Opinion ID: 2444731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Claims Against Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolliver

Text: Appellants also contend that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolliver. We agree. We review a trial court's order granting summary judgment de novo, view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Jane W. v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown College, 863 A.2d 821, 826 (D.C.2004). We must affirm the judgment `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Molla v. Sanders, 981 A.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C.2009) (quoting Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)). The trial court granted the summary judgment motions because (1) under Boyle, a personal representative's duties are non-delegable and (2) [Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolliver] are agents of Mr. Queen. So he would be responsible for their acts. ... [T]here's no privity of a relationship [sic] between them [and the personal representatives]. We have already concluded that the court erred, as a matter of law, by relying on Boyle to bar the malpractice claims. Moreover, further factual inquiry is required to clarify the roles of Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolliver. The exact nature of their relationship to Mr. Queen is not clear from the present record, and it is important to remember that Mr. Queen was wearing two hats. A key question (perhaps not susceptible of a clear answer) is whether he engaged Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolliver while acting as a personal representative of the estate or solely in his capacity as the estate's attorney. The evidence points in different directions. For example, Mr. Queen said Mr. Tolliver was engaged as an independent contractor to provide accounting and tax advice and that Mr. Tolliver prepared and signed one of the federal tax returns. Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolliver, himself, claimed that Mr. Tolliver was hired by the co-personal representative[s] to prepare the Estate's tax returns. In addition, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolliver said they did not work for Mr. Queen. Yet, during a deposition, Mr. Tolliver stated that Mr. Queen asked me to prepare the estate tax returns for the clients that he had. ... As far as I know, I worked for Mr. Queen. The record does not contain a bill from Mr. Tolliver to the Pairs. Instead, Mr. Tolliver sent at least two bills to Mr. Queen and Mr. Smith, respectively, at Thomas H. Queen and Associates, charging $2,250.00 to prepare various tax returns for the estate. Mr. Tolliver received [payment] from Mr. Queen or Mr. Smith. [8] Mr. Queen admitted that the estate paid him approximately $10,000 to probate the estate, including fees for preparing and filing tax returns, and for Mr. Smith's work. When asked how he was paid for his services by Mr. Queen, Mr. Smith answered that he had no records of being paid and could not recall how he was paid; when pressed as to whether he paid Mr. Smith for his services in connection with the Pair estate, Mr. Queen declined to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds. We conclude that the present record does not support the trial court's decision granting summary judgment on the ground that there was no privity of contract between Mr. Smith and Mr. Tolliver with the personal representatives.