Opinion ID: 2638107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motions to Correct Illegal Sentence

Text: [¶ 9] Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), a motion to correct an illegal sentence may be brought at any time. `An illegal sentence is one which exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law.' Martinez, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d at 396, quoting Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885, 887 (Wyo.1997). See also, Brown v. State, 2004 WY 119, ¶ 7, 99 P.3d 489, 492 (Wyo.2004). Appellants present several arguments in support of their claims the district court erred by denying their motions to correct illegal sentence, including: 1) the district court's orders denying their motions did not properly address their legal arguments; 2) their convictions should have merged for sentencing; 3) their sentences were enhanced on the basis of improper factors; and 4) their sentences were illegally executed because the DOC transferred them to a detention center in Texas to serve their sentences.
[¶ 10] Appellants argue their cases should be remanded to their respective district courts with directions requiring the courts to articulate the legal reasons for denying their motions to correct illegal sentence. The appellants cite to general constitutional provisions but do not provide any specific authority indicating district courts are required to provide detailed legal reasons for their rulings on motions to correct an illegal sentence. [¶ 11] In Mr. Gould's case, the district court's order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence stated, in pertinent part: The court, having considered said motion and the governing law, finds that defendant's motion is without merit and, in large part, directs the court to consider case law and authority that is not governing in defendant's matter. Mr. Gould filed a motion for reasoned judgment and a motion for rehearing. The district court denied his motions, indicating the sentences were within the limits prescribed by Wyoming law and the court had discretion to sentence him to consecutive sentences. The court stated Mr. Gould's sentences were appropriate in light of his extensive criminal history and the extreme violence of the case. In Mr. Kolb's case, the district court's order, although brief, indicates it considered his filings and the procedural history of the case and denied his motions for the reasons set forth in the State's Traverse. [6] [¶ 12] The respective orders indicate the district courts did, in fact, consider the appellants' legal claims. In their arguments to this Court, appellants do not identify any specific authority obligating the district courts to make more definitive findings and conclusions in support of their decisions. We, therefore, refuse to remand these cases to the district courts to require them to include further reasons for their respective denial orders. Moreover, as is apparent from our decisions on the substantive issues presented in this case, such an exercise would have no practical effect on the outcome.
[¶ 13] Appellants argue their sentences were illegal because they were punished multiple times for the same conduct in violation of the constitutional proscriptions against double jeopardy. They do not challenge the validity of the underlying convictions, but argue the convictions should have merged for sentencing. Compare, DeSpain v. State, 865 P.2d 584 (Wyo.1993) (holding a double jeopardy challenge to multiple convictions for a single criminal event must be brought in a petition for post conviction relief pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101, et seq. rather than in a motion to correct an illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a)), and Birr v. State, 878 P.2d 515 (Wyo.1994), upon rehearing, 895 P.2d 43 (Wyo.1995). [¶ 14] Before we address the merits of the appellants' arguments, we consider whether their claims are barred by res judicata. The preclusive doctrine of res judicata applies in the criminal context, as well as to civil matters. See, e.g., Beck v. State, 2005 WY 56, 110 P.3d 898 (Wyo.2005); Lacey, 2003 WY 148, 79 P.3d 493; Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo.1989). Our precedent is clear that the principle of res judicata may be applied to claims brought pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a). See, e.g., Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Wyo.1997). In Hamill, we rejected the appellant's argument that, because Rule 35 states that a motion to correct an illegal sentence may be brought at any time, it is not subject to bar under the doctrine of res judicata. Id. [¶ 15] Res judicata bars relitigation of issues raised and considered in a prior criminal proceeding. Lacey, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d at 495. Moreover, [i]t is a longstanding rule that issues which could have been raised in an earlier proceeding are foreclosed from subsequent consideration. Id. (emphasis added). It is, therefore, appropriate for us to consider application of the preclusive doctrine to appellants' Rule 35(a) claims that their sentences are illegal because their convictions should have merged for sentencing. [¶ 16] As we stated earlier, Mr. Gould pled guilty to aggravated assault and battery and burglary and was sentenced to consecutive terms for his actions. He initially filed a direct appeal, but voluntarily dismissed that appeal before any action was taken by this Court. He subsequently filed a motion for sentence reduction, asking the district court to reconsider its decision to impose consecutive sentences. The district court denied his motion, and he did not appeal that decision. Thus, Mr. Gould had the opportunity to argue his sentences should merge for purposes of sentencing in both his direct appeal and his 2002 motion to reduce his sentence, which he did not appeal. The judicial interests of finality in criminal cases demand disciplined application of the preclusive doctrine. See Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, 51 P.3d 851 (Wyo.2002) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the importance of finality in criminal cases). Consequently, we conclude Mr. Gould's merger issue is barred by res judicata. [¶ 17] Although the procedural history in Mr. Kolb's case differs from Mr. Gould's, the same underlying principles apply. Mr. Kolb was convicted after a jury trial of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. Kolb, 930 P.2d at 1239-40. He appealed and this Court affirmed. Id. Although he could have presented a claim that his sentences should have merged in his direct appeal, he did not do so. Under our precedent, it is clear Mr. Kolb had an obligation to present his claim that his convictions should have merged for sentencing in a timely fashion. Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564 (Wyo.2000); See also, Hamill, 948 P.2d at 1359. Having failed to do so, he is barred from litigating that issue at this late date. [¶ 18] Further, although we are under no obligation to do so, we note the appellants' claims that their convictions should have merged for sentencing are not well-founded. Mr. Gould pled guilty to, and was convicted of, burglary for entering a home without authorization to demand sex from the female victim. He also pled guilty to, and was convicted of, aggravated assault and battery for the vicious beating which followed the victim's refusal to comply with his demands for sex. As is obvious from the quotation of the relevant statutes in footnotes 2 and 3 of this opinion, the elements of the two crimes are very different. Furthermore, under the rationale of cases like Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo.1995) and Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254-55 (Wyo.2000), even a cursory review of the facts demonstrates Mr. Gould could have committed either of his crimes without necessarily committing the other. His convictions would not, therefore, merge for sentencing purposes. [¶ 19] Mr. Kolb was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and first degree pre-meditated murder. The elements of those crimes, as set out in footnotes 4 and 5 of this opinion, are very different and the legislative intent to punish them separately is obvious. Moreover, we concluded in Kolb, 930 P.2d at 1247, there was sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Kolb's conviction for pre-meditated murder. It is evident from that conclusion that, although the crimes occurred during an on-going criminal episode, the kidnapping was not an essential component of the pre-meditated murder charge. Mr. Kolb's merger argument, therefore, also fails on its merits.
[¶ 20] As we explained earlier, both appellants were convicted of two crimes and sentenced to separate sentences for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. Relying upon the United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), appellants claim their rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated because the district courts enhanced their sentences by ordering them to be served consecutively without an admission by the accused or a determination by a jury as to that enhancement. [7] They do not, however, identify any particular factors which were improperly relied upon by the district courts in ordering the consecutive sentences. [¶ 21] In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court considered the State of Washington's determinate sentencing structure. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Blakely pled guilty to kidnapping which carried a maximum sentence of fifty-three months. However, [p]ursuant to state law, the court imposed an `exceptional' sentence of 90 months after making a judicial determination that he had acted with `deliberate cruelty.' Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Relying on Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court ruled the sentencing judge's decision to increase Blakely's sentence beyond the statutory maximum based upon the judge's finding Blakely acted with deliberate cruelty violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 303-05, 124 S.Ct. 2531. In that decision, the Court expressly distinguished indeterminate sentencing schemes, like Wyoming's, and ruled they do not infringe on the province of the jury. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308-10, 124 S.Ct. 2531. See also, Janssen v. State, 2005 WY 123, ¶¶ 20-22, 120 P.3d 1006, 1011-12 (Wyo.2005). [¶ 22] Applying Apprendi and its progeny in Janssen, we concluded the district court was free, in the exercise of its sentencing discretion, to consider factors relating to Mr. Janssen and his crimes in imposing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range. Janssen, ¶ 21, 120 P.3d at 1012. See also, Smith v. State, 2005 WY 113, ¶ 37, 119 P.3d 411 (Wyo.2005). We held, because Mr. Janssen was sentenced under Wyoming's indeterminate sentencing structure and his sentence fell within the statutory maximum for his crime, Apprendi and Blakely did not support his claim. Janssen, ¶ 21, 120 P.3d at 1011-12. [¶ 23] Appellants were sentenced in accordance with Wyoming's indeterminate sentencing statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 (LexisNexis 2005) (except Mr. Kolb's first degree murder conviction which mandated death or life imprisonment), and their individual sentences fell within the statutory maximums set out for their crimes. Consequently, in accordance with our rulings in Janssen and Smith, there was no obvious violation of the constitutional principles discussed in Apprendi and Blakely. [¶ 24] With regard to the consecutive nature of their sentences, we have long said the district court has discretion in determining whether the sentences will be served consecutively or concurrently. See, e.g., Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 29, 33 (Wyo.2002); Eaton v. State, 660 P.2d 803, 806 (Wyo.1983). Other than their argument that the consecutive sentences violated the Sixth Amendment under the precepts of Apprendi and Blakely, the appellants do not point to any specific error in the district courts' decision to order their sentences to be served consecutively. The argument that judicial imposition of consecutive sentences violates the Sixth Amendment has been soundly rejected by other courts. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated: [O]ther jurisdictions, including several federal circuits, have aphoristically dismissed the proposition that either Blakely or Apprendi proscribes consecutive term sentencing, and this court does likewise. State v. Kahapea, 111 Hawai`i 267, 141 P.3d 440 (2006), and cases cited therein. We follow suit and conclude the district courts did not improperly enhance the appellants' sentences under the Sixth Amendment and the rationale of Apprendi or Blakely simply by imposing consecutive sentences for their separate crimes.