Opinion ID: 2297256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The prosecutorial misconduct prejudicially affected Kirkley.

Text: Having decided that the prosecutor made improper statements, we must next determine whether those statements prejudicially affected the defendant. Not every improper remark requires reversal. [31] Only comments that prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the defendant compromise the integrity and fairness of a trial. [32] In Hughes v. State , we adopted a three part test for determining the prejudicial effect of an improper statement: The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the (alleged) error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. [33] Baker reaffirmed the test with the further clarification that the test is applied in a fact intensive manner where one factor may outweigh the other two. [34] This was a close case focused on the question of whether Kirkley committed the charged offense of Attempted Robbery or the lesser included offense Attempted Theft. As described by the trial judge, the jury must find that Kirkley acted with the intent to prevent or overcome the resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or the defendant must have acted with the intent to compel the owner of the property or another person to deliver up the property. [35] The record demonstrates that Kirkley reached for the cash register twice. The first attempt resulted in Kirkley getting his fingers caught in the drawer as Stepro slammed it shut. Stepro thwarted the second attempted when she actually closed the drawer. Finally, as Kirkley reached into his waistband, Stepro yelled, which prompted Kirkley to look both ways and flee. It was not obvious, based on this factual record, [36] that Kirkley had formed the requisite intent to overcome resistance or compel delivery of the property. Because the State had the burden to prove either the element of intent to overcome resistance or to compel delivery beyond a reasonable doubt, this was a close case. [37] Second, the misconduct affected the crux of the casewhether Kirkley committed Attempted Robbery. By vouching for the State's case by validating the charging process, the prosecutor's improper statement affected the ultimate question at trial by implying personal superior knowledge beyond the evidence he presented that could not be inferred from the evidence presented thereby adversely affecting the presumption of innocence. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of a finding that the misconduct prejudicially affected the defendant. Finally, we consider any steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. Whenever this Court has found curative instructions effective, we have noted the speed with which the trial judge gave the instruction. In Boatson v. State , the defendant appealed on grounds that the prosecutor improperly introduced prejudicial statements that were neither in evidence nor made by the defendant. [38] We held that the prosecutor's remarks were improper but found no prejudice under Hughes because the trial judge's immediate and thorough instruction to the jury that it could disregard the statement mitigated the effects of the comments. [39] Edwards v. State found that the prosecutor's question Have you ever been with [defendant] when he raped a woman? was reprehensible misconduct. [40] Nonetheless, we did not reverse because the reaction of the Trial Judge was swift in an effort to negate any possible prejudice aroused in the jury's mind. [41] Because defense counsel alertly objected to the prosecutorial misconduct immediately after closing rebuttal argument, the trial judge had a chance to respond. The trial judge noted the objection but declined to take any immediate curative measures. Instead, the trial judge held, I will instruct the jury that what an attorney personally believes or thinks about the evidence is not relevant. So, I think, for the relatively mild transgression, even if it was a transgression which I'm not finding, it's sufficiently cured by the pattern instruction. [42] Later, the trial judge read the following as part of the jury instructions: An attorney may draw all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. However, it is not proper for an attorney to state his or her opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony, or evidence, or the guilt or innocence of an accused. What an attorney personally thinks or believes about the testimony or evidence in a case is not relevant; and you are instructed to disregard any personal opinion or belief concerning testimony or evidence which an attorney offers during opening or closing statements or at any other time during the course of the trial. [43] DeAngelis v. Harrison demands that we find a pattern jury instruction ineffective for curing misconduct in closing arguments. [44] In DeAngelis, a civil case, defense counsel equated plaintiff's claim of damages to winning a lottery ticket. Despite an objection, [t]he trial judge declined to give a specific instruction, noting that the comments of counsel were simply argument and the standard instruction to the jury not to treat the arguments of counsel as evidence would suffice. [45] This Court held that the comments were clearly objectionable and that the failure to provide a specific cautionary instruction created prejudice. [46] Therefore, [i]n the absence of an immediate cautionary instruction, the refusal to grant a new trial must be deemed an abuse of discretion. [47] The Kirkley pattern jury instruction failed to specifically address the source of the prejudice and even if it had, it was not sufficiently immediate to expunge the prejudicial impact of the prosecutor's statements. Just as the standard jury instruction failed to cure the objectionable misconduct in DeAngelis, we must hold that the Kirkley jury instruction failed to cure the prosecutorial misconduct. This was a close case focused on whether Kirkley committed Attempted Robbery or Attempted Theft. The prosecutor's improper statement affected the central issue in this case and the pattern jury instruction had no meaningful curative effect. Therefore, applying the Hughes test, the prosecutor's misconduct prejudicially affected Kirkley. Because we conclude that the misconduct warrants reversal, we do not reach or apply the Hunter test. [48] Finally, Kirkley brings a Cooke v. State claim. [49] He argues that defense counsel's statement I'm asking you to find Mr. Kirkley guilty, guilty of attempted theft felony conflicts with Kirkley's desire to pursue a not guilty because of involuntary intoxication defense. [50] As a result of our holding above, we need not reach the asserted Cooke issue.