Opinion ID: 426161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of a Damage Remedy.

Text: 84 The Counties claim first that they did not violate the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act, and second that if they did, the Act explicitly provides the exclusive remedies for its violation. They note that it was the state that violated the 1793 Act in 1795 and not the Counties, 18 which were subsequent occupiers of the land. 19 Even bad faith occupation would not violate the Act, the Counties assert, because section 8 regulates the disposition, not the occupation of Indian land. The Counties also contend that, in any event, they are good faith occupiers, and that the 1793 Act was not intended to assess damages against those holding land in good faith. 85 The Counties, however, do not question Judge Port's holding that the 1795 transfer of Indian land was void. 20 In effect the Counties have asked us to find that their good faith occupation of Oneida land can act as a subsequent validation of the 1795 transaction. To accept the Counties' argument, however, would render the Trade and Intercourse Acts wholly ineffective. 21 86 As we previously stated, the Oneidas are entitled to enforce the Nonintercourse Act's voiding of the 1795 purchase. This is what the Oneidas' lawsuit seeks to do. Their suit closely corresponds to the common law action for ejectment in which a plaintiff need only establish his right to possession. See New York v. White, 528 F.2d 336, 338 (2d Cir.1975); see also Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 34 S.Ct. 724, 58 L.Ed. 1218 (1914). The Oneidas' claim is based on their present right of possession, see Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 666, 94 S.Ct. at 776, and the Counties' liability is premised on their continued occupancy of Oneida land in violation of the Act. Under the common law the good or bad faith of the occupant is irrelevant to his liability. See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 80-81, 5 L.Ed. 547 (1823); Miceli v. Riley, 436 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74-75, 79 A.D.2d 165 (1981). The Counties' occupation, regardless of their good or bad faith, of Indian land obtained in a transaction that violated the 1793 Act renders them liable. 87 The Counties also contend, however, that if their possession does violate the Act, the only remedies for their violation are expressly set out in the statute. See supra note 10. It follows from our conclusion that the Oneidas have a private cause of action that Congress intended the concomitant damage remedy that flows with it to be available; it is a customary legal incident of the private action. See Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19, 100 S.Ct. at 247. The Counties' conclusory statement that the statute provides the exclusive remedies for its violation, without citation to any legislative history, ignores the Supreme Court's repeated admonitions: The creation of one explicit mode of enforcement is not dispositive of congressional intent with respect to other complementary remedies. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 295 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. at 1780 n. 6, citing Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 29 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. at 252 n. 6 (White, J., dissenting); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 82-83 n. 14, 95 S.Ct. at 2089-2090 n. 14. Accordingly, we agree with Judge Port that the Counties are responsible for the continuing violation of the 1793 Act and are liable in damages for that violation. 88