Opinion ID: 4519362
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The exercise of an administrative

Text: function involving the determination of fundamental governmental policy. Id. By implication, the Public Entities Act may accept liability for all other claims against the state and its subdivisions. Redgrave argues that Arizona does not enjoy sovereign immunity from her FLSA claims because the setting of independent providers’ pay and hours is neither a judicial function, nor a legislative function, nor a determination of fundamental government policy. There appears to be no controlling precedent specifying that ALTCS’s compensation of independent providers is not a fundamental government policy. Nor is it apparent to us whether section 12-820.01 even governs the question of Arizona’s immunity from FLSA claims. 1 In the view of the State’s counsel and the decision of the district court, the Public Entities Act waives only Arizona’s sovereign immunity from tort liability. The district court read the 1963 Stone decision as having abrogated “governmental immunity from tort liability” only. Stone, 381 P.2d at 109; see Redgrave, 2018 WL 4931722, at . Under this view, the Public Entities Act, which was initially proposed by the Governor’s Commission on Governmental Tort Liability, created an exception to Stone’s abrogation and selectively reasserted governmental tort immunity. See Glazer v. State, 347 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. 2015); City of Tucson v. Fahringer, 795 P.2d 819, 820 (Ariz. 1990) (calling the Public Entities Act a “tort claims act”). Thus, the district court concluded that Arizona retains its inherent right to immunity from non-tort claims, including, of course, FLSA claims. Redgrave, 2018 WL 4931722, at . 10 REDGRAVE V. DUCEY Despite Stone’s focus on tort claims, the Public Entities Act itself may occupy the field of Arizona’s law of sovereign immunity. See Backus v. State, 203 P.3d 499, 502 (Ariz. 2009); City of Phoenix v. Fields, 201 P.3d 529, 532 (Ariz. 2009) (calling the Public Entities Act “a comprehensive statutory scheme governing actions against public entities and employees”). Indeed, many references to “tort liability” were removed from the bill during the drafting process, indicating a legislative purpose to define state sovereign immunity more broadly. Compare Governor’s Comm’n on Governmental Tort Liability, Ariz. Governmental Tort Claims Act (Dec. 16, 1983), with 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1091–94; cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”). However, the remaining reference to tort immunity—in the residual “other immunities” provision—could be understood to limit the Public Entities Act’s scope to tort claims. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-820.05(A) (stating that the Public Entities Act “shall not be construed to affect, alter or otherwise modify any other rules of tort immunity regarding public entities and public officers as developed at common law and as established under the statutes and the constitution of this state” (emphasis added)). Arizona courts have from time to time applied the Public Entities Act’s provisions to non-tort claims. E.g., Fields, 201 P.3d at 531, 534 (applying the Public Entities Act’s requirement under section 12-821.01(A) that a person with claims against a public entity make a settlement demand within 180 days—not an immunity provision—to class claims for constructive fraud, breach of contract, and failure REDGRAVE V. DUCEY 11 to pay wages); 1 Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 146 P.3d 1016, 1022, 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006), vacated on other grounds, 165 P.3d 168 (Ariz. 2007) (holding that, under section 12-820.01(A), the legislature but not the Board of Regents was immune from lawsuit alleging that tuition hikes violated the Arizona Constitution); Pima County v. State, 850 P.2d 115, 118 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that the state auditor general did not enjoy legislative immunity from Pima County’s challenge to its calculation of the county’s statutorily required contribution to a health care fund). However, it is not apparent from these cases whether the state defendants raised the issue of the Public Entities Act’s application to non-tort claims. 2 Another possibility is that the Public Entities Act effects a waiver of Arizona’s state sovereign immunity from both tort claims and non-tort claims but that such a waiver is limited to claims arising out of state law—in other words that Arizona specifically retains its immunity from federal law claims like those in this case. Such a reading is supported by the Public Entities Act’s enacted statement of purpose, in which the Legislature declared it “to be the public policy of this state that public entities are liable for the acts or omissions of public employees in accordance with the statutes and common law of this state.” 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1091–92 (emphasis added). Insofar as the scope of the Public Entities Act’s provisions is ambiguous, the enacted statement of purpose may suggest that the Act does not govern immunity from federal claims. Cf. Antonin Scalia & 1 Fields might be especially relevant because the grounds of an Arizona law claim of failure to pay wages are similar to those of the FLSA claims in this case. 201 P.3d at 531. 12 REDGRAVE V. DUCEY Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 218 (2012) (“[T]he prologue does set forth the assumed facts and the purposes that the majority of the enacting legislature . . . had in mind, and these can shed light on the meaning of the operative provisions that follow.”). 3 Finally, we are unsure whether to read the Public Entities Act by applying the usual rule of construction that a sovereign does not subject itself to liability unless it does so explicitly. “[A] waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 146–50 (2010) (describing the long history of the canon requiring a clear statement before interpreting a law to override sovereign immunity). Yet the Arizona Supreme Court may have flipped the traditional rule—at least in dicta. According to the Court, “governmental liability is the rule in Arizona and immunity is the exception . . . [w]e therefore construe immunity provisions narrowly.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. State, 24 P.3d 1269, 1271 (Ariz. 2001). It is not apparent, however, whether the canon is only reversed as to tort claims (if at all). See, e.g., Fahringer, 795 P.2d at 820 (stating the rule as “when a government entity or employee is a defendant in a tort action, ‘the rule is liability and immunity is the exception’” (quoting Stone, 381 P.2d at 112)).