Opinion ID: 763102
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trademark Infringement Generally

Text: 12 Before discussing the specific question presented on this appeal, it is useful to outline the law of trademark infringement. The Lanham Act prohibits the use in commerce, without consent, of any registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods, in a way that is likely to cause confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). The Act similarly prohibits the infringement of unregistered, common law trademarks. See id. § 1125(a)(1). Petersen brought counterclaims of trademark infringement against Time under both of these provisions. 13 To prevail on a trademark infringement claim under either of these provisions, a plaintiff must demonstrate that  'it has a valid mark entitled to protection and that the defendant's use of it is likely to cause confusion.'  Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Gruner + Jahr USA Publishing v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir.1993)). A mark is entitled to protection when it is inherently distinctive; if the mark is merely descriptive, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), it qualifies for protection only if it has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., if it has become distinctive of the ... goods in commerce, id. § 1052(f). Secondary meaning attaches when 'the name and the business have become synonymous in the mind of the public, submerging the primary meaning of the term in favor of its meaning as a word identifying that business.'  Arrow, 59 F.3d at 390 (quoting Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir.1990)). 14 If a mark is valid, its possessor, in order to succeed on its infringement claim, must prove that numerous ordinary prudent purchasers are likely to be misled or confused as to the source of the product in question because of the entrance in the marketplace of defendant's mark. Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1077. Under the law of this circuit, courts must consider Judge Henry Friendly's Polaroid factors to decide whether a plaintiff has established a likelihood of confusion: 15 (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will 'bridge the gap' ...; (5) actual confusion; (6) the defendant's good faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality of the defendant's product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers. 16 Arrow, 59 F.3d at 391 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.1961)). 17 Many of these factors received considerable attention at trial. Petersen and Time introduced consumer studies, documentary evidence, and witnesses in an effort to prove the presence or lack of good faith, consumer confusion, and similarity between the Teen and Teen People marks (as well as the similarity between Time's People and Teen People marks). On appeal, however, Petersen's sole challenge is to the district court's supplemental instruction. This instruction related only to the first Polaroid factor, the strength of Petersen's trademark, and to it we now turn. 18 The strength, or distinctiveness, of a mark is its power to identify the source of a product. See Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743 (2d Cir.1998). In somewhat circular fashion, consideration of this factor includes an evaluation of the same characteristics that initially determined a mark's validity: inherent distinctiveness, descriptiveness, and secondary meaning. 19 There are four categories along the spectrum of possible trademarks: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1976) (Friendly, J.). A generic mark (e.g., Magazine as a magazine title) receives no trademark protection. See id. The other three categories of marks may be valid trademarks deserving of protection, and the mark's classification is also relevant in determining the strength of the mark. 20 The strongest marks are arbitrary or fanciful marks, which are entitled to the fullest protection against infringement. See id. at 11. The next strongest are suggestive marks, which require imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods. Id. (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs. Inc., 295 F.Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y.1968)). A mark that is merely descriptive of its product is entitled to somewhat less protection. At common law, a merely descriptive mark could not be a valid trademark, see id. at 9 (citing Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323, 20 L.Ed. 581 (1871)), but as trademark law developed, these marks were accorded legal protection if they had acquired secondary meaning, see id. With regard to all valid marks, the stronger the secondary meaning, the stronger the mark for the purpose of the first Polaroid factor. 21 Along with the inherent distinctiveness of a mark, the mark's distinctiveness in the marketplace also must be considered in determining its strength. See Streetwise, 159 F.3d at 743-44. The use of part or all of the mark by third parties weakens its overall strength. See id. at 744 (finding that extensive use of word street as a mark for maps weakened Streetwise as a trademark). 22 Registration under the Lanham Act is also pertinent to a mark's strength. See Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1077. Registration allows a merely descriptive mark to become incontestable on the basis of lack of secondary meaning. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193, 105 S.Ct. 658, 83 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985). However, while incontestability relates to a trademark's strength, it does not alter the breadth of infringement protection that a mark is accorded. As a general matter, registration creates no substantive trademark rights against infringement beyond the common law rights acquired through use of the mark. See La Societe Anonyme des Parfums LeGalion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270 n. 5 (2d Cir.1974); Clairol Inc. v. Gillette Co., 389 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir.1968). The test for infringement of a registered or unregistered trademark is the same: the likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source of the allegedly infringing product. See American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 664 (2d Cir.1979). 23 It is also relevant that the law of trademark accords stronger protection to the stylized version of certain words used as trademarks than to those words themselves. In Gruner + Jahr, the plaintiff claimed that defendant's magazine Parent's Digest infringed the trademark of its magazine Parents. 991 F.2d at 1075. We observed that the mark's registration protect[ed] not the name or the word 'parents,' but rather the stylized logo of that name, and left undisturbed the district court's factual finding that the  'parents' portion of the mark--divorced from the stylized typeface and its particular placement on the magazine cover--was extremely weak. Id. at 1078. These statements, made in the context of a registered mark, are no less true under the common law of trademark infringement.