Opinion ID: 206567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel: Right to Public Trial

Text: Morales's first two ineffective assistance claims are premised on what he asserts was his lawyers' failure to protect his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. [7] Specifically, in reliance on two bare-bones affidavits submitted by his girlfriend and the mother of his child nearly five years after the purported closure, Morales contends that at least those two women were denied access to the courtroom by courthouse security for the final day of voir dire. Without expressly considering those affidavits, the district court determined that Morales's right to a public trial was not violated because the courtroom remained open at all times, Morales, 294 F.Supp.2d at 178-79. We find it unnecessary to dwell on the factual issue, however, because we are convinced that, even if Morales's affidavits are credited in full, counsel's failure to challenge the closure they allege was not unreasonable. [8] See, e.g., Parisi v. United States, 529 F.3d 134, 140-41 (2d Cir.2008). Strickland requires that scrutiny of counsel's performance be highly deferential, and that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This compels us to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. As a preliminary matter, thus, we note that there is no evidence in the record that defense counselor anyone in the courtroomknew of the alleged closure at the time, or at any time before Morales's two affiants came forward years after the fact. Indeed, none of the lawyers representing Morales's ten co-defendants lodged an objection or raised a point of appeal regarding the alleged closure. As such, there is strong reason to believe defense counsel was not aware of any closure and thus cannot be faulted for failing to raise an issue about which he had neither knowledge nor reason to know. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Moreover, even assuming counsel was aware of the supposed closure, we cannot deem his failure to object to the closure unreasonable. Crediting Morales's affidavits to the fullest extent possible, the closure lasted not much longer than one morning out of a multi-month trial. During that period of time the general public was denied access to witnessing the prospective jurors: state their names; give excuses individually as to why they could not serve on the jury; have their names drawn for the jury; and be dismissed. Importantly, the record indicates that voir dire occurred in the days proceeding the day the closure occurred, so that any questioning of potential jurors as to their fitness or bias was open to the public. [9] It is true that the court took preemptory challenges on the day of the closure, but these challenges are seldom, if ever, registered within earshot of spectators, so the public was not precluded from witnessing anything to which it otherwise would have been privy. In short, the ultimate effect of the day's closed proceedings was the random selection of a jury out of the wheel, and the non-public exercise of peremptory challenges. [10] Given what are generally understood to be the values protected by the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, [11] it is difficult to see how Morales's lawyers at the time of the courtroom closure and after the trial would perceive Morales's right to a public trial to have been violated. It would not be unreasonable for a defense attorneyif he were aware of any closure at allto believe that Morales's trial had been unaffected notwithstanding the public's absence. In this regard, we reiterate that none of the lawyers for Morales's ten co-defendants objected to the alleged closure or raised the issue on appeal, is itself evidence that Morales's counsel's conduct here was not objectively unreasonable for Strickland purposes. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (noting that counsel's performance is to be evaluated in light of prevailing professional norms). For the same reasons it was not unreasonable for Morales's trial attorney to fail to object to whatever closure may have occurred, the performance of his appellate attorney was also not deficient. Alternatively, Morales contends the district court erred in failing to hold a factual hearing with regard to his claims. Section 2255(b) provides that [u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). We have interpreted this provision as requiring a hearing in cases where the petitioner has made a plausible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir.2009) (quotation marks omitted). A district court's determination that it can resolve a section 2255 motion without resort to an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir.2001). We find no abuse of discretion on these facts. For the reasons set forth above, the record before the district court did not and could not demonstrate a plausible claim. Even crediting Morales's affidavits in full, they are insufficient to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, while the district court overreached in stating that there is no evidence that any member of the public. . . was specifically excluded from the proceedings, Morales, 294 F.Supp.2d at 179 n. 1 (emphasis added), it did not err in failing to hold a hearing to explore that evidence further.