Opinion ID: 2185005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Question of directed verdict.

Text: A verdict should only be directed against a plaintiff where plaintiff's evidence, giving it the most favorable construction it will reasonably bear, is insufficient to sustain a verdict in plaintiff's favor. Wallow v. Zupan (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 195, 150 N. W. 2d 329; Baumgarten v. Jones (1963), 21 Wis. 2d 467, 124 N. W. 2d 609. The central issue in this case is whether or not the railroad had a duty to warn motorists of the presence of a train. The defendant railroad contends that it is unreasonable to require the railroad to flag the crossing because the train itself furnishes adequate warning of its presence on the crossing. For this proposition the railroad relies heavily on Hendley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1929), 198 Wis. 569, 572, 225 N. W. 205. In Hendley, the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile which struck a standing train. The railroad demurred to the complaint, and this court sustained the demurrer on the ground that there is no common-law duty to warn travelers of the presence of such a conspicuous object as a standing freight train. The court, in Hendley, went on to note, however, that: . . . although it may well be that the mere absence of a specific statutory provision requiring flagmen is not of itself sufficient as a matter of law, to relieve a railroad from giving warning in appropriate situations. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant also cites Schmidt v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1926), 191 Wis. 184, 210 N. W. 370. In Hendley, supra, there were no signals of any kind. In Schmidt, there were signals at the crossing, voluntarily installed by the railroad, but they failed to operate just prior to the accident. In Schmidt, the court held that the failure to keep the signals working properly did not render the railroad liable because the plaintiff ran into a train which was already upon the crossing. The court found that the purpose of the signals was to warn of the approach of a train, not its actual presence. The factual situation in the instant case differs substantially from the facts in both the Hendley Case and Schmidt Case. In Hendley, there was no Wisconsin public service commission order requiring the installation of warning devices. In Schmidt, there was no evidence that the plaintiff was familiar with the crossing and that he relied upon the absence of a warning signal. In the instant case, it was uncontradicted that this plaintiff had traversed this crossing, often twice a day, since 1959 when he first learned to drive. The signals at this crossing had been operating from 1957, and over a period of eight years the plaintiff had come to place some reliance on the presence of the signals. Here there is the additional fact that a signal repairman for the defendant testified that some type of temporary warning signal could have been installed at this crossing while the signal control box was being repaired, but this was not done because the railroad had issued instructions to the train crews of all trains using the crossing that they were to stop and flag over the crossing. The defendant railroad points out that sec. 192.29 (3) (a) and (4), Stats., require it to sound a warning bell only until such crossing shall be reached. The railroad contends that these provisions constitute legislative recognition of the fact that it is unreasonable to require the railroad to warn motorists of the presence of a train as opposed to the approach of a train. We do not believe these statutes were intended to relieve the railroad of the duty to warn highway travelers in appropriate situations. We think the crucial fact in this case is that the public service commission has, by the authority granted to it under sec. 195.28, Stats., imposed a duty on the railroad to erect and maintain at this crossing an electric warning system of flashing lights and ringing bells. The commission's order does not specify that the warning system must continue to operate as the train passes over the crossing, but that is the type of system the railroad erected at this crossing. Therefore, even if it was not so ordered, the railroad has nevertheless imposed upon itself the duty of warning motorists of not only the approach of trains, but also the presence of trains on the crossing. The railroad recognized this duty when it issued the order to the train crew directing them to flag over the crossing. It is a common and well-established principle of tort law that by undertaking to do an act which the law might not otherwise require, one can impose upon himself a duty to do or continue the act properly because others have learned to rely on his conduct. Two examples of the operation of this rule are found in Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. hornbook series), p. 342, sec. 54. [1] The latter example is rather pertinent to the instant case: Where performance clearly has been begun, there is no doubt that there is a duty of care. Thus a landlord who makes repairs on leased premises, although he is under no obligation to do so, assumes a duty to his tenant and to those entering in the right of the tenant, to exercise proper care to see that the repairs are safe, or at least that the tenant is not left in ignorance of his danger. The same principle frequently has been applied in the very common case where a railway company has made a practice of maintaining a flagman or giving warning signals at a crossing, and when it fails to do so on a particular occasion, is held liable to a traveler who has relied on the absence of warning. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.) The propriety of this rule was recognized in Wisconsin as early as Gundlach v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1920), 172 Wis. 438, 179 N. W. 577, 179 N. W. 985. In that case the railroad flagman was absent, and the plaintiff approached the crossing with a team of horses. He, like the plaintiff in this case, was familiar with the crossing and relied upon the presence of the flagman. This court stated as follows, at page 444: . . . It is a matter of common knowledge and experience that travelers approaching a railway crossing at a time when gates or flagmen are ordinarily or usually maintained, take into consideration that fact in determining their course of conduct, and it is for the jury to determine whether or not, in a particular case, a traveler has given that circumstance such weight and consideration as the great mass of mankind ordinarily do under such circumstances, . . . Of course, one must always exercise reasonable caution for his own safety, and the fact that a flagman or warning system is usually operative at a crossing does not automatically relieve the plaintiff of that duty. The rule in Gundlach, supra, was reaffirmed in Wasikowski v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1951), 259 Wis. 522, 525, 49 N. W. 2d 481, where this court restated all of the pertinent considerations related to this type of a fact situation and affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. In that case the plaintiff was familiar with the crossing for many years and knew a flagman was on duty when a train was about to cross over the crossing. At that time of the night the flagman was not present, and the plaintiff collided with the train. The court quoted the language from the Gundlach Case, supra , and specifically analyzed the conduct of the plaintiff and found that the question of negligence was for the jury. The next case is the case of McLaughlin v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. Co. (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 378, 143 N. W. 2d 32. In McLaughlin, the plaintiff ran into a flatcar with a crane mounted on it. The crossing was on a highway, not a city street, and it was not governed by any kind of signal at all and never had been. In spite of this, an apportionment of negligence65 percent to the railroad and 35 percent to the plaintiffwas affirmed on appeal. In McLaughlin, at page 386, this court noted: The learned circuit judge deemed that it was negligence for the crew to leave the crossing blocked, without warning signals, in order to go and have their supper. Under the evidence the collision may have happened before the crew actually left the engines to walk to the restaurant. But regardless of when, during this interval, it happened, the critical question is whether the leaving of the cars on the crossing, at night, under existing conditions of visibility, without a warning signal, involved an unreasonable risk of harm to people traveling on the highway. (Emphasis supplied.) Of course, the crew in the instant case did not abandon the train and leave it on the crossing. But the reason there was no warning flagman in this case is the same as it was in McLaughlin. The crew was too preoccupied with plans for supper. The crew admitted it stayed with the engine (and, therefore, one did not stay at the crossing and signal the crossing for traffic) because it was closer to the restaurant for the crew. Moreover, plaintiff has in this case a fact not present in McLaughlin, namely, a past history of signal warnings at the crossing which he had to some extent come to rely on. Consequently, since this court found that the facts in McLaughlin presented a jury question, we must in all consistency find that the facts of the instant case presented a jury question. We conclude that since a jury question was presented, the trial court was correct in denying the railroad's motion for a directed verdict, both at the time it was initially made (at the close of the evidence) and at the time it was revived (on motions after verdict).