Opinion ID: 772639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intent to Endanger an Aircraft in Flight Under 32(a)(6)

Text: 67 Mendoza also challenges the sufficiency of the jury instructions given on the 18 U.S.C. 32(a)(6) charge. He argues that the government should be required to prove willfulness with respect to the endangerment element. 68 At trial, Mendoza submitted a proposed jury instruction regarding the elements of 18 U.S.C. 32(a)(6), which included the requirement that Mendoza either knew that [Flight 24] was or could be in flight and would be endangered, or that he intended to endanger [Flight 24] in flight. 5 69 The district court denied his proposed instruction. However, the instruction given was similar to Mendoza's proposed instruction although it did not include the element that Mendoza either knew that such aircraft was or could be in flight and would be endangered, or that he intended to endanger such aircraft in flight. Mendoza failed to object to the instruction given. Review, therefore, is for plain error. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 953. 70 We start from the basic premise that the  `definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.'  Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)). In determining the elements the government must prove to establish a violation of 32(a)(6), the focus of our inquiry is the intent of Congress. United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1995). We look first to the text of the statute in determining the intent of Congress. Id. 71 Section 32(a)(6) states: Whoever willfully-communicates information, knowing the information to be false and under circumstances in which such information may reasonably be believed, thereby endangering the safety of any such aircraft in flight is guilty of the offense. The text of the statute does not support Mendoza's argument that he had to have known that the aircraft would be in flight and would be endangered, or that he must have intended to endanger the aircraft in flight. A plain reading of the statute teaches that it is enough that Mendoza willfully communicated information knowing it was false and under circumstances in which the information could reasonably be believed, and as a result of his intentional misconduct, an aircraft was endangered while in flight. 72 Mendoza argues that, without reading into the statute an additional mens rea requirement, the phrase endangering the safety of any such aircraft in flight improperly imposes strict liability. He argues that this court should insert a mens rea requirement into each element of the statute pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Staples and its progeny. 73 In Staples, 511 U.S. at 623, the Court held that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant knew the weapon he possessed had characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a machine gun in order to be convicted for failing to register a machine gun. The Court noted that the mere fact that a statute is silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation by itself does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element, which would require that the defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal.  Id. at 605. The Court stated that it must construe the statute at issue in light of the background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded. Id. (citations omitted). 74 We agree that the background rule of the common law favoring mens rea should govern interpretation  of 18 U.S.C. 32(a)(6). Staples, 511 U.S. at 619. Unlike the statute at issue in Staples, which did not contain a mens rea element and thus made criminal a broad range of otherwise innocent conduct, 32(a)(6) expressly sets forth two mens rea elements: (1) the defendant willfully conveyed false information (2) knowing the information to be false and under circumstances in which the information may reasonably be believed. Therefore, although 32(a)(6) fails to specify whether the intent to convey false information knowing it to be false includes the intent to endanger the aircraft while in flight, the statute nevertheless punishes what is otherwise culpable conduct. 75 In support of his argument that we should read in an additional mens rea element, omitted by Congress, Mendoza relies on this court's decision in United States v. Pasillas-Gaytan, 192 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 1999). In Pasillas-Gaytan, the jury was instructed that, where the defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 1425, it could convict the defendant if the government proved that he knowingly acquired naturalization  and that such naturalization was contrary to law. Id. at 867. 6 This court rejected the district court's instruction stating that, because applying for naturalization would almost always be a knowing act, such a jury charge essentially made 1425 a strict liability offense, one which imposes criminal liability without regard to the defendant's state of mind at the time he sought naturalization. Id. We did not agree with the government that the statute was intended to impose no mens rea requirement, other than the requirement of intentionally applying for naturalization, and therefore held that the statute required a culpable state of mind as well. Id. at 868. We thus followed the reasoning of Staples and construed the statute with `the usual presumption that a defendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal.'  Id. (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 619). Therefore, the government was required to prove that Pasillas-Gaytan either knew he was not eligible for naturalization due to his prior conviction, or knowingly misstated his criminal record on his application or in his interview.  Id. (footnote omitted). 76 Here, as in Pasillas-Gaytan, the statute is silent on the mens rea requirement for one of its elements. However, in Pasillas-Gaytan, the court determined that the statute as drafted did not require that the defendant have a culpable state of mind and therefore read in the requirement that the defendant must know the underlying acts which made his conduct illegal. Section 32(a)(6) does not have the same shortcoming. Instead, it requires that the violator willfully communicate information, knowing the information is false and under circumstances in which such information could reasonably be believed. Therefore, the statute does not violate the fundamental principle that a person is not criminally responsible unless `an evil-meaning mind' accompanies `an evil-doing hand.'  Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 890 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952)). We have stated: 77 Criminal law presumes that the government must prove that the defendant possessed some mental state for each statutory circumstance that would make criminal otherwise innocent conduct even if this construction is not the most natural grammatical reading of the statutory language. Provided the defendant recognizes he is doing something culpable, however, he need not be aware of the particular circumstances that result in greater punishment. Criminal intent serves to separate those who understand the wrongful nature of their act from those who do not, but does not require knowledge of the precise consequences that may flow from that act once aware that the act is wrongful. 78 United States v. Flores-Garcia, 198 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). These principles of criminal law instruct that the government does not need to prove that the Mendoza willfully endangered the safety of an aircraft while in flight. Here, the government proved that Mendoza engaged in culpable conduct as required by the statute. There was no plain error in refusing the instruction requested. 79 AFFIRMED.