Opinion ID: 1144411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: submission of the question of proximate cause to the jury.

Text: The jury was given the following form of verdict to resolve: VERDICT The jury must answer ALL of the questions, unless otherwise indicated. Answer the questions in numerical order, starting with question number 1, because an earlier answer may excuse you from answering a later question. Answer all questions yes or no, unless otherwise indicated. If you do not understand any question, please communicate with the Court in writing. 1(a). Was Hawaiian Electric negligent toward Joseph A. Kamali? Yes 1(b). If your answer to question 1(a) is yes was Hawaiian Electric's negligence a proximate cause of the accident? Yes If your answer to 1(a) and 1(b) are yes go on; if your answer to 1(a) or 1(b) is no, stop here and sign this verdict form. 2(a). Was Joseph A. Kamali contributorily negligent? No 2(b). If your answer to question 2(a) is yes was Joseph A. Kamali's contributory negligence a proximate cause of the acdent? ____ 3. Was Hawaiian Electric guilty of willful and wanton misconduct toward Joseph A. Kamali? No 4. Did Joseph A. Kamali assume the risk of the injuries he received? No Answer questions 5 and 6 if you answered 2(a) or 2(b) no or your answer to question 3 is yes. However, if your answer to question 4 is yes stop here and sign this verdict form. 5. Joseph A. Kamali is entitled to the following amount: Compensatory Damages $ 150,000.00 Punitive Damages $ 0 6(a). Was Tanji House Movers, Ltd. negligent toward Joseph A. Kamali? Yes 6(b). If your answer to question 6(a) is yes was Tanji House Movers, Ltd.'s negligence a proximate cause of the accident? No We, the Jury in the above-entitled cause, return the foregoing verdict. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, this 3 day of December, 1970. /s/ Herbert Y.C. Ching FOREMAN The jury specifically found that Tanji's negligence was not a proximate cause of Kamali's injuries. Hawaiian Electric did not object to the submission of the special verdict form to the jury. Neither did Hawaiian Electric move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See HRCP 50(b). Hawaiian Electric is thus foreclosed and has no standing to now claim that it is not primarily negligent and that the jury erred in its verdict. Based on the record we see no reason to set aside the jury's verdict. Judgment is affirmed. ABE, J., with whom LANHAM, J., joins, concurring. While I concur with this court's decision, I do not believe that it should rule on the issue of indemnity. This court has stated that [a]ppellate courts will not consider any question not necessary or relevant to the final determination of the appeal. Glover v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 577 (1958); see also In re Brandt, 25 Haw. 51, 52 (1919). Here, I believe the opinion of this court transgresses this general rule. On appeal in this court Hawaiian Electric's sole claim for indemnity against Tanji was based upon an alleged agreement entered into by Hawaiian Electric and Tanji. On this issue this court holds: Assuming that the Joint Pole permit is a contract, we are of the opinion that the language of the permit did not constitute an indemnity contract as a matter of law. Now, having reached this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary for this court to decide whether a claim for indemnification lies outside the scope of the exclusive liability provisions of HRS § 386-5. In my opinion, this issue raises the following question: Did the compensation acts, in conferring immunity on the employer from common-law suits, mean to do so only at the expense of the injured employee, or also at the expense of outsiders? 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 76.52. The determination of this issue involves consideration of legislative policy involved in a complex statutory scheme. As I had stated above, in this appeal it is not necessary to decide this policy question; and, therefore, I believe that this issue should be left for future determination in a proper case.