Opinion ID: 3209079
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The NRC’s Waiver Process Ensures

Text: Consideration of Site-Specific Impacts Finally, we note that the NRC’s regulations already provide a means by which the petitioners can raise sitespecific challenges during licensing proceedings. Specifically, under 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b), “[a] participant to an adjudicatory proceeding [before the NRC] . . . may petition 18 that the application of a specified Commission rule or regulation or any provision thereof . . . be waived or an exception be made for the particular proceeding.” The standard by which the NRC will grant such a petition “is that special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that the application of the rule or regulation (or a provision of it) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted.” Id. We hold that the NRC’s waiver provision provides an adequate mechanism by which the petitioners can challenge the GEIS in site-specific proceedings. The petitioners raise two objections to the NRC’s waiver provision. First, they argue that the waiver provision shifts the burden of NEPA compliance from the NRC to the party requesting waiver. Second, the petitioners characterize the waiver process as “illusory.” States’ Br. 34. Neither argument is persuasive. First, for the reasons stated above, see supra Part II.B.1-4, the GEIS fulfills the NRC’s NEPA obligation to analyze the impacts of the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel. The NRC, in the GEIS, has therefore presented sufficient evidence to carry its burden of persuasion under NEPA that the impacts of continued storage of spent nuclear fuel are generic to all licensed reactors. The burden of production therefore necessarily shifts to the parties raising objections to provide substantial evidence demonstrating that the GEIS neglects those site-specific considerations, thereby obstructing the GEIS’s purpose “to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s licensing process . . . .” 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,239. Of course, the NRC always retains the burden of persuasion under NEPA to consider fully the environmental impacts and alternatives for its proposed action. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. 19 Second, the NRC conceded during oral argument that we have jurisdiction to review its decision to deny a waiver petition under 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b). See Oral Arg. Rec. 48:11-:40; see also NRDC v. NRC, 2016 WL 1639661, at  (considering whether the NRC properly denied a waiver petition); cf. Massachusetts v. NRC, 708 F.3d 63, 74 & n.17 (1st Cir. 2013) (same). Although we have stated that the NRC’s decision whether to grant a waiver petition “is entitled to deference,” that deference extends only so far as the NRC’s decision is not arbitrary or capricious. NRDC v. NRC, 2016 WL 1639661, at . Therefore, we expect that the NRC will give due consideration to waiver petitions raising nonfrivolous site-specific challenges to reactor licensing. Cf. 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,242 (stating that “concerned parties who meet the waiver criteria in 10 C.F.R. § 2.335 will be able to raise site-specific issues related to continued storage at the time of a specific license application” (emphasis added)). Furthermore, the petitioners retain the ability to petition the NRC for a rulemaking to amend the GEIS. Cf. NRDC v. NRC, 2016 WL 1639661, at , . “Although rulemaking is far from the fastest route, it has transparency, extensive public input, and broad application to recommend it.” Id. at . We believe these protections are sufficient to prevent the NRC’s waiver process from becoming “illusory.” Accordingly, we deny the petitions for review.