See York, 761 F.2d at 1053 ([we do] not order [an] ... EIS because the question of whether the Project may have significant adverse impacts is still an open one); Found. on Economic Trends, 756 F.2d at 154 (until [the agency] completes such an evaluation the question whether the experiment requires an EIS remains an open one). Fritiofson, 772 F.2d at 1238-39. 12 56 The district court in this case set out to answer the question of whether the Corps was arbitrary or capricious in concluding that the mitigation measures, upon which the permit was conditioned, reduced the otherwise significant impacts of the project to a level of insignificance. O'Reilly, 2004 WL 1794531 at . In order to reach its affirmative answer to that question, the court found as follows: 57 1) that the Corp's [ sic ] failure to employ any analysis or gather any data with respect to its mitigated FONSI rendered its decision arbitrary or capricious[] ( Id. at ); 58 2) that the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that the cumulative effects of the project were sufficiently mitigated where the EA [was] supported by no real analysis or data with respect to [that issue] ( Id. ); and 59 3) that the Corps acted arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the permit without considering the effect of the other two [reasonably foreseeable] phases [of the development] ( Id. at ). 60 We read the district court's language as describing flaws in the Corps's methodology that render its ultimate conclusion unreliable and that therefore warrants remand to the agency, per the holding quoted in Fritiofson, above. In other words, the district court found that the administrative record did not contain sufficient information to support the agency's conclusion that mitigation rendered the project's impacts insignificant. 61 Appellees argue that the district court did, in fact, find that the project's impacts were significant, based on its statement that [u]ndoubtedly, the environmental impacts associated with [the project] are significant even when the future phases and cumulative impacts are not taken into consideration. Id. at . That statement, however, is taken out of context. As the district court noted, the Corps does not appear to [disagree] with Plaintiff's contention that there are significant environmental impacts associated with the proposed ... project. O'Reilly, 2004 WL 1794531 at . Rather, the crux of the dispute is whether the Corps's FONSI, which was predicated upon the permittee agreeing to certain mitigation measures, was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id. The district court focused on the Corps's reliance on mitigation, holding that the Corps's analysis was insufficient to support its conclusions. At no point did the district court conclude that there was no possibility that the project's effects could become insignificant after mitigation. Since that possibility has not been entirely foreclosed, the proper remedy under this court's precedents is to remand the case to the agency to correct the deficiencies in its analysis. Fritiofson, 772 F.2d at 1239. 62 Plaintiffs also argue that the district court's injunction should not be read as requiring an EIS, but rather as simply enjoining the permit until the Corps has complied with NEPA. In doing so, plaintiffs rely on the fact that the bare language of the separate document final judgment enjoins the § 404 permit, and says nothing about requiring an EIS. Plaintiffs assert that the language of the Order serves only to explain[ ] why the permit is illegal[.] We disagree. The most plausible reading of the opinion's concluding paragraph, which explicitly describes the Corps's offense as issuing the § 404 permit without preparing a full EIS as required by NEPA, is that the Corps can only become compliant by completing an EIS. As we have discussed, that reading runs afoul of our precedent on the issue. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district erred in enjoining the Corps' issuance of a § 404 permit until an EIS is prepared. Therefore, in affirming the district court's judgment in part, and reversing it in part, we amend the district court's injunction order to enjoin the issuance of the permit pending our remand of the case to the Corps for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the instructions set forth below.