Opinion ID: 2792922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purpose of the PLRA

Text: When congressional intent is clear from the text of a statute, we do not delve into legislative history or focus on the statutory scheme.46 However, in light of the discord among courts of appeals, and the apparent tension between subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), it is appropriate to consider the purpose of the statutory scheme to ensure that our interpretation is consistent with Congress’s objectives in enacting these provisions.47 As the Supreme Court has explained, the meaning of “certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context . . . and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”48 The Supreme Court has noted that the overarching purpose of the PLRA is to implement “a series of controls” 45 Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 276 (2d Cir. 2001). 46 In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 7, 2010) (“‘When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.’” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992))). 47 See Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering [its] purpose and context[.]”). 48 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 16 designed to prevent meritless filings in federal court.49 In enacting the PLRA, “Congress sought to put in place economic incentives that would prompt prisoners to ‘stop and think’ before filing a complaint.”50 Congress did not enact the PLRA to punish inmates for filing suits, nor did it intend to deter prisoners from filing valid claims.51 In fact, § 1915(b)(4) specifically provides that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”52 Congress was, therefore, keenly aware of the need to safeguard a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts.53 49 Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011); see also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 318 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001). 50 Id. (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S7,498-01, S7,526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (Sen. Kyl)). 51 See 141 Cong. Rec. S7,526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (Sen. Kyl) (“The filing fee is small enough not to deter a prisoner with a meritorious claim . . . .”); 141 Cong. Rec. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (Sen. Hatch) (“I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims.”); see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977) (“More recent decisions have struck down restrictions [to prisoners’ constitutional right of access to the courts] and required remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful.”); see generally Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (“[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.”). 52 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). 53 The Supreme Court has held that prisoners have a constitutional right to bring court challenges to vindicate “‘basic constitutional rights.’” Allah v Seiverling, 229 F.3d 17 In order to balance the competing objectives of preserving a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts while deterring frivolous litigation, § 1915(b) requires that an IFP prisoner make an initial payment towards the filing fee, but permits the prisoner to pay the balance of his or her fees over an extended period of time. Pursuant to this scheme, the initial partial filing fee can be withdrawn only “when funds exist” in the prisoner’s account.54 Thereafter, monthly payments, pegged at 20 percent of the prisoner’s account balance, are withdrawn only when the account balance “exceeds $10.”55 Concurrent recoupment is inconsistent with the purpose of the PLRA because, although Congress intended to deter frivolous litigation by requiring IFP prisoners to bear some marginal cost, Congress did not intend to create a payment scheme that would ensure fees be paid as expeditiously as possible or that would create tension with an inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts.56 Citing Newlin v. Helman, the government argues that sequential recoupment would undermine Congress’s intent to deter frivolous prisoner litigation by allowing a prisoner to “postpone” indefinitely his or her monthly payments for any additional lawsuit until after all previous filing fees had been paid.57 We realize, of course, that sequential recoupment is 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)). 54 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 55 Id. § 1915(b)(2). 56 As we noted at the outset, and as Siluk’s allegations suggest, although the amounts appear “marginal,” they can be quite substantial to an inmate subsisting on nominal prison wages. 57 See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000) and Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 66, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Christensen v. Big Horn County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 374 F. App’x 821, 830 (10th 18 less of a deterrent to frivolous claims, but that consideration does not alter our analysis. Although Congress was concerned that prisoners would pay their filing fee, Congress was clearly not as concerned about when the payment occurred. As Senator Dole explained during the debates on the PLRA, “when prisoners know that they will have to pay these costs -- perhaps not at the time of filing, but eventually - - they will be less inclined to file a lawsuit in the first place.”58 That is precisely the point. Congress could have required payments of more than 20 percent of the previous month’s income or imposed a time limit for payment of all outstanding fees if § 1915 was intended to collect filing fees as quickly as practicable. However, that is not what Congress did. Although Congress wanted to encourage indigent prisoners to think before bringing claims, it did not want to subject inmates to unacceptable hardships in order to pursue judicial redress.59 Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (observing that the PLRA’s “pay-asyou-go constraint[] would be diluted if not defeated by permitting prisoners with one ongoing case to postpone all successive filing fee obligations”); Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, Inc., 146 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting “per inmate” approach to the “PLRA[’s] fee provisions” as inconsistent with Congress’s intent). 58 See 141 Cong. Rec. S14,413-14 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). 59 See also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948) (noting that an undesirable result would be a “statutory interpretation [that] . . . force[s] a litigant to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in order to spare himself complete destitution.”). This Court has also repeatedly held that “prisoners are not required to surrender those small amenities of life which they are permitted to acquire in a prison in order to litigate [IFP.]” Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bullock v. Suomela, 710 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1983); Souder v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1975). 19 Moreover, concerns that sequential repayment will not sufficiently deter meritless claims are alleviated by subsection (g)’s “three strikes” rule.60 That is a “powerful economic incentive” aimed specifically at repeat filers to prevent them from filing more “frivolous lawsuits or appeals.”61 Subsection (g) seeks to penalize prisoners who have filed multiple, meritless claims, and revokes the IFP “privilege” from those who have had “three strikes,” “no matter how meritorious subsequent claims may be.”62 Subsection (b), on the other hand, is a moderate measure only intended to address prisoners filing lawsuits without considering the merit of their claims.63 Accordingly, there is a clear difference between the purpose of § 1915(g) and the rest of the PLRA. As the government agrees, § 1915(g) is structured to deter frivolous suits while protecting a prisoners’ right of access to the courts.64 Accordingly, we need not interpret § 1915(b)(2) as 60 As discussed above, § 1915(g) states “if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,” brought an action or appeal in federal court “that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[,]” then “[i]n no event shall [the] prisoner” bring an action or appeal IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Subsection (g) contains an exception permitting a prisoner with three strikes to file an IFP action if s/he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id. 61 Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001) (emphasis added). 62 Id. 63 Although, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Torres, the statutory requirement, that all filing fees be paid, deters frivolous litigation on its own, without further requiring simultaneous recoupment. Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2010). 64 See Gov. Br. at 22. 20 requiring simultaneous fee collection in order to advance the congressional concern with frivolous lawsuits.65 Nevertheless, we recognize that the contrary view, as expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Newlin, has gained some support. In Newlin, the Court reasoned that, because the PLRA is designed to “require the prisoner to bear some marginal cost for each legal activity,” simultaneous recoupment is most consistent with the statute’s purpose because it exacts that price the soonest.66 The Newlin Court was concerned that, “[u]nless payment begins soon after the event that creates the liability, this will not happen[]” and prisoners could file “multiple suits for the price of one.”67 However, that analysis conflates the distinct objectives of ensuring payment of all filing fees and expediting payment of fees. Neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history supports this view. In fact, that interpretation is in direct conflict with the text of § 1915(b) because the PLRA’s filing 65 In addition to the “three strikes” rule of subsection (g), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) permits IFP privileges to be automatically revoked on appeal if the trial court certifies that the appeal is meritless. Additionally, in cases brought by a plaintiff proceeding IFP, the court is directed to “dismiss the case at any time if [it] determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(a)-(b) (containing a similar requirement for all prisoner cases which “seek[] redress from a governmental entity”). If the court dismisses an action or appeal on one of these grounds, the prisoner nonetheless remains liable for paying the filing fee in full. See, e.g., J.A. 49 (“[T]he prisoner is obligated to pay the entire filing and/or docketing fee . . . regardless of the outcome of the proceeding or appeal.”); see also Porter v. Dep’t of Treasury, 564 F.3d 176, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2009). 66 See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000) and Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 66, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2000). 67 Id. at 436-37. 21 fee provisions explicitly permit a prisoner to postpone the payments indefinitely if the inmate’s account balance never exceeds $10.00.68 Moreover, sequential payment does not mean that an inmate can file “multiple suits for the price of one.” The prisoner still has to pay all fees incurred, the amount of each individual payment is simply capped at 20 percent of the prior month’s balance, and the payments are stretched over a greater period of time.69 The Newlin Court’s concern that, under a sequential collection scheme, a prisoner filing multiple suits could “postpon[e] payment of the fees for later-filed suits until after the end of imprisonment (and likely avoid them altogether)[]”70 is also misplaced. Although appellate courts do not agree on the interpretation of the payment mechanism in § 1915(b)(2), there is consensus among appellate courts that an inmate’s obligation to fully pay all fees incurred is not coterminous with the inmate’s incarceration.71 68 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 69 Under either a simultaneous or sequential recoupment approach, § 1915 requires the prisoner to repay the entire filing fee, eventually. See id. §§ 1915(b)(2), (3) (filing fee payments continue “until the filing fees are paid”); see also Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 243 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding that, under a sequential collection scheme, a prison could “collect the funds to pay the fees accrued by a specific inmate, and then distribute those funds to the appropriate court until that court’s fees are paid in full. After satisfying the first court, the prison would continue to collect funds and use them to pay the next court in sequence.”). 70 Newlin, 123 F.3d at 436. 71 All appellate courts to have reached this issue have held that the obligation is not coterminous. See Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that, under the PLRA, “release does not eliminate an obligation that could and should have been met from the trust account while imprisonment continued.”); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that “if a litigant is a prisoner on the day he files a civil action, the PLRA applies.”); Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr., 117 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1997) 22 As we have noted, the majority of view (of simultaneous recoupment) could result in 100 percent of a prisoner’s income being garnished to pay filing fees.72 We cannot imagine a valid penological or rehabilitative purpose in creating a risk that inmates would have to surrender the necessities of daily subsistence. We find nothing in the legislative history of § 1915 that would allow us to impute such a draconian intent to Congress.73 Rather, we agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that “[t]he garnishment of more than twenty percent of an indigent inmate’s already meager income crosses the line from deterrence to punishment and was not the intent behind § 1915.”74 (holding that § 1915’s filing-fee requirement applied to an inmate even though he was released, because he “file[d] an appeal” while he was a prisoner); McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (construing the PLRA to “require[] partial fee payments . . . only while the prisoner remains in prison, and that, upon his release, his obligation to pay fees is to be determined, like any nonprisoner, solely by whether he qualifies for i.f.p. status.”). 72 Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that simultaneous recoupment could subject “100% of a prisoner’s income” to recoupment); Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000) and Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 66, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2000) (observing that, under a simultaneous recoupment plan, “[f]ive suits or appeals mean that the prisoner’s entire monthly income must be turned over to the court until the fees have been paid.”). 73 See also Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Congress put a limit on garnishment from an inmate’s (already meager) income, understanding that a ‘chilling effect’ on litigation was not the same as a complete bar on filing suits, which may occur if close to one hundred percent of an inmate’s income is taken to pay his filing fees.”). 74 Id. 23 We therefore conclude that sequential recoupment harmonizes subsection (b)(2) with the purpose of the statute, while avoiding the constitutionally suspect result of erecting barriers to courts that would make some inmates choose between attempting to seek redress for legitimate claims and having enough money in one’s prison account to purchase items required for basic hygiene.75