Opinion ID: 1592808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the savings statute applies to the claim.

Text: ¶ 29. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law which this Court reviews de novo. Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 165 (Miss.1999). ¶ 30. Tolliver argues that Mississippi Code Section 15-1-69, popularly known as the savings statute, applies to save her cause of action from being time-barred. This statute provides: If in any action, duly commenced within the time allowed, the writ shall be abated, or the action otherwise avoided or defeated, by the death of any party thereto, or for any matter of form ... the plaintiff may commence a new action for the same cause, at any time within one year after the abatement or other determination of the original suit. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-69 (Rev.2003). ¶ 31. If this statute is to apply, it must do so as a dismissal for a matter of form after being duly commenced. Dr. Arceo and St. Dominic assert that, because Tolliver failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement, she had no legal right to file suit, therefore no suit filed by Tolliver has been duly commenced, and the provisions of the savings statute do not apply. ¶ 32. The savings statute was first enacted in 1848, more than 130 years before the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. In the Twenty-First Century, the commencement of a lawsuit is governed by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a), which states that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. Further, the complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled, including relief in the alternative. M.R.C.P. 8(c). ¶ 33. To the extent a legislative act purports to abridge the judicial branch's authority to promulgate rules and procedures for the conduct of business in its courts, we previously have held it encroaches upon judicial authority in contravention of constitutional separation of powers. Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135 (Miss. 2008). Certainly the Legislature may enact pre-suit requirements. That prerogative also has been recognized, as well as our duty to enforce such requirements. Id. Failure to comply with pre-suit requirements will result in dismissal, as Tolliver is well aware from her first appearance before this Court. ¶ 34. Nevertheless, the commencement of litigation is determined by the Rules of Civil Procedure, not the requirements which may have existed prior to their adoption, nor pre-suit statutory requirements which do not govern judicial procedural rules. For purposes of the savings statute in a Rules world, duly commenced is a cause commenced consistent with the requirements of the Rules. Otherwise, whether or not the savings statute applies in a given circumstance remains unchanged. ¶ 35. Caselaw does not define specific elements required for a suit to be duly commenced for purposes of the savings statute, though this Court previously has discussed application of the savings statute. The seminal case, still quoted and cited as authority, on this issue is Hawkins v. Scottish Union & National Insurance Company, 110 Miss. 23, 69 So. 710 (1915). ¶ 36. The savings statute is highly remedial ... and ought to be liberally construed for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was designed, namely, to save one who has brought his suit within the time limited by law from loss of his right of action by reason of accident or inadvertence, and it would be a narrow construction of that statute to say that because, if plaintiff had, by mistake, attempted to assert his right in a court having no jurisdiction, he is not entitled to the benefit of it. Id. ¶ 37. Although Hawkins is of considerable vintage, it is still the standard by which we have continued to measure application of the savings statute throughout the intervening decades. See, e.g., Crawford v. Morris Transp., Inc., 990 So.2d 162, 170 (Miss.2008); Ryan v. Wardlaw, 382 So.2d 1078 (Miss.1980); and Frederick Smith Enter. Co. v. Lucas, 204 Miss. 43, 36 So.2d 812 (1948). ¶ 38. We previously have observed that notice is a pre-suit prerequisite to a claimant's right to file suit. Thomas, 999 So.2d at 847. It does not, however, touch on the merits of the claim; Tolliver failed to follow the statutory requirement. Such situations fall within the purview of the remedial savings statute. Where the plaintiff has been defeated by some matter not affecting the merits, some defect or informality, which he can remedy or avoid by a new process, the statute shall not prevent him from doing so, provided he follows it promptly, by suit within a year. Hawkins, 110 Miss. at 31, 69 So. 710. ¶ 39. Tolliver I was dismissed due to failure of the plaintiff to comply with the statutory notice requirement. Dismissal was therefore proper, which we determined on interlocutory appeal, a mandate memorializing that decision being issued on March 15, 2007. Being a dismissal for failure to provide the statutory notice, Tolliver I falls within the parameters of a matter of form such that the savings statute applied. Therefore, the one-year clock began to run concurrently with the remaining thirty-eight days in the limitation period on March 15, 2007, and ended on March 14, 2008. [8] Tolliver had this year in which to refile her suit. [9] ¶ 40. Tolliver did file a second complaint on May 9, 2007. The auspices of the savings statute made this permissible, as the trial court correctly determined.