Opinion ID: 2001797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury instruction on assumption of the risk.

Text: Bell's Estate argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury on assumption of the risk, because there was a dearth of evidence that Bell would have had knowledge or appreciation of the fact that he could have been arced by electricity emanating from this high-voltage, uninsulated line. In Westover v. East River Elec. Power, 488 N.W.2d 892, 900 (S.D.1992), we reiterated the test to determine if an injured party assumed the risk: The injured party must have (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the risk, (2) an appreciation of the risk's character, and (3) voluntarily accepted the risk, having had the time, knowledge, and experience to make an intelligent choice. Assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense which must be pled and proved by the party asserting it. Nelson v. Nelson Cattle Co., 513 N.W.2d 900, 904 (S.D.1994). In Nelson we upheld a jury's finding that an injured party did not assume the risk. Id. at 904. There an inexperienced part-time farm hand was told by experienced movers to climb on top of a portable grain bin and was given a homemade tool to lift an overhead electrical line so the bin could be moved underneath. After the tool broke, the plaintiff was injured in a fall from the bin. Evidence at trial established the plaintiff did not know he would be expected to move wires. We agreed the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that the plaintiff did not appreciate the risk of the task he was asked to undertake. Id. A person can be deemed to appreciate a risk if it is a risk that no adult person of average intelligence can deny. Id. at 905 (quoting Westover, 488 N.W.2d at 901). On the other hand, Bell, an experienced contractor, constructed the building beneath what he knew was a high power line leaving less than a five foot clearance, without notifying East River or requesting it to move or de-energize its line. On several occasions while installing the metal roof, including the day of the accident, he crawled or walked on the building within close proximity of the electrical line. Bell knew the danger, knew the line was hot, and even warned others to be cautious of it when on the roof. East River presented evidence concerning Bell's intelligence, his general knowledge of the danger of electricity, his change of construction plans, and the line's visibility. The trial court outlined the Westover criteria permitting the jury to apply the evidence to the law. East River's evidence certainly established a fact question for the jury on this issue. Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W.2d 642 (S.D.1992); Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816, 825 (S.D.1991). The Estate next argues that because no one knows exactly what happened to Bell when he was electrocuted, the trial court erred in refusing to give the Estate's proposed instruction based upon Theunissen v. Brisky, 438 N.W.2d 221 (S.D.1989): There is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a person killed in an accident such as this one was exercising due care for his protection at, and immediately before, the accident. East River argues the presumption of due care disappears when direct or circumstantial evidence is introduced from which facts to the contrary can be adduced. Id. at 224; Wibeto v. Ristvedt, 83 S.D. 221, 157 N.W.2d 343, 345-46 (1968) (presumption decedent exercised due care defeated by opposing prima facie evidence). South Dakota adopted a modified version of FRE 301: In all civil actions and proceedings, unless otherwise provided for by statute or by chapters 19-9 to 19-18, inclusive, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast. When substantial, credible evidence has been introduced to rebut the presumption, it shall disappear from the action, or proceeding, and the jury shall not be instructed thereon. SDCL 19-11-1 (emphasis added). The term substantial, credible evidence remains undefined, but certainly it was intended to give a presumption greater strength by requiring much more to defeat it than a mere `tapping on the window.' John W. Larson, SOUTH DAKOTA EVIDENCE § 301.1 (1991) (also discussing the difficulties with this rule). Under the particular facts of this case, we conclude substantial, credible evidence rebutted the due care presumption, especially as we find the circumstances justified an assumption of the risk instruction.