Opinion ID: 844251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Motion for Individual Sequestered Voir Dire of the Prospective Jurors

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's denial of his motion for individual sequestered voir dire violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution. His contention lacks merit. In Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80 [168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301], we stated that, to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects of voir dire conducted in open court, in future capital cases, the portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror involving death qualification should be done individually and in sequestration. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 559 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076] ( Avila ).) On June 5, 1990, the voters adopted Proposition 115, which, among other things, abrogated Hovey by adding section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure, containing a provision stating that `where practicable, [voir dire shall] occur in the presence of the other [prospective] jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.' ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262] ( Slaughter ).) Because defendant was tried after Code of Civil Procedure section 223 was enacted, that section controls here. [15] Before trial, defendant moved for individual sequestered voir dire. He asserted a significant possibility of prejudice existed in this case because the circumstances of the murders of two young men would present emotional issues, evidence of gang affiliation and rivalry would be introduced, defendant was a young African-American man, and the nature of the death-qualification process itself was prejudicial. The trial court summarily denied his request for sequestered voir dire, but granted his motion for the use of a questionnaire containing 50 questions drafted by the parties. Initially, defendant contends that any restriction on individual and sequestered voir dire on death-qualifying issues, including that imposed by Code of Civil Procedure section 223, violates a defendant's rights to an impartial jury, to a reliable death sentence, and to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Consistent with past decisions, we reject this contention. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 494 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947] ( Lewis ); Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 559; People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 287-288 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990] ( Vieira ); Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514, 537.) (2) Defendant next contends the trial court's summary denial of motion did not amount to a reasoned judgment, and thus constitutes an abuse of discretion. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, the question of whether individual, sequestered voir dire should take place is entrusted to the trial court's discretion. [Citations.] Discretion is abused when the questioning is not reasonably sufficient to test prospective jurors for bias or partiality. ( People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 168 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 164 P.3d 590].) Here, we agree with the People that, although the trial court did not state its reasons for denying defendant's motion for sequestered voir dire, its remarks during voir dire confirm that its denial of the motion reflected careful consideration of the issue and that it properly exercised its discretion. Before the commencement of voir dire, the court explained to the prospective jurors that use of the questionnaires would save about two to three weeks in selecting a jury because it would obviate the need to question them and listen to their answers in open court. The court offered prospective jurors the option to discuss sensitive subjects in private, if needed. In the context of these comments, it is apparent the trial court thoroughly considered the issue and determined group voir dire was adequate. The court's denial of defendant's motion was not outside the bounds of reason. Defendant additionally contends that group voir dire was not practicable within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 223 because prospective jurors were influenced by the responses of others. He observes that, during voir dire, Prospective Juror S.R. expressed in front of other prospective jurors her views that she did not think she could ever vote to impose a death sentence. The trial court dismissed her for these views. Defendant asserts this juror's views suggested to other prospective jurors who favored the death penalty and wished to serve, but feared disqualification based on their pro-death-penalty views, that they could avoid dismissal by expressing less support for the death penalty and conveying a willingness to consider both penalties if they served. The possibility that prospective jurors may have been answering questions in a manner they believed the trial court wanted to hear, however, identifies at most potential, rather than actual, bias and is not a basis for reversing a judgment. ( Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 289.) Indeed, the purpose and effect of the group voir dire requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 223 would be obviated if nonsequestered questioning were deemed [im]practicable because of the speculative concern that one prospective juror's death penalty responses might influence the responses of others in the venire. It is precisely this premise of Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, that Proposition 115's adoption of Code of Civil Procedure section 223 was intended to overrule. ( Vieira, supra, at p. 288, citing Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1178 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91].) Finally, defendant asserts that the group voir dire procedure employed by the trial court was inadequate to identify prospective jurors whose views on the death penalty rendered them partial and unqualified to serve. As a result, he asserts, the court was unable to determine whether any of the prospective jurors who sat on the jury in his case held disqualifying views that impaired their ability to judge him in accordance with the court's instructions. Defendant, however, does not describe any specific example of how questioning prospective jurors in the presence of other jurors prevented him from uncovering juror bias. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182].) Accordingly, defendant has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by the trial court's use of group voir dire.