Opinion ID: 2453427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Military Retirement

Text: DeJeaux was in the military during the parties' entire 14-year marriage. However, the property settlement provisions of the parties' original divorce decree, issued in December 2000, did not specifically address DeJeaux's future military retirement pay. In July 2001, the superior court amended the decree to hold that upon DeJeaux's retirement, Phyllis was entitled to one half (½) times 170 months of married military service divided by the total number of months defendant eventually serves in the military. It appears DeJeaux retired sometime in 2006. In June 2007, citing the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act [1] (USFSPA), the court awarded Phyllis 35% of DeJeaux's retirement pay. The court explained how it reached this percentage as follows: 50% × (months of military service during marriage) ÷ (total months of active service)[,] more fully defined as: 50% × 168 months ÷ 240 months = 35%. In January 2009, citing generally to the USFSPA, Phyllis asked the superior court to increase her entitlement to DeJeaux's military retirement pay from one-third to 50%. The court denied Phyllis's request, explaining that the 35% determination was properly based upon the number of years the parties were married and the number of years DeJeaux was in the military. On April 3, 2009, Phyllis again moved to increase her share of the military retirement to 50%, this time invoking Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) and arguing, in part, that new evidence had been discovered. Phyllis did not say what the new evidence was, though she may have been referring to a copy of the pamphlet entitled Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act: Dividing Military Retired Pay, a publication of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service that Phyllis referenced on one of the two pages of her motion. Phyllis filed a similar motion three days later, this time including the aforementioned pamphlet. DeJeaux opposed the motion, arguing that the original determination was proper and nothing had changed since it was made. At an April 23, 2009 hearing, the superior court denied Phyllis's motion, explaining that the court's previous division of the marital portion of the retirement was correct. A written order denying the motion was issued the same day. Phyllis appeals this determination.