Opinion ID: 163333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

Text: 5 The district court's instructions to the jury on counts 2 through 5 contained both constitutional and unconstitutional definitions of child pornography. The court instructed the jury that child pornography is any visual depiction ... where (1) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, or (2) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Supp. I, Instruction 21. The is, or appears to be aspect of the definition of child pornography in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) and relied upon by the district court in its instructions to the jury, see United States v. Pearl, 89 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1247-48 (D.Utah 2000) (finding appears to be language in statute constitutional), was found to be overbroad and thereby unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S.Ct. at 1405. Because Mr. Pearl began his challenge as to the sufficiency of the indictment and the jury here returned a general verdict and did not specify the grounds for conviction, we must vacate the convictions on counts 2 through 5 because one of the possible grounds for conviction is unconstitutional. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 53, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) ([W]here a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict that may have rested on that ground.); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) ([I]f any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld.). The government concedes that Mr. Pearl's convictions on these counts must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Free Speech Coalition, though appending a footnote in a later brief asking this court to affirm the convictions outright. Aplee. Supp. Br. at 2; Aplee.2d Supp Br. at 11 n.3. 6 We disagree with the dissent's view that, because Mr. Pearl failed to object to the jury instructions pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 30, this court need only review for plain error and can affirm the convictions. First, this court has endorsed the view that the application of the plain error standard is inappropriate when the aggrieved party may object to the error at any time, as is the case with respect to challenges to an indictment under Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2). United States v. Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d 779, 785 n. 4 (10th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). Mr. Pearl moved to dismiss his indictment on the grounds that the CPPA's definition of child pornography was unconstitutionally overbroad, a view endorsed by the Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition. Though the safer course would have been to pursue the argument as applied to the jury instructions, the district court had already issued a ruling squarely finding the CPPA's definition of child pornography constitutional — a ruling manifested in the erroneous jury instructions. The motion to dismiss the indictment plainly, then, preserved Mr. Pearl's right to challenge his convictions on appeal. See United States v. Hathaway, 318 F.3d 1001, 1010 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that a defendant cannot waive his right to challenge an indictment based upon its failure to charge an offense). 1 7 In the cases cited by the dissent in which convictions under the CPPA were affirmed post- Free Speech Coalition, we do not know whether the defendants challenged the indictments, and, furthermore, the government offered expert testimony at trial to prove that the images depicted actual minors. United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir.2002); United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.2002). Our review of the images in this case on appeal, however much they might appear to be actual minors, should not serve as a substitute for the government's burden of proving at trial the depiction of actual minors. Similarly, the fact that Mr. Pearl acknowledged at trial that the images depict[ed] minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, Rec. Vol. XV at 38, does not require affirmation of his convictions because it is precisely the ambiguity in the word depict that led to the Supreme Court's holding in Free Speech Coalition. 8 Our conclusion that Mr. Pearl's convictions on counts 2 through 5 must be reversed does not, however, preclude retrial of Mr. Pearl on these counts, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment notwithstanding. The government may retry a defendant whose convictions, as here, are set aside due to trial error without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (The successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge.) (citations omitted). Where the government produces no evidence at trial, then double jeopardy bars retrial. See United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1564, 1567-68 (10th Cir.1996). That is certainly not the case here; there is sufficient evidence in this record to permit a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the children in the pornographic images were actual minors. Because the government cannot be held responsible for `failing to muster' evidence sufficient to satisfy a standard [actual minors] which did not exist at the time of trial, and because this is trial error rather than pure insufficiency of evidence, Mr. Pearl may be retried without violating double jeopardy. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir.1995).