Opinion ID: 618612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bennett's Right To Testify and To Decide Whether To Testify

Text: With respect to the first issue as to which we granted a certificate of appealability, i.e., whether defense counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by overriding Bennett's desire to exercise his constitutional right to testify at his second trial, we begin by considering, as did the district court on the Jacobson remand, the related issue of whether Bennett was advised of his constitutional rights to testify at trial and to be the sole decider of whether or not to testify. Bennett argues, inter alia, that because he testified at the hearing that he was not so advised and because neither Gombiner nor Yankwitt remembered a specific conversation in which Bennett was so advised, the district court's finding that he was in fact so advised should be overturned. Under the standards established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for consideration of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we reject his argument and this facet of his IAC claim. At this point in the development of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987); see, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). This right, which is one of the rights that `are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process,' Rock, 483 U.S. at 51, 107 S.Ct. 2704 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)), has its roots in several provisions of the Constitution, including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony, and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, see, e.g., Rock, 483 U.S. at 51-52, 107 S.Ct. 2704. Our Court's framework for consideration of a claim that a defendant has been denied the right to testify at his criminal trial was established in Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.1997). In Brown, we held that the decision whether to testify belongs to the defendant and may not be made for him by defense counsel, id. at 78, and that defense counsel has a duty to inform the defendant of that right, see id. at 79. [D]efense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify or not to testify . . . . Although counsel should always advise the defendant about the benefits and hazards of testifying and of not testifying, and may strongly advise the course that counsel thinks best, counsel must inform the defendant that the ultimate decision whether to take the stand belongs to the defendant, and counsel must abide by the defendant's decision on this matter. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis ours). Moreover, [b]ecause the burden of ensuring that the defendant is informed of the nature and existence of the right to testify rests upon defense counsel, we conclude that this burden is a component of the effective assistance of counsel. As a result, any claim by the defendant that defense counsel has not discharged this responsibilityeither by failing to inform the defendant of the right to testify or by overriding the defendant's desire to testifymust satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for assessing whether counsel has rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. . . . Brown, 124 F.3d at 79. Under Strickland, in order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must meet a two-pronged test: (1) he must show that counsel's performance was deficient, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, so deficient that, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; and (2) he must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, in the sense that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Strickland standard is highly demanding, Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986), and rigorous, Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir.2001). The IAC claim must be rejected if the defendant fails to meet either the performance prong or the prejudice prong. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.2001) (given that Chang did not establish[] a deficiency in representation, we . . . need not address the prejudice issue); Brown, 124 F.3d at 80 (seeing no need to remand for findings as to counsel's performance, given that Brown cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test). See also Chang, 250 F.3d at 84 (upholding ruling that the performance prong was not established where the only evidence that the defendant was prevented from testifying came from his own blanket statements (internal quotation marks omitted)). The ultimate question of counsel's [i]neffectiveness is not a question of basic, primary, or historical fac[t], Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (internal quotation marks omitted), but rather is a mixed question of law and fact. [B]oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact, id. and we review a district court's conclusions on those issues de novo, see, e.g., Chang, 250 F.3d at 82although district court findings as to basic, primary, or historical fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Rule 52(a) provides that the district court's [f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6). Construing a substantively identical prior version of that Rule, the Supreme Court has noted that a reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court. In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504. Issues involving credibility are normally considered factual matters, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), and Rule 52(a) emphasize[s] the special deference to be paid credibility determinations, Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504. This deference reflects the superiority of the trial judge's position to make determinations of credibility, id., since only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said, id. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504. Thus, when a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error. Id. In the present case, applying these standards to the district court's posthearing findings of historical factespecially with regard to the questions of who said what to whomwe conclude that on the claims that counsel failed to advise him with respect to his right to testify and/or overrode his desire to testify, Bennett has not met the performance prong of the Strickland test. His claim that neither Gombiner nor Yankwitt, nor anyone else at Legal Aid, informed him of his rights to testify and to decide whether to testify is unsupported by any evidence other than Bennett's blanket assertion that he was not so informed. Although Bennett complains that the district court at the hearing excluded evidence that would have corroborated his testimony, the exclusion was plainly correct, given that what was proffered would either have been testimony by other persons as to what was in Bennett's mind or hearsay testimony as to what Bennett had told them. Bennett himself was of course entitled to, and did, give his own version of what his attorneys had or had not said to him. His version, much of which the court found implausibleindeed, preposterous, Bennett VI, 2009 WL 3614613, at , was contradicted by the testimony of both Gombiner and Yankwitt. The fact that at the hearing neither attorney could remember the particular conversation in which he advised Bennett of his rights to testify and to decide whether to do so is hardly surprising, given that there were hundreds of conversations with Bennett (Tr. 34) and that the hearing was held 10 years after Bennett's second trial. Cf. Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 326 (2d Cir.2005) (Time inevitably fogs the memory of busy attorneys. That inevitability does not reverse the Strickland presumption of effective performance.). Both Gombiner and Yankwitt testified to their respective practices always to inform a client who was going to trial that it was the client's absolute right to testify and to decide whether to testify. ( E.g., Tr. 16, 17, 101.) And as to his conversations with Bennett in particular, Gombiner testified, I know we discussed the fact . . . that it was up to him. ( Id. at 32). The district court, who observed these three witnesses, was entitled to find that the testimony of Gombiner and Yankwitt was to be credited and that the testimony of Bennett was not. The court's finding that Bennett was in fact informed by his attorneys of his rights with respect to testifying at his second trial also finds support in assertions madeand not madeby Bennett himself over the course of this proceeding. To begin with, although Bennett's § 2255 motion based on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, made in March 2003 (and supplemented in 2004 with an unrelated claim), asserted that counsel had made 19 errorsinvolving such matters as venue, the admissibility of coconspirator testimony, the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Bennett on certain counts, various instructions to the jury, and alleged statements causing Bennett to perceive a bias on the part of the trial judgethere was no semblance in that motion of any allegation that Bennett had not been advised by his attorneys of his constitutional right to testify or of the right to make his own decision as to whether to testify. It was not until December 2008, nearly six years after his § 2255 motion claiming that counsel had erred in 19 ways, and more than nine years after his second trial, that Bennett first raised a failure-to-advise claim. Moreover, both prior to and since his assertion of a failure-to-advise claim, Bennett has made statements that indicate he knew he had the rights to testify and to decide whether to testify at his second trial. For example, in his First Affidavit, submitted in March 2003 in support of his § 2255 motion, Bennett, in asserting his belief that the trial judge had been predisposed against him, stated that that belief haunted me throughout trial and greatly affected my decision not to testify at the second trial (First Bennett Aff. ¶ 65 (emphasis added)) and weighed heavily in my decision not to testify at the second trial ( id. ¶ 70 (emphasis added)). Thus, the district court noted that Bennett's affidavit in support of the 2255 petition makes it clear . . . that he had a choice, and he made the choice to not testify at the second trial. Bennett VI, 2009 WL 3614613, at . Further, the implication in those early statements that Bennett knew the choice was his was reinforced by some of his assertions at the June 2009 hearing. For example, in claiming that counsel's performance was deficient in various other ways, Bennett testified that if I was aware of the proper charges, . . . I would have testified (Tr. 192 (emphasis added)); that if my first transcript came in, ifnone of it would have mattered, I would have testified no matter what (id. (emphasis added)); that [i]f I had been properly informed of [the significance of materiality with respect to the charged offenses], I would have testified under any set of conditions (id. at 199 (emphasis added)). Given Bennett's statements and the record as a whole, we conclude that the district court's finding that Bennett had been informed that he had the absolute right to testify and to decide whether or not to testify cannot be considered error, much less clear[] erro[r]. Nor do we see any basis for overturning the district court's ruling that Bennett's alleged desire to testify was overridden by counsel. Gombiner testified that although there had been heated discussions as to whether to go to trial, after Bennett made the decision to go to trial there were no arguments over whether Bennett should testify. Both Gombiner and Yankwitt testified that Bennett, prior to the second trial, made the decision not to testify, and Gombiner recalled no instance in which Bennett indicated any strong desire to testify. ( See id. at 32-34, 38, 103-04.) The court found incredible Bennett's testimony that he wanted to testify but declined to do so because he feared the trial judge was predisposed against him, and found incredible Bennett's testimony that Gombiner assured him that he need not testify because his first-trial testimony would be admitted at the second trial. Gombiner denied that he had made any such statement to Bennett, a denial that was entirely credible in light of the rules of evidence and Gombiner's decades of experience at the time of that alleged conversation. In finding that Gombiner did not give such advice, Bennett VI, 2009 WL 3614613, at , the court credited the testimony of Gombiner, as it was entitled to, and found that Bennett's contradictory testimony at the hearing was untruthful. Our review of the record persuades us that these findings are not clearly erroneous. In light of the court's substantiated factual and credibility findings, we see no error in its conclusion that there was no deficient performance by counsel with respect to the failure-to-advise aspect of Bennett's IAC claim or his claim that his attorneys overrode his desire to testify.