Opinion ID: 889702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court's Approach

Text: ¶ 49 The error in the Court's approach is its dogged refusal to apply the statute according to its plain language. Our cases have adopted the principle that the owner of a servient estate may make use of the land in any lawful manner that she chooses, so long as the use is not inconsistent with and does not interfere with the rights reserved to the easement holder. See City of Missoula v. Mix, 123 Mont. 365, 372, 214 P.2d 212, 216 (1950); Titeca v. State, 194 Mont. 209, 214, 634 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1981); Flynn v. Siren, 219 Mont. 359, 361, 711 P.2d 1371, 1372 (1986); Stamm v. Kehrer, 222 Mont. 167, 171, 720 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1986). Subsequently, we modified this rule to prohibit only interference that is unreasonable. See Strahan v. Bush, 237 Mont. 265, 268-69, 773 P.2d 718, 721 (1989); Gabriel v. Wood, 261 Mont. 170, 176-78, 862 P.2d 42, 45-47 (1993); Mason v. Garrison, 2000 MT 78, ¶¶ 47-49, 299 Mont. 142, 998 P.2d 531. No one disputes this standard, insofar as it applies to easements other than ditch easements. ¶ 50 With respect to ditch easements, however, the Legislature has abrogated that standard. The Legislature removed any subjective inquiry into the reasonableness of an encroachment or impairment. The Legislature determined, as a matter of public policy, that [n]o person may encroach upon or otherwise impair any easement for a canal or ditch used for irrigation or any other lawful domestic or commercial purpose, including carrying return water. Section 70-17-112(2), MCA. Had it wanted to, the Legislature could have used the words [n]o person may unreasonably interfere with any easement for a canal or ditch. The Legislature did not use those words, however. Rather, the Legislature chose a more clear, objective, and categorical prohibition: no encroachment or impairment, period. ¶ 51 Accordingly, whether an encroachment or impairment amounts to interference, and whether the encroachment or impairment is unreasonable, are not the issue. There is no allowance in the statute for encroachments and impairments that interfere reasonably with the easement. Nor, for that matter, are there allowances for encroachments and impairments that are slight and immaterial (Opinion, ¶ 19) or minimal (the standard applied by the District Court). Pursuant to the plain statutory language, no person may encroach upon or otherwise impair any easement for a ditch, no matter how reasonable, slight, immaterial, or minimal one might think the encroachment or impairment is. ¶ 52 Unfortunately, the Court replaces the statutory standard with its own judge-made standard, as evidenced by at least three statements in the Opinion. First, referring to Joukova's culvert and rock bridge, the Court observes that such a permanent and immovable encroachment constitutes unreasonable interference with the easement right. Opinion, ¶ 24. It does not matter, however, whether the encroachment constitutes unreasonable interference. The fact that it is an encroachment means that it is per se in violation of the statute. Second, the Court observes that [i]f interference is `slight and immaterial . . . it is not objectionable.'  Opinion, ¶ 19 (ellipsis in original). What possible relevance could this statement have to the analysis unless the Court is engrafting a slight and immaterial interference exception onto the statute? Third, the Court states that [s]ome permanent encroachments may not justify a finding of unreasonable interference. Opinion, ¶ 27. Again, what purpose could this statement serve except to dilute the statutory standard by creating an exception where the otherwise prohibited encroachment does not unreasonably interfere with the easement holder's rights?