Opinion ID: 755387
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mutual Intent Requirement

Text: 28 Childress mandates that the parties entertain in their minds the concept of joint authorship. 945 F.2d at 508. This requirement of mutual intent recognizes that, since coauthors are afforded equal rights in the co-authored work, the equal sharing of rights should be reserved for relationships in which all participants fully intend to be joint authors. Id. at 509. 15 29 The Childress court noted that [a]n inquiry into how the putative joint authors regarded themselves in relation to the work has previously been part of our approach in ascertaining the existence of joint authorship. Id. at 508 (citing Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir.1976); Fisher v. Klein, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795, 1798 (S.D.N.Y.1990); Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 198 (S.D.N.Y.1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir.1921)). Moreover, the Childress rule of mutual co-authorship intent has subsequently been followed in this circuit and elsewhere. See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068-69 (7th Cir.1994) (adopting Childress, and noting that reliance on collaboration alone ... would be incompatible with the clear statutory mandate that there be intent to create a joint work); Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y.1996) ([B]oth parties must have intended, at the time of creation, that the work be jointly owned.); Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F.Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (The requisite intent to create a joint work exists when the putative joint authors intend to regard themselves as joint authors [and][i]t is not enough that they intend to merge their contributions into one unitary work.); Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 743, 764 (D.P.R.1995) (following Childress intent requirement). 30 Childress and its progeny, however, do not explicitly define the nature of the necessary intent to be co-authors. 16 The court stated that [i]n many instances, a useful test will be whether, in the absence of contractual arrangements concerning listed authorship, each participant intended that all would be identified as co-authors. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508. But it is also clear that the intention standard is not strictly subjective. In other words, co-authorship intent does not turn solely on the parties' own words or professed state of mind. See id. ([J]oint authorship can exist without any explicit discussion of this topic by the parties.). Rather, the Childress court suggested a more nuanced inquiry into factual indicia of ownership and authorship, such as how a collaborator regarded herself in relation to the work in terms of billing and credit, decisionmaking, and the right to enter into contracts. See id. at 508-09. 17 In this regard, the court stated that [t]hough joint authorship does not require an understanding by the co-authors of the legal consequences of their relationship, obviously some distinguishing characteristic of the relationship must be understood for it to be the subject of their intent. Id. at 508. 18 31 Finally, the Childress court emphasized that the requirement of intent is particularly important where one person ... is indisputably the dominant author of the work and the only issue is whether that person is the sole author or she and another ... are joint authors. Id. Care must be taken ... to guard against the risk that a sole author is denied exclusive authorship status simply because another person render[s] some form of assistance. Id. at 504; see also Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069 (Those seeking copyrights would not seek further refinement that colleagues may offer if they risked losing their sole authorship.). 32 Thomson intimates that Childress' stringent mutual intent standard is properly limited, by its facts, to cases involving claimants who have made minimal contribution[s] to the writing of a work. Brief for Appellant at 30. And she asserts that her purported major contribution of copyrightable expression to Rent, by itself, is evidence of Larson's intent that she be a co-author. Indeed, Thomson goes further and claims that this proof is enough to give her relationship with Larson the distinguishing characteristics needed to establish co-authorship. But Childress makes clear that the contribution even of significant language to a work does not automatically suffice to confer co-author status on the contributor. Under Childress, a specific finding of mutual intent remains necessary. 19 See 945 F.2d at 508. We therefore turn to an examination of the factual indicia of ownership and authorship relevant to this inquiry, as they are defined in prior cases. 33