Opinion ID: 2344039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Overturning Nevada precedent

Text: [U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, [this court] will not overturn [precedent] absent compelling reasons for so doing. Mere disagreement does not suffice. Secretary of State v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Those compelling reasons must be `weighty and conclusive.' Id. (quoting Kapp v. Kapp, 31 Nev. 70, 73, 99 P. 1077, 1078 (1909)). However, [t]he doctrine of stare decisis must not be so narrowly pursued that the... law is forever encased in a straight jacket. Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 400, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1974). The weighty and conclusive reason the State offers for overturning our prior precedent is, essentially, that the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which Nevada based its trafficking statutes on, was designed to make all actors in the illicit drug deal equally culpable when a trafficking quantity of a controlled substance is involved. The State goes on to argue that that purpose would be defeated if this court allowed the use of the procuring agent defense to defend against a charge of trafficking. We agree. The principle behind the procuring agent defense is that a person who acts solely as a procuring agent for the purchaser of drugs is a principal to the purchase, not the sale, and thus, should be held liable only to the same extent as the purchaser. Because the purchaser cannot be held liable for selling the drugs, neither can the purchaser's agent. 25 Am.Jur.2d Drugs and Controlled Substances § 185 (2004). The purchaser typically is liable for possession of the drugs and, therefore, that is the extent of his procuring agent's liability as wellwhich explains why this court summarily held in Buckley that the procuring agent defense does not apply to the crime of possession. [5] The same point is implicit in the seminal procuring agent case, wherein the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded its discussion recognizing the defense with the observation that [t]he government having elected to charge the defendant with the crime of sale rather than illegal possession, the jury should have been alerted to the legal limitations of the sale concept in relation to the circumstances of this case. Sawyer, 210 F.2d at 170 (emphasis added); accord People v. Hall, 44 Colo.App. 535, 622 P.2d 571, 572-73 (1980) (explaining that procuring agent defense negates an essential element of the sales offensethe sale itselfand therefore the defense is not applicable in a prosecution for mere possession); State v. Osburn, 211 Kan. 248, 505 P.2d 742, 746 (1973) (Where possession of a substance, such as a narcotic, is unlawful a procuring agent for a purchaser may be convicted of unlawful possession thereof....). Thus, while the procuring agent defense protects the purchaser's agent from a conviction for a charge that involves the sale of a controlled substance, it does not protect the purchaser's agent from a conviction for a charge of possession of the controlled substance. Although this court implicitly recognized this conceptual limitation on the procuring agent defense with the holding in Buckley, 95 Nev. at 604, 600 P.2d at 228, that the agency defense is inapplicable to the crime of possession, no mention was made of that limitation or Buckley when this court first considered whether the procuring agent defense applies to a charge of trafficking in a controlled substance in Hillis. The Hillis court held that the procuring agent defense is applicable to a trafficking charge that is based on a theory of possession if the facts reveal that the possession was clearly incidental to a contemplated sales transaction. 103 Nev. at 535, 746 P.2d at 1095. The court in Hillis asserted that the principle enunciated in Roy [, 87 Nev. 517, 489 P.2d 1158,] logically extends to the charge of possession for the purpose of sale. Id. That logical extension makes sense: the procuring agent defense applies to a charge of possession for the purpose of sale because the defense negates an element of the offensethe intent to sell the controlled substance, see NRS 453.337 the same as it negates the sales element in a charge of selling a controlled substance. But that logical extension does not explain the Hillis court's next conclusion: Even when possession for sale is not specifically alleged, the instruction may be required where possession was clearly incidental to a contemplated sales transaction initiated by an informant. 103 Nev. at 535, 746 P.2d at 1095. That conclusion was not supported by any authority. More importantly, the Hillis court's ultimate conclusion suffers from at least two fatal flaws. The first flaw in Hillis ' conclusion is that it does not comport with the principle behind the defense: that the purchaser's agent should be held liable only to the same extent as the purchaser. Although the purchaser clearly is liable for a charge of trafficking based on actual or constructive possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled substance, Hillis would absolve the purchaser's agent of that same liability. This is in direct conflict with the trafficking statutes, which make everyone who has any part in the transactionfrom the person who manufactured the drugs to the end purchaser and everyone in betweenguilty of the same offense (trafficking) and subject to the same potential penalty when a trafficking quantity of a controlled substance is involved. See, e.g., NRS 453.3385. In contrast, when a trafficking quantity is not involved, the sale offenses typically carry harsher penalties than the possession offense. Compare NRS 453.336 (providing that first and second offense of simple possession is category E felony), with NRS 453.321 (providing that sale of controlled substance is category B felony), and NRS 453.338 (providing that first and second offense of possession for the purpose of sale is category D felony). It therefore makes a difference in that context whether the defendant is charged with a sales offense or simple possession. As a result, the procuring agent defense has a place when the transaction involves a nontrafficking amountit ensures that the purchaser's agent has only the same liability as the purchaser rather than the greater liability imposed on the seller. But because the trafficking statutes do away with any distinction between seller and buyer for all practical purposes, the statutes already achieve the result that would otherwise be achieved by the procuring agent defense, and, thus, there is no place for the defense when the charge is trafficking. The second flaw in Hillis ' conclusion is that it disregards how the procuring agent defense works as a defense. The procuring agent defense works as a defense to a charge of selling a controlled substance because it negates an element of the offensethe sale. When the charge is simple possession, see NRS 453.336, or trafficking based on possession, see NRS 453.3385-.3395, the defense does not negate an element of the offense, and therefore it does not work as a defense to those charges. The court seemingly recognized this problem in Love v. State, 111 Nev. 545, 893 P.2d 376 (1995), in the context of deciding who has the burden of proof regarding the procuring agent defense. There, the court rejected the State's argument that the instructions adequately informed the jury regarding the State's burden of proof on the procuring agent defense because the instructions gave the impression that the elements of trafficking and the procuring agent defense were two separate issues: This is a result of the State having charged Love with trafficking based purely on possession: the procuring agent defense does not negate any element of the trafficking offense on which the jury was instructed. Id. at 550, 893 P.2d at 379 (emphasis added). Despite that observation, the Love court did not question the idea that the State had the burden of proof on the defense, which is only the case if the defense negates an element of the offense. See id. at 549-51, 893 P.2d at 378-79. Love thus is internally inconsistentit indicates that the State had the burden of proof on the procuring agent defense because the defense negates an element of the charged offense, but because the State charged the defendant with trafficking based solely on possession, there was no element of the offense for the procuring agent defense to negate. Based on the above, we overrule our prior cases insofar as they have allowed a defendant to use the procuring agent defense to defend against a charge of trafficking in a controlled substance based on a possession theory. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense, see Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970), and we affirm the judgment of conviction. [6] We concur: SAITTA, C.J., and PARRAGUIRRE, J.