Opinion ID: 156679
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Logic Test

Text: 51 As indicated above, the logic test asks whether public access would play a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process. 18 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 2735. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that public access to the backup documentation, motions, orders, and hearing transcripts will not play a significant positive role in the functioning of the CJA process, and that, in fact, access would play, as in McVeigh II, 119 F.3d at 813, a negative role in the process. In short, logic does not support release of these documents. 52 Just as the grand jury process is the classic example of a government process that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly, see Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9, 106 S.Ct. 2735 (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979)), so too would CJA proceedings be frustrated if conducted openly. The CJA process is the defendant's means of preparing a defense, and keeping that process closed will prevent the government from being tipped off as to the direction in which the defendant's trial strategy is heading. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Smith), 579 F.2d 836, 840 (3rd Cir.1978); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). 53 The CJA, which requires that a defendant reveal a high degree of detail about his or her reasons for requesting assistance other than counsel in preparing for trial, see United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 908 (10th Cir.1974), recognizes that confidentiality of that detail is vital to the proper functioning of the CJA process. See Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1317-19 (10th Cir.1970); see also Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743, 751 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1160-62 (5th Cir.1974). Therefore, the CJA provides that the process for requesting assistance other than counsel is to be ex parte, see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1), so as not to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of a defendant's case and his or her trial strategy, including possible defenses, witnesses, and evidence to be used at trial. Likewise, the backup documentation to the attorneys' vouchers reveals much of the same information as that contained in requests for services other than counsel, and the same reasons justifying closure of those proceedings apply to the backup documentation. 54 Another reason grand juries function best in secret is because secrecy encourage[s] free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 1667 (quotations omitted). Without an assurance that the information revealed at CJA hearings and in documents submitted to the court will not be disclosed, a defendant and his or her counsel would be discouraged from fully disclosing the information to the court. Cf. State v. Ballard, 333 N.C. 515, 428 S.E.2d 178, 183 (1993) (Only in the relative freedom of a nonadversarial atmosphere can the defense drop inhibitions regarding its strategies and put before the trial court all available evidence of a need for psychiatric assistance.); United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir.1995) (Disclosure of [presentence reports] to the public may stifle or discourage that vital transmission of information by the defendants ... and by cooperating third parties.). 55 Also, information obtained by the public prior to judgment could influence the jury or prospective jury and would provide the government with unauthorized discovery which is forbidden under our concept of criminal procedure. Edwards, 488 F.2d at 1162; see Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(2); see also Marshall, 423 F.2d at 1318. And information obtained after judgment could still be used by the government to investigate and bring new charges against a defendant or other individuals, including potential witnesses and other sources of information. These ramifications would ultimately decrease the information the court could use to make a decision, would hinder the court's fact-finding ability, see Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir.1994) (fostering more accurate fact finding should be a positive role of public scrutiny), and would, therefore, impede its ability to correctly decide whether and how much assistance to grant the defendant. 56 Moreover, much of the information disclosed to the court during the CJA process does not ultimately become part of the criminal trial. A defendant's request for investigative services to look into possible defenses, for example, will not always be fruitful for the defense. Likewise, a defendant's request for funds to interview potential witnesses does not always result in the defendant's use of those witnesses at trial. The danger in disclosing this type of information was manifest in Marshall, 423 F.2d at 1319, where the government learned of the existence of a witness who ultimately testified against the defendant only because the district court had erroneously allowed the government to attend the CJA hearing. 57 In McVeigh II, 119 F.3d at 813, we held that press access to suppressed evidence would play a negative role in the functioning of the criminal process by exposing the public and potential jurors in particular to incriminating evidence not to be introduced at trial. Press access to information disclosed in the CJA process, most of which will not be introduced in the trial, will also play a negative role in the criminal process. 58 In addition, the CJA process is part of the means by which an indigent defendant obtains discovery. The detail required of the defendant in the CJA process includes the specific information he expects to find. See Kennedy, 64 F.3d at 1470; Mundt, 508 F.2d at 908. Discovery proceedings are fundamentally different from other proceedings to which courts have recognized a First Amendment right of access. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.1986). Therefore, disclosing the information a court considers in making what is essentially a determination of the scope of discovery would make the CJA process more complicated and burdensome. Id. at 12; see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) (holding that party had no First Amendment right to disseminate information obtained by the legislative grace of discovery which may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action). 59 The Journal emphasizes the positive role access would provide by ensuring the quality of the judge's decision-making, by limiting the potential for abuse by the judge and defense counsel, and by educating the public as to how its money is being spent in criminal defense. Intervenor's First Br. at 14-17. As we have discussed above, we do not believe the judge's decision-making will be improved by an open process, and it may well be hindered. In addition, we point out that the judge's involvement in the process is the protection against corruption, as opposed, for instance, to expenditures by the prosecution and Federal Public Defenders Offices which in the detail sought here, are not subject to judicial supervision or public scrutiny. We see little reason to believe that public scrutiny would sway these types of rulings by the court. 60 Obviously, disclosure would provide some information to the public, but we agree with the Ninth Circuit that [w]ere we to accept this argument, few, if any, judicial proceedings would remain closed. Every judicial proceeding, indeed every governmental process, arguably benefits from public scrutiny to some degree, in that openness leads to a better-informed citizenry and tends to deter government officials from abusing the powers of government. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir.1989). Yet, because the integrity and independence of proceedings such as the grand jury, jury deliberations, and the internal communications of the court are threatened by public disclosures, claims of 'improved self-governance' and 'the promotion of fairness' cannot be used as an incantation to open these proceedings to the public. Id. 61 The Albuquerque Journal's information arguments would apply to every governmental process, including those of the executive branch, where the Supreme Court has extended no First Amendment right of access. See El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 494-95 (1st Cir.1992); see, e.g., Calder v. Internal Revenue Serv., 890 F.2d 781, 783-84 (5th Cir.1989) (denying First Amendment right of access to IRS records held by that agency); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1175-76 (3d Cir.1986) (denying First Amendment right of access to records of state agency). Indeed, there is no First Amendment right of access to government processes in general. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14-15, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978). And although Congress can choose to open some of those processes, Justice Stewart has commented that the Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act. Id. at 15, 98 S.Ct. 2588 (quoting Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1975)); see also In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 502 (D.C.Cir.1998) (The Chief Judge can allow some public access [to grand jury-related matters, b]ut it will be done because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure confer this authority on district courts, not because the First Amendment demands it.). 62 Moreover, the linchpin of the Albuquerque Journal's claim to a First Amendment right of access is that judicial discretion has been applied. Yet, in many contexts, courts have rejected a constitutional right of access where judicial discretion has been applied, even in proceedings relating to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and even though the public would have been educated and the participant's actions would have been checked. These include: presentence reports relied on by the court in making a sentencing decision, United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229-30 (7th Cir.1989); pre-indictment search warrant affidavits used by the court in considering search warrant applications, Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64-65 (4th Cir.1989); Times Mirror Co., 873 F.2d at 1218; documents considered by the court in ruling on civil discovery motions, Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d at 11-12; grand jury proceedings and ancillary proceedings or documents related thereto, In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d at 498-99, 502-03; and evidence actually ruled inadmissible by the court in suppression hearings, McVeigh II, 119 F.3d at 813. 19 In the instant case, the CJA process is not even a preliminary process relating to the guilt of the defendant, nor does the information contained in the CJA documents relate to the core proceeding--the determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 63 As an alternative argument, the Journal contends that the process will not be hindered if the court selectively redacts any information that may hurt the process. Intervenor's Third Br. at 13-14. After reviewing many of the materials contained in the record of this case, we disagree. The hearing transcripts, motions, orders, and backup documentation are replete with sensitive information, the release of which would harm the CJA process as discussed above. The public has an interest not only in the way its funds are used but also in seeing that judicial processes are efficient and that defendants are given the  'basic tools'  and  'raw materials integral to'  the presentation of an adequate defense so as to ensure a fair trial. See Kennedy, 64 F.3d at 1473 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985)). 64 Requiring the release of the requested materials would entail an extensive--not to mention expensive--use of court and counsel effort by forcing counsel to be more careful in the information presented to the court for fear of future disclosure and by forcing the court and counsel to ensure that most of the information in the CJA materials is ultimately redacted. Cf. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d at 574-75 (holding that even where the First Amendment right of access applied, line-by-line redaction of the sealed documents was not practicable, and thus not required); see also Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 2199; Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d at 12. Especially in a high profile case like this one, effective, efficient, and fair procedures must be employed. See McVeigh II, 119 F.3d at 813. Access only to those portions of the materials that do not contain the implicated information would be a Pyrrhic victory for access, with little benefit to the functioning of the system. See Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d at 12. 65 In sum, neither experience nor logic lead us to conclude that there is a First Amendment right of access to CJA-related backup documentation, motions, orders, and hearing transcripts.b. CJA Vouchers 66 We find it unnecessary to address whether there is a constitutional right to the vouchers themselves because the district court's order already requires release of the vouchers--a decision we uphold on other grounds discussed below. As we said at the outset of this discussion, we avoid deciding cases on constitutional grounds if they can be resolved on another basis. Since the Journal already has the relief it seeks as to disclosure in general, any opinion on constitutional grounds would be merely advisory. 20 67 This conclusion still leaves unanswered the Journal's arguments with respect to the timing of the vouchers' release. It is the Journal's position that access to the vouchers at the end of trial is not enough--immediate access is required. We disagree. In our view, there is no constitutional right in this case to timing as opposed to access itself. Here, the Defendants are represented by CJA attorneys, who handle only a minority of the total criminal caseload, and of that minority, only a minority of all CJA attorneys submit vouchers on an interim basis, so, at best, we are dealing with a fraction of a fraction of cases. Further, we must observe that while vouchers are required to be submitted, they are not required to be submitted on an interim basis. Thus, it is fortuitous that here the vouchers have been submitted on an interim basis, which depends to a large extent on the attorneys' financial strength. Certainly, the Journal could not argue that the First Amendment would compel CJA attorneys to submit vouchers on an interim basis because there is a constitutional right to immediate access to accruing data, as opposed to access itself. 68 To support its timing argument, the Journal relies on United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.1989), where the Second Circuit upheld on First Amendment grounds a district court order permitting the press access to interim vouchers. We think Suarez is distinguishable. In that case, the district court's order only addressed present access to interim vouchers. No order existed allowing access to vouchers at the end of trial, and the district court was not called upon and did not address the interim voucher issue in such a context. Thus, the Second Circuit's review was limited, and there is no way to discern from the opinion how much the reasoning was driven by the subject of access itself, and how much significance, if any, the court placed on timing. In short, we do not know how the Second Circuit would have ruled if faced with a situation like that before us, where the district court has already ordered release of the vouchers at the end of the proceedings. 69 Likewise, we find the Journal's reliance throughout its briefs on United States v. McVeigh, 918 F.Supp. 1452 (W.D.Okla.1996), contrary to its position with respect to timing. There the court never made clear whether it found a qualified First Amendment right or whether it based its decision on the common law, see McVeigh, 918 F.Supp. at 1464, but its conclusion was that interim vouchers should not be released. Id. at 1465. 70 If we were to apply the experience and logic test to the issue of immediate access to the vouchers, it is clear for all the reasons stated earlier in this opinion, and more, that it would fail. In the end, we agree with the McVeigh court that revealing the amounts of interim payments is not a reasonable alternative to full disclosure because it would distort the public perception about the fairness of the process because the expenditures, out of context, would emphasize costs without any information about benefits obtained. Id. at 1465. 71