Opinion ID: 1219383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: incarceration is incarceration

Text: Peltier's pro se brief filed in the district court in support of his motion for partial summary judgment in the post-conviction relief proceedings, which is found attached to his counsel's brief filed in this Court, presented for the attention and benefit of the district court compelling case precedent. The authority cited is applicable to the issues before us, and it may very well be controlling, although none of it was given consideration when the district court summarily granted the state's motion for entry of summary judgment. Peltier cited to the case of Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.1973). The Court of Appeals provided a concise statement of the facts: Although this case involves complicated constitutional and statutory questions, the facts are simple and undisputed. On November 12, 1970, Roger Fain, then aged sixteen years and nine months, was arrested by Ormond Beach police officers for the alleged rape the day before of Mary Frances Oswald in Volusia County, Florida. Five days later, a counselor of the juvenile court system filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that Fain was a delinquent child by reason of having assaulted and raped Mrs. Oswald. On November 23, 1970, a hearing was held in the Volusia County Juvenile Court, during which an assistant state attorney appeared and urged the judge to waive jurisdiction and certify the case to the circuit court. After hearing argument on this question, the judge declined to waive jurisdiction, found Fain delinquent and committed him to the Division of Youth Services for an indeterminate period not to extend beyond his 21st birthday. Since November 23, 1970, Fain has remained in the custody of the Division of Youth Services at the Dozier School for Boys. On December 1, 1970, the state attorney for the Seventh Judicial Circuit urged the juvenile court judge to stay the issuance or execution of its order of commitment; the judge did not do so. The next day, an indictment was returned alleging the same acts on which the delinquency adjudication was based. Two weeks later, on December 17, 1970, the state attorney urged the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction. In the circuit court, Circuit Judge Melton of the Seventh Judicial Circuit dismissed the indictment against Fain on January 7, 1971, on the grounds of former jeopardy. The state appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which reversed Judge Melton's ruling on August 17, 1971. State v. R.E.F., 251 So.2d 672 (Fla.App.1971). The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the court of appeal, but stayed its mandate to allow Fain to pursue any remedies he might have in federal court. R.E.F. v. State, 265 So.2d 701 (Fla.1972). Fain filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Middle District of Florida, and a hearing was held before the U.S. District Court on November 21, 1972. On January 15, 1973, the district court issued the writ requested by Fain. The state filed a notice of appeal February 7, 1973. Three questions confront us in this appeal: . . . . 2. Was the district court correct in determining that the actions of the State of Florida violate the former jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . . In this case, the courts of Florida have had an opportunity to promulgate a final, definitive ruling on the question involved. The Florida Supreme Court has authoritatively stated in the context of this case that in its opinion reprosecution of the petitioner will not violate his right not to be twice placed in jeopardy. 265 So.2d 701. There is nothing more for the courts of Florida to say on this issue. . . . . Fain is not asserting merely a federal defense to a state prosecution. He is asserting a constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Although double jeopardy (if shown) would certainly be a proper defense to assert at trial and in post-conviction proceedings, the right consists of more than having the second conviction set aside. It consists of being protected from having to undergo the rigors and dangers of a second โ illegal โ trial. Double jeopardy is not a mere defense to a criminal charge; it is a right to be free from a second prosecution, not merely a second punishment for the same offense (though that is obviously included in the right.) The prohibition of the double Jeopard Clause is `not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.' United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192 [1194], 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221 [223], 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). . . . . We now turn to the question of whether prosecuting Fain for rape violates his rights under the Constitution. Fain argues that he was not only placed in jeopardy in the juvenile court โ he was convicted and punished. His is a plea of autrefois convict. To try him again would not only subject him to the harassment of an additional judicial proceeding, but also subject him to the risk of being twice punished for the same offense. Therefore, reprosecution of him as an adult violates both conceptions of fundamental fairness and the Constitution's protection against double jeopardy, made applicable in the state proceedings by the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The State of Florida contends (1) since the juvenile proceedings were not criminal in nature, Fain was never put in jeopardy; (2) even if the juvenile proceedings are held to have placed Fain in jeopardy, as a juvenile, he has no right not to be placed in jeopardy again; and (3) the correct standard to apply is fundamental fairness, and it is not fundamentally unfair to prosecute Fain as an adult for the rape. A. Was Fain placed in jeopardy in the juvenile court proceedings? It cannot be disputed that a juvenile court judge in Florida may, by finding a juvenile to be delinquent, impose significant restrictions on his liberty. He may `Place a child . . . under the supervision of an authorized agent of the division of youth services . . . Commit the child to a . . . child-caring institution . . . Commit the child to the division of youth services . . . .' F.S.A. ง 39.11. Although commitment to the Division of Youth Services may result in the juvenile being allowed to return to his home, it may also result in incarceration until age 21. Fain's commitment to the division resulted from his having been found delinquent. And his being found delinquent resulted from his having violated a criminal law of the State of Florida. F.S.A. ง 39.01(9). Thus, a violation of the criminal law may directly result in incarceration. This is a classic example of `jeopardy.' The state's argument that the purpose of the commitment is rehabilitative and not punitive does not change its nature. No authority need be cited for the proposition that a court should look past the labels to the substance of an action. Regardless of the purposes for which the incarceration is imposed, the fact remains that it is incarceration. The rehabilitative goals of the system are admirable, but they do not change the drastic nature of the action taken. Incarceration of adults is also intended to produce rehabilitation. A court proceeding which may result in incarceration places a person, adult or juvenile, in jeopardy. [Citations omitted.] . . . . Fain's mere status as a juvenile, although it may subject him to the jurisdiction of an entirely different court system, cannot deprive him of rights that adults enjoy in the criminal justice system. If Florida wants to punish Fain as an adult, it must give him all the rights of an adult. We need not deal at all with Fain's rights in the juvenile court system, for now he is in the adult court system. And in that system, the Constitution's command that no person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense unquestionably applies. . . . . In this case it is especially clear that Fain is being prosecuted for `the same offense,' because he was adjudged delinquent by reason of having violated the same criminal law for which he is now being indicted. This is even a clearer case than Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970), in which the Court held that for a State and a municipality to both prosecute someone for committing the same acts violates the double jeopardy clause. Here, we have not only the same sovereign, we have in addition exactly the same acts being punished and exactly the same elements in each offense. Thus, Fain is now being prosecuted for the `same offense' for which he was adjudged delinquent in the juvenile proceedings. . . . . The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Fain was placed in jeopardy in the juvenile court proceedings, and that he is now placed in jeopardy again in the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit for the same offense. The Constitution does not permit such an action to occur. Fain, 488 F.2d at 221-26 (emphasis added). Standing alone, the Fain decision is impressive and persuasive. It becomes more so when one observes that of the circuit court's fifteen judges, all fifteen participated when the state of Florida sought an en banc rehearing. Of the fifteen judges, eleven by denying the petition voiced their approval of the opinion as written. Appreciation for the quality of the Fain opinion becomes further enhanced when one notes that the Supreme Court of the United States quoted from it approvingly in the landmark case of Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). Chief Justice Burger, in authoring the Breed opinion for a unanimous court, noted that seventeen-year-old Breed's actions, while allegedly armed with a deadly weapon, if committed by an adult would constitute the crime of robbery. Following a detention hearing he was detained to await a hearing on the petition. At the hearing the Juvenile Court found the allegations proven, and the youth was further detained to await a dispositional hearing. After two hearings the court declared the youth unfit for treatment as a juvenile and ordered that he be prosecuted as an adult. None of the higher California courts afforded any relief on habeas corpus petitions. After a preliminary hearing the youth was ordered held for trial in Superior Court, was informed against, and entered pleas of not guilty. The case was submitted to the court on a stipulation of facts. The court found the youth guilty and committed him to the state's Youth Authority. At this point his mother, as guardian ad litem, sought relief by applying to the appropriate United States District Court, claiming that the youth had been placed in double jeopardy. The case wound its way through the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and eventually found a final resolution of the double jeopardy issue in the Supreme Court. [13] The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion dealt exhaustively with the pros and cons which had been advanced by the parties. In doing so it stated, inter alia, that: `commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called criminal or civil.' Breed, 421 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 1786 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). It was at this point that the Breed court, by footnote 12, embraced the language of Fain v. Duff : Nor does the fact `that the purpose of the commitment is rehabilitative and not punitive . . . change its nature . . . . Regardless of the purposes for which the incarceration is imposed, the fact remains that it is incarceration. The rehabilitative goals of the system are admirable, but they do not change the drastic nature of the action taken. Incarceration of adults is also intended to produce rehabilitation.' Breed, 421 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 1786 (emphasis added). In his brief furnished to the district court, Peltier, in presenting his double jeopardy argument and citing Breed v. Jones , also included Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874); United States v. Best, 571 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.1978); U.S. v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126 (1st Cir.1977); U.S. v. Teresi, 484 F.2d 894 (7th Cir.1973); Oksanen v. United States, 362 F.2d 74 (8th Cir.1966); and U.S. v. Rosenstreich, 204 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.1953). The Lange case, although it is now quite old, has stood the test of time, and was considerably relied upon in United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931), as to the issue of increasing a sentence. There the following question was certified from a circuit court to the Supreme Court: After a District Court of the United States has imposed a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant in a criminal case, and after he has served a part of the sentence, has that court, during the term in which it was imposed, power to amend the sentence by shortening the term of imprisonment? Benz, 282 U.S. at 306, 51 S.Ct. at 113 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: The general rule is that judgments, decrees and orders are within the control of the court during the term at which they were made. They are then deemed to be in the breast of the court making them, and subject to be amended, modified, or vacated by that court. Goddard v. Ordway, 101 U.S. 745, 752, 25 L.Ed. 1040 [1879]. The rule is not confined to civil cases, but applies in criminal cases as well, provided the punishment be not augmented. In re Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 167-174, 21 L.Ed. 872; Basset v. United States, 9 Wall. 38, 19 L.Ed. 548. In the present case the power of the court was exercised to mitigate the punishment, not to increase it, and is thus brought within the limitation. Benz, 282 U.S. at 306-07, 51 S.Ct. at 114 (emphasis added). The court then explained the constitutional prohibition against increasing a sentence during the same term using the language from Ex parte Lange, supra : For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can never be tried again for that offence? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution. But if, after judgment has been rendered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judgment executed on the criminal, he can be again sentenced on that conviction to another and different punishment, or to endure the same punishment a second time, is the constitutional restriction of any value? Is not its intent and its spirit in such a case as much violated as if a new trial had been had, and on a second conviction a second punishment inflicted? The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it. Benz, 282 U.S. at 308, 51 S.Ct. at 114 (quoting Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173, 21 L.Ed. at 878). The Benz court then noted that in the Lange case the court had gone on to say that, during the term, a judgment imposing a sentence of two years imprisonment could be vacated and a lesser sentence imposed, either one year's imprisonment, or a $200 fine, the latter only in the event that no time had been served on the first sentence. Obviously a reduction in sentence being served is not two punishments for the same offense, but that time served plus a fine would be in violation. The power of a federal court to lower a sentence during the term in which the sentence has been imposed is seen as firmly established. But there has always and only been a power to lower. So in Benz, note was approvingly taken of the construction put on Lange by a United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, where a defendant's sentence had been reduced during the term from 2 years to 1ฝ years: In Ex parte Lange, supra, the doctrine so stated is distinctly recognized, but the case is distinguished as one where the statute authorized imprisonment, or fine, in the alternative only, and the sentence imposed both; and the majority opinion merely holds that new sentence of imprisonment alone cannot be imposed after payment of the fine, which operated as a satisfaction of the prior judgment. Benz, 282 U.S. at 310, 51 S.Ct. at 115 (quoting In re Graves, 117 F. 798, 799 (E.D.Wis.1902)). Thus it is seen that in the federal system there is no notion whatever that a sentence once imposed can be increased. Any doubt, and there should be none on a close reading of Lange, is laid to rest by Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 64 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed. 41 (1943). While it is true that our case today is not in the federal system, we take it to be the law that the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States is applicable to the state courts via the fourteenth amendment. As is often the case, entry of judgment of conviction in a criminal case is in Idaho much the same under our I.C. ง 19-2519 as it is under California's Penal Code ง 1207. In People v. Banks, 53 Cal.2d 370, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102 (1959), that court made it abundantly clear that the entry of conviction of a felony together with imposition of sentence of imprisonment is in and of itself punishment even though the incarceration is withheld while the defendant serves out his probation time: [T]he defendant acquires the legal status of a person who has been both convicted of a felony and sentenced to such imprisonment. During the maximum period of such term the defendant so sentenced may be retained in the constructive custody of the court or may at any time, in the discretion of the court, be commuted to custody of the prison authority. The term of imprisonment in either case is that to which he was sentenced . . . . It is, of course, express statutory law that `When judgment upon a conviction is rendered, the clerk, or if there is no clerk, the judge, must enter the same in the minutes, stating briefly the offense for which the conviction was had, and the fact of a prior conviction, if any. A copy of the judgment of conviction shall be filed with the papers in the case.' (Pen. Code, ง 1207.) Upon entry of such judgment and withholding of commitment the sentenced defendant is held in the custody, actual or constructive, of the court and is entitled to only such privileges as the court may affirmatively prescribe in its order. Mere stay of execution of an entered judgment manifestly does not entitle the defendant to his freedom or otherwise relieve him of the disabilities resulting from conviction and imposition of judgment of imprisonment in a state prison. So completely are his rights suspended and his status established that, in the event of any violation of the terms of probation, the court at any time during the probationary term may forthwith require his arrest and commit him to the prison authority. Banks, 1 Cal.Rptr. at 679, 348 P.2d at 112 (emphasis added) (note omitted). As to whether suffering entry of judgment of felony conviction and imposition of sentence of imprisonment amounts to punishment, one need only consider that in People v. Banks such was defendant's status when he was apprehended in possession of a firearm, contrary to a statute forbidding such possession by one previously convicted of a felony. In People v. McAllister, 15 Cal.2d 519, 102 P.2d 1072 (1940), the California Supreme Court, quoting the federal rule as to alteration or amendment of criminal judgments during the term (coming down via Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 415, 26 L.Ed. 797, 799 (1881)), observed that California had abolished terms of court, and with due regard for its statutes, from which Idaho's are taken, declared the rule as follows: If the sentence has been entered in the minutes of the court, or if the defendant has begun serving said sentence or has been restrained by the sentence imposed then the court is without jurisdiction to vacate, add to, or in any manner modify the sentence originally pronounced. On the other hand, if the sentence pronounced has not been entered by the clerk in his minutes, and no legal restraint has been imposed upon the defendant by reason of said sentence, then it is proper for the court to change the sentence originally pronounced. McAllister, 102 P.2d at 1075 (emphasis in original). The McAllister rule was reaffirmed in Ex parte Pedrini, 33 Cal.2d 876, 206 P.2d 699, 702 (1949), with the observation that there were then in that state two statutory exceptions, of no pertinence here. Similarly, of course, we have in Idaho statutory provisions for 120 day retained jurisdiction, and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 โ which specifically allows for reduction of a sentence. More recently, Chief Justice Traynor, also writing for a unanimous court, as was so in the two aforementioned cases, cited Pedrini for the proposition that the superior court having imposed sentence on May 23rd, was on July 13th without power to thus `correct' its sentence as pronounced and formally entered in the minutes. In re Wimbs, 65 Cal.2d 490, 55 Cal.Rptr. 222, 421 P.2d 70, 75 (1966) (emphasis added). Even more recently a California court of appeals reaffirmed the holdings of People v. Banks, supra , and In re Wimbs, supra , citing the latter for the proposition that upon the imposition of sentence as pronounced and its formal entry in the minutes, the trial court is without power to revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion. Boles v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.App.3d 479, 112 Cal.Rptr. 286, 289 (1974) (emphasis in original). Turning to the other above-mentioned cases which Peltier's brief brought to the attention of the district court, it is noted that all are directly on point on the issue of a court's authority to increase the severity of a sentence previously imposed and put into execution, a sentence fashioned after violation of probation. Moreover, it is seen that a sentence to probation is punishment and is every bit as much an imposed sentence as is a sentence to pay a monetary fine, or a sentence which includes the imposition of a term of incarceration. In United States v. Teresi, 484 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973), the sentencing judge, whose imposition of a three year term had been affirmed, died, and Teresi moved the court for a reduction in sentence. The criminal offense involved was refusal to be inducted, which ceremony Teresi disdained, with the result that instead of being inducted he was indicted and convicted. While the appeal was pending it appears that Teresi was at liberty. On affirmance of his conviction and sentence and the mandate being filed in the district court, apparently by arrangement with the marshal, defendant was to surrender at noon March 28, 1973, to begin his sentence. Teresi, 484 F.2d at 896. On March 28, 1973, Teresi filed his motion for reduction of sentence. The deceased judge who had sentenced Teresi to the three year term had also denied a request for probation. Judge Perry, who was assigned to the case, on hearing the motion, suspended the sentence and placed Teresi on a three year probation under the following conditions: First that he seek custody of his minor daughter and support her during the period of probation; second that he shall spend six months in the custody of the Attorney General of the United States beginning on such date as this Court shall fix and determine during said period of probation provided however that if this Court is satisfied with defendant's conduct while on probation and does not order defendant to be so committed for six months period before September 27, 1975, then on that date defendant's probation shall be terminated and the condition of spending 6 months in the custody of the Attorney General of the United States shall automatically be waived and become null and void. Teresi, 484 F.2d at 896. The judge's probation order was entered March 28, 1973. Within a week, the government responded by moving to vacate Judge Perry's order, and eventually managed to present the motion to another judge of the same district, Judge Austin. [14] Judge Austin conducted a hearing and, concluding that Judge Perry's order of probation was void, vacated it as requested by the government. Judge Austin entered his own order of April 17, 1973, which left almost intact the three year term of incarceration; he did reduce it to two years and eleven months, thereby giving Teresi credit for the one month defendant had served on probation. Teresi, 484 F.2d at 897. The circuit court first concluded and held as to the jurisdictional issue: The orders directly before us on appeal are those entered April 17. It will be seen, however, that because of our view with respect to double jeopardy resulting from the imposition of sentence of imprisonment after service of a period of probation had begun, the critical question is whether the March 28 order is void. Neither the lapse of time nor affirmance of the original judgment waived the district court of jurisdiction to suspend the execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation. Kriebel v. United States, 10 F.2d 762 (7th Cir.1926); White v. Steigleder, 37 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1930). Such jurisdiction would have been lost had defendant begun service of his sentence. Cook v. United States (United States v. Murray), 275 U.S. [347], 48 S.Ct. 146, 72 L.Ed. 309 (1928). [T]he district court had jurisdiction on March 28 to stay execution of the sentence and place defendant on probation. Teresi, 484 F.2d at 897. The court observed an ambiguity in the sentence initially imposed, and resolved it: Giving paramount effect to the references to three years as the term of imprisonment and as the term of probation, the sentence could have been expressed as a sentence of imprisonment for three years, execution suspended, and defendant placed on probation for three years. In any event, the court's intention that defendant need not necessarily be confined at all, and that he be placed on probation is manifest and paramount. Although the ambiguities require that the sentence prescribed on March 28 be corrected, they did not render it void. Teresi, 484 F.2d at 898. [15] Significant to Peltier's appeal, and validating his citing Teresi to the district court, is the ratio decidendi of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: Judge Perry had reconsidered Judge Napoli's original denial of probation and had chosen a different result. Any restraint with which one judge approaches reconsideration of a decision made in the same case by another judge of his court is a principle of comity and not a limitation upon jurisdiction. Bowles v. Wilke, 175 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir.1949). Could Judge Austin reconsider Judge Perry's decision, and impose a more onerous sentence? We think no more onerous sentence could be imposed once defendant began to serve his period of probation under the March 28 order. `It is a well settled general rule that increasing a sentence after the defendant has commenced to serve it is a violation of the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy.' United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368, 369 (2nd Cir.1966), and cases cited therein. Of course probation is subject to revocation, and actual confinement may result therefrom. 18 U.S.C. งง 3651, 3653. Such confinement as a result of revocation does not violate the fifth amendment. But we think that, short of revocation, a change from probation, once service thereof has been commenced, to an unsuspended sentence of imprisonment, must, logically, be a violation of the guaranty against double jeopardy. In deciding that an order of probation without sentence is appealable, the Supreme Court noted that a probation order is an abridgement of the defendant's liberty in the public interest and a mode of punishment, though mild and ambulatory. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435, 63 S.Ct. 1124 [1126], 87 L.Ed. 1497 (1943). Probation has been held to constitute punishment, though lenient, for the purpose of determining the question of double jeopardy. Oksanen v. United States, 362 F.2d 74, 80 (8th Cir.1966); Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301, 305 (1967). Defendant began to serve the period of his probation when he reported, apparently March 28, to the probation officer and the officer accepted technical custody. Pugliese v. United States, 353 F.2d 514, 516 (1st Cir.1965). Reversing the April 17 orders would restore the March 28 orders to force. The ambiguities of that order, however, call for correction. On remand, the district court should correct it so that its terms are clear and it is consistent with 18 U.S.C. ง 3651. It should be no more onerous than a sentence of imprisonment for three years with execution suspended and defendant placed on probation for a period of three years, with the conditions concerning defendant's daughter as now provided. It may be made less onerous. Teresi, 484 F.2d at 899 (emphasis supplied). One of the three judges comprising the panel in Teresi was the Hon. Robert A. Sprecher. He also sat in the case of United States v. Dorszynski, 484 F.2d 849 (1973); the opinion issued in that case five weeks prior to Teresi. The defendant Dorsynski had pleaded guilty to a charge of possessing LSD, and was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of one year, ninety days of which were to be served in a jail-type institution. The execution of the remainder of the commitment was stayed and the petitioner was placed on probation for a period of two years following his jail sentence. Dorszynski, 484 F.2d at 856. While serving his sentence he filed a series of motions, one of which alleged that the special agent induced his guilty plea by lying to him as to what he would gain thereby. Both the agent and Dorsynski testified at the hearing regarding such promises: The trial judge indicated that he believed that the petitioner had testified falsely. He denied the motions and then requested counsel to show cause why the probation should not be terminated for lying under oath. After defense counsel argued against this action, the judge terminated the petitioner's probation and committed him to custody. This court ordered the release of the petitioner on bail pending appeal. Dorszynski, 484 F.2d at 850. The 7th Circuit panel appreciated the district judge's sense of outrage, but reversed the judge's revocation of probation: It is evident from the record that the judge determined that the petitioner was guilty of perjury, an offense punishable under 18 U.S.C. ง 1621. Although the petitioner was not formally charged with that offense nor afforded a trial to determine his guilt, he was in a very practical sense convicted โ in the mind of the judge โ and punished by the revocation of his probation. The only condition of the petitioner's probation prescribed at the time of sentence that is relevant was that he should `refrain from violation of any law [federal, state, and local].' rule 32(f) provides that probation should be revoked only after a hearing `at which the defendant shall be present and appraised of the grounds on which such action is proposed.' It is highly questionable whether the procedure by the rule was observed even in a rudimentary sense in the situation before us. But bypassing that and assuming that the petitioner did testify falsely, such conduct did not violate any of the specified conditions of his probation. Only upon being accused of and convicted of perjury in accordance with procedural due process would the petitioner have violated the condition of probation referred to above. We appreciate the sense of outrage that the district judge apparently experienced upon becoming convinced that the petitioner had not testified truthfully. False swearing, however, not only is a serious offense, legally and morally, but also its proof must be established, if legal consequences are to result, by procedures that fully comport with due process. . . . . Were probation terminable upon a judge's summary determination in a post-conviction proceeding that the probationer had testified falsely, the chilling effect of such a practice upon the pursuit of post-conviction remedies is quite apparent. Dorszynski, 484 F.2d at 852. Although this case does not have any substantial bearing as to a court's lack of jurisdiction to increase the severity of a sentence once it has been imposed and execution of any part of it has commenced, it does bear heavily upon the consideration to be accorded to a probationer's alleged criminal guilt while serving his probation. Thus viewed, especially on review of a trial court's granting a state's motion for summary judgment dismissing an incarcerated defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, it should have been taken into account where the district court accepted as a fact that Peltier, by reason of the Child Protective hearing and Decree of Termination of Parental Rights, was guilty of violating the terms of his probation. Peltier was as much entitled to have his guilt of child molestation established in a criminal proceeding as was the defendant Dorsynski. Chief Judge Coffin authored the panel's opinion in United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126 (1st Cir.1977). The district court, responding to the entry of defendant's guilty plea to the charge of acting as attorney before the Immigration and Naturalization Service (in a proceeding wherein the United States had a direct and substantial adverse interest and the defendant was employed by the government, suspended imposition of sentence and placed [defendant] on probation for one month. Bynoe, 562 F.2d at 127. One week later the court, feeling that it had been misled as to the multiplicity of such happenings like the one which led to the charge and guilty plea, called a hearing to reconsider the disposition earlier made in light of the information of which it had theretofore but a paucity. The court thereupon vacated its order suspending imposition of sentence and imposed a fine of $2500.00, which it conceded to be a more severe disposition. Bynoe, 562 F.2d at 128. In his opening, Judge Coffin preliminarily dealt with the statutory provision and distinctions, 18 U.S.C. ง 3651, and after citing Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 63 S.Ct. 1124, 87 L.Ed. 1497 (1943), noted that probation is nonetheless a punishment imposed on the defendant, albeit a mild one. Bynoe, 562 F.2d at 128 (emphasis added). Following that he dealt in depth with increasing a defendant's sentence versus the constitutional right to not be subjected to double jeopardy: The general rule is that an increase in sentence after the defendant has commenced serving his punishment is a violation of defendant's right not to be subject to double jeopardy. See United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14, 15 (7th Cir.1975) and cases cited therein; United States v. Bowens, 514 F.2d 440, 441 (9th Cir.1975); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 63 S.Ct. 470, 87 L.Ed. 608 (1943). Since probation is a form of punishment, the guaranty against double jeopardy will attach as soon as a defendant, placed on probation under a suspended sentence, begins to serve his period of probation. United States v. Teresi, 484 F.2d 894, 898-99 (7th Cir.1973); Oksanen v. United States, 362 F.2d 74, 80 (8th Cir.1966); United States v. Rosenstreich, 204 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.1953). There appears to be no statutory basis or policy justification for treating the commencement of probation differently because the imposition of sentence rather than the execution of sentence was suspended. Indeed, it seems that the only difference contemplated by the statute is that if imposition of sentence is suspended, the court may, upon revocation of probation, impose any sentence it might originally have imposed, whereas if sentence is imposed and execution suspended, the sentence may not be increased when probation is revoked. See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 64 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed. 41 (1943). While in the present case it may appear that the serving of a few days probation has such a minimal effect on a defendant that there is no injustice done by altering sentence, we can easily conceive of circumstances in which a court might attempt to increase the defendant's punishment after months or years of probation had been served. A formal rule against any increase in penalty after service of probation has commenced will prevent any such occurrences and insure the defendant the requisite degree of finality in the disposition of his case. Bynoe, 562 F.2d at 129 (emphasis added). The difference, as explained by Judge Coffin, is exactly the same difference which Justice Bakes pointed out in his Pedraza opinion, above, and which has again been addressed in this opinion. Judge Coffin obviously saw that the increasing of a sentence imposed upon a defendant, any part of which sentence had been put into execution, ran head-on into the fifth amendment's prohibition against subjecting a defendant to double jeopardy. The panel vacated the judgment of the district court, directing that proceedings on remand be in accordance with the opinion. One score plus one year ago the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a monumental decision which made the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution applicable to the states, and since that time, subjecting a person to double jeopardy has been no more palatable in state judiciaries than in the federal courts. The court wrote: Recently, however, this Court has `increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the [Bill of Rights] to determine whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law.' Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1922, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In an increasing number of cases, the Court `has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights   .' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). Only last Term we found that the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was `fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), and held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. For the same reasons, we today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Insofar as it is inconsistent with this holding, Palko v. Connecticut [302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937)] is overruled. Palko represented an approach to basic constitutional rights which this Court's recent decisions have rejected. It was cut of the same cloth as Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942), the case which held that a criminal defendant's right to counsel was to be determined by deciding in each case whether the denial of that right was `shocking to the universal sense of justice.' Id., at 462, 62 S.Ct., at 1256. It relied upon Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908), which held that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was to an element of Fourteenth Amendment due process. Betts was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Twining, by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic constitutional rights can be denied by the States as long as the totality of the circumstances does not disclose a denial of `fundamental fairness.' Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is `fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, [391 U.S.] at 149, 88 S.Ct., at 1447, the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments. Palko's roots had thus been cut away years ago. We today only recognize the inevitable. The fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted. Its origins can be traced to Greek and Roman times, and it became established in the common law of England long before this Nation's independence. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-155, 79 S.Ct. 676, 697, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). As with many other elements of the common law, it was carried into the jurisprudence of this Country through the medium of Blackstone, who codified the doctrine in his Commentaries. `[T]he plea of autrefois acquit, or a former acquittal,' he wrote, `is grounded on its universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense.' Today, every State incorporates some form of the prohibition in its constitution or common law. As this Court put it in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), `[T]he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.' This underlying notion has from the very beginning been part of our constitutional tradition. Like the right to trial by jury, it is clearly `fundamental to the American scheme of justice.' The validity of petitioner's larceny conviction must be judged, not by the watered-down standard enunciated in Palko, but under this Court's interpretations of the fifth amendment double jeopardy provision. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2062-63, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) (emphasis added). With the applicable prevailing law spread out before us, the following conclusions are self-evident. First, there are no prior Idaho cases where double jeopardy has been asserted and discussed in the context of a district court's revocation of probation and attendant ensuing resentencing with an increase in severity of the probationer's previously imposed sentence. No such Idaho cases appear to have been reviewed in light of Benton v. Maryland , wherein the United States Supreme Court overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), and ruled that the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States is applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment. We do recognize that there have been cases in this Court which, although not in the sense of resentencing following revocation of probation, have recognized the double jeopardy provisions of the statutory law and constitutions of both the United States and Idaho. [16] These cases provide that even though a criminal defendant could be convicted of two or more crimes for conduct proscribed under two or more statutes, he could not be sentenced for more than one crime unless there were elements in the conviction of a second or third crime which were not contained in the initial crime for which the defendant was convicted. In State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 536 P.2d 738 (1975), Justice Bakes, writing for a unanimous court, held that the district court had erroneously granted a defendant's motion to dismiss the charges, from which the state had appealed. After reviewing the evidence which had been presented against Lewis, the conclusion was reached that had the case gone to the jury, and had the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the kidnapping count (another count was forcible rape), the conviction would have been sustained. But the Court then noted why it could not reverse and remand for a new trial: Although the trial judge erroneously dismissed the charges against these two defendants, the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, ง 13, which provides that `[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense,' prevents the retrial of the defendants on either the kidnapping or rape charges. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides that `nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb,' which in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), was held to be applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, prevents the retrial of these defendants. The dismissal of the kidnapping charges was based upon an evaluation of the evidence, albeit an erroneous evaluation, and having once had the factual issues involved in the kidnapping charge resolved in their favor the defendants may not be retried. It is unclear upon what basis the rape charges were dismissed, whether they were dismissed upon an erroneous evaluation of the evidence or upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, but because the dismissals might have been based upon a factual determination favorable to the defendants they cannot be retried upon the rape charges. United States v. Jenkins, [420] U.S. [358], 95 S.Ct. 1006, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975). Jeopardy had long since attached to these proceedings and in a jury trial, as this was, a termination of the proceedings by the judge upon a Rule 29(a) motion because `the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction' is a factual determination of innocence favorable to the defendant which for double jeopardy purposes must be equated to a jury verdict of `not guilty'; therefore, the defendants cannot be retried because of the double jeopardy clauses of the Idaho and United States Constitutions. See United States v. Jenkins, supra, United States v. Wilson, [420] U.S. [332], 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975). State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho at 750, 536 P.2d at 745. Another case decided three months earlier found the Court not entirely unanimous. Stone v. Brusseau, 96 Idaho 558, 532 P.2d 563 (1975). The author of the majority opinion, Justice Shepard, joined by Justices McQuade and McFadden, recognized the provisions of I.C. ง 18-301. Justice Shepard saw the provisions of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution as differing from the language of art. 1, ง 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The three opinions in that case provide interesting reading. The net result of the majority holding was to uphold two prosecutions, notwithstanding the provision of I.C. ง 18-301, but to vacate the earlier imposed lesser sentence of ten years and let stand the second sentence of fourteen years. Justice Donaldson appears to have had the best grasp on double jeopardy as expressed in his belief that the prohibition of double jeopardy is against a successive prosecution, where a jury has convicted (or acquitted) and a sentence has been imposed. Apparently the last and most recent double jeopardy case reaching this Court was State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 712 P.2d 585 (1985), where the appealed ruling was the grant of a suppression order. Justice Shepard concurred in the proposed majority opinion authored by Justice Bakes; Justices Donaldson, Huntley, and I wrote separately, but cumulatively reached a majority holding on the underlying and foremost issue of double jeopardy. In the plurality opinion which I authored, ten landmark cases from the Supreme Court of the United States were reviewed, and were followed by a synopsis of eleven double jeopardy cases handed down by this Court starting with State v. Randolph, 61 Idaho 456, 102 P.2d 913 (1940). In Alanis the majority held that: It is clear that the dismissal here not only `might have been based upon a factual determination favorable' to Alanis, but was so based by reason of the prosecutor's evaluation of the sufficiency of his remaining evidence. Accordingly, she cannot be retried, and a majority of this Court so holds. Idaho statutory law also prohibits the state from retrying Alanis. I.C. ง 19-1719 reads as follows: `When the defendant is convicted or acquitted, or has once been placed in jeopardy upon an indictment, the conviction, acquittal or jeopardy is a bar to another indictment for the offense charged in the former, or for an attempt to commit the same, or for an offense included therein, of which he might have been convicted under that indictment.' I.C. ง 19-1718 defines an acquittal as follows: `Whenever the defendant is acquitted of the same offense, notwithstanding any defect in form or substance in the indictment on which the trial was had.' It is readily apparent that an erroneous decision on the merits is of no consequence in determining whether a defendant can be retried. The statute makes no exceptions: so long as the defendant was acquitted, and the reason is a failure of sufficient evidence to convict the defendant, the state cannot retry him or her for the same offense. Therefore, on statutory grounds, we hold that Alanis cannot be retried on the matter upon which she was charged and acquitted. Alanis, 109 Idaho at 899, 712 P.2d at 591 (relying upon and citing to State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 750, 536 P.2d 738, 745). One of those eleven opinions, and much to this Court's credit, was the unanimous decision in State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972), where the Court was confronted with exactly the same issue which was decided in Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.1973), discussed above at page 460-61, 808 P.2d at 379-80, and the same issue as in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). This Court's opinion in Gibbs preceded Fain v. Duff by one year and the opinions in Breed by, respectively, three and two years, and reached the exact same result. The clear message coming from all of the cases discussed to this point is that a court does have authority to reduce a sentence which has been imposed, which authority in Idaho is both statutory and, so I also believe, inherent. Double jeopardy, however, is an absolute bar standing in the way of a district court increasing the sentence which it has previously imposed upon a criminal defendant and which has been placed in execution. It is abundantly clear that increasing the sentence necessarily involves the imposition of a second sentence for the very same criminal conduct which brought about the first sentence imposed, which had placed the defendant in jeopardy, i.e., prior jeopardy. Another clear message under the existing state of the law is that sentencing a defendant to a term of probation is a sentence. Moreover, viewing the circumstances attached to the probation in light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States, incarceration is incarceration, no matter how eleemosynary the court's intent in doing so, and hence is punishment, as is inescapably true of the infliction of punishment carried out in execution of the sentence imposed. Such is wholly in accord with this Court's holding in State v. Pedraza, 101 Idaho 440, 614 P.2d 980, wherein was noted the distinction between withholding judgment and imposition of sentence, on the one hand, and not withholding but imposing judgment with execution thereof suspended. The federal cases discussing these alternatives, and execution thereof having commenced, make it clear that incarceration, a drastic penalty inflicted where a court has spoken in terms of probation, is punishment. Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it is observed that Peltier's first sentence was to sixty days incarceration in the Nez Perce County jail, and consecutive thereto the sentence imposed committed him to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections to serve a five year (less the sixty days incarceration time) term of probation under somewhat onerous terms which greatly circumscribed his liberty. Without delving into the district court's grounds and reasons for revoking the probation which had been created in the initial sentence imposed, it is clear that the double jeopardy prohibition against increasing a sentence once imposed precluded Judge Maynard from fashioning and imposing a new sentence which increased the previous five year commitment to the State Board of Corrections by adding an additional fifteen years ! Under Pedraza, it should be concluded that the district court was in error in believing that it had the authority to restructure the initial sentence which was imposed on Peltier on June 23, 1982. That sentence committed [17] Peltier to the Idaho State Board of Corrections for five years, but execution of that imposed sentence was suspended. That sentence also imposed on him the status of probationer for those five years. The order of the court that Peltier serve sixty days in the Nez Perce County jail was also a part of the sentence imposed, and it was put into execution immediately. Following the sixty days of incarceration, Peltier then embarked on his term of probation, which was in further execution of the court's sentence of a five year term, but formal entry of judgment of conviction was suspended. When the court revoked that probation, whether correctly or in error being of no moment, it was barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy from meting out to Peltier a new sentence greater in severity than that first imposed. The sentence imposed on June 23, 1981, was for a crime (to which Peltier entered a guilty plea) allegedly to have been committed on April 26, 1982. The new sentence purportedly imposed on March 28, 1983, was also for that same crime committed on April 26, 1982. Double jeopardy precludes not only two prosecutions for the same crime but also two sentences for the same crime. Although it is clear that a court is not constitutionally precluded from decreasing the severity of a sentence which has been imposed, it is precluded from increasing the severity. See I.C.R. 35. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence has been imposed or within 120 days after the court releases retained jurisdiction. The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as provided by law. However, the district court was not cloaked with authority to ignore a first sentence which had been placed into execution and render a sentence more severe than the first one imposed, in this case a five year maximum indeterminate sentence replaced by a sentence of twenty years, even though the execution of the latter sentence be initially suspended, as was equally true of the first sentence. According to my computations, the time of confinement served by Peltier under the two sentences totals more than one year beyond the legal sentence of the five year commitment to the custody of the State Board of Corrections on June 23, 1982. Peltier, having served out that sentence and more, is entitled to be discharged from the custody of the State Board of Corrections. The Court should vacate and hold for naught the district court's order of March 28, 1983, insofar as it ordered that defendant be punished by being placed in the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections for the maximum indeterminate term of twenty years (20), the time of this imprisonment and confinement to commence to run on the 16th day of February 1983, and that the defendant stand committed until said sentence is complied with. The Court should also vacate the district court's September 19, 1985, order reimposing the suspended sentence insofar as the same purports to hereby reimpose its sentence of custody to the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a maximum indeterminate term not to exceed twenty (20) years, said sentence to commence to run on September 11, 1985. Note is taken, without comment, that as to the Order of September 19, 1985, and the Order of March 28, 1983, that the court purposefully did not give Peltier any credit for time previously served, and that the district court relied on the collateral determination of Judge Perry in a civil action under the Child Protective Act initiated by the Department of Health & Welfare seeking the termination of the child-parent relationship, as valid evidence that Peltier was guilty of child molestation and hence in violation of the terms of his probation. This is highly questionable, but more elaboration is unnecessary and futile. The harm has been irretrievably done, that is, if one accepts the philosophy that a convicted felon is fair game. There remain other very serious issues raised by Peltier, some of which include the failure of the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on receiving Peltier's Petition for Post-conviction Relief, and the failure of the district court to provide Peltier with the transcripts which were asked for and which the court initially agreed to provide, notwithstanding that the district court's memorandum decision audaciously quoted from a transcript of the March 16, 1983, hearing (pages 11-14). R. 101. Peltier's post-conviction petition specifically requested that he be furnished transcripts of court proceedings held on June 23, 1982, March 16, 1983, and September 18, 1985, as provided by I.C. ง 19-4904. [18] Because of these failures on the part of the district court, I concur with the majority in the vacating of the summary disposition of the post-conviction relief petition and the remand for an evidentiary hearing, but dissent from the district court's order imposing the twenty year sentence. Those who read our opinions will be gratified to observe that the Court comes up with the conclusion that Peltier received short shrift indeed by the manner in which his petition for post-conviction relief was mistreated. As a result Peltier will get another try. The problem with that disposition, however, is that, although Peltier may now get his day in court, a far larger concern is that the majority opinion upholds increasing Peltier's confinement from five years (which he has already served, and more) to twenty years, all supposedly because of the terrible violation of his probation terms which happened when he went to his wife's house to fix her car, and the children were in that same vicinity.