Opinion ID: 2600675
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect on California jurisdiction of defendant's seizure in Mexico

Text: Defendant contends that because he was a citizen of the Republic of Mexico, he was not subject to seizure in Mexico by law enforcement officials of the United States and California governments. Defendant urges that in obtaining custody of him by falsely representing to Mexican government officials that defendant was a citizen of the United States, American officials violated the terms of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, as well as international law, and as a consequence California forfeited its jurisdiction to prosecute him. [3] According to defendant, the state is required to release him to the custody of law enforcement officials in Mexico, whose legal system does not prescribe a death penalty for any crime, and whose official policy is not to extradite an individual sought for criminal prosecution by another nation having criminal laws that prescribe the death penalty for certain crimes.
On December 12, 1989, defendant moved to prohibit the prosecution from seeking the death penalty on the basis that, in requesting defendant's return to the United States for prosecution, American law enforcement officers intentionally circumvented the extradition procedures of the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States. (Agreement of May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656, entered into force Jan. 25, 1980 (Extradition Treaty or Treaty).) Defendant asserted that American officials sought to forestall an attempt by the Mexican government to invoke article 8 of the Treaty, which provides that the requested party may refuse extradition unless the requesting party furnishes assurances that its death penalty laws will not be imposed. The prosecution opposed the motion on the basis that only the Mexican government is a party to the Treaty with standing to complain of a violation. Defendant urged in reply that, inasmuch as the Mexican government participated in defendant's illegal arrest and detention, it could not object to a treaty violation. The trial court conducted a series of hearings and granted defendant several continuances to pursue further discovery in this matter. Defendant also unsuccessfully applied to obtain commissions to examine foreign witnesses the subject of defendant's fourth claim below. (See post, at pp. 130-132.) On August 1, 1990, defendant moved to preclude application of the death penalty, this time on the theory that the penalty violated international law. [4] Defendant relied upon testimony and other evidence concerning the circumstances of his arrest in Mexico and return to the United States presented at the hearings held in connection with these motions, the substance of which is recounted below. In seeking custody of defendant, officials in Sonoma County consulted with officials of the offices of the California Attorney General and the United States Attorney regarding matters of formal and informal extradition, and received the assistance of several other government agencies in this country and in Mexico. On April 18, 1989, Sonoma County Sheriff's Detective David Edmonds was apprised that defendant was in Mexico, and Edmonds subsequently learned from a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent in Mazatlan, Mexico, that defendant had been taken into custody in that city. Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officers Moya and Arturo Zorilla (head of the Latin American Fugitive Unit), whose areas of expertise included international custody, informed Sonoma County officials that the Mexican government might formally extradite, informally expel, or prosecute defendant, and would require certain documents from any American officials who sought custody. Having been apprised that authorities in Mexico likely would not extradite defendant, Sonoma County officials did not seek formal extradition. Based upon their consultants' advice, Sonoma County officials prepared two information packets. The larger packet was to be provided in the event the Mexican government would not extradite or otherwise release defendant to American law enforcement officers for prosecution in the United States. The packet included a copy of a 1986 Immigration Visa and Alien Registration form designating defendant a Mexican national, and a letter dated April 19, 1989, prepared by Sonoma County District Attorney Gene Tunney, requesting that the Mexican government prosecute defendant as a Mexican national for the murders. The smaller packet contained information concerning the murder case against defendant and identifying him, including his place of birth but not his nationality. In Mexico, meanwhile, DEA Supervisor Edward Heath, then stationed atthe American Embassy in Mexico City, had been apprised that defendant was wanted for murder in the United States and was currently in Mexico. DEA Agent Joseph Martinez, stationed in Mazatlan, provided this information to Heath prior to and following defendant's arrest near Los Molchis by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, which took place in the presence of Agent Martinez. Defendant was driven to Mazatlan in a convoy of vehicles. DEA Agent Martinez was present in another vehicle. Heath learned from several communications with his agents and with Assistant Attorney General of the Republic of Mexico, Javier Coelho Trejo (second in command at that office), that defendant had identified himself to the federal magistrate in Mazatlan. Although the magistrate was prepared to expel defendant immediately, and Coelho Trejo did not want someone like that in their country, officials arranged for defendant to be transported (in the company of the federal judicial police and DEA Agent Martinez) to Mexico City to make positive identification. On April 20, 1989, Sonoma County Sheriff's Detectives Edmonds, Doherty, Mike Brown, and Frank Trejo, and LAPD Officers Moya and Zorilla flew on a borrowed private aircraft to Mexico City. Detectives Edmonds and Doherty and DEA Supervisor Heath met with Coelho Trejo, who told them defendant had signed documents attesting that he was a citizen of the United States. Coelho Trejo also related that he had observed defendant make a statement to the public on television that he was a United States citizen and wanted to be returned to the United States. Heath testified that the Americans presented a package to Coelho Trejo that included all of the charges, defendant's fingerprints, his application for an immigrant visa, and other information. Coelho Trejo retained the package, stating he would discuss the matter with his superiors and make a final determination whether to informally extradite (or expel) defendant, or, if it was determined that he was a Mexican citizen possibly he would not be expelled. Heath testified that in negotiating the terms of defendant's release and transfer, Heath and Coelho Trejo both assumed defendant was an American citizen. Heath believed that was the case, because defendant had resided and worked for several years in the United States, had a Social Security card and a driver's license, and had children and a permanent residence in California. Detective Edmonds told Heath defendant was an American citizen. Heath testified that, had Coelho Trejo realized defendant was a Mexican citizen or national, it would have been difficult for him to surrender defendant to the American authorities. Approximately three hours after the foregoing meeting, the American agents were informed by the Mexican officials that their government had decided to expel defendant, and that the Americans would be permitted to return defendant to Sonoma County. During the hearings on defendant's motion to preclude the death penalty because of asserted treaty and international law violations, the trial court considered the testimony of Supervisor Heath, Detectives Edmonds, Trejo, Doherty, Brown, Officer Zorilla, and District Attorney Tunney. Defendant also furnished documents that included the statement of an official in the Mexican Attorney General's office disclaiming knowledge of any written documents executed by defendant in Mexico, and commenting it was highly unlikely such a document existed because defendant had been expelled from that country. The trial court determined that only a party government may assert a violation of the terms of the Treaty, that the government of Mexico did not seek to invoke the protections of the Treaty or request that defendant not be subject to the death penalty, and that defendant did not appear to have standing to object to any violation of the terms of the Treaty. The court also rejected the claim based on international law, and denied defendant's motions as well as his application for an additional commission and a continuance. Defendant sought relief by filing a petition for a writ of mandate, which was denied by the Court of Appeal.
(1) In furtherance of the mutual goal to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime, under the 1978 Extradition Treaty the United States and the Republic of Mexico each is required to extradite any person whom the other nation is seeking, has charged, or has convicted of certain offenses within its borders. The Treaty mandates extradition for enumerated willful acts, including murder or manslaughter, that are subject to punishment by the laws of each nation party for a maximum sentence of one or more years. (Art. 2, subd. (1).) The requested party is required to grant extradition if the person is a national of the requesting Party, and that Party has jurisdiction under its own laws to try that person. (Art. 1, subd. (2)(b).) Article 8 of the Treaty provides: When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the laws of the requesting Party and the laws of the requested Party do not permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party furnishes such assurances as the requested Party considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be executed. (Italics added.) Article 9, subdivision (1) provides that a nation party is not bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive authority of that party may do so at his or her discretion, if not prohibited by the party's laws. Subdivision (2) provides that if the national is not extradited, the requested party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1992) 504 U.S. 655 [119 L.Ed.2d 441, 112 S.Ct. 2188] ( Alvarez-Machain ), the high court interpreted the Treaty as not defeating federal jurisdiction to prosecute a foreign national abducted abroad for the purpose of prosecution. Following the defendant's indictment for kidnapping and murdering a DEA special agent, the DEA orchestrated the defendant's forcible kidnapping in Mexico to enable his prosecution in the United States. The Mexican government protested. The district court and the circuit court of appeals both ruled that forcible abduction of a Mexican national with the authorization or participation of the United States violated the Treaty and, in view of Mexico's formal objection, defeated jurisdiction and required dismissal of the indictment. (504 U.S. at pp. 657-659.) In reversing the lower courts, the high court compared two early, nearly contemporaneous precedents. In United States v. Rauscher (1886) 119 U.S. 407, 430 [30 L.Ed. 425, 7 S.Ct. 234], the court determined the effect of Great Britain's surrender of a British national to the United States for prosecution pursuant to an extradition treaty. The court held that a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty, and for the offence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition.... ( Id. at p. 430.) In contrast, in Ker v. Illinois (1886) 119 U.S. 436 [30 L.Ed. 421, 7 S.Ct. 225] ( Ker ) the court considered the effect on jurisdiction of forcible abduction in Peru of a non-Peruvian national (without objection from Peru) for the purpose of prosecution in the United States. The court held that forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offence.... (119 U.S. at p. 444; see Alvarez-Machain, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 659-666.) The high court observed it has `never departed from the rule announced in [ Ker ] that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a forcible abduction.... There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.' ( Alvarez-Machain, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 661-662; see Frisbie v. Collins (1952) 342 U.S. 519, 522 [96 L.Ed. 541, 72 S.Ct. 509] [concluding Michigan had jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant abducted in Illinois by Michigan officers, because due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly appri[s]ed of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards].) (2) In Alvarez-Machain the defendant contended the rule in Ker, recognizing jurisdiction to prosecute despite abduction from a foreign country, did not apply, because the federal government was involved in his abduction and Mexico objected to his prosecution. In considering whether the defendant's abduction defeated jurisdiction, the high court stated that if the abduction did not violate the terms of the Treaty, the rule in Ker applied and the court need not inquire as to how [the defendant] came before it. ( Alvarez-Machain, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 662.) The court observed that the Treaty does not discuss the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty if such an abduction occurs. (504 U.S. at p. 663.) Further considering the language in historical context, the high court held the Treaty does not prohibit abductions when formal extradition is not sought. Article 9 does not purport to specify the only way in which one country may gain custody of a national of the other country for the purposes of prosecution. In the absence of an extradition treaty, nations are under no obligation to surrender those in their country to foreign authorities for prosecution. [Citations.] Extradition treaties exist so as to impose mutual obligations to surrender individuals in certain defined sets of circumstances, following established procedures. [Citation.] The Treaty thus provides a mechanism which would not otherwise exist, requiring, under certain circumstances, the United States and Mexico to extradite individuals to the other country, and establishing the procedures to be followed when the Treaty is invoked. ( Alvarez-Machain, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 664-665.) The high court next analyzed whether the Treaty should be interpreted so as to include an implied term prohibiting prosecution where the defendant's presence is obtained by means other than those established by the Treaty. ( Alvarez-Machain, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 666.) The court found the legislative history did not reflect an intent to prohibit abductions outside of its terms, and the Treaty does not prohibit abduction when the nation from which the defendant was abducted objects. (504 U.S. at pp. 666, 667.) Thus, jurisdiction was not defeated by the abduction regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other nation. ( Id. at p. 667.) The high court also noted that international law, which clearly prohibits international abductions, does not govern extradition treaties and thus does not affect interpretation of the Treaty. (504 U.S. at p. 668.) [T]o infer from this Treaty and its terms that it prohibits all means of gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond established precedent and practice and would require an inferential leap with respect to international law. ( Id. at pp. 668-669.) Because the defendant's abduction did not violate the Treaty, Ker was applicable and the defendant could be tried in this country for violations of its criminal laws. (504 U.S. at p. 670.) (3) In the present case, no proceedings under color of the Treaty were commenced when defendant was apprehended. As federal and state court decisions repeatedly have held, an individual lacks standing to challenge an asserted violation of an international treaty if the sovereign who is a party to the treaty does not protest. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Emuegbunam (6th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 377, 389-390; U.S. v. Jimenez-Nava (5th Cir. 2001) 243 F.3d 192, 195 & fn. 3; Rodriguez v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2002) 837 So.2d 478, 481; Commonwealth v. Diaz (2000) 431 Mass. 822, 827 [730 N.E.2d 845, 850].) Far from protesting defendant's seizure and rendition, Mexico willingly, if not enthusiastically, accommodated defendant's request to return to California in light of the avowal of U.S. citizenship he made on live television in Mexico. (See ante, at p. 122; see also Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Judg. of Mar. 31, 2004) [Mexico recognized that at the time of his arrest, the defendant asserted his United States citizenship].) In the absence of an objection on the part of Mexico, defendant as an individual may not question the validity of his seizure under the Treaty. ( Alvarez-Machain, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 668-670; Ker, supra, 119 U.S. 436, 444.) Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that American law enforcement officers obtained custody of defendant from Mexican authorities by intentionally misrepresenting he was a citizen of the United States and that, had the Mexican authorities believed defendant was a Mexican national, they would have objected to a transfer of custody, as the high court in Alvarez-Machain has explained, such involuntary seizures are neither permitted nor prohibited under the terms of the Treaty. Had defendant's abduction been accomplished by mendacity rather than by force, that circumstance would not render the rule in Ker inapplicable. (4) In the alternative, defendant contends that the conduct of the Republic of Mexico was consistent with his having been expelled, thus rendering the Treaty applicable, because both parties to the TreatyMexico and the United Statessought the same result. The circumstance that a foreign national's country of origin informally cooperates with the government of the United States in securing the removal of the foreign national does not make the removal subject to the terms of the Treaty. For example, in U.S. v. Mejia (D.C. Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 436, 439, 442-443, the court held that the Panamanian authorities' seizure of the defendants in Panama and rapid transfer of their custody to DEA agents was permissible. Similar to the United States-Mexico treaty, the United States-Panama treaty contained no prohibition against procuring the presence of an individual outside the terms of the treatylet alone one barring the signatories from informally cooperating with each other. (448 F.3d at p. 443.) Similarly, in U.S. v. Bourdet (D.D.C. 2007) 477 F.Supp.2d 164, 169, 178, DEA and Salvadoran officials met and discussed the manner in which the defendants would be arrested for drug offenses committed in the United States, and Salvadoran officials made the decision to arrest and controlled the ensuing tactical and administrative details. The United States-El Salvador treaty was found not to prohibit or address procurement of an individual outside its terms, and the court, declining to infer a prohibition, held that the defendants' renditions did not violate the treaty or compromise their due process rights. (See also U.S. v. Suchit (D.D.C. 2007) 480 F.Supp.2d 39, 49-50.) We see no reason to depart from that precedent in the case before us. Even assuming that defendant has standing to object to a Treaty violation on this theory, his seizure and transportation from Mexico did not violate the Treaty, and the California court had jurisdiction of his case. (5) Defendant also suggests that even if federal precedent does not mandate reversal of his conviction on the ground that his custody was obtained through deception committed by the authorities in violation of the Treaty, this court should reverse the judgment in the exercise of our inherent supervisory power to do equity and administer justice. Defendant urges that doing so would prevent the abuse of court process undertaken by United States officials, who, in deceiving the Mexican government as to defendant's nationality, induced it to violate its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It has not been demonstrated that Mexican officials released custody of defendant to American agents as a result of any misrepresentation. Moreover, assuming defendant had standing to invoke that covenant, it is not our task to redress an asserted violation of an international agreement by a nation party. (See People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1298 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] ( Prince ); People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 106 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622] ( Cornwell ).)