Opinion ID: 2575837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unit of Prosecution Claim

Text: {32} Defendant was convicted of five counts of tampering with evidence, one each for hiding the knife, glass, hammer, car, and clothing. He argues that his disposal of these items consisted of a continuous course of conduct with a single mens rea and constitute a single crime. In unit of prosecution cases, where a defendant is charged with multiple violations of a single statute, we inquire whether the [L]egislature intended punishment for the entire course of conduct or for each discrete act. Id. at 8, 810 P.2d at 1228. If a statute clearly creates separate offenses, we follow the statute. State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 40, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699. In construing the statute we consider the text and its apparent purpose. Id. ¶¶ 40-42. We also consider whether the offenses are separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness as an indication of legislative intent. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233. Finally, if we have not found a clear indication of legislative intent, we apply the rule of lenity, a presumption against imposing multiple punishments for acts that are not sufficiently distinct. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 40, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699. {33} Defendant argues that the statute forbids tampering with any physical evidence, rather than each piece of evidence and reasons that the use of the word any suggests punishment for the entire course of conduct rather than each act of tampering. The State suggests first that this analysis is inconsistent with State v. Morro, 1999-NMCA-118, ¶ 1, 127 N.M. 763, 987 P.2d 420 (upholding multiple convictions for damaging gravestones even though all damage occurred in a single incident). The relevant statute in that case also prohibited defacing of any gravestone, id. ¶ 13, but the court did not find that this established the Legislature's intent to punish defacing multiple gravestones as a single crime. We believe Morro is distinguishable in at least two respects. There were different victims for each act of vandalism to a different gravestone, id. ¶ 19, and the court in Morro concluded that each act of vandalism took place at a distinct time and place, each time the defendant smashed or defaced a particular gravestone. Id. ¶ 20. Nonetheless, we are not persuaded that the statute's use of the word any shows the Legislature's intent to permit only a single conviction for all tampering with a single crime scene. {34} The State argues that the underlying purpose of the tampering statute is to punish those who deprive the State of evidence needed in investigating possible crimes. Because the harm associated with tampering increases with each piece of evidence removed, we are asked to conclude the Legislature intended to punish each act of tampering, rather than the course of conduct. This argument proves too much. First, the statute, prior to the 2003 amendment, made no distinction based on the severity of the underlying crime, suggesting that the Legislature was not focused on the severity of the harm caused by tampering. Compare § 30-22-5 (1963, prior to 2003 amendment) (providing that [w]hoever commits tampering with evidence is guilty of a fourth degree felony), with NMSA 1978, § 30-22-5 (2003) (providing for different degrees of the offense of tampering). Second, given the ambiguity in the term evidence, the State's interpretation could open the door to a virtually unlimited number of tampering prosecutions in any given case. Defendant in this case, for example, could have been charged with separate tampering counts for each article of clothing he concealed: shoes, shirt and pants. We believe the Legislature intended a more moderate result, consistent with our unitary conduct analysis. We consider whether a defendant's actions can be divided into discrete acts, and permit only a single conviction where they cannot. In the absence of clear evidence that the Legislature intended to punish a defendant for every individual piece of evidence hidden, we apply the rule of lenity and presume that the Legislature did not intend to impose multiple punishments on a single action. {35} Because we conclude that the statute does not clearly define the unit of prosecution, we consider whether Defendant's acts are separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233. Such indicia include the timing, location, and sequencing of the acts, the existence of an intervening event, the defendant's intent as evidenced by his conduct and utterances, and the number of victims. Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357, 361, 805 P.2d 624, 628 (1991). {36} Defendant's conduct appears to be three distinct acts rather than a single continuous action. All of the evidence was gathered from the crime scene in a relatively short span of time, but was disposed of at three distinct times in different locations. The State argues that each act of removing material from the crime scene should be viewed as a separate act of tampering. At the time of the alleged tampering, the tampering statute prohibited destroying, changing, hiding, placing or fabricating any physical evidence and did not differentiate among the degrees of offenses with which the tampering had occurred. Section 30-22-5. The jury was instructed to return guilty verdicts if it found that Defendant hid evidence. They were not instructed to consider specifically whether Defendant changed or removed evidence. The relevant actions are, therefore, throwing the knife, hammer, and crystal or glass from the car, abandoning the car, and placing the clothing in the van. {37} Defendant hid evidence at three different times: throwing the box containing the knife, glass, and hammer from the car; leaving the car on the side of the road on his return trip; and hiding his clothing in his van the next morning after he returned to his house. These actions each took place in a different location. These were three distinct acts, supporting three convictions for tampering with evidence. {38} Defendant has made a strong argument that the disposal of the knife, glass, and hammer was a single action. Not only were the three items gathered in a short period of time, but they were also thrown together, in a single box, on the side of the road. No events intervened as he hid each weapon. There is no indication that Defendant's intentions were different with respect to each weapon. To the extent that the crime had identifiable victims, they were the same with respect to each weapon. In the present case, the same interest was harmed when the knife, glass, and hammer were hidden, and we have already found that these items were hidden at the same time and in the same location. {39} We therefore dismiss two of the tampering counts because Defendant's disposal of the weapons constituted a single act and can support only a single tampering conviction.