Opinion ID: 2133433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: application of daubert standards in new trial

Text: We note that although Wass' testimony did not meet the requirements of the Frye test at the first trial, this does not necessarily preclude the Schafersmans from offering such testimony at a second trial. As stated above, novel scientific theories can be reliable and thus admissible under Daubert even if not generally accepted in the scientific field, so long as foundation is presented to satisfy the court of the validity of the theory or methodology underlying the proffered opinion. In evaluating expert opinion testimony under Daubert, where such testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question, the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline. See Kumho Tire Co., supra . In determining the admissibility of an expert's testimony, a trial judge may consider several more specific factors that Daubert said might bear on a judge's gatekeeping determination. See id. These factors include whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high known or potential rate of error; whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation; and whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community. See id. These factors are, however, neither exclusive nor binding; different factors may prove more significant in different cases, and additional factors may prove relevant under particular circumstances. See, e.g., Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136 (3d Cir.2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1357, 149 L.Ed.2d 287 (2001) (setting forth additional factors to be considered). In the instant case, the questions presented arise in the discipline of veterinary epidemiology. When epidemiology is used in legal disputes, the methodological soundness of a study and its implications for resolution of the question of causation require the assessment of whether the study reveals an association between an agent and disease, whether sources of error in the study may have contributed to an inaccurate result, and whether any relationship between the agent and the disease is causal. See, generally, Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 333 (Federal Judicial Center 2d ed.2000), at http://air. fjc. gov/public/fjcweb.nsf/pages/16. A trial court must also consider whether an expert has accounted for other possible causes of disease; differential diagnosisthe process of eliminating other possible causescan be an essential component in establishing specific causation. See Sarah Brew, Where the Rubber Hits the Road: Steering the Trial Court Through a Post -Kumho Tire Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 27 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 467 (2000). Evidence of an association may be sufficient for formulation of a hypothesis that can later be tested and confirmed, but it is not proof of causation in the courtroom or the scientific community. Nelson v. American Home Products Corp., 92 F.Supp.2d 954 (W.D.Mo.2000). A gatekeeping court must evaluate the reliability of the bridge the expert takes to the opinion, not the opinion itself. Owens v. Amtrol, Inc., 94 F.Supp.2d 952 (N.D.Ind.2000). Thus, in applying the Daubert standards, Nebraska courts should remember that the focus must be on the principles and methodology utilized by expert witnesses, and not on the conclusions that they generate. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Reasonable differences in scientific evaluation are not a basis for exclusion of an expert witness' opinion. See Falise v. American Tobacco Co., 107 F.Supp.2d 200 (E.D.N.Y.2000). As Judge Jack Weinstein observed: Too nitpicking an approach to find reasons to exclude expert testimony from distinguished scientists will tend to drive the best of them out of the courtroom. The greatest danger to the courts is not the incompetent who will testify for pay, but our failure to encourage sound scientists to assist the law. Id. at 205. Exercise of the Daubert gatekeeping responsibility requires a balance between rigorous examination of the reliability of the principles and methodology of expert witnesses, and acceptance of reasonable disagreement regarding such principles and methods and the conclusions that they generate. We are confident that the trial courts of Nebraska, like the majority of courts throughout the United States, will be able to strike this balance.