Opinion ID: 2351048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Issue 3: The distinction between Class B clubs formed before January 2, 2009, and those formed after January 1, 2009, has a rational relationship to the statewide smoking ban.

Text: We have recognized that the rational basis standard is a very lenient standard. Peden v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 261 Kan. 239, 258, 930 P.2d 1 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1229, 117 S.Ct. 1821, 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997). And we defined the limits of this very lenient standard in Miami County, 292 Kan. at 316-17, 255 P.3d 1186: Where, as in this case, a party attacks a statute as facially unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause for failing to satisfy the rational basis standard, the party must demonstrate that `no set of circumstances exist' that survive constitutional muster. Injured Workers of Kansas [ v. Franklin ], 262 Kan. [840,] 850[, 942 P.2d 591 (1997) ]. For this reason, it is not enough to `[s]imply point[ ] out that [a statute] might not be rationally related to the state objectives sought under one set of facts.' Injured Workers of Kansas, 262 Kan. at 851 [94:2 P.2d 591]. Instead, a party `asserting the unconstitutionality of a statute under the rational basis standard ha[s] the burden `to negative every conceivable basis which might support [the classification].'' [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis added.) As the United States Supreme Court has succinctly explained: A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). So [i]t is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. [Citation omitted.] In re Tax Appeal of Weisgerber, 285 Kan. 98, 108-09, 169 P.3d 321 (2007). At oral argument before this court, counsel for Downtown Bar conceded that if we apply a rational basis test without his requested nuances, he cannot meet his burden. In other words, he cannot negative every conceivable basis which might support the statutory classification in the smoking ban. See Miami County, 292 Kan. at 316, 255 P.3d 1186. As explained below, we agree. We continue our analysis by acknowledging that Downtown Bar presents the issue for our resolution as simply whether it was denied equal protection of the law by the Act's cut-off or grandfathering date of January 1, 2009. Downtown Bar does not challenge the objective of the bill, i.e., the State may promote its interest in the health and safety of its citizens by reducing exposure to second-hand smoke. Nor does it challenge the fact of grandfathering. Given this narrowing, the State suggests two conceivable bases support the January 1, 2009, cut-off or grandfathering date. First, it alleges this date is rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in protecting the reliance interest of older clubs, citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Second, it contends the date is rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in preventing mere drinking establishments from circumventing the smoking ban. The State alleges that absent this cut-off date, they could circumvent by (1) reorganizing as Class B clubs during the pendency of the legislation, i.e., before the ban took effect on July 1, 2010, and then (2) electing to continue to allow smoking on their premises. We start with the second conceivable basis alleged by the State. The State points out that the 2009 legislature tried to pass the same legislationa statewide smoking ban (including drinking establishments) that nevertheless allowed exemptions for Class B clubs in existence before January 1, 2009. The January 1 cut-off therefore could have prevented drinking establishments from circumventing the ban by converting to Class B club status during the pendency of the 2009 legislation. The State reasons that drinking establishments therefore would know that such legislation could be revived during the 2010 legislative session. So the State contends that such drinking establishments, essentially given a reprieve by the legislative failure in 2009, could try to circumvent the anticipated ban by converting to Class B club status before the legislature did pass such a law in 2010. According to the State's logic, the 2010 legislature's retention of the January 1, 2009, cut-off continued to prevent that circumvention. In support of this purported conceivable basis, the State first points out that as of June 23, 2010, Kansas had 1,814 drinking establishments. And as of 1 week later, all of them would be statutorily required to be smoke-free. The State next points out that by June 23, 2010, Kansas had 127 Class B clubs, an increase of nearly 30 percent from January 1, 2009. The State concludes that the increase demonstrates its point: The 2010 legislature conceivably could have kept the January 1, 2009, date to prevent those 1,814 drinking establishments from reorganizing as Class B clubs and thus circumventing the smoking ban before it could ever take effect. In granting Downtown Bar injunctive relief, the trial court first made a ruling consistent with the State's position. It held that the January 1, 2009, date arose during the 2009 legislative session as an attempt to prevent entities like drinking establishments from rushing to seek club status: What more likely seems to be the case is that the occurrence arises from a history of the substance of the text for H.B. 2221, which text was inserted in H.B. 2221 by the Senate in 2009 and passed. . . . Thus, in a bill drafted . . . for passage in 2009 to carry a cut-off date for the grandfathering of class A and class B clubs as of the beginning of that year [2009] when the bill was intended to be passed that year seems rational in assuring or preventing a rush to club status by, for example, `drinking establishments.' (Emphasis added.) But the court then disagreed with the State's other principal point. It held that because the January 1, 2009, date was simply left over from the failed legislative attempt in 2009, the date was wholly arbitrary and therefore unable to provide a rational basis for the 2010 Act. However, as noted, the bill was not passed in 2009, but rather was resurrected and reenrolled on February 26, 2010. Counsel associated with Intervenors indicated it then passed the Kansas House of Representatives on a procedure providing for no amendments. Thus, what had been intended in 2009 and had `died' and which provided a short window for grandfathering class A and class B club status became one of over one year by the 2010 passage. While citizens are deemed to know the law, they are not deemed to know what their legislature is doing. Thus, to consider the basis for the distinction, represented by the exemption date, as justifiable as a more or less `put on notice' provision is not a fair or rational assumption. The result is that January 1, 2009, cut off for class A and class B exemption from the state wide smoking ban seems, at best, an unintended consequence, and nevertheless, wholly arbitrary because this particular date, other than by its existence, finds no rational basis for its selection. Accordingly, until this aspect of the ban is further examined, a temporary injunction should issue in favor of Plaintiff, Downtown Bar and Grill. (Emphasis added.) In agreeing with the trial court that the cut-off date was arbitrary and therefore could have no rational basis connected to the smoking ban, Downtown Bar contends the State has produced no evidence that the 2010 legislature actually chose the January 1, 2009, date to prevent drinking establishments from circumventing the ban. But no such evidence is necessary. `[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' (Emphasis added.) Peden, 261 Kan. at 263, 930 P.2d 1 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). And instead of a State obligation to provide evidence, it was Downtown Bar's obligation to negative every conceivable basis for the cut-off date of January 1, 2009. See Miami County, 292 Kan. at 316-17, 255 P.3d 1186. Turning to the trial court's holding, we start with its conclusion that the January 1, 2009, cut-off date in the 2009 legislation seems rational in assuring or preventing a rush to club status by, for example, `drinking establishments' so they could not seek exemption from the smoking ban during the pendency of the legislation. A cut-off date earlier than the effective date of the 2009 bill becoming lawtypically upon its publication in the Kansas Register or on July 1 of the year the bill is passed by the legislature was apparently acceptable to the trial court. And we agree. We disagree, however, with the trial court's next conclusion that the January 1, 2009, cut-off date stopped being rational merely because it was not independentlyor deliberatelyselected by the 2010 legislature. If the 2009 legislature conceivably chose the January 1, 2009, date as a cut-off which would eliminate any incentive to rush to Class B club status during the pendency of the 2009 legislationthen it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the 2010 legislature could not conceivably have retained that same cut-off date for the same reason during its own session. See Peden, 261 Kan. at 263, 930 P.2d 1 (legislative choice may be based on rational speculation). And under these circumstances, courts certainly do not ask whether they would have chosen that particular date for the 2010 Act. See Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096 ([E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.). As the Supreme Court has stated, such restraints on judicial review have added force `where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.'[Citation omitted.]. 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096. Under these circumstances, we must conclude the trial court erred in holding that Downtown Bar established a substantial likelihood that it would eventually succeed on the merits of its equal protection claim. Miami County, 292 Kan. at 317, 255 P.3d 1186 (burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support the classification). Because this element is an essential predicate for a temporary injunction, the trial court erred in its issuance. See Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 284 Kan. 380, 394, 160 P.3d 843 (2007). Given this analysis, we need not review any other conceivable bases for the cut-off date, e.g., protecting reliance interests of older clubs. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Cf. Augusta Medical Complex, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 227 Kan. 469, 473, 608 P.2d 890 (1980) (held an abuse of discretion for trial court to grant temporary injunction requiring appellant to continue to carry out contract terms when under agreed facts, as a matter of law, appellant had right to terminate the contract and did so; reversed and remanded).