Opinion ID: 1683646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: disclosure to jury

Text: In its next point of error, Tom's propounds two issues, both relating to disclosure of the settlement agreement to the jury. First, Tom's argues that the trial court erred in granting Consolidated's motion in limine, which prevented disclosure to the jury of the terms of the Mary Carter agreement during voir dire and opening statement. Second, Tom's contends that the trial court erred in failing to admit into evidence the actual settlement agreement, offered in redacted form. In support of these points, Tom's states that disclosure, would have revealed to the jury the true alignment and interest of the parties, the bias and prejudice of the witnesses and the reasons behind plaintiff's and Consolidated's conduct during trial with regard to liability and damages. We agree with Tom's that the surest cure for the ill effects of a Mary Carter agreement is disclosure of its terms to the court and to the jury. See Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 707 P.2d 1063, 1074 (1985). The court should, upon motion of a party adversely affected by the settlement agreement, disclose the existence of and the basic terms of the agreement unless the court finds that disclosure will create substantial danger of undue prejudice or confusion. Id. 707 P.2d at 1074-76. However, the extent of that disclosure should ordinarily be limited. Mary Carter agreements most often contain information that is impermissibly prejudicial, such as amounts of settlement and provisions referring to insurance coverage. There is little disagreement that this kind of information should be eliminated. Moreover, in making disclosure, it is appropriate and probably necessary that the jury be told either by a stipulation or by trial court instruction that the agreement has no bearing on the issue of the parties' respective liability. With these points in mind, we turn to the specific issues raised by Tom's. During the pretrial conference on the first day of trial, the court sustained Consolidated's oral motion in limine in which it requested that through voir dire and opening statement that [Tom's counsel] not make any reference to the fact that there has been an agreement entered into between Consolidated and plaintiff. Although the motion was sustained, the trial court indicated that the agreement would be admissible at least for the impeachment of Consolidated's witnesses and to establish bias and prejudice on the part of those witnesses. In the opening statements, plaintiff's counsel made the following remarks: I have no grudge against Mr. Bauer at Consolidated Freightways. If you believe the brakes were going out, if you don't believe the brakes were going out, it is all Mr. Bauer's fault. I don't personally believe that. It's for you to determine what the evidence will show and make up your own minds. It's either/or. Brakes were going out, Tom's Truck Repair's fault or Mr. Bauer's fault, which I don't believe it was Mr. Bauer's fault.