Opinion ID: 764700
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The district court may decline to award damages

Text: 44 The Abshers contend that the district court abused its discretion in awarding any damages at all to the employees. This presupposes that the district court had discretion to refuse to impose damages, which is yet another issue of first impression in this circuit. 45 The plain meaning of the statute appears to support the Abshers' interpretation. The text of § 2520(c)(2) states that the court may assess ... damages. (emphasis added). The use of the term may in a statute is generally construed as permissive rather than as mandatory. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Richardson, 446 F.2d 126, 128 (6th Cir.1971) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees when the statute used the verb may). 46 Moreover, Congress amended the statute in 1986, changing the operative verb in this subsection from shall to may. Where the words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same ... subject, the Congress must have intended them to have a different meaning. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C.Cir.1988). One would therefore assume that Congress intended to invest district courts with the discretion to not award damages in appropriate cases. 47 Our sister circuits, however, have split over this issue. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that district courts lack discretion to withhold damages. See Rodgers v. Wood, 910 F.2d 444 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that the lack of a legislative record supporting the change from shall to may, combined with other amendments to the statute, indicate that Congress did not intend to give the district courts discretion). On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit held that district courts do have discretion to withhold damages. See Nalley v. Nalley, 53 F.3d 649 (4th Cir.1995) (holding that the plain language of the statute and the fact that Congress changed the operative verb from shall to may are clear signs that Congress intended district courts to have such discretion). The Eighth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's approach in Reynolds v. Spears, 93 F.3d 428 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming the district court's determination that damages under the wiretapping statute are discretionary). 48 We find that the plain language of the statute compels the conclusion that the district courts have the discretion to decline the imposition of damages. Congress expressly changed the verb from a mandatory form to a permissive one. In all cases of statutory construction, the starting point is the language employed by Congress. Appleton v. First Nat'l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir.1995). Where the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'  United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)). A court should look beyond the language of the statute only when the text is ambiguous or when, although the statute is facially clear, a literal interpretation would lead to internal inconsistencies, an absurd result, or an interpretation inconsistent with the intent of Congress. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (holding that RICO applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises because the statute refers only to enterprises). 49 In this case, a literal interpretation of the word may does not lead to internal inconsistencies or an absurd result. There is thus no reason to look beyond the plain language of the statute. We therefore agree with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits that 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) gives the district courts discretion in deciding whether to assess damages.