Opinion ID: 439077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Independent Evidence of Conspiracy

Text: 15 According to the rule of United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.1976), the prosecution must lay a foundation for the admission of co-conspirator testimony by establishing the existence of a conspiracy including the defendant by a fair preponderance of independent evidence. Id. at 811-13. See Ammar, 714 F.2d at 246 & n. 3.; Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 665 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 374, 66 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 457 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032, 100 S.Ct. 703, 62 L.Ed.2d 668 (1980). 11 This preponderance standard simply requires the prosecution to present sufficient proof so that the trial judge may find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. Trotter, supra, 529 F.2d at 812 n. 8 (quoting McCormick, Evidence 794 (2d ed. 1972)). 12 In reviewing the district court's determination that a preponderance of independent evidence established Gibbs' participation in the conspiracy, this court's inquiry is limited to whether the trial judge had reasonable grounds to make his finding. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 249; Continental Group, 603 F.2d at 460; United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir.1971). 16 In holding that the district court did not err in finding that the conspiracy existed and that Gibbs participated in the conspiracy we do not consider the alleged telephone conversations between Quintiliano and Gibbs to which White and Bilella testified. 13 The existence of a conspiracy in this case is clear and uncontested. As for Gibbs' participation in the conspiracy, the independent evidence (i.e., evidence apart from the testimony of White and Bilella) offered by the Government to prove that Gibbs was a member of the conspiracy, while not weighty, was nevertheless sufficient. The Government relied heavily on Gibbs' visit to Pennsylvania in April 1980 and on telephone records showing calls made from Quintiliano's residence to Gibbs' residence or Ram Broadcast Co. around the time of the unsuccessful smuggling operation. 17 The circumstances surrounding Gibbs' April 7, 1980, visit to see Quintiliano, the principal conspirator, provides some evidence that Gibbs was involved in Quintiliano's scheme at that time. The meeting took place only nine days after Quintiliano bought an airplane to be used for smuggling marijuana into the United States, and it took Gibbs a considerable distance from home to the place of the conspiratorial planning. Gibbs and Quintiliano had obviously had some communication prior to the visit. Although the plane was located at Quakertown Airport, White was instructed by Quintiliano to take Gibbs to Wings Airfield, 14 from which the Government suggests an inference can be drawn that Gibbs and Quintiliano wanted to hide their connection with the smuggling plane located at Quakertown Airport. 15 Gibbs and Quintiliano conferred at the Perkins Pancake House, the site of previous conversations between Quintiliano and White and Bilella concerning the conspiracy. The defendant and Quintiliano then proceeded to Quakertown Airport, where they inspected the plane to be used in the smuggling operation. Finally, evidence of Quintiliano's evasive driving after leaving Quakertown Airport accompanied by his passenger Gibbs, and the frequent glances by both Quintiliano and Gibbs for the apparent purpose of detecting surveillance allows the further inference of unlawful activity. See United States v. D'Amato, 493 F.2d 359, 364-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826, 95 S.Ct. 43, 42 L.Ed.2d 50 (1974) (counter-surveillance driving indicative of conspiracy). 18 We recognize that at that point in the trial the evidence of Gibbs' contacts with Quintiliano may have fallen short of establishing Gibbs' involvement in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. But that is not the appropriate standard to be applied at that stage. The evidence, as recounted above, permits a reasonable inference of Gibbs' complicity in the enterprise then under way. We cannot say that the district court lacked reasonable grounds to infer that Gibbs was participating in the conspiracy at the time of his visit. 16 19 Because most of the co-conspirator declarations offered by the Government were made six months after Gibbs' April 7, 1980, visit to Pennsylvania, we must consider whether there was sufficient independent evidence from which the district court reasonably could have inferred that Gibbs was still involved in the conspiracy in October 1980. The Government, in seeking to demonstrate the necessary predicate for admission of Quintiliano's co-conspirator declarations, relied on a presumption that Gibbs' membership in the conspiracy continued until October 1980. 17 20 This court has held that once the Government establishes a defendant's involvement in an ongoing conspiracy, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy that he withdrew. 18 Ammar, 714 F.2d at 254; United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793, 803-04 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908, 103 S.Ct. 213, 74 L.Ed.2d 170 (1983); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 548 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866, 100 S.Ct. 137, 62 L.Ed.2d 89 (1979). 19 Because there is no evidence that Gibbs withdrew from the conspiracy after April, his involvement may be deemed to have continued until October, 20 making him a conspirator at the time of Quintiliano's incriminating statements to White and Bilella on October 4 and 5, 1980. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in its determination that the Government met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of independent evidence that Gibbs was involved in the conspiracy at the time of Quintiliano's statements.