Opinion ID: 177996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Instruction 3.4defining major or significant change

Text: Bahrani next contends the district court gave what Bahrani describes as an erroneous and prejudicial materiality instruction, i.e., Instruction No. 3.4, during the hide export certificates trial. We review de novo whether the [district] court erroneously instructed the jury on the applicable law. Gonzales, 590 F.3d at 859. Instruction No. 3.4, entitled `MAJOR' OR `SIGNIFICANT' CHANGEDEFINED, stated as follows: As you have already been told, there is no requirement under USDA statutes or regulations that an exporter must obtain a replacement certificate every time a change to an existing certificate is made. It is the law of this case that only the making of major or significant changes triggers an obligation to obtain and pay for a replacement certificate. That is not to say that the law allows exporters to change certificates at will or that it is not unlawful to do so. There are, in fact, laws that prohibit exporters from making any kind of unauthorized change or alteration to a government-issued certificate and which subject exporters to administrative fines and penalties if they do so. These laws say nothing, however, about replacement certificates and say nothing about when an exporter who wishes to make a change to a certificate must get a replacement certificate to do so. For this reason, it is not a Con[A]gra employee's making of a correction or change to a certificate that creates an obligation under the law to obtain a replacement certificate and pay the fee at issue in this case. Instead, that obligation arises from the discovery, by the employee making the correction, that a major or significant change is necessary. You will hear considerable testimony from various witnesses about what does and does not constitute a major or significant change to a hide export certificate. All I can tell you about what major or significant means is that it embodies a principle of materiality. Something is material if it has the tendency to influence or persuade a person to act in a certain way. As it is contemplated in this case, a major or significant change is one that would have influenced or persuaded the certifying official that a replacement certificate was, in fact, required. Aplt.App. at 2400-01. Bahrani objected to the last sentence of the last paragraph of the instruction, asserting that the word would should be replaced with the word could. Id. at 1303-04. Bahrani's objection was overruled and the instruction was given as originally worded by the district court. Bahrani argues on appeal that Instruction 3.4's use of the word `would' instead of `could' impermissibly increased the standard beyond that required by Bahrani I, elevating the standard from one focusing on the potential effect of the change and a `tendency to influence,' to one requiring certainty. Aplt. Br. at 48. Bahrani further argues that [u]se of the word `would' in reference to the `certifying official' impermissibly emphasized the importance of an individual official's decision rather than keeping the proper focus on agency action. Id. (italics in original). In sum, Bahrani asserts, [t]his instruction conflicts not only with the decision in Bahrani I, but also with the intent of the FCA. Id. To date, we have never directly addressed whether civil claims under the FCA incorporate a materiality element and, if so, what the proper test is for materiality. [9] That said, the decision in Bahrani I referred to the concept of materiality by concluding that there is a certain class of [certificate] changes, i.e., major or significant changes, that ... require [replacement] certificates. 465 F.3d at 1200 (emphasis added). Indeed, Bahrani I held that [t]his agreed description of the circumstances in which the USDA requires exporters to obtain new certificates ... adopts a principlematerialitythat has been widely employed in various circumstances, including False Claims Act actions. Id. The instruction now challenged by Bahrani clearly tracks Bahrani I by informing the jury that the terms major and significant embod[y] a principle of materiality. As for the instruction's use of the phrase would have influenced, instead of the could have influenced language suggested by Bahrani, we conclude this language was necessary to properly enforce Bahrani I's distinction between so-called major or significant changes and other, minor changes that did not require the issuance of a new certificate. As ConAgra persuasively argues, if the instruction had said could have influenced, it would have effectively allowed Bahrani to argue (as he persisted in doing below and continues to attempt to do on appeal) that literally all certificate changes were major or significant; a position clearly foreclosed by Bahrani I. Thus, in sum, the challenged instruction was consistent with, and indeed mandated by, Bahrani I. Bahrani also complains about Instruction 3.4's use of the phrase certifying official, arguing it should have instead utilized the terms `an agency official' or `an official action on behalf of the agency.' Aplt. Br. at 54. Notably, however, Bahrani failed to assert that objection below, and indeed effectively invited the alleged error by proposing that the district court refer to the United States government official who endorsed the original certificate. Dist. Ct. Doc. 317 (Proposed Instr. No. 3.1). Thus, we decline to address Bahrani's argument.