Opinion ID: 1236325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: S00A1043 Michael Jackson v. The State.

Text: Michael Jackson was arrested on April 12, 1997 and indicted in January 1998. In August 1998 he filed, through counsel, an out-of-time demand for trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170. [7] Jackson was not granted bond until March 1999, after the state obtained a continuance of trial until September 1999 in order to indict Nolton and Mosely, and to re-indict the other four defendants. On July 26, 1999, Jackson filed a motion to dismiss the indictment against him, alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The state apparently concedes that the length of the delay between Jackson's April 1997 arrest and the trial date of September 1999 is presumptively prejudicial, thus triggering the Barker inquiry. [8] Jackson asserts that the reasons for the state's delayan overcrowded docket; successionally reassigning this case to three assistant district attorneys; and the delay in order to indict Nolton and Moselyare not justified and therefore are to be weighted in his favor. This Court has held that a delay of trial for more than two years is deplorable. [9] However, if the delay attributable to the state's preparation of its case is not deliberate but is negligent, it is weighted as a relatively benign factor against the state. [10] The delay of trial in order for the state to indict Nolton and Mosely presents a different matter. After seeking a continuance of the specially set March 1999 trial date until September 1999 so that it could indict these two defendants, the state agreed, at an August 1999 hearing, to sever the trials of Nolton and Mosely from the remaining four. [11] The record shows that Nolton was known to the state and was a suspect in the case immediately following the murders. Thus, the record does not support the state's contention that the delay attributable to this continuance was necessary. The state nonetheless maintains that because this delay was not intentional, it is of no consequence. While there is no evidence that this was a deliberate attempt to hamper the defense, [12] neither is it negligence which is relatively benign. It is therefore weighted against the state. Even if we were to assume that Jackson's assertion of his out-of-time demand for a speedy trial under OCGA § 17-7-170 also raised his Sixth Amendment right, [13] this claim was not made until 16 months after arrest. Jackson did not specifically assert his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial until well over two years following his arrest. As the Supreme Court noted in Barker, the length of delay in asserting the right is directly related to the personal prejudice experienced by the defendant. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. [14] Jackson's extensive delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial is to be weighted against him. With regard to his claim of prejudice, Jackson's nearly two-year period of pre-trial incarceration was unquestionably burdensome. However, we have held that pre-trial incarceration of 27 months does not automatically establish prejudice in the defendant's favor for purposes of the Barker analysis absent proof of sub-standard conditions or other oppressive factors beyond those that necessarily attend imprisonment. [15] Having failed to offer the specific evidence required to support his general claims of anxiety, poor conditions in the Fulton County jail, and that his defense may be impaired by the delay, [16] Jackson has failed to swing the balance of prejudice in his favor. Weighing the state's negligent delay of trial against Jackson's failure to demonstrate that his defense will be impaired by this delay as well as his failure to timely assert his Sixth Amendment right, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Jackson's motion to dismiss his indictment.