Opinion ID: 1111189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the lower court erred in granting the state's challenges for cause, and in failing to grant the defense challenges for cause, violating the appellant's rights under the sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, and sections 14, 26 and 28 of the mississippi constitution.

Text: Under this assignment Pinkney argues that the trial court erred in granting the prosecutor's Whitherspoon challenges. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412-420, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Whitherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968); Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 53 (Miss. 1985). Pinkney specifically challenges the dismissal of jurors Armstrong, Cassell, Coleman, Crump, Emma Dixon, Rosie Dixon, Frazier, Gilmer, and Harris. Pinkney claims that Jurors Crump, Emma Dixon, and Frazier were rehabilitated during defense counsel's voir dire. The prosecution addresses the dismissal of each juror with specificity. Juror Crump had formed an opinion. Juror Frazier twice said that she would never vote for the death penalty. Juror Dixon made inconsistent statements regarding her position on the death penalty. On the authority of Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928 (Miss. 1986), the trial judge committed no error in excusing those jurors whose position on the death penalty was not unmistakably clear. In Stringer we addressed the death qualification of jurors and stated: In Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1985), this Court recognized a recent pronouncement on this issue from the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Witt upheld the standard of Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), and reiterated it, stating: That standard is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ... . This standard .. . does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity ... . many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made `unmistakably clear.' ... Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d at 943; see also, Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868 (Miss. 1987). In Williamson, supra, we upheld the dismissal of jurors who had given inconsistent answers with regard to their ability to return a death sentence. Williamson, 512 So.2d at 881. None of the prosecutor's challenges for cause were erroneously granted. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). Pinkney also alleges that the trial judge's failure to grant his challenges for cause on Jurors Askew, Barlow, Hammack, and Harrison denied him his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Sections 26 and 14 of the Mississippi Constitution. Askew, who works with Hinds County as an emergency specialist, received radio communications on the night in question and knew some of the State's witnesses. Barlow was challenged because his brother is a jailer at the Hinds County Detention Center. Hammack was challenged because he played softball with two of the State's witnesses. Harrison, who had taught two of the State's witnesses' children in Sunday School and whose son-in-law is a Hinds County Deputy was challenged for cause. Hammack, Harrison, Askew and Barlow each testified unequivocally that they could sit as an impartial juror. None of these jurors knew the facts of this case. In Mhoon v. State, 464 So.2d 77 (Miss. 1985), we addressed a case in which nearly one-third of the qualified venire persons were either policemen or were related to one who was or had been a policeman. Mhoon, 464 So.2d at 80. Mhoon explicitly rejects the notion that policemen and their relatives are per se unqualified to sit on a jury. Mhoon, 464 So.2d at 81. The teaching of Mhoon is that trial judges should scrupulously guard the impartiality of the jury and should take corrective measures to ensure that a jury does not disproportionately represent the law enforcement community. There is no evidence that the trial judge improperly rejected these challenges for cause on this record and this assignment of error is without merit.