Opinion ID: 1965862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Is there a Rational Basis?

Text: It is well settled that under the equal protection clause, legislative classifications that do not affect a fundamental right or a suspect class such as race, alienage, or national origin, are examined under a minimal-scrutiny analysis. Under minimal scrutiny, the Legislature has a wide scope of discretion to enact laws, which will be upheld so long as they bear a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, or welfare. Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 11. Riley argues that even if we hold that he has no fundamental right to the license he desires, we nonetheless should declare the statute constitutionally infirm. He points out, among other things, that there are various interstate compacts that regulate the poundage of each species of sea creature that can be harvested, and that those regulations are sufficient to preserve the resources for the benefit of all the people of the state, in accordance with the mandate of article 1, section 17 of the Rhode Island Constitution. Regulating the fisheries is an immense and complex process. The General Assembly is tasked with a difficult burden as it endeavors (even with the collaboration of numerous parties) to regulate an environment constantly in flux. Viewed through this prism, we must determine whether the means of restricting commercial licenses, undertaken by the General Assembly and DEM, are rationally based to achieve a legitimate goal. [12] It is significant that the General Assembly has given DEM the authority to issue new licenses on a yearly basis, taking into account the stocks and environmental conditions, and the number of licenses granted or surrendered in a given year. For example, in 2005, thirteen new licenses in restrictive finfish, and also some quahogging licenses, were issued. Riley did not receive one of these licenses because priority went to others, according to regulation, and there were more applicants than available licenses. It is beyond peradventure that the right of fishery is a public right, and the General Assembly has a constitutional duty to enact legislation necessary to preserve fisheries for the good of the whole. In these circumstances we are unable to perceive that the rights of any person have been infringed. On the contrary, it seems to us that the greatest good of the greatest number will be advanced by the legislation complained of. Kofines, 33 R.I. at 241, 80 A. at 444. Although there are boundaries to such legislation, we see nothing discriminatory or invidious in limiting the number of licenses in relation to the condition of the species itself, and then allocating those limited licenses on the basis of who was there first. There is no class of citizens that is being discriminated against, and Riley does not argue that he is a member of a `discrete and insular minority' entitling him to such a classification. Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 11 (quoting Trembley v. City of Central Falls, 480 A.2d 1359, 1366 (R.I. 1984)). Riley is not eligible for the license he seeks, and although he may believe that all those ineligible for this license constitute a class, those who fall into this purported class exist only as a consequence of their ineligibility and not because of any particular trait they share. The complex scheme of varying access to restricted species on a yearly basis is a far cry from the sweeping prohibition aimed at just one `class of citizens' that the justices opined would be unlawful in Opinion to the Senate.  Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 825. As noted above, we are mindful that the statute already carries a presumption of constitutionality and it is Rileys burden to show that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore [i]f under any reasonable state of known or assumed facts, the challenged provision can be said to protect the public health, safety, or welfare, then the statute must be upheld. Baffoni, 118 R.I. at 233, 373 A.2d at 188 (quoting State ex. rel . Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 31, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (1968)). The legislative power is plenary, and as long as its chosen method bears a rational relationship to the legitimate end to be achieved, neither municipalities nor individuals may challenge the legislative choice solely on the ground that they could devise a better or more accurate method. Newport Court Club Associates v. Town Council of Middletown, 800 A.2d 405, 415 (R.I.2002) (citing Town of Lincoln v. City of Pawtucket, 745 A.2d 139, 144 (R.I.2000)). Section 20-2.1-2 outlines the purposes of the licensing scheme to include: (1) Preserve, enhance, and allow for any necessary regeneration of the fisheries of the state, for the benefit of the people of the state, as an ecological asset and as a source of food and recreation; (2) Provide Rhode Islanders who wish to fish commercially the opportunity to do so and end the moratorium on issuance of new commercial fishing licenses so that new licenses may be issued for, the year beginning January 1, 2003, and each year thereafter; (3) Allow residents who have fished commercially to sell their vessels and gear in a manner that first, facilitates up-grading license levels among residents already in the fishery; that second, provides lateral movement among residents who are holders of commercial fishing licenses to other types of fishing; and that third, enables new entrants into new commercial fishing; (4) Respect the interests of residents who fish under licenses issued by the state and wish to continue to fish commercially in a manner that is economically viable: provided, it is specifically not a purpose of this chapter to establish licensing procedures that eliminate the ability to fish commercially of any resident as of the date of enactment who validly holds [a] [ sic ] commercial fishing license and who meets the application renewal requirements set forth herein;    (6) Establish principles, for a system of adaptive management,   ; (7) Provide, a licensure system that facilitates data collection and management so that marine fisheries can be managed more efficiently and effectively. In our opinion, these goals of conservation and concern for the viability of the fishing industry are legitimate. They also are part of the General Assembly's constitutional duty as the guardian of Rhode Islands natural resources. Riley argues that by considering the effects on the present industry and the economic viability of fishermen who already possess licenses, the General Assembly has overstepped its bounds. We disagree. The Assembly has proper concern for the economic viability of the industry as a whole, and in particular, for those individuals who have the most at stake within it. In Kofines, we said, Without protection from the rapacity of man, lobsters must become scarcer, and consequently dearer. This has been the costly experience of all countries where the experiment has been tried. The natural tendency to kill the goose that lays the golden egg is always exhibited when the opportunity is afforded.    [M]an should be saved from the consequences of his own selfishness, thoughtlessness, and wastefulness in the matter of fisheries. And for this purpose an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Kofines, 33 R.I. at 225-26, 80 A. at 438. The General Assembly regulates fisheries in trust for the public, and it is precisely because the rapacity of man remains a legitimate concern to the economic viability of this important industry that there is a need for conservation and preservation for future generations. Furthermore, limiting access to different species via limited licensing is related directly to the goals of maintaining the viability of those stocks and the fishing trade that depends upon them. This not only benefits the trade, but also it is for the well-being of all the people of the state. It is certainly natural that the most desirable species face the greatest threat from overfishing and depletion. Therefore, we hold that the objectives of this scheme are legitimate and in accordance with the. General Assembly's constitutional duty of pre serving marine fisheries, and that limiting the entry of new licenses is a rational way to achieve those goals. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court and return the papers in this case thereto.