Opinion ID: 2598178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kirkman

Text: ¶ 29 The State argues that the Court of Appeals wrongly held that the testimony provided by Dr. Stirling and Detective Kerr amounted to improper opinions on the victim's credibility. The State also contends that even if the trial court erred, no objection was made; thus, the issue is waived on appeal. We agree with the State.
¶ 30 Dr. Stirling was asked for his expert opinion on the results of his physical examination of A.D. He testified: I'm trying to think of how to phrase this. I found nothing on the physical examination that would make me doubt what she'd said, or was there anything that would necessarily confirm it. There was no damage, it was a normal examination. 2 RP at 173. ¶ 31 Asked for his general assessment, Dr. Stirling testified that A.D. gave a very clear history with lots of detail, a clear and consistent history of sexual touching . . . with appropriate affect and that [t]he physical examination doesn't really lead us one way or the other, but I thought her history was clear and consistent. Id. at 175-76. ¶ 32 Relying upon State v. Carlson, 80 Wash.App. 116, 906 P.2d 999 (1995), the Court of Appeals held that Dr. Stirling testified that A.D.'s report of sexual touching was clear, consistent, with appropriate affect, and that she used appropriate vocabulary. The physician was clearly commenting on A.D.'s credibility. Kirkman, 126 Wash.App. at 104, 107 P.3d 133 (emphasis added). ¶ 33 The State counters that Dr. Stirling did not comment directly or indirectly on Kirkman's guilt nor did he comment on the innocence of another, as in State v. Dolan, 118 Wash.App. 323, 329, 73 P.3d 1011 (2003). ¶ 34 We agree with the State and the dissent below. The Court of Appeals erroneously deemed Dr. Stirling's testimony as clearly an improper opinion implying Kirkman's guilt. Dr. Stirling was not clearly commenting on A.D.'s credibility and actually testified that his findings neither corroborated nor undercut A.D.'s account. Dr. Stirling did not come close to testifying that Kirkman was guilty or that he believed A.D.'s account Dr. Stirling's statement that A.D.'s account was clear and consistent does not constitute an opinion on her credibility. A witness or victim may clearly and consistently provide an account that is false. The jury properly was instructed to determine the facts. Thus, Dr. Stirling's testimony was not a manifest error of constitutional magnitude.
¶ 35 Kerr testified about the competency protocol he gave to A.D., relating to her ability to tell the truth. Yes . . . it's kind of a competency. 2 RP at 73. When asked why, Kerr responded, [b]ecause I'm  I'm interested inin this person being able to distinguish between truth and lies. Id. at 74. Kerr testified that A.D. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie and that A.D. expressly promised to tell him the truth. Kerr then related what A.D. said in her interview. ¶ 36 The Court of Appeals' majority conceded that Detective Kerr did not offer his direct opinion on A.D.'s credibility. Kirkman, 126 Wash.App. at 105, 107 P.3d 133. The court nonetheless ruled that because Kerr told the jury that he tested A.D.'s competency and her truthfulness, id., that he [i]n essence told the jury that A.D. told him the truth in providing her account of events. Id. The Court of Appeals cited Demery for the proposition that a police officer's testimony may particularly affect a jury because of its `special aura of reliability.' Id. (quoting Demery, 144 Wash.2d at 765, 30 P.3d 1278). ¶ 37 The challenged portion of Kerr's testimony is simply an account of the interview protocol he used to obtain A.D.'s statement. Kerr did not testify that he believed A.D. or that she was telling the truth. Therefore, no manifest error occurred that could relieve Kirkman of his duty to object. ¶ 38 By testifying as to this interview protocol, Kerr merely provided the necessary context that enabled the jury to assess the reasonableness of the . . . responses. Demery, 144 Wash.2d at 764, 30 P.3d 1278. Detectives often use a similar protocol in all child witness interviews, whether they believe the child witness or not. ¶ 39 An interview protocol as employed by Kerr does not carry a special aura of reliability beyond the special aura of reliability conferred upon a witness when a judge swears him or her to tell the truth in front of the jury at trial. See RCW 5.28.020. A jury must still determine credibility and truthfulness of each witness. Kerr's testimony was not a manifest error of constitutional magnitude.