Opinion ID: 2268188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Mens Rea

Text: ¶ 5 Meneses argues that the jury instructions omitted an essential element of the crime of telephone harassment under RCW 9.61.230, namely, that the intent to harass be formed at the outset of the call. We have previously held that the intent to harass must be formed when the defendant places the call. State v. Lilyblad, 163 Wash.2d 1, 13, 177 P.3d 686 (2008). In reaching this conclusion, we abrogated a Court of Appeals decision that had construed RCW 9.61.230 to criminalize calls even when the defendant formed the intent to harass during the call. Id. at 8, 12-13, 177 P.3d 686 (abrogating City of Redmond v. Burkhart, 99 Wash.App. 21, 991 P.2d 717 (2000)). We held that such an interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute, which requires that the call be made with intent to harass or intimidate. Id. at 8-9, 177 P.3d 686. To make a telephone call means to place the call, we said, so the requisite mens rea must be formed when the defendant places the call. Id. at 10, 177 P.3d 686; see also id. at 12, 177 P.3d 686 (calling the statute's meaning unambiguous). ¶ 6 This definition of telephone harassment was given to the jury: A person commits the crime of Telephone Harassment when he or she, with intent to harass or intimidate any other person, makes a telephone call to such other person threatening to inflict injury on the person called or any member of the family or household of the person called. A person also commits the crime of Telephone Harassment when he or she, with the intent to harass or intimidate any other person, makes a telephone call to such other person threatening to kill that person or any other person. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 71 (Jury Instruction 7) (emphasis added). The to convict instructions stated: To convict the defendant of the crime of Telephone Harassment ... each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) That on or about [date,] the defendant placed a telephone call to Jamila Willis; 2) That the telephone call was made with the intent to harass or intimidate Jamila Willis; 3) That the defendant threatened to kill [or inflict injury on, as appropriate] Jamila Willis[;] and 4) That the acts occurred in the State of Washington. E.g., CP at 76 (Jury Instruction 12) (emphasis added). ¶ 7 An average juror hearing these instructions would interpret them to require that Meneses have the intent to intimidate or harass Willis when he made the call. Following our reasoning in Lilyblad, this means that he would have to form the intent before placing it. But, Meneses notes that before Lilyblad, Division One opined that making a telephone call includes the entire call, not merely the initial placing of the call. The phrase cannot be unambiguous if an appellate court previously interpreted it differently, he urges. This argument misses Lilyblad 's point: we abrogated Division One's interpretation of the statute because, in an effort to follow the legislative intent, it contravened the plain meaning of the statute. Lilyblad, 163 Wash.2d at 8-10, 12, 177 P.3d 686. It is the jury instructions' ordinary meaning that matters. [2] See State v. Foster, 91 Wash.2d 466, 480, 589 P.2d 789 (1979) (upholding instructions if they are readily understood and not misleading to the ordinary mind). By requiring the call to be made with intent to harass, the instructions at Meneses's trial properly apprised the jury of the applicable law.