Opinion ID: 1060443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: improper delegation of state highway patrol authority to local police officers

Text: Because courts should not generally decide constitutional issues if the case may be properly resolved on nonconstitutional grounds, see State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn.1996); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995), we first address whether the evidence in this case should have been suppressed because local police officers unlawfully stopped motorists to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-351(a) provides that [I]t is unlawful for any law enforcement officer of this state, except a state patrol officer or officer of the department, to demand the exhibition of such [drivers'] licenses, unless the operator of the motor vehicle is then engaged in, or immediately prior to such demand has been engaged in, a violation of any municipal ordinance or statute law of this state. In addition, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-103(c) (1997) provides that no officer except members of the Tennessee highway patrol acting pursuant to [section] 4-7-104, shall have the authority to stop a motor vehicle for the sole purpose of examining or checking the operator's license of the driver of such vehicle. Citing both of these statutes, the appellant argues that the roadblock in this case was statutorily illegal because officers other than those with the Tennessee Highway Patrol actually stopped his car and requested to see his operator's license. A majority of the intermediate court found that these statutes conflicted with Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-804 (1998), which requires a driver to display his or her license upon demand of any officer or agent of the department or any police officer of the state, county or municipality.... The majority then held that the conflict between section 55-50-804 and the statutes cited by the appellant should be resolved in favor of the former because it was the last in time to be enacted. Writing in dissent, Judge Tipton opined that the statutes cited by the appellant have not been superseded by section 55-50-804 because all three statutes can be harmoniously construed to permit local officers to request an operator's license, so long as those same officers do not initiate the stop in order to do so. We disagree with the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals in so far as it found an irreconcilable conflict between these statutes. The legislature is always presumed to know of its prior enactments, see, e.g., State v. Levandowski, 955 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tenn.1997), and consequently, courts should find repeals by implication only when statutes cannot be construed harmoniously, see, e.g., Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn.1995). In this case, the various statutes can be reasonably construed so as to give effect to each, and we find no need to resort to the last-in-time canon of construction to resolve a supposed conflict. Section 55-50-804 does not address the ability of officers to initiate a stop of a motor vehicle to conduct a license check, but it speaks only to the general authority of officers to request a driver to display his or her license. On the other hand, sections 55-50-351(a) and 40-7-103(c) are quite emphatic that only state highway patrol officers possess the authority to initiate the stop of a vehicle for this purpose, and these two statutes do not speak to whether other officers may request a license after a stop has been initiated. Consequently, we agree with Judge Tipton that the legislature probably intended for section 55-50-804 to apply only to motorists that have already been stopped for a violation of the law. Assuming this to be the case, then, the roadblock at issue here was in clear violation of sections 55-50-351(a) and 40-7-103(c) because the record unequivocally shows that the appellant's stop was initiated by local police officers. However, our finding that the roadblock in this case was operated contrary to statutory requirements does not necessarily resolve the issue of whether the evidence seized as a result of this roadblock should be suppressed. Importantly, suppression of evidence is not required if the statutory violation does not actually infringe upon a specific constitutional protection or guarantee. See Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 93. Judge Tipton believed that because the statutes represented a legislative declaration that seizures contrary to the statute were unreasonable, the violation of sections 55-50-351(a) and 40-7-103(c) warranted suppression of the evidence obtained from the roadblock. While this view may have possessed some merit at the time that Judge Tipton penned his dissent, we are reluctant to adopt a similar holding today. Since the time that this case was pending before the intermediate court, the legislature has amended section 55-50-351(a) to permit any police officer of the state, county, or municipality to request display of drivers' licenses. See 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 700, § 12 (effective July 1, 2001). Accordingly, any legislative declaration in this regard must be weighed in favor of approving the stop. Moreover, we have found no authority for holding that the employment status of the officer requesting to see the license may alone be determinative of the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure. Instead, the statutory violation appears relevant only to the extent that it, along with other factors, contributes to finding an unreasonable intrusion on the liberty and privacy of motorists. Therefore, because resolution of this statutory issue does not lead to a full and proper resolution of the case, we must address the constitutionality of the roadblock itself.