Opinion ID: 2162895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the extra murder convictions

Text: Holman and the State agree that because only one homicide occurred, three of the four convictions of murder must be vacated. (See People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 524; People v. Bone (1982), 103 Ill. App.3d 1066, 1068; People v. Jacobs (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 291.) They also agree that two of the felony-murder convictions based on burglary should be vacated, and we approve this agreement. Holman argues that the third felony-murder conviction, the one based on armed robbery, should also be vacated in favor of the intentional-murder conviction. The State, on the other hand, contends that this felony-murder conviction should stand because the aggravating factor on which it relied for purposes of seeking the death penalty was that the murder took place in the course of an armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)). The disagreement between the parties is difficult to understand inasmuch as the aggravating factor relied upon requires the State to establish not only that the murder occurred in the course of one of various specified felonies, but also that it was committed by the defendant and not by another party to the crime (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(a)) and was committed intentionally or with the knowledge that the acts which caused the death created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b)) to the victim or another individual, factors which are not elements of felony murder and are not proved by a conviction of felony murder standing alone. However, because we find it necessary to remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing and because any of the murder convictions might support a death sentence under the facts of this case, we believe the State has the right to elect which of the convictions should be retained. Holman contends that the State cannot rely upon any of the felony-murder convictions because the procedure used to obtain the indictment which added those counts was improper. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor's request to the grand jury to recollect the testimony it had heard four weeks earlier, unaccompanied by any summary of that testimony or any presentation of new testimony by live witnesses, violated the due process guarantees of the Federal Constitution. He also argues that because only 18 grand jurors were present at the original proceeding while 20 were present at the second, it is not possible to determine that a quorum of 16 grand jurors out of the original panel of 23 had the information necessary to return the felony-murder indictments, as Holman argues is required by the statutes of this State. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 78, par. 16. This attack upon the grand jury proceedings is not valid in this case. The quorum requirement mentioned by Holman refers only to how many jurors of the panel of 23 must be present to constitute a grand jury at any one time. The same act provides that [n]o grand jury shall make presentments of their own knowledge, upon the information of a less number than 2 of their own body. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 78, par. 19.) This section controls the instant case, and from the numbers recited above it is apparent that no fewer than 15 of the members of the second grand jury quorum attended the first grand jury proceeding and heard the evidence presented there. Holman, citing People v. Rodgers (1982), 92 Ill.2d 283, and People v. Curoe (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 258, urges that an indictment may not be based solely on the recollection of the grand jurors of the testimony presented to them at an earlier date. There are significant differences between this case and Rodgers and Curoe. In Rodgers this court ruled only that an indictment had to be supported by some evidence tending to show the existence of probable cause. In Curoe, a case in which the second grand jury was different from the first and was apprised of the relevant facts only by the unsworn testimony of the prosecutor summarizing testimony adduced before the first grand jury, the appellate court dismissed the indictment because no competent testimony had been presented to the second grand jury and there was [no] evidence that the [second] grand jury indicted defendant on the basis of the personal knowledge of two or more of [its] members (97 Ill. App.3d 258, 268-69). In this case at least 15 members of the second grand jury heard both the prosecutor's request and the earlier testimony of which he reminded the jurors: the earlier testimony served as evidence bearing on the existence of probable cause, while the grand jurors' recollection of it certainly constituted personal knowledge of two or more of them so as to satisfy the statutory requirement underlying the Curoe decision. For similar reasons we find the Federal cases cited by Holman not in point. United States v. Hodge (5th Cir.1974), 496 F.2d 87, United States v. Mahoney (E.D. Pa. 1980), 495 F. Supp. 1270, United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (W.D. Tex. 1977), 428 F. Supp. 579, and In re Grand Jury Investigation (D. Md. 1963), 214 F. Supp. 856, all involved two distinct grand juries, the second of which learned the relevant facts only through a summary of testimony presented to the first. Nor is it a matter of concern in this case that the predicate felonies for the three felony-murder charges were not charged by the grand jury when it first convened. As we have stated, a grand jury may indict a defendant on the basis of the personal knowledge of two or more of its members. Holman has not demonstrated that the information which the 15 or more grand jurors who heard the original testimony gained from it would not qualify as personal knowledge relevant to those felonies.