Opinion ID: 2668800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Injury in Law

Text: The consumers’ effort to distinguish their case from a mine-run product liability case is unconvincing: “‘Ah, but this is not a products-liability case!’ So plaintiffs respond.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002). The consumers “describe the injury as financial rather than physical and seek to move the suit out of the tort domain and into that of contract (the [product] was not the flawless one described and thus is not merchantable, a warranty theory) and consumer fraud (on the theory that selling” beef products that might not be kosher, “and thus worth less than represented, is fraudulent).” Id. at 1017. Article III cannot be so easily fooled. Viewing the consumers’ argument most charitably, the argument proceeds in three steps. First, multiple states have created causes of action that do not require a particularized showing of individual injury to recover. Second, Congress extended federal jurisdiction to these causes of action under CAFA. Third, CAFA’s extension of federal jurisdiction to these state causes of action means the consumers need only 2 For example, even if only half of all cows processed by AER and AFG met kosher standards (meaning 20% of all cows were marked improperly) five out of every seven cows marked as kosher would still be kosher. For most of the beef labeled as kosher not to be kosher, in fact, one would have to assume fewer than 35% of all cows processed by AER and AFG met kosher requirements—an assumption for which there is no basis in the complaint. -8- show a bare statutory violation—injury in law rather than an injury in fact—to satisfy Article III. Assuming the first step is correct (an assumption we make to avoid unnecessary analysis of state law), we are not convinced by the consumers’ argument at the other two steps. To interpret CAFA as a congressional attempt to extend federal jurisdiction to cases involving no injury in fact would force us to presume—without any basis in the statutory text, see 28 U.S.C. § 1453, and in contradiction to long-settled constitutional precedent, see, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560—that Congress intended to stretch, if not breach, the constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction. We never assume the people’s elected representatives would so casually disregard the Constitution they have sworn to uphold. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). To the contrary, recognizing that “Congress is predominantly a lawyer’s body,” we “assume that our elected representatives . . . know the law.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981) (omission in original) (internal quotations omitted). Our “respect for Congress” also leads us to “assume [Congress] legislates in the light of constitutional limits.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991). For these reasons, “[w]ithout the ‘clearest indication’ that Congress intended to enact a constitutionally suspect statute,” Union Pac. R.R. v. DHS, 738 F.3d 885, 893 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960)), we “construe the statute to avoid [constitutional] problems,” De Bartolo, 485 U.S. at 575. The consumers’ jurisdictional theory presents a serious constitutional problem. Article III, to be sure, vests Congress with significant authority over federal jurisdiction. Congress can “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto”—i.e., factual—“injuries that were previously inadequate in law,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578, which means “[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing,’” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda -9- R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)). But Congress’ ability to do so remains firmly circumscribed by Article III itself. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). As the Supreme Court said in Lujan, “‘[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.’” 504 U.S. at 578 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)). “[T]he requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (emphasis added). Rather than confronting the difficult constitutional question whether Congress can drill through this hard floor of injury in fact by creating an injury in law (i.e., a statutory cause of action requiring no showing the plaintiff was personally and actually harmed),3 “we follow ‘the traditional rule’ and ‘independently inquire whether there is another interpretation, not raising . . . serious constitutional concerns, that may fairly be ascribed to [the statute].’” Union Pac., 738 F.3d at 893 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 577). Congress clearly incorporated Article III’s traditional limits into CAFA. In drafting the Act, Congress was not required to restate existing standing law, nor to specify that Article III limited CAFA’s reach, because “Congress legislates against 3 This constitutional question recently reached the Supreme Court without yielding an answer. See First Am. Fin. v. Edwards, 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2536, 2536-37 (2012) (per curiam) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). -10- the background of . . . standing.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997).4 Congress passed CAFA to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.” CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109–2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005) (emphasis added). This stated purpose is wholly inconsistent with the notion Congress wished to reject Article III’s historic injury in fact requirement. CAFA’s repeated reference to “cases” must be read to incorporate the Supreme Court’s well-known explication of that word’s constitutional meaning. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. We therefore hold CAFA does not purport to extend federal jurisdiction to state claims—if any exist—permitting recovery for bare statutory violations without any evidence the plaintiffs personally suffered a real, non-speculative injury in fact. Not only have the consumers failed to provide any basis to think the particular packages they purchased were tainted, they affirmatively allege they could not possibly tell if the packages were not kosher. Because the consumers suffered no “particularized[] and actual” injury, Monsanto, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2752, we are bound to conclude the consumers lack traditional Article III standing and CAFA does not extend federal jurisdiction to this case. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1148; Zurn, 644 F.3d at 616.