Opinion ID: 196722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Safety Valve Exception

Text: 40 In 1994, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which, in certain cases, limits the application of mandatory minimum sentences. Pursuant to this provision, when a convicted defendant meets five delineated requirements, 6 the district court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. The parties agree that Jimenez meets the first four requirements, but dispute whether Jimenez's disclosure to a probation officer, but not the United States Attorney, constitutes providing information to the Government as understood under § 5C1.2(5). We review this question of legal interpretation under the guidelines de novo. United States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304, 315 (1st Cir.1996). 41 Neither the United States Code nor the Sentencing Guidelines contains a specific definition of government. Jimenez thus advances a generic conception derived from a dictionary: the executive branch of the United States Federal Government. Jimenez asserts that this characterization includes the probation department. For additional support, Jimenez contends, correctly, that aspects of the sentencing procedures contemplate some disclosure to the probation officer. See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.1. 42 In resolving this issue, we are guided by the use of the word government in other relevant provisions, and by legislative history. Section 5C1.2 provides that prior to its determination, the court shall afford the government an opportunity to make a recommendation and cites Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1). 7 Section 5C1.2 comment. (n.8.). Under this procedural rule, government implicitly identifies the prosecutorial authority. See United States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193, 196 & n. 3 (5th Cir.1995) (relying on, inter alia, the doctrine of in pari materia in holding that statements to a probation officer do not satisfy § 5C1.2). 8 43 We also think that § 5C1.2 is properly understood in conjunction with § 5K1.1, which authorizes downward departure upon the government's motion that the defendant has provided substantial assistance to authorities. The second clause of § 5C1.2(5)--securing the benefit of the safety valve even if the fully disclosing defendant has no useful other information or the Government is already aware--seems specifically designed to reward forthcoming defendants who cannot satisfy § 5K1.1. It seems evident that section 5K1.1's reference to the government and to substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person contemplates the defendant's provision of information useful in criminal prosecutions. 44 The house report accompanying the 1994 bill reinforces the notion that the provision requires disclosure of information of a type that would aid prosecutors' investigative work. It states that, by the time of sentencing, the defendant must have fully assisted the Government by providing all relevant information regarding the offense. H.R.Rep. No. 460, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (emphasis added). We think this contemplates more than the summary of the crime typically provided by a defendant to a probation officer. Our conclusion is further buttressed by the timing component of § 5C1.2(5)--requiring provision of all information to the Government not later than the time of the sentencing hearing--which necessarily anticipates communication that could occur after the creation of the presentence report, indicating that something other than ordinary disclosure to a probation officer is intended. 45 While full disclosure to the probation officer may assist the officer in preparing the defendant's presentence report, we do not believe that § 5C1.2 was meant to extend so far. The probation officer does not create a presentence report with an eye to future prosecutions or investigations. Indeed, in that context, the disclosure of one's role is the domain of acceptance of responsibility. Section 5C1.2, like 5K1.1, requires more affirmative involvement in the prosecutorial function. Cf. United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995) (requiring an affirmative act of cooperation). See also United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 378 (10th Cir.1995) (stating that the defendant must disclose everything he knows about his own actions and those of his co-conspirators.). 46 In sum, we conclude that government in § 5C1.2(5) refers to the prosecutorial authority. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's holding that Jimenez did not satisfy the requirements of the safety valve provision. 9