Opinion ID: 2972888
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court’s Jurisdiction

Text: A district court’s denial of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). “[A] defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995). It is not fatal to the defendants’ appeal that the district court based its holding on the existence of genuine issues of material fact, as “[t]his court has recognized the standard articulated by the Supreme Court: ‘regardless of the district court’s reasons for denying qualified immunity, we may exercise jurisdiction over the ... appeal to the extent it raises questions of law.’” Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689-90 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, despite the label used by the district court, this court can consider whether “the undisputed facts or the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to establish a prima facie violation of clear constitutional law.” Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998). Because this court does not have appellate jurisdiction over factual issues, a defendant must “concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.” Berryman, 150 F.3d at 563. In compliance with this rule, the brief submitted by Simpson, White, Crouse and Chief Kitchen specifically noted that it is their position on appeal that “the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference on the part of the Defendants.” (Final Reply Brief Of Defendants/Appellants Chief Kitchen, Officer Paul Simpson, Dispatcher Jason White, And Cadet Crouse, (“Ferndale Defendants’ Reply Brief”) at 2.) Thus, the court may hear the Ferndale defendants’ appeal. -5- With regard to the plaintiff’s claims against Thomson, the court notes that Thomson continues to argue on appeal that Bradley’s actions were not sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that he was possibly suicidal. (Defendant-Apellant Thomson’s Brief On Appeal, (“Thomson’s Brief”), at 18.) The plaintiff argues that because Thomson failed to concede the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, this court is deprived of jurisdiction. (Plaintiff-Appellee’s Final Consolidated Brief On Appeal, (“Appellee’s Brief”), at 30.) This proposition is arguably supported by language in Booher v. Northern Kentucky University Board of Regents, 163 F.3d 395, 396-97 (6th Cir. 1999), and Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 1998). If, however, aside from the impermissible arguments regarding disputes of fact, the defendant also raises “the ‘purely legal’ question of ‘whether the facts alleged ... support a claim of violation of clearly established law,’” Berryman, 150 F.3d at 562 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985)), then there is an issue over which this court has jurisdiction. Therefore, this court can ignore Thomson’s attempts to dispute the facts and, nonetheless, resolve the legal issue, obviating the need to dismiss the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 602 n. 5 (6th Cir. 2005).