Opinion ID: 2766861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comment on the Defendant’s Silence

Text: [¶15] Jeffrey argues that the State improperly introduced his post-arrest silence by eliciting the officer’s testimony (1) that Jeffrey did not report during the OUI investigation that he drank alcohol after going off the road, and (2) that the officer did not hear Jeffrey’s account of drinking after going off the road until the OUI trial. He also argues that the State impermissibly commented on his silence during its closing argument when it asked the jury to consider the context of Jeffrey’s statements, including “what was said before” and “what was said after.” He contends that this comment and the elicitation of this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV. The State contends that these references constituted a proper attack on Jeffrey’s credibility. [¶16] “The trial court is vested with broad discretion in controlling the mode of examining witnesses.” Ricci v. Delehanty, 1998 ME 231, ¶ 17, 719 A.2d 518; see M.R. Evid. 611(a). “Absent an abuse of discretion [that] interferes with the rights of a party to a fair trial, we will uphold the trial court’s decisions 2 The jury also found David guilty of perjury and he too appealed from his conviction. We address David’s appeal in a separate opinion. See State v. Wyman, 2015 ME 2, --- A.3d ---. 9 concerning the scope and manner of examination of witnesses.” State v. McKenna, 1998 ME 49, ¶ 3, 707 A.2d 1309. We thus review the court’s denial of Jeffrey’s motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Logan, 2014 ME 92, ¶ 14, 97 A.3d 121. Because Jeffrey did not object at trial to the prosecutor’s alleged reference to his silence during closing argument, we review that portion of his claim for obvious error. See State v. Johnson, 472 A.2d 1367, 1374 (Me. 1984). [¶17] “A prosecutorial reference to silence by the accused may, under certain circumstances, require a new trial.” Id. at 1373. However, when a defendant gives a statement to the police that conflicts with an exculpatory statement presented at trial, the State may inquire into the defendant’s failure to give the exculpatory statement to the police because such inquiry draws a negative inference from the prior inconsistent statement rather than from the defendant’s failure to speak. United States v. Donnat, 311 F.3d 99, 104-05 (1st Cir. 2002). When a defendant is accused of perjury at trial, a disparity between the defendant’s pretrial statements and his testimony at trial is also admissible for the purpose of showing that the defendant testified falsely at trial. See State v. Doughty, 399 A.2d 1319, 1325 (Me. 1979) (concluding that, in a perjury case, a disparity between the defendant’s pretrial conduct and her conduct at trial is admissible to prove the elements of perjury and to impeach). 10 [¶18] Before he was arrested for OUI on April 20, 2011, Jeffrey told the officer who had responded to his single-vehicle accident that he had consumed one beer that morning at 8:30. During the OUI trial, he explained his intoxication at the time the officer found him by testifying that he had drunk eight beers after going off the road at 9:38 a.m. During the perjury trial, the court allowed the State to elicit and refer to testimony by the arresting officer that highlighted the discrepancy between Jeffrey’s pre-arrest statement and his testimony during the OUI trial. Because the perjury trial turned on the truth of Jeffrey’s testimony during the OUI trial, the court determined that the discrepancy between Jeffrey’s pre-arrest statement and his testimony during the OUI trial was relevant to show the elements of perjury and to impeach Jeffrey by a prior inconsistent statement. [¶19] The State’s initial inquiry into Jeffrey’s failure to tell the officer that he became intoxicated after going off the road followed the officer’s testimony that Jeffrey reported before his arrest that he had consumed one beer at 8:30 a.m. The inquiry, when viewed in context, appears to have been made for the dual purposes of proving the falsity of Jeffrey’s testimony at the OUI trial and impeaching Jeffrey’s credibility by a prior inconsistent statement. The prosecutor’s reference to this information during his closing argument as “what was said before” and “what was said after” must likewise be understood to compare Jeffrey’s pre-arrest statement with his testimony at trial for the same dual purposes. Therefore, both in 11 its examination of the officer and in its final argument, the State cannot be seen to have commented on or referred to Jeffrey’s silence in violation of his constitutional rights. [¶20] The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to declare a mistrial following the officer’s testimony that Jeffrey did not report drinking after going off the road. We also find no error in the prosecutor’s reference to this testimony during the State’s closing argument.