Opinion ID: 2344634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court properly exercised its authority to call a witness to testify after the close of evidence.

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and functioned as a prosecutor when it re-opened the evidence and called Diltner to testify after closing arguments. While we agree with Appellant insofar as the substance of Diltner's testimony should have been excluded, we find that the trial court was properly within its purview to re-open and call such witness pursuant to RCr 9.42 and KRE 614. After the close of evidence, and closing arguments, the court took a brief recess for deliberation and indicated that it needed to check on a couple of matters. Upon returning from recess, the court called Diltner to testify. During the course of Diltner's testimony, the court questioned her concerning the subject matter discussed supra. No objections were raised at the time of trial. Appellant now asserts, however, that the trial court abandoned its adjudicatory role in calling Diltner to the stand to question her and instead usurped the role of prosecutor. Appellant concedes that this issue is unpreserved. As such, we will review for palpable error. RCr 10.26. First, it is elemental that the trial court retains authority over the manner in which a trial proceeds, and may alter the order of proceeding if it deems necessary. RCr 9.42. The trial court controls the timing and sequence in the court room. This Court has afforded great discretion to the trial court in determining when such evidence should be received. Davis v. Commonwealth, 795 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Ky.1990) ( citing Pilon v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Ky.1977)). Accordingly, we find that the trial court was well within its ability to reopen the case after closing arguments to permit the presentation of additional evidence. See Davis, 795 S.W.2d at 947 (finding no abuse of discretion in permitting party to offer additional testimony after the close of evidence). Further, it is significant to note that in the present instance Appellant requested and received a bench trial. During a bench trial, judicial questioning of witnesses is subject to the court's discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 419 (Ky.2002). Moreover, a trial court is vested with the authority to call and question witnesses pursuant to KRE 614. KRE 614(a) states that the court may call witnesses on its own motion, while KRE 614(b) indicates that the court may interrogate those witnesses which it calls. When the trial court acts as the trier of fact, the extent of examination of witnesses by the presiding judge is left to the trial judge's discretion. Bowling, 80 S.W.3d at 419 ( citing United States v. McCarthy, 196 F.2d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 1952)). In Transit Authority of River City (TARC) v. Montgomery, 836 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Ky.1992), we noted that [a] judge should and does have the right and duty, within reasonable limits, to bring out the facts in the case before him clearly. Likewise, a trial judge is vested with a large discretion in the conduct of the trial of causes and an appellate court will not interpose to control the exercise of such discretion by a court of original jurisdiction, unless there has been an abuse or a most unwise exercise thereof. Id. We find no such abuse of discretion here. The trial judge in the present instance presided over a bench trial of Appellant's request. Therefore, he was bound to elicit such relevant information as he deemed fit. Presumably, the trial judge noticed that Appellant had given a Kentucky address on his bail form, and decided to call Diltner to question her concerning this. The court was acting out of its obligation to elicit the necessary information to properly hear the case. That the information the court sought to ascertain was ultimately confidential does not denigrate the proper intent behind calling the witness, nor does it somehow lessen the court's authority to do so under KRE 614. Appellant's position principally relies on the language this Court espoused in LeGrande v. Commonwealth, 494 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Ky.1973), where we noted that a trial judge cannot conduct himself in such a manner as to place him in the role of the prosecutor rather than an arbiter. Indeed, our case law has tended to lend a wary eye and a cautious approach to judicial involvement in the interrogation of witnesses. See Terry v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 794, 802 (Ky.2005). However, such caution has traditionally hinged on our abundant sensitivity to what effect, if any, such involvement may or may not have upon a jury when the influence of the bench is allowed to leak into the crucible, and our ardent devotion to an impartial and objective judiciary. Davidson v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Ky.1965); see KRE 614(b), Drafters' Commentary (1989) ([b]ecause of the risk that judicial participation in the production of evidence might unduly influence the triers of fact, it is expected that courts will use this power sparingly.); see also Caudill v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 674, 170 S.W.2d 9, 10 (1943) (holding that a trial judge should not indicate to the jury through his questioning his opinion of the witnesses' veracity). Thus, necessarily, when such risk of prejudice to the jury is missing, the risk of judicial involvement in interrogation is likewise substantially lessened. Therefore, in instances, such as the one at present, wherein a bench trial is conducted and no jury is present, a trial court should enjoy considerable discretion in its authority to call and interrogate witnesses under KRE 614. Accordingly, as previously indicated, because Appellant received a bench trial and the trial judge expressly informed the parties at the judgment of acquittal hearing that he had discounted the impact of the improper testimony and based his finding of guilt on other evidence, we find that trial judge did not commit palpable error in exercising his authority under KRE 614. Any error resulting from interrogation concerning the confidential information discussed in Part II.A, supra was de minimis.