Opinion ID: 166171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Text: 6 We review de novo a district court's dismissal of an inmate's suit for failure to exhaust his or her administrative remedies. Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir.2002). 3 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) states that [n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). As we explained in Jernigan, [e]ven where the `available' remedies would appear to be futile at providing the kind of remedy sought, the prisoner must exhaust the administrative remedies available. 304 F.3d at 1032 (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001)). Moreover, we have held that the PLRA contains a total exhaustion requirement, and ... the presence of unexhausted claims in [prisoner]'s complaint require[s][a] district court to dismiss his [or her] action in its entirety without prejudice. Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (When multiple prison condition claims have been joined ... § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims.). 7 To exhaust his or her administrative remedies, an inmate in a federal prison must complete a four-step process before filing suit. This process is laid out in the Code of Federal Regulations, as well as a parallel Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Program Statement. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 542 (2004); BOP Program Statement 1330.13 (2002). First, an inmate usually must attempt to informally resolve his or her concerns with prison staff. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13. If this attempt fails, an inmate must submit a formal written Administrative Remedy Request within twenty days of the date on which the basis for the Request occurred. Id. § 542.14(a). If the Request does not provide satisfactory relief, an inmate must appeal the resolution of his or her Request to the appropriate BOP Regional Director within twenty days. Id. § 542.15(a). Finally, if an inmate disagrees with the Regional Director's decision, the inmate must appeal the decision to the BOP's General Counsel within thirty days. Id. § 542.15(a). 8 We have held that if an inmate does not comply with the time limits laid out in 28 C.F.R. § 542, he or she has not properly exhausted his or her administrative remedies. As we noted in Ross, 9 the PLRA ... contains a procedural default concept within its exhaustion requirement. A prison procedure that is procedurally barred and thus is unavailable to a prisoner is not thereby considered exhausted. Regardless of whether a prisoner goes through the formality of submitting a time-barred grievance, he may not successfully argue that he has exhausted his administrative remedies by, in essence, failing to employ them. 10 365 F.3d at 1186 (citations, quotations omitted). 11 In this case, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his alleged exposure to secondhand smoke because he did not submit a written Administrative Remedy Request within twenty days of the date on which the basis for the Request occurred, as required by 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). 4 Plaintiff first filed such a Request regarding his alleged exposure to cigarette smoke on September 4, 2001. This Request was necessarily filed more than twenty days after the date on which the basis for the Request arose because Plaintiff was not incarcerated at FCI El Reno after December 6, 2000 — approximately nine months before Plaintiff filed his Request. 5 12 Plaintiff argues that his late filing of a Request should be excused because BOP policy establishes that the twenty-day filing deadline is flexible. The BOP does encourage Remedy Coordinators to be flexible in deciding whether to reject a Request that is filed late. See BOP Program Statement 1330.13(11)(b)(3). 6 However, while flexibility in accepting belated filings is encouraged, such flexibility is not required. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.17 (The Coordinator at any level may reject and return to the inmate without response a Request ... that . . . does not meet any other requirement of this part.); see also BOP Program Statement 1330.13(11)(a) (same); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.2002) (To exhaust administrative remedies, a person must follow the rules governing filing and prosecution of a claim.... [T]hese include time limits.). Thus Plaintiff's belated filing must not be excused on the grounds that the twenty-day filing deadline is flexible. 13 Nor must Plaintiff's belated filing be excused based on the circumstances that he asserts necessitated the late filing. The period in which an inmate may file a Request may be extended 14 [w]here the inmate demonstrates a valid reason for delay. . . . In general, valid reason for delay means a situation which prevented the inmate from submitting the request within the established time frame. Valid reasons for delay include the following: an extended period in-transit during which the inmate was separated from documents needed to prepare the Request ...; an extended period of time during which the inmate was physically incapable of preparing a Request. . .; an unusually long period taken for informal resolution attempts; [or an] indication by an inmate, verified by staff, that a response to the inmate's request for copies of dispositions ... was delayed. 15 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b). 16 In this case, Plaintiff explains that he did not file his Request earlier because he was earnestly attempting to resolve his concerns informally and did not want to rock the boat. However, 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b) vests the discretion to grant an extension in filing time with officials within the Bureau of Prisons, not an individual inmate. An inmate cannot unilaterally extend the twenty-day time limit for making a formal filing based on a desire to resolve his or her claims informally. In this case, no official within the Bureau of Prisons granted Plaintiff an extension. Plaintiff's own decision to rely on informal methods to resolve his concerns is not sufficient to extend the deadline for filing a formal Request. Moreover, we see no basis in the record that suggests that the Bureau of Prisons should have granted Plaintiff an extension. Plaintiff cannot explain how he was attempting to resolve his concerns informally with the staff at FCI El Reno— much less explain why those informal resolution attempts took an unusually long period, id. —when he had been transferred from FCI El Reno more than nine months previously and presumably had had no contact with the staff at FCI El Reno after his transfer. Thus, Plaintiff's contention that his delay in filing a Request was justified is without merit. 17 Finally, Plaintiff's belated filing cannot be excused on the grounds that the filing was considered on the merits despite its lateness. In Ross, we stated that [i]f a prison accepts a belated filing, and considers it on the merits, that step makes the filing proper for purposes of state law and avoids exhaustion, default, and timeliness hurdles in federal court. 365 F.3d at 1186. Plaintiff argues that his late filing of a Request regarding his alleged exposure to cigarette smoke should be excused under Ross because that filing was considered on the merits. Because the record reveals that the portion of Plaintiff's Request regarding his alleged exposure to cigarette smoke at FCI El Reno was never considered on the merits, Plaintiff's argument is without merit. 18 Plaintiff submitted his Request while incarcerated at FCI Bastrop in Texas. In the response to Plaintiff's Request, the Warden at FCI Bastrop made no mention of FCI El Reno, only addressing Plaintiff's Request as it related to FCI Bastrop. Likewise, the Regional Director did not mention FCI El Reno in his response to Plaintiff's appeal of the Warden's determination. Finally, the response to Plaintiff's appeal to the Office of General Counsel states that the Warden and the Regional Director adequately responded to the issues [Plaintiff] raised in [his] appeal. The response does go on to paraphrase the general policy of FCI El Reno regarding the incarceration of smokers and non-smokers, stating: 19 At FCI El Reno, inmates are allowed to smoke inside their assigned cells only, with the cell door closed, on a designated smoking range. Staff at FCI El Reno ... assign smokers and non-smokers to cells accordingly upon arrival to the unit. The sharing of a cell or living area between a smoker and a non-smoker will be avoided except when institution needs require housing of a smoking and non-smoking inmate in the same cell.... [I]nmates who are found to be in violation of smoking in non-smoking areas are subject to disciplinary action. Institution staff are making a reasonable effort to enforce the non-smoking policy. 20 However, this explication of FCI El Reno's general policies does not amount to addressing the merits of Plaintiff's claim regarding FCI El Reno. For example, the response did not explore whether (1) Plaintiff was housed in a smoking unit at FCI El Reno; (2) Plaintiff was housed in a cell with a chain smoker; (3) institution needs required housing Plaintiff in a smoking unit and/or in a cell with a chain smoker; (4) Plaintiff was exposed to secondhand smoke; or (5) Plaintiff suffered actual harms as a result of this exposure. Thus, it is clear that neither the Warden, nor the Regional Director, nor the Office of General Counsel accept[ed] a belated filing, and consider[ed] it on the merits, thereby mak[ing] the filing proper ... and avoid[ing] exhaustion, default, and timeliness hurdles in federal court. Ross, 365 F.3d at 1186.