Opinion ID: 1164389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the scope of the use permitted by the easement

Text: Wrangell contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the state's express reservation permitted Wrangell to use the reservation to the extent necessary to construct a roadway and, thus, that it was a jury question whether the use of the easement was reasonable or excessive. [6] Wrangell maintains that no such requirement of reasonableness exists where there is an expressly reserved and dedicated defined highway right-of-way... . Therefore, it asserts that there is an absolute right to clear the right-of-way within the 100-foot limit of the reservation. The Edwardses, on the other hand, argue that only the amount of trees reasonably necessary to construct the roadway may be cleared. We agree with the Edwardses and hold that the trial court did not commit error. The general rule regarding the scope of the use of a right-of-way easement was stated in Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Properties, 221 Kan. 579, 561 P.2d 818, 822 (1977): The law appears to be settled that where the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress have been expressly set forth in the instrument the easement is specific and definite. The expressed terms of the grant or reservation are controlling in such case and consideration of what may be necessary or reasonable to the present use of the dominant estate are not controlling. If, however, the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress are not fixed by the terms of the grant or reservation the dominant estate is ordinarily entitled to a way of such width, length and location as is sufficient to afford necessary or reasonable ingress and egress. [7] To sustain [a] contention [that an easement grants the right to use any and all of a strip of land], the plaintiff must point to language in the deed which clearly and definitely fixes the width of the right of way... . Barton's Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., 113 N.H. 333, 306 A.2d 774, 775 (N.H. 1973). [8] Moreover, it has been generally stated: A grant or reservation of a right of way `over' a particular area, strip, or parcel of ground is not ordinarily to be construed as providing for a way as broad as the ground referred to. Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 253, 265 (1953). In Hyland v. Fonda, 44 N.J. Super. 180, 129 A.2d 899 (N.J.App.Div. 1957), the court considered whether the reservation in a deed entitled the grantor's assigns to use the entire reserved strip. The deed stated: Reserving, however, unto the party of the first part [Scientific Research Corporation], its successors and assigns the right of ingress and egress for roadway purposes along a strip 25 feet in width along the entire northerly boundary for roadway purposes, together with the right to dedicate said strip, together with any additional land of the party of the first part for roadway purposes whenever a municipality shall accept the same as a public thoroughfare. 129 A.2d at 901. The court stated: We cannot say there is no ambiguity on the face of the grant here involved concerning the matter of the physical area over which the defendants have a present right of roadway use. The language of the reservation does not specifically describe the intended roadway as 25 feet in width ... it provides a `right of ingress and egress for roadway purposes along a strip 25 feet in width,' etc. This kind of ambiguity is frequently found... . (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 129 A.2d at 904. Similarly, here neither the reservation in the contract for sale nor the statutory dedication describe the intended roadway as 100 feet in width. In fact, the statutory dedication states that 100-footwide tracts are dedicated for use as public highways. This is analogous to the grant in Hyland for a right-of-way for roadway purposes. The express language of the dedication suggests that the legislature intended only that the amount of land necessary for use as public highways be dedicated. Consequently, we believe that the reference to width in the reservation is ambiguous as to whether it refers to the width of the way, or is merely descriptive of the property over which the grantee may have such a way as may be reasonably necessary. Id. [9] Consequently, Wrangell was entitled to make only reasonable use of the right-of-way. Although the result we reach may generate litigation because of disputes over what constitutes reasonable use, the result will avoid a construction of the grant of a right of way on and over [a] parcel of land that would unduly restrict its use. Alban v. R.K. Co., 15 Ohio St.2d 229, 239 N.E.2d 22, 25 (Ohio 1968). Moreover, this result will prevent needless destruction of property by insuring that the construction of roadways will be accomplished with care. [10]