Opinion ID: 774351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA)

Text: 61 Clark argues that because the Task Force that provided the evidentiary support for Ordinance 171 conducted its meetings in secret, the Ordinance resulting from the Task Force's work is null and void, according to the terms of the OPMA. We agree that the OPMA applies to the Task Force and that the Task Force violated the OPMA by closing the majority of its meetings to the public. We conclude, however, that the remedy is not declaring the Ordinance null and void, but declaring the actions the Task Force conducted behind closed doors null and void. 62 The purpose of the OPMA is to ensure that public bodies make decisions openly. See RCW §§ 42.30.010; Miller v. City of Tacoma, 979 P.2d 429, 432 (Wash. 1999) (en banc). As stated in the statute: 63 The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. 64 RCW §§ 42.30.010. To meet the Act's purpose, courts applying its provisions are to construe it liberally. See RCW §§ 42.30.910 (The purposes of this chapter are hereby declared remedial and shall be liberally construed.); Miller, 979 P.2d at 433. The driving provision of the Act states: 65 All meetings of a governing body of a public agency shall be open and public and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the governing body of a public agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. 66 RCW §§ 42.30.030. 67 To determine whether the Ordinance is valid under the OPMA, we must answer three questions: (1) Does the OPMA apply to the Task Force? (2) Did the Task Force violate the OPMA? (3) If the Task Force did violate the OPMA, is the remedy nullification of the Ordinance? 68 (1) Does the OPMA apply to the Task Force? 69 The requirement for open and public meetings applies only to governing bodies of public agencies. RCW §§ 42.30.030. We must determine whether the Task Force is a governing body of a public agency. 70 Public agency is defined under RCW §§ 42.30.020(1) to mean (in relevant part): 71 (b) Any county, city, school district, special purpose district, or other municipal corporation or political subdivision of the state of Washington; 72 (c) Any subagency of a public agency which is created by or pursuant to statute, ordinance, or other legislative act, including but not limited to planning commissions, library or park boards, commissions, and agencies . . . . 73 Governing body is defined by RCW §§ 42.30.020(2) to mean: 74 the multimember board, commission, committee, council, or other policy or rule-making body of a public agency, or any committee thereof when the committee acts on behalf of the governing body, conducts hearings, or takes testimony or public comment. 75 Clearly, the City of Lakewood itself is a public agency as defined under §§ 42.30.020(1)(b) and the Planning Advisory Board is a public agency under §§ 42.30.020(1)(c) because it is a planning commission. Under these definitions, the Lakewood City Council is a governing body of the City of Lakewood, because it is a council of the public agency of Lakewood. See §§ 42.30.020(2); Miller, 979 P.2d at 432 (applying OPMA to Tacoma's City Council). Under the broad definitions of the Act, the Planning Advisory Board is also a governing body. The Board takes testimony and public comments on behalf of Lakewood and the City Council, as it did prior to passage of Ordinance 171. See §§ 42.30.020(2). 76 Based upon these predicates and the statute, we conclude that the Task Force is a governing body of a public agency. The Task Force was created as a committee of the Planning Advisory Board (a governing body) and it took testimony and public comments, conducted hearings and acted on behalf of the Board and the City Council (both public agencies). This places it squarely within the ambit of RCW §§ 42.30.020(2). 77 Lakewood disputes that the Task Force is a governing body, citing to Refai v. Central Washington University, 742 P.2d 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). In Refai, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the faculty senate executive committee was not a governing body of Central Washington University. The Refai court, however, applied an older, narrower definition of governing bodies which limited governing bodies to those groups that make policy or rules. Id. at 144. Refai itself states that the faculty senate executive committee would probably have been considered a governing body under the then recently enacted new definition of governing bodies. See id. at 145 n.5. That new definition is the definition we apply today to conclude that Lakewood's Task Force is a governing body of a public agency. 78 2) Did the Task Force Violate the OPMA? 79 The evidence is undisputed that the Task Force violated the OPMA. The Act requires that all meetings of a governing body shall be open to the public. RCW §§ 42.30.030. The Task Force conducted at least 10 meetings, the majority of them closed to the public. These closed meetings violated the Act. 80 3) Does the Task Force's Violation of the OPMA Result in the Nullification of the Ordinance? 81 The third question we must answer is what consequences flow from the Task Force's violations of the OPMA. Clark would have us declare the entire Ordinance null and void, whereas Lakewood argues that because the ultimate ratification of the Ordinance was done in compliance with the Act, the Ordinance is valid. We agree that the Task Force's violations of the OPMA do not result in the Ordinance being declared null and void under the OPMA. We conclude, however, that the OPMA requires us to declare the Task Force's actions that were conducted in violation of the Act null and void. RCW §§ 42.30.060 states that: 82 No governing body of a public agency shall adopt any ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, order, or directive, except in a meeting open to the public and then only at a meeting, the date of which is fixed by law or rule, or at a meeting of which notice has been given according to the provisions of this chapter. Any action taken at meetings failing to comply with the provisions of this subsection shall be null and void. 83 Action is defined to mean: 84 the transaction of the official business of a public agency by a governing body including but not limited to receipt of public testimony, deliberations, discussions, considerations, reviews, evaluations, and final actions. Final action means a collective positive or negative decision, or an actual vote by a majority of the members of a governing body when sitting as a body or entity, upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order, or ordinance. 85 RCW §§ 42.30.020(3). 86 Under these provisions, any action taken in closed meetings is null and void. See Org. to Preserve Agric. Lands (OPAL) v. Adams County, 913 P.2d 793, 802 (Wash. 1996) (en banc). The statute, however, does not require that subsequent actions taken in compliance with the Act also be held null and void. Id. 10 In OPAL, two members of the County Commission discussed official business -the issuance of a permit -over the phone and not in an open meeting. Subsequently, the entire County Commission decided to issue the permit. The court held that any action taken on the phone was invalid, but the issuance of the permit was valid because it occurred in a public and open meeting. Id. 87 Here, whereas the majority of the Task Force's meetings leading up the Ordinance's passage were conducted behind closed doors, the City Council's actual passage of the Ordinance occurred at a public meeting on May 18, 1998. Therefore, the Ordinance is not null and void under the OPMA. Id. We conclude, however, that any actions taken at the Task Force's meetings that were closed to the public are null and void, thereby potentially undercutting the evidentiary foundation for the Ordinance, as we discuss in the next section below. Id. at 883. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's summary judgment in favor of Lakewood and denial of partial summary judgment in favor of Clark. As this is an appeal from a pretrial order, the record is not fully developed and we are unable to conclude what specific Task Force actions were conducted in open meetings and which were conducted in closed meetings. Upon remand, at trial or through other appropriate means, the district court will have to determine which actions are null and void and what effect, if any, that may have on the constitutionality of the Ordinance's provisions.