Opinion ID: 180034
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Second Debriefing

Text: The government informed the district court that Nunez placed limits on the topics he was willing to discuss during his second debriefing: Nunez was unwilling to discuss his customers and his co-defendants, and he was only willing to discuss particular suppliers. Nunez does not challenge the reliability of the government's proffer at the sentencing hearing concerning the limits he placed on his second debriefing. Instead, he argues that the district court must have relied solely on CI-1's statements when it concluded that Nunez was untruthful and unwilling to provide the government with all information he had concerning the charged offense. At the sentencing hearing, the district court expressly indicated that it considered the limits Nunez placed on his second debriefing. It, thus, clearly relied, at least in part, on the limits Nunez placed on his second debriefing in reaching its sentencing decision. See Lechner, 341 F.3d at 639. The limits Nunez placed on his second debriefing suffice to affirm the district court's decision that Nunez was ineligible for a safety valve adjustment: They demonstrate that Nunez failed to provide the government with all information and evidence he had concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); see Montes, 381 F.3d at 634-37; Ponce, 358 F.3d at 468-69; United States v. Alvarado, 326 F.3d 857, 860-62 (7th Cir.2003); Arrington, 73 F.3d at 148-49; Ramirez, 94 F.3d at 1101. The district court did not clearly err when it concluded that Nunez was ineligible for a safety valve adjustment based, at least in part, on the limits he placed on his second debriefing. In fact, we would affirm the district court if it relied solely on the limits Nunez placed on his second debriefing.