Opinion ID: 1662575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: recusal of judge

Text: As previously stated, on seven different occasions following his conviction, defendant wrote letters to the trial judge, generally declaring that he had been wrongfully convicted. He then moved to have the judge recuse himself from hearing the motion for postconviction relief on the grounds that the court could be biased because of its receipt of those letters. He argues on appeal that this correspondence was of a threatening and accusatory nature and that the judge was biased against him and should not have heard his motion for postconviction relief. A motion to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias or prejudice is addressed to the discretion of the judge, and an order overruling such a motion will ordinarily be affirmed on appeal unless the record establishes bias or prejudice as a matter of law. State v. Reddick, 230 Neb. 218, 430 N.W.2d 542 (1988). Thus, the defendant has the burden of showing that the court was actually biased or prejudiced, and, hence, it is not sufficient to merely show that the court could have been biased or that an appearance of impropriety was created. Moreover, a party seeking to disqualify a judge on the basis of bias or prejudice bears the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of judicial impartiality. State v. Bird Head, 225 Neb. 822, 408 N.W.2d 309 (1987); State v. Gillette, 218 Neb. 672, 357 N.W.2d 472 (1984). To carry defendant's claim to its logical conclusion, all any party in a legal proceeding would have to do in order to disqualify a judge would be to write a series of nasty letters, and then claim foul. A review of the record discloses that there was no basis for requiring the district judge in this instance to disqualify himself. There is no merit to any of defendant's contentions on appeal. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.