Opinion ID: 1501012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Appellant contends that, as an elected public official, neither Rule 8 nor Rule 9 of this Court's rules can be applied to him. [2] To do so, he submits, would violate both the Tennessee Constitution and the United States Constitution. Appellant avers that in suspending him the Disciplinary Board, and presumably the Chancery Court, exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Appellant argues that under the Tennessee Constitution, judges and district attorneys are treated identically and Article VI, Section 6 ordains a single and exclusive method of removal  impeachment by the Legislature. We agree that the exclusive method of removal from office for judges and district attorneys is by impeachment. However, this does not mean that district attorneys and judges are not subject to discipline. The right of this Court to establish Rules of practice and procedure for disciplining attorneys is clear. Petition of Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 539 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tenn. 1976). Rule 9, Section 1.1, Rules of the Supreme Court, states that any attorney admitted to practice law in this State ... is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Board, the hearing committees, hereinafter established, and the Circuit and Chancery Court. This Court has inherent, original and exclusive jurisdiction pertaining to the licensing of attorneys. Belmont v. Board of Law Examiners, 511 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. 1974). Our authority to make rules governing the practice of law is traditional, inherent and statutory. Such power is indispensable to the orderly administration of justice. Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tenn. 1976). No person shall engage in the practice of law in Tennessee, except pursuant to the authority of this Court. Rule 7, Section 1.01, Rules of the Supreme Court. The office of District Attorney constitutes no shield or protection to an attorney who violates his oath as an attorney or the disciplinary rules of this Court. Judges and district attorneys alike are not only subject to the disciplinary rules of this Court, but are subject to annual registration and payment of a license fee to support the attorney disciplinary system. Petition of Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 539 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tenn. 1976), Rule 9, Section 20.1. [3] Disciplinary proceedings which result in disbarment or suspension from the practice of law are not equivalent to impeachment. A disbarment is a removal of a law license; an impeachment is the removal from office. They are not the same. In In re Murphy, 726 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1987), Judge Ira Murphy's law license had been suspended based upon Rule 9, Section 14 of the Disciplinary Rules governing the conduct of attorneys. He was appealing the judgment of the Court of the Judiciary which recommended that the General Assembly remove him from office. He had already had his law license suspended by this Court in a different proceeding; however, he was continuing to receive his full salary as a judge because the sole method of removal from office is impeachment by the Legislature under Article VI, Section 6. [4] The issues of whether Judge Murphy's federal convictions were serious crimes so as to warrant disbarment and whether the convictions were grounds for removal from office were not identical. Id., at 513, 514. Two separate and distinct procedures are involved in disbarment and impeachment. In Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 209 Tenn. 304, 353 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. 1961), the Senate could not lawfully have passed upon the fitness of the judge to remain a member of the Bar; its powers as a Court of Impeachment are specifically limited to removal from office and disqualification. 209 Tenn. at 312, 353 S.W.2d at 404. In response to Appellant's argument that he cannot be disbarred while serving as District Attorney General, the Court, in Schoolfield, specifically found that [a] lawyer may be disbarred for misconduct occurring while he is acting as a judge... . 209 Tenn. at 313, 353 S.W.2d at 405. It follows that a lawyer may be disbarred for misconduct while acting as a district attorney. Appellant avers that the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 8, Rules of the Supreme Court, at no point purports to regulate district attorneys. He is in error. Rule 8, DR 7-107 expressly applies to prosecutors. See, In re John Zimmerman v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 764 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn. 1989). The Appellant testified that when he ran for office he promised he would be accountable to the public and he would speak to the press subject to the rules of pretrial publicity, and he pledged to those present at the hearing, I will not talk about pending cases, DR 7-107, ... . Although Appellant testified that he would follow the mandates of DR 7-107, he contends he is not subject to disciplinary action under the Rules. This position seems somewhat inconsistent. We hold that the Disciplinary Board, the hearing committees and this Court have jurisdiction over the Appellant and all District Attorneys General admitted to practice law in this State. Rule 9, Section 1.1.