Opinion ID: 1713495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Indirect or Direct Criminal Contempt

Text: A complete disposition of this action requires an examination of whether the judge was correct in finding Mrs. Tetter in direct criminal contempt. Hence our next consideration. It is conceded that this action is a case of criminal contempt. Criminal contempt is:    imposed to punish for an act of past disobedience, to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court, and to punish any act which is in disrespect of the court or tends to obstruct the administration of justice, or which tends to bring the court into disrepute.    Carroll v. State, 350 So.2d 723 (Ala.App. 1977). However, the parties disagree as to whether or not the contemptuous conduct in question constitutes an indirect (constructive) or direct contempt. The distinction between the two is drawn as a basis for procedural differences in applying a remedy. If the contemptuous conduct is determined to be a direct contempt, punishment is imposed without notice of hearing. On the other hand, if found to be an indirect contempt, punishment can be imposed only upon notice and hearing. See Carroll, supra. Mrs. Tetter contends the contempt was indirect; the State argues it was direct. In Ex parte Tarpley, 53 Ala.App. 363, 300 So.2d 401 (1974), aff'd 293 Ala. 137, 300 So.2d 409 (1974), Judge Harris, writing for a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals, aptly summarized the constitutional procedures to be utilized when remedying an indirect contempt:    a person alleged to be in contempt of court [shall] be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either in defense or explanation., and a direct one:    a distinguishable category of circumstances [exist] where the above procedures are not mandatory. The excepted instances include charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent demoralization of the court's authority before the public.    if some of the essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the judge and he must depend upon statements made by others to supply his knowledge as to such essential elements, due process requires reasonable prior notice and the opportunity to be heard in person and with his witnesses at a fair hearing. (emphasis added) These procedures raise the following decisive issue in determining whether contempt is indirect or direct: Were all of the essential elements of the contemptuous misconduct under the eye of the court? We think not. The contemptuous conduct in question involved about sixteen or seventeen persons. The judge, in his findings, stated that upon stepping from his chambers into the hallway, he observed all sixteen or seventeen persons involved in the melee. How could he possibly, from this observation, determine which parties were responsible for the disturbance. The answer is simple, the judge had to    depend upon statements made by others (the persons involved) to supply his knowledge as to such essential elements   , as evidenced in his contempt order. Thus, he did not have under his eye all the essential elements of the misconduct. Summary punishment is allowed in those exceptional cases, direct contempts, because the personal knowledge of the court in whose presence the act was committed takes the place of evidence. Tarpley, supra, Carroll, supra. The judge's incomplete personal knowledge here, could not supply the needed evidence that would warrant denying Mrs. Tetter due process of law. Had his personal knowledge been complete there may have been no need to take testimony. Whether Mrs. Tetter was responsible for the disturbance was not within the judge's personal knowledge from what he observed. We hold this was an indirect criminal contempt and the judge was required to afford to Mrs. Tetter due process of law (notice of the charges against her and a hearing) before imposing punishment. In light of the foregoing, this action is remanded to the circuit court so that Mrs. Tetter may be advised of the charges against her and given a proper hearing in accordance with the requirements of due process as stated in cases of indirect contempt. For a detailed explanation of the proper procedures see Carroll, supra, and Ex parte Seymore 264 Ala. 689, 89 So.2d 83 (1956). REVERSED AND REMANDED. TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.