Opinion ID: 1427434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assumed Responsibility by Conduct

Text: The meeting at which the unconscionable sales agreement was first addressed occurred in Zebre's law office. THE COURT: Let me interrupt. Who was there the first time you went? THE WITNESS: My daughter Kathy, and Pete and John, and Mr. Zebre. Q. (By Mr. White) Now, during that meeting, were you represented by an attorney? A. No. Q. At that time, was the estate in progress? A. Yes. Q. Who was the attorney for the estate at that time? A. Galen West. Q. And did you suggest that Mr. West be involved in these negotiations? A. I said  yes. I told them that I thought that I should talk to Galen being that he, you know, was representing the estate. And John says, You don't need to talk to Galen because he won't let you do it because he wants all the money. Q. Now, Mrs. Brooks, there are two John's that were present. A. John Arambel. Q. John Zebre and John Arambel. A. And John Zebre told me, too, not to talk to West about it because he wouldn't want me to lease it. Q. Now, just repeat again, what did John Arambel say? A. He told me not to get Galen because he said, All he'll do is tell you not to do it, `cause he'll want all your money. Q. And what did Mr. Zebre say? A. And he said, Don't tell Galen because he said, he'll just tell you not to lease that ranch. The next meeting occurred when Zebre came to the house of Patricia Brooks: Q. What happened, then, after that [earlier] meeting? A. Kathy and I left and went home. And then Mr. Zebre came to my house. Q. Did he call you before he came to your house? A. He called me and said, I'll be stopping on my way back from lunch. He said, I live right up the hill from you. And he said, I'll stop on my way back. He said, I want to talk to you. Q. Well, now, is this the same day? A. No, this was a day after or so. And when he come back, he wanted the will and he had a paper. My brother was there. And my brother asked him something about the equipment. Q. Well, Mr. Zebre came to your house how many times before the contract was signed? A. Twice. Q. Okay. Now, we'll be talking about the first time. What happened? Why did he come to your house the first time? A. He came for the will. Q. A copy of the will? A. A copy of the will. Q. Why did he say he needed that? A. He didn't. He just said he wanted a copy of the will; he wanted to read it. A third visit occurred by a trip of the attorney to the house of Patricia Brooks: A. And then he come back some other time and he had the contract or whatever it was. I can't remember if it was a contract. Jimmy was there, my brother, and my brother asked him something about the equipment. Q. Now, he came to your house a second time? A. Yes. Q. When was that in relation to the first visit? A. That was like a day before the contract. Q. This would be like August 11th, 1983? A. Uh-huh. Q. And what time of day did he come to your house? A. Oh, I'd say it was a little after one o'clock, not too long after that. About five after one. Q. And who was present when he arrived? A. My brother Jim. Q. And yourself? A. And myself. Q. And what transpired? A. Well, he had the lease, and he got to talking and Jim said  Jimmy read some of the lease. And then my brother says, Well, how about this equipment in here? And he says, Well, don't worry about a thing, `cause we're not going to cheat your sister. And he got up and left. Q. Mr. Zebre said that  A. Yes. Q.  to your brother Jim? A. Yes. And again the next day after John Arambel called her to go to Zebre's office to sign the lease: A. Well, it was like one o'clock, and they told me to be down there right away. So, I went right down. And  Q. Now, excuse me. They called you on the day you signed the contract? A. Yes. Q. What time did they call you? A. It was around one o'clock, I'd say. Maybe a little after. Q. What did Mr. Arambel say in that telephone conversation? A. He said, We have the lease ready. Would you come down and meet us at Zebre's office to sign it? Q. Did he give you any reason why that particular time? A. No. Q. Was there any sense of urgency in that or what? A. No. They just said that they had to get back to Farson to work. They wanted to get the contract signed. Q. So, when did they tell you to be down to Zebre's office? A. They called and told me to come down right away. Q. So, they called you about one o'clock and told you to come down right away? A. Yes. Q. And did you go to Zebre's office right away? A. Yes. Q. And approximately what time did you arrive at Zebre's office? A. I would say it was around one-thirty. Q. Did you talk to anybody prior to going down there? A. No. Q. Did you go by yourself or with somebody? A. I went by myself. Q. Who was in Zebre's office when you arrived? A. Pete and John and Mr. Zebre. Q. And there were no other persons? A. No. Q. Tell us, then, when you arrived what happened? A. When I got there, I was sat down for a few minutes, and then they  and the girl says, Well, you can go in. Go back. So, I went back and I sat down. And they had the contracts all there. There was a stack of them. And he said, We read through it, parts of it. I didn't understand. I didn't bring my glasses, so I couldn't read it. And he  Q. Did you tell him that? A. Yes, I told him, I says, Well, I can't read it `cause I didn't bring my glasses. Q. Okay. A. And he read through it and then he said, Here, sign it. So, I signed it. And then after I signed it  Q. Excuse me, Mrs. Brooks, but you say he read through it. Did he read word for word? A. I don't think so. Q. Did you understand what he was saying? A. No. Q. Did you ask him to delay the signing of the contract `till you saw your attorney? A. No, I did not. Q. Did they offer to postpone the signing of the contract `till you had an opportunity to see an attorney? A. No. Q. Did John Arambel suggest you wait until you saw an attorney? A. No. Q. Did Peter Arambel suggest you wait? A. No. Q. Mr. Zebre? A. No. Q. So, you didn't read the contract? A. No. Q. And is it your testimony that Mr. Zebre read parts of the contract? A. Yes. Q. Then what happened? A. Then I signed it. And then Mr. Zebre said, Well, I better call Saima right away. And I said, well, I didn't know if Saima had been back from California yet or not. And he said, Well, I'm calling her anyway. Q. Now, when you say Saima  A. McCurtain. Q. Saima McCurtain. And did he  did Saima come to the meeting? A. Yes, she did. Q. How long a period of time was it after you signed it before she came to the meeting? A. I think around fifteen minutes, Saima was there. She came right from work. Q. Tell us what happened as soon as Mrs. McCurtain arrived at the meeting. A. Well, she came in and she sat down at the far end of the table. Mr. Zebre handed her the contract and told her to sign it. And she says, Well, do you think I should read it first? He said, No, I don't think it's necessary. Q. Now, did you have an opportunity to talk with Mrs. McCurtain  A. No, I didn't. Q.  prior to the time she signed the contract? A. No. Q. Did you talk to her at all before that time? A. No. Q. All right. Did she read the contract; do you know? A. She just went over parts and she asked me, How about the Rock Springs Grazing? And I said, No, I'm just letting them use the ground on it. And then she signed it. And then Mr. Zebre told her it didn't matter whether she signed it or she didn't sign it. Q. Did she sign the agreement after you signed it? A. After John and Pete and I had signed it, then Saima signed it after  when she came in. Q. Did she receive a copy of the contract? A. I don't remember whether she  I don't think she did. Q. Did they suggest to her that she would have an opportunity to have an attorney present for her? A. No.       Q. (By Mr. White) Now, after she signed the contract, what happened? A. Well, they got up and we went out of the office. And Saima was going ahead of me, and when I got my coat on, I heard John Zebre say, I can't wait to throw these in Galen's face Monday morning. [9] What right for the contended million dollar loss does the defrauded seller have against the attorney who pursued the conduct described? This case is epitomized by relevancy to a death penalty statement involving prosecutorial activity. Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d 77 (Miss. 1988). We have a rule that seems to work well in civil cases. A lawyer is forbidden to communicate with the opposing party who has a lawyer without that lawyer being present. At the very least, he must give notice of his intentions to or obtain consent of opposing counsel. This rule is undergirded by an ethical principle. All accept that a lawyer who approaches a represented third party without going through counsel should be severely sanctioned. And this is so though the lawyer uses a lay representative or paralegal to do his dirty work. Think what we would do in a personal injury case. The injured party is represented and has been engaged in settlement negotiations with the prospective defendant and his lawyer. Unbeknownst to plaintiff's lawyer, defense counsel's paralegal investigator approaches plaintiff and emerges with a settlement agreement for a sum substantially less than counsel had been demanding. Or, suppose the investigator obtained a(n oral) statement that compromises plaintiff's case. We know well what would happen, the only point of mystery being whether defense counsel would be shot or flogged. Id. at 101 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). See also Trans-Cold Express v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc., 440 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir.1971) and Bruske v. Arnold, 44 Ill.2d 132, 254 N.E.2d 453 (1969). Zebre assumed the responsibility of an advising attorney when he advised Patricia Brooks to exclude her counsel. Since Zebre undertook to advise, direct, and control the negotiations, he assumed responsibility to both parties. When he said he would not cheat the estate and Patricia Brooks, we need only enforce that bargain by requiring a compensatory payment equal to the losses his legal activities precipitated. Collins v. Binkley, 750 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. 1988). Recognizing that legal assistance is needed to protect a pending estate when the attorney excludes proper counsel, he then assumes that responsibility by replacement. Cf. Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976). Furthermore, where there is a duty to speak, which here was certainly created by Wyoming's Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law 4.2, silence may be as misleading as a positive misrepresentation of existing facts. Hennigan v. Harris County, 593 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980). A vast collection of case law, see Treece & Hall, Attorney's Liability: Negligent Misrepresentations to Third Parties  a Growing Threat, 31 For The Defense 18 (July 1989), some of it cited by the majority, can be found but no case approaches this factual situation. Categories of cases with little precedential value to this case are included in Zebre's brief and the majority opinion. The first case involved a litigation privilege case. Here, no litigation was involved when the fraudulent misrepresentation developed. Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 50 Cal.3d 343A, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365 (1990). The answer suggested in Silberg need not be applied here  criminal prosecution for perjury, solicitation of perjury, or even, though clearly appropriate, state bar disciplinary proceedings. Lacking practical involvement in pending litigation with bi-lateral representation, the interest of justice criteria can be maintained. Cf. Bradley v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 30 Cal. App.3d 818, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1973). This general category of cases deals with a disgruntled litigant's suit against the opposing attorney. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1114, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Friedman, 312 N.W.2d 585. See likewise Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. App. 1981) and Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978). This is not a suit by one litigant against the attorney for the opposing litigant. This is an ex parte contact and negotiation of an unconscionable contract by convincing Patricia Brooks to exclude her attorney. We cannot compare what Zebre, as a lawyer, did with a doctor upset that a lawyer represented a former patient in an unsuccessful medical malpractice lawsuit. Friedman, 312 N.W.2d 585. This is not a case addressing the protected right of a citizen to have access to the courts. Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir.1979); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky.App. 1978); Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 118 (1988); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910, 386 N.E.2d 821 (1978). This is also not a case of an unrepresented party being misled by what an attorney told his own client. These third-party reliance cases are addressed in Vanguard Production, Inc. v. Martin, 894 F.2d 375 (10th Cir.1990); First Florida Bank v. Maximum Mitchell & Co., 558 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Harris v. Bonacci, 109 A.D.2d 1072, 487 N.Y.S.2d 224, aff'd 65 N.Y.2d 876, 493 N.Y.S.2d 309, 482 N.E.2d 1225 (1985); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 552 (1977). This is the third-party beneficiary concept as a contractual status creating an enforceable duty to the third party. This concept follows the doctrine of Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) from which Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) followed and to be now applied to attorneys in Vereins-Und Westbank AG v. Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Flaherty, 492 A.2d 618 and Note, Attorney Liability to Third Parties For Corporate Opinion Letters, 64 B.U.L.Rev. 415 (1984). The adversary-non adversary dichotomy in litigative activities must be recognized. Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill.2d 13, 64 Ill.Dec. 544, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982); ABA/BNA, Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, Current Reports at 413 (December 20, 1989). The adversarial process in law requires two attorneys, each representing a party, pitted against one another. A like responsibility was found for the attorney's obligation to a buyer when he, as seller's attorney, failed to provide a proper acknowledgement on the deed of conveyance, Collins, 750 S.W.2d 737, and when the attorney for the collection agency that owed a duty to the account assignor negligently failed to pursue the collection, Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App.3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971). The key to the establishment of a duty is expected reliance. That is the case here. Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App.3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976), duty to reveal business entity status of partnership to lender; Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (1976), the duty undertaken that initiates consideration of liability for negligent performance. The required performance is use of ordinary skill and knowledge, Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3rd Cir.1985), securities selling, attorney had economic interest in the operation; Bradford Securities Processing Services, Inc. v. Plaza Bank and Trust, 653 P.2d 188 (Okl. 1982), bond counsel attorney's opinion; Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (Pa. 1989). We deal here with what Zebre told Patricia Brooks in regard to her need for independent advice, Crutchley v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 450 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1990), in a transaction which she obviously did not understand and in which was, by any circumstance of normal real estate sales, patently fraudulent in perspective and effect. Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir.1987). See the example given in Harad v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 839 F.2d 979 (3rd Cir.1988). There is no subjective good faith excuse for attorney negligence. An attorney in Wyoming is held to the standard of care which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent attorney. Bobbitt v. Weeks, 774 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1989). As discussed in the next section, this includes ethical conduct which relates to standards of care and performance. Elementary principles developed in medical malpractice cases are equally applicable to the attorney's standard of care. What is expected of the medical profession should also be provided by the legal profession. Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. App. 1986); Ward, Developments in Legal Malpractice Liability, 31 S.Tex.L. Rev. 121 (1990); Comment, Evidence  Cleckner v. Dale: Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice Cases, 18 Mem.St.U.L.Rev. 555 (1988). The law of professional malpractice should be uniform, unless it can reasonably be shown that one profession is more deserving of protection than another for valid policy or social reasons. Ward, supra, 31 S.Tex.L.Rev. at 142-43. [10] The district court characterized the understanding that Patricia Brooks had about the transaction, which she called a lease, and what the Arambels booked out as a purchase when it stated in decision letter: I am convinced, under the circumstances, that the contract was so one-sided as to be oppressive; that the sellers were deprived of meaningful choice; that there was no real opportunity for meaningful negotiation; that there was such gross inequality of bargaining power that fair negotiations were not possible for the estate, that Mrs. Brooks was in fact uneducated, intellectually illiterate, and the type of person easily deceived and susceptible of being taken advantage of; and that Mrs. Brooks did not comprehend and was not knowledgeably aware of the contents of the contract and its effect on her and her children. I doubt that even today she is fully aware of its terms, despite it having been explained to her as often as it has. Not only do the authorities cited by the majority not countenance attorney performance of this type, but the extensive case law provides no example that would lend justification in these facts for immunity from responsibility by the attorney. Cf. Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App.3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1985) and Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App.2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967). There is no automatic immunity for attorneys from their tortious conduct. Havens v. Hardesty, 43 Colo. App. 162, 600 P.2d 116 (1979). See also Comment, Attorney Malpractice: Use of Contract Analysis to Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, 63 Minn.L. Rev. 751 (1979) and Note, Attorney's Liability to Third Parties for Malpractice: The Growing Acceptance of Liability in the Absence of Privity, 21 Washburn L.J. 48 (1981). National Sav. Bank of District of Columbia v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879), serving as the ancestor of lawyer immunity, cannot be applied here. Ward was a privity case and very clearly recognized that cases where fraud or collusion are alleged and proved are exceptions to the non-liability privilege. Here, for the Brooks estate, where the transactional incidents sound in fraud and collusion, there is no precedential relevance from Ward to be derived. [W]here there is neither fraud or collusion nor privity of contract, the party will not be held liable, unless the act is one imminently dangerous to the lives of others or is an act performed in pursuance of some legal duty. Id. 100 U.S. at 206. Conversely, that court recognized in citing Langridge v. Levy, 4 Mee. & W. 337: [T]hat as there is fraud and damage the result of that fraud, not from an act remote and consequential, but one contemplated by the defendant at the time as one of the results, the party guilty of the fraud is responsible to the party injured. Ward, 100 U.S. at 206. Where there is fraud or collusion, the party will be held liable even though there is no privity of contract. Id. at 205. Ward only wrote the title opinion for the buyer and not for the funding bank. Privity or its absence has no relation to this transaction where the challenged conduct was directly between the attorney and the defrauded listener. Cf. Symposium, Attorney's Liability in Title Examination, 6 Wyo.L.J. 177, 181 (1952) (citing Glanzer, 135 N.E. 275, for a duty derived from representation of fact with expectable reliance). The reliance criteria was recognized in the name case, Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974), which incidently cited Symposium, supra, 6 Wyo.L.J. 177, in following Judge Cardozo's opinion in Glanzer for abstractor liability. Michigan had categorically eliminated the requirement of privity. Williams, 215 N.W.2d at 153. See also Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897), where an attorney title examiner for the borrower was involved with a suit by the lender. In Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. 1987), the court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 522 in perceiving possible negligence from failure to tell elderly vendors who relied on them that a mortgage interest upon sale reflected by the mortgage should be recorded. The New Mexico court similarly applied Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 522 to a misconceived real estate transaction to provide a viable case against the participating lawyer in Holland v. Lawless, 95 N.M. 490, 623 P.2d 1004 (1981). A uniform thread in those jurisdictions which abjured limiting liability by privity is that responsibility still depends on an examination of the transaction. Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1987). Cf. Landrigan v. Nelson, 227 Neb. 835, 420 N.W.2d 313 (1988) and Ames Bank v. Hahn, 205 Neb. 353, 287 N.W.2d 687 (1980), where the court recognized the facts and circumstance test but declined factual application in a negligently prepared will case. The bad will cases initiated from California decisions in Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961) and Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). See also Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal.2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969) and ABA/BNA, supra, at 365. The thesis of the will cases sounded in a third-party beneficiary concept of contract as a recognized duty of the drafter to the anticipated beneficiaries whose interest was explicit in the testator's employment of the lawyer. Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1988). Similarly, inducement and reliance cases run the gamut from title opinions to probate related activities. Greycas, Inc., 826 F.2d 1560; Fickett, 558 P.2d 988; Hermann v. Frey, 537 N.E.2d 529 (Ind. App. 1989); Cornell, 408 N.W.2d 369; Elam v. Hyatt Legal Services, 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 541 N.E.2d 616 (1989) (distinguishing Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636 (1987), where privity denied liability in a negligently drafted will lawsuit by a beneficiary). See likewise Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966), privity defense rejected and Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa.Super. 543, 421 A.2d 333 (1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983). [11] See also Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis.2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983). Cf. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis.2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). Contra Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor P.C., 717 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App. 1987), restating the present rule requiring absolute priority. See Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C., 729 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1987). Certainly the granting of a writ of error is not a conclusive indication that the Texas Supreme Court was ready to abandon the privity requirement. It does indicate, however, that the court was prepared to re-examine the present state of the law in the face of a very sympathetic factual setting for the injured plaintiffs. In the future, courts of appeals dealing with this question should consider the fact that a writ of error was granted on the isolated issue of privity as a bar to intended beneficiaries and the fact that a decision was preempted by settlement. Baron, The Expansion of Legal Malpractice Liability in Texas, 29 S.Tex.L.Rev. 355, 361 (1987) (emphasis in original). The direction was preordained by the accounting case of Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.Civ. App. 1971), where Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 522 was applied. See Ward, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 19 S.Tex.L.J. 587, 611 (1978). However, the injured third party plaintiff may well have valid arguments for bringing a legal malpractice case. If it is foreseeable that a third party will rely on the work of an attorney, then the general principles of tort law suggest that the innocent party should not bear the full loss proximately caused by the negligence of an attorney. To hold otherwise would be inequitable to foreseeable third parties and would fail to deter negligence in such instances, having an overall negative effect on the reputation of the legal profession.    Under Shatterproof, the demise of the privity defense appears imminent in actions by third parties who were foreseeable beneficiaries of and/or justified in reliance on the negligent work of an attorney. Id. at 610-11 (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted). Comment, Lawyers' Negligence Liability to Non-Clients: A Texas Viewpoint, 14 St. Mary's L.J. 405 (1983). Also relating generally to the sphere of liability of the attorney to the non-client are the false arrest and malicious prosecution cases as again within a category of facts and circumstances defined within a theory of tort, a zone of duty contrasted with any contractual theory. Havens, 600 P.2d 116; Pomeranz v. Class, 82 Colo. 173, 257 P. 1086 (1927); Vernes v. Phillips, 266 N.Y. 298, 194 N.E. 762 (1935); Yahola v. Whipple, 189 Okl. 583, 118 P.2d 395 (1941). These cases are founded on an independent tort concept, wrongful attachment theory. Home Budget Loans, Inc. v. Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, 207 Cal. App.3d 1277, 255 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1989); Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIntyre, 206 Cal. App.3d 1513, 254 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1988); Munson, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340; Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577 (La. 1989); Schierloh v. Kelly, 253 A.D. 373, 2 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1938); Gibson v. Holmes, 78 Vt. 110, 62 A. 11 (1905). For summary judgment review purposes, Zebre knew Patricia Brooks served as an officer of the court as an executor and trustee at the time of these negotiations. Fickett, 558 P.2d 988. In August 1983, she had no definable interest for which she had an appropriate right of negotiation. Consequently, the conduct of Zebre in ex parte contact with her was especially egregious since not only involving a fraud perpetrated upon the court process, but also against the minor children who were heirs of the estate. [12] That burden of misconduct was magnified not only by the negative misfeasance of direct contact, but by the affirmative behavior of aggressively advising a represented person not to see that person's attorney at a time when a fraudulent and unconscionable agreement was being prepared. Greycas, Inc., 826 F.2d at 1565 (quoting Penrod v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 68 Ill. App.3d 75, 81-82, 24 Ill.Dec. 464, 469, 385 N.E.2d 376, 381 (1979)) states the proposition as: [O]ne who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in their business transactions is liable for negligent misrepresentations that induce detrimental reliance. Like Greycas, Inc. in that case in regard to the third party, Zebre here used no care. Here also, there can be no doubt about the casual relationship between the misrepresentation and the sale completion and consequent estate loss. Greycas, Inc., 826 F.2d at 1565. The Brooks-Zebre relationship is similar to Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989), where Krahn actually thought she was being represented but the attorney failed to communicate a favorable plea bargain because of the effect on his real client. A somewhat similar transactional scenario occurred in Hill v. Okay Const. Co., Inc., 312 Minn. 324, 252 N.W.2d 107 (1977), where one lawyer represented both the buyer and the seller in a sale of a business. When problems developed following sale, one party claimed intent to have a secured loan which was instead prepared as a sale. Expert testimony at trial contended negligence in the joint representation and in the result of the joint representation as an unsatisfactory sale documentation. The appellate court held the attorney liable for buyer's losses following purchase and the attorney fees incurred by both the buyer and the seller in defending claims of creditors. The principles followed in Hill can apply to Brooks where third-party counsel was excluded by Zebre from the negotiations.