Opinion ID: 683512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fees and expenses

Text: 18 In the alternative, Kaufman argues that he should be able to recover for his time spent on the case under the provision of the EAJA that provides for the recovery of fees and expenses, including expert witness fees and the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case ... 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2412(d)(2)(A). 19 His claim is made under two theories: first, that he had functioned as his own expert and was entitled to an expert witness fee; second, that he performed studies and analyses necessary to the preparation of his case and was entitled to recover the reasonable cost thereof. As to his claim for an expert fee, 4 we agree with the SEC that he never applied to the district court for recompense as an expert witness. As he did not preserve this contention in the proceeding below, he may not argue it on appeal. 20 Kaufman did, however, seek compensation for the value of his time spent in the study and analysis of matters in preparation for the litigation, making specific reference to the EAJA's paragraph (d)(2)(A) which defines fees and expenses to include the reasonable cost of any study, analysis.... test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(2)(A). 5 His application related to time spent studying depositions and exhibits. Although the study and analysis of documentary evidence and testimony is often done by attorneys, it is not a task legally reserved to attorneys. One need not be an attorney to study evidence in preparation for litigation; indeed, attorneys often hire non-attorneys to perform such tasks. Accordingly, compensation is not barred by the Kay holding. 21 The district court denied compensation without discussing this provision of the EAJA, and did not decide whether any portion of Kaufman's work was necessary for the preparation of [his] case. With respect to this aspect of his claim, my colleagues constituting a majority of this panel are of the view that Kaufman is precluded from such recovery because, as the result of his work on this case, he suffered neither loss of income nor consequential expenses (in the nature of hiring others to replace him in other activities). Though not doubting that a pro se litigant might suffer non-monetary burdens in successfully opposing the Government, they construe the reasonable cost of any necessary study or analysis to be limited to monetary cost. That is our holding on this issue. 22 From this holding, I respectfully dissent. In my view, the fact that a litigant suffered no loss of income or consequential expenses, although a factor, should not be a legal bar to an award under the EAJA of the reasonable non-monetary cost of necessary studies and analyses, given the purpose of the Act. 23 The purposes of the EAJA differ substantially from other fee-shifting statutes like Sec. 1988. The latter is designed primarily to enable poor victims of abuse by state governments to bring actions seeking redress. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 436 n. 8, 111 S.Ct. at 1437 n. 8 (Congress focused on the need of average citizens to be able to afford lawyers so that they could protect their rights in court); Ortiz v. Regan, 980 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir.1992) (Sec. 1988 was designed to allow private individuals a meaningful opportunity to vindicate civil rights violations). The provisions of the EAJA, despite its somewhat misleading name, are designed to compensate victims of unjustified litigation by the Government from some of the burdensome expenses and costs to which they were subjected by the Government's taking of unreasonable positions. Awards under the EAJA are not made in favor of a plaintiff who merely prevails in some aspect of the litigation, as is the case under Sec. 1988. To win an award under the EAJA, the litigant opposing the United States must not only prevail, but must show in addition that the position of the United States in the litigation was not substantially justified. The Act essentially recognizes that abusive litigation tactics by the United States government, whether the Government appears in the role of plaintiff or defendant, can inflict great unjustifiable cost and expense. It is designed to furnish relief from such governmental litigation abuse. 24 The abused litigant, regardless whether represented by counsel, may be required to devote weeks, months, perhaps years, to studies and analyses that a court would find were necessary to that party's preparation for litigation. Such substantial expenditures of time can have a significant cost, regardless whether the party suffers expenditures or loss of income. Consider, as examples, a salaried university professor or research scientist who loses the opportunity to conduct important research or to produce significant academic writings, a top amateur athlete whose skill is destroyed by inability to maintain training, a parent forced to forego devoting any substantial time to parenthood, a retiree whose retirement is consumed by projects necessary to conduct his or her defense. In each of these cases, the performance of the necessary preparatory work to defend against the Government's unjustified litigation imposes a substantial cost, albeit not in money. It is not so clear to me that Congress intended to withhold compensation for costs of this nature, inflicted by abusive Government litigation tactics. 25 The interpretation I advocate would not subject the public treasury to heavy burdens. First, because no award may be made unless the Government has litigated abusively, without even a substantial justification, this award will be made in rare cases; second, no award may be given for the time cost of studies and analyses unless the district court finds them to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case; third, the award is limited to reasonable costs. 26 In my opinion, there should be a remand to the district court to determine whether any of Kaufman's preparatory work was necessary to the conduct of his defense and, if so, to allow him the reasonable cost thereof. The fact that, according to the district court's findings, he neither lost income nor incurred consequential expenses, would surely be pertinent in determining what was the reasonable cost he incurred. The majority, however, rules that it is preclusive. I respectfully note my disagreement. 27