Opinion ID: 2023181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Double Jeopardy in Enhancement Proceeding.

Text: Nelson asserts that in the event of a remand for resentencing, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, U.S. Const. Amend. V and Neb. Const. art. I, § 12, prohibit the State from attempting to resentence him as a habitual criminal. Nelson bases his argument on the holding of the Nebraska Court of Appeals in State v. Gray, 8 Neb.App. 973, 606 N.W.2d 478 (2000). In Gray, the Court of Appeals held that double jeopardy principles apply to habitual criminal proceedings under § 29-2221 and that the State is prohibited from attempting to resentence a defendant as a habitual criminal where the enhanced sentence has been vacated because of insufficient evidence. The State questions the Court of Appeals' holding in Gray. In so arguing, the State cites to this court's holding in State v. Neiss, 260 Neb. 691, 619 N.W.2d 222 (2000), and the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998). In Neiss, we held that double jeopardy principles do not apply to Nebraska's driving under the influence enhancement proceedings. In deciding Neiss, we relied in part on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Monge. In Monge, the Court held that in noncapital sentencing proceedings, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not preclude resentencing enhancement proceedings even where the enhancement sentencing proceeding has certain hallmarks of a trial. The Court noted that double jeopardy protections are generally inapplicable to sentencing proceedings because the determinations at issue in sentencings do not place a defendant in jeopardy for an offense. The Court in Monge noted, however, that double jeopardy protections do apply to capital sentencing proceedings. We have similarly concluded in State v. Hochstein and Anderson, 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001). At issue in Monge was California's three-strikes law, which provides that a defendant convicted of a felony who has two qualifying prior convictions for serious felonies shall be sentenced to a minimum prison sentence of 25 years to life, and a defendant convicted of a felony who has one prior serious felony shall be sentenced to a double term of imprisonment. The Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude a resentencing hearing, the subject of which would be the merits of allegations regarding the existence of prior serious felony convictions under California's three-strikes law. We conclude that the rationale of Monge applies to habitual criminal enhancement proceedings under § 29-2221. Habitual criminal proceedings under the Nebraska statutes are similar to proceedings under the California three-strikes law at issue in Monge in that the determinations made in habitual criminal proceedings are sentencing determinations involving establishing the existence of prior convictions. Such determinations are not trials regarding an element of an offense. Monge, supra . We hold that double jeopardy principles do not apply to habitual criminal enhancement proceedings under § 29-2221, and we therefore overrule State v. Gray, 8 Neb.App. 973, 606 N.W.2d 478 (2000), to the extent it held that double jeopardy principles applied to habitual criminal enhancement proceedings. Nelson urges us to conclude that even if the U.S. Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to habitual criminal enhancement proceedings, the Nebraska Constitution's double jeopardy clause prohibits the State from attempting to sentence him as a habitual criminal on remand. However, we have held that the protection provided by Nebraska's double jeopardy clause is coextensive with that provided by the U.S. Constitution. State v. Isham, 261 Neb. 690, 625 N.W.2d 511 (2001); Neiss, supra; State v. Franco, 257 Neb. 15, 594 N.W.2d 633 (1999). We, therefore, reject Nelson's argument that the Nebraska Constitution provides greater protection, and we conclude that on remand, neither the U.S. nor the Nebraska Constitution's double jeopardy provisions preclude resentencing Nelson as a habitual criminal.