Opinion ID: 895256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Local Government Code section 271.152

Text: The Legislature enacted section 271.152 to loosen the immunity bar so that all local governmental entities that have been given or are given the statutory authority to enter into contracts shall not be immune from suits arising from those contracts. Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 327 (Tex.2006) (quotations omitted). [7] The statute waives immunity from suit for certain contract claims: A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract.... TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.152. The statute defines contract subject to this subchapter as a written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity. Id. § 271.151(2). The Agreements here are written contracts stating their essential terms. The names of the parties, property at issue, and basic obligations are clearly outlined. See Liberto v. D.F. Stauffer Biscuit Co., 441 F.3d 318, 324 (5th Cir.2006) (noting that Texas courts generally construe essential terms of a contract to include the time of performance, the price to be paid, the work to be done, the service to be rendered, or the property to be transferred); Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 846 (Tex.2000) (noting that a contract is legally binding if its terms are sufficiently definite to enable a court to understand the parties' obligations). The relevant inquiry is whether the Agreements entail the provision of goods or services to the Authority. Chapter 271 provides no definition for services, despite the Legislature's definition of the term in other contexts. [8] It appears, generally, that the term is broad enough to encompass a wide array of activities. See Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1962) (In ordinary usage the term `services' has a rather broad and general meaning. It includes generally any act performed for the benefit of another under some arrangement or agreement whereby such act was to have been performed. (quoting Creameries of Am. v. Indus. Comm'n, 98 Utah 571, 102 P.2d 300, 304 (1940))); but see Berkman v. City of Keene, 311 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex. App.-Waco 2009, pet. denied) ([T]he statute does not apply to contracts in which the benefit that the local governmental entity would receive is an indirect, attenuated one.) (quotations omitted). The Friendswood I court relied on our analysis in Ben Bolt to conclude that the agreement to hire third parties to construct the Facilities and to build the streets, roads, and bridges is ... sufficient to constitute the provision of services to the Authority. Friendswood I, 256 S.W.3d at 751; see Ben Bolt, 212 S.W.3d at 327. In Ben Bolt, we liberally construed a government-pooled insurance policy (the Fund) as encompassing services rendered by its members, based on the fact that the Fund's members elect a governing board, and a board subcommittee resolves claims disputes. To that extent, at least, the Fund's members provide services to the Fund. Id. The services provided thus need not be the primary purpose of the agreement. See Friendswood I, 256 S.W.3d at 746 n. 13 ([I]n Ben Bolt, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature had waived immunity under this statute even though the court concluded that the part of the contract on which the plaintiff based its claim did not involve the provisions of good [sic] or services to the local governmental entity.). We agree with the court of appeals that the Agreements entail services provided directly to the Authority. The Developers contracted to construct, develop, lease, and bear all risk of loss or damage to the facilities, obligations far more concrete than those at issue in Ben Bolt. Ben Bolt, 212 S.W.3d at 327. We therefore hold that the Agreements contemplate the provision of services under the statute. The Authority also argues that the Agreements fall outside chapter 271 because there is no balance due and owed. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.153(a)(1) (limiting [t]he total amount of money awarded in an adjudication brought against a local governmental entity for breach of a contract to the balance due and owed by the local governmental entity under the contract.). According to the Authority, because the voters have not approved bonds to buy the facilities, the Developers cannot prove that the amount they seek is due and owed. At least within the context of these Agreements, we disagree. The purpose of section 271.153 is to limit the amount due by a governmental agency on a contract once liability has been established, not to foreclose the determination of whether liability exists. Furthermore, the Agreements do stipulate the amount of reimbursement owed upon approval of bond funds. The existence of a balance due and owed is thus incorporated within the contracta balance that would come due when voters approve payment in a bond election. For the above reasons, we agree that section 271.152 waives the Authority's immunity from suit.