Opinion ID: 1126332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reverse-Witherspoon Challenges in the Present Case

Text: Defendant contests the trial court's denial of cause challenges against prospective jurors Ronald Sheets, Ronald Lindsly, and Marjorie Roy. Part of the questioning of Sheets by the prosecutor included: Q. Do you believe in the death penalty? A. Sure do. Without a doubt. Q. Without a doubt? A. Yes, Ma'am. Q. But can you listen to both sides? A. Sure. Q. We will present our side during the penalty phase and of course, the defendant may present evidence. And after considering the evidence presented can you personally return a death sentence against this defendant? A. Sure. Q. Now, if you felt that a life sentence was more appropriate could you return a life sentence? A. I could if that's what the case, you know, turned to, but, I could, yes. Q. What do you mean? Tell me what you mean. A. Well, I believe in the death penalty and the fact that a person can take another man's life and have no remorse about it or whatever other than self-defense then the person needs to die, you know. Bottom line that is the way I feel about it. Q. But under Louisiana law you are requiredit'sit's okay if a person leans one way or another either in favor of the death penalty or in favor of a life sentence. But what we are looking for and what the law mandates that we have is a person who isn't going to automatically vote one way or another without regard to the evidence. And the law requires that in deciding the penalty that you have to give a fair consideration to each side, and if the defendant presents some mitigating evidence you have to give fair consideration to it along with the state's evidence, and weigh it and decide which you think is more important, and then based on that make a decision on which penalty you think that the defendant deserves. Could you do that? A. Sure. Q. You wouldn't automatically vote for the death penalty? A. No, not necessarily. Upon being questioned by the defense attorney, Sheets agreed that he was very strongly in favor of the death penalty. Defense counsel then asked: Q.... But let's assume for the sake of argument that they do prove thatthat he was the one that committed this particular crime, that he raped and murdered a 67 year old lady, and then we got to go into a penalty phase. Okay? Would you begiven that evidence, you have seen all of the evidence, all the gory photographs and theall of the other stuff that goes with one of these first degree murder trials, would you be kind of disposed to say, Well, he did it, he deserves the death penalty, I don't care whether he is a nice guy or otherwise or if he was kind to his mother or what have you, he gets the death penalty. Would you bein other words, would it be more or less an automatic with you given those circumstances? A. If he's found convicted or if he's convicted of first degree murder and it goes to the penalty phase and the choice is towards death, yes, I will lean towards death. Q. Okay. Are you telling me that you would become somewhat impaired from considering mitigating circumstances? Say the fact that he may have served honorably in the army or done this or done that? A. It wouldn't have any bearing on the situation at all. The prosecutor objected to the question, and the judge sustained the objection, but specifically stated, And I'm also going to say if you want to talk about mitigating you can ask about any mitigating circumstances. I don't think his response had to do with all mitigating circumstances. I think it had to do with that particular example you gave. Defense counsel then asked Sheets whether, if the jury found the defendant guilty of raping and murdering the sixty-seven-year-old victim, there was anything that would prevent him from automatically imposing the death penalty. Sheets responded: A. Well, I am not agoing to automatically say, yeah, give him death, you know. If it wasdepending upon the evidence and the findings in the case and all of that if it was more appropriate for a life then that is what I would vote. Q. Okay. Give me some examples of what you would considerwhat would influence you toward leaning toward life in prison rather than the death penalty? A. Well, in this particular situation it would be kind of hard, you know, for a young man of his age to attack an elderly woman 67 years old. I can'tI can't see why or how anybody can even do anything of that nature. So, like I say, it wouldI can't think of any kind of situation to tell you, you know, he deserves life over the death penalty, you know in a situation like this. You know, I can't come up with an example. Q. In other words, if you are convinced in your own mind that he was guilty of the crime as charged then it wouldn't make any difference what I At this point, the prosecutor objected, and the judge sustained the objection. Defense counsel proceeded: Q. You can't think of anything that would change your mind about the death penalty in that situation. A. In this case, no sir. Q. Even though the judge tells you thatthat you would have to consider mitigating circumstances? The prosecutor again urged an objection, which was sustained, and defense counsel did not ask Sheets any additional questions. In denying the challenge for cause, the judge stated: I am not going to grant a cause on Mr. Sheets. I am very convinced that he he is open-minded to a life sentence. I think that the way that the questioning went, he tried to explain, Yeah, I can consider a life sentence. It was evident that he was pro to the death penalty, but he didn't say that his mind was closed. He didn't sayhe did not indicate that he would not be able to discharge his duties or his oath, and for that reason I am going to deny it. Defense counsel then used a peremptory challenge to excuse Sheets from the jury. The voir dire of Sheets is troublesome because the trial judge incorrectly sustained an objection to a question inquiring whether, after defendant was found guilty, it would make any difference what evidence the defense presented. This sustained objection to the unfinished question involved the type of denial of voir dire that caused the reversal of the death penalty in Morgan v. Illinois, supra . However, defense counsel, unlike the attorney in Morgan, was not totally barred from questioning the jurors on their willingness to consider mitigating circumstances and to consider a life sentence. In earlier questioning, Sheets clearly stated he could consider a life sentence if defendant were found guilty of the first degree murder and would not automatically give him death, but would consider all the evidence and vote for life if it were more appropriate. Defense counsel was concerned that, and argued that, Sheets may give lip service to the instruction to consider any mitigating evidence and to consider a life sentence, and likely would disregard the instruction. However, the trial judge was in the best position to determine whether Sheets would discharge his duties as a juror in that regard, and the judge ruled that Sheets, although favoring capital punishment, would follow the judge's instructions. Upon reviewing the voir dire in its entirety, we cannot say that the judge erred in denying the cause challenge. Defendant next argues Ronald Lindsly, who served as foreperson of the jury, should have been excused for cause. When the prosecutor asked Lindsly how he felt about the death penalty, he stated that he believed in it, especially if the person involved, whatever, was one of the main causes in the death. He further affirmatively answered questions whether he could listen to the evidence presented by the prosecutor and by the defense and could fairly consider both sides, and he affirmed that he could return either a death sentence or a life sentence, whichever he thought was appropriate. When defense counsel asked Lindsly to explain his answer about believing in the death penalty, he stated: A. I believe that if somebody purposefully takes somebody else's life that they are accountable for that and they deserve to die. If it were an accident that something transpired or happened then it was an accidental death associated to that, that's a different story. Just for instance, whatever, a hunting accident out in the woods. A guy shoots a bullet, or whatever, and it kills somebody, whatever. That I could determine as accidental and not a main contributing factor to the death where you purposefully went to do that. Q. I don't gather that you meant to suggest an eye for an eye is what you would believe about that? A. I believe in the fact that if you take somebody's life you deserve to lose your own. Q. So then you do believe in an eye for an eye? A. Literally the biblical terms, whatever, I don't believe that if you happen to knock somebody's eye out that you deserve to give up that eye. But I do believe that you are accountable for taking from somebody else. When defense counsel told him the law required him to consider mitigating factors, Lindsly responded that he could, adding. I'm pretty analytical, and I would look at all factors that come. The trial judge denied defense counsel's cause challenge without comment. The only difficulty with Lindsly's voir dire involved the eye for an eye discussion with defense counsel. Nevertheless, Lindsly expressly agreed to consider both death and life sentences and to consider any mitigating evidence, as required by the statutes. The judge clearly did not err in denying the cause challenge. Defendant finally argues that prospective juror Marjorie Roy should have been excused for cause. During voir dire by the prosecutor, Roy gave the following responses: Q. Do you believe in the death penalty? A. Yes, sir. Q. And if you thought it was an appropriate penalty after listening to the state's case and to the defense if they choose to put on something, could you personally return such a verdict? A. Yes, sir. Q. And also if you listen to everything and thought a life sentence was appropriate could you return a life sentence? A. Yes, sir. Q. Would your religious beliefs in any way interfere with your returning a death penalty? A. No, sir. I believe like the bible said, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. If you take someone's life then your life should be taken also. Q. Okay, but you would reserve that judgment until you heard everything? A. Oh, yes. Q. And fairly consider a life sentence also? A. Yes. When defense counsel questioned Roy, the following occurred: Q.... I notice that youin responding to [the prosecutor's] questionand I don't think you used this exact word, but what I got from the answer was that you pretty much believe in an eye for an eye type A. Yes, sir. Q. That you do believe that? A. Yes. Q. Now, you understand A. I read that in the Bible just the day before yesterday. Q. Ma`am? A. I read that in the Bible just the day before yesterday, when a person's life is taken then the person that killed that persons life should also be taken. And just a few verses below that it said an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Q. And you understand that in this case a person was in fact killed? A. Yes. Q. Now, the law in the state does not automatically provide that if the person is found guilty they have to be killed? A. Right. Q. Do you understand that? A. I understand. That is just my opinion. Q. So if you were chosen for the jury, and let's say the jury did in fact return a guilty verdict, would at that point would you automatically vote for the death penalty? A. Probably. Q. You said probably. A. Yes, sir. Q. Why do you say probably? A. Well, I would have to wait until the circumstances The prosecutor objected, suggesting during a bench conference that the juror first had to listen to the mitigating evidence. The judge asked defense counsel to rephrase the question, and the prosecutor suggested that defense counsel ask if the juror will listen to evidence on both sides and consider both life and death sentences, whereupon the judge noted those questions had been asked and answered. Then the questioning continued as follows: Q.... You understand that in the penalty phase the state would be required to prove certain aggravating factors as they are called. Are you aware of that? A. Yes. Q. And the defendant, if he so chose, could also put on evidence of what is called mitigating factors? A. Yes. Q. My question is that since the defendant would have been convicted in the first phase would you considerwould you give the same weight to the mitigating factors as you would to the aggravating factors? Would you consider them fairly? A. Yes. Q. And if in your mind you were convinced that life imprisonment should be a sentence would you then imposevote to impose life imprisonment? A. I am not sure that I could. The lady got no choice. She didn't get a second chance. During the argument on defendant's cause challenge, the judge asked the prosecutor to respond to Roy's eye for an eye attitude, explaining: [B]ecause I don't think that there is any person of any rationality that cannot hear that and begin to question whether this person was making lip service to your questions and not being directly honest, and then her true emotions come out when she quotes the biblical passages. That's my concern. The prosecutor then argued that the bible-quoting juror's religious beliefs indicated her honesty in stating she would consider a life sentence. Defense counsel responded that the juror, after a guilty verdict, is going to leapfrog into the bible and do the eye for an eye. The judge denied the challenge, stating: I did have the chance to observe her and watch her while [the prosecutor] questioned her on theon whether or not she could listen to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Sheshe appeared to understand exactly what he was talking about. She also appeared to be quite candid in saying, yes, I could and, yes, I could consider a life sentence. And so for that reason I do believe that she will be able to perform her duties as a juror. And I am going to deny your motion for cause on that juror. Although Roy stated that she probably would vote for death if defendant was found guilty of murder, she immediately qualified her answer that she would have to wait until all the circumstances ..., at which time she was interrupted by an objection. Thereafter, she affirmatively answered defense counsel's question whether she would consider both mitigating and aggravating factors fairly. Roy also equivocated at the end of voir dire on whether she could vote for life (because the victim didn't get a second chance) if convinced this was the appropriate sentence. However, the trial judge considered the overall voir dire and concluded that Roy had candidly answer[ed] that she could consider a life sentence. Although the lack of rehabilitation by the prosecutor as to the last answer, when viewed alone, weighs against the trial judge's conclusion, we cannot say the judge, who was truly concerned whether Roy's emotional quotation of biblical passages affected her stated ability to fairly consider voting for a life sentence, erred in denying the cause challenge based on the overall voir dire.