Opinion ID: 3052167
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: 3d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).16

Text: Under California law, as we have explained, only one aggravating factor is necessary to set the upper term as the maximum term. Any Apprendi error therefore will be harmless if it is not prejudicial as to just one of the aggravating factors at issue. Here, the district court noted that it is impossible to know what the trial court would have done had it found only one aggravating factor. It concluded that the Sixth Amendment violation therefore could not be harmless unless it did not affect either of the aggravating factors upon which the judge relied. With regard to a Sixth Amendment sentencing violation, however, the relevant question is not what the trial court would have done, but what it legally could have done. After one aggravating factor was validly found, the trial court legally could have imposed the upper term sentence. That the judge might not have done so in the absence of an additional factor does not implicate the Sixth Amendment, as that con16 The parties have brought to our attention United States v. ZepedaMartinez, 470 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2006), in which it appears that this court did consider a concession made at sentencing in holding that an Apprendierror was harmless. Id. at 913 (making reference to the defendant’s failure to contest the date of his removal at sentencing). Salazar-Lopez, however, was decided after Zepeda-Martinez and reiterates our long-standing rule that admissions at sentencing are not relevant to an Apprendi harmless error analysis. Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d at 755. Moreover, in ZepedaMartinez, there was “overwhelming” evidence demonstrating the date of Zepeda’s removal, without regard to any admission by the defendant. 470 F.3d at 913 (the government introduced a warrant of removal indicating the date of Zepeda’s removal and Zepeda himself submitted the first page of the same document in a pre-trial filing). At best, then, Zepeda-Martinez stands for the proposition that a defendant’s failure at sentencing to dispute a particular fact may be considered in a harmless error analysis when there is overwhelming additional evidence of the relevant fact. 6468 BUTLER v. CURRY sideration concerns only the imposition of a sentence within an authorized statutory range. With these principles in mind, we turn to the aggravating factors that form the basis for Butler’s sentence.
[12] The state trial court found that Daria Butler was a particularly vulnerable victim because “she was attacked from behind.” Under California law, vulnerable means “ ‘defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.’ ” People v. Weaver, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18, 27 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting People v. Smith, 156 Cal. Rptr. 502, 503 (Ct. App. 1979)). A victim is “particularly” vulnerable only if he is vulnerable to a “special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.” People v. Loudermilk, 241 Cal. Rptr. 208, 214 (Ct. App. 1987). A victim is thus not “particularly” vulnerable where all victims of the crime of conviction are vulnerable in the same manner. See People v. Bloom, 190 Cal. Rptr. 857, 865 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating that “[a]ll victims of drunk drivers are ‘vulnerable victims’ ”). There is little doubt, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the jury would have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Daria Butler was attacked from behind. Butler never contested the evidence showing that Daria’s wounds were to the back of her head, and the jury’s verdict demonstrates that it believed Daria’s version of the incident. But after examining California case law on the “particularly vulnerable” victim aggravating factor, we have grave doubt about whether a jury would have found that Daria was a particularly vulnerable victim of the crime of domestic assault (Cal. Penal Code § 273.5) because she was attacked from behind. In the overwhelming majority of cases, “particularly vulnerable victims” have had inherent personal characteristics BUTLER v. CURRY 6469 that, sometimes in combination with the manner in which the crime was committed, render them more vulnerable than other victims. See, e.g., People v. Bishop, 204 Cal. Rptr. 502, 505 (Ct. App. 1984) (victims were very young and of small stature); People v. McGlothin, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1998) (the victims were particularly vulnerable because they were elderly and were attacked in a parking lot late at night); People v. Karsai, 182 Cal. Rptr. 406, 416 (Ct. App. 1982) (victim was young and physically weak); id. (“While age and physical traits are not the only factors which may indicate particular vulnerability, they are the most obvious.”). The California courts have in a few cases relied on aspects of the status of the victim that are more changeable than age or physical frailty, but have done so only when the victim was seriously, if only temporarily, incapacitated. People v. Hoover, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208, 215-16 (Ct. App. 2000) (extremely intoxicated victim in domestic violence case); People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612, 618 (Ct. App. 1981) (shooting a victim already incapacitated from earlier gunshot), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Scott, 9 Cal. 4th 331, 353 n. 16 (1994); Loudermilk, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 214 (sleeping victim); Smith, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (sleeping victims). We found no case in which attacking a victim from behind was the sole basis for a finding of particular vulnerability. Here, there is no evidence that at the time of the crime Daria was less able than other victims to ward off attacks because of any such disability or incapacitation. Indeed, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that Daria was generally a physically capable individual, as there was testimony at trial from both Daria and Butler that she had physically attacked Butler in the past.17 A jury might have 17 We note that, in pointing to the fact that Daria had engaged in physical fights with Butler in the past, we do not mean to suggest that Daria was not clearly a victim of Butler’s crime, or that she is in any way at fault for not having defended herself successfully in this instance. We mean only to demonstrate that she did not have any inherent physical characteristics that would render her less capable of defending herself than most victims of assault. 6470 BUTLER v. CURRY concluded that having one’s back turned is similar to being asleep in the sense that both are temporary states, and that in each case the defendant takes advantage of a moment of greater assailability. But they are not so similar that we can say with confidence, particularly in light of the many cases focused on characteristics such as age and physical frailty, that a jury would conclude that an individual with her back turned is a “particularly vulnerable victim.” [13] Moreover, as we have already discussed, a victim must be not only vulnerable, but “particularly” vulnerable in relation to other victims of the same crime. See, e.g., People v. Piceno, 241 Cal. Rptr. 391, 394 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that it was error to apply the particularly vulnerable victim factor to a conviction for vehicular manslaughter because, while “[n]o one could possibly deny the victim here was vulnerable[,] . . . all victims of vehicular manslaughter . . . were vulnerable”); People v. Flores, 171 Cal. Rptr. 777, 778-79 (Ct. App. 1981) (applying particularly vulnerable victim aggravator because of the victim’s young age was inappropriate because all victims of the crime of oral copulation with an individual under 16 are young).18 The particularly vulnerable victim aggravating factor was applied to Butler’s conviction for domestic violence under Cal. Penal Code section 273.5. In interpreting section 273.5, the California Court of Appeal has 18 The State argues that a recent California Court of Appeal case has limited the rule that a victim is only particularly vulnerable when other victims of the offense are not vulnerable in the same manner. See People v. Weaver, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18, 29 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that victims of drunk driver were particularly vulnerable because driver was traveling in the wrong direction at night with her lights off). Weaver, however, purported to apply the rule that a victim must be particularly vulnerable, holding that most victims of vehicular manslaughter are not as vulnerable as the victims were in that case. See id. Moreover, Weaver, like all of the cases we have cited, is a California Court of Appeal case, and cannot overrule the many cases that have reached a different result on this issue. See, e.g., Piceno, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 394; People v. McNiece, 226 Cal. Rptr. 733, 739 (Ct. App. 1986), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 18 Cal. 4th 470 (1988)); Bloom, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 865. BUTLER v. CURRY 6471 noted that it was the purpose of the legislature in criminalizing domestic violence to protect individuals who are in a vulnerable position. See People v. Mora, 59 Cal. Rptr. 801, 80405 (Ct. App. 1996). In other words, it is in the nature of domestic violence that its victims are vulnerable, because of their close relationship with their attacker, their attacker’s typically greater physical strength, and their isolation in their homes. As a result, a jury could have concluded that Butler was not more vulnerable than other victims of domestic violence because she was attacked from behind.19 [14] In sum, we are left with “grave doubt” as to whether a jury would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt and based solely on the circumstance of being attacked from behind, that Daria was a “particularly vulnerable” victim of domestic violence. The Apprendi error was therefore not harmless with regard to the first aggravating factor. See O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 445 (“[W]e conclude that, when a habeas court is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error that affects substantial rights, it should grant relief.”).
[15] Whether a jury would have found Butler’s probationary status beyond a reasonable doubt turns out to be, on the record in this case, a difficult question to answer. The record before the district court does not reveal what evidence on the probation issue was presented to the state trial court. We therefore remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on that question. 19 In concluding that allowing a judge to find the “particularly vulnerable victim” factor was not harmless, we do not hold that the trial court was wrong as a matter of California law when it found that Daria was a particularly vulnerable victim because she was struck from behind. We hold only that a jury properly instructed on California law and applying a reasonable doubt standard could well have found otherwise. 6472 BUTLER v. CURRY The state trial court opened the sentencing proceeding by stating, “I’ve read and considered the probation report in this case.” After statements from the prosecutor and defense counsel, the judge found that Daria Butler was a particularly vul- nerable victim and that Butler “was on probation at the time the crime was committed.” In response to the judge’s second finding, Butler’s lawyer suggested that the probation aggravating factor be stricken because “there is no indication that he was noncompliant except for this.” The statement of defense counsel at sentencing suggests that Butler acknowledged, or at least did not dispute, that he was on probation at the time of the crime. Even assuming, however, that defense counsel’s statement was sufficiently specific as to constitute an admission, we may not consider it in determining whether the Apprendi error in Butler’s sentencing was harmless. See Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d at 755. We are left, then, to determine whether the evidence presented by the prosecution at sentencing is sufficient to render the error harmless. Unfortunately, the record simply does not reveal what that evidence was. Having reviewed all the submissions to the district court in this case, we have not found a probation report or any other document that reflects Butler’s probationary status at the time of the crime. At oral argument, the government acknowledged that it did not submit the probation report read by the sentencing judge to the district court. We thus cannot be certain what evidence was presented to the state trial court on the question of Butler’s probationary status. Yet, to determine whether an Apprendi error was harmless we must examine the whole record, including the evidence presented by the government at sentencing. We therefore cannot make our determination without further factfinding as to what evidence was presented at sentencing. [16] We recognize that neither of the parties has requested an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Further factfinding on this issue is necessary, however, not to assist either of the parBUTLER v. CURRY 6473 ties in meeting a burden of proof as to harmlessness, but to assist the court in making an accurate determination. See Frantz, 513 F.3d at 1023 (remanding to district court for evidentiary hearing to determine circumstances in which in chambers conference in absence of the petitioner was conducted); see also Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 949 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hether a trial error had a substantial and injurious effect is not to be analyzed in terms of burdens of proof.”). We therefore vacate the grant of a writ of habeas corpus to Butler and remand for an evidentiary hearing on what evidence was presented to the state trial court in support of the allegation that Butler was on probation at the time of his crime.