Opinion ID: 1133268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amendment to Information

Text: On the day of trial, but prior to its commencement, the district attorney was allowed to amend orally the first count of the information over defendant's objection. The first count, before amendment, alleged that the defendants    did then and there feloniously, wilfully, maliciously and forcibly break and enter, and did then and there feloniously, wilfully and maliciously without force enter the building of    with the intent then and there to commit a crime and to steal property of any value    (Emphasis added.) The amendment struck the words and to steal property of any value, and substituted in lieu thereof the words to wit, a larceny. Defendant contends that he was not charged with the crime of burglary until after the amendment of count one, and hence, that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for continuance, which was sought on ground of surprise. This contention of defendant's is without merit. Count one of the information in its original form adequately informed defendant that he was charged with the crime of burglary, because it apprised him clearly that he was charged with breaking and entering a building with intent to steal property. As we stated in Gallegos v. People, Colo., 444 P.2d 267, 269: The name of the crime need not be mentioned in an information, if the crime is adequately described therein.    An information is sufficient if it advises a defendant of the charge he is facing so that he can adequately defend against it. The amendment was one of merely form and not of substance, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for continuance.