Opinion ID: 1945434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative Standing

Text: Jurisprudence concerning legislative standing is sparse but instructive. The seminal case in Pennsylvania addressing the standing of a legislator to invoke the authority of the court is Wilt v. Beal, 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 298, 363 A.2d 876 (1976). W. William Wilt, a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Public Welfare and the State Treasurer from taking steps to operate an unused geriatric center as a mental health care facility. In his original complaint filed in the Commonwealth Court, Representative Wilt alleged only his standing to sue as a taxpayer of the Commonwealth. Preliminary objections were filed to the complaint challenging Wilt's standing to sue. Following a hearing, Wilt was granted leave to file an amended complaint to assert his standing as a legislator, in addition to his status as a taxpayer. The preliminary objections to the complaint were stayed pending the amendment of the complaint. In considering the preliminary objections, the Commonwealth Court examined federal cases that had recognized the standing of a legislator to sue in limited circumstances. The Commonwealth Court observed that standing had been granted to legislators in cases asserting claims that their unique legislative powers had been infringed. Thus, the court noted, legislative standing had been recognized where an individual legislator alleged a deprivation of his right to vote to override a veto, and where state senators had challenged an illegal tie-breaking vote cast by a lieutenant governor. Legislative standing was not extended, however, where legislators' votes had been duly counted but the legislators claimed the effectiveness of the legislation had been impaired by some subsequent event. The Commonwealth Court in Wilt summarized its review as follows: What emerges from this review of the federal cases is the principle that legislators, as legislators, are granted standing to challenge executive actions when specific powers unique to their functions under the Constitution are diminished or interfered with. Once, however, votes which they are entitled to make have been cast and duly counted, their interest as legislators ceases. Some other nexus must then be found to challenge the allegedly unlawful action. We find this distinction to be sound for it is clear that certain additional duties are placed upon members of the legislative branch which find no counterpart in the duties placed upon the citizens the legislators represent. These duties have their origin in the Constitution and in that sense create constitutional powers to enforce those duties. Such powers are in addition to what we normally speak of as the constitutional rights enjoyed by all citizens. To give but one familiar example, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, members of the Senate have the duty to approve or disapprove certain appointments made by the Governor. Interference with the performance of this duty would be an injury to members of the Senate sufficient to give each senator standing to protect the injury to his or her constitutional right to vote for or against confirmation of an executive appointee. 363 A.2d at 881 (footnotes omitted). The Wilt court therefore sustained the preliminary objections, concluding that Wilt lacked legislative standing to seek to enjoin the use of the geriatric center. The court specifically rejected Wilt's assertion that he had been deprived of the effectiveness of his vote because the purpose of the legislation for which he had voted had been frustrated, noting that such a claim is no different from the interest that each citizen has in the law's proper execution: However, once Wilt's vote had been duly counted and the bill signed into law, his connection with the transaction as a legislator was at an end. Therefore, he retains no personal stake, as required by William Penn, supra, in the outcome of his vote which is different from the stake each citizen has in seeing the law observed. He therefore has no standing to sue in his capacity as a legislator. 363 A.2d at 881. [4] This Court addressed legislative standing in Zemprelli v. Daniels, 496 Pa. 247, 436 A.2d 1165 (1981). Zemprelli involved a petition for review in the nature of a quo warranto action that was filed with this Court by five state senators seeking to remove an individual from a seat on the State Tax Equalization Board. The individual's nomination, which was submitted by the Governor, required the confirmation of a majority of the members elected to the Senate. The nomination received 25 yeas and 22 nays. The President of the Senate found that the requisite vote of a constitutional majority had been obtained and ruled that the appointment was confirmed. The presiding officer's ruling was objected to by State Senator Edward P. Zemprelli, who claimed that the constitutional majority should be computed on the basis of the total number of senators authorized for election, i.e., 50, rather than the total number of 48 senators then serving in office. The Senate President ruled that the nomination had achieved the majority vote required under Article IV, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as the Pennsylvania Code defined a majority of the senators elected to include those who were elected, living, sworn, and seated. The ruling was sustained by a vote of the Senate. After the senators' petition for review was filed, the respondents challenged the standing of the senators to maintain the action. The respondents alleged that the senators had failed to plead the special interest required of private parties seeking to bring a quo warranto action, and that the senators did not have any interest greater than that of the public at large. The respondents argued that the senators were afforded the opportunity to exercise their power as legislators by voting on the nominee and that their special interest ceased to exist after they had voted. The senators responded that since the gubernatorial appointment required the confirmation of a majority of the senators, each senator had the individual right to confirm or reject certain gubernatorial nominees. The senators argued that their right, therefore, was an interest in the appointments separate from the interest of the general public. The Zemprelli Court rejected the respondents' argument that the senators' special interest expired upon casting their votes, stating that, [w]here the voting process itself is not, as here, under attack, this argument might be persuasive. 436 A.2d at 1167. But, since the senators' petition proceeded on the basis that their votes were effectively diluted by the Senate President's interpretation of the constitutional majority requirement, the Court concluded that the action presented a claim of cognizable injury to the objecting senators in their legislative capacity. The Court then held that the senators had alleged a sufficient interest in the outcome of the action to establish standing. Also instructive is City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75 (2004), wherein the City of Philadelphia and its Mayor challenged the legality of amendments to Pennsylvania's Parking Authority Law. Prior to the General Assembly's enactment of the amendments, the Philadelphia Parking Authority was controlled by a five-member governing board appointed by the City's Mayor. The amendments included a special provision, applicable only to Philadelphia, that supplanted the Mayor's appointive powers over the governing board and granted the appointment authority to the Governor. The original members of the governing board that had previously been appointed by the Mayor were to continue to serve out their terms, but no new members could be appointed by the Mayor. The number of members also was increased immediately from five to eleven, which granted the Governor appointment authority over a majority of the board positions. The complaint asserted in its first count that the amendments violated the City's home-rule rights under Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the First Class Home Rule Act, and the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. The City and the Mayor asserted, inter alia, that the ordinances by which the City created and expanded the Parking Authority provided for continued City control over the authority through mayoral appointment powers. In the remaining counts of their complaint, the City and the Mayor asserted that the General Assembly had violated a binding statutory pledge in the Parking Authority Law to deny parking authorities the power to harm the security of bondholders, and not to alter the rights of parking authorities until all of its outstanding bonds were retired. The appellees filed preliminary objections, asserting that the City lacked standing and raising demurrers to all counts. The Commonwealth Court granted the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. On appeal to this Court, the appellees conceded that the Mayor had standing to pursue the issues raised in the complaint's first count, but contended that the City did not have standing. Since the standing of the Mayor had been conceded, this Court deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the City also had standing as to the first count. With respect to the remaining counts, the appellees argued that the Mayor and the City did not have standing as neither had claimed to be a bondholder. We separately considered the standing of each party, and determined that the Mayor did not have standing, although the City had established standing, stating: As to standing, we agree with Appellees that the Mayor has not identified any discernible interest that could be affected by the alleged harms reflected in these counts, as he does not claim to be a bondholder or specify any manner in which the powers or obligations of his office have been altered. Therefore, he lacks standing to raise Counts II-V of the amended complaint. The City, however, asserts that it is the guarantor of the Parking Authority's bonds and, as such, is subject to an augmented financial risk due to the latter's mandate to transfer substantial funds to the Philadelphia School District. We find this interest sufficient to confer standing upon the City relative to these counts of the complaint. 858 A.2d at 89 (emphasis supplied). Although City of Philadelphia did not involve legislative standing, the focus on the powers or obligations of the mayor's office reinforces the proper foundational approach when a public official seeks standing based upon his official status. Finally, we find persuasive the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the recent case of Common Cause of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 558 F.3d 249 (C.A.3 2009), on the issue of a state legislator's standing. [5] In Common Cause, the plaintiffs, who included a state legislator, two associations, and several individuals, filed a federal complaint against Commonwealth officials, challenging the enactment of now-repealed Act 44, a statute that increased the compensation of state legislators, executive officials and judges. [6] The plaintiffs alleged that the timing and method of Act 44's passage deprived them of due process and equal protection. The defendants moved for dismissal of the action, raising the plaintiffs' lack of standing. The district court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that all of the plaintiffs, including the state legislator, failed to establish both constitutional and prudential standing. With respect to the prudential limits on standing, the court explained that allegations that raise only `generalized grievances about the conduct of government' and are predicated on the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to the law' are insufficient to demonstrate standing. Id. at 259 quoting, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479-83, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Drawing a distinction between those claims brought by legislators that allege a concrete injury and establish standing from claims that assert a mere generalized grievance and do not allege a concrete injury, the court observed that claims that assert that a legislator's vote or official authority has been impaired or nullified fall into the former category, thereby supporting standing. Id. at 266, citing, e.g., Russell v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that courts have held that legislator has standing to challenge nullification of his vote due to legally protected interest in his right to vote on legislation and other matters committed to legislature) and Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.1984) (legislators had standing to challenge governor's appointment without consulting legislators based on allegations that legislators had a specific right under federal statutory law to provide advice and consent on appointment and no clear recourse through political process). Applying these principles to the state legislator's claims, which were premised on the contention that the defendants denied him and other legislators the ability to discuss, debate, and perhaps amend Act 44 before having to vote on the legislation, the court determined that his claims were a clear example of one of those `abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to `generalized grievances, pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches[.]' Id. at 267 quoting, Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752. Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court, concluding that the state legislator did not satisfy prudential standing concerns. Id. See also Goode v. City of Philadelphia, 539 F.3d 311, 319 (3d Cir. 2008) (denying standing to City Council in suit challenging settlement agreement reached by City with billboard operators concerning regulation of billboards in City; noting that City Council's allegations concerned City's lack of enforcement of ordinances already enacted by Council and therefore amounted to only generalized complaints about the functioning of government so that [City Council] ha[s] no different legally cognizable interest in the subject matter of the action than anyone else in Philadelphia). The existing case law addressing legislative standing reflects a sensible approach. Legislators and council members have been permitted to bring actions based upon their special status where there was a discernible and palpable infringement on their authority as legislators. The standing of a legislator or council member to bring a legal challenge has been recognized in limited instances in order to permit the legislator to seek redress for an injury the legislator or council member claims to have suffered in his official capacity, rather than as a private citizen. Legislative standing has been recognized in the context of actions brought to protect a legislator's right to vote on legislation or a council member's viable authority to approve municipal action. Legislative standing also has been recognized in actions alleging a diminution or deprivation of the legislator's or council member's power or authority. At the same time, however, legislative standing has not been recognized in actions seeking redress for a general grievance about the correctness of governmental conduct.
Turning to the state legislators' Petition for Review, we begin with Claim I, which alleges that the General Assembly has the sole and exclusive authority to grant a license for use of the submerged lands at issue, and therefore the City acted without legal authority in issuing HSP the submerged lands license. [7] The state legislators allege that the General Assembly repealed the City of Philadelphia's statutory authority to license submerged lands and that, accordingly, only the General Assembly now holds the licensing authority. Thus, they argue that [b]y granting a license to occupy Commonwealth lands, the Commerce Director of the City of Philadelphia usurped the [appellants'] legislative authority to convey those lands and deprived them of the ability to exercise their constitutional mandate to make basic policy decisions about Commonwealth lands held in trust for the public. State Legislators' Brief in Opposition to Application for Summary Relief of HSP Gaming L.P. at 5-6. We conclude that the state legislators have legislative standing to pursue Claim I. The state legislators seek redress for an alleged usurpation of their authority as members of the General Assembly; aim to vindicate a power that only the General Assembly allegedly has; and ask that this Court uphold their right as legislators to cast a vote or otherwise make a decision on licensing the use of the Commonwealth's submerged lands. Thus, the claim reflects the state legislators' interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their legislative authority and their vote, and for this reason, falls within the realm of the type of claim that legislators, qua legislators, have standing to pursue. The same cannot be said, however, of Claim II, which alleges that the Commerce Director's decision was inconsistent with the licensing authority Act 321 provides because HSP intends to construct a portion of its casino upon submerged lands and HSP should have been required to present evidence of deed or title. In this claim, the state legislators allege only that the City did not act properly in exercising its statutory authority to license. The claim reflects nothing more than the state legislators' disagreement with the way in which the Commerce Director interpreted and executed her duties on behalf of the City. The claim does not demonstrate any interference with or diminution in the state legislators' authority as members of the General Assembly. As such, Claim II is only a generalized grievance about the conduct of government that all citizens share. Thus, we conclude that the state legislators lack standing to pursue Claim II.
With respect to the standing of City Council and Councilman DiCicco, we conclude that they, unlike the state legislators, do not have legislative standing to pursue the claim that the City was without authority to issue the submerged lands license to HSP. In their claim, City Council and Councilman DiCicco do not allege that their vote or official authority was undercut by the Commerce Director's action nor do they seek to restore the prerogatives of their office. Further, they have not identified a specific legally protected interest, arising from their status as local legislators, that has been interfered with or diminished by the Commerce Director's decision. All that City Council and Councilman DiCicco allege is that as an elected municipal legislative body, City Council has not only the right, but an obligation to Philadelphia residents to make basic inquiries about the impact that construction of the gaming facility will have on City residents. While the asserted obligation may be accurate politically, it provides no basis for legislative standing to challenge the lawfulness of an executive decision premised upon a power granted by a statute passed by the General Assembly, a statute which contemplates no role for City Council. City Council does not assert that it has the executive authority in Philadelphia to issue riparian licenses. Indeed, City Council does not have any authority under the Philadelphia Code to consider, approve, or disapprove applications made to the Department of Commerce pursuant to Phila. Code. § 18-103. Nor does City Council have authority, under the Gaming Act, to second-guess the Gaming Board's selection of sites for casino licenses. In summary, we conclude that while the state legislators, based on their status as legislators, have standing to pursue the claim that the City's issuance of the submerged lands license was unauthorized, City Council and Councilman DiCicco do not. [8] We further conclude that the state legislators do not have legislative standing to pursue a claim that the Commerce Director did not properly apply Act 321 since their interests in seeking enforcement of their preferred interpretation of Act 321 are no different from a private citizen's interest in securing obedience to the law. Although the state legislators could certainly seek to participate as amicus curiae in a properly instituted challenge to the Commerce Director's decision, that decision caused them no injury in their status as legislators.