Opinion ID: 3011186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: AEDPA's New Substantive Standards

Text: We now consider whether applying AEDPA's new substantive gatekeeping standards would have an impermissible retroactive effect if applied in Minarik's case. At all times here relevant, the unsuccessful prosecution of a S 2254 proceeding has had an adverse impact on the petitioner's right to prosecute a second or successive S 2254 proceeding. When Minarik filed his first federal habeas petition, the existing law provided that he could thereafter prosecute another such petition only if he could (1) show cause for, and prejudice from, the omission of his new claim or claims from his earlier petition (i.e., that his proceeding would not constitute an abuse of the writ), or (2) demonstrate actual innocence. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244; McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). AEDPA's passage significantly altered the showing that Minarik was required to make in order to proceed on new claims in a second petition. Section 2244(b), as amended by AEDPA, provides in relevant part: (1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. (2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless-- 13 (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could n ot have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(2). These substantive gatekeeping provisions were intended to reduce the universe of cases in which a habeas petition may go forward on a second or successive petition. In those cases where a prisoner in state custody had a right to prosecute a second or successive petition prior to AEDPA's passage, but would be deprived of that right by these new gatekeeping provisions, we conclude that applying the AEDPA standard would have a genuine retroactive effect because it would attach a new and adverse consequence to pre-AEDPA conduct -- the prosecution of the original proceeding. By its terms, S 2244(b) requires that a claim not meeting its articulated standards shall be dismissed thus extinguishing any right the petitioner may have to relief. Its effect is not unlike that of AEDPA's statute of limitations which we recently declined to apply retroactively in Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). On September 21, 1995, when Burns exhausted all of his state rights of direct appeal and collateral review, there was no statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. AEDPA, however, established a one year statute of limitations which, by its terms, begins to run as soon as the petitioner's rights of direct review have been exhausted or expired. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d). If applicable, AEDPA's limitations period would require Burns to file his petition on or before September 22, 1996. Burns, 14 however, filed his petition on April 22, 1997. Because Burns had a right to proceed on his habeas claim prior to AEDPA's enactment, and because AEDPA's statute of limitations, if applied to his case, would extinguish his claim, we held that such an application would impermissibly attach new legal consequences to events completed before the statute's enactment. Burns , 134 F.3d at 111. We see no meaningful distinction between that case and Minarik's, assuming that Minarik had a right to proceed on his claim prior to AEDPA. AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions when applied to cases in which there was a right to proceed under preexisting law also operate much like the RICO amendment we considered in Mathews, 161 F.3d at 163. Prior to the RICO amendment, securities fraud could serve as a predicate offense under RICO, thereby entitling a plaintiff to treble damages. The RICO amendment altered the text of the statute conferring federal jurisdiction over RICO claims to exclude jurisdiction over RICO claims predicated onany conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities. Id. We pointed out that, while phrased in jurisdictional terms, the amendment's practical effect was to alter substantive rights because prior to the passage of the Act, the [plaintiff] had a RICO cause of action based upon defendants' alleged actions, but afterward he would not. Id. Similarly, if a habeas petitioner had a right to initiate federal proceedings to secure release from confinement prior to AEDPA, and had no such rights thereafter, then AEDPA has altered substantive rights and thereby attached new legal consequences to pre-enactment conduct.5 We find additional support for our conclusion in cases from two other circuits. See Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161; In re Green, 1998 144 F.3d 384; In re Sonshine, 132 F.3d 1133 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922. These Courts have encountered a similar retroactivity issue in cases _________________________________________________________________ 5. In Mathews, we distinguished Salazar-Haro v. I.N.S., 95 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), as falling on the other side of thesubstantive/jurisdictional dichotomy. 161 F.3d at 163. We view this case as falling on the same side of that dichotomy as Mathews and Burns. 15 where petitioners challenged application of AEDPA's new gatekeeping standards governing second or successive S 2255 motions. In these cases, the petitioners filed their first S 2255 motions before, and their second motions after, AEDPA's effective date. These Courts have concluded that the AEDPA standard would have an impermissible retroactive effect if applied where the petitioner would have been allowed to file his second S 2255 motion under the pre-AEDPA standard, but would be precluded from doing so under the AEDPA standard. See Ortiz, 136 F.3d at 166 ([T]he new standards and procedures under AEDPA for filing S 2255 motions could only be improperly retroactive as applied to [the petitioner] if he would have met the former cause-and-prejudice standard under McCleskey and previously would have been allowed to file a second motion, but could not file a second motion under AEDPA.); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d at 930 (When [the movant] filed his initial S 2255 motion, the law would have allowed him to raise a Bailey claim in a second motion . . . Under AEDPA, however, he may not. Applying the new statute would thus attach a severe new legal consequence to his filing a first motion . . . Because Congress has not expressed an intent that the new Act have such a retroactive effect, we could not apply AEDPA in this way.); Sonshine, 132 F.3d at 1134 (noting that retroactive effect exists only where the difference matters between pre- and post-AEDPA standards). Conversely, where the two standards lead to the same outcome, these courts have concluded that there is no genuine retroactive effect and the AEDPA standard may be applied. See Sonshine, 132 F.3d at 1135 ([Petitioner's claim] would be barred under both AEDPA and the old abuse-of-writ standard. [Petitioner] would not have prevailed under pre-AEDPA law, as his petition would have been denied as an abuse of writ. AEDPA's restrictions thus do not attach new legal consequences for [petitioner], and AEDPA has no impermissible retroactive effect on this case.); Ortiz, 136 F.3d at 167 (applying AEDPA's new standard to deny the petitioner's second S 2255 motion carried no impermissible retroactive effect because petitioner failed to meet the requirements of the former `abuse of writ' standard of McCleskey, and the new AEDPA standards.); see also In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d at 932 16 (Where the old and the new law lead to an identical result, there is no need to conduct a retroactivity analysis because the new law has not attached any new consequences to preenactment conduct or upset settled expectations.); United States v. Enigwe, 1998 WL 150974 (E.D.Pa. March 30, 1998) (applying AEDPA standards where firstS 2255 motion was filed before AEDPA was not impermissibly retroactive because there was no difference in outcome between pre- and post-AEDPA law). We agree. We conclude therefore that if Minarik can show that he would have been entitled to pursue his second petition under pre-AEDPA law, then the Landgraf default rule prohibits applying AEDPA's new substantive gatekeeping provisions to bar his claims. In the absence of such a showing, however, applying those standards to Minarik results in no genuine retroactive effect, and the AEDPA standard must be applied under the Supreme Court's holding in Lindh that AEDPA's habeas corpus amendments apply generally to cases filed after its effective date. 1. The Pre-AEDPA Law And Minarik's Second Petition We first consider whether Minarik's second application is barred under the pre-AEDPA standard. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it is. Minarik filed his first federal habeas petition on December 23, 1981, ten years after pleading guilty to his fiancee's murder. His first petition raised two claims: (1) the due process clause was violated because hi s guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered because (a) his counsel did not explain to him the mental state which the State would be required to prove and, (b) he had no recollection of the events surr ounding the crime, and (2) the equal protection and due pr ocess clauses were violated when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania failed to apply Commonwealth v. Minor, 365 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1976), in his case. In November of 1982, the District Court held a lengthy evidentiary hearing concerning the circumstances surrounding Minarik's guilty plea. Minarik called two expert witnesses to testify about the effects of alcohol and Triavil, 17 a drug prescribed for Minarik several months before the murder. While neither knew when Minarik last took Triavil before the crime or how much alcohol he had consumed, each expressed the opinion, inter alia, that he was amnesiac following his arrest. Minarik testified that he had no memory of the events of the crime, that his attorney had failed to advise him regarding the intent that would have to be proved and that counsel, rather than Minarik, made the decision to plead guilty. The respondent called Minarik's trial counsel, Ralph J. Cappy, in rebuttal. He confirmed that Minarik's memory on the night of the murder lapsed when he was in the bushes outside the house. Counsel also testified that he reviewed every element of the offense charged and possible defenses with Minarik, and explained that Minarik had insisted on pleading guilty against counsel's advice. Counsel summed up the situation as follows: Q. Did you make a recommendation yourself as to whether or not there should be a guilty plea or you should go to trial? A. I know that was one point of disagreement that he and I always had. I was always -- my recollection is that I wanted to try this case. There were a number of reasons why I wanted to try it. I didn't believe in my heart that a jury would send a 21-year-old man, with his education, lack of prior record, to the electric chair. We had somewhat of an equitable defense, in the sense that this was a homicide resulting from a lover's situation, with a very distraught defendant; we had alcohol involved; we had a potential for drugs and alcohol involved; we had a potential, as I recall the Behavior Clinic describing him as having had a personality disorder. None of these things by themselves rose to the level of the legitimate defense, but it was my opinion, taken together with his age, his family, it was a very good family, hard working good people, that our equitable defense, in my mind, would have -- I mean, there's always a chance involved, but in my mind I didn't believe I would lose the case to the 18 death penalty, therefore the worse I could do was life, therefore, why not take a chance and see if you could get a second or voluntary. Voluntary was probably the most realistic from analyzing it from a legal standpoint. Quite frankly, John refused all through this. If my memory serves me correctly, he never wanted to go to trial. He steadfastly maintained that he was pleading guilty, period; he was going to take his punishment. App. III at 526-527a. Counsel further testified that he had talked with Minarik's family doctor who had prescribed Triavil for the depression Minarik experienced after the breakup with his fiancee. He engaged the services of Dr. Stanger, a psychiatrist, to secure an opinion regarding a possible insanity defense, and he reviewed reports supplied by the state from the Behavioral Clinic on Minarik's mental state. In connection with the possibility of an intoxication defense, counsel and the Chief Investigator of the Public Defender's Office interviewed everyone they couldfind who was present at the party Minarik attended earlier on the evening of the crime. They discovered two witnesses who were prepared to testify that Minarik had announced his intended purpose prior to actually going to commit this act. Id. at 535a. When asked whether he had investigated and considered an intoxication defense and an involuntary intoxication defense, counsel gave the following testimony: A. My investigation, as I recall it, did reveal th e fact that at some time during the evening, earlier in the evening, John had become intoxicated and had placed himself on a couch and dozed off, or rested for a period of time. Subsequent to that time he either awoke or got up and seemed to be, to the witnesses who had talked with him, coherent, not intoxicated, and to one of those witnesses he had offered a ring, an engagement ring, that apparently had been the victim's ring, as I recall, and had told the witness, I'll not need this ring after tonight, or I'll no longer need this ring, and told this witness that he was going to, in essence, kill Rosemary. 19 Q. Did you investigate the possibility of defendin g against these charges on an involuntary intoxication theory? A. John had told me that he was taking a medicatio n -- I had a discussion or discussions with the family doctor --