Opinion ID: 853409
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Kilpatrick does not contest his conviction for aggravated battery. He contends, however, that his convictions for murder, attempted robbery, and criminal gang activity are not supported by sufficient evidence. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Brown v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1157, 1158 (Ind.1999). Rather, we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict and will affirm the conviction if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Kilpatrick's chief complaint concerns the testimony of Tommy Thompson. Contending that Thompson was the only witness to testify concerning the murder and attempted robbery, Kilpatrick argues that Thompson's testimony is impossible to believe, and is insufficient to support a conviction. Br. of Appellant at 28. Kilpatrick's claim amounts to an invocation of the incredible dubiosity rule. Under this rule, a court will impinge upon the jury's responsibility to judge witness credibility only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity. Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind.1994); Gaddis v. State, 253 Ind. 73, 80-81, 251 N.E.2d 658, 661-62 (1969). Application of this rule is limited to cases, such as Gaddis, where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant's guilt. Tillman, 642 N.E.2d at 223. In this case, Thompson testified that he arrived on the scene after a fight between Crafter and several other men had begun and that he hit Crafter only once. R. at 342, 346. By contrast, two other witnesses testified that Thompson participated more actively in the beatings. R. at 274, 457. Thompson testified that Ferrell and Kilpatrick beat Crafter but did not mention anyone else. R. at 344. On the other hand, other witnesses testified that four or five persons participated in the beating. R. at 272-73, 425. No witness other than Thompson testified that Kilpatrick stabbed Crafter; however, no blood was found on Kilpatrick's clothing, which according to Kilpatrick, one might expect given the tremendous amount of blood that Crafter lost. On this latter point, the record shows the clothing that was tested for bloodstains was clothing Kilpatrick wore at the time of his arrest three weeks after the stabbing. R. at 541, 562, 649. Further, Thompson as well as another State's witness testified that on the night of the stabbing Kilpatrick removed the clothes he was wearing and placed them in a trash bag. R. at 376, 449-50. In any event, although Thompson's testimony was inconsistent in several respects with the testimony of other witnesses, it was not equivocal and Thompson did not contradict himself on the stand. Rather, the record shows that even though Kilpatrick thoroughly cross-examined Thompson, he nonetheless stuck by his account of the events occurring on the night of the fatal stabbing. R. at 380-86. See Berry v. State, 703 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ind.1998) (declining to apply the incredible dubiosity rule where there were inconsistencies in the testimony among witnesses but no one witness contradicted himself). Further, in addition to Thompson's testimony, one other witness testified that Kilpatrick went through Crafter's pockets after knocking him to the ground with a block of ice. R. at 275-76. It is for the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide which witnesses to believe or disbelieve. Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 320 (Ind.1993). If the testimony believed by the trier of fact is enough to support the verdict, then the reviewing court will not disturb it. Id. In this case the jury apparently believed Thompson's testimony. His testimony coupled with the testimony of other witnesses was sufficient to support a guilty verdict for murder and attempted robbery. We therefore affirm Kilpatrick's convictions for these offenses. We have a different view, however, concerning Kilpatrick's conviction for criminal gang activity. In order to convict a defendant of criminal gang activity, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual: (1) is an active member of a group with five or more members which promotes, sponsors, assists in, participates in, or requires as a condition of membership or continued membership the commission of a felony or an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, (2) has knowledge of the group's criminal advocacy, and (3) has a specific intent to further the group's goals. See Ind.Code §§ 35-45-9-1, -3. The State presented substantial evidence that Kilpatrick was a member of a gang: an acquaintance testified Kilpatrick was a member of the Vice Lords gang, R. at 333-35; a patrolman with the Indianapolis Police Department testified he had previously completed a gang contact sheet on Kilpatrick based on known associates, colors, and tattoo identifiers indicating gang affiliation, R. at 670; and a detective assigned to the Metro Gang Task Force testified concerning Kilpatrick's affiliation with the Vice Lords, basing his opinion on the number, type, and location of tattoos on Kilpatrick's body. R. at 713. The State also linked the Vice Lords gang to criminal activity. R. at 703. To sustain a conviction under a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, there must be sufficient evidence on each material element. Grace v. State, 731 N.E.2d 442, 445 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied. Here, the State presented no evidence that Kilpatrick had the specific intent to further the gang's criminal goals when he stabbed and attempted to rob Crafter. The State's case consisted only of evidence that Kilpatrick was a member of a gang that commits criminal offenses. That is not enough. See Robinson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied; Trice v. State, 693 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (both reversing convictions for criminal gang activity where the State failed to show a nexus between the defendants' gang membership and the crimes for which they were charged.). We thus conclude the evidence was not sufficient to support Kilpatrick's conviction for criminal gang activity. Therefore, we are compelled to reverse this conviction.