Opinion ID: 1791667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plaintiffs' experts (Myrna Kruckenburg).

Text: ¶ 50. During discovery, it appears [9] that one or more of the defendants filed interrogatories to the plaintiffs, seeking information concerning experts, as allowed by M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4). Plaintiffs' only response to this interrogatory stated, Plaintiffs have not yet determined who they may call as an expert at the trial of this matter, but will timely supplement this response. The record does not reflect that this supplemental interrogatory response was ever filed. [10] ¶ 51. We note that the trial court entered several scheduling orders which required the parties to designate their trial expert witnesses. We further note that, at some point, plaintiffs filed a document titled Plaintiffs' Designation of Expert Witnesses, which purports to comply with Rule 26. However, outside the requirement that parties properly respond to interrogatories, we find no compliance requirement under Rule 26. We find it more likely that the designation of experts filed by plaintiffs was in response to the scheduling order. ¶ 52. In their designation of experts, plaintiffs named Myrna Kruckenburg as a fact and expert witness to testify to [t]he extent and nature of injuries sustained by Plaintiffs, Randal Palmer, Lynn Palmer, and Ann Palmer, as well as the treatment rendered. Plaintiffs further stated that they had not yet received Mr. and Mrs. Kruckenburgs' [sic] curriculum vitae or estimated cost for deposition or trial testimony, but will supplement as soon as said documents are received. Finally, plaintiffs stated whey were not in possession of any reports by Mr. and Mrs. Kruckenburg. No other information was provided to defendants prior to trial. ¶ 53. At trial, when plaintiffs attempted to call Kruckenburg, defendants objected, claiming plaintiffs had not provided sufficient expert information pursuant to the requirements of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs responded that they had contacted counsel for defendants prior to trial and offered to present Kruckenburg for deposition. The trial court found the offer of a deposition to be inadequate and refused to allow any testimony from Ms. Kruckenburg. ¶ 54. Only in cases of abuse of discretion will we reverse a trial court's ruling on discovery matters. Harkins v. Paschall, 348 So.2d 1019, 1022 (Miss.1977). The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow Ms. Kruckenburg to testify, based upon inadequate discovery responses. Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated: Volkswagen had the burden to request further discovery or file a motion to compel, but it failed to complain until the trial. Because Volkswagen did not meet its burden, the trial court erred by excluding Kruckenburg's testimony on this ground. Palmer, ___ So.2d at ___, 2003 WL 22006296, at  (citation omitted). ¶ 55. We cannot agree that parties who file appropriate interrogatories seeking expert information acquire the additional burden of filing a motion to compel, where they are provided an answer which promises supplementation. The trial court was well within its discretion in disallowing the testimony of Ms. Kruckenburg, based upon the failure of plaintiffs to provide expert information in response to either the interrogatory filed by defendants and the trial court's scheduling order.