Opinion ID: 187252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Government's Cross-Appeal (Restitution on Federal Counts)

Text: The government cross-appeals the district court's ruling that it lacked authority to order restitution to the United States. While it ordered Anderson to pay $22,809,032 in restitution to the District on the fraud count, it concluded that the plea agreement did not authorize restitution to the United States. United States v. Anderson, 491 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2007). We interpret the terms of a plea agreement de novo. United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 691 (D.C.Cir.1995). Federal courts have authority to order restitution solely pursuant to statute. United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 101 (2d Cir.1991)). Section 3663(a)(1)(A) of Title 18 authorizes the court to order restitution if the defendant violates certain criminal statutes set forth therein. The statutes do not include 26 U.S.C. § 7201, the statute Anderson pleaded guilty to violating. Nevertheless, the district court may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). Anderson argues that the plea agreement is ambiguous as to restitution on the federal counts and should be interpreted against the government. See United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir.1996) (In determining whether any particular plea agreement has been breached, we look to the reasonable understanding of the parties and resolve any ambiguities in the agreement against the government.) (internal citation omitted). If the parties make clear that the district court is authorized to order restitution, however, then the use of an interpretive rule for resolving ambiguities is unnecessary. See United States v. Heard, 359 F.3d 544, 554 (D.C.Cir.2004) (finding no ambiguity in plea agreement because defense counsel made clear at sentencing hearing that both parties agreed to leave resolution of issue to district court); United States v. Gary, 291 F.3d 30, 33 (D.C.Cir.2002) (declining to construe plea agreement against drafter because agreement was not ambiguous); United States v. Sparks, 20 F.3d 476, 478 (D.C.Cir.1994) (same). In the section of the plea agreement entitled Restitution, Anderson agree[d] that the court may order restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and 16 D.C.Code § 711. Plea Agreement at 2. But section 3572 of Title 18, titled Imposition of a sentence of fine and related matters, addresses, unsurprisingly, the imposition of a fine only. Subsection (a) lists several factors the district court should consider in imposing a fine. Subsection (b) states, the court shall impose a fine or other monetary penalty only to the extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the ability of the defendant to make restitution. [6] The parties' citation to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 instead of 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) in the plea agreement does not preclude our finding that the parties nonetheless agreed that restitution could be ordered on the federal counts. First, section 3663(a)(3) does not require that the plea agreement expressly include the statutory basis for restitution. Moreover, the government persuasively explained the reference to section 3572 as a drafting mistake. If the parties had intended to authorize restitution to the District only, it would have been unnecessary to include any statute other than D.C.Code § 16-711. The reference to a federal statute, albeit an incorrect one, indicates the parties intended to authorize restitution to the United States as well as to the District. Most important, the conduct of the parties plainly reflects their understanding that the district court had the authority to order restitution to the United States in an amount to be determined by the court. During the plea hearing, the assistant United States attorney stated, The only other thing I'd ask, that the government is also free to ask for restitution. Plea Tr. at 6, United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066, 2006 WL 6051415 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2006). Anderson's counsel stated that the parties had not agreed on an amount but that [t]he government is free to seek restitution under the plea agreement, and we're free to propose alternatives or other suggestions to the Court. Id. at 16. Anderson's counsel later argued at sentencing that Anderson would be better able to make restitution if he served a shorter sentence. Specifically, counsel stated, If Mr. Anderson is locked up for an extended period of time, he has very little likelihood of being able to ... generate wealth with which to pay back the money that he owes the U.S. Government and the DC government. Sentencing Hr'g Tr. at 476, United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2007) (3/23/07 Sent. Tr.). And in his sentencing memorandum submitted before sentencing, Anderson claimed that he could not be directed to pay restitution in an amount exceeding the tax loss related to the tax evasion counts to which he pleaded guilty. Def. Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 58, United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 2, 2007). In addition, Anderson's presentation of evidence at sentencing regarding the amount of federal tax loss supports the conclusion that restitution to the United States was contemplated by the parties. On the second day of the sentencing hearing, Anderson's expert witness proposed a lower federal tax loss and a higher D.C. tax loss than the losses the government had proposed. Anderson's overall proposed tax loss was lower than the government's proposal. Anderson had no reason to propose a higher D.C. tax loss if he believed that the district court had authority to order restitution to the District only. Nor did he have any reason to propose a lower federal tax loss if he did not believe the court had authority to order him to make restitution to the United States. Anderson's response that he presented evidence regarding the federal tax loss only because the D.C. tax loss depended on the federal loss is not supported by the record. Anderson's expert witness determined a lower federal tax loss by classifying certain income as long-term capital gains, which are taxed at a lower rate. According to Anderson's expert, the government classified the income differently, resulting in a higher tax rate and higher federal tax loss. Nevertheless, based on our review of the transcript portions included in the record on appeal, Anderson's expert did not testify that calculation of the federal tax loss was necessary to determine the District tax loss. And the government's expert witness testified that he used Anderson's federal adjusted gross income computed by the IRS, not the federal tax loss, as a starting point to determine the taxes Anderson owed the District. On the third day of the sentencing hearing, Anderson argued for the first time that 18 U.S.C. § 3572 related to fines and did not authorize the court to order restitution. His counsel then said, But we're not arguing that that means he ... can't be required to pay restitution if the court orders it. 3/23/07 Sent. Tr. at 521. We conclude that the district court was authorized to order restitution to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). The parties' conduct plainly evinced their intent that the district court could order restitution to both the United States and the District under the plea agreement. See Heard, 359 F.3d at 554 (parties' conduct at sentencing hearing clarified plea agreement). [7] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's sentence of 108 months' imprisonment and its order of restitution to the District of Columbia. We reverse the district court's holding that it lacks authority to order restitution to the United States and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [8] So ordered.