Opinion ID: 218505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arpaio

Text: We agree with the district court that the allegations against Arpaio fail to state a claim. First, Arpaio's efforts to persuade the county attorneys to pursue charges against Plaintiffs for violating the privacy statute do not violate the Constitution. The district court was therefore correct to grant Arpaio qualified immunity for all acts before the arrests. Second, Plaintiffs' allegations regarding Arpaio's involvement in the arrests are too insubstantial to sustain a § 1983 claim. Under § 1983, Arpaio can be liable for the actions of his subordinates only if (1) he was personally involved in a constitutional violation, or (2) there was a sufficient causal connection between his wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir.1989); see also Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir.2011) (supervisors are individually liable in § 1983 suits when culpable action ... is directly attributed to them). Sufficient personal involvement could include culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of ... subordinates,... acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made, or conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others. Starr, 633 F.3d at 1195. The district court correctly determined Plaintiffs failed to meet this standard in their original complaint and gave them an opportunity to amend. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs again failed to allege facts showing Arpaio personally knew the subpoenas could not support a violation of the grand jury secrecy statute, and, despite that knowledge, was personally involved in ordering or carrying out the latenight arrests. Indeed, the amended complaint, even taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, does not demonstrate a sufficient causal connection between Arpaio's actions and constitutional deprivations. For example, the amended complaint makes only general allegations that Arpaio abused his power[, First Am. Compl. ¶ 19]; indirectly prompted Wilenchik to issue improper subpoenas and order the arrests[, id. ¶ 21]; and conducted the arrests via the Selective Enforcement Unit [ id. ¶ 111]. Plaintiffs say Arpaio did all of this with improper and unconstitutional motives. [ Id. ¶ 114]. Nowhere, however, do Plaintiffs set forth facts suggesting that Arpaio, rather than one of his colleagues or associates, was closely connected to the arrestsor that he lacked probable cause to carry out any of the arrests. Indeed, the allegations are long on conjecture but short on the factual nexus necessary to sustain a claim. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (to sustain a § 1983 claim, [a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights). Through confusing and misleading and/or formulations, the amended complaint has forced the district court and this court on appeal to try to figure out who did what. Especially in the immunity context, such bare assertions do not meet our minimal pleading standards. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 970-72 (9th Cir.2009). Even with generous pleading standards, we agree with the district court that the amended complaint did not cure the deficiencies identified in the court's initial order dismissing the original complaint. Thus, the amended complaint's allegations regarding Arpaio are conclusory and devoid of sufficient factual matter to suggest his actions infringed clearly established constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Plaintiffs simply do not provide enough factual content to allow us to draw a reasonable inference that Arpaio knew of the infirmities of the subpoenas and arrests. Id. According to the Supreme Court, a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. And that is, at most, what we find here-conclusions not yet entitled to the assumption of truth. Without sufficiently specific factual allegations, Plaintiffs cannot overcome Arpaio's claims to qualified immunity, and the district court was correct to dismiss the claims against him. [9]