Opinion ID: 4544938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Father’s Appeal in the Nature of a Writ of Error

Text: Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s lawful authority to adjudicate a legal matter. Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2012) (citations omitted). Statutes or constitutional provisions confer and define a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and parties to litigation cannot confer or expand subject matter jurisdiction by consent or waiver. Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tenn. 2016) (citations omitted); Johnson, 432 S.W.3d at 843-44 (citing In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tenn. 2012)). For the reasons set forth below, we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction. The intermediate appellate court erred when it determined that the writ of error remains a viable and separate option by which to appeal from general sessions court orders. First, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion disregards the specific statute10 that confers subject matter jurisdiction on chancery courts to consider appeals from orders of protection entered by general sessions courts. This statute provides: Any appeal from a final ruling on an order of protection by a general sessions court . . . shall be to the circuit or chancery court of the county. Such appeal shall be filed within ten (10) days and shall be heard de novo[.] 10 There is a longstanding principle that “specific statutory provisions control over general provisions.” Martin v. Powers, 505 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2013)); Woodroof v. City of Nashville, 192 S.W.2d 1013, 1015 (Tenn. 1946) (“[W]here the mind of the legislature has been turned to the details of a subject and they have acted upon it, a statute treating the subject in a general manner should not be considered as intended to affect the more particular provision.”). - 14 - Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(3)(F). By stating that such an appeal “shall” be filed within ten days, this statute plainly conditions a chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction upon timely filing the appeal. Id.; see also Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., 439 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tenn. 2014); Love v. Coll. Level Assessment Servs., Inc., 928 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn. 1996); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dorris, 556 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted). If an appeal is not filed within the statutory ten-day period, the general sessions court’s order becomes final, and the chancery court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the untimely appeal. See Griffin, 439 S.W.3d at 902; Love, 928 S.W.2d at 38; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 556 S.W.3d at 749. Here, Father unquestionably failed to file his appeal within ten days of the general sessions court’s order of protection, as Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-601(3)(F) specifically requires. Accordingly, the chancery court did not err in dismissing the untimely appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on two other statutes to support its conclusion that the writ of error remains a viable method of appealing a general sessions court’s order. The first statute states: A writ of error lies from the final judgment of the court of general sessions to the circuit or proper appellate court, and from the circuit and chancery court to such appellate court, in all cases where an appeal in the nature of a writ of error would have lain. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-6-101 (2017). The second statute states that a party wishing to appeal has sixty days from the date of the general sessions court’s judgment to apply for a writ of error. Id. § 27-6-103 (2017). The text of these statutes, in substantially the same form, has been part of Tennessee law since the 1858 Code.11 In 1959, however, the General Assembly enacted legislation that established “a statewide system of general sessions courts” and “set up a uniform appeal period of [ten] days in general sessions cases.” Steinhouse v. Neal, 723 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tenn. 1987) (discussing Act of Mar. 11, 1959, ch. 109 § 4, 1959 Tenn. Pub. Acts 353, 353-54). This 1959 legislation has not been changed in significant ways since its enactment and currently is codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-108, which provides: 11 These statutes were codified as sections 3176 and 3179 of the 1858 Code. - 15 - (a)(1) Any party may appeal from a decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with this chapter. (2) In civil cases, if one (1) or more of the parties before the general sessions court, on one (1) or more warrants, perfects an appeal of a decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court, as provided in this section, then cross appeals and separate appeals are not required, and upon the filing of a notice of appeal by any party, issues may be brought up for review by any party. (b) This provision allowing ten (10) days in which to perfect an appeal shall apply in every county of Tennessee, any provision of any private act to the contrary notwithstanding, it being the legislative intent to establish a uniform period of ten (10) days in which any such appeal may be perfected in any county in Tennessee. (c) Any appeal shall be heard de novo in the circuit court. (d) If no appeal is taken within the time provided, then execution may issue. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108 (2017) (emphasis added).12 More than thirty years ago, this Court explained the impact of the 1959 legislation now codified at section 27-5-108. Steinhouse, 723 S.W.2d at 626. The Steinhouse Court addressed whether a statute, enacted in 1858, that provided two days to appeal a general sessions court’s judgment in a forcible entry and detainer action had been implicitly repealed by the 1959 legislation providing ten days to appeal from a general sessions court’s judgment. Id. at 626-27. The Court concluded: 12 The 1959 legislation was originally codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-509 and provided: [A]ny party may appeal from an adverse decision of the [g]eneral [s]essions [c]ourt to the [c]ircuit [c]ourt of the county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with the law as now provided for appeals from justices of the peace courts. This provision allowing ten (10) days in which to perfect an appeal shall apply in every county of Tennessee, any provision of any [p]rivate [a]ct to the contrary notwithstanding, it being the legislative intent to establish a uniform period of ten (10) days in which any such appeal may be perfected in any county in Tennessee. Any appeal shall be heard de novo in [c]ircuit [c]ourt. If no appeal is taken within the time provided, then execution may issue. Act of Mar. 11, 1959, ch. 109, § 4, 1959 Tenn. Pub. Acts 353, 353-54. - 16 - Based upon the wording and the history of both statutes, we are convinced that it was the legislative intent that [Tennessee Code Annotated section] 27-5-108 control the period of limitations. The purpose of the 1959 Act was to enact a law dealing with general sessions courts as a whole. The Act was to include a uniform time period for appeals in all cases throughout the state. The legislative intent, as expressed in the wording of the 1959 Act[,] was “to establish a uniform period of ten (10) days in which any such appeal may be perfected in any county in Tennessee.” Where two statutes cover the same subject matter, the last enactment repeals the former by implication. Id. at 627. The Steinhouse rationale applies with equal force in the circumstances of this case. The statutes on which the Court of Appeals relied here to conclude that Father had sixty days to appeal by way of a writ of error were enacted in 1858. Like the statutes at issue in Steinhouse, these statutes, in particular the statute providing sixty days for appeal, were implicitly repealed by the 1959 legislation establishing a uniform method and timeframe for appealing general sessions court judgments. Therefore, even if we disregarded the specific statutory provision governing appeals from orders of protection entered by general sessions courts, Father’s appeal would still be untimely because the 1959 legislation implicitly repealed the statute allowing sixty days to appeal by way of a writ of error appeal from general sessions court judgments and replaced it with a uniform ten-day period for perfecting a de novo appeal from a general sessions court’s order to the circuit court only. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108(a)(1), -108(b). Finally, even assuming the statutes on which the Court of Appeals relied were not implicitly repealed under the Steinhouse rationale by the 1959 legislation, these statutes became obsolete on July 1, 1979, the effective date of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 1. Rule 3(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure declares: An appeal as of right is an appeal that does not require permission of the trial or appellate court as a prerequisite to taking an appeal. There shall be one method of appeal as of right to be known as an ‘appeal as of right.’ Writs of error, appeals in the nature of a writ of error, and simple appeals are abolished. - 17 - Tenn. R. App. P. 3(d) (emphasis added). Rule 3(d), and other procedural changes made by the Rules of Appellate Procedure, were implemented by a statute that declares: “After the rules have become effective, all laws in conflict with the rules shall be of no further force or effect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-3-406 (2009); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 1, Advisory Comm’n. cmts. (referring to section 16-3-406 and stating that, by its terms, “after the rules have taken effect, all laws in conflict therewith are of no further force and effect”). Therefore, pursuant to Rule 3(d) and section 16-3-406, on July 1, 1979, the effective date of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, any statutes providing for an appeal by a writ of error or an appeal in the nature of a writ of error were “of no further force and effect.” See Haynes, 667 S.W.2d at 498 (recognizing “the abolition of the writ of error as an appellate procedure”); State v. Copeland, 647 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (recognizing that “[a]ppeals in the nature of a writ of error” were abolished by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure). Here, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Rule 3(d) abolished the writ of error as a method of appeal, but it concluded that this abolition did not apply to appeals from general sessions courts because the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure “govern procedure in proceedings before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Court of Criminal Appeals” and do not apply to general sessions courts. Tenn. R. App. P. 1. However, Rule 3(d) does not merely prescribe procedure; it broadly abolishes specific methods of appeal that had previously existed in Tennessee law. By abolishing these methods of appeal, Rule 3(d) directly advanced one of the primary purposes supporting adoption of the Rules of Appellate Procedure—“bring[ing] together in one place a simplified, coherent, and modern body of law.” Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 1, Advisory Comm’n. cmts.). The Rules of Appellate Procedure were “intended to replace the appellate court procedure that was governed by scattered provisions of the Tennessee Code and the rules and decisions of the appellate courts.” Id. at 516 (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 1, Advisory Comm’n cmts.). As the original Advisory Commission Comments to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 3(d) stated: One of the needless complexities of existing law is the tripartite division among writs of error, appeals in the nature of a writ of error, and simple appeals. These devices for gaining appellate review are of only historical interest with little contemporary utility. In order to simplify appellate procedure these three traditional methods of gaining appellate review are expressly abolished. - 18 - Tenn. R. App. P. 3(d), Advisory Comm’n cmt. (1979), available at Tennessee Rules of Court XXIX (West 1978).13 Therefore, we decline to read Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 1 as a limitation on the broad abolition of writs of error and other forms of appeal in Rule 3(d), as doing so would frustrate one of the main purposes of the Rules of Appellate Procedure–simplification of the appellate process.14 The chancery court properly held that the writ of error is obsolete and no longer a viable method of appealing a general sessions court’s judgment. Accordingly, for all these reasons, we hold that the chancery court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.