Opinion ID: 1625018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Annie's divorce

Text: The decree divorcing Carroll from Sharon was filed with the chancery clerk on October 5, 1984. On that same date, the chancellor heard the divorce proceedings between Terry and Annie Thacker, and he wrote on his docket book, decreea little unusual but it may work. Apparently the chancellor was referring to the fact that Terry Thacker was to have custody of the couple's daughter and Annie was to have custody of the son, Johnny. The daughter was afflicted with a disease known as lupus and required extensive medical support. There was no provision, other than medical insurance coverage, for support for Johnny, but Terry was given reasonable visitation rights. On October 7, 1984, Carroll and Annie participated in a marriage ceremony. On October 24, 1984, the decree divorcing Annie and Terry Thacker was filed with the chancery clerk. Annie and Carroll were aware there was a problem with the validity of their marriage. She testified about the two of them having made several visits to Oklahoma because she and Carroll thought they would thus achieve a common law marriage. She said she and Carroll did not want to go through another ceremony because he did not want it to seem as an admission that they had not been married during the time they had lived together. In support of his holding that the marriage was valid, the court cited Parker v. Parker, 227 Ark. 898, 302 S.W.2d 533 (1957), and Pendergist v. Pendergist, 267 Ark. 1114, 593 S.W.2d 502 (App.1980). Both are cases which were decided in accordance with the law in effect prior to the adoption of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The Parker case held that a pronouncement of divorce from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing effected the divorce. In the Pendergist case, the court of appeals noted that the controlling law in the future would be Rules 58 and 79 which would at least require a written docket entry of it, referring to the judgment. Since the adoption of the rules, this court has made it clear that a judgment or decree may not be effective until it has been entered as provided in Rules 58 and 79. The latter rule has now become Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order 2. The second paragraph of Rule 58 provides: Every judgment or decree shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment or decree is effective only when so set forth and entered as provided in Rule 79(a). Entry of judgment or decree shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs. Administrative Order 2, as did the former Rule 79(a), provides merely for the ministerial act of filing in the chancery docket book kept by the clerk. In Childress v. McManus, 282 Ark. 255, 668 S.W.2d 9 (1984), a chancellor held that a divorce announced from the bench at the close of a hearing was valid although the husband died before the decree was entered. The decree was reversed, and we held a divorce decree entered after the death of a party was a nullity. The failure to enter the decree in accordance with Rule 58 until after the death invalidated the decree. Annie argues the Childress case and cases similarly decided by our court of appeals are distinguishable because they involve the death of a party, which is not involved here, and because they involve situations where there were or may have been issues left unresolved after announcement of the decree which, she contends, is not the case here. We see no significant difference between the case where a death occurs before entry of a decree and one where remarriage occurs before entry of a decree. In each case, the question is the same. Was the announcement of the divorce from the bench sufficient to effect the divorce? We again say no. Nor are we persuaded by the idea that in those cases there may have been issues remaining to be resolved. Although in the case before us now the support and property issues seemed to have been settled through Annie's testimony at the divorce hearing as to the parties' agreement, there is no telling what sort of objections one or the other of them might have upon seeing the decree in writing and being asked to approve it before entry. Our experience tells us there may always be outstanding issues until a written document is made the final instrument of the divorce and the divorce is made final at some definite point. The purpose of Rule 58 was to provide a definite point at which a judgment, be it a decree of divorce or other final judicial act, becomes effective. The rule tells clearly what that point is. As Annie was not divorced at the time she married Carroll, their marriage was invalid. A statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-101 (1987), provides that a subsequent marriage may not be undertaken by a person not yet divorced from a living former spouse. We have held such a marriage to be void, Goset v. Goset, 112 Ark. 47, 164 S.W. 759 (1914), and that is so even where one of the parties to the second marriage entered it in good faith. Morrisson v. Nicks, 211 Ark. 261, 200 S.W.2d 100 (1947); Evatt v. Miller, 114 Ark. 84, 169 S.W. 817 (1914). See Yocum v. Holmes, 222 Ark. 251, 258 S.W.2d 535 (1953). Note, 10 Ark.L.Rev. 188, 196 (1956).