Opinion ID: 2460248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: because big ditch is entitled to the use of water, it is entitled to file change applications

Text: ¶ 52 Section 73-3-3 of the Utah Code provides that [a]ny person entitled to the use of water may make permanent or temporary changes in the: (i) point of diversion; (ii) place of use; or (iii) purpose of use for which the water was originally appropriated. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(2)(a) (Supp. 2010). [12] The district court concluded that Big Ditch was not entitled to file change applications under this section. It reasoned that Big Ditch was not entitled to the use of water because it was neither an appropriator nor owner of a water right. In so holding, the court relied on two cases from this court, East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993) and Prisbrey v. Bloomington Water Co., 2003 UT 56, 82 P.3d 1119. It did not, however, consider more recent precedent. We conclude the district court erred. ¶ 53 In East Jordan, we faced the question of whether a shareholder in a mutual water corporation had a legal right to file a change application in its own name without the consent of the corporation. 860 P.2d at 310-11. We held that it did not. Id. at 316. First, we reasoned that the shareholder was not an appropriator of the water right. Id. at 313. Second, after applying principles of corporate law, we concluded that only the corporation may initiate a change application because it alone is empowered with the right to manage and control the affairs of the company. Id. at 314. ¶ 54 In Prisbrey, we considered whether a lessor of water rights was entitled to the use of the leased water such that it could file a change application at the lessee's request. 2003 UT 56, ¶¶ 22-23, 82 P.3d 1119. We concluded that it was. Id. ¶ 23. We noted that we had previously held that the phrase person entitled to the use of water refers strictly to a party who `alone owns the right as an appropriator to the use of public waters.' Id. (quoting E. Jordan, 860 P.2d at 313). Because only [the lessor had] made application to the state engineer for use of the water rights in question, it properly filed the change application. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. Our conclusion was bolstered by the fact that allowing a lessee to file a change application would derogate the rights of the lessor because the lessee's interest is only a terminable possessory one. Id. ¶ 24. ¶ 55 Although East Jordan and Prisbrey can be read to have equated the phrase person entitled to the use of water with appropriator or owner status, we retreated from this narrow reading in Strawberry Water Users Ass'n v. Bureau of Reclamation, 2006 UT 19, 133 P.3d 410. In Strawberry, the United States initially appropriated water, then accepted applications from homesteaders to use the water. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 18. A homesteader whose application was approved was contractually entitled to a certain quantity of water in perpetuity. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. Later, an association of water users who had succeeded to the homesteaders' rights filed change applications. Id. ¶ 21. The United States protested, claiming ownership of the water rights. Id. ¶¶ 21, 30. The association countered, claiming equitable title. Id. ¶ 27. ¶ 56 We recognized that [i]n navigating a course through Utah water law, it is easy to be misled by the word `ownership,' id. ¶ 34, because one can never own water. Rather, one can only own the right to use water. See id. (`All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground, are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof.' (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2004))). We therefore concluded that it is not sufficient to ask only who has title to water or in whose name a certificate of appropriation has been issued. Id. ¶ 35. And we repudiated any suggestion in Prisbrey that one must be either an owner or appropriator of water in order to be one entitled to the use of water for the purposes of a section 73-3-3 inquiry. See id. ¶¶ 39-40. We similarly distinguished East Jordan, noting that it illustrates the importance of asking not only the `title' or `ownership' question, but also the second question, which probes roots, purposes, and entitlements. Id. ¶ 36. ¶ 57 After analyzing all of our cases on the issue East Jordan, Prisbrey, and Strawberry we conclude that owner or appropriator status is not determinative of whether one may file a change application. Rather, one's right to use water is significant. While there are times when one's right to use is subsumed to other competing interests, as in East Jordan and Prisbrey, it remains the case that one with an entitlement to use water may file a change application. This framework is consistent with the statutorily prescribed practice of the State Engineer, which focuses on entitle[ment] to the use of water, thereby largely avoiding the ownership question. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3. This practice acknowledges that ownership of water is far more complex than ownership of other forms of property, and the mere existence of legal title does not determine all the rights of ownership. Indeed, even the term `ownership' is an oversimplication. E. Jordan, 860 P.2d at 317 (Durham, J., dissenting). ¶ 58 We conclude that Big Ditch is entitled to file change applications regarding the water to which it is contractually entitled under the 1905 Agreement. Under the 1905 Agreement, the City is obligated to provide to Big Ditch a measured flow of water in perpetuity. And, unlike in East Jordan and Prisbrey, Big Ditch's right to use is not subsumed to other competing interests. As a result, Big Ditch is entitled to file change applications with the State Engineer. [13]