Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Miscellaneous Instructional Errors

Text: (66) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.11 (4th ed. 1979) as follows: Neither side is required to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any of the events disclosed by the evidence or who may appear to have some knowledge of these events, or to produce all objects or documents mentioned or suggested by the evidence. In support, defendant asserts that The vice of this instruction at the penalty phase of a capital trial is its implication that there was evidence in aggravation not placed before the jury. In essence, it invites the jury to speculate on the probable existence of non-statutory aggravating factors, in violation of the rule of People v. Boyd [(1985)] 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-76. The assertion is empty. Plainly, the challenged instruction does not give such an invitation to a reasonable juror as a general matter. Nor did it do so under the unique facts of this particular case. (67) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on another point. At the guilt phase, the People called Edward Rogers and presented his testimony against defendant. In its charge, the court declared  properly  in conformity with CALJIC No. 3.18 (4th ed. 1979 (1979 rev.)) that The testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case. The court also declared  again properly  that Edward Rogers was an accomplice as a matter of law. At the penalty phase, the People did not call Rogers but they did rely on the testimony he had previously given, with the prosecutor extensively quoting his words in summation. In its charge, the court instructed the jurors to consider all the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case.... It did not repeat the instructions referred to above. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to reinstruct that an accomplice's testimony should be viewed with distrust. We disagree. Of course, when the People present the testimony of an accomplice, the court must instruct, sua sponte, that such testimony should be viewed with distrust. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1314 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) But the same obligation does not arise when, as here, they merely rely on previously given testimony covered by previously delivered instructions.