Opinion ID: 147677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ground Four: Ineffective Assistance Regarding Mental Health Mitigation Evidence

Text: Jones argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they should have presented available mental-health mitigation. Jones's application summarizes the testimony of Dr. Lipman and states that reasonable jurists could differ on the question[ ] of whether such powerful and extensive mitigation should have been presented for the jury's consideration. Jones's only legal argument that his attorneys performed ineffectively is that the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, under Hitchcock[ v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987),] and Lockett[ v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978),] the jury should know the person they are being asked to sentence to death. Jones has not established that he is entitled to a certificate of appealability on this ground. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because Jones's attorneys investigated his mental health, they presented expert testimony regarding his mental functioning and drug addiction, and the trial court found mitigation: This is not a case in which trial counsel failed to conduct any meaningful investigation into mitigation. Defense attorneys Buzzell and Chipperfield both recounted their investigation into mental health mitigation. Indeed, Buzzell stated that the defense team spent substantial time on this issue. Additionally, the trial record establishes that Jones' mental health and serious cocaine addiction were major themes in this case. As this Court noted on direct appeal, counsel presented the testimony of two experts during the penalty phase: Defense counsel also called Drew Edwards to testify as an expert in the penalty-phase proceedings. Edwards offered his testimony as an expert regarding the effect of cocaine on the brain. Edwards testified that Jones was a crack addict, suffering from these symptoms. Edwards made clear that he did not believe addiction to cocaine is an excuse for crime, yet he admitted that a cocaine addict would suffer impairment of his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Edwards testified that despite his addiction, Jones would have always known the difference between right and wrong. Another defense expert testified that Jones has an I.Q. of 78, placing him between the fifth and ninth percentiles of the population. The expert testified that standardized tests revealed that Jones had little ability to control his impulses, but admitted that his motivation to get the right answer during his testing appeared to vary. She opined that he was able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, provided he's not impaired in some other way. Jones, 748 So.2d at 1017. Although Jones acknowledges that trial counsel did pursue mental health mitigation, he argues that trial counsel did not adequately investigate, prepare, and present evidence on this issue. We disagree. This is not a case where a mental health defense was considered and then summarily rejected. Rather, mental health mitigation was vigorously pursued, the jury was instructed on statutory mitigation, and the trial court found mitigation .... Accordingly, trial counsel's performance regarding the presentation of mitigation was not deficient.... Jones II, 949 So.2d at 1035. The record supports the description by the Florida Supreme Court of the mental health defense presented by Jones's attorneys, and reasonable jurists would not debate the decision of the district court to deny relief on this ground. It is not debatable that the Florida Supreme Court reasonably applied clearly established federal law.