Opinion ID: 149229
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Materiality of Count Three

Text: Finally, Mr. Hasan argues that the inconsistent statements supporting his conviction on Count Three were not material to any issue examined by the April 2005 grand jury. Because he raised this claim before the district court, to prevail on appeal, Mr. Hasan needs to show that, viewing the evidence de novo and in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Parada, 577 F.3d 1275, 1283 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. May 24, 2010) (No. 09-8388). Count Three concerns testimony given by Mr. Hasan about injuries to his mouth and teeth that he suffered while in Somalia. At his appearance before the April grand jury, Mr. Hasan stated that he had suffered broken teeth in an attack; before the November grand jury he denied having received such an injury. Mr. Hasan now argues that any statement about his teeth could not have been material to the April grand jury's investigation. He reasons as follows: The April grand jury was investigating the truthfulness of the statements that Hasan made to federal agents in 2004, regarding his personal and family history. Aplee. Br. at 34. But when the federal agent who interviewed Mr. Hasan in 2004 testified at trial, he did not disclose any statements made by the Defendant about harm he suffered in Somalia or the condition of his teeth. Aplt. Br. at 26. Thus any statement about broken teeth could not have been material to the April grand jury's inquiry because Mr. Hasan had not said anything about teeth to the federal agent and there was no potential falsehood for the grand jury to uncover on the topic. Mr. Hasan frames the materiality inquiry too narrowly. As noted above, for testimony to be material, it need not have an actual effect; it merely must be `capable of influencing' the grand jury. Vap, 852 F.2d at 1253 (quoting United States v. Girdner, 773 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir. 1985)). Our sister circuits take the same view. The Ninth Circuit has said: The only requirement is that the question be material to a subject of grand jury inquiry. The evidence need not be material to the main issue and it need not be directed to the primary subject of the investigation. It is material if it is relevant to any subsidiary issue then under consideration. United States v. Percell, 526 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir.1975); see also United States v. Farnham, 791 F.2d 331, 334 (4th Cir.1986) (Given the wide-ranging investigative function of the grand jury, the materiality of any line of inquiry pursued by a grand jury must be broadly construed. (citation omitted)). The April grand jury was investigating allegedly false statements made by Mr. Hasan to the federal agent regarding his family and personal history. The agent's testimony indicates that portions of the 2004 interview focused on physical harms suffered by Mr. Hasan and his family. Mr. Hasan's statements to the April grand jury that he suffered broken teeth involve harms he suffered in Somalia and thus would be material to that grand jury's investigation into whether Mr. Hasan made false statements about his personal circumstances in his home country. This is so even if he made no mention of broken teeth during the 2004 agent interview. In this light we are confident that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Hasan's statements at the April grand jury were material, and we reject Mr. Hasan's claim that the government failed to present sufficient evidence on this count.