Opinion ID: 561245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: RCRA Violations

Text: 31 MacDonald & Watson, D'Allesandro, Slade and Ritarossi were convicted of knowingly transporting, or causing the transportation of hazardous waste, i.e., toluene-contaminated soil, to a facility which does not have a permit, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928(d)(1). See note 6, supra. MacDonald & Watson and NIC were convicted of knowingly treating, storing and disposing of a hazardous waste without a permit, under Sec. 6928(d)(2)(A). See note 6, supra. They now argue that their convictions were illegal because NIC did in fact have a Rhode Island RCRA permit, albeit one that did not allow disposal into its facility of toluene-contaminated soil. NIC's permit, instead, authorized acceptance of liquid RCRA hazardous wastes and non-hazardous solids, such as petroleum-contaminated solid materials. While NIC's permit, therefore, provided no authority to dispose of the hazardous waste in question, appellants contend they did not violate either prong of Sec. 6928(d) because the statute only penalizes transportation to a facility which does not have a permit under this subchapter, and disposal without a permit under this subchapter. 32 We find this argument entirely unpersuasive. Subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2)(A) both penalize unpermitted transportation and disposal of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter (emphasis supplied), thus embracing the hundreds of different noxious substances described and listed in EPA regulations. See 40 C.F.R. Subparts C and D (1990). As these toxic wastes vary enormously in levels of toxicity and other characteristics, they require different kinds of facilities for safe disposal. In order to channel each waste to a proper disposal facility, Congress established a system of permits, with each permit indicating what wastes that particular facility may legally accept. Thus the statutory phrase which does not have a permit naturally conveys the meaning: which does not have a permit for that substance. Having a permit for some different substance would frequently offer no more protection to the public than having no permit at all. Just as a deer hunting license does not imply a license to hunt duck, a facility which does not have a permit clearly implies, in this context, a facility which does not have a relevant permit. Any other construction would ignore the central object of the permit program, which is to limit the disposal of any given waste to an appropriate facility. It is well accepted that, 33 criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to protect public health, in contrast to statutes based on common law crimes, are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose. (Citing cases.) 34 United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S.Ct. 1171, 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985). RCRA is a public welfare statute enacted to protect the national health and environment, Wycoff Co. v. E.P.A., 796 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir.1986), and to provide nationwide protection against the dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal. H.R.Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6238, 6249 (hereinafter, 1976 House Report). See also United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1143, 107 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1990) (The overriding concern of RCRA is the grave danger to people and the environment from hazardous wastes.) 35 To construe subsection (d)(1) and subsection (d)(2)(A) as appellants urge would not only involve reading the word permit abnormally (i.e., as meaning an irrelevant permit as well as a relevant one), 10 but would significantly weaken the protection against the danger that most concerned Congress, namely the improper disposal of toxic wastes. See generally United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 1911-12, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81, 64 S.Ct. 134, 136-37, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943). 36 Appellants contend that their strained construction of the word permit is needed to protect innocent transporters and facility operators. Especially under Sec. 6928(d)(1) which pertains to transporters, they suggest that Congress did not intend to impose criminal penalties on persons who lack responsibility to identify the wastes or designate the facility that will receive them. For this reason, they contend, it is necessary to limit criminal liability to just those transporters who violate a responsibility that is unambiguously theirs: They may not deliver hazardous wastes to facilities that are outside the RCRA permitting, inspection and reporting system. In other words, so long as a permit of some type exists, the transporter's duty has been correctly fulfilled. Appellants expand this theory into the notion that Congress wanted a calibrated system of punishments, limiting the heavy criminal penalties of Sec. 6928(d)(1) to transporters who, like midnight dumpers, transport hazardous waste to unpermitted disposal sites, and leaving all other violations to the civil enforcement machinery. 37 While appellants weave an ingenious argument, we find little in the legislative history to suggest that Congress had this restrictive reading of Sec. 6928(d)(1) in mind. To the contrary, when Congress added or causes to be transported to subsection (d)(1), the House Report indicated plainly that generators, at least, would be liable under that statute for the improper transportation and disposal of waste: 38 This provision clarifies the criminal liability of generators of hazardous waste who knowingly cause the waste to be transported to an unpermitted facility. Because the generator is in the best position to know the nature of his waste material, the regulatory scheme established by RCRA places a duty on the generator in the first instance to make arrangements to transport and dispose of his waste properly. EPA's ability to obtain criminal penalties against generators who knowingly cause the transportation of hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility is essential to the regulatory scheme. 39 H.R.Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, pt. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5576, 5613 (emphasis added) (hereinafter 1984 House Report). The underscored language is inconsistent with the argument that subsection (d)(1) requires no more than an irrelevant permit, since such a permit would not ensure the making of arrangements to transport and dispose of waste properly. As subsection (d)(1) itself makes no distinction between defendants who are generators, as such, and those who are transporters, it follows that subsection (d)(1) contemplates arrangements in all cases for proper waste disposition, i.e., a proper permit, not merely some type of permit. 40 Appellants' argument indirectly raises an interesting issue not actually before us: namely, whether knowingly in subsection (d)(1) not only requires knowledge as to the nature of the hazardous waste being transported, but also knowledge of the facility's permit status, i.e., that the facility lacked a proper permit. The district court here instructed the jury that, to convict under subsection (d)(1), it had to find that defendants knew that NIC lacked a proper permit authorizing it to treat, store or dispose of this type of hazardous waste, or else must find that defendants willfully failed to determine whether NIC did or did not have such a permit. This instruction, both on the need for knowledge and on willful failure to determine permit status, is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Hayes International Corporation, 786 F.2d 1499, 1503-05 (11th Cir.1986). Obviously, if a conviction under subsection (d)(1) requires that a defendant know, or be willfully indifferent to, the facility's lack of a proper permit, this would eliminate the danger of convicting some hypothetical transporter who lacked information that the disposal facility was without the proper license. Thus, under the given instruction, most of the concerns appellants now raise are beside the point. The correctness of this part of the court's instruction is not, however, before us, and we need not, and do not, decide now whether, as charged, the knowledge requirement under subsection (d)(1) extended to the facility's permit status. As an initial matter, however, we find much to be said for the district court's position. 41 In arguing that without a permit means entirely without a permit, appellants do not limit themselves to subsection (d)(1). In respect to the subsection (d)(2) conviction against MacDonald & Watson and NIC, appellants also urge that the words knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste ... without a permit are confined to facilities lacking in any sort of RCRA hazardous waste permit. They make this argument even though persons who treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes will obviously be better positioned than at least some transporters to know what materials a particular permit covers. 11 42 Appellants make much of the fact that subsections (d)(2)(A) and (B) explicitly distinguish between treatment, storage and disposal without a permit and treatment, storage and disposal in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a permit. See note 6, supra. Appellants argue that interpreting subsection (d)(2)(A) to penalize handling any hazardous waste not authorized in a facility's existing permit would emasculate subsection (d)(2)(B), rendering it superfluous. Appellants contend that RCRA originally criminalized only hazardous waste transportation to a facility without a permit and disposal without a permit. Pub.L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, 2812. In 1978, Congress amended subsection (d)(2) to include treatment and storage. In 1980, Congress added subsection (d)(2)(B) concerning permit violations to eliminate ambiguity [regarding whether a violation of a permit condition constitutes a criminal violation] by providing explicit penalties for knowingly failing to comply with a material condition of the permit. 1980 Senate Report at 36-37, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5036. Appellants find significance in the fact that Congress declined to make a similar change in 1980 to subsection (d)(1) to criminalize transportation to a disposal facility where receipt of the hazardous waste in question is in violation of a permit condition or requirement, leaving subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2)(A) limited to cases where the facility had no permit at all. 43 We find little force in arguments such as the above. 44 First, there is nothing to the contention that construing subsection (d)(2)(A) as penalizing disposal without a relevant permit renders subsection (d)(2)(B) surplus. The latter penalizes treatment, storage and disposal in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a permit. The words permit condition and permit requirement as used in the EPA's regulations describe a vast array of collateral obligations imposed when wastes are stored at permitted facilities, such as the duty to operate and maintain properly all required treatment and control systems, to maintain proper records, to monitor and sample site conditions, and so on. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Sec. 280.30 and Sec. 270.31. Depending on the kind of waste authorized to be stored under the permit, conditions are imposed that form part of the permit: for example, that waste be stored on a concrete pad surrounded by a containment berm, or that mutually reactive wastes not be stored in the same room. The effect of subsection (d)(2)(B) is simply to criminalize the knowing violation of any such material condition or requirement of a permit. Clearly, subsection (d)(2)(A)--penalizing disposal without a permit--does not adequately cover such breaches of a permit's requirements and conditions. By the same token, construing subsection (d)(2)(A) to penalize the disposal of a given hazardous waste without a permit for storage of that particular waste in no way renders subsection (d)(2)(B) surplus. 45 Second, we are puzzled by appellants' suggestion that the conduct charged here under subsection (d)(2)(A) should really have been charged as the violation of a material condition or requirement of a permit under subsection (d)(2)(B). For such a violation to have occurred, it would have to be shown that NIC's existing permit contained a condition or requirement forbidding disposal of the substance in question or, at least, of any substance not affirmatively authorized in that permit. Perhaps NIC's permit contained such an express or implicit condition, but, if it did, appellants have not identified it. If not, the subsection (d)(2)(A) charge was the only possible one for this kind of conduct. But whether or not a charge under subsection (d)(2)(B) was also possible, we believe subsection (d)(1) and subsection (d)(2)(A) violations were properly alleged. 46 Third, the absence of a permit violation subsection in subsection (d)(1) is in no way inconsistent with our reading of subsection (d)(1) and subsection (d)(2)(A). Facility operators are in a position to control the manner of hazardous waste disposal and are therefore appropriately made liable for knowing infractions of material conditions and requirements of the permit issued to them. Since generators and transporters have little control over either the operation of the facility or the manner of disposal after the wastes are delivered to the facility, it is not surprising that subsection (d)(1) omits a provision relating to manner of disposal, and limits generator and transporter responsibility to ensuring that the facility has an appropriate permit for the type of waste being delivered. 47 Fourth, the legislative development of the current subsection (d)(2) supports our conclusion that current subsection (d)(2)(A) reaches disposal of wastes where a facility's permit does not authorize disposal of the hazardous waste at issue. As originally enacted in 1976, RCRA imposed criminal sanctions in the case of 48 (d) Any person who knowingly-- 49 . . . . . 50 (2) disposes of any hazardous waste listed under this title without having obtained a permit therefor under this subtitle.... 51 Pub.L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, 2812 (emphasis added). The only kind of permit issued under the statute is for hazardous waste disposal--thus therefor must mean a permit for disposal of the particular hazardous waste at issue. A contrary interpretation of subsection (d)(2) would render the word therefor redundant or meaningless and is therefore to be avoided. United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 81 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751-52 (1st Cir.1985). While the therefor was not carried into the current statute, there is not the slightest indication anywhere in the legislative history that adoption of the current without a permit language was meant to restrict the reach of subsection (d)(2)(A) to situations where the facility is entirely without a permit. 52 Finally, appellants urge that they could not have reasonably anticipated the charged interpretation of the statute, and that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. Public welfare statutes, however, are not to be construed narrowly but rather to effectuate the regulatory purpose. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 666, and cases cited. We hold that appellants were properly indicted under subsection (d)(1) and subsection (d)(2)(A) for the conduct charged. 53