Opinion ID: 172221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Determination of the Termination Date

Text: The district court was not inconsistent in its determination of the Agreement's termination date because it did not make any such determination until after the bench trial. In granting partial summary judgment to Deer Crest, the court never assigned a date to the termination of the Agreement; it simply stated in dicta that it was [Avalon] who terminated the agreement. Avalon interprets this statement as a factual finding that Avalon terminated the Agreement in 2002, but this is nothing more than Avalon's speculation. Moreover, in its memorandum opposing summary judgment, Avalon itself argued that the Agreement was terminated by May 15, 2002, at the latest. Thus, the district court at most simply accepted Avalon's position without assessing that position's accuracy. See Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir.1997) ([T]raditional `findings of fact' are inappropriate in a summary judgment order, because if summary judgment is proper no findings of fact need be made and the case can be resolved as a matter of law.). See also Ando v. Great W. Sugar Co., 475 F.2d 531, 535 (10th Cir.1973) (at summary judgment, no margin exists for the disposition of material factual issues and summary judgment does not serve[ ] as a substitute for trial of the case.). Avalon's argument that the Agreement terminated on January 8, 2002, or alternatively, on May 15, 2002 is likewise unavailing. Although Avalon delivered a termination letter to Deer Crest on January, 8, 2002, the parties' conduct demonstrates that neither party intended to end their relationship. In fact, Avalon made numerous subsequent representations that the Agreement remained in effect. As the district court observed in its conclusions of law, Delaware courts have long looked to relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the contract, including the actions of the parties, in ascertaining the intention of the parties. Such actions are of great weight in determining the meaning and applicability of the contract. . . . Artesian Water Co. v. Del. Dep't of Highways & Transp., 330 A.2d 441, 443 (Del.1974) (citations omitted). Here, the relevant facts and circumstances support the district court's determination that the Agreement survived beyond January 8, 2002. Avalon made no attempt to wrap up and terminate its involvement with DCRG, as required by the Agreement. Avalon did not convey to Deer Crest any of the architectural plans, permits, appraisals, site studies, legal agreements, or other documents called for in the Agreement's termination provisions. Willamette continued developing the Project. Avalon's counsel drafted the Letter, which Mr. Brenneke signed, affirming that Avalon remained a member of DCRG. The Letter also affirmed that the Agreement remained operative, as amended. Thereafter, Avalon and Deer Crest signed the Memorandum, which also acknowledged that the Agreement remained in effect. Finally, Avalon represented in a February 25, 2003 letter that [t]here are three operative agreements now in effect; (1) the Operating Agreement, (2) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and (3)[t]he . . . Letter of Understanding. Avalon's activities clearly demonstrate that it chose to continue its relationship with Deer Crest after January 8, 2002, under the original Agreement. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in holding that Avalon did not terminate the Agreement on January 8, 2002. We also disagree with Avalon's assertion that the Agreement automatically expired on May 15, 2002. The Agreement expressly states that it may be terminated. . . at the election of Deer Crest or Avalon under certain conditions. Neither party elected to terminate the Agreement in May 2002. In fact, Avalon made clear its intention to continue the Project. On May 14, Mr. Brenneke personally guaranteed Avalon's obligations. On May 15, 2002, Avalon informed Deer Crest by email that despite its failure to achieve certain Project milestones, it had agreed to proceed to invest in the [P]roject. As noted above, Avalon's conduct, and specifically its desire to continue the Project, is of great weight in determining the meaning and applicability of the contract. Artesian Water, 330 A.2d at 443. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that the Agreement did not terminate on May 15, 2002.