Opinion ID: 3035625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness and Procedural Default

Text: The Anti-Terrorism, and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) creates a one-year period of limitations for state prisoners to file federal habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one year clock usually starts ticking when the time for direct review expires. Typically, that is when the United States Supreme Court denies certiorari or when the time for seeking certiorari review expires. However, the limitation period is tolled while “a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment. . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Kindler and the Commonwealth agree that the limitation 18 period here was tolled until at least December 11, 1998 when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected his appeal of the denial of PCRA relief.5 As noted earlier, thereafter, Kindler filed for reargument of that December 11 ruling, and that petition for reargument was not decided until March 15, 1999. The parties disagree about whether the filing period was tolled while his petition for reargument was pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. If the period was not tolled by filing the petition for reargument, Kindler’s one year limitation period expired on December 10, 2000, and his March 13, 2000 5 Kindler’s PCRA petition was pending as of April 24, 1996, when AEDPA became effective, and remained pending at least through December 11, 1998 when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Kindler’s state habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also, Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir.1998); Miller v. N.J. State Dep't of Corrs., 145 F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that for convictions that became final prior to AEDPA’s enactment, the AEDPA limitations period begins on AEDPA’s effective date of April 23, 1996). 19 federal habeas petition would therefore be untimely. Conversely, if the AEDPA clock was tolled while that petition was pending, the habeas petition was timely filed as detailed above.6 Congress specifically provided that the one year period for filing a federal habeas petition is tolled while “a properly filed application for state post-conviction review or other collateral proceeding is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). AEDPA does not specifically define that phrase or explain what it includes. Nevertheless, we have held that an application for relief that is permitted under state law and filed in accordance with the state’s procedural requirements, tolls the filing period 6 We reject the Commonwealth’s argument that the limitation period was not tolled from December 11, when the the PCRA petition was denied to December 20 th when the motion for reargument was filed because there was nothing pending before a court during that time. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (petitioner’s application would be considered as pending during 4 ½ month time between denial of lower court petition and filing of appeal of that decision so long as the appeal was filed in accordance to state law.) 20 under AEDPA. Compare Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (a prisoner’s second state habeas petition tolled the AEDPA period of limitations because the state courts permitted successive habeas petitions, and occasionally granted relief on these petitions.); with Douglas v. Horn, 359 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2004) (a notice to appeal nunc pro tunc did not toll the limitation period because Pennsylvania courts do not recognize nunc pro tunc appeals as a permissible avenue for postconviction relief.). The Commonwealth does not dispute that Kindler properly filed his motion for reargument within 14 days of the denial of relief, as required by state law. Rather, the Commonwealth argues that motions for reargument are petitions for “extraordinary relief,” and therefore not encompassed within the meaning of “a properly filed petition” under AEDPA. The Commonwealth rests this argument on its contention that such 21 petitions are “not favored” under Pennsylvania law. According to the Commonwealth such petitions are an exceptional form of relief and Congress could therefore not have intended the AEDPA clock to stop ticking while such a motion was pending. However, we have found no Pennsylvania statute, case or rule prohibiting motions for reargument and the Commonwealth does not direct us to any. Indeed, Pennsylvania appellate practice specifically provides for a motion for reargument, and sets forth the time for filing such a motion. See Pa.R.A.P. 2542 (setting forth a 14 day time limit for filing a motion for reargument as well as other procedures for such motions); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2543-2547. Moreover, not surprisingly, capital defendants in Pennsylvania routinely seek reargument when their claims for relief are denied, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted such motions on more than one occasion. See Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 810 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2002) (on 22 reargument, granting reinstatement of PCRA petition that had been dismissed on appeal); Commonwealth v. Young, 748 A.2d 166 (Pa. 2000)(on reargument, granting relief on claim that was denied in original decision); see also, Lovasz v Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (considering the fact that the state historically allowed a certain type of filing in determining that such a filing tolls the AEDPA statute of limitations). The Commonwealth nevertheless claims that Kindler’s motion for reargument should not toll the limitation period here because it was not necessary to exhaust state remedies. According to the Commonwealth, only proceedings that are required to exhaust a claim toll the limitation period under AEDPA. That argument is not rooted in the text of AEDPA or any decision of this court of the Supreme Court. Rather, the Commonwealth rests this argument upon the logic of harmonizing AEDPA’s requirements for exhaustion and tolling. 23 The Commonwealth also argues that this interpretation of AEDPA’s one year time limit prevents habeas petitioners from tolling the limitation period indefinitely with a series of “exotic” petitions for “extraordinary” relief. We disagree. Nothing in the text of AEDPA suggests that Congress intended any such linkage. To the contrary, that text undermines the Commonwealth’s attempt to read exhaustion into the statute’s tolling requirements. Section 2244 conditions AEDPA tolling only upon properly filling an application for postconviction or collateral review. Once properly filed, the time during which the petition is pending is explicitly tolled under § 2244. Congress could easily have declared that the limitations period would only be tolled while any petition required to exhaust claims is pending in state court. It did not do so, and we can not amend the statute by adopting the Commonwealth’s attempt to forge a nonexistent link between exhaustion and 24 statutory tolling.7 Moreover, we rejected a similar argument in Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2002). There, we concluded that the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 undermines any policy justification for linking AEDPA’s tolling requirements with its exhaustion requirements. Specifically, we had to determine whether this tolling provision applies on a claimby-claim basis, requiring at least one or more of the issues raised in the state collateral proceeding to be included in the federal habeas petition, or whether a state post-conviction proceeding attacking a judgment of conviction tolls the period of limitations for the entire habeas petition attacking that same judgment. 294 F.2d at 513. We held that Congress did not intend AEDPA’s tolling 7 Indeed, it is ironic given considerations of deference and comity so frequently relied upon in arguing against federal relief that the state would now ask us to ignore a procedure provided under state procedural law and utilized by the state’s highest court. 25 provision to be applied on a case by case basis. We noted that our decision would have been the same even if we factored policy considerations into our analysis because separate rules for tolling and exhaustion advance, rather than retard, the goals of federalism and comity enshrined in AEDPA. Id. at 519-520 (“ the statute of limitations . . . and the exhaustion doctrine . . . impose entirely distinct requirements on habeas petitioners; [although] both must be satisfied before a federal court may consider the merits of a petition.”). Maintaining the distinction encourages habeas petitioners to utilize all avenues for review authorized under state law before seeking habeas relief in federal court. Id. Moreover, we are simply not impressed by the Commonwealth’s concern that habeas petitioners may endlessly extend AEDPA’s one year filing deadline by resorting to exotic or “extraordinary” state petitions. That theoretical concern, not 26 exemplified here, does not justify the forced reading of AEDPA required by the Commonwealth’s position. B. Procedural Default As noted above, the Pennsylvania courts applied Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture rule and concluded that Kindler waived his right to seek appellate review. They thus dismissed his appeals without reaching the merits of any of his claims. As a matter of comity and federalism, a federal court cannot rule on the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims when a state court has found such claims to be procedurally defaulted pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice for the default. See Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 1996). The district court reasoned that, in this case, Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture doctrine did not preclude review of the merits of Kindler’s claims. We agree. 27 A state procedural rule precludes federal habeas review only if it is “firmly established” and “consistently and regularly applied” by the state’s courts. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988); see also Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991) (state procedural rule must be “firmly established and regularly followed” to bar federal habeas review). In addition, the state rule must speak in unmistakable terms, and the state courts’ refusal to review a petitioner’s claim must be consistent with decisions in similar cases. See Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d at 683-684; Neely v. Zimmerman, 858 F.2d 144, 148 (3d Cir.1988). A procedural rule that is consistently applied in the vast majority of cases is adequate to bar federal habeas review even if state courts are willing to occasionally overlook it and review the merits of a claim for relief where the rule would otherwise apply. Id. Furthermore, the adequacy of the rule is determined by the law in effect at the time of the 28 asserted waiver, not when the petitioner subsequently seeks review in federal court. See Doctor, 96 F.3d at 684. Despite the Commonwealth’s efforts to distinguish this case, our analysis of Kindler’s procedural default is controlled by our analysis in Doctor. There, we held that Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture rule did not bar federal habeas review as applied to Doctor, a habeas petitioner who had, like Kindler, escaped. Doctor escaped in 1986 during a lunch recess of his criminal trial, but the trial resumed after the recess and he was convicted in absentia. Id. at 678. Five years later, after he was captured and sentenced, he appealed. The Pennsylvania courts applied the fugitive forfeiture rule and refused to consider the merits of his appeal. Id. On federal habeas review, the Commonwealth argued that the state courts’ application of the fugitive waiver doctrine precluded federal habeas relief. We disagreed because the rule was not being consistently or strictly 29 applied when Doctor escaped in 1986. Id. at 684-686. After surveying decisions of Pennsylvania courts we concluded that Pennsylvania courts had discretion to hear an appeal filed by a fugitive who had been returned to custody before an appeal was initiated or dismissed. Id. at 686. Accordingly, the fugitive forfeiture rule was not “firmly established” and therefore was not an independent and adequate procedural rule sufficient to bar review of the merits of a habeas petitioner in federal court. Here, Kindler escaped from custody in 1984 while his post-verdict motions were pending. Kindler, like Doctor, was returned to custody before any direct appeal of his conviction or sentence was initiated. The Commonwealth seeks to distinguish Doctor because Kindler’s escape resulted in the dismissal of post-verdict motions that were pending when he escaped. The Commonwealth contends that the dismissed post-verdict motions were analogous to a dismissed appeal. Therefore, 30 argues the Commonwealth, the state appellate courts had no more discretion to re-instate Kindler’s post-verdict motions than they had to reinstate a dismissed appeal. Despite its facial appeal, we cannot agree with this interpretation of Doctor. In Commonwealth v. Galloway, 333 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1975), as discussed in Doctor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-instated supplemental post-verdict motions that had been dismissed pursuant to the fugitive forfeiture rule. The court did so because once the defendant was apprehended, he was returned to the jurisdiction of the court, and would therefore be responsible for, and subject to, the court’s judgment. Galloway thus underscores a critical distinction between dismissed post-verdict motions and a dismissed final appeal. That distinction arises from the fact that after an appeal is dismissed, a court no longer retains jurisdiction. However, appellate courts can exercise jurisdiction after post-verdict motions are 31 dismissed, and they therefore can exercise discretion to hear the claims of defendant’s appeal. Thus, Galloway fatally undercuts the Commonwealth's attempt to distinguish Kindler’s situation from Doctor’s based upon differences in the procedural posture at the time of their respective escapes. When Kindler escaped in 1984, Galloway had not been overruled. Accordingly, the state trial court still had discretion to reinstate his post-verdict motions. Accordingly, we conclude that, under Doctor, Pennsylvania’s fugitive waiver law did not preclude the district court from reviewing the merits of the claims raised in Kindler’s habeas petition.