Opinion ID: 2338779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Libel Claims against the MBNA Defendants

Text: The Superior Court reached in two steps its conclusion that the claims asserted against the MBNA Defendants were not viable. First, it decided that the description of Ramunno's property holdings contained in Cawley's letter  including the statement that some of Ramunno's rowhouses are occupied by tenants  was substantially true and therefore not libelous, even if technically inaccurate. Second, the Court held that Cawley's statement that Ramunno has done well through poorly-maintained parking lots and rental homes was a constitutionally-protected expression of opinion. We disagree with both of these conclusions. The law of libel enjoys a constitutional grounding. [11] We have interpreted Section 9 of the Delaware Bill of Rights, [12] colloquially referred to as the open courts or remedies clause, to provide a strong state constitutional basis for remedies to recompense damage to one's reputation. [13] Libel itself consists of a false and defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff made in an unprivileged publication to a third party. [14] But a statement is not defamatory unless it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. [15] Moreover, a statement of fact is not libelous if it is substantially true. [16] That is, no libel has occurred where the statement is no more damaging to plaintiff's reputation in the mind of the average reader than a truthful statement would have been. [17] Immaterial errors do not render a statement defamatory so long as the gist or sting of the statement is true. [18] Cawley's account of Ramunno's property holdings was clearly a statement of fact. In his complaint, Ramunno alleged that it is false and defamatory because Cawley's description  specifically, his use of the adjective some  implies that Ramunno has multiple tenants in his rowhouses, when in fact, he rents out only one-half of one of his five houses. In response, the MBNA Defendants referred the Superior Court to Webster's Dictionary, which defines some as one, a part or an unspecified number and at least one. The Superior Court declined to resolve this interpretive debate, deciding instead that the gist of Cawley's description was accurate. The Court held that any error in the account was basically harmless, and that rewriting the letter to convey that Ramunno owns only one house that is currently occupied would make no difference in the minds of the readers. Cawley's description of Ramunno's land holdings is, in fact, inaccurate, when we construe the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff. All but one-half of one of Ramunno's houses are vacant. Cawley's letter, however, states that some of them are occupied. To be sure, the adjective some may not imply that Ramunno owns a vast empire of Eastside tenements, but we believe that an average reader could accept that term as a plural modifier. In suits for libel and defamation, dictionary definitions do not control the interpretation of allegedly defamatory statements. Rather, courts must take the words in their plain and natural meaning and understand them as would a person of average intelligence and perception. [19] Keeping in mind this rule of interpretation  as well as our duty to draw inferences in favor of Ramunno, the non-movant  we hold that the allegation in the complaint that Cawley's letter contains a false description of Ramunno's property holdings cannot be dismissed on the pleadings. The Superior Court erred in dismissing this part of the complaint on the rationale that the description is substantially true. We do not necessarily disagree with the substance of that finding. The trier of fact might very well find that the error was immaterial and that the controversy itself is trivial. Indeed, on a summary judgment record or at trial, the defendants may be successful in portraying this dispute as silly. But in dismissing the complaint on this ground, the Superior Court strayed from the time-honored rules governing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) by failing to draw every reasonable factual inference in favor of the complainant. [20] The defense of substantial truth may necessarily entail some inferential judgment concerning the importance of a falsity to the average reader. The notion of substantial truth necessarily implies a thread of untruth. The conclusion that a statement is substantially true will therefore involve the uncertain determination that whatever errors abound in the statement are irrelevant in the minds of the audience. In resolving the question of substantial truth against Ramunno, however, the Superior Court improperly drew a factual inference in the movant's favor, not in the pleader's favor as the court is constrained to do. Indeed, given the unavoidably inferential nature of this inquiry, it is a rare case that may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the rationale that the statements complained of are substantially true. [21] We turn now to the Superior Court's treatment of Cawley's statement that Ramunno has done well through poorly maintained properties. The Court held this to be non-actionable as a protected expression of opinion, applying the four-part test we adopted in Riley to determine whether a statement is one of fact or opinion. [22] We disagree with the Superior Court's conclusion. In our view, the holding attaches undue importance to the form in which Cawley cast his statement. A speaker may not insulate himself or herself from liability simply by phrasing defamatory statements as opinions where an imbedded defamatory fact may be inferred. [23] It is generally true that courts are reluctant to impose liability for the expression of opinions. [24] But there is no wholesale exemption from defamation law for any statement cast in the form of an opinion. [25] Rather, a defamation action may lie where an opinion implies the existence of an undisclosed defamatory factual basis. An `opinion may often imply an assertion of objective fact' and, if the implied fact may be found to be false the trier of fact may find the plaintiff to have been libeled.... Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications ... [26] By contrast, where a speaker makes explicit an underlying nondefamatory factual basis, a defamation action will fail without regard to how ridiculous or unjustified the opinion may be. [27] With respect to Cawley's statement that Ramunno has done well through poorly maintained properties, we hold that the grant of defendants' 12(b)(6) motion was in error. As in Kanaga, we find that the statement may suggest a defamatory factual basis not disclosed by the speaker. For instance, the phrase in question could imply that Ramunno has prospered from rents gleaned from dilapidated, sub-standard buildings, or that he has failed to observe governing building and health codes. What is crucial is that the average reader is unable to discern the source of the statement. Nothing in the letter signals to the audience that Cawley is surmising or reasoning from facts made explicit in the letter. [28] Readers are simply left to wonder what facts underlie Cawley's derogation of Ramunno's real estate portfolio. These circumstances, we feel, fall squarely within the scope of Kanaga and Milkovich. In holding that Cawley's description of Ramunno's land holdings was substantially true, the Superior Court overstepped its role in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The Court was obliged to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant Ramunno, and in this respect it should have ruled that the errors in Cawley's description were potentially material to the average reader. And in finding that Cawley's claim that Ramunno has done well through poorly maintained properties is a non-actionable opinion, the Superior Court failed to recognize the potentially defamatory factual basis imbedded in the statement. In his complaint, then, Ramunno offers two statements on the part of the MBNA Defendants, both of which are actionable on their face. We therefore reverse this part of the Court's decision and remand with instructions to reinstate the libel claims against the MBNA Defendants.