Opinion ID: 4442168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: McCourty next argues that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to prove the New York state crimes of assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, and acting in a manner to injure a child less than 17 years of age. We review a district court’s finding of a supervised release violation for abuse of discretion. United States v. Spencer, 640 F.3d 513, 520 (2d Cir. 2011).
Under New York law, a person is guilty of third-degree assault “when . . . [w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person.” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(1). “Physical injury” is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00(9). The only question raised on appeal is whether McCourty caused “substantial pain.” He did. While “slight or trivial pain” is insufficient to meet the “substantial pain” threshold, the “[p]ain need not, however, be severe or intense to be substantial.” People v. Chiddick, 8 N.Y.3d 445, 447 (2007). “Each case ultimately turns upon the facts unique thereto, with a variety of relevant factors, including, among others, the injury viewed objectively, the victim’s subjective 5 description of the injury and her pain, and whether the victim sought medical treatment.” People v. Rivera, 42 A.D.3d 587, 588 (3d Dep’t 2007). Perhaps the most important factual aspect to support a finding of substantial pain is the injury the defendant inflicted, viewed objectively. Chiddick, 8 N.Y.3d at 447. A punch to the face—even one—is “an experience that would normally be expected to bring with it more than a little pain.” Id. Several repeated punches to the face and being forcibly removed from a car, viewed objectively, would cause substantial pain. Hospital records reflect that the victim had a facial contusion and swelling on the right side of her face, and the responding officer observed her injuries, which showed bruising on K.B.’s face. The district court did not err, much less abuse its discretion, in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that McCourty caused substantial pain.
Under New York law, a person is guilty of third-degree menacing “when, by physical menace, he or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury.” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.15. There must be “evidence of . . . threatening behavior before, after, or otherwise separate from the sudden attack” to support a guilty verdict of menacing in the third degree. In re Shenay W., 68 A.D.3d 576, 576 (1st Dep’t 2009). McCourty argues that there is no evidence “separate” from the assault that he threatened K.B. Appellant’s Br. at 29. He is wrong. The district court correctly found that kicking K.B. out of a car, getting out, and continuing to hit her constitutes threatening behavior “separate” from the “sudden attack” of the first punch that was thrown after McCourty and K.B. began to argue. Moreover, after the assault, K.B. called 911 and entreated the 911 operator to send an officer quickly because McCourty was returning to the scene. He was coming back toward her, which, in this case, constituted threatening behavior 6 given that McCourty had just punched her repeatedly, pushed her out of a car, and continued to hit her on the street. Again, the district did not err, much less abuse its discretion, in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that McCourty exhibited threatening behavior and K.B. was scared. C. Acting in Manner to Injure a Child Less than 17 Years of Age Under New York law, a person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when, “[h]e or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old.” N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10(1). A defendant need not actually harm a child, “rather, a defendant must simply be aware that the conduct may likely result in harm to a child, whether directed at the child or not.” People v. Johnson, 95 N.Y.2d 368, 372 (2000). McCourty argues that the February 11 incident “was not sufficiently serious to be endangering under New York law.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. Again, we disagree. The New York Court of Appeals has recognized that “[t]he adverse effects of domestic violence on children have been well documented over the past two decades and have been recognized by all branches of our government in New York,” and so held that a “defendant who performs a significant act of domestic violence against a mother in the presence of a child” may be found “guilty of endangering the welfare of that child,” depending on the specific facts of that case. Johnson, 95 N.Y.2d at 373. Following that case, intermediate appellate courts have affirmed convictions when the defendant “repeatedly struck the victim directly in the presence of the child, who attempted to intervene on behalf of her mother,” People v. Powell, 128 A.D.3d 1174, 1176 (3d Dep’t 2015), and engaged in “a physical dispute in the presence of the children,” and “refused to leave the premises and blocked the way so that the victim’s sister could not leave with the children,” People v. Bray, 46 A.D.3d 1232, 1233 (3d Dep’t 2007). On the other hand, they have rejected convictions when the evidence established only “that defendant pushed his wife to the 7 ground” once in front of the child. People v. Hosue, 56 Misc. 3d 51, 55 (App Term, 2d Dep’t, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017). McCourty argues that his conduct was unlikely to endanger his child’s welfare because his child told the arresting officer that “McCourty hit [K.B.] only once.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. That is not what the son said. The officer testified that the son “told [him] that they were in the car and that Mr. McCourty did punch his mom in the face.” Appellant’s App. at 72. But he did not say that McCourty hit his mother “only once.” And other credible evidence indicated that McCourty not only punched K.B. in the face in the car, but also kicked her out of the car, and then continued to hit her outside, all in view of his thirteen-year-old son, in the middle of the night on the side of a highway. McCourty also notes that the arresting officer said the child appeared calm when interviewed. But the child need not actually suffer harm to support a conviction. Johnson, 95 N.Y.2d at 373. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that McCourty was aware that beating his child’s mother in front of him would likely endanger his son’s mental and moral welfare, and that the incident was therefore sufficiently serious to support the conviction. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 8