Opinion ID: 504895
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factoring out the Four Factor Test

Text: 12 Although the task of defining custody can be a slippery one, 10 Supreme Court precedent has substantially undermined the four factors comprising our custody test. First, the existence of probable cause to arrest is largely immaterial to the question of custody. In a case holding that traffic stops do not ordinarily place a motorist in custody, the Court rejected the position that custody arises as soon as the level of suspicion amounts to probable cause to arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3148 n. 22, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). 13 The threat to a citizen's Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda was designed to neutralize has little to do with the strength of an interrogating officer's suspicions. And, by requiring a policeman conversing with a motorist constantly to monitor the information available to him to determine when it becomes sufficient to establish probable cause, the [proposed rule] would be extremely difficult to administer. 14 Id. Police officers are not required to effectuate an arrest the moment probable cause arises. 11 Regardless of the presence of probable cause, until an officer acts to exert some type of restraint a suspect cannot reasonably believe her freedom is restrained. 15 The Supreme Court has also made it clear that focus alone does not create Miranda custody. 12 Acknowledging this rule, 13 our cases have held that custody arises when focus is coupled with another factor such as probable cause. 14 Even this approach remains problematic because the exertion of restraint no more accompanies focus than it does probable cause. In particular, the presence of probable cause and focus often adds little to the custody equation because facts that establish these two factors tend to coalesce. 15 Probable cause and focus become material to the custody inquiry only when they influence a reasonable person's perception of the situation. 16 To consider these factors in any other light may hamper legitimate police practices that do not threaten Fifth Amendment rights. 16 Finally, both our third and fourth factors--the unrevealed subjective intent of the law enforcement officer and the subjective belief of the suspect--are irrelevant to the custody determination. The Supreme Court recently stated that [a] policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was 'in custody' at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. 17 Consideration of the subjective belief of the suspect may have an apparent logical soundness because a person who honestly but unreasonably believes he is in custody is subject to the same coercive pressures as one whose belief is reasonable. 18 But the Supreme Court adopted a reasonable person test because it  'is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question.'  19 17