Opinion ID: 852197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Fault Allocation Remedy

Text: The jury in this case determined the relative fault of the parties and the nonparty, assigning the following fault percentages: 33% to the decedent, 31% to Ford, 31% to nonparty Goodyear, and 5% to TRW. But now, with our decision to vacate the 5% fault assigned to TRW and the 31% assigned to Goodyear, the jury's remaining fault allocations account for only 64% of the total fault contributing to cause the plaintiffs damages, leaving 36% not allocated. The appropriate appellate remedy is not dictated by existing statutory provisions or case law precedent. And as noted above, Indiana Appellate Rule 66 provides us with a broad range of options. In seeking to fashion a remedy on appeal that is consistent with the provisions of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, which governs proceedings at trial, we find inconsistent and opposing guidance. One provision declares, In an action based on fault that is brought against two (2) or more defendants, the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant's contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages. Ind.Code § 34-51-2-6(b). If we were to ignore the unallocated fault resulting from our decision today and literally apply only this provision, it would appear to require a final judgment in favor of the defendant Ford, whose 31% fault allocation was exceeded by the 33% allocated to the plaintiff's decedent. On the other hand, the Act also limits an allocation of less than 100% of the fault: The percentage of fault of parties to the action may total less than one hundred percent (100%) if the jury finds that fault contributing to cause the claimant's loss has also come from a nonparty or nonparties. Ind.Code § 34-51-2-8(b)(1). Because we have determined that fault should not have been allocated to TRW and Goodyear, the remaining jury fault allocations to the remaining parties, Ford and the plaintiff's decedent, fail to meet the condition to allocate less than 100% of the fault. In addition, for a jury to return a defendant's verdict, the Act requires that the percentage of fault of the claimant is greater than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault involved in the incident which caused the claimant's death, injury, or property damage. Ind.Code § 34-51-2-8(b)(2). This jury allocated only 33% fault to the plaintiff's decedent, and thus a defendant's verdict is inappropriate. Comment h to section seven of the Restatement Third, Torts: Apportionment of Liability considers the [j]udicial reallocation of responsibility when an assignment of responsibility is legally erroneous, and suggests that [o]ne remedy is for the court to reallocate the nonliable person's share of comparative responsibility proportionately to the remaining persons, noting the resulting advantage of avoiding a new trial. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 7, cmt. h (2000). But it then adds, Nevertheless, interests of justice may sometimes require a new trial. Id. In the present case, the jury was instructed that the percentages of fault they determine for the plaintiffs decedent, Ford, TRW, and nonparty Goodyear must total 100 percent. Tr. at 2946-47. By its verdict, the jury found that the comparative fault of the plaintiff's decedent was only 33% of the total fault contributing to cause the plaintiffs damages. The allocation of an aggregate 5% fault to TRW presumably reflects the jury's belief that such percentage related to the defective seatbelt assembly it supplied to Ford for inclusion in the completed vehicle. While reasonable to predict that, without TRW as a party, the jury would have assigned that 5% to Ford as manufacturer of the finished product, we decline to engage in such speculation as a basis to reallocate the jury's fault attribution on appeal. Even more uncertain is how the jury would have reassigned the fault it erroneously imposed on Goodyear. The Florida Supreme Court has observed: Since liability is inextricably bound up with the apportionment of damages under the doctrine of comparative negligence, this matter must be left to the jury. When the percentages of liability are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court must treat this defect as an error in the finding of liability itself. The only remedy is to order a new trial on all issues affected by the error. Rowlands v. Signal Constr. Co., 549 So.2d 1380, 1383 (Fla.1989) (footnote omitted). We conclude that the interests of justice require a new trial to allocate fault, and we remand for a new trial on the issues of comparative fault and its allocation between Ford and the plaintiff's decedent. If the fault of the plaintiff's decedent does not exceed that of Ford, the resulting fault allocations shall be applied to the total damages determined in this case in accordance with the principles specified in Indiana Code § 34-51-2-7(b)(4).