Opinion ID: 3166803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defining arms

Text: We have never decided the parameters of the right to bear arms. See Rupe, 101 Wn.2d at 706-07 (Although we do not decide the parameters of this right here, defendant's behavior-possession of legal weapons-falls squarely within the confines of the right guaranteed by Const. art. 1 § 24.); Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 591. That question is properly before us now. 12 City of Seattle v. Evans, No. 90608-4 We hold that the right to bear arms protects instruments that are designed as weapons traditionally or commonly used by law abiding citizens for the lawful purpose of self-defense. In considering whether a weapon is an arm, we look to the historical origins and use of that weapon, noting that a weapon does not need to be designed for military use to be traditionally or commonly used for self-defense. We will also consider the weapon's purpose and intended function. Contrary to Evans's assertions, this approach-which is rooted in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Heller and the Oregon Supreme Court's interpretation of its state constitution's article I, section 27-is fully consistent with our opinion in Montana. In particular, Oregon's focus on historical use and function supports the idea, expressed by the lead opinion in Montana and relied on by the concurring opinions thereto, that not all knives are arms. Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 590-91 (Under even the broadest possible construction, the term 'arms' extends only to weapons designed as such, and not to every utensil, instrument, or thing which might be used to strike or injure another person.). It is, in fact, this definitional approach that resulted in our holding that fixed-blade paring knives and small kitchen knives are not protected arms under the Washington State Constitution: Notwithstanding my disagreement with the majority, I concur in the result it reaches here because I am satisfied that the knives possessed by McCullough and Montana are not arms. Although certain objects that could fall into the generic definition of a dangerous knife may well be considered arms, the knives possessed by McCullough and Montana (a small paring knife and a filleting knife) are not, in my opinion, either traditional or modern arms of self-defense. Therefore, they are not afforded protected status by article I, section 24 of the state constitution. 13 City of Seattle v. Evans, No. 90608-4 /d. at 601 & n.9 (Alexander, J., concurring) (citing Delgado, 298 Or. 395, for the proposition that historically, certain knives, for example, bowie knives and swords, have been commonly used for self-defense and, therefore, may be considered arms under article I, section 27 of the Oregon Constitution). 9 Evans does not demonstrate that our opinion in Montana is incorrect or harmful or that the legal underpinnings of the decision have changed. A survey of the relevant case law suggests instead that Montana provides an appropriate framework for analyzing the right to bear arms that is both useful and true to the purpose of that right. Further, the opinion is consistent with Heller and the decisions of other courts postHeller. We therefore reject Evans's invitation to reconsider Montana. IV. Evans's Knife Is Not a Protected Arm With this framework in mind, we turn to Evans's as-applied challenge to SMC 12A.14.080. Evans asserts that his knife is a constitutionally protected arm and that the ordinance's prohibition against carrying fixed-blade knives is unconstitutional as applied to him. We hold that Evans cannot establish that SMC 12A.14.080 is unconstitutional as applied to him because his paring knife is not a constitutionally protected arm. Evans does not attempt to establish that his paring knife is a weapon designed and traditionally used for self-defense. Indeed, he offers no meaningful distinction between his paring knife and the paring knife at issue in Montana. He instead argues 9 Notably, Heller also cites favorably to the Oregon Supreme Court's discussion of lawful arms in Kessler. See 544 U.S. at 624-25. Additionally, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently noted that Oregon's definitional approach mirrors the model employed by the United States Supreme Court in [Heller]. DeCiccio, 315 Conn. at 117. 14 City of Seattle v. Evans, No. 90608-4 that all fixed-blade knives are constitutionally protected arms following Heller and that his paring knife is thus protected because it is a fixed-blade knife. To make this argument, Evans relies on language in Heller asserting that the term arms encompasses weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. He is correct that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess weapons designed for personal protection as well as for use in a militia. /d. at 581, 592. But this cannot be understood to grant a right for citizens to possess anything that may plausibly be used for selfdefense-the Second Amendment protects the right to carry a weapon for selfdefense. /d. Evans also relies on DeCiccio and Delgado to reinforce his argument that all fixed-blade knives are arms. 10 Neither case supports that interpretation: both cases rely on an extensive historical and functional analysis of the specific knife at issue, and DeCiccio expressly limits its holding to knives with characteristics of the dirk knife at issue in the present case. DeCiccio, 315 Conn. at 128 n.34; Delgado, 298 Or. at 400-03. The lengthy historical analysis and specific limiting language of both opinions actually undermines Evans's argument and reinforces our conclusion that some knives are not arms. 10We are aware of no decision holding that all knives are constitutionally protected arms, regardless of historical use, origin, purpose, or function. Even advocates of the position that knives should broadly be considered bearable arms following Heller also acknowledge that some knives are designed as tools or utensils and are therefore not entitled to constitutional protection. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Knives and the Second Amendment, 47 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 167, 194 n.146 (2013). 15 City of Seattle v. Evans, No. 90608-4 Evans compounds this error by setting up a false equivalence between the dirk knife at issue in DeCiccio and the paring knife at issue in his own case. Highlighting the DeCiccio court's holding that dirk knives are constitutionally protected arms because they are weapons designed for and historically used in battle, Evans points out a passage in American Knives suggesting that dirk knives are equally useful for meals. See HAROLD L. PETERSON, AMERICAN KNIVES: THE FIRST HiSTORY AND COLLECTOR's GUIDE at 19 (1958). Evans then points out that kitchen knives are useful for meals-they are inarguably designed and generally used for culinary purposes. However, he also asserts that kitchen knives may be and have been used for selfdefense. Thus, he reasons that both dirk knives and paring knives are constitutionally protected arms because both may be used for multiple purposes, including selfdefense. This reasoning ignores the origins, use, purpose, and function of both knives. It is true that some weapons may be used for culinary purposes, as it is also true that many culinary utensils may be used when necessary for self-defense; but it does not follow that all weapons are culinary utensils or that all culinary utensils are weapons. Were we to adopt Evans's analysis and hold that a kitchen knife was a protected arm because it could be used for self-defense, there would be no end to the extent of utensils arguably constitutionally protected as arms. If a kitchen knife is a protected arm, what about a rolling pin, which might be effectively wielded for protection or attack? Or a frying pan? Or a heavy candlestick? Admittedly, any hard object can be used as a weapon, but it would be absurd to give every knife, pitchfork, rake, brick 16 City of Seattle v. Evans, No. 90608-4 or other object conceivably employable for personal defense constitutional protection as 'arms.' Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 591 n.2. Both the federal and state constitutions require us to give protection to certain weapons that have been designed and commonly used for self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581-82; Kessler, 289 Or. at 368-69. The Connecticut Supreme Court persuasively holds that dirk knives satisfy these criteria and are constitutionally protected arms. However, the small knife found on Evans's person is a utility tool, not a weapon. While almost any common object may be used as a weapon, that does not necessarily mean that possession of otherwise innocuous objects that could be wielded with malice will trigger the constitutional protections afforded to arms. See Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 590-91, 599, 401. Evans does not demonstrate that his paring knife is a constitutionally protected arm. We therefore reject his as-applied challenge.