Opinion ID: 4198310
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Corps deemed the environmental impact of

Text: compression too “significant” to endorse. In its alternatives analysis, Tennessee Gas stated that “adding a 27 new (greenfield) compressor station would require Tennessee [Gas] to obtain approximately 40-acres per site,” and that construction “would require permanent vegetation clearing from the area in order to install permanent access roads, fencing, buildings and other appurtenance equipment . . . resulting in increased impacts to the environment.” Id. Tennessee Gas also observed that “a new (greenfield) compressor station would be an aboveground facility with light pollution and noise impacts and may also become a source of [greenhouse gas] emissions.” Id. In contrast to those permanent environmental impacts, the land affected by the Orion Project “will be allowed to re-vegetate to minimize and mitigate possible environmental impacts.” Id. In its alternatives analysis, the Corps favored the Orion Project for those same reasons: [Tennessee Gas] examined several alternatives . . . including . . . Compression Alternatives . . . . The preferred alternative co-locates the new pipe within the existing right of way, thereby avoiding clearing of a new greenway. The majority of impacts are temporary, and will be restored to minimize the resultant impact. Permanent conversion in impacts are from one wetland type (PFO or PSS) to another wetland type (PEM), and do not result in wetlands being converted to uplands. 28 JA 438. The Corps articulated a clear preference for temporary environmental impacts, in direct contrast to the permanent impacts of compression cross-referenced in Tennessee Gas’s report. The Corps’ conclusion, therefore, amounts to judgment that permanent environmental impacts—including those from compression—are “significant” in this context. Riverkeeper objects that the Corps never explicitly found any impact “significant.” But the omission of that singular word is not fatal. Even if the agency’s decision is “of less than ideal clarity,” we will uphold it “if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Bowman, 419 U.S. at 286). Here, the agency’s path can reasonably be discerned: the Corps rejected the compression alternative on the ground that its permanent impacts—including permanent de-vegetation of forty to eighty acres of greenfield and light, noise, and greenhouse gas emissions—would be significant under 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). ii. The Corps’ finding was not arbitrary or capricious. Riverkeeper further objects that, even if the Corps implicitly found the permanent environmental impact of compression “significant,” that finding was clearly erroneous. Applying our deferential standard of review, we reject that argument. 29 According to Riverkeeper, the Orion Project would result in “long-term impact[s] on forested areas (30 to 50 years to reach preconstruction mature tree size and densities)” on over 47 acres of forested uplands. JA 282. Additionally, the project would result in “222.6 more acres of total disturbed land, over a hundred more acres of impacts to agricultural lands, nearly 6 more acres of permanently deforested wetlands, 15 more acres of impacts to water resources, impact on 65 more wetlands and 31 more streams, and will traverse 2,100 feet of steep slopes.” Reply Br. 15. By contrast, light, air, and sound pollution from compression were never quantified, according to Riverkeeper. The Corps concedes that the Orion Project will disturb more land. But it is well supported in the record, and Riverkeeper does not dispute, that the land will be restored and allowed to revegetate. See JA 664 (“[I]f Tennessee [Gas] complies with the construction and restoration methods described . . . the impacts on waterbodies and wetlands would be minor and temporary.”); JA 665 (“The required mitigation measures are adequately protective and will be enforced.”). That regrowth may occur over a long period of time, but the compression alternative’s impacts would continue indefinitely. And as for the Orion Project’s permanent effects on wetlands, those were not concerning to the Corps based on its expert judgment. See JA 438 (“Permanent conversion in impacts are from one wetland type (PFO or PSS) to another wetland type 30 (PEM), and do not result in wetlands being converted to uplands.”). When evaluating the significance of certain aquatic impacts, the Corps is instructed to put “special emphasis on the persistence and permanence of the effects.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c); see also id. § 230.1 (“The guiding principle should be that degradation or destruction of special sites may represent an irreversible loss of valuable aquatic resources.”). We conclude that it was not a clear error of judgment for the Corps to apply similar reasoning to other kinds of environmental considerations, particularly when the Orion Project would not result in any net loss of wetlands or other aquatic resources. Riverkeeper further objects that environmental impacts of compression cannot be “significant” under the Guidelines because FERC has found similar projects not significant under NEPA. See Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. F.E.R.C., 762 F.3d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2014). That analogy is unpersuasive because the requirements of NEPA are different and not at issue here. By Riverkeeper’s logic, the Corps could only reject an alternative as having “other significant adverse environmental consequences,” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a), if the alternative would also constitute a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Riverkeeper’s approach finds no support in any regulation 31 or case. It conflates two bodies of law with different text, authorship,10 and purpose. For example, finding significance under NEPA triggers a duty to prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement rather than a concise Environmental Assessment. See Lower Alloways Creek Twp. v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 740 (3d Cir. 1982). If we were to adopt this definition of significance, the Guidelines would fail to address situations where an alternative’s impact would be significant enough to be substantially worse for the environment than the proposed project, but would not be 10 The Guidelines are promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency, whereas NEPA’s implementing regulations are promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality. For purposes of NEPA, “significantly” is defined by regulation. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. Riverkeeper does not, and cannot, argue that the same definition is controlling here. To the contrary, the Corps acted consistently with the understanding of significance expounded elsewhere in the Guidelines. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(o)(3)(v) (“For an effect to be significant, it must be more than speculative or insubstantial.”); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (“Findings of significant degradation . . . shall be based upon appropriate factual determinations, . . . with special emphasis on the persistence and permanence of the effects.”). 32 significant enough to constitute a “major Federal action[].” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Nothing in § 230.10(a) requires the Corps to insist on such an alternative. Even under NEPA, determining significance is more art than science. “By adding the word ‘significantly,’ . . . Congress apparently was willing to depend primarily upon the agency’s good faith determination as to what conduct would be sufficiently serious from an ecological standpoint to require use of the full-scale procedure.” Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 848 F.2d 256, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972)). Here, the Corps acted consistently with that understanding: it made a “good faith determination” that the permanent environmental consequences of certain alternatives, including compression, “would be sufficiently serious from an ecological standpoint” to prefer the Orion Project. Id. Accordingly, the Corps’ finding that the compression alternative had other significant adverse impacts on the environment, precluding its selection, was not arbitrary or capricious based on the record before us. 2 Riverkeeper’s final argument is that the Corps erred by failing to conduct a water-dependency analysis and by failing to hold Tennessee Gas to a heightened standard applicable to non-water-dependent projects. While the 33 Corps did not make an explicit water-dependency finding, its failure to do so was harmless because the Corps took an appropriately hard look at the project alternatives. As described above, a project is water dependent if it “require[s] access or proximity to or sit[s] within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). “Examples of water dependent projects include, but are not limited to, dams, marinas, mooring facilities, and docks. The basic purpose of these projects is to provide access to the water.” Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting Army Corps of Engineers Standard Operating Procedures for the Regulatory Program (Oct. 15, 1999)), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 100 (11th Cir. 2010). If the project is not water dependent, “practicable alternatives that do not involve special aquatic sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). The applicant can “clearly demonstrate[] otherwise,” id., by putting forward “detailed, clear and convincing” information showing that non-aquatic alternatives are unavailable, Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1186. “This does not require a specific level of detail to rebut the presumption, but only record evidence the agency took a hard look at the proposals and reached a meaningful conclusion based on the evidence.” Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 702 F.3d 1156, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012). 34 Here, Riverkeeper is correct that the Corps did not make any finding regarding water dependency. But that was harmless error. Assuming that the Orion Project is not water dependent, and assuming that Tennessee Gas was required to overcome a heightened burden, the Corps’ determination was still sufficient. Based on Tennessee Gas’s environmental report, combined with the Corps’ concern with permanent environmental impacts, we conclude that the Corps “took a hard look at the proposals and reached a meaningful conclusion based on the evidence.” Hillsdale, 702 F.3d at 1168. To be sure, the Corps did not conduct a detailed analysis of the compression alternative. But under the principle of commensurate review, it was not required to do so. “Although all requirements in § 230.10 must be met, the compliance evaluation procedures will vary to reflect the seriousness of the potential for adverse impacts on the aquatic ecosystems posed by specific dredged or fill material discharge activities.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10; see also id. § 230.6(a). The Corps explicitly endorsed Tennessee Gas’s analysis under that rubric: “Based upon the level of impact to aquatic resources, it was determined that the alternatives analysis carried out in order to avoid aquatic resource impacts was commiserate [sic] with the level of impact.” JA 438. Thus, we conclude that the Corps acted in accordance with the applicable regulations when it rejected the compression alternative. 35