Opinion ID: 70766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Entrapment as a Matter of Law Issue

Text: 11 King moved for a judgment of acquittal on all three counts, arguing that he was entrapped as a matter of law. The district court denied his motion, and submitted the entrapment issue to the jury. King contends that the district court's refusal to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal was error under the Supreme Court's holding in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992). 12 In Jacobson, the Supreme Court explained the government's burden of proof in an entrapment case: Where the government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue ... the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents. Id. at 548-49, 112 S.Ct. at 1540. In Jacobson itself, the Court held that the Government did not prove that this predisposition was independent and not the product of the attention that the Government had directed at petitioner. Id. at 550, 112 S.Ct. at 1541. 13 Applying Jacobson, in United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 309, 133 L.Ed.2d 212 (1995), we observed that [e]ntrapment is generally a jury question, and [t]herefore, entrapment as a matter of law is a sufficiency of the evidence inquiry. Id. at 622 (citations omitted); see also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) (holding that the question of entrapment is generally one for the jury, rather than for the court). Our inquiry is whether the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant was predisposed to take part in the illicit transaction. Brown, 43 F.3d at 622 (citing United States v. Aibejeris, 28 F.3d 97, 99 (11th Cir.1994)). Although our review of an entrapment defense is de novo, we must view all facts and make all inferences in favor of the government. Id. 14 King's primary argument is that Jacobson requires the government to have evidence of predisposition before it begins its investigation of the defendant. This Court disposed of that contention in Aibejeris, where we held: 15 This is an incorrect reading of Jacobson. That case does not stand for the proposition that the government must have evidence of predisposition prior to investigation. Rather, Jacobson holds that the government must prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually predisposed to commit the underlying crime absent the government's role in assisting such commission. 16 28 F.3d at 99. Accordingly, it matters not when the evidence of King's predisposition to sell drugs was developed. It does matter whether that predisposition itself existed before the government became involved. 17 Turning to the sufficiency of the evidence of predisposition, we hold that there was enough evidence that King was predisposed, independent of any government involvement, to commit the crimes for which he was convicted, to create a jury question. A reasonable jury could have believed Gandy's testimony that prior to Gandy becoming an informant, King had provided narcotics to Gandy on more than one occasion. Likewise, a reasonable jury could also have believed Gandy's testimony that during the time Gandy was acting as an informant, King was dealing drugs with others but refused to deal with Gandy because King was suspicious that Gandy was an informant. Finally, a reasonable jury could have believed Gandy's testimony that even though Gandy made his first offer to engage in drug transactions with King on March 29, 1992, King had told Gandy on February 14, 1992, that Alphonso was coming from Florida with two killer kilograms of cocaine. All of this evidence supports the conclusion that King was predisposed to commit the crime, independent of any government involvement. Unlike the situation in Jacobson, much of the evidence about predisposition in this case was evidence of the defendant's conduct and statements prior to the government's involvement, and therefore was independent and not the product of the attention that the Government ... directed at [the defendant], see Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550, 112 S.Ct. at 1541. We hold that the district court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1 and 2, and properly submitted the entrapment defense to the jury.