Opinion ID: 464866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Validity of the District Court's Decision

Text: 19 Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for intervention. Washington State Building & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.1982); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, Sec. 1904. We have adopted a four-part test to determine whether applications for intervention as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) should be granted. An order granting intervention as of right is appropriate if (1) the applicant's motion is timely; (2) the applicant has asserted an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that without intervention the disposition may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d at 527; County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d at 438. In applying this test we are guided primarily by practical considerations. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee note (if an [applicant] would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, [the applicant] should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene....). The parties dispute neither the timeliness of CNA's application nor its interest in the property at issue. Accordingly, we will address only the remaining two parts of the test. 20 1. Extent to which denial of appellant's motion to intervene as of right impairs its ability to protect its interest 21 In support of its showing that disposition of this action may have a practical adverse impact on its interests, CNA points to the effect that any decision in this case would have on subsequent claims it might bring against the original parties. CNA correctly points out that [u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, appellate rulings of law become controlling precedent and, consequently, affect the rights of future litigants. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1201. In light of this potential stare decisis effect, CNA contends that its absence from this litigation could, as a practical matter, result in its being precluded from litigating several of its claims against the governmental parties. 5 We agree. 22 The prospect of stare decisis may, under certain circumstances, supply the requisite practical impairment warranting intervention as of right. Smith v. Pangilinan, 651 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir.1981); see also Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826-29 (5th Cir.1967); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, Sec. 1908 at 515-17. Here, because of the issues of fact and law that are common to (1) CNA's complaint in intervention, (2) the governments' original complaint and (3) the waste-generators' counterclaims, resolution of the liability questions would, as a practical matter, bear significantly on the resolution of CNA's claims against any of the original parties in a subsequent related action. Cf. Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d at 826-29. 23 Our analysis is also influenced by the divergent remedial schemes sought by the original parties and CNA. In addition to abatement of the hazardous waste releases from the Stringfellow site and reimbursement for funds expended in response to the imminent hazard sought by the original plaintiffs, CNA seeks to obtain additional injunctive relief against the 31 named waste generators and the original plaintiffs, including permanent abatement of the hazard by removal of all hazardous substances from the site. In addition, CNA seeks the inclusion of health studies in any remedial program devised as a result of this litigation. 24 The disposition of the present litigation will, as a practical matter, establish the applicable remedial scheme. CNA has a palpable interest in that scheme. Where, as here, a prospective intervenor has demonstrated a clear interest in the remedial scheme, and where the prospective intervenor seeks to obtain remedies that differ from those sought by the original plaintiffs, it is reasonable to conclude that disposition of the litigation may impair the prospective intervenor's ability to protect its interests. That the remedy established in the present litigation may be challenged in a subsequent action does not detract from our conclusion. See Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District, 500 F.2d at 353 (where, in desegregation action brought by parents of black children, remedy sought by plaintiffs would affect interests of Chinese children, threat of impairment held sufficient to warrant intervention despite ability of intervenors to challenge adopted remedy in subsequent lawsuit); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 910 (D.C.Cir.1977) (it is not enough to deny intervention under 24(a)(2) because applicants may vindicate their interests in some later, albeit more burdensome, litigation). 25 Because of the possible stare decisis effect of this litigation, and because of CNA's palpable interest in the remedial scheme, we hold that CNA has adequately demonstrated that disposition of the litigation may, as a practical matter, impair its ability to protect its interests. 26 2. Adequacy of Representation by Existing Parties 27 Finally, we must determine whether CNA's interest in this litigation can be represented adequately by the original plaintiffs. In finding that the original plaintiffs adequately represented CNA's interests, the district court applied the standard of United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 987 (2d Cir.1984), under which an applicant must make a strong showing of inadequate representation when the purported representative is a state or the federal government. However, this standard clearly conflicts with the law of this circuit. Consistent with Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 538-39, 92 S.Ct. 630, 636, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972), where the government was the purported representative, we have held that the requirement of inadequacy of representation is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of its interests 'may be' inadequate and ... the burden of making that showing is minimal. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d at 528; see also Legal Aid Society v. Dunlop, 618 F.2d 48, 50 (9th Cir.1980); Johnson, 500 F.2d at 353-54. 28 In evaluating whether there exists an original party that will adequately represent CNA's interests, we consider three factors: whether the interests of a present party to the suit are such that it will undoubtedly make all of the intervenor's arguments; whether the present party is able and willing to make such arguments; and whether the intervenor would offer any necessary element to the proceedings that the other parties would neglect. County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438-39 (9th Cir.1980); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954-55 (9th Cir.1977). 29 Because the thirty-one generators have brought counterclaims on the issue of liability against the original plaintiffs, the district court reasoned that each of the relevant factors weighs in favor of adequate representation. The district court concluded that either the original plaintiffs or the original defendants possessed interests such that CNA's arguments would undoubtedly be made; that either the original plaintiffs or the original defendants would be able and willing to make these arguments; and that because of the relative positions of the original parties, intervention by CNA would not contribute any necessary element to the proceedings that would otherwise be neglected. The district court's analysis is defective. 30 When a party possesses interests adverse to those of a prospective intervenor, that party cannot adequately represent the intervenor's interests. See Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Department of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir.1984) (an applicant may meet burden of showing inadequate representation by showing that the representative has an interest adverse to the applicant); Stadin v. Union Electric Co., 309 F.2d 912, 919 (8th Cir.1962) (same); 7A Wright & Miller, supra, Sec. 1909 at 524-25 (absentee cannot be required to look for adequate representation from an opponent; if all existing parties are adverse, then absentee is not adequately represented); cf. United States v. Board of School Commissioners, Indianapolis, Indiana, 466 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 964, 35 L.Ed.2d 271 (1973) (representation is adequate if, inter alia, representative does not have or represent an interest adverse to the proposed intervenor); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, supra, 713 F.2d at 528 (that defendant representative had previously been head of plaintiff organization raised question concerning adequacy of representation sufficient to support intervention). Although the original plaintiffs and defendants certainly have an interest in attempting to place the blame on each other, it does not necessarily follow that CNA's claims will be prosecuted as vigorously as they would be if CNA were granted leave to intervene as of right. First, by engaging in independent discovery CNA might uncover facts that would affect the remedy in a manner favorable to it or would materially influence the settlement. Secondly, each party may be reluctant to advance an argument that would support a finding of liability against its opponent, but might, at the same time, expose that party to an increased risk of liability. Finally, where, as here, a third party seeks to press claims against both the plaintiffs and the defendants in ongoing litigation, there exists a genuine possibility that, in the absence of intervention, the existing parties will bargain away the third party's interests rather than vigorously represent those interests at the possible expense of their own liability. Indeed, should settlement become a viable alternative in this litigation, it is highly unlikely that this division of representation would result in a settlement that would adequately address CNA's interests. 31 Moreover, CNA seeks to proceed on the theory that plaintiffs and defendants are jointly and severally liable. As a practical matter, neither plaintiffs nor defendants, who respectively seek to impose liability exclusively on the opposing party, will represent this particular interest. 32 Finally, CNA seeks remedies that neither existing party has contemplated. Thus, even were we to credit the district court's novel division of representation theory, it would not dispose of the issue of representation with respect to devising an appropriate remedy. 33 We conclude that CNA has carried its minimal burden with respect to a showing that its interest might be inadequately represented. 6 Because of our finding that CNA is entitled to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), we do not rule on the question of its statutory right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1). We note, however, the persuasiveness of its argument that it is afforded such a right under the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6972 (West Supp.1985). 7 34 We reverse that portion of the district court's order denying intervention as of right; vacate that portion of the order granting CNA the right to intervene permissively; and remand the matter with instructions to grant CNA leave to intervene as of right. 35 REVERSED AND REMANDED.