Opinion ID: 734228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determination of Appropriate Standard of Review

Text: 9 In the past decade, this Circuit has consistently declined to decide the appropriate standard of review for a district court's ruling on authority to consent to a search. See, e.g., United States v. Dearing, 9 F.3d 1428, 1429 n. 1 (9th Cir.1993) (We have not decided the standard of review for apparent authority determinations.); United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 n. 4 (9th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Sealey, 830 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir.1986) (same). 10 In lieu of providing a standard, we have repeatedly held that the standard of review did not effect our determination of the case at issue. Dearing, 9 F.3d at 1429 (Whether we review de novo ... or for clear error, our conclusion is the same.). As we have uniformly affirmed decisions regarding authority to consent, the result has been to uphold the district court without delineating an appropriate standard. See, e.g., Dearing, 9 F.3d at 1429 n. 1; United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir.1992); Sealey, 830 F.2d at 1031; Hamilton, 792 F.2d at 841. We now hold explicitly that district court authority determinations are reviewed de novo. 11 United States v. McConney delineates this Circuit's approach to deciding the appropriate standard of review for the type of mixed questions of law and fact presented by authority determinations. 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). In McConney we stated: 12 If application of the rule of law to the facts requires an inquiry that is essentially factual--one that is founded on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct,--the concerns of judicial administration will favor the district court, and the district court's determination should be classified as one of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. If, on the other hand, the question requires us to consider legal concepts in the mix of fact and law and to exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles, then the concerns of judicial administration will favor the appellate court, and the question should be classified as one of law and reviewed de novo. 13 728 F.2d at 1202 (citations omitted). 14 McConney identified three distinct steps to deciding such a mixed question: (1) establishment of facts; (2) selection of the applicable rule of law; and (3) application of the law to the facts. Id. at 1200. The district court's determination of the facts is reviewed for clear error and its selection of the applicable rule of law is reviewed de novo. Id. at 1200-01. The standard of review for the district court's application of law to facts is based on a functional analysis. Id. at 1202. 15 Under the McConney approach, we must first ascertain if determination of authority to consent is essentially factual or instead requires a studied analysis of mixed facts and law. Judge Hall's dissent in Hamilton provides a persuasive argument for the latter characterization. 792 F.2d at 844-45 (affirming district court ruling that third party had apparent authority to consent to a motor home search) (Hall, J., dissenting). In response to the majority's decision not to determine the standard of review for authority decisions, Judge Hall argued that the Court should apply a de novo standard: While a trial court may be in the best position to determine the actual extent of mutual use, the question of whether these facts constitute a 'sufficient relationship' for the purposes of the fourth amendment is an inherently legal one. Hamilton, 792 F.2d at 844. 1 As Judge Hall noted, this analysis requires us to consider abstract legal doctrines, to weigh underlying policy considerations, and to balance competing legal interests. Id. at 844 (quoting McConney, 728 F.2d at 1205). We agree that this balancing presents a mixed question of law and fact that should be examined under a de novo standard. 16 Our decision is also guided by the constitutional implications of consent analysis. As McConney noted, de novo review is favored when courts apply the law to facts in constitutional cases. This process requires consideration of the abstract principles that inform constitutional jurisprudence. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1203. Applying this test, McConney held that the exigent circumstances justifying a police search conducted without following standard procedures is reviewable de novo because it is rooted in constitutional principles and policies. Id. at 1204-05. The same type of concerns are presented when reviewing the existence of authority to consent to a search: balancing society's interest in effective law enforcement with the expectations of privacy contained in the Fourth Amendment. Thus, applying de novo review in the present context is appropriate and consistent with our application of a de novo standard in exigent circumstances cases. See United States v. Von Willie, 59 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir.1995) (applying de novo review to exigent circumstances decision). 17 Analysis illustrates that review of a trial court's determination of authority to consent to a search requires a considered judgment of both factual circumstances and legal issues. Thus, we review the district court's authority decisions de novo.