Opinion ID: 836247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: second cause of complaint: conversion

Text: Finally, the Bar contends that the accused violated DR 9-101(A) when he deposited the $750 that he received directly into his personal account before he had earned it. DR 9-101(A) provides, in part: All funds of clients paid to a lawyer    shall be deposited and maintained in one or more identifiable trust accounts   .      (2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer    must be deposited therein but the portion belonging to the lawyer    may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer    to receive it is disputed by the client in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved. Moreover, the Bar contends that the accused knowingly helped himself to client funds to which he was not entitled. By doing so, the Bar contends, the accused also violated DR 1-102(A), which provides, in part: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:      (3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.] The accused responds that he had earned more than $750 by the time he received that sum, because he had done more than two hours of work on the case by June 29, 1996. This court has explained that conduct akin to theft is not a prerequisite to a finding of conversion. In re Martin, 328 Or. 177, 184-85, 970 P.2d 638 (1998). An actor who mistakenly believes that his or her conduct is legal nonetheless can commit conversion. Id. at 184, 970 P.2d 638. However, to violate DR 1-102(A)(3), there must be evidenceor an inference that reasonably follows from the evidencethat a lawyer had the necessary intent to appropriate funds. Id. at 189, 970 P.2d 638. We already have found that the accused performed his services on an hourly basis and that he spent only two-and-one-half hours on the case, notwithstanding his testimony that he also had performed three or four hours of research. The accused's billing reflects that he worked on the case for two hours in April 1996 and that he charged $50 for a missed appointment on April 22, 1996. The accused received payments of $600 on May 5, 1996, and $150 on June 29, 1996. When the accused received those payments, he had earned only $350reflecting two hours of work at $150 per hour and a charge for the missed appointmentbut he deposited both payments into his personal account. The accused violated DR 9-101(A). We turn to the Bar's contention that the accused knowingly converted client funds in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). According to the Bar, the accused intentionally had adopted a system whereby all funds received by his office would be treated as his own property unless he specifically told his secretary otherwise. The accused's secretary testified that she informed the accused every time money came into the office. It follows, the Bar asserts, that the accused knowingly helped himself to (and has since refused to refund) client funds. The Bar's argument reduces to the proposition that, because the accused apparently did not have appropriate procedures in place for handling client funds generally, he knowingly misappropriated client funds in this case. That argument proves too much. It is true that the accused's testimony to the LPRC investigator and at the hearing was inconsistent about how much time he expended on this case, that his bills to Yother senior never reflected more than two-and-one-half hours of work, and that the accused never produced records that would establish that he performed three or four hours of research before receiving the payments in May and June of 1996. However, it also is true that, when the LPRC investigator showed the accused the bills that the accused had sent to Yother senior, the accused immediately acknowledged that there were errors in them and said that he would have corrected them if Yother senior had brought them to his attention. Moreover, at the time that the accused met with the LPRC investigator, the only matter that he knew was being investigated was the fee matter that the DDA had raised. It is not surprising that, at that time, the accused did not attempt to locate the notes he believes he kept regarding his research on possible defenses the defendants might have. On this record, we agree with the trial panel that carelessness and sloppiness, rather than dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, best depict the accused's conduct. The Bar did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3).