Opinion ID: 1110827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Object to Admission of Prior Felony Conviction.

Text: ¶ 17. Hughes was previously convicted in Arkansas of raping a seven year-old child. Hughes was nineteen at the time of that offense. Hughes argues that this prior conviction was improperly introduced as an aggravating circumstance and that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(b) (Rev.2000) specifically provides that a prior conviction of a capital offense or felony involving the use and/or threat of violence shall constitute an aggravating circumstance for consideration by the jury in imposing the death penalty. ¶ 18. The crux of Hughes' argument is that the prior conviction was not a crime of violence. Hughes was convicted of raping a minor under the age of 14 pursuant to former Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1803 which was replaced in 1993 by Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-103. The Arkansas habitual offender statute deems convictions under § 5-14-103 to be crimes of violence. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-501(C)(a)(v) (Supp.2001). A prior conviction from another state must be analyzed under Mississippi law to determine whether it is one of violence. Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 874 (Miss.1991). ¶ 19. Although there may be instances of consensual, nonviolent sex which nonetheless violate the statutory rape laws, such is not the case here. Hughes was nineteen, and his victim was seven years old. Consent was not an issue, and Hughes' prior crime must be viewed as one of violence sufficient to be used as an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(b) (Rev.2000). This issue is completely without merit, and it follows that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is likewise without merit. The [f]ailure to raise meritless objections is not ineffective lawyering. Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d 959, 966 (5th Cir.1994).