Opinion ID: 807645
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Robert M.

Text: The prosecution struck Hispanic juror Robert M. in the final round of peremptory challenges. In camera, the prosecutor explained that he had been concerned, given Robert M’s response to voir dire questioning, that he might not be willing to impose the death penalty. This concern had been heightened by Robert M.’s mentioning the Sagon Penn case — a case in which the defendant was found not guilty in a second trial and the police and the district attorney’s office were accused of misconduct. The trial judge accepted the prosecu- tion’s explanation, stating that, although Martinez’s “questionnaire would tend to indicate a person that is certainly pro the death penalty[,] . . . his answers varied somewhat to the extent that individually, there may well be a legitimate concern as to whether or not he could impose it.” Defense counsel’s presence in the Batson proceedings was necessary to call into question the prosecution’s claim that it struck Robert M. because of his reluctance to impose the death penalty. Even without comparing Robert M. to other jurors permitted to serve, this explanation is highly suspect: Robert M. repeatedly stated during voir dire that he believed in the death penalty and could personally vote to impose it, and his questionnaire (which has, of course, been lost) maniAYALA v. WONG 10127 fested a similar enthusiasm according to the trial judge. Defense counsel could have brought to the trial court’s attention that the only statement potentially raising any question whatsoever — that voting for a death sentence might “weigh on his conscience,” and would be a “heavy” decision — was indistinguishable from a practical standpoint from statements by Dorothy C, who said that serving as juror in a capital case was “a lot of responsibility” and would cause her to “worry a lot,” Dorothy H., who stated that imposing the death penalty would not “be an easy thing for anyone,” Dorothea L., who said she would not know if she could impose the death penalty until she had to do it, and Leona B., who affirmed that this responsibility would “bother” her. Other prospective jurors who were struck by the defense, but had been accepted by the prosecution, may have made comparable statements in their questionnaires (which, again, have been lost). Counsel could have argued that most jurors who believed in imposing the death penalty would consider a decision to do so a “heavy” decision that would weigh on one’s conscience. Following counsel’s argument, the judge might well have recog- nized that there is indeed rarely a “heavier” decision a citizen is ever asked to undertake. Certainly, like Gerardo O., Robert M. was no more hesitant than Ana L., who had actually at one point stated that she would be unable to impose the death penalty. To the extent that the prosecution gave Robert M’s reference to the Sagon Penn case as a separate reason for its challenge, defense counsel could likely have demonstrated that this reason was pretextual. First, the entirety of the Sagon Penn exchange was as follows: Prosecutor: Have you followed any kind of — any court cases in the news or come downtown to watch any trials? Robert M.: Well, I followed the Saigon [sic] Penn case. 10128 AYALA v. WONG Prosecutor: All right. Robert M. briefly mentioned the case in response to the prosecution’s question, and he said nothing about any accusations of police or prosecutorial misconduct. Second, although none of the seated jurors had been asked a similar question, one seated white juror had on his own initiative referred to a far more controversial capital case. When asked to describe his feelings about the death penalty, Douglas S. mentioned the “Harris” case, saying: “The Harris case, which goes back . . . . I believe he’s on death row . . . I can’t even recall the exact crimes, but I remember them to be quite bizarre, and — and here he was, facing execution, and I don’t know.” Douglas S. was presumably referring to Robert Alton Harris, who at the time of Ayala’s trial was on California’s death row, and had, in a case that was extensively covered by the press, been tried, convicted and sentenced to death in San Diego. People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240, 246 (Cal. 1981). As Harris’s case wound its way through the state and federal courts, it generated substantial controversy, some of which, as in the Sagon Penn case, was related to allegations of official misconduct. See, e.g., id. at 267 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Harris had been denied his right to a fair trial due to extensive and prejudicial pretrial publicity, partially the product of the “sorry spectacle of prosecutorial offices publicly vying with each other to have ‘first crack’ at convicting the accused”); see also Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and The Harris Case, 102 Yale L.J. 205, 205 & n.1 (1992) (for further description of controversy generated by case). Douglas S.’s statement about the case — “here he was, facing execution, and I don’t know” — suggests that this controversy had created some doubt in his mind as to the propriety of Harris’s conviction and sentence. Certainly, Douglas S.’s unelicited discussion of the Harris case should have troubled the prosecutor far more than Robert M.’s brief direct response regarding the Sagon Penn case. AYALA v. WONG 10129 Finally, if there was any inference to draw from Robert M’s fleeting reference to the Sagon Penn case, it was that Robert M. would not return a guilty verdict based on a blind trust of the police and the prosecution who had arrested and charged the defendant with the crime. Numerous seated white jurors expressed similar sentiments. Douglas S., for example, stated that the last person who had lied to his face was a California policeman. Similarly, Charles C. said, “You don’t change your stripes . . . when you put on a badge; and you have to judge everybody’s testimony in a court case on its face.” Even if the trial judge had not been willing to completely reject the prosecution’s implausible explanation that it struck Robert M. because he mentioned the Sagon Penn case, there is a strong likelihood that, had defense counsel been present and been able to persuade the court that the prosecution’s principal reason for challenging this juror — his reluctance to impose the death penalty — was pretextual, the court would have concluded that the strike violated Batson. We thus cannot conclude that the exclusion of defense counsel from the Batson proceedings did not prevent Ayala from showing that the prosecution’s strike of Robert M. was based on its impermissible consideration of race.