Opinion ID: 1953260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial under the mandates of edmonson v. leesville concrete co. inc.

Text: Brown contends that Blackwood exercised each of his peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors, in violation of Batson. Brown argues that under Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), which held Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), applicable to civil cases, this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Blackwood argues that Brown failed to raise a Batson challenge at the time peremptory strikes were made, thereby waiving her right to raise this issue on appeal. He argues that Brown instead objected to his (Blackwood's) Taleff challenges, which occurred prior to the peremptory challenges. Blackwood further explains that Brown, in exercising her Taleff challenges, had struck all white veniremen connected with the Clinic, but had left black veniremen connected with the Clinic. Blackwood states that in seeking to eliminate all jurors connected with the Clinic, he necessarily struck only black veniremen because that was all that was left, i.e., (p)laintiffs had selectively left them on the panel. Blackwood asserts that the trial court properly found that all such challenges were valid under Taleff, and properly found that Blackwood had provided a sufficient race neutral reason for Batson purposes  striking all remaining Clinic-connected veniremen. Blackwood asserts that if Brown did in fact preserve the Batson issue, the remedy would be a limited remand to allow him to give evidence supporting his proffer of the race neutral reasons for his peremptory challenges. Brown's attorneys voiced their Batson claim after Blackwood exercised his Taleff challenges, which was after Brown's attorneys had exercised their Taleff challenges. Blackwood's attorney explained his challenges: MR. JACKS: Your honor, for the record, with the exception of two people, one of whom works for me and who is black, Ms. Murry, and the other who identified himself as working for the Valley Bank and has a great deal of contact with me; all of the jurors that the Plaintiffs challenged were white. We simply knocked the remaining patients from the Clinic off the panel so that we would have a list of jurors to choose a jury from who were completely unbiased and unprejudiced and have no relationship whatsoever with the Defendant. THE COURT: I did note that both of you were doing the same thing except for  what were the two exceptions, Mr. Jacks? MR. JACKS: Ms. Murry who identified herself as working for me, who had been challenged for cause earlier by the Plaintiffs, and it was denied. And Kenneth Morgan who has identified himself as having been previously represented by me and working for the Valley Bank who is a client of mine. THE COURT: Okay. The motion relating to the Batson challenges will be denied for several reasons. One, it is a civil case. The other is, we are dealing with cases which the Taleff challenges would have been in order in each and every case. O.K. Let's go to peremptory challenges ... Brown's attorneys raised no objection on Batson or other grounds during the peremptory challenges. Batson was held applicable to civil cases in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co ., decided after the plaintiffs in this case filed their appeal. In Scott, we held that Edmonson should be applied retroactively to a civil case pending on review, according to the same logic by which Batson was applied retroactively to criminal cases under Williams v. State, 507 So.2d 50 (Miss. 1987) and Brown v. U.S., 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). See Scott, 595 So.2d at 852-853. Therefore, if a Batson claim was properly raised in the case at bar, Edmonson should be applied retroactively to determine if racial discrimination occurred in the use of peremptory challenges, thus denying the plaintiffs a fair trial. However, there are several hurdles which the appellants in this case must overcome before the application of Batson and Edmonson. First, as noted above, Brown's attorneys raised their Batson challenge at the time of the Taleff, or for-cause strikes. Batson applies to the use of peremptory challenges, not to the court's excusals for cause. Shaw v. State, 540 So.2d 26, 27 (Miss. 1989). [12] Therefore, Brown's Batson challenge to Blackwood's Taleff strikes could not succeed. Second, Brown's attorneys did not raise their Batson claim at the time of Blackwood's peremptory strikes. Under Shaw, where Batson is not raised during the jury selection, any challenge to the racial composition of the jury is waived. 540 So.2d at 27. Generally, timely requests an motions for a ruling at trial are necessary to preserve an issue on appeal. Therefore, it could be said that the appellants in this case waived their claim. However, assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs raised their Batson claim at the proper time, preserving the issue for appeal, it must be determined what type of relief, if any, the plaintiffs would be entitled to under a retroactive application of Edmonson. In Scott, we considered the retroactive application of Edmonson to a medical malpractice case decided in favor of the defendant doctor. Plaintiffs had made a timely Batson challenge at the peremptory strike stage, and Edmonson was handed down after their appeal. On appeal, the doctor requested that in light of Edmonson, this Court remand for a Batson hearing before the circuit judge, as authorized in Williams. He suggested that if the judge found that racial discrimination had occurred in the use of peremptory challenges, then a new trial should be ordered; if he found that a race-neutral reason existed for the peremptory challenges, a record of the hearing and the circuit judge's findings should be submitted to this Court. The plaintiff argued for reversal of the case. We discussed the reasoning of Williams: We held that Williams made a prima facie case of illicit peremptory challenges, and that the prosecutor's explanation for peremptory challenges was insufficient under Batson. We further held, however, that reversal was not necessary because Batson had not been decided when the district attorney made the challenges, and the prosecution could not be said to have waived the opportunity to offer racially neutral reasons in its exercise of peremptory challenges because it had no reason to know it was obligated to do so. We remanded with instructions that the district attorney be given an opportunity to offer racially neutral explanations for each of the peremptory challenges he used on black persons, and held consideration of the appeal in abeyance until a Batson hearing in the circuit court was conducted. If the circuit court found purposeful discrimination in the prosecution's use of the peremptory challenges, it should order a new trial. However, if the court did not find any impermissible discrimination, we would consider the evidence adduced at the hearing to determine if reversal was required. Scott, 595 So.2d at 852-853. We then weighed remand for a hearing against reversal: There is much to be said for the procedure we followed in Williams, and the defense in this case had no more reason to anticipate Edmonson than the district attorney in Williams to anticipate Batson. Again, however, experience has taught us that cases in general should not be tried in bits and pieces. Judicial economy is not advanced thereby. This is a civil case, and although it is a complaint of malpractice against a doctor, it should not entail complex or detailed evidence and, at least as far as the defendant doctor is concerned ... witnesses in his defense should be easily and readily available. This case, in the interest of both parties, needs to be tried and concluded as soon as reasonably possible. There is another problem with simply remanding for a circuit judge Batson hearing. When the four black prospective jurors were peremptorily challenged, counsel had no reason to suppose he had to have any reason at all to excuse them. Asking him and the circuit judge two years later to resurrect from memory some Batson -approved basis for peremptory challenge is neither fair nor satisfying. There may be cases in which judicial economy will be better served by a Williams procedure, but that will be a case having special or unusual features. This is not such as case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 595 So.2d at 853 (emphasis added). The case at bar did have a special or unusual feature: a jury pool with an unusually large number of potentially biased individuals. This unusual feature prompted the judge to initiate special procedures under Taleff. Clearly, not only would judicial economy be better served by a Williams procedure than by reversal, the equivalent of a Williams procedure has already been held, i.e., the hearing on Brown's motion to supplement. At this hearing, the judge did not permit Blackwood's attorney to put on evidence as to the race-neutral reasons for his peremptory challenges. [13] However, Blackwood's attorney was permitted to make a proffer as to the race neutral reasons for his four peremptory strikes. Hagwood stated that he had challenged juror 26, Moses Riley, because Riley had been represented by Levi Boone in the past; juror 40, Juanita Todd, had been challenged because she was a nursing assistant, prompting concern about how her profession would affect her consideration of the case; juror 65, Susan Franklin had been challenged because she worked in a day care center, and because her grandchild had cerebral palsy; Blackwood's lawyers were concerned that she would be totally over sympathetic toward a small child with the same type injuries as Tryvale; juror 64, Willie George Sisson, had been challenged because he had stated he knew Bobbie Jean Brown Webb's husband, Roosevelt Brown. These are valid, race-neutral reasons under Batson and Edmonson. Even if Edmonson is applied retroactively to this case, reversal is not warranted.