Opinion ID: 835782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: oregon constitutional claims

Text: On review, petitioner argues that this court should set aside his conviction and grant a new trial because trial counsel made errors that prejudiced his case. He further argues that trial counsel's errors, taken together, were so egregious that he should be granted a new trial without showing actual prejudice, because the entire underlying trial was infected with structural error. We first address petitioner's theories under the Oregon Constitution and then review his theories under the federal constitution. See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123 (1981) (explaining order of consideration).
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part, that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right    to be heard by himself and counsel. To prevail on his post-conviction claim of inadequate assistance of counsel under Oregon law, petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, the two elements of that claim: that trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment, and that petitioner suffered prejudice as a result. Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or. 350, 359, 39 P.3d 851 (2002). A showing that the lawyer's acts or omissions prejudiced a petitioner's case is an essential element of establishing a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel. Stevens v. State of Oregon, 322 Or. 101, 110, 902 P.2d 1137 (1995) ('[O]nly those acts or omissions by counsel which have a tendency to affect the result of the prosecution can be regarded as of constitutional magnitude.' (quoting Trujillo v. Maass, 312 Or. 431, 435, 822 P.2d 703 (1991), quoting Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or. 867, 627 P.2d 458 (1981); emphasis in Stevens )); Trujillo, 312 Or. at 437, 822 P.2d 703 ([P]etitioner [must] establish    facts demonstrating that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel's acts or omissions.); Krummacher at 875, 627 P.2d 458 (Adequacy of assistance of counsel allows for errors which are inconsequential in the context of the entire trial or proceeding.). Petitioner claims that trial counsel's decision not to challenge Juror Ten was a lapse of reasonable professional skill and judgment that prejudiced him. As described above, Juror Ten asserted during voir dire that I've had several friends that told me they have been raped and I believe them. Petitioner contends that that statement proves that Juror Ten was biased against him because she was predisposed to believe accusations of rape. The court should exclude a prospective juror for actual bias if the prospective juror's ideas or opinions would impair substantially his or her performance of the duties of a juror to decide the case fairly and impartially on the evidence presented in court. State v. Barone, 328 Or. 68, 74, 969 P.2d 1013 (1998). Petitioner claims that trial counsel should have challenged Juror Ten and that his failure to do so was prejudicial because Juror Ten could have been the deciding vote on the charge of attempted rape. We disagree. For petitioner to prevail, he must be able to demonstrate either (1) that Juror Ten actually was biased and therefore that trial counsel erred by failing to challenge her for cause or (2) that trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable skill and diligence when he concluded that Juror Ten would be able to evaluate the evidence impartially and, for that reason, failed to use one of his peremptory challenges to remove her from the jury. As we describe below, petitioner did not make either showing here. As trial counsel's colloquy with the other jurors reveals, at least one other juror noted the difference between believing a friend's accusation of rape and evaluating evidence as a juror in a criminal trial. [Trial Counsel:]    I'd like to know if you would want more than just somebody's accusation of rape or sodomy. What other kinds of things would you be looking for? [Juror:] You mean if it weren't a friend? [Trial Counsel:] Yes. [Juror:] Yes. Well, if it weren't a friend, I'd be  ifI  the weapon wasn't there, I'd need other evidence. I'd needa  a witness or something. I mean just the word wouldn't be enough for me. It was not unreasonable for trial counsel to believe that Juror Ten had recognized the same distinction. Moreover, trial counsel did not simply ignore Juror Ten's statement. Rather, he spent time during voir dire discussing the dangers of find[ing] somebody guilty of a crime based solely on an accusation. That discussion allowed trial counsel an opportunity to observe Juror Ten and further evaluate her fitness for the jury. Trial counsel's affidavit indicates that his observation of Juror Ten led him to believe that she could evaluate the case impartially. We cannot say on this record that that was not a reasonable conclusion for him to reach. Moreover, petitioner presented no evidence beyond the voir dire transcript to substantiate his claim that Juror Ten was actually biased. Petitioner did not prove either that Juror Ten was actually biased or that trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment when he allowed Juror Ten to remain on the jury. In addition to his argument regarding Juror Ten, petitioner claims that trial counsel committed other errors that prejudiced him. As we shall explain, we reject those claims for several reasons. Many of the acts or omissions by trial counsel that petitioner asserts to be mistakes either did not occur as petitioner describes them or, in context, do not constitute lapses of professional skill and judgment. For example, petitioner alleges that trial counsel should not have allowed the state to present the motion in limine. However, the state's presentation of that motion largely consisted of a statement of the state's concessions in response to the motion, each of which benefitted petitioner. Petitioner also claims that trial counsel should not have reserved his arguments on Measure 11 and Measure 40. However, trial counsel's reservation was at the behest of the trial judge, the state conceded petitioner's argument that Measure 40 did not apply to the case, and the trial court ruled that it would follow the decisions of the motions panel regarding Measure 11. In addition, petitioner claims that trial counsel negligently failed to pursue a no contest plea agreement and that petitioner would have accepted such an agreement. Trial counsel, however, stated that petitioner refused to allow him to negotiate a plea agreement, adamantly insisting on his innocence. Petitioner's bare assertion that he would have accepted a favorable plea agreement is insufficient to carry his burden of proving that trial counsel failed to provide adequate representation. Other actions of trial counsel that petitioner cites as error constituted reasonable tactical choices and, therefore, do not demonstrate a lack of professional skill or judgment. For example, as previously noted, trial counsel (with petitioner's agreement) alluded to petitioner's incarceration in the hope of eliciting the jury's sympathy. That tactic, although perhaps misguided, is not necessarily error. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) (holding that defendant who appeared before jury in prison uniform had received fair trial because he was not compelled to appear in that manner and noting that it is not an uncommon defense tactic to produce the defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury). Similarly, trial counsel's approach to closing argument  including, for example, his decision not to make distinct arguments regarding the separate charges  and his choice to use the defense that petitioner sold his guns to Pedersen were reasonable tactical choices, even if, as petitioner asserts, they backfired. We agree with petitioner that trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment in several respects. The record reveals that trial counsel appeared to be unaware of the disposition of pretrial motions filed by petitioner's previous counsel. His inexperience and unfamiliarity with the rules of evidence caused the trial court to exclude some proffered testimony that might have been helpful to petitioner and that might have been admitted if he had phrased his questions differently. Trial counsel moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion that is unavailable in criminal cases. State ex rel Haas v. Schwabe, 276 Or. 853, 857, 556 P.2d 1366 (1976) ([N]either under our statutes nor under common law is there any basis for the entry of a judgment n.o.v., or its equivalent, in a criminal case.). He made an oral motion for a new trial, a motion that must be presented in writing. ORS 136.535, ORCP 64 D. However, the post-conviction court determined that none of those lapses prejudiced petitioner, and we conclude that evidence in the record supports that determination. In summary, we conclude that trial counsel's failure to challenge Juror Ten did not demonstrate that trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment in his representation of petitioner. We also conclude that, although trial counsel's conduct of some aspects of the trial fell below the required standard of skill, petitioner has not proved that any of those mistakes had a tendency to affect the result of the prosecution.
Notwithstanding his inability to prove that any particular error by trial counsel tended to affect the result of the case against him, petitioner nevertheless contends that trial counsel's performance in this case as a whole was so inadequate that it undermined the required adversarial nature of the trial. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (Sixth Amendment rights violated when criminal trial loses its adversarial character). Therefore, petitioner urges this court to apply the doctrine of structural error and order a new trial, without requiring him to show actual prejudice. We first note, however, that structural error is a doctrine that originated in federal criminal cases and, contrary to petitioner's assertions, has not been adopted by this court as an aspect of Oregon law, although this court has discussed structural error on several occasions. See, e.g., State v. Barone, 329 Or. 210, 226, 986 P.2d 5 (1999) (holding that this court has not adopted the doctrine of `structural' or `systemic' error in analyzing questions of Oregon law); State v. Wilson, 323 Or. 498, 505 n. 5, 507, 918 P.2d 826 (1996) (declining to address defendant's structural error claims); State v. Cole, 323 Or. 30, 37 n. 5, 912 P.2d 907 (1996) (declining to consider doctrine of structural error because actual prejudice existed). Petitioner alternatively urges us now to adopt the structural error doctrine as part of Oregon criminal law. However, as we discuss below in our analysis of petitioner's federal claims, petitioner's trial did maintain its adversarial nature and involved no arguable structural error even under the theory of structural error that petitioner puts forward. We pause at this point, however, to comment briefly on petitioner's request that this court adopt some form of the structural error doctrine that federal decisions have recognized. As discussed above, petitioner advances his structural error argument as a basis for this court to grant post-conviction relief even if he cannot demonstrate that his trial counsel's lack of professional skill and judgment caused him prejudice. In other words, petitioner offers structural error as an alternative to our usual inquiry into whether his trial counsel's acts and omissions at trial were prejudicial or, instead, constituted harmless error. Although petitioner's argument arises in the context of a post-conviction proceeding, the same inquiry is required in direct criminal appeals when we consider whether errors at trial require reversal. See State v. Davis, 336 Or. 19, 27-35, 77 P.3d 1111 (2003) (discussing harmless error analysis). Despite petitioner's carefully reasoned argument in favor of the structural error doctrine, we do not find the concept helpful in determining whether, in an Oregon criminal trial, legal error should result in reversal or whether, in a post-conviction proceeding, trial counsel's mistakes should lead to a new trial. The term structural error, of course, appears in no statute or constitutional provision, and the substantive content of the term, as developed in the federal cases, is elusive. Indeed, the term appears to state a conclusion more than to provide an analytical framework for deciding cases. More significantly, the addition of the abstract adjective structural to the commonly used legal term error diverts attention from the critical task of determining the existence and nature of any legal errors at trial. In our view, the latter inquiry provides the more appropriate focus and allows a reviewing court sufficient scope to determine whether legal errors at trial were prejudicial or harmless. In Davis, for example, this court considered whether the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence was prejudicial by closely examining the nature of the error and its context, including its relationship to defendant's factual theory of the case. 336 Or. at 32-34, 77 P.3d 1111. Similarly, in Cole, the defendant, without making a valid waiver of his right to counsel, represented himself at a suppression hearing. In rejecting the state's argument that the lack of counsel was harmless, this court reviewed the context in which the right to counsel was denied, the elements of the charges against defendant, and the evidence at trial. Cole, 323 Or. at 36-37, 912 P.2d 907. Finally, we note that the structural error doctrine, at least as articulated by the federal courts, is not consistent with Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. That section provides, in part: If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters submitted, that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial   . This court consistently has held that, under that provision, we must affirm a judgment, despite any error committed at trial, if, after considering all the matters submitted, the court is of the opinion that the judgment `was such as should have been rendered in the case.' Davis, 336 Or. at 28, 77 P.3d 1111. Under Article VII (Amended), section 3, the test for affirmance despite error consists of a single inquiry: Is there little likelihood that the particular error affected the verdict? Id. at 32, 77 P.3d 1111. Obviously, the nature of an error will dictate how much or how little it will take to satisfy us that the error affected the verdict. See, e.g., Cole (prejudicial error when defendant denied counsel at suppression hearing); State v. Cavan, 337 Or. 433, 98 P.3d 381 (2004) (prejudicial error when defendant's jury trial for attack on prison guard held in prison where attack occurred). In our view, however, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that the structural error doctrine would not provide a useful analytical tool for Oregon courts to use in determining whether legal error in a trial proceeding should result in reversal. This court's cases discussing prejudicial and harmless error appropriately apply the controlling constitutional requirements and provide sufficient guidance to lower courts and counsel.