Opinion ID: 2775233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Improper-Purpose Doctrine Rests on

Text: Weak Authority and Reasoning ¶24 The first factor in determining how much deference a precedent should be afforded is the persuasiveness of the authority and reasoning on which the precedent is based. See Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 46, 57 P.3d 1007 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he precedent rejected in Menzies was established ‘with little analysis and without reference to authority.’” (quoting Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399)); accord Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009) (“[T]he relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include . . . whether the decision was well reasoned.”). ¶25 Here we note first that our cases supporting improperpurpose liability are themselves weak authorities on this issue. We first endorsed the improper-purpose doctrine in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, but the decision in that case did not actually rely on it. 657 P.2d 293, 308 (Utah 1982) (“[T]he evidence in this case would not support a jury finding [of improper purpose].”). Because Leigh Furniture was decided on other grounds, its endorsement of improper-purpose liability was not, in the strictest sense, part of the case’s holding. Its precedential weight is therefore limited.4 See 20 AM . JUR. 2D Courts § 134 (2014) (“[A] case is not authority for any point not necessary to be passed on to decide the case . . . .”); Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 161 (1930) (“In order that an opinion may have the weight of a precedent . . . it must be an opinion the formation of which is necessary for the decision of a particular case . . . .”).5 4 Limited, that is, with respect to this court. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3 (“[L]ower courts are obliged to follow . . . any ‘judicial dicta’ that may be announced by the higher court.”); 20 AM . JUR. 2D Courts § 134 (2014) (“[D]ictum of a court of last resort can be tantamount to a decision and therefore binding only in the absence of a contrary decision of that court.”). 5 This is not a purely formalist distinction, one without any practical purpose. Rather, it recognizes that when a court announces a rule that is unnecessary to its decision, it is less likely to have considered all the potential arguments against the rule. Had the Leigh Furniture court actually attempted to impose liability in the absence of any improper means, it might have been forced to confront the problems inherent in the improper-purpose prong of its test. As it was, the facts of the case did not require the court to confront those problems, and, by and large, it did not confront them. (continued...) 7 ELDRIDGE v. JOHNDROW Opinion of the Court ¶26 The only decision in which we have allowed liability based solely on an improper purpose is Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., which upheld a jury verdict based on improper purpose where the jury had found no improper means. 885 P.2d 786, 788–89 (Utah 1994). Pratt, however, is also a weak precedent because it merely assumed that Leigh Furniture’s improper-purpose prong was good law, without hearing argument on that issue. Cf. 20 AM . JUR. 2D Courts § 134 (2014) (“For a case to be stare decisis on a particular point of law, that issue must have been raised in the action decided by the court . . . . [A] case is not binding precedent on a point of law where the holding is only . . . assumed in the decision but is not announced.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). ¶27 Further, only two of the four justices who decided Pratt actually endorsed improper-purpose liability. Pratt, 885 P.2d at 790–91 (Stewart, A.C.J., concurring). The other two expressed “grave doubts about the future vitality of Leigh’s improper-purpose prong,” but they declined to consider the issue because it was not properly “before the court.” Id. at 789 n.3 (opinion of Zimmerman, C.J.). That this court split evenly on improper-purpose liability twenty years ago, in a case where the issue had been neither raised nor argued by the parties, does not preclude us from reconsidering it today. ¶28 When we turn from the precedential status of Leigh Furniture and Pratt to the reasoning and authority on which they were based, we see nothing in either case that would make us hesitate to overrule them. To begin with, Pratt’s application of improper-purpose liability was based entirely on Leigh Furniture, without any discussion of other authority. See id. at 788. As for its reasoning, two of the Pratt justices endorsed improper-purpose liability because it allowed courts to reach desirable results where “[i]nfliction of gratuitous harm” might otherwise not be remedied. Id. at 791 (Stewart, A.C.J., concurring in the result). The other two worried about the doctrine allowing “wholly legitimate” conduct to be declared tortious by “a jury’s unguided exercise of its moral judgment.” Id. at 789 n.3 (opinion of Zimmerman, C.J.). Because reconsideration of the doctrine was not before the court, neither opinion did the hard work of weighing all the arguments and reaching a reasoned conclusion. ¶29 Leigh Furniture’s endorsement of improper-purpose liability rested on more authority, but less reasoning. Leigh adopted the improper-purpose prong by adopting Oregon’s definition of 5 (...continued) See infra ¶¶ 29–31. 8 Cite as: 2015 UT 21 Opinion of the Court tortious interference. 657 P.2d at 304. Its argument for adopting Oregon’s definition was simple and persuasive: the first Restatement put too little burden on plaintiffs making their case, the second Restatement put too much, and Oregon’s “middle ground” was the best option available. Id. ¶30 But as sound as this reasoning was, it did not explain why improper purpose, in the absence of improper action, should constitute independent grounds for liability. On this crucial point, Leigh Furniture was silent. It warned against overuse of the improper-purpose prong. Id. at 307 (“[I]t [is] prudent for commercial conduct to be regulated for the most part by the improper means alternative . . . .”). It explained why the improper-purpose prong was problematic. Id. (acknowledging “[p]roblems inherent in proving motivation or purpose”). But nowhere did it explain why the improper-purpose prong was necessary at all. ¶31 Its inclusion of improper purpose in its reasoning therefore rested entirely on persuasive authority. See id. at 307–08 (citing a treatise and a handful of cases from other jurisdictions). Yet its appeal to authority on this issue was also weak because, as it acknowledged, there was “no generally acknowledged or satisfactory majority position” on the elements of tortious interference. Id. at 303–04. Rather, tortious interference law nationwide was “still in a formative stage.” Id. at 304. ¶32 We do not wish to overstate the matter. Leigh Furniture is the seminal case of Utah’s tortious interference law, and we would follow even its dicta if we had no good reason to do otherwise. However, on the narrow issue of improper-purpose liability, its authority is weak and its reasoning is nearly nonexistent. It does nothing to quell our concerns about the improper-purpose doctrine.