Opinion ID: 2815292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Juvenile Counsel

Text: Atkins’s first claim of IAJC––that juvenile counsel failed to inform Atkins of his right to testify and that such testimony would not be used against him––was raised in his petition for state collateral relief. This also amounts to a claim of ineffective assistance of state collateral appellate counsel. Again, “attorney error at state post-conviction appellate proceedings cannot excuse procedural default under the Martinez-Trevino framework.” Id. As to Atkins’s remaining two IAJC claims, the question is whether to extend our holding in Sutton to claims in which a Tennessee petitioner seeks to demonstrate cause for the procedural No. 12-6498 Atkins v. Holloway Page 11 default of his IAJC claims on the basis of ineffective assistance of state collateral counsel. We decline to make such an extension. Atkins claims that “[t]here is no logical basis to distinguish Mr. Atkins’s trial and juvenile transfer hearing IAC claims . . . .” Atkins argues that a juvenile transfer proceeding is a “critical stage” of the proceedings, and therefore, Atkins was entitled to effective assistance of counsel. Here, however, the question is not whether Atkins had a right to effective assistance of counsel during his juvenile transfer proceeding, but whether he has established cause, as explained in Martinez, Trevino, and Sutton, to excuse his procedural default of that claim. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320 (“Cause, however, is not synonymous with a ground for relief.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “We will assume that the Supreme Court [in Martinez] meant exactly what it wrote: ‘Coleman held that an attorney’s negligence in a postconviction proceeding does not establish cause, and this remains true except as to initial-review collateral proceedings for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.’” Hodges, 727 F.3d at 531 (emphasis in original) (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316); but see Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293– 94 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that cause for a procedurally defaulted claim for ineffective assistance of initial appellate counsel can be established under the Martinez principles because Martinez was primarily concerned with ensuring that a substantial IAC claim be heard by at least one court). Recall that Trevino merely broadened the holding from Martinez and permitted a petitioner to demonstrate cause in states that do not technically require a defendant to raise IATC claims for the first time in collateral proceedings but do so as a matter of course. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. In Sutton, we held that Tennessee courts and Tennessee procedural rules, in practice, require ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to be presented at post-conviction proceedings, and therefore, Trevino applies to petitioners in Tennessee. Sutton, 745 F.3d at 795– 96 (“[I]neffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can establish cause to excuse a Tennessee defendant’s procedural default of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” (emphasis added)). But nothing in Trevino or Sutton would alter the caveat that the Supreme Court thought important enough to repeatedly emphasize in Martinez: the exception is limited to instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in initial-review proceedings that fail to raise No. 12-6498 Atkins v. Holloway Page 12 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315, 1319, 1320 (“[T]his remains true except as to initial-review collateral proceedings for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.” (emphasis added)). The Court in Trevino also emphasized that it created a “narrow exception” in Martinez to Coleman on the basis of equity for three reasons: (1) “the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system”; (2) the Court had already recognized that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel could constitute “cause” to excuse a procedural default; and (3) the state law at issue in Martinez and Trevino effectively channeled initial review of IATC claims to state collateral proceedings rather than direct appellate review. 133 S. Ct. at 1917–18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Atkins has failed to cite any law to indicate that the right to effective assistance of juvenile counsel during juvenile transfer proceedings would, like a claim of IATC, rise to the level of being “a bedrock principle in our justice system,” “the foundation for our adversary system,” and an “obvious truth.” See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has dubbed juvenile transfer proceedings “critically important proceeding[s.]” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560 (1966)1 (internal quotation marks omitted). This means that juveniles must receive the essentials of due process and fair treatment, including legal representation and a developed record, but the Supreme Court has not specified “the exact nature of the constitutional requirements of due process at a juvenile transfer hearing.” Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 367–68 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, obvious distinctions exist between juvenile transfer proceedings and trial. As the Court noted in Martinez, for example, defense counsel at trial “tests the prosecution’s case to ensure that the proceedings serve the function of adjudicating guilt or innocence.” 132 S. Ct. at 1317. This is not so in juvenile transfer proceedings. We conclude that Martinez does not extend to cases in which the underlying habeas claim is ineffective assistance of counsel during juvenile transfer proceedings. This is consistent with our holding in Hodges, in which we declined to extend the Martinez exception to excuse the 1 Notably, the Court in Kent did not specifically hold that juveniles have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at juvenile transfer proceedings. 383 U.S. at 560–62. No. 12-6498 Atkins v. Holloway Page 13 procedural default of ineffective assistance of initial appellate counsel claims. See Hodges, 727 F.3d at 531.