Opinion ID: 1404383
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Assessment of Whether Emergency Circumstances Existed.(1) Deference

Text: The district court concluded that CEQ's interpretation of 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11 is not entitled to deference. It reasoned that under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. ง 551 et seq., the courts traditionally afford deference to (1) an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue . . ., citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and (2) an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation, citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945). See Feb. 4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 1226-1227. NRDC challenged neither the propriety of CEQ's original promulgation of 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11 nor the fact that ง 1506.11 allows alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA under genuine emergency circumstances. Instead, NRDC limited its challenge to CEQ's application of the regulation to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the district court considered whether the term emergency circumstances could be afforded so broad an interpretation as to encompass the Navy's need to continue its long-planned, routine sonar training exercises without the mitigation measures imposed by the district court. The district court concluded that the plain language of the regulation and the limited indicia of the agency's original intent compelled a narrower interpretation of emergency circumstances than the one afforded it by CEQ. Accordingly, the district court concluded that it did not owe deference to CEQ's interpretation of ง 1506.11 under Thomas Jefferson and Seminole Rock. We review that conclusion to determine whether in so doing it relied on an erroneous legal premise or abused its discretion; we conclude that it did neither. The district court followed established Supreme Court precedent in finding that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is not entitled to deference when it is inconsistent with the regulation itself, conflicts with agency intent at the time of promulgation, and reaches beyond the limits imposed by the statute, NEPA. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997). Next, the district court, after concluding that the meaning of emergency circumstances was clear, applied the appropriate legal principles that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined not to give deference to CEQ's overly broad interpretation of emergency circumstances. [40]