Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voir Dire of Jurors

Text: Defendant next complains about alleged errors connected with the selection of jurors at the guilt phase of the trial. (Because this jury hung on penalty, it was not the jury that eventually imposed the death penalty.)
Defendant first contends the Hovey voir dire ( Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1,168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301), by which prospective jurors are asked individually about their views on the death penalty and may be excused if they would not vote to impose the death penalty under any circumstances, violated the standards laid down by the high court in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776. (But see Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 [juror may be excused if the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath'].) [6] Additionally, he claims that the Hovey procedure results in a jury that does not represent a fair cross-section of the community, in that the jury will contain a disproportionate share of persons who are submissive in the face of authority and who cannot approach the prosecution's evidence in an appropriately skeptical and inquiring frame of mind. Relying on Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 184, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, defendant argues the Hovey voir dire produced a jury that was more prone to return a guilty verdict and more likely to exclude members of racial minorities. He also argues the prosecutor's ability to exercise peremptory challenges exacerbated these problems. At the threshold, it appears defendant failed to object to the Hovey voir dire on these grounds and thus failed to preserve these issues for appeal. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 413, 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) Defendant, however, contends in his reply brief that if we find he failed to preserve the issue for appeal, we should find his trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to preserve the issue. We need not address this contention because even assuming for argument the issue is properly before us, we find no error, [7] as it is now settled that the Hovey voir dire procedure is constitutional and does not deny a capital defendant his right to an impartial or a representative jury. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 797-798, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1279, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Nor does the procedure improperly discriminate against racial minorities ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 1214-1215, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047) or produce a conviction-prone or death-penalty-prone jury ( People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 331, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121). Finally, the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges does not exacerbate the alleged problem. ( Ibid. )
Defendant next contends his defense counsel were constitutionally ineffective in informing some jurors, during questioning on voir dire, that they expected the jury to return a guilty verdict, which would require them to participate in a penalty phase. Defendant overstates the number of times counsel made such admissions, but that makes no difference. Counsel may have concluded that honesty and candor with the jurors was necessary so as not to lose credibility with them. Counsel may also have seen no disadvantage to such admissions given that defendant had admitted he knowingly participated in the robbery and murder of Dolinka (although he claimed Garrison was the actual killer) and was thus clearly guilty of murder with special circumstances at a minimum, and the trial court had ruled that defendant's admissions would not be excluded from trial. In any event, the record does not indicate counsel's reasons for making such admissions to some prospective jurors, so we reject the contention that counsel were ineffective. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134 [issue of counsel's effectiveness more appropriately raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus].)
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by conducting voir dire while he was under the influence of tranquilizers to such an extent that we should conclude he was not present. (See § 977, subd. (b) [The accused shall be personally present.]; Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 504 U.S. 127, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479.) [8] He contends the trial court characterized him as looking totally droopy and thus should have stopped the proceedings. He is mistaken: it was defense counsel who so characterized defendant. The trial court disagreed with counsel's assessment, noting it did not see a great difference in [defendant's] appearance. The trial court discussed the matter with defense counsel, Philip Barnett, and counsel assured the court that defendant was mentally and physically able to participate despite having taken some tranquilizers two nights before to help him sleep and another medicine the next night. The trial court assured defendant that if he felt ill, uncomfortable or dizzy, it would halt the proceedings. Later that afternoon, defendant stated he felt all right. We thus reject the claim that the trial court improperly allowed voir dire to proceed when defendant was severely impaired by his medication with tranquilizers, for there is no substantial evidence his medication had a palpable effect on him.