Opinion ID: 78403
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of Factual Support

Text: We find that the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in finding no factual support for Ginsberg's assertion that the existence of the Complaint created an appearance of impropriety requiring recusal. The mere filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct is not grounds for recusal. As Shuker's expert witness Lubet explained, it would be detrimental to the judicial system if a judge had to disqualify himself anytime someone filed a complaint about his conduct. A party would only have to file a complaint to get a different judge. Lubet testified that the Rules of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability (Judicial Council Rules) allow lots of complaints to be filed, many of which are frivolous. (Recusal Tr. Vol. II at 13-14.) The Rules therefore create their own screening mechanism for these complaints; a stage one limited inquiry to determine whether a formal investigation into the validity of the complaint is necessary. ( Id. ); see also Judicial Council Rule 4(a) (the Chief Judge may conduct a limited inquiry for the purpose of determining(1) whether appropriate corrective action has been or can be taken without the necessity for a formal investigation; and (2) whether the facts stated in the complaint are plainly untrue or are incapable of being established through investigation. (emphasis added)). This limited inquiry resolves 98% of all filed complaints; only 2% of all complaints ever proceed to the formal investigation stage. (Recusal Tr. Vol. II at 13-14.) It would create an absurd result to force a judge to recuse himself because of the 2% possibility that the complaint will become an investigation and the even smaller chance that an involved party will be called as a witness in that investigation. ( Id. ) Thus, the mere existence of a complaint of judicial misconduct does not create an appearance of impropriety. While a formal investigation into a complaint may trigger recusal, there is no evidence of an impending investigation here. Yet, the Recusal Motion referred to the Complaint as an investigation twelve times, made fourteen implications of the existence of a formal investigation, and referred to Shuker as a key player in the investigation and a future witness. (Recusal Mot. at 21.) During the Sanctions Hearing, Ginsberg testified that he assumed there was an ongoing investigation by virtue of the fact that Hudson's Complaint had not been dismissed for a number of months. [5] Yet, according to the Judicial Council Rules the length of time that a complaint remains pending is irrelevant. [6] Ginsberg further asserted that Spradley used the term investigation when relating his conversations with Hudson (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 5) and Spradley testified that Hudson had used the term investigation when relating the events to him ( id. at 136-37, 142). In Hudson's deposition, however, he testified that he never used the term investigation. (Sanctions Order at 28.) Anthony's deposition revealed he did use the term investigation, but Anthony admitted that he had no first hand knowledge of the Complaint. (Recusal Ex. II at 56-57, 62.) Anthony compared his knowledge of the Complaint to knowledge about Britney Spears' divorce ... a lot of people have heard a lot. ( Id. at 56-57.) Moreover, the Judicial Council Rules clearly state that if the Chief Judge was conducting a formal investigation, Hudson (the complainant) would be informed. See Judicial Council Rule 4(c) (If the complaint is not dismissed ... the Chief Judge shall appoint a special committee ... to investigate the allegations of the complaint.... The Chief Judge shall notify the complainant and the complained-of judge of the appointment of a special committee.... (emphasis added)). Hudson was never notified of such and never indicated to anyone that he had been. Spradley testified that Hudson's only correspondence with the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit was immediately after he filed his Complaint. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 142.) Hudson received a letter confirming the Complaint was received and submitted to the Chief Judge. ( Id. ) Spradley further testified that he spoke with Hudson three or four times after that with the expressed reason to ask if he had heard the result or an update, and he replied in the negative. ( Id. at 154.) Even though the Judicial Council Rules clearly state that Hudson would be informed if his Complaint was dismissed or moved to the investigation stage, Ginsberg relied only on the fact that Hudson was not informed of a change in status to deem it an investigation. [7] This is clearly an unreasonable reliance and jump to an unsupported conclusion. Similarly, the mere existence of an ex parte hearing is not grounds for recusal. As Lubet explained there are many reasons judges properly hold ex parte hearings, such as a temporary restraining order or bail revocation proceedings. Indeed, in ATN Judge Jenneman stated that ex parte hearings may be appropriate. (Am. Memo. Op. Den. Defs.' Emergency Mot. to Disqualify at 9.) In fact, Judge Jenneman held that the ex parte hearing in ATN did not create the appearance of impropriety. ( Id. ) ([T]he conversation [did] not rise to the level of a specifically identifiable impropriety.).