Opinion ID: 1376983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: special or local law

Text: The City also challenges section 26.179 as an unconstitutional local or special law. Article III, section 56 of the Texas Constitution provides: Local and special laws The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law . . . Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards or school districts; . . . Exempting property from taxation; . . . And in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted.... TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56. Section 26.179 generally applies to the ETJ of a city with a population greater than five thousand. TEX. WATER CODE § 26.179(c), (d). [6] Section 26.179 applies when a municipality either: (1) enacted or attempted to enforce three or more ordinances or amendments attempting to regulate water quality or control or abate water pollution within the five years preceding the effective date of the Act (June 16, 1995), or (2) enacts or attempts to enforce three or more such ordinances or amendments in any five-year period. Id. § 26.179(c). The City of Austin maintains, without dispute from the landowners, that Austin is the only city that fell within section 26.179's classifications when it was passed by the Legislature, and that Austin is the only city that falls within these classifications today. In Maple Run v. Monaghan , this Court recognized the Legislature's broad authority to make classifications for legislative purposes. 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. 1996) (citing Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (1941)). To determine whether a law that is limited to a particular class or locality is general or is an unconstitutional local or special law: [T]he classification ... must be based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing [the] class from others with respect to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed legislation. The primary and ultimate test of whether a law is general or special is whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification made by the law, and whether the law operates equally on all within the class. Maple Run, 931 S.W.2d at 945 (citations omitted). This test ensures that the classification is not a mere arbitrary device resorted to for the purpose of giving what is, in fact, a local law the appearance of a general law. Miller, 150 S.W.2d at 1002. The City argues that section 26.179 is an unconstitutional local or special law because it violates the underlying purpose of section 56, which is to prevent the granting of special privileges and the trading of votes for personal interests, see Maple Run, 931 S.W.2d at 945, and because it fails the test the Court has relied upon to foster that purpose. Specifically, the City argues that: (1) laws that define a class of one city are constitutional only if they advance a statewide interest, and section 26.179 does not; (2) section 26.179 is not broad enough to include a substantial class; (3) section 26.179's classification is not reasonably related to the statute's alleged purpose of ensuring regulatory certainty or providing the regulatory flexibility necessary to facilitate land development; (4) section 26.179's legislative history demonstrates it is unconstitutional; and (5) section 26.179's substantive provisions are not reasonably related to its alleged purpose. In considering these arguments, it must be presumed that the Legislature has not acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. See Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1968). It is also presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds. Id. (quoting Texas Nat'l Guard Armory Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d 627, 634 (1939)). A mere difference of opinion on the matter is not a sufficient basis for striking down legislation as arbitrary and unreasonable, because [t]he wisdom or expediency of the law is the Legislature's prerogative, not ours. Id.