Opinion ID: 1560190
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Status of the Property

Text: Linen argues that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord because a material fact remained in dispute, specifically whether the property is a single-family or two-unit dwelling. He contests the trial court's reliance on language in an August 2002, Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs decision and order stating that the property is a single-family dwelling on the ground that this portion of the decision is dicta. The order was entered in a DCRA proceeding initiated by Linen in which it was established that although the residence was in form a single-family home, it was being used as a two-unit rental property without the required certificate of occupancy. He argues that the property's status as a single-family or two-unit accommodation was not sufficiently considered by the DCRA to have precedential value for the trial court. In its decision and order, the DCRA awarded Linen a rent refund in excess of $24,000. Further, the tenant disputes the trial court's reliance in part on the landlord's filing in February 2002, of an amended registration form that describes the property as a single-family home. The tenant states that he filed his petition with the Rental Accommodations and Conversion Division of the DCRA in June of 2001, that the apartment became vacant in August of 2001, and that the landlord did not file the amended registration until February of 2002, after the DCRA hearing had taken place. The tenant suggests that this sequence of events indicates that the landlord did not intend to permanently remove the basement apartment from the rental market, but rather that the basement apartment was merely vacant, or temporarily removed from the rental market, or taken off the market in bad faith. We are not convinced that this sequence of events lends appellant's position any support at all. Linen also argues that the property's location in the R-3 zoning district, an area where only single-family homes are permitted, does not support the trial court's conclusion that the property is a single-family home. He contends that the landlord illegally maintained a two-unit dwelling in violation of the applicable zoning regulations, and that the landlord's conduct in this respect dictates the status of the property for TOPA purposes. In addition, Linen argues that the language in the 2005 Superior Court order [2] describing the property as a single-family home did not have any precedential value for the trial court because the property's status as a single-family or two-unit dwelling was not sufficiently considered by the Landlord and Tenant Branch in the 2005 proceeding. To affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment we must find, on the basis of our independent review of the record, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). The Supreme Court has explained that under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(c), [3] entry of summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). The substantive law applicable to an individual case determines when a fact is material, and only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Genuine factual issues for trial are those that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In the case at bar, whether the property is a single-family or two-unit dwelling will affect the outcome of Linen's TOPA-based claim, and thus the status of the property is a material fact under Anderson. However, on the record before us, there is no genuine issue concerning this material fact. Any finding by a judge or a jury that Lanford had failed to establish that the property is a single-family dwelling would be insupportable. As the trial court correctly pointed out in its order granting summary judgment, Linen prevailed before the DCRA because the property is a single-family home that Lanford had illegally rented as a two-unit dwelling. The amended registration filed by Lanford in February 2002, following the DCRA proceeding identified the property as a single-family home, and DCRA records describe the property as a two bedroom single family home. Moreover, the property is situated in district R-3 and the applicable zoning regulations prohibit two-family homes. Linen has not set forth any specific facts indicating that a genuine factual issue remains for trial. Instead, he has made conclusory allegations in opposition to Lanford's evidence that are insufficient to create a genuine factual issue requiring a trial. See Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 198 (D.C.1991) (explaining that [c]onclusory allegations by the non-moving party are insufficient . . . to defeat the entry of summary judgment[.]) (internal citations omitted). We conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that the property is a single-family home.