Opinion ID: 2632907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Failure to Appoint the Regional Director for the Developmentally Disabled to Examine Defendant

Text: When the trial court declared a doubt as to defendant's competence to stand trial, it appointed two psychiatrists to examine him. But it did not appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled to examine defendant, although it was aware that he suffered from epilepsy. Defendant contends that the court's failure to do so is a jurisdictional error requiring reversal of his convictions and death sentence. Subdivision (a) of section 1369 describes the procedures to be followed when a trial court declares a doubt as to a defendant's competence to stand trial: The court shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, and any other expert the court may deem appropriate, to examine the defendant. ... If it is suspected the defendant is developmentally disabled, the court shall appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled ... to examine the defendant. The court may order the developmentally disabled defendant to be confined for examination in a residential facility or state hospital. [¶] The regional center director shall recommend to the court a suitable residential facility or state hospital. Prior to issuing an order pursuant to this section, the court shall consider the recommendation of the regional center director. While the person is confined pursuant to order of the court under this section, he or she shall be provided with necessary care and treatment. (Italics added.) And at the time of defendant's trial, former subdivision (a)(1) (now subd. (a)(1)(H)) of section 1370.1 provided: `[Developmental disability' means a disability that originates before an individual attains age 18, continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely and constitutes a substantial handicap for such individual.... [T]his term shall include mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism. (Italics added.) Defendant suffers from epilepsy, a disability that originated well before his 18th birthday, is expected to continue indefinitely, and has constituted a substantial handicap for him. Thus, his epilepsy falls within the definition of developmental disability in section 1370.1, and the trial court erred when it did not appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled to examine him as part of the competency proceedings, as required by section 1369. In contending that the trial court's noncompliance with section 1369 requires reversal, defendant relies on People v. Castro (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1402, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d 770 ( Castro ). In Castro, the defendant was charged with child abuse and murder of her infant child. After a court-appointed psychiatrist reported that the defendant was developmentally disabled, the trial court suspended proceedings to determine her competence, but it refused to appoint the director of the regional center to examine her, and instead appointed a psychiatrist to perform that task. The psychiatrist concluded that the defendant had no psychiatric disease but suffered from an unspecified learning disability. Based on this report the trial court found the defendant competent. Later court proceedings revealed that the defendant was mentally retarded, with an IQ of 61 and the intelligence of a six-to-seven-year-old child. The Court of Appeal in Castro held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it failed to appoint the director of the regional center to examine the defendant, and that this failure required reversal of her conviction for second degree murder. The court explained: When the relevant statutes set forth a specific procedure to be followed in determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, and those procedures have not been adhered to, the fundamental integrity of the court's procedures have been compromised. Due process requires that any doubt regarding the defendant's competency be properly evaluated by experts prior to proceeding with trial. ( Castro, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 770.) The Attorney General here argues that Castro, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 1402, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, was wrongly decided and that reversal in this case is not required. As explained below, we conclude that although the result in Castro may well be correct, Castro is wrong to the extent it holds that a trial court's erroneous failure to appoint the director of the regional center to examine a developmentally disabled defendant whose competence is in question is a jurisdictional error that necessarily requires reversal of any ensuing conviction. To determine whether defendant here was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to appoint the director of the regional center to evaluate him because of his developmental disability (§ 1369), we must first consider why the Legislature required the evaluation. The statutory requirement appears to serve three functions. First, the evaluation assists the trial court in determining where the defendant should be confined pending the competency determination. Subdivision (a) of section 1369 permits the trial court to confine a developmentally disabled defendant for examination in a residential facility or state hospital. If the court chooses to do so, [t]he regional center director shall recommend to the court a suitable residential facility or state hospital and before issuing a confinement order the court shall consider the recommendation of the regional center director. ( Ibid. ) Second, the regional director assists the trial court in selecting an appropriate placement for the defendant if the defendant is found incompetent. Subdivision (a)(l)(B)(i) of section 1370.1 provides that if a defendant found to be incompetent is developmentally disabled, criminal proceedings are suspended until the defendant becomes competent, and the court shall consider a recommendation for placement, which recommendation, shall be made to the court by the director of a regional center or designee. The third purpose of section 1369's requirement of an evaluation by the regional director, and the only one relevant here, is to ensure that a developmentally disabled defendant's competence to stand trial is assessed by those having expertise with such disability. In the words of the California Department of Developmental Services (DDS), the state agency that oversees the regional centers: A valid assessment of a criminal defendant's ability to stand trial requires a [] comprehensive, individualized examination of the defendant's ability to function in a court proceeding. A reliable assessment is achieved through thorough examinations of each individual by experts experienced in developmental disabilities. [2] A regional center, the DDS explains, is the primary agency to provide expert advice relating to the assessment, needs, and abilities of a criminal defendant with developmental disabilities. Court-appointed psychiatrists and psychologists may not have this expertise, because their experience may pertain to mental illness rather than developmental disability. This was the case in Castro, where the two psychiatrists who evaluated the defendant's competence made no attempt to determine [the defendant's] intelligence level or assess the extent of her developmental disability. ( Castro, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 770.) When a trial court suspends criminal proceedings based on a doubt that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial, and the court thereafter fails to hold a competency hearing, the trial court acts in excess of jurisdiction by depriving the defendant of a fair trial ( People v. Superior Court (Marks ) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 70, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389, 820 P.2d 613), and any ensuing criminal conviction must be set aside ( People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1340, 248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260; People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 541, 244 Cal.Rptr. 114, 749 P.2d 769). But here, the trial court's error was less egregious: it failed to appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled to evaluate defendant. Given the three statutory purposes of this evaluation that we have just described, defendant's ensuing murder convictions and death sentence need not be reversed unless the error deprived him of a fair trial to determine his competency. As we explain, the error was harmless. Unlike Castro, supra, 78 Cal. App.4th 1402, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, the trial court's competency determination was based on evidence from experts who were familiar with defendant's developmental disability and who considered it in evaluating his competence. Dr. Schaffer, the court-appointed psychiatrist who testified that defendant was competent to stand trial, was a professor at the University of California at Davis Medical School and a diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. Even though he did not specialize in epileptic patients, he had observed patients who had seizures similar to those of defendant. Similarly, Dr. Lynch, the neuropsychologist who testified for the defense, had treated many epileptic patients, although his primary area of expertise pertained to head injuries, not epilepsy. Unlike the court-appointed psychiatrists in Castro, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 1402, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, neither of whom evaluated the developmental disability of the defendant in that case, Drs. Schaffer, Lynch, and Lashi testified at length about defendant's developmental disability, epilepsy. In addition, Dr. Schaffer's report extensively discussed defendant's epilepsy, and an appendix to his report listed eight articles in scholarly journals that Dr. Schaffer used as references in preparing his report, all of which dealt with epilepsy. In summary, appointment of the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled (§ 1369, subd. (a)) is intended to ensure that a developmentally disabled defendant is evaluated by experts experienced in the field, which will enable the trier of fact to make an informed determination of the defendant's competence to stand trial. Here, defendant was evaluated by doctors who possessed these qualifications, and their testimony provided a basis for the trial court's ruling that defendant was competent to stand trial. Thus, the court's failure to appoint the director of the regional center to examine defendant did not prejudice defendant. [3] Defendant asserts that the trial court's failure to appoint the regional director to evaluate him violated his rights under the federal Constitution to due process and a fair trial, as well as his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable guilt and penalty proceeding. Not so. The federal Constitution requires the states to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial. ( Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103.) Here, notwithstanding the trial court's failure to obtain an evaluation from the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled, defendant's competency trial protected his right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent.