Opinion ID: 4023577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Contract and Lease

Text: ¶23. Alternatively, Linde argues the Hospital failed in its burden to demonstrate the arbitrator and the Missouri court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Hospital. ¶24. Under the United States Constitution, Mississippi courts “must give full faith and credit to the final judgments of all other states” when “the court of state had lawful authority to enter the judgment.” Reeves Royalty, 513 So. 2d at 598 (citing U.S. Const. art. 4, § 1). 10 But when “the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction or [the] judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud,” a Mississippi court “is not required to recognize the judgment of a court of another state[.]” Id. (quoting Britton v. Gannon, 285 P.2d 407, 409 (Okla. 1955)). Here, neither the Claiborne County Circuit Court nor Madison County Circuit Court recognized the Missouri judgment. Rather, both Mississippi courts found Missouri lacked personal jurisdiction because the Hospital never agreed to arbitrate in Missouri.5 See Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 204 S.E.2d 834, 842-43 (N.C. 1974) (finding New York judgment, confirming an arbitration award rendered in New York, was not entitled to full faith and credit in North Carolina because the North Carolina company against which the judgment was entered never agreed to arbitrate in New York, never appeared before the New York arbitrator or New York court, and never conducted business in New York). ¶25. Linde challenges this finding, claiming the Hospital failed to sufficiently show Linde’s foreign judgment was invalid. Linde is correct that we are to presume “a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in a sister state is . . . valid[] as to that court’s assumption of jurisdiction.” Galbraith & Dickens Aviation Ins. Agency v. Gulf Coast Aircraft Sales, Inc., 396 So. 2d 19, 21 (Miss. 1981). So “the burden is on the party attacking the judgment to affirmatively show its invalidity.”6 Id. 5 The Claiborne County Circuit Court also refused to give full faith and credit based on extrinsic fraud. 6 Linde relies on authority from other jurisdictions to advocate that the Hospital must show by “clear and convincing” evidence that the foreign judgment should not be accorded full faith and credit. See, e.g., Winston v. Millaud, 930 So. 2d 144, 153 (La. Ct. App. 11 ¶26. But our review shows the Hospital met this burden. “[E]xtrinsic evidence is admissible in a collateral attack upon a foreign judgment to show that it is void[.]” Galbraith & Dickens Aviation, 396 So. 2d at 21. And the contract and lease affirmatively show the Hospital was not the entity that contracted with Linde. Indeed, the lease establishes that during the contract period, the Claiborne County Board of Supervisors had leased the hospital facility to Patient’s Choice and had ceased operating it. ¶27. Linde counters that the lease was never properly admitted or authenticated and is hearsay. But as a public document under seal, duly recorded in the Board minutes and registered in the chancery court, the lease is both self-authenticated under Rule 902(1) and nonexcluded hearsay under Rule 803(8). M.R.E. 902(1); M.R.E. 803(8). Further, the Hospital submitted the lease to both circuit courts in its Rule 60(b) motions to set aside. And Linde never moved to strike the lease.