Opinion ID: 2338449
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alaska Supreme Court cases

Text: Alaska's emergency aid doctrine originated with Stevens v. State , which relied on United States v. Barone for the general rule that [t]he right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest is inherent in the very nature of their duties as police officers, and derives from the common law. [20] In Stevens, [21] Stevens shot and killed a friend during early morning drinking at Stevens' house in Hoonah. Stevens' children fled the house and told a neighbor about the shooting. The neighbor phoned the Hoonah chief of police, who went to Stevens' house and knocked on the door. Stevens' wife opened the door, and the chief entered without any comment by either. When Stevens sobbingly confessed he had shot his `buddy' and threatened suicide, the chief arrested and jailed Stevens for his own safety. The chief returned shortly thereafter with the Hoonah mayor. The chief and mayor briefly inspected the house, viewed the victim's body, and then left, padlocking the house. The mayor contacted state troopers in Juneau for assistance, and a trooper ordered the premises be kept locked and advised the chief to also confine Stevens' wife. The troopers arrived seven hours later, ten hours after the chief's original entry, and entered the house without a search warrant to conduct a homicide investigation. Stevens and his wife were still incarcerated and were unaware of the troopers' warrantless entry into their house. At trial Stevens sought to prevent presentation of the evidence gathered during the troopers' warrantless search of his house, but the trial court allowed it. Stevens ultimately was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal Stevens conceded the chief's original entry was lawful. [22] The court stated the general rule that the right to enter and investigate in an emergency, without an accompanying intent to search or arrest, derives from the common law and is an inherent police duty. [23] The court further observed that [t]he criterion is the reasonableness of the belief . . . as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact. [24] The court concluded that given the phone call from Stevens' neighbor, which was based on knowledge gained from Stevens' children, the chief had reason to believe that an emergency existed when he knocked at the door of [Stevens'] home, and even though he entered uninvited, his entry was made under the same reasonable belief. [25] The court built on that conclusion, explaining that after legally entering Stevens' home and learning of the homicide, the chief's duty to investigate included the right to inspect the premises; [26] had the chief conducted his investigation immediately, he could have taken pictures, made measurements, and retrieved evidence in plain view without violating Stevens' constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. [27] The court concluded the ten-hour delay between the chief's original entry and the troopers' later entry did not convert what otherwise would have been a legal investigation into a violation of constitutional privacy rights. [28] Justice Rabinowitz concurred in the decision, agreeing with the court's recognition of the Barone emergency aid doctrine and its conclusion that the chief's initial entry into the home was lawful, but viewing the totality of the circumstances as supporting a lawful search of Stevens' house incident to Stevens' arrest. [29] Justice Rabinowitz made two key points guiding the assessment of potential emergencies. [30] First, he noted [t]he reasonableness of an entry by the police upon private property is measured by the circumstances then existing. [31] Second: The preservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy protected by search and seizure laws and constitutional guaranties; it is an overriding justification for what otherwise may be an illegal entry. It follows that a search warrant is not required to legalize an entry by police for the purpose of bringing emergency aid to an injured person. Frequently, the report of a death proves inaccurate and a spark of life remains, sufficient to respond to emergency police aid. As a general rule . . . an emergency may be said to exist, within the meaning of the `exigency' rule, whenever the police have credible information that an unnatural death has, or may have, occurred. And the criterion is the reasonableness of the belief of the police as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact.[ [32] ]
In Schraff v. State , [33] a trooper conducting a routine bar check noted one of the patrons, Schraff, was inebriated. While securing Schraff's vehicle, the trooper discovered a large quantity of marijuana and contacted narcotics investigators for assistance. When a narcotics investigator requested identification, Schraff allowed his friend to hand Schraff's wallet to the investigator. While briefly looking through the wallet for identification, the investigator discovered a foil packet containing cocaine. Schraff was arrested and later convicted of cocaine possession. Schraff appealed his conviction, challenging the investigator's search. [34] In relevant part the State claimed the wallet search was designed to provide crucial information in the rendition of emergency aid in light of Schraff's stupified condition. [35] The court pointed to Barone for the modern emergency aid doctrine and noted the Stevens court's recognition of the `emergency' exception to the warrant requirement. [36] The court also noted the business of policemen and firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether [a] report is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently dead often are saved by swift police response. [37] The court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions to evaluate the State's emergency aid claim. These included a Sixth Circuit case upholding a search of a seizing man's luggage, [38] a D.C. Circuit case upholding a search of an unconscious man's person, [39] a California case upholding a search of a man in shock and suffering from knife wounds, [40] an Illinois case upholding a search of a disoriented and incoherent man who did not seem drunk, [41] and a Washington case upholding a search of an unconscious man in his hotel room based on needle track marks on his arms. [42] In each case the reviewing court had upheld the challenged search as within the ambit of the emergency aid doctrine. The court nevertheless rejected the State's claim. The court first noted the narcotics investigator arrived at the scene to engage in a narcotics investigation, not to render emergency aid, and that multiple motivesincluding crime detectionprompted him to search Schraff's wallet. [43] The cited emergency aid cases, in contrast, involved officers [who] claimed that their only motivation was that of rendering aid to an injured person. [44] The court also noted Schraff was not totally unconscious and was accompanied by a somewhat responsive companion, suggesting the officers had a way of getting necessary information about Schraff without searching his wallet. [45] Justice Boochever and Chief Justice Rabinowitz concurred, agreeing that the emergency aid doctrine was inapplicable based on the facts of the case, but contending that if the officers had reasonably believed that it was necessary to gather Schraff's identification for medical purposes, the search ought not be disqualified simply because of an accompanying motive to detect crime. [46] To do so would inhibit police from fulfilling common law duties to Alaskan citizens that all members of the court agreed police owe. [47] They also felt a rule requiring an alone and unconscious victim too narrow a reading of the emergency exception, and were inclined to allow the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement when police reasonably believed a medical emergency existed (an imminent and substantial threat to life or health) and that a search of the sick or injured person for immediate identification was necessary. [48]
City of Nome v. Ailak [49] involved a homeowner's civil suit for, among other claims, trespass. When Nome police officers stopped Ailak outside his residence on the report of a rape and murder, the man who had reported the crimes pointed at Ailak's house and told police that a body was inside. Without obtaining permission or knocking, the police entered Ailak's home and asked the people occupying the home where the body was; the occupants explained that a crazy girl had attempted to gain entry earlier but they would not let her in. The officers subsequently left. After trial on Ailak's claims, a jury awarded him $10,000 for trespass. On appeal the City conceded its police had entered Ailak's residence without consent, but maintained police may assert as a defense to trespass that they are privileged to enter a citizen's home without permission or a warrant in emergency situations. [50] The court acknowledged the case did not confront whether a warrant was necessary to justify police entry into Ailak's residence, but cited Justice Rabinowitz's Stevens concurrence with approval, stating the same concerns applied to the issue of whether police officers should be civilly liable for trespass as a result of their unauthorized entry into a home. [51] The court quoted Justice Rabinowitz's broad formulation of potential emergencies: As a general rule . . . an emergency may be said to exist . . . whenever the police have credible information that an unnatural death has, or may have[,] occurred. [52] The court reiterated that police owe civilly actionable duties to go to the aid of imperiled citizens. [53] The court stated the reasonableness of the belief of the police as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact controlled the propriety of the police's actions. [54] Because the officers were told that a body was in the Ailak home, and police officers should be encouraged to check out such reports as quickly as possible in case `a spark of life remains,' the court concluded the officers' entry into the Ailak home was privileged as a matter of law. [55]
In State v. Myers , [56] police officers on routine patrol conducted a security check in an alley and discovered a theater's fire exit door open. Following customary procedures, they entered the building to search for intruders. As the officers walked down a hallway they heard voices from a backstage area. They looked in and saw three individuals, including the theater manager, sitting on the floor with cocaine paraphernalia. The officers arrested the individuals and seized the evidence. The trial court granted the defendants' suppression motion and the State appealed. The court reversed, holding the entry and limited search were police actions for which no warrant was required and were otherwise reasonable within the meaning of constitutional protections. [57] Relying on diminished expectations of privacy in commercial premises, the court ruled police: may enter commercial premises without a warrant only when, pursuant to a routine after-hours security check undertaken to protect the interests of the property owner, it is discovered that the security of the premises is in jeopardy, and only when there is no reason to believe that the owner would not consent to such an entry. . . . Any search conducted incident to a legitimate entry must be brief and must be limited and necessary to the purpose of ensuring that no intruders are present on the premises.[ [58] ] Justice Rabinowitz concurred, but on the basis that the search fell within the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. [59] Justice Rabinowitz believed the court should expressly adopt the emergency aid exception delineated in the New York case of People v. Mitchell with the following essential components: (1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.[ [60] ] Chief Justice Boochever dissented, concluding the court's general reasonableness analysis was too generous in light of the availability of other less intrusive alternatives to the police entry. [61] Reasoning that the only possible exception to the warrant requirement was the emergency aid exception, [62] Chief Justice Boochever concluded the court should recognize the emergency aid exception as defined in Mitchell, subject to a requirement that no search could be justified under that exception if a reasonable alternative were available. [63] But the Chief Justice noted the emergency exception was not applicable under the facts of the case because the police had reasonable alternatives to the warrantless entry into the theater. [64]