Opinion ID: 878340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: voluntary instruction

Text: The trial court refused an instruction offered by the defendant that: A material element of every crime is a voluntary act. The court did include four instructions that specifically mentioned the requirement of voluntariness: [Instruction No. 17] A person commits the offense of attempt when with purpose to commit a specific offense he voluntarily does any act toward the commission of such offense. [Instruction No. 24] ... the State must prove that each element of the offense was done purposely or knowingly and voluntarily... . [Instruction No. 38] ... You may consider such evidence because the defendant asserts that due to mental disease or defect he could not have had a particular state of mind which is an element of the offense, i.e., that he did not purposely or knowingly and voluntarily commit the acts constituting the offense... . [Instruction No. 40] ... a person, to be guilty of any of the offenses charged, must have committed the act or acts voluntarily, while having, with regard to each element contained in the law defining the offenses, one of the mental states contained in said definition... The refused instruction is based on section 45-2-202, MCA, which states: A material element of every offense is a voluntary act... . This code provision expresses the common law principle previously discussed that every crime must consist of an act and a criminal intent. One of defendant's theories in this case was that he did not act voluntarily due to his mental condition. Although this Court permitted section 45-2-202, MCA, to be used for such a theory in Zampich, supra, the statute was not intended to address psychological impairment. The voluntary act requirement properly reflects physiological considerations; those who act by reflex, while sleepwalking, etc., should not be held criminally responsible. See, section 45-2-101(31), MCA; Bender, supra, at 144-145; W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 25, at 179-181 (1972). Defendant's theory of his case was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to give the instruction. Arguably, the instruction would not have hurt the prosecution as it correctly states the law of Montana. However, we sense that defense counsel was offering the instruction for a context to which it was not designed. The four instructions set forth above properly instructed the jury on the requirement of a voluntary act.