Opinion ID: 2402568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Cases Against Jones

Text: This appellant questions the legality of his arrest, the voluntariness of his confession, the sufficiency of the evidence and the absence of counsel at the taking of his confession. Claiming that the arrest took place when the police officer spoke to him as he was running away from the scene of the attempted holdup and suggested that he retrace his steps, it is contended that the officer had neither witnessed a misdemeanor being committed in his presence nor had probable cause to believe that a felony was being or had been committed at the time of the arrest. We think this was no more than an accosting and that the appellant was not placed under arrest until he was taken to the hospital and placed under police guard. At no time was there a touching and he was never told that he was under arrest. While he may have thought that he was under arrest when he was stopped and returned to the scene at the suggestion of the officer, he was not actually arrested until he was taken to the hospital to be treated for his injuries. See Cornish v. State, supra . We think there was sufficient probable cause for the police officer to believe that a felony had been committed and that the appellant had committed it. When the officer arrived at the scene, he not only learned of the abortive holdup but observed that the appellant was bleeding in the area of his abdomen as well as from the wound on his head. This, coupled with the flight of the appellant from the scene of the holdup and the subsequent refusal to say what had happened other than to indicate that he had been shot, was ample probable cause for the arrest. Young v. State, supra . The arrest was therefore legal. We must, nevertheless, determine whether the confession was freely and voluntarily made. On the day he was released from the hospital, the appellant, who was still in pain, was interrogated at the police station. The interrogation was begun in an overheated room but this condition was soon remedied. During the questioning, which lasted about three hours, the police, who were aware that the appellant was uncomfortable because of pain, offered to discontinue the taking of his confession, but the offer was declined and the questioning was continued. At the preliminary hearing, the interrogating officers testified that they used no force and made no promise or inducement to obtain the confession and denied making a threat to withhold medical treatment until he confessed. To the contrary, the appellant testified that the officers had kept on with the questioning despite his condition and indicated an intention to continue until he signed a statement. The appellant was never confronted with the robbery weapon or any part of it while the confession was being taken. Nor was he aware at that time of the fact that some of his codefendants had implicated him in their statements to the police. On this testimony the trial court found that the confession was voluntary and we cannot say, since there was here no showing that the will of the confessor was so overpowered as to render the confession involuntary, that the finding was clearly erroneous. Green v. State, 236 Md. 334, 203 A.2d 870 (1964). Even without the confession there was ample legally sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that this appellant had participated in the attempted robbery as well as the prior robbery of Howard's Liquor Store. An employee who had witnessed both crimes identified the appellant as one of the participants in both offenses. Identification by a single eyewitness is sufficient to convict. Coates v. State, 232 Md. 72, 191 A.2d 579 (1963). The final contention of the appellant that he was not afforded counsel at the taking of his confession has no merit. He makes no claim, nor does the record indicate, that counsel had either been retained or requested at that time. Furthermore, he was advised of his right to remain silent. See Mefford and Blackburn, supra . Under these circumstances, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which he cites as authority for the claim, is not applicable. The mere fact that an accused was without counsel at the time he made a confession would not of itself render the confession inadmissible. Bagley v. State, 232 Md. 86, 192 A.2d 53 (1963).