Opinion ID: 3006154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reasonableness of brown’s sentence

Text: Brown challenges his sentence as procedurally unreasonable, arguing that, in sentencing him to a below-guidelines term of imprisonment, the District Court did not adequately address all of the arguments raised by counsel and, thus, erred.6 When determining an appropriate sentence, a district court must follow our well-established process: (1) correctly calculate the applicable advisory guidelines range; (2) rule on any departure motions; and (3) consider the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). motion to suppress, a defendant must have advanced substantially the same theories of suppression in the district court as he or she seeks to rely upon in this Court.”). And, even if we were to excuse Brown’s forfeiture, the argument would still fail because he has not shown how inconsistencies that are unrelated either to the voluntariness of the consent or even to the search itself would affect the outcome here. 6 Brown and the government entered into a plea agreement, under which the government agreed to seek a 120-month period of incarceration and Brown agreed to relinquish his appeal rights (unless he received a sentence in excess of that period). The United States Probation Department, however, determined that Brown was subject to the ACCA enhancement and, as a result, he was subject to a mandatory minimum of 180 months’ incarceration. The District Court found that the enhancement applied, but granted a departure and sentenced Brown to a period of 150 months’ incarceration, which is below the statutory mandatory minimum. Cf. United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a district court must impose at least the statutory mandatory minimum unless it grants a downward departure (1) for substantial assistance to the government or (2) under the so-called safety-valve provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)). 7 United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). A sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Brown challenges only the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. In reviewing a district court’s sentence for procedural reasonableness, we consider, as relevant here, whether the court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors or failed to explain its chosen sentence. Id. Here, Brown essentially claims that, even though the District Court gave him a below-guidelines sentence, it failed to give consideration to his “history of abuse and addiction coupled with [his] newly demonstrated determination to tackle those crimedriving issues.” (Opening Br. at 28-29.) We disagree. As Brown acknowledges, he “indisputably committed a serious offense and has a substantial prior record.” (Opening Br. at 28.) The District Court recognized that it was not bound by the Guidelines and imposed a sentence below the Guidelines suggested range. The Court explained that it weighed Brown’s substantial criminal history, the need to protect the public, and his individual characteristics, and concluded that a sentence somewhat below the Guidelines was appropriate. On this record, that was sufficient. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (district court’s reasoning must “satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis” for its decision and that “when a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation”); United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 567 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he court does not need to ‘discuss and make findings as to each of the 8 § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.’”). Accordingly, Brown has not shown any procedural error.7