Opinion ID: 1124716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Counsel as State Witness.

Text: The second facet of defense counsel's testimony presents a question that is not susceptible of categorical answer, but one that, on a retrial of this case, may be presented to the trial court. Following Mr. Conroy's previous testimony, the prosecuting attorney examined Mr. Conroy at length on his participation in the search for Mr. Sullivan's body January 19, 1961; whether he took part in the search of the trailer house; what he had seen; what was found; discovery of the gun; uncovering of the body; identification of numerous exhibits, including photographs taken at the scene  one showing the presence of defense counsel. Although the evidence was not cumulative at the time Mr. Conroy was called as a witness, it became repetitious by the end of the trial, for everything to which defense counsel testified was established with particularity by numerous other witnesses. We recognize, and do not wish to change or modify, the rule that a lawyer in a cause is not disqualified as a witness; his testimony is admissible, if otherwise competent. Ryan v. Ryan, 48 Wn. (2d) 593, 599, 295 P. (2d) 1111 (1956). In at least two prior decisions, this court has recognized the right of the prosecuting attorney to call defense counsel as a witness. State v. Cresto, 130 Wash. 436, 227 Pac. 856 (1924); State v. Allgood, 50 Wn. (2d) 618, 313 P. (2d) 695 (1957). In the Cresto case, supra, husband and wife were being tried jointly. The state believed it had not sufficiently identified appellant's wife as the person who had previously been convicted in justice court on another charge. The state called defense counsel, the former prosecuting attorney, as a witness to furnish the identification. This court said: ... The state had a right to make the necessary proof in any way it saw fit, and the mere fact that it made it through a person who happened at the time to be appellant's attorney cannot alter the situation nor make the testimony improper. Besides, all this part of the proceeding was with reference to the action against appellant's wife and did not touch him, and it is difficult for us to see how the matters complained of here could have been prejudicial to him. In the Allgood case, supra, defense counsel had notarized an affidavit signed by his client. It was not error for the court to permit defense counsel to identify the signature, for a notary public ... may not refuse to prove the authenticity of signatures so notarized. (p. 620) Neither case is directly in point on the question now before us. In the first, defendant's rights were not invaded; in the second, the evidence concerned the authenticity of proof. As we pointed out in Ryan v. Ryan, supra , when trial counsel is a witness, except as to merely formal matters, he stakes his oath and word against the oath of his client's adversary. This is true whether he testifies with consent of his client or under compulsion, as in the instant case. ... When this occurs, he [counsel] becomes something more, in the eyes of the court or jury, than a professional representative of his client's interests. Ryan v. Ryan, supra . If defense counsel is required to testify under compulsion, it might well be that defendant's right to complete and unhampered representation is invaded. Balanced against this, however, is the possibility that defense counsel's testimony is necessary to the state's case in the interest of justice and for the protection of the public. Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 43.12W, RCW Vol. 0, and Canon of Professional Ethics, 19 RCW Vol. 0, must be considered in this delicate situation. The rule provides: If an attorney shall offer himself as a witness [which he did not do in the instant case] on behalf of his client and give evidence on the merits, he shall not argue the case to the jury, unless by permission of the court. The canon provides: When a lawyer is a witness for his client [which he was not in the instant case], except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client. Applied to a civil case, we said in Ryan v. Ryan, supra : ... should a breach of a canon of professional conduct be so flagrant that it can be said, as a matter of law, that the breach prevented a fair trial, a court should not hesitate to hold such breach of conduct prejudicial error and grant a new trial. ... (p. 600) (Italics ours.) In State v. Fackrell, 44 Wn. (2d) 874, 271 P. (2d) 679 (1954), the situation was the reverse of the instant case. A deputy prosecuting attorney testified concerning the validity of defendant's confessions. Thereafter, he did not participate in the trial of the case nor argue it to the jury. Although not a point of decision, the opinion is meaningful, for it recognizes that a defendant's rights in a criminal case may, in certain circumstances, be affected by a violation of the rule of court and canon of professional ethics. At least a portion of the rationale of the rule of court and canon of professional ethics is brilliantly illustrated by the record before us. The short, ineffectual cross-examination of defense counsel by himself is in sharp contrast to his cross-examination of other witnesses. [4] Defense counsel did not breach the rule or canon; nor can we say that the prosecuting attorney breached them. There must always be a sensitive balance between the right of the state to prove its case, in the best manner possible, and the right of the accused to have unhampered and effective representation, especially when on trial for his life. Applying this reasoning to the facts of the case before us, we find, from a survey of the record, that Mr. Conroy's testimony became repetitious and not necessary to the state's case in the interest of justice and the protection of the public. This tilts the balance in defendant's favor. Defense counsel's presence, as an unwilling witness for the state, rendered his services less effective and invaded the accused's right to unhampered representation at the trial. We do not decide whether Mr. Conroy, if he is defense counsel upon a retrial of this case, can or cannot be called as a witness for the state; that depends upon circumstances existing at the time. In view of the fact, however, that approximately 20 officials took part in the search of the Sullivan's trailer house and premises and were present when Mr. Sullivan's body was exhumed, it is difficult to imagine that Mr. Conroy's testimony would be necessary to prove those facts.