Opinion ID: 361300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure of wiretap evidence

Text: 7 Taxpayers concede that the FBI was properly authorized, pursuant to the federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2516, to intercept telephone communications of the numbers operation in order to ascertain whether violations of federal gambling criminal statutes had occurred. They contend, however, that 18 U.S.C. § 2515 bars the admission into evidence, at a civil or criminal trial, of any intercepted wire communication, or evidence derived therefrom, that has been improperly disclosed to one department of the government by another. They argue that interdepartmental disclosures within the federal government are barred by the wiretap statute unless specifically authorized by the wiretap statute. They contend that the FBI's disclosure of the wiretap evidence to IRS for use in civil tax proceedings is not specifically authorized by any provision of the statute, therefore, all wiretap evidence and evidence derived from it should have been excluded, and without this evidence there could have been no judgment in the government's favor. 8 After the initial briefs were filed in this case, this court decided Fleming v. U. S., 547 F.2d 872 (CA5), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831, 98 S.Ct. 113, 54 L.Ed.2d 90 (1977). In that civil wagering tax assessment suit, the government used information derived from the same wiretaps as those in the present case against another member of the numbers operation. The same argument as in this case that interdepartmental transfers are barred by the wiretap statute was presented to this court in Fleming and was rejected on the basis of the facts of Fleming. The court reached the conclusion that § 2515 did not bar admission at trial of wiretap evidence improperly disclosed from one federal agency to another, so long as the initial wiretap was lawfully authorized. Moreover, the court suggested that FBI disclosure of wiretap information gathered in the course of a criminal investigation of a gambling ring to IRS for purposes of assessing civil wagering tax liability is specifically authorized by either § 2517(2) 3 or § 2517(3) 4 , or both. The Court, however, did not hold that its reading of the wiretap statute to allow free inter-agency disclosures of wiretap information was applicable to all conceivable cases. Instead it limited its construction of the statute to the specific facts before it, concluding that no statutory purpose would be served by a more restrictive interpretation of the government's authority to allow inter-agency disclosures of wiretap information where (1) there is no showing that the original criminal investigation was a subterfuge for developing information for civil tax proceedings, and (2) there is no infringement on any privacy interest caused by disclosure of the conversations from one agency to another. We held that there had been no subterfuge because the wiretaps had resulted in criminal convictions and that the privacy interest infringed by the disclosure was weak because the intercepted communications were already part of the public record of a criminal prosecution. The Fleming court concluded that it would not make greater efforts to resolve any possible ambiguities in the statute until a stronger showing of infringement upon privacy interests or a showing of subterfuge was made in a subsequent case. 9 On first impression Fleming is controlling. Taxpayers attempt to deal with it in three ways. First, they suggest that it is simply wrong and should be overruled. One Fifth Circuit panel does not overrule another. Robinson v. Parsons, 560 F.2d 720 (CA5, 1977). 10 Second, they contend that their privacy interests were significantly infringed since the first jeopardy assessment, based on information derived from the FBI wiretaps, was made before the wiretap information had been placed in the public record of any criminal proceedings. Their argument apparently is that they retained a privacy interest in the intercepted conversations at the time these conversations (or information derived from them) was disclosed to IRS. Thus, they say, Fleming is not controlling because of the lesser privacy interest implicated in that case and this panel is free to independently construe the wiretap statute and to reassess the arguments that the statute bars introduction of these wiretaps at trial. 11 Whatever the merits of this argument based on the sequence in which disclosures, jeopardy assessments, criminal trials, and civil trials occurred, we need not consider it here because the sequence of events relevant to the taxpayers' privacy interests conforms exactly to the sequence of events in Fleming, as taxpayers' counsel conceded in brief and oral argument. In both cases the sequence of events was (1) lawful interception of telephone communications by the FBI; (2) FBI briefing of IRS civil agents on the contents of wiretapped communications; (3) initial IRS calculation of unpaid wagering tax liability based on information given by the FBI, with subsequent jeopardy assessments; (4) placing of contents of wiretaps on public record in criminal proceedings; (5) FBI transmittal to IRS of additional evidence derived from the wiretapped communications; (6) second IRS calculation of unpaid wagering tax liability based on the additional evidence; and (7) filing of refund suit by plaintiffs, with a subsequent IRS counterclaim for the remainder of the unpaid tax. The privacy interests implicated in Fleming and those in the present case do not differ in any significant respect. 5 The wiretap statute must be construed here as it was in Fleming. 6 12 Taxpayers' third argument is that one of the factual premises of Fleming, not relevant to the strength of the privacy interests implicated, is not present in the instant case. In Fleming the court stated that the parties had stipulated that a district judge had authorized or approved the use of wiretap materials in the tax refund suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 547 F.2d at 875 n. 3. No like stipulation appears in the present case. Taxpayers argue that there has been no § 2517(5) district court authorization for the use of the wiretaps in civil proceedings. For reasons discussed below we do not inquire into the meaning of the stipulation made in Fleming and whether it binds the taxpayers in this case. 13 Fleming relied on three separate provisions of the wiretap statute in approving the disclosures: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2517(2) and 2517(3). Section 2517(3) allows disclosure of legally obtained wiretap information in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States. The Fleming court noted that this statute apparently would allow FBI agents to testify at a civil trial about the contents of wiretap information and concluded that § 2517(3) should be read to authorize disclosure to IRS of the contents of the testimony before trial as well. 7 14 Taxpayers argue here, as was argued in Fleming, that disclosure at a civil tax trial (or any trial or proceeding involving crimes, offenses, or other matters different from those specific offenses that the original wiretap was authorized to gather information about) can be made only if a district judge has previously approved this disclosure. Taxpayers assert that § 2517(5) requires such district court approval prior to use at trial and that no such prior approval had been given here. The Fleming court accepted the argument that such approval is required but concluded that it had been given. We pretermit the dispute over whether there is a § 2517(5) disclosure order that affects this case, but, nevertheless, approve the disclosure and use of the wiretap evidence on the basis of Fleming. The Fleming court relied not only on § 2517(3) but also on § 2517(2) and § 2515 in approving the disclosures there. According to Fleming, in cases where the privacy interests are no stronger than they are here § 2515 does not bar the admission into evidence of lawfully obtained wiretaps and § 2517(2) affirmatively authorizes such use. Section 2517(2) is expressly exempted from the requirements of § 2517(5); § 2515 also does not appear to be constrained by § 2517(5) requirements. Thus the Fleming holding on each of these grounds is unaffected by any lack of a disclosure order here, and we affirm the admission of the wiretap evidence on that basis. 15