Opinion ID: 174724
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction over the Right to Repayment

Text: Allied also argues that BNP Paribas's decision to stop the EFT and segregate funds associated with the transfer in a suspense account entitles Descatrade to a right of repayment under the so-called money-back guarantee provision of N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-402(4). [4] Allied argues that this right of repayment is an attachable property interest under Rule B. The District Court properly concluded that, regardless of whether the suspense account was in Paris or New York, the right to repayment under U.C.C. § 4-A-402(4), like the suspense account itself, cannot be attached. Allied Maritime, 2009 WL 4884160, at . The Scanscot Shipping analysis is no less applicable to the recovery right under U.C.C. § 4-A-402(4) derived from a suspense account than it is to the suspense account itself. [5] The jurisdictional defect that renders the suspense account unattachable under Rule B also renders unattachable any recovery right arising out of that suspense account. As one court has aptly observed, [n]o alchemy by the bank [can] transform[] EFTs that cannot be attached into property of the defendant that can be attached. Argus Dev. Inc. v. Steelcore Trading Ltd., No. 09-6009, 2009 WL 4016626, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov.16, 2009).