Opinion ID: 2601821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Intervening Cause and Comparative Negligence

Text: First, Nurse Deruy and Dr. Paoni ask us to determine whether intervening causea common-law liability shifting devicecontinues to be valid when Kansas' comparative negligence statuteanother form of a liability shifting deviceapplies. They contend that the Court of Appeals' decision alters these principles and, in effect, prohibits defendants from simultaneously raising the affirmative defense of intervening cause and the defense of comparative fault. We disagree with Nurse Deruy's and Dr. Paoni's proposition that the Court of Appeals established such a narrow rule of law. Instead, the Court of Appeals merely determined that the intervening cause doctrine did not apply under the facts of this case. Moreover, in Hale, this court recently settled the question of whether the adoption of comparative negligence in Kansas rendered it unnecessary to determine whether a party's negligence was the proximate cause of injuries to a plaintiff. In so doing, the court rejected the contention that the legal proceeding, without regard to proximate cause, determines the percentage of causation attributable to the various parties. Hale, 287 Kan. at 321-23, 197 P.3d 438. Further, the Hale court rejected an expansive approach that would require a plaintiff to merely be able to prove that injury resulting from the defendant's conduct was foreseeable and that the defendant's conduct contributed to the injury. Such an approach, according to Hale, would greatly increase the number of potential defendants in negligence actions and the affiliated litigation costs. Hale, 287 Kan. at 323-24, 197 P.3d 438. Instead, the court reiterated that `[p]roximate cause is not an obsolete concept in Kansas law.' [Citation omitted.] Hale, 287 Kan. at 323, 197 P.3d 438. Finally, the Hale court concluded that `[i]ntervening and superseding causes, which cut off liability for earlier negligence, are still recognized in extraordinary cases. ' [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis added.) Hale, 287 Kan. at 323, 197 P.3d 438; see also Godbee v. Dimick, 213 S.W.3d 865, 884 (Tenn.App.2006) (`[T]he superseding cause doctrine can be reconciled with comparative negligence. Superseding cause operates to cut off the liability of an admittedly negligent defendant, and there is properly no apportionment of comparative fault where there is an absence of proximate causation.' 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-3, pp. 165-166 [2d ed.1994].). In addition, intervening cause survives the adoption of comparative negligence because nonnegligent conduct can be an intervening cause. For example, intentional tortious conduct, criminal acts of third parties, and forces of nature can be intervening causes. See, e.g., Llewellyn v. City of Knoxville, 33 Tenn.App. 632, 646-47, 232 S.W.2d 568 (1950) (The intervening cause might be either a negligent or nonnegligent act of somebody else, an act of a child, a lunatic, or an act of God.); see generally, Schlosser, Intervening-Cause Defense: Is It Still Viable Under Comparative Fault?, 42 Res Gestae 16, 19 (July 1998) (discussing cases involving intervening actions that were nonnegligent or were negligent but unforeseeable). Kansas precedent, bolstered by persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, leads to the conclusion that the existence of comparative fault in our state does not automatically preclude a party from simultaneously raising the theory of intervening cause.