Opinion ID: 852106
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indiana's Right to Counsel Under Article 1, Section 13

Text: The right to counsel protections afforded through Article 1, Section 13, of our Constitution are sometimes broader than those flowing from the Sixth Amendmentparticularly in the context of invocation of the right and when the right attaches. See Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1079 (Ind.2003) (In light of Indiana's history of an expansive state right to counsel . . . an incarcerated suspect has a right under section 13 to be informed that an attorney hired by his family to represent him is present at the station and wishes to speak to him.); Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 658, 88 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind.1949) (right to counsel violated when defendant requested counsel during interrogation, specified the particular attorney, and the police refused his request and refused to permit the attorney to see him); Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 76-77, 125 N.E. 773, 776 (Ind.1920) (It has been held that a constitutional right to be heard by counsel is not limited to the right to be heard by counsel at the trial, but the spirit of the provision contemplates the right of accused to consult with counsel at every stage of the proceedings.). In Hall v. State, the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant who requested counsel on one offense was entitled to counsel on other offenses. 870 N.E.2d 449 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). The police had arrested a juvenile based upon a tip that he was involved in a robbery-homicide. Id. at 454. His parents were brought to the detention facility and provided a list of the defendant's rights. The juvenile and his parents spent twenty-five minutes discussing whether he wanted to give a statement. Thereafter, the juvenile and his mother signed a waiver of rights and the juvenile confessed. Id. Based partially on this confession, the juvenile was chargedas an adultand found guilty of multiple counts of burglary, murder, robbery, and other offenses. On appeal, he argued that his statement to police violated his right to counsel under Section 13 because he had requested counsel at a prior court hearing and his statement to the police was provided outside that counsel's presence. Id. at 460-61. The prior hearing was more than a month before his arrest for robbery-homicide and involved a violation of a suspended commitment (juvenile probation). Id. The court found no violation of his right to counsel. Id. at 461. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Indiana Constitution provides a more protective right to counsel than the Sixth Amendment, specifically in that Indiana's constitutional rightcontrary to the Sixth Amendmentcan attach prior to the filing of formal charges against the defendant, but both provisions guarantee the right to counsel at any critical stage of prosecution where counsel's absence `might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.' Id. at 460 (quoting Koehler v. State, 499 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind.1986)). But the Hall court appears to have treated Indiana's right to counsel as offense specific, just like the federal right. See id. at 461. The police have an interest in investigating new or additional crimes after an individual is formally charged with one crime. Id. `To find that the defendant invoked his . . . right to counsel on the present charges merely by requesting the appointment of counsel at his arraignment on the unrelated charge is to disregard the ordinary meaning of that request.' Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204). With this foundation of case law in mind, we proceed finally to the jurisprudential issue at hand: does the inextricably intertwined exception have a place within Indiana's constitutional protections?
We agree with the U.S. Supreme Court in Cobb that a primary concern in assessing the scope of the constitutional right to counsel protections is society's interest in the ability of police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who have been charged with other offenses. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 171-72, 121 S.Ct. 1335. Furthermore, proper Miranda warnings can alleviate many concerns in the context of custodial interrogations. Compare id. at 171, 121 S.Ct. 1335, with Malinski, 794 N.E.2d at 1076-80. However, Miranda protections will not arisemuch less be sufficientwhere, as here, there is no custodial interrogation involved and the defendant is wholly unaware that he is being questioned by a de facto agent of the state. And more importantly, the state's interest in protecting society by investigating potential criminal activities must be balanced with the defendant's right to aid of counsel before facing the full power of the prosecutorial state. Furthermore, Justice Breyer's observations in Cobb seem well taken. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 183, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Blockburger testand the correlative test for double jeopardy developed under our cases applying Article 1, Section 14, of the Indiana Constitution is deliberately narrow in scope. The test seeks to determine whether a single act or criminal transaction constitutes a violation of two or more separate and distinct statutory crimes. See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 & 50 n. 41 (Ind.1999). That determination is not at issue here. Here, the question is whether two or more acts or criminal transactions are so closely related that the right to counsel for one offense must necessarily apply to the other. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223. Simply put, we conclude that the Blockburger test is a little out of place on questions like the one before us. In light of our traditional view that Article 1, Section 13 provides broader protection than the Sixth Amendment, we believe the inextricably intertwined exception is appropriate under our Constitution. It properly reflects the balance we seek to maintain between society's legitimate law enforcement needs and a defendant's right to counsel. The inextricably intertwined exception to the general rule that Section 13's right to counsel protection is offense specific applies when it was objectively foreseeable that the pending offense, for which the right to counsel has already attached, was so inextricably intertwined with the offense under investigation that the right to counsel for the pending offense could not be constitutionally isolated from the right to counsel for the offense under investigation. [13] The inquiry focuses on the nature of the conduct involved rather than on the elements of the offenses. A reviewing court must examine and compare all the facts and circumstancesas known at the time of the investigation related to the conduct, including the nature of the conduct, the identity of the persons involved (including the victim, if any), and the timing, motive, and location of the crimes. [14] None of those factors is particularly dispositive, nor do all factors need to tip in favor of the exception for it to apply. However, the greater the commonality of the factors and the more directly linked the conduct involved, the more likely it is that the two offenses are inextricably intertwined.
We conclude that Jewell's sexual misconduct was notbased on the facts and circumstances known to Detective Judy at the time of the phone callsso closely related to the offense of tattooing a minor as to be inextricably intertwined. The respective offenses were not linked temporally or geographically, nor by any common motive in the record. It is true that the primary partiesJewell, T.S., and Detective Judywere the same. However, that does not end the inquiry. The sexual misconduct occurred over a period of years, from 2004 to 2007, at both T.S.'s and Jewell's homes, whereas the tattooing was a single incident at a single locationan otherwise-unrelated tattoo parlorand took place almost a year after the sexual relationship ended. In fact, aside from the identity of the parties, the nuclei of operative facts for the two offenses are wholly and logically distinct. Not only would it be possible for Detective Judy to confine his questioning to the facts and circumstances of one offense without straying into a discussion of the other, that is exactly what occurred. Cf. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226 n. 8. Furthermore, while one might now hypothesize that Jewell's conduct facilitating T.S.'s tattoo was some form of grooming related to the sexual misconduct, at the time Detective Judy conducted his investigation there was no indication that this could have been the case. Nor has this been claimed by any party. For that matter, while the motive for the sexual misconduct appears clearJewell's own sexual gratificationthere is no evidence whatsoever of any particular motive for the tattooing offense. In sum, there is no evidence that it would have been objectively foreseeable for Detective Judy, at the time he conducted the phone calls, to believe the pending tattooing offense was inextricably intertwined with the alleged sexual misconduct. His inquiry into Jewell's alleged sex crimes was a proper exercise of his responsibility to protect society by investigating potential criminal activities and did not violate Jewell's right to counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Jewell's motion to suppress the recorded phone conversations.