Opinion ID: 77840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Smith's Claims for Injunctive Relief Under RLUIPA

Text: On appeal, Smith first argues that the district court erred in construing his claims for injunctive relief under RLUIPA as being moot. Smith's argument in this regard is two-fold. First, he contends that the district court erred in treating his request for injunctive relief based on his request for a small quartz crystal as moot, due to his release from prison in 2004. Second, he argues that the district court erred in assuming that his other requests for injunctive reliefnamely, his petition for a designated worship area and his request for a fire pithad been mooted by the ADOC Committee's 2003 decision. We address each argument in turn. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the consideration of `Cases' and `Controversies.' Mingkid v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 468 F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). The doctrine of mootness derives directly from the case-or-controversy limitation, because an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, we may not entertain an appeal unless there is a present case or controversy, that is, an actual dispute [that] continues to exist between the parties. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir.2004). On the other hand, [a] case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief. Mingkid, 468 F.3d at 768 (citation, alteration, and internal quotations omitted). The general rule in our circuit is that a transfer or a release of a prisoner from prison will moot that prisoner's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. McKinnon, 745 F.2d at 1363; Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir. 1986) ( per curiam ). [6] The reason for this rule is that injunctive relief is a prospective remedy, intended to prevent future injuries, Adler, 112 F.3d at 1477, and, as a result, once the prisoner has been released, the court lacks the ability to grant injunctive relief and correct the conditions of which the prisoner complained. See, e.g., Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir.1985) ( per curiam ) (stating that a prisoner's past exposure to sub-par conditions in a prison does not constitute a present case or controversy involving injunctive relief). The district court relied on this well-established rule, and concluded that Smith's claim for injunctive reliefrequesting that the ADOC be ordered to grant him a crystal for his practice of Odinismhad been rendered moot by his release from prison in 2004. The court found that [Smith's] release constituted a change in the facts that ended the controversy with respect to injunctive relief for this alleged injury, that is, the denial of the crystal. Smith, 401 F.Supp.2d at 1244. This determination was not erroneous at the time it was madeindeed, under the law of our circuit, Smith's release from the prison would have mooted his claim for injunctive relief requesting that he be granted the future use of a crystal. In an interesting turn of events, however, after the district court rendered its decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees on Smith's claim for injunctive relief, Smith was re-incarcerated. At present, Smith remains incarcerated in the ADOC prison system. Moreover, as the defendants-appellees concede, Smith is again subject to the ADOC's 2003 decision denying his request for a small, quartz crystal. Smith's appellate brief includes a letter from the ADOC, dated 14 September 2006, which indicates that the 2003 Committee decision remains in full effect and is applicable to his earlier religious requests. See Reply Br. of Appellant, Exh. 1. Thus, if Smith were to again request the use of a small quartz crystal in connection with his practice of Odinism, the ADOC would presumably decline his request for the same reasons it did in its original 2003 decision, namely, that there was a lack of supporting materials validating a need for this item. R2-98, Exh. M at 1. In light of this evidence, we conclude that Smith's claim for injunctive relief, predicated on the prospective use of a quartz crystal, is not moot. The fundamental question with respect to mootness is whether events have occurred subsequent to the filing of an appeal that deprive the court of the ability to give the. . . appellant meaningful review. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir.2001) ( per curiam ). Here, were we to conclude that the denial of a quartz crystal constituted a substantial burden on Smith's religious practice and that it was not justified by a compelling government interest, we would have the ability to afford relief to Smith, by reversing the district court's summary judgement order and remanding the case so that Smith could obtain the injunctive relief he seeks. Because we have the ability to effectuate a remedy in Smith's case, we conclude that this particular aspect of his case is not moot. [7] See, e.g., SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir.1996) (stating that [t]he ability of the appellate court to effectuate a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent mootness and concluding that because potential relief remains available to [the plaintiff] . . . th[e] case is not moot and [] we have jurisdiction to decide the merits of this appeal) (quotations and internal citations omitted). Therefore, in assessing the merits of Smith's RLUIPA action, we will consider Smith's claim for injunctive relief, based on his request for a small, quartz crystal. Smith further challenges the district court's determination that other aspects of his claim for injunctive relief had been mooted by the ADOC Religious Activities Review Committee's decision in 2003. Specifically, he challenges the district court's conclusion (based on the magistrate judge's recommendation) that his requests for a designated place of worship and for a pine wood fire in a small fire pit approximately 9 in diameter and 9 deep, R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 1-2, had been mootedprior to the summary judgment stageby the Committee's 2003 decision. In assessing these claims, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's finding that Smith's request for a designated place of worship had been mooted, since the Committee had decided that Smith would be granted a secure place of worship going forward. R2-98, Exh. M at 2. Notably, the Committee declined to grant Smith's request for a  designated place of worship to perform [the Odinist] rites within the larger prison area, id. (emphasis added); however, the district court construed the Committee's decision to grant Smith a secure place of worship, id., as, effectively, a grant of his request, thereby rendering it moot. The district court also concluded that the Committee decision granting Smith a candle [to be used] in a private secure place, id., had effectively satisfied Smith's request for a ceremonial fire pit, and, therefore, that particular claim for injunctive relief had been mooted. Smith contends that these conclusions were in error, and that, contrary to the district court's finding, the 2003 decision did not moot these two individual requests for injunctive relief. He points out that his request for a designated place of worship was actually denied by the Committee, and that this request for injunctive relief remains pending at present, since he continues to petition the ADOC for a designated worship area in the prison. In other words, Smith argues that the Committee's limiting of his request to a secure place of worship, R2-98, Exh. M at 2, does not moot his (still extant) request for a designated area of worship in the greater prison, R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 1, and that therefore, we may consider it. Additionally, Smith contends that the Committee's granting him a small candle did not moot his claim for a fire pit, approximately 9 in diameter and 9 deep, id. at 2, and, since this claim for injunctive relief remains pending, we may consider that request as well. We agree. As noted earlier, Smith is presently incarcerated, is subject to the ADOC's earlier decision, and is apparently continuing to press his request for a designated place of worship in the general prison area and for a ceremonial fire pit. As discussed, injunctive relief is prospective in nature, intended to prevent future injuries, including the ADOC's continued denial of a designated worship spot and a 9 by 9 fire pit. See Adler, 112 F.3d at 1477. While the district court found that these two claims were no longer pending, because the Committee had allow[ed] Smith to possess certain religious objects, as well as an area in which to practice his faith, Smith, 401 F.Supp.2d at 1244, we agree that the Committee's decisionwhich was partial in naturedid not wholly nullify Smith's requests, and that, for purposes of mootness, we retain the ability to effectuate a partial remedy in this case. See SunAmerica, 77 F.3d at 1333 (The ability of the appellate court to effectuate a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent mootness.) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Put simply, were we to find that the denial of a designated worship place in the larger prison, and the denial of a 9 by 9 fire pit, did in fact violate RLUIPA, Smith could obtain appropriate relief, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), including, in the court's discretion, an injunction prospectively granting him these two requests, in their entirety. Because some potential relief remains available to [Smith], we hold that these two claims are not moot and that we have jurisdiction to decide the merits of these claims. See SunAmerica, 77 F.3d at 1333. We agree that the district court should not have labeled these two particular claims for injunctive relief as being moot, based solely on the Committee's 2003 decision, which only partially granted Smith's requests. As a result, we consider these two claims on the merits in addressing Smith's underlying RLUIPA action.