Opinion ID: 3062121
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial and Post-Trial Error

Text: Wilson argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for mistrial based on testimony he alleges was incurably prejudicial. The government called as a witness at trial Andrew Jones, a fraud investigator with the United States Postal Inspection Service. Inspector Jones was involved in the investigations underlying both the 263 Case and the 450 Case. He was also one of the federal officials who Wilson accused of being anti-Arab. During Wilson’s pro se cross-examination of Inspector Jones, Wilson asked him questions about an envelope the Inspector had retrieved from a mailbox at a United Parcel Service store where Wilson had received mail. The envelope was from Washington Mutual, and it was addressed to First Community Mortgage, a business owned by Wilson. The following exchange took place: Wilson: My question was where did Washington Mutual, if the account is a credit card and the credit card for William Wilson, that the statement coming from Washington Mutual coming not to William Wilson, is coming to a First Community Mortgage? .... Jones: If you’re asking if that – my answer is this – is this linked up with the Washington Mutual credit card itself? I don’t know. I saw that in other evidence that comes back to your name. Is William Wilson – is this particular William Wilson linked up to the credit card that we discussed today? I don’t know. You’re right, it does come back to First Community Mortgage. I’m telling you that I took the mail, and this is one piece of mail, and it came back to - 17 - Washington Mutual. The other evidence shows that it – you had a credit card. Wilson: Could it possibly [be] that there is some evidence missing pertaining to Washington Mutual somewhere? Jones: There is certainly – there could certainly be other evidence that First Community Mortgage is also part of the crime somewhere. You’ve done a lot of crime. It’s hard to get all of it in. Wilson: I appreciate – I don’t appreciate your personal opinion because I do have personal opinion of you, too, so if you could please save it to yourself. Jones: You asked me a question. Wilson: But you also go beyond – Jones: I apologize, Mr. Wilson. R., Vol. 3 at 1071-73 (emphasis added). Wilson’s stand-by counsel immediately asked for a bench conference. Before speaking to counsel and Wilson at sidebar, the district court advised the jury as follows: “Meanwhile, members of the jury, the Court’s going to strike the detective’s statement that the defendant has done a lot of crime and that was totally unnecessary and it wasn’t a proper response to the question that was asked.” Id. at 1074. In response to Wilson’s motion for a mistrial, the court initially commented that Inspector Jones’s statement was “[v]ery unprofessional” and instructed the prosecutor “to counsel him about the fact that he’s testifying as a law-enforcement officer. This is not a personal issue.” Id. at 1075. The prosecutor then argued in opposition to Wilson’s motion that his cross-examination of government witnesses - 18 - was often broader than the issues that were relevant in the 263 Case. The court responded: I think that’s a fair observation. So, Mr. Wilson, this situation is partly because of the nature of the questions that you are asking. And you’re injecting a lot of issues here that don’t really have anything to do with whether you’re guilty or not guilty of the particular crimes charged. So the Court has admonished the witness, but I could do the same to you. You need to stick to the charges which the Government has filed against you. They’re not on trial for the way they conducted the investigation. I’ve already addressed that before trial. And you need to stick to the matters which are directly relevant to the subject of this lawsuit. ’Cause you’re inviting him to get off subject. Id. at 1075-76. The court then stated, “I’m overruling the motion for mistrial partly because . . . of what I just told Mr. Wilson. I think that the nature of his questions are inviting the witness to interject personal opinions and straying from what is strictly relevant here.” Id. at 1076. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Martinez, 455 F.3d 1127, 1129 (10th Cir. 2006). “[W]e will reverse only if the decision was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quotations omitted). “In determining whether a new trial is required after a witness offers improper information, we consider (1) whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith, (2) whether the district court limited the effect of the improper statement through its instructions to the jury, and (3) whether the improper remark was inconsequential in light of the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Lamy, 521 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The government - 19 - argues that each of these factors supports the district court’s denial of Wilson’s motion for mistrial. Wilson disagrees. He disputes that he opened the door to Inspector Jones’s testimony regarding his other criminal conduct. He maintains that the Inspector’s comment was intentional, rather than inadvertent, based on that witness’s experience in testifying and the likelihood that Inspector Jones held some animosity against Wilson due to his allegations of racial bias. Wilson also contends that the district court’s order striking Inspector Jones’s testimony was insufficient to cure the undue prejudice without an additional cautionary instruction directing the jury to disregard that testimony in their deliberations. He argues, as well, that the evidence supporting his guilt—specifically with respect to his intent to defraud or deceive—was not overwhelming. Finally, Wilson asserts that regardless of the strength of the evidence against him—and even if the necessary curative instruction had been given— allowing the jury to hear propensity or bad-character evidence related to Wilson’s other criminal conduct requires reversal of his conviction. Wilson’s arguments ignore the record, misconstrue the case law, and fail to show that the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. First, he offers only the bald assertion that he did not open the door to Inspector Jones’s statement about his other crimes. To be sure, the district court agreed with Wilson that Inspector Jones’s comment was unprofessional and that, as a law-enforcement officer, he was expected to avoid personal commentary in his testimony. But the - 20 - court held that Wilson was nonetheless partly responsible for inviting the Inspector to stray in his testimony from relevant issues and to interject personal opinions. Moreover, Wilson ignores the other instances, cited by the government, in which he affirmatively elicited testimony regarding the Inspector’s involvement in investigating other, unrelated charges against him. Thus, he fails to show error, much less clear error, in the district court’s finding. Second, contrary to Wilson’s assertion, the trial court did instruct the jury, at the close of trial, to disregard evidence that the court had stricken, and it cautioned the jury more specifically that [i]n determining whether defendant is guilty or innocent, you will consider only whether he has committed the facts charged in the indictment. Defendant is not on trial for anything else. Therefore, even if you believe that defendant committed some other crime, you must find defendant not guilty if the evidence fails to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the specific crimes charged in the indictment. R., Vol. 3 at 1258. Cautionary instructions such as these are “ordinarily sufficient to cure any alleged prejudice to the defendant and declaring a mistrial is only appropriate where a cautionary instruction is unlikely to cure the prejudicial effect of an error.” United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 859 (10th Cir. 1989). In fact, “[w]e presume that jurors will follow clear instructions to disregard evidence unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be - 21 - devastating to the defendant.” United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). Third, contrary to Wilson’s assertion, the evidence supporting his guilt, including the evidence of his intent to defraud and deceive, was overwhelming. The jury heard evidence that Wilson wrote checks on bank accounts that he knew were closed, deposited them in his accounts with ELCU and Chase through ATM machines at other banks, then withdrew funds from the ELCU and Chase accounts before those banks could determine that the checks would not be honored. The evidence also showed that, in opening his accounts with ELCU, Chase, and Academy Bank, as well as when he applied for a credit card with Washington Mutual, Wilson represented as his own Social Security number the Social Security number belonging to another person named William Wilson. Wilson’s argument that some of the evidence was circumstantial fails to detract from the weight of the government’s case overall. Lastly, the cases Wilson cites do not support his final contention that, despite the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, a cautionary instruction was not sufficient to cure the prejudice in this case. Notably, in Sumrall v. United States, 360 F.2d 311, 312-13 (10th Cir. 1966), the district court had overruled the defendants’ objection to testimony regarding their prior criminal records and no cautionary instruction was given. And in United States v. Sands, 899 F.2d 912, 914-15 (10th Cir. 1990), no cautionary instruction was requested or given, and the evidence of guilt was not - 22 - overwhelming. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson’s motion for mistrial.
Wilson makes two separate arguments in support of his contention that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. First, he contends that he was forced to choose between being represented by incompetent counsel and representing himself. He maintains that his appointed counsel refused to pursue his claims of selective and vindictive prosecution, so he was forced to proceed pro se in order to file his motions to dismiss the superseding indictment. But by Wilson’s own measure, this claim has no merit if this court affirms the district court’s denial of those motions. Therefore, we have no occasion to consider it further. Wilson’s second contention is that the district court failed to advise him, in connection with his request to proceed pro se at trial, of the potential penalties he was facing if he were convicted, including sentence enhancements and aggravating factors, possible consecutive sentences, and the use of uncharged conduct in sentencing, as well as possible defenses to the charges. Wilson asserts that his waiver of counsel was therefore not knowing and voluntary. When a defendant chooses to exercise his constitutional right to represent himself, his relinquishment of the benefits of representation by counsel must be knowing and intelligent. United States v. Turner, 287 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2002). And it is up to the trial judge to assure that the defendant’s waiver of counsel - 23 - is knowing and intelligent. Id. “However, there is no precise litany of questions that must be asked of defendants who choose self-representation.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). And reversal is not required “if the surrounding facts and circumstances indicate that the defendant understood his right to counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review de novo the validity of a waiver of counsel, and we will not reverse the underlying factual findings absent clear error. See id. When Wilson moved to proceed pro se in the district court, the court held a hearing during which it carefully reviewed the charges against him and the possible penalties he would face for each offense. The court cautioned Wilson that if he chose to represent himself he would be proceeding against very experienced prosecutors; that the court would not advise him with regard to how to try the case or positions he should take; that it would apply to him the same evidentiary and legal rules it would apply to the prosecution; and that he would have to make decisions about what defenses he wanted to present, including any defenses to the merits of the charges if his pro se motions to dismiss the superseding indictment were not successful. As to each of the court’s cautionary statements, Wilson affirmatively stated his understanding. The district court ultimately advised Wilson of its opinion that he would be better off being represented by counsel, but he persisted in his wish to represent himself. We conclude, based on the record, that Wilson understood his right to counsel and that he effectively waived that right. - 24 - 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish that the Victim Banks Were Federally Insured To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1), “the government must prove that: (1) the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution; (2) the defendant had the intent to defraud a financial institution; and (3) the bank involved was federally insured.” United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1223 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Wilson contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the victim banks were federally insured at the time of the alleged crimes. The government notes that Wilson does not point in the record to where he raised this issue in the district court. This court applies a “waiver rule,” under which “we review for plain error where a defendant appeals the sufficiency of the evidence based upon an argument that he failed to make or reaffirm before the district court. Our plain error analysis in this context, however, is essentially the same as our usual sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). “Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable to the government.” Id. at 1222 (quotations omitted). The bank-fraud charges in this case related to ELCU and Chase, and the government presented testimony from representatives of each of these banks that its deposits were federally insured. Wilson argues that the evidence failed to establish that the banks were federally - 25 - insured at the time of the offenses, but that was a reasonable inference the jury could make based upon the witnesses’ testimony. Therefore, Wilson’s insufficientevidence contention is without merit. 4. Denial of Rule 29 Motion Wilson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. But rather than making any argument in his appeal brief, he refers the court to the arguments he made in the trial court. This is not acceptable appellate argument. Tenth Circuit Rule 28.4 provides, “Incorporating by reference portions of district court or agency briefs or pleadings is disapproved and does not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 28(a) and (b).” Wilson argues in his reply brief that he was not able to present a detailed argument on this issue until March 20, 2012, the date he says he received a copy of the record on appeal. But that assertion fails to excuse his decision not to comply with the court rules, because he submitted his deficient argument to the court on April 5, 2012. We hold that Wilson has waived appellate consideration of the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 motion.