Opinion ID: 4561956
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Porter’s Procedural Due Process Claim

Text: Because Porter’s procedural due process rights have been clearly established since we decided Williams in 2017, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. In Williams, we explicitly stated: Our holding today that Plaintiffs had a protected liberty interest provides “fair and clear warning” that, despite our ruling against Plaintiffs, qualified immunity will not bar such claims in the future. As we have explained, scientific research and the evolving jurisprudence has made the harms of solitary confinement clear: Mental well-being and one’s sense of self are at risk. We can think of few values more worthy of constitutional protection than these core facets of human dignity. 848 F.3d at 574 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S.at 271). We were not alone in reaching this conclusion. See Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that inmate who had been in administrative segregation for over ten years had a due process liberty interest in avoiding continued isolation); Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 531–32 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that an inmate who spent twenty years in solitary confinement had a due process liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement); Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845, 857–58 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying a qualified immunity defense to prison officials on a procedural due process claim brought by an inmate who had been in solitary confinement for thirty-nine years and stating that “no 36 reasonable prison official could conclude that continuing four decades in indefinite solitary confinement would not implicate a liberty interest protected by due process”); Brown v. Ore. Dep’t of Corrs., 751 F.3d 983, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that an inmate who spent twenty-seven months in solitary confinement had a due process liberty interest in avoiding further solitary confinement); Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that an inmate who spent thirteen years in solitary confinement had a due process liberty interest); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1277–80 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that an inmate who spent more than five hundred days in solitary confinement stated a claim for a procedural due process violation); Hanrahan v. Doling, 331 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming the denial of qualified immunity to prison officials on a procedural due process claim brought by an inmate who had been sentenced to solitary confinement for ten years); Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that solitary confinement for 305 days gave rise to a due process liberty interest). There is therefore wide consensus that prolonged and indefinite solitary confinement gives rise to a due process liberty interest for inmates in Porter’s circumstances. These cases gave Defendants “fair warning” that keeping an inmate who has been in solitary confinement for thirty-three years on death row while appeals of his vacatur order proceed violates his procedural due process rights. Defendants therefore are not entitled to qualified immunity as of our decision in Williams.