Opinion ID: 1175813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative Intent and Authority

Text: We must first determine both the legislature's intent in authorizing multiple sentences and whether such an authorization was within its power. [6] The starting point for statutory analysis is the language of the statutes in question. At issue here are AS 11.41.120, [7] AS 11.41.220, [8] and AS 11.41.135. [9] In the manslaughter statute, AS 11.41.120, and the criminal assault statute, AS 11.41.220, the legislature expressly sought to punish a person for deaths and assaults caused by reckless behavior. [10] The legislature, therefore, has defined as manslaughter the loss of life which results from a person's conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. In order to ensure that those who kill more than one person are held responsible for their deeds, the legislature has enacted AS 11.41.135. That statute provides: If more than one person dies as a result of a person committing conduct constituting a crime specified in AS 11.41.100-11.41.130, each death constitutes a separately punishable offense. [11] The legislature explicitly set out the purposes of AS 11.41.135 in commentary accompanying its passage: The intent of [AS 11.41.135] is to reverse the outcome in cases similar to Thessen v. State, 508 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1973). In Thessen the Alaska Supreme Court held that only one homicide conviction may result when a defendant is convicted of setting a fire that kills 14 people. Under [this section] the defendant could be convicted of 14 counts of homicide  one for each death. Multiple convictions would also result in Manslaughter cases where multiple deaths are caused by a defendant who drives while intoxicated, thus reversing the Alaska Supreme Court's holding in cases similar to the factual situation in State v. Souter, 606 P.2d 399 (Alaska 1980). 3 1982 House Journal, Supp. No. 63, 2 (June 1, 1982). [12] In Thessen we held that where there has been but one statute violated by a single act, without intent to harm multiple victims, the Alaskan constitutional prohibition against placing a person in jeopardy twice for the same offense prevents imposition of multiple punishments. 508 P.2d at 1195. This broad language potentially applies to the violation of any single statute where there are multiple victims. On its face AS 11.41.135 does not directly authorize multiple punishments for multiple victims of reckless assaults. It does, however, imply such intent. We do not believe that the legislature sought to single out homicide defendants for special treatment. At the time AS 11.41.135 was enacted only homicide cases had been decided. See 3 1982 House Journal, Supp. No. 63 at 2. It would be inconsistent to hold that where deaths occur multiple punishments are possible but where only injuries or a combination of deaths and injuries occur, a court would be required to only punish once for multiple assaults. We do not believe the legislature intended such an anomaly. By defining manslaughter and third degree assault to include responsibility for reckless behavior and defining recklessness to include the risk that a result will occur, the legislature sought to hold people criminally responsible for the results of their behavior that are within the scope of the risk created by that behavior. [13] Our decisions and those of other courts uniformly recognize the inherent authority of the legislative branch to define and punish crimes absent constitutional violations. [14]