Opinion ID: 2602167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: preservation of bona fide purchaser argument

Text: ¶ 12 In a footnote to its opinion, the court of appeals declined to address Brookside's bona fide purchaser argument, holding that, under Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998), the issue had not been properly preserved for appeal. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2000 UT App 314, ¶ 18 n. 3, 14 P.3d 105. Before addressing Brookside's arguments on this issue, we take this opportunity to clarify the requirements for preserving issues for appellate review. ¶ 13 One of Brookside's arguments before the court of appeals centered around its contention that it should have been granted summary judgment based on its bona fide purchaser theory. Brookside raised this theory before the trial court in support of its original motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals held that Brookside did not preserve this issue because it did not raise the argument again in response to Peebles' motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling. In the eyes of the court of appeals, [a]t that crucial point, Brookside did not give the trial court the opportunity to consider the bona fide purchaser theory as a basis for denying the motion. Brookside, 2000 UT App 314 at ¶ 18 n. 3, 14 P.3d 105. With this view, the court of appeals stated, Brookside has not properly preserved the bona fide purchaser issue for appeal, and we decline to address it. Id. (citing Badger, 966 P.2d at 847). ¶ 14 The court of appeals was correct to look to Badger to determine whether Brookside properly preserved the issue for appeal. As Badger explains, in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. 966 P.2d at 847. Badger sets forth three specific factors which help determine whether the trial court had such an opportunity: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). While the court of appeals correctly cites Badger for the preservation standard, it misinterprets Badger as requiring an appellant to raise issues more than once at the trial court level, even after the trial court has already ruled on the issue. Badger does not require this. Under Badger, once trial counsel has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal. See id.; see also, e.g., Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, ¶¶ 15-17, 2 P.3d 442 (holding that appellant need not have filed post-judgment motion to preserve issue for appeal where issue was briefed in summary judgment memorandum and other pleadings). ¶ 15 In the instant case, Brookside raised its bona fide purchaser argument before the trial court such that the court had an opportunity to rule on the issue. Specifically, Brookside raised the argument during the initial summary judgment phase of the trial court proceedings in its memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment and in its reply. Raising the issue in this fashion (1) was timely, (2) specifically raised the legal argument, and (3) provided relevant legal authority on the issue to the trial court. See Badger, 966 P.2d at 847. Thus, because the trial court had an opportunity to rule on the issue, in accordance with Badger, Brookside properly preserved this argument. See id. ¶ 16 Notwithstanding the fact that Brookside's bona fide purchaser argument was properly preserved, however, because the issue is moot we decline to address it. Ordinarily we will not adjudicate issues when the underlying case is moot. A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants. Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 25, 16 P.3d 1233 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The jury found that a lease existed between Peebles and the Park, and that the lease had not been surrendered. Brookside does not challenge these findings on appeal. The Residency Act provides that a mobile home park may not terminate a lease upon any ground other than as specified in this chapter. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(1) (Supp.2001). Therefore, the lease can be terminated only in accordance with the Act. The purchase of a mobile home park by a buyer who does not know about an existing lease or who assumes a leasethe essence of Brookside's bona fide purchaser argumentis not a ground specified in the Act. See § 57-16-5(1). Consequently, regardless of the viability of Brookside's bona fide purchaser argument, summary judgment on that basis would be inappropriate. Because this issue cannot affect the rights of the parties, it is moot, and we decline to address it further. See Ellis, 2000 UT 101 at ¶ 25, 16 P.3d 1233.