Opinion ID: 1955378
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Intent Element of Attempted Murder

Text: Two questions arise concerning the element of intent in the attempted murder prosecution. First, what was the trial judge's finding concerning Earp's intent? Second, if the trial judge found an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, but not an intent to murder, would that be sufficient to support a finding of attempted murder in the second degree? With respect to the first question, we agree with the majority of the Court of Special Appeals panel that the trial judge grounded his decision upon a finding that Earp intended to inflict serious bodily harm, and that the trial judge did not find that Earp harbored an intent to murder. The relevant colloquy between the attorneys and the trial judge, and the trial judge's statements concerning the defendant's involvement, are set forth in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, 76 Md. App. at 440-43, 545 A.2d at 702-03, and need not be repeated here. We agree with the State that the evidence was sufficient to have permitted a finding of an intent to murder. We think it clear, however, that the trial judge did not make that finding, but instead concluded that Earp's intention was only to inflict grievous bodily harm. Concerning the second question, we believe it is equally clear that the trial judge accepted the argument of the assistant state's attorney that because an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is one of the several malevolent states of mind that will support a conviction for murder in the second degree when death results, it should be sufficient to support a conviction of attempted murder in the second degree when the victim does not die. It is true that a specific intent to kill is not an indispensable element of murder in the second degree. As we said in Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735 (1987): Murder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation. These qualifying malevolent states of mind are: 1) the intent to kill, 2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, 3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or 4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. (Footnotes omitted). The question here is whether an intent to do grievous bodily harm, which satisfies the mens rea element in a consummated murder, suffices for a conviction of attempted murder when death does not result. The crime of attempt consists of a specific intent to commit a particular offense coupled with some overt act in furtherance of the intent that goes beyond mere preparation. Bruce v. State, 317 Md. 642, 646, 566 A.2d 103 (1989); State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 604-05, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988); Cox v. State, 311 Md. 326, 330, 534 A.2d 1333 (1988); Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 303-06, 493 A.2d 352 (1985). One may be guilty of an attempted murder in the first or second degree, State v. Holmes, 310 Md. 260, 268, 528 A.2d 1279 (1987), Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 139-40, 482 A.2d 474 (1984), or of an attempted voluntary manslaughter, Cox v. State, supra, 311 Md. at 334, 534 A.2d 1333. The specific intent that is required may be a transferred intent, that is, the mens rea of a defendant as to his intended victim will be transferred to an unintended victim who suffers injury as a result of the defendant's attempt. State v. Wilson, supra, 313 Md. at 609, 546 A.2d 1041. The specific intent required to prove an attempt is the intent to commit a particular crime, in this case murder. Accordingly, the required specific intent in the crime of attempted murder is a specific intent to murder. It must be kept in mind that an intent to murder is not the same as an intent to kill. The former includes the latter, but the reverse is not true. Intent to kill means just what the term suggests  one person intends to bring about the death of another. The harboring of this intent may be entirely without culpability in the eyes of the law, as when a soldier intends to kill his adversary in time of war, or an innocent person intends to kill another to save himself from an unprovoked attempt on his life. Or, the harboring of the intent to kill may be culpable but mitigated, as where the intent to kill proceeds from a hot-blooded reaction to an adequate provocation. Or, the intent to kill may satisfy the mens rea element of murder or attempted murder, as when it exists in the absence of legally adequate justification, excuse, or mitigation. It is then, in the truest sense, an intent to murder. Our cases have sometimes used the terms intent to kill and intent to murder interchangeably. In most instances, the meaning is clear and the mixing of terms poses no real possibility of misunderstanding. Where, for example, evidence fails to generate any question of justification, excuse or mitigation, both terms are used to reflect an intent to kill. A word of caution is in order, however, particularly in the matter of instructing juries. A familiar instruction informs the jury that an intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body. That is true; but if the jury is instructed that an intent to murder may be inferred from such use of a deadly weapon, the instruction may be erroneous. If the jury has been instructed that intent to murder means intent to kill plus the absence of justification, excuse or mitigation, which indeed it does, the jury might understand from the instruction that the absence of justification, excuse, or mitigation could be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body, and that is clearly incorrect. See Glenn v. State, 68 Md. App. 379, 404-05, 511 A.2d 1110, cert. denied, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986). The better practice, particularly in a case involving a legal issue of justification, excuse, or mitigation, would be to instruct the jury that the attempt must be accompanied by a specific intent to kill and must occur under circumstances that would not legally justify or excuse the killing or mitigate it to manslaughter if death should result. The State, although agreeing that an intent to murder may consist of an intent to kill and the absence of justification, excuse, or mitigation, argues that an intent to commit grievous bodily harm will serve as a substitute for an intent to kill, as it does in the case of second degree murder. We do not agree. We hold, instead, that where an attempted murder is charged, the State must show a specific intent to kill  an intent to commit grievous bodily harm will not suffice. In addition, of course, the State must prove an attempt, and, where the evidence fairly generates the issue, the absence of justification, excuse, or mitigation. Our holding today is consistent with our determination in State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 510-15, 515 A.2d 465 (1986), that a specific intent to murder is an indispensable element of the crime of assault with intent to murder. [2] We said in Jenkins that the clear language of the statute makes an intent to murder a critical element of that offense. Id. at 510, 515 A.2d 465. From what we have said of the common law of the offense of attempt, it is equally clear that an attempted murder is an attempt, manifested by an overt act, coupled with a specific intent to commit murder, i.e., an attempt with intent to murder. The analysis of Jenkins therefore applies with equal force here, and we reach the same conclusion. Our holding on this point is in accordance with the nearly unanimous view of the authors of respected treatises in the criminal law field. One commentator suggests: Some crimes, such as murder, are defined in terms of acts causing a particular result plus some mental state which need not be an intent to bring about that result. Thus, if A, B, and C have each taken the life of another, A acting with intent to kill, B with an intent to do serious bodily injury, and C with a reckless disregard of human life, all three are guilty of murder because the crime of murder is defined in such a way that any one of these mental states will suffice. However, if the victims do not die from their injuries, then only A is guilty of attempted murder; on a charge of attempted murder it is not sufficient to show that the defendant intended to do serious bodily harm or that he acted in reckless disregard for human life. Again, this is because intent is needed for the crime of attempt, so that attempted murder requires an intent to bring about that result described by the crime of murder (i.e., the death of another). LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 59 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied). See also 1 Bishop on Criminal Law, § 730 (9th ed. 1923) ([t]o commit murder, one need not intend to take life; but to be guilty of an attempt to murder, he must so intend); Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes, § 4.08 (7th ed. 1967) ([t]o constitute an attempt to murder, specific intent to kill is necessary, and an intent to commit any other crime will not suffice); Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law, 637-38 (3rd ed. 1982) (while a person may be guilty of murder though there was no actual intent to kill, he cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit murder unless he has a specific intent to kill); 1 Warren on Homicide, § 81 (permanent ed. 1939) (to constitute an attempt to commit murder one must specifically contemplate taking someone's life); 4 Wharton's Criminal Law, § 743 (14th ed. 1981) ([a]lthough a murder may be committed without an intent to kill, an attempt to commit murder requires a specific intent to kill). The overwhelming majority of state courts that have considered this issue also have reached the same conclusion. See People v. Lee, 43 Cal.3d 666, 238 Cal. Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752, 754 (1987); People v. Harris, 72 Ill.2d 16, 17 Ill.Dec. 838, 377 N.E.2d 28, 31-33 (1978); Pearson v. State, 523 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ind. 1988); State v. Strother, 362 So.2d 508, 509 (La. 1978); State v. Keefe, 553 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1989); Com. v. Maloney, 399 Mass. 785, 506 N.E.2d 1147, 1149 (1987); State v. Dahlstrom, 276 Minn. 301, 150 N.W.2d 53, 58-59 (1967); Ramos v. State, 95 Nev. 251, 592 P.2d 950, 951 (1979); State v. Lyerla, 424 N.W.2d 908, 912 (S.D. 1988); State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 904-05 (Utah 1982); Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 180 S.E. 395, 398-99 (1935); State v. Schenk, 53 Wis.2d 327, 193 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1972); Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137, 147 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Huitt v. State, 678 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Alaska App. 1984); Littles v. State, 384 So.2d 744 (Fla.App. 1980); State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 707 P.2d 1174, 1178-79 (App. 1985); State v. Smith, 21 Or. App. 270, 534 P.2d 1180, 1184 (1975); Com. v. Griffin, 310 Pa.Super. 39, 456 A.2d 171, 177-78 (1983); Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 741-42 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984). The required intent to kill, may, of course, be proved by circumstantial evidence  that is, the trier of fact may infer the existence of the required intent from the surrounding circumstances. [S]ince intent is subjective and, without the cooperation of the accused, cannot be directly and objectively proven, its presence must be shown by established facts which permit a proper inference of its existence. Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 51, 102 A.2d 816 (1954). An intent to kill may, under proper circumstances, be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the human body. State v. Jenkins, supra, 307 Md. at 514, 515 A.2d 465. Thus, while the inflicting of grievous bodily harm may be sufficient to permit the trier of fact to infer an intent to kill, unless that inference is actually drawn, the required mens rea has not been found. In summary, there is a difference between the intent that will suffice to prove a consumated murder, and that which is required when death does not result. The required intent in the crimes of assault with intent to murder and attempted murder is the specific intent to murder, i.e., the specific intent to kill under circumstances that would not legally justify or excuse the killing or mitigate it to manslaughter. The requisite intent to kill may, under appropriate circumstances, be inferred. From the evidence before him in the instant case, the trial judge could have found that Earp harbored a specific intent to kill Lawrence. As we have earlier indicated, however, he did not draw that inference. His decision was based upon his finding that Earp had an intent to do grievous bodily harm, and upon the erroneous belief that this intent alone was sufficient to support a conviction on the charge of attempted murder in the second degree. Accordingly, that conviction must be reversed.