Opinion ID: 2630876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Were the references judicial comments on the evidence?

Text: ¶ 16 Levy argues that references to the building address, Kenya White, Michael Montemayor, Brianna Thorne, the revolver, the crowbar, and the jewelry instruct[ed] the jury that matters have been established as a matter of law. Pet. for Review at 5. Levy further argues that it is not necessary for the judge to expressly convey his personal feelings on the evidence for the comments to constitute a violation. Id. He cites to two rulings of this court as support for his claim that the to-wit language violated the prohibition on judicial comment. Becker, 132 Wash.2d 54, 935 P.2d 1321; State v. Akers, 136 Wash.2d 641, 965 P.2d 1078 (1998). In Becker, we held that a special verdict form asking whether defendants were within 1,000 feet of school grounds that included the phrase `to-wit: Youth Employment Education Program [YEP] School' impermissibly relieved the State of its burden to prove that the program was, in fact, a school. 132 Wash.2d at 64, 935 P.2d 1321. In Akers, we did not reach the question of whether a special verdict form that left out the word school in the to-wit phrase was judicial comment, but we criticized the Court of Appeals holding that it was not a judicial comment based on Becker. 136 Wash.2d at 644, 965 P.2d 1078. ¶ 17 The State counters that jury instructions must be read as a whole and that the instructions in this case were clearly distinguishable from Becker. The State argues that in Becker the question of whether YEP was a school was critical to the issue of whether the defendants had committed a crime at all. 132 Wash.2d at 63, 935 P.2d 1321. Here, the State contends that because other jury instructions defined the terms building, deadly weapon, and personal property, to interpret the to-wit references as a directed verdict would render the other instructions meaningless. Further, the State argues that there was never any dispute that White's apartment is a building, that .38 revolvers or crowbars are deadly weapons, that jewelry is personal property, or that named victims are persons other than the defendant. ¶ 18 We review jury instructions de novo, within the context of the jury instructions as a whole. State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 656, 904 P.2d 245 (1995). A judge is prohibited by article IV, section 16 from conveying to the jury his or her personal attitudes toward the merits of the case or instructing a jury that matters of fact have been established as a matter of law. Becker, 132 Wash.2d at 64, 935 P.2d 1321. Moreover, the court's personal feelings on an element of the offense need not be expressly conveyed to the jury; it is sufficient if they are merely implied. State v. Jacobsen, 78 Wash.2d 491, 495, 477 P.2d 1 (1970); Lampshire, 74 Wash.2d at 892, 447 P.2d 727. Thus, any remark that has the potential effect of suggesting that the jury need not consider an element of an offense could qualify as judicial comment. ¶ 19 In Becker, the to-wit reference in the special verdict form expressly stated that the youth program was a school, a fact that was highly contested by the parties and critical to the case. 132 Wash.2d at 64, 935 P.2d 1321. The question of whether it was a school was also a threshold issue that had to be established for there to be any crime at all. Id. Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that the references to White's apartment as a building and to the revolver and crowbar as deadly weapons were arguably judicial comments. We agree with respect to the references to the building and crowbar. ¶ 20 The only instruction here that is clearly analogous to the instruction in Becker is the reference to the building of Kenya White, located at 711 W. Casino Rd., Everett, WA. CP at 59. As with the reference in Becker, which named YEP as a school, the instruction here expressly named White's apartment as a building. Id. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the use of the word building in the instruction improperly suggested to the jury that the apartment was a building as a matter of law. ¶ 21 The reference to the crowbar is also problematic. A crowbar only qualifies as a deadly weapon if it has the capacity to inflict death and from the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce or may easily and readily produce death. RCW 9.94A.602. Thus, the State must prove that the crowbar was used in a way that met the criteria of a deadly weapon. We conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the reference to the crowbar as a deadly weapon was likely a judicial comment because the jury need not consider whether the State proved that its use caused it to be qualified as a deadly weapon. ¶ 22 We disagree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the references to the revolver constituted judicial comment on the evidence. The pattern jury instructions permit a court to instruct the jury that a revolver is a deadly weapon as a matter of law, and the court was well within its authority to so instruct the jury in this case. See 11 WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 2.06.01, at 29 (1994) (WPIC); WPIC 2.07.02, at 37. ¶ 23 We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that referring to jewelry as personal property and the names of the alleged victims as another do not qualify as judicial comment. The pattern jury instructions for the offense of robbery expressly permit the court to instruct the jury that a particular item qualifies as property if it would be appropriate within the context of the case. WPIC 2.21, at 53. Here, because there was no dispute as to whether jewelry was personal property and the only question related to whether jewelry was taken from the victims, it was not inappropriate for the court to instruct the jury that jewelry is personal property. ¶ 24 Similarly, the victim's name is not an element of the offense of robbery. Therefore, it would not constitute a comment on the evidence for the court to name the alleged victim in a jury instruction. Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals that naming the victim does not improperly suggest to the jury that it need not find that the property was taken from another. ¶ 25 We hold that the to-wit references to the building and the crowbar qualified as judicial comments and the remaining references did not.