Opinion ID: 1182062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Defense Counsel's Closing Argument in the Guilt Phase

Text: (31) Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective in closing argument because counsel conceded defendant's presence at the scene of the crime (thereby repudiating defendant's alibi testimony) and proferred a statutorily abolished defense of diminished capacity. We disagree with defendant's assessment of counsel's performance. Going into final argument, the prosecution had presented an extremely strong case against defendant. Five eyewitnesses identified him as the murderer or placed him at the scene of the crime. One of those witnesses, a Der Wienerschnitzel employee, had waited on him about once a week and remembered him because of his habit of harassing service employees by changing his orders. Defendant's gun, which contained his own fingerprint, was the murder weapon. Defendant's cousin had testified against him, recounting defendant's own statements and actions, which both placed him at the scene of the crime and showed his consciousness of guilt in fleeing from police after he returned there. Defendant then testified on his own behalf, denying he was even present and suggesting someone had somehow planted his fingerprint. Defense counsel had only one realistic chance  to discredit the robbery evidence  and faced the likely prospect that defendant's own testimony had destroyed his credibility beyond rehabilitation. From a tactical point of view, it was, to say the least, an uphill battle. In light of the evidence, counsel elected to concede his client's presence at the scene (a fact no one but defendant disputed) and to explain his client's contrary testimony as a failure of recollection. Defendant's testimony provided support for the strategy: he professed failure of recollection numerous times while on the stand. Counsel attacked the robbery and robbery special-circumstance charges, maintaining defendant did not have the requisite intent to steal and did not in fact steal. These arguments were proper and related to the elements of the crimes as disclosed in the instructions given to the jury. Under these circumstances, we cannot say counsel was constitutionally ineffective in his attempt to make the best of a bad situation. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) Unlike People v. Diggs (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 958, 970-971 [223 Cal. Rptr. 361], relied on by defendant, there is a plausible tactical explanation for the defense argument in this case, as we have shown. In addition, as the People observe, counsel's contention that defendant lacked the specific intent to rob was not an improper attempt to proffer a defense of diminished capacity, but a proper argument on an element of a charged offense. Moreover, defendant fails to show prejudice in light of the evidence against him. Defendant does not establish that he was deprived of any potentially meritorious defense nor does he show to a reasonable probability that the result would have been different in the absence of any alleged ineffectiveness. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-689 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 693-695]; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 215-218.)