Opinion ID: 2226504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the municipal tuberculosis sanitarium objection

Text: Objection No. 13 relates to the levy of $4,500,000 for municipal tuberculosis sanitarium purposes. The objector contends that the maximum permissible levy for this purpose was $3,000,000, and that the levy in excess of that amount is invalid. The collector contends that a levy of $4,500,000 was authorized by statute. The municipal tuberculosis sanitarium levy is authorized by section 72-1 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act. Prior to 1947, that section authorized the city of Chicago to levy at a rate which would produce the sum of $3,000,000. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, chap. 24, par. 72-1.) Two amendments to that section were adopted in 1947. Senate Bill No. 320, introduced on April 23, 1947, increased the permissible levy to $4,500,000. It was passed by the Senate on June 3, and by the House on June 26. House Bill 906 was introduced on June 10, passed by the House on June 24, and by the Senate on June 27. This bill amended fifty-seven sections of the Revised Cities and Villages Act by substituting in each of those sections a reference to the Revenue Law of Illinois, in place of a reference to Section 162a of the `Revenue Act of 1939,' No other change appears to have been made by H.B. 906 in any of the sections amended, and particularly no other change was made in section 72-1. The objector contends that H.B. 906, being the last expression of the General Assembly, limits the levy to $3,000,000. The collector's position is that the purpose of the General Assembly was to amend section 72-1 in two different respects which are not inconsistent with each other, and that the two bills should therefore be read together and both amendments given effect. The question thus presented is not a new one. Its frequent recurrence is due to the practical situation which confronts the General Assembly. Section 13 of article IV of the Illinois constitution requires that when an existing statute is to be amended the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act. So each bill which proposes to amend an existing statute must include not only the language necessary to effect the desired change, but must also repeat all the other provisions of the section being amended, even though they have no direct bearing upon the subject matter of the amendment. And when, as has frequently happened, two unrelated amendments to the same section are adopted at a single session of the General Assembly, the repetition in each bill of those provisions of the existing law which that particular bill does not propose to change will give rise to a surface inconsistency. The principles governing the solution of these problems have become settled. It is established that when the General Assembly amends a statute, portions of the old law which are repeated, either literally or in substance, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law and not the enactment of new law upon the subject. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 131, par. 2; S. Buchsbaum & Co. v. Gordon, 389 Ill. 493; People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23; Svenson v. Hanson, 289 Ill. 242.) Amendments are to be construed together with the original act to which they relate as constituting one law, and are also to be considered together with other statutes upon the same subject as a part of a coherent system of legislation. ( S. Buchsbaum & Co. v. Gordon, 389 Ill. 493; Klemme v. Drainage District No. 5, 380 Ill. 221.) In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, and where the two acts are not so inconsistent that both cannot stand and be given effect, a later law which is merely a re-enactment of a former law does not repeal an intermediate act which has qualified or limited the first one, but the intermediate act will be deemed to remain in force and to qualify or modify the new act in the same manner as it did the first. S. Buchsbaum & Co. v. Gordon, 389 Ill. 493. The mechanical approach which the objector here urges upon us  a reading of the two amendments to determine literal inconsistency, followed by an automatic enforcement of the one which was adopted last in point of time  has been rejected by this court. Where acts passed at the same session of the legislature contain conflicting provisions, we have held that the whole record of the legislation is open to examination in order to ascertain the legislative intent. And when that intent is ascertained, it is given effect, irrespective of priority of enactment. ( S. Buchsbaum & Co. v. Gordon, 389 Ill. 493; People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23; Mette v. Feltgen, 148 Ill. 357.) As explicitly stated in the Buchsbaum case, (p. 501,) In all cases the primary question is the intention of the legislature, rather than the technical priority of the passage of the acts. Applying these principles to this case, it is clear that the intention was to make two separate and distinct changes in section 72-1. The object of S.B. 320 was to increase the authorized tax levy for tuberculosis sanitarium purposes in municipalities exceeding 200,000 population from $3,000,000 to $4,500,000. On the other hand, H.B. 906 was not concerned with the amount of the authorized tax levy. Its only purpose was to eliminate from section 72-1 the reference in its last paragraph to Section 162a of the `Revenue Act of 1939' and to substitute a reference to the Revenue Law of Illinois. That appears also to have been the purpose of amending the other fifty-six sections of the Revised Cities and Villages Act. H.B. 906 did not purport to be and was not the enactment of a new law with respect to the amount of a permissible maximum tax levy for tuberculosis purposes. The repetition in this bill of all of the other language of the section as it existed when the bill was introduced, including the then existing tax rate limitation, indicates an intention to comply with the requirement of section 13 of article IV of the constitution, rather than an intention to repeal the increased tax rate authorized by S.B. 320. Both of the enactments here involved can be given effect without inconsistency. Mechanical application of the familiar rule that where inconsistent amendatory acts are passed at different times, the last one is to be obeyed ( People ex rel. Heaton v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 295 Ill. 408; People ex rel. Hines v. Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co. 366 Ill. 318; People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Mattes, 396 Ill. 348; People ex rel. English v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co. 370 Ill. 420,) would frustrate the accomplishment of the perfectly consistent objectives dealing with different subject matter expressed in S.B. 320 and H.B. 906. The clear intention of the legislature in passing the two amendments must be given effect. In invoking the rule that the later of seemingly repugnant statutes controls, the taxpayer ignores the canon of statutory construction that where a construction can reasonably be made by which both acts will stand it will be adopted. ( People ex rel. Davis v. Wabash Railroad Co. 276 Ill. 92.) The authorities upon which the taxpayer relies, which are cited above, involve, in the main, situations in which each amendatory act related to the same subject matter and not, as here, a case in which the purposes of the two amendments are entirely different. As pointed out in People ex rel. Heaton v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 295 Ill. 408, 411, 412, Two acts that are passed at the same session of the legislature are not to be construed as inconsistent if it is possible to construe them otherwise, but where it is impossible to give effect to both acts the latest in point of time will prevail. The objector contends, in the alternative, that even if S.B. 320 and H.B. 906 are consistent, they cannot be read together because section 13 of article IV of our constitution forbids interweaving and reading together the two amendatory acts to establish the text of section 72-1. The constitutional provision invoked is, and no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act. The contention is not sound. Both S.B. 320 and H.B. 906 re-enact section 72-1 in its entirety, and neither contravenes section 13 of article IV of our constitution. The objection to the municipal tuberculosis sanitarium levy should have been overruled.