Opinion ID: 2607582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: False Light Invasion of Privacy and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Text: Arizona has turned to Restatement § 46 to define intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as the tort of outrage. Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 43, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (1987). This section provides: (1) one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. The element of extreme and outrageous conduct requires that plaintiff prove defendant's conduct exceeded all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ... and [caused] mental distress of a very serious kind. PROSSER & KEETON § 12, at 60. This standard distinguishes true claims from false ones, and ... the trifling insult or annoyance from the serious wrong. Prosser, Mental Suffering, 37 MICH.L. REV. 874, 877 (1939); see also Restatement § 46 comments b, d, and f. The court of appeals has advanced two main reasons to justify imposing the intentional infliction standard on privacy actions. First, because the basis of the wrong in both outrage and invasion of privacy is infliction of mental suffering, the two torts are substantively similar and the same standard should apply to both. Cluff, 10 Ariz. App. at 564, 460 P.2d at 670; see also Davis v. First National Bank of Arizona, 124 Ariz. 458, 462-63, 605 P.2d 37, 41-42 (Ct.App. 1979). Second, the court suggested that the rule was necessary to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the stringent standards necessary to otherwise establish a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rutledge, 148 Ariz. at 557, 715 P.2d at 1245. This stricter standard was necessary to protect defendants from unwarranted lawsuits. Duhammel, 133 Ariz. at 561, 653 P.2d at 18. Here, as in the above cases, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' privacy claims for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Rutledge and holding that the acts of which plaintiffs complained were not outrageous. Minute Entry (filed June 18, 1986). Assuming the court was correct on the evidence, we must determine whether it correctly required plaintiffs to prove the tort of outrage in a privacy action. Publishers emphasize that actions for both intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy provide compensation for emotional distress or damage to sensibility. Cf. Restatement §§ 46 and 652E. Thus, the injury from both torts is similar. Although this may be true, the fact that two different actions address the same injury is no reason to refuse to recognize torts that protect against different wrongful conduct. For example, three victims may suffer broken legs in the following ways: (1) a defendant negligently drives a car into the first victim's car; (2) a defendant's defective product injures the second victim; and (3) a defendant, without justification, attacks the third. Each victim would have a different tort claim: negligence, strict liability, and battery. The fact that each victim suffers the same type of injury does not preclude recognizing separate tort actions. Each tort theory developed separately to deter and provide redress against a different type of wrongful conduct. Thus, the fact that outrage and invasion of privacy both provide redress for emotional injury does not persuade us that the actions are merged or that plaintiffs should be required to prove the former in an action for the latter. The outrage tort protects against conduct so extreme that it would induce an average member of the community ... to exclaim, `outrageous!' Restatement § 46 comment d. False light invasion of privacy, however, protects against the conduct of knowingly or recklessly publishing false information or innuendo that a reasonable person would find highly offensive. Although false publication may constitute outrageous conduct and vice versa, it is also true that the same wrongful conduct will not always satisfy the elements of both tort actions. See Note, supra, 30 ARIZ.L.REV. at 342. Because each action protects against a different type of tortious conduct, each has its place, and the common injury should not abrogate the action. See id. Nor do we believe that recognizing the false light action without requiring plaintiffs to prove outrage will circumvent the stringent standards of the emotional distress tort. See Rutledge, 148 Ariz. at 557, 715 P.2d at 1245. The standards for proving false light invasion of privacy are quite stringent by themselves. For example, the plaintiff in a false light case must prove that the defendant published with knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See Restatement § 652E. This standard is as stringent as the intentional infliction of emotional distress requirement that the plaintiff prove the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the emotional distress. See Restatement § 46. We also do not share the court of appeals' concern with creating unwarranted lawsuits. Freeing a plaintiff from the need to prove outrageous conduct in a privacy suit does not require us to provide a remedy for every trivial indignity. See Prosser, supra, 37 MICH.L.REV. at 877. A defendant is not liable in a false light case unless the publication places the plaintiff in a false light highly offensive to a reasonable person. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967); Restatement § 652E. Thus, the plaintiff's subjective threshold of sensibility is not the measure, and trivial indignities are not actionable. We conclude, therefore, that the two torts exist to redress different types of wrongful conduct. Situations exist where a jury could find the defendant's publication of false information or innuendo was not outrageous but did satisfy the false light elements. See Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U.L.REV. 364 (1989). Thus, we believe the tort action for false light invasion of privacy provides protection against a narrow class of wrongful conduct that falls short of outrage, but nevertheless should be deterred.