Opinion ID: 2342755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Request for Specific Performance

Text: The defendant's first contention on appeal is that the trial justice erred in granting plaintiff specific performance of the purchase and sales agreement. We are not persuaded by this contention. In the absence of a legitimate and articulable equitable defense, specific performance is an available remedy when a purchaser of real estate under a written contract demonstrates that he or she was at all times ready and willing to perform the contract. Thompson, 762 A.2d at 436; see also Fracassa, 876 A.2d at 509. Additionally, specific performance for a real estate contract is an available remedy when a party unjustifiably refuses or fails to perform under the agreement. Yates v. Hill, 761 A.2d 677, 679 (R.I.2000); see also Lajayi, 860 A.2d at 686. In the instant case, the trial justice determined that the parties entered into an agreement providing for the sale of property with a closing to be held on September 1, 2000, but he also noted that the contract contained no time is of the essence provision. Additionally, the trial justice found that paragraph ten of the contract allowed plaintiff (buyer), if defendant (seller) were unable to convey marketable title, the option of either (1) accepting the lesser title to the property or (2) having her earnest money returned. The trial justice stated that plaintiff attempted to exercise her right under the first of those options by agreeing to accept whatever title defendant was able to produce upon plaintiff's tender of consideration. In his bench decision, the trial justice recognized that, before he could exercise his discretion and grant specific performance, plaintiff was required to demonstrate (1) that a valid agreement existed and (2) that she was ready, willing, and able to perform. He then concluded that both of those requirements were met. First, the trial justice acknowledged that the existence of a valid and binding agreement was not challenged. Second, the trial justice determined that plaintiff proved by clear and convincing evidence that she was ready, willing, and able to pay the agreed-upon consideration and accept the encumbered title to the property within a reasonable time after the September 1, 2000 closing date. The trial justice explained in some detail that, although the parties never explicitly agreed that the closing date was extended, the de facto existence of such an extension could be inferred from the conduct of the parties. More specifically, the trial justice pointed to the extensive discussions between the parties and their agents subsequent to the September 1, 2000 closing date. He took special note of the letter of October 16 from plaintiff's attorney to defendant's attorney expressing plaintiff's desire to exercise her rights under paragraph ten of the purchase and sales agreement. Furthermore, the trial justice specifically addressed and rejected defendant's contentions to the effect (1) that defendant made an earnest effort to return plaintiff's deposit during September and (2) that the cash sale nature of the transaction created a time mandate. Then, in exercise of this discretion, the trial justice concluded that plaintiff should be granted the equitable remedy of specific performance. We perceive no abuse of discretion in either the trial justice's analysis or in his final decision.