Opinion ID: 1809977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Negligence Per Se Claim

Text: The Andersons present a question of first impression regarding the standing to bring a claim alleging a violation of the AAMVA. Section 32-13-4(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides that at least 30 days before the sale of an abandoned motor vehicle, a wrecker service, such as Smith's Towing Company, shall give written notice to the owner, secured parties of record, and known lienholders, if any, of the sale of the vehicle. (Emphasis added.) If the name of the owner, secured parties, or lienholders cannot be reasonably ascertained, then the seller must publish a notice once a week for two successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the sale is to be held. § 32-13-4(b). It is undisputed that the Smiths failed to comply with the notice requirements of § 32-13-4. Regardless of this failure, the Smiths claim that the Andersons, as future title holders or heirs, are not within the class of persons protected by the statute an element of negligence per se. See Sparks v. Alabama Power Co., 679 So.2d 678, 685 n. 2 (Ala.1996). The Andersons, however, claim that because the Smiths knew that Joseph was the owner of the Thunderbird and because they knew how to contact him, the Smiths were under a duty to notify the Andersons of the sale. The Andersons claim that the word owner as used in § 32-13-4 is not limited to the holder of legal title and that the AAMVA was enacted for the purpose of affording notice of the sale of an abandoned motor vehicle to any interested parties. Andersons' brief, p. 6. We disagree. Section 32-13-4 specifically delineates three classes of persons protected by the AAMVAowners, secured parties, and known lienholders. The Court of Civil Appeals stated that while it had previously recognized that secured parties and lienholders are protected by the AAMVA, it has not previously held that a future titleholder or an heir is directly affected under the AAMVA. See Global Fed. Credit Union v. Walker, 679 So.2d 1075 (Ala.Civ. App.1996); see also DeRamus Exxon, Inc. v. Wyatt, 636 So.2d 450 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) (recognizing that the AAMVA applied to owners). The Andersons cite several statutes for their proposition that the word owner is not limited to legal title holders. See, e.g., § 32-7-2(8), Ala.Code 1975; § 32-7A-2(13), Ala.Code 1975; § 32-8-2 (mistakenly cited by the Andersons as § 38-8-2), Ala.Code 1975; § 32-6-210, Ala.Code 1975. The Andersons quote phrases from those statutes and argue that the word owner includes persons having the property in, with an immediate right of possession, and entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle. Andersons' brief, pp. 7-8. Even if we were to conclude that the various definitions of the word owner as proposed by the Andersons apply to § 32-13-4, we cannot conclude that the definitionswhen analyzed in their entiretyencompass the Andersons' possessory interest within the scope of the word owner. Section § 32-8-2(13) provides: (13) Owner. A person, other than a lienholder, having the property in or title to a vehicle or manufactured home. The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle or manufactured home subject to a security interest in another person, but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as security. Under any lease-purchase or installment sales agreement where a governmental agency, either city, county or state, is the lessee or purchaser with a security interest or right to purchase, such lessee or purchaser shall be the owner for purposes of this chapter. (Emphasis added.) Section 32-7A-2(13) provides: Owner. Any of the following persons: a. A person or persons holding the legal title to a motor vehicle, unless paragraph b. or c. is applicable. b. The mortgagor, debtor, conditional vendee, or lessee of a vehicle that is the subject of a chattel mortgage, lien, agreement for the conditional sale thereof, lease or other like agreement with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with the immediate right of possession vested in the mortgagor, debtor, conditional vendee, or lessee, in which event the mortgagor, debtor, conditional vendee, or lessee shall be deemed the owner for purposes of this chapter. c. The lessee of a vehicle owned by the United States of America or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. (Emphasis added.) Section 32-7-2(8) provides: (8) Owner. A person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease of the motor vehicle with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee, or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then the conditional vendee, or lessee, or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purposes of this subdivision. (Emphasis added.) The above-emphasized phrases in each definition of the word owner, when read in the context of the entire definition, make it clear that the Andersons are not owners entitled to the protection of the AAMVA. At the time of the conversion, the Andersons did not have actual possession of the Thunderbird; they did not hold it subject to a security interest; and they were not mortgagors, debtors, conditional vendees, or lessees of the Thunderbird. We conclude that the Andersons' claim does not constitute that of an owner within § 32-13-4.