Opinion ID: 1765903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lucas Appeal

Text: This appeal presents the following two issues for our review: 1) whether Lucas's $46,200 settlement award satisfies the $15,000 judgment rendered against John Crane and 2) whether Lucas's action was time barred. For the reasons set out below, we resolve both issues in favor of Lucas and affirm the judgment.
On June 28, 1979, Lucas discovered that he was afflicted with asbestosis. Lucas had a one-year period after the date of this discovery within which to commence a civil action for damages. Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d 263 (Ala.1981). Before the one-year limitations period expired, on June 26, 1980, he filed suit in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, alleging that his injuries were proximately caused by exposure to asbestos. The complaint stated a cause of action against several named defendants who manufactured asbestos products and 50 fictitious defendants. In the complaint, Lucas alleged that he was ignorant of the identities of the fictitious parties. On May 21, 1981, after the one-year limitations period expired, Lucas amended the complaint, substituting John Crane for one of the fictitious parties. The question before us is whether under Rules 9(h) and 15(c), Ala.R.Civ.P., the substitution of John Crane relates back to the time of the filing of the complaint and thereby precludes the one-year limitations period from barring Lucas's cause of action against John Crane. Because this issue implicates a fact question, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Lucas failed to make a timely substitution under Rule 9(h). An amendment substituting a real defendant for a fictitious one relates back to the date of the original complaint if the plaintiff stated a cause of action against the fictitious party in the body of the original complaint and if the plaintiff was ignorant of the identity of the fictitious party at the time of the filing. A plaintiff is ignorant of the identity of the fictitious party when at the time of the filing he lacks knowledge of facts indicating to him that the substituted party was in fact the party intended to be sued. Dannelley v. Guarino, 472 So.2d 983 (Ala.1985); Alexander v. Scott, 529 So.2d 951 (Ala.1988). The dispositive issue in the instant case concerns a disputed fact questionnamely, Lucas's ignorance of the identity of the fictitious party at the time of the filing of the complaint. John Crane interposed the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations in its answer and in its motions for directed verdict and J.N.O.V. As a part of its trial strategy, John Crane argued that, as a matter of law, the statute of limitations had run, and, accordingly, chose not to request that this issue be submitted to the jury. The import of John Crane's contention is that, due to Lucas's alleged non-compliance with Rule 9(h), the trial court should have adjudged his claim to be time-barred as a matter of law. In support of this contention, John Crane produced some evidence indicating that Lucas, at the time he filed the complaint, had knowledge of facts upon which to assert a cause of action against it. This evidence, however, was contradicted by Lucas's testimony at trial that he did not become aware of John Crane's use of asbestos until two months before trial: Q. Do you know whether or not Crane packing material contained asbestos? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q. Okay. When did you find out that Crane packing material contained asbestos? A. About two months ago. Q. How did you find out? A. I read a tag that said it has asbestos in it. Q. Did anybody show you that tag, or did you stumble on it by yourself? A. Robert Hendricks showed me the tag and I read it. It has asbestos fibers in it. . . . . Q. Up until two months ago when you and Mr. Hendricks saw that box of Crane packing, did you know that it contained asbestos? A. I didn't know it up until then. Because this conflicting evidence presents a fact question, we cannot decide, as a matter of law, that Lucas failed to comply with Rule 9(h).
John Crane further argues that the $46,200 Lucas received from joint tort-feasors pursuant to a pro tanto settlement satisfies the $15,000 judgment rendered against it. The prevailing rule is that, under the single recovery concept, the amount of damages received by way of settlement from one or more joint tort-feasors is credited against the subsequent recovery from one or more remaining joint tort-feasors. `It is well settled that a person injured by joint tort-feasors may release one or more pro tanto and proceed against the others. The tort-feasors may plead the release as a bar to that amount paid by the released tort-feasor or may place it in evidence showing payment for the injury up to the amount shown in the release. Anderson v. Kemp, 279 Ala. 321, 184 So.2d 832 (1966). In lieu of allowing defendant to place the pro tanto settlements into evidence, the trial court properly informed the jury of the total amount of the settlements and instructed them to subtract that figure, $145,000, from the full amount of damages, if any, sustained by plaintiff.' Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Ala.1988) (quoting Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Von Haden, 416 So.2d 699 (Ala.1982). As the following jury instruction reveals, the trial court properly adhered to the rule of law articulated in Bucyrus-Erie: You have heard evidence of a release by the plaintiffs of certain other defendants. The law says that the way we handle that is this: You takeif you find for the plaintiffs, you determine the total amount of damages which they would be entitled to recover under the principles of law that I have given to you and then from that sum you would deduct the damages which they have already received. And in the case of the plaintiff, Mr. Lucas, the sum that he has received is forty-six thousand two hundred dollars. And in the case of Mr. Stanley, he has received the sum of one hundred forty-one thousand five hundred dollars. Later, the trial court gave the following explanatory instruction, which also conforms to the Bucyrus-Erie rule: I told you that if youwith respect to the pro tanto release by the plaintiffs, that you consider the total amount of damages which under the guidelines that I gave you if the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, you consider the total amount of damages and from that you would subtract the amount of settlement, even if the amount was zero. In other words, if you find that that was the extent of the damages, you would say: We, the jury find for the plaintiff and assess his damages at zero and just sign it if that be your verdict. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Lucas, assessing his damages at $15,000. The record does not contain any evidence indicating that the jury's verdict was illegal; therefore, we must assume that the jury complied with the trial court's instructions.