Opinion ID: 439343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Legislative Taking Issue

Text: 52 We cannot agree with the following holding of the Claims Court that section 708 was not a legislative taking which deprived plaintiffs of the right to just compensation because: 53 Congress made no provision for the vesting of specifically defined property in the United States as of a particular date, nor was provision made for judicial determination and payment of just compensation. Section 708 does not affirmatively direct the Secretary of the Interior to exercise the power of eminent domain. 54 2 Cl.Ct. at 802. 55 In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-27, 95 S.Ct. 335, 350, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974), the Supreme Court made it clear that none of these elements is an essential ingredient of a legislative taking. There the Court stated: 56 The general rule is that whether or not the United States so intended, [i]f there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 [66 S.Ct. 1062, 1068, 90 L.Ed. 1206] (1946). [I]f the authorized action ... does constitute a taking of property for which there must be just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the Government has impliedly promised to pay that compensation and has afforded a remedy for its recovery by a suit in the Court of Claims. Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 [60 S.Ct. 413, 414, 84 L.Ed. 554] (1940). See also Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 [52 S.Ct. 267, 76 L.Ed. 637] (1932). 57 Moreover, there was no occasion for the Congress to provide for the vesting of the property in the United States, because it already held both legal and equitable title, subject only to plaintiffs' possessory rights. 58 In addition, the last sentence of section 708 indicates that Congress intended to pay compensation for any property interest taken because it provides:For the purposes of this river, there are authorized to be appropriated not more than $1,000,000 for the acquisition of lands or interest in lands. 59 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1274(a)(23). 60 In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, the Supreme Court scrutinized the regulatory act before it to see if Congress had withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims. In the same way, we find that there is nothing in the language of section 708 indicating that Congress intended to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy for the recovery of just compensation. Also, we have not found nor have we been cited to anything in the legislative history which indicates such a Congressional intent. 61 Because it collides with a recent declaration by this court, we must also disagree with the conclusion of the Claims Court that there was no inverse condemnation of the plaintiffs' claims because there has been no physical invasion of plaintiffs' property. In Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884, 887 (Fed.Cir.1983), a case involving somewhat similar facts, this court, speaking through Chief Judge Markey, stated: 62 Neither physical invasion nor physical restraint constitutes a sine qua non of a constitutionally controlled taking. 63 We agree with the holding of the Claims Court that without doubt, the United States has the authority to regulate the use of the land on which the claims are located and that section 708 is a lawful exercise of the regulatory power of the government to protect and promote the general welfare. There remains, however, the difficult question whether such regulatory action has resulted in depriving plaintiffs of any economically viable use of the claims. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). Because of material factual disputes which the parties so designated and jointly submitted to the trial court, we hold that this crucial issue could not properly be resolved on summary judgment and that it cannot be decided by this court on the present record. 64 The analysis of whether a particular regulatory act constitutes a legislative taking remains one of the most troublesome line-drawing exercises in the judicial function, characterized by a few basic precepts and the admonition that each case turns on its own peculiar facts. In the field of land use regulation, the emphasis which Justice Holmes placed on the degree of value diminution suffered by the property owner has continued to be the central focus of modern case law on the subject. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). However devised or articulated, the heart of the inquiry is whether the governmental action is so onerous as to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. As the Claims Court correctly stated, permissible governmental regulatory action does not constitute a compensable taking merely because the result may diminish the value of the property or prevent its most beneficial use. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). 65 The Supreme Court recently stated that to determine whether a regulation amounts to a Fifth Amendment taking requires-- 66 essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors--such as economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action   . 67 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 100 S.Ct. 383, 390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). 68 As we have stated above, this inquiry necessitates a remand of the case to the trial court for resolution of the following factual issues, which were listed in the joint submission of counsel for the parties to the Claims Court: 2 69 a. Which of the claims, in whole or in part, fall within the definition of beds and banks as referred to in Public Law 95-625, Sec. 708? 70 b. Can the Plaintiffs' alleged unpatented mining claims be mined by methods other than placer or dredge mining methods? 71 c. If there was only a portion of the claims taken, can the remainder be mined or is there in effect a taking of the whole by taking of part?