Opinion ID: 2333115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compensability Of McGahuey's Injuries

Text: The Board performed an alternative analysis, assuming that McGahuey had given timely notice, and looked at the merits of his claim. McGahuey's claim was for medical treatment for his back and hip, in 2005 and afterwards, as well as medical treatment for a lump near his ear. [13] The Commission reviewed the Board's compensability analysis and affirmed the Board's decision. McGahuey asserts that the Board and Commission erred in finding that his claim was not compensable. Whitestone argues that the Commission correctly concluded that substantial evidence in the record supported the Board's findings. In a workers' compensation case, the Board uses a three-step presumption analysis to evaluate the compensability of a worker's claim. [14] At the first step, the employee must attach the presumption of compensability by establishing a link between his employment and the injury. [15] For purposes of determining whether the claimant has established the preliminary link, only evidence that tends to establish the link is consideredcompeting evidence is disregarded. [16] The Board need not concern itself with the witnesses' credibility when making its preliminary link determination. [17] In this case, the Board improperly considered McGahuey's credibility when it examined the evidence at the first stage of the analysis. Relying on dicta in Osborne Construction Co. v. Jordan, [18] the Commission wrote that it was a close question whether the [B]oard erred in determining that McGahuey failed to raise the presumption of compensability because of `his lack of credibility to effectively raise the presumption.' To the extent the Commission suggested that the Board could consider credibility at the first stage, it was mistaken. We have repeatedly stated that the Board cannot consider credibility at the first stage of the presumption analysis. [19] We agree with the Commission, however, that any error the Board made was harmless because the Board did an alternative analysis, assuming that McGahuey had attached the presumption. If the presumption attaches, the second step of the presumption analysis provides that an employer may rebut the presumption by presenting substantial evidence that: (1) provides an alternative explanation which would exclude work-related factors as a substantial cause of the disability, or (2) directly eliminates any reasonable possibility that employment was a factor in causing the disability. [20] The Board looks at the evidence to rebut the presumption in isolation, without weighing it. [21] The Board found that Whitestone rebutted the presumption of compensability by showing that: (1) McGahuey did not complain about his back and relate his back condition to the March 2004 altercation until he saw doctors in late 2005 and 2006; (2) McGahuey had a back condition during the four years prior to the March 2004 injury; (3) McGahuey failed to report an injury to his hip and back in May 2004, when he saw the doctor in Kodiak; [22] and (4) no physician independently connected his work and his back pain, relying instead on McGahuey's reports. The Commission correctly decided that the Board's conclusionthat Whitestone rebutted the presumptionwas supported by evidence in the record. Whitestone presented evidence that McGahuey had been treated for low back pain in 2002 and possibly earlier. A preexisting back condition alone might not eliminate any reasonable possibility that his employment with Whitestone was a factor in causing later back pain. [23] But a preexisting back condition together with the lack of contemporaneous complaints of back pain or evidence of a home-treatment regimen is adequate evidence to support a conclusion that the back pain McGahuey reported in April 2005more than a year after the fightwas not caused by the fight, particularly when the imaging studies from 2005 and 2006 were normal. As to the hip condition, Whitestone presented evidence that McGahuey was not limping in the days following the injury and that he did not report hip pain near the time of the fight. A March 2006 MRI of McGahuey's hip was normal. This evidence supports the conclusion that any need for medical treatment of McGahuey's hip in 2005 and later was not related to his employment at Whitestone. Finally, with respect to the lump near McGahuey's ear, at least two doctors indicated in their chart notes that it was not work related. These opinions were adequate evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability. [24] If an employer rebuts the presumption of compensability, at the third step of the analysis the burden shifts to the employee to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. [25] At the third stage, the Board was permitted to weigh the evidence and consider McGahuey's credibility. [26] The Board alone can determine witness credibility. [27] Because the Board found that McGahuey was not credible, the Commission correctly concluded that substantial evidence in the record supported the Board's decision. The only links between McGahuey's back and hip pain and the Whitestone fight were his testimony and his statements to doctors that the back and hip pain arose after the fight. After the Board determined that his account of the injuries was not credible, there was no evidence to establish the compensability of any of his injuries. The normal imaging studies of his back and hip likewise provided evidence that he did not suffer a compensable injury. The same analysis applies to the lump near McGahuey's ear, which was later determined to be a lipoma. [28] Although at least one doctor indicated that the lipoma could be associated with trauma, the link between trauma and the fight at the Afognak camp depended on the Board's believing McGahuey's account of the fight and his resulting injuries. The Board's finding that McGahuey was not credible removed any causal link between his employment and the lipoma. The Commission did not err in concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that McGahuey did not prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.