Opinion ID: 1093220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were the lineups conducted improperly?

Text: Among the rights guaranteed under both the United States and Mississippi Constitutions is the right to counsel. This right to counsel in the U.S. Constitution is found in the Sixth Amendment: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. The parallel provision in the Mississippi Constitution reads as follows: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel ... Miss. Const., Art. III. § 26 (1890). Page v. State, 495 So.2d 436, 439 (Miss. 1986); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 722 (Miss. 1984); Patterson v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2393, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches once adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). Kirby, supra, held that these proceedings may take the form of an indictment, information, arraignment or preliminary hearing. See also, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). These cases suggest that the Court look to the state procedure to determine when formal adversarial proceedings have been initiated. The most recent formulation of when the right to counsel attaches under Mississippi law begins with Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984), where the Court held that the right to counsel may attach as early as the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 722. See also, Livingston v. State, 519 So.2d 1218 (Miss. 1988); Page v. State, 495 So.2d 436, 439 (Miss. 1986); and, Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078 (Miss. 1987). More recently we have refined our view to hold that state law effects attachment of the right to counsel after arrest and at the point when the initial appearance ought to have been held. May v. State, 524 So.2d 957, 967 (Miss. 1988); Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68, 77 (Miss. 1988). In the case at bar, Jimpson alleges that he was denied the right to have counsel present at each of the lineups where he was positively identified by both Mae Kirkland and Woodrow Rogers. Due to the nature of the right being asserted here by Jimpson, and the circumstances surrounding this case, a careful examination of Sixth Amendment law within the framework of the facts in this case is required. When Jimpson was arrested on February 14, 1985, pursuant to an arrest warrant, he was given his Miranda rights prior to being interrogated. Detective C.M. Crisco testified that he fully explained these rights to Jimpson twice and that Jimpson indicated his understanding of these rights, including his right to an attorney. Jimpson nonetheless indicated his willingness to talk with the police and signed a written waiver of these rights. Jimpson was placed in a lineup the next day, February 15, and was positively identified by Mae Kirkland and Woodrow Rogers. No attorney was present at the lineup. It is this lineup which Jimpson now challenges on appeal. There is no dispute in the record that Jimpson was in custody as the result of an arrest warrant when this lineup was held. It thus seems clear that Jimpson's right to counsel had attached by the time he was placed in the lineup. The point when the initial appearance ought to have been held was well past. See Rule 1.04, Miss.Unif.Crim.R.Cir. Ct.Prac. The protections afforded by the right to counsel are to assure that a defendant need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1157 (1967). In the case at bar, Jimpson has not challenged the propriety of the lineup itself; rather, he is citing as error the fact that counsel was not present at the lineup. A lineup is a critical stage. An accused enjoys the right to counsel at a lineup because there exists the possibility of irremediable prejudice if counsel is not afforded. Once the right to counsel has attached, [a]t all critical stages thereafter, the accused is of right entitled to access to counsel, absent a specific, knowing and intelligent waiver tied to that stage. Nicholson, supra, at 76 (Robertson, J., concurring). It appears that Jimpson was here denied his right to counsel at lineup. His claim fails, however, for one fundamental reason. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the United States Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of harmless constitutional error. We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the federal constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. 386 U.S. at 21, 87 S.Ct. at 827, 17 L.Ed.2d at 709. This principle is applicable to the case now before this Court. Although Jimpson's right to counsel had attached at the lineup, thereby constituting a technical violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the record is clear as to both witnesses, that their identification was based on their view of the defendant at the bank and its vicinity and was not based on the lineup identification. See York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1380-83 (Miss. 1982). It should also be noted that in this case, even if the lineup was improper, the amount of evidence favoring conviction was overwhelming. Jimpson here protests his lack of counsel at the lineup, not the lineup itself. Even without the lineup identification, the amount of other evidence present in this case is overwhelming. See Meadows v. Kuhlmann, 812 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir.1987); Robinson v. Percy, 738 F.2d 214, 220-21 (7th. Cir.1984). In summary, this Court holds that even though the constitutional right to counsel had attached at the critical stage of a lineup identification held after arrest, there is no reversible error here. The error is harmless for there is no sufficient showing in the record that the identification testimony was impermissibly tainted by the lineup being held without the presence of legal counsel. Nicholson, supra at 77.