Opinion ID: 2635594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Were Iniguez's Speedy Trial Rights Violated?

Text: ¶ 37 Having established the method of analysis under article I, section 22 and the Sixth Amendment, we turn to the facts of the case at hand. The Court of Appeals agreed with Iniguez that the pretrial delay was presumptively prejudicial. Iniguez, 143 Wash. App. at 859, 180 P.3d 855. The court surveyed cases from other jurisdictions and concluded that the consensus is to presume prejudice for delays of between eight months and one year. Id. at 858-59, 180 P.3d 855. Because the delay in this case was more than eight months, the Court of Appeals held it qualified as presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 859, 180 P.3d 855. ¶ 38 In analyzing the Barker factors, the Court of Appeals noted that (1) Iniguez was never the cause of any pretrial delay, (2) the delay due to the unavailability of the witness should be weighed against the State, (3) Iniguez consistently asserted his speedy trial rights by objecting to all delays, and (4) Iniguez was prejudiced by his pretrial incarceration which caused anxiety and concern and was exacerbated by the delay of his trial. Id. at 855-58, 180 P.3d 855. Further, with respect to the trial court's desire to try Iniguez in conjunction with his codefendant, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant's invocation of his speedy trial rights necessarily trumps the policy favoring joinder of trials. Id. at 856, 180 P.3d 855 (citing United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 828 (4th Cir.1998)). ¶ 39 We appreciate the Court of Appeals' attempt to work through the appropriate speedy trial analysis, particularly given the absence of guidance in our decisions since Barker and the confusion introduced by some United States Supreme Court decisions. However, we must disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion. As noted above, whether a delay is presumptively prejudicial is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry dependent on the circumstances of each case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Fladebo, 113 Wash.2d at 393, 779 P.2d 707 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182); Brewer, 73 Wash.2d at 62, 436 P.2d 473 (citing 5 ANDERSON, supra, § 1912 n. 2); Alter, 67 Wash.2d at 119, 406 P.2d 765 (citing Orcutt, 125 Wash. at 666, 216 P. 874). Once the delay is found to be presumptively prejudicial, this does not end the analysis but rather triggers the Barker inquiry. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686. ¶ 40 While the United States Supreme Court has consistently emphasized an individualized, fact-specific inquiry into whether a delay is presumptively prejudicial, some confusion was created by the Court's observation in a footnote in Doggett that [d]epending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay `presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year. Id. at 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Many lower courts have seized on this statement as evidence that one year is the cutoff point for a presumptively prejudicial pretrial delay. See, e.g., Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 828; United States v. Beamon, 992 F.2d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. Goodroad, 521 N.W.2d 433, 437 (S.D.1994). This focus on the length of delay as the dispositive factor suggests that no fact-specific contextual analysis was performed. ¶ 41 Indeed, Division Two of our Court of Appeals has taken this approach. In State v. Corrado, 94 Wash.App. 228, 231, 972 P.2d 515 (1999), the defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder and incarcerated for the entire 11-month pretrial delay. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found the 11-month delay presumptively prejudicial after noting that other courts have found delays between eight months and one year presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 233-34, 972 P.2d 515. There was no analysis of any other factors in the court's discussion. ¶ 42 The Court of Appeals below followed Division Two's reasoning. In finding the more than eight-month pretrial delay presumptively prejudicial, it cited Corrado and relied on the same general consensus that prejudice is presumed beginning between eight months and one year. Iniguez, 143 Wash.App. at 858-59, 180 P.3d 855. ¶ 43 This approach to the presumptively prejudicial analysis is out of step with the fact-specific nature of the Barker inquiry, which is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Therefore, we reject a formulaic presumption of prejudice upon the passing of a certain period of time. Of course, the passage of time is an important factor in this analysis. The length of delay is not, however, the only factor. The complexity of the charges and a reliance on eyewitness testimony are two other factors that also can be examined in this analysis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 & n. 31, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 44 Applying all of the relevant factors to Iniguez's case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the pretrial delay here was presumptively prejudicial. First, the length of delay was substantial and Iniguez spent all of it in custody. Second, Iniguez was not facing complex charges involving multiple actors, such as with conspiracy charges, which might necessitate greater pretrial delay. Rather, Iniguez and his codefendant were accused of first degree robbery. Lastly, the State's case rested in large part on eyewitness testimony from multiple people, underscoring the importance of avoiding delays that could result in witnesses becoming unavailable or their memories fading. In light of all these circumstances, the over eight-month delay was presumptively prejudicial. ¶ 45 Because we find the delay presumptively prejudicial, we next examine the nature of the delay, using the balancing test discussed in Barker, to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred. This involves a more searching examination of the circumstances, including the length of and reasons for delay, whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial rights, and prejudice to the defendant. [8] Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Fladebo, 113 Wash.2d at 393, 779 P.2d 707 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182). This is a determination to be made `in the light of the circumstances of each particular case,' Alter, 67 Wash.2d at 119, 406 P.2d 765 (quoting Orcutt, 125 Wash. at 666, 216 P. 874), which necessarily means that other considerations may also be relevant in a particular case. ¶ 46 The first factor in our inquiry is the length of delay. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686; Fladebo, 113 Wash.2d at 393, 779 P.2d 707. We do not consider this factor in the same way as in the presumptive prejudice analysis. Instead, what is important here is the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the inquiry. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686. While the passage of a specific period of time does not establish conclusively that a speedy trial violation occurred, the lapse of a lengthy period of time compels a court to give `an extremely careful appraisal of the circumstances.' Alter, 67 Wash.2d at 121, 406 P.2d 765 (quoting Fouts v. United States, 253 F.2d 215, 217 (6th Cir.1958)). In other words, the longer the pretrial delay, the closer a court should scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the delay. ¶ 47 Even though we agree that the pretrial delay here was presumptively prejudicial, it is just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry under these circumstances. While Iniguez spent the entire pretrial period in incarceration, eight-plus months is not necessarily an undue delay. As such, this factor weighs only slightly against the State. [9] ¶ 48 The second factor in the inquiry is the reason for delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Alter, 67 Wash.2d at 120, 406 P.2d 765. We look to each party's level of responsibility for the delay and assign different weights to the reasons for delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 49 Here, even though the State requested all of the continuances, there was no evidence of an intent on the part of the State to interfere with Iniguez's speedy trial rights. The State requested the first two delays with respect to Iniguez because the State had already agreed to the delay with his codefendant and wanted to try the cases together. One of the delays was due at least in part to the State's need to interview witnesses. The third delay was requested by McIntosh's attorney for scheduling reasons. The State requested the fourth delay because it discovered about a week prior to trial that a key witness had left the country and was unavailable for trial. While there is some question as to whether the State could have acted more diligently to ensure the witness's appearance at trial, the unavailability of a key witness is a valid reason for a continuance. Id. On balance, none of the continuances can be described as unreasonable, especially in light of the policy favoring joint trials, Dent, 123 Wash.2d at 484, 869 P.2d 392, and the juggling that trial courts must do to accommodate the schedules of multiple lawyers and multiple witnesses. [10] Thus, this factor should not weigh against the State. ¶ 50 The third factor, the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, favors Iniguez. As previously mentioned, we consider whether and to what extent a defendant demands a speedy trial. [11] Barker, 407 U.S. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. 2182. For example, the frequency and force of a defendant's objections should be taken into consideration, as well as the reasons why the defendant demands or does not demand a speedy trial. Id. at 529, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Additionally, we give strong evidentiary weight to a defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right. Id. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Here, Iniguez asserted his right at every continuance request. He objected, requested reduced bail, moved for a severance twice, and moved for a dismissal at least four times. Iniguez consistently asserted his speedy trial right, and thus, this factor weighs against the State. ¶ 51 The last factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice is judged by looking at the effect on the interests protected by the right to a speedy trial: (1) to prevent harsh pretrial incarceration, (2) to minimize the defendant's anxiety and worry, and (3) to limit impairment to the defense. Id. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Even though impairment to the defense by the passage of time is the most serious form of prejudice, no showing of actual impairment is required to demonstrate a constitutional speedy trial violation. Id. As noted above, this is difficult to prove, and as a result, we presume such prejudice to the defendant intensifies over time. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Where it is shown, however, there will be a stronger case for finding a speedy trial violation. Here, Iniguez relies on the presumption of prejudice and does not try to show how the delay impaired his defense. Certainly, longer delays have been allowed. For instance, the Barker Court did not consider a ten-month pretrial incarceration to be prejudicial, absent any actual impairment of the defense. 407 U.S. at 534, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 52 On balance, the totality of the circumstances here does not support finding a speedy trial violation of constitutional magnitude to justify the extreme remedy of dismissal of the charges with prejudice. As a result, we hold that there was no state or federal constitutional speedy trial violation. The trial court had good reasons for granting each of the continuances Iniguez challenged and acted within the constitutional limits in balancing the competing interests of trying the codefendants jointly, accommodating trial preparation and scheduling concerns, and securing the defendant's constitutional rights.