Opinion ID: 2581604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury Instructions on Evidence of Uncharged Acts of Violence as an Aggravating Factor

Text: Section 190.3, factor (b) permits the introduction of all evidence of violent crimes, whether or not they resulted in a conviction, except those of which the defendant has been acquitted. ( People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 47, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109.) When the prosecution presents substantial evidence of uncharged acts of violence, state law requires an instruction to the effect that the jury may consider such evidence as a factor in aggravation only when the commission of such other crimes is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 841-842, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889; People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 53-56, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279.) Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct sua sponte that the jury could not consider evidence that he had committed acts of violence against Consuelo  in particular, the percipient evidence (see ante, 24 Cal. Rptr.3d at pp. 523-525, 105 P.3d at pp. 1112-1114), when defendant took Consuelo to his bedroom, locked the door, and kept her there all night  unless it first found those other acts proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim has no merit. [I]n the absence of a request, the trial court is under no duty to give an instruction at the penalty phase regarding evidence received at the guilt phase. ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 443, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 588, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1039, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) Even when section 190.3, factor (b), criminal activity is expressly alleged, ... `the rule absolving the court of a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of crimes introduced under [section 190.3, factor (b)] `is based in part on a recognition that, as [a] tactical matter, the defendant may not want the penalty phase instructions ... [to] lead the jury to place undue emphasis on the crimes rather than on the central question of whether he should live or die.'' ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 443, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Further, when the evidence of uncharged acts of violence is admitted at the guilt phase and is not referred to at the penalty trial, as here, the reasonable doubt instruction is not required. ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 967, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571; People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1121, 248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960.) The percipient evidence, which was but a small part of the guilt phase, played no part in the evidence or arguments in the penalty phase. The prosecution relied upon the facts of the crime itself and the effects of the crime on the victim's family as factors in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (a). Neither the prosecution nor the defense referred to the percipient evidence, and the court did not err by failing to instruct the jury as defendant contends. Defendant further argues the failure to so instruct the jury violated his right to due process, a fair penalty trial, and a reliable penalty proceeding pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and section 16 of article 1 of the state Constitution. These claims are rejected because, as we have concluded, there was no error.