Opinion ID: 2264505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Certificate Revoked or Saved?

Text: The State and amicus curiae KDR argue that the January 2008 certificate remained in effect and the rights granted by the certification were not revoked simply because the regulations were revoked. To support the argument, amicus curiae KDR points to K.S.A. 77-425, which states in relevant part: The revocation of a rule and regulation by a state agency shall not be construed as reviving a rule and regulation previously revoked by such agency, nor shall such revocation by a state agency be construed as affecting any right which accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, nor any proceeding commenced, under or by virtue of the rule and regulation revoked. The KDR argues that under this provision the revocation of the regulations did not impact the certification that had been issued in January 2008, which on its face stated it was effective from January 15, 2008, until December 31, 2008. Before discussing the substance of K.S.A. 77-425 and its impact on the issues, we must consider the fact the statute was first cited and discussed in the amicus brief filed by the KDR. In other words, it was not cited to the district court or in the appellant's or appellee's initial briefs. It was, however, argued in this appeal sufficiently early that Ernesti was able to submit a brief discussing the implications of the statute and both the State and Ernesti discussed K.S.A. 77-425 during oral arguments before this court. Hence, the parties had a full opportunity to argue the impact of the provision. Further, even though K.S.A. 77-425 was not considered by the district court, it can be considered for the first time on appeal because it presents a question of law that is potentially dispositive of the appeal. See State v. Hawkins, 285 Kan. 842, 845, 176 P.3d 174 (2008). This court has not previously applied K.S.A. 77-425 but has applied a similar provision relating to legislation, K.S.A. 77-201 First. In doing so, we have construed K.S.A. 77-201 First as a general savings statute that preserves all rights and remedies under a repealed statute when the repealing statute is silent as to whether such rights and remedies shall be abrogated. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 238 Kan. 559, 566, 712 P.2d 1258 (1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to dismissal on basis that statutes under which he was charged had been amended after the offenses were committed); City of Kansas City v. Griffin, 233 Kan. 685, 689, 664 P.2d 865 (1983) (Where a new statute or ordinance defining a crime is enacted which is still the same basic crime with the same basic elements and only the penalty is increased, it seems logical to us that, in the absence of some evidence of a contrary intention, the legislative intent is not to abate pending prosecutions.). Cases applying K.S.A. 77-201 First are helpful in two respects. First, the cases recognize that the statute abrogates the common-law rule that the repeal of a statute terminates rights accruing or prosecutions commenced under the repealed statute. See Griffin, 233 Kan. at 686-87, 664 P.2d 865. In this case, the district court applied the common-law rule without regard to the effect of the general, statutory savings provision. Yet, K.S.A. 77-425, in the same manner as K.S.A. 77-201 First, is a general savings statute that preserves all rights and remedies under a repealed regulation when the repealing regulation is silent as to whether such rights and remedies shall be abrogated. As such, when a regulation is repealed, K.S.A. 77-425 abrogates the common-law rule that the repeal terminates rights accruing or proceedings commenced under the repealed provision. Second, the cases applying K.S.A. 77-201 First address an argument made by Ernesti i.e., that a savings statute has no application because the proceedings against him were not initiated until after the regulations were revoked. This narrow focus on the term proceeding in K.S.A. 77-425 and narrow view of what that term means is contrary to the case law under K.S.A. 77-201 First. In The State v. City of Topeka, 68 Kan. 177, 74 P. 647 (1903), this court explained that the term proceeding as used in the statute is not limited to judicial proceedings. Rather, in the context of that case, the term applied to the organization, powers, and duties of cities of the first class, and particularly of issuing bonds and the erection of public improvements, and it was to protect proceedings of this character commenced under previously existing laws that the saving clause was enacted. Topeka, 68 Kan. at 187, 74 P. 647. Here, a different context applies to the proceeding. As the State and the KDR note, and as we previously discussed in the context of the jurisdiction argument, the certification process requires an administrative proceeding that ends with the denial or issuance of a certificate. In this case, the LPD initiated a proceeding and received the administrative award of a certificate i.e., an administrative orderthat was valid until December 31, 2008. The subsequent adoption of regulations would not require that the LPD meet new requirements for the already-issued certificate to be valid. Rather, the LPD was entitledindeed, it had the rightto rely on the authorized certificate without fear of penalty. This right arises primarily from the fact that if there was not a valid certification of the testing device both the LPD officer who administered the test and the LPD were potentially subject to penalties. As it would affect the officer, the legislature has declared it a crime to test human breath for law enforcement purposes unless the testing device was approved by the KDHE, stating: (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to make any test of the human breath for law enforcement purposes, unless: . . . . (2) the apparatus, equipment or device used by such person in the testing of human breath for law enforcement purposes is of a type approved by the secretary of health and environment and otherwise complies with the rules and regulations of the secretary of health and environment adopted pursuant to K.S.A. 65-1,107 and amendments thereto to govern the periodic inspection of such apparatus, equipment and devices. (b) Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor. (c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the use of devices approved pursuant to K.S.A. 65-1,107 and amendments thereto for . . . law enforcement purposes. K.S.A. 65-1,109. Further, there are potential consequences for any agency that allows testing without compliance with the regulations. See K.A.R. 28-32-9(f) ([t]he failure to comply with this regulation may be grounds for suspension or revocation of the agency's certification); K.A.R. 28-32-10(f) (relating to operator certification; [t]he failure of an applicant or a certified operator to comply with this regulation may be grounds for denial of the application or renewal or for suspension or revocation of the operator's certificate). The LPD sought and obtained a certification from the KDHE, and device operators relied on that certification as a license to legally perform breath tests for law enforcement purposes. Thus, the certificate protected important interests and vested an accrued right, and suspension of the issued certificate would involve state action that adjudicates important interests. As such, the certificate cannot be taken away without the procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); State v. Heironimus, 262 Kan. 796, 803, 941 P.2d 1356 (1997). Because such an accrued right existed, K.S.A. 77-425 preserves the validity of both the administrative process of seeking a certificate and the resulting administrative order represented by a certificate issued pursuant to K.A.R. 28-32-4, even after the regulation was revoked. Consequently, a certificate issued pursuant to K.A.R. 28-32-4 remains valid until its original expiration date even though the regulation was revoked.