Opinion ID: 2612329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Produce Evidence

Text: Johnson claims that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to dismiss following the State's failure to produce the inhaler in question. At trial, Johnson filed a motion for production and independent analysis of a metaprel inhaler seized by Detective Romero of the Albuquerque Police Department, pursuant to a search warrant at the Johnson residence. The motion, in the alternative, requested that if the State could not produce the inhaler, then the indictment be dismissed because the independent analysis of ... the Metaprel inhaler may well reveal the presence of ethyl ether within the deceased's home ... [and] ... [t]hat the failure of the State to produce the [inhaler] hampered [Johnson] in the preparation of his defense. The motion to dismiss was not granted and the inhaler was not produced. Also, Mr. Rogillio, Sylvia's father, testified that after Detective Romero seized the inhaler, he told Mr. Rogillio that he would have its contents analyzed. Detective Romero, however, testified that he gave the inhaler to Mr. Rogillio. Johnson, therefore, argues that by depriving him the production of the inhaler into evidence, he was denied due process. We disagree. In State v. Chouinard, 96 N.M. 658, 661, 634 P.2d 680, 683 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S.Ct. 1980, 72 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982), we adopted a three-part test to determine whether the deprivation of evidence constituted reversible error: 1) The State either breached some duty or intentionally deprived the defendant of evidence; 2) The improperly `suppressed' evidence must have been material; and 3) The suppression of this evidence prejudiced the defendant. (Citations omitted.) We stated that [t]he purpose of the three-part test is to assure that the trial court will come to a determination that will serve the ends of justice. Id. The record clearly indicates no evidence that Johnson was intentionally deprived of the inhaler. The record further indicates that the inhaler was lost or disposed of after an apparent determination that it had no evidentiary value. The State cannot be said to have breached any duty to Johnson by releasing the inhaler or disposing of it after a reasonable determination that it had no evidentiary value. See State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 368, 600 P.2d 820 (1979). Nevertheless, even if the State did breach a duty to Johnson by not producing the inhaler, the inhaler was not material evidence. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-113, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401-02, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that: The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. (Footnote omitted.) Such a finding is permissible only if supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. (Footnote omitted.) If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. [Emphasis added.] After considering the inhaler in the context of the entire record, and in light of our review and determination of substantial evidence in points I and II, we hold that Johnson was neither prejudiced nor deprived of a fair trial as guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. Const.amend. VI and XIV, because there is no reasonable doubt about [Johnson's] guilt whether or not the [inhaler] is considered.... United States v. Agurs, supra, at 112-113, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-02. Therefore, we determine that the trial court did not err in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss following the State's failure to produce the inhaler.