Opinion ID: 891684
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondents' Complaint States a Patron Claim

Text: {27} We next address whether the common law permits patron claims, which are those brought by an intoxicated patron to recover for his own injuries. Section 41-11-1(B) permits a patron action against a licensee where the licensee is determined to have acted with gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of the person who purchased or was served the alcoholic beverages. As we have previously noted, Respondents may not proceed under the statutory cause of action provided in Section 41-11-1(B) because the Casino is not a licensee. Therefore, for Respondents' complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it must do so pursuant to a common law patron action. {28} In our discussion above, we concluded that the plain language of Section 41-11-1 limits its reach to licensees, and as a result, the section does not preempt all common law third-party claims. This analysis of Section 41-11-1 is equally applicable as to common law patron claims, and therefore, we need not restate it here. Rather, we proceed from the conclusion that Section 41-11-1 does not supplant all common law claims. {29} Even though we have settled that the enactment of Section 41-11-1 did not preempt all common law claims, there remains an important issue for our consideration. We must address whether our common law recognizes patron claims. Our opinion in Lopez, which was issued prior to the enactment of Section 41-11-1, recognized a common law cause of action in favor of third parties. Lopez, 98 N.M. at 632, 651 P.2d at 1276. Accordingly, in our consideration of whether Section 41-11-1 preempts third-party claims, we were able to proceed knowing that the background principles of our common law supported a cause of action for third parties. We are unable to proceed in such fashion here; we did not have occasion to address the existence of a common law patron cause of action prior to the enactment of Section 41-11-1. {30} The Court of Appeals concluded that our common law recognizes a patron cause of action. Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, ¶¶ 20-22, 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d 903. The Court analyzed the Casino's duty pursuant to Section 184 of the Pueblo Liquor Ordinance and determined that the Casino owed a duty to patrons. Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, ¶ 22, 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d 903. In determining that the Casino owed a duty to patrons, the Court relied upon the Compact's policy concern of casino visitor protection, noting that the Compact specifies that safety and protection of visitors is a priority of the Pueblo. Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, ¶ 22, 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d 903 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the Court determined that the Casino's duty under the Pueblo Liquor Ordinance extended to patrons, it concluded that Respondents stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, ¶ 22, 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d 903. {31} The Casino disagrees with the Court's conclusion and submits that we should not adopt a common law patron action. The Casino argues that, if we were to adopt a common law patron action, every plaintiff would elect the less stringent common law theory, which presumably would require only proof of simple negligence, rather than Section 41-11-1(B)'s stricter requirement of gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of the person who purchased or was served the alcoholic beverages on the part of the alcohol purveyor. Alternatively, if the common law alternative to Section 41-11-1 only applies where the claimant proceeds against a tribal gaming facility, then the Casino argues there is a violation of equal protectiontribal facilities would be held to a much higher legal standard than non-tribal facilities. {32} In Lopez, we recognized our ability to revise the common law when the policy concerns which undergirded a common law doctrine no longer reflected modern realities. 98 N.M. at 629-30, 651 P.2d at 1273-74. There, we noted it was within our province to elect not to adhere to ancient common law doctrines when those doctrines [become] out of tune with today's society. Id. at 629, 651 P.2d at 1273. Thus, we revised the outmoded common law in order to permit an injured third party to pursue an action against the seller of liquor. Id. at 630, 632, 651 P.2d at 1274, 1276. {33} Traditionally, the common law reflected a belief that patrons should not be able to seek relief from a tavernkeeper for injuries arising out of their intoxication. Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex. 1993). The rationale was that the proximate cause of the injury was not the furnishing of the liquor, but the drinking of it. Lopez, 98 N.M. at 628, 651 P.2d at 1272. This view holds the patron alone responsible for injuries arising out of his liquor consumption and does not require the tavernkeeper to bear any responsibility. {34} Just as we recognized in Lopez that the policy considerations concerning third-party claims were no longer valid, we recognize that the policy considerations concerning patron claims no longer stand on solid ground. Two factors lead to this conclusion. First, our statutory laws evidence a change in the prevailing view regarding the responsibility of the tavernkeeper. In 1985, the Legislature amended Section 41-11-1 to recognize a patron cause of action. See 1985 N.M. Laws, ch. 191, § 1(B). Pursuant to Section 41-11-1(B), a patron who is served alcohol while intoxicated and injured as a result may obtain relief from the licensee who served him. As we have discussed, the statutory patron cause of action requires proof beyond simple negligence; the claimant must show that the licensee acted with gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of the patron. Id. This statute articulates a policy in favor of holding the tavernkeeper responsible for the patron's injuries, where it is clear that the tavernkeeper's actions were reckless. Thus, the Legislature's recognition of a patron cause of action undermines the common law's view that only the patron can be held responsible for injuries resulting from his alcohol consumption. {35} Second, a patron cause of action can be a catalyst which promotes important social goals. New Jersey courts have recognized the senseless havoc and destruction caused by intoxicated drivers and have permitted a patron cause of action in order to discourage drunk driving. See Voss v. Tranquilino, 413 N.J.Super. 82, 992 A.2d 829, 836 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2010), aff'd, 206 N.J. 93, 19 A.3d 470 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In our state, where tragedies too often result from drunk driving, this policy consideration certainly strikes a chord. See, e.g., State v. Roper, 1996-NMCA-073, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 126, 921 P.2d 322 (taking account of severe drunk-driving problems in New Mexico). {36} This important policy consideration, in conjunction with Section 41-11-1(B), persuades us that the common law's bar on patron actions does not reflect the realities of our modern times. See Lopez, 98 N.M. at 632, 651 P.2d at 1276 (revising outmoded common law doctrine). Accordingly, because Section 41-11-1 does not preempt all common law claims, we hold that the common law recognizes an action by a patron against a tavernkeeper for over service of alcohol. {37} While the Court of Appeals concluded that the common law permitted a patron cause of action, it did not subject this patron cause of action to a more demanding standard akin to the requirements of Section 41-11-1(B) that the liquor licensee acted with gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of the patron. Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, ¶ 22, 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d 903. The common law must reflect modern policy considerations. These considerations are best encapsulated in the balance struck by our Legislature in Section 41-11-1(B), which allows a patron cause of action, yet demands proof of gross rather than simple negligence. We revise the common law and adopt the standard articulated in Section 41-11-1(B). Thus, the common law recognizes an action by an injured patron against a tavernkeeper who served the patron alcohol while intoxicated; in such an action, the claimant must show that the tavernkeeper acted with gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of the patron in order to recover. This standard ensures that the common law reflects modern policy considerations, and additionally, because the standard mirrors Section 41-11-1(B), it resolves the potential equal protection concerns brought to light by the Casino. {38} We clarify the application of the distinct standards required by common law third-party claims as distinguished from common law patron claims. Because third-party claims require proof of simple negligence while patron claims require proof of gross negligence, it is necessary to distinguish who may seek relief as a third party and who must seek relief as a patron. Where, as here, an intoxicated passenger seeks relief, it may be unclear to courts and litigants whether the intoxicated passenger should be treated as a patron or as an injured third party. {39} We construe Respondents' complaint as alleging a third-party claim with respect to the intoxicated passenger. We do so based on Baxter and Murphy v. Tomada Enterprises, Inc., 112 N.M. 800, 819 P.2d 1358 (Ct.App.1991). Both Baxter and Murphy involve claims by intoxicated passengersindividuals who drank liquor and were subsequently injured when they rode as passengers in vehicles driven by their drinking partners. Baxter, 107 N.M. at 48, 752 P.2d at 240; Murphy, 112 N.M. at 801, 819 P.2d at 1359. In Baxter, we permitted the intoxicated passenger's claim to proceed on the basis that she was an injured third party in relation to the tavern. 107 N.M. at 50, 752 P.2d at 242. Similarly, in Murphy, the Court of Appeals treated an intoxicated passenger's cause of action as a third-party claim. 112 N.M. at 802, 819 P.2d at 1360. {40} Murphy made clear that the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries is the key element which distinguishes a patron claim from a third-party claim. See id. (noting that the statutory patron claim, found in Section 41-11-1(B), extends only to injuries proximately caused by the patron's own intoxication, not by the intoxication of another patron). Murphy made this distinction in the context of statutory dram shop claimsthose maintainable against licensees pursuant to Section 41-11-1. {41} The Casino expresses concerns regarding disparate treatment between non-licensee taverns, which are subject to common law dram shop claims, and licensee taverns, which are subject to statutory claims under Section 41-11-1. However, if the common law dram shop claim mirrors the statutory claim, no potential for disparate treatment existsnon-licensee taverns will be subject to the same standards as licensee taverns. Thus, in order to ensure that common law claims mirror statutory claims, we extend Murphy 's rationale to the common law context. {42} Therefore, a passenger sues as a third party, whether under Section 41-11-1 or the common law. The passenger must prove that the tavern was negligent and that the passenger's damages were proximately caused by the tavern. An intoxicated driver sues as a patron, whether under Section 41-11-1 or the common law. The intoxicated driver must prove that the tavern acted with gross negligence and in reckless disregard of the driver's safety and that the driver's damages were proximately caused by the tavern. Accordingly, the factual allegations in the complaint regarding the driver are sufficient to state a patron claim.