Opinion ID: 162589
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Faulkingham

Text: 62 With its recent decision in United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002), the First Circuit rejected the Third and Fourth Circuits' blanket refusal to apply Wong Sun suppression to the fruits of a Miranda violation. Id. at 90-91. Faulkingham acknowledged, contrary to Sterling and DeSumma, that Dickerson 's recognition that Miranda violations are constitutional violations strengthened the argument that their physical fruits must be suppressed. Id. at 92-93. However, Faulkingham concluded that suppression of the fruits of a Miranda violation was not required in every case. Rather, it adopted a rule mandating suppression of the fruits of a Miranda violation in individual cases where a strong need for deterrence outweighs the reliability of that evidence. Id. at 93. Because the physical fruits of a Miranda violation generally will be trustworthy evidence, it appears that in most cases the First Circuit's analysis boils down to a rule excluding the fruits of a Miranda violation only when there is a strong need for deterrence. On each of Faulkingham 's two basic points — that Dickerson alters the analysis regarding suppression of the fruits of a Miranda violation, and that suppression of the physical fruits is required where necessary to effectuate Miranda 's deterrent purpose — we agree with the First Circuit. For reasons already stated above, we conclude that each of these propositions is compelled by Supreme Court precedent. 63 Turning to the application of this standard to circumstances — present both in Faulkingham and in the present case — where an officer negligently rather than intentionally violates a defendant's Miranda rights, however, we disagree with the First Circuit. In Faulkingham, the court concluded that, where the Miranda violation resulted from mere negligence on the part of the interrogating officer, there is no strong need for deterrence and thus the physical fruits of the Miranda violation need not be excluded. We conclude that Faulkingham 's cramped view of deterrence leads it to an erroneous conclusion regarding negligent Miranda violations. 64 Faulkingham asserted, without elaboration, that [o]nce the un- Mirandized inculpatory statements of the defendant are themselves suppressed, the role of deterrence under the Fifth Amendment becomes less primary. Id. at 92. The heart of the court's analysis is the following: 65 Where, as here, negligence is the reason that the police failed to give a Miranda warning, the role of deterrence is weaker than in a case ... where the apparent reason the police failed to give a warning was their intention to manipulate the defendant into giving them information. 66 Faulkingham's claim, taking all the surrounding circumstances into account, simply does not tip the balance toward a strong need for deterrence. Faulkingham's statement was not the result of coercive official tactics. There was no deliberate misconduct by the [police] agents here. There was no misleading or manipulation by the government.... The findings of the magistrate judge and the trial judge give us no reason to think that the agents deliberately failed to give the warning in order to get to the physical evidence or that they did so to get to another witness who might or might not incriminate Faulkingham. The agents' negligence resulted in the suppression of Faulkingham's confession, itself a detriment to the agents.... 67 Id. at 93-94 (citation to opinion below omitted). The court noted that Faulkingham himself started talking without much questioning and observed that there is nothing to shock the conscience of the court and no fundamental unfairness. Id. at 94. In light of the totality of the circumstances, the court held that Faulkingham's far weaker argument for recognition of a deterrence interest for suppression of derivative evidence arising from a negligent violation of his Miranda rights is insufficient to carry the day. Id. 68 We do not believe that the role of deterrence... becomes less primary once the statement itself has been suppressed. Id. at 92. Instead, the relevant question remains whether suppression of the statement alone provides deterrence sufficient to protect citizens' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. As we already have stated above, see supra at 1026-27, we answer this question in the negative. 69 Nor do we share Faulkingham 's view that there is a strong need for deterrence only where the officer's actions were deliberate rather than negligent. Finally, Miranda itself made clear that the privilege against self-incrimination was animated, not by a desire merely to deter intentional misconduct by police, but by the one overriding thought that the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also id. ([T]he privilege has come rightfully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right ... to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The personal right to be free of government invasions of the privilege against self-incrimination is violated just as surely by a negligent failure to administer Miranda warnings as a deliberate failure. Deterrence is necessary not merely to deter intentional wrongdoing, but also to ensure that officers diligently (non-negligently) protect — and properly are trained to protect — the constitutional rights of citizens. The call for deterrence may be somewhat less urgent where negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing is at issue, but in either case we conclude that the need is a strong one. 70 Moreover, we conclude that a rule limiting Wong Sun suppression of the physical fruits of a Miranda violation to situations where the police demonstrably acted in intentional bad faith would fail to vindicate the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose. Even in cases where the failure to administer Miranda warnings was calculated, obtaining evidence of such deliberate violations of Miranda often would be difficult or impossible. Cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (noting that one reason for the Court's adoption of an objective test for the reasonableness of a seizure was the evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective intent of officers). An exclusionary rule turning on the subjective motivation of the police officer would burden courts with the difficult task of discerning, from the particular facts of each case, the thought processes of the officer that resulted in the Miranda violation. See Carter, 884 F.2d at 374 (reasoning that courts should not once again be embroiled in the endless case-by-case voluntariness inquiries Miranda was designed to prevent [because] the ease-of-application rationale enunciated by the Supreme Court will be largely nullified). We believe a rule that provides certainty in application and clarity for the officers charged with operating under it better serves the interests of citizens, officers, and judicial efficiency. 71 Accordingly, we agree with the First Circuit's conclusion that the Wong Sun fruits doctrine may apply to the physical fruits of Miranda violations, but we decline to adopt Faulkingham 's view that the physical fruits of a negligent Miranda violation are admissible. As a practical matter, we agree with the view of the United States District Court for the District of Maine, expressed in an opinion issued prior to Faulkingham: 72 Prior to the decision in Dickerson, the issue of suppression of evidence discovered as a result of a violation of Miranda turned on a complex and largely opaque analysis attempting to resolve on an ad hoc basis the tension between the reliability of the subject evidence and the goal of deterrence of police misconduct. This Court believes all of that has gone by the board with the conferral by Dickerson of constitutional status on the right to a Miranda warning. 73 United States v. Kruger, 151 F.Supp.2d 86, 101-02 (D.Me.2001) (citations omitted), overruled by Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 90-94. 74 As explained above, we conclude that Miranda 's deterrent purpose would not be vindicated meaningfully by suppression only of Patane's statement. We hold that the physical fruits of this Miranda violation must be suppressed.