Opinion ID: 891652
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Recorded Jail Phone Calls

Text: {5} While being held in the Eddy County Detention Center (Detention Center) awaiting his second trial, Defendant made multiple telephone calls, which were recorded because the Detention Center digitally records all calls placed by inmates for security purposes. When a call is placed, a digital message informs both parties to the call that it may be recorded and monitored, stating, This call is from a correctional institution and is subject to monitoring and recording. The Detention Center interprets the decision of both parties to the call to continue talking after hearing the recorded message as their consent to the recording. {6} While in the Detention Center, Defendant placed two calls to Thomas Martinez (Martinez) and one to Cynthia Flores (Flores), requesting that Martinez be present at Defendant's trial and that Flores ask another individual to be present at the trial, ostensibly to influence the testimony of the State's witnesses. In a motion in limine, the State argued that the calls to Martinez and Flores were evidence that Defendant was engaging in witness intimidation to prevent certain witnesses from testifying about the true nature of Defendant's role in the crimes. The court granted the State's motion in limine, permitting recordings of the conversations to be played at trial, and admitting Defendant's statements as admissions of a party opponent and those of Martinez and Flores as non-hearsay statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy. [1] A portion of one call to Martinez was admitted as an adoptive admission of Defendant. {7} Defendant argues that the calls were recorded in violation of his rights under the New Mexico Abuse of Privacy Act and the United States and New Mexico Constitutions and were improperly admitted at trial.
{8} Our review of the admission of the telephone calls involves a mixed question of law and fact and is reviewed de novo. State v. Templeton, 2007-NMCA-108, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 369, 165 P.3d 1145.
{9} Defendant argues that the phone calls in question were recorded in violation of Section 30-12-1 of the Abuse of Privacy Act (Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 30-12-1 to -11 (1963, as amended through 1979), which prohibits the knowing interference of communication without lawful authority by reading, interrupting, taking or copying any message, communication or report intended for another by telegraph or telephone without the consent of a sender or intended recipient thereof [.] Section 30-12-1(C). An exception is provided when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception, monitoring or recording of such communication. Section 30-12-1(E)(3). {10} Two Court of Appeals opinions have addressed this question and held that the Act is not violated when a prisoner impliedly consents to the recording of calls placed from jail. In State v. Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882, cert. denied, 123 N.M. 168, 936 P.2d 337 (1997), the defendant was in jail awaiting trial on first degree murder charges when he placed a call on the jail phone, next to which was a sign stating that all calls were subject to monitoring and recording. The Court of Appeals consulted case law discussing the analogous federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, to conclude the defendant's consent to the recording could be shown by circumstantial evidence, namely, the sign next to the phone stating that the call was subject to recording. Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶¶ 10, 13, 16, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882. In Templeton, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Coyazo application of the exception in the Act to calls made in jail. The Court reiterated that consent may be implied where adequate notice has been given an inmate that phone calls are subject to recording. 2007-NMCA-108, ¶ 15, 142 N.M. 369, 165 P.3d 1145 (stating that adequate notice includes signs near telephones indicating that calls may be monitored, information in orientation or prison handbooks provided to inmates, forms signed by inmates consenting to monitoring procedures, [and] recordings on telephones that indicate the monitoring policy prior to the placing of a call). The Court found that the recording of a call placed from the booking area, where no notice was given that calls could be recorded, violated the Act. Id. ¶ 16. However, the Templeton Court concluded that a call placed from inside the jail, where there were signs next to the phone stating that the call would be recorded and an automated recording informed the caller that the call was being recorded before the number dialed was connected, did not violate the Act because the defendant had consented to the recording by placing the call with the knowledge that it would be recorded. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. {11} Defendant's briefs do not attempt to distinguish Coyazo and Templeton and do nothing more than reference arguments made in response to the State's motion in limine, which is an unacceptable appellate practice. See Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA. We agree with the Court of Appeals' analyses in Coyazo and Templeton concluding that the Act is not violated when phone calls placed from jail are recorded after the caller has been given notice that such will occur. Defendant impliedly provided prior consent to the recording of his calls by placing the calls with the knowledge that they were subject to recording and monitoring; indeed, we may say that Martinez and Flores also consented to the recording of the phone calls by accepting the calls after hearing the recording. The consent exception to the Act, Section 30-12-1(E)(3), applies to phone calls placed from jail when one or both parties impliedly consents, and thus Defendant's rights under the Act were not violated.
{12} Defendant also claims that the recording of the phone calls violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. These claims are meritless. {13} The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921). While the United States Supreme Court has not decided whether the monitoring and recording of prison phone calls violates the Fourth Amendment, the federal Circuit Courts which have addressed this question under the federal wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, have found that it does not. Like the New Mexico Abuse of Privacy Act, the federal wiretapping statute contains an exception that permits recording when consent has been obtained. Compare NMSA 1978, § 30-12-1(E)(3) with 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). Federal courts have found implied consent under the wiretapping statute when jails notify inmates by sign or recording that their calls are being monitored, and thus there exists no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone call that would result in a Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 894 (10th Cir.2008) (finding implied consent to recording based on circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew calls from jail phones were recorded); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693-94 (2d Cir.1996) (consent implied when inmate notified that call would be recorded and still placed call); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir.1996) (same); Jaramillo v. Scribner, 2009 WL 1444353, at  (E.D.Cal. 2009) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone call from prison where a recorded voice at the beginning of the telephone call alerted [the defendant] that the call may be monitored and recorded). We agree that Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the recording of a phone call he made with notice that the call would be recorded. {14} The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination and is violated by custodial interrogation resulting in a coerced confession. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Here, Defendant was in police custody, but he was not the subject of police interrogation when he placed these phone calls, nor was he coerced into conversing about witness intimidation on the jail phone. See Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶ 17, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882 (finding that there is no evidence that [the defendant] was compelled, coerced, or improperly influenced into making the calls in question); see also United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir.1992) ([The defendant] was aware of the telephone monitoring policy. It was his choice to use the telephone to conduct his illegal business. Having gambled by discussing his [illegal plan], [the defendant] cannot now be heard to complain that he lost.). Defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights were not violated. {15} The Sixth Amendment protects an individual's right to counsel and the confidentiality of conversations between client and counsel. See State v. Young, 2007-NMSC-058, ¶ 2, 143 N.M. 1, 172 P.3d 138; Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882. None of the phone calls in question were to Defendant's counsel, and therefore Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. See Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882.
{16} Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although our Constitution generally provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, Article II, Section 10 is not violated by the recording of the jail phone calls because Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone calls he knew were being recorded. See Templeton, 2007-NMCA-108, ¶ 26, 142 N.M. 369, 165 P.3d 1145. {17} Article II, Section 14 protects the right to counsel. As there was no call to Defendant's attorney involved, Section 14 was not violated. See Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882. {18} Article II, Section 15 protects against coerced self-incrimination. Just as it did not violate the Fifth Amendment, recording these calls did not violate Section 15. See id. ¶ 17. {19} Article II, Section 17 protects freedom of speech. The First Amendment of the federal Constitution is not violated when prisons monitor inmates' phone calls for prison security purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Vasta, 649 F.Supp. 974, 989-90 (S.D.N.Y.1986). Defendant offers no argument that Article II, Section 17 provides greater speech protections in this case, see State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1, and thus we need not determine whether Section 17 was violated by prison officials recording the phone calls.
{20} Having determined that the recording of the phone calls should not be suppressed for violating the Act or the United States or New Mexico Constitutions, we turn to whether the calls were admitted for a proper purpose. Defendant argues that the calls were improperly admitted and that an expert was necessary to explain the colloquial language used in the calls. The State argues that the calls were properly admitted as the non-hearsay admissions of a party opponent or for purposes other than the truth, such as evidence of other bad acts for proving motive or intent. {21} The district court did not err in admitting the calls. The statements of Defendant were admitted as non-hearsay statements of a party opponent. Rule 11-801(D)(2)(a) NMRA. The statements of the other party to the phone conversations were admitted as adoptive statements of a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, Rule 11-801(D)(2)(e), and, in one case, as an adoptive admission of Defendant. Rule 11-801(D)(2)(b). Cf. State v. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 36, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804 (holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting recorded phone calls placed from a jail phone to which no exception or exemption to the hearsay rule applied). Defendant need not have been charged with conspiracy to intimidate a witness in order for this exception to the hearsay rule to be invoked to admit evidence. See State v. Farris, 81 N.M. 589, 589-90, 470 P.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1970). We hold that these statements were properly admitted under the aforementioned hearsay exceptions.
{22} Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because no objection was made to the lack of an expert witness to explain the language used in the recorded calls. Establishing a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to show (1) an error by trial counsel, and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced by that error. See State v. Grogan, 2007-NMSC-039, ¶ 11, 142 N.M. 107, 163 P.3d 494. As the Court of Appeals noted in its review of two of these conversations in Martinez's trial for conspiracy to intimidate a witness: While the conversations were replete with idiomatic and offensive language, the agreement that [Martinez] would appear in court to intimidate [the witness] was sufficiently clear and understandable for the jury to determine that the two agreed on a plan to accomplish that result: shake the witness up and make him afraid to testify truthfully or to have a lapse in memory. Martinez, 2008-NMCA-019, ¶ 4, 143 N.M. 428, 176 P.3d 1160. There was no error in admission of the phone calls without the use of an expert. As there was no error by trial counsel in not objecting to the lack of expert witness in the admission of the phone conversations, Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.