Opinion ID: 2538686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: prp of carlstad

Text: Carlstad's PRP is a motion for collateral attack on a judgment in a criminal case, which must be filed within one year of the judgment becoming final. RCW 10.73.090(1). RCW 10.73.090 does not define the term filed and does not specify when or how a filing occurs. To fill this gap the majority looks to RAP 18.6(c), which, according to the majority, provides a PRP is `timely filed only if it is received by the appellate court within the time permitted for filing.' Majority at 590. As such the majority concludes that RAP 18.6(c) prohibits adopting the mailbox rule for PRPs. Majority at 590. However, in light of the procedural hurdles faced by pro se prisoners who lack control over the filing of their pleadings, RAP 18.6(c) need not be so rigidly interpreted. RAP 1.2(a), which governs this court's interpretation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: These rules will be liberally interpreted to promote justice and facilitate the decision of cases on the merits. Cases and issues will not be determined on the basis of compliance or noncompliance with these rules except in compelling circumstances where justice demands, subject to the restrictions in rule 18.8(b). Similarly RAP 1.2(c) provides that [t]he appellate court may waive or alter the provisions of any of these rules in order to serve the ends of justice, subject to the restrictions in rule 18.8(b) and (c). Finally, RAP 18.8(a) states [tjhe appellate court may ... waive or alter the provisions of any of these rules and enlarge or shorten the time within which an act must be done in a particular case in order to serve the ends of justice, subject to the restrictions in sections (b) and (c). These rules remain unrestricted here as neither RAP 18.8(b) nor RAP 18.8(c) applies in this case. Together RAP 1.2(a), RAP 1.2(c), and RAP 18.8(a) make clear that an appellate court should liberally interpret the Rules of Appellate Procedure and alter any provision included therein when necessary to promote justice and to consider cases and issues on their merits. See State v. Olson, 126 Wash.2d 315, 323, 893 P.2d 629 (1995) (noting the discretion provided to an appellate court in RAP 1.2(a) should normally be exercised unless there are compelling reasons not to do so); Weeks v. Chief of Wash. State Patrol, 96 Wash.2d 893, 896, 639 P.2d 732 (1982) (citing RAP 1.2(a) and observing that [applying strict form would defeat the purpose of the rules to `promote justice and facilitate the decision of cases on the merits'). Strictly construing RAP 18.6(c) to dispose of Carlstad's PRP solely because, due to circumstances beyond his control, his PRP did not arrive at the Court of Appeals until one day after the one-year deadline, usurps this view.