Opinion ID: 1763545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: be it enacted by the legislature of the state of minnesota:

Text: Section 1. Minnesota Statutes 1980, Section 518.552, is amended to read: 518.552 MAINTENANCE. Subdivision 1. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or in a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse and which has since acquired jurisdiction, the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: (a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, especially during a period of training or education, and (b) Is unable to adequately support himself after considering all relevant circumstances through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home. Subd. 2. The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time, either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors including: (a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian; (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, and the probability, given the spouse's age and skills, of completing education or training and becoming fully self-supporting; (c) The standard of living established during the marriage; (d) The duration of the marriage and, in the case of a homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the extent to which any education, skills, or experience have become outmoded and earning capacity has become permanently diminished; (e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and (f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; and (g) The contribution of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property, as well as the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker. Sec. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE. Section 1 is effective May 1, 1982. Approved March 22, 1982 Changes or additions are indicated by underline, deletions by strikeout. The legislative history of the 1982 amendment leaves no doubt as to the legislative intent. Senator Berglin, who had introduced the original section 518.552 legislation, spoke on behalf of her bill in the Subcommittee on Law Revision, Senate Judiciary Committee, as follows: Basically, this bill is brought to you because of some of the language in the ruling in Otis v. Otis which was recently, or last fall I believe, was ruled on, October 3rd, 1980, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court in a rather split decision chose to interpret the law that we passed on marriage dissolution and the awarding of maintenance to place heavy emphasis on the rehabilitative aspects of the bill. It was, of course, not the intention of the legislature to place emphasis on that aspect to the exclusion of permanent maintenance and the need for some homemakers, particularly homemakers of a longtime marriage, to be able to receive permanent maintenance. I think that it is clear that very oftentimes, if a person has been out of the work force for a very long period of time and is re-entering the work force late in life, that there is clearly permanent damage done to their ability to be able to participate in the work place in a competing manner, and certainly the economic capacity of that person's earning power has been diminished. What we are doing then in the bill is including language to make it clear to courts in the future in Minnesota that we mean both temporary and permanent maintenance. Subcommittee on Law Revision, Senate Judiciary Committee, Tuesday, April 7, 1981, S.F. 378. The following is the clarifying language adopted by the legislature: Subd. 2. The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time, either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just,          (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, and the probability, given the spouse's age and skills, of completing education or training and becoming fully self-supporting;       (d) The duration of the marriage and, in the case of a homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the extent to which any education, skills, or experience have become outmoded and earning capacity has become permanently diminished; This language makes clear that to the extent this court held in Otis that section 518.552 emphasizes rehabilitative maintenance to the exclusion of permanent maintenance, it is not good law and should not be followed. The legislature intended permanent maintenance to be, not a lifetime pension in every case, but an option in those cases where the earning capacity of a long-term homemaker has become permanently diminished during the course of the marriage. The primary issue in the case before us, as articulated in the majority opinion, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $4,000 per month as permanent spousal maintenance to Beverly Abuzzahab. The majority proposes to affirm the amount of the award for some period of time but concludes that the trial court's award of permanent maintenance is not justified. I cannot agree. The standard of review on appeal from a trial court's determination of a maintenance award is whether the trial court abused the wide discretion accorded it. Absent abuse, the determination is final. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn.1982). Beverly Abuzzahab was a psychiatric nurse over 20 years ago when she gave up that career upon her marriage to Dr. Faruk Abuzzahab to become a full-time homemaker and mother. The couple first adopted Dr. Abuzzahab's niece, then had four children of their own. Beverly Abuzzahab is 49 years old; today her professional skills are outmoded; and she suffers from chondromalasia, an inflammation beneath the kneecap which appears to require surgery on at least one knee. It is questionable whether with this condition she could perform nursing services even if there were a demand for her particular skills and those skills were rehabilitated. She is trying to sell real estate but at the time of trial had yet to realize her first commission from this source. She was awarded physical custody of the daughter and the youngest son, age 8, and will be obliged to use a substantial part of the property awarded to her, some of it not income-producing and not easily saleable, to provide a new home, while Dr. Abuzzahab will stay in the $400,000 family home, which is paid for, with the two older sons. The trial court was very concerned that the children in the mother's custody have the same advantages as the children in the father's custody, or at least not have their standard of living dramatically reduced, and took into consideration, in setting this award of maintenance, the minimal child support ordered. Dr. Abuzzahab's income from his professional corporation was $215,473 in the fiscal year ending July 31, 1981. [3] Beverly Abuzzahab was found by the court to have a maximum earning capability of $18,000 to $22,000 per year. The trial court considered the state of Beverly Abuzzahab's health; her age; her contribution as a homemaker for 20 years; the standard of living maintained during the marriage; her monthly living expenses, including income taxes payable on maintenance; her nonuse of her nursing skills and absence of career advancement for 20 years; and Faruk Abuzzahab's ability to pay maintenance from his current income level. The trial court found that Beverly Abuzzahab lacked sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to her, to provide her reasonable needs and that she was unable to adequately support herself under the relevant circumstances. The trial court then awarded permanent maintenance, recognizing that the amount would be subject to reduction when Beverly Abuzzahab returned to the work force full-time. This determination is within the broad discretion of the trial court and should be affirmed.