Opinion ID: 4545965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Narrow Approach

Text: Under the narrow approach, a patient waives privilege by “‘affirmatively placing the substance of the advice or communication directly in issue.’” Koch, 10 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) 489 F.3d at 390 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). For example, in Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, the plaintiff alleged violations of various antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws; for most of those violations, she sought damages for emotional distress. 174 F.R.D. 225, 226 (D. Mass. 1997). Courts applying the broad approach would have held that the plaintiff waived privilege simply by seeking damages for emotional distress. See, e.g., Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 823. But the court in Vanderbilt rejected the broad approach and instead opted for the narrow approach. 174 F.R.D. at 228. The court held that a plaintiff waives privilege only if he or she “puts the privileged communication itself at issue,” by “us[ing] the substance of her communication, by calling her psychotherapist as a witness, for example, or by testifying to the substance of the communication herself.” Id. at 230. Courts that adopt the narrow approach treat waiver of the psychotherapistpatient privilege similarly to how they treat waiver of the attorney-client privilege. “A client waives [attorney-client] privilege when he puts the attorney-client relationship in issue—for example, by suing the attorney for malpractice or by claiming he relied upon the attorney’s advice.” Koch, 489 F.3d at 389 (citing United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 352-53 (5th Cir. 1991); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.30 (3d ed. 2003); 11 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)). “By analogy, a patient would waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege when he sues the therapist for malpractice, or relies upon the therapist’s diagnoses or treatment in making or defending a case.” Id. (citing Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229).6 To be sure, courts that adopt the broad approach also claim that they are attempting to treat waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege the same way they treat waiver of the attorney-client privilege—but that claim falls flat. For example, in Schoffstall, a case often cited as an example of the broad approach, the court reasoned “that, similar to attorney-client privilege that can be waived when the client places the attorney’s representation at issue, a plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing his or her medical condition at issue.” 223 F.3d at 823 (relying on several federal district court opinions). But that 6 In Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wn.2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990), we examined when a client impliedly waives attorney-client privilege. We held that the client does so when he or she sues an attorney for malpractice. Id. at 208-09. In doing so, we applied a threeprong test that we borrowed from a federal court. Id. at 207-08 (applying test from Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975)). Under one of those prongs, we examined the opposing party’s need for the evidence. Id. But as explained above, the United States Supreme Court has since rejected any sort of analysis that balances the importance of a privilege with the opposing party’s need for the privileged evidence. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17 (“Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”). 12 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) comparison is imperfect. It equates placing one’s medical condition at issue with placing an attorney’s representation at issue, id., and the two do not equate: “Asking whether the patient’s mental condition is at issue is a very different question from that asked in the context of determining waiver of the attorney-client privilege: whether the client has put the representation—not the topic of representation—at issue.” Anderson, supra, at 124. Simply put, the Schoffstall court’s conclusion that “making a claim for emotional distress necessarily waives the privilege . . . does not follow from the . . . analogy to the attorney-client privilege.” Koch, 489 F.3d at 389 (citing Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 823). At bottom, the narrow approach is tailored to protect privilege while at the same time barring a party from wielding the privilege as a sword. Id. “‘In other words, a party cannot partially disclose privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party.’” In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000)). As I discuss below, our court has already gone a long way toward adopting the narrow approach, and I would explicitly do so here. 13 Magney et al. v. Pham, MD et al., No. 96669-9 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)