Opinion ID: 375743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellants' Expectation of Privacy

Text: 16 Brien, Labus and Zolla contend there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and that it did not meet the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment. 8 The government denies this contention and questions the standing of Brien, Labus and Zolla to challenge the warrant. 17 The district court found that Brien and Zolla definitely had standing and that Labus also had standing, although his standing was borderline. We find no error in this determination. 18 In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 429, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court reduced the issue of standing to one essential question: did the persons asserting a fourth amendment claim have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, also entered into by Chief Justice Burger, suggests a variety of factors for consideration in answering this question. Were the persons asserting the claim legitimately on the premises? Did the persons take the customary precautions to protect their privacy? Had the persons used the location in a way which implied a subjective expectation of privacy? Is the asserted expectation of privacy consistent with the historical notions of privacy held by the Framers of the fourth amendment? Did the persons possess conventional property rights in the area searched? Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 150-53, 99 S.Ct. at 434-435 (Powell, J., concurring). 19 The district court requested that argument on standing focus on six factors: (1) his (each defendant's) position in the firm; (2) did he have any ownership interest; (3) his responsibilities; (4) his power to exclude others from the area, if any; (5) did he work in the area; (6) was he present at the time of the search. The district court properly adapted the Rakas guidelines to this case. 9