Opinion ID: 3039459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relative Strength Of Washington Law

Text: The thrust of the Winter Objectors’ argument is that Washington class members’ claims are stronger than those of other class members because Washington law is more favorable than federal law and other states’ law. They claim that although Washington wage and hour law generally follows the FLSA, Washington has not adopted the Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 251, et seq., or the Employee Commuting Flexibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, § 2102, 110 Stat. 1755, 1928 (1996) (“ECFA”), both of which provide Sears with strong defenses. According to the Winter Objectors, Washington class members’ strong claims under Washington law were unfairly discounted by being settled together with relatively weaker claims, under federal and state law, that are subject to defenses under the Portal to Portal Act and the ECFA. Citing two unpublished Washington state trial court decisions, Stevens v. Brink’s Home Sec., Inc., No. 02-2- 32464-9 (King County Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2005), and Crow v. Northwest Transp., Inc., No 03-2-35135-1 (King County Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2005), and an administrative guideline informally promulgated by Washington’s Department of Labor and Industries (“DLI”), they argue that Washington law would likely permit recovery here, while states following the Portal to Portal Act and the ECFA would not. The District Court rejected this argument, observing that the Washington Supreme Court had not ruled on the compensability of travel time under these circumstances, and 6 that the only relevant published decision, Anderson v. State of Washington, 63 P.3d 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), suggested that Washington followed the general rule that commute time is not compensable. The District Court distinguished Brink’s and Crow on the ground that, in those cases, the Washington trial court explicitly found that the home dispatch program placed significant restrictions on the drivers during drive time, whereas “[d]uring this litigation, Sears has contended that the HDP was voluntary and contained minimal restrictions on the Technicians’ use of the vehicles during the commute periods.” (JA 43.) Finally, the District Court found that, because the DLI guideline was informally promulgated, it was non-binding and thus entitled to little deference. We agree with the District Court that Brink’s and Crow appear to be driven, at least in part, by the explicit finding that the employer exercised significant control over the employee during drive time. While this appeal was pending, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in Brink’s. See Stevens v. Brink’s Home Sec., Inc., 169 P.3d 473 (Wash. 2007). Tellingly, the court’s “on duty” analysis focused almost exclusively on the extent to which the employer exercised control over the employee during drive time. See id. at 476 (“[W]e must evaluate the extent to which Brink’s restricts Technicians’ personal activities and controls Technicians’ time to determine whether Technicians are ‘on duty’....”); id. (“Unlike ordinary commuters who regularly run errands during their commutes and carry additional passengers, Brink’s policy prohibits Technicians from engaging in personal activities while driving the 7 Brink’s trucks.”); id. (“In addition to the restrictions on Technicians’ drive time, Technicians remain ‘on duty’ during the drive. Supervisors may redirect Technicians under the HDP while en route to and from their homes to assist with other jobs or answer service calls.”). The District Court found that there was a legitimate dispute concerning the extent of Sears’ control during drive time, and we cannot say that this finding was clearly erroneous. The Winter Objectors argue that there is little evidence that Sears did not exercise control during drive time. However, even assuming that that is true, there also is little evidence that Sears did exercise control. That is, based on our review of the record, it would have been difficult for the District Court to find – as the Brink’s and Crow courts found – that Sears placed significant restrictions on drivers during drive time. Absent a finding that Sears exercised significant control, Washington class members do not appear to have strong claims under Washington law.1 Washington class members were included in Class One and therefore, for purposes of analyzing the relative strength of their claims, the proper comparison is with other members of Class One. California class members were also included in Class One. Washington law and California law appear to be similar, as both focus on the element of 1 We also agree with the District Court that the DLI guideline was non-binding and entitled to little deference. Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court’s analysis in Brink’s, which focused extensively on employer control (and did not even acknowledge the guideline), casts doubt on the extent to which the guideline accurately reflects Washington law. 8 employer control during drive time. Compare Brink’s, 169 P.3d at 476 (“[W]e must evaluate the extent to which Brink’s restricts Technicians’ personal activities and controls Technicians’ time to determine whether Technicians are ‘on duty’....”) with Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 995 P.2d 139, 146 (Cal. 2000) (“The level of the employer’s control over its employees [while traveling to work], rather than the mere fact that the employer requires the employees’ activity, is determinative.”). Accordingly, even if Washington law is somewhat favorable relative to other states’ law, it does not appear to be more favorable than California law, and we take comfort in the fact that class members from both states are treated identically under the settlement.2 We agree with the District Court that Washington class members’ claims are not significantly stronger than those of other class members. Even assuming their claims are slightly stronger than the claims of some non-Washington class members, this factor is adequately taken into account by their inclusion in Class One, where they receive a 50% premium. B. The District Court’s Decision To Certify The Class. Certification of a settlement class is only appropriate if the class meets the 2 There is no reason to believe (and the Winter Objectors do not allege) that the settlement is unfair as to California class members, as plaintiffs’ counsel in DeSoto serves as class counsel and was involved in the arm’s length negotiation of the settlement. Assuming the settlement is fair as to California class members, the obvious implication is that it also must be fair as to Washington class members, given that both states have similar laws, class members from those states press the same claims, and class members from those states are compensated identically under the settlement. 9 requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Under Rule 23(a), class representatives and class counsel must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Winter Objectors argue that, because Washington class members’ claims are stronger than those of other class members, the settlement class fails to meet those requirements and therefore the class should not have been certified. In light of our finding that Washington class members’s claims are not stronger than those of other class members, these claims necessarily fail. Even assuming that Washington class members’ claims are slightly stronger than some non-Washington class members’ claims, their inclusion in Class One, where they received a 50% premium, allays any concerns about the class’ ability to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. C. The District Court’s Finding That The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable and Adequate. The fairness of the settlement is determined by consideration of the nine factors articulated in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1975).3 The District Court 3 The nine factors include: “(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation”; “(2) the reaction of the class to the settlement”; “(3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed”; “(4) the risks of establishing liability”; “(5) the risks of establishing damages”; “(6) the risks of maintaining the class 10 properly considered each of those factors and found the settlement to be fair, reasonable and adequate. The Winter Objectors argue that the District Court erred in its Girsh analysis. Although we could address each factor separately, we need not do so because at bottom the Winter Objectors’ criticisms concerning the District Court’s analysis are premised on their belief that Washington class members’ claims are stronger than those of other class members. Given our finding to the contrary, their argument concerning the fairness of the settlement necessarily fails. And again, even assuming that Washington class members’ claims are slightly stronger than some non-Washington class members’ claims, the 50% premium adequately compensates them for any such advantage.