Opinion ID: 2398940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pretrial intervention as a procedural alternative

Text: Pretrial intervention represents a procedural alternative to the traditional system of prosecuting and incarcerating criminal suspects, and was intended as a response to deficiencies in that system. Although the deficiencies which PTI attempts to address have existed for years, PTI is a fairly recent innovation, and has developed only within the last decade. While all PTI programs have common objectives and a common origin, they have exhibited substantial diversity in program goals and operational formats. An understanding of the premises upon which PTI rests is vital to comprehend the diverse ways in which the programs have been implemented, especially in New Jersey where programs differ from county to county. In addition, an assessment of the purposes of pretrial intervention will provide a benchmark by which to measure the particular programs challenged here and the general scheme established pursuant to R. 3:28.

While the origins of PTI may ultimately be found in traditional criminal procedures such as parole and probation, the formalization of that concept has emerged only during the last decade. The initial impetus for development of PTI came from a 1967 report compiled by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) [hereinafter referred to as The President's Comm'n.] This report, which was based upon a nationwide study, expressly recognized the desirability of alternative means for the disposition of criminal cases. In particular, it noted that due to the unsatisfactory performance of the criminal justice system, there was a need for prosecutorial options to augment those traditionally exercised by law enforcement authorities. The lack of sufficient resources, the often debilitating effects on a suspect from introduction to the criminal process and the failure of the system to rehabilitate criminal offenders were all cited as warranting attention. The Commission found that resolution of these problems might be accomplished by diversion of cases from the criminal process prior to prosecution. However, the report also recognized that the lack of information and the absence of clearly defined standards and procedures would initially frustrate the decisions of prosecutors concerning cases to be diverted. Consequently, the Commission recommended that: Prosecutors should endeavor to make discriminating charge decisions, assuring that offenders who merit criminal sanctions are not released and that other offenders are either released or diverted to noncriminal methods of treatment and control by: Establishment of explicit policies for the dismissal or informal disposition of the cases of certain marginal offenders. Early identification and diversion to other community resources of those offenders in need of treatment, for whom full criminal disposition does not appear required. [1 The President's Comm'n, supra, at 134]. Within a year of the publication of the Commission's report, two pilot PTI programs were established according to the general guidelines presented in the report. These programs, the Manhattan Court Employment Project and Project Crossroads in Washington, D.C., provided for the diversion of criminal cases involving juveniles, first-time offenders and defendants accused of committing misdemeanors and specified felonies. The identification of these individuals was intended to isolate suspects for whom prosecution in the traditional sense would be unnecessary, ineffective or counterproductive. The projects also sought to provide alternatives to defendants for whom rehabilitation was possible. In exchange for the suspension of prosecution, these individuals were required to participate in a community-based rehabilitation program which included counseling, training and job placement. See generally, Nat'l Pretrial Intervention Service Center, Descriptive Profiles on Selected Pretrial Criminal Justice Intervention Programs, 21-25 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Descriptive Profiles ]; Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 Yale L.J. 827, 828-830 (1974); Note, Pretrial Intervention Programs, 28 Rutgers L. Rev. 1203, 1207-1209 (1975). The initial successes attained by these programs in terms of reduced recidivism and promotion of employable skills prompted the establishment of second-round programs in other cities which were modeled after the original pilot projects. [4] See generally, Vera Institute of Justice, The Manhattan Court Employment Project: Final Report (1972); Nat'l Comm. for Children & Youth, Final Report: Project Crossroads (1971); Descriptive Profiles, supra, at 24-25; Gorelick, Pretrial Diversion: The Threat of Expanding Social Control, 10 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 180, 194-200 (1975). These programs were, in turn, followed by programs in other locales. The diversity of these programs underscores the experimental nature of the PTI concept. Although most programs were instituted and administered in accordance with prosecutorial discretion ( see Note, 83 Yale L.J. at 827; Note, 28 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1209); some states, such as New Jersey, have authorized PTI programs by court rules, N.J.R. 3:28; Pa. R. Crim. P. 175, et seq., and two states have even resorted to formal legislation to enact PTI programs, Cal. Penal Code § 1000, et seq.; Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 276A §§ 1-9 (Supp. 1975). These various programs also differ in terms of their breadth and their ambition. While a majority of them are comprehensive in scope, see generally, Descriptive Profiles, supra; Nat'l Pretrial Intervention Service Center, Directory of Criminal Justice Diversion Programs (Rev. 1975), others confine their attention to individuals suspected of committing particular crimes, Robertson, Pretrial Diversion of Drug Offenders, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 335 (1972); Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the Criminal System, 60 Geo. L.J. 667 (1972); Descriptive Profiles, supra, at 37-39 (Project F.O.U.N.D. (Baltimore)  property crimes). In short, PTI programs share a common background, but have assumed no uniform structure. Nonetheless, the success of these programs has encouraged more and more state and local authorities to initiate and develop PTI programs of their own. [5]
Although PTI programs may differ in scope and procedure, they all serve the same general purposes. These purposes are summarized by one commentator as follows: The primary goals of diversion are two-fold. The first is the early identification and referral of defendants who are in need of treatment. This may be the most effective way to rehabilitate them and return them to the community as productive citizens. Second, diversion serves to dispose quickly and inexpensively of cases which are more effectively handled without full criminal disposition. This permits the court to focus its attention and concentrate its resources on those cases where deterrence and rehabilitation can best be achieved by ordinary criminal processing. [Note, supra, 60 Geo. L.J. at 673] While it is the unification of these purposes  expeditious disposition and rehabilitation  which particularly characterizes the PTI concept, it should be noted that they often serve different ends. Expeditious disposition, of course, is not a new objective for either prosecutors or the judiciary. Informal diversion of criminal defendants to achieve this goal existed prior to any attempt to formally implement diversion through PTI programs. For instance, prosecutors have traditionally exercised the option of dismissing charges or declining to proceed with prosecution. See generally, 1 The President's Comm'n, supra, at 133; Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Crim. Justice Standards and Goals, Courts 17-26 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Courts; Ferguson, Formulation of Enforcement Policy: An Anatomy of the Prosecutor's Discretion Prior to Accusation, 11 Rutgers L. Rev. 507 (1957); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543 (1960); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion  A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 174 (1965); Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1057 (1955); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 519 (1969). PTI programs have retained many of the same advantages which attend a prosecutor's informal decision to divert prior to criminal prosecution. In this way, pretrial intervention provides one means of addressing the problems of congestion and backlog of cases which currently confront our prosecutors, public defenders and courts. To the extent that a PTI program averts the costs of processing these cases, it also permits a more efficient use of the limited resources available to law enforcement authorities. Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Crim. Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 74-76 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Corrections ]. Note, supra, 10 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. at 193. Furthermore, pretrial intervention affords prosecutors with alternatives to prosecution and therefore increases their flexibility to respond to individual cases. As a study by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals reported: Perhaps the major benefit of diversion is that it broadens the resources that can be used to deal with offenders. Under existing circumstances, it permits dispositions of offenders that would be difficult or impossible as sentencing alternatives. Because of its informality and flexibility, diversion also is likely to encompass more programs than could be made available as sentencing alternatives. [ Courts, supra, at 28] While PTI programs provide most of the advantages which are traditionally associated with prosecutorial discretion, their formal structure at the same time places restrictions on the exercise of that discretion. [6] By providing guidelines for the proper diversion of cases, they furnish standards of discretion thereby assuring a uniformity and predictability which are not characteristic of the ad hoc decisions of prosecutors. See Administrative Office of the Courts, Proposal for Statewide Implementation of a Uniform Program of Pretrial Intervention Under New Jersey Court Rule 3.28, 57-91 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Proposal; Courts, supra, at 32-41; ABA Project on Standards for Crim. Justice, Standards Relating to The Prosecution Function and The Defense Function, Standards 2.5, 3.8 (1971); 1 The President's Comm'n, supra, at 133. [7] While the goal of expeditious disposition is certainly important and central to the PTI concept, it is at the same time subordinate to the rehabilitative function of PTI. [8] See State v. Nolfi, 141 N.J. Super. 528 (Law Div. 1976). This function is, in the first instance, performed by the supportive services of the various programs, which generally include training, counseling, education and job placement. See generally, Descriptive Profiles, supra. However, the significance of rehabilitation is also apparent in the procedural operation of the PTI program. Because admission to and participation in a PTI program precedes trial and often precedes entry of formal charges, a defendant who successfully completes the program avoids adjudication of his guilt. Furthermore, few, if any, PTI programs require entry of a guilty plea as a prerequisite to admission in a program. Proposal, supra, at 35-38; Nat'l Pretrial Intervention Service Center, Legal Issues and Characteristics of Pretrial Intervention Programs, 44-52 (1974). Note, supra, 60 Geo. L.J. at 696. Due to this procedural aspect of pretrial intervention, the often counterproductive stigma of conviction, which accompanies parole and probation, does not attach to participants in a PTI program. This not only furthers the rehabilitative function of PTI, but also provides defendants with a real incentive for enrollment and participation. A national advisory commission which studied the judicial role in the criminal process mentioned this aspect of PTI: By taking the offender out of the criminal justice process before conviction, diversion imposes no stigma of conviction, and unlike screening, prevents the offender from committing future harmful acts or requires him to make restitution. Only diversion provides a means of accommodating this compromise solution. If diversion programs were made available as sentencing alternatives, the objective of avoiding the stigma of a criminal conviction would be nullified. [ Courts, supra, at 28] The success of such programs when measured in terms of decreased recidivism, increased job placements and reduced caseloads is ultimately a function of the specific services which they provide. However, a related and equally important sign of success  the ability of a program to encourage and promote successful diversion of criminal cases  is founded to a large extent upon the eligibility criteria which determine admissions to the program. These criteria must mediate between the conflicting interests which underlie PTI. On the one hand, the eligibility criteria must be sufficiently broad to divert as many cases as could possibly benefit from the program consistent with public security. On the other hand, the criteria must be sufficiently discriminatory to assure selection of those applicants who have the best prospects for rehabilitation. To harmonize these interests, the eligibility criteria must be both comprehensive and flexible. Narrow and inflexible criteria, which unduly restrict admissions to the program would be self-defeating and would undermine the efficacy of PTI. The net result of such criteria would be readily measurable in terms of denied opportunities for rehabilitation and fewer cases diverted from the congested dockets of our courts. Proposal, supra, at 20-35; Note, supra, 83 Yale L.J. at 834-35. As a result, proponents of the PTI concept have contended that its function is more readily served by eligibility criteria whose focus is only on the defendant's needs and his amenability to correction. This individualistic approach, they suggest, can best identify those persons who require rehabilitation and whose diversion would present a minimal threat to the interests of society. [9] As one group study reports: Among the factors that should be considered favorable to diversion are: (1) the relative youth of the offender; (2) the willingness of the victim to have no conviction sought; (3) any likelihood that the offender suffers from a mental illness or psychological abnormality which was related to his crime and for which treatment is available; and (4) any likelihood that the crime was significantly related to any other condition or situation such as unemployment or family problems that would be subject to change by participation in a diversion program. [ Courts, supra, at 32] Thus, PTI proponents and program administrators have criticized attempts to define admissions criteria according to criminal status or the particular crime with which a defendant is charged. Besides being arbitrary, such categorizations may bear only a tenuous relationship to the rehabilitative function of PTI. Because rehabilitation is dependent on an individual's propensity for correction, conditioning his admission solely on the nature of his crime may be both arbitrary and illogical. Greater emphasis should be placed on the offender than on the offense. Having made this inquiry into the general purposes and standards of PTI, we will now examine the pretrial intervention programs which have been authorized under R. 3:28. Our review in this regard will permit an assessment of how closely New Jersey programs approximate the general purposes of pretrial intervention, and will place the appeals before this Court within a proper perspective.
The growth and development of PTI in New Jersey has paralleled its evolution at the national level. Motivated by the same general concerns which prompted the establishment of PTI programs in other jurisdictions ( compare Chief Justice Burger, No Man is an Island, 56 A.B.A.J. 325 (1970) with Editorial, A Right to Rehabilitation?, 93 N.J.L.J. 792 (1970)), New Jersey has assumed an advanced position among the states which have implemented the concept of pretrial intervention. Despite this distinction, the development of PTI in New Jersey has not been uniform and the progress which has been achieved by different programs has not been even. The enabling court rule under which existing PTI programs have been established ( R. 3:28) was adopted in 1970 as this Court's authorization for the Newark Defendants Employment Project, one of the eight federally funded second-round programs. Most subsequent PTI programs in this state have been based both on the Newark project and on the rule which this Court adopted for that program. See generally, Proposal, supra at 9-10, 12-13; Note, supra, 28 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1208 n. 34; Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. 3:28 at 457-458. [10] The influence of the pilot project can be seen in the procedure which has been employed in establishing and admintering PTI programs under R. 3:28. All programs must in the first instance secure the approval of this Court as to the rules and regulations under which the program will operate. After the proposed program is approved, the assignment judge for the county must designate a judge or judges to hear all matters pertaining to the admission and functioning of the program, R. 3:28(a), except that the assignment judge himself must hear all cases concerning specified heinous crimes such as treason, murder, kidnapping, manslaughter, sodomy, rape, armed robbery, and distribution of narcotics by persons who are not drug-dependent. R. 3:28 (a). After a person's arrest and during his initial appearance in court, the committing judge shall inform the suspect of the availability of a PTI program if one has been established in that county. R. 3:4-2. The judge shall also inform the defendant of the name of the program director and the general procedure by which an application can be made to the program. After an application is filed, the matter is referred to the judge who has been designated by the assignment judge to hear such matters pursuant to R. 3:28(b). Where a defendant meets the preliminary eligibility criteria, the designated judge may upon recommendation of the program director (who most likely will be the county's trial court administrator or its chief probation officer) and the prosecuting attorney, postpone all further proceedings against the defendant for a three month period. R. 3:28(b). In the intervening three months, the defendant is to participate in the rehabilitation program which has been established by the county. Because neither the form nor the content of these programs has been prescribed by R. 3:28, the resulting services vary according to the objectives of the respective programs. At the end of three months, the judge may dispose of the case in one of several ways. Upon the recommendation of the program director, and with the consent of the prosecuting attorney, the judge may dismiss all outstanding complaints, indictments or accusations against defendant. R. 3:28(c)(1). This disposition, however, is contingent upon certification by program officials that the defendant has successfully participated in the PTI program and has been rehabilitated. With the concurrence of either of the previously mentioned officials, or upon the court's own motion, the judge may order the prosecution of defendant. R. 3:28(c)(3). However, prior to entering such an order, the defendant and his attorney must be given notice of the order and may request a hearing before the judge on that disposition. R. 3:28(c)(3). Should the designated judge eventually order that the defendant be prosecuted, any admissions or statements made by the defendant and all reports compiled during his enrollment in the program shall be considered inadmissible at trial. R. 3:28(c) (4). As an interim measure, the designated judge may also postpone further proceedings for an additional three-month period. R. 3:28(c)(2). This option, which must be recommended by the program director and consented to by the prosecuting attorney, may be employed only once. R. 3:28(d). After the conclusion of the second three-month period, the designated judge must either dismiss the case, or order the prosecution to proceed. R. 3:28(d). [11] Within this broad procedural framework, there is considerable room for variation in the development and implementation of county programs. This discretion is particularly noticeable in the different types of rehabilitation programs which have been established within counties that have adopted PTI. Some of these programs, most notably the Newark Defendants' Employment Project and the Hudson County Pretrial Intervention Project, have a broad orientation; admission to them is available to defendants charged with almost any criminal offense. The Newark TASC/Pretrial Intervention Program, however, has a more restrictive admissions policy, and concentrates primarily on individuals whose criminal problems are related to drug-abuse. A third type of program, such as the Jersey City and Union County Rehabilitation Programs, attempts to divert those criminal cases which arise from a pattern of alcoholism. The individuality which marks these different programs may be observed in other aspects of their operation including the services which are afforded to defendants, the point in the criminal process at which a defendant may be diverted, and the civil and social agencies with which the program is associated. See Proposal, supra, at 12-18. Nat'l Pretrial Intervention Service Center, Directory of Criminal Justice Diversion Programs, 8 (rev. 1975); Zaloom, Pretrial Intervention Under New Jersey Court Rule 3:28, Proposed Guidelines for Operation, 2 Crim. Justice Q. 178, 182-186 (1974); Descriptive Profiles, supra, at 40-44. In this regard the appeals represented by the instant case all concern the manner in which a county has attempted to fill the broad interstices created by R. 3:28. Each of these appeals implicates some exercise of discretion by an official connected with a PTI program. Consequently, in all three appeals, we are asked to consider and sanction the procedural practices which the program has adopted, pursuant to R. 3:28, as measured against constitutional standards and the original purposes of pretrial intervention.