Opinion ID: 2028187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: amount due

Text: Westendorf argues that the evidence shows that the labels were not merchantable within the meaning of § 2-314 in that they did not pass without objection in the trade under the contract description. Section 2-314 reads in relevant part: (1) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.... (2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description.... In the instant case, there is no question that Label Concepts was a merchant and no evidence that Label Concepts disclaimed any warranties pursuant to § 2-316; thus, the question is whether the labels which were the subject of the disputed invoices were merchantable. See Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., 215 Neb. 604, 340 N.W.2d 369 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 423, 412 N.W.2d 56 (1987). For the purpose of this analysis, we assume, without deciding, that the labels were accepted by Westendorf, as the term acceptance is defined in § 2-606. Thus, the burden of proof was on Westendorf as the buyer to establish the breach of warranty. See, Laird v. Scribner Coop, 237 Neb. 532, 466 N.W.2d 798 (1991); § 2-607(4). Whatever else might be said about the Labatt's Lite labels, there is no question that the labels were too short and that the first of the three disputed invoices covers the extension strips produced to make the Labatt's Lite labels usable. While there was testimony from Label Concepts that the Labatt's Lite labels as reprinted met the specifications Westendorf provided, the district court was free to accept the countervailing testimony. The controlling rule is that in reviewing a trial court's factual determinations in a bench trial in an action at law, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, but considers it in the light most favorable to the successful party and resolves evidentiary conflicts in favor of that party, who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence. Lone Cedar Ranches v. Jandebeur, 246 Neb. 769, 523 N.W.2d 364 (1994). That brings us to the subject of the remaining two disputed invoices, which cover the Blue Light labels. In that regard, Westendorf points to testimony that its Canadian purchaser declared the labels to be defective and unacceptable. Citing Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp. v. Gates Eng'g Co., 219 Neb. 303, 363 N.W.2d 155 (1985), for the proposition that there must be proof of a deviation from the standard of merchantability causing the injury, Label Concepts responds that the fact that the labels obviously passed through Westendorf's operation without objection indicates they were not defective. However, the fact that Westendorf did not notice the defect does not counter the proof that Westendorf's Canadian purchaser refused to accept the refrigerators on which those labels had been affixed. The district court could well have found that the colors Label Concepts matched were those meant for the Labatt's Lite label, thus making the colors wrong for the Blue Light label. Accordingly, there is no merit to Label Concepts' first assignment of error.