Opinion ID: 815314
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of T.B.’s Testimony

Text: Although Mr. Tavares does not appeal the admission of evidence concerning the other twenty-five overt acts, he does challenge the admission of T.B.’s testimony about Overt Act J. He challenges T.B.’s testimony only as irrelevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. We shall address these arguments in turn.10 7 R.1 at 3. 8 Jungle is an unindicted co-conspirator. 9 R.297 at 81. 10 At trial, Mr. Tavares grounded his objection to T.B.’s testimony in Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403 and 404(b). Before us, he has abandoned his Rule 404(b) objection. -12- We review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 15 (1st Cir. 2009). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, “evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence[] and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Mr. Tavares objected at trial, and presses here on appeal, that T.B.’s testimony was not relevant and is therefore inadmissible because it primarily inculpated Jungle.11 The Government submitted at trial, and the district court agreed, that T.B.’s testimony was relevant because it explained the relationship between Mr. Tavares and T.B., a fact germane to whether Mr. Tavares transported T.B. for prostitution. Further, Mr. Tavares’s offering to take T.B. off Jungle’s hands suggests that she worked for him as a prostitute, also germane to whether Mr. Tavares trafficked her for sex (Count Ten). We certainly cannot discern any abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling. The events to which T.B. testified certainly have “a tendency to make a fact [that Mr. Tavares transported T.B. and trafficked her for sex] more probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Furthermore, whether Mr. Tavares transported her and prostituted her “is of consequence in determining the action.” Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that although 11 See, e.g., R.297 at 4-5. -13- relevant, evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” We do not disturb the district court’s balancing of probative value and risk of unfair prejudice absent “extraordinarily compelling circumstances.” Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988). We see no such extraordinary circumstances here. In Mr. Tavares’s view, even if T.B.’s testimony is relevant, it still should have been excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. According to Mr. Tavares, prostitution and sex trafficking of children are not violent crimes. Thus, he concludes, any mention of violence inherently poses a risk of prejudice substantially outweighing probative value and inviting jurors to decide the case purely on emotion. We accept neither Mr. Tavares’s premise nor his conclusion. Violence, abuse and other forms of human degradation are part and parcel of sex trafficking. It is not at all surprising that evidence of such acts is offered to establish a conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking. Moreover, evidence of these violent acts was particularly probative of the defendants’ relationship with the women because it directly demonstrated the control that the defendants exercised over the women in their prostitution operation. Specifically, with respect to Mr. Tavares, the evidence showed that the violent episode also entailed negotiations with Jungle to get T.B. back to work for him. The -14- testimony was also relevant to and probative of Mr. Tavares’s knowledge and intent with respect to Count Ten, charging him with recruiting and transporting T.B. to engage in a commercial sex act. Here, the district court considered Mr. Tavares’s arguments several times and concluded that the probative value of T.B.’s testimony was not substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice. That decision was certainly among the options from which a reasonable judge could be expected to choose. The record contains no basis that would justify our overturning the district court’s decision.