Opinion ID: 2968317
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim One—Discrimination

Text: Francis first argues that the district court erred in holding that BAH did not discriminate against her in violation of USERRA with respect to the changes in her work schedule and responsibilities. Although Francis alleges discrimination under both §§ 4311 and 4312, the procedural requirements of the two provisions differ. An employee proceeding under § 4311 has the burden of proving that the employer discriminated against him or her based on a status or activity protected by USERRA. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.22 (2006). Section 4312 6 FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON imposes no such burden. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.33 (2006). We consider Francis’ claims under both provisions.2 We begin by noting that, [b]ecause USERRA was enacted to protect the rights of veterans and members of the uniformed services, it must be broadly construed in favor of its military beneficiaries. Hill v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 307, 312-13 (4th Cir. 2001). In addition, while USERRA is a relatively recent statutory scheme, we can and should use relevant pre-USERRA case law as a guide toward understanding USERRA: [i]n enacting USERRA, Congress . . . emphasized that Federal laws protecting veterans’ employment and reemployment rights for the past fifty years had been successful and that the large body of case law that had developed under those statutes remained in full force and effect, to the extent it is consistent with USERRA. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.2 (2006). The first step in determining the meaning of a statute is to examine the statute’s plain language. In doing so, we look at ‘the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’ United States v. Andrews, 441 F.3d 220, 222 (4th Cir. 2006)(internal citation omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). USERRA provides a multi-tiered and comprehensive remedial scheme to ensure the employment and reemployment rights of those called upon to serve in the armed forces of the United States. Morris-Hayes v. Bd. of Educ., 423 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing USERRA in the context of Section 1983 claims). We analyze this comprehensive scheme holistically, careful to interpret each section in a manner that does not render any other sections inconsistent or superfluous. See Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2005). With this guidance in mind, we consider the relevant statutory sections. 2 There is some dispute over whether Francis properly raised the applicability of § 4312 in the district court. If she did not raise the issue in the district court, then we cannot consider it here under the longstanding rule that issues raised for the first time on appeal generally will not be considered. Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993). After reviewing the record of the proceedings below, we conclude that Francis preserved her arguments under § 4312 and will, accordingly, fully consider those arguments here. FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON 7

In relevant part, § 4312 states that any person whose absence from a position of employment is necessitated by reason of service in the uniformed services shall be entitled to the reemployment rights and benefits of [USERRA]. § 4312(a). Francis argues that § 4312 protects her from discrimination with respect to the terms and conditions of employment after she has been rehired. Conversely, BAH argues that the reemployment rights protected by §§ 4312 and 4313 apply only at the instant of reemployment, and that other sections of USERRA operate to protect employees after they are properly reemployed under §§ 4312 and 4313. We find BAH’s interpretation to be more faithful to the statutory framework. As noted above, § 4312 is part of a comprehensive statutory scheme and must be read in context with the rest of USERRA— specifically, for purposes of our analysis, §§ 4311 and 4316. Section 4312 provides that any person whose absence from a position of employment is necessitated by service in the uniformed services is entitled to reemployment rights. Warren v. IBM, 358 F.Supp.2d 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Section 4311 prohibits discrimination with respect to any benefit of employment against persons who serve in the armed services after they return from a deployment and are reemployed. See id. at 309-10. Finally, § 4316 converts the otherwise atwill employment status of covered individuals to one in which they are protected from dismissal except for cause for a period of time. Id. at 310. In short, § 4312 requires an employer to rehire covered employees; § 4311 then operates to prevent employers from treating those employees differently after they are rehired; and § 4316 prevents employers from summarily dismissing those employees for a limited period after they are rehired. While combining to form comprehensive protection from the point of rehire to untimely dismissal, each provision is nonetheless functionally discrete. As one court has noted, Section 4312 serves only to guarantee service persons’ reemployment without question as to the employer’s intent. 8 FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON This interpretation is in keeping with congressional intent in enacting the USERRA. Finding existing veteran’s right statutes overly complex and ambiguous, leaving veterans and employers confused as to their rights and responsibilities, Congress acted to clarify, simplify, and where necessary, strengthen the existing veterans’ employment and reemployment rights provisions. Lapine v. Town of Wellesley, 970 F. Supp. 55, 58, fn.2. (D. Mass. 1997). Section 4312 places service people and employers on notice that, upon returning from service, veterans are entitled to their previous positions of employment. After being reemployed, the service person is protected by §§ 4316(c) and 4311. Jordan v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 225 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Put more simply, § 4312 only entitles a service person to immediate reemployment and does not prevent the employer from terminating him the next day or even later the same day. Id. The apparent harshness of this result is addressed by the fact that §§ 4311 and 4316 operate to protect the employee as soon as she is reemployed. Francis’ interpretation of § 4312 as requiring BAH to provide all of the rights and benefits afforded to her under USERRA with no temporal limitation (appellant’s Reply Brief at 15, emphasis in original) would render §§ 4311 and 4316 superfluous. If § 4312 provided ongoing protection after reemployment, it would subsume the specific guarantees of §§ 4311 and 4316. [W]e are ‘loath’ to read one statutory provision so as to render another provision of the same statute superfluous. Gonzales, 419 F.3d at 283 (quoting Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004)). Congress carefully constructed USERRA to provide comprehensive protection to returning veterans, while balancing the legitimate concerns of employers. We will not upset that balance and render USERRA sections meaningless by adopting the overly broad interpretation of § 4312 that Francis seeks. We therefore hold that § 4312 applies to protect a covered individual only as to the act of rehiring.
We now decide whether BAH violated § 4312 when it reemployed Francis. Section 4312 states that BAH had to provide Francis with FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON 9 both reemployment rights and employment benefits. Under its terms, BAH must reemploy Francis in either the position of employment in which [she] would have been employed if [her] continuous employment . . . with [BAH] had not been interrupted by [military] service, or a position of like seniority, status and pay, the duties of which [Francis] is qualified to perform. § 4313(a)(2)(A) (defining the rights provided by § 4312). In addition, BAH was required to rehire Francis with her employment benefits, which include, in relevant part, any advantage, profit, or privilege . . . that accrues by reason of an employment contract or agreement . . . [including] . . . the opportunity to select work hours or location of employment. § 4303(2). We conclude that BAH complied with both of these requirements. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Francis was rehired with the same title, salary, consulting engagement, and work location upon returning. The actions Francis complained of occurred significantly after her return to BAH in August of 2003. Accordingly, they fall outside of § 4312’s scope. Specifically, Francis’ work hours were not changed until several weeks after she was rehired. She further admitted during her deposition that changes in her job responsibilities occurred in late October, 2003.3 In view of Francis’ failure to present 3 At her deposition, Francis noted that her pre-deployment job responsibilities involved setting up the user accounts administratively wise, deletions, managing the disk space, performing upgrades, [and] desktop upgrades. J.A. at 523. She later acknowledged that she had these same responsibilities after returning from deployment: Q. Now when you returned to work, when you returned after deployment, were you doing the administrative deletions and additions? A. Yes, I was. Q. Were you doing the user account work after you returned from deployment? A. Yes, I was. Q. Were you doing the disk-based management when you returned from deployment? A. Yes, I was. 10 FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON any evidence that BAH improperly denied her either reemployment rights or employment benefits at the time it rehired her, we hold that § 4312 does not provide Francis with relief on her discrimination claim.

We now consider whether § 4311 provides Francis with any relief on her discrimination claim. Section 4311(a) states that a person [such as Francis] shall not be denied . . . any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of [her membership in the armed services]. § 4311(a). As noted above, USERRA defines benefit of employment in relevant part as any advantage, profit, [or] privilege . . . that accrues by reason of an employment contract or agreement . . . [including] . . . the opportunity to select work hours or location of employment. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2). Our analysis is guided by the fact that an employer shall be considered to have engaged in prohibited conduct under § 4311(a) only if the employee’s military status is a motivating factor. § 4311(c)(1).
Francis first contends that, after being reemployed as a Level II Senior Consultant, she was gradually given more Tier I work than she had pre-deployment and was no longer given any Tier III work. Therefore, Francis contends, even though her job title and salary Q. Were you doing the computer and software upgrades when you returned from deployment? A. Yes, I was, initially. Q. When did that stop, the upgrades? A. Gradually my duties and responsibilities were further reduced, and I was designated to just only do call center, answering the phone. J.A. at 524-25. FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON 11 remained the same, she was effectively demoted. See generally Harris v. City of Montgomery, 322 F.Supp. 2d 1319, 1323 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (noting that a significant change in job responsibilities, even when pay and title remain the same, can create a jury question as to whether a benefit of employment had been denied). The district court responded to this argument, noting that [Francis] offers no support, beyond her own conclusory opinions, for the contention that her status and duties were changed and that such changes constituted the denial of a benefit of employment. . . . [Francis]’ own deposition testimony reveals that she performed nearly identical duties before and after her deployment, that is, providing both Tier I and Tier II support (in the Call Center). Francis v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8159 at . We agree with the district court. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Francis does indicate that the relative amount of Tier I, II, and III work that Francis received post-deployment differed from her pre-deployment workload. This difference, however, was extremely slight and simply a continuation of her pre-deployment work patterns—which always involved a mix of Tier I, II, and III work depending on client needs, as did the responsibilities of other employees. Francis’ deposition testimony indicates that she performed Tier I and Tier II duties both before and after deployment. J.A. 502-03, 51516 (noting that she performed Tier I duties both before and after deployment); 518-20 (acknowledging that she performed Tier II duties after returning from deployment). In addition, the reduction of Tier III work began before Francis was deployed, was a direct result of the change in the OSWER contract, and applied to all employees in Francis’ position. In response to this evidence, Francis provides naked speculation and open-ended rhetorical questions. See Appellant’s Brief at 22 (noting that it is hard to believe that Tier III work was not available anywhere within BAH); 25 n.5 (asking, but not answering, How many other jobs within BAH on other contracts or locations required mainly Tier II type work?). In short, the district court correctly held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Francis, BAH did not deny Francis a benefit of employment 12 FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON by altering the relative amounts of Tier I, II, and III work that she had after her return from deployment.4
Francis next contends that BAH denied her a benefit of employment by changing her work schedule, making it difficult for her to attend evening classes. USERRA expressly states that the opportunity to select work hours constitutes a protected benefit of employment. § 4303(2). In addition, we have held that a more favorable working schedule is, in and of itself, a benefit of employment. Hill, 252 F.3d at 313. The district court dismissed Francis’ claim, holding that a two-hour schedule change, which did not change the total number of hours worked and which Francis had previously worked without objection, was not significant enough to constitute the denial of a benefit of employment. We need not decide whether the schedule adjustment, on these facts, deprived Francis of a benefit of employment. Even if we so assume, Francis is entitled to relief under USERRA only if she can demonstrate that her military status was a motivating factor in her schedule change. § 4311(c)(1). While issues of improper motivation generally involve factual determinations properly left for a jury, [m]ere conclusory allegations of motivation do not preclude sum- 4 Francis cites several cases in support of the position that changed job responsibilities can constitute a denial of a benefit of employment. These cases, however, all involve situations in which the employee’s new job responsibilities were drastically different from their old responsibilities. See Harris, 322 F.Supp.2d at 1323 (reassignment from head coach to assistant coach of the same team); Nichols v. Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs, 11 F.3d 160, 161-63 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (chaplain was reassigned to a position in which his immediate supervisor was the person holding his old job); Carlson v. N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 609 F.2d 1024, 1026 (1st Cir. 1979) (state trooper assigned to new troop that had no overlapping responsibilities with his original troop); Duarte v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 366 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1043-46 (D. Col. 2005) (employee given a significantly different job in which he was transferred from a lead design consultant position to an assistant design consultant position). Francis cites no cases in which an employee whose job responsibilities changed as little as hers was found to have been denied a benefit of employment. FRANCIS v. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON 13 mary judgment. Yarnevic v. Brink’s, Inc., 102 F.3d 753, 757-58 (4th Cir. 1996). Francis simply presents no evidence, direct or circumstantial, through which a rational trier of fact could find that BAH was motivated to change her schedule because of her military service. In addition, the slight nature of the change and the fact that Francis routinely worked a similar schedule in the past provides circumstantial evidence for a conclusion that BAH’s actions were not motivated by Francis’ military status.5 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Francis’ discrimination claim.