Opinion ID: 76722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hobbs Act Extortion Convictions

Text: 67 The jury convicted both Defendants of violating the Hobbs Act by extorting money from juvenile prostitutes. The Hobbs Act criminalizes conduct that in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by ... extortion.... 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
68 Pipkins contends that his conduct did not amount to extortion; this contention is meritless. Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear.... 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). According to Pipkins, the juvenile females voluntarily turned over their prostitution earnings to him as part of the rules of the game, which they knew about prior to beginning their independent contractor relationship with him. Therefore, he argues, the money never belonged to the prostitutes, and thus, any force or violence Pipkins used to extract his money from his prostitutes could not constitute extortion. 69 Pipkins's view of the facts is belied by the record. JF33 testified that she gave all of her money earned through prostitution to Pipkins because she had no choice, as Pipkins would beat her if she kept the proceeds for herself. When Pipkins learned that she had kept earnings, Pipkins hit her. JF5 also turned over all of the money she earned prostituting for fear of Pipkins beating her. These earnings were substantial: one night, Pipkins required her to meet a quota of $1,000. 70 Pipkins instituted and perpetuated a system in which his juvenile prostitutes turned over their earnings because of his threats and physical violence. This supports Pipkins's convictions on the Hobbs Acts extortion charges. 71
72 The Defendants also contend that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act charge. We review this issue for plain error because neither Defendant objected to the jury instruction in the district court. United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1148 (11th Cir.2003). We will find plain error only where (1) there is an error; (2) the error is plain or obvious; (3) the error affects the defendant's substantial rights in that it was prejudicial and not harmless; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding. United States v. O'Neal, 362 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir.2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The district court instructed the jury: 73 While it is not necessary to prove that the defendant specifically intended to interfere with interstate commerce, it is necessary that the Government prove that it was realistically probable that the natural consequences of the acts alleged in the indictment would be to delay, interrupt or affect interstate commerce, which means the flow of commerce or business activities between two or more states. The effect shown may be minimal. 74 The evidence is insufficient if it rests only on speculation about whether individuals might have spent money differently but for any extortionate act which you might find. 75 (R.24 at 1896.) Specifically, the Defendants contend that the phrase realistically probable that the natural consequences of the acts alleged in the indictment would be to ... affect interstate commerce ... allowed the jury to convict them without proof of an actual effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1085 (11th Cir.2001) (requiring an actual effect on interstate commerce to support a Hobbs Act conviction.) 76 The instruction given the jury is similar to Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 66.3, 11 which we approved in United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir.1997). While the pattern jury instruction does not contain the phrase realistically probable, the Government contends that we have held that the government need only show a realistic probability of an effect, or some actual de minimis effect, on commerce to bring the extortion within the reach of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351, 1354 (11th Cir.1999) (en banc). 77 Careful review of the cases themselves reveals a fracture in the Government's argument. In Kaplan, we spoke of reasonable probability in the context of the inchoate Hobbs Act offenses of attempt to extort and conspiracy to extort. 171 F.3d at 1354. But here, the Government sought convictions for violations of the Hobbs Act by means of actual extortion. The Kaplan case, therefore, is inapposite. 78 Even so, comparing the language of the pattern jury instruction — natural consequences — with the language the district court used — realistically probable — we conclude that any error that may have occurred had no effect on the Defendants' substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1259 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Therefore, the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the interstate commerce element. 79