Opinion ID: 1352261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to modify sentence

Text: The presentence investigation report recommended that Sutherland receive the minimum sentence. The court gave Sutherland the maximum sentence15 years to life. In sentencing Sutherland, the court took note that Sutherland's extensive juvenile record included five misdemeanor thefts, one attempted misdemeanor theft, four burglaries, two batteries, and a criminal trespass. He served several years in youth correctional facilities while a juvenile. The court stated the victims of this crime both felt threatened, there was no excuse for the crime, and Sutherland's character and attitude made it likely that his criminal lifestyle would continue. The SRDC report contains the following recommendation: It is recommended that the inmate remain incarcerated. During his incarceration, he should be required to successfully complete a substance abuse program with AA and NA follow-up . . . . Because of his youth, it is recommended that favorable consideration be given to modification of sentence. Sutherland filed a motion to modify his sentence. The court stated, For the reasons set forth at the time of sentencing I'll decline to modify the sentence. On appeal, Sutherland argues that K.S. A. 1989 Supp. 21-4603(3) mandates that his sentence be reduced because of the recommendations made in the SRDC report. K.S.A.1989 Supp. 21-4603(3) provides that at any time within 120 days of sentencing, the district court shall modify a sentence imposed if recommended by the state reception and diagnostic center unless the court finds that the safety of the public will be jeopardized and that the welfare of the inmate will not be served by such modification. The legislature has amended this statute (L.1990, ch. 101, § 4) and, although not applicable to this case, it currently requires the court to find and set forth with particularity the reasons for finding that the safety of members of the public will be jeopardized or that the welfare of the inmate will not be served by such modification. K.S.A.1989 Supp. 21-4603(3) became effective July 1, 1989. Prior to the amendment, the section provided that the court may modify a sentence. The robbery of the Town and Country took place on October 5, 1988. Defendant was sentenced on May 5, 1989. The only portion of the proceeding in this case to take place after the effective date of the amendment was the motion to modify, which was filed on July 13, 1989. Sutherland contends the trial court erred in failing to follow the SRDC recommendation for a reduction of his sentence, where it made no finding that such a modification would not be in Sutherland's welfare. The Kansas Court of Appeals has filed conflicting decisions concerning the issue of whether K.S.A.1989 Supp. 21-4603(3) operates prospectively or is retroactive. In State v. Sylva, 14 Kan.App.2d 609, 795 P.2d 947 (1990), a panel of the Court of Appeals relied on State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 216, 768 P.2d 268 (1989), and State v. Henning, 3 Kan.App.2d 607, 609, 599 P.2d 318 (1979), holding K.S.A.1989 Supp. 21-4603(3) to be a substantive statute that prescribes punishment as opposed to a procedural statute and, therefore, is to be applied prospectively. On petition for review, we affirmed this holding of the Court of Appeals. State v. Sylva, 247 Kan. 118, 804 P.2d 967 (1991). In State v. Moon, 15 Kan.App.2d 4, 801 P.2d 59 (1990), a different panel of the Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that the statute in question applies retroactively. In Moon, the court reasoned: K.S.A.1989 Supp. 21-4603(3)(a) provides that `any time within 120 days after a sentence is imposed . . . the court may modify such sentence . . . and shall modify such sentence if recommended by the state reception and diagnostic center.' (Emphasis added.) The statute comes into play only after a defendant has been charged, convicted, and sentenced. It acts to regulate the steps by which a defendant convicted of a crime is punished and therefore, by definition, is a procedural criminal law. The statute does not alter the punishment itself. This fact becomes particularly clear in cases in which SRDC has recommended probation. Probation is defined as a procedure whereby a defendant, found guilty of a crime, is released by the court after imposition of sentence, without imprisonment, subject to various conditions. K.S.A. 21-4602(3). Probation is separate and distinct from sentencing. State v. Dubish, 236 Kan. 848, Syl. ¶ 2, 696 P.2d 969 (1985). We are mindful of the fact that another panel of this court recently determined the 1989 amendment to 21-4603(3)(a) is a substantive change which only operates prospectively to offenses committed after its effective date. State v. Marks, 14 Kan.App.2d 594, 796 P.2d 174 (1990), rev. denied, (September 20, 1990). See State v. Sylva, 14 Kan. App.2d 609, 795 P.2d 947 (1990), rev. granted, (September 20, 1990). In Marks, the court found the 1989 amendment `materially limits the court's sentencing discretion and is therefore substantive not procedural.' 14 Kan.App.2d at 599 [796 P.2d 174]. While it is true the amendment does limit the court's sentencing discretion, that fact does not render the amendment substantive. A substantive law is one which makes an act criminal and prescribes the punishment for that act. Hutchison, 228 Kan. at 287 [615 P.2d 138]. A law is not made substantive by the mere fact it alters the court's discretionary authority to direct how the sentence will be served. The law at issue must affect the substantive rights of the defendant before retroactive application of the law is constitutionally impermissible. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. [423] at 429 [107 S.Ct. 2446 at 2450-51, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987)]; Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. [24] at 29 [101 S.Ct. 960 at 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)]. The amendatory language in 21-4603(3)(a) does not prejudicially affect the defendant's substantive rights. 15 Kan. App.2d at 9, 10, 801 P.2d 59. In Moon, the Court of Appeals devotes considerable analysis to whether the statute is an ex post facto law, and the court correctly reasons that it is not. Whether the statute violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws is immaterial, however, since legislative intent must be first ascertained. State v. Dubish, 236 Kan. 848, 853, 696 P.2d 969 (1985). If it is determined the legislature intended the statute to apply retroactively, the analysis then turns to whether the statute violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The legislature is aware of this court's established rules of statutory construction. The legislature is aware, and has, on many occasions, used specific language to clearly set forth whether a statute is to be applied prospectively or retrospectively. For example, the legislature adopted K.S.A.1989 Supp. 22-3725 to be effective one month after the effective date of K.S.A.1989 Supp. 21-4603(3) and continued the provision in 22-3725 that regardless of when the inmate was sentenced or committed the crime for which sentenced, good time credits shall be allocated as follows: . . . In amending 21-4603(3), the legislature chose not to use specific language, so we must turn to the applicable rules of construction of legislative acts. The fundamental rule is that a statute operates prospectively unless its language clearly indicates that the legislature intended it to operate retroactively. State v. Hutchison, 228 Kan. 279, 287, 615 P.2d 138 (1980). An exception to the fundamental rule is that if the statutory change does not prejudicially affect the substantive rights of the parties and is merely procedural or remedial in nature, it applies retroactively. 228 Kan. at 287, 615 P.2d 138. Thus, the issue becomes whether the statute is substantive criminal law, which either defines a crime or involves the length or type of punishment. Here, the defendant had been sentenced, but the sentence was not final and was subject to change for 130 days. The sentence to be served was subject to reduction, and the defendant could also have been placed on probation. Thus, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' reasoning in State v. Moon that the statute in question does not alter the punishment itself. The statute, assuming it is constitutional (and its constitutionality is not challenged in this case), mandates that the sentencing court shall modify (reduce) the sentence imposed. Thus, it deals with the length of the sentence to be imposed and not merely how the sentence is to be served or how the length of the sentence is to be determined. In State v. Hutchison , the defendant was 16 years old when he used a firearm to commit aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. When the crimes were committed, the mandatory firearm sentencing statute (K.S.A.1976 Supp. 21-4618) applied to any person committing a crime set out in article 34 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated and who used a firearm during the commission of a crime. The defendant was sentenced and two months later (within the 130-day sentence modification period), the legislature amended 21-4618 to provide that it not apply to any crime committed by a person under 18 years of age. Hutchison argued that the statute as amended should be applied retroactively to exclude him from the mandatory firearm sentencing. This court went through the prospective/retrospective analysis and cited State v. Ogden, 210 Kan. 510, Syl. ¶ 10, 502 P.2d 654 (1972), for the proposition that changes in length of sentences for criminal acts have been given prospective application only. 228 Kan. at 287, 615 P.2d 138. We also quoted State v. Henning, 3 Kan. App.2d at 609, 599 P.2d 318, where the Kansas Court of Appeals stated that `[t]he penalty for a criminal offense is the penalty provided by statute at the time of the commission of the offense.' 228 Kan. at 287, 615 P.2d 138. State v. Henning dealt with the issue of whether a statutory change allowing an imposed Kansas sentence to run concurrently with an out-of-state sentence could be applied retroactively, and the answer as set out above was no; in the absence of legislative expression otherwise, it was to be applied prospectively only. In Kelsey v. State, 194 Kan. 668, 670, 400 P.2d 736 (1965), we reversed the trial court for applying an amended sentencing statute retroactively. The original statute (G.S.1949, 62-1528) provided that any person on parole, who is convicted of a subsequent crime, shall serve the second sentence after the first is served. The amended version of the statute (K.S.A. 62-2251 [Corrick]) provided that a prisoner would serve the second sentence concurrently with the first, unless otherwise ordered by the court. We held that the penalty for an offense is that provided by statute at the time the offense was committed and that the amended sentencing statute could not be applied retroactively. From the above, we conclude K.S.A.1989 Supp. 21-4603(3) should be applied prospectively and is not applicable to this case. Although the issue is not before us, we hope that when the State Reception and Diagnostic Center intends to make a recommendation pursuant to K.S.A.1989 Supp. 21-4603(3), it will cite the statute and give specific guidelines as to what it is recommending. Under the facts, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to modify Sutherland's sentence. Affirmed.