Opinion ID: 1314900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: seizures of evidence

Text: The defendant contends that the seizure of his jacket and clothing violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution [1] and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution [2] because the officers had not obtained a search warrant. We disagree. A. Clothes Seized In Search Incident to An Arrest One of the most frequently utilized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the search incident to an arrest. J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 322 at 494 (2d ed. 1985). Before a search will be upheld as a lawful search incident to an arrest, it must be both spatial and contiguous to the arrest. The leading case on this issue is Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). In Chimel, the police had an arrest warrant for the petitioner. When they arrived at his home, he was not there, but his wife invited them in. When the petitioner arrived home, he was promptly arrested, and the police asked if they could look around. Although the petitioner objected, the police searched throughout his house, garage, work shop, and attic. During the search, the police seized numerous items which were admitted into evidence at the petitioner's trial. The United States Supreme Court found the seizure unconstitutional and then outlined the parameters of a lawful search incident to an arrest: When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.... In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.... There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control'construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694. We recognized the holding in Chimel in Syllabus Point 6 of State v. Moore, 165 W.Va. 837, 272 S.E.2d 804 (1980): A warrantless search of the person and the immediate geographic area under his physical control is authorized as an incident to a valid arrest. See also State v. Hodges, 172 W.Va. 322, 305 S.E.2d 278 (1983); State v. Drake, 170 W.Va. 169, 291 S.E.2d 484 (1982). Nearly a decade later, the United States Supreme Court extended the boundaries of Chimel by holding: [I]t is also plain that searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 1237, 39 L.Ed.2d 771, 775 (1974). [3] See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). Under the principles of Chimel and Edwards, there is no question that the seizure of the defendant's clothes at city hall was a lawful search and seizure incident to his lawful arrest. The same result is not true of the seizure of the jacket. The State did not present any evidence that the jacket was within the immediate reach of the defendant at the trailer to show that its seizure was permissible under Chimel. However, as we discuss in Subpart B, infra, the seizure of the jacket was lawful under the plain view doctrine. B. Plain View In the alternative, the State argues that even if the seizure of the jacket did not result from a lawful search incident to an arrest, it was permissible under the plain view doctrine. It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 582 (1971). See also Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968). See generally J. Cook, supra at § 3:32. What the `plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.... Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the `plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d at 583. (Emphasis added; citation omitted). In Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Stone, 165 W.Va. 266, 268 S.E.2d 50 (1980), we recognized the plain view doctrine: It is not a search for the police to discover evidence in plain sight and the warrantless seizure of such evidence is constitutionally permissible provided 1) the police observe the evidence in plain sight without the benefit of a search [without invading one's reasonable expectation of privacy]; 2) the police have a legal right to be where they are when they make the plain sight observation; and, 3) the police have probable cause to believe that the evidence seen constitutes contraband or fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of crime. In addressing these elements, [s]ome courts have restated the first element to be `the discovery of the evidence must have been inadvertent.' State v. Moore, 165 W.Va. at 852, 272 S.E.2d at 814. (Citations omitted). Despite the difference in language, both statements address the same problem, which is that the police may not under the guise of an initial lawful search into a constitutionally protected area, such as a search incident to an arrest, use this action as a means of conducting a broad warrantless search. State v. Moore, 165 W.Va. at 852, 272 S.E.2d at 814. See State v. Woodson, ___ W.Va. ___, 382 S.E.2d 519 (1989) (discussed in note 5, infra, where we distinguish between the two types of plain view seizures). Under the standard announced in Stone and Moore, the seizure of the jacket would not have been proper under the plain view doctrine. The second and third requirements were met in that the police were lawfully on the premises as a result of the arrest warrant and had probable cause to believe the jacket constituted evidence of the crime. However, the first factor in the plain view matrix, that the discovery of the jacket was inadvertent, was lacking. The police were aware that the defendant wore a camouflage jacket at the time of the crime and were hoping to find it in the defendant's trailer. Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court revisited the plain view doctrine in Horton v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). In Horton, the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant had hidden stolen property and weapons used in a robbery in his house. They filed an affidavit for a search warrant. The search warrant only itemized the property stolen in the robbery and not the weapons used in its commission. While searching the home, the police observed, in plain view, the weapons and seized them. Initially, the United States Supreme Court explained that the inadvertence requirement of the plain view doctrine was supported only by a plurality of the Coolidge Court. The Court in Horton then elaborated on the essential predicates of a plain view warrantless seizure. These predicates are (1) that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the incriminating evidence could be plainly viewed; (2) that the item was in plain view and its incriminating character was also immediately apparent; (3) that not only was the officer lawfully located in a place from which the object could be plainly seen, but the officer also had a lawful right of access to the object itself. [4] With these predicate safeguards in mind, the Supreme Court in Horton went on to discuss the inadvertent discovery requirement of Coolidge and concluded it was unnecessary: [E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. ___ U.S. at___, 110 S.Ct. at 2308-09, 110 L.Ed.2d at 124. Following Horton, a number of state courts have concluded that the inadvertence requirement is not necessary to sustain a plain view seizure. See, e.g., People v. Stokes, 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 273 Cal.Rptr. 752 (1990); State v. Almand, 196 Ga.App. 40, 395 S.E.2d 609 (1990); People v. Gentile, 205 Ill.App.3d 952, 150 Ill.Dec. 799, 563 N.E.2d 926, appeal denied, 137 Ill.2d 667, 156 Ill.Dec. 564, 571 N.E.2d 151 (1990); State v. Brady, 569 So.2d 110 (La.App.1990); State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or. 613, 801 P.2d 749 (1990). See also State ex rel. Love v. One 1967 Chevrolet El Camino, 247 Kan. 469, 799 P.2d 1043 (1990); Buie v. State, 320 Md. 696, 580 A.2d 167 (1990), cert, denied, ___ U.S.___, 111 S.Ct. 1011, 112 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1991); State v. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d 128, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). We agree with Horton `s analysis and determine that the inadvertent discovery of the object is not a predicate requirement of a plain view seizure. To the extent that State v. Stone, supra , and State v. Moore, supra , and their progeny hold to the contrary, they are overruled. [5]