Opinion ID: 161852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Overview of the Allen Charge

Text: 30 Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, [e]very defendant in a federal criminal case has the right to have his guilt found, if found at all, only by the unanimous verdict of a jury of his peers. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc); see also United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 888 (10th Cir. 2001) (The Sixth Amendment guarantees a federal criminal defendant the right to a unanimous verdict.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a) (The verdict shall be unanimous.). If no unanimous verdict can be attained, then the jury is considered hung and a mistrial is declared. Thus, a federal criminal case may terminate with the failure to reach a verdict. See Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting) (stating that it is a basic misapprehension[] that a criminal trial must end with (1) a verdict of guilty or (2) a verdict of not guilty); see also Paul Marcus, The Allen Instruction in Criminal Cases: Is the Dynamite Charge About to Be Permanently Defused?, 43 Mo. L. Rev. 613, 624 (1978) (stating that there are not two but rather three possible decisions of the jury). 31 An Allen instruction is, in effect, a charge given by a trial court that encourages the jury to reach a unanimous verdict so as to avoid a mistrial. See United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961) (stating that, through an Allen charge, a trial court suggest[s] to jurors the desirability of agreement and avoidance of the necessity of a retrial before another jury), abrogated on other grounds by Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356 (1983); see also United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682, 683-84 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that purpose of an Allen instruction is to encourage unanimity); Hale v. United States, 435 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that [t]he purpose of the Allen charge is to obtain a verdict). Its name is derived from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), in which the Supreme Court first approved a supplemental instruction given to a deadlocked jury. 2 The Court described the instruction as taken literally, id. at 501, 17 S. Ct. 154, from a charge approved in Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1 (1851). According to the Supreme Court, it provided: 32 [I]n substance, [the instruction was] that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that, although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with candor, and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority. 33 Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. The instruction also included a reminder to the jury of the burden of proof. See 6th Cir. Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 8.04 cmt. (1991 ed.) (noting that the trial court in Allen told the jury: 'In order to make a decision more practicable, the law imposes the burden of proof on one party or the other, in all cases. In the present case, the burden of proof is upon the government.'); see also Potter v. United States, 691 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that [t]he Supreme Court did not set out the full body of the instruction given in Allen; then stating that the trial court in Allen had included from Tuey a reminder of the burden of proof). 34 For purposes of clarity, we label an instruction that tracks the above description and that includes a reminder on the burden of proof a pure Allen charge. An instruction that departs from the pure charge, whether by omission or embellishment, we call a modified Allen instruction. Cf. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 844 (1977) ([I]t is somewhat imprecise to refer to a single Allen charge. Decades of judicial improvisation have produced a variety of permutations . . . .). Where we do not use the terms pure and modified, we speak of Allen instructions, both pure and modified, in general. Today, most Allen instructions are given as supplemental charges to deadlocked juries, just as in Allen itself. The name Allen charge, however, has been used to describe not only supplemental instructions provided to deadlocked juries but also charges given as part of the original jury instructions. 35 Interestingly, when the pure Allen charge was first approved by the Supreme Court in 1896, it engendered little to no controversy, presumably because the instruction was seen as an extension of a trial court's power to lend guidance and assistance to a jury in reaching a verdict. See United States v. Winn, 411 F.2d 415, 416 (10th Cir. 1969) (taking note of this right and duty of the trial court to guide and assist). As the years passed, the popularity of the instruction quickly grew, [u]ndoubtedly . . . from its perceived efficiency as a means of 'blasting' a verdict out of a . . . jury. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d at 844. With the increased use of the charge came an increasing tendency on the part of trial courts to deviate from the language of the pure instruction, often in an apparent attempt to increase the intensity of the 'blast.' 3 Id. 36 In the latter part of the twentieth century, courts became concerned that the Allen charge might have a coercive element--in other words, that a jury might interpret the instruction encouraging a unanimous verdict as an order to agree. See Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., concurring) (stating that a jury views an Allen charge as a direct appeal from the Bench for a verdict). If a jury was in fact coerced into returning a verdict as a result of the charge, then the defendant's due process rights would be violated. See Hale, 435 F.2d at 741 (Problems arise when the Allen charge is used to coerce the jury into reaching a verdict . . . . [A] coercive charge violates due process . . . .); Mills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311, 313 (10th Cir. 1963) (To compel a jury to agree upon a verdict is a denial of a fair and impartial jury trial, and, hence is a denial of due process.). 4 37 Because of this concern, many federal courts have voiced criticisms of the Allen instruction, even when given in the form approved by the Supreme Court. State courts and scholarly commentators have expressed similar opinions. 5 For example, the use of the following language in the pure instruction has been the basis of many complaints: 38 [I]f much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority. 39 Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. This language has been subject to much disparagement because it directs only the minority jurors, and not the majority, to reconsider its views as part of the deliberation process. See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969) ([T]he very real treachery of the [pure] Allen Charge [is that] [i]t contains no admonition that the majority reexamine its position.). According to the critics, if every juror were called upon to rethink his or her views, and not just the minority, there would be less intimation that the dissenters are presumably wrong and should capitulate in favor of the view espoused by the greater number of jurors. Smith, 857 F.2d at 684 n.4. In other words, the possibility of coercion would be less likely. 6 40 In spite of such critiques, federal courts have been reluctant to hold that the Allen charge--at least in its pure form--is impermissibly coercive and therefore a violation of due process. See Wright, supra, 502, at 540. Still, unhappiness with the instruction has given rise to a variety of new developments. For example, some circuit courts emphasize that the pure Allen instruction approaches the ultimate permissible limits or the outermost limit of . . . permissible use with respect to a trial court's prerogative to guide and direct a jury toward a verdict. Id. 502, at 533 (internal quotation marks omitted). Departures from the pure instruction have been thereby discouraged, see United States v. Scott, 547 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1977) (Any variation upon the precise language approved in Allen imperils the validity of the trial.), though some variations have still passed constitutional muster if they do not heighten the coercive element already existing in the charge. See, e.g., Smith, 857 F.2d at 684 (noting that, in this circuit, [o]ne common elaboration of the [pure] Allen charge is to admonish the jury that it is unlikely that any other jury of superior ability, or better equipped than the jury now in the box . . . can be found). 7 41 Other circuit courts have recommended the inclusion of certain cautionary language within the Allen charge. Some of the recommended cautionary language already existed in the pure instruction, for example: (1) that no juror should yield his or her conscientiously held convictions simply to reach an agreement; and (2) that the burden of proof belonged to the government, not the defendant. See United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971) ([T]he court should be careful to include all those elements of the original charge designed to ameliorate its coercive effect . . . .); see also Potter, 691 F.2d at 1280 (same). Other cautionary language reflected the federal courts' worry that the pure charge unfairly singled out the minority. See Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883 (Whenever a court instructs jurors to reexamine their positions, it should expressly address its remarks to the majority as well as the minority.). 42 Finally, as an exercise of their supervisory powers, several circuit courts have ruled that, any time a trial court directly encourages a unanimous verdict, a substitute charge containing certain cautionary language (in effect, a particular modified charge) must be given or the defendant's conviction should generally, if not automatically, be reversed. See Thomas, 449 F.2d at 1187 (D.C. Circuit); Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 420 (Third Circuit); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933-34 (7th Cir. 1969) (Seventh Circuit). 8 Interestingly, these courts were likely motivated, at least in part, by a concern over the instruction's potential coercive effect, and yet they claimed to be motivated by considerations of judicial policy only. See Thomas, 449 F.2d at 1186 (We are persuaded . . . by the volume and complexity of the litigation generated by the Allen charge, that its continued unrestricted use is incompatible with sound judicial administration.); Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 420 & n.31 ([T]he use of the Allen charge is an invitation for perennial appellate review.). 43 Oddly enough, soon after these Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuit decisions requiring that cautionary language accompany an Allen instruction, the debate over the charge's validity tapered off dramatically, leaving for the federal courts the framework discussed above: in some courts, the pure charge still persists, though certain modified forms were recommended instead because of their inclusion of cautionary language, while, in other courts, the Allen charge has been formally replaced by a substitute charge, also containing cautionary language to ward off the potential for coercion. The Supreme Court, surveying the scene in the late 1980s, commented that, in spite of all the past controversy over the Allen instruction, [a]ll of the Federal Courts of Appeals have upheld some form of [such] a charge. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238 n.1 (emphasis added). Or, as the Fourth Circuit put it, not a single one of the circuit[] [courts] has outlawed . . . instructions to juries for the purpose of inducing further deliberation and agreement upon a verdict. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1343 (4th Cir. 1970). This fact remains true today. 9 44