Opinion ID: 1172030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: custody of the child

Text: The mother contends that the placement of her child in foster care with the Huddlestons was not consistent with the Indian Child Welfare Act. The mother requested that the trial court place the child in accordance with that Act. [10] The Act specifies that foster care or preadoptive placement should be with: (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the child's tribe; (3) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or (4) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs. 25 U.S.C. § 1915. The Indian child's tribe may establish a different order of preference by resolution. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c). The child welfare worker testified that the Huddleston's home was not an approved foster home. [11] No evidence was introduced as to whether the child's tribe had approved, licensed, or specified a foster home. Section 1915 requires placement of the child in the categories specified in the absence of good cause to the contrary. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The Department of Human Services child welfare worker testified that no Indian foster homes were available. [12] The Creek tribe had been contacted about foster homes, but apparently the Kaw tribe had not been contacted. [13] Mrs. Huddleston testified that she was one-eighth Cherokee and was in the process of providing verification of her Indian status. [14] She also testified that Mr. Huddleston's grandfather was a full-blood Cherokee, and that he was in the process of providing verification of his Indian status. [15] A finding of good cause to the contrary is predicated upon the court's consideration of the placement categories specified. Where no inquiry occurs as to whether the child's tribe has licensed, approved, or specified a foster home, the court has not adequately considered such a placement. We remand the case for a new dispositional hearing because the record does not disclose that the trial court afforded placement preference to the categories specified in 25 U.S.C. § 1915. On remand the court should consider whether the good cause exception in § 1915 is met by the child's best interests. In re Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741, 331 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1983). The adjudication order determining N.L. to be deprived is reversed with instructions. The dispositional order of May 28, 1986 is reversed with instructions. The trial court's orders denying a transfer and denial of a continuance are affirmed. HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur. DOOLIN, C.J., and OPALA and KAUGER, JJ., concur in part, dissent in part. SIMMS, J., dissents: I would affirm the trial court.