Opinion ID: 804454
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conditions of Confinement Claim

Text: Carson complains that during certain overnight periods, when the ACJF was forced to double-bunk inmates, he had to wait until morning to use the toilet because he was unable to maneuver his wheelchair around the extra bed.3 When a pre-trial detainee claims that the conditions of his confinement violate his due process rights, “the proper inquiry is whether those conditions [at issue] amount to punishment of the detainee.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. Bell established a two-prong standard for determining whether conditions of confinement violate Due Process: whether the questioned “restrictions and practices” (1) “are rationally related to a 3 Defendants argue that Carson‟s claim should fail because officials eventually agreed that Carson should have a one-man cell absent emergency circumstances. This argument is meritless; even if past constitutional violations have ceased, an inmate can still sue for damages, Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir. 1980), and so certainly a pre-trial detainee may do so as well. 9 legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose[,]” and (2) “whether they appear excessive in relation to that purpose.” Id. at 561. The first prong of the Bell analysis requires a two-part inquiry, analyzing “first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by [the] conditions [of confinement], and second, whether these conditions are rationally related to these purposes.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2005). Turning to Carson‟s claim, we begin with the principle that mere double-bunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no “„one man, one cell‟ principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 542. Nonetheless, “confining a given number of people in a given amount of space in such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time might raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause as to whether those conditions amounted to punishment[.]” Id. For example, we found a constitutional violation where the conditions of confinement were “unsanitary and humiliating” in Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 996 (3d Cir. 1983). In that case, pre-trial detainees were double-celled, resulting in mattresses being placed next to toilets on the floors of small (five-foot by seven-foot) cells. Id. at 988. Carson attempts to analogize his case to LeFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987) and Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2000), where the Fourth and Ninth Circuits found Eighth Amendment violations because convicted prisoners‟ lack of toilet access resulted in deplorably unsanitary conditions. See LeFaut, 834 F.2d at 392-94 (wheelchair-bound plaintiff housed in location without handicap facilities had to drag 10 himself to the toilet, and would sometimes slip down into the toilet bowl water); Johnson, 217 F.3d at 730 (prisoners forced to wait outside in prison yard for four days and lack of toilet resulted in extremely unsanitary conditions). We are not persuaded by Carson‟s argument. Despite his attempts to analogize his case to LeFaut or Johnson, he does not claim any deprivation that is even akin to the deplorable conditions in those cases. The conditions of which Carson complains simply do not rise to the level of punishment because the conditions were rationally related to the nonpunitive purpose of housing inmates, and did not appear to be excessive. At most, Carson complains of an inconvenient and uncomfortable situation, but, as the District Court noted, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons[.]” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). We find no error in the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on this issue.