Opinion ID: 217548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Injunctive Relief on the NEPA Claim

Text: Although we agree with the district court's conclusions concerning the substantive application of NEPA to the 2004 Framework and the Basin Project, we part ways concerning the appropriate remedy for the NEPA violation that occurred when the Forest Service established the 2004 Framework. Before an award of permanent injunctive relief, a plaintiff must meet four well-established requirements: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). Even in NEPA cases, [a]n injunction should issue only if the traditional four-factor test is satisfied; no thumb on the scales is warranted. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2757, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010).
The first issue we face is the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' substantive claims against the programmatic 2004 Framework, based on the legal premise that [o]n a programmatic Framework basis... [courts] are limited to providing procedural relief. Sierra Forest V, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1110. This is plainly erroneous. As noted above, Sierra Forest and California have standing to assert a facial NEPA challenge to the 2004 Framework, and their claim is ripe. The APA requires that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... without observance of procedure required by law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (emphasis added). We have directed or upheld setting aside agency action pending NEPA compliance on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 562 (9th Cir.2006) (enjoining timber sales premised on a policy change that violated NEPA). If courts could not stop the federal government from applying a substantive rule promulgated without adherence to required procedures, regardless of the equities, both NEPA and the APA would be toothless. [3] Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by finding that it lacked jurisdiction to bar implementation of the 2004 Framework during a remand for analysis required by NEPA.
As an alternative ground for its limited remedial order, the district court engaged in a traditional equitable analysis and concluded that the appropriate remedy was to leave the 2004 Framework in place and to order the Forest Service to prepare another supplemental EIS on the Framework, one that meets the range of alternatives and analytical consistency identified by the Ninth Circuit in its decision on the preliminary injunction portion of this case. Sierra Forest V, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1113. Sierra Forest challenges this decision on numerous grounds. When assessing the four prerequisites for a permanent injunction, the district court correctly noted that the Forest Service is entitled to rely on the reasoned opinions of its experts. Sierra Forest V, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1111. However, the court then deferred to those experts in its own equitable analysis. In so doing, the district court improperly conflated deference in the context of judicial review of an agency decision, see Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 993, with deference in consideration of the equities after a violation of law has been found. Although the federal government is undoubtedly permitted to follow its own experts when making a decision, see Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), federal experts are not always entitled to deference outside of administrative action. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F.Supp. 1081, 1096 (W.D.Wash.), aff'd 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.1991) (This is not the usual situation in which the court reviews an administrative decision and, in doing so, gives deference to agency expertise.); see also Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that district court's remedy order was not an abuse of discretion). Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council is illustrative of the circumstances in which deference is appropriate when considering a broad equitable question. In Winter, the Supreme Court held that lower courts failed properly to defer to senior Navy officers' specific, predictive judgments about how the preliminary injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the Navy's ... training exercises. 129 S.Ct. at 379. It is reasonable that courts would defer to particular experts when the government has unique expertise, in fields such as national security or the internal functioning of the military. However, Winter applied no such deference concerning the possibility that sonar testing would irreparably harm whales. See id. at 383-84. Ecology is not a field within the unique expertise of the federal government. See Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 1004-05 (applying balance of harms analysis without deference to agency views); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519-20, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (noting special solicitude given to states concerning interests in health and welfare). Deference to agency experts is particularly inappropriate when their conclusions rest on a foundation tainted by procedural error. If the federal government's experts were always entitled to deference concerning the equities of an injunction, substantive relief against federal government policies would be nearly unattainable, as government experts will likely attest that the public interest favors the federal government's preferred policy, regardless of procedural failures. We hold that the district court abused its discretion by deferring to agency views concerning the equitable prerequisites for an injunction. We therefore vacate the district court's narrow permanent injunction and remand for analysis of the requirements of a permanent injunction without deference to the Forest Service's experts simply because of their relationship with the agency. Our interim injunction will remain in place until the district court has addressed these cases on remand and crafted its own injunctive order.