Opinion ID: 1751299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Support Order.

Text: The second issue is whether the district court had the authority under chapter 252A to enter orders on collateral matters. The purpose of chapter 252A is quite circumspect. Section 252A.1 states: The purpose of this uniform chapter is to secure support in civil proceedings for dependent spouses, children and poor relatives from persons legally responsible for their support. Clearly, support for a dependent is the primary thrust of chapter 252A. However, because a father of a child born out of wedlock may not be held liable for support unless he has been adjudicated to be the father, Iowa Code § 252A.3(9), paternity may be adjudicated as a part of the chapter 252A proceeding. See In re Marriage of Stogdill, 428 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Iowa 1988); Stearns v. Kean, 303 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Iowa 1981). A New York court, in a uniform support act case, noted the narrow scope of the uniform act: Proceedings for the support of the child should not be frustrated by endless dispute over what is essentially a collateral problem, namely, in whose custody does the child rightfully belong. The proceedings under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law are salutary in purpose, and are designed to be summary and direct. They do not provide a suitable forum to try out or determine issues more properly handled in a plenary action, or by way of appeal from or modification of existing judgments, or in habeas corpus proceedings. This is not to say that such issues may not become inextricably involved in a support proceeding, but when and if they do, they must not be permitted to defeat the primary and summary purpose of the proceeding. Aberlin v. Aberlin, 3 A.D.2d 417, 421, 161 N.Y.S.2d 305, 309-10 (1957). Throughout chapter 252A, references are made to support or child support without any reference to other issues such as visitation, name change, or tax exemption. In fact, nothing in chapter 252A suggests that issues other than paternity and support may be adjudicated by the court. This was the holding of Beneventi v. Beneventi, 185 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1971). In Beneventi, the district court had ordered visitation rights for the father in a chapter 252A action, and we reversed. As we said, [i]t is implicit from a review of the ... provisions of our Uniform Support of Dependents Law, and the decision[s] of other courts under like statutes, that the only real problem in such a proceeding is the extent of the support required of the respondent. The issue of dissolving the bonds of matrimony certainly is not before the court and, while some of the evidence relevant to that issue might bear on the amount of support necessary for the children, it is nevertheless extraneous to the real issue of respondent's duty to furnish support for them. We do not believe the legislature, in adopting the Uniform Support Law, ever intended to include under chapter 252A the review or determination of the issues involved in a suit for divorce. As appellant contends in this appeal, the whole purpose of the law is to require a respondent to support his dependents to the extent of his ability to do so, and the legislature surely did not intend that the county attorney, a prosecuting official who is designated to represent the dependents in the proceeding, should be transformed into an attorney representing a private client in a divorce proceeding. Id. at 223-24. In the present case, we believe the same reasoning should apply. The county attorney, or assistant attorney general, designated by statute to be the representative of the claimant, should not be required to litigate issues, extending beyond paternity and support, which are more properly litigated in other forums. In fact, this mother, whose rights would be directly affected by orders for visitation, name change, and tax exemption, is not even a party to the case. A mother under such circumstances cannot be a petitioner for purposes of chapter 252A because she is not a spouse. See State ex rel. Warren v. Mahan, 329 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Iowa 1983) (unmarried mother not dependent who may be petitioner under chapter 252A). We conclude that the court's order insofar as it provided visitation, name change, and tax exemption was beyond the scope of its authority and the pleadings. We therefore reverse that part of the court's order and remand for entry of a revised decree.