Opinion ID: 78296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Forfeiture of Substitute Assets

Text: Seher asserts that the district court erred in finding that his real property could be a substitute asset under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) for the $1,610,400 laundered in connection with the drug conspiracy charged in Count One. He argues that these funds were the property of the Depot, not him, and that he therefore had no interest in this property and should be deemed an intermediary to the conspiracy, who could not be subject to a money judgment. He also contends that the government failed to prove that he caused this property to be unavailable via an act or omission on his part. Both of these arguments fail. The evidence at trial established that the laundered funds were originally given to Seher, and there was no indication that they ever became the property of the Depot. Furthermore, as he was convicted of conspiracy to launder money, it is reasonable to hold him liable for all the proceeds that were a reasonably foreseeable result of that conspiracy regardless of whether he still possesses them. See United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1506-09 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming forfeiture order imposing joint and several liability on RICO conspirators based on this rationale); see also United States v. Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir.2007) (affirming forfeiture order holding single conspirator vicariously liable for the total value of the conspiracy). Seher also asserts that he was merely an intermediary to these financial transactions, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(2), and therefore would be ineligible for a money judgment. That statute defines an intermediary as an individual who handled but did not retain the property in the course of the money laundering offense. 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(2). However, an individual would not be an intermediary if, in committing the offense or offenses giving rise to the forfeiture, [he] conducted three or more separate transactions involving a total of $100,000 or more in any twelve month period. Id. There was evidence that Manning made at least $200,000 in purchases on a single day in 1998 and that Johnson and McDowell also made purchases that same year. Seher therefore would not be an intermediary under the statute regardless of whether he handled but did not retain the money involved in the laundering. Seher is likewise in error in asserting that the government failed to provide proof that his actions or omissions triggered the substitute asset provision. As part of the government's motion for a preliminary forfeiture order, it attached a declaration from an IRS Special Agent involved in the case stating that, based on the government's attempts to locate the missing proceeds, Seher had dissipated or otherwise disposed of the proceeds of his crimes. R4-155, Exh. B at 2. Though the affidavit did not identify every effort the government had made to obtain the proceeds, we find it sufficiently specific in identifying Seher's acts and omissions for the district court to rely on it as the basis for ordering forfeiture under the substitute asset provision. We note that the First Circuit made a similar finding based on a government affidavit that used virtually the same language regarding the defendant's actions. See United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 42 (1st Cir. 1999). The district court therefore did not err in finding that Seher's property could be a substitute assert for the personal money judgment on Count One.