Opinion ID: 732305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: George Ennenga's Legal Malpractice Claim

Text: In their amended complaint, George and India alleged that Starns, Stortz, and Burt committed legal malpractice by failing to properly effectuate Tom and Ida Lou's testamentary intent. The defendants moved to dismiss George's claim as untimely. (As we have noted, India's minority status tolled the statute of limitations.) It is undisputed that George, an intended beneficiary of the Ennengas' estate, is a proper plaintiff here. See McLane v. Russell, 131 Ill.2d 509, 137 Ill.Dec. 554, 546 N.E.2d 499, 503-04 (1989). The question for us is whether the district court correctly dismissed his malpractice claim because it was filed outside the applicable limitations period. George challenges this ruling on multiple fronts. First, he contends that the defendants waived the statute-of-limitations defense by not raising it in their first motion to dismiss. This argument is based on a misreading of Rule 12(g)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule requires litigants to consolidate certain dismissal arguments in a single motion, but it also contains some important exceptions: Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion. The exception at issue herecontained in Rule 12(h)(2) makes it clear that a litigant need not consolidate all failure-to-state-a-claim arguments in a single dismissal motion: Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be raised: (A) in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(2). The district court noted that a motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds qualifies as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Small v. Chao, 398 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir.2005) ([A] district court may dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) something that is indisputably time-barred . . . .). As such, the court held that the Rule 12(h)(2) exception applied and the defendants' failure to raise the statute-of-limitations defense in their earlier Rule 12(b)(6) motion was not a waiver. This ruling was sound. Rule 12(g)(2) does not prohibit a new Rule 12(b)(6) argument from being raised in a successive motion. Stated differently, Rule 12(h)(2) specifically excepts failure-to-state-a-claim defenses from the Rule 12(g) consolidation requirement. The policy behind Rule 12(g) is to prevent piecemeal litigation in which a defendant moves to dismiss on one ground, loses, then files a second motion on another ground. See Pilgrim Badge & Label Corp. v. Barrios, 857 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1988). Rule 12(h)(1) enforces this consolidation requirement by adding a waiver rule: A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by . . . omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2) or by failing to preserve it by motion under this rule or in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(1). Note the limitation, however. The Rule 12(h)(1) waiver rule applies only to the defenses listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) (lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, and insufficient service of process). Failure-to-state-a-claim defenses are thus excepted from the Rule 12(g)(2) consolidation requirement and not included in the Rule 12(g)(1) waiver rule. And on the specific point raised here, we have heldalbeit without much analysis that a statute-of-limitations defense is not waived if raised for the first time in a successive motion to dismiss. Perry v. Sullivan, 207 F.3d 379, 381-83 (7th Cir. 2000). George argues that Perry is distinguishable because the plaintiff there conceded that the statute of limitations had run. That distinction goes to the merits of the defense, not whether the defense is waived. George also contends that the statute-of-limitations defense was not properly raised in a motion to dismiss because the defense was not plain on the face of the complaint. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the issue could be resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage based on the allegations in the complaint and a few undisputable facts within its judicial-notice powerspecifically, the date on which the estate entered probate and the deadline for filing a claim within the probate proceeding. This decision, too, was sound. Taking judicial notice of matters of public record need not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Doss, 551 F.3d at 640 (citing FED. R.CIV.P. 12(d)). A court may take judicial notice of facts that are (1) not subject to reasonable dispute and (2) either generally known within the territorial jurisdiction or capable of accurate and ready determination through sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.1997). Here, the court took judicial notice of the dates on which certain actions were taken or were required to be taken in the earlier state-court litigationfacts readily ascertainable from the public court record and not subject to reasonable dispute. See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.1994) (finding public court documents judicially noticeable). Having cleared these hurdles, we now arrive at the merits of the statute-of-limitations defense. George first argues that the district court should have applied Minnesota's statute of limitations, not Illinois's, because Starns and Stortz reside and practice law in Minnesota, and their firm is a Minnesota law firm. The district court evaluated the choice-of-law issue under the most significant contacts test and held that Illinois law applied. This holding was correct, although a significant contacts analysis was ultimately unnecessary. Illinois choice-of-law rules apply. Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir.1977). The district court correctly noted that Illinois courts apply the most significant contacts test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which involves balancing a number of factors, including the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; the domicile or place of business of each party; and the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. Wreglesworth ex rel. Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill.App.3d 1023, 250 Ill.Dec. 495, 738 N.E.2d 964, 971 (2000). However, the Restatement also contains a strong presumption that the forum state will apply its own statute of limitations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (An action will not be maintained if it is barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, including a provision borrowing the statute of limitations of another state.). Illinois courts have adopted this presumption. See Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. 199 Ill.2d 325, 264 Ill.Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177, 194 (2002); Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 309 Ill.App.3d 730, 243 Ill.Dec. 384, 723 N.E.2d 687, 692-93 (1999). Thus, even when the substantive law of a nonforum state applies, Illinois courts apply the Illinois statute of limitations because statutes of limitations are procedural, fixing the time in which the remedy for a wrong may be sought rather than altering substantive rights. [3] Freeman v. Williamson, 383 Ill. App.3d 933, 322 Ill.Dec. 208, 890 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (2008). Accordingly, the district court properly applied Illinois's statute of limitations rather than Minnesota's. George next argues that the statute-of-limitations defense could not be decided on a motion to dismiss because he raised a claim of equitable tolling based on a fraudulent-concealment theory. This argument also fails. George's equitable-tolling argument is based on an email he inadvertently received from Burt on August 8, 2004. [4] As we will explain in more detail in a moment, under the applicable statute of limitations, the limitations period began to run on June 24, 2004, and ended on January 1, 2005. Accordingly, George knew the facts on which he bases his equitable-tolling claim well before the limitations period expired. In Illinois, courts will not equitably toll a statute of limitations based on a claim of fraudulent concealment if the plaintiff discovers the fraudulent concealment and a reasonable time remains within the relevant limitations period. . . . Barratt v. Goldberg, 296 Ill.App.3d 252, 230 Ill.Dec. 635, 694 N.E.2d 604, 609 (1998) (citing Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill.2d 295, 37 Ill.Dec. 558, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979)). Here, George discovered the facts underlying his claim of fraudulent concealment with almost five months left on the limitations clock. The district court correctly held that this was a reasonable time within which to comply with the statute of limitations. We agree that equitable tolling does not apply. George brings a claim of legal malpractice arising from the preparation of an estate plan. Illinois has established the following time limit for this particular kind of professional malpractice claim: When the injury caused by the act or omission does not occur until the death of the person for whom the professional services were rendered, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the date of the person's death unless letters of office are issued or the person's will is admitted to probate within that 2 year period, in which case the action must be commenced within the time for filing claims against the estate or a petition contesting the validity of the will of the deceased person, whichever is later, as provided in the Probate Act of 1975. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-214.3(d). [5] Any injury to George occurred upon the death of his father, the person for whom the professional services were rendered. It was at this point that the terms of the trust agreement took effect. The two-year statute of limitations prescribed by section 5/13-214.3(d) therefore displaces the more generally applicable six-year limitations period. See id. 5/13-214.3(b)-(d). However, because Tom Ennenga's will was admitted to probate within the two-year statutory period, the time limit was shortened even further. George was required to file his malpractice claim within the time limit for filing claims against the estate or a petition contesting the validity of the will . . . whichever is later. Id. 5/13-214.3(d). The statutory period for a will contest is six months after the will is admitted to probate. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1 (a). Tom Ennenga's will was admitted to probate on June 24, 2004, so the will-contest period extended to December 24, 2004. But the claims notice in connection with the probate proceeding set a later claim-filing deadlineJanuary 1, 2005making that date the deadline for George's malpractice claim. George did not file this suit until June 2006. Accordingly, the district court correctly held that his malpractice claim was untimely.