Opinion ID: 168874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: M alicious Prosecution

Text: Although the common law provides a starting point for defining a § 1983 cause of action, the ultimate question is whether the plaintiff has established a constitutional violation. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1291 (10th Cir. -11- 2004). Neither party in this case disputes that Kee’s malicious prosecution claim required him to show that probable cause was lacking at the time of arrest. This court may therefore assume that lack of probable cause is an essential element of the claim. See id. at 1294 (assuming the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution requires an absence of probable cause where neither party disputed the issue). For the reasons discussed above, Ahlm had probable cause to arrest Kee for criminal trespass. Further, Kee has not pointed to any facts established at trial indicating that probable cause dissipated at some later point in time or that Ahlm was even involved in the prosecution after the initial arrest. See id. at 1295 (noting liability may be premised on the continuation of prosecution without probable cause, even if probable cause existed at the time of the arrest). Thus, the district court erred in failing to grant Ahlm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Kee’s malicious prosecution claim. 4