Opinion ID: 1827009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admission of Second Interview

Text: Last, Schuster alleges that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his interview with Evans. Based on the denial of his request for assistance of counsel during the initial Nulle interrogation, Schuster contends he did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his rights prior to the Evans interview, making the interview inadmissible. [2] The United States Supreme Court has established clear rules concerning Miranda rights. Waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of that right. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 385 (1981). Whether the waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently depends `upon the particular facts and circumstance surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). In this case, Schuster had repeatedly requested and been denied counsel while in custody and being interrogated by Nulle. Schuster also alleged that he requested and was denied counsel while he was at the hospital in the custody of Evans. The United States Supreme Court has specifically examined the subsequent interrogation of an accused after the accused has requested counsel. [W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386. Schuster clearly exercised his right to counsel by requesting counsel on at least twelve different occasions during the Nulle interrogation. The fact that Schuster's second interview was conducted by a different law enforcement officer does not negate his request for counsel made during his initial interview with Nulle. Schuster's request for counsel during his interrogation by Nulle serves to terminate any interrogation of Schuster until he is either provided counsel or initiates further communication with the police on his own. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Edwards rule applies [w]hether a contemplated reinterrogation concerns the same or a different offense, or whether the same or different law enforcement authorities are involved in the second investigation[.] Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687-88, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d 704, 717 (1988). Schuster had not been provided counsel as he had requested during his interrogation by Nulle, nor did Schuster initiate the subsequent interview with Evans. Schuster's interrogation by Evans thus fails to meet the standards established by Edwards and Roberson and was inadmissible as evidence at trial, since the waiver given to Evans cannot be construed as having been given knowingly or intelligently. Since it was error to admit this evidence, State argues such admission is harmless error under this record on appeal. In order to find error harmless, it is necessary for the appellate court to find that the admission of the erroneous evidence did not prejudice the defendant's case. Prejudicial error, when constitutional questions are being considered, is error which would have some likelihood of changing the result. State v. Blue Thunder, 466 N.W.2d 613, 618-19 (S.D.1991) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). A constitutional violation may constitute harmless error, and thus not require reversal, if the court can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless and did not contribute to the verdict obtained. State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 819 (S.D.1987). We are thus required to ask whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty absent the admission of Schuster's statements to Evans. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-511, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1981, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 107 (1983). State produced a plethora of forceful evidence at trial. Julie Fernen's testimony placed D.T. and Schuster at Orman Dam the night of the rape. D.T. herself testified as to the alleged penetration by Schuster and reporting the rape shortly thereafter to Julie Fernan, Bechen, and the police. Bechen testified to finding D.T. half-naked, upset, and asking for help. Two psychologists and a psychiatrist testified that D.T. had the mental capacity of only an eight- or nine-year-old. In addition, the psychiatrist and one psychologist testified that D.T. exhibited signs of post-traumatic stress syndrome. Schuster, on the other hand, alleged only that any penetration of D.T. was consensual. Schuster's testimony via the taped interview by Evans did not present any evidence inconsistent with his defense and, in fact, was the only evidence presented upon which such a defense could be premised. Nowhere in the interview does Schuster admit to raping D.T. Rather, Schuster merely states that the sexual relations between he and D.T. were consensual. [3] The facts in this case closely parallel the facts in State v. Forcier, 420 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.1988). In Forcier, the rape victim was twenty-three years old and had an IQ of only 77. Id. at 884. The victim reported being forced to submit to fellatio and anal intercourse. Id. at 885. The defendant made statements following his Miranda warning admitting to fellatio with the victim, but denying anal intercourse. Id. While the court found that the defendant's statements should not have been admitted at trial, it declared the error harmless in light of the other evidence presented at trial. Id. at 887. The victim had promptly reported the matter to his neighbor, boss, and the police; the medical evidence corroborated the victim's testimony; and, the defendant failed to present any witnesses or testimony at trial, instead arguing that penetration of the victim was consensual. The court thus determined that the jury had sufficient evidence to sustain its verdict absent the defendant's statements. Id. In light of the other evidence presented at trial, we find that Schuster's statements to Evans, admitting that he penetrated D.T., were not essential to sustain Schuster's conviction. Thus, while Schuster's statements were inadmissible, we find their admission to be harmless error and affirm Schuster's conviction. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, J., concur. HENDERSON and SABERS, JJ., dissent.