Opinion ID: 704786
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Smith's Jury Instruction Claims

Text: 17 This instruction informed the jury that they could consider the custom in the industry or safety rules when determining what is reasonable in a given situation. Further, the jury was instructed that even if industry custom or rules were not followed, you must still find that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances. 18 Smith points to Havens, 996 F.2d at 218 to support his claim that the standard of care in Jones Act cases is something less than reasonable care. This contention lacks merit. Havens addressed the quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of liability, but did not discuss, much less change, the definition of negligence or the necessary standard of care. 2 Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion by giving Instruction No. 14.
19 The district court instructed the jury that to establish contributory negligence, Tow Boat only had to show that Smith's negligence contributed in some way to his injury. Smith argues that this instruction improperly placed him on equal footing with Tow Boat regarding negligence and causation. Instead, Smith insists that, as a Jones Act employee, he only had a slight duty to protect himself, and that breach of this duty must be a proximate cause of the injury. 20 In support of his argument Smith cites several Fifth Circuit cases, and attempts to apply the slight negligence rule that he infers from Havens to the standard for contributory negligence. Additionally, Smith contends that the district court's reliance on the Ninth Circuit model jury instruction, from which Instruction No. 19 was drawn, and its citation to Almaraz v. Universal Marine Corp., 472 F.2d 123 (9th Cir.1972), were misplaced because Almaraz and the model instruction set forth the standard for longshoremen, not seamen. 21 Even if Smith is correct, and Almaraz and the model instructions did misstate the standard for a seaman, it was not an abuse of the district court's discretion to rely on them. Smith did not cite any Ninth Circuit authority holding a plaintiff to a different standard of care, and the court took instruction No. 19 directly from the Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions Sec. 14.02G (1985). Further, even if Havens supported Smith's argument that the slightest negligence could result in Jones Act liability, it would not necessarily follow that Havens also changed the standard for contributory negligence. The district court's contributory negligence instruction was not an abuse of discretion.
22 Smith next argues that the district court abused its discretion by not instructing the jury that Tow Boat owed Smith a heightened duty of care because he was an inexperienced seaman. He contends that his years of naval, commercial, and recreational sailing offered no experience remotely similar to disembarking a barge by way of a platform. Drawing strength from the words of Justice Cardozo in Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 377 (1932), 3 Smith attempts to impose a special duty of care on Tow Boat because it was the stronger party. Id. However, neither Cortes nor California Home Brands, Inc. v. Ferreira, 871 F.2d 830, 836 (9th Cir.1989), expressly created a heightened duty of care in the Ninth Circuit for employers of inexperienced seamen. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to fashion one out of whole cloth. 23 More significantly, such an instruction would not have been supported by the evidence presented at trial. The evidence showed that Smith was a seasoned deck hand, with life-long experience on boats. Moreover, even if he was unaware how to get ashore from a barge, Smith was specifically instructed, only minutes before the accident, on how to utilize the platform and ladder to disembark. [SER RT 3-16-93 at 89-90; RT 3-17-93 at 46.] Therefore, the district court's conclusion that the evidence did not warrant an inexperienced seaman instruction was not an abuse of discretion. 24