Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Carol Neve

Text: Regarding evidence of Pamela’s intent to cooperate with federal authorities on the Goldfinger investigation, the prosecution proffered the testimony of witness Carol Neve, a longtime friend and confidante of Pamela’s. After the parties vigorously debated the issue, the trial court prohibited the prosecution from eliciting Neve’s testimony that Pamela told Neve she was going to cooperate with the federal authorities. The trial court concluded the prosecution failed to show the link between Pamela’s intent to cooperate and defendant’s knowledge of that intent, which the trial court described as a “pretty pivotal issue in this case.” However, the trial court permitted Neve, who had a similar e-currency business and 60 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. spoke to Pamela about it, to testify about Pamela’s intent to obtain a money transmitting license for Goldfinger. Over defendant’s hearsay objection, Neve testified that in September or October of 2007, she had advised Pamela that “her company [Goldfinger] was at risk” and told Pamela that she should get “money transmitter licenses,” even though such licenses were “very expensive” and had to be obtained through the federal government. The trial court ruled such statements did not constitute hearsay because they were not offered for their truth; rather, Neve’s testimony was “what Miss Fayed was advised.” Neve also testified that Pamela told her that “her intent was to obtain those money transmitter licenses.” Overruling defendant’s hearsay objection, the court concluded that Pamela’s hearsay statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(2), as a statement of future intent “to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.” On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Neve’s testimony. Defendant again asserts that Neve’s statement regarding what she advised Pamela was hearsay. As the trial court concluded, however, Neve’s advisement to Pamela was not offered for the truth of the matter stated, i.e., to show that Pamela should have obtained the licenses, but was offered to show Pamela’s reaction and conduct in response to the statement. (See Evid. Code, § 1200; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1162.) Likewise, we conclude that Pamela’s hearsay statement, i.e., that she told Neve she intended get the money transmitting license for Goldfinger, was admissible as a statement of the declarant’s future intent under Evidence Code section 1250, 61 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. subdivision (a)(2). Under this provision, “a statement of the declarant’s intent to do certain acts is admissible to prove that he did those acts.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Evid. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 1250, p. 531; see People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177, 187-188.) Here, Pamela’s statement of future intent to purchase a money transmitting license was admissible to prove that she tried to obtain the license, which in turn was relevant to show why defendant was angry at Pamela and had a motive to kill her. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the statement was not admitted to prove Pamela’s existing state of mind under Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(1), which expressly requires that the declarant’s mental state be “itself an issue in the action.” (See People v. Noguera (1991) 4 Cal.4th 599, 621.)