Opinion ID: 3001522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Officer Anders’ Detention of Mr. Jewett

Text: We now turn to the first step in the Saucier analysis and explore whether Officer Anders violated the constitutional rights of Mr. Jewett. The first issue that we must decide is whether Officer Anders’ detention of Mr. Jewett constitutes an investigatory Terry stop or a complete arrest. If Mr. Jewett’s detention constituted only an investigatory stop, the Fourth Amendment requires the lower standard of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Kirksey, 485 F.3d 955, 957-58 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).4 If Mr. Jewett was arrested, then the Fourth Amendment requires the presence of probable cause. United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2006). There is no bright-line that separates a Terry investigatory stop from a formal arrest. United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 1995). The distinction hinges on the intrusiveness of the detention, id., which is a “flexible and highly factintensive” inquiry. United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1084 (7th Cir. 2004). In denying Officer Anders qualified 4 Qualified immunity protects those officers who make a reasonable error in determining whether there is reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 559 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 85051 (6th Cir. 2003); Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 74243 (7th Cir. 2001). No. 06-2982 11 immunity, the district court assumed that the detention was an arrest. We begin by examining whether Officer Anders’ actions, as alleged by Mr. Jewett, can be characterized as a constitutional investigatory stop authorized by Terry. Mr. Jewett had a right to be free from a Terry stop unless Officer Anders had reasonable suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. To conduct a Terry stop, an officer must be “aware of specific and articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994). Reasonable suspicion is more than a hunch but less than probable cause and “considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003). It requires “some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop,” given the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Moreover, “a court’s determination of reasonable suspicion ‘must be based on common-sensical judgments and inferences about human behavior.’” United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125). Because reasonable suspicion is evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances known to the officer, we have noted that certain “behavior may give rise to reasonable suspicion when viewed in the context of other factors at play.” United States v. Lawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 2006). Finally, in evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop, we examine first whether the “officer’s action was justified at its inception” and, second, “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; United States v. Wilson, 2 F.3d 226, 230 (7th Cir. 1993). 12 No. 06-2982 In determining whether Officer Anders’ action was justified at its inception, we must consider whether it was based on the applicable standard of reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court has considered whether an individual’s unprovoked flight is sufficient to give the officer reasonable, particularized suspicion to warrant an investigatory stop. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. In Wardlow, a caravan of police officers was converging on a high-crime area known for its heavy drug trafficking. As the police approached the area, an officer observed an individual look in the direction of the police caravan and then flee. The Court declined to adopt a per se rule as to whether headlong, unprovoked flight creates reasonable suspicion. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court nevertheless explained that “[h]eadlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” Id. at 124 (Rehnquist, C.J.). The Court held: [U]nprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about one’s business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning. Id. at 125. In examining whether Officer Anders’ actions were “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, we must keep in mind that an investigatory stop can involve a measured use of force. Indeed, we have No. 06-2982 13 noted explicitly that a necessary corollary to the power of the police to conduct an investigatory stop is the ability to “use reasonable means to effectuate that stop.” United States v. Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by statute; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Weaver, 8 F.3d at 1244 (“It is well-established that ‘[a] measured use of force . . . appropriate to accomplish the purposes of [the] investigatory stop’ does not convert a Terry stop into an arrest.” (quoting Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 1992))). However, an officer’s use of force may escalate to the point where the encounter becomes, as a matter of law, a formal arrest. See United States v. Weaver, 8 F.3d at 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1993). In differentiating between the two, the touchstone is reasonableness: Were the officer’s actions reasonable in light of all the circumstances? Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. In evaluating whether the force that an officer used to effectuate the investigatory stop was so disproportionate to the purpose of such a stop as to convert the encounter into a full arrest, we consider whether “the surrounding circumstances g[a]ve rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety” on the part of the officer, Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1226; we also must consider “the defendant’s own actions in resisting an officer’s efforts.” Lawshea, 461 F.3d at 860; see also Weaver, 8 F.3d at 1244 (noting that a “suspect cannot complain that [a] police officer took forcible steps to detain him when the suspect’s own evasive actions created the need for those steps” (citing Voida, 963 F.2d at 958-59 & n.6)). Given the potential dangers involved in conducting investigatory stops, “Terry allows an officer to conduct a pat-down search if the officer has articulable facts that led him or her to believe that the individual could be armed or present a threat to others.” United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 14 No. 06-2982 599 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. As we have noted previously, “[t]o require an officer to risk his life in order to make an investigatory stop would run contrary to the intent of Terry.” Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1085 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Turning to the case before us, we believe that Officer Anders’ detention of Mr. Jewett, at the time that the Officer initiated the action, did not exceed the permissible bounds of an investigatory detention under Terry. We also believe that the measures employed by the Officer were reasonable when evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. At the moment that he decided to conduct an investigatory stop of Mr. Jewett, Officer Anders was at the Wal-Mart to search for and arrest Andre Thompson. Thompson was suspected by the police of having perpetrated the shooting and attempted murder that had occurred the previous day. Officer Anders had been advised that Thompson could be armed, and he reasonably considered Thompson to be dangerous to himself, his partner and others. 5 Officer 5 We pause briefly to address the district court’s evidentiary ruling, which bears on Officer Anders’ knowledge immediately prior to his detention of Mr. Jewett. The district court excluded Officer Anders’ statement that “[o]fficers had been advised that we were to proceed to [the Wal-Mart] to look for and apprehend one Andre Thompson, who had a birth date of January 24, 1981, and who had a physical description of being a black male, 6’3” tall, and approximately 216 pounds.” R.37 at 4 & n.1. Our jurisdiction necessarily must extend to review of the district court’s exclusion as inadmissible hearsay of Officer (continued...) No. 06-2982 15 5 (...continued) Anders’ testimony regarding the information that he received from his superiors when he was dispatched to the Wal-Mart to apprehend Andre Thompson. That issue is intertwined with the issue of qualified immunity, and its consideration is “necessary to ensure meaningful review of the qualified immunity question.” Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that a court of appeals’ jurisdiction “over an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity also provides a basis for consideration of other district court rulings that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the decision of the lower court to deny qualified immunity or when consideration of the additional issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 153 (2d Cir. 2007); Meals v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 493 F.3d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 795 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007); Kirkland v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. No. Re-1J, 464 F.3d 1182, 1198 (10th Cir. 2006); Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2005); Wallace v. County of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 292 (5th Cir. 2005) (cautioning that the “exercise of this jurisdiction is only proper in rare and unique circumstances” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2004); Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that the doctrine must be used only “to ensure meaningful review of the linchpin issue”); Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000); cf. Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, n.2 & 50-51 (1995) (discussing the scope of pendant appellate jurisdiction in the collateral order context). In the district court’s view, the statement in question was inadmissible hearsay. We respectfully cannot agree. The statement is offered to demonstrate the effect of this information on Officer Anders as he encountered Mr. Jewett and to explain the Officer’s actions in detaining Mr. Jewett, United States v. Norwood, 798 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. (continued...) 16 No. 06-2982 Anders observed an individual peering out of the door of the Wal-Mart where Thompson was thought to be. The Officer then observed the individual, later identified as Mr. Jewett, exit the Wal-Mart. Officer Anders drove toward him in order to determine whether the individual engaging in this suspicious behavior was Thompson. As Officer Anders neared, Mr. Jewett fled without provocation and continued running despite Officer Anders’ calls for him to stop.6 Once Mr. Jewett reached the door of the 5 (...continued) 1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985), not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. All that matters is that the statement was made and that Officer Anders heard it. Mr. Jewett disputes the veracity of Officer Anders’ assertion that he had been given Thompson’s height and weight. Specifically, Mr. Jewett maintains that Officer Anders inserted into his police notebook Thompson’s weight and height only after he had detained Mr. Jewett. Given the posture of this case, we may not rely on that portion of the statement. Mr. Jewett, however, does not take issue with Officer Anders’ assertion that he had been told to proceed to the Wal-Mart to arrest Thompson, a black male of approximately 22 years, the suspected perpetrator of the previous days’ attempted homicide. Therefore, we consider only that portion of the statement in our analysis. 6 Mr. Jewett submits that Officer Anders’ actions were unreasonable because Mr. Jewett was not running away from the police, but rather running back toward the Wal-Mart door because he wanted to try to catch the door before it closed and locked. Mr. Jewett claims that he had left his keys inside the Wal-Mart and that he had run back to retrieve them. Mr. Jewett also maintains that he did not see Officer Anders in the marked police squad car or in his police uniform, and he did not (continued...) No. 06-2982 17 Wal-Mart, he began pounding frantically to gain entrance. Upon reaching him, Officer Anders pushed him into the door, brought him face down onto the floor and handcuffed him. Given Officer Anders’ reasonable belief that Mr. Jewett was Thompson, who was wanted for attempted murder and whom the police believed to be armed, this procedure was “appropriate to accomplish the purpose of [the] investigatory stop.” Weaver, 8 F.3d at 1244 (alteration in original); United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the police’s tackling of a suspect did not convert a Terry stop into an arrest where the suspect was in flight, and the police reasonably believed that he was armed); Lawshea, 461 F.3d at 860-61 (holding that the use of a police dog to effectuate a stop did not convert the detention into an arrest). It allowed Officer Anders to frisk Mr. Jewett safely and to confirm whether Mr. Jewett in fact was Thompson while minimizing the danger to himself and to his partner. See Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1085 (holding that it was not unreason- 6 (...continued) hear Officer Anders identify himself as a police officer. Nevertheless, Mr. Jewett’s subjective motivations for running away are irrelevant, as is the fact that he did not hear Officer Anders identify himself as a police officer. When determining whether a police officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop, we “look to the officer[’s] knowledge at the time of the [detention], not the suspect’s.” Marshall ex rel. Gossens v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2002) (Manion, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Gilbert, 45 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1995)). From Officer Anders’ perspective, he observed suspicious behavior and an individual matching Thompson’s description running away from him as he exited his marked police squad car. 18 No. 06-2982 able for officers to handcuff an individual whom they believed had perpetrated a violent crime and whom they suspected was armed); Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1228 (“When a suspect is considered dangerous, requiring him to lie face down on the ground is the safest way for police officers to approach him, handcuff him and finally determine whether he carries any weapons.”). Given the totality of the circumstances, the force that Officer Anders used to effectuate the investigatory stop did not convert the encounter into a full arrest.7 Moreover, because Officer Anders had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Jewett, we hold that his action “was justified at its inception.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Once he had secured Mr. Jewett, Officer Anders frisked him, and, during the frisk, he retrieved Mr. Jewett’s identification from his pocket, which identified him as Terrance Jewett rather than Andre Thompson. We have held that an officer may retrieve an individual’s identification from his wallet. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n officer may check an individual’s identification in his wallet during a Terry stop.”); Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d at 599. Officer Anders then placed Mr. Jewett in the squad car while he confirmed 7 Officer Anders’ motion for partial summary judgment did not request summary judgment on the merits or on qualified immunity grounds as to Mr. Jewett’s excessive force claim. We acknowledge that our holding that Officer Anders’ use of force in effectuating the investigatory stop did not convert the encounter into a formal arrest is in tension with Mr. Jewett’s excessive force claim. The parties have not briefed this matter on appeal, and, more important, Mr. Jewett’s excessive force claim is not before us. No. 06-2982 19 his identification, issued him a municipal citation for obstructing a police officer and released him. See Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1084 (placing briefly an individual in a squad car does not convert a Terry stop into an arrest); Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1228; Vega, 72 F.3d at 515. The length of the detention is a factor in determining whether an investigatory stop was transformed into a formal arrest. Although Officer Anders claims that the entire incident—from the time that Mr. Jewett fled until the time that he was released—lasted twenty minutes, we are required, given the procedural posture of this case, to assume Mr. Jewett’s version of thirty to forty minutes. The length of Mr. Jewett’s detention alone did not convert the investigatory stop into an arrest.8 Indeed, we have noted that “[t]here is no bright-line rule as to how long an investigative detention may last; instead we look to whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigating that was likely to confirm or dispel quickly their suspicions.” United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, we have explained that “[w]hen delay is attributable to the evasive actions of a suspect, the police do not exceed the permissible duration of an investigatory stop.” Cady, 467 F.3d at 1063. In this case, Mr. Jewett’s evasive actions caused Officer Anders to chase, apprehend and frisk him and further caused Officer Anders to issue him a municipal citation, all of which contributed to the time that Mr. Jewett was detained. There 8 See, e.g., Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2006) (twenty to thirty minutes); Vega, 72 F.3d at 515 (sixty-two minutes); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1985) (forty-five minutes); see also, e.g., United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 2006) (seventy-five minutes). 20 No. 06-2982 is no indication that Officer Anders detained Mr. Jewett longer than necessary to complete his investigation and issue the municipal citation. Consequently, we conclude that Officer Anders’ investigatory stop of Mr. Jewett was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.