Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: procedural motions

Text: 64 Abouhalima argues that the district court deprived him of a constitutionally fair trial by denying his pretrial motion for a severance. Specifically, Abouhalima first claims that absent severance, he was harmed by the admission and the subsequent spillover effect of holy war literature and video tapes that were seized from Ajaj at Kennedy Airport in September 1992. These materials included (1) a videotape of the bombing of the American Embassy, which contained instructions regarding how to make explosives and timing devices and how to construct a bomb; (2) Ajaj's manuals, detailing how to prepare explosives, including urea nitrate, and improvised weapons; (3) a videotape containing a chemistry lesson on manufacturing explosives; (4) additional manuals on catalysts, detonators and other bomb ingredients; (5) a document entitled Facing the enemies of God--[T]errorism is a[R]eligious [D]uty and [F]orce is [N]ecessary, which urged acts of terrorism against the enemies of Islam; and (6) a book entitled Rapid Destruction and Demolition, which described the destruction of buildings and contained a formula for using explosives to accomplish this end. Copies of publications (5) and (6) above were recovered from Abouhalima's residence and admitted into evidence. Although identical, Abouhalima does not dispute the admissibility of these items, but only those items seized from Ajaj. 65 Next, Abouhalima argues that through the joinder, he was prejudiced by Salameh's closing argument, where Salameh purportedly asserted a defense antagonistic to his own. In this regard, as part of his defense, Abouhalima refused to concede either that a bomb had caused the World Trade Center explosion, or that he had any association with Yousef. Salameh, on the other hand, conceded not only the existence of a bomb, but argued that he was an unwitting dupe of Yousef, who had masterminded the bombing. Because the government had characterized Yousef as Abouhalima's close associate, Abouhalima avers that Salameh's summation undermined his defense of not knowingly participating in the conspiracy. 66 We find no basis for reversal. There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1029 (2d Cir.1996). This preference is particularly strong where, as here, the defendants are alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b); United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 482 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Turoff, 853 F.2d 1037, 1042 (2d Cir.1988). It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system to require ... that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). 67 Whether to grant or deny a severance motion is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir.1989); see United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 230 (2d Cir.1990). The district court's exercise of that discretion is virtually unreviewable. United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1306 (2d Cir.1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 68 Accordingly, a district court's denial of a severance motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 will be reversed only if a defendant can 'show prejudice so severe that his conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice, and that the denial of his motion constituted an abuse of discretion.'  Hernandez, 85 F.3d at 1029 (quoting United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 341 (2d Cir.1993)). To satisfy this extremely difficult burden, of showing an abuse of discretion, an appellant must demonstrate that the denial of the motion caused substantial prejudice, Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1149-50 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), that is, prejudice so great as to deny him a fair trial, Cardascia, 951 F.2d at 482. If the denial of the motion causes some prejudice, but less than substantial prejudice, we are not apt to reverse, since, by and large, joinder promotes judicial efficiency. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1150.
69 The admission of Ajaj's holy war materials did not result in prejudicial spillover as to Abouhalima. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying severance. A defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence at a joint conspiracy trial is insupportable when the evidence would have been admissible against him in a separate trial alone as a member of the conspiracy. See Rosa, 11 F.3d at 341 (such evidence is neither spillover nor prejudicial); United States v. Cunningham, 723 F.2d 217, 230 (2d Cir.1983). Prejudice occurs in joint trials when proof inadmissible against a defendant becomes a part of his trial solely due to the presence of co-defendants as to whom its admission is proper. See, e.g., United States v. Cervone, 907 F.2d 332, 341-42 (2d Cir.1990). This is an unlikely occurrence when all the defendants are charged under the same conspiracy count. See United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843-44 (2d Cir.1992). 70 In the present case, Ajaj and Abouhalima were alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme and were tried under the same conspiracy count. As we have already discussed in connection with co-appellant Ayyad, the materials seized from Ajaj at Kennedy Airport were properly admitted as background evidence to establish the nature and scope of the conspiracy and to establish the motive and intent of the conspirators, namely, a desire to use violence to effect change in American foreign policy in the Middle East. See United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1387 (2d Cir.1988) (Background evidence may be admitted to show, for example, the circumstances surrounding the events or to furnish an explanation of the understanding or intent with which certain acts were performed.). Additionally, the materials were admissible to link Abouhalima to the conspiracy, as two of the terrorist publications seized from Ajaj were identical to the publications found in Abouhalima's apartment. Because each of the items would have been admitted against Abouhalima had he been tried alone, they were properly admitted against Abouhalima in the joint trial and there is no prejudicial spillover. Consequently, Abouhalima has not shown that the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion for a severance, let alone an abuse of discretion and a miscarriage of justice.
71 We find no prejudice to Abouhalima arising from Salameh's summation.  '[M]utually antagonistic' or 'irreconcilable' defenses may be so prejudicial in some circumstances as to mandate severance. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. 933. In order to make a showing of mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses, the defendant must make a factual demonstration that acceptance of one party's defense would tend to preclude the acquittal of [the] other. United States v. Smith, 788 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 765 (7th Cir.1985). However, [m]utually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se. Moreover, Rule 14 does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39, 113 S.Ct. 933; see, e.g., id. at 540-41, 113 S.Ct. 933 (where two co-defendants both claim they are innocent and each accuses the other of the crime, district court did not err in denying motion for severance). The risk of prejudice will vary with the facts in each case ... [and w]hen the risk of prejudice is high, a district court is more likely to determine that separate trials are necessary, but, as [the Supreme Court] indicated in Richardson v. Marsh, less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. Id. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933.  '[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.'  Id. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933 (citation omitted). 72 Throughout the trial in this case, all four defendants challenged the government's case without attempting to accuse one another. Unlike Abouhalima, during summation Salameh abandoned his trial strategy of disputing that a bomb had caused the explosion and argued that he was nothing more that an unwitting dupe of Yousef, who had masterminded the bombing. While the defense asserted by Salameh was, in the end, inconsistent with Abouhalima's defense, at no time did Salameh argue or suggest that Abouhalima was involved in the bombing, or directly contradict Abouhalima's defense strategy. Salameh and Abouhalima both claimed to be innocent of the charges and neither's claim of innocence required the jury to find the other guilty. 73 Consequently, because there was nothing directly antagonistic between the two defense theories so as to create mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses, we perceive no ground for reversal based on the court's denial of severance. Furthermore, any possible prejudice was eliminated by the district court's repeated admonitions to the jury that each defendant's guilt had to be separately and individually considered. 3 See, e.g., Hernandez, 85 F.3d at 1029-30 (rejecting claim of prejudicial spillover where the district court instructed the jury that it was required to consider the evidence against each defendant individually for each count); United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir.1982) (same). 74 Moreover, to the extent that Salameh's summation may have undermined Abouhalima's defense by indirectly linking him to Yousef, any possible prejudice was cured by the district court's jury instruction that [m]ere association with other people that you found are members of the conspiracy is not enough for you to find a person to be a member ... [even] a person who has knowledge of a conspiracy and all of its ramifications and does nothing about it is not a co-conspirator.... [It's] got to be an intentional joining of the conspiracy. In light of this instruction, we find no error.
75 Abouhalima made two incriminating remarks during his post-arrest interview. Specifically, shortly after being taken into United States' custody, Abouhalima was informed that he was under arrest for his participation in the World Trade Center bombing. Once FBI agents advised him of his constitutional rights, they interviewed him about the apartment at 40 Pamrapo. During the interview, Abouhalima asked an officer whether he knew an individual by the name of Rashid. Yousef's nickname was Rashed. 4 Abouhalima also corrected an FBI agent's pronunciation of Pamrapo. At trial, Abouhalima requested a suppression hearing directly before these remarks were admitted into evidence. The court, however, found that such a hearing was unnecessary. After introducing these statements into evidence, the government used these statements to assert that Abouhalima had linked the questioning about 40 Pamrapo to the World Trade Center bombing and to Yousef. 76 Abouhalima now argues that we should direct the district court on remand to reconsider Abouhalima's motion to suppress his post-arrest remarks. Specifically, Abouhalima asserts that his comments were given involuntarily and without a valid Miranda waiver because they followed ten days of incarceration and torture in Egypt. Accordingly, Abouhalima argues that the court's failure to hold a suppression hearing violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 77 Under the circumstances, we find no basis for a suppression hearing. [Courts are not required to] divine a defendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did [when] there [is] no claim that governmental conduct coerced his decision. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-66, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). A diminished mental state is only relevant to the voluntariness inquiry if it made mental or physical coercion by the police more effective. United States v. Chrismon, 965 F.2d 1465, 1469 (7th Cir.1992). 78 In the present case, while it is reasonable that Egyptian incarceration and torture, if true, would likely weaken one's mental state, one's mental state does not become part of the calculus for the suppression of evidence unless there is an allegation that agents of the United States engaged in some type of coercion. Because Abouhalima does not contend that federal agents either mentally or physically coerced his remarks during that interrogation, there is no basis for inquiry into a possible constitutional violation. Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right--the right of a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated--could respondent's present claim be sustained. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, 107 S.Ct. 515.C. Ayyad--Failure to Grant Funds for Experts 79 Ayyad argues that the district court unreasonably interfered with his efforts to secure expert testimony and consultation by authorizing only a portion of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) funds that he requested. Specifically, on January 28, 1994, during the fourth month of the trial, Ayyad, who was represented by retained counsel, applied for $35,000 in CJA funds for five expert witnesses concerning DNA evidence, explosives, computers, linguistics and culture. The district court initially responded by authorizing $1,000 for the DNA expert and $1,000 for the explosives expert, but denied Ayyad's request to retain the computer expert, linguist and an expert on culture (sociologist). Ayyad asserts that the district court's response left him unprepared and unable to test the government's direct case ... requir[ing] reversal. 80 The government responds that just three days after its initial ruling, the court reconsidered and granted Ayyad's application in full. Accordingly, the government avers that Ayyad's argument is factually incorrect and does not support a reversal. We agree. 81 The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part: Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate representation may request them in an ex parte application. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). The statute requires the district court to authorize these funds when a defense attorney makes a reasonable request in circumstances in which he would independently engage such services [if his client was able to pay for them]. United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir.1976) (citing United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir.1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring)); see United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir.1980). While the district judge should entertain such requests with a liberal attitude, he is nevertheless obligated to exercise his discretion in determining whether such services are necessary. Oliver, 626 F.2d at 260. Services necessary for an adequate defense include preparation for cross-examination of a government expert as well as presentation of an expert defense witness. Id.; see id. at 828 (district court commits reversible error when it denies CJA funds for fingerprint expert, where fingerprint evidence was likely to be pivotal). 82 In this case, we need not decide whether the district court erred in initially declining to grant Ayyad's application in full. Because the district court timely reconsidered that order and granted Ayyad the full $35,000 in CJA funds, we perceive no prejudice. Moreover, we observe that during the three-week interval between the district court's authorization of the funds and the time that Ayyad rested before the jury, he called no witnesses and never requested a continuance to consult with his experts. Consequently, there is no basis for reversal. D. Ajaj--Eastern District Plea Agreement 83 Ajaj argues that his prosecution under the instant indictment is barred by the express terms of his plea agreement regarding the passport fraud charges in the Eastern District of New York (Eastern District plea agreement). He claims that the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York (Eastern District prosecutor's office) improperly passed along work to the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (Southern District prosecutor's office) to circumvent a restriction on its own ability to prosecute Ajaj on charges stemming from Ajaj's role in the World Trade Center bombing. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Ajaj's arguments are meritless. 84 Following his arrest and detention at Kennedy Airport, Ajaj was charged in the Eastern District of New York with knowingly using a false passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (Count One), and using the passport of another person, 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (Count Two) (Eastern District indictment). On October 6, 1992, Ajaj, with the assistance of his then-counsel, Douglas Morris, executed a written plea agreement with the Eastern District prosecutor's office. Ajaj agreed to plead guilty to Count Two in return for the Eastern District prosecutor's promise to move to dismiss Count One at sentencing and not oppose a two-level reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines for Ajaj's acceptance of responsibility. Paragraph 4 of that plea agreement provided that [t]his agreement is limited to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York and cannot bind other federal, state or local prosecuting authorities. 85 On October 6, 1992, Ajaj pled guilty to Count Two of the Eastern District indictment before United States District Judge Raggi. During the course of the allocution, Judge Raggi asked the parties whether they had agreed to any additional terms to supplement the written plea agreement. Attorney Morris, counsel for Ajaj, responded: 86 There's also an agreement that the Government will not bring any charges arising out of Mr. Ajaj's entry into the United States on September 1st, including any false statement charge, and it will not bring any charges arising from any thing or document that Mr. Ajaj was carrying with him on that date. 87 (emphasis added). Following Attorney Morris' articulation of this supplementary oral agreement, the Eastern District prosecutor agreed, stating [t]hat's correct, your Honor. Judge Raggi, to ascertain whether Ajaj understood the agreement in its entirety, questioned Ajaj and paraphrased Attorney Morris' articulation of the oral agreement. Judge Raggi stated: 88 THE COURT: Now, the lawyers tell me that the agreement represents all of the promises and agreements between you and the Government, except that the Government also promises that it's not going to bring any other charges against you relating to your conduct on September 1st. 89 The question I want to put to you, now, is do you know of any other promises [or] agreements made by you or the Government as a part of this decision to plead guilty? 90 Is there anything else? 91 THE DEFENDANT: No. 92 (emphasis added). 93 Prior to trial under the instant indictment filed in the Southern District of New York (Southern District indictment), Ajaj moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the prosecution was barred by the terms of the Eastern District plea agreement. Specifically, Ajaj argued that under the terms of the oral supplement to that agreement, the Government, which included the Southern District prosecutor's office, was barred from prosecuting Ajaj on charges arising from and relating to his September 1 entry into the United States and the terrorist materials in his possession. Ajaj argued that in contravention of that agreement, two overt acts charged in Count One of the Southern District indictment stated: 94 a. On or about September 1, 1992, AHMAD MOHAMMAD AJAJ, using an airline ticket issued in the name of Khurram Khan, and RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF, using an airline ticket issued in the name of Azan Muhammad, traveled together from Pakistan to John F. Kennedy International Airport, in Queens County, New York (Kennedy Airport). 95 b. On or about September 1, 1992, AHMAD MOHAMMAD AJAJ transported from Pakistan to Kennedy Airport, manuals and other materials containing, among other things, instructions on the construction and use of explosive devices, including improvised explosive devices using urea and nitric acid and nitroglycerine. 96 The government, in opposition to Ajaj's motion, argued that the parties to the Eastern District plea agreement never contemplated that the plea agreement would bar the prosecution of Ajaj for terrorist-related activities. According to the government, the parties had entered into the supplementary oral agreement to address Ajaj's concern that (1) he had made false statements to INS officials on September 1, 1992; (2) the government would bring additional fraud-related charges against Ajaj based on his possession of false identification documents; and (3) the possession of terrorist materials themselves might constitute a crime. 97 On September 13, 1993, the district court denied Ajaj's motion, concluding that the written portion of the plea bargain specifically limited the [plea agreement] to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York. It is unreasonable to believe that anyone, including Ajaj, believed that the addendum announced in open court by his own attorney could bind all levels of government within the United States.... Under the circumstances leading up to Ajaj's guilty plea, the only reasonable expectation Ajaj could have was that he would not be further prosecuted by the United States Attorney in the Eastern District of New York. We agree. 98 It is well settled that a prosecutor's promises made in return for a defendant's guilty plea must be fulfilled. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984) ([W]hen the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand.); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). When the express terms of a plea agreement set forth promises by the Government, we have held that the plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction, United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir.1985) (per curiam), or unless there [is] evidence to show that [a prosecutor] [i]s attempting to evade its own obligations [under the plea agreement] by transferring a prosecution to another office, United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139, 1154 (2d Cir.1976); see also United States v. DiNapoli, 817 F.2d 978, 979 (2d Cir.1987) (per curiam); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 825 (2d Cir.1976). The mere use of the term  'government' in the plea agreement does not create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement. United States v. Laskow, 688 F.Supp. 851, 853 (E.D.N.Y.1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.1988). 99 Here, Ajaj presents no evidence that the parties to the Eastern District plea agreement contemplated that it would bar the prosecution of Ajaj in any district other than the Eastern District. Indeed, the explicit terms of the Eastern District plea agreement expressly limited the plea agreement to the Eastern District of New York. Moreover, assuming that the plea agreement would bar the Eastern District prosecutor's office from prosecuting Ajaj for crimes arising from the World Trade Center bombing, Ajaj presents no evidence that the Eastern District prosecutor's office attempted to circumvent a restriction on its authority to prosecute by transferring its work to the Southern District prosecutor's office. The Southern District prosecutor's office independently investigated criminal offenses arising from the World Trade Center bombing and filed an indictment in the Southern District charging Ajaj with crimes that were distinct from the passport fraud charges in the Eastern District. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Ajaj's motion.