Opinion ID: 262002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: merchants's cross-appeal

Text: 29 One final point to be considered is Merchants's allegation of error in the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence a letter purportedly from the Nebraska City grain inspector to Merchants's manager. The writer of the letter relates that a few days before the loading, a small amount of off-grade wheat was accidentally dumped on a tank of corn and that this load was then loaded in a barge. Merchants does not seek to introduce the letter to show that corn with off-grade wheat in it was actually loaded on the barge, but rather to show that the inspector had knowledge of off-grade wheat being mixed with corn at the time of the loading. This type of evidence, Merchants asserts is not objectionable hearsay, since the knowledge of the grain inspector is relevant to show whether his certificate was properly made and his statements are evidence of his knowledge. 30 Declarations may be introduced to show the state of mind of the declarant when he made them. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hillmon, 1892, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706. People of State of Cal. v. One 1948 Chevrolet Coupe, 1955, 45 Cal.2d 613, 290 P.2d 538, 55 A.L.R.2d 1272; see 6 Wigmore, Evidence 1714 (3d ed. 1940); 20 Am.Jur. Evidence 585. But in this case the letter was written on November 5 about four and one half months after the inspection. If it does show knowledge on the part of the inspector that bad wheat was loaded in the barge, it does not give any indication that he had such knowledge when he made out the certificate, the only time relevant to the purpose that could justify its admission. This case is thus distinguishable from Yazoo City v. Loggins, 1927, 145 Miss. 793, 110 So. 833, on which Merchants relies. That case involved an action against the city for injuries sustained in a fall into an unlighted trench across a sidewalk. The city alleged in defense that it had no knowledge of the existence of the trench. The court there held that a statement by the city street commissioner that he had seen the trench was admissible to show the city had actual knowledge of the existence of the trench prior to and at the time of the injury, but not to establish the existence of the trench. Similarly, in Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. Jackson Co. v. Matthews, 1951, 212 Miss. 190, 54 So.2d 263, a statement by the agent of an automobile leasing company that one who had rented one of the cars and who had just been involved in an accident was drunk was held competent and relevant to show the company's knowledge of its lessee's habits of drink at the time the car was entrusted to him. These cases both differ from the situation at hand because the statements involved showed knowledge at the time of the occurrence in question. Here, however, the declaration tended to show only that the inspector had knowledge of the molded wheat at a time subsequent; hence the proffered evidence was immaterial and irrelevant. Cf. Shepard v. United States, 1933, 290 U.S. 96, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196; 6 Wigmore Evidence 1729, at 91 (3d ed. 1940). We hold that the court below was not in error in excluding it. 31 The judgment is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.