Opinion ID: 2180320
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Challenged State Action Restrains the Free Exercise of a Religious Belief

Text: [¶ 62] The pleadings do not establish whether, or the extent to which, the adoption of a duty of due care under the circumstances of the present case will restrain the free exercise of the Diocese's activities or beliefs, as required by the second step in Blount. By contrast, in Swanson we specifically concluded that the imposition of liability for negligent supervision against the Diocese would infringe upon [the Diocese's] right to determine the standards governing the relationship between the church, its bishop, and the parish priest. 1997 ME 63, ¶ 12, 692 A.2d at 445. [¶ 63] Fortin's claim is also distinguishable from Swanson because it is closely connected to an independent statutory duty. As the administrator of a school, the Diocese has been obligated since 1975 to report to civil authorities information that a child has been or is likely to be abused. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4011-A(1)(A)(13) (Supp.2004); P.L.1975, ch. 167, § 1 (effective Apr. 21, 1975). In 1997, subsequent to the time period during which Fortin claims to have been abused, a duty to report suspected child abuse was also imposed on [a] clergy member acquiring the information as a result of clerical professional work except for information received during confidential communications. P.L.1997, ch. 251, § 1 (effective Sept. 19, 1997); see also 22 M.R.S.A. § 4011-A(1)(A)(27). [¶ 64] The amended complaint specifies that the Diocese became aware that Melville had a propensity to sexually abuse minor boys as the result of a letter it received. Viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Fortin's amended complaint alleges circumstances under which the Diocese, as the administrator of a school, may have had a statutory duty to report the allegations in the letter pursuant to section 4011-A(1)(A)(13). Moreover, the Diocese may have a separate duty to report today pursuant to section 4011-A(1)(A)(27). This is in marked contrast to the circumstances that would exist, for example, if the Diocese received confidential information through the confessional, pastoral counseling, or some other confidential means because of the protection afforded confidential communications by section 4011-A(1)(A)(27). [¶ 65] The claim considered in Swanson did not implicate a statutory duty similar to that associated with Fortin's claim. Rather, our conclusion in Swanson was premised, in part, on the absence of any existing secular duties. See 1997 ME 63, ¶ 12, 692 A.2d at 445 (The imposition of secular duties and liability on the church as a `principal' will infringe upon its right to determine the standards governing the relationship between the church, its bishop, and the parish priest.). Here, the relationship between the diocese, its priest, and the State, as it pertains to nonconfidential information regarding child abuse, is already informed by the statutory reporting requirements established in sections 4011-A(1)(A)(13) and (27).