Opinion ID: 1057584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecution's Closing Arguments

Text: The defense complains that, during closing argument in the sentencing phase of his trial, the prosecution misled the jury about its responsibility in sentencing Defendant; belittled Defendant's mitigation proof; and made inappropriate references to an angel of death. Initially, we stress that it is incumbent upon defense counsel to object contemporaneously whenever it deems the prosecution to be making improper argument. A contemporaneous objection provides the trial court with an opportunity to assess the State's argument and to caution the prosecution and issue a curative instruction to the jury if necessary. [14] Additionally, defense counsel's failure to object contemporaneously will constitute a waiver of the issue on appeal. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a) (providing that an appellate court need not grant relief where party failed to take reasonably available action to prevent or nullify an error); see also State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 601 (Tenn.2006) (appendix); State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 413 (Tenn.2005) (appendix); State v. Little, 854 S.W.2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim.App.1992) (defendant's failure to object to the State's alleged misconduct during closing argument waives that issue). In this case, the defense failed to lodge timely objections to the prosecutor's arguments. Our review is therefore limited to the parameters of this Court's discretionary plain error review. See Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 119. We will grant relief for plain error only when five prerequisites are met: (1) the record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court, (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached, (3) a substantial right of the accused was adversely affected, (4) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons, and (5) consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice. Id. at 119-20. It is the defendant's burden to convince this Court that plain error exists, and we need not consider all five factors when it is clear from the record that at least one of them cannot be satisfied. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn.2007).
During its final closing argument, the prosecution told the jury: If you voteAnd I think it's appropriate, and I'm asking you based upon the law and the evidence to impose the death penalty in this case. You're not putting the Defendant to death. Don't go for that trip. I'm not putting the Defendant to death. The State of Tennessee is not putting that Defendant to death. His actions, his conduct, his repeated conduct is such that makes him responsible for his own conduct and the consequences of that conduct. The defense made no contemporaneous objection, but now contends that this argument misled the jury into feeling less responsible than it should be for the sentencing decision that it had to make and that its verdicts of death therefore failed to meet the heightened standard of reliability required under the 8th Amendment. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court stated that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). In Caldwell, the prosecution argued to the jury that its decision to render a death sentence was not the final decision.... Your job is reviewable.... [T]he decision you render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Id. at 325-26, 105 S.Ct. 2633. Additionally, on objection, the trial court endorsed the prosecution's argument, telling the jury, I think it proper that the jury realizes that it is reviewable automatically as the death penalty commands. Id. at 325, 105 S.Ct. 2633. Concluding that the State sought to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death, the United States Supreme Court vacated the death penalty. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633. Subsequently, the high court has construed Caldwell as `relevant only to certain types of commentthose that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.' Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)). Therefore, `[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.' Id. (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989)). See also State v. West, 767 S.W.2d 387, 399 (Tenn.1989) (The concerns voiced in Caldwell are triggered when a jury is misled as to its role in the capital sentencing scheme.). This Court has determined that [t]he two steps in reviewing an alleged Caldwell violation are determining (1) whether the prosecutor's comments to the jury were such that they would minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death and (2) whether the trial judge in the case sufficiently corrected the impression left by the prosecutor. West, 767 S.W.2d at 399 (quoting Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1456 (11th Cir. 1988)). In West, this Court held that the prosecutor's argument that the law is self-executing, that the law provides the punishment, not you, [the jury], and that you [the jury] don't impose the sentence, the law provides the sentence, you are merely finders of fact, violated Caldwell. 767 S.W.2d at 399. We held that [s]uch statements minimize the jury's role and allow[] [the jurors] to feel that the responsibility for a death sentence rests elsewhere. Id. We found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, however, because these brief erroneous characterizations of the jury's role in determining the appropriateness of a death sentence were sufficiently corrected by the trial judge [in its charge to the jury on its responsibility in determining the death penalty] and the accurate portions of the district attorney's and the defendant's arguments stressing the proper responsibility of the jury. Id. at 399-400. Similarly, in State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn.1994), we found error where the prosecutor told the jury that the law says it[']s not your decision anymore, that you're not making the finding of the death penalty. You're finding fact, that the verdict is automatic, and the law book says what the verdict shall be. Id. at 263-64. We determined the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, however, because the trial court did not endorse the remarks but rather instructed the jury correctly about its responsibility for determining whether a death sentence was appropriate, and because other portions of the State's final argument correctly set forth the responsibility of the jury under Tennessee's capital sentencing procedure, and the defendant's final argument repeated and re[i]nforced the State's correct argument. Id. at 264. Although the prosecution should avoid telling the jury that it is not putting a defendant to death while simultaneously asking the jury to render a sentence of death, the overall message of the quoted portion of the prosecution's argument in this case was that Defendant, himself, took the actions that made a death sentence possible. While seeking to reassure the jury that Defendant was responsible for his own conduct and therefore responsible for facing the ultimate punishment, the prosecution was not, in our view, trying to shift the ultimate authority for imposing the death sentence to another entity, as did the prosecution in Caldwell. Rather, we agree with our Court of Criminal Appeals that this type of argument can just as easily be interpreted as an expression of the [defendant's] burden of responsibility for his own actions. State v. Blanton, No. 01C01-9307-CC-00218, 1996 WL 219609, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Apr. 30, 1996), aff'd, 975 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn.1998). See also State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 517 (Tenn.1997) (appendix) (observing that the State may properly argue that a defendant is the `author of his own fate' (quoting Wright v. State, No. 01C01-9105-CR-00149, 1994 WL 115955, at  (Tenn. Crim.App. Apr. 7, 1994))). We hold that the prosecution's comments did not go so far as to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death. West, 767 S.W.2d at 399. Further, even if the prosecution's argument crossed the Caldwell line, the trial court corrected any improper impression made by the prosecutor's comments. Before the prosecution began its closing argument, the trial court instructed the jury that [i]t is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law the penalty which shall be imposed as punishment for these three offenses and that [t]he jury is the sole judge of the facts and of the law as it applies to the facts in this case. After closing arguments were finished, the trial court instructed the jury that, [i]f you unanimously determine that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt and said circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the State to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be death. The jury therefore knew that it was responsible for deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty on Defendant for each of the murders he committed. The jury was never told by either the trial court or counsel for the parties that an appellate court, or any other person or entity, would be reviewing the jury's decision. Because no substantial right of Defendant's was adversely affected by the challenged argument, Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief on this basis.
Defendant also contends that, during closing argument, the prosecution improperly belittled the mitigating circumstances. Specifically, he complains about the following remarks: What mitigating factors is he pointing to? He expresses remorse. That doesn't make this any better. That doesn't make those three people any less dead. That doesn't take away from the pain and suffering of Larry Taylor and James Goff. I'm sorry just won't cut it. That's not going to mitigate the seriousness of this offense and what has happened out there at the TDOT facility. Saying I'm sorry is just not going to get it. Now I know his children love him. I would expect that from his children. That doesn't make this any better. Most people's children love them, but that doesn't mean that these three people are any less dead, and that does not mean that these people aren't suffering just the same. That doesn't make it any better. That doesn't make it anymore understandable. It has absolutely nothing to do with what happened out there. He adjusted well to prison life. That doesn't make this any better. He might live on in prison. That doesn't weigh anything. That doesn't make this any more understandable. Well let me tell you what weighs heavily against all of those mitigating factors in this case. That this Defendant left his house that morning with the intent of murdering his wife in cold blood, and it had special meaning to him because he was gonna do it with her brother's gun. He had a special purpose there to make sure that when she turned around after being shot in the leg, she knew she was dying with her brother's gun. That's what's weighty in this case. ... Depravity of mind.... I'm sorry doesn't mitigate that. My children don't want me to die doesn't mitigate that. I'll do well in prison doesn't mitigate that. I read books while I'm in jail doesn't mitigate that. (Emphasis added). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that, for the most part, the prosecutor's remarks were aimed simply at the weight to be given the mitigating circumstances. Such argument is proper. Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 135; State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 85 (Tenn.1994). That portion of the argument we have italicized, however, went beyond simply arguing the weight of mitigating factors. Arguing that the jury should give weight to Defendant's use of Mrs. Jordan's brother's gun was tantamount to arguing that aspect of the crime as an aggravating circumstance. It is improper for a prosecutor to argue non-statutory aggravating circumstances. See Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Tenn.2001) (recognizing that the State may not rely upon nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in seeking the imposition of the death penalty). Moreover, this argument misstated the evidence. The gun which belonged to Mrs. Jordan's brother was the assault rifle. By the time Defendant shot Mrs. Jordan with that gun, she was already dead. She did not, therefore, know that she was dying with her brother's gun. There was, however, a contemporaneous objection to this argument, and the trial court instructed the jury that which gun [was] utilized is not an aggravating factor in itself. Additionally, the trial court's instructions made clear that the jury could base a verdict of death only upon its unanimous finding of one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances charged. Defendant is therefore not entitled to relief on this basis.
At the end of its closing argument during the sentencing phase of Defendant's trial, the defense offered the following quotations to the jury: The quality of mercy is not strained. It falls like the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath. It is twice blessed. It blesses him that gives and him that receives. It's the mightiest in the mighty. It becomes the throned monarch better than [h]is crown. His scepter shows the force of earthly power, the tribute to [h]is awe and majesty. Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings. But mercy is above this sceptered way. It is enthroned in the hearts of kings. It is a tribute to God himself. And, Earthly power shows most like God's when mercy seasons justice. Defense counsel did not identify the source of this quoted material to the jury. [15] In response, the prosecution argued as follows: Defense counsel would refer to God as he addresses this jury as he tries to make you feel responsible for doing what you told the State of Tennessee that you would do, and that's follow the law and the instructions of the Court. And each and every one of you promised, not only this Defendant, but the State of Tennessee that you would follow the instructions of the Court. That's very important for a legal reason, and I'll state that in a minute. ... Defense counsel would talk about the guilt trip he's putting on you with God and judgment. Let me tell you, ladies and gentlemen, what takes care and addresses that argument by defense counsel, is rendering unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and unto God, that which is God's. I represent Caesar, and I have the duty and responsibility, as you do, to follow the instructions given to you by the Court and that codified by the State of Tennessee, and I suggest to you and I tell you, and I know you'll follow that law and instructions given to you by the Court. ... They rely upon part of the testimony of Ms. Fisher, the former girlfriend, one of their, quote, mitigating factors, and I believe she said that Sydney, which would be Renee's child along with the Defendant, made the comment that, Mama is an angel in heaven looking down on me. And ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm going to suggest to you that there was another angel involved in this situation, and that angel is the angel of death. And the angel of death went into that crow's nest a few hours before Renee came to work, and a few hours before Jerry Hopper just happened to need to have his state truck serviced that day, and just a few hours before Mr. Gordon was involved in an auto accident. And how did the death angel know to go there that morning? Because the death angel heard the Defendant say on Tuesday, January 11th of '05 at 2:11 a.m., I'll see you at work, bitch. The death angel also heard at 2:17 a.m. the Defendant say, I hope you go to work tomorrow. So the death angel was there and saw everything that happened and everything that's been presented in evidence and wrote down the aggravating circumstances that occurred on or about 11:30 a.m. on the birthday of Renee's father. And these aggravating circumstances are that the Defendant knowingly created a risk of death to two or more persons other than the victim murdered during an act of murder. That will involve, I suggest, ladies and gentlemen, three different counts of this indictment which you will have. That will be the first count, the second count and the third count. And second, the angel wrote down that this murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel and that it involved serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, and that will involve, I think the Court will tell you, the first count involving Renee and the fourth count involving Mr. Gordon and the fifth count of the felony murder indictment of Mr. Gordon. Now as the angel sat there and recorded these aggravating circumstances, the angel also wrote down, the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest of the Defendant or another, and that will apply as you see when you look at the Defendant to Count 2 involving Mr. Hopper and his premeditated murder, and Mr. Hopper, his felony murder count, and Mr. Gordon, the count of his premeditated death, and the fifth count of this indictment, the felony murder of Mr. Gordon. The angel had a lot to write down and a lot to observe and a lot of things to have to be able to report at a later time. And also I submit to you he wrote down the fourth aggravating circumstance, that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed or aided by the Defendant while the Defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit first degree murder. This will encompass the first five counts of this indictment, Renee's premeditated murder, Mr. Hopper's premeditated murder, Mr. Hopper's felony murder, Mr. Gordon's premeditated murder and Mr. Gordon's felony murder. Then the angel goes and writes down that the Defendant committed mass murder which is defined as the murder of three or more persons when committed during a single criminal episode, which this was, or at different times within a 48-month period. And then the last thing that the angel wrote down which has been preserved for your consideration is that the Defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim after death. ... There's a part of [Defendant's] conduct, deliberate, premeditated. The one that Sydney wrote about, that My mama is in heaven, an angel, and the one the death angel wrote about that's contained by the State of Tennessee in the law and evidence that will be instructed to you about aggravating circumstances. I even imagine that when the first shot went off and caught Renee in the leg and got her attention, that it really got the attention of the death angel who looked and realized that not only did it get Renee's attention but that it had gotten her attention. And then we've got the shot to the head. Who can ever forget that. The angel will never forget, and that's why it was written down in these instructions. ... I thank you for your consideration and your attention. It's been difficult. It's difficult for me to make the decision that I thought this was appropriate, but I did much the same, based upon the information provided by the angel of death, that delineate and record and file the aggravating circumstances. And I ask that you follow the law and the instructions given to you by the Court and return a verdict that truth dictates and justice demands. (Emphases added). Initially, we have no trouble concluding that the prosecution's repeated references to the angel of death and the death angel as recording and writing down and providing the aggravating circumstances were improper. This argument implied that the aggravating factors alleged to apply to Defendant's murders were somehow delivered from on high and possessed the imprimatur of a supernatural being. This implication is, of course, not accurate. In its brief to this Court, the State disingenuously purports that, [i]f the `angel of death' is a religious figure, the State is unaware of the scriptural passage to which it is referable. We are not persuaded. Persons possessing even a casual acquaintance with the Bible recognize that it refers to angels as holy messengers, for instance, the angel Gabriel's announcement to the Virgin Mary of her divine pregnancy. And, as we emphasized in State v. Middlebrooks, [w]e have condemned Biblical and scriptural references in a prosecutor's closing argument ... frequently.... The obvious danger in such references by both prosecutors and defense counsel is the risk that a sentencing decision may be made not upon the facts and the law but on an appeal to the bias or passion of the jury. 995 S.W.2d 550, 559 (Tenn.1999). While the prosecutor in this case may not have referred specifically to a particular Biblical passage, the repeated references to an angel acting as a messenger were inappropriate allusions to the Christian religion. This Court has admonished many times that closing arguments must be (1) temperate; (2) predicated on the evidence adduced at trial; and (3) pertinent to the issues. See State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 813 (Tenn.2010); State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 413 (Tenn.2005) (appendix); Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d at 557; State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tenn.1994); State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn.1978); Russell v. State, 532 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn.1976). Additionally, because a prosecutor's role is to seek justice rather than simply advocate, the State's prerogative during argument is more limited than that of other parties. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 413 (appendix). As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, [The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods... as it is to use every legitimate means.... Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). A prosecutor must therefore refrain from argument designed to inflame the jury. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 158 (Tenn.1998) (appendix) (quoting Coker v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357, 368 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995)). The State responds to this issue in its brief to this Court as follows: The comments were ... a trope; the prosecution depicted a supernatural figure writing down aggravating circumstances as [Defendant] pursued his course of conduct on January 11, 2005. The use of a literary device, in and of itself, violates no constitutional stricture, and because the aggravators that the prosecution portrayed the angel scribbling down were fully supported by the evidence, the argument cannot be viewed as inflammatory. We disagree that the argument cannot be viewed as inflammatory and suggest that the State misses the point. The metaphor utilized by the prosecutor suggested that, while he was shooting the victims, Defendant was accompanied by an angel who, apparently fulfilling some angelic mission, dutifully recorded Defendant's actions in order to later convince a jury to impose the death penalty. This metaphor is inappropriate on its face. We do not consider it temperate, it refers to no evidence in the record, it is not a justifiable inference from any proof in the record, and it is not pertinent to the issues. This argument was improper. We will not overturn a verdict on the basis of a prosecutor's improper argument unless the impropriety affected the verdict. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d at 823. In conducting this inquiry, we consider five factors: (1) the conduct complained of viewed in context and in light of the facts and circumstances of the case; (2) the curative measures undertaken by the [trial] [c]ourt and the prosecution; (3) the intent of the prosecutor in making the improper statement; (4) the cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the record; and (5) the relative strength or weakness of the case. State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 609 (Tenn. 1984) (quoting Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn.Crim.App.1976)). Taking these factors out of order, we first note that there were no specific curative measures taken by the court or the prosecution. While this would ordinarily weigh against the State, in this case, the defense must also bear some responsibility for failure to object during the prosecutor's argument, which limits our review to a plain error analysis. Combining the first and third factors, we observe that the prosecutor did not begin referring to the death angel until the rebuttal portion of his closing argument. The trigger for the prosecutor's improper comments appears to have been the defense's reference to Ms. Fisher's mitigation testimony. The defense described Fisher as Defendant's friend, who stood by him even after this horrible event and throughout this horrible tragedy. In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor recalled that Fisher had testified that Defendant's daughter referred to Renee, her murdered mother, as an angel in heaven. The prosecutor then segued into his trope about the angel of death. Thus, the intent of the prosecutor appears to have been to strike back at defense argument. While the prosecutor reached too far in his argument, it appears that the prosecutor was at least trying to place his argument in some overall context triggered by the argument of defense counsel. We view the fourth and fifth factors in tandem. The strength of the State's case was overwhelming. Defendant's identity as the murderer was never in dispute; thus, the defense made no effort to argue residual doubt. Moreover, not only did the State adduce significant proof of multiple aggravating circumstances as to each victim, but this proof was largely unchallenged. Instead, the defense focused on Defendant's psychological state as mitigation, proof which was strongly challenged by the State. And, although we have identified other trial errors, we have deemed them harmless. Finally, we take note of the trial court's jury charges delivered during the sentencing proceeding. Prior to opening statements, the court told the jury that Tennessee statutory law provides that no death penalty shall be imposed unless you find unanimously that one or more specified statutory aggravating circumstances has been proven to you by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. These statutory aggravating circumstances are specific circumstances enumerated by the legislature to establish which first degree murders will make a defendant eligible for the death penalty. The State is limited to the statutory aggravating circumstances. After the parties closed their sentencing proof and prior to closing argument beginning, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: It is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law the penalty which shall be imposed as punishment for these three offenses. Tennessee law provides that a person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole or by lifeor by imprisonment for life. A defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for release until the defendant has served at least 51 full calendar years of his or her sentence. A defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life without parole shall never be eligible for release. In arising [sic] at this determination, you are authorized to weigh and consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstances which may have been raised by the evidence throughout the entire course of this trial, including the guilt-finding phase or sentencing phase or both. The jury is the sole judge of the facts and of the law as it applies to the facts in this case. In arriving at your verdict, you are to consider the law in connection with the facts, but the Court is the proper source from which you are to get the law. After the trial court instructed the jury as to each of the statutory aggravating factors at issue, it continued: Members of the jury, the Court has read to you the aggravating circumstances which the law requires you to consider if you find are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. You shall not consider any other facts or circumstances as an aggravating circumstance in deciding whether the death penalty or imprisonment for life without possibility of parole would be appropriate punishment in this case. Additionally, prior to closing arguments in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the court instructed the jury that [s]tatements, arguments and remarks of counsel are intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the law, but they are not evidence. If any statements were made that you believe are not supported by the evidence, you should disregard them. Later in its charge, but still before closing arguments in the guilt/innocence phase, the court reiterated, [r]emember that the statements of attorneys are not evidence in this case. And, at the commencement of the sentencing phase, the trial judge told the jury, I will remind you that statements of counsel are not evidence. We presume that the jury follows its instructions. Young, 196 S.W.3d at 111. Considering the parties' arguments as a whole, the trial court's instructions, and the evidence adduced during the sentencing proceeding of both aggravating and mitigating factors, we hold that the prosecution's references to the angel of death did not affect the jury's verdicts. Because Defendant has not demonstrated that any of his substantial rights were adversely affected by the improper argument, he is not entitled to plain error relief on this basis.