Opinion ID: 1347734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Other Jury Instructions

Text: Finally, Smith argues that the trial court erred in denying certain requested jury instructions regarding the law of self-defense and legal provocation. On self-defense, Smith requested an instruction that words accompanied by hostile acts may constitute self-defense and that a person acting in selfdefense does not have to wait until an assailant gets the drop on him. On legal provocation, Smith requested an instruction that sufficient legal provocation can be defined as an overt threatening act or physical encounter by the deceased. The relevant portion of the trial court's jury instruction on self-defense stated: [t]he party attacked is a judge of his own peril and can act safely upon the appearance, facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time and the situation should be determined from the standpoint of the defendant, it being for you, the jury, to say whether or not his apprehension of immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm was reasonable and would have been felt by a man of ordinary reason and firmness. Now, whether there was such a reasonable appearance of danger as would justify the killing is, of course, for you, the jury, to determine and in making your determination as I said earlier you could consider the conditions of both parties. If the appearance to the defendant at the time the fatal shot was fired that such he could not reasonably and safely avoid taking of the life of the deceased and a man of ordinary reason and prudence would have arrived at that same conclusion, then he should be acquitted if he is free from fault in bringing on the immediate difficulty. As I said, he has the right to use force in repelling force or in protecting himself. And he cannot be required to make a nice calculation as to the degree or quantity of the amount of force which may be necessary for the protection from loss of his life or serious bodily harm. ROA p. 246-47. The trial court defined legal provocation as some act which either alone or in connection with words or circumstances is calculated to throw one into a passion, such as someone pulling someone's nose or spitting in their face. ROA p. 243. It is of particular interest that Smith was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, which was the only offense which required legal provocation for conviction. It is clear from the verdict that the jury comprehended this instruction. Jury instructions should be considered as a whole, and if as a whole they are free from error, any isolated portions which may be misleading do not constitute reversible error. State v. Sims, 304 S.C. 409, 405 S.E.2d 377 (1991). The substance of the law is what must be instructed to the jury, not any particular verbiage. State v. Rabon, 275 S.C. 459, 272 S.E.2d 634 (1980). The record supports the State's contention that the instructions given by the trial judge sufficiently instructed the jury on both self-defense and legal provocation. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, Smith's conviction for voluntary manslaughter is AFFIRMED. HARWELL, C.J., and CHANDLER, FINNEY and MOORE, JJ., concur.