Opinion ID: 2778011
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Catch-all Clauses

Text: To reiterate, under Beltran, a penal statute is void for vagueness unless the criminal offense is defined “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage - 42 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 151, 172 P.3d at 463. Thus, a challenged statute is examined as to whether it is internally inconsistent and incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence or invites delegation of basic policy matters to police for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Id. at 153, 172 P.3d at 465. A statute that is internally inconsistent may prevent a person of ordinary intelligence from knowing what conduct is prohibited.28 Id. at 151, 172 P.3d at 463. However, HRS § 707756(1) is not internally inconsistent. There is nothing about the reference in HRS § 707-756(1)(b)(iii) to the covered offenses in HRS § 846E-1 that contradicts any other part of the prohibition of electronic enticement in HRS § 707-756. A statute is not incomprehensible if “a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to ascertain the nature of conduct prohibited.” Bui, 104 Hawaiʻi at 465, 92 P.3d at 474. The ICA in this case held that the “exceeds” language in the Catch-all Clauses introduced unconstitutional vagueness into HRS § 707-756, Alangcas, 131 Hawaiʻi at 325, 318 P.3d at 615, but 28 One standard for an internally inconsistent statute was highlighted in Beltran: a law is inconsistent if it instructs that a violation occurs where “it reasonably appears, in light of the circumstances, that the participants in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any activities in which they may also be engaging,’” because of the conflict between “reasonably appears” and “in fact.” Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 153, 172 P.3d at 465. - 43 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER that the “comparable” language in the Catch-all Clauses did not suffer the same deficiency. Id. at 321-22, 325, 318 P.3d at 611-612, 615. HRS § 707-756(1)(b) requires that the actor intend to promote or facilitate a “felony.” Thus, the qualifying “covered offense” set forth in HRS § 846E-1 must be a felony. HRS § 707756(1)(b). That is, whatever covered offense may be alleged as part of the mens rea to the agreement element of an electronic enticement prosecution, including an offense that is “comparable to” or that “exceeds” a crime against a Minor or a sexual offense, the intended conduct must be classified as a felony by the Hawaiʻi legislature.29 A person of ordinary intelligence would know that intending to promote or facilitate a felony, as defined by 29 HRS § 701-107 provides the following regarding grades and classes of offenses: (1) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized constitutes a crime. Crimes are of three grades: felonies, misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors. Felonies include murder in first and second degrees, attempted murder in the first and second degrees, and the following three classes: class A, class B, and class C. (2) A crime is a felony if it is so designated in this Code or if persons convicted thereof may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term which is in excess of one year. HRS § 701-107 (1993) (emphases added). Consequently, a crime is a “felony” if it is so designated by the Hawaiʻi penal code or if another statute of this State authorizes a sentence of “imprisonment for a term which is in excess of one year.” HRS § 701-107(2). - 44 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Hawaiʻi law, against a Minor is prohibited. Future cases may reveal a dispute as to whether a given felony is actually “comparable to” or actually “exceeds” the listed offenses included within the covered offenses, such that a question is present as to whether the intent to promote or facilitate the felony was properly included as a mens rea in a prosecution under HRS § 707-756. However, such a hypothetical dispute is irrelevant to a vagueness challenge to HRS § 707-756 because there is no question that a person of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to know that, as a felony, the intended conduct upon a Minor was indeed prohibited. To put it another way, when the intended conduct in question is indisputably proscribed by Hawaiʻi law as a felony, a person cannot complain in a vagueness challenge that the person is rendered unsure as to whether the intent to promote or facilitate that conduct upon a Minor is against the law. Thus, the reference to HRS § 846E-1 does not render HRS § 707-756 incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence. Bui, 104 Hawaiʻi at 465, 92 P.3d at 474 (“Consequently, we conclude a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to ascertain the nature of conduct prohibited.”). The same analysis eliminates the concern of “a delegation of basic policy matters to police resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,” Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 153, 172 P.3d - 45 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER at 465, because if the intended conduct is already prohibited as a felony, there is no concern of arbitrary or subjective police enforcement. That is, so long as the intended conduct designated as a felony in Hawaii’s statutory code is not defined so vaguely as to permit “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,” Gaylord, 78 Hawaiʻi at 138, 890 P.2d at 1178, prosecuting the intent to promote or facilitate such conduct under the electronic enticement prohibition does not jeopardize consistent nondiscriminatory enforcement. Thus, as the Catch-all Clauses are narrowed in application to HRS § 707-756 by the requirement that the intended conduct be a felony, they are neither incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence, nor do they risk subjective or arbitrary enforcement by police. Therefore, HRS § 707-756 is not unconstitutionally vague.30 As the statute is not vague, the question of whether the statute is vague as applied to Alangcas’ conduct is inapplicable. 30 Had this court determined that the term “exceeds” introduced unconstitutional vagueness, as set forth supra in section II.C.1, into either HRS §§ 707-756 or 846E-1, it is noted that an offending portion of a statute may be severable such that the remaining portion of the law is constitutional. “A part of a statute may be unconstitutional and at the same time the remainder may be upheld as constitutional.” Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Smith, 31 Haw. 196, 202 (Haw. Terr. 1929); see also Nelson v. Miwa, 56 Haw. 601, 611, 546 P.2d 1005, 1013 (1976) (“Where part of a statute is unconstitutional [but] is inseparable from the remainder, the whole statute is invalid.”). - 46 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER