Opinion ID: 768725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Be Free of Unlawful Arrest

Text: 15 To recover under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, Wilson must establish that a state actor engaged in conduct that deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution or laws of the United States. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). Because Russo has fairly raised a qualified immunity defense, Wilson has a further burden. According to the doctrine of qualified immunity, law enforcement officers acting within their professional capacity are generally immune from trial insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1699 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 16 The qualified immunity defense requires that we engage in a two-step analysis. First, we must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all. Conn v. Gabbert , 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295 (1999). Only if he has should we proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable juror could conclude that Wilson's clearly established rights were violated. See Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). 17 This does not mean that the jury determines the contours of the right. Rather, after making a legal determination about the existence of a right, and whether it is clearly established, we determine whether the facts on the record are such that a jury could conclude that the clearly established right was violated. See id. As a methodological matter, we commonly work backwards: We arrange the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and then determine whether, given precedent, those facts, if true, would constitute a deprivation of a right. And then, if necessary, we determine if the right is clearly established. In this case, since we conclude that Wilson has not adduced facts from which a jury could conclude that his constitutional rights were deprived at all, we need not engage in the second inquiry. 18 Wilson contends that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. He acknowledges that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant, but claims that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. However, the statements given to Judge Dilts by Officer Russo clearly establish probable cause: He was told that a robbery had taken place; that the descriptions of the victims were used to compile a photo array; that one of the victims had quickly and positively identified the suspect from the photo array; and that an employee in a nearby establishment had seen Wilson in the vicinity near the time he supposedly entered the flower shop. See infra Section I.B. 19 In light of these facts, the only way that Wilson can succeed is if he proffers evidence that Russo recklessly disregarded the truth in his warrant application, and that a warrant application based on what Russo should have told the judge would have lacked probable cause. As this recitation suggests, an arrest warrant issued by a magistrate or judge does not, in itself, shelter an officer from liability for false arrest. See Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). Rather, a plaintiff may succeed in a S 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the police officer knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause. Id. 4
20 With these precepts in view, we must first consider whether Wilson adduced sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude that Russo made statements or omissions that he knew [were] false, or would have known [were] false except for his reckless disregard for the truth. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In Franks, the Court held that where a defendant showed by the preponderance of the evidence that a false statement necessary to the finding of probable cause was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, the constitution requires that any evidence derived from the exercise of that warrant had be excluded from a criminal trial. Id. at 155. But as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has lamented, [u]nfortunately, the Supreme Court in Franks gave no guidance concerning what constitutes a reckless disregard for the truth in fourth amendment cases, except to state that `negligence or innocent mistake[is] insufficient.'  United States v. Davis , 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). This case, with its hybrid allegation (Russo purportedly doctored some facts and failed to inform the judge of others) requires us to acknowledge that reckless disregard for the truth means different things when dealing with omissions and assertions, and to explain the different methodologies for dealing with each.
21 All storytelling involves an element of selectivity. We cannot demand that police officers relate the entire history of events leading up to a warrant application with every potentially evocative detail that would interest a novelist or gossip (. . . the witness blushed when I mentioned the gun, and blinked six times while studying the photographic array. I noticed his hand crept up to his lips (which were chapped) . . .). On the other hand, one of the reasons for requiring a neutral magistrate to evaluate probable cause is that an uninterested party is presumably better suited to review and evaluate the facts than an officer pursuing a lead. The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (cited in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980)). It follows that a police officer cannot make unilateral decisions about the materiality of information, or, after satisfying himor herself that probable cause exists, merely inform the magistrate or judge of inculpatory evidence. 22 Recognizing the tension between the extreme models that could arise if either of these competing concerns were taken alone--requiring a police officer to tell all, and permitting a police officer to independently determine materiality--we follow the common sense approach of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and hold that omissions are made with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that [a]ny reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know. United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993). In Jacobs, the court concluded that the officer acted with reckless disregard when he told the magistrate that a drug sniffing dog showed interest in the bag of the defendant but failed to inform the magistrate that it had not gone into alert. Id. at 1234.Because of the highly relevant nature of the omitted information, the court held that the omission occurred at least with reckless disregard of its effect upon the affidavit. Id. 23 Wilson alleges that Rosso made the following omissions in his warrant application: (1) he did not tell the judge that although Officer Lipp's investigative report stated that the robber was between 6'3 and 6'5, Wilson's driver's abstract indicated that he was 5'11; (2) he did not tell the judge that Druce did not pick Wilson out of an array; (3) he did not tell the judge that in the photo array, Wilson looked ethnically different from the others; and (4) he did not mention that height and weight were not indicated on the photo array. 24 Applying the test adopted above, we address these contentions in turn. Any reasonable person would know that the significant height differential, and the fact that an eyewitness-victim did not identify Wilson, were the kind of thing[s] the judge would wish to know. Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 1235. On the other hand, we do not believe that an officer can be expected to communicate the apparent ethnicity of the victim, or slight variations in appearance on the photographic line-up absent circumstances making these factors more important or prejudicial. Finally, the fact that height and weight were not listed on the photo array is so routine as to be unremarkable to a judge. Although these latter facts could be used for impeachment at trial, a police officer cannot be expected to present a judge with complete background.
25 Unlike omissions, assertions can be made with reckless disregard for the truth even if they involve minor details-recklessness is measured not by the relevance of the information, but the demonstration of willingness to affirmatively distort truth. In applying the reckless disregard test to assertions, we have borrowed from the free speech arena and equated reckless disregard for the truth with a high degree of awareness of [the statements'] probable falsity. Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1501 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)); see also United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 1995) (reckless disregard for the truth is exhibited when expressing that which was not believed or appropriately accepted as true). An assertion is made with reckless disregard when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported. Clapp, 46 F.3d at 801 n.6. 26 Applying these tests to this case, Russo had reasons to doubt the accuracy of his intimation that he had personally investigated the entire case and interviewed the witnesses after the robbery. More importantly, a jury could conclude that Russo must have entertained serious doubts about the truth of his statement that the dental worker had seen Wilson around 3:00, instead of around 3:30. Because he told the judge about DaVila's identification, Russo must have learned of DaVila's statement from somewhere; a jury could infer that he learned of it from the transcript of DaVila's statement or a complete report, either of which would include her statement that she saw Wilson about a half an hour before the police arrived, which would place her sighting at about 3:30. If Russo knew of the time difference, he had obvious reasons to doubt his assertion to the judge that a witness saw Wilson around 3:00. 27 As to the other information from the other officers' reports, Wilson did not adduce any evidence that Russo would have examined these reports as a matter of course or policy, or any evidence from which a jury could infer knowledge of their content. Moreover, there is no evidence that Russo knew that the array was developed from Wilson's photo alone. Therefore, a jury could not conclude that his representation that the array was made as a result of the physical descriptions was made with reckless disregard of the truth. 5
28 Since there was sufficient evidence of omissions and assertions made knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, we turn to the next step of the reconstructive surgery required by our jurisprudence, and assess whether the statements and omissions made with reckless disregard of the truth were material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause. Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399. 6 To determine the materiality of the misstatements and omissions, we excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the corrected warrant affidavit would establish probable cause. See Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 400. If it does, the grant of summary judgment should be affirmed, for even if there had not been omissions and misrepresentations in Russo's presentation to Judge Dilts, Wilson would have been arrested. 29 Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that the person committed the crime at issue. See Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 401. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483. A police officer may be liable for civil damages for an arrest if no reasonable competent officer would conclude that probable cause exists. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 30 The defendants maintain that a positive identification by a victim is sufficient by itself to establish probable cause that the identified party was the offender. While we agree that a positive identification by a victim witness, without more, would usually be sufficient to establish probable cause, this qualified precept cannot be rendered absolute. Independent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of the witness's own unreliability that is known by the arresting officers could outweigh the identification such that probable cause would not exist. Each case must therefore be examined on its facts. 31 For example, if two identifying witnesses had told the officer that the robber was 7', and the officer knew that the person in the photograph was 5', the positive identification would not be enough. Likewise, an otherwise credible victim identification would not provide probable cause if police officers contemporaneously possessed reliable DNA evidence which determined conclusively that the accused could not have committed the crime. Or, if Druce had, equally firmly, picked another person from the photo array, Braverman's identification might not have been sufficient for Russo to conclude that Wilson probably committed the crime. An officer contemplating an arrest is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by itself) suggests that probable cause exists. Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999). 7 32 The cases that the defendants cite for their argument fall into two basic camps: (1) those in which there was no exculpatory evidence or evidence of witness unreliability, such as United States v. Harris, 956 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1992); and (2) those in which the court concluded that a positive identification was not fatally undermined by unreliability or exculpatory evidence, such as Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1993) and Lallemand v. University of Rhode Island, 9 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 1993). The first class of cases is inapposite here. Looking at the second class of cases, we find that courts have consistently considered the context of an identification, and have not stated that police can rely on any witness accusation, however unreliable or unbelievable. 33 For example, in Sharrar we affirmed the principle that [w]hen a police officer has received a reliable identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause. 128 F.3d at 818 (emphasis added). We concluded in that case that when the witness initially gave one name, but then identified her husband as her attacker, it was reasonable for the officer to assess Gannon's demeanor, find her story credible, and rely on her subsequent identification of her husband as the attacker in part because it was a domestic violence case. Id. Likewise, in Lallemand, the First Circuit concluded that discrepancies in a victim's description were trivial, given their nature and in light of the positive identification, clearly implying that non-trivial discrepancies, or external evidence powerfully undermining the reliability of the witness's identification, might translate into a finding that there was no probable cause. 9 F.3d at 217. 8 We reject the rule suggested by the defendants and engage in the routine probable cause analysis, weighing the inculpatory evidence against any exculpatory evidence available to the officer. 34 The strongest inculpatory evidence is clearly the positive identification. Braverman had considerable opportunity to view the robber at the scene of the crime, and she exhibited a high level of certainty. There were three days between the crime and identification, so while it was not an entirely fresh identification, not so much time had passed as to call into question her recollection. Granted, Braverman's testimony should be viewed with some skepticism because her identification of Wilson was inherently incompatible with her description of the robber--according to the information available to Russo (Lipp's report), Braverman (and/or her coworker) originally described the robber as between 6'3 and 6'5. Although she did not know it, in identifying Wilson she identified someone much shorter. Both of these identifications cannot be correct. However, this indication of unreliability does not, from the vantage point of the arresting officer, fatally undermine the forceful positive identification. Added to this identification is the fact that DaVila testified that she saw Wilson in the vicinity near the time of the theft. 35 On the other hand, there are three exculpatory facts that Russo should have mentioned: (1) the robber was originally identified as someone 6'3 to 6'5, while Wilson is four to seven inches shorter; 9 (2) one of the two victim-witness with ample opportunity to view the robber failed to identify Wilson when shown a photo array; and (3) DaVila saw Wilson out in the shopping center when he was supposedly in the flower shop. But these exculpatory facts, when weighed against the inculpatory facts, are not strong enough to undermine a finding of probable cause. Thus, we conclude that the District Court correctly found that no reasonable jury could find facts that would lead to the conclusion that Wilson's corrected warrant lacked probable cause. Therefore, we do not have to reach the second prong of the qualified immunity investigation, that is, whether the right was clearly established. 36 In sum, we conclude that the District Court correctly concluded that Russo did not violate Wilson's constitutional right to be free of unlawful arrest. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.