Opinion ID: 4550984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Person

Text: ¶ 19. Ms. Hall first contends that the Environmental Division erred in determining that the Resort and owners of the rental homes were not a collective “person” under Rule 2(C)(1)(a) because (1) the Environmental Division “lacked jurisdiction to reject” Rule 2(C)(1)(a), and (2) assuming the Environmental Division had jurisdiction, the Rule is “narrower than and consistent with the jurisdictional statute.” Each argument is considered in turn.
¶ 20. The parties dispute the jurisdictional limits of the Environmental Division as established by § 8503(e). As a threshold matter, however, the parties disagree on whether the Environmental Division ruled on the validity of Rule 2(C)(1)(a). The Environmental Division explained that it “did not rule on the general lawfulness, enforceability, or validity of Rule 2(C)(1)(a).” Distinguishing between as-applied and facial challenges, the Environmental Division claimed that it concluded that “Ms. Hall’s suggested application of Rule 2(C)(1)(a) to the specific facts of this case” would exceed the statutory definition of person for the purposes of development. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 21. Ms. Hall argues that, despite the Environmental Division’s conclusion that it was not invalidating the Rule, it “in effect found the rule unenforceable.” The Resort argues in response that the Environmental Division did not declare Rule 2(C)(1)(a) “invalid or unlawful on its face.” 11 Instead, the Resort argues the court construed the rule in a way that would not improperly expand Act 250 jurisdiction. We agree with Ms. Hall that the Environmental Division ruled on the validity of Rule 2(C)(1)(a). ¶ 22. “The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges . . . goes to the breadth of the remedy . . . .” Gross v. United States, 771 F.3d 10, 14-15 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (first alteration in original) (quotation omitted). In a facial challenge, a litigant argues that “no set of circumstances exists under which [a statute or regulation] [c]ould be valid.” See State v. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95, ¶ 19, ___ Vt. ___, 214 A.3d 791 (quotation omitted); see also, e.g., Lucks Bros., Inc. v. Agency of Transp., 2014 VT 59, ¶ 18, 196 Vt. 584, 99 A.3d 997 (explaining that plaintiff had brought “facial challenge to the Agency’s claims process, arguing that it [was] void and unenforceable”). The remedy in a successful facial challenge is that a court will invalidate the contested law. See Killington, Ltd v. State, 164 Vt. 253, 261, 668 A.2d 1278, 1284 (1995) (explaining that plaintiff’s request for monetary relief was “inconsistent with a facial challenge” because facial challenges usually result in “invalid[ating] the regulation”). In an as-applied challenge, however, a party claims that a statute or regulation is invalid as applied to the facts of a specific case. See In re LaBerge NOV, 2016 VT 99, ¶¶ 25-26, 203 Vt. 98, 152 A.3d 1165; see also, e.g., Aranoff v. Bryan, 153 Vt. 59, 65, 569 A.2d 466, 470 (1989) (concluding that petitioner had brought as-applied challenge because she “attack[ed] the canon as it [was] applied and interpreted by her supervisor”). The scope of the remedy is an as-applied challenge is narrower. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010). Although a court grants relief “to the parties before the Court,” it does not necessary invalidate the contested law in its entirety. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477 (1995). ¶ 23. The Environmental Division claimed that it determined only that applying Rule 2(C)(1)(a) to the facts of this specific case would expand the statutory definition of “person” for the purposes of development in § 6001(14). The problem with this reasoning is that the 12 Environmental Division’s conclusion did not rely on a specific set of facts to determine that Rule 2(C)(1)(a) expanded the statutory definition of person. The Environmental Division made a legal conclusion that Rule 2(C)(1)(a) expanded the statutory definition of person because it “conflat[ed] a ‘person’ involved in partition or division of land and a ‘person’ for purposes of development.” This legal conclusion applies under every set of facts, not simply this one. Accordingly, despite its reasoning to the contrary, the Environmental Division concluded that Rule 2(C)(1)(a) was invalid to the extent that it expanded the statutory definition of person for the purposes of development in § 6001(14). ¶ 24. The question on appeal is accordingly whether the Environmental Division had jurisdiction to determine the validity of Rule 2(C)(1)(a). The Vermont Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial power of the State shall be vested in a unified judicial system which shall be composed of a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, and such other subordinate courts as the General Assembly may from time to time ordain and establish.” Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 4. Unlike the Supreme Court, whose jurisdiction is defined by the Vermont Constitution, “[t]he jurisdiction of the trial courts is shaped by the legislature.” State v. Saari, 152 Vt. 510, 518, 568 A.2d 344, 349 (1989). The Vermont Constitution specifically provides that all inferior courts “shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.” Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 31. ¶ 25. Consistent with its authority to establish subordinate courts, the Legislature created the Environmental Division of the Vermont Superior Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over, among other things, all appeals of “acts or decisions of the Secretary of Natural Resources, district environmental coordinators, and District Commissions.” 10 V.S.A. §§ 8501(1), 8503(a); Gould v. Town of Monkton, 2016 VT 84, ¶ 10, 202 Vt. 535, 150 A.3d 1084. Section 8503(e), however, specifies that the Environmental Division does not have jurisdiction over “appeals from [Act 250] rulemaking decisions by the [Natural Resources Board (NRB)].” 10 V.S.A. § 8503(e). Instead, appeals from Act 250 rulemaking decisions by the NRB are governed by the Vermont 13 Administrative Procedure Act (VAPA). Id. § 6025(b) (providing that NRB “may adopt substantive rules, in accordance with the provisions of 3 V.S.A. chapter 25, that interpret and carry out the provisions of [Act 250]”); 3 V.S.A. § 801(a) (explaining that chapter 25 “may be cited as the ‘Vermont Administrative Procedure Act’ ”). VAPA, in turn, provides that “[t]he validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment in the [Civil Division of the] Washington Superior Court.”9 3 V.S.A. § 807; see also 12 V.S.A. § 4711 (Declaratory Judgment Act) (“Superior Courts within their jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”). ¶ 26. Construing all these statutory provisions together, Ms. Hall argues that the Environmental Division lacks jurisdiction to invalidate Act 250 Rules. She contends that § 8503(e), in conjunction with VAPA, indicates that the exclusive way to challenge an Act 250 Rule is a declaratory-judgment action in the Civil Division of the Washington Superior Court. We disagree. The plain language of § 8503(e) and the larger statutory scheme lead us to conclude that parties may challenge an NRB rulemaking decision in accordance with VAPA by bringing a declaratory-judgment action in the Civil Division of the Washington Superior Court. There is no indication, however, that by establishing this avenue for challenging Act 250 rulemaking decisions, the Legislature intended to divest the Environmental Division of jurisdiction to invalidate an Act 250 regulation when exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matters outlined in § 8503. 9 VAPA predates Vermont’s Unified Court System. 4 V.S.A. § 1. Under Vermont’s Unified Court System, the Civil Division of the Superior Court has “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all original civil actions, except as otherwise provided.” Id. §§ 30, 31. Although § 807 of VAPA refers generally to the Washington Superior Court, 4 V.S.A. § 31 specifies that the Washington Superior Court’s Civil Division has jurisdiction over an § 807 proceeding. 14 ¶ 27. “Our objective in statutory interpretation is to construe and effectuate legislative intent behind a statute.” Northfield Sch. Bd. v. Wash. S. Educ. Ass’n, 2019 VT 26, ¶ 13, ___ Vt. ___, 210 A.3d 460 (quotation omitted). “In accomplishing this, our first step is to examine the statute’s language because we presume that the Legislature intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the statutory language.” Shires Hous., Inc. v. Brown, 2017 VT 60, ¶ 9, 205 Vt. 186, 172 A.3d 1215. “[W]here there is ambiguity [in a statute], we look to the general context of the statutory language . . . .” Shea v. Metcalf, 167 Vt. 494, 498, 712 A.2d 887, 889 (1998). ¶ 28. Beginning with the plain text, § 8503(e) provides that the Environmental Division does not have jurisdiction over “appeals from [Act 250] rulemaking decisions by the [NRB].” 10 V.S.A. § 8503(e). By its plain text, the jurisdictional limitations in § 8503(e) apply to “appeals” of “rulemaking decisions by the [NRB].” The present case, however, does not involve an appeal of an NRB rulemaking decision; rather, it involves an appeal of a decision by a district coordinator, i.e., the issuance of a binding jurisdictional opinion pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 6007. Because this case does not involve an appeal of an NRB rulemaking decision, the jurisdictional limitations in § 8503(e) do not apply. ¶ 29. Contrary to Ms. Hall’s suggestion, the larger statutory scheme confirms our reading of § 8503(e). While the Legislature explained that the purpose of creating the Environmental Division was to “consolidate existing appeal routes,” it specifically emphasized in several different sections that it did not intend to replace the procedures outlined in VAPA for adopting or challenging rules. See 10 V.S.A. § 8501(1) (providing that the purpose of creating the Environmental Division was to “consolidate existing appeal routes” but specifically “excluding . . . the adoption of rules under [VAPA]”); id. § 8503(a) (excluding challenges to “rulemaking” from the Environmental Division’s jurisdiction); id. § 6025 (providing that NRB “may adopt substantive rules, in accordance with the provisions of [VAPA], that interpret and carry out the 15 provisions of [Act 250]”). The Environmental Division does not have jurisdiction over challenges to Act 250 rulemaking decisions by the NRB because those challenges are governed by VAPA. ¶ 30. VAPA provides that parties “may” bring declaratory judgment actions in the Civil Division of the Washington Superior Court “if it is alleged that [a] rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff.” 3 V.S.A. § 807. We have never explicitly addressed whether § 807 of VAPA provides the exclusive way to challenge an agency regulation. See Miller v. IBM, 163 Vt. 396, 398 n.2, 659 A.2d 1126, 1126 n.2 (1995) (declining to address defendant’s arguments that that exclusive way to challenge agency rule is “declaratory judgment under 3 V.S.A. § 807”); Appeal of Stratton Corp., 157 Vt. 436, 440, 600 A.2d 297, 299 (1991) (declining to address Attorney General’s argument that “the exclusive method to challenge the validity of a rule is by declaratory judgment action in Washington Superior Court as provided in 3 V.S.A. § 807”). However, the plain text of § 807, and our case law explaining why the Legislature created a declaratory-judgment remedy, indicate that § 807 of VAPA is not the exclusive way to challenge agency regulations. ¶ 31. Section 807 provides that parties “may” bring a declaratory judgment action in the Civil Division of the Washington Superior Court. The use of the word “may” indicates that a plaintiff is permitted, but not required, to file a declaratory judgment action to challenge an agency regulation. See May, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “may” as “[t]o be permitted to” and “[t]o be a possibility”). VAPA establishes a discretionary avenue for challenging regulations because a declaratory judgment action “is a cumulative remedy.” Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Inc. v. Houle, 118 Vt. 154, 158, 102 A.2d 326, 329 (1954). In fact, the Legislature created this additional remedy to correct “deficiencies in legal procedure.” Poulin v. Town of Danville, 128 Vt. 161, 163, 260 A.2d 208, 209 (1969); see also 10B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2751 (4th ed. 2020) (“The declaratory-judgment remedy enlarges the judicial 16 process and makes it more pliant and malleable by putting a new implement at the disposal of the courts.”). ¶ 32. The specific deficiency the Legislature intended to correct by creating the declaratory-judgment remedy was “the Damoclean threat of impending litigation which a harassing adversary might brandish, while initiating a suit at his leisure or—never.” C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 2751 (quoting Japan Gas Lighter Ass’n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 237 (D.N.J. 1966)) (interpreting Federal Declaratory Judgment Act); see also 12 V.S.A. § 4725 (explaining that Vermont’s Declaratory Judgment Act “shall be so interpreted . . . as far as possible to harmonize with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments”). The declaratory-judgment remedy therefore “afford[s] one threatened with liability an early adjudication without waiting until an adversary should see fit to begin an action after the damage has accrued.” C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 2751; Cooperative Fire Ins. Ass’n of Vt. v. Bizon, 166 Vt. 326, 330, 693 A.2d 722, 726 (1997) (“The [Declaratory Judgment] Act opened to plaintiffs at an early stage of the controversy a right to petition for relief not heretofore possessed.” (alteration and quotation omitted)). ¶ 33. By establishing in VAPA that parties “may” challenge regulations via declaratory judgment actions, the Legislature did not intend to create an exclusive avenue for challenging regulations. Justice Dooley, post, ¶¶ 55-61, provides several additional persuasive reasons why VAPA is not the exclusive way to challenge agency regulations. Rather than creating an exclusive avenue for challenging agency regulations, VAPA merely establishes the Civil Division of the Washington Superior Court as the venue that hosts declaratory-judgment challenges to regulations. ¶ 34. The statutory scheme therefore confirms our reading of § 8503(e)’s plain text. The Legislature expressly provided that the Environmental Division does not have jurisdiction over challenges to Act 250 rulemaking decisions by the NRB because VAPA establishes a separate scheme for those challenges: a declaratory-judgment action in the Civil Division of the 17 Washington Superior Court. But, because VAPA is not the exclusive avenue for challenging agency regulations, the Environmental Division retains jurisdiction to consider the validity of Act 250 regulations to resolve particular disputes within its exclusive jurisdiction. ¶ 35. In sum, in § 8503(e) the Legislature merely reinforced that if parties want to challenge Act 250 rulemaking decisions by the NRB, they must follow the general procedures outlined in VAPA for challenging agency regulations. Reinforcing that challenges to Act 250 rulemaking decisions, like all direct challenges to agency regulations, are governed by VAPA in no way suggests that the Legislature intended to divest the Environmental Division of jurisdiction to invalidate agency regulations to resolve disputes within its exclusive jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would produce an absurd result: the Environmental Division would be required to apply Act 250 rules without regard to their validity.
¶ 36. Having established that the Environmental Division had jurisdiction to invalidate Rule 2(C)(1)(a), the next question is whether it properly concluded that the Resort and owners of the rental homes were not a collective person because the definition of person in Rule 2(C)(1)(a) expands the statutory definition of person for the purposes of development. “[U]nder our constitutional system, administrative agencies are subject to the same checks and balances which apply to our three formal branches of government.” In re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. 68, 75, 444 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1982). Because an agency has only the authority delegated to it by the legislature, In re Club 107, 152 Vt. at 322, 566 A.2d at 967, “an administrative body may promulgate only those rules within the scope of its legislative grant of authority,” In re Vt. Verde Antique Int’l., Inc., 174 Vt. 208, 210-11, 881 A.2d 181, 183 (2002). ¶ 37. “To determine the scope of authority vested in an administrative agency by a statutory grant of power, we look to its enabling legislation.” Id. at 211, 881 A.2d at 183. “When examining the legislative grant of authority to [an agency], we look to the plain meaning of the 18 statutory language . . . .” In re Huntley, 2004 VT 115, ¶ 6, 177 Vt. 596, 865 A.2d 1123. We presume that “the Legislature intended the statutory language to carry its plain, ordinary meaning.” C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v Dep’t of Taxes, 2016 VT 77A, ¶ 13, 203 Vt. 183, 155 A.3d 169. “Where the meaning of a statute is plain on its face, this Court will enforce the statute according to its terms.” Id. But, “where there is ambiguity [in a statute], we look to the general context of the statutory language.” Shea, 167 Vt. at 498, 712 A.2d at 889. We consider “the whole and every part of the statute,” Herrick v. Town of Marlboro, 173 Vt. 170, 173, 789 A.2d 915, 918 (2001) (quotation omitted), and avoid a construction “that would render part of the statutory language superfluous,” In re Margaret Susan P., 169 Vt. 252, 263, 733 A.2d 38, 47 (1999). ¶ 38. Here, 10 V.S.A. § 6001(14)(A) provides four definitions of person: (i) [A]n individual, partnership, corporation, association, unincorporated organization, trust or other legal or commercial entity, including a joint venture or affiliated ownership; (ii) [A] municipality or State agency; (iii) [I]ndividuals and entities affiliated with each other for profit, consideration, or any other beneficial interest derived from the partition or division of land; (iv) [A]n individual’s parents and children, natural and adoptive, and spouse, unless [specific criteria are met]. (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to its authority to “adopt substantive rules . . . that interpret and carry out the provisions of [Act 250],” id. § 6025, the NRB promulgated Rule 2(C)(1)(a), which defines “person” for the “purposes of a ‘development’ ” as: [A]n individual, partnership, corporation, association, unincorporated organization, trust or other legal or commercial entity, including a joint venture or affiliated ownership; a municipality or state agency; and, individuals and entities affiliated with each other for profit, consideration, or any other beneficial interest derived from the ‘development’ of land. Act 250 Rule 2(C)(1)(a) (emphasis added). 19 ¶ 39. Ms. Hall argues that the Resort and owners of the rental homes are a collective person for the purposes of development within the meaning of Rule 2(C)(1)(a) because they are affiliated with each other for profit. The problem, however, is that § 6001(14)(A)(iii) defines person in the same way but limits its application to the “partition or division of land.” 10 V.S.A. § 6001(14)(A)(iii). Act 250 defines “[s]ubdivision” in part as land that has been “partitioned or divided.” Id. § 6001(19)(A)(i)-(iii). By its plain language, § 6001(14)(A)(iii) is applicable only to the subdivision of land. Rule 2(C)(1)(a) expands the definition of person in subsection (iii) to include the “development” of land. ¶ 40. Nevertheless, Ms. Hall argues that Rule 2(C)(1)(a) does not exceed the statutory definition of person because subsection (i) of the statutory definition—“an individual, partnership, corporation, association, unincorporated organization, trust or other legal or commercial entity, including a joint venture or affiliated ownership,” 10 V.S.A. § 6001(14)(A)(i) (emphasis added)— is broad enough to encompass Rule 2(C)(1)(a). Ms. Hall submits that while subsection (i) uses “association,” Rule 2(C)(1)(a) covers the narrower subset of “associations” that “are for mutual ‘profit, consideration or other beneficial interest.’ ” Furthermore, Ms. Hall argues that the language of the Rule is “consistent with the statutory assertion of jurisdiction over any ‘commercial entity’ that is not a ‘legal entity.’ ” ¶ 41. Although Ms. Hall provides a plausible reading of § 6001(14)(A)(i), she fails to consider “the whole and every part of the statute.” Herrick, 173 Vt. at 173, 789 A.2d at 918. Section 6001(14)(A) needs to be interpreted as a whole, considering the limiting effect subsection (iii) has on subsection (i). Subsection (iii) provides that “person” includes “individuals and entities affiliated with each other for profit . . . derived from the partition or division of land.” 10 V.S.A. § 6001(14)(A)(iii). It would render subsection (iii) superfluous if subsection (i) covered all “individuals and entities affiliated with each other for profit” for the purposes of development when subsection (iii) expressly limits that same language to subdivision. Accordingly, the 20 Environmental Division properly concluded that the Resort and owners of the rental homes were not a collective person because Rule 2(C)(1)(A)’s definition of person for the purposes of development improperly expands the statutory definition of person in § 6001(14).