Opinion ID: 2625941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue of juror misconduct?

Text: ¶ 10 Defendant argues that he must be granted a new trial because of prejudicial juror misconduct stemming from the bailiff's presentation of extrinsic evidence to the jury. ¶ 11 On September 13, 1999, the day the jury received the case, the trial court's bailiff quit her job. The next day, Defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming that the bailiff, in response to a question from a juror, had told the juror that Defendant was not in custody. The trial judge acknowledged that he had heard such a story but ruled that, even if such an exchange had occurred, it was not prejudicial. ¶ 12 After the verdict, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, setting forth several issues, including possible juror misconduct. Three weeks later, Defendant filed a supplemental motion, supported by affidavits from two jurors, alleging that during the trial the bailiff had told jurors that Defendant had tattoos around his wrists that looked like bracelets, a fact not part of the evidence presented at trial, and that the jurors discussed this information during their deliberations. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which ten of the twelve jurors who found Defendant guilty testified. Two jurors who deliberated were not present at the hearing. ¶ 13 During the hearing, it was revealed that while the trial was in progress, the bailiff had told at least one juror, E.C., that Defendant had tattoos on his wrists. Another juror testified that the bailiff pointed to Defendant's wrist during the trial, indicating the presence of tattoos. Testimony revealed that five other jurors overheard the bailiff's conversation with E.C. regarding the tattoos. Of the remaining six jurors who were not present during the conversation with the bailiff, three admitted that they later learned of the evidence, and a fourth, G.C., who testified that he was not aware of the extrinsic evidence, was impeached by an investigator who testified that G.C. told him about the conversations concerning the tattoos. Further evidence revealed that some of the jurors spent time during deliberations methodically watching surveillance videos from the Quick Mart in New Mexico looking for tattoos on the individual who used Ted Lindberry's credit card. ¶ 14 In response to questions from the trial judge, the ten jurors testified that they did not see any tattoos on the person in the videos. At the evidentiary hearing, Defendant's counsel played one of the videos from the Quick Mart to show that a tattoo could be seen. For the record, the trial judge indicated that Defendant has barbed wire tattoos on each wrist. ¶ 15 In a detailed minute entry, the trial judge found that [u]ndisputed evidence established that the jury engaged in misconduct by receiving and considering extrinsic information that was not admitted at trial. He also observed that when the Quick Mart videos are carefully examined and stop framed ... a bracelet, watch or bracelet type tattoo can be seen on [Defendant's] left wrist. The court noted, however, that despite the visible wrist mark, all jurors who testified that they looked for tattoos said that [though] the topic of whether any tattoos could be seen on the subject was discussed amongst the jurors ..., nobody said they saw any tattoos. Therefore, despite the court's having seen what might have been a bracelet type tattoo, the trial judge denied Defendant's motion, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic and inadmissible evidence that [Defendant] had tattoos around his wrists did not contribute to the jury verdicts of guilty. [Defendant] has failed to show that he suffered actual prejudice by this improper and extrinsic information being presented to and considered by the jury.
¶ 16 A trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial based on alleged jury misconduct generally will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 484, 917 P.2d 200, 213 (1996). However, a trial court may order a new trial if jurors receive extrinsic evidence not properly admitted during the trial. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 24.1(c)(3)(i). This court has adopted the Ninth Circuit's standard of review for such issues, which entitles a defendant to a new trial if the jury receives extrinsic evidence and it cannot be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict. State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 283, 645 P.2d 784, 798 (1982) (citing United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir.1979)). In applying that standard, this court observed that [a]ny private communication, contact or tampering with a juror gives rise to a strong presumption that the verdict has been tainted. State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555, 557, 875 P.2d 788, 790 (1994) (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-50, 13 S.Ct. 50, 52-53, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892)). We concluded that juror misconduct warrants a new trial if the defense shows actual prejudice or if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.  Id., at 558, 875 P.2d at 791 (citing State v. Vasquez, 130 Ariz. 103, 105, 634 P.2d 391, 393 (1981)). Once the defendant shows that the jury has received and considered extrinsic evidence, prejudice must be presumed and a new trial granted unless the prosecutor proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not taint the verdict. Id. at 558-60, 875 P.2d at 791-93.
¶ 17 At the evidentiary hearing in the case before us, the trial court correctly noted that Defendant bore the initial burden of proving that the jurors received and considered extrinsic evidence. In its ruling, the trial court stated that Defendant failed to show that he suffered actual prejudice. While the court's finding was correct as far as it went, the court failed to address the second part of the inquiry, whether prejudice could be fairly presumed from the facts of the case. Id. at 558, 875 P.2d at 791. ¶ 18 In this case, prejudice may be presumed from the facts, for [i]n a criminal case, any private communication, contact or tampering[,] directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 558-59, 875 P.2d at 791-92 (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451); cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality) (In capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability.); State v. Vickers, 138 Ariz. 450, 452, 675 P.2d 710, 712 (1984) (observing that death penalty cases are treated differently from non-death penalty cases, and finding an appearance of impropriety when a judge who sentenced a defendant to death in a prior case also tried the same defendant in a subsequent capital case). Most of the jurors received extrinsic evidence and considered it during deliberations. The improper evidence was provided to the jury by the trial court's bailiff. And, of course, we cannot know what effect the extrinsic evidence might have had on the two jurors who could not be found, or otherwise did not appear, for the evidentiary hearing. Thus, we cannot avoid the presumption of prejudice to Defendant. ¶ 19 This conclusion is strengthened by analyzing several factors the Ninth Circuit has identified to assist courts in determining whether extrinsic evidence has contributed to a verdict. Those factors are as follows: 1. whether the prejudicial statement was ambiguously phrased; 2. whether the extraneous information was otherwise admissible or merely cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial; 3. whether a curative instruction was given or some other step taken to ameliorate the prejudice; 4. the trial context; and 5. whether the statement was insufficiently prejudicial given the issues and evidence in the case. United States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1491-92 (9th Cir.1997)). Factor four, the trial context, includes whether the material was actually received, and if so, how; the length of time it was available to the jury; the extent to which the jurors discussed and considered it; whether the material was introduced before a verdict was reached, and if so at what point in the deliberations; and any other matters which may bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of whether the extrinsic material affected the verdict. Id. (quoting Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.1988)). ¶ 20 We find these factors instructive in the case at bar. While the first factor does not apply, analysis of the second, third, and fourth factors raises a significant concern regarding the impact of the extrinsic evidence on the outcome of this case. The tattoo evidence may have been admissible, but it was not admitted and would not have been merely cumulative of other evidence presented at trial. The only evidence tying Defendant to the Quick Mart in New Mexicoand therefore to the use of Lindberry's credit cardswas the video evidence. [4] The trial court's bailiff told several jurors, outside the trial setting, that Defendant had tattoos on his wrists, a fact never introduced into evidence and one that might have assisted the jurors in identifying Defendant as the person at the Quick Mart who was using Lindberry's credit cards. Several jurors considered and discussed this evidence and looked for tattoos on the individual by viewing the Quick Mart videos and still shots several times over several days. And finally, no curative instruction was given because the court did not know of the situation until after the verdict had been returned. Because Defendant claimed not to have been at the Quick Mart, and because the State offered no other evidence placing Defendant there, his identification as the person in the video was a contested fact that helped tie him to Lindberry's disappearance. ¶ 21 The fifth factorwhether the evidence was insufficiently prejudicial given the issues and evidence in the caseasks us to consider the evidence in the context of the case. The identity of the person in the video was vital to the State's case. Given Defendant's claim that it was not he, and given the lack of other evidence tying Defendant to Lindberry's disappearance, we cannot say that the evidence was insufficiently prejudicial. ¶ 22 Thus, three of the four applicable factors favor the conclusion that the evidence might have affected the verdict. Certainly nothing presented allows us to discount that possibility. ¶ 23 In assessing juror misconduct, this court accords deference to the trial judge who held the evidentiary hearing and was in the best position to assess the effect of the extrinsic evidence. See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 598, 858 P.2d 1152, 1201 (1993). Although cognizant of the trial court's advantage on this point, we are also mindful that two jurors who sat on the jury that convicted Defendant did not testify at the evidentiary hearing. We have held that the improper influence of even one juror taints a verdict. Miller, 178 Ariz. at 558, 875 P.2d at 791. Thus we cannot underestimate the possible improper effect of the evidence on the missing two jurors. Moreover, despite the jurors' statements that the evidence did not sway them, [t]he effect of extrinsic prejudicial evidence on a juror's deliberation may be substantial even though it is not perceived by the juror and a juror's good faith cannot counter this effect. Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1491 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 24 The trial judge found and it is clear from the transcript of the inquiry that jurors received extrinsic evidence of Defendant's tattoos and considered it during their deliberations. Indeed, the record shows that, individually and in small groups, the jurors scrutinized the videos looking for tattoos on the person in the Quick Mart videos. The record suggests and the trial judge expressly found that in a portion of the Quick Mart videos a bracelet tattoo can be seen on the person using Lindberry's credit card. This extrinsic evidence was improperly brought to the jurors' attention by the court's own bailiff. The identity of the subject in the Quick Mart videos was in question, as the defense at trial was that Defendant was not the perpetrator of the crimes at issue. These factors, coupled with the court's inability to provide a curative instruction or otherwise mitigate the impact of the extrinsic evidence, support rather than defeat the presumption of prejudice. ¶ 25 Although Defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, only a fair one, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), in this case the appearance of impropriety is strong. Dispositively, we cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the improperly introduced extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict. See Poland, 132 Ariz. at 283, 645 P.2d at 798. Under these circumstances, [t]he right to an impartial jury demands that [we] err in favor of defendant. Miller, 178 Ariz. at 560, 875 P.2d at 793. Therefore, we must reverse Defendant's conviction and remand for a retrial.