Opinion ID: 2518909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: although the parents' statements are ineligible for the protection of the absolute judicial proceeding privilege, they are protected by a conditional privilege

Text: ¶ 28 The Parents have also invited us to affirm the district court on the alternative ground that their statements were not actionable because they were protected by either an absolute or conditional privilege. We consider here whether the Parents' statements qualify for protection under an absolute or conditional privilege and will consider each privilege claim in turn. ¶ 29 When circumstances mandate wholly open, frank, and unchilled communication, the law readjusts the scales that balance the right to free expression with the interest in protecting one's reputation. See, e.g., DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, ¶ 10, 992 P.2d 979. The scales tip most heavily in favor of unfettered expression when we confer an absolute privilege on the speaker. We extend absolute privileges to persons whose special position or status requires that they be as free as possible from fear that their actions in their position might subject them to legal action. Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1990). Participants in judicial proceedings are among those who qualify for such a privilege against defamation. Id. ¶ 30 The Parents claim absolute sanctuary within this privilege. It is specifically bestowed upon those who make statements during or in the course of a judicial proceeding and exists for the purpose of preserving both the integrity of the judicial proceeding and the associated quest for the ascertainment of truth that lies at its heart. Id. It is not inimical to this objective that speakers may express false statements, even those uttered with ill motives, within judicial proceedings free of the risk that tort will hold them to account. The system achieves a satisfactory measure of confidence that the search for truth has been fruitful when all who claim to possess part of or the entire truth may freely disclose the basis of that claim. ¶ 31 The judicial proceeding privilege has three elements. First, the alleged defamatory statement must have been made during or in the course of a judicial proceeding. Second, the statement must have some reference to the proceeding's subject matter. Third, the party claiming the privilege must have been acting in the capacity of a judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel in the proceeding at the time of the alleged defamation. Id. at 1313; see also Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶¶ 27-31, 164 P.3d 366 (applying the judicial proceeding privilege in the context of a complaint); Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, ¶ 13, 40 P.3d 1128 (discussing the privilege, its elements, and its furthered public policies as akin to that of the legislative proceeding privilege); Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ¶ 8, 20 P.3d 895 (applying the privilege in the context of a published demand letter); Allen, 802 P.2d at 1311-13 (reviewing the history to date of Utah jurisprudence surrounding the privilege). The statements attributed to the Parents fail on all counts. ¶ 32 Our view of the forums and events that are entitled to designation as judicial proceedings is an expansive one. Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 29, 164 P.3d 366; see also DeBry, 1999 UT 111, ¶ 14, 992 P.2d 979 ([T]he requirement that the defamatory statement must be made in the course of a judicial proceeding requires a broad interpretation of the term `judicial proceeding.'). Even under the broadest definition of the term, however, the Parents give us scant reason to deem remarks made by several of their number during the Community Comment portion of an Alpine School District Board meeting as falling within any quasi-judicial function of the school board. Although the school board may have the authority to conduct quasi-judicial proceedings under certain circumstances, the record here makes clear that no such proceeding was underway or even contemplated when the statements were made. In the absence of a pending proceeding, the Parents' statements could not possibly satisfy the privilege's second element: that the content of the statements related to the subject matter of the proceeding. ¶ 33 A comparison of the Parents' appearance at the school board meeting with the facts in Allen is instructive. In Allen, we reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a clinical social worker who had sent letters to a mayor and a domestic-relations commissioner, alleging that a child's mother and stepfather had sexually molested the child. 802 P.2d at 1308. The mother had previously filed a petition to modify her custody and visitation rights. Believing the child to have been abused, the child's father solicited the letters detailing the social worker's affirming conclusions. We held that the social worker was ineligible for the privilege because she failed to satisfy its third element: when she made her statements, she was not, as a matter of law, acting as a witness in a judicial proceeding. For purposes of the privilege, a witness must be more than a person with sufficient expertise in or knowledge of a matter to be of some potential benefit. We were troubled that a contrary view would permit individuals, on their own initiative, to direct libelous communications to a participant or decision maker in a litigation with impunity. Id. at 1313. The judicial system, even when broadly defined, does not demand such license. Id. We decline to extend that license to the Parents here. We believe that the objectives of the absolute, judicial proceeding privilege are at odds with permitting unsolicited communication of defamatory statements to an entity that has undertaken no judicial proceeding. We therefore hold that the absolute privilege is inapplicable to the statements made by the Parents.
¶ 34 The Parents also claim a conditional privilege. Like absolute privileges, qualified privileges take numerous forms. The Parents ask us to extend to them conditional protection for communications that contain information relating to intra-family relationships, a privilege Utah has not yet formally recognized. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 597 (1977) (detailing the intra-family relationship privilege). ¶ 35 In Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991), we awarded our approval to a similar conditional privilege that concerned a business, as distinguished from a familial, relationship. It was a retail-clothing employer that made the defamatory statements in Brehany when explaining to its managers and buyers that it had terminated the plaintiffs for conduct violating the drug policy; we held that these statements were privileged. We grounded our recognition of the conditional privilege on the existence of an employer's legitimate interest in disseminating its intention to enforce its drug policy. ¶ 36 Because we find little justification to deny relationships in the familial setting the same legitimacy we granted in Brehany to those in the business world, we take this occasion to incorporate Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 597 into Utah's defamation jurisprudence. Section 597, entitled Family Relationships, states: (1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a) there is information that affects the well-being of a member of the immediate family of the publisher, and (b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the lawful protection of the well-being of the member of the family. (2) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged when the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a) there is information that affects the well-being of a member of the immediate family of the recipient or of a third person, and (b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the lawful protection of the well-being of the member of the family, and (c) the recipient has requested the publication of the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its publication is otherwise within generally accepted standards of decent conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 597. ¶ 37 Although we hold that Mr. O'Connor's position as coach of the Lehi High School women's basketball team was not of such civic importance as to render him a public official, we conclude that the Parents possess a legitimate interest in affairs of the basketball team of such a degree as to demand that we grant their statements the breathing space afforded by section 597. It is important to note that our reference to the Parents in this context is not limited to immediate family members of basketball team members, but also includes statements made by third parties so long as the statements were published within the generally accepted standards of decent conduct under the conditional privilege described in section 595 and recognized by this court in Brehany. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 595(1)(b); Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58. This standard does not shield defamatory statements that abuse the conditional privilege, but it does protect those defendants who are not immediate family members of women on the team. The Parents may have abused and therefore lost this conditional privilege as a refuge if, for example, they knew their statements regarding Mr. O'Connor were false or acted with a reckless disregard as to their falsity, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600, exceeded the privilege's purpose in making their statements, see id. § 603, or made statements to an individual or in a manner not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the privilege's purpose, see id. §§ 604, 605, 605A. See also Hales v. Commercial Bank, 114 Utah 186, 197 P.2d 910, 913 (1948) (`The publisher's lack of belief in the truth of the defamatory matter published, or his lack of reasonable grounds for so believing, while immaterial to the existence of the privileged occasion, is important as constituting an abuse of the occasion which deprives him of the protection which it would otherwise afford.' (quoting Restatement of Torts § 594 cmt. b (1938))). Although we have not yet had occasion to formally adopt all the potential means to abuse the privilege cited in the Restatement, they all enjoy close ties to common sense and thus appear worthy of our confidence. ¶ 38 Whether a statement is entitled to the protection of a conditional privilege presents a question of law; whether the holder of the privilege lost it due to abuse presents a question of fact. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, ¶ 53, 116 P.3d 271; Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58; Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 228 P.2d 272, 274-75 (1951). The district court's ruling did not address this conditional privilege issue and, therefore, did not consider whether Mr. O'Connor sufficiently carried his burden to demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue regarding the Parents' abuse of their privilege. Consistent with our authority to affirm a district court on alternative grounds, we could canvass the record and make this determination in the first instance. Instead, we elect to cede this task to the district court as we have ceded the task of ascertaining the susceptibility of the Parents' statements to defamatory meaning.