Opinion ID: 2331578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Relevance under W.R.E. 401

Text: [¶ 17] We begin our analysis by addressing the issue of whether the evidence was relevant. For evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant. W.R.E. 402. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. W.R.E. 401. This definition of relevance, which is identically expressed in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is generous and it distinctly favors broad admissibility. 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4.1, at 541 (3d ed.2007) (footnote omitted). According to Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick, If evidence has only slight probative force, it may well be excludable, but the reason is not that it is irrelevant. Quite deliberately, Fed.R.Evid. 401 ignores suggestions that legal relevance means that each bit of proof should carry a plus value or should make the point or proposition sought to be proved more probable than not. Instead Fed R. Evid. 401 requires no more probative worth than that which reasonable persons would require in making thoughtful decisions in life outside the courtroom. Id. (footnote omitted). Similarly, we have stated that Generally speaking, `[t]he test of relevancy is one of reasonableness and common sense, liberally applied to favor admissibility rather than the exclusion of evidence.' Foster v. State, 2010 WY 8, ¶ 20, 224 P.3d 1, 8 (Wyo.2010) (quoting Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 17, 192 P.3d 137, 144 (Wyo.2008)). [¶ 18] Mr. Glenn contends the evidence of the prior incident was relevant because it tended to show why Black Butte changed the car-checking procedure and why Glenn was out walking the loop. We agree that the incident is relevant because it provides a context for Black Butte's decision to change its car-checking procedure. As noted by Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Circumstantial evidence that provides such background may be relevant if it throws other evidence into sharper relief, helps clarify or explain it, or makes it more vivid or real. Id. at 559. At the very least, the prior incident helps explain Black Butte's decision to change its car-checking procedure, which was made in direct response to the incident involving Mr. Porter. More fundamentally, however, the prior incident was relevant to the question of whether Black Butte's new car-checking procedure was more or less safe than its former procedure, or the procedure suggested by Union Pacific at trial. Black Butte's attempt to eliminate the risk of injury from a moving train by switching to a procedure that required the train to be stationary until all cars were checked tends to show that the procedure in place at the time of Mr. Glenn's accident was, in at least one respect, a safer alternative to the former procedure. The degree of safety of Black Butte's car-checking procedure had direct implications for the jury's determination as to Black Butte's degree of fault, one of the ultimate issues in this case. The evidence was relevant. [¶ 19] The district court appears to have determined that, by stipulating to the fact that the balloon track was an unsafe place for Mr. Glenn to check the train cars, Mr. Glenn purged the prior incident of its potential relevance. During the hearing on Union Pacific's motion in limine, the court indicated that there was no need to explain why the cars were checked on the balloon track, as opposed to the tipple, in light of the stipulation: The reason [Mr. Glenn] went out there is it was the policy of Black Butte at that point to walk the line, or whatever, walk the loop. He doesn't have to testify about why it's the policy unlesswell, I guess since there is a stipulation that it wasn't a safe workplace it kind of covers it. Doesn't it? The evidence of the prior incident, however, did not become irrelevant merely because Mr. Glenn admitted that the balloon track was not a safe place to check the train cars. First, as we have previously stated, an evidentiary admission is not conclusive but is subject to contradiction or explanation. Jewell v. Chrysler Corp., 994 P.2d 330, 335 (Wyo.1999) (quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 254, at 137-38 (5th ed. 1999)). Second, even if the stipulation had removed from consideration the issue of whether the balloon track was safe, Mr. Glenn's admission does not answer the question of whether Black Butte's new car-checking procedure was more or less safe than other possible car-checking procedures. At trial, Union Pacific argued that all train cars should be checked near the tipple, where the footing was sound. This procedure necessarily required the train to be moved periodically during the inspection process. Black Butte's new procedure, however, eliminated the risk of injury from a moving train. The prior incident was relevant to a determination as to the degree to which Black Butte's procedure was safe or unsafe, and it was ultimately the jury's responsibility to factor that determination into its apportionment of fault. The stipulation that the balloon track was not a safe place to check the train cars did not render the prior incident irrelevant.