Opinion ID: 1351145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Introduction of uncharged offenses during the prosecution's rebuttal

Text: (50) Defendant asserts the court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of the Vaught/Scheffler killings during the prosecution's rebuttal, rather than in its case-in-chief. He overlooks the fact that the other crimes evidence became highly relevant only after defendant testified in his own defense that although he believed he killed Miller, he lacked intent or motive to kill Miller and/or Sowers. As we explained above (pt. II.6.), under these circumstances the other crimes evidence was properly admitted to prove defendant's intent and motive. We decline to find the court's decision to allow the evidence in rebuttal (but to grant defendant a three-week continuance to prepare) an abuse of discretion.

(51) Defendant asserts the kidnappings alleged as the second special circumstance were merely incidental to the murders, and that under People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, the special circumstance finding is invalid. The record, however, discloses the kidnappings were not incidental to the murders, but were committed to facilitate defendant's separate sex-slave fantasy. The court instructed the jury, pursuant to Green, that the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the kidnapping was merely incidental to the commission of murder. We thus reject defendant's suggestion that the jury was not apprised of the Green requirement. We likewise reject his suggestion the evidence was insufficient to establish the Green requirement. The record, as set out above, contains substantial evidence showing the kidnappings were not merely incidental to the murders, and that the murders were committed to facilitate successful kidnapping and rape.
Defendant asserts the special circumstance findings must be vacated because the court failed to instruct the jury on intent to kill. We rejected this claim in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], and in People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d 306, 326-237, we rejected defendant's related claim that Anderson is not retroactive. (52) We also reject defendant's related assertion that the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that the jury must find the killings to be premeditated and deliberate. There is neither statutory nor constitutional support for this asserted requirement. We conclude the special circumstance findings are valid. (53) We also find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual killer, and hence the finding required by Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 102 S.Ct. 3368], is satisfied.

(54) Defendant asserts four prospective jurors who expressed opposition to the death penalty were improperly excused for cause because they did not make it unmistakably clear they would refuse to impose the death penalty in all situations. ( Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) As we have held in numerous cases (e.g., People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 954 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]), the proper test for determining Witherspoon error is set out in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424-426 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]. Under Witt the prospective juror need not demonstrate unmistakable clarity about his opposition, but may be excluded for cause if his views on the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852], fn. omitted.) Defendant asserts we should not apply Witt retroactively. We have applied Witt retroactively in numerous recent cases (e.g., People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 954-956), and we are satisfied that our practice is in conformity with constitutional principles. We thus analyze defendant's claims pursuant to Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. (i) Prospective Juror Simonds. Carole Simonds stated she believed in the death penalty, but her religious beliefs might prevent her from actually voting for it. On further questioning about whether she could vote to impose death, she responded: I don't think I can, I don't think so, and Oh, I don't know. I don't think I could tell someone just take their life away, I don't think so. When asked if she could vote for death for Adolf Hitler, she replied, I don't think I could. I don't know. (ii) Prospective Juror Moore. Samuel Moore expressed general qualms about the death penalty, and on further questioning stated, due to my religious belief I don't feel that I could vote for the death penalty, regardless of the facts of the case. He affirmed this statement twice more, telling defendant he did not believe he could vote for death even if Hitler or Attila the Hun were on trial. (iii) Prospective Juror Fredman. Lucca Fredman told the court she did not believe in the death penalty, and twice affirmed, I do believe that I could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. She later told the court that even if instructed that the death penalty was a proper sentence under the law, she could not follow the law and impose death: I really believe I couldn't. I couldn't live with myself. (iv) Prospective Juror Jensen. Mark Jensen stated he did not believe he could participate in anything that may involve putting a person to death. He thereafter affirmed three times that his conscience would not permit him to vote for death under any circumstances. As in Guzman, supra, we conclude that under these circumstances the court could properly have concluded from their responses that [the] jurors' views would `prevent,' or at least `substantially impair' performance of their duties as jurors at the penalty trial. (45 Cal.3d at p. 956.) We find no error under Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, or Witt, supra, 459 U.S. 412.
(55) In a related argument, defendant asserts in his supplemental brief that the court erred by failing to excuse for cause three jurors who were inclined toward imposition of death. As a result, defendant asserts, he was forced to use peremptory challenges to remove those jurors. Consequently he exhausted all of his challenges, and the court refused to allow him additional peremptory challenges. (See People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]; People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 749, 770.) Assuming for the sake of argument that the propriety of the court's ruling on defendant's for cause challenges is properly raised (see People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1248 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251]), we find no basis for reversal because we are not convinced the court erred in failing to excuse the jurors in the first instance. (i) Prospective Juror Werner. John Werner gave several equivocal answers about the death penalty. He told defendant he believed the death penalty was appropriate for first degree murder, but not for crimes of passion; thereafter he told the prosecutor he would not automatically vote for death, and he told the court he would listen to the testimony and did not consider either possible penalty to be automatic. (ii) Prospective Juror Creutzinger. On questioning by the court, Thomas Creutzinger admitted his innermost feeling that one convicted of first degree murder deserved the death penalty, and stated that he thinks he probably would always vote for the death penalty. After the court explained that the jury would be instructed to consider factors in mitigation and aggravation, however, he stated he would not vote for death if he felt the mitigating evidence outweighed that in aggravation. In response to questioning by defendant, Creutzinger again expressed his feeling that first degree murderers deserve death. In response to further questions by the prosecutor and defendant, he stated he would consider the mitigating evidence in making his decision, but that it would be difficult for him to conclude a sentence less than death was appropriate for first degree murder. (iii) Prospective Juror Barton. Margaret Barton told the prosecutor she believed the death penalty was appropriate in some cases, but not others. She told defendant she believed death was appropriate for first degree murder. She then told the prosecutor she would consider all the evidence in determining the appropriate penalty. She thereafter stated that death was the proper penalty for one convicted beyond a reasonable doubt by a fair jury that had weighed all the evidence presented it. In People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 768 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250], we noted that when equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited ..., the trial court's determination as to [the prospective juror's] true state of mind is binding on an appellate court. In Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pages 1089 and 1091, we applied that rule to find proper a trial court's denial of a defendant's challenges for cause in the face of equivocal responses by three prospective jurors. The same rule applies, and the same result follows, here. We conclude the trial court did not err by denying defendant's challenges for cause.
(56) Defendant concedes section 190.3, factor (b), specifically allows introduction of uncharged crimes evidence at the penalty phase, but he asserts admission of such evidence (e.g., the murders of Mochel and Aguilar) violated his due process and self-incrimination rights. In a supplemental brief he insists that, for various reasons, admission of such evidence also violates both his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable sentence, and his right to equal protection. We rejected defendant's due process claim in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-206 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; for the same reasons, we would reject his Eighth Amendment reliability claims as well. The high court rejected defendant's self-incrimination claim in McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183, 213-217 [28 L.Ed.2d 711, 729-732, 91 S.Ct. 1454]. In People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 773-774, we rejected defendant's related assertion that failure to require jury unanimity on the uncharged crimes posed a constitutional problem; we thus reject this aspect of his Eighth Amendment challenge as well. For the same reasons we reject defendant's equal protection challenge.
(57) Pursuant to section 1111, the court instructed that Charlene's testimony must be corroborated. Defendant insists there was insufficient evidence to corroborate Charlene's penalty phase testimony about the murders of Mochel and Aguilar. Corroboration is sufficient if it merely tends in some degree to implicate the defendant. ( People v. Santo (1954) 43 Cal.2d 319, 327 [273 P.2d 249].) As noted above, defendant's own testimony that he was present at the Sail Inn on the night of Mochel's disappearance linked him to that killing, and Charlene led the police to the exact location where the body was found. She testified they had fished earlier in the day in the location where Mochel was killed, and that Mochel's hands had been tied. When the body was found police discovered the hands were bound by fishing line. Similarly, physical evidence found at the scene of the Aguilar murders  i.e., clothing and yellow nylon rope described by Charlene  amply corroborated Charlene's testimony, and demonstrated that she had knowledge of the murder that could have been possessed only by one who was present at the killing.
(58) As noted above, by stipulation the jury was instructed on defendant's prior criminal record, including an adjudication for lewd conduct when he was 13, and an adjudication for armed robbery when he was 16. He now asserts admission of his juvenile adjudications was prejudicial error. Defendant waived his claim by his counsel's decision to enter the stipulation. In any event, the claim  at least as to the robbery, which is clearly a violent offense  is meritless. ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 294-295 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052] [adjudication of attempted use of force or violence as a juvenile admissible in aggravation under § 190.3, factor (b)].) The People appear to concede that the record does not demonstrate that the lewd conduct involved attempted use of force or violence, but assert it is nevertheless admissible as a felony conviction under section 190.3, factor (c). Under our analysis in Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 295, this view is unpersuasive; and yet, even if we assume penalty phase counsel acted unreasonably in this regard, the misjudgment was plainly harmless in light of the other properly introduced aggravating evidence in this case. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-696 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-699, 104 S.Ct. 2052] [reasonable probability standard].)
(59) Defendant asserts the court erred in allowing the jury to consider evidence of his escape attempt as an aggravating factor under section 190.3, factor (b). He observes that pursuant to People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782], uncharged criminal activity involving use or attempted use of force or violence may be used in aggravation only if, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury concludes the defendant's conduct amounted to a crime. Although the question may be close, we are not prepared to say the escape plan evidence ( ante, p. 155) was insufficient to meet this test. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo the evidence was insufficient to establish such a crime, we conclude its admission was nonprejudicial. We agree with defendant that in some cases, erroneous admission of escape evidence may weigh heavily in the jury's determination of penalty. In view of the properly admitted aggravating evidence in this case, however, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the asserted error affected the penalty verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P2d 1135].)
(60) Defendant objected under Evidence Code section 352 to three photographs at the penalty trial. The first two concerned the Mochel murder. One photo shows a roadway, and demonstrates the difficulty of seeing the victim's remains from the roadway; the body is barely visible. The other photograph is of the same view, taken closer to the body, showing skeletal remains. The other photograph concerned Aguilar. It showed only her ankles and shoes, and her feet tied with yellow rope. All of the photographs were relevant. The first two show that the perpetrator left the body in an area where it was unlikely to be discovered, and corroborate Charlene's testimony about the killing. The third photograph corroborates Charlene's testimony regarding the type of shoes the victim was wearing. None of the photographs is so gruesome that we would find its admission an abuse of discretion ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1256), and in any event on this record it is difficult to imagine that had the challenged photographs been excluded the result would have been different ( id., at p. 1258).
(61) The prosecutor elicited from Charlene the fact that defendant expressed no remorse for killing Mochel despite the victim's pleas for herself and her children. Defendant asserts this testimony is inadmissible under Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 760, 774. We have repeatedly rejected similar claims that the prosecution may not comment, in argument, on a defendant's lack of remorse. (See, e.g., People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d 291, 339 [[a] defendant's remorse or lack thereof is a proper subject for the jury's consideration at the penalty phase].) For the same reasons, we reject defendant's contention.
Section 190.4, subdivision (c), provides that the same jury that decided guilt and special circumstances is to decide penalty unless for good cause shown, the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn.... (62) At the start of the penalty phase defendant moved to question the jury to determine whether there was good cause for its discharge. He asserts the court erred in denying his motion. We find no error. First, as we have held in numerous cases, the statutory preference for a single jury in capital cases is constitutionally unobjectionable. ( People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 351-353 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680].) Second, although section 190.4 envisions departure from this course on a showing of good cause, we reject defendant's speculation that because he may have conducted an inadequate voir dire at the guilt phase, and/or may have alienated the jury during the guilt trial, there existed grounds to question the jury a second time before the penalty trial. A court does not abuse its discretion by failing to allow a disappointed defendant to conduct a fishing expedition to attempt to discover good cause when there is no independent basis to believe good cause exists.
(63) Citing distinguishable, out-of-state authority applying statutory and common law (e.g., Lowery v. State (Ind. 1982) 434 N.E.2d 868), defendant asserts that sequestration of a capital jury should be mandatory throughout the trial, or at least during deliberations, on a defendant's request. There is no basis in our law for this proposition. As noted above, section 1121 leaves sequestration to the sound discretion of the trial court, and requires the court to admonish the jurors if it allows them to separate. This legislative rule, which under California law has long applied with equal force in capital cases (see People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1218 [249 Cal. Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795]) must be followed unless it violates the Constitution  a showing defendant does not and cannot make. There being no basis on which to conclude the court abused its discretion, we find no error. ( Id., at pp. 1219-1220.)