Opinion ID: 1057775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutional right of access

Text: The public’s constitutional right of access to criminal proceedings and records is well-established. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment.” 7 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 580. This 6 The Commonwealth now concedes that the sealing order was erroneous. However, we do not allow parties to define Virginia law by their concessions. See Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 111 n.5, 334 S.E.2d 838, 846 n.5 (1985); Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 168, 172, 622 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2005) (en banc) (“Our fidelity to the uniform application of law precludes us from accepting concessions of law made on appeal.”). Consequently, we will consider the merits. 7 Daily Press asserts that it has a constitutional right of access under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia. These provisions are virtually identical. See, 8 constitutional right of access extends to the inspection of documents filed in such proceedings. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 622, 628, 570 S.E.2d 809, 812 (2002). Although the right of access to criminal proceedings is of constitutional stature, it is not absolute. See Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 570. However, the circumstances in which criminal trial exhibits can be sealed are limited. The public’s right of access can only be denied upon a strong showing of a compelling governmental interest, and any closure must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982). The governmental interest asserted here as the basis for the sealing order was Stoffa’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. In assessing whether closure is appropriate, there is a presumption in favor of openness. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 573. This presumption can only be overcome if specific findings are made that: (1) there is a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity and that closure would prevent that e.g., Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 785, 553 S.E.2d 738, 750 (2001) (Hassell, C.J., dissenting) (observing that “[t]he freedom of speech guaranteed by Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia is co-extensive with the protections guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Thus, for purposes of this opinion, we make no distinction between them. 9 prejudice; and (2) reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant’s fair trial rights. PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986). To ensure stringent safeguarding of the constitutional rights at stake, courts are required to justify any decision to close with specific reasons and findings on the record. Id. at 13. We will review such findings de novo. In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850, 853 (4th Cir. 1989). In this case, the circuit court failed to make specific findings necessary to justify the sealing order. The court’s rationale for sealing the exhibits was the possibility that they might be used in Stoffa’s impending trial. The court expressed concerns over (1) potential prejudice from publication of the information contained in the exhibits; and (2) physical damage to the original exhibits that could affect their admissibility in Stoffa’s trial. These rationales were speculative and not supported by particularized factual findings. First, there was no evidence that publication of the information contained in the exhibits would prejudice Stoffa’s right to a fair trial, or that sealing the exhibits would prevent any such prejudice. At the time of the March 28 and April 22 orders, Stoffa was scheduled to be tried without a jury, which made concerns over tainting the jury pool 10 irrelevant. 8 Furthermore, while protecting the original exhibits from damage was a valid concern, the April 22 order was not the least restrictive means to satisfy it. The court could have protected the rights of Stoffa and the Commonwealth, while also protecting the public’s right of access, by allowing the original exhibits to be withdrawn but requiring photocopies of the exhibits to remain in the public file.