Opinion ID: 2420277
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosing Personal Information under the DPPA

Text: Title 18, Section 2721(a)(1), of the United States Code, provides that a State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available personal information obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record. There is no dispute that the information was personal information or that it was obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record. The parties focus on whether or not placing a citation with readily accessible personal information discloses personal information with the meaning of Section 2721. The Village argues that disclose means to disclose to someone. In the Village's view, a plaintiff must show that personal information was actually handed over to a specific someone, or at least that a specific someone observed the information. The Village's argument, however, puts shackles on the ordinary meaning of the word disclose. The infinitive form of the word means [t]o open up to the knowledge of others; to make openly known, reveal, declare. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 737-38 (2d ed.1989) (def.5); see also, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 360 (1990) (defs.2a, 2c) (to make known or public and to expose to view); THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 378 (Rev. ed.1980) (defs.1-3). One may disclose information by handing it over to someone or by exposing it to view. Either will do. The Village does not grapple with the breadth of the word. Nor does it otherwise offer a convincing defense of its position that Congress adopted half of the word's meaning. Respect for the DPPA's text demands that we not blithely accept that view. Imagine if a DMV employee placed a stack of driver records on a city sidewalk. Under the Village's reading, only the person whose information was at the top of the stack would have his information disclosed and only after someone viewed it. The second record would not be disclosed, and a cause of action would not accrue, until a passer-by picked up the first record, removed it, and peered down. Our conclusion that Congress would not have intended that outcome is bolstered by the rest of Section 2721(a). The Village's argument about the word disclose casts a squinted eye toward the section in which the word appears. Section 2721(a) makes it illegal to disclose or otherwise make available  personal information. The Village's brief does not address the emphasized language, and the language is not helpful to its cause. The word available means capable of being employed with advantage. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 812 (2d ed.1989) (def.3). When a citation with personal information has been placed on an automobile, readily viewable and free for the taking, it cannot be gainsaid that the recipient's personal information has been made available. Accordingly, the Village's argument that knowing disclosure under Section 2721(a) requires knowledge that the information would be discovered by a hypothetical thief is a non-starter. As our oft-approved criminal pattern jury instructions provide, knowingly means that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct. Pattern Criminal Federal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 4.06. If the act that constitutes disclosure was done voluntarily and purposely, the mens rea element of the DPPA is satisfied. See also United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 188-89 (7th Cir.1986); Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b)(i). Finally, we note that both parties have argued, at a high level of abstraction, that the legislative history supports their favored interpretation of Section 2721(a). Legislative history can be useful in resolving statutory ambiguity, although resorting to it is not without perils. As Judge Leventhal's quip goes, using legislative history can be akin to looking out over a crowd and spotting one's friends. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.REV. 195, 214 (1983). We need not decide whose friends we like better, however, because the meaning of the words in § 2721 is plain. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987). A plaintiff seeking to sue under the DPPA is not required to show (much less plead) that a third-party actually received personal information from a motor vehicle record. The Village's practice of placing personal information on an uncovered traffic citation disclose[s] or otherwise make[s] available the information.