Opinion ID: 748373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sniff & Search

Text: 36 Once we accept that the stop and arrest were lawful, and that there is insufficient evidence to reasonably question the legality of the impoundment, the next fact finding by the district judge becomes critical to a proper resolution of this case: 37 There was no search or entry made into Castro's vehicle until Trooper Pitts' narcotics dog alerted on the rear and side door of the Suburban, and that the search was lawful, both as to the inventory requirement and that probable cause existed before Castro's vehicle was searched. 38 This finding is important because our Court has clearly held that a drug-sniffing dog's sniff does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 853, 114 S.Ct. 155, 126 L.Ed.2d 116 (1993). Thus, no constitutional violation occurred in this case when the deputy sheriff and DPS officer decided to smell test the exterior of the Suburban. Furthermore, our Court has held that a drug-sniffing dog's alert to the possible presence of narcotics constitutes sufficient probable cause to suspect that a vehicle contains contraband to permit a warrantless search. United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1182, 116 S.Ct. 1284, 134 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996). Therefore, once the drug-sniffing dog alerted in our case, the police had probable cause to believe that the Suburban contained drugs and, therefore, had sufficient cause to search the vehicle without a warrant under the automobile exception. United States v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188, 191-92 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 91, 136 L.Ed.2d 47 (1996). 39 Accordingly, the critical issue in this case is not the validity of taking possession of the Suburban for purposes of an inventory search as the majority frames it; but whether Castro's and Gomez's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when (1) the deputy sheriff used the drug-sniffing dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle, or (2) the officers searched the Suburban on the dog's alert. Clearly, both questions must be answered in the negative. 40 It is important to note that the search that produced the 900 pounds of cocaine was based upon probable cause resulting from the alert of the drug-sniffing dog. That search was not an inventory search and, therefore, the majority's extended discussion of what is, or is not, an appropriate inventory search is not determinative of the critical issue in this case. Surely, if Trooper Pitts and his dog had been able to come to the scene of the highway stop, and had the dog alerted there to the presence of drugs, the validity of the search and seizure would be unquestionable. Likewise, if Officer Nettles had decided to conduct an inventory search of the Suburban on the side of the highway, which he certainly would have been authorized to do, that search also would have revealed the contraband. But the side of a heavily trafficked highway is not a safe or appropriate place to conduct an inventory search of any vehicle. Officer Nettles' decision to take the Suburban into custody by moving it to the Polk County sheriff's compound before performing the inventory search was a reasonable exercise of police discretion. This is especially true given the fact that the Suburban was a rental car that obviously belonged to another party, and contained a substantial amount of luggage and cargo that would have to be removed to be properly inventoried.