Opinion ID: 5296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fair's Ability to Pay the Fine Imposed.

Text: The district court adopted the PSR, which recommended against imposing a fine. The PSR justified this by stating: The defendant does not appear to have any assets which could be liquidated to pay fine [sic] immediately, nor does he appear to have the means to pay a fine on an installment basis after a lengthy period of incarceration. At his sentencing, neither Fair nor the government objected to the 5 PSR, the sentence imposed, or the imposition of the $20,000 fine. In a supplemental sentencing memorandum, the district court reaffirmed the fine, and indicated that Fair's present indigency was considered; however, the court stated that Fair could pay off the fine in monthly installments after his release. See R. 1, at 193. District courts are directed to impose a fine in all cases, unless the defendant establishes that he will be unable to pay. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). In determining the fine, the guidelines list seven factors for consideration, including any evidence presented as to the defendant's ability to pay the fine (including the ability to pay over a period of time) in light of his earning capacity and financial resources[.] Id. § 5E1.2(d)(2). Because of the mandatory language of § 5E1.2(d) ([T]he court shall consider. . . . ), some circuits require that trial courts make specific findings showing they properly considered the pertinent factors in determining the fine amount. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1369 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); United States v. Seminole, 882 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1989). We have declined to impose this requirement, as there is no statutory or sentencing guideline intimation that such detailed findings are necessary. United States v. Matovsky, 935 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1991); see discussion at note 3, infra. But see United States v. Pattan, 931 F.2d 1035, 1044 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2308 (1992) (sentencing court erred in not explaining decision to impose cost of incarceration fine in 6 light of PSR's recommendation that this would impose severe hardship on defendant's family). A brief digression is necessary to analyze the apparent divergent views espoused in Matovsky and Pattan. In Matovsky, the district court adopted the PSR which made no recommendation on imposing a fine. See 935 F.2d at 722. We held that it was not error for the court to impose a fine within the guideline range without making specific findings on Matovsky's ability to pay. Id. The trial court in Pattan likewise adopted the PSR, but this report recommended that neither a fine nor the cost of incarceration be imposed on the defendant. See 931 F.2d at 1038. On appeal, we held that The only evidence we can find, that in the presentence report, does not support the decision of the trial court. . . . Id. at 1044. Reading Matovsky and Pattan together, we can distill the rule that specific findings are necessary if the court adopts a PSR's findings, but then decides to depart from the PSR's recommendation on fines or cost of incarceration.3 The necessity for such explanation is illustrated by this case. Fair's PSR points out that he has limited future earning 3 A sentencing court is required, under certain circumstances, to give a statement of reasons for imposing a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (Supp. 1992); United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1484-85 (11th Cir. 1990) (if applicable guideline range is greater than twenty-four months, court must provide reasons for imposing sentence at a particular point within this range). There is no statutory counterpart requiring articulated reasons for imposing a fine on an individual. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 941 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1991) (Since the requirement of subsection 3553(c)(1) is triggered only by the length of the sentence and not by the amount of the fine, the district court was under no special obligation to justify the magnitude of this fine.). 7 capacity, and little realistic chance of paying a large fine: Fair has been incarcerated most of his adult life, he has minimal education, and his work record is sporadic. Furthermore, Fair will be sixty-six years old when he is released from his present incarceration. Even with a monthly installment plan, we are hard pressed to see how he will be able to pay off his $20,000 fine. On remand, we urge the district court to consider these and the other factors contained in Fair's PSR when determining whether it is appropriate to impose a fine that a defendant has little chance of paying. United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir. 1990). It is undisputed that the guidelines place the burden of proving an inability to pay a fine squarely on the defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a), (f); United States v. Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 185 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 108 (1992). If the defendant makes such a showing, the court may impose a lesser fine, or waive the fine altogether. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(f). In Pattan, we held it was error for the district court to adopt the PSR, and then depart from its recommendation on fines and cost of incarceration, absent any reasons for such a departure. See United States v. Pattan, 931 F.2d 1035, 1044 (5th Cir. 1991). The only evidence before the court concerning Pattan's ability to pay was the PSR. Id. We now take the step that we implicitly relied on in Pattan, and hold that a defendant may rely on the PSR to establish his inability to pay a fine or cost of incarceration. This is not an anomalous position among the circuits. See, e.g., 8 United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 895 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Cammisano, 917 F.2d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Labat, 915 F.2d 603, 606 (10th Cir. 1990). When a sentencing court adopts a PSR which recites facts showing limited or no ability to pay a fine the government must then come forward with evidence showing that a defendant can in fact pay a fine before one can be imposed. See id.; United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1206-07 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). For example, the government can point to evidence of assets concealed by the defendant,4 evidence of the future earning potential of the defendant,5 and even evidence of the wealth of the defendant's family.6 Once such a showing has been made, it is within the trial court's discretion to consider the factors outlined in U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d), and determine if a fine should be applied, and if so, the proper amount within the applicable guideline range. The trial court should give its reasons for departing from the PSR's recommendations on fines and costs of incarceration. 2. Cost of Incarceration Fine. In the supplemental sentencing memorandum, the district court explained that the $20,000 fine impose on Fair was intended by the Court to represent a small portion of the defendant's cost of imprisonment pursuant to guideline § 5E1.2(i). R. 1, at 193. The 4 See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, comment. (n. 6). 5 See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)(2). 6 See United States v. Fabregat, 902 F.2d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 1990). 9 full text of § 5E1.2(i) is quoted supra, in note 1; in pertinent part this provision authorizes the sentencing court to impose an additional fine amount to offset the cost of incarceration, probation, or supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(i). The plain language of this section indicates that a cost of incarceration fine should only be imposed after a § 5E1.2(a) punitive fine has been assessed. This is the interpretation other circuits have adopted: [F]undamental semantics dictates that a subparagraph (i) fine cannot be 'additional,' unless it augments another fine. United States v. Labat, 915 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Corral, 964 F.2d 83, 84 (1st Cir. 1992) ([A] district court may not impose a duty to pay for costs of incarceration or supervised release if the defendant is indigent for purposes of a fine under Sentencing Guideline section 5E1.2(a).). We find this reasoning persuasive, and hold that the imposition of a cost of incarceration fine, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(i), is not proper absent an initial punitive fine, Id. § 5E1.2(a). To impose a cost recovery fine alone is a misapplication of the sentencing guidelines. See Labat, 915 F.2d at 606-07. The trial court in the instant case characterized Fair's $20,000 fine as a § 5E1.2(i) cost of incarceration fine, and did not delineate any portion of it as a § 5E1.2(a) punitive fine. We must therefore vacate the fine and remand the case for further consideration and resentencing. 10