Opinion ID: 4514181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State v. Holdcroft

Text: {¶ 12} In considering the issues before us in this case, we first review our decision in Holdcroft. In that case, the defendant was convicted of aggravated arson and arson. The trial court imposed a ten-year prison term for the aggravated-arson offense and a consecutive, five-year prison term for the arson offense. Holdcroft at ¶ 2. The trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control for either offense. After the defendant had completed his prison term for aggravated arson, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing to correct its errors in imposing postrelease control. Id. at ¶ 3. The trial court reimposed both prison terms and then imposed a mandatory, five-year postrelease-control term for the aggravated-arson offense and a discretionary postrelease-control term of up to three years for the arson offense. Id. {¶ 13} We held that “[a] trial court does not have the authority to resentence a defendant for the purpose of adding a term of postrelease control as a sanction for a particular offense after the defendant has already served the prison term for that offense.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. In applying that holding to the case, we explained that, because the defendant had completed his prison term for the aggravated-arson offense, the trial court was not authorized to impose a postrelease-control term for that offense, despite the fact that the defendant was still serving a prison term for another offense. Id. at ¶ 19. {¶ 14} We further explained that “so long as a timely appeal is filed from the sentence imposed, the defendant and the state may challenge any aspect of the sentence and sentencing hearing, and the appellate court is authorized to modify the sentence or remand for resentencing to fix whatever has been successfully challenged.” Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, at ¶ 9. However, “absent a timely appeal, res judicata generally allows only [for] the correction of a void sanction.” Id. We added that “we have consistently held that once an offender has been released from prison, he cannot be subjected to another 6 January Term, 2020 sentencing to correct the trial court’s flawed imposition of postrelease control.” Id. at ¶ 11. Because the defendant in Holdcroft had served the entirety of his prison sanction for aggravated arson at the time he was resentenced, we concluded that he “had a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence that he had fully served.” Id. at ¶ 12. {¶ 15} Of particular significance to this case, we set forth the following three principles in Holdcroft to provide a framework for future cases: First, when a sentence is subject to direct review, it may be modified; second, when the prison-sanction portion of a sentence that also includes a void sanction has not been completely served, the void sanction may be modified; and third, when the entirety of a prison sanction has been served, the defendant’s expectation in finality in his sentence becomes paramount, and his sentence for that crime may no longer be modified. Id. at ¶ 18. We also emphasized that “either the defendant or the state may challenge any aspect of a sentence so long as a timely appeal is filed” and noted that “once the time for filing an appeal has run, Ohio courts are limited to correcting a void sanction.” Id. B. Pursuant to Holdcroft, the trial court had the authority to resentence Christian after portions of her original sentence had been vacated on direct appeal {¶ 16} In its decision below, the Second District failed to apply this court’s repeated statements in Holdcroft that, on a direct appeal of a criminal conviction, any aspect of a defendant’s sentence may be challenged, and any part of that sentence that has been successfully challenged may be corrected. Because Christian successfully challenged her sentence in the direct appeal from her 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO criminal convictions in Christian II, 2016-Ohio-516, 56 N.E.3d 391, the court of appeals properly remanded her case for resentencing and the trial court had the authority to properly sentence Christian on that remand. {¶ 17} The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a defendant “has no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the time to appeal has expired.” United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). In applying DiFrancesco, this court has stated that “when the legislature has provided the government with a statutory right of appeal, ‘[t]he defendant    is charged with knowledge of the statute and its appeal provisions, and has no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the time to appeal has expired.’ ” (Brackets and ellipsis sic.) State v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294, 2008-Ohio-3835, 893 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16, quoting DiFrancesco at 136. {¶ 18} In this case, the relevant portions of Christian’s sentence were vacated on direct appeal and ultimately the case was remanded to the trial court with the specific instruction to resentence Christian on Counts Two, Three, and Five. Because Christian’s sentences on those counts were subject to correction pursuant to DiFrancesco and Roberts, Christian had no expectation of finality in those portions of her original sentence, and the trial court had the ability and obligation to resentence her on those counts on remand. C. Christian’s resentencing did not violate her protections from double jeopardy {¶ 19} The Second District raised a concern that nullifying Christian’s original sentence could violate her double-jeopardy protections. {¶ 20} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” 8 January Term, 2020 {¶ 21} This court has explained that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects persons from (1) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’ (2) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,’ and (3) ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294, 2008-Ohio3835, 893 N.E.2d 818, at ¶ 11, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Relevant to this case is whether resentencing constitutes multiple punishments for the same offense. This court has stated that jeopardy does not attach to a sentence that has been invalidated and, therefore, a trial court’s imposition of a new sentence does not constitute double jeopardy. See State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984). {¶ 22} This appeal stems from Christian’s direct appeal, in which the appellate court properly invalidated portions of Christian’s sentence. As we have explained, Christian had no expectation of finality in her original sentence. It is also notable that it was Christian who, when she appealed her sentence, opened the door for the trial court’s revisiting of her sentence on remand. The fact that Christian actively sought to have her sentence altered supports the conclusion that she had no expectation of finality in that sentence. See United States v. Harrison, 237 Fed.Appx. 911, 913 (5th Cir.2005). This is not a situation in which Christian is being punished twice. Instead, her resentencing represents a correction or clarification of her first, and only, sentence, and she is being punished only once. Accordingly, there is no double-jeopardy concern here. D. Christian is entitled to credit for the time she was confined while her appeals were pending {¶ 23} The Second District also raised a concern that if Christian’s original sentences are treated as having been vacated rather than completed, then the time she served on those counts would be subject to “being twice served.” 2017-Ohio8249, 99 N.E.3d 887, at ¶ 27. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 24} Under Pearce, 395 U.S. at 718, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, when imposing a new sentence for an offense on remand, a trial court must order that a defendant receive full credit for any punishment that the defendant previously served for that offense. This is because “the constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that punishment already exacted must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense.” Id. at 718-719. In this case, the trial court originally ordered Christian to serve the sentences for Counts Two and Three concurrently to the sentence for Count Five. On remand, the trial court ordered Christian to serve the sentence for Count Two consecutively to the sentence for Count Five. Because Christian served prison time on those counts simultaneously, she is entitled to have that time credited toward both of her new sentences on those counts. E. Allowing resentencing on counts for which a sentence has been vacated on direct appeal does not violate any fairness concerns {¶ 25} Christian also raises a fairness argument involving general concepts of due process. {¶ 26} This court has made it clear that all sentences are subject to correction on direct appeal. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have emphasized that there is no expectation of finality in a sentence until the appeals process has run. See Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 543, 751 N.E.2d 1043 (2001), citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). There is no compelling reason to depart from that rule. {¶ 27} Significantly, many of the due-process concerns raised by Christian about resentencing hearings should be addressed in an appeal from the resentencing hearing. For example, if a defendant’s sentence is increased, the defendant is free to challenge the new sentence on the ground that the trial court vindictively increased the defendant’s sentence or that the increased sentence was the result of 10 January Term, 2020 improper sentence packaging. Indeed, in her appeal from her resentencing, Christian challenged the trial court’s decision to impose her sentence for Count Two consecutively to her sentence for Count Five. She argued that the trial court improperly reconsidered its initial decision to run those sentences concurrently without any new factual basis for doing so. This argument—which the court of appeals declined to address below—may be analyzed on remand. Whenever a defendant is resentenced in a case like this, that new sentence is subject to correction on direct appeal if it is contrary to Ohio’s sentencing statutes or if it violates the federal or state constitutions. {¶ 28} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had the authority to resentence Christian de novo on Count Two. We therefore reverse the decision of the Second District Court of Appeals and remand this cause to that court to consider the assignment of error raised by Christian in her appeal from her resentencing.