Opinion ID: 499711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: availability of interim injunctive relief

Text: 32 To determine whether an injunction is appropriate, the District Court should balance (1) the likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits, (2) the threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff in the absence of an injunction, (3) the possibility of substantial harm to other interested parties from a grant of injunctive relief, and (4) the interests of the public. 66 District courts have broad discretion to evaluate the irreparability of alleged harm and to make determinations regarding the propriety of injunctive relief. 67 We have held that [u]nless appellant carries the heavy burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion in denying an injunction, the order must be affirmed. 68 The District Court's conclusion that the facts fail to require ... intervention at this time 69 is unassailable on that basis. 33 As the court observed, Wagner's intra-agency transfer was rescinded prior to the hearing on the motion for an injunction. 70 Because of Wagner's status in the Senior Executive Service, he cannot be transferred without fifteen days' notice. 71 Most of his five complaints of reprisal had already gone through the expedited grievance process, and all are eventually subject to judicial review. 72 Although Wagner alleged that future retaliation was imminent, he offered no supporting evidence except copies of his formal complaints. 73 We agree with the District Court that Wagner presented no clear indication that ... he will experience any interference with the progress of his complaint in the future. 74 He thus has not established either the irreparable injury essential to requests for equitable relief 75 or the imminence of further retaliation. We therefore affirm the dismissal of his claim for injunctive relief as a reasonable exercise of discretion. 76 IV. ATTORNEYS' FEES 34 Wagner also seeks attorneys' fees under Title VII's provision authorizing awards therefor, in the court's discretion, when the aggrieved employee is the prevailing party. 77 This provision applies to federal as well as nonfederal employees who bring employment discrimination actions. 78 Since, however, Wagner's bid for interim injunctive relief has been rejected both by the District Court originally and by this court on appeal, it is apparent that he cannot be considered the prevailing party. 35 Wagner maintains that [t]his court has repeatedly held that civil rights litigants whose prayers are mooted through reformatory action by the defendant, in response to the suit, are entitled to attorney fees. 79 The decisions cited for this proposition do not support such a broad statement. In Grubbs v. Butz, 80 we rejected a request for attorneys' fees by a Title VII claimant who was substantially successful in her interlocutory appeal, 81 because she had yet to demonstrate discrimination. 82 In that case, we did not discuss the question of mootness attributed to voluntary agency action, but did recognize that an interim fee award might be appropriate if discrimination had been established or if the losing party had acted in bad faith. 83 Wagner has satisfied neither of these latter criteria. 36 In Foster v. Boorstin, 84 this court did find that a Title VII litigant was a prevailing party even though his request for promotion had been granted before the case went to judgment. We noted, however, that neither the District Court nor the Government on appeal suggests that [the plaintiff] did not prevail in his claim that he had been discriminated against or in his quest for proper remedial relief. 85 Such an achievement certainly cannot be claimed here. The remaining cases Wagner cites 86 were suits under the Freedom of Information Act 87 and do not inform our decision here. 37 Moreover, in seeking relief, Wagner does not ask us merely to prevent his transfer. Instead, he seeks an injunction preventing any future retaliation against him, 88 which today we deny. The instant case, therefore, does not fall squarely within the attorneys'-fees doctrine as advanced by counsel. 38 Under more appropriate circumstances, the District Court could have exercised its jurisdiction to protect a Title VII claimant from irreparable harm during the course of the administrative process. We agree, however, that the record failed to justify intervention at the time Wagner sought it. The judgment appealed from is accordingly 39 Affirmed.