Opinion ID: 2013434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Reasonable Time After Service

Text: [3] ¶ 15. The first issue is, what is a reasonable time after service for a defendant to file an answer with the court? The answer to this question requires an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4)a court-made rule. In interpreting a court rule, our objective is to discern and give effect to the intent of this court. State v. Sorenson, 2000 WI 43, ¶ 15, 234 Wis. 2d 648, 611 N.W.2d 240 (citing County of Door v. Hayes-Brook, 153 Wis. 2d 1, 21-22, 449 N.W.2d 601 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., concurring)). ¶ 16. Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14 is entitled Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. This rule is based upon Rule 5 of the Federal Rules. Clausen & Lowe, supra, at 24. The rule emphasizes in subsection (1) that, with few exceptions, a copy of all pleadings, written motions, and other important papers must be served upon all other parties. [4] ¶ 17. The rule then provides in subsection (4) that virtually all papers that are required to be served also shall be filed with the court within a reasonable time after service. [5] The papers covered by this subsection include more than answers. ¶ 18. Under the present rule, filing an answer with the court accomplishes at least two objectives: First, filing certifies to the court that the answer has been served upon the plaintiff and thereby eliminates the need for a separate affidavit of service. Second, filing notifies the court that issue has been joined and the case is ready to proceed. [6] ¶ 19. The present rule is a departure from prior law, which permitted some papers, including answers, to be filed with the court not later than ten days after the action is noticed for trial. Wis. Stat. § 263.23 (1971). Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(4) has the effect of narrowing the time period in which to file answers and other papers with the court. [4, 5] ¶ 20. Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(4) differs from rules that delineate a specified number of days within which service or filing must be accomplished. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 801.02(1) (within 90 days after filing); Wis. Stat. § 801.09(2) (within 45 days, exclusive of the day of service, after the summons has been served). Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(4) uses the phrase reasonable time. A reasonable time is not a specified time. It is an imprecise, unspecified time and requires a judicial determination. To determine whether an answer or other paper was filed within a reasonable time after service, the circuit court must make a finding of fact, [7] subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. [8] ¶ 21. Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(4) does not spell out what factors to consider in determining whether a filing has been made within a reasonable time after service. [9] Nonetheless, the complete text of the rule furnishes evidence of why its framers used an indefinite time rather than a specified time in subsection (4). ¶ 22. Subsection (2) of the rule outlines several different methods of making service. [10] Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2). Subsection (4) then declares that the filing of any paper required to be served constitutes certification by the party or attorney effecting the filing that a copy of such paper has been timely served on all parties required to be served, except as the person effecting the filing may otherwise stipulate in writing. Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4). [6] ¶ 23. These two provisions imply that a defendant should not file an answer with the court until the defendant is able to certify that all necessary parties have been timely served, unless the defendant stipulates otherwise. A defendant may have difficulty serving a plaintiff or multiple plaintiffs or an impleaded third party. The rule provides some latitude, in these unusual situations, to assure that filingwhich certifies serviceis not premature. If service upon a party were always a matter of certainty, there would be little reason not to require simultaneous filing at the time of service. ¶ 24. Once a defendant is able to certify that service has been made, there should be no reason, in ordinary situations, to delay filing the answer with the court. To illustrate, Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) states in part that: Service by mail is complete upon mailing and [s]ervice by facsimile is complete upon transmission. If a defendant chooses to serve a party by mail or by facsimile, there is no apparent reason why the defendant should not be able to file with the court simultaneously, or shortly after service. By contrast, if a defendant chooses to serve a party by personal delivery, the fact of personal service may require time for verification. [7] ¶ 25. We believe Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4) is intended to encourage prompt filing of papers with the court. This is especially true of answers. Prompt filing is the surest way to inform the court of the status of pending litigation so that the court can effectively manage its docket. [8, 9] ¶ 26. If and when a court is called upon to determine whether an answer has been filed within a reasonable time after service, the court should focus on the length of time between service and filing that allegedly amounts to unreasonable delay. The court should examine whether there are any factual circumstances that explain the delay, such as a problem with service, a need for verification of service, or the existence of a judicial stay. [11] If no such factors are present, the court should consider whether the answer was filed within 45 days after service of the complaintthe statutory time limit for answering the complaint. In theory, a defendant could serve an answer upon the plaintiff the very day the complaint was served but not file the answer for another 45 days. Although it would be difficult to find a factual basis justifying the defendant's delay in filing, a court would be hard pressed to impose a sanction upon a defendant who had a legal basis for delaynamely, compliance with the statutory time frame for answering the complaint. Finally, the court should consider whether the time period between service and filing is too insignificant to warrant any sanction. As a policy matter, the court should discourage technical objections in circumstances in which no sanction of any kind is warranted. ¶ 27. We acknowledge that the too-insignificant-to-warrant-sanction factor may appear inconsistent with a judicial finding of fact. Our goal is to develop an objective standard for the prompt filing of papers. [10] ¶ 28. Consistent with this goal, the determination whether the time period between service and filing was reasonable should exclude unrelated issues such as whether a party suffered prejudice because of the delay. Filing a timely served answer three months after service is not reasonable simply because the late filing did not prejudice the plaintiff or the court. Conversely, filing a timely served answer three days after service does not become unreasonable simply because the non-simultaneous filing caused some prejudice to the plaintiff. Injecting extraneous factors like prejudice into the determination whether a specific time period is a reasonable time after service undermines an objective standard for prompt filing. [11] ¶ 29. The Wisconsin rules expect that answers will be timely served and promptly filed. Courts ought to have authority to impose a serious sanction for failure to timely serve, and an appropriate sanction, however modest, for failure to file within a reasonable time after service. ¶ 30. This analysis is consistent with the practice in the federal courts. Rule 5(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the model for Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4). It reads in part: (d) Filing; Certificate of Service. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party, together with a certificate of service, must be filed with the court within a reasonable time after service. . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (emphasis added). ¶ 31. Professors Wright and Miller observe that federal courts have liberally construed the words `reasonable time' in order to minimize the incidence of technical objections that a paper, although served in ample time, was not filed . . . at the proper time. 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1152 (3d ed. 1997). [12] They note that failure to file generally is corrected by an order to compel filing. Id. Addressing motions for default, the professors conclude that under Rule 5, entry of default for failure to file timely is exceptional. In general, the rules regard the serving of a paper as the critical act that must be done within the specified time. A default cannot be predicated on a failure to file within the time permitted for service. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 32. In deciding a motion for default judgment based upon an alleged violation of Rule 5(d), federal courts usually consider whether the moving party was prejudiced by the delay. See Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660, 668 (D. Kan. 1998); Wilson v. United States, 112 F.R.D. 42, 43 (N.D. Ill. 1986). [12] ¶ 33. We agree that prejudice should be considered in determining the sanction, if any, for violation of the prompt filing requirement. As we explain below, prejudice must be considered and found before the court weighs default judgment as a sanction for failure to file promptly. As a practical matter, when the plaintiff moves to strike an answer to facilitate a default judgment for an alleged failure to file within a reasonable time after service, the court may begin with an analysis of prejudice; if it is not present, there is no need to go back to determine the reasonableness of the filing, except as the basis for a lesser sanction. [13] ¶ 34. In this case, Judge Gallagher began his analysis with the question whether Lumber Liquidators had filed within a reasonable time after service. He determined that Lumber Liquidators' filing, 45 days after service, was late. The judge said he was not going to find that 45 days was a reasonable time after service to file an answer when the general practice is that you do them at the same time. The record shows that Lumber Liquidators knew its answer had to be served by December 22, 1999, and it served its answer by mail on December 21, 1999, in order to meet this deadline. Lumber Liquidators offered no explanation why it did not file the answer until 45 days after it had served Split Rock44 days after the extended period for serving the answer had expired. Under these circumstances, the circuit court was not clearly erroneous when it determined that filing the answer 45 days after service was not within a reasonable time after service. [13]