Opinion ID: 530736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Opening and Closing Statements of the Prosecutor

Text: 26 Escruceria claims that improper remarks made by the prosecutor in both his opening and his closing statements were so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. 27 Whether improper argument by government counsel has so prejudiced the trial process as to require reversal must be gauged from the facts of each trial. United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1051 (4th Cir.1983). The test for reversible prosecutorial misconduct generally has two components: (1) the prosecutor's remarks or conduct must have in fact been improper, and (2) such remarks or conduct must have prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d 872, 875 (4th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). 28 If prosecutorial comments were in fact improper, this court looks to four factors to determine whether they were so damaging as to require reversal: 29 (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to direct attention to extraneous matters. 30 Harrison, supra, at 1052.
31 The prosecutor's opening statement should be an objective summary of the evidence reasonably expected to be introduced, and the prosecutor should not use the opening statement as an opportunity to 'poison the jury's mind against the defendant.'  Brockington, supra, at 875. 32 That part of the prosecutor's opening statement objected to by Escruceria is as follows: 33 Ladies and gentlemen, this is an organized crime case, an organized crime case involving an international cocaine conspiracy operated by the Escruceria family and controlled as the head of that family, the godfather, for lack of a better word, of that family by the defendant seated in the courtroom today, Samuel Alberto Escruceria-Delgado. 34 Escruceria claims that the prosecutor's reference to this as an organized crime case, and an international cocaine conspiracy involving a family operation, as well as his reference to Escruceria as the godfather of the family, were unduly inflammatory in that they brought to mind images of the Mafia. Clearly the second and third remarks were not improper. They were accurate descriptions of the case and, in and of themselves, they were not particularly inflammatory. 35 The prosecutor's use of the terms organized crime and godfather, could be construed as improper. Under the four factors to be considered, however, it does not appear that the use of these terms unduly prejudiced Escruceria. The reference to Escuceria as a godfather was made only once, and the term organized crime was used only twice--once in opening and once in closing. Thus, these remarks were isolated, rather than recurring instances. There exists little likelihood, therefore, that these words misled the jury to the prejudice of the defendant. Furthermore, in the absence of these remarks, there was sufficient proof to establish Escruceria's guilt. Finally, the trial judge immediately issued curative instructions, informing the jury that the remarks of counsel were not evidence.
36 Escruceria also objected to the prosecutor's closing remarks which referred to this as an organized crime case. As discussed above, however, the use of the term organized crime, even if improper, appears to have been nonprejudicial. Escruceria further claims that the part of the prosecutor's rebuttal which discussed the Witness Protection Program (WPP) was unduly prejudicial. These comments, however, appear to have been proper. 37  'The closing argument of the Prosecutor must be considered in light of the previous arguments of defense counsel in order to determine whether there was provocation for what the prosecutor said.'  Harrison, supra, at 1053, quoting United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 50 (6th Cir.1965), aff'd, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). In its closing, the defense had argued that Gutierrez's testimony was less than credible, because of the benefits inuring to him via the WPP. Specifically, defense counsel told the jury: 38 Now that he's arrested, what does Bill Gutierrez realize? Hey, they arrested this man on what I said over the telephone. This is my big ticket. He knows that he's a necessary witness. He knows that he's the only witness. He knows that the government needs him. So what happens now? He ups the ante. He says, Hey, I'm afraid. I'm afraid, the old deal isn't in tact anymore, I want more. I'm afraid. If I'm going to testify against this guy, you have to put me under the Witness Protection Program. What's the Witness Protection Program? They give a guy a new name, a new identity, and they give him a job somewhere. The prosecutor would have you think that he's going to jail. That's crazy. So, think about this. 39 In his rebuttal, the prosecuting attorney stated to the jury: 40 I also talked about the Witness Protection Program. [Defense] counsel told you that because several of the government's witnesses are in the Witness Protection Program and that means they are not going to jail, that Bill Gutierrez is not going to jail. That is completely wrong. The Witness Protection Program is approved by the Marshal Service, not by this office, not by the U.S. Attorney's office. It's approved by the Marshals and it's approved for those people who have a documented threat against their lives or their family's life by criminal organizations like the one headed by Delgado. And when he goes to jail, and he's facing twenty years, he will go in under the Witness Protection Program, which means he will be isolated so he doesn't get killed in jail. That's what the Witness Protection Program means, is to keep people who do decide to cooperate from getting killed by criminal organizations and heads of organizations like Delgado's. That's what it means. 41 We find that the prosecutor's rebuttal remarks concerning the WPP were invited by the defense counsel's statements concerning both the WPP and Gutierrez's lack of jail time, and were therefore proper. 42 Finally, Escruceria objects to the remark the prosecutor made in closing his rebuttal. The prosecutor stated: 43 Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for your attention. I ask you to consider the evidence and then to hold this defendant accountable. Something has to be done and I ask you to hold this defendant accountable for every count so we can do something to stop this. 44 Escruceria claims that under United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.1988), such a statement was improper. Pupo involved a prosecutor who closed his argument by urging the jury to 'make that statement so that we can address these types of conspiracies that are taking place in our community.'  841 F.2d at 1240. The court found this remark improper because it could suggest to the jury that they should convict the defendants not for their participation in these crimes, but merely to make a statement against narcotics crimes in general or to prevent future crimes. Id. The Pupo court went on to hold, however, that this statement did not constitute reversible error, commenting that, the improper remarks were isolated and were not deliberately made to direct the jury's attention to extraneous matters. Although the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming ... it was adequate [and] the degree to which the remarks could have prejudiced the jury was relatively small. Id. 45 Even if improper, then, the prosecutor's remark on rebuttal does not appear to constitute reversible error. As in Pupo, the remark was isolated, and therefore the degree to which it could have misled and prejudiced the jury was small. Furthermore, the evidence of guilt in this case, while perhaps not overwhelming, also appears to have been more than merely adequate. 46