Opinion ID: 1591402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the actions of hall and the other two women relieved east mississippi of liability and whether the circuit court's allocation of 50% fault to east mississippi was too high.

Text: ¶ 22. The circuit judge allocated 25% of the fault to Hall, 25% to Neal and O'Bryant (12-1/2% each), and 50% to East Mississippi. East Mississippi argues that all fault should be laid at Hall's feet because: (1) her actions were intentional; (2) she knew she should not have been in the unsupervised conference room; and (3) she intentionally attempted to avoid personnel in the escape attempt. East Mississippi concludes, without citing any case law, that it should not be held liable for [Hall's] poor judgment. Alternatively, East Mississippi argues that the allocation of 50% fault to East Mississippi was too high. ¶ 23. One of the reasons Hall was committed to East Mississippi was her poor judgment. Her medical records show that she was highly impulsive and reckless. She had attempted suicide on prior occasions. Her condition would deteriorate from time to time so that it was necessary to move her to the third-floor locked ward for her own safety. The civil commitment order stated that Hall was a danger to herself and to others and that Hall's behavior was sometimes irrational and often described as `childlike.' [8] It was East Mississippi's duty to care and to provide a safe environment for a person who, because of her mental impairments, could not take very good care of herself. ¶ 24. That the three women entered and departed from the third-floor conference room adjacent to the nurses' station several times within a short time, changed from pajamas to street clothes, broke a window pane, and transported a rope made out of sheets to the conference room without detection shocks the Court's conscience. A review of Hall's testimony at the bench trial clearly shows the severity of Hall's mental impairments. An allocation of 50% fault to East Mississippi is a very conservative estimate of the extent of its negligence in caring for Hall. We find the circuit court's allocation of fault is supported by substantial evidence.
¶ 25. East Mississippi argues that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m) (Rev. 2002) provides it with immunity. The statute provides as follows: (1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:    (m) Of any claimant who at the time the claim arises is an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution, regardless of whether such claimant is or is not an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution when the claim is filed; . . . East Mississippi contends that other such institution may be interpreted as a state mental hospital. However, subsection (m) clearly pertains to penal institutions. ¶ 26. East Mississippi also claims that Hall was not entitled to recover damages because she was injured during the performance of an illegal act pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. §§ 97-9-25 (Rev.2000) and 11-46-9(1)(f) (Rev.2002). A mental patient's attempted escape is not a criminal act. This claim is without merit.
¶ 27. Gwendolyn Hardaway was a patient advocate [9] at East Mississippi at the time of the accident. She conducted an investigation, interviewed many witnesses and wrote a report. East Mississippi filed a motion in limine to prevent Hardaway from testifying at the trial and to bar the introduction of her report into evidence. The circuit court granted that part of the motion in limine which pertained to the report, finding it was confidential and privileged under Miss.Code Ann. § 41-63-21 (Rev.2005). However, the circuit court held that a patient advocate was not subject to any privilege and that Hardaway could testify. East Mississippi contends that Hardaway was, in essence, a quality assurance officer and was thus subject to Miss.Code Ann. § 41-63-23 (Rev.2005), which provides in pertinent part as follows: No person involved in preparation, evaluation or review of accreditation or quality assurance materials shall be permitted or required to testify in any civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the course of preparation, evaluation or review of such materials or as to any finding, recommendation, evaluation, opinion, or other action of such accreditation or quality assurance or other person involved therein. ¶ 28. The circuit court found that a patient advocate's primary duties were to protect vulnerable adults and to investigate allegations of abuse, neglect or exploitation. Hardaway also testified that patients had specific rights guaranteed by statute and by East Mississippi, and had civil rights. Her purpose was to respond to reports and determine whether a patient's rights had been violated or if the patient had been abused, neglected or exploited. We find that the circuit court's denial in part of the motion in limine was not an abuse of discretion. See Poole v. Avara, 908 So.2d 716, 721 (Miss.2005) (The standard of review for the admission or suppression of evidence . . . is abuse of discretion.). Hardaway's function was to protect Hall's rights as a patient, not to participate in accreditation or quality assurance.
¶ 29. East Mississippi objects to Dr. Hiatt's testimony as to Hall's physical injuries and what medical expenses she might incur in the future. It contends that Dr. Hiatt, who had practiced family medicine in the past, was not an expert in orthopedics, infectious disease, vascular medicine, pain management or neurology. He never examined Hall, but testified after reviewing her medical records and photographs of her leg. ¶ 30. East Mississippi fails to note, however, that Dr. Hiatt served as a general medical officer in the U.S. Air Force, had served as a flight surgeon for the Mississippi Air National Guard, and had performed or assisted in numerous orthopedic surgeries. He was familiar with the use of antibiotics and how they treat infections. ¶ 31. Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides that expert testimony must be based upon sufficient facts or data; the testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods; and the witness must have applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Poole, 908 So.2d at 722. Scientific knowledge means something more than unsupported speculation or subjective belief that is grounded in methods and procedures of science. Id. at 723 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), superceded by F.R.E. 702). Also, [u]nlike an ordinary witness . . . an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. This Court has held that, [a]bsent other grounds to exclude, an expert's testimony is presumptively admissible when relevant and reliable. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 39 (Miss.2003). The basic threshold for admitting an expert's opinion is whether the testimony is based on scientific knowledge which would assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact at issue. Poole, 908 So.2d at 724 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786). ¶ 32. Dr. Hiatt testified that Hall suffered extensive orthopedic injuries, extensive soft tissue damage, and a string of infections. He pointed out that, after her hospitalization immediately following the accident, Hall was hospitalized several times for infections. He opined that, because of the nature of the soft tissue damages and the recurring infections, it was reasonable to assume that Hall would undergo additional treatment requiring hospitalization and possibly an amputation. ¶ 33. We find that Dr. Hiatt's testimony was admissible under M.R.E. 702. The testimony was not based on any new or untested medical theories, but merely on his lengthy experience as a physician. All his testimony was based on facts found in extensive medical records; therefore it was reliable. The testimony assisted the trier of fact (here, the circuit judge); therefore, it was relevant.
¶ 34. Khin Wai, M.D., was Hall's treating psychiatrist. Her deposition consisted of two volumes. There was only one correction on the errata sheet for her deposition. Nowhere does East Mississippi state what the correction was or whether it was relevant to the outcome of the case. To the appellant falls the duty of insuring that the record contains sufficient evidence to support his assignments of error on appeal. Dillard's, Inc. v. Scott, 908 So.2d 93, 99 (Miss.2005) (quoting Burney v. State, 515 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1987), superceded by statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-2 (Rev.2000)).
¶ 35. Hall's past medical expenses totaled $348,402.94. East Mississippi offered no rebuttal to these costs. ¶ 36. Hall was hospitalized immediately after the accident, but she had several other hospitalizations to treat the recurring infection in her leg. The circuit judge found that the average cost of these hospitalizations was $15,000. He awarded $75,000 for future medical expenses. East Mississippi offered no rebuttal to this estimate. ¶ 37. The damages total was $1,000,000, meaning that the circuit judge gave Hall $591,597.06 for pain and suffering and for a permanent physical impairment to the leg and foot. The circuit judge stated: The injuries to the Plaintiff's right foot and heel cause drainage to ooze and her sock becomes attached to the wounds when she tries to remove it. As depicted by the photographs in evidence, it is clear that the Plaintiff's right foot and lower leg are swollen and that she has significant scar tissue as well. The foot appears to be deformed with a large calloused area around the heel. . . .    She is permanently physically impaired and she will continue to have pain and suffering for the balance of her life. She has a noticeable limp in her walk and gait. ¶ 38. Hall suffered horrible injuries to her leg, and she will be impaired for the rest of her life. The amount of $591,597.06 is not even one and one-half times the amount of the compensatory damages. The circuit court's award of $1,000,000 in damages was not excessive and is supported by substantial evidence.
¶ 39. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (Rev.2000) provides that judgments in cases such as this  shall bear interest at a per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from a date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint. (Emphasis added.) Here, the circuit court did not include post-judgment interest in its memorandum opinion and judgment. Subsequently, Hall filed a motion for post-judgment interest, which was granted. ¶ 40. Hall filed her motion under M.R.C.P. 60(a), alleging that the circuit court's failure to address her prayer for post-judgment interest was a clerical error. East Mississippi contends, however, that her motion is, in actuality, a motion to alter or amend a judgment under M.R.C.P. 59(e), which is required to be filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment. Hall did not file her motion until 58 days after the circuit court filed its judgment. East Mississippi's argument does not take into account our ruling in U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Estate of Francis ex rel. Francis, 825 So.2d 38, 50 (Miss.2002): We also hold the chancellor was within the bounds of his discretionary authority in awarding post-judgment interest. Because the right to post-judgment interest is a statutory right according to Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (1991), this Court does not conclude that the motion for interest was a motion to amend or alter the judgment. Therefore, we need not address the timeliness of filing the motion in accordance with M.R.C.P. 59. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (1991) has been amended to allow interest at a per annum rate set by the judge. We hold that the chancellor's awarding of interest at the rate of one percent above the prime rate of eight percent was within his discretion under the revised statute. Therefore, under Francis, the Rule 59(e) 10-day limitation is not applicable to a motion for post-judgment interest. ¶ 41. Next, East Mississippi contends that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion inasmuch as the motion was filed after East Mississippi had filed its notice of appeal. Indeed, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Smith v. Parkerson Lumber, Inc., 890 So.2d 832, 834 (Miss. 2003). We find, however, that, even if the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to rule upon Hall's motion, the error would be harmless due to the mandatory nature of Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (Rev.2000): post-judgment interest shall be awarded. ¶ 42. East Mississippi argues that post-judgment interest cannot be awarded where, as here, the award of compensatory damages is equal to the statutory cap of $250,000 under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-15 (Rev.2002). Section 11-46-15(2) specifically excludes awards of punitive damages, pre-judgment interest and attorney's fees from being imposed against a governmental entity. Therefore, because the Legislature did not specifically exclude post-judgment interest, it may be awarded against governmental entities. See Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Ronald Adams Contr., Inc., 753 So.2d 1077, 1094 (Miss.2000) (adopting plurality opinion in City of Jackson v. Williamson, 740 So.2d 818, 821 (Miss.1999)). Public policy also demands that governmental entities covered by the MTCA pay post-judgment interest: Several important public policy considerations undergird both legislative intent and our interpretation of that intent today regarding post-judgment interest. Post-judgment interest is generally recognized as a common-law element of actual damages in civil actions. In fact, we have long held that interest is not imposed as a penalty but instead as compensation for detention of overdue money. This resolves any questions of hybrid situations where the governmental entity is represented by an insurance company to which the governmental entity has paid a premium for costs, interest, and statutory damages. Indeed, our citizenry must be given the benefit of that which they have already paid. Dealing with the current issue as we have rectifies the gamut of potential scenarios that may arise. Further, simple interest is not a sufficient remedy. The utility of post-judgment interest, statutory damages, and costs is that of supplementing this simple damages interest with necessary additional damages. In addition, the application of post-judgment interest and statutory damages discourages frivolous appeals and encourages governmental actors to settle legitimate claims when made. The potential of paying post-judgment interest and statutory damages encourages speedy compensation of legitimate claims and discourages litigation of unworthy issues. The strategy of delaying payment until the award has actually diminished in value will be thwarted. The interests of worthy claimants and judicial economy will each be advanced by today's holdings. Williamson, 740 So.2d at 823 (citations omitted). ¶ 43. We find that, due to the mandatory nature of § 75-17-7 and because public policy heavily favors post-judgment interest, post-judgment interest over and above the statutory cap may be awarded against a governmental entity.