Opinion ID: 353767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applicability of the uniform relocation act

Text: 16 The Uniform Relocation Act was passed in 1970 to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of all persons displaced as a result of any federal or federally assisted program. 18 It replaced a patchwork of piecemeal relocation statutes. For displaced tenants, it provides the following benefits: (1) actual reasonable moving expenses, or a moving expense allowance of up to $300 and a dislocation allowance of $200, 19 and (2) a payment of the amount necessary to rent a comparable decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling for up to four years, but not to exceed $4,000. 20 Most importantly, the Act provides that: 17 No person shall be required to move from his dwelling on or after January 2, 1971, on account of any Federal project, unless the Federal agency head is satisfied that replacement housing, in accordance with section 4625(c)(3) of this title, is available to such person. 21 18 Section 4625(c)(3) specifies that such replacement housing must be in areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the families and individuals displaced, . . . and reasonably accessible to their places of employment . . . . 19 To qualify for benefits under the Act, a tenant must come within the statutory definition of displaced person. Reduced to its essential language, that definition reads: 20 The term displaced person means any person who . . . moves from real property . . . as a result of the acquisition of such real property, . . . or as the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency . . . . 22 21 The section sets out two alternative grounds of eligibility: having moved as a result of the acquisition of property for a federal program or project (the acquisition clause); or having moved as a result of a written order of the acquiring agency to vacate the property for a federal program or project (the notice clause). The District Court ruled that appellees clearly fell within the second or notice definition: 22 (B)y having come into possession of the Sky Tower Apartment project as the result of a mortgage default, HUD was the acquiring agency within the meaning of the Act; 23 . . . the notices of September 27, 1974 advising Sky Tower tenants to vacate were the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property within the meaning of the Act; and 24 . . . the notices aforesaid were for a program or project undertaken by a federal agency within the meaning of the Act, to wit, the demolition of Sky Tower . . . 23 25 We agree that appellees qualify as displaced persons under the notice alternative. It is undisputed that HUD is an agency, and that HUD  acquired Sky Tower within the common meaning of that word. It is undisputed that HUD, having acquired Sky Tower, served upon each tenant a written order to vacate. 24 And it is undisputed that some 55 households moved from Sky Tower as the result of HUD's written order. 26 Moreover, it is clear that the Sky Tower tenants were ordered to vacate their apartments for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency, namely, the demolition of the buildings. Although there is some suggestion in the government's brief that a program or project means only a federal construction or rehabilitation project, such as public works or urban renewal, 25 there is no warrant in the statute for this limiting interpretation. Obviously, construction and rehabilitation projects will frequently be preceded by demolition. If the government means that demolition is a project within the Act when the agency constructs a building in its place but not when the agency simply tears down without building up, the anomaly is obvious. HUD's mandate is to increase the stock of decent, sanitary housing for low-income families not to destroy existing housing. Congress clearly did not intend that tenants displaced by a simple decision to wreck their homes would receive less protection than tenants displaced by a constructive urban renewal project. 27 In sum, appellees qualify as displaced persons within the plain terms of the notice clause. This common sense interpretation is reinforced by consideration of the policies of the Relocation Act. A basic purpose of the Act is to ensure that displaced persons do not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole. 26 Equally important, by providing relocation benefits for persons displaced by programs or projects for the general welfare, the Act ensures that federal officials take the costs of relocation into account before embarking on such programs. 28 Clearly, the Sky Tower tenants were displaced for a federal project designed for the benefit of the public as a whole. In proceedings before the district court, HUD admitted that the demolition of Sky Tower was part of a program to eliminate blight. It stated that Sky Tower had become blighted, vandalized, unattractive and unsafe and that the area needed to be revitalized by the construction of single-family dwellings in accordance with the District of Columbia government's master plan. 27 Thus, unless relocation benefits are paid to the former Sky Tower residents, they will be forced to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of a project for the benefit of the general public, and federal officials will be able to ignore relocation costs in considering whether to proceed with the project. 29 Although the Sky Tower tenants appear to qualify for benefits under the plain terms of the notice definition, the government nevertheless maintains that this definition is subject to a restriction not apparent from the face of the statute. Specifically, it contends that the tenants do not qualify as displaced persons because, at the time Sky Tower was acquired, HUD had not determined to use it for a federal program or project. We find the arguments advanced in support of this implied restriction unpersuasive. 30 First, the government argues that this restriction is required by Caramico v. Secretary of Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974), which held that random and involuntary acquisitions of property due to default and foreclosure are not acquisitions for a federal program or project. 28 As the government concedes, Caramico was concerned solely with the acquisition definition, rather than the one upon which the Sky Tower tenants rely, the notice definition. 29 But it finds significance in the phrase acquiring agency contained in the notice definition. Invoking the principle that the same word used in different parts of a statute is presumed to have the same meaning each time it is used, 30 it argues that acquiring agency should be interpreted to mean an agency making an acquisition as that term was construed by Caramico. In other words, that the notice definition, like the acquisition definition, should not apply where property is acquired due to default and foreclosure and only later is committed to use in a federal program or project. 31 We find little merit in this argument. Aside from the fact that acquiring agency is not the same word as acquisition the former is an entity whereas the latter is an event the government's argument proves too much. If an acquisition as that term is used in the acquisition clause is also required under the notice clause, then the notice alternative would be rendered surplusage. 32 More fundamentally, the government's argument fails to probe beyond the holding of Caramico to the rationale of that decision. Because the Relocation Act contemplates a conscious government decision to dislocate some so that an entire area may benefit, 509 F.2d 698, Caramico requires that an acquisition for purposes of the acquisition clause must be for a federal program or project. By parity of reasoning, the Act requires that an order to vacate in terms of the notice clause must be for a federal program or project, a requirement satisfied in this case. The government's argument that the notice clause requires, in addition, that an agency acquire property for a government program or project, would artificially restrict the coverage of the Act in a way inconsistent with the policies recognized by Caramico. 33 The government's second argument, vigorously pursued by the dissent, is that the legislative history of the Relocation Act indicates the notice definition was intended to apply when an agency issues an order to vacate before real property is acquired. Of course, resort may be had to legislative history when a statute is ambiguous, or where the ordinary meaning would lead to absurd or futile results. 31 But the plainer the language, the more convincing contrary legislative history must be. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 229, 38 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Since the notice clause is clear on its face, and its common sense meaning is consonant with the purposes of the Act, we would accept the government's interpretation of the clause only if supported by clear and convincing evidence from the legislative history. 34 In fact, there is very little legislative history expressly concerned with the meaning of the notice clause and the history that exists is, at best, inconclusive. 32 The meager state of the legislative history suggests that in considering the definition of displaced person Congress' attention was focused on the class of persons displaced by acquisitions or anticipated acquisitions of property, rather than the class of persons already living on government property and displaced by a federal program or project. But congressional inattention does not constitute the kind of convincing demonstration of contrary legislative intent required to overcome the plain language of the statute. In fact, considering the purposes of the Relocation Act, we are convinced that if Congress had explicitly considered the problem of persons ordered to vacate government property for a program or project, it would have approved an interpretation of the Act making benefits available for such persons. 35 The government's final argument is that the plain terms of the Uniform Relocation Act cannot be heeded because to do so would impose a financial burden on HUD. The essential point, however, is that any financial burden results not from our construction of the Act but rather from HUD's own decision to displace people in order to demolish their homes. HUD appears to suggest that if the costs of relocation are too heavy for government funds, the displaced tenants should bear them. But the mandate of the Act is precisely contrary: if the costs are too much for HUD, then the demolition should not take place. 33