Opinion ID: 2050910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: barnard

Text: Of course, that the portions of Taylor upon which the majority relies are dicta does not, by itself, subvert the majority's analysis. It could be that those portions, albeit dicta, also happen to be right. The problem with that proposition, however, is that, 17 years after Taylor, this court addressed the precise issue presented in this case and reached a conclusion contrary to that suggested in Taylor. In People v. Barnard, 104 Ill.2d 218, 83 Ill.Dec. 585, 470 N.E.2d 1005 (1984), the issue presented was whether defendant's counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's failure to instruct the jury sua sponte on a lesser-included offense over the defendant's objection. In holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective, this court explained that the proffered argument was without merit: The trial judge was well aware of defense counsel's reluctance to have the jury given an instruction on manslaughter. It would therefore not have been proper for the judge to interfere with defense counsel's strategy and give the self-defense and voluntary-manslaughter instruction sua sponte. (Emphasis added.) Barnard, 104 Ill.2d at 232, 83 Ill.Dec. 585, 470 N.E.2d 1005. Thus, unlike Taylor, Barnard addressed the precise question presented in the present appeal: whether, over a defendant's objection, a trial court may instruct on an uncharged lesser-included offense. Barnard answered this question in the negative, and Barnard therefore should dispose of this case. The majority's efforts to explain away Barnard are unavailing. The majority's first strategy is to intimate that, if the portions of Taylor upon which it relies are dicta, then the portion of Barnard upon which I rely must be dicta, too. 188 Ill.2d at 281, 242 Ill.Dec. at 303, 721 N.E.2d at 582. The only problem is that, unlike the aforementioned portions of Taylor, which endeavor to adjudicate an issue not presented, the portion of Barnard upon which I rely is the court's judgment. The issue in Barnard was whether defendant's counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's failure to instruct. In holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective, this court gave two reasons for why the proffered argument would not have succeeded on direct appeal: (1) because trial counsel's decision not to tender the instructions was a matter of sound trial strategy, it would have been improper for the trial court to interfere with that strategy; and (2) because trial counsel did not tender the instruction, the issue would likely have been found waived. Barnard, 104 Ill.2d at 232, 83 Ill.Dec. 585, 470 N.E.2d 1005. Where the dicta comes in, I have no idea. The majority next asserts that  Barnard recognized that a `court should exercise restraint in giving instructions on its own motion when the instructions could interfere with defense strategy.' Sinnott, 226 Ill.App.3d at 932, 168 Ill.Dec. 865, 590 N.E.2d 502. 188 Ill.2d at 280, 242 Ill.Dec. at 303, 721 N.E.2d at 582. Hyperbole aside, this is perhaps the strangest citation I have ever seen. The majority purports to quote from Barnard but then cites an appellate court opinion decided eight years after Barnard that itself does not cite Barnard. I have been out of law school a long time, but surely the Bluebook does not permit this. As if the Sinnott citation were not suspicious enough, the majority then, using the simple phrase in other words, recasts Barnard beyond all recognition. Again, Barnard states: The trial judge was well aware of defense counsel's reluctance to have the jury given an instruction on manslaughter. It would therefore not have been proper for the judge to interfere with defense counsel's strategy and give the self-defense and voluntary-manslaughter instruction sua sponte.  (Emphasis added.) Barnard, 104 Ill.2d at 232, 83 Ill.Dec. 585, 470 N.E.2d 1005. To the majority, this is simply another way of saying: `where the defense wholly refrained from tendering an instruction on a lesser-included offense, the possibility that such restraint may have been a viable strategy decision militates against [a reviewing court] invoking any exceptions to the waiver doctrine.' 188 Ill.2d at 280, 242 Ill.Dec. at 303, 721 N.E.2d at 582, quoting People v. Lewis, 97 Ill. App.3d 982, 988, 53 Ill.Dec. 353, 423 N.E.2d 1157 (1981). How a categorical prohibition on the trial court's authority to instruct the jury on an uncharged lesser-included offense over the defendant's objection is in any way related to, let alone synonymous with, a reviewing court's authority to suspend waiver principles is beyond me. Nor does the majority provide any explanation, apparently content to leave it to the reader to discern the relationship between the two doctrines. In other words, indeed. Finally, the majority attempts to circumvent Barnard by stating:  Barnard did not overrule Taylor. The court in Barnard merely expressed the view that it is not error for a trial court to refrain from giving an instruction to the jury which might interfere with defense strategy. 188 Ill.2d at 281, 242 Ill.Dec. at 304, 721 N.E.2d at 583. Let me say that I agree entirely with the majority that Barnard did not overrule Taylor. The reason for this is that the rule set forth in Taylor -that a defendant who does not request a lesser-included offense instruction cannot argue on appeal that that instruction should have been given-is irrelevant to Barnard. As I explained above, the issues in Taylor and Barnard are unrelated. Consequently, the Barnard court would have no reason to mention Taylor, let alone overrule it. That said, when did this court begin expressing views? I thought we issued controlling opinions. Barnard did not merely express[ ] the view that it is not error for a trial court to refrain from giving an instruction to the jury which might interfere with defense strategy. 188 Ill.2d at 281, 242 Ill.Dec. at 304, 721 N.E.2d at 583. In fact, this language nowhere appears in Barnard. What Barnard did was hold that: The trial judge was well aware of defense counsel's reluctance to have the jury given an instruction on manslaughter. It would therefore not have been proper for the judge to interfere with defense counsel's strategy and give the self-defense and voluntary-manslaughter instruction sua sponte.  (Emphasis added.) Barnard, 104 Ill.2d at 232, 83 Ill.Dec. 585, 470 N.E.2d 1005. In sum, in Barnard, this court directly addressed the question presented in this appeal and concluded that it is improper for a trial court to instruct the jury on an uncharged lesser-included offense over a defendant's objection. The majority offers no compelling explanation for abandoning Barnard in favor of an unrelated decision rendered 17 years earlier.