Opinion ID: 2217474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Felony Murder Charge

Text: Defendant was charged with murder committed during the commission of the felony of child abuse. Defendant argues that the information failed to charge an offense of felony murder because the underlying felony, child abuse, merged into the homicide, rendering the felony murder doctrine inapplicable. The felony murder rule arose as a doctrine of the common law. The rule was applied without regard to the dangerous nature of the felony involved or the likelihood that death might result from the felonious activity. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 71 (1972). At the time the felony murder rule was originally established, all felonies were punishable by death. As the death penalty was eliminated for all but the most serious crimes, primarily murder, the felony murder rule was subjected to closer scrutiny. 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 147 (14th ed. 1979). In England the courts came to limit the felony-murder doctrine in one of two ways: (1) by requiring that the defendant's conduct in committing the felony involve an act of violence in carrying out a felony of violence, or (2) by requiring that the death be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's conduct in committing the felony. LaFave & Scott, supra, § 71 at 546 (footnotes omitted). Although the felony murder doctrine was abolished in England in 1957, LaFave & Scott, supra, § 71 at 560, the rule still remains in force in the United States, though various limitations have been imposed upon it. These include: permitting only certain types of felonies to trigger the rule; strict interpretation of proximate or legal cause requirements; narrow construction of the time period in which a homicide may be found to be contemporaneous with the underlying felony; and requiring that the underlying felony be independent of the homicide. LaFave & Scott, supra, § 71; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law, supra, § 147. Two principal rationales have been advanced for the continued application of the felony murder rule. Most courts have applied the rule for reasons of deterrence, the purpose being to deter ... those crimes of a particularly heinous and brutal nature as well as those felonies necessarily involving great risk of death or serious bodily injury to the victim. Williams v. State, 542 P.2d 554, 586 (Okl.Cr.App. 1975). Thus, [t]he purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit. People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 445, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (1965). Comment, Merger and the California Felony-Murder Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 250, 258 (1972). The second rationale underlying the felony murder rule is the transferred or constructive intent theory. According to this approach, the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation or malice.... By proof of the perpetration of a separate felony, general malicious intent is transferred from that crime to the homicide, thus elevating the homicide to the crime of murder. 13 Gonz.L.Rev. 268, 271 (1977). [The] underlying general felonious intent having been established, it is thus felt unnecessary to prove a specific mental state as to the homicide itself. Once it is established that a defendant has the requisite intent sufficient to establish guilt as to the underlying felony, the felony-murder rule then operates as a conclusive presumption that the defendant possessed the intent necessary for murder. State v. Thompson, 88 Wash.2d 13, 558 P.2d 202, 207 (1977) (Utter, J., dissenting). See also State v. Clark, 204 Kan. 38, 460 P.2d 586 (1969). In order to mitigate the harshness imposed in certain instances by the application of the felony murder rule, the doctrine of merger developed. The merger doctrine operates to bar application of the felony-murder rule whenever the underlying felony `directly results in or is an integral element of the homicide.' Conversely, to support a felony-murder conviction, the elements of the underlying felony must be independent from those of the homicide so that the felony is not a constituent part of the homicide .... Comment, The Merger Doctrine as a Limitation on the Felony-Murder Rule: A Balance of Criminal Law Principles, 13 Wake Forest L. Rev. 369, 377 (1977) (footnotes omitted). As stated by Chief Judge Cardozo: To make the quality of the intent indifferent, it is not enough to show that the homicide was felonious .... The felony that eliminates the quality of the intent must be one that is independent of the homicide .... People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927). Thus, a second degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (1969) (footnote omitted). The courts are divided on the adoption of the merger doctrine. Among those jurisdictions following the merger rule are: Arizona ( State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228, 403 P.2d 540 (1965)); California ( People v. Ireland, supra); Kansas ( State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226, 243 P. 291 (1926)); Missouri ( State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552 (1878)); New York ( People v. Moran, supra); Oklahoma ( Tarter v. State, 359 P.2d 596 (Okl.Cr.App. 1961)); and Oregon ( State v. Branch, 244 Or. 97, 415 P.2d 766 (1966)). States that have declined to adopt the merger doctrine include: Florida ( Robles v. State, 188 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1966)); Georgia ( Baker v. State, 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976)); Illinois ( People v. Viser, 62 Ill.2d 568, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975)); Texas ( Hilliard v. State, 513 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974)); and Washington (See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1341 (1971); State v. Harris, 69 Wash.2d 928, 421 P.2d 662 (1966)). The decision to adopt or reject the merger doctrine in a particular jurisdiction has resulted largely from an analysis of that jurisdiction's statutes. See People v. Viser, supra; State v. Clark, supra. Several courts adopted the rule in order to avoid the result that all homicides not justified or excused would become first-degree murder under their statutes. State v. Fisher, supra; People v. Moran, supra; Note, The Doctrine of Merger in Felony-Murder and Misdemeanor-Manslaughter, 35 St. John's L. Rev. 109 (1960-61). Courts that have declined to adopt the merger doctrine have tended to do so on the basis that it was not required by their particular statutory provisions. See People v. Viser, supra; State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash.2d 301, 588 P.2d 1320 (1978). Furthermore, the merger rule has been most frequently adopted where the underlying felony was one of assault. See State v. Essman, supra; People v. Ireland, supra; People v. Moran, supra; and State v. Branch, supra. Additionally, not all instances of assault will trigger merger. [The] inquiry cannot stop with the fact that death resulted from the use of a deadly weapon and, therefore, technically included an assault with a deadly weapon, but must extend to an investigation of the purpose of the conduct. People v. Burton, 6 Cal.3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 801 (1971). See Comment, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev., supra, at 270-71. At the time of the incident involved in this action, SDCL 22-16-9 provided: Homicide is murder when perpetrated without any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony. [1] Child abuse was at that time and still is a Class 6 felony. [2] Defendant argues that his actions, although admittedly falling within the provisions of the child abuse statute, also constituted an assault that, as an integral part of the resulting homicide, defeats application of the felony murder statute. Defendant cites Massie v. State, 553 P.2d 186 (Okl.Cr. App. 1976), holding that the felony of child beating merges with a resultant homicide. As we have noted, however, Oklahoma is among those jurisdictions that have adopted the merger doctrine. We decline to hold that the merger doctrine should be applied to the facts of this case. Rather, we find ourselves in agreement with what was said by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Viser, supra: Our Criminal Code does not establish degrees of murder. And we are not concerned with whether the General Assembly, in establishing the offense of felony murder, intended to deter the criminal from the commission of rape, or robbery, or burglary, but not to deter him from the violent assault that accompanies each of those offenses. That kind of fragmentation of legislative purpose cannot survive the forthright characterization of aggravated battery as one of the forcible felonies that will trigger a charge of felony murder. What was intended was to deter the commission of any of the enumerated forcible felonies, including aggravated battery, by holding the perpetrator responsible for murder if death results. 343 N.E.2d at 909. So also, our legislature has not established degrees of murder. Likewise, we do not presume to say that our legislature did not intend the felony of child abuse to be included within the reach of the deterrent effect of the felony murder statute that was in effect at the time the offense in question was committed. It may very well be that the sweep of that statute was, as a matter of legislative policy, too broad, as the recent amendments to the relevant statutes may indicate. Nevertheless, for us to impose a retroactive judicial limitation when there is no need to do so in order to prevent the nullification of other provisions of our homicide statutes would represent an exercise of judicial oversight that would have no warrant. See State v. Wanrow, supra; State v. Thompson, supra. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in overruling defendant's demurrer to the information.