Opinion ID: 543757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jurisdiction over the County of Orange Suit

Text: 45 Appellant Grace properly raises other jurisdictional claims. 5 With respect to the County of Orange suit, Grace contends that the district court should have dismissed the entire County of Orange action for lack of jurisdiction because it did not have either federal question or diversity jurisdiction over the case at its commencement. The original suit was a suit brought by a single plaintiff asserting a CERCLA claim against the non-diverse National Gypsum. Jurisdiction was predicated solely on the federal claim. Since plaintiff failed to state a claim under CERCLA, the entire suit should have been dismissed. Appellants urge that appellee County of Orange did not have standing to amend the original complaint, and therefore the district court erred in allowing it to amend to name new plaintiffs, defendants, and claims. See Summit Office Park, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 639 F.2d 1278, 1282 (5th Cir.1981). 46 Appellees argue to the contrary that Orange County was entitled as a matter of right to amend its complaint, pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 15(a), to add the new parties and state law claims. McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Company, 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1976), mod. on other grounds, 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.1977) (en banc). In McLellan, this Court held that a plaintiff could amend his complaint under Rule 15(a) to add new claims and new defendants, thereby establishing jurisdiction despite the fact that the original defendant properly was dismissed for failure to state a federal claim against it. 47 Both appellants and appellees miss the critical point. Regardless of whether appellees possessed the right under F.R.C.P. Rule 15(a) to amend their original complaint to name new parties and claims, thereby creating jurisdiction, the amended complaint in this case did not accomplish that result. At no time since its inception has there been federal question or diversity jurisdiction in the County of Orange suit. It is well-established that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state law claims is proper only when there is a substantial federal question before the court. See Slaughter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir.1986); Hondo National Bank v. Gill Savings Ass'n., 696 F.2d 1095, 1102 (5th Cir.1983). Because appellees have failed to state a federal question, we decline to exercise jurisdiction over appellees' pendent state claims. 48 Appellees put forth the argument that their recent attempt to amend their complaint in district court in order to drop National Gypsum, which they claim was proper under F.R.C.P. 21, has had the effect of injecting valid diversity jurisdiction. But as we stated above, the district court lacked jurisdiction to change the status of the parties pending the disposition of this appeal. In the posture of the case before us, subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. 49 Appellees alternatively urge us to exercise our discretion in favor of allowing them, either here or on remand to the district court, to amend their complaint to dismiss National Gypsum, which would create diversity jurisdiction retroactively. While we have the discretionary power to grant the plaintiffs-appellees leave to amend in order to dismiss the non-diverse National Gypsum, see Newman-Green Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 2225-26, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989), we decline to do so here. Plaintiffs-appellees attempted to bootstrap themselves into federal court by virtue of their invalid CERCLA claims. There is no justification to complicate this complex litigation further by allowing the entire nature of the case to be altered. We dismiss this case in its entirety. 50 It is also within our power to dismiss the entire Dayton II action for lack of jurisdiction as well. We do not choose, however, to take that course. In that action, the plaintiffs originally did have valid diversity jurisdiction, which was subsequently destroyed when they joined the CERCLA-National Gypsum bandwagon. Instead of dismissing the entire Dayton II suit, we recognize a right to litigate the issues raised by means of a diversity proceeding. So we dismiss defendant-appellant National Gypsum from the Dayton II action and restore diversity jurisdiction. 51