Opinion ID: 220779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Staleness of the Prior Conviction

Text: Sentencing judges must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, among other factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez argues that the district court misconstrued his history by not discounting his drug trafficking conviction for being 15 years old, especially when that conviction accounted for 12 of his 17 offense levels. Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez compares his case to United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir.2009). In Amezcua-Vasquez, the defendant was convicted of illegal reentry and sentenced to 52 months, which was within a Guidelines range reflecting a 16-level enhancement for two 25-year-old felonies. See id. at 1052-53. The Ninth Circuit said that [t]he staleness of the conviction does not affect the Guidelines calculation, but it does affect the § 3553(a) analysis. Id. at 1056. Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez also cites this court's decision in United States v. Chavez-Suarez, 597 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir.2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 286, 178 L.Ed.2d 188 (2010), which discussed Amezcua-Vasquez and agree[d] with the Ninth Circuit that the staleness of an underlying conviction may, in certain instances, warrant a below-Guidelines sentence. Chavez-Suarez, 597 F.3d at 1138. But, as Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez notes, in Chavez-Suarez we affirmed a within-Guidelines range sentence of 41 months. The range reflected a 16-level enhancement for an 11-year-old marijuana trafficking conviction. Id. at 1137, 1139. [2] Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez's case for a downward variance based on a stale conviction is even weaker than Mr. Chavez-Suarez's. Although Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez's prior conviction occurred 15 years before his illegal reentry conviction and Mr. Chavez-Suarez's prior was 11 years old, Mr. Chavez-Suarez trafficked a less serious drug (marijuana compared to cocaine), received a much steeper enhancement (16 levels compared to 12 levels), and was sentenced to over a year more (41 months compared to 27 months). Our role is not to second guess the district court's treatment of the § 3553(a) factors. The sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (quotations omitted). In this case, the district court stated what § 3553(a) requires and then discussed Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez's criminal history, his pattern of reentry, his family situation, and his acceptance of responsibility. The court also reviewed the PSR, which explained Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez's background in detail. [W]e are not persuaded that the district court's judgment fell outside the range of rationally permissible choices before it. Chavez-Suarez, 597 F.3d at 1139 (quotations omitted). We find no error or abuse of discretion on the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.