Opinion ID: 217937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subordinate Bias

Text: Our inquiry is not limited, however, to evaluating whether Sykes' justification for terminating Ms. Simmons was, in the eyes of the final decision-makers, honestly held in good faith. We must also address whether Mses. James and Owen harbored discriminatory animus toward Ms. Simmons and, through their biased influence on the final decision, caused Ms. Simmons' termination. The Supreme Court recently affirmed the theory of subordinate biasor cat's paw [3] liability in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011), holding that, in a discrimination suit arising under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), an employer is liable if: (1) a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended to cause an adverse employment action, and (2) that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action. We must first consider whether the holding in Staub applies to discrimination cases brought under the ADEA. Unlike Title VII and the USERRA, the ADEA's text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor, the operative phrase relied upon in Staub. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2349. A plaintiff alleging age discrimination must instead prove age was a but for cause of her termination. See id. Despite this distinction, the underlying principles of agency upon which subordinate bias theories are based apply equally to all types of employment discrimination discussed here. Indeed, this circuit has applied the subordinate bias doctrine to cases arising under both Title VII, see, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir.2006), and the ADEA, see Schulte v. Potter, 218 Fed.Appx. 703, 719 (10th Cir.2007). Although we apply the subordinate bias doctrine to age discrimination cases, the ADEA requires more than what must ordinarily be proven under an analogous Title VII or USERRA action. If we were to apply Staub directly to an age-discrimination case, the plaintiff would then only need to prove her supervisor's animus was somehow related to the termination and not that the animus was necessary to bring about the termination. Compare Staub, 131 S.Ct. at 1192 (Proximate cause requires only some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged, and excludes only those links that are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), with Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2349-50. In age-discrimination cases, however, the relationship between a subordinate's animus and the ultimate employment decision must be more closely linked. Cf. Lindsey v. Walgreen Co., 615 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir.2010) ([E]ven if Jenkins were a cat's paw, Lindsey could not prevail because the evidence established at most that her age was a motivating factor in Walgreens' decision to fire her. To establish liability under the ADEA, however, Lindsey had to show that her age was the determinative factor.). Thus, even after Staub, an ADEA plaintiff seeking to hold an employer liable through the discriminatory conduct of its subordinate must show the subordinate's animus was a but-for cause of the adverse employment action, i.e. it was the factor that made a difference. See Jones, 617 F.3d at 1277. To illustrate, a supervisor's animus might be a but-for cause of termination where, for example, the biased supervisor falsely reports the employee violated the company's policies, which in turn leads to an investigation supported by the same supervisor and eventual termination. Or the biased supervisor may write a series of unfavorable periodic reviews which, when brought to the attention of the final decision-maker, serve as the basis for disciplinary action against the employee. But where a violation of company policy was reported through channels independent from the biased supervisor, or the undisputed evidence in the record supports the employer's assertion that it fired the employee for its own unbiased reasons that were sufficient in themselves to justify termination, the plaintiff's age may very well have been in playand could even bear some direct relationship to the termination if, for instance, the biased supervisor participated in the investigation or recommended terminationbut age was not a determinative cause of the employer's final decision. Here, assuming without deciding that Mses. James and Owen were motivated by ageist animus and intended to have Ms. Simmons' employment terminated, we must still determine whether Ms. Simmons' age was a but-for cause of her termination by asking whether Sykes would have fired Ms. Simmons but for Mses. James and Owen's alleged bias. It is undisputed that neither Ms. James nor Ms. Owen caused the investigation to begin. Rather, Mr. Bieker and Ms. DiRose acted in response to a complaint initiated by an aggrieved, unbiased employee. Mr. Bieker ordered the first interview, and Ms. DiRose ordered the full investigation. Ms. DiRose received input from individuals other than Mses. James and Owen and personally interviewed both Ms. Simmons and Ms. Gaddis before deciding to recommend termination to Ms. Nelson. Mr. Bieker, against whom there is no allegation of discriminatory bias, similarly concluded Ms. Simmons should be terminated. Sykes also terminated Ms. Gaddis' employment for similar violations of company policy despite an absence of discriminatory animus. These undisputed facts permit only the inference that, absent the alleged discriminatory bias, Sykes would still have fired Ms. Simmons because, from Sykes' perspective, she violated company policy and could not be trusted with confidential information. Thus, a reasonable jury could not find Ms. Simmons was terminated because of her age.