Opinion ID: 1711125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Expanding Civil Rights

Text: As the scope of the equal protection provision has expanded, it has always included the private right to judicial remedies, whether expressly provided by statute or inferred by the judiciary. [35] The Legislature has done nothing in the subsequent history to impair or restrict the aggrieved individual's access to judicial remedies. Nor could it under Const. 1963, art. 5, § 29. In 1976, the Michigan Civil Rights Act consolidated the existing civil rights statutes into one statute and, more importantly, expanded the scope of protection against discriminatory actions. House Legislative Analysis, HB 4055 (Second Analysis), December 30, 1976. Entwined with the new expanded rights was the right to bring a civil action in circuit court. M.C.L. § 37.2801; M.S.A. § 3.548(801). [36] In Boscaglia, we found that the Civil Rights Act extended Pompey. We noted: The FEPA, enacted in 1955, declared that the opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry is a civil right, and stated a definition of an unfair employment practice. In Pompey [at 560, 189 N.W.2d 243]... this Court declared that an employe can maintain a civil damage action for redress of his statutorily created right to be free from [racial] discrimination in private employment, and that this remedy may be pursued in addition to the remedial machinery provided by [the FEPA]. The civil rights act, enacted in 1976, prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. The act extended this Court's decision in Pompey by expressly providing for direct access to circuit court for an aggrieved party. Holmes v. Houghton Elevator Co., 404 Mich. 36, 44, 272 N.W.2d 550 (1978) (Moody, J., concurring). This direct access provision states that a person alleging a violation of the act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both, and that the term damages means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney's fees. [ Boscaglia, 420 Mich. at 314-315, 362 N.W.2d 642 (citations omitted).]