Opinion ID: 1954827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Fifth Amendment Rulings Upheld

Text: Brown's second argument is that the Superior Court failed to properly balance his Sixth Amendment right to call a witness against the Hickmans' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court has held that the trial court must determine whether a witness invoking his or her Fifth Amendment privilege is confronted by substantial and `real', and not merely trifling or imaginary hazards of incrimination. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). This Court followed the reasoning of Marchetti in holding that a witness who has entered into a plea bargain with the State does not necessarily relinquish his or her Fifth Amendment rights. See Zebroski v. State, Del.Supr., 715 A.2d 75, 80-81 (1998). Brown argues that the Superior Court erred in sustaining the Hickmans' invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights because the Hickmans had no justifiable fear of self-incrimination. Brown bases that contention on the fact that the Superior Court had already sentenced Lester Hickman regarding the Grambell incident and that Charles Hickman had pled guilty and negotiated a maximum cap on the State's recommended sentence in his plea agreement. We have concluded that this argument is without merit. A criminal defendant has the right to compulsory process to obtain the appearance of witnesses to testify on his behalf. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Del. Const. art. I, § 7. When a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process conflicts with the witness's proper invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the witness's Fifth Amendment right prevails, forcing the defendant to go to trial on less than all the possible evidence. United States v. Anderson, D.Del., 391 F.Supp. 68, 71 (1975). Accordingly, the trial court must first determine whether the witness can substantiate a Fifth Amendment claim. A witness cannot avoid interrogation by claiming that his answers may tend to incriminate him. Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, Del.Supr., 306 A.2d 742, 743 (1973). It is for the [trial court] to decide whether the question, after actually being put, is such that any direct answer thereto could reasonably be self-incriminatory. Id., citing Mumford v. Croft, Del.Supr., 93 A.2d 506 (1952). [2] The trial court must determine whether a witness invoking his or her Fifth Amendment privilege is confronted by substantial and `real', and not merely trifling or imaginary hazards of incrimination. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The fact that a witness has entered into a plea bargain with the State does not mean that the witness has lost the right to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Zebroski v. State, Del.Supr., 715 A.2d 75, 80-81 (1998). Other jurisdictions that have considered the question of a witness' possibly incriminating testimony in the period between pleading guilty and sentencing have uniformly held that a defendant's right to compulsory process does not override the witness' Fifth Amendment privilege. See United States v. Kuku, 11th Cir., 129 F.3d 1435, 1437 (1997); United States v. De La Cruz, 1st Cir., 996 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (1993); United States v. Hernandez, 5th Cir., 962 F.2d 1152, 1161 (1992); United States v. Lugg, D.C.Cir., 892 F.2d 101, 103 (1989). Lester Hickman had pled guilty and received a sentence with respect to the Grambell incident. The Superior Court stated that Lester Hickman could not avoid testimony on the facts of the incident for which he had been sentenced. Lester Hickman did not plead guilty to or receive a sentence for any charges in connection with the Jerome incident. Since Brown called the Hickmans to refute the testimony of Henry regarding the Jerome incident, Lester Hickman was entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment because his plea agreement and sentence did not extend to the alleged Jerome incident. Although Charles Hickman had pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, his sentencing had not taken place. This Court has held that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination remains available for a witness who has entered into a plea agreement but has not been sentenced. Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d at 80. We did so because the obligation to testify arose at a time when the agreement was still susceptible to being nullified upon the occurrence of either of two alternative events: (1) a breach of the plea agreement by the State or (2) a refusal on the part of the court to accept the plea agreement. Id. We hold that the Superior Court properly sustained the invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights by both Hickmans. Lester Hickman's concern about self-incrimination was real and substantial. Charles Hickman's plea agreement was still subject to possible rejection or reconsideration either by the State or the Superior Court. In addition, neither plea agreement covered the alleged Jerome incident.