Opinion ID: 481018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of Ortega's Claim

Text: 12 The merits of Ortega's habeas corpus claims rest upon a determination of whether the prosecutor's statements rendered Ortega's trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. at 1871. Ortega's objections to some of the statements made by the prosecutor are so obviously lacking in merit that we do not examine them in detail. Even when considered cumulatively, some of the statements could have no effect on our decision. Remaining statements, however, do present issues which we address. 13 Ortega's contentions can be divided into four categories: (1) the prosecutor improperly referred to him as dope-seller; (2) the prosecutor improperly impeached the testimony of Elmer Don Culp and bolstered the veracity of Gerald Howard; (3) the prosecutor impermissibly commented upon the testimony of Ortega and his witness; and (4) the prosecutor deliberately and repeatedly misstated the amount of heroin involved in the transaction. Each of these issues will be addressed in turn. 14 The first point of controversy involves the prosecutor's characterization of Ortega as a dope-seller. 2 The record, however, supports the reasonable accuracy of the prosecutor's description. Ortega admitted at trial to selling heroin. Also, he previously had been convicted for the sale of heroin, possession of marihuana, and the possession of narcotic paraphernalia. A prosecutor's statements referring to an accused as a dope seller are not inappropriate suggestions of enhanced criminality when the characterization [is] really nothing more than a statement based on the evidence ... presented at trial. United States v. Correa-Arroyave, 721 F.2d 792, 795 (11th Cir.1983) (prosecutor in a case involving over twenty pounds of cocaine referred to accused as a big-time, high stakes, narcotics dealer here in Dade County). In contrast is the case of Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372 (1978), in which the prosecutor made repeated references to the accused's dealing and selling when no evidence of such activity was introduced and the accused had never before been convicted of any felony. Prejudice was properly found in that case. 15 Second, Ortega accused the prosecutor of impermissibly questioning the veracity of Elmer Don Culp and vouching for the credibility of Gerald Howard. 3 The remarks containing the improper statements by the prosecutor that he personally believed one witness rather than the other were not so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. A far more extreme example is presented in Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 567 (5th Cir.1981). In that case, the prosecutor stated that the defense witnesses were lying and that the state's witnesses were telling the truth. The Court held that such statements were improper and deserving of criticism but did not reach the level of denying the accused due process of law. 16 Ortega next claims that the prosecutor impermissibly speculated in opening argument upon the testimony of Ortega's witnesses and commented improperly in closing argument upon how they did testify. 4 A prosecutor's assertion of what he believes the evidence will show and has shown is not error. United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.1978) (an attorney's statements that indicate his opinion or knowledge of the case as therefore presented before the court and jury are permissible if the attorney makes it clear that the conclusions he is urging are conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.) 17 The most troublesome of Ortega's objections concerns the prosecutor's repeated and exaggerated references to the amount of heroin involved in the transaction. 5 The prosecutor claimed that Ortega sold at least one gram of heroin, even though, at the beginning of the trial, the state's chemist testified that the substance he received from Gerald Howard weighed four-tenths of a gram. The trial court sustained Ortega's objection to the misstatements of the prosecutor, but he continued to use one gram as the amount of heroin involved in the transaction. 18 There is no doubt that some of these remarks of the prosecutor were improper. But, it is our duty to determine whether those statements also were so prejudicial that ... the state court trial was rendered fundamentally unfair within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whittington v. Estelle, 704 F.2d 1418, 1421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983, 104 S.Ct. 428, 78 L.Ed.2d 361 (1983). The constitutional frontier stands very far indeed from the core of good prosecutorial practice. Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d at 384. [A] prosecutor's improper argument will, in itself, exceed constitutional limitations in only the most 'egregious cases.'  Menzies v. Procunier, 743 F.2d 281, 288-89 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d at 382). 19 The statements must be viewed in the context of the entire trial and we must determine whether the improper arguments were a crucial, critical, highly significant factor in the jury's determination of guilt. Whittington, 704 F.2d at 1422. We conclude that the prosecutor's comments did not have the requisite effect to justify setting aside the jury verdict in this case. The jury was entitled to believe Howard's testimony that Ortega sold the heroin to him directly and not to Elmer Don Culp. The jury further had reason to disbelieve Culp's testimony as a result of his four prior felony convictions. 20 The core question of unfair prejudice relates to the length of Ortega's sentence rather than the determination of guilt or innocence. Ortega received ninety-nine years for selling approximately half a gram of heroin. It is possible that the length of the sentence might have been affected by the prosecutor's continual references to Ortega as an habitual dope seller who was arrested for delivering enough heroin to make seventy shot papers. Ortega's past convictions, however, constitute sufficient justification for the jury's sentence. We cannot say, therefore, that any errors in Ortega's trial deprived him of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. For these reasons, the district court order denying habeas corpus relief is 21 AFFIRMED.