Opinion ID: 1664931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to discover or guard against product defect

Text: Even under current law, I would hold that the harm caused by Keen's conduct was properly comparable with the harm caused by the defective product of Ashot Ashkelon. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 427. I disagree that this comparison was foreclosed by this court's reaffirmation of comment n in Duncan. Comment n of Section 402A the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in a product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery. (Emphasis added). This comment identifies only two types of contributory negligence: (1) a mere failure to discover or guard against a product defect, and (2) assumption of the risk. Under this polarized scheme for labeling a plaintiff's negligent conduct, contributory negligence in the mere failure category in no way reduces recovery, while conduct in the assumption of the risk category operates as a total bar. Using this analysis, it is little wonder that courts labored mightily to fit an injured plaintiff's conduct within the former category. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.1967), and McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.1967), are representative of cases decided under this anachronistric, all-or-nothing approach. Duncan v. Cessna , however, presented a factual setting which did not fit neatly into either of the available categories of comment n. None of the parties contended that pilot Smithson was aware of the design and manufacturing defects in the legs of the cockpit seat, yet Cessna, a strictly liable manufacturer, sought contribution from Smithson's estate on the theory that his negligence as a pilot caused the fatal crash. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 418. Because those facts presented a third category of contributory negligence, we framed the question for decision as follows: whether a plaintiff's contributory negligence is a defense in strict liability actions when that negligence does not rise to the level of assumed risk or unforeseeable product misuse, but is more than a mere failure to discover a product defect.... Id. at 422. Although this comparison was never made in a new trial because Cessna failed to preserve error, it is clear that waiver, and not the retention of comment n, was responsible for Cessna's loss. Id. at 434. And even though comment n was expressly reaffirmed, we held as follows: [T]he system we adopt will allow comparison of plaintiff's conduct, whether it is characterized as assumption of risk, misuse, or failure to mitigate or avoid damages, with the conduct or product of a defendant.... Assumption of risk and misuse will no longer be separate defenses, but will be subsumed under the more familiar notion of contributory negligence. Id. at 428. Duncan, therefore, implicitly recognizes a middle category of plaintiff conduct not previously provided for in comment n: contributory negligence without regard to discovery of a product defect. This case fits squarely within this category. The jury found that Keen was contributorily negligent in moving his hostling tractor beside the trailer-chassis combination. The majority concedes that Keen knew of the risk that trailers might fall and that he violated a recognized safety rule not to pull alongside a trailer in motion or one in the disengagement process. The jury was instructed to not consider any conduct of the plaintiff which amounts only to a failure to discover or guard against a product defect, if any. As in Duncan, evidence of contributory negligence (here the safety rule violation) exists even though Keen had no knowledge of the product defect. But contrary to Duncan, comparison is not allowed. The majority has thus expanded the scope of comment n beyond that envisioned by Duncan and has retreated to a method of apportioning fault that predates our current comparative concepts. Under Duncan, the majority has erred.