Opinion ID: 2317972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: tears' appeal

Text: The questions involved on the appeal of defendant Tears include whether (a) a statement relating to Tears' conviction in a traffic court as a result of this accident by the attorney for the defendants Jersey Central and Walling, required the trial court to declare a mistrial; (b) whether there was error prejudicial to Tears in the trial court's failure to exclude testimony relative to conduct by one of the truck crew after the collision; and (c) whether the trial court erred in leaving to the jury the question whether the site of the collision was in a residence district. Tears did not contend on this appeal that the verdict against him was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Further there was ample evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Tears operated his motor vehicle in a negligent manner, proximately causing, at least in concurrence with negligence of his co-defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, the collision and resultant injury to Melone. Tears' first point of argument was that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial when on cross-examination counsel for Jersey Central and Walling (the co-defendants) asked Tears whether he was convicted in a magistrate's court as the result of this accident. Defendant Tears' two trial counsel both objected. Tears' defense counsel moved for mistrial. The objection was sustained, the trial court admonishing the jury will disregard that entirely, and the motion for mistrial was denied. No abuse of discretion is indicated. Cf. Gregg v. Fisher, 377 Pa. 445, 105 A. 2 d 105 ( Sup. Ct. 1954). Compare State v. Witte, 13 N.J. 598, 611-612 (1953). Tears next contended that testimony by a police officer, Nuss, as to observation (at least two minutes after the collision) of a man standing back of Tears' vehicle with a big light was erroneously admitted in evidence. Tears' defense counsel began an objection, the trial court interrupted, holding the question irrelevant but permitting it as corroboration of Tears' testimony. Tears had testified he saw a man waving a light in back of the truck, in sufficient time for him (Tears) to stop but he didn't reduce speed and prepared to pass the stalled truck. Under these circumstances we discern no error prejudicial to Tears' substantial rights Tears further contended that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question whether the collision occurred in a residential area. The Appellate Division held that no objection was asserted to the portion of the charge attacked. There was an objection by defendants Walling and Jersey Central, without expression of grounds for objection, after the jury retired, which objection was joined in by Tears' defense counsel. From the colloquy between the court and counsel prior to the retirement of the jury it was contended on this appeal by Tears that ample opportunity for objection was not given the parties by the court within the spirit of R.R. 4:52-1. However, even if this be so, counsel were permitted to object subsequently and even then did not state grounds for the objection, nor request correction of the instruction. Tears had testified that the district was semi-residential. Officer Nuss' testimony was as to physical facts of the area clear and undisputed. The question was one of statutory application, not opinion, and the evidence warranted a charge that the provisions of R.S. 39:3-64, as amended, supra, were effective in the area involved. Under Nuss' testimony as applied to R.S. 39:3-64, as amended, supra, and R.S. 39:1-1, as amended L. 1951, c. 25, sec. 1, supra, it appears that the area was neither a business district nor a residence district. The trial court correctly charged that a violation of the Traffic Act was not in itself negligence. It is a factor to be taken into consideration, an incident of negligence. Renner v. Martin, 116 N.J.L. 240, 241 ( E. & A. 1936). Cf. Seibert v. Goldstein Co., 99 N.J.L. 200, 201-204 ( E. & A. 1923). The violation of a statute by others does not constitute a sufficient reason to fail in one's own duty to exercise reasonable care.