Opinion ID: 2481670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Appeal Is Moot

Text: Illinois courts do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 351, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74 (2009). Walsh argues the appellate court's dismissal should be reversed because the legislature clearly intended for the Act to provide an independent and substantive right to appellate review of final trial court orders denying a motion to dispose of a lawsuit brought pursuant to the Act. Walsh continues that the appellate court's dismissal order ignored basic tenets of statutory construction because it failed to address the new rights conferred by the Act and the legislature's intent when it enacted the statute. Wright Development asserts that Walsh's sole basis to seek an appeal is the attorney fees; therefore, the case is moot because there are no substantive issues left to decide and any decision by this court would merely be an advisory opinion. We agree with Walsh. The determination of whether an appeal is moot is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d at 350, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74. The purpose of the Act is to give relief, including monetary relief, to citizens who have been victimized by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits because of their act or acts made in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government. 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008). As an expression of intent to protect and encourage public participation in government to the maximum extent permitted by law (735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008)), the legislature deemed the mere dismissal of SLAPP lawsuits insufficient. The legislature has expressly stated it is in the public interest to establish an efficient process for identification and adjudication of SLAPPs. 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008). As part of this process, if a trial court denies a motion under the Act, the Act directs the appellate court to expedite an appeal of a circuit court order whether interlocutory or not. 735 ILCS 110/20(a) (West 2008). The Act also directs the appellate court to provide expedited treatment of a trial court's failure to rule on an Act motion. 735 ILCS 110/20(a) (West 2008). The instant appellate court's failure to undertake the question of whether the plaintiff's lawsuit could be identified as a SLAPP directly contradicts the legislature's explicit expression of public policy regarding the efficient process to identify and adjudicate SLAPPs. 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008). The mootness finding also contradicted the legislature's express finding of public policy in favor of an award of attorney fees and costs to prevailing movants. 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008). Further, there was, in fact, a potential injury to Walsh. Walsh was denied the relief requested in his Act motion to identify Wright Development's lawsuit as a SLAPP and for a statutory award of attorney fees and costsan entitlement not available with the mere section 2-615 dismissal. The appellate court therefore erred when it stated Walsh has already obtained the relief he sought and, any action by this court would constitute an advisory opinion. If indeed Wright Development's action was a SLAPP suit, then the appellate court's ruling also relieves Wright Development of the punishment which the Act imposes upon entities who chill the exercise of constitutional rights by use of meritless and retaliatory lawsuits. Thus, the appellate court ruling frustrates the legislature's expression of the public interest, withholds the relief provided by the Act for true SLAPP defendants, and constitutes a nullification of a principal part of the anti-SLAPP legislation. Accordingly, Walsh's appeal is not moot.