Opinion ID: 1111563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Superior Court Err in Denying B.J.'s Motion for Attorney's Fees?

Text: B.J. argues that she was entitled to attorney's fees and maintains that the superior court should have considered the relative economic situations and earning powers of the parties when deciding whether to grant or deny her motion. Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf, 741 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Alaska 1987) (approving exception to Alaska Civil Rule 82 in cases of divorce). J.D. contends that this limited exception to the rule of prevailing party attorney's fees is inapplicable. He contends that AS 25.20.115 governs the award of attorney's fees resulting from an action to modify, enforce or vacate a child custody award. The decision of which statute or rule applies to an award of fees presents a question of law. The standard of review on questions of law is de novo or independent review. See Langdon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999, 1001 (Alaska 1988). The rule upon which B.J. relies is not applicable because the instant action did not involve the dissolution of a marriage. We have previously held that the divorce exception to Civil Rule 82 is based on a broad reading of AS 25.24.140(a)(1) [pertaining to an interim award of attorney's fees in divorce cases] ..., and on the reality that there is usually no prevailing party in a divorce case. L.L.M. v. P.M., 754 P.2d 262, 264 (Alaska 1988). Neither of these reasons applies here because this is not a divorce case and J.D. was clearly the prevailing party. In Bergstrom v. Lindback, 779 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Alaska 1989), we applied the divorce exception to a custody dispute between an unmarried couple both of whom were biological parents of the child. The present case is distinguishable in many respects. It concerns the rights of a biological parent in relation to those of a non-biological parent. Although the parties in Bergstrom had never been married, they had been living together as husband and wife for fourteen years, and the custody dispute litigated there was closely analogous to custody disputes in divorce cases. Here, by contrast, J.D. filed this action more than three years after the parties had voluntarily ended their relationship and after the trial court had dismissed a lawsuit by J.D. seeking custody as a biological parent. The present case does not bear the same close resemblance to an initial custody proceeding in a divorce action as did Bergstrom. J.D. argues that the circumstances of this case are more akin to the modification of a custody award than to a divorce action. Alaska Statute 25.20.115 provides [i]n an action to modify, vacate, or enforce that part of an order providing for custody of a child or visitation with a child, the court may, upon request of a party, award attorney fees and costs of the action. In awarding fees and costs under this section, the court shall consider the relative resources of the parties and whether the parties have acted in good faith. Although by its terms the statute applies only to actions to modify, vacate and enforce child custody and visitation awards, we conclude that it is applicable to the present case. In J.D.'s initial action to gain custody of V.J., filed when he still believed himself to be her natural father, Superior Court Judge Jay Hodges entered a temporary order regarding visitation. J.D. was granted visitation rights, but B.J. was given physical custody of V.J. and the authority to take her to Hawaii on the condition that she return for the start of trial later the following year. When the paternity test established that J.D. was not the biological father, the court dismissed J.D.'s complaint and custody of V.J. remained with B.J. By filing his 1995 complaint and expedited motion for temporary orders, J.D. attempted to modify the substance of the court's earlier custody order and the status quo. Therefore, AS 25.20.115 governs J.D.'s efforts to regain custody of V.J. With respect to modification of custody and visitation orders, we review the denial of a motion for attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. See Kessler v. Kessler, 827 P.2d 1119, 1120 n. 4 (Alaska 1992). In addressing attorney's fees under AS 25.20.115 the court must consider the parties' relative economic situations, as well as whether they have acted in good faith. The parties' relative financial resources do not necessarily take primacy over the presence or absence of good faith. S.L. v. J.H., 883 P.2d 984, 985-86 (Alaska 1994). B.J. failed to allege at anytime during the proceedings below or in her points on appeal that J.D. acted in a vexatious manner or in bad faith. Thus, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying B.J.'s motion for attorney's fees.