Opinion ID: 2068058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Warrantless Arrest at Home

Text: Phillips also argues that the statements which he made to the police should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. He claims that the police arrested him at his home without a warrant. He maintains that, absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a suspect's home to make an arrest without a warrant, citing Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. On October 13, 1983, Phillips accompanied the police from his home to the police station where he was questioned and then booked. The police testified at trial that they did not consider defendant to be under arrest when he was questioned at the police station on the 13th. However, the facts indicate otherwise. On October 13th, Officers David Becher and Mitch Ely picked up defendant at his mother's house, where he resided. The police knocked on the door and an adult, apparently Phillips' mother, answered the door. The officers were not in uniform, but identified themselves as police officers and showed their badges and identification cards. They advised his mother that they needed to speak with Joe Phillips and were then allowed access to the interior of the residence. The officers again identified themselves as police detectives and asked defendant to come downtown to discuss the homicide of Robert Smith. Defendant responded that he didn't know anything about it. The police then told defendant that a person who appeared to be a principal in the crime had indicated willingness to testify against him. Officer Becher testified that he told defendant that we wanted him to come downtown with us, and if he wouldn't do so of his own volition then, we'd have to arrest him right then for felony murder and burglary. Defendant accompanied the police to the station. After being advised of his rights, defendant again stated that he did not know anything about the Smith homicide and invoked his right to remain silent. The police then booked defendant on burglary and murder charges. Probable cause to detain Phillips for seventy-two hours was determined by a judge on October 14th. The police did not obtain a warrant to arrest Phillips until October 18th. An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a crime. Ind. Code § 35-33-1-5 (Burns 1985). An arrest has occurred when police officers interrupt the freedom of an accused and restrict his liberty of movement. Armstrong v. State (1982), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 647, 651. Here, defendant would have been arrested had he declined to accompany the police and was booked for the present charges immediately after he was interrogated at the station. The arrest occurred at his home, where his freedom and liberty of movement had been restricted by the police. A warrantless and nonconsensual felony arrest in the accused's home is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Payton, supra ; accord, Steagald v. United States (1981), 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38. Although Payton did not decide whether an initial consensual entry would justify a subsequent warrantless arrest, subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate that a valid consent to enter the home would justify a subsequent warrantless arrest. [5] Entry to effect an arrest and entry to search and seize property implicate the same interest in the preservation of the privacy and sanctity of the home and therefore justify the same level of constitutional protection. Payton, supra . Since the breach of the entrance to an individual's home is a fundamental characteristic shared by each intrusion, id., the same standard controls whether the consent was valid and voluntary. Whether a consent to entry is voluntary is therefore a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854; See also, United States v. Briley (8th Cir.1984), 726 F.2d 1301. Consent to entry is generally valid except when it is procured by fraud, duress, fear, intimidation, or when it is merely a submission to the supremacy of the law. Darnell v. State (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 250. In this case, the facts indicate that the police were given valid and voluntary consent to enter the home of appellant. The police identified themselves to appellant's mother when she answered the door and explained the nature of their visit. The police were then allowed entry into the interior of the home where appellant was located. There is no evidence that the mother's consent was coerced or obtained through deception.