Opinion ID: 501759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of Showing of Distinctive Group

Text: 56 Trial by a jury of one's peers contemplates that an impartial jury will be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220, 66 S.Ct. 984, 985, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946). The sixth amendment does not guarantee a randomly selected jury, United States v. Wellington, 754 F.2d 1457, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Utz v. United States, 474 U.S. 1032, 106 S.Ct. 592, 593, 88 L.Ed.2d 573 (1985), nor does it require that the jury contain representatives from every group in the community. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220, 66 S.Ct. at 985. A fair cross-section challenge to the constitutionality of the jury venire requires a showing: 57 (1) That the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; 58 (2) That the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 59 (3) That this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 60 United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir.1985) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. 357 at 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579). 61 Coleman contends that as a result of the jury selection process, persons from the lower socioeconomic areas of Billings were excluded from his panel of prospective jurors. He has not alleged any facts, however, from which it could be concluded that persons from the lower socioeconomic areas of Billings, Montana formed a distinctive group in the community, or that if such a group existed it consisted of a sufficient number of persons so that its systematic exclusion from jury panels would support a fair cross-section challenge under the sixth amendment. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531, 95 S.Ct. 692, 698, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). See United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.1977) (passim ); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904-05 (9th Cir.1977). Having failed to demonstrate the existence of a distinctive group, Coleman's claims that such a group was underrepresented in jury venires or was systematically excluded in the jury selection process also fail.