Opinion ID: 1998256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of Temporary Help Services

Text: [¶ 7] An employer that contracts with a private employment agency for temporary help services is, as a general rule, immune from a civil suit brought by an employee of the private employment agency for workplace injuries so long as the agency has secured workers' compensation protection for the employee. 39-A M.R.S. § 104. [2] This case turns on the meaning of temporary help services as it is defined by section 104: [A] service where an agency assigns its own employees to a 3rd party to work under the direction and control of the 3rd party to support or supplement the 3rd party's work force in work situations such as employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal work load conditions and special assignments and projects. Id. [¶ 8] Penn contends that the Legislature, by using the word temporary in section 104, intended for a time limitation to inhere in section 104 beyond which a worker's temporary employment no longer qualifies as temporary and the employer's immunity from suit no longer applies. Although Penn raises a variety of challenges to the Superior Court's summary judgment analysis, we address only his principal contention that evidence that at least two other Manpower employees were working at FMC on a long-term basis and that Penn believed his employment at FMC was not temporary because he was never informed to the contrary, establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was engaged in temporary help services at the time of his injury. [¶ 9] Viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Penn, the undisputed material facts establish all of the elements for temporary help services contained in section 104. First, Penn was employed by Manpower, a temporary help agency. Second, he was assigned to work at FMC under the direction and control of an FMC employee. Finally, his assignment was for the purpose of supporting or supplementing FMC's workforce arising out of, among other things, a potential outsourcing plan that would result in the reassignment of permanent employees. These facts plainly establish that Penn was engaged in temporary help services as contemplated by section 104. [¶ 10] Contrary to Penn's assertion, section 104 does not contain any temporal limit on a temporary employee's temporary help services assignment, nor does it require that a temporary services employee be explicitly informed that the assignment is temporary in order for the employer's section 104 immunity to be preserved. Although we found the phrase to work under the direction and control of the 3rd party as employed in section 104 to be ambiguous in Marcoux, 2005 ME 107, ¶¶ 10-12, 881 A.2d at 1142-43, section 104 is not ambiguous in the constellation of elements that give rise to temporary help services. 39-A M.R.S. § 104. Even if it were, there is nothing in its legislative history to suggest that the Legislature intended that additional, yet unspoken, elements must be satisfied before an employer who contracts for temporary help services qualifies for immunity from suit. [¶ 11] As applied in this case, the plain meaning construction of section 104 furthers the overall purpose of the Maine Workers' Compensation Act. Penn, the employee, was compensated for his work-related injury, while Manpower and FMC, his private employment agency and the employer, receive immunity from suit. Neither the fact that Penn worked at FMC for approximately seven months at the time of his injury nor the fact that other Manpower employees were assigned to FMC for periods greater than Penn's assignment, generate a dispute of material fact that if resolved in Penn's favor could negate FMC's section 104 immunity. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.