Opinion ID: 1818601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: THE APPLICATION OF STATE v. FRIERSON

Text: In addition to the foregoing conclusion that the encounter was consensual, we further hold that even if the encounter had constituted a seizure, suppression of the evidence discovered during the search of Golphin would not have been required. The United States Supreme Court has stated that not all evidence is `fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Rather, the High Court has concluded that in such a situation, the issue to be determined is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Id. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407. In State v. Frierson, 926 So.2d 1139 (Fla.2006), we held that [t]o properly undertake the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun, we must consider three factors: `(1) the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' Id. at 1143 (quoting United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir.1997), wherein the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on the factors explicitly noted in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). In Frierson, an officer stopped Frierson's vehicle for a cracked taillight and failure to use a turn signal. See id. at 1141. A subsequent identification check indicated that there was an outstanding warrant in Frierson's name. See id. [11] The search incident to arrest revealed a firearm, and Frierson was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. See id. We applied the factors announced in Green and ultimately concluded that the firearm did not need to be suppressed even though the initial stop of Frierson was invalid: The brief amount of time that elapsed between the illegal stop and the arrest of respondent weighs against finding the search attenuated, but this factor is not dispositive. In turning to the next factor, the outstanding arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance that weighs in favor of the firearm found in a search incident to the outstanding arrest warrant being sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal stop to be purged of the primary taint of the illegal stop. Crucially, the search was incident to the outstanding warrant and not incident to the illegal stop. The outstanding arrest warrant was a judicial order directing the arrest of respondent whenever the respondent was located. As Judge Gross noted, A warrant indicates the existence of criminal conduct separate from the conduct that occurred at the time of the illegal traffic stop. The illegality of the stop does not affect the continuing required enforcement of the court's order that respondent be arrested. We believe to be very significant the third factor in the Brown analysis, which is whether the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct in making the illegal stop outweighs the intervening cause of the outstanding arrest warrant so that the taint of the illegal stop is so onerous that any evidence discovered following the stop must be suppressed. In this case, we do not find that the purpose and flagrancy of misconduct in illegally stopping respondent was such that the taint of the illegal stop required that the evidence seized incident to the outstanding arrest warrant should be suppressed. The law enforcement officer made a mistake in respect to the enforcement of the traffic law, but there was no evidence that the stop was pretextual or in bad faith. Id. at 1144-45 (citation omitted). The application of the three-part test announced in Frierson to the facts of the instant case compels the conclusion that, even if Golphin was seized when Officer Doemer retained the identification which Golphin voluntarily provided, the evidence discovered as a result of the subsequent search would not need to be suppressed. Although it appears from the record that only a brief period of time elapsed between the initial encounter with Golphin and the discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia (a factor that weighs against finding the search attenuated), the warrant that was discovered by Officer Doemer constituted a judicial order directing the arrest of [the defendant] wherever [he] was located. Id. at 1144. Upon discovery of the warrant, Officer Doemer had an indisputable obligation to enforce that court order. Accordingly, it is evident under these facts that the search was incident to the arrest, not to the preceding encounter between Golphin and Officer Doemer. We further note that the United States Supreme Court has held that searches incident to a lawful arrest are constitutionally permissible and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a `reasonable' search under that Amendment.). With regard to the third prong of the Frierson analysis, we conclude that even if a seizure of Golphin had occurred, the officers' misconduct did not outweigh[] the intervening cause of the outstanding arrest warrant so that the taint of the illegal stop is so onerous that any evidence discovered following the stop must be suppressed. 926 So.2d at 1144. In denying Golphin's motion to suppress, the trial court found: It is clear that the main officer that dealt with Mr. Golphin was Officer Doemer, who testified that there were no lights, no sirens, no weapons drawn, the defendant was not instructed to stop, and also indicated the casual conversation, hey, guy, what's up, what are you doing here, do you live here, asking for identification and the identification being freely produced. Moreover, during the suppression hearing, Officer Deschamps testified that she and Officer Doemer had been dispatched to conduct field interviews while patrolling the Ridgewood area of Daytona Beach. Thus, it was part of the officers' official duties that night to approach individuals, speak with them, and attempt to obtain information about them, and there is no evidence to indicate that the officers were operating with any malice or bad faith when they approached Golphin. Indeed, the officers' conduct in approaching Golphin (a pedestrian) and retaining his identification was no more, and quite possibly was less, egregious than the conduct of the officers in Frierson, who stopped an automobile for invalid reasons and then retained the defendant's driver's license to check for outstanding warrants. We conclude that whatever official misconduct occurred in the instant case was neither purposeful nor flagrant. Therefore, the third prong of the Frierson analysis would not compel suppression of the evidence discovered during the search of Golphin. See 926 So.2d at 1144. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that even if a seizure had occurred in the instant case, suppression of the evidence discovered during the subsequent search of Golphin was not required because the search was incident to his arrest on the outstanding warrant, and there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the officers. See id. at 1143.