Opinion ID: 1111189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: the lower court erred in granting the state's sentencing instructions s-1 and s-3, denying appellant's instruction ds-7, and deleting paragraph four of appellant's instruction ds-10, in violation of appellant's rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution and sections 14 and 28 of the mississippi constitution.

Text: Pinkney argues that the trial judge erred in granting jury instructions S-1 and S-3. The thrust of this argument is that these instructions fail to define especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. It should be noted that Pinkney offered no instruction to further define especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and therefore may be barred from raising this issue on appeal. See Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 78 (Miss. 1975). Notwithstanding, we consider this argument in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), in which the court considered an Eighth Amendment vagueness challenge directed at the aggravating circumstance of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in Oklahoma's capital sentencing statute. See Mississippi Code Annotated, § 99-19-101(5)(h) (Supp. 1988). The essence of Maynard is that the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance is too vague and leaves the jury with unchanneled discretion in imposing the death penalty. In other words, this aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague because it does not offer sufficient guidance to the jury in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. 486 U.S. at ___, 108 S.Ct. at 1859, 100 L.Ed.2d at 382. This being so, we must hold that the jury in the instant case considered an invalid aggravating circumstance in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. However, the question left open by Maynard, and which distinguishes Maynard from the present case, is whether the death penalty will remain in spite of the successful challenge brought against one aggravating circumstance. In Maynard, the presence of another, unchallenged, aggravating circumstance did not sustain the death sentence where Oklahoma had no procedure for attempting to save a death penalty when one of the several aggravating circumstances was held to be invalid; instead, when this case was decided, the Oklahoma Court simply vacated the death sentence and automatically imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. 486 U.S. at ___, 108 S.Ct. at 1857, 100 L.Ed.2d at 379. To the contrary, [T]his Court (Mississippi) has held and established unequivocally through the years that when one aggravating circumstance is found to be invalid or unsupported by the evidence, a remaining valid aggravating circumstance will nonetheless support the death penalty verdict. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). See Mississippi Cases: Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204 (5th Cir.1988); Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1987); Nixon v. State, [533] So.2d [1078], No. DP-65 (Miss. November 25, 1987) Slip Op. at 34; Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1987); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1336 (Miss. 1987); Faraga v. State, 514 So.2d 295, 309 (Miss. 1987); Johnson v. State, 511 So.2d 1333, 1337 (Miss. 1987); Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 945 (Miss. 1986); Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 314 (Miss. 1986); Wiley v. State, 484 So.2d 339, 351-52 (Miss. 1986); Edwards v. State, 441 So.2d 84, 92 (Miss. 1983); Tokman v. State, 435 So.2d 664, 670 (Miss. 1983); Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 743 (Miss. 1982). Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d 1354, 1362 (1988). In Edwards v. Scroggy , a Mississippi case, the Fifth Circuit considered what effect the erroneous admission of a misdemeanor conviction in the sentencing phase had on the sentence ultimately imposed by the jury. There the court said: ... Assuming that the misdemeanor conviction of carrying a concealed weapon is necessary to support the jury's finding of this aggravating circumstance, appellant's argument nevertheless must fail. The Court in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), held that the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance did not require the vacation of the death penalty so long as there were other valid aggravating circumstances remaining. [Footnote omitted]. The jury in this case found six aggravating circumstances and the invalidation of one of them would not require vacation of the death sentence. See Rault v. Butler, 826 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.1987); cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 14, 97 L.Ed.2d 803 (1987); Celestine v. Butler, 823 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1987); Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 3278, 97 L.Ed.2d 782 (1987). The district court correctly rejected this claim. 849 F.2d at 211; see also, Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d at 1362-63. In a footnote, the Fifth Circuit discussed the effect of Maynard v. Cartwright, as follows: Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), just decided by the Supreme Court does not undermine this conclusion. In Maynard, the petitioner was sentenced to death following a finding by an Oklahoma jury of two statutory aggravating circumstances: an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel murder and the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person. The Supreme Court determined that the first aggravating circumstance was invalid; the second remained unchallenged. The Court, however, instead of reinstating the death penalty, approved a remand of the case to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. But the opinion makes it clear that the Court approved this remand because Oklahoma law was unclear on whether the sentence of death should be set aside if one of the aggravating circumstances was found invalid and others remained unchallenged. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Oklahoma court to determine as a matter of state law whether the sentence should be set aside. Unlike Oklahoma law, however, Mississippi law is clear that one invalid aggravating circumstance will not suffice to overturn a death penalty where other valid aggravating circumstances remain. Edwards v. State, 441 So.2d 84, 89, 92 (Miss. 1983). 849 F.2d at 211, n. 7; see also, Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d at 1363. In the case at hand, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating ones. As outlined above, our well recognized practice has been to leave such sentences undisturbed. While Maynard v. Cartwright dictates that the aggravating circumstance especially heinous, atrocious or cruel must fall, that case does not dictate that the death penalty must also fall. Clemons, 535 So.2d at ___; Maynard, 486 U.S. at ___, 108 S.Ct. at 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d at 383. Here, also as in Edwards v. Scroggy , and in Clemons v. State, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict would have been the same with or without the invalid aggravating circumstance. Therefore, we find error in the jury's consideration of this aggravating circumstance as given, but consistent with Maynard and our prior practice, we leave the ultimate sentence of death intact. In the future, however, Maynard v. Cartwright dictates that our capital sentencing juries in this State be more specifically instructed on the meaning of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. While the court in Maynard did not set forth a specific limiting construction to be used, this Court has in several instances placed a limiting construction on especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. In Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 1979), we recognized the construction found in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), which states: What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies  the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. 578 F.2d at 611. (Emphasis in original). 378 So.2d at 648; see also, Jordan v. State, 464 So.2d 475, 478 (Miss. 1985). In Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 743 (Miss. 1982), we held that the jury could consider mental torture and aggravation which the victim probably underwent in order to determine whether or not the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. We note also that barbarity sufficient to satisfy this aggravating circumstance can be demonstrated by showing that the defendant utilized a method of killing which caused serious mutilation, where there is a dismemberment of the corpse, where the defendant inflicted physical or mental pain before death, or where a lingering or torturous death was suffered by the victim. See also, Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 464-65 (Miss. 1984). Finally, in Maynard v. Cartwright, the U.S. Supreme Court said: We also do not hold that some kind of torture or serious physical abuse is the only limiting construction of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance that would be constitutionally acceptable. 486 U.S. at ___, 108 S.Ct. at 1859-60, 100 L.Ed.2d at 382. Because the recognized practice of this Court allows death penalties in cases like this to be left undisturbed, we need not here attempt to apply the limiting construction of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel to the record before us. Instead, it is sufficient for us to hold that hereafter, capital sentencing juries of this State should and must be specifically instructed about the elements which may satisfy the aggravating circumstance of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Nothing we say here, therefore, conflicts with Maynard v. Cartwright, or with our prior death penalty practice and procedure. Pinkney also contends that the trial court erred in deleting from Instruction DS-10 the language that with the exception of the events of October 24, 1984, the defendant has always been a quiet, polite individual. Since there was evidence to the contrary, the trial judge struck the language. The instructions show that the jury was adequately informed of the facts of Pinkney's background. There was no impermissible restriction of the mitigating circumstances which the jury could consider. Contra Davis v. State, 512 So.2d 1291, 1293 (Miss. 1987). Therefore, this assigned error has merit insofar as we hold the jury's consideration of the aggravating circumstance at issue erroneous, but the assigned error has no merit insofar as the invalid aggravating circumstance does not require vacation of the death penalty.