Opinion ID: 518495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Highway Search

Text: 15 Officer Keene's further detention of Mr. Rivera and Ms. Jones was supported by reasonable suspicions following their conflicting and inconsistent responses to his questions and to Mr. Rivera's inability to produce the car's ownership papers. See United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.1984) (officer acted lawfully in detaining car when possessory rights could not be determined). The district court entered two separate findings regarding the highway search of the vehicle during this detention: 1) Officer Keene had probable cause to search the vehicle incident to an arrest and, 2) Mr. Rivera gave Officer Keene permission to search the vehicle. Each of these findings warrant separate analysis.
16 A warrantless search of an arrested person and the immediate surrounding area may be conducted contemporaneously with the arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2862, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). On the other hand, a search cannot precede an arrest and then serve as part of its justification. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1903, 1905, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). However, in some instances, a search occurring before a formal arrest may be valid where the arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search.... Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). For example, in one case, a detainee was compelled to empty his pockets and the contents of the objects produced were searched a few minutes prior to making a formal arrest. United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 371, 378 (10th Cir.1985). During an investigatory stop in another case, one officer inspected a stopped vehicle while two other officers performed a pat-down search of vehicle's two occupants. United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir.1982). The first officer announced that he detected the smell of marijuana while opening the door of the stopped vehicle and, at about the same time, another officer pulled a plastic bag of marijuana from the pocket of one detainee. Id. 17 In both Gay and Romero, this court held that the search and seizure was lawful. However, [i]t is a question of fact precisely when, in each case, the arrest took place. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. at 67, 88 S.Ct. at 1905. That determination distinguishes the facts now before us and is dispositive to our analysis. 18 The district court found that approximately seven minutes elapsed from the time the vehicle was stopped until the first package of cocaine was discovered. [T]he entire search of the vehicle consumed approximately fifteen minutes, record, vol. 2 at 88, and culminated in the arrest of Mr. Rivera and Ms. Jones. From these findings and the factual sequence of events, it is evident that short intervals separated the time Officer Keene first smelled the possible odor of cocaine while searching the car trunk, located the first, second and third packages of cocaine within the car's interior, and carried out the actual arrest. Thus, the search preceded the arrest and was not truly contemporaneous. 19 In Gay, grounds for arrest were present at the time defendant was first involuntarily detained and before the incriminating evidence was discovered. United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d at 378. This court noted that, although the defendant was not actually arrested until later, he was not free to leave during the search and was in effect ... already apprehended. Id. In Romero, this court observed that the search for marijuana occurred incident to an arrest only if the officer announced that he smelled marijuana prior to the search and seizure since that event, combined with other circumstances, was necessary to create probable cause for an arrest. United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d at 703-04. The search was validated on other grounds since it was unclear whether probable cause for arrest existed at the time of the search and seizure. Id. at 704. Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682, 688, 105 S.Ct. at 1573, 1576 (twenty-minute detention was reasonable where police had reasonable and articulable suspicion of narcotic trafficking). 20 In contrast to those other cases, neither the government nor Mr. Rivera claim that he was under any form of apprehension or arrest during the highway search and, in fact, probable cause for his arrest did not exist until the search was underway. Therefore, we hold that the district court improperly found that Officer Keene had probable cause to search the vehicle incident to an arrest. In order to be lawful, the search and seizure must be upheld on other grounds.
21 It is well recognized that a search and seizure can be made even without probable cause if voluntary consent is given. See United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654, 658 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 82, 98 L.Ed.2d 45 (1987). According to Officer Keene's testimony and the findings of the district court, he asked Mr. Rivera for permission to search the vehicle and Mr. Rivera gave that permission. The ensuing search soon led to the three packages of cocaine, and the arrest swiftly followed. Mr. Rivera does not deny that he gave his consent. However, he essentially claims that the district court's findings establish that this consent occurred after the search was complete. 22 We do not agree that the stated findings of the district court support that conclusion. After finding that the initial stop and search was lawful, and that permission to search the vehicle was given, the district court discussed the written consent form and the subsequent gas station search of the vehicle. The district court stated: 23 The Court therefore finds that there was probable cause for Officer Keene to stop the vehicle and search the vehicle incident to the arrest. 24 The Court is somewhat puzzled about the form for consent to search which was obtained after the initial stop and search. 25 While it is signed by Mr. Rivera, the Court finds that following their being arrested, that it was incumbent upon the arresting officers to get a search warrant. 26 I do not find that--I find that this consent to search form does not give the officers permission to dismantle the car.... 27 And I do not feel that any consent to search form entitles the policemen after the people have been taken into custody and have custody of the automobile to dismantle an automobile, which is apparently what took place in this case, notwithstanding the consent to search form executed by Mr. Rivera. 28 So the Court will suppress any evidence that was obtained from the automobile after the initial stop and search.... 29 Record, vol. 2 at 89-90. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the district court's concern was related to the written consent form and not to the earlier verbal consent for the vehicle's search. 30 Furthermore, the district court's findings were based upon testimony just freshly received. Officer Keene related that Mr. Rivera gave verbal consent prior to the search. Mr. Rivera has not made any direct claim, then or now, that Officer Keene's testimony regarding the sequence of events was incorrect. Neither does he challenge Officer Keene's statements that he himself assisted in the search by walking to the driver's side of the car, leaning through the window and removing the car keys, and then moving to the rear of the vehicle and opening the trunk. These circumstances support the district court's ruling that Mr. Rivera gave voluntary consent to conduct the highway search, even though the written consent was not sufficient to justify the subsequent gas station search. See United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d at 1376-77. Thus, while the highway search was not correctly characterized as a search incident to an arrest, it was lawfully performed with Mr. Rivera's consent and partial assistance.