Opinion ID: 7124138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fourth Amendment states:

Text: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV. The defendant has sensibly invoked the protection of this Amendment in objecting to the search and seizure of items from his residence since the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). It is beyond debate that only “reasonable” searches are allowed by the Fourth Amendment, and that searches and seizures without a warrant are “per se unreasonable” except in a few well-defined and carefully circumscribed instances. Id. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Likewise, to be reasonable, searches must be based “upon probable cause.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). It is equally well-established, however, that the search of property without a warrant or probable cause, but with proper consent voluntarily obtained, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Furthermore, “[a] search does not violate the Fourth Amendment where police obtain consent to search from one who possesses common authority over the premises.” United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 777 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 1413, 113 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991). See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (“[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrant-less search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that the consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”). The defendant does not quarrel with these principles, nor does he contest the lower court’s finding that Michelle Coomer had common authority over the premises and consented to the search. Rather, Caudill argues that Detective Peters’ search of the garage and the seizure of the marijuana was unreasonable because it exceeded the scope of Coomer’s consent. Specifically, the defendant contends that Peters obtained Coomer’s consent only to search the premises in order to investigate the reported shooting. According to the defendant, the seizure of the marijuana transformed the endeavor into a drug investigation for which no consent was given, and the warrantless drug seizure thus constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. It is true that when the government relies on consent as an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the “exception[ ][is] circumscribed ... by the object of the search.” United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir.1998). In this case, Detective Peters’ avowed purpose was to “determine who shot [Caudill] and why.” J.A. at 92. The defendant argues that if Peters’ true intention in searching the garage was to hunt for drugs, Coomer’s consent was vitiated and the entry into the garage unlawful. Citing United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d 690 (6th Cir.2000), the defendant posits that the seizure of the marijuana itself, preceded by the collection of photographs and drug paraphernalia from the house, caused the transformation of the investigation into a drug search. Blair does not support the defendant’s position. The court there held that the execution of a search warrant for documents was not a subterfuge for a drug investigation, and that the government agents properly seized and field tested narcotics found in plain view during the course of the search. Id. at 697-98. The defendant misapprehends the nature of the appropriate inquiry in this case because he fails to focus on the constitutional interests at stake. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from both unlawful searches and unlawful seizures. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). “A search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). There is no dispute that the incriminating character of the marijuana seized in this case was immediately apparent. Thus, under the “plain view” doctrine, the contraband could lawfully be seized if Detective Peters did not violate the Fourth Amendment “in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed,” and “he had a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Id. at 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301. Since the Supreme Court in Horton dispensed with the “inadvertency” prong of the “plain view” test, Peters’ subjective state of mind is not pertinent to the inquiry. If the search of the garage fell within the scope of the consent given by Ms. Coomer to Detective Peters, the seizure of the marijuana was proper. “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). This test implies that the assessment of objective reasonableness is made as of the time of the conversation between the consenting party and the police. Consequently, information that comes to the police after the consent has been given will not affect the validity or scope of the consent, unless, of course, the party withdraws his or her consent. It is not difficult to conclude that a reasonable person would understand that Coomer consented to have Detective Peters search the garage as part of his investigation. Coomer demanded a thorough inquiry. Peters told her that he intended to examine and videotape the house, the grounds and all the outbuildings. Peters considered the three shootings incidents to be related, and Coomer told him that a shooting two weeks earlier had originated near the corner of the garage. After Peters explained the expansive nature of his intended search to Coomer, Coomer left the premises and Peters went about his business. Neither Coomer nor the defendant attempted to limit Peters’ access to the garage or any other part of the dwelling or curtilage, nor did anyone with authority over the premises attempt to withdraw the consent previously given. The defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the garage was properly compromised by the consent to search, and his possessory interest in the marijuana was properly abridged under the plain view doctrine. The trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress the evidence.