Opinion ID: 1860646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the circuit court err in failing to dismiss travis's claim for improper venue?

Text: ¶ 9. Under its first claim, ICRR argues that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-5 (Supp. 2001) controls the venue choice in this case. Thus, it argues that the only appropriate places for venue are where the action accrued, where the defendant has its principal place of business, or where the plaintiff resided. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-5. Second, ICRR contends that while Miss. R. Civ. P. 82(c) states that where several claims or parties have been joined, the suit may be brought in any county which any one of the claims could properly have been brought, this does not apply to those parties joined under Rule 20(a). It cites the second sentence of Rule 82(c) for this finding. That sentence states that: Whenever an action has been commenced in a proper county, additional claims and parties may be joined, pursuant to Rules 13, 14, 22, and 24, as ancillary thereto, without regard to whether that county would be the proper venue for an independent action on such claims or against such parties. ¶ 10. ICRR acknowledges that this Court has recently stated that when Rule 20 joinder of parties is involved, `venue is proper wherever it is proper as to one such claim.' American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Alexander, ___ So.2d ___, ___, 2001 WL 83952  (Miss.2001) (citing McDonald v. Holmes, 595 So.2d 434, 436 (Miss.1992)). Despite this fact, ICRR argues that in Alexander the defendant had conceded that Rule 82(c) applied if Rule 20 was used properly. It asserts that they make no such concession and further argues that the language of Rule 82(c), as well as the logic behind that rule, preclude its application where joinder is asserted under Rule 20. ¶ 11. Plaintiff argues that Travis is properly joined under Rule 20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus Rule 82(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that venue is proper for all plaintiffs where it is proper for one, makes Marshall County, Mississippi, an appropriate venue for this action. Plaintiff states that within the ten-plaintiff trial group that Travis is a part of, four of the plaintiffs worked for ICRR in Marshall County and were exposed to asbestos during that time. Further, plaintiff Dean Pounders currently resides in Marshall County. ¶ 12. First, this Court has previously stated that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-5 is not the only venue statute to which parties may resort in an action against a railroad. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Tircuit, 554 So.2d 878, 881 (Miss.1989). In that case, this Court found that this state's general venue statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Supp.2001), provides additional venue options, including where a non-resident corporation `may be found'. Id. Thus, if ICRR can be found in Marshall County, Mississippi, this would be an additional venue option. However, plaintiffs' only argument is that Marshall County is the location where the cause of action accrued for at least four of the plaintiffs in this ten-plaintiff trial group, as well as others within the remaining ninety-nine plaintiffs. Their contention is that Rule 82(c) allows for venue to be proper for all where it is proper for one. ¶ 13. As for ICRR's argument that Rule 82(c) does not apply to parties joined under Rule 20, Mississippi law has never suggested that Rule 82(c) might not apply. In two cases, this Court has simply stated that Rule 82(c) applied when parties are joined under Rule 20. The Alabama Supreme Court addressed an argument similar to this in Ex parte Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. 533 So.2d 230 (Ala.1988). There it was argued that a party joined under a Rule 15 amendment to the pleading could destroy venue. The Alabama Supreme Court stated: [T]he second sentence of Rule 82(c) can be read to mean that the addition of parties whose relation to each other or to existing parties is different from the original plaintiff/defendant relation does not render venue improper or require severance. That sentence's omission of Rule 15 does not mean that amendments adding parties do render venue improper, but rather, the sentence is more properly interpreted as omitting reference to Rule 15 because that Rule is unlike the four that are mentioned. An amendment adding a party under Rule 15 is properly analogous to Rules 19 and 20, under which joinder is practiced in the original pleadings, and therefore comes within the import of the first sentence of Rule 82(c). 533 So.2d at 232-233. We agree with this reasoning. Thus, if joinder is appropriate as to the plaintiffs, then venue is proper to all under Rule 82(c) since it is proper to one or more of the plaintiffs.