Opinion ID: 1849909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The present facts show:

Text: The plaintiff Nicosia sued Guillory and his mother [1] on November 17, 1971, alleging that Guillory's negligence had destroyed the plaintiff's truck on September 18, two months earlier. Guillory and his mother filed an answer through retained counsel on December 1, 1971. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff moved for trial on the merits. The trial (as well as a scheduled pre-trial conference) was continued on several occasions, being finally fixed for February 6, 1973. On the morning of the trial, the minor (by then a major), [2] for the first time questioned his procedural capacity to be sued by filing an exception to this effect and praying that the suit be dismissed. The trial judge overruled it and (so far as the record shows) the trial commenced without further objection on the defendant's part. [3] The trial court correctly held that the filing of the dilatory exception to procedural capacity, after the answer, was not timely, and thus the objection urged by it was waived. The Code of Civil Procedure expressly so provides. Articles 926 (6), 928. Likewise the objection (first urged on appeal by argument), questioning as insufficient the personal service on and the citation of the unemancipated minor, was waived by not filing such declinatory objections prior to appearance or answer. La.C.Civ.P. arts. 925(1), (2), 928. In reaching the contrary result, the court of appeal reasoned that, since the plaintiff's petition had itself pleaded the minority of the defendant Guillory (further alleging that his mother, sought to be held solidarily liable, see Footnote 1, was his mother and natural tutrix), the trial court had a duty to enforce the mandate of La. C.Civ.P. art. 732 that an attorney be appointed to represent an unemancipated minor of a dissolved marriage who is without tutor. Davis v. Bankston, 192 So.2d 614 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1966). In Davis , however, as an essential basis of its holding, the court expressly held that an exception to procedural capacity was regarded as timely filed to the reconventional demand against the minor. [4] In the present case, however, no exception to the procedural capacity was timely filed. The holding in such decision is thus inapposite to the present issue. We are not here faced with a final judgment which might be annullable because rendered against an incompetent person who has not been represented by an attorney, such as a minor against whom a default has been rendered. La.C.Civ.P. art. 2002(1). Here, the minor was personally served and was represented at the trial by his retained counsel. His procedural capacity (incompetency) to be sued was waived by the answer filed on his behalf by his attorney, without objection to the minor's lack of procedural capacity. In fact, at the time of the trial, the defendant had become a major, so the judgment rendered against him was not even technically annullable as rendered against an incompetent person not represented as required by law. La.C.Civ.P. art. 2002(1). Accordingly, the court of appeal erred in holding that the judgment obtained against Guillory must be set aside because Guillory was a minor at the time of suit. By failing to object timely to his lack of procedural capacity and by answering through retained counsel, Guillory waived his right to attack the judgment subsequently obtained following a trial at which he was represented by his counsel.