Opinion ID: 1011830
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: csx’s role in creating the hazard

Text: Sheppard’s final argument is that CSX had a duty to warn Sheppard of hazards on the premises because Sheppard was a fellow subcontractor. Sheppard relies primarily on decisions of the Court of Appeals of Georgia for the proposition that subcontractors owe a duty in prosecuting [their] work, to use ordinary care not to cause injuries to others engaged in work on the same premises. Soucy v. Alexander, 323 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); see also Ragsdale Heating 4 See Seckinger & Co. v. Foreman, 314 S.E.2d 891, 893 (Ga. 1984) (holding that because one joint venturer is liable for worker’s compensation benefits for its joint venturer’s employees then one joint venturer is immune from tort liability to its joint venturer’s employees); but see Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-2(b) (2003) ([T]his chapter shall not apply to any common carriers by railroad). 8 SHEPPARD v. CSX TRANSPORTATION & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Terrell, 539 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing duty of subcontractors to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to other subcontractors), Doke v. Dover Elevator Co., 263 S.E.2d 209, 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (same). This line of cases, as the district court recognized, only creates a duty of reasonable care where the actions of the subcontractor create the hazard that causes the injury. Georgia law does not create a duty for subcontractors to warn of hazards that they are aware of but did not create. Cf. Adcox Serv. Co. v. Adderhold, 435 S.E.2d 262, 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that independent contractors did not owe a duty to warn others of a hazard unless they created it). Therefore, the issue in this case is whether Sheppard presented a triable issue of fact that Wasdin created the hazard by closing the door and removing the cone. Sheppard is correct that the issue of who closed the door is one of fact. [I]t is the duty of the court to withdraw the case from the jury when the necessary inference is so tenuous that it rests merely upon speculation and conjecture, however. Sylvia Development Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259 F.2d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 1958)); accord Moore v. Teague, 564 S.E.2d 817, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ([W]hen the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to grant summary judgment for the defendant.). Sheppard’s only evidence is that both Wasdin and Byrnes admitted that they might have closed the door, although neither remembers. Byrnes also admits he may have moved the cone, but Wasdin remained certain that he did not alter the cone’s placement. Wasdin’s denial regarding the cone, given the evidence that the cone had to be moved to close the door, in fact makes it more likely that Byrnes closed the door. Thus, the jury could, at most, merely speculate about whether it was Wasdin or Byrnes who moved the cone, closed the door, and created the hazard. Because Sheppard cannot prove that Wasdin created the hazard, he cannot show that CSX owed a duty of reasonable care to him.5 CSX 5 Sheppard believes that a tort rule finding a duty when the subcontractor created the hazard but not when the subcontractor knew of the hazard SHEPPARD v. CSX TRANSPORTATION 9 cannot be found negligent if it did not owe a duty to Sheppard. The district court was correct in awarding summary judgment on this claim.6