Opinion ID: 6109012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-Examination on Theft of Property Conviction

Text: Rogers next argues that the circuit court erred in prohibiting his counsel from cross-examining LW about her misdemeanor conviction for theft of property under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 609(a) (2017) 1 which provides that [f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one [1] year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party or a witness, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. The admission or rejection of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Benson v. State , 357 Ark. 43 , 160 S.W.3d 341 (2004). During the cross-examination of LW, Roger's counsel approached the bench and explained that he intended to impeach LW. At that time, the following colloquy occurred: DEFENSE COUNSEL : She has a misdemeanor conviction out of 2014 for theft of property. Before I impeach her for that, I want to make sure are y'all objecting on that? PROSECUTOR : Yes. It's a misdemeanor, and it's over-I mean, it's over a year old. DEFENSE COUNSEL : It's a misdemeanor, but it's in the matter that deals with truthfulness.  PROSECUTOR : Actually theft is not. If it was a forgery, or filing a false police report or something like that. COURT : I agree. Rogers argues this ruling was an abuse of discretion because a conviction of theft of property is a crime involving dishonesty and is therefore always admissible under Rule 609(a). In response, the State argues that the issue is not preserved because Rogers failed to proffer the facts underlying the conviction and failed to establish that the theft involved dishonesty or false statement. We conclude that the circuit court erred. This court has consistently held that theft crimes involve dishonesty, regardless of the facts underlying the particular offense. See, e.g. , State v. Cassell , 2013 Ark. 221 , 427 S.W.3d 663 (stating that the crime was infamous because it was a theft offense, which involves dishonesty); Edwards v. Campbell , 2010 Ark. 398 , 370 S.W.3d 250 (holding that misdemeanor theft of property, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103 (a), is a crime of dishonesty); Webster v. State , 284 Ark. 206 , 680 S.W.2d 906 (1984) (stating that grand larceny involves dishonesty); Floyd v. State , 278 Ark. 86 , 643 S.W.2d 555 (1982) (holding that conviction for theft was admissible for impeachment because it is a crime of dishonesty); James v. State , 274 Ark. 162 , 622 S.W.2d 669 (1981) (stating that prior convictions for theft, grand larceny, and forgery all involved dishonesty); Gustafson v. State , 267 Ark. 278 , 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979) (holding that convictions for larceny and burglary were indicative of dishonesty under Rule 609(a) ). Further, under Rule 609(a)(2), when considering the admissibility of a crime involving dishonesty, courts are not required to compare the weight of the probative value to the prejudicial effect, and we have held that these crimes are automatically admissible. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Tr. Dep't , 347 Ark. 826 , 69 S.W.3d 20 (2002) (citing congressional commentary to Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), which is identical to our rule). Here, Rogers sought to impeach LW with her prior misdemeanor-theft conviction. Because this court holds that theft crimes involve dishonesty and are automatically admissible pursuant to Rule 609(a), it was unnecessary for Rogers to proffer the factual circumstances underlying the conviction. See Edwards , 2010 Ark. 398 , 370 S.W.3d 250 . Accordingly, not only is this issue preserved for our review, but we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to admit this evidence under Rule 609(a). However, our analysis does not end there. After we determine that a defendant was denied the opportunity to impeach a witness's credibility, we must next consider whether that error was harmless. Winfrey v. State , 293 Ark. 342 , 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987). This court has previously found harmless error in rape-conviction appeals. Pigg v. State , 2014 Ark. 433 , at 5, 444 S.W.3d 863 , 866 (holding on appeal that the court need not determine whether it was error to deny defendant the opportunity to question the victim's credibility when the alleged error would be harmless); Johnston v. State , 2014 Ark. 110 , at 8, 431 S.W.3d 895 , 899 (holding that erroneous admission of incestuous and pornographic pictures was harmless error in a rape conviction); Kelley v. State , 2009 Ark. 389 , at 21, 327 S.W.3d 373 , 384 (determining error was harmless in admitting two prior convictions involving indecency with a minor in a rape conviction); Buford v. State , 368 Ark. 87 , 91, 243 S.W.3d 300 , 303-04 (2006) (finding harmless error when the court erroneously allowed a child-abuse expert to testify as to the victim's credibility in a rape trial). But see  Scamardo v. State , 2013 Ark. 163 , at 9, 426 S.W.3d 900 , 905 (denying a harmless-error argument when the circuit court refused to allow questioning regarding the victim's inconsistent statement as to whether the rape occurred). Here, the circuit court's error fits the harmless-error mold. An error is harmless when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error is slight. Scamardo , 2013 Ark. 163 , at 9, 426 S.W.3d at 905 . In Buford , the court found evidence of guilt overwhelming when the trial testimony included graphic detail of the rape, the victim testified to the rape, and another witness testified to witnessing the rape. Buford , 368 Ark. at 91 , 243 S.W.3d at 303 . Here, the evidence that Rogers raped LW is overwhelming. LW testified in specific detail to multiple occurrences of rape. TB testified that she observed a video of Rogers engaged in sex with LW. Moreover, all four victims described what this court emphasized in Kelley when affirming for harmless error as remarkably similar conduct on the part of [the defendant]. Kelley , 2009 Ark. 389 , at 20, 327 S.W.3d at 383 . The girls similarly described their sexual encounters with Rogers, including the color of the condom, the dead-end road where he took two of them, and Rogers's suicide threats. Additionally, if Rogers experienced any prejudice, it was slight. Whether an error is slight hinges on the degree to which the defendant was prejudiced. Id. The proposed impeachment testimony of LW, unlike the victim's testimony in Scamardo , did not directly relate to the allegation at hand. Thus, although there was error, it was harmless. Affirmed; court of appeals decision vacated. Womack, J., concurs. Kemp, C.J., and Baker and Hart, JJ., dissent.