Opinion ID: 2507466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Removal of a Juror Without Sufficient Cause

Text: On May 10, 1998, the second day of penalty phase deliberations, the trial court received a note from the jury foreperson which read: We have a juror whose decision was made up prior to deliberation. Please advise. Out of the presence of other jurors, the trial court questioned the jury foreperson, Juror No. 5, about the note. Juror No, 5 explained that one juror had already made a decision about penalty before such deliberations began, and that she was not going to change her mind. [8] Juror No. 5 identified the person as Juror No. 1. The trial court next questioned Juror No. 1. The juror admitted that she had more or less made up her mind about penalty and that she was not going to be swayed by further discussion. She confirmed that she had that view when the jury was sent back to begin penalty phase deliberations. After conferring with the prosecution and defense counsel on what to do next, the trial court asked Juror No. 1 one final question: You have indicated that you pretty much had your feelings or your mind made up when you began your discussions. [¶] Are you willing at this point in time to listen with an open mind to the argument of the other jurors or do you feel that your mind is made up at this point in time? The juror answered: If there was eleven and I was the only one, I would go with them. She repeated that she would go along with the other 11 jurors, even if she felt strongly about her own contrary position. After Juror No. 1 left the courtroom, the prosecutor stated he believed the juror, who was elderly and appeared to be tired, was violating her duty as a juror. The trial court agreed: She appears to be wearing at this point. Her statement that she would simply go along with the other eleven jurors if she were the holdout, notwithstanding her own feelings about the correctness of her position, that coupled with the report by the foreperson of the jury, it does not appear that this juror is participating in a meaningful way in deliberations. The trial court discharged Juror No. 1 for failing to deliberate, and replaced her with an alternate juror. Defendant did not object to the substitution, nor did he move for a mistrial. [9] On appeal, defendant asserts that Juror No. 1 did not fail to deliberate. He contends she did not violate her oath as a juror, and that she should not have been discharged simply because she disagreed with other jurors. He argues therefore that the trial court abused its discretion in removing her without sufficient cause, and that her removal requires reversal of the penalty determination and death judgment. He maintains the trial court's actions violated his rights to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, to an impartial jury, to due process, and to a reliable capital sentencing determination. (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15.) Because defendant failed to object or to move for a mistrial, he has forfeited his claim of error. (See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1029, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) His claim also fails on the merits. As relevant here, a trial court may discharge a juror for good cause at any time if the juror is found to be unable to perform his or her duty. (§ 1089.) [10] A juror who refuses to follow the court's instructions is `unable to perform his duty' within the meaning of Penal Code section 1089. ( People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 448, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209.) Such instructions here included that each juror render a verdict according to the evidence presented and the instructions of the court (see Code Civ. Proc., § 232, subd. (b)), and that each juror will consider all of the evidence, follow the law, exercise your discretion conscientiously, and reach a just verdict. A juror who actually refuses to deliberate is subject to discharge by the court [citation].... ( People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 442, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209, citing People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 484, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225.) `A refusal to deliberate consists of a juror's unwillingness to engage in the deliberative process; that is, he or she will not participate in discussions with fellow jurors by listening to their views and by expressing his or her own views. Examples of refusal to deliberate include, but are not limited to, expressing a fixed conclusion at the beginning of deliberations and refusing to consider other points of view, refusing to speak to other jurors, and attempting to separate oneself physically from the remainder of the jury. ( People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225; see People v. Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 449, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209 [juror's duty is to deliberate with an open mind].) We review a trial court's decision to discharge a juror under an abuse of discretion standard, and will uphold such decision if the record supports the juror's disqualification as a demonstrable reality. ( People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052-1053, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596 [explicitly holding that more stringent demonstrable reality standard is applicable in juror removal cases]; see also People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1158, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321.) The demonstrable reality test requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that [disqualification] was established. ( People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1052-1053, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596.) To determine whether the trial court's conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied, we consider not just the evidence itself, but also the record of reasons the court provided. ( Id. at p. 1053, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596.) In doing so, we will not reweigh the evidence. ( Ibid. ) Applying these general principles to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court's decision to discharge Juror No. 1. was not an abuse of discretion because the juror's refusal to deliberate appears in the record as a demonstrable reality. The trial court here expressly found that Juror No. 1 was not participating in a meaningful way in deliberations based on the jury foreperson's report that Juror No. 1 had made a final decision about penalty before deliberations began, and Juror No. 1's statement that she would simply go along with the other 11 jurors if she were the holdout and held a contrary position. As the jury foreperson explained, Juror No. 1 repeatedly told other jurors she had already made up her mind, and did not participate in any of the discussions. Juror No. 1 essentially confirmed this account to the court. As discussed above, expressing a fixed conclusion at the beginning of deliberations and refusing to consider other points of view, and failing to participate in discussions with fellow jurors both constitute a refusal to deliberate. ( People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225.) Moreover, Juror No. 1's admission that she would go along with the other 11 jurors if they all agreed on a position, even if she strongly disagreed with them, also subjected her to discharge. (See People v. Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 442, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209 [juror who proposes to reach a verdict without respect to the law or the evidence is subject to discharge]; People v. Williams, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 463, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209 [reaffirming basic rule that jurors are required to determine the facts and render a verdict in accordance with the court's instructions on the law; jurors unable to do so are subject to discharge].) `Acquiescence simply because the verdict has been reached by the majority is not an independent judgment, and if permitted, would undermine the right to a unanimous verdict.' ( People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 849, 139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997.) Contrary to defendant's contention, this is not a situation where the juror had doubts about the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, viewed the evidence differently from the way other jurors viewed it, or, after participating in deliberations for a reasonable time, expressed the belief that that further discussions would not alter her view. ( People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 483, 486, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225 [finding trial court abused discretion in discharging juror].) Nothing in the record supports these scenarios. Though defendant emphasizes that Juror No. 1 told other jurors she had already made up her mind after the jury's first vote (which assertedly indicates she was participating in deliberations), this does not contradict Juror No. 1's direct statement that she had already made up her mind at the start of penalty deliberations, a fact she confirmed several times to the trial court. We are confident that the trial court's conclusion that Juror No. 1 was not meaningfully participating in deliberations is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied. ( People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596.)