Opinion ID: 1791677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancellor erred in divesting effort alexander of title to parcel 15 and vesting title to parcel 15 in ella daniel.

Text: ¶ 9. In exercising our mandated appellate review, we will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, was clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Rush v. Wallace Rentals, LLC, 837 So.2d 191, 194 (Miss.2003) (citing Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 10. To fully discuss this issue, we must go deeper into the record. From 1986 until 2000, there were five DeSoto County land conveyances which must be reviewed. (1) On November 3, 1986, Sam Lee Daniel and wife, Ella Mae Daniel, conveyed by warranty deed approximately 36 acres of land to Freddie L. Henderson and Will R. Henderson. [7] (2) On July 18, 1988, Freddie L. Henderson conveyed by warranty deed 5½ acres of land to Sam Lee Daniel. [8] (3) On September 22, 1994, Sam Lee Daniel conveyed by warranty deed this same 5½ acres back to Freddie L. Henderson. [9] (4) On March 5, 1999, Freddie L. Henderson conveyed by warranty deed this same 5½ acres to Ella Daniel. [10] (5) On November 27, 2000, Effort Alexander conveyed by warranty deed 6.05 acres of land to Effort Alexander. [11] Additionally, we mention here that prior to the filing of the Alexander-to-Alexander deed, Effort Alexander had received a Forfeited Tax Land Patent from the State of Mississippi, and within this forfeited tax land patent, there is a legal description of the land which Alexander had purchased at the tax sale, to-wit: Pt. SW 1/4 SE 1/4 BK 191 PG 220 Parcel # XXXX-XXXX.0-00015.00 Section 29, Township 3 South, Range 9 West Parcel/PPIN: 30992900.000015.00 DeSoto County, Mississippi. [12] This forfeited tax land patent was dated August 8, 2000, and was filed at 1:38 p.m., August 18, 2000, and appears of record in Book 377, Page 753, in the Office of the Chancery Clerk of DeSoto County. The reference in the above legal description to BK 191 PG 220, is in fact Book 191, Page 220, in the DeSoto County Chancery Clerk's office. The 1986 deed of approximately 36 acres of land from Sam and Ella Daniel to Freddie Henderson and Will Henderson is filed of record in Book 191, Page 220. What is factually uncertain is whether Ella Daniel's homestead property is either contained in the 35 3/4 acres conveyed by this deed, or is the 4 1/4 acres excepted from the conveyance, or is neither. What also is factually uncertain is whether the 6.05 acres in the Alexander-to-Alexander deed is Ella Daniel's homestead property. ¶ 11. But there are certain facts we do know. Stephen Gullett, a mapper with the DeSoto County Tax Assessor's office, testified at the hearing that Parcel 15 is where Ella Daniel resided at the time of the hearing. Gullett also confirmed via Exhibit 2, a Tax Forfeited Land Certificate dated September 24, 1999, that Freddie Henderson was listed as the record owner of Parcel 15, and that a 1992 Mississippi Homestead Exemption Renewal form revealed that Sam and Ella were receiving homestead exemption on Parcels 17 and 19, but not Parcel 15. [13] Also, when Ella Daniel came into the Tax Assessor's office after Sam's death, she signed a new homestead application because she had been receiving the benefit of Sam's over 65 tax exemption; however, she had just reached 65 years of age approximately two weeks after Sam's death. The homestead application Ella signed revealed only Parcels 17 and 19 as being homestead property. Finally, Gullett testified that from all the documents to which he had access, including aerial photographs, he could state with certainty that there were no dwellings on Parcels 17 or 19 and that there were houses situated only on Parcel 15. ¶ 12. Barbara Howell Greer, a deputy clerk in the DeSoto County Tax Assessor's Office, also testified at the hearing before Chancellor Lynchard. Greer testified that there was a period of time when Sam and Ella received homestead exemption on Parcel 15 but that changed after the 1986 conveyance from Sam and Ella to Freddie Henderson. However, Greer also testified that she knew Sam and Ella Daniel resided on Parcel 15, and that even as of the time of the hearing, she knew that Ella was still living on Parcel 15. Greer also could not explain the handwritten notation on Exhibit 10, a Homestead Exemption Record. What appears to be a notation of Parcel 15 on the homestead record was changed (in ink or pencil) from 15 to 19. Greer also testified about the early-1999 office visit with Ella Daniel: A. She came in to discuss with us that we didn't have her homestead on her house, you know, that something changed. She discussed the fact that we didn't give her homestead on her house, and she was absolutely correct. Somewhere between '86 and the time that she came in in '99 to do a new [application], we had assigned her  not assigned, but given her homestead on her other two tracts. She had three. We took it off the 15 and we put it on the 17 and the 19, and she assured us that her house was on neither. Q. When you say neither, which one are you talking about? A. Seventeen or 19, that it was on 15. We pulled all the maps out, we looked at it, and we sent a field man out to field check it.         A. When she came in, the owner of 17 and 19 was Ella Daniel and Sam Daniel. Q. What about the other parcel? A. Parcel 15 I want to say was Freddie Henderson. Q. And, in fact, Mr. Henderson bought the property in 1986; is that correct? A. That's correct. ¶ 13. Ella Daniel testified that in addition to the home on the 5½ acre tract which she and Sam had always homesteaded, there was also a mobile home and another house. We note that on the surveyor's plat attached as Exhibit A to Alexander's deed, there is indicated a white frame house, a frame house, and a trailer house. The road or path which cuts through the 6.05 acres from the southwest to the northeast is labeled as Daniels Lane. This is consistent with the testimony of Ella and others as to what structures were situated on the 5½ acres where Sam and Ella had resided since 1962. Ella also testified that when she and Sam signed the 1986 deed conveying 35 3/4 acres of land to Freddie Henderson, she never intended that they convey their 5½ acre homestead property, and it was not her understanding that they were doing so. Also, Sam never told Ella about the 1994 conveyance of the 5½ acres to Henderson. ¶ 14. From this record, the chancellor ruled in Ella's favor. We quote only such much of the chancellor's bench opinion as we deem necessary to adequately convey his findings of fact and conclusions of law: In her complaint to set aside the deed of Mr. Alexander, Ms. Daniel argues two points. First of all, that the property in question, being  or rather parcel 15 constitutes her homestead on which she has occupied and continues to this day to occupy since 1963. That her husband, Sam Lee Daniel, now deceased, and she moved on to the property in 1962. He died in 1998. ....[T]wo different parcels were conveyed to Freddie Lee Henderson, one by Sam and Ella Daniel dated November 3, 1986, and one by Sam Lee Daniel only to Freddie Henderson dated September 22, 1994. At the time the 1994 property was conveyed, the DeSoto County tax assessor's office changed the designation of the parcel on which homestead  on which a homestead exemption had been granted from parcel 15 to parcel 17 or 19, either of which is unclear. However, it is clear that parcel 15 had previously been enumerated as homestead property, and following that conveyance in 1994, was no longer listed as same. The Court notes that insufficient evidence is before the Court to verify the actual homestead of the parties, but it is stipulated  or rather it is not stipulated that parcel 15 is the homestead. However, inasmuch as parcel 15 was declared by DeSoto County to be the homestead parcel and inasmuch as through the actions of the DeSoto County assessor only, that parcel number was changed for whatever reason, obviously erroneously, obvious to this Court erroneously, then same should not have been  that parcel should not have been assessed to Freddie L. Henderson, at which time Mr. Henderson should not have been the responsible party for the payment of those taxes. The surviving widow and plaintiff in this action, Ella Mae Daniel, should have been the surviving and assessed party. However, in 1998 following the death of her husband, she was, in fact, 65 years of age for which no taxes should have been assessed.         Erroneously assessing the property to Freddie Henderson, the county then ultimately through mistake or oversight reflected the property as being unpaid for taxes and subsequently conveyed it to the State of Mississippi who likewise in error conveyed same to the defendant, Effort Alexander. Finding that the parcel in question, parcel 15, is, in fact, the homestead of the plaintiff and finding that the DeSoto County tax assessor's office. ........erroneously assessed same to Freddie L. Henderson to the detriment of the plaintiff, the Court finds that the burden of proof has been met which would allow this Court to equitably set aside the order and cancel the deed or any deeds purporting to convey the property to Effort Alexander and likewise vesting title and declaring full title to Ella Daniel, the widow of Sam Lee Daniel. ¶ 15. The record and the applicable law certainly undergird the chancellor's findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the time of their marriage, Sam was 26 years older than Ella. Sam took care of the business transactions, quite often without telling Ella. Parcel 15 was the homestead property of Ella and Sam. As so found by the chancellor from the testimony, somewhere along the way, the Tax Assessor's office removed Parcel 15 as part of the Daniels' homestead property, and listed this property in the name of Freddie Henderson. Upon losing its tax exempt status, taxes on Parcel 15 began to accumulate, and these taxes went unpaid by Henderson. Prior to the state tax sale, notice was given not to Ella but to Henderson, who failed to pay the back taxes and failed to redeem the property. Alexander argues basically that the 6.05 acres he had surveyed is Parcel 15 on his forfeited tax land patent, but that it is not the same property homesteaded by Ella and Sam. However, other than a plat attached to his deed of November 27, 2000, which itself is not wholly supportive of Alexander's position, there is little, if any, evidence before us to support Alexander's claim. Alexander offered no testimony from an engineer or a surveyor to aid the trial court, and this Court, in converting the legal descriptions into what was actually on the ground. We see no reason to get out a compass and protractor to attempt to do that which Alexander could have done while he was before the chancellor. On the other hand, two employees of the DeSoto Tax Assessor's office testified that Ella and Sam resided on Parcel 15. ¶ 16. If we accept the premise that the 1994 conveyance of the 5½ acres from Sam to Henderson was indeed the homestead property of Sam and Ella, then, as correctly argued by Ella, such unilateral conveyance of this homestead property by Sam without Ella's knowledge and consent by way of her signature on the deed, is void. Ward v. Ward, 517 So.2d 571, 572 (Miss. 1987). Miss.Code Ann. § 89-1-29 (1999) provides in pertinent part: A conveyance, mortgage, deed of trust or other incumbrance upon a homestead exempted from execution shall not be valid or binding unless signed by the spouse of the owner if the owner be married and living with the spouse... In Ward we stated: While Section 89-1-29, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), does not give the wife any property right or ownership, it does give her at least a veto power. Scott v. Scott, 73 Miss. 575, 19 So. 589 (1896); and Duncan v. Moore, 67 Miss. 136, 7 So. 221 (1890). In New Orleans Railway & Mill  Supply Co. v. Gatti, 77 Miss. 754, 27 So. 601 (1900), this Court held that a woman who had no title to her husband's property may convey to him all her right or interest in this homestead property. It was not until 27 years later (sic) in Williams v. Green, 128 Miss. 446, 91 So. 39 (1922), that this Court dropped the other shoe and held that thereafter a husband may not circumvent the statute and convey the homestead to a third party without the wife's signature.         Therefore the statute mandates that any conveyance of that homestead without the joinder of both spouses is invalid. We have consistently held that such a conveyance is null and void as to both the husband and wife. Hughes v. Hahn, 209 Miss. 293, 46 So.2d 587, 589 (1950). See also, Goodwin v. McMurphy, 435 So.2d 639 (Miss.1983); Stockett v. Stockett, 337 So.2d 1237 (Miss.1976); Gilmer v. Freeman, 336 So.2d 717 (Miss. 1976); Hendry v. Hendry, 300 So.2d 147 (Miss.1974). The issue is not whether the husband and wife may convey either of their homestead interests to one another, but whether after such a conveyance, if the grantor spouse remains on the homestead, may the grantee spouse reconvey the homestead property to a third party without the joinder of the grantor spouse? The answer is no. 517 So.2d at 572-73 (emphasis in original). ¶ 17. Here, the chancellor was more than justified from the record in finding that the 1994 unilateral conveyance from Sam Daniel to Freddie Henderson involved the homestead property of Ella and Sam. Thus, Sam's unilateral conveyance of this property without Ella's signature on the deed was invalid. Because the property remained Ella's homestead, and because Sam, and then later, Ella, qualified for total homestead exemption, taxes wrongfully accumulated against Parcel 15. From the evidence presented, the chancellor was certainly in the best position to make the appropriate findings of fact. See Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So.2d 705, 708 (Miss.1983). ¶ 18. For the reasons stated, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.