Opinion ID: 1525843
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Suppression and Failure to Correct False Testimony โ Incentive to Wanner

Text: Relying upon the evidence that the prosecutor told Wanner that he would see what he could do concerning the outcome of sentencing in a prosecution against him, Appellee maintains that the Commonwealth committed another Brady violation by suppressing evidence which would have undermined Wanner's credibility as a key prosecution witness. Appellee also claims that the Commonwealth exacerbated the violation by failing to correct Wanner's false trial testimony that no promises were made to him. See generally Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (reaffirming that the government has an obligation to redress the elicitation of testimony which the prosecutor knows to be false). The United States Supreme Court has not provided definitive guidance concerning what constitutes a promise, reward or inducement for purposes of Brady/Giglio. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 884 (11th Cir.1985). In collecting relevant decisions of other federal and state courts, one commentator notes an apparent split, as some courts have interpreted Giglio narrowly to encompass only express agreements, whereas others have applied a broader interpretation encompassing any communication suggesting preferential treatment in return for testimony. See R. Michael Cassidy, Soft Words of Hope: Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1129, 1152-56 (2004) (citing cases). While the Superior Court has taken the narrower approach, see Commonwealth v. Burkhardt, 833 A.2d 233, 243 (Pa.Super.2003), it has been argued that Giglio supports the broader one in which the relevant inquiry is whether the government has said or done anything that might reasonably lead the informant to believe that his interests are aligned with that of the state. Soft Words of Hope, 98 Nw. U.L.Rev. at 1157; see also id. at 1156. We need not address this controversy here, however, since the PCRA court determined that Appellee failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that any form of promise or inducement existed in the first instance. See Sattazahn, No. 2194-89, slip op. at 24-25. While the court recognized that the district attorney's office may have maintained some general policy, it explained that the statements made on the record by Commonwealth agents do not specifically discuss whether that policy was employed in Fritz Wanner's case following his testimony against [Appellee]. Furthermore, the Assistant District Attorney handling Fritz Wanner's case had no knowledge of any alleged agreement. The Commonwealth cannot be found to have failed to disclose an agreement which has not been proven to exist or for failing to correct testimony which has not been proven to be false. Id. Thus, it is reasonably clear that the court rejected Wanner's post-conviction testimony. [14] Wanner's post-conviction testimony was in conflict with his trial testimony, exemplifying that there were reasonable grounds to question its credibility. Since the PCRA court's factual determination carries sufficient support in the evidence and is free from legal error, the present claim does not give rise to a basis for relief.