Opinion ID: 154163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 9 The Defendant argues that the federal district court was without jurisdiction over the property because of the pendency of the forfeiture proceeding in the state district court. The foundation for Defendant's argument is a rule which applies when two courts seek to assert in rem jurisdiction over the same property in essentially the same type of action. Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935). In such a case, the court first asserting jurisdiction over the property has the power to decide the case without interference from other courts, even though those courts may have had jurisdiction over the property had they exercised that jurisdiction first. Id. This first-in-time rule applies to in rem proceedings in both federal and state courts. It stands as the lone exception to the general rule that the pendency of a prior suit does not bar another suit for the same cause of action in a different court having concurrent jurisdiction. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964); Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465-66 (1939). 10 Although the rule relied on by the Defendant has an admirable pedigree, it is not applicable to the facts before us. The cases in which the rule was established, and those to which it applies, involve separate tribunals vying for jurisdiction over the same property. Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 456; Penn Gen. Casualty, 294 U.S. at 194; Cassity v. Pitts, 995 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. $79,123.49 in United States Cash & Currency, 830 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1987). For instance, in $79,123.49, the State of Wisconsin commenced a forfeiture action regarding property seized during a drug arrest. The case was dismissed for noncompliance with statutory time limits, but the court placed a stay on its order turning the property over to claimant's counsel. Before the stay expired, however, the United States Marshal seized the property from the county courthouse. 830 F.2d at 95-96. The Seventh Circuit held that the first-in-time rule applied and deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over the property, noting that the case presented all of the logistical problems and potential for federal-state conflict inherent in two courts simultaneously competing for control of one res. Id. at 97. 11 This case does not present a situation in which two tribunals simultaneously compete for jurisdiction over the same property. On October 30, 1992, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the Kansas Constitution protected homesteads from forfeiture under state law. State ex rel. Braun v. A Tract of Land in the Northwest Quarter of Section 4, Township 11 South, Range 19 West of the 6th P.M., Ellis County, Kansas, 840 P.2d 453 (Kan. 1992). Consequently, state officials contacted federal authorities and requested that a forfeiture action be commenced under federal law. The federal district court was informed of the pendency of the state proceeding, and of the City's agreement to dismiss that action at the same time the United States Marshal seized the property. On December 18, 1992, the City of Lenexa's motion to voluntarily dismiss the forfeiture action against Lot 85 was granted by the state district court. Lot 85 was seized by federal authorities on December 22, 1992. By granting the motion to dismiss, the state district court affirmatively relinquished its jurisdiction over Lot 85 -- and its power to prevent the federal district court from asserting jurisdiction over the property. The seizure by federal authorities on December 22, 1992, brought Lot 85 within the jurisdiction of the federal district court. 12 The forfeiture claim was filed in federal district court on December 8, 1992. On December 10, 1992, the federal district court issued an order directing that a warrant of seizure of the property be issued. Although on these dates the state district court had exclusive jurisdiction to control the disposition of the property, neither of these actions in the federal district court interfered with the state district court's jurisdiction over the property or with that court's judicial processes. Penn Gen. Casualty, 294 U.S. at 198 (While it is often said that of two courts having concurrent jurisdiction in rem, that one first taking possession acquires exclusive jurisdiction, it is exclusive only so far as its exercise is necessary for the appropriate control and disposition of the property. The jurisdiction does not extend beyond the purpose for which it is allowed, to enable the court to exercise it appropriately and to avoid unseemly conflicts. The other court does not thereby lose its power to make orders which do not conflict with the authority of the court having jurisdiction over the control and disposition of the property.) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276, 282 (1938); First Charter Land Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 643 F.2d 1011, 1015 (4th Cir. 1981). 13 The Defendant further argues that the state district court did not at any time lose its jurisdiction over Lot 85. It contends that because the order dismissing Lot 85 from the suit was set aside nunc pro tunc from the bench on January 21, 1993, and entered in an order dated March 4, 1993, the state district court maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the property throughout. The Defendant offers no authority for its argument, and we have found none. Federal authorities seized Lot 85 on December 22, 1992, nearly one month before the order to set aside the dismissal was granted from the bench by the state district court. Giving that nunc pro tunc order retroactive effect, as the Defendant urges, would create the potential for the unseemly and disastrous conflicts in the administration of our dual judicial system which the first-in-time rule relied upon by Defendant seeks to avoid. Penn Gen. Casualty, 294 U.S. at 195.