Opinion ID: 2804365
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pleading Guilty as a Principal and an Aider and

Text: Abettor The dissent contends that Rosemond is not applicable to this case because Encarnación pleaded guilty as both a principal and as an aider and abettor, and, thus, we can affirm his conviction as a principal without addressing whether the government must prove that an aider and abettor of a § 2251(a) offense knew that the victim was a minor. According to the dissent, because the indictment charged Encarnación and Vilanova with aiding and abetting each other, and Encarnación never indicated at his change of plea hearing that he was pleading guilty as an aider and abettor only, he must have pleaded guilty as both a principal and as an aider and abettor.9 9 Neither party has raised the issues presented by the dissent, and we have received no briefing on them. Yet, the dissent would leave for another day the Rosemond issue, claiming that it was not squarely raised and . . . fully fleshed out in the parties' briefs. In fact, however, we explicitly requested, and received, supplemental briefing from the parties regarding how Rosemond affects this case. -21- The dissent is incorrect for a number of reasons. First, the dissent argues that when an indictment charges two defendants with aiding and abetting each other, the government always charges them both as aiders and abettors and as principals. We, however, have not definitively determined that issue. In some instances, we have treated this language as the dissent proposes to do in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Hilario-Hilario, 529 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Matos-Quinones, 456 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2006); Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2002). In other instances, where the nature of the charges was unquestioned by the parties, we have treated this language as indicting the defendant only as an aider and abettor. See, e.g., United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 259, 261 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Ramirez, 884 F.2d 1524, 1525, 1532 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Bonfant, 851 F.2d 12, 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1988). Importantly, in this case, neither party questions that Encarnación was only charged as an aider and abettor. Therefore, we do not need to reach the question of whether the aiding and abetting each other language always charges a defendant as both an aider and abettor and as a principal.10 10 The dissent claims that Hilario decided the very question before us that the aiding and abetting each other language always indicts a defendant both ways. However, the defendants in Hilario were not even indicted under the general aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, utilized in this case. See 529 -22- Second, even assuming that the indictment charged Encarnación as both an aider and abettor and as a principal, neither the record nor our case law supports the dissent's conclusion that Encarnación pleaded guilty both as a principal and as an aider and abettor. As the dissent acknowledges, in his written plea agreement, Encarnación only admitted to appearing in a video showing him aiding and abetting another co-defendant . . . engaging in sexually explicit conduct with the minor 'KMV.' Plea Agreement at 13 (emphasis added); see also id. (stating that Encarnación, while aiding and abetting others charged in the Superseding Indictment, did . . . coerce a female minor . . . to engage in sexually explicit conduct) (emphasis added). Nothing in F.3d at 69, 75. Instead, they were charged with both the central offense of smuggling an alien into the United States or attempting to do so, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)(2000), and the separately enumerated offense of aiding and abetting such an offense, id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II). Id. at 69. The court recognized that the aiding and abetting the smuggling of an alien statute was unusual because, unlike 18 U.S.C. § 2, it called for a lower statutory maximum sentence for an aider and abettor than for a principal. Id. at 75 & n.2. Thus, the court never addressed the question of whether defendants charged with aiding and abetting each other under 18 U.S.C. § 2--like Encarnación--are always indicted as both principals and aiders and abettors. Moreover, the parties in Hilario did not question the court's interpretation that the indictment charged the defendants as both principals and aiders and abettors. See id. at 69, 75. That situation is the opposite of this case, where the parties agree that Encarnación was only charged as an aider and abettor. -23- the plea agreement indicates that Encarnación also admitted guilt as a principal.11 Furthermore, nothing in the change of plea hearing demonstrates that Encarnación pleaded guilty as a principal. The dissent assumes that because Encarnación acknowledged at the change of plea hearing that he was charged with production of child pornography and participated in acts of a sexual nature with a minor without referring to his role as an aider and abettor, he admitted guilt as a principal. The dissent's assumption is incorrect. An aider and abettor to the production of child pornography is also charged with production of child pornography (as an aider and abettor) and could also participate[] in acts of a sexual nature with a minor. Encarnación did not plead guilty as a principal simply because he did not explicitly acknowledge his role only as an aider and abettor during the change of plea hearing. Additionally, on appeal, both parties agree that Encarnación was only charged as an aider and abettor. In its 11 The dissent argues that because the plea agreement made an explicit reference to both the production of child pornography statute and the aiding and abetting statute, it demonstrates that Encarnación admitted he acted as both a principal and an aider and abettor when he pleaded guilty. The dissent's contention has no merit. Even when a defendant pleads guilty only as an aider and abettor, his plea agreement necessarily must reference both the substantive offense statute and the aiding and abetting statute. Otherwise, the plea agreement would contain no indication of what substantive offense the aider and abettor was charged with supporting. -24- briefing, the government repeatedly acknowledges this fact. See, e.g., Gov't Br. at 15 (stating that Encarnación-Ruiz was charged as an aider and abettor); id. at 17 (stating, in title of Argument section, that Defendant Encarnación-Ruiz . . . Was Charged As An Aider And Abettor); id. at 24 (referring to Encarnación as an aider and abettor); Gov't Supp. Br. at 3 (noting that defendant ha[s] been charged as aider and abettor); id. at 5 (noting that Encarnación was charged under § 2251(a) only as an aider and abettor). Despite these clear statements, the dissent claims that the government also proceeded against Encarnación as a principal because its brief quotes 18 U.S.C. § 2 and argues that Encarnación must be punished as a principal since he actively assisted and participated in the substantive offense. We do not understand how quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2, universally known as the federal aiding and abetting statute, Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1243 (emphasis added), can be any indication that the government proceeded against Encarnación as a principal. Moreover, the statement that Encarnación should be punished as a principal provides further support that the government proceeded against him as an aider and abettor. The entire purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2 is to punish as a principal those who aid and abet a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); see Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1245 (noting that § 2 reflects a centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be responsible -25- for a crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another to complete its commission). If the government were indeed proceeding against Encarnación as a principal, it simply would have no reason to state that he must be punished as a principal. Finally, any argument by the government that it proceeded against Encarnación as a principal would likely violate the written plea agreement because the agreed upon statement of facts incorporated into the agreement clearly states that Encarnación was aiding and abetting another co-defendant. Plea Agreement at 13. The dissent contends that our decision in United States v. Grant, 114 F.3d 323 (1st Cir. 1997), stands for the proposition that when a defendant charged with multiple counts enters an unqualified guilty plea, that defendant admits guilt as to all counts. Because Encarnación was charged as both a principal and aider and abettor, and Encarnación entered an unqualified guilty plea, the dissent argues that he admitted guilt under both theories of liability. In Grant, the defendant argued that the imposition of consecutive sentences for four counts that amounted to the same offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 328. We rejected that argument because the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that the indictment was facially multiplicitous. Id. at 329. In doing so, we noted that [a]t the plea hearing, the district court repeatedly directed Grant's attention to the fact -26- that he had been charged with four different crimes, and he subsequently entered an unconditional plea on each count. Id. Grant conceded guilt to [four] separate offenses because he admitted to each of the distinct factual predicates underlying the separate counts. Id. Encarnación did not plead guilty to two separate crimes consisting of distinct factual predicates, and the government did not charge him under two separate counts. Instead, the government, at most, charged him under two alternative theories of the same crime — as an aider and abettor and as a principal — under a single count consisting of the same factual predicate, and chose to proceed against him only as an aider and abettor. See, e.g., United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that direct principal liability and aider and abettor liability are alternative theories of liability on [the same] charge), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Mojica–Baez, 229 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 2000). Moreover, the district court never repeatedly directed Encarnación's attention to the fact that he had been charged both as an aider and abettor and as a principal. In fact, neither the court nor the government ever informed Encarnación that he was pleading guilty under both theories of liability, which, as explained above, have distinct mens rea requirements. -27- The dissent has cited no case — and we are not aware of any — which holds that when a defendant pleads guilty to a charge containing the aiding and abetting each other language, and there is no indication from the government or the district court at the change of plea hearing under which theory the government intends to proceed, the defendant necessarily pleads as both an aider and abettor and a principal as a matter of law. Regardless, in this case, the government clearly stated in the plea agreement that Encarnación was only aiding and abetting another co-defendant. The dissent's proposed outcome would raise a significant due process concern regarding whether Encarnación's plea was knowing and voluntary. A defendant must be instructed in open court on 'the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered.' United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)). A plea cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the fact of voluntariness cannot be inferred by a reviewing court from a silent or otherwise inadequate record. Instead, due process requires that there be an 'affirmative showing' in the record to support that determination. United States v. Ward, 518 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)) (emphasis in original). -28- As explained above, there is simply no affirmative showing in the record that Encarnación knew he was pleading guilty as both a principal and aider and abettor. Yet, the dissent claims that Encarnación necessarily pleaded guilty as both a principal and aider and abettor because neither Encarnación nor the district judge indicated that he was pleading guilty as an aider and abettor only. The dissent's assertion would flip the due process inquiry on its head. Instead of requiring an affirmative showing, the dissent would infer from a silent record that Encarnación voluntarily pleaded guilty under both theories of liability. The dissent claims that its proposed outcome would resolve this appeal on the narrowest grounds possible but never explains why its resolution is narrow at all. It is true that we endeavor to avoid deciding constitutional issues and attempt to decide cases on the narrowest grounds possible. Bellville v. Town of Northboro, 375 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2004). However, instead of resolving the case on narrow grounds, the dissent would prefer to establish an unprecedented ruling that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty as both an aider and abettor and a principal whenever the indictment contains the aiding and abetting each other language and the change of plea hearing record is silent as to which theory the government intended to pursue. This ruling, without any briefing from the parties, would in fact create constitutional due process concerns. We believe the better — and -29- narrower — way of deciding this case is to answer the questions presented on appeal and addressed in the supplemental briefing that we requested.