Opinion ID: 2714904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard ofReview

Text: Sentencing conditions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). Restitution orders, when authorized by statute, are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In reMarriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 889 (2013). 7 State v. Deskins No. 88140-5 II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Setting the Probation Term That the Defendant Could Not Live With or Own Any Animals The district court has the statutory authority to impose conditions of probation under RCW 3.66.067 and .068. District courts may place the defendant on probation for a period of no longer than two years and prescribe the conditions thereof. Former RCW 3.66.067 (2001). [T]he court has continuing jurisdiction and authority to suspend or defer the execution of all or any part of its sentence upon stated terms, including installment payment of fines. Former RCW 3.66.068 (2001). [A] court may impose probationary conditions that bear a reasonable relation to the defendant's duty to make restitution or that tend to prevent the future commission of crimes. State v. Williams, 97 Wn. App. 257, 263, 983 P.2d 687 (1999) (citing State v. Summers, 60 Wn.2d 702, 707, 375 P.2d 143 (1962)). Courts have a great deal of discretion when setting probation conditions for misdemeanors and are not restricted by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, which applies only to felonies. See Harris v. Charles, 171 Wn.2d 455, 465, 256 P.3d 328 (2011) (In contrast [to misdemeanor sentencing], the SRA has limited felony sentencing courts' discretion.). Deskins argues that the trial court did not have statutory authority to prohibit her from owning or living with animals during the probationary period. She points to former RCW 16.52.200(3)-the sentencing section of the cruelty to animals statutewhich read: 8 State v. Deskins No. 88140-5 In addition to the penalties imposed by the court, the court shall order the forfeiture of all animals held by law enforcement or animal care and control authorities under the provisions of this chapter if any one of the animals involved dies as a result of a violation of this chapter or if the defendant has a prior conviction under this chapter. In other cases the court may enter an order requiring the owner to forfeit the animal if the court deems the animal's treatment to have been severe and likely to reoccur. If forfeiture is ordered, the owner shall be prohibited from owning or caring for any similar animals for a period of two years. Deskins argues that because the statute does not grant the authority to prohibit living with animals during the probationary period, the court erred in her case by imposing that condition. We disagree. Deskins's argument fails for two reasons. First, it overlooks the first subsection of the statute she cites, which says that [t]he sentence imposed for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor violation of this chapter may be deferred or suspended in accordance with RCW 3.66.067 and 3.66.068, however the probationary period shall be two years. Former RCW 16.52.200(1). Deskins was sentenced for misdemeanor violations. As mentioned above, the trial court has discretion to impose conditions of probation under RCW 3.66.067 and .068 that tend to prevent future crimes. Here, the trial court used its discretion and found that letting Deskins own or live with animals could result in future crimes. Her illegal animal keeping practices harmed not only her own dogs and those in the neighborhood but also the livestock that lived on the property. Thus, the trial court had reason to extend the prohibition to owning livestock as well as pets. 9 State v. Deskins No. 88140-5 Second, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, Deskins confuse[s] what a trial court must do with what it may do. Deskins, 2012 WL 3861275, at  (emphasis added). The portion of former RCW 16.52.200(3) that deals with probation sets a floor for what a trial court must do when it orders forfeiture-it does not set the ceiling for the entire sentence. It ensures that trial courts order a prohibition on ownership in certain cases but does not prevent them from ordering it in others. A trial court sentencing for misdemeanor violations of the cruelty to animals statute may use its discretion to set terms of probation under RCW 3.66.067 and .068, and by its own terms former RCW 16.52.200(3) applies only [i]n addition to the penalties imposed by the court. The record indicates that the court imposed the probation term barring Deskins from owning or living with animals as part of its discretionary authority independent from former RCW 16.52.200. It expressly stated that under former RCW 16.52.200, Deskins must undergo psychological counseling. 3 TR at 632. Then it imposed the probation conditions as other conditions of the sentence without citing the cruelty to animals statute. !d. This was a proper exercise of judicial discretion in misdemeanor sentencing to impose conditions in addition to the minimum called for by the statute. We affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue. 10 State v. Deskins No. 88140-5