Opinion ID: 204153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Display

Text: The owner of a copyrighted work has the exclusive right to display the copyrighted work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). Displaying a work is defined as show[ing] a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process. 17 U.S.C. § 101. A copy includes the original. Id. Büchel argued below, as he does on appeal, that the Museum's repeated public exhibitions of Training Ground for Democracy constituted a public display of his work in violation of his exclusive right under section 106(5). The district court gave no explicit reason for its dismissal of this claim, remarking only that [f]or the reasons already stated, presumably in its discussion of VARA, MASS MoCA was entitled to judgment on this count. 565 F.Supp.2d at 261. The court also remarked, however, that since Büchel would have suffered a violation of no right recognized by this statute, this messy situation simply fell outside the boundary of VARA and, a fortiori, outside the more general provisions of the Copyright Act. Id. at 260. This statement reflects a misreading of the Copyright Act. As we have explained, the moral rights granted to specific artists under VARA are separate and independent from the economic rights guaranteed by section 106. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (providing that rights of attribution and integrity are independent of the exclusive rights provided in section 106). Thus, the inadequacy of claims under VARA does not, on its own, signify the inadequacy of more traditional copyright claims. See Wu, supra, at 164 (observing that VARA has acquired the attributes of a false talisman, both because artists overly rely on it in instances where economic rights, including traditional rights of copyright provided by Section 106 ... would more effectively protect their interests and also because courts tend to view VARA claims as devalu[ing] entitlements to economic rights pleaded in tandem with VARA claims). We thus turn specifically to this claim. The Museum argues that Büchel has failed to present a triable issue of fact on his claim under section 106(5) because the unfinished work was never publicly displayed. However, as we have described in the context of our VARA discussion, there is significant record evidence suggesting that the work was repeatedly and deliberately exhibited to numerous individuals. [23] MASS MoCA also asserts an affirmative defense under section 109(c), which provides that the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c). The Museum argues that it owned the physical copy of Training Ground, and that section 109(c) therefore permitted it to display the unfinished work. Here again, however, the record reveals disputed issues of fact with respect to whether the Museum's copy was lawfully made, as it may have been created in violation of the artist's rights under VARA. Moreover, Büchel introduced evidence to rebut the Museum's assertion that the installation's various components all belonged to, or were purchased by, MASS MoCA. Finally, Büchel presented evidence that the Museum understood that the physical copy of the installation belonged to him. [24] Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Büchel, we cannot say that a reasonable jury could not conclude that the Museum violated his exclusive right to publicly display Training Ground for Democracy.