Opinion ID: 2971953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Standard: Summary Judgment

Text: The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to determine if genuine issues of material fact exist to be tried. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). As the party seeking summary judgment, SM bore the burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions and affidavits established the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See id. at 323. SM had to discharge that burden by showing that there was an absence of evidence to support Collette’s case. See id. Summary judgment was appropriate if Collette failed to establish the existence of an element essential to her case, and on which she would have borne the burden of proof at trial. See Whitley v. Spencer Cty. Police Det., 178 F.3d 1298, 1999 WL 196499, at  (6th Cir. Mar. 26, 1999) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Collette was not entitled to rest on her pleadings, but had to come forward with evidence that would allow a rational factfinder to find in her favor. See Bridgeport Music, 371 F.3d at 889 (citation omitted). Because Collette was opposing summary judgment, her factual allegations were to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in her favor. See DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). But the ultimate burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact always remained on Collette. See id. B. Employer Liability for Supervisor Sexual Harassment under Title VII 1. Sexual Harassment Giving Rise to Hostile Work Environment Title VII provides, in pertinent part: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with -5- respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Collette alleged that SM allowed the harassment to create a hostile work environment which resulted in her constructive discharge. To hold SM liable, Collette had to show that she was subjected to unwelcome harassment based on her sex, the harassment created a hostile work environment, and SM failed to take reasonable action to prevent and correct the harassment. See Schramm v. Slater, 2004 WL 1595195, at , __ Fed. Appx. __ (6th Cir. July 14, 2004) (citing Williams v. GMC, 187 F.3d 553, 560-61 (6th Cir. 1999)). To establish a hostile environment she had to show that the harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment.” Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal citations omitted). 2. Constructive Discharge in the Wake of Sexual Harassment Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) is our seminal decision on constructive discharge. There we held that “[p]roof of discrimination alone is not a sufficient predicate for a finding of constructive discharge; there must be other ‘aggravating factors.’January 25, 2005” Id. at 637. “The plaintiff must show more than a Title VII violation to prove constructive discharge, so the fact that plaintiff may have proven a hostile work environment is not enough by itself to prove constructive discharge also.” Moore v. KUKA Welding Systems & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999). This heightened constructive discharge standard requires an objective assessment of the employee’s feelings, and an inquiry into the employer’s intent and the foreseeability of the impact its conduct had on the employee. See Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 285 F.3d 456, 478 (6th Cir. 2002). -6- The objective inquiry focuses on whether “working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Smith v. Henderson, 376 F.3d 529, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004) (plaintiff must show that “the abusive working environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting response.”). The “employer” inquiry focuses on whether the employer intended the work environment to cause the employee to resign. See Yates, 819 F.2d at 637; accord MacGregor v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 373 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2004) (“constructive discharge occurs when an employee resigns after the employer has created an intolerable working environment in a deliberate attempt to compel such a resignation”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In ascertaining the employer’s intent, the court may consider whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the harassment and the employer’s handling of it would cause the employee to resign. See Moore, 171 F.3d at 1080. Under this test, “the feelings of a reasonable employee would not be enough to show discharge without at least some foreseeability on the part of the employer.” Starks v. New Par, 181 F.3d 103, 1999 WL 357757, at  (6th Cir. May 11, 1999) (quoting Yates, 819 F.2d at 637). 3. Employer’s Liability for Supervisor’s Sexual Harassment of Employee The Supreme Court distinguishes between supervisor harassment unaccompanied by an adverse official act and supervisor harassment accompanied by “a tangible employment action.” An employer is strictly liable for supervisor harassment that “culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); accord Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998). But when the employer takes no tangible adverse action, it may raise a defense comprised of two elements: -7- “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Suders, __ U.S. at __, 124 S.Ct. at 234 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765). This is known as the Ellerth/Faragher defense. C. Discussion 2 We need not consider the district court’s holding that Collette failed to make a prima facie case of hostile work environment sex discrimination and constructive discharge, because even if she had, SM had a meritorious Ellerth-Faragher defense. “[W]hen no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may defeat vicarious liability for supervisor harassment by establishing, as an affirmative defense, both that ‘the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,’ and that ‘the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.’” Suders, 124 S.Ct. at 2253-54 (citations omitted). Collette alleges constructive discharge, but the Supreme Court recently held that “an employer does not have recourse to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense when a supervisor’s official act precipitates the constructive discharge; absent such a ‘tangible employment action,’ however, the defense is available to the employer whose supervisors are charged with harassment.” 2 Harassment is actionable under Title VII “only if it is so severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The district court did not address whether the harassment was sufficiently “severe or pervasive.” We need not address that issue either, because other factors suffice to sustain the grant of summary judgment to SM. -8- Suders, 124 S.Ct. at 2351; see also id. at 2355 n.9 (“Tellingly, we stated that Ellerth ‘ha[d] not alleged she suffered a tangible employment action,’ despite the fact that her complaint alleged constructive discharge.”) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766). Thus constructive discharge cannot serve as an adverse employment action for this purpose, since SM took no action that could be construed as such against Collette. Therefore SM may assert the Ellerth-Faragher defense. 1. SM Could Not Have Known About the Harassment Until at Least Dec. 3 It is undisputed that the only harassment took place on the night of Sunday, December 2. Collette did not report it to SM’s counsel or upper management until Tuesday, December 4, but she complained to assistant managers Schmidt and Schafer on the night of the 2nd. They could have informed SM’s counsel or upper management of Collette’s complaint when they went to work on Monday the 3rd. If they did not do so, SM would have first learned of Collette’s complaint when her counsel contacted SM’s on Tuesday the 4th. Cf. Courtney v. Landair Transport, 227 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir. 2000) (“It was not until December 4, 1996, when defendant received the lawyer’s letter asking defendant to stop the harassment, that defendant had notice of the harassment.”). Moreover, Collette testified that she worked comfortably with Davidson and everyone else without incident in the months before the party, so SM had no reason even to suspect that Davidson or anyone else might harass her. Cf. Stone-Graves v. Coop. Elevator Co., 2003 WL 1867921, at  (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2003) (plaintiff had praised alleged harasser’s “exceptional management” and “affirmatively indicated that she had no complaints with any other employees or customers,” so a jury could not find that the employer had notice of the alleged harassing behavior). -9- Thus SM could not have known about Collette’s allegation until at least Monday, December 3. Compare Stevens v. USPS, 21 Fed. Appx. 261, 264, 2001 WL 1298955, at  (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001) (employer had no reason to know of alleged harassment before employee reported it) with Minnich v. Cooper Farms, 39 Fed. Appx. 289, 2002 WL 1396910 (6th Cir. June 26, 2002) (genuine issued existed as to whether employer knew or should have known about harassment, as plaintiffs had complained numerous times over course of months). 2. SM Took Sufficient Steps to Prevent Sexual Harassment Generally The next element of the Ellerth/Faragher defense requires SM to show that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent” this type of harassment.3 SM satisfies this element. Preliminarily, there was no evidence that SM generally tolerated sexual harassment or did not take it seriously. Contrast Dysert v. Whirlpool Corp., 167 F. Supp. 2d 967, 973 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (coworker confirmed plaintiff’s allegation that department where alleged harassment occurred had “a sign reading ‘sexual harassment will not be tolerated, but will be graded’”). On the contrary, it is uncontested that SM had policies explicitly prohibiting workplace sexual harassment and that 3 We had held that “mere negligence as to the content of the response cannot be enough to make the employer liable. When an employer responds with good faith remedial action,    it can be liable for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII only if that remedy exhibits such indifference as to indicate an attitude of permissiveness that amounts to discrimination.” Weigold v. ABC Appliance Co., 2004 WL 1543165, at -8 (6th Cir. July 7, 2004) (quoting Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998)). Ellerth and Faragher, however, speak of the employer’s duty to exercise “reasonable care” in fashioning a remedy for unlawful discrimination. Thus an employer may be held liable when its remedial response is merely negligent, however well-intentioned. See Madeja v. MPB Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1042-43 (N.H. 2003) (Ellerth and Farragher effectively overruled Blankenship); cf. Petty v. DHL Airways, 176 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (employer’s reliance on Blankenship was misplaced); Farra v. GMC, 163 F. Supp. 2d 894, 906 n.8 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (discussing compatibility of Blankenship with Ellerth). -10- it distributed materials informing the employees of these policies. SM’s “Standard Operating Procedures” memorandum on Sexual Harassment stated, in part: Policy Stein Mart is committed to providing a work environment for all associates that is free from all forms of discrimination, including harassment. Harassment of an associate because of the associate’s ... sex ... is a form of discrimination and will not be tolerated. Any associate who engages in such conduct will be made to bear the full responsibility of [sic] such unlawful conduct and will be subject to appropriate discipline up to and including termination of employment. Prohibited Conduct