Opinion ID: 1874114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Foreign Precedents

Text: ถ 159 The majority's reliance on foreign precedents for guidance may be creative, but it is fundamentally unsound. The case before this court involves the interpretation of Wisconsin statutes. The term quasi-governmental corporation is not found in the Maryland, New York, or Florida cases cited by the majority. The majority tacitly recognizes its leap of logic, [13] but still plows through a result-oriented analysis, disregarding the language of these states' open meetings and public records laws. The majority treats the interpretation of out-of-state statutes by out-of-state courts as if we were collectively developing the common law of freedom of information. ถ 160 City of Baltimore Development Corporation v. Carmel Realty Associates, 395 Md. 299, 910 A.2d 406 (2006), involved two questions of statutory interpretation: (1) whether the City of Baltimore Development Corporation (BDC) was a public body within the meaning of Maryland's Open Meetings Act Md.Code Ann., State Gov't งง 10-501โ10-512 (LexisNexis 2004); and (2) whether the BDC was an instrumentality of the City of Baltimore for purposes of Maryland's Public Information Act (Md.Code Ann., State Gov't งง 10-601โ10-628 (LexisNexis 2004)). Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 410. ถ 161 The Maryland Court of Appeals found that BDC performed many purely public functions and was inextricably linked to the City of Baltimore. Id. at 424-25. BDC's bylaws gave the mayor of Baltimore the power to appoint or nominate members of BDC's board of directors, remove members of the board, including the Chairman of the Board, and to appoint directors when positions on the board were vacated. Id. at 422, 425. BDC could implement, oversee, and encourage public and private development and rehabilitation projects to increase the city's tax base. Id. at 424. BDC was tasked with the attraction of new businesses, retention of existing businesses, and the stimulation and encouragement of growth and expansion of commercial office uses, manufacturing, warehousing, distribution, research, and development. Id. at 425. If BDC ceased to exist, tangible property purchased with funds attached to that contract would revert to the city. Id. Over 80 percent of BDC's budget was provided by the city. Id. ถ 162 The Maryland Court of Appeals set forth its analysis under the heading Statutory Interpretation. Id. at 417. In Maryland, a public body is subject to notice provisions of the Open Meetings Act. See id. at 419-20; Md.Code Ann., State Gov't ง 10-501(c) (LexisNexis 2004). Public body is defined in the Maryland Code. [14] ถ 163 In interpreting and applying the defined term public body to BDC, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that Md.Code Ann., State Gov't ง 10-502(h)(2) introduced a new concept and was an alternative to ง 10-502(h)(1) because it set forth a different set of public bodies from those described in ง 10-502(h)(1). Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 420. The court further explained that if ง 10-502(h)(2) had been a subsidiary clause, it would have been designated as  ง 10-502(h)(1) . . . (iii). Id. The court further held that because there was no evidence that BDC was created by a specific act or order under ง 10-502(h)(1), the court would have to consider whether BDC fell under ง 10-502(h)(2). Id. at 421. ถ 164 The court held that BDC was a public body under ง 10-502(h)(2) because the parties did not dispute that BDC's bylaws required it to be a multimember board, that its board of directors consisted of at least two individuals not employed by the city, and that the board was nominated or appointed by the mayor. Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 421. The court concluded that since there were no purely private functions of the BDC, it was consistent with the intent of the Maryland Open Meetings Act that the deliberations of the BDC be open to the public. Id. at 425. ถ 165 The majority characterizes the Maryland Court of Appeals' analysis as applying a totality of the circumstances approach to the defined term public body. Majority op., ถ 54. This is not accurate. The Maryland court instead interpreted a defined statutory term to ascertain whether BDC was subject to Maryland's open meetings laws pursuant to that definition. Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 419-25. The analysis of a defined statutory term (public body) in Maryland is not much use to interpretation of an undefined statutory term (quasi-governmental corporation) in two Wisconsin statutes. ถ 166 The Maryland Court of Appeals next turned to the second question presented, namely whether BDC was an instrumentality for purposes of Maryland's Public Information Act. Id. at 425-26. In Maryland, a public record is subject to the state's public records laws. See id. at 426; Md.Code Ann., State Gov't ง 10-611(g)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2004). Public record is a defined term and means the original or any copy of any documentary material that: (i) is made by a unit or instrumentality of the State government or of a political subdivision or received by the unit or instrumentality in connection with the transaction of public business. Id., ง 10-611(g)(1)(i). ถ 167 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that BDC was an instrumentality of the city. Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 426. The court stressed that the holding was consistent with the purpose of the Maryland Public Information Act and with the Maryland General Assembly's intent when it enacted the act. Id. The court looked to a standard dictionary for the definition of instrumentality and noted that [i]nstrumentality is defined as `the quality or state of being instrumental' and instrumental is defined as `serving as a means, agent, or tool.' Id. at 427 (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 607 (10th ed.1998)). The court also examined a number of BDC's characteristics to conclude it was an instrumentality, including the following: The BDC's Board of Directors, to include the Chairman of the Board, are nominated or appointed by the Mayor of Baltimore; he has the power to remove members of the Board before their four year terms are up; the Mayor also has the power to fill vacancies; the City's Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Community Development and the City's Director of Finance are permanent members of the Board; the BDC receives a substantial portion of its budget from the City; the BDC has a tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code; pursuant to the City's contract with the BDC, if it should cease to exist, the City would control the disposition of the BDC's assets; BDC is also authorized to prepare and adopt Urban Renewal Plans, Unit Development, Industrial Retention Zones, and Free Enterprise Zones which are traditionally governmental functions. We also note that the City Solicitor represented the BDC in this matter. Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 428 (footnotes omitted). ถ 168 The statutory interpretation problem in the instant case is similar to the problem faced by the Maryland Court of Appeals in interpreting the undefined term instrumentality. Hence, the majority opinion turns to some of the same methods to construe quasi-governmental corporation, such as using the dictionary. See majority op., ถ 32. However, the majority's description of the Maryland case blends the Maryland court's separate analyses of defined and undefined statutory terms into an evaluation of the totality of circumstances. See majority op., ถ 54. This allows the majority to analogize Carmel Realty to the instant case. Majority op., ถถ 66, 68, 72. ถ 169 Buffalo News, Inc. v. Buffalo Enterprise Development Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 488, 619 N.Y.S.2d 695, 644 N.E.2d 277 (1994), involved the question of whether the Buffalo Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDC), a non-profit corporation administering government loan programs, was an agency within the meaning of New York's Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). Id. at 278. Agency was defined by statute as any state or municipal department, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority, public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities thereof, except the judiciary or the state legislature. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law ง 86, subd. 3 (McKinney 1990) (emphasis added). ถ 170 The New York Court of Appeals concluded that BEDC was an agency under FOIL, constituting a governmental entity. Buffalo News, 619 N.Y.S.2d 695, 644 N.E.2d at 279-80. BEDC's stated purposes were to relieve and reduce unemployment, to promote and to provide for additional and maximum employment . . . [to] encourag[e][ ] development . . . in the community . . . and to lessen the burdens of government and to act in the public interest. Id. at 278 (brackets in original). The court observed that BEDC's purposes were undeniably governmental. Id. at 279. BEDC was  created exclusively by and for the City of Buffalo to attract investment and stimulate growth in Buffalo's downtown and neighborhoods. . . . Moreover, the BEDC describes itself in its financial reports and public brochure as an `agent' of the City of Buffalo. Id. (emphasis added). ถ 171 The New York statute's definition of agency included a governmental entity, not a quasi -governmental entity. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law ง 86, subd. 3 (McKinney 1990). The Buffalo News court held that BEDC was, in effect, an arm of government. See Buffalo News, 619 N.Y.S.2d 695, 644 N.E.2d at 279. By avoiding any discussion of the statute at play in Buffalo News, the majority here buries this crucial distinction. See majority op., ถถ 55-56. BEDC was viewed as a governmental entity, not something resembling a governmental entity. Compare Buffalo News, 619 N.Y.S.2d 695, 644 N.E.2d at 279 with majority op., ถ 63. Furthermore, the New York court's decision was premised upon its determination that BEDC was created exclusively by and for the City of Buffalo. Buffalo News, 619 N.Y.S.2d 695, 644 N.E.2d at 279. The City of Beaver Dam did not create BDADC. ถ 172 Finally, the majority discusses News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., 596 So.2d 1029 (Fla.1992), which involved the following question: Does a corporation act on behalf of a public agency when hired by a county to perform professional architectural services for the construction of a school so as to be subject to the provisions of Chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes? Id. at 1030. Agency is defined broadly in the Florida Statutes: Agency means any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer, department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of government created or established by law and any other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency. Fla. Stat. Ann. ง 119.011(2) (West 1989) (emphasis added). [15] ถ 173 In News and Sun-Sentinel, an architectural firm, Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc., a private corporation, contracted with a school board to provide architectural services in relation to the construction of school building facilities. News and Sun-Sentinel, 596 So.2d at 1030. A reporter, pursuant to Florida Statutes ch. 119, requested that he be allowed to inspect the files in the corporation's possession related to the projects. Id. The firm refused and argued that it was not an agency as set forth in Fla. Stat. ง 119.011(2). Id. ถ 174 In siding with the architectural firm, the Florida Supreme Court noted that courts interpreting agency under Fla. Stat. ง 119.011(2) make a determination based on the totality of the factors. Id. at 1031 (citations omitted). The court provided a non-exclusive list of factors considered in its analysis. [16] The court emphasized the fact that the term agency is defined broadly under Florida's Public Records Act to include private entities acting on behalf of any public agency. Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. ง 119.011(2)). The court concluded that, after reviewing the totality of the factors, the firm was not acting on behalf of a public agency so as to fall under Chapter 119's definition of agency. Id. at 1033. ถ 175 Unlike Florida's public records laws, Wisconsin's public records laws do not extend to private entities acting on behalf of a public agency. Compare Fla. Stat. ง 119.011(2) with Wis. Stat. ง 19.32(1). Therefore, it is difficult to swallow the majority's extension of the analysis in News and Sun-Sentinel to distinguish the case at hand. Majority op., ถ 66 (Moreover, unlike the architecture firm in News and Sun-Sentinel, 596 So.2d 1029, BDADC received tax money in order to provide public service, not merely to receive compensation.). ถ 176 The majority's analysis of the foreign precedents discussed above eschews discussion of the unique statutory language analyzed by courts in Maryland, New York, and Florida to determine whether these states' public records and open meetings laws applied to a particular entity. Instead of discussing the real statutory issues in these precedents, the majority instead draws broad conclusions regarding these cases to suit its result-oriented approach. [17] The majority's analysis of these foreign precedents is not a satisfactory technique for interpreting differently worded Wisconsin statutes.