Opinion ID: 2709484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Marital Privileges

Text: We first consider the challenge to Mr. Brock’s convictions, which depends on whether the district court erred in finding that the Brocks had waived their marital privileges. There are two distinct marital evidentiary privileges under federal law: the marital communications privilege and the adverse spousal testimonial privilege. United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1984). The two privileges are different in scope and in terms of how and by whom they may be asserted or waived. We address first the marital communications privilege and then turn to the spousal testimonial privilege. No. 11-3473 7
The marital communications privilege covers “information privately disclosed between husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relationship . . . .” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951). The marital communications privilege belongs to both spouses, so either spouse may invoke the privilege to avoid testifying or to prevent the other from testifying about the privileged communication. See United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 2001). The marital communications privilege exists “to ensure that spouses . . . feel free to communicate their deepest feelings to each other without fear of eventual exposure in a court of law.” United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 (7th Cir. 1992), quoting Byrd, 750 F.2d at 590. The marital communications privilege applies even after the marriage has dissolved, but the protected subject matter includes only what one spouse communicates to the other, not what one spouse learns about the other in other ways, such as by observing the other’s actions. See Lofton, 957 F.2d at 477. In Mr. Brock’s trial, the marital communications privilege could have applied to Mrs. Brock’s testimony that he told her to take two guns from their home and put them in a car. It would not have applied to her testimony about Mr. Brock handling the guns or shooting possums. The district court found that both Mr. and Mrs. Brock had waived this privilege when Mrs. Brock testified without objection in the detention hearing that he had 8 No. 11-3473 told her to move two guns from the house to the car. We agree. As with other privileges governing communications, such as the attorney-client privilege, an unprivileged disclosure amounts to a waiver. In developing the federal law of privilege, other circuits have affirmed findings of implied waiver of the marital communications privilege when the witnessspouse testified to marital confidences in a pretrial proceeding and the party-spouse failed to object. See Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 123 F.3d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 1997) (party-spouse’s failure to object to witnessspouse’s deposition testimony about confidential communications waived the marital communications privilege for trial as to those statements); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1043–44 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendantspouse waived marital communications privilege by failing to object to wife’s testimony at suppression hearing); see also Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 667–69 (9th Cir. 2003) (deposition testimony about privileged conversations waived the confidential marital communications privilege for trial) (applying California law of evidence in diversity case).1 These decisions are consistent with the more frequently litigated issue of waiver of the attorney-client 1 Numerous state court decisions are in agreement. See, e.g., Northern RR. Co. v. Hood, 802 P.2d 458, 465 (Colo. 1990) (failure of husband’s attorney to object at deposition to wife’s testimony about conversations with husband waived marital communications privilege). No. 11-3473 9 privilege in pretrial proceedings. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Staples, 148 F.3d 379, 384 (4th Cir. 1998) (deposition testimony about confidential conversation with lawyer waived attorney-client privilege); United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 36–37 (1st Cir. 1995) (disclosure of confidential communications to government investigators waived attorney-client privilege for criminal trial); United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158, 1160 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant’s testimony at hearing to withdraw guilty plea about confidential conversation with attorney waived attorney-client privilege as to subject for trial).2 Mr. Brock contends that his wife’s pretrial testimony did not waive the privilege because the waiver could not have been “knowing, voluntary, and intentional.” Appellant’s Br. at 46, citing In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding waiver of state-law psychotherapist-patient privilege under this 2 See also 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2328 at 638–39 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (“A waiver [of attorney-client privilege] at one stage of a trial should be final for all further stages, and a waiver at a first trial should suffice as a waiver for a later trial, since there is no longer any reason for preserving secrecy.”); Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 299 (4th ed. 2001) (“Failure to make an adequate or timely objection to disclosure either in responding to interrogatories, giving testimony in depositions or in producing documents may well be fatal to any successful assertion of the privileged matter at trial. . . . Likewise, disclosure in court effects a waiver.”). 10 No. 11-3473 more stringent standard, without expressly deciding whether that standard or a less stringent standard should apply). While waiver of certain constitutional rights must be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,” see, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004) (right to counsel); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (right to be present at trial); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (guilty plea), this standard generally does not apply to common law privileges protecting confidential communications. See generally 26A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5726 (1st ed.) (discussing waiver standards but indicating rule might be different for spousal testimony). We conclude that a waiver of the marital communications privilege must be “voluntary” only in the sense that the holder must realize that the once-confidential communication is being revealed. “But if the holder intends to disclose the privileged material, [even] ‘without realizing the impact’ of the disclosure on the privilege, then there is a waiver.” Id. § 5726; see United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding no waiver of marital communications privilege, but stating: “Ordinarily, deliberate disclosure of a privileged communication, where no privilege protects this further disclosure, waives a communications privilege. . . . The restriction is one of public policy, and applies regardless of the privilege holder’s subjective intent.”) (citations omitted). “There can be no disclosure of that which is already known, for when a secret is out, it is out for all time, and cannot be caught again like a bird, and put back in its cage.” People v. Bloom, 85 N.E. 824, 826 (N.Y. 1908). No. 11-3473 11 We agree with the district court that what happened in the detention hearing amounted to a clear waiver of the marital communications privilege as to the communications that Mrs. Brock described in her testimony. The disclosure was made voluntarily and without pertinent objection to try to protect the confidentiality of any communications between Mr. and Mrs. Brock. The district court did not err by overruling the objections to Mrs. Brock’s trial testimony based on the marital communications privilege.
The second marital privilege, the spousal testimonial privilege, applies to any adverse testimony one spouse might provide as a witness against the other in a criminal case. It is both broader and narrower than the marital communications privilege. It is broader in that it covers testimony on any adverse facts, no matter how they might have become known to the witness- spouse. It is narrower in that it applies only to adverse testimony in a criminal case, and it applies only during the marriage. See Byrd, 750 F.2d at 590–91; United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1975). Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Trammel, either spouse could invoke the spousal testimonial privilege, so that a defendant could prevent his spouse from testifying against him, even willingly. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1958). In Trammel v. United States, however, the Court modified the privilege so that 12 No. 11-3473 only the witness-spouse can invoke the privilege to refuse to testify adversely. 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). In Mr. Brock’s trial, the spousal testimonial privilege could have applied to any of Mrs. Brock’s testimony. The district court found that Mrs. Brock had also waived this privilege by testifying in the detention hearing. Mr. Brock appeals that ruling, but the government counters that he lacks standing to raise the issue since this privilege belonged only to his wife. We said as much in United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992), where the district court similarly found that the defendant’s wife had waived the spousal testimonial privilege for purposes of trial by testifying at a pretrial suppression hearing without objecting or claiming the privilege. Relying on Trammel, we concluded that because the defendant-spouse could not invoke the privilege, he also could not appeal a rejection of the privilege. Accord, United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999); Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford v. United States, 756 F.2d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1985). In view of Trammel and our decision in Lofton, Mr. Brock has no standing to raise this issue. We recognize that there are several consequences of this rule. Our circuit’s rule on this issue makes it especially important for defense counsel to stay alert. Nothing should stop counsel for the defendant-spouse from raising an objection to the witness-spouse’s testimony to ensure that she knows she cannot be required to testify against the defendant-spouse. No. 11-3473 13 We also recognize that a consequence of the Lofton rule on standing to invoke the privilege is that when a trial court rejects a witness-spouse’s claim of privilege, appellate review of that decision may require the witness-spouse to refuse to comply with the court’s order to testify and to be found in contempt of court. An emergency appeal of such matters in the middle of the defendant-spouse’s criminal trial could be highly disruptive, of course, but we agree with the government that the logic of the Trammel limit on who can invoke the privilege leads to that path for appellate review. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951) (on appeal from contempt order, reversing sentence for justified refusal to testify). By resolving the issue here nearly a week before trial, Judge McKinney handled the issue well, so that there would have been time for emergency consideration before the trial began. Given the importance of the spousal testimonial privilege, it would also be entirely appropriate and often prudent for the court, even in the absence of an objection, to make sure that the testifying spouse understands that she cannot be required to testify against her spouse, especially if she does not have her own counsel. See United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 N.E.2d 87, 96 n.9 (Mass. 1978) (“as a matter of good trial practice the judge should satisfy himself, outside the presence of the jury, that the spouse who is about to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding knowingly waives his or her statutory privilege”). Cf. United States v. Thompson, 14 No. 11-3473 454 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Defendants point to no case law that suggests that a witness must be affirmatively warned of the right not to testify against his or her spouse.”). The bottom line, however, is that under the logic of Trammel and the precedent of Lofton, Mr. Brock does not have standing to appeal the district court’s finding that his wife waived the spousal testimonial privilege. Since he cannot prevail on either of his challenges to his wife’s testimony at trial, his convictions are affirmed.