Opinion ID: 3014421
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stop and Seizure of Sinkler

Text: We dispose of the first issue relatively easily. Sinkler points to two relevant moments in time when he contends an illegal stop or seizure of him occurred: the initial approach of the police car prior to the chase, which he characterizes as a stop, and the instant when his car struck a police van to end the chase, which he characterizes as a seizure. It is well-established that police officers may conduct warrantless stops of suspects where they have reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that “criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. A Terry stop is likewise appropriate where officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that a person they is an argument as to sufficiency of the evidence of guilt. As such, it would appear to be subsumed within his guilty plea, and not really a suppression issue at all. In any event, we do not consider this issue of ownership to be properly presented for our review. 4 After oral argument, it is unclear whether the Government has “abandoned” the abandonment argument, which is barely mentioned in its brief, or whether it will continue to pursue this issue on remand. We also note that the Government only referred to the possibility of invoking the inventory search issue in a short footnote near the end of its brief. However, the District Court will be free to address these issues if the parties choose to explore them on remand. 6 encounter was involved in a completed felony. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985). It is also clearly established that a suspect is only seized, for Fourth Amendment purposes, where there has been an application of physical force, or a show of authority to which the suspect submits.5 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626. Regarding the initial unsuccessful attempt by the officers to conduct an investigatory stop, we find this case to be squarely governed by Hodari D. There, the suspect fled upon noticing an unmarked police car approaching his group of companions on the street, prior to any stop or contact by the police. Id. at 622-23. The Supreme Court determined that he was neither stopped nor seized when the officers approached and pursued him, but rather was only actually seized when he was tackled by an officer to end the chase. Id. at 629. The officers here approached the Jeep and flashed their lights, intending to conduct a Terry stop. No stop occurred, as Sinkler immediately sped away. Rather than submitting to their show of authority, Sinkler fled, just like the suspect in Hodari D. In fact, Sinkler admits in his brief that “he did not submit to authority at the stop light.” Thus, we agree with the District Court that no illegal stop or seizure of Sinkler occurred prior to the chase.6 5 Once such physical force or show of authority is found, the inquiry then turns to whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would feel free to leave; if not, then a seizure has occurred. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). This second stage of the seizure inquiry is not relevant to our analysis of this case. 6 Before discussing Hodari D. and finding that Sinkler did not initially submit to the officers’ show of authority, the District Court determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Sinkler prior to the chase. Because we conclude that no stop or seizure 7 As to the collision that ended the chase, Sinkler contends that he was stopped and seized by the application of physical force when his Jeep struck the police van. He points to language from Hodari D. and Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), to support his contention that the collision constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. In both of those cases, the Supreme Court discussed what types of police behavior result in a seizure of the suspect. In Brower, the Court held that a seizure occurred where police officers placed a tractor-trailer across a highway in order to stop a fleeing suspect by causing him to crash into it. 489 U.S. at 598-99. Then in Hodari D., the Court noted that the “laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement” is readily classified as a seizure. 499 U.S. at 626. Relying on these cases, Sinkler contends that the police, using a van involved in the pursuit, applied force and effectively seized Sinkler illegally at the conclusion of the chase. However, Sinkler’s argument related to the collision fails for two reasons. First, the District Court made a finding that the police van accidentally struck the Jeep when Sinkler lost control after making a u-turn. Given the testimony of the officers at the suppression hearing supporting this determination, such a finding is not clearly erroneous. In light of the finding that the collision was unintentional, this case is distinguished from Brower, where the Court emphasized that a seizure “requires an intentional acquisition of occurred when the officers first approached Sinkler in his Jeep, we need not decide whether the facts here gave rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a stop at that time. 8 physical control.” 489 U.S. at 595-96 (emphasis added). A roadblock constructed with the express purpose of causing a suspect to collide with it presents a very different situation from an accidental crash where the suspect suddenly loses control of his vehicle. See id. (addressing and distinguishing accidental collisions when parties to a chase lose control of their vehicles). Since we will uphold the District Court’s finding that the collision here was accidental, we cannot find a seizure based upon Brower as Sinkler urges. The second fatal flaw in Sinkler’s argument related to the conclusion of the chase is the fact that by the time of the crash, even if a seizure had occurred when the cars collided, the police officers quite clearly had probable cause to arrest Sinkler for a multitude of traffic violations, as well as assault of a police officer, based on his actions during the chase itself. Further, “unprovoked flight upon noticing the police” is a factor that is also significant in determining whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exist in a situation encountered by the police. Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (describing “headlong flight” as “the consummate act of evasion,” and something that is reasonably suggestive of wrongdoing, in a case involving a Terry stop). Thus, when Sinkler was ultimately seized and arrested following the chase, that seizure was justified based on his flight coupled with the observations of the police officers during their pursuit of him. We therefore conclude that the District Court was correct in holding that Sinkler was not subjected to any illegal stop or seizure before, during, or after the 9 chase. The issues that remain involve alternative methods of attacking the subsequent search of the backpack found near Sinkler’s Jeep.