Opinion ID: 1690384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: From Penry to Atkins: Development of a National Consensus Against Execution of the Mentally Retarded.

Text: 1. Penry v. Lynaugh. The same day that the Supreme Court held in Stanford that there was no national consensus against imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, it held in Penry, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, that there was also no national consensus against imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded. Like Thompson and Stanford, Penry recognized that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is not a static concept, immutably tied to what punishments would have been included within the reach of the Eighth Amendment when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1789. Id. at 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Rather, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments also recognizes the `evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' Id. at 330-31, 109 S.Ct. 2934, quoting, Trop, 356 U.S. at 101, 78 S.Ct. 590. And, like Stanford, Penry looked to statutes passed by state legislatures as the best type of objective evidence of how our society views a particular punishment today. Id. at 331, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Penry also said that the Court looked to the data concerning the actions of sentencing juries. Id. a. Legislative Action. When Penry was decided in 1989, only Georgia, Maryland, and the federal government had statutes barring the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded. Id. at 334, 109 S.Ct. 2934. The Supreme Court concluded that the two state statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the 14 States that have rejected capital punishment completely, do not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus. Id. (emphasis added). b. Other Factors. Mr. Penry was unable to provide evidence that juries chose not to sentence mentally retarded defendants to death. In addition, on the record before it, the Supreme Court said it could not conclude that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty. Id. at 338-39, 109 S.Ct. 2934. For these reasons, the Court determined that at present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 335, 109 S.Ct. 2934. 2. Atkins v. Virginia. In 2002, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of capital punishment of the mentally retarded in the case of Daryl Atkins, an allegedly mentally retarded man whose death sentence had been affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court based on Penry ' s determination that there is no national consensus against the execution of the mentally retarded. In a principal opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court reversed Mr. Atkins' death sentence and remanded for a determination of his mental status. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335. In so holding, Atkins reaffirmed that whether capital punishment is barred for certain classes of offenders is necessarily part of a fluid, rather than a static, process and that as our standards of decency evolve, so will the determination of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 312, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Atkins ' analysis more closely resembles that in Thompson than that in Stanford. Atkins : (a) first looked at the objective evidence of legislative intent provided by state legislation barring the death penalty. (b) Like Penry , it considered the frequency with which the death penalty was imposed on the mentally retarded. (c) It then looked to the opinions of national professional, religious, and social organizations, and the approach of other countries to the death penalty for the mentally retarded. (d) Finally, it undertook an independent examination of whether the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under today's evolving standards of decency. Id. at 313, 122 S.Ct. 2242. a. Legislative Action. Atkins found that, in the thirteen years after Penry , fourteen more statesincluding Missourihad adopted legislation barring the application of their death penalty laws to the mentally retarded. And, while New York and Nebraska had each reinstated the death penalty, each had specifically exempted the mentally retarded from the reach of those newly enacted statutes. Id. at 314-15, 122 S.Ct. 2242. When these sixteen new states were added to the two states that had already adopted such legislation in 1989, eighteen states, and the federal government, then prohibited imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded. See id. In addition, the Court noted that the Texas legislature had unanimously adopted a bill barring the execution of the mentally retarded, but the bill was vetoed by the governor on other grounds, and that at least one house of the Virginia and Nevada legislatures had similarly adopted bills barring the death penalty for the mentally retarded. Id. at 315, 122 S.Ct. 2242. [4] While the number of states barring imposition of the death penalty had clearly grown impressively, the Court stated that, It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). This consistency was further reflected by the fact that, since Penry , no state had adopted a law permitting the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 315-16, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court found such consistency particularly persuasive given the anticrime atmosphere of the times: Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal. Id. b. Frequency of Imposition of Death Penalty. The Court found that some states, such as New Hampshire and New Jersey, whose statutes nominally authorize the execution of mentally retarded persons, had not carried out executions of any persons in decades, thus removing the incentive to pass legislation barring execution of the mentally retarded in particular. Id. at 316, 122 S.Ct. 2242. And, in those states that still carried out executions, the Court found, the practice of executing mentally retarded offenders had become very uncommon: only five persons who were known to have an I.Q. of less than 70 had been executed in the thirteen years since Penry . Id. The Court concluded that [t]he practice ... has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it. Id. c. National and International Opposition to Death Penalty. Atkins stated that the consensus against the death penalty for the mentally retarded was evident not only from the legislation passed over the prior thirteen years, and the rareness of the application of the death penalty in those states that permitted its use, but also from the opposition to the practice from experts in the field, noting several organizations with germane expertise have adopted official positions opposing the imposition of the death penalty upon a mentally retarded offender, including the American Psychological Association and the American Association of Mental Retardation. Id. at 316 n. 21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court also found the sentiments of this nation's religious communities, and of the world community, to be overwhelmingly opposed to execution of the mentally retarded. Id. Finally, the Court cited to polling data that showed a widespread consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded is wrong. Id. While the Court stated that the opposition of these groups was by no means dispositive, the Court did find significant their consistency with the legislative evidence, stating that it provided further support to [the Court's] conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue. Id. d. Independent Judicial Determination. Finally, the Supreme Court undertook an independent evaluation of whether such executions should be prohibited. It found that neither the retributive nor the deterrence justifications for the death penalty would be furthered by executing the mentally retarded, stating, If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. Id. at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242. [5] It further concluded, the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make [mentally retarded] defendants less morally culpable ... also make it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information. Id. at 320, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court further implicitly rejected the suggestion in Penry that the death penalty could not be barred if any mentally retarded person might theoretically deserve it, so that the effect of mental retardation should instead simply be considered as a mitigating factor. Id. at 318-19, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Rather, it said, the very fact that persons are mentally retarded not only makes them more likely to give a false confession, but also makes them less able to assist their counsel, typically makes them poor witnesses, and may cause them to exhibit a demeanor that is unsympathetic and that may incorrectly imply a lack of remorse. Id. at 320-21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Its independent evaluation led the Court to conclude that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242.