Opinion ID: 857180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Checkpoint Incident

Text: Davila appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claim against the government under the FTCA for false imprisonment, arising out of his interrogation and imprisonment by Unknown Border Patrol Agents on January 7, 2009 (Count 2).3 The claim was dismissed on the grounds that the district 3 In his complaint, Davila also alleged two Fourth Amendment violation claims arising from the same January 7, 2009 interrogation and arrest (Counts 1 and 4). He does not appeal the dismissal of those claims. Neither does Davila appeal the dismissal of his FTCA claim for 6 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ FTCA claim de novo. Jeanmarie v. United States, 242 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2001). This Court “accept[s] all of the nonmovant’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but [does] not rely upon conclusional allegations or legal conclusions that are disguised as factual allegations.” Id. The district court found that Jeanmarie, 242 F.3d 600, controls this issue and forecloses Davila’s FTCA claim arising out of the checkpoint incident as barred under the FTCA detention-of-goods exception. Because the interrogation and imprisonment occurred after the detention of Davila’s vehicle had ended, however, the detention-of-goods exception does not apply to Davila’s false imprisonment claim, and the holding in Jeanmarie is inapplicable to the present case. The FTCA waives the government’s immunity from suit. The waiver is subject to several exceptions, including the detention-of-goods exception, which provides that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is inapplicable to “[a]ny claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). We interpret this subsection broadly. Capozzoli v. Tracey, 663 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1981). Under a separate subsection of the FTCA, Congress has also made the waiver of immunity inapplicable to “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious intentional infliction of emotional distress (count 3). Davila abandoned his appeal of these arguments by failing to raise them in the body of his brief. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 22425 (5th Cir. 1993). 7 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights,” but explicitly waives that immunity—thereby providing an exception to the exception—for “any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution,” where such claims result from “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Davila urges this court to reverse the district court on the basis that his intentional tort claim of false imprisonment falls within this waiver of immunity, even where the detention-of-goods exception might otherwise apply. In Jeanmarie, we concluded that notwithstanding the fact that intentional tort claims arising out of arrests are not barred by § 2680(c), and are in fact permitted by § 2680(h), such claims are barred by the [detention-of-goods] exception if the alleged torts arose from the inspection, seizure, or detention of goods by a Customs agent because such claims involve conduct covered by § 2680(c). Jeanmarie, 242 F.3d at 604 (citing Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, even intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers are exempt from FTCA suits when such torts were committed during circumstances that would warrant a detention-of-goods exception. Davila’s claim, however, should not have been dismissed as lacking subject-matter jurisdiction because it did not arise from the inspection, seizure, or detention of goods by the Border Patrol agents. In Jeanmarie, we determined that Jeanmarie’s assault, battery, and false imprisonment occurred while his vehicle was being searched at a checkpoint, and therefore fell within the broad language of the exception. Id. at 605; see also Capozzoli, 663 F.2d at 658 (noting that the language of the exception “is broad enough to encompass any activities of an IRS agent even remotely related to his or her official duties”). Jeanmarie 8 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 was waiting in a designated area while customs officials checked his vehicle. When he went to search for a bathroom after being denied permission to do so, officers caught him, shoved him against a counter, injuring his stomach, and forcibly restrained him. We held that his claim was barred by the detention-ofgoods exception because it occurred while the search was ongoing. Jeanmarie, 242 F.3d at 604. Jeanmarie did not reach the question of whether an intentional tort would fall under the detention-of-goods exception if it takes place after the search is concluded, noting that “an intentional-tort claim involving the infliction of emotional distress during an arrest following a search by a Customs agent [may] not fall within § 2680(c) because such a tort was incident . . . to the detention of a person after the search for and detention of goods was completed.” Id. at 604 (citing Rivera v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (W.D. Tex. 1995)). The intentional tort alleged by Davila occurred well after the search of his car by Border Patrol agents. Davila waited without incident while his car was searched at the primary inspection checkpoint and for two additional hours while the Border Patrol agents waited for a K-9 unit to be brought in from a different checkpoint for additional screening. He does not allege that the Border Patrol agents committed any intentional tort during this time. After the two hours lapsed, Tocho left in the vehicle, leaving Davila and Mata behind at the inspection site, and was pursued and caught by Brewster County officers. The intentional tort against Davila occurred only after Tocho had left the checkpoint in the vehicle. The false imprisonment claim arose out of the officers’ arrest and detention of Davila in a county jail, located away from the checkpoint. No contraband had been found in the vehicle, the search had long since ended, and Tocho had been caught by the time that Davila was arrested and detained. The detention-of-goods exception covers “[a]ny claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of 9 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). Davila does not contend that the claim arose in respect of the detention of his vehicle, and he does not bring suit with regard to the search of his vehicle or his treatment while at the checkpoint area. The intentional tort was allegedly committed after Tocho left in the vehicle and were unrelated to the vehicle or the detention thereof. For these reasons, the detention-of-goods exception does not apply to Davila’s claim of false imprisonment as alleged in Count 2 of his complaint.