Opinion ID: 887762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Approach

Text: ¶ 50 The majority opinion is grounded in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, which effected a sea change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. [7] However, the majority has misapplied the core holdings of the Crawford decision and, in so doing, has severely diminished the confrontation and cross-examination rights of persons accused of crimes in this state. That this should happen in Montana is especially tragic. ¶ 51 Crawford may be analyzed from two perspectives, both of which I cover in this opinion. First, I begin with an analysis of what constitutes a testimonial statement, focusing on the meaning of that term as set forth in Crawford and the authorities to which it cites. During this discussion, I also address the majority's (mis)interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and, in particular, its erroneous definition of testimonial. ¶ 52 I next apply to the facts of the case sub judice a definition of testimonial that is faithful to both Crawford and the Confrontation Clause as conceived by the Framers. If the hearsay evidence at issue here is testimonial under this definitionand I conclude that it isthen its use at Mizenko's trial was categorically barred unless Debra was unavailable to testify and Mizenko had a prior opportunity to cross-examine her. ¶ 53 Thus, because I disagree with the majority's determination that the hearsay statements admitted at trial were nontestimonial, I then address whether Debra was unavailable to testify and whether Mizenko had a prior opportunity to cross-examine her. With respect to the former requirement, the District Court (1) failed in its obligation to hold the State to its burden to prove Debra was unavailable (in the legal sense) and (2) failed to specifically rule on the question of unavailability. Thus, Debra was not unavailable. With respect to the latter requirement, there is no dispute that Mizenko did not at any time have an opportunity to cross-examine Debra. Accordingly, I conclude that neither requirement was met and that the District Court, therefore, erred in admitting Debra's statements. ¶ 54 Finally, I take up the second perspective from which Crawford may be analyzed, focusing on the Supreme Court's rejection of the reliability and trustworthiness framework of Ohio v. Roberts (1980), 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, and, in particular, the Court's rejection of the very rationales upon which it had relied in White v. Illinois (1992), 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848, in upholding the admission of hearsay testimony as an excited utterance. I conclude that the admission of hearsay statements based on the excited utterance exception is no longer permitted unless the declarant is unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for the accused to cross-examine the declarant.