Opinion ID: 2657018
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim to Quiet Title

Text: Apparently acceding to the District Court’s holding that the Release and Surrender documents filed by Chesapeake and Statoil in September 2011 moot their claim for quiet title, the Lincolns present a new argument on appeal. They claim that both the Lease filed by Magnum and the Release and Surrender filed by Chesapeake and Statoil misidentified by number one of the parcels of property, and that therefore a cloud remains on the title of that parcel.4 The Lincolns claim that the Magnum lease identified 4 The Lincolns purported to drop their claim to quiet title against Belmont in their First Amended Complaint because Belmont filed a surrender and release of rights in February 2012. (App. 27a.) However, the Lincolns evidently continued to seek damages from Belmont in connection with the quiet title action. See 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at  n.3. The District Court held that it would be “clearly inappropriate” to allow the Lincolns to collect damages based on a claim of action they no longer press. See id. (“As Plaintiffs no longer allege that Belmont engaged in any liability-creating conduct with respect to the quiet title claim, they can no longer seek damages from Belmont for that claim.”). 7 the parcel as “26-058.0-02-00.00,” and that the Release and Surrender identified it as “26-58-02-00-00.” They claim that the correct designation is “#26-058.0-178-00-00-00.” (Lincoln Br. 19.) “It is axiomatic that arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are deemed to be waived and consequently are not susceptible to review in this Court absent exceptional circumstances.” Tri-M Grp., L.L.C. v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Lincolns do not dispute that they did not advance any arguments with respect to the purported misidentification in their pleadings or elsewhere in the proceedings below.5 The Lincolns disagree, however, that their arguments based on the misidentification are waived, pointing to general allegations in their First Amended Complaint regarding the purported cloud on their title and reiterating their claim for quiet title. See Lincoln Reply Br. 11. These allegations were entirely insufficient to put the District Court on notice of their current claim that a numerical misidentification continued to cloud their title as to one of the parcels. See Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 608 (3d Cir. 2011) (the “crucial question” in deciding Because the Lincolns have not done us the favor of specifying which defendants they contend are continuing to cloud their title, we will assume that they mean to include Belmont in this claim as well. 5 Somewhat astoundingly, the Lincolns attempt to frame the issue for appeal by casting it as an error by the District Court in, presumably, failing to comb the record, identify the purported “misidentification,” and hold, sua sponte, that the misidentification cast a cloud on the title of the parcel. See Lincoln Br. 18 (“[T]he District Court erred in failing to recognize that the Release and Surrender only applied to two of the parcels.”). Of course, this is not the District Court’s job. Rather, it was the Lincolns’ duty to raise and explain each and every argument it wished to advance in support of its claims in the District Court. See United States v. Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d 259, 262 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[D]efendant asks this court to rule that a district court, upon learning the facts of the case, should propose legal theories sua sponte and rule on them. No such duty exists.”). 8 whether an issue has been waived is whether the party “presented the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the district court”) (citing Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005)). The Lincolns further argue that we should decline to find waiver because the issues that would otherwise be waived are of public importance. (Lincoln Reply Br. 5.) They argue that “drillers [in the Marcellus Valley] have exploited, cheated and defrauded landowners in Pennsylvania. . . . It is in the public interest that such practices be brought into the public view and addressed by the courts.” (Lincoln Reply Br. 9.) The Lincolns misread the public policy exception to waiver. The waived issue here is not the broader backdrop of the oil drilling industry in the Marcellus Valley, or even whether the Lincolns were treated unfairly by the Defendants in connection with their attempts to lease the Lincolns’ oil and gas rights. The waived issue is simply whether an alleged numeric misidentification of one of the parcels of land in the Lease casts a cloud on the title of that parcel. This simply does not rise to the level of public importance that courts have deemed sufficient to overcome waiver. See, e.g., MD Mall Assocs., LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 479, 486 (3d Cir. 2013) (reaching otherwise waived argument where landowner’s claims under a federal regulation aimed at preventing the discharge of storm water by a railroad onto neighboring land could have implications for numerous railroads and landowners); Tri-M Grp., 638 F.3d at 416 (finding an issue of public importance where the otherwise waived issue “entail[ed] crucial and unresolved issues of state sovereignty and state procurement spending, and test[ed] the limits of the dormant Commerce Clause in this field.”). 9 The Lincolns failed to advance any arguments with respect to the purported misidentification of the parcel in the District Court. Absent exceptional circumstances not present here, they cannot do so for the first time on appeal.6