Opinion ID: 2212347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recklessness requires a conscious disregard of a risk.

Text: SDCL 22-16-20 treats [a]ny reckless killing as manslaughter in the second degree. [1] The definition of reckless for the purpose of this statute is set forth in SDCL 22-1-2(1)(d). State v. Martin, 449 N.W.2d 29 (S.D.1989). That definition states: The words reckless, recklessly and all derivatives thereof, import a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of a substantial risk that the offender's conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when he consciously and unjustifiably disregards a substantial risk that such circumstances may exist[.] In other words, for someone's conduct to be deemed reckless, they must consciously disregard a substantial risk. Consequently, someone cannot be reckless if they are unaware of the risk their behavior creates as they cannot disregard that risk if they are unaware of it. As the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated: In order that conduct be considered reckless it must create a high degree of risk of which the actor is actually aware.  State v. Anderson, 336 N.W.2d 634, 637 (N.D.1983) (emphasis added). Recklessness requires more than ordinary negligent conduct. Evidence of carelessness, inadvertence or other similar behavior is insufficient to sustain a conviction where reckless conduct is required. See People v. Buffington, 61 Misc.2d 429, 304 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 35 A.D.2d 1063, 316 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1970). The difference between reckless behavior and negligent behavior is primarily measured by the state of mind of the individual. As explained in 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 27 at 140 (1978): The difference between the terms recklessly and negligently, as usually defined, is one of kind, rather than of degree. Each actor creates a risk of harm. The reckless actor is aware of the risk and disregards it; the negligent actor is not aware of the risk but should have been aware of it. (Emphasis in original). The same idea is expressed in Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 Am.J.Crim.L. 281, 351 (1981): It is the concept of conscious disregard that distinguishes recklessness from negligence. The negligent actor fails to perceive a risk that he ought to perceive. The reckless actor perceives or is conscious of the risk, but disregards it. Consequently, outwardly identical actions by two people may be reckless behavior for one, but only negligent behavior for the other. Although it is not always possible for the State to directly establish that a defendant was aware of a risk, it can be done indirectly through the defendant's conduct. Awareness can be established if the defendant acts in a manner that indicates a reckless disregard for the safety of others. However, the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of the law is not in and of itself sufficient to constitute reckless conduct, even if a person is killed as a result thereof. See State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1972); State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 11 N.W.2d 371 (1943); Commonwealth v. Clowser, 212 Pa.Super. 208, 239 A.2d 870 (1968). As explained in Commonwealth v. Kaulback, 256 Pa.Super. 13, 389 A.2d 152, 154-155 (1978), the evidence must show more than a mere violation of the law before criminal responsibility for a death will arise: [N]ot every violation of law or unlawful act in the operation of a motor vehicle will render the operator criminally responsible for deaths which may result. Such an operator, to be criminally responsible, must evidence a disregard of human life or an indifference to the consequences of his acts. This is based on the sound principle that there must be found from the evidence some degree of culpable behavior or reckless disregard for the safety of others before a conviction may be sustained. Criminal responsibility for death resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of the law will result only if the violation is done in such a manner as to evidence a reckless disregard for the safety of others. Mere carelessness or inadvertence or thoughtless omission is insufficient. Buffington, supra . In the present case, the State has failed to introduce evidence of Olsen's conduct that would rise above the level of negligence. Nothing in the evidence of Olsen's behavior suggests that he was in any way aware of the risk he was creating when he turned his tractor towards the gravel road. Although it appears he did not properly yield the right-of-way, [2] as the court explained in Clowser, supra : We are of the opinion that a mere failure to yield the right-of-way is not such evidence of culpable or criminal negligence as will support the charge of involuntary manslaughter. Id. 239 A.2d at 873 (quoting Commonwealth v. Humphrey, 14 Law.L.J. 145 (1955)). The State has failed to offer evidence indicating that Olsen's failure to yield the right-of-way was done in such a manner as to suggest a reckless disregard for the safety of others. While the State need not introduce evidence that Olsen could foresee a death resulting from his conduct, the State must introduce evidence that would allow a trier of fact to conclude that Olsen was aware of the dangerous nature of his conduct. Since the State has failed to introduce such evidence, we cannot say that the magistrate court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint against Olsen. SDCL 23A-4-7. [3] As indicated above, the magistrate's determination regarding the existence of probable cause shall not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion [4] is demonstrated. Doss, supra ; Paille, supra . MORGAN, J., concurs. HENDERSON, J., concurs with a writing. WUEST, J., concurs specially. MILLER, C.J., concurs in result without a writing.