Opinion ID: 1268063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Requirement of Finding Irreparable Injury

Text: Fry Roofing Company contends that the injunction issued by the district court is fatally deficient because the court made no finding that irreparable harm would result unless the injunction was issued. The following remarks of the trial court constitute the sole factual findings supporting the issuance of the injunction: Now, as to the injunction the Court finds that there was ample testimony and evidence in the case to justify the verdict of the jury; that the Court finds that the Fry Roofing Company was in violation of the State of Colorado law as to air pollution; that it was in violation of the cease and desist order ordered by the Air Pollution Board; and that they have had some four years to comply; that they made a half-hearted effort to comply by submitting plans or specifications for a so-called scrubbing operation which was unacceptable by the Air Pollution Board, which by the way, the statute says must approve it. It must be approved by the State Board. The granting of the injunction in this case was governed by section 25-7-118, C.R.S.1973, one of the two enforcement provisions of the Air Pollution Control Act of 1970. Section 25-7-118 provides that an injunction may be ordered [i]n the event any person fails to comply with a cease and desist order that is not subject to a stay pending administrative or judicial review . . . . See also Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. State, 179 Colo. 223, 499 P.2d 1176 (1972). The terms of the statute do not dictate that a showing of irreparable injury must be made prior to the granting of an injunction. Several courts have held, in varying contexts, that irreparable injury need not be shown when the injunction is sought pursuant to statute rather than by the rules of civil procedure. Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973); Murry v. American Standard, Inc., 488 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Central Carolina Bank and Trust Co., 431 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Hayes International Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); S.E.C. v. Globus International Ltd., 320 F.Supp. 158 (D.S.D.N.Y.1970); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F.Supp. 530 (W.D.Pa.1963), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). Analogously, this court has held that it is not necessary to prove irreparable injury or the threat thereof, where the suit is in behalf of the public. Conway-Bogue v. Bar Association, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); see also Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944). The legislative declaration of policy contained in section 25-7-102, C.R.S.1973 of the Air Pollution Control Act of 1970 states that the Act is intended to promote the public health, welfare, convenience, and comfort by attempting to achieve the maximum practical degree of air purity in every portion of the state. Moreover, the section concludes that the prevention, abatement, and control of air pollution. . . are matters of statewide concern and are affected with a public interest. . . . The injunction which was sought in this case was sought in behalf of the public, following 83 specific violations of Colorado air quality standards. The acts which the state is attempting to enjoin in this suit are imbued with great public importance. A violation of the air quality standards embodies, in any case, sufficient injury to the public interest to permit the injunctive remedy. Fry Roofing Company argues that C.R.C.P. 65(d) controls the granting of this injunction and that the form and scope of the injunction in this case violates the standards set forth in that rule. This proceeding, however, is a special statutory proceeding, and, therefore, any inconsistency between C.R.C.P. 65(d) and section 25-7-102, C.R.S.1973, is resolved in favor of the statutory section. C.R.C.P. 81(a); Brown v. Hansen, 177 Colo. 39, 493 P.2d 1086 (1972); City of Westminster v. District Court, 167 Colo. 263, 447 P.2d 537 (1968). In view of the stated public policy of the Act and the express criteria provided by section 25-7-118, C.R.S.1973, we hold that no showing of irreparable injury must be made prior to the granting of an injunction under this Act.