Opinion ID: 721376
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 13 As a preliminary matter, we must address our jurisdiction to consider the officers' assertion that their actions did not amount to a constitutional violation. It is by now axiomatic that the federal appellate tribunals may normally review appeals only from final decisions issued by the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); Johnson v. Jones, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2154, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). Due to this statutory limitation upon our jurisdiction, a party is in most cases precluded from interrupting litigation by filing an interlocutory appeal from a district court's ruling. See Johnson, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2154-55. Of course, an order denying a litigant's motion for summary judgment is not typically considered a final decision worthy of immediate appellate attention. 14 The Supreme Court has held, however, that a district court's refusal to grant a public official's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity will, under certain circumstances, qualify as a collateral order from which the official may file a prompt appeal. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2155 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). The Court has recently reiterated that this type interlocutory appeal is only appropriate when it involves abstract issues of law relating to qualified immunity. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2158. By contrast, where a public official merely challenges a portion of a district court's summary judgment order that, though entered in a 'qualified immunity' case, determines only a question of 'evidence sufficiency,'  Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2156, we cannot entertain the appeal. In other words, a district court's pretrial rejection of a proffered qualified immunity defense is not immediately reviewable if the issue on appeal is whether the pretrial record is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 78 F.3d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir.1996). 15 In the case currently before us, we are called upon to decide whether the district court correctly concluded that the facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to Eagle, could substantiate a finding that the JPD officers violated Eagle's right to privacy. This constitutional question is inherently an abstract issue of law over which we presently have jurisdiction. Indeed, as a threshold element in any qualified immunity appeal, we must determine, as a matter of law, whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Manzano v. South Dakota Dep't of Social Services, 60 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir.1995). To be sure, some factual matters remain disputed. For instance, Eagle contends that McDaniel and his peers at the JPD, acting in concert, were solely responsible for the dissemination of his criminal record, but the officers respond that members of the press also distributed this information. Disagreements such as this do not concern us here. Rather, in resolving this appeal, we will take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment.... Johnson, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2159. As an example, we will assume, as did the district court, that the appellant officers were the only persons who publicly revealed Eagle's criminal history. Mindful of these principles, we turn to the constitutionality of the officers' conduct. 16