Opinion ID: 1670044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Availability of Appellate Review

Text: Patterson asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a summary judgment, in denying her motion for a JML, in instructing the jury, and in ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence. Even if we treat the silence in the record regarding the disposition of Patterson's motion for a summary judgment as creating a presumption of its denial, we cannot reach the question whether the trial court erred in denying the motion. [3] This case proceeded to trial, and appellate review of any alleged pretrial error in denying the motion for a summary judgment is precluded. See Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala.2003)([W]e do not review a trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.). Neither do we address the denial of Patterson's motion for a JML, because she failed to renew that motion after the verdict was entered. See Johnny Spradlin Auto Parts, Inc. v. Cochran, 568 So.2d 738, 741 (Ala.1990)(An appellant who seeks reversal of an adverse judgment on the ground that there is insufficient evidence must meet a two-pronged test: he must have asked for a [JML] at the close of all the evidence, specifying `insufficiency of the evidence' as a ground, and he must have renewed this motion by way of a timely filed motion for [a JML] that again specified the same insufficiency-of-the-evidence ground. (emphasis added)). Stripping out the defense of misrepresentation would present the trial court with a question of the sufficiency of Liberty National's remaining evidence in opposition to Patterson's breach-of-contract claim. Cf. Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770, 777 (Ala. 1988), dealing with the defense of qualified immunity and holding that the precursor of a motion for a JML need not be renewed where a pure question of law is presented. We decline to apply Barnes to the instant case because of the presence here of the residual question as to the sufficiency of the evidence if the question of law as to the necessity to plead an affirmative defense is resolved in favor of Patterson. [4] Patterson's failure to renew her motion for a JML or to move for a new trial does not preclude us from considering errors in the admission of evidence. Travis v. Hubbard, 267 Ala. 670, 673, 104 So.2d 712, 715 (1958). Likewise, adverse rulings on jury instructions do not require a motion for a new trial to preserve error. Mobile City Lines, Inc. v. Proctor, 272 Ala. 217, 226, 130 So.2d 388, 396 (1961). Liberty National cites Johnston v. Frost, 547 So.2d 528 (Ala.1989), as support for its contention that a `trial court may not be put in error for failure to rule on a matter which was not presented to it or decided by it.' (Liberty National's brief at 47 (quoting Johnston, 547 So.2d at 529)). In Johnston, this Court refused to consider a defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence because that ground was not argued in the motion for a new trial. Of course, this Court has repeatedly held that the loser after a jury trial cannot, on appeal, seek a new trial based on the verdict's being contrary to the weight of the evidence without having first moved for a new trial in the trial court. See, e.g., Spiers v. Flowers, 572 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Ala.1990). In this case, we have refused to review the trial court's denial of Patterson's preverdict motion for a JML, also based on the insufficiency of the evidence, because Patterson failed to renew her motion for a JML after the verdict was entered, thereby never presenting to the trial court the question whether the verdict should be set aside and a judgment entered for Patterson. This Court in Johnston also refused to consider an alleged defect in the form of the verdict, noting that the issue had never been previously raised in a motion for a new trial. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the issue had been previously raised in the trial court before the verdict was entered. We are not inclined to extend the holding in Johnston by assuming that the error had been previously asserted before the entry of the verdict, but simply omitted from the postjudgment motion for a new trial. Johnston is not inconsistent with Travis v. Hubbard, supra , or Mobile City Lines, Inc. v. Proctor, supra , because those cases distinguish between reviewing matters upon which the trial court was never given the opportunity to rule, on the one hand, and reviewing rulings based on the admission of evidence and on the instruction of the jury, with respect to which the trial court had made adverse rulings, on the other. Liberty National also cites Green v. Taylor, 437 So.2d 1259 (Ala.1983), for the proposition that [f]ailure to make a motion [for a new trial] to [the] trial court preclude[s] [an] appellate court's review of plaintiff's contention that [the] trial court abused its discretion. (Liberty National's brief at 46). The trial court in Green had dismissed the case because the plaintiffs failed to appear for their depositions. On appeal, this Court refused to review the judgment of dismissal because the plaintiffs had not moved to set aside that judgment. Without a motion to set aside, the trial court was not afforded an opportunity to fully consider the position of the party against whom the judgment of dismissal was entered. See Green, 437 So.2d at 1261 (Torbert, C.J., concurring) (The dismissal for failure to comply with the discovery rules occurred after something less than a full hearing. Failure of the appellants here to move to set aside the dismissal under Rule 60(b), [Ala.] R. Civ. P., prevents the trial court from correcting its decision and deprives this Court of a fully developed record from which to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion.  (emphasis added)). The fact that Liberty National failed to plead its defense of misrepresentation was repeatedly brought to the trial court's attention in the proceedings below. The concerns for a fully developed record from which to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion that animated our review of a dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition in Green are not here presented. Because the authorities we rely upon Travis v. Hubbard and Mobile City Lines, Inc. v. Proctor predate the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, it is noteworthy that federal courts, governed by the analogous Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, generally have held that a motion for a new trial is not a prerequisite to appellate review of issues the trial court has previously decided adversely to the appellant. See Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc. v. H.A. Crane & Bro., Inc., 417 F.2d 1263, 1271 n. 2 (3d Cir.1969) (While it would have been desirable for the trial court to have had an opportunity to consider this alleged error [in the admission of hearsay evidence] on the motion for a new trial, appellant's failure to raise the claim at that time does not, of course, bar him from asserting this ground on appeal provided objection to the evidence was made at trial. . . .); United States v. Mountain State Fabricating Co., 282 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir.1960) (stating, in the context of alleged errors in excluding certain evidence and in instructing the jury, failure to file [a motion for a new trial] does not forfeit the litigant's right to have reviewed on appeal questions which were properly reserved); United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1101 (7th Cir.1970) (Under federal procedure, it is not necessary to file a motion for a new trial in order to have reviewed on appeal questions properly preserved at trial.); Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373, 1377 (5th Cir.1994) (Filing a Rule 59 [Fed.R.Civ.P.] motion [for a new trial] is not a prerequisite to taking an appeal . . . . (footnote omitted)); Etienne v. Inter-County Sec. Corp., 173 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir.1999) (court refused to consider a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, but went on to address alleged errors in jury instructions even though no new-trial motion had been filed). See also C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil § 2540, p. 366, (2d ed. 1994) (A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) is not a condition precedent to appeal from a final judgment. If there have been errors at the trial, duly objected to, dealing with matters other than the sufficiency of the evidence, they may be raised on appeal from the judgment even though there has not been either a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or a motion for a new trial, although it is better practice for the parties to give the trial court an opportunity to correct its errors in the first instance. (footnote omitted)). In federal cases where a failure to file a new-trial motion has proven fatal, the appeals have typically been based upon the inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages awarded or upon the insufficiency of the evidence. See Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir.1988) ([A] motion for new trial must be made in the first instance before the trial court, particularly where the weight of the evidence is at issue. (emphasis added)); Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 577 (5th Cir.1981) (`[T]here can be no appellate review (of allegedly excessive or inadequate damages) if the trial court was not given an opportunity to exercise its discretion on a motion for new trial.' (quoting Baker v. Dillon, 389 F.2d 57, 58 (5th Cir.1968)) (emphasis added)); Ryen v. Owens, 446 F.2d 1333, 1334 (D.C.Cir.1971) (The trial judge must . . . be given an opportunity to exercise his discretion. For this reason, a motion for a new trial must be made . . . if a party desires to attack on appeal a judgment... on the ground that the damages are inadequate.  (emphasis added)); Baker v. Dillon, 389 F.2d 57, 58 (5th Cir.1968) (discussing appeal challenging amount of damages and holding that a motion for a new trial is required before the trial court can exercise its discretion); Etienne v. Inter-County Sec. Corp., supra (court refused to consider a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, but went on to address alleged errors in jury instructions even though no new-trial motion had been filed). This result is similar to the holdings in our cases. See Spiers v. Flowers, supra . We base our remand in this proceeding not on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on errors in the admission of evidence and in the refusal of jury charges. Both of these issues were sufficiently presented to the trial court and were decided adversely to Patterson. Patterson is therefore not precluded by reason of her failure to file a postverdict motion for a JML and a motion for a new trial from urging this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case based on the issues related to Liberty National's defense arising out of the alleged misrepresentations on the insurance application. While Patterson's original brief in this Court does not expressly request a remand of her case for further proceedings as an alternative to the entry of a summary judgment or a JML, she does state issues and present argument that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the effect of the alleged misrepresentations in the insurance application and erroneously permitted Liberty National to argue the issue. In a paragraph in the conclusion in her brief, separate from an earlier paragraph seeking the reversal of what we have presumed to be a denial of her motion for a summary judgment, Patterson refers to errors in charging the jury on a defense related to misrepresentation. Those assertions of error inherently embrace relief in the form of a remand of the case for further proceedings. Indeed, in its brief Liberty National recognizes that an incorrect, misleading, erroneous, or prejudicial charge may form the basis for granting a new trial. Taken as a whole, Patterson's brief sufficiently seeks remand as an alternative to a JML in the context of Patterson's claim that the trial court erred in permitting Liberty National to assert a defense of misrepresentation. This Court can therefore consider whether to reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings on the breach-of-contract claim as an alternative to relief in the form of reversal of the judgment and remand with instructions to enter judgment for Patterson, which relief, for the reasons previously stated, is unavailable to her.