Opinion ID: 2198126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Equal Pay Claim

Text: Under the EPA, [14] [a] plaintiff who alleges that [ ]he was unlawfully paid less than a [wo]man must establish that the `employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.' Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 984 (D.C.1984) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (construing Equal Pay Act)) (quotations omitted). The phrase equal work does not require that the jobs be identical, but only that they be substantially equal. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Skill includes consideration of such factors as experience, training, education and ability. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Responsibility involves the degree of accountability required in the performance of the job; the controlling factor is not job title but job contentthe actual duties that the respective employees are called upon to perform. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). As the trial court pointed out, it is undisputed that Seay was paid more than [Johnson] for a job that undisputably was considered `equivalent.' Defendants argue, nevertheless, that they established one of the Act's affirmative defensesthat the pay differential was based on something other than sex. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (2000). They assert that Seay's higher pay was justified by her skills and experience, and by the importance of having a strong relationship with the Visitors Bureau. But defendants do not convincingly explain why they paid Seay more money at the outset, before she had a chance to demonstrate her abilities. Moreover, Johnson offered evidence that he maintained a good relationship with the Visitors Bureau. The trial court instructed the jury that WCCA could defeat Johnson's claim if its decision on pay was based on any factor other than sex or gender, and the jury rejected that defense. Recognizing the limitations of our role when reviewing the denial of a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, see George Washington University v. Violand, 940 A.2d 965, 980 (D.C.2008) (citing Liu v. Allen, 894 A.2d 453, 459 n. 10 (D.C.2006)), we are unpersuaded by WCCA's argument. On the basis of the record before us, we see no justification for upsetting the jury's verdict on liability under the EPA. We will, however, ask the trial court to clarify its award of damages for the EPA claim. The parties asked the jury to decide the issue of liability under the EPA, but stipulated that the trial court would determine damages. Their stipulation reads, in relevant part: [The parties] have agreed that the damages available under the Equal Pay Act are $3,235.201 and the Parties have agreed that the Court should decide the amount of these damages. . . . 1 [T]he difference between what Ms. Seay was paid for the pay period of September 18, 2000 through November 12, 2000 ($80,000-$76,395) added to the difference between what Ms. Seay was paid for the pay period of November 12, 2000 through February 1, 2001 including the payments made retroactively on February 23, 2001 ($88,000.00-$76,395). We have recognized that parties may stipulate to the extent of their damages,. . . [as well as] to the means to be employed in calculating their damages. . . . Goozh v. Capitol Souvenir Co., Inc., 462 A.2d 1140, 1142 n. 4 (D.C.1983); see also Waverly Taylor, Inc. v. Polinger, 583 A.2d 179, 181 (D.C.1990) (The court awarded Polinger damages of $150,000.00, an amount stipulated by the parties prior to trial.). Although the trial court explained clearly and in great detail how it calculated damages in the amount of $62,829.46, [15] its memorandum and order does not reference the stipulation. For this reason, defendants argue on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding the stipulation and by failing to explain in its Memorandum its reason for disregarding the stipulation. The defendants interpret the stipulation as establishing that the damages available under the EPA would be $3,235.20. [16] Johnson counters that the stipulation is simply an agreement that $3,235.20 would be minimally available if the jury found an EPA violation. The stipulation by its terms leaves to the Court discretion to determine the actual amount of damages thereunder. Defendants ask us to vacate and remand with instructions to reduce the award of damages on the EPA claim to $3,235.20. However, neither party has persuaded us that its interpretation conveys the plain meaning of the stipulation. For this reason, we remand the issue of damages under the EPA to the trial court, which may conduct further fact-finding to determine the intentions of the parties. See Tillery v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 912 A.2d 1169, 1176 (D.C.2006) (`If the court finds that the contract has more than one reasonable interpretation and therefore is ambiguous, then the court after admitting probative extrinsic evidence must determine what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the disputed language meant.' (quoting In re Bailey, 883 A.2d 106, 118 (D.C.2005))). [17]