Opinion ID: 2345146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wehde's Earlier Convictions Constitute Predicate Offenses Under the Habitual Offender Statute

Text: Although the sentencing judge did not explain her reasoning, she implicitly held that Wehde's earlier convictionsfor which he received suspended imprisonment for probationwere predicate offenses under the habitual offender statute. On appeal, Wehde argues that those convictions could not be predicate offenses because, without incarceration, he did not receive a chance to rehabilitate. He relies on Buckingham v. State, [5] in which we described 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) as requiring three convictions ... each successive to the other, with some chance for rehabilitation after each sentencing.... [6] Wehde's argument, however, rests on the remarkable premise that a person on probation cannot be rehabilitated, but only one who is imprisoned can. In Whiteman v. State, [7] we held that imprisonment suspended for probation does not ipso facto preclude a conviction from constituting a predicate offense under the habitual offender statute. [8] That holding implicitly recognizes that the purpose of probation is to attempt to rehabilitate a criminal in a non-correctional setting. [9] Wehde clearly received an opportunity to rehabilitate between the earlier sentences. Although our cases do not articulate a bright line, one size fits all, standard for determining whether any particular defendant had sufficient time to rehabilitate, the shortest time period between one of Wehde's earlier convictions and a later crime was more than one year. We assume, without deciding, that our case law establishes that there must be some time span for rehabilitation before a conviction can constitute a predicate offense. A one year period of probationary supervision should satisfy any rational minimum standard. The sentencing judge committed no legal error by declaring Wehde an habitual offender.