Opinion ID: 1368015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 1a Question: Is the degree of discipline recommended appropriate under the circumstances?

Text: Yes. It has been uniformly held that the purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is not to punish the attorney but to inquire into the moral fitness of an officer of the court to continue in that capacity and to afford protection to the public, the courts and the legal profession. ( Clancy v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 140, 151 [77 Cal. Rptr. 657, 454 P.2d 329].) (2) Misappropriation of funds entrusted to him, wilfully failing to render services for which he was employed, wilfully failing and refusing to communicate with his clients regarding the status of their actions or to answer their communications, falsely and knowingly deceiving other persons are acts sufficient to place in jeopardy petitioner's right to continue the practice of law. (3) Habitual disregard by an attorney of the interests of clients is ground for disbarment, even when such neglect is grossly negligent or careless, rather than willful and dishonest. ( Grove v. State Bar (1967) 66 Cal.2d 680, 683-684 [58 Cal. Rptr. 564, 427 P.2d 164], disbarment.) (4) Gross carelessness and negligence constitute a violation of the oath of an attorney to discharge faithfully the duties of an attorney to the best of his knowledge and ability and involve moral turpitude, in that they are a breach of the fiduciary relation which binds him to the most conscientious fidelity to his client's interests. ( Simmons v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 719, 729 [87 Cal. Rptr. 368, 470 P.2d 352].) Petitioner's knowledge, ability and experience have not here been questioned. Indeed, they have been highly praised by his colleagues in their declarations herein. (5) Misappropriation of funds entrusted to an attorney at law is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics, and, in addition, is likely to endanger the confidence of the public in the legal profession. It deserves severe punishment. ( Resner v. State Bar, supra, 53 Cal.2d 605, 612, disbarment.) In the absence of strong mitigating circumstances the usual penalty is disbarment. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) p. 91.) (6) Mitigating circumstances may be considered in the determination of discipline to be imposed. (See 1 Witkin, supra, Cal. Procedure, 115-118; idem., 1967 Supp. pp. 62-63.) Voluntary closing of a law office during a period of personal difficulty may be considered, and petitioner refers to the closing of his law office during a part of the period in which he was having a drinking problem. It appears that financial difficulties caused him to close his law office and that he practiced out of his home until November 1968 when he went into residential treatment. He can claim no merit for self-imposed suspension of practice during the period December 19, 1968, to July 10, 1969, when he was involuntarily suspended for nonpayment of dues. Neither petitioner's heavy debts nor his drinking problems can exonerate his acts of forgery, misappropriation, deception and misrepresentation. (7) Whatever the reason for an attorney's misconduct, our concern is and must be the protection of the public in the high duties of an attorney, the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession, and the maintenance of the highest professional standards for attorneys. (1b) The trial committee, before whom petitioner personally appeared, and the Disciplinary Board have indicated by their recommendations their belief that petitioner can redeem himself if permitted to resume practice after a short actual suspension but subject to specific conditions of probation extending over a five-year period. We specifically note petitioner's prior good record as a lawyer, the confidence presently placed in him by his fellow attorneys, and the diligence and dedication with which he has applied himself as a lawyer since his return to practice. We note his candor, cooperation and remorse throughout the disciplinary proceedings, and the efforts he has made and is making to overcome his personal difficulties and to repay his debts. We therefore concur in the recommendations as made. It is ordered that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, that execution of the order for such suspension be stayed, and that petitioner be placed upon probation for said period of five years upon the conditions prescribed by the board in this matter, including actual suspension from practice for the first six months thereof, the order to be effective 30 days after the filing of this opinion.