Opinion ID: 2523769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard of Review and Miranda Law

Text: In a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court must find facts and apply the law. People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1065 (Colo.2004); People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 483 (Colo.2001); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1991). We defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065; Kaiser, 32 P.3d at 483. However, whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard to the facts established by the record is a mixed question of fact and law we review de novo. Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065 ([A] trial court may not reach legal conclusions that are not supported by the record.). Hence, we defer to the trial court's finding of facts in the record but review all legal conclusions de novo, including the application of legal factors to the facts of the case. Prior to a custodial interrogation, the Fifth Amendment requires that the police give a Miranda advisement to inform the defendant of his constitutional rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Suspects can waive their rights upon receiving a proper Miranda advisement; however, in order to be valid, the waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. We have previously analyzed the validity of a waiver in two parts, asking first whether the waiver was voluntary and free of governmental coercion and second whether it was knowingly made with full awareness of the nature and consequences of the right. See Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065; People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1993); [1] People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 851 (Colo.1989). The State has the burden to prove the validity of the defendant's waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). In this case, we agree with the trial court that Ferguson was in custody, so Miranda applies. We also agree with the trial court that, because Ferguson volitionally initiated conversation with the arresting officer after invoking his Miranda rights on the night of the arrest, he validly waived his rights. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ([A]n accused, ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.); Maryland v. Shatzer, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1219, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (endorsing and further defining the Edwards rule). [2] With respect to Ferguson's statements to Investigator Piechota two days after the arrest, however, we reverse the trial court. We disagree with the trial court's ruling that coercive government conduct played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make a statement, because the trial court provides no explanation of its reasoning and there are no examples in the record of coercive conduct. We also disagree with the trial court's ruling that, although Ferguson signed a printed form waiving his rights, the waiver was not knowing or intelligent because Ferguson was not mentally sound at the time. The trial court failed to engage in the proper totality of the circumstances analysis appropriate to the knowing element of a Miranda waiver. We discuss each error in turn.