Opinion ID: 844220
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Juror P.J.

Text: Jury selection began with the excusal of prospective jurors who established that service would cause an unusual hardship. The prospective jurors remaining in the jury panel completed a 27-page questionnaire by answering 125 questions, one of which asked them to state their “race and ethnic origin.” The prospective jurors were then divided into groups and examined on voir dire, during which the parties exercised challenges for cause. In the final phase, the names of the remaining prospective jurors were placed in a random order on a computer-generated list that was provided to counsel. After the first 12 prospective jurors on the list were seated in the jury box, both parties proceeded to exercise peremptory challenges against the seated jurors, with each side having 20 challenges. As each challenge was exercised, another juror was called in order from the list to occupy the seat of the juror removed by challenge. When the defense had exhausted its peremptories, and the prosecution had accepted the jury as then constituted (after exercising 17 of its 20 peremptories), the 12 jurors seated in the box were sworn to try the case. Four alternate jurors were then selected in the same manner, with each side receiving four peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used her 10th peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror P.J., an African-American woman. The defense raised a Batson/Wheeler objection, noting that P.J. was the “only Black juror who has been called” into the jury box. The trial court asked the prosecutor to state her reason for the challenge. 28 The prosecutor answered: “May I see her questionnaire, and I‟ll tell you exactly why. [¶] I remember her. Because I felt that she was weak on death when I first read her. And I‟m kicking off everybody that I feel — that I perceive as being weak on death from the questionnaire. [¶] And since we didn‟t — I realize I didn‟t get a chance to really talk to her because we were running at the end of the day. She appeared at the end of the day when we were talking to her. The defense never talked to her about death. [¶] So from — all we have as to her feelings on death is what she wrote in this questionnaire. And it‟s apparent from the questionnaire she‟s weak on death.” Defense counsel did not dispute the prosecutor‟s statements, and the trial court overruled the defense objection, stating: “I think counsel is entitled to exercise her discretion in exercising the peremptories. And I‟m satisfied from [the prosecutor]‟s explanation that she is not excluding her because of race, but because of her answers to the questionnaire.” Because the prosecutor explained her reason for the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror P.J., and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing is moot. (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 165; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 471.) We therefore proceed directly to the third step of the Batson/Wheeler analysis. Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s finding that the prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination by peremptorily challenging Prospective Juror P.J. On her questionnaire, when asked to describe her “opinion regarding the death penalty,” P.J. wrote: “I feel a little uneasy with the death penalty, never really gave it a deep thought.” Asked to describe her “opinion regarding life in prison without the possibility of parole,” she wrote: “A little more comfortable with that . . . as it is not taking a life.” In answer to another question, she wrote that she thought that life without parole was “worse for a 29 defendant” than death because “with death it‟s over — life in prison is like a living death.” During voir dire, neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor directed any questions to P.J. Given the questionnaire answers just quoted, the prosecutor could reasonably conclude that Prospective Juror P.J. would be reluctant to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. P.J.‟s written answers revealed that she was “uneasy” with the death penalty because it involved taking a life, while she would be “more comfortable” voting for life without parole because it did not involve taking a life. Moreover, she might vote for the penalty of life without parole on the rationale that it was actually more severe than the death penalty. A prospective juror‟s reluctance to vote for a penalty verdict of death is a permissible, race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 472.) Defendant argues that a comparison of Prospective Juror P.J.‟s questionnaire answers with those of non-African-American prospective jurors whom the prosecutor did not peremptorily challenge demonstrates that the prosecutor‟s stated reason for striking P.J. was pretextual. Defendant‟s failure to make this argument in the trial court does not preclude our consideration of it on appeal, but “we are mindful that comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record has inherent limitations.” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622.) “One of the problems of comparative juror analysis not raised at trial is that the prosecutor generally has not provided, and was not asked to provide, an explanation for nonchallenges. When asked to engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, a reviewing court need not, indeed, must not turn a blind eye to reasons the record discloses for not challenging other jurors 30 even if those other jurors are similar in some respects to excused jurors.” (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 365-366.) Defendant asserts that Prospective Juror P.J.‟s questionnaire responses indicating reluctance to impose the death penalty were “substantively indistinguishable” from those of Jurors S.S., S.G., R.L., and C.G., none of whom were challenged by the prosecutor. S.S., S.G., and R.L. were impaneled on the trial jury; C.G. was selected as an alternate juror. When asked by the questionnaire to express her “opinion regarding the death penalty,” Juror S.S. wrote: “I don‟t know if I could sentence someone to the death penalty. I would have to weigh all the circumstances presented.” Asked for her “opinion regarding life in prison without the possibility of parole,” she wrote: “I am in favor of this, I believe this would be a lesser sentence than the death penalty.” We agree that these answers imply a reluctance to impose the death penalty comparable to that implied by Prospective Juror P.J.‟s answers to the same questions. Unlike P.J., however, S.S. viewed punishment by death as “worse for a defendant” than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because “with life in prison they will continue to live the rest of their life behind bars.” She affirmed that she would not automatically vote against the death penalty, and that she would “listen to all the facts.” Asked again by defense counsel whether “there are some instances when you could vote for the death penalty,” S.S. answered, “Yes.” She also said that she had never thought about the death penalty before she came to court that week. During voir dire by the prosecutor, when asked whether she thought she could impose the death penalty if she “felt it was appropriate,” S.S. answered, “Yes, yes, I do.” Asked whether she thought that, with regard to penalty, “anybody is at a disadvantage with your frame of mind, someone with your frame of mind being on the jury,” she answered, “No.” 31 These voir dire responses, during which the prosecutor was able to evaluate Juror S.S.‟s demeanor, together with her questionnaire response stating that she regarded death as a more severe punishment than life imprisonment without possibility of parole, sufficiently distinguish S.S. from Prospective Juror P.J. Juror S.G., when asked for her “opinion regarding the death penalty,” wrote on her questionnaire: “I don‟t think it serves its purpose — it is no punishment for the criminal, but for the people he leaves behind.” Her opinion of life imprisonment without parole was that it “is more a punishment knowing you have to [spend] the rest of your life behind bars.” Asked whether “death in the gas chamber is a severe punishment,” she checked the box “No,” adding, “I believe the person is punished while waiting to be put to death — but once dead there is no punishment.” She thought life without parole would be “worse for a defendant” because “a person would hurt more by knowing he-she would never be free.” These questionnaire responses by Juror S.G. are similar in some ways to those of Prospective Juror P.J. Unlike P.J., however, S.G. did not express discomfort with the death penalty on the basis that it involved “taking a life.” Rather, she expressed her reluctance entirely in terms of her view that death was less severe than life without parole because punishment would cease at the time of death. The prosecutor could reasonably regard that view, which S.G. reiterated on voir dire, as more favorable to the prosecution than the view of Prospective Juror P.J. Moreover, unlike P.J., who did not indicate on her questionnaire that she had any friends or relatives in law enforcement, S.G. wrote on her questionnaire that her husband was a detective employed by the Los Angeles Police Department, that she had “seen pictures on homicide cases my husband brough[t] home to work on,” and that one of the “most important problems in the current criminal justice system” was that “some punishments are not severe enough.” These responses 32 also distinguish S.G. from P.J. and provide a race-neutral explanation for the prosecutor‟s nonchallenge of S.G. Juror R.L., on her questionnaire, described her “opinion regarding the death penalty” as “unsure.” She provided the same one-word description of her opinion regarding life without parole. She considered life without parole “worse for a defendant” than death, but she provided no explanation for that view. These questionnaire responses differ significantly from those of Prospective Juror P.J. They do not indicate a reluctance to vote for the death penalty on the basis that it involves “taking a life.” On voir dire, moreover, when asked why she wrote that she was “unsure” about her views on the death penalty and life without parole, R.L. gave this explanation: “I meant at this time I couldn‟t give you an answer as to would I or wouldn‟t I. I would have to hear all the facts before I could answer that question.” When the prosecutor asked whether the questionnaire response meant that R.L. was unsure whether she “believed in the death penalty,” R.L. answered, “Oh, no, no, no, no.” She added: “I mean I could vote for the death penalty. I can vote against it. I could go either way depending on the circumstances and facts and the evidence.” On further questioning, she said she “wouldn‟t favor one [penalty] over the other” and that she “look[ed] at them equally.” These responses dispel any inference that R.L. would be disinclined to vote for the death penalty. We consider, finally, Alternate Juror C.G. To describe her “opinion regarding the death penalty,” she wrote: “I am not sure, never had to really think about it, depends on case.” To describe her opinion of life without parole, she wrote: “Justice has been served.” She indicated that she regarded death as “worse for a defendant” than life without parole, but she did not explain that answer. Unlike the corresponding questionnaire responses of Prospective Juror P.J., C.G.‟s responses do not indicate discomfort with the death penalty because it involves 33 “taking a life.” On voir dire, moreover, C.G. was able to clarify her views. She affirmed that, if called upon to do so, she would “feel comfortable in deciding” the penalty question, and that nothing about the case made her “feel one way or the other now.” She said she regarded death as the “ultimate” punishment and that she would “look at the facts, the circumstances” and “read the testimony, everything.” The prosecutor asked: “Could you ever see yourself voting to impose the death penalty in a case where you have been convinced of a defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but you haven‟t been convinced of his guilt beyond all possible doubt?” C.G. answered, “Yes.” Asked whether she felt “comfortable about that,” she again answered, “Yes.” These responses sufficiently distinguish Alternate Juror C.G. from Prospective Juror P.J. Also, C.G. wrote that her brother was a police officer in Los Angeles. This provided another reasonable basis for the prosecutor to regard C.G. as a more favorable juror than P.J.