Opinion ID: 1268876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Boys' Club's male-only membership policy is prohibited by the Unruh Act.

Text: (3a) The Club next argues that, even if it is a covered business establishment, its traditional membership policy is reasonable and therefore permitted by the Act. Justice Kaus also urges that view. Under the facts of this case, we cannot accept the contention. (4) The Unruh Act accords every person an individual right against arbitrary discrimination of any kind, whether or not set forth expressly in the statute. ( Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d 721, 732, quoting Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 216.) Plaintiffs suggest that by condemning in particular those discriminations based on sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, and national origin, the Legislature deemed them arbitrary and unreasonable per se. Plaintiffs find support for this view in the legislative history of the 1974 amendment to the Act, which added a specific reference to sexual discrimination. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1193, § 1, p. 2568.) Intermediate versions of the amending bill, they note, proposed to ban  arbitrary discrimination ... on account of sex (italics added), but the modifying phrase was deleted from the final statute. Plaintiffs also emphasize the Legislative Counsel's view that the addition of sex to the Act would not extend its reach, since sexual discrimination would probably be considered a form of arbitrary discrimination already prohibited. (See discussion, post. ) After examining the history of the 1974 amendment in Marina Point, this court affirmed the Cox rule that the Act's identification of particular bases of discrimination ... is illustrative rather than restrictive. (See 3 Cal.3d at p. 216.) The Marina Point opinion emphasized a letter to Governor Reagan from Senator Petris, Chairman of the Select Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs and also the author of the 1974 bill. (30 Cal.3d at p. 734.) Urging the Governor's signature on the sex amendment, Senator Petris explained: The purpose of the bill is to bring it to the attention of the legal profession that the Unruh Act provides a remedy against arbitrary discrimination against women (or against men) in public accommodations which are business enterprises. This bill does not bring such discrimination under the Unruh Act, because that Act has been interpreted as making all arbitrary discrimination illegal, on whatever basis. The listing of possible bases of discrimination has no legal effect, but is merely illustrative. (Second and third italics in original.) If the last quoted sentence is true, the mere fact that sex is listed as a prohibited ground of discrimination does not give it a special arbitrary per se status, as plaintiffs suggest. Official comments by other persons and agencies involved in passage of the 1974 amendment do not appreciably advance plaintiffs' argument. The most complete analysis is that of the Legislative Counsel, included by Senator Petris with his letter to the Governor. This report took mutually contradictory views of the Act and the proposed amendment. First, it noted that, under Cox, the listed bases of discrimination are illustration[s] of what [constitute] arbitrary discrimination. Hence, it said, the bill would not extend the application of the Unruh Civil Rights Act under existing case law, since discrimination based solely on sex would [probably] be considered arbitrary even without addition of that word to the statute. The Legislative Counsel cautioned, however, that a construction of the act that would prohibit discrimination on any of the grounds enumerated therein whether or not such action was arbitrary would lead to absurd results. (Italics added.) Noted in particular was the opposition mounted against the 1974 amendment by those who feared it would prohibit sex-segregated dormitories, institutional housing, and residence hotels. Such distinctions, the Legislative Counsel speculated, could probably be justified under both existing law and the proposed amendment as not based solely on sex. (See also Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Digest of Sen. Bill No. 1380 (Aug. 13, 1974) p. 2.) This confusing appraisal is scant evidence of a legislative intent to alter Cox's determination that the identified bases of discrimination in the Act merely illustrate what may constitute arbitrary discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm that holding. [15] (3b) In Marina Point, the court discussed the nature of arbitrary discrimination. Though one may be excluded from a business establishment on an individual basis if he conducts himself improperly or disrupts the operations of the enterprise, it is arbitrary, and therefore prohibited, to exclude an entire class on the basis of stereotyped notions. (30 Cal.3d at pp. 738-739; see Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.) Marina Point left open the possibility, however, that the Act might allow the exclusion of an entire class whose presence basically [would] not accord with the nature of [the] business enterprise and of the facilities provided. (30 Cal.3d at p. 741.) Specifically, it suggested that limitation of access to members of certain groups might operate in certain cases as a reasonable and permissible means under the Unruh Act of establishing and preserving specialized facilities for those particularly in need of such services or environment. [Citation and fn. omitted.] (Italics added.) An example was housing facilities reserved for the elderly, which by design and function served the unique physical, social, and psychological needs of this minority group. ( Id., at pp. 742-743.) The court suggested that the social need served by such a specialized institution must be well-documented and established as a matter of public policy. The case for specialization is strengthened if the facility was designed to satisfy the particular concerns and characteristics of the needy group, making it less suitable for general use. ( Ibid. ) The Marina Point complex, the opinion said, could not qualify under those standards. As designed, it was suitable for children; indeed, the adults-only policy was of recent vintage. Moreover, compared to the special housing needs of the elderly, the preference of some childless adults to live away from children was not a similarly compelling societal interest. [16] In fact, the no-children rule exacerbated a more serious social problem than it purported to alleviate, since there is considerable evidence that families with small children have particular trouble finding affordable housing. ( Ibid. ) Nonetheless, the Club argues here that it falls within the Marina Point exception as a specialized facility designed and operated solely to serve the particular social needs of boys. But the Club has failed to make the showing on this issue that Marina Point demands. There is no indication that the crafts, games, counseling programs, and recreational facilities offered by the Club are suited or safe only for males. Indeed, plaintiffs seek admission to membership because of their interest in using those programs and facilities. (See National Org. for W., Essex Ch., supra, 318 A.2d at pp. 38-39.) [17] The Club contends that its primary purpose  to combat delinquency  is an important social interest best served by concentrating on male youth. It introduced juvenile hall statistics suggesting that Santa Cruz boys are four times more likely than their female counterparts to get into trouble with the law. By extending service to girls, the Club urges, it will have to dilute its efforts with boys, who present the greater social problem. [18] It was conceded, however, that delinquency affects substantial numbers of girls. There was no evidence that boys need the recreation offered by the Club more than girls, that a sex-segregated drop-in recreational facility is more effective in combating juvenile delinquency than one open to both sexes, or that extension of membership to girls would cause an impractical net increase (or decrease) in membership. [19] (5) Most fundamentally, the Club argues that it nonetheless has the absolute right to choose to focus on the needs of boys alone. Again, the analogy is drawn to the many organizations which limit their services and programs to particular minority subgroups. As we have seen, however, noncommercial organizations open only to such well-defined subgroups are not public accommodations and thus may not be business establishments covered by the Act. Here, by contrast, the Club will admit without distinction fully half the youthful population of Santa Cruz. The sole group excluded, though not numerically a minority, has been a traditional target of discrimination. [20] The effect of this policy in Santa Cruz is to deny the excluded group, and that group alone, access to recreational opportunities available nowhere else in the vicinity. Thus, as was true of Marina Point, the Club may be creating a more compelling social problem than the one it seeks to alleviate. (3c) Even the Club's argument that it traditionally serves only boys can no longer be sustained. There was undisputed evidence that a number of local Clubs, including several in California, have admitted girls with no untoward effects. [21] Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Club is a specialized facility entitled, despite the broad proscription of the Unruh Act, to deny access to girls. The Club suggests that its funding is in jeopardy if its membership policies change. But the trial court found on substantial evidence that the original Mallery Trust, the Club's major financial source, is unrestricted on that score. We recognize with concern that the Mallery's 1978 gift of $200,000 is conditioned on continuation of the male-only policy. But admission of girls may well produce offsetting new revenue sources. There is no evidence of severe, permanent financial danger should the Club be forced to comply with the Act. In sum, this record provides no basis for an exception to the Act's rule against arbitrary discrimination by business establishments.