Opinion ID: 38
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Central Hudson and the Content-Based Regulations

Text: Under the second prong of Central Hudson, the State must identify a substantial interest in support of its regulation[s]. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 624, 115 S.Ct. 2371. [T]he Central Hudson standard does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions. Id. at 624, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quotation marks omitted). Before the District Court and again on appeal, Defendants proffered a state interest in prohibiting attorney advertisements from containing deceptive or misleading content. (Appellants' Br. 32) The report by the New York State Bar Association's Task Force on Lawyer Advertising (hereinafter, the Task Force Report or Report), which the State considered in formulating its new rules and which constitutes the bulk of the record on appeal, indicates that this is a proper and genuinely asserted interest. The Task Force Report identified protecting the public by prohibiting advertising and solicitation practices that disseminate false or misleading information as one of its key concerns. (Task Force Report 1-2) This state interest is substantial  indeed, states have a generally unfettered right to prohibit inherently or actually misleading commercial speech. See, e.g., Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 769, 113 S.Ct. 1792 ([T]here is no question that [the State's] interest in ensuring the accuracy of commercial information in the marketplace is substantial.); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 929 (States retain the authority to regulate advertising that is inherently misleading or that has proved to be misleading in practice.). The disputed regulations codified at § 1200.50(c) therefore survive the second prong of the Central Hudson analysis. [8] Defendants also assert an interest in protecting the legal profession's image and reputation. (Appellants' Reply 30) In Florida Bar, the Supreme Court recognized a substantial interest in preventing the erosion of confidence in the [legal] profession. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 635, 115 S.Ct. 2371. Defendants explain that their interest in preventing misleading attorney advertising is inextricably linked to its overarching interest in maintaining attorney professionalism and respect for the bar. (Appellants' Reply 30) This interest also supports the disputed regulations. [9]
The penultimate prong of the Central Hudson test requires that a regulation impinging upon commercial expression `directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose.' Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 100 S.Ct. 2343). The state's burden with respect to this prong is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a material degree. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 626, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, [i]f the protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force, we cannot allow rote invocation of the words `potentially misleading' to supplant this burden. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146, 114 S.Ct. 2084 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Invalidating a regulation of commercial speech for lack of sufficient evidence under this prong of Central Hudson does not foreclose a similar regulation being enacted validly in the future. Rather, such invalidation returns the matter to the applicable legislating body and forces [that body] to take a `second look' with the eyes of the people on it. Guido Calabresi, Foreward: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 104 (1991); see also Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 190 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Calabresi, J., concurring in the result). In defending the disputed § 1200.50(c) provisions, Defendants rely on three sources of evidence: (1) history, consensus, and simple common sense, Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 628, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quotation marks omitted), including regulations of attorney advertising in other states; (2) existing and unchallenged rules already in New York's Code of Professional Responsibility targeting advertising similar to that targeted by the new amendments; and (3) the New York State Bar Association's Task Force Report. Defendants have not submitted any statistical or anecdotal evidence of consumer problems with or complaints of the sort they seek to prohibit. Nor have they specifically identified any studies from other jurisdictions on which the state relied in implementing the amendments. See Alexander, 634 F.Supp.2d at 248. Against this background, we test each of the disputed § 1200.50(c) provisions.
This subsection prohibits advertisements that include an endorsement of, or testimonial about, a lawyer or law firm from a client with respect to a matter that is still pending. N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs., tit. 22, § 1200.50(c)(1). The Task Force Report observed that testimonials can be misleading because they may suggest that past results indicate future performance. (Task Force Report 26-27) The Task Force Report, however, did not recommend outright prohibitions of all testimonials on this basis. Instead, as the District Court observed, the Task Force Report recommended a different approach. Alexander, 634 F.Supp.2d at 249. The Report suggested strengthening the rules governing testimonials to prohibit the use of an actor or spokesperson who is not a member or employee of the advertising lawyer or law firm absent disclosure thereof.  (Task Force Report 27) (emphasis added). The Task Force noted, moreover, that it would be an improper restriction on a client's free speech rights to prohibit client testimonials outright. ( Id. ) The Task Force Report therefore does not support Defendants' assertion that prohibiting testimonials from current clients will materially advance an interest in preventing misleading advertising. Indeed, the Report contradicts, rather than strengthens, the Board's submissions. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 772, 113 S.Ct. 1792. Nor does consensus or common sense support the conclusion that client testimonials are inherently misleading. Testimonials may, for example, mislead if they suggest that past results indicate future performance  but not all testimonials will do so, especially if they include a disclaimer. The District Court properly concluded that Defendants failed to satisfy this prong of Central Hudson with respect to client testimonials.