Opinion ID: 853172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Aggravators

Text: Nicholson argues on appeal that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravators of intentionally killing the victim while committing a robbery, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G) (West 1998), and torturing the victim while she was alive, Id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(11). Neither party addresses the third aggravator found by the trial court, that Heitger was the victim of criminal confinement for which Nicholson was convicted. [9] Id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(13)(C). Sentencing decisions rest within the discretion of the trial court, and we review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Monegan v. State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 501 (Ind.2001) (citations omitted). The same standards apply in imposing a sentence of life without parole as for the death penalty, [10] including the degree of specificity required in explaining the factors and weighing process that led to the sentence. Holsinger v. State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Ind.2001). In Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d at 1262 (citations omitted), we established the following steps: The trial court's statement of reasons (i) must identify each mitigating and aggravating circumstance found, (ii) must include the specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance, (iii) must articulate that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence, and (iv) must set forth the trial court's personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime. We first address the trial court's third aggravator, that Heitger was a victim of criminal confinement. Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(a) requires the State to alleg[e], on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b). While Nicholson's conviction for criminal confinement could have supported a life without parole sentence under Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(13)(C), it was error for the trial court to list this as an aggravator because the State did not allege it. (R. at 102-03.) A. Evidence of Intentionality. The evidence reveals that Nicholson bound Heitger's arms and legs to bedposts, stuffed tissue paper inside her mouth, taped her mouth shut, and wrapped a ligature tightly around her neck. (R. at 568, 833, 836-39.) He did not obstruct the airflow through the victim's nose, nor did he sexually or physically assault the victim. (R. at 851-52.) Heitger died of asphyxia, caused by the material inside her mouth becoming lodged in her throat and the position of her body, which caused difficulty in breathing. (R. at 846.) The statutory aggravator relied on by the trial court required an intentional killing. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(B), (G) (West 1998). A person engages in conduct `intentionally' if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. Id. § 35-41-2-2(a). In this case, we cannot conclude that it was Nicholson's conscious objective to kill Heitger. Rather, Nicholson prevented her interference with the robbery by restraining her movement and preventing her from calling for help. [11] While we have no trouble upholding the murder conviction as Nicholson engaged in the conduct knowingly and with utter disregard for the victim's well-being, the evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Nicholson's intent to kill. B. Torture Aggravator. The second aggravator was an allegation that Nicholson tortured the victim while she was alive. See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(11)(C) (West 1998). This case is our first encounter with torture as an aggravating circumstance. The statute does not define torture. Webster's Dictionary defines it as the infliction of intense pain (as from burning, crushing, wounding) to punish or coerce someone; torment or agony induced to penalize religious or political dissent or nonconformity; to extort a confession or a money contribution, or to give sadistic pleasure to the torturer. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2414 (1993). The State argues that the torture aggravator is satisfied by proof of infliction of severe physical or mental pain. This alone surely cannot be sufficient. If such were the case, any stabbing or shooting victim would also be tortured. The other aggravators listed in Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(11), burned and mutilated, further suggest that the legislature intended something more than simply the infliction of severe physical or mental pain to satisfy the torture aggravator. We conclude that the torture aggravator requires something more: an appreciable period of pain or punishment intentionally inflicted and designed either to coerce the victim or for the torturer's sadistic indulgence. Put another way, torture is the gratuitous infliction of substantial pain or suffering in excess of that associated with the commission of the charged crime. Although the victim here undoubtedly experienced extreme suffering, the evidence does not show that the events fit the definition of torture.