Opinion ID: 768931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sharkey's Cross-Appeal

Text: 6 On Sharkey's cross-appeal, we review the district court's order denying Sharkey equitable relief for abuse of discretion. See Banks v. Travelers Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999); Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir. 1998). Sharkey contends that the district court erred in denying the award of prejudgment interest and pension credits. We agree, with qualifications. We therefore vacate the order and remand to the district court for further proceedings. 7 As to the denial of the award of pension benefits, Sharkey argues that he is entitled to service and salary credits for the same period as the jury awarded backpay. We agree with Sharkey that awards for lost pension benefits are compensation for past economic loss-not a form of prospective relief, as the district court found. See Sharkey, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 404-05. If Sharkey was denied compensation for lost pension benefits, he was not made whole, and thus did not receive the proper measure of relief under the anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1984). 8 However, it does not necessarily follow that Sharkey is entitled to the relief he seeks. We have distinguished two kinds of relief that may compensate a victim of discrimination for his lost pension benefits. See Banks, 180 F.3d at 365. First, the plaintiff's lost service and salary credits may be restored to his pension plan. See id.; Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980). This is the post-trial, equitable relief that Sharkey seeks. However, as we recognized in Banks, it is also possible to award money damages to compensate the plaintiff for the value of the pension benefits that were lost. This form of legal relief is proper for a jury to award. See Banks, 180 F.3d at 365 (Had [plaintiff] actually requested money damages for lost pension benefits, the district court might well have been right to deem that form of relief legal . . . .). 9 Sharkey argues that because he did not include lost pension benefits in his calculations of damages argued to the jury or attempt to quantify his lost benefits either through testimony or in closing argument, the jury must not have included them in its award. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that the value of Sharkey's lost pension benefits were included by the jury in the award. The evidence Sharkey presented to the jury included reference to pension provisions offered him and his colleagues. Sharkey's counsel made reference to pension benefits in his closing argument. The court instructed the jury that the measure of damages should be [Sharkey's] economic loss. The court further instructed the jury that Sharkey was entitled to recover lost salary and benefits, including . . . fringe benefits. And again, it charged: you may award him an amount equal to the salary and benefits he would have received . . . less the amount of salary and benefits he received after he left the employ of the defendants, including severance payments, pension benefits and amounts from other employers . . . . (Emphases added.) The jury returned one net verdict as damages for [Sharkey's] total financial losses. (Emphasis added.) Given this record we cannot say for certain whether the jury did, or did not include the value of Sharkey's lost pension benefits in making its award. 10 On remand, the district court should make a determination whether the jury's award included the value of lost pension benefits. If not, Sharkey is entitled to equitable relief to provide him with his lost pension entitlement. If so, he has already been compensated, and is not entitled to equitable relief that would duplicate the relief awarded by the jury. 11 As to the court's denial of prejudgment interest, we have consistently stated that [t]o the extent . . . that the damages awarded to the plaintiff represent compensation for lost wages, it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-judgment interest. Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 873 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, the district court relied on three grounds for denying prejudgment interest: (1) the jury's award was already surprising[ly] genero[u]s, Sharkey, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 405-06; (2) Sharkey had made only desultory efforts to mitigate his damages, see id.; and (3) Sharkey had received a considerable settlement of his severance claims, see id. These grounds do not justify denying prejudgment interest on lost wages. See Gierlinger, 160 F.2d at 874-75. A court may not decline to award interest by reason of a belief that the jury's award is excessively generous. If the award was excessive, the court might have exercised the power of remittitur. But it had no basis to deny prejudgment interest as a substitute for reducing an excessive award. 12 We agree, however, with the defendant that prejudgment interest may be inappropriate on portions of the award that are attributable to the restricted stock and stock options that plaintiff was denied, depending on how that award was calculated. Cf. Scarfo v. Cabletron Systems, Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 961 (1st Cir. 1995) (damage award for stock options calculated in manner that already represented the present value of the stock options at the date of judgment). It may also be inappropriate on the portion attributable to the value of lost pension benefits, if any. The court will need to apportion the jury's award. See Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 875 (noting, where there is indication that jury included those losses, district court may determine what portion of the award should be attributed to particular categories of loss); see also Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1987) (same and discussing appropriate methodologies); cf. Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1214 (2d Cir. 1993) (approving district court's surmise[] regarding reason for jury's award). The court should award prejudgment interest on that part of the jury's award attributable to lost wages. As to stock rights and options and the value of lost pension benefits, if any, it should determine whether any prejudgment interest is appropriate and if so how much.