Opinion ID: 184302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion to modify his sentence. Although a district court's decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) ordinarily is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, the court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines are reviewed de novo. United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 517, 175 L.Ed.2d 366 (2009). Section 3582(c)(2) provides that: in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. § 3582(c)(2). The applicable policy statement, § 1B1.10, provides that the court has the authority to reduce a term of imprisonment pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) if the defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, the applicable guidelines range has been lowered as the result of an amendment to the Guidelines, and the amendment is listed in § 1B1.10(c). § 1B1.10(a)(1). If the amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range, a sentence reduction is not consistent with § 1B.10 and is not authorized by § 3582(c)(2). § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). It is undisputed that Appellant is serving a term of imprisonment and that Amendment 599 is listed in § 1B1.10(c). Thus, the only question is whether the amendment lowers the applicable guideline range. We conclude that it does not actually lower Appellant's guideline range. Appellant was sentenced in 1996. Appellant argues that Amendment 599, which became effective in 2000, clarified that when a defendant is sentenced under § 924(c), a sentence for the underlying offense conduct should never be enhanced based on conduct that involved the use of a firearm. Amendment 599 amended application note 2 of the commentary to § 2K2.4. See United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir.2001). At the time of Appellant's original sentencing, application note 2 provided that when a defendant is sentenced for a § 924(c) offense, any specific offense characteristic for the possession, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm . . . is not to be applied in respect to the guideline for the underlying offense. § 2K2.4 cmt. n. 2. After Amendment 599, note 4 (formerly note 2) provided in relevant part that, [i]f a sentence under this guideline [§ 2K2.4] is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use or discharge of an explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying offense. § 2K2.4 cmt. n. 4. Thus, an increase in the offense level for possessing or using firearms was prohibited at the time Appellant was sentenced, and Amendment 599 did not affect that rule. See United States v. Issac, 396 Fed.Appx. 55, 2010 WL 3736228, at  (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 2010) (unpublished) (Although Amendment 599 altered and clarified the text of the relevant Application Note, it did not change the general rule against applying the firearms enhancements to the underlying offense where the defendant also was convicted under § 924(c).). In other words, at the time of Appellant's sentencing, it was already prohibited to give a weapons enhancement on a sentence for an underlying violent crime when there was also a § 924(c) sentence. Indeed, during the original sentencing proceedings, Appellant's defense counsel specifically objected to the PSR by asserting that the defendant should not be increased an additional four levels because he has plead[ed] guilty to Count Three of the indictment which makes an additional 5 years mandatory for the use of a handgun in commission [of] the crime. R. 1, 72. Accordingly, Amendment 599 did not actually lower Appellant's guideline range, and thus a reduction in Appellant's sentence would neither be consistent with policy statement § 1B1.10(a)(2) nor authorized under § 3582(c)(2). Issac, 396 Fed.Appx. 55, 2010 WL 3736228, at . [3] Moreover, the district court determined that it had not given Appellant a weapon enhancement; instead, the district court increased the sentence based on the aggravated sexual abuse that occurred during the kidnapping. As previously stated, pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(1), because the kidnapping offense was committed by means set forth in the aggravated sexual abuse statute, § 2241, Appellant's sentence was increased four levels. Those means include, in relevant part, using force against the victim [or by] threatening or placing the victim in fear that any person will be subject to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. § 2A3.1, cmt. n. 2. Appellant contends that the display of the gun was the force or threat of force used to commit the aggravated sexual abuse, and therefore the four-level increase should be prohibited as double counting. See United States v. Franks, 230 F.3d 811, 813-14 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a § 924(c) sentence for the same firearm); United States v. Katalinic, 510 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir.2007) (same). We reject this contention because we find that there was force independent of the gun used to commit the aggravated sexual abuse. In reaching that conclusion, we rely on the actions of Appellant's codefendant, Martin. [4] This is permissible under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(b), which defines relevant conduct for the Guidelines as, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. Appellant and Martin undertook a criminal activity jointly, and Martin's sexual assault of R.C. was reasonably foreseeable. With respect to aggravated sexual abuse, a defendant uses force within the meaning of § 2241 when he employs restraint sufficient to prevent the victim from escaping the sexual conduct. United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th Cir.1998). Further, this Court has explained that pressing the victim against a table and thereby blocking her means of egress suffices to constitute force within the meaning of § 2241. Id. at 1002 n. 9. In the instant case, the PSR provides more details regarding the force used to commit the aggravated sexual abuse inflicted upon the victim in the back seat of the vehicle. Martin forced the victim to perform oral sex, and after she vomited on him, he shoved her against the door. Martin then sodomized and raped the victim. The PSR also provides that the victim was taken from the crime scene to the hospital and treated for neck and back injuries. By shoving the victim against the car door and forcing her to engage in sexual conduct, Martin clearly employed restraint sufficient to prevent the victim from escaping from the back seat. Without relying on the use of the gun, we conclude that the force used to commit the aggravated sexual abuse suffices to constitute force within the meaning of § 2241. Under those circumstances, enhancing Appellant's sentence for aggravated sexual abuse by force does not double count the use of the gun. [5]