Opinion ID: 2626921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Judge Lindsley Heard Lengthy Testimony on the Safety of the Children at the July Permanency Hearing and Reviewed Transcripts of the April Permanency Hearing Before Returning the Children to Mother's Custody

Text: ¶29 Because Judge Valdez extended reunification services rather than making a final permanency order, it became necessary for the juvenile court to hold another permanency hearing at the expiration of the ninety-day extension. [18] At this second permanency hearing, which, due to Judge Valdez's recusal, was held before Judge Lindsley in July, the same standard that Judge Valdez applied at the April Permanency Hearing was applicable. Judge Lindsley was required to determine whether the children could safely be returned to Mother's custody. [19] ¶30 Accordingly, at the July Permanency Hearing Judge Lindsley heard three days of testimony focusing on the safety of the children in addition to reviewing the transcripts from the April Permanency Hearing. Judge Lindsley then concluded that, with the exception of S.K. and A.K., all of the children who had not already been placed in Mother's custody could safely be returned to her custody, provided family preservation services are provided to the family. She therefore returned custody of all of the children except S.K. and A.K. to Mother. ¶31 Despite Judge Lindsley's express finding in the permanency order that the children would be safe in Mother's custody, the GAL argues that we should read statements made by Judge Lindsley in both her oral ruling and the permanency order as proof that Judge Lindsley improperly substituted an inquiry into whether Mother was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the child and family plan for an inquiry into the children's safety in Mother's custody. Specifically, the GAL points to statements made by Judge Lindsley in her oral ruling to the effect that the July Permanency Hearing had introduced nothing new, that she was going to make the same findings of fact as Judge Andrew Valdez, and that the case previously had not met any criteria for extension of reunification services past the April Permanency Hearing. The GAL argues that if Judge Lindsley truly made the same findings as had Judge Valdez, she would necessarily conclude that it was not safe to return the children to Mother. ¶32 Additionally, the GAL maintains that because Judge Valdez found substantial compliance and because Judge Lindsley repeated the finding of substantial compliance and stated that Mother has followed through with the services required of her by the court and necessary for the return of her children, Judge Lindsley must have erroneously applied a substantial compliance standard rather than the safety standard. ¶33 Judge Lindsley's comments in connection with her oral ruling do indicate a belief that at the April Permanency Hearing Judge Valdez should have immediately returned custody of the children to Mother rather than using the exception in section 78-3a-312(4)(d) to support the children's transition into Mother's home. Nevertheless, Judge Lindsley recognized that reunification services were extended and that there was never a motion for no reunification services. Upon expiration of the time set for reunification services, Judge Lindsley therefore held a permanency hearing in accordance with Utah Code sections 78-3a-111(2)(f) and 78-3a-312. ¶34 Our review of the record from the July Permanency Hearing and Judge Lindsley's permanency order leaves us satisfied that Judge Lindsley was herself ultimately concerned with whether the children could safely be returned to Mother, as required by Utah Code section 78-3a-312(2)(a). At the July Permanency Hearing, the GAL provided extensive testimony on the impact that return of the children would have on their safety and mental health. And during that hearing, Judge Lindsley made statements indicating that she understood that her primary concern was with the children's safety. ¶35 In an exchange with counsel on the first day of the hearing Judge Lindsley stated, [W]here the focus of this hearing is whether it's safe to return the children or not, I think it would be beneficial for this Court to hear from the children, so we will need to make arrangements for the children to come to court. Later, Judge Lindsley interviewed the children individually in her chambers on the record and in the presence of the parties' counsel. During the interviews, she asked each child about recent interactions with Mother and about whether the child felt safe in Mother's care. For instance, during Judge Lindsley's interview with Ja.K., who at that time was already living with Mother, the following exchange took place: [Q. by Judge Lindsley] Do you feel like you're safe at home? [A. by Ja.K.] Yeah. Q. Do you worry about someone hurting you there? A. No. Q. Have you ever worried about people hurting you at home? A. No. Q. What if somebody had come to the house and was going to hurt you, what would you do? A. I wouldn't have to worry about that because it's not going to happen. Q. Okay. Well, let's say what if, because, I mean, we always figure we're safe there but what if somebody were to come to the house? A. Um, I don't know. Q. Would you call the police? A. I guess so. Q. Do you know how to call the police? A. Yeah. Q. How? A. I'm not dumb. Q. I know you're not dumb. Do you just call 911 if someone was there to hurt you? A. Yeah. Judge Lindsley's interviews with the other children involved similar exchanges. Together with the lengthy testimony regarding the children's safety at the permanency hearing and Judge Lindsley's ultimate finding that the children were safe in Mother's custody, these statements by Judge Lindsley demonstrate that she was indeed ultimately concerned with the children's safety. ¶36 Further, the record shows that Judge Lindsley was not using the term substantial compliance as a substitute for the children's safety, but as a measurement of Mother's acknowledgment of prior abuse and compliance with court orders. Throughout both the April and July Permanency Hearings, the GAL argued that Mother had not appropriately acknowledged the prior abuse and neglect suffered by her children and that without this acknowledgment the children could not be safe in her care. Witnesses for the GAL maintained that the children would not be safe physically because Mother could not empathize with them to determine when they were unsafe, and they would not be mentally and emotionally safe because her failure to believe that they were abused would present problems as to their concept of reality. ¶37 The true degree of Mother's acknowledgment was in dispute, however, with the therapists for the children on one side arguing that she had not adequately acknowledged the problem and Mother's therapists on the other stating that Mother had indeed acknowledged the past problems, although she was reluctant to specifically admit those problems because of concerns that doing so would incriminate her in other legal proceedings. Mother's therapists criticized the children's therapists for looking specifically for magic words and not allowing visitation in which she could put her professed changes into practice. ¶38 After hearing this testimony at the April Permanency Hearing, Judge Valdez made a number of findings of fact indicating that he had considered this testimony and felt that the degree of Mother's acknowledgment was sufficient for the children's protection. Judge Valdez found that [b]ased upon the testimony of . . . the therapists for [Mother], [Mother] has made significant adjustments with respect to the matters which led to the removal of the children from her care; that [Mother] has made progress in what this Court has ordered her to do in terms of counseling and therapy; that [t]he children have expressed that they desire to return home to live with their mother . . . and have not expressed any fear of returning home to live with [her]; and that [Mother] has shown marked improvement and the Court feels that she would be capable of standing up for either herself or the children, and that [Mother] would be capable of protecting the children. ¶39 Judge Valdez's findings indicate that his concern with the children's emotional safety was based on therapist testimony that an immediate return of the children to Motherwith whom visitation had previously been suspendedwould be emotionally detrimental. Judge Valdez indicated that he believed reunification with Mother was likely within ninety days, although there was no testimony to indicate that Mother would be likely to make further statements of acknowledgment during that time. ¶40 Because Judge Valdez ordered reunification services and did not return the children to Mother's custody, all of the evidence that was previously considered by Judge Valdez was still relevant at the July Permanency Hearing to assessing the children's safety. Judge Lindsley was not required to give that evidence the same weight as Judge Valdez had given it because it was her prerogative to independently weigh the evidence initially heard at the April Permanency Hearing in light of the additional evidence regarding interactions with the children that occurred between the two permanency hearings. [20] ¶41 Nevertheless, Judge Lindsley still assigned significant weight to Judge Valdez's findings. In reaction to a dispute over the introduction of evidence regarding the degree of Mother's acknowledgment, Judge Lindsley stated as follows: I have findings from Judge Valdez on what was found at the permanency hearing, which finds with regard to substantial compliance, it was not safe to return the children at that time. Now I'm looking at is it safe today to return the children, so if you can link this up, do it quickly, but I'm not going to rehash everything that Judge Valdez has previously found. He has found substantial compliance by the mother. ¶42 Essentially, although substantial compliance was a legal conclusion necessary for Judge Valdez to extend reunification services, Judge Lindsley also considered Judge Valdez's finding of substantial compliance to reflect on issues regarding Mother's acknowledgment, and she expressed that she was less interested in retreading the controversy regarding the degree of Mother's acknowledgment than in looking at other indicators of the children's safety. When Judge Lindsley stated in connection with her oral ruling that extension of reunification services had not been warranted at the April Permanency Hearing and that there was nothing new since the April hearing, it appears that she was expressing her impression that Judge Valdez had essentially already determined that safety would be assured by the next permanency hearing when he found that despite Mother's failure to make complete acknowledgment she had substantially complied, that Mother was capable of protecting the children, and that Mother should get her children back as long as the transition was facilitated by a therapist and Mother continued to comply with court orders. Judge Lindsley indicated that in light of the testimony at the July Permanency Hearing, the outlook was very similar and that the transition of the children to Mother's custody should be completed because the children were safe. ¶43 In sum, despite Judge Lindsley's generalized statements about Judge Valdez's prior findings, we are convinced that Judge Lindsley understood that it was her duty to determine whether the children would be safe if returned to Mother and that she did so in this case.
¶44 Finally, we consider the GAL's argument that the juvenile court erred in excluding the GAL's expert witness, psychologist Dr. Goldsmith, from testifying based on the GAL's failure to disclose the witness at least ten days prior to trial in accordance with rule 20A(h)(1) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Ordinarily, we will not overturn a trial court ruling excluding a proffered witness from testifying unless the trial court has overreached the broad discretion granted it and thereby affected [the complaining party's] substantial rights. [21] As discussed below, we hold that rule 20A(h)(1) does not apply to permanency hearings and that the court therefore erred in excluding Dr. Goldsmith's testimony based on the GAL's failure to comply with rule 20A(h)(1). We find that the error was harmless and not a violation of the children's due process rights, however, because Dr. Goldsmith's testimony regarding the importance of Mother's acknowledgment was cumulative of other testimony from both the April and July Permanency Hearings.
¶45 On the first day of the July Permanency Hearing, the GAL stated to the court that it intended to call Dr. Goldsmith as an expert witness. Later that day, the GAL filed an expert witness designation as a courtesy. Mother objected to Dr. Goldsmith's offering testimony, and the juvenile court excluded it as untimely under rule 20A(h)(1) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The GAL made a proffer of Dr. Goldsmith's intended testimony and now appeals the exclusion of his testimony. ¶46 The GAL maintains that rule 20A(h)(1) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure was inapplicable and that the juvenile court should have instead applied rules 26 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and granted a continuance rather than excluding Dr. Goldsmith's testimony. In contrast to the interpretations of the rules offered by the juvenile court and the GAL, we hold that rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, not rule 20A(h)(1), applies to discovery of expert witnesses in permanency hearings. ¶47 Rule 20A(h) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides for discovery of experts in two types of trials in juvenile court: adjudication trials and termination of parental rights trials. [22] In this case, the juvenile court applied the provision applicable to adjudication trials, rule 20A(h)(1), which states as follows: Adjudication trials. Any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at the adjudication trial must be disclosed by the party intending to present the witness at least ten days prior to the trial or hearing unless modified by the court. If ordered by the court, a summary of the proposed testimony . . . shall be filed at the same time. [23] While the juvenile court apparently recognized that the permanency hearing was not an adjudication trial, it reasoned that rule 20A(h)(1) applied to permanency hearings based on the language mandating that expert testimony must be disclosed at least ten days prior to the trial or hearing. [24] ¶48 We note, however, that the language trial or hearing in rule 20A(h)(1) is modified by the initial designation of the provision as one that applies to [a]djudication trials. The or hearing language must therefore be taken to refer to an adjudication hearing. This conclusion is supported by a comparison of the instant language in rule 20A(h)(1) with almost identical trial or hearing language in rule 20A(h)(2), the provision applicable to [t]ermination of parental rights trials. [25] If the reference to a hearing in rule 20A(h)(1) were interpreted to extend the application of rule 20A(h)(1) to hearings not associated with an adjudication, rule 20A(h)(2) would require similar interpretation and it would be unclear which provision would be applicable to any particular hearing. We find it more consistent with logic and with the apparent structure of the statute to interpret the or hearing language in rule 20A(h)(1) as a reference to an adjudication hearing. ¶49 A permanency hearing is not an adjudication trial or hearing to which rule 20A(h)(1) applies, but is instead a type of disposition hearing to which rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure applies. Adjudication is a defined term both in the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure and in related statutes that refer to a finding by the court, incorporated in a judgment or decree, that the facts alleged in the [petition alleging the court's jurisdiction] have been proved. [26] In the context of a juvenile court proceeding based on a petition alleging abuse or neglect such as this one, an adjudication trial or hearing is one where the juvenile court determines whether a minor has been abused or neglected and thus whether the minor comes within its jurisdiction. ¶50 If the juvenile court finds abuse or neglect at an adjudication hearing, it then conducts a dispositional hearing where it may make any disposition authorized by Utah Code section 78-3a-118. [27] Disposition is defined by the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure to mean any order of the court, after adjudication, pursuant to section 78-3a-118. [28] Permanency hearings are a type of disposition hearing, which in previous versions of the relevant statutes were called dispositional review hearings. [29] Permanency hearings are held after the initial dispositional hearing in cases where DCFS custody over the minor is continued at the disposition hearing. [30] Permanency hearings are designed to end the `legal limbo' for the children concerned. [31] ¶51 In contrast to the specific rules for discovery and expert witness disclosure in the context of adjudication trials and termination of parental rights trials, the rule applicable to disposition hearings is explicitly informal. Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides that [d]isposition hearings shall be conducted in an informal manner to facilitate the opportunity for all participants to be heard. [32] Rule 46(b) further provides: The court may receive any information that is relevant to the disposition of the case including reliable hearsay and opinions. Counsel for the parties are entitled to examine under oath the person who prepared the pre-disposition report if such person is reasonably available. The parties are entitled to compulsory process for the appearance of any person, including character witnesses, to testify at the hearing. [33] ¶52 In the context of permanency hearings, the instructions of rule 46 are modified by Utah Code section 78-3a-312(3), which mandates, among other things, that in making a determination regarding whether it is safe to return a minor to the parent's custody the court shall review and consider: . . . (b) any admissible evidence offered by the minor's guardian ad litem. [34] ¶53 In the absence of strict deadlines for disclosure of expert testimony like those provided for adjudication trials and termination of parental rights trials, the juvenile court has broad discretion to control the conduct and admission of evidence in disposition hearings. [35] But it must abide by the intent expressed in rule 46 that the hearings be managed informally to facilitate the opportunity for all participants to be heard, [36] and it must ensure that the disposition hearing meets the requirements of due process. [37] ¶54 As for the permanency hearing in this case, we do not read the requirement of Utah Code section 78-3a-312(3)(b) that the juvenile court review and consider . . . any admissible evidence offered by the [GAL] to limit the juvenile court's discretion to exclude expert testimony that the GAL, without good cause, fails to disclose prior to the permanency hearing. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court had discretion in the context of the permanency hearing with respect to deciding whether to admit or exclude Dr. Goldsmith's expert testimony. ¶55 While the GAL correctly argued in its briefs that the juvenile court erred in applying rule 20A(h)(1) to permanency hearings, the GAL erroneously concluded that the juvenile court should have instead applied rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The GAL argues, based on the court of appeals' decision in Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, [38] that the juvenile court erred in excluding Dr. Goldsmith's testimony instead of granting a continuance because the juvenile court had not set a disclosure deadline for the permanency hearing. In response to the GAL's arguments, the juvenile court also cited rule 26's requirement of a written report as an alternative ground supporting exclusion of Dr. Goldsmith's testimony. ¶56 We note briefly that the provisions for discovery of expert witnesses in rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with the informal nature of disposition and permanency hearings. Therefore, the expert witness disclosure provisions of rule 26 and the accompanying discovery sanctions in rule 37 do not apply in this case. [39] Furthermore, the court of appeals' decision in Berrett is distinguishable because its holding that a court cannot sanction a party by excluding a witness when there is no judicially mandated deadline for disclosure applies only to courts' use of exclusion of a witness as a discovery sanction under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [40] Thus, we hold that the juvenile court should have applied only rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure and exercised its discretion in determining whether Dr. Goldsmith's testimony should have been excluded from the permanency hearing. ¶57 We do not reach the question of whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in this case, however, because in applying rule 20A(h)(1) of the rules of juvenile procedure the juvenile court appeared to believe that exclusion was mandated rather than subject to the court's exercise of discretion. We therefore treat the juvenile court's exclusion of Dr. Goldsmith's testimony as error. As we will now discuss, however, the error was harmless.
¶58 When a trial court errs in excluding evidence, no new trial . . . is warranted, unless the error affected a substantial right of the party. [41] An error is harmful if it is reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. [42] According to the GAL's proffer, Dr. Goldsmith is a child psychologist with training regarding chronic abuse and neglect who would have testified that parental acknowledgment of abuse is important to measure change and assure children's safety; that change is unlikely in a family where there is a chronic history of past abuse, neglect, and DCFS intervention; that a parent's failure to acknowledge abuse and neglect has detrimental effects on the children; that Mother's treatment was superficial; and that the court should not rely simply on whether the children indicate that they would feel safe returning because young children often do not recognize when their needs are not being met. The evidence that Dr. Goldsmith was prepared to provide regarding these issues was, however, largely cumulative of testimony at both the April Permanency Hearing and the July Permanency Hearing. ¶59 Over the course of both permanency hearings, the juvenile court heard extensive testimony regarding the importance of acknowledgment of past abuse and neglect from the doctor who performed Mother's psychological evaluation, from the children's therapists, and from DCFS worker Curtis Giles. These witnesses testified that acknowledgment was important as the first step toward changing a prior pattern of abuse, as well as for the children's mental health. Even one of Mother's therapists, Bonnie Peters, agreed at the April Permanency Hearing that perpetrators must acknowledge their abuse before the family can begin getting back together. Yet, at both permanency hearings, the degree of Mother's acknowledgment was disputed, with witnesses for the GAL on one side arguing that Mother's statements of acknowledgment were vague and that she continued to blame others for her problems and with witnesses for Mother on the other opining that she had adequately accepted responsibility, made the commitments necessary for change, and was now able to empathize with her children. ¶60 As for the other related issues that Dr. Goldsmith would have addressed if allowed, the juvenile court heard similar testimony from Dr. Davies and two of the children's therapists, Paul Butters and Pamela Mitchell, who testified that a parent's failure to acknowledge isolated a child and could lead the child to question reality and perhaps to psychotic behaviors. It heard testimony questioning the focus of the treatment programs in which Mother was enrolled and the lack of a traditional element of domestic violence treatment. And finally, it heard testimony from witnesses that children often express a desire to return home to their parents, even when they have been seriously abused. ¶61 In short, despite hearing substantially similar testimony to that which Dr. Goldsmith would have offered, the juvenile court was persuaded that Mother had made sufficient changes for the children to be returned safely to her custody. None of the problems raised by Dr. Goldsmith were new or previously unconsidered by the court, and there was nothing in Dr. Goldsmith's proffered testimony to indicate that the court would be likely to give more weight to these problems than it gave to them without Dr. Goldsmith's testimony. We therefore conclude that although the juvenile court erred in excluding Dr. Goldsmith's proffered testimony under rule 20A(h)(1) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the error was harmless. We also conclude that, because Dr. Goldsmith's proffered testimony was cumulative and the error was harmless, the juvenile court's exclusion of Dr. Goldsmith's testimony did not violate the children's due process rights.