Opinion ID: 4534699
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sixth Circuit Framework

Text: In reviewing prosecutorial misconduct cases on direct appeal, or on habeas claims where AEDPA deference does not apply, this Court has fleshed out the Darden standard by formalizing a two-step framework for assessing prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Bates, 402 F.3d at 641; Macias v. Makowski, 291 F.3d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001). Under this framework, the reviewing court first determines (much like in Darden) whether the prosecutor’s conduct or statements were improper. Macias, 291 F.3d at 452. Then, the court assesses whether this conduct was “flagrant,” in which case it would violate the defendant’s due process rights. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 25 1385 (6th Cir. 1994) (listing four factors used to decide whether prosecutorial misconduct was flagrant). The district court in this case looked beyond Supreme Court case law and applied the Sixth Circuit’s two-part framework. Stermer v. Warren, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 653–54. As the state argues on appeal, this was error. In Parker v. Matthews, the Supreme Court expressly held that the Sixth Circuit’s two-step “improper and flagrant” inquiry could not be used in cases where AEDPA deference applies. 567 U.S. at 48–49. This is because “circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’ [and] therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).4 The question under AEDPA is not whether the state court followed Sixth Circuit case law, but whether it reasonably applied binding Supreme Court precedent. Id.; Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778–79 (2010). By assessing Stermer’s claim in the context of the Sixth Circuit’s framework, the district court applied the wrong test in this case. But in any event, this Court reviews the district court’s grant of habeas relief de novo. Satterlee, 453 F.3d at 365. Thus, we proceed to assess Stermer’s claim by applying AEDPA deference and looking only to whether the state court’s decision comports with Supreme Court case law on prosecutorial misconduct.5