Opinion ID: 1723445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Good Faith Criterion Issue

Text: In Asmund, the companies argued that § 29(8)(b) contained an implied subjective criterion that interim employment be performed in good faith. The Court of Appeals agreed. It reasoned that each interim employment had been make-work, created solely for the purpose of allowing the employee to requalify for benefits. Consequently, each worker was barred from receiving benefits. Asmund, supra at 121, 535 N.W.2d 223. The steelworkers appealed to this Court, which granted leave. The steelworkers in Asmund argue that the Legislature achieved its purpose by amending § 29(8)(b). They contend that only the requirements expressed in the statute are necessary for requalification. Therefore, they conclude, nothing more should be required. We agree. We cannot read requirements into a statute that the Legislature did not put there. [12] In defending their position, the mining companies in Asmund rely on Alin v. Alaska Employment Security Comm., 17 Alaska 607, 615 (1958). They advance Alin as authority for the proposition that a subjective criterion of good faith employment is necessary in evaluating interim employment. In Alin, the court was asked to interpret the phrase last employed. [13] It explained the rationale for its conclusion, stating: Where the act itself, as here, does not define the meaning of the term last employed it would seem that the commission could properly construe it to mean in effect last regularly employed. To do otherwise would open the door to unlimited abuse. It would permit a striker to obtain any sort of temporary work and when it was terminated to apply for benefits for the loss of the temporary job even though the work stoppage still continued. [Emphasis added.] The Alin court judicially inserted the word regularly when interpreting last employed. Although this Court has not been asked to interpret the phrase last employed, the mining companies have nonetheless asked this Court to follow the Alin court. They seek judicial imposition of a subjective criterion of good faith when an employee has obtained interim employment during a labor dispute. We avoid inserting words in statutes unless necessary to give intelligible meaning or to prevent absurdity. See McKibbin v. Michigan Corporation & Securities Comm., 369 Mich. 69, 119 N.W.2d 557 (1963); Lawrence Baking Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260 (1944). Because of our reluctance to insert words into statutes, we will not read into § 29(8)(b) a subjective intent requirement of good faith on the part of employees. Given the remedial purpose of the MESA and the potential to overload the system if subjective criteria were adopted, we will not tread where the Legislature has refused to go. Inquiry into the subjective elements of an employee's employment is outside the bounds of the act. [14]