Opinion ID: 2521467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application of the doctrine of strict liability

Text: Before the trial, Pullen filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the court to rule as a matter of law that the use of commercial-quality, class B explosive fireworks during an illegal fireworks display constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity requiring the application of the strict liability doctrine. In denying Pullen summary judgment on the issue of strict liability, the trial court avoided a decision on the issue of whether the use of class B explosive fireworks constituted an abnormally dangerous activity, which is a necessary finding before the doctrine of strict liability may be applied. The trial court noted this was an issue of first impression in Kansas and that a split of authority existed on this issue among jurisdictions throughout the country. Our research confirms the above findings. See Litzmann v. Humboldt County, 273 P.2d 82, 88 (Cal. App. 1954) (doctrine of absolute liability not applicable to public fireworks display); Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks Mfg. Co., 297 Ill. App. 3d 945, 962, 697 N.E.2d 802 (1998) (public fireworks display not ultrahazardous activity); Haddon v. Lotito, 399 Pa. 521, 523-24, 161 A.2d 160 (1960) (a public fireworks display handled by competent operator in reasonably safe area and properly supervised is not ultrahazardous). But see Miller v. Westcor Ltd. Partnership, 171 Ariz. 387, 391-94, 831 P.2d 386 (1991), rev. denied (1992) (operating public fireworks display inherently dangerous activity); Lipka v. DiLungo, 2000 WL 295355 (Conn. Super.) (unpublished opinion filed March 8, 2000) (abnormally dangerous activity); Klein v. Pyrodyne Corporation, 117 Wash. 2d 1, 5-11, 810 P.2d 917, amended 117 Wash. 2d 1, 817 P.2d 1359 (1991) (strict liability applies). The doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities is derived from the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). There, water from the defendants' reservoir broke through the disused and filled-up shaft of an abandoned coal mine and flooded the connecting mine belonging to the plaintiff. The defendants were held liable upon the theory the defendants had made a non-natural use of their land, which brought with it increased danger to others. See Williams v. Amoco Production Co., 241 Kan. 102, 113-15, 734 P.2d 1113 (1987). The Williams court adopted § 519 and § 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976): The general rule imposing strict liability in tort for abnormally dangerous activities as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1976) is stated and adopted: (1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land, or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm; and (2) this strict liability is limited to the kind of harm the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous. In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered: (a) Existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1976). 241 Kan. 102, Syl. ¶¶ 8, 9. The Commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 states that whether the activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by the court, upon consideration of all the factors listed in the section defining an abnormally dangerous activity. Falls v. Scott, 249 Kan. 54, 60-61, 815 P.2d 1104 (1991). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment involving this issue, Falls is instructive: When the facts are undisputed, whether an activity is inherently or intrinsically dangerous is a question of law to be decided by the court. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment involving this question, the trial court as a matter of law must determine from the undisputed facts contained in the record whether the activity under review is inherently dangerous. When the facts are disputed, the question is to be determined by the jury. 249 Kan. 54, Syl. ¶ 3. On appeal, Pullen argues that the trial court erred in finding that the fireworks display was not an abnormally dangerous activity and that the doctrine of strict liability was inapplicable to this case. We note that while the trial court discussed some of the factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, its focus was upon the question concerning the plaintiff's participation in the very activity he asked the court to declare abnormally dangerous: [T]he Court has a question regarding whether strict liability in this case would also apply to the plaintiff's actions. Upon finding that the facts necessary to a proper disposition of this issue were not entirely undisputed, the trial court ultimately concluded that the appellate courts of Kansas would not apply the strict liability doctrine under the facts of this case. Thus, without deciding the issue of whether the activity was abnormally dangerous, the trial court resolved the applicability of strict liability upon the fact that Pullen participated in the very activity he claimed was abnormally dangerous. The defendants based much of their arguments that the doctrine did not apply upon this crucial fact. In this determination, we conclude that the trial court's decision was correct and thus we need not reach a conclusion as to whether the class B fireworks display was an abnormally dangerous activity. The defendants argue on appeal that Pullen's participation in the activity barred his recovery under § 523 and § 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976). The plaintiff's assumption of the risk of harm from an abnormally dangerous activity bars his recovery for the harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 523 (1976). Comment d to § 523 provides: The risk is commonly assumed by one who takes part in the activity himself, as a servant, an independent contractor, a member of a group carrying on a joint enterprise or as the employer of an independent contractor hired to carry on the activity or to do work that must necessarily involve it. Thus a plaintiff who accepts employment driving a tank truck full of nitroglycerin, with knowledge of the danger must be taken to assume the risk when he is injured by an explosion. (Emphasis added.) However, in this argument, the defendants failed to note that the common-law doctrine of assumption of the risk in Kansas cases is restricted to cases involving employer-employee relationships. Tuley v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 252 Kan. 205, 210, 843 P.2d 248 (1992). As this case does not present such a situation, § 523 does not operate as a complete bar to the Pullen's recovery. Nevertheless, [t]he benefit of strict liability does not run to a person participating in the activity deemed ultrahazardous. 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence § 390, p. 429. One of the factors under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 is that the activity carries (a) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others. (Emphasis added.) Defendants contend on appeal that by directing the assessment of the risk to others, the drafters of the first Restatement (using the term ultrahazardous rather than abnormally dangerous) intended to prevent persons participating in ultrahazardous activities from utilizing the benefit of the strict liability doctrine. Restatement of Torts § 520 (1938). In the case of Whitlock v. Duke University, 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1475 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987), relied upon by the defendants, the court noted: North Carolina recognizes ultrahazardous activities as a basis for applying strict liability. [Citations omitted.] However, in none of the cases cited by the plaintiffs does the benefit of strict liability run to a person participating in the activity deemed to be ultrahazardous. Indeed, plaintiffs cite Restatement of Torts § 520 (1938) as reflecting North Carolina's law of ultrahazardous activity; § 520 states an ultrahazardous activity is one which: `a) Necessarily involves the risk of serious harm to the person, land, or chattels of others . . .' (emphasis added). Again, the benefit of strict liability under § 520 runs to `others'; not to those engaged in the activity. See also Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 48, 588 P.2d 326, 341 (1978). In Trull, 264 N.C. 687, 142 S.E.2d 622 (1965), the plaintiffs sought to impose liability upon the defendant for vibration injury associated with well drilling. Plaintiffs had contracted with the defendant and brought defendant on their land to drill the well. The Trull court held plaintiffs could not recover because they were not innocent parties within the rule of strict liability. Id. at 693. The court stated, `[h]ere the activity was not upon adjoining or neighboring property . . . nor were the plaintiffs unconcerned with the activity itself.' In the instant case Mr. Whitlock was a participant in the very activity alleged to be ultrahazardous. Therefore, the Court is persuaded that North Carolina's law of ultrahazardous activity is inapplicable to the case at bar. The defendants' argument is persuasive. As implicitly noted by the trial court, strict liability in the context of this case does not apply to the plaintiff who participated in the activity. Rather, it applies to others harmed by the abnormally dangerous activity. While Pullen is not completely barred from recovery based on his participation in an abnormally dangerous activity, he is unable to obtain the benefit of the doctrine of strict liability because he participated in the abnormally dangerous activity. As such, the trial court properly concluded that the doctrine of strict liability was not available to Pullen under the facts of this case. The defendants also argue that if the trial court should have applied the doctrine of strict liability to this case, any error would be harmless. They reasoned that because the Kansas comparative negligence statute, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-258a, applies to cases decided under the doctrine of strict liability, the jury would have reached the same conclusion that Pullen was 92% at fault, barring his recovery. See M. Bruenger & Co., v. Dodge City Truck Stop, Inc., 234 Kan. 682, 687, 675 P.2d 864 (1984). While the evidence presented at trial would likely have been the same if the doctrine of strict liability had been applied, the possibility exists that the jury would have assessed more fault to all of the defendants if it were instructed as a matter of law that they were strictly liable for Pullen's injuries, even if comparative fault was applied. As such, this argument alone is not grounds for affirming the trial court.