Opinion ID: 835608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

Text: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right    to be confronted with the witnesses against him   . In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Confrontation Clause test that it had announced in Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, and construed the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to apply primarily to testimonial hearsay statements admitted in criminal trials against a defendant. [6] Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 60-61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Conversely, if a hearsay statement is not testimonial, then the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause does not apply. See id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (suggesting such an approach). Although the Supreme Court did not comprehensively define the word testimonial, the Court concluded that a recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition. Id. at 52, 53 n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford went on to hold that a testimonial hearsay statement is admissible under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In Crawford, the police questioned the declarant while she was in their custody. Id. at 65, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In response, she made a statement implicating herself and the defendant in a crime and undermining the defendant's self-defense claim. Id. at 39-40, 65, 124 S.Ct. 1354. After the declarant asserted a privilege and refused to testify, the trial court admitted the declarant's statement under the against penal interest hearsay exception. Id. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Supreme Court held that the statement was testimonial because the declarant had made it while in police custody and in response to police questioning. Id. at 53 n. 4, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court further concluded that the second requirement for admission of a testimonial hearsay statement was missing because the State admitted [the] testimonial statement against [the defendant], despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine [the declarant]. See id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Therefore, the Court concluded that admission of the statement violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The present case is closely analogous to Crawford. Here, the declarants, Gregory and Lewis, made statements while in police custody and in response to police questioning. The statements inculpated Gregory, Lewis, and defendant in a crime and undermined defendant's defense-of-others claim. By asserting their rights against self-incrimination, Gregory and Lewis did not testify at defendant's trial, and the trial court admitted the statements of Gregory and Lewis under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. Under Crawford, those statements were testimonial because Gregory and Lewis made them while in police custody and in response to police questioning. Thus, although the first requirement for admitting testimonial hearsay under Crawford was met, because Gregory and Lewis were unavailable, the second requirement was not met, because defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine Gregory and Lewis. Therefore, admission of their statements violated defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right.