Opinion ID: 1766222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the court erred in allowing the state to call police officer willie joe coleman for the purpose of impeaching its own witness, ray lee patty.

Text: We repeat that the voucher rule is no longer in effect in this State. Also, this was proper impeachment. A proper predicate for impeachment had been laid. Carlisle, supra . Impeachment can be accomplished through the introduction of extrinsic evidence. M.R.E. 613(b); Hubbard v. State, 437 So.2d 430, 434-35 (Miss. 1983). Third, M.R.E. 613(b) was complied with in that the witness Ray Patty was given an opportunity to explain or deny his statements, and Patty was available for interrogation by opposing counsel. Officer Coleman was likewise available for interrogation by counsel for the defendant. The prior statements of Ray Lee Patty to Officer Coleman were inconsistent with his testimony at trial. On direct and re-direct, Patty denied telling Officer Coleman that he heard Annie Ruth hollering, or that the defendant kept saying he had messed them up. It was proper, therefore, to elicit from Officer Coleman that Patty had previously made these statements. It is clear without reference to authority that a flat denial by a witness constitutes an inconsistency subject to impeachment. As to the third statement, Patty testified on direct that he had no memory of telling Officer Coleman that the defendant showed him a Dutch knife with blood on it. This differs from the previous two statements because it involves a faulty memory and not a flat denial. Nonetheless, Officer Coleman was allowed to testify that Patty told him on a prior occasion that Harrison showed him (Patty) a knife with blood on it. Patty clearly remembered seeing the knife, but he did not remember seeing blood on it, or giving Officer Coleman a statement to that effect. The Federal Courts are not in agreement on whether a mere lack of memory can be impeached. U.S. v. Grubbs, 776 F.2d 1281, 1287 (5th Cir.1985). It appears that the Second and Eighth Circuits leave the question of whether a lack of memory is an inconsistency to the judge's discretion. Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, has held that a claim of faulty memory does not constitute an inconsistent statement. Id. But in Mississippi, prior to the enactment of the rules, our Supreme Court has held that where a witness claims not to recall making a statement, the witness' lack of recognition is essentially a denial. In Magness v. State, 106 Miss. 195, 63 So. 352 (1913), a witness stated that he did not remember making a certain statement before the grand jury. 106 Miss. at 197, 63 So. 352. The State, in rebuttal, was allowed to introduce evidence that he did in fact make the statement being asked about. Id. This Court stated that when a witness is given an opportunity to admit or deny the making of a statement, as he must be, his refusal to admit or deny making the statement opens the door for impeachment. 106 Miss. at 198, 63 So. 352. If we accept that unwilling witnesses may take refuge in a failure to remember, then the Mississippi approach seems to be most in accord with the broad relevancy rule stated in Rule 401 and the wide discretion granted to the trial judge in Rule 403. Under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, this approach is most consistent with the rules of relevancy, and with the development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. M.R.E. 102. When a witness fails in any manner to acknowledge the making of a statement, the impeacher is obligated to offer proof establishing the making of that statement, assuming, of course, that the issue is relevant. The trier of fact must have a valid means to decide whether the witness' claimed lack of recollection is anything more than a refuge. By being apprised of this prior statement, the trier has such a means. There is no merit to this assignment of error.