Opinion ID: 2082188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the offenses, the course of prosecution and the sentences imposed

Text: During the late evening of December 30, 1975, while the victims, Mr. and Mrs. C, were peaceably in their home, [1] the defendant and two accomplices forced an entrance thereto, brandishing knives and threatening death to the occupants. They raped the female victim and inflicted other unspeakable assaults upon her which need not be described here. They so choked and brutalized Mr. C as to seriously and most likely permanently damage his larynx, including binding his throat by a necktie and pulling him from room to room in their search for booty. They ripped off wall telephones, imprisoned their victims, took care to obliterate fingerprints (one, that of defendant, survived), and stole all the money they could lay their hands on or extort, as well as a television set, watches and items of jewelry. At the end of this reign of terror they left, and later the victims were found and released by a neighbor. Mrs. C identified defendant as the person who had raped her and he admitted as much in a police statement. Later in his trial testimony, as the jury verdict established, he falsely denied that factor of participation. Yet his defense counsel would suggest to the sentencing judge, in mitigation, the candor of the defendant in admitting in his testimony at least a limited participation in the criminal events involved. The judge who had presided over the trial of defendant for some five days, had observed all witnesses and had heard and recorded the jury's verdict convicting the defendant of various offenses, then faced the responsibility of imposing sentence. The defendant by this time had enjoyed, as he should have, the fair public trial guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Because indigent, he had been defended with competence (the record does not suggest otherwise) by the Public Defender, also appropriately his right under the law. N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-5. He had been advantaged by a presentence investigation, R. 3:21-2, in which any mitigating factors could be advanced. It is difficult to imagine any other advantage or benefit which could have been afforded this defendant by the administration of justice, or suggested by rights of constitutional origin. Defendant had previously been characterized, in a 1973 diagnostic evaluation relating to a juvenile delinquency charge involving violence, as highly predisposed toward asocial behavior patterns. The trial judge was entitled to find as he did that defendant represented an imbedded threat to the peaceful community. In this posture then, the trial court proceeded to impose sentence, a societal and legal imperative. The defendant had been convicted and sentences were imposed, as follows: Count One  Entering with intent to rob ( N.J.S.A. 2A:94-1) Not less than 3 nor more than 4 years in the New Jersey State Prison, consecutive to the sentence to be imposed on Count Six. Count Two  Robbery ( N.J.S.A. 2A:141-1) A minimum of 9 and a maximum of 12 years, concurrent with sentence to be imposed on Count Six. Count Three  Robbery while armed ( N.J.S.A. 2A:151-5) A minimum of 5 and a maximum of 7 years, concurrent with sentence to be imposed on Count Six. Count Four  Robbery ( N.J.S.A. 2A:141-1) Not less than 9 nor more than 12 years, consecutive to the sentence to be imposed on Count Six. Count Five  Robbery while armed ( N.J.S.A. 2A:151-5) Not less than 5 nor more than 7 years, consecutive to the sentence to be imposed on Count Six. Count Six  Rape ( N.J.S.A. 2A:138-1) Not less than 26 nor more than 27 years. There was a certain rationality to these sentences so far as separation of offenses was concerned. Having entered the home violently, with intent to rob, defendant and his accomplices could have abandoned that intent and need not have committed the actual robberies, distinct and separate offenses. Having committed the robberies, they need not have raped and sexually brutalized their female victim, nor need they have physically abused the male victim. There is, of course, no suggestion of legal merger of the separate and successive offenses of which defendant was convicted. The sole question presented to us is the alleged excessive character of the sentences and the propriety of the Appellate Division disapproval and reduction thereof. Under present law, the consecutive sentences thus imposed are aggregated. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.10 provides: Whenever, after the effective date of this act, 2 or more sentences to run consecutively are imposed at the same time by any court of this State upon any person convicted of crime herein, there shall be deemed to be imposed upon such person a sentence the minimum of which shall be the total of the minimum limits of the several sentences so imposed, and the maximum of which shall be the total of the maximum limits of such sentences. For purposes of determining the date upon which such a person shall be eligible for consideration for release on parole, the board shall consider the minimum sentence of such person to be the total aggregate of all the minimum limits of such consecutive sentences and the maximum sentence of such person to be the total aggregate of all of the maximum limits of such consecutive sentences. Thus, for parole consideration purposes, the minimum of the sentences imposed by the trial judge totals 43 years and the maximum 50 years. That such was the sentencing judge's intention is evident from the transcript of his remarks at sentence:    making a total of not less than 43 and not more than 50 years in the State Prison at Trenton. On the basis of its conclusion that this disposition was unduly harsh and punitive, the Appellate Division decided that the consecutive sentences should instead run concurrently with the principal sentence imposed, that for rape, of not less than 26 nor more than 27 years. Accordingly, this divergence of opinion involves the judicial function of the trial judge in imposing sentences aggregating 43 to 50 years, and that of the Appellate Division fixing such aggregate sentences at 26 to 27 years. As bearing upon the potential of these sentences for actual incarceration, it must be noticed that a prisoner serving a minimum-maximum term in the New Jersey State Prison is entitled by law to remission of time for the carrying out of work assignments (work time), such credits being graded upward if the prisoner is sufficiently trustworthy to be classified in minimum security and be employed on honor details. N.J.S.A. 30:4-92. Additionally, progressive time credits are allowed for good behavior (good time). N.J.S.A. 30:4-140. As a first (adult) offender, defendant would become eligible for consideration for release on parole after serving his minimum sentence or one-third of his maximum sentence, less the good behavior and work credits mentioned. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.10. Counsel for the parties indicated at argument before us that in this posture defendant could become eligible for consideration for release on parole, under the Appellate Division sentence, on May 21, 1982, or about three years hence. Under the trial court sentence, he would reach this eligibility date on April 15, 1987, or about eight years hence. This potential of release on parole, and of course it is only a potential, is nevertheless relevant to the needful period of incapacitation of the defendant if that factor is important, and we hold that it is, to the protection of the peaceful community from further violent assault. We proceed to examine the judicial discretion exercised by the courts involved, with respect to the sentences imposed and then reduced.