Opinion ID: 867235
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Double-Counting of Cassandra's Age

Text: ¶ 81 Prince claims that because no special verdict form was used, the final penalty jury might have improperly considered Cassandra's age twice in imposing the death sentence. [5] Although a specific fact, such as the victim's age, can establish two aggravating factors, that fact cannot be weighed `twice in balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.' Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 241 ¶ 48, 236 P.3d at 1188 (quoting State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 307 ¶ 21, 166 P.3d 91, 98 (2007)). In Chappell, the judge instructed the jury not to consider twice any fact or aspect of the offense. Id. at ¶ 50; see also Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 307 ¶ 23, 166 P.3d at 98. ¶ 82 The trial court here did not instruct the jury to refrain from counting Cassandra's age twice. But unlike Velazquez, Prince did not request a specific jury instruction on this point. Indeed, Prince never raised the double-counting issue at any time. Thus, fundamental error review applies. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶ 83 Prince cannot show error, let alone fundamental error. As he acknowledges, it is unknown, and indeed unknowable, whether [Cassandra's] age was counted twice in imposing the death sentence. But even if the trial court erred by failing to specifically instruct the jury on this point or by not using a special verdict form, no prejudice resulted. The court's instruction defining the (F)(6) especial cruelty aggravator did not mention the victim's age. Nor did the prosecutor suggest that the victim's age is a factor in the (F)(6) analysis, unlike the situation presented in Chappell.