Opinion ID: 3030007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contra Proferentem (Against the Drafter)

Text: If the ambiguity is not resolved by the analysis set forth in sections 1644 and 1649, then Bank of the West tells us one must look to California Civil Code section 1654, which states: “In cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules, the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist.” See also Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 551-52; Toscano, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 926 (“ambiguities are construed in favor of the defendant”). Here, finally, there is no ambiguity. It is undisputed that the prosecutor drafted both the December 15, 1987 letter and the Felony Disposition Statement comprising the plea agreement. Accordingly, under section 1654, the plea agreement must be construed in Buckley’s favor as providing for a determinate sentence of 15 years maximum, with life parole. By failing to analyze the plea agreement under California contract law, the state superior court failed to apply clearly established federal law as set forth by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. at 5 n.3. 7 From the exchange between the prosecutor and Buckley, it is clear that Buckley agreed to cooperate in the trials of two other defendants. The prosecutor’s representations and his voir dire of Buckley in the presence of the court were not for the purpose of forming a contract, but to assure the court Buckley understood the terms of the agreement as required under California law. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5. BUCKLEY v. TERHUNE 1107 “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).8 Here, because the plea agreement is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of Buckley and against the prosecution. Therefore, even on the state court record alone, Buckley’s interpretation must prevail, and his sentence is a determinate sentence of 15 years, with the possibility of life parole. In support of his interpretation, Buckley’s declaration submitted with his habeas petition showed that he thought the terms “15 years with a parole period of life” and “15 years to life” meant the same thing since the prosecutor himself used 8 Another, but not essential, way of looking at this is based on Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). Once the superior court focused on what Buckley “understood, knew or believed” (his subjective knowledge) rather than the objective manifestation of the parties’ intent as documented in their written offer and acceptance, the superior court’s factfinding process was not only wrong, it was unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Taylor v. Maddox did not limit our review of the state court’s fact-finding process to whether the state court needed to hold a hearing. The state court’s fact-finding process is also unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2): where the state court does make factual findings, but does so under a misapprehension as to the correct legal standard. See, e.g., Caliendo v. Warden, 2004 WL 720362, at  (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2004); Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002); Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). Obviously, where the state court’s legal error infects the fact-finding process, the resulting factual determination will be unreasonable and no presumption of correctness [under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)] can attach to it. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001. That is exactly what happened here. The state court—and the majority—seek to interpret the terms of the plea agreement by one party’s subjective understanding, rather than the objective manifestation of the parties’ intent. Accordingly, the state court’s construction of the plea agreement is not entitled to the special deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) that the majority opinion gives to it. 1108 BUCKLEY v. TERHUNE the terms interchangeably. The district court found Buckley’s testimony credible because he had not initialed the handwritten paragraph and the prosecutor did not have a clear memory of the events. Although superfluous under our analysis because neither mistake nor modification are properly before us, the district court found Buckley’s belief that his maximum possible sentence was a determinate term of fifteen years was reasonable under the circumstances. The district court also found that Buckley had no reason to suspect that the prosecutor had attempted to change the terms of the plea agreement until a probation officer finally informed Buckley that the term “15 to life” meant he could serve a life sentence in prison. This finding is not clearly erroneous. See Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1052. Once the prosecutor realized he had made a mistake, he had several opportunities to remedy it. Upon realizing that he had said “a maximum possible term of 15 years” when he meant to say “15 to life,” the prosecutor could have corrected his mistake and made certain that Buckley understood the difference before Buckley’s guilty plea was accepted and before Buckley testified, at some risk to his life, at the trials of Fauber and Caldwell. Having failed to correct his mistake in time, and having taken advantage of Buckley’s reliance on the original terms of the contract by obtaining the benefit of Buckley’s testimony at the other trials, the state is now estopped from arguing that the plea agreement should not be enforced. See People v. Collins, 45 Cal. App. 4th 849, 864-865 (1996). When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits, both parties must abide by the terms of the agreement. Id. at 862-63; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262 (1971).