Opinion ID: 2533404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Search of the Residence under Article I, Section 7

Text: ¶ 16 Winterstein argues that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the Terry analysis to decide whether Rongen had the authority to search 646 Englert Road. Implicitly, Winterstein argues that authority of law requires something more than the Terry reasonable or well-founded suspicion standard, necessarily probable cause. ¶ 17 Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides: No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. Under article I, section 7, the requisite authority of law is generally a search warrant. State v. Morse, 156 Wash.2d 1, 7, 123 P.3d 832 (2005) (citing State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999)). Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless justified by a recognized exception. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) (citing State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980)). The narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement are `jealously and carefully drawn.' Id. (quoting Houser, 95 Wash.2d at 149, 622 P.2d 1218). ¶ 18 Both parties agree that because Winterstein is under community supervision, he has a lesser expectation of privacy and may be searched on the basis of a well-founded or reasonable suspicion of a probation violation. However, even with this lesser expectation of privacy, the probation officer's authority to search a residence extends only to the probationer's residence: [i]f there is reasonable cause to believe that an offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, an offender may be required to submit to a search and seizure of the offender's person, residence, automobile, or other personal property. Former RCW 9.94A.631 (1984) (emphasis added). We have never decided whether it is enough that a probation officer reasonably believes a probationer lives at a certain residence prior to performing a search of that residence. ¶ 19 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has addressed this issue. In Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir.2005), that court held that before conducting a warrantless search of a parolee's residence, law enforcement officials must have probable cause to believe that they are at the parolee's residence. The court noted that the probable cause requirement is important to protect the interests of third parties because it `seek[s] to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.' Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). ¶ 20 Similarly, we have recognized that probable cause is the minimum standard for determining whether a residence belongs to the subject of an arrest warrant. State v. Hatchie, 161 Wash.2d 390, 392, 166 P.3d 698 (2007). In Hatchie, the police had a misdemeanor arrest warrant for an unrelated person when officers entered Hatchie's residence believing the suspect lived there. Id. We held that under article I, section 7, the police have the limited power to enter a residence for an arrest, so long as the entry is not pretextual, the subject of the arrest warrant is actually present, and the police have probable cause to believe that the subject of the arrest warrant is a resident of the home to be entered. Id. at 392-93, 166 P.3d 698. We explained the probable cause requirement is a protection of the third parties' privacy interests, which come into play when officers enter the homes of nonsuspects: [t]he third party's privacy interest in being free from unreasonable invasion of his home is distinguishable from the suspect's interest in avoiding unreasonable seizure. It is the rights of the homeowner that the issuing magistrate must balance with the necessity for the search. Unless the third party's interests are considered, the search is no more reasonable than if no warrant had been issued. Id. at 402-03, 166 P.3d 698 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Anderson, 105 Wash.App. 223, 232, 19 P.3d 1094 (2001)). We concluded that if the police did not have probable cause to believe, based on objective evidence, that the subject of the arrest warrant was a resident of the home they wished to enter, the arrest warrant could not authorize them to enter. Hatchie, 161 Wash.2d at 403, 166 P.3d 698. ¶ 21 As both the Motley and Hatchie opinions recognized, protection of third party privacy interests is implicated when there is a question about the residence of a person who is the target of a search. Even though probationers have a lessened expectation of privacy, third parties not under the control of the DOC do not. Anytime a question arises about the actual residence of a probationer, therefore, third party privacy interests must be considered. This is particularly important where, as here, DOC asserts the right to search a probationer's residence even when he is not home. [2] ¶ 22 We follow the reasoning of Hatchie and Motley and hold that probation officers are required to have probable cause to believe that their probationers live at the residences they seek to search. In this context, probable cause exists when an officer has information that would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that the probationer lives at the place to be searched. The information known to the officer must be reasonably trustworthy. Only facts and knowledge available to the officer at the time of the search should be considered. See State v. Mance, 82 Wash.App. 539, 541-42, 918 P.2d 527 (1996) (citing State v. Fore, 56 Wash.App. 339, 343, 783 P.2d 626 (1989)). Because the court below did not apply the proper probable cause standard, we remand for further proceedings to determine whether Rongen had probable cause to believe Winterstein resided at 646 Englert Road at the time of the search.