Opinion ID: 62013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Tenure Claim

Text: Tulane and UHS next contend that Hartz’s Title VII claim regarding her denial of tenure should have been dismissed because Hartz failed to timely file her charge of discrimination with the EEOC. We agree. 8 No. 07-30506 In the state of Louisiana an employee must file her charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); see also Janmeja v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 96 Fed. Appx. 212, 214 (5th Cir. 2004). If the employee fails to submit a timely EEOC charge, the employee may not challenge the alleged discriminatory conduct in court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2166-67 (2007). We have previously held that the operative date from which the limitations period begins to run is the date of notice of the adverse action, not the date that the adverse action takes effect. Clark v. Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1988); Stith v. Perot Systems Corp., 122 Fed. Appx. 115, 117 (5th Cir. 2005). This is consistent with firmly established precedent from the Supreme Court. In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a junior professor who was denied tenure, Ricks, failed to timely file his EEOC charge. The Court explained that the filing limitations period commenced at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks. Id. at 258 (“the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” (citing Abramson v. Univ. of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979)). The court rejected Ricks’ argument that the pendency of a grievance should toll the running of the limitation period. Id. at 261 (“[W]e already have held that the pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the running of the limitations period. The existence of careful procedures to assure fairness in the tenure decision should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer’s decision is made.”) (internal citations omitted). The holding of Ricks was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court 9 No. 07-30506 in Ledbetter. 127 S. Ct. at 2168. Accordingly, since Hartz’s EEOC charge was filed approximately one hundred days after the limitation period had expired, she is precluded from bringing her claim in federal court.2 Hartz’s argument that the charging period did not begin to run when she initially received notice that she was denied tenure is unavailing. She attempts to distinguish Ricks by contending that, unlike in that case, she did not receive an “unbroken array of negative decisions.” While it is true that the Grievance Committee recommended that Hartz be granted tenure even after the dean notified her of the EFC’s decision, the Supreme Court was clear in Ricks that grievance procedures, no matter the outcome therein, do not alter the date that the limitations period begins to run. 449 U.S. at 261 (“The grievance procedure, by its nature, is a remedy for a prior decision, not an opportunity to influence the decision before it is made.”) (emphasis in original). And as we already discussed above, Ricks also forecloses invocation of the principal of equitable tolling in this case.