Opinion ID: 1397653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determining Abuse of Discretion

Text: As this Court has stated many times, an appellate court should find that a trial court has abused its discretion only when the trial court has applied an incorrect legal standard, or has reached a decision which is illogical or unreasonable and causes an injustice to the party complaining. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 337 (Tenn.2006). The correct legal standard to apply to a defendant's application to suspend the balance of his or her sentence, which application has been made pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-306(c), is a matter of first impression before this Court. Again, we look for guidance to the analogous Rule 35 motion to reduce sentence. The Advisory Commission Comments to that Rule provide that [t]he intent of this rule is to allow modification only in circumstances where an alteration of the sentence may be proper in the interests of justice. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 35, Advisory Commission Comments. This Court, too, has recognized that [t]he intent of Rule 35(b) is to allow modification in circumstances where an alteration of the sentence may be proper in the interest of justice. State v. Hodges, 815 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tenn.1991). Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals has affirmed a trial court's denial of a Rule 35 motion where the defendant failed to show that post-sentencing information or developments had arisen to warrant a reduction of his sentence in the interest of justice. State v. McDonald, 893 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). We now hold that the applicable legal standard for evaluating applications to suspend the balance of a sentence, made pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-306(c), is the same as that applied to a motion to reduce sentence: whether post-sentencing information or developments have arisen that warrant an alteration in the interest of justice. In this case, the only proof of post-sentencing circumstances offered in support of Defendant's application was a stipulation to the effect that Defendant was abiding by the terms of his confinement and work release. Of course, defendants are expected to comply with the terms of their sentences, and a defendant's compliance is not, in and of itself, a sufficient development to require that he or she be placed on probation earlier than initially ordered. Cf. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-314(d) (2003) (providing that the trial court retains the authority to order a defendant serving a felony sentence in a local jail to continuous confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction if the defendant violates any condition or rule of the local jail). Accordingly, the trial court did not apply an incorrect legal standard when it declined to grant Defendant's application on the basis of this proof alone. [5] Nor can we conclude that the trial court's decision to deny Defendant's request for early release is illogical or unreasonable. The trial court indicated that it was refusing to release Defendant early because Defendant continued to refuse to name his source for the cocaine he sold. The trial court interpreted Defendant's continued silence on this point as indicative of his refusal to break his ties to that past that led him to come before the Court and as an impediment to verification of Defendant's compliance with that term of his probation prohibiting him from association with his prior drug contacts. That is, the trial court interpreted Defendant's continued silence as having an adverse impact on Defendant's rehabilitation. As the intermediate court has recognized, a refusal to identify the person who supplied the drugs that the [defendant] admittedly sold demonstrates deficiencies in [his] asserted feelings of remorse and contrition, and casts doubt upon his potential for rehabilitation. State v. Lee, No. W1999-01804-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1840077, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec.14, 2000), perm. appeal denied (Tenn. May 21, 2001). In this case, the trial court's comments to counsel upon Defendant's application for early release make clear that it remains concerned that Defendant may resume his relationship with his drug source, a logical and not unreasonable conclusion. Defendant's continued confinement will minimize that risk for at least several additional months.