Opinion ID: 2823534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gioeli’s Multiplicity Argument

Text: Gioeli argues that Racketeering Act 5A, conspiracy to murder Minerva, contains no legal or factual element that is not contained in Racketeering Act 3, conspiracy to murder Orena faction members, and that the former is therefore multiplicitous of the latter and should be stricken. Although the government contests this argument on the merits, it also introduced considerable evidence of Saracino’s involvement in several aspects of the Orena conspiracy that were unrelated to Marasa’s murder. 5 In his reply brief, Saracino argues that the untimely disclosure of these materials was prejudicial because although the jury found the government had not proven his involvement in the Greaves’s murder, the district court’s sentence was based in part on its finding to the contrary. We disagree with this contention. The district court did find, by both a preponderance and by clear and convincing evidence, for § 3553(a) purposes, that Saracino was involved with Greaves’s murder. The court explicitly based that finding on the testimony of defendant Saracino’s brother, Sebastian Saracino. Sebastian testified that he was present in his brother’s basement when his brother shot Greaves in the head. Although the jury did not have access to the confidential source’s nondisclosed statement in reaching its verdict, at the time of sentencing in April 2014, the district court was well aware of that statement, having ruled on defendants’ Brady arguments in October 2013. 11 asserts that Gioeli waived any multiplicity argument by failing to raise it prior to trial and that the multiplicity claim is moot because Gioeli’s conviction for racketeering conspiracy is still supported by the jury’s finding that the government proved the requisite two racketeering acts. The district court ruled that because racketeering acts implicate double jeopardy, Gioeli’s multiplicity claim had not been waived under this Court’s decision in United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1999). There we held that Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not “bar a double jeopardy argument qua multiplicity argument when it is made to the district court in a posture other than that of a pre-trial motion,” and that such an argument “‘may’ be made as part of a pre-trial motion or it can be made at a later time.” Id. at 146 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 12). Ruling on the merits, the district court concluded, nonetheless, that the two conspiracies identified as predicate acts had different objectives and were thus not multiplicitous. On appeal, the government advances forceful arguments for reversing the district court’s decision on the waiver issue,6 and Gioeli does the same with respect to the court’s 6 Although we do not address the government’s waiver argument, we acknowledge the novel legal question to which the district court’s ruling on the issue of waiver is addressed: whether double jeopardy is implicated when a defendant claims that racketeering acts are multiplicitous. We are skeptical of the district court’s affirmative answer to this question. At the heart of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause is the concept that “courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Thus, not only does the Clause protect against successive prosecutions for the same offense, it also “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (stating that the “Double Jeopardy Clause . . . applies both to successive punishments and to successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense”). The ban against multiplicity in an indictment derives from this prohibition against multiple punishments. See Chacko, 169 F.3d at 145 (“An indictment is multiplicitous when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed. This violates the Double 12 decision on the merits. Our conclusion as to Gioeli’s Brady claim, however, renders both issues moot. Gioeli was convicted of one count of racketeering conspiracy, which requires, inter alia, proof of participation in a “pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To establish such a pattern, the government must prove “at least two acts of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). As previously explained, the jury found the government had proven Gioeli’s involvement in three racketeering acts. Given our holding that the government’s untimely disclosure of materials pertaining to Racketeering Act 2A (conspiracy to murder Minerva) does not invalidate or otherwise impinge upon the jury’s finding regarding that Act, Gioeli’s conviction for racketeering conspiracy would be supported by two predicate acts (Racketeering Acts 2A and 5A) even if we were to rule in Gioeli’s favor on waiver and on the merits and strike Racketeering Act 3. Gioeli’s multiplicity argument is thus moot, and we decline to address it. Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, subjecting a person to punishment for the same crime more than once.” (emphasis added) (internal citations and footnote omitted)). Because multiple punishments are the constitutional harm to be avoided by the prohibition against multiplicitous indictments, it follows that in order for double jeopardy focused on resulting punishments to be implicated, the multiplicity must occur in a fashion that gives rise to the possibility of multiple punishments. In other words, the alleged multiple offenses must have been “charged” between or among “separate counts.” Where, as here, the alleged multiplicity appears not in separate counts that each carry the possibility of conviction and punishment but in separate racketeering predicate acts that are components of a single overall count of racketeering conspiracy, the danger posed is an improper conviction based on legally insufficient evidence (i.e., one that is not supported by proof of at least two predicate acts). But there is no danger of multiple punishments when charged with a single count of conspiracy. While legally insufficient proof of the elements of conspiracy is a cognizable basis for challenging a conviction, it is not the variety of harm addressed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 13 III. Suppression of Evidence Removed from the Gioelis’ Home Prior to trial, Gioeli moved to suppress evidence taken from his home by Andrea Calabro, the wife of Dino Calabro, and also by the FBI during a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. The district court held a suppression hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and filed a memorandum decision denying the motion. Gioeli challenges that decision. The pertinent facts regarding Gioeli’s suppression arguments are as follows.7 Gioeli and Dino Calabro, along with their wives Maureen Gioeli and Andrea Calabro, were neighbors and friends for almost 20 years. At the time of the events at issue, Calabro and Gioeli had both been charged under the S-4 indictment with crimes for which both men were eligible to receive the death penalty. From 2008 to 2010 the Department of Justice conducted a review to determine if the government would pursue that penalty. In 2009, Dino Calabro began actively pursuing a cooperation agreement with the government. To assist in the effort, Mrs. Calabro provided FBI Special Agent Scott Curtis various family mementos including photographs that she indicated were given to her by Mrs. Gioeli. Mrs. Calabro informed Agent Curtis that Mrs. Gioeli often took photos at family events and social gatherings, had done so for a number of years, and had invited the Calabro family to look through and borrow photos that might support Mr. Calabro’s death penalty 7 We draw heavily from the district court’s findings of fact based on evidence and testimony proffered at the Franks hearing. Gioeli does not appear to challenge the court’s factual findings on appeal, and in any event, after thorough review of the record in this case we conclude that those findings are well-supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2015) (reviewing district court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress evidence for clear error). 14 review submission. At Agent Curtis’s suggestion, Mrs. Calabro accepted the invitation, arranging with Mrs. Gioeli to borrow photos for the death penalty mitigation process. After Mrs. Gioeli provided Mrs. Calabro with a number of photos, Mrs. Calabro asked if she could come to the Gioelis’ home to search Mrs. Gioeli’s photo collection herself. Mrs. Gioeli agreed, and on several occasions the two women spent time looking through numerous photo albums in the Gioelis’ home. Mrs. Gioeli gave Mrs. Calabro permission to borrow any photos of the Calabro family that might benefit Mr. Calabro’s death penalty review submission. In April 2009, when Mrs. Gioeli was momentarily absent, Mrs. Calabro took an address book from the Gioelis’ home. She then turned it over to Agent Curtis along with several pictures that Mrs. Gioeli later claimed she had not given Mrs. Calabro permission to borrow. Agent Curtis did not instruct Mrs. Calabro one way or the other whether she should take anything from the Gioelis’ home without Mrs. Gioeli’s permission. Agent Curtis did, however, open and examine the contents of the address book despite knowing that Mrs. Calabro did not have permission to take it from the Gioelis’ home. In January 2010, Agent Curtis applied for a warrant to search the Gioelis’ home and to seize a wide variety of items located there. Agent Curtis’s affidavit in support of the warrant relied heavily on information he learned from Mrs. Calabro, whom he identified as a confidential source. Agent Curtis disclosed that Mrs. Calabro had removed an address book without Mrs. Gioeli’s permission and handed it over to the FBI. The affidavit’s discussion of the content of the address book is limited to the following statement: “The address book and its accompanying papers contain[] entries for, among others, ‘Dino Andrea Calabro,’ 15 ‘Michelle & Joey Compentillo,’ ‘Billy & Kathy Russo,’ and ‘Connie Chucky Russo,’ all of which entries I believe refer to Colombo family members and their wives.” J.A. 311. A magistrate judge issued the warrant, and the FBI seized a number of responsive items, including photo albums, address books, wallets containing business cards, and cell phones. The Fourth Amendment enshrines “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created mechanism that safeguards these Fourth Amendment rights, “generally through its deterrent effect,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), by forbidding “the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial,” United States v. Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009). When applicable, the exclusionary rule “reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (citation omitted) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). Not every Fourth Amendment violation warrants suppression. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (“The question whether the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”). Exclusion is a “last resort, not [a] first impulse.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). 16 “On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the erroneous admission of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional right for harmless error, affirming the judgment if we “conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered a verdict of guilty absent the alleged error.” United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 649 (2d Cir. 2001). A defendant in Gioeli’s position, therefore, must surmount a series of hurdles: first establishing a constitutional violation, then demonstrating that the violation falls under the ambit of the exclusionary rule, and finally showing that the erroneously admitted evidence affected the outcome of the trial. This is a heavy burden, and one that Gioeli ultimately fails to sustain. Of Gioeli’s three arguments for suppression, two were rejected by the district court, and one is raised for the first time on appeal. Gioeli first challenges the constitutionality of Mrs. Calabro’s entry of his home and retention of any photos, regardless of Mrs. Gioeli’s consent, because of the “ruse” Mrs. Calabro wanted the photos to save her husband from death row, was so coercive as to render Mrs. Gioeli’s consent involuntary, and thus invalid. The district court considered this argument and concluded that “[t]here can be no serious question that Mrs. Gioeli voluntarily consented to the search of her home.” J.A. 417. Although warrantless searches and seizures in a home are presumptively unreasonable, “the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions,” Brigham City v. 17 Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), including “when the search is conducted pursuant to the consent of an authorized person,” United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 2006). The government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was voluntary and not “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” Id. at 131 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973)). “We will not reverse a finding of voluntary consent except for clear error.” Id. Additionally, although the Fourth Amendment does not protect against searches or seizures “effected by a private party on [her] own initiative,” it does apply when a private party commits the intrusion while acting “as an instrument or agent of the Government.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). It is undisputed that Mrs. Calabro was acting as an agent or instrument of the government when she sought photos of her family from Mrs. Gioeli and when she borrowed photos with Mrs. Gioeli’s permission. On appeal, as below, Gioeli cites United States v. Montes-Reyes, 547 F. Supp. 2d. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), in which consent was found to be involuntary when government agents concocted a story involving an abducted four year-old girl to gain access to the defendant’s hotel room. Even if Montes-Reyes were binding, it would be distinguishable: the “consent” in that case was elicited by an immediate “threat” to the life or welfare of a child. Here, even if the prosecution sought the death penalty, it would come to pass only after lengthy and attenuated proceedings. The district court did not err, clearly or otherwise, in finding that Mrs. Gioeli voluntarily consented to Mrs. Calabro’s 18 presence in the Gioelis’ home for the purpose of viewing and borrowing photos of the Calabro family. Mrs. Gioeli’s consent, on the other hand, did not extend to some of the materials Mrs. Calabro took from the Gioelis’ house, including the address book and, as asserted by Mrs. Gioeli, certain photos. These actions, Gioeli argues, were beyond the scope of his wife’s consent and violated the Fourth Amendment because Mrs. Calabro was acting in her capacity as an agent of the government. This argument also fails. “A private person cannot act unilaterally as an agent or instrument of the state; there must be some degree of governmental knowledge and acquiescence,” United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)), in the actions that violate the Fourth Amendment. In this regard we will not disturb the district court’s factual findings that Mrs. Calabro “acted in direct contravention of Special Agent Curtis’s instructions to borrow photographs from Mrs. Gioeli” and that Agent Curtis had no reason to know that Mrs. Calabro would do so. J.A. 419. Gioeli asserts in his reply brief that the scope of Mrs. Calabro’s agency must be expressly limited by the government in order for her actions to be “in direct contravention” of the government’s instructions such that those actions fall outside the scope of her agency (e.g., “Do not remove anything from the Gioelis’ home without permission.”). Although such an instruction was given in Bennett, that case does not stand for the proposition that such an instruction must be given in every instance in order to avoid creating a general agency relationship between the government and a private citizen assisting with a government investigation. Neither logic nor law counsels that 19 any action the government failed expressly to proscribe thereby falls within the ambit of that private citizen’s agency. Mrs. Calabro exceeded the scope of her government agency; the government did not know of her intent to do so; and, as far as we can ascertain from the record, it had no reason to suspect that she might do anything more than borrow photographs with Mrs. Gioeli’s permission.8 The district court’s determination that Mrs. Calabro acted in her personal capacity when she removed the address book and any photos other than those authorized by Mrs. Gioeli was not clearly erroneous. Her actions do not offend the Fourth Amendment. In an argument not raised before the district court, Gioeli now asserts that Agent Curtis’s search of the address book without a warrant was unconstitutional. He concludes that not only should the address book have been suppressed on that basis but that the additional address books seized from the Gioelis’ home pursuant to the warrant should also be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree. The record supports Gioeli’s position that Curtis’s search of the address book was conduct not permitted either by a warrant or any Fourth Amendment exception. See United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the district court “failed to draw a distinction” between a burglary committed by a private citizen, and a subsequent search of the materials that had been stolen). We decline to reach this constitutional question, however, because assuming arguendo that there was a 8 In fact, the circumstances at the time could very reasonably lead an officer to conclude that Mrs. Calabro would not take anything without permission. As the district court pointed out, “Mrs. Calabro was afraid that people in her neighborhood thought Mr. Calabro was cooperating with the Government and that [Agent Curtis] had advised Mrs. Calabro to keep up appearances. Obviously, Mrs. Calabro stealing photographs and an address book from Mrs. Gioeli would arouse suspicion, not minimize it.” J.A. 419 n.3. 20 constitutional violation, the admission of evidence derived from any of the address books was harmless. The only non-cumulative trial evidence yielded was an entry pertaining to “O.J.,” whose murder was purportedly the catalyst for Marasa’s murder. The government contended that Gioeli had approved the Marasa murder based on the request of others in his crew and not on any personal desire of his own to exact retribution for O.J.’s death. Thus, any relationship between O.J. and Gioeli was not material to any fact in dispute at trial. This conclusion is reinforced under the plain error standard that governs our review because Gioeli failed to raise these arguments in the district court. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262-66 (2010) (under plain error standard, we may act only if there is error, that is clear or obvious, that affects substantial rights, and that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings). There was no error in the district court’s ruling on this aspect of Gioeli’s motion to suppress, let alone an error that is plain or rises to the level of affecting Gioeli’s substantial rights.