Opinion ID: 2510618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Functional Equivalent of Police Interrogation

Text: As a preliminary matter, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that a court must first determine whether there was a police interrogation and only after finding no police interrogation analyze whether the statement falls into the core class of testimonial statements. Maj. Op. at 923 n. 5. In its attempt to define testimonial, Crawford discusses three formulations of the core class of testimonial statements and declines to adopt a precise definition. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Next, Crawford recognizes that even under a narrow standard, the term testimonial encompasses statements taken during police interrogations. Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Thus, I conclude that police interrogations do not exist as a separate class of testimonial statements distinct from the formulations of the core class. Instead, like ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing, statements taken during police interrogation are always testimonial, even under the narrowest articulation of the core class of testimonial statements. Crawford 's core class discussion informs the Court's understanding of the term testimonial throughout the opinion and underscores Crawford 's concern with governmental participation in the production of testimony for trial. Although I disagree with the distinction the majority draws between police interrogation and the core class of testimonial statements, I agree with the factors the majority applies to determine whether a statement is testimonial under the theory that it constitutes the functional equivalent of police interrogation. See Maj. Op. at 922 (discussing whether the doctor's questioning constituted the functional equivalent of police interrogation and whether its purpose was to develop testimony for trial). I disagree with the majority's application of these factors and would hold that the doctor's questioning did constitute the functional equivalent of police interrogation and that the doctor acted at the request of the police with the primary purpose of examining the child to preserve testimony for trial. Therefore, the statements elicited by the doctor were testimonial, and, pursuant to Crawford, they could not be admitted without Vigil having the opportunity to cross examine the child. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). In my view, the police officer was inextricably involved in the doctor's examination of the child and the circumstances surrounding the examination show that its primary purpose was to help the police gather evidence to prosecute Mr. Vigil. The lead investigating officer drove the child to the hospital and assisted the mother in signing the child in and filling out the hospital paperwork. Before the doctor conducted the forensic exam, this officer spoke with him about the background of her sexual assault investigation. At this time, the police had identified Mr. Vigil as a suspect and were working to build a sexual assault case against him. After providing the doctor with the background of the case, this officer gave him a Colorado Sexual Assault Evidence Collection Kit and asked the doctor to examine the child. Upon completion of this forensic exam, the doctor immediately sealed the exam and handed it to the officer who immediately took it to the police station and entered it into evidence. Hence, the circumstances surrounding the forensic examination imply direct police involvement and demonstrate that the purpose of the exam was to secure evidence for the prosecution of Mr. Vigil. The facts of this case also demonstrate that the doctor acted on behalf of the police when he administered the forensic exam and that he administered it not for medical treatment, but to preserve evidence in anticipation of a criminal trial. The doctor has a history of testifying as an expert witness, having appeared in hundreds of child sexual assault trials. On the night of the incident, he met with the child to perform a forensic sexual abuse examination to look for evidence of sexual abuse. The doctor administered the Colorado Sexual Assault Evidence Collection Kit, a forensic exam that is administered as standard protocol in cases of alleged sexual abuse. The doctor testified that he administered the exam in part [to find] physical corroboration [of the child's statements] as well as [to gather] laboratory or forensic evidence. Specifically, the doctor administered the exam to test for the presence of semen, sperm, and acid phosphatases or other types of forensic evidence. Black's Law Dictionary defines forensic as [u]sed in or suitable to courts of law or public debate. Black's Law Dictionary 578 (7th ed.1999). One purpose of this forensic exam was to detect and collect spermazoa for the Colorado Bureau of Investigation to analyze as part of the police investigation. The doctor never met with or examined the child after the night that he administered the forensic exam. These facts demonstrate that the doctor's purpose in administering the forensic exam was not to treat the child, but to gather and preserve evidence for trial and to help the police conduct their criminal investigation of Mr. Vigil. That this was the purpose of the doctor's examination is established by the trial court finding of fact that the doctor's examination was for the purpose of establishing an expert opinion and not for treatment purposes. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Bordeaux is instructive in this case. 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir.2005). In Bordeaux, the court held that statements a child victim made to a forensic interviewer were testimonial, citing the formality of the questioning and the government involvement in it. Id. at 556. The court reasoned that the purpose of the forensic interview was to collect information for law enforcement. Id. The court added that even if the statements had some medical purpose, this does not change the fact that they were testimonial, because Crawford does not indicate, and logic does not dictate, that multi-purpose statements cannot be testimonial. Id. In addition to comparing the facts of this case to cases from other jurisdictions, the majority points to two arguments to support its conclusion that the statements the child made to the doctor do not constitute the functional equivalent of police interrogation. First, the majority suggests that admitting the child's statements would not violate Mr. Vigil's right to confrontation because the trial court found the statements admissible under the Colorado Rules of Evidence hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Second, the majority infers from Crawford 's reference to White v. Illinois that the statements the child sexual assault victim made to police in White were testimonial while the statements she later made to a doctor were non-testimonial. I find neither argument persuasive. The majority argues that the factors the trial court considered in its medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay analysis are relevant to a Confrontation Clause analysis. Maj. Op. at 924-925. [1] In my view, this reasoning blurs the distinction between these two doctrines and mistakenly concludes that the forensic exam was for medical purposes. One point Crawford makes clear is that the Court's former reliance on a firmly rooted hearsay exception justification to find Confrontation Clause compliance is no longer the rule. The Court expressly dismissed this approach in Crawford: Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Crawford Court added that the necessity of the Confrontation Clause does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances. Id. at 56 n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Thus, the majority's reliance on the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay doctrine appears to contradict Crawford 's express rejection of the firmly rooted hearsay exception approach to Confrontation Clause analysis. In addition to conflicting with Crawford, the majority's reliance on the trial court's hearsay exception analysis results in a conclusion at odds with the trial court's express finding that the doctor performed the forensic examination for law enforcement rather than medical purposes. That court found that the doctor was not a treating physician and that the doctor's exam was not for treatment purposes. Rather, the doctor's examination was for the purpose of establishing an expert opinion. The trial court's conclusion that these statements were nonetheless admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception is not relevant to a Confrontation Clause analysis. The majority's reliance on the trial court's hearsay analysis appears unjustified. Turning to the majority's argument concerning White v. Illinois , Crawford 's implication in a footnote that the child's statement to police in White was testimonial addressed neither the question of whether that child's statements to a treating physician were testimonial nor whether the child's statements to police in the present case were testimonial. See Maj. Op. at 922 n. 4. Hence, I disagree with the majority's reliance on Crawford 's reference to White and with the conclusions the majority draws regarding intentions of the Crawford court. Because I conclude, as the trial court did, that the doctor examined the child as part of the police investigation and with the purpose of preserving evidence and testimony for trial, the statements he elicited from the child were testimonial and therefore not admissible without the accused having the opportunity to cross examine the child-declarant.