Opinion ID: 175076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The answer to the jury's question

Text: At the close of arguments, the district court instructed the jury, inter alia, on the Fourth Amendment issues implicated by Feeney's entry into Correia's vehicle. After a period of deliberation, the court received a written question from the jury: Can Detective Feeney enter the car without violating the Fourth Amendment after refusing to produce license and registration? [3] Prior to summoning the jury to respond to their question, the judge told counsel that he planned to answer as follows: The short answer to the question is yes, but you should consider all of my instructions, and, particularly, those that related to unlawful arrest and excessive force. . . . Hearing this proposal, counsel for Correia suggested that the judge simply reply, that is for the jury to decide. If the court gave its answer as proposed, Correia's counsel asked that the court note our objection. Correia did not renew his objection when the final answer was read to the jury, which was as follows: [T]he short answer to your question is yes, but you should consider all of my instructions on the law in deciding the issues before you. On appeal, Correia argues that the court's answer was flawed for three reasons: it assumed the validity of a disputed fact, namely that Correia refused to produce his license and registration; it emphasized the unlawful arrest claim over the excessive force claim; and it decided Correia's unlawful arrest claim when combined with the inference that Correia refused to produce his license and registration. A case could be made that Correia did not properly preserve these objections for appeal and that we should be reviewing his objections only for plain error. His vague objections were not adequate to make clear to the district judge the arguments he now presses on appeal. See Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 529 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir.2008). And the judge's answer changed the instruction, which should have prompted Correia to renew his objections with further explanation if he were not satisfied, which he failed to do. See Booker v. Mass. Dep't of Pub. Health, 612 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir.2010). Regardless, even if reviewed as preserved objections, Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 108 (1st Cir.2008), we find no merit in any of Correia's claims of error. The text of the exchange between the court and the jury does not support Correia's assertion that the court's response of, Yes, to the jury's question somehow affirmed the truth of Feeney's claim that Correia had refused to produce his license when asked by Feeney. The court's one-word response did not suggest to the jury that the hypothetical it had posed was the only version of the facts. Rather, it was a direct answer to the jury's legal question. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (When a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy.). By the same token, simply by answering, Yes, to the jury's question, the court did not emphasize the unlawful arrest violation over the excessive force violation. The question concerned a fact related to the unlawful arrest claim. Although the answer responded to the question as framed, it did not, in so doing, diminish the excessive force portion of Correia's case. Moreover, the court's reminder to the jury that it should consider the entirety of the court's instructions in deciding the issues before it avoided any problem of undue emphasis. Finally, there is no support for the argument that the court's answer to the jury's question decided any of Correia's claims. Again, the court instructed the jury to consider the answer to its question in light of the jury instructions as a whole. In offering that instruction, the court did not make any comment on disputed questions of fact, such as whether Correia was asked for his license, whether he refused to produce it, and whether the force Feeney used to deal with Correia was unreasonable under all the circumstances. Morelli, 552 F.3d at 23 (1st Cir.2009). In sum, the court's reply to the jury's question was not misleading, unduly complicating, or incorrect as a matter of law, nor did it adversely affect[] Correia's substantial rights. United States v. Stark, 499 F.3d 72, 79 (1st Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).