Opinion ID: 185833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Management Rights Clause

Text: 35 Next we address Regal's argument that the Board erroneously interpreted the management rights clause contained in the collective bargaining agreements between Regal and the Locals. According to Regal, the Board erred in applying a waiver analysis to the management rights clause because the clause arguably covered Regal's decision to convert to manager-operated theaters. Thus, Regal maintains, the Board should have analyzed the management rights clause under standard contract law principles. This argument fails. 36 Although a union may waive its statutory protection against an employer's unilateral changes in subjects of mandatory bargaining, we will not infer such a waiver from a general contractual provision unless the waiver is `clear and unmistakable.' Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 125, 133 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708, 103 S.Ct. 1467, 1477, 75 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983)). In determining whether a union has clearly and unmistakably waived its bargaining rights, we consider the language of the collective bargaining agreement as well as the bargaining history between the parties when it is crucial to understanding the purpose behind the contractual language. Local Union No. 47, IBEW v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 635, 640 (D.C.Cir.1991). Waiver analysis does not apply, however, if a collective bargaining agreement covers the challenged action. NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 832, 836-37 (D.C.Cir. 1993) (USPS). Unlike waiver, by which a union knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes its right to bargain, if a subject matter is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the union has exercised its bargaining right and the question of waiver is irrelevant. Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 962 F.2d 48, 50 (D.C.Cir.1992). In such a case, the resolution of the refusal to bargain charge rests on an interpretation of the contract at issue. USPS, 8 F.3d at 837. 37 Applying a waiver analysis, the Board concluded that the management rights clause did not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of bargaining regarding the allocation of the work among different classifications of employees. JDA 9. Relying upon our decision in USPS, 8 F.3d at 836-38, Regal argues that the Board should have applied a covered by analysis to the management rights clause. Specifically, Regal argues that the management rights clause, which expressly authorized Regal to introduce new or improved work methods ... processes and procedures and to change or eliminate existing ... procedures or work, JDA 583, 590, 596, implicitly afforded Regal the right to change or eliminate projectionist work without first bargaining, Br. for Pet'r at 32-33. Regal attempts to buttress its reading of the management rights clause by emphasizing, among other contextual factors, the fact that the parties adopted the clause only after Regal had made known to the Locals its intent to convert all of its theaters to manager-operated. 38 Regal's reliance on USPS is misplaced. Although Regal correctly observes that we rejected the Board's crabbed reading of the `waiver'/'covered by' distinction in USPS — a reading which relied upon the fact that the management rights clause did not specifically refer to the type of employer decision at issue in the case — Regal overlooks crucial differences between the management rights clause at issue in USPS and its own. USPS, 8 F.3d at 838. The broadly worded management rights clause in USPS gave the Postal Service the exclusive right [t]o hire promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions within the Postal Service, [t]o maintain the efficiency of the operations entrusted to it and [t]o determine the methods, means, and personnel by which such operations are to be conducted. Id. at 835. Rejecting the Board's waiver analysis, we held that the above language covered the Postal Service's unilateral decision to change the work schedules of its employees. Id. at 838. 39 Here, Regal advocates a more expansive reading of a much narrower management rights clause. Unlike the clause in USPS, id. at 835, Regal's management rights clause does not grant the authority to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees, see JDA 583, 590, 596. As the General Counsel observes, the plain language of the clause involves only the right to introduce new technology, machinery, and methods for the projectionists to execute the tasks they are to perform. Br. for Resp't at 37. In fact, the clause mentions employees only with respect to Regal's obligation to negotiate the effects [of such decisions] on the employees. JDA 583, 590, 596. Regal thus fashions its covered by argument around the language giving it the authority to change or eliminate existing methods, procedures or work. JDA 583, 590, 596. But Regal's actions here are not embraced by the literal language of the management rights clause. As discussed above, the record shows that Regal's decision involved no change in the methods or procedures of projection and no elimination of work. Rather, Regal merely transferred to managers work that was previously done by projectionists. Moreover, we have previously cautioned that the canon of ejusdem generis (`of the same kind or class') counsels against ... reading [a] general phrase to include conduct wholly unlike that specified in the immediately preceding list of prohibited acts. Mohave Elec. Coop., Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 1183, 1191-92 (D.C.Cir. 2000). We therefore find that the language of the management rights clause fails to support Regal's argument that the clause authorized its unilateral decision to convert all of its theaters to manager-operated. 40 The bargaining history between Regal and the Locals likewise fails to support Regal's claim. Although Regal repeatedly emphasizes that it made known to the Locals its intent to convert all of its theaters to manager-operated before they separately agreed to the management rights clause, Regal does not and apparently [cannot] show that any specific discussions occurred during negotiations that equated or tied in that `intention' with its introduction of the management rights clause. JDA 18. Absent such affirmative evidence, we are loath to conclude that a union would knowingly agree to a clause that would effectively permit the employer to unilaterally extinguish the bargaining unit altogether. Hence, Regal's argument that the Locals should have understood that the management rights clause permitted Regal to eliminate the projectionist position simply fails. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's conclusion that the Locals did not clearly and unmistakably waive their right to bargain over the transfer of unit work to non-unit employees. See Honeywell Int'l, 253 F.3d at 133.