Opinion ID: 1703071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: History of La.Code Cr.P. art. 905.2(A)

Text: As originally enacted by 1976 La.Acts 694, La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 (now art. 905.2(A)) provided in pertinent part that the sentencing hearing of a capital case shall focus on the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender. Although the original version of art. 905.2 did not explicitly mention victim-impact evidence, this Court held in State v. Bernard, 608 So.2d 966, 972 (La.1992), that some evidence of the murder victim's character and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors is admissible as relevant to the circumstances of the offense or to the character and propensities of the offender. Our holding in State v. Bernard was based upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), which acknowledged that a State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant. The Supreme Court thereby recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We therefore concluded in Bernard that because any person of basic understanding knows that every murder victim is a unique individual and that the murder will cause some emotional, physical or economic harm to some group of survivors .... the prosecutor, within the bounds of relevance under the statute, may introduce a limited amount of general evidence providing the identity to the victim and a limited amount of general evidence demonstrating harm to the victim's survivors. Bernard, 608 So.2d at 971. In 1994, the legislature endorsed our holding in Bernard by amending La. C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 to provide that a capital sentencing hearing shall focus on the circumstances of the offense, the character and propensities of the offender, and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family members. 1994 La.Acts 14. Subsequent to the 1994 amendment, we had occasion to consider the scope of the amendment in State v. Frost, 97-1771 (La.12/1/98), 727 So.2d 417. In Frost, the state presented evidence at the defendant's capital sentencing hearing testimony from the victim's close friends as to the impact of the victim's death on their lives. While we ultimately determined that the error was harmless, Frost held that [a]lthough the [witnesses] were very close to the victim, they [did] not qualify as `family' under either a traditional or a legal definition of the word. Frost, 97-1771 at 14, 727 So.2d at 429. Although the impact of the victim's death on close friends is arguably as relevant to assessing the moral culpability of the defendant's crime as the impact of the loss on members of the victim's immediate family, we resolved in Frost, as we had in Bernard, to confine admissible victim impact testimony to that which is deemed relevant by the capital sentencing statute. Frost, 97-1771 at 14, 727 So.2d at 429-30; see also State v. Wessinger, 98-1234, p. 21 (La.5/28/99), 736 So.2d 162, 181 (Because these individuals were not family of the victims under either a traditional or legal definition of the word, the testimony of these witnesses was indeed erroneously admitted.). This Court decided Frost at a time of growing support for victims' rights in Louisiana. In 1998, voters approved an amendment of this state's constitution adding art. I, § 25 to guarantee that [a]s defined by law, a victim of crime shall have the right to reasonable notice and to be present and heard during all critical stages of preconviction and postconviction proceedings.... In the following year, Senator Dardenne introduced Senate Bill 776 in the legislature to make comprehensive changes in existing law. As explained by its sponsor, the legislation was required because of the constitutional amendment that brought Louisiana into a group of states that have adopted statewide amendments recognizing victims' rights .... this legislation is an attempt to bring the [victims' rights] statute in line with the constitution. Minutes, Senate Committee on Judiciary, April 27, 1999. The bill, which became 1999 La.Acts 783, substantially revised and reenacted the victim's rights provisions of La.R.S. 46:1842-1844, and specifically implemented the mandate of La. Const. art. I, § 25 by defining a critical stage of a criminal proceeding as any judicial proceeding at which there is a disposition of the charged offense or a lesser offense, or a sentence imposed pursuant thereto. La.R.S. 46:1842(2). The bill also amended La.C.E. art. 615 to exempt the victim of the offense, or the family of the victim, from the rule of sequestration, amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 877 to provide the victim with access to confidential presentence reports, added article 882.2 to the Code of Criminal Procedure to authorize in cases of actual pecuniary loss the award of restitution to the victim as part of any sentence imposed by the court, amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 886 to include restitution to the victim within its provisions for enforcement of unpaid costs and fines, and amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(A) to provide that a capital sentencing hearing in Louisiana shall focus on the circumstances of the offense, the character and propensities of the offender, and the victim, and the impact that the death of the victim has had on family members, friends, and associates. The legislature's recent amendment of La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(A) has unquestionably superceded our decisions in Frost and Wessinger with regard to those persons entitled to provide testimony as to the impact that the death of the victim has had on their lives. On the other hand, we find no evidence either in the express wording of 1999 La.Acts 783 or in its legislative history that the legislature contemplated or specifically addressed the appropriate procedures for a capital sentencing hearing for when the crime does not result in the death of the victim merely by providing that a capital sentencing hearing shall focus on the character and propensities of the victim as well as the defendant.