Opinion ID: 151577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Leadership Role Enhancements

Text: The Gilmans each challenge the sentence enhancements they received for holding leadership roles in the gambling business. We review “the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of this case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 997 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Gilmans argue that their sentence enhancements resulted from impermissible double counting because both the crime of conducting an illegal gambling business and the adjustment for holding a leadership position in a criminal activity require at least five participants. 18 U.S.C. § 1955; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. The enhancement does not involve double counting because it includes an element distinct from the crime itself, namely a leadership role. “If . . . it is possible to be sentenced under a particular offense guideline without having engaged in a certain sort of behavior, such behavior may be used to enhance the offense level, for in this situation, the guideline’s base offense level will not 19 necessarily have been set to capture the full extent of the wrongfulness of such behavior.” United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993). A leadership role is not a necessary element of the crime of “conduct[ing], financ[ing], supervis[ing], direct[ing], or own[ing] all or part of an illegal gambling business.” 18 U.S.C. § 1955. It is possible, for example, to finance such a business without organizing, leading, managing, or supervising it. Thus, the application of the leadership role adjustment does not involve impermissible double counting. Douglas Gilman, Sr., challenges the factual basis for the district court’s imposition of a four-point enhancement for his role as an “organizer or leader” of the gambling business. Even if Douglas Gilman, Sr., were correct that he did not own the business or receive the largest share of the proceeds, the enhancement would still be appropriate based on evidence in the record that he directed Charles Gilman to set up the tent, ordered the payoffs to Terragna, and parceled out to the workers tips from gamblers who sat in the shade of the tent. On this evidence, the district court’s finding that Douglas Gilman, Sr., was an organizer or leader was not clearly erroneous. William Gilman also challenges the factual basis for his three-point “manager or supervisor” adjustment. The court relied on evidence that William operated dice tables, received proceeds from the chicken fights, and could choose 20 his method of payment.2 This evidence did not necessarily mean that he qualified for the “manager or supervisor” adjustment. “To qualify for an adjustment under [U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1], the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2 (emphasis added). We must vacate a sentence that imposes this enhancement absent evidence that the defendant supervised another participant. See United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2003). In determining whether the requirement of supervising another participant has been met, “the court must focus on what the defendant did, in relation to at least one other participant, in the commission of the offense.” United States v. Jordan, 291 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 655 (1st Cir. 1996)). The district court examined the evidence concerning what William did in relation to the business’s customers, but pointed to no evidence that he supervised another participant in the 2 The probation office recommended William Gilman’s “manager or supervisor” adjustment based on a disputed portion of the presentence report. The district court did not clearly rule on the dispute, but we conclude that the district court complied with Rule 32 by indicating that it would “proceed with the understanding that William Gilman was not involved in putting up or taking down . . . the equipment that was used at the chicken fights.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3) (allowing the district court to avoid ruling on a disputed portion of the presentence report by deciding that “the court will not consider the matter in sentencing”). 21 business. The customers who placed bets at William’s table were not “participants” in the illegal gambling business. “A ‘participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” Woods, 335 F.3d at 1001 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1). Thus, the district court erred by imposing the “manager or supervisor” enhancement in calculating the advisory guideline range for William. We vacate his sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing. See Jordan, 291 F.3d at 1099.