Opinion ID: 2615067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Restrictive Covenant.

Text: Defendants rely on Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980), for the proposition that a mobile home is not prohibited by the language in the restrictive covenant covered in this case. We disagree. Ostensibly, Heath is the controlling case regarding the narrow issue here. That is, whether a mobile home is a prohibited structure within the meaning of the drafted language of the restrictive covenant. In Heath, this Court was called upon to determine whether the word trailer, without further definition or qualification, used in a restrictive covenant supported the contentions of lot owners who had sought to restrict a party from placing a double-wide mobile home in the subdivision. We reversed the trial court. We held that a double-wide mobile home was substantially the same as a conventional one-family dwelling and that the placing of a mobile home on the lots in that case did not violate the letter or spirit of the restrictive covenant. Heath, however, is necessarily limited to the facts present in that case. The restrictive covenant only spoke in general terms of prohibiting a trailer from being placed on the lots. The dedicating instrument did not seek to distinguish the difference between a trailer, a house trailer, a mobile home or a horse trailer, a truck-trailer, or any other possible permutation of the word trailer that could have been contemplated. Absent some clarity in that case, we declined to enforce a blanket restrictive covenant against the defendants. In the restrictive covenant in this case, however, specificity was used to control the use and appearance of the area in which the mobile home was placed and for a definite period of time. The relevant portions of the restrictive covenant provide: 1. No trailer houses or modular homes shall be allowed on the premises, except that grantees and they alone, may place a trailer house or modular home on the premises for a period not to exceed three (3) years from the date hereof. 2. The premises shall be used for residential and agricultural purposes only; no more than two residences shall be erected on the premises, and they shall be of substantial construction; no homes shall be moved upon the premises. To determine whether a restrictive covenant in any given case will be enforced as it speaks, we are guided by certain general rules of construction. First, when the language of a restrictive covenant is unclear or is subject to ambiguity, then the covenant will be resolved in favor of the free enjoyment of the property and against the restriction. Heath v. Parker, supra . Second, restrictions on land use will not be read into covenants by implication lest the free alienability of property be frustrated. Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal.2d 442, 211 P.2d 302 (1949). Third, restrictive covenants must be considered reasonably, though strictly, so that illogical, unnatural or strained construction will not be effected. Hyder v. Brenton, 93 N.M. 378, 381, 600 P.2d 830, 833 (1979). And, fourth, words in a restrictive covenant must be given their ordinary and intended meaning. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974). Here, the defendants attempt to create a meaningful difference between the term mobile home, which they contend is not covered by the restrictive covenant, and the term trailer houses, which appears in the restrictive covenant. We find this to be a distinction without substance or conviction. The term mobile home would generally be understood in its usual meaning to refer to a trailer house. Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1978). The record shows that the structure placed on the subject property is approximately ten feet wide and is well in excess of forty feet in length and is designed for residential habitation. Applying the aforementioned rules of construction, to give credence to a contrary meaning would only serve to defeat the clear intention of the drafter who sought to restrict a trailer house, or mobile home, from being placed on the property. See Carter v. Conroy, 25 Ariz. App. 434, 544 P.2d 258 (1976); Jones v. Beiber, 251 Iowa 969, 103 N.W.2d 364 (1960); Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970); Brasher v. Grove, 551 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); McBride v. Behrman, 28 Ohio Misc. 47, 272 N.E.2d 181 (1971); Smith v. Bowers, 463 S.W.2d 222 (Tex.Civ.App. 1970). A majority of foreign jurisdictions faced with the identical issue has decided that where the restrictive covenant was clearly intended to prohibit a trailer home from being placed on a parcel of realty, the restrictive covenant will be enforced despite the protestations of a party that the trailer home is a mobile home. Lassiter v. Bliss, supra . Generally, for example, it is stated at Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 232 § 1 (1964), that [t]he term `trailer' is understood in its usual meaning regardless of whether it is referred to or described as house trailer, mobile home, trailer coach, or some such term. This proposition is illustrated by Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ.App. 1973), where the defendant conceded that while he had placed a mobile home on his lot in a subdivision in Travis County, Texas, nonetheless the restrictive covenant seeking to prohibit a trailer and other structures from being placed on the residential lots did not include mobile homes within the meaning of the restriction. The Texas Court of Appeals rejected that notion and held that the purpose of the restrictive covenant was plain. Accordingly, a trailer is still prohibited by a restrictive covenant, even though the trailer may also be referred to as a mobile home. Similarly, in Timmerman v. Gabriel, supra , the Montana Supreme Court pointed out that a restrictive covenant was likewise enforceable, notwithstanding the defendants' attempts to characterize a trailer home as a mobile home. The court observed that [t]he term mobile home is an advertising euphemism for a large house trailer and although the larger models of mobile homes are considerably less mobile than the smaller models, they are essentially similar in structure and appearance. Id. 470 P.2d at 530. And, in Van Poole v. Messer, 19 N.C. App. 70, 198 S.E.2d 106 (1973), the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the term trailer was also inclusive of the term mobile home, further commenting that this synonymous definition of the term was the accepted rule in every authority that they had located. Indeed, in the case at bar, the expert testimony adduced at trial from a former owner of a house trailer business confirmed that the terms mobile home or house trailer are in fact used interchangeably in that industry. The intent of the restrictive covenant here was clear. The plaintiffs sought to prohibit trailer houses from being placed on the property sold to the defendants and for a definite period of time. No trailer house is to be used as a residence. A mobile home is a trailer house and is therefore excluded by the restriction. To the extent Heath v. Parker, supra , may be read to be inconsistent with this opinion, it is hereby expressly overruled. IT IS SO ORDERED. DAN SOSA, Jr., Senior Justice, and STOWERS, J., concur.