Opinion ID: 1908530
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: M.A.P. v. Ryan.

Text: The rule is fundamental in our jurisprudence that no division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971) (footnote omitted). Overruling our precedents can be effected only by this court en banc. Id. Mendes v. Johnson , itself an en banc decision, is thus presumptively binding on us. We do not believe, however, that M.A.P. v. Ryan, supra , obliges us to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 n. 27 (D.C.1979). Arguably, Beam and Harper have substantially undermined our reliance, in Mendes, on the Supreme Court's former approach to retroactively issues, as articulated in Linkletter. Indeed, we think it probable that if Beam and Harper, and not Linkletter, had reflected the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in 1978, this court would have given its decision in Mendes full retroactive effect. Nevertheless, [t]his court will not lightly deem one of its decisions to have been implicitly overruled and thus stripped of its precedential authority. Lee v. United States, 668 A.2d 822, 828 (D.C.1995). As a two-judge majority of a three-judge panel, we are especially reluctant to take such a step, although it may well be desirable for the en banc court to revisit Mendes in light of arguably supervening developments during the past two decades. In any event, we think it unnecessary to decide whether Mendes has survived Beam and Harper because, even if it has, then under the Mendes standards, reasonably construed, our decision in Carl II must be retroactively applied to the present case. [6]