Opinion ID: 1435335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Official Immunity

Text: Petitioner Fried and Appellant Muthukumarana maintain that 911 operators and dispatchers are not entitled to public official immunity. According to Muthukumarana, the Circuit Court erred in concluding that Woodward was entitled to public official immunity because Woodward does not satisfy the prerequisite of being a public official and was not performing a `discretionary act' as required ... to claim public official immunity. In like manner, Fried asserts that Archer was not a governmental official, but merely an employee, and was not performing a discretionary but, rather, merely a ministerial act. Woodward contends that because the Circuit Court found that [she] did not have a special relationship with [Appellant] Muthukumarana, the determination as to whether the Circuit Court erred in holding that [she] was a public official entitled to qualified immunity [wa]s not dispositive to [her] appeal. Archer counters Fried's argument and maintains that the police dispatcher qualifies as a public official and that [a]s [she] was exercising discretion within the scope of her employment, she enjoyed public official immunity as a matter of law. For the following reasons, we agree with Petitioner Fried and Appellant Muthukumarana and conclude that 911 operators and dispatchers, on these facts, are not entitled to public official immunity. At common law, a government actor will enjoy a qualified immunity from liability for his or her non-malicious acts where: (1) he `is a public official rather than a mere government employee or agent; and (2) his tortious conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in furtherance of his official duties.' Ashburn, 306 Md. at 622, 510 A.2d at 1081 (quoting James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 323, 418 A.2d 1173, 1178 (1980)) (emphasis omitted). See also Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 704, 785 A.2d 726, 734 (2001) (quoting James ). `Once it is established that the individual is a public official and the tort was committed while performing a duty which involves the exercise of discretion, a qualified immunity attaches; namely, in the absence of malice, the individual involved is free from liability.' Lovelace, 366 Md. at 705, 785 A.2d at 734 (quoting James ). In James, we enumerated guidelines to be used in determining whether an individual is a public official, including whether: (i) The position was created by law and involves continuing and not occasional duties. (ii) The holder performs an important public duty. (iii) The position calls for the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power of the State. (iv) The position has a definite term for which a commission is issued and a bond and an oath are required. James, 288 Md. at 324, 418 A.2d at 1178 (citing Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 105, 271 A.2d 547, 550 (1970)). Additionally, there are at least two exceptions to the guidelines, where an individual fails to meet most of the above tests, and yet is nevertheless considered to be a public official, which include those individuals who exercise `a large portion of the sovereign power of government,' and those individuals who can be called on to exercise police powers as conservators of the peace. Duncan, 260 Md. at 106, 271 A.2d at 551 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). See also James, 288 Md. at 324-25, 418 A.2d at 1178-79 (quoting Duncan ). Pursuant to our standards for determining whether an individual is a public official entitled to immunity, it is apparent that 911 operators and dispatchers do not qualify for that protection. Although we agree that 911 operators and dispatchers perform an important public duty, they fail to satisfy most of the requirements for classification as a public official. Specifically, their positions are not created by law, do not call for the exercise of ... the sovereign power of the State, do not have a definite term for which a commission is issued, and do not require a bond and an oath. James, 288 Md. at 324, 418 A.2d at 1178. In addition, 911 operators and dispatchers do not fall within either of the two exceptions to the guidelines, where an individual is nevertheless considered to be a public official. Duncan, 260 Md. at 106, 271 A.2d at 551. The first exception, which requires that an individual exercise `a large portion of the sovereign power of government,' contemplates someone serving in a legislative or policymaking capacity. Id. (citation omitted). In Duncan, we held that a public school teacher did not meet the terms of that exception because he d[id] not make rules and regulations or determine county educational policy. Id. Under the same rationale, 911 operators and dispatchers cannot invoke that exception because, by the nature of their duties, they execute, rather than determine and adopt, governmental policy. The second exception, applicable to those who can be called on to exercise police powers as conservators of the peace, also does not extend to 911 operators and dispatchers. Id. Again in Duncan, we compared a public school teacher, who did not meet the second exception, to a sheriff, who did meet the exception, and noted a subtle distinction between authority in the nature of police power and the authority used by a teacher. The former is exercised in opposition to those subject to it for the public good whereas the latter is exercised as a service to benefit those immediately subject to it while also directed to the ultimate public welfare. Duncan, 260 Md. at 107, 271 A.2d at 551. Any authority a teacher might be considered to exercise in his own right, we explained, would not be in the nature of police power. Duncan, 260 Md. at 106, 271 A.2d at 551. Similarly, the acts of a 911 operator or dispatcher providing a service to benefit an individual caller and the public welfare also do not satisfy the exception. The handling of an emergency call is not an exercise of power in opposition to those subject to it for the public good. Duncan, 260 Md. at 107, 271 A.2d at 551. Rather, it is an exercise of power for the benefit of those in need of 911 services. Because we find 911 operators and dispatchers are not public officials, as contemplated in Duncan and James, it is not necessary for us to examine the particular acts in question to determine whether they were discretionary and performed within the scope of official duties. The initial failure of 911 operators and dispatchers to qualify as public officials prevents them from enjoying a public official immunity at common law. [21]