Opinion ID: 2070715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The efficacy of the trial judge's instruction.

Text: The foregoing discussion of the six Guesfeird factors reveals that although they do not all tilt in the same direction, Curtis' disclosure surely had a significant potential for prejudice, at least in the absence of effective counter-measures by the judge. The case is a close one and, in our view, turns squarely on the efficacy of the trial judge's remedial instruction to the jury. In that instruction, the judge did not confine herself to a directive that the jury disregard Curtis' comment about a lie detector. Rather, she explained to the jury that the science hasn't developed enough to permit the admission into evidence of the results of a polygraph test. Further, the judge reminded the jurors that they did not know the results of any polygraph examination that may have been administered to Curtis, nor were they aware of the particular questions that may have been asked. [16] The judge concluded her admonition with a forceful prohibition against any further reference to polygraphs by any participant in the trial or by any juror. Taken as a whole, the judge's instruction was not a pro forma and self-defeating admonition not to think about a pink elephant. On the contrary, the judge explained to the jurors, in rational and persuasive terms, why speculation about any hypothetical polygraph test would be unfair and unwarranted. A juror who, notwithstanding the judge's admonition, might have attempted to argue for conviction during deliberations on the basis of the stricken polygraph evidence would surely have faced a skeptical reception from his or her colleagues on the jury. Generally, in the words of Justice Holmes, [i]t would be absurd to upset a verdict upon a speculation that the jury did not do their duty and follow the instructions of the court. Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 481, 34 S.Ct. 148, 152, 58 L.Ed. 319 (1913); Coates v. United States, 558 A.2d 1148, 1150 (D.C.1989) (quoting Graham ). To be sure, we have recognized that there are circumstances in which one cannot unring a bell; after the thrust of the saber it is difficult to say forget the wound; and finally, if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can't instruct the jury not to smell it. Thompson, supra, 546 A.2d at 425 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir.1962)). [17] Nevertheless, we reiterated in Thompson our presumption that the jury is able to follow the judge's instructions, and we stated that our theory of trial depends on our belief in the jury's ability to do so. Id. (citations omitted). Where, as in this case, the judge's instruction was prompt, complete, persuasive, and to the point, we should not readily assume that the jury could not or would not follow it. Although some courts have disagreed, the overwhelming weight of authority in cases involving the disclosure that a witness took a polygraph test supports the position that an effective instruction by the judge is sufficient to avoid a mistrial. See, e.g., Price, supra, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d at 165, 821 P.2d at 669 (where the trial judge strongly admonished the jurors to disregard [a prosecution witness'] mention of polygraphs because polygraph results are both scientifically unreliable and legally inadmissible in evidence, the admonition was thorough and forceful and sufficient to prevent any prejudice to the defendant); Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 505 Pa. 442, 480 A.2d 980, 986 (1984) (because the trial judge issued immediate and extensive instructions regarding the unreliability and inadmissibility of polygraph tests and caution[ed] the jury to disregard any testimony concerning such tests, the defendant could not have been prejudiced and his motion for a mistrial was properly denied); Beal v. State, 453 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ind.1983) (affirming the defendant's conviction despite a prosecution witness' unsolicited disclosure that she had taken a polygraph examination where, inter alia and  [m]ost importantly, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the statement and instructed the jury not to take it into account in their deliberations) (emphasis added); State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai`i 383, 894 P.2d 80, 95 (1995) (dictum) (an admonition to the jury to disregard a witness' statement that he took a polygraph test could have eradicated or minimized the harmful effects of the testimony); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 832 P.2d 593, 625-26 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993) (any possible error was rendered harmless by the court's immediate instruction to the jury to disregard the witness's answer [relating to taking polygraph test]); Annotation, supra, 15 A.L.R.4th at 832-50 & Supp.1997 at 185-91 (citing numerous additional authorities). In United States v. Dietrich, 854 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (7th Cir.1988), a case in which a witness had volunteered that he had taken a polygraph test, the trial judge's relatively perfunctory instruction to the jury that the remark of the ... witness is stricken from the record, and I will admonish this jury to disregard it was held sufficient to cure any prejudice, and the appellate court rejected the defendant's contention that a more detailed instruction was required. Some courts have expressed the view that an admonition to the jury on this particular issue may do more harm than good. In Guesfeird, for example, the court deemed it arguable that rather than being curative, such an instruction might only serve to emphasize the prejudice. 480 A.2d at 807 (citations omitted). [18] In Nichols v. State, 378 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Crim.App.1964), the court went further, holding (over a strong dissent) that where the prosecutor asked the complainant in a statutory rape case whether she had taken a polygraph test and the witness had answered in the affirmative, the harm done was so great that no instruction from the court could remove it. Id. at 337. But whether or not these cases are distinguishable from the present one, [19] we have previously, albeit in a different context, abjured excessive mistrust of juries. See Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1224 (D.C.) (en banc) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1227, 112 S.Ct. 3050, 120 L.Ed.2d 916 (1992). At least on this record, with this forceful instruction, we adhere to that approach today. It would, of course, have been better if Curtis had not foregone his golden opportunity to remain silent on the subject of the lie detector. Nevertheless, the defendants received a fair trial.