Opinion ID: 1717534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: anne nelson

Text: Mr. Craddick: Okay. Do you believe that you could participate in the decision making process that could result in the imposition of the death penalty? Venireperson Nelson: I'm not sure. Mr. Craddick: All right. When you say you are not sure, are you not sure that you can give equal consideration to both of the punishments? Venireperson Nelson: That is correct. Mr. Craddick: Do you think there's something in your mind that may make you preclude from your consideration one or the other punishments? Venireperson Nelson: Yes. Mr. Craddick: And that's clear in your mind; is that? Venireperson Nelson: Yes. After the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 67, 21 L.Ed.2d 186 (1968), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), a venireperson can be excused if his or her views on the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. Even from a reading of the record without the benefit of hearing and seeing the proceedings, this Court is left with the unmistakable impression that venireperson Warren, Jones, and Nelson were prevented or substantially impaired from performing their duties as jurors in accordance with their instructions and oath. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision to sustain the State's challenges for cause to Warren, Jones, or Nelson from the jury. The point is denied.
Isa raises numerous points of error relating to evidence adduced at trial. For ease of analysis, we separate the challenged evidence into two categories: demonstrative and testimonial.
Demonstrative evidence is admissible when it is relevant to a material fact at issue in this case. State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 688 (Mo. banc 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 770, 74 L.Ed.2d 983 (1983). Evidence tending to connect a defendant to a crime, prove identity of the deceased, show the nature and character of wounds, or throw light upon a material fact in issue is admissible. Id.
Isa challenges the trial court's admission of photographs depicting the victim and the crime scene. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility of photographs. State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 108 (Mo. banc 1992). Photographs that tend to corroborate the testimony of witnesses, assist the jury in understanding the facts and testimony of witnesses, or prove an element in the case are admissible. State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 917 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746 (1993). We reverse only for abuse of discretion. State v. Cummings, 607 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. banc 1980).
Isa first attacks State's Exhibits 16 and 17. These exhibits depict the victim's naked, traumatized body lying on the autopsy table. Isa contends that the enlarged photographs were unnecessarily gruesome, highly prejudicial, and designed solely to inflame the passions of the jurors. Although gruesome, photographs are generally admissible to assist the jury better to understand the testimony of a witness, to show the nature and location of the wounds, depict the location and condition of the body, or to establish any other element of the State's case. Mease, 842 S.W.2d at 108. The trial court admitted Exhibits 16 and 17 over defense counsel's objections during the testimony of Dr. Phillip Burch, a medical examiner for the City of St. Louis. With the aid of the exhibits, Dr. Burch showed the jury the precise nature, severity, and location of Tina's wounds. Exhibit 16 was particularly helpful to the jury in that it depicted the unusually close proximity of the wounds; a fact critical to the inference that Tina was being restrained while the fatal blows were struck. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibits 16 and 17. The point is denied.
Isa next challenges the admission of State's Exhibits 25, 26, and 27, photographs that depict Tina's body as first discovered by police in the Isa home. The exhibits show generally the location and positioning of Tina's lifeless body, her purse, and two bloodied knives lying near Tina's head. Defense counsel objected, citing the gruesome nature of these photographs. Murder is usually gruesome. The gruesome nature of a photograph, however, will not limit its admissibility where the photograph serves a legitimate and useful function. See Ervin, 835 S.W.2d at 917. Here, the photographs corroborated and explained Officer Ratermann's description of the crime scene. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these typical crime scene photographs. The point is denied.
Isa's final attack is lodged against State's Exhibit 29, a photograph depicting the living room in which Tina died. Exhibit 29 does not depict the victim's body, murder weapons, or blood stains. It simply gives a panoramic view of the living room from above waist level. Isa contends that Exhibit 29 was cumulative of State's Exhibits 25 through 27. The record is unclear whether Isa lodged an objection at trial. Assuming she did, however, it was not error to allow Exhibit 29 into evidence. Unlike Exhibits 25 through 27, Exhibit 29 provided a view of the interior of Isa's apartment not provided by the other photographs. This photograph was neither repetitive nor cumulative. It permitted the jury to acquire a spatial orientation not available in the other exhibits. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibit 29 into evidence. The point is denied.
Isa claims that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting State's Exhibit 15 into evidence, arguing that the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation for its admission. The decision to admit a diagram or drawing into evidence lies within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Croney, 425 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Mo.1968). We reverse only for abuse of discretion. Id. State's Exhibit 15 was a floor plan of Isa's apartment. The foundation for the admission of State's Exhibit 15 was laid during the State's direct examination of Officer Billy Qualls. The relevant exchange follows: Ms. Hayes: What was yourwhat were your primary responsibilities at the scene? Mr. Qualls: The evening of early a.m. that I arrived, that particular day I was the scene investigator. The scene investigator basically consists of taking an overview of the scene itself, transposing the measurements, taking particular photographs and seize particular property, particular evidence and conduct any and all measurements at the scene and transpose them to report form. Ms. Hayes: And did you do that that night? Mr. Qualls: I did. Ms. Hayes: All the measurements and everything? Mr. Qualls: Correct. Ms. Hayes: Now, have you had an opportunityI am going to refer you to the exhibit up there right behind you that's already been marked as State's Exhibit 15, Detective Sgt. Qualls. Have you had an opportunity to look at this exhibit? Mr. Qualls: Prior? I did not. Ms. Hayes: Would you quickly do so? Mr. Qualls: Yeah. I believe it to be correct. Ms. Hayes: What is it a correct rendering of, sir? Mr. Qualls: It's a rendering or a drawing of the apartment where the body was. Verification of a diagram is similar to the verification of a photograph. The diagram need not be to scale. However, the verifying witness must testify that the diagram is generally a true, accurate, or fair depiction of the scene or object shown. Officer Qualls verified Exhibit 15 sufficiently to permit the trial court to admit it. Exhibit 15, whether drawn to scale or not, assisted the jury in understanding the testimony of Officer Qualls. There was no error in admitting Exhibit 15 into evidence. The point is denied.
Isa next claims that the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibit 2-L into evidence without a prior limiting instruction to the jury. State's Exhibit 2-L was one in a series of audio tapes played for the jury. Specifically, Exhibit 2-L contained a recorded conversation between Zein Isa and his daughter, Fayrouz Abdeljabbar. The conversation took place immediately following Tina's murder. Prior to presenting Exhibit 2-L to the jury, Isa objected to the following exchange contained on the tape: Zein Isa: Tina came at 12. Fayrouz: Yes. Zein Isa: You understand, five thousand dollars or you die. She grabbed a knife from the kitchen and came straight toward me. By force, me and her motherunclearand took the knife from her and stabbed her with it and she died. Isa contends that the reference to her contained in this exchange was highly prejudicial in that it inferred her involvement in the crime. Failure to give a cautionary instruction as to this conversation, argues Isa, amounted to a clear abuse of discretion. Statements of coconspirators made after the perpetration of a crime for the purposes of concealment are admissible under the coconspirators exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Pizzella, 723 S.W.2d 384, 388-89 (Mo. banc 1987). The statements made by Zein Isa to his daughter, Fayrouz, were a part of Zein's and appellant's effort to conceal the actual events surrounding the death of their daughter. The statements fall within the coconspirators exception to the hearsay rule and are admissible against both Zein Isa and appellant without a limiting instruction. The point is denied.
Isa repackages her earlier unsuccessful argument against joint trials with her objection to the admission of State's Exhibits 3-A, 3-C, 3-D, 3-E, and 3-F, transcripts of taped conversations between Zein and his various daughters and sons-in-law. See Section II, Point A. Now, again, in objections to demonstrative evidence, Isa points specifically to the exhibits she contends are inadmissible against her and which contain highly prejudicial evidence from which the jury will infer guilt against her. The trial court gave a limiting instruction on the admissibility of State's Exhibits 3-A, 3-C, 3-D, 3-E, and 3-F. The evidence over which Isa expresses concern is easily distinguishable as admissible against her codefendant and not her. The conduct of trial depends on the trial court's confidence that limiting instructions will be followed. For the reasons stated in Section II, Point A, and those stated here, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting State's Exhibits 3-A, 3-C, 3-D, 3-E, and 3-F. The point is denied.
Last among Isa's challenges to the State's demonstrative evidence is her claim that State's Exhibit 1, [1] the tape recording of the murder, was highly prejudicial and of little probative value, and should have been excluded from trial. The trial court has broad discretion in considering the admission of tape recordings; its determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Wahby, 775 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Mo. banc 1989). The admissibility of a tape recording will, however, depend on the particular circumstances of each case. Despite being aurally startling or disturbing, a taped recording is admissible to assist the jury to understand the facts or testimony of witnesses, the timetable of events, or to establish any element of the State's case. Isa's real concern is that this tape is too probative. She prefers to sanitize the trial, removing from the jury any evidence that will allow the jury to see her for what she isa woman who restrained and participated in the torture and murder of her own child. Exhibit 1 placed the parties at the scene of the crime during the time of its commission. The victim's actual screams and moans, though rarely heard in a murder trial, are part and parcel of this murder. Exhibit 1 aided the jury in understanding the ebb and flow of events on that fateful evening. The probative value of this recording is obvious. Its only potential prejudice to the defendant is that it let the jury hear the truth first hand. The trial court did not err in admitting State's Exhibit 1 into evidence. The point is denied.
Isa raises eight points of error focusing on the trial court's rulings concerning testimony at trial. We address each point cognizant of the trial court's broad discretion to consider and admit such evidence and our abuse-of-discretion standard of review. State v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 620 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 884, 103 S.Ct. 185, 74 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982); State v. Miles, 253 Mo. 427, 161 S.W. 766, 769 (1913).
Isa again attempts to breathe life into her earlier argument against joint trials with her objection to the admission of Sergeant Qualls' statement as necessitating a prior limiting instruction. At trial, Sergeant Qualls testified to statements made by Zein Isa immediately following the crime. The critical exchange follows: Ms. Hayes: All right. And what did he say happened next? Mr. Qualls: Well he told me that she [Tina] demanded five thousand dollars from he and his wife. And she said he told me that Mrs. Isa told her [Tina], what do you need five thousand dollars for? We don't have five thousand dollars. The banks aren't open. What do you need five thousand dollars for? Ms. Hayes: And what happened? Mr. Shaw: Oh, if Your Honor please, I am going to ask that the jury be admonished to disregard that statement as it pertains to Maria. See this is a problem we have. That's hearsay as far as Maria is concerned. Isa's claim on appeal is that a limiting instruction should have been given prior to the testimony given by Sergeant Qualls. The record is devoid of any such request. We review Isa's claim for plain error. Rule 30.20. In order to justify a limiting instruction, the moving party must demonstrate to the court that the evidence has a prejudicial effect. Statements by a coconspirator in the course of the conspiracy, however, are admissible declarations excepted from the hearsay rule. Pizzella, 723 S.W.2d at 388-89. Zein Isa made his statement to Sergeant Qualls in furtherance of a conspiracy to conceal the true events of that evening. Zein Isa's statement is admissible against appellant as that of a coconspirator. There is no plain error. The point is denied.
Next, Isa charges that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Officer Guzy about statements she made immediately following the murder. Isa advances two arguments in support of her position.
First, Isa argues that Officer Guzy's testimony about comments she made immediately after the murder are inadmissible hearsay. Officer Guzy interviewed Isa at the crime scene and later at the police station. During this interview, Isa described Tina's threats to her father and how she, Isa, attempted to restrain Tina during the ensuing struggle. Isa argues that the conversation with Officer Guzy does not fall within the admission exception to the hearsay rule. An admission is the statement or conduct of a party that tends to incriminate or connect her with the crime charged, or which manifests a consciousness of guilt. In determining whether a defendant's statement constitutes an admission, the court must consider the defendant's statement in light of the surrounding circumstances. State v. Spica, 389 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Mo.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 972, 86 S.Ct. 1277, 16 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966). Officer Guzy testified that Isa admitted pulling Tina's hair, grabbing Tina from behind, or restraining Tina in the struggle against her father. When considered in the light of the circumstances, these statements tend to incriminate and connect Isa to the crime charged. They state facts that support the State's contention that Isa held Tina while Zein Isa stabbed her to death. Officer Guzy's recounting of Isa's statements was admissible at trial as an admission. Moreover, a statement need not express an acknowledgment of guilt to qualify as an admission. A false denial can constitute an admission as well as manifest a consciousness of guilt. A permissible inference of guilt may be drawn from the acts or conduct of a defendant, subsequent to an offense, if they tend to show a consciousness of guilt and a desire to conceal the offense or a role therein. State v. Walker, 357 Mo. 394, 208 S.W.2d 233, 236 (1948). Isa contends that her statements to Officer Guzy were of an exculpatory nature and did not acknowledge guilt in any way. Evidence in the record unquestionably demonstrates that Isa's statements were, in part, untrue. Isa's recital was simply another stage in the conspiracy she and her husband engineered as they stood over Tina's body and planned to conceal the events of the murder. Insofar as Isa relied on the false story, her statements were admissible to show her desire to conceal her role in the offense. Isa's statements manifested a consciousness of guilt. For this additional reason, her statements are admissions and are admissible. The point is denied.
Second, Isa contends that Officer Guzy based his testimony on an out-of-court statement in violation of Isa's right against self-incrimination. Isa voluntarily accompanied Officer Guzy to the police station. Once there, she remained free to leave. The St. Louis police did not arrest Isa until several days after she made her statement. Even assuming Isa had become a suspect in the mind of Officer Guzy at the time of her statements, Miranda warnings are not required when there is no custodial interrogation. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713-14, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991). The simple fact that investigative questioning takes place in a potentially coercive environment does not require Miranda warnings. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. Isa did not make her statements during a custodial interrogation. There is no Fifth Amendment violation when voluntary statements are made in a noncustodial setting. The point is denied.
Isa next maintains the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of Dr. Phillip Burch, the State's medical examiner. Isa sets forth two arguments in support of this position.
First, Isa claims that Dr. Burch did not perform the toxicology report about which he testified. Therefore, her argument continues, his testimony as to the results of the toxicology report are hearsay. We will reverse a conviction for the improper admission of testimony only where the error is prejudicial. State v. Fulkerson, 331 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Mo.1960); State v. Leisure, 796 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Mo. banc 1990). Dr. Burch testified that the State's toxicology reports showed no trace of drugs or alcohol in her system at the time of her death. This bit of information neither supported nor refuted any facet of Isa's defense. Even if erroneously admitted, Dr. Burch's testimony concerning the report did not prejudice Isa's defense. The point is denied.
Isa next asserts that admission of Dr. Burch's testimony improperly injected the victim's character into the case when the defense had not yet raised the issue. Where self-defense is an issue in a criminal case, the trial court may permit a defendant to introduce evidence of the victim's prior specific acts of violence of which the defendant had knowledge, provided the prior acts are reasonably related to the crime with which the defendant is charged. State v. Waller, 816 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. banc 1991); 1A Wigmore, Evidence § 63 (1983); Mo.Evidence Restated, § 404 (Mo.Bar 1984). In any other form, the character of the victim is not relevant to the guilt of a defendant and may not be raised by any party. On two occasions, Zein Isa made reference to the possibility of Tina being intoxicated with drugs or alcohol at the time of their final confrontation. In response, the State offered, through Dr. Burch, evidence that Tina's body was free of drugs and alcohol at the time of her death. Such evidence directly contradicted and disputed Zein's assertions. Evidence is relevant if the fact it tends to prove or disprove is a fact in issue, or if it corroborates other relevant evidence that bears on the main issue. State v. O'Neal, 718 S.W.2d 498, 503 (Mo. banc 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926, 107 S.Ct. 1388, 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987). Evidence that Tina's body was free from drugs or alcohol at the time of the murder, although relevant, infers nothing of her character. Furthermore, Isa made no showing of prejudice resulting from the admission of this evidence. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Burch's testimony at trial. The point is denied.
Isa raises four points of error concerning the testimony of State's witness, Pamela Fournier, Tina's high school guidance counselor. As grounds for reversal, Isa maintains that the trial court erroneously allowed Ms. Fournier to testify regarding (1) Tina's character (on two separate occasions); (2) her opinion of Isa's beliefs; and (3) previous statements she had made to the principal of Roosevelt High School. It is unnecessary to burden this opinion with the details of each alleged error. Our review will focus on the alleged prejudice, if any, flowing from the admission of such evidence, for we will reverse a conviction for the improper admission of testimony only where there is prejudice to the defendant. Fulkerson, 331 S.W.2d at 571. The burden is on Isa to show both the error and the resulting prejudice before reversal is required. Leisure, 796 S.W.2d at 879. Isa makes no showing of prejudice as to any of the points raised in regard to the testimony of Ms. Fournier. Other than the mere allegations of prejudice found in Isa's questions presented, the record is devoid of evidence describing how the admission of Ms. Fournier's testimony worked an injustice upon Isa's rights or her ability to defend herself. Mere allegations are insufficient to prove or preserve error. State v. Spraggins, 368 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Mo.1963). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to permit Ms. Fournier's testimony. The point is denied.
Next, Isa assigns error to the trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination of Pamela Fournier with regard to her knowledge of Isa's abuse or neglect of her daughter. On direct examination, the State asked Ms. Fournier if she was aware that a call had been made to the Child Abuse Hotline on Tina's behalf. Ms. Fournier responded that she knew of the call but that she was not the person who made the call. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Mr. Shaw: Now you were asked about something about a hot line. As a matter of fact, didn't you call the State of Missouri's hot line and say that this girl was being abused at home? Ms. Fournier: I did not. Mr. Shaw: Well, somebody called you and asked you about it; didn't they? Ms. Fournier: Yes. Mr. Shaw: Do you know that the State of Missouri investigated it? Ms. Fournier: Yes. Mr. Shaw: And did you learn that they found no abuse and neglect? Ms. Hayes: Your Honor, I am going to object to that question. If he wants to put that in evidence, it's the appropriate witness to call. The Court: Sustained. Great latitude is allowed on cross-examination in criminal cases. The trial court is permitted broad discretion in deciding the permissible scope of cross-examination. State v. Lue, 598 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. banc 1980). The standard of review remains abuse of discretion. State v. Goacher, 376 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. banc 1964). The trial court is also permitted broad discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination, especially as to collateral matters. State v. Kirk, 636 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Mo.1982); State v. Hill, 371 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo.1963). A collateral matter is one that could not have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction [for which it is offered]. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). A defendant, therefore, is entitled to show material, ultimate facts, but not each and every detail of those facts. State v. Rose, 339 Mo. 317, 96 S.W.2d 498, 504 (1936). No right exists for a defendant to show those matters collateral to the main issue or those of trivial or minor importance. State v. Burns, 280 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Mo. 1955). Defense counsel's question immediately prior to the State's objection called for information outside the scope of direct examination and collateral to the main issue of the casewhether Isa murdered her daughter. Evidence of the alleged child abuse was not relevant to that primary issue. Its usefulness was limited to the impeachment of Ms. Fournier. The trial court was entirely within its discretion when it sustained the objection, choosing to cut short interrogation over this collateral matter. Isa's suggestion that the limitation infringed her constitutional right of confrontation is also without merit. The Constitution does not require that defense counsel be permitted to ask every possible question on any and all collateral subjects. Rose, 96 S.W.2d at 504. On the record before us, we find defense counsel setting out on an excursion into a collateral matter without the prospect of producing any relevant evidence. Indeed, whether a hotline investigation showed or did not show prior child abuse is not relevant to the question whether Isa killed her daughter. We cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion. The point is denied.
Finally, Isa challenges the trial court's denial of her right to rebut and impeach the testimony of the State's witness, Marianna Palladino, on the issue of alleged child abuse. Marianna Palladino testified on direct examination that she had noticed bruises on Tina's neck and face in October, 1989. She also testified that the bruises appeared around the time that Tina had an altercation with her parents. At no point did Ms. Palladino testify that the bruises were the product of child abuse. Isa raised and sought to impeach the inference that Tina had been the subject of child abuse. She intended to offer a report of the Missouri Department of Social Services indicating that Tina had, in fact, not been the subject of abuse. Even if allowed, the report would not have contradicted or disproved Ms. Palladino's simple assertion that she saw bruises on Tina's neck and face. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The point is denied.
Isa argues that the trial court improperly denied her the right to call the court appointed translator as a rebuttal witness. At trial, the State offered, and the court heard, testimony from two interpreters, Peter Heath and Leny Mendible, experts in the translation of the Arabic and Portuguese languages, respectively. The State used Mr. Heath and Ms. Mendible exclusively as translators for the numerous taped conversations offered by the State. On the night of her murder, Tina entered her home only to be greeted by Isa, [w]here were you, bitch? Isa's challenge centers on the translation of this statement as found in State's Exhibit 1 and 1-A. In questioning Ms. Mendible, defense counsel sought to determine whether the Portuguese word for a female dog carried with it the same negative connotations as its English equivalent, bitch. At two separate points in her testimony, Ms. Mendible testified that the Portuguese word (cadela) did not have a negative or contentious connotation. Soraia Salem, Isa's daughter, made the same point when the State cross-examined her. During this exchange Soraia testified that she was unfamiliar with the term cadela but that the Portuguese term for female dog, as she understood it, carried no negative connotations. Near the close of the defense's case, Isa attempted to call the court-appointed Portuguese interpreter, Ofelia Huelman, to testify as to whether the term cadela had a negative connotation similar to its English counterpart. The trial court denied her request. The scope of rebuttal testimony rests within the broad discretion of the trial court. State v. Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366, 380 (Mo.1988). Ms. Huelman's testimony would say no more than had already been said on three prior occasions by two prior witnesses. The trial court did not abuse it discretion in refusing repetitive and cumulative testimony. The point is denied.
Isa next raises five points of instructional error.
First, Isa challenges the trial court's submission of Instruction No. 9, the verdict director for murder in the first degree. Instruction No. 9 reads: A person is responsible for her own conduct and she is also responsible for the conduct of another person in committing an offense if she acts with him with the common purpose of committing that offense, or if, for the purpose of committing that offense, she aids or encourages the other person in committing it. If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First that on November 6, 1989, in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant or Zein Isa caused the death of Palestina Isa by stabbing her, and Second, that defendant or Zein Isa knew or was aware that his conduct was causing or was practically certain to cause the death of Palestina Isa, and Third, that defendant or Zein Isa did so after deliberation, which means cool reflection upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief, and Fourth, that defendant Zein Isa did not act in lawful self-defense as submitted in Instruction No. 8, then you are instructed that the offense of murder in the first degree has occurred, and if you further find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: Fifth, that with the purpose of promoting or furthering the death of Palestina Isa, the defendant Maria Isa aided or encouraged Zein Isa in causing the death of Palestina Isa and reflected upon this matter coolly and fully, then you will find the defendant Maria Isa guilty of murder in the first degree. However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant Maria Isa, not guilty of murder in the first degree. If you do find the defendant Maria Isa guilty of murder in the first degree, you will return a verdict finding her guilty of murder in the first degree.
Isa insists that Instruction No. 9 is not consistent with the indictment charging her. The indictment charged that Maria and Zein Isa committed capital murder: MARIA ISA acting with her husband ZEIN HASAN ISA after deliberation, knowingly caused the death of PALESTINA ISA by stabbing her. Instruction No. 9 submitted the guilt question in terms of the conduct of Maria or Zein Isa: Maria Isa, aided or encouraged Zein Isa. Isa claims that the shift from and to or renders the instruction invalid and requires reversal. Long ago, this Court eliminated the common law distinction between principals and accessories. All persons who act together with a common intent and purpose in the commission of a crime are equally guilty. State v. Goodman, 482 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Mo.1972). An indictment or information may charge a defendant either as a principal or as an aider and encourager with the same legal effect. State v. Lunsford, 331 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo.1960); State v. Jackson, 822 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Mo.App. 1992). It is proper to submit to the jury a theory of accomplice liability despite charging the defendant as a principal. Lunsford, 331 S.W.2d at 540; State v. Easton, 577 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Mo.App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S.Ct. 131, 62 L.Ed.2d 85 (1979). The point is denied.
Isa next submits that Instruction No. 9 lacked the defense of abandonment contrary to MAI-CR3d 304.04. MAI-CR3d 304.04, Notes on Use, Paragraph 10, requires a modification for the defense of abandonment when there is evidence to support the defense. Section 562.041.2(3), RSMo 1986, permits the defense of abandonment when, [b]efore the commission of the offense [the defendant] abandons his purpose and gives timely warning to law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. This record is barren of any evidence indicating that Isa made any effort to prevent the murder of her daughter. In fact, during the murderous act, Tina's cries for mercy and assistance are met by the cold disinterest of appellant: Tina: Mother, please help me! Mother: Huh! What do you mean? Tina: Help! Help! Mother: What help!? Tina: (Screams) After killing their daughter, Isa and her husband engaged in a series of phone calls to police and relatives, in which they spun a tale of deceit to conceal the true events of that evening. This calculated act of concealment and misdirection indicates Isa's continuing cooperation with her husband in the commission of the crime well after abandonment became moot. The point is denied.
Next, Isa contends that Instruction No. 9 prevented the jury from considering lesser included offenses. Specifically, Isa claims that the language the murder in the first degree of Palestina Isa, as found in the Fifth paragraph of Instruction No. 9, should be replaced with the death of Palestina Isa. Isa claims proposed modification would have permitted the jury to consider the possibility of lesser offenses by eliminating an automatic finding of culpability on murder in the first degree. To repeat: If an accomplice has a purpose to promote an offense, she has acquired the requisite culpable state of mind for that offense. State v. Johns, 679 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034, 105 S.Ct. 1413, 84 L.Ed.2d 796 (1985). Deliberation is distinctive to murder in the first degree. Accordingly, a verdict director for first degree murder must require a finding of deliberation. By instructing in the alternative in the Third paragraph of Instruction No. 9, defendant or Zein Isa did so after deliberation, the instruction satisfied the requirement of finding that Isa deliberated. Paragraph Fifth of Instruction No. 9, the section about which Isa complains, tracks the language of MAI-CR3d 304.04, Notes on Use, Paragraph 8(b), and adds the additional assurance that Isa, as an aider and encourager, reflected upon this matter coolly and fully. This addition makes clear to the jury that it must find Isa, herself, deliberated upon the crime charged. By modifying the verdict director to include paragraph Fifth, the instruction required the jury to ascribe a more specific mental state to Isa, as a first degree murder accomplice. In short, the additional language placed a higher burden on the State than that mandated by Section 562.041.1(2), RSMo 1986. See State v. Roberts, 709 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 946, 107 S.Ct. 427, 93 L.Ed.2d 378 (1986). If a jury finds that Isa acted with deliberation in the murder of her daughter, her culpability can be nothing less than murder in the first degree. Only where the elements of first degree murder are not satisfied should the jury consider the possibility of guilt on a lesser included offense. [2] Therefore, it was not error to instruct the jury to find Isa guilty of murder in the first degree where the elements of Instruction No. 9 were satisfied. We find no error in the trial court's submission of Instruction No. 9 to the jury. The point is denied.
Isa's final charge of error as to Instruction No. 9 is that it fails to charge the essential element of deliberation. We have already rejected this argument. The point is denied.
Isa believes the trial court committed prejudicial error when it refused her proffered instructions concerning the presumption of coercion between a husband and wife. In support of her instructions, Isa cites State v. Ready, 251 S.W.2d 680 (Mo.1952), in which this Court agreed that a presumption exists that a wife, acting in the presence of her husband, is acting under his coercion and thus under duress, and that she is therefore not guilty of a crime committed in his presence. Isa's argument is ill-founded for three reasons. First, the presumption that a wife, acting in the presence of her husband, acts under his coercion, had its foundation in the notion that marriage cast upon [a wife] the duty of obedience to and affection for her husband. State v. Miller, 162 Mo. 253, 62 S.W. 692, 694 (1901). Our society no longer tolerates the common law fiction that wives are the property of their husbands, unable to think independently, and obedient to the point of criminal acts. Second, even the common law presumption did not extend to murder. [I]f a wife commits any felony, with the exception of murder and treason, and perhaps some other heinous felonies, in the presence of her husband, it is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that she did it under constraint of him, and is therefore excused. State v. Baker, 110 Mo. 7, 19 S.W. 222, 224 (1892). [Emphasis added.] Third, Missouri's Criminal Code (Chapters 556-600, RSMo 1986) (effective January 1, 1979), codified the common law defense of duress, and, by implication, eliminated the affirmative defense of duress or coercion for wives recognized by the common law. Section 562.071, RSMo 1986. In doing so, the statute limited those circumstances under which the defense of duress will be recognized in the State of Missouri. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so, by the use of, or threatened imminent use of, unlawful physical force upon him or a third person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. The defense of duress as defined in subsection 1 is not available: (1) As to the crime of murder; (2) As to any offense when the defendant recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to the force or threatened force described in subsection 1. Such a presumption takes the marital commitment, to love and obey to an unreasonable extreme. More importantly, we note that the presumption did not arise because of any use of or threatened use of unlawful physical force. Section 562.071 eliminates the affirmative defense of duress when the crime charged is murder. For the reasons expressed, Isa's proposed instruction misstates the law. The point is denied.
Isa also urges that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to accept her proffered Instruction P. Instruction P stated: The evidence consisting of taped statements of Defendant Zein Isa and persons other than Palestina Isa and Defendant Maria Isa may be considered by you only on the case against Defendant Zein Isa and not on the case against Defendant Maria Isa. Isa refers this Court to Paragraph 2 of the Notes on Use to MAI-CR3d 310.15, which states in pertinent part: When an oral instruction limiting the use of evidence was properly given at the time such evidence was received, this instruction may be given on the Court's own motion and must be given at the request of the party in whose favor the limitation applies. In short, Isa maintains that the trial court was bound to accept her proffered instruction since it directly patterned MAI-CR3d 310.15. The trial court aptly noted that there are some tapes, in particularly the incident tape, as well as the tapes following the incident ... [that] would apply to both [Zein and appellant]. We agree. Certain tapes contained statements by Zein Isa that were admissible against the appellant as statements of a coconspirator. See, e.g., Section II, Point D, Subsection 1(c). In this regard, Isa's Instruction P misstated the law as to what evidence was admissible against her. The trial court properly refused Isa's Instruction P. The point is denied.
Isa challenges the trial court's failure to mark and file her proffered instructions as required by Supreme Court Rule 28.02(e). Specifically, Isa charges that the trial court failed to mark and record three proffered first degree murder verdict directors and that it improperly recorded a fourth. This failure, argues Isa, resulted in an incomplete record that prevented her from effectively challenging the instructions given at trial. Isa's claim fails on several grounds. First, Isa failed to preserve her point for review by not including in her brief any portion of the refused instructions. Rule 30.06; State v. Tatum, 807 S.W.2d 126 (Mo.App.1991). Second, Isa did not support her allegation of error with any citations of authority. Absent a clear and concise explanation as to why authority was unavailable, her point is deemed waived. Rule 30.06; see State v. King, 747 S.W.2d 264 (Mo.App.1988). Third, Isa's abstract statement of error preserves nothing for appellate review. Simply to allege a violation of Rule 28.02(e), without setting forth competent facts describing the violation together with a brief and concise statement of the prejudice suffered, is to fail to preserve anything for review. Rule 30.06; State v. Murphy, 796 S.W.2d 429 (Mo.App. 1990). The point is denied.
Isa submits that the trial court improperly denied her the opportunity to amend her proffered instructions. During the instruction conference, the State offered a verdict director on murder in the second degree. Recognizing that the verdict director lacked the element of acting in lawful self-defense, the trial court inquired [h]ave you included that element lawfulnot acting in a lawful self-defense? The state's prosecutor responded, [y]es. We realized we had to put that in, and are doing it right now. Defense counsel then offered two verdict directors on second degree murder that included the defenses of abandonment ( see Section II, Point F, Subsection 1(b)) and husband coercion ( see Section II, Point F, subsection 2). The trial court refused Isa's instructions. In a creative reading of the record, Isa complains that the trial court's actions denied her the opportunity to amend instructions and showed the trial court's bias against her. For reasons we have already expressed, Isa's instructions either misstated the law (husband coercion) or were not founded on evidence (abandonment) and amounted to misstatements of the law. The trial court asked defense counsel if he was offering the same, previously refused, instructions on the verdict director of second degree murder. In doing so, the trial court recognized the possibility that defense counsel had the right to proffer something new or different from what had previously been submitted on first degree murder. Defense counsel did not seize the opportunity to offer new legally correct instructions. The trial court properly refused the proposed instructions. Thus, Isa was not deprived of an opportunity to amend her instructions. Isa claims that the trial court's actions show its bias against her. The mere fact that the trial court refused erroneous instructions is not evidence of judicial bias. State v. DeClue, 805 S.W.2d 253, 260 (Mo. App.1991). The point is denied.