Opinion ID: 1996538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Second Amendment Claims

Text: Appellant argues that his convictions for CPWL, UF, and UA must be reversed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2822-23, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (holding that the District of Columbia's ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense. (emphasis added)). But, appellant did not raise this claim in the trial court, therefore we review only for plain error. See Sims v. United States, 963 A.2d 147, 148 (D.C. 2008) (applying plain error analysis in light of Heller ). Under plain error review, appellant must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). [I]n a case such as thiswhere the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appealit is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Even if all three elements are met, we may exercise our discretion to notice the error only if it seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Appellant argues that at the time of the offense, the CPWL, UF, and UA statutes functioned as a total ban on handguns because the District unconstitutionally prohibited all registration and licensing of pistols by ordinary citizens, and thus the only way for an ordinary citizen to possess and carry a pistol was to do so without a license and registration. We have rejected claims that the CPWL, UF, and UA statutes are facially invalid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Heller. See Brown v. United States, 979 A.2d 630, 638-39 (D.C.2009); Howerton v. United States, 964 A.2d 1282, 1288 (D.C.2009); Sims, supra, 963 A.2d at 148-9. We have stated that [n]otably, the Supreme Court in Heller did not declare invalid any of the individual statutes under which appellant . . . was convicted. Moreover, to make a successful facial challenge to the statutes in issue here, appellant must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [they would be valid]. Howerton, supra, 964 A.2d at 1288 (quoting McPherson v. United States, 692 A.2d 1342, 1344 (D.C.1997)) (internal quotations omitted). As an example, we pointed to the CPWL statute and noted that while the statute prohibited carrying a pistol without a license, it did not prohibit issuing a license to possess a gun in the home. Id. Therefore, we concluded that the statute was not facially unconstitutional because a set of circumstances exists where the statute could be valid. This same logic also applies to the UF and UA statutes. Id. at 1289 n. 12 (stating that there does not appear to be anything facially improper about the statute requiring firearms to be registered or the statute prohibiting possession of ammunition without a registration certificate for a firearm of the same caliber). Even if we were to assume error, [6] that error must also be plain. Sims, supra, 963 A.2d at 150. Appellant does not demonstrate that the constitutional error is plain as the CPWL, UF, and UA laws pertain to his conduct. See Heller, supra, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2783. In Heller, the issue was the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's ban on `the possession of usable handguns in the home, ' specifically regarding the right `to use arms in defense of hearth and home.' Howerton, supra, 964 A.2d at 1287 (quoting Heller, supra, 128 S.Ct. at 2821 (emphasis added)). In Sims, where appellant was found to have carried and possessed a loaded . . . pistol which he discarded while . . . . [outside] the boundary lines (or curtilage) of his home, 963 A.2d at 150, we held with regard to Heller that it was not `clear' and `obvious' from the decision . . . that it dictates an understanding of the Second Amendment which would compel the District to license a resident to carry and possess a handgun outside the confines of his home, however broadly defined. Id. In Howerton, where appellant was in his home at the time he possessed the handgun, we held that his use of the handgun to threaten his girlfriend did not fall within the defense of home allowance of Heller. See 964 A.2d at 1287. The appellant's claim failed because the jury found . . . that he had used the gun in question to assault [the victim] and no evidence was presented that he possessed the gun for purposes of self-defense. Id. In this case, Mr. Totev testified that he saw appellant hit Mr. Richardson on the head with a gun. And, Mr. Richardson testified that he was trying to get the gun away from appellant as they struggled. Appellant concedes that he was not in his own home. Thus, appellant was outside of the bounds identified in Heller, i.e., the possession of a firearm in one's private residence for self-defense purposes. Under these circumstances, and based on our decisions in Howerton and Sims, even if there were error in extending the CPWL, UF, or UA prohibitions to appellant's conduct, he cannot show that such error is plain. Accordingly, appellant has not satisfied the first and second prong of the plain error analysis. Thus, we conclude appellant's CPWL, UF, and UA convictions must stand.