Opinion ID: 895327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remainder Damages

Text: As support for its conclusion that there was some evidence of damage to the remainder, the court of appeals referenced Smith's testimony that conversion of Highway 290 to a toll road would reduce the financial feasibility of some types of development on the remainder. See Petropoulos, 346 S.W.3d 619. But Smith only testified that the taking would affect the soundness of a business decision to build a car wash and lube facility on the property post-taking. Specifically, he stated that it would be physically and legally possible to build a car wash and lube facility on the tract both before and after the taking, but impulse retail on a mid-block location on a toll road was less financially feasible because: [an upgraded corner site] increases the exposure and accessibility of getting in and out of that site, it, enhances the ability to see the property, and it increasesyou know, the visibility of it to where customers can actually see what's there and what business they may frequent. We have previously held that altered exposure to traffic and altered accessibility to a roadway are not compensable damages. State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 777 (Tex.1993) (holding that a landowner could be compensated if access to their property is completely denied, but not for loss of value due to diversion of traffic or circuity of travel). Further, in State v. Dawmar Partners, Ltd., we recently considered damages for a partial taking as part of a highway improvement project. 267 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Tex.2008) (per curiam). In Dawmar Partners the principal issue was whether the landowners were entitled to remainder damages caused by permanent denial of direct access to the highway if the restrictions on access changed the highest and best use of the property from commercial to residential. Id. We held that the landowners were not entitled to compensation for diminished value of the remainder because they had not suffered a material and substantial impairment of access, regardless of the fact that the highest and best use had drastically changed because of loss of direct access to the highway. Id. at 878. Here, the Petropouloses did not offer any evidence that the taking caused a material and substantial impairment of access to their property. Although Smith testified that the Property would have less exposure to traffic after conversion of the highway to a toll road, the Petropouloses' remainder property would still have frontage on and direct access to the highway. There was no evidence that any other access to the property would be affected by the highway conversion. Evidence that conversion of U.S. 290 to a toll road would alter the nature of the property's highest and best use is not, without more, evidence of compensable damages for a partial condemnation and taking. See id.; Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 777. Nor is diminished traffic and diminished exposure to traffic. See Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 773-74; Archenhold Auto. Supply Co. v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex.1965); see also State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tex. 1996) (holding that absent a material and substantial impairment of access, the landowners were not entitled to compensation even if the remainder of their property has lost some degree of value). Moreover, Hornsby testified that the taking did not cause any change in the value of the remainder property, and Smith expressly limited his valuation opinion to only the pre-taking value of the whole property. The parties agreed that the tract's allowable impervious cover areathe area on which buildings, parking lots, etc. could be constructedwas increased by the taking. We conclude that there was no evidence of compensable remainder damages.