Opinion ID: 1718692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Thomas Hutson

Text: Defendant avers that Hutson, who believed in an eye for an eye, would automatically vote for death in a case of premeditated murder. A review of the voir dire record as a whole reveals that Hutson was questioned in Pool 2, Panel 2, and his responses to both the judge and the prosecutor were balanced and fair. While he admitted in response to one of the prosecutor's inquiries that he believed in the concept of an eye for an eye, when the state asked where Hutson fell on the death penalty continuum: strong advocate, a weak advocate, or somewhere in the middle. Hutson placed himself in the middle. He assured the state that he would consider all of the mitigating evidence before making a sentencing decision. When defense counsel asked Hutson to elaborate on his view of the death penalty, Hutson suggested: If a person has committed a serious crime such as murder and is guilty beyond that total shadow of a doubt, then I think he should be sentenced to death. Counsel then asked Hutson if he thought mitigating circumstances should allow a person convicted of premeditated murder to escape the death penalty, and Hutson replied, [d]epending on what they actually were. At this point, counsel gave Hutson a convoluted hypothetical involving a lying in wait type of murder, and then asked if Hutson thought mitigating circumstances should apply to such a case. Hutson's reply was no. Thereafter, counsel reworded his question, and Hutson indicated that he could consider mitigation evidence. Finally, after counsel asked multiple questions without giving Hutson a chance to respond on the subject of whether he would consider mitigation, a befuddled Hutson replied: I'm not real sure how to answer that. No, I would still like to see what the circumstances behind it was before I actually made up my mind confirming it. Hutson did not waver from his opinion stating that mitigation would still be needed for consideration even in a case of premeditated murder. Further, Hutson reiterated that there are some circumstances I wouldn't vote for death. The trial judge denied defense counsel's challenge for cause as to Hutson, with the following observations: The Court observed his entire testimony and observed his facial expressions and his voice tones. He's a very soft-spoken person.... I wrote a bunch of [notes]. He said to my questions in particular that he could consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances and that he could consider both life or death. Now in your hypo, and he came back and cleared that up, based on that hypo and only on that hypo with no other evidence and no other mitigating or aggravating evidence, that he would impose the death penalty, but even then he'd put up a stronger burden on the state than they're required. The state is only required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and not beyond a shadow of a doubt. And so even then he put a stronger burden on [the state] before he would impose death.... [H]is answers taken as a whole shows me that he's a very thoughtful person, that he will listen to both sides, and that based on the facts of the case ... he'll consider both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, he'll consider both the death penalty and life imprisonment, whether it be premeditated or not, and that there are some situations where he will give life and there are some situations where he'll give death depending upon the facts of the case. Based on our review of Hutson's voir dire responses as a whole, and the trial court's candid assessment of his demeanor, no abuse of discretion is apparent in the court's denial of this challenge for cause. See Lee, 93-2810 at 9, 637 So.2d at 108 (A trial judge is accorded broad discretion in ruling on cause challenges because he or she has the benefit of seeing the facial expressions and hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as they respond to questioning by the parties' attorneys.). Since jury selection was completed before Hudson's name was called for further questioning, the defense was not required to use one of its peremptory challenges to excuse Hutson, and thereby waived any complaint about the trial court's ruling.