Opinion ID: 1969380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: JENNINGS v SOUTHWOOD

Text: The plaintiff [19] filed suit in the Berrien Circuit Court on January 15, 1988, against defendant Lake Township Municipality, its ambulance service, Lake Township Ambulance and Rescue, and the individual EMS personnel, Richard Southwood and Bill Boyd, seeking damages for gross negligence. [20] The plaintiff's key allegation is that the defendants refused to transport thirteen-year-old Cynthia Rasmussen, a diabetic and epileptic, to the hospital on November 25, 1986. As a result of the defendants' refusal, Cynthia slipped into a diabetic coma later that evening and has been unconscious ever since. By October 1988, the trial court dismissed the municipality, holding that it could not be vicariously liable on grounds of governmental immunity. During the subsequent jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury about gross negligence using the GTLA definition. During the instruction, the court gave examples of gross negligence in the context of the criminal law. Plaintiff's counsel specifically objected to the use of such examples. Following deliberations, the jury reached a verdict of no cause of action, and the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The plaintiff filed an appeal of right in the Court of Appeals, alleging two errors: (1) an instructional error concerning the use of criminal examples to demonstrate civil gross negligence, and (2) an error regarding the trial court's grant of summary disposition to the municipality on the grounds of governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals issued a per curiam opinion, affirming the judgments for the defendants on the basis of an issue that it raised sua sponte and resolved against the plaintiffs. 198 Mich App 713; 499 NW2d 460 (1993). Because the plaintiff failed to plead and prove that Cynthia was negligent before the defendants' negligence, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate gross negligence as defined in Gibbard, rendering the defendants immune from suit under the EMSA. The majority also concluded that the trial court erred in using criminal examples of gross negligence and dismissing the municipality on governmental immunity grounds; it held, however, that these errors were harmless in light of plaintiff's failure to plead and prove gross negligence pursuant to Gibbard. We granted the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal, as well as the defendants' cross-application for leave to appeal. The issues remaining are (1) whether governmental immunity under the GTLA bars suit against the defendant municipality, [21] and (2) whether the trial errors regarding the use of criminal examples for gross negligence and the dismissal of the defendant municipality require a new trial.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition for the municipal defendants. The error was harmless, however, because the plaintiff could not prove gross negligence under Gibbard, and, as a result, the municipal defendants could not be vicariously liable. Defendants assert that the EMS provision does not expressly abrogate the complete immunity for municipal entities performing governmental functions. According to the defendants, if the Legislature intended another exception to governmental immunity (in addition to the four exceptions enumerated in the GTLA), it would have unequivocally pronounced an intent to create another exception to this absolute immunity in either the EMS Act or the recent 1986 Tort Reform Amendments.... In Malcolm, this Court examined whether liability may be imposed on a governmental agency pursuant to the provisions in the EMSA, despite the immunity granted in the GTLA. Id. at 135. The Court held that the EMSA modified the GTLA, thus providing an exception to the broad grant of immunity afforded governmental units. On the basis of the EMSA's wording and the Legislature's intent, six members of this Court [22] agreed that vicarious liability can be imposed on a governmental unit if the acts or omissions of its EMS personnel were found to constitute gross negligence or wilful misconduct. The alleged acts of gross negligence in this case, like the Malcolm case, occurred before a 1990 amendment. Thus this case is controlled by the construction of the earlier statute, as followed in Malcolm. This Court issued its opinion in Malcolm in April 1991, after the 1990 amendment. While it acknowledged the amendment, it concluded that the amendment was not to be given retroactive application: In 1990 PA 179 the Legislature, apparently in response to the Court of Appeals opinion in this case, added subsection (2) to § 20737 (which was also changed to MCL 333.20965; MSA 14.15[20965]) which provides: (2) Subsection (1) does not limit immunity from liability otherwise provided by law for any of the persons listed in subsection (1). There was no indication that the amendment was to be given retroactive application; therefore, we do not express a view regarding any effect this amendment may have upon the analysis of this case. [ Malcolm at 141, n 9.] Despite this Court's position in Malcolm, the defendants assert that the amendment should be given retroactive application. We disagree because six members of this Court concluded otherwise in Malcolm, and the 1990 EMSA amendments are not remedial or procedural in nature. White v General Motors Corp, 431 Mich 387, 391-394; 429 NW2d 576 (1988). As a result, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that the dismissal of the defendant municipality on grounds of governmental immunity was erroneous.
While the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to the municipality and in using criminal examples in its instructions regarding gross negligence, the panel nevertheless determined that the error was harmless in light of the plaintiff's failure to prove Gibbard 's gross negligence. Given that the justification can no longer support this conclusion, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to that Court for further consideration of whether the errors were harmless. See Petrove at 34. We do not retain jurisdiction.