Opinion ID: 677661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jury instruction: cce conviction (arturo)

Text: 25 Arturo next contends that the district court erred in not giving a unanimity instruction to the jury which would have instructed them that each juror had to agree on the identity of five persons whom Arturo organized, supervised or managed. We agree. A unanimity instruction was neither requested nor given. Because Arturo failed to object to the omission of a unanimity instruction, we review for plain error. United States v. Jerome, 942 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.1991). 26 In order to establish that a defendant is guilty of operating a CCE, the Government must show that he engaged in a continuing series of violations of federal narcotics law. Id. at 1330; see also 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(c) (Supp.1993). The Government must establish two elements: (1) that the continuing series of violations were undertaken in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom [the defendant] occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management; and (2) that the defendant obtained substantial income or resources from the continuing series of violations. Jerome, 942 F.2d at 1330 (internal quotations omitted); 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(c)(2)(A)-(B). It is the five-person requirement with which we are concerned in this case. 27 In Jerome, the Government presented the jury with a variety of people from whom the prosecution told them they could properly count in making the five-person calculation. 942 F.2d at 1331. Some of those individuals were not properly included because they were not organized, supervised or managed within the meaning of Sec. 848(c)(2)(A). Id. Therefore, we held that in such cases, the district court must give the jurors a specific unanimity instruction--that is the jurors had to be instructed that they must unanimously agree as to the identity of each of the five people [the defendant] organized, managed or supervised. Id. We reasoned that the district court's failure to issue such an instruction was highly prejudicial, with a high probability of substantially affecting the jury verdict. Id. Even though the defendant had failed to object to the jury instructions, we concluded that the district court's failure to issue the unanimity instruction constituted plain error, and thus we reversed the CCE conviction. Id. 28 Because the Government presented the jury in this case with several individuals not properly included in the five-person calculation, the district court's failure to give the unanimity instruction constituted plain error. Accordingly, Jerome requires us to reverse Arturo's CCE conviction. An organizer within the meaning of Sec. 848(c)(2)(A) does not require the Government to prove that the defendant exerted control over those individuals whom he organizes. United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir.1984). Rather, the statutory language or any other position of management means that an organizer must exercise some sort of managerial responsibility. Jerome, 942 F.2d at 1331. Nonetheless, [t]o be an organizer within the sense of the statute more is required than simply being a steady customer. Id. Thus, a defendant's suppliers are not properly counted. Id. We extended Jerome 's reasoning in United States v. Delgado, 4 F.3d 780 (9th Cir.1993), where we held that a defendant's drug customers (as opposed to his suppliers, as in Jerome ) cannot be included in the five-person requirement if the evidence establishes no more than an arm's length buyer-seller relationship. Id. at 787. Instead, the evidence must establish that the defendant exercised managerial responsibility over the individuals at issue. Id. (concluding that defendant's wholesale customers did not qualify under CCE statute). 29 Arturo concedes, and in light of the evidence there can be no doubt, that Duran and Reynoso were properly counted as individuals he managed. Arturo instructed them on where to live, sometimes even locating an available stash house. He had them deliver the drug money they collected to him and he personally paid them for stashing the marijuana and cocaine. Moreover, he instructed them to make two trips to Nogales, Sonora in Mexico to deliver cash. 30 However, despite the Government's protestations to the contrary, we conclude that Chrisantos, Manuelitos, Gringo # 1, Gringo in the wheelchair, 3 and Quaill were not properly included in the five-person calculation. It is evident that Arturo supplied drugs to these individuals; however, the record establishes no more than a buyer-seller relationship. Although the fact that Arturo held a higher position in the chain of distribution than those to whom he supplied drugs may be relevant, that evidence alone is insufficient to establish his position as a manager or organizer. See Delgado, 4 F.3d at 786 ([S]elling to people does not make one an organizer of customers, even wholesale customers, any more than buying from them makes one an organizer of suppliers.). 31 Similarly, the two Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) officials (Vidal Moran and Alejandro Mercade), and Manuel Perez were not properly counted. With regard to Moran and Mercade, the evidence establishes a tenuous connection at best and even assuming they were involved, the evidence does not indicate that Arturo managed or organized them. 4 Finally, Aguilar testified that Banos told him Perez sent the marijuana to the Rex Street residence from Sonora. At most, Perez was one of Arturo's suppliers, which under Jerome, is not enough. After reviewing the record, we find that the Government failed to establish that Arturo organized or managed these individuals, and thus, they were not properly counted. See Delgado, 4 F.3d at 787. Because the jury was presented with a variety of individuals, some of whom were not properly counted in the five-person CCE requirement, the district court committed plain error in failing to issue a unanimity instruction. Jerome, 942 F.2d at 1331. Accordingly, we reverse Arturo's CCE conviction. 5