Opinion ID: 6107769
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Heading: Does Tennessee's 1989 consolidated theft statute encompass theft of real property?

Text: Prior to 1989, Tennessee did not have a single, generic definition of theft. Rather, theft offenses were contained in a number of antiquated and confusing statutes and included embezzlement, false pretense, fraudulent conversion, larceny, receiving or concealing stolen property, and shoplifting. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-101 (2014 & 2017 Supp.), Sentencing Comm'n Cmnts. 5 These statutes derived from English common law, which was later applied in the American colonies and then in American states. People v. Williams , 57 Cal.4th 776 , 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 , 305 P.3d 1241 , 1244 (2013) (recounting the history of theft-like crimes from their common-law roots in Britain and the United States to the early 20th century development of California's consolidated theft statute). Under the common law, larceny was the first theft-like crime. Id. , 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 , 305 P.3d at 1245 . In the 18th century, by a somewhat ad-hoc process, the British Parliament created separate statutory offenses of theft by false pretenses and embezzlement. Id., 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 , 305 P.3d at 1245-46 . However, this division of theft-like crimes into separate statutory provisions was criticized as burdensome to prosecutors and arbitrary. Id., 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81 , 305 P.3d at 1246 . Following the expansion of the scope of theft offenses, the move to enact consolidated theft statutes can be traced at least as far back as 1827, when the Parliament of the United Kingdom noted that a failure of justice frequently arises from the subtle distinction between larceny and fraud and allowed, by statute, a conviction for larceny to stand even if a defendant was indicted for false pretenses. State v. Tower , 122 Kan. 165 , 251 P. 401 , 402-03 (1926) (describing this as an act consolidating and amending the laws relating to larceny and offenses connected therewith and citing 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 29, 67 Stat. at L. 168 § 53 (1827)). In 1873, the Virginia Supreme Court opined that various theft offenses were so much alike in many respects and often separated by lines so indistinct, and almost imaginary, that it was difficult for the prosecutor, in most cases, to determine, a priori , which particular crime to charge in the indictment. Anable v. Com. , 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563 , 580 (1873). This criticism of arbitrary distinctions between larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses, was expanded upon and echoed by many subsequent commentators. See Stuart P. Green, Thirteen Ways to Steal a Bicycle , 17, 284 n. 67 (2012) (hereinafter Green at ___); Com. v. Ryan , 155 Mass. 523 , 30 N.E. 364 , 364-65 (1892) ; Van Vechten v. Am. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. , 239 N.Y. 303 , 146 N.E. 432 , 433 (1925). In the 1950s and 60s, the American Law Institute attempted to resolve some of these arbitrary distinctions by drafting and including in the Model Penal Code a consolidated theft statute, from which  many states borrowed in crafting their own statutes. 6 See Model Penal Code § 223.1 (1962). By 1985, just four years before the General Assembly enacted the consolidated theft statute at issue in this appeal, the Maryland Supreme Court summarized the state of the law throughout the United States and the movement towards consolidation of theft offenses: At least thirty-five states, in addition to Maryland, have enacted consolidated theft-related statutes. While the provisions of these statutes vary from state to state, their purpose appears to be, as in Maryland, to create a single statutory crime encompassing various common law theft-type offenses in order to eliminate the confusing and fine-line common law distinctions between particular forms of larceny. Eleven states have enacted provisions virtually identical to those contained in § 341 of the Maryland statute; they are in general conformity with § 223.1(1) of the Model Penal Code (1962). Jones v. State , 303 Md. 323 , 493 A.2d 1062 , 1067, 1067 n.7-9 (1985) (internal citations omitted). 7
The Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 8 brought about a major structural change in Tennessee theft law by replacing, including, and embracing traditional theft offenses into a new statutory generic theft offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-101 & Sentencing Comm'n Cmnts. 9 Like many other states, Tennessee enacted a consolidated theft statute that is heavily based, both conceptually and textually, 10 on the Model Penal Code. A person commits theft under our statute, when he or she obtains or exercises control over [ ] property without the owner's effective consent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103 (2014 & 2017 Supp.). Thus, three elements must be proven to establish theft under our statute: (1) the defendant knowingly obtained or exercised control over property; (2) the defendant did not have the owner's effective consent; and (3) the defendant intended to deprive the owner of the property. State v. Amanns , 2 S.W.3d 241 , 244-45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Defendant argues that we should interpret the 1989 statute as limited in scope to offenses recognized as theft prior to 1989. 11 It is true that the terms obtains or exercises control encompass concepts that were familiar to pre-1989 offenses.  For example, larceny involved a physical taking or obtaining of property, while false pretenses involved obtaining property by deception, and embezzlement involved exercising control over property without the owner's consent. 12 But by using these terms the General Assembly clearly did not intend to limit the scope of the 1989 statute to the offenses previously recognized as theft. To the contrary, the General Assembly very broadly defined [o]btain, as used in the theft statute, declaring that it includes, but is not limited to , the taking, carrying away or the sale, conveyance or transfer of title to or interest in or possession of property, and includes, but is not limited to , conduct known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by conversion, embezzlement, extortion or obtaining property by false pretenses.... Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106 (a)(24)(B) (emphases added). Twice in this concise statutory definition the General Assembly emphasizes that [o]btain encompasses but is not limited in scope to conduct formerly categorized as theft. See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-101 (stating that theft under the 1989 statute embraces the separate offenses referenced before 1989 as embezzlement, false pretense, fraudulent conversion, larceny, receiving or concealing stolen property, and other similar offenses.  (emphasis added)); State v. Young , 904 S.W.2d 603 , 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (Even though the legislature intended to simplify the prosecution of theft crimes by consolidating them into a general statute, the legislature also clearly changed the definition of the crime and the elements needed to prove the offense.); State v. Nix , 922 S.W.2d 894 , 900-01 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (explaining that a theft, for the purposes of defining robbery, no longer requires asportation under the 1989 theft statute). 13 Thus the scope of our consolidated theft statute is not limited by common-law technicalities, and distinction[s] between the various theft offenses [are] unimportant; the crime is complete when a person takes property, without the owner's consent with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. Amanns , 2 S.W.3d at 243-44 . [T]he critical inquiry is thus twofold: whether the actor had control of the property, no matter how he got it, and whether the actor's acquisition or use of the property was authorized. MPC Commentaries at 166. 14 As described by one of the principal drafters of the consolidated theft language in the Model Penal Code, Louis B.  Schwartz, [t]here are a lot of ways of stealing. The basic conception of this draft [of the consolidated statute] is that it does not make any difference which way you choose to steal. If you are stealing, you are a thief. Green at 26. Defendant alternatively argues that the Tennessee consolidated theft statute applies only to tangible, movable property, and does not apply to real property, such as the house at issue in this case. In response, the State points to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(28), which defines property as: anything of value, including, but not limited to, money, real estate , tangible or intangible personal property, including anything severed from land, library material, contract rights, choses-in-action, interests in or claims to wealth, credit, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106 (a)(28) (emphasis added). We agree with the State on this issue, for several reasons. First, the Sentencing Commission Comments for Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103 state directly that the statute punishes theft of property as defined in § 39-11-106. 15 Furthermore, the [d]efinitions section includes other terms that appear in the theft of property statute, such as [d]eprive, [e]ffective consent, [o]btain, and [o]wner. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-106 (a)(8), (9), (24), and (26). More importantly for purposes of this appeal is a distinction drawn in the Model Penal Code that the General Assembly has chosen not to adopt. Specifically, the Model Penal Code distinguishes, in the definition of the crime of [t]heft by [u]nlawful [t]aking or [d]isposition, between movable and immovable property: (1) Movable Property. A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof. (2) Immovable Property. A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully transfers immovable property of another or any interest therein with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto. Model Penal Code § 223.2. The comments in § 223.1, explain, Immovable property, principally real estate, is stolen if one unlawfully transfers the property of another, or an interest therein, with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto. The major purpose of the distinction is to avoid theft liability for such conduct as trespass or occupying real property beyond the terms of a lease. Model Penal Code § 223.1, Explanatory Note. The Model Penal Code drafters believed that the definition of theft was broad enough to encompass and apply to theft by physical occupation of real property unless an express distinction were drawn, specifying that immovable property could only be subject to theft by unlawfully transfer[ring the] property. Some states have incorporated this exact distinction and limitation in their own consolidated theft statutes. See, e.g. , N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-3 ; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3921 ; 9 Guam Code Ann. § 43.30 ;  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-511 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 514.030 ; State v. Kosch , 444 N.J.Super. 368 , 133 A.3d 669 , 678-79 (2016) (explaining that, while conduct of squatters is not criminalized under the New Jersey statute, the defendant could be found guilty of fraudulently transferring the right to charge rents to the property to himself). 16 Other states have simply excluded immovable property from their theft statutes. See, e.g. , Ala. Code § 13A-8-1(11) ; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101 (8) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 857(6) ; see also Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Subst. Crim. L. § 19.4 n.7 (2d ed.); Sheffield v. State , 708 So.2d 899 , 900 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (explaining over the course of the entire opinion why immovable property cannot be the object of theft under the Alabama statute and reversing the defendant's theft conviction). At least one state, Maryland, has adopted a statute clarifying that theft does not include trespass or occupying land without authorization. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 7-101 (d)(2). 17 Tennessee has not adopted any of these limitations. Indeed, in our criminal code, the term movable property is used only once in a statute not relevant to this appeal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106 (a)(35) (defining [s]ervices that can be stolen as the use of vehicles or other movable property). The theft statute makes no distinction between movable and immovable property, either in the definition of theft, id. § 39-14-103, or in the definition of property, id. § 39-11-106(a)(28). And although we have previously discussed one statutory definition of [o]btain, our criminal code defines [o]btain twice. 18 Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(24)(A)(i) states that [o]btain means to [b]ring about a transfer or purported transfer of property or of a legally recognized interest in the property, whether to the defendant or another. This language is nearly identical to the Model Penal Code's description of theft of immovable property, including real estate. However, unlike the Model Penal Code, which uses this language to define the exclusive means of stealing real or immovable property, Model Penal Code § 223.2(2), under our statute, a person commits theft of real property either by obtaining (under sub-section (A) or (B)) or exercising control of real property. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103 , 39-11-106(a)(24). Thus, no limitations in our consolidated theft statute preclude its application to theft of real property generally or distinguish between real and personal property  for purposes of the conduct requirements for carrying out a theft. Given the options available to the General Assembly when the consolidated theft statute was enacted and the statutory language it chose to adopt, we conclude that the General Assembly intended our consolidated theft statute to apply to theft of real property in the same way it applies to other property. That decision was and is within the competency of the General Assembly, which was fully capable of employing alternate language in the theft statute. See, e.g. , Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-104 (2014 & 2017 Supp.) (defining theft of services as a person intentionally obtain[ing] services by deception, fraud, coercion, forgery, false statement, false pretense or any other means to avoid payment for the services). Defendant argues that the theft statute should not apply to her because this was essentially a civil matter and that a squatter is not subject to prosecution under [Tennessee's consolidated] theft statute[ ]. To the extent that the Defendant occupied the house without the Bank's effective consent, it does not matter, as Defendant states, that there were civil remedies available to the Bank to evict Defendant, or that the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act has provisions that govern the conduct at issue in this case. We note that the Model Penal Code Commentaries have a fairly detailed note on this subject along the lines of the Defendant's points. 19 But, as already explained, the Tennessee General Assembly chose not to limit theft to personal property. Courts may neither alter or amend statutes nor substitute our own policy judgments for those of the General Assembly. Britt v. Dyer's Empl. Agency, Inc. , 396 S.W.3d 519 , 523 (Tenn. 2013). Perhaps the General Assembly should have excluded real property from the theft statute, but it has not done so. See Am. Heritage Apartments, Inc. v. Hamilton Cnty. Water and Wastewater Treatment Auth. , 494 S.W.3d 31 , 50 (Tenn. 2016). Just as we may not overlook or ignore any of the words in a statute, we must be circumspect about adding words to a statute that the General Assembly did not place there. Coleman v. State , 341 S.W.3d 221 , 241 (Tenn. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, the statute is broad enough to encompass theft of real property, and we are not at liberty to impose a restriction on that language.