Opinion ID: 2636967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Decision supported by any evidence

Text: Sengel implicitly argues that reversal of the Board is justified under NRS 463.3666(3)(d) because the Board's decision is not supported by any evidence. Sengel states that there are no disputed facts, yet consistently recasts the factual findings of the Board throughout his argument. Therefore, we will address the issue as though raised explicitly. The district court exhibited some confusion as to whether the any evidence or the substantial evidence standard applied. The district court stated that because there was overwhelming evidence supporting the Board's decision, there was enough evidence to affirm the Board under either standard. After reviewing the record, we agree that the Board's decision was supported by both substantial evidence and any evidence, although the district court should have conducted its review under the any evidence standard. NRS 463.3666(3)(d). Because the district court arrived at the correct decision, even though based on the wrong standard, we affirm that decision. See Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Torres, 97 Nev. 399, 403, 632 P.2d 1155, 1158 (1981) (holding that a correct decision of a district court will be affirmed, even if based on the wrong reason). In order to give clear direction to the lower courts and prevent the application of the wrong standard in the future, primarily in cases with less than substantial evidence in which using the wrong standard could make a difference, we take this opportunity to clarify that the any evidence standard applies. NRS 463.3666(3)(d) uses the word any instead of substantial, indicating that a reviewing court should affirm a decision of the Board which is supported by any evidence whatsoever, even if that evidence is less than that which `a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' City of Las Vegas v. Laughlin, 111 Nev. 557, 558, 893 P.2d 383, 384 (1995) (defining the substantial evidence standard) (quoting State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971))). This comports with the great deference we afford a decision of the Board on appeal. See Redmer v. Barbary Coast Hotel & Casino, 110 Nev. 374, 378, 872 P.2d 341, 344 (1994). With this standard in mind, we examine Sengel's contentions. Sengel contends that the slot machine did not malfunction because it acted exactly as it was designed to operate. By stopping abruptly upon receiving an error code, the machine produced a result on the reels in a manner in which it was designed. Because, argues Sengel, the reels were stopped in a manner in which they were designed to be stopped, the result was not a malfunction. However, the Board heard evidence that the slot machine was only designed to produce jackpots via the random number generator. It was not designed to produce a final game result with the sudden stoppage of the reels caused by an error code. Any result shown on the reels during suspension of the game was designed to be just that: a suspended result. Upon a reel shutdown caused by a tilt code, the machine was not designed to recognize the suspended result as a legitimate outcome, be it an apparent winning or non-winning alignment. Respondents' witnesses testified that, while the game did do what it was designed to do, which is to immediately shut down upon detection of an error code, the game was not designed to produce a final play alignment of the reels until after the error code was cleared. Sengel's own expert witness admitted on cross-examination that a door tilt code would have to be considered a malfunction. Further, the Board took evidence from Board agent Robert Johnson that the machine itself showed a malfunction code and in other ways visually appeared to not have a valid jackpot. The abrupt stop of the reels, the uneven alignment of the jackpot symbols, the tilt code in the winner paid window, the maintenance light on top of the machine and the absence of jackpot lights, the continued running of the progressive jackpot amount, the lack of sirens or music coming from the slot machine, and the fact that no jackpot win registered on the inter-linked computer system all support the Board's finding that a malfunction occurred. Accordingly, Sengel's argument is without merit, because there is evidence to support a finding that a malfunction occurred. Sengel challenges the Board's finding that the malfunction was part of the slot machine, not part of associated equipment. He argues that the slot machine itself is a gaming device, as defined in NRS 463.0155, but that the bill validator is merely associated equipment, as defined in NRS 463.0136. Sengel argues that some Quartermania slot machines have bill validators and some do not, so the bill validator is not an essential part of the actual gaming device. The Board, however, with its expertise in gaming matters, found that the bill validator, once placed inside the slot machine and connected with the machine's unified security system and part of the computerized game flow process, is part of the slot machine and not merely associated equipment. Because there is evidence supporting this finding, we again defer to the Board.