Opinion ID: 2100135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation of the Right to Dismiss Counsel After Trial Begins

Text: While we have recognized the importance of the right to dismiss counsel, we have also concluded that at some point after trial begins, the right to defend pro se and the right to obtain substitute counsel must be limited to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 605, 536 A.2d at 1159. See also United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858, 99 S.Ct. 174, 58 L.Ed.2d 166 (1978). In the absence of such a limitation, defendants could use eleventh hour requests to discharge counsel as a tactic to delay the proceedings or to confuse the jury. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 172 W.Va. 656, 310 S.E.2d 173, 187 (1983); Dunlap, 577 F.2d at 868-69. In order to justify substitution of counsel after trial begins, the defendant must demonstrate good cause. McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982) (good cause may include a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.). See also Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 605-06, 536 A.2d at 1159. The decision whether to permit mid-trial substitution of counsel is left to the trial court's discretion. See Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 616 N.E.2d 423, 428 (1993); Commonwealth v. Miskel, 364 Mass. 783, 308 N.E.2d 547, 552 (1974). As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has stated: It is now well established by decisions of this court and of the [f]ederal courts that a defendant's freedom to change his counsel is restricted on the commencement of trial. Once the trial had begun, the effectiveness of any right of the defendant to force a change of counsel was diminished.... Thereafter any prejudice to his interests was to be balanced with the foreseeable effect upon the trial already in progress. Upon this issue the decision must be largely within the discretion of the trial judge[.] Miskel, 308 N.E.2d at 552 (citations omitted) (quoting Lamoureux v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 556, 233 N.E.2d 741, 744 (1968)). See also United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 572 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir.1973); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007, 86 S.Ct. 1950,16 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1966); State v. LaBare, 637 A.2d 854, 855 (Me.1994); State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 631 A.2d 288, 297 (1993); State v. Ronne, 458 N.W.2d 294, 299-300 (N.D.1990); Garris v. United States, 465 A.2d 817, 820 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S.Ct. 1013, 79 L.Ed.2d 243 (1984); Swinehart v. State, 268 Ind. 460, 376 N.E.2d 486, 490 (1978); State v. Heaps, 87 Or.App. 489, 742 P.2d 1188, 1189 (1987). If the court concludes that the defendant's request to dismiss counsel was not made in good faith but [was] a transparent ploy for delay, the court may exercise its discretion to deny the request. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). Furthermore, tactical disagreements short of a total breakdown in communication between attorney and client generally do not warrant mid-trial substitution of counsel. See Miskel, 308 N.E.2d at 552; see also Morris, 461 U.S. at 13, 103 S.Ct. at 1617 (rejecting the view that the defendant is entitled to a meaningful attorney-client relationship). [4] Frequently, denial of a defendant's request for substitute counsel leads to a request to defend pro se. [5] See, e.g., Snead, 286 Md. at 126, 406 A.2d at 100; see also Taylor v. State, 557 So.2d 138, 140 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1990). Although the request to proceed pro se ordinarily should be granted if asserted unequivocally before trial, the right to proceed pro se is limited after trial has begun. See, e.g., Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 941 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 1639, 113 L.Ed.2d 734 (1991); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1084, 100 S.Ct. 1041, 62 L.Ed.2d 770 (1980); Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir.1976); People v. Windham, 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187, 1190-91 (1977). For example, as the Fourth Circuit stated in Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 1639, 113 L.Ed.2d 734 (1991): Although under ... the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution a defendant has a right of self-representation ... this right is not absolute, and after a defendant has proceeded to trial with an attorney, the right to proceed pro se rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Appellant argues that under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right of self-representation; however, this right is not absolute and may be waived or limited if not raised before trial. Faretta does not deal with the situation of a defendant attempting to proceed pro se after trial has begun. Id. at 941 (citations omitted). Thus, if a defendant does not timely assert the right to proceed pro se, the decision to grant the request is also left to the sound discretion of the trial court. [6] Although we have not previously addressed this issue, the Court of Special Appeals has reached a similar conclusion in several decisions. [7] See Ross v. State, 53 Md.App. 397, 453 A.2d 828 (1983); Johnson v. State, 44 Md.App. 515, 411 A.2d 118 (1980). For example, in Ross v. State, 53 Md.App. 397, 453 A.2d 828 (1983), the defendant was represented by counsel throughout the trial, but indicated a desire to deliver the closing argument himself after all the evidence was presented. Id. at 398, 453 A.2d at 829. The trial court denied the request, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision. The intermediate appellate court distinguished other cases where the request by the accused to represent himself came prior to the beginning of the trial and concluded that there was no abuse of the trial judge's judicial discretion in his denial of the appellant's request to give his closing argument to the jury pro se. 53 Md.App. at 401, 453 A.2d at 830-31. In Johnson v. State, 44 Md.App. 515, 411 A.2d 118 (1980), at the conclusion of the State's evidence, defense counsel indicated that the defendant wished to discharge him. Id. at 521, 411 A.2d at 122. The court denied the request, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Although the intermediate appellate court found that the defendant did not clearly and unequivocally indicate a desire to represent himself, the court also stated that: Faretta v. California, supra , held that there is a constitutional right to self-representation. Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122 [406 A.2d 98] (1979), held that when a defendant expresses a desire to represent himself before the trial begins, the trial judge must conduct an inquiry to determine that (a) his request is made clearly and unequivocally and (b) he is knowingly and intelligently foregoing his right to counsel. Faretta and Snead, therefore, do not affect the established rule that replacement of counsel during the course of a trial is a matter of discretion left to the trial court, United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 393 (C.A.4th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 [89 S.Ct. 1209, 1210, 22 L.Ed.2d 465] (1969), and absent a showing of cause, such a request is properly denied. State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270 [347 A.2d 219] (1975); Wright v. State, 32 Md. App. 60, 62 [359 A.2d 1] (1976), cert. denied, 278 Md. 740 (1976). In this case, there was no showing of prejudice and the motion was properly denied. Id. at 524, 411 A.2d at 123. We agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Special Appeals in Ross and in Johnson, that the decision to permit discharge of counsel after trial has begun is within the sound discretion of the trial court.