Opinion ID: 2302568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Counts 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 & 11)

Text: On appeal, Tarzia also contends that this Court should recognize other causes of action based in common law for alleged violations of the sealing statute. Tarzia argues that although the only remedy explicitly included in the sealing statute is a monetary fine, there exist other causes of action available to him. [18] In fact, Tarzia asserts that the $100 fine in the sealing statute bolsters his argument in this regard by imposing a duty on custodians of police and court records. This argument draws our attention to the well-established rule of statutory construction that when, as here, a statute operates in    derogation of the common law, we are charged with a strict interpretation of the General Assembly's language. Sindelar v. Leguia, 750 A.2d 967, 970 (R.I.2000) (citing Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 876 (R.I.1996)). Here, Tarzia conceded in the Superior Court, as he must, that at common law, there is no right to the sealing of court records or the destruction of police records, and thus the sealing statute operates in derogation of the common law. The plain language of the sealing statute indicates that the only redress for a violation of that statute is a fine not exceeding $100. Indeed, nothing in the statutory language remotely suggests that a further remedy applies. The fact that the Legislature specifically limited the remedy for the violation of the statute to a monetary fine demonstrates that the [L]egislature provided precisely the redress it considered appropriate[,] and therefore we decline to expand that remedy. Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Limited Partnership v. Burrillville Racing Association, Inc., 989 F.2d 1266, 1270 (1st Cir.1993). We note that, in support of his argument to expand the remedies allowed under the sealing statute, Tarzia relies on this Court's holding in Stebbins v. Wells, 818 A.2d 711, 717 (R.I.2003) ( Stebbins II ), [19] in which we held that a monetary fine instituted by a statute did not preclude further causes of action sounding in negligence. In Stebbins II, this Court, in interpreting the Real Estate Sales Disclosure Act (the act), initially reaffirmed that the function of prescribing remedies for [statutory] rights is a legislative responsibility [and] not a judicial task. Id. at 716 (quoting Cummings v. Shorey, 761 A.2d 680, 685 (R.I.2000)). However, after reaffirming this general rule, this Court concluded that the act did not preclude an aggrieved buyer's separate causes of action against a real estate agent, despite the act containing a statutory penalty of $100. Id. In so doing, this Court held that the act imposed a duty on real estate agents to disclose to a potential buyer of real estate any material defect in the property that the agent has knowledge of and that could affect the buyer's decision, and that a breach of this duty may be the basis for a negligence claim. Id. at 718-19. The Stebbins II case is distinguishable from this case because the act in Stebbins II, 818 A.2d at 718, codified an existing exception to the common law principle of caveat emptor. Specifically, the statute codified the principle that, in real estate transactions, passive concealment by the seller may be grounds for a cause of action. Id. (quoting Stebbins v. Wells, 766 A.2d 369, 373 (R.I.2001) ( Stebbins I )). Indeed, in Stebbins II we recognized that this exception extends to an agent to disclose any known defects to a potential buyer of real estate in situations where [the agent] has special knowledge not apparent to the buyer and is aware that the buyer is acting under a misapprehension as to facts which would be important to the buyer and would probably affect [his or her] decision. Id. (quoting Stebbins I, 766 A.2d at 373). Hence, the act did not create a right unrecognized at common law, but rather codified an exception under the common law. In contrast, the sealing statute in the case at bar is purely a statutory right that has no basis in common law. When a statute `does not plainly provide for a private cause of action [for damages], such a right cannot be inferred.' Stebbins II, 818 A.2d at 716 (quoting Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 584 (R.I.1998)). Upon application of a strict interpretation of the sealing statute, this Court is constrained to conclude that a violation of this non-common-law statutory right cannot yield Tarzia a cause of action based in common-law negligence. See Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 582, 584 (refusing to recognize a negligence claim against the state and local municipality for the violation of a statutory right created in derogation of common law). In conclusion, we hold that there is simply no reason to promulgate by judicial fiat additional causes of action based upon the sealing statute, and we affirm the trial court's decision on counts 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, accordingly. 3