Opinion ID: 2816862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Need for rehabilitation

Text: Next, Purvis contends the district court abused its discretion by improperly considering his welfare and rehabilitation when imposing its sentence of imprisonment. He explains the district court stated it sentenced Purvis based on the need to “protect him from himself” and “give him the maximum time available to regain his sobriety.” As an initial matter, Purvis failed to preserve this argument before the district court because he did not inform the district court of the legal basis he now argues. “[F]or a defendant to preserve an objection to her sentence for appeal, she must raise that point in such clear and simple language that the trial court may not misunderstand it. When the statement is not clear enough to inform the district court of the legal basis for the objection, we have held that the objection is not properly preserved.” United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation and citation omitted). We applied plain error review in Vandergrift, where the appellant argued on appeal that the district court improperly considered rehabilitation in sentencing him to imprisonment, but did not do so before the district court. 754 F.3d at 1307, 1309-1312. In Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (2011), the Supreme Court held a sentencing court may not impose or lengthen a prison term in order to promote an offender’s rehabilitation. In Vandergrift, we extended Tapia’s holding 4 Case: 14-15661 Date Filed: 07/14/2015 Page: 5 of 8 to a term of imprisonment imposed after the revocation of supervised release. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1309. In Vandergrift, the defendant served a prison sentence for possession and distribution of child pornography. Id. at 1305. His supervised release was later revoked and the district court sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 1306. We determined the district court erred in considering rehabilitation when it imposed Vandergrift’s sentence and assumed for the sake of analysis the error was plain. Id. at 1310-12. Nevertheless, we affirmed because Vandergrift had failed to prove the third prong of the plain error test—the error affected his substantial rights. See id. at 1312. Specifically, Vandergrift failed to show his sentence would have been different, because the sentencing transcript reflected that his rehabilitative needs constituted only a minor portion of the district court’s reasoning. Id. We explained, “[t]he [district] court’s primary considerations were for the safety of the public and deterring others from similar conduct.” Id. We will assume without deciding that the district court committed error that is plain by considering rehabilitation in imposing Purvis’s sentence. However, Purvis has not established this error affected his substantial rights by showing a reasonable probability he may have received a lower sentence but for the district court’s error. Like the court in Vandergrift, the district court considered rehabilitation in imposing a sentence of imprisonment, but this consideration only 5 Case: 14-15661 Date Filed: 07/14/2015 Page: 6 of 8 reflected a minor portion of the court’s reasoning. The district court primarily focused on the seriousness and continuing nature of Purvis’s violations, public safety, and the need to deter him from further criminal activity. Therefore, Purvis cannot establish plain error.