Opinion ID: 2975920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions on Unanimity

Text: The district court instructed that Myra could be found guilty under three alternative theories of liability: (1) as a principal, (2) as an aider and abettor, or (3) as a co-conspirator under the Pinkerton1 theory. The jurors were given a general unanimity instruction, requiring them to 1 This refers to the doctrine that originated in Pinkerton v. United States whereby a person may be held liable for crimes committed by a co-conspirator if those crimes are within the scope of the conspiracy, committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, and are reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the conspiracy. 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946). -2- No. 04-5884 U.S. v. Combs unanimously agree the defendant committed acts that constituted each element of the offense. The instruction did not require the jurors to unanimously agree upon the theory by which the government proved the elements or upon the specific means by which the defendant satisfied each element. Myra asserts it is possible that the jury rendered its guilty verdict with only a fraction of the jurors finding her guilty under each alternative theory. She argues that such a result does not comport with the Fifth Amendment right to due process or the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Because the defendant did not raise this objection at trial, we review for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir. 1998). When reviewing jury instructions for plain error, the test is “whether the instructions, when taken as a whole, were so clearly wrong as to produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184, 187 (6th Cir. 1992). As a general rule, specific unanimity instructions are not required “unless 1) a count is extremely complex, 2) there is variance between the indictment and the proof at trial, or 3) there is a tangible risk of jury confusion.” Id. None of these circumstances is present here. Jurors are not required to agree upon the specific means or act by which a crime was committed. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991) (plurality opinion). Moreover, a specific unanimity instruction is not needed simply because the government presents multiple factual scenarios and theories of liability to prove the commission of a single offense. United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1997) (involving charge of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute). In Washington, the government offered proof of two separate drug transactions and presented alternative theories as to the defendant’s participation in the transactions, including theories of liability as a principal and as an aider and abettor. Id. at 513 n.3. As in this -3- No. 04-5884 U.S. v. Combs case, the trial court gave only a general unanimity instruction, and we reviewed for plain error. Id. at 513. We rejected the defendant’s argument that a specific instruction was needed due to jury confusion and ruled that it was not plain error to charge the jury with only a general unanimity instruction. Id. at 514. In this case, Myra does not argue jury confusion; instead, she argues it is fundamentally unfair not to require a specific unanimity instruction where the government presents alternative theories of liability. In support of her argument, she points to this court’s finding of plain error in United States v. Henning, 286 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2002). However, Henning is entirely distinguishable because it involved a situation where the district court reversed the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy but failed to consider that the jury may have relied on a Pinkerton instruction to convict the defendant of other counts. Id. at 920. Failure to give jurors a specific unanimity instruction does not constitute plain error simply because the government advances multiple theories of liability. See Washington, 127 F.3d at 513-14. Therefore, the absence of an instruction requiring unanimity as to the theory of conviction does not mandate a reversal of Myra’s conviction.