Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Penalty Phase Evidentiary Rulings

Text: Defendant contends the trial court made four erroneous evidentiary rulings that allowed the prosecutor to wrongly impeach defendant's mitigation witnesses. Defendant claims these rulings violated state law and the federal Constitution requiring reversal of the penalty verdict. [12] We disagree. (11) While a capital defendant must be permitted to offer any relevant mitigating evidence (§ 190.3; People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 152 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825, 96 P.3d 126]; Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4-8 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669]), this does not `abrogate[] the California Evidence Code.' [Citation.] ( People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 238 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145].) The trial court retains the discretion to exclude irrelevant evidence. ( People v. Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 152.) We address each challenged ruling in turn.
Defendant's mother was the first defense witness. She testified after Christine Hougan testified about the impact her mother's death had on her. Defense counsel asked defendant's mother whether there was something you wanted to say first before we got to the formal questioning? The prosecutor objected that there was no question pending and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel then asked, Did hearing Christine Hougan's testimony move you to want to say something? Defendant's mother responded Yes and defense counsel inquired What's that? The prosecutor objected and the trial court sustained the objection on relevance grounds. The parties then approached the bench. The trial court said it suspected that defendant's mother, like everyone in the courtroom, felt bad for Christine Hougan, but the fact that she felt sorry for the victim's family was neither relevant nor admissible as mitigating evidence. Defense counsel argued that the testimony was relevant to the credibility of defendant's mother. Counsel explained that defendant's mother would testify that it was very hard and that if she could undo it herself, she would. The trial court ruled that defense counsel was trying to demonstrate the character of defendant's mother, which was irrelevant. (12) Defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding relevant evidence concerning the credibility of defendant's mother, violating his rights under state law and the federal Constitution. We disagree. Evidence Code section 780 permits credibility evidence that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of [the witness's] testimony. (Italics added.) Defendant does not explain how his mother's desire to undo the murder was relevant to her truthfulness. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the testimony was irrelevant. ( People v. Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 152.)
Rick Wentworth, an elder in the Jehovah's Witness church, was called as a defense witness. Wentworth testified that he was asked to visit defendant in jail and that they established a relationship. He testified that defendant expressed an interest in Bible study and that he visited defendant about three times a month over the previous year and a half. Wentworth and defendant discussed family, friends in the congregation, and then had a formal study. Defense counsel then asked Wentworth whether defendant discussed any concerns about his own plight and Wentworth answered no. Defense counsel asked What areas has he expressed concern about to you? The prosecutor objected and asked to approach the bench. Defense counsel said that Wentworth would testify that defendant had expressed concern about his familythat's alland how they're handling it. The prosecutor said the testimony constituted improper testimony about the impact on defendant's family and was also hearsay. The trial court agreed that it appeared to be hearsay. Defense counsel replied that the testimony fell into the state of mind exception (Evid. Code, § 1250). The trial court responded that even so, it was irrelevant. Defendant argues that the trial court erred and we agree. Evidence that defendant was concerned about how his family was doing was relevant in mitigation because it constitutes indirect evidence of the defendant's character. ( Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 456.) However, even assuming the error violated defendant's constitutional rights, the erroneous exclusion of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811].) Defendant introduced ample alternative evidence of his relationship with his family. Defendant's wife testified extensively about her love for him, how he had wanted to plead guilty to avoid causing more pain for his family, his character, and his relationship with her and with his children. Additionally, Dr. Kaser-Boyd testified at length about the children's bond with defendant, their love for him, and how they would benefit from a continuing relationship if he were allowed to live. Thus, even without the excluded testimony, the jury was presented with substantial evidence of defendant's relationship with his family and his concern for them. There is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have returned a different sentence even if Wentworth had been permitted to testify that defendant had inquired after his family's well-being. [13]
During the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant's wife, the prosecutor asked whether she was encouraging the relationship between defendant and his children because she thought it would help him and she answered, No, not true at all. The prosecutor then asked whether she had ever brought the children to court and she said that, while she had not, someone else had. The prosecutor asked Was the purpose of bringing your children here to court to give, at which point the court interjected that the prosecutor's question called for speculation because the witness had testified that she did not bring the children to court. The prosecutor continued cross-examining defendant's wife who testified that she was aware the children had been brought to court. The prosecutor then began, You relinquished the children to somebody, whereupon defense counsel objected and asked to approach the bench. Defense counsel argued the prosecutor was improperly insinuating that the children were brought to court to be spectacles to the jury which I think is improper and prejudicial and has very little probative value. The prosecutor countered that, If she allowed the children to be brought to court and knew that was the purpose it goes to her bias and goes to her willingness to use her kids for show. The prosecutor also pointed out that defense counsel had mentioned the children's presence in court in the opening statement. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor could ask whether defendant's wife allowed the children to be brought to court, but not whether they were brought by another person. The prosecutor continued his cross-examination, asking whether defendant's wife had allowed the children to be brought to court, to which she answered Yes. Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant testimony that was more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. The question was relevant to the witness's credibility. Defendant's wife had testified that she encouraged the contact between defendant and his children and that she wanted to stay married because she thought it would help defendant. Whether she also intended to help him by encouraging his relationship with his children or allowing them to be brought to court was relevant to her credibility. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f).) We also disagree that the question and witness's response were more prejudicial than probative. There was no risk of prejudice since, even without the testimony, the jury could have inferred from the children's presence in court that their mother had allowed them to attend. The testimony, on the other hand, was probative of the witness's credibility. The trial court did not err.
James Waltz, an attorney and a Jehovah's Witness, was called by the defense and testified on direct examination that he had been asked by defendant's wife's grandmother to speak with defendant in jail regarding a disagreement between defendant and his attorneys over whether defendant should plead guilty. Waltz testified that he advised defendant of the legal and religious aspects of going to trial, ultimately recommending that defendant cooperate with his attorneys. On cross-examination, Waltz acknowledged that he knew defendant had been charged with a capital crime when he went to meet with him. He also testified that he was a devout member of the Jehovah's Witness church. The prosecutor then asked a series of questions about whether Waltz was personally opposed to the death penalty. Defense counsel objected on relevance grounds, but the objection was overruled. In response to a question asking whether he would ever vote for the death penalty?, Waltz answered No. The prosecutor continued, And isn't that, in part, your Jehovah Witness connection with the defendant and your opposition to the death penalty, aren't those really the reasons why, to which Waltz responded, I'm not opposed to the death penalty. The prosecutor followed up, You just personally would never vote for it. Is that right? and Waltz answered, Correct. Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to ask these questions, arguing that the testimony was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. The witness's personal philosophical opposition to the death penalty is relevant to his credibility. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f); see People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 196 [284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290] [expert's philosophical views on capital punishment might disclose bias].) Defendant's claim that the testimony was more prejudicial than probative is forfeited by his failure to object on that ground at trial. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 972, fn. 10 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) Even were the claim not forfeited, it is without merit. The value of giving the jury a full and accurate view of Waltz's credibility was not substantially outweighed by the probability of a substantial danger of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Defendant claims the above evidentiary rulings, singly and cumulatively, violated his constitutional rights. We disagree. The trial court's exclusion of Wentworth's statement was the only error and it does not require reversal.