Opinion ID: 884022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Analysis of Utah Jurisdiction

Text: The fact that Montana has jurisdiction under its own laws to make a custody determination does not, however, resolve the issue of whether the District Court has jurisdiction under the PKPA to modify the original Utah custody determination. In order to do so, the second requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) also must be met; namely, that Utah no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify its earlier custody determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2). Yancy did not file a motion or petition for modification of custody in Utah and the parties agree that Utah has not declined to exercise jurisdiction. Therefore, our review is limited to the District Court's conclusion that Utah did not lose jurisdiction over matters relating to Megan's custody. Utah's version of the UCCJA, set forth at Title 78, Chapter 45c of the Utah Code Annotated, governs whether Utah district courts have jurisdiction. Section 78-45c-3, Utah Code Ann., like § 40-4-211(1), MCA, sets forth four alternative bases under which a Utah district court would have jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree. The District Court found that, when this proceeding was commenced in April of 1995, Utah was Megan's home state. Based on that finding, the court concluded that Utah did not lose its jurisdiction. Under § 78-45c-3(1)(a)(i), Utah Code Ann., Utah has jurisdiction if Utah was, in fact, Megan's home state at the time Yancy commenced these proceedings. Section 78-45c-2(5), Utah Code Ann., defines home state as the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents [or] parent ... for at least six consecutive months.... Yancy and Pamela agree that Megan lived in Montana with them from January until sometime in March of 1995. Therefore, the District Court's finding that Utah was Megan's home state is not supported by substantial evidence and is clearly erroneous. Notwithstanding the District Court's erroneous finding, however, the court's conclusion that Utah has jurisdiction over matters involving Megan's custody is not necessarily incorrect. It is well-established that we will affirm a district court's decision which reaches the right result, regardless of the court's reasoning. See Farmer's Union Cent. Exch. v. Department of Revenue (1995), 272 Mont. 471, 475, 901 P.2d 561, 563; Bohmer v. Uninsured Employers' Fund (1994), 266 Mont. 289, 291, 880 P.2d 816, 817. Under Utah law, as in Montana, another basis for jurisdiction over custody determinations is that it is in the child's best interests for Utah to assume jurisdiction because the child and at least one contestant have a significant connection with Utah and there exists in Utah substantial evidence regarding the child's present and future care, protection, training and personal relationships. See § 78-45c-3(1)(b), Utah Code Ann. We note that the District Court did not address this basis for Utah jurisdiction, presumably because it concluded that Utah was Megan's home state. The record contains the following evidence regarding Pamela and Megan's connection with Utah. Megan was born in Utah and has lived there most of her life, with the exception of approximately three months in which she lived in Montana and periods of time in 1994 when she visited Montana. After leaving Montana in March of 1995, Pamela and Megan returned to Utah and lived with Pamela's mother and Megan's maternal grandmother, Ivy Northlander. Additionally, Pamela's other children, who are Megan's half-siblings, live in Utah. Thus, the record reflects that both Pamela and Megan have a significant connection with Utah. The record also reflects that substantial evidence exists in Utah concerning Megan's present and future care, protection, training and personal relationships. For example, Lonni Watson, a friend of Pamela's in Utah, testified that she did not have any concerns about Pamela's ability to care for Megan and that Pamela spoils [Megan] rotten. Additionally, Pamela's mother, Ivy, testified regarding Pamela's relationship with Megan. Ivy testified that Pamela and Megan were living with her in Utah and that Megan was well cared for by Pamela. In light of the foregoing evidence, we conclude that, at the time Yancy petitioned the District Court for modification of Utah's custody determination, Utah had jurisdiction to make a child custody determination under § 78-45c-3(1)(b), Utah Code Ann. Thus, we hold that the District Court's conclusion that Utah did not lose jurisdiction is correct. We observe, in this regard, that our conclusions that Montana and that Utah both have jurisdiction under their respective laws to make a child custody determination illustrate the problems regarding concurrent jurisdiction which can arise under the UCCJA and which were remedied by enactment of the PKPA. Since Utah has jurisdiction to make a custody determination, the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2)  that Utah no longer has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination or declined to exercise such jurisdiction  is not satisfied. Thus, notwithstanding that the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(1)  that Montana has jurisdiction to make a custody determination under Montana law  is satisfied, the District Court was not authorized to modify the original Utah custody determination regarding Megan under 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f). Accordingly, we hold that the District Court correctly concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the PKPA to modify Utah's original custody determination in this case. Affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and HUNT, TRIEWEILER and NELSON, JJ., concur.