Opinion ID: 2735560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of the Vehicle Registration

Text: After the testimony of the government‘s last fact witness, the prosecutor informed the court that he intended to introduce a copy of the registration for the vehicle appellant was driving on the day of his arrest, to establish that the vehicle was registered to him. Defense counsel objected to admission of the vehicle registration because the government had failed to produce it in response to the defense‘s pre-trial discovery request for ―any and all documents that [the government] intend[ed] to use at trial.‖ The trial court overruled appellant‘s objection, explaining that it could not ―see unfair prejudice‖ from admitting a vehicle registration for ―a car that [appellant] knows is registered to him.‖ Faced with the court‘s ruling, defense counsel agreed to the stipulation that the vehicle was registered to appellant. Appellant now contends that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his objection to the admission of his vehicle registration. He contends that ―his defense was prepared with the understanding that the government did not intend to present evidence of ownership of the vehicle.‖ 24 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16 (a)(1)(C) provides in relevant part that ―[u]pon request of the defendant the prosecutor shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph . . . papers [or] documents . . . which are within the possession, custody or control of the government, and which . . . are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial[.]‖ The government contends that it did not violate Rule 16 because it was not until the first day of trial that the government ―first obtained‖ the vehicle registration from the Department of Motor Vehicles (―DMV‖),21 and thus that the document was not in the government‘s possession at the time of appellant‘s Rule 16 request. The government also contends that appellant can show no prejudice from admission of his vehicle registration. Rule 16 (d)(2) provides ―[i]f at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may . . . prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed[.]‖ Accord Wiggins v. United States, 521 A.2d 1146, 1148 (D.C. 1987). The decision whether to impose sanctions is within the discretion of 21 We surmise that the prosecutor sought and obtained the registration after defense counsel asserted in his opening statement that the police found the vial of PCP in a vehicle that appellant ―happened to be driving.‖ Prior to that statement, it appears that the ownership of the vehicle was not in dispute: in his testimony at the suppression hearing, appellant acknowledged that he owned the vehicle. 25 the trial court, which must ―consider a number of factors including the reason for nondisclosure, the impact of nondisclosure, and the impact of the proposed sanction on the administration of justice.‖ Id. This court ―defer[s] to the [trial] judge‘s choice if it was within the range of permissible alternatives, taking cognizance of the nature of the determination being made and the context within which it was rendered.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We will reverse a conviction obtained in the wake of a challenged ruling declining to impose a sanction ―only if the error substantially prejudiced appellant‘s rights.‖ Lee v. United States, 454 A.2d 770, 776 (D.C. 1982). The Rule 16 duty of disclosure not only applies to the prosecutor‘s office, but also extends to other ―investigative agencies of the government.‖ Myers v. United States, 15 A.3d 688, 690 (D.C. 2011). We held in Myers, however, that a video recording in the possession of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was not in the possession of the government in part because ―there was no . . . showing of involvement by the Metro Transit Police at any time in the investigation or prosecution of [the] case.‖ Id. at 692. Assuming without deciding that the DMV is an investigative agency of the government and that the government was required to produce documents in the DMV‘s possession, we agree with the government that appellant suffered no legally cognizable prejudice 26 from admission of his vehicle registration, and thus that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it and declining to sanction the government. That is not to say that appellant suffered no prejudice; the prosecution‘s presentation of evidence probative of guilt is always prejudicial from a defendant‘s point of view. The relevant question is whether the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, and we are satisfied that admission of the vehicle registration was not unfairly prejudicial, since appellant and his trial counsel knew without discovery that the vehicle was registered to appellant and also knew that the government might be able to prove this fact in some way other than through introduction of the vehicle registration. Cf. Washington v. United States, 600 A.2d 1079, 1081 (D.C. 1991) (reasoning that Washington‘s argument that he was prejudiced by the government‘s failure to disclose a photograph ―show[ing] that appellant had a moustache at the time of his arrest‖ was meritless because ―appellant obviously had first-hand knowledge of his appearance at the time of his arrest‖).