Opinion ID: 456170
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speed

Text: 39 The district court held that Captain Liu was negligent in allowing his ship to be directed up the channel by the pilot at speeds ranging from half-speed ahead to full ahead. The district court's findings of fact with regard to speed were as follows: (1) At 0650, in the vicinity of buoy 6, the speed of the vessel was increased to full ahead or 13 knots over the water; (2) One-half mile after passing buoy 12, near buoy 14, and still proceeding full speed ahead, the weather had deteriorated so the bow of the ship could not be seen, indicating visibility was less than 500 feet; (3) Maintaining a speed of 13 knots, the SUMMIT VENTURE traveled from buoys 14 to 16, a distance of 1.25 nautical miles, in approximately five minutes. Just prior to reaching buoy 16 at 0721, the vessel's speed was reduced to half ahead or 9 1/2 to 11 knots. When the lookout, Boatswain Sit, arrived on the bow about 0723, he immediately sighted buoy 16 off the port bow as it passed down the port side of the vessel. The boatswain could not clearly see the color or shape of the sighted buoy because of the heavy fog and poor visibility. At that time the rain and wind increased, and visibility was approximately 300 to 500 feet--less than the ship's length. According to the posted maneuvering characteristics, emergency stopping distance of the vessel was in excess of 3,500 feet; (4) The vessel continued to proceed up Tampa Bay at one-half ahead, even though Pilot Lerro could not visually sight the next set of buoys; 1A and 2A. By the time the vessel was two tenths of a mile from buoys 1A and 2A, Atkins advised that the radar scope had been totally obliterated by heavy rainfall and that radar contact was lost. Although radar contact was momentarily regained for one or two sweeps of the port radar, buoys 1A and 2A were never visually sighted or seen again on radar. The vessel proceeded forward at one-half ahead at approximately 10 knots, toward the critical turning buoy and the bridge, which was less than one mile away; (5) Notwithstanding radar occlusion and virtually zero visibility, the vessel continued to proceed at 9 1/2 to 11 knots through the turn at buoy 2A, just seven-tenths of a mile away from the bridge. Under these conditions, the vessel required approximately 2500 feet to stop its forward motion. Pilots Lerro, Evans 5 and Atkins, all testified that the vessel was in violation of the speed and visibility rules at this point. At no time did Captain Liu or Chief Mate Chan communicate with the pilot or suggest that the ship be slowed or anchored; (6) At 0731, approximately seven-tenths of a mile from the Skyway Bridge and approximately three and one-half minutes prior to the collision, Pilot Lerro ordered the engine speed to slow ahead, but that reduction had no appreciable effect on the speed of the SUMMIT VENTURE; and (7) At 0732.5, Lerro ordered double full astern, hard aport, and let go both anchors, however only one anchor dropped. Before any of these emergency measures could take effect, the starboard bow of the SUMMIT VENTURE struck the Skyway Bridge, approximately 800 feet from the center line of the channel. 6 At the time of the allision, the vessel was proceeding at a speed of approximately eight knots. The allision with the bridge occurred at 0734. 40 It is clear from the evidence adduced at trial that the excessive speed of the SUMMIT VENTURE was the principal overt act of negligence causing the allision with the bridge. Hercules attempts to circumvent the fact of the SUMMIT VENTURE's excessive speed by citing to the testimony of four witnesses who stated that it would have been imprudent to attempt to stop the SUMMIT VENTURE in the circumstances existing on the morning of May 9, 1980, after the storm broke. The fallacy of this argument is two-fold. First, Hercules claims that the storm broke at buoy 2A when the facts clearly show that the SUMMIT VENTURE had been in a heavy rain storm for approximately two and one-half miles after passing buoy 14. Second, the evidence clearly establishes that the SUMMIT VENTURE's speed far exceeded minimum visibility requirements prior to buoy 2A and that attempts to reduce the vessel's excessive speed after passing buoy 2A had no appreciable effect. It is true that some circumstances would make low speed inappropriate, and Hercules in its appeal suggests that reducing speed below half ahead would have been imprudent because a greater speed was necessary to maintain control of the ship. However, the expert witnesses at trial stated only that an attempt to stop the ship during the heaviest rain after passing buoy 2A would have been imprudent. Significantly, they did not question the propriety of slowing at some point before buoy 2A, when the severity of the rain storm was evident and visibility virtually non-existent. Moreover, had the SUMMIT VENTURE been traveling at a more moderate speed prior to buoy 2A, attempts to slow the vessel after passing buoy 2A would have been more successful. Clearly the success of any attempt to stop the vessel by either backing the engine or dropping the anchors was directly correlated to the vessel's speed at the time these maneuvers were attempted, and certainly appellants cannot argue that stopping a vessel is imprudent when a bridge has been sighted and allision is imminent. 41 Article 16 of the Inland Rules, subtitled Speed in Fog provides: Every vessel shall, in a fog, mist, falling snow, or heavy rainstorms, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 192. 7 The Pennsylvania Rule provides that a statutory violation raises a rebuttable presumption that the ship caused the collision. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1874). If a statutory violation is proven, Hercules must demonstrate that the violation could not have been one of the causes of the allision. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. at 136. With regard to the moderate speed required in heavy weather under 33 U.S.C. Sec. 192, the half distance rule is a gloss that has been recognized by the courts. The Supreme Court in Union Oil Company of California v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140, 93 S.Ct. 368, 34 L.Ed.2d 365 (1972), defined the half-distance rule as follows: If two vessels, upon sighting each other, are proceeding at rates of speed such that each can stop before it reaches the point at which the courses of the two intersect, collision is impossible. 409 U.S. at 144-145, 93 S.Ct. at 371. 42 Though this rule is not directly applicable here because a stationary object, the bridge, was involved, we find that the circumstances of this case clearly demonstrate a violation of the moderate speed rule. The facts show that from buoy 14 to the bridge, a distance of over three miles, Pilot Lerro allowed the vessel to proceed up the channel with visibility of 500 feet or less. With a ship length over 600 feet and visibility less than 500 feet, good seamanship plus the pilot's statutory duty under the moderate speed rule dictated that the ship be stopped by buoy 14 or 16. 43 Instead, Pilot Lerro chose to push ahead blindly at a grossly excessive speed when he could not even see the bow of the ship. Between buoys 14 and 16 the ship maintained a speed of 13 knots; at this speed the ship had an emergency stopping distance of 3,500 feet, or approximately seven times Pilot Lerro's actual visibility. Just prior to reaching buoy 16, the ship's speed was reduced to half ahead and upon reaching buoy 2A (which was never sighted), 1.3 miles away, the ship was traveling at 9 1/2 to 11 knots. At this point, the bridge was .7 miles away, visibility was zero and the ship's emergency stopping distance was 2,500 feet. Given the ship's speed, even if Pilot Lerro had been able to see the bridge at this point, full emergency stopping measures would have still brought the ship perilously close to the bridge. Pilot Lerro chose to push forward resulting in the tragic allision. 44 We can think of no greater case of misfeasance or gross negligence than as exemplified by the facts of this case. This strong language not only applies to Pilot Lerro, but also to Captain Liu and Chief Mate Chan who stood by mutely as these events unfolded in their full view. Likewise, we find absurd appellant's suggestion that the storm suddenly broke at buoy 2A and caught the crew of the SUMMIT VENTURE by surprise. As established by the facts recited above, the severity of the storm was clearly evident for over three miles prior to reaching the bridge, rendering any defense of surprise ludicrous. 45 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding, as a matter of law, that Captain Liu, as master of the SUMMIT VENTURE was negligent in allowing his vessel to proceed at the speeds ordered by Pilot Lerro under conditions of visibility of less than 500 feet. 46