Opinion ID: 2508648
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Treacy Was Properly Found Liable Under the Ordinance.

Text: In his appeal to the superior court, Treacy attempted to introduce several exhibits into the record, including Anchorage Assembly and Anchorage Police Department internal memoranda used in drafting the ordinance and an article by the Justice Policy Institute entitled The Impact of Juvenile Curfew Laws in California. Anchorage moved to strike the exhibits on the ground that they were not part of the agency record on appeal, [88] and Judge Hunt granted the motion without explanation. Treacy appeals this ruling, arguing that the exhibits consisted of legislative facts properly considered by an appeals court [89] and that Judge Hunt should have ordered a de novo trial to consider the constitutional issues at stake since the hearing officer could not properly have ruled on the constitutionality of the ordinance. [90] Anchorage contends that the exhibits are not legislative facts and argues that, while Alaska Appellate Rule 609(b)(1) [91] does afford the trial court discretion to hold a trial de novo in an administrative agency review, such trials are rare. [92] We review the superior court's decision whether to order a de novo trial or a de novo examination of the record for abuse of discretion. [93] To find an abuse of discretion, we must be left with a definite and firm conviction after reviewing the whole record that the trial court erred in its ruling. [94] A trial de novo is particularly appropriate when certain issues are not within the expertise of the reviewing body or when the present record is inadequate. [95] A trial de novo is also appropriate when the procedures of the administrative body are inadequate, for instance when they do not provide due process, [96] when the agency was biased, [97] or when the agency excluded important evidence. [98] Normally, however, a court will review an agency decision on the record. [99] In this case, where there was no suggestion of inadequate procedure or bias, the superior court acted well within its discretion in not granting a trial de novo on the broad question of the constitutional validity of the ordinance. Since there was no trial de novo, the superior court also acted within its discretion to review only the administrative agency record under Alaska Appellate Rule 604(b)(1), regardless of whether the proposed exhibits contained legislative facts. It should be noted that, even had we ruled to the contrary, this issue would be moot, as we have considered most, if not all, of the excluded evidence in our facial review of the ordinance.
Treacy contests the application of the ordinance to his particular case. He argues that he cannot be said to have remained in public under the ordinance, which defines remain in part as to stay or to linger, because all of these words imply a lack of motion, whereas he was in a moving car. Anchorage replies that the intent of the ordinance is to prevent minors from being on the streets or in public places after curfew hours, and that Treacy's definition of remain is so excessively precise as to strain common sense. We hold that Treacy could not avoid citation under the ordinance merely by moving from one place to another. [100] Remain does not necessarily imply a lack of motion; as we discussed above, a minor who is moving about in public without a purpose or with an improper purpose remains in public after a time when he or she should have gained lawful admittance to a place to which a substantial group of the public does not have access. [101] Although other courts have held that remain in a juvenile curfew ordinance simply refers to the minor being in public, [102] Treacy's case does not require us to rule on this issue. [103] We hold that the hearing officer and superior court did not construe the ordinance improperly in Treacy's case.