Opinion ID: 1395083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The attempt by the dissent to distinguish such decisions.

Text: The dissent seeks to distinguish those cases by stating that they are based on statutes which, unlike ORS 656.807, provide for separate periods of limitation for the worker and the beneficiary. In our opinion, however, such an analysis begs the question. It is true that those cases construed those statutes to provide a separate time limitation for claims filed after death. Whether ORS 656.807 likewise provides such a separate period for the claims of dependents is best determined by comparing the statutes involved in those cases with ORS 656.807, instead of presupposing that ORS 656.807 does not provide for a separate period and thus avoiding the persuasive reasoning found in those cases. Such a comparison indicates that, although ORS 656.807 is not identical to the other statutes, it is substantially the same and should be interpreted in a similar manner. [9] Each of the statutes upon which those cases are based provides separate periods for filing after disability or injury and for filing after death. Additionally, each of the filing periods, though stated separately, is for an identical duration, reinforcing that dependents have rights after death equivalent to the worker's rights after disability or injury. Both of these factors appear in ORS 656.807. Subsection (1) provides for filing claims after disability or knowledge of the occupational disease, while subsection (2) separately provides for filing claims after death. Both filing periods are 180 days. As such, the structure of ORS 656.807 is substantially the same as the structure found in other statutes concerning the filing of claims for worker's compensation benefits, and deserves the same interpretation. It is true that the statutes construed in those cases did not contain ultimate repose provisions such as the five-year limitation found in subsection (1) of ORS 656.807. The absence of such an ultimate repose provision does not make a comparison with those statutes less persuasive, however, because, as previously noted, it is of importance to recognize that the analysis by the dissent and the Court of Appeals would make filing after death dependent not only on the five-year limitation of subsection (1), but also on that subsection's requirement that claims be filed within 180 days after disability, a requirement similar to provisions found in the other statutes. Thus, the Court of Appeals has construed the provisions of ORS 656.807 that are found in the statutes involved in those cases from other states in a manner inconsistent with the conclusions drawn by other courts in construing those similar statutory provisions. It is also significant, in our opinion, to note that in Hovey v. General Const. Co., 242 Mich. 84, 218 N.W. 768 (1928), which may be the only case in which a court has interpreted a statute [10] containing an ultimate repose provision in addition to separate provisions for filing after disability and after death, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the ultimate repose provision did not apply to claims filed after death. In reaching that conclusion, the court emphasized not only the structure of that statute, but also the general policy regarding the independence of claims filed after death, stating: If the two-year limitation were applicable to claims of dependents, then in every instance where the injured employee lived more than two years after the date of his injury as in the instant case, his dependents could have no right of compensation. While this circumstance is not conclusive as to the proper construction of this section, surely it is somewhat persuasive. If the Legislature had intended to fix such a limitation, it would have couched it in language far more direct, simple, and concise than that found in this section. The limitation of two years applies only to the class of cases included within the first provision of this section. The dissent recognizes the similarity of the statute construed in Hovey to ORS 656.807, but seeks to dismiss Hovey as being inconsistent with Oregon case law and therefore not persuasive. It states that Hovey ignored a clear legislative intent to apply the ultimate repose provision to claims filed after death, and thus is inconsistent with this court's holding in Rosell v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 164 Or. 173, 95 P.2d 726 (1940). In that case this court stated that the courts do not have the authority to waive conditions set by the legislature for filing claims, even if a potential claim by a dependent is extinguished before it ever accrues. The dissent's analysis misinterprets both Hovey and ORS 656.807. Hovey did not involve a statute with a clear legislative intent requiring that claims filed after death be subject to the statute's ultimate repose limitation. Rather, the case interpreted a somewhat ambiguous statute. In that situation the court appeared to reason that because the claims of beneficiaries are independent and do not arise until the worker's death, the ultimate repose limitation should not be applied to claims filed after death. In contrast, Rosell involved a statute with language that clearly required that in fatal cases a claim must be filed within a year of the injury, and not within a year of death. [11] The court applied a literal construction to the statute to deny a widow's claim filed within a year of death but more than a year after the injury occurred. ORS 656.807 is similar to the statute applied in Hovey in that there is no clear expression in ORS 656.807 of an intent to apply the five-year ultimate repose provision to claims by widows and dependents filed after death. Instead, the most that can be said of ORS 656.807 is that it is ambiguous. Although the dissent's interpretation of ORS 656.807(2) may be plausible, it is necessarily speculative of what the legislature intended. At best, it points up the ambiguity created by reading subsection (1) together with subsection (2). In the absence of a clear expression in ORS 656.807 of legislative intent, we believe that the reasoning in Hovey is both applicable and persuasive. For similar reasons, this court's holding in Rosell, supra, does not require an interpretation of ORS 656.807 that applies either the five-year or 180 day provisions of subsection (1) to claims filed after death. The clear legislative intent present in the statute involved in Rosell to require that claims be filed within one year of injury and not within one year of death is not found in ORS 656.807. Indeed, to apply a literal reading to ORS 656.807(2), as applied by the court to the statute in Rosell, would require that a widow always be allowed 180 days after the worker's death in which to file a claim for widow's benefits. In sum, we are of the opinion that the rule stated by the previously cited cases and authorities is applicable to an interpretation of ORS 656.807 and should be followed and adopted by this court. Such a holding, in our opinion, is entirely consistent with this court's holding in Rosell, supra . Indeed, to hold to the contrary would be inconsistent, in our view, with the rule as previously established by this court in Mikolich, supra, that the claim of a widow for widow's benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act is not a derivative claim from and dependent upon the claim of her deceased husband for compensation, but is an independent claim. Furthermore, we believe that any ambiguity that might result from reading subsection (1) together with subsection (2) requires resolution in favor of the petitioner because of the rule that the Workers' Compensation Act must be construed liberally in favor of compensation. For these reasons, we reverse the decision by the Court of Appeals. Because, however, that court did not consider or decide whether or not the Workers' Compensation Board was correct in rejecting the claim of the widow of Mr. Fossum for lack of evidence of causation, we remand this case to that court for consideration and decision of that question. Reversed and remanded. TANZER, J., dissented and filed opinion in which DENECKE, C.J., and PETERSON, J., joined.