Opinion ID: 3012034
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Misconduct Amount to a Due Process

Text: Violation? Marshall urges that the New Jersey Supreme Court misapplied the United States Supreme Court’s precedent in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), by determining either that no error occurred, or that any error that did occur was harmless. App. Br. at 134. In Berger , the United States Supreme Court condemned the prosecutor’s argument as undignified and intemperate, containing improper insinuations and assertions calculated to mislead the jury. Id. at 85. The Court then enunciated the oftencited standard by which prosecutors must abide: The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Id. at 88. But improper conduct is not, in itself, sufficient to constitute constitutional error, even when -- as here -- that conduct is alleged to be both deliberate and pervasive. Improper conduct only becomes constitutional error when the impact of the misconduct is to distract the trier of fact and thus raise doubts as to the fairness of the trial.16 Under these facts, the two dissenting justices on the New Jersey Supreme Court would have held that the _________________________________________________________________ 16. We note that we only conduct a harmless error inquiry once we decide that constitutional error did occur. Thus, we first examine whether the misconduct so infected the trial as to render it unfair. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 n.15 (1986). 41 prosecutor’s actions were so deliberate and so pervasive, and that at least some of the actions were either not cured, inadequately cured, or incurable by subsequent instructions from the court, that the fairness of the proceeding was threatened. For Justice Handler, the trial itself was rendered suspect, while for Justice O’Hern, the misconduct at the trial threatened the integrity of the penalty proceeding. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 212 (Handler, J., dissenting); id. at 198-99 (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).17 Marshall relies heavily on the reasoning of these two justices in his argument that we, likewise, should deem the misconduct to have rendered his trial unfair. App. Br. at 134. We cannot condone the prosecutor’s conduct here, which amounted to repeated, deliberate misconduct. But we believe that the majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court was reasonable in analyzing the impact that the conduct that amounted to constitutional error might have had upon the proceedings, thus looking at the totality of the trial in assessing whether his trial was rendered unfair. Indeed, we would be concerned if a court placed undue emphasis on the deliberateness of a prosecutor’s actions, because the focus on the prosecutor might distract a reviewing court from its _________________________________________________________________ 17. We note in addition that Justice O’Hern did not say that the misconduct alone constituted constitutional error, but rather that the misconduct, when weighed with the other errors at trial, was sufficient to undermine his confidence in the outcome. The dry curative instructions given by the trial court hardly sufficed to dispel the visual image of a place in hell for defendant that the prosecutor planted in the jurors’ minds. Those remarks were neither accidental nor the result of the passion of a heated trial. They were planned. Contemporary statements by the prosecution to the press set forth in the record demonstrate that. I cannot conclude that those instances of prosecutorial misconduct, weighed cumulatively with the other instances of trial error and with the constitutional error of non-disclosure of the promise of immunity made to Sarann Kraushaar and the special expenses paid by the State for the support of the McKinnon family, could not present at least a real possibility that there would have been a sentence other than death. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 198-99 (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 42 rightful focus upon the fairness of the trial itself. The critical question in assessing constitutional error is to what extent a defendant’s rights were violated, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith, 455 U.S. at 219. Such an inquiry requires a focus upon the reliability of the verdict and whether the trial as a whole was rendered unfair. A prosecutor’s deliberate acts might have no effect at all upon the trier of fact, while acts that might be inadvertent could serve to distract the jury from its proper task and thus render a defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair. A similar concern informs our reluctance to be swayed by the extensive nature of the misconduct. In Berger, the case that Marshall relies on, the United States Supreme Court addressed the interaction of the evidence of guilt and the impact on the jury of persistent misconduct: In these circumstances prejudice to the cause of the accused is so highly probable that we are not justified in assuming its non-existence. If the case against Berger had been strong, or, as some courts have said, the evidence of his guilt overwhelming, a different conclusion might be reached. Moreover, we have not here a case where the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was slight or confined to a single instance, but one where such misconduct was pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be disregarded as inconsequential. Berger, 295 U.S. at 89 (internal citations omitted). Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinions are replete with references to the overwhelming evidence of Marshall’s guilt. In Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 119 (3d Cir. 2001), we read United States Supreme Court precedent as establishing the principle that the stronger the evidence against the defendant, the more likely that improper arguments or conduct have not rendered the trial unfair, whereas prosecutorial misconduct is more likely to violate due process when evidence is weaker. When evaluating Marshall’s claims, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited not to federal law, but to New Jersey precedent, State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 290 (N.J. 1987), for its standard of constitutional error. Ramseur 43 itself cites to earlier New Jersey law, rather than the applicable United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Rather than dwell on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s error in applying its own precedent, however, we believe AEDPA review requires a more nuanced approach in this situation. Because we are examining to see whether the New Jersey Supreme Court’s analysis resulted in a decision that was either contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, we believe that any error that we find in the approach or specific analysis of the Court must be tempered by our overall assessment as to whether the result it reached is in fact consistent with Supreme Court precedent.18 See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). The New Jersey Supreme Court did inquire whether the misconduct was such that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial, which is consonant with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court enunciated above. It also consistently examined the statements to determine whether _________________________________________________________________ 18. The District Court, applying Darden, concurred with the New Jersey Supreme Court, concluding that the few improper comments made by the prosecutor during his closing argument were not enough to have had a substantial or injurious affect [sic] on the jury’s decision. Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 781; see also id. at 776. It did not address the New Jersey Supreme Court’s application of state law, but performed an independent examination using federal law that arrived at the same conclusion. We note that this situation is distinguishable from our recent case of Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 507-08 (3d Cir. 2002), in which we held that the state court’s ruling should not be analyzed under the AEDPA standard of review because it was notclear from the face of the state court decision that the merits of the petitioner’s constitutional claims were examined in light of federal law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. (emphasis omitted). In Everett, the Pennsylvania courts did not address the petitioner’s due process claim at all, and analyzed his ineffectiveness claim not under a Strickland analysis, but under standards set by its own precedent, different from those enunciated in Strickland . Rather than asking whether counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable, the court inquired whether the underlying claim was meritorious, then whether the course of action chosen by his counsel had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s interests, and, finally, whether the defendant was prejudiced. Id. at 506-07. By contrast, here the New Jersey Supreme Court examined the merits of Marshall’s claims and measured them against a standard that was consistent with federal law. 44 they challenged the core of Marshall’s defense, and repeatedly evaluated the comments within the larger context of the trial as a whole, asking whether prior testimony, curative instructions, or the collateral nature of the comments served to mitigate their impropriety, particularly in the face of what it viewed as overwhelming evidence produced by the State. This also is in keeping with the teachings of the Supreme Court -- and our precedent -- recited above. The majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court found that, for the most part, the misconduct either impacted a collateral issue in the case, Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 166, 169, 171,19 was sufficiently remedied by the court’s curative instructions, id. at 168, 169,20 was of limited significance because it was adequately challenged by the defense, id. at 167, or was an isolated reference that did not have the capacity to affect the jury’s deliberative process, id. at 171.21 We agree that those conclusions are reasonable under Berger and its progeny. _________________________________________________________________ 19. In one instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to collapse the constitutional error and harmless error analysis: Based on our review of the prosecutor’s entire guilt-phase summation, we are satisfied that those references to the victim that were unrelated to any substantive issues were neither extensive nor inflammatory, and we find them harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 171. 20. To the extent that we may discern, therefore, Supreme Court precedent counsels that the reviewing court must examine the prosecutor’s offensive actions in context and in light of the entire trial, assessing the severity of the conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of evidence against the defendant. There are ‘some occurrences at trial [that] may be too clearly prejudicial for . . . a curative instruction to mitigate their effect.’ In making this determination, Supreme Court precedent requires the reviewing court to weigh the prosecutor’s conduct, the effect of the curative instructions and the strength of the evidence. Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). 21. In other words, it is not enough for theconcerns underlying our reactions against improper prosecutorial arguments to the jury to be implicated; they must be implicated to the extent that we conclude that the jury’s deliberations were compromised. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985). 45 Thus, the majority of the misconduct that we have reviewed did not deprive Marshall of his right to a fair trial, and we agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusions that no constitutional right was implicated; accordingly, for those instances we do not reach the question of whether the error was harmless. Two instances of misconduct, however, implicated specific constitutional guarantees and require further examination.22 2. Violations of Specific Constitutional Rights Marshall claims the prosecutor’s misconduct violated two specific rights -- his right to counsel and his right to call witnesses -- both of which are rights that are specifically guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has presumed that a due process violation has occurred when prosecutorial misconduct implicates specific rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); see also Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998).23 The Supreme Court has only evaluated a presumptive due process violation where a prosecutor misused a defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent as evidence of guilt. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). However, we think it clear that the same presumption applies when other enumerated rights are implicated. See United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1988); United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973).24 We analyze whether the constitutional _________________________________________________________________ 22. While the New Jersey Supreme Court found that one comment in the prosecutor’s summation implicated Marshall’s privilege against selfincrimination, Marshall has not specifically raised that ruling before us, and we will not address it here. 23. As discussed in more detail later, though such misconduct presumptively violates due process, there are exceptions. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987). 24. Some circuit courts of appeals have restricted their review under AEDPA to United States Supreme Court decisions alone. See, e.g., Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1998) (considering itself 46 right was violated, and if so, whether the error was harmless. Marshall alleges two such violations: the exchange by the prosecutor with DeCarlo about Marshall’s retention of counsel and the prosecutor’s remarks about Marshall’s calling of his sons as witnesses. We will examine each in turn. a. Right to Counsel
Conclude that the Error was of the Type Condemned in Macon? Oakleigh DeCarlo, Marshall’s sister, was questioned on cross-examination about the visit police investigators made to the Marshall home on September 21, 1984, to inquire about the then newly discovered Louisiana contacts. Ms. _________________________________________________________________ barred from examining lower federal court decisions in deciding whether the state decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law). We have concluded, however, that decisions of federal courts below the level of the United States Supreme Court may be helpful to us in ascertaining the reasonableness of state courts’ application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, as well as helpful amplifications of that precedent. Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 105 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F. 3d 877, 890 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 824 (1999)). We view our reliance on Thame and Macon as such a helpful amplification. And we think that other United States Supreme Court precedent implicitly recognized the principle we iterated in those cases. In Donnelly, for example, the United States Supreme Court contrasted the alleged error before it with the denial of thebenefit of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to counsel or the constructive denial of such a right, citing to Griffin. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. Thus, while the United States Supreme Court has not had the opportunity specifically to extend Griffin’s holding, it has recognized the basis for our holding in Macon. Further, the New Jersey Supreme Court itself stated that we are fully in accord with the decisions of the federal Courts of Appeals holding that a prosecutor’s statement suggesting that retention of counsel is inconsistent with innocence impermissibly infringes on a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 148. 47 DeCarlo was present. At trial, there was conflicting testimony as to whether Marshall was asked whether he knew certain names or was also shown photographs of the Louisiana contacts. Defense counsel had sought -- and received -- a ruling that the prosecutor could inquire as to Marshall’s reaction to the photographs shown to him, but not as to Marshall’s refusal to answer based on counsel’s advice. App. Br. at 123-24. The prosecutor inquired of Ms. DeCarlo whether the interview ended after Marshall was shown the photographs. PROSECUTOR: You didn’t hear him answer any questions, did you, when they said -- DECARLO: Yes, I did. PROSECUTOR: You did? DECARLO: Yes. PROSECUTOR: Answer their questions? DECARLO: He answered a question. PROSECUTOR: A question? DECARLO: A question. PROSECUTOR: One question? DECARLO: One question. PROSECUTOR: Then the conversation ended: is that correct? DECARLO: No. They said they had other questions and he said, I think I should have my lawyer here if you’re going to ask any more questions. PROSECUTOR: Did you say to him, Hey, Rob. Why get your lawyer. Your wife was murdered. Maybe these people -- Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 147. The above were characterized by the New Jersey Supreme Court as verging on infringement of the right to counsel, but brief andnot dwell[ed] on. Id. at 148. After the prosecutor completed his cross-examination, Thompson’s counsel, Mr. Hartman, cross-examined DeCarlo: 48 HARTMAN: You wouldn’t think it unreasonable that if a person retained an attorney and was possibly under suspicion that they should have their attorney present? DECARLO: Not at all. That’s why you hire them for his advice. Id. at 148. Hartman then asked Ms. DeCarlo if she thought it unreasonable that a person under suspicion would want their attorney present during questioning, and she responded that that is why attorneys were hired. Then the prosecutor resumed his cross-examination: PROSECUTOR: Especially when your wife has been killed and you haven’t -- you didn’t have anything to do with it, you still run out and hire an attorney? Id. Marshall’s counsel objected to the question, and the objection was sustained, but no curative instruction was sought or given. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that what could be characterized as a question only by a most indulgent reading required a clear and forceful curative instruction by the court. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court characterized the prosecutor’s cross-examination of DeCarlo as a highly improper and inexcusable attempt . . . to suggest that defendant’s retention of counsel was inconsistent with his claim that he was innocent. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 147. 49 [This page intentionally left blank] 50 Volume 2 of 3 51
In analyzing whether the prosecutor’s behavior impermissibly suggest[ed] that retention of counsel is inconsistent with innocence, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied a harmless error analysis, reasoning that all courts of appeals to address the issue, except the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, had done so, and that the Fifth Circuit itself was inconsistent in whether it applied a per se or harmless error analysis. Id. at 148-49. In examining the prosecutor’s conduct for harmless error, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused on our rationale in United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1973), where we reversed the conviction in the face of a prosecutorial comment that impinged upon the defendant’s right to counsel, because the credibility of the petitioner as a witness was a central issue, given that critical portions of the evidence were disputed. Id. at 616. The prosecutor’s conduct during Marshall’s trial was distinguishable, according to the New Jersey Supreme Court, for two reasons: the jury had already been made aware that Marshall had retained counsel by the time the episode in question had taken place, and had learned it from Marshall himself; and the evidence of defendant’s guilt was so persuasive that it is virtually impossible to conceive that this isolated comment by the prosecutor, however reprehensible it may have been, could have contributed significantly to the jury’s determination of guilt. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 149. When the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the same facts in its post-conviction relief review, it reiterated that the remarks were harmless error, and it likewise dismissed the possibility that they were evidence either of the ineffectiveness of Marshall’s counsel (in not requesting a curative instruction) or prosecutorial misconduct, because there was no prejudice. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 67-69. When presented with the habeas petition, however, the District Court evaluated the claim as the New Jersey Supreme Court had on direct appeal, and found that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusions were neither unreasonable nor contrary to Supreme Court jurisprudence. Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 777-79. Like 52 the District Court, we will evaluate the reasonableness of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s evaluation on direct appeal. Before us, Marshall contends that the prosecutor deliberately led DeCarlo to the improper disclosure, and that, indeed, the prosecutor’s entire cross of DeCarlo was aimed at these topics. App. Br. at 124. But the New Jersey Supreme Court found that DeCarlo’s comment was volunteered. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 148. Whether DeCarlo’s disclosure was instigated or voluntary is, we believe, not clear. Thus we will not find the New Jersey Supreme Court’s determination of the facts to be unreasonable. Marshall also, however, challenges the prosecutor’s follow-up comments implying that if Marshall were innocent, he would not have run out and hire[d] an attorney. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 148. As noted above, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the comments were constitutional error, but that they were harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).25 Under Chapman, an error is harmless if there is noreasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. _________________________________________________________________ 25. In Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 950-55 (3d Cir. 1998), we stated that -- in reviewing a claim on habeas that is not governed by AEDPA -- we would apply the harmless error standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), regardless of whether the state court applied the Chapman standard. Hassine, 160 F.3d at 952-53. In Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001), the United States Supreme Court did likewise under AEDPA, instructing us that, where courts find, using the AEDPA analysis, that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, and thus that an error occurred in the trial that the state court did not evaluate as such, the habeas court is to apply Brecht to evaluate whether that error is harmless. Id. at 795. That is not the situation here, however. The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly found an error, and applied Chapman to evaluate whether that error was harmless. We need not determine whether, in such an instance, we should review their application of Chapman or apply Brecht independently, however, because here the error would be harmless regardless of which standard applied. The District Court also found that the error would be harmless under either standard. See Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 778-79. 53 Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). Further, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the impact of the prosecutor’s line of questioning was ameliorated because Marshall testified before DeCarlo and had himself disclosed that he had retained counsel prior to the incident in question. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 149. We reach that conclusion in part because the jury knew from defendant’s own testimony that he had retained counsel and did not consider that conduct to detract at all from his claim of innocence. Id. That reasoning, however, was secondary to the Court’s conviction: More important to our conclusion, however, is that the evidence of defendant’s guilt was so persuasive that it is virtually impossible to conceive that this isolated comment by the prosecutor, however reprehensible it may have been, could have contributed significantly to the jury’s determination of guilt. Id. In Marshall’s direct testimony at trial, he stated that his office was searched during the weekend prior to his wife’s memorial service, and that as a result of that action, he consulted an attorney. Direct Testimony of Robert Marshall, February 26, 1986, St. Ex. 28T at 107-09. Immediately thereafter, Marshall discussed the visit paid him by the investigators on September 21, when his sister was present. Id. at 109-11. He denied being showed photographs at that time. Id. at 110. DeCarlo’s testimony occurred on February 24, 1986, two days prior to Marshall’s testimony. Thus, Marshall had not in fact disclosed his retention of counsel before she testified. Rather, her testimony provided the initial impression to the jury as to Marshall’s retention of counsel. Accordingly, we cannot discount the impact of the prosecutor’s statements on the basis of the jury’s knowledge via Marshall’s testimony, as the New Jersey Supreme Court did. DeCarlo had testified that the investigators asked Marshall whether he knew a couple of names. Direct Testimony of Oakleigh DeCarlo, February 24, 1986, St. Ex. 27T at 118. She further testified that Marshall was not shown any photographs at that time. Id. 54 From the beginning of the cross-examination, the prosecutor was combative with DeCarlo. She had testified that she had not heard one of the names asked by the investigators. The first question that the prosecutor asked was: You didn’t hear him answer any questions, did you, when they said --, to which DeCarlo responded that she had heard Marshall’s response. Cross-Examination of Oakleigh DeCarlo, February 24, 1986, St. Ex. 27T at 119. Then the prosecutor asked whether the conversation ended, to which DeCarlo replied that Marshall had said he should have his attorney present if they were to ask more questions. Id. The prosecutor started to ask whether DeCarlo had said Hey, Rob. Why get your lawyer. Your wife was murdered. Maybe these people --, but when DeCarlo attempted to answer, he cut her off. Id. Defense counsel objected, and the prosecutor reframed his question:Did you say to your brother, ‘Rob, wait a minute. Don’t just answer one question. Take a good look at these photographs.’? DeCarlo replied -- as Marshall would later confirm -- that he was not shown any photographs at that point. Id. at 120. The prosecutor then asked several questions attempting to elicit whether DeCarlo had ever stated that she could not tell whether Marshall was lying or telling the truth, and concluded his cross-examination. Thompson’s counsel then asked DeCarlo whether she would think it unreasonable to want an attorney present if possibly under suspicion. She replied: Not at all. That’s why you hire them for his advice. Id. at 122. The prosecutor then asked again, Especially when your wife has been killed and you haven’t -- you didn’t have anything to do with it, you still run out and hire an attorney? Id. The question was objected to, and the objection sustained, and DeCarlo was permitted to step down. The New Jersey Supreme Court properly considered the weight of other evidence against Marshall in determining that the error was harmless. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639. However, as we noted, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that part of its determination was based on the fact -- which is not actually a fact -- that Marshall’s testimony that he had retained counsel lessened the impact that the prosecutor’s questioning of DeCarlo had upon the jury. We then must answer an additional question by looking at the 55 record: Considering the totality of DeCarlo’s testimony, was it unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that the disclosure that Marshall had hired counsel -- absent the palliative ascribed by the Court of the jurors’ having already heard from Marshall -- was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? To answer that question, it is important to look at what the United States Supreme Court reacted to in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S 609 (1965), and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and what we reacted to in Macon. In Griffin, the prosecutor used the defendant’s silence -- and his own powerful oratory -- to convey that the defendant knew the truth, but was wilfully withholding it from the jury.26 Further, the prosecutor’s words were compounded by the court’s instructions -- consistent with California law -- that the jury could draw an inference unfavorable to the defendant as to facts within his knowledge about which he chose not to testify. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 30 (1988) (discussing Griffin, 380 U.S. at 610-15). In Doyle, the prosecutor, on cross-examination of the defendant, repeatedly denigrated Doyle’s assertions of innocence.27 There, the trial court overruled objections and _________________________________________________________________ 26. As quoted by the Supreme Court, the prosecutor testified: The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up appearance at the time he left her apartment and went down the alley with her. What kind of a man is it that would want to have sex with a woman that beat up if she was beat up at the time he left? He would know that. He would know how she got down the alley. He would know how the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know how long he was with her in that box. He would know how her wig got off. He would know whether he beat her or mistreated her. He would know whether he walked away from that place cool as a cucumber when he saw Mr. Villasenor because he was conscious of his own guilt and wanted to get away from that damaged or injured woman. These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain. And in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would know. Essie Mae is dead, she can’t tell you her side of the story. The defendant won’t. Griffin, 380 U.S at 610-11. 27. The relevant prosecutorial questions are as follows: 56 allowed the prosecutor to argue the post-arrest silence in closing. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 614. In Macon, the prosecutor in his closing expressly tied the defendant’s retention of counsel to the other circumstantial evidence of his guilt.28 There was no objection or requested instruction. We concluded there that the error was not harmless, because the verdict rested on a credibility determination, and the comments would appear to have been directed to, and may have had the effect of, raising in the jurors’ minds the inference that petitioner was, or at least believed himself to _________________________________________________________________ Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene why didn’t you tell him? But in any event, you didn’t bother to tell Mr. Beamer anything about this? You are innocent? . . . . That’s why you told the police department and Kenneth Beamer when they arrived -- . . . . about your innocence? You said nothing at all about how you had been set up? As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony correctly, you said instead of protesting your innocence, as you do today, you said in response to a question of Mr. Beamer, -- ‘I don’t know what you are talking about.’  Doyle, 426 U.S. at 614 & n.5. 28. As quoted in our opinion, the relevant portions of the prosecutor’s summation are: Then what does he do? He drives along and can’t tell us where. The gun goes out the window. An act of innocence? The car is left somewhere and he doesn’t remember where? An act of innocence? He goes home and puts the shirt down in the chest, a torn shirt. Then he goes to bed. He says he had trouble sleeping. He gets up the next morning and lo and behold, what does he do? He calls his lawyer. These are acts of innocence? I say, ladies and gentlemen, his story is implausible, impossible and you can judge by his own conduct, unbelievable. Macon, 476 F.2d at 614 (emphasis in original). 57 be, guilty. Such an inference might certainly tend to cause the jury to disbelieve Macon’s version of the story. Macon, 476 F. 2d at 616-17. We believe that there are important, though subtle, distinctions between the effect of the prosecutor’s actions in these cases and in the one before us. First, in Griffin, Doyle, and Macon, the prosecutor attacked the defendant directly. Here, the attack was indirect. Second, in each of the above cases, the prosecutor was allowed to wax eloquent without challenge or interruption, while here Marshall objected -- and the objection was sustained -- three times in the brief interchange between the prosecutor and DeCarlo. Finally, in part because both the direct and cross examination were brief, it was very obvious, even to us on a cold record, that the prosecutor was, for whatever reason, attempting to twist all of DeCarlo’s testimony -- intimating that she did not hear Marshall’s answer when she had testified that she did not hear one of the names asked by the investigator; asking her why she didn’t ask Marshall to examine the photographs when she had already testified that he hadn’t been shown any -- and we think that the way the prosecutor formulated the questions: Didn’t you ask him . . . would have been perceived as yet further attempts to badger and twist the testimony of a minor witness. When all three factors are considered in combination, we cannot find the prosecutor’s questions and comments, improper though they were, to support -- as they did in as in Griffin, Doyle, and Macon-- a clear inference that the exercise of the constitutional right was itself evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Thus, we concur in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusion that the error was harmless. b. Right to Call Witnesses i. Did the New Jersey Supreme Court Properly Conclude that the Error was Not of the Type Condemned in Macon? The remarks in question were quoted by the New Jersey Supreme Court: 58 And he has the audacity to bring in his three boys to testify. That’s obscene. And I’m not being critical of them, because I would probably do the same thing. To put his boys on that witness stand is obscene, and for that there’s a place in hell for him. He will use anybody, he will say anything and he will do anything, including his own family, to get out from under. And that’s Robert Oakley Marshall. Make no mistake about it. Marshall I, 586 A. 2d at 169. Marshall raises these remarks before us twice, once by citing to the relevant portions of the dissent and including these remarks among those to be analyzed under Berger and Darden, App. Br. at 129-30, 132, and earlier, when Marshall discusses the infringement of the right to counsel discussed above. There, he states specifically that the right to counsel should be evaluated in conjunction with other misconduct including the prosecutor’s telling the jury in summation that there is a place in hell for Robert Marshall for exercising his 6th Amendment right to call his sons as witnesses. App. Br. at 127. The majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court did not directly address the contention that the prosecutor’s comments were tantamount to a denial of Marshall’s right to call witnesses, stating merely that: Arguably, defendant’s sons’ testimony concerned only peripheral aspects of the case -- except for that of Robbie Marshall who stated that defendant was at home at noon on September 6, 1984, the time, according to McKinnon, that he and defendant met on the Garden State Parkway. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to have implied that defendant’s sons had been called as witnesses not so much for the substance of their testimony but because their mere presence as witnesses would suggest support for their father, support that would have been unwarranted if defendant had participated in the murder of their mother. Thus, in emotional and inflammatory terms, the prosecutor expressed his revulsion at what he perceived as defendant’s ‘using’ his sons in order to gain an acquittal . . . . Although the prosecutor’s remarks went beyond the boundaries 59 of permissibly forceful advocacy, we note that their focus was on a distinctly collateral aspect of the trial, not on a critical and contested issue of fact. We acknowledge that the trial court’s curative instruction could have been more forceful, but we are satisfied that it was adequate to ameliorate any significant prejudice to defendant. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 169. It is beyond dispute that the right to call witnesses is protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (internal citations omitted). But even though the prosecutor’s misconduct in this instance did touch on Marshall’s exercise of a constitutional right, we conclude that the court’s curative actions rightly kept the offending statements from the consideration of the jurors, and thus, that consonant with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987), there was no violation of Marshall’s right to call witnesses. As the United States Supreme Court characterized Doyle, the harm lay in using the defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed silence to impeach him at trial. Greer, 483 U.S. at 763. In Greer, a question was asked, counsel objected, and the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard questions that had been objected to if the objection had been sustained. Id. at 764. Thus, [t]he fact of Miller’s postarrest silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference, and thus no Doyle violation occurred in this case. Id. at 764-65. While the prosecutorial comments here are nowhere near as benign as the single prosecutorial question at issue in Greer, we think that Greer’s holding is controlling. Here, as in Greer, the comments the prosecutor made regarding Marshall’s sons were at a single point in a long trial. Though they were more inflammatory -- indeed,[a]mong the most inflammatory portions of the prosecutor’s 60 summation, possessing the capacity to anger and arouse the jury and thereby divert them from their solemn responsibility to render a verdict based on the evidence, Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 168, 169 -- the trial court instructed the jury specifically to disregard the prosecutor’s comments: A defendant in a criminal case has a right to bring in any witnesses or subpoena or bring in any other way any witnesses to testify on his behalf, and no adverse inferences should be drawn against the defendant merely because his sons testified as witnesses on his behalf. Id. at 169. The Court also instructed the jurors to disregard the reference to a place in hell.29 Id. Indeed, the instructions here were specifically directed at the prosecutor’s statement, unlike the general instructions that the Court upheld in Greer. As Greer stressed, we are to presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an ‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be ‘devastating’ to the defendant. Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 n.8. Thus, the fact that Marshall called his sons as witnesses was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference. Id. at 764-65. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor’s statements were not directed at a critical and contested issue of fact and that the trial court’s curative instructions were adequate to ameliorate any significant prejudice to defendant. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 169. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court should have evaluated this misconduct to determine if there was a violation under Doyle, its conclusions are essentially the same as those we reach independently applying the proper framework, and we find no constitutional error. Accordingly, we will not disturb its conclusions. 30 _________________________________________________________________ 29. Also as in Greer, the trial court denied Marshall’s motion for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor’s actions. Id. 30. Because we find that there was no constitutional error, we do not need to reach the question of whether any error was harmless. 61 3. Accumulation of Error The New Jersey Supreme Court also evaluated the right to counsel claim separately from the other claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and Marshall complains vociferously that, if the instances of prosecutorial conduct that were found to be improper by the New Jersey Supreme Court were considered together, there would be error that would render the trial unfair and not be harmless. App. Br. at 127. Further, he alleges that the nondisclosure of Kraushaar’s immunity agreement should be factored in as well. Id. As stated above, Marshall is correct that error attributed to prosecutorial misconduct is accumulated for the purposes of the Chapman analysis. Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1541 (3d Cir. 1991). Indeed, in Chapman itself, the cumulative effect of the error was weighed together. Thus, the state prosecutor’s argument and the trial judge’s instruction to the jury continuously and repeatedly impressed the jury that from the failure of petitioners to testify, to all intents and purposes, the inferences from the facts in evidence had to be drawn in favor of the State -- in short, that by their silence petitioners had served as irrefutable witnesses against themselves. And though the case in which this occurred presented a reasonably strong circumstantial web of evidence against petitioners, it was also a case in which, absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts. Under these circumstances, it is completely impossible for us to say that the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor’s comments and the trial judge’s instruction did not contribute to petitioners’ convictions. Such a machine-gun repetition of a denial of constitutional rights, designed and calculated to make petitioners’ version of the evidence worthless, can no more be considered harmless than the introduction against a defendant of a coerced confession. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 25-26 (internal citations omitted). It is also true, as noted above, that in Brecht v. Abrahamson, the United States Supreme Court did not preclude the 62 possibility that in an unusual case, a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even if it did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9. But the essence of Chapman is that a prosecutor’s misconduct is not harmless when it renders the defendant’s evidence worthless. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26. Here, none of the misconduct properly before the jury undermined the integrity or fairness of the proceeding. While the United States Supreme Court has not clarified what might constitute an unusual case, we do not think that the single instance of constitutional error -- the prosecutor’s questioning of DeCarlo -- at Marshall’s trial could suffice.31