Opinion ID: 1772284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Circuit Court's Analysis

Text: To facilitate its analysis of Trepal's twenty-one claims, the circuit court grouped the claims under four legal theories and then addressed each theory: Martz's conduct at trial was outrageous and shocking, and the apparent lack of supervision which allowed this misconduct is troubling. Nevertheless, the court must consider the legal effect of his actions in determining whether Trepal is entitled to relief. Trepal makes numerous claims in his motion; few of which are clearly delineated. The court has identified, numbered and grouped twenty-one claims into categories for ease of analysis. The categories are: newly discovered evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; Brady and Giglio claims; and cumulative error. For each claim, it is not enough for a defendant to establish an alleged error, the defendant must also show that he was prejudiced by the alleged error. In considering the claims, the court must look to the effect the evidence would have on the jury verdict, both in the guilt phase and the penalty phase. Although the legal standards differ among most of the doctrines, the question of the impact on the jury is common to all. ... .... A. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE Trepal argues that the OIG report and other Justice Department documents constitute newly discovered evidence and show that the prosecution presented inadmissible scientific evidence. Newly discovered evidence is information that was unknown to the trial court, to the party, and to counsel at the time of trial, was undiscoverable by due diligence, and would probably produce an acquittal at retrial. See Robinson v. State, [770 So.2d 1167] 2000 WL 1473147 (Fla.); Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla.1997). To qualify as new evidence, it must be admissible. Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998). The OIG report would be inadmissible hearsay. See Norton v. State, 709 So.2d 87, 95 (Fla.1997); Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250, 262 (5th Cir.1980). Further, it did not exist at the time of trial. Other documents produced in the Justice Department investigation are the subject of a protective order and are not part of the court file. They cannot be considered as evidence. See Buenoano v. State, 708 So.2d 941 (Fla.1998). Further, the charts, graphs, and lab notes which are the basis of the investigative report are not subject to disclosure. See Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 960 (Fla. 1996). Realistically, all these documents are ones that were not in existence at the time of the trial, or were not discoverable, but are actually the indication of false testimony at trial. The core of Trepal's case is that the prosecution relied on false and misleading evidence at trial. This is not newly discovered evidence in the normal sense. It is better addressed as a Giglio claim and that aspect will be discussed later. In addition, even if this material is considered newly discovered evidence, the court cannot find that this material would probably produce an acquittal or a life sentence at trial. B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL Trepal raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel's failure to discover evidence of laboratory misconduct. A successful claim will show deficient performance and prejudice to the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984); Robinson v. State, [770 So.2d 1167] WL 1473147 (Fla.2000). The first question is whether their performance was deficient. What did counsel fail to do? They could not have secured lab notes since the notes were not subject to discovery. They could have had a chemist present during trial to advise them on appropriate testing procedures and cross examination, or they could have accomplished this during discovery. They could have educated themselves as to the proper testing procedures in advance of trial. Had the defense taken any of these measures, Martz would have been seriously impeached. The defense relied on the FBI lab report which stated that the test results showed thallium consistent with the presence of nitrate. (T. 672-3) In hindsight, they were not justified in doing so. When Martz testified differently at trial, defense counsel failed to attack his changed conclusion. The court is compelled to find their performance deficient. The court does this with great reluctance because it can foresee a flood of requests to have a defense chemist at trial in routine lab testimony. Did the deficiency prejudice the defense? This, in turn, depends on whether counsel's ineffectiveness was such as to `undermine confidence in the outcome.'  Robinson v. State, [770 So.2d 1167] WL 1473147 (Fla.2000) (Anstead, J., special concurrence). The court finds that ... the outcome would be the same at the guilt phase. Taking the narrow view of the penalty phase, we look to what the jury was instructed. Under the standard jury instructions, the jury was told to consider the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors as set out in the standard jury instructions. The instructions do not include residual doubt. The court finds that there is no reasonable probability that the [sentence] would have been different .... .... C. BRADY AND GIGLIO CLAIMS Trepal alleges a discovery violation for the prosecution's failure to make full disclosure of testing procedures contained in lab notes in violation of Brady. The holding in Brady states that suppression of exculpatory evidence after defense request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt or punishment. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (1963). Brady has come to stand for the proposition that the prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence whether the defense makes a specific request, a general request, or no request. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 [115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490] (1995); Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667, 678 [105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481] (1983) [ (1985) ]; United States v. Anderson, 574 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir.Ga.1978). The notes were not exculpatory prior to trial. They could only be regarded as exculpatory after Martz testified. There was no Brady violation of the type dealt with in this section. He also claims a violation of Giglio for use of false testimony at trial. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 [92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104] (1972). The problems with test procedures are so wrapped up with the false testimony issues that they must be dealt with here. Claims 16-21 raise the issue of false testimony presented at trial under Giglio. Giglio holds that a conviction based on false or perjured testimony, which the prosecution knew or should have known was false, violates due process when such information is material. The materiality prong is the same as that used in Brady. See Rose v. State, [774 So.2d 629] WL 1508576 (Fla.2000). False information is material if there is a reasonable likelihood that it could have affected the jury verdict. Id. In examining the effect on the jury, what must the court consider? The question implies a comparison. Trepal would have the court compare actual testimony with impeachment testimony which would have revealed all these problems at trial. Realistically, if all this had been known in advance of trial, Q1, Q2, and Q3 would have been retested. On the other hand, the prosecution would have us look to what the substance in Q1, Q2, and Q3 really is, including reliance on the quantitative analysis. The court has previously rejected these positions and indicated that for this analysis the actual testimony should be compared to what Martz could have truthfully testified to at trial. As to the guilt phase, the court finds... that there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different. This case was based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. The testing results of the Coke samples and Q206 were the only direct evidence of Trepal's guilt. Even so, given the test results that Martz could have rightfully testified about and considering all the other evidence in the case, the court finds no reasonable likelihood that the guilt phase results would have been different. Although this is a circumstantial evidence case, the evidence was strong. Turning to the penalty phase .... Under the standard jury instructions, the jury was told to consider the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors as set out in the standard jury instructions. The instructions do not include residual doubt. The court finds that there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different. .... D. CUMULATIVE ERROR The cumulative error doctrine applies when there are other claims supported by competent evidence, but they do not meet the criteria for securing relief. In that instance, the court must consider the cumulative effect of the evidence. If under the unique circumstances of the case, confidence in the outcome has been undermined, and a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would be different, relief may be granted. See State v. Gunsby, 670 So.2d 920, 924 (Fla. 1996) (citing Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1995) and Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1995)). The cumulative effect doctrine is only relevant if the other claims have been rejected. They have under the narrow view. Under the narrow view, the court finds that cumulative effect claim lacks merit because the cumulative effect of errors, if any, is not sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. See Rose v. State, [774 So.2d 629] WL 1508576 (Fla.2000).... [T]he court cannot find that confidence in the outcome has been undermined or the reasonable probability of a different outcome. (Footnotes omitted and emphasis added.)