Opinion ID: 2632648
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Elk as livestock

Text: {22} Because elk are not included among the enumerated animals in the definition of livestock under Section 7-35-2(C), the question becomes whether either the Lodge's private or public herd of elk are other domestic animals useful to man. Under the Property Tax Code, Petitioner and the Board are entrusted to make this initial determination, subject to the Division's supervision. See NMSA 1978 § 7-36-16(A) (2000) (County assessors shall determine values of property for property taxation purposes in accordance with the Property Tax Code ... and the regulations, orders, rulings and instructions of the department.); NMSA 1978 § 7-35-3(A) (1989) (The director [of the Division] has general supervisory authority over county assessors for the purposes of assuring implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the Property Tax Code ... and applicable regulations, orders, rulings and instructions of the department.). In this case both Petitioner and the Board based their decision on the fact that Petitioner learned from attending a seminar that the Division does not consider elk to be livestock and had omitted elk from its list of classes of livestock in P.T.D. Order No. 99-25. That order is required by NMSA 1978, § 7-36-21(D) (1975), and directs the assessors in the imposition of property taxes on livestock. Furthermore, the Department of Taxation's regulations provide: Classes of livestock and the value of each class are required to be established by order each tax year pursuant to [Section 7-36-21]. Particular classes or types of [other] domestic animals useful to man which are named in the order establishing classes of livestock are livestock as that term is defined in [Section 7-35-2]. 3.6.1.7(F) NMAC. The assessors are required to follow this order in valuing livestock for property tax purposes. See Section 7-36-16(A); see also Zwaagstra v. DelCurto, 114 N.M. 263, 264-65, 837 P.2d 457, 458-59 (Ct.App.1992) (concluding that the assessors do the actual valuation of livestock, although their discretion is limited to determin[ing] the number of animals in each class of livestock owned by the taxpayer, and apply[ing] to that the values established by the division). Thus, although procedurally we are reviewing the Board's decision to uphold Petitioner's assessment, in a very real sense we are reviewing the Division's determination that elk are not livestock and its decision not to include elk in P.T.D. Order No. 99-25.
{23} The Court of Appeals concluded that the Lodge's private elk herd fit the definition of livestock contained in Section 7-35-2(C), but that the public herd did not. The answer to this question depends, in large part, on the appropriate standard of review. Under NMSA 1978, § 7-38-28 (1999), a party may appeal an order made by a county valuation protests board by filing an appeal pursuant to the provisions of NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1 (1999). Under Subsection D of Section 39-3-1.1, there are three grounds for reversing an order of an agency: (1) the agency acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously; (2) the final decision was not supported by substantial evidence; or (3) the agency did not act in accordance with law. The Court of Appeals acknowledged this limited scope of review but also noted that, while it would not substitute its judgment for that of the Board's, it was not bound by the Board's interpretation of the law. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 2004-NMCA-055, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642. Although it never makes this point explicit, the Court of Appeals seemed to view this question to be a legal one and reviewed the Board's determination de novo. {24} Determining whether the Lodge's private or public herd of elk consists of other domestic animals useful to man would ordinarily require factual findings about the nature of the elk and the Lodge's handling of them, and then a legal determination whether the facts so found support the conclusion that the elk fit the legal definition of livestock. In general, we review findings of fact for substantial evidence, and the legal conclusion de novo. See TPL, Inc. v. N.M. Tax. & Rev. Dep't, 2003-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 133 N.M. 447, 64 P.3d 474; Rauscher, Pierce, Refsnes, Inc. v. Tax. & Rev. Dep't, 2002-NMSC-013, ¶ 26, 132 N.M. 226, 46 P.3d 687. But see State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144-45, 870 P.2d 103, 106-07 (1994) (suggesting that the standards of review for fact and law are not binary and the degree of deference given to a mixed question of law depends less on the category into which each fall than on principles of appellate review and policy considerations). Here, however, the facts are not in dispute. Instead, the parties disagree about the legal conclusion to draw from those facts. Thus, we are faced with a pure question of law, which we review de novo. See TPL, Inc., 2003-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 133 N.M. 447, 64 P.3d 474. {25} Although we review de novo the Board's legal conclusion that elk are not livestock under the Property Tax Code, that de novo review is limited by the deference courts should give to these kinds of legal determinations made by administrative agencies. As we noted in Rio Grande Chapter of the Sierra Club, 2003-NMSC-005, ¶ 17, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806, we are not bound by an agency's interpretation of the law, but we do give deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation or application of law. See also Chavez v. Mountain States Constructors, 1996-NMSC-070, ¶¶ 20-21, 122 N.M. 579, 929 P.2d 971; Morningstar Water Users v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 120 N.M. 579, 583, 904 P.2d 28, 32 (1995). Indeed, we give a heightened degree of deference to legal questions that `implicate special agency expertise or the determination of fundamental policies within the scope of the agency's statutory function.' Morningstar Water Users, 120 N.M. at 583, 904 P.2d at 32 (quoting Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987)). Given that deferential standard of review, we cannot conclude that the Board acted improperly in following the direction of the Division and concluding that elk are not livestock for purposes of the Property Tax Code.
{26} In affirming Petitioner's assessment, the Board relied, in part, on the fact that P.T.D. Order No. 99-25 does not include elk in its list of livestock. The Court of Appeals rejected this approach, noting that the Order also fails to include other animals, such as buffalo, mules, and ratites, that are specifically listed as livestock in Section 7-35-2. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, the absence of an animal from the Order cannot be deemed conclusive or even to provide guidance in the interpretation of Section 7-35-2. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 2004-NMCA-055, ¶ 29, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642. Petitioner, however, was not using P.T.D. Order No. 99-25 as an aid in interpreting the statute, but rather as evidence of the Division's determination on the issue, which determination he must follow. See Section 7-36-16(A). Furthermore, it was not the only evidence of the Division's determination; as noted, an assessor in Petitioner's office testified that he learned that the Division did not consider elk livestock from attending a seminar on the subject. See NMSA 1978, § 7-35-5(A) (1991) (The department shall conduct or sponsor special courses of instruction and in-service and intern training programs on the technical, legal and administrative aspects of property taxation.). The fact that some animals listed in the statute are absent from the order could become an issue in other cases, but it is not at issue here. That is, had Petitioner denied an agricultural exemption to land used primarily to produce buffalo based solely on its absence in the order, such a decision would be invalid because it violates Section 7-35-2. Because, however, Petitioner denied an agricultural exemption to land used primarily to produce an animal that is included in neither the order nor the statute, and because the order is not the only evidence of the Division's conclusion on the matter, we cannot say Petitioner unreasonably concluded that the Division does not consider elk to be livestock. {27} On appeal to this Court, the Department of Taxation and Revenue filed an Amicus Curiae brief arguing that the Court of Appeals' opinion, by allowing the assessors to disregard the direction of the Division, could lead to uneven application of the Property Tax Code. Indeed, the Department could not emphasize too strongly what problems it would cause in the administration of property taxes throughout the state if local county assessors had the power to substitute their own judgment for statutory provisions and regulations and classifications issued by the Department. [Amicus Br. 6] That risk is heightened by the final result of the Court of Appeals' opinion, which concluded that some elk are livestock and other elk are not. [1] We agree that uneven administration of the Property Tax Code is troubling, which is why we emphasize that what we are reviewing in this case is the Division's categorical determination that elk are not livestock. As we explain below, we conclude that the Division's conclusion that elk are not livestock is a reasonable interpretation of Section 7-35-2. Furthermore, the facts of this case show that the Petitioner's and the Board's acceptance of the Division's determination is also reasonable. {28} Neither party disputes that the meat and hides of elk make them useful to man. Rather, the dispute centers on the question whether elk are domestic animals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board in part because it concluded that elk are not significantly less tame than buffalo. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 2004-NMCA-055, ¶ 28, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642. In support of this argument, the Court noted how the Lodge carefully regulates their breeding and they are kept within an eight-foot fence. Although these facts are both indicia of domestication, we conclude that they are not sufficient to allow a court to second-guess the Board's decision to follow the Division's determination. Although the private elk herd are contained within a fence, that fence encloses two separate 3,200-acre game preserves. There was no testimony at the hearing to support a conclusion that the herd was significantly restricted within either of the 3,200-acre sections. Furthermore, the Board based its conclusion in part on the fact that the elk were used to support the Lodge's use as a hunting lodge. The fact that the elk are harvested through big game hunts  that is, through sport  is at odds with a conclusion that they are domestic, and supports the Board's decision to follow the determination of the Division. They are distinguished from the animals in the enumerated list of livestock in Section 7-35-2(C) by this fact. {29} Finally, contrary to the Court of Appeals, we do not conclude that the fact that farmed cervidae is listed under the definition of livestock under the Livestock Code is dispositive of their classification under the Property Tax Code. First, we note that each definition includes different animals in its enumerated lists that fit the definition. Compare NMSA 1978, § 77-2-1.1(A) (2001) (livestock includes horses, asses, mules, cattle, sheep, goats, swine, bison, poultry, ostriches, emus, rheas, camelids and farmed cervidae), with § 7-35-2(C) (livestock means cattle, buffalo, horses, mules, sheep, goats, swine, [and] ratites). Additionally, each provides a different blanket definition covering those animals not listed. Compare § 77-2-1.1(A) (`livestock' means all domestic or domesticated animals that are used or raised on a farm or ranch, including the carcasses thereof, and exotic animals in captivity), with § 7-35-2(C) (livestock also means other domestic animals useful to man). Had the Legislature intended for the word livestock to be given identical treatment under each section, it would have been a simple matter for it to have given the term identical definitions. [2] {30} Second, the definition section of the Livestock Code begins: As used in The Livestock Code ...: Section 77-2-1.1. The Property Tax Code definition section is preceded by a similar phrase. See § 7-35-2. Thus, both codes, by their express terms, limit the scope of the definitions contained therein. Additionally, the definition of livestock under the Livestock Code itself recognizes different definitions of the term for different purposes. The general definition described above is followed by these provisos: [P]rovided that for the purposes of Chapter 77, Article 9 NMSA 1978, [dealing with branding of livestock] animals or livestock have the meaning defined in that article.... For the purpose of the rules governing meat inspection, wild animals, poultry and birds used for human consumption shall also be included within the meaning of animals or livestock[.] Section 77-2-1.1(A). Chapter 77, Article 9, referred to above, defines livestock only as horses, asses, mules, cattle or bison. NMSA 1978, § 77-9-1.1 (1999). Thus, even the Livestock Code itself recognizes that the definition of livestock is not fixed and can have different meanings in different contexts. {31} Finally, we note that other Codes seem to refer to elk in a way that is inconsistent with their being livestock. For example, the Food Donors Liability Act contains a provision allowing hunters to donate wild game meat products. That provision defines wild game as deer, elk, antelope, caribou, ibex, oryx and Barbary sheep. NMSA 1978, § 41-10-5(B) (1997) (emphasis added). Additionally, NMSA 1978, § 17-2-3(A)(4) (1971), contained in the Chapter that describes the duties and powers of the State Game Commission to regulate the hunting of certain animals, includes all of the family Cervidae (elk and deer) in the list of game mammals subject to the commission's regulation. {32} As the Court of Appeals held, in general we try to read different statutes in connection with other statutes concerning the same subject matter. Quantum Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-050, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 49, 956 P.2d 848. Additionally, we generally presume that the Legislature does not intend to enact legislation inconsistent with existing law. See Schnedar, 115 N.M. at 575, 855 P.2d at 564. We, however, see nothing necessarily inconsistent with defining terms in different ways depending on the context in which the term is to be used. The Legislature, for whatever reason, has defined livestock and elk differently in different sections. We must give effect to that unambiguous intent. {33} The Court of Appeals concluded that the private elk herd could only be considered livestock. We reverse that conclusion and hold that the Board properly deferred to the decision of the Division that the private herd was not livestock, despite the fact that it bears some indicia of domestication. The Court of Appeals also held that the public herd was not livestock. Because the public herd bears none of the indicia of domestication, we affirm that conclusion. We do so because the facts of this case allow us to accept the Division's categorical determination that elk are not livestock. As the Court of Appeals noted, however, these conclusions do not completely resolve the case. We next determine whether the Lodge's conservation agreement with the USDA mandates that the property in question be considered agricultural.