Opinion ID: 1591468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Do the Allegations of the Complaint Establish Absolute Legislative Privilege for the Yarbrough Defendants?

Text: Hillman's final argument on appeal is that Yarbrough's comments were not shown to be absolutely privileged. For the reasons set forth below, we agree. The Alabama Constitution of 1901, § 56, affords absolute legislative immunity to members of the legislature, providing that for any speech or debate in either house [the legislators] shall not be questioned in any other place. At least as early as 1967, this Court recognized the availability of an absolute privilege for communications made in the course of legislative or judicial proceedings, and acts of state made under authority of law. Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 281 Ala. 102, 106, 199 So.2d 645, 648 (1967). In 2003, in Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1 (Ala.2003), this Court noted that [t]his privilege has been extended to members of local legislative bodies, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590 (1977), which provides that `[a] member of the Congress of the United States or of a State or local legislative body is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in the performance of his legislative functions.' 871 So.2d at 24 (emphasis added). `To make the defense of absolute privilege available, the communication must be made on a privileged occasion; the circumstances under which the defamatory language is used are the occasion, and it is the occasion that is privileged.' Butler, 871 So.2d at 23 (quoting O'Barr v. Feist, 292 Ala. 440, 445, 296 So.2d 152, 156 (1974), quoting in turn 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 193, p. 696). Thus, members of local legislative bodies ... are absolutely privileged to publish matters concerning others if the publication is made during the performance of the members' legislative duties.... The privilege, however, does not extend to public discussion outside of a legislative function.... 871 So.2d at 24. The fact that an action is undertaken in the course of a legislator's fulfilling his or her responsibilities does not necessarily indicate that the action was taken in the performance of a legislative duty or act. In United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972), the Supreme Court was confronted with a question concerning the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. Const., art. I, § 6, which provides, in pertinent part: [F]or any speech or debate in either house, [senators and representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place. The Court, interpreting the federal constitutional provision, observed the state of the law to be that a member of Congress was immune from suit if the basis of the prosecution was a legislative act or the motivation for a legislative act. In thus defining what constituted a legislative act, the Court stated: A legislative act has consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause [U.S. Const., art. I, § 6] prohibits inquiry only into those things generally said or done in the House or the Senate in the performance of official duties and into the motivation for those acts. It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many activities other than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. These include a wide range of legitimate `errands' performed for constituents, the making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing Government contracts, preparing so-called `news letters' to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress. The range of these related activities has grown over the years.... Although these are entirely legitimate activities, they are political in nature rather than legislative, in the sense that term has been used by the Court in prior cases. But it has never been seriously contended that these political matters, however appropriate, have the protection afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Careful examination of the decided cases reveals that the Court has regarded the protection as reaching only those things `generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it,' Kilbourn v. Thompson, [103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)], or things `said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office.' Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808). 408 U.S. at 512-13, 92 S.Ct. 2531. The Supreme Court has also offered these observations, however, in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998): The rationales for according absolute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply with equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279 (1990) (noting, in the context of addressing local legislative action, that `any restriction on a legislator's freedom undermines the public good by interfering with the rights of the people to representation in the democratic process'); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson , 103 U.S. [168], at 201-204 [(1881)] (federal legislators); Tenney[ v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367], at 377 [(1951)] (state legislators); Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. [391], at 405 [(1979)] (regional legislators). Furthermore, the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace. See Tenney, supra, at 377 (citing `the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial'). And the threat of liability may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). In Butler, 871 So.2d at 23, we explained: `As one court has stated, the availability of an absolute privilege must be reserved for those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant's motives.' Webster v. Byrd, 494 So.2d 31, 35 (Ala.1986)(quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274, 276, 293 A.2d 767, 769 (1972)). `An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which, or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon a person who claims to be injured thereby, and even though it may have been made maliciously, and is false. To make the defense of absolute privilege available, the communication must be made on a privileged occasion; the circumstances under which the defamatory language is used are the occasion, and it is the occasion that is privileged. The privilege is a matter of public policy, and is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.'  O'Barr v. Feist, 292 Ala. 440, 445, 296 So.2d 152, 156 (1974)(quoting 50 Am. Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 193, p. 696). We also stated in Butler: `A member of the Congress of the United States or of a State or local legislative body is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in the performance of his legislative functions.' Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 590 (1977). Thus, members of local legislative bodies, i.e., city council members, are absolutely privileged to publish matters concerning others if the publication is made during the performance of the members' legislative duties. See id. Unlike the privilege afforded to those involved in judicial proceedings, the legislative privilege applies even when the defamatory communication is not related to matters of public or legislative concern. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 590 cmt. a. (1977). The privilege, however, does not extend to public discussion outside of a legislative function, such as explaining reasons for voting on legislation or engaging in activities only incidentally related to legislative affairs. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 590 cmt. a. Furthermore, although this absolute privilege is rooted in defamation law, the privilege also applies to the publication of any matter that amounts to an invasion of privacy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652F (1977). 871 So.2d at 24. Hillman asserts that he can present evidence indicating that in addressing the Board Yarbrough was not performing legislative duties. In making this argument, Hillman partially relies upon an affidavit submitted in conjunction with his motion to vacate the judgment, filed after the court entered its ruling on the Yarbrough defendants' motion to dismiss. The record does not indicate whether the trial court considered this evidence, because it denied Hillman's motion to vacate without explanation. The court was free to disregard the evidence presented in the affidavit. In a case in which a party files a motion to alter, amend, or vacate a summary judgment, we have consistently held that ``[t]he trial court can consider only that material before it at the time of submission of the motion' [such as to dismiss or for a summary judgment] and ... any material filed thereafter `comes too late.'' Ex parte Organized Cmty. Action Program, Inc., 852 So.2d 92, 95 (Ala.2002) (quoting Bean v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 591 So.2d 17, 20 (Ala.1991), quoting in turn other cases). We see no distinction between a motion that comes on the heels of a ruling on a motion to dismiss as opposed to a ruling on a motion for a summary judgment. Therefore we need not consider the evidence presented in the affidavit attached to Hillman's motion to vacate. Our standard of review obliges us to reverse an order dismissing a defendant if the plaintiff could possibly prove any set of facts that would allow recovery. Fontenot, supra; Feore, supra. It appears that Hillman could conceivably prove a set of facts under which Yarbrough's presence at the meeting of the Board was not a legislative function but rather a public discussion outside of a legislative function. Butler, 871 So.2d at 24. Because we conclude that Hillman could prove such a set of facts, we reverse the trial court's order granting the Yarbrough defendants' motion to dismiss, and we remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion. APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF NOVEMBER 10, 2005, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED. NABERS, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, and PARKER, JJ., concur.