Opinion ID: 786488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Extraordinary Family Circumstances Departure

Text: 20 The government also objects to the District Court's decision to grant Huerta a four-level downward departure for extraordinary family circumstances. The Supreme Court, in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), explained that a defendant's family ties and responsibilities are a discouraged basis for departure under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035; see also U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 (Family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted.). A court still may depart on the basis of such a factor but only if it `is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense.' Koon, 518 U.S. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0). 21 Huerta was sentenced on July 15, 2003, over two months after the effective date of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B) (PROTECT Act). The PROTECT Act requires us to review de novo whether a departure is `justified by the facts of the case.' United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting PROTECT Act, § 401(d), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(iii)); see also United States v. Kostakis, 364 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir.2004). 22 In this case, the District Court justified its decision to depart as follows: 23 [T]he facts as I understand them are not simply that Mr. Huerta's wife is not employed and that they have minor children, who are, I think, approximately eight and 11 years old. He also gives financial support and moral support and physical support to his father, who, as I understand it, is only 62 years old, but has had a massive stroke, and is paralyzed on his left side, and does not have medical insurance ... and ... cannot obtain home care services for that reason. And who has a wife, but she is out of the house, at least during the working week, 2:30 in the afternoon, doesn't get back until about 2:00 in the morning. 24 Mr. Huerta's father is obviously somebody who needs care, and in this very difficult situation, it appears that he visits his father regularly, supplements his father's wife['s] income by purchasing food and medicine for the family, and actually assists his father in bathing, which due to paralysis his father can't do by himself. 25 In view of the totality of these particular circumstances, I do believe a departure is in order to a degree in this extraordinary situation and I am going to depart to a level 12 on the ground of family circumstances. 26 The other cases in which we have affirmed downward departures for family circumstances or family ties each presented extraordinary factors that weighed in favor of such a departure. 1 See, e.g., United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1032, 1035 (2d Cir.1997) (affirming departure where defendant was sole provider for his wife (who had a limited earning capacity because of her difficulty speaking English) and their two children (ages 8 and 9)); United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1992) (finding extraordinary family circumstances where the defendant was the sole caretaker for her three children and the young child of her institutionalized daughter); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1991) (affirming downward departure where the defendant and his wife were responsible for caring for their two daughters (ages 4 and 11), the defendant's disabled father (who depended on the defendant to help him in and out of his wheelchair) and the defendant's grandmother). 27 In other cases presenting less compelling circumstances, we have rejected family circumstances departures. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 331 F.3d 292, 293-94 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that the defendant's family circumstances did not warrant a departure where defendant's wife, a part-time college student, earned about $1400 per month and his mother and half-sister lived only two blocks away from him and might be expected to assist with childcare for his two-year-old son); United States v. Madrigal, 331 F.3d 258, 260 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam) (holding that family circumstances departure was inappropriate where only one of the defendant's six children was under the age of eighteen and there was evidence that the three older children (and perhaps members of the defendant's extended family) would be able to care for the younger siblings); United States v. Faria, 161 F.3d 761, 763 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (holding that defendant's family was not uniquely dependent on him because his three children did not live with him and his ex-wife earned approximately $40,000 annually as a systems analyst). 28 The parties disagree about whether Huerta's case is closer to the Galante-Johnson-Alba line of cases or to Smith, Madrigal, and Faria. The principal problem we face in trying to resolve that question de novo is that there are some important findings that the District Court did not explicitly make. For example, the government argued below and argues again on appeal that there are a number of other adult family members, on both [Huerta's wife's] side and his side of the family, who would be able to assist in providing financial support or child-care assistance. Huerta disagrees. As the cases cited above make clear, this factor — the absence or presence of adults who can step in during the defendant's incarceration to assist with caring and providing for the defendant's dependents — is a central part of the extraordinary family circumstances inquiry. See Smith, 331 F.3d at 294; Madrigal, 331 F.3d at 260; Faria, 161 F.3d at 762; Galante, 111 F.3d at 1032; Johnson, 964 F.2d at 129. We are not in a position to evaluate the government's claim about the role that other family members could play in assisting Huerta's wife, children, and father because the District Court did not address that issue at the sentencing hearing. 29 In addition, the District Court made no findings about Huerta's wife's ability to sustain the family business on her own while Huerta was incarcerated. The government asserts that because Huerta's sole source of income is the business that he and his wife run out of their home, his wife is uniquely situated to care for the children as well as continue to run the business. Huerta's wife claimed in her letter to the District Court that she was not capable of running the family business without Huerta. The most that the District Court said on this issue was that it was limiting Huerta to five months' incarceration because the court's hope is that [Huerta's wife] will be able to keep this business going and, perhaps, be assisted by telephone ... contact during this period of incarceration. The court suggested, but made no finding, that Huerta's wife would struggle to keep the business afloat if he were incarcerated for a period longer than five months. Here again, our ability to review the sentence de novo is compromised by the absence of an explicit finding regarding Huerta's wife's precise role in the business and her ability to run the business in her husband's absence. 30 In light of these deficiencies in the record, we remand the case to the District Court for additional factfinding. Huerta (who was sentenced in July 2003) has presumably completed the five-month incarceration portion of his sentence. Thus the District Court's analysis on remand of how the Huerta family might be able to cope in the defendant's absence will be informed by five months of the family's actual experience with Huerta's incarceration. Cf. United States v. Lauersen, 348 F.3d 329, 344 n. 16 (2d Cir.2003) (explaining that the PROTECT Act does not bar a district court from considering grounds for departure that did not exist at the time of the original sentencing), adhered to on reh'g, 362 F.3d 160 (2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2190, 158 L.Ed.2d 735 (2004); United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir.2002) ([E]ven when a remand is limited, an issue may be raised if it arises as a result of events that occur after the original sentence.), cert. denied sub nom., Donato v. United States, 539 U.S. 902, 123 S.Ct. 2246, 156 L.Ed.2d 110 (2003). 31 Finally, we note that the PROTECT Act also imposes on district courts a new requirement that they must, in granting departures of any kind, state[] with specificity in the judgment the specific reason for the departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). In this case, the judgment states merely that the District Court departed because of the defendant's extraordinary family circumstances and refers to the transcript. If, after supplementing the record in the manner outlined above, the District Court elects to grant a family circumstances departure, it must record in the judgment the specific reasons that support its decision.