Opinion ID: 2623482
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr. Krugman's testimony undermined the strength of the State's case.

Text: In concluding that the prosecution had built such a strong case at the trial that Dr. Krugman's testimony would be inconsequential, the court of appeals relied on two factors, Dague's lying and her memory of the assault: Dague's admitted perjury, combined with Dr. Wolf's testimony that Dague had a clear memory of the assault, were strong arguments in favor of the State's position that Dague had acted knowingly. [14] Dague could have used Dr. Krugman's excluded testimony to help rebut both of those arguments. Although a jury might conclude that lying about the abuse indicates that Dague acted knowingly at the time of the abuse, a conclusion that lying was irrelevant to the issue would also be supportable. Dr. Wolf did not appear to see any necessary connection between lying and knowledge at the time of the crime. His position was that Dague acted reflexively and that she did not know what she was doing. Yet he also acknowledged that Dague lied about the events to the police and others. He testified that fear, shame, or inability to cope with the stress of trying to replicate the event were among the possible explanations for this. None of these explanations required that Dague knew what she was doing when she killed the child. Dr. Krugman did not address lying directly, but he did speak of a pressure ... in individuals who abuse children, to suppress or repress what's happened. As to whether a subsequent memory of the assault indicates awareness of its nature at the time of the act, both Drs. Wolf and Krugman found no necessary connection. Dr. Wolf acknowledged that Dague had no memory loss from the event, but nevertheless found this consistent with his conclusion that the abuse was reflexive and unknowing in character. Similarly, Dr. Krugman declined to follow the district attorney's suggestion that a person slamming a baby's head against a hard object would know what she was doing. Instead he answered, I think that knowledge comes after the event. I'm not sure I can say it comes during the event. We conclude that admitting Dr. Krugman's testimony would have put this case in a different light. Both the State's expert and the defense expert would have been seen to agree on the causes of this type of child abuse and on the fact that at the time of the act of abuse the abuser is probably not acting knowingly. Only by discounting the testimony of both experts could the jury have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the knowingly element of second-degree murder was present. It follows that it was not harmless error to exclude Krugman's testimony.