Opinion ID: 526766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finality of the Separate Signed Agreement

Text: 25 The settlement of Landry's grievance, which allowed him to regain his registration card after a 72-day suspension, resulted from negotiations at a Step Two grievance proceeding pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The grievance settlement was embodied, however, in a discrete written agreement signed by Landry. Cooper/Smith and NOSSA suggest that this separate agreement is absolutely final without regard to whether Local 854 breached its duty of fair representation, because Landry expressly agreed to accept the return of his G card as a settlement of his prior grievances. In effect, they argue for an exception to the rule that a union's breach of the duty of fair representation may open a final grievance settlement, which would apply when the grievant specifically consents to the settlement. 26 The parties and the court below focused much of their attention on the finality of the signed settlement agreement. We do not need to reach this question, however, to decide Landry's appeal. 5 Instead, we conclude that the question of whether Local 854 breached its duty of fair representation is the controlling issue. 27 The settlement agreement states only that it resolves Landry's grievances against Cooper/Smith and NOSSA. It does not purport to settle Landry's duty of fair representation claim against Local 854, which had not even been raised at the time the agreement was signed. Accordingly, even assuming that the agreement cannot be challenged, it would resolve only one prong of Landry's interrelated claims. We would then have to address Landry's contention that the union breached its duty of fair representation. 28 This two-step analysis becomes unnecessary, however, if we determine as an initial matter that Local 854 did not breach its duty to represent Landry fairly. Landry must establish this breach to prevail against the union and his employer; the 'indispensable predicate' for a Sec. 301 action in this situation is a fair representation claim against the union. Daigle, 794 F.2d at 977 (quoting United Parcel Service, 451 U.S. at 62, 101 S.Ct. at 1564). See also Hines, 424 U.S. at 567, 96 S.Ct. at 1058; Bache, 840 F.2d at 289. If Landry did not introduce sufficient evidence to establish the union's breach, the JNOV was proper for both of his claims. Accordingly, without deciding the independent finality of the signed settlement agreement, we turn to the dispositive question of whether Local 854 breached its duty of fair representation.IV. The Union's Duty of Fair Representation A. Scope of the Duty 29 A union must represent all employees fairly in its enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement. This duty of fair representation stands as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182, 87 S.Ct. at 912. 30 A union retains considerable discretion, however, in processing the grievances of its members. Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, 607 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir.1979); Turner v. Air Transport Dispatchers Assoc., 468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir.1972). An employee has no absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration, Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191, 87 S.Ct. at 917, or to any other level of the grievance process. Turner, 468 F.2d at 300. Instead, a breach of the duty of fair representation occurs only when the union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 87 S.Ct. at 916. 31 Under this test, a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion. Id. at 191, 87 S.Ct. at 917. Thus, the duty of fair representation imposes an obligation for a union to investigate a grievance in good faith. Abilene Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 332, 347 (5th Cir.1980). A union also has an obligation to prosecute a grievance with reasonable diligence unless it decided in good faith that the grievance lacked merit or for some other reason should not be pursued. Hammons v. Adams, 783 F.2d 597, 602 (5th Cir.1986). 32 A union does not breach its duty of fair representation, however, through simple negligence or a mistake in judgment. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 192-93, 87 S.Ct. at 918; Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir.1978). We have upheld a determination that a union did not breach its duty when its conduct in processing an employee's grievance was less than enthusiastic and not perfect. Connally, 583 F.2d at 202-203. The critical question is whether a union's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, so that it undermined the fairness or integrity of the grievance process. See Hines, 424 U.S. at 567-69, 96 S.Ct. at 1058. 33 B. Local 854's Actions Prosecuting Landry's Grievances 34 The revocation of Landry's registration card resulted from his accumulation of three disciplinary citations. Two citations arose from the 1983 dispute over production quotas, and were grieved together. The third incident, which immediately preceded the revocation of Landry's registration card, involved Landry's 1985 refusal to work in the rain. 35 We have carefully reviewed the evidence of the union's conduct in both 1983 and 1985. While mindful of the deferential standard of review due the jury's verdict, we conclude that the evidence introduced at trial is insufficient to establish that the union's actions in processing Landry's grievances were arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 87 S.Ct. at 916. We affirm the judgment NOV on this ground.
36 We start with the 1985 rain incident, which, as Landry's third disciplinary citation, triggered the revocation of his G card. Landry contends that Local 854 breached its duty of fair representation in failing to investigate this grievance adequately. He also faults the union for refusing to resolve the dispute on the merits through arbitration. 37 In support of his claim, Landry notes that the evidence established that the union president, Tyrone Webster, declined to meet with Landry to discuss his grievance. Landry testified that Webster stated he was too busy for such a meeting. Landry also points to the fact that NOSSA officials testified that they agreed to return Landry's card primarily because union representatives lobbied them on humanitarian grounds, stating that Landry had suffered enough and needed to return to work to support his family. In seeking the return of Landry's card, Local 854 officials did not focus on the merits of Landry's grievance. 38 Even when this evidence is considered in the light most favorable to Landry, however, it is not sufficient to support a conclusion that Local 854 breached its duty of fair representation. The failure of a union president to meet with a grievant does not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the union did not investigate a claim adequately. In fact, it is undisputed that union vice-president Ray Worthy was present on the docks at the time of the rain incident. Worthy was able to determine the prevailing weather conditions. He questioned the protesting workers and the Cooper/Smith supervisor. Worthy also discovered that 23 of the 25 workers on the crew went to work without protest; Landry was one of two workers who refused to work because of the rain. 39 Under these circumstances, Local 854 may well have concluded that a humanitarian appeal was more likely to succeed in regaining Landry's card than would an arbitration based on the merits of Landry's claim. The decision not to arbitrate the grievance on its merits was clearly within the union's discretion. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-95, 87 S.Ct. at 917-19. 40 The insufficiency of evidence to support Landry's contention that Local 854 breached its duty of fair representation becomes even more apparent when one examines the uncontradicted evidence regarding the actions the union did take to prosecute Landry's grievance. Ray Worthy immediately took up Landry's cause at a Step One negotiation, attempting to avert a disciplinary citation for the rain incident. When that approach proved unsuccessful, Local 854 supported Landry at a Step Two meeting before the Disputes Resolution Committee, with both union representatives on the Committee voting in Landry's favor. When Landry's registration card was nevertheless revoked under the just cause provision of the collective bargaining agreement, the Union repeatedly requested that NOSSA officials return the card. Ultimately, a settlement was reached so that the revocation of Landry's card was reduced to a 72-day suspension, and he was allowed to return to work. 41 In short, the evidence conclusively established that Local 854 diligently pursued Landry's grievance, albeit not on the grounds or with the tactics Landry desired. Cf. Hart v. Nat'l Homes Corp., 668 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir.1982). The union's duty of fair representation, however, was not a ministerial one of satisfying each employee's demands at all costs. Cox, 607 F.2d at 142. 42 Landry's dispute with Local 854 over the rain incident is, at bottom, a disagreement over tactics and discretionary decisions. The evidence in support of Landry's claim does not indicate any arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith conduct by the union. Thus, the evidence is insufficient to establish that Local 854 breached its duty of fair representation in grieving Landry's disciplinary citation for refusing to work in the rain.
43 Landry also contends that Local 854 breached its duty of fair representation in failing to reschedule the arbitration over the poor production citations issued to 25 union members, including Landry, in 1983. In support of his claim, Landry notes that union officials did not respond to repeated requests by the members to take this matter to arbitration. Landry testified that when Tyrone Webster was running for union president in 1983, he promised the workers that he would restart the arbitration. Webster did not do so when elected. The testimony also indicated that union officials did not inform the members of the reasons for their decision to abandon the arbitration over the poor production citations. Finally, the evidence established that the collective bargaining agreement provided for hourly wages for freight handlers. Landry and other union members testified that they interpreted this provision as precluding production quotas set by the employer. 44 The union president, Tyrone Webster, conceded that he did not adequately explain to union members why the arbitration was not rescheduled. Webster testified, however, that Local 854 had decided that continued arbitration over the poor production issue would not be in the best interest of all of its members. At the time of this dispute, production in the Port of New Orleans was declining to the extent that New Orleans-based companies and workers were losing business to other, more productive, ports. Union officials decided that an arbitration over poor production would exacerbate this problem by bringing negative publicity to the port and the union. The union feared that the ultimate result of arbitration would be less work for its members. 45 The testimony of a NOSSA official, Win Niemand, confirmed that the New Orleans port had production problems which led to declining stevedoring business. Niemand testified that NOSSA discussed this problem with union officials, seeking their cooperation to increase production in order to avert a further loss of work. On the question of whether the attempt to introduce production quotas violated the collective bargaining agreement, Neimand stated that NOSSA took the firm position that the employers had the right to demand a certain level of production pursuant to the management rights clause of the Agreement. 6 46 Under these circumstances, Local 854 was well within its discretionary right in deciding not to arbitrate the poor production citations. Courts have long recognized that a union must, at times, subordinate the interests of individual employees to the collective interest of all union members. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182, 87 S.Ct. at 912; Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir.1976). In addition, a union may act according to its own reasonable interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Local 854 could recognize an interpretation allowing the employer to set acceptable production quotas under the management rights clause. A union is not required to advocate a different interpretation preferred by some individual union members. Bache, 840 F.2d at 290. 47 The evidence offered by Landry does not refute that there was a production problem in the Port of New Orleans which adversely affected the stevedoring companies and the freight handlers. Instead, Landry contends that the fact that Tyrone Webster broke his promise to restart arbitration and did not explain to union members why the union had abandoned the poor production issue is sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. This conduct by union officials may fall short of the best in contract administration, but the duty of fair representation does not reach all less than perfect behavior. Connally, 583 F.2d at 203. See also Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S.Ct. 104, 66 L.Ed.2d 39 (1980) (A union did not breach its duty of fair representation by informing an employee that his grievance had been rejected by an arbitrator, when in fact it had been withdrawn). Instead, the duty is breached only by conduct that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 48 Under this standard, a union may refuse to process a grievance or handle the grievance in a particular manner for a multitude of reasons, so long as a union acts in good faith and there is some nonarbitrary basis for its decision. Griffin v. Int'l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir.1972). The overwhelming evidence established that Local 854 did not resume the arbitration over the poor production citations because it thought such a step would not enhance the greater good of all union members. This decision cannot be considered arbitrary, and there is no evidence that it was motivated by ill will toward Landry or discriminatory motives. The evidence is therefore insufficient to establish that the union breached its duty of fair representation in refusing to arbitrate Landry's earlier poor production citations.