Opinion ID: 6226905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court erred because the release

Text: IS NOT CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE ¶11 The district court dismissed the Cunninghams‘ negligence claim, finding that Cunningham waived any claim he might have against Weber County when he signed the Release. The Cunninghams argue this was error because the Release is unenforceable.3 We agree. ¶12 Utah law disfavors preinjury releases. We have long viewed preinjury releases with suspicion, concluding that ―the law does not look with favor upon one exacting a covenant to relieve himself of the basic duty which the law imposes on everyone: that of using due care for the safety of himself and others.‖ Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah 1965). Accordingly, ―the presumption is against any such intention, and it is not achieved by inference or implication from general language.‖ Id. at 914. Instead, a preinjury release must ―make [its] intent clear and unmistakable.‖ Id. ¶13 We have reasoned that ―contracts exempting persons from liability for negligence induce a want of care, for the highest incentive to the exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that a failure in this respect will fix liability to make full compensation for any injury resulting from the cause.‖ Jankele v. Texas Co., 54 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1936) (citation omitted). ―It has therefore been declared to be good doctrine that no person may contract against his own negligence.‖ Id. (citation omitted). Allowing a party to contract against his own negligence ―tend[s] to encourage carelessness and would not be salutary either for the person seeking to protect himself or for those whose safety may be hazarded by his conduct.‖ Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (Utah 1966). We have further asserted that parties entering into contracts should be able ―to assume that the other intends to conduct himself as a reasonable and prudent person would under whatever circumstances may thereafter arise, which presupposes that he will commit no wrongful act nor be guilty of negligence.‖ El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 408 P.2d at 913. _____________________________________________________________ 3 The Cunninghams also assert that the Release violates public policy and is contrary to the public interest. Because we conclude the Release is not clear and unmistakable, we need not reach the Cunninghams‘ other arguments. 4 Cite as: 2022 UT 8 Opinion of the Court ¶14 Although we respect the ability of two parties bargaining at arm‘s length to agree that one party may waive its ability to sue for injuries arising out of the other‘s negligence before any injury is suffered, such arrangements are unenforceable unless they are clear and unmistakable about both parties‘ intentions. See Jankele, 54 P.2d at 427; El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 408 P.2d at 914. ¶15 In the context of preinjury releases, we balance a party‘s ability to enter freely into contracts against the potential harm that can flow from a party relieved of the obligation to act reasonably. To that end, we demand precision in preinjury releases to ensure that a reasonable person reviewing the document would understand that she is changing the default setting and waiving her right, prior to suffering any injury, to recover the damages caused by another party‘s negligence. ¶16 For this reason, we will not imply that a party intended, prior to suffering an injury, to release another party from the consequences of her negligent act. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Intermountain Farmers Ass’n, 568 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1977).4 In El Paso Natural Gas Co., the parties presented us with a contract stating that the defendant would indemnify and hold the railroad harmless from and against any and all liability, loss, damage, claims,. . .of whatsoever nature, . . . growing out of injury or harm to or death of persons whomsoever, or loss or destruction of or damage to property whatsoever, including the pipe line, when such injury, harm, death, loss, destruction or damage, howsoever caused, grows out of or arises from the bursting of or leaks in the pipe line, or in any other way whatsoever is due to or arises because of the existence of the pipe line or the construction, operation, maintenance, repair, renewal, reconstruction or use of the pipe line or any part thereof, or to the contents therein or therefrom. 408 P.2d at 912. We recognized that the provision employed broad language—presumably in an attempt to allow for broad _____________________________________________________________ 4 See also Jensen's Used Car v. Rice, 323 P.2d 259, 260-61 (Utah 1958) (holding ―it is also elementary and of extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their clear and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by them as signatories thereto‖). 5 CUNNINGHAM v. WEBER COUNTY Opinion of the Court interpretation. See id. at 913-14. But the broad language the parties chose did not reveal a clear and unmistakable intent to release each other from their own negligent acts. Id. at 914. We concluded that if ―it had been the intent of the parties that the defendant should indemnify the plaintiff even against the latter‘s negligent acts, it would have been easy enough to use that very language and to thus make that intent clear and unmistakable.‖ Id. We accordingly found that the release did not require one party to indemnify the other for its negligent acts. Id. ¶17 That is not to say that a release must use specific words to make its intent clear and unmistakable. See Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 371–72 (Utah 1990). In Freund, the court considered a release between a cable company and a power company. Id. at 364. The language of the release indicated that ―[e]xcept for intentional wrongdoing or willful negligence on the part of Licensor, or any of its agents or employees, Licensee shall also indemnify[,] protect[,] and save harmless Licensor from and against any and all claims, demands, causes of action, costs, or other liabilities . . . .‖ Id. at 371 (second and third alterations in original) (emphasis removed). Although that release did not specifically state that the licensee was agreeing to indemnify the licensor for claims that might arise out of the licensor‘s negligence, the specific carveouts for intentional wrongdoing and willful negligence helped transform what might have been mistakable language into a clear and unmistakable expression of an intent to extend the indemnification to negligent acts. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the release intended to give the power company ―‗full and complete‘ indemnification‖ for its own negligence. Id. at 371–72. ¶18 The United States District Court for the District of Utah has applied the ―clear and unmistakable rule‖ to find several releases unenforceable. For example, in one case, the parties presented the federal court with a preinjury release that a plaintiff was required to sign before he could compete in a cycling race. Finken v. USA Cycling, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-79, 2020 WL 2926661, at  (D. Utah June 3, 2020). A racer suffered a severe injury when he turned a corner on the route and ran into a concrete barrier blocking the road. Id. at –2. The racer sued USA Cycling as well as the independent contractor in charge of the course design. Id. at . ¶19 Both USA Cycling and the contractor raised the waiver the racer had signed as a defense against the suit. Id. at . The waiver was broadly worded. Id. It noted ―that cycling is an inherently dangerous sport‖ and included dangers such as ―collision with 6 Cite as: 2022 UT 8 Opinion of the Court pedestrians, vehicles, other riders, and fixed or moving objects.‖ Id. It further noted ―the possibility of serious physical and/or mental trauma or injury, or death associated with the event.‖ Id. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had agreed to ―waive, release, discharge, hold harmless, and promise to indemnify and not to sue‖ ―USA Cycling‘s Event Directors, Affiliates, Agents, and Officials‖ for ―any and all rights and claims including claims arising from [their] own negligence.‖ Id. at ,  (alteration in original). The court held that the release waived claims against USA Cycling. Id. at . But it did not unambiguously release USA Cycling‘s independent contractors because it was unclear whether the term ―Event Directors‖ applied to independent contractors. Id. at . We endorse the federal court‘s reasoning that if a preinjury release can lead to a disagreement between reasonable minds about who is released, it cannot be considered unmistakable. ¶20 The federal district court has also concluded that a release is not clear and unmistakable when the language supports more than one reasonable meaning. In Zollman, a woman was injured while snowmobiling when she collided with another snowmobiler. Zollman v. Myers, 797 F. Supp. 923, 924 (D. Utah 1992). The rental agency required all renters to sign a preinjury release as part of the rental agreement. Id. The release ―enumerate[d] some of the risks involved in snowmobiling, including the failure to follow instructions.‖ Id. at 928. It then ―state[d] in bold print that the signer [would] not hold [the rental company] liable, even if [it] or its employees act[ed] negligently.‖ Id. However, in the second-to-last clause, the release required the signer to agree ―to stop and follow instructions if encountering a hazardous situation. Otherwise, the signer agrees to assume all risk.‖ Id. The court held that the second-to-last clause rendered the entire release ambiguous because that clause created an inconsistency, which could lead a reasonable person to interpret the release as meaning that the signer did not assume liability in certain situations. Id. This impression was ―sufficient to render the contract ambiguous.‖ Id. This holding harmonizes with the way we have articulated the rule. ¶21 Similarly, in Ghionis, a skier was injured when she used ski boots that were incompatible with the skis she had rented from a ski resort. Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D. Utah 1993). The skier alleged that the resort gave her an express warranty of the skis‘ compatibility with her boots. Id. The resort asked the court to analyze whether the skier‘s release, which indicated that the resort rented all ski equipment to consumers in an ―as is‖ condition, 7 CUNNINGHAM v. WEBER COUNTY Opinion of the Court protected the resort from liability. Id. at 793. The resort insisted that the release‘s ―as is‖ language served as an express disclaimer of any warranties. Id. The court disagreed and held that because ―the terms [were] slipped into paragraph 1, without any indication to the average consumer that they [were] words of art with distinct legal meaning,‖ they constituted an ambiguous, and potentially deceptive, term. Id. at 793–94. This again comports with how we envision the rule should operate. ¶22 Taken together, these cases illustrate how a preinjury release must clearly and unmistakably inform a reasonable person who and what she is releasing to be enforceable. It is not enough that we might be able to squint at the preinjury release language and conclude that a reader ―might have known‖ or ―probably knew‖ that she was releasing a certain party or claim. ¶23 The Release Cunningham signed provided that he would ―unconditionally and irrevocably release and discharge the Ogden Metro SWATT [sic] Team and all related organizations and entities from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions and causes of action arising, whether directly or indirectly, from or in connection with [his] attending or participating in the described SWAT training.‖ ¶24 The Release‘s language does not clearly and unmistakably release ―the Ogden Metro SWATT [sic] Team and all related organizations and entities‖ from liability for their own negligence.5 Instead, it uses broad, general language that does not specifically nor unequivocally evince an intent to hold the released party blameless for its own negligent conduct. Unlike the release in Freund, there is no additional context that would put a party on specific notice that it was providing a preinjury release for claims arising out of the other party‘s negligence. ¶25 Ambiguity exists in a preinjury release when reasonable minds could disagree on the release‘s meaning. In the words of the Union Pacific court, had the Release meant to waive negligence claims against Weber County, ―it would have been easy enough to use that _____________________________________________________________ 5 Because we conclude that the release is not clear and unmistakable about what it purports to release, we need not address the question of whether it is clear and unmistakable about who it releases. 8 Cite as: 2022 UT 8 Opinion of the Court very language and to thus make that intent clear and unmistakable.‖ El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d at 259–60. ¶26 Simply stated, the preinjury release Cunningham signed was not clear and unmistakable. It was therefore unenforceable, and the district court erred when it concluded otherwise and granted summary judgment. II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT OF UTAH DOES NOT WAIVE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR CLAIMS OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE ¶27 The Cunninghams asserted a claim of gross negligence. The district court granted summary judgment on that claim, reasoning that while the GIA waives immunity for injuries caused by a governmental entity‘s negligence, it does not waive immunity for injuries caused by the governmental entity‘s gross negligence. The Cunninghams argue that the district court misread the statute to reach that conclusion. ¶28 The GIA codifies the broad immunity that a sovereign traditionally enjoys from legal action and explicitly extends the immunity to political subdivisions, like counties. See generally UTAH CODE §§ 63G-7-101–904. The act provides that governmental entities ―are immune from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a governmental function,‖ id. § 63G-7-201(1), unless the act specifically provides otherwise. Id. § 63G-7-301. In other words, a governmental entity enjoys immunity from suit unless the GIA waives that immunity. ¶29 The district court concluded that the Cunninghams ―could not identify any provision within the [GIA] or any case law that supports their position‖ that the GIA waives immunity for gross negligence. The court further reasoned that had ―the Legislature intended for government entities to be liable for their employees‘ gross negligence, the Legislature could have included such a provision, but did not do so.‖ ¶30 We do not read the GIA the way the district court did. Before the district court, the Cunninghams argued that Utah Code section 63G-7-301(2)(i)—which waives governmental immunity for ―any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 9 CUNNINGHAM v. WEBER COUNTY Opinion of the Court employee committed within the scope of employment‖—waives immunity for both simple and gross negligence.6 We agree. ¶31 The GIA waives immunity for an injury ―caused by a negligent act or omission.‖ UTAH CODE § 63G-7-301(2)(i). ―‗[G]ross negligence‘ . . . differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.‖ Negligence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). In other words, a grossly negligent act is still a negligent act. And when the Legislature waived immunity for negligent acts, it waived immunity for negligence in all of its forms. Accordingly, we reverse the district court‘s grant of summary judgment on Cunningham‘s gross negligence claim. III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MS. CUNNINGHAM‘S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM ¶32 The district court granted Weber County‘s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Cunningham‘s loss of consortium claim. As with the gross negligence claim, the district court concluded that the GIA barred the loss of consortium cause of action ―because there is no waiver of immunity for these types of claims.‖ The district court declined ―to extend the reach of the [GIA] to include waivers of immunity for claims not specifically identified in the [GIA].‖7 ¶33 The district court again misread the GIA. The GIA waives immunity for ―any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee‖ committed within the scope of her employment. UTAH CODE § 63G-7-301(2)(i) (emphasis added). Ms. Cunningham alleges that Weber County‘s negligent act caused her to suffer a loss of consortium with her husband. That is an injury she claims was proximately caused by Weber County‘s negligence. The GIA waives immunity for the claim. _____________________________________________________________ 6 The waiver of liability for negligent acts is subject to several exceptions given in Utah Code sections 63G-7-101(4) and 63G-7- 201(2)–(4). 7 The court also opined that even if the GIA had waived immunity for loss of consortium claims, ―given [the] court‘s finding that Plaintiff Brian Cunningham‘s claims cannot be maintained, Plaintiff Mariah Cunningham‘s . . . loss of consortium claim is not viable and must be dismissed.‖ The restoration of Brian Cunningham‘s claims undermines the district court‘s logic. 10 Cite as: 2022 UT 8 Opinion of the Court ¶34 Even if we were tempted to entertain doubt about this reading, the statutory scheme governing loss of consortium claims would eliminate it. Utah Code section 30-2-11 sets forth the parameters of a loss of consortium claim. That section indicates that if damages are ―awarded for loss of consortium which a governmental entity is required to pay‖ the total amount of damages ―may not exceed the liability limit for one person . . . .‖ UTAH CODE § 30-2-11(8). This language confirms that the Legislature anticipated that a governmental entity might need to pay damages for a loss of consortium claim. There would have been no need for the Legislature to include such a provision if the Legislature did not understand that the GIA waived immunity for such claims in certain circumstances. Simply put, the district court misinterpreted the GIA to conclude that it does not waive immunity for loss of consortium claims related to injuries for which immunity is waived.8