Opinion ID: 774363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construing Aggravated Felonies Generally

Text: 15 We have construed the meaning of several of theaggravated felonies listed at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43). The case law shows that we have developed two alternative methodologies for defining these aggravated felonies. 16 First, in United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999), we employed the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of sexual abuse of a minor to define that term, listed as an aggravated felony  at §§ 1101(a)(43)(A). We coupled the dictionary definition of abuse with the common understanding of sexual and minor to conclude that a conviction under California Penal Code §§ 288(a) (lewd or lascivious act on a minor) constituted such a conviction. Id. 17 Second, in Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000), we construed burglary offense, listed as anaggravated felony at §§ 1101(a)(43)(G). Rather than use the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the term, we looked to a Supreme Court case, Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 (1990), which crafted a detailed, uniform definition of burglary. Id. We adopted this definition, using it to define burglary offenses. Id. 18 Recently in United States v. Corona-Sanchez 234 F.3d 449 (9th Cir 2000), we considered the meaning oftheft offense, which is defined as an aggravated felony at §§ 1101(a)(43)(G). We noted the divergent methodologies developed in Baron-Medina and Ye and explained when each should be applied. Id. at 451-53. We summarized the cases thus: 19 Baron-Medina and Ye take two different approaches to testing a prior conviction for aggravated felony status. Baron-Medina considered the ordinary meaning of the words sexual abuse of a minor and tested whether the conduct reached by the specific state statute at issue fell within the common, everyday meaning of those words. Ye, on the other hand, followed Taylor's approach by adopting auniform definition independent of the labels used by state codes for burglary, identical to the one in Taylor. In other words, Baron-Medina did not set forth the elements or a uniform definition of sexual abuse of a minor. 20 Id. at 451 (internal citations omitted). We held that the issue presented in Corona-Sanchez was more like Ye and followed the categorical approach in adopting the Model Penal Code definition of theft to define theft offense. Id. at 451-53. In so deciding, we stressed that, like burglary, theftis a more traditional crime containing distinct elements. Id. at 453. 21 This case is more like Baron-Medina than Ye. Crime of violence is not a traditional common law crime. Like sexual abuse of a minor, it can only be construed by considering the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the language Congress used in defining the crime. 1 22