Opinion ID: 76805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment for Dekalb County

Text: 13 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment to DeKalb County de novo, and apply the same legal standards used by the district court. See O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A district court should grant summary judgment when, after an adequate time for discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element of that party's case. See Nolen v. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 373 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). 14 We resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff, and then determine the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under that version of the facts. Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir.2003). If the evidence could not lead a rational fact-finder to find for the nonmoving party, and where the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing to demonstrate an element essential to that party's case, on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial, then no genuine of issue material fact exists, and summary judgment should be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1525-26 (11th Cir.1997). Finally, genuine disputes are those in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.1996). 15 Mr. McDowell argues that Dekalb County's custom of understaffing the Sheriff's Office (and the Jail) delayed the treatment of his condition and thereby violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that: 16 Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 17 Although the Supreme Court has held that counties (and other local government entities) are persons within the scope of § 1983, and subject to liability, McDowell cannot rely upon the theory of respondeat superior to hold the County liable. 7 See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (finding that § 1983 cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor); Pembaur v. Cincinatti, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). It is only when the `execution of the government's policy or custom ... inflects the injury' that the municipality may be held liable. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). A county does not incur § 1983 liability for injuries caused solely by its employees. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Nor does the fact that a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands of a municipal employee infer municipal culpability and causation. Bd. of County Com'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Instead, to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197. 18 No party challenges that McDowell had a severe medical condition that required urgent care and treatment, which he did not receive. This resulted in a violation of McDowell's constitutional rights. 8 Our first inquiry, then, is whether Dekalb's policy or custom was to understaff the field division so as deny McDowell's constitutional rights. In Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir.1999), we clarified the standard for establishing municipal liability. A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must identify a municipal `policy' or `custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 1105 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). We defined custom as a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of the law. Wayne, 197 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct. 852, 139 L.Ed.2d 753 (1998)). In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate a policy or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread practice. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also, Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir.1994). 19 This threshold identification of a custom or policy ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Brown, 520 U.S. 403-04, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (citations omitted). This prevents the imposition of liability based upon an isolated incident. See Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir.1986) (Normally, random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy). Rather, the incident must result from a demonstrated practice. See Wayne, 197 F.3d at 1106 (determining that a single decision, even if erroneous, would not support the inference that the County had a custom or policy in place). Based on these instructions, McDowell must establish that DeKalb's policy was to understaff the field division, and that this practice left the division unable to execute medical transports. 20 The Sheriff and the Sheriff's Office of Dekalb County are responsible for the County's law enforcement functions. The Board of Commissioners of Dekalb County (the Board) approves the Sheriff's Office budget. To demonstrate the Jail's routine understaffing practices, McDowell points to the testimony of numerous Sheriff's Office employees claiming that the Jail lacked adequate manpower. Indeed, the chief of jail operations, Dennis Cheatham, testified in his deposition that despite Sheriff's Office requests for additional personnel, other priorities often took precedent. Moreover, the Jail's former health services coordinator explained that transporting inmates between the Jail and Grady was a continual problem, which he constantly [tried] to correct and amend. 21 Although McDowell produced evidence that the Jail had staffing problems, the record provides no evidence that the field division consistently failed to transport non-emergency cases to Grady. Additionally, the field division's policy was to call an ambulance to take the inmate to Grady if it could not accomplish the transport itself. While McDowell's case is tragic, he cannot point to another occasion when the Jail's understaffing, and resulting inability to transport, contributed to or exacerbated an inmate's medical condition. Simply put, this isolated incident, however unfortunate, does not demonstrate evidence of the County's persistent or widespread policy of understaffing the Jail so as to delay the transfer of inmates to Grady. 22 Our next inquiry requires that a municipality's that the municipality's action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability... with deliberate indifference to its known or obvious consequences. Davis ex rel. Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1367, 1375-76 (11th Cir.2000). McDowell cannot rely on a generalized policy of understaffing. See Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 687-88 (11th Cir.1985). The County must have a deliberate intent to inadequately staff the field division. Id. 23 In Brown, the Supreme Court refined the culpability requirement for municipal liability cases. The Court set forth a scheme whereby a governing body's own intentional acts that violate constitutionally protected rights amount to per se § 1983 liability. In such cases, where the municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so ... issues of fault and causation [are] straightforward, and present no difficult questions.... Id. at 405-06, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (examining Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (city council discharged an employee without notice), and City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (city imposed content-based speech regulation, in violation of the First Amendment); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (prosecutor was a final municipal decisionmaker who directed deputies to illegally enter plaintiff's business)). 24 At the other end of the § 1983 liability spectrum, is where the plaintiff claims that a municipality's facially valid actions violated his constitutional rights. In such a case, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee. Brown, 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. As Brown pointed out, Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights. Id. at 415, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (emphasis in the original). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the lawful action was taken with `deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences. Id. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197). Plainly stated, a showing of simple or even heightened negligence is not enough. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382. 25 Mr. McDowell traces the County's liability to its failure to properly fund the resources necessary to staff the Jail. The Supreme Court has recognized that inadequate training may impose § 1983 liability on a municipality in limited circumstances. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 387, 109 S.Ct. 1197. The Court, however, refused to extend liability to inadequate hiring practices. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382. McDowell is asking this Court to extend liability to inadequate budgeting practices, but does not identify any pattern of injuries linked to the County's budgetary decisions, nor does he insist that its accounting practices are defective. Id. at 408, 117 S.Ct. 1382. McDowell's claim rests upon one incident, which he attempts to trace back to a single decision; a decision that does not represent a violation of federal law on its face. Our precedent does not permit such an attenuated link. If it did, the danger that a municipality would be held liable without fault is high. Brown, 520 U.S. at 408, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The County's decision impacted this single case; it had no notice of the consequences based on previous violations of federally protected rights. Id. McDowell cannot establish that a reasonable member of the Board would conclude that the County's budget decisions would lead to events that occurred here. See Davis, 233 F.3d at 1376. Although the record reflects that several deputies testified that the field division lacked the personnel to move inmates to Grady, no evidence was presented that the County's Board was aware of the health consequences involved. Moreover, the record demonstrated that the field division accomplished non-emergency transfers to Grady within a one-to-two hour window. Finally, the County's policy directed the field division to send all emergency cases to Grady by ambulance, and even non-emergency cases, if transport could not be effected in a timely manner. It was a clear, simple directive that said if you cannot transport with your resources you are to call an ambulance for needed medical transportation. With such practices in place, McDowell cannot establish or seriously dispute that the Board would anticipate that inmates would not receive timely medical attention. The alleged constitutional violation here was not a highly predictable consequence of the County's failure to budget (and hence, adequately staff) the Sheriff's Office. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 409-410, 117 S.Ct. 1382. 26 Our final inquiry examines causation. A plaintiff must prove causation by demonstrating that the municipality's  deliberate conduct ... was the `moving force' behind [his] injury.... Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (emphasis in the original). See also Davis, 233 F.3d at 1376-77. Brown noted that every injury suffered at the hands of a municipal employee can be traced to a hiring decision; we believe the same holds true for budget decisions. Id. at 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382. If we employed such a strict causation analysis, then but for the County's budget decision, McDowell would not have suffered the injury. Id. at 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The Supreme Court warned against such pervasive scrutiny: To prevent municipal liability for a ... decision from collapsing into respondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged. Id. 27 We heed the Court's caution and apply it here. While it may be true that the Board's budget decision would make a violation of his constitutional rights more likely,  that alone cannot give rise to an inference that a policy maker's failure to scrutinize the [budget] ... produced a specific constitutional allegation. Brown, 520 U.S. at 411, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (emphasis in original). Brown determined that the showing of one incident of inadequate employee screening did not establish deliberate indifference. Id. Brown further enunciated that a finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any constitutional injury. Id. At 412. We agree. The County's liability cannot be dependent on the scant likelihood that its budget decisions would trickle down the administrative facets and deprive a person of his constitutional rights. Instead, liability must be premised on a finding that  this  budget decision was highly likely to inflict the particular injury McDowell suffered. Id. 28 To test the link between McDowell's injury and the County's conduct, we look to whether a complete review of the budget decision (and the resulting understaffed Jail) reveals that the Board should have known that McDowell's injuries were a plainly obvious consequence of that decision. Brown, 520 U.S. at 412, 117 S.Ct. 1382. We find no such revelation. Even making all reasonable inferences in McDowell's favor, we must agree with the district court that he failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact that the County acted with conscious disregard. See Davis, 233 F.3d at 1374-75. McDowell did not proffer testimony that members of field division believed they could not perform medical transports because of understaffing. Additionally, McDowell did not demonstrate that the County was the moving force behind his injury, given that the Jail was instructed to request an ambulance to transport medical cases to Grady when the field division was unavailable. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Finally, the record indicates that the consequences associated with the Jail's failure to transport McDowell to the hospital in a timely fashion never happened before. To hold a municipality liable for any conceivable constitutional violation, whether based on past concrete injury or mere speculation, would erode its ability to manage and govern. 29 As a final matter, McDowell insists that Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678 (11th Cir.1985) is controlling and diminishes his burden of establishing deliberate indifference to one of proving a policy of deficiencies in staffing or procedures such that [he] is effectively denied access to adequate medical care. Id. at 686 n. 12. We find no merit in McDowell's argument, and his situation distinguishable from Anderson. In Anderson, Atlanta police deputies arrested Larry Anderson and transported him to the city jail. Anderson informed deputies at the time that he needed medical assistance because he had overdosed on drugs. Deputies instead placed Anderson in a holding cell. Anderson remained in the cell throughout the night, and deputies discovered his lifeless body the next morning. The medical examiner determined that Anderson likely died of a drug overdose. A jury held the county liable under § 1983, and awarded damages, but the district court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We reversed that decision, finding that the City of Atlanta did violate Anderson's constitutional rights. 30 The facts in Anderson demonstrated a complete departure from operating procedure whereby the jail was required to staff healthcare personnel at all times. The jail never hired a nurse for the 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. shift, when Anderson arrived and later died at the jail. Anderson, 778 F.2d at 684. Moreover, the medical examiner testified that deputies probably never checked on Anderson, despite their insistence that they had done so. Id. at 685. This Court acknowledged the gross indifference that existed. On the other hand, Mr. McDowell was treated by Nurse Brown and other medical staff consistently monitored his condition both in the Jail's clinic and the intake area. The Jail had a policy in place to rectify any understaffing that would result in delay of medical transports. An ambulance would be called to transport the inmates to Grady if either the situation was emergent or the field division lacked manpower to accomplish the transport. McDowell's injuries result more from a breakdown in communication rather than from understaffing or an abrogation of Jail procedure. As Anderson makes clear, [a] municipality can generally not be liable for a single act of negligence or misconduct. Id. at 685. 31 In the instant case, the record is barren of any evidence of implementation of an intentionally malevolent or impermissible policy by the Board so as to authorize a cause of action against Dekalb County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The fact that the Board's budget practices resulted in understaffing does not amount to a purposeful disregard which would violate any citizen's constitutional rights. McDowell may not infer a policy merely because harm resulted from some interaction with a governmental entity. Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993). There is no indication that Dekalb County deliberately invoked a policy to interfere with the Jail's provision of medical care to inmates or to deny inmates access to medical care. McDowell's argument in this case is essentially a medical malpractice claim which is insufficient to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted to Dekalb County.