Opinion ID: 437648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: henry irby

Text: 29 The district court found that defendants Sheriff's Department and El Paso County dismissed plaintiff Irby from his position as a detention officer in the El Paso County Jail in retaliation for the filing of an EEOC charge. The court held that the dismissal violated section 704(a) of Title VII and it awarded back pay and attorneys' fees. It also held, however, that Irby failed to prove he was the victim of intentional racial discrimination, 17 and thus could not recover damages under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983 or 1985(c). Irby argues on appeal that proof of the retaliatory firing necessarily established a violation of section 1983. He seeks emotional damages and additional attorneys' fees for the section 1983 violation. 18 We conclude that the district court erroneously denied Irby's claim under section 1983, and we reverse. 30 It is now well-settled that section 1983 does not create any substantive rights. Rather, it creates only a remedy for violations of rights secured by federal statutory and constitutional law. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 41 U.S. 600, 617-18, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1915-16, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi, 701 F.2d 556, 559 n. 3 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc). Irby argues that because the Sec. 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory ... law, 19 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4, 100 S.Ct. at 2504, he is entitled to seek damages under section 1983 for a violation of the retaliation prohibition, section 704(a), of Title VII. The [Supreme] Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the application of section 1983 to statutory violations. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 19, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). First, section 1983 does not afford a remedy for violations of a statute unless the statute creates a 'right secured' by the laws of the United States within the meaning of Sec. 1983. Halderman at 28, 101 S.Ct. at 1545. Accord, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority, 453 U.S. at 19, 101 S.Ct. at 2626. Second, section 1983 is not available where the 'governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms.'  Halderman, 451 U.S. at 28, 101 S.Ct. at 1545, quoting Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 22 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. at 2514 n. 11 (Powell, J., dissenting). Accord, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority, 453 U.S. at 19-20, 101 S.Ct. at 2626; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 n. 5, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, n. 5, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Marvin H. v. Austin Independent School District, 714 F.2d 1348, 1358 (5th Cir.1983). When the remedial devices provided in [the] particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, a congressional intention that those remedies be exclusive may be inferred. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority, 453 U.S. at 20, 101 S.Ct. at 2626. 31 Title VII, of course, creates rights secured by the laws of the United States. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979), compels the conclusion that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for a violation of the terms of section 704(a) of that Act. Therefore, the rights created by section 704(a) may not be asserted within the remedial framework of section 1983. Id. at 377, 99 S.Ct. at 2351. Novotny held that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate section 704(a) of Title VII may not assert that claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(c). Novotny at 372, 378, 99 S.Ct. at 2349, 2352. Section 1985(c), enacted as section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, prohibits individuals from conspiring to deprive another of the equal protection of the [law], or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. Although section 1985(c) differs substantially from section 1983, both statutes are identical in one critical respect: neither provides any substantive rights; they merely provide remedies for violations of the rights they designate. Novotny at 372, 99 S.Ct. at 2349; Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617-18, 99 S.Ct. at 1915-16. 32 In Novotny, the Court examined the comprehensive remedial scheme contained in Title VII, including its requirements for utilization of local and state remedies and the administrative procedures of the EEOC; express time limitations for administrative and judicial filings; the grant of conciliatory, investigatory and prosecutorial powers to the EEOC; and the specification of remedies, including attorneys' fees, back pay, reinstatement, and other equitable relief. Id., 442 U.S. at 373-75, 99 S.Ct. at 2349-50. The Court concluded: If a violation of Title VII could be asserted through Sec. 1985(c), a complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific provisions of the law. Id. at 375-76, 99 S.Ct. at 2350-51. 33 We perceive no logical basis for distinguishing the claim asserted in Novotny from Irby's contention that section 1983 provides a remedy for violation of the retaliation provision of Title VII. Allowance of such a remedy through section 1983 likewise would enable a complainant to sidestep the detailed and specific provisions of Title VII. Like section 1985(c), section 1983 authorizes compensatory and punitive damages, which may not be available under Title VII. Novotny at 375-76, 99 S.Ct. at 2350-51; Miller v. Texas State Board of Bar Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 249, 66 L.Ed.2d 117 (1980); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 122-23 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980). In an action under sections 1983 or 1985(c), a plaintiff may demand a jury trial, a right not available under Title VII. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 375-76, 99 S.Ct. at 2350-51; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.1969). The short and precise time limitations of Title VII do not apply in actions under sections 1983 or 1985(c). Novotny, 442 U.S. at 373, 376, 99 S.Ct. at 2349, 2351; O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914). Perhaps most importantly, if a violation of Title VII could be asserted through either sections 1985(c) or 1983, the complainant could completely bypass the administrative process, which plays such a crucial role in the scheme established by Congress in Title VII. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 376, 99 S.Ct. at 2351. Therefore, we conclude that [u]nimpaired effectiveness can be given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII only by holding that deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under Sec. [1983]. 20 Id. at 378, 99 S.Ct. at 2352. 34 Although Irby has cited an incorrect predicate for utilization of the section 1983 remedy, his section 1983 claim need not fail for that reason, for this Court has held that a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 21 may be based on retaliatory action taken in response to an employee's filing of an EEOC charge or civil rights lawsuit alleging racial discrimination. Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir.1982); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, A Division of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1229 n. 15 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983). Accord, Caldwell v. National Brewing Company, 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916, 92 S.Ct. 931, 30 L.Ed.2d 785 (1972); Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1147 (8th Cir.), modified at 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 615, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981); Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266, 1270 (6th Cir.1977). See also B. Schlei and P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 564 n. 172 (2d ed. 1983) (citing cases). The Goff panel concluded that if we were not to allow such a claim, 35 ... we would in effect be discouraging the filing of meritorious civil rights suits and sanctioning further discrimination against those persons willing to risk their employer's vengeance by filing suits. Section 1981 would become meaningless if an employer could fire an employee for attempting to enforce his rights under that statute. 678 F.2d at 598. 22 36 In Goff, we held that the elements of a retaliation claim under section 1981 are essentially the same as those establishing retaliation under section 704(a) of Title VII. Id. at 599. See, e.g., McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., supra, 710 F.2d at 1116. Because the district court's unchallenged findings establish that Irby was the victim of retaliation in violation of section 704(a), we must hold that a violation of section 1981 also has been established. Thus, although Title VII may not provide the source of a claim of retaliatory discharge under section 1983, section 1981 may. The district court erred in denying Irby's claim under sections 1981 and 1983 based on the absence of intentional racial discrimination. 23