Opinion ID: 215414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Collateral Estoppel, Res Judicata, and Law of the Case

Text: First, this Court never reviewed the particular charges on which the Committee based its discipline. Instead, in the appeal from Judge Baer's sanction order, this Court stated that it need only review a sampling of Peters's conduct to affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions, and then discussed three charges not now at issue. Wolters Kluwer, 564 F.3d at 116, 118-19. The Court then concluded as follows: Having reviewed these three instances, we see no need to consider the other sanctions for which the district court issued reprimands. No likely argument has been advanced as to why the other nineteen sanctions are defective, and because the sanctions are all non-monetary, the subtraction of one or another from the whole course of conduct would not alter the nature or tenor of the district court's rulings. Id. at 119. Although the Court saw no likely argument concerning the sanctioned conduct presently at issue, the Court nonetheless made clear that appellate review had been limited to the sampling of conduct explicitly discussed in the opinion. We therefore disagree with the Grievance Committee's statements that Judge Baer's conclusions regarding the incident involving Mr. Brackett . . . have been affirmed by the Second Circuit, In re Peters, M-2-238, doc. 193 at 5, and that [t]he Second Circuit affirmed all of the sanctions on Ms. Peters, id. at 7. Thus, the Committee was incorrect to rely on such preclusion doctrines as collateral estoppel and res judicata in finding that it need not hold its own hearing. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 94 F.3d 747, 754 (2d Cir.1996) (It is a well-established principle of federal law that if an appellate court considers only one of a lower court's alternative bases for its holding, affirming the judgment without reaching the alternative bases, only the basis that is actually considered can have any preclusive effect in subsequent litigation.); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986) ([I]f an appeal is taken and the appellate court affirms on one ground and disregards the other, there is no collateral estoppel as to the unreviewed ground.); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. o (1982). The Committee also relied on the law of the case doctrine in finding that it need not hold its own hearing. The law of the case doctrine, although not binding, counsels a court against revisiting its prior rulings in subsequent stages of the same case absent `cogent' and `compelling' reasons, including, inter alia, the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000)). We need not address whether the present matter is the same case as Judge Baer's sanctions proceeding because, even assuming arguendo that the doctrine could apply, the present issues are sufficiently compelling to warrant revisiting the Brackett allegation. See id.