Opinion ID: 163071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of evidence of proper venue

Text: 48 Finally, Mr. Evans argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on counts six and seven of the indictment. Those counts (attempted manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine) concern the evidence discovered by law enforcement agents at Mr. Evans's trailer on October 16, 2000. Mr. Evans contends that the prosecution never proved that the trailer was located in the District of Kansas, and that, as a result, the evidence is insufficient to establish venue as to these two counts. 49 As a general rule, our review of challenges to evidence of proper venue is quite deferential. The standard of review for whether venue lies in a particular district is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and making all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the finder of fact, the Government proved by a preponderance of direct or circumstantial evidence that the crimes charged occurred within the district. United States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir.1985). Thus, the question before us is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could have concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that the trailer in which Mr. Evans was residing on October 16, 2000 was located in the District of Kansas. 50 Our review of the record indicates that the prosecutor told the jury in his opening statement that [o]n October 16, 2000, Agent Holsinger went to the Evanses' new residence in a trailer in Chetopa in Cherokee County, Kansas. The Evanses were living at this trailer that was parked on the property there. Rec. vol. X, at 20. (Trial Tr., dated May 24, 2001). 51 In spite of the prosecutor's description, the record before us provides no indication that the jury ever heard any direct evidence as to where the trailer was located. Indeed, the only testimony explaining how law enforcement agents came to the trailer was provided by Agent Holsinger. He stated that, on October 16, 2000, he went to the trailer accompanied by another agent and one or two deputy sheriffs from Cherokee County, Kansas. However, neither Agent Holsinger nor any other witness identified by the government provided any testimony about a specific location. 52 In objecting to Mr. Evans's motion for a judgment of acquittal, the government argued that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the trailer was in Kansas. In particular, the government stated that [f]rom the first lab, the jury knew that the Evanses resided in Cherokee County, Kansas, and could have reasonably inferred, from the presence of Cherokee County sheriff's deputies at the second lab, that it was also in Cherokee County, Kansas. Rec. vol. I, doc. 124, at 3. (Gov't Resp., dated June 27, 2001). The government did acknowledge that no specific evidence relating to the exact location of the Evans' trailer was elicited from Agent Holsinger on direct examination by the government. Id. at 2. 53 In denying Mr. Evans's motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court accepted the government's characterization of this circumstantial evidence, stating that the fact that Cherokee County, Kansas deputy sheriffs accompanied Agent Holsinger to the trailer on October 16, 2000 established that the trailer was located in Kansas: 54 The evidence further established that Cherokee County [Kansas] law enforcement officers and an agent of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation arrested the defendant and searched his property again on or about October 16, 2000 at a different location. There was no evidence that law enforcement officers from any other state investigated the charges in this case. In October, the officers found more methamphetamine related materials in a trailer in which the defendant appeared to be living. They also found the defendant's Kansas driver's license. The government has represented, without rebuttal, that the materials which were sent away for lab analysis were marked with stickers indicating Cherokee County, Ks and notations relating to this case. The lab analysis for all the suspected drug materials that were collected were referred back to an agent of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation. For the above-stated reasons, we believe a juror could reasonably infer from the whole of the evidence, including the actions and involvement of the Kansas law enforcement officers in October (when the events charged in Counts 6 and 7 occurred) that the crimes occurred in the District of Kansas. 55 Evans, 2001 WL 1013322 at  3. 56 In our view, the entirely circumstantial evidence cited by the government and the district court is insufficient to establish, even by a preponderance of the evidence and viewed in the light most favorable to government, that the trailer was located in the District of Kansas. In effect, the district court applied a presumption that law enforcement officers of a particular jurisdiction act within that jurisdiction. It may well be true that in most cases deputy sheriffs and other law enforcement officials — like the ones that searched Mr. Evans's property on October 16, 2000 — act within the boundaries of the jurisdiction that employs them. However, the district court did not cite, nor are we aware of, any rule of law that establishes such a presumption. 57 Indeed, this circuit has rejected the government's attempts to rely on presumptions to establish proper venue. See Jenkins v. United States, 392 F.2d 303, 306 (10th Cir.1968) (concluding that [a] presumption suitable to support venue in Kansas... did not arise from appellant's possession in Oklahoma of property recently stolen in Kansas ... in the absence of proof that he was in Kansas at any pertinent time. There is not a sufficient relationship between the fact of possession in Oklahoma and the circumstance sought to be presumed — receiving and possessing [property] in Kansas). Moreover, several state courts have expressly refused to adopt the presumption that the government seeks to apply here. See Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 378, 368 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1988) (The mere fact that police of a certain jurisdiction investigate a crime cannot support an inference that the crime occurred within their jurisdiction.); Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Crim.App.1983) (concluding that testimony that police officers worked for a certain police department was insufficient to establish venue); People v. Manley, 196 Ill. App.3d 153, 142 Ill.Dec. 610, 552 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (1990) (stating that the only indication in the stipulation that Macon County was involved was the statement that the seizure of the contraband evidence at the scene of the crime was made by Decatur police officers and that [t]hat, of itself, was insufficient to prove venue). 58 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses set forth in counts six and seven of the indictment occurred in the district of Kansas. Accordingly, we will remand this case to the district court with instructions to vacate Mr. Evans's convictions on those counts and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.