Opinion ID: 1119821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Testimony by Defense Counsel.

Text: (7) Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it permitted defense counsel de la Pena to testify. De la Pena decided that it was necessary for him to testify in surrebuttal after district attorney investigator Gonzalez testified in rebuttal regarding his 1983 interview with Dr. Godinez. Investigator Gonzalez testified that Dr. Godinez had told him that defendant's parents had brought in a prescription about a year after defendant's treatment, that he had issued an affidavit based on the prescription, and that the parents had kept both the affidavit and prescription. Investigator Gonzalez also testified that Dr. Godinez had said he was not shown documents by anyone and that the only person who had talked to him was a private investigator. The latter testimony conflicted with that of defense investigator Daniel Mendoza, who had stated that he had shown Dr. Godinez the affidavit regarding his treatment of defendant. De la Pena explained outside the presence of the jury that he would need to testify in surrebuttal to relate his conversation with Dr. Godinez  that is, that he and his investigator were both present and showed Dr. Godinez the affidavit. The trial court explained to defendant that although de la Pena would be unavailable to advise defendant during his testimony, cocounsel Brewer would still be available to advise defendant. Defendant indicated his understanding and agreement with the plan for de la Pena to testify. As a precaution the court advised defendant of his attorney-client privilege and obtained a waiver from defendant to the extent that de la Pena disclosed any confidential communications. De la Pena testified that he and investigator Mendoza went to Mexico in January 1983. They attempted to find records of defendant's birth, went to El Pilon to talk with defendant's family, and went to Buena Vista to talk to Dr. Godinez. They showed Dr. Godinez the affidavit that he had earlier given to defendant's parents. The affidavit refreshed Dr. Godinez's recollection as to the dates of defendant's treatment. De la Pena acknowledged on cross-examination that he could not find, and had never seen, the prescription, and that defendant's parents had said that they had some flooding and much was destroyed. De la Pena also explained that he had checked with local police in the hope of discovering proof of defendant's age. The prosecutor asked if defendant was known by El Chile in Mexico, and de la Pena responded that an uncle had said defendant was called El Chile when he was little. In arguing that the court erred in permitting counsel to testify, defendant has cited no authority directly supportive of his position. The situation here is significantly different from that in People v. Rodriguez (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 1018 [171 Cal. Rptr. 798], where defense counsel was called as a witness by the prosecution. Moreover, a trial court may not deny the defendant the right to present impeaching evidence through the testimony of his counsel, notwithstanding the provisions relating to testimony by counsel in the Rules of Professional Conduct. (See People v. Goldstein (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 1024, 1030-1032 [182 Cal. Rptr. 207].) (8a) Defendant also charges ineffectiveness of counsel as a result of counsel's decision to testify. Defendant argues that the benefits of such testimony were negligible and that the prejudice that ensued was substantial. Defendant asserts that counsel completely sabotaged his defense by allowing inadmissible testimony out of counsel's own mouth that defendant had been called El Chile as a child, whereas defendant, in his own testimony, had denied that he was called El Chile. Defendant made a number of claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel in his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We discuss the matter at length in a companion opinion that is being filed today. (9) As we note in that opinion, there are two components to a claim by a defendant that his counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence. ( In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1069 [275 Cal. Rptr. 384, 800 P.2d 862]; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) The burden is on the defendant to show (1) that counsel's representation was inadequate, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been more favorable absent counsel's deficiencies. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687, 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 693, 697-699]; accord People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-698].) (8b) We need not determine whether counsel's actions were deficient because, in our view, defendant has failed to show prejudice under the Strickland v. Washington standard ( supra, 466 U.S. 668). Based on our review of the evidence presented at trial, we are convinced that there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result had it not heard counsel's testimony that defendant had been called El Chile as a youngster or any other references to the perpetrator being known as El Chile. The issue of whether or not defendant was known as El Chile was of minor consequence at trial in light of the evidence of defendant's detailed confession to both murders and his identification by three eyewitnesses to the 1981 murder. We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the eyewitness testimony should be accorded little weight. Each separately identified defendant from a live lineup and at trial. Each had sufficient opportunity to observe defendant and had strong recollection of his appearance. Moreover, each testified that she recognized defendant as soon as he entered the live lineup area. The fact that Connie Hernandez did not identify defendant's photo from a group of photos that had been shown to her does not diminish the strength of her identification testimony. Though defendant recanted his confession in his trial testimony, his testimony was marked by frequent failures to recall or to understand in response to questions on cross-examination.