Opinion ID: 1088727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Troopers Seals's and Little's Conduct Was in Reckless Disregard of the Safety and Well-being of Phillips.

Text: ¶ 13. This Court reviews errors of law de novo, including the proper application of the MTCA, Mississippi Code Annotated sections 11-46-1 et seq. (Rev.2004). City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So.2d 59 (Miss.2005) (citing City of Jackson v. Brister, 838 So.2d 274, 278 (Miss.2003)). The findings of fact by a circuit court judge, sitting without a jury, will not be reversed on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence. City of Greenville v. Jones, 925 So.2d 106, 109 (Miss.2006) (citing City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So.2d 373, 376 (Miss. 2000)). ¶ 14. Phillips's first assertion is that the trial court's findings of fact should be subject to a heightened review since he alleges they are adopted verbatim, in pertinent part, from the defendants' trial brief. Indeed, this Court has held that heightened review was appropriate where the trial judge adopted verbatim a party's findings of fact and conclusions of law, differing only in that the trial judge filled in the blanks for the percentages of fault apportioned to the parties. Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Johnson, 873 So.2d 108, 111 (Miss.2004). However, this case is more akin to Delta Regional Medical Center v. Venton, 964 So.2d 500 (Miss.2007). The Venton Court found deferential review appropriate because, in addition to adoption of some findings from each party's findings, the trial court included its own findings. Id. at 503-04. The Court rejected the argument that Johnson mandated heightened review in such circumstances. Id. ¶ 15. This case is distinguishable from Johnson. After a careful comparison of the defendant's trial brief and the trial judge's findings, we find that, while the trial judge adopted some sentences, portions of sentences and phrases verbatim from the defendant's trial brief, the majority of the findings are the trial court's own. Similar to Venton, in this case, the trial judge's findings of fact consisted mostly of his own findings. Therefore, we find that deferential review of the court's findings is appropriate. ¶ 16. The MTCA provides the exclusive remedy for Phillips in his claims against the MHP. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1) (Rev.2004). The Legislature of this state has expressly determined that as a matter of public policy, the state and its political subdivisions are immune from suit due to any tortious act or omission by any employee of the state or its political subdivisions. However, there are exceptions. The MTCA states in pertinent part: (1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim: . . . . (c) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. . . . Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c)(Rev.2004). ¶ 17. In order to recover in this case, Phillips must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendants acted in reckless disregard of his safety and that he, the claimant, was not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. Simpson v. City of Pickens, 761 So.2d 855, 859 (Miss. 2000). ¶ 18. It is undisputed that Seals and Little were acting within the course and scope of their duties relating to police protection. The question is whether they acted in reckless disregard of the safety or well-being of Phillips. ¶ 19. Reckless disregard has been defined by this Court as a higher standard than gross negligence, and it embraces willful or wanton conduct which requires knowingly and intentionally doing a thing or wrongful act. City of Greenville v. Jones, 925 So.2d 106, 110 (Miss.2006); City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So.2d 59, 71 (Miss.2005); Collins v. Tallahatchie County, 876 So.2d 284, 287 (Miss.2004). This Court will look to the totality of the circumstances when considering whether someone acted in reckless disregard. City of Ellisville v. Richardson, 913 So.2d 973, 978-979 (Miss.2005); City of Jackson v. Brister, 838 So.2d 274, 279 (Miss.2003) (finding that our case law requires that the circuit judge look at the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the officers acted with reckless disregard to public safety and that he base his findings on substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence). This Court has held that the nature of the officers' actions is judged on an objective standard with all the factors that they were confronted with, taking into account the fact that the officers must make split-second decisions. Powell, 917 So.2d at 72 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))). The `reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 392, 109 S.Ct. 1865. ¶ 20. Phillips argues that the troopers' failure to identify his vehicle as the wrong vehicle, failure to identify him as the wrong suspect and the actions taken against him, resulting in injuries, constitute reckless disregard. The MHP responds that its officers acted appropriately under the circumstances. ¶ 21. On two previous occasions this Court has considered whether police officers' mistaken arrests of individuals rose to the level of reckless disregard. In Foster v. Noel , this Court held that a police officer's failure to investigate before obtaining a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest constituted reckless disregard. Foster v. Noel, 715 So.2d 174, 179 (Miss.1998). In Foster, the manager of a Jitney Jungle observed a black man who had been shoplifting enter a car with another black man and reported to the police the perpetrator's gender, race, name and the tag number of the car he was driving. Foster, 715 So.2d at 175-76. The police officer filled out an affidavit and obtained a warrant for Jacqueline Noel, the owner of the truck with the tag number given; however, neither her name nor her gender matched the information provided to the officer. Id. The Court found that the officer acted in reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety and well-being by inserting [the plaintiff's] name in the affidavit for an arrest warrant based solely upon a car tag number although he knew that [the manager] stated two black men stole the [merchandise]. Id. at 179. The Court characterized the officer's actions as an intentional act taken in reckless disregard of the adverse effect upon [the plaintiff] of the wrongful arrest to follow therefrom. Id. ¶ 22. Eight years later, in City of Greenville v. Jones , this Court again considered whether police officers acted in reckless disregard when they mistakenly identified and arrested the plaintiff. Jones, 925 So.2d 106. The Court held that the officer's actions in that case were, at most, mere negligence and did not constitute reckless disregard. Id. at 121. In Jones, in the course of investigating a series of bomb-threat calls, the police traced the calls to a cellular telephone service provider and requested from that provider the phone records associated with the number from which the threats were made. Id. at 107-08. ¶ 23. When the provider's employee entered the number to obtain the records, the employee transposed two numbers and retrieved the plaintiff's phone records. Id. at 108. [P]age two of the packet revealed that Jones owned the cellular phone bearing the transposed number; however, pages 3-6 of the packet revealed that the four bomb threat calls had been placed from the cellular phone bearing the untransposed number. Id. The plaintiff asserted that a careful review by the officers of the package would have revealed the mistake. Id. at 110. The trial court found that the police conducted an inadequate and careless investigation. Id. at 119. This Court reversed the trial court, finding that the trial court ruling was not supported by substantial, credible and reasonable evidence. Id. The Court distinguished Jones from Foster, and found that the most plaintiffs had proven was that one or more of the [Greenville] officers were negligent, thus causing the City of Greenville to be exempt from liability under the MTCA. [5] Id. ¶ 24. The case sub judice is easily distinguished from Foster, where the officers intentionally disregarded information they had been given, resulting in the mistaken arrest. Foster, 715 So.2d 174. Unlike Foster, the evidence in this case establishes that Seals knew only the description of the vehicle. When Seals requested a description of the vehicle, he was informed that he was looking for a white Ford Explorer and that the registration information was unknown. He knew only the make, model, and color of vehicle for which he was looking. Unlike the facts presented in either Foster or Jones, the officers involved in this case were required to make split-second decisions while involved in the high-speed pursuit of a violent suspect. ¶ 25. Presented with conflicting testimony, the trial court made findings of fact which we consider to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. The trial court found that Seals was engaged in a high-speed pursuit, which had at times reached more than 100 miles per hour, attempting to subdue a fleeing perpetrator of a violent crime. Under those circumstances, Seals requested a description of the suspect's vehicle and looked for a vehicle based on the information he was given. Unaware that Phillips, a reserve officer, was attempting to participate in the pursuit in his personal vehicle (also a white SUV), Seals pulled over a vehicle which appeared to fit the description he had been given, which was traveling very near to Rayborn at the time Seals was approaching Rayborn to assist him in the pursuit. Seals knew that the suspect had failed to yield to Rayborn, who was attempting to pull the suspect over. After the stop, Phillips, by his own admission, neither identified himself nor complied with Seals's requests during takedown and handcuffing. The trial court concluded that Phillips was noncompliant and resisted arrest. ¶ 26. Accepting the trial court's factual findings, we review the officers' actions on an objective standard with all the factors that they were confronted with, and find that the officers did not act in reckless disregard. Although the officer mistakenly identified Phillips as the suspect, Phillips failed to prove that Seals and Little acted in any way other than reasonably under the circumstances. Phillips did not meet his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Seals intentionally disregarded information and thus, acted in reckless disregard when he misidentified Phillips or his vehicle. [6]