Opinion ID: 2634745
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Disposed of the Attorney Fees Issue

Text: ¶23 At the summary proceeding, both the Andersons and Wilshire made requests for attorney fees, pursuant to Utah Code section 38-9-7(5). According to that section, at a summary lien proceeding, a court shall award attorney fees to a petitioner if it finds that a document is a wrongful lien, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7(5)(a), and may award attorney fees to the lien claimant if it finds that a lien is valid, id. § 38-9-7(5)(c). ¶24 In this case, the district court concluded that Wilshire's trust deed was not a wrongful lien. As to whether to award attorney fees to Wilshire, the district court denied [the request for attorney fees] at this time, but stated that [t]he request is reserved for consideration by the Court at a later date should this case continue. ¶25 Wilshire argues that, by reserving the attorney fees request for consideration . . . at a later date, the district court left the attorney fees issue pending. The Andersons respond that the district court disposed of Wilshire's request by stating that it was denied at this time and that the district court's statement that it would consider awarding attorney fees at a later date, should this case continue, merely demonstrated the court's willingness to consider awarding attorney fees if the Andersons amended their pleadings to raise additional claims. ¶26 The court of appeals agreed with Wilshire and held that the attorney fees issue remains pending. In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals applied this court's holding in ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, ¶ 15, 998 P.2d 254, that a trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal. ¶27 However, we conclude that the court of appeals' reliance on ProMax was misplaced. In the case before us, Wilshire's only request for attorney fees was based on those awardable under section 38-9-7(5) at the summary lien proceeding. That request was denied. The district court reserved the right to consider awarding attorney fees only if such requests were made at further proceedings. This reservation, contingent upon the occurrence of an uncertain event, was insufficient to leave the attorney fees issue pending. ¶28 The ProMax rule is inapplicable to cases where, as in this case, a court makes an outright denial of a request for attorney fees. For the attorney fees issue to be pending, there must be something left for the district court to decide. Cf. State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43, ¶ 10, ___ P.3d ___ (holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was not pending because nothing was left for the court to decide). As a result, we hold that the court of appeals erred when it determined that the attorney fees issue remains pending before the district court.