Opinion ID: 615269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: HBC's Approval of Twigg's Leave Request Through April 1, 2008

Text: On February 26, 2008, Twigg contacted Cotton to figure out why her FMLA leave had only been approved through February 29. Cotton told Twigg that Twigg needed to call MetLife to determine why MetLife had only approved her short-term disability benefits for one week. In her affidavit, Twigg claims that Cotton also explained that the procedure for applying for FMLA leave is different from the procedure for obtaining short-term disability benefits; however, Cotton did not advise Twigg of HBC's practice of approving FMLA leave for as long as MetLife approves short-term disability benefits. Immediately after her conversation with Cotton, Twigg called MetLife and spoke to a customer service representative who informed Twigg that MetLife was still waiting on documents from her doctor. On February 28, 2008, Dr. Lickteig faxed additional medical information to MetLife. In response to a question asking for Twigg's anticipated return-to-work date, Dr. Lickteig answered, 4-21-08. (Aplt.App. at 218.) Later in the questionnaire, Dr. Lickteig also noted, Pt. isn't ready to return to work yet. ( Id. at 218A.) Nothing in the record suggests that HBC saw this information before the discovery phase of the present lawsuit. On March 4, 2008, Twigg called Cotton regarding MetLife and her short-term disability benefits. Twigg claims that during this conversation, Cotton told her that everything was taken care of; that [she] shouldn't be concerned about [her] FMLA leave; and that Ms. Cotton would call [her] if there was a problem. (Aplt.App. at 187.) Twigg does not assert, however, that any dates were mentioned during this conversation. On March 14, 2008, MetLife sent Cotton an e-mail indicating that it had approved short-term disability benefits for Twigg through April 1, 2008. That same day, Cotton prepared a memorandum to Twigg that stated, Your request for FMLA leave has been reviewed and approved for the following dates: February 20, 2008 thru April 1, 2008 ([short-term disability] approved thru 4/1). (Aple. Supp.App. at 163.) Cotton testified that she mailed the memorandum to Twigg's home address, though, as with the prior memorandum approving Twigg's leave through February 29, 2008, Twigg claims that she never received this memorandum. During the period between February 29, 2008 (the expiration date of Twigg's original FMLA leave approval), and March 14, 2008 (the date on which Twigg's approval was extended through April 1, 2008), Twigg's status with HBC was FMLA pending, which meant that she had not been formally approved for FMLA leave and had nothing covering her absences. (Aplt.App. at 214.) Nevertheless, Kathy Sade did not contemplate taking any disciplinary action against Twigg during that time because she thought the paperwork just needed to catch up. ( Id. at 205.) On March 18, 2008, Twigg sent an e-mail to Ealey, Sade, and other members of her department. ( Id. at 232-33.) This e-mail provided a general update on Twigg's status and concluded, Take care all, I will see you in about a month. ( Id. at 233.) Twigg testified that she never received any notification from HBC that her leave had been approved through the date that she originally requested, April 17, 2008. (Aple. Supp.App. at 46 (Question: Had you ever received anything from the company saying you were approved for FMLA leave through the 17th of April? Twigg: No.).) Yet other than the March 4 telephone conversation with Cotton and the March 18 e-mail, Twigg made no attempt to contact anyone at HBC between the date her original FMLA approval ended, February 29, 2008, and her termination on April 7, 2008.
On April 1, 2008, Sade sent an e-mail to Cotton expressing her expectation that Twigg would return to work the following day: I have not heard that Denice's [short-term disability] is approved past today so I assume she will be at work tomorrow. If anyone knows anything different please let me know. (Aplt.App. at 151.) The next day, Cotton responded by informing Sade that, according to MetLife, Twigg had not applied for an extension of her short-term disability benefits past April 1, 2008. Twigg did not return to work on April 2, nor did she come in on April 3 or 4. Moreover, Twigg did not call her supervisors to report her absences on those days. Thus, Twigg's absences on April 2, 3, and 4 constituted absences on three consecutive working days without proper notification, in violation of HBC's Rules of Conduct. As noted above, the presumptive discipline for Twigg's violation was termination, but HBC's rules provided management with the discretion to determine whether termination was warranted under the circumstances. Kathy Sade made the decision to terminate Twigg, with some input from the HR department. On April 7, 2008, Sade sent a termination letter to Twigg via certified mail. The letter informed Twigg that she was terminated as of April 7, 2008, for violating Rule 1 of HBC's Rules for Personal Conduct. The post office first attempted to deliver this letter on April 9, 2008, but Twigg did not pick it up until April 17. During her deposition, Sade was asked why she chose to terminate Twigg for the unreported absences in April when she had discretion not to impose termination as a sanction and when she had previously not taken action for unreported absences in March (i.e., the absences when Twigg's status was FMLA pending). Sade explained that HBC was in the process of reviewing Twigg's performance evaluations for the past year and had determined that Twigg was going to be given a low enough rating that she would be placed on a Performance Improvement Plan when she returned from leave. The low rating was based on a decline in Twigg's work performance, excessive tardiness, Twigg's failure to log on to the phone system as she was required to do, and various other things. ( Id. at 206.) According to Sade, Twigg's performance issues influenced the decision not to depart from the presumptive discipline of termination. ( Id. at 207 (These [issues] were considered because [Twigg] had a failure to report and I was not going to look the other way because she was going to be placed on a Performance Improvement Plan.).)
On April 11, 2008, Twigg returned to Dr. Lickteig for another examination. In his chart note for this examination, Dr. Lickteig wrote, in relevant part, The patient is in today for postop check from her bunionectomy performed six weeks ago. She is doing very well on the right foot.... Is set to return to work on 04/21/2008 and I gave her a back to work slip for that time. (Aplt.App. at 219.) On the morning of April 15, 2008, Twigg wrote an e-mail to Sade and Cindy Ealey. In the e-mail, Twigg said, I wanted to let you know I will be returning to work on Monday April 21st. ( Id. at 221.) Sade forwarded this e-mail to Candye Daughhetee, the head of HBC's HR department. Later that morning, Daughhetee left a voicemail for Twigg at her home phone number and sent Twigg an e-mail asking Twigg to contact her. In a letter dated April 16, 2008, MetLife notified Twigg that her claim for disability benefits was being closed as of April 1 on account of her failure to provide requested medical information. MetLife also sent Amber Cotton an e-mail notification that Twigg's file had been closed because no medical information was recieved [sic]. (Aple. Supp.App. at 183.) On that same day, however, Dr. Lickteig faxed his April 11 chart note to MetLife. Consequently, MetLife sent another e-mail to Cotton the next day indicating that it had extended Twigg's short-term disability benefits through April 20, 2008. As noted above, Twigg picked up her termination letter from the post office on April 17, 2008. Also on April 17, Twigg spoke with both Daughhetee and Sade on the phone. During Twigg's conversation with Sade, Sade explained to Twigg that her FMLA leave had not been approved past April 1 and she was basically a no-show. (Aplt.App. at 234.) Twigg then expressed her belief that Sade should have been able to get her FMLA leave approved for the full amount of time requested. Sade responded that she had no authority over FMLA matters. Twigg also complained that no one had told her that her leave had not been approved. But Sade corrected her and said Amber Cotton had called her and informed her it was only approved to the 1st of April. [2] ( Id. ) Finally, Twigg asked if Sade wanted her to come back. ( Id. ) Sade stated that she did not, given Twigg's performance and attitude for the last couple of years, especially the last year. ( Id. ) At some point after Twigg's termination, Sade learned of MetLife's decision to extend Twigg's short-term disability benefits through April 20, 2008. [3] In her deposition, Sade testified that MetLife's decision did not cause her to contemplate retracting Twigg's termination. Sade explained, [A]s I said earlier, [Twigg] was going to be put on a Performance Improvement Plan when she got backif she got back. And she still had a failure to report. ( Id. at 207.) On April 28, 2008, Twigg filed an administrative complaint against HBC with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), prompting the DOL to begin an investigation. On October 20, 2008, Nita Long participated in a final conference with a DOL investigator. During the conference, Long and the investigator discussed the possibility of Long's reinstating Twigg. Long described the substance of that conversation in her deposition: Q. Do you recall having a conference with [the investigator] in which the issue of reinstating Ms. Twigg came up? A. She did ask me if I would do that, yes. Q. And what was your answer? A. My answer was no. Q. And you were the decision-maker who made the decision not to reinstate Ms. Twigg, correct? A. Based on the fact that I wasn't going to change my decision on the FMLA. Q. And what was the reason why you refused to reinstate Ms. Twigg? A. Well, number one, the employee was already terminated for failure to report. I felt that the decision to terminate her for failure to report was correct. That based on the evidence that we had, she had not donehad not held up her responsibility by staying in touch with the company. That was her obligation, she didn't do it and so I felt that the termination was proper. I didn't see any reason to go back and make any changes from my perspective. ( Id. at 199.)
Twigg filed suit against HBC in the District of Kansas on December 28, 2008, alleging (1) retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on her defense of her black coworker, Teresa Cole; (2) retaliation under the FMLA; (3) and interference under the FMLA. [4] After the final pretrial conference and entry of the pretrial order, HBC moved for summary judgment on all of Twigg's claims. In an order dated April 21, 2010, the district court concluded that Twigg could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 1981, that Twigg could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, and that Twigg could not establish any of the elements of an FMLA interference claim. As a result, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of HBC. Twigg timely appealed to this Court.