Opinion ID: 199735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Disqualify Navy Officers

Text: Appellants Guadalupe-Ortiz, Morales, López-Ortiz, and Rabin argue that the district court erred by not disqualifying Navy officers from serving as the prosecuting attorneys. In support of their -6- argument, appellants rely exclusively on Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). In Young, petitioners were found guilty of criminal contempt for violating the district court's injunction prohibiting trademark infringement. To prosecute the criminal contempt action, the district court appointed the attorney of the party whose trademark had been infringed. The Supreme Court exercised its supervisory power to reverse the convictions, holding that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed to undertake contempt prosecutions for alleged violations of that order. Id. at 790. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court stated that a private attorney appointed by the court to prosecute a criminal contempt action should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes such a prosecution. Id. at 804. Appellants argue that the Navy officers assigned to prosecute their case did not possess the requisite amount of disinterestedness. At the time of trial, several of the defendants had been actively involved in political and legal efforts to enjoin the Navy from conducting its military exercises in Vieques. Appellants claim that their repeated conflicts with the Navy vested the prosecuting officers with a passionate resolve to convict appellants that violated the disinterestedness requirement set forth in Young. Notwithstanding appellants' assertions to the contrary, Young is inapposite for at least one conspicuous and significant reason: the -7- Young Court challenged the propriety of a court-appointed prosecutor. In contrast, the instant case involves prosecutors whom the Attorney General appointed to serve as Special Assistant United States Attorneys. The Attorney General is authorized to make these appointments under 28 U.S.C. § 543(a), and [t]his authorization contains no limitation on the persons whom the Attorney General may appoint. United States v. Allred, 867 F.2d 856, 871 (5th Cir. 1989). In essence, then, appellants are asking this Court to dictate to the executive branch whom it can appoint to serve as its prosecutors. Such a position would expand the power of judicial officials to such a degree as to trigger weighty separation of powers concerns. Appellant’s argument thus takes us far outside the scope of Young, where the doctrine of separation of powers was not even implicated. We, therefore, find appellants' reliance on Young to be misguided and decline their invitation to over-extend our authority and trample on the executive branch's seemingly exclusive discretion.2 B. Admission of Certificate of Non-Existence of Record Appellants collectively argue that the district court erred in admitting the Certificate of Non-Existence of Record. For our analysis on this issue, see United States v. Ventura-Meléndez, No. 01- 2 This case does not present, and we do not reach, any question of an appointment under 28 U.S.C. § 543(a) of a prosecutor so interested in the outcome of a case as to raise the serious constitutional questions discussed in Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980). -8- 1400, slip op. at 7-8 (1st Cir. Dec. __, 2001).3 On the basis of the analysis set forth in Ventura-Meléndez, we conclude that the district court was well within its discretion in admitting the certificate.4 C. Exclusion of the Necessity Defense Appellants collectively assert that the district court erred by finding the defense of necessity irrelevant to their trespassing convictions and therefore barring its presentation at trial. For our analysis on this issue, see United States v. Sued-Jiménez, No. 00-2146, slip op. at 5 (1st Cir. Dec. __ 2001).5 Based on the analysis set forth in Sued-Jiménez, we conclude that the district court properly precluded the defense. D. Exclusion of State of Mind Testimony 3 The Ventura-Meléndez case also involved an appellant who was convicted of trespassing onto Camp García in 2000. In her appeal, Ventura argued that the district court erred in admitting a Certificate of Non-Existence of Record. Because the certificate in VenturaMeléndez is identical to the one that appellants challenge here, we have decided to dispose of this issue by referencing the VenturaMeléndez case rather than repeating its contents. 4 Because the Certificate of Non-Existence of Record is admissible, we find that there is sufficient evidence for the district court to have found that appellants were not authorized to enter Camp García. Thus, appellants' perfunctory and conclusory claim that there was insufficient evidence to support their conviction necessarily fails. 5 Sued-Jiménez also involved appellants who were convicted of trespassing onto Camp García in 2000. Appellants in that case argued that the district court erred in excluding their presentation of a necessity defense. Because appellants in both cases shared the same circumstances and set forth identical arguments regarding the necessity defense, we have decided to dispose of this issue by referencing the Sued-Jiménez case rather than repeating its contents. -9- Appellants Tirado, García-Cordero, and López-Ortiz challenge the district court's refusal to allow them to testify as to their state of mind. Appellants were prepared to testify that their actions were justified based on their political, religious, and moral beliefs. They argue that as criminal defendants, they have an unbridled right to present evidence related to their state of mind. Though a criminal defendant is granted much latitude in presenting a defense, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1978), he does not have the right to present irrelevant testimony. United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001). Therefore, when the proffer in support of an anticipated affirmative defense is insufficient as a matter of law to create a triable issue, a district court may preclude the presentation of that defense entirely. Id.; see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414-15 (1980) (finding it essential that defendant's proffered evidence on a defense meet a minimum standard as to each element before that defense may be submitted to the jury). In the instant case, appellants were prevented from testifying as to the political and religious reasons that motivated them to trespass on Navy property. This testimony is relevant, as the district court noted, only insofar as it pertains to the necessity defense. Because the district court correctly determined that appellants could not make out a necessity defense, we find no error in -10- the district court's excluding the presentation of that defense entirely. Maxwell, 254 F.3d at 26.