Opinion ID: 197434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Search of Swain

Text: 44 Turning to the particular search at issue, we conclude, taking all the facts in the light most favorable to Swain, that a jury could find that the search was unreasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we find that Swain has stated a trialworthy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On these facts, there appears to be the distinct possibility that Officer Hayes ordered the strip search in retaliation for his failed interrogation of Swain in her cell, imposing sexual humiliation on her as a punishment for what he perceived as her non-cooperation. Hayes' angry response to Swain's inability to provide information about Milbury's activities and the timing of the search raise this inference. This possibility distinguishes this case from Klein, where the court found that there was no evidence that the stripping was a pretext to humiliate or degrade. Klein, 522 F.2d at 300. 2 45 We must thus examine whether, on these facts, an objective officer would have had a reasonable suspicion that Swain was concealing drugs or contraband on her person. Three factors suggest that there were not adequate grounds to justify the strip and visual body cavity search of Swain. First, there is the timing of the search. Swain had been alone in the cell for some period of time before she was searched and no one thought it important to search her before she angered Hayes by not giving him the information he sought. Perhaps more importantly, she had been allowed to go to the bathroom by herself, unobserved, prior to being taken to her cell. This also indicates that no one thought she had secreted drugs in her private parts. Cf. Burns, 907 F.2d at 238 (common knowledge that drug users and dealers with controlled substances on their persons often attempt to flush drugs down the toilet). If a warrantless strip search may be justified by the need to avoid the destruction of concealed evidence, Swain already had had ample opportunity to destroy any such evidence. To the extent there was any reason to believe such evidence still existed, further delay to obtain a warrant would not have significantly increased the risk of destruction. This was particularly true because Swain was kept under observation and recorded by video camera while in the holding cell. 46 Second, as noted, the most compelling justification for warrantless strip and visual body cavity searches is institutional security. It is uncontroverted that, prior to her arraignment, Swain was the only person in the women's holding cell of the North Reading Police Station. Her arraignment was later the same afternoon, and she was then released, on her own recognizance. There was no risk that she would come into contact with other prisoners, or be able to smuggle contraband or weapons into a secure environment. Hayes stated that he believed that Swain, as a narcotics suspect, might have been carrying a concealed weapon but he did not assert that Swain posed a threat to his safety or that of others in the police station. The institutional security justification thus appears to be absent from this case. 47 Third, there is the differential treatment by the police of the young woman and her boyfriend. Swain and Milbury were first pulled over because of Milbury's shoplifting activities. Officer Hayes stated that, prior to searching Swain, he had examined both Swain's and Milbury's records. Officer Hayes knew that Milbury was on probation and had a history of drug convictions. By contrast, Swain did not have a criminal record. Milbury had told officers, including Hayes, that the marijuana was his. Yet Milbury was not strip searched. If there was an objective basis--apart from retaliation--for stripping Swain, it would have been objectively reasonable, and more so, to search Milbury as well. 48 On the other hand, Swain did drop a baggie of marijuana at the scene of the crime. Officer Hayes expressed the view (belied by his failure to strip search Milbury) that a strip search was justified whenever narcotics are involved in the case. This is not consistent with either the Town policy, which requires probable cause, or the MPI policy, which requires an individualized suspicion, even where the crime involves contraband or weapons. The record does not reveal how much marijuana was in the baggie Swain dropped, nor does it reveal whether possession of that amount constitutes a misdemeanor or a felony under Massachusetts law. Nothing in the record suggests that Swain was suspected of being a distributor of marijuana. The fact that Swain may have possessed some unspecified amount of marijuana is not enough to overcome, as a matter of law, the factors, discussed above, under which a jury could find the search of Swain unreasonable. 49 Accordingly, we hold that a jury could lawfully find that there was no objectively reasonable basis for strip searching Swain and that, on these facts, Swain has stated a claim for violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches that survives defendants' motion for summary judgment.