Opinion ID: 2581604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal of Prospective Jurors Based Upon Questionnaire

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in excusing, upon stipulation, eight prospective jurors based solely upon their responses to juror questionnaires without follow-up questioning. The court, which has the discretion to allow parties to ask or submit supplemental questions, must conduct the initial examination of jurors. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223.) Upon completion of the court's initial examination, the parties have the right to examine the prospective jurors. ( Ibid. ) In capital cases, death-qualifying examination pursuant to Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, is conducted individually, and in sequestration at the discretion of the court. ( Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1172, 1177-1182, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91.) The court initially submitted two questionnaires to each prospective juror, one regarding hardship and the other specific to death qualification. The court and counsel conducted the hardship voir dire. Thereafter, taking groups of 24 prospective jurors at a time, the court and counsel conducted additional general voir dire in the presence of all prospective jurors, and then began with the individualized and sequestered Hovey voir dire. Later, after having conducted several days of general and Hovey voir dire, the court stated, Counsel have indicated also, yesterday, that, having reviewed the questionnaires from today, and having the benefit of extensive voir dire of a number of other individuals in this particular case, that, in the interest of time, and more particularly in the interests of justice, they are prepared to agree that certain of our prospective jurors for this morning may be excused. Over the course of the day, counsel stipulated that eight prospective jurors could be excused based upon their responses to questionnaires alone. As a result, these eight prospective jurors were excused without having been subject to the general voir dire by court and counsel, or the individual Hovey voir dire. Defendant contends this procedure violated his rights to an impartial jury because it materially departed from the statutory scheme in that it eliminated the court from the voir dire process and resulted in the excusal of at least seven death-qualified prospective jurors. Defendant is barred from raising on appeal this claim regarding defects in the jury selection procedure. (See, e.g., People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 627-628, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) As we stated in [ People v.] Visciotti [(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 37-38, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388], `counsel acquiesced in the [voir dire] procedure of which defendant now complains.... [¶] ... [¶] ... While the parties are not free to waive, and the court is not free to forego, compliance with the statutory procedures which are designed to further the policy of random selection, equally important policies mandate that criminal convictions not be overturned on the basis of irregularities in jury selection to which the defendant did not object or in which he has acquiesced. [Citations.]' [Citation;] see also Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 ([no reversal for procedural errors absent a `miscarriage of justice'].) ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 73, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506 ( Ervin ).) In Ervin, the parties stipulated to the excusal of numerous prospective jurors based upon their answers to questionnaires. Because the defendant acquiesced in the procedure, and the procedure benefited all parties by screening out overzealous `pro-death' as well as `pro-life' venirepersons, thereby culling out prospective jurors who probably would have been unable to serve as jurors, we found no error. ( Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 73, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Defendant asserts, without authority, that Ervin was wrongly decided, and argues Ervin is distinguishable because the trial court here requested counsel show a legitimate reason for agreeing to the stipulated excusals. By doing so, argues defendant, the trial court rendered the excusal procedure to be one based upon judicial discretion rather than stipulation of parties. We disagree. The record reveals no indication that in making the request the trial court was passing on the adequacy of the reasons for the stipulations. Were we to address this claim on the merits, it would fail. An appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court's conduct of the voir dire of prospective jurors. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 223.) A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling `fall[s] outside the bounds of reason.' ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46, quoting People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) The trial court did not act unreasonably in allowing counsel to prescreen prospective jurors whose questionnaires showed they were probably subject to challenge and excusal. (See Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 72-74, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Both defense counsel and the prosecutor recognized upon review of the questionnaires alone that they did not want to accept any of these prospective jurors, and neither felt it necessary to inquire further into the prospective jurors' views on the death penalty. Instead of pursuing additional questioning, they mutually agreed to reject these prospective jurors. Defendant fails to show how this procedure was unreasonable. Finally, defendant argues that because he was absent when the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to stipulate to the excusal of these eight prospective jurors, he was denied the right to be present at a critical stage of the trial in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. ( United States v. Gagnon (1985) 470 U.S. 522, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486.) This claim is without merit. A defendant is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings that bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him, and the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair and impartial trial. (See People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 585-586, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776 ( Hovey ).) Defendant was present at all stages of jury selection, including when counsel entered into the stipulation and when the prospective jurors were excused. When trial was not in session, the court overheard the meeting in the courtroom between all counsel during which counsel discussed and agreed to exclude a number of prospective jurors, but whether defendant was present at counsel table during these prestipulation discussions is not a matter of record. Even assuming he was absent, however, he only speculates his consultation with [counsel] could reasonably have resulted in these prospective jurors not being excused. He fails to show that his presence would have served a purpose. For the foregoing reasons, we also reject defendant's claims this jury selection procedure violated his right to due process, an impartial jury, and a reliable penalty verdict in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and article 1, sections 13 and 15 of the state Constitution.