Opinion ID: 1433952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Motions to Dismiss Based on Foreign Sovereign Immunity

Text: The Holy See has brought a facial attack on the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court under Rule 12(b)(1). We therefore assume [plaintiff's] [factual] allegations to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004); see also McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that we favorably view[ ] the facts alleged to support jurisdiction). We do not, however, accept the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis added; internal quotations omitted) (quoting W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981)). The Holy See suggests that when evaluating facial motions to dismiss based on foreign sovereign immunity, we must require a greater-than-usual level of detail in the pleadings, and may not construe factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Neither contention is correct. The cases on which the Holy See relies involve fact-based challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 137-38, 146 (2d Cir.2001) (relying on testimony and affidavits from the parties in concluding that the generic allegations in the complaint were insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA). In such cases, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.1987). Here, in contrast, the Holy See is contending that on the face of the complaint, we lack subject matter jurisdiction; it has introduced no evidence contesting any of the allegations. With regard to such a challenge, a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA is no different from any other motion to dismiss on the pleadings for lack of jurisdiction, and we apply the same standards in evaluating its merit. See, e.g., Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2004). As the D.C. Circuit explained in Rong v. Liaoning Province Gov't, 452 F.3d 883, 888 (D.C.Cir.2006), in the foreign sovereign immunity context, [i]f the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations, then the district court should take the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and determine whether they bring the case within any of the exceptions to immunity invoked by the plaintiff. Moreover, we have never held that anything other than our usual notice pleading standard applies to complaints that allege an exception to foreign sovereign immunity. Under notice pleading rules, we require only a short and plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction and the claim for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), (2); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). We do not impose a heightened pleading standard in the absence of an explicit requirement in a statute or federal rule, Skaff v. Meridien North America Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir.2007); there is no such explicit requirement here applicable. In evaluating assertions of subject-matter jurisdiction based on an exception to foreign sovereign immunity, then, we apply the same notice pleading requirements we would apply to any other assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction and look only for a short and plain statement of the basis for jurisdiction.