Opinion ID: 2590584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Special Verdict for Tucker and TKL

Text: Maroun argues the jury's responses to the special verdict should have resulted in a judgment in his favor. He asserts the jury's answers in the affirmative to questions one, two and three are inconsistent with the entry of judgment by the district court in favor of Tucker and TKL. To make a special verdict consistent, a court must look at the evidence and the instructions given and see if there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers consistent. If there is this consistent view, the court must resolve the case in that way. Griffith v. Latham Motors, Inc., 128 Idaho 356, 360, 913 P.2d 572, 576 (1996) (citing Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 878, 761 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1988)). There are two elements that warrant casting aside the legal fiction of distinct corporate existence  there must be (1) such a unity of interest and ownership that the individuality of such corporation and such person has ceased and (2) it must further appear from the facts that the observance of the fiction of separate existence would, under the circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote injustice. Hayhurst, 50 Idaho at 761, 300 P. at 897. The special verdict questions address the two elements of a claim to set aside the legal fiction of a corporation. Special verdict questions two and three address element one  whether there was such a unity of interest and ownership that the individuality of Wyreless and Tucker or TKL had ceased. In answering yes to questions two and three, the jury was simply determining that there was a unity of interest and ownership between Tucker, TKL and Wyreless. Special verdict question four addresses element two  whether observance of the fiction of separate existence would, under the circumstances, promote injustice. By answering no to question number four, the jury determined that it would not be unjust to Maroun if he (or his estate) were not allowed to disregard the corporation and hold Tucker and TKL liable. In essence, the jury determined element one of an alter ego claim was met but not element two. This is consistent with the other jury instructions. Jury instruction number ten paraphrases the two elements from Hayhurst, supra . Jury instruction number eleven states in part: A corporation is responsible for its own debts and obligations unless it is determined that the corporation is an alter ego of the owners of the corporation. If it is determined that the corporation is an alter ego of the individual shareholders, the individual shareholders may be held liable for the amounts owed by the corporation if failure to do so would result in an injustice. Although this instruction misstates the law (because if one finds the corporation is an alter ego one has necessarily already decided elements one and two are met), this instruction is consistent with the special verdict because it demonstrates how the jury could find the corporation to be the alter ego of Tucker and TKL but also find that the required level of injustice to hold them liable was not present. Therefore, the district court's judgment in favor of Tucker and TKL was consistent with the special verdict.