Opinion ID: 199698
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review of Challenged Testimony

Text: 77 Having determined that Meserve's challenges to the government's cross-examination of Kevin were properly preserved for review, the court considers the testimony to which Meserve objects, bearing in mind the following points: 78 First, the district court's construction of evidentiary rules is a question of law which we review de novo. Second, the application of an evidentiary rule to particular facts is normally tested by an abuse of discretion standard, which favors the prevailing party. Finally, we may affirm the district court's evidentiary rulings on any ground apparent from the record on appeal. 79 United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1296 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 80
81 Meserve's first challenge to the government's cross-examination of Kevin is that the government's questions about Kevin's disorderly conduct and assault convictions were improper because these convictions were not permissible subjects of cross-examination under Rule 609(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a): 82 For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 83 (1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by . . . imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 84 (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 85 Id. Thus, the government could only inquire about Kevin's convictions for disorderly conduct and assault if the crimes were punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than one year or involved dishonesty or false statement. 86 Under Maine law, disorderly conduct is a Class E crime, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 501(6), punishable by a maximum term of six months, id. § 1252(2)(E), and assault is a Class D crime, id. § 207(2), punishable by a term of imprisonment less than one year, id. § 1252(2)(D). Because the sentences for these crimes do not exceed one year, Meserve argues that evidence of these crimes is per se inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(1). In opposition, the government asserts that assault is not always a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for less than one year in Maine; section 207(2) provides that when the perpetrator is at least eighteen years of age and the assault produced bodily injury to a child under six years of age, the crime is classified as a Class C crime, punishable by a prison term of up to five years. Id. § 207(2). 87 The record before this court does not resolve the question whether Kevin's assault conviction was for bodily injury to a child less than six, an omission for which the government blames Meserve: [I]t is Meserve's failure [to] develop a record that leaves this court with inadequate facts to resolve the issue definitively. Through this simple sentence, the government attempts to shift the burden of proving admissibility from the proponent of evidence to the party opposing the admission of the evidence. 88 It is a principle too simple to seem to need stating, however, that the government, as the party seeking to introduce evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes under Rule 609, was obligated to have researched Kevin's prior offenses and to have determined that they were admissible. E.g., 1 Wigmore, supra § 17. Upon Meserve's challenge, the government should have been prepared to produce to the district court concrete proof that Kevin had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year within the previous ten years. Admittedly, the government may have been in possession of precisely such proof, and merely failed to produce it because the district court did not demand it upon Meserve's objection. Even so, the failure of the district court to press the government on this issue does not shift the burden to Meserve. 89 Nor do the convictions for disorderly conduct and assault introduced by the government against Kevin fall within Rule 609(a)(2), as the legislative history of the rule makes clear: 90 [T]he phrase dishonesty and false statement . . . means crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully. 91 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, at 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7103. To be admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), a prior conviction must involve some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification which would tend to show that an accused would be likely to testify untruthfully, United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 190 (10th Cir. 1978), elements not readily apparent in the crimes of disorderly conduct and assault. 4 92 Because the government failed to develop an adequate predicate for admitting the convictions for disorderly conduct and assault, it was error to permit interrogation concerning these convictions for the purposes of impeaching Kevin. 93
94 Meserve further argues that the questions the government posed to Kevin about being a tough guy and having [b]een in a lot of fights in [his] day were improper under Federal Rule of Evidence 608. The government counters that it was entitled to introduce evidence that Kevin had previously been involved in fights as impeachment by contradiction following Kevin's denial that he was a tough guy. 95 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a): 96 The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 97 Id. The government's questions about Kevin's status as a tough guy and his reputation in the community for violence were completely irrelevant on the facts here to this jury's credibility determination. Even if, as suggested by the government at trial, people in the community were afraid of Kevin because he was an assaultive person, this has no bearing on Kevin's credibility as a witness, given the issues in this case. No other theory of admissibility is offered. 98 As the government's questions about Kevin being a tough guy were impermissible, they cannot serve as a launching pad for the admission of additional evidence. Moreover, the government's questions about Kevin's involvement in a couple of fights are impermissible in their own right. Under Rule 608(b): 99 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness . . . . may . . . in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . . 100 Id. The specific instances of prior conduct about which the government questioned Kevin bore no relation whatsoever to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. As Meserve correctly states, the government wanted to suggest, and succeeded in suggesting, that Kevin was a man with a violent disposition. 101