Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Faretta Claim (Lewis)

Text: Lewis claims the trial court erred by allowing him to relinquish his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself (see Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525) without ascertaining that he was mentally sound at the time. We disagree. Counsel was appointed early in the case. Lewis also had library privileges to help with his defense. Nevertheless, and possibly in an attempt to delay the proceedings, Lewis brought numerous motions regarding his representation, vacillating about whether he wanted to represent himself or be represented by counsel. Lewis first moved to represent himself with Richard Leonard as cocounsel. On October 24, 1990, the trial court denied the motion. On October 30, 1990, Lewis moved to represent himself under Faretta. At a hearing on November 2, 1990, the court appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Coburn, who found that Lewis could knowingly and intelligently waive his right to appointed counsel. After the court warned Lewis about the risks of self-representation, he sought and received more time to decide the issue. On December 14, 1990, his Faretta motion was granted, and his counsel was placed on advisory status. At hearings on April 14 and 20, 1992, the trial court and Lewis discussed whether he wanted to continue representing himself. Lewis sought to forgo self-representation if he could retain his library privileges. The court apparently agreed and reappointed Richard Leonard as counsel. On May 19, 1992, Lewis asked to represent himself again. On June 5, 1992, the trial court warned that Lewis would not be allowed to go back unpro per, but granted his second Faretta motion. Two days before trial, on January 4, 1993, Lewis asked to relinquish his in propria person status a second time. After warning Lewis that he can't change [his] mind, the court granted the request. It reappointed Richard Leonard as lead counsel, and appointed his brother James Leonard as cocounsel. Meanwhile, at an evidentiary hearing on December 9, 1992, the trial court learned that Lewis had accused his alibi witness and first wife, Jeanett Hudson, of involvement in the murder of one Frankie Hudson in 1975 or 1977. On January 19, 1993, the prosecutor moved to have Lewis's telephone privileges revoked, explaining that Lewis had been calling Jeanett Hudson and threatening her. The prosecutor stated, These threats entailed his intent to have her and her daughter killed, as well as threats to find a way to get her fired. On January 20, 1993, after counsel was reappointed, Lewis declined to appear in court because other inmates had made upsetting comments about his mother's death, which had occurred about a year beforehand. [7] Citing Brown v. Wainwright (5th Cir. 1982) 665 F.2d 607, 612, Lewis argues that a defendant may not forgo self-representation absent a dialogue with the court, at least where special circumstances are present. Such conditions supposedly existed here in the form of what he characterizes as his aberrant behavior before and after the January 4, 1993 hearing. He claims the court erred in not questioning him or ordering a new psychiatric examination to determine whether the renewed request for counsel resulted from a mental defect. The record suggests that Lewis acted intentionally and voluntarily ( People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 909, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494) when he requested counsel on January 4, 1993, and was not incompetent or suffering from any mental defect. (See ibid., citing Brown v. Wainwright, supra, 665 F.2d 607, for general rule that Faretta may be waived through silence or equivocation.) After all, Lewis had taken a similar step once before and was familiar with the differences involved in self-representation as opposed to representation by counsel. In addition, the trial court alerted Lewis to the consequences of abandoning his role as his own counsel so near the start of trial. A short time later, as we shall discuss, the trial court declined to declare a doubt as to Lewis's competence to stand trial. (See Dunkle, supra, at pp. 909-910, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494 [defendant found competent around time of request for counsel].) There was no substantial evidence that Lewis was mentally incapable of surrendering his Faretta rights. The asserted error did not occur.