Opinion ID: 543080
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Resolution

Text: 28 The Resolution was passed at a special meeting of the GEB on November 1, 1989, after the Administrator had decided that he had authority to proceed against Friedman and Hughes on the charges against them but before the district court had decided that issue. The Resolution was passed without notice to the Administrator and without provision by the IBT of an agenda in advance as required by the Consent Decree. This conduct is apparently the subject of a dispute, presently under consideration by the district court, over whether the discussions at the GEB November 1989 meeting were protected from disclosure to the Administrator by the attorney-client privilege. The Resolution was passed at the request of at least one member of the GEB, IBT Vice President Theodore Cozza, who was himself charged with conducting himself so as to bring reproach upon the IBT by knowingly associating with associates of La Cosa Nostra. 29 The Resolution purported to interpret two portions of the IBT Constitution: Article II, section 2(a), see note 1, and Article XIX, section 3(d). The text of the latter is reproduced in the margin. 2 The Resolution first provided that the phrase to bring reproach upon the Union of Article II, section 2(a), was unduly vague and thus must be limited in application to the more specific provisions of Article XIX, sections 6(b)(3)-(7), reproduced in the margin. 3 In addition, the Resolution stated that the reproach provision was never intended to cover associations between union members or officers with other persons inside or outside the trade union movement based upon the reputation or reputed activities of such other persons, absent any proof of participation or association with such persons in conduct violating the more specific provisions of Article XIX, sections 6(b)(3)-(7). See note 3. Finally, the Resolution provided that the term known generally in Article XIX, section 3(d), see note 2, does not require an officer's admission of wrongful activities or actions, because to so interpret such language would make it possible to set aside the will of the membership which elected such officer when it was known generally by the membership of such allegations. 30 The Resolution, if binding, would presumably bar Charge I against Friedman and Hughes, since the Resolution silently repeals sections 6(b)(1) and (2) of Article XIX, see note 3, and the latter recognizes violation of the oath of loyalty as a basis for disciplinary charges. Moreover, since both Friedman and Hughes were re-elected to their union posts in 1987, presumably after the allegations in their 1986 indictments became known generally to the IBT membership, the Resolution's interpretation of Article XIX, section 3(d), would also independently bar Charge I. 31 Appellants argue that the Administrator was without authority to override the Resolution and further that the Resolution provided a reasonable interpretation of relevant disciplinary provisions of the IBT Constitution. 32 1. The Administrator's Authority. Appellants argue that the delegation of specific disciplinary powers to the Administrator in the Consent Decree did not include the GEB's power to interpret the IBT Constitution. The Administrator derived his authority to review the Resolution and to interpret the IBT Constitution as related to disciplinary matters from the powers granted to him under paragraph 12(A) of the Consent Decree. That paragraph provides, in relevant part, that the Administrator 33 shall have the same rights and powers as the IBT's General President and/or General Executive Board under the IBT's Constitution (including Articles VI and XIX thereof) and Title 29 of the United States Code to discharge those duties which relate to: disciplining corrupt or dishonest officers, agents, employees or members of the IBT or any of its affiliated entities (such as IBT Locals, Joint Councils and Area Conferences), and appointing temporary trustees to run the affairs of any such affiliated entities. Paragraph 12(A) further provides: 34 As to decisions of the IBT General Executive Board on disciplinary charges and trusteeship proceedings during the Administrator's tenure, the Administrator shall review all such decisions, with the right to affirm, modify or reverse such decisions.... 35 The Administrator considered his disciplinary powers under paragraph 12 of the Consent Decree to include a delegation of the interpretive authority of the General President and the GEB, as set forth in Article VI, section 2(a), and Article IX, section 1, of the IBT Constitution, insofar as he exercised that authority to interpret the disciplinary provisions of the IBT Constitution. Article VI, section 2(a), provides that the General President shall have authority to interpret the Constitution and laws of the International Union ... and to decide all questions of law thereunder between meetings of the [GEB], and Article IX, section 1, of the IBT Constitution provides that the GEB shall have the authority to interpret and apply the Constitution and laws of the International Union and to decide all questions of law thereunder subject to appeal to the next Convention. 36 In his January 1990 opinion, the Administrator ruled that the Resolution did not bind him. In its March 1990 opinion, the district court upheld the Administrator's authority to override the GEB Resolution. 37 We agree that the Administrator had authority to disregard the Resolution. In determining the scope of the Administrator's authority, we turn to the explicit terms of the Consent Decree. See SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (2d Cir.1989). The disciplinary power vested in the Administrator by virtue of paragraph 12(A) of the Consent Decree, set forth above, plainly included the power to interpret the disciplinary provisions of the IBT Constitution. Appellants maintain, however, that Article IX, section 1, of the Constitution, grants the GEB exclusive authority to issue definitive interpretations of the Constitution, and that this authority was not modified by the Consent Decree in view of both the absence of any specific reference to the Administrator's interpretive power in the Consent Decree and the express reservation of rights contained in paragraph 18(a) of the Consent Decree. That paragraph states that [e]xcept as provided by the terms of this order, nothing else herein shall be construed or interpreted as affecting or modifying ... the IBT Constitution.We are not persuaded that the IBT reserved the right to issue binding interpretations of the disciplinary provisions of its Constitution, in view of the express delegation contained in paragraph 12(A) of the Consent Decree, which grants the Administrator the same rights and powers as the IBT's General President and/or General Executive Board under the IBT's Constitution (including Articles VI and XIX thereof) to discharge disciplinary duties. Appellants would have us read the parenthetical phrase as confining the Administrator to the more limited interpretive powers set forth in Article VI, section 2(a), of the IBT Constitution, but the plain language of the Consent Decree does not permit such a restrictive reading. The Administrator's powers includ[e], but are not limited to, Articles VI and XIX. The Administrator's powers include as well the broader interpretive power authorized under Article IX, section 1, of the IBT Constitution insofar as the exercise of that power relates, as it does here, to disciplining corrupt or dishonest IBT or IBT-affiliated officers, agents, employees or members. As already indicated, Article IX, section 1, of the IBT Constitution vests the GEB with authority to interpret and apply the IBT Constitution and to decide all questions of law thereunder. Moreover, the Administrator's comprehensive right to review disciplinary charges of the GEB necessarily includes the final authority to determine what constitutes an offense subject to discipline under the IBT Constitution. 38 2. Reasonableness of the Resolution. Appellants also argue that the Resolution is a reasonable interpretation of the IBT Constitution, and is thus binding on the Administrator and the courts, because federal case law recognizes a union's fundamental right to interpret its own constitution and requires judicial deference to that interpretation unless patently unreasonable. The Administrator rejected the GEB's constitutional interpretations as unreasonable, and the district court affirmed this ruling. 39 Even on the unlikely assumption that the GEB retained any independent authority to issue interpretations of the disciplinary provisions of the IBT Constitution, we conclude that the Resolution was entitled to no weight. The parties disagree over whether this court applies a patently unreasonable or a mere unreasonable standard to review of a union's interpretation of its Constitution. Appellants maintain, relying on Association of Contracting Plumbers, Inc. v. Local Union No. 2, United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Indus. of the United States and Can., 676 F.Supp. 523, 530 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 841 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.1988), that this Circuit applies a patently unreasonable standard of review. The government contends, relying on Schonfeld v. Raftery, 359 F.Supp. 380, 388 (S.D.N.Y.1973), aff'd sub nom. Fritsch v. District Council No. 9, Bhd. of Painters, 493 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.1974), that this court merely applies an unreasonableness standard. Under either standard, we reach the same result. 40 Appellants' arguments in defense of the reasonableness of the Resolution are not persuasive. The IBT attempts to sugarcoat the circumstances surrounding the Resolution, which was passed at a special meeting just one month after the Administrator had ruled against Friedman and Hughes on their various legal defenses to the charges against them and while the district court was considering the matter. The IBT also attempts to minimize the Resolution's likely effects, while Friedman and Hughes recognize the exculpatory nature of the Resolution but maintain that this fact is irrelevant, even as they attempt to benefit by it. Appellants ask this court not only to disregard the exculpatory character of the Resolution, which would bar pending charges against current and former GEB members, but also to ignore the fact that the Resolution was precipitated by a request from at least one charged IBT officer. This we decline to do. Cf. Morrissey v. Curran, 423 F.2d 393, 400 (2d Cir.) (exculpatory amendment to union constitution declared void), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928, 90 S.Ct. 2245, 26 L.Ed.2d 796 (1970). 41 Moreover, the passage of the Resolution apparently violated the IBT's obligations under paragraph 17 of the Consent Decree, which expressly provides that the IBT must seek approval prior to making any changes in the areas covered by the Consent Decree: 42 The parties intend the provisions set forth herein to govern future IBT practices in those areas. To the extent the IBT wishes to make any changes, constitutional or otherwise, in those provisions, the IBT shall give prior written notice to [the government].... 43 The IBT maintains, however, that the requirement of paragraph 17 refers solely to changes that it might propose to the Consent Decree, and does not affect the IBT's right to interpret its Constitution. This argument ignores the fact, as the district court noted, that this paragraph specifically requires the IBT to refrain from any unilateral changes, constitutional or otherwise, in the broad areas covered by the Consent Decree. Paragraph 17 was obviously intended to protect the background understanding of both parties of what existing rules, regulations and constitutional provisions would govern the IBT. 44 We agree with the district court that the significant alterations attempted by the Resolution in the offenses which constitute violations of the IBT Constitution are major changes in the governing rules of the IBT, and would effectively nullify the Administrator's powers in disciplinary matters.