Opinion ID: 1891715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Meaning of the Statutes

Text: The surcharges at issue were mandated under sections 938.08 and 938.085, Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), which state in relevant part: 938.08 Additional cost to fund programs in domestic violence.In addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of ... s. 784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $201. Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervision.... 938.085 Additional cost to fund rape crisis centers.In addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, a violation of ... s. 784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $151. Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervision. The issue is whether sections 938.08 and 938.085 apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. This issue is purely one of statutory interpretation. Although legislative intent guides our analysis, see Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004), to determine that intent we look first to the statute's plain meaning. State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 1996). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is `that a statute should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. ' City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp., 445 So.2d 578, 579 (Fla.1984) (emphasis added) (quoting Deltona Corp. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 220 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1969)). [W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction.... Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla.1931)). [T]he legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving incidental rules of construction or engaging in speculation as to what the judges might think that the legislators intended or should have intended. Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So.2d 779, 782 (Fla.1960). [T]he statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Holly, 450 So.2d at 219 (quoting McRainey, 137 So. at 159). Thus, the statute's text is the most reliable and authoritative expression of the Legislature's intent. Under the plain language of the statutes in question, sections 938.08 and 938.085, they apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Section 938.08 states, without exception, that [i]n addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of . . . s. 784.03, . . . the court shall impose a surcharge of $201. (Emphasis added.) The statute thus requires the trial court to impose this surcharge on anyone, juvenile or otherwise, who violates section 784.03 (or any of the other statutes enumerated in section 938.08). This language is clear, definite, and unambiguous. Juveniles, as well as adults, can violate the law. Because V.K.E. pled nolo contendere to simple battery under section 784.03, under section 938.08 she committed a violation of ... s. 784.03. That the court withheld adjudication of delinquency does not change the analysis. As one court has said, [i]n a juvenile proceeding, a finding that the child has committed a delinquent act or violation of law occurs when the court withholds adjudication of delinquency and when the court adjudicates [a] child delinquent. State v. Menuto, 912 So.2d 603, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (emphasis added) (citing § 985.228(4), Fla. Stat. (2002)). Therefore, notwithstanding the trial court's withholding of adjudication in this case, V.K.E. committed a violation of law. Section 938.085 contains similar language. It provides that [i]n addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads ... nolo contendere to ... a violation of ... s. 784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $151. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the State originally charged V.K.E. with felony battery under section 784.041, Florida Statutes (2002). However, the State and V.K.E. later agreed to a plea bargain. To avoid a possible conviction of felony battery, she pled nolo contendere to a violation of section 784.03simple battery. This plea placed her within the ambit of section 938.085 because she pled nolo contendere to ... a violation of ... s. 784.03. The statute requires the trial court to impose this $151 surcharge on anyone who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a violation of section 784.03 (or any of the other statutes enumerated in section 938.08). The statute contains no exceptions for juveniles. In addition, sections 938.08 and 938.085 explicitly state that [p]ayment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation . . . or any other court-ordered supervision.  (Emphasis added.) The trial court's disposition order did impose the surcharges as a condition of probation. The order includes, among the twenty-three conditions of V.K.E.'s probation, payment of the surcharges. [5] The order reflects the language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 that [p]ayment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation. Because the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the analysis must end there. The plain meaning of sections 938.08 and 938.085 controls. As a majority of this Court recently noted, [w]hile this may seem simplistic, it is nevertheless what is required. Knowles, 898 So.2d at 11-12 (Cantero, J., concurring, with three other justices joining). The majority relies heavily on legislative intent, see majority op. at 1278, yet the legislature is assumed to have expressed its intent through the words found in a statute. Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.1993). When that language ... is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, I conclude that a trial judge has the authority to impose the surcharges set forth in sections 938.08 and 938.085 on juveniles in delinquency proceedings.