Opinion ID: 781796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McKenna's literally true defense with respect to Count 3

Text: 30 McKenna also argues that the district court should have dismissed Count 3 because she gave an answer that was literally true to the government's question on cross-examination in the civil trial asking: You didn't tell us about [the November 1994] accident, did you, during discovery. In response to this question, McKenna said that she believe[d] she did, and explained that she thought she had revealed that accident: (1) when she agreed to release her medical records to the government; (2) during the early part of the July 1998 deposition while the court reporter's equipment was experiencing problems; and (3) and during her examination with Dr. Prieto. 31 McKenna correctly states that neither 18 U.S.C. § 1621 nor 18 U.S.C. § 1623 reach a witness' answer that is literally true, but unresponsive. See United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1536 (9th Cir.1991). And her first explanation (that she thought she had disclosed the November 1994 accident when she signed the consent for release of her medical records) could indeed be literally true. 32 Count 3, however, charges McKenna with perjury based only on her second and third explanations (that she had disclosed the November 1994 accident in the July 1998 deposition and when Dr. Prieto examined her). The testimony at the criminal trial was clearly sufficient to prove that those statements were not literally true. The court reporter who took the July 1998 deposition, AUSA Kingston, and McKenna's civil attorney all testified that the court reporter did not experience problems with her equipment in that deposition; the testimony also established that McKenna did not in fact disclose the November 1994 accident then. In addition, Dr. Prieto's records and testimony established that McKenna did not in fact inform him of the November 1994 accident when he examined her.