Opinion ID: 849062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the proportionality of the jtc's recommendation

Text: The JTC has recommended that respondent be suspended for one year without pay. Respondent argues that, in light of previous JTC recommendations, this sanction is disproportionate. Respondent cites several opinions written before Brown I and Brown II in which various sanctions were meted out for incidents of judicial misconduct. However, as Brown I indicated, review by this Court of previous judicial disciplinary proceedings has sometimes been hampered because the standards by which the JTC [produced] its recommendations [were not always] apparent. Brown I, supra at 1292, 625 N.W.2d 744. Rather than analyze each of the cases raised by respondent in her argument challenging the proportionality of the recommended sanction, we have chosen instead to examine the proportionality of her sanction in light of the JTC's application of the Brown factors. Here, as outlined in part III, the JTC set forth its analysis in the context of these factors. We find this analysis to be reasonably done and therefore accord the recommendations of the JTC considerable deference. [18] This Court assesses the proportionality of the JTC's recommendations of discipline, with the goal of maintain[ing] the honor and the integrity of the judiciary, deter[ring] similar conduct, and further[ing] the administration of justice. In re Hocking, 451 Mich. 1, 24, 546 N.W.2d 234 (1996). [T]he purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish but to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. In re Moore, supra at 118, 626 N.W.2d 374. We conclude that the JTC's recommendation of a one-year suspension of respondent without pay was a clearly reasonable one. However, the JTC could not have known, and thus did not consider, the overall length of respondent's interim suspension, which has continued until the issuance of this opinion. We believe that some consideration should be given to the chastening effect of respondent's seventeen-month interim suspension from judicial duties, although such suspension has been with pay. In a democratically elected judicial system, such as we have in Michigan, suspension of a judge from judicial activities is itself a sanction with considerable consequences, and we believe that respondent has incurred many of those consequences. We conclude that in this unique case it is reasonable to accord respondent credit for six months of her seventeen-month interim suspension. Accordingly, pursuant to MCR 9.225, [19] we modify the recommendation of the JTC only to accord respondent credit for six months of the seventeen-month interim suspension that she has already served. [20] Therefore, we direct the following disciplinary action in this case: This cause having been brought to this Court by the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commission and having been briefed and argued by counsel, it is ordered that Respondent Hon. Susan R. Chrzanowski shall be suspended from the discharge of all judicial and administrative duties, without pay, for a period of twelve months. However, respondent shall receive credit for six months served during the period of her interim suspension. Respondent shall serve the remainder of her twelve-month suspension, six months without pay, to begin January 1, 2002. After June 30, 2002, respondent may return to the bench of the 37th District Court to serve the remainder of her term. Respondent's conduct on the bench was unbecoming of the office that she holds. Her actions undermined public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and were prejudicial to the administration of justice. Const. 1963, art. 6, § 30. As the cornerstone of our tripartite system of government, the judiciary has a public trust to both uphold and represent the rule of law. Hocking, supra at 6, 546 N.W.2d 234. [J]udges ... are bound to conduct themselves with honor and dignity. Id. We conclude, as did the JTC, that respondent's conduct was violative of the standards established by the constitution, the Michigan Court Rules, and the Code of Judicial Conduct. We emphasize, moreover, that respondent is being disciplined only for her improper appointments of counsel, her failure to disclose those appointments, and for her false statements to the interviewing officers.