Opinion ID: 887762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crawford Changes the Landscape

Text: ¶ 9 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Until recently, the Supreme Court had allowed courts to admit hearsay when that evidence bore adequate `indicia of reliability.' Ohio v. Roberts (1980), 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 (citation omitted). Further, [r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or if the evidence has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d at 608. Thus, under Roberts, the rules of evidence subsumed any substantive restrictions the Sixth Amendment had placed on admitting hearsay. ¶ 10 In 2004 the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, in which the Court dramatically bifurcated hearsay law from the Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment allows courts to admit hearsay against criminal defendants in only two instances: (1) if the hearsay is testimonial, the defendant must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and the prosecution must show that the declarant is unavailable to appear at trial, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197; or (2) if the hearsay is nontestimonial, the hearsay must bear adequate indicia of reliability or particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203. In Crawford, although the Supreme Court gave numerous examples, it specifically declined to define what constitutes testimonial evidence. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203. Mizenko's case forces this Court to deal with the definitional void left by Crawford.