Opinion ID: 747642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Susan Heller's Testimony

Text: 49 Mrs. Yoon next argues that the district court committed reversible error in relying on Susan Heller's testimony because it was so general and conclusory that it violated her Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment, and that some of Heller's testimony was hearsay. Mrs. Yoon also argues that the admission of Heller's testimony as habit evidence under Rule 406 was erroneous. See FED.R.EVID. 406. In short, Mrs. Yoon wants us, on appeal, to tell the district court to exclude Heller's testimony. 50 We cannot do this. The district court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we review the district court's rulings on the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Payne, 102 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir.1996). In light of the very relevant nature of Heller's testimony, we will hardly interfere with the district court's discretion in admitting it. The evidence was not introduced as habit evidence pursuant to Rule 406, so Mrs. Yoon's argument is misplaced. Rather, Heller testified as to her own personal knowledge of the workings of the Yoons' office on the days when she was present. This evidence was introduced to show that Mrs. Yoon had knowledge of the business finances and the checking accounts at issue in this case. Mrs. Yoon is correct that this testimony prejudiced her--Heller's testimony, along with Rasho's were important in establishing Mrs. Yoon's state of mind. However, we find absolutely no reason to substitute our judgment for that of the district court, and we are certainly not in a position to question how much weight the district court gave to the testimony. The court was in a much better position then we are to evaluate the credibility and reliability of witnesses. In short, we do not find any abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to admit Heller's testimony and we certainly find nothing in it to warrant reversal.