Opinion ID: 380737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Secretary Act in Good Faith?

Text: 38 We have indicated here, as we did in our previous opinion, that any delay in the development of a standard beyond the time limits set in 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1)-(4) must be the result of a good faith ordering of priorities by the Secretary. In Hispanic I we acted on the assumption that the Secretary (was) acting honestly and fairly in the selection of priorities, an assumption we (adopted) since no claim (was) made to the contrary. 41 The district court did not say that the Secretary has not acted in good faith. Rather, the district court based its opinion on its perception that the Secretary (had failed) to articulate rationally his rulemaking priority, a perception which led that court to invoke its own view of appropriate priorities for standards development. 42 39 The Secretary's claim of a good faith effort to discharge his statutory obligations is supported by the fact that he has already promulgated standards addressing many significant hazards, including standards regulating the most hazardous aspects of the agricultural industry. 43 In so doing, he has demonstrated a willingness to face strong political opposition by promulgating standards which were strenuously, even bitterly, opposed by those to be regulated. Nothing in the record would lead us to conclude at this time that the Secretary has been insincere in setting priorities or in presenting his timetable to the district court. 40