Opinion ID: 780490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Limited Nature of Our Holding

Text: 24 Our holding on the liability provision in the Circular is limited: we hold only that the district court erred in determining that on the basis of contract interpretation Jessica Howard's damages must, as a matter of law, be measured by the goods' acquisition cost in Shanghai. We do not reverse the district court or hold that actual physical loss must, as a matter of law, be the value of the goods at destination. Furthermore, if the district court determines that the liability limitation provision of the Circular applies, it may even decide, after a bench trial and in light of its findings of fact, that the proper measure of damages to compensate for Jessica Howard's actual physical loss is the amount Jessica Howard paid for the goods in Shanghai. Cf. Project Hope, 250 F.3d at 77 (While it is true that damages under the Carmack Amendment should generally be based on the fair market value, we have held that it need not be applied if `circumstances suggest a more appropriate alternative.' (quoting Thyssen, Inc. v. S/S Eurounity, 21 F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir.1994))); Weirton Steel Co., 126 F.2d at 594 (The ordinary rule is indeed that damages for injury to goods while in possession of a carrier are to be computed at the difference between the sound market value at destination and the value as damaged. That is obviously the right measure where the consignee buys the goods for resale which is the ordinary case; but at times it works out to give him more than indemnity, and when it does, the courts have refused to adopt it. (internal citations omitted)). For example, if Jessica Howard had a sufficient inventory of the goods in New Jersey so as not to have lost any sales, replacement cost might be an appropriate measure of damages where [Jessica Howard] could mitigate the loss by replacing the goods. Neptune Orient Lines, 213 F.3d at 1120. Such a decision on the appropriate measure of damages, when based on findings of fact rather than solely on the construction of a contract, would be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See Project Hope, 250 F.3d at 77.