Opinion ID: 1804268
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rejection Of The False Light Tort

Text: Based upon our review of the law in Florida and in many other jurisdictions, we simply cannot ignore the significant and substantial overlap between false light and defamation. Although we acknowledge that a majority of the states have recognized the false light cause of action, we are struck by the fact that our review of these decisions has revealed no case, nor has one been pointed out to us, in which a judgment based solely on a false light cause of action was upheld. In fact, as exemplified by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Cain, many of the decisions reveal that the cause of action could have been brought as, or was included as an alternative to, a claim for defamation. See 878 S.W.2d at 581 (noting that all of the false light claims brought in Texas could have been brought ... under another legal theory, and refusing to recognize false light when recovery for that tort is substantially duplicated by torts [such as defamation] already established in [Texas]). As one commentator concluded, after reviewing six hundred false light cases through the country, false light most often duplicates defamation and there is not even a single good case in which false light can be clearly identified as adding anything distinctive to the law. J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 Santa Clara L.Rev. 783, 785 (1992). Our own review of cases in Florida reveals a similar conclusion. [14] These observations lead us to two competing conclusions. On the one hand, recognizing the tort would apparently not open the proverbial floodgates to false light claims. Yet, the fact that we can find no judgment that has been upheld by an appellate court solely on the basis of false light leads us to conclude that the absence of false light does not create any significant void in the law. Indeed, there are relatively few scenarios where defamation is inadequate and false light provides a potential for relief. The Restatement discusses one such example: A is a war hero, distinguished for bravery in a famous battle. B makes and exhibits a motion picture concerning A's life, in which he inserts a detailed narrative of a fictitious private life attributed to A, including a non-existent romance with a girl. B knows this matter to be false. Although A is not defamed by the motion picture, B is subject to liability to him for invasion of privacy. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. b, illus. 5. Another illustration may be the portrayal of the plaintiff as suffering from a terminal illness, which is not necessarily defamatory, but [is] potentially highly offensive. Bueno, 54 P.3d at 902-03. However, to the extent that there may be a subset of cases where there is a wrong without a remedy, we consider that interest too tenuous to be recognized through the tort, most especially in light of the First Amendment concerns. In fact, it appears that the reason there has recently been a spate of false light claims in this State may be because of an attempt to circumvent the shorter statute of limitations for defamation as well as the other statutory prerequisites for a defamation claim. See Anderson, 947 So.2d at 7-8 (concluding that a claim for false light was specifically brought to circumvent the shorter limitations period that applies to defamation actions and that it should be treated the same as defamation or the strict requirements in the law of defamation would have no effect at all). We once again acknowledge that it is our duty to ensure the protection of the individual in the enjoyment of all of his inherent and essential rights and to afford a legal remedy for their invasion. Cason, 20 So.2d at 250. However, because the benefit of recognizing the tort, which only offers a distinct remedy in relatively few unique situations, is outweighed by the danger of unreasonably impeding constitutionally protected speech, we decline to recognize a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy.