Opinion ID: 1704613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: interior vs. exterior

Text: In our decisions in Von Edwards and Stephens we have recognized that Florida's burglary statute provides that taking apart any portion of a conveyance constitutes an entry. However, we have explained that the offense of burglary requires more than an entry, and there must also be proof of the requisite statutory intent to commit a crime within the conveyance. In this way the statute cannot be used to punish as burglary conduct which should be treated as larceny. Von Edwards at 685. For example, in Hankins, as in this case, the State attempted to show that the removal of the hubcaps was the act constituting the entry as well as the crime intended to be committed therein. Although the Hankins court concluded that the removal of the hubcaps did not constitute an entry, it further explained that [c]learly, the theft of hubcaps from an automobile wholly fail[ed] to establish a prima facie case of intent `to commit an offense therein.' 376 So.2d at 286. The Fourth District in Jones similarly held that the removal of the hubcaps does not constitute a burglary because [u]nder those circumstances, there is no `intent to commit an offense therein' i.e., within the vehicle. 763 So.2d at 1103. As noted above, some courts have applied the statutory definition of entry as if that was all that was required to prove a burglary. As was noted in Jones, it appears the Word court failed to consider our holding in Von Edwards when it held in a conclusory fashion that the theft of the wheels and tires removed from the automobile supply sufficient evidence of his intent to commit an offense after entering the automobile by taking apart or removing the wheels and tires. Word, 711 So.2d at 1241. Clearly, the Word court relied on the same act to satisfy both requirements of the statute, an illegal entry as well as the intent to commit a crime within the conveyance. This analysis is inconsistent with our reasoning in Von Edwards and Stephens. In fact, as explained by comment 3(c) to section 221.1 of the Model Penal Code, [t]he word `therein' in Subsection (1) of the Model Penal Code provision ... requir[es] that the intent be to commit an offense after the entry has been effected. Arguably, in some of the other cases, the courts did consider whether the entry was merely to facilitate the commission of an offense within the vehicle. For instance, in Bragg, lifting a hood (entry) may be seen as different from the act of actually removing the engine (the crime intended to be committed). Similarly, in Braswell, defendant's sticking his hand into the bed of the pickup truck (entry) may be distinguished from the removal of the object (the crime intended to be committed). Although such distinctions will ordinarily not present a problem because usually the conduct supporting the entry and the crime to be committed therein are easily identifiable and exclusive of each other, courts must be careful not to end the analysis once it is determined that an entry has occurred. As noted above, such a limited analysis would render meaningless that portion of the burglary statute requiring an intent to commit an offense within the vehicle. In other words, a proper analysis of the offense of burglary must focus both on the act constituting the entry and the intent to commit an offense therein. The language of the burglary statute, as drafted by the Legislature, requires both an entry and the requisite intent to commit a crime within the conveyance. Therefore, it follows that the crime must be one that is capable of being committed within or inside the vehicle. Moreover, it naturally follows that an entry into a vehicle without the requisite intent to commit a separate crime therein is not a burglary. Thus, while the actual penetration into any interior or enclosed area may constitute an entry, including the removal of a portion or part of one of these areas or compartments, an intent to remove an object or commit an unauthorized act therein after the entry has occurred must also be established to satisfy the intent required to commit a crime. This interpretation naturally follows from our previous pronouncement of the legislative intent that the removal of a portion of the conveyance must be to facilitate the commission of an offense within the conveyance ... [and] not seek to punish as burglary conduct which should be treated as larceny. Von Edwards, 377 So.2d at 685. Moreover, such a construction renders more meaningful the overall scheme of the burglary statute and Judge McDonald's observation in Hankins that the definition of `entering a conveyance'... does not obviate the necessity for alleging facts in support of an intent to commit an offense therein. 376 So.2d at 286. It inherently follows from this interpretation that those acts deserving of a burglary conviction should be distinguished from those that constitute a criminal larceny, such as the removal of an antenna, hood ornament, or hubcap from a vehicle.