Opinion ID: 2668800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Particularized, Actual Injury in Fact

Text: Yet ConAgra has another standing challenge—this one well founded. ConAgra argues that even if the consumers would have overpaid if the Hebrew National products they bought were not actually kosher, the consumers “have not alleged that the products they each purchased were defective.” ConAgra analogizes this to a product defect case in which some products are admittedly defective, but most are not. The consumers’ allegations do not establish that all or even most Hebrew National products were not kosher, which means the particular packages of processed beef they purchased may have been—and indeed more than likely were—prepared in accordance with minimum kosher standards. Article III requires “an injury [to] be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010) (emphasis added). An alleged injury cannot be “too speculative for Article III purposes.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992). If there is no “actual” harm, then there must at least be an “imminent” harm. Id. As the Supreme Court emphasized just last year, “mere speculation” that injury did or might occur “cannot satisfy the requirement that any injury in fact must be fairly traceable to” the alleged source. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013). The consumers’ allegations fail to show that any of the particular packages of Hebrew National beef they personally purchased contained non-kosher beef. The consumers frankly admit that “it is impossible for any reasonable consumer to detect” -6- whether purportedly kosher meat is non-kosher. Instead, the consumers pin their Article III hopes on the allegation that they “paid a premium price for the Hebrew National products purchased believing them to be 100% strictly kosher, when they weren’t.” The consumers maintain this general allegation, that the non-kosher status of some packages of beef tainted all Hebrew National’s products, means they “are not required to allege the specific products or packages that failed to meet the represented standard.” (Emphasis added). The consumers’ argument is inconsistent with Article III. The Supreme Court has made it clear that standing must be particularized, meaning the alleged “injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1 (emphasis added). In the context of defective products, “it ‘is not enough’ for a plaintiff ‘to allege that a product line contains a defect or that a product is at risk for manifesting this defect; rather, the plaintiffs must allege that their product actually exhibited the alleged defect.’” In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 616 (8th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting O’Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 503 (8th Cir. 2009)). Without any particularized reason to think the consumers’ own packages of Hebrew National beef actually exhibited the alleged non-kosher defect, the consumers lack Article III standing to sue ConAgra. Accepting the consumers’ various allegations, it remains entirely possible, maybe probable, that the packages of beef they personally purchased and consumed met the “strict” standards advertised by ConAgra. Even supposing the 70% kosher quota meant some beef was improperly certified as kosher, the consumers give no reason to think all the beef marked as kosher under the quota did not meet kosher standards. As we cannot discern from the complaint how many packages were tainted with non-kosher beef, it is unclear -7- whether even a bare majority of Hebrew National packages were not kosher.2 Which means, it is pure speculation to say the particular packages sold to the consumers were tainted by non-kosher beef, while it is quite plausible ConAgra sold the consumers exactly what was promised: a higher quality, kosher meat product. Time and again the Supreme Court has reminded lower courts that speculation and conjecture are not injuries cognizable under Article III. See, e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1148.