Opinion ID: 4955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Chavez's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment

Text: Hernandez's fourth claim of error is that the district court erroneously permitted Chavez to invoke the Fifth Amendment, because, having entered a guilty plea, Chavez no longer enjoyed a privilege against self-incrimination. It is well settled that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor must yield to a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Roussell v. Jeane, 842 F.2d 1512, 1516 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Khan, 728 F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1984). The trial judge, moreover, necessarily is accorded broad discretion in determining the merits of a claimed [Fifth Amendment] privilege. United States v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir. 1983). 3 It is also doubtful that Hernandez has adequately presented on appeal any complaint of the denial of his requested instruction. No claimed instructional error is listed in the statement of the issues in his brief, nor is any mentioned in his summary of the argument or in any of the argument headings in his brief. The matter is mentioned only in the argument section of the brief dealing with the contention that there was a variance between the conspiracy charged in the indictment and the conspiracy proved at trial. 18 Hernandez relies on the principle that once a defendant has been convicted of, or has pleaded guilty to, an offense, the privilege ceases to apply as to that offense and as to any other charges in an indictment that the government promises to dismiss as part of the plea agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1980). However, Chavez had not been sentenced at the time of Hernandez's trial. As other courts of appeals have held, impending sentencing may furnish grounds for a legitimate fear of incurring additional criminal liability from testifying, in which case the privilege should remain in effect. See United States v. Lugg, 892 F.2d 101, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Tindle, 808 F.2d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 1986); Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fierro-Soza v. United States, 99 S.Ct. 618 (1978). From the record before us, we cannot preclude that reasonable possibility, and we therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's deferral to Chavez's invocation of the Fifth Amendment.