Opinion ID: 2796318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Adult Sentencing of Warren

Text: Warren, who was age 16 when indicted, argues that under the governing statute he could not be sentenced as an adult because, though charged with multiple violent crimes including murder, he was convicted only of obstructing justice, CPWL, and corresponding street gang offenses.17 We have not opined on this issue of interpretation before, but conclude that the plain language of D.C. Code § 16-2301 (3) defeats Warren’s argument. The Family Court of the Superior Court generally has exclusive jurisdiction over a “child” accused of committing a delinquent act that would be considered a crime if committed by an adult. D.C. Code § 11-1101 (13); see, e.g., United States v. Hobbs, 594 A.2d 66, 67 (D.C. 1991). Chapter 23 of Title 16 of the Code, however, allows for certain juveniles to be prosecuted as adults in the Criminal Division when the United States Attorney, in his discretion, decides to prosecute as an adult a 16- or 17-year-old who is “charged with” one or more serious crimes enumerated in D.C. Code § 16-2301 (3). That section provides: 17 As noted previously, the obstruction count and related street gang conviction predicated on it must be vacated on remand. See note 1, supra. 36 (3) The term “child” means an individual who is under 18 years of age, except that the term “child” does not include an individual who is sixteen years of age or older and – (A) charged by the United States Attorney with (i) murder, first degree sexual abuse, burglary in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault with intent to commit any such offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense properly joinable with such offense; (B) charged with an offense referred to in subparagraph (A)(i) and convicted by plea or verdict of a lesser included offense; or (C) charged with a traffic offense. Warren does not dispute that the crimes he was convicted of were “properly joinable” with the enumerated crimes in subsection (3)(A)(i). But he argues that once he was acquitted of all enumerated crimes and lesser offenses included in them, nothing remained for the conviction-crimes to be “join[ed]” with, and as free-standing convictions they could not support continued adult jurisdiction over him through sentencing. By its terms, however, § 2301 (3) makes being “charged with” particular crimes, not “convicted of” or “charged with and convicted of” them, the basis for criminal prosecution of what otherwise would be a child. In only one instance does the section look beyond the charging decision to the result of prosecution by 37 “convict[ion]” and (implied) acquittal, and that is as to lesser-included offenses of the enumerated crimes, where a defendant would not normally, and certainly not invariably, be “charged with” the included crime expressly. In enacting § 16-2301 (A) Congress18 must be assumed to have chosen its words deliberately, and its focus on being “charged with” as the operative jurisdictional event speaks plainly as to its intent. 3A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72:3 (7th ed.) (“Courts assume that every word, phrase, and clause in a legislative enactment is intended and has some meaning and that none was inserted accidentally”). Warren’s contrary argument that conviction for a (3)(A)(i) or (B) offense is necessary for a properly joined conviction-crime to be punished can point to nothing in the statute’s text other than a pairing – “an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense” – expressly made part of the act of being “charge[d].” By denying properly joinable offenses any independent role in whether adult jurisdiction can be maintained through sentencing, moreover, Warren’s reading of the statute leads to a strange result. While convictions for, say, the lesser-included offenses of simple assault or unlawful entry, both misdemeanors, suffice to allow 18 Section 16-2301 was enacted by Congress in 1970 as part of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act. See Pendergrast v. United States, 332
38 criminal punishment, conviction alone for major joined offenses such as aggravated assault, carjacking, conspiracy, or serious firearms offenses means loss of criminal jurisdiction and transfer of the defendant for juvenile treatment. That would be a tolerable and even necessary result if the statute reasonably read supported it, because § 16-2301 (3)(A) must be construed strictly against charging 16- or 17-year-olds criminally as adults. See United States v. Tucker, 407 A.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. 1979). And the result would likewise be dictated, as Warren urges, by principles of lenity if § 2301 (3)(A) were ambiguous and we were uncertain of the intent the legislature expressed. See Logan v. United States, 483 A.2d 664, 676 (D.C. 1984). But Warren has directed us only to a statutory link between enumerated and joined offenses that Congress expressly made a function of charging, not conviction or acquittal. On his acquittal of the enumerated crimes Warren was indeed not “charged with” them, just as on conviction he was not “charged with” the joined offenses, but only because the prosecution had moved beyond that stage to verdict. At the relevant time he was charged with crimes in both categories, and thus remained subject to criminal jurisdiction through sentencing. 39