Opinion ID: 179524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eye-witness Identification

Text: Winfrey argues that the district court erred in admitting: (1) Rivers’s showup identification because it was the product of unduly suggestive procedures; and (2) Rivers’s in-court identification because it was tainted by the show-up identification. We use a two-part test to determine whether an out-of-court identification was properly admitted. United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1102 (11th Cir. 2001). First, we consider whether the original identification procedure was unduly suggestive. If we conclude that it was, we then consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “the identification was nonetheless reliable.” Id. At the second step, we consider several factors to determine the identification’s reliability, including: (1) the opportunity the witness had to view the suspect at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime 5 and the confrontation. Id.; see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S. Ct. 375, 382 (1972). While show ups, i.e., “showing suspects singly to persons for the purposes of identification,” are considered inherently suggestive, see Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1972 (1967), “admission of evidence of a showup without more does not violate due process.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (1977). This is because “immediate confrontations allow identification before the suspect has altered his appearance and while the witness’ memory is fresh, and permit the quick release of innocent persons.” Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, show ups are unnecessarily suggestive only when “police aggravate the suggestiveness of the confrontation.” Id. An in-court identification based on an independent source may be admissible despite a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure. See Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988). In determining whether Rivers’s in-court identification had a reliable, independent basis, we consider the same factors that we consider when determining whether an out-of-court identification is reliable. Id. Here, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the district court’s admission 6 of Rivers’s out-of-court and in-court identifications of Winfrey.1 The show-up procedure used in this case was not unduly suggestive. After Officer Cunningham drove Rivers to the location where they had recovered his car, he asked Rivers to identify anyone that may have been involved in the carjacking. While Rivers remained in Officer Cunningham’s patrol car, officers escorted Winfrey out of another patrol car so Rivers could see him. At that point, Rivers identified Winfrey as the gunman. Rivers testified that he was “a hundred percent sure” Winfrey was the gunman when he saw Winfrey. There is no evidence in the record that the officers did anything to aggravate the suggestiveness of this encounter. Moreover, Rivers’s identifications of Winfrey were highly reliable. Rivers had ample opportunity to view Winfrey at the gas station. Rivers testified that he first noticed Winfrey standing across the street while Rivers was pumping gas and 1 Although Winfrey filed a motion to suppress Rivers’s identifications, he did not object to their admission during the trial. Thus, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 966 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A defendant must object at trial to preserve an objection on appeal; the overruling of a motion in limine does not suffice.”); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To prevail under the plain error standard, Winfrey must show that the district court committed error that was plain and that affected substantial rights. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). We may then correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the government, as the prevailing party. United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 2007). We are not limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, but may consider the entire record, including trial testimony. Id. at 1224. 7 then stood face-to-face with Winfrey and spoke with him during the robbery. Rivers was attentive during the crime and recalled specific details of the carjacking, such as the kind of handgun Winfrey used (a small Derringer with two barrels side by side and about four inches in length), Winfrey’s demeanor and statements he made during the carjacking and the direction in which Winfrey drove away afterward. Only about twenty minutes elapsed between the carjacking and River’s identification of Winfrey, so River’s recollection was fresh. And, at the show up and later in court, Rivers was absolutely certain Winfrey was the gunman who stole his car. Rivers’s general description of the two carjackers as two black males was consistent with what officers found when they located Rivers’s Monte Carlo. Under the circumstances, Rivers’s lack of detail does not suggest unreliability. Because the police located Rivers’s car at the same time that Officer Cunningham arrived at the gas station, Rivers had little opportunity to give a detailed description of the carjackers before Officer Cunningham escorted him to the scene. Winfrey did not show that Rivers’s out-of-court identification was impermissibly suggestive or unreliable or that it tainted River’s in-court identification. Therefore, the admission of this testimony did not violate 8 Winfrey’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.