Opinion ID: 613271
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sporhase/Wunnicke Standard for Congressional Consent

Text: The Supreme Court elaborated its standard for determining Congress's intent to consent to state statutes in Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1982), a principal case in the parties' briefs and the district court's decision. Sporhase recognized that water is included in interstate commerce. Id. at 953-54, 102 S.Ct. 3456. It found that a Nebraska law restricting the interstate transfer of groundwater violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 957-58, 102 S.Ct. 3456. Although the groundwater at issue was not covered by an interstate compact, the Sporhase Court acknowledged that federal water statutes, including congressional approvals of interstate water compacts, showed deference to state law. Id. at 958-59, 102 S.Ct. 3456. This general deference to state law, however, did not constitute expressly stated congressional consent to immunize the Nebraska law from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Id. at 960, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (quoting New England Power, 455 U.S. at 343, 102 S.Ct. 1096). The Nebraska law discriminated against interstate commerce by preventing the withdrawal of groundwater from any well in Nebraska for use in another state unless the other state granted reciprocal opportunities to withdraw and transfer groundwater to Nebraska. Id. at 960, 102 S.Ct. 3456. The Court found the reciprocity requirement not narrowly tailored to serve Nebraska's water conservation goals. Id. at 957-58, 102 S.Ct. 3456. Two years later, the Court cautioned that the phrase expressly stated in Sporhase had no talismanic significance. South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984). Alaska had required that timber taken from state lands be processed within the state before export. The Wunnicke Court held that this state law was not authorized by Congress. Id. at 90, 104 S.Ct. 2237. The Court clarified that an express statement is just one way Congress can manifest intent. Id. at 88, 104 S.Ct. 2237. What matters is that Congress affirmatively contemplate that it is consenting to state protectionism and that its intent is unmistakably clear. Id. at 91-92, 104 S.Ct. 2237. The Court cautioned that a law that appears to be consistent with federal policy  or even that state policy furthers the goals ... that Congress had in mind  is an insufficient indicium of congressional intent. Id. at 92, 104 S.Ct. 2237.