Opinion ID: 3012935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judicial Privilege

Text: The attorney appellees also contend that, regardless of how we resolve the issues regarding the contours of the abuse of process claim, leave to amend would be futile given that the judicial privilege would insulate them from liability. The District Court agreed with the attorney appellees and held that their “response to discovery and court filings in the Insurance Coverage Action are absolutely privileged and, as such, cannot support a claim for abuse of process.” General Refractories, 2002 WL 376923, at . The District Court, however, interpreted the judicial privilege too broadly. 5. Because we will remand this case to the District Court to allow GRC to amend its abuse of process claim, we find it unnecessary to parse each allegation contained in the Complaint to determine which constitutes a “legal process.” Should the occasion arise, the District Court should engage in that analysis in the first instance. 21 The judicial privilege — often referred to, in Pennsylvania, as “judicial immunity” — extends to “communications which are issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought.” Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1986); see also Binder v. Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 275 A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971). As our court stated in a case that required us to assess “judicial privilege” in the context of a tortious interference claim: [T]he “privilege exists because there is a realm of communication essential to the exploration of legal claims that would be hindered were there not the protection afforded by the privilege.” Without the protection of the privilege for communications necessary to such exploration, access to the courts would be impaired, witnesses would be intimidated and lawyers’ efforts in pursuit of their clients causes would be chilled. Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Post, 507 A.2d at 353, 355 (Pa. 1986)); see also Binder, 275 A.2d at 56 (stating that privilege is intended to allow “[a] judge . . . free[dom] to administer the law without fear of consequences” and is extended “to parties to afford freedom of access to the courts, to witnesses to encourage their complete and unintimidated testimony in court, and to counsel to enable him to best represent his client’s interests.”). Therefore, the privilege (1) only applies to communications, and (2) does not apply to communications not either “pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought,” Post, 507 A.2d at 353, or “essential to the exploration of legal claims in litigation.” Silver, 894 F.2d at 603; see, e.g., Post, 507 A.2d at 355 (stating that there was no immunity for an attorney’s statements about an adversary made in a disparaging letter to the Disciplinary Board because the statements were not made in the pleadings, during argument in the case, or during trial, but, rather, “took the form of an extrajudicial communication which was issued during the course of trial”). GRC mainly argues that the judicial privilege cannot possibly apply to these circumstances because “[i]t is illogical on the one hand to say that discovery abuses and 22 filing frivolous motions can support an abuse of process claim because those actions are incident to the litigation process, and on the other hand to say that those actions are absolutely privileged because they are communications issued in the litigation process.” GRC’s argument has a good deal of logical appeal. The mere existence of the abuse of process tort is evidence that judicial privilege applies to a much narrower range of activity than the attorney appellees urge. Where judicial process is being perverted, immunity would impede, not further, the interests protected by the judicial privilege. See Silver, 894 F.2d at 603-04 (finding that judicial privilege does not apply to the Pennsylvania statutory tort for wrongful use of civil proceedings — the Dragonetti Act — because “Pennsylvania would not have the Dragonetti Act if Pennsylvania’s judicial privilege protected the filing of an action without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than to secure relief ”). What is more, the gist of GRC’s Complaint is that the attorney appellees acted in a way that abused process. That is, GRC does not base its cause of action merely on statements, but, rather, chiefly on conduct. While some communications may be privileged — allowing, for instance, immunity from defamation actions — conduct is clearly susceptible to being punishable as abuse. See Brown v. Del. Valley Transplant Program, 539 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (stressing that the “key” to “the absolute privilege accorded an attorney in the representation of a client in judicial proceedings . . . is whether the pertinent communication was undertaken in connection with representation of a client in a judicial proceeding” (emphasis added)). There are few allegations in the Complaint pertaining to the substance of any communication. Moreover, the conduct criticized by the court in the State Court Litigation would seem a dubious candidate for the privilege as it was most probably not essential to the exploration of claims. We are therefore convinced that GRC, in its amended complaint, as in its original Complaint, could include averments that the attorney appellees abused process in a manner not protected by the judicial privilege. While the 23 privilege does encompass statements made in court filings and during argument and trial, see Binder, 275 A.2d at 56 (holding that statements by a party, a witness, counsel, or a judge cannot be the basis of a defamation action whether they occur in the pleadings or in open court), the privilege does not extend to either conduct or to other communications neither “pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought” nor “essential to the exploration of legal claims in litigation.” We will not, however, examine the allegations of the Complaint as it stands to determine whether the judicial privilege applies, given our determination of the underlying issue. Rather, on remand, the District Court can examine the allegations in the amended complaint regarding attorney appellees’ statements and determine whether those allegations involved privileged communication.6