Opinion ID: 879381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Golden Eagle and Security Bank? On May 13, 1980, Golden Eagle moved for summary judgment on Payne's complaint. Payne failed to respond with brief or affidavit by November 9, 1980, and the District Court granted Golden Eagle's motion. Affidavits placed on record by Golden Eagle imposed upon Payne the duty of raising a genuine issue of material fact. Kronen v. Richter (Mont. 1984), 683 P.2d 1315, 1317, 41 St.Rep. 1312, 1315. We have consistently held that when the moving party adequately supports a motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the opposing party to present the court with evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. National Gypsum Co. v. Johnson (1979), 182 Mont. 209, 212, 595 P.2d 1188, 1189; Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(e), M.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent part: ... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. [Emphasis added.] Clearly Payne failed to come forward with a material issue of fact. Earlier we held that when a party moves for summary judgment and the opposing party fails to respond, summary judgment is proper. [A] party who ignores the judicial system and slumbers on his rights, does so at his own peril. Bedford v. Jordan (Mont. 1985), 698 P.2d 854, 856, 42 St.Rep. 589, 592. On November 11, 1980, nearly a month after summary judgment was granted, Payne filed a responsive brief. Payne contends that affidavits in opposition were unavailable. Therefore, Payne argues the court erred when it failed to grant a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f), M.R.Civ.P. A review of the record does not support Payne's argument. Payne could have, but failed to, file (1) a responsive brief, (2) an attorney affidavit or (3) affidavits pursuant to Rule 30(e), M.R.Civ.P. Further, the record clearly indicates that Payne's commission was contingent on the failed November 1, 1977, payment and that Payne voluntarily subordinated his right to a commission. The District Court properly awarded summary judgment against Payne.