Opinion ID: 1170873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Instructions Regarding Circumstantial Evidence

Text: Because much of the evidence was circumstantial, the court gave the general instructions distinguishing and defining direct and circumstantial evidence (CALJIC No. 2.00) and advising the jury that (1) a finding of guilt cannot be based on circumstantial evidence unless that evidence is consistent with guilt and cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion, (2) each fact supporting the inference of guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) if the circumstantial evidence is susceptible of one interpretation pointing to guilt and another pointing to innocence, the jury must adopt the latter (CALJIC No. 2.01). [3] Defendant requested two special instructions, denominated D-1 and D-2, which purported to apply these rules to the evidence of the footprints outside the apartment window. D-1 would have told the jury that the footprint evidence was circumstantial, that the facts supporting an inference that defendant was the last person to enter the window had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that if the evidence could reasonably be interpreted as consistent with defendant having made the footprints either at the time of the murder or at the earlier entry, the jury should adopt the interpretation consistent with his innocence. D-2 was similar but less explicit. Additionally, defendant requested D-4, an instruction purporting to apply the foregoing rules of circumstantial evidence to Schmidt-Till's statements. It provided that the jury could infer the victim was referring to defendant only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Schmidt-Till had the ability to perceive his assailant, to accurately recall his appearance, and to reconstruct the circumstances of the assault. (16a) The court declined to give defendant's special instructions, on the grounds that the general instructions on circumstantial evidence were sufficient and that giving the additional charges would confuse the jury. Defendant complains of this ruling, but it is correct. To the extent that the requested instructions stated principles of law, they were repetitious of instructions already given and hence were properly refused on that ground. ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1134 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049].) To the extent that they purported to relate those principles to the facts of the case, they were properly refused as argumentative, i.e., they would invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to the defendant from specified items of evidence on a disputed question of fact, and therefore properly belong[ed] not in instructions, but in the arguments of counsel to the jury. ( Id. at p. 1135.)