Opinion ID: 425960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Navajo Appeal3

Text: 8 The Navajo Tribe contends that it cannot be found in contempt because it lacks the ability to comply with the district court's order to cause the disassembly and removal of structures built on Hopi partition lands. Specifically, the Tribe argues that it has no sovereign jurisdiction over members who live on what is now Hopi land and that, even if the Tribe had such power when the land was considered a joint use area, any jurisdiction was divested by the district court's 1977 partition order and by Congress when it enacted 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-9(e)(1)(B). 4 9 In rejecting the Navajo argument, the district court properly stressed that since the Tribe represents its membership by Congressional delegation, the Tribe is the entity to which orders effectuating the partition must be directed. See 25 U.S.C. Secs. 640d-17(a), (c) (each tribe authorized to commence or defend actions necessary to effectuate partition and insure quiet enjoyment of partitioned land); cf. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-7(a). The Navajo Tribe therefore was obligated to carry out the court's order. 10 The Navajo nevertheless claim that because tribal sovereignty stops at the border, the Tribe is unable to comply. We realize that there is indeed a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2587, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980); accord, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 142, 102 S.Ct. 894, 904, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982). The 1980 amendments to the Settlement Act clearly provide that each tribe shall have full and complete jurisdiction and authority over lands it acquired in the district court's 1977 judgment of partition. See 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-9(e)(1)(B). 5 11 The issue here, however, does not concern the extraterritorial application of tribal law to which section 640-9(e)(1)(B) is directed. This case concerns the Navajo Tribe's responsibility to effectuate Congress' express intent to resolve the land dispute between the Hopi and Navajo tribes expeditiously through judicial proceedings enforcing partition. See 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-3(b). Congress has long been aware that the partition process necessary to resolve the Navajo-Hopi dispute would create a situation in which tribal members would be residing off-reservation. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 1177, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974); H.R.Rep. No. 909, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). To remedy that situation it attempted to provide fully in both the 1974 Act and the 1980 Amendments for the relocation and resettlement of tribal members. See 25 U.S.C. Secs. 640d-10 to 640d-15. The order questioned here is a part of that judicial partition and congressionally authorized relocation and resettlement process; the Tribe remains the entity responsible for compliance. The partition boundary therefore does not limit the Navajo Tribe's authority to enforce this judicial order. 12 We further observe that reservation boundaries are not considered absolute limitations on tribal power in other contexts as well. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, supra, 448 U.S. at 151, 100 S.Ct. at 2587. As the Supreme Court has stated, Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory. Merrion, supra, 455 U.S. at 140, 102 S.Ct. at 903 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 711, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (emphasis supplied)). Membership is therefore another aspect of tribal sovereignty which exists separate and apart from the territorial jurisdiction of the tribe. See F. Cohen Handbook of Federal Indian Law 246 (1982 ed.). Our circuit has recognized this principle in both United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1975), aff'g 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D.Wash.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976), and Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.1974). In those cases, we affirmed the regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction of Indian tribes. 520 F.2d at 686; 507 F.2d at 239-40. See also United States v. Michigan, 471 F.Supp. 192, 270-73 (W.D.Mich.1979). 13 The Navajo Tribe also argues that the district court's contempt order and declaratory judgment must be reversed so that Navajo homeowners who are residing on Hopi land can be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Tribe maintains that the order requiring the Tribe to enforce the injunction creates a conflict of interest between the Tribe and these individuals, and that due process is therefore violated by adjudicating their rights through inadequate representatives. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 81 S.Ct. 1309, 6 L.Ed.2d 604 (1961) (due process requires adequate representation); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 833-34 (9th Cir.1982). 14 We have, however, on several occasions, rejected similar claims and reaffirmed the congressionally authorized representative capacity of the tribal chairmen in these proceedings. See Healing v. Jones, supra, 210 F.Supp. at 129 n. 2 (citing Act of July 22, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-547, 72 Stat. 403). 6 In United States v. Kabinto, 456 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842, 93 S.Ct. 40, 34 L.Ed.2d 81 (1972), we affirmed the res judicata effect of the Healing judgment on individual Navajos and rejected their assertion that they were not adequately represented by the Navajo tribal chairman. Similarly, in Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1550, 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977), we held that individual Navajos were not entitled to notice and hearing before their grazing permits were cancelled because the Tribe adequately represented its members. Id. at 403. We stated [t]here is no substantial basis for the claim that Congressional action has the effect of depriving the Navajo of their property without due process of law. Id. (citing Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391-92, 41 S.Ct. 342, 349-50, 65 L.Ed. 684 (1920)). Finally, in Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 591 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.1979), we refused to allow intervention by individual Navajos in a proceeding to determine rights to 1934 Act reservation lands, stating that Congress did not intend individual participation in suits authorized by 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-7(a), which parallels the congressional authorization of these proceedings in 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-17(c). We also noted that under 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-17(c), individual interests may be litigated in a suit between the two tribes only when those interests are represented by the tribal chairmen. 591 F.2d at 1292. 15 Given these precedents, we must conclude that due process is not violated by allowing Chairman Zah to represent the Navajo tribal members in this case. While the Navajo argue that the congressionally authorized representation in section 640d-17(c) is limited to suits involving determinations of land interests, and not improvements, this action is, after all, a supplemental proceeding to effectuate a judicial land settlement; the purpose is therefore the same. 16 The Navajo Tribe additionally challenges that part of the court's order concerning removal of construction on the ground that such mandatory injunctive relief is unnecessary. Specifically, the Tribe argues that the Hopi have an adequate remedy at law because 25 U.S.C. Sec. 640d-15(a) provides complete monetary compensation for the use of Hopi partition lands by Navajo tribal members and that the Hopi therefore will suffer no irreparable harm from this use. 17 We note initially that this portion of the order merely reaffirms the court's 1980 injunction. The Tribe did not appeal the 1980 ruling. Thus, the merits of the 1980 injunction cannot be challenged in this appeal from the district court's finding of contempt for failing to comply with that order. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68-70, 68 S.Ct. 401, 407-08, 92 L.Ed. 476; Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 628, 636-37 (3d Cir.1982); Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 233, 238 n. 10 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); see generally Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967) (collateral attack of injunction on constitutional grounds denied when no appeal taken). 18 Even if that part of the injunction now appealed relating to new-new construction could be attacked, we would be compelled to recognize that use of such mandatory injunctive relief to effectuate the judicial settlement of this Navajo-Hopi dispute is well established. For example, in Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir.1974), this court, in affirming the propriety of the 1972 order of compliance which included a limitation concerning Navajo construction on the JUA, stated that the building restriction is simply an appropriately designed equitable remedy to allow the Hopi equal possession to which they are entitled. Id. at 1150. Similarly, in both cases in which we reviewed the district court's 1977 judgment of partition, we were confronted with injunctive orders prohibiting new construction on Hopi partition land. See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th Cir.1978), after remand 626 F.2d 113 (9th Cir.1980). In neither of these cases did we disapprove of the use of the district court's equitable injunctive powers to effectuate the congressionally mandated settlement process. Thus the propriety of using such mandatory injunctive relief in these supplemental Healing proceedings clearly is entitled to be regarded, at the very least, as the law of the case. See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.1982) (law of case applied to issue decided explicitly or by necessary implication); cf. Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (9th Cir.1974) (application of law of the case doctrine to district court order that Navajo and Hopi must share JUA equally). Because the Navajo Tribe presented no substantially new evidence or contrary controlling authority on the applicable issues of law, nor demonstrated that our previous decisions were clearly erroneous and that their application here would work a manifest injustice, we follow the law of the case. United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919, 923-24 (9th Cir.1983); Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 771-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826, 100 S.Ct. 49, 62 L.Ed.2d 33 (1979).