Opinion ID: 772253
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Plaintiff's Speech Protected as Addressing a Matter of Public Concern?

Text: 43 At this juncture, we turn to our analysis of Plaintiff's speech and why we find that a portion of the speech addresses a matter of public concern. 7 Plaintiff's distribution of the Apology along with the student's sexual harassment Complaint to his students, fellow faculty members, and the media, as well as his use of classroom language considered to be obscene and not germane to the course content, are the acts of expression for which he was disciplined and thus are at issue here. 8 See Johnson v. Lincoln Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 776 F.2d 443, 451 (3d Cir. 1985) (It is implicit inConnick that the court must examine each activity which the employee claims provided the actual motivation for his termination to see whether it 'touch[es] . . . upon a matter of public concern.') (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 149) (alteration in Johnson). 44 Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. Speech which can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community touches upon matters of public concern. See id. at 146. Absent unusual circumstances, a public employee's speech dealing with matters only of personal interest is not afforded constitutional protection. See id. at 147. However, mixed questions of private and public concern, where the employee is speaking both as a citizen as well as an employee, can be protected, see Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2000), such that if any part of an employee's speech, which contributes to the [disciplinary action], relates to a matter of public concern, the court must conduct a balancing of interests test as set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Rahn v. Drake Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 407, 412 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (finding that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, no First Amendment protection is afforded to the speech); Johnson, 776 F.2d at 451 (finding that the fact that a statement evolves from a personal dispute does not preclude some aspect of it from touching upon matters of public concern). 45 We find the case at hand to be a mixed speech case inasmuch as Plaintiff's speech at issue concerns both private as well as public matters. Stated otherwise, although aspects of Plaintiff's speech involve matters of personal interest where he is speaking regarding a personal grievance as an employee, his speech also involves matters of public interest such that Plaintiff is speaking as a concerned citizen. Mixed speech cases are perhaps the most difficult subset of employee speech cases to adjudicate. Because the employee admittedly speaks from multiple motives, determining whether she speaks as a citizen or employee requires a precise and factually-sensitive determination. Kennedy, 224 F.3d at 367. However, [w]hether an employee's statement is predominated by 'the employee's personal interest qua employee' is primarily a content-based inquiry, not an exclusively motive-based inquiry. Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 575 (6th Cir. 1997). In other words, '[t]he motive which underlies an employee's statements is a relevant, but not necessarily dispositive factor' when considering whether an employee's statements may be fairly characterized as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Id. at 576 (quoting Cliff v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1994)). 46
47 One of the acts of expression for which Plaintiff was disciplined was his distribution of the sexual harassment Complaint lodged against him. Regarding the content of the Complaint, it is well-settled that allegations of sexual harassment, like allegations of racial harassment, are matters of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (noting that it is clear that . . . statements concerning the school district's allegedly racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of public concern) (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979)); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1269 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that reports of sexual harassment perpetrated on [the plaintiff] and other women at [the University of Texas Health Center] - is of great public concern); see also Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 608 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that because the plaintiff's complaint was for race discrimination, it inherently involved a matter of public concern). It is true that the plaintiff alleging a First Amendment violation is usually the person who lodged the sexual or racial harassment complaint, claiming that the employer retaliated against him for filing the complaint; while in the case at hand, it is the person against whom the complaint was made who is claiming a First Amendment violation. However, the lack of parallelism between Plaintiff in this case and the plaintiffs in other cases does not change the fact that the Complaint related to sexual harassment and therefore involves a matter of public import. 48 The context and form of Plaintiff's speech in this regard require further inquiry. Plaintiff's expression of circulating the sexual harassment Complaint came on the heels of his being called before the College to answer to the allegations made by the complaining student regarding Plaintiff's classroom conduct. Although Plaintiff may have circulated the Complaint in the context of a heated dispute with the College and out of personal animus in retaliation against the complaining student, the fact remains that the context of his circulating the Complaint to faculty members, students, and the media is a matter of public concern where the public - particularly other students attending and planning to attend the College - certainly would be interested in learning the nature of the sexual harassment Complaint lodged against Plaintiff. See Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that the plaintiff's criticism of the fire department to the media addressed a matter of public concern, although the criticisms may have been borne out of the plaintiff's personal disagreement with the fire department's staffing problems, because the public was eager to hear about the ability of the fire department to perform its duties). Accordingly, we believe that Plaintiff's distribution of the Complaint involved a matter of public concern such that the act of expression was protected under the First Amendment. See id. 49 The district court likewise found that Plaintiff's distribution of the redacted Complaint was protected as a matter of public concern inasmuch as the content, context, and form of the expression dealt with the issue of sexual harassment, and we do not take issue with the district court's findings or holding in this regard. However, the district court's factual findings regarding Plaintiff's distribution of the Apology presents a different case where, although the court ultimately reached the correct conclusion of law, the court's findings were clearly erroneous. 50
51 The district court could not be more incorrect when it found that [t]he entire eight page Yes, Virginia memorandum does not state that the student had filed a sexual harassment complaint against Bonnell, or even use the term sexual harassment. It is totally directed toward a discussion of the English language. (J.A. at 146.) One need look no further than the second paragraph of the Apology to find the term sexual harassment used, and the Apology opens in the first paragraph with a salutation to Young lady, - obviously in reference to the complaining student - as well as with a reference to the apology that she sought from Plaintiff for his allegedly harassing conduct. (J.A. at 103.) Specifically, theApology states as follows: Young lady, before identifying the clause in the title, and as a preface to the apology that you desire, let me review the two articles of impeachment which you have preferred against me. First, there is the one count of buttfucking; second, there are the three counts of blow-job. The first charge all by itself, I must confess, would inspire squeals of protest even from the most asinine, the most cheeky. The second charge, on the face of it, is more than your average mouthful. I marvel at your courage in bringing notice of these alleged outrages to the proper authority, and I am amazed by the modest remedy you require. In short order, I was summoned before the college's highest tribunal where the grand inquisitor himself, with the support of sundry assistants, subjected me to rigorous cross-examination. I was not informed beforehand as to the specifics of this interrogation, apparently because the examiners were after the truth of the matter and probably felt that the element of surprise would tend more profitably to that end. Professors are rather like politicians: give them ample time to consider any question, they are apt to expatiate ad nauseam. I did know, because of your formal complaint, what the fundamental charge might be: sexual harassment. But, as that might be anything from gang rape by a branch of the Hell's Angels to an indiscreet plucking at one's own wedgie, I couldn't imagine what witches' spew might be brewing. 52 (J.A. at 103 (emphasis added).) Indeed, contrary to the district court's finding, the Apology is explicitly directed toward the complaining student, as the salutation indicates and as the entire exposition reiterates. Throughout the entire eight-pageApology, Plaintiff continually refers to the complaining student as Virginia, and does so with mockery, disdain, and insults as to her immaturity in bringing the sexual harassment Complaint against Plaintiff. For example, Plaintiff states as follows on the fourth page of the Apology: It is true - this is your half of a truth - that I talked about previous hassles with the college administration over some students lining up (an obvious exaggeration for comic effect) at some dean's office to complain about the bad man with the potty mouth. And, yes, a semester or more after the fact, I probably dismissed such folks (especially the cowards, the ones who never broach their disaffection in class or at any time to my face) with a gibe, a jeer, a hiss of derision. I tend to get a tad defensive when people don't just disagree with me, my values, my behavior, but who would also campaign for and delight in my utter destruction. Disagreement is fine; I welcome it and always remember to reward it. The clash of ideas and values is usually both exciting and illuminating. But I have never dressed down, attacked, insulted, or ridiculed any actual student in any actual class. And you know that; you know there can be no corroboration for your arrant lie. (Shame on you, Virginia - so very young and yet so devious). 53 (J.A. at 106.) Also replete throughout the Apology is the phrase, I am sorry, Virginia, that you find your own language, the English language, so painful, again directed at the complaining student in reference to the fact that she filed a sexual harassment complaint against Plaintiff for his use of profanity which she found so offensive that it allegedly created a hostile learning environment. (J.A. at 104, 105, 107.) It is not until that last paragraph of the Apology that Plaintiff identifies the First Amendment, or as Plaintiff coins it, the sanity clause. (J.A. at 107.) Accordingly, the district court's finding that the Apology is totally directed toward a discussion of the English language is clearly erroneous where a review of the Apology on its face does not support this finding. 54 Based upon its previous finding that the Apology never once mentions the term sexual harassment and is totally directed toward a discussion of the English language - the district court went on to find that [t]his indicates that Bonnell's motive in writing the Yes, Virginia memorandum was not to retaliate for a sexual harassment complaint, but instead to discuss First Amendment concerns in the context of classroom language. (J.A. at 147.) However, at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court ruled that Plaintiff's motivation in writing the Apology was irrelevant and he refused to allow Plaintiff to be questioned regarding his motivation. 9 Then, despite the court's finding to the contrary, in discerning Plaintiff's motive, the district court also found it important that at the time Plaintiff wrote the Apology, the Complaint had been decided in his favor. Apparently, the district court was of the opinion that because the outcome of the student's claim against Plaintiff had been decided in his favor, Plaintiff could not have been motivated by retaliation in writing the Apology. However, Plaintiff expressly states in the Apology that he was on the defensive because of the Complaint lodged against him, and Plaintiff expressly testified that at the time he wrote the Apology, he did not know the outcome of the sexual harassment Complaint. (J.A. at 107, 697.) Furthermore, Plaintiff could have sought to retaliate against the student and the College regardless of the actual outcome of the matter. 55 The district court then based its conclusion of law that Plaintiff's Apology was protected under the First Amendment as a matter of public concern on its finding that Plaintiff's motive in writing the Apology was to discuss the First Amendment in the context of classroom language. However, as previously indicated, an employee's motivation in speaking is not dispositive as to whether the speech was protected, thereby making the district court's basis for its conclusion of law erroneous. See Chappel, 131 F.3d at 574 (finding that the argument that an individual's personal motives for speaking may dispositively determine whether that individual's speech addresses a matter of public concern [to be] plainly illogical and contrary to the broader purposes of the First Amendment). And, also as indicated, the district court refused to allow Plaintiff to be questioned as to his motive in writing and distributing the Apology on the basis that Plaintiff's motive was not relevant. 56 Despite these erroneous factual findings and the erroneous legal premise upon which the court based its conclusion of law, we believe that the district court properly concluded that Plaintiff's speech was protected under the First Amendment because the Apology - although expressed as a satirical diatribe fraught with references to Plaintiff's personal disagreement with the student's characterization and reaction to his classroom language - addressed a matter of public concern. 57 Regarding the content of the Apology, it is true that Plaintiff apparently crafted the title in response to the remedy sought by the complaining student; that he addresses the Apology to the complaining student, albeit under the pseudo-name Virginia in order to create a sarcastic spoof on the editorial, Yes, Virginia, There is a Santa Claus; and that he criticizes both the student and the sexual harassment Complaint that she filed against him, as well as the College's disciplinary measures taken in response to the Complaint, all in relation to the First Amendment - which Plaintiff describes as the Sanity Clause. While the content of the Apology appears to be a personal attack on the various parties involved, the content also addresses the College's sexual harassment policy as it relates to classroom language. For example, It says, after all, in the cover letter to the college's Revised sexual harassment policy (July 30, 1997) that Regular use of profane, vulgar, or obscene speech in the classroom which is not germane to course content (and thus educational purpose) as measured by professional standards will lead to the imposition of discipline. But you see, Virginia, this sort of legalese is variantly known in the grown-up, adventitiously sane, world as bullshit. Profanity, vulgarity (I'm especially fond of this one, since it ensnares virtually everyone in its aristo- analcratic web; look it up, and you'll see what I mean. You will think: sump'n' ain't right here, and you'll be right, and wrong, altogether.), and obscenity (this one's a doozy, too. Inciting lustful feelings; lewd, is the second definition. The other applications are reminiscent of vulgar. The only persons in my classes who are stirred, in any antisocial sense, by my diction are either the very unfortunately wired, on the one hand, or the very young, Virginia, on the other.) - all these are in the eye of the beholder. That's why even so august a body as the U.S. Supreme Court has continually tied itself into comical knots trying to sort out the sordid, parse the putrid, and teet the totter. That which is germane to course content is best left to the professional (more on academic freedom later), while imposition of discipline is reserved for the amusement of inquisitors. 58 (J.A. at 103-04.) 59 A review of the Apology also indicates that Plaintiff was speaking as a concerned citizen about the importance of the right to free speech under the First Amendment, and the need to protect that right in society. For example, Plaintiff wrote as follows: So, then to conclude this my apologia. I am sorry, almost ineffably sorry, that you find our language, the English language, so painful. You will never have the power, of course, to restrict it, or to kill part of it, as you wish. Nor am I possessed of the tongue of men and of angels, so as to protect it from you or all the tribe of its detractors. It will continue to wend its way and may even find complete vindication, one day, from its shaky jurisprudential custodians. I will probably not see that day, as it lies somewhere beyond the frenetic millennial epoch. But you may. Hopefully, by then, you will have learned to appreciate it. Maybe, then, you will understand that life without the fullness of your language's energy would be like that life Khalil Gibran says languishes without love: life where you may still laugh, but not all of your laughter; where you may still cry, but not all of your tears. Oh! - the sanity clause! Virginia, I almost forgot! Here it is: Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . . This has driven the thought police, the language censors, and all deputy inquisitors beyond despair, into madness. If I had access to your Christmas stocking, I would stuff it there. When, at length, you grow up, you will cherish it above every other gift, save love itself. Cheers. 60 (J.A. at 107.) 61 As noted at the outset of our analysis, the debate of constitutionally protected speech in the classroom setting -- particularly as it relates to sexual harassment and a college's obligations under Title IX -- is a heated one where the most learned of academic institutions struggle to find a common ground. Therefore, speech which sets forth the type of remarks that served as the catalyst to a sexual harassment complaint lodged against a college professor, and the professor's reaction thereto, is speech which can fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 & 147-48. Said differently, the subject of profane classroom language which precipitates a sexual harassment complaint lodged against the instructor for his use of this language in relation to the First Amendment, as well as the sanctity of the First Amendment in preserving an individual's right to speak, involves a matter of public import. See Wilson, 973 F.2d at 1269. Stated more broadly, there is a public interest concern involved in the issue of the extent of a professor's independence and unfettered freedom to speak in an academic setting. 62 The context and form of Plaintiff's circulation of the Apology was public in nature such that Plaintiff distributed theApology to the College's more than two hundred faculty members as well as to two local television stations and a local newspaper, thereby bringing to light the subject of allegedly profane classroom language which led to the filing of a sexual harassment complaint. Although it is true that finding speech to be a matter of public concern does not turn on communication of the speech to the public, see Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 585 (6th Cir. 2000), and that a finding of public concern is . . . strengthened by the fact that the plaintiff did not solicit the attention of the media, but simply responded to questions regarding the existing controversy, see Matulin v. Vill. of Lodi, 862 F.2d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 1988), we believe that Plaintiff's circulation of the Apology was in the context of bringing the issue to the fore as a matter of public interest. 63 The district court found - by virtue of its own devices and not based upon Plaintiff's testimony - that Plaintiff's motivation, or the context in which he circulated the Apology, was to discuss the bounds of the First Amendment, which thereby rendered Plaintiff's speech a matter of public import. We have two concerns regarding the district court's assessment. First, as noted, a speaker's underlying motivation in expressing himself as he did, although relevant, is not dispositive of the issue of whether the act of expression addresses a matter of public concern. See Chappel, 131 F.3d at 574. Second, we do not believe that the record supports a finding that Plaintiff's motivation in circulating the Apology was necessarily only one of public interest. 64 Based upon the nature of the Apology, one could conclude that Plaintiff was motivated by personal animus against the complaining student as well as against the College for its reaction to her Complaint, and that he circulated the Apology as a retaliatory gesture against these parties. Indeed, in the Apology Plaintiff states that until the formal Complaint had been lodged against him, he had ignored similar complaints made by students. In other words, until the formal complaint was filed and the College acted upon it, Plaintiff did not react to similar complaints made by students, suggesting that Plaintiff's reaction in this case was simply in response to his discontent with the College's discipline. However, even assuming that Plaintiff was motivated by personal animus in circulating the Apology, the fact remains that in doing so, he addressed a matter occurring at the college which was of public concern. 65 In Perry v. McGinnis, this Court recently rejected the argument that because the plaintiff brought his race discrimination complaint in the context of an internal grievance with his employer, the complaint did not address a matter of public concern. See 209 F.3d at 608. The Perry Court noted that in Chappel we clarified that [t]he fundamental distinction recognized in Connick is the distinction between matters of public concern and matters only of personal interest, not civic-minded motives and self-serving motives. Id. (citing Chappel, 131 F.3d at 575) (citing Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 979 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc)). Accordingly, the Perry Court went on to conclude that whether Perry's racial discrimination complaint was borne out of civic-minded motives or of an individual employment concern is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the subject of Perry's complaint was racial discrimination - a matter inherently of public concern, according to the Supreme Court. 209 F.3d at 608-09 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8). And so it goes that in the case at hand, although Plaintiff may have circulated the Apology in the context of a self-serving motive, it nonetheless remains that the subject of the Apology - classroom language by a college professor which led to the filing of a sexual harassment complaint by one of his students for which he was disciplined, all in relation to the First Amendment - inherently touches upon a matter of public concern. 66 We are further persuaded in this regard by the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Seemuller v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 878 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir. 1989). There, a high school physical education teacher alleged that his First Amendment rights were violated when he did not receive his wage step increase because he wrote a satirical letter to the school newspaper commenting on allegations of sex discrimination against female students by teachers in the physical education department.See id. at 1579. Specifically, the teacher was responding to a letter in the school newspaper which complained about a few male chauvinistic P.E. teachers. Id. Before the teacher's satirical response was published in the school newspaper, both the paper's faculty advisor as well as the school's principal read the letter and did not object to it. Id. In addition to being published in the school paper and distributed to the students at the high school, the letter was mailed to approximately 3,600 families in the school's community. Id. at 1580. 67 After distribution, the principal informed the teacher that he had received complaints from the community, faculty members, and others. See id. The principal also stated that the teacher may receive a needs improvement rating in Professional Responsibility on his evaluation, and suggested that the teacher meet with the human relations committee and write a letter of apology to the newspaper. Id. The teacher complied on both measures. Id. However, in his performance evaluation, the teacher received the needs improvement rating, despite his letter of apology, and did not receive his wage step increase. Id. at 1580-81. The teacher filed suit alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. The district court held for the school on the basis that the speech did not involve a matter of public concern, but the Fourth Circuit reversed.Id. at 1582. The Fourth Circuit found that the teacher's letter involved a matter of public concern because it addressed the issue of sex discrimination in the physical education department, or the treatment of females in school programs. Id. at 1583. Accordingly, it follows that Plaintiff's Apology, which addressed an allegation of sexual harassment, and therefore the treatment of females at the College, similarly addressed a matter of public concern. Moreover, in the case at hand, theApology went one step further and addressed issues of public concern such as the sanctity of the First Amendment. 68
69 Finally, we turn to Plaintiff's classroom language which gave rise to the sexual harassment complaint and the disciplinary measures. The content of Plaintiff's language at issue is what the College terms profanity not germane to course content. 10 See, e.g., March 4, 1998 Memorandum from MacQueen to Plaintiff entitled Obscene and vulgar speech (cautioning Plaintiff that [u]nless germane to discussion of appropriate course materials and thus a constitutionally protected act of academic freedom, your utterance in the classroom of such words as 'fuck,' cunt,' and 'pussy' may serve as a reasonable basis for concluding as a matter of law that you are fostering a learning environment hostile to women, a form of sexual harassment). In other words, it was not the content of Plaintiff's speech itself which led to the disciplinary action; rather, it was the context and form in which Plaintiff used the speech -- i.e., in the course of his teaching where the language was not germane to the course content -- that the College found to be in violation of its sexual harassment policy. 70 The context in which a message is delivered is often the pivotal factor when determining whether the speech will be protected. As the Supreme Court recently opined: [T]he protection afforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it. Indeed, it may not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate verbal or visual assault, that justifies proscription. Even in a public forum, one of the reasons we tolerate a protestor's right to wear a jacket expressing his opposition to government policy in vulgar language is because offended viewers can effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes. 71 Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Nearly a century before Hill was decided, Justice Holmes likewise opined that the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it was done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that have all the effect of force. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citations omitted). 72 The degree of protection afforded to a college professor's speech in the context of the classroom was addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1995). There, the plaintiff was discharged from his teaching position at a college for his incessant use of profanity in the classroom. Id. In finding that the speech was not protected, the Fifth Circuit took into account the unique context in which a college professor speaks such that his students are a captive audience who may find themselves intimidated by the person who has the ability to pass upon them a poor grade. Specifically, in Martin the plaintiff teacher denigrated his students with profanity such as bullshit, hell, damn, God damn, and sucks, allegedly because the students had a poor attitude. The plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against the college for violation of his First Amendment rights; the district court held that the plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected right to use profanity in the classroom; and the Fifth Circuit agreed. See id. at 585. The Court held that the teacher's speech did not touch upon a matter of public concern because the profanity served only to reflect the teacher's attitude toward his students. Id. In connection with its holding, the Court recognized that the students were a captive audience, and that they paid to be taught and not vilified in indecent terms .... Id. at 586. In short, the Court held that the teacher's language is unprotected . . . because, taken in context, it constituted a deliberate, superfluous attack on a 'captive audience' with no academic purpose or justification. Id. 73 In Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, we relied upon the Fifth Circuit's decision in Martin when we held that the coach of a state university basketball team did not engage in protected speech when he used the word nigger during a locker room session allegedly to motivate his basketball players. See 55 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1995) ([Y]ou know we need to have more niggers on our team . . . . Coach McDowell is a nigger, . . . . Sand[er] Scott who's an academic All-American, a Caucasian, I said Sand[er] Scott is a nigger. He's hard nose, [sic] he's tough, et cetera.). The coach was discharged by the university for this speech and he filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the First Amendment. The district court granted the university's motion for summary judgment and this Court affirmed. Relying upon Martin, the Court concluded as follows: The First Amendment protects the right of any person to espouse the view that a nigger is someone who is aggressive in nature, tough, loud, abrasive, hard-nosed and intimidating; someone at home on the [basketball] court but out of place in a classroom setting where discipline, focus, intelligence and interest are required. This same view has been and is held about African Americans by many who view the success of Black athletes as a result of natural athletic ability and the success of Black executives as the result of affirmative action. What the First Amendment does not do, however, is require the government as employer or the university as educator to accept this view as a valid means of motivating players. An instructor's choice of teaching methods does not rise to the level of protected expression. . . . The University has a right to disapprove of the use of the word nigger as a motivational tool just as the college in Martin was not forced to tolerate profanity. 74 55 F.3d at 1190-91 (citation omitted; emphasis added). 75 The Dambrot Court also rejected the coach's argument that his speech was protected under the realm of academic freedom. 55 F.3d at 1188. The analysis of what constitutes a matter of public concern and what raises academic freedom concerns is of essentially the same character. Id. (citing Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250 (7th Cir. 1990)). The Court then noted that the linchpin of the inquiry is, thus, for both public concern and academic freedom, the extent to which the speech advances an idea transcending personal interest or opinion which impacts our social and/or political lives. To this end, the Court concluded that, unlike the case of Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992), and Jeffries v. Harleston,21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 513 U.S. 996 (1994), rev'd 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995) - where the speech of college professors who made derogatory comments about persons of certain racial or ethnic groups was found to serve the purpose of advancing viewpoints, however repugnant, which had as their purpose influencing or informing public debate - the coach's speech did not have such a purpose. Id. at 1189. 76 Turning to the matter at hand, just as a university coach may have the constitutional right to use the word nigger, but does not have the constitutional right to use the word in the context of motivating his basketball players, see 55 F.3d at 1190; so too, Plaintiff may have a constitutional right to use words such as pussy, cunt, and fuck, but he does not have a constitutional right to use them in a classroom setting where they are not germane to the subject matter, in contravention of the College's sexual harassment policy. See id.; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (finding speech that is 'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and 'shocking' ... is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances). This is particularly so when one considers the unique context in which the speech is conveyed -- a classroom where a college professor is speaking to a captive audience of students, see Martin, 805 F.2d at 586, who cannot effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their [ears]. Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2489. Although we do not wish to chill speech in the classroom setting, especially in the unique milieu of a college or university where debate and the clash of viewpoints are encouraged - if not necessary -- to spur intellectual growth, it has long been held that despite the sanctity of the First Amendment, speech that is vulgar or profane is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747. 77 To summarize, although we find Plaintiff's classroom profanity that was not germane to the subject matter to be unprotected speech, we are also of the belief that Plaintiff's acts of expression in circulating the Complaint and the Apologywere protected as addressing matters of public concern. Because parts of Plaintiff's speech for which he was disciplined addressed a matter of public concern, we are required to conduct a balancing of the parties' respective interests as set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149; Rahn, 31 F.3d at 411. 78 b.Was Plaintiff's Interest as a Citizen in Speaking on a Matter of Public Concern Greater than the College's Interest in Promoting the Efficiency of the Service that it Performs through its Employees? 79 In Pickering, the Supreme Court developed a balancing test which weighed the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The district court failed to properly apply Pickering because the court never balanced the parties' respective interests; instead, the court appears to have assessed whether Plaintiff actually violated the College's sexual harassment policy by retaliating against the complaining student. Indeed, nowhere in the district court's opinion does it balance the interests involved; the court simply concludes that[t]he issue is whether the First Amendment protects the publication of [Plaintiff's] Yes, Virginiamemorandum attached to a copy of the sexual harassment complaint filed against him that redacts the name of the complainant and her class. The Court holds that it does. Based on content, form, and context of the distribution, [Plaintiff's] speech relates to matters of a public concern, and was not done in retaliation for a complaint of sexual harassment. (J.A. at 150.) 80 The district court misses the mark in its analysis and erroneously applies the relevant legal standard, which could possibly account for its erroneous decision to grant the preliminary injunction in this case. Specifically, the court failed to conduct a meaningful balancing of the interests involved in order to determine whether the College's interests in enforcing its policy outweighed Plaintiff's interests in speaking. 81 i. Interests of the Parties Involved 82 Plaintiff claims that his interests in free speech and academic freedom outweigh the College's stated interests in regulating Plaintiff's speech. Defendants contend that their interests in 1) disciplining Plaintiff for conduct that threatened the College's eligibility for receiving federal funding under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g et seq., which forbids the release of educational records and the release of personally identifiable information absent prior written authorization; 2) prohibiting retaliation against students who file sexual harassment complaints, as expressly prohibited by the College's sexual harassment policy; 3) maintaining the confidentiality of a student complaint, as provided by Article VII.A.7. of the CBA between the College and Plaintiff's union, MCCFO; and 4) maintaining a learning environment free of faculty disruption, outweigh Plaintiff's interests which Defendants claim are negligible. 83 A college's or university's interest in maintaining a hostile-free learning environment, particularly as it relates to its Title IX funding, is well recognized. However, the interests of allowing persons to speak freely in the college and university setting are equally as well-established such that the balancing of these interests is not an easy one where even the most revered universities struggle with creating a sexual harassment policy that preserves this delicate balance. See, e.g., 18 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. at 306-19 (noting the sexual harassment policies of various institutions including Stanford University and Harvard Law School). Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) recognize that limitations must exist on college professors' speech in order to provide a learning environment free of harassment; however, such organizations maintain that the limitations must be narrowly drawn so as not to compromise the professors' rights to academic freedom. See id. at 296-97. For example, the ACLU has opined that [a] sexual harassment policy . . . in an academic setting must be drawn very narrowly . . . [where it is] limited to situations where a practice of . . . sexually derogatory comments is . . . so pervasive and abusive as to demonstrably hinder the learning experience. Id. 84 Although it is true that the complaining student in the case at hand filed her sexual harassment Complaint against Plaintiff with the College and not under Title IX, the College nonetheless took disciplinary action against Plaintiff in light of the College's policy against sexual harassment, and the same concerns thereby apply. Indeed, the inquiry and the concerns are the same whether the sexual harassment claim is brought pursuant to Title IX or pursuant to an internal sexual harassment policy. See Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: O Say, Does that Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 48 (1993) (recognizing that teachers sanctioned for exercising what they believe to be constitutionally protected speech face the same legal hurdles of Connick, Pickering,and Mt. Healthy). This, along with the College's interests in maintaining the confidentiality of a student complaint as set forth in the CBA, protecting a complaining student from retaliation, and continuing its public funding are all interests which we find to be significant in promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of [the College's] official duties .... Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 85 Plaintiff claims that his interest in free speech under the First Amendment and his interest in academic freedom outweigh Defendants' purported interests. Academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). Although academic freedom is not an independent First Amendment right, see Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991), the Supreme Court has long recognized the significance of academic freedom: The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. . . . Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. 86 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that [a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (citations omitted); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) ([The university atmosphere] is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedoms of a university -- to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 87 Similarly, this Court has recognized that the term academic freedom 'is used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue its end without interference from the government ... and the freedom of the individual teacher . . . to pursue his ends without interference from the academy; and these two freedoms are in conflict.' See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Piarowski v. Ill. Comm. College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985)). Although the College is not claiming an interest in academic freedom per se in support of its position in the matter at hand, it is important to bear in mind that a professor's right to academic freedom is not absolute, and the autonomous decisionmaking of the College must be considered when balancing the parties' respective interests. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12. 88 ii. Balancing of the Interests 89 The balancing of interests between a faculty member's right to free speech and a college's or university's right in preserving its interests has recently been described as follows: Free speech rights stemming from the First Amendment apply to both students and faculty members on public colleges and university campuses.... [H]owever, those rights are not absolute. The objectives that underscore the First Amendment also reflect and reinforce the educational mission of colleges and universities. These objectives include advancement of a representative democracy and self-government; the pursuit of truth in the marketplace of ideas; and the promotion of individual self-expression and development. Constitutional protection is afforded to the open and robust expression and communication of ideas, opinions, and information to further each of these objectives. This protection parallels a central mission of higher education: to nurture and preserve a learning environment that is characterized by competing ideas, openly discussed and debated. 90 Arthur L. Coleman & Jonathan R. Alger, Beyond Speech Codes: Harmonizing Rights of Free Speech and Freedom from Discrimination on University Campuses, 23 J.C. & U.L. 91, 98-99 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 91 In the matter before us, we believe that Defendants' purported interests, including maintaining the confidentiality of student sexual harassment complaints, disciplining teachers who retaliate against students who file sexual harassment claims, and creating an atmosphere free of faculty disruption, outweigh Plaintiff's purported interests. As noted by the several commentaries cited above, colleges and universities are legally required to maintain a hostile-free learning environment and must strive to create policies which serve that purpose. While a professor's rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are paramount in the academic setting, they are not absolute to the point of compromising a student's right to learn in a hostile-free environment. To hold otherwise under these circumstances would send a message that the First Amendment may be used as a shield by teachers who choose to use their unique and superior position to sexually harass students secure in the knowledge that whatever they say or do will be protected. Such a result is one that a state college or university is legally obligated to prevent, and such a result would fail to consider the countervailing interests. See 18 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. at 320 ([The First Amendment and] [a]cademic freedom must not be used to shield the abuse of a captive audience by racially or sexually derogatory epithets.). 92 Speech that rises to the level of harassment -- whether based on sex, race, ethnicity, or other invidious premise -- and which creates a hostile learning environment that ultimately thwarts the academic process, is speech that a learning institution has a strong interest in preventing. The line drawn as to whether a professor's speech rises to this level is to be decided on a case by case basis, and in the instant case Plaintiff is not challenging the constitutionality of the College's sexual harassment policy. Our task today is to balance the parties' respective interests under the facts of this case and, in doing so, we believe that the College's interest in preserving a learning environment free of sexual harassment, among others, outweighs Plaintiff's claimed free speech and academic freedom interests. As we acknowledged at the outset of this opinion, although this balance is a delicate one, we believe that the College's interests prevail under the facts and circumstances presented here. 93 c. Summary 94 The district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff demonstrated a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his First Amendment claim; although Plaintiff's speech addressed a matter of public concern, Plaintiff failed to show that his interests in speaking outweighed the College's interests in enforcing its policies. 95 It should be noted that Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity provides another basis as to why Plaintiff's claim may fail. It is well-established that the defense of qualified immunity grants government officials engaged in discretionary activities immunity from individual liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Court applies a two-part test to determine whether a government official is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Summar v. Bennett, 157 F.3d 1054, 1057 (6th Cir. 1998). The first inquiry is whether the Plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right; and the second inquiry is whether that right was clearly established at the time such that a reasonable official would have understood that his behavior violated that right. See id. at 1058. 96 To determine whether a right was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, we look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this court and other courts within our circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits. Chappel, 131 F.3d at 579. No decisions from the Supreme Court, our circuit, or any other court, clearly establish that Plaintiff's speech in the instant case was constitutionally protected so that Defendants would have understood that their disciplinary action violated Plaintiff's rights. Thus, Defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity, and this could provide yet another basis for concluding that Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. See Cohen v. San Bernadino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant community college board of trustees was immune from the plaintiff-teacher's § 1983 suit for violation of his First Amendment rights in relation to the discipline that the teacher received for responding to a student's sexual harassment claim because the defendants could not have reasonably known that the discipline violated an established right). 97 Having found that Plaintiff has failed to show a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his First Amendment claim, this preliminary injunction factor is thus dispositive of the issue, and we need not address the remaining three factors. See In re DeLorean Co., 755 F.2d at 1228. However, because the district court made specific findings on the remaining factors, we shall do the same. 98