Opinion ID: 883138
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Whether the District Court erred when it denied Moore's motion for a new trial on claims of juror misconduct?

Text: On January 19, 1993, Moore moved for a new trial alleging, among other things, juror misconduct as a result of two contacts Moore had with juror Tina Coulston during trial which occurred outside of the courtroom. During trial, Ms. Coulston told some of the other jurors about these contacts. Ms. Coulston also related a bad dream she had about Moore to some of the other jurors just prior to deliberations. After learning that Ms. Coulston made these remarks to other jurors, Moore moved for a new trial two months after the verdict. Moore alleged in his motion that one of the jurors expressed an opinion during deliberations to the other jurors that she was being stalked by the defendant in the course of the trial. Pursuant to Moore's motion, a hearing was held where Ms. Coulston testified that on two different occasions, Moore had come out to the Gallatin County airport cafe and ordered coffee. Ms. Coulston testified that she acted as Moore's waitress on both occasions, as she was the only waitress on duty, and that she did not talk to him on either occasion. Ms. Coulston also testified the contacts made her uncomfortable, but that she did not feel threatened. Ms. Coulston testified that she never used the term stalking when explaining the situation, and did not know where the term came from. In addition, the other jurors who testified concerning the stalking allegation related that Ms. Coulston did not use the term stalking. The following testimony from the hearing on Moore's motion for a new trial, evidences that Ms. Coulston did not relate to other jurors or anyone else, that she believed Moore was stalking her, following her, or that she felt threatened by the incidents. Q: [By defense counsel] During the trial, do you recall telling Patrick Fleming or saying in his presence at a lasagna party that Larry Moore was stalking you, following you, or watching you? A: [By Ms. Coulston] I did not say that. .... Q: Did you express concern regarding your belief that you were being watched by Larry Moore? A: No. Q: You did not express concern to the other jurors? A: Just that he was there and he made me uncomfortable. .... Q: And you told two different groups of jurors during the trial when they were sitting as active jurors in this case Mr. Moore was watching you, isn't that correct? A: I did not say he was watching me. I told them about the incident at the airport. Q: An you indicated by your tone of voice and by your expressions and by your gestures that you felt threatened by Mr. Moore, isn't that correct? A: No. Q: And as a matter of fact, Miss Coulston, you did feel threatened by Mr. Moore, didn't you? A: No, I did not. When testifying about relating her dream to the other jurors, Ms. Coulston's stated that she could not remember the specifics of her dream, just that she had a bad dream. However, Juror Knight testified that Ms. Coulston related to other jurors that [Ms. Coulston] dreamed that we all found Larry guilty, and he had a gun and he shot Mr. Jent and you, [Jent's co-counsel] and he grabbed her out of the jury box and ran off with her. After considering the testimony at the hearing, the District Court denied Moore's motion finding no evidence to support the allegation of juror misconduct concerning either the stalking claim or in relating the dream. We agree. The decision whether to grant a new trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not overturn a denial of a motion for a new trial on appeal. State v. Arlington (1994), 265 Mont. 127, 150-51, 875 P.2d 307, 321; State v. Staat (1991), 251 Mont. 1, 9-10, 822 P.2d 643, 648. Initially, we address the State's argument that the District Court was without jurisdiction to consider Moore's motion for a new trial, because he failed to file his motion within 30 days of the verdict as is required by statute. Section 46-16-702, MCA, provides in pertinent part: Motion for a new trial. (1) Following a verdict or finding of guilty, the court may grant the defendant a new trial if required in the interest of justice. (2) The motion for a new trial must be in writing and must specify the grounds for a new trial. The motion must be filed by the defendant within 30 days following a verdict or finding of guilty and be served upon the prosecution. Moore argues that our decision in State v. Redcrow (1990), 242 Mont. 254, 790 P.2d 449, provides two exceptions to the 30 day time limit: (1) if the motion was filed within a reasonable period of time after the verdict; and (2) if the crime is of a serious nature. However, in Redcrow we noted that those factors did not require the district court to entertain the motion, but nevertheless, we agreed to address the issue as a result of the district court's extensive consideration of the motion. Redcrow, 242 Mont. 254, 790 P.2d at 452. Similarly, in the instant case, because the District Court gave extensive consideration to Moore's motion for a new trial, and because this is a serious case, we shall address the merits of the motion. A defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury is guaranteed by both our state and federal constitutions. Mont. Const. Art. II, Sec. 24; U.S. Const. amend. VI. Moore argues that when a defendant moves for a mistrial based on ex parte contact, the defendant is afforded a presumption of prejudice. We disagree. Where a defendant moves for a mistrial based on juror misconduct resulting from ex parte contact, the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice in order to receive a new trial. State v. Hage (1993), 258 Mont. 498, 503, 853 P.2d 1251, 1254, citing, United States v. Madrid (9th Cir.1988), 842 F.2d 1090, 1094-95, cert. denied 488 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 269, 102 L.Ed.2d 256. The Ninth Circuit Court in Madrid distinguished between cases where ex parte contact provided extraneous information to the jury, and ex parte contact which did not pertain to any fact or controversy or any law applicable to the case. The court held that the defendant must prove actual prejudice in cases which do not involve the unauthorized submission of extraneous information to the jury. Madrid, 842 F.2d at 1093. Here the District Court concluded that the contact did not result in the jury receiving any extraneous information. The court summarized its ruling as follows: There had been no discussion between the defendant and Miss Coulston. There had been no discussion of the case between Miss Coulston and any of the other jurors. What really occurred was that Mr. Moore was at the Gallatin County airport to pick up or deliver his sister or his mother, who were in attendance at one time or another during the course of this trial, and saw Ms. Coulston there. So it's going to be the Court's ruling with respect to that issue that it is insufficient and inadequate as a matter of law to impeach the jury verdict or to cause this Court to grant a new trial or to cause this Court to set aside the jury verdict in this case. We agree that no extraneous information was submitted to the jury as a result of Ms. Coulston's relating the incidents. There was testimony that the defendant and the juror had seen each other at the Gallatin County airport. The extent of the contact was that Ms. Coulston acted as Moore's waitress. Moore kept his head down and did not engage Ms. Coulston in any conversation. We conclude that Ms. Coulston did not discuss any fact in controversy or any law applicable to the case with either Moore or other jurors. Ms. Coulston merely mentioned an incident that had occurred to her about which she was concerned. In alleging that Ms. Coulston related to other jurors that she felt Moore was stalking her during trial, we first observe that the evidence does not support the accusation. Moreover, it appears that Moore is attempting to take advantage of his own conduct. During the trial Moore went to the airport cafe on two occasions and ordered food or coffee from Ms. Coulston. Ms. Coulston had to serve Moore as she was the only waitress on duty. Ms. Coulston related to other members of the jury that she was concerned by the contact. However, there is no evidence in the record that the stalking term came from the juror, or that she made remarks that Moore had stalked her during trial. The law will not allow a defendant to purposefully create grounds for a mistrial. To hold otherwise would provide a criminal defendant with a convenient device for provoking a mistrial whenever he chose to do so, either inside or outside the courtroom. Hammond v. United States (D.C.App. 1975), 345 A.2d 140, 141. We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Maine which held: [A] defendant who seeks to prejudice his own case by [contact with a juror], and keeps that contact secret until an unfavorable verdict is returned, cannot claim to be prejudiced by his own misdeed. State v. Nielson, (Me. 1989), 552 A.2d 543, 545. Although he was permitted an evidentiary hearing to prove his allegations of juror misconduct, Moore failed to prove that juror misconduct occurred, or that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced. Rather, it appears that Moore was simply trying to take advantage of his own acts. Moore also contends that it was juror misconduct for Ms. Coulston to have related her dream about Moore to the jury. The State counters that the dream is beyond the scope of inquiry pursuant to Rule 606(b), M.R.Evid. Rule 606(b), M.R.Evid., provides in pertinent part: Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith ... However, as an exception to this subdivision, a juror may testify ... as to any matter or statement concerning only the following questions, whether occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or not: (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention; or (2) whether any outside influence was brought to bear upon any juror ... This Court has held that [a] juror's physical, mental, and emotional condition is inherent in the verdict, and the effect of such a condition on a juror's vote is within the prohibition of Rule 606(b). Hage, 853 P.2d at 1257, citing State v. DeMers (1988), 234 Mont. 273, 277-278, 762 P.2d 860, 863. After an extensive search, this Court was unable to find any authority indicating that a juror's relating a dream to other jurors constituted either impermissible extraneous prejudicial information, or an outside influence. Therefore, we hold that any inquiry into Ms. Coulston's dream is prohibited pursuant to Rule 606(b), M.R.Evid., as it relates to her mental process, and because it cannot be characterized as an exception to the rule. During the trial Ms. Coulston approached the bailiff, and related that Moore had been out at the airport cafe. Ms. Coulston explained she was concerned about the contact, and thought it was very peculiar that Moore would travel all the way to the airport to eat. The bailiff asked Ms. Coulston whether Moore had talked to her. Upon learning that Moore did not say anything, the bailiff told Ms. Coulston that she (the bailiff) would bring the matter to the judge's attention, and would let Ms. Coulston know if the court had any further concerns. The bailiff related the matter to the judge, and the matter never came up again during the trial or deliberations. Moore argues that the District Court erred by failing to immediately notify counsel of the situation after Ms. Coulston contacted the bailiff. Moore alleges that had he learned of this incident during trial, he would have questioned Ms. Coulston and the other jurors during trial to determine what she had conveyed to them concerning the incident. If the defense determined Ms. Coulston had related that she felt she was being stalked by Moore, the defense would have asked the court to remove Ms. Coulston from the jury and to seat one of the alternate jurors. Moore's claims are without merit. He was afforded a hearing after trial but could not demonstrate prejudice. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Rushen v. Spain (1983), 464 U.S. 114, 119-20, 104 S.Ct. 453, 456, 78 L.Ed.2d 267, 273-74. When an ex parte communication relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally should disclose the communication to counsel for all parties. The prejudicial effect of a failure to do so, however, can normally be determined by a post-trial hearing. The adequacy of any remedy is determined solely by its ability to mitigate constitutional error, if any, that has occurred. Post-trial hearings are adequately tailored to this task. (Citations omitted.) The United State Supreme Court addressed the issue of juror misconduct as a result of ex parte contact in Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78. There a juror applied for a job as an investigator with the district attorney's office during the defendant's trial. The prosecution did not disclose this information until after the verdict had been rendered, and the defendant moved to set aside the verdict. Smith, 455 U.S. at 212-13, 102 S.Ct. at 943-44, 71 L.Ed.2d at 83-84. The trial court denied the motion after holding a post-trial hearing, at which the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. Smith, 455 U.S. at 213-14, 102 S.Ct. at 944, 71 L.Ed.2d at 84. The defendant argued to the United States Supreme Court that jurors' testimony could not be relied upon to determine whether they were impartial, and maintained that the law must impute bias to jurors in these situations. Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 944-45, 71 L.Ed.2d at 85. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating, [t]his Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 945, 71 L.Ed.2d at 85. The Court also stated: [D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a hearing like that ... held in this case. Smith, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 946, 71 L.Ed.2d at 86. In conclusion, here, the trial judge held a hearing on Moore's motion for a new trial, and Moore failed to demonstrate that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced as a result of alleged juror misconduct. We therefore hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moore's new trial motion on the basis of juror misconduct.