Opinion ID: 792391
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Education, Employment and Community Service Conditions

Text: 23 We next turn to Mr. McKissic's challenges to the special conditions regarding education, employment and community service. 24 Mr. McKissic submits that the conditions that he attempt to complete his high school education, that he maintain employment and that he perform community service in the event that he fails to maintain employment were all imposed in plain error. He maintains that his lack of a high school education and employment is not at all unique, and, if this condition was imposed on him, it would need to be imposed on most criminal defendants. Mr. McKissic also contends that there is no support for these conclusions in the existing statutes or case law. He concedes that 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5), as referenced in § 3583(b), allows the district court to impose a special condition that a defendant refrain from engaging in a specified occupation, but he argues that the statute does not allow a condition that affirmatively requires a defendant to engage in any occupation. 25 We cannot accept Mr. McKissic's arguments. They ignore the statutory provisions that specifically allow for conditions based on education and employment. Education and employment are specifically listed as discretionary conditions that the court may impose; for example, 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(4) allows for a condition that requires a defendant to work conscientiously at suitable employment or pursue conscientiously a course of study or vocational training that will equip him for suitable employment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines Manual lists as a recommended standard condition that the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(5). 26 Mr. McKissic also is incorrect in his assertion that there is no statutory support for a condition imposing community service; 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(12) allows the court to impose a discretionary condition that a defendant work in community service as directed by the court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). The Guidelines also provide that [c]ommunity service may be ordered as a condition of probation or supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 5F1.3. 27 Furthermore, the imposition of education, employment and community service conditions will further the statutory goal of providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. Schave, 186 F.3d at 841 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)). Indeed, these conditions are especially suited to Mr. McKissic. He nearly completed his high school education, and former employers have indicated that he has the potential to be a very capable worker. Both a high school degree and community service can give Mr. McKissic the training he needs for a vocation of his choosing. 28 Finally, if Mr. McKissic maintains steady employment, it likely will lower the chances that he will reoffend. A district court may also impose a condition as long as it is reasonably related to protecting the public from future crimes of the defendant, and keeping Mr. McKissic in steady employment would further that goal. See Schave, 186 F.3d at 841; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Therefore, we do not believe that the imposition of conditions relating to education, employment, or community service was in error, let alone plain error. 29 B. The District Court's Failure to Notify Mr. McKissic that it was Contemplating Special Conditions 30 Mr. McKissic also submits that, according to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h), a district court must give notice before it imposes a special condition on a ground not identified in the presentence report or prehearing submissions. According to Mr. McKissic, it was plain error for the district court not to provide warning that it intended to impose special conditions related to alcohol use, education, employment and community service. Mr. McKissic relies on United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 347 (7th Cir.2000), in which we held that a special condition requiring a defendant to register as a sex offender required notice under Rule 32. 31 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) states that: Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party's prehearing submission, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure. That notice must also specify any ground on which the court is contemplating a departure. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(h). Rule 32(h) codifies the Supreme Court's holding in Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991), that such notice is necessary. In Angle, we determined that notice was necessary for the condition requiring registration because such a condition was not expressly contemplated by the guidelines at that time, and thus was analogous to an upward departure. 234 F.3d at 347 (citing United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938 (5th Cir.1998)). Such notice is necessary to give the parties an adequate opportunity to comment on matters relating to the appropriate sentence; notice also promotes focused, adversarial resolution of the legal and factual issues relevant to sentencing. Id. (citation omitted). In United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733 (7th Cir.2003), we reinforced the holding of Angle by ruling that notice is required before imposing terms of supervised release that are out of the ordinary. Id. at 736 (ruling that a flat ban on use of the internet was such an unexpected condition). 32 In this case, the special conditions regarding education, employment and community service were listed explicitly among the discretionary conditions that a court may impose. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). Thus, Mr. McKissic was given constructive notice that they could be imposed without requiring additional notice from the district court. See United States v. Barajas, 331 F.3d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir.2003); United States v. Lopez, 258 F.3d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the district court did not depart from the guidelines, but rather imposed a condition of supervised release that is contemplated by the guidelines when a condition of participation in a mental health program was imposed, so notice was not required) (emphasis in original); United States v. Mills, 959 F.2d 516, 519 (5th Cir.1992). Agreeing with our sister circuits, we now determine that there was adequate notice for the special conditions involving employment, community service and education special conditions because they are contemplated explicitly in the recommended standard conditions found in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c) as described above. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d). 33 However, the district court should have provided notice to Mr. McKissic that it contemplated imposing a complete ban on alcohol consumption. The only mention of alcohol restrictions comes in the recommended standard condition found in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), which lists, as a discretionary condition, that the defendant refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or use of a narcotic drug or other controlled substance . . . . U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(7); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(7), 3583(d). A total ban on alcohol therefore goes beyond the discretionary condition enumerated in the statute and guidelines, and neither the statute nor the guidelines provided Mr. McKissic with notice that a complete ban could be imposed. Because the record does not contain any evidence that Mr. McKissic was aware that the court was contemplating a complete ban, it was error not to provide him notice that such a condition was being contemplated by the district court. Without notice, he was not able to develop meaningful arguments on his behalf; nor was he able to direct the court to evidence that could demonstrate that the condition was not necessary. 34 Although the district court should have given notice to Mr. McKissic that it contemplated imposing an alcohol restriction not found in the mandatory conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), the recommended standard conditions in U.S.S.G. 5D1.3(c), or the discretionary conditions in § 3563(b) as incorporated into the supervised release provisions by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), we cannot say that the error constituted plain error. It did not affect substantial rights because Mr. McKissic can seek modification of the conditions. 2 The district court can modify Mr. McKissic's conditions of supervised release; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) states that the court may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release. (emphasis added). The district court has authority to hear a motion to modify the terms of supervised release under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. See also United States v. Monteiro, 270 F.3d 465, 472 (7th Cir.2001). Because the district court can modify Mr. McKissic's conditions, the lack of notice does not rise to the level of plain error.