Opinion ID: 485228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exhaustion and Ripeness Doctrines

Text: 11 Apart from the obvious differences in the results reached in Hastings and Andrade, it is important to recognize that the cases rely on distinct legal theories. The principal holding in Hastings is that the plaintiff's claim was not ripe for judicial review; whereas in Andrade the court held that the plaintiffs need not exhaust their administrative remedies before pursuing their constitutional claims in court. Nonetheless, although Hastings relies on the ripeness doctrine, the court appears to be principally concerned with the requirement that Judge Hastings exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of his constitutional challenges. 12 Hastings is thus instructive in demonstrating areas of overlap in the ripeness and exhaustion doctrines, both of which serve at a minimum to postpone judicial consideration of claims that are otherwise cognizable in court. However, although the case law is sometimes confusing on this point, the purposes and tests associated with the application of each doctrine are distinct: 13 When the party seeking review has come into court prematurely, he is likely to be told that he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or that the matter is not yet ripe for judicial review. Ripeness and exhaustion are complementary doctrines which are designed to prevent unnecessary or untimely judicial interference in the administrative process. 14 If the agency proceeding is still at an early stage and the party seeking review has the right to an administrative hearing or review, the court will decline to hear his appeal on the ground that he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Judicial intervention may not be necessary because the agency can correct any initial errors at subsequent stages of the process; moreover, the agency's position on important issues of fact and law may not be fully crystallized or adopted in final form. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 [58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638] (1938), illustrates one situation in which this principle applies. The company had been served with an NLRB complaint, alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor practices. Bethlehem Shipbuilding took the position that the complaint was invalid because the NLBR [sic] had no jurisdiction over the company, and it tried to obtain immediate judicial review of the complaint. Despite the company's claim that it would suffer irreparable harm if it were forced to participate in an unnecessary evidentiary hearing, Bethlehem was required to exhaust its administrative remedies: Lawsuits also often prove to have been groundless, the Court observed, but no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a trial to establish the fact. See also FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California [449 U.S. 232], 101 S.Ct. 488 [66 L.Ed.2d 416] (1980) (issuance of an FTC complaint not final agency action subject to review before the final adjudicatory order is delivered). 15 .... 16 The ripeness doctrine looks to similar factors in determining the availability of review--that is, the fitness of the issues for judicial determination and the hardship to the parties that would result from granting or denying review--but it has a different focus and a different basis from exhaustion. The exhaustion doctrine emphasizes the position of the party seeking review; in essence, it asks whether he may be attempting to short circuit the administrative process or whether he has been reasonably diligent in protecting his own interests. Ripeness, by contrast, is concerned primarily with the institutional relationships between courts and agencies, and the competence of the courts to resolve disputes without further administrative refinement of the issues. In extreme cases, the ripeness doctrine serves to implement the policy behind Article III of the Constitution. Since the judicial power is limited to cases and controversies, federal courts cannot decide purely abstract or theoretical claims, or render advisory opinions. 17 E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 316-19 (1981). 18 In a recent review of the ripeness doctrine, this court has stated the test for its application as follows: 19 [In its prudential aspects] ... the ripeness inquiry takes into account pragmatic concerns regarding the institutional capacities of, and the relationship between, courts and agencies. These concerns include the agency's interest in crystallizing its policy before that policy is subjected to judicial review, the court's interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting, and the petitioner's interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action. In Abbott Laboratories [v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) ], the Supreme Court announced the two-pronged test for ripeness that balances these interests. The test requires a court to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 20 Pursuant to the fitness of the issues prong, we first must decide whether the disputed claims raise purely legal questions and would, therefore, be presumptively suitable for judicial review. Second, we determine whether the court or the agency would benefit from the postponement of review until the agency action or policy in question has assumed either a final or more concrete form. Finally, we examine the appellants' interest in immediate review. In order to outweigh any institutional interests in the deferral of review, appellants must demonstrate hardship, i.e., that the impact of the administrative action could be said to be felt immediately by those subject to it in conducting their day-to-day affairs. 21 .... 22 We recognize that this hardship analysis relies in part upon an acceptance of the appellants' view of the merits. 23 Better Gov't Ass'n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d 86, 92, 94 (D.C.Cir.1986) (footnotes omitted). 24 Both the ripeness and the exhaustion doctrines are arguably implicated in the instant case. On balance, however, I believe that, apart from Hastings, the prevailing case law does not support a finding that the appellants' claim is unripe for judicial review. Given the benefit of hindsight and further reflection, Hastings appears to me to be somewhat aberrant in its application of the ripeness doctrine. However, when Hastings is viewed as a case mostly concerned with the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, the holding seems unexceptional. 25 In any event, it is my judgment that the instant case is principally concerned with an application of the exhaustion, not the ripeness, doctrine. My analysis will proceed accordingly. 26