Opinion ID: 478410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Adjustment for Inflation

Text: 29 Plaintiffs argue on cross-appeal that the district court abused its discretion by not adjusting the fees awarded for inflation. We disagree. 30 Inflation's effect on a fee award is an inherent result of delay in litigation. Delay, as we have held, is one reason a contingent-fee arrangement may justify an upward adjustment in a fee award. See also Johnson v. University College of the University of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994, 104 S.Ct. 489, 78 L.Ed.2d 684 (1983). Likewise, the diminution of a fee by high inflation could, in a court's discretion, justify a separate upward adjustment. 31 But while adjustments may be justified because of inflation, they are not invariably required, any more than a contingency multiplier is. See Louisville Black Police Officers Organization, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 700 F.2d 268, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983). The standard under section 1988 is a reasonable fee in light of all of the circumstances. The district court reached its fee decision in light of the totality of the circumstances, applying the many factors we have identified as relevant. One of the factors leading to award of a multiplier was delay in payment. 6 There was no abuse of discretion in refusing to adjust the fee for inflation.