Opinion ID: 213521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: ADDENDUM Examples of Improper Confidentiality Markings In Sun's Briefs

Text: All of the following material was marked as confidential in Sun's briefs except for the one italicized sentence on page ii. The Settlement Agreement Does Not Support an Injunction. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 24, Sanofi-Aventis v. Sandoz, Inc., No.2010-1338, 405 Fed.Appx. 493, 2010 WL 5393659 (Fed.Cir. Dec. 22, 2010). Courts have repeatedly held that consent orders are not decision(s) of the courts. For example, numerous courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have held that a consent judgment will not have issue preclusion effect with respect to any subsequent action because none of the issues have actually been litigated and the judgment reflects no adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 [120 S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374] (2000) (It is the general rule that issue preclusion attaches only `[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment. In the case of a judgment entered by . . . consent . . . none of the issues is actually litigated[ ]' and thus such judgments ordinarily have no issue preclusive effect. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)); U.S. v. Int'l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 [73 S.Ct. 807, 97 L.Ed. 1182] (1953) (Where there is no adjudication on the merits, the doctrine of estoppel by [consent] judgment would serve an unjust cause: it would become a device by which a [pro forma] decision not shown to be on the merits would forever foreclose inquiry into the merits.). Id. at 24-25. These holdings represent sound judicial logic. On the one hand, the collateral estoppel rule is meant to promote judicial efficiency and consistency by precluding re-litigation of issues already decided by a court. However, in the case of consent judgments, there has been no decision, and thus there is no risk of duplication or judicial inconsistency. See In re Carrero, 94 B.R. 306, 310 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1988) ([R]efusing to construe consent judgments as adjudicating the issues joined therein will not threaten any legitimate expectations of repose, since none of the parties to the consent judgment ever bargained for such protection. Nor will a rule giving collateral estoppel effect to consent judgments promote judicial consistency, since the judges are not deciding anything. ) (quoting Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 64 Mich.App. 315 [235 N.W.2d 769] (1975)) (emphasis added). Id. at 25. Likewise, the fact that parties have settled a dispute does not, in the absence of express language to the contrary, indicate resolution or determination on the merits of any of the underlying issues that escaped formal litigation. See, e.g., Dunning v. Pacerelli, [63 Wash.App. 232] 818 P.2d 34, 39 (1991) (Consent judgments `are not . . . ordinarily given issue preclusion effect.' The reason is that `the parties could settle for myriad reasons not related to the resolution of the issues they are litigating.') (quoting Marquardt v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co., 33 Wash.App. 685, 658 P.2d 20 (1983)) (internal citations omitted). Id. at 26. In addition to this body of law arising under the collateral estoppel rule, case law makes clear that the implementation of agreed injunctions, with no independent review or analysis, are not decision(s) by a court. See, e.g., Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4443 (1981)) (`[T]he central characteristic' of a consent decree is `that it does not involve consent or decision on the merits [.]') (emphasis added); Walker v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 831 (5th Cir.1990) (The court's approval of the consent decree in this case is not equivalent to a `decision' on the merits of the action. Such a resolution evade[s] decision completely.) (emphasis added); U.S. v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.1990) (A consent decree is `essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial policing.' It is not a decision on the merits or the achievement of the optimal outcome for all parties, but is the product of negotiation and compromise.) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); Beatrice Foods Co. v. F.T.C., 540 F.2d 303, 312 (7th Cir.1976) (The entering of a consent decree, however, is not a decision on the merits and therefore does not adjudicate the legality of any action by a party thereto.) (emphasis added). Id. at 26-27. Finally, even without reference to the decisions cited above, the plain meaning of the term decision[] may be determined by reference to any number of legal dictionaries. See CBS Corp. v. Eaton Corp., No. 07 Civ. 11344, 2009 WL 4756436, at  (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2009) (A sound method for determining the plain meaning of words is to look at their dictionary definitions. (quoting In re Delta Airlines [ Air Lines ], Inc., 381 B.R. 57, 64-65 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2008))); In re Delta Fin. Corp., No. 09-3557 [378 Fed.Appx. 241, 244], 2010 WL 1784054, at  (3d Cir. May 5, 2010) (unpublished decision) (holding that in applying controlling New York law concerning the interpretation of insurance contracts, the Bankruptcy Court's reliance on dictionary definitions to identify the plain meaning of the terms . . . was proper.). For example, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004) defines decision as [a] judicial. . . determination after consideration of the facts and the law. See also Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed.) (defining decisions as [t]he application, by a court of competent jurisdiction, of the law to a state of facts proved, or admitted to be true, and a declaration of the consequences which follow. (citing Le Blanc v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., [73 Miss. 463] 19 So. [211] 212-13 (Miss.1896))); Lawyers.com ( available at http://research. lawyers.com/glossary/decision.html) (defining decision as an authoritative determination (as a decree or judgment) made after consideration of facts or law  (emphasis added)). Under any of these definitions, the term decision requires more than what happened in this case. Id. at 27-28. [P]arol evidence should have been examined to resolve the ambiguity and determine the intent of the parties. . . . See Whitebox Convertible Arbitrage Parnters [ Partners ], L.P. v. Fairfax Fin. Holdings, Ltd., [73 A.D.3d 448] 900 N.Y.S.2d 56, 59 (2010) (Because the sentence is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve it.); Scherer v. North Shore Car Wash Corp., 72 A.D.3d 927, 929, 901 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y.App.Div.2d Dept.2010) ([W]hen language of a stipulation is ambiguous, that is, `reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation,' extrinsic or parol evidence may be permitted to determine the parties' intent as to the meaning of that language.). The merger clause does not change this basic, well-established rule of law. See Chocolas Assocs. Ltd. P'Ship v. Handelsman, [262 A.D.2d 133] 691 N.Y.S.2d 519, 519 (1999) (affirming trial court's decision that the terms of a settlement agreement. . . were sufficiently ambiguous [so as] to warrant the introduction of extrinsic evidence, despite the existence of a merger clause); World Mgmt. Corp. v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 135 A.D.2d 317, 525 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434-435 (1988) ([N]either the contract's merger clause nor the parol evidence rule would prohibit collateral evidence . . . since such evidence would not modify or contradict the terms of the contract, but would explain ambiguities in the contract.). Id. at 29-30 (italicized information not marked confidential, but provided for context). See Town of Wawarsing v. Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc., [49 A.D.3d 1100] 855 N.Y.S.2d 691, 693 (2008) (holding that to determine the intent of contracting parties, [w]e are guided by basic principles of contract construction which instruct that the provisions of a contract should be construed as a whole with all parts given effect). Id. at 32.