Opinion ID: 435308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 2 On July 18, 1980, two automobiles collided at the intersection of McAfee Road and Laurel Lane in Dekalb County, Georgia. Cyrus Broadus, the driver of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, was hit nearly head-on when the driver of another car attempted to turn left in front of him. Mr. Broadus was injured in the accident and remained in his car until bystanders were able to remove him. His car then rolled several feet down a hill and into a ditch. The other car had stopped near a pole at the intersection but the driver of the vehicle was nowhere to be found. 3 Within a few minutes of the accident, the police arrived at the scene. They searched the abandoned car for information indicating who the driver might be and found various documents addressed to and from a Mr. Hosea Williams. They also found a Hertz rental agreement in the name of Mrs. Hosea Williams. Several bystanders then told the police that, shortly after the collision, they had overheard an unidentified man remark that the driver of the abandoned car looked like Hosea Williams and was wearing a flowered shirt. R.Vol. I. at 102, 116, 126. 4 Based on this information Hosea Williams was arrested within thirty minutes at his place of business, the Bingo Palace. He was wearing a flowered shirt and had a cut over his right eye. R.Vol. I. at 200, 240-242. At the station the police found a briefcase in the car trunk with $1,400.00 in receipts from the Bingo Palace. Mr. Williams claimed the briefcase with the money. R.Vol. I. at 293-295, 298. The police also found a plastic bag of tomatoes in the front seat of the car. R.Vol. I. at 292. 5 Mr. Williams was indicted and tried on two counts, a felony count charging him with operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his driver's license and a misdemeanor count, which charged him with leaving the scene of an accident without stopping to render aid. During the trial the judge admitted into evidence, under Georgia's res gestae rule, the hearsay testimony of three bystanders. All of them testified that they clearly remembered an unknown declarant at the scene of the accident stating that the driver of the abandoned vehicle looked like Hosea Williams. The jury had to decide whether Williams was the driver of the rented, abandoned automobile involved in the collision. They concluded that he was the driver and returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. 6 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Williams' felony conviction but affirmed his misdemeanor conviction. Williams v. State, 162 Ga.App. 415, 291 S.E.2d 732 (1982). He filed a federal habeas petition and the federal district judge granted relief finding that Georgia's res gestae exception was vague and imprecise and that in this case it also violated the federal constitutional requirements imposed by the sixth amendment confrontation clause. 2 The state appeals the granting of the habeas corpus petition asserting that the admission of the hearsay testimony in this case, under Georgia's res gestae rule, did not violate the sixth amendment confrontation clause. GEORGIA'S RES GESTAE EXCEPTION 7 The term res gestae is almost incapable of a definition that covers all of the various and different uses it encompasses. Walker v. State, 137 Ga. 398, 73 S.E. 368 (1912). It literally means things happened and generally is used to refer to the transaction, occurrence, controversy or matter under investigation, whether it is the principal fact in question or a collateral one. See, Kornicki v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 460 F.2d 1134 (3d Cir.1972); Black's Law Dictionary, 1173 (5th ed. 1979). Even though hearsay, any circumstances, facts or declarations which are automatic and undesigned incidents of the particular litigated act are admissible evidence as part of the res gestae if they help to clarify the fact in question. Id. 8 Georgia codified a res gestae exception in 1863 and since then it has consistently been used in the Georgia courts. 3 See e.g., Standard Oil v. Reagan, 15 Ga.App. 571, 84 S.E. 69 (1915); Jones v. State, 62 Ga.App. 734, 9 S.E.2d 707 (1940); Shapiro Packing Co. v. Landrum, 109 Ga.App. 519, 136 S.E.2d 446 (1964); Gaines v. State, 232 Ga. 727, 208 S.E.2d 798 (1974); Black v. State, 154 Ga.App. 441, 268 S.E.2d 724 (1980). The version presently in effect permits [d]eclarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, to be admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae. O.C.G.A. Sec. 24-3-3 (Michie 1982). The trial court, in its sound discretion, must decide on a case by case basis whether or not to admit the hearsay evidence. Based on the time, circumstances and statements in question the judge must determine whether the declarations meet the requirements of being free from all suspicion of device or afterthought. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 80 Ga.App. 472, 479, 56 S.E.2d 305, 309 (1949). 9 Georgia case law has established a set of standards which must be met before the hearsay evidence is admitted on the basis of the res gestae exception. As a prerequisite to admission the declaration must appear to spring out of the transaction. Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615 (1852). It must be voluntary and spontaneous, and so close in time to the event that it precludes the possibility of device or afterthought. Clark v. State, 142 Ga.App. 851, 237 S.E.2d 459 (1977). Georgia's res gestae exception distrusts not after-speech but afterthought. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 775, 12 S.E. 18, 26 (1890). 10 Applying these standards to this case we find that the trial judge properly concluded that the statements of the unavailable declarant fell within Georgia's firmly rooted res gestae exception. The testimony at trial established a scenario of excitement and confusion. A car had turned into another car, almost head-on. The injured driver of the struck car had to be removed from his car by bystanders. His car then rolled several hundred yards and crashed into a ditch. In all this confusion, three different people overheard an unidentified declarant state, approximately ten to fifteen minutes after the accident, that the driver of the abandoned car looked like Hosea Williams and that he was wearing a flowered shirt. R.Vol. I. at 98, 102. This declaration was a natural result of the incident and clarified it. It was voluntary and spontaneous and was made at a time so near to it that it reasonably precluded the idea of any deliberate design. The trial judge properly concluded that the declarations of the unidentified black male clearly fell within Georgia's res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. Yet our review cannot end here. Although the hearsay statements were properly admitted into evidence it is necessary also to determine whether this resulted in a violation of Mr. Williams' constitutional right to confront his adverse witnesses. SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 11 Appellant asserts, based on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537-39, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), that statements properly admitted as part of the firmly rooted res gestae exception do not violate per se a defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. We do not agree and do not read Ohio v. Roberts to establish such a rule. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court found that testimony taken at a preliminary hearing, where the witness was thoroughly cross-examined, bore sufficient indicia of reliability to make the statements from the hearing admissible at trial, although the declarant was not available. 4 The Court stated that [r]eliability can be inferred ... in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539. Yet this language in Roberts is only dicta because the Court did not find a firmly rooted hearsay exception. It seems to us it would be possible for a court to apply Georgia's firmly rooted res gestae exception in an unconstitutional manner. We should therefore examine the indicia of reliability present in this case so as to guarantee that petitioner's sixth amendment right to confrontation was not violated. 12 The sixth amendment right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him or her is a fundamental right. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). It is so basic that the Supreme Court has held that its denial, without waiver ... would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 749, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968). The purpose of this right is not only to allow the defendant a chance at cross examination, but also to allow the jury to observe and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 89, 91 S.Ct. at 219. 13 The declarations of the unidentified male in this case are hearsay. Yet a finding that the statements are hearsay does not necessarily require a finding that the confrontation clause has been violated. See e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). The sixth amendment confrontation clause restricts the use of otherwise admissible hearsay in two ways. First, the prosecution must show that the out-of-court declarant is unavailable for trial. Second, where the declarant is shown to be unavailable, a hearsay statement may be used only if the circumstances provide sufficient indicia of reliability from which the jury can evaluate the truth. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537-39, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). In this case all parties have agreed that the hearsay declarant was unavailable. R.Vol. II. at 835. We must therefore only determine whether the circumstances surrounding the hearsay declarations contain sufficient indicia of reliability so as to satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause. 14 There is substantial circumstantial evidence in this case which provided the indicia of reliability needed by the jury to conclude that Hosea Williams was the driver of the abandoned car. Law enforcement officers who arrived on the scene shortly after the accident searched the car and found various documents addressed to and from Mr. Williams as well as a Hertz rental agreement for the vehicle in Mrs. Williams' name. R.Vol. I. at 173-174. Approximately thirty minutes after the accident Mr. Williams was arrested near the Bingo Palace, a business establishment operated by him and located within a mile of the scene of the accident. R.Vol. I. at 237-243; 249. He was wearing a flowered shirt, was somewhat disheveled and had a cut over his right eye. Id. An accident specialist with the county police department testified that the rearview mirror in the abandoned car had been broken off the windshield and cracked on the left side. Mr. Williams' wound and the broken mirror were consistent with the probable pattern of impact on the driver of the abandoned car. R.Vol. I. at 284-290. At the police station, a briefcase containing some $1,400.00 in receipts from the Bingo Palace was removed from the car trunk and claimed by Mr. Williams. R.Vol. I. at 293-297. A plastic bag of tomatoes was also found in the car. Id. A customer at the Bingo Palace, on the night of the accident, testified that she gave Mr. Williams a plastic bag of tomatoes that night and later saw him take the tomatoes and his briefcase and head for the front door of the Bingo Palace just before 8:00 p.m. R.Vol. I. at 154. 15 The evidence in this case overwhelmingly afforded the jury an opportunity to evaluate the truth of the unavailable declarant's statement. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). The purpose of the confrontation clause is to increase the accuracy of the fact-finding process by guaranteeing that the defendant has an effective means of testing adverse evidence. Thus, hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107, 54 S.Ct. 330, 333, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), does not violate the confrontation clause. There was ample circumstantial evidence in this case to establish the trustworthiness of the hearsay res gestae declarations. 16 REVERSED.