Opinion ID: 760681
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Herpin's Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: 18 Herpin also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction. When faced with such a claim, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the government, and will affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Katalinich, 113 F.3d 1475, 1480 (7th Cir.1997). Herpin broadly challenges whether the government proved that he was knowingly involved in the conspiracy. In reviewing the record, we look for whether the defendant's acts rendered support to the co-conspirators, whether the defendant was entrusted with some task that furthered the criminal design, or whether he entered into a mutually cooperative relationship with co-conspirators that assisted them in bringing about the object of a conspiracy. United States v. Magna, 118 F.3d 1173, 1200 (7th Cir.1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted). As noted above, Kevin Brown testified that Herpin was present at cocaine deals conducted by Martinez. Further, Raymond Smith, a drug courier working for Martinez, testified that Herpin would accept money from Smith in payment for drugs Smith had delivered to Martinez's various drug houses. This evidence certainly suggests that Herpin had knowledge of the Martinez cocaine conspiracy. 19 Additionally, evidence supports the conclusion that Herpin had agreed to participate in the conspiracy. Smith's testimony regarding Herpin's role in providing large quantities of cocaine for transport to Martinez's drug houses suggest that Herpin was Martinez's employee. The government also proved that Herpin took Martinez's place at a drug buy with a drug supplier, Mario Gonzales, at a motel called the Hospitality Inn. There, Herpin tasted the five kilograms Gonzales had for sale, and stated that Martinez would able to sell the cocaine. He even warned Gonzales that law enforcement officials were investigating the conspiracy. This evidence suggests that Herpin had been entrusted with a task that furthered the criminal design. In short, Herpin was a player who supported the criminal design and wanted to make it succeed. 20 Herpin tries to lessen the overwhelming evidence against him by suggesting that Raymond Smith's testimony was incredible as a matter of law. However, Herpin merely points to Smith's bias and inconsistencies in his testimony. These are the sort of routine challenges to credibility which juries are charged with sorting out. United States v. Scott, 145 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir.1998). We will not redo the jury's work. In sum, we conclude that Herpin has not carried his heavy burden of demonstrating that based on the record, a rational trier of fact could not conclude that Herpin was a member of the Martinez cocaine conspiracy. See United States v. Alexander, 135 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir.1998) (the defendant bears a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence). 21