Opinion ID: 1896707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intelligence

Text: The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea. State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). Consequences refers to a plea's direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence and fine. Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn.1998). Raleigh makes no claim that he misunderstood the charges against him or the rights he waived; he contends only that he misunderstood the consequences of his plea. Here, the consequence of pleading guilty to first-degree premeditated murder is a sentence of life without the possibility of release. Minn.Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2(1) (2008). The record is clear that Raleigh gave an affirmative answer to this question from his attorney: When we come back for sentencing, you're going to get a life without parole sentence, do you understand that? Raleigh points to nothing in the record to contradict his answer. Therefore, we conclude that Raleigh understood the direct consequence of his pleaa sentence of life without the possibility of release. Because he understood the plea's consequences, we hold that Raleigh's plea was intelligent. Because Raleigh has not shown his plea to be inaccurate, involuntary, or unintelligent, Raleigh has failed to show his plea was invalid. He is therefore not entitled to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice under Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
We turn to the question of whether the district court should have granted Raleigh's plea withdrawal motion under the fair and just standard of Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. The rule reads: In its discretion the court may also allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to do so, giving due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant's plea. The fair and just standard requires district courts to give due consideration to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant advances to support withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the State given reliance on the plea. Id. A defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to support withdrawal. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn.1989). The State bears the burden of showing prejudice caused by withdrawal. State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Minn. 2003). We review a district court's decision to deny a withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion, reversing only in the rare case. Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 266. We first review the district court's assessment of the reasons Raleigh gave to support withdrawal of his plea. At the hearing, Raleigh asserted that the court should grant withdrawal because he was under stress, felt pressured to plead guilty, and did not fully appreciate or understand the consequences of his plea. Yet Raleigh failed to provide any evidentiary support for the reasons he advanced. The court at the plea withdrawal hearing provided Raleigh the opportunity to address the court, but he inexplicably declined. [1] Because Raleigh failed to substantiate the reasons he advanced to support withdrawal, the district court could only consider Raleigh's argument in the context of the record and evidence offered by the State. Nothing in the record reveals that Raleigh felt pressured to plead guilty; to the contrary, the plea hearing transcript indicates that he suggested the plea and that counsel and the court emphasized to Raleigh how unusual his plea was. Similarly, nothing in the record shows that Raleigh did not understand the consequence, namely the corresponding sentence, of his plea. As previously discussed, Raleigh affirmed that he understood he was accepting a sentence of life without the possibility of release. Raleigh offers no other reasons why withdrawal would be fair and just, and we hold him to the reasons advanced. Because Raleigh failed to provide any valid reason why withdrawal would be fair and just, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Raleigh failed to advance a credible reason to support withdrawal of his plea. We next review the district court's assessment of the potential prejudice to the State that would be caused by withdrawal. The court concluded that the State would suffer serious prejudice if the motion to withdraw was granted. The court noted that it had been almost 16 months since the alleged crime; memories fade and witnesses become unavailable. Two witnesses for the State had already died. The court relied on the prosecutor's representation that the State had intended to try Raleigh first, and that since the time of Raleigh's guilty plea, all of the State's efforts had been focused on the trial of King. The court further relied on the prosecutor's representation that a continuance to try Raleigh first would result in witnesses becoming more uncooperative and more witnesses dying, moving or otherwise becoming unavailable. The court also noted that withdrawal would prejudice the State by affecting motions regarding the joinder or severance of King's and Raleigh's trials. Finally, the court noted that due to Raleigh's plea, the State had turned its focus to King's trial and stopped searching and interviewing witnesses for Raleigh's case. We believe the prejudice to the State was overstated by the prosecutor and the court. Raleigh's motion was, without question, timely. He determined to withdraw his plea within days of entering it. The State could easily have resumed handling its joinder or severance motions and preparing for trial. Indeed, the State had continued to prepare and secure witnesses for King's trial, which was factually nearly identical to Raleigh's case. The deaths of two witnesses and the 16 months between the time of the alleged crime and the motion to withdraw were unrelated to Raleigh's plea. Yet, even if the prejudice to the State was overstated, we do not believe the district court abused its discretion in denying Raleigh's motion to withdraw his plea. The district court noted that even if there were no prejudice to the State, the court would still have denied Raleigh's motion because Raleigh failed to advance reasons why withdrawal was fair and just. Given that Raleigh failed to advance substantiated reasons for withdrawal of his plea, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Raleigh's motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the fair and just standard of Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to deny Raleigh's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree premeditated murder under either the manifest injustice or the fair and just standard. Affirmed.