Opinion ID: 3013816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Personal Jurisdiction in Pennsylvania

Text: Saudi claims that the District Court erred in dismissing his suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) allows a district court to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident to the extent allowed by the law of the forum state. Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984). Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents “to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees in personam jurisdiction may only be asserted over a nonresident defendant corporation if that defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotation omitted). In assessing personal jurisdiction, the court must resolve the question based on the circumstances that the particular case presents. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485 (1985). A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant has specific or general contacts with the forum. Specific jurisdiction is appropriate only if the cause of action is related to or arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities, so 6 that it should reasonably expect to be haled into court. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prod. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8. The defendant must have “purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum” and the litigation must have resulted from alleged injuries that “‘arise out of or relate[] to those activities.’” BP Chem. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472). This determination is both claim-specific and defendant-specific. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2001); Rusk v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). If the cause of action does not “arise out of” the defendant foreign corporation’s activities, a court may assert general jurisdiction if the corporation has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state. 466 U.S. at 414-15. The standard for evaluating whether minimum contacts satisfy the test for general jurisdiction is more stringent than the test applied to questions of specific jurisdiction. See Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 1998).
The District Court found no basis to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Acomarit, as Saudi presented no evidence demonstrating the underlying accident arose out of or related to Acomarit’s contacts with or activities in Pennsylvania, such that Acomarit “should reasonably expect being haled into court” in Pennsylvania. 245 F. 7 Supp. 2d at 669 (quoting Vetrotex, 75 F.3d at 151). Saudi’s claims against Acomarit relate only to an accident which occurred in the Gulf of M exico, not in Pennsylvania or its territorial waters, and Saudi’s alleged injury did not arise from any activities Acomarit “purposefully directed” at Pennsylvania. Id. We find no error.
Saudi contends Acomarit had sufficient continuous and substantial contacts with Pennsylvania to establish general jurisdiction over Acomarit through its alleged employee Thomas Garrett. He claims that Osprey-Acomarit Ship Management employee Thomas Garrett was actually a “hidden” employee of Acomarit. According to Saudi, Acomarit hired Garrett as its port captain and entered into a joint venture with American Automar to form a company called Osprey-Acomarit Ship Management (“Osprey-Acomarit”), placed Garrett on that company’s payroll, and hid the fact that Acomarit used a resident agent in the United States to carry out its business. Even if Garrett was employed by Acomarit, Saudi has not shown sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania through Garrett’s employment to warrant general jurisdiction over Acomarit. At most, Garrett traveled to and from Pennsylvania to Osprey-Acomarit’s office in Maryland, where he had an office, sent some reports from his home in Pennsylvania, and made some telephone calls and some e-mails to and from Pennsylvania. There is no evidence that Acomarit conducted or solicited any business in Pennsylvania. With the exception of one vessel that paid a port call after the Saudi 8 accident, no Acomarit-managed vessels entered Pennsylvania waters. As such, these actions in Pennsylvania are not sufficient to establish “continuous and systematic” contacts with Pennsylvania. See, e.g., BP Chem. Ltd., 229 F.3d at 262 (finding lack of continuous and systematic contacts where the defendant corporation has no personnel or facilities in the forum and has not advertised or solicited business in the forum); Nichols v. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding insufficient “continuous and substantial activities” to justify general jurisdiction despite defendant’s solicitation activities and employment of representatives in the forum state). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding lack of general personal jurisdiction over Acomarit in Pennsylvania.