Opinion ID: 1784700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the misadvice issue in the district courts

Text: We have stated that defense counsel and the court have a duty to inform a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea. State v. Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960, 960-61 (Fla.1987), superseded by In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro., 536 So.2d 992 (Fla.1988), as recognized in State v. DeAbreu, 613 So.2d 453 (Fla.1993). However, in Major v. State, 814 So.2d 424, 426-27 (Fla.2002), we reiterated that the law does not require a defendant to be informed of collateral consequences and determined that the potential for sentence enhancement for a future crime is just such a collateral consequence. Thus, we held, in answer to a certified question, that neither the trial court nor counsel has a duty to advise a defendant that the defendant's plea in a pending case may have sentence enhancing consequences on a sentence imposed for a crime committed in the future. Id. at 431. With that question resolved, all five district courts of appeal began grappling with the question of whether a defense counsel's providing wrong advice about this collateral effect constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Three courtsthe Second, Third, and Fifthhave held that defense counsel's providing erroneous advice about the potential for use of a conviction to enhance the sentence for a future crime does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel or render a plea involuntary. See Stansel v. State, 825 So.2d 1007, 1009-10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (Even in cases where defense counsel mistakenly informs the defendant that his guilty plea cannot be used to enhance a subsequent sentence, we believe public policy demands that the defendant bear the consequences of his decision to commit future crimes.); Scott v. State, 813 So.2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (A defendant is not entitled to relief where he has been given affirmative misadvice regarding the possible sentence-enhancing consequences of a plea in the event that the defendant commits a new crime in the future.); McKowen v. State, 831 So.2d 794, 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (concluding that a defendant is not entitled to receive postconviction relief based on a claim that he relied on the misadvice of counsel that his plea would have no adverse sentencing effect should he decide to commit future crimes). The Fourth District Court of Appeal, however, has held that this affirmative misadvice claim is a valid ineffective assistance claim on which relief may be granted. See Smith v. State, 829 So.2d 940, 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing cases). Finally, the First District originally aligned itself with the Second, Third, and Fifth Districts. See Bates, 818 So.2d at 630-631. In Bates, the district court also certified the question presented here. On review, we quashed the decision on other grounds, finding that Bates's petition for writ of error coram nobis was untimely and therefore procedurally barred. 887 So.2d at 1215. In the case under review, the First District again considered the issue, and now reached the opposite conclusion. See Dickey, 30 Fla. L. Weekly at D444. The court held that allegations of affirmative misadvice by trial counsel on the sentence-enhancing consequences of a defendant's plea for future criminal behavior in an otherwise facially sufficient motion are cognizable as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. Thus, the First District agreed with the Fourth District, certified conflict with the other district courts, and also certified the question to this Court. Id. at D444, D446. We now answer the certified question.