Opinion ID: 628999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Accommodations Required

Text: 27 McGregor attacks the accommodations because they did not directly address his disability, i.e., fatigue and pain that impaired his ability to learn, and argues that the Law Center discriminated against him by insisting on a full-time schedule, in-class examinations, and advancement only upon achievement of a 68 average in each freshman semester. He says this was equal treatment which resulted in unequal opportunity to participate in the law program. The Law Center says that they bent over backward to help McGregor; that what McGregor seeks is to blame the Law Center for his mental ineptitude; and that his additional requests for accommodations amount to demands for preferential treatment or a substantial modification of its program, which is not required by law. 28 The Supreme Court's decision in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), sets the stage for almost every Sec. 504 handicap discrimination suit involving postsecondary educational programs. 8 There, the Supreme Court emphasized that Sec. 504 proscribes use of the mere possession of a handicap ... [as] a ground for assuming an inability to function in a particular context. Id. at 405, 99 S.Ct. at 2366. Here, the Law Center has not and does not assume that McGregor cannot function in its legal educational environment. Unlike the plaintiff in Davis, McGregor gained admission to the law school program. Some accommodations were made to allow McGregor to participate and to remain a participant in the program. Despite the Law Center's joint efforts and McGregor's repeated attempts, McGregor did not achieve the necessary GPA to advance to the junior year. McGregor's repeated attempts demonstrate that he cannot function successfully in the Law Center's program. 9 29 McGregor argues that he could succeed in law school if the Law Center accommodated him with (1) a part-time schedule and (2) at-home examinations. 10 As proof of his abilities, he points to the spring 1989 semester (during which he earned a 70 in Constitutional I and passed Legal Writing and Research) and the fall 1989 (during which he received a 70.2 cumulative GPA with three at-home examinations and extra time on the fourth in-class examination). First, we are unpersuaded that this is competent evidence that McGregor can meet the academic demands set by the Law Center on a part-time schedule. McGregor received these passing scores after having a second crack at the courses. Second, his ability to pass given a part-time schedule is not dispositive of the issue here. We agree with the Law Center that many more students could succeed in law school on a part-time schedule. While other law schools in Louisiana and in other states have part-time students, the Law Center has made an academic decision to require that all freshman students carry a full-time course load. Any deviation from this constitutes an accommodation for McGregor's disability. We must decide whether Sec. 504 requires the Law Center to accommodate McGregor either by giving him a part-time freshman schedule or at-home examinations or by advancing him to the junior year despite his failure to satisfy the minimum standard GPA, and later the minimum probationary GPA. 30 The Supreme Court in Davis made clear that Sec. 504 does not mandate that an educational institution lower or [ ] effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person, assuming such standards are reasonable. Id. at 423, 99 S.Ct. at 2377. This rule was crafted in an effort to balance the institution's right to decide the basic requirements pertinent to its program and the handicapped student's right to participate. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). The extent of an institution's affirmative duties to accommodate handicapped individuals is far from clear. The best that opinions following Davis have been able to state definitively is that an educational institution must make reasonable, but not fundamental or substantial modifications to accommodate the handicapped. E.g., Brennan, 834 F.2d at 1261. McGregor, therefore, is entitled to the requested accommodations only if he can demonstrate that the accommodations constitute reasonable deviations from the Law Center's usual requirements which meet[ ] his special needs without sacrificing the integrity of the [Law Center's] program. 11 However, absent evidence of discriminatory intent or disparate impact, we must accord reasonable deference to the Law Center's academic decisions. Brennan, 834 F.2d at 1261 (quoting Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir.1983) and Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)). 31 The record on summary judgment is devoid of evidence of malice, ill-will, or efforts on the part of the Law Center to impede McGregor's progress. Therefore, we must accord deference to the Law Center's decisions not to modify its program if the proposed modifications entail academic decisions. McGregor characterizes the proposed changes as reasonable schedule modifications since the ABA accredits programs with part-time or evening students and the Law Center's bulletin allows such deviation in exceptional circumstances. This does not persuade. 32 First, whether the ABA accredits part-time programs is not determinative of reasonableness under the Rehabilitation Act, and we refrain from giving ABA accreditation such adjudicatory effect. Second, the fact that the Law Center has recognized in its Bulletin that exceptional circumstances may prompt the institution to alter its full-time attendance does not mean that such an alteration is not substantial. Given the Law Center's history and admittance practices, the full-time attendance requirement is critical to their program and the requested deviation would be a substantial modification under any circumstance. 12 Whether the Law Center yields to such a request and whether Sec. 504 requires the Law Center to yield to such a request are two different questions. 33 We conclude that the Law Center's decisions to require full-time attendance and in-class examinations for first year students are academic decisions, ones which we find reasonable in light of the Law Center's admittance practices. The first year courses are specifically chosen to simulate the same challenges found in the practice of law, i.e., to assess and assimilate various legal theories in an intelligible manner. The Law Center has structured an intensive program with high academic standards, which it believes is best equipped to produce high quality lawyers. Essential to its program is a level playing field for all students: First year students cannot engage in outside work during the semester; they must take the same required courses in the same semesters; the examinations are given in class at the same time for each class section; and the final grades are generally based entirely on the final examinations. 34 The Law Center's program, though strict, is effective by some accepted measures. The Law Center has had and continues to have the highest bar passage rate in Louisiana. McGregor proposes that the Law Center create for him a law school program, either with a part-time schedule and at-home examinations or with lowered passing GPA requirements. These additional accommodations clearly force the Law Center either to lower its academic standard and pass McGregor to the next level or to compromise the reasonable policy of its academic program and allow McGregor to attend part-time and take his examinations at home. Section 504 does not require this much. 13 35 The Law Center proved, by way of L'Enfant's affidavit, that no other student has ever been allowed to audit a course in the second semester after failing the first semester, and that no other student, under any circumstances, has ever had a professor assigned to him for the specific purpose of concentrated tutorial instruction on a one on one basis. Also, no student other than McGregor has ever been permitted to take examinations at home, except in the junior or senior level courses in which all students took the examinations at home. Furthermore, no student has ever received the additional accommodations requested. Although the Bulletin allows for schedule changes under exceptional circumstances, the Law Center has not, in fact, permitted it and says that even under exceptional circumstances, a student must have proven his analytical abilities to succeed in the law program before receiving such an accommodation. 36 Viewing the undisputed facts, we can conclude only that the Law Center reasonably accommodated McGregor's disability and that the additional accommodations, if granted, would constitute preferential treatment and go beyond the elimination of disadvantageous treatment mandated by Sec. 504. Brennan, 834 F.2d at 1259-60. We agree with Judge Duplantier that despite the reasonable accommodations provided, McGregor did not achieve the minimum cumulative GPA as required under the academic standards set by the Law Center. McGregor, therefore, is not an otherwise qualified individual who has been denied the benefits of the Law Center's program solely because of his handicap. We affirm the summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the Rehabilitation Act claims.