Opinion ID: 2996365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Argument Waiver

Text: This Court has repeatedly held that “a voluntary and knowing waiver of an appeal is valid and must be en- forced.” See, e.g., United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 860 (7th Cir. 2001); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999). A waiver is defined as “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). An effective waiver “extinguishes the error and precludes appellate review.” United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 2000). We note, however, that “a waiver of the right to appeal does not completely foreclose review.” Jones, 167 F.3d at 1144. A defendant does not lose the right to pursue a claim that the waiver was involuntarily made, was based on a constitutionally impermissible factor (such as race), or was made without the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1144-45. Here, however, Rhodes does not claim that the waiver was involuntarily made, was based on an impermissible factor, or was made without the effective assistance of counsel. Rather, Rhodes objects to the fact that the restitution order imposed on him directs him to pay his former employer, Magna. He also maintains that the district court erred by not establishing a payment schedule for the restitution. We will not vitiate the plea agreement by entertaining either of these two arguments. Paragraph 12 of the plea 4 No. 02-2218 agreement expressly states that “the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to appeal his conviction, any invalidity in the plea agreement and any sentence within the maximum provided in the statute of conviction.” The only exceptions to this waiver are narrow: “[T]he Defendant reserves the right to appeal from (a) any finding that the amount of loss attributable to the Defendant under §2F1.1 or owed as restitution is more than $9,198.00; (b) any determination that the Defendant’s sentencing range for imprisonment is higher than 33 to 41 months; and (c) any upward departure.” Rhodes was sentenced within the 33-41 month range (37 months), and he did not receive any upward departure. Under the terms of the plea agreement he signed, Rhodes reserved the right to appeal only one aspect of the restitution order—the amount owed, if ordered over a given amount of $9,198.00. Thus, he waived his right to make any other arguments—including those concerning the identity of the party to whom he was ordered to make restitution and the lack of a payment schedule—when he signed the plea agreement. As we stated in United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 2000), waivers of appeal will be enforced “only to the extent of the agreement.” The plea agreement that Rhodes signed reflected a specific consideration of the restitution issue—i.e., the explicit exception to the appeal waiver over the amount of the restitution. Thus, we refuse to hold that the matter of restitution in this case was not specifically considered and treated in the negotiation and formulation of the plea agreement.