Opinion ID: 791269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 14 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction on direct appeal, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). We must also resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the government. United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir.2001). We may not, however, reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir.1993).
15 Defendant argues that attempted bank robbery requires proof of actual intimidation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,. . .). Conceding that this argument is raised for the first time on appeal, defendant contends that the argument was not waived because his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal was general in nature. Specificity in a Rule 29 motion is not required. United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1356 (6th Cir.1993). When a defendant makes a motion on specific grounds, however, all grounds not specified in the motion are waived. Id. at 1357. 16 A similar waiver argument was addressed in United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 371 (6th Cir.2002). There, the court found that although the colloquy focused on a specific area of the evidence, the motions were general in nature and the district court treated them as such by assessing the evidence as to each element of each crime. Here, the defendant's rule 29 motion challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to establish both elements of attempt. This, in the abstract, might seem to be a general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In fact, defendant is arguing that there is an additional element to attempted bank robbery. For this reason, we find defendant's motion was not a general challenge to all the elements and this claim was waived by the failure to raise it in the Rule 29 motion. See United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir.1998). 17 Even if the issue had not been waived, however, we would find it to be without merit. On appeal, defendant relies on a Fifth Circuit decision, openly creating a split of authority, that held the most natural reading of the statute requires proof that the defendant actually committed an act of intimidation, or of force and violence, in order to be convicted of attempted bank robbery. United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir.2004). That is, the court found the attempt relates only to the taking and not the intimidation. 18 This court has not specifically addressed this argument, but it has been squarely rejected by three other circuits. See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir.1976); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.1984); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir.1990). Rejecting this argument as wooden logic, the Second Circuit explained that: 19 Attempt is a subtle concept that requires a rational and logically sound definition, one that enables society to punish malefactors who have unequivocally set out upon a criminal course without requiring law enforcement officers to delay until innocent bystanders are imperiled. 20 Jackson, 560 F.2d at 116 (quoting Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040). We agree that to read the statute as defendant urges would be inconsistent with our definition of attempt crimes, and would, without reason, require proof that a defendant actually confronted someone in the bank before he could be convicted of attempted robbery. We find the only reasonable interpretation is that the statute criminalizes attempted taking by force or violence, or by intimidation. Actual intimidation is not required to prove attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). 1
21 To convict a defendant of attempt, the government must prove (1) the defendant's intent to commit the criminal activity; and (2) that the defendant committed an overt act that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. United States v. Bilderbeck, 163 F.3d 971, 975 (6th Cir.1999). Defendant argues, as he did in his Rule 29 motion, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he took a substantial step toward commission of the robbery. 2 22 Because of the problems of proving intent in attempt cases and the danger of convicting for mere thoughts, desires, or motives, we require that the substantial step consist of objective acts that mark the defendant's conduct as criminal in nature. Id. (citing United States v. Pennyman, 889 F.2d 104, 106 (6th Cir.1989)). This objective conduct must unequivocally corroborate the required subjective intent to engage in the criminal conduct. Id. Emphasizing that the substantial step requirement is an objective one, this court explained in Bilderbeck that 23 under the substantial step analysis, an appellate court evaluates whether any reasonable person could find that the acts committed would corroborate the firmness of a defendant's criminal intent, assuming that the defendant did, in fact, intend to commit the crime. The requirement does not mandate that the activity constituting a substantial step must be sufficient to prove that the defendant had the subjective, specific intent to commit a crime. The intent may need to be proven separately. 24 163 F.3d at 975. 25 Arguing that his actions represented mere preparation, as opposed to a substantial step toward the commission of the crime, defendant emphasizes that he was arrested at his home an hour away from the bank, by himself, and without a weapon or disguise. While this indicates that the robbery may not have been as imminent as it seemed to Agent Booth, it does not negate evidence from which the jury could have found Wesley intended to rob the bank or that he planned to do it soon. Likewise, although defendant told Reid that he doubted the robbery would be the next day and said he was at a standstill, he did not disavow his plan or indicate he was having second thoughts. In addition, the jury was free to conclude, as Agent Booth believed, that these statements were a reflection that Wesley had become suspicious of Reid. As we made clear in Bilderbeck, the focus of the inquiry is not so much whether the actions constitute preparation, but whether the conduct corroborates clear criminal intent. 26 Defendant's heavy reliance on United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.1987), is misplaced. Although the court in Buffington reversed the defendants' convictions for attempted bank robbery on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, closer examination of the case reveals that it is easily distinguished. Significant to the reasoning in Buffington was the fact that the government had chosen not to present evidence concerning the information received from the confidential informant. Instead, the government argued that intent could be inferred from the observations of the police officers who saw the defendants drive slowly around a bank in a shopping center and return five days later with revolvers and in disguises. The Ninth Circuit found this evidence alone, unaided by the informant's testimony, was insufficient to establish intent to rob the bank or a substantial step toward commission of the crime. In this case, however, the government offered substantial evidence from Reid and others concerning Wesley's intent to rob the Stockbridge bank. 3 27 As we observed in our initial opinion, whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that Wesley committed an overt act that constituted a substantial step toward commission of the crime is a closer question. While we find reversible error in the admission of the statements referring to Wesley's prior conviction, retrial is not precluded if the evidence admitted at trial, whether erroneously or not, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988). In resolving that question, however, we are mindful that we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 28 Wesley's overt acts began with his late-night visit to Reid's home to question her about whether the bank was a good target for robbery. Wesley recruited Reid to act as the getaway driver because she was familiar with the area. There was also evidence that Wesley attempted to recruit Carr, a convicted robber, to participate in the bank robbery, although Carr declined to join in. Wesley conveyed specific plans to Reid and told her he knew someone he could trust to help. Finally, Wesley had Reid take him to see the bank, including the open vault, and picked the route for the getaway after the robbery. 29 The critical inquiry in the substantial step analysis, separate from the question of subjective intent, is whether the defendant's conduct, viewed objectively, corroborates his subjective intent to commit the crime. For example, we explained by way of a hypothetical in Bilderbeck that a penniless man who engages in active negotiations with a drug dealer, knowing that he had no money with which to consummate the sale, has committed acts that objectively corroborate the firmness of his intent and constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. 163 F.3d at 975. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we must, we find that a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Wesley's conduct, when viewed objectively, unequivocally corroborates his subjective intent to commit bank robbery. As a result, we find there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Wesley's conviction for attempted bank robbery.