Opinion ID: 2542926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: krs 503.055(3) instruction on behalf of the victim

Text: At the beginning of trial, the Commonwealth made a motion in limine to preclude the defense from obtaining a self-defense instruction because of KRS 503.055, the castle doctrine. KRS 503.055(3), the pertinent provision of the statute under the facts in the instant case, provides: A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a felony involving the use of force. The Commonwealth maintained that because Warren was lawfully on his own property at the time he was shot, the defense of self-defense was unavailable to Jones. Defense counsel countered that there was evidence supporting Jones's claim of self-defense and that the issue would turn on who was the initial aggressor. The trial court ruled that the defense was entitled to try to sell its claim of self-defense to the jury, but the Commonwealth was entitled to a no duty to retreat instruction pursuant to KRS 503.055(3) on behalf of Warren. The trial court remarked to defense counsel that the instruction for the Commonwealth cuts your legs right out from under you. Over the objection of Jones, the following instruction was submitted to the jury: Use of Defensive Force  A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a felony involving the use of force. Jones argues that the instruction essentially negated his affirmative defense of self-defense, to which he was entitled, and that KRS 503.055(3) was not intended to be asserted on behalf of the victim. Jones also contends that proper initial aggressor instructions were given, thus, the no duty to retreat instruction violated the bare bones principle of jury instructions. Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky.2009), was this Court's first opportunity to address the 2006 amendments to the self-defense provisions of KRS Chapter 503. We held that under the facts in Rodgers, wherein the crime was committed before the amendments were enacted, the amendments did not entitle the defendant to a no duty to retreat instruction because the amendments (with the exception of the immunity provision in KRS 503.085) were adjudged to be substantive and, thus, could not be applied retroactively. Id. at 756-57. We left the question of whether the amendments now allow for a no duty to retreat instruction for another day. Id. at 757. Under the facts in the instant case, we likewise do not reach the issue because we adjudge that the amendments do not apply on behalf of the victim of the crime who is not subject to criminal prosecution. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ... give effect to the intent of the legislature. Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Jeffers ex rel. Jeffers, 13 S.W.3d 606, 610 (Ky.2000). In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, a court must not be guided by a single sentence, but must look to the provisions of the whole act and its object and policy. Cosby v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 56, 58 (Ky. 2004). KRS Chapter 503 is entitled, General Principles of Justification. Justification is defined in KRS 503.020 as a defense. Relative to KRS 503.055, KRS 503.085 provides that [a] person who uses force as permitted in ... KRS 503.055 ... is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force.... In viewing KRS Chapter 503 as a whole, we deem that it was meant to apply to the conduct of the person who is subject to criminal prosecution as a result of the use of force, and not the victim of such force. Accordingly, the Use of Defensive Force instruction in the present case was submitted in error. In this jurisdiction it is a rule of longstanding and frequent repetition that erroneous instructions to the jury are presumed to be prejudicial; that an appellee claiming harmless error bears the burden of showing affirmatively that no prejudice resulted from the error. McKinney v. Heisel, 947 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Ky.1997). We cannot say that no prejudice resulted from the erroneous instruction given in this case. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial. We address only those remaining allegations of error that are likely to occur again on retrial.