Opinion ID: 901472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amendment of Judgment

Text: [¶ 6.] Ted's motion to amend was based alternatively on SDCL 15-6-60(a) or SDCL 15-6-60(b), and the parties presented argument concerning both subsections on appeal. It appears from the record that the trial judge amended the judgment under SDCL 15-6-60(a). [2] Therefore, we first address the application of Rule 60(a) to the facts of this case. [¶ 7.] Rule 60(a) provides, in relevant part: Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. SDCL 15-6-60(a). As we have explained, clerical corrections include the implementation of what was intended and what the court had accepted as the proper resolution, but failed to memorialize [as] part of a decision. Reaser v. Reaser, 2004 SD 116, ¶ 29, 688 N.W.2d 429, 438 (citations and quotation marks omitted). We review a lower court's ruling on a Rule 60(a) motion for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d 1225, 1229 (8thCir.1997) (We review denials of Rule 60(a) motions for abuse of discretion.); Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9thCir.1987) (The standard of review for [a] Rule 60(a) claim is abuse of discretion.); Walsh v. Larsen, 2005 SD 104, ¶ 6, 705 N.W.2d 638, 641 (The decision to grant or deny a motion under [Rule 60(b)] rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion.). [¶ 8.] The application of Rule 60(a) depends on the characterization of the correction sought; that is, whether the correction is due to a clerical error or whether it involves a judicial decision. A clerical error under Rule 60(a) is a mistake or omission mechanical in nature, one which does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney. Reaser, 2004 SD 116, ¶ 29, 688 N.W.2d at 438 (citation omitted). Additionally, the error or omission must be apparent from the record. Id. Thus, if the correction is clerical, the rule applies; if the correction is substantive, the rule does not apply. For example, in Wolff v. Weber, we held that Rule 60(a) could not be used to correct a referee's mistake in applying the child support guidelines. 1997 SD 52, ¶¶ 10-13, 563 N.W.2d 136, 139. In that case, the record revealed that the referee had misread the guidelines. Id. ¶ 11. Instead of using the amount of support for two children, the referee ordered the amount of support listed in the column for one child. Id. We found this mistake was not clerical. Id. ¶ 12. We declined to characterize the child support error as a correction within Rule 60(a). Id. We said: We find the error here to be one of judicial function rather than a clerical mistake. Determination of a party's child support obligation requires application of the law to the facts of the case and affects the substantive rights of the parties. Such a process can never be held to be merely clerical. SDCL 15-6-60(a) does not authorize correction of a mistake of judicial function. Id. Thus, even though the record revealed that the referee unintentionally used the wrong figure from the child support guidelines, we characterized the error as a substantive change that could not be corrected with a Rule 60(a) motion. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Quoting the Supreme Court of Montana, we said: `The authority of a court to amend its record by a nunc pro tunc order is to make it speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken.' Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 189 Mont. 547, 551, 617 P.2d 133, 135 (1980)); see also Reaser, 2004 SD 116, ¶ 29, 688 N.W.2d at 438 (detailing the nature of clerical errors). [¶ 9.] As with Wolff, the omission in the present case was not a clerical error, but rather was substantive in nature. It involved a judicial function. The judicial function was to determine whether Sally would be able to claim a portion of Ted's federal pension. Even though Judge Grosshans may have intended to preclude Sally from claiming her entitled portion of Ted's pension under the Foreign Service Act, his intention is not clear from the record. The record contains the judgment, which merely provided that the assets and liabilities shall be divided as set forth on the attached property division sheet. The property division spreadsheet placed. Ted's retirement in the amount of $93,498 in the column marked Husband and Sally's retirement in the amount of $54,758 in the column entitled Wife. Similarly, Judge Grosshans' oral pronouncement gave Ted the cash value of his pension and Sally the cash value of hers. The record contains no other testimony or documentation explaining how the cash value of Ted's retirement amount was calculated or whether the amount included or excluded Sally's entitlement. Sally provided Judge Grosshans with a copy of the federal statute that required a court order or spousal agreement to divest Sally of her entitled share. Nevertheless, the judge made no reference of his intention concerning the federal law either in his oral ruling or in the judgment. [3] [¶ 10.] Judge Trimble attempted to determine Judge Grosshans' intent from the record and to amend the judgment to reflect that intent. By amending the prior judgment under Rule 60(a), however, Judge Trimble impermissibly made it speak what it did not speak but [what he thought it] ought to have spoken. Wolff, 1997 SD 52, ¶ 13, 563 N.W.2d at 139. Similar to the child support obligation in Wolff, Sally's entitlement to or divestment of Ted's Foreign Service pension was a judicial function, not a clerical mistake. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion when it amended the judgment entered by Judge Grosshans. [¶ 11.] Our holding applies only to the limited issue of whether the judgment can be amended nunc pro tunc pursuant to SDCL 15-6-60(a). Whether it can be amended under SDCL 15-6-60(b) is not before us. The trial court did not address in the first instance Ted's claim for relief under SDCL 15-6-60(b), Sally's claim for alimony, or Sally's equitable defenses of laches, waiver, estoppel, and res judicata. We decline to consider them for the first time on appeal. We, therefore, reverse and remand for the trial court to consider the remaining claims of both parties, including Sally's claim for attorney fees. [4] [¶ 12.] Sally is awarded appellate attorney's fees in the amount of $5,000.00. [¶ 13.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, Justice, concur. [¶ 14.] ZINTER, Justice, concurs with a writing.