Opinion ID: 2353917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicable Statute/Standards of Review

Text: Finding that Inkelaar preserved this evidentiary issue for appeal, we begin our discussion with the language of K.S.A. 60-455 and the applicable standards of review. The version of K.S.A. 60-455 in effect at the time of the alleged crimes and during Inkelaar's trial is as follows: Subject to K.S.A. 60-447 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his or her disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion but, subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448 such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. K.S.A. 60-455. It should be noted that the legislature amended the statute effective April 30, 2009. See L.2009, ch. 103, sec. 12; K.S.A.2010 Supp. 60-455. Neither party, however, argues the amendment's relevance to the issues before this court. Thus, the amendment will not be discussed. As provided by K.S.A. 60-455, although evidence of prior crimes or civil wrongs cannot be admitted to prove a criminal defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime, it can be `admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact.' State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 12, 169 P.3d 1069 (2007) (quoting K.S.A. 60-455). Several steps are required in determining whether evidence was properly admitted under the statute. See State v. Wells, 289 Kan. 1219, 1226-27, 221 P.3d 561 (2009); State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 940-42, 190 P.3d 937 (2008); State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 3, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). The court must determine that the fact to be proven is material, e.g., concerning intent, motive, knowledge, or identity. In other words, the court must determine whether the fact `has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case.' State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 14, 169 P.3d 1069 (2007). Our standard of review for materiality is de novo. State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 505, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). The court must also determine whether the material fact is disputed. Reid, 286 Kan. at 505 [186 P.3d 713]; Garcia, 285 Kan. at 14, [169 P.3d 1069] (`[T]he element or elements being considered ... must be substantially at issue in the case.'). The court must also determine whether the evidence is relevant to prove the disputed material fact, i.e., whether it has `any tendency in reason to prove' that fact. K.S.A. 60-401(b); Reid, 286 Kan. at 505 [186 P.3d 713]. This court reviews relevancein particular, the probative element of 60-455for abuse of discretion. Reid, 286 Kan. at 507 [186 P.3d 713]. The court must next determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for producing undue prejudice. Reid, 286 Kan. at 503 [186 P.3d 713]. Our standard for reviewing this determination is also abuse of discretion. Reid, 286 Kan. at 512 [186 P.3d 713] (citing Garcia, 285 Kan. at 18 [169 P.3d 1069]). Finally, if the presented evidence meets all of these requirements, then the trial court must give a limiting instruction `informing the jury of the specific purpose for [the evidence's] admission.' Garcia, 285 Kan. at 12 [169 P.3d 1069]. State v. Hollingsworth, 289 Kan. 1250, 1258, 221 P.3d 1122 (2009).