Opinion ID: 3029788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 12(b)(6) Dismissal

Text: The order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. In re Adams Golf, Inc. Secs. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2004) (“This Court reviews Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs.”). The denials of the motions for appointment of counsel are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). We conclude that the decisions by the Magistrate Judge and the District Court were both flawed. With respect to the District Court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal, the dismissal lacked any reasoning, and the immediate reference to the fact that no response was received from Aruanno indicates that the District Court may have believed that the absence of a response to a 12(b)(6) motion meant that the motion was conceded and therefore should be granted. Our precedent states clearly that this is not the case. See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The fact is that if a motion to dismiss is granted solely because it has not been opposed, the case is simply not being dismissed because the complaint has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Rather, it is dismissed as a sanction for failure to comply with the local court 7 rule.”). We cautioned in Stackhouse that we were not “suggest[ing] that the district court may never rely on the local rule to treat a motion to dismiss as unopposed and subject to a dismissal without a merits analysis. There may be some cases where the failure of a party to oppose a motion will indicate that the motion is in fact not opposed, particularly if the party is represented by an attorney and in that situation the rule may be appropriately invoked. Nor do we suggest that if a party fails to comply with the rule after a specific direction to comply from the court, the rule cannot be invoked.” Id. In this case, no local rule was mentioned, Aruanno was not represented by an attorney, and he was not specifically directed to comply with a local rule. When Aruanno replied to the District Court that he was not sure if he had received the motion to dismiss in light of circumstances relating to his medical condition, he did not concede the motion or indicate it was unopposed. Given this, the District Court should have proceeded to conduct a merits analysis. Instead, it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Thus, the District Court appears not to have employed the proper 12(b)(6) inquiry. Moreover, even if the District Court’s order resulted from an examination of the merits, we would have little difficulty finding we must reverse the District Court. Aruanno’s § 1983 suit challenged the actions taken by Cape May corrections officials and sets forth a claim under the Eighth Amendment of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Ingraham, v. Wright, 430 U.S. 650, 670 (1977), via his allegations of excessive 8 force, inhumane integration with dangerous prisoners, and the absence of proper medical care. The standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) orders is a generous one, and the standard is even more forgiving when a pro se plaintiff is involved. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003). Aruanno’s allegations state a claim for which relief can be granted, “accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs.” In re Adams Golf, Inc. Secs. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2004).1