Opinion ID: 3187215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: other ineffective-counsel claims

Text: We also conclude that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, or unreasonably determine the facts, in rejecting Ledford’s remaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. As to Ledford’s failure-toobject claims, trial counsel’s decision to refrain from making certain objections in both the guilt and penalty phases constitutes a strategic decision that does not amount to deficient performance. See Bates v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 768 F.3d 1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that “[d]ecisions about whether to object . . . are tactical choices consigned by Strickland to a lawyer’s reasoned professional judgment,” and that “[g]ood lawyers . . . serve their clients best when they are judicious in making objections”). Due to the overwhelming evidence of Ledford’s guilt and the violent nature of Dr. Johnston’s murder, there is not a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s failure to object, Ledford would not have been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. See id. at 1300 n.9. As to Dr. Herendeen, the state court reasonably concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to present adequate mental health evidence. After a diligent but unfruitful attempt to locate a favorable expert witness, trial counsel was referred to Dr. Herendeen by an experienced capital defense attorney. See Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) (noting that the selection of an expert witness is a paradigmatic example of the type of strategic 101 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 102 of 103 choice that is “virtually unchallengeable”). The state court found that Dr. Herendeen never informed trial counsel that he was unprepared or needed more time or records. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that trial counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient with respect to the retention and preparation of Ledford’s mental health expert. Despite his delayed retention, Dr. Herendeen adequately examined Ledford, and trial counsel had an opportunity to speak with Dr. Herendeen about his testimony. He offered testimony beneficial to Ledford’s defense, telling the jury that Ledford had a significant substance abuse problem that would “definitely” have an effect on his actions at the time of the murder.28 Dr. Herendeen testified that, because of his childhood history, Ledford’s alcohol addiction could not be considered “voluntary,” which supported trial counsel’s primary defense. The vast majority of Dr. Herendeen’s expert opinion was beneficial to Ledford. It is true that his antisocial personality diagnosis was more aggravating than mitigating. Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1248 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the petitioner’s antisocial personality disorder diagnosis and narcissistic personality disorder diagnosis “was more harmful to [him] than mitigating”). Defense counsel thus was faced with a difficult choice in presenting 28 Ledford makes no contention that his intoxication and history of substance abuse was an aggravating factor. In fact, he argues that trial counsel should have focused more on how his intoxication negated mens rea. 102 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 103 of 103 mental health evidence because some of it was mitigating and some aggravating. That is often the case with mental health evidence. Trial counsel’s decision to call Dr. Herendeen, despite his antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, was the “epitome of a strategic decision” we decline to second guess. Waters, 46 F.3d at 1512.