Opinion ID: 1314674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the process of termination

Text: The standard for determining the fitness of a parent to maintain custody of his child was recently reiterated in syllabus point 1 of Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W., ___ W.Va. ___, 356 S.E.2d 464 (1987) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, Hammack v. Wise, 158 W.Va. 343, 211 S.E.2d 118 (1975)). We stated the following: A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child, and, unless the parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment, or other dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement or otherwise has permanently transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts. Syllabus, State ex rel. Kiger v. Hancock, 153 W.Va. 404, 168 S.E.2d [798] (1969).' West Virginia Code § 49-6-5(a)(6) (1988) governs the procedure for termination of parental rights and unequivocally states that a parent's rights may be terminated [u]pon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future, and when necessary for the welfare of the child.... The appellant contends that the D.H.S. failed to make a reasonable effort to reunify her family, pursuant to W.Va.Code § 49-6-5, and failed to develop a realistic family case plan as required by W.Va.Code § 49-6D-3. [13] The appellant requested and was granted a six-month improvement period, in accordance with W.Va.Code § 49-6-2(b). She was later granted a second six-month improvement period. As we stated in syllabus point 3 of State ex rel. West Virginia Dept. of Human Serv. v. Cheryl M., ___ W.Va. ___, 356 S.E.2d 181 (1987), [u]nder W.Va.Code, 49-6-2(b) (1984), when an improvement period is authorized, then the court by order shall require the Department of Human Services to prepare a family case plan pursuant to W.Va.Code, 49-6D-3 (1984). Such plans were prepared for the appellant and filed with the circuit court in this case. The purpose of the family case plan is to clearly set forth an organized, realistic method of identifying family problems and the logical steps to be used in resolving or lessening these problems. Cheryl M., 356 S.E.2d at 186 (quoting W.Va.Code § 49-6D-3(a)). The D.H.S. certainly could have acted with greater dispatch in preparing the first family case plan, for it was not completed until some seven months after the beginning of the first improvement period. However, the appellant wasn't harmed as a result of this delay both because D.H.S. did take immediate steps to offer services and because the improvement period was extended an additional six months. Such delays do, however, always harm the child, as the significance of a six-month period in the first three years of life must once again be viewed as an extremely vital time in the course of a child's human development. In formulating the improvement period and family case plans, courts and social service workers should cooperate to provide a workable approach for the resolution of family problems which have prevented the child or children from receiving appropriate care from their parents. The formulation of the improvement period and family case plans should therefore be a consolidated, multidisciplinary effort among the court system, the parents, attorneys, [14] social service agencies, and any other helping personnel involved in assisting the family. The goal should be the development of a program designed to assist the parent(s) in dealing with any problems which interfere with his ability to be an effective parent and to foster an improved relationship between parent and child with an eventual restoration of full parental rights a hoped-for result. The improvement period and family case plans must establish specific measures for the achievement of these goals, as an improvement period must be more than a mere passage of time. It is a period in which the D.H.S. and the court should attempt to facilitate the parent's success, but wherein the parent must understand that he bears a responsibility to demonstrate sufficient progress and improvement to justify return to him of the child. Subsequent to the initial formulation of the improvement plan and family case plans, it is imperative that the progress of the parent(s) toward the achievement of enumerated goals be monitored closely. As provided in W.Va.Code § 49-6-2(d), proceedings filed under the child abuse or neglect provisions shall, to the extent practicable, be given priority over any other civil action before the court, except proceedings under article two-A [§ 48-2A-1 et seq.], chapter forty-eight of this Code [prevention of domestic violence] and actions in which trial is in progress. Any petition filed under the provisions of this article shall be docketed immediately upon filing. Any hearing to be held at the end of any improvement period and any other hearing to be held during any proceedings under the provisions of this article shall be held as nearly as practicable on successive days and, with respect to said hearing to be held at the end of an improvement period, shall be held as close in time as possible after the end of said improvement period. The clear import of the statute is that matters involving the abuse and neglect of children shall take precedence over almost every other matter with which a court deals on a daily basis, and it clearly reflects the goal that such proceedings must be resolved as expeditiously as possible. During the improvement period, the status of the child(ren) and the progress of the parent(s) in satisfying the conditions of the improvement period should be monitored by the circuit court on a monthly basis. To the extent possible, such review should also incorporate the multi-disciplinary approach, with social workers and other helping personnel present in the court with attorneys and parties to review progress and assure the program is being followed and improvement being made. [15] At the conclusion of the improvement period, the court shall review the performance of the parents in attempting to attain the goals of the improvement period and shall, in the court's discretion, determine whether the conditions of the improvement period have been satisfied and whether sufficient improvement has been made in the context of all the circumstances of the case to justify the return of the child. As we explained in West Virginia Dept. of Human Serv. v. Peggy F, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 399 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1990), it is possible for an individual to show compliance with specific aspects of the case plan while failing to improve ... [the] overall attitude and approach to parenting. Thus, a judgment regarding the success of an improvement period is within the court's discretion regardless of whether or not the individual has completed all suggestions or goals set forth in family case plans. The improvement period is granted to allow the parent an opportunity to remedy the existing problems. The case plan simply provides an approach to solving them. As is clear from the language of the statute, ... the ultimate goal is restoration of a stable family environment, not simply meeting the requirements of the case plan. 399 S.E.2d at 464. In the present case, two family case plans, dated November 20, 1987, and August 25, 1988, were formulated to assist the appellant. The appellant contends that the plans were unrealistic and that the success of the plans was dependent upon Ms. Laudermilt, with whom the appellant maintained an adverse relationship. The appellant bases her contention that the plans were unrealistic on the fact that the two psychologists involved in this matter, Dr. Hewitt and Dr. Maceiko, made recommendations for treatment of the appellant which were not specifically included in the case plan. Dr. Maceiko, for instance, recommended in his April 10, 1986, report that the appellant receive psychotherapy and chemotherapy for control of her violent impulses. [16] He also stated that the appellant would not be a good candidate for parenting groups simply because of the many problems that she has to contend withintellectual, poor impulse control, stress management problem, etc. Dr. Hewitt, however, explained in his April 30, 1988, report that psychotherapy or counselling per se is not likely to be useful to [the appellant]. Dr. Hewitt further noted that the conflict between the appellant and Ms. Laudermilt seriously interfered with the development of a meaningful plan to attempt to reintegrate the children back into the household. Dr. Hewitt further recommended in his April 30, 1988, report that meaningful attempts be made to reintegrate Christopher and Carlita into the household and to permit homemaker services to continue. The appellant argues that the D.H.S., in formulating the family case plans, ignored the suggestions of the psychologists. Despite Dr. Maceiko's opinion that the appellant was not a good candidate for parenting groups, for instance, the case plan required the appellant to attend anger control group meetings, parental group classes, play therapy, and parenting assistance classes. Upon review of the plans and the reports of the psychologists, we fail to discern any unfairness in the family case plans. They were realistic and appropriate in their attempts to address the particular needs of the family. Reports rendered by psychologists are certainly of assistance to a court in determining the psychological capacity of an individual to raise a child and of assistance to the D.H.S. in formulating the tactics to be employed in the attempt to remedy the familial problems. The family case plans, however, are not required to reflect the recommendations of a particular psychologist in every detail. On the issue of psychotherapy, for instance, the reports of Dr. Maceiko and Dr. Hewitt differed with regard to the potential efficacy of such treatment for the appellant. Thus, formulation of a family case plan in perfect congruity with both reports would have been difficult. Furthermore, we find the appellant's argument that the success of the family case plans was dependent upon Ms. Laudermilt to be meritless. Ms. Laudermilt was not the only individual providing assistance to the appellant. Beatrice Lahita, a D.H.S. worker providing home services, was also involved in the framework of assistance to the appellant. Therapists at Northern Panhandle Behavioral Health Center and workers from the Florence Crittenton Home were also involved in attempting to provide parenting education and skills. All of these social work personnel found the appellant extremely difficult and not very receptive to accepting assistance. In executing the improvement plan and the family case plans, the D.H.S. is also obligated to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and the court shall consider the efforts made by the department to provide remedial and reunification services to the parent. W.Va.Code § 49-6-5(a)(6). Furthermore, the court's order is to specifically state whether or not the state department made a reasonable effort to prevent the placement or that the emergency situation made such efforts unreasonable or impossible and whether or not the state department made a reasonable effort to reunify the family including a description of what efforts were made or that such efforts were unreasonable due to specific circumstances. Id. The thrust of the appellant's argument with regard to lack of reasonable effort is that the uncooperative relationship between the appellant and Ms. Laudermilt rendered it impossible for the appellant to fully comply with the improvement period and family case plans. The appellant contends that the D.H.S. should have removed Ms. Laudermilt from the appellant's case as it became apparent that an adversarial relationship was developing between Ms. Laudermilt and the appellant. The appellant further argues that the D.H.S.'s failure to attempt to remedy the hostility and mistrust which existed between the appellant and Ms. Laudermilt constituted a lack of reasonable effort. The appellant stresses that the D.H.S. failed to make such reassignment even after it was recommended by Dr. Hewitt and Ms. Taylor. [17] We agree that the deteriorating relationship between the appellant and Ms. Laudermilt rendered complete cooperation unlikely. The D.H.S. together with all other entities involved in a child abuse and neglect case must bear in mind always its obligation to provide a cooperative, encouraging, and supportive environment designed to foster the eventual reconciliation of parent and child. Such an environment is important not only because it is what the law requires, but also becausein the event improvement is inadequate and termination must eventually be soughtthe record can better support a conclusion that all reasonable efforts were made by the D.H.S., the other helping personnel, and the court. We believe that certainly once a D.H.S. caseworker and client's relationship deteriorates to the degree evidenced in the present case by a physical altercation and subsequent assault charges and involuntary commitment, the D.H.S. has an obligation to consider changing assigned workers if at all possible, within the parameters of the agency's resources and obligations. However, we recognize that the steady erosion of child protective services resources has created an enormous unmet need and earnestly hope the Legislature and D.H.S. will address this crisis. [18] In ascertaining the degree of reasonable effort made by the D.H.S., however, we must also consider the appellant's role in the proceedings and her response to efforts made by the D.H.S. The appellant was provided with a variety of other caseworkers and therapists on whom she could have relied and to whom she could have demonstrated her willingness and desire to reunify her family. From review of the record, it appears that the appellant completely refused to cooperate with the D.H.S. during her improvement period. In an attempt by the D.H.S., for instance, to assist the appellant in controlling her violent mood swings, the D.H.S. scheduled several appointments for the appellant with Northern Panhandle Behavioral Health Center, a community mental health services provider. While the appellant finally attended an initial evaluation, she refused to return for subsequent appointments. Furthermore, Ms. Laudermilt testified that the appellant often refused to visit her children or would be late for visitation. At visits specifically scheduled for three and one-half hour duration, for instance, the appellant would frequently appear for the visit one hour late. The appellant would also cancel visitation with Carlita, stating that if she could not see all of her children, she did not wish to see any of them. A parent's level of interest in visiting with his or her child during an out-of-home improvement period is an extremely significant factor for the circuit court to review. A parent who consistently demonstrates a desire to be with his child obviously has far more potential for being a nurturant and committed parent than one whose interest in being with his child is erratic. Outreach workers from Northern Panhandle Behavioral Health Center were scheduled to visit the appellant in an attempt to educate her regarding parenting and homemaking skills. When the workers would appear for the appointments, the appellant would not answer the door. Even after the workers left notes on the door with information regarding the scheduling of appointments, the appellant refused to participate in the program. Attempts by the D.H.S. to involve the appellant in a mothers' support group also failed. Ms. Laudermilt accompanied the appellant to the first meeting, but the appellant refused to return to additional meetings. The D.H.S. also encouraged the appellant to participate in a variety of other activities designed to increase her ability to effectively care for her children. The appellant, however, refused to cooperate with such attempts. We do not believe that the lack of cooperation exhibited by the appellant is attributable in its entirety to the adverse relationship between the appellant and Ms. Laudermilt. The record reflects the appellant's almost complete disregard for and disinterest in the efforts of the D.H.S. to assist her in developing the control and skills necessary to regain her children. Whether the result of apathy, misunderstanding, or ignorance on the part of the appellant, the ultimate termination of her parental rights was attributable to her behavior rather than to any lack of reasonable effort by the D.H.S. Despite the responsibility of the D.H.S. and the court to provide interventive resources and to aid the parents, the rehabilitation envisioned by an improvement period is not a task which anyone can accomplish for the parent. The natural parental instinct is to do the work necessary to regain full custody of the child. Evidence of that instinct and the concomitant energy required to achieve that goal is missing from this case. In the difficult balance which must be fashioned between the rights of the parent and the welfare of the child, we have consistently emphasized that the paramount and controlling factor must be the child's welfare. [A]ll parental rights in child custody matters, we have stressed, are subordinate to the interests of the innocent child. David M., 385 S.E.2d at 916. Syllabus point 1 of In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), in part, states the following: As a general rule the least restrictive alternative regarding parental rights to custody of a child under W.Va.Code, 49-6-5 [1977] will be employed; however, courts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement before terminating parental rights where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened.... We therefore conclude the improvement periods and the family case plans were more than adequately developed and implemented to assist the mother in the steps needed to remedy the problems which gave rise to these proceedings, and we find no merit to her assignment of error related thereto.