Opinion ID: 2600609
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Victim's Prior Injuries

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior acts of physical abuse against Kesha, in violation of Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352. As we explain, we conclude the evidence was properly admitted.
Through an in limine motion, the prosecutor sought the admission of evidence of injuries Kesha suffered in the months before she was killed. The prosecutor stated he was filing his motion in response to the trial court's order that the prosecution reveal all evidence proffered under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The prosecutor, however, contended that, although proffered evidence of defendant's acts of physical abuse towards children other than the murder victim (i.e., defendant's biological children, S. and J.) implicated Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), evidence of past injuries to the murder victim did not. Rather, citing People v. Aeschlimann (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 460 [104 Cal.Rptr. 689], the prosecutor contended that evidence of past injuries to the murder victim was independently admissible as part of the res gestae of the murder by torture charge. The defense objected to the admission of evidence of Kesha's past injuries on the ground that there was no evidence defendant had inflicted the injuries, and that they were too remote in time to be relevant. The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible under both Evidence Code section 352 and section 1101, subdivision (b).
Defendant contends the evidence of Kesha's past injuries was not admissible under either of the two theories raised below: (1) to show intent or absence of accident under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), or (2) as part of the res gestae of the crime of murder by torture. In arguing against the admissibility of this evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), defendant makes the same contentions he made in arguing against the admissibility of evidence of defendant's past acts of physical abuse against his biological children, discussed above. (See ante, at pp. 203-205.) He contends the evidence of Kesha's prior injuries did not show an intent to torture or kill, and that such evidence therefore was not admissible to show absence of accident, because defendant did not offer an accident defense. For the same reasons stated above, we reject defendant's contentions and conclude the trial court properly admitted the evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Defendant's prior acts of violence against the victim are indisputably relevant to showing intention and absence of accident. (See People v. Zack (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 409, 415 [229 Cal.Rptr. 317].) Finally, we need not, and therefore do not, reach the prosecutor's alternate argument that the evidence was also admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime of torture murder.