Opinion ID: 476632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Injustice

Text: 25 Both parties to this appeal agree that the Secretary's denial of an application for correction of naval records is a final agency action subject to review under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Neal v. Secretary of the Navy, 639 F.2d 1029, 1037 (3d Cir.1981). Accordingly, both parties have focused on whether his decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, and whether it was supported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A), (E). This in turn has led the parties to attempt to show that the factual findings underlying the Board's conclusion that Miller was treated unjustly either were or were not supported by the Administrative Record. To this end, the parties point to conflicting indications in the record regarding whether Miller was notified of the charges against him and whether he was afforded an opportunity to respond to the charges. 26 We think these efforts are misplaced, for we do not read the Secretary's decision as a rejection of the Board's findings that Miller had neither notice of the charges against him nor an opportunity to respond to the charges. Rather, we read the Secretary's decision as finding that Miller was afforded all of the procedural due process to which he was entitled. Thus, we believe that the disagreement between the Secretary and the Board concerns not how Miller was treated, but rather whether the treatment he received violated naval tradition. 27 Neither the Board nor the Secretary cites any authority in support of their conclusions regarding naval tradition. We recognize that there are a number of cases suggesting that findings of the Board are entitled to deference by the Secretary because of section 1552(a)'s mandate that the Secretary act[ ] through boards of civilians when correcting military records. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 187 Ct.Cl. 1, 408 F.2d 416, 421-22 (1969); Proper v. United States, 154 F.Supp. 317, 325-26 (Ct.Cl.1957). Accord Neal v. Secretary of the Navy, 639 F.2d at 1043 n. 13. In the instant case, however, we conclude that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the Board's finding that the procedures used to censure Miller violated naval tradition. 28 It must be emphasized that the Secretary is by no means a cipher in the process of correcting naval records. Though section 1552(a) directs the Secretary to act through a civilian board, it leaves no doubt that the final decision is to be made by him: The Secretary of a military department ... may correct any military record of that department when he considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552(a) (emphasis added). See also 32 C.F.R. Sec. 723.7 (1985) (recommendations of the BCNR will be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy who will direct such action in each case as he determines to be appropriate ...). Moreover, members of the Board are appointed by the Secretary and serve at his pleasure. See id. Sec. 723.2(a). We therefore cannot agree with the district court's apparent conclusion that findings of the Board are binding on the Secretary unless shown to be unsupported by substantial evidence. We conclude instead that the substantial evidence standard applies only to judicial review of final agency actions, see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 704, which in the context of applications for correction of military records means review of decisions by the Secretary. See 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552(a). 29 In this case, the failure of the Board to cite any authority in its decision leaves us with no basis upon which to conclude that the Secretary's finding with respect to naval tradition was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence. We therefore hold that the district court erred in reversing the Secretary's determination that the procedures used to censure Miller were not unjust.