Opinion ID: 1508408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Felony Murder

Text: As noted, the jury was specifically instructed that, to convict Stouffer of felony murder, the State was required to prove that the defendant or another participating with the defendant committed a felony and specifically kidnaping, that the defendant or another participating in the crime killed Jeffrey Lynn Fiddler and that the act resulting in the death of Jeffrey Lynn Fiddler occurred during the commission of the kidnaping. The jury obviously believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State had proved those things. The Court of Special Appeals concluded otherwise. It determined that [i]n no sense can Fiddler's death be viewed as the `result or outcome' of a kidnapping that [Stouffer] and his bellicose band intended to perpetrate. Stouffer v. State, supra, 118 Md.App. at 616, 703 A.2d at 874. That, in turn, arose from the appellate court's determination that Stouffer's overarching intent was not to kidnap Fiddler but simply to beat him. The court held at 118 Md.App. at 620, 703 A.2d at 875, that [t]here was no direct or inferential evidence before the trier of fact that the announced purpose of Stouffer's missionto scare Fiddlerwas to be accomplished by forcibly confining and transporting him. All of the evidence, it said, indicates that the means to be employed in intimidating Fiddler or placing him in fear was the infliction of serious bodily harm in a reckless and dangerous manner with indifference to the consequences. Id. at 620, 703 A.2d at 876. In his brief, Stouffer puts the point more succinctly: The beating that culminated in the fatal stabbing was not done to further the kidnapping; rather, the kidnapping was carried out to further the beating. As a result there was no felony murder. In supporting the conclusion of the intermediate appellate court, Stouffer cites Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 444 A.2d 1034 (1982) and a number of out-of-State cases that we cited in Campbell. The issue in Campbell and in most of the cases cited by Stouffer was whether a participant in a robbery or other felony could properly be convicted of felony murder when the person killed was killed by someone other than a participant. In Campbell, for example, a co-participant with Campbell in an armed robbery was killed either by the robbery victim, shooting in self-defense, or by a police officer in a concurrent attempt to apprehend the co-participant. We joined the prevailing view that under the felony-murder doctrine a participating felon is not guilty of murder when the killing is done by a person other than the participating felon or his co-felons. Campbell, supra, 293 Md. at 443, 444 A.2d at 1037. That is not, of course, the issue here. The more pertinent point sought to be drawn from Campbell and the other cases is that stated in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (Pa.1958) and quoted by us in Campbell, that [t]he mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine. `It is necessary ... to show that the conduct causing death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.' That principle, that there must be some nexus between the killing and the underlying felony, is not really in dispute and, indeed, is clear from the Maryland felony murder statute itself. Maryland Code, Article 27, § 410 makes all murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any ... kidnapping as defined in [§ 337]... murder in the first degree. The question, then, is simply whether the evidence sufficed to show that Fiddler was murdered in the perpetration of a kidnapping. In that regard, we take issue with Stouffer and the Court of Special Appeals that the overarching intent of Stouffer and his cohorts was simply to beat Fiddler and that the kidnapping was carried out solely in furtherance of that intent. For one thing, that presumed overarching intent found by the Court of Special Appeals is quite irrelevant. Whatever may have been Stouffer's motive, we have already determined that there was sufficient evidence to establish a kidnapping, and it is clear, really beyond cavil, that the stabbing occurred in the perpetration of that kidnapping. There was evidence that Fiddler was stabbed in order to prevent his escape. Because kidnapping is a continuing crime, remaining in effect until the hostage is safely released, the stabbing was necessarily in furtherance of the felonious undertaking. Campbell v. State, supra, 293 Md. at 446, 444 A.2d at 1039, quoting from Commonwealth v. Redline, supra, 397 Pa. at 496, 137 A.2d at 476. It appears as well that there was evidence of an independent intent to kidnap Fiddler, that the kidnapping itselfthe forcible removal of Fiddler to a place where he would be isolated and helpless, where he could be stripped, humiliated, and beatenwas what was intended to teach him a lesson. The evidence therefore did suffice to indicate that the beating may have been part of the kidnapping, not the other way around. In both events, the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the felony murder judgment.