Opinion ID: 795236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Underrepresented Criminal History Score and Reasonableness

Text: 15 Ellsworth next contends that the district court's two category increase in his criminal history score violated his Sixth Amendment jury trial right, see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and his Fifth Amendment right to due process. Both arguments lack merit. Moreover, Ellsworth's sentence — which the district court based in part on stale prior offenses that would not ordinarily be counted towards his criminal history score because they were committed too long ago to be considered under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e) (2003) — was reasonable. 2 16 On appeal, Ellsworth argues for the first time that the district court erred in increasing [his] criminal history category from III to V because no documentation was provided to prove up the priors pursuant to Taylor .... Accordingly, we must determine whether that increase in his criminal history score constituted plain error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.) Because Ellsworth fails the first requirement of plain error review — that there indeed be an `error,' United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) — his Taylor argument is without merit. 17 Ellsworth misapprehends the instances where the Taylor categorical and modified categorical approaches are applicable. We rely upon Taylor in the context of sentencing to determine whether a prior conviction fits within the scope of a generically defined crime, such as an aggravated felony or a crime of violence. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 907 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (sentencing); cf. Morales-Alegria v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.2006) (removal). 18 However, for the most part a criminal history calculation is not predicated on the commission of an underlying generically defined crime. Instead, the criminal history score looks to the defendant's prior sentence of imprisonment, the length of that sentence, the defendant's parole status and the length of time between his commission of the instant offense and his release from a previous term of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 (2003). The Taylor problem does not arise when dealing with such criminal history facts because they are independent of the nature of the underlying offense. Only subsection (f) of § 4A1.1 could potentially raise a cognizable Taylor issue, because it refers to an underlying prior conviction for a crime of violence. However, the district court, in evaluating whether Ellsworth's criminal history score was underrepresented due to exclusion of stale offenses, did not rely on § 4A1.1(f). Instead, the court looked to the other sub-sections of § 4A1.1 to determine what Ellsworth's criminal history score would have been had his previous sentences not been too old to be considered under § 4A1.2(e). See supra note 2. Therefore, the district court did not commit a Taylor error. 19 Next, Ellsworth argues that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment due process right when it relied upon what he calls the unsubstantiated priors in the presentence report. 20 However, Ellsworth conceded at the sentencing hearing that the presentence report listing his prior offenses was factually accurate. Accordingly, he has waived any challenge to the accuracy of the presentence report. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770 ([W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.... [W]aiver ... extinguish[es] an `error' under Rule 52(b). (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 21 We understand Ellsworth's final criminal history argument to be a challenge[] to the reasonableness of the overall sentence in light of all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Cantrell, 433 F.3d at 1280. Ellsworth contends that the district court unreasonably [gave] undue weight to the murder for which Mr. Ellsworth was already being punished in both the State and federal systems and that, except for his conviction in Nevada for first degree murder, ... his criminal history consisted of little more than misdemeanors with one prior felony burglary.... We conclude that the district court did not give undue weight to Ellsworth's murder conviction and that it was reasonable for the district court to increase his criminal history score from a category III to a category V. 22 In United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir.2006), we recognized that post- Booker district courts may now engage in a broader appraisal ... of the defendant's history and characteristics for reasons extending beyond the Guidelines when deciding upon an appropriate sentence. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) The district court properly understood and articulated the role that advisory Guidelines play in sentencing: [U]nder Booker and Fanfan, [this court] has a certain amount of discretion to go beyond the guidelines or below the guidelines, but my first obligation is to consider the guidelines. Accord Kimbrew, 406 F.3d at 1152 (Even though the Guidelines are no longer mandatory after ... United States v. Booker, the district court should still consult them for advice as to the appropriate sentence....). 23 The district court discussed at length the nature and circumstances of the offense and Ellsworth's history and characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 3 It noted that Ellsworth, this convicted murderer[, was] seated in the casino with a fully-loaded semiautomatic nine millimeter weapon which [had] recently been stolen from a law enforcement officer. [T]he presence of the holster [purchased by Ellsworth] and the loading of the weapon suggests that those were intentional acts by Mr. Ellsworth that were designed and intended to allow him to carry a loaded weapon ... on more than one occasion. 24 Explaining its decision to consider what Ellsworth's criminal history score would have been were his older convictions added in, the court reasoned that 25 [i]t is only because he was in the Nevada State Prison on a life sentence that these prior convictions became stale under the sentencing guidelines and time dated.... [N]ormally a defendant who is convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to a life sentence will ... seldom, if ever, have that conviction come back to be calculated again in a subsequent offense. 26 The court concluded that Ellsworth's criminal history closely resembles a V criminal history category as that is applied generally to criminal history V defendants. In reaching that conclusion, the district court did not give undue weight to Ellsworth's murder and robbery convictions, as Ellsworth suggests. The court was at least as concerned (if not more) about the nature of the instant offense and the length and seriousness of Ellsworth's criminal history as it was about the heinousness of the murder he had committed. 27 We also disagree with Ellsworth's characterization of his criminal history before his murder and robbery convictions as not being particularly serious, or at least no more serious than that of the defendant in United States v. Bad Marriage, 392 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir.2004). Ellsworth is plainly a more serious offender than was Bad Marriage — most obviously because of Ellsworth's murder and robbery convictions. Further, his other prior convictions (and terms of imprisonment) for burglary, battery, possession and sale of a switchblade and grand larceny were also serious, especially when considered together. We conclude that the district court's characterization of Ellsworth's criminal history was reasonable: [I]t's certainly an aggravated criminal history[,] and it reflects both violent and intentional criminal conduct over an extended period of time which is egregious to the point that it certainly supports the upward placement in the V. Therefore the two-category increase in Ellsworth's applicable criminal history score was reasonable as well.