Opinion ID: 186742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Foreseeability of Intervening Criminal Conduct in an Egress.

Text: 31 It is axiomatic that under a negligence regime, one has a duty to guard against only foreseeable risks. Doe v. Dominion Bank of Washington, N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1560 (D.C.Cir.1992); see Viands, 107 A.2d at 121. `As a general rule the proprietor of a place of public resort is subject to liability to his business invitees for injuries inflicted by the acts of other patrons or third persons if the proprietor by the exercise of reasonable care could have known that such acts were being done or were about to be done....' Grasso v. Blue Bell Waffle Shop, Inc., 164 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C.1960) (quoting Gregorc v. Londoff Cocktail Lounge, Inc., 314 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Mo.1958)). 32 The foreseeability required when the harm is caused by the criminal act of a third party, however, is more exacting. Because of the extraordinary nature of criminal conduct, liability depends on a heightened showing of foreseeability in the context of an intervening criminal act. Potts v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 1249, 1252 (D.C.1997) (quotation marks omitted). In Workman, we recently observed that the Court of Appeals has provided only limited specific guidance, 320 F.3d at 262, on what a heightened showing of foreseeability requires, id. Workman explained: 33 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has said a heightened showing is required, the requirement is a demanding one, and the proof must be precise. Potts, 697 A.2d at 1252. Foreseeability cannot be predicated upon generic information such as crime rates, [ Bailey v. District of Columbia, 668 A.2d 817, 820 (D.C.1995)], or evidence that the defendant's employees worked in a criminally active environment, Clement v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 634 A.2d 425, 429 (D.C.1993). The plaintiff is not, however, required to show previous occurrences of the particular type of harm; the requirement can be met instead by a combination of factors which give [the] defendant[ ] an increased awareness of the danger of a particular criminal act. District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987). 34 320 F.3d at 262 (second and third alterations in original). After reviewing D.C. tort cases involving a third party's criminal conduct, we predicted in Workman that heightened foreseeability is present when there is a special relationship between the person injured by the crime and the defendant, and prior, similar criminal acts have occurred in the area where the plaintiff was hurt. Id. at 264. 8 35 [T]he requirement that the defendant have been able to foresee that a third party would likely commit a criminal act, we explained, ordinarily has, and perhaps must have, a relational component. Id. at 263. Cases in this area suggest a sliding scale: If the relationship between the parties strongly suggests a duty of protection, then specific evidence of foreseeability is less important, whereas if the relationship is not of a type that entails a duty of protection, then the evidentiary hurdle is higher. Id. at 264. We noted, for example, that in District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d at 33-34, the Court of Appeals determined a duty could exist where a criminal abducted a young girl from her classroom in a public school and raped her at a park across the street from the school. Workman, 320 F.3d at 263. The Court of Appeals found persuasive the fact that there was evidence of prior crimes occurring in and around the school (although there was no evidence that this exact crime occurred previously in this location) and the fact that the victim was a young schoolchild over whom the District of Columbia exercised custodial care. Id. 36 This Court, as Workman notes, see id., looked to a special relationship and evidence of prior similar conduct in Doe v. Dominion Bank. There, a woman who had been raped on a vacant floor of an office building sued the landlord of the building. The District Court entered a directed verdict for the defendant, but we reversed because [t]here was ample evidence ... that the [landlord] had incessant notice of criminal activity — including theft, burglary, drug use, and possibly prostitution — ongoing at [the office building] during the two and a half years preceding Doe's rape. 963 F.2d at 1561. Although there was no evidence of criminal assaults, see id., Workman noted that in Dominion Bank the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant suggested the defendant should be held liable ... because the landlord was in the better position both to know about security threats and to protect against them. Workman, 320 F.3d at 263. The parties' special relationship and evidence of repeated intruders and prior nonviolent crimes made up for the lack of evidence of prior violent crimes. Id. 37 Looking to the existence of a special relationship is not novel: it is the basis for, and determines the contours of, the law of premises liability. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(3) (1965), provides: [a] possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a ... duty to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation. The duty arise[s] out of special relations between the parties, which create a special responsibility. Id. § 314A cmt. b. This duty to protect the other against unreasonable risk of harm extends to risks arising ... from the acts of third persons, whether they be innocent, negligent, intentional, or even criminal. Id. § 314A cmt. d. 38 Applying Viands and Workman to the facts before us and looking at those facts in the light most favorable to appellants, we conclude that a criminal attack on Novak and Valdivia in the I Street alley met the requirements of heightened foreseeability. The club, as business invitor, shared a special relationship with its business invitees, patrons Novak and Valdivia. See Hall v. Ford Enters., Ltd., 445 A.2d 610, 611 n. 4 (D.C.1982) (Traditionally, relationships that were considered to give rise to a duty of one party to protect the other party from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons have included the relationships of landowner to invitee, businessman to patron, employer to employee, school district to pupil, hospital to patient, and common carrier to passenger.). Additionally, there is evidence that the Zei Club had an increased awareness of the danger of a particular criminal act. District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d at 33. Novak and Valdivia proffered testimony from the club's security guards and other employees indicating that fights occurred in the club once every two weeks at least, twice a month, or probably 1 a month or 1 a week. One employee testified that he saw fights in the alley by the exit twice a month; another said he saw maybe 1 or 2 fights each month in the alley by the exit. 9 If believed, this evidence certainly could put a reasonable club owner on heightened notice that a serious problem existed outside its door. See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. O'Neill, 633 A.2d 834, 840 n. 11 (D.C.1993) (Virtually all courts and all commentators who have considered the issue have concluded that a common carrier's duty to its passengers includes a duty to protect them from assault by fellow passengers.) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). 10 39 The Zei Club had notice that prior fights frequently occurred in and around the club. Indeed, in the words of the Zei Club's own incident report from the night of the attack, just moments prior to the assault on Novak and Valdivia, the club had ejected a group of patrons for fighting inside the club. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Novak and Valdivia, the club cannot now seriously contend that an assault at its exit was not legally foreseeable. The club's special relationship, combined with significant evidence of repeated fights in and around the establishment, put this club on notice that its violence problem was not sudden and unexpected, Kline, 439 F.2d at 483, such that it had no duty to foresee any problem in its alleys for its patrons. With notice of repeated fights on its premises and in its entryways and approaches, having made substantial special use of those entryways and approaches, with every reason to expect that fights would continue absent the exercise of reasonable care, and with the power to exercise reasonable care over entryways and approaches, a reasonable jury could believe Novak and Valdivia's evidence on prior similar conduct and conclude that the Zei Club failed to take reasonable steps to secure its alley. 11