Opinion ID: 902845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Calculating a Reasonable Fee

Text: Joyce asserts that the court made two legal errors in awarding her only $30,000 of the nearly $170,000 in fees that she requested: (1) linking the amount of compensable fees to the amount of damages, and (2) factoring in her refusal to accept the Town's settlement offer. We agree that the court's reduction of the fee award based on those rationales was improper and, hence, an abuse 26 Of course, even obtaining only nominal damages does not negate the possibility of a fee award. Coutin, 124 F.3d at 339 n.6. -36- of the court's discretion. See Coutin, 124 F.3d at 336 (stating that an abuse of discretion occurs, inter alia, 'when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored [or] when an improper factor is relied upon' (quoting Foster v. Mydas Assocs., Inc., 943 F.2d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 1991))). The court began its discussion by describing at length the well established principle that a fees award should reflect the plaintiff's level of success, obliging the court to trim the base fee generated by the hours-times-rate calculation when the litigation has achieved only modest results. The district court also recognized that the results of litigation embrace more than the amount of damages awarded by the jury. The court's application of these principles, however, was flawed in multiple respects. First, in assessing the benefits achieved by the litigation, the court emphasized the Town's prelitigation change of policy and its own limited finding of unlawful discrimination that it had declared applicable to this case only. The court overlooked, however, the potential impact of its state-law rulings characterizing the golf tournament as a place of public accommodation, rejecting a separate but equal exception to the public accommodation law, and clarifying the plaintiff's burden of proof. It thus appeared to treat the damages award as the only significant result obtained. Indeed, it stated that, [i]n accordance with the substantial body of case law cited -37- herein, the award of attorney's fees here will be correspondingly circumscribed by the jury award of damages. Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 290. This limited view of the litigation's impact was incorrect. Relatedly, as the authorities described above make clear, even if Joyce's lawsuit had achieved nothing other than compensatory relief for her, it would have been an error of law for the district court to link the amount of recoverable attorney's fees solely to the amount of her damages. Fee-shifting provisions in general reflect a legislative judgment that 'the public as a whole has an interest in the vindication of the rights conferred by the statutes . . . over and above the value of a . . . remedy to a particular plaintiff.' City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 444 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). With respect to § 9 in particular, the Massachusetts Attorney General has stated that an 'appropriate award of attorney's fees promotes Chapter 151B's policy of enlisting the help of private attorneys general in the fight against discrimination.' Borne v. Haverhill Golf & Country Club, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 903, 917 n.17 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (quoting brief filed by Attorney General as intervenor); see also Stratos, 439 N.E.2d at 786 (noting the purpose of fee-shifting provision to encourage suits that are not likely to pay for themselves, but are nevertheless desirable because they vindicate important rights). -38- The district court appeared to recognize that the amount of damages is only one element in the constellation of factors that must be considered in determining a reasonable fee. Coutin, 124 F.3d at 338. As we have described, the court discussed a number of reasons for its decision. Yet its pre-trial ruling on fees expressly stated that it would correlate the fee award to the jury's damages award: If only nominal or limited damages are awarded, the reasonable fee will be correspondingly limited. Joyce, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 427. The court confirmed its intent to draw such a link in its post-trial ruling, noting that it previously had advised the plaintiff that any award of attorney's fees would be proportionate to her recovery at trial. Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 291. Whether or not the district court ultimately relied exclusively on the amount of the damage award to calculate the appropriate fee, it is apparent that it gave too much weight to that element. The other substantial problem with the court's calculation is that it unequivocally took into account Joyce's rejection of the settlement offer. Although the court recognized that Rule 68 did not apply because Joyce's total award (damages, costs, and attorney's fees) exceeded the Town's offer, it nonetheless repeatedly pointed to her refusal to settle. It observed that the settlement offer was reasonable, that the offer obviated the need for a jury trial, and that the refusal to -39- accept the offer was unreasonable. Id. The court stated that, in keeping with the principle of Rule 68, it would be reasonable to award no costs or fees incurred after the offer was made on February 4, 2011. Id. Indeed, it deleted from Joyce's requested costs the expenses incurred after that date. Finally, the court concluded its fees discussion by commenting that placing the full cost of the litigation on the defendants would encourage similarly situated plaintiffs to refuse all reasonable settlement offers and proceed to trial instead. Id. at 292. We have held that it is a mistake of law to reduce an award of attorneys' fees in a civil rights case in response to a plaintiff's rejection of a defendant's settlement offer when the subsequent judgment exceeds that offer. Coutin, 124 F.3d at 341; see also id. (noting that the higher judgment amount validates the appellant's rejection of the tendered settlement and immunizes her from detrimental consequences based upon that rejection). It is plain that the district court committed such an error in this case and, hence, for that reason alone the fees must be recalculated. The court did not quantify the reduction it made on account of the rejected settlement, though it did not appear to entirely exclude payment for the post-offer fees.27 Hence, we cannot remedy this error by directing the court to add a specific amount or percentage 27 The court reported that plaintiff's counsel invoiced $48,254 in attorney's fees after February 1, 2011. -40- to Joyce's fee award. Instead, the court should calculate a new award on remand that eliminates as a factor Joyce's refusal to settle, and also rectifies its undervaluation of Joyce's success and its over-emphasis on the amount of the damages award. Moreover, the court should clearly and fully explain the basis for its recalculation. See id. at 337 ([T]he order awarding fees, read against the backdrop of the record as a whole, must expose the district court's thought process and show the method and manner underlying its decisional calculus.). That recalibration will not necessarily produce a fees award at or near the amount of Joyce's request. The district court referred to a number of factors that it could properly consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the time expended. These include a relatively simple and straightforward fact pattern and . . . an uncomplicated legal theory, Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 291, and the attendance of two experienced litigators throughout the damages trial (representing sixty hours of billable time). We emphasize that we are not endorsing these factors as justifications for the court's substantial reduction of the fee request, but note them only as considerations the court properly could take into account. On the other hand, the court could not properly ignore the Town's vigorous defense of the case. Although the court recognized that the defendants bore some responsibility for the nature and length of the litigation, its incorrect focus on -41- the rejected settlement plainly colored its attitude toward the defendants' strategy. Not only did the defendants oppose summary judgment on multiple (unsuccessful) grounds and propose settlement at the last minute -- factors noted by the district court -- they also repeatedly argued against any award of attorney's fees for Joyce (including in a cross-appeal). In deciding whether, and how much, to adjust the baseline lodestar calculation, the court should not overlook Joyce's need to respond to such defense positions. As we have observed, the trial court is in the best position to gauge the bona fides of a request for fees. Spooner v. EEN, Inc., 644 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2011). So long as the court relies on proper factors, and offer[s] reasonably explicit findings . . . to spell out the whys and wherefores, Coutin, 124 F.3d at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted), we will not secondguess its judgment on the time reasonably spent preparing and litigating [the] case, Fontaine, 613 N.E.2d at 891. Here, because the court's calculation incorporated multiple mistakes of law, we have no choice but to remand for reconsideration of a reasonable fee.