Opinion ID: 1308968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the special verdict and evidentiary matters

Text: [6] As part of what can only be described as a shotgun approach that comes perilously close to being frivolous at times, WEPCO makes numerous claims that the circuit court made discretionary errors. A court properly exercises its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper legal standard, and reaches a reasonable conclusion. See Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982). We have examined the extensive record in this case and have determined that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion.
[7] WEPCO argues that the circuit court erroneously submitted questions to the jury which asked whether it had violated PSC 114.04, NESC 214, and NESC 281 without also instructing the jury that it had to find WEPCO negligent before it could find that WEPCO had violated those provisions. WEPCO claims the circuit court reached this conclusion based on this court's decision in Peissig v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 155 Wis. 2d 686, 456 N.W.2d 348 (1990). We have examined the portion of the record WEPCO cites to and find no mention of Peissig. Instead, the circuit court submitted the separate questions regarding PSC 114.04, NESC 214, and NESC 281 because the circuit court believed they were separate standards of conduct and that a violation of any one of them would be a basis for imposing liability without a concomitant finding of common-law negligence. We agree with the circuit court. The court of appeals certified this issue, noting that Wisconsin law recognizes that statutory or administrative code violations can constitute negligence. See Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 164 Wis. 2d 639, 657-58, 476 N.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Ct. App. 1991). In addition, the law also recognizes industry custom and usage as bearing upon the question of a party's negligence. However, we are not directed to any law which speaks to whether an industry code violation, standing alone, can serve as the basis for liability. (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) NESC 214 and NESC 281 are not industry code violations standing alone. Wisconsin Admin. Code sec. PSC 114.06 adopts the National Electrical Safety Code by reference. NESC 214 and NESC 281 are thus part of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. NESC 214, NESC 281, and PSC 114.04 are safety statutes, the violation of which is negligence per se. The circuit court properly submitted questions about these code sections without instructing the jury that they also had to make a finding of negligence. [8] WEPCO also claims that the special verdict questions which addressed statutory and code violations, negligence, and strict liability prejudicially focused undue attention on WEPCO's conduct. We disagree. At the close of testimony, there were issues of fact regarding WEPCO's liability for statutory and code violations, common-law negligence, and strict liability. The questions were thus proper. See Dahl v. K-Mart, 46 Wis. 2d 605, 609, 176 N.W.2d 342 (1970). WEPCO maintains that the verdict the jury returned is inconsistent because the jury answered that WEPCO did not violate PSC 114.04(1) but that WEPCO did violate NESC 281. PSC 114.04(1) states: All electrical power and communication equipment and lines shall be of such construction, and so installed, operated and maintained as to minimize the life and fire hazard. NESC 281 states, in part, [t]rees which may interfere with ungrounded supply conductors should be trimmed or removed. NESC 281.A.1. WEPCO contends that PSC 114.04 is mandatory and general and that NESC 281 is advisory and specific and, consequently, the jury acted inconsistently by finding that WEPCO did not violate PSC 114.04 but that it did violate NESC 281. [9] Again we disagree. PSC 114.04 deals with maintenance and operation of electrical power equipment and lines, while NESC 281 deals with the trimming and removal of trees. The jury could have consistently concluded that WEPCO operated and maintained its equipment and lines in accordance with PSC 114.04 but did not trim trees in accordance with NESC 281. We are also unpersuaded by WEPCO's argument that NESC 281 is advisory and hence cannot be violated. Although the section uses the word should, NESC 015 states that [w]here a rule is of an advisory nature, to be followed insofar as practical, it is indicated by the use of the word should.  (Emphasis added.) Depending on the practicality of trimming, NESC 281 can be violated. [10] WEPCO's next attack is to claim that NESC 281 was not intended to protect Beacon Bowl. In Schicker v. Leick, we said: [I]f a person violating the safety statute was in a class of persons that the safety statute sought to regulate, that person should be held to have a duty to the class of persons or the type of property which the safety statute seeks to protect. 40 Wis. 2d 295, 301, 162 N.W.2d 66 (1968). WEPCO argues that NESC 281 does not seek to protect Beacon Bowl because its drafters did not contemplate that it would prevent fires resulting from voltage transients. It follows, WEPCO claims, that NESC 281 is not a safety statute, the violation of which is negligence per se. See Schicker, 40 Wis. 2d at 301. Accordingly, WEPCO maintains that the circuit court erred by submitting a question about NESC 281. We disagree with this argument because common sense suggests that NESC 281 was meant to protect members of the public (such as the Krzykowskis) who use electricity on lines that may have trees nearby that should be trimmed or removed. We therefore conclude that the circuit court did not err by submitting a question concerning NESC 281 to the jury. [11] WEPCO also claims the circuit court erred by submitting the negligence question. It did not. A party may be negligent even if it complies with all applicable statutory and code sections. Kemp v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 579, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969). [12] WEPCO claims it had no common-law duty to trim trees in order to prevent voltage transients. However, within the framework of a negligence case the particular conduct of a defendant is not examined in terms of whether or not there is a duty to do a specific act, but rather whether the conduct satisfied the duty placed upon individuals to exercise that degree of care as would be exercised by a reasonable person under the circumstances. Walker, 100 Wis. 2d at 264. Evidence introduced at trial created a factual issue as to whether WEPCO had exercised reasonable care. Accordingly, the circuit court properly submitted the negligence question to the jury.
[13] WEPCO next assaults three of the circuit court's evidentiary rulings, the first concerning the testimony of Dr. Szews. Evidentiary rulings are discretionary rulings. See generally State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 267, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993). [14] WEPCO claims Dr. Szews was not qualified to give expert testimony. We have examined the portion of the record that WEPCO cites and have examined the circuit court's discussion of this issue. WEPCO's argument is groundless. Dr. Szews' education, background, and experience qualified him. See sec. 907.02, Stats. [15] Next, WEPCO asserts that the circuit court erred by refusing to allow Mr. Hooper, a retired employee of the Public Service Electric and Gas Company and a part-time consultant, to testify. WEPCO claims Hooper's testimony would have reflected the knowledge of the utility industry in general. Hooper was a member of an NESC subcommittee. The circuit court properly precluded Hooper from testifying about the intent of the drafters of NESC 281. See, e.g., Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Board, 117 Wis. 2d 351, 356, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984) (improper for court to rely on legislators' statements concerning legislative intent); Cartwright v. Sharpe, 40 Wis. 2d 494, 508-09, 162 N.W.2d 5 (1968) (improper to allow member of legislature to testify about legislative intent applied to facts of case). [16] WEPCO argues that the court erred by precluding Hooper from testifying about his knowledge and the industry's knowledge in general because, under D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 622-23, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983), such negative evidence was admissible to show that WEPCO's product was safe. The circuit court properly exercised its discretion regarding Hooper's lack of knowledge. Such testimony would have had little probative value and would have raised collateral issues. This argument is related to WEPCO's next claim of circuit court error. [17] WEPCO claims the court erred by precluding three WEPCO employees from testifying about their personal knowledge of voltage transients and fires in buildings. The circuit court correctly concluded that allowing the three WEPCO employees to testify would raise collateral issues. Pinky had asked WEPCO in interrogatories to identify all persons who had sustained damage from voltage spikes. WEPCO refused to provide that information because, among other reasons, it claimed the information was irrelevant. The court offered to let the WEPCO employees testify about the lack of other fires caused by voltage spikes resulting from tree contact if WEPCO gave Pinky and the insurers records of claims and incidents. WEPCO did not give them the records. The court's rulings were correct, based on the proper legal standard, see sec. 904.03, Stats., and facts of record. [18] WEPCO also contends that the circuit court erred by preventing it from presenting an argument in rebuttal of Pinky. The decision of whether to allow one defendant to rebut another defendant's closing argument is a discretionary decision. Wells v. National Indemnity Co., 41 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 162 N.W.2d 562 (1968). [19] WEPCO's reliance on Wells, a case in which we interpreted sec. 270.205, Stats., the predecessor to sec. 805.10, Stats., is misplaced. We believe WEPCO misconstrues our language in Wells and appears to argue that prejudice to the plaintiff is the only proper consideration when deciding whether to allow a defendant to rebut another defendant. Here, the court considered all factors and made a reasonable decision that the complaints WEPCO had would be better addressed by further instructions to the jury.