Opinion ID: 526161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified immunity of individual defendants.

Text: 98 With respect to their second rationale for exoneration from damages, the individual defendants object to the jury instruction concerning good faith immunity on the basis that (1) the court applied an improper standard, and (2) that the instruction presume[d] 'established law' without informing the jury as to what the law is. Record, vol. 14, at 1004. 33 99 The qualified immunity of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), shields government officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. The key to the inquiry is the objective reasonableness of the official's conduct in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken. Id. 100 Reliance on this qualified immunity standard should permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. However, this does not prevent defendants from raising the issue in the absence of a prior summary judgment motion. See Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1204 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 497, 102 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). 101
102 Determining whether a public employee has been discharged in violation of his First Amendment rights requires a case-by-case analysis: initially to determine if the speech was on a matter of public concern, and, secondly, to determine how the balancing of competing interests should be resolved in light of particular facts. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). We must now determine how the individualized nature of this inquiry can be reconciled with Harlow 's requirement that the law be clearly established before qualified immunity can be defeated. 103 The Fifth Circuit recently addressed this issue in Noyola v. Texas Department of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.1988). In Noyola, a former employee of the Texas Department of Human Resources sued officials of the Department, claiming that he was fired for exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech. The Fifth Circuit held that the speech at issue was not protected. Even assuming arguendo that it was protected, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the balancing process required by this type of case showed that neither the 'contours' of [the employee's] rights were so clearly outlined nor was the 'unlawfulness' of terminating [him] so 'apparent' that [the officials] should forfeit their qualified immunity. Id. at 1026 (citing Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039). 104 The Seventh Circuit has also recognized that: 105 [T]here is one type of constitutional rule, namely that involving the balancing of competing interests, for which the standard may be clearly established, but its application is so fact dependent that the law can rarely be considered clearly established. ... With Harlow 's elimination of the inquiry into the actual motivations of the official, qualified immunity typically casts a wide net to protect government officials from damage liability whenever balancing is required. 106 Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986) (footnote omitted) (cited with approval in Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1213). In Rakovich, the complainant sued a police chief and police officers under section 1983 claiming that they had launched an investigation of him in retaliation for comments protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had not shown that defendants retaliated against him for his protected speech. The court alternatively concluded that the officials had qualified immunity for conduct which, at the time of the alleged violation, did not violate clearly established law. 107 In Roth v. Veteran's Administration, 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.1988), the Ninth Circuit rejected the Benson analysis on which Rakovich relied. Roth involved a suit by a physician and former employee of the Veteran's Administration medical center in San Francisco. Plaintiff sued his former superiors in their individual capacities, charging that they fired him in retaliation for his activities as a whistleblower in exposing wastefulness, mismanagement, unethical conduct, violations of regulations, and incompetence.... Id. at 1403. 34 108 The Ninth Circuit held that Roth's speech was on a matter of public concern, 856 F.2d at 1406, and that factual disputes concerning the disruptive nature of Roth's statements precluded summary disposition. Defendants relied on the rationale of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Benson in arguing their entitlement to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument stating: 109 If we accepted defendants' argument for a broader reading of Benson, we essentially would be holding that public employees can never maintain [an] action alleging retaliation for exercise of their first amendment rights because adjudicating these claims requires particularized balancing. We decline to adopt a rule that would effectively eviscerate whistleblower protection for public employees. 110 Id. The court noted that it and others had found the law to be established with sufficient clarity to deny defendants the protection of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage in cases comparable to Roth's. Id. at 1408. 111 We understand the concerns which prompted the Ninth Circuit's determination not to give Benson a broader reading. These cases illustrate how difficult it is to apply Harlow in the setting of Pickering balancing. A simple black letter rule is not possible. What is clear is that Harlow places the presumption in favor of immunity for public officials acting in their individual capacities. 35 Harlow is intended as a shield against liability but cannot become an insuperable barrier; therefore, public officials lose immunity in the face of clearly established law. However, because a rule of law determined by a balancing of interests is inevitably difficult to clearly anticipate, it follows that where Pickering balancing is required, the law is less likely to be well established than in other cases. We believe that except for case-by-case analysis and application, the rule cannot be better stated than in Harlow itself with careful consideration of its underlying principles. 112 In some circumstances, the fact-specific nature of the Pickering balancing may preclude a determination of clearly established law, thereby giving rise to qualified immunity under Harlow. This is most likely to occur in situations where supervisors, in a reasonable and good-faith exercise of their duties, discipline employees without the direction that would come through analogous cases. 36 We believe that the approach we adopt gives proper consideration to the concerns which prompted the Supreme Court to recognize qualified immunity, while it protects individuals from unprincipled behavior by a public employee's supervisors acting under color of law. 113 We now turn to the application of those principles to the facts before us. Qualified immunity analysis requires the court to consider the operation of the rule in the context of 'the circumstances with which [the official] was confronted.'  Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 85 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039). 37 Consequently, our inquiry is: At the time these events took place, was the protected nature of Mr. Melton's speech sufficiently clear that defendants should have been reasonably on notice that the City's interest in its disciplinary rule would not survive a balancing inquiry? 114 This case presents an extremely close question as to whether the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants should have been clearly on notice that Mr. Melton's trial testimony constituted protected speech under the First Amendment. See Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.1982). In our mind, a reasonable official would have been on notice that the City's interest in the effective and efficient functioning of its enterprise cannot outweigh an employee's right (and a citizen's duty) to testify truthfully at trial. See Reeves v. Claiborne County Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir.1987) (To allow a government employer to retaliate ... against an employee's unfavorable trial testimony would undermine the ability of the witness to speak truthfully without fear of reprisal.) Therefore, under Harlow no immunity could exist for retaliatory action based on Mr. Melton's trial testimony. 115 We conclude, however, that defendants do enjoy qualified immunity to the extent that their liability is predicated on their recommendation of dismissal for Mr. Melton's communications with defense counsel. We have concluded that under Pickering the balance to be struck between the City's interest in smooth intergovernmental relations is outweighed by Mr. Melton's interest in speaking to defense counsel. However, the balancing of these competing interests would not have been so clear to a reasonable official under these circumstances that we can say it constituted clearly established law under Harlow. We cannot expect individual defendants to have understood at the time of Mr. Melton's discharge that it was unconstitutional to fire Mr. Melton for his communications with Mr. Page's counsel, particularly in view of their belief that this discussion constituted a breach of confidentiality. 116 We have ordered a new trial on Mr. Melton's claim that his trial testimony was a substantial or motivating factor in his dismissal from the Oklahoma City Police Department. If on retrial the jury so finds, the individual defendants will not be shielded by Harlow from personal liability for any damages which may be awarded on that basis. Because Harlow immunity shields the individual defendants from the alternative basis of First Amendment liability (Mr. Melton's communications with defense counsel), no purpose would be served by a retrial on that basis since damages could not be collected. 117
118 We now examine whether Chief Gramling's deprivation of Mr. Melton's property interest in his status as a retired officer is protected by qualified immunity. This is a question of law which this court can address. 38 Our inquiry is whether it was clearly established law at the time the Chief acted that Okla.Stat. tit. 11 Sec. 50-125 created a property interest that could not be deprived without affording Mr. Melton the right to be heard. 119 The right to due process whenever a property interest is impaired was established over fifteen years ago by the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In Sindermann, the Court recognized that  'property' denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by 'existing rules or understandings.' A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit.... Id. at 601, 92 S.Ct. at 2699 (citation omitted). Here, a state statute, Okla.Stat. tit. 11, Sec. 50-125, and the police department's own Operations Manual, outlined the basis of Mr. Melton's entitlement. 39 120 Chief Gramling argues that he relied in good faith on the advice of municipal counsel in sending his letter to Mr. Melton, and, therefore, he should be absolved of any personal liability for the consequences of his actions. While superficially attractive, this argument proves too much. Adopting the proffered position would immunize officials from liability via the simple expedient of consulting counsel. In Harlow, the Supreme Court sought to protect officials in the good faith exercise of discretion in areas of the law which are not clearly charted. However, where the law is clearly established, there is no justification for excusing individuals from liability for their actions. In sum, officials are presumed to know and abide by clearly established law. When their actions are otherwise, their claims of qualified immunity will fail. 121 We conclude that Chief Gramling knew or should have known that under Oklahoma statute Mr. Melton had a property interest in his status as a retired police officer. According to the statute, it was clearly within the discretion of municipal officials to approve or deny Mr. Melton the right to keep and bear firearms. However, the Chief's letter was designed to, and actually did, reach beyond permissible limits by forbidding Mr. Melton from representing himself in any way as a retired member of the Oklahoma City police force. Chief Gramling deprived Mr. Melton of this property interest without notice or opportunity to respond. We hold that in so doing, Chief Gramling violated clearly established law and cannot claim the protection of qualified immunity on retrial. 122
123 We have long held that  '[t]he concept of liberty recognizes two particular interests of a public employee: 1) the protection of his good name, reputation, honor and integrity, and 2) his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.'  Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 530 F.2d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir.1976) (quoting Lipp v. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.1972)). If the dismissal of a government employee implicates a liberty interest, the employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing. Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d at 373. Under Anderson v. Creighton, we must determine if the circumstances in this case were such that reasonable official[s] would understand that what [they are doing] violate[d] that right. 107 S.Ct. at 3039. Thus our inquiry is whether it was clearly established law in 1983 that the public dissemination of unsupported perjury allegations, followed by a discharge, created enough of a stigma that Mr. Melton was entitled to a name-clearing hearing. 124 We conclude that the law in this area was clearly established, and that all but one of the individual defendants violated this right by failing to provide Mr. Melton with the opportunity to address that charge in an appropriate way. With the exception of defendant McBride, 40 each of the other individual defendants was in a position to ensure that Mr. Melton received a name-clearing hearing. Specifically, defendant Maxwell as Chair of the Disciplinary Review Board should not have prevented Mr. Melton from addressing the perjury issue. In addition, each Board member was in a position to bring to the Chair's attention the need to provide such an opportunity in light of the public dissemination of the perjury charges. As the highest authority in the police department, defendant Gramling should have made sure that Mr. Melton received due process in this area. We affirm the award of damages on the liberty interest claim as to all defendants except defendant McBride.