Opinion ID: 2103351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Election of Remedies and Rescission Arguments.

Text: Simpson argues that Gottschalks elected the remedy of forfeiture and could not therefore take a different tack by accepting a deed in lieu of forfeiture. We pass the threshold question of whether Simpson could take advantage of an election-of-remedy argument when the remedies asserted were against another party; we simply reject Simpson's argument on its merits. Election of remedies is a doctrine not favored by the law; it is ordinarily applied in a strict and limited way. Stroh Corp. v. K & S Dev. Corp., 247 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Iowa 1976); 25 Am.Jr.2d Election of Remedies § 3, at 648-49 (1966). Furthermore, when remedies are factually consistent, an election to pursue one does not preclude pursuit of another until the first is fully completed. See First Sec. Bank v. McClain, 403 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Iowa 1987). For the reasons stated in Division I of this opinion, Gottschalks had not pursued forfeiture to its conclusion; it was waived before the remedy was complete. Gottschalks could therefore not be bound to that election. Simpson also argues that there had been a termination, rescission or abandonment of the Pregler-Simpson subcontract. While Simpson uses these terms to describe his argument, the argument boils down to this: Because Preglers were in default on their contract with Gottschalks, they could not have received a deed from Gottschalks by March 1, 1985, the date on which Preglers were to deliver title to Simpson under the subcontract. This rendered the subcontract impossible to perform and would allow Simpson to rescind. See Fulton v. Chase, 240 Iowa 771, 774, 37 N.W.2d 920, 922 (1949). Under the reasoning of Division I, however, there was no forfeiture; the effect of Preglers' assignment of the subcontract to Gottschalks was to make Gottschalks the sellers, and title could be delivered by them to Simpson. There was, therefore, no ground for rescission. We summarily reject Simpson's additional argument that Preglers had abandoned the contract. Preglers' assignment of their interest in the Simpson subcontract merely substituted Gottschalks for Preglers. This did not amount to an abandonment. We believe the case was properly decided in the district court and the court of appeals. Our disposition of the appeal on the issues discussed makes it unnecessary to address Gottschalks' alternative grounds for affirmance. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.