Opinion ID: 2995232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Title IX Claim

Text: The Board also argues that it is immune from Cherry’s Title IX claim. According to the Board, even though it is a recipient of federal funds under Title IX, it has not waived its immunity from suits under Title IX by accepting those funds. Congress enacted Title IX pursuant to its authority under the Spending Clause./3 Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999). Title IX provides, with certain exceptions not at issue here, that ’[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.’ Id. at 638 (quoting 20 U.S.C. sec. 1681(a)). Congress enacted Title IX with two principal objectives in mind: ’[T]o avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ’to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices.’ Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). Although Congress can abrogate the States’ immunity when it legislates pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress cannot override the States’ immunity using an Article I power such as Spending Clause legislation. See Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 962 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996)). But the Supreme Court has recognized that federal funds under Title IX are gifts to the States, College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 687. Therefore Congress may, in its exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States on their consent to waive their immunity from suit. See id. at 686; MCI, 222 F.3d at 344; see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (Turning to Congress’ power to legislate pursuant to the spending power, our cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States.). According to the Supreme Court, legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; Davis, 526 U.S. at 640; see also MCI, 222 F.3d at 344 (States may waive their immunity by accepting a benefit from Congress that has conditions attached to that acceptance.). Thus, a State may waive its immunity from Title IX suits by accepting federal funds under the statute. MCI, 222 F.3d at 344 (citing College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 686- 87). However, the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985). Congress must manifest a clear intent to condition participation in programs funded under [Title IX] on a State’s consent to waive its constitutional immunity. Id. at 247. If Congress intends to require the States to waive their immunity from Title IX suits in exchange for their receipt of Title IX funds, Congress must speak with a clear voice, and do so unambiguously, in order to enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. Thus, the test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241. In this case, the Board contends that Congress has not made a clear statement of its intent to condition the State’s receipt of Title IX funds on the State’s consent to waive its immunity. In support of its contention, the Board argues that because Title IX does not expressly provide for a private cause of action against the State, Congress has never properly notified the Board that it must surrender its immunity from Title IX suits in exchange for its receipt of Title IX funds. The Board’s argument fails because Congress has unambiguously conditioned the States’ receipt of Title IX funds on their waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity from private causes of action. Although Title IX does not expressly provide for a private right of action, the Supreme Court has recognized since 1979 an implied private right of action under the statute. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717; Davis, 526 U.S. at 639. Subsequently in 1986, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d-7(a), the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act (CRREA), which provides in relevant part: (1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of . . . title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. sec. 1681 et seq.], . . . or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d-7(a)(1). Congress enacted the CRREA with full cognizance of the holding in Cannon that Title IX can be enforced by a private right of action. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992); see also id. (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d-7 cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon’s holding.); see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97 (It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law.). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress carefully crafted the CRREA as an unambiguous waiver of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996); see also id. at 198 (in enacting the CRREA, Congress sought to provide the sort of unequivocal waiver that our precedents demand.). And subsequent to the CRREA, the Court established that monetary damages are available to Title IX plaintiffs. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76; Davis, 526 U.S. at 639. In short, when the Board accepted federal education funds under Title IX, it was clearly put on notice that it may not discriminate in its programs on the basis of sex, 20 U.S.C. sec. 1681(a); that if it does discriminate on the basis of sex, it may be sued by a private individual, see Davis, 526 U.S. at 639; and that in any such suit, the Board may not assert its Eleventh Amendment immunity, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d-7(a). See Litman v. George Mason University, 186 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 1999). Clearly, the Board was able to ascertain what is expected of it in return for Title IX funds. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. Thus, we agree with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits that by enacting 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d-7(a), Congress clearly and unambiguously manifested its intent to condition the States’ receipt of Title IX funds on their waiver of immunity from suit. See Litman, 186 F.3d at 555; Pederson v. Louisiana State University, 213 F.3d 858, 876 (5th Cir. 2000). In accepting Title IX funding, the Board has waived its immunity from Cherry’s Title IX claim.