Opinion ID: 2651088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Remaining Factors

Text: The parties presented little argument on the remaining factors that may be considered, and the district court did not address them. See Jenkens & Gilchrist, 542 F.3d at 119 (stating a court need not consider all of the factors). The only one that we find clearly weighs either for or against vacating the default judgment against Ms. Carpanzano is the substantial-financial-loss factor. Undoubtedly, $2.1 million in damages militates strongly in favor of a trial on the merits. See In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d at 374 (finding that a loss of several hundred thousand dollars weighed in favor of setting aside a default judgment); Jenkens & Gilchrist, 542 F.3d at 122 (finding that a loss of approximately $1.3 million militated in favor of setting aside a default judgment). 6 Nor are there any allegations that Ms. Carpanzano took possession of any other proceeds of the escrow account, which she might be able to hide or dispose of if allowed more time. 7 Indeed, the court did hold a contempt hearing and adjudicated these three defendant guilty of civil contempt, ordering them to appear for their depositions and respond to interrogatories, assessing attorneys’ fees of $1650, and imposing a fine of $500 per day until compliance is reached. This appeal does not seek review of that order. 17 Case: 13-10096 Document: 00512512053 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/24/2014 No. 13-10096 In sum, we affirm the district court in full as to Mr. Carpanzano and Ms. Belcastro, since the former willfully defaulted and the latter failed to present a meritorious defense. As to Ms. Carpanzano, however, we conclude that the district court’s order was at least a “slight abuse of discretion” as to the denial of relief from the monetary default judgment. See Jenkens & Gilchrist, 542 F.3d at 118 (“Because of the seriousness of a default judgment, . . . even a slight abuse of discretion may justify reversal.” (quoting Lacy, 227 F.3d at 292)). We therefore vacate the order in this regard only. See In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d at 370–71 (“Unless it appears that no injustice results from the default, relief should be granted.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).