Opinion ID: 848846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the charter creates a cause of action

Text: Having demonstrated why the issue is not irrelevant, in spite of the majority's assertions otherwise, I believe it is necessary to clarify that the plain language of the charter creates a cause of action. [1] The Detroit citizenry clearly has the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation: The city has an affirmative duty to secure the equal protection of the law for each person and to insure equality of opportunity for all persons. No person shall be denied the enjoyment of civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, color, creed, national origin, age, handicap, sex, or sexual orientation. [Charter, Declaration of Rights, § 2.] Defendant city of Detroit, however, claims the plain language of the charter prescribes an exclusive administrative remedy for this broadly pronounced right, prohibiting enforcement by its citizenry: The city may enforce this declaration of rights and other rights retained by the people. [Id. at § 8.] Defendant's cursory assertion that this provision prohibits individual enforcement of the rights granted in the charter results from an erroneous interpretation of the plain language of the text. [2] Certainly this provision grants the city the authority to enforce the rights proclaimed in the charter. However, this grant of authority is not exclusive. The drafters gave the city the power to enforce the declaration of rights and other rights retained by the people. If one accepts defendant's claim that this text gives the city the exclusive authority to enforce the declaration of rights, the drafters also would have granted to the city the exclusive authority to enforce other rights retained by the people. In other words, with the adoption of the charter as constructed by defendant, the people of Detroit purportedly stripped themselves of their ability to bring civil actions to enforce any other right. Even if the city had the authority to enforce these rights, the text simply does not support such an unprecedented grant of authority. Further, the drafters used may, not shall, in this provision. May suggests that one is permitted to or has discretion. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed). If the drafters had intended to grant the city the exclusive authority to enforce the charter, they certainly would have used shall, mandating such action. Id. (shall implies a duty or requirement). Moreover, the citizens of Detroit surely did not intend to grant the city the discretionary and exclusive power to enforce both the rights under the charter and all others retained by the people. Thus, by use of the permissive and discretionary term, the drafters indicated an intention to permit enforcement mechanisms beyond those powers granted to the city. Any other interpretation ignores the text of the charter. Reference to the city's ordinances supports this interpretation of the charter. [3] In 1988, the city deliberately clarified that those who experienced discrimination on the basis of AIDS and conditions related to AIDS could bring a civil action to enforce their rights granted by the city. Chapter 27, article 7 prohibits such discrimination in the employment, housing, business, and educational arenas. See generally, §§ 27-7-1 to 27-7-90. In particular, the charter prohibits discrimination in the provision of public facilities or services. Section 27-7-7. The enforcement provision includes the following subsection: Any aggrieved person may enforce the provisions of this article by means of a civil action. [Section 27-7-10(a).] Clearly, the city intended to create a civil cause of action for the victims of such discriminatory practices. Assuming drafters of the ordinance did not intend to contravene the charter, which we must, we may only conclude that the authority granted to the city in the declaration of rights, § 8, did not give the city the sole right to enforce the charter. Although defendant correctly referenced ordinance 27-7-10, it draws the wrong conclusion. As noted, article 7 of chapter 27 was enacted in 1988. Detroit Ordinance § 24-88, July 14, 1988; see also Detroit Ordinance § 33-88, September 21, 1988. In contrast, the enabling ordinances at issue here were enacted in 1979. Detroit Ordinance § 303-H, January 24, 1979. It is entirely reasonable to conclude that the city simply intended to clarify that a private cause of action could be had under the charter when enacting § 27-7-10, as had been authorized implicitly by the charter. The inclusion of § 27-2-10 was particularly appropriate because of the circuit courts' treatment of similar claims. In this case, for example, the court noted that this issue had arisen in the past. Without direction from the Court of Appeals, the trial court refused to recognize a cause of action. Certainly an ordinance or charter amendment that made clear that a cause of action existed for a violation of any right provided by the charter would have made this exercise even simpler. However, its absence cannot force the conclusion that an action only for AIDS-related discrimination was intended. In this age of the overly rhetorical and often vacuous concern over special rights, it is unreasonable to presume the charter permits individual actions for AIDS-related discrimination, but not for the other forms of discrimination enumerated in the declaration of rights, § 2. Therefore, though we often rely on the maxim that the inclusion of one term implies the exclusion of another, that inference loses force where the circumstances indicate otherwise. [4] In this case, the circumstances suggest the opposite, i.e., that the express provision of a cause of action for AIDS-related discrimination only clarifies that the charter permitted such actions for all violations. Additional support for this conclusion can be found in the drafters' decision to include two provisions that suggest that Detroit's citizens retained the right to sue for violations of the charter. The declaration of rights clearly states: The enumeration of certain rights in this Charter shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. [Declaration of Rights, § 7.] In that same vein, the charter's chapter on human rights ends with the following proclamation: This chapter shall not be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct any immediate legal or equitable remedies in any court or other tribunal. [Section 7-1007.] This evidence indicates an intention to create a scheme whereby the administrative remedies supplement an individual's ability to bring a private cause of action. [5] In light of this analysis, a rational interpreter must conclude that neither the drafters nor the citizenry intended to grant the city exclusive, discretionary authority to remedy violations of the rights granted in the charter. Therefore, I would hold that the charter does, in fact, create a damages action for discrimination based on sexual orientation.