Opinion ID: 176784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recent Case Law

Text: In the watershed case of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the sentencing guidelines are advisory only. In Gall v. United States , the Court reaffirmed that the guidelines are advisory only, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), and further provided that in considering the § 3553(a) factors the sentencing judge may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable. Id. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. Likewise, appellate courts are not permitted to apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences falling outside of the recommended guidelines range. Id. at 47, 128 S.Ct. 586 ( citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 354-55, 127 S.Ct. 2456). The Court explained that [t]he sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case, id. at 52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (internal quotation marks omitted), because [t]he sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court, id. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 ( quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58, 127 S.Ct. 2456); Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 225 (noting that in Gall, the Court emphasized that district courts have wide latitude in making individualized sentencing determinations). Further elucidating this new understanding of the guidelines, the Supreme Court decided Kimbrough on the very same day that it decided Gall. There, the Court made abundantly clear that the guidelines are advisory only and that district court judges are authorized to disagree with the Sentencing Commission, even in a mine-run case. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109, 128 S.Ct. 558. Significantly, the Court rejected the government's position that the guideline adopting the 100-to-1 ratio for crack and powder cocaine was binding on district courts because it was effectively sanctioned by Congress. Id.; see also Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 148. As such, the Court decline[d] to read any implicit directive into. . . congressional silence. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 87, 128 S.Ct. 558. More recently the Court expounded on the application of Booker, Gall, and Kimbrough in Spears v. United States , in which it held that a district court had authority to replace the guidelines' 100:1 ratio for crack and powder cocaine offenses with its own 20:1 ratio. 129 S.Ct. at 843-44. The Court said that the correct interpretation of Kimbrough is that the district court may vary from the guidelines based solely on its view that the 100-to-1 ratio embodied in the sentencing guidelines for the treatment of crack cocaine versus powder cocaine creates `an unwarranted disparity within the meaning of § 3553(a),' and is `at odds with § 3553(a).' Id. at 842 ( quoting United States v. Spears, 533 F.3d 715, 719 (8th Cir.2008) (en banc) (Colloton, J., dissenting)). Therefore, the sentencing courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines. Id. at 843-44 (emphasis added). We subsequently considered the impact of these cases en banc, reaching the conclusion that  Kimbrough and Spears . . . mean that district judges are at liberty to reject any Guideline on policy grounds though they must act reasonably when using that power. Corner, 598 F.3d at 415. Finally, in Vazquez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1135, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010), the Court vacated an Eleventh Circuit opinion that held that sentencing courts could not disagree with congressionally dictated policy expressed in the career offender guidelines. See United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2009). Rather, the Court was receptive to the Solicitor General's position that: Kimbrough's reference to Section 994(h) as an example of Congress directing the Sentencing Commission to adopt a Guideline reflecting a particular policy, 552 U.S. at 103, 128 S.Ct. 558, did not suggest that Congress had bound sentencing courts through Section 994. The court of appeals' reliance on Kimbrough's reference to Section 994(h) therefore depends on the additional, unstated, premise that congressional directives to the Sentencing Commission are equally binding on sentencing courts. That premise is incorrect. See Brief for the United States at 9, Vazquez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1135, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (No. 09-5370). In combination, these cases have cast doubt on the notion that district courts are bound to follow directives issued to the Sentencing Commission by Congress. In light of Booker, Gall, Kimbrough, Spears, and Vazquez, we recently granted a petition for rehearing en banc in United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir.2010), to reconsider our holding in United States v. Welton, 583 F.3d 494 (7th Cir.2009), the primary authority on which the government in the cases at hand appears to rely. Basing our reasoning on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Vazquez, in Welton we held that a sentencing court lacks authority to vary from the career offender guidelines based on the career offender crack/powder disparity because the disparity is the result of a legislative act. Id. at 499. We reached this conclusion by interpreting Kimbrough to mean that § 994(h) reflects a Congressional policy with which a sentencing court may not disagree and is one instance where Congress has expressly incorporated a sentencing policy into the Guidelines. 583 F.3d at 498-99. We overruled Welton in Corner. Not only does Corner overturn Welton, but also to a large extent it eviscerates the government's position in this case. According to Corner, Welton mistakenly interpreted the Supreme Court's reference to § 994(h) in Kimbrough to imply that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which implements § 994(h), should be treated as a statute for the purpose of Booker and Kimbrough.  598 F.3d at 415. Importantly, Corner explained that a congressional directive to the Sentencing Commission to implement a particular guideline does not satisfy Kimbrough's requirement that Congress must direct sentencing practices in express terms in order to limit judicial discretion. Id. ( quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 103, 128 S.Ct. 558). We did, however, qualify our holding in Corner by noting that district court judges must implement all statutes, whether or not the judges agree with them; but we added that  Booker, Kimbrough, and Spears hold that the floors (and ceilings) in Guidelines are not legally binding. Id. at 415-16. Because the parallels between the analyses and holdings of these cases are unquestionably similar to the issues presented in the fast-track context, we now revisit our prior precedent in that area.