Opinion ID: 1819622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the discernible legislative intent

Text: On the merits, I first present the interpretive approach this Court customarily uses to determine legislative intent. I then apply this approach to the statute. This customary approach reveals that the majority has prematurely and, therefore, inappropriately applied the rule of lenity.
Our customary approach to statutory interpretation views legislative intent as the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis. State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla.2002). The search for legislative intent starts with the actual language of the statute. See Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000). If the statutory language is clear, the plain textual meaning indicates the legislative intent. See Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007). However, if the statutory language is unclear, we continue our search for legislative intent. See Joshua, 768 So.2d at 435. In discerning the legislative intent of an unclear statute, we consider the statute as a whole, including the evil to be corrected, the language, title, and history of its enactment, and the state of law already in existence on the statute.  State v. Anderson, 764 So.2d 848, 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (citing McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48, 52 (Fla.1974)) (emphasis added). In a criminal case, if our legislative intent analysis fails to reveal a single, clear, and unambiguous meaning, the rule of lenity applies, and we must adopt a reasonable construction most favorable to the accused. See Clines v. State, 912 So.2d 550, 560 (Fla.2005). However, as the majority recognizes, the rule of lenity is a canon of last resort. It applies only if we have completed our customary legislative intent exploration and are still left without a clear understanding of the Legislature's intent. See State v. Rubio, 967 So.2d 768, 778 n. 9 (Fla.2007) (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d at 1180, 1188 n. 9 (Fla. 2003)) (rule of lenity does not apply before a court engages in a search of legislative intent using traditional tools).
Considered as a whole, including (1) the title, (2) the existing status of the law and the history of the statutory change, and (3) the evil to be corrected, section 948.03(5)(a)(7) unambiguously reveals the Legislature's intent that, unless the offender's treatment plan provides otherwise, a sex offender probationer or community controllee is prohibited from viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material. In addition to this broad antipornography prohibition, a sex offender is specifically precluded from telephone, electronic media, computer programs, and computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. At this point, it is important to set forth the statute, the 1997 session law, and, most importantly, the 1997 session law title. The statute provides: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999). The 1997 session law enacting section 948.03(5)(a)(7) reveals the changes made to the 1995 statute. It reads, in relevant part: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory explicit material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. Ch. 97-308, § 3, at 5520, Laws of Fla. [30] Finally, and most important to the proper resolution of this case, the title to chapter 97-308, Laws of Florida, reads: An act relating to sex offenders; amending s. 947.1405, F.S.; clarifying legislative intent regarding sentences that are eligible for conditional release supervision; requiring a curfew between specified hours; providing alternatives; revising requirements for treatment for sex offenders; revising a provision that prohibits a sex offender from viewing, owning, or possessing certain materials; prohibiting a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern; requiring that a sex offender submit to certain warrantless searches; requiring a sex offender whose crime was committed on or after a specified date to undergo polygraph examinations; requiring that such offender maintain a driving log and not drive a motor vehicle alone without prior approval; prohibiting such offender from obtaining or using a post office box without prior approval; amending s. 948.001, F.S.; defining the terms sex offender probation and sex offender community control; amending s. 948.03, F.S.; requiring a curfew between specified hours; providing alternatives; revising requirements for treatment for sex offenders; revising a provision that prohibits a sex offender from viewing, owning, or possessing certain materials; prohibiting a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern; requiring that a sex offender submit to certain warrantless searches; requiring a sex offender whose crime was committed on or after a specified date to undergo polygraph examinations; requiring that such offender maintain a driving log and not drive a motor vehicle alone without prior approval; prohibiting such offender from obtaining or using a post office box without prior approval; requiring such offender to submit to HIV testing; requiring such offender to submit to electronic monitoring; providing an effective date. Ch. 97-308, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). [31]
The title is more than an index to what the section is about or has reference to; it is a direct statement by the legislature of its intent. State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla.1981) (citing Berger v. Jackson, 156 Fla. 251, 23 So.2d 265 (1945)); see also Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 1981); Foley v. State, ex rel. Gordon, 50 So.2d 179, 184 (Fla.1951). In this case, the title to chapter 97-328 answers the question the majority says is dispositive, namely which part of [section 948.03(5)(a)(7)] is modified by the phrase `relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern.' Majority op. at 806. The title to chapter 97-308 states in its relevant part that the Legislature amended section 948.03(5)(g) (postamendment section 948.03(5)(a)(7)) to [revise] a provision that prohibits a sex offender from viewing, owning, or possessing certain materials; [prohibit] a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern. Ch. 97-328, Laws of Fla. [32] This title clearly shows that the Legislature intended the clause that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern in the postamendment statute to modify only telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services. Thus, as a result of the amendment, sex offenders are prohibited from utilizing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern in addition to the materials that had already been prohibited. This clear intent is consistent with the state of the law and the amendment's history.
The previous version of the statute read: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material. § 948.03(5)(g), Fla. Stat. (1995). And the majority concludes that [g]iven that the previous version of the statute already prohibited the possession of any `obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material,' the 1997 amendment seems intended to narrow the prohibition's scope. Majority op. at 809. The majority's supposition is unfounded. Not only is it contrary to what the session law title unambiguously reveals, there is also absolutely nothing in the 1997 amendment's history to suggest any intention to relax the preexisting blanket ban on obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating material. Indeed, the opposite is true: The Legislature amended section 948.03(5)(g) (postamendment 948.03(5)(a)(7)) to improve the effectiveness of supervising sex offenders in the community by (1) retaining the broad prohibition against obscene or pornographic materials by leaving that language unchanged; (2) changing the phrase sexually explicit materials to sexually stimulating visual or auditory materials in order to clarify the breadth of the prohibition; and (3) adding a prohibition of telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. Ch. 97-328, Laws of Fla. The effect of this change is an expansion, rather than a limitation, of the prohibition regarding obscene, pornographic, and sexually stimulating materials. The overall scheme the Legislature enacted in 1997 evinces an intent to fortify control of sex offenders. Specifically, the Legislature enacted the following new restrictions: [P]rohibiting a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern; requiring that a sex offender submit to certain warrantless searches; requiring a sex offender whose crime was committed on or after a specified date to undergo polygraph examinations; requiring that such offender maintain a driving log and not drive a motor vehicle alone without prior approval; prohibiting such offender from obtaining or using a post office box without prior approval; requiring such offender to submit to HIV testing; requiring such offender to submit to electronic monitoring.... Ch. 97-308, Laws of Fla. The Legislature also tightened the following existing restrictions: (1) changing the discretionary curfew into a mandatory curfew; (2) requiring a sex offender treatment program to be conducted by specifically trained therapists, unless such a trained therapist is not available; (3) requiring the additional approval from the victim and the therapist in addition to the sentencing court in order for a sex offender to contact the victim; and (4) requiring approval by the sentencing court in order for an offender to engage in unsupervised contact with a child, if certain other conditions are met. Id. Together with section 948.03(5)(a)(7), these measures constitute a comprehensive scheme to fortify community containment of sex offenders. Read in this context, it is apparent that the Legislature amended section 948.03(5)(g) (postamendment 948.03(5)(a)(7)) to expand, rather than limit, the existing prohibition. Specifically, the clause regarding telephonic, electronic, or computerized materials was added to target otherwise benign services or materials that are used by some sex offenders as part of their particular deviancy. [33] Examples of how this new restriction applies is the case of a sex offender whose deviant behavior pattern includes either luring children to meet him by trolling Internet services like MySpace.com or one who uses these media to trade in child pornography. This reasoning that the 1997 change was intended to expand the scope of prohibition, not to retract it as the majority holds, is even more compelling when one considers the evil to be corrected.
As I will explain, the 1997 amendments to section 948.03(5)(a)(7) seek to minimize reoffense by improving the statutory containment process. Specifically, according to the sponsor of the senate bill that resulted in the session law, the purpose of the changes was to implement the recommendations of the National Institute of Justice regarding a new type of supervision for convicted sex offenders. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (April 25, 1997) (on file with Florida State Archives) (Senator Burt). The new type of supervision for convicted sex offenders to which Senator Burt referred, which was also cited in the Staff Analysis, [34] was a five-part model containment process recommended in the NIJ Research. Kim English, et al., Managing Adult Sex Offenders in the Community  A Containment Approach, Nat'l Inst. Just. (Jan. 1997). The NIJ research recognizes that offender-specific probation or parole conditions play a crucial role in implementing its strategy and recommended fourteen sample conditions. Id. at 5. The top priority of these conditions is to eliminate opportunities for reoffense  to protect victims and the general public. Id. The research specifically noted that the recommended strategy targeted thoughts and feelings ... as a starting point for risk management, because deviant thoughts and fantasies by sex offenders are precursors to sexual assault, and, therefore, are an integral part of the assault pattern. Id. Accordingly, treatment providers and supervising officers should instill in offenders the dictum that deviant attitudes and fantasies are not acceptable. Id. In light of the purpose of section 948.03, and especially of the critical role thoughts and fantasies play in preventing reoffense, the majority's supposition that the 1997 amendment seems intended [by the Legislature] to narrow the prohibition's scope is clearly erroneous. Majority op. at 808. Instead, as first revealed in the session law title, the Legislature supplemented the existing antipornography ban with new restrictions to prevent recidivism and protect the community, especially potential victims. Because the session law title, the existing status of the law and the history of the statutory change, and the evil to be corrected all reveal an unambiguous legislative intent to expand the prohibition to include telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern, this Court is obligated to interpret the statute to help achieve that intent, not frustrate it.