Opinion ID: 7026974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of the Government’s Re-Direct

Text: We review the district court’s decision to permit the government to cover matters not covered in its direct examination for an abuse of discretion. “[T]he conduct of a criminal trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and such discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse.” United States v. Wilson, 27 F.3d 1126, 1129 (6th Cir.1994); accord United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827, 831 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 838, 92 S.Ct. 129, 30 L.Ed.2d 71 (1971) (quoting United States v. Wade, 364 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir.1966)).
Defendant argues that the district court erred in permitting the government to exceed the permissible scope of its redirect of Hilary Dolin, the government’s witness and the Defendant’s ex-girlfriend. Following Defendant’s cross-examination of Ms. Dolin, the government attempted to examine her on matters outside the scope of cross-examination. Specifically, the government asked the witness to identify a rental agreement for the car used in the two robberies. In response to the defense counsel’s objection, the district court held a side bar discussion with both attorneys. There, the district court stated “I understand that this is outside the bounds of cross. [The prosecutor] should have done some of this stuff on direct, but I am exercising my discretion to allow him to go back into some items that he obviously forgot to address on direct.” The government then proceeded to obtain from Ms. Dolin her testimony regarding the car rental agreement. When a party seeks to reopen its proof, “[t]he district court judge must consider the party’s explanation of failing to introduce the evidence earlier, the admissibility of the evidence, its relevance, and the degree to which the opposing party would be prejudiced by reopening the case.” Wilson, 27 F.3d at 1129. In United States v. Wilson, this Court upheld the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to reopen his case so that two witnesses, who came late to trial, could testify. Id. The Wilson Court noted that it would have been permissible for the district court to allow the testimony, but that it could not be said that it was an abuse of discretion to deny defendant’s request. Id. Similarly here, we cannot say that permitting the government to proceed was an abuse of discretion. The evidence was admissible and highly relevant. Moreover, there was no evidence of misconduct by the prosecutor; rather, he apparently forgot to address the exhibit in his direct. We disagree with Defendant that the witness’s testimony was “very prejudicial” merely because the testimony served to further implicate the Defendant. We decline Defendant’s invitation to find that a party may not reopen its proofs when the evidence it seeks to admit is not favorable to the other party. The district court’s decision to permit the government leeway in its re-direct was reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, we reject Defendant’s final claim of error.