Opinion ID: 2362987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Batson/Miller-El Claim

Text: Evans was tried in 1984, before Batson was decided by the Supreme Court. During jury selection, the State's use of its peremptory strikes to exclude African Americans was commented upon three times. The court (Judge Cathell) first raised the issue on its own initiative. After twelve jurors were tentatively seated, the parties proceeded to select two alternates. During that process, when the State excused a black prospective juror, Judge Cathell called counsel to the bench and directed them to make their strikes in alternating order. He wanted a clear record of who was striking whom, he said, so that later on I can make an indication whether they were excused as to race. Noting that the lead prosecutor was on loan from the United States Attorney's Office, Judge Cathell warned that there was a line of Maryland cases disapproving racial strikes and wanted to make sure that the Federal prosecutor was aware of those cases: [t]here has been some extremely strong language in dicta about using peremptory challenges for racial purposes. And I think you ought to think about that. The prosecutor responded that he was aware of those cases and stated I am not striking anybody based on race. The process continued until twelve jurors and two alternates had been selected, at which point the court asked if counsel were satisfied with the jury. Defense counsel informed the court that the panel was not acceptable because the State had used its peremptory challenges to purposely limit blacks from representation on the panel. Counsel noted that the State had used eight of its ten peremptory challenges to strike black jurors and two to strike white jurors, leaving two African Americans on the jury and one as an alternate. The court invited a response from the State, whereupon the prosecutor advised that he did not keep track of whether he had struck black or white jurors and that [w]e struck on background, age, occupation, what was learned during the voir dire at the bench and in open court. We did not strike on racial grounds. There was no challenge to that explanation and no request for further elucidation, and the court accepted it. The next day, while the court was considering Evans's complaint that the venire itself did not reflect a fair cross-section of the community, the prosecutor noted that 22% of the county population was African American and three of the jurors  two regular jurors and one alternate  were black, which constituted 21.4% of the panel. His point was that there was no significant racial disparity in the actual make-up of the jury. Defense counsel responded that his objection the day before was not to a cross-section but rather that the State's peremptory challenges were racially motivated, to which the court noted that the prosecutor had given his reasons for the strikes and that the objection had been ruled upon. In Evans's appeal from the conviction and sentence, he raised the issue of whether the State's peremptory strikes had been improperly used to exclude African Americans. Batson had still not been decided. After reviewing the existing state of the law, which was already trending beyond Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), we assumed that the use of eight peremptory strikes to exclude African Americans was sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the defendant's rights, but concluded that the explanation offered by the prosecutor, and apparently accepted by the court, was sufficient under the circumstances to support the decision of the trial judge in overruling the defendant's objection. Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 528, 499 A.2d 1261, 1282 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986). We observed: It is also significant that neither the judge nor defense counsel questioned the explanation of the prosecutor or requested further particulars. This may well have represented a tactical decision by the defendant's counsel, to require the court's decision to be made upon the weighing of the defendant's prima facie showing against the rather general response of the prosecutor, as opposed to seeking specific information from the prosecutor as to each excused venireman and running the risk of further strengthening the prosecutor's explanation. For whatever reason, the explanation of the prosecutor stood uncontroverted and unimpeached. Id. Batson was decided by the Supreme Court on April 30, 1986. At the time, Evans's petition for certiorari seeking review of this Court's decision was also pending in that Court. That petition was denied without comment on June 30, 1986; this Court was not directed to reconsider its decision in light of Batson. In his first petition for post conviction relief, filed in 1990, Evans argued that the State's use of peremptory strikes to exclude African Americans constituted a violation of Batson. The court had before it the transcript of the jury selection phase of the trial and noted that, even though Batson had not then been decided, Judge Cathell had required the prosecutor to explain his peremptory strikes. The reasons given, the court concluded, were race-neutral and did not appear to be pretextual. Moreover, the matter had been raised and decided in Evans's direct appeal and was therefore finally litigated. Evans complained about that aspect of the post conviction court's ruling in an application for leave to appeal, which we denied. State v. Evans, Misc. No. 8, Sept. Term 1991 (Order filed June 4, 1991). As a result of the first post conviction proceeding, Evans received a new sentencing hearing, at which a jury in Baltimore County again sentenced him to death. He raised a Batson issue at that proceeding as well. It appears that the only African American jurors who were excused by the State were alternate jurors, however, and no alternate jurors were called upon to deliberate. The trial judge (Judge Kahl) found no merit to the complaint. In August, 1995, Evans filed his second petition for post conviction relief. Among the 41 issues presented in that petition were seven relating to the State's peremptory challenges  three complaints dealing with the re-sentencing and four emanating from the initial trial. As no complaint is made in this appeal about jury selection at the re-sentencing proceeding, we need to consider only the four dealing with the initial trial. Evans's only direct challenge did not invoke Batson, but was instead grounded on Swain v. Alabama, supra, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759. He complained that he was denied his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution because the Baltimore County State's Attorney's Office engaged in a pattern of using peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of race in violation of Swain v. Alabama .  The post conviction court (Judge Smith), noting that that issue had been raised and decided in the appeal from the initial conviction and sentence, Evans v. State, supra, 304 Md. 487, 522-28, 499 A.2d 1261, 1280-82, concluded that it had been finally litigated and that there was no merit to it in any event. A second, related argument was that trial counsel was deficient by failing to investigate and present evidence of the State's pattern of exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. That, too, invoking Swain rather than Batson, was found to be without merit. Two challenges grounded specifically on Batson were presented, but only in the context of deficient performance by counsel in the first post conviction proceeding. Evans complained that post conviction counsel was deficient in (1) failing to pursue grounds for establishing a Batson violation based on the State's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, (2) not pursuing claims that the prosecutors in this case demonstrated a pattern of using peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson, (3) making only a perfunctory presentation to this Court relating to the State's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, and (4) failing to raise and preserve on appeal meritorious claims that the prosecutors in this case had demonstrated a pattern of using peremptory strikes on the basis of race. Judge Smith found that the validity of the State's use of peremptory challenges at the initial trial had been fully and finally litigated. He observed that trial counsel had challenged the State's use of peremptory challenges at the trial, that the issue was raised and decided in the appeal from the initial judgment, and that it had been raised and decided in the first post conviction proceeding. The second argument, as viewed by the post conviction court, was almost a repetition of the one just noted. Evans complained that post conviction counsel was deficient in that he made only a perfunctory presentation to the Court of Appeals relating to the State's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. He added: Petitioner alleges that (1) he was denied equal protection of the law by the prosecution's purposefully striking African Americans from the jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky and (2) he was denied equal protection of the law because he was prosecuted by attorneys who had demonstrated a pattern of using peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky .  The court rejected that claim, noting that the peremptory challenge issue had been finally litigated in the direct appeal, before post conviction counsel was involved in the case. Those claims were presented to this Court in Evans's amended application for leave to appeal from the denial of relief by the post conviction court. We considered the application and obviously found no merit to it, for on May 7, 1997, we denied it. Evans v. State, 345 Md. 524, 693 A.2d 780 (1997). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Evans v. Maryland, 522 U.S. 966, 118 S.Ct. 411, 139 L.Ed.2d 314 (1997). In November, 1997, Evans filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court. Among the 24 issues raised in that petition was a four-part complaint about the State's peremptory strikes at the initial trial: i) because his trial and direct appeal concluded before the Supreme Court announced Batson, the federal courts should give no deference to the state proceedings described above; ii) Batson requires, `[the] prosecution to articulate a race-neutral reason for each strike' once a prima facie case has been established . . . iii) the race-neutral reasons given by prosecutor . . . were clearly pretextual; and iv) his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to demonstrate this pretext by comparing the ages, occupations, etc. of the potential jurors Irwin struck against those he did not strike. Evans v. Smith, 54 F.Supp.2d 503, 514 (D.Md.1999). The District Court (Judge Legg) reviewed the trial transcript and this Court's ruling on appeal and concluded that none of those complaints had merit. It found, first, that anticipating the shifting burdens eventually adopted by the Supreme Court in Batson,  this Court, in Evans's appeal, applied a reasonable and correct legal standard, and that, in the first post conviction proceeding, Judge Eschenburg measured Evans's claim against Batson, which had by then been published. Id. Accordingly, the court held that both decisions were entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e). Second, the court held that Batson did not require an individual explanation for each strike but only a clear and reasonably specific justification for the prosecutor's use of strikes relating to the particular case to be tried. Third, the court held that Evans's analysis of the ages, occupations, etc. of the jurors stricken and accepted does not clearly demonstrate the pretextuality of [the prosecutor's] explanation. Id. at 515. In that regard, the court found Evans's analysis of the juror data unpersuasive in that it fails to take into consideration the many impressions that a potential juror makes on voir dire. Id. at 515, n. 20. Finally, the court concluded that Evans's appellate counsel were not constitutionally remiss in failing to develop this. Id. at 515. Rather, it found the proposed evidence unpersuasive as it does not clearly demonstrate that the factual determinations of Judge Cathell and the Court of Appeals were incorrect. Id. The District Court denied the petition and a motion for rehearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306 (4th Cir.2000), and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, Evans v. Smith, 532 U.S. 925, 121 S.Ct. 1367, 149 L.Ed.2d 294 (2001). It is abundantly clear from this history that Evans's Batson claim has been fully and finally litigated, in both the State and Federal courts. It has been presented to and rejected by this Court on at least two occasions, it was presented to and rejected by the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court has denied review of it at least three times. The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the 1995 post conviction proceeding to examine it again.