Opinion ID: 2215822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: History of CPL 270.35

Text: Section 358-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure  the statutory predecessor to CPL 270.35  originally permitted the court to substitute an alternate juror only prior to commencement of deliberations and required that the alternate jurors be dismissed once the case was submitted to the jury. [1] In People v Mitchell (266 N.Y. 15, supra ), this Court held that section 358-a did not violate the defendant's fundamental right to a jury of 12. In Mitchell itself, the alternates were discharged when the 12 regular jurors retired for deliberation. The Court explained that the defendant's constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence determined by 12 jurors was fully protected since at no time did either of these alternates attempt[] in any way to influence any of the twelve ( People v Mitchell , 266 NY at 18). Consequently, [t]his defendant was not tried by a jury of fourteen men. Only twelve participated in the rendition of the verdict and they are the same twelve originally selected for the performance of that service. Each heard all the evidence and at no time during the course of the trial did any one of them cease to function as a juror ( id. ). In an effort to avoid mistrials in lengthy trial proceedings, the Legislature in 1952 amended section 358-a, authorizing retention of the alternate jurors subsequent to submission of the case to the jury and substitution for a regular juror discharged during deliberations ( see , People v Ryan , 19 NY2d at 102). [2] The statute did not require any form of consent by either party prior to such substitution. In 1966, this Court held in People v Ryan that, once deliberations had commenced, replacing a regular juror with an alternate pursuant to section 358-a violated the constitutional guarantee to trial by a jury of 12. In Ryan , an alternate juror was substituted for an ill juror after five hours of deliberation. The Court explained that this procedure amounted to deliberation by more than 12 jurors: We believe that the Constitution of this State, as it has been construed, prohibits the substitution of an alternate juror  in effect a 13th juror  after the jury has begun its deliberation. While it may be difficult in an individual case to evaluate the extent to which a defendant may be prejudiced by such a substitution, we believe that, once the deliberative process has begun, it should not be disturbed by the substitution of one or more jurors who had not taken part in the previous deliberation and who had cease[d] to function as jurors. ( People v. Mitchell , supra .) ( Id. at 104-105.) The Court, however, acknowledged that a defendant could waive the right to a jury trial  as well as the inclusory right to a jury of 12  and thereby consent to substitution of an alternate for a deliberating juror, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense (NY Const, art I, § 2). Although trial counsel in Ryan consented to replacement of a deliberating juror with the alternate, the Court rejected the People's contention that consent by the defendants' counsel amounted to an effective waiver ( People v Ryan , 19 NY2d at 106). When the Criminal Procedure Law was adopted in 1970, the Ryan holding was incorporated into section 270.35, addressing substitution of an alternate juror during deliberations. Section 270.35 provides that if any alternate jurors are available for service, the first alternate should replace the discharged juror. The statute, however, further directs, if the trial jury has begun its deliberations, the defendant must consent to such replacement. Such consent must be in writing and must be signed by the defendant in person in open court in the presence of the court (emphasis added). Tellingly, the statutory procedure for consenting to substitution of a deliberating juror mirrors the requirements contained in the Constitution for waiving a jury trial  written consent signed personally by the defendant in open court and in the presence of the court. Indeed, the Staff Comment accompanying the legislative proposal for this section explains that it seeks to comply with the Ryan opinion (Commission Staff Notes, reprinted following NY Cons Law Serv, CPL 270.35, at 446; see also , Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 270.35, at 453). There can be no doubt, then, that the purpose of the specification in CPL 270.35 for consent memorialized in a writing signed in open court is to ensure that the State constitutional requirements for waiving a jury trial are followed before an alternate is substituted for a regular juror once deliberations have begun.