Opinion ID: 504724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Like Punishment

Text: 21 For many of the same reasons that Congress promulgated Sec. 3013, the Texas legislature enacted the Crime Victims Compensation Act providing for the imposition of monetary assessments against individuals convicted of crimes to be paid into a victims crime fund. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 8309-1. The Texas assessment scheme, while similar to the federal scheme, is not identical. It is the differences between the two statutes which Davis asserts render an assessment under the Texas compensation system not punishment within the context of the ACA. 22 Specifically, art. 8309-1, Sec. 14(b) provides in pertinent part that 23 A person shall pay $20 as a court cost on conviction of any felony, $15 as a court cost on conviction of a violation of a municipal ordinance punishable by a fine of more than $200 or on conviction of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or by a fine of more than $200, and $3 as a court cost on conviction of a violation of a municipal ordinance punishable by a fine of not more than $200 or on conviction of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $200, other than a conviction of a misdemeanor offense or violation of a municipal ordinance relating to pedestrians and the parking of motor vehicles.... If a person is granted deferred adjudication ... the person shall pay as a court cost the amount that the person would have otherwise been required to pay under the subsection had the adjudication not been deferred and had the person been finally convicted of the offense. 24 Art. 8309-1, Sec. 14(b). Davis seeks to persuade this Court that the Texas special assessment is not punishment by contending that the Texas assessment is essentially imposed as a court cost. Indeed, Davis points out that the statutory language of art. 8309-1 refers to the Texas assessment as a court cost. We are not convinced that the labeling of an assessment as a court cost is dispositive on the question of its character. In United States v. Robertson, 638 F.Supp. 1202 (E.D.Va.1986), the court collected and analyzed the various state victim assistance statutes and classified those statutes generally into three categories for purposes of determining a statute's punitive character: 25 (1) schemes funded from general state resources; (2) schemes funded solely, or mainly, from monies paid by convicted criminals; and (3) schemes funded by a combination of general state resources and monies paid by convicted criminals. 26 Id. at 1207-08. (footnotes omitted). Schemes within the second tier--funded from monies paid by convicted criminals--are restitutionary and, as such, punitive in nature. Id. at 1208. In Robertson, the court concluded that the Virginia compensation statute, which labeled assessments as additional costs, derived mainly from the pocketbooks of convicted criminals and was therefore, punitive in character. Id. Similar to the Virgnia compensation scheme, art. 8309-1 generates its revenue primarily from individuals convicted of crimes. Although labeled as a court cost, the fees are collected in the same manner as other fines. Art. 8309-1, Sec. 14(c). Thus, the Texas assessment scheme also falls within the second group of the Robertson classifications and is a punitive measure. 27 Davis attempts to distinguish the Texas assessment scheme from the federal scheme on the basis that not only convicted individuals pay monies into the compensation fund, but individuals who receive deferred adjudication pay monies as well. We reject this distinction as one which removes the punitive taint from the Texas assessment. Defendants who are granted deferred adjudication are still individuals who have been charged with a crime; in this respect, the Texas assessment remains an additional burden which a defendant is required to bear to atone for his criminal acts. Additionally, the assessment varies in severity with the nature of the crime. Thus, we conclude that an assessment imposed upon a defendant pursuant to art. 8309-1 is punishment within the meaning of the ACA. 28 Having determined that the Texas assessment is punitive, we now turn to the question of whether or not the Texas assessment is like punishment within the context of the ACA. The term like punishment is incapable of precise definition; instead, the term is defined by the particular facts of each case when considered in light of federal policy concerns. Davis relies on the definition of like punishment set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Press Publishing Co., which states: 29 [I]t is apparent that the statute, instead of fixing by its own terms the punishment for crimes committed on such reservations which were not previously provided for by a law of the United States, adopted and wrote in the state law, with the single difference that the offense, although punished as an offense against the United States, was nevertheless punishable only in the way and to the extent that it would have been punishable if the territory embraced by the reservation remained subject to the jurisdiction of the state. 30 219 U.S. at 9-10, 31 S.Ct. at 214 (emphasis added). Under the Press Publishing interpretation of like punishment, the federal assessment imposed on Davis could only amount to the maximum assessment allowable under Texas law--$15 per count. Davis' reliance on Press Publishing in the instant case, however, is misplaced as the version of the ACA before the Supreme Court in 1911 when it rendered the Press Publishing decision provided that defendants convicted under the ACA should receive the same punishment, rather than the current like punishment provision. Applying the plain meaning of the statutory language, same requires identity, while like requires similarity. 3 31 We note that federal courts have consistently declined to assimilate provisions of state law through the ACA if the state law provision would conflict with federal policy. See United States v. Pinto, 755 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Vaughan, 682 F.2d 290, 294-95 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 946, 103 S.Ct. 261, 74 L.Ed.2d 203 (1982); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988, 992-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 158, 58 L.Ed.2d 156 (1978); United States v. Kendrick, 636 F.Supp. 189 (E.D.N.C.1986). In Pinto, Vaughan, and Smith, the courts each rejected state provisions requiring minimum incarceration before parole, reasoning that the minimum-confinement provisions conflicted with federal policy. Similarly, in Kendrick, the district court refused to incorporate North Carolina law allowing up to two years of imprisonment for a drunk driving conviction when that state law conflicted with federal law limiting the power of United States magistrates to allow no more than a fine of $1000 or imprisonment for no more than one year for the same offense. 4 636 F.Supp. at 191-92. 32 In the instant case, relying on the plain language of the term like which suggests similarity, and on the principle that state laws should be assimilated through the ACA in light of federal policy concerns, we conclude that the federal assessment provisions under Sec. 3013 should be applied in full. Incorporation of the maximum assessments under Texas law, instead of the federal assessments, in situations such as that presented in the instant case would result in individuals convicted of an assimilative crime paying lower assessments than individuals convicted of other federal crimes. These limited assessments in ACA cases would be collected and processed the same as federal assessments. Limitation of the special assessments to various amounts under state law is at odds with the uniform administration of the federal victim compensation program, of which the special assessments are a part.... Robertson, 638 F.Supp. at 1214. Therefore, the better result to facilitate the uniform and effective implementation of the victims compensation fund for federal offenses is to apply the federal assessments in full.