Opinion ID: 2055188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Views of Other Jurisdictions

Text: Some courts have found statutes containing language similar to that of § 28-1310(1)(b) unconstitutionally overbroad. For example, in Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975), the Colorado Supreme Court declared overbroad a statute prohibiting any communication, whether by telephone, mail, or any other form, made with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm and in a manner likely to harass or cause alarm. The court noted that if alarm means arouse to a sense of danger, then the statute reached speech entitled to first amendment protection, such as storm forecasts, political trend predictions, or warnings concerning illnesses. Id. at 398, 541 P.2d at 83. The Bolles court observed that a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute, including unsettling, disturbing, arousing, or annoying communications, and that the absurdity of prohibiting such speech is patently obvious to anyone who envisions our society in anything but a state of languid repose. Id. Bolles v. People, supra , was followed in Everett v. Moore, 37 Wash.App. 862, 683 P.2d 617 (1984), wherein the court held that a city ordinance identical to the statute in Bolles encroached on constitutionally protected speech. The court stated that although the city unquestionably has a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting its residents from fear and abuse at the hands of persons who employ the telephone to torment others ... and in protecting the privacy of residents' homes from the intrusion of unwanted telephone calls, the statute failed because it was not limited to telephone calls, intrusions into the home, and communications which abuse the listener `in an essentially intolerable manner.' Everett at 865-66, 683 P.2d at 619, quoting Cohen v. California, supra . In State v. Keaton, 371 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1979), the court held overbroad a Florida statute prohibiting the use of telephone communication to make any comment, request, suggestion, or proposition which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, because it covered consensual as well as nonconsensual conversations. In dicta, the court observed that the statute would pass constitutional muster if it were limited to calls made to the listener at a location where he enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy and which were intended to harass the listener. State v. Ray, 302 Or. 595, 733 P.2d 28 (1987), held that a statute which prohibited subjecting another to alarm or annoyance by telephonic use of obscenities or the description of sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual conduct was overbroad because it was not limited to unwanted, unsolicited, or nonconsensual calls nor to the person placing the call and thus could prohibit calls between spouses, lovers, or friends that may from time to time cause annoyance; consensual calls from legitimate polling organizations collecting data on attitudes pertaining to sexual matters; and discussions between patients and doctors concerning sexual matters which cause alarm. Other courts have found similar statutes which include a specific intent element not to be overbroad. For example, in State v. Hagen, 27 Ariz.App. 722, 558 P.2d 750 (1976), the court upheld a statute which makes it unlawful for any person to telephone another and use any obscene, lewd, or profane language or suggest a lewd or lascivious act with the intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or offend. The court determined that the state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting obscene, threatening, or harassing telephone calls, none of which are protected by the first amendment, and concluded that because the statute specifies the intent with which the calls must be made and the nature of the language prohibited, the statute reaches no speech protected by the first amendment. A similar holding is found in United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978). There, the court upheld against an overbreadth challenge 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(D) (1982), which prohibits making repeated telephone calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number. The court observed that Congress has power to impose criminal sanctions on the placement of interstate telephone calls made with the intent to harass, abuse, or annoy, stating: Congress ha[s] a compelling interest in the protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse or annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives. 573 F.2d at 787. State v. Gattis, 105 N.M. 194, 730 P.2d 497 (1986), held that a statute which proscribes obscene telephone calls initiated by one with the intent and sole purpose of conveying an unsolicited, obscene, imminently threatening, or harassing message to an unwilling recipient did not encroach on the first amendment. In State v. Koetting, 691 S.W.2d 328 (Mo.App.1985), the court considered the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the making of repeated telephone calls if done for the purpose of frightening or disturbing another person. Limiting the statute to language directed to a specific individual in the privacy of her or his home or business, the court held that the government had a compelling state interest in protecting the privacy rights of its citizens and thus could regulate speech content. The Illinois experience is most instructive. In People v. Klick, 66 111.2d 269, 5 Ill.Dec. 858, 362 N.E.2d 329 (1977), upon which Kipf places major reliance, the court declared overbroad a disorderly conduct statute prohibiting telephone calls made with the intent to annoy another, irrespective of whether conversation thereby ensues. Applying the rule that a statute is overly broad if it may reasonably be interpreted to prohibit conduct which is constitutionally protected, the court determined that because the subject statute applied to any call made with the intent to annoy, it was too broad. Although recognizing that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens from unwanted telephone intrusions, the court observed that first amendment protection is not limited to amiable communications, but must be considered to extend to consumer complaints, contractual disputes among businessmen, and citizen complaints to public officials, as well as family quarrels. In answer to the state's contention that one's right to communicate must be balanced against another's right to privacy in his home, the court, relying on Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971), reh'g denied 404 U.S. 876, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 124, ruled that the ability of government to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner and observed that the statute was not limited to intolerable conduct, nor was it limited to calls made to private homes. Subsequent to that decision, the Illinois statute was rewritten to prohibit telephone calls made with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass, rather than with the intent to annoy, and the court upheld the statute, holding that the words abuse and harass take color from, and were narrowed by, the word threaten. People v. Parkins, 77 111.2d 253, 32 Ill.Dec. 909, 396 N.E.2d 22 (1979), appeal dismissed 446 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1825, 64 L.Ed.2d 254 (1980).