Opinion ID: 2075762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District of Columbia Caselaw on Constitutional Challenges to Adoptions and Other Terminations of Parental Rights

Text: In three pre- Lehr adoption cases, this court, applying the statutory best interests standard, affirmed, against a due process, not a statutory, challenge, the termination of an objecting parent's parental rights in favor of an adopting family without a finding of parental unfitness. In re P.G., 452 A.2d 1183 (D.C.1982); In re J.O.L., 409 A.2d 1073 (D.C.1979), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 989, 101 S.Ct. 523, 66 L.Ed.2d 286 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832, 102 S.Ct. 131, 70 L.Ed.2d 110 (1981); Matter of Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C.1977). We concluded in J.S.R. that the best interests standard requires the judge first to apply a variety of factors, such as those set forth in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402, [37] see J.S.R., 374 A.2d at 863 n. 11; but see D.R.M., 570 A.2d at 804-05 (suggesting that § 16-2353 termination criteria are relevant and applicable), and then to select the least detrimental of the available alternatives for custody. Id. at 863; see P.G., 452 A.2d at 1184. We did not employ a custodial preference for a fit natural parent. In the most recent of these cases, P.G., we noted that appellant, the child's natural father, had separated from the child's mother (with whom he had been living) while the mother was pregnant; that the child had lived with the prospective adoptive family for about a year and four months at the time of the trial court order; and that only the biological tie favored the father. [A]ll else is decisively in favor of the adoption petition. 452 A.2d at 1184. We then discussed Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, stressing that the case at bar, like Quilloin, concerned a child who had become part of an existing family unit. P.G., 452 A.2d at 1184-85. We concluded that our due process analysis in J.S.R., applying a best interests test without a necessary finding of parental unfitness, controlled [i]n the absence of subsequent contrary Supreme Court authority. P.G., 452 A.2d at 1185. Then came Lehr in 1983. Until the present case, we have not had occasion to consider Lehr's impact on the proposed termination of parental rights of an arguably fit parent in the adoption context. We have, however, published seven opinions on termination of parental rights in neglect cases under D.C.Code § 16-2353 (1989), supra note 18, of relevance hereonly one of which touched on Lehr, indirectly, in a concurring opinion. I turn now to those seven opinions. In In re K.A., 484 A.2d 992 (D.C.1984), both parents had abandoned their daughter at age five to foster care, although witnesses testified that the father, the appellant, had achieved a close relationship with the child even though he had visited her only eight times in three years. Id. at 996. The trial court, applying the § 16-2353(b) factors, supra note 18, terminated parental rights, over the father's objection, in the interest of stabilizing the child's relationship with her foster family. We affirmed, concluding that the P.G. line of cases controlled in the absence of a custodial relationship between parent and child. Significantly, however, we stated, in effect, that a fitness analysis might be required if a natural parent had custody at the time of the termination proceeding: [W]e do not wish to rule out, just as the Supreme Court in Quilloin v. Walcott did not want to preclude, a more prominent role for a concern for the natural parents' rights, if and when the case demands. Where custodial parents' rights are threatened with possible termination, it may be appropriate for the court to analyze the four statutory factors spelled out in § 16-2353(b) first with respect to the natural parents facing rights termination. And only if the results of that analysis are unsatisfactory would the court then proceed to apply the factors to the other, potential custodians seeking parental status. But that is for another case on another day. K.A., 484 A.2d at 998 (emphasis added). Interestingly, this court did not advert to Lehr, perhaps because the facts showed abandonment by the objecting father, as well as an established foster family relationship with the child. In another 1984 neglect case, In re M.M.M., 485 A.2d 180 (D.C.1984), where there was no custodial or other meaningful relationship between the child and his natural motherwho was mentally ill and violentwe sustained termination of the objecting mother's parental rights in favor of a loving foster family. We reiterated K.A.'s message that if the natural mother had brought up the child and had custody at the time of the hearing, the Constitution might have required the court to apply the § 16-2353(b) factors first with respect to the mother's fitness before considering other potential custodians. M.M.M., 485 A.2d at 184 n. 4. Again, there was no mention of Lehr; the facts made the opportunity doctrine inapplicable. Three years later in In re C.O.W., 519 A.2d 711 (D.C.1987), a termination proceeding concerning a neglected and sexually abused child who was in a prospective adoptive home (although an adoption petition was not before the court), we again affirmed the termination of parental rights over the natural mother's objection. The mother argued that § 16-2353(b) was facially unconstitutional because only parental fitness should be considered at the termination hearing. We disagreed, citing J.S.R., K.A., and M.M.M., again noting that the result might have been different if the mother had retained custody, see C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 714 n. 3. Appellant, however, had another argument: the best interest test inevitably invites a comparison of the natural parent and foster family in which the natural parent will always fall short, and thus termination will often be based on economic and cultural factors that were found objectionable by the Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 [102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599] (1982). C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 714. Without squarely ruling on this argument, we noted that the trial court had avoided possible constitutional infirmities that might arise if it appeared that all the court had done was to make a direct comparison of the natural parent and the foster home. Id. The trial court first addressed the child's special need as a result of sex abuse (by unknown persons), then in effect found the mother unfit, and [o]nly then turned to an evaluation of the child's current placement. Id. We implicitly approved that approach. Lehr, again, was apparently irrelevant. A year later in Appeal of U.S.W., 541 A.2d 625 (D.C.1988), we sustained termination of parental rights in another neglect case over objection of the noncustodial father. The childa victim of fetal alcohol syndrome and fetal hydantoin syndrome had special needs for occupational and physical therapy. The trial court found that both parents, who were alcoholics and unable to hold steady jobs, were unable to meet their child's needs and that both were `seriously deficient in skills and insight needed to raise [C.E.W.]'; the foster parents were especially suitable because they were given training in infant stimulation. Id. at 625, 626. Concurring specifically, Judge Rogers noted that the father had regular and consistent interest in the child, in contrast with the intermittent interest of the father in K.A., U.S.W., 541 A.2d at 627 (Rogers, J., concurring). Judge Rogers also noted that by the time of the hearing, a prospective adoptive home was no longer available. Id. The judge agreed, however, that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of parental rights in the child's best interests because the father has long had difficulty overcoming his own problems and has failed. Id. The father did not challenge expert testimony that termination would improve the child's prospects for adoption, and [n]o claim is made that the father had been denied his `opportunity interest' in his child. Id. at 627-28 (citing Buchanan, Constitutional Rights ). Judge Rogers, therefore, acknowledged possible impact of Lehr. [38] The present case is thus the first in which we must consider an effort to terminate the parental rights of an apparently fit natural father who, although a noncustodial parent, had not abandoned his opportunity interest in gaining custody. As indicated earlier, we believe that under these circumstances Supreme Court caselaw culminating in Lehr mandates, as a matter of due process, that a fit parent must prevail over a prospective adoptive family unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the natural parent's custody would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. We have already recognized that the Constitution may require consideration of a custodial parent's fitness, as a virtually controlling factor, before permitting termination of parental rights in favor of another custodian. K.A., 484 A.2d at 998; see C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 714 n. 3; M.M.M., 485 A.2d at 184 n. 4. We have also recognized possible constitutional infirmities if a court were to terminate even noncustodial parental rights by merely comparing the natural parent with a prospective custodial family to determine the child's best interests. C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 714. Finally, at least one judge has heretofore recognized that a noncustodial parent's opportunity interest must be considered in appropriate cases. See U.S.W., 541 A.2d at 627-28 (Rogers, J., concurring). Given this evolution of our caselawand our first opportunity to consider Lehr directlyI perceive no barrier to concluding that, by identifying a parent's protectible opportunity interest as a basis for evaluating the right to custody, the Stanley-Lehr line of Supreme Court cases mandates substantial constitutional protection of a fit noncustodial parent whose opportunity interest in custody is still intact. This conclusion means that although the applicable statutes, § 16-304(e), supra note 17, and § 16-2353(a) and (b), supra note 18, prescribe a best interests, not a fitness, test, we must construe best interests in a manner that preserves statutory constitutionality. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App.3d at 550, 258 Cal.Rptr. at 532; see also Stuart, 72 App.D.C. at 396, 114 F.2d 825. Furthermore, Justice Traynor explained 35 years ago why, in any event, a child's best interests normally are achieved through custody of a fit parent: The objection to the rule that custody must be awarded to the parent unless he is unfit carries the harsh implication that the interests of the child are subordinated to those of the parent when the trial court has found that the best interests of the child would be served by giving his custody to another. The heart of the problem, however, is how the best interests of the child are to be served. Is the trial court more sensitive than the parent to what the child's best interests are, better qualified to determine how they are to be served? It would seem inherent in the very concept of a fit parent that such a parent would be at least as responsive as the trial court, and very probably more so, to the best interests of the child. [Emphasis added.] In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal.2d 91, 94-95, 265 P.2d 888, 891 (1954) (en banc) (Traynor, J., concurring); see N.M.S., 347 A.2d at 927 (ordinarily a child's best interest is served by being with a fit parent); In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 693, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 454, 523 P.2d 244, 254 (1974) (en banc) (parent fit to exercise custody may have better understanding of best interests than does juvenile court). In sum, I construe D.C.Code §§ 16-304(e) and 16-2353 to incorporate a parental preference in determining the best interests of the child when an unwed, noncustodial father is fit and has not abandoned his opportunity interest. See Jermstad, 210 Cal. App.3d at 533, 550, 258 Cal.Rptr. at 520, 532 (civil code provision incorporating best interests standard for termination of parental rights, read in light of federal constitutional law, accords natural father parental preference where he has diligently pursued opportunity to establish custodial relationship, and thus best interests of child may not be measured by comparing father's circumstances with those of putative adoptive parents). Given controlling Supreme Court authority subsequent to the J.S.R.-P.G. line of cases, see P.G., 452 A.2d at 1184, I conclude in the context at issue that a best interests analysis which justifies termination of parental rights in an adoption proceeding without a finding of parental unfitnessor a finding by clear and convincing evidence that custody in a fit parent would be detrimental to the best interests of the childno longer is available. See Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 n. 27 (D.C.1979) (court may decline to follow prior decision when there has been subsequent change in governing law). A court in this context, therefore, cannot constitutionally use the best interests standard to terminate the parental rights of a fit natural father who has timely and continually asserted his parental rights and, instead, grant an adoption in favor of strangers simply because they are fitter. Cf. C.O.W., 519 A.2d at 714 (trial court resolved issue of parental fitness before evaluating child's current placement). The opportunity for [constitutional] protection of a custodial relationship is illusory if it is subject to being nipped in the bud by application of an unprotected best interest of the child comparison with prospective adoptive parents. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App.3d at 550, 258 Cal.Rptr. at 532. Accordingly, I now apply the best interests standard to reflect the presumptive custodial rights of a fit natural father who has not surrendered his opportunity interest as defined by Lehr.