Opinion ID: 1088903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the Discovery Deposition a Prior Opportunity to Cross-Examine?

Text: Blanton concedes that his counsel took the victim's deposition before trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(h). However, he argues that this discovery deposition did not provide a meaningful or adequate opportunity for cross-examination. The State counters that Blanton did have an opportunity to confront the victim during this deposition and counsel's failure to engage in vigorous cross-examination does not negate this fact. The State also notes that Blanton never requested to conduct a rule 3.190(j) deposition to perpetuate testimony, even though this vehicle was available to him. The Fifth District agreed with both of the State's arguments on this issue. The court noted that Blanton was afforded a reasonable opportunity to test the veracity of the victim's statement by deposition and that he availed himself of this opportunity. Blanton, 880 So.2d at 801. The court faulted Blanton for not attempting to depose the witness under rule 3.190(j), [6] for failing to impeach the victim with the discovery deposition, and for never attempt[ing] to use the deposition for any purpose. Id. The court also chided that Blanton should not be heard to complain about an opportunity squandered based on counsel's purported lack of vigor in cross-examination during the discovery deposition. Id. at 802. We do not agree with the Fifth District. As we explained in Lopez, there are a number of reasons why a discovery deposition does not satisfy the opportunity for cross-examination that is required under Crawford. See Lopez, 974 So.2d at 347-50. First, rule 3.220(h) was not designed as an opportunity to engage in adversarial testing of the evidence against the defendant, nor is the rule customarily used for the purpose of cross examination. Instead, the rule is used to learn what the testimony will be and attempt to limit it or to uncover other evidence and witnesses. A defendant cannot be expected to conduct an adequate cross-examination as to matters of which he first gained knowledge at the taking of the deposition. State v. Basiliere, 353 So.2d 820, 824-25 (Fla.1977). This is especially true if the defendant is unaware that this deposition would be the only opportunity he would have to examine and challenge the accuracy of the deponent's statements. Id. at 824. Second, a discovery deposition is not intended as an opportunity to perpetuate testimony for use at trial, is not admissible as substantive evidence at trial, and is only admissible for purposes of impeachment. Third, the defendant is not entitled to be present during a discovery deposition pursuant to rule 3.220(h). See Lopez v. State, 888 So.2d at 700. Thus, the exercise of the right to take a discovery deposition under rule 3.220 does not serve as the functional substitute for in-court confrontation of the witness. The Fifth District also noted that Blanton had the opportunity to depose the victim under rule 3.190(j), which would have required his presence and permitted the deposition to be admitted as substantive evidence at trial, but made no such attempt. Blanton, 880 So.2d at 801. If the court is equating Blanton's failure to exercise the right to perpetuate testimony under rule 3.190(j) with a waiver of his right to confrontation, we do not agree. Under the circumstances of this case, the failure in this regard does not comport with the definition of waiver, i.e., an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Additionally, we conclude that the mere existence of rule 3.190(j) does not provide defendants with a prior opportunity for cross-examination, as explained in Crawford. Under the rule, a defendant has a right to be present when the deposition is taken on the application of the state. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.190(j)(3); see also Basiliere, 353 So.2d at 825 (concluding that Confrontation Clause mandates presence of defendant where deposition will be admitted as substantive evidence against him at trial). Thus, when a State witness may be unavailable for trial, the burden is on the State to file a motion to perpetuate testimony under rule 3.190(j). [7] Only then would the defendant's prior opportunity for cross-examination come into play. [8] Thus, under the facts of the instant case, we conclude that neither the discovery deposition of the victim nor the existence of the rule permitting a deposition to perpetuate testimony provided Blanton with the prior opportunity for cross-examination required by Crawford. Thus, the trial court erred by admitting the victim's recorded testimonial statements because they violated Blanton's right to confrontation.