Opinion ID: 4539815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Trial—Acquittal

Text: Petitioner argues that his conviction should be reversed because his first trial resulted in an acquittal. According to Petitioner, the circuit court thwarted his acquittal by polling the jury in an improper manner. The West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure require a circuit court to poll the jury whenever a party requests it or the court deems it appropriate. W. Va. R. Crim. P. 31(d) (1995). We have this rule to ensure that the verdict is unanimous, as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and our Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ramos v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397, ___ L. Ed. ___, ___ (2020); W. Va. R. Crim. P. 31(a). As we have said, “the chief purpose behind an individual poll of jurors is to enable a juror to express any reservation he may have about the verdict free from the pressure of his fellow jurors.” State v. Tennant, 173 W. Va. 627, 630, 319 S.E.2d 395, 399 (1984). During polling, however, it is not always clear whether a juror agrees (or disagrees) with the verdict. Sometimes a juror’s candid response to, “Is that your verdict?” creates ambiguity. Accordingly, we have held “that appropriate neutral questions may be 11 asked of the juror to clarify any apparent confusion, provided the questions are not coercive.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Tennant, 173 W. Va. 627, 319 S.E.2d 395. Such questions are appropriate “when a juror indicates in a poll that he either disagrees with the verdict or expresses reservations about it[.]” Id. Tennant authorizes, however, “only a very limited inquiry” in order “to prevent the possibility of coercing the juror to conform to the verdict.” Id. at 630, 319 S.E.2d at 399. If, after limited, neutral, and non-coercive questioning, the juror continues to disagree with, or have reservations about, the verdict, “the trial court must either direct the jury to retire for further deliberations or discharge the jury.” Id. at 628, 319 S.E.2d at 396, syl. pt. 2, in part.12 In Petitioner’s case, the State asked the circuit court to poll the jury, and ten out of twelve jurors answered “Yes” to the finding of not guilty without qualification or any apparent hesitation. Yet two jurors offered qualified responses—“I guess it has to be by the law” and “By law, I guess”—that evidently suggested to the circuit court that these jurors may have disagreed with the verdict or had reservations about it. Petitioner argues that these responses were not sufficiently equivocal to prompt further inquiry, and he refers us to a case in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a “juror’s response 12 See also State v. Cole, 180 W. Va. 412, 419, 376 S.E.2d 618, 625 (1988) (“Juror No. 5 expressed some initial doubt as to the verdict. As permitted by Tennant, the court questioned the juror in an attempt to clarify any possible confusion. The juror’s answers to those questions did not dispel the existence of doubt. To the contrary, Juror No. 5 expressed reservations about the guilty verdict on three occasions. Once it became apparent that the verdict was not unanimous, the court was duty bound to either direct the jury to deliberate further or to declare a mistrial.”). 12 [(“Guilty, I guess”)], in context, [did] not demonstrate uncertainty about appellant’s guilt[.]” Johnson v. United States, 470 A.2d 756, 759 (D.C. App. 1983). Yet Petitioner ignores Johnson’s reason for reaching this conclusion: “The trial court is in a much better position to evaluate these factors than . . . an appellate tribunal.” Id. at 760. As the Johnson court observed, “Guilty, I guess” can be understood several different ways,13 and “[t]o determine which of these meanings should be ascribed . . . , one must consider the juror’s demeanor and the tone and pattern of his speech.” Id. Because of this, “the trial judge possesses ‘a measure of discretion’ in evaluating such responses, and ‘the reasonable exercise of this discretion should be accorded proper deference by a reviewing court.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Brooks, 420 F.2d 1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). In Johnson, the fact that the trial court allowed the jury poll to continue, and the fact that defense counsel failed to object, showed that the juror’s response of “Guilty, I guess” was unequivocal and that the trial court judge acted reasonably in interpreting the response that way. Johnson, 470 A.2d at 760. To return to Petitioner’s case, we were not present to hear or observe the jurors’ responses, and Petitioner, himself, argues that their responses were susceptible to 13 While “‘Guilty, I guess’ could indicate that the juror was uncertain about the defendant’s guilt, it also could mean that the juror was uncertain whether it was his turn to speak, or unclear about the terminology that he should use.” Johnson, 470 A.2d at 760. “I guess” can also function “as a meaningless addendum to an answer, without intending to communicate uncertainty of any kind.” Id. 13 more than one interpretation.14 Therefore, we are ill-equipped to second-guess the circuit court’s determination that these responses warranted clarification. Furthermore, we agree with the Johnson court and now hold that, when a circuit court polls a jury pursuant to Rule 31(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is within the circuit court’s sound discretion to evaluate the jurors’ responses and determine whether clarifying questions should be asked of the jurors.15 Petitioner also finds fault with the circuit court’s statement—“It doesn’t have to be”—contending that it “amounted to abetting jury nullification” and was “wholly improper[.]” We note that, in Tennant, we authorized a circuit court to ask “appropriate neutral questions . . . to clarify any apparent confusion, provided the questions are not coercive.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Tennant, 173 W. Va. 627, 319 S.E.2d 395 (emphasis added). This language from Tennant might be taken to suggest that, in seeking to “clarify any 14 In one sentence in his brief, Petitioner suggests that “the words ‘I guess’ are essentially meaningless surplusage to the jurors’ implicit acknowledgment that they had reached a not guilty verdict by applying the law.” In the next sentence, Petitioner writes, “Another way of construing the jurors’ statements is that they were simply unenthusiastic about the verdict the law required them to arrive upon.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioner ignores a third possible interpretation—among, perhaps, many others—that the two jurors were prepared to convict Petitioner but felt constrained to acquit him by some aspect of the circuit court’s instructions that they were not certain they had understood. 15 We also believe that there is an important difference between (a) saying that a juror’s response required a trial court to inquire further and (b) saying that a juror’s response barred a trial court from inquiring further. Both sides in a criminal case have a right to know that the jury’s verdict is unanimous, and—within reason—a trial court should err on the side of certainty. Because of this, there are circumstances where a trial court has discretion to inquire further even though it has no duty to do so. 14 apparent confusion,” a circuit court must confine itself to asking questions. We reject that understanding of Tennant. As Tennant explains, “the chief purpose behind an individual poll of jurors is to enable a juror to express any reservation he may have about the verdict free from the pressure of his fellow jurors.” Id. at 630, 319 S.E.2d at 399. To advance this purpose, we allow circuit courts to pose “appropriate neutral questions . . . to clarify any apparent confusion[.]” Id. at 628, 319 S.E.2d at 396, syl. pt. 2, in part (emphasis added). If a circuit court’s appropriate, neutral questions reveal, for example, that a juror is confused about a matter or feels coerced to join the majority’s verdict, we fail to see how a circuit court can correct the juror’s confusion, or assure the juror of his or her freedom to decide, without making appropriate, neutral statements in response. We hold, therefore, that when a circuit court polls a jury pursuant to Rule 31(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, and appropriate, neutral questions reveal that a juror is confused about a matter, feels coerced to join the majority’s verdict, or is otherwise in need of further instruction, the circuit court may respond in a very limited manner with appropriate, non-coercive, neutral statements that address the concern. Accord State v. Vandevender, 190 W. Va. 232, 235,