Opinion ID: 2292054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the introduction of appellant's prior persistent felony offender status into the penalty phase of trial was harmless error

Text: Appellant next argues that the introduction of his prior status as a second-degree PFO into evidence during the penalty phase was error. During the penalty phase, a deputy circuit court clerk testified that Appellant had previously been convicted of theft by unlawful taking as a persistent felony offender, second degree and possession of anhydrous ammonia as a persistent felony offender, second degree. Appellant's objection to the reference to his prior PFO status was overruled. The PFO jury instruction ultimately stated that, to find Appellant to be a first-degree PFO, the jury must believe that Appellant was previously convicted of knowingly possessing anhydrous ammonia, committed as a persistent felony offender, second-degree  and theft by unlawful taking, committed as a persistent felony offender, second-degree. He now argues that the admission into evidence of the reference to his prior second-degree PFO status, and its inclusion in the jury instructions violated due process. A persistent felony offender in the first degree is a person who is more than twenty-one years of age and who stands convicted of a felony after having been convicted of two or more felonies, or one or more felony sex crimes against a minor as defined in KRS 17.500, and now stands convicted of any one or more felonies. KRS 532.080(3) (emphasis added). Conviction as a persistent felony offender is not a charge of an independent criminal offense but rather a particular criminal status ... Persistent Felony Offender proceedings involves the status of the offender and the length of the punishment, not a separate or independent criminal offense. White v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Ky.1989). Both parties acknowledge that we have no reported case law holding that the inclusion of a defendant's prior PFO status in a jury instruction or in the penalty phase hearing is error. We first address the evidentiary question. KRS 532.055(2)(a), part of the Truth In Sentencing legislation that established our bifurcated method of trying felony cases, provides that in the sentencing phase of the trial evidence may be offered by the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing including: ... (2) The nature of prior offenses for which he was convicted. As established in White, a prior PFO conviction is not itself a prior offense. In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Ky.1996), we held all that is admissible [under KRS 532.055(2)(a) ] as to the nature of a prior conviction is a general description of the crime. In this case, it would be sufficient to introduce the judgment with testimony that defendant assaulted the woman with whom he had been living. However, in Cuzick v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Ky.2009), we cautiously held, consistent with Robinson, that the Commonwealth could read into evidence from the arrest record prepared by the arresting officer on the prior charge, a description of the nature of the prior offense [that] was limited solely to the information contained on the citation, namely that Appellant utilized a bat to commit the breaking aspect of the burglary. The dissenting opinion in Cuzick reminded us that [i]n Robinson this Court noted that the purpose of truth in sentencing in regard to a[PFO] conviction was simply to inform the jury that the defendant had prior convictions, and what their general nature was, so that the jury could determine whether the defendant had the status of a persistent felon.  Id. at 269 (J. Noble, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added). The concern voiced in Robinson, and echoed in the Cuzick dissent, was that an expansive interpretation of phrase the nature of the prior offense might lead to protracted and potentially prejudicial retrying of contested details of the prior crime during the penalty phase of the later crime, especially if the general description of the prior offense included disputed gruesome or heinous details of the prior offense. Appellant's previous second-degree PFO status is not an aspect of the earlier crime that would lend itself to such controversy. Moreover, if not a part of the prior criminal act itself, it is an aspect of the nature of the prior offense that informs the jury's determination on the first-degree PFO issue and the appropriate penalty. We therefore conclude that the limited reference to Appellant's previous PFO status, presented to the jury simply as part of the descriptive name of his prior felony offense, did not violate the evidentiary restriction of KRS 532.055, and hence it did not violate his due process right to a fair trial. With respect to the PFO instruction, we simply state that requiring the prior offenses to have been committed as a persistent felony offender, second-degree is an incorrect statement of law, and is error. Whether Appellant had PFO status at the time of those convictions is immaterial to the first-degree PFO charge. However, we see no likelihood the error affected the jury verdict or substantially swayed the jury. It was, therefore, harmless and affords Appellant no grounds for relief. See Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-689.