Opinion ID: 203163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substantive Objections.

Text: We turn next to the appellants' substantive objections, which are addressed to the December IEP. We subdivide this discussion into four segments to match the appellants' asseverational array. 1. Incorrect Legal Standard. The appellants insist that the lower court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard. Specifically, they argue that, in the area of transition services, the Rowley standard has been supplanted by the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, see IDEA Amendments for 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37, but the court failed to recognize this development. To put this argument into perspective, we start with the Rowley Court's mandate that IEP components must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The appellants contend that Congress, in 1997, raised the bar for IEP transition services, directing that those services must result in actual and substantial progress toward integrating disabled children into society. Existing precedent forecloses this contention. In Lt. T.B., the parents advanced a similar though slightly more ambitious thesis; they posited that, given Congress's statement of goals, the 1997 amendments must have replaced the Rowley standard across the board with a requirement that an IEP furnish a disabled child with the maximum benefit available. 361 F.3d at 83. We flatly rejected that thesis, noting that it had no support in the text of the amendments and that no other court of appeals, post-1997, had exhibited a willingness to scuttle the Rowley standard. Id. For aught that appears, the decision in Lt. T.B. remains good law. [5] To the interpretive mix presented in Lt. T.B., the appellants add only an allusion to the amendments' definition of transition services. In relevant part, the amendments defined that term to mean a coordinated set of activities for a student with a disability that is designed within an outcome-oriented process, which promotes movement from school to post-school activities. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A). The appellants theorize that an outcome-oriented process must mean a process that actually achieves substantial progress toward that outcome and, thus, the 1997 amendments must to this extent have superseded the Rowley standard. The appellants read far too much into Congress's 1997 definition of transition services. It seems obvious to us that the word process denotes a praxis or procedure; it does not imply a substantive standard or a particular measure of progress. The adjectival phrase outcome-oriented is similarly agnostic with respect to ultimate results; it specifies the perspective that participants in the process should strive to attain but does not establish a standard for evaluating the fruits of that process. For these reasons, we decline the appellants' invitation to defenestrate the Rowley standard. The district court did not apply an incorrect legal rule in evaluating the adequacy of the transition services limned in Stephanie's final IEP. 2. Literacy. The appellants' next claim relates to Stephanie's proposed reading program. In their view, the School District's literacy methodology produced a level of progress categorically beneath what their daughter was capable of attaining. Since superior methodologies were readily available (in particular the LiPS system advocated by Dr. Kemper), the School District's chosen methodology denied Stephanie a FAPE. It is difficult to prevail on a claim of this nature. The Supreme Court has pointed out with conspicuous clarity that the IDEA confers primary responsibility upon state and local educational agencies to choose among competing pedagogical methodologies and to select the method most suitable to a particular child's needs. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, added that it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to [the IDEA]. Id. at 207-08, 102 S.Ct. 3034. After all, courts lack the specialized knowledge and experience needed to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy. Id. at 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, once a court determines that the requirements of the [IDEA] have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States. Id. Rowley sends a very clear message. The short of it is that courts are entrusted with ascertaining the adequacy of an IEP's educational components but not with weighing the comparative merit of the components when stacked against other heuristic methods. See, e.g., Lt. T.B., 361 F.3d at 86; G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir.1991). In an effort to expand the scope of judicial intervention, the appellants resort to an esoteric definition of appropriate educational theories, which they equate with theories that produce results. They do not contest that Stephanie was the beneficiary of a standard, multisensory reading methodology. Nevertheless, they argue that since Dr. Kemper concluded that Stephanie had progressed very little under that methodology, it was, a fortiori, inappropriate. This construct inverts the rule of decision. Actual educational progress can (and sometimes will) demonstrate that an IEP provides a FAPE. See, e.g., Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209-10, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Nack, 454 F.3d at 612; see also Roland M., 910 F.2d at 991 (explaining that actual educational results are relevant to determining the efficacy of educators' policy choices). But to impose the inverse of this rule  that a lack of progress necessarily betokens an IEP's inadequacy  would contradict the fundamental concept that [a]n IEP is a snapshot, not a retrospective. Roland M., 910 F.2d at 992. Where, as here, a school system develops an IEP component in reliance upon a widely-accepted methodology, an inquiring court ought not to condemn that methodology ex post merely because the disabled child's progress does not meet the parents' or the educators' expectations. See Lachman v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir.1988). If more were needed  and we doubt that it is  we remark the district court's finding that Stephanie had been making reasonable progress in reading. See Lessard, 2007 WL 1221103, at . That finding is fully supportable: in his testimony at the due process hearing, Stephanie's reading teacher painted a far more positive picture than did Dr. Kemper, testifying that Stephanie had been making steady headway. The hearing officer and the district court were entitled to accept that assessment. After all, levels of progress must be judged with respect to the potential of the particular child. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermed. Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 185 (3d Cir.1988). So here: while the reported progress is modest by most standards, it is reasonable in the context of Stephanie's manifold disabilities and low IQ. That disposes of the literacy-related claim. On this record, we are compelled to conclude that, in the subject area of reading, the proffered IEP afforded Stephanie educational benefits consistent with a FAPE. 3. Transition Services. The appellants voice dissatisfaction with the transition services component of the December IEP. They claim that this component was too generic and that a personalized IEP tailored to Stephanie's needs would necessarily have contained relatively intense services in community-based settings to prepare her to be a contributing member of society. Appellants' Br. at 43. They acknowledge that the IEP provided for monthly field trips into the community, but aver that those trips were inadequate because behavior problems often prevented Stephanie from participating in them. In our estimation, the district court did not clearly err in finding the panoply of transition services adequate. See Lessard, 2007 WL 1221103, at . In addition to the scheduled field trips, the December IEP incorporated a wide array of other transition services. These included six hours of pre-vocational training each week and regular instruction in specific transition-related skills (such as using a telephone, identifying workers in community settings, maintaining proper self-hygiene, and preparing food). This regimen apparently had some efficacy; the district court found that Stephanie's transition skills were improving. See id. In an effort to blunt the force of this reasoning, the appellants argue that a specific service  activities conducted in community settings  failed adequately to provide educational benefits in an important area of need. Though artfully framed, this argument fails for two reasons. First, in considering the adequacy of a myriad of transition services, an inquiring court must view those services in the aggregate and in light of the child's overall needs. See, e.g., Rettig v. Kent City Sch. Dist., 788 F.2d 328, 332 (7th Cir.1986). The test is whether the IEP, taken in its entirety, is reasonably calculated to enable the particular child to garner educational benefits. See id.; Karl v. Bd. of Educ. of Geneseo Cent. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 873, 877 (2d Cir.1984). Were the law otherwise, parents could endlessly parse IEPs into highly particularized components and circumvent the general rule that parents cannot unilaterally dictate the content of their child's IEP. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Lachman, 852 F.2d at 297. The second reason why the appellants' argument founders is that the district court concluded that the extant community-oriented services, when evaluated in conjunction with the IEP's other transition services, furnished Stephanie with the requisite educational benefit. Lessard, 2007 WL 1221103, at . This finding is not clearly erroneous. While we can accept the possibility that monthly field trips might not be an ideal service component given Stephanie's needs, the IDEA does not require an ideal or optimal IEP, simply an adequate one. See Five Town, 513 F.3d at 284-85; Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1086. 4. Behavioral Plan. The appellants' last substantive objection focuses on the supposed inadequacy of the IEP's behavioral plan. This objection fails for reasons already discussed: no behavioral plan is required for purposes of this IEP. See supra Part IV(A); see also Alex R., 375 F.3d at 614.