Opinion ID: 63774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Taylor's habeas petition

Text: This court has no authority to grant habeas corpus relief simply because we conclude, in our independent judgment, that a state supreme court's application of [federal law] is erroneous or incorrect. Martinez v. Dretke, 404 F.3d 878, 884 (5th Cir.2005). Instead, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court is restricted in granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus: (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.... 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the contrary to clause of Section (d)(1), a federal court may only grant habeas relief if the state court decided a case differently than the United States Supreme Court previously decided a case on a set of nearly identical facts. Under the unreasonable application clause, a court may grant habeas relief if the state court misapplied the relevant legal principles to the facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). As there is no United States Supreme Court case with nearly identical facts to this one, this case is governed by the unreasonable application prong of Section 2254(d).
The necessary inquiry is whether the Louisiana Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court when it denied relief to Taylor. That court analyzed whether there was error in admitting Detective Bates's testimony about the unidentified witness, as well as the prosecution's references to that testimony in closing argument. However, the state appellate court did not resolve whether the trial court committed constitutional error in this regard. Instead, it merely concluded that any error was harmless. Even though the Louisiana Court of Appeal only answered the harmless error question, this court must first consider whether the admission of Detective Bates's testimony was an unreasonable application of federal law. AEDPA deference is due to state court decisions, even when the state court does not explicitly address the relevant issue. See Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 443 (5th Cir.2003) (Because a federal habeas court only reviews the reasonableness of the state court's ultimate decision, the AEDPA inquiry is not altered when ... state habeas relief is denied without an opinion.). Accordingly, AEDPA deference extends to the preliminary question of whether there was legal error, in addition to questions of the harmlessness of error. We now turn to the issue of legal error. Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). The Confrontation Clause generally bars witnesses from reporting the out-of-court statements of nontestifying declarants. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54-56, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Crawford was decided after the completion of Taylor's direct appeal. But even under the Supreme Court's earlier decisions, the Confrontation Clause generally barred the admission of statements made by out-of-court declarants for the truth of the matter asserted. [2] Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). The only exception was when the declarant's statement fell into a firmly rooted hearsay exception or when there was a showing that the statement bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. This exception assumed the declarant was legitimately unavailable to testify after the prosecutorial authorities [] made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. Id. at 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531. Detective Bates testified about highly incriminating information from the unidentified eyewitness. The prosecution's reference to that testimony in closing argument reinforced it. There was no hearsay exception, firmly rooted or otherwise, and Taylor was denied his right to confront the witness. Police officers cannot, through their trial testimony, refer to the substance of statements given to them by nontestifying witnesses in the course of their investigation, when those statements inculpate the defendant. When the statement from an out-of-court witness is offered for its truth, constitutional error can arise. This principle is well established. See 2 CHARLES T. McCORMICK, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249, at 104 (4th ed.1992); see also United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir.2004) (Allowing agents to narrate the course of their investigations, and thus spread before juries damning information that is not subject to cross-examination... would eviscerate the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine one's accusers.) This Circuit has applied this analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1257-58 (5th Cir.1985) (inadmissible hearsay for a DEA agent to testify that [w]e received a referral by the U.S. Customs as [defendant] being a drug smuggler); United States v. Kang, 934 F.2d 621, 627 (5th Cir.1991) (similar). Louisiana state courts have recognized this principle. See, e.g., Hearold, 603 So.2d at 737 (Law enforcement officers may not testify as to the contents of an informant's tip because such testimony violates the accused's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers.) Applying this understanding, it is apparent that Detective Bates's testimony indicating that an unidentified, nontestifying witness identified the defendant as the perpetrator, along with the prosecution's references to that testimony in closing argument, was hearsay. Under Ohio v. Roberts , the admission of such hearsay statements against a criminal defendant violates the Confrontation Clause, unless the declarant's statement either falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Neither of those bases was affirmatively shown, nor is either established by the record. Accordingly, the admission of this testimony against Taylor was a violation of Roberts, which was clearly established Supreme Court precedent at the time of Taylor's trial. Even under the deference required by Section 2254(d), which limits us to deciding whether any implicit rejection of Taylor's argument was an unreasonable application of federal law, we find there to be error. Unless the error may be considered harmless, relief is justified.
The final question is whether the error committed by the Louisiana courts was harmless and therefore not a basis for relief. On habeas review under AEDPA, the prejudice of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial is measured by the substantial and injurious effect standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). See, e.g., Hughes v. Quarterman, 530 F.3d 336, 345 (5th Cir.2008). The Louisiana appellate court has already measured the harmfulness of the trial court's decision and found reversal not to be required. We decide whether, in reaching that conclusion, the state court applied harmless error analysis in an objectively unreasonable manner. Id. The Louisiana trial court's decision to permit references to the testimony of the unidentified eyewitness is sufficiently prejudicial if it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710. There are guideposts in applying the standard to the facts of a given case. When a court finds itself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error under the Brecht standard, the court should treat the error as if it affected the verdict. Fry v. Pliler, ___ U.S. ___ n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2327 n. 3, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 305 (5th Cir.2003) ([T]he petitioner should prevail whenever the record is so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt.). Conversely, an error is insufficient under Brecht when the evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming. See, e.g., Burgess v. Dretke, 350 F.3d 461, 472 (5th Cir.2003). In this case, the evidence of guilt is far from overwhelming. Though Taylor could be thought to have a motive to harm the victim, there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime. Only a single eyewitness Osborne Parkeridentified the defendant at the crime scene. His testimony concerning the actual identification was markedly indefinite. Apart from Detective Bates's reference to the unidentified source, there was no corroboration of Parker's testimony. Keyoka Riley, who was with Parker throughout the time of the shooting, did not corroborate his testimony, noted the darkness at the time, and stated that she couldn't see how he could see anything. Parker and Riley were close friends who lived together, yet Riley testified that Parker never told her that he had seen the defendant. [3] In addition, the defendant also had several alibi witnesses. Although there was every reason that jurors could question the credibility of these witnesses because of their affinity for Taylor, doubts about the strength of the affirmative evidence of innocence does not add to the limited evidence of guilt. We find the harmfulness here at least as strong as that presented in another recent decision. Burbank v. Cain, 535 F.3d 350 (5th Cir.2008). In that precedent, there was no physical evidence linking the accused to the murder; only a single witness identified him as the shooter. Id. at 352. In contrast to the present case, the identifying witness in Burbank took the stand. The defendant was able to elicit testimony casting doubt on the witness's credibility, including that she had been drinking and taking drugs on the day of the killings, that she had considered falsely testifying, that she had three prior convictions, and that she had been recently arrested again and was facing at least five years in prison. Id. at 352-53. The defense also implied that she regularly smoked crack and that she faced twenty to life if she did not identify the defendant as the killer. Id. at 353-54. Still, we granted habeas relief, citing violation of the Confrontation Clause due to the trial court's refusal to allow two additional defense witnesses who would have impeached the eyewitness. Id. at 359. In the present case, the comment attributed to the nontestifying witness was critical, as the other evidence was not at all overwhelming. Compare Wilkerson v. Cain, 233 F.3d 886, 891-92 (5th Cir.2000) (habeas relief warranted where defendant could not effectively cross-examine a witness crucial to the prosecution's case), with Burgess, 350 F.3d at 472 (harmless error where there was a wealth of evidence validly in the record that provided overwhelming evidence of Burgess's guilt), and Cotton v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 746, 752 (5th Cir.2003) (describing the sea of evidence incriminating the defendant). In light of the dependency of the prosecution on a single witness's less-than-certain identification, combined with the use of tainted hearsay evidence both in testimony and in closing argument asserting that the defendant was the perpetrator, we conclude that the Louisiana Court of Appeal's holding that any error would have been harmless was contrary to, and also an unreasonable application of, federal law as clearly established by the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, Taylor is entitled to habeas relief. The district court judgment is AFFIRMED.