Opinion ID: 548943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sealing Delay

Text: 32 Having determined we cannot justify the broader relief sought by appellants, that is, the suppression of all of the enhanced wiretap evidence, we must consider their more particularized contention that, in light of Rios, the West Long Branch tapes were subject to suppression because of the unexplained sealing delay. 33 The government advances several arguments why appellants' convictions should be reinstated notwithstanding Rios and the demise of Falcone. First, it submits that no sealing delay occurred because the order of June 26, 1985, authorizing electronic surveillance at Video Warehouse's new location in Neptune City, New Jersey, was an extension of the original authorization for the West Long Branch surveillance and its accompanying extensions, so that its obligation to present the tapes for sealing did not arise until the conclusion of the Neptune City surveillance. Second, relying largely on Rios, it argues that even if the the June 26, 1985, order could not be characterized as an extension order, the supervising attorneys, based on precedent at the time of the surveillance, reasonably believed that the sealing obligation would arise at the conclusion of the entire Video Warehouse investigation. Thus, we should find that the government has furnished a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Seemingly in the alternative, the government maintains that resolution of the sealing question is not necessary because even if the tapes covering the West Long Branch surveillance were suppressed, there would be sufficient evidence to sustain Vastola's and Saka's convictions on practically all counts. Accordingly, in the government's view, the admission of the tapes was at worst, harmless error. Finally, the government suggests that we remand for further factual inquiry into the reason for the sealing delay if we find that we cannot reinstate our opinion affirming appellants' convictions at this juncture. 14 34 We agree with the government that the matter should be remanded to the district court. But we cannot accept its argument that our original judgment should now be reinstated. We could not possibly hold that the Neptune City interception order was an extension of the West Long Branch order. Although the government rightly points out that Rios did not decide whether a change in the location of an illegal operation will prevent a subsequent order covering the new location from being an extension of a previous order, the statute unambiguously rules out this possibility. 15 35 Section 2518(1)(b)(ii) plainly states that an application for a surveillance order must contain a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted. In addition, section 2518(3)(d) requires a particularized showing of probable cause that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in the commission of [the] offense [under investigation]. Based on these two provisions alone, we would have no difficulty concluding that Congress intended for interception orders, and their accompanying extensions, to apply only to surveillances in the particular locations specified in the applications. 36 Moreover, even if we felt that subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of section 2518 were susceptible to a different interpretation, we would still reject the government's argument, as we agree with the Court of Appeals' statement in Ojeda Rios, 875 F.2d at 22, that section 2518(11), added to Title III as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Sec. 106(d)(3), Pub.L.No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1857, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, eliminates all room for argument on this point. Section 2518(11) provides for roving surveillances of wire or electronic communications upon a showing of the suspect's purpose to thwart interception by changing facilities. Section 2518(11) further states that if the preconditions for a roving surveillance are met, then the requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) ... relating to the specifications of the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to be intercepted do not apply. The unmistakable inference from the language of subsection (11) is that before its inclusion in section 2518, subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) restricted surveillances to particular locations, regardless of whether the same suspects and crimes were involved. 37 We conclude that a sealing delay indeed occurred as the West Long Branch tapes should have been sealed either as soon as was practical after May 31, 1985, when the actual surveillance ended, or as soon as practical after June 13, 1985, when the final extension order expired. 16 Furthermore, we cannot now on the record before us accept the government's suggestion that, even if erroneous, the supervising attorneys' reasonable belief that the order of June 26, 1985, extended the original interception order satisfactorily explains the delay. 17 Appellants understandably protest that the government's belated explanation not only is unsupported by the record but contradicts its specific assertions to this court and the district court that a delay occurred but that, under Falcone, it could not serve as a basis for suppression because the physical integrity of the tapes remained pure. They argue that government cannot now change its position and assert that it operated under the assumption that the Neptune City order extended the original order. 18 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 208, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1646, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (The government, however, may lose its right to raise factual issues ... when it has made contrary assertions in the courts below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during the litigation.). 38 Although we do not at this time accept the government's explanation for the delay, we find that its failure in the district court to offer evidence concerning the circumstances of the sealing delay should not necessarily now foreclose it from offering such evidence before the district court. We acknowledge that the circumstances of this case differ slightly from Rios because there the government seems to have offered some explanation for the delay at trial, though a question as to whether it had shifted its position on appeal remained. Here, however, the government relied under Falcone on the physical integrity of the tapes. 39 We do not consider this difference between the two cases to be significant on the issue of whether the government should now be able to explain the delay in the district court. Rios arose in the Second Circuit which, since United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir.1976), has held that the government must prove a satisfactory explanation for a sealing delay before wiretap evidence may be admitted over a defendant's objection. In this case, while it is possible that the government offered no explanation for the delay because it had none, it is also possible that, acting in reasonable reliance on Falcone, it assumed that it could defeat the suppression motion by demonstrating the integrity of the tapes and thus did not find it necessary to introduce evidence on this point. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court should be entitled to exercise its discretion to decide whether the government should now be permitted, under Rios, to offer an explanation for its violation of the sealing requirement. It seems to us that this threshold determination should be made by the district court rather than by us as the nature of the determination is similar to that on a ruling on a motion by the government to reopen, traditionally a discretionary matter for the district court. See United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 740-41 (6th Cir.1985). 40 While we are remanding the matter we think it appropriate to comment on the appellants' argument that the government could not reasonably rely on Falcone because that case's continued viability was questionable at the time of trial in light of intervening precedent. We do not agree. To be sure, before Rios, the Courts of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits had followed the literal construction of section 2518(8)(a) adopted by the Supreme Court. United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d at 864-65; United States v. Massino, 784 F.2d at 156. However, several other courts of appeals agreed with our holding in Falcone that lawfully intercepted wiretap evidence could not be suppressed on the basis of a sealing delay if the tapes were proven to be authentic. United States v. Angelini, 565 F.2d 469, 473-74 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923, 98 S.Ct. 1487, 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978); United States v. Diadone, 558 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064, 98 S.Ct. 1239, 55 L.Ed.2d 765 (1978); McMillan v. United States, 558 F.2d 877, 878-79 (8th Cir.1977). Thus, the district court might conclude that it would not fairly characterize any reliance the government may have placed on Falcone as unreasonable, especially considering that the government correctly predicted that we would adhere to that decision. 41 We have not overlooked the appellants' complaint that the government, in arguing that it reasonably believed it had an extension, already has proffered an explanation for the delay and should not be allowed a second bite at the apple before the district court. However, we do not think that the district court is necessarily compelled to conclude that a waiver would be appropriate in this case, as the government first advanced its explanation in the same submission in which it asserted a need for further factual inquiry into the reason for the delay. We emphasize, however, that upon remand, if the district court permits the explanation of the sealing delay to be given, the government must prove to the court's satisfaction the actual reason for the sealing delay. This would require a formal hearing in which the government corroborates its arguments to the district court through authenticated records produced at the time of the sealing delay, the testimony of individuals who participated in the interceptions, or other competent evidence. 42 In view of our decision to remand this case, we do not reach the question of whether the admission of the West Long Branch tapes could be considered harmless error. 19 We realize, of course, that if we concluded that a high probability exists that the evidence in the tapes did not contribute to appellants' convictions, we could save judicial resources by reinstating our opinion affirming appellants' convictions, thus obviating the need for a hearing. See United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219-20 n. 2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880, 105 S.Ct. 243, 83 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984) (defining the high probability standard of appellate review used to determine the harmlessness of nonconstitutional errors in the admission of evidence); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir.1976). However, if the tapes should have been suppressed, the extent of the damage to the government's case could not easily be assessed, as suppression of the tapes would remove the basis for certain other evidence presented in this case, such as Sergeant Robert Jones' explanation of loansharking terms used in the intercepted conversations. App. at 694-95, 733-34. 20 Considering that a possibility exists that the sealing delay will be satisfactorily explained, we think it best not to pass judgment on the murkier question of the harmlessness of the purported error. If necessary that issue may be reached on the remand.