Opinion ID: 2176468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WMATA's Claim of Immunity

Text: By the terms of the Compact creating it, WMATA is subject to suit for the alleged negligence of its employees only if the tort was committed in the conduct of any proprietary function.... D.C.Code § 1-2431(80) (1992). Conversely, WMATA is immune from suit if the negligence occurr[ed] in the performance of a governmental function. Id. WMATA asserts that the bus driver's response to the behavior of Jones and Mallory leading to the beating of O'Neill involved police-type activity and the exercise of a governmental function, thus barring appellee's suit. We disagree. We have held that, in general, the provision of mass transportation is a proprietary function within the meaning of the WMATA Compact, Qasim v. WMATA, 455 A.2d 904, 906 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929, 103 S.Ct. 2090, 77 L.Ed.2d 300 (1983), and that WMATA, like any common carrier, owes a duty of reasonable care to its passengers. McKethean v. WMATA, 588 A.2d 708, 712 (D.C.1991). But in establishing WMATA as a common carrier, the creating jurisdictions did not intend to expose it to liability coextensive with that of a private carrier; otherwise the governmental-proprietary distinction of the Compact would have no meaning. Therefore, in McKethean, we looked for a standard by which to determine which activities of WMATA's officers or employees implicate its duty of reasonable care to its passengers and hence subject it to tort liability; and which do not. Finding too broad in many applications a test of whether the activity was for the common good (rather than motivated narrowly for corporate benefit or pecuniary profit), we agreed with a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the more appropriate inquiry is whether a particular activity involves a legislative, administrative, or regulatory policy decision or merely implements such a decision. Only the former type of action, a policy decision, is a discretionary function which should be immune from second-guessing by a jury. Id. at 713 (citing and quoting Sanders v. WMATA, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 359, 362-64, 819 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (1987)). Relying on Sanders and previous federal decisions reaching back to Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (construing Federal Tort Claims Act), [7] we concluded that in most instances the issue of WMATA's immunity comes down to a question of whether its alleged acts of negligence are characterized as discretionary decisions or ministerial execution of those decisions. Id. at 713 (footnote omitted). [8] In McKethean, the gist of appellants' complaint ... [was] that WMATA was negligent in not relocating [a] bus stop to a safer place after a 1967 street widening had allegedly made the existing stop a hazard. While reiterating that WMATA's provision of mass transportation is itself a proprietary activity, we held that the design and planning of a transportation system are governmental activities because they involve quasi-legislative policy decisions which are discretionary in nature and should not be second-guessed by a jury. Only the negligent operation of such a system or the negligent implementation of such a design may be characterized as proprietary. Id. at 713-14 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The acts (or inaction) of the bus driver alleged in this case cannot by any stretch of reason be said to involve quasi-legislative policy decisions which are discretionary in nature, rather than conduct implement[ing] such ... decision[s]. Nor are we convinced by appellant's argument that because O'Neill claimed essentially that WMATA failed to protect him from a criminal attack by third persons, his suit fails under the settled principle that the operation of a police force is a governmental function. Martin v. WMATA, 667 F.2d 435, 436 (4th Cir.1981) (citation omitted). O'Neill alleged that the bus driver was negligent in not following WMATA's safety directivesrules which define the appropriate standard of care in this situation. O'Neill does not challenge the adequacy of the rules themselves. Hence his suit does not interfere with WMATA's judgment as to the appropriate response, or gradation of responses, to be followed by its drivers in dealing with disruptive passengers. Indeed, O'Neill's claim was that while WMATA instructed its drivers in an array of steps for responding to such conduct, the driver was negligent by not reacting at all or by doing so too late. WMATA points to the judgment its drivers must exercise in these situations, but WMATA's safety directives do not leave the drivers unbridled discretion in dealing with unruly passengers. While drivers are expected to avoid unnecessary use of the silent alarm, they are instructed to activate the external alarm lights when a passenger violates any of the conduct ordinances or harasses another passenger, and are to activate the silent alarm upon observing threats of bodily harm. At a minimum, unless this would exacerbate the situation, they are instructed to order disruptive passengers to leave the bus if they do not stop the abusive conduct. In short, the drivers are not directed to be negligent in carrying out the passenger safety rules, Sanders v. WMATA, 260 U.S.App.D.C. at 359, 819 F.2d at 1156, and it is that negligence which O'Neill alleged. Beyond this, the discretion WMATA's drivers retain as to the proper means of handling disruptive conduct cannot be considered a discretionary function of the kind that, because it involves judgments at the policy and planning level, should be immune from second-guessing by a jury. McKethean, 588 A.2d at 713. The fact that in a particular case a bus driver might have alternative courses of action from which to choose and this choice might involve a certain degree of judgment, does not elevate the driver's decision to the level of `basic policy.' Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit, 40 Cal.3d 780, 221 Cal.Rptr. 840, 849, 710 P.2d 907, 916 (1985). [9] Nor does it change our analysis that, as WMATA points out, its safety rules are an initial system for patron protection which ultimately results in police protection (emphasis added), the latter being a classic governmental function. Hall, supra note 8, 468 A.2d at 973; see E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §§ 53.29, 53.30 & 53.31 (3d ed. 1993). Just because measures such as ordering a passenger to leave the bus or triggering an alarm would have the effect of protecting passengers from criminal assaults does not transform them into `police protection services.' Lopez, 221 Cal.Rptr. at 848, 710 P.2d at 915 (emphasis in original). O'Neill's suit did not require the driver to have acted as a police officer; it alleged that he failed to summon the police by the means available to him and in which he had been instructed, or to take lesser steps such as ordering the men to stop their behavior or leave the bus. What the California Supreme Court has stated applies similarly to this case: Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege, nor do plaintiffs argue that RTD [the transit authority] was negligent in failing to provide police personnel or armed guards on board its buses. Rather, the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that the bus driver, who was already hired by RTD and was present on the scene and aware of the violent disturbance, did absolutely nothing to protect plaintiffs, but simply continued to drive the bus as if nothing was wrong. Id. 221 Cal.Rptr. at 847, 710 P.2d at 914. In sum, WMATA's sovereign immunity did not bar this suit premised on the alleged negligence of its driver in carrying out express safety directives intended for the protection of its passengers. [10]