Opinion ID: 1270889
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: seizure of taco bell bag with coins

Text: The trial court denied the minor's motion to suppress the Taco Bell bag with coins that police found in the beanie on the closet shelf. He contends that illegal seizure of the items (1) invalidated their admissibility against him on the Taco Bell robbery charge, and (2) made his confession to both robberies inadmissible because confrontation with the items was used to induce his confession. (See People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 541, 545 [75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 450 P.2d 865, 43 A.L.R.3d 366].) (2) The court ruled that the seizure without warrant was validated by his mother's consent to the search of the house. He contends the evidence required a finding that her consent was coerced by fear and therefore ineffective. She testified that five or six officers entered the house unannounced with drawn guns, conducted a search, and asked her to sign the written consent only after their search was virtually complete. She stated she signed because she was afraid. An officer, however, testified that he was one of five who went to the house to arrest the minor, whom they believed to be armed and dangerous. Two went to the rear to prevent an escape. The others knocked on the front door; the mother answered; and they announced their purpose, entered, and went through the house looking for the minor. They obtained her written consent only after explaining her right to refuse and before searching for evidence. Accepting that officer's testimony, the trial court properly found the consent to be voluntary. ( People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99 [137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135].) (3) By supplemental brief filed after we granted a hearing, the minor's attorney for the first time argues that the mother's consent was vitiated by illegality of the police entry. (See Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 238, 251 [118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590] [consent immediately following illegal entry is not voluntary].) Illegality is claimed on two grounds. The first is noncompliance with Penal Code section 844, which permits an officer to make a forced entry for an arrest only after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired. The statute requires entering officers to identify themselves as such. ( Greven v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 287, 291-293 [78 Cal. Rptr. 504, 455 P.2d 432].) Only two of the five who went to the house here were in uniform. They might have been the ones who watched the back door; in that case the ones who entered were in plain clothes. When the mother answered the door an officer said, We're here to arrest Joe or We're looking for your son, Joe. The officers then entered. Though the mother testified they entered unannounced, she did not claim any doubt when she first saw them that they were officers. The statute's self-identification requirement thus seems satisfied. (4) The other ground asserted for illegality of the entry is lack of an arrest warrant. People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263 [127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333] (filed more than three months prior to the events here in question) held that a warrantless arrest in defendant's home is illegal in the absence of exigent circumstances. Such circumstances have been found where the arrest was in continuous fresh pursuit ( People v. Escudero (1979) 23 Cal.3d 800, 808-811 [153 Cal. Rptr. 825, 592 P.2d 312] (one-hour pursuit)), or the suspect probably was armed and likely to escape ( People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 168-169 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]), or a major emergency in early morning hours severely taxed police facilities ( Cleaver v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 297, 306-307 [155 Cal. Rptr. 559, 594 P.2d 984]). The investigating officer said he was first called about the case at 2 a.m. at his home. He went to the scene of the killing, where he spent an hour to an hour and a half. He returned to the station and interviewed seven to nine possible witnesses. The last interview was with the robbery victim, Anderson, and took at least an hour. The police arrived at the minor's home about 8 a.m. to arrest him. Though that evidence alone appears insufficient to establish exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest at 8 a.m., we do not know what additional showing of exigency might have been made if illegality of the entry had been asserted in the trial court as a ground for attacking the validity of the mother's consent to the search. Accordingly, we do not now consider the claimed illegality as basis for reversal on appeal. ( People v. Kizzee (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 927, 934 [156 Cal. Rptr. 784], and cases cited.) (5) The minor further contends that his mother's consent did not authorize the seizure of the Taco Bell bag and rolls of pennies, empty roll-wrapper, and loose change inside the bag. He concedes that she could properly consent to search of the bedroom he shared with a younger brother and of the closet, which police entered without opening any door. (See In re Scott K. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 395, 404 [155 Cal. Rptr. 671, 595 P.2d 105]; United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164 [39 L.Ed.2d 242, 94 S.Ct. 988]; People v. Daniels (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 36 [93 Cal. Rptr. 628].) He argues, however, that the police had no right to open the bag, invoking Scott K., supra, where we held that a father's consent did not justify search of his minor son's locked toolbox. The court ruled here that his mother's consent did justify search of his personal property, including the bag and other items. If made today that ruling arguably might conflict with Scott K. The ruling was made, though, in August 1976, upholding a search that occurred the preceding June; and Scott K. was not filed until May 25, 1979. Should Scott K. be applied retroactively? The principles are stated in People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 10 [136 Cal. Rptr. 409, 559 P.2d 1028], as follows: Whether a judicial decision establishing new constitutional standards is to be given retroactive effect is customarily determined by weighing the following factors: `(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.' ( Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203, 87 S.Ct. 1967]; accord, In re Johnson (1970) 3 Cal.3d 404, 410 [90 Cal. Rptr. 569, 475 P.2d 841].) `It is also clear that the factors of reliance and burden on the administration of justice are of significant relevance only when the question of retroactivity is a close one after the purpose of the new rule is considered.' ( In re Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d 404, 410.) Decisions have generally been made fully retroactive only where the right vindicated is one which is essential to the integrity of the fact-finding process. On the other hand, retroactivity is not customarily required when the interest to be vindicated is one which is merely collateral to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. ( In re Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d 404, 410-413 and cases cited therein.) Burrows [v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d 238] clearly falls within the latter category. Exclusion is not necessary to ensure the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial. No compulsion is present and the evidence seized is entirely trustworthy. As the purpose of the exclusionary rule in those circumstances is to deter illegal conduct by law enforcement officials, exclusion of evidence seized prior to the pronouncement of a decision does not further compliance with that decision. ( Id. ) (Italics added; fn. omitted.) See too In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.3d 368 [42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380]; People v. Superior Court ( Harris ) 100 Cal. App.3d 386 [160 Cal. Rptr. 880] (hg. den. Feb. 20, 1980).) Those principles apply here. Scott K. announced a rule that, even if not new, had before its announcement been far from clear. The rule's aim was not to protect the integrity of the factfinding process but to deter invasion of minors' property and privacy rights. Accordingly, the rule does not apply retroactively.