Opinion ID: 853864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Hearsay Statements

Text: Willey next argues that the trial court erred when it overruled several of his hearsay objections. Eight witnesses, including the Willeys' son, Willey's sister, a co-worker and close friends of Janice's, police officers and a psychologist testified that Janice had told them that she feared Willey and/or that Willey had threatened to kill her. James Willey Jr. testified that he spoke with Janice shortly after a May 5, 1996 incident that resulted in police being called to his parent's home. He testified that his mother sounded afraid and upset. The State then asked if Janice told him what was making her scared, and defense counsel objected based on hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection and the witness responded [s]he said that he had threatened her life, that he would kill her and that she was scared and as a result she had packed her bags and had moved out. She had left. She had called 911 when things got too violent. I mean, she didn't say he had struck her, just that he had clearly threatened and she was afraid for her life and so she called 911, they responded, they escorted her out of the house and she left. The testimony of the other seven witnesses is sufficiently similar to that quoted above that its admissibility stands or falls under the same analysis that applies to this statement. [4] At trial, the State asserted that this testimony was admissible because it was offered to prove motive or intent, not the truth of the matter asserted. However, it is readily apparent that this testimony was offered to prove the matter asserted, specifically that Willey had threatened Janice. Therefore, it is hearsay and inadmissible unless one of the exceptions applies. Motive and intent of the defendant are potentially relevant to the admissibility of prior bad acts under Evidence Rule 404(b), but do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. On appeal, the State argues that this testimony falls under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule: These comments directly establish Janice's state of mind at the time she made the statements and demonstrate her fear of Defendant. See Ind. Evidence Rule 803(3). In addition to the requirement that hearsay fall under an exception to be admissible, the Rules of Evidence also mandate that only relevant evidence is admissible. Evid. R. 402. This Court recently observed that a victim's state of mind is relevant where it has been put in issue by the defendant. Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 1997) (citing Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 543 (Ind.1995)); see also Lock v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Ind.1991) (hearsay statements admissible to show the victim's state of mind, in part, because the relationship between the victim and defendant was one of the contested issues at trial); 13 ROBERT L. MILLER, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE § 803.103A at 613 (2d ed.1995) (admissibility under Rule 803(3) requires, among other things, that the declarant's state of mind must be relevant to an issue in the case) (citing United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir.1992)). The record does not support the State's claim that Willey put in issue his relationship with Janice. During opening statement the prosecutor noted that the Willeys were divorced and read Willey's typewritten statement to the police, see supra note 1, which included the statements I have threatened Janice before. I was mad at Janice because she booted me out last November 1996. Defense counsel's opening statement made no specific mention of the nature of the relationship between Willey and Janice. Rather, defense counsel merely stated that Willey repudiates that statement in some respects and by that I mean to say he will testify and tell you that that statement, regardless of what it says, is not really accurate in all respects and he'll explain that to you. It was clear from the outset of the trial that the Willeys were divorced and that their relationship was strained. This is not a situation as in Angleton, where the defendant put the victim's state of mind at issue by portraying her as a happily married wife who peacefully spent her time writing love notes and poems for her husband. 686 N.E.2d at 809. The State also asserts that Willey's alleged threats and Janice's fear of him were relevant because Willey testified at trial that he had not threatened Janice. These witnesses testified in the State's case in chief, before Willey took the stand. The State cannot bootstrap this evidence into admissibility by putting it in, forcing a denial, and then claiming it was put in issue by the defendant. In sum, because Janice's fear of Willey was not relevant to any issue in the case and Willey did not place her state of mind in issue, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing these witnesses to offer hearsay testimony regarding Willey's threats and Janice's fear of him. [5] We disregard error in the admission of evidence unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. Ind. Trial Rule 61; Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ind. 1995). An error will be found harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor that it did not affect the substantial rights of a party. Id. For the same reasons described in Part I., supra, the erroneous admission of this testimony was harmless error.