Opinion ID: 201550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Elements of the Tort Claims

Text: 24 We note, moreover, that plaintiffs' evidence also fell short of demonstrating the requisite proximate cause between either a failure to warn or design defect and decedent's death from lung cancer. As detailed above, decedent chose to disregard his family's and friends' repeated admonitions that he give up cigarettes because of the health risk, stating his intention to continue smoking despite its link to disease and death because we all have to die some time from something. This attitude was expressed notwithstanding the explicit warning on cigarette packages, beginning in the mid-1980s, that smoking causes lung cancer and other serious diseases. Thus, on this record, warnings appear irrelevant to decedent's decision-making. 7 Accord Estate of White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 F.Supp.2d 424, 435 (D.Md.2000) (proof that decedent ignored verbal warnings and warning labels on cigarette packages shows lack of proximate cause for decedent's cigarette-related injuries); see Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 351-52 (6th Cir.2000) (finding that common knowledge doctrine bars design defect and failure-to-warn claims under Ohio product liability law where decedent began smoking in 1969 [after the federal labeling act was in effect] and continued to smoke up until her death in 1997, affirming earlier precedent focusing not on the point at which the plaintiff began smoking, but rather, the point at which she quit smoking). 25 In addition, the contention that nicotine's addictive nature rendered decedent incapable of stopping once he started smoking — a point asserted but undeveloped in appellants' brief — is belied by the testimony of his wife and daughter that he stopped near the end of his life because he no longer could afford the cost of cigarettes. Although he briefly tried nicotine patches and gum provided by family members, the evidence that he deliberately chose to continue smoking despite its life-shortening effect undermines the genuineness of those attempts to stop and, thus, their probative value. In sum, the evidence taken as a whole forecloses a jury finding that Reynolds' failure to warn of the health hazards of smoking before 1969 was a proximate cause of decedent's lung cancer. Cf. Tompkin v. American Brands, 219 F.3d 566, 568, 575 (6th Cir.2000) (court reversed summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-warn and design defect claims based on factual question regarding common knowledge where decedent gave up smoking in 1965, at age 31, after smoking for 15 years). 26 Nor did decedent ever switch to available brands of cigarettes with lower levels of tar or nicotine in an effort to lower the risk to his health; he instead remained loyal throughout his life to regular Winstons. Thus, Reynolds' failure to develop a healthier cigarette design also could not be deemed the cause of his illness and death. 27 For these reasons as well, appellants' failure-to-warn and design defect claims were properly dismissed. 8