Opinion ID: 2603459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the utpa claim

Text: In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant partnership violated certain provisions of the UTPA. He attempts to plead his case within the only arguably relevant sections of ORS 646.608(1), which provide: A person engages in an unlawful practice when in the course of the person's business, vocation or occupation the person does any of the following:       (b) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of real estate, goods or services.       (g) Represents that real estate, goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that real estate or goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.       (k) Makes false or misleading representations concerning credit availability or the nature of the transaction or obligation incurred. Defendant contends not only that plaintiff failed to allege violations of these specific sections, but also that the UTPA does not cover Mead's acts because the UTPA covers only  `[r]eal estate, goods or services'    which are or may be obtained primarily for personal, family or household purposes.  ORS 646.605(7) (emphasis added). This court construed the scope of the UTPA's coverage in Searle v. Exley Express, Inc., 278 Or. 535, 564 P.2d 1054 (1977). In Searle, the plaintiff, who had purchased a truck tractor, alleged that the seller misrepresented the truck's condition. This court held that the UTPA did not cover the purchase. Justice O'Connell wrote: We will assume, as plaintiff asserts, that the truck was purchased as a family investment and to provide employment for plaintiff's son. In this sense the purchase could be deemed to have been made for `personal, family or household purposes.' But this looks solely at the subjective motivation of the purchaser, and as we have already stated, we do not regard the statute as having this broad sweep. If goods are customarily bought by a substantial number of purchasers for personal, family or household uses and were, in fact, bought by the plaintiff for his or someone else's use and not for resale, the statute applies. Certainly a truck designed for the business of hauling freight does not fall within that classification. The purchase of a truck to carry on a freight business may fulfill personal and family needs in a particular case but generally it would be purchased to carry on a business, and it is this customary or predominant purpose which is to be used in characterizing the transaction. Therefore, we hold that the purchase in the present case did not come within the statute. 278 Or. at 539-40, 564 P.2d 1054. Applying the rationale and test of Searle to the case at bar, we examine the customary or predominant purpose of the legal services obtained by plaintiff to determine whether the UTPA covers such services. Plaintiff presented no evidence concerning the nature of his investment or the customary or predominant use of such profits by persons who make such loans. We cannot say as a matter of law that loaning money at an interest rate at or above market rates, and obtaining legal advice concerning such loans, is generally and customarily for a personal, family or household purpose. The loan may have been for a personal or business purpose, but no evidence in the record of this case allow us to draw any conclusions on this issue. Because plaintiff failed to prove facts that would bring his claim within the UTPA, we hold that the UTPA did not apply to the transaction at issue here. The legal services plaintiff received concerned the investment of money and were not manifestly for personal use. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the UTPA does not cover the transaction at issue. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.