Opinion ID: 1591751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Potential for Bodily Injury to a Victim

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in enhancing each sentence for aggravated assault on the basis that [t]he crime was committed under circumstances under which the potential for bodily injury to a victim was great. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(16) (1997 & Supp.2001). The defendant contends that this enhancement factor, like the multiple victims factor, is not appropriate where the offense involves a specific, named victim. The State maintains that the enhancement factor was properly applied based on the presence of other individuals involved in the accident. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the potential for bodily injury factor was properly applied to enhance the sentences for aggravated assault because other individuals were involved in the accident and injured. See State v. Sims, 909 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1995) (holding that Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(16) was applicable to enhance sentence for aggravated assault). Concurring separately, Judge Tipton wrote that the factor was not applicable because each offense involved bodily injury to a specific, named victim. See State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (holding that Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(16) was not applicable to enhance sentence for aggravated assault). Once again, we believe that Judge Tipton's analysis reflects the better reasoned approach to the application of the potential for bodily injury enhancement factor. The offenses of aggravated assault in this case required proof that the defendant recklessly caused bodily injury to a named victim with a deadly weapon. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101(a) and -102(a)(2)(A) (1997 & Supp. 2001). The statutory language of the enhancement factor provides that [ t]he crime was committed under circumstances under which the potential for bodily injury to a victim was great. Id. § 40-35-114(16) (emphasis added). In effect, elements of an aggravated assault against a specific, named victim are reflected in the statutory language of the enhancement factor, thus rendering its application to enhance the sentence inappropriate. There is nothing in the statutory language of the enhancement factor to indicate that it applies to potential victims or that it applies simply because the offense was committed in the presence of other individuals. Additional support for our interpretation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(16) is found by its comparison to the enhancement factor in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(10), which states that [t]he defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high. The enhancement factor in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(10) is broadly written to include risk to human life, and it does not contain the restrictions to the crime and a victim that are contained in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(16). Indeed, in the present case it is the risk to human life factor that accounts for the fact that other individuals were involved in the accident and endangered by the defendant's actions. In short, the statutory distinctions must be given proper effect to determine which factor is applicable or whether both are applicable. See Lewis, 44 S.W.3d at 508 (finding both enhancement factors (10) and (16) applicable to the facts of the aggravated arson).