Opinion ID: 1443351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mistaken Dismissal

Text: Howe argues that the district court violated the Fifth Amendment by reinstating the count of the indictment on which he was convicted after it dismissed the entire indictment without prejudice. The Government argues that the district court may correct a clerical error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Rule 36 states, After giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission. Fed.R.Crim.P. 36. Our circuit has not identified what standard of review applies to a district court's decision to correct a clerical error under Rule 36. We choose to review this decision for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Niemiec, 689 F.2d 688, 690 (7th Cir.1982). But see United States v. Dickie, 752 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir.1985) (applying the clearly erroneous standard). We have permitted a district court to correct a final judgment under Rule 36 to include an omitted forfeiture order where the court had entered a preliminary forfeiture order earlier. United States v. Hatcher, 323 F.3d 666, 673-74 (8th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Ferrario-Pozzi, 368 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir.2004); United States v. Mitchell, 70 Fed.Appx. 707, 714 (4th Cir.2003) (unpublished per curiam). In United States v. Bennett, the Third Circuit also discussed the application of Rule 36 in a forfeiture case. 423 F.3d 271, 277-82 (3d Cir.2005) (holding that the district court could amend a final sentence that omitted an order of forfeiture because a preliminary order of forfeiture was issued and the parties knew about the forfeiture). The Third Circuit held that The District Court's error can properly be regarded as clerical because (1) the parties stipulated to the forfeiture; (2) a preliminary order of forfeiture was issued; and (3) the omission of the final order of forfeiture resulted from an organizational failure, not a legal error. We have said that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) [the civil analogue of Rule 36] ... is limited to the correction of clerical mistakes; it encompasses only errors mechanical in nature, apparent on the record, and not involving an error of substantive judgment. Id. at 281 (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). We have said that [a]n authorized correction, pursuant to Rule 36, may clarify a sentence, unclear in written form, that is clear when the record is examined as a whole. United States v. Tramp, 30 F.3d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir.1994) (discussing the differences and ambiguities between an oral and written judgment). While this case does not involve a forfeiture order or any previous oral judgment relating to a sentence, we apply the principles of these cases to this situation. After examining the record as a whole, we conclude that the district court's dismissal of the entire indictment was an oversight that was apparent on the record. The district court denied Howe's motion for judgment of acquittal in the same order that it dismissed the entire indictment. Thus, the court clearly provided Howe with notice of its intent to uphold the guilty verdict on the felon in possession count. To then dismiss it without explanation would be obviously and inherently inconsistent. In addition, if the original dismissal without prejudice were to stand, then there would be another fundamental and obvious inconsistency. The jury acquitted Howe on Counts 2 and 6. If the dismissal of these counts were to be without prejudice, the Government presumably would be allowed to retry Howe on counts for which he had been acquitted. However, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a retrial on counts for which Howe was acquitted. See U.S. Const. amend. V ([N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb....). These obvious inconsistencies demonstrate that the district court did not intend to dismiss the entire indictment. Therefore, the district court's original dismissal was not an error of judgment, but it qualifies as an oversight that was apparent from the record. While there certainly are limits to the reach of Rule 36, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion, under these circumstances, by correcting its order dismissing the entire indictment.