Opinion ID: 1843606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cases 1950030 and 1950031Petitions for Permission to Appeal

Text: The State parties seek permission, pursuant to Ala. R. App. P. 5, to appeal the denial of their motion to vacate all previous orders and to dismiss the action. Their petition challenges, primarily on constitutional grounds, the validity of the Liability Phase in addition to challenging the Remedy Plan. More specifically, the State parties argue that the trial court's holdings as to both Phases of this action violate the separation of powers doctrine. Ordinarily, we would, before reviewing issues pursuant to Rule 5, order briefs from opposing parties. In this case, however, the issues involved in cases 1950030 and 1950031 are the same issues presented in cases 1950240 and 1950241, and in those cases the issues have been fully briefed by the opposing parties. For this reason, and because the Remedy Plan is not yet final and appealable, we grant the petitions and review the issues pursuant to Rule 5. We shall explain the present procedural posture of the Remedy Plan before addressing the merits of the State parties' arguments. Procedurally and substantively, the Remedy Plan differs from the Liability Phase. In the text of Pinto, we set forth several sections of the Remedy Plan as evidence that the court intended to oversee and direct the processes of education `reform' for an indefinite period, that is, as evidence of its inherently interlocutory nature. 662 So.2d at 899 (emphasis added). After reproducing several exemplary excerpts from the Remedy Plan, we stated: These and numerous other provisions of the Remedy [Plan] [emphasis added] obviously contemplate perennial revision and reassessment [emphasis in Pinto ] of the progress of the process, the purpose of which is to convert a system that failed to `offer equitable and adequate educational opportunities to the schoolchildren of the state,' Opinion of the Justices, No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 110 (Ala.1993) (emphasis added [in Pinto ]), into a system that succeeds in doing so. 662 So.2d at 899. We described this objective as an ambitious oneone that could not be achieved without significantly impactingdirectly or indirectlyvirtually every Alabama citizen for years to come. Id. at 899-900. Thus, it was not merely ¶ XI(F) of the Remedy Plan that rendered the Remedy Plan interlocutory. [2] Indeed, Judge Greenhaw, in her order of October 6, 1995, in an apparent attempt to facilitate appellate review of the Remedy Plan, stated: [I] In the Remedy Order the trial court specifically retained jurisdiction to issue further orders required to secure implementation. [II] Inasmuch as this court has made the Remedy and Remedy Approval Orders final, for purposes of the record Sec. XI(F) of the Remedy Order is set aside. [III] However, the court would note that it has inherent power to issue such orders as necessary to render its judgments effective.... (Emphasis added.) These three sentences succinctly illustrate the difficulties inherent in attempting to convert to a final judgment the Remedy Plan in toto. Essentially, sentence three replaced what sentence two purportedly removedthe power of the trial court to revis[e] and reassess[] ... the process, Pinto, 662 So.2d at 899, in other words, to modify the Remedy Plan as necessary. As we explained in Pinto, the Remedy Plan is interlocutory by its very nature and will remain so until an educational system that complies with the constitution is in place. It was designed to remain modifiable in order to accommodate, among other things, legislative and executive action. Thus, unlike the Liability Phase, which ascertained and declared the rights of the parties, Taylor v. Taylor, 398 So.2d 267, 269 (Ala.1981), by declaring the challenged system unconstitutional, and which became final on June 9, 1993, the Remedy Plan does not ascertain[ ] and declare[ ] the rights of the parties and settle[ ] the equities as to any party in this action. Such a disposition is a prerequisite for a Rule 54(b) certification of finality. See Tanner v. Alabama Power Co., 617 So.2d 656, 656 (Ala. 1993) (Rule 54(b) confers appellate jurisdiction over an order of judgment only where the trial court `has completely disposed of one of a number of claims, or one of multiple parties' (emphasis in Tanner )). In short, Rule 54(b) cannot make the Remedy Plan in toto a final and appealable judgment. Review of specific orders implementing specific provisions may be obtained, however, in a manner to be discussed more fully in Part III.C. of this opinion. That was the sense of this Court's order denying Governor James's petition for a writ of prohibition in Ex parte James (no. 1940679); that order stated: [I]ssues regarding other orders may be raised on appeal in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure when such orders become final. Pinto, 662 So.2d at 898 n. 2. That this statement has apparently been misunderstood by the parties and the trial court is one consideration that has prompted our decision to grant the Rule 5 petition at this time. We turn now to the merits of the arguments. The State parties challenge the validity of the judgments on which both the Liability Phase and the Remedy Plan are based, on three grounds. First, they contend that these judgments violate the separation of powers doctrine. Second, they argue that this actionup to, and including, the time of the entry of the order setting forth the Remedy Planwas not sufficiently adversarial to render the action justiciable. Thus, they insist, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter any of the orders material to this action. Third, they insist that campaign conduct of Judge Reese draws in question the impartiality of the entire judicial proceedings. Brief and Arguments of Appellants, at 27. For ease of discussion, we shall address these contentions in reverse order.
In his unsuccessful bid for a seat on this Court in the 1994 election campaign, Judge Reese's campaign circulated literature categorizing him as the judge for educational reform, and stating, among other things: Gene Reese is a tough judge. Last year, he became famous for ruling Alabama's education system unconstitutional and telling a Governor and the Legislature to fix the problem.... Now, Gene Reese is running for Alabama Supreme Courtand he will be a tough Justice for change. Brief and Argument of Appellants (Cases 1950240 and 1950241), at App. A. This conduct, it is contended, created an atmosphere that could be perceived as judicial bias, and thus compromised the integrity of this action in toto. Due [p]rocess ... entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). Trial before such a tribunal helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. Id. In facilitating this principle, Canon 3(C)(1) prevents a judge from exercising discretion in a case where the demonstrated facts make it reasonable for a party, for members of the public, or for counsel to question [his] impartiality. Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (recusal was required under such facts even without evidence of actual bias). Neither the State parties nor the Pinto intervenors contend that the Liability Phase, which was made final on March 31, 1993, or the Remedy Plan, which was entered on December 3, 1993, were accompanied by conduct evidencing actual bias. Judge Reese's 1994 campaign advertisements and activities transpired after the Liability Phase order was entered. Moreover, Judge Reese's recusal was not sought by any party in this action, as far as the record reveals, until May 1995, when the State parties moved for it. Thus, the contentions are, in effect, that the Commission's order of disqualification, which was based on the activities of the 1994 campaign, should be applied retroactively to nullify even the actions taken many months before any of the challenged campaign conduct occurred. We disagree with these contentions. Other courts have held that [o]rders entered prior to the recusal motion are unaffected by its disposition, absent a showing of actual bias. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed.2d 51 (1988). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed: Our research has not turned up any case involving mere appearance of impropriety in which the court has set aside decisions that had been taken by the district judge before any party asked for recusal. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012, 106 S.Ct. 1188, 89 L.Ed.2d 304 (1986). See also United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.1985) (Disqualification for the appearance of impropriety runs prospectively only; even a successful motion does not vitiate acts taken before the motion was filed). If orders entered by a trial judge before recusal is requested are valid, then, a fortiori, orders, such as those in this case, that were entered before the questionable conduct occurred are valid. Thus, we hold that where a party seeks the recusal or disqualification of a trial judge on the ground that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, that is, without evidence of actual bias, orders entered by that judge before the occurrence of the conduct for which recusal was sought are valid. This holding does not, however, entirely resolve a contention, peculiar to the Pinto intervenors, regarding the Remedy Plan. Specifically, they state: Judge Reese called his judicial independence into question by appearing at an event to be publicly honored by a party to the pending litigation. In April 1993, prior to the Remedy Plan, Judge Reese attended the State [Parent Teachers Association (`PTA')] 1993 annual convention in Huntsville, Alabama. Dr. Wayne Teague, a party defendant/plaintiff/defendant and State Superintendent of Education, introduced Judge Reese, read excerpts from his Liability Order, and praised both to the standing ovation of the crowd. Birmingham News, April 17, 1993, p. 1A .... [The] Association actively campaigned for the proposed remedy plan to be implemented. This activity alone warrants disqualification. Brief of Pinto Appellants, at 27-28 (emphasis added). Unlike the Liability Phase, the Remedy Plan was entered after the PTA convention, but well before the motion for recusal or disqualification. We need not decide whether this distinction requires a different result, because, we conclude, this challenge by the Pinto intervenors to the Remedy Plan is due to be rejected pursuant to another rule. Specifically, [i]t has been held that the subsequent approval or ratification by [a] qualified judge of the invalid acts of [a] disqualified judge has the effect of relieving the case of any objection to the proceedings based on the ground of the disqualification of the regular judge. 48A C.J.S. Judges § 157, at 865 (1981). Otherwise stated, [a]n order of a judge made prior to his disqualification is in effect set aside by a similar order made by the new judge to whom the case is submitted after the original judge has stepped out of the case. Id. See Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 307, 74 P.2d 761 (1937), aff'd, 305 U.S. 297, 59 S.Ct. 170, 83 L.Ed. 182 (1938); Garrison v. Marietta Trust & Banking Co., 155 Ga. 562, 118 S.E. 48 (1923). After Judge Reese withdrew from this case on August 23, 1995, it was reassigned to Judge Greenhaw. In their motion filed on September 15, 1995, the State parties directly presented Judge Greenhaw with issues going to the merits of the Remedy Plan. They contended that the action must be dismissed, because (1) the circuit court had no power to require the Governor and legislature of Alabama ... to take certain specific actions, and (2) the judgment was invalid because of the appearance of bias created by Judge Reese's campaign activities. The question of the court's jurisdiction was, of course, identical to the question resolved by Judge Reese before he withdrew from the case. Judge Greenhaw reviewed the Remedy Plan de novo. Thus, Judge Greenhaw's October 6, 1995, judgment, which rejected the State parties' arguments and denied their motion, effectively superseded, or set aside, the Remedy Plan entered by Judge Reese. The Remedy Plan is not, therefore, invalid simply because it was originally entered by Judge Reese before he withdrew from the case.
The State parties, as well as the Pinto intervenors, contend that this action was not sufficiently adversarial to render the action justiciable. The essence of this argument is that from the time Governor Guy Hunt was removed from office as a result of a felony convictionto be replaced by operation of law by Governor Jim Folsomuntil Governor Fob James and Attorney General Jeff Sessions succeeded Governor Folsom and Attorney General James Evans as a result of the 1994 election, the action included no parties who truly represented opposing interests. These contentions are based, for the most part, on the fact that the State parties' predecessors alternately assumed the roles of plaintiffs and defendants throughout this litigation. The sequence of these realignments was discussed in Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So.2d 894 (Ala.1995). The original defendants in the action were Governor Guy Hunt, State Director of Finance Robin Swift, Lieutenant Governor James Folsom, Speaker of the House of Representatives James Clark, State Superintendent of Education Wayne Teague, and the members of the Alabama State Board of Education [`SBOE']. Id. at 895. However, Speaker Clark, Lieutenant Governor Folsom, Superintendent Teague, and all members of the SBOE were subsequently realign[ed] as plaintiffs, indicating that they agreed with [the] plaintiffs' claims. Id. (Emphasis added.) After Governor Hunt was succeeded by Lieutenant Governor Folsom, another realignment occurred. Speaker Clark, Superintendent Teague, and members of the SBOE were realigned as defendants in their official capacities. Id. at 897 (emphasis added). On June 9, 1993, Governor Folsomwho had already become a defendant by substitutionwas formally realigned as such. That same day, the parties jointly moved the trial court to certify the liability phase order as a final judgment. Id. That judgment was not appealed. It is contended that the multiple realignments of the state officials, their failure to appeal the Liability Phase, and their submission to the circuit court of the Remedy Plan, id. the essence of which was ultimately adoptedidentifies this action as, in the words of the Pinto intervenors in their principal brief in Pinto, a sweetheart suit. Brief of Pinto Appellants, at 43 (1931030 and 1931031). In other words, it is insisted, from the time Governor Hunt was removed from office until the substitution of the current GovernorGovernor Jamesas a party defendant, this action lacked any party with an interest sufficiently adverse to confer subject-matter jurisdiction. See Brief and Argument of [State] Appellants, at 30 (1950240 and 1950241). To be sure, the circuit courts of this state do not have jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions when there is no case or controversy presented. Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Alabama State Health Planning Agency, 554 So.2d 1032, 1033 (Ala.Civ. App.1989). A `justiciable controversy' is a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Thompson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 460 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Ala.1984). These rules, however, primarily ensure that resort to the judiciary will not be made for advisory opinions, based on hypothetical facts which are not certain to occur. Southern Methodist Univ. v. Times Herald Printing Co., 729 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex.App. 1987). They also ensure that courts will not render legal opinions in ... situations [that] do not fulfill the judicial function of finally settling disputes. Id. Additionally, they ensure that the issues and facts in the dispute will be fully and fairly presented to the court. In a more traditional litigation context, we might find the scenario of which the State parties and Pinto intervenors complain convincing. However, this case is sui generis in Alabama jurisprudence. It has involved elected representatives of both the executive branch and the legislative branch of government, including (1) the Governor, (2) the state finance director, (3) the speaker of the house of representatives, (4) the president pro tempore of the senate, and (5) the SBOE. By virtue of their offices, each official represented interests that were, in many contexts, inherently adverse to those of the others. We are presented with no evidence, or, even allegations, that these officers, or any one of them, breached the public trust vested in their respective offices. Indeed, it cannot be supposed that either the speaker of the house or the president pro tempore of the senate would collude in a scheme that would ultimately require legislation misallocating state funds or that would otherwise waste the resources of this state, unless they were, in fact, engaged in such a breach. The same observations apply with equal force to the state finance director, who has remained a party defendant throughout this action. Similar observations could be made as to the Governor and the SBOE. Suffice it to say, however, that the presence of officers of both the executive branch and the legislative branch of government tended to confer upon this action an institutionalized adversity, thus minimizing the potential for collusion. Thus, the fact that the present State parties may disagree more personally and fundamentally with some aspects of this case than did their predecessors does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Moreover, this case contravenes in no sense the rationale underlying the rules of justiciability discussed above. The dispute does not require the court to apply legal principles to hypothetical facts which are not certain to occur. Southern Methodist Univ., 729 S.W.2d at 131. On the contrary, the trial court, in its Liability Phase, made extensive findings of fact and statistics, expressing in the starkest of terms the conditions then prevailing in Alabama's public schools. See Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 124-44 (Ala.1993). Also, this action has, from its inception, been so postured that the judgments entered would bind all the parties necessary finally to settle this dispute. Indeed, it is precisely this aspect of the case that the State parties challenge most vigorously. But there are yet more cogent reasons why this action does not fail for lack of adversity. First, throughout the trial of the Liability Phase, former Governor Guy Hunt was, at all times, a party defendant, and he presented an aggressive defense. It cannot be, and, in fact, is not, contended that this action lacked adversity as long as Governor Hunt was involved. Also, the decision not to appeal the Liability Phase, although curious, Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So.2d 894, 902 (Ala.1995) (Houston, J., concurring specially), had already been made by Governor Hunt before he left office. Hunt: No appeal of school ruling, Montgomery Advertiser, April 6, 1993, at 1A, included in Brief of Harper, ACE, ADAP, and John Doe Appellees (1950240 and 1950241) App. A. Instead, Governor Hunt promised to appoint with the aid of Speaker Clark and then Lieutenant Governor Jim Folsoma task force to address the judge's order to overhaul the education system. Id. On October 1, 1993, the proposed Remedy Plan was submitted by, among others, Governor Folsom and Speaker Clark. Pinto, 662 So.2d at 897. In no manner that is apparent to us did the action proceed differently between the time Governor Hunt left office and the time the remedy proposal was submitted than it would have proceeded if Governor Hunt had continued in office. Thus, we fail to see how the court was deprived of jurisdiction because of insufficient adversity during this period. On November 16, 1993, before the Remedy Plan was approved, Walter Anderton and others purporting to represent `taxpayers and citizens' of Alabama (Anderton intervenors), moved to intervene in the action. Pinto, 662 So.2d at 897. Within a month, the Pinto intervenors formally sought to join the action. In Pinto, of course, we held that the Pinto and Anderton intervenors were entitled to intervene in the remedy phase of this unique litigation, as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 24(a), [Ala. R. Civ. P.]. 662 So.2d at 900 (emphasis in original). Concurrently, we pointed out that the [Remedy Phase] order entered on December 3, 1993, did not constitute a final judgment. Id. at 898. In the interim between December 3, 1993, and October 6, 1995, this action included not only the present State parties, but also the Pinto and Anderton intervenors. Thus, although we conclude that this action suffered no infirmity through an absence of adversity, any infirmity allegedly attaching after Governor Hunt left the case was assuredly cured by the participation of the present State parties and the intervenors. See City of Springfield v. Washington Public Power Supply, 752 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.1985) (any doubt as to the existence of a justiciable controversy at the outset of the action was dispelled by the intervention of a party taking an adversarial position), cert. denied sub nom. DeFazio v. City of Springfield, 474 U.S. 1055, 106 S.Ct. 792, 88 L.Ed.2d 770 (1986); Associated General Contractors of America v. Laborers Int'l Union, 476 F.2d 1388, 1402-03 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1973); 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3530, at 319 (1984) (a case conceived in cooperation may be saved by intervention of a genuine adversary).
The State parties challenge the validity of the judgments on which both the Liability Phase and the Remedy Plan are based, arguing that they violate the separation of powers doctrine as primarily expressed in Ala. Const. 1901, §§ 42 and 43: [Section 42] The powers of the government of the State of Alabama shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another. [Section 43] In the government of this state, except in the instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men. This action is nonjusticable, it is contended, because it involves a political question one that is beyond the scope of the judiciary's constitutional role. In reality, this political-question argument is a composite of two separate inquiries. The first involves the power of the judiciary to review the constitutionality vel non of the school systemthe Liability Phase. The second involves the power of the judiciary to impose a remedy the Remedy Plan. In the following two subsections of this opinion, we shall address the issues implicated in each Phase.