Opinion ID: 1700511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Application of (1)(d) to Ryan

Text: Ryan does not dispute the constitutionality of the first prong of aggravating circumstance (1)(d), nor does he assert that the sentencing judge relied solely upon the unconstitutional second prong of (1)(d). Rather, he complains that the sentencing judge made only a single series of findings of fact supporting the application of (1)(d), instead of stating which findings of fact supported which prong. He asserts that the record makes it clear that the trial court and the appellate court relied heavily on the `exceptional depravity' component of (1)(d) in sentencing him to death. Brief for appellant at 22. Ryan contends that it is pure speculation to conclude that the original sentencing judge would have reached the same conclusion about the weight given to circumstance (1)(d), if only the first prong applied. Brief for appellant at 25. In finding that aggravating circumstance (1)(d) applied to Ryan's killing of Thimm, the sentencing court stated in part: Some of the facts supported by the evidence which would allow this Court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder of James Thimm was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence are as follows: a) The death of James Thimm occurred over several days while James Thimm was tied and chained in a hog confinement shed; b) Michael W. Ryan on numerous occasions sodomized James Thimm with a shovel handle and directed others to do the same; c) Michael W. Ryan upon several occasions whipped and beat James Thimm and directed others to do the same; d) Michael W. Ryan shot the fingertips of James Thimm with a .22 caliber pistol and directed others to do the same; e) Michael W. Ryan skinned James Thimm while he was alive; f) Michael W. Ryan broke James Thimm's arm and directed others to assist in that effort; g) Michael W. Ryan broke James Thimm's legs and directed others to assist with this; h) Michael W. Ryan, by force, crushed James Thimm's ribcage[,] which was the final act that caused his death; i) There is also some evidence that Michael W. Ryan either removed or amputated James Thimm's penis and testicles or directed that this be done by others; j) Michael W. Ryan wired or chained James Thimm to a farrowing crate while all of these cruel acts were taking place or directed that others do this to James Thimm; k) Michael W. Ryan caused James Thimm to suffer further humiliation by directing him to perform homosexual acts with another member of the group. THE COURT CONCLUDES AND FINDS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THIS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE EXISTS IN THIS CASE. (Emphasis supplied.) While it is true that the sentencing judge, in his order, did not apply the facts to each prong of (1)(d) separately, the language of the order indicates that the sentencing judge found facts to support the application of either the first or second prong of (1)(d) beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not fatal to the use of (1)(d) as an aggravating circumstance. It is evident that to the extent that the sentencing court may have based its factual findings upon the unconstitutional second prong of (1)(d), Ryan's death sentence may be tainted by constitutional error, although not necessarily reversible error. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1797, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (holding that not all constitutional violations amount to reversible error.). Accord Williams v. Clarke, 40 F.3d 1529 (8th Cir.1994). [T]here may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Moreover, before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court held that upon a determination that an invalid aggravating circumstance had been considered by a sentencing body, it was constitutionally permissible for a state supreme court to either reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to perform a harmless error analysis. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that appellate reweighing violates a defendant's right to due process under Nebraska's death penalty sentencing statutes. See Rust v. Hopkins, 984 F.2d 1486 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2950, 124 L.Ed.2d 697. See, also, Reeves v. Hopkins, 871 F.Supp. 1182 (D.Neb.1994). That leaves this court with the options of performing a harmless error analysis or remanding the cause to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. See State v. Reeves, 239 Neb. 419, 476 N.W.2d 829 (1991), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 114, 121 L.Ed.2d 71 (1992). We elect to perform a harmless error analysis.