Opinion ID: 2099757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: validity of september 23, 1987, ordinance

Text: We next turn to an analysis of the validity of the disputed ordinance enacted by the City. In evaluating the ordinance, we must keep in mind that under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the City is a home rule unit of local government. The 1970 Constitution of Illinois bestows broad authority on home rule units. In article VII, section 6(a), it is stated in part: Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a).) The powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed broadly. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(m).) It has been stated that home rule units have the same powers as the sovereign except where such powers are limited by the General Assembly. City of Urbana v. Houser (1977), 67 Ill.2d 268, 273. Bearing in mind the broad authority of a home rule unit, we find controlling a principle articulated in Illinois Gasoline Dealers Association v. City of Chicago (1988), 119 Ill.2d 391. In Illinois Gasoline Dealers Association, the plaintiffs asserted that a fuel tax ordinance was improperly removed from committee and therefore improperly adopted. The plaintiffs' claim there was based on an alleged violation by the city council of one of its own rules. We declined to review the plaintiffs' assertions in this regard, since the plaintiffs did not claim that the allegedly improper adoption was a violation of any constitutional or statutory provision. (119 Ill.2d at 404.) It is true, as the National Trust points out, that the rule allegedly violated in Illinois Gasoline Dealers Association was an internal rule rather than an ordinance, but this distinction is not controlling here. In Illinois Gasoline Dealers Association, we quoted with approval the following language in Chirikos v. Yellow Cab Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 569, 574: This court cannot handle matters which in effect are attempts to overrule decisions of a legislative body based upon alleged failure to follow requirements imposed by that body itself.    We have authority to invalidate legislation adopted by the city council only upon grounds that the enactment violates a provision of the Federal or State constitutions or violates the mandate of a State or Federal statute. We find this language applicable here, and we may not hold invalid the disputed ordinance unless it was enacted in violation of a constitutional provision or a provision of a State or Federal statute. The National Trust has not pointed out, and we have not discovered, any Federal or State statutory provision infringed by the amendatory ordinance in question. We also note, without meaning to imply that any constitutional violation is readily apparent, that the National Trust has not alleged that the disregard of certain procedures in enacting the ordinance was unconstitutionally arbitrary; the National Trust has not contended that the ordinance was enacted in violation of constitutional guarantees of equal protection, procedural due process or substantive due process. Because we can invalidate an ordinance only when it violates a constitutional provision or a State or Federal statute, and because no such violation is asserted here, we must affirm the circuit court's ruling that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action. In reaching our conclusion that this case is controlled by Illinois Gasoline Dealers Association, we observe that in enacting the disputed ordinance, the City was functioning as a legislative body rather than, as the National Trust suggests, an administrative body. We recognize that a municipality may in some instances be required to perform an administrative function either directly or through the establishment of a separate board or agency. For example, section 11-13-3 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 24, par. 11-13-3) requires that certain municipalities establish a zoning board of appeals, an administrative body. (See also 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 58 (1962) (discussing a multitude of situations in which legislative bodies may come within the term administrative agency).) In the instant case, however, what is involved is not the performance of an administrative function pursuant to the General Assembly's delegation of authority, but the performance of a legislative function authorized by the home rule provisions of the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiffs have cited numerous cases involving zoning ordinances, which cases they believe dictate that the ordinance at issue here is void for failure to comply with procedural requirements of an earlier ordinance. We find it necessary to discuss some of these cases in detail. Prior to the institution of constitutionally granted home rule authority, municipalities looked to the General Assembly to grant them limited authority to enact zoning laws. Since a legislative grant of authority was the source of a municipality's limited ability to zone, it necessarily followed that zoning action had to be exercised within the boundaries of the delegated authority. Thus, this court and lower courts necessarily struck down ordinances which were enacted in violation of the limited authority bestowed by the General Assembly. For example, in Treadway v. City of Rockford (1962), 24 Ill.2d 488, cited by the National Trust, this court held that a cause of action could be stated to have a zoning ordinance declared void where it was alleged that, in enacting the ordinance, the city council violated the then-existing zoning enabling act by neglecting to follow certain petition and publication requirements mandated in the zoning enabling act. This court stated that it is obvious that, when a statute prescribes certain steps as conditions to the enactment of an ordinance, those conditions must be substantially complied with. This holding in Treadway is not, of course, applicable here, since the City is a home rule unit, and its authority to enact the instant ordinance derives not from a zoning act but from the home rule provisions of the Illinois Constitution. Dicta can be found in Treadway indicating that a zoning ordinance amendment which is enacted in violation of the procedural requirements of an earlier, more general zoning ordinance is void. In Treadway, the court stated: [W]e have further held that where a general zoning ordinance includes additional procedural requirements for its amendment, not inconsistent with those of the statute, these requirements must also be complied with. (24 Ill.2d at 496.) In making this statement, the court in Treadway cited Cain v. Lyddon (1931), 343 Ill. 217, which so stated. A similar conclusion was reached in Cosmopolitan National Bank v. City of Chicago (1963), 27 Ill.2d 578. In view of the holding in Illinois Gasoline Dealers Association and our holding today, Cain, Cosmopolitan, and the dicta in Treadway can be legitimately distinguished only on the basis either that the disregard of the procedural provisions involved therein was unconstitutionally arbitrary (an issue not raised here) or that the nonuniform application of the municipality's own procedural provisions was inconsistent with the General Assembly's intent in delegating limited zoning authority to municipalities in the then-existing zoning act. As stated in Cain, [i]n Michigan-Lake Building Corp. v. Hamilton [1930], 340 Ill. 284, this court emphasized the fact that careful, serious and intelligent consideration of amendments to zoning ordinances is contemplated by the Zoning act. 343 Ill. at 221. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a cause of action is affirmed. Affirmed.