Opinion ID: 888583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legality of the $85 Fine/Surcharge

Text: ¶ 22 Stephenson points out that a sentencing court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority. See State v. Hatfield, 256 Mont. 340, 346, 846 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1993). Thus, unless the District Court had specific statutory authority to impose the $85 fine/surcharge payable to the community service program, the fine/surcharge is illegal. ¶ 23 As noted above, in its Notice of Concession and Waiver of $85 Fine for Community Service Program, the State conceded that the $85 fine/surcharge was improperly imposed. However, the State provided no insight as to why, having argued in its brief on appeal that the fine/surcharge was lawfully imposed, the State subsequently concluded that the fine/surcharge was improperly imposed. In its brief on appeal, the State argued that Stephenson bargained for the benefit of an ordinary suspended sentence and agreed, without limitation, to any probation condition recommended in the PSI, therefore including the $85 fine/surcharge. The State reached this conclusion based on the following language in the plea agreement: Any condition of probation recommended by Probation and Parole, including, but not limited to. . . . The State characterized the $85 fine/surcharge as a standard condition of probation, normally imposed `for any period of community supervision.' The State also pointed out that the PSI recommending the $85 fine/surcharge was provided to Stephenson before sentencing. Accordingly, the State maintained that Stephenson should have contemplated the $85 fine/surcharge, that he bargained for a sentence that includes the $85 fine/surcharge, and, as a result, that the District Court correctly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Yet, notwithstanding these arguments, the State now concedes  without any rationale or explanation  that the $85 fine/surcharge was improperly imposed. ¶ 24 Given Stephenson's arguments and the State's unexplained change of position in this appeal, we conclude that it is appropriate to address the legality of the $85 payable to the community service program either as a fine (as it was characterized in the court's written judgment) or in the nature of [a] surcharge fee (as it was characterized by the court at the sentencing hearing).
¶ 25 The community service program is a program which operates under the Montana Community Service Act. See Title 90, Chapter 14, Part 1, MCA. The Act was adopted in 1993 and amended in 1999 and 2007. Its purpose is to encourage volunteer service to the state in a variety of projects and programs. See § 90-14-103, MCA. The programs under the Act are not operated by the Department of Corrections. ¶ 26 Section 46-18-231, MCA, provides authority for a sentencing court to impose a fine in a felony or misdemeanor case. Section 46-18-232, MCA, provides authority for the court to require a convicted defendant in a felony or misdemeanor case to pay certain costs. Section 46-18-233, MCA, provides authority for the court to make the payment of fines and costs imposed under §§ 46-18-231 and -232, MCA, a condition of probation. ¶ 27 Of significance here, § 46-18-235, MCA, states as follows: Except as provided in 61-8-726, the money collected by a court as a result of the imposition of fines or assessment of costs under the provisions of XX-XX-XXX and XX-XX-XXX must be paid: (1) by the clerk of district court to: (a) the department of revenue for deposit into the state general fund; or (b) if the fine was imposed for a violation of Title 45, chapter 9 or 10, and at the court's discretion, the drug forfeiture account maintained under XX-XX-XXX for the law enforcement agency that made the arrest from which the conviction and fine arose; and (2) by a justice's court pursuant to 3-10-601. ¶ 28 In this case, there is no question that the court had authority to impose a fine by reason of Stephenson's plea of guilty to partner or family member assault, see § 45-5-206(3)(a)(ii), MCA, and tampering with witnesses and informants, see § 45-7-206(2), MCA. However, we have found no statutory authority for the court to impose a fine and then direct the disposition of the money collected from that fine to the community service program. Under § 46-18-235, MCA, any fine imposed by the court in this case was required to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this statute. Accordingly, the court's disposition of the $85, when considered as a fine payable to the community service program, is patently illegal.
¶ 29 Various Montana statutes authorize the imposition of fees and surcharges on defendants at sentencing. For example, § 46-18-111, MCA, provides for a $50 fee payable to the Department of Corrections at the time the presentence investigation report is completed; § 3-1-317, MCA, provides for a $10 user surcharge payable to the Department of Revenue for deposit in the state general fund to be used for funding court information technology; and § 46-18-236, MCA, provides for the imposition of various charges upon conviction. No statute, however, authorizes an assessment in the nature of [a] surcharge fee to be paid to the community service program.
¶ 30 It is well-established that a district court's authority to impose sentences in criminal cases is defined and constrained by statute. State v. Blackwell, 2001 MT 198, ¶ 6, 306 Mont. 267, ¶ 6, 32 P.3d 771, ¶ 6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, [w]e have long held that a district court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority. Hatfield, 256 Mont. at 346, 846 P.2d at 1029 (citing State v. Stone, 40 Mont. 88, 105 P. 89 (1909), and State v. Openshaw, 172 Mont. 511, 565 P.2d 319 (1977)). Whether one characterizes the $85 in this case as a fine or a surcharge fee payable to the community service program, the imposition is illegal. ¶ 31 We recently disapproved this sort of creative sentencing in State v. Krum, 2007 MT 229, 339 Mont. 154, 168 P.3d 658. Krum was convicted of two counts of felony sexual assault, and the district court sentenced him to the Department of Corrections for 20 years, with all but 2 years suspended. The sentence was subject to a number of terms and conditions, including the successful completion of an approved sex-offender treatment program and payment of restitution to the victim's family. Krum, ¶¶ 5, 7. In addition, the court imposed the following condition: The defendant has sufficient funds to pay a $5,000.00 assessment to the Park County Court Automation Fund, $2,500.00 to the Tri-County Network for Domestic Violence, and $2,500.00 to Park County Big Brothers and Sisters, all to give back to society and those who assist and help others who are victims of these type of offenses. Krum, ¶ 8. ¶ 32 Stating that a court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority and that a sentence not based on statutory authority is an illegal sentence, Krum, ¶ 11, we held that the assessments imposed by the district court could not be considered as fines authorized by § 45-5-502, MCA (the sexual-assault statute), Krum, ¶ 15. Moreover, we considered whether § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, authorized the district court's imposition of the assessments. This section provides that the sentencing judge may impose any other limitation reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society. We concluded that § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, did not provide the necessary statutory authority for imposing the assessments because the assessments were not limitations on Krum's conduct but, rather, were affirmative duties to make donations to community entities. We also determined that the assessments could not be characterized as restitution because the money was being paid to community entities rather than to the victim. Krum, ¶ 20. ¶ 33 Similarly, here, the District Court's imposition of the $85 as a fine or surcharge fee payable to the community service program also fails. As in Krum, imposition of an $85 fine/surcharge payable to the community service program is not authorized by statute and is, therefore, illegal. Krum, ¶ 26. Having reached that decision, we next turn to the appropriate remedy.