Opinion ID: 796898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction with respect to the infliction-of-emotional-distress claims

Text: 47 Chesher asserts that her claims must have arisen prior to April 9, 2003 because the latest amended complaint in this action was filed in 2002. She therefore argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over the present interlocutory appeals. Causes of action for emotional distress, however, accrue not when the underlying activity occurs, but rather when the plaintiff suffers emotionally by learning of it. See, e.g., Biro v. Hartman Funeral Home, 107 Ohio App.3d 508, 669 N.E.2d 65, 68 (1995) (holding that an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues at the time the injury is incurred and the emotional impact is felt). Class plaintiffs in this case include not only those families whose deceased relatives were photographed by Condon (Subclass One), but also all families whose relatives were housed in the Morgue during the time the offending photographs were taken and whose bodies thus may have been accessed, viewed, or manipulated by Condon (Subclass Two). According to their deposition testimony, many, if not all of the members of Subclass Two did not discover their injury until contacted by Chesher's counsel in 2004. 48 Chesher argues that, although the claims of some class members did not accrue until after April 9, 2003, the class representatives' claims accrued before that date. To hold that the claims accrued after that date, Chesher contends, would let the tail wag the dog. But the defendants point out that even the chosen representatives of Subclass Two did not learn of their claims until after the effective date, and that the vast majority of that class is similarly situated. This would mean that we have jurisdiction over the majority of the class's claims. 49 Our sister circuits have recognized the problems inherent in ascertaining when claims accrue on a class-wide basis. See, e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir.2006) (upholding the denial of class certification where a statute-of-limitations defense required an individualized examination of each plaintiff's knowledge to determine when their claims accrued). The present case, however, does not involve a statute-of-limitations defense as in Thorn. Because we have interlocutory jurisdiction over the majority of the class's emotional-distress claims and because all plaintiffs are similarly situated for purposes of resolving the immunity issues presented, we can properly take up the question presented. Cf. Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d 216, 224 (6th Cir. 2004) (addressing, in the context of an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal, related but unappealable issues that were inextricably intertwined with the appealable issues). 50