Opinion ID: 2982127
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Arrest of Evans

Text: Evans argues that his arrest was unlawful, and that because of that, the post-arrest eyewitness identifications of him as one of the robbers should have been excluded. As an initial matter, an eyewitness identification of a person of interest is unlikely to be suppressed as a result of an illegal arrest. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472–73 (1980).2 In this case, Evans’ connection to the other suspects was known before the search and arrest, and the identification could have proceeded regardless of any Fourth Amendment violation during the search or arrest. See id. at 471–72. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court find that probable cause existed to sustain the arrest, and we agree with that recommendation. There is probable cause for an arrest when there is a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime. Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2002). The determination as to probable cause is based on the jurisdiction’s law at the time of the occurrence. Patrizi v. Huff, 690 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2012). An arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 593–93 (6th Cir. 1999) (“It is a well-settled principle of constitutional law that an arrest without probable cause constitutes an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”); accord Patrizi690 F.3d at 464. 2 The Government claims that the Crews decision stands for the proposition that an eyewitness identification of a defendant’s face in a photo array can never be excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. That is a patently false reading of the case. See id. at 472 (“This is not to say that the intervening photographic and lineup identifications—both of which are conceded to be suppressible fruits of the Fourth Amendment violation—could not under some circumstances affect the reliability of the in-court identification and render it inadmissible as well.”) 12 Case: 12-6175 Document: 006111909876 Filed: 12/16/2013 Page: 13 Nos. 12-6175/12-6187/12-6324 When the officers completed their search of the apartment, they had the following evidence: a general description of a suspect matching Evans; evidence from various databases linking Evans with the other suspects; evidence that Evans was found in an apartment with two positively identified suspects; knowledge that he had attempted to block the officers’ entry and then had attempted to flee; physical evidence found in the apartment; two cars matching the descriptions of the cars used in the robberies that were found near the apartment; and a Costco card belonging to a victim who had been seen in one of the vehicles. While “mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person,” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979), the police had far more than that in this case. Prior investigation had tied Evans to the other suspects, he was found nearby to evidence linked to the robberies, and he tried to flee the scene. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Accordingly, we find that there was probable cause to support the arrest of Defendant Evans, and consequently, no basis upon which to exclude the postarrest identification.