Opinion ID: 1743494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Freedom of Speech Analysis

Text: Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that charitable solicitation is constitutionally fully protected speech. [4] In holding that portions of the Tennessee Charitable Solicitations Act violate constitutional guarantees of free speech, this Court stated: The challenge mounted here is directed to purported violations of both the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec. 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. This Court has previously recognized that regulation of First Amendment rights is subject to exacting judicial review, as well as the duty imposed upon the State to demonstrate that any burden placed on Free Speech Rights must be justified by a compelling State interest. See Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Tenn. 1987). WRG Enter., Inc. v. Crowell, 758 S.W.2d at 215. The United States Supreme Court refused to accept the argument that charitable solicitation is commercial speech, and, therefore not entitled to full constitutional protection: Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon. This is the teaching of Schaumburg and Munson, in which we refused to separate the component parts of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole. Regulation of a solicitation must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech ..., and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease. [ Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S.Ct. 826, 834, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980), quoted in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959-60, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2848, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984).] See also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422, n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 1892, n. 5, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988); [ Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540-41, 65 S.Ct. 315, 327, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945)]. Thus, where, as here, the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impractical. Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected expression. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. at 796, 108 S.Ct. at 2677. Statutes that regulate solicitation, regulate speech on the basis of its content. Therefore, any regulation imposing limitations on the right to solicit charitable contributions must withstand exacting First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 789, 108 S.Ct. at 2673. This Court has recognized that all basic rights of free speech are subject to reasonable regulation, H & L Messengers, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 577 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Tenn. 1979), and that in determining whether a regulation is reasonable there must be a balancing of the freedom of expression against recognized competing rights. State v. Marshall, 859 S.W.2d 289, 305 (Tenn. 1993) (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting). The analysis to be applied when reviewing a challenge to a statute based on an impermissible burden on free expression is as follows: Regulations which restrain speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment. Such a regulation may be upheld only if the State can prove that the burden placed on free speech rights is justified by a compelling state interest. The least intrusive means must be utilized by the State to achieve its goals and the means chosen must bear a substantial relation to the interest being served by the statute in question. Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d at 903. Freeman v. Burson, 802 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tenn. 1990), rev'd, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (citations omitted).