Opinion ID: 340428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: factual basis for seiller's plea

Text: 40 Rule 11 requires not only that a defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge be established before a plea of guilty may be accepted, but also that the court must satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea. McCarthy v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. at 467. Moreover, this factual basis must be sufficiently established by the record, rather than by assumptions of fact made by the trial judge which may be open to dispute. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Irizarry v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d at 967-68. 41 Seiller claims that the colloquy between Judge Cooper and himself on the factual basis for his pleas, see note 6, supra, was insufficient to establish the requisite factual basis for any of the three counts to which he pleaded guilty. He now seeks to interpret his answers to Judge Cooper's questions as showing that the only act he performed in connection with each conspiracy was the introduction of the parties who later transported stolen securities. Merely introducing the parties, Seiller argues, could not make him a participant in the conspiracy unless he knew of the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy and intended to further its unlawful purpose at the time he introduced the parties. With respect to two of the conspiracies (Count One of each of indictments 71 Cr. 675 and 71 Cr. 676), Seiller contends that his responses indicate that he denied any knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the conspiracies or any intent to further that purpose when he introduced the other conspirators. 10 With respect to the third conspiracy (Count Three of indictment 71 Cr. 675), Seiller contends that the record at best is ambiguous as to his knowledge and intent. 11 42 I would hold that Seiller's responses to the reading of each count of the indictments, together with his responses to Judge Cooper's questions, provide a sufficient factual basis for accepting Seiller's guilty pleas to each of the three counts. 12 43 As stated above, the reading of the offenses charged in the indictment, coupled with a defendant's admission that he committed the offenses charged, may provide a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea where the charge is straightforward and the elements of the crime are clearly set out. Irizarry v. United States, supra, 508 F.2d at 968 n. 9; Rizzo v. United States, supra, 516 F.2d at 794. Here, however, in my view there is no need to affirm solely on that ground. 44 At the government's request, Judge Cooper pursued further his inquiry into the basis for the pleas, even though he believed that the reading of the indictments was sufficient in light of Seiller's intelligence and the clear, detailed language of the indictments. 45 Seiller told Judge Cooper that he was pleading guilty (t)o the conspiracy charge because I hold myself responsible that I introduced parties to each other which committed the crime I am accused of. Judge Cooper then asked, But you knew that they were committing them? (emphasis added). To this Seiller responded, Yes, I knew that. 46 With respect to the third conspiracy (Count Three of indictment 71 Cr. 675), Seiller unequivocally stated,  . . . I introduced Mr. Silverman to Mr. Reeves . . . for the purpose to make arrangements to sell to purchase stolen securities. Contrary to Seiller's present contentions, it would be difficult to articulate a less ambiguous or more inculpatory admission of guilty knowledge and intent to commit the crime charged. 47 With respect to the conspiracy charged in Count One of indictment 71 Cr. 676, it is significant that there were read to Seiller, and he admitted, the overt acts alleged in furtherance of the conspiracy charged particularly the allegation that he had sent a highly incriminating telex to one of his co-conspirators in Frankfurt, Germany, on September 27, 1969, as well as another incriminating letter to Wiesbaden, Germany, on September 29, 1969. 13 Since the incriminating character particularly of the telex was beyond dispute and since Seiller pled guilty to a charge specifically alleging his authorship of the telex, it would have been superfluous for Judge Cooper to have read the contents into the record. 14 48 As to this same count, Seiller did state that his partners used him to find a buyer for stolen securities which I didn't know at that time whether they were stolen but I was later on informed that they were stolen. Judge Cooper had ample justification for interpreting this to mean that Seiller learned that the securities were stolen sometime after he was asked to find a buyer but before termination of his participation in the transportation of the securities. 15 As stated above, Seiller fully understood the charges against him, including the requirements of knowledge and intent. Judge Cooper's line of questioning was such as to make it abundantly clear to Seiller that the court was attempting to determine whether Seiller knew the securities were stolen before his participation terminated. In this context, and especially with an attorney at his side, Seiller's voluntary admission but I was later on informed that they were stolen justifiably was taken as an admission that he was informed while he was still participating in the conspiracy. 49 In short, with respect to Count One of indictment 71 Cr. 676, I would find a sufficient factual basis for the plea in: (1) Seiller's admission of guilt to the charge which alleged specifically that he had sent the September 27 telex and the September 29 letter; and (2) Seiller's initial, unequivocal admission that he knew his co-conspirators were committing crimes. 50 Upon similar reasoning, I would find a sufficient factual basis for the plea to Count One of indictment 71 Cr. 675. When asked about his knowledge that the Treasury bills had been stolen, Seiller responded, Not known to me but later on found out it was stolen. Again, this response must be considered in light of Seiller's admission of guilt to the straightforward charge which alleged specific overt acts committed by him. This response also must be considered in light of Seiller's unequivocal admission during the earlier colloquy that he knew the others were committing the crimes crimes which were taking place while he was still participating in the conspiracy. 16 For these reasons, I would hold that the record of the change of plea proceedings, read as a whole and in context, established an adequate factual basis for Seiller's pleas of guilty to each of the three conspiracy counts. 17