Opinion ID: 2419836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Child Endangerment Charges

Text: The information that purportedly charged Madison with child endangerment in the first degree, a class D felony, misstated the mental state required by section 568.045, RSMo. [2] The information charged that Madison acted with criminal negligence, the mental state required by section 568.050, RSMo, [3] for child endangerment in the second degree, a class A misdemeanor. The information correctly stated the title of the offense, the statute creating the offense, and the classification of the offense. The jury instructions correctly stated the law as to the offenses, including the requisite mental state. However, the prosecutor mentioned criminal negligence three times during the trial, without objection. Kevin Madison raised his objection to this variance for the first time on appeal. The main issue raised on the child endangerment convictions is whether this trial was conducted on the wrong legal theory, an error so fundamental as to require reversal. However, we need not reach that issue because Madison, whose defense was that he did not wave or point a gun at the children, was not prejudiced by the trial error and the improperly stated information, especially since there was no objection from the defense. A variance between an information and the instructions to the jury after the evidence is submitted is not necessarily fatal to the state's case. State v. Lee, 841 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. banc 1992), holds that a variance between the charges in the information and the jury instructions is prejudicial, and therefore reversible error, only where it affects the defendant's ability adequately to defend against the charges in the information. 841 S.W.2d at 650. In Lee , the defendant was not prejudiced because his defense at trial, if believed by the jury, was adequate to disprove both the charges in the information and the charges in the instruction. Similarly, State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. banc 1992), holds that when a defendant raises insufficiency of the information for the first time on appeal, the information will be deemed insufficient only if it is so defective that (1) it does not by any reasonable construction charge the defendant with the offense of which the defendant was convicted or (2) the substantial rights of the defendant to prepare a defense and plead former jeopardy in the event of acquittal are prejudiced. 845 S.W.2d at 35. In Parkhurst , the Court held that the omission of the required mental state was not a fatal defect because, in the circumstances of that case, it did not adversely affect the preparation of a defense and it did not prejudice the defendant. In this case, a careful reading of the information might have served to put Madison on notice of the crime with which he was charged since the statutory reference and the classification were accurate. However, mentioning a statute number in an information is not conclusive as to the offense charged and is treated as surplusage. State v. Cusumano, 819 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Mo.App. E.D.1991). The defense is entitled to rely on the factual allegations in the charge. This reliance would have affected the preparation of the defense only to the extent that Madison was defending factually against child endangerment in the second degree. That does not seem to be the case here, because Madison prepared and presented a defense to the factual elements alleged; his defense was that he did not endanger the children by pointing or waving a gun at them. Even if the defendant shows that the charging document was incorrect, Parkhurst and Lee require that the defendant demonstrate actual prejudice in order to be entitled to relief. If it were just the defect in the information, we would be faithful to Lee and Parkhurst in this situation and affirm Madison's conviction for child endangerment and armed criminal action without further discussion. Madison's defense that he did not wave or point a gun in front of the children, if believed by the jury, should have been an adequate defense regardless of his state of mind. There seems little doubt that there was at least one gun, and that Kevin Madison picked up the gun. The essential fact in dispute is whether defendant Madison waved and pointed a gun at the children, thus knowingly endangering them. The prosecutor presented and argued a less stringent standard, that of criminal negligence. In his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury, ... three counts of felony endangering the welfare of a child, and that's that he, with criminal negligence, acted in a manner that created a substantial risk ... (Tr. 67) (emphasis added). During the state's cross-examination of Madison, the prosecutor asked, Let's talk about Count III. You never acted with criminal negligence in a manner creating risk of harm. (Tr. 199-200) Then, prior to the court's instructions to the jury, and final arguments, the trial court held a jury instruction conference and went over the instructions, on the record, with counsel. The instructions correctly stated the law, contrary to the prosecutor's comments in opening statement and in the cross-examination of Madison. But in final argument, the prosecutor told the jury: ... he endangered each and every one of them, and that was criminally negligent, and certainly that was a significant threat to their lives. (Tr. 218) The prosecutor never argued that Madison knowingly endangered the children. In final argument, the defense attorney argued: Did he endanger the life of any child? No. I asked him: `Did you intend to hurt the kids?' He said, `No.' Now, he had that gun in his hand. I don't think there is any doubt about it; although, he said it was pointed to the ground. He had that gun in a safe position, and he didn't intend to hurt anybody.... Now, what did he do with the gun? Did he wave it around? I don't think so. Where an objection is timely made, a trial court has the duty, not discretion, to restrain and purge such arguments. Fahy v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 740 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Mo. 1987). See also, Beis v. Dias, 859 S.W.2d 835 842 (Mo.App. S.D. 1993), and Fox v. Ferguson, 765 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Mo.App. 1989). Our insistence on the proper objection is based on the notion that opposing counsel should not be permitted to let error in argument pass without objection and then to raise the matter after trial or on appeal. Madison's counsel made no objection to the use of the term criminal negligence, even at sentencing. As noted, the prosecutor referred to the concept of criminal negligence in the opening statement, in cross-examination of the defendant, and in final argument. However, there is no suggestion in the record that the prosecutor emphasized the term in any of these references to it. While the defense has the obligation to object to misstatements of the law, in order to preserve the point for appeal, the defense does not have the obligation to supply the prosecution with a proper legal theory. In this case, the trial judge conducted a careful on-the-record review of jury instructions with counsel. Even after this review, neither the attorneys nor the judge noted the discrepancy between the information and the prosecution's argument and the instructions. Despite the prosecutor's references to criminal negligence, Madison's argument that the child endangerment convictions should be reversed must ultimately fail. Madison was not prejudiced in preparing and presenting his defense because the argument that he did not wave a gun in front of the children and point the gun at them, if believed by the jury, would have been sufficient no matter what state of mind was alleged. He simply cannot demonstrate prejudice or that the outcome would have been different if the word knowingly, was used in the information and the prosecutor's argument. When his defense is that he did not do the act, his mental state is irrelevant. Although the instructions concerning the child endangerment charges which were given to the jury conflicted with the argument made by the prosecutor, MAI-CR 3d 302.02, which was read to the jury after its members are sworn, and MAI-CR 3d 302.06, read to the jury before deliberation, instructed that the opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence, and that members of the jury are to be guided by the evidence and the law as given to them by the court. Furthermore, a jury is presumed to know and follow the instructions. State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1,7 (Mo. banc 1984). In context, we do not conclude that Madison was tried on the wrong legal theory.