Opinion ID: 64150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Factor Four

Text: Factor Four requires that both disputes involve the same claim or cause of action. The claims at issue in the instant case, and the claims filed by Gunderson in the OWC, all involve discount and payment provisions in Provider 4 On May 9, 2006, Gunderson appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. This Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction in a per curiam opinion without explanation. Based on the briefs filed, this Court finds that the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Gunderson improperly attempted to appeal the district court's denial of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Appellee's Mot. to Dismiss the Appeal for Lack of Juris. in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gunderson, No. 06-30545, (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished decision). Gunderson failed to brief the only appealable issue, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual, and therefore abandoned that issue on appeal. 9 No. 08-30075 Agreements between First Health and Gunderson. First Health’s payors provided payments to Gunderson under the provisions found in these Provider Agreements between First Health and Gunderson. Gunderson repeatedly attempted to make claims against First Health’s payors, arguing that the payors improperly discounted rates for their services under these Agreements, despite the district court’s rejection of that very argument in its ruling that the Provider Agreements are valid and enforceable. In addition, collateral estoppel precludes Gunderson from pursuing any future claims that would involve relitigating the issues decided by the district court when it granted summary judgment against Gunderson. Vines, 398 F.3d at 709 (explaining that collateral estoppel requires the same issue, fact, or law be actually litigated and determined in a prior judgment). Gunderson is barred from attempting to bring a claim in federal court, state court, or the OWC that would involve deciding the validity of the discount or payment provisions contained in Provider Agreements between First Health and its payors. The district court decided these issues on summary judgment, and Gunderson abandoned its appeal of the rulings contained in the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Factor Four is satisfied. 2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Regions Bank Factor Two) Gunderson alleges that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the instant case. To demonstrate the district court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Gunderson points to similar lawsuits where the same district court found that it lacked jurisdiction. See Sentry v. Lake Charles Mem’l, 2:06-cv-00570 (W.D. La. June 4, 2008); AIG v. Gunderson, 2:05-cv-247 (W.D. La. May 11, 2005); Gunderson v. F.A. Richard & Assocs., 2:04-cv-1242 (W.D. La. Mar. 23, 2005).5 Gunderson, however, in making this argument 5 The findings in the other cases are irrelevant; however, this Court notes that the district court distinguished the instant case from each one of the decisions cited by Gunderson to argue that the district court lacked subject 10 No. 08-30075 ignores that the district court had proper diversity jurisdiction over this case. The Supreme Court explained in Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. that state workers’ compensation claims may be removed to federal district courts if diversity jurisdiction exists. 367 U.S. 348, 352 (1961). Regions Bank Factor Two requires the court have “competent” jurisdiction, but does not specifically require that the court using the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Regions Bank, 224 F.3d at 488 (citation omitted). The district court properly found that it maintained diversity jurisdiction over this case. 3. Final Judgment on the Merits Between Gunderson and First Health Gunderson next argues that the district court erred in issuing the injunction, because “Plaintiffs in both suits must have asserted the same claim or cause of action, the federal court’s underlying judgment must be ‘final’, [sic] and the federal and state proceedings must involve identical parties.” Gunderson then provides a citation to Regions Bank. Gunderson misunderstands what is required by the relitigation exception. The four factor test outlined in Regions Bank does not require a final judgment on the merits between Gunderson and First Health. Regions Bank, 224 F.3d at 488 (citation omitted). The test does, however, require a final judgment on the merits. As discussed above, the district court issued a final judgment when it granted summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual. While this Court acknowledges that the grant of summary judgment was limited to a finding in favor of Liberty Mutual, we also find that First Health and its payors are in privity with Liberty Mutual for purposes of the relitigation exception. The district court specifically ruled on the validity of Provider Agreements entered into between Gunderson and First Health in its summary judgment ruling. matter jurisdiction. On de novo review, this Court must make an independent determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction. 11 No. 08-30075 4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 Gunderson argues that enjoining actions against parties who are not identified (or identifiable without initiating litigation), violates the rule of specificity for injunctions. Gunderson asserts that the permanent injunction is impermissibly vague, overbroad and hard to ascertain in that it fails to name or otherwise identify the ‘payors’ of First Health. Rule 65(d) requires specificity; “[a]n injunction must simply be framed so that those enjoined will know what conduct the court has prohibited.” Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981). The district court correctly noted that the Provider Agreements between First Health and Gunderson required First Health to provide a payor listing to Gunderson. Liberty Mutual, No. 04-cv-2405, slip op. 5-6 (Mem. Ruling). First Health complied with these requirements, and provided Gunderson with payor listings. Therefore, this Court holds that the permanent injunction is framed in a manner that enables Gunderson to know what conduct the district court prohibited.