Opinion ID: 2539393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equitable indemnity statute of limitations

Text: Appellants argue that a cause of action for equitable indemnity is separate and distinct from the underlying cause of action and carries its own limitations period. We agree. Although our caselaw has not addressed the issue, it is generally recognized that equitable indemnity claims are not governed by the limitations period applicable to the underlying tort. See, e.g., Reggio v. E.T.I., 15 So.3d 951, 955 (La.2008) (An action for indemnity is a separate substantive cause of action, arising at a different time, independent of the underlying tort, with its own prescriptive period.); Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Covers Action for Indemnity, 57 A.L.R.3d 833 § 2(a) (1974) (The cause of action for indemnity is wholly distinct from the transaction or situation which gave rise to the right to indemnity.). In line with this view, we hold that equitable indemnity claims that arise out of medical malpractice allegations are not subject to NRS 41A.097(2)'s limitations period for medical malpractice claims, but are instead subject to NRS 11.190(2)(c)'s limitations period for actions on implied contracts. NRS 11.190(2)(c) prescribes the limitations period for actions on implied contracts, providing that action[s] upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing must be brought within four years. Because claims for equitable indemnity are based upon a theory of implied contract, we conclude that NRS 11.190(2)(c) provides the applicable statute of limitations for equitable indemnity claims. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto., A.B. Co., 372 F.2d 18, 21 (3d Cir.1966); see also 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 38 (2005) (A common-law indemnity action is based on a theory of quasi-contract or contract implied in law and is generally held to be governed by the statute of limitations applicable to actions on implied contracts.); accord Brunner, supra, § 3. Therefore, because appellants have not suffered any actual loss, and thus the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing appellants' equitable indemnity claim as time-barred. [4] See Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Aztec Plumbing, 106 Nev. 474, 476, 796 P.2d 227, 229 (1990) (the limitations period for equitable indemnity claims does not begin to run until the indemnitee suffers actual loss by paying a settlement or underlying judgment); accord Rodriguez v. Primadonna Company, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 216 P.3d 793, 801 (2009).