Opinion ID: 2746598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Statements

Text: Finally, Defendant argues the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial on the basis of three improper statements made at trial: (1) the expert officer's use of the term confession; (2) the same expert's slam-dunk remark; and (3) the prosecutor's statement that drug dealers use female drivers. We consider de novo whether these statements were actually improper and, if so, whether they were harmful. See United States v. Manor, 633 F.3d 11, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2011). But we review the judge's decision denying [Defendant's] mistrial and new-trial motions only for 'manifest abuse of discretion.' Id. at 17 (quoting United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2006)). Defendant tacitly admits each alleged error would not itself merit a mistrial. Rather, he only contends the district court abused its discretion by not declaring a mistrial based on their cumulative prejudicial effect. We cannot agree. -26- In a different context, say, where a defendant's inculpatory statement was entirely excluded, the use of the term confession at trial could be devastating. Here, however, two officers testified at trial that Defendant made inculpatory comments to them after his arrest. And 18 U.S.C. § 3501(e) defines a confession as any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing. Thus, Defendant arguably did make a confession, like the expert stated, as that term is defined in federal statutes. Moreover, defense counsel made clear only the term confession was objectionable, not the expert's reference to Defendant's underlying statements.9 In a scenario such as this, [t]he use of the word 'confession' without more . . . simply is not 'serious' misconduct, if misconduct at all. United States v. Scott, 267 F.3d 729, 742 (7th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Goodlow, 105 F.3d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1997) (Whether a statement given to law enforcement officials should be referred to as a confession . . . appears, at best, to be a question of semantics and not a potential ground for misconduct.). And the court's prompt and accurate instructions suffice to assuage any fair-trial concerns. See, e.g., Scott, 267 F.3d at 742. 9 Indeed, moments after the confession comment, defense counsel did not object when the expert testified one reason police did not look for fingerprints was because of the statement that was given [by Defendant]. Supp. App'x at 557 (emphasis added). -27- Similarly, the prosecutor's challenged comment during closing argument was just a slight misstatement of the evidence, and it was swiftly corrected by the court. Again, the expert testified drug dealers often avoid detection by having women in the car, whereas the prosecutor stated they often have women driving the car. This was incorrect and improper, to be sure, but it was hardly harmful given that the officer's original statement was applicable to the situation here--Johnson was in the car, after all--and therefore probably just as damning. See United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 2011)(Any error is harmless if the government shows it is 'highly probable that the error did not influence the verdict.' (citation omitted)). Also, nothing indicated this misrepresentation was intentional. This court has consistently held that where the prosecutor unintentionally misstates the evidence during closing argument, a jury instruction ordinarily is sufficient to cure any potential prejudice, particularly where, as here, the instruction was given immediately after the statement. Olszewski v. Spencer, 466 F.3d 47, 60–61 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). This leaves Defendant's cumulative argument resting almost exclusively on the slam-dunk comment. The district court rightly acknowledged this comment was more problematic. As Defendant points out, this case was not a slam-dunk given Johnson's claims of sole culpability. That said, the court -28- immediately and repeatedly admonished the jury to disregard this statement, and we have long presumed juries obey curative instructions. See United States v. Rodriguez, 675 F.3d 48, 63 (1st Cir. 2012); Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1184–85. Defendant has provided us with no case where a mistrial was granted based on a similar statement by itself or in conjunction with other more minor improper statements. Trial judges are best situated to make a battlefield assessment of the impact that a particular piece of improper information may have on a jury. United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1248 (1st Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Here, the district court declined to grant a mistrial because the slam-dunk comment was random and could have hurt the prosecution, and because proper instructions were given. We find no manifest abuse of discretion in that decision.