Opinion ID: 2637091
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: custody determinations under miranda

Text: To protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Miranda prohibits the prosecution from introducing in its case-in-chief any statement, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, procured by custodial interrogation, unless the police precede their interrogation with certain warnings. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. They must advise the subject that he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says may be used against him; that he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and that if he cannot afford one, one will be appointed for him. Id. Miranda is a constitutional decision, and state law enforcement officers are bound by its strictures. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432, 438-39, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). Miranda identified the principal threat to the privilege against self-incrimination as the compulsive effect of psychological coercion applied during incommunicado interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602. These tactics, the court concluded, serve no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 86 S.Ct. 1602. After enumerating examples of psychological coercion impacting the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court emphasized the coercive aspects of custodial interrogation with which it was most concerneddeprivation of the suspect's freedom followed by his isolation from friends and family: An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to. . . techniques of persuasion ... cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than . . . where there are . . . impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery. 384 U.S. at 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (recognizing that the `principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy being alone with the person under interrogation' (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449, 86 S.Ct. 1602)). In succeeding opinions, the Supreme Court has had occasion to emphasize this point, delineating the limits of Miranda in the process. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam), for example, the United States Supreme Court summarily concluded that the Oregon Supreme Court had read Miranda too broadly in concluding that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. 429 U.S. at 493, 97 S.Ct. 711. The defendant was a suspect in a burglary investigation. Id. After trying to contact the defendant three or four times, an officer investigating the theft finally left a note asking the defendant to call and informing him that the police wished to discuss something with him. Id. When the defendant called the following afternoon, the officer asked if the defendant could meet him at the state patrol office. Id. The officer met the defendant in the hallway of the patrol office and took him into an office and closed the door. Id. The officer informed the defendant that he was not under arrest. Id. He told the defendant that he was suspected in the burglary and that telling the truth might be considered by the district attorney or judge. Id. Finally, the officer falsely informed the defendant that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the burglary. Id. As a result, the defendant confessed. Id. They had only been in the office for approximately five minutes. Id. Holding that this scenario did not constitute custodial interrogation as envisioned by Miranda the court explained: Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a coercive environment. Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is the one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody. It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited. 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711. The fact that the defendant came voluntarily to the police station and was informed that he was not under arrest was important to the Court's conclusion. Id. These same factors contributed to the Court's conclusion that the defendant in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) was not in custody either. Indeed, Beheler's facts were virtually identical to those of Mathiason: the defendant voluntarily came to the police station, he was specifically told he was not under arrest, and he was allowed to leave after the interview. 463 U.S. at 1122-23, 103 S.Ct. 3517. In Beheler, however, the interview lasted closer to thirty minutes. Id. at 1122, 103 S.Ct. 3517. Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Id. at 1126, 103 S.Ct. 3517.  Miranda warnings are not required `simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.' Id. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711). The ultimate inquiry for determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the Court held, is simply whether there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711.) Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), like Mathiason and Beheler, reiterated that Miranda was decided in reference to those situations exerting upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. 468 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138. Accordingly, Berkemer too recognized that the pertinent inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would believe that his freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138. However, unlike Mathiason and Beheler, which explicated the degree of restraint on freedom necessary to trigger Miranda, Berkemer emphasized that the incommunicado nature of police interrogation was an important underpinning of the Miranda decision. The Court distinguished roadside questioning at issue in Berkemer from custodial interrogation on the ground that circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. Id. at 438, 104 S.Ct. 3138. The Court reasoned that exposure to public view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse. Id. The rule derived from two other Supreme Court cases interpreting Miranda is also helpful in resolving the issue before us today. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), the Court made clear that [i]t was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the Miranda requirements with regard to custodial questioning. Id. In Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam), the court expounded this principle. Stansbury is particularly relevant to the facts of the case before us. In Stansbury, the defendant was contacted at 11:00 p.m. at his home by three plain-clothes officers. 511 U.S. at 320, 114 S.Ct. 1526. The officers informed the defendant that they were investigating a homicide and that he was a possible witness. Id. They requested that he accompany them to the police station to answer some questions. The defendant agreed and accepted a ride to the station in the front seat of one of the officers' police car. Id. At the station, the defendant was interrogated without first being advised of his Miranda rights; he made incriminating statements and was arrested. Id. at 320-21, 114 S.Ct. 1526. The trial court refused to suppress statements made by the defendant before his responses to the officers' questions caused the focus of the investigation to shift toward him. Id. at 321, 114 S.Ct. 1526. The defendant was not in custody, the trial court held, until the defendant himself was suspected of the crime. Id. The California Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant was not in custody until the investigation focused on him. Id. at 321-22, 114 S.Ct. 1526. The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court began by reciting the black letter test for whether a suspect is in custody: a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. at 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (internal quotation marks omitted). Reiterating the Beckwith principle, the court continued, Our decisions make clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Id. at 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526. A policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question of whether a suspect was `in custody' at a particular time; rather, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. Id. at 323-24, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, an officer's knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned, but only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action. Id. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526. Illuminating this point, the Court opined that: Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. The weight and pertinence of any communications regarding the officer's degree of suspicion will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Id. On remand, ignoring the subjective intent of the officers as the United States Supreme Court instructed, the California Supreme Court engaged in an objective analysis of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt that his freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. People v. Stansbury, 9 Cal.4th 824, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d 588, 591 (1995). Under this standard, the California Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Id. 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d at 594. California's high court took into account the fact that Defendant was invited, not commanded, to come to the police station for an interview; that defendant was offered the choice of driving himself or accepting a ride from the police; that upon accepting a ride, he sat in the front seat of the car; that he was told he was being interviewed as a possible witness; that the questioning was brief and nonaccusatory, notwithstanding that it took place in the jail area of the police station; and that defendant was largely permitted to recount his observations and actions through narrative. Id. 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d at 591-92. The court did not find persuasive the defendant's argument that the interrogation was custodial simply because he had to pass through a locked parking structure and a locked entrance to the jail to get to the interview room where he made his statement. Id. 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d at 593. Here, although defendant had been admitted to the jail section of the police station through locked doors and would have needed assistance to leave the facility, these facts alone do not establish that he was in custody. Id. 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d at 594. There is no evidence to indicate that a reasonable person in his position would feel that assistance in leaving the facility would not be forthcoming. Id.; see also Green v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.3d 126, 219 Cal.Rptr. 186, 707 P.2d 248, 255 (1985) (holding questioning in a locked interview room in police station to be noncustodial where record did not reveal whether the defendant realized that room was locked). A handful of times, we have had occasion to review a trial court's determination that a suspect was or was not in custody during a station house interview. Although none is directly on point, a few are informative in some regards. The most factually similar case we have considered is People v. Trujillo, 938 P.2d 117 (Colo.1997). There, the defendant and the investigating detective agreed to meet at the police station to discuss an alleged sexual assault. 938 P.2d at 120. When he arrived, the defendant was escorted through a locked door and into an interview room. Id. He was informed that he was not under arrest, that he was free to leave, and that the interview would take place only if the defendant wanted to talk. Id. at 120-21. We made clear that the objective reasonable person standard applies to the issue of custody. Id. at 123. The reasonable person standard, we explained, is superior to a subjective test because it is not `solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant.' Id. (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 n. 35, 104 S.Ct. 3138); accord Hamilton, 831 P.2d at 1330; Trujillo, 785 P.2d at 1293. Some of the factors a court should consider under this standard are: (1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer's response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the defendant's verbal or nonverbal response to such directions. Trujillo, 938 P.2d at 124. Because none of these factors is determinative, we held that a police interrogation at a stationhouse does not necessarily render the interrogation custodial for purposes of the Miranda warning. Id. (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711). We concluded that the undisputed facts in the record did not support the trial court's conclusion that the defendant was in custody. Id. For instance, we pointed out that the interview occurred at the police station by mutual agreement; that the defendant was informed that he was not under arrest and was free to leave; that the defendant was relaxed; and that the initial tone of the interview was conversational. Id. Nevertheless, we remanded the case to the trial court for further findings of fact because it had failed to resolve conflicting testimony. Id. at 125. Specifically, the defendant's and the investigator's accounts of the interview differed vastly and it was unclear whether or not the door to the interview room was locked. Id. at 124-25. The fact that the defendant voluntarily came to the police station and was free to leave at anytime was important in People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193 (Colo.1984), too. In Thiret, the defendant was questioned in the office of an investigator with the district attorney's office after taking a polygraph examination. Id. at 198. A police officer had transported the defendant to the district attorney's office for the purpose of the polygraph examination over four hours earlier. Id. During the interview, which lasted approximately an hour and a half, the door to the office was closed. Id. However, a few minutes after the defendant and the investigator began talking, the officer assigned to drive the defendant home came in and told the defendant to let him know when the defendant was ready to leave. Id. In holding that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes, we reasoned that the defendant went voluntarily to the district attorney's office to take part in the polygraph examination; that he was not under arrest; and that his freedom to depart was not restricted. Id. at 203. In fact, shortly after the defendant began conversing with [the investigator], another officer told the defendant to let him know when he was ready to leave. [6] Id. With the principles discussed above to guide us, [7] we now consider whether Defendant's statements were the product of custodial interrogation. [8]