Opinion ID: 2631069
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonably Available

Text: ¶ 31 The second issue, whether other work was reasonably available to Martinez, is a closer question. In different contexts, reasonableness has been considered both a legal and a factual question. See, e.g., Benson, 604 P.2d at 929 (finding that whether a defendant acted as a reasonable man in a negligence case is an issue for the trier of fact that should not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence). But see, e.g., Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1998) (finding that reasonable cause was primarily a legal question in the antitrust arena, but that appellate courts should grant the fact-finder a measure of discretion); Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1996) ([T]he reasonableness of an award of attorney fees ordinarily presents a question of law with some measure of discretion given to the trial court.). Additionally, the Labor Commission has defined reasonably available as regular, steady, and readily available work, Utah Admin. Code r. 612-1-10(D)(1)(b), a definition that reads like a legal rule to be applied to a factual situation. ¶ 32 Despite these countervailing examples, we conclude that the question of whether other work is reasonably available is a factual determination. The statute asks the Commission to determine if other work is reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's[] . . . age; . . . education; . . . past work experience; . . . medical capacity; and . . . residual functional capacity. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1)(c)(iv). These factual considerations inform what is reasonable; its parameters are not further defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the case of reasonable suspicion, for example. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. ¶ 33 Our conclusion that essential functions and reasonably available are factual determinations is consistent with both our prior precedent and the applicable statutory language. First, we have traditionally viewed permanent total disability determinations as factual. Hodges v. W. Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718, 721 (Utah 1986); Kerans v. Indus. Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1986); Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1980); Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Indus. Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319, 322 (Utah 1946). Second, as discussed herein, the language of subsection (b) requires the employee to prove permanent total disability by a  preponderance of the evidence,  using the elements of subsection (c) to meet that evidentiary burden (emphasis added). ¶ 34 In sum, we conclude that the court of appeals erroneously applied an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the Commission's factual findings that Martinez was capable of performing the essential functions of his prior job and that he was capable of performing other work reasonably available to him.