Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Closing Argument at the Sanity Phase

Text: Defendant contends his defense counsel, Donnalee Huffman, was constitutionally ineffective for giving an inadequate closing argument at the sanity phase. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 218-219, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710; cf. Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 859, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 [state law granting trial court power to deny counsel any opportunity for closing argument violative of the Sixth Amendment].) He argues counsel was unprepared and insufficiently experienced to take sole charge of this complex and technically difficult phase of the trial and that [h]er closing argument was punctuated with admissions that she was tired and that she did not understand important concepts addressed in the expert testimony. He claims her argument was rambling, unfocused and laced with irrelevant information, that she failed to argue or call the jury's attention to important testimony supporting [defendant's] insanity defense, and that she failed to explain the relevant law or to integrate it with the evidence. We disagree. Defense counsel attempted to summarize the sanity phase evidence by making the following points: (1) Dr. Cholet's testimony should be discounted because, although she was of the personal opinion defendant was sane, she did not know the legal definition of insanity; (2) that all the experts believed that schizophrenia had a genetic component (supporting the conclusion that defendant was probably schizophrenic); (3) that no experts ruled out the possibility that defendant heard voices in his head; (4) that it was likely defendant was telling the truth about the voices because there was evidence he had told people about the voices well before his arrest for these crimes; (5) that evidence defendant sometimes appeared somewhat lucid did not preclude a finding he was insane at the time of the crimes; (6) that the jury should look at the total picture to decide the question of sanity or insanity; (7) that Dr. Wilson's views on whether defendant suffered from PTSD as a result of his service in Vietnam carried greater weight than the views of some of the other experts because he had observed defendant for a longer time; (8) that Dr. Wilson's and Dr. Kormos's views deserved greater weight because they had more experience in their respective fields; (9) that the jury should not discount Dr. Shonkwiler's views merely because he had a problem with his professional license because, despite the problem, he had made a proper diagnosis; (10) that the views of Drs. Shonkwiler, Wilson and Kormos deserved greater weight because they were the only ones who had interviewed defendant's mother and sister; (11) that even the People's experts (Drs. Criswell, Burdick, Matychowiak and Cutting) all agreed defendant had endured an abusive childhood; (12) that when considering whether defendant had had an abusive childhood, the jury should consider the point of view of the child, not the mother; (13) that the jury should not credit the prosecutor's suggestion that defendant did not suffer from hallucinations merely because his alleged hallucinations were not grandiose; (14) that the mere fact an expert witness has testified numerous times does not necessarily mean his or her opinion is more believable than the opinion of a witness who has testified fewer times; (15) that Dr. Owre testified that he thought defendant was out of touch with reality just by looking at him in the courtroom; (16) that mental illness can get worse over time; (17) that someone can be suffering from schizophrenia and not be a raving lunatic; (18) that the jury should recall that Dr. Chappell testified that an insane person would not remember what happened at the time of the crime, but then did not have a good answer when asked about defendant's claim he blacked out when Levoy bit him and that he had no memory of strangling her; (19) that the jury should consider the evidence of schizophrenia, personality disorder, and PTSD together as a total picture; (20) that defendant's loss of control and killing Radford when the victim started screaming, and then returning to Levoy and making her sit as if she were a Vietnamese prisoner, was consistent with the conclusion defendant was suffering from PTSD; and (21) that the stress of the situation pushed defendant over the edge and into a psychotic state. Defense counsel concluded her argument by comparing defendant's mental state to someone in a bed covered by many blankets. She explained that some expert witnesses saw only the top blanket, which she said represented defendant's antisocial behavior. Other doctors peeled off additional blankets and found deeper layers of psychosis or personality disorders. Counsel urged the jury to take off all the blankets to find out defendant's true nature: just don't stop with the top blanket, but you get down to the bottom blanket and you put them all together. . . . [¶] You will find and you will come back with the fact that Mr. Weaver was insane at the time of these crimes. Thank you very much. As is clear, defense counsel's closing argument did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) We thus reject the argument counsel was ineffective under both the state and federal Constitutions. Because there was no violation of defendant's right to effective counsel, there can be no resulting deprivation of his Eighth Amendment right to a fair and reliable penalty determination; accordingly, we reject that claim as well.