Opinion ID: 1196688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Burden: Dietary Request Procedural Requirements

Text: Nelson contends that he was substantially burdened by the procedures for obtaining a religious accommodation; specifically, defendant's requirement that he produce documentation of a religious requirement. In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760-61 (7th Cir.2003), we stated that in the context of RLUIPA's broad definition of religious exercise, a ... regulation that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise ... effectively impracticable. In Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir.2008), we quoted language from the Supreme Court's decision in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) to explain the substantial burden test, noting that Thomas teaches that government conduct is substantially burdensome when it `put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and violate his beliefs.' Koger, 523 F.3d at 799 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425). [5] Koger is similar to the instant case. In Koger, we held that it was a violation of the First Amendment and RLUIPA for prison officials to deny an inmate's request for a non-meat diet on the ground that his religion does not require such a dietary restriction. [6] Id. at 797-800. In that case, the plaintiff prisoner, Koger, belonged to a religion known as Ordo Templi Orientis (OTO), which had as its central tenet only Do what though wilt. Id. at 789. But Koger nonetheless believed that his practice of OTO required him to observe a vegetarian diet. Id. at 797. In support of his request for the non-meat prison diet, Koger submitted paperwork from OTO stating that OTO had no general dietary restrictions but that each individual [follower] may from time to time, include dietary restrictions as part of his or her personal regimen of spiritual discipline. Id. The prison nonetheless denied Koger's request. Id. at 794. We held, first, that requiring a prisoner to show that his preferred diet is compelled by his religion was unlawful, as such a requirement was contrary to RLUIPA, which specifically stated that [t]he term `religious exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. [7] Koger held, second, that requiring a religious belief be verified by clergy was a substantial burden because Koger's religion lacked traditional clergy members. Id. at 799. Importantly, we opined that even if Koger had belonged to a religion with more traditional clergy, a clergy verification requirement forms an attenuated facet of any religious accommodation regime because clergy opinion has generally been deemed insufficient to override a prisoner's sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. at 799-800 (citing Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593-94 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that the role the Eid ul Fitr feast played in a prisoner's practice of Islam was determinative of whether there had been a substantial burden, and not the testimony of Muslim clerics as to the proper celebration of the feast); Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320-21 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that it was the sincerity of a prisoner's beliefs, and not the decision of Jewish religious authorities, that determined whether the prisoner was an adherent of Judaism entitled to a kosher meal); see also Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989) (holding that in the context of a denial of unemployment benefits, the plaintiff's refusal, based on his Christianity, to work on Sundays was entitled to protection even though there are assorted Christian denominations that do not profess to be compelled by their religion to refuse Sunday work)). Koger is essentially dispositive in this case. [8] Like the prison officials in Koger, Miller required Nelson to show that his religion compelled the practice in question and to verify that compelled practice with documentation. As in Koger, the first of these requirements was unlawful under RLUIPA and the second imposed a substantial burden on Nelson's desired religious practice because it was impossible for him to show that his religion, Catholicism, required him to abstain from meat on all Fridays or avoid the meat of four-legged animals. The Catholic clergy who opined on the matter, Father Fortenberry and Father Roscioli, both opined that although not required, dietary discipline was a permissible and laudatory way for Nelson to engage in penance. Miller's demands that Nelson show a religious requirement and submit documentation to that effect thus made Nelson's desired religious exercise effectively impracticable. See Koger, 523 F.3d at 799; see also Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir.1990) (recognizing that a prisoner can bring a free exercise claim where he is put to an improper choice between adequate nutrition and observance of the tenets of his faith). Because we find that Nelson's practice of his religion was substantially burdened by Tamms's procedural requirements for obtaining a religious diet, we reverse the district court in this regard.