Opinion ID: 3011956
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is there an historical right of access to

Text: government proceedings generally? In Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575, the Supreme Court acknowledged the State’s argument that the Constitution nowhere explicitly guarantees the public’s right to attend criminal trials, but it found that right implicit because the Framers drafted the Constitution against a backdrop of longstanding popular access to criminal trials. Likewise, in Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1059, we found a First Amendment right of access to civil trials because at common law, such access had been beyond dispute. The history of access to political branch proceedings is quite different. The Government correctly notes that the Framers themselves rejected any unqualified right of access to the political branches for, as we explained in Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1168-1171, the evidence on this point is extensive and compelling. We need not rescribe it here, but a few snippets are instructive. At the Virginia ratification convention, Patrick Henry was a leading opponent of government secrecy. He said of the publication clause: [Congress] may carry on the most wicked and pernicious of schemes under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them. 3 Elliot’s Debates at 169-70 (J. Elliot ed. 1881). Nevertheless, even Henry conceded that not all government activities should be publicized, particularly those related to military operations or affairs of great consequence. Id. at 19 170. Thomas Jefferson agreed, noting that [a]ll nations have found it necessary, that for the advantageous conduct of their affairs, some [executive] proceedings, at least, should remain known to their executive functionary only. Randall, 3 Life of Thomas Jefferson 211 (1858), reprinted in Wiggins, Freedom or Secrecy 67-68 (1964). Congressional practice confirms that there is no general right of public access to governmental proceedings or information. The members of the First Congress did not open their own proceedings to the public -- the Senate met behind closed doors until 1794, and the House did likewise until after the War of 1812.6See Watkins, Open Meetings under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268, 271 & n.96. While both Houses thereafter opened floor deliberations, committee sessions remained closed and were not routinely opened to the public until the mid1970s. Id. at 272. Even today, the Senate operates under a resolution limiting public access to routine Senate records for 20 years after their creation and to sensitive records, such as investigative files for 50 years after their creation, and each Senate committee retains the right to extend that access period for its own records. S. Rep. 474, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. S15209-10 (daily ed., Dec. 1, 1980). See generally Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1170-71. This tradition of closing sensitive proceedings extends to many hearings before administrative agencies. For example, although hearings on Social Security disability claims profoundly affect hundreds of thousands of people annually, and have great impact on expenditure of government funds, they are open only to the parties and to other persons the administrative law judge considers necessary and proper. 20 C.F.R. 404.944. Likewise, administrative disbarment hearings are often presumptively closed. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. 19.199 (Office of Comptroller of Currency); 12 C.F.R. 263.97 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors). The Government lists more than a dozen other _________________________________________________________________ 6. Indeed, it is interesting to note that our democracy was created behind closed doors, as the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 excluded the public from their proceedings. 20 examples of mandatorily or presumptively closed administrative proceedings. For instance, hearings on charges of wrongdoing may often be closed at the administrator’s discretion for good cause, to protect the public interest, or under similar standards. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. 185.132(d) (Office of Personnel Management); 10 C.F.R. 13.30(d) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 13 C.F.R. 142.21(d) (Small Business Administration); 28 C.F.R. 68.39(a) (Department of Justice); 31 C.F.R. 500.713(a) (Office of Foreign Asset Control); 38 C.F.R. 42.30(d) (Office of Veterans Affairs). Hearings on adverse passport decisions by the Department of State shall be private. 22 C.F.R. 51.87. See also 5 C.F.R. 2638.505(e)(2) (hearings on ethics charges against government employees may be closedin the best interests of national security, the respondent employee, a witness, the public or other affected persons); 10 C.F.R. 1003.62(a) (hearings before Department of Energy Office of Hearings and Appeals may be closed at discretion of administrator). Faced with this litany of administrative hearings that are closed to the public, the Newspapers cannot claim a general First Amendment right of access to government proceedings without urging a judicially-imposed revolution in the administrative state. They wisely avoid that tactic, at least directly.7 Instead they submit that, despite frequent closures throughout the administrative realm, deportation proceedings in particular boast a history of openness sufficient to meet the Richmond Newspapers requirement. We now assess that claim, and find that we disagree. _________________________________________________________________ 7. Although the Newspapers do not argue directly for a general right of access to government proceedings, they maintain that FMC v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002), compels us to recognize the procedural similarities between civil trials and deportation hearings and extend the same access rights to each. We find that this contention turns, at least in part, on whether there is a fundamental right of access to government proceedings comparable to nonconsenting states’ fundamental right to freedom from private suit. It is because we find no such comparable right that FMC does not bind us here. See discussion infra. 21