Opinion ID: 4217261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Avenues of Recovery.

Text: Medical malpractice is but a specific branch of the common law tort of negligence. In medical malpractice cases[,] the plaintiff must prove that the treatment given was below the degree of care and skill expected of a reasonably competent practitioner and that the negligence proximately caused injury or death. Reams v. Stutler, 642 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Ky. 1982) (citing Bla~r v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970)). Claims of negligence, or medical malpractice, against hospitals are not new causes of action. For example, plaintiffs are free to bring negligence claims against hospitals for Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) infections; premises liability issues; and for the hospital's negligence in sel~cting its staff. See, Stallins v. Hinton, 2015 WL 5316700 (Ky. App. September 11, 2015); Shelton v. Kentucky EasterSeals Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3.d 901 (Ky. 2013); Rlinois Cent. R. Co. v. Buchanan, 103 S.W. 272 (Ky. 1907). The structure in which hospitals are now operating has changed and this change has encouraged the push to recognize a specific cause of action - - ·negligent credentialing. Traditionally, hospitals were charitable organizations, non-profit, and recipients of state funding. Now, however, hospitals are becoming increasingly private·, for profit, and corporate in nature. Hospitals 12 are moving away from traditional physician employees and instead are granting _ \ hospital privileges to independent contractor physicians. What has remained constant is that hospitals are required to exercise ordin~ry care. Se7, Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. McKee, 834 S.W.2d 711, 722 \ . (Ky. App:-1992). Hospitals have a duty to make sure patients receive a medically acceptable standard of care, and this duty extends to making sure I qualified staff are providing the appropriate medical care. See, Rlinois Cent. R. Co. v. Buchanan, 103 S.W. 272, 274 (Ky. 1907). The hospital can certainly be liable· for its own negligence, separate and distinct from any negligence on the part of a physician - - even a non-employee physician. In Rlinois Cen.t. R. Co. v. Buchanan, the railroad established· a hospital to which it sent its sick, disabled, and injured employees. An employee brought an action on the grounds that surgeons and attendants at the hospital were incompetent and unskilled. The Court held: All of these persons are appointed by the railroad company; and, although the railroad company is not liable in damages for the negligence and carelessness or unskillfulness of any of its surgeons, physicians, or attendants in charge in their treatment and care of the employees received into the hospital, yet it is 0 bliged to exercise reasonable care in the selection of the persons who have charge of the patients; and, if it fails to select skillful and competent surgeons, physicians, and attendants, it may be required to respond in damages to any employee who has been injured by such incompetent or unskillful physicians, surgeons, or attendants. I.d. at 273. In the employment by a railroad company of its surgeons to attend to persons injured by its trains, the relation of master and servant, principal 13 ' J \ and agent, does not exist. And, if the.railroad company is careful and selects suitable surgeons, it is not re&p9nsible for their neglect or malpractice. Id. It is clear that the duty on hospitals to employ competent staff has existed in the qommonwealth at least since the beginning of the twentieth century. There is no need for this Court to establish a new tort specifically applying to hospitals. Like many negligence actions, a claim, of negligence • J against a hospital for the selection of its physicians is derivative of the medical malpractice claim against the physician. I Without proof that. the doctor ·) committed malpractice, the plaintiff will be unable to prove causation in the negligence action against the hospital. This is consistent with I liability being· imputed to a principal in vicarious liability actions, Branham v. Rock, 449 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky. 2014) (citing Cohen v. Alliant Enterprises, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Ky. 2001)2, as well as with the bifurcated trial practice in the jurisdictions that expressly recognize negligent credentialing as a separate tort. Kyle Deskus, Health Law - - Band-Aid Jurisprudence: Why the Recognition of Negligent Credentialing Threatens Patient Care in Massachusetts, 37 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 27, 36 (2015) (citing Schelling v. Humphrey, 916 N.E.2d 1029, 1035-36 (Ohio 2009)).3. 1 When we say the.case against a hospital is derivative, we mean that the plaintiff will have to prove the underlying harm, often against a negligent physician, which will often require litigation of a case within a case. However, we can envision a scenario where a negligence action against a hospital would not be derivative - of an action against - a physician or employee. \ ~ ' 2 [I]f the agent did not act negligently, there can be no vicarious liability imputed to the principal. ' 3 In Schelling, th~ Ohio Supreme Court explained that bifurcation would be beneficial because it avoids the problem of jury confusion or prejudice ... [and] also allows a negligent 14 Because the Court finds a new cause of action is not necessary for the plaintiffs' claims, we must now examine whether the plaintiffs' claims should have been dismissed by the trial court on other grounds. 1. Helen Adams. The trial court granted LCRH's motion for judgment on the pleadings ( finding that Adams's claim of negligent credentialing was not a recognized cause of action. No other grounds gave rise to the Pulaski Circuit Court's dismissal of Adams's claims, and therefore, the court erred. For that reason, we remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; 2. Karen Jones (now Epley). Spring View sought summary judgment on additional grounds that Jones filed her claim against Spring View more than two years after filing her claim against Dr. Bailey, thus, her claim was time-barred under the statute of ) limitations. The Marion Circuit Court denied Spring View's motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. An action against a hospital for negligence or malpractice shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued. KRS 413.140(1)(e). The discovery rule is a means by which to identify when a cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run on the date of the discovery of the injury, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have. credentialing. claim against a hospital to be dismissed if the plaintiff does not prevail in the initial malpractice action. 15 been discovered. Wiseman v. Alliant Hospitals, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Ky. 2000). It is important to note the distinction between injury and harm. Harm in the context of medical malpractice might be the loss of health foll.owing medical treatment. Injury, on the other hand, is defined as 'the invasion of any legally protected interest of another'. Wiseman, 37 S.W.3d at 712. The injury in the medical malpractice context refers to the actual wrongdoing, or the . - malpractice itself. Id. Under the discovery rule, it is the date of the actual or constructive knowledge of the injury which triggers the running of the statute of limitations. Id. (citing Hall v. Musgrave, 517 F.2d 1163, ·1168 (6th Cir. 1975)(Celebrezze, J·., dissenting)): This distinction is important because it underscores the fact that Jones's claim against Spring View did not n~cessarily accrue at the same time as her claim against Dr. Bailey. Spring View argues that Jones's claim accrued on ,, August 3, 2009, when Jones learned from another doctor, Dr. Sewall, that other patients had complaints about Dr. Bailey. This argument is flawed because it conflates the facts which might have given rise to Jones's claim against Dr. Bailey with those that would have given rise to her claim against Spring View. The same applies to Spring View's next contention that Jones?s claim accrued in 2010 when Jones read about the Spaldings' claims in the local newspaper. Spdng View additionally argues that Jones's claim is barred because Jones's lawyer had knowledge about possible fault on the part of Spring View 16 and such knowledge would be imputed to Jones. Jones and the Spaldings were both represented by the same attorney. The Spaldings filed their claims against Dr. Bailey and Spring View prior to Jones filing her ~laims. The general rule that an attorney's knowledge may be imputed to his or her client is subject to a number of exceptions. Accordingly, knowledge which an attorney obtained in transactions independent of his or her representation of the client is not imputed to the J client, and a client is not affected with notice because of knowledge obtained by the attorney from outside _source,s and not in the course ofhis or her employment, as, for example, where the, knowledge is acquired by the attorney·in the performance of professional services for another. Nor is the client affected by knowledge acquired, or notice received, by the attorney before the commencement of the attorney-client relationship. 3M Co. v. Engle, 328 S.W.3d 184, 189, fn. 26 (Ky. 2010): Jones maintains that she did not become aware of a possible claim against Spring View until 2012, when Spring'View responded to discovery in the Spalding case admitting that Dr. Bailey did not meet the requirements of Spring View's bylaws. The Court of Appeals held that Jones was not clearly on notice of her cause of action against Spring View before March 30, 2012, and these circumstances at least raise genuine issues of material fact, inappropriate for granting a sum:rp.ary judgment motion. On this issue, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals: Jones's claim clearly falls into the exception discussed in the Engle footnote above. The knowledge of Jones's attorney cannot be imputed to her because any such knowledge was acquired by the attorney in providing services for another client. Summary judgment is inappropriate .as to this issue. Because we affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment for Spring View based on the statute of limitations, and 17 because we find that Jones can proceed with her action against Spring View, ·we remand Jones's case to the Marion Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 3. Joseph and Joyce Spalding. a. Settlement. The Spaldings filed suit against Dr. Bailey and Spring View on January · 11, 2010. On October 14, 2011, Dr. Bailey filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and . the Spaldings agreed to dismiss their claim against Dr. Bailey by agreed order entered January 4, 2013. There was no stipulation to liability or fault in the agreed order as to Dr. Bailey: Spring View contended at the trial court that, because Dr. Bailey was dismissed from the case without any establishment of fault on his part, Spring View would be prejudiced by having to defend Dr. Bailey in the negligent credentialing trial. The trial court was not sympathetic to Spring View's arguments, and neither is this Court. w·e adopt the reasoning of the Marion Circuit, Court that settlement with the doctor without an admission of fault is not a bar to prosecuting the _claim against the hospital. As t~e trial court noted, KRS 411.182(4) addresses the procedure when one defendant settles in a tort case. The case against the remaining defendants proceeds as usual. 4 _This is not a case where the dismissal of an agent also relieves the master of 4 KRS 411.182(4) states: A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable, shall discharge that person from all liability for contribution, but it shall not be considered to discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons shall be reduced by the amount of the released persons' equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of this section. 18 liability. This is so because the Spaldings' claim against the hospital arises from the hospital's own alleged negligence. b. Circular Indemnification. When Dr. Bailey filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Joseph and Joy~e Spalding, and Spring View, were named as creditors. The Spaldings \ subsequently entered into a Release and Settlement of Claims (Settlement) with Dr. Bailey. Pertinent parts of the Settlement state: Although it appears that any claigi of indemnity by any person or party, including the potential claim ofindemnity of Spring View Hospital, LLC, is now barred and the commencement of any such action enjoined by 11 U.S.C. § 524, to the ext.ent of the personal liability of Daniel E. Bailey, Jr., M.D., and resultant exposure of The Medical Protective Company, if any, and only to such extent, Joseph Spalding and Joyce Spalding, further agree to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless the Released Parties, from 1 any and all claims, ,suits, third party claims, cross-claims, claims for indemnity or contribution, or any other actions, causes of action, known or unknown, presently or at any future time made ' against the Released Parties by any person, entity, insurance co.mpany, corporation, agency,-governmental agency, hospital or organization, including but not limited to Spring View Hospital LLC, arising out of or in connection with the above-mentioned alleged incident and fawsuit. The terms recited. herein should not be construed. to release any claims that Joseph Spalding and Joyce Spalding may have against any other potentially liable party, including, but not limited to, Spring View Hospital LLC, and it is the intent of the parties that said claims are expressly reserved. Furthermore, any payments made in accordance with the terms of this Settlement will serve as only partial satisfaction of the injuries sustained by Joseph Spalding and Joyce Spalding, and this agreement should not be constru.ed to cause a forfeiture of the right of Joseph Spalding and Joyce Spalding to seek full satisfaction of said injuries from any other potentially liable party, including, but not limited to, Spring View Hospital LLC. · .Spring View argued that the Spaldings' indemnification of Dr. Bailey in the Settlement would preclude any claim or award against Spring View under 19 / the circular indemnity argument established in Crime Fighters Patrol v. Hines, 740 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1987). The present case differs from Hines. Any claim of indemnity Spring View possessed was extinguished when the Bankruptcy Court entered ·an order extinguishing all debts, actual or potential, ag~inst Dr. ' Bailey. Creditors of the debtors are parties to a bankruptcy proceeding. Cadle Company v. Gasbusters Production I Limited Partnersfup, 509 S. W .3d . . 713, 719 (Ky. App. 2016) (citing Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc., v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 481 (6th Cir. 1992)). Spring View made no attempt to except its potential indemnity claim from discharge in the pankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, we find that any claim of indemnity held on behalf of Spring View was terminated with the remainder of Dr. Bailey's debt in the January 18, 2012 Order from the Bankruptcy Court. c. Expert Witness. In granting Spring View's motion for summary judgment, the Marion Circuit Court based its decision, in part, on its review of the deposition testidiony of Kathy Matzka, the Spaldings' e:x;pert. ·The trial court found that Ms. Matzka's testimony was insufficient to establish a jury question regarding the hospital's violation of the standard of care. The trial court stated that if it were to adopt Ms. Matzka's reasonin'g, that hospitals create a higher standard of liability when the hospital establishes a higher standard for credentialing, it would discourage hospital's from setting higher standards. Although not stated in its order, it.appears that the trial court also found that Ms. Matzka was not qualified as an expert. _The issue of qualification is not before this Court, so we 20 need not address it~ however, because we agree that Ms. Matzka's testimony stated an erroneous standard of care, we affirm the trial court's finding that the testimony could not be presented to the jury. Under Kentucky law, a plaintiff alleging medical malpracticei~. gen~rally required to put forth expert testimony to show th~t the defendan~ medical provider failed to conform to the standard of care. Love v. Walker, 423 S.W.3d 751, 756 (Ky. 2014) (citing Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 655-56 (Ky. 199.2)). The trial court cited Rogers v. Kasdan in its order granting Spring ·View's summarjr judgment moti~n, again, focusing on the idea that the hospital's established policies do not heighten the standard of ca.re. We agree with the trial court that Spring View's bylaws do not create a higher standard of care or otherwise alter its liability. In Rogers, the trial court instructed the jury on the duty to exercise that degree ofcare ordinarily used byhospitals under circumstances like or similar to those shown in this case. 612 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Ky .. 1981). The trial court . went on to add additional duties relating to the hospital maintaining appropriate procedures. Id. at 135-36. The Court found these additional duties and instructions to be in error because they failed to meet the bare bones instruction test. Id. at 136. Whether the hospital hired knowledgeable nurses, or had proper supervision fpr staff physicians, or accurate record keeping, and so forth, were all evidently questions for the jury to consider. While they constituted criteria the jury might use to decide the question of 21 ordinary care, listing them in this manner was not necessary to pose the issue of the hospital's duty. 1d. .It is our conclusion that the jury should be instructed that the defendant was under a duty to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the . same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances. Under the standard just expressed, the evidence may include the elements of locality, availability of facilities, specialization or general practice, proximity of specialists and special facilities as well as other relevant considerations. Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970). Ms. Matzka's testimony regarding the hospitals bylaws and procedures does not create an entitlement to a specific jury instruction on the duty to follow those bylaws and procedures, and because this Court declines to recognize a new cause of acticin or a new express duty relating to hospitals, the instruction remains that as outlined above· in Blair. In examining Ms. Matzka's deposition testimony, the Court notes that Ms. Matzka did not a<;;curately testify as to the standard of c~re for a hospital in medical negligence cases. Q. Do you know - - did they require - - did that hospital require board certification?