Opinion ID: 2332716
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The parties' competing affidavits

Text: In her motion to modify custody, Branwen alleged two circumstances that went to the heart of legal custody: (1) a failure of communication between the parties; and (2) Will's refusal to honor court orders regarding co-parenting counseling, use of email, and telephone access to Zada. Branwen also claimed a change in her post-graduation work schedule in support of modifying physical custody. In its February 19, 2009 order denying Branwen's motion to modify custody, the only explanation the superior court gave was that it found [Will's] arguments persuasive. The court gave minimal further explanation when it issued its order on Branwen's motion for reconsideration, adding that it found the affidavits of [Will] credible and no significant change in circumstances warranting modification of the present custody order. In its order on Branwen's second motion for reconsideration, the court explained that [t]he ... issues raised by [Branwen] as to telephonic and e-mail contact and co-parenting classes go to enforcement of current [c]ourt orders. The superior court explained that the appropriate remedy for enforcement problems would be a motion to enforce or an order to show cause. But in the same sentence, the court wrote that these types of motions would be warranted if the [c]ourt found [Will's] response unpersuasive. As explained, the court's original order denying the motion to modify made clear that the superior court found [Will's] arguments persuasive. Branwen argues that the superior court's statements, taken together, imply that any motion to enforce would be fruitless. She also argues that the court attempted to resolve factual issues by making credibility determinations based on the affidavits the parties filed, which is not permissible. We agree with Branwen that the superior court's decision is troubling on these grounds. First, the court's order is problematic because it overlooks Branwen's contention that her motions appear to have been what motivated Will to comply with the court's orders, such as scheduling a counseling appointment for himself and a dentist appointment for Zada. There is at least some support for this contention: at the conclusion of the October 2008 trial, the superior court found Will failed to comply with a court order due to a misunderstanding of what daycare costs he was required to pay. It was Branwen's order to show cause that led the court to clarify this requirement, and to enforce it. The second reason the court's order is problematic is because the court weighed Will's credibility when determining whether a hearing was warranted on the motion to modify custody. In its order denying Branwen's motion to modify, the court wrote that it finds [Will's] arguments persuasive and, in its order on the motion for reconsideration, the court elaborated that it found the affidavits of [Will] credible [and] the arguments of [Will's] Counsel persuasive. Branwen argues the court should not have made credibility determinations based on the parties' affidavits. Will responds that a court can deny a motion to modify custody or visitation, without holding a hearing, based solely on the pleadings or after considering material beyond the pleadingse.g., affidavits. [11] But we held in C.R.B. v. C.C . that granting or denying a motion to modify custody without a hearing is akin to making a determination on summary judgment; [12] and we have cautioned that courts should not weigh witness credibility on summary judgment. [13] Here, Will alleges that the superior court was justified in judging the affidavits' credibility because the court had multiple, extended opportunities to not only review and assess Branwen's many affidavits, but also to view her conduct and demeanor and to assess her credibility in trial and in hearing after hearing. We have never directly addressed this issue, but other jurisdictions have recognized that a court's familiarity with a case can sometimes allow it to make credibility determinations without taking additional testimony. [14] There may be circumstances where a party's repetitious use of the judicial system over a short time period without new allegations would allow a trial court to make a credibility determination on written filings, but this is not such a case. Here, the parties' affidavits contained directly conflicting information regarding the reasons for ongoing failures in communication and cooperation. Physical custody had not been addressed since July 2007, the court had never decided physical custody in a contested setting, and Branwen had filed only two motions to modify physical custody in the entire history of the case. Filing a second motion to modify does not constitute repetitious use of the judicial system such that Branwen should be denied her day in court. In fact, it appears that the only time Branwen testified before the superior court was at the October 2008 trial. [15] The October 2008 trial did not include arguments or evidence about modifying physical custody because the superior court had ruled that evidence shall not be presented ... on modification of physical custody of the parties' minor child. Under these circumstances, the superior court's credibility determinations were premature. Although we conclude that the superior court erred in its reasons for denying Branwen a hearing, our analysis does not end here. We review de novo whether a party has a made a prima facie showing sufficient to justify a modification hearing; in this case we independently conclude that Branwen failed to make a sufficient showing.