Opinion ID: 1755783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ms Bailey's individual claim

Text: In oral argument, defendants took the position that, even if prescription on the claims filed by Ms. Bailey on behalf of Jada did not commence until her birth, prescription on Ms. Bailey's individual claim commenced on the date prior to Jada's birth when Ms. Bailey learned that her unborn child had developed birth defects. This argument is based on the defendants' position that Ms. Bailey had actual or constructive knowledge of the tortious act, the damage and the causal relation between the tortious act and the damage on that day. See LeCompte, 97-1878, 723 So.2d 474. According to defendants, Ms. Bailey's knowledge of both the existence of the birth defects and the suspected cause of the birth defects, coupled with her testimony that she was upset when she gained that knowledge, is sufficient to commence prescription under the discovery rule governing prescription in medical malpractice claims established by La.Rev.Stat. 9:5628. In support of their argument, defendants attached to their memoranda in support of their exceptions Ms. Bailey's June 12, 2001 deposition (or portions thereof). In that deposition, Ms. Bailey admitted that, immediately after her pregnancy was confirmed, she was informed of the risks of birth defects related to use of Depakote during pregnancy. Ms. Bailey further conceded that she knew that Jada had birth defects probably caused by her use of Depakote at least by October 28, 1997, when Dr. Grundmeyer told her both that her child had developed birth defects and that the defects were probably caused by her ingestion of Depakote early in her pregnancy. When asked how she felt when she learned that her unborn child had birth defects, Ms. Bailey replied that she was messed up and upset. Ms. Bailey also said that she considered having an abortion, despite the fact she did not believe in abortion. According to Ms. Bailey, her pregnancy with Jada was rough because she was sick all the time and unable to eat, and she also experienced greater depression than normal. In this case, we have struggled to find a logical and equitable legal solution to the matter of accrual of Ms. Bailey's individual claim and the corresponding commencement of prescription. Although a finding that prescription commenced on Ms. Bailey's individual claim before Jada's birth would not raise the same equitable concerns as those raised by a finding that her claim on behalf of Jada commenced prior to Jada's birth, we nevertheless find that the twin goals of consistency and predictability would be better served through holding that the claims accrue on the same date. Because Ms. Bailey is the plaintiff in both claims, and because both claims allege the same negligent acts (failure to warn), the determination of when prescriptive commences on the two claims should not turn upon which hat Ms. Bailey happens to be wearing. Further, a finding that prescription commenced on Ms. Bailey's individual claim at the same time it commenced on her claim on behalf of Jada provides the additional benefit of a clear, predictable benchmark, and relieves a pregnant plaintiff of the burden of worrying about the need to pursue potential legal claims during a difficult pregnancy. Finally, and most importantly, proper application of the applicable legal principles to the facts surrounding Ms. Bailey's claim does not support the conclusion urged by the defendants. For the reasons explained below, we therefore reject the defendant's argument that Ms. Bailey's claims accrued on the date she was told that her unborn child had birth defects probably caused by her ingestion of Depakote. Reduced to its essence, defendants' argument is that knowledge of the birth defects and their probable cause, coupled with Ms. Bailey's testimony that she was upset when she gained that knowledge, is sufficient to commence prescription under the discovery rule. We disagree. As is evident from the principles governing application of the discovery rule discussed above in the introduction to the section entitled Commencement of Prescription, determination of the date when a cause of action in a medical malpractice action accrues is more complicated than the defendants suggest. In fact, determination of when prescription commences under the discovery rule depends on at least two primary factors: (1) the date on which the plaintiff gained actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that he or she is the victim of a tort, Campo, 01-2707 at 11, 828 So.2d at 510; and (2) the date on which the tortious act actually produces damage. Harvey, 593 So.2d at 354. Both knowledge and damages must be present for prescription to commence, and, as will be shown, the two factors work together in this case. Defendants' argument focuses on the first of these factors, while virtually ignoring the second. When applying the above principles to the facts of a particular case, we must also keep in mind the general precepts governing determination of exceptions of prescription. For example, the above principles must be applied in light of the precept that the burden of proof on the prescription issue rests with the party pleading prescription. See Bouterie, 616 So.2d at 660. Further, prescription statutes are to be strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished. Id. Determination of when prescription commences under the discovery rule is a fact-intensive inquiry. Stansbury v. Accardo, 2003-2691, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/04), ___ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 2415903, citing Campo. Concerning the first factor set forth above (the date plaintiff gained knowledge she was the victim of a tort), Ms. Bailey clearly testified in her deposition that she had actual knowledge that her unborn child had developed birth defects at least by October 28, 1997, because Dr. Grundmeyer had told her that the ultrasound revealed those defects. Further, when asked how she felt when she was told about the birth defects, Ms. Bailey stated that she was messed up and upset. The question is whether this testimony presented by the defendants is sufficient to carry their burden of proving that Ms. Bailey's individual claim filed more than a year after she gained that knowledge is barred by prescription. The ultimate question that we must answer is whether, possessing this knowledge, Ms. Bailey's delay in filing suit seeking recovery of her individual damages, including pain and suffering, was reasonable, in light of [her] education, intelligence, the severity of the symptoms, and the nature of defendant's conduct. Campo, 01-2707 at 12, 828 So.2d at 511. This issue is not as straightforward as it might seem. Primarily, we are troubled by the fact that Ms. Bailey's testimony is imprecise concerning the extent of information she was given on October 28, 1997. Ms. Bailey's deposition reveals that she was told that her unborn child had developed birth defects, but that undisputable fact does not necessarily mean that she immediately obtained actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that he or she is the victim of a tort, as required for application of the discovery rule. Id. at 11, 828 So.2d at 510. The phrase birth defect can be widely applied to any number of perceived imperfections in a newborn child, and nothing in Ms. Bailey's testimony indicates that she was told that her unborn child had suffered a neural tube defect, that the child had spinal bifida, or that the child would be paralyzed from the waist down and suffer loss of motor control and other symptoms. Ms. Bailey's deposition is silent concerning the details of the knowledge she received. We find that Ms. Bailey's deposition testimony is insufficient to carry the defendants' burden of proving that, on November 28, 1997, Ms. Bailey gained actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that he or she had been the victim of a tort. The problem is that nothing in Ms. Bailey's deposition indicates that, as a reasonable person, Ms. Bailey should have known on November 28, 1997, that she personally was the victim of any tortious action on the part of the defendants. In order to carry their burden of proving that Ms. Bailey had actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that he or she is the victim of a tort, defendants cannot focus exclusively on the first factor set forth above. Because the word tort includes fault, damages, and causation, defendants had the burden of showing the second factor  that their alleged tortious acts actually produced damage on October 28, 1997, when Ms. Bailey gained knowledge that her unborn child had developed birth defects. This court offered some general principles for determining the date when a tortious act actually produces damage in Harvey. The court found that the damage suffered must at least be actual and appreciable in quality  that is, determinable and not merely speculative. 593 So.2d at 354. This court has also held that damage is sufficient to commence the running of prescription only when it has manifested itself with sufficient certainty to support accrual of a cause of action. Cole, 620 So.2d at 1156. We find that the defendants failed to carry their burden of proving that any damages suffered by Ms. Bailey prior to Jada's birth manifested themselves with sufficient certainty to support accrual of a cause of action. Although Ms. Bailey was naturally upset when she learned that her unborn child had developed birth defects, the real issue is whether any damages Ms. Bailey suffered at that point in time qualify as actual and appreciable damages that are determinable, as opposed to speculative damages. Other than her simple statement that she was messed up and upset, Ms. Bailey's deposition is silent concerning the impact of learning that her child had birth defects. Thus, the defendants failed to carry their burden of proving that Ms. Bailey's individual cause of action accrued on the date she was told that her unborn child had birth defects. Prescription will not begin to run at the earliest possible indication that a plaintiff may have suffered some wrong. Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So.2d 420, 423 (La.1987). Further, this court has rejected the idea that prescription principles should be used to force a person who believes he may have been damaged in some way to rush to file suit against all parties who might have caused that damage. Id. Adoption of the arguments presented by the defendants in this case would violate those principles, as well as the other principles discussed herein. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the lower courts denying the defendants' peremptory exceptions of prescription relative to Ms. Bailey's individual claim, this in addition to our earlier determination in this opinion that the lower courts did not err in denying defendants' exception of prescription to Ms. Bailey's claim on behalf of Jada.