Opinion ID: 4544632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FMLA-Retaliation Claim

Text: Banerjee brings a claim for retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., on the grounds that the University refused to renew her contract, in part, “because of her requests for Family Medical Leave” and “because she continually complained about the denial of FMLA leave.” The two incidents that provide the basis for this claim are her request for maternity leave in Fall 2008, and her request for a more flexible class schedule in Spring 2009, to help with childcare. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (guaranteeing “eligible employees” 12 weeks of unpaid leave per “because of the birth of a . . . daughter and in order to care for such . . . daughter”). Banerjee made these requests in her first year at UTK, before she had been at the University for more than a year, and thus before she became “eligible” for leave under the FMLA. Id. § 2611(2)(A) (defining “eligible employee” as “an employee who has been 7 19-6009, Banerjee v. Univ. of Tenn. employed . . . for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested . . . .”). It is well established in this circuit that if one is not eligible for FMLA leave, one cannot maintain a cause of action for FMLA retaliation. See Davis v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 543 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir. 2008) (“To the extent that [plaintiff] is claiming that she was terminated because of her attempt to obtain FMLA leave in January of 2005, her claim must fail as a matter of law because she was not eligible for FMLA benefits . . . .”); Staunch v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 511 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 2008); Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004). And Banerjee cites no authority to the contrary. Rather, she makes a frivolous pleading-standard argument. According to Banerjee, the fact that her complaint pleads that she “sought FMLA leave at least twice during her employment with [the University]” means that we should construe her complaint liberally to imply that there were some other, unnamed times when she was a qualified employee, sought leave, and was retaliated against. She attempts to bolster this argument by pointing to places in the complaint that allege “multiple requests/complaints about FMLA leave” or speak of “requests for FMLA leave” in the plural. But it is clear in the context of her complaint what Banerjee is talking about: 238. Dr. Banerjee sought FMLA leave at least twice during her employment with Defendant. 239. She first sought FMLA during Fall 2008 and was denied this leave. 240. She also sought FMLA leave during Spring 2009, in the form of intermittent leave or a reduced teaching schedule that would allow her to breastfeed her newborn daughter. The complaint continues after these paragraphs with other statements that are not instances of Banerjee requesting FMLA leave. In context, then, her allegation that she “sought FMLA leave at least twice” refers to these two instances. To infer the existence of any others, without additional alleged facts, would be the type of “speculative” interpretation of pleadings that Bell Atlantic Corp. 8 19-6009, Banerjee v. Univ. of Tenn. v. Twombly rejects. 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Banerjee does not—and by all appearances, cannot—provide specifics about any other occasion that would provide a basis for her FMLA-retaliation complaint.4 Accordingly, her FMLAretaliation claim fails.