Opinion ID: 2123675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to incorporate the visitation schedule agreed to by the parties in its judgment and decree of divorce?

Text: In its judgment and decree of divorce, the trial court ordered, that [William] shall have reasonable rights of visitation [with the two minor children] based upon reasonable notice and circumstances. William contends this order violates the following stipulation on visitation made during trial: [William's Counsel]: Your Honor, that's basically correct. My understanding was, though, that it was agreed that visitation rights will be alternating weekends from 6 p.m. Friday until 6 p.m. Sunday and alternating major holidays and a period of six weeks in the summer, but the judge will decide whether or not the visitation rights will be subject to approval of the children. Basically, the plaintiff would like some type of clause in there giving the childrenthat these rights are subject to agreement of the children.       [Shirley's Counsel]: ... These are not three and four year olds. Basically, it resolves [sic] around their activities, and I'm hopeful that the parties themselves and I've discussed this with my client as well as provided my client with the pamphlet that's put out in terms of visitation but I think as the divorce goes on or as theas the divorce goes on in life, the parties are going to have to work around the children's lives more than their own. But as [William's counsel] stated, I think that's essentially correct. In Radigan, 465 N.W.2d at 484-85, this court upheld the trial court's rejection of a property settlement and child custody agreement based upon the rule that: An agreement between the parties on any of these matters is one relevant factor for the court's consideration, but such an agreement does not control the court's exercise of its discretion in light of all relevant factors. The trial court's determinations will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has abused its discretion by reaching a result `clearly against[ ] reason and evidence.' (citations omitted). `[t]he right of visitation derives from the right of custody and is controlled by the same legal principles.' Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 255 (S.D.1991). Thus, just as the trial court had the discretion to reject the child custody agreement in Radigan, so did the trial court have discretion to reject the visitation agreement in the instant case. A review of the visitation stipulation itself shows that Shirley had some reservations regarding the fact that the children might not want the frequent and extended visitations that William was seeking. As Shirley's counsel pointed out, the children are not three and four year olds and Shirley testified during trial to their active participation in school activities and various odd jobs. Based upon these considerations, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the narrow visitation agreement of the parties and utilizing broader language in its judgment that would afford greater flexibility in the visitation arrangements.