Opinion ID: 2165124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Section 102(b)(7) to Disclosure Claims

Text: Article XIII of Bancorp's certificate of incorporation, which parallels the language in Section 102(b)(7), states in relevant part: No director of the Corporation shall be liable to the Corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability: (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the Corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law ... (Emphasis added). Plaintiff claims that the legislative history of Section 102(b)(7) supports his argument that the shield is not applicable here. Plaintiff's argument, however, bypasses a logical step in statutory analysis. [30] A court should not resort to legislative history in interpreting a statute where statutory language provides unambiguously an answer to the question at hand. E.g., Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley, Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 63, 68 (1993) (In the absence of any ambiguity, the language of the statute must be viewed as conclusive of the legislative intent.... The judicial role is then limited to an application of the literal meaning of the words[ ]) (internal citation omitted); Hudson Farms, Inc. v. McGrellis, Del.Supr., 620 A.2d 215, 217 (1993) (If there is no reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words used, the statute is unambiguous and the Court's role is limited to an application of the literal meaning of the words[]); Silverbrook Cemetery Co. v. Department of Fin., Del. Supr., 449 A.2d 241, 242 (1982) (holding that trial court erred by engaging in statutory interpretation where interplay of two provisions yielded clear and unambiguous result). [31] In the instant case, plaintiff's claim that Section 102(b)(7) does not extend to disclosure violations must be rejected as contrary to the express, unambiguous language of that provision. Section 102(b)(7) provides protection for breach of fiduciary duty. Given that the fiduciary disclosure requirements were well-established when Section 102(b)(7) was enacted and were nonetheless not excepted expressly from coverage, see Hudson Farms, 620 A.2d at 218 (it is presumed that the General Assembly is aware of existing law when it acts), there is no reason to go beyond the text of the statute, see, e.g., Grand Ventures, 632 A.2d at 68; Hudson Farms, 620 A.2d at 217. Thus, claims alleging disclosure violations that do not otherwise fall within any exception are protected by Section 102(b)(7) and any certificate of incorporation provision (such as Article XIII) adopted pursuant thereto. In any event, nothing in the legislative history of the adoption of Section 102(b)(7) is inconsistent with the result we reach herein.