Opinion ID: 2597427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rationally related to a legitimate and content neutral governmental interest

Text: The first factor is the rational basis test, i.e., whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Additionally, the governmental objective must be content neutral. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. As noted, respondents presented evidence to the trial court attempting to show that the prison regulations served the government's interests in security and the rehabilitation of inmates. Both are valid penological interests. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47, 122 S. Ct. 2017 (2002); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 348. The district court found that K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX(q) and IMPP 11-101 were aimed at security and the rehabilitation of inmates, and that the State showed the regulations were rationally related to rehabilitation: The defendants presented evidence that IMPP 11-101's restriction on free [gift] publications was designed in order to have some incentives for people in prisons to behave. The mission of the institution was to try and change behavior. The regulation was designed to try and get people to make better decisions and be more accountable. The defendants presented evidence that the problem with the gift subscriptions was that it was an easy way to circumvent and take the incentives and privileges portion of IMPP 11-101 out of play. The goal of IMPP 11-101 was for inmates to behave and participate in programs and as a result they would be able to use a certain portion of their money in a discretionary way. By contrast, the Court of Appeals held there was no rational relationship between the ban on gift periodicals and the goals of prison security and inmate rehabilitation. It is not rational to eliminate all access to all gift periodicals for all inmates, be they model prisoners or habitual disciplinary rule violators. 31 Kan. App. 2d at 973. We disagree with the Court of Appeals. We have examined the record on appeal, and conclude that substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that the regulations are rationally related to the rehabilitation of prisoners. See Pool v. McKune, 267 Kan. at 797 (evidence of record also demonstrates that there is a rational connection between plethysmograph testing and the legitimate penological goal of rehabilitation); Collier v. Nelson, 25 Kan. App. 2d 582; cf. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 n.12, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989) (district court stated its standard of review required the Bureau of Prisons to articulate a relationship between its regulations and practices and legitimate penological objectives; Court held that standard was sufficiently close to the Turner standard to permit reliance on the district court's findings). DOC personnel testified that IMPP 11-101 was designed to, among other things, create incentives for inmates to behave, and that gift subscriptions are an easy way to circumvent the outgoing funds restrictions contained there. Additionally, the use of outside funds is but one of several earnable privileges contained in IMPP 11-101. Others include audio-visual equipment, handicrafts, participation in organizations and formalized activities, canteen expenditures, property, incentive pay, and visitation. IMPP 11-101(I). Earnable privileges are grouped into four incentive levels for inmates: Intake Level, Level I, Level II, and Level III. While inmates may use up to $30 per month in outside funds, Intake Level inmates are limited to using their outside funds for legal services fees. IMPP 11-101(VI)(A) and (B). Moreover, inmates at Level I may not use those funds to purchase books or subscriptions to newspapers or magazines. IMPP 11-101(VI)(A). Inmates at Levels II and III are not subject to those limitations on use of funds. Additionally, they may maintain one newspaper subscription and may exceed the $30 limit for outgoing funds in order to do so. IMPP 11-101(VI)(D). To complete Level I  and receive additional earnable privileges such as greater flexibility in use of his outside funds  an inmate must remain free of certain disciplinary convictions, have no pending disciplinary reports, and demonstrate a willingness to participate in recommended programs and work assignments for 120 consecutive days. IMPP 11-101(III)(B)(2). The same requirements hold for completion of Level II and advancement to Level III. IMPP 11-101(III)(D). In turn, inmates are automatically reduced to Incentive Level I  with its corresponding limitation on use of outside funds and loss of other earnable privileges  for being terminated from a work assignment for cause; for refusing to participate in work assignments or recommended programs; upon conviction of a felony; and for disciplinary convictions for such things as theft, intoxication, drug use, sodomy, arson, assault, battery, sexual activity, relationships with staff, dangerous contraband, disobeying orders, and rioting. IMPP 11-101(IV)(B). Inmates are reduced only one incentive level for two or more disciplinary reports during a single 180-day period which result in a conviction for a class I or class II offense, or any disciplinary conviction not listed in IMPP 11-101(IV)(B) which nevertheless results in a loss of custody or disciplinary segregation. IMPP 11-101(IV)(A). The district court found that the State's second penological objective of reducing strong-arming, i.e., security, was weak: The defendants also maintained that if inmates were allowed to receive gift publications, inmates could strike deals within the prison and demand that friends or family members send books in lieu of cash payments. If the friends of family of an inmate did not comply, the inmate's family or friends could suffer retaliation. This is a practice commonly known as `strong-arming.' The defendants offered one example of what they believe to be an example of the above problem but even with this the court finds that this argument is weak. The institution allows an inmate to receive a money order or cashiers check to be sent from family or friends. The issue of `strong-arming' by inmates is just as viable with money being sent in (which is permitted) as it is with free [gift] subscriptions, but the defendants do not restrict the incoming money. The argument that the allowance of free [gift] subscriptions causes a security risk standing alone would not be sufficient to withstand the scrutiny of the Turner test. (Emphasis added.) We agree with the district court that strong-arming is not a well-supported argument and that standing alone it is insufficient to withstand Turner. Nevertheless, it does add weight to the overall constitutionality of the challenged regulations. Moreover, while the judge did not specify the example he alluded to, we find that Cummings' Kansas City Star example quoted earlier in the opinion is illustrative of several of the problems the LCF officials testified that the regulations attempt to address. First, this dealing and trading allowed both inmates to circumvent the incentives and privileges system. Second, had the bargain been kept, the transaction would have been completely hidden from the LCF officials who monitored the account of the first inmate, which also would have prevented them from setting off those funds to satisfy his $2,500 debt for fines and postage loans. See, e.g., K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX(o)(3) (All postage for legal and official mail shall be paid by the inmate . . . . The cost of postage for legal or official mail paid by the facility on behalf of an indigent inmate shall be deducted from the inmate's funds, if available.). Finally, this dealing and trading did indeed create security problems: one inmate openly threatened the other with my own talented ways because of the busted deal. While this example admittedly also demonstrates that most of the same problems occur with money gifts  which are not prohibited  LCF nevertheless has legitimate needs, e.g., security, to track the magazines and newspapers just like it tries to track the money. It accomplishes this by its chosen method of requiring that the inmate himself purchase the periodicals from his own account with an SPO. More important, when the gifted money is deposited in the first inmate's account  per the purpose of the system to provide transaction transparency  LCF at least has the ability to set it off against inmate obligations and thus encourage the inmate to instead voluntarily meet his obligations. This encouragement is a form of rehabilitation but is not possible with an inmate who reaps the benefits of gift subscriptions because the money never appears in his account. Moreover, not even blanket bans are constitutionally prohibited. In Turner, the Court upheld on security grounds a regulation which as practiced [meant] that inmates may not write non-family inmates throughout the Missouri prison system. 482 U.S. at 82. Similarly, 3 years earlier in Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984), the Court upheld a blanket prohibition on contact visits in detention facilities as reasonably related to the security at those facilities, a legitimate governmental objective. In the process, it rejected the Federal District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that totally disallowing contact visits was excessive in relation to the security and other interests at stake. 468 U.S. at 587. [W]e have emphasized that we are unwilling to substitute our judgment on these difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration and security for that of `the persons who are actually charged with and trained in the running,' [441 U.S. at 562], of such facilities. In sum, we conclude that petitioners' blanket prohibition is an entirely reasonable, nonpunitive response to the legitimate security concerns identified, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. 468 U.S. at 588. In the First Amendment context, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629, 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977), is of guidance. There, the Court addressed prison regulations which prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join the North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union (Union), barred all meetings of the Union, and refused to deliver packets of Union publications that had been mailed in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other prisoners. The Union claimed that its rights, and the rights of its members, to engage in protected free speech, association, and assembly activities were being infringed by the no-solicitation and no-meeting rules. 433 U.S. at 122. Jones was summarized by the Turner court as follows at 482 U.S. at 86: Noting that the lower court in Jones had `got[ten] off on the wrong foot . . . by not giving appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement,' [433 U.S. at 123], the Court determined that the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners were `barely implicated' by the prohibition on bulk mailings, [433 U.S. at 130], and that the regulation was reasonable under the circumstances. The prisoners' constitutional challenge to the union meeting and solicitation restrictions was also rejected, because `[t]he ban on inmate solicitation and group meetings . . . was rationally related to the reasonable, indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration. [433 U.S.] at 129.' Similarly, in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974), the Court addressed a prison regulation which prohibited face-to-face interviews between press representatives and individual inmates whom they specifically named and requested to interview. The Court rejected a First Amendment challenge by the inmates (rights of free speech) and by the reporters (freedom of the press). Regarding the inmates' challenge, the Court held: Although they would not permit prison officials to prohibit all expression or communication by prison inmates, security considerations are sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison to justify the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of outsiders into the prison for face-to-face contact with inmates. . . . . Accordingly, in light of the alternative channels of communication that are open to prison inmates, we cannot say on the record in this case that this restriction on one manner in which prisoners can communicate with persons outside of prison is unconstitutional. 417 U.S. at 827-28. In addition to arguing that the Court of Appeals was correct, petitioners in the instant case rely on Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999). There, the district court had granted an injunction barring the enforcement of a Washington prison regulation that prohibited the receipt by a prisoner of any book, magazine, or other publication unless the prison ordered the publication from the publisher and paid for it out of the prisoner's own prison account. The warden had claimed that the policy furthered the interests of preventing contraband from entering the prison, insuring the efficiency of the prison mailroom, limiting fire hazards, complying with space requirements, and preventing strong-arming. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the State of Washington had failed to show how its goals were furthered by a prohibition on gift subscriptions. The court ruled: Here, although the state has had ample opportunity to develop a record, it has offered no justification for a blanket ban on the receipt of all gift publications, nor has it described any particular risk created by prisoners receiving such publications. In sum, the state has shown no rational relationship between the policy and the legitimate penological objectives that it has asserted. Under the First Amendment, this is what the state must do to justify the restriction. 170 F.3d at 960-61. Crofton is distinguishable for two reasons. First, there the State failed to establish a sufficient record that the regulation was rationally related to any penological interest. Second, the penological interest at issue in Crofton was security; the court did not reject a blanket ban on gift subscriptions in an incentive program context. Here, DOC also defended its regulations based on the State's interest in inmate rehabilitation  which the district court found was factually demonstrated. In turn, respondents claim that Zimmerman v. Simmons, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Kan. 2003)  decided 6 months after the district court's decision but not addressed by the Court of Appeals  is more persuasive. There, as in the instant case, the defendants claimed that K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX(q)(1) and IMPP 11-101 promoted KDOC's security objective of controlling, managing, and tracking property in the prison, its objective of promoting order through positive inmate behavior, and its objective of ensuring the collection of inmates' other financial obligations. Senior District Judge Van Bebber granted defendants' summary judgment motion and rejected plaintiffs,' concluding that K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX(q)(1) and IMPP 11-101 are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and therefore valid. They promote the internal security of the prisons, help to deter inmates from committing future crimes or rules violations, and aid in inmate rehabilitation. 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. As in the instant case, the Zimmerman court distinguished Crofton because the Crofton defendants had failed to develop a sufficient record to show they had actually experienced any of the problems they described. On the other hand, Zimmerman's [d]efendants. . . developed a sufficient record to show that their regulation and policies are rationally related to legitimate governmental interests. Crofton is distinguishable and the court will not rely on it. 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. As stated above, we agree that the regulations are rationally related to the prison's legitimate interests in the rehabilitation of inmates and security. The connection is not so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. Under Turner, the regulations must also be content neutral. It is important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates' First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression. 482 U.S. at 90. As explained in Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989), the Court's reference to `neutrality' in Turner was intended to go no further than its requirement in Martinez that `the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.' 416 U.S. at 413. The district court, while affirming the neutrality of IMPP 11-101, noted that the regulation is being enforced with uneven application. The court found that although exceptions were made to allow inmates to receive free religious subscriptions and to grandfather one gift subscription, these exceptions were consistent with the respondent's concept of rehabilitation. Similarly, Senior Judge Van Bebber found K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX(q)(1) and IMPP 11-101 to be content neutral. Zimmerman, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. Phelps' memo dated February 20 appears to make an exception for free religious periodicals. Her March 2 memo clarifies that all free publications, whether religious or not, sent other than by bulk mail will be allowed, as long as the mailroom is notified in advance and the inmate verifies that it is free. Free publications would differ from gift publications in that a free publication would be available to any inmate who requested it. Because all gift subscriptions are treated equally, the regulation is content neutral. It is also important to note that LCF is not totally suppressing any expression, but rather restricting the amount of subscriptions to newspapers and magazines the inmates receive. Within those parameters, the inmates appear to be able to choose freely. We hold that the regulations are rationally related to the legitimate penological purposes of rehabilitation and, to a lesser extent, security. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals was incorrect in holding otherwise.