Opinion ID: 29434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Oatman’s FMLA Claims

Text: The district court found that Fuji was entitled to summary judgment regarding Oatman’s FMLA claims because Oatman failed to show that he was eligible to be reinstated when his FMLA leave expired, as required under the FMLA. Oatman argues that the district court’s dismissal of his FMLA claim is misplaced because the court failed to consider the effect of reasonable accommodation on his ability to return to work. 2 Plaintiff’s original suit also included claims under Sections 409 and 502 of ERISA. On appeal, Oatman does not challenge the district court’s summary judgment ruling that both of these claims were barred due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. -3- Under the FMLA, an employee is entitled, upon returning from FMLA leave, to be restored “to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced” or “an equivalent position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). In addition: If the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition, including the continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA. However the employer’s obligations may be governed by the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). See § 825.702. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b). Furthermore, if an employee is able to return to work upon the expiration of FMLA leave, the employer will then be liable for failing to restore the employee to their former position. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A); see also Holmes v. E. Spire Communications Inc., 135 F.Supp.2d 657 (D.Md. 2001)(holding that plaintiff’s FMLA claim was precluded as a matter of law because of the admitted fact that plaintiff could not have returned to work on the date she believed her FMLA leave ended). Oatman does not deny that he was unable to perform the essential functions of his job at Fuji. In fact, according to Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony, he could not have returned to work on October 9, 1998 –the date when Oatman alleges his FMLA leave ended. Rather, Oatman argues that, had he been offered reasonable accommodations, he could have returned to work upon the expiration of his FMLA leave –i.e., he would have been able to perform the essential functions of his position if he had been offered reasonable accommodations. Under the FMLA, however, there is no right to reinstatement with “reasonable accommodations.” Indeed, existing case law suggests otherwise. See, e.g., Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hospital of Rhode Island, 168 F.3d 538, 543-44 (1st Cir. 1999)(finding no right to reinstatement where employee was unable to work more than forty hours each week and it was established that an essential function of her job -4- was working between fifty and seventy hours per week). Apparently recognizing that the FMLA does not independently provide for reinstatement with reasonable accommodations, Oatman calls attention to the last sentence of 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b), which refers both to the Americans With Disabilities Act and to 29 C.F.R. § 825.702. Oatman argues that 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b) should apply in conjunction with § 825.702, which, in part, provides: If an employee is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the Americans With Disabilities Act, the employer must make reasonable accommodations, etc., barring undue hardship, in accordance with the ADA. At the same time, the employer must afford an employee his or her rights under the FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b)(emphasis added). Undoubtedly, as Plaintiff suggests, there is some level of interplay between the FMLA and the ADA. However, it does not necessarily follow that Oatman is entitled to the relief he seeks. Significantly, Oatman did not assert a claim under the ADA in this case. Other than simply stating that the FMLA should be considered in conjunction with the ADA, Plaintiff offers no authority to support his assertion that the FMLA requires an employee to be reinstated with reasonable accommodation at the end of FMLA leave. Had Plaintiff pursued a claim under the the ADA, the issue of reasonable accommodation might have been pertinent. Because Oatman did not bring such a claim, however, the issue is not relevant to the resolution of this portion of his case. Furthermore, as the discussion below regarding Oatman’s ERISA claim shows, Oatman did not present competent summary judgment evidence regarding his ability to return to his previous position, even if accommodation had been provided. Under the FMLA, Oatman must show that he was able to return to his previous position when his FMLA leave expired. Oatman does not deny that at the end of his leave he was unable to -5- perform the essential functions of his job at Fuji. Therefore summary judgment was appropriate as to Plaintiff’s FMLA claims.