Opinion ID: 78060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Merit Pay Increase

Text: Crawford claims that her April 2002 performance evaluation was retaliatory and racially discriminatory and resulted in her being denied a merit pay increase she otherwise would have received. With respect to this claim, the parties' arguments, and the district court's analysis, center on whether Crawford presented a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation by showing she suffered an adverse employment action. [9] To make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified to do the job; (3) she was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her class more favorably. See Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) ( per curiam ). These elements also apply to a claim of race discrimination under § 1983 because the analysis of disparate treatment claims under § 1983 is identical to the analysis under Title VII where the facts on which the claims rely are the same. See Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII and § 1983 claims have the same elements where the claims are based on the same set of facts); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir.1985) (stating that [w]here, as here, a plaintiff predicates liability under Title VII on disparate treatment and also claims liability under sections 1981 and 1983, the legal elements of the claims are identical ... [and] we need not discuss plaintiff's Title VII claims separately from his section 1981 and section 1983 claims.). Title VII also prohibits retaliation against an employee because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing [thereunder]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir.2001). In the past this circuit's standard for both discrimination and retaliation claims has required an employee to establish an ultimate employment decision or make some other showing of substantiality in the employment context in order to establish an adverse employment action. See Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 616-17 (11th Cir.2004); Gupta v. Florida Board of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir.2000); Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). We defined ultimate employment decisions as those such as termination, failure to hire, or demotion. Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 617. And we required that conduct falling short of an ultimate employment decision must, in some substantial way, alter[ ] the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprive him or her of employment opportunities, or adversely affect[ ] his or her status as an employee. Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587 (quotation and citation omitted). More particularly, when defining the level of substantiality required for a Title VII discrimination claim, we required an employee to demonstrate she suffered a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to show an adverse employment action. Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239 (emphasis added). The serious and material change requirement has also been applied in this circuit to Title VII retaliation claims. [10] See, e.g., Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 617; Bass v. Board of County Com'rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1118 (11th Cir.2001); Gupta, 212 F.3d at 588; Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir.1998); Benefield v. Fulton Co., Ga., 130 Fed.Appx. 308 (11th Cir.2005). The district court in this case found that because GSU had awarded Crawford a merit pay increase, effective retroactively to October 2002, Crawford could not establish an adverse employment action for purposes of either her discrimination or retaliation claims. According to the district court, because Crawford's job was never in doubt, and she never lost any of her base salary, she did not suffer a materially adverse employment action in connection with the denial of her merit pay increase. The question then is whether the fact that GSU reversed its decision and awarded Crawford her merit pay increase retroactively somehow deprives her of the right to pursue her claims. For the reasons given below, we think the answer to that question is no. We first note that our decision in Gillis v. Georgia Department of Corrections, 400 F.3d 883 (11th Cir.2005), is directly on point on Crawford's discrimination claims. The district court recognized the relevance of Gillis to the instant case but declined to apply that decision because it concluded, as it did in connection with Crawford's retaliation claim, that her successful grievance resulted in her having suffered no loss and thus no adverse employment action. In Gillis the plaintiff, an African-American female, received a met expectations performance evaluation, which resulted in her receiving a three percent raise, rather than an exceeded expectations evaluation, which would have yielded a five percent raise. The difference between the three percent raise and the five percent raise was less than $1000 annually, and the plaintiff lost no employment benefits as a result of the evaluation. Gillis brought a Title VII action against her employer and former supervisors. The district court held that Gillis' receiving a smaller pay raise than she would have had her performance evaluation been more favorable did not constitute an adverse employment action and granted summary judgment for the defendants. We reversed the district court's judgment on Gillis' race discrimination claim, holding that a poor performance evaluation that directly results in the denial of a pay raise of any significance clearly affects an employee's compensation and thus constitutes an adverse employment action under Title VII. Id. at 888 (citing Davis, 245 F.3d at 1240; McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir.1994); and Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590). We perceive no basis for distinguishing the facts of the instant case from those in Gillis. As was true for the plaintiff in Gillis, the evidence in this case shows that Crawford's poor evaluation and her compensation were inextricably intertwined. Id. at 888. From October 2002 (when Crawford's paycheck did not include the four percent merit pay increase she otherwise would have received absent the poor evaluation she was given in April 2002) until her position was reclassified in March 2003 and salary retroactively increased by four percent in October 2003, Crawford suffered an adverse employment action directly connected to her compensation. Although Crawford received a retroactively awarded merit pay increase, that raise could not alter the fact that she had been denied the increase or erase all injury associated with it, specifically the lost value and use of the funds during the time she was not receiving them. See Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding, for purposes of plaintiff's VII gender discrimination claim, that a four month job termination constituted an adverse action even though the plaintiff was later reinstated and awarded back pay). To conclude otherwise would permit employers to escape Title VII liability by correcting their discriminatory and retaliatory acts after the fact. Id. (stating that [c]onsistent with Title VII's goal of deterring discrimination, we decline to endorse a rule that would allow employers to escape liability by merely reinstating [an] aggrieved employee months after termination, whenever it becomes clear that the employee intends to pursue her claims in court.). Following the Seventh Circuit's lead, we too decline to hold as a matter of law that a retroactive pay raise can undo the harm caused by a discriminatory or retaliatory act because such a decision could permit employers to elude liability for conduct that otherwise is actionable. We therefore find that the district court erred when it held that Crawford's poor performance evaluation, which made her ineligible for a merit pay increase in October 2002, did not constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of her discrimination claims. The district court relied on our decision in Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610 (11th Cir.2004), to analyze Crawford's allegations of retaliation. In that case an untenured college assistant professor claimed she was retaliated against in violation of Title VII when, after she complained about a hiring decision involving another professor, the faculty later twice voted not to renew her teaching contract. On both occasions, after the plaintiff successfully challenged the faculty's votes, her contract was renewed before the prior contract had concluded. We affirmed summary judgment in the defendants' favor, noting first that no ultimate employment decisions were involved because the plaintiff did not lose her job or suffer a lessening of pay, position, or benefits. Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 617. We also concluded that the complained-of acts did not rise to a sufficient level of substantiality because they ultimately had no effect on the plaintiff's employment status. Further, we decided that any emotional distress or costs incidental to the plaintiff's seeking review of the votes were too insubstantial to be considered an adverse employment action because the plaintiff's challenges ultimately were successful. Id. at 618. Our decision in Stavropoulos hinged on whether the employer's actions adversely affected the plaintiff's employment status. See Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 617 (noting that [h]ere, the acts Stavropoulos complains of ultimately had no effect on her employment status.). As previously discussed, the plaintiff in that case suffered no loss in pay or benefits whatsoever as a result of the faculty votes recommending that she not be rehired. Stavropoulos' contracts in fact were renewed, with no lapse in employment and thus nothing more than an anticipated loss. We thus concluded Stavropoulos suffered no tangible harm as a result of an employment decision that never became final. Id. We think that on the facts of this case the district court misapplied the standard and the holding of Stavropoulos. In Crawford's case, the decision that she not be awarded a merit pay increase was a final decision that resulted in her not receiving a merit pay increase. As acknowledged by the district court, [t]here is no dispute that as a result of the rating Carroll gave to plaintiff on her 2001-2002 evaluation, Plaintiff did not receive an increase in her salary effective 2002. Crawford, unlike Stavropoulos, therefore, realized an actual loss. Although the four percent merit pay increase eventually was awarded retroactively in October 2003, as noted, Crawford nevertheless was deprived of the use or value of her merit pay from the time it otherwise would have been awarded in October 2002. In other words, Crawford suffered an adverse employment action directly related to her compensation: the alleged retaliatory performance appraisal deprived her of the tangible employment opportunity of receiving a merit pay increase and thus adversely affected her status as an employee. [11] Again, we think it important to emphasize that an employer cannot undo the harm its actions have caused, and thereby avoid liability, simply by attempting to make the employee whole retroactively. See Phelan, 463 F.3d at 780. This case is not, as the district court deemed it, simply a matter of no harm, no foul. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, with respect to the temporary denial of a merit pay increase, we conclude that under the standards outlined in Gillis and Stavropoulos Crawford showed that she suffered an adverse employment action for purposes of her race discrimination and retaliation claims. The district court therefore erred in ruling otherwise. The district court also discussed but chose not to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006), in which the Court announced a new rule which redefines the standard for retaliation claims under Title VII. [12] For the reasons previously discussed, we are convinced that under this circuit's prior standard the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Crawford's retaliation claim. If any doubt remained regarding the incorrectness of the district court's ruling  though we find none does  application of the decidedly more relaxed Burlington standard to the facts of this case must emphatically dispel it. Under the holding of Burlington, the type of employer conduct considered actionable has been broadened from that which adversely affects the plaintiff's conditions of employment or employment status to that which has a materially adverse effect on the plaintiff, irrespective of whether it is employment or workplace-related. [13] See Burlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. Thus, the Burlington Court effectively rejected the standards applied by this court in both Stavropoulos and Gupta that required an employee to show either an ultimate employment decision or substantial employment action to establish an adverse employment action for the purpose of a Title VII retaliation claim. [14] See Burlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2415; Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 616-17; Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587. Additionally, the Court explained that in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim, a materially adverse action means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. This more liberal view of what constitutes an adverse employment action accords an employee protection from a wider range of retaliatory conduct than would be available under the standard applied in Stavropoulos and Gupta. See Phelan, 463 F.3d at 781, n. 3 (stating that in Burlington the Court concluded the Title VII retaliation provision protects an employee from a wider range of conduct than the discrimination provision does.). We therefore are persuaded that the adverse employment action standard previously applied in this circuit to Title VII retaliation claims is more stringent than the materially adverse standard announced in Burlington. [15] In the instant case, we have no doubt but that Crawford suffered a materially adverse action in the form of the unfavorable performance review she received (that affected her eligibility for a merit pay increase) after she complained of racial discrimination. Such conduct by an employer clearly might deter a reasonable employee from pursuing a pending charge of discrimination or making a new one. Burlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. We therefore conclude that not only was district court's ruling on Crawford's Title VII retaliation claim wrong under our prior, narrower standard, but also that it most certainly is wrong under Burlington 's more liberal standard.