Opinion ID: 484637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lorenzetti Problem

Text: 19 Plaintiffs point to the Lorenzetti case as one in which the Supreme Court decided an FECA compensation issue on statutory grounds, without reference to the Sec. 8128(b) preclusion of judicial review. See United States v. Lorenzetti, 467 U.S. 167, 104 S.Ct. 2284, 81 L.Ed.2d 134 (1984); see also Green v. United States Dep't of Labor, 775 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1985) (deciding similar issue to Lorenzetti ); Ostrowski v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Detroit, 479 F.Supp. 200 (E.D.Mich.1979), aff'd, 653 F.2d 229 (6th Cir.1981) (deciding nearly identical issue as Lorenzetti ). Lorenzetti considered the following question: 20 whether the United States may recover FECA payments for medical expenses and lost wages from an employee whose third-party tort recovery compensates him solely for noneconomic losses like pain and suffering. 21 467 U.S. at 168, 104 S.Ct. at 2286. Plaintiff Lorenzetti had won a tort judgment compensating him, under a state no-fault insurance statute, solely for noneconomic losses resulting from an injury for which he had previously received FECA benefits. The Secretary ordered him to reimburse the United States under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8132 for his FECA payments. The recipient refused and initiated the suit for declaratory judgment that culminated in the Lorenzetti opinion. 22 In reconciling Lorenzetti with our decision here, we note that in referring to Sec. 8128 in Lindahl v. O.P.M., supra, the Court made no mention of the drastic limit on preclusion that plaintiffs argue follows from Lorenzetti. Instead, the Court gave Sec. 8128(b) as an example of unambiguous and comprehensive language that shows Congress intends to bar judicial review altogether. 105 S.Ct. at 1627 & n. 13. Section 8128(b), as noted above, prohibits review of the action of the Secretary ... in allowing or denying a payment. (Emphasis supplied). In Lorenzetti the payment had already been allowed. Thus, the question had changed from one dealing with the unreviewable discretion of the Secretary--allowing or denying a payment--to one involving the question of reimbursement out of a tort judgment rendered under a state no-fault insurance statute. Section 8128(b) does not preclude review of that question. Lorenzetti is thus distinguishable from the present case.