Opinion ID: 2611854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Montalvo's Cross-Appeal

Text: Because we are remanding this case to the trial court, we address the merits of Montalvo's cross-appeal. Montalvo contends that the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on hedonic (or loss of enjoyment of life) damages. Whether expert testimony should be admitted at trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Montalbo, 73 Haw. 130, 140-41, 828 P.2d 1274, 1281 (1992). We note first that, indisputably, hedonic damages are recoverable. HRS § 663-8.5(a) (Supp.1992) provides that [n]oneconomic damages which are recoverable in tort actions include damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, and all other nonpecuniary losses or claims (emphasis added). Thus, the important issue-of-first-impression we face is strictly whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony on such damages. The question of admissibility of expert testimony on how the value of [hedonic] damages is calculated is the focus of controversy and debate. Decisions continue to go both ways. T. Branch, Seeking Recovery for Loss of Enjoyment of Life, Trial, April 1994, at 40, 43 [hereinafter, Branch, Seeking Recovery ]. HRE 702 [20] and 703 [21] govern expert testimony. Under these rules, a court applies the following factors in deciding whether to admit such testimony: [A] court should weigh general acceptance along with the other factors listed below in order to determine, under [HRE] Rules 702 and 703, whether scientific evidence should be admitted at trial. These factors include whether: 1) the evidence will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 2) the evidence will add to the common understanding of the jury; 3) the underlying theory is generally accepted as valid; 4) the procedures used are generally accepted as reliable if performed properly; 5) the procedure were applied and conducted properly in the present instance. The court should then consider whether admitting such evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Montalbo, 73 Haw. at 140, 828 P.2d at 1280-81 (citations omitted). At trial, Montalvo offered the testimony of Dr. Louis Rose, a professor of economics at the University of Hawai`i, who testified as an expert on lost wages. Additionally, Montalvo made a lengthy offer of proof on Rose's proposed testimony regarding hedonic damages. Montalvo argued, in part: Doctor Rose would be testifying that based upon the article in Exhibit 99,[ [22] ] it is a standard to rely upon that article [in] the economic community. And therefore, hedonic damages are not speculative. It's based upon more than 40 studies as far as the value of life which is based upon people taking riskier jobs, no greater amounts of pay, safety factors such as what people are willing to pay for airbags and things of that nature. Doctor Rose would be testifying that in this particular case, Mr. Montalvo, based upon his life expectancy of [75.7] years, would have a certain loss based upon the date of the accident in 1988 until the time he died at age 77 and-a-half [sic] ... . . . . ... [T]he jury would then be able, based upon the expected hedonic loss of [$1,700,000], to life's end to decide what amount should be awarded for hedonic damages. And that would be used as a guide for the jury to give them some figure upon which they would base that part of the damages, which is better than just picking a number out of the air. Montalvo also noted that Rose's theory of estimating hedonic damages was based on (1) [w]orker's wages for risk of death, (2) [c]onsumer expenditures on safety, and (3) [s]urvey questionnaires. Perhaps surprising to some, the development of methodologies to place a value on human life is not a new science.... [Economists] have come up with two basic approaches for valuing human life: the human capital approach and the willingness-to-pay approach. A. McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 Notre Dame L.Rev. 57, 100 (1990) [hereinafter, McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life ]. [T]he willingness-to-pay approach studies people's consumption behavior to determine how much they are willing to pay to reduce the possibility of dying. The theory is that the amount people are willing to pay for lifesaving products like smoke alarms or automobile safety devices shows what dollar value people place on life. Branch, Seeking Recovery, supra, at 42; see also McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life, supra, at 102-06. Based on Montalvo's offer of proof and his citation to Miller, Willingness to Pay, supra, Rose's proffered expert testimony clearly was based on the willingness-to-pay approach discussed in the McClurg and Branch articles. Recent decisions, however, have specifically rejected expert testimony on hedonic damages based upon willingness-to-pay studies. [23] Some courts have allowed such testimony. [24] However, we reject the minority view and agree with the majority trend towards inadmissibility of expert testimony on hedonic damages based on willingness-to-pay studies. We stress that the narrow issue is whether an expert can assist a jury in valuing loss of enjoyment of life due to an injury; the value of life itself is, at most, tangentially related. Assum[ing] that [the willingness-to-pay] methodology has some valid economic basis [to measure the value of life], we reject it from the legal standpoint because it has nothing to do with defining the particular value of the loss of enjoyment of life[.]  Wilt, 443 S.E.2d at 205 (emphasis in original). Under the Wilt analysis, the testimony proffered by Montalvo's expert would have been irrelevant. Moreover, we agree with other courts that assumptions made in willingness-to-pay studies are questionable. [T]he calculations are based on assumptions that appear to controvert logic and good sense. Id. As did the Wilt court, we find the following analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit persuasive: We have serious doubts that [the] assertion that the studies [relied] upon actually measure how much Americans value life.... [S]pending on safety items reflects a consumer's willingness to pay to reduce risk, perhaps more a measure of how cautious a person is than how much he or she values life. Few of us when confronted with the threat, Your money or your life! would, like Jack Benny, pause and respond, I'm thinking, I'm thinking. Most of us would empty our wallets. Why that decision reflects less the value we place on life than whether we buy an airbag is not immediately obvious. Mercado, 974 F.2d at 871 (emphasis in original). The measurement of the joy of life is intangible. A jury may draw upon its own life experiences in attempting to put a monetary figure on the pleasure of living. It is a uniquely human endeavor ... requiring the trier of fact to draw upon the virtually unlimited factors unique to us as human beings. Foster, 603 So.2d at 286. Testimony of an economist would not aid the jury in making such measurements because an economist is no more expert at valuing the pleasure of life than the average juror. [T]he loss of enjoyment of life resulting from a permanent injury is ... not subject to an economic calculation. Wilt, 443 S.E.2d at 207. Thus, because the proffered expert testimony on hedonic damages would have been irrelevant, would not have assisted the jury, and would not have added to the common understanding of the jury, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it.