Opinion ID: 2512385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: NRS 484.3795(1)(a): under the influence

Text: The district court held that Cotter states the correct interpretation of under the influence, requiring a connection between the defendant's intoxication and his ability to exercise physical control over his vehicle. The State initially argued that NRS 484.3795( l )(a) and Cotter require that it show Burcham's driving was only slightly impacted by the ingestion of alcohol to establish that he was under the influence of alcohol. [9] But the State conceded in its reply brief and oral argument that Cotter is probably still the correct standard. Thus, the State and Burcham essentially agree that Cotter still requires that the State prove that the alcohol impaired Burcham to a degree that rendered him incapable of driving safely. The issue remaining for this court is whether the Cotter holding is still sound considering the subsequent amendments to NRS 484.3795. This court reviews questions of law and statutory interpretation de novo, and we only look beyond the plain language of the statute if that language is ambiguous or its plain meaning clearly was not intended. [10] Therefore, where the legislative intent is clear, we must effectuate that intent. [11] Additionally, statutory construction should always avoid an absurd result. [12] NRS 484.3795(1) sets forth six alternative means of violating the statute. The three alternatives set forth in subsections ( l )(a)-(c) are relevant to this case. Under paragraph (a), a person must be under the influence of intoxicating liquor, whereas under paragraphs (b) and (c), a person must have a BAC of 0.08 or more, under different circumstances. Thus, paragraphs (b) and (c) establish per se violations based on a specific BAC regardless of whether the person is impaired, whereas paragraph (a) does not require a specific BAC. [13] This court addressed the meaning of under the influence in a prior version of NRS 484.3795 in Cotter, a case involving a defendant convicted of DUI causing substantial bodily harm based on being under the influence of a controlled substance. [14] When Cotter was decided in 1987, NRS 484.3795(1) set forth the offense and alternative means of committing it in a lengthy single sentence: Any person who, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or with a 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood, or while under the influence of a controlled substance, or under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or any person who inhales, ingests, applies or otherwise uses any chemical, poison or organic solvent, or any compound or combination of any of these, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving or exercising actual physical control of a vehicle, does any act or neglects any duty imposed by law while driving or in actual physical control of any vehicle on or off the highways of this state, if the act or neglect of duty proximately causes the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, any person other than himself, shall be punished by imprisonment. ... (Emphasis added.) Based on this provision, the State argued that the phrase to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving or exercising actual physical control of a vehicle applied only to the clause immediately preceding it, dealing with any chemical, poison or organic solvent, or any compound or combination of any of these, and not to the clause under which the defendant had been convictedbeing under the influence of a controlled substance. [15] Consistent with that interpretation, the State insisted that any person who drives a vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance, and while doing so, commits any act which causes death or substantial bodily harm, is guilty of a felony DUI. [16] This court rejected that interpretation, explaining that a plain reading and logical application of the provision suggests that more than this is required, one must be under the influence of the controlled substance to a degree which renders him incapable of driving safely or exercising actual physical control of the vehicle. [17] The court concluded that the State's interpretation would create[ ] anomalous prospects by, for example, making felons of drivers on lawfully prescribed medications irrespective of whether the medication had any causal relationship to the event leading to the death or injury of another. [18] Thus, this court concluded that the statute embraces only those individuals who ingest substances mentioned in the statute to a degree that renders them incapable of safely driving or exercising actual physical control of the vehicle. [19] The Cotter court went on to explain that with the exception of a per se violation of NRS 484.3795, whether a driver is under the influence will always be a question of fact, to be considered in the light of such variable circumstances as the individual's resistance to the substance, the amount ingested and the type and time of ingestion. [20] The issue here is similar but involves interpreting the amended statute. In 1995, the Legislature amended NRS 484.3795, primarily to include a per se violation based on a prohibited BAC within two hours of driving and an affirmative defense to that provision based on consumption of alcohol after driving. [21] But at the same time, the Legislature placed the alternative means of violating the statute into separate paragraphs and included the to a degree language only in paragraph (e), which deals with the ingestion of chemicals, poisons, or organic solvents. [22] As a result, NRS 484.3795(1) is currently structured in relevant part to provide that a person who: (a) Is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; [or] (b) Has a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or breath; [or] .... (e) Inhales, ingests, applies or otherwise uses any chemical, poison or organic solvent, or any compound or combination of any of these, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving or exercising actual physical control of a vehicle; ... .... and does any act or neglects any duty imposed by law while driving or in actual physical control of any vehicle ... if the act or neglect of duty proximately causes the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, a person other than himself, is guilty of a category B felony.... (Emphasis added.) The legislative history behind this amendment is silent regarding why the Legislature broke the subsection into multiple paragraphs, but the overall intent of the law was to crack down on drunk driving. [23] Because the to a degree language is now found in paragraph (e), regarding chemicals, poisons, and organic solvents, and is separated from the other acts by semicolons, [24] the 1995 amendments have some impact on the reasoning employed in Cotter. But the basic premise in Cotter remains soundthe phrase under the influence requires impairment, resulting in the inability to drive safely.