Opinion ID: 1188922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Criminal Conduct

Text: DR 1-102(A)(2) provides: (A) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:      (2) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law. The trial panel concluded that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2) because he committed theft by deception, as defined in ORS 164.085. [6] The accused offers two reasons why he did not commit the crime of theft by deception. He first argues that the true value of the overall package was virtually unaffected by invalidity of the will because, if properly funded and updated, the trust would eliminate the need to probate the will at all. Presumably, the accused is arguing that his misrepresentations had no pecuniary significance and that, therefore, there was no deception under ORS 164.085. That argument is not persuasive. The accused ordinarily charged his clients between $900 and $1500 for a living trust package. That package included both the pour-over will and the directive to physicians. The accused stated before the trial panel that the fee for the package included a fee for a valid will. As part of the total package, therefore, the will and the directive to physicians had some pecuniary value attached to them, regardless of whether or not the will ever was admitted to probate. The accused intentionally did not provide 290 clients with the full services for which they paid. Thus, the accused committed deception for the purposes of ORS 164.085. Second, the accused argues that he did not have the necessary intent to have committed the crime of theft by deception. The statute provides the following definition: `Intentionally' or `with intent,' when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described. ORS 161.085(7). The accused argues that he did not intend to enrich himself by cold-bloodedly deceiving clients, but that his mental state was one of egregious inattentiveness. We are not persuaded. The accused did not just let things slip while he was going through a period of crisis in his life. The accused affirmatively directed members of his office staff to falsely witness documents after the documents were executed. He consciously led his clients to believe that the wills and directives to physicians that had been executed as part of the package would have legal significance. The accused knew that the wills were invalid and, therefore, worthless, at best, and he continued charging the full price for the package without either notifying his clients of the invalidity of the wills and directives to physicians or discounting the package for the invalid parts. The Bar met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the accused committed the crime of theft by deception, and thus, that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2). See In re Anson, 302 Or. 446, 453-54, 730 P.2d 1229 (1986) (under former DR 1-102(A)(3), it is not necessary for the accused to be convicted of a crime; clear and convincing evidence meets Bar's burden).