Opinion ID: 2037079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the Guilty Plea on the Ineffective Assistance Claim

Text: Following a valid guilty plea only those challenges that are fundamental to the plea itself still remain available to the defendant. See Mann, 602 N.W.2d at 789. Generally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims fall within this category. See Mott, 407 N.W.2d at 582-83. However, this court has recently held that if the undercurrent of the ineffective assistance claim is an issue designed to question the validity of the conviction, it, too, is waived. Speed v. State, 616 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 2000) (per curiam) ( Speed II ). In Speed II, we held that we would not hear ineffective assistance claims that did not bear[ ] on the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea. Id. In an earlier disposition of the same case on direct appeal we had occasion to state: Any subsequently discovered deficiency in the State's case that affects a defendant's assessment of the evidence against him, but not the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea, is not intrinsic to the plea itself. State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998) ( Speed I ). The Speed II court dealt with a challenge of the failure of counsel to move for suppression of evidence in the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Speed II, 616 N.W.2d at 159. The court first recognized that evidentiary challenges which attack the basis for the conviction do not survive the entry of a guilty plea. Id. (citing State v. Sharp, 572 N.W.2d 917, 918-19 (Iowa 1997)); see also Speed I, 573 N.W.2d at 596 (holding that the decisions not to investigate further or move to suppress evidence have more relation to a tactical rationale for pleading guilty [than] a defendant's understanding of what a plea means or its voluntariness). When these challenges are then brought disguised as ineffective assistance claims the result is unchanged, and the objection is waived. Speed II, 616 N.W.2d at 159. We hold that LaRue's ineffective assistance claims presented here fall within the Speed II rationale. The defendant maintains that his counsel should have objected to the alleged conflict of interest created by the counsel substitution and should have deposed a defense witness. Neither of these claims imply the defendant's plea was uninformed or involuntary. In Speed II, we held that counsel's failure to investigate or move in objection were not circumstances inherent in the plea itself. Such is also the case here. Moreover, LaRue's conflict of interest assertion is not a viable claim recognized by this court. Were we to preserve it for postconviction, we would have no definable issue to leave for the district court's perusal. This is because in the instant case there is no record made as to what information was obtained by Zamora in her representation of LaRue that specifically prejudiced his rights when she subsequently represented Kelly. Accordingly, we hold that LaRue waived his ineffective assistance claims upon pleading guilty.