Opinion ID: 2611102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malice, Express or Implied

Text: Former NRS 42.010 (now NRS 42.005) allows punitive damages to be awarded in cases wherein a defendant is guilty of malice, express or implied. (My emphasis). Express malice, sometimes called [m]alice in fact, or actual malice, denotes ill will on the part of the defendant, or his desire to do harm for the mere satisfaction of doing it. Nevada Credit Rating Bur. v. Williams, 88 Nev. 601, 610, 503 P.2d 9, 14 (1972). Express malice, then, may be seen as a malice of intended harm, the kind of malice which the plurality believes is the only kind of malice. Implied malice is malice of unintended harm [2] ; it is distinguished from [express malice] simply by absence of the need to look to the actor's motivation and purpose. 2 J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice § 19.19 at 60 (1985). Unlike express malice, implied malice does not require that the defendant be motivated by ill will or intent to harm anyone. Malice has been implied in law whenever a tort resulted from a voluntary act, even if no harm was intended.  Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 39 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1631 n. 8 (my emphasis). For example, a person may do something knowing it to be dangerous and realize at the time that someone will probably get hurt, yet have no real intention to harm anyone. Such a person is guilty of implied malice. Where a person consciously acts in a dangerous manner, knowing that the probable result of that action will be injury to others, inquiry into actual motive or intent becomes unnecessary because the law will infer from such willful misconduct the `legal equivalent' of actual malice. Ghiardi, id. [3] In Village Development Co. v. Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 315, 526 P.2d 83, 89 (1974), we accurately noted that in previous cases we had sustained awards of punitive damages where evidence showed the wrong was willful, and the damage either intended or a necessary consequence of the willful wrongdoing. (My emphasis). This court's use of the disjunctive in Filice shows rather clearly Nevada's acceptance of both a malice of intended harm (express malice) and a malice of conscious wrongdoing but of unintended harm (implied malice). The language of Filice embraces both kinds of malice. If the defendant intends to harm, the defendant is guilty of express malice. If the defendant does not intend to harm anyone, yet knows that the probable or necessary consequences of his or her acts will be harm to some unidentified victim, then the defendant is guilty of implied malice. Otherwise put, when the defendant knows that injury will probably result from his or her actions and, consciously disregarding the probability of injury to others, goes ahead wrongfully to commit the dangerous acts, such a defendant is guilty of implied malice and is subject to being punished by punitive damages. Implied malice is a culpable state of mind that is manifested by a person's conscious taking of excessive risks at the expense of injury to others; so, when one consciously decides to act in a dangerous manner and that decision is made despite the knowledge that the action will probably result in injury to others, such a decision, such a conscious disregard [4] of the safety and personal integrity of other persons, constitutes malice, malice implied in law. Examples of implied malice are easy to come by. A useful example was given by Senator Cliff Young during legislative hearings on punitive damages as now codified in NRS 42.005 (formerly NRS 42.010). Apparently recognizing the culpability of unacceptable, deliberate risktaking and of exposing others to danger even if no harm was specifically intended, Senator Young gave this illustration: Suppose a big drug company puts out a certain drug and they know there is something wrong with it, but they still put forward a big campaign for it. Then you can sue for punitive damages. Hearings on S.B. 198 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., (1967) (statement of Senator Cliff Young, sponsor of S.B. 198) (my emphasis). Senator Young was, at that time, at least, of the opinion: An irresponsible attitude toward an individual or a group as a whole is a ground for punitive damages. Id. Product liability cases such as the hypothetical case suggested by Senator Young are classic instances of the need to punish those who injure others in an irresponsible manner but without having any actual malice or intention to harm any given person. [5] The rule proposed by the plurality would eliminate punitive damage awards in the type of drug case exampled by Senator Young during legislative deliberations. Assuming that malice express or implied is not restricted to the deliberate injury of an intended victim, I think it is necessary to go on to examine how the type of cognition called malice can be applied to an impersonal corporation thus making a corporation liable in punitive damages for its animus malus.