Opinion ID: 515509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal and Sanctions

Text: 17 Appellants allege that the district court erred in basing the dismissal and imposition of monetary sanctions on Local Rule violations and Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, 37, and 41(b). Because we find that the basis for the sanctions was appropriate pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, we need not address the other alleged violations.
18 The district court's dismissal of a case with prejudice is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir.1987). [W]e will overturn a dismissal sanction only if we have a definite and firm conviction that it was clearly outside the acceptable range of sanctions. Id. The issue is not whether this court would have, as an original matter, imposed the sanctions chosen by the trial court, but whether the trial court exceeded the limits of its discretion. Halaco Engineering Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 379 (9th Cir.1988). A determination that court orders were disobeyed is entitled to considerable weight since a district judge is best equipped to assess the circumstances of the noncompliance. Id. 19 Five factors must be considered before imposing the sanction of dismissal: 1 (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 112, 93 L.Ed.2d 60 (1986). When the district court does not explicitly consider the five factors, as was the case here, we must review the record independently to determine whether the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. Malone, 833 F.2d at 130. 20 Dismissal of this action was based on appellants' continued refusal to respond to requests to produce; they continued to refuse even after the court had ordered their responses. The record contains substantial evidence of long and unjustified delays in responding to discovery requests and noncompliance with judicial orders. We find this evidence relevant to the considerations of expeditious resolution of litigation, docket management, and prejudice, and support the district court's order. The district court considered, and indeed instigated, less drastic sanctions, but to no avail. While the public policy favoring disposition on the merits weighs against dismissal, it is not enough to preclude a dismissal order when the other four factors weigh as heavily in favor of dismissal as they do in this case. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 133 n. 2.
21 Appellants contend that the district court's award of costs and attorney's fees in the amount of $15,288.25 is an abuse of discretion. They challenge both the entitlement to, and the reasonableness of this award. 22 Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) provides for the award of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees caused by the failure to obey a court order to provide or permit discovery. Expenses incurred outside of this particular context are not provided for in Rule 37(b)(2). 2 23 Here, while the district court cited to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, 37(b)(2), and Local Rules 100-3 and 235-2, it specifically alluded to the language of 37(b)(2) when it ordered plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, jointly and severally liable, to pay to TWA its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred as a result of plaintiff's and plaintiff's counsel's disobedience of this Court's orders. Excerpts of Record (ER) 138 at 19 (emphasis added). 24 Counsel for TWA submitted a declaration itemizing attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with this action. Clerk's Record (CR) 126. The fees and costs included time traceable to the preparation and filing of TWA's Motion for Discovery Plan and (Proposed) Plan and Schedule of Discovery, CR 126 at 4, as well as time traceable to efforts in opposing an Ex Parte Application for Protective Order filed by appellants on February 6, 1987. Id. at 6. The itemization of costs and fees also included numerous other expenditures incurred prior to the attainment of the first court order directed against appellants on February 23, 1987. See ER 86, 87. 25 To the extent that such expenses were not incurred as a result of plaintiff's and plaintiff's counsel's disobedience of ... Court[] orders, we find that the amount of the award was an abuse of the district court's discretion. 3 26 Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the rates claimed were reasonable or that they were comparable with prevailing rates in the community. The district court simply recited the total sanction award, stating that [t]he amount of these sanctions ... [is] established by TWA to the satisfaction of this Court. ER 138 at 19. 27 As we explained in Southerland v. Intern. Longshoremen's, Local 8, 834 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1987): 28 The district judge is in the best position to determine the reasonableness of a fee award, but in order for this appeal to be meaningful, the record must inform us of the basis for this conclusion ... Failure to provide evidence of prevailing legal rates in the community leaves a court with an insufficient basis from which to conclude that the rates requested are reasonable. 29 Id. at 795 (citations and footnote omitted). 30 Because the costs and fees awarded were not properly segregated to those expenses caused by the failure to obey court orders, as circumscribed by 37(b)(2) and the district court's sanction order, we remand to the district court with directions to adjust the award of monetary sanctions accordingly. On remand, the district court is instructed to set forth facts explaining its ultimate award.