Opinion ID: 1290712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: Reversal is based upon prosecutorial misconduct and failure of the trial judge to consolidate counts in the indictments for purpose of sentencing. We address those issues and additionally, Appellant's challenges of the constitutionality of the obscenity statute and adequacy of the indictments. Remaining questions are rendered moot by the reversal.
Appellant contends that Section 16-15-260 (1976 & Supp. 1984) is overbroad and vague in its definition of patently offensive and prurient interest and overbroad in its definition of sexual conduct. Constitutionality of the statute as to patently offensive and prurient interest was upheld by this Court in State v. Barrett , 278 S.C. 92, 292 S.E. (2d) 590, cert. den. 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S.Ct. 388, 74 L.Ed. (2d) 518 (1982). By order of September 19, 1984, we denied Appellant's Petition to Argue Against Precedent. Accordingly, we are concerned here only with the challenge of the statute's alleged overbroadness in Section 16-15-260(d)(2), which defines sexual conduct. Specifically, appellant argues that the language ... female breast nipples including male or female genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal or covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, exceeds the limitations imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the pleading case of Miller v. California , 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed. (2d) 419 (1972). We disagree. Miller , as this Court stated in Barrett, supra , 278 S.C. at p. 95, 292 S.E. (2d) 590, ... attempted to clarify the law for the state and federal lawmakers in the problem of dealing with obscenity and pornography. In doing so the Miller court emphasized its intention not to propose regulatory schemes for the States. The covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, of which Appellant complains is a description we find accords with language in Miller , which offers a plain example for regulation ... and lewd exhibition of the genitals. Photographs of a penis, discernibly turgid, may offend Appellant's interpretation of Miller , but they might well constitute lewd exhibition of the genitals. Cases cited by Appellant are distinguishable upon the facts, and not in point. Appellant's position here is akin to that of the defendants in Barrett, supra , in which Chief Justice Littlejohn, speaking for the Court stated: Here, as is typical in obscenity cases, counsel `picketh the nit.' Squabbles over technicalities and definitions have lured the courts to write fluently, resulting, ofttimes, in overdefining obscenity. We appreciate the fact obscenity is difficult to define; fortunately, it is not difficult to detect. ... Our statute is not so broad as to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Barrett , 278 S.C. at 96, 292 S.E. (2d) 590.
Appellant claims error in the trial judge's refusal to quash the indictments as vague and duplicitous. We disagree. An indictment is adequate if the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce, the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer, and acquittal or conviction to be placed in bar to any subsequent conviction. State v. Crenshaw , 274 S.C. 475, 266 S.E. (2d) 61 (1980). The wording of the indictments accords with the language of S.C. Code Ann. Section 16-15-320 (1985), which prohibits obscenity and enumerates four methods by which a defendant may be in violation. Prior to trial the court amended the indictments, eliminating possible confusion. The indictments were clear, and the trial judge's refusal to quash them was correct. Nor were the indictments duplicitous. The statute prohibits obscenity; the indictments relate to one crime only, and the description of more than one method of violation does not create a new crime. See, State v. Jeffcoat , 279 S.C. 167, 303 S.E. (2d) 855 (1983). Moreover, any possible duplication was remedied by amendment of the indictments, eliminating any surplusage.
We recognize and affirm here the sound and long standing rule in South Carolina that wide latitude is permitted in cross examination. We likewise recognize and affirm the rule which holds that the scope of such examination is in the sound discretion of the trial judge, a discretion not to be disturbed absent abuse. From the record in this case it is patent that the solicitor, in his cross examination, exceeded the permissible latitude and, in so doing, denied Appellant a fair trial. In his cross examination the solicitor repeatedly employed the hypothetical question, the factual basis for which, however, was not in the record, either at the time of asking or at the close of evidence. The necessity that facts cited in hypothetical questions be of record has been stated by this Court: The expert, properly so called, is asked what would be his judgment upon all or any prescribed part of the facts, as to which evidence has been lawfully received , or which has been admitted, assuming that they are true. [Emphasis supplied]. State v. King , 222 S.C. 108, 116, 71 S.E. (2d) 793 (1952). The facts set out in the solicitor's hypotheticals, if established, were favorable to the state in conveying inferences of Appellant's guilt. These inferences, which were impermissible to be drawn, were highly prejudicial and devastating to Appellant's defense. Although there were numerous prosecutorial excesses, one sufficient to require reversal, and typical, was a line of interrogation occurring during the cross examination of Appellant's witness, Theodore McIIvenna. In an obvious effort to convey to the jury an inference that a rape in Horry County, resulting in a conviction, was caused, at least in part, by the rapist's possession of magazines like those distributed by Appellant, the solicitor asked: ... if I gave you the additional facts for this hypothetical question, that addresses of girls that you could call up on the phone for sexual conversations have been found in the possession of people convicted of rape, would that change your mind? (Tr. Vol 3, p. 515-516, 1. 24). When counsel objected on grounds that no substantiating fact to support the hypothesis was in evidence, the solicitor, after being instructed by the court to Pose the question in terms of the basis on the record, inquired: MR. DUNN: Your Honor, would I be at liberty to put those facts into evidence? COURT: Yes, sir. The facts were never placed in evidence assuming, without deciding, the propriety of the question at all. The solicitor continued: Assuming for the sake of my question  and don't answer until His Honor has a chance to rule  that I can show you a case where a rapist, convicted of rape in this court, had in his possession the phone number of one of these girls listed in this type of magazine that you call where you can call and talk about sex with them  would that fact change your mind about the effect it would have on a sex offender? (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 516, 1. 17-23).       How about if he's been convicted of rape in this very courtroom , having been arrested with that number in his pocket, coming out of a book, just like some of these that are in evidence? (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 517, 1. 11-14, emphasis supplied).       All right, sir, let me ask you this. If I can produce evidence for you here that would show that a man convicted of rape and murder in this county , had available to him in his billfold, the number of a lady just like is reflected in State's Exhibit No. 14, of that type, a phone number for him to call, and in lieu of that he raped and murdered somebody here in this county ... (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 553, 1. 9-15, emphasis supplied). The likely prejudice to Appellant from the foregoing impacts with such flagrance as to require no further comment. Failure of the solicitor to present the facts set out in the hypothesis simply exacerbated the error, an error which admonitions of the trial court could not cure. State v. Huiett , 271 S.C. 205, 246 S.E. (2d) 862 (1978).
Appellant also argues the trial judge should have consolidated the counts contained in the indictments for the purpose of sentencing. We agree. The indictments were based upon Appellant's distribution of 39 magazines to seven stores. Nowhere in the record is there evidence that the distribution occurred at different times. The Court of Appeals of Georgia has held that separate exhibitions of several films for which the viewer pays one entry fee constitute only one violation of its obscenity statute. Maxwell v. State , 152 Ga. App. 776, 264 S.E. (2d) 254 (1980); cert. den 449 U.S. 899, 101 S.Ct. 245, 66 L.Ed. (2d) 114. We find the analogy to separate distributions of several magazines persuasive. It is clear from the evidence that magazines were distributed by Appellant to seven stores. In the absence of proof by the state that there were several distributions to each store, the record can support but one count of distribution to each. To hold otherwise is to speculate on matters not apparent in the record. It was error, therefore, to refuse to consolidate the indictments for sentencing.