Opinion ID: 385769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: immunity of the prison officials

Text: 39 Hayes has requested that both compensatory and punitive damages be awarded as partial relief for the prison officials' violation of his constitutional rights. The officials respond that even if Hayes' rights were violated, they acted in the good faith belief that their actions conformed to all applicable requirements and they are thus immune from damages under a qualified good-faith immunity. The District Court held that the officials were indeed entitled to immunity and could not be liable for damages. We agree with the District Court's result. 40 The Supreme Court has recognized a qualified good-faith immunity for state prison officials acting within the scope of their official responsibilities when damages are sought for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). Accord, Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975). Cf. Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1978) (same standard in Bivens -type action against federal officials (Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971))). In Navarette, a state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials charging wrongful interference with his outgoing mail, a violation of his First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that the qualified immunity it had outlined for school officials in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), was applicable to state prison officials as well. The test enunciated in Navarette consists of two parts:Under the first part of the Wood v. Strickland rule, the immunity defense would be unavailing to (the prison officials) if the constitutional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or should have known of that right and if they knew or should have known that their conduct violated the constitutional norm. 41 (T)he second branch of the Wood v. Strickland standard ... would authorize liability where the official has acted with 'malicious intention' to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right or to cause him 'other injury.'  Navarette, 434 U.S. at 562, 566, 98 S.Ct. at 862, quoted in Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d at 25. 42 It is this two-pronged test which we apply here.
43 The District Court found as fact that the evidence demonstrates that the Committee believed that their denial of the request (for witnesses) was in compliance with Wolff and administrative regulation 804, both of which provide that a request for witnesses may be denied if it will be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. The Court also concluded that the Committee could not have reasonably known that Wolff could be read to require reasons more specific than those enumerated in the Wolff decision. The Court went on to conclude that the Committee was here immune from damages for their denial of the witness request. 44 Taken as a whole, the District Court's broad findings of fact indicate that the Committee did not know and reasonably could not have known that more was required of them to fully comport with Hayes' constitutional rights. If these findings can be upheld, then the conclusion that the administrators were entitled to immunity for their decision to refuse to call witnesses was proper. 45 Our standard of review in examining a District Court's findings of fact is a narrow one. Unless the findings are clearly erroneous, we must accept them undisturbed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534 n.8, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977 n.8, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979). Only if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed will the findings be set aside. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20, 75 S.Ct. 6, 8, 99 L.Ed. 20 (1954). Although we are to be more critical in our review when a District Court, as here, essentially adopts the findings prepared by the prevailing party, such findings are nonetheless to be measured by the clearly erroneous standard. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 731 (7th Cir. 1979); Schwerman Trucking Co. v. Gartland Steamship Co., 496 F.2d 466, 474-75 (7th Cir. 1974); FS Services, Inc. v. Custom Form Services, Inc., 471 F.2d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 1972). 46 We turn now to the record. The subsequent testimony taken at the trial may be considered to inquire into the good faith of the defendants. This testimony reveals that two of the three Committee members were familiar with Wolff and all three members were familiar with the applicable administrative regulations incorporating parts of Wolff. They believed that the regulations incorporated all relevant federal and state law. However, Wolff expressly stated that the Constitution does not require that witnesses be called in prison disciplinary proceedings nor that reasons must be given for refusal to call a witness. Further, administrative regulation No. 804(II)(B)(6) states only: The committee will state its reasons for refusing to call or interview a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity or the hazards presented in the individual cases. The statements in Wolff and the language of the regulation could reasonably, though erroneously, lead these officials to believe that their broad statement concerning the potential hazards of calling any witnesses would be sufficient to satisfy these requirements. It was not until we decided Hayes I that more than the general, broad reasons given here were clearly established as being required by due process in these sorts of prison disciplinary proceedings. Thus, we cannot say that the District Court's broad factual findings that the Committee acted in good faith with respect to denial of witnesses are clearly erroneous.
47 The District Court filed as a finding of fact that (t)he evidence at trial indicates that the defendants reasonably believed that provision of a transcript of the proceedings complied with the Constitution and regulations governing the requirements for statement of reasons. As above, our review of this finding must be under the narrow clearly erroneous standard. 48 Wolff explicitly requires that a  'written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons' for the disciplinary action be given. 5 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-2979. The language of Wolff, with its explanation underlying the requirement, rendered the right to a written statement of evidence and reasons as clearly established at the time of Hayes' hearing. 6 Further, we believe that the members of the Committee should have known of that right. When the Supreme Court of the United States renders a decision on prison proceedings as it did in Wolff v. McDonnell, those involved in the conduct of such proceedings have a constitutional obligation to investigate and familiarize themselves with the Court's pronouncements. Moreover, the Illinois prison administration issued regulations in response to Wolff, applying its requirements, which reiterated the requirement of a written statement, and each member of the Committee admitted that he was familiar with these regulations. Thus, we find that each Committee member should have known and did know of the constitutional requirement to provide the statement described in Wolff. 49 The key question in resolving the immunity issue thus becomes whether the Committee members knew or should have known that what they provided was constitutionally insufficient. Although not explicitly so worded, we understand the District Court's use of the term reasonably believed in its finding of fact to indicate that the Committee members did not know, and could not have reasonably been expected to know, that they were not complying. We see no indication that the members actually knew that what they provided was inadequate, and so in reviewing this finding we focus on whether they should have known. 50 The test is an objective one. We must look at what the Committee gave Hayes and consider whether a prison disciplinary committee could reasonably have concluded that it complied with the requirement of Wolff. Here, Hayes was provided with a copy of the transcript 7 of the proceedings and a copy of the violation report (Resident Information Report) as written by Warden Wolff. The transcript stated that the guilty finding was based upon the Warden's violation report and the report of the special investigator. A brief summary of the investigator's findings were included in the report, based on a telephone conversation with the investigator. The Committee also noted that a full report of the investigator was to follow. The investigator's summary appearing in the transcript noted that Hayes called the meeting in the prison yard, that he was a ring leader, and a leader among the black residents. The investigator recommended that Hayes be transferred. 51 Whether the Committee should have known it violated Hayes' rights is a close question. If the Committee had provided merely the Warden's Resident Information Report as the basis for its finding, it would be clearly erroneous to find that the Committee reasonably believed it was complying with Wolff, in light of Regulation No. 804(II)(B)(9). 8 But more was provided here. The transcript which Hayes received covered the entire hearing and included the summary of the investigator's report. 9 It is the presence of this report in particular which tips the scales in our review of the District Court's finding on the immunity issue. If appropriately detailed and supported, and properly considered, such an outside investigative report may well constitute adequate basis for a disciplinary decision. Further, the Committee may have believed that it was incorporating by reference the full written report which was to follow. Although the Committee's statement provided to Hayes, including the transcript's summary of the investigator's conclusions, is constitutionally insufficient under Wolff, it does contain conclusions of the investigator upon which the Committee might have reasonably believed, at that time, constituted adequate basis for its decision. Thus, in light of the language of the regulation, and the sparse interpretation of Wolff at the time of Hayes' hearing, we cannot say, within the scope of the clearly erroneous standard of review, that the Committee should have known that what it provided violated the Wolff requirement. And even though the reasons expressed in the transcript fall far short of what would be necessary to establish conspiracy to incite to riot and commit mutinous acts, we cannot consider it bad faith merely because non-lawyer committee members err in their perception of the amount of evidence necessary to establish a violation. 52 Accepting the District Court's findings regarding both the denial of witnesses and the failure to give adequate reasons as not clearly erroneous, we conclude that the members of the Committee acted in good faith and are, therefore, immune from money damages.
53 Hayes further claims that in addition to the Committee members, Warden Wolff is liable in damages for the unconstitutional conduct of the Adjustment Committee. Hayes argues that Wolff failed to properly supervise and train the members of the Committee concerning the due process requirements of Wolff, that the Committee's errors were a result of Wolff's conduct, and that the constitutional deprivations in this case were foreseeable, precluding good-faith immunity. 54 Even if Wolff could be held liable under Section 1983, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), there is insufficient support in the record to conclude that the Warden acted in bad faith. The District Court found that Wolff was not in any manner responsible for the decision or actions of the Committee. While this is not very specific, we take as a necessary implication of this finding that the District Court believed there were no deficiencies in Wolff's supervision which were responsible for the constitutional violations in Hayes' hearing. There was testimony at trial that Wolff held regular staff meetings at which rules and requirements regarding disciplinary proceedings were discussed. Further, Wolff had been decided only ten months before, and Regulation 804 was apparently an administrative response to the requirements of that decision. Wolff could have reasonably believed that Regulation 804 provided adequate guidance for the members of the Committee regarding the requirements of Wolff, and until there was some need manifested, further instruction was not necessary. As discussed above, all members of the Committee testified that they were familiar with the regulation. Thus, we cannot conclude that the District Court's finding was clearly erroneous. Warden Wolff is entitled to good-faith immunity in his role as supervisor of the Adjustment Committee, and may not be held liable for money damages. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 635 (7th Cir. 1979), sum. rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980).