Opinion ID: 2621995
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Heading: 18 u.s.c. ง 1161

Text: ถ 31 While Rice v. Rehner rejected the notion of tribal sovereignty to regulate alcoholic beverages, Manufacturing Technologies mechanically applied the notion of tribal sovereignty to bar state court jurisdiction over contracts. In deciding whether 18 U.S.C. ง 1161 [11] permits a private person to maintain a suit in state court alleging dram shop liability against an Indian tribe, we must avoid doing violence to Rice v. Rehner and Manufacturing Technologies. We must decide whether the words laws of the State [12] in 18 U.S.C. ง 1161 authorize the exercise of state court jurisdiction over the Tribe for alleged violation of the state alcoholic beverage statutes. ถ 32 Undoubtedly, ง 1161 decriminalized liquor transactions in Indian country and opened Indian country to state laws governing alcoholic beverages. When Congress enacted ง 1161, state law governed activities involving alcoholic beverages. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205, 97 S.Ct. 451, 461, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). Early on, Congress left liquor regulation to the states [13] and the United States Supreme Court upheld state court remedies provided to third parties aggrieved by tavern keepers furnishing alcoholic beverages. Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97, 38 S.Ct. 298, 62 L.Ed. 596 (1918). Eiger v. Garrity upheld an Illinois statute that subjected the premises of a dram shop to a lien for damages recovered by the wife against the tavern owner who furnished the husband intoxicating liquor. In so ruling, Eiger v. Garrity said: In view of the broad authority of the states over the liquor traffic, and the established right to prohibit or regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, we are unable to discover that there has been a deprivation of property rights in the legislation in question in violation of due process of law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. ถ 33 The Twenty-first Amendment [14] to the Constitution of the United States gives states considerable regulatory power not strictly limited to importing and transporting intoxicating liquors. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107, 100 S.Ct. 937, 944, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980). Each state holds great powers over the importation and transportation of intoxicating liquors, State Bd. of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63-64, 57 S.Ct. 77, 78-79, 81 L.Ed. 38 (1936), with wide latitude in regulation of intoxicating liquors, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 42, 86 S.Ct. 1254, 1256, 16 L.Ed.2d 336 (1966). Other constitutional provisions may limit the exercise of the state's police power in regulating intoxicating liquor pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment. State liquor laws cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-209, 97 S.Ct. 451, 460-463, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), the Due Process Clause, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436, 91 S.Ct. 507, 509, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971), the Export-Import Clause, Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341, 84 S.Ct. 1247, 12 L.Ed.2d 362 (1964), or the Commerce Clause, Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-332, 84 S.Ct. 1293, 1298, 12 L.Ed.2d 350 (1964). ถ 34 There is no bright line between the states' virtually unfettered power over the distribution and sale of intoxicating liquors and Congress' commerce power in situations where the state regulation of intoxicating liquor prevents enforcement of a federal law, such as antitrust laws. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 110, 100 S.Ct. at 946. The competing state and federal interests must be reconciled. Id. Even so, there can be no doubt that when Congress enacted ง 1161, it was well aware of the breadth of the state's authority over alcoholic beverages, which involved the states' adjudicatory authority as well as its legislative authority. ถ 35 The Tribe argued that a private person may not sue the Tribe under the state liquor laws because a private person may not exercise the state's police power. This position, of course, fails to recognize that police power is exercised when the legislature enacts a law that restricts the behavior of a tavern keeper and when it enacts a law allowing a tavern keeper's property to be taken to cover the costs of damages suffered by innocent third parties, as explained in Eiger v. Garrity . Neither the filing of a suit in court alleging dram shop liability nor the maintaining of the suit involves police power [15] and the Tribe cites no authority otherwise. The Tribe acknowledged that ง 1161 might allow the state to bring an action in state court against the Tribe to enforce the state liquor laws, even though it urged a private party cannot. With this acknowledgment, the Tribe tacitly concedes that Congress intended the Tribe to be subject to state court jurisdiction when it enacted ง 1161. ถ 36 Rice v. Rehner read ง 1161 as a delegation of authority over alcoholic beverages in Indian country to the states to exercise their police power to protect the congressional decision in favor of the states and as a delegation of congressional licensing authority to the Indian tribes. 463 U.S. at 731, 103 S.Ct. at 3301-3302. Rice v. Rehner rejected an argument that United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 547-548, 95 S.Ct. 710, 713, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975), recognized Indian tribes possessed independent authority over liquor transactions and state laws are generally not applicable to Indians in Indian country unless expressly provided by Congress. Rice v. Rehner said because of the lack of a tradition of self-government in the area of liquor regulation it is not necessary that Congress indicate expressly that the state has jurisdiction.... 463 U.S. at 731, 103 S.Ct. at 3302. ถ 37 Consistent with Rice v. Rehner , we reject the Tribe's argument that ง 1161 does not authorize the state courts to exercise jurisdiction over the Tribe because the statute does not expressly state, in plain and precise words, that an Indian tribe shall be subject to state court jurisdiction. The words laws of the State in ง 1161 are comprehensive and under Rice v. Rehner , include state authority over alcoholic beverages whether it is legislative, executive, or adjudicative in nature. ถ 38 Here, the state statute imposes a duty on a mixed beverage license holder not to serve alcohol beverages to an intoxicated person and our extant jurisprudence recognizes the right of an individual injured by the breach of that statutory duty to maintain a negligence action against the dram shop. This state law remedy is consistent with Eiger v. Garrity . It is consistent with federal principles that those for whom a statutory duty is imposed are entitled to recover damage caused by the breach of the statutory duty and that the denial of a remedy is the exception rather than the rule. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-375, n. 52 & 53, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1837, n. 52 & 53, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982). This state law remedy to recover money damages furthers the legitimate objectives of the state's liquor laws. We reject the Tribe's argument that dram shop liability should be excluded from the words laws of the State in ง 1161.