Opinion ID: 62562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pretext or Discriminatory Purpose

Text: Because BMC has shown a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Stroud’s termination, the only way Stroud can survive summary judgment is if she shows either that (1) BMC’s explanation was pretextual, or (2) BMC’s nondiscriminatory rationale, “although true, is but one of the reasons for its conduct, another of which was discrimination.” Richardson, 434 F.3d at 333. Under either approach, Stroud’s arguments come up short. First, she alleges that BMC’s reference to her absences is pretext because the company misapplied its own policy on absences, which apparently stated no maximum number of allowed absences. Nevertheless, we can assume that BMC wants its employees to show up at work. Stroud’s attendance record was dismal, and she was warned repeatedly about her excessive absenteeism. This rationale does not appear to be pretextual. Next, Stroud notes that two financial analyst positions became vacant around the time of her termination, and both were filled by new hires. This Stroud argues, undermines BMC’s argument that her termination resulted from the reduction in force. However, Rodriguez explained in his deposition that Stroud was not “qualified” for either of these positions because she lacked the education and experience requirements. In addition, Rodriguez remained bothered by her attendance problems and his belief that she was “not dependable.” Thus, the mere existence of two open positions at the time of the reduction in force does not override BMC’s legitimate reasons for terminating Stroud. Stroud also alleges that the legitimate reduction in force gave BMC the ability to mask its retaliatory firing of her: “[A]ny company who wanted to fire individuals who engaged in protected activity . . . could just include that individual in it’s [sic] reduction in force.” While this may be true, it does not excuse Stroud from her burden to prove—or at this stage raise a fact issue 12 No. 07-20779 regarding—her claim of retaliation. Furthermore, the mere fact of BMC’s reduction in force more strongly suggests there was no retaliatory purpose in this case, especially given Stroud’s past poor job performance and absenteeism. In an effort to show discriminatory purpose, Stroud repeats her allegations of Rodriguez’s pattern of discrimination against pregnant women. Above, we concluded that Stroud’s allegations of a discriminatory pattern by Rodriguez were insufficient to support Stroud’s prima facie case. Similarly, we find that these allegations do not constitute circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive behind Stroud’s termination. That leaves only temporal proximity as circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory purpose. “‘Close timing between an employee's protected activity and an adverse action against him may provide the ‘causal connection’ required to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. However, once the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that explains both the adverse action and the timing, the plaintiff must offer some evidence from which the jury may infer that retaliation was the real motive.’” Woodson v. Scott & White Mem’l Hosp., 255 F. App’x 17, 20 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 562 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., LLC, 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that temporal proximity alone is insufficient to support a finding of “but for” causation in a Title VII retaliation suit). Stroud has offered no such evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BMC. AFFIRMED. 13