Opinion ID: 2076775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Division of Real and Personal Property

Text: We review the trial court's distribution of marital property in a divorce proceeding for abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 249, 254 (D.C.1998). This court has consistently applied the well-settled principle that the trial court has considerable discretion and broad authority in distributing marital property as part of a judgment of divorce. Young-Jones v. Bell, 905 A.2d 275, 277 (D.C.2006) (quoting Barnes v. Sherman, 758 A.2d 936, 939 (D.C.2000)). As long as the trial court considers the relevant statutory factors in a manner that is equitable, just and reasonable, we will not disturb its conclusions on appeal. Id.
Many of Bansda's complaints on appeal concern the court's division of property, a division arguably affected by the court's ruling that there was no common law marriage between Bansda and Wheeler before the April 28, 2001 ceremonial marriage in the District. Because of that ruling, the court concluded that Rittenhouse, acquired by Wheeler in December 2000 (and titled solely in his name) was not marital property subject to equitable division. As elaborated below, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to accept Bansda's claim that she and Wheeler had entered into a common law marriage, first in the Netherlands and then in Virginia; the court properly determined that neither jurisdiction recognizes common law marriages. During argument on the common law marriage claim, Bansda's counsel maintained that the marriage began in 1999 in the Netherlands when the parties held themselves out as husband and wife under that country's Domestic Partnership Act. Counsel argued that this was the equivalent of a common law marriage in the Netherlands. Wheeler countered that Dutch law is civil law, that the Netherlands is not a common law jurisdiction, and that even if registered domestic partners could establish the equivalent of an American common law marriage there, Wheeler and Bansda never registered their partnership. The court ruled that no common law marriage had been established in Holland or Virginia, two jurisdictions that, according to the court, do not recognize common law marriage. The court added contrary to Bansda's trial testimonythat the couple did not hold themselves out as married between January 2001, when they moved into Rittenhouse, and April 2001, when they finally married in the District. For the reasons provided by the trial court, Bansda cannot establish a common law marital relationship during the period before January 2001 when the parties lived in the Netherlands and in Virginia before moving to the District. The validity of a marriage is to be determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage occurred. See De Liedekerke v. De Liedekerke, 635 A.2d 339 (D.C.1993). As Bansda acknowledged, the parties did not register their domestic partnership with the Dutch government while living in the Netherlands. Nor does she contest Wheeler's position that the law of the Netherlands is civil law, and thus that common law marriage does not exist there. The trial court observed that [t]he defendant seemed to be unaware that common-law marriage is a creation of the English common-law, and that the defendant sought to establish a common-law marriage in Holland, certainly not a common-law[] jurisdiction. After living abroad, but before moving to the District, the couple lived in Virginia. However, Virginia also does not recognize common law marriage. Hudson Trail Outfitters v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 801 A.2d 987, 992 n. 5 (D.C.2002). Thus, any time period prior to the parties' January 2001 relocation to the District could not be considered in determining the validity of Bansda's common law claim. Turning to the four months in 2001 between the parties' relocation to the District (January) and their ceremonial marriage (April), we are aware that the District of Columbia does recognize common law marriage. Coates v. Watts, 622 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C.1993). However, [s]ince ceremonial marriage is readily available and provides unequivocal proof that the parties are husband and wife, claims of common law marriage should be closely scrutinized.... Id. Proof of cohabitation alone will not suffice to prove the existence of a common law marriage. See id. Instead, the proponent of the marriage must show that the parties cohabitated as husband and wife, following an express mutual agreement, which must be words of the present tense. Id. In this case, therefore, Bansda was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a valid common law marriage. See East v. East, 536 A.2d 1103, 1106 (D.C.1988). She was unable to do so. Bansda was the only witness to testify on her behalf about the purported common law marital relationship. Although Bansda's counsel attempted to proffer to the court how two additional witnesses would testify at a later time, in order to establish the common law relationship, counsel was not able to proffer with any specificity and seemed uncertain about the ability of these witnesses to provide the necessary facts to satisfy the elements of common law marriage. Moreover, Bansda's testimony focused largely on the parties' attempts to research surrogacy. The court pointed out that many unmarried partners have children in the District, and that this does not mean that these couples intend to hold themselves out as married. Finally, on cross-examination Bansda admitted that she and Wheeler did not open any joint bank accounts until after they were married in April 2001. The court ultimately concluded that the parties had not entered into a common law marriage before the April 2001 ceremonial marriage. In her brief on appeal, Bansda argues that Wheeler fully intended to marry her because they were in love, and that while living in Virginia the parties intended to buy a house together and marry in early 2001. These statements may be true; however, an intent to marry someday does not establish the existence of a common law marriage. If anything, it tends to suggest the opposite by showing that the parties, for whatever reason, were not ready to be legally married until they married in April 2001. In addition, Wheeler's testimony provides evidence that the couple did not hold themselves out to the community as husband and wife before April 2001. He states that his relationship with Bansda was rocky in December 2000 when he purchased Rittenhouse, and that it wasn't clear that [they] were in fact going to get married. This testimony weighs heavily against the existence of a common law marriage, and the court did not err in rejecting the common law marriage claim.
The court determined that Rittenhouse was Wheeler's separate property. The court then rejected Bansda's request for exclusive use and possession of the property. The court held that there was no basis in law or fact warranting exclusive use and possession of the Rittenhouse Property to the defendant. The court also observed that, although it need not consider Bansda's economic and educational status, Bansda did not show that she was unable to obtain adequate housing on her own; rather, [s]he is an educated person with experience in the television industry and in business. This determination was not an abuse of discretion where D.C.Code § 16-910(a) requires the court to assign to each party his or her sole and separate property acquired prior to the marriage.
The court then considered whether Bansda had an equitable interest in the Rittenhouse property and decided that she did not. The court noted that in some instances, property may be subject to being encumbered by an equitable lien in favor of ... the non-purchasing spouse. In Yeldell v. Yeldell, 551 A.2d 832 (D.C. 1988), we acknowledged that a divorce court, exercising its general equity power, could apportion individually owned property, but in order to do so, `the court was required to find that the nontitled spouse had a legal or equitable interest in the property.' Id. at 834 (quoting Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C.1979)). The only way for a nontitled spouse to establish such an equitable interest is by showing that she made substantial contributions to the home. Id. The trial court found that Bansda contributed only $3,000 for repairs to the home and did not contribute toward capital improvements, while Wheeler paid the monthly mortgage and other taxes and charges on the house. In Yeldell, we held that Mr. Yeldell had an equitable interest in his ex-wife's house in large part because he had contributed approximately $50,000 to pay the mortgage on the home, twice the amount that Mrs. Yeldell paid to purchase the property. 551 A.2d at 833. We noted that although Mr. Yeldell's contributions were of marital funds under § 16-910(b) and not separate funds under § 16-910(a), he was still entitled to an equitable share in the house because he made the monthly payments from his marital earnings. Id. at 834 n. 4. Bansda's contributions were far less substantial than those of Mr. Yeldell. Not only did Wheeler purchase the house, but he made the majority of the mortgage payments from his earnings, both separate and marital. The rest of the mortgage payments came from rental income. Wheeler testified that the contract sales price of the Rittenhouse property was $270,000. He also testified that he had made payments on the house in the amount of $151, 699. This figure is far more substantial than the amount contributed by Bansda for repairs. Bansda also argues that she furnished and maintained Rittenhouse, cleaned the home, clothes, and car, and prepared the meals, but the court found that there was no evidence of any homemaker contributions by Bansda, a finding we see no basis for rejecting. In Ealey v. Ealey, 596 A.2d 43 (D.C.1991), we upheld a trial court's denial of an equitable interest in the residence where the appellant, Ms. Ealey, alleged that she had contributed a substantial amount to the home as a homemaker, by cleaning, cooking, conducting daily chores, and providing home maintenance and repair. Id. at 47-49. We noted that [s]ince the judge considered all possible homemaker contributions, he cannot be held to have abused his discretion for viewing homemaker contributions too narrowly. Id. at 49. Bansda contends, however, that the trial court improperly curtailed her testimony on her homemaker contributions in order to speed the trial along. However, the record reveals otherwise. It indicates that the trial court did not improperly preclude her from discussing her homemaker contributions. Likewise, Bansda's attorney cross-examined Wheeler about the contributions Bansda made in both furnishing the property and obtaining renters. As Wheeler notes in his brief, Bansda now attempts to rely on evidence that was never introduced at trial to substantiate her claim, and we will not consider evidence introduced for the first time on appeal. See Fisher v. Sinrod, 197 A.2d 846, 847 (D.C.1964) ([W]e must consider the case as we find it from the record of the trial.). Moreover, while the appellant in Ealey had rendered her homemaker services for twenty-three years, Ealey, 596 A.2d at 45, the trial court observed that Bansda and Wheeler were married for only five years and had lived together in the home for less than two years. This short amount of time provides additional support for the trial court's conclusion that Bansda's homemaker services did not entitle her to an equitable lien on the property. There was no abuse of discretion.
After determining that Bansda did not have a legal or equitable interest in the real property, the court divided the rest of the marital and non-marital property. Bansda maintains that she was entitled to the value of the household appliances and to the value of rental income paid to Bansda and Wheeler during the marriage. She further contends that her contributions to the house helped attract renters. Bansda's counsel made similar points during closing argument, stating that the parties had bought household appliances together, which should be divided between the two as marital property, and that the money they earned from renting the property should be divided as well. Wheeler testified that he and Bansda had rented out the house to a group of men for $2,050 per month. He further testified that he had received some rental payments from January 2002 through December 2005, and that he had put those payments toward the mortgage. Pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-910(b), the rental income, which originally was paid into a joint account and had accumulated during the marriage, was marital property subject to equitable distribution. Bansda alleges that Wheeler had closed the joint account and moved all of the rental income into a personal account. The court subsequently ruled, however, that Wheeler was entitled to all of the marital assets in his personal possession. Bansda may have had a claim to the rental income as marital property received between 2002 and 2005, had substantial funds remained in Wheeler's personal account at time of trial. We conclude, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider this argument, made on the final day of trial. The record reveals that any rental money had been exhausted to pay the mortgage on the house and that this rental income covered less than half of the total amount that he paid on the mortgage, [4] that Wheeler had received very little rent during the time that Bansda refused to vacate Rittenhouse, and that Wheeler was forced to pay the majority of the mortgage from his personal income, without help from Bansda. The division of marital property in the form of arts and gifts, as well as household furniture, also arose during closing argument. The trial judge informed the parties that he would need a list of all arts and gifts and household furniture in order to divide and distribute the property pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-910(b). Bansda indicates in her brief that she was not refunded any of the money that she spent on household appliances. The trial court, however, awarded her all the personal property located at Rittenhouse except for the dining room table, chairs and matching bench, and the gardening tools. There is no basis for a refund to Bansda for the household appliances, as they were clearly awarded to her. Finally, Bansda argues, in broad and conclusory terms, that the trial court miscalculated the parties' marital and non-marital funds and property, including pensions. She indicates that she corrected the court's figures in a sworn affidavit presented to this court. This affidavit, however, is not a part of the record evidence submitted to the trial court, and we cannot consider it for the first time on appeal. The trial court relied largely on Wheeler's testimony and the plaintiff's exhibits to calculate the parties' marital and pre-marital funds. The court noted that it was difficult to assess the current or recent value of Bansda's assets because she had repeatedly failed to comply with discovery requests. Therefore, the court calculated values to the best of its ability, making the appropriate credibility determinations when necessary. See Joiner-Die v. United States, 899 A.2d 762, 764 (D.C.2006) (In a bench trial, the judge, as fact finder, has the right to make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences of fact.). In this non-jury trial, we will not set aside the court's factual findings where there is evidentiary support for these findings and where they are not clearly erroneous. See Malik Corp. v. Tenacity Group, LLC, 961 A.2d 1057, 1060 (D.C.2008). This is especially true where, as here, [t]he evidence presented to the trial court [must] be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. [5]