Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: guilt phase discussion

Text: (1) Defendant contends his arrest was invalid, and thus its fruits, including his statements to police, should have been suppressed, because the arresting officers who entered the Los Robles house to serve the arrest warrant did not have reasonable cause to believe he was inside, thus violating section 844 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We disagree. Section 844 requires police officers to have reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect is inside a dwelling before they may make a nonconsensual entry to effect an arrest. [4] This requirement applies to arrests with and without warrants ( People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 478 [233 Cal. Rptr. 323, 729 P.2d 757]; People v. Marshall (1968) 69 Cal.2d 51, 55-56 [69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P.2d 665]), and to peaceable as well as forcible entrances ( People v. Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 480). At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence arising from his arrest, Officer Dennis Sullivan of the Alhambra Police Department testified that he first encountered defendant on September 30, 1984, two months before the arrest, when Sullivan investigated an apparent altercation between an unidentified man and Frank Hillhouse at the Los Robles street address where defendant was later arrested. In the course of determining whether he should arrest either party, Sullivan spoke to defendant inside the front room of the house. Defendant identified himself as Michael Wader, said that his girlfriend lived at the house, and that he had been in prison for murder for 20 years. Although Officer Sullivan made no arrests resulting from the altercation, he filled out field interview cards on defendant and Hillhouse. On November 28, 1984, Officer Sullivan learned at roll call of two outstanding arrest warrants each for defendant and Hillhouse. He then drove past the Los Robles address, saw two cars in the driveway, and ran license plate checks. Neither car was registered to defendant. Officer Sullivan returned to the house in the early morning hours. He drove past the house slowly on several occasions, and at least once, used binoculars. Through a three-foot opening in the drapes of the inside front room, he observed defendant and a woman sitting on a couch backed up against the front window. The interior lights were on. Although their backs were to the window, Officer Sullivan could identify defendant because the man and woman turned toward each other, presenting profiles. Officer Sullivan was certain the man was defendant and not Hillhouse, because defendant was thinner and lighter than Hillhouse. Officer Sullivan left the Los Robles site at one point; when he returned, one of the two cars was gone. At 2:30 or 3:00 a.m., the lights in the house went out. After staying at the location for two more hours, Officer Sullivan returned to the police station. At approximately 6:15 a.m., Officer Sullivan, assisted by another officer, returned to the Los Robles address with an arrest warrant. Employing a ruse, the officers obtained entrance to the house and arrested defendant. At most, defendant contends, the police had a hunch that he was inside the house. In essence, defendant argues that Officer Sullivan's testimony was not worthy of belief because it varied in certain particulars from a written police report he prepared shortly after the arrest. First, defendant focuses on a statement in Officer Sullivan's report that when he drove by the house, he saw a man later identified as defendant. But Officer Sullivan testified that his reference to a subject later identified as defendant meant only that he later confirmed, by viewing defendant's driver's license, that the subject was indeed defendant. Second, defendant stresses that Officer Sullivan wrote in the arrest report that he saw the backs of people in the Los Robles residence, but did not write that he saw their profiles, as he later testified. Any confusion or lack of complete consistency in a witness's testimony speaks to the weight of the evidence. (See 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Introduction of Evidence at Trial, ง 1751, p. 1706.) This is a matter within the province of the trier of fact โ here, the trial court. Third, defendant contends that People v. Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d 472, cannot be meaningfully distinguished from this case. We disagree. In Jacobs, the arresting officer testified he believed that the defendant was at a residence during daytime hours because the officer had obtained his address from an employment application, had seen the defendant at that address some three months earlier, and had learned the defendant was not employed during the day. ( Id. at p. 478.) We held this evidence was insufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief that the defendant was inside the house. ( Id. at p. 479.) Here, by contrast, the arresting officer personally observed defendant at the residence in the early morning hours before the arrest at dawn. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that Officer Sullivan had reasonable cause to believe defendant was inside the Los Robles address when he served the arrest warrant; accordingly, section 844 was not violated. (See People v. Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 479-480.) For the same reason, defendant has not demonstrated a violation of the Fourth Amendment. (See Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 603 [63 L.Ed.2d 639, 661, 100 S.Ct. 1371].) The officers searched the residence and found defendant. Defendant also argues that this nonconsensual search was unlawful because the arresting officers did not have a search warrant, and there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search. But because the arrest was made under the authority of a valid arrest warrant and in conformity with section 844, the absence of exigent circumstances or a search warrant is of no significance.
Defendant raises a number of guilt phase issues relating to statements he made to sheriff's deputies following his arrest. The relevant facts are as follows: On November 29, 1984, defendant was arrested in Los Angeles County on a warrant issued in San Bernardino County for possession of narcotics on prison grounds. The arrest warrant was issued when defendant failed to attend a sentencing hearing in a then-pending matter. About 4 p.m. on November 29, 1984, Sergeant Rod Hoops and two other deputies of the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department transported defendant from the Alhambra Police Department to the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department in Ontario. During the ride, Sergeant Hoops asked if defendant knew the whereabouts of Frank Hillhouse, defendant's friend. Defendant replied he had heard that Hillhouse was in the Yucca Valley area of San Bernardino County and was involved in shooting a woman in the La Puente area. Sergeant Hoops testified he did not advise defendant of his constitutional rights ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725-726, 86 S.Ct. 1602]) because defendant was at that time not a suspect in the murder of Maxine Brown. The next day, November 30, Sergeant Hoops again questioned defendant without advising him under Miranda. This time, defendant said that Hillhouse had a .357 magnum gun, had used it to shoot an old white broad, and had also taken the victim's car. Sergeant Hoops then contacted Deputy Michael Griggs of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, who informed him of some of the details of Maxine Brown's killing. Griggs mentioned that Brown's credit card had been used to buy a pair of boots from Kinney's Shoe Store. In a telephone conversation a few hours later, Griggs gave Hoops certain details regarding the boots. At that point, Hoops walked over to defendant and removed his boots to see if they matched Griggs's description of the boots that had been bought with the victim's credit card. After asking why Hoops was taking the boots, defendant volunteered that he had bought them and had a receipt. Defendant then said, Well, I changed my mind. They were a gift. Sergeant Hoops did not at any time ask defendant any questions about the boots. Later that same day, November 30, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputy Griggs and Sergeant Stoner went to the Ontario sheriff's station to interview defendant. The deputies questioned defendant twice. Before the first interview, which was not tape-recorded, Stoner advised defendant of his Miranda rights by reading from a standard admonition card issued by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Defendant indicated he understood his rights, did not want an attorney at that time, and wished to speak to the officers without an attorney present. The second interview on November 30 was tape-recorded. Before questioning defendant, Sergeant Stoner orally advised defendant of his constitutional rights by reading them from a form. Stoner misread one line on the form. The form stated: If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, free of charge. Instead, Stoner told defendant: If you hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent you before any questions free of charge. Before this oral advisement, Sergeant Stoner had given defendant a card that listed his constitutional rights; defendant signed the card immediately after the advisement. The next day, December 1, 1984, the deputies questioned defendant in a tape-recorded session. There was another tape-recorded interview in February 1985. Each interview was preceded by an advisement, and waiver, of defendant's constitutional rights.
(2) Defendant argues that his uncounseled statements to Sergeant Hoops on November 29, 1984, were obtained in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution and should have been suppressed. The Attorney General asserts that the issue was waived and, in any event, no constitutional violation occurred. We agree that the issue was waived. At the beginning of the hearing on defendant's nonstatutory motion to exclude certain testimony, the prosecutor described the motion as directed towards the statements ... that were taken by [Sergeant] Hoops.... Defense counsel agreed with this statement, and Sergeant Hoops was called as a witness and examined by both sides. But defense counsel never made clear on what grounds he sought to exclude defendant's responses to Sergeant Hoops's questions on November 29, 1984, as Evidence Code section 353 requires. (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 188 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 906 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) The focus of argument at the conclusion of the court hearing shifted to the testimony of other witnesses, and the trial court did not rule on the admissibility of defendant's statements to Sergeant Hoops. Defense counsel never argued to the trial court that those statements should be suppressed. When Hoops testified at trial, defense counsel failed to object to his testimony on constitutional grounds. Accordingly, we conclude the issue was waived. ( People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 270, fn. 13 [256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610].) (3a) Defendant alternatively contends that if the issue was waived, the failure to preserve it demonstrates his counsel's ineffective representation. The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when an attorney fails to perform as a reasonably competent attorney, and it is reasonably probable that, absent counsel's deficiencies, a more favorable result would have been obtained. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 950 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222]; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 449 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 33 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249].) Here, it is not reasonably probable that if defense counsel had pursued the Fifth and Sixth Amendment objections defendant now urges on appeal, there would have been a more favorable result. Defendant's Sixth Amendment theory is that, because his arrest arose from a case pending in San Bernardino County in which he had requested and obtained a court-appointed attorney, Sergeant Hoops violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by questioning him outside the presence of his counsel. (4) The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to `protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations' with his `expert adversary,' the government, after `the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified' with respect to a particular alleged crime. ( McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. ___, ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 158, 168, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2209], original italics.) Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. ( Id. at p. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 166, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2207].) (3b) Here, that right had not attached when defendant was questioned by Sergeant Hoops, because at that time adversary criminal judicial proceedings had not yet commenced in this case. Although defendant had obtained counsel in a case that was unrelated to this case, because defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel in this case had not attached it could not be violated. (5) Defendant also contends that his attorney was incompetent for not arguing that defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated by Sergeant Hoops's failure to advise him of his Miranda rights before asking him about the whereabouts of Frank Hillhouse. Generally, Miranda advisements must be given by law enforcement officers before any custodial interrogation. ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725-726, 86 S.Ct. 1602].) Here, Sergeant Hoops's inquiry regarding Hillhouse was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. Not every question directed by an officer to a person in custody amounts to an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. The standard is whether under all the circumstances involved in a given case, the questions are `reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' ( United States v. Booth (9th Cir.1981) 669 F.2d 1231, 1237.) This is an objective standard. The subjective intent of the [officer] is relevant but not conclusive. [Citation.] The relationship of the question asked to the crime suspected is highly relevant. [Citation.] ( United States v. Gonzalez-Marez (9th Cir.1985) 752 F.2d 1485, 1489; accord, e.g., United States v. Talbott (4th Cir.1990) 902 F.2d 1129, 1134.) As Sergeant Hoops's testimony indicates, his inquiry regarding the whereabouts of Hillhouse was designed to elicit information about Hillhouse, not defendant. There is no indication in the record before us that the inquiry was at all relevant to any charge for which defendant was then in custody or any crime of which he was then suspected. Accordingly, Sergeant Hoops was not required to advise defendant of his rights under Miranda, and defendant's counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to raise this issue.
As mentioned earlier, before questioning defendant on November 30, 1984, Sergeant Stoner advised defendant of his Miranda rights by reading them from a form. The full text of one of the rights stated: If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, free of charge. (Italics added.) Stoner, however, misread this; he omitted the three italicized words, instead telling defendant: If you hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent you before any questions free of charge. (6) Defendant contends this misreading invalidated the Miranda warnings, thus requiring suppression of the statements obtained as a result. We reject defendant's contention for several reasons. First, 15 to 20 minutes before the tape-recorded interview in which Sergeant Stoner misread the advisement, defendant was advised of his rights under Miranda by Sergeant Stoner in a manner he does not assert was inaccurate. Second, defendant indicated in writing immediately after the misadvisement that he understood his rights as set forth on an admonition card, and he signed the admonition card. With respect to the one right at issue here, the card correctly specified: If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, free of charge. Defendant does not argue misadvisement in this respect. Third, the United States Supreme Court has stressed that `the rigidity of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant,' and that `no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its strictures.' ( Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 202-203 [106 L.Ed.2d 166, 176-177, 109 S.Ct. 2875], quoting California v. Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355, 359 [69 L.Ed.2d 696, 701, 101 S.Ct. 2806].) Under the circumstances, the proper warnings that immediately preceded Sergeant Stoner's misreading of one of the rights adequately advised defendant of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda.
(7) We reject defendant's contention that his December 1, 1984, interrogation violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution. That right, as we explained earlier, is offense-specific. In this case, that right had not attached when the police questioned defendant on December 1, because criminal proceedings against defendant in this case had not commenced; charges were not filed until December 5, 1984. The fact that defendant had obtained counsel in a case that was unrelated to this case did not implicate the Sixth Amendment, because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. Accordingly, there was no violation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and it was not ineffective for counsel not to argue there was such a violation.
(8) Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on this court's decision in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] ( Anderson ). This court held in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 140 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862] ( Carlos ) that the felony-murder special circumstance of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) required the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim, irrespective of whether the defendant was the actual killer or an aider or abettor. In Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147, we overruled Carlos and held that a felony-murder special circumstance may be found and the death penalty imposed without proof that the defendant intended to kill, unless the defendant was not the actual killer. We later clarified that the holding of Anderson did not apply to crimes committed while Carlos was in effect. ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973, fn. 4 [281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131]; accord, People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 835 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249].) The crimes in this case occurred in November 1984, when this court's decision in Carlos was in effect. When the trial began, Carlos was still the law. This court filed its opinion in Anderson on October 13, 1987. On October 14, 1987, the prosecution in this case rested its case-in-chief. The next day, defendant moved for a mistrial. Defendant's motion for a mistrial was based on the theory that his defense was structured around the central contention that, although he kidnapped, robbed and fatally shot the victim, he lacked the intent to kill her. On appeal, defendant contends that had he known that, under Anderson, the prosecution would not have to prove intent to kill, he would have structured his defense differently. But in arguing the motion at trial, the only material choice that defense counsel indicated might have been different was the use of peremptory challenges; defense counsel suggested that, had the defense known intent to kill would not be an issue, it would have tried to select a jury with only the penalty phase in mind. The primary defect in defendant's argument is that, as this court has subsequently made clear, for crimes committed when Carlos was in effect the jury was required to find that the defendant had the intent to kill before a felony-murder special circumstance could be found true. ( People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 973, fn. 4; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 835.) In this case, the trial court's charge to the jury anticipated our later ruling that Anderson was not to be applied retroactively to crimes committed while Carlos was in effect. The trial court required the jury to find whether or not defendant intended to kill a human being at the time of the murder. The jury expressly found that defendant had the intent to kill the victim. Accordingly, defense counsel's strategy of basing the defense on defendant's asserted lack of intent to kill was in no way compromised by Anderson, because Anderson did not apply to defendant's trial. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. Our conclusion is not affected by the trial court's refusal to specifically instruct the jury that it must find intent to kill in order to find the robbery-murder special circumstance. As noted above, the trial court did require the jury to determine whether or not defendant had the intent to kill. Thus, the jury necessarily found the requisite intent to kill as a result of other properly given instructions.... ( People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 108 [221 Cal. Rptr. 826, 710 P.2d 893]; see also People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 438.) We note that defense counsel in closing argument stressed to the jurors that they had to make a finding whether defendant had the intent to kill. Nor does consideration of Coleman v. McCormick (9th Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 1280 alter our conclusion. As we have elsewhere explained,  Coleman considered whether a trial held under one set of rules can later be used to reach a sentencing verdict under a quite different set of rules, and concluded it cannot. ( People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 110 [279 Cal. Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].) Here, the rules governing the critical issue โ whether the jury had to conclude that defendant had the intent to kill as a prerequisite to the felony-murder special circumstance finding โ did not change during trial in any way that affected this case. Thus, Coleman, which this court is not bound to follow in any event, has no application here.
(9a) Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he intended to kill Maxine Brown when he fired the fatal shot. We reject this argument. (10) In assessing a sufficiency-of-evidence argument on appeal, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party to determine whether it shows evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 462 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].) We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. ( Ibid. ) (9b) Here, defendant's tape-recorded statement to sheriff's deputies on December 1, 1984, supplied ample evidence that he intended to kill Maxine Brown when he shot her. This is what defendant told the deputies: After driving with the victim in her car for several hours, looking unsuccessfully for a place to rob, he stopped at a church. Defendant eventually told Brown to get out of the car and start walking. Brown got out, but then came back into the car and asked for her purse. Defendant said, No, you can't have your purse because you'll call the police. When Brown replied, I'm going to call them anyway, defendant got scared, and hit her on the head with his gun, and told her to get out again. She did so. She then turned around and told defendant, I'm going to call the police. At that point, defendant jumped out and shot her. Also, at trial defendant testified that when the victim was in her car in the church parking lot, he told her, Leave. I don't want to shoot you but I will. These statements by defendant strongly support the jury's conclusion that he intended to kill Maxine Brown when he shot her. In the tape-recorded interview with defendant that was played at trial, defendant claimed he did not intend to kill the victim, but intended only to scare her. At trial, defendant made the same claim. He testified that as to the third (and fatal) shot, which hit the victim in the chest, he just fired at random. The jury, however, was not required to accept that testimony. The jury was free to believe some of defendant's statements and to disbelieve other statements. (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, งง 1770-1771, pp. 1723-1725.) Moreover, the testimony of defendant's girlfriend, Mary Kimble, also supports the jury's finding that defendant intended to kill Maxine Brown when he shot her. Kimble testified that when defendant came home on the night of the crimes, he told her that things went sour and that he had to kill a woman. Defendant emphasizes the evidence tending to show that the first two shots were fired at a downward angle, which, he argues, is consistent with an intent to frighten rather than an intent to kill. But defendant need not have intended to kill the victim when he fired the first and second shots. The jury's conclusion that defendant intended to kill when he fired the third and fatal shot, which hit the victim in the chest, is supported by evidence that the gun used by defendant required that he manually retract the hammer before pulling the trigger. The testimony of Mark Velarde also supports this conclusion. This witness, who lived across the street from the site of the killing, testified that he heard three shots. The first two shots were fired in rapid succession, but there was a slightly longer delay between the second and third shots than between the first and the second. In the context of this case, this delay is further evidence that defendant intended to kill the victim when he shot her in the chest.
(11) Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury that it must find intent to kill before it could find the robbery-murder special circumstance to be true. As explained earlier, when the trial of this case began, Carlos, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, which required proof of intent to kill as a prerequisite for a felony-murder special circumstance, was the law. While the trial was in progress, this court overruled Carlos in Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104. As we later made clear, the rule of Carlos applied to cases in which the crime occurred when Carlos was in effect. ( People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 973, fn. 4; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 835.) Under Carlos, the standard jury instruction specified, in pertinent part: To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder in the commission of a robbery, is true, it must be proved: ... [ถ] 2. That the defendant intended to kill a human being. (CALJIC No. 8.81.17 (1984 rev.) (4th ed. Jan. 1987 pocket pt. pp. 130-131).) In this case, the trial court instructed the jury in terms of the special circumstance without reference to intent to kill. The court then added to the special circumstance instruction the following: If you find the special circumstance true, you must make a separate finding as to whether the defendant intended to kill a human being at the time of the murder. A special form will be provided for that purpose. The jury was given a special finding form that read: We find the defendant Michael Joseph Wader intended to kill Maxine Brown. True. Not True. The jury circled True. Instructional error, even with regard to an element of an offense, is measured under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]. ( People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 414 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184]; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 789 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419]; see generally Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263 [105 L.Ed.2d 218, 109 S.Ct. 2419].) But with respect to a failure to instruct on intent to kill under Carlos, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, we have stated that no reversible error exists where the jury necessarily found the requisite intent to kill as a result of other properly given instructions (the so-called Sedeno exception).... ( People v. Leach, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 108, referring to People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913]; see generally People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 438.) This case comes within the Sedeno exception. Here, the jury explicitly found that defendant intended to kill the victim when he shot her. Because of that express finding, the trial court's failure to adhere to the precise terms of former CALJIC No. 8.81.17 did not prejudice defendant.
(12) Defendant contends the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on its own motion on the relevance of voluntary intoxication to the questions whether defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim, to commit robbery, or to kidnap the victim for the purpose of robbery. There is some evidence from which the jury could have inferred that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the crimes. Defendant's girlfriend, Mary Kimble, testified that defendant injected cocaine before he left the Los Robles residence on the night of the crimes. And defendant testified that he had a lot of cocaine with him in the victim's car, and injected it all night long. He also testified that he used crystal meth on the night of the crimes. Defendant, however, did not rely on voluntary intoxication as a defense to the specific intent crimes with which he was charged. As we have recently held, a trial court has no duty to instruct on its own motion on voluntary intoxication. ( People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an instruction on voluntary intoxication. We disagree. Defendant's version of events was that he specifically intended not to kill the victim when he shot her. According to defendant, he did harbor a specific intent when he fired the third and fatal shot โ to scare the victim, and nothing more. An instruction on voluntary intoxication as negating specific intent would have been inconsistent with defendant's theory of the case. Accordingly, we cannot say that defense counsel had no rational tactical purpose in not requesting an instruction on intoxication.
The trial court instructed the jury in the terms of CALJIC No. 2.03 (1984 rev.) (4th ed. 1987 pocket pt., p. 8) that if you find that before this trial the defendant made wilfully false or deliberately misleading statements concerning the charge upon which he is now being tried, you may consider such statements as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt but it is not sufficient of itself to prove guilt.... (13) Defendant contends the trial court erred in so instructing the jury, because defendant's statements that might be considered false and misleading had no probative value for any contested issue at trial. As we shall explain, the instruction properly directed the jury's attention to testimony tending to show that defendant attempted to divert suspicion from himself to Frank Hillhouse, and that his later inconsistent statements that he did not intend to kill the victim were false. Defendant testified at trial that when he fired his gun at the victim, he did not intend to kill her. He stated that when she fell to the ground, he thought she had fainted, and when, after the incident, he read the newspapers and watched television and found no account of a murder, he concluded that he had not killed the victim. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant's statements to San Bernardino County sheriff's deputies, who at that time were unaware of the victim's murder, that Frank Hillhouse, defendant's friend, had a .357 magnum gun, had used it to shoot an old white broad in the La Puente area, and had also taken the victim's car. The jury could reasonably conclude that these statements were false and misleading, that defendant attempted to divert suspicion from himself to Hillhouse, and that this attempt tended to show the falseness of defendant's later testimony that he did not intend to kill the victim and did not believe he had killed the victim. Thus, defendant's false statements to sheriff's deputies had a direct bearing on the credibility of his later testimony that he did not intend to kill. The trial court therefore did not err in instructing the jury in the terms of CALJIC No. 2.03, supra.
The trial court gave the jury CALJIC No. 2.20 (1980 rev.) (4th ed. 1984 cum. pocket pt., p. 8), which told the jury it could properly consider the witnesses' prior consistent and inconsistent statements, and anything that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of a witness. (14) Defendant claims the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury in the terms of the second paragraph of the then-current version of CALJIC No. 2.21 (4th ed. 1979 bound vol.) At the time of trial, the instruction read: A witness willfully false in one material part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless, from all the evidence, you shall believe the probability of truth favors his testimony in other particulars. [ถ] However, discrepancies in a witness' testimony or between his testimony and that of others, if there were any, do not necessarily mean that the witness should be discredited. Failure of recollection is a common experience; and innocent misrecollection is not uncommon. It is a fact, also, that two persons witnessing an incident or a transaction often will see or hear it differently. Whether a discrepancy pertains to a fact of importance or only to a trivial detail should be considered in weighing its significance. [5] Defendant contends the inconsistencies between his statements to the police that were admitted at trial and his trial testimony required the trial judge to instruct the jury on its own motion in the terms of the second paragraph of the instruction at issue. We disagree. The requirement that the trial court give sua sponte instructions applies only to those instructions that are `necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.' ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311]; accord, People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 442.) As noted above, the jury was given CALJIC No. 2.20, which told the jury it could properly consider the witnesses' prior consistent and inconsistent statements, and anything that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of a witness. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court gave the jury the instructions that were necessary to evaluate the testimony of the witnesses, including defendant. The jury was adequately instructed.