Opinion ID: 2015708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Conflict with Public Policy

Text: Our inquiry must next focus upon whether the contract in this case, as interpreted by the arbitrator, clearly violates that policy. We are mindful of the fact that the foregoing public policy conflicts with the policy inherent in providing for time limits within which disciplinary charges or claims may be brought. However, the State's interest in its children's welfare and protection must override AFSCME's concerns for timeliness. In certain cases, interpreting the time provisions as the arbitrator did in this case and ordering reinstatement will not contravene the public policy enunciated above. Mere charges of tardiness, standing alone, would not contravene that public policy. However, the manner in which the time provision was enforced in this case with respect to the misconduct at issue cannot be upheld. As with any limitation, the nature of the conduct at issue must be considered before arbitrary time restrictions can be imposed. The arbitrator's remedy for the violation of the contract's time provision caused him to fully reinstate a DCFS child welfare specialistcharged with both falsifying a uniform progress report intended for submission to the Juvenile Court and neglecting to compile required family service plans for three yearswithout any determination that the welfare of the minors in the DCFS system will not be compromised by such a reinstatement. Rather, he avoided discussion of the charges against DuBose. He did not take any precautionary steps to ensure the misconduct at issue here will not be repeated, and he neither considered nor respected the pertinent public policy concerns that arose from them. Thus, the remedy in this case violates public policy in that it totally ignores any legitimate public policy concerns. As with any contract, a court may not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement in a manner that is contrary to public policy. Accordingly, if an arbitrator construes such an agreement in a way that violates public policy, an award based on that construction may be vacated by a court. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S.Ct. at 2183, 76 L.Ed.2d at 307. Questions of public policy, of course, are ultimately left for resolution by the courts. Board of Trustees, 74 Ill.2d at 424, 24 Ill.Dec. 843, 386 N.E.2d 47; see also W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S.Ct. at 2183, 76 L.Ed.2d at 307. Even if the arbitrator had considered issues of public policy, we may not abdicate to him our responsibility to protect the public interest at stake. Board of Trustees, 74 Ill.2d at 424, 24 Ill.Dec. 843, 386 N.E.2d 47. We believe the public policy identified above is violated by the arbitral award in this case. That award cannot be said to in any way promote the welfare and protection of children. DCFS, in agreeing to a time provision that does not allow for exigent disciplinary circumstances, has compromised its ability to discharge its duties as expressed by the General Assembly. Thus, we believe the appellate court's likening of the parties' contractual time provision to our criminal statutes of limitation is flawed. Such statutes, as enacted by the legislature, embody the public's regard of the seriousness of the conduct in issue. Although certain crimes do carry statutes of limitation within which prosecution must be commenced, some crimes such as treason, arson, forgery, first and second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, and reckless homicide do not. 720 ILCS 5/3-5(a) (West 1992). Therefore, the people of this state, through the General Assembly, have recognized that certain conduct is never subject to time limitations and may be prosecuted at any time, no matter the staleness. We cannot compare such statutory provisions with the time provision contained in the collective-bargaining agreement at issue here, particularly where the agreement applies to employees of a state agency charged with particular responsibilities which represent the will of the public with respect to the welfare and protection of children. That said, we do not lightly disregard the right of the parties to privately negotiate their contracts. Nor do we attempt to restrain them in any way from so acting in the future. However, where public employment is at issue and that employment concerns the welfare and protection of minors, this court must balance these competing, positive policies so that the two can co-exist harmoniously and the public can reap the benefits from both. Likewise, we find the analogy to the statutes of limitation governing civil actions between citizens unpersuasive because we are not dealing with private claims here, but claims arising from employment with an agency which represents the State and derives its duties from the General Assembly. Case law teaches us that in matters concerning child abuse and neglect, even a parent's rights yield to the State's interest in protecting its children. Although the timeliness provision of the contract is laudatory and espouses the concepts inherent in our government's disapproval of stale claims, it, too, must yield to the public's interest in the welfare and protection of abused and neglected children. Nevertheless, AFSCME contends that the award of reinstatement here does not violate public policy because there is no positive law which forbids DCFS from rehiring a worker in DuBose's situation. We acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court left unanswered the question of whether only a precise violation of a positive law, caused by the award itself, is necessary before a court may vacate the award on public policy grounds. As a result, the federal circuit courts of appeals have taken different views on the matter. Compare United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C.Cir.1987) (upholding reinstatement of postal carrier convicted of unlawful delay of mail because there was no legal proscription against reinstatement of such employee), with United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir.1984) (vacating reinstatement of postal employee who had been convicted of embezzlement of postal funds on public policy grounds despite no legal proscription against rehiring such employees). However, in cases where the safety and welfare of third persons is compromised, the results are more consistent. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir.1993) (vacating arbitral award which reinstated seaman discharged for intoxication while on duty); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America AFL-CIO, Local Union 540 v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.1983) (vacating arbitral award which reinstated driver who drove employer's truck while drunk). In this case, we need not elaborate as to the potential tragedies which can result from even one false DCFS case report. We believe that a bright-line test requiring that the award itself violate an explicit law has the potential to swallow the public policy exception. Indeed, this case illustrates why such a narrow view is unworkable. None of the acts enacted by the legislature concerning DCFS contain any statute which explicitly prohibits the agency from hiring dishonest workers or workers previously disciplined for dishonesty. True, too, there is no statute which expressly prohibits a DCFS worker from submitting a false case report. Such prohibitions are absent because the very essence of the acts presupposes that only trustworthy workers will be hired. The employment of any other type of worker defeats the legislative purpose surrounding the entire statutory scheme. That DCFS caseworkers be diligent and truthful is not a general consideration[] of supposed public interests. Given their statutory mandates, truthfulness, diligence, and honesty are implicit in their duties. For DCFS to employ an untrustworthy child welfare specialist violates these implied mandates. For these reasons, we decline AFSCME's invitation to adopt such a rigid rule in cases where public policy is at issue. We also disagree with AFSCME's contention that the contractual time provision at issue here protects industrial due process and, as such, must be upheld. Courts have defined industrial due process as merely requiring employers to give employees advance notice of and an opportunity to respond to the charges against them before discipline is imposed. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein). DuBose received both notice and an opportunity to be heard; therefore, industrial due process, as defined by our courts, has been satisfied in this case. Moreover, some courts have recognized that the just cause provisions found in many collective bargaining agreements also trigger analyses in terms of industrial due process. See, e.g., Chauffeurs Local Union No. 878 v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 716, 718 (8th Cir.1980). Indeed, just cause, like the time provision at issue here, is a condition precedent to discipline. However, that has not prevented courts from vacating, on public policy grounds, reinstatements based upon the lack of just cause. We stress that our decision should not be interpreted as denigrating either the notion or importance of industrial due process in the day-to-day administration of labor contracts in the workplace. We simply fail to see any violation of the concept in the present case. Finally, AFSCME submits that if we were to overturn the arbitral award, we would be encouraging employers to ignore the bargained-for rights that employees have earned through the collective-bargaining agreement. We disagree. Nothing in our decision restrains an arbitrator from imposing sanctions against employers who violate a contractual provision. The arbitrator remains free to determine appropriate remedies within the confines of the collective-bargaining agreement. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: As long as the arbitrator's remedy is `rationally explainable as a logical means of furthering the aims of the contract' [citation], the arbitrator may for example, impose monetary penalties, order the [employer] to reimburse the employee for rehabilitation programs, order reinstatement of the employee to a position in which he poses no danger to the public, or create its own unique sanction to deter overreaching by the employer. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 3 F.3d 255, 263 (8th Cir. 1993). In fact, as long as the arbitrator makes a rational finding that the employee can be trusted to refrain from the offending conduct, the arbitrator may reinstate the employee to his or her former job, and we would be obliged to affirm the award. See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 124 Ill.2d at 263, 124 Ill.Dec. 553, 529 N.E.2d 534 (upholding arbitrator's reinstatement despite public policy arguments because arbitrator found employees were exemplary, some punishment had been imposed, and the conduct at issue did not threaten patient safety). Accord Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C.Cir.1987) (upholding reinstatement of pilot who flew commercial airliner while drunk because reinstatement was conditioned upon the pilot's recertification by the Federal Aviation Administration); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Independent Ass'n of East Chicago, Inc., 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.1986) (upholding reinstatement of employee discharged after mental breakdown at work because arbitrator specifically found that recurrence of mental illness was unlikely so that worker safety was not comprised). However, the arbitrator's freedom in fashioning an appropriate remedy is not without limitation, as this case amply demonstrates. Where, as here, an arbitrator awards full reinstatement as a remedy for the contractual violation without any findings that the worker poses no risk to the welfare and protection of DCFS's children and their families, the award simply cannot stand. For the reasons stated earlier in this opinion, the full measure of the arbitrator's discretion must always yield to public policy. Accordingly, we must decide the proper disposition of this case given our conclusions as to the public policy identified and the arbitral award of reinstatement. AFSCME's demurrer at the second arbitration hearing has complicated our review of the case in that AFSCME contends throughout its brief that the employee has never been found guilty of any of the conduct alleged by DCFS. Specifically, AFSCME argues that in the absence of a finding by the [a]rbitrator that the employee was guilty of misconduct, there is no basis for an argument predicated on public policy. Although such an argument may be justified in the name of zealous advocacy, we find it to be a perversion of the record. The procedural history of this case reveals that AFSCME, by its own actions, prevented the arbitrator from making any such findings. The original circuit court order in this case stated the following: Plaintiff's Petition to Vacate the Arbitrator's Award and Remand to the Arbitrator for a hearing on the Merits is granted as the Arbitrator's Award is contrary to public policy of this State as set forth in the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. (Emphasis added.) AFSCME then requested the circuit court to certify the issue regarding public policy and the timeliness provision under Supreme Court Rule 308 for purposes of an interlocutory appeal. The circuit court denied the request. Thus, because the court found that the case did not involve a question of law as to which there was a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, AFSCME was obligated to return to the arbitrator for a hearing on the merits, as ordered by the circuit court. Notwithstanding the above order, AFSCME elected not to proceed with a hearing on the merits. Rather, AFSCME submitted the following to the arbitrator upon remand: The Union has decided to interpose a demurrer on the basis of the time-limits provision in the contract as interpreted and applied in your vacated award. Rather than arguing the merits, we will stand on the first award. The time-limits provision was predicated upon the agreement of the parties that it would violate an employee's due process rights to require the employee to defend herself against State charges as in the present case. [The circuit court] in effect has found either that the State cannot agree to such a due process protection or that it cannot be applied to the instant case. His order fails to explicate his reasoning for applying the public policy doctrine. Accordingly, the Union will not offer a defense to the State's charges and its claim that they warrant discharge. It is our position that, to do so, would severely prejudice Ms. DuBose's right to legally challenge [the circuit court's] order vacating your award. Under these circumstances, [the Union] submits that you have no authority under the Court order but to deny the grievance, recognizing that the Union has elected to stand on its rights under the earlier award. (Emphasis added.) In the arbitrator's supplemental arbitral order following the remand from the circuit court, he reasoned that AFSCME, by way of its demurrer, had withdrawn all of its remaining arguments to the discharge, including the issue of just cause. This is an apt conclusion given the fact that the demurrer states that AFSCME specifically stood on the time-limits provision of the contract, as interpreted and applied in [the arbitrator's] vacated award. (Emphasis added.) The arbitrator concluded that there is no longer anything before me to decide. If a party chooses to no longer press a position, I cannot compel it to do so. Thereafter, the arbitrator denied the grievance in the following language: Given [the circuit court's] order, the parties' positions prompted by the procedural posture of this matter, the Union's demurrer and notwithstanding my prior award sustaining the grievance, and recognizing that the Union has elected to stand on its rights under the earlier award, the grievance is now denied based upon the Union's demurrer. The circuit court confirmed the supplemental arbitral order, and AFSCME appealed to the appellate court, which reversed the court's confirmation and reinstated the initial arbitral award. Thus, the case comes to us in a somewhat unusual procedural posturethe common law demurrer, as such, no longer exists in Illinois, the General Assembly having abolished it over 60 years ago. See Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 110, par. 2-615, Joint Committee Comments [1955], at 407 (Smith-Hurd 1983). After the enactment of the Civil Practice Act, the demurrer evolved into what is now recognized as a motion to dismiss under section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 1992)). Such a motion raises the question of the sufficiency of the pleadings, as a matter of law, and admits the pleadings solely for purposes of deciding the legal question. However, once that legal question has been answered and rejected, and a circuit court orders the case to be heard on the merits, the time to demur on the pleadings has passed. See generally 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(b) (West 1992). Here, AFSCME requested the arbitrator, and later the circuit court, to rule on DCFS's failure to impose discipline in a timely fashion. Although the arbitrator agreed with AFSCME that the discipline was not imposed as soon as possible, the circuit court rejected that contention and ordered the case to be heard on the merits. Thus, in the absence of some other defensive pleading attacking DCFS's allegations, the case was no longer at the pleading stage, and AFSCME was not entitled to reiterate its previously rejected position by way of a demurrer. In this context, AFSCME's demurrer served only as a withdrawal of all of its other challenges to the discharge. Put another way, those challenges were abandoned. We further note that AFSCME's contention that it had to preserve its argument regarding the as soon as possible language because the circuit court had denied its request for Rule 308 certification is disingenuous. Although the circuit court's order was nonfinal for purposes of appeal, an appeal from a subsequent final judgment `draws in question all prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment.' Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill.2d 427, 433, 31 Ill.Dec. 178, 394 N.E.2d 380 (1979), quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1253 (3d Cir. 1977). The denial of Rule 308 certification does not render the issue nonappealable after a subsequent entry of a final judgment. Accordingly, there was no danger that the issue of timeliness would not be preserved for later appellate review. AFSCME's abandonment of its remaining challenges to the discharge leaves this court with the sole issue of whether the arbitrator's remedy for the violation of the as soon as possible contractual languagea blanket reinstatementviolates public policy. We have found that it does. Because AFSCME has stood on the arbitrator's application of the as soon as possible language, all of its remaining contentions have been waived, and a full hearing as to those contentions is no longer appropriate. AFSCME had the opportunity to make a record before the arbitrator on these remaining contentions in order to preserve them, but willingly chose not to do so. It cannot now change its stance. See Leffler v. Browning, 14 Ill.2d 225, 228, 151 N.E.2d 342 (1958). AFSCME further maintains that this court must remand the case to the arbitrator on a limited basis for reconsideration of a remedy for DCFS's violation of the as soon as possible language. In other words, if a remand for a hearing on the merits is not possible, then this court should nevertheless remand the matter for a redetermination of the appropriate remedy. We find this request to be tenuous at best. First, AFSCME is now asking this court for reconsideration of the appropriate remedy despite the fact that it had previously indicated to the arbitrator that it was prepared to stand on the [arbitrator's] first award. Second, nothing in this case prohibited AFSCME from trying the case on the merits, and then, once the arbitrator determined all of the factual questions, requesting that an appropriate remedy be fashioned. Finally, the possibility of a remand for redetermination of a different remedy based solely on the failure to impose timely discipline has already been precluded by the arbitrator's interpretation of the as soon as possible language, an interpretation AFSCME specifically stood on. Indeed, in construing the contractual provision at issue, i.e., [d]iscipline shall be imposed as soon as possible after the Employer is aware of the event or action giving rise to the discipline and has a reasonable period or time to investigate the matter, the arbitrator discussed various remedies which he could utilize to give effect to the provision. The arbitrator reviewed other arbitral decisions in which delay was found and discipline nonetheless was imposed. He rejected, however, the notion that any other remedy absent a blanket reinstatement was appropriate. Specifically, the arbitrator stated at length: The answer to the remedy question in this case comes from the parties' negotiated words.    If discipline is not imposed `as soon as possible', the merits of the discipline cannot be addressedno matter how egregious the alleged misconduct may be.             The result of my conclusion is simple and provides stability. Most importantly, my conclusion follows the clear language of the Agreement and is what the parties agreed to.    Given that the discipline has been found to be invalid, the only remedy is that Grievant must be reinstated to her former position without loss of seniority and other rights and benefits and she shall be made whole for all lost compensation. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the arbitrator specifically adopted an all or nothing approach as a remedy for a violation of the timeliness provision, to the exclusion of all other remedies. This approach is analogous to that taken by courts when ruling on motions to dismiss based upon statutes of limitations. If an action is not timely filed, the only remedy is dismissal of the entire cause of action without any determination of the merits. Here, the arbitrator reasonably interpreted the timeliness provision to admit of no other remedies but a blanket reinstatement without reaching the merits of the case. He, rightly or wrongly, explicitly rejected imposing any other remedy. Accordingly, we cannot order a remand even if we were to disagree with the arbitrator's honest judgment as to the unavailability of other remedies. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 108 S.Ct. at 371, 98 L.Ed.2d at 299. Indeed, such action on our part would severely undermine the role of judicial review in the arbitral process. As the United States Supreme Court has stated: The question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1429 (1960). The Supreme Court has also advised courts not to be suspicious of an arbitrator's interpretation merely because an arbitrator's actions might not track those that courts would take when faced with analogous situations. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1351-52, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1416-17 (1960). In Misco, the Court again cautioned that the deference to an arbitrator's determination is high even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract. Misco, 484 U.S. at 36, 108 S.Ct. at 370, 98 L.Ed.2d at 298. Therefore, even if we were to interpret the collective-bargaining agreement to permit other remedies which would not violate public policy in this case, our interpretation of the contract is irrelevant in the face of the arbitrator's specific conclusion that no other remedy existed. The arbitrator's factual determinations and legal conclusions generally receive deferential review as long as they derive their essence from the collective-bargaining agreement, notwithstanding the error of those factual or legal conclusions. Thus, we do not have the license to order a remand for the imposition of some other remedy when the arbitrator has specifically rejected the possibility of other remedies. We simply lack the authority to so act. We are mindful that the public policy exception has become a favorite pretext for those less than favorably disposed to the awards of labor arbitrators. Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir.1989). We believe that our opinion, however, strikes the proper balance between the public's interest in protecting its children, the utilization of arbitration as a means for settling labor disputes, and the proper role of the judiciary in the arbitral process. Unfortunately, the dissenting justices fail to appreciate this fact. We believe that Justice Harrison's remarks have little to do with the legal issues in this case. We further believe, with respect, the criticisms of Justices Heiple and Nickels reflect a serious misunderstanding of our opinion. In arguing that the deaths of the three children in this case were wholly unrelated to anything Vera DuBose may have done wrong, Justice Harrison states that he could not forget[] that dead children figure into this case. 173 Ill.2d at 337-338, 219 Ill.Dec. at 520, 671 N.E.2d at 687. However, this case is not about dead children. The case is about children who are alive today and under DCFS protection. It is those children who depend upon child welfare specialists like Vera DuBose to monitor their cases and to speak for them in the court proceedings where their neglect, abuse, and dependency are at issue and where their futures are decided. The case illustrates what happens, or could happen, if false reports are made by DCFS child welfare specialistsreports which are submitted to our circuit judges in difficult and emotional proceedings where child placement decisions are made. Serious consequences may follow if Vera DuBose fails to fulfil her statutory duty. In our view, it was DuBose's falsification of the progress report and her failure to make service plans which is the harm suffered in this case, not the fact that three children have tragically died. Justice Harrison also chides us for waiting until now to debut our compassion for the children of this State. 173 Ill.2d at 337, 219 Ill.Dec. at 520, 671 N.E.2d at 687. Even if he were correct in his assessment of our previous decisions, which he is not, what would he have us do in this case? Perpetuate our indifference? He then insists that the only distinction between DuBose's case and that of the two mental health technicians in AFSCME v. State of Illinois is that the person who died in [that case] was a profoundly mentally retarded patient    and not a child, as was the case here. 173 Ill.2d at 339, 219 Ill.Dec. at 521, 671 N.E.2d at 688. He suggests that we view the life of a mental patient as somehow less worthy of our concern and protection than the life of a child and hastens to remind us that we are duty bound to place such prejudices behind [us] when acting as justices of this court [where we] are obliged to follow the law, and under the law of Illinois, all people are equal. 173 Ill.2d at 339, 219 Ill.Dec. at 521, 671 N.E.2d at 688. These accusations are not only unfounded, but they have no place in a judicial opinion and do not deserve the dignity of a response. Returning to the legal issues in this case, we note that although Justices Heiple and Nickels omit the rancor, they, too, view AFSCME v. State of Illinois as analogous to the case before us. However, DuBose's situation is not analogous to that of the two mental health technicians. As we have explained, the arbitrator there reinstated the workers by reducing their dismissals to suspensions. We upheld the arbitral decision because the arbitrator expressly found that the employees were exemplary mental health employees,    punishment ha[s] been imposed, and    no nexis [ sic ] exist[ed] between the infraction and the    death. AFSCME v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill.2d at 262-63, 124 Ill.Dec. 553, 529 N.E.2d 534. That holding specifically recognized the long-standing principle that an employee's amenability to discipline is a factual determination which cannot be questioned or rejected by a reviewing court. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 44-45, 108 S.Ct. at 374, 98 L.Ed.2d at 303. In other words, this court's decision then reflected the understanding that [o]rdinarily, a court would be hard-pressed to find a public policy barring reinstatement in a case in which an arbitrator has, expressly or by implication, determined that the employee is subject to rehabilitation and therefore not likely to commit an act which violates public policy in the future. Stead, 886 F.2d at 1213. Of course, such an express or implied determination from the arbitrator is totally lacking in this case. And that, of course, is why AFSCME v. State of Illinois, is of little assistance in resolving the issues presented in this case. In addition, Justice Heiple stresses that, in this case, no nexus exists between DuBose's conduct and the unfortunate deaths of the children. He states that our previous decisions have required a nexus between the misconduct and the harm suffered in order for the public policy exception to apply. 173 Ill.2d at 336, 219 Ill.Dec. at 520, 671 N.E.2d at 687. However, this court has never ruled that such a nexus must exist and to suggest otherwise oversimplifies the holding of AFSCME v. State of Illinois. This court's decision there did not turn solely on whether a nexus existed. The court, in fact, identified two other factors which were equally important: whether the arbitral award sanctioned violations of the law (it did not because the misconduct did not go unpunished) and whether the arbitral decision posed a threat of harm to third persons (it did not based upon the arbitrator's factual findings). See AFSCME v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill.2d at 263-65, 124 Ill.Dec. 553, 529 N.E.2d 534. Justice Heiple does not consider these two other elements and does not discuss how they would apply to the facts in this case. The arbitral award here fails to safeguard DCFS, the courts, and the public from any possible future falsifications and neglect on DuBose's part. This shortcoming, in the eyes of the dissenting justices, is insufficient to warrant the invocation of the public policy exception. Instead, the dissenting justices are confident that the next children who would come under DuBose's supervision would receive from her all that the legislature demands. They apparently trust that the next uniform progress report prepared by DuBose for use at a placement hearing in the circuit court would be accurate. We, however, cannot take the risk which attends to such confidence. In this respect, Justices Nickels and Harrison suggest that we are improperly speculating or assuming that DuBose will be derelict in the future. Nothing is further from the truth. We are merely mindful that DuBose's past performance has called into question her dedication to and her ability to perform a job which impacts on the safety and welfare of others. As we have stated, when public policy is at issue, it is the court's responsibility to protect the public interest at stake. That is why courts will not give the drunken pilot the opportunity to fly a commercial airliner again even though no harm befell his passengers. Likewise, courts will step in to insure that the hungry nuclear power plant employee will not contaminate an entire population the next time he is in a hurry to eat lunch. Justice Nickels states that we have removed an important bargained-for due process consideration from the collective-bargaining agreement (173 Ill.2d at 347, 219 Ill.Dec. at 525, 671 N.E.2d at 692), and Justice Harrison denounces us for reducing industrial due process to a sham (173 Ill.2d at 342, 219 Ill.Dec. at 522, 671 N.E.2d at 689). In fact, Justice Harrison's polemic leaves one with the misimpression that our decision sounds the death knell for organized labor in this state because an employer can now take away an employee's job without ever having to substantiate its charges of misconduct. None of these points are very well-taken and, in fact, fall wide of the mark. First, our opinion in no way enables DCFS to take away DuBose's job without substantiating its allegations. Justice Harrison forgets that it was AFSCME, by its own procedural posturing, that insured that result by filing its ill-advised demurrer after the circuit court specifically ordered the case to be heard on its merits. At that time, AFSCME elected not to offer a defense to the charges. Therefore, as the arbitrator before us did at the conclusion of the second hearing, we, too, must conclude that just cause did, in fact, exist for DuBose's dismissal. See Ramonas v. Kerelis, 102 Ill.App.2d 262, 243 N.E.2d 711 (1968) (holding that a party's default at arbitration hearing results in a complete, final, and binding determination of the controversy). Once AFSCME removed the issue of just cause from its grievance, DCFS's charges became substantiated. Our opinion today did not compel that result nor should the blame for it rest upon our shoulders. Second, our opinion in no way holds that the timeliness provision in the collective-bargaining agreement can never be invoked. Rather, our opinion merely recognizes the fact that in certain cases, a mechanical application of the provision may, as it did here, collide with public policy. Indeed, DCFS employees who occupy sensitive positions concerning the safety and welfare of the people DCFS is legislatively designed to protect are more susceptible to a public policy challenge than those workers who do not. Simply stated, a DCFS child welfare specialist is not in the same league as a DCFS janitor. The public policy concerns implicated in the case of the former are notably absent in the case of the latter. Our opinion acknowledges this reality. Moreover, our recognition of the possibility of other remedies, short of a blanket reinstatement, belies any intimation on the part of the dissent that we have ignored the language of the collective-bargaining agreement at issue. We note that it is in this context that Justice Harrison accuses us of union busting. 173 Ill.2d at 342, 219 Ill.Dec. at 522, 671 N.E.2d at 689. Like his other accusation regarding our impartiality, this charge, too, lacks merit, is without any basis or support, and does not deserve the dignity of a response. The dissenting justices would have the highest court of this state play the part of an ostrich by putting its head in the sand and pretending that the potential for tragedy does not exist or, even worse, by waiting until some tragedy actually befalls a child. Although our concern for the children and families served by DCFS is cause enough for us to invoke public policy, we feel compelled to offer some observations, which, in our opinion, would seem superfluous but for the opprobrium utilized by some of our dissenting brethren. The ramifications of permitting the type of reinstatement ordered here would undoubtedly be felt by more than just the children and families served by DCFS. The resulting perception of a tolerance of dishonesty and neglect in DCFS workers would undermine the public's confidence in the system as a whole and would do little to enhance the public image of our unions and their workers. More important, such a reinstatement would leave our circuit judges in the unenviable position of having to second-guess the reports submitted by DuBose and her peers, reports which, as we have pointed out, are essential in carrying out the legislature's mandate regarding abused and neglected children. Their jobs, already arduous because of the nature of these proceedings, would be made even more onerous. We will not put our imprimatur on such a disaster. We do not believe that deference to arbitration, a concept with which we wholeheartedly agree, suffers at all if the judiciary retains the right to keep arbitrators within the bounds of public policy. Nor do we believe that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Misco compels the hands-off approach espoused in the dissents.