Opinion ID: 618222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Felipe and Juan

Text: The filmmakers contend that Felipe and Juan are limited-purpose public figures. The Vicinis vehemently dispute that label. Although they no longer contest the existence of a public controversy, the Vicinis argue that neither of them attempted to influence its resolution. Their argument has three constituent parts and spans both time and space. First, they say they did nothing before 2003 that, standing alone, could subject them to public-figure status. Second, any conduct after 2003 that might do so, we are told, is shielded by the anti-bootstrapping principle. The third is that, whatever their conduct in the Dominican Republic, it cannot make them public figures in the United States. The status question is a legal one that we review de novo. Pendleton, 156 F.3d at 68; see Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966). We do so mindful that the inquiry is inescapably fact-specific, Mandel v. Bos. Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198, 204 (1st Cir.2006), and does not always lend itself to summary judgment, compare id. at 204-07 (vacating status determination because the factual record, at the summary judgment stage, was too uncertain to warrant a legal conclusion either way about Mandel's status), with Pendleton, 156 F.3d at 68 (affirming status determination because [t]here is no conflict as to any material fact; the issue is whether the discerned facts suffice to establish that Pendleton acted in a way sufficient to make him a public figure for the purpose of this defamation action). But here, as in Pendleton, the Vicinis do not argue that the district court based its status determination on disputed facts, only that the undisputed facts were insufficient to make them public figures for the reasons outlined above. [5] We disagree and conclude, as did the district court, that both Felipe and Juan are limited-purpose public figures. Because we ultimately reject their anti-bootstrapping argument, [6] we find it appropriate to begin by examining all relevant conduct up to the film's release in March 2007. Within that span, both Felipe and Juan came to occupy leadership positions within the family businesses. Felipe began working for the company in the mid-to-late 1990s as a member of the board. He gradually became part of a small group of family members that directed the agricultural enterprise; among other things, he oversaw sugar exports and sought to ensure favorable trade policies with the United States (the largest importer of Dominican sugar) and other countries. Later he was installed as president of Grupo Vicini, the entity that manages the family's investments and coordinates initiatives on the bateyes. Juan joined the company in 2000 directly out of school in the United States. He, too, began working on the agricultural side of the business and ultimately assumed the number-two position in Grupo Vicini, under Felipe. [7] Juan's role was perhaps less conspicuous, but it focused on the bateyes from the beginning. His homecoming in 2000 coincided with Fr. Hartley's controversial benedictiondelivered during a visit to Fr. Hartley's parish by the Dominican presidentthat was critical of the batey system and of those, including the Vicini family, responsible for it. The strongly worded benediction caught the attention of the media, prompting the Vicinis to call a meeting with Fr. Hartley. As a result of that meeting, which both Juan and Felipe attended, Juan took on the role of humanitarian attaché to Fr. Hartley and his cause of improving conditions on the bateyes. Over the next couple of years Juan and Fr. Hartley met about a dozen more times, toured the bateyes together, and regularly spoke by telephone. Juan also hired a social worker and tasked her with identifying the most pressing items in need of resolution. [8] For reasons that are not altogether clear, the Vicini-Hartley collaboration fizzled in 2003 or 2004. But rather than abandon the project, the Vicinis embraced it as their own. For instance, Juan reached out to nongovernmental organizations in order to combat HIV/AIDS in the bateyes. A newsletter reporting on the initiative described the efforts of Casa Vicini to develop cooperative plans to combat HIV/AIDS, with the support of the World Bank, and included a picture of Juan signing a participation agreement. Juan himself described initiatives like these in a letter to church officials as attempts to find a solution to the batey problem. And around the same time, both Juan and Felipe began courting the U.S. embassy in Santo Domingo. Juan personally escorted embassy officials on visits to the bateyes; one visit was attended by the Deputy Chief of Mission, the embassy's second-in-command. For his part, Felipe spoke with embassy officials by telephone, including the U.S. ambassador. This outreach touched off a relationship between the Vicinis and U.S. diplomats that Felipe described as ongoing. Their efforts entered a new phase in 2005. After a U.S. newspaper published an exposé critical of the batey system, the Vicinis brought in Newlink Communications, a public-relations (PR) firm based in the United States. Newlink's proposal, signed by Felipe in April 2005, provided for a massive PR campaign in the Dominican Republic that would reach as far as the United States. Among other things, the proposal identified the need for a strategic communications program to deal with the negative perceptions against the company, reaching the United States media, [b]lock messages critical of the Vicinis, and [i]mprove the image and reputation of the company in the eyes of the public. It spelled out country-specific strategies, focusing on the Dominican Republic and the United States, designed to implement those general goals. And it included media training for both Felipe and Juan, in Spanish and English, such as mock interviews about the bateyes and model answers emphasizing Vicini initiatives. All told, the Newlink deal cost the Vicinis about $1.2 million. As it was implemented, the Vicini-Newlink PR campaign targeted several sectors within the Dominican political apparatus. A Vicini deputy arranged a series of meetings with senior Dominican officials, particularly those responsible for immigration and labor policies. Those meetings culminated in a Felipe-led tour of the bateyes that showcased Vicini initiatives to the heads of the Dominican interior and labor departments. In the ecclesiastical sector, Felipe and Juan met with the Papal Nunciothe Vatican's equivalent of an ambassadorto get our story out about their batey initiatives. Felipe also attended a conference of bishops to give a presentation on Grupo Vicini's social programs. And the press was also targeted: in a single month Felipe was pictured and quoted in three Dominican newspapers concerning the company's restructuring efforts in human resource components. He was quoted again the next month, this time about improvements in the bateyes and conditions for workers generally. Then he appeared in a documentary about the bateyes (not the film at issue here) that was broadcast on Dominican television. In it, he described efforts to build rural medical clinics, root out child labor, and bring modern mechanization to sugarcane cutting. This was followed by several Yes to Change events, hosted by the Vicinis to advertise their altruism, that resulted in another string of articles picturing and quoting Felipe. The PR campaign also targeted international media outlets and policymakers, particularly in the United States. Felipe traveled to the United States to meet with the author of the newspaper exposé referenced above. The purpose of the meeting, which took place in Newlink's Miami offices, was for the reporter to hear the other side of the story. On another occasion, Felipe sent a deputy to a PBS interview with the stated goal of attempting to `flip' the story in the family's favor. According to Newlink records, the deputy was prepared ahead of time for that interview with a Q & A that Newlink drew up to ensure that his answers were in keeping with the goal of maintaining the [company's] image intact. And in late 2006, Felipe, accompanied by several Newlink team members, led a U.S. congressional delegation on a tour of Vicini bateyes. During the tour a fact sheet was distributed that described Vicini initiatives in detail. CNN covered the delegation and interviewed Felipe; clips of that interview aired on Anderson Cooper 360° and were rebroadcast multiple times over the next two months on CNN and its affiliates. Felipe testified that his goal during these events was to try to get our story out, to get our side out. Shortly before the release of The Price of Sugar (the end of our continuum), Felipe and Juan hosted an industry luncheon in the Dominican Republic. One purpose of the luncheon was to reveal more Vicini initiatives on the bateyes. During the luncheon, journalists from several Dominican newspapers were permitted to attend and ask questions. The resulting articles highlighted the batey initiatives discussed during the event and, as before, pictured and quoted Felipe and Juan. All together, this conduct shows beyond hope of legitimate contradiction that Felipe and Juan are limited purpose public figures. Both leveraged their positions and contacts to influence a favorable outcome in the batey controversy. Both enjoyed access to the press and exploited it by orchestrating a PR blitz to garner public support and mute their critics. [9] In doing so, both assumed roles of prominence for this limited purpose and the risk of closer public scrutiny that came with it.