Opinion ID: 1114161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: attacking the credibility of a witness by introduction of specific instances of conduct

Text: Next appellant contends that the trial judge abused his discretion when he restricted the cross-examination of a state witness concerning a civil complaint that had been brought against this witness. We cannot agree. We recognize that cross-examination is a fundamental right granted by the confrontation clause contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965); Holm v. State, Wyo., 404 P.2d 740 (1965). We further recognize that the confrontation right is binding in state criminal prosecutions by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The right of an accused, however, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him has recognized limitations. Those limitations are left largely to the discretion of the trial judge. People v. Wynsma, Colo. App., 541 P.2d 328 (1975); United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924 (2nd Cir.1976). As stated in Rule 608(b), W.R.E.: (b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction for crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness   . (Emphasis added.) In Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 (1979), the appellant alleged an improper restriction of his cross-examination of a prosecution witness. Nimmo was charged with two counts of false swearing. Quarberg, the witness whom the defense sought to impeach, gave testimony about a conversation he had with Nimmo concerning certain questionable costs. Nimmo's attempt to characterize the Quarberg testimony as critical to the prosecution's case was discounted by this court as follows:    Quarberg's testimony merely reiterated other evidence presented at the trial.       The record reflects that Quarberg's testimony is cumulative. This belies the contention that he was a principal or critical witness   . Nimmo v. State, supra, p. 392. The majority go on to state:    We have recognized before that an improper limitation of cross-examination may not be prejudicial. [Citation.] While it must be conceded that a defendant has an absolute right to cross-examine a witness about anything which was the subject of direct examination, there is a distinction between a denial of cross-examination and its limitation. The extent and manner of a witness' cross-examination in such cases is in the court's discretion. [Citations.] A trial court's discretionary ruling on evidence will not be upset except for clear abuse which is appellant's burden to demonstrate. [Citations.] Id. (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar Sharon Delight Hubbell was called as a witness for the State. She testified in substance to a conversation that she overheard in a restaurant one week after the shooting between appellant and a younger man. The conversation contained several incriminating remarks made by appellant. Just as the testimony of the witness Quarberg in Nimmo v. State, supra, was cumulative and corroborated by other evidence, so too was the evidence provided by Sharon Hubbell. Appellant's statement in the restaurant to the effect that, the minute he opened the door, I blasted him, was also testified to by Vernon Hubbell, Sharon's husband, who was also present at the time. Other details from the conversation in the restaurant, such as the appellant and the decedent arguing over a divorce and money before the shooting, were confirmed by witnesses from the Bel Air Motel where the shooting occurred. The victim, Kenneth Buhrle, as he lay wounded, made statements to two prosecution witnesses that his wife had shot him after an argument. Edith Buhrle's remarks in the restaurant about hiding the rifle under a trailer after the shooting were substantiated by a witness who actually saw her carry the gun off and followed her to see how she disposed of it. Therefore, even [a]ssuming arguendo, that it was improper to so limit the cross-examination, prejudice must be demonstrated to justify a reversal.    The factual situation here does not demonstrate prejudice. Nimmo v. State, supra, p. 393. And because no Sixth Amendment or other constitutional objection was raised at the trial, we need not accept the view of the Defendant that regardless of the facts and circumstances, it must be deemed plain error requiring an automatic reversal. Campbell v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 358, pp. 366-367 (1979); Rule 49, W.R.Cr.P. [3] The court was concerned that the jury might confuse the issues if the witness were put on trial for an unadjudicated matter which might yet be the subject of litigation; therefore, he limited the cross-examination. In limiting the cross-examination of Sharon Delight Hubbell the trial judge exercised his discretion under Rules 608(b), supra, and 403, W.R.E. [4] A trial court's discretionary ruling on evidence will not be overturned except for clear abuse which is appellant's burden to demonstrate. Nimmo v. State, supra. Defense counsel in his brief seems to concede that rulings under Rule 608(b) are discretionary. He attempts, however, to show abuse of discretion by alluding to rebuttal testimony produced by the State to the effect that Mrs. Buhrle had signed her husband's name without authority. This testimony was permitted in a different posture. This testimony came in rebuttal, only after the defense had placed Mrs. Buhrle's character in issue. Defense counsel does not claim that this type of rebuttal testimony is reversible standing alone, but indicates that in fairness and consistency Sharon Hubbell should have been subject to cross-examination in like manner. Perhaps another way to state appellant's position is: If the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of Sharon Hubbell, it should have committed the same error and limited the examination of the State's rebuttal witness. We are unaware of any rule of offsetting errors and do not agree that appellant has demonstrated that the trial judge abused his discretion. The trial court's ruling under 608(b), W.R.E., did not constitute prejudicial error or an abuse of discretion.