Opinion ID: 2078506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Certification and Authentication of Documents During Habitual Phase

Text: After the jury returned its guilty verdicts, the State set out to prove that Cavendish had two prior unrelated felony convictions and, thus, was a habitual offender. Cavendish claims the court erred in allowing into evidence State's exhibits which purported to show that Cavendish had been convicted in Tennessee of possession of burglar tools. The documents used to establish this conviction were certified by the following sworn statement from the court clerk in Tennessee: I, Betty Carter Justis, Criminal, Circuit, Court Clerk of Greene County, Tennessee, in aforesaid State and County, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages, contain a full, true and correct copy and exemplification of the record of the cause, State of Tennessee v. Charles Clayton Cavendish, No. 4256 as appears of record in said Court. Cavendish's contention is two-fold. First, he argues that the evidence of the Tennessee conviction should not have been admitted because the certification refers to foregoing pages whereas in fact the pages followed the certification. The trial court ruled that this discrepancy was an understandable mechanical error and would not preclude admission of the documents. We agree that the authenticity of the documents was not placed into question by virtue of the fact that the certification was stapled atop the certified documents. Second, Cavendish argues the evidence of the conviction should not have been admitted because the certification refers to Cause No. 4256, whereas the document entitled Waiver of Jury Trial, Plea of Guilty and Submission of the Case refers to No. 4257, as does the Verdict, Judgment and Sentence. In admitting the exhibits, the court ruled that the discrepancy was a typographical error. We note that the Presentence Indictment is labelled Case No. 4256-57, and indicated that Cavendish had a co-defendant, which explains the double cause number. Yet, all the documents tending to prove the fact of the conviction leave no doubt that they apply to Cavendish, not to the co-defendant. Thus, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the documents. The discrepancies in the cause numbers went to the weight of the evidence and were within the jury's province to resolve. Barger v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 725.