Opinion ID: 1219292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: grievance board's subject matter jurisdiction

Text: The Legislature established the grievance procedure in W.Va.Code, 18-29-1, et seq., to provide the State's education employees with a simple, expeditious and fair process for resolving [employment] problems[.] W.Va.Code, 18-29-1 (1992); see Triggs v. Berkeley County Bd. of Educ., 188 W.Va. 435, 425 S.E.2d 111 (1992); Fayette County Bd. of Educ. v. Lilly, 184 W.Va. 688, 403 S.E.2d 431 (1991). Under W.Va.Code, 18-29-5(a) (1989), the Grievance Board is created and is directed to employ hearing examiners to conduct and decide level IV hearings, as provided in W.Va.Code, 18-29-4 (1992). W.Va.Code, 18-29-5(b) (1989), authorizes the hearing examiners to provide such relief as is deemed fair and equitable in accordance with the provisions of [article twenty nine.] Grievances, according to W.Va.Code, 18-29-2(a) (1992), may include claims by employees alleging discrimination in the application or interpretation of written rules or procedures, discrimination in the application of unwritten policies or practices of the board, [and] any specifically identified incident of harassment or favoritism[.] W.Va.Code, 18-29-2 (1992), also defines the following terms for purposes of article twenty-nine: (m) `Discrimination' means any differences in the treatment of employees unless such differences are related to the actual job responsibilities of the employees or agreed to in writing by the employees. (n) `Harassment' means repeated or continual disturbance, irritation or annoyance of an employee which would be contrary to the demeanor expected by law, policy and profession. ( o ) `Favoritism' means unfair treatment of an employee as demonstrated by preferential, exceptional or advantageous treatment of another or other employees. Thus, the Grievance Board, through its hearing examiners, has jurisdiction to decide grievances that include claims of discrimination, harassment, and favoritism which have the potential to overlap claims under the Human Rights Act. The latter prohibits discrimination in public and private employment on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness, or handicap. W.Va.Code, 5-11-9 (1992). The two statutes may, in a given case, provide alternative remedies to aggrieved persons. Obviously, a state educational employee who is denied a job benefit solely because of her gender would have a meritorious grievance based on either discrimination or favoritism and also would have a claim for relief under the Human Rights Act. Similarly, a victim of sexual harassment would be entitled to relief in a grievance that alleged harassment [3] and in a claim (administrative or judicial) under the Human Rights Act. E.g., Westmoreland Coal Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 181 W.Va. 368, 382 S.E.2d 562 (1989). These overlapping remedies lead to issues, such as are presented in this case, where we must reconcile the goals of various statutory schemes with the policies [4] supporting the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion doctrines. Clearly, the Grievance Board's authority extends only to resolving grievances made cognizable by its authorizing legislation, that is, those grievances recognized in W.Va. Code, 18-29-2. Just as certainly, there is no authority in the statute for the Grievance Board to decide whether a person states a claim under the Human Rights Act. In fact, W.Va.Code, 5-11-10 (1994), W.Va.Code, 5-11-11 (1989), and W.Va.Code, 5-11-13 (1983), commit interpretation and enforcement of the Human Rights Act to the Human Rights Commission and to the courts of this State. Price v. Boone County Ambulance Auth., 175 W.Va. 676, 337 S.E.2d 913 (1985). On the other hand, the Grievance Board can entertain grievances claiming that a particular employment action was the result of discrimination based on sex or any of the other prohibited motivations listed in the Human Rights Act. If a grieving employee can prevail on the claim that she has been the victim of discrimination, harassment, or favoritism, it necessarily follows that the employee also can prevail by showing that the discrimination, harassment, or favoritism, was motivated by sexual, racial, or some other invidious ground. Conversely, an employment decision that treats an employee differently because of the employee's race or gender, etc., is, by definition, not one that is related to the actual job responsibilities of the [employee.] W.Va.Code, 18-29-2(m). For example, as a practical matter, a grievant who has persuasive evidence that sexual or racial bias entered into an employment decision may want to present such evidence at a grievance hearing both to prove discrimination and to rebut the employer's neutral or job-related explanation for its action. To hold that a grievant could not present evidence of an illicit motive to help prove discrimination just because such motive also is prohibited by the Human Rights Act would be both unfair to the grievant and inefficient for our administrative and judicial systems. It would be unfair to the grievant because it artificially would limit probative evidence relevant to discrimination. It would be inefficient because a grievance decision in favor of the grievant may, in many cases, end the controversy and preclude the need for further administrative or judicial proceedings under the Human Rights Act; and, it does so by a procedure that is much faster and less expensive. Thus, the answer to the District Court's first certified question is in the affirmative. The Grievance Board does not have authority to determine liability under the Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-11-1, et seq.; nevertheless, the Grievance Board's authority to provide relief to employees for discrimination, favoritism, and harassment, as those terms are defined in W.Va.Code, 18-29-2 (1992), includes jurisdiction to remedy discrimination that also would violate the Human Rights Act. In other words, the Grievance Board does have subject matter jurisdiction over gender-based discrimination claimsjust as it has subject matter jurisdiction over any claim of discrimination, meaning employment decisions that are not based on job-related reasons or agreed to in writing by the employees. Discrimination, favoritism, and harassment in W.Va.Code, 18-29-2, comprise, inter alia, employment discrimination that also is prohibited by the Human Rights Act. Accordingly, we must proceed to answer the District Court's second certified question.