Opinion ID: 177847
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Clarity of the Law as Applied

Text: Not only was the law generally clear that Pietroski's conduct violated Raiche's right to be free from unreasonable seizures, but it was also sufficiently clear that an objectively reasonable [officer] would have believed that the action taken violated that clearly established constitutional right. Jennings, 499 F.3d at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). As our previous discussion makes clear, the record does not reveal any circumstances that would support Pietroski's use of force as reasonable, but it does reveal that an officer with Pietroski's training should not have used the force that he did. Thus, Pietroski cannot claim that he was reasonably mistaken as to the degree of force he should have used, and he has no recourse to qualified immunity. Id. We sympathize with the challenging work of police officers, which often forces them to make split-second judgmentsin circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolvingabout the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. However, we do not find such circumstances here. An objectively reasonable police officer would have believed that tackling Raiche from his motorcycle and slamming him into the pavement would violate his constitutional right to be free from excessive force. We have found that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Pietroski used excessive force to arrest Raiche in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, we have found that the law at the time was clearly established enough to caution Pietroski that the force he exercised against Raiche was excessive. Finally, we have found that an objectively reasonable officer under the specific circumstances in which Pietroski found himself would have believed that the force that Pietroski used to make the arrest was excessive. Therefore, Pietroski is not entitled to qualified immunity against Raiche's excessive force claim under § 1983. We affirm the denial of Pietroski's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Raiche's § 1983 excessive force claim.