Opinion ID: 3009545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: wrongful death statutes

Text: Whether federal admiralty law preempts state wrongful death statutes from applying to accidents to non-seamen in territorial waters presents a more difficult inquiry. Moragne apparently creates a federal wrongful death remedy that applies dependents for loss of support in a wrongful death action; the support dependents lose as a result of the seaman's death would have come from the seaman's future earnings. Miles, 498 U.S. at 35, 111 S. Ct. at 327. This rationale appears to be quite suspect when the decedent is someone who is not employed, especially a child. A child does not typically support her parents and so loss of support damages will be negligible. A child's expected future earnings, however, may be considerable. Allowing for lost future earnings under such circumstances raises minimal risk of duplicative recovery. In our view, to deny loss of future earnings under such circumstances gives a windfall to potential defendants. Thus, even if there is a federal rule which extends beyond seamen to conflict with a state survival statute allowing recovery of lost future earnings, we doubt that the federal rule would extend to deny lost future earnings when the decedent was a child and loss of support damages would be negligible. We also doubt its applicability to cases where the decedent was an adult who, unlike a Jones Act seaman, was unemployed. This analysis, we add, is not intended to suggest case-by-case preemption analysis, but rather to demonstrate why, in policy terms, the construction advanced by Yamaha is flawed and hence unlikely to have animated the Supreme Court. See Garner, 768 F. Supp. at 195. to non-seamen in territorial waters.32 Yamaha argues that Moragne therefore displaces state wrongful death statutes. But although we know that Moragne provides a wrongful death remedy, the precise contours of that remedy are not yet fully defined.33 32 The Moragne remedy might apply only to Jones Act seamen and to those others, including longshoremen, to whom a federal duty of seaworthiness or due care is owed. Moragne explicitly grounded its holding in the propriety of extending a federal remedy to correspond to the federally imposed duties of maritime law, filling a gap left by some state statutes. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 401 & n.15, 90 S. Ct. at 1788. 33 Even if Moragne did provide a clear rule of decision in this area, however, the mere existence of a federal wrongful death cause of action does not necessarily require displacement. Cf. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02, 109 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1989) (concurrent application of federal and state rules of decision are allowed); Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 224, 106 S. Ct. at 2495 (States could `modify' or `supplement' the federal maritime law by providing a wrongful death remedy enforceable in admiralty for accidents on territorial waters.) (citing Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42 S. Ct. 89 (1921), and Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 21 L. Ed. 369 (1873)); GILMORE & BLACK § 1-17, at 49-50 (All that can be said in general is that the states may not flatly contradict established maritime law, but may `supplement' it, to the extent of allowing maritime recoveries in some cases where the maritime law denies them . . . .). Concurrent application of state and federal law is commonplace, particularly in areas governed by federal common law. See, e.g., ARC America, 490 U.S. at 101-02, 109 S. Ct. at 1665 (antitrust); Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556, 561, 74 S. Ct. 298, 301 (1954) (Aside from its inability to provide a remedy in rem for a maritime cause of action, . . . a state, `having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit' so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the `substantive maritime law.) (quoting Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 124, 44 S. Ct. at 277). Indeed even where the states may impose liability beyond that imposed under federal law, there is not necessarily a conflict, particularly in the absence of a statement from Congress to the contrary. See ARC America, 490 U.S. at 105, 109 S. Ct. at 1667 (Ordinarily, state law causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law, . . . and no clear purpose of Congress indicates that we should decide otherwise in this Unless applying state law would be inconsistent with, or would frustrate the operation of, a particular federal maritime rule of decision in this area, Moragne should not displace state law rules of decision for deaths of non-seamen in territorial waters.34 Yamaha's argument that Moragne displaces all state wrongful death statutes as rules of decision is fairly case.) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 25758, 104 S. Ct. 615, 626-27 (1989), and California v. Zook, 336 U.S 725, 736, 69 S. Ct. 841, 847 (1949)). In the traditional concurrent application of state law context, in which there is a clear federal rule, a legitimate state law may still apply if it does not impose too great a burden on the uniform vindication of the federal policy. See, e.g., Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 630 (describing the interest-balancing approach and suggesting that the inquiry reduces to the familiar one of burden). Here, by contrast, there is no specific federal rule on point, and we thus need not analyze the question under the rubric of incorporation. State law, subject to possible preemption on grounds we have enumerated, applies of its own force. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co., 348 U.S. at 316, 75 S. Ct. at 371 ([The `literal performance' rule of insurance contracts law] has not been judicially established as part of the body of federal admiralty law in this country. Therefore, the scope and validity of the [maritime insurance] policy provisions here involved and the consequences of breaching them can only be determined by state law unless we are now prepared to fashion controlling federal rules.). 34 And were Moragne to extend to persons in Natalie Calhoun's circumstances, we might hold that its wrongful death remedy either does not displace or actually incorporates state (and territorial) law; the demand for uniformity is not inflexible and does not preclude the balancing of the competing claims of state, national and international interests. Wilburn Boat Co., 348 U.S. at 323-24, 75 S. Ct. at 376 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). As our analysis below indicates, Congress has expressed an affirmative intent, as far as civilians are concerned, to preserve state law remedies in territorial waters. See infra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not defined.. straightforward: both DOHSA and the Jones Act preempt state wrongful death statutes, so why shouldn't Moragne?35 This argument, at least on its face, is seductive. Tallentire, Higginbotham, and Miles are to at least a certain extent the lineal descendants of Jensen, which introduced the importance of uniformity in admiralty law and stressed the preeminence of federal maritime law over state law rules of decision. See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216, 37 S. Ct. at 529.36 But unlike the situations in Tallentire, Higginbotham, and Miles, each of which implicated clearly articulated federal statutory schemes, the Moragne cause of action in this context 35 The rule that the Jones Act preempts state remedies stems from Lindgren and Gillespie (which held that the Jones Act was the exclusive remedy for survivors of seamen killed in territorial waters). These cases may not have survived Moragne, see GILMORE & BLACK § 6-32, at 368 (saying that Moragne effectively overruled Lindgren and Gillespie), although in Miles the Court suggested that at least with respect to the issue of the preemption of state remedies, Lindgren and Gillespie are still good law. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 29, 111 S. Ct. at 324 ([T]he preclusive effect of the Jones Act established in Lindgren and Gillespie extends only to state remedies . . . .) (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 396, n.12, 90 S. Ct. at 1785 n.12). At all events, the premise of Yamaha's argument that the federal statutes displace all state remedies is not free from doubt, even where the federal statutes apply. 36 Of course Justice Holmes dissented in Jensen, uttering what is perhaps his best known statement: The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified. 244 U.S. at 222, 37 S. Ct. at 531 (Holmes, J. dissenting). And Jensen has since been called the Lochner of the federal maritime law. See American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 991 (Stevens, J. concurring) (Jensen is just as untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905), would be in a case under the Due Process Clause.) (parallel citation omitted). reflects anything but a clearly articulated scheme. Not only has Congress said nothing about the applicability of particular remedies, but the Court's common law has not either. And since Moragne explicitly left open a number of questions about remedies, application of state remedies remains permissible to the extent they do not conflict with whatever settled principles exist.37 This proposition is true whether state laws operate to plaintiffs' or defendants' benefit. See, e.g., Brockington v. Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1528-33 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (applying exclusivity provisions of Georgia Worker's 37 Although Yamaha has been able to muster considerable support in the case law for its position that Moragne displaces all state wrongful death statutes, the case law appears to be split on this issue. Compare Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing cases); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980); Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626 (Ala. 1994); Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1991) (holding that Moragne displaces state wrongful death and survival statutes), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 301 (1991), with Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270, 1280 n.12 (1st Cir. 1993) (Even today, plaintiffs may invoke state wrongful death statutes under the saving clause insofar as they involve accidents in territorial waters and do not conflict with the substantive principles developed under the maritime wrongful death doctrine.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2987 (1993); Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (applying Massachusetts state law as its rule of decision in wrongful death action brought by survivor of person killed in a scuba accident within Massachusetts territorial waters). Cf. Favorito v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Rhode Island law to claims arising from allision of small boat with anchored vessel within Rhode Island's territorial waters and citing Lyon); Marine Transp. Serv. v. Python High Performance, 16 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 1994) (although recognizing that general maritime law was applicable to the claim under admiralty jurisdiction, nevertheless applying principles of Florida equitable estoppel law in commercial dispute). Compensation Act to exclude additional recovery under general federal maritime law to nonmaritime worker injured within territorial waters), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026, 111 S. Ct. 676 (1991). Prior to Moragne, it was well established that state wrongful death statutes could apply to maritime deaths occurring in territorial waters. Lindgren, 281 U.S. at 43-44, 50 S. Ct. at 210 ([Before the Jones Act], in the absence of any legislation by Congress, . . . where a seaman's death resulted from a maritime tort on navigable waters within a State whose statutes gave a right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts could entertain a libel in personam for the damages sustained by those to whom such right was given.);38 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239, 245, 63 S. Ct. 246, 251 (1942) ([A]dmiralty courts, when invoked to protect rights rooted in state law, endeavor to determine the issues in accordance with the substantive law of the State.); The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 590-91, 79 S. Ct. at 505-06 (pre-Moragne rights of non-seaman killed in state territorial waters depend on state wrongful death statute).39 38 See also id. at 44, 50 S. Ct. at 210 ([S]such statutes `were not a part of the general maritime law' and were recognized only because Congress had not legislated on the subject.). 39 This aspect of the holding of The Tungus retains vitality post-Moragne, for the Moragne Court concluded that the primary source of the confusion [in the law of maritime wrongful deaths] is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The Harrisburg, Moragne, 398 U.S. at 378, 90 S. Ct. at 1776, only the latter of which Moragne accordingly overruled. Id. at 409, 90 S. Ct. at 1792. Furthermore, Moragne itself showed no hostility to concurrent application of state wrongful death statutes. Indeed, to read into Moragne the idea that it was placing a ceiling on recovery for wrongful death, rather than a floor, is somewhat ahistorical. The Moragne cause of action was in many respects a gap filling measure to ensure that seamen (and their survivors) would all be treated alike. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 596, 608 n.19, 94 S. Ct. at 820, 826 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting). The humane and liberal purpose underlying the general maritime remedy of Moragne was driven by the idea that survivors of seamen killed in state territorial waters should not have been barred from recovery simply because the tort system of the particular state in which a seaman died did not incorporate special maritime doctrines. It is difficult to see how this purpose can be taken as an intent to preclude the operation of state laws that do supply a remedy. Of course, as we have mentioned above, Moragne also recognized the importance of federal statutory commands in shaping the general maritime wrongful death remedy -- both in the way in which it created a general maritime wrongful death remedy, and in its suggestion that courts should look to statutes for guidance in developing the contours of that remedy. And postMoragne jurisprudence has given that principle preeminence. But a proper application of this principle, in our view, shows that state wrongful death statutes should not be displaced in this context. Our principal guidance on this issue comes from Tallentire and its interpretation of DOHSA, the one federal statute applicable to non-seamen. Although Tallentire held that DOHSA displaced state wrongful death statutes for deaths on the high seas, its analysis of Section 7 of DOHSA is of considerable importance in understanding the extent to which the DOHSA remedies should not be treated as the exclusive types of remedies in a Moragne cause of action. Of decisional importance in Tallentire was the notion that by enacting Section 7 of DOHSA, Congress intended to preserve concurrent state jurisdiction for maritime deaths within state territorial waters. As we have discussed in the previous section, the Court stressed that the animating purpose of Section 7 was to preserve to the states jurisdiction to provide wrongful death remedies under state law for fatalities on territorial waters, and that [b]ecause DOHSA by its terms extended only to the high seas and therefore was thought not to displace [state wrongful death remedies] on territorial waters, § 7, as originally proposed, ensured that the Act saved to survivors of those killed on territorial waters the ability to pursue a state wrongful death remedy in state court.40 Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 225, 106 S. Ct. at 2495 (internal citation omitted). Tallentire thus tells us that DOHSA was affirmatively intended to preserve 40 See also id. (The felt necessity for a DOHSA saving clause, then, may be traced to the fact that [state] wrongful death statutes like workmen's compensation schemes were not common law remedies, and thus may not have been deemed saved to suitors under the Judiciary Act of 1789, as construed in Jensen.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). state wrongful death remedies for survivors of people killed in territorial waters. This intent to preserve state wrongful death remedies in state territorial waters should not be lightly disregarded, particularly since Moragne and its progeny say nothing explicit about abrogating state remedies. Tallentire's interpretation of DOHSA is also important for another reason. It suggests that there is a more fundamental flaw in Yamaha's argument that the incorporation of DOHSA's provisions into a Moragne cause of action should be treated as displacing all state wrongful death remedies. If Yamaha is right, it means that Moragne gives DOHSA preclusive effect in an area (maritime deaths in state territorial waters) in which Congress explicitly intended DOHSA to have no such effect. See The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 608, 79 S. Ct. at 514 (It is odd to draw restrictive inferences from a statute whose purpose was to extend recovery for wrongful death.). So interpreted, Moragne would thus transform a statute explicitly designed to preserve state remedies into one that would displace them. In our view, such a result would cut Moragne loose from its conceptual moorings and disregard Supreme Court teachings since Moragne that we must look to congressional statutory commands to determine what remedies are available for maritime deaths. But even if DOHSA is not treated as explicitly allowing state law to operate in this area, at the very least the legislative history of DOHSA shows no hostility toward the application of state wrongful death statutes in territorial waters. See Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 588 n.22, 94 S. Ct. at 816 n.22. And since a clear conflict must exist before state law is displaced by federal admiralty law, see Askew, 411 U.S. at 325, 93 S. Ct. at 1600, we cannot find that Moragne displaces state wrongful death remedies for deaths of non-seamen in territorial waters. Because we see no congressional intent to preclude the operation of state wrongful death statutes, and, indeed, believe that DOHSA arguably preserves state wrongful death remedies in territorial waters, we hold that state wrongful death statutes provide the rule of decision when a recreational boater is killed in territorial waters. We find support for this result in Judge Breyer's opinion in Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying Massachusetts state law as its rule of decision in wrongful death action brought by survivor of person killed in scuba accident within Massachusetts territorial waters), and the views of a leading commentator, 14 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3672 at 295 (2d ed. Supp. 1994) (If the same accident [one falling within the provisions of DOHSA] occurs within a marine league from shore, where [DOHSA] has no effect, the survivors can recover damages under the state wrongful death statute, including, when provided, reimbursement for non-economic losses.). Cf. Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 631 (holding that the federal maritime economic loss rule of Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), which denies recovery for purely economic losses, did not displace a Rhode Island statute that allowed damages for some economic losses). We also believe our holding to be in full accord with the principle of uniform vindication of federal maritime policies that, however attenuated, see supra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not defined., has generally been considered the hallmark of conflicts jurisprudence in admiralty law. In terms of the notion of uniformity, Yamaha's claim basically boils down to the following proposition: state wrongful death statutes cannot apply to deaths to recreational boaters in territorial waters because it would raise the possibility of different remedies depending on the location of the accident and the citizenship of the parties.41 But Yamaha heralds the need for uniformity without an appreciation for the boundaries of its relevance. Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270, 1279 (1st Cir. 1993). The argument simply proves too much. All state laws, if given effect in admiralty cases, interfere to a degree with the uniformity of admiralty law. 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 112, at 7-36. 41 Yamaha states, in terrorem: The Calhouns argue against the weight of authority and against the concept of uniformity; instead they espouse a different remedy for civilians injured in territorial waters than that afforded seamen and maritime workers by Congress and the Supreme Court. If accepted, their argument would result in at least 50 different possible measures of damages for the same cause of action, depending solely on the citizenship of the decedent and/or the place of the accident. Reply/Answering Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 1-2. Perhaps recognizing that its uniformity argument proves too much, Yamaha advanced a variant of it at oral argument, suggesting that accepting the Calhouns' position on available damages would lead to the following allegedly untenable result: in an accident on a ship in which a non-seaman and a seaman were each killed, the non-seaman's survivors would potentially be entitled (depending on the state statute) to higher damages than those available to the survivors of the seaman. This result, however, is untenable only if we assume that a person's statutory status should be irrelevant for purposes of determining recovery for maritime deaths. But Miles, by denying loss of society damages to the survivor of a seaman because the seaman was covered by the Jones Act, has told us that such status does make a difference. 498 U.S. at 32-33, 111 S. Ct. at 325-26.42 More fundamentally, however, it is fairly common for tort systems to allow different recoveries based on the injured party's status. The problem Yamaha poses arises all of the time, whenever two parties are injured in the same event but one is covered by worker's compensation and the other is not. Even within maritime law, differing recoveries based on status occur all of the time. Longshoremen and seamen can often be injured in 42 The case law is replete with statements that non-seamen should not be entitled to damages in greater amounts than seaman because allowing recovery would not foster admiralty's aim of providing special solicitude to seamen. See, e.g., Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092. But this argument seems to us to be a non sequitur, for it is difficult to see how denying recovery to nonseamen's survivors shows any special solicitude to seamen or their survivors. the same event, but a longshoreman covered by LHWCA, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901 et seq. (1986), cannot sue under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, while a seaman can. A similar asymmetry exists between non-seamen and seamen where non-seamen cannot take advantage of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 629, 79 S. Ct. 406, 409 (1959); Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 294 n.11 (5th Cir. 1990). For instance, should a non-seaman and a seaman be injured due to a non-negligent but unseaworthy condition of the vessel, the seaman would recover and the non-seaman would not. This analogy has especial importance because in Moragne itself a negligence theory was at all times still available to the plaintiff.43 Indeed, this case is, in many respects, the mirror image of Moragne. Moragne was driven by the realization that the state wrongful death tort system simply could not be grafted wholesale onto the regime governing torts affecting seamen. 398 U.S. at 401, 90 S. Ct. at 1788 (stating that its holding would remove the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from 43 It is often a quite reasonable choice for a group of potential plaintiffs to give up the prospect of huge damages in return for easier theories of recovery, and vice versa. The trade-off that the longshoreman received in exchange for losing the right to sue on an unseaworthiness theory was an increase in the compensation benefits under the LHWCA and expanded coverage. See GILMORE & BLACK § 6-53, at 437 & n.339. More specifically, a trade-off similar to the one made in the context of longshore workers' injuries seems quite reasonable in the context of this case. the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts). To accept Yamaha's position in this case would create the opposite of the problem faced in Moragne, for we would be grafting a compensation scheme designed principally for seamen onto cases that fit easily within the tort systems developed by the states. This case is, at base, no different than a cause of action arising out of the average motor vehicle accident. Finally, we note that states have substantial interests in policing their territorial waterways and protecting their citizens through their tort systems. In light of such interests, we should be loath to displace their statutes under our federal common law power absent a clear federal rule. See American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 992 (Stevens, J. concurring) (citing Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992)). Although we recognize that the rule barring state claims if they conflict with basic maritime principles often requires a delicate accommodation of federal and state interests, here, in the absence of a clear federal interest, we think that the balance tips in favor of allowing state law to apply. In sum, we hold that general maritime law does not preempt state law wrongful death acts in actions based on the death of a nonseaman in territorial waters, and that such acts therefore govern this case.