Opinion ID: 477838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parole Board Members

Text: 5 Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in holding defendants Moore and Duncan absolutely immune from suit based on their decision to parole Nave on March 14, 1983. Although the United States Supreme Court expressly left this issue unanswered in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 553 n. 11, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1979), this circuit has held that parole board members are cloaked with absolute immunity. In Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828 (8th Cir.1983) this court held that since parole officials perform functions comparable to those of judges they are entitled to absolute immunity in deciding to grant, deny, or revoke parole. Id. at 831. In Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.1985) we found that members of the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole were absolutely immune from suit in carrying out their official duties in considering and deciding parole matters. Gale involved a decision denying parole. 6 Plaintiffs argue that the present case can be distinguished on the basis of the status of the claimant. If the claimant is an inmate or parolee Evans should apply (Brief for Appellants at 21-22), but if innocent third parties are bringing the suit then absolute immunity should not apply. While the plaintiffs' case does present a factual difference from Evans and Gale, it does fall within the factual confines of Martinez and we think the same reasoning would be applicable. 7 Whether an official is cloaked with absolute or qualified immunity depends on the function performed by the official. In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) the Court stated that judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities. Id. Using a functional approach the Supreme Court has found that judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1981). Thus the extent of immunity accorded an official depends solely on the official's function. Whether claimant is an inmate appealing denial of parole or a victim of a parolee's criminal actions is irrelevant. Since Duncan and Moore performed a quasi-judicial function when they paroled Nave, they are entitled to absolute immunity.