Opinion ID: 1918099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Contempt

Text: I concur with the majority that the contempt order should not stand. I agree with the majority that, while that order stated the basis for the finding and that Northrop was in direct contempt, it did not indicate whether the contempt was criminal or civil. See OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 437, 992 A.2d at 71. Failure to comply with statutory guidelines is fatal to the order's validity. See Hermina v. Baltimore Life Ins. Co., 128 Md.App. 568, 589, 739 A.2d 893, 905 (1999)(The failure of the court to comply with [Md.] Rule 15-203(b)(2) renders its order of contempt fatally defective in substance as well as form.... The defect in the judgment, failure to specify the evidentiary facts on which it was based, as required by [Md.] Rule 15-203(b)(2), requires that we reverse it.). In this case, the trial judge failed to comply with Md. Rule 15-203(b)(1). [23] I would add, however, that, for the reasons articulated above, the trial court exceeded its authority when it appointed the OPD, and later Northrop, to represent Stinnett. On this additional ground, the contempt order must be reversed. An individual, in this case, an attorney ordered by the court to perform a task, which runs contrary to his or her statutory obligations, has neither a duty nor an obligation to comply with that order. That is the situation here. Although Northrop did not comply with the court's order that he represent Stinnett, a defendant whose representation the OPD had declined, he had no duty to do so. Judges BATTAGLIA and GREENE join in the views herein expressed.