Opinion ID: 3004143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Opinions of State‐Agency Psychologists

Text: Mrs. Overstreet first argues that the ALJ erred in determining that she was not disabled by ignoring the conclusions of two state‐agency psychologists in 2000 that her depression moderately restricted her daily living, caused her moderate difficulty in maintaining social functions, and caused either moderate (according to one psychologist) or marked (according to the other) deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. Recall, however, that Mrs. Overstreet had amended the onset date of her disability from 2000 to 2003. The ALJ limited evidence created before the claimed onset date “to the purpose of providing a foundation for consideration of the claimant’s current disability status.” (Emphasis added.) (The psychologists’ conclusions from 2000 were considered as part of her previous disability claim, which was denied in 2002.) The ALJ in this case found that Mrs. Overstreet’s impairments included a history of depression rather than depression itself. Nothing in the record indicates that she received mental health treatment during the claimed disability period or that the limitations from 2000 persisted after the 2003 onset date. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Mrs. Overstreet’s depression did not limit her ability to work. He noted that in 2003 Mrs. Overstreet told her primary care provider, Dr. K.N. Kacha, that she was depressed. An exam at that time indicated that Mrs. No. 09‐1742 Page 4 Overstreet’s mood and affect were abnormal, but her judgment, insight, orientation to time, place, and person, and her recent and remote memory were all normal. Mrs. Overstreet herself testified that she had trouble remembering day‐to‐day things because of her pain and high blood pressure and that she had trouble keeping her mind on things because she got depressed. But she said she had no trouble understanding things and that when she felt stress at work, she would “suck it in” and continue her job “because I love people, and I’m not going to make them wait because I don’t feel good.” II. Conflict Between Vocational Expert’s Testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles Mrs. Overstreet next argues that the ALJ violated Social Security Ruling 00‐4p when he failed to ask the vocational expert whether his testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). The vocational expert concluded that the worker in the ALJ’s hypothetical question could do sedentary work. Mrs. Overstreet contends that the expert’s testimony assumed from the ALJ’s question a need for the worker to alternate sitting and standing every hour and thus conflicted with the DOT’s description of sedentary work as work that “involves sitting most of the time, but may involve walking or standing for brief periods of time.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Appendix C, 1991 WL 688702 (Westlaw). An ALJ has an affirmative responsibility to ask a vocational expert about any possible conflict between evidence the vocational expert provides about a job’s requirements and information in the DOT. If the expert’s testimony “appears to conflict with the DOT,” the ALJ “will obtain a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict.” SSR 00‐4p. But not asking a vocational expert about a conflict is a harmless error if there is no actual conflict. See Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2009). There was no conflict here. The record shows that the ALJ’s question did not require the worker to alternate every hour between sitting and standing; the context of the question establishes that the ALJ was referring to hourly breaks from sitting or standing. The ALJ, in fact, clarified for the vocational expert that the worker would be able to stand or walk for two hours and sit for six hours in an eight‐hour day. R. 885. The vocational expert then testified that if the worker could “take a short break after an hour,” the worker could perform Mrs. Overstreet’s sedentary and past relevant work as a data‐entry clerk or administrative assistant. Because that testimony is compatible with the DOT’s description of sedentary work, see Terry, 580 F.3d at 478, and because the DOT’s description did not conflict with the limitations imposed by the ALJ in his hypothetical question, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625‐26 (7th Cir. 2008), the ALJ’s failure to ask was a harmless error. No. 09‐1742 Page 5