Opinion ID: 4468130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State Proved Prejudice

Text: ¶32 Wren's unreasonable delay alone is not sufficient to support the application of laches. The State also must prove that the unreasonable delay prejudiced its defense against the habeas petition.25 Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶19. What amounts 25Many jurisdictions include in their prejudice analysis whether the delay prejudices the state's ability to address the underlying merits should the petition be granted. The State has made no such argument in this case, but it is a common position around the country. See, e.g., United States v. Darnell, 716 F.2d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 1983) (The government's ability to meet successfully the allegations of the motion or to present a case against the defendant if he is granted a new trial may be greatly diminished by the passage of time. (footnote omitted)); Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1994) (In making a determination of prejudice, the effect of the delay on both the government's ability to respond to the petition and the government's ability to mount a retrial are relevant. (citing Darnell, 716 F.2d at 480)); In re Douglas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 236, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ([T]he People have been prejudiced both with regard to retrying Defendant and to responding to issues raised in Defendant's petition.); Armstrong v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (Ind. 2001) (For post-conviction laches purposes, prejudice exists when the unreasonable delay operates to materially diminish a reasonable likelihood of successful re-prosecution. (citation omitted)); 19 No. 2017AP880-W to prejudice, such as will bar the right to assert a claim after the passage of time pursuant to laches, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but it is generally held to be anything that places the party in a less favorable position. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 143. ¶33 Courts commonly describe two types of prejudice: evidentiary and economic.26 The State here claims evidentiary Woodberry v. State, 101 P.3d 727, 731 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (The length of th[e] delay is unreasonable, and the State would undoubtedly be prejudiced if forced to retry [the petitioner].); Jones v. State, 126 A.3d 1162, 1182 (Md. 2015) ([W]e conclude that, for purposes of determining whether laches bars an individual's ability to seek coram nobis relief, prejudice involves not only the State's ability to defend against the coram nobis petition, but also the State's ability to reprosecute.); Johnson v. State, 714 N.W.2d 832, 838 (N.D. 2006) ([P]rejudice exists when the unreasonable delay operates to materially diminish a reasonable likelihood of successful reprosecution. (quoting Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005))); Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ([We] expand the definition of prejudice under the existing laches doctrine to permit consideration of anything that places the State in a less favorable position, including prejudice to the State's ability to retry a defendant . . . .). 26 See ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp., 828 F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (Material Prejudice 'may be either economic or evidentiary.' (quoted source omitted)). American Jurisprudence, using slightly different terms, describes it this way: Generally, there are two main types of prejudice arising from delay by plaintiffs in bringing their claims that support the laches defense: (1) defense prejudice, whereby the defendant is impaired from successfully defending itself from suit given the passage of time; and (2) economic prejudice, whereby the costs to the defendant have significantly increased due to the delay. 20 No. 2017AP880-W prejudice. Evidentiary prejudice . . . may arise where a plaintiff's delay in bringing an action has curtailed the defendant's ability to present a full and fair defense on the merits due to the loss of evidence, the death of a witness, or the unreliability of memories. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 158. ¶34 The loss of key records and the unavailability of essential witnesses are classic elements of prejudice in a laches defense. Id. The death of key witnesses is precisely the kind of thing laches is aimed at, particularly where the the decedent's knowledge is crucial to a party's defense . . . . 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 152. American Jurisprudence explains: The doctrine of laches is peculiarly applicable where the difficulty of doing justice arises through the death of the principal participants in transactions complained of, or of witnesses to transactions . . . . For example, documents may have been misplaced or destroyed, or it may be difficult or impossible for the party to defend a claim if essential witnesses are deceased . . . . Id. § 149.27 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 144. The Wisconsin Practice Series offers draft forms for 27 practitioners. One of its sample laches forms addresses precisely this type of scenario as an archetypal issue. The form reads: The plaintiff had knowledge of all of the facts set forth in the complaint at least _______ years before commencement of this action. During that interval, all persons who would be material witnesses have died, the defendant's position has substantially changed as a result, and the defendant is materially prejudiced. The plaintiff should be barred by laches from obtaining relief in this action. 21 No. 2017AP880-W ¶35 Wren asserts that the State has not proven prejudice. He rests his argument largely on the fact that the State's claim of prejudice relies on the unavailability of Attorney Kostich. And in that vein, Wren points specifically to the circuit court's factual findings that he believed Kostich would file an appeal on his behalf and subsequently failed to respond to Wren or his family, despite their attempts to contact him. If these findings are accepted, Wren maintains, that establishes ineffective assistance of counsel, and no contradictory hypothetical evidence could matter. ¶36 Wren's argument on this point is superficially strong, but it rests on a faulty foundation. To be sure, the State does not contest the circuit court's factual findings. But fairly understood, the State advanced something even more fundamental: it had no tools and no evidence to defend the habeas claim at all because its necessary evidence——the files and testimony of Kostich——were unavailable due to Wren's unreasonable delay in raising the issue. The State made this point most poignantly at oral argument when it said it did not challenge the factual findings because——due to Wren's delay——it had nothing with which to challenge them. Even the evidentiary hearing at which the circuit court made its factual findings was a one-sided story. This is the very definition of prejudice. 5 Wisconsin Practice Series: Civil Procedure Forms § 40:433 (3d ed. 2019). 22 No. 2017AP880-W ¶37 It is no excuse to say that we do not know what testimony Kostich would have offered, or what evidence his case files may have contained. Zizzo v. Lakeside Steel & Manufacturing Co. is instructive on this point. 2008 WI App 69, 312 Wis. 2d 463, 752 N.W.2d 889. There, a son who inherited property sought to discharge the mortgage obligations on the property in part on the grounds of laches. Id., ¶1. His deceased parents received a loan in 1989 and were supposed to pay off the property in 1993, but no payments were ever made, nor were efforts made to collect or foreclose on the mortgage. Id. The mortgage holder responded that no prejudice was shown, essentially arguing the claim was speculative because he does not know exactly what information his [deceased] parents possessed . . . . Id., ¶20. The court's response there is true here as well: Of course he does not know that information——and that is exactly how he is prejudiced. Id. ¶38 It is important to stress that prejudice to a party for purposes of laches does not mean a party is so disadvantaged that it cannot prosecute its case. The prerequisite under our law is prejudice due to the delay, i.e., disadvantage to a party. Thus, the legal element is met by showing the State's defense of the habeas petition was meaningfully disadvantaged. The death of the essential witness to the events at issue, along with the loss of his documentary files, unquestionably satisfies this standard. 23 No. 2017AP880-W