Opinion ID: 424713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Protective Measures

Text: 64 Subsection (e) of the challenged statute provides that if the juvenile court denies the minor's petition for waiver of parental notification, the court shall assume the responsibility of taking whatever protective action is thought necessary by the court for the minor in connection with the implementation of subsection (a). The appellants contend that this provision means that, if the court denies the waiver petition, the minor could be subjected to any action the juvenile court was otherwise authorized to take under Indiana juvenile law. They suggest, for example, that the court could determine that the minor was promiscuous and hence a child in need of services, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 31-6-4-3(a)(3), (6) (Burns Supp.1982), with the result that the court upon its own motion could enjoin the child from leaving the state, id. Sec. 31-6-7-14(a)(3), or order her held without a hearing for several days, id. Sec. 31-6-7-14(c). 65 The state responds that all that this subsection means is that, upon denial of the waiver petition, the juvenile court must notify the minor's parents that the child had filed a petition. The phrase protective action means only that the court has authority to send a social worker to ease the notification process. 66 We begin by discussing the constitutionality of the requirement that the court notify the minor's parents once the petition is denied. Indiana's interest in requiring parental notification upon denial of the waiver petition is, presumably, to encourage parental participation in the abortion decision in order to protect the best interests of the immature minor. See City of Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2497. On the other hand, a state has a duty to  'assure'  that the proceedings to determine maturity  'be completed with anonymity.'  Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644, 99 S.Ct. at 3048 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.), quoted in Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 16 (opinion of Powell, J.). 67 We conclude that the requirement of confidentiality outweighs the state's interest. First, the state's interest is as fulfilled when the petition is simply denied as when the pregnant minor never goes to court to seek a waiver. Second, a minor whose petition is denied has three choices, in the absence of state involvement: she can simply tell her parents that she is pregnant, or she can tell them that she wants to have an abortion, or she can tell them that she sought to obtain court waiver of notification. 13 If the state requires notification, it takes away the first two choices. If the minor knows that her parents have deep religious or moral beliefs about the wrongfulness of abortion, she may have good reason to tell them only about the fact of her pregnancy and not that she sought to have an abortion to deal with it. Similarly, parents who might at least be somewhat receptive to a discussion of the advisability of abortion might well be extremely upset if the state told them that their daughter was not only pregnant but had sought to obtain an abortion behind their backs. 68 Indiana's automatic notification provision thus adds another factor for a minor to consider before going to court: whether the benefit of not having to tell her parents that she is pregnant if the court grants her petition outweighs the risk of losing the ability to choose what to tell her parents if the court denies her petition. It is hardly speculative to imagine that even some mature minors will be deterred from going to court if they know that their parents will be notified if their petitions are denied, because no minor can be certain that the court will rule in her favor. 69 [A] State [is required] to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642, 99 S.Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). We believe that the state has not acted with the necessary sensitivity in requiring that the juvenile court notify the parents of a minor whose petition the court has denied. Confidentiality during and after the waiver proceeding ensures that no minors will be deterred from exercising their right to try to establish maturity because of the fear that their parents may be notified. Notification will inevitably result from denial of the petition because pregnancy cannot be hidden forever, but the state's form of notification is likely to cause additional trauma to the minor and is unlikely to encourage family harmony. Thus we conclude that whatever interest the state does have in stepping in at this point is not significant enough to justify the chilling effect on minors contemplating going to court. 70 As for the appellants' contention that the subsection allows the juvenile court to take whatever action it thinks necessary to effect notification, it follows from our holding that postdenial notice is inappropriate that any action taken to ensure notification is also inappropriate. 14 J. Venue 71 Section 35-1-58.5-2.5(b) provides that a minor seeking waiver of the notice requirement may petition for waiver in the juvenile court in the county in which she resides. The appellants challenge this provision on the ground that the statute provides no guidance to a nonresident minor seeking an abortion in Indiana, and in fact denies out-of-state minors the right to resort to the judicial bypass procedure. 72 If the statute barred out-of-state minors from employing the judicial bypass procedure, it would be unconstitutional because the effect would be to prohibit mature outof-state minors from having abortions in Indiana. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200, 93 S.Ct. 739, 751, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) (holding unconstitutional the provision in a Georgia abortion statute limiting abortions to Georgia residents). 73 In order to interpret the venue requirements of section 35-1-58.5-2.5(b), it is necessary to consider Rule 75 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. Subsection (D) of that rule provides that Rule 75 supersedes any more special statute relating to venue, the place of trial, or the authority of the court to hear the case. It also states that no statute fixing the place of trial shall be deemed a requirement of jurisdiction. 74 Rule 75 provides that any case may be commenced in any court in any county except that a court may transfer a case to another court if the former does not meet preferred venue requirements and the latter does. For an out-of-state minor, no court would be preferred (there being no opposing party to consider) and thus the general rule that a case may be commenced in any county would prevail. Accordingly, we hold that the venue requirements are constitutional as applied to out-of-state minors seeking abortions in Indiana. 75 As to resident minors, the preferred venue under Indiana law is the county of the minor's residence, Rule 75(A)(8). The appellants contend that this restriction unduly burdens the process of seeking waiver because a minor might have to travel a substantial distance to petition the court. We agree with the district court that this provision is constitutional. 76 A petition for waiver of notice may be brought by the minor or her next friend, Sec. 35-1-58.5-2.5(b), or by her physician, Sec. 35-1-58.5-2.5(c). the notification statute provides that the petition is to be filed in the minor's home county no matter who files it, but Rule 75(D) supersedes this section and allows the general venue rule of Rule 75(A) to apply. Rule 75(A)(5) provides that preferred venue includes the county where one or more individual plaintiffs reside. 15 Accordingly, it appears that a resident minor has considerable flexibility about where to bring her petition. K. The Waiting Period 77 The appellants contend that the mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period between actual notice and the abortion and the forty-eight-hour waiting period for constructive notice by certified mail unconstitutionally burden the right of a minor to have an abortion. 78 A twenty-four-hour waiting period is unconstitutional as applied to adult women seeking abortions. City of Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2503. In that case, the city had contended that the waiting period would allow a woman to reflect upon her decision to have an abortion, with beneficial effects. The Court held that no legitimate state interest was shown to be furthered by an arbitrary and inflexible waiting period, and that there was no showing that a woman's abortion decision would be more informed as a result of the delay. The Court noted, with apparent approval, the findings of the district court (which nevertheless upheld the waiting period) that the delay increases the cost of obtaining an abortion by requiring the woman to make two trips to the abortion clinic and often results in a delay of more than twenty-four-hours. Id. 79 The Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of waiting periods imposed in connection with parental notification or consent statutes. In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 & n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 1172 & n. 21, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981), the Court held that a parental notification statute was not unconstitutional for failure to include a mandatory period of delay following notification. The Court noted that time is likely to be of the essence in an abortion decision. Id. at 412, 101 S.Ct. at 1172. 80 Indiana contends that the waiting period is necessary and appropriate in order to ensure that notification results in parental involvement in minors' decisions to have abortions. The state asserts that the delay is not a significant burden in light of that interest. The state also notes that an Indiana statute requires a twenty-four-hour delay for adult women seeking abortions, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-1-58.5-2(d), a provision not challenged in this appeal. 16 81 On the other hand, the same objections to the waiting periods for adults listed in City of Akron apply to waiting periods for minors. The delay increases the cost of obtaining abortions by requiring the minor to make two trips to the abortion clinic. As noted in Part IV E, supra, cost is especially relevant to minors because few have significant amounts of money available independent of their parents' control. The waiting period is arbitrary and inflexible because it applies both to minors whose parents have been notified within the time period and object and those whose parents have already expressed approval of the abortion. In addition, there was evidence in the record that a combination of a woman's schedule and the schedule of her abortion clinic may often serve to produce 'a substantially longer delay' than 24 hours. Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1014 (1st Cir.1981) (quoting Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 785 (7th Cir.1980)). As the Supreme Court noted in Matheson, time is likely to be of the essence in an abortion decision. 82 Although we recognize that the state does have an interest in encouraging parental involvement, we are not persuaded that this interest outweighs the severe burden the statute as written places upon the minor's abortion right. Notification itself in most cases should lead to parental consultation without the state's additional help because minors are particularly susceptible to parental wishes, see Part II, supra. Accordingly, we hold that the state cannot require that an abortion be delayed once notification has been effected upon a minor's parents. 83 By contrast, we uphold the constitutionality of the forty-eight-hour constructive notice provision to the extent that it allows a delay in the performance of the abortion to effectuate notice. As noted in Part IV G, supra, the abortion may proceed if, after forty-eight-hours, the parent has not responded to notification. If the parent does respond before forty-eight-hours, additional delay may not be required by the state. L. Corporate Liability 84 Finally, we affirm the district court's decision to strike the allegations of the appellants' complaint that contended that the statute is unconstitutional because it allows an abortion clinic or other employer of physicians to be held liable for a violation of the statute under a theory of vicarious liability. We are persuaded that this claim is too speculative to be sustainable, as it appears from our review of Indiana criminal statutes that such a prosecution is not possible, a conclusion with which the state agrees. Liability is imposed only upon the physician.