Opinion ID: 2594624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Same Occasion

Text: In Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th 585, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945, the defendant entered a furniture store with an armed companion, who pointed a gun at a salesperson while the defendant took $1,200 from the cash register, $200 from the wallet of another salesperson, and the purse of a female customer who approached him, before the two fled. ( Id. at p. 589, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) The defendant was convicted of four counts of second degree robbery. On those facts we held the offenses were committed on the same occasion within the meaning of section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) and (7) (see also § 667, subd. (c)(6) and (7); fn. 1, ante ). ( Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 594, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) In reaching that conclusion, we rejected an argument that the analysis for determining whether section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) and (7) (see also § 667, subd. (c)(6) and (7)) requires consecutive sentencing is coextensive with the test for determining whether section 654 permits multiple punishment. ( Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 591-595, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) We explained that section 654 is irrelevant to the question of whether multiple current convictions are sentenced concurrently or consecutively under the three strikes law, because section 654 does not allow any multiple punishment, whether concurrent or consecutive, and the analyses performed under the two statutes are entirely separate. (18 Cal.4th at p. 594, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) [3] We also rejected an argument that same occasion, as used in the three strikes mandatory-consecutive-sentencing provision, is necessarily closely related to the definition of separate occasion found in section 667.6, subdivision (d) (providing for full, separate, consecutive terms for certain sex offenses involving separate victims or the same victim on separate occasions), and that both phrases should therefore be construed as reflecting a common legislative intent. ( Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 596-599, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) We observed that because the term separate occasions appears in a variety of statutes, and does not appear to have a consistent meaning, section 667.6, subdivision (d)'s definition of that term[ ] is of only marginal assistance under these circumstances in construing the meaning of the phrase `not committed on the same occasion.' ( Id. at p. 599, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) Turning to the phrase same occasion found in section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) (see also § 667, subd. (c)(6)), we next explained in Deloza that the legislative and initiative versions of the three strikes law are the only Penal Code sections that use the term `same occasion.' Nothing in either the language of subdivision (a)(6) and (7) or its legislative history suggests the electorate intended these words to have a special or peculiar import different from their ordinary, generally understood meaning. The phrase `committed on the same occasion' is commonly understood, to refer to at least a close temporal and spatial proximity between two events, although it may involve other factors as well. Making mandatory consecutive sentences for those current crimes committed on different occasions is consistent with the focus of the three strikes law, which is recidivism. (Ballot Pamp., text of Prop. 184, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 64 [The voters' stated intent in enacting section 1170.12 was `to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.']; § 667, subd. (b); People v. Neivsome [(1997)] 57 Cal.App.4th [902,] 913, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 438.) ( Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 594-595, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945, first italics added.) Applying our construction of the phrase committed on the same occasion to the facts there before us, we explained in Deloza that defendant entered a furniture store, robbed four victims, and left. His robberies were committed in one location, and were apparently brief in duration. They were committed essentially simultaneously against the same group of victims, i.e., persons in the furniture store. While [the patron whose purse was stolen] approached defendant, his criminal activity was not thereby interrupted, but merely continued with her as an additional victim. Nor was there any other event that could be considered to separate one `occasion' of robbery from another. Given the close temporal and spatial proximity of defendant's crimes against the same group of victims, they were clearly committed on the `same occasion,' regardless of what additional factors may be found relevant in defining the precise parameters of this phrase in future cases. ( Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 595-596, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945, fn. omitted.) Because the defendant's crimes in Deloza were committed in one location, were brief in duration, and were committed essentially simultaneously against the same group of victims, we had no difficulty concluding they were committed on the same occasion within the meaning of section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) and (7) (see also § 667, subd. (c)(6) and (7)), and that consecutive sentencing was therefore not mandated. ( Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 596, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) Accordingly, we had no occasion in Deloza to further construe the phrase arising from the same set of operative facts as used in the three strikes mandatory-consecutive-sentencing provision. ( Id. at p. 596, fn. 7, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) In this case, if defendant's current felony offenses of petty theft with a prior and aggravated assault were committed on the same occasion, then, as in Deloza, consecutive sentencing would not be mandatory under subdivision (c)(6), and we would need not further construe the language arising from the same set of operative facts also used in the statute. The Court of Appeal majority, with one justice dissenting, concluded that defendant's theft of a bottle of brandy from the market and subsequent assault on LaVastida were committed on the same occasion within the meaning of the statute. The majority opinion, citing Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th 585, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945, stated: [Defendant's] offenses all were committed within a short span of time some five to 15 minutes, and within `close spatial proximity'in the market and the area immediately adjacent to it. Like the dissenting justice below, we disagree with the Court of Appeal majority, and conclude instead that defendant did not commit the felony assault upon LaVastida on the same occasion (subd. (c)(6)) as the petty theft from the market. As noted, in Deloza, the four robberies occurred almost simultaneously. Similarly, in Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th 508, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 941 P.2d 64, the defendant robbed or attempted to rob four victims seated at a table in a mall, demanded money at gunpoint, backed out of the room briefly, returned to warn them not to move, then left. We concluded on the facts of Hendrix that the crimes had been committed on the same occasion, a point ultimately conceded by the parties in that case. ( Id. at pp. 510-511, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 941 P.2d 64.) Here, in contrast, defendant fled the scene of his first crime, the theft of a bottle of brandy from a market. He was seen running across the street and through a gas station. He likely followed the shortcut through the vacant lot, over the wall behind the Rojas/LaVastida house, and into their fully enclosed backyard. There was testimony it would have taken defendant two or three minutes to walk that distance, though he undoubtedly traveled the route at a quickened pace. The facts taken as a whole support an inference that defendant committed his second offense at the Rojas/LaVastida home, a one- to three-block distance from the site of his first crime (depending on whether he took the shortcut or followed the city streets), and most likely within two or three minutes of his theft from the market. Although he was fleeing from the first crime scene and may have been following a known neighborhood shortcut, he nonetheless chose to trespass into the Rojas/LaVastida house's fully enclosed backyard. At the point at which he entered the backyard, defendant was no longer being pursued by any store personnel (although we do not know whether he was aware of that). In theory, he could have fled along a public street or thoroughfare and possibly escaped apprehension. Instead, he chose to commit new and separate crimes during his flight. The instant case thus involves additional factors not present in Deloza and Hendrix: two separate locations (a market and a residence one to three blocks away), and two entirely separate groups of victims (the employees and a patron of the market, and Rojas and LaVastida, who had no connection to the first crime scene). Nor can it be said that defendant's crimes were committed simultaneously (cf. Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th 585, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945) or through the same criminal act directed against multiple victims (cf. Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th 508, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 941 P.2d 64). Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, we do not believe the facts of this case warrant invoking the escape rule (dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d at p. 585, 6 P.3d at pp. 241-242), as defendant did not act with an accomplice in perpetrating the theft from the market, nor did the crime result in a felony murder. Once again, we observed in Deloza that [n]othing in either the language of [the three strikes law's mandatory consecutive-sentencing provision] or its legislative history suggests the electorate intended these words [`same occasion'] to have a special or peculiar import different from their ordinary, generally understood meaning. The phrase `committed on the same occasion' is commonly understood to refer to at least a close temporal and spatial proximity between two events.... ( Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 594, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945.) If there is no ambiguity, the usual and ordinary meaning of the term same occasion used in subdivision (c)(6) must control. ( People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313.) Applying the commonly understood meaning of that term to these facts, we find that the theft from the market, and the aggravated assaults subsequently committed at the Rojas/LaVastida home, were not committed on the same occasion within the meaning of subdivision (c)(6). Even if the test were whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity for calm reflection between commission of the two offenses (dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 585, 6 P.3d at p. 241), the facts would still support an inference that after fleeing from the market, defendant did have sufficient opportunity to reflect upon the additional penal consequences of his decision to trespass into a fully enclosed private backyard, and thereafter assault the homeowners. We do not believe it was intended that the mandatory consecutive-sentencing provision of the three strikes law not apply to the commission of different crimes perpetrated against different groups of victims merely because the later crimes occurred while the defendant was still in flight from the initial crime scene. No principle of criminal law shields a defendant from conviction of all such offenses, nor does section 654 prohibit multiple punishment for crimes of violence against multiple victims. ( People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 78, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 233, 851 P.2d 27.) We find no basis for concluding the voters who enacted the initiative version of the three strikes law (or the drafters of the virtually identical legislative version) nonetheless intended that all offenses a defendant chooses to commit while still in flight from the first crime scene should be excluded from the scope of the mandatory consecutive-sentencing provision. Applying the close spatial and temporal proximity test of Deloza, we conclude the aggravated assault upon LaVastida, perpetrated two to three minutes or more after the theft from the market, at a location one to three blocks away (depending upon the flight route taken), was not committed on the same occasion as the theft within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (c)(6). Accordingly, we must now reach the question whether these offenses did or did not aris[e] from the same set of operative facts. ( Ibid.)