Opinion ID: 2633013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court violate L.K.'s constitutional rights by periodically muting the microphone at the Montana State Hospital in order to control L.K.'s disruptive behavior during the final commitment hearing?

Text: ¶29 L.K. argues that the District Court's muting of the Warm Springs microphone prevented her from being heard in a meaningful manner and from being effectively 'present' during the proceeding. L.K. urges that even though her attorney did not object to the District Court's muting of the microphone at the hearing, this Court should engage in plain error review because her fundamental constitutional rights were implicated. See e.g. State v. Godfrey, 2004 MT 197, ¶ 22, 322 Mont. 254, ¶ 22, 95 P.3d 166, ¶ 22 (citation omitted). Alternatively, L.K. argues she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her attorney did not object. ¶30 The State responds that L.K.'s right to be present at her commitment hearing does not include a right to totally disrupt the hearing. The State further points out that L.K.'s microphone was not left on mute, but rather was muted only after L.K. repeatedly disrupted the proceedings and continued to do so after further opportunities to comply with the District Court's instructions. Finally, the State argues L.K.'s counsel was not ineffective because L.K.'s conduct only worked to her detriment, and Hunt was able to effectively cross-examine the State's witnesses notwithstanding L.K.'s temporary inability to participate. ¶31 Section 53-21-115(2), MCA (2005), provides that, in addition to the rights granted by the Montana and United States Constitutions, a person who is involuntarily detained has the right in any hearing to be present, to offer evidence, and to present witnesses. . . . Likewise, § 53-21-116, MCA (2005), provides that a person alleged to be suffering from a mental disorder and requiring commitment has the right to be present and the right to counsel at any hearing or trial. Two-way electronic audio-video communication devices may be used for such hearings as long as the audio-video device operates in such a way that the respondent, his or her counsel, and the judge can see each other simultaneously and converse with each other, the respondent and his or her counsel can converse privately with each other, and the respondent and his or her counsel are both present during the two-way electronic audio-video communication. Section 53-21-140(2), MCA (2005). ¶32 The District Court afforded L.K. due process and complied with § 53-21-140, MCA, when it conducted L.K.'s final detention hearing via video-conference from the Montana State Hospital. Although L.K. was entitled to communicate with the District Court and her counsel by video-conference, she was not entitled to constantly disrupt the proceedings by interrupting the District Court, the State's witnesses, and counsel for both parties. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in the context of a criminal proceeding: Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights, we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1060-61 (1970) (Internal citations omitted). ¶33 In the present case, L.K. was warned that her disruptive behavior would result in the Warm Springs microphone being muted. When L.K. continued her disruptive behavior, the District Court muted the microphone, but the District Court consistently gave L.K. the opportunity to once again conform her behavior to the requirements of an orderly hearing. L.K. could hear each witness's testimony, observe the entire proceeding, and consult with her attorney at any time. We hold that the District Court did not deprive L.K. of her constitutional right to be present and to participate in her commitment hearing, and thus, that L.K.'s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object when L.K.'s microphone was muted. ¶34 Affirmed. JUSTICES KARLA M. GRAY, PATRICIA COTTER, JAMES C. NELSON, BRIAN MORRIS, concur.