Opinion ID: 1631232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Disqualify David Ringer

Text: ¶ 51. A trial court's findings of fact when considering a motion to disqualify an attorney are reviewed for manifest error. Colson v. Johnson, 764 So.2d 438, 439 (Miss.2000) (citing Quick Change Oil & Lubrication Co. v. County Line Place, Inc., 571 So.2d 968, 970 (Miss.1990)). The court has broad discretion. Id.
¶ 52. Hartford's grievance with David Ringer emanates from Ringer's representation of Dan Pierce. Pierce was among the numerous defendants named in the litigation arising from the well blowout. Hartford initially declined to extend its coverage to Pierce because Pierce was not a named insured under Tomlinson's policy. Pierce hired Ringer to represent his interests. After Ringer made demands on Hartford on behalf of Pierce, Hartford's investigation revealed that its agent had been instructed to make Pierce and his organization a named insured. Thereafter, Hartford undertook payment of Pierce's defense. Ringer continued as Pierce's attorney. Hartford alleges it paid Ringer in excess of $930,000 for legal fees and reimbursable expenses. ¶ 53. Hartford hired Curtis Coker to represent Tomlinson in the blowout litigation. Hartford asserts Coker determined Halliburton was the truly negligent party. Coker hired Jim Langston as an expert witness, and Hartford paid Langston's fees. Hartford asserts Coker allowed Ringer to meet with Mr. Langston and question Mr. Langston as freely as he wished. Hartford claims Langston is the expert witness it intended to use in the present case when it went to trial. Thus, it complains that Ringer is now representing Halliburton, but has had personal meetings with Hartford's own expert. Hartford contends Ringer represented both it and Pierce in the blowout litigation, and that Ringer learned confidential information from the expert Hartford intended to use in the present case. Hartford additionally refers to Dan Pierce's answers he gave to interrogatories in defense of his own suit. Pierce asserted in these answers that Halliburton (whom Ringer now represents) was the sole cause of the well blowout. Ringer signed these answers. Lastly, Hartford makes reference to another expert witness, Pete Courtney, hired by Ringer. Hartford asserts that Ringer and Coker agreed to split the costs for Courtney, and that Hartford ultimately paid the bill for him as well. Hartford concludes the foregoing disqualifies Ringer from representing Halliburton in the current litigation under Miss. R. Prof Conduct 1.9 which governs an attorneys conflict of interest regarding former clients. Hartford emphasizes the portion of the comments to Rule 1.9 which states: When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representations of other clients with materially adverse interests is clearly prohibited. ¶ 54. Halliburton first asserts this issue is procedurally barred by M.R.C.P. 54(b). We agree. Rule 54(b) requires that: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated which adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. ¶ 55. Halliburton's counterclaim seeking indemnity from Hartford is still pending. Halliburton asserts the only order made denying the motion to disqualify Ringer was oral. A few points of clarification are needed at this juncture: Judge Goza was the judge presiding over this case prior to Judge Kitchens. Judge Goza orally denied this motion, but an order was never entered. When this matter came before Judge Kitchens, he was considering a motion already decided by Judge Goza. On May 17, 1999, Judge Kitchens signed an order denying Hartford's motion to reconsider its motion to disqualify Ringer. The Rankin County Circuit Clerk's docket sheet reflects this order was filed May 18, 1999. However, there has been no certification by the trial court that there is no just reason for delay. Hartford never addressed this procedural issue in its reply brief. ¶ 56. Both parties refer to the two-part test developed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for attorney disqualification under these circumstances. The two elements are: (1) an actual attorney-client relationship between the moving party and the attorney he seeks to disqualify; and (2) a substantial relationship exists between the subject matter of the former and the present representations. Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1569 (5th Cir.1989). There has been no dispute regarding whether the subject matter is substantially related. The only meaningful point of dispute is whether David Ringer ever represented Hartford. We find that Hartford has failed to establish that an attorney-client relationship ever existed between itself and Ringer. Hartford seems to assert that Ringer is deemed to have represented it by virtue of his representing one of its insureds and Hartford's having paid his bill. ¶ 57. Hartford cites to Moeller v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 707 So.2d 1062 (Miss.1996) and Hartford Acc. & Indent. Co. v. Foster, 528 So.2d 255 (Miss.1988) for the principle that an attorney who is employed to represent an insured is representing both the insured and the insurer. Yet, both of these cases are factually distinguishable from the case sub judice. In both cases, the insurance company retained the attorney who would ultimately represent the insured. Conversely, Pierce independently hired Ringer prior to any admission of coverage by Hartford. Ringer's representation continued after Hartford agreed to pay. Ringer stated in his affidavit that Hartford was never given a choice as to who would represent Pierce, but rather, he informed Hartford that he was representing Pierce and left Hartford to decide whether or not it would fund the representation. ¶ 58. Hartford asserts Coker's affidavit supports its assertion that Ringer represented both it and Pierce. Yet, Coker's affidavit stated that he believed himself to be representing both Tomlinson and Hartford. The relationships between Coker and Hartford, and Coker and Tomlinson, were wholly independent of the relationship Hartford had with Ringer. ¶ 59. Hartford asserts that in his representation of Pierce, Ringer learned confidential information from the expert witness that Hartford plans to use in this case. Ringer's affidavit asserts that he did not learn anything confidential from the expert, and learned nothing beyond that which he could have gained in a deposition. Hartford never states exactly what information Ringer allegedly learned that would be harmful to it in this case; all that Hartford asserts is this broad, vague allegation. ¶ 60. Consequently, we find that Hartford's motion to disqualify David Ringer was properly denied.