Opinion ID: 790446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ACCA Violent Felonies

Text: 5 We first consider whether the district court erred in enhancing Mincks's sentence under the ACCA based on his prior statutory sexual offenses. Mincks maintains these prior convictions are not violent felonies, because (1) neither of the Missouri statutes under which Mincks was convicted requires physical force or threats of force, and (2) the statutory sexual offenses do not present serious risks of harm to others. 6 We review de novo whether a prior offense constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir.2005). The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence for a defendant who (1) is convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and (2) has three prior violent felony convictions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A violent felony under the ACCA includes any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, ... that ... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 7 In determining whether a prior offense is a violent felony for purposes of sentence enhancement under the ACCA, the Supreme Court has adopted a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). Accordingly, we look to the Missouri statutes which Mincks violated. In Missouri, a person commits second-degree statutory rape if being twenty-one years of age or older, he has sexual intercourse with another person who is less than seventeen years of age. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 566.034(1). A person commits second-degree statutory sodomy if being twenty-one years of age or older, he has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than seventeen years of age. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 566.064(1). 8 Even though physical force, or the threatened use of such force, is not an element of second-degree statutory rape or sodomy under Missouri law, we conclude categorically that the statutory sexual offenses present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, because this type of contact between parties of differing physical and emotional maturity carries `a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used in the course of committing the offense.' United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)) (holding sexual assault of a child is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)); United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373, 374-75 (8th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (holding statutory rape is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which uses the same language as the ACCA, notwithstanding the fact that sexual intercourse may have been consensual); United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir.1992) (holding offense of lascivious acts with a child, by its nature, poses a substantial risk of physical force, and, therefore, is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). Whether physical injury is intended when an adult engages in sexual intercourse or sodomy with a minor, physical injury is a serious potential risk arising from either of the assaults, and is logically foreseeable. We conclude the district court correctly determined Mincks's second-degree statutory rape and second-degree statutory sodomy convictions constitute violent felonies for purposes of sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Thus, the district court correctly sentenced Mincks to the mandatory minimum under the ACCA.