Opinion ID: 2518471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Effect of UBC and ANSI Standards

Text: [¶ 22] This Court has not previously held that the UBC or ANSI standards establish minimum standards of care as a matter of law. Rather, this Court has held, pursuant to Restatement 2d of Torts § 286 (1965), that a court may, under certain circumstances, adopt as the standard of conduct the requirements of a legislative or administrative enactment. Pullman v. Outzen, 924 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo.1996), citing Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 175 (Wyo.1981). Where such a standard is not adopted the unexcused violation of the enactment may serve as evidence of negligence. Id. [¶ 23] The decision whether to adopt a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation as the standard of conduct is a discretionary one. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo.1987). We reverse a district court's ruling in that regard only upon finding an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court: [A]cts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 43, 93 P.3d 222, ¶ 43 (Wyo.2004) (citation omitted). We have previously recognized that courts are under no compulsion to accept a legislative or administrative enactment as defining any standard of conduct for purposes of a tort action. Distad, 633 P.2d at 177. We have further acknowledged that courts have tended to adopt administrative standards less frequently than those of legislative enactments. Id. In considering whether to accept legislative or administrative enactments as establishing the standard of care in a particular case, we have said: Courts should refrain from an inflexible application of the negligence per se rule because of the impact that may have upon the traditional policy of premising liability on fault. The approach of the Restatement 2d is consistent with such restraint.... Following the Restatement 2d approach we find: (1) the standard defined by legislation or administrative rule should only be adopted when the four criteria of § 286, Restatement 2d, are met; (2) the excused violation of the legislative enactment or administrative rule is not negligence (a non-exclusive list of excused violations is encompassed in § 288A, Restatement 2d); and (3) even if the court finds that the criteria of § 286 are met, it is not required to adopt the legislative enactment as the standard of conduct because of the permissive language of the Restatement 2d. Short, 731 P.2d at 1198-99 (Wyo.1987). The four criteria referenced from Restatement 2d § 286, are stated as follows: The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results. In addition to these four criteria, there are other factors a trial court may consider in exercising its discretion to adopt or not adopt an enactment as the standard of conduct. We have said, for example, [a law should not be adopted as the standard of care if it] is so obscure, oblique, or irrational that it could not be said as a matter of law to provide an appropriate standard. Furthermore, that court has said that the statutory standard should not be substituted if the statute is somewhat obscure or unknown to the general public.... in order to invoke the statute or regulation as a standard the statute or regulation must prescribe or proscribe specific conduct. Using the statute or regulation as a standard is not appropriate if it sets out only a general or abstract standard of care. Short, 731 P.2d at 1199 (citations omitted). Additionally, we have said it is not appropriate to use a legislative or administrative enactment as establishing the standard of care in cases in which the facts represent a conglomeration of circumstances. Id. Finally, we have said a request for an instruction stating that an enactment establishes the standard of care must be supported by competent evidence. Id. [¶ 24] From the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision not to accept the UBC and the industry standards as defining the minimum standard of care in this case. The parties presented conflicting evidence as to whether the UBC and ANSI standards had been adopted or applied in Buffalo. Mr. Landsiedel presented testimony that the applicable code required the use of safety glass in the door through which he fell. Buffalo Properties presented testimony that no building code applied to the Cross Roads Inn when it was constructed and renovated; even if the UBC did apply, there was no requirement that safety glass be used on doors having a metal push bar like this door had; and the ANSI standards applied only if adopted by city officials and there was nothing indicating Buffalo officials had adopted them. Given the conflicting evidence presented, we are unable to conclude the district court exceeded the bounds of reason, could not reasonably conclude as it did or committed an error of law in exercising its discretion to decline to adopt the UBC and ANSI standards as establishing the standard of care. [¶ 25] Given the discretionary nature of the decision whether to accept administrative regulations as defining the standard of conduct, the district court did not transgress a clear rule of law in refusing Mr. Landsiedel's proposed instruction concerning the UBC and industry standards. Moreover, the district court allowed Mr. Landsiedel to present evidence of the UBC and ANSI standards and argue that they had the effect of the law at the time of the injury and Buffalo Properties failed to comply with them. Thus, the district court's refusal to give the instruction did not prevent Mr. Landsiedel from arguing and presenting evidence concerning industry standards and he has not shown the court's ruling affected a substantial right or materially prejudiced him.