Opinion ID: 1004158
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Combination of Discouraged Factors

Text: The district court also relied upon a combination of discouraged factors to justify its downward departure. In particular, the district court identified physical condition or age, mental capacity, employment record, lack of criminal record for over 70 years, community ties and service to his country, single act of aberrant behavior,7 and emotional toll arising from his battle with the IRS as factors that combined to warrant a downward departure. The district court conceded that none of these factors, considered singularly, warranted departure, but it concluded that these circumstances, in combination, were present to such an extraordinary degree that departure was appropriate. (J.A. at 234-35.) The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 provides that The Commission does not foreclose the possibility of an extraordinary case that, because of a combination of such characteristics or circumstances, differs significantly from the heartland cases covered by the guidelines in a way that is important to the statutory purposes of sentencing, even though none of the characteristics or circumstances individually distinguishes the case. However, the Commission believes that such cases will be extremely rare. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, comment. Thus, under some circumstances, the district court is permitted to find that a combination of circumstances creates an extraordinary case sufficient to warrant a downward departure. See DeBeir, 186 F.3d at 573 ([T]he Guidelines clearly contemplate that even if none of the factors at issue taken individually warrants a departure, the cumulative effect of all of the circumstances of the case may, in some instances, bring it outside the heartland.). 7 As discussed above, we have already concluded that the district court misapplied the single act of aberrant behavior factor. We fail to see how the addition of a misapplied factor to the other factors adds anything to the equation. 8 UNITED STATES v. COBLE In Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), the Supreme Court set forth a multi-step analysis that courts must undertake in determining whether a departure is appropriate. See id. at 95-96. Under the Koon framework, the district court must impose a sentence within the guideline range unless it determines that individual facts present in the case take the case outside the heartland of typical cases embodied in the conduct covered by the applicable guideline. See id. at 92-95. Before departing, the sentencing court should determine whether the factor on which it is considering a departure has been forbidden, encouraged, discouraged, or unmentioned as a possible basis for departure by the Sentencing Commission. See id. at 95-96. Forbidden factors may never be grounds for departure.8 If the factor being considered is a discouraged factor,9 it may support a departure only if the court finds that it is present to such an extraordinary degree that it takes the case outside the heartland of ordinary cases encompassed by the guidelines. Id. Similarly, if a factor is encouraged but the applicable guideline takes it into account, then it may justify a departure only if it is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present. Finally, as noted above, under the commentary to § 5K2.0, in an extraordinary case, a combination of factors which are not ordinarily relevant to a departure decision may cause the case to differ[ ] significantly from the ‘heartland’ cases . . . in a way that is important to the statutory purposes of sentencing, even though none of the characteristics or circumstances individually distinguishes the case. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, comment. A departure would be possible in such a case, but such a case would be extremely rare. United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir. 1996). Applying this framework to the present case, we first must determine whether the factors relied upon by the district court — physical 8 Examples of forbidden factors include race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status, lack of guidance during youth, drug or alcohol dependence, and economic hardship. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir. 1996). 9 Examples of discouraged factors include family ties and responsibilities, education and vocational skills, and military, civic, charitable, or public service. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir. 1996). UNITED STATES v. COBLE 9 condition or age, employment record, lack of criminal record for over 70 years, community ties and service to his country, and emotional toll arising from his battle with the IRS — are discouraged, encouraged, or forbidden factors. Four of the factors — military service and public service; employment history; family ties and community ties; and emotional toll arising from his battle with the IRS — are discouraged factors. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1, p.s. (age);10 § 5H1.11, p.s. (military service and public service); § 5H1.5 (employment record); § 5H1.6, p.s. (family ties and community ties).11 Coble’s clean criminal record for over 70 years is essentially the same as being a first time offender, which is a factor that is already considered by the guidelines. See United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir. 1990) (In considering the criminal history of the defendant, the Sentencing Guidelines do take into account a defendant’s status as a firsttime offender.); cf. Koon, 518 U.S. at 111 (We further agree with the Court of Appeals that the low likelihood of petitioners’ recidivism was not an appropriate basis for departure. Petitioners were first-time offenders and so were classified in Criminal History Category I.). Thus, these factors are sufficient to support departure only if they are present to an extraordinary degree so as to take the case outside the heartland of ordinary cases encompassed by the guidelines. Nothing in the record indicates that any of these factors, individually or in combination, are present to an extraordinary degree so as to warrant departure. The district court, in finding that the factors in combination presented an atypical case, did not articulate how Coble’s situation was unusual, except to state that 10 The policy statement provides that [a]ge may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range when the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly then incarceration. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1, p.s. 11 To the extent that the district court relied upon the duress arising from the economic hardship imposed by the IRS liens, that is a forbidden factor. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12 (coercion and duress) (stating that [t]he Commission considered the relevance of economic hardship and determined that personal financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a trade or business do not warrant a decrease in sentence). 10 UNITED STATES v. COBLE I don’t think that there has been a federal court sentencing anyone with a fifteen to twenty-one month initial guideline for obstruction of the [IRS] that is 75 years old, with no criminal record, a combat pilot in two wars, a 747 captain and who has attempted to use the warrant to satisfy a lien against his property from the IRS, which even though arguably valid, he nevertheless believed to be invalid and improper, and I think you do sincerely believe that, even though you may well be seriously misguided in this case. (J.A. at 237.) Of the factors that the district court combined to justify departure, the district court explicitly refused to find that Coble was feeble and infirm or that he had diminished capacity (J.A. at 225 (I think it would be less than honest for the Court to do something about being aged and infirmed in this case, as well as any diminished capacity type argument on the grounds at this time.).) As to the emotional toll arising from his battle with the IRS, that could hardly be deemed unusual because any defendant in a lengthy dispute with the IRS would presumably be subject to a similar emotional toll. Cf. Koon, 518 U.S. at 110 (finding an abuse of discretion in the district court’s reliance upon Koon’s career loss because it is not unusual for a public official who is convicted of using his governmental authority to violate a person’s rights to lose his or her job and to be barred from future work in that field); Rybicki, 96 F.3d at 758 (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to firearm handler’s deprivation of right to handle firearms or to vote). Thus, these factors fail to support a departure by themselves, and they do not come close to reflecting anything unusual about Coble’s case. We do not believe, on the record before us, that combining these factors with the remaining factors — employment record, lack of criminal record for over 70 years, community ties and service to his country — makes Coble’s case exceptional. Cf. Rybicki, 96 F.3d at 758 (rejecting the district court’s decision, in a case involving a similarly decorated veteran who was convicted of a non-violent crime, to depart downward on the basis of the confluence of several factors that, standing alone, were each insufficient to warrant departure).12 12 In United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 1996), the district court relied upon a combination of several factors, including that RybUNITED STATES v. COBLE 11 None of the factors cited by the district court come close to being present to an exceptional degree and the district court failed adequately to explain how combining these factors makes them so. In other words, we simply do not agree that combining these factors causes Coble’s case to fall within the extremely rare circumstances warranting departure as contemplated by the commentary to § 5K2.0. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision to depart downward on the basis of the confluence of these factors because there is no indication that these factors, considered individually or jointly, are present to an exceptional degree so as to make Coble’s case atypical.13 icki was a highly decorated Vietnam War veteran who had saved a civilian’s life during the My Lai incident and had an unblemished record of 20 years of service to his country, both in the military and in the Secret Service. Id. at 758. We stated that Rybicki’s 20 years of unblemished service to the United States and his responsibilities to his son and wife, both of whom have medical problems, are also factors that the Sentencing Guidelines have expressly addressed, instructing that they are ordinarily not relevant and therefore discouraged. Because the record does not indicate that these factors are present to an exceptional degree, they may not form the basis for a downward departure. Id. (internal citations omitted). The commentary to § 5K2.0 became effective on November 1, 1994 and superseded our prior holding in United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1447 (4th Cir. 1990), that a combination of factors that did not independently warrant departure could not provide a basis for departure. Although the district court in Rybicki relied upon a combination of factors that did not independently warrant departure, we did not explicitly address the applicability of the commentary to § 5K2.0 in that case, and it is unclear whether Rybicki was sentenced before or after the effective date of the commentary. We nevertheless find Rybicki instructive, at least to the extent that Rybicki’s military and public service, which, like Coble’s, was extensive and distinguished, was considered a discouraged factor that was not present to an exceptional degree. 13 Although the dissent suggests that the district court’s decision to depart downward in this case is wholly insulated from review pursuant to Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), we disagree. Indeed, we 12 UNITED STATES v. COBLE