Opinion ID: 2053657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Adequacy of Attempted Murder Instruction

Text: Greenlee also asserts the trial court erred by not adequately instructing the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Greenlee intended to kill Ledford. Following the evidence on Count I, Attempted Murder, the trial court gave the following instructions: Court's Final Instruction No. 1 The crime of Attempted Murder is defined by statute as follows: A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for the commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. An attempt to commit a crime is a felony of the same class as the crime attempted. . . . To convict the Defendant the state must have proved each of the following elements: The Defendant 1. on or about August 20,1993, knowingly 2. engaged in conduct, to-wit: repeatedly striking at and against the head and body of Kinsey Ledford with his hands and feet and then pulling a knife and attempting to stab the said Kinsey Ledford as he lay unconscious on the ground, with the intent to kill Kinsey Ledford. 3. that the conduct was a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder. If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant not guilty. (R. at 420-21) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). . . . Court's Final Instruction No. 2 Attempt, is a crime of specific intent, that is, it must be done with the intent to commit a [sic] alleged felony. You are instructed that where a specific intent must be proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, as in ATTEMPT, to make an act an offense, the State is not required to make proof of specific intent by direct evidence, for purpose and intent are subjective facts. That is, they exist within the mind of the person, and since you cannot delve into a person's mind and determine his purpose and intent, you may look to all the surrounding circumstances, including what was said and done in relation thereto. The State is only required to produce such evidence as will satisfy the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime charged was committed by the Defendant. A determination of the Defendant's intent may be arrived at by the jury from a consideration of the Defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points. (R. at 422.) This Court established the standard that trial courts should use to instruct juries for attempted murder in Spradlin v. State (1991), Ind., 569 N.E.2d 948. See also Taylor v. State (1993), Ind., 616 N.E.2d 748. In Spradlin, this Court held that an instruction which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing. Spradlin, 569 N.E .2d at 950. Following this standard we have also noted: Absent inclusion of specific intent as an element of attempted murder, individuals who act without the necessary mens rea could be found guilty of attempted murder. Greer, 643 N.E.2d at 326 (citing Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 749). As in Greer, the court in Greenlee's trial told the jurors in Final Instruction No. 1 that if they decide the defendant knowingly or intentionally attempted to murder the victim, they could find him guilty. In Greer, this Court reversed the defendant's conviction after it found that an instruction of that type might have allowed the jury to convict the defendant of attempting to murder the victim by finding he acted with the lesser mens rea of knowingly. Id at 326. In Greenlee's trial, however, the trial court's instructions mentioned intent to kill, intent to commit murder and specific intent at three different points. Final Instruction No. 1 stated the jury must convict the Defendant if the State proved Greenlee struck the victim and drew his knife with the intent to kill Kinsey Ledford. (R. at 420.) The court's Final Instruction No. 2A also explicitly stated that the requisite intent to commit murder may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause death or great bodily harm. (R. at 423). Moreover, the court's Final Instruction No. 2 pointed out: Attempt is a crime of specific intent, that is, it must be done with the intent to commit a [sic] alleged felony. (R. at 422). The instructions used here by the trial court needed revision in light of Spradlin, but taken together they adequately informed the jury that it needed to conclude the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill before it could convict him.