Opinion ID: 203268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Whitney's Prior Arrest

Text: Whitney next argues that the district court erred in allowing evidence concerning his arrest on the protective order to be brought out at trial. The parties disagree, however, on the applicable standard of review. Because Whitney asserts that his motion in limine was finally and unconditionally denied by the Court, he argues that the issue as to whether the court correctly allowed the testimony of Officer Dyer was preserved for appeal and should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Crowe v. Bolduc, 334 F.3d 124, 134 (1st Cir.2003). The Government alleges that the court only ruled preliminarily on Whitney's motion in limine and that Whitney did not object later to any aspect of the evidence he now challenges. It further contends that Officer Dyer testified at trial, without objection, to having arrested Whitney on the violation of the protective order. Because of that, the Government argues that this issue should be reviewed for plain error only. See United States v. Reed, 977 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir.1992) (A motion in limine without subsequent, contemporaneous objection at trial, or other factors not present here, is ordinarily insufficient to preserve an evidentiary ruling for appeal) Having reviewed the transcript of the proceedings before the district court, it is clear that although the court heard extensive argument on the issue of the admissibility of evidence regarding Whitney's arrest for violation of the protective order, its decision was not final. In fact, the court expressed it was willing to entertain any stipulation the parties might agree to that would limit any probative value, admonished Whitney's attorney that the issue was something you clearly ought to discuss with the prosecutor and then I'll hear argument depending upon what conclusion you reach ... [in terms of a stipulation], but that is something I left open. It is clear that its ruling was preliminary and subject to change in light of further negotiations by the parties or the trial evidence. Therefore, our review is for plain error. Under this standard, it falls to Whitney to show (1) that error occurred; (2) that the error was plain or obvious; and (3) that it affected substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Even if the appellant satisfies the first three steps, reversal is not automatic. Instead, reversal on plain error review is a remedy that we will apply sparingly, and only to correct an error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Colon-Nales, 464 F.3d 21, 25-26 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even assuming that the motion in limine did preserve the objections stated in it, however, Whitney's argument would fail. Whitney argues, again without further detail or analysis, that the trial judge erred when he allowed evidence of Whitney's previous arrest for the violation of the protective order. The substance of Whitney's contention is that his prior arrest was not relevant for purposes of establishing knowledge under § 922, and was evidence barred by Rule 404(b). He further posits that Officer Dyer's testimony regarding his arrest was prejudicial because his credibility was paramount in this case. Therefore, [a]ny evidence tending to denigrate his character would unfairly draw a jury to doubt Whitney's claim that he was careless while attempting to purchase the firearm and the trial court exceeded what was necessary for the limited purpose of establishing knowledge. The Government contends, however, that Whitney's challenge to the admission of evidence of his arrest should be rejected for various reasons. First, and as previously addressed, the Government states that the issue was not preserved for appeal. Additionally, it argues that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of Whitney's knowledge and intent, and also was more probative than prejudicial, as Rule 403 requires. Finally, it argues that in light of the other, independent evidence that showed that Whitney knew he was subject to the protective order, which defense counsel himself argued was pretty much overwhelming, any error in admitting evidence of the arrest was harmless. Having evaluated the parties' contentions, we conclude that the decision to admit evidence of Whitney's arrest for violating the protective order was correct. Rule 404(b) allows [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to be introduced for certain permitted purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. There is a two-step analysis to determine admissibility of other acts as evidence under this rule. First, the court must decide whether the evidence is `specially probative of an issue in the case' and is not merely offered to show the defendant's bad character or propensity for crime. United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 98-99 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648 (1st Cir.1996)). Even if the special relevance is established, the evidence must still satisfy Rule 403. Pursuant to Rule 403, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. As Rule 403 explicitly states, the law shields defendant, against unfair prejudice, not against all prejudice. Smith, 292 F.3d at 99 (quoting United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 162 F.3d 698, 705 (1st Cir.1998)). We have consistently held that evidentiary rulings of this sort are reviewable for abuse of discretion only, and we usually defer to the district court's balancing under Rule 403 of probative value against unfair prejudice. Id. at 99; accord, United States v. Currier, 836 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir.1987). Only rarely  and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances  will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 78, 84-85 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 403 tilts the balance in favor of admission. United States v. Rivera, 83 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir.1996) After considering both parties' arguments, the trial court expressed the following: As long as the defendant's state of mind at the time he signed the form is an issue, and I understand it to be an issue, the Government is entitled to put in this evidence as the most persuasive proof of what the defendant must have been aware of at the time he signed the form. Turning to the Rule 403 balance, the court explained that the evidence was not excessively prejudicial under Rule 403 because it's the most probative information in terms of nearness in time, and in terms of [the] significance of something like an arrest in terms of bringing it home to a defendant and causing him to remember. [5] We agree with the district court's decision that evidence of Whitney's arrest three weeks before he completed the form was relevant to show that he was aware of the protective order against him at the time he signed the form. Its admission is not substantially outweighed by the Rule 403 factors. Whitney's attorney always had the option of asking for a limiting instruction; he chose not to. No error occurred. [6] Thus, under Rule 403's deferential standard, we cannot find that the district court erred in admitting the evidence at issue. Its Rule 403 determination was appropriate and should be affirmed.