Opinion ID: 1956713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Omission of the statutory term unlawfully.

Text: The defendant's second contention is that the absence of the statutory term unlawful to characterize the defendant's alleged conduct rendered the indictment void and that his motion in arrest of judgment should have been granted. We disagree. It is true that this Court in dictum stated in State v. Robbins, 66 Me. 324, 327-328 (1877), a prosecution for criminal libel, that [t]he only case when it may be necessary to use it [the word unlawfully], is where it is a part of a description of a statute offense. See also State v. Skolfield, 86 Me. 149, 29 A. 922 (1893); State v. Parker, 132 Me. 137, 167 A. 854 (1933). Section 201, Title 17, in defining an assault and an assault and battery does use the word unlawfully, e. g. [w]hoever unlawfully attempts to strike, [etc.] is guilty of an assault. If such attempt is carried into effect, he is guilty of an assault and battery. But, as we have mentioned previously, our assault statute is declaratory of the common law. State v. Mann, Me., 361 A.2d 897, 902 (1976); State v. Worrey, supra; State v. Rand, 156 Me. 81, 161 A.2d 852 (1960); State v. Mahoney, 122 Me. 483, 120 A. 543 (1923). At common law, an indictment or information charging an assault is sufficient even if the charging document does not allege that the assault was unlawful. Such an indictment or information is equally good when brought pursuant to the statute which is merely declaratory of the common law. State v. Bray, 1 Mo. 180 (1822); People v. Cantwell, 253 Ill. 57, 97 N.E. 287 (1911). Cf. State v. Skolfield, 86 Me. 149, 29 A. 922 (1893). The mere use of the term assault necessarily implies the general descriptive conduct associated therewith in the statute, and an indictment is sufficient under the statute even if it does not allege in express terms that the assault was perpetrated in a wanton, wilful, angry or insulting manner ( State v. Mann, Me., 361 A.2d 897, 902 (1976)), or if it does not specify that the defendant did strike, hit, touch or do violence to the victim ( State v. Mahoney, 122 Me. 483, 120 A. 543 (1923)), or if the word unlawfully is omitted ( State v. Creighton, 98 Me. 424, 57 A. 592 (1904)). The indictment in this case consists of only one count. It is true that in the first phrase thereof it does not state the accusation in explicit terms of assault or assault and battery, but rather alleges the specific facts, even though in general language, which under the statute constitute an assault and battery. Even so, in the second phrase of this single count indictment, made an integral part of this single accusation, the defendant's first stated conduct is characterized as an assault and battery, as readily appears by the following language: and your Grand Jury further alleges that said assault and battery was of a high and aggravated nature. (Emphasis supplied) The offense of assault and battery under 17 M.R.S.A., § 201, whether considered in its simple aspect or in its more serious concept of high and aggravated in nature, is a single crime. There is but one offense. It is either simple or high and aggravated depending on the circumstances surrounding the same. State v. Childs, Me., 388 A.2d 76, 80 (1978); State v. Pinnette, Me., 340 A.2d 17, 25 (1975); State v. Davenport, Me., 326 A.2d 1, 9 (1974). Hence, under our case law as previously considered, the instant indictment must be ruled sufficient in law. Furthermore, this Court has recently set at rest this very issue in a case of kidnapping. In State v. Knowles, Me., 371 A.2d 624 (1977), where the indictment did not allege, in accordance with the statute, that the defendant unlawfully transported and carried the victim, it was said at page 631: We decide that in those situations, as here, in which the statutory use of the word `unlawfully' is only to negative the existence of legal justification or excuse for the conduct otherwise defined to be criminal, an indictment is not fatally defective because it fails to use the statutory word unlawfully. In such context the very existence of the charging instrument sufficiently serves the purpose intended by the statute since the fact that a charging instrument has been returned against defendant conveys to him the information that the State deems the conduct described in the indictment to be a crime, thus to be conduct neither justified nor excused in legal contemplation. The entry will be Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.