Opinion ID: 388061
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Manageability and Need for Initial Policy Determinations

Text: 40 As this historical resume makes abundantly clear, there were in 1976 and there are now no manageable standards for a court to apply when viewing staff participation in a Senate reelection campaign. 89 Moreover, the inability of the Senate a body constitutionally authorized and institutionally equipped to formulate national policies and internal rules of conduct to solve the problem demonstrates the impossibility of deciding the issue appellant poses without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. 90 Indeed, the interpretation of the False Claims Act suggested by appellant would license the courts to monitor every action taken by a Senator and his aide in an effort to determine whether it is sufficiently official or too political. 41 The dilemma thus posed is just as unsurmountable here as we found it to be in another recent case one involving a presidential reelection campaign. 91 There we cited both lack of standing and general prudential considerations in declining to exercise jurisdiction to deal with claims of misuse of federal power and funds by a candidate who allegedly had followed 42 a concerted course of conduct designed to use the public treasury for salaries, travel expenses, costs of meetings and other political outlays; to grant and withhold public employment based upon political support by the employee; and to promise and award federal programs and funds to communities as political inducements and rewards, all in order to obtain support for President Carter's renomination. 92 43 These accusations, we noted, relate(d), quite literally, to virtually every discretionary decision made by the Administration acting through ... high government officials; (c)onsequently, we said, any relief, to be effective, would have to be as broad as the authority of the high offices held by the federal defendants. 93 So, 44 (w)hether shaped as declaratory relief, or injunctive relief, or both, the court's judgment would have to interject itself into practically every facet of the Executive Branch of the federal government, on a continuing basis, for the purpose of appraising whether considerations other than pure public service motivated a particular defendant in the performance of his or her official duties. 94 45 But this, we concluded, was beyond the ability of the judiciary, for the courts simply are not suited to undertake neutral consideration of every Executive action. 95 And we pointed out that resolving the issue drawn would compel us to make fundamental policy decisions: 46 For this court to undertake the inquiry which would be required in this case would be to invade the far corners of the Executive Branch by subjecting countless Administration decisions to judicial scrutiny for any vestige of political motivation.... (I)n addition to being unmanageable(,) (n)either would that inquiry proceed on the basis of a discrete judicial standard .... Rather the court would be assessing the correctness of an action assigned to the Executive Branch and often requiring substantial supporting personnel and expertise, as well as a significant time investment. 96 47 In the absence of any discernible legal standard or even of a congressional policy determination that would aid consideration and decision of the question raised by appellant's first count, we are loathe to give the False Claims Act an interpretation that would require the judiciary to develop rules of behavior for the Legislative Branch. We are unwilling to conclude that Congress gave the courts a free hand to deal with so sensitive and controversial a problem, or invited them to assume the role of political overseer of the other branches of Government. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellant's first claim. In doing so, we do not, of course, say that Members of Congress or their aides may defraud the Government without subjecting themselves to statutory liabilities. We simply hold that under the facts alleged in count one of appellant's complaint, no cause of action has been made out under the Act.