Opinion ID: 3158584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Travel Act Conspiracy Instructions

Text: We likewise reject Mazer’s objection to the district court’s instruction on the charge of conspiracy to violate the Travel Act. According to Mazer, the district court erred in not clarifying that, unlike federal programs bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666, for which proof of an unlawful gratuity is sufficient, bribery under New York law (the predicate “unlawful activity” for the Travel Act charge) requires proof of a quid pro quo. Mazer did not raise this objection below, and we therefore review only for plain error. We conclude that, even if the instructions were flawed, Mazer has failed to carry his burden to establish prejudice. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). In an attempt to show prejudice, Mazer argues that he “presented evidence at trial that his interests in [D.A. Solutions] and Prime View were more akin to joint ventures than the result of any quid pro quo agreement.” Mazer Br. 86. But this defense theory, if accepted, would have resulted in an acquittal on the federal programs bribery charges—whether grounded in a quid pro quo or a gratuity theory—as well, and the jury necessarily rejected Mazer’s theory (and related interpretation of this evidence) when it convicted him of those charges. We see no reason why a different jury instruction would have led the jury to accept the joint-venture defense only with respect to the Travel Act conspiracy charge, and so we find that the district court’s error, if any, was harmless. 10