Opinion ID: 2240281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Presumption of Loss of Society for Adult Child

Text: The next issue we are asked to address is whether a presumption of loss of society should pertain to cases where the decedent has reached the age of majority. In this case the jury was given a damage instruction which stated in part: Where a decedent leaves parents the law recognizes the presumption that they sustained some substantial pecuniary loss by reason of the death.    In determining pecuniary loss to the parents and brothers and the weight to be given to the presumption of pecuniary loss to the parents, you may consider what benefits of pecuniary value, including money, goods, society, companionship and services the decedent might have been expected to contribute to the parents and brothers had the decedent lived. Coast and Coleman readily admit in their brief that parents of a decedent who has reached the age of majority are entitled to recover for the loss of society in Illinois, if they affirmatively prove such a loss. While there are no cases in Illinois that are dispositive of this issue, Coast and Coleman specifically stated in their brief: The close and familial ties that unite the minor child living in the household of the parents, do not necessarily exist between parents and adult children. That is not to say that adult children in many instances are not `close' to their parents, in which case, such evidence may be adduced and the jury instructed that `loss of society' and the valuation put thereon are compensable elements of damages depending upon the extent and nature of the contacts. There is simply no need for a presumption   . (Emphasis added.) Although no State allows for a presumption, some States do allow parents to recover for the loss of society for an adult child. (See Sawyer v. United States (E.D. Va. 1978), 465 F. Supp. 282; Riley v. California Erectors, Inc. (1973), 36 Cal. App.3d 29, 111 Cal. Rptr. 459; Jones v. Carvell (Utah 1982), 641 P.2d 105; Butterfield v. Community Light & Power Co. (1946), 115 Vt. 23, 49 A.2d 415; Balmer v. Dilley (1972), 81 Wash.2d 367, 502 P.2d 456; Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 537.090 (Supp. 1985-86).) In none of these cases did the court address the issue of a presumption. However, Coast and Coleman argue, and the appellate court agreed, that the instruction given was erroneous insofar as it contained presumptions of loss of society. Recently, in Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill.2d 505, this court addressed this issue with regard to the parents of a minor child. In Bullard, this court noted the trend toward allowing such damages and stated: In Illinois, too, the trend in our more recent decisions under the Wrongful Death Act has been to expand the scope of pecuniary injury to encompass nonmonetary losses. In Elliott v. Willis (1982), 92 Ill.2d 530, this court quite recently unanimously held, based on a broad definition of pecuniary injury, that a widowed spouse had the right to recover damages for loss of consortium under the Wrongful Death Act. We there relied upon Hall v. Gillins (1958), 13 Ill.2d 26, where the court refused to allow a common law action to recover for `destruction of the family unit' caused by the death of the father because an adequate remedy already existed under the Wrongful Death Act. This court there stated: `The term pecuniary injuries [found in section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act] has received an interpretation that is broad enough to include most of the items of damage that are claimed by plaintiffs in this case. Each plaintiff alleges deprivation of support as well as deprivation of the companionship, guidance, advice, love and affection of the deceased.' (Emphasis added.) 13 Ill.2d 26, 31. To the same effect is Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 73, 82-83. Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill.2d 505, 514. In Bullard, we concluded that parents are entitled to a presumption of pecuniary injury in the loss of a minor child's society but did not decide whether the loss-of-society presumption applies to children who have reached the age of majority. ( Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill.2d 505, 517.) However, we do so today. Coast and Coleman argue that Bullard should not apply, pointing out that the decedent was over 18 years of age and no longer a minor when she was killed. They contend that a parent's interest in the society and companionship of a child is less substantial when the child is an adult and not living with the parents. However, we refuse to draw a line based solely on the age of a child. We fail to see how a presumption of loss of society suddenly disappears upon a child's 18th birthday. The return on parents' investment in their children is very real, even though it may not be in the form of money. When children are wrongfully killed, the parents' investment of money and in affection, guidance, security and love is destroyed. Society recognizes the destruction of that value, whether the child is a minor or an adult. The intent of Bullard was to recognize the intrinsic value of children to their parents regardless of which way financial support is flowing at death. Since there is a presumption of loss of society for an adult child, it was proper that the jury was instructed as to this presumption in the present case.