Opinion ID: 782000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: andy ridge: motion to suppress

Text: 18 Ridge argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm because the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. When reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 590 (6th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1127, 120 S.Ct. 961, 145 L.Ed.2d 834 (2000). Thus, we review de novo the district court's conclusion that the stop was constitutional, while giving due weight to inferences drawn from [historical] facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 19 When an officer conducts a brief investigatory stop of a person or vehicle, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (quotations omitted); cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (noting that an officer conducting an investigatory stop must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity (quotations omitted)). In reviewing a reasonable suspicion determination, we consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (explaining that an officer's actions are judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate? (citation omitted)). It is inappropriate to examine each individual circumstance in isolation; rather, they must be considered in their totality. United States v. Orsolini, 300 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir.2002). Moreover, as long as a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger, an officer need not be certain that an individual is armed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Officers need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct to have reasonable suspicion. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744. 20 This court has concluded that Terry stops conducted under similar factual circumstances were justified by reasonable suspicion. In United States v. Barrett, 890 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.1989), a panel of this court concluded that an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop where someone drove up to a residence that the officer had just finishing searching. Id. at 860-61. The officer knew that a drug dealer lived in the residence, the residence was a distribution point for other dealers, couriers frequently made deliveries there, and the delivery of a specific quantity of drugs was expected at that time. Id. Finally, the officer observed the driver's suspicious demeanor. Id. at 861. The totality of these circumstances established reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop. 21 In this case, the officers were executing a search warrant in a residence housing a methamphetamine laboratory where Danny Baker was known to cook methamphetamine. Like the officer in Barrett, these officers were awaiting the arrival of something — not an expected delivery, but a man named Danny — because they had intercepted a phone call in which the caller said `Danny's on the way with the money.' J.A. at 240 (Prichard Test.). Two officers stated that the Danny referred to by the caller might be Danny Baker, who, they had learned from an informant, had cooked methamphetamine at the drug laboratory they were searching. A third officer said Baker had been armed during a previous arrest. Thus, when the van drove up to Stocklem's residence approximately twenty minutes after the anonymous phone call, the officers had reasonable suspicion that one of the men was Danny and that he had come to Stocklem's residence to traffic in methamphetamine. Although the officers did not have an opportunity to observe Baker's behavior before they effectuated the stop, they had strong reason to believe that a specific individual known to cook methamphetamine at that location was scheduled to arrive. 22 Moreover, [t]he possible danger presented by an individual approaching and entering a structure housing a drug operation is obvious. In fact, it would have been foolhardy for an objectively reasonable officer not to conduct a security frisk under the circumstances. United States v. Bohannon, 225 F.3d 615, 617 (6th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). In Bohannon, a panel of this court explained that because the officers were searching a suspected methamphetamine lab, an officer could reasonably infer that a customer or distributor would arrive on the premises. The agents had reasonable suspicion that [he] was involved in criminal activity. Id. This suggests that, even if the officers did not have specific reason to know that Danny would be arriving with money shortly, they may have been justified in stopping individuals who approached the residence that they were searching. 23 In light of Bohannon and Barrett, we affirm the district court's denial of Ridge's motion to suppress. The officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop, which led naturally to the discovery of the weapon in plain view when Baker exited the van. 24