Opinion ID: 2823794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: CRE 403 Analysis

Text: Â¶43Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Even relevant alternate suspect evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. CRE 403; Flowers, 644 P.2d at 920. In this context, the most likely concern will be the confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or considerations of undue delay. See Salazar, Â¶ 27, 272 P.3d at 1074â75 (concluding that the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury substantially outweighed the minimal probative value, if any, of the alternate suspect evidence); Flowers, 644 P.2d at 920 (agreeing with the prosecution that the evidence of the alternate suspectâs other crimes would tend to confuse the issues in the case before the jury and unduly delay the trial). Â¶44Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In balancing probative value against the countervailing policy considerations of CRE 403, an item of evidence should not be viewed as an island. People v. Saiz, 32 P.3d 441, 446 (Colo. 2001). The probative worth of any particular bit of evidence is affected by the scarcity or abundance of other evidence on the same point. Id. âBecause the balance required by CRE 403 favors admission, a reviewing court must afford the evidence the maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable fact finder and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected.â Rath, 44 P.3d at 1043. To show an abuse of discretion for exclusion of relevant alternate suspect evidence, a defendantÂ âmust establish that, under the circumstances, the trial courtâs decision was âmanifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.ââ People v. Gibbens, 905 P.2d 604, 607 (Colo. 1995) (quoting People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo. 1993)).