Opinion ID: 2446193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Decision to Grant Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice[8]

Text: A trial court's decision to permit a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(a)(2) [9] is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [10] Dismissal should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit. [11] Indeed, [t]o compel a favorable ruling the defendant must show a real and substantial detriment. [12] To determine whether the defendant will endure legal prejudice, i.e., a real and substantial detriment, we consider the defendant's effort and expense in trial preparation, any excessive delay or lack of diligence in prosecution of the action on the part of the plaintiffs, the sufficiency of the plaintiff's explanation for moving for dismissal, and the stage of the litigation, specifically whether a motion for summary judgment was pending. [13] Because George did not suffer legal prejudice as a result of the trial court's dismissal of this case, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion. George's strongest argument of legal prejudice is his contention that appellees will simply file this case again. [14] We have explicitly held, however, that the incidental annoyance of a second suit is not enough to prove prejudice. [15] With regard to the second factor, George has incurred expenses in defense of this suit, but the fact that the defendant may have incurred substantial expense prior to dismissal does not amount to legal prejudice. [16] The substantial expense incurred by George is mitigated by the fact that his trial preparation efforts will likely benefit him in future litigation, including his current suit in Superior Court. [17] Rule 41(a)(2) also provides for mitigation of this factor by permitting the trial judge to award the defendant costs and attorneys' fees when granting a voluntary dismissal. Indeed, such an award is customary. [18] George also fails to show that the appellees created excessive delay or demonstrated a lack of diligence, or that they presented an insufficient reason for dismissal. While appellees did cause the original hearing date to be cancelled by filing their praecipe, their effort to avoid litigation of one of the two contested issues was as likely to accelerate the proceedings as it was to cause delay. Appellees then moved to voluntarily dismiss the case because they recognized that George had already taken several significant steps to improve the care of their mother. The purpose of the Act is to promote the best interests of the incapacitated individual. [19] Appellees' explanation is thus not only sufficient, but it is the best possible reason for a dismissal of a conservator or guardianship probate matter in that it prioritizes the best interests of the incapacitated party. Lastly, appellees did not file their motion at an unreasonably late stage in this litigation and we are unpersuaded by George's contention that appellees' motion to dismiss was an improper attempt to evade a final judgment. Most denials of voluntary dismissals are justified by the fact that ... the parties were on the eve of trial, which is not the case here. [20] While appellees possibly were motivated by a desire to avoid litigating the validity of the POAs after the trial court concluded that this issue could not be circumvented, this is not a case where George had won beneficial rulings which the siblings might have wanted to eviscerate. Here, the trial judge denied George's motion for a partial summary judgment; thus, both parties presumably remained on relatively equal footing. George disputes this, arguing that the discovery produced up to the point of dismissal clearly supported his position and contending that appellees only moved for dismissal because the weight of the evidence was against them. This argument is a straw man because anything yielded by discovery in this case can, and likely will, be used in future litigation.