Opinion ID: 2610902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counsel's Absence from Reading of Testimony

Text: (18) In a related argument, defendant complains that he was denied the assistance of counsel when his trial counsel stipulated that the assault charge testimony could be read to the jury by the court clerk without counsel's presence. Defendant cites no case suggesting that counsel must always attend a routine reading of earlier testimony to the jury, and our cases permit counsel discretion to waive his right to be present on such occasions. (See People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1028; People v. Bloyd, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 360-361.) No suggestion is made that actual prejudice occurred by reason of counsel's absence, such as a misreading of testimony or misconduct by the clerk, and such prejudice cannot be presumed on a silent record. In this regard, the situation is different from that presented in People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 848-850 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93], on which defendant relies. In Hogan, counsel was never informed of jury requests to see various exhibits and transcripts sent to the jurors during deliberations. Here, on the other hand, counsel was aware of the jury's request and was able to make an informed decision as to the necessity of attending the proceeding. We conclude no error occurred.

During the penalty phase, the prosecutor called relatives of the three robbery-murder victims to confirm that the victims were friendly, nonaggressive persons who would not have resisted a robbery attempt. For example, victim Martin's father and victim Metal's sister each testified that the respective victim had previously agreed not to resist any such attempt. The various family witnesses also identified recent family type photographs of the victims to show their appearance when defendant confronted them. Thereafter, in argument, the prosecutor used the photographs to argue that each victim was a passive type unlikely to resist a robbery. The prosecutor cautioned the jury not to use the photos to feel sympathy for the victims or their families. (19) The foregoing evidence was introduced to assist in establishing, as an additional aggravating circumstance of the crime (see ง 190.3, factor (a)), that the nonresisting victims may have been executed without cause or provocation. The trial court ruled that evidence of the victims' likely nonresistance was relevant to show the state of mind of these ... victims as to what their attitude would be if they were to be robbed. As for the photos, the court explained that they had probative value to show what these people look like and what [defendant] saw at the time of the killings. Defendant argues that, despite the prosecutor's disclaimer, the nonresistance evidence was only marginally relevant to the penalty phase and constituted, in effect, victim impact or character evidence of the sort ruled inadmissible by the United States Supreme Court. (See South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805 [104 L.Ed.2d 876, 109 S.Ct. 2207]; Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529].) Gathers makes it clear that prosecutors may not exploit evidence regarding the victim's good character or background for purposes of gaining the jury's sympathy for the victim or his or her family. Booth precludes admission of evidence regarding the impact of the victim's death on his or her family. Both cases deemed the evidence at issue irrelevant to the sentencing decision and potentially prejudicial to the defendant's plea for a lesser punishment. We recently encountered a similar contention in People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 336 [261 Cal. Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121], where the victim's mother testified regarding her children's nonaggressive personalities. We first observed in Carrera that  Booth does not purport to bar generally the use of information about a murder victim at the penalty phase. The Supreme Court's concern lay mainly in the mandatory requirement that the entire victim-impact statement be admitted and in the risk that the jury's attention would be drawn to the personal qualities of the victim rather than to the blameworthiness of the defendant.... [T]he court took pains to note that `[s]imilar types of information may well be admissible because they relate directly to the circumstances of the crime' and that `there may be times that the victim's personal characteristics are relevant to rebut an argument offered by the defendant.' [Citation.] Booth thus does not alter the standard for the admission of such evidence. (See also South Carolina v. Gathers [ supra ] 490 U.S. 805 [104 L.Ed.2d 876, 109 S.Ct. 2207].) The question thus remains whether the testimony was relevant, and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. (49 Cal.3d at p. 336.) We concluded in Carrera that similar evidence of the victims' nonaggressive character was relevant to support the inference that the victims in all likelihood did not resist the robbery and the violent, fatal attack. This in turn bore directly upon the manner in which defendant committed the murders, and was plainly a `circumstance of the crime' to which fair comment could be directed. (49 Cal.3d at pp. 336-337.) Under the principles set forth in Carrera, the trial court here did not err in admitting evidence of the victims' nonaggressive character traits. (See also People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d 468, 536 [In our view, neither Booth nor Gathers bars comments on the crime from the victims' perspective, or brief references to the victims or their families. [Citations.]].) Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d 291, did not suggest, however, that family photographs would be relevant to establish the nonresisting character of the victims. Moreover, defendant points out that some family members additionally testified to such irrelevant matters as the victims' capacity for work, desire to save money or return to school, or vegetarian eating habits. Our review of the record indicates, however, that except for a few isolated references of this kind (to which no objection was made), the family members' testimony was essentially confined to the victims' probable nonresistance to being robbed. Even if we were to conclude that the introduction of the photographs and family member testimony violated the proscriptions of Gathers and Booth, we would find beyond a reasonable doubt that any such error did not contribute to the sentencing determination. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) In our view, the foregoing evidence could not have diverted the jury from its task of determining the appropriate punishment. (See People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 537.)
(20) The prosecutor introduced evidence of four prior unadjudicated crimes as aggravating circumstances relevant to sentencing. (ง 190.3, factor (b).) These crimes included another robbery-murder (victim Martin), two assaults and a rape. Defendant contends that introduction of such evidence denied him due process and equal protection, and resulted in an unreliable sentence. He acknowledges that we rejected similar arguments in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480] [maj. opn. by Grodin, J.], but he urges us to reconsider that ruling because of the gross superficiality of our analysis in that case. We have had many opportunities to reconsider Balderas ( supra, 41 Cal.3d 144), but have consistently, and without a dissenting vote, declined to do so. (See, e.g., People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, 42; People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1, 48; People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 569 [250 Cal. Rptr. 530, 758 P.2d 1060]; People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 144 [249 Cal. Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348]; People v. Grant, supra, 45 Cal.3d 829, 859; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 808 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 76 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1202 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) Defendant, characterizing these cases as the dubious progeny of Balderas, and lacking in any reasoned analysis, insists that new arguments exist to support reconsideration of that case. We disagree. Defendant argues (1) the jury which found him guilty of the charged offenses could not be fair and unbiased in adjudging his guilt of other unadjudicated crimes at the penalty phase; (2) other crimes evidence is inherently prejudicial, diverting the penalty phase jury's attention from its proper task; (3) the jury cannot realistically be expected to ignore other crimes evidence not found true beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) some other state courts favor a rule contrary to Balderas; and (5) equal protection principles require treating all defendants equally, yet those who are separately prosecuted for the alleged aggravating circumstances are given rights (e.g., an impartial and unanimous jury) not available when other crimes evidence is merely presented to the penalty phase jury. Contrary to defendant's assumption, we think Balderas and its progeny adequately considered and rejected the foregoing arguments. As Balderas observes, each of these contentions is overshadowed by the state's legitimate interest in prosecuting capital cases before a single jury, and in allowing that jury to weigh and consider the defendant's prior criminal conduct in determining penalty, so long as reasonable steps are taken to assure the defendant a fair and impartial penalty trial. (See People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 204-205.) We decline to reconsider that rationale here. (21) Defendant observes that criminal charges regarding his prior rape offense had been twice dismissed, thereby barring further prosecution (ง 1387). Defendant contends this bar likewise extended to use of the evidence as an aggravating circumstance. In People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, 193, we explained that dismissal of charges is not the equivalent of an outright acquittal, because it is not based on any judicial determination with respect to the truth or falsity of the charge.... Similarly, we have held that evidence of offenses barred by the statute of limitations is nonetheless admissible as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase. ( People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 43-44; People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 981-982 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475].) The rationale of those cases applies here.
(22) In accordance with section 190.3, factor (d), the jury was instructed to consider [w]hether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (CALJIC former No. 8.84.1.) Defendant asserts that the foregoing instruction, by referring to an extreme condition, indicated that any lesser disturbance would not be a possible mitigating factor. He fears this instruction may have induced the jury to ignore the substantial evidence indicating he was suffering from some type of mental illness. We cannot agree. First, it should be noted that the trial court also instructed the jury that it was to consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime.... (ง 190.3, factor (k); CALJIC former No. 8.84.1.) In People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, we concluded that this `catchall' provision is sufficient to permit the penalty jury to take into account a mental condition of the defendant which, though perhaps not deemed `extreme,' nonetheless mitigates the seriousness of the offense. ( Id., at p. 776.) In subsequent cases, we have reaffirmed our Ghent holding. (E.g., People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 987-988 [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608]; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 270 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906]; People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1064 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680]; People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 457-458; People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 720-721 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 297 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) The trial court went even further, however, and modified the factor (k) instruction to include consideration of any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. (See People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 876-878, & fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) Moreover, the court instructed the jury that it should disregard any other conflicting instruction. Although in closing argument the prosecutor asserted that defendant's mental state evidence did not disclose any extreme condition, he did not advise the jury that such evidence was wholly irrelevant to its penalty decision, and defense counsel confirmed that the evidence could be deemed a mitigating circumstance under factor (k). We conclude that the jury was properly instructed in this regard.
The court gave the standard instructions setting forth the list of aggravating and mitigating factors. (CALJIC former No. 8.84.1.) Defendant asserts the instructions were inadequate in failing to explain that certain factors, including defendant's mental condition and age, must be deemed mitigating ones. He maintains the prosecutor improperly labelled defendant's sociopathic condition and age (41) as aggravating factors. (23) We have held the standard instructions adequate despite their failure to identify the aggravating or mitigating character of the various sentencing factors, because such matters should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context of each particular case. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 316 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]; see People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 118 [249 Cal. Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569].) As for the prosecutor's remarks, no error or misconduct appears: At no time did the prosecutor argue that defendant's mental condition should be deemed an aggravating factor. Our review of the record indicates that, in context, the prosecutor was simply observing that defendant's sociopathic condition, and the resulting antisocial conduct, should not be deemed a mitigating factor. (See People v. Fields, supra, 35 Cal.3d 329, 369-370.) (24) Although he did argue that defendant's age should be deemed aggravating, that argument was interwoven with the theme that, unlike an extremely young or old person, defendant was a mature, experienced individual who made a well-considered decision to undertake the various crimes he committed. Such an argument is a legitimate one. (See People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 302.) As Lucky observes, the statutory word age is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. (45 Cal.3d at p. 302.) We decline defendant's invitation to reconsider Lucky. (See People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d 468, 538-539; People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1062; People v. McLain, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 111.)
(25) Defendant next argues the 1978 death penalty law is unconstitutional for failure to require the jury to set forth written findings regarding the various aggravating factors it relied on in imposing death. We rejected this constitutional objection several years ago, and we discern no compelling reason for reconsidering our position now. ( People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 178-180 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]; see People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 805; People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1203; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 316-317.) The federal courts have likewise declined to require such findings as a matter of constitutional law. ( Harris v. Pulley (9th Cir.1982) 692 F.2d 1189, 1195-1196, reversed and remanded on other grounds in Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871]; see Hildwin v. Florida (1989) 490 U.S. 638, 640-641 [104 L.Ed.2d 728, 731-732, 109 S.Ct. 2055] [6th Amend. does not require Florida's advisory jury to specify aggravating factors].) Defendant, observing that other convicted felons are entitled to trial court findings specifying the aggravating facts which justify an increased sentence (see ง 1170, subd. (c)), argues that the lack of jury findings in capital cases offends equal protection principles. But the defendants in these two situations are not similarly situated. Requiring the trial judge to specify his or her reasons for making an increased sentencing decision is hardly comparable to requiring 12 jurors to recite the aggravating facts which each of them believed justified a death penalty. The California death penalty law does impose on the trial court in a capital case, in ruling on the automatic motion to modify sentence (see ง 190.4, subd. (e)), the obligation to specify its reasons. This section fully satisfies any legitimate equal protection demands.
(26) Defendant next contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must unanimously find any uncharged offenses occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, before those offenses could be deemed aggravating circumstances under section 190.3, factor (b). We rejected that argument in People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pages 773-774. (See also People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1250; People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 988; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 90 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) Defendant urges we reconsider Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739. He relies on Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578 [100 L.Ed.2d 575, 108 S.Ct. 1981], but that case seems wholly inapposite. In Johnson, the penalty jury had considered a prior criminal offense which was later set aside. The court reversed the death judgment on the basis the jury may have relied on the invalid conviction. Nothing in Johnson indicated a requirement the jury unanimously agree that a particular offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As we stated in Ghent, we see nothing improper in permitting each juror individually to decide whether uncharged criminal activity has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty. (43 Cal.3d at p. 774.)
Defendant asserts various constitutional challenges to the California sentencing law and procedure; he acknowledges that our prior decisions have rejected all these challenges. (See People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 992; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698-704 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 102-107; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 777-779; People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 315-317; People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 172-188.) Defendant states no compelling reasons which might induce us to reconsider these decisions. (See also Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190].)
After the jury rendered its verdict, and after the trial court denied defendant's automatic motion to modify the death verdict (ง 190.4, subd. (e)), but before formal sentencing, various relatives of the victims testified regarding personal characteristics of the victims, and expressed their wish that the death sentence be imposed. For example, victim Ariza's mother testified that her son had been a promising and decent young man, and a college student working to help pay his way through college. She testified that his death caused her family untold grief, pain and suffering, and she urged that the death penalty be imposed. Ariza's father likewise attested to his suffering over his son's death, which led to his alcoholism, drunk-driving conviction, loss of family and job. Similar, though less dramatic, testimony was elicited from the relatives of victims Rea, Metal, and Martin. Before sentencing defendant, the trial court indicated it had certainly considered the foregoing testimony. As we have previously noted herein in connection with a similar argument involving the jury's consideration of evidence regarding the victims' nonaggressive characters, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court deem most victim impact and victim character evidence irrelevant to the sentencing decision and potentially prejudicial to the defendant's plea for a lesser punishment. (See South Carolina v. Gathers, supra, 490 U.S. 805 [104 L.Ed.2d 876] [prosecutor's argument regarding victim's good character]; Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496 [victim impact statements].) Neither case involves the admissibility of victim impact or character evidence at a sentencing hearing by the trial court following the jury's verdict. (See People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 585-586, fn. 12 [247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306].) Thus, we have stated that the Eighth Amendment considerations expressed in Booth/Gathers are not implicated in a modification hearing under section 190.4. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 994-995; see People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1043-1044.) Nonetheless, as we explained in Jennings, that section does limit the court's consideration to the evidence that was available to the jury. (46 Cal.3d at p. 994.) (27) As previously noted, the trial court announced its denial of the modification motion before hearing the family member testimony discussed above. After announcing its ruling, but before formally sentencing defendant, the court then permitted the family members to speak. Although the court indicated it had considered the family member testimony, it then outlined the considerable aggravating factors and evidence that it deemed supportive of a death sentence. The family victim testimony was not mentioned. A similar situation occurred in Siripongs, supra, where we observed that the victim impact evidence could not have affected the trial court's ruling because the court had denied the motion before hearing the challenged testimony. (See People v. Siripongs, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 585-586, fn. 12; see also People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1044 [trial court's consideration of victim impact evidence did not affect ruling denying modification]; People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 274 [same]; People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 995 [same].) As we observed in Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, although the trial court did state it had read and considered a presentence report containing the victim impact evidence, the court in ruling on the motion referred only to the evidence presented to the jury and did not indicate his decision was influenced by that report or its contents. The situation presented here and in Lang is quite different from that in People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892], where the trial court in denying the automatic motion for modification of sentence expressly stated it was relying on facts found in an inadmissible probation report. In Lewis, the opinion orders a limited remand for another modification hearing. We conclude that under the circumstances in the present case, no such remand is required.
Defendant asserts that we should undertake a comparative intercase sentence review to assure that his death sentence is not disproportionate in light of the underlying facts. We have uniformly declined to undertake such review and see no reason to reconsider our holdings. (See, e.g., People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1045; People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 873 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270]; People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1253.)
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety.