Opinion ID: 563746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Davis's Claim Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983

Text: 12 Locke and Gemelli appeal the district court's denial of their motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on this claim. On review, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990). Reversal is proper only if the facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of the movant that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Id. 13 Davis contends that Locke and Gemelli violated his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law when they pulled him from the dog cage and caused him to fall to the ground. Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities protected by the constitution or the laws of the United States. 14 The eighth amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or the infliction of pain totally without penological justification. Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir.1987). In the context of prison discipline, we must consider 15 the distinction between, on the one hand, punishment in the strict sense and, on the other, immediately necessary coercive measures undertaken to obtain compliance with a reasonable prison rule or regulation. Punishment in the strict sense involves a penalty which is deliberately administered after reflection and evaluation in response to conduct occurring in the past.... Punishment in this sense is not designed to bring an ongoing violation to a halt. 16 Id. at 322 (footnote omitted). However, an isolated assault by an individual guard on an inmate is not, within the meaning of the eighth amendment, punishment. George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413, 415 (5th Cir.1980). 17 Even if a physical assault does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the use of undue force by a prison guard is actionable as a deprivation of fourteenth amendment due process rights. Id., 633 F.2d at 416. Moreover, the fourteenth amendment is violated where prison officers continue to employ force or other coercive measures after the necessity for such coercive action has ceased. Ort, 813 F.2d at 327. 18 The Supreme Court has explained that this issue turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973)). At the time of the incident in question, Davis had been recaptured after his escape from prison. He was confined in a dog cage with his hands shackled behind his back. Under these circumstances, the ongoing violation of escape had been terminated, and a jury could reasonably conclude that Davis posed no continuing threat to Locke or Gemelli. 19 The record evidence supports a jury determination that Locke and Gemelli intended to punish Davis for his attempted escape and did so through the use of excessive force, in violation of the fourteenth amendment, when they pulled Davis from the dog cage. There was evidence at trial that the guards taunted Davis with racial epithets and threatened to teach him a lesson when they returned to the prison. 2 A reasonable juror could conclude that Locke and Gemelli fulfilled that threat. Davis also presented uncontradicted psychiatric testimony that the incident caused him severe psychological injuries, and such evidence is directly relevant to the issue of damages under section 1983. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 784 (11th Cir.1991). The evidence was not so insubstantial as to warrant a directed verdict or JNOV as a matter of law, and we therefore affirm the district court's denial of Locke and Gemelli's motions on this claim. 20 Davis also sought civil damages for Locke and Gemelli's actions under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1985(3) and 1986. The jury verdict did not tie its award of damages to violation of a particular statute; the verdict simply held Locke and Gemelli responsible for violating Davis's constitutional rights when they pulled him from the dog cage and let him fall to the ground. Our decision to affirm the jury verdict under section 1983 obviates any need to consider Locke and Gemelli's alternative arguments against recovery under sections 1981, 1985(3) or 1986.