Opinion ID: 849204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: was the common understanding of the article 2, section 9 limitation on the right of referral at the time of ratification different from the plain meaning of the language?

Text: The majority construes the language of art. 2,  9 in a plain and natural manner. Thus, it concludes that 2000 PA 381 is an act making an appropriation to a state institution and is thus exempt from the referral power. To read the limiting language of art. 2,  9 in any other manner would incorporate into that constitutional provision a meaning that is not apparent on its face. Accordingly, unless we are able to determine that this provision had some other particularized meaning in the collective mind of the 1963 electorate, we must give the effect to the natural meaning of the language used in the constitution. Justice Cavanagh asserts that the common understanding of art. 2,  9 is different from the plain meaning given to this constitutional provision by the majority. Those who suggest that the meaning to be given a provision of our constitution varies from a natural reading of the constitutional text bear the burden of providing the evidence that the ratifiers subscribed to such an alternative construction. Otherwise, the constitution becomes no more than a Rorschach [8] exercise in which judges project and impose their personal views of what the constitution should have said. [9] Interestingly, no oneÔÇönot the dissents, the parties, or even the amici curiaeÔÇöhas attempted to provide a scintilla of historically based evidence that provides support for the belief that in 1963 the people of this state understood the limiting language of art. 2,  9 to mean something other than what it naturally and plainly says. The reason for this omission is simple: There is not much historical background on the provision to report in the first instance. Moreover, that which exists fails to demonstrate that the people attributed a meaning other than the construction the majority gives to art. 2,  9. Within the limited time constraints occasioned by the exigencies of having to decide this case by the July 1, 2001, effective date of 2000 PA 381, we have searched for evidence that the common understanding is that proposed by Justice Cavanagh. We have found no such historical evidence in the record of the constitutional convention, at the time of our constitution's ratification, or in contemporaneous news, articles that provide support for the dissent's asserted special common understanding of art. 2,  9. Indeed, one might expect that the framers of our 1963 ConstitutionÔÇöthe participants of the constitutional convention that drafted the constitutional text that was eventually ratifiedÔÇöwould have provided some gloss on or construction of the intended meaning of the art. 2,  9 limitation on the right of referral. In point of fact, the framers provided none. Surprisingly, during the entire constitutional convention, excepting references to the convention's successive procedural approvals of the provision at issue, the framers never discussed the substance of art. 2,  9. [10] Especially important, nothing in the convention record has any bearing on what the framers, much less the public, commonly understood about the limitation on the referral power created by the constitutional language selectedÔÇöacts making appropriations for state institutions. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the Address to the People accompanying Const. 1963, art. 2,  9. The address, officially approved by the members of the constitutional convention, provides the text of each provision of the proposed constitution the people ratified in 1963 and a commentary, written in simple language, explaining the import of each provision and any changes the proposed constitution made to comparable provision of the 1908 constitution. That address was widely distributed to the public before the ratification vote. [11] The address was intended as a vehicle to educate the public about the proposed constitution. Significantly, in the Address to the People accompanying Const. 1963, art. 2,  9, the framers advise the people that this provision constitutes only a revision of Const. 1908, art. 5,  1, and that the revision eliminat[es] much language of a purely statutory character. 2 Official Record, p. 3367. The address also notes that the revision specifically reserves the initiative and referendum powers to the people [and] limits them as noted.... [12] Id. (emphasis added). There is no further reference to the art. 2,  9 limits on the power of referral or any explanation regarding how those limitations were expected to function in practice. Thus, the 1963 constitutional record provides no basis for concluding that the people were led to believe (or actually entertained the notion) that the art. 2,  9 limitation on the right of referralÔÇöacts making appropriations for state institutionsÔÇömeant or was intended to mean anything other than what it plainly says. Similarly, I have been unable to locate (and no one has provided to the Court) any contemporaneous news articles or other documents circulated in the public domain that suggest that the public in 1963 had a specific or common understanding of art. 2,  9 that diverged from the natural and plain meaning of its text. [13] The absence of any evidence from the 1963 constitutional convention record or other contemporaneous articles in the public domain suggesting support for some kind of special common understanding about art. 2,  9 consistent with the dissents' view (or any other) ought to be conclusive. In the absence of evidence on this point, this Court should accord the language in question its natural, plain meaning.