Opinion ID: 1210508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Double jeopardy effect of defendant's robbery conviction in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309

Text: At the time of his initial trial in 1979, defendant pleaded guilty to the robbery and murder of store owner Naumoff. On defendant's automatic appeal, this court held that both guilty pleas were invalid and reversed both convictions. We reasoned that defendant was not permitted to plead guilty to the robbery charge against the advice of his attorney because, under the felony-murder rule, the elements of the robbery charge were essential elements of the murder for which defendant was sentenced to death. We pointed out that unless we reversed the robbery conviction, that conviction Should be conclusive on retrial of the murder count and the prosecution would need only prove the fact of the killing in its perpetration in order to obtain a new conviction of first degree murder.' ( Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 625, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, quoting People v. Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 755, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837; People v. Ballentine (1952) 39 Cal.2d 193, 197, 246 P.2d 35.) Defendant contends that his trial for murder, following his plea of guilty to robbery ( Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309), impressibly placed him in double jeopardy. He points out that the murder and the robbery of Naumoff were the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, because, to establish defendant's guilt of murder under the felony murder rule, the prosecution had to prove defendant's commission of the robbery. (See United States v. Dixon (1993) 509 U.S. 688, 698, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556[[F]or double jeopardy purposes, `the crime generally described as felony murder' is not `a separate offense distinct from its various elements.' ]; Harris v. Oklahoma (1977) 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 [double jeopardy clause barred robbery prosecution of a defendant previously tried for felony murder based on the same robbery].) But, as explained in parts II.A.1 and II.A.2, ante, jeopardy does not attach to an invalid plea of guilty. Defendant's guilty plea to robbery, which, under the felony-murder rule, relieved the prosecution from having to prove some of the elements of the capital murder with which defendant was also charged, was invalid because the plea was entered against defense counsel's advice. As we mentioned earlier, California law prohibits such a plea in a capital case. (§ 1018.) Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant's claim that his trial violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Defendant also argues that section 1239(b)'s automatic appeal provision pertains only to his murder conviction, not to convictions for other crimes charged in the same accusatory pleading. He asserts that in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, we lacked jurisdiction to reverse his robbery conviction and that therefore the trial of the murder, the same offense as the robbery for double jeopardy purposes ( United States v. Dixon, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 698, 113 S.Ct. 2849), violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Assuming for the sake of argument that the doctrine of law of the case does not dispose of this contention, [5] we find it to be without merit. At the time of defendant's 1979 convictions for robbery and capital murder, section 1239(b) provided: When upon any plea a judgment of death is rendered, an appeal is automatically taken by the defendant without any action by him or his counsel. Nothing in that language limits the scope of a defendant's automatic appeal to the crime or crimes for which the defendant was sentenced to death. We therefore construe that provision as requiring an automatic appeal to this court of the entire judgment, thus including convictions for noncapital as well as capital crimes.