Opinion ID: 2815883
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Alternate Juror Vanessa H.

Text: The prosecutor claimed he excused Prospective Alternate Juror Vanessa H. because of her statements during voir dire concerning the death penalty and because she had served on a jury that was unable to reach a verdict. These assertions are also supported by the record. In her written questionnaire, Vanessa H. rated herself a “five” on a 10-point scale concerning the strength of her support for the death penalty, and she further wrote, “I feel if you think the death penalty is a good thing to have in this state, I‟m not against it, and I think my feelings don‟t count.” During voir dire, the prosecutor asked Vanessa H. to clarify what she meant about her feelings not counting. She explained that “because the way the world is now and the way people make decisions on a lot of things, they [are] not basing . . . the decision on what‟s in the world today” but instead “on how they feel.” She further stated that she thought that “Especially AfricanAmerican opinions, it really don‟t count on how I feel about the death penalty.” 22 When asked more directly about whether she could return a verdict of death, Vanessa H. gave conflicting responses. First, she stated that she did not “really have an opinion on the death [penalty]” because she “never came to that situation.” Then, Vanessa H. stated, “Based on my religion — I believe in Jesus Christ. According to him, you shouldn‟t kill . . .„Thou shalt not kill.‟ ” She further said, “But if it was to be based on the evidence and special circumstances, I can look at it both ways.” Later, however, the prosecutor presented Vanessa H. with a hypothetical scenario in which someone was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with aggravating circumstances substantially outweighing mitigating circumstances “and you think the just and necessary verdict is death,” and asked whether she could return such a verdict.6 Vanessa H. responded, “I can‟t answer that question two months down the road” because she thinks “about everyday life” and goes “day by day.” She clarified that she would have to look at all the evidence and circumstances first. In response, the prosecutor asked Vanessa H. more directly if she could imagine coming into the courtroom two months later and saying, “I voted to have you executed.” Vanessa H. continued to refuse to directly answer the question, saying, “I probably can, and I probably can‟t” and that she could not answer the question “until it comes to that time.” Vanessa H. further 6 The prosecutor used the above-described hypothetical for numerous prospective jurors. We recognize that the standard instructions in CALJIC No. 8.88 do not speak in terms of whether jurors must believe that a verdict of death is “just and necessary.” Instead, we instruct penalty phase jurors that, “[t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.” (CALJIC No. 8.88.) It appears that the prosecutor used this “just and necessary” phrasing in his hypothetical to determine whether a prospective juror could actually return a verdict of death where the circumstances would otherwise warrant such a sentence in the prospective juror‟s mind. Our subsequent references to this phrase are not intended to alter our standard instructions. 23 elaborated that if she weighed the evidence and it showed that defendant should be put to death, she thought she could make such a decision, but that she was “not going to give you an answer like „Yeah‟ right now” because she did not know yet, “[b]ut I think I can.” When posed with the scenario in which Vanessa H. agreed that the hypothetical evidence and circumstances would support a verdict of death, she expressed considerable confusion and hesitation as to whether she could actually deliver such a verdict. This afforded the prosecutor with a valid, neutral reason to excuse her. (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 902 [“That a juror is equivocal about his or her ability to impose the death penalty is relevant to a challenge for cause, but does not undercut the raceneutral basis for a prosecutor‟s decision to excuse a prospective juror peremptorily”].) In addition, Vanessa H. described in negative terms her past experience on a civil jury that failed to reach a verdict. She complained that the other jurors in that case “already had the answer” before deliberations began. Vanessa H. claimed that the jurors were not listening to each other and were basing their decision on emotions rather than on the evidence. Prior service on a deadlocked jury is an accepted neutral reason for excusing a prospective juror. (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 644.)