Opinion ID: 2631202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actually Litigated and Decided

Text: ¶ 38 The second element outlined above requires that the issue sought to be litigated in the present action must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous action. See id. Macris does not argue that the judgment entered in Macris I was not a final judgment on the merits. Therefore, our analysis, with respect to the second element outlined above, focuses on whether the issue raised in the present case was actually asserted and tried in the prior proceeding. Int'l Res. v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979). ¶ 39 In Macris I, the trial court determined that a valid distributorship agreement existed between Macris and Images, that Images breached the Agreement, and that Macris was entitled to damages as a result of that breach. Accordingly, the trial court awarded Macris damages in the amounts Images stipulated that it should have paid Macris for subsequent months, from March 1991 through August 31, 1992, the date on which Images ceased doing business as a multilevel marketing company. In Macris II, Macris sought to litigate whether it was entitled to additional contract damages not recovered in Macris I arising after the date Images transferred its assets to Neways. ¶ 40 Macris argues that because the trial court limited its award of damages to August 31, 1992, the issue of Macris's entitlement to damages accruing after August 31, 1992, was never actually litigated or decided in Macris I. Clearly, if an issue is actually raised by proper pleadings and treated as an issue in a case, it is conclusively determined by the first judgment. See Int'l Res., 599 P.2d at 517. However, the preclusive effects of the doctrine of collateral estoppel go further. The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in a former action is applicable to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. This application of the general rule extends to questions necessarily involved in an issue ... although no specific finding may have been made in reference to that matter, and although such matters were not directly referred to in the pleadings. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 545. It follows, therefore, that a party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and litigate them in separate actions. If the second action involves an issue as to which the judgment in a prior action is a conclusive adjudication, the estoppel, so far as that issue is concerned, extends to every matter which was or might have been urged to sustain or defeat the determination actually made. See id. ¶ 41 The issue of damages resulting from Images's 1991 breach of contract was decided in Macris I. Moreover, the effect of the trial court's award of damages in Macris I embodied all damages: past, present, and prospective. The Restatement supports this view, reasoning: Typically, even when the injury caused by an actionable wrong extends into the future and will be felt beyond the date of judgment, the damages awarded by the judgment are nevertheless supposed to embody the money equivalent of the entire injury. Accordingly, if a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against a defendant in a certain amount becomes dissatisfied with his recovery and commences a second action to obtain increased damages, the court will hold him precluded; his claim has been merged in the judgment and may not be split. It is immaterial that in trying the first action he was not in possession of enough information about the damages, past or prospective, or that the damages turned out in fact to be unexpectedly large and in excess of the judgment. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 cmt. c (1982) (emphasis added). Moreover, the trial court made no finding that its award of damages in Macris I was not final. Therefore, because the trial court's award of damages in Macris I was a conclusive adjudication on the issue of damages resulting from Images's 1991 breach of the autoqualification agreement, the issue of damages accruing after August 1992 was connected to the subject matter and necessarily decided in Macris I. ¶ 42 Macris further argues that because the issue of contract damages was decided by stipulation, it was not actually litigated and decided for collateral estoppel purposes. ¶ 43 An issue determined by stipulation rather than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent action if the parties manifested an intention to that effect. See, e.g., 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4443, at 382 (1981) (Issue preclusion does not attach unless it is clearly shown that the parties intended that the issue be foreclosed in other litigation.); 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 132.03[2][h][ii] (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 2000) ([S]tipulation may be binding in a subsequent action ... if the parties ... manifested an intention to that effect.). In this case, Macris does not argue that the stipulation concerning contract damages was not binding in general; rather, Macris argues that the stipulation was not binding as to damages accruing after August 31, 1992, the date on which Images transferred its assets to Neways. However, if the stipulation is meant to be final as to some damages but not final as to other damages, it must say so. Our review of the record in this case, however, evidences no such intention. Moreover, the trial court made no finding that its damages awardwhich was based on the parties stipulationwas not final as to all damages. Therefore, we find that the stipulation in this case has res judicata effect.