Opinion ID: 2552627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Frye properly applied

Text: ¶ 19 By its own words, Frye applies to the use of novel scientific theories or processes to produce results. At the outset, we note that neither Plaintiff nor her lawyers argue that any scientific principle or process can be used to produce memories that are always or often accurate. As a matter of scientific principle, one may now say that E always equals MC2, but Plaintiff does not claim that some scientific process, theory, or formula may be applied to test whether her memories of having been molested are true and accurate or whether the memories were imagined, suggested, implanted, or even, to put it tactfully, invented. One may or may not believe Plaintiff. The effect of the June 11 Order is to practically ensure Plaintiff's testimony will not be believed because she will not be allowed to present expert evidence to describe or support the possible existence or diagnosis of repressed memory or dissociative amnesia. ¶ 20 We believe, however, that the truth of Plaintiff's testimony that she actually and accurately recalled or remembered the events, as distinguished from inventing them or having had them suggested or implanted, is for a jury to decide. While Defendant contends the alleged loss of memory and consequent delay in reporting make Plaintiff's testimony unworthy of belief, in this, as in other cases, Rule 702 allows Plaintiff to call expert witnesses to explain her behavior following the events alleged and to help the jury determine whether Plaintiff's memories are real and accurate or imagined. We have so held on just such issues in the criminal law. ¶ 21 In State v. Lindsey , for example, we dealt with the question of expert testimony regarding behavior patterns of victims of `in-home incestuous-type [child] molesting.' 149 Ariz. 472, 473, 720 P.2d 73, 74 (1986). The court of appeals noted that the evidence was offered to explain why child victims of incest may not reveal the events until long after the occurrence and why they may recant. State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 493, 495-96, 720 P.2d 94, 96-97 (App.1985). The trial judge overruled defendant's Frye objection to the opinion evidence. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 476, 720 P.2d at 77. The Martone dissent makes much of the fact that the expert testimony was based on recognized principles of social and behavioral science. But Doctor van der Kolk's testimony is similarly based on principles of social and behavioral science recognized by clinicians. There was no Frye hearing in Lindsey. Defendant's Frye objection was overruled because the judge determined Doctor Baker was qualified to testify because she had practiced in the field, saw patients suffering from child sexual abuse, consulted with state agencies and case workers, and made decisions and plans on specific cases [as well as doing] psychological evaluation of child victims and [having] seen over 100 victims, mostly in the family-type situation. Id. at 497, 720 P.2d at 98. We had the following comment regarding the propriety of admitting such testimony: The trial judge has discretion to allow such expert testimony [under Rule 702] where it may assist the jury in deciding a contested issue, including issues pertaining to accuracy or credibility of a witness' recollection or testimony. The trial judge may exercise this discretion where there is a reasonable basis to believe that the jury will benefit from the assistance of expert testimony that explains recognized principles of social or behavioral science which the jury may apply to determine issues in the case. Testimony of this type is not to be permitted in every case, but only in those where the facts needed to make the ultimate judgment may not be within the common knowledge of the ordinary juror. [T]he court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting ... testimony on general patterns of behavior. We cannot assume that the average juror is familiar with the behavioral characteristics of victims of child molesting. Knowledge of such characteristics may well aid the jury in weighing the testimony of the alleged child victim. Children who have been the victims of sexual abuse or molestation may exhibit behavioral patterns ( e.g. recantation, conflicting versions of events, confusion or inarticulate descriptions) which jurors might attribute to inaccuracy or prevarication, but which may be merely the result of immaturity, psychological stress, societal pressures or similar factors as well as of their interaction. Id. at 473-74, 720 P.2d at 74-75 (citations omitted); see also State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986). ¶ 22 In State v. Roscoe, we again dealt with behavioral evidence, though of a much different sort. We held a dog handler's opinion on the alleged ability of his tracking dog to identify scent long after it was laid down was admissible and Frye inapplicable. 145 Ariz. 212, 219-20, 700 P.2d 1312, 1319-20 (1984). We explained: The evidence here was not bottomed on any scientific theory. In fact, it appears that no one knows exactly how or why some dogs are able to track or scent, or the degree to which they are able to do so. No attempt was made to impress the jury with the infallibility of some general scientific technique or theory. Rather, this evidence was offered on the basis that it is common knowledge that some dogs, when properly trained and handled, can discriminate between human odors. Preston's testimony was premised upon this simple idea and was not offered as a product of the application of some accepted scientific process, principle, technique or device. It was offered as Preston's opinion of the meaning of his dog's reaction; that opinion was based upon Preston's training of and experience with the dog. The weight of the evidence did not hinge upon the validity or accuracy of some scientific principle; rather, it hinged on Preston's credibility, the accuracy of his past observation of the dog's performance, the extent of the training he had given the dog, and the reliability of his interpretations of the dog's reactions. It was not the theories of Newton, Einstein or Freud which gave the evidence weight; if so, the Frye test should have been applied. It was, rather, Preston's knowledge, experience and integrity which would give the evidence weight and it was Preston who was available for cross-examination. His credentials, his experience, his motives and his integrity were effectively probed and tested. Determination of these issues does not depend on science; it is the exclusive province of the jury. Id. (citations omitted); see also Brooks v. Colorado, 975 P.2d 1105 (Colo.1999) (similar experience-based testimony subject to Rule 702 analysis, not Frye ); Louisiana v. Catanese, 368 So.2d 975 (La.1979) (excluding polygraph evidence using equivalent of Ariz.R.Evid. 702). It turned out that the witness presenting the dog-scent evidence in Roscoe was a charlatan. See State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 910 P.2d 635 (1996) ( Roscoe II ). But neither Rule 702 (with or without Frye ), Daubert/Kumho, nor any other system can guarantee the validity of any particular evidentiary ruling. Just as the refusal to apply Frye to Preston's dog-scent evidence led to the admission of false testimony, so the application of Frye or Daubert could well have led to the exclusion of testimony from Einstein or Freud, both of whom advanced theories not generally accepted for many years. See CLIFFORD M. WILL, WAS EINSTEIN RIGHT? (1986). ¶ 23 In State v. Hummert , we held that expert opinion on probability percentages based on computations derived from DNA statistics was inadmissible under Frye because the statistical bases and resultant formulae applied to reach the conclusion were not yet generally accepted. The expert's opinionthe final resultwas based on a process or formula established by others and not generally acknowledged by scientists and statisticians in that field. 188 Ariz. 119, 124-25, 933 P.2d 1187, 1192-93 (1997). But we also held that the expert could relate his experience in the field to the facts and that an opinion based on his observations and experience would be admissible. Id. at 125, 933 P.2d at 1193. This was not, as the Martone dissent claims, because the DNA principle passed the Frye test. See Martone dissent at ¶ 83. It was, rather, because the opinions offered on random match frequency, while not generally accepted, passed the Ariz.R.Evid. 702 test of witness observation and experience. We explained: The experts' testimony in the present case involved two types of evidencescientific evidence on the procedures for determining a match between evidentiary DNA and opinion evidence concerning the experts' experience with random matches. The trial judge properly applied the Frye analysis and determined that evidence of a match is admissible. However, on the basis of the scientific evidence then available, the judge did not allow the experts to testify about the mathematical or statistical probability resulting from the match. Instead, the experts were allowed to offer evidence of their personal opinion. This testimony is governed not by the application of Frye but by Arizona Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.  Frye -ing scientific evidence is necessary when application of a scientific technique is likely to have an enormous effect in resolving completely a matter in controversy. However, when the expert gives testimony that only helps a trier to interpret the evidence ... it will be received on a lesser showing of scientific certainty. As we stated in Roscoe, [t]he weight of the evidence did not hinge upon the validity or accuracy of some scientific principle; rather, it hinged on [the expert's] credibility, the accuracy of his past observation ... the extent of the training ... and the reliability of his interpretations.... The experts in this case did not testify to conclusions based on the application of Cellmark's statistics and database but only to their own experience. Having made the DNA examination according to recognized scientific principles and finding a match at three loci, the experts claimed that because of the unique nature of each person's DNA, they had never before seen a three-loci match from unrelated individuals. On the basis of their own experience, they believed such a random match would be very uncommon. The trial judge did not err in admitting this evidence of the experts' own work and experience and the opinions reached on that basis. See Ariz.R.Evid. 702 and 703. Id. at 124-25, 933 P.2d at 1192-93 (citations omitted). ¶ 24 Many cases in our courts, and in those of other states with rules similar to our Ariz.R.Evid. 702, reach similar conclusions in dealing with expert opinion in matters of behavioral science. Our court of appeals concluded that Frye was inapplicable to expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). State v. Varela, 178 Ariz. 319, 873 P.2d 657 (App.1993). The court remarked that testimony concerning general characteristics of child sexual abuse victims is not `new, novel or experimental scientific evidence' and therefore does not require the additional screening provided by Frye.  Id. at 325-26, 873 P.2d at 663-64 (quoting People v. Stoll, 49 Cal.3d 1136, 265 Cal.Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698, 714 (1989)); see also State v. Tucker, 165 Ariz. 340, 346, 798 P.2d 1349, 1355 (App.1990) (behavioral characteristics of child molesters and victims); State v. Stowers, 81 Ohio St.3d 260, 690 N.E.2d 881 (1998) ( Frye inapplicable to expert's testimony that alleged child victim's behavior, including delayed disclosure and recantation, is consistent with behavior expert observed in victims of CSAAS). ¶ 25 Of course in Varela and Tucker, as in the other cases cited, the testimony was not offered as direct proof that sexual abuse occurred but as an explanation of behavior that would help the jury understand the evidence and determine whether the charge was true. See also Frenzel v. Wyoming, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo.1993) (although CSAAS is not yet generally accepted and thus not admissible to prove sexual abuse actually occurred, expert testimony based on experience, observation, and literature may be admitted to explain behavior of alleged victim, including delayed reporting); cf. Lantrip v. Kentucky, 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky.1986) (an example of cases holding CSAAS not generally accepted, therefore testimony inadmissible); see also Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F.Supp. 1055 (E.D.Mich.1995) (evidence such as Dr. van der Kolk's admissible, but expert may not testify about victim's credibility). ¶ 26 We have reached similar conclusions in rape cases. In upholding a rape conviction based in part on psychiatric testimony regarding the way in which post-traumatic stress syndrome might have affected the victim's behavior, we noted that courts in other states disagreed on the admissibility of so-called rape trauma syndrome to prove the rape occurred but nevertheless concluded: Although we might have some difficulty in upholding the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome to prove the existence of a rape, we believe, however, if properly presented by a person qualified by training and experience such as a psychiatrist or psychologist, that such evidence is admissible to show lack of consent. This testimony would not invade the province of the jury. The expert would be subject to cross-examination and the jury could then determine what weight the evidence is to receive. State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 63, 699 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1985). ¶ 27 Other states have reached similar conclusions with regard to rape trauma syndrome. The California Supreme Court, for example, applied Frye and concluded that expert testimony was not admissible to prove that rape occurred. If factually relevant, however, it would have been admissible to explain behavior following the incident and to rebut popular misconceptions that might have given credence to a defendant's argument that the victim's delayed reporting or other behavior would justify an inference that rape had not occurred. California v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291, 298-99 (1984); see also Colorado v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 949-52 (Colo.1987) (collecting cases and holding that Frye test inapplicable when behavioral testimony offered to explain ninety-day reporting delay). ¶ 28 These principles are not limited to criminal cases. The same rationale is applied in cases involving medical causation and techniques. Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 295 Mont. 345, 983 P.2d 869 (1999) (evidentiary standards applicable to novel scientific evidence should not have been applied to preclude anesthesiologist's expert opinion that placement of catheter while patient was anesthetized increased risk of injury). In a recent case in which the operative facts are quite similar to those in this case, the court was required to decide whether a physician's testimony based on experience, observation, and study of literature was admissible on the question of whether stress could trigger otherwise asymptomatic multiple sclerosis. Colwell v. Mentzer Inv., Inc., 973 P.2d 631 (Colo.App.1998). Refusing to apply Frye and using a version of Rule 702 identical to Arizona's, the court blended a number of theories but held the testimony should be admitted. The admissibility of such testimony should be determined by balancing (1) the reliability of the scientific principles upon which the testimony rests, i.e., the potential to aid the jury in reaching an accurate resolution of a disputed issue, and (2) the likelihood that the introduction of the evidence may overwhelm or mislead the jury.    The reliability inquiry does not require a process of scientific nose-counting. Rather, a court should consider factors such as the degree of acceptance in the scientific community, the novelty of the scientific principle, and the existence of specialized literature on the subject.    The expert's qualifications and expertise in the area of MS were not disputed, and the trial court determined that his testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact. His testimony did not involve the application of any novel or newly developed scientific device or process, nor did it involve the manipulation of physical evidence. Rather, it concerned his observations of thousands of cases of MS and review of studies by others. Plaintiff's expert, a board certified neurologist, testified that he has been in practice for over 40 years. At the time of the trial he taught at Harvard Medical School and ran the multiple sclerosis project at the Beth Israel Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. He testified that over the course of his career he had seen between 5,000 and 6,000 MS patients. In his opinion, certain kinds of stress in some patients with MS can trigger the appearance of symptoms in an asymptomatic patient.... The evidence presented at trial concerned the effect that stress could have in causing MS to become symptomatic. Such testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence of what researchers in the field have discovered. Thus, the evidence satisfies the threshold inquiry. Id. at 636-37 (citations omitted). ¶ 29 Finally, a recent California case directly on point puts the matter quite well. The plaintiffs claimed their memory of sexual abuse by their father and stepfather had been repressed and then fortuitously triggered. They offered expert evidence by a psychologist who specialized in the field of sexual abuse and memory. The California court refused to apply either Frye or Daubert and affirmed the trial judge's refusal to hold a Frye hearing, holding the judge correctly admitted the expert's opinion that the circumstances and plaintiffs' behavior were consistent with other individuals who had repressed their memories of childhood sexual abuse. Wilson v. Phillips, 73 Cal.App.4th 250, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 204, 206 (1999). The court explained: California distinguishes between expert medical opinion and scientific evidence; the former is not subject to the special admissibility rule of Kelly-Frye. Kelly-Frye applies to cases involving novel devices or processes, not to expert medical testimony, such as a psychiatrist's prediction of future dangerousness or a diagnosis of mental illness. Similarly, the testimony of a psychologist who assesses whether a criminal defendant displays signs of deviance or abnormality is not subject to Kelly-Frye. Id. at 207 (quoting California v. Ward, 71 Cal.App.4th 368, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 833 (1999) ( Frye inapplicable to psychologist's opinion of defendant's propensity to repeat sexually violent behavior)). The Martone dissent labels Wilson a renegade case. Martone dissent at ¶ 81. In fact, it is simply the latest in a long line of California cases refusing to apply Frye to testimony like that offered from Doctor van der Kolk. See Wilson, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d at 206-08 (citing cases). ¶ 30 There are many more cases, with varying rationales and conclusions, but we extract and apply the same rule that our courts have previously applied in cases involving Ariz.R.Evid. 702. See, e.g., Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 699 P.2d 1290; Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73; and Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248. Opinion testimony on human behavior is admissible when relevant to an issue in the case, when such testimony will aid in understanding evidence outside the experience or knowledge of the average juror, and when the witness is qualified, as Ariz.R.Evid. 702 requires, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. To put it simply, Frye is inapplicable when a qualified witness offers relevant testimony or conclusions based on experience and observation about human behavior for the purpose of explaining that behavior. Of course, our cases forbid a witness from expressing an opinion on the alleged victim's credibility or the truth of allegations of sexual abuse or rape. This principle applies as well in the present case to Doctor van der Kolk's proposed testimony. Expert testimony is admitted to explain behavior that a party claims is consistent or inconsistent with the alleged event. As we said in Hummert: Although compliance with Frye is necessary when the scientist reaches a conclusion by applying a scientific theory or process based on the work or discovery of others, under Rules 702 and 703 experts may testify concerning their own experimentation and observation and opinions based on their own work without first showing general acceptance. Such evidence need only meet the traditional requirements of relevance and avoid substantial prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 188 Ariz. at 127, 933 P.2d at 1195; see also California v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984). ¶ 31 This does not mean, as the dissenters argue, that we believe the practice of medicine, including psychiatry, is not based on science. See Martone dissent at ¶¶ 79, 87-88; McGregor dissent at ¶ 102. Rather, it means that expert evidence based on a qualified witness' own experience, observation, and study is treated differently from opinion evidence based on novel scientific principles advanced by others. As in the past, Frye continues to apply only to the latter. The June 11 Order applied Frye to prohibit observation- and experience-based expert testimony about recovered memory, no matter for what purpose offered. Insofar as it relied on Frye, the order was therefore overbroad and legally erroneous and must be vacated. See State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983). Because the evidence in question is not precluded by the Frye test, its admissibility is to be determined under Ariz.R.Evid. 702. ¶ 32 The Martone dissent misstates and exaggerates our holding by prophecying that our refusal to apply Frye to Doctor van der Kolk's testimony means that any expert on human behavior can hereafter be allowed to testify to any theory, however farfetched, without any showing of scientific reliability. Martone dissent at ¶¶ 80-81. Doctor van der Kolk is not any expert testifying to farfetched theories. As one glance at his curriculum vitae shows, he is a very experienced, well recognized, respected clinician with degrees in psychology and medicine. See Appendix A. He is asked to testify to his experience and observation in caring for patients, such as Plaintiff, who report repressed memory of sexual abuse. We hold simply that he can be asked to testify to his opinions based on the results of his experience, his observations, his own research and that of others with which he is familiar, and the care of his patients. It is true that some or many research psychologists, including Defendant's witness, disagree, mainly because repressed memory is woefully short of empirical verification. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS, & JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 13-1.5, at 534 (1997). But as the succeeding paragraph of the cited treatise points out, we must also balance justice, fairness, efficiency, and other factors related to [the law's] special role in American society. Id. at 535. In doing so, we must decide whether the judge or the jury should resolve the controversy between clinical psychiatrists and psychologists on the one hand and research psychologists on the other. This, of course, brings us back again to the application of Rule 702 and Daubert as interpreted by the cases that follow it.