Opinion ID: 2994244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Trespass

Text: Illinois’s criminal trespass to land statute provides that [w]hoever . . . enters upon the land of another, after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the owner or occupant that such entry is forbidden . . . commits a Class B misdemeanor. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/21-3(a)(2); see People v. Flanagan, 478 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). If we conclude that a prudent person in light of the facts and circumstances known by Stelivan on September 15, 1998, would have believed that Kincaid both had entered Childress’s property and had notice that he was not allowed to do so, we will conclude that Stelivan had probable cause to arrest Kincaid. Kincaid first questions whether a prudent person would have believed that he had prior notice that he was not allowed on Childress’s driveway. A person has received notice if he has been notified personally, either orally or in writing or if a printed or written notice forbidding such entry has been conspicuously posted or exhibited at the main entrance to such land or the forbidden part thereof. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/21-3(b). Kincaid argues that the No Trespassing sign posted on the garage door was not posted at the main entrance to Childress’s property. In addition, he notes that the adjoining property, which shared a single driveway, posted a sign for a business, Sparkle Automotive Repairs. On these grounds, Kincaid contends that a reasonable person would not obtain notice from the No Trespassing sign, as one might reasonably infer that the sign referenced only the forbidden part of Childress’s property, the garage. However, the district court based its finding of probable cause on both this posted notice and its finding of fact that Kincaid had received prior oral notice from Stelivan that he was not allowed on Childress’s property. Stelivan testified that, pursuant to Childress’s request, he told many people, including Kincaid, that they were not allowed to stand around on Childress’s property. Kincaid does not dispute that Childress had previously warned him against standing around on Childress’s property, but he contends that this notice does not constitute proper notice that using the driveway to perform emergency repairs on his car was forbidden. We find this argument unavailing. The relevant probable cause inquiry on the question of notice is whether a reasonable person in Stelivan’s position would infer notice onto Kincaid, that is whether Stelivan had reasonable grounds to believe that Kincaid received the notice, not whether Kincaid believed such notice had been given. See Dutton v. Roo-Mac, Inc., 426 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). The district court found that Stelivan had previously warned Kincaid against standing around on Childress’s property. The court held that a prudent person would have believed that Kincaid had prior notice that he was not allowed to be on Childress’s driveway. Direct evidence of a defendant’s prior notice is dispositive as to whether a reasonable person would believe that the defendant had received notice. Moreover, at least one Illinois court has found probable cause for a criminal trespass arrest without direct evidence of notice. In People v. Wetherbe, 462 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), the court concluded that the arresting officer had probable cause to make a criminal trespass arrest without any evidence of prior notice, when the arrest was based on prior request of the owner that prowlers be kept away, the presence of individuals on the property at an unusual hour and these individuals’ unlikely explanation for their presence. Here, in contrast, the court had credible evidence that, at the time of arrest, Stelivan knew that Kincaid had been given prior notice. Kincaid also contends that Stelivan lacked probable cause to make an arrest because a reasonable person would not necessarily have believed that Kincaid had actually entered Childress’s property. Kincaid states that he never actually entered Childress’s property. Instead, he claims he remained at all times on the driveway before the end of the sidewalk, which is on public property. However, Stelivan testified that when he first saw Kincaid, both Kincaid and his car were on Childress’s property, and for purposes of establishing probable cause, a reasonable person must consider not whether Kincaid actually entered the property, but whether Stelivan reasonably believed that he did. The district court credited Stelivan’s testimony that he had seen Kincaid on the property, and from this testimony found that a reasonable person would have believed that Kincaid had entered onto Childress’s property and was, by so doing, committing a crime. On the basis of Stelivan’s testimony, we find no error in this aspect of the district court’s probable cause analysis.