Opinion ID: 213397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Control of Others

Text: The majority argues that Bardzik had the power to control others as Reserve Division Commander. Maj. op. at 1148. But in that position, Bardzik supervised only one more fulltime paid employee than he did in Court Operations, a position the majority holds was not policymaking. Maj. op. at 1151. Thus, considering fulltime, paid subordinates, his position as Reserve Division Commander was about the same as his job in Court Operations. Nor does the record indicate that Bardzik had significant control over the 600 part-time volunteer reserve members (many of whom were not authorized to wear a badge or carry a firearm). Bardzik explains that as manager of the Reserve Division, his job was to see to it that the reserve members followed already-established departmental policies. The majority acknowledges that Bardzik could not by himself evaluate or promote the reserve members, but was required to send evaluations and recommendations for promotion up the chain of command for approval by the Assistant Sheriff. Maj. op. at 1148-49. Bardzik did not supervise or train the reserve members; instead, they were supervised and trained by the divisions to which they were allocated. The process of allocating reserve members to divisions that needed them was effectively taken out of Bardzik's hands by the decentralization program; reserve liaisons in each division could request reserve members without notifying Bardzik. Personnel issues were referred to and handled by the personnel division, not by Bardzik. Making every reasonable inference in Bardzik's favor, it would appear that Bardzik had little control over the reserve component. The majority tells us that whether Bardzik actually trained or dealt with the personnel issues of his subordinates is immaterial, so long as he oversaw reserve training and personnel issues. Maj. op. at 1148-49. The term oversaw suggests that Bardzik delegated the training and personnel issues while retaining supervisory authority. There is no evidence in the record that Bardzik retained any supervisory authority over personnel issues once he referred a reserve member to the personnel division. As for training, to the extent that Bardzik was authorized to recommend a course of training for a reserve member, he was still required to obtain the Assistant Sheriff's approval. The majority cites Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828 (9th Cir.1989) to support the argument that Bardzik was a policymaker. But Thomas favors Bardzik's position. In Thomas, we held that, on the pleadings, a sheriff's lieutenant was not a policymaker despite being involved in training and evaluating the department's high risk entry team. Id. at 829, 832. We reasoned that training and evaluation of subordinates has no significant relationship to one's political loyalty. Id. at 832. So even if Bardzik was involved in the training and supervision of the reserve members, under Thomas that involvement would not weigh in favor of finding that Bardzik was a policymaker. The facts of Bardzik's case are even stronger than those of the lieutenant in Thomas: the record shows that Bardzik was only tangentially involved in training and supervision. Thus, reading the record in the manner most favorable to Bardzik, one must conclude that he did not have any significant control of others, and therefore the control factor does not weigh in Sheriff Carona's favor.