Opinion ID: 2790268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the test for continuing offenses

Text: ¶12 We are asked to determine whether the criminal charges in this case are time barred. In general, “a prosecution for” a felony, misdemeanor, or infraction “shall be commenced within” four, two, or one year, respectively, “after it is committed.”4 If the State does not commence prosecution within this period, any criminal liability will expire. The limitations period begins to run when a crime is “committed.”5 A crime is committed when every “element of the 3 State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ¶¶ 10–11, 37 P.3d 1103. 4 UTAH CODE § 76-1-302(1); see also id. § 61-1-21.1(1) (“No indictment or information may be returned . . . [for securities fraud] more than five years after the alleged violation.”). 5 See id. § 76-1-302; see also Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 20, 108 P.3d 741 (“As a general rule, a statute of (continued...) 4 Cite as: 2015 UT 42 Opinion of the Court offense” is met.6 But the Legislature has structured the elements of some offenses in such a way that a perpetrator continues to commit the offense so long as he continues to satisfy the elements. These offenses are considered continuing offenses. In the case of a continuing offense, while criminal liability attaches when every element is satisfied, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the perpetrator ceases to satisfy the elements of the crime.7 At that point, the whole arc of criminal conduct is aggregated into a single criminal violation. ¶13 In determining whether a crime is a continuing offense, the United States Supreme Court looks to the intent of Congress. In Toussie v. United States, it recognized the inherent tension between the policies underpinning statutes of limitations—preventing prosecution of stale claims and motivating prompt investigation of crimes—and the imposition of criminal liability for proscribed acts.8 With that tension in mind, the Court reasoned that criminal statutes should not be interpreted to create a continuing offense “unless the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.”9 Other states considering this question have looked to Toussie, either adopting its language or citing its reasoning.10 5 (...continued) limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 6 See State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103, ¶ 14, 37 P.3d 1099 (surveying cases and holding that the crime of escape was complete when the defendant left official custody without authorization). 7 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 256 (2015) (“Although normally a statute of limitation begins to run from the time the crime is complete, if the crime is a continuing one the statute does not begin to run until the continuous commitment of the crime ceases.”); see also WAYNE R. LA FAVE ET AL., 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.5(a) (3d ed. 2007). 8 397 U.S. 112, 114–15 (1970). 9 Id. at 115. 10 See, e.g., People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1193–94 (Colo. 2003); State v. Francois, 577 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Iowa 1998); State v. Gainer, 608 P.2d 968, 970 (Kan. 1980); State v. Mullin, 886 P.2d 376, (continued...) 5 STATE v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court ¶14 The Toussie analysis is generally consistent with our longstanding approach to statutory construction. Our objective in construing statutes is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the statutory text.11 Thus, to determine whether a criminal statute creates a continuing offense, we look to the plain meaning of the enacted text, considering that text in the context of the whole statute.12 And we harmonize the statute with related provisions of the code, including any applicable statutes of limitations.13 ¶15 In sum, we respect the legislative policy choice reflected in a clear statute of limitations and will effectuate that protection except in those instances where we find clear, contrary legislative intent in the terms of the substantive criminal statute at issue. In this case, we are asked to determine whether securities fraud and theft are continuing offenses. We turn first to securities fraud and then to theft.