Opinion ID: 504821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of the Recusal Motion

Text: 14 Plaintiffs contend that Bankruptcy Judge Bare should have recused himself from ruling on the trustee's motion for attorneys' fees since Judge Bare was the same judge who had initially found plaintiffs in contempt of court. Plaintiffs contend that an attorney who has been found to be in contempt is entitled to have the sanctions for contempt determined by a judge other than the one who cited him. Under the circumstances here, we find this argument without merit. 15 Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 provides in pertinent part: 16 Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. 17 Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455 provides in pertinent part: 18 (a) Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 19 (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.... 20 It is well settled that sections 144 and 455 must be read in pari materia. United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir.1983); Cleveland v. Krupansky, 619 F.2d 576, 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980). The standard for recusal requires the facts asserted to be such as would convince a reasonable man that a bias exists. United States v. Story, 716 F.2d at 1090. 21 Recusal is not mandatory upon the filing of an affidavit stating a good faith belief regarding the judge's bias. Rather, the affidavit must be sufficient. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144. In Cleveland v. Krupansky, the Sixth Circuit held that affidavits that are  'assertions merely of a conclusionary nature are not enough nor are opinions or rumors' . 619 F.2d at 578 (quoting United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 131 (D.C. Cir.1976), cert. denied sub nom. Ehrlichman v. United States, 431 U.S. 933 (1977)). Similarly, in United States v. Story, the court stated: The facts and reasons set out in the affidavit 'must give fair and adequate support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.'  716 F.2d at 1090 (citations omitted). 22 Moreover, judicial disqualification under sections 144 and 455 must be predicated upon extrajudicial conduct rather than upon judicial conduct. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); United States v. Story, 619 F.2d at 1091; Cleveland v. Krupansky, 619 F.2d at 578. The judge's impressions of perceptions based upon information gained during the trial cannot be the basis of an allegation of bias. In re M. Ibrahim Khan, P.S.C., 751 F.2d 162 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983). 23 Plaintiffs have asserted no facts which would lead a reasonable person to doubt the impartiality of Judge Bare. The Liberis affidavit was speculative, and Liberis did not allege one extrajudicial incident which would give the appearance of bias or warrant recusal. Moreover, a judge need not disqualify himself from imposing sanctions for contempt unless he has become so personally embroiled with counsel so as to be unfit to sit in judgment. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427, 438 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982) (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971)). In Farmer, the Fifth Circuit upheld the sentence for counsel's criminal contempt, although it was made by the judge who had held him in contempt for insulting, sarcastic, and disrespectful behavior to the court. The court noted the Supreme Court's recognition of the principle that, even in criminal cases, not every attack on a judge ... disqualifies him from sitting. Rather, the attack must be personal and inflamatory. 652 F.2d at 438 (citing Mayberry, 400 U.S. 455 (1971)). In the instant case, plaintiffs' contumacious actions were not insulting nor were they personally directed at Judge Bare. The contempt certainly did not sink to the level of personal vilification and scurrilous attacks on the judge so as to disqualify him from pronouncing sentence on the contemnor. Farmer, 652 F.2d at 439. Thus, we find that plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts which would indicate that Judge Bare was biased or incapable of reaching an impartial decision. Moreover, we note that the district court conducted a de novo review of the contempt order and the imposition of sanctions. Plaintiffs do not allege that either District Judge Hull or District Judge Jarvis were biased against them. Accordingly, we uphold the district court's order affirming the order of the bankruptcy court denying the plaintiffs' motion for recusal.