Opinion ID: 3040342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of Plea

Text: We review the district court’s denial of Jones’s motion to withdraw his plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Nostratis, 321 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2003). A court abuses its discretion when it rests its decision on an inaccurate view of the law. United States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2005). [5] This court has made clear that “[a] defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after a district court accepts the plea but before sentencing if ‘the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.’ ” United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)). The burden of demonstrating such a fair and just reason rests with defendant; however, the standard is applied liberally. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2005); Garcia, 401 F.3d at 1011; Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d at 883. “Fair and just reasons for withdrawal include inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies, newly discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for withdrawing the plea that did not exist when the defendant entered his plea.” Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d at 883. [6] The sole reason Jones offered for withdrawal was that the magistrate judge failed to ensure that his plea included the necessary factual basis, thereby rendering the Rule 11 plea colloquy inadequate. As discussed above, this argument lacks merit. Although the standard for allowing withdrawal of a plea is applied liberally, Jones is still required to show some “fair and just” reason for withdrawing his plea. Here, he offered nothing more than his own inaccurate interpretation of the law. Without more, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. AFFIRMED.