Opinion ID: 2633341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Protracted Period of Time Instruction

Text: {23} Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to give the jury his tendered instruction defining the phrase protracted period of time. Defendant's proposed instruction read: protracted period of time means a lengthy or unusually long time under the circumstances. Relying on State v. MascareZas, 2000-NMSC-017, 129 N.M. 230, 4 P.3d 1221, Defendant asserts that the trial court was required to give his tendered instruction. Defendant appears to argue that once a court has determined the meaning of a term, the jury should be instructed on that meaning. However, Defendant told the trial court when he submitted his definitional instruction that the definition might be helpful to the jury but that it was not required. Defendant asserts that because it is uncertain whether the jury considered the circumstances in determining whether he had kept the children for a protracted period of time, this error rose to the level of fundamental error. {24} We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to give Defendant's requested instruction. Where the issue is the failure to instruct on a term or word having a common meaning, there is no error in refusing an instruction defining the word or term. State v. Carnes, 97 N.M. 76, 79, 636 P.2d 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1981). Since the phrase protracted period of time is self-explanatory and has an understandable and common meaning, there was no need for further definition. See Trujeque v. Serv. Merch. Co., 117 N.M. 388, 390, 872 P.2d 361, 363 (1994) (concluding that the phrase exclusive control and management was self-explanatory and thus required no further definition for the jury); Luckie, 120 N.M. at 279, 901 P.2d at 210 (concluding that the phrase protracted time does not require enactment of a further statutory definition because any reasonable person would interpret the meaning of the phrase `protracted period' to mean a `lengthy or unusually long time under the circumstances' ( quoting People v. Obertance, 432 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1980))). Indeed, Defendant admits that this phrase has a common meaning. {25} Additionally, Defendant's reliance on MascareZas is misplaced. In MascareZas, 2000-NMSC-017, ¶ 21, we held that the trial court committed fundamental error when it failed to properly instruct the jury on the mens rea element of the crime at issue. We determined that the trial court's failure to provide the instruction was a critical determination akin to a missing elements instruction. Id. ¶ 20. That is not the situation here because the jury was properly instructed on all the elements of the crime. Thus, MascareZas is not applicable to the facts of this case. {26} Further, Defendant was able to argue his interpretation of the meaning of protracted period of time to the jury. Defendant argued that he did not intend to keep the children for a protracted period of time, unlike situations where a child is taken and never heard from again until several years later when the child is found. Defendant said that he never intended to deprive Yolanda of the children; she knew where they were and he told her that she could come and get them. He argued that the two-week time period in this case did not qualify as a protracted period of time. We believe that a reasonable juror could glean from Defendant's closing argument that a protracted period of time meant an unusually lengthy amount of time and that, according to Defendant, the two-week period was not unusually long under the circumstances of this case. Thus, we conclude that no error resulted from the trial court's refusal to give the jury Defendant's tendered definitional instruction on the phrase protracted period of time. Cf. Bennally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 21 (holding that closing argument was not sufficient to correct fundamental error arising from an erroneous jury instruction).