Opinion ID: 1941856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: poole's remaining arguments

Text: Poole contends that the government improperly introduced evidence implicating him in other crimes, thereby prejudicing the fairness of his trial. See Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 15, 331 F.2d 85, 89 (1964) (evidence of one crime is inadmissible to prove disposition to commit crime). Specifically, Poole complains of statements concerning (1) two bags containing white powder recovered at 510 Ridge Road and (2) his arrest for other reasons in New Jersey. At trial, however, defense counsel failed to raise any objection to these statements, nor did he request any limiting instruction. We therefore review for plain error. See Johnson v. United States, 596 A.2d 980, 986 (D.C.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1987, 118 L.Ed.2d 585 (1992); Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc). A police detective mentioned the two bags containing white powder when the prosecutor asked him to describe a photograph of the contents of a drawer from the apartment at 510 Ridge Road. Neither the prosecutor nor any of his witnesses ever referred to the bags of white powder again or ever spoke of them in any way that would identify the white powder as drugs. Later, in a conference on the admissibility of the photograph itself, the trial judge raised on his own the reference to the bags. He noted that the bags were mentioned quickly in passing and he concluded that he didn't think that it would be caught on .... Showell's counsel also said that nobody caught it. Not even the jurors caught it. The trial judge decided not to admit the photograph [o]ut of an abundance of caution. While we are sensitive to the especially inflammatory nature of evidence of illegal drug use, see Robinson v. United States, 623 A.2d 1234, 1241 (D.C.1993), we conclude that on this record the single, unelaborated reference to white powder was not so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial, Watts, 362 A.2d at 709. The reference to Poole's arrest in New Jersey arose under the following circumstances. In order to show Poole's appearance at the time of the robbery, the government sought to introduce a photo of Poole that had been taken on February 1, 1990, when he had been arrested for a traffic violation in New Jersey. Poole's counsel agreed to stipulate that Mr. Poole was arrested on February 1st, 1990 at 9:50 a.m. in Salem County, New Jersey and that the photo was a fair and accurate photo of how Mr. Poole looked at the time of his arrest. There was no reference to Poole's having been arrested for any other crime, and, as the trial court observed and Poole's counsel himself later noted, the most natural inference the jury would have drawn from the stipulation was that Poole had been arrested for the robbery for which he was on trial. Indeed, there was no evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Poole had been arrested for any other crime. Moreover, the trial court refused to allow the government to argue that the location of this arrest showed that Poole was fleeing from this crime. Accordingly, we conclude that there was no plain error in the admission of this stipulation.
Poole also contends that he was unfairly prejudiced by statements in the prosecutor's closing argument suggesting that both Poole and his lawyer had tried to intimidate the government's witnesses. At the outset of his closing argument, the prosecutor made the following observations: This was a serious crime. You know that because you saw the witnesses that came in here, and you had a chance to observe their demeanor. Some of them started to get upset during the course of their examination because this is a painful thing. And a lot of them were scared.... You should probably know it is not an easy thing to stand up here if you are one of these women and pick out Mr. Poole, even though you know that the situation is safe, because there is a physical trauma and a mental trauma that goes with it. But we asked each of the witnesses, do you think that the fact that you were afraid affected your ability to pick these people out, and there was no person, except for [one witness], who said she couldn't pick out anyone. Do you remember what they said? ... Yes, I was scared. Yes, I was frightened. But no, I remember the guy that did it. Later, the prosecutor added, And just what the Defense lawyers were doing in a large measure, you may think they were trying to intimidate these witnesses in kind of a nice way. []How long did it take?[] []Ten minutes.[] []Are you sure?[] []Well, I don't know. Maybe longer. I don't know.[] And just like they tried to intimidate the witnesses, [Poole's counsel] is trying to intimidate you all. At that point Poole's counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel did not request any further instruction, however. Accordingly, we will reverse only if the failure of the trial court to take any additional corrective action constituted plain error. See McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 48 (D.C.1991). The first statement, taken by itself, was clearly not improper. The prosecutor was arguing that the government's witnesses were scared as a result of the robbery, not as a result of any other action by Poole. The second statement may have gone too far, insofar as the word intimidate could be understood to mean that the defense lawyers were improperly threatening both witnesses and jurors. Considered in the context of the entire trial, however, this single statement was not so extreme as to undermine the very integrity of the proceedings. As we have already noted, the evidence against Poole was very strong; the court cut off the prosecutor at that point in his argument; and defense counsel did not request any further instructions. As we observed of another prosecutor's ill-chosen words: Ad hominem attacks against opposing counsel are uncalled for and unprofessional. The prosecutor would have done better ... to choose his words more carefully.... We cannot agree with appellants, however, that his remarks were egregious, or that in context they had any significant potential for affecting the verdict. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 34 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted).
Poole claims that his conviction for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, D.C.Code § 22-3204(b), merges with his predicate convictions for armed robbery, burglary while armed, and assault with intent to commit robbery while armed. In ( Michael) Thomas v. United States, 602 A.2d 647 (D.C.1992), this court faced a similar claim that the crime of possessing a firearm while committing a dangerous crime should merge with distribution of a controlled substance while armed and possession with intent to distribute while armed. We held that the D.C. Council did not intend for the offense defined by 3204(b) to merge with an offense subject to the enhanced penalty provision of 3202 for armed offenses. Id. at 650. That holding clearly applies to this case and forecloses further consideration of Poole's merger claim. As for Poole's one-sentence assertion that his sentences are undue and oppressive, given the acts constituting the offenses for which he was convicted, it is well established that this court will not review on appeal sentences which are within statutory limits, upon the ground that such sentences are too severe. In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.1988). Since Poole does not allege that his sentence conflicts with statutory guidelines, we need not consider his claim further.
Poole argues, finally, that the trial court erred in denying without a hearing his motion to vacate his conviction under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989 Repl.). [27] The trial court is statutorily required to hold a hearing on § 23-110 claims [u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. D.C.Code § 23-110(c). A hearing is not required where the petitioner's claims (1) are vague and conclusory, (2) are palpably incredible, or (3) would not merit relief even if true. Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 766 (D.C.1992), and cases cited therein. In his motion, Poole alleged that government witnesses perjured themselves, that the prosecutor had manufactured evidence, that newly discovered evidence would exonerate him and prove the foregoing claims, and that his defense counsel was ineffective. As the trial court found, these allegations are totally devoid of specifics. Although the motion repeatedly refers to four documents constituting newly discovered evidence, there is absolutely no statement of what the documents are or what information they contain. In the absence of more specificity, we conclude that most of Poole's claims are vague, conclusory, and palpably incredible. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing them without a hearing. The only one of Poole's assertions that merits more than cursory consideration is the ineffective assistance claim. Specifically, Poole alleged that his counsel was ineffective in failing (1) to be present at his lineup, (2) to file adequate pretrial motions, including a challenge to the validity of the warrants for his arrest and the search of 510 Ridge Road, and (3) to investigate the possible use of the four documents or other documents that Poole had in his possession. From the record it is clear that Poole's claim that his counsel failed to contest the warrants is simply wrong. Poole's allegations that his counsel failed to investigate the documents are, again, vague and conclusory. As for counsel's absence at the lineup, assuming that this constituted ineffective assistance, we conclude that Poole has failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066-67, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), insofar as (a) the trial court found that there was nothing suggestive about the lineup, and (b) we have concluded that the lack of counsel at the lineup was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, for the reasons given above, appellants' convictions on all counts are Affirmed.