Opinion ID: 1144890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Territorial Uniformity Prior to 1917

Text: Originally, in the Oregon Constitution of 1859, article I, section 32, provided:    [A]ll taxation shall be equal and uniform. In addition, article IX, section 1, originally provided: The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation;   . The simple language of these provisions was intended to prevent anyone from escaping his just share of the tax burden, and these requirements of equal and uniform taxation can be traced to a public distrust of state legislatures who were likely and willing to aid railroads and other private economic enterprises by levying state and local taxes to assist private construction and by granting privileges and tax exemptions to vested interests. See Report of Board of State Tax Commissioners 15-16 (1911). Cf. Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 666, 22 L.Ed. 227 (1873). The constitutional requirements of equal and uniform taxation, in Oregon as in other states, resulted in the general property tax  the taxation of everything, tangible and intangible, by one uniform rule. See Judson on Taxation 562 (1903). See generally Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce et al, 112 Or. 314, 333-334, 228 P. 812 (1924). Territorial uniformity was a judicial concept that appears to have developed from a strict interpretation of the requirements of uniformity and equality in taxation. Simply stated, the territorial uniformity concept required that the tax operate uniformly throughout the territorial limits of the government authority within and for which the tax was raised. In other words, it required that a tax levied by the state (for a state purpose) be uniform throughout the state, a tax levied by a county (for a county purpose) be uniform throughout the county, and so on. See, e.g., Yamhill County v. Foster, 53 Or. 124, 99 P. 286 (1909); Cook v. The Port of Portland, 20 Or. 580, 27 P. 263 (1891); City of East Portland v. County of Multnomah, 6 Or. 62 (1876); Board of Comm'rs of Jackson County v. State ex rel. Shields, 155 Ind. 604, 58 N.E. 1037 (1900); Watkins v. Barrow, 121 Va. 236, 92 S.E. 908 (1917); Day v. Roberts, 101 Va. 248, 249, 43 S.E. 362 (1903); The People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 474, 4 Am.Rep. 400 (1870); Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 410 (1859); Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1 (1853); Gray, Limitations of Taxing Power and Indebtedness 670, § 1351b (1906); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 711, 726 (7th ed. Lane 1903). See also Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, supra ; Gilman v. City of Sheboygan, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 510, 17 L.Ed. 305 (1862). The concept was so widely accepted that, as one legal scholar observed, [i]n some of the constitutions this rule is expressly stated, but where it is not thus expressly stated the constitutions are interpreted in conformity with it. Gray, supra at 670. [16]