Opinion ID: 393167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Language and the Legislative History

Text: 18 As a preliminary matter, the meaning of a statute should be sought in the language in which it is framed. See Local 1976, United Brhd of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100, 78 S.Ct. 1011, 1016, 2 L.Ed.2d 1186 (1958); see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1976); Internat'l Brhd of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20, 99 S.Ct. 790, 800 n.20, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917). The action taken by the union here certainly falls within the plain meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A). When the union removed Helton's literature from the bulletin board, it restrained him in the exercise of his Section 7 rights, at least as the word restraint is commonly understood. 34 19 As the NLRB emphasizes, however, interpretation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) cannot be governed solely by reliance on the statutory language. The Taft-Hartley Act, which added Section 8(b)(1)(A) to the National Labor Relations Act, was the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests. Local 1976, United Brhd of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, supra, 357 U.S. at 99-100, 78 S.Ct. at 1016. 35 Thus the Supreme Court has stated that interpretations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) must be guided not just by the section's literal language, but also by an understanding of the congressional purpose. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175, 179, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2005-06, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967); NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 292, 80 S.Ct. 706, 716, 4 L.Ed.2d 710 (1960). 36 Our review of the legislative history fails to convince us that Congress intended Section 8(b)(1)(A) to apply solely to union conduct involving threats of violence, economic reprisal, or discipline. 20 The sponsors of the Taft-Hartley Act, in explaining their proposed legislation, focused primarily on the need to control union violence and economic coercion. For example, Senator Taft, in responding to a request for examples of the sort of conduct that Section 8(b)(1)(A) would prohibit, described threats of bodily harm, mass picketing in organization campaigns, and coercion that prevented employees not involved in a labor dispute from going to work. 93 Cong.Rec. 4435-4436 (1947), 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Leg.Hist.) 1205-1206 (1948). See also 93 Cong.Rec. 4016-4017, 4271, 4432, 4434, 2 Leg.Hist. 1018-1021, 1139, 1199, 1203 (remarks of Senator Ball). However, nothing in the legislative history supports the conclusion that violence and economic reprisal were the sole evils at which Section 8(b)(1)(A) was aimed. Rather, it appears that Congress intended Section 8(b)(1)(A) to cover a range of conduct as broad as that covered by Section 8(a)(1). Senator Ball, a co-sponsor of the legislation, stated that the purpose of the amendment is very simple. It is to insert an unfair-labor practice for unions identical with the first unfair labor practice prohibited to employers in the present act   . 93 Cong.Rec. 4016 (1947), 2 Leg.Hist. 1018 (emphasis added). See also 93 Cong.Rec. 4021, 4023, 4025, 4436 (1947), 2 Leg.Hist. 1028, 1031, 1032, 1207; S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, 1 Leg.Hist. 456. 21 Omission of the words interfere with from Section 8(b)(1)(A) was not intended to indicate that union conduct should be measured against a less demanding standard than employer conduct. The legislation as originally proposed contained these words. They were deleted because it was feared that they would unduly restrict union organization campaigns; they might be construed to mean that any conversation, any persuasion, any urging on the part of any person, in an effort to persuade another to join a labor organization, would constitute an unfair labor practice. 93 Cong.Rec. 4399 (1947), 2 Leg.Hist. 1138 (remarks of Senator Ives). Senator Taft agreed to the deletion because he was convinced it would have no effect on the application of Section 8(b)(1)(A): 22 I have consulted with the attorneys and they tell me that elimination of the words interfere with would not, so far as they know, have any effect on the court decisions. Eliminating those words would not make any substantial change in the meaning.    23 Id. (remarks of Senator Taft). Similarly, Senator Ball stated that the words 'interfere with' are very vague, that even with respect to employers no complaint is ever issued on the interference angle, and that, because union organizational activities might be affected, it is important that such vague language be eliminated   . 93 Cong.Rec. 4399 (1947), 2 Leg.Hist. 1139 (remarks of Senator Ball). 24