Opinion ID: 1247774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Misinterpretation and Misapplication of the Law.

Text: In determining sentence, the trial court began by discussing each of the statutory factors listed in former section 190.3. As to factor (c), whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the court found defendant was not acting under such influence, stating in part: Specifically, the Court finds that the defendant was not acting under a post-traumatic stress disorder or under the psychotic state defined as brief reactive psychosis. As to factor (g), whether or not at the time of the offense the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or the effects of intoxication, [11] the court found there was no such impairment. Thereafter, the court summarized its findings. At the conclusion of its statement of applicable aggravating factors and before reciting the applicable mitigating factors, the court repeated its finding of no evidence of mental or emotional disturbance to support factor (c) nor evidence of impaired capacity under factor (g). (20) Relying on People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861], defendant argues the trial court improperly considered the absence of mitigating factors as factors in aggravation. In Davenport this court held the prosecutor erred in arguing to the jury that the absence of certain mitigating factors, not relevant to the evidence in the case, rendered each of them an aggravating factor. (41 Cal.3d at pp. 289-290.) In People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pages 789-790, we distinguished Davenport and held the prosecutor did not err in merely pointing out to the jury the inapplicability of a mitigating factor. (Accord, People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 775.) In the present case factors (c) and (g) were relevant to the evidence; indeed, they were the crux of defendant's case in mitigation. Viewed in context, the court's reference to the absence of evidence supportive of factors (c) and (g) was no more than a statement that defendant had failed in his attempt to prove potentially significant mitigating circumstances. (Cf. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 790.)
In concluding its summary of the applicable aggravating factors, the court stated that it had also considered the fact that at the time of the murders defendant was on probation from the crimes committed against Kim [P.] and was actually undergoing therapy at that time. (21) Relying on People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, defendant asserts the court erred in considering in aggravation the nonstatutory factors of defendant's probation status and therapy participation. In Boyd we held that under the 1978 death penalty statute the prosecution's case for aggravation is limited to evidence relevant to the listed factors exclusive of factor (k)  since that factor encompasses only extenuating circumstances and circumstances offered as a basis for a sentence less than death.... (38 Cal.3d at pp. 775-776.) We thus distinguished the 1978 statute from its 1977 predecessor, under which evidence of defendant's character and mental condition was admissible if relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence (former § 190.3, 1st par.), even if it did not relate to any specific aggravating or mitigating factor. (38 Cal.3d at p. 772.) Defendant argues his probation status and therapy participation are relevant under neither the 1977 death penalty law  which he concedes is generally applicable to this case, nor under the 1978 law  which he maintains is applicable on this point. Because defendant committed the offenses when the 1977 law was in effect, that statute's provisions governed the penalty retrial. Although the trial court, as indicated, expressed its intent to apply any provisions of the 1978 law it deemed more favorable than the 1977 law  in effect, to give defendant the best of both worlds  in so doing, it gave defendant more than he was entitled to. A capital trial must be held under the death penalty law in effect at the time the capital offenses were committed; application of any other law is error. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 883 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208 [145 Cal. Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026] and People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295 [134 Cal. Rptr. 64, 555 P.2d 1313], cited by defendant, are inapposite. Both cases deal with the legislative decriminalization of conduct, the effect of which is to put an end to all prosecutions and proceedings under the repealed statute not reduced to final judgment. ( Rossi, supra, at p. 302; cf. In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948] [legislative mitigation of punishment].) The replacement of the 1977 death penalty law with the 1978 law had no bearing on the criminality of defendant's conduct or the severity of punishment therefor; hence the statute in effect at the time of the offenses governs. Under the 1977 statute, the sentencer was permitted to consider evidence of `any matter relevant to ... the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition.' ( People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 773.) Defendant's therapy and probation status clearly were relevant to his character and background: they displayed a violation of the state's trust and indicated defendant's refusal or inability to learn from his prior misdeeds and to benefit from the help offered him. The trial court thus did not err in considering these facts.
(22) Defendant maintains the court made an impermissible dual use of his prior violent criminal acts against Kim P., Ernest F. and Catherine A. when it cited those offenses under both factor (b), the presence or absence of violent criminal activity, and factor (c), whether or not the offenses were committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. In People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713 we held that although an individual criminal act cannot be counted twice in aggravation for the same purpose, there is no constitutional obstacle to separate consideration of properly distinct aspects of the penalty determination, even when those aspects happen to coexist in a single incident. ( Id. at pp. 764-765.) Here, after reciting the prior offenses as factor (b) criminal activity, the court discussed their circumstances at length in reaching its determination under factor (c). Based on its evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the two charged crimes and the defendant's criminal history, as reflected in the prior violent criminal acts, the court concluded defendant was not in the instant case acting under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; rather his purpose was sexual gratification. Use of the prior criminal acts for the foregoing distinct purposes was not error.
(23) Defendant asserts that ambiguity in the record concerning the court's consideration of sympathy requires reversal. Defendant acknowledges the court understood it could properly consider sympathy for defendant, but maintains it failed to understand that sympathy alone could form the basis for a life sentence. We disagree. In making its sentence determination the court expressly noted that it could properly consider sympathy or pity for the defendant in determining whether or not to show mercy and spare the defendant from execution (italics added) and that defendant was constitutionally entitled to have it consider any sympathy factor raised by the evidence. As the basis for his claim of ambiguity, defendant points to the court's subsequent statement in ruling on his penalty-reduction application that although it recognized and considered sympathy factors raised by the evidence, the Court still feels that it is bound to review the evidence and consider and take into account and be guided by aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in the statute. Read in context, however, with the court's earlier express recognition that sympathy could form the basis for mercy, this statement was fully consistent with our subsequent decisions relied on by defendant. (E.g., People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 875-879; People v. Lanphear, supra, 36 Cal.3d 163, 166-167; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-540 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], revd. on other grounds California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].) The record thus does not support an inference the court did anything other than give sympathy the weight it determined was appropriate in this case.