Opinion ID: 786156
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reason to Find Prejudice

Text: 36 We agree with the BIA that to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a deportation hearing, an alien must show that he or she has been prejudiced by his or her attorney's ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir.2002); Lata, 204 F.3d at 1246. A showing of prejudice is essentially a demonstration that the alleged violation affected the outcome of the proceedings.... Lata, 204 F.3d at 1246. Because the only reason the BIA had summarily dismissed Singh's appeal in March 2002 was his failure to file a brief, Singh's former attorney's failure to file this brief, ipso facto, caused Singh prejudice. That is, but for the attorney's failure, the BIA would not have summarily dismissed Singh's appeal. 37 In Dearinger v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.2000), we held that an alien was prejudiced by counsel's filing of her petition for review of a BIA order one day late in this court, resulting in the petition's dismissal. Explaining the prejudice counsel had caused the alien in Dearinger, we stated: [W]here an alien is prevented from filing an appeal in an immigration proceeding due to counsel's error, the error deprives the alien of the appellate proceeding entirely. And... this error mandates a presumption of prejudice because the adversary process itself has been rendered presumptively unreliable. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Rodriguez-Lariz, 282 F.3d at 1226 (stating that prejudice results when the outcome of the proceedings is unquestionably affected). Elsewhere, we have clearly stated that [u]nder Dearinger, [an alien-petitioner's] counsel's failure to file a brief with the BIA, which resulted in summary dismissal, creates a presumption that [the petitioner] was prejudiced because his counsel's mistake deprived him of a direct appeal to the BIA. Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir.2003). Because the BIA summarily dismissed Singh's appeal for failure to file a brief, counsel's failure to file a timely brief deprived Singh of any meaningful review of the IJ's decision. A presumption of prejudice is thus warranted here. 38 The presumption of prejudice resulting from counsel's failure to file a brief may be rebutted. Id. The presumption, however, is not rebutted if an alien is able to show plausible grounds for relief. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Stated affirmatively, [t]o show prejudice, [Singh] must show that the BIA could plausibly have determined that he was[eligible for relief] based on the record before it. Id. at 827. In the record before it, the BIA had ample evidence that could plausibly have supported a finding that Singh was eligible for asylum. Singh testified credibly before the IJ that while he was in India he had been arrested and beaten numerous times because of his suspected connections to Sikh separatists affiliated with the All India Sikh Students Federation. In his motion to reopen, Singh reiterated the content of his underlying claim for asylum when he explained that he had suffered past persecution as he was detained and tortured by the Indian security forces for his alleged association with the Sikh separatist movement. That an alien has been subject to detention and beatings because of an imputed political opinion makes out a plausible claim for eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. See, e.g., Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir.2000) (arrest and torture may amount to persecution); Prasad v. INS, 101 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir.1996) (repeated beatings when jailed may amount to persecution); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir.1992) (imputed political opinion is valid basis for eligibility for asylum). 39 In finding a plausible ground for relief in Singh's case, we, of course, express no opinion as to whether the BIA should ultimately reverse the IJ's denial of Singh's application. We merely hold that Singh has presented a claim that could plausibly succeed on the merits. The presumption of prejudice arising from Singh's former attorney's failure to file an appellate brief has not therefore been rebutted. In holding that Singh had not shown prejudice arising from his counsel's failure to file an appellate brief, the BIA thus abused its discretion.