Opinion ID: 1861263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of motion requesting jury instructions on lesser included charges.

Text: Defense counsel moved for inclusion of lesser included charges in the jury instructions prior to the omnibus hearing. At the time of that hearing, the matter was reserved until the time of trial. The motion was renewed at the time of trial, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury was instructed only on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree. Defendant argues on appeal that the failure to instruct the jury in the lesser included charges of murder in the third degree and manslaughter in the first degree was prejudicial error. In State v. Leinweber, 303 Minn. 414, 422, 228 N.W.2d 120, 125 (1975), we enunciated the following two-part test for determining when lesser degrees of an offense must be submitted to the jury: (1) the evidence would reasonably support a conviction of the lesser degree, and (2) the evidence would justify a finding of not guilty of the greater offense. When this two-part test is satisfied, the trial court must submit to the jury such lesser degrees as are warranted by the evidence. Failure to submit such lesser degrees is not reversible error if no prejudice to defendant results or if defendant waives that submission. Murder in the third degree is defined in Minn.St. 609.195(2) [1] as an act that     without intent to effect the death of any person, causes the death of another by    the following means   :       (2) Commits or attempts to commit a felony upon or affecting the person whose death was caused or another, except rape or sodomy with force or violence within the meaning of section 609.185. Manslaughter in the first degree is defined in Minn.St. 609.20(2) [2] as  Caus[ing] the death of another in committing or attempting to commit a crime with such force and violence that death of or great bodily harm to any person was reasonably foreseeable, and murder in the first or second degree was not committed thereby   . Both of these offenses require that the killing be done without intent to cause death. Defendant argues that the evidence submitted could reasonably support finding that he did not intend to cause the death of Mrs. Miesler and that he was incapable of forming the requisite intent because he was intoxicated at the time of the crime. Defendant further argues that the court in essence decided the issue of intent when it submitted instructions only on murder in the first and second degree. Defendant's implicit argument  that the jury could reasonably have concluded that he intended to inflict great bodily harm on Mrs. Miesler and therefore might have concluded that he intended the death of Mrs. Miesler rather than find him not guilty of any crime  would be more persuasive if the jury had found defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. This case is thus unlike State v. McDonald, Minn., 251 N.W.2d 705 (1977), where only one charge was submitted to the jury and there was a genuine issue about one of the necessary elements of the crime. We determined there that if the jury had been given the option, the defendant might have been convicted of the lesser offense. In the instant case, however, the verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree indicates that the jury believed the defendant not only had the requisite intent but also acted with premeditation and that the failure to submit instructions on the lesser offenses did not prejudice defendant on the issue of intent. See, State v. Keaton, 258 Minn. 359, 366, 104 N.W.2d 650, 656 (1960).