Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: 1. Finalization of Agreement

Text: Lotter argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting the time at which the agreement was actually finalized. According to Lotter, the agreement was actually finalized early Monday morning, rather than Monday evening as indicated by the prosecutor. Lotter asserts that had he known the agreement was finalized prior to opening statements, his opening statement would have been substantially more effective. Accordingly, he argues that the prosecution's misrepresentation to the court and his defense counsel as to the time the agreement was finalized amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. Relying on DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 94 S.Ct. 1185, 39 L.Ed.2d 501 (1974), Lotter asserts that the instant case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to make a factual determination concerning the alleged misrepresentation. In DeMarco, a prosecution witness that had been indicted along with the defendant testified at the defendant's trial and stated that the prosecution had made no promises to him with respect to the disposition of his case. The defendant was convicted, and he appealed. Meanwhile, the witness/co-indictee pled guilty to a lesser charge, and at his sentencing hearing, the prosecution made certain statements that apparently indicated that the promise had been made prior to the witness/co-indictee's testimony. Although the defendant did not present the matter to the district court, raising it for the first time on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals addressed the issue and determined that the promises had not been made to the witness/co-indictee prior to his testifying. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that had the promise been made prior to the witness/co-indictee's testimony, the defendant's case would have to be reversed. The Court also noted that it was clear that some type of plea bargain had occurred, the question being whether it was made after or before the defendant's trial. Because the factual issue was dispositive of the case, the Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals, and remanded the case with instructions to remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. The DeMarco Court held that when a factual issue arises after trial that would be dispositive of the case, the factual issue cannot be determined on appeal, but, rather, the case must be remanded for a determination in the trial court. Thus, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether there is a genuine factual issue as to when the agreement was finalized. Our review of the record indicates that the agreement may have been finalized early on the morning of May 15, 1995, and not that evening as suggested by the prosecution. First, the agreement provided that Nissen would speak with Chrans [o]nce this agreement has been entered into, and Nissen spoke with Chrans between 1 and 4:45 a.m. on Monday. Why would Nissen speak to Chrans if the agreement had not been finalized? Second, Nissen testified that he signed the agreement early Monday morning. Considering that the agreement would be rendered null and void if Nissen's testimony was perjured, what incentive would Nissen have to lie about when the agreement was signed? Third, the time written on the agreement is less than convincing. The following is typed at the bottom of the agreement: Dated this ___ day of May, 1995. The date is written in as the 15th. After the period following 1995, the following is handwritten: 9 24 PM and the initials JE. If the time had been on the original agreement, why did the typed language not read as follows: Dated this ___ day of May, 1995, at ___.? Signed initials usually indicate that a document has been altered. Fourth, on May 15, 1995, at trial, when the prosecutor stated that the agreement was not finalized, the judge responded by asking, It has not been finalized? The prosecutor then noted that Nissen's counsel had agreed to continue his Motion to Quash until such time as Nissen could be called. Finally, when Lotter's counsel asked for a copy of the agreement on May 18, 1995, after Nissen testified, the prosecution denied having a copy of the agreement and when pressed, admitted that Chrans had a copy. Chrans later testified that the copy he had that day was the wrong copy and that a different copy had been filed by the prosecutor. The facts indicate and it is reasonable to conclude that the sentencing agreement was signed early Monday morning. Because the prosecutor stated that the agreement was not finalized at that time, there is a genuine factual issue as to when the agreement was actually finalized. However, even assuming that the resolution of this factual issue would be dispositive of the instant case, we nonetheless conclude that a remand is not required. The instant case is unlike DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 94 S.Ct. 1185, 39 L.Ed.2d 501 (1974), where the factual issue did not appear until after the defendant's trial had concluded. All of the facts which indicate there is a genuine issue concerning the finalization of Nissen's sentencing agreement arose before Lotter's trial was completed. Had Lotter thought there was a factual issue that was dispositive of his case, he could have raised that issue at trial as soon as the underlying facts were known to him. When an issue has not been raised or ruled on at the trial level and the matter necessitates an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not address the matter on direct appeal. State v. Cody, 248 Neb. 683, 539 N.W.2d 18 (1995). Because Lotter could have raised this issue at trial and had an evidentiary hearing at that time, he is not entitled to a remand.