Opinion ID: 1789697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for New Trial.

Text: Dixie's trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal at trial on the grounds the State failed to prove malice and Dixie was not justified in shooting Scott. The district court overruled Dixie's motion. After the jury returned its verdict of murder in the second degree, Dixie raised this issue in her motion for new trial claiming the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The court also overruled the motion for new trial. In order to convict Dixie of second-degree murder, the district court instructed the jury the State had to prove: (1) on or about August 2002, Dixie shot Scott; (2) Scott died as a result of being shot; (3) Dixie acted with malice aforethought; and (4) Dixie acted without justification. See Iowa Code § 707.3 (providing [a] person commits murder in the second degree when the person commits murder which is not murder in the first degree). The district court defined malice as: a state of mind which leads one to intentionally do a wrongful act to the injury of another out of actual hatred, or with an evil or unlawful purpose. It may be established by evidence of actual hatred, or by proof of a deliberate or fixed intent to do injury. It may be found from the acts and conduct of the defendant, and the means used in doing the wrongful and injurious act. Malice requires only such deliberation that would make a person appreciate and understand the nature of the act and its consequences, as distinguished from an act done in the heat of passion. See State v. Love, 302 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Iowa 1981) (discussing the definition of malice), overruled on other grounds by State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2001). The district court defined malice aforethought as a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another which exists before the act is committed. It does not have to exist for any particular length of time. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993) (discussing the definition of malice aforethought). Because Dixie raised justification as a defense, the State was required to prove she acted without justification. State v. Lawler, 571 N.W.2d 486, 489 (Iowa 1997). As to the defense of justification, the district court instructed the jury: A person is justified in using reasonable force if she reasonably believes the force is necessary to defend herself from any imminent use of unlawful force. If the State has proved any one of the following elements, the defendant was not justified: 1. The defendant started or continued the incident which resulted in injury. 2. An alternative course of action was available to the defendant. 3. The defendant did not believe she was in imminent danger of death or injury and the use of force was not necessary to save her. 4. The defendant did not have reasonable grounds for the belief. 5. The force used by the defendant was unreasonable. See State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993) (setting forth the elements the State must prove to show a defendant's act was not justified). Dixie does not claim the law in the instructions was incorrect, but rather the evidence did not support the jury's finding as to malice and justification. Therefore, we will examine Dixie's claims in light of the instructions the district court gave the jury. In evaluating Dixie's claim that the district court should have granted her motion for judgment of acquittal, we apply a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999). Substantial evidence is required to support the verdict. State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 338-40 (Iowa 1980). If the evidence could convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it is substantial. Greene, 592 N.W.2d at 29. As to Dixie's claim in her motion for new trial that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, the trial court should grant the motion only if the jury's verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 657-59 (Iowa 1998). We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Iowa 1997). A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence where `a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.' Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 658 (citation omitted). Although Dixie testified she only picked up the shotgun after she saw Scott move towards her or the gun, there is other substantial and credible evidence to support her conviction. At trial, an officer described the position of Scott's body as found by the officers to be typical of someone . . . lying in bed, resting or sleeping. Dixie admitted the position in which the authorities found Scott is how he would sleep. The cause of Scott's death was determined to be a shotgun wound to the back of the head. See State v. Hahn, 259 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 1977) (stating a jury may infer malice aforethought from the use of a deadly weapon). Additionally, Dixie's own statements supported the jury's finding in this case. In addition to the statements she made to Kathy Meyers, she told a fellow inmate while awaiting trial that she shot her husband in the back of the head while he was in the bed. During her cross-examination, Dixie told the jury she pulled the trigger hoping and meaning the gun would go off. When asked if she meant for the gun to go off so it would hit Scott in the head and kill him, she acknowledged that she not only meant to shoot him in the head, but she also meant to kill him. This evidence supports the State's contention that Dixie entered the room, saw Scott sleeping, took the shotgun, and shot him in his sleep. Under the sufficiency-of-the-evidence test, this evidence could convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixie acted with malice and without justification when she shot Scott. The jury members were free to give Dixie's testimony such weight as they thought it should receive. State v. Schrier, 300 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Iowa 1981). They were free to accept or reject any of Dixie's testimony. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d at 673. The function of the jury is to weigh the evidence and place credibility where it belongs. State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1984). Therefore, the district court was correct in overruling Dixie's motion for judgment of acquittal. Additionally, the district court has considerable discretion when determining a motion for new trial under the weight-of-the-evidence test. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 659. Except in the extraordinary case where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict, trial courts should not lessen the jury's role as the primary trier of facts and invoke their power to grant a new trial. Id. A trial court should not disturb the jury's findings where the evidence they considered is nearly balanced or is such that different minds could fairly arrive at different conclusions. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 203. For the same reasons we found there was sufficient evidence to overrule the motion for judgment of acquittal, we cannot say the evidence preponderates heavily against the jury's finding that Dixie acted with malice and without justification when she fired the shotgun. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Dixie's motion for new trial.