Opinion ID: 885518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Family Law Exception

Text: ¶ 24 As Johnson correctly points out, however, although the judgment and orders resulting from contempt cases are by statute reviewable only pursuant to a writ of certiorari, this Court has judicially created an exception in family law cases. By no means is creating such an exception without precedence. In the past, we have reviewed contempt cases subsequent to this Court granting writs of habeas corpus, and writs of supervisory control. See Gillispie v. Sherlock (1996), 279 Mont. 21, 23, 929 P.2d 199, 200 (stating that contempt proceeding may be reviewed under a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the person seeking review is incarcerated at the time petition is filed); State ex rel. Anderson v. District Court (1980), 188 Mont. 77, 79, 610 P.2d 1183, 1185 (concluding that pursuant to this Court's general supervisory powers over all other courts under Article VII, Section 2, of the Montana Constitution, a writ of supervisory control may be granted in contempt cases when the party is barred from using a writ of certiorari). ¶ 25 The family law exception that Lee encourages us to reject in this instance was approved by this Court as recently as 1998. See In re Marriage of Baer, 1998 MT 29, ¶ 42, 287 Mont. 322, ¶ 42, 954 P.2d 1125, ¶ 42. We have expressly extended this family law exception to dissolution of marriage proceedings. See In re Marriage of Sessions (1988), 231 Mont. 437, 441, 753 P.2d 1306, 1308. Contrary to Lee's argument, this exception has never been narrowly drawn to cases exclusively involving child custody, visitation, or maintenance where it would be easier to handle all the issues in an appeal rather than through a writ of review for contempt. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith (1984), 212 Mont. 223, 226, 686 P.2d 912, 914 (addressing contempt for nonpayment of marital debt). ¶ 26 The family law exception to the writ of certiorari mandate of § 3-1-523, MCA, is, however, of recent vintage. For example, in a 1928 divorce case, Hanson v. Hanson, the plaintiff husband was cited for contempt for failing to comply with the terms of a divorce decree. The court found him not guilty, and dismissed the contempt. On his wife's direct appeal, this Court stated that in the face of section 9921, R.C.1921, which provides in part that `the judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive, and there is no appeal' nothing remains for us to do but to dismiss the attempted appeal and it is so ordered. Hanson v. Hanson (1928), 83 Mont. 428, 429, 272 P. 543 (per curiam). ¶ 27 Thirty years later, in Application of Nelson, a dissenting Justice noted that although there is a right of appeal from the court's order of October 9, 1957, modifying the [divorce] decree, yet, by virtue of the express provisions of R.C.M.1947, Sec. 93-9814, `there is no appeal' from the court's subsequent order adjudging the petitioner Nelson guilty of contempt and sentencing him to imprisonment therefor. Application of Nelson (1957), 132 Mont. 252, 257, 316 P.2d 1058, 1060-61 (Adair, J. dissenting) (addressing writ of habeas corpus). ¶ 28 The foregoing code provisions, § 93-9814, RCM (1947), and its precursor, § 9921, Rev.C. (1921 & 1935), would in 1979 be codified verbatim under § 3-1-523, MCA. ¶ 29 Initially, this Court's interpretation of § 3-1-523, MCA, followed the same historical course. For example, in a terse 1979 decision, O'Neill v. O'Neill , we dismissed an appeal where no writ of certiorari had been granted, and stated that the district court's inherent contempt power must be exercised... with the knowledge that it will not be upset on appeal .... [t]his is necessary to preserve the dignity and authority of the court. O'Neill v. O'Neill (1979), 184 Mont. 415, 417, 603 P.2d 257, 258 (dismissing husband's appeal of contempt order for failure to pay child support). Then, in a 1982 decision brought by a father seeking to modify his parental visitation rights, this Court again followed the statutory rule, that the proper avenue to use to gain review of a contempt order, by this Court, is a writ of certiorari. Milanovich v. Milanovich (1982), 200 Mont. 83, 87, 655 P.2d 959, 961 (dismissing appeal). This Court, in fact, reviewed the very same claim once the father properly petitioned and was granted a writ of certiorari. See Milanovich v. Milanovich (1982), 201 Mont. 332, 655 P.2d 963. In this latter decision, we explained the underlying public policy, that the best remedy to insure respect for the law and the orderly progress of relations between family members split by dissolution is to give effect to the contempt powers of the District Court. Milanovich, 201 Mont. at 336, 655 P.2d at 965. Three years later, in a child custody modification case, we again followed earlier precedent and the express language of § 3-1-523, MCA, in dismissing a father's direct appeal of a district court's contempt order. See In re Marriage of Robbins (1985) 219 Mont. 130, 136, 711 P.2d 1347, 1350. ¶ 30 Three years later, however, this Court concluded that the writ of certiorari requirement could, indeed, be suspended in dissolution of marriage proceedings, and a court's contempt order could be challenged on direct appeal. Sessions, 231 Mont. at 441, 753 P.2d at 1308 (affirming district court's contempt order). We stated that [a]lthough contempt of court orders by the District Court are final and usually unreviewable by this Court in any manner except by writ of certiorari, § 3-1-523, MCA, an exception is made in dissolution of marriage proceedings. For this proposition we cited to an earlier decision, In re Marriage of Smith (1984), 212 Mont. 223, 686 P.2d 912. In Smith, the party appealed a district court's order which had denied her petition to hold her former husband in contempt for nonpayment of marital debt an order we ultimately affirmed. We offered no clue as to why this exception rather suddenly should be adopted into Montana jurisprudence. We merely stated that [w]e permit an exception to this rule, however, in dissolution of marriage proceedings and we consider the subject by way of appeal. Smith, 212 Mont. at 225-26, 686 P.2d at 914. Curiously, the same justice who established this exception in Smith in 1984 also penned the 1985 Robbins decision which followed earlier precedent and the writ of certiorari mandate of § 3-1-523, MCA. ¶ 31 Remarkably, seven months after this Court decided Sessions in 1988, we offered the following rule analysis in yet another family law case: William raises a threshold question in his brief. He argues that Jan is attempting to appeal a contempt order, which is not allowed. Section 3-1-523, MCA, states contempt orders are final and conclusive, and may not be appealed. Review may be had only on a writ of certiorari by this Court. We have held this statute applicable in dissolution cases. In re Marriage of Harper (1988), 235 Mont. 41, 44, 764 P.2d 1283, 1285 (concluding that although husband moved for contempt, district court issued no contempt order; thus, order modifying custody was appealable by wife). By 1988, two distinct lines of authority existed: one following the clear mandate of the statute and well-grounded in Montana case law; the other carving out an exception with no indication of authority or public policy that may have factored into its adoption. ¶ 32 Five years later, this Court turned in favor of the precedent established in Sessions and Smith, which has been the uncontested authority ever since. We stated: Pursuant to § 3-1-523, MCA, contempt of court orders issued by a district court are final and usually unreviewable by this Court except by way of a writ of certiorari or review. However, an exception exists for contempt of court orders made in dissolution of marriage proceedings. In re Marriage of Sessions (1988), 231 Mont. 437, 441, 753 P.2d 1306, 1308; citing In re Marriage of Smith (1984), 212 Mont. 223, 225-26, 686 P.2d 912, 914. Therefore, the contempt of court order in this case is properly before the Court for review. In re Marriage of Boharski (1993), 257 Mont. 71, 77, 847 P.2d 709, 713. See also In re Marriage of Sullivan (1993), 258 Mont. 531, 539-40, 853 P.2d 1194, 1200 (citing In re Marriage of Sessions ); In re Marriage of Prescott (1993), 259 Mont. 293, 296-97, 856 P.2d 229, 231 (citing In re Marriage of Boharski ); In re Pedersen (1993), 261 Mont. 284, 289, 862 P.2d 411, 414 (citing In re Marriage of Prescott ); Woolf v. Evans (1994), 264 Mont. 480, 483, 872 P.2d 777, 779 (citing In re Pedersen ); In re Marriage of Dreesbach (1994), 265 Mont. 216, 223-24, 875 P.2d 1018, 1022-23 (citing In re Marriage of Boharski ); Heath v. Heath (1995), 272 Mont. 522, 527, 901 P.2d 590, 593 (citing Woolf v. Evans ); In re Marriage of Nevin (1997), 284 Mont. 468, 471, 945 P.2d 58, 60 (citing Heath ); In re Marriage of Baer, 1998 MT 29, ¶ 42, 287 Mont. 322, ¶ 42, 954 P.2d 1125, ¶ 42 (citing Dreesbach and Boharski ).