Opinion ID: 1401746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: single-subject/clear titles analysis

Text: Turning to an analysis of the Initiative presently before us, we hold that the proposed Initiative contains multiple subjects. Further, we hold that the titles of the Initiative fail to fairly, clearly, and correctly express the true intent and meaning of Initiative # 104.
Petitioner alleges that, in addition to subjects which this court has found to violate the single-subject requirement in the past, this proposal contains, at the least, the following additional separate subjects: 1. The interference with the administrative duties of the chief justice concerning the prompt disposition of judicial business by limiting the period of service of senior judges and by requiring gubernatorial appointment and senate confirmation of senior judges  compare article VI § 5(3) with (2) of the proposal; 2. Interference with the discipline powers of the judicial discipline commission and this Court by requiring suspension of judges without pay upon any negative finding of the commission or any misdemeanor or felony conviction  compare article VI, § 23(3)(e)-(f) with (3)(a) of the proposal; 3. Establishment of a detailed petitioned recall of judges at variance with constitutional recall  compare article XXI with (3)(a) of the proposal; 4. Establishment of detailed provisions governing ballot content and voter information in recall and retention elections at variance with existing provisions  compare article II, § 10, article V, § 1(5.5), article VII, § 11, article XIX, § 2(2)-(3), article XXI, part 9 of article 7 of title 1, C.R.S[.], and part 1 of article 12 of title 1, C.R.S. with (3)(a) of the proposal; 5. Impairment of the function of the judicial discipline commission by requiring all future complaints, papers, hearings, and findings to be public and c[o]mputer accessible  compare article VI, § 23(3)(g) with (3)(b) of the proposal; 6. Nullification of the purpose of the judicial performance commission function by prohibiting mention or publication of any judicial performance commission review  compare article II, § 10, § 13-5.5-101, C.R.S., § 13-5.5-103(1)(i), C.R.S., § 13-5.5-105(1)(b), C.R.S., and [§] 13-5.5-106, C.R.S. with (3)(b) of the proposal; 7. Interference with the prompt disposition of judicial business and the conduct of litigation by requiring consent of all parties in a case to a senior judge presiding in that casecompare article VI, § 5(3) with (4) of the proposal; and 8. Abolition of the probate court and the juvenile court in the City and County of Denver  compare article VI, §§ 14-15 with section 2 of the proposal. Pet'r Brief at 11-12.
The text of the Initiative proposes term limits for all active county judges. It further states that the governor shall appoint all future active county judges. As we have previously held, because the language of the Initiative encompasses Denver county court judges, it includes a second subject. By way of background, Article VI, Section 26 of the Colorado Constitution provides: The provisions of sections 16, 20, 23, 24 and 25 hereof shall not be applicable to judges of the county court of the City and County of Denver. The number, manner of selection, qualifications, term of office, tenure, and removal of such judges shall be as provided in the charter and ordinances of the City and County of Denver. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 26 (emphasis added). This home rule provision apportions independent authority over county court judgeships in the City and County of Denver. See, e.g., In re Proposed Initiative for 1999-2000 No. 29, 972 P.2d at 264; In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d at 1198; Francis v. County Court, 175 Colo. 308, 314-17, 487 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1971) (treating Article VI, Section 26 as a home rule provision). Generally, home rule provisions reflect an intent to vest in home rule cities the plenary power of self-government over matters of local concern. See Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380-81 (Colo.1980); see also Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters....). In several prior decisions, this court has held that an initiative which includes sections altering the control over Denver county and municipal court judgeships violated the single-subject requirement. See In re Proposed Initiative for 1999-2000 No. 29, 972 P.2d at 264-65; In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d at 1198 (finding that prior version of the instant Initiative contained multiple subjects because repeal of Article VI, Section 26 did not share a unifying or common objective with those provisions changing the qualifications of judicial officers). Initiative # 104 again proposes an implied repeal of Section 26 by reallocating the City and County of Denver's governmental authority and control over its county judges to the state. As such an alteration of the City and County of Denver's constitutional power over its county court merely perpetuates the problem that we previously identified, we find that Initiative # 104 once again constitutes a discrete and independent subject from that of the qualifications, removal, and retention of judges.
Petitioner alleges that the Initiative creates a second subject through language altering the powers of the Judicial Discipline Commission. We agree. Initiative # 104 would alter the following procedures applicable to the proceedings of the Commission on Judicial Discipline: (1) it would require the disclosure of all documents, regardless of whether the Commission reaches a negative finding; (2) it would alter the confidentiality afforded to complainants and witnesses in proceedings before the Commission; and (3) it would deprive the Commission of its disciplinary discretion by imposing a mandatory requirement that all judges subject to a negative disciplinary finding be suspended without pay, pending a retention election the following November. The aforementioned changes would be the result of Initiative # 104's repeal of Article VI, Section 23(3)(g), which provides, inter alia : Prior to the filing of a recommendation to the supreme court by the commission against any justice or judge, all papers filed with and proceedings before the commission on judicial discipline or masters appointed by the supreme court, pursuant to this subsection (3), shall be confidential, and the filing of papers with and the giving of testimony before the commission or the masters shall be privileged.... In lieu of Section 23(3)(g), Initiative # 104 provides for the mandatory public disclosure of all disciplinary proceedings and findings, regardless of the outcome of said proceedings, and of all documents (including all complaints and papers) filed in connection with same. Our prior decisions regarding other versions of the instant Initiative have repeatedly held that provisions which alter the powers of the Commission on Judicial Discipline constitute an additional subject. See In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d at 1199-1200 (finding that alteration of Commission powers was impermissible because the Commission on Judicial Discipline is an independent constitutional body whose members are not `judicial officers' ); accord In re Proposed Initiative for 1999-2000 No. 29, 972 P.2d at 263; In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 No. 95, 960 P.2d at 1208-09. We again hold that provisions which alter the powers of the Commission on Judicial Discipline constitute an additional subject.
We turn now to Petitioner's assertions that the provisions within the Initiative which deal with senior judges create distinct and separate subjects. The three provisions within the Initiative dealing specifically with senior judges (1) limit the time of service of senior judges, (2) alter the appointment process for senior judges, and (3) require consent from the parties who appear before senior judges. Petitioner alleges that each of these provisions interferes with the administrative duties of the chief justice and the prompt disposition of judicial business, thus creating an additional subject. Respondents, however, argue that the language within the Initiative concerning senior judges fits within the single subject presented by the measure: the qualification of state judicial officers. We agree that the provisions within the Initiative concerning senior judges do not present a separate subject unrelated to the qualification of state judicial officers. The Initiative seeks to change the method by which judicial personnel in general are qualified, appointed and retained; senior judges are judicial personnel. We have previously held that matters relating to the qualification of judges are appropriately embraced within a single initiative. See In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d at 1197. Accordingly, the Title Board appropriately determined that the language within the Initiative that referred to senior judges constitutes part of the single subject of the qualifications of state judicial personnel.
Petitioner also asserts that this Initiative creates a separate subject by nullifying the purpose of the Judicial Performance Commission and by limiting the kind of information available to voters about judges during recall and retention elections. Specifically, Initiative # 104 calls for publicizing reports on each judge; however, it specifically bars the mention or publication of any reports prepared by the Judicial Performance Commission. Petitioner argues that this bar on the publication of Commission reports constitutes an additional subject beyond the selection, retention, and removal of judges because it renders the purposes and duties of the Judicial Performance Commission moot, as set forth at section 13-5.5-101 to -109, 5 C.R.S. (1998). We disagree. The Judicial Performance Commission is the product of an effort by the Colorado Legislature to establish a uniform system of evaluating judicial performance in order to provide voters in judicial retention elections with fair, responsible, and constructive information about judicial performance and to provide judges with useful information concerning their own performance. Sections 13-5.5-103(1)(i) and 13-5.5-105(1)(b) require the Commission to draft, produce, and publicly distribute a narrative profile on each justice, court of appeals judge, district judge, county judge, and magistrate. See also § 13-5.5-106 (requiring disclosure of performance reports to judges and to the public). By ensuring that the aforementioned performance reports, even if prepared, are never released to the public, Petitioner argues that the Initiative effectively nullifies the legislatively enumerated purpose behind the creation of the Judicial Performance Commission; namely to inform the public about the qualifications of the judges who are standing for a retention election. The proponents of the Initiative, however, urge us to view the Initiative as one which continues to allow the Commission to review judicial performance, but not mention or publicize the results of said reviews. In addition, the Initiative mandates that voters be informed about judges standing for retention or removal elections by the dissemination of information on caseloads, case resolution time, continuances, hours of daily courthouse attendance, and criminal sentencing records, as well as all discipline commission complaints and appellate opinions. As discussed earlier, it is not this court's function to address the merits of a proposed initiative, interpret its language, or predict its application. See In re Petition on Campaign & Political Fin., 877 P.2d 311, 313 (Colo.1994); In re Proposed Initiative on Fair Treatment of Injured Workers, 873 P.2d 718, 719-20 (Colo.1994); In re Proposed Election Reform Amend., 852 P.2d at 28. Rather, this court's review must be limited to a determination of whether the contested language within the Initiative creates a distinct and separate subject which is not connected to or dependent upon the remaining aspects of the Initiative. Here, the language of the Initiative has as its subject the qualifications, appointment, and retention of judges. The dissemination of information about judges standing for removal or retention elections is connected with this subject. Accordingly, the contested language does not violate the constitutional prohibition against second subjects.
Petitioner next asserts that the language of the Initiative creates a separate and unrelated subject by establishing a recall procedure for judges at variance with other constitutional recall procedures for non-judges. We disagree. As we have emphasized, this court's review of the single-subject requirement is limited to whether the proposal has at least two distinct and separate purposes which are not dependent upon or connected with each other. In re Public Rights in Waters II., 898 P.2d at 1078-79. Here, the purpose of the Initiative is to alter the manner is which judges are qualified, appointed and retained. As such, provisions within the Initiative dealing with the recall of judges are necessarily connected with the purpose of altering how judges are retained.
Finally, Petitioner alleges that the proposal creates a second subject because it eliminates the probate and juvenile courts of the City and County of Denver. Because this Initiative does not seek to abolish the probate or juvenile courts of the City and County of Denver, we do not address this last allegation.
Petitioner additionally claims that, even if a single subject is presented within the proposed Initiative, the titles and summary as set by the Title Board fail to conform to the legal requirements of accuracy and fairness. Petitioner argues that the titles are unclear in the following ways: (1) the definition of judicial personnel; (2) the procedure for removal elections; (3) the procedure for providing voter information about judges; and (4) the explanation of term limits.
Petitioner first alleges that the titles and summary are unclear as to which judicial personnel are affected by the Initiative. We agree. First, due to a contradiction between the titles and the text of the Initiative, a voter would not be able to determine whether water judges are included within the Initiative. For example, the text of the Initiative provides that its provisions apply to all active county, district, court of appeals, and supreme court judges. (Emphasis added.) The title, however, expressly exempts water judges from its terms. The summary, on the other hand, provides that [t]his measure ... would affect all county, district, and water court judges and magistrates. (Emphasis added.) Second, a voter would not be able to determine whether probate and juvenile judges are included within the Initiative. Again, the language of the Initiative itself provides that all active county, district, court of appeals, and supreme court judges are affected. (Emphasis added.) The title, however, specifically exempts probate and juvenile judges. The summary, on the other hand, provides that the Initiative will affect all county, district, ... [and] the probate and juvenile court judges and magistrates in the City and County of Denver. (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner next alleges that the titles and summary are unclear with respect to the procedure used to remove a judge. We agree. The language of the Initiative states that a judge may be removed after a petition to remove a judge is signed by registered electors in that court district not to exceed 5% of the general election votes last cast in that district for all secretary of state candidates. (Emphasis added.) This aspect of the Initiative is not discussed in the title or submission clause, but is repeated verbatim in the summary section. The plain language of this section suggests that one or more voters (any amount less than 5%) may sign the removal petition and thus put the removal petition on the ballot. However, if more than 5% of the voters sign a removal petition, the petition would not be placed on the ballot. The not to exceed language is unclear when compared to the language used in other Colorado recall or removal statutes. Sections 1-12-101 to -123, 1 C.R.S. (1999), provide for the recall from office of various selected officers. Each of these statutes clearly states the number of signatures that are necessary before a petition may be placed on the ballot. For example, section 1-12-104, which governs the recall of state and county officers, provides that the petition shall be signed by eligible electors equal in number to twenty-five percent of the entire vote cast at the last preceding general election. (Emphasis added.) Petitions to recall school district officers, on the other hand, are governed by section 1-12-105, which states that the petition shall be signed by eligible electors of the school district equal in number to at least forty percent of those electors who voted in such district. (Emphasis added.) Finally, in order to recall nonpartisan officers, a petition shall be signed by three hundred eligible electors of the political subdivision. (Emphasis added.) In each of these statutes, a set percentage or number of signatures is required, with no upper limit set for the collection of signatures. As noted above, the Title Board repeated the language not to exceed 5% in its summary, without further explaining that the Initiative sets an upper limit on the number of signatures which need to be collected, but no lower limit. The summary does not explain that the result of this Initiative wouldbe to allow a recall petition to be put on the ballot if only one voter signs the petition. We have previously held that the mere repetition of language from the initiative to the titles and summary does not necessarily ensure that the voters will be apprised of the true intent and purpose of the initiative. While it is true that the title and submission clause read, virtually word for word, the same as the Initiative, this fact does not establish that the title and submission clause fairly and accurately set forth the major tenets of the Initiative. The pertinent question is whether the general understanding of the effect of a `yes' or `no' vote will be unclear from reading the title. There may be situations, therefore, where the title and submission clause likely would create public confusion or ambiguity about the effect of an Initiative even though they merely repeat the language contained in the Initiative itself. In re Proposed Initiative on Obscenity, 877 P.2d 848, 850 (Colo. 1994) (citations omitted) In the instant case, the not to exceed language of the Initiative, which was repeated without explanation or analysis in the summary, creates confusion and ambiguity.
Petitioner next contends that the titles and summary are misleading with respect to the procedure used to provide the public with information about a judge standing for a retention or removal election. We disagree. The summary fully sets forth the information that will be provided to the public about a judge and discloses that no Judicial Performance Commission reviews will be published. Similarly, the titles state that the Initiative proposes to publicize reports about judges. Accordingly, a voter would not be confused about the nature of the Initiative or its provisions regarding election information.
Petitioner finally argues that the titles fail to disclose that the term-limit provisions of the Initiative provide only one future term for any judge having eight or more years of service. We disagree. The summary prepared by the Board specifically states that if a judge has served eight years or more at a judicial level, that judge is eligible to serve only one additional term at that level. In addition, the titles set forth that the measure limits future terms of office. As such, a voter would not be confused about the nature of the Initiative regarding term limits.