Opinion ID: 2604678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Clearer Approach: Dolan

Text: We began our analysis in Presbytery by equating inverse condemnation with excessive regulation. Equating these two different concepts was unfortunate, however, because doing so causes unnecessary confusion. The term inverse condemnation is better left to its original association as the inverse of eminent domain: an `action brought against a governmental entity having the power of eminent domain to recover the value of property which has been appropriated in fact, but with no formal exercise of the power.' Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 309, 310 n. 1, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989, 85 S.Ct. 701, 13 L.Ed.2d 610 (1965). Presbytery, 114 Wash.2d at 323 n. 2, 787 P.2d 907. What makes inverse condemnation inverse is that the compensation for the taking occurs after the taking, and at the instance of the property owner, who sues for the value of the taking. Condemnation by eminent domain means an actual physical occupation or taking of property, or damage to it. Condemnation does not occur until the landowner receives compensation through the eminent domain process. A regulatory taking is not a physical occupation of land, or damage to land, but simply a regulatory limitation of the owner's use of land. [11] Damages from a regulatory taking will almost always be in the nature of economic loss, rather than in the form of monetary loss resulting from physical occupation of or damage to land. The allegation in a regulatory taking case will be that owner's land diminished in economic value as a result of restrictions the regulation placed on its use. The law should maintain a robust distinction between eminent domain and inverse condemnation on the one hand, and regulatory taking on the other. In defining a regulatory taking, we would be wise to cut the Gordian Knot by scrapping the conflicting lines of authority and start afresh to describe when a regulatory limitation of the owner's use of land, which is not a physical occupation of the land or damage to the land, constitutes a taking. We should abandon substantive due process as an analytical tool and avoid the alternate remedies for excessive government regulation set forth in Orion and subsequent cases. We should rely instead on Dolan, which provides a workable framework for assessing an allegation of excessive regulation of land. We have adopted the Dolan approach in two recent cases. In Trimen Dev. v. King County, 124 Wash.2d 261, 877 P.2d 187 (1994), we upheld the county's imposition of a park impact fee on a developer as being reasonably necessary to offset the direct detrimental results of the development, citing to Dolan's rough proportionality test. Id. at 274, 877 P.2d 187. Similarly, in Sparks v. Douglas County, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738 (1995), where Douglas County conditioned approval of the Sparkses' short plat applications upon dedication of rights of way for road improvements, we applied a Dolan analysis, asking whether the exactions demanded by Douglas County are roughly proportional to the impact of the Sparkses' proposed developments. Sparks, 127 Wash.2d at 915, 904 P.2d 738. We concluded they were, and reversed the Court of Appeals. Id. at 917, 904 P.2d 738. [12] The Dolan rough proportionality test now provides the appropriate analytical framework for deciding when a regulation goes too far. To prove a regulatory taking in Washington, the plaintiff must allege a lack of rough proportionality between the cost of the taking to the property owner and the benefit to the public. The agency has the burden of proving the existence of rough proportionality. That is, the agency must show (1) the challenged regulation advances a legitimate state interest; (2) there is an essential nexus between the interest advanced and the requirement exacted, Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834, 107 S.Ct. at 3147-48; The Luxembourg Group, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 76 Wash. App. 502, 505, 887 P.2d 446, review denied, 127 Wash.2d 1005, 898 P.2d 307 (1995); (3) there is a roughly proportional relationship between the benefit to the public and the cost to the landowner; and (4) damages were proximately caused by the governmental action. The Court in Sintra I appeared inclined to hold the demolition fee goes too far: The economic impact on Sintra is enormous. It was asked to pay a $219,000 fee to develop a $670,000 piece of property. Sintra, 119 Wash.2d at 22, 829 P.2d 765. Plainly, the Court could only express its shock at the size of the demolition fee. By contrast, had Dolan been available at the time of the Sintra I decision, the Court would have been able to assess whether the City had carried its burden of showing the demolition fee was roughly proportional to the public benefit. In summary, Dolan provides a sturdy analytical framework for cases such as this. By placing the burden of proving rough proportionality on the administrative agency, Dolan protects property owners by providing quantitatively-based administrative and judicial review of land use regulations.