Opinion ID: 212425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court would have original jurisdiction over the Elams' negligence per se claim.

Text: The Elams approach the complete preemption issue from yet another perspective. The Elams contend the district court could not have exercised original (and hence removal) jurisdiction over their negligence per se claim because the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims under the ICCTA. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1) (providing that STB has exclusive jurisdiction over remedies provided in ICCTA). The Elams point to the Second Circuit's decision in Sullivan v. American Airlines, which held that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) does not completely preempt state-law-based minor disputes because minor disputes under the RLA cannot be filed in the first instance in federal court. 424 F.3d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 2005). The Elams' argument is unpersuasive in the context of the ICCTA for several reasons. First, we have already held the ICCTA may completely preempt at least some state law tort claims. See PCI, 418 F.3d at 540. This alone prevents us from adopting Sullivan 's reasoning in this context. Second, the district court would have had original jurisdiction over the Elams' negligence per se claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. Section 1337 authorizes original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies. . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (authorizing original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under federal laws). For the reasons already discussed, the Elams' negligence per se claim arises under the ICCTA, a federal statute protecting interstate rail transportation against state regulation and restraints. See CSX Transp. Co. v. Novolog Bucks Cnty., 502 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing original federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 over cause of action arising under the Interstate Commerce Act); Fla. E. Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1326 (same); cf. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 533-34, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (per curiam) (recognizing federal question jurisdiction and § 1337 jurisdiction over claim arising under Interstate Commerce Act); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 202-03, 38 S.Ct. 429, 62 L.Ed. 1071 (1918) (same). Third, the plain text of the ICCTA contemplates civil actions against rail carriers. Section 11704(c)(1) provides [a] person may file a complaint with the Board under section 11701(b) of this title or bring a civil action under subsection (b) of this section to enforce liability against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part. 49 U.S.C. § 11704(c)(1). Subsection (b) states [a] rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part is liable for damages sustained by a person as a result of an act or omission of that carrier in violation of this part. 49 U.S.C. § 11704(b). As the First Circuit has correctly observed, [t]he most natural reading of this language is that it authorizes a person who has suffered damages as a result of a rail carrier's violation of the ICCTA either to file a complaint with the STB or to bring a civil action. Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 202 (2000); see also I.C.C. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 383 U.S. 576, 579-80, 86 S.Ct. 1000, 16 L.Ed.2d 109 (1966) (stating that under former Interstate Commerce Act, a complainant is given the alternatives of seeking such damages by complaint to the Commission. . . or of bringing suit in a federal district court). Fourth, courts have repeatedly applied the judicial doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the context of both the ICCTA and its predecessor statute, the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA). See, e.g., Atl. Coast Line, 383 U.S. at 579-80 (ICA); United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956) (same); Hansen v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 689 F.2d 707, 710 (7th Cir.1982) (same); Novolog, 502 F.3d at 252 (ICCTA); Pejepscot, 215 F.3d at 202 (same). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction attempts to maintain proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies by suspending judicial process pending the referral of certain issues to an administrative agency for its views. W. Pac., 352 U.S. at 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b) (providing district court may refer action to STB for determination). Despite its name, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not related to the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court over the underlying action. S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 136 (2d Cir.2010); see also Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 122 L.Ed.2d 604 (1993) (Referral of the issue to the administrative agency does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. . . .). Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction presumes original federal subject matter jurisdiction. See W. Pac., 352 U.S. at 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161 (stating that doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts (emphasis added)); Ill. Bell Tel. Co., Inc. v. Global NAPs Ill., Inc., 551 F.3d 587, 595 (7th Cir.2008) (Despite the term primary jurisdiction, the reference of a case to an agency pursuant to that doctrine, rather than denying the jurisdiction of the court over the case, presupposes that jurisdiction.). Thus, when courts have applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to claims under the ICA and the ICCTA, they have also implicitly acknowledged the claims were properly filed in federal court. To the extent §§ 11501(b)(1) and 11704(c)(1) are in tension, we must attempt to read the provisions together to produce a harmonious whole. Doe v. KPMG, LLP, 398 F.3d 686, 688 (5th Cir.2005); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (stating acts of Congress should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions). In fact, we think the doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides the best way to reconcile §§ 10501(b) and 11704(c)(1). Under the ICA, the ICC had exclusive primary jurisdiction to decide certain matters affecting transportation policy. W. Pac., 352 U.S. at 63, 77 S.Ct. 161. Viewed in this light, § 10501(b) also may be interpreted as vesting the STB with exclusive primary jurisdiction over the remedies provided in the ICCTA. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1). When a civil action in federal court arises under the ICCTA, the action ordinarily should be stayed and the relevant claims referred to the STB. But recognizing the STB's primary jurisdiction does not divest the district court of its original subject matter jurisdiction. Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268, 113 S.Ct. 1213. Thus interpreted, § 10501(b) and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction ensure both that the STB remains the primary policy maker on matters arising under the ICCTA, and also that matters falling squarely under the ICCTA do not languish in state courts for lack of federal removal jurisdiction. Furthermore, when the text of a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning, we may look to legislative history to discern legislative intent. See United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 345 (5th Cir.2008). Here, legislative history suggests Congress did not intend § 10501(b) to preclude original (or removal) federal jurisdiction over claims arising under the ICCTA. For one, Congress was clear that § 10501(b) establishes the complete preemption of state economic regulation of railroads. H.R.Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807, 808. Complete preemption and removal jurisdiction are simply two sides of the same coin: a finding of complete preemption represents a conclusion that all claims on the topic arise under federal law, so that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits removal. Pollitt v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 558 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir.2009); see also Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331 (Complete preemption is a `jurisdictional doctrine. . . .'). In expressing its intent to completely preempt state economic regulation of railroads, Congress also was expressing its intent that claims attempting to enforce such state regulations would be removable. As the First Circuit recognized in Pejepscot, the basic purpose of the ICCTA is to federalize the regulation of rail transportation, not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction. 215 F.3d at 204-05. Moreover, legislative history indicates that current § 11704(c)(1) was intended to reenact [] the applicable rail portions of former section 11705 of the ICA. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-422, at 195, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 880 (emphasis added). Current § 11704(c)(1) is almost identical to former § 11705(c)(1), [12] and civil actions against rail carriers under [former § 11705] were routinely brought in federal district court. Pejepscot, 215 F.3d at 203; see also Atl. Coast Line, 383 U.S. at 579-80, 86 S.Ct. 1000 (recognizing ICA gives complainant choice of bringing suit in a federal district court); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. San Antonio, Tex. by and through City Pub. Serv. Bd., 748 F.2d 266, 271 n. 11 (5th Cir.1984) (Although the notion of exclusive jurisdiction in the I.C.C. may once have found voice in the Supreme Court . . . subsequent cases have established that reasonableness claims may be brought in federal court.). Notably, courts found original federal jurisdiction under the ICA even though the ICC's jurisdiction, like the STB's jurisdiction, was described as exclusive. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d) (1994). We will not presume Congress intended § 10501(b) to withdraw original federal jurisdiction over claims arising under the ICCTA, particularly when such jurisdiction was commonly exercised under the similarly worded ICA. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (declining to presume Congress intended to withdraw federal question jurisdiction); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-98, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (presuming Congress was aware of judicial interpretations of earlier statute). For the reasons stated, the Elams' negligence per se claim arises under the ICCTA, and the district court would have had original jurisdiction over the claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. The district court therefore had removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Moreover, the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the Elams' other state law claims because they all arise out of the same common nucleus of operative fact, namely, the accident at the Pine Crest Road crossing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 337-38 (5th Cir.1999) (When a complaint raises both completely-preempted claims and arguably conflict-preempted claims, the court may exercise removal jurisdiction over the completely-preempted claims and supplemental jurisdiction . . . over the remaining claims.). Accordingly, we hold the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over this action.