Opinion ID: 1201664
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ingersoll v. Palmer

Text: In Ingersoll, we examined the question whether sobriety checkpoints are permissible under the United States and California Constitutions. The case involved a challenge brought by California taxpayers against various law enforcement officials and cited, as an example, a sobriety checkpoint program established by the Burlingame Police Department. As part of that program, law enforcement officials prepared a manual governing checkpoint operations, including guidelines established by the Attorney General, a cost analysis, factors affecting selection of the checkpoint location, required personnel and equipment, training, press relations and publicity, and procedures for a follow-up evaluation. The Burlingame sobriety checkpoint operated pursuant to these guidelines. ( Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1325-1327.) (6) In examining the challenge presented in Ingersoll, we held: The touchstone for all issues under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution is reasonableness. (See Terry v. Ohio [1968] 392 U.S. 1, 19 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 904, 88 S.Ct. 1868]; People v. Hyde [1974] 12 Cal.3d 158, 166 [115 Cal. Rptr. 358, 524 P.2d 830], conc. opn. [of Wright, C.J.] at pp. 172-173.) [¶] The federal test for determining whether a detention or seizure is justified balances the public interest served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. ( Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 [61 L.Ed.2d 357, 361-362, 99 S.Ct. 2637].) In addition, federal constitutional principles require a showing of either the officer's reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred or is occurring or, as an alternative, that the seizure is `carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.' ( Brown v. Texas, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 51 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 362], citing Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 663 [59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673-674, 99 S.Ct. 1391] and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 558-562 [49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1128-1131, 96 S.Ct. 3074].) ( Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1329.) (7) The primary purpose of a sobriety checkpoint is to prevent and deter conduct injurious to persons and property. ( Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1331.) In Ingersoll, in applying Brown 's three-pronged balancing test, we determined that (1) [d]eterring drunk driving and identifying and removing drunk drivers from the roadways undeniably serves a highly important governmental interest, and (2) sobriety checkpoints advance this interest. (43 Cal.3d at pp. 1338-1341.) (8) In examining the third prong of the Brown balancing test, which we rephrased as the intrusiveness on individual liberties engendered by the sobriety checkpoints, we identified eight factors important in assessing intrusiveness, noting that such factors provide functional guidelines for minimizing the intrusiveness of the sobriety checkpoint stop. ( Id. at p. 1341.) The factors identified in Ingersoll are: (1) Whether the decision to establish a sobriety checkpoint, the selection of the site, and the procedures for the operation of the checkpoint are made and established by supervisory law enforcement personnel; (2) Whether motorists are stopped according to a neutral formula, such as every third, fifth or tenth driver; (3) Whether adequate safety precautions are taken, such as proper lighting, warning signs, and signals, and whether clearly identifiable official vehicles and personnel are used; (4) Whether the location of the checkpoint was determined by a policymaking official, and was reasonable, i.e., on a road having a high incidence of alcohol-related accidents or arrests; (5) Whether the time the checkpoint was conducted and its duration reflect good judgment on the part of law enforcement officials; (6) Whether the checkpoint exhibits sufficient indicia of its official nature (to reassure motorists of the authorized nature of the stop); (7) Whether the average length and nature of the detention is minimized; and (8) Whether the checkpoint is preceded by publicity. ( Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1341-1347.) In discussing the eighth factor  advance publicity  we stated as follows: Advance publicity is important to the maintenance of a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint. Publicity [without disclosure of the precise location of the checkpoint] both reduces the intrusiveness of the stop and increases the deterrent effect of the roadblock. The concurring opinion in State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of State [1983] [136 Ariz. 1] 663 P.2d 992, at page 1001 explained the value of advance publicity: `Such publicity would warn those using the highways that they might expect to find roadblocks designed to check for sobriety; the warning may well decrease the chance of apprehending ordinary criminals, but should certainly have a considerable deterring effect by either dissuading people from taking one more for the road, persuading them to drink at home, or inducing them to take taxicabs. Any one of these goals, if achieved, would have the salutary effect of interfering with the lethal combination of alcohol and gasoline. Advance notice would limit intrusion upon personal dignity and security because those being stopped would anticipate and understand what was happening.' (663 P.2d 992, 1001, conc. opn. [of] Feldman, J.; see also State v. Deskins [(1983) 234 Kan. 529] 673 P.2d 1174, 1182.) Publicity also serves to establish the legitimacy of sobriety checkpoints in the minds of motorists. Although the court in Jones v. State [Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984] 459 So.2d 1068, found that advance publicity was not constitutionally mandated for all sobriety roadblocks, nevertheless the court offered the observation, consistent with finding reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, that `[A]dvance publication of the date of an intended roadblock, even without announcing its precise location, would have the virtue of reducing surprise, fear, and inconvenience. [Citation.]' ( Id. at p. 1080.) In the instant case, substantial advance publicity accompanied each sobriety checkpoint instituted. ( Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1346-1347.) After completing our discussion of the eight factors, we concluded in Ingersoll that, while the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint stop is not trivial, the enumerated safeguards operate to minimize the intrusiveness.... The fright or annoyance to motorists condemned in connection with roving stops is absent when the checkpoint is operated according to the guidelines followed here. [¶] On balance, the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is sufficiently circumscribed so that it is easily outweighed and justified by the magnitude of the drunk driving menace and the potential for deterrence. ( Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1347, italics added.) Because the sobriety checkpoint program discussed in Ingersoll encompassed all eight factors, we had no occasion in that decision to examine the narrower question presented in this case  whether the absence of evidence relating to the factor of advance publicity is fatal to the constitutional validity of a sobriety checkpoint. As previously noted, that question was addressed by the appellate department of the superior court in People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1.