Opinion ID: 1275739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Language is Speech Protected by the First Amendment

Text: ¶ 44 Unlike other English-only provisions, the Amendment explicitly and broadly prohibits government employees from using non-English languages even when communicating with persons who have limited or no English skills, stating that all government officials and employees during the performance of government business must act in English and no other language. Amendment, §§ 1(3)(a)(iv), 3(1)(a). It also requires every level and branch of government to preserve, protect and enhance the role of ... English ... as the official language and prohibits all state and local entities from enacting or enforcing any law, order, decree or policy which requires the use of a language other than English. §§ 2, 3(1)(b). We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the Amendment could hardly be more inclusive and that it prohibit[s] the use in all oral and written communications by persons connected with the government of all words and phrases in any language other than English. Yniguez v. AOE, 69 F.3d at 933. ¶ 45 Assuming arguendo that the government may, under certain circumstances and for appropriate reasons, restrict public employees from using non-English languages to communicate while performing their duties, the Amendment's reach is too broad. For example, by its express language, it prohibits a public school teacher, such as Appellant Garcia, and a monolingual Spanish-speaking parent from speaking in Spanish about a child's education. It also prohibits a town hall discussion between citizens and elected individuals in a language other than English and also precludes a discussion in a language other than English between public employees and citizens seeking unemployment or workers' compensation benefits, or access to fair housing or public assistance, or to redress violations of those rights. ¶ 46 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. ¶ 47 The First Amendment applies to the states as well as to the federal government. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665, 45 S.Ct. 625, 630, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925). The expression of one's opinion is absolutely protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. AMCOR Inv. Corp. v. Cox Ariz. Publications, Inc., 158 Ariz. 566, 568, 764 P.2d 327, 329 (App.1988) (citation omitted); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 627, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (stating that the United States Constitution protects speakers of all languages). The trial court held that the Amendment is content-neutral, and, therefore, does not violate the First Amendment. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 929-30, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). That ruling is flawed. ¶ 48 Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1541, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (footnote omitted) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966)). We note that the Amendment, Section 3, acknowledges that its mandate that government act only in English is superseded by the use of foreign languages in schools both to enable students to transition to English (subsection 2(a)) and to teach students a foreign language (subsection 2(c)). Subsection 2(b) states that the Amendment's English-only mandate does not apply in instances where foreign language use is required to ensure compliance with federal laws. Therefore, the Amendment would not apply, for instance, with regard to bilingual ballots in Arizona in designated political subdivisions as required by the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 aa-1a(c) (forbidding states from conditioning the right to vote on the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret English). Nor would it affect a criminal defendant's right to have a competent translator assist him, at state expense, if need be. See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 391 (2d Cir.1970). ¶ 49 Notwithstanding these limited exceptions, we find that the Amendment unconstitutionally inhibits the free discussion of governmental affairs in two ways. First, it deprives limited- and non-English-speaking persons of access to information about the government when multilingual access may be available and may be necessary to ensure fair and effective delivery of governmental services to non-English-speaking persons. It is not our prerogative to impinge upon the Legislature's ability to require, under appropriate circumstances, the provision of services in languages other than English. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 23-906(D) (Providing that every employer engaged in occupations subject to Arizona's Workers' Compensation statutes shall post in a conspicuous place upon his premises, in English and Spanish, a notice informing employees that unless they specifically reject coverage under Arizona's compulsory compensation law, they are deemed to have accepted the provisions of that law). The United States Supreme Court has held that First Amendment protection is afforded to the communication, its source, and its recipient. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1822-23, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). ¶ 50 In his concurring opinion in Barnes, Justice Scalia stated, [W]hen any law restricts speech, even for a purpose that has nothing to do with the suppression of communication..., we insist that it meet the high First-Amendment standard of justification. 501 U.S. at 576, 111 S.Ct. at 2465-66. The Amendment contravenes core principles and values undergirding the First Amendmentthe right of the people to seek redress from their governmentby directly banning pure speech on its face. By denying persons who are limited in English proficiency, or entirely lacking in it, the right to participate equally in the political process, the Amendment violates the constitutional right to participate in and have access to government, a right which is one of the fundamental principle[s] of representative government in this country. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, 566-68, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381, 1383-85, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). The First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances lies at the core of America's democracy. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482-83, 485, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 2790, 2791, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985); United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222, 88 S.Ct. 353, 356, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (right to petition is among the most precious liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights). In Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 2808, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982), the Court recognized that the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press and political freedom. ¶ 51 The Amendment violates the First Amendment by depriving elected officials and public employees of the ability to communicate with their constituents and with the public. With only a few exceptions, the Amendment prohibits all public officials and employees in Arizona from acting in a language other than English while performing governmental functions and policies. We do not prohibit government offices from adopting language rules for appropriate reasons. We hold that the Amendment goes too far because it effectively cuts off governmental communication with thousands of limited-English-proficient and non-English-speaking persons in Arizona, even when the officials and employees have the ability and desire to communicate in a language understandable to them. Meaningful communication in those cases is barred. Under such circumstances, prohibiting an elected or appointed governmental official or an employee from communicating with the public violates the employee's and the official's rights. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465-66, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 1012, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995) (employee commenting on matters of public concern has right to speak, subject to considerations of governmental efficiency); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1020, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (finding state law violates party officials' rights to spread political message to voters seeking to inform themselves on campaign issues). As the Ninth Circuit noted, the Amendment could hardly be more inclusive; it prohibit[s] the use in all oral and written communications by persons connected with the government of all words and phrases in any language other than English. Yniguez v. AOE, 69 F.3d at 933. ¶ 52 Except for a few exceptions, the Amendment prohibits all elected officials from acting in a language other than English while carrying out governmental functions and policies. Several of the plaintiffs in this matter are elected state legislators, who enjoy the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136, 87 S.Ct. 339, 349, 17 L.Ed.2d 235 (1966). Heretofore, when necessary in order to communicate effectively with their constituents, those legislators have spoken their constituents' primary language if those constituents do not speak English well, or at all. ¶ 53 Citizens of limited English proficiency, such as many of the named legislator's constituents, often face obstacles in petitioning their government for redress and in accessing the political system. Legislators and other elected officials attempting to serve limited-English-proficient constituents face a difficult task in helping provide those constituents with government services and in assisting those constituents in both understanding and accessing government. The Amendment makes the use of non-English communication to accomplish that task illegal. In Arizona, English is not the primary language of many citizens. A substantial number of Arizona's Native Americans, Spanish-speaking citizens, and other citizens for whom English is not a primary language, either do not speak English at all or do not speak English well enough to be able to express their political beliefs, opinions, or needs to their elected officials. Under the Amendment, with few exceptions, no elected official can speak with his or her constituents except in English, even though such a requirement renders the speaking useless. While certainly not dispositive, it is also worth noting that in everyday experience, even among persons fluent in English as a second language, it is often more effective to communicate complex ideas in a person's primary language because some words, such as idioms and colloquialisms, do not translate well, if at all. In many cases, though, it is clear that the Amendment jeopardizes or prevents meaningful communication between constituents and their elected representatives, and thus contravenes core principles and values undergirding the First Amendment. ¶ 54 AOE argues that the First Amendment addresses [the] content not [the] mode of communication. The trial court adopted this argument, concluding that the Amendment was a permissible content-neutral prohibition of speech. Essentially, AOE argues that strict scrutiny should be reduced in this case because the decision to speak a non-English language does not implicate pure speech rights, but rather only affects the mode of communication. By requiring that government officials communicate only in a language which is incomprehensible to non-English speaking persons, the Amendment effectively bars communication itself. Therefore, its effect cannot be characterized as merely a time, place, or manner restriction because such restrictions, by definition, assume and require the availability of alternative means of communication. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (requiring the performance of a concert at a lower than desired volume); see also Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (requiring the distribution rather than the posting of leaflets on public property). ¶ 55 AOE also argues that the Amendment can be characterized as a regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression and therefore should be deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754 (citing City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48, 106 S.Ct. at 929-30). We agree with the Ninth Circuit's emphatic rejection in Yniguez v. AOE of the suggestion that the decision to speak in a language other than English does not implicate free speech concerns, but is instead akin to expressive conduct. There, the court said that [s]peech in any language is still speech and the decision to speak in another language is a decision involving speech alone. 69 F.3d at 936. See generally Cecilia Wong, Language is Speech: The Illegitimacy of Official English After Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 30 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 277, 278 (1996). ¶ 56 The United States Supreme Court has observed that [c]omplete speech bans, unlike content-neutral restrictions on time, place or manner of expression, are particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain information. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 506, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 1507, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (internal citation omitted); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 2045, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (Our prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression.). ¶ 57 The Amendment poses a more immediate threat to First Amendment values than does legislation that regulates conduct and only incidentally impinges upon speech. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-76, 382, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 1681-82, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (statute prohibiting knowing destruction or mutilation of selective service certificate did not abridge free speech on its face); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3068-69, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (National Park Service regulation forbidding sleeping in certain areas was defensible as a regulation of symbolic conduct or a time, place, or manner restriction). Laws directed at speech and communication are subject to exacting scrutiny and must be justified by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment requires. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2541, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (citations omitted); accord First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1421, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17, 96 S.Ct. 612, 633, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Here, the drafters of the Amendment articulated the need for its enactment as promoting English as a common language. The Legislative Council's official argument in favor of the Amendment stated: The State of Arizona is at a crossroads. It can move toward the fears and tensions of language rivalries and ethnic distrust, or it can reverse this trend and strengthen our common bond, the English language. ¶ 58 Even if the Amendment were characterized as a content- and viewpoint-neutral ban, and we hold such a characterization does not apply, the Amendment violates the First Amendment because it broadly [11] infringes on protected speech. See National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 470, 115 S.Ct. at 1015 (striking down content-neutral provisions of Ethics Reform Act due to significant burdens on public employee speech and on the public's right to read and hear what Government employees would otherwise have written and said). In National Treasury Employees Union, the Court recognized that a ban on speech ex ante (such as that imposed by the Amendment) constitutes a wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a massive number of potential speakers and thus chills potential speech before it happens. Id. at 467-68, 115 S.Ct. at 1013-14 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted); see also City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 55, 114 S.Ct. at 2045 (holding that even content- and viewpoint-neutral laws can suppress too much speech); Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987) (viewpoint neutral regulation held unconstitutional because it prohibited all protected expression). ¶ 59 The chilling effect of the Amendment's broad applications is reinforced by Section 4 which provides that elected officials and state employees can be sued for violating the Amendment's prohibitions. See Appendix. We conclude that the Amendment violates the First Amendment.