Opinion ID: 399147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denials of jury demands

Text: 34 By failing to make their first jury demand within 10 days after the last pleading had been served, plaintiffs waived their rights to a jury trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b), (d). Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred when denying their two motions for Rule 39(b) relief. 12 We review for abuse of discretion. Chandler Supply Co. v. GAF Corp., 650 F.2d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 1980). 35 We have strictly applied Civil Rules 38 and 39. See id. (an untimely request must be denied unless some cause beyond mere inadvertence is shown); Mardesich v. Marciel, 538 F.2d 848, 849 (9th Cir. 1976) (Where the only reasons advanced are oversight or inadvertence, the trial court has virtually no discretion to exercise.). 36 Here the uncontroverted affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel indicates the jury demand was filed fifty days late because the attorney then in charge of the case was preoccupied with the impending dissolution of his law firm. The affidavit does not set forth details of any disruption or confusion or other cause for preoccupation. The affidavit also fails to explain why assisting counsel, such as affiant, who drafted the complaint, did not detect the oversight and file a demand before the deadline had passed. Further, the affidavit is not supported by an affidavit of the then lead attorney. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's rejection of plaintiffs' first untimely jury demand. 37 The second demand for a jury trial was made after plaintiffs were granted permission to amend their complaint. It was not error to deny this demand. The amended complaint did not raise new issues. See Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 810 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973).