Opinion ID: 4195156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Phelps-Roper’s Facial Challenge to the NFPL

Text: “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully . . . .” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). “To succeed challengers [must] establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the Act] would be valid, or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 685 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)). “[A statute] may also be invalidated on a facial First Amendment challenge as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The constitutionality of [a statute] regulating the exercise of protected speech in a public forum depends in large part on whether it is content based or content neutral.” Id. at 686. A statute is “content neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Content based regulations, such as those which impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects, are presumptively invalid, are subject to the most exacting scrutiny, and must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, “[c]ontent neutral time, place, or manner regulations . . . must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and allow for ample alternative channels for communication.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we find that the NFPL is content neutral. First, the NFPL is similar to the ordinance that we found content neutral in City of Manchester because it “simply limits when and where picketing and other protest activities may occur in relation to a funeral or burial service without regard for the speaker’s viewpoint.” 697 F.3d at 688-89; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 704 (2000) (noting as content neutral a “regulation of places where some speech may occur” (internal quotation marks -9- omitted)). Second, similar to the Manchester ordinance, “the asserted purpose for the [statute], the protection of citizens from disruption . . . during a funeral or burial service . . . is unrelated to the content of the regulated speech.” City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 688-89 (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, regardless of any evidence of the Nebraska legislature’s motivation for passing the NFPL, “the plain meaning of the text controls, and the legislature’s specific motivation for passing a law is not relevant, so long as the provision is neutral on its face.” Id. at 688 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 724-25 (finding a statute content neutral despite being enacted to stop harassment of people outside medical clinics by anti-abortion groups); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (finding a statute enacted in response to anti-abortion protestors to be content neutral). As noted above under Ward, content neutral statutes must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and allow for ample alternative channels for communication. 491 U.S. at 791. In City of Manchester, this court sitting en banc upheld a Manchester city ordinance that placed time and place restrictions on picketing at funerals. 697 F.3d at 683. The ordinance barred “[p]icketing and other protest activities . . . within 300 feet of any funeral or burial site during or within one hour before or one hour after the conducting of a funeral or burial service at that place.” Id. The term “other protest activities” was defined as “any action that is disruptive or undertaken to disrupt or disturb a funeral or burial service.” Id. The Manchester ordinance did not restrict picketing or protesting funeral processions. Id. Fines and imprisonment were possible with violations. Id. In comparison to the Manchester ordinance, the NFPL states: Unlawful picketing of a funeral; terms, defined. . . . [T]he following definitions apply: (1) Funeral means the ceremonies and memorial services held in connection with the burial or cremation of the dead but does not include funeral processions on public streets or highways; and (2) Picketing of a funeral means protest activities engaged in by a person -10- or persons located within five hundred feet of a cemetery, mortuary, church, or other place of worship during a funeral. Unlawful picketing of a funeral; penalty. (1) A person commits the offense of unlawful picketing of a funeral if he or she engages in picketing from one hour prior to through two hours following the commencement of a funeral. (2) Unlawful picketing of a funeral is a Class III misdemeanor. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-1320.02, 28-1320.03 (emphasis added). Thus, the time and place speech restrictions of the NFPL differ from those of the Manchester ordinance because the place restriction extends the distance between the picketers and the funeral from 300 to 500 feet and the time restriction is “from one hour prior to through two hours following the commencement of a funeral,” instead of Manchester’s “during or within one hour before or one hour after the conducting of a funeral.” We found that Manchester’s ordinance (1) served a significant government interest, (2) was narrowly tailored, and (3) allowed for ample alternative channels for communication. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 695. In this facial challenge, we ask “if there exist[s] any set of plausible circumstances in which [the NFPL] may be constitutionally applied and whether the ordinance has a plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 693. “The government may restrict disruptive and unwelcome speech to protect unwilling listeners when there are other important interests at stake.” Id. at 686. “Where there are competing interests and values, courts must find an acceptable balance between the constitutionally protected rights of law-abiding speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The increase of the buffer zone to 500 feet and the change in time restrictions in the NFPL compared to the Manchester ordinance do not change the outcome of this inquiry. Similar to the Manchester ordinance, we find that the NFPL serves a -11- significant government interest, is narrowly tailored, and leaves open ample alternative channels for communication. Therefore, we hold that the NFPL survives the facial challenge, as explained below. 1. Nebraska’s Significant Government Interest in the NFPL “[F]unerals implicate the most basic and universal human expression of the respect a society shows for the deceased and for the surviving family members.” Id. at 693 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004)). We have “conclude[d] that mourners attending a funeral . . . share a privacy interest analogous to those which the Supreme Court has recognized for individuals in their homes . . . and for patients entering a medical facility.” Id. (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85; Hill, 530 U.S. at 717; Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 767-68 (1994)). Here, the NFPL expressly states that it was enacted: to protect the privacy of grieving families and to preserve the peaceful character of cemeteries, mortuaries, churches, and other places of worship during a funeral . . . Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1320.01. At the bench trial, Nebraska presented experts supporting its significant interests. First, Dr. Scott Bresler, an expert in forensic psychology, testified that many mourners he interviewed felt victimized by WBC’s pickets—identifying one such victim as the grieving widow who said WBC’s August 2010 picket of her husband’s funeral “caused [her] so much pain” and that she “felt very hurt” when she saw WBC’s picket. Bresler testified that vulnerable mourners can suffer significant emotional injury due to the picketers’ presence, and the 500-foot buffer zone helps. Bresler also testified that the pickets may trigger anger and violence from mourners, such that the buffer zone provides added safety. Second, James Davidsaver, an expert -12- in crowd control and management, also testified that a 500-foot buffer zone between the picketers and the funeral provides necessary space to help ensure the safety of a large number of people within a city block. We conclude that Nebraska has shown a “significant government interest in protecting the peace and privacy of funeral attendees for a short time and in a limited space”—so that vulnerable friends and family can mourn and honor their deceased loved one in a respectful environment of peace and privacy free from unwanted public exploitation. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 693 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Favish, 541 U.S. at 168). 2. The NFPL is Narrowly Tailored “Although a valid time, place, or manner regulation need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the government’s interest, it may not restrict substantially more speech than is necessary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99). First, the NFPL’s time restriction is narrowly tailored. In City of Manchester, we upheld a time restriction of one hour before through one hour after the funeral. Id. at 694. Here, the NFPL has a time restriction that is more narrowly tailored than the one in City of Manchester because it only limits picketing “from one hour prior to through two hours following the commencement of a funeral.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1320.03 (emphasis added). Thus, under the NFPL the maximum time restriction is three hours. Whereas in City of Manchester, the time restriction lasted until one hour after the funeral regardless of funeral duration. We noted that “Manchester’s ordinance only restricts protests for a relatively short period, tailored to encompass a mourner’s time of highest emotional vulnerability and no longer,” and that “[p]rotesters are free to picket throughout the area for most of the day.” City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 694. The NFPL’s time constraint is more narrowly tailored than the ordinance that we upheld in Manchester, so the NFPL’s relatively brief time restriction is properly narrowly tailored. -13- Next, the NFPL’s place restriction is narrowly tailored. In City of Manchester, we upheld as narrowly tailored a place restriction that barred picketing in an area within 300 feet of a funeral. Id. at 694-95. Importantly, we noted that the “buffer zone” in the Manchester ordinance targeted “events, not locations.” Id. at 694. In addition, the Supreme Court upheld as narrowly tailored a 500-foot restriction outside foreign embassies to protect security interests, a 100-foot zone around medical facilities to protect patient privacy, and an area “before or about” a home to protect residential privacy. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329 (upholding the 500-foot restriction); Hill, 530 U.S. at 725-30 (upholding the 100-foot restriction); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 476 (upholding “before or about” a residence). Nebraska’s expert in crowd control and management, James Davidsaver, testified based on his practical training and experience that the 500-foot buffer zone should give an adequate safe zone in the event of violence because “closeness kills” in these emotionally charged situations, while also allowing for control of traffic issues—pointing out that 500 feet is “just a city block.” In addition, the NFPL’s 500foot zone does not create permanent speech-free zones because it targets only significant events instead of places and does not create floating speech-free zones moving about the area because it does not include funeral processions. Further, Phelps-Roper presented no convincing evidence that increasing the distance from 300 to 500 feet denied her the opportunity to express her message or that 500 feet was substantially more distance than required. In fact, one WBC member, Stephen Drain, seemed to have no problem with the 500-foot rule stating that 300 versus 500 feet did not make a difference, “[a]s long as I’m not out of sight and sound of my target audience.” Also, given that the NFPL places no limit on the noise level, use of amplification equipment, or size of the picketers’ signs, evidence is lacking that a 500foot buffer is significantly different from a 300-foot buffer for communication of Phelps-Roper’s message. Finally, the NFPL’s manner restriction is narrowly tailored. In City of Manchester, we upheld a manner restriction that limited picketing and “protest -14- activities.” 697 F.3d at 693. Likewise the NFPL applies only to picketing and “protest activities.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1320.02 (stating “[p]icketing of a funeral means protest activities”). Like in City of Manchester, the NFPL does not restrict the manner of speech by limiting noise level, amplification, placard or font size, or number of placards/protesters. The WBC member mentioned on the Omaha street corner in Part I of this opinion demonstrated many forms of protest during the October 2011 picket including (1) loud singing and music protests, (2) large sign protests, (3) colorful clothing protests, and (4) marching or movements protests—none of which are restricted by the NFPL. Thus, the NFPL’s time, place, and manner restrictions are narrowly tailored and do not restrict substantially more speech than necessary to achieve the state’s significant interests. 3. Ample Alternative Channels Exist for Communication of WBC’s Message The NFPL leaves open many alternative channels for communication of WBC’s message. First, during the narrow time and place restrictions delineated above, WBC members are free to lawfully picket and protest throughout the remainder of the city. Thus, in balancing the two competing interests, Nebraska left open large expanses of public property available for WBC’s pickets and protests right up to the 500-foot line. “Speakers retain great latitude to express any viewpoint or discuss any topic at nearly any location and nearly any time” throughout the rest of the city of Omaha, except where funerals are actively occurring. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 695. In addition, the WBC members (as pointed out in City of Manchester) are free to disseminate their message and publicize their views by (1) going door-to-door to proselytize, (2) distributing literature through the mail, (3) contacting residents by telephone, (4) writing letters to the editors of newspapers, and (5) using social media and the internet (WBC runs “eight or nine websites”). Id. Here, Professor Phyllis Larsen, an expert in communications, confirmed that these options are available to Phelps-Roper in Nebraska. -15- For the reasons stated above, we hold that the NFPL is not unconstitutional on its face. B. Phelps-Roper’s As-Applied Challenge to the NFPL “An as-applied challenge consists of a challenge to the statute’s application only as-applied to the party before the court.” Republican Party of Minn., Third Cong. Dist. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). “If an as-applied challenge is successful, the statute may not be applied to the challenger, but is otherwise enforceable.” Id. Here, Phelps-Roper must show that the NFPL is unconstitutional “because of the way it was applied to the particular facts of [her] case.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 n.3. “[She] generally cannot prevail on an as-applied challenge without showing that the law has in fact been . . . unconstitutionally applied to [her]. Specifically, when someone challenges a law as viewpoint discriminatory . . . , [she] must show that [she] was prevented from speaking while someone espousing another viewpoint was permitted to do so.” McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 n.4 (2014). The caveat that “First Amendment issues require a case-by-case analysis of the fact[s]” is especially true with regard to as-applied challenges. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 685 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even though Phelps-Roper seeks review of three Omaha pickets, we look at this as-applied challenge only with regard to the October 2011 picket of Caleb Nelson’s funeral because that is the only event before the court where the amended NFPL was applied in a situation involving the parties before the court—specifically, Shirley Phelps-Roper and the Omaha Police Department. Republican Party of Minn., 381 F.3d at 790 (noting that an “as-applied challenge consists of a challenge to the statute’s application only as-applied to the part[ies] before the court”). It is undisputed that Phelps-Roper sought only prospective relief declaring the NFPL unconstitutional and seeking a permanent injunction against its enforcement in -16- her Third Amended Complaint. “When a law has been amended or repealed, actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief for earlier versions are generally moot unless the problems are capable of repetition yet evad[ing] review.” City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 687 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, a panel of this court remanded this case for “the district court to have the first opportunity to evaluate Phelps-Roper’s facial and as applied challenges to the amended NFPL,” and chose not to consider the earlier versions. Phelps-Roper v. Troutman, 712 F.3d at 416-17. The record does not support a reasonable expectation that Nebraska will reenact the earlier versions of the NFPL, and even if it did, there is no indication that it would evade review at the time that it is reenacted. Further, in City of Manchester, we upheld an ordinance similar to the earlier NFPL with a 300foot buffer zone. 697 F.3d at 683. Therefore, we consider the issues as to the earlier versions moot and only consider the amended NFPL with the 500-foot buffer zone in this as-applied review.
The district court divided its as-applied analysis around three issues presented by Phelps-Roper: (1) Application of the NFPL by the OPD to persons other than Phelps-Roper, (2) Phelps-Roper allegedly being forced by the OPD well beyond the 500-foot radius, and (3) Permitting others to block Phelps-Roper’s message. We will review each of the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal findings de novo for these categories in turn. Outdoor Cent., Inc., 688 F.3d at 941. a. Application of the NFPL to Persons Other than Phelps-Roper To sustain an as-applied challenge based on viewpoint discrimination, PhelpsRoper must establish a “pattern of unlawful favoritism” by showing that she “was prevented from speaking while someone espousing another viewpoint was permitted to do so.” Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002); McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2534 n.4. We agree with the district court’s findings and find no unlawful favoritism here. -17- i. Phelps-Roper Was Permitted to Speak and Express Her Viewpoint Phelps-Roper and other WBC picketers picketed the funeral of Caleb Nelson on October 13, 2011 for about 45 minutes before the funeral. Phelps-Roper was obligated to abide by the NFPL since she was a funeral picketer or protestor. She was also obligated to follow other Nebraska laws. She stood on a street corner where the mourners had to pass to reach the funeral. She held four signs, sang loudly, played loud music, and moved around to draw attention to herself. The OPD helped her group identify a location that was (1) on public property, (2) legally outside the buffer zone, (3) on the main (possibly the only) route to the funeral, (4) near readily accessible parking, and (5) near a quick and easy exit route. After the event, a WBC attorney member sent the Omaha police chief a thank you note from the group mentioning the officers involved by name and commending them for being “dedicated to the proposition that 1st Amendment rights are precious.” We agree that the OPD did not prevent Phelps-Roper from speaking at the October 2011 picket. ii. The OPD Did Not Unlawfully Favor Other Viewpoints Over Phelps-Roper’s Phelps-Roper asserts that the OPD showed unlawful favoritism in applying Nebraska’s laws to others at Caleb Nelson’s funeral. Construing her argument liberally, Phelps-Roper refers to the Patriot Guard Riders, funeral attendees, and mourners—who the OPD did not prohibit from being within 500 feet of the church. But the record shows that Phelps-Roper and other WBC members were the only people at Caleb’s funeral participating in “protest activities”2 under the NFPL, and thus were the only relevant parties subject to the NFPL’s restrictions. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1320.02(2). Indeed, Phelps-Roper and other WBC members are self-described 2 The NFPL defines picketing as “protest activities” within the buffer zone. Protest activities are not defined in the NFPL. “[T]here is no per se requirement that a statute must define these terms.” Phelps-Roper v. Koster, 713 F.3d 942, 952 (8th Cir. 2013). “[I]n the absence of a statutory definition, [p]icketing can include a wide variety of activities . . . .” Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ordinance upheld in Frisby likewise did not define picketing. 487 U.S. at 477. “Courts will interpret statutes to avoid constitutional issues.” Phelps-Roper v. Koster, 713 F.3d at 952. -18- protestors who targeted the “patriotic hoopla” associated with Caleb’s funeral. By contrast, the PGR and other attendees were, as invitees, a part of the funeral itself, and thus they did not engage in “protest activities” within the meaning of the statute. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 168-69 (explaining the social and cultural significance of funerals). Therefore, the OPD had no obligation to move them beyond the 500-foot buffer zone. Moreover, the PGR members were invited by Caleb’s family to attend his funeral, and Phelps-Roper offers no evidence that the PGR would not have accepted the invitation but for WBC’s presence. In short, Phelps-Roper requests that this court create a rule that, because the WBC chooses to protest a funeral, all others already participating in or attending that funeral must likewise be considered “protestors” under the NFPL. We decline Phelps-Roper’s request. For the reasons stated above, we find no clear error with the district court’s finding that “[t]here is no evidence to suggest that the NFPL was applied to PhelpsRoper and not others similarly situated.” b. Phelps-Roper’s Allegation that She Was Forced Well Beyond the NFPL’s 500Foot Radius Phelps-Roper alleges that the OPD unconstitutionally forced her to stand at a location 2000 feet from Caleb Nelson’s funeral in October 2011 that was far beyond the 500-foot restriction required by the NFPL. We disagree. First, the OPD cooperated with Phelps-Roper and other WBC members in trying to help them locate a safe and lawful location that met their goals. The evidence does not indicate that the OPD forced Phelps-Roper to stand at any particular location. Rather than sending an advance scout to pick a location, WBC’s practice is to contact law enforcement in advance to seek assistance with finding a location for their picket. Attorney and WBC member Rebekah Phelps-Davis talked with OPD officers by phone on October 12, 2011—the day before the protest at Caleb Nelson’s funeral. She used Google Maps to help her pick the location of her choice closest to Christ Community Church, the location of Caleb’s funeral. WBC members’ stated goals were for their picket location to be on an open space on public land that gave -19- them visibility to funeral attendees, “at a location where the words [were] going to be seen,” and that has an easy and quick exit route if faced with danger. Phelps-Davis’s handwritten notes from her planning conversations with the OPD indicated that she and Phelps-Roper considered the location “good with us” during their planning. Phelps-Roper produced no written or other evidence that the OPD “required” WBC members to stand in any particular location. Phelps-Davis did not complain to the OPD about the location’s distance from the funeral in her initial telephone call nor later after having time to review it with Phelps-Roper. The location chosen was around 2000 feet from the funeral. On cross-examination during her testimony while looking at a Google Maps exhibit of the area around the funeral site, Phelps-Davis acknowledged that the location was along the only road into the church and failed to offer a better location meeting WBC goals. We disagree that police officers’ cooperating with WBC to help WBC find suitable, lawful locations prior to WBC events by phone or “suggesting” potential locations is the same as requiring WBC to occupy the location. Such a posture would stifle law enforcement’s ability to facilitate WBC’s free speech rights in advance in a way that helps prevent violence at their pickets. Law enforcement can cooperate and suggest locations without requiring WBC to occupy those locations. To rule otherwise would increase the danger associated with these activities. Phelps-Davis even agreed with the statement that her “handwritten notes indicate that the OPD cooperated with you in assisting you in having a protest.” The NFPL was not unconstitutionally applied to Phelps-Roper during the advanced planning stage of the October 2011 picket. Second, once at the funeral location, the OPD did not force Phelps-Roper to stand in the chosen location, and the OPD continued to cooperate with WBC fulfilling its duty to protect WBC members and the public from harm. WBC members testified that they carry devices to their pickets that they can roll on the ground to measure distances, including the 500 feet applicable in the NFPL. Phelps-Roper testified that once on site, she wanted to picket a closer area of a “big open sidewalk where the traffic that flows to the church would pass.” However, she said, “Becky called me back after we had that discussion that this is where we want to be . . . .” (emphasis added). This implies that she walked toward the closer location and attempted to get -20- other WBC members to follow, but WBC picketers were already where they wanted to be. More telling is the fact that police officers were on site at the time, and there is no evidence that any of them interfered with Phelps-Roper’s walk toward the closer site from which she was “called back” or with her attempt to move the group to a closer location. OPD Lieutenant Jay Leavitt, a 16-year veteran, testified that he met PhelpsRoper in a parking lot close to their chosen location and let them know that he would be nearby, showed them where the public right of way was located, and told them that he would protect their van in the parking lot so that nobody bothered it. He testified that neither he nor any other OPD officer told WBC members where they could or could not stand, placed any markings on the pavement delineating where they could or could not stand, or in any other way tried to prevent WBC members from picketing in the location of their choice. Third, the OPD has no affirmative obligation to scout and secure the optimum location for WBC pickets precisely 500 feet from the funeral. Cf. Moss, 134 S. Ct. at 2068 (“No decision of which the Court is aware . . . would alert . . . agents engaged in crowd control that they bear a First Amendment obligation to ensure that groups with different viewpoints are at comparable locations at all times.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We agree with Phelps-Roper’s own testimony stating, “it is not the job of the Omaha Police Department to decide for us where is the best place for us to stand in an effort to reach our target audience.” OPD simply assisted WBC in identifying locations that were lawful by pointing out public rights of way and discussing the locations that might meet WBC’s goals in a way that met OPD’s goals of maintaining public order and safety in the City of Omaha. Phelps-Roper was free to pick the lawful location of her choice. Finally, Phelps-Roper and WBC never notified OPD of any concerns regarding their treatment at the October 2011 picket. In fact, Jonathan Phelps, an attorney, wrote a thank you note on behalf of WBC thanking the OPD and praising Leavitt and another officer by name for their dedication to the First Amendment. -21- Thus, we find no clear error in the district court’s conclusion “that the evidence has not shown that OPD [unconstitutionally] restricted Phelps-Roper’s picketing to areas [well] beyond the 500-foot buffer zone.” c. Permitting Others to Block WBC’s Message Phelps-Roper argues the NFPL was applied to her in an unconstitutional manner because others were allowed by the OPD to block WBC’s messages and cites a recent Sixth Circuit case in support. See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., 805 F.3d 228, 234 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“The scenario presented by this case, known as the ‘heckler’s veto’ occurs when police silence a speaker to appease the crowd and stave off a potentially violent altercation.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2013 (2016). We disagree. There is no evidence that OPD silenced WBC or selectively allowed the crowd to act in an unlawful manner at WBC’s October 2011 picket. The decedent’s family and other private parties are under no obligation to listen to WBC’s message and can take whatever lawful means they wish to avoid hearing or seeing Phelps-Roper. The First Amendment guarantees free speech, not forced listeners. “The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.” Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (emphasis added). Mourners are “captive to their overwhelming human need to memorialize and grieve for their dead,” and “[i]t is unreasonable to expect a family or friend of the deceased to reschedule or forgo attending the funeral so as to avoid offensive picketing.” City of Manchester, 697 F.3d at 693. Having no other alternatives, mourners (and other Americans) are free under the Constitution to “avert their eyes,” wear headphones, hire body guards (or instruct invitees) to block their view, pull shades, and otherwise use lawful measures to avoid exposure to Phelps-Roper’s unwanted message—while exercising their right to pursue a peaceful, private, and tranquil funeral service to honor their loved one. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (noting that the viewer can “avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities -22- simply by averting [his] eyes.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The OPD is not obligated to try to force others to listen to WBC’s message—its obligation is to protect WBC’s right to the opportunity to reach willing listeners. In Bible Believers, the Sixth Circuit noted “the officers have a duty to protect speakers . . . from the reactions of hostile audiences.” 805 F.3d at 236-37. “‘A police officer has the duty not to ratify and effectuate a heckler’s veto nor may he join a moiling mob intent on suppressing ideas. Instead, he must take reasonable action to protect from violence persons exercising their constitutional rights.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 906 (6th Cir.1975)). “If the officers allow a hostile audience to silence a speaker, the officers themselves effectively silence the speaker and effectuate a ‘heckler’s veto.’” Id. at 237. The job of law enforcement is complicated by the fact that the crowd has the same First Amendment rights as WBC, which law enforcement also has a duty to protect. So, WBC is not entitled to its own bubble-ensconced pedestal surrounded by chalk lines or yellow tape any more than those opposed to WBC messages are entitled to a heckler’s veto. Law enforcement has a duty to enforce the laws equally without regard to the viewpoints expressed. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the funeral attendees were engaged in speech inciting “imminent lawless action.” Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. In fact, Phelps-Roper admitted that there was no violence at the October 2011 picket. Likewise, Phelps-Roper presents no evidence that the OPD protected, facilitated, or ignored any other lawless action by the other speakers with differing viewpoints from WBC’s. Instead, Officer Leavitt stayed nearby and guarded her group’s van while keeping an eye on the protest. Afterwards, her group sent a thank you letter commending Leavitt and the OPD. Thus, this case is easily distinguishable from Bible Believers. Therefore, we find no clear error in the district court’s determination that the OPD did not unconstitutionally disfavor Phelps-Roper’s viewpoint or allow others to -23- unlawfully block WBC’s picket by preferentially allowing them to break Nebraska laws.