Opinion ID: 1841669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jim skinner ford, inc.

Text: Skinner Ford's preanswer motion to dismiss alleged, inter alia: 1. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 2. The complaint shows upon its face that it was not filed in accordance with the applicable statute of limitations. Skinner Ford argues, in brief, that Braggs failed to state a claim under the Alabama Mini-Code because she did not aver that the $81.20 processing fee was a direct or an indirect charge made as an incident to the extension of credit, inasmuch as Code 1975, § 5-19-1(1) states that the term finance charge shall include all charges payable directly or indirectly by the debtor and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit. ... (emphasis ours). Braggs contends, however, that what the processing fee actually represents is at best a question of fact, making the lower court's dismissal erroneous because the complaint contains contested factual issues. She urges that if the processing fee is in fact charged as an incident to the extension of credit, then it should have been incorporated within the total amount of the finance charge assessed by Skinner Ford, resulting in its inclusion creating a finance charge exceeding that required by law under the Mini-Code. Braggs alleged in her complaint that the processing fee charged by Skinner Ford as part of the amount financed violated the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, delineating specific sections. She averred: Pursuant to such contracts said defendants disclosed and charged plaintiff and the members of the class she represents a processing fee as part of the amount financed through such contracts; said defendants violated the disclosure requirements of the Truth-In-Lending Act and Regulation Z (which was promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in accordance with the Truth-In-Lending Act [15 USCA, Section 1604]). Specifically, said defendants violated requirements of 15 USCA 1631, et seq. (Truth-In-Lending Act) and Sections 226.4, 226.5, 226.6(a), and 226.8(c) of Regulation Z. In sum, these sections require that any fees falling within the statutory definition of finance charge must be disclosed adequately and must not exceed the annual percentage rate provided by law. She made similar allegations in support of violations of the Alabama Mini-Code: Processing fees of the type charged by said defendants are required to be included as part of the maximum finance charged said defendants, pursuant to the provisions of the Mini-Code (Ala.Code, Section 5-19-1), could charge plaintiff and the members of the class she represents. Said defendants did not openly include such processing fees as part of the finance charges charged plaintiff and the members of the class she represents, however, the inclusion of such processing fees as part of the finance charges charged plaintiff and the members of the class she represents by said defendants reveals that said defendants charged plaintiff and the members of the class she represents a finance charge in excess of the amount authorized by the Mini-Code (Alabama Code, Section 5-19-3). Said defendants made such excess finance charges in deliberate violation or in reckless disregard of the requirements of the Mini-Code. She requested damages, costs plus interest, attorney's fees and a permanent injunction against further violations. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), ARCP, should seldom be granted and is properly granted only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Henderson, 371 So.2d 899, 901 (Ala. 1979). Here, it does not appear beyond doubt that Braggs could not prove any set of facts entitling her to relief. Next, the standard for granting a motion to dismiss based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations is whether the existence of the affirmative defense appears clearly on the face of the pleading. Sims v. Lewis, 374 So.2d 298 (Ala.1979); Browning v. City of Gadsden, 359 So.2d 361 (Ala.1978); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil & 1357, at 605 (1969). Looking at the face of the complaint, it is obvious that the statute of limitations had not expired to bar the action. Because Mary Braggs's complaint alleges some facts, albeit a generalized statement of facts, which, if proven, would support her claim for relief, and because the expiration of the statute of limitations does not appear clearly on the face of the pleading, the court erroneously granted Jim Skinner Ford, Inc.'s motion to dismiss; we reverse and remand as to this appellee.