Opinion ID: 3010964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testing and Treatment for Drug Abuse 8

Text: Appellant argues that since there was no indication in the pre-sentence report or elsewhere in the record that he ever used drugs, this condition is not reasonably related to any statutory goal and involves a greater deprivation of liberty than required. While it is true that there is nothing in the pre- sentence report, or elsewhere in the record indicating that Loy engaged in illegal drug use, submission to drug testing is a mandatory condition of supervised release, regardless of the defendant's drug history. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5). Loy, nevertheless, argues that the court abused its discretion in requiring drug testing since the statute provides that the condition may be ameliorated or suspended by the court for any individual defendant if the defendant's pre-sentence report or other reliable sentencing information indicates a low risk of future substance abuse by the defendant. Id. What Loy overlooks in making this argument is that the relevant provision merely suggests that the court may ameliorate or suspend the condition where there is low risk of future substance abuse. It does not state that the court is required to do so. Consequently, the district court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in imposing drug testing as a condition of Loy's supervised release, despite his lack of prior drug use. __________________________________________________________ 8. We address the alcohol and drug components of this condition separately since the court is required by statute to impose drug testing as a condition of supervised release, while the imposition of alcohol testing and treatment is discretionary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5). __________________________________________________________ As for the drug treatment component of the condition, the district court only directed that Loy submit to drug treatment if necessary and as directed by the probation officer. Whether Loy will have to enroll in drug treatment program, then, depends on whether he tests positive for drug use. If the tests reveal no evidence of drug use, then treatment would not be necessary and as such, could not be required. Consequently, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion by imposing provisional drug treatment as a condition of supervised release. B. Conditions Requiring Alcohol Testing and Treatment, Prohibiting Unsupervised Contact with Minors, and Forbidding Appellant from Possessing Pornography Loy also argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to submit to alcohol testing and treatment, prohibiting him from having unsupervised contact with minors, and forbidding him from possessing pornography of any kind. Generally, appellant argues that these conditions are not reasonably related to any of the statutory goals and involve a greater deprivation of liberty than required. The court imposed these special conditions without making any factual findings relating to them or providing any reasons in support of them. While the district court has broad discretion in fashioning conditions of supervised release, the sentencing judge is required by statute to state the reasons in open court for imposing a particular sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). By explaining the reasons behind the sentence, the court ensures that appellate review does not flounder in the zone of speculation. United States v. Edgin, 92 F.2d 1044, 1049 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.1069 (1997)(quotations omitted). Since we do not know why the district court imposed these conditions, we cannot properly review Loy's abuse of discretion claim. Accordingly, we remand the case and direct the district court to state its reasons for requiring alcohol testing and treatment, prohibiting unsupervised contact with minors, and forbidding Loy from possessing pornography of any kind. In remanding, we remind the court that the conditions of supervised release must be reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, protection of the public and rehabilitation of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) & § 3553(a)(2). Moreover, we caution that any condition implicating the deprivation of liberty can be no greater than necessary to meet these goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).