Opinion ID: 172808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guidelines provisions

Text: Under the Sentencing Guidelines, loss means the greater of actual loss or intended loss, with actual loss defined as the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense. [5] U.S.S.G. ง 2B1.1, cmt. n. 3(A). For cases involving government benefits, loss is further defined as  not less than the value of the benefits obtained by unintended recipients or diverted to unintended uses.... For example, if the defendant was the intended recipient of food stamps having a value of $100 but fraudulently received food stamps having a value of $150, loss is $50. Id. cmt. n. 3(F)(ii) (emphasis added). Where evidence of direct loss is not available, the district court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss. Id. cmt. n. 3(C); see Sutton, 520 F.3d at 1262-63. Further, the comments to the Guidelines instruct that we are to give appropriate deference to the district court's determination, because the sentencing judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence. U.S.S.G. ง 2B1.1, cmt. n. 3(C).
In calculating loss under the Guidelines, the district court does not limit itself to conduct underlying the offense of conviction, but rather may consider all of the defendant's relevant conduct. U.S.S.G. ง 1B1.3; see id. ง 1B1.2(b) (directing the district court, [a]fter determining the appropriate offense guideline section, to determine the applicable guideline range in accordance with ง 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)). In pertinent part, the Guidelines define relevant conduct as follows: (1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense; [and] (2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which ง 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, [6] all acts and omissions described... above that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. Id. ง 1B1.3(a) (footnote added). The Guidelines commentary further explains that For two or more offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.... .... Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. Id. ง 1B1.3, cmt. n. 9. `We have interpreted this language to mean that if the conduct is sufficiently similar and within the same temporal proximity, it may be considered relevant for purposes of determining the guideline range.' United States v. Williams, 292 F.3d 681, 685 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. McClelland, 141 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir. 1998)). Relevant conduct under the Guidelines thus `comprises more, often much more, than the offense of conviction itself, and may include uncharged and even acquitted conduct.' United States v. Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d 1087, 1095 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2007)). Nonetheless, relevant conduct still must relate to the offense of conviction. Id. (quotation omitted). While we review for clear error the district court's factual findings in support of a determination of relevant conduct, we review the ultimate determination of relevant conduct de novo. United States v. Tran, 285 F.3d 934, 938 (10th Cir.2002).
Six other circuits have held that relevant conduct under the Guidelines must be criminal or unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. Chube, 538 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir.2008) (explaining that relevant conduct must be unlawful); United States v. Maken, 510 F.3d 654, 657-59 (6th Cir.2007) (reciting 6th Circuit precedent to the effect that relevant conduct must amount[ ] to an offense for which a criminal defendant could potentially be incarcerated); United States v. Culverhouse, 507 F.3d 888, 895 (5th Cir.2007) (An offense need not have resulted in a conviction to constitute relevant conduct under the guidelines, but the conduct must be criminal.); United States v. Dove, 247 F.3d 152, 155 (4th Cir.2001) (concluding that relevant conduct under the Guidelines must be criminal conduct); United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 830-31 (3d Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 595, 600 (8th Cir.1994) (same). Like this court, see Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d at 1095, the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits have held that uncharged and even acquitted conduct may constitute relevant conduct under the Guidelines, but have not explicitly held that such conduct must be criminal or unlawful, see, e.g., United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir.2007); United States v. Reyes-Echevarrํa, 345 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Peyton, 353 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.2003). Our description of relevant conduct as including uncharged and even acquitted conduct, Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d at 1095 (quotation omitted), strongly suggests that the conduct at issue must at least be criminally chargeable. That suggestion comports with the reasoning of courts that have held that relevant conduct must be criminal or unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir.1996) (To hold otherwise would allow individuals to be punished by having their guideline range increased for activity which is not prohibited by law but merely morally distasteful or viewed as simply wrong by the sentencing court.); Dove, 247 F.3d at 155 (explaining that if relevant conduct need not be criminal, sentencing courts would become mired in the impossibly subjective task of determining the relative `benignness' of various legally permissible acts). Among those courts that have held that relevant conduct must be criminal, those that have taken up the question have also held that the criminal violation may be of either a federal or a state statute. See, e.g., Maken, 510 F.3d at 657-58; Dickler, 64 F.3d at 831; United States v. Bell, 46 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Newbert, 952 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that under U.S.S.G. ง 1B1.3, conduct which could be the basis of state prosecution may be considered for sentencing purposes on a federal conviction for other conduct which was part of the same common scheme or plan). Agreeing with the reasoning of our sister circuits, and making explicit what has been implicit in our own precedent, we hold that for a district court to consider a defendant's conduct as relevant under the Sentencing Guidelines, the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant (1) engaged in conduct (2) related to the offense of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G. ง 1B1.3 and (3) constituting a criminal offense under either a federal or a state statute. [7]