Opinion ID: 1879579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: vi. the trial court erred in allowing the hearsay testimony of deniece mcclure regarding statements made by the complaining witness, s.h., regarding who had allegedly raped her.

Text: Deniece McClure, the sister of the victim, testified that the day after the alleged assault S.H. called McClure, told McClure that something had happened, and asked McClure to pick her up at work. McClure went to S.H.'s place of employment as she had been requested to do. She described the meeting: A. I went inside at the register. And she was standing there at the register, waiting on her customers, crying with her face all beat up. And I just asked her through the line what was the matter. And she asked her supervisor if she could leave, and that's when we left. Q. Okay, Did she leave right away? A. Right after she  right. As soon as her supervisor told her she could go on and go. Q. Okay. And what was she doing when you got there? A. Waiting on customers. Q. Okay. And describe her emotional condition when you saw her. A. Well, when I saw her she was crying. And she had bruises around her neck and on her face. Q. You were able to see the bruises? A. Yes. Q. Okay. What did you do after you talked to [S.H.]? A. In the car we went  we drove to my mother's. Q. Okay. All right. When you went to the store and talked to [S.H.], where did you  what did you do after you talked to her, immediately after you talked to her? A. We went and got in the car. And then as we were leaving the parking lot, she just told me a little bit of what had happened. She just kind of screamed it out and told me. And we just sat there for a little while in the parking lot. And [S.H.] was crying. And I was just holding her, listening to, you know, little things and she was saying that had happened. Q. Okay. Then what? A. Then we started on to go to my mother's. And several times we  we had to stop because [S.H.] just started crying real bad. So we stopped on the side of the road and just held her  Q.  And where  I'm sorry  A.  Yeah, we just  Q.  Where did you stop? A. Just this side of the interstate. Just pulled over. Q. On the interstate? A. Um-hum. Q. And why did you do that? A. I just wanted to hold her. She was just crying, telling me little things that had happened. And I just pulled over. Q. How long did you sit there after you pulled over because she was crying? A. Maybe 15 minutes. Q. Okay. And what did she say when you pulled over? A. She just said, My dad raped me. Objection to this testimony was overruled by the trial judge and the testimony allowed as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(2) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The statement to the sister was made less than 24 hours after the assault. It is undisputed that S.H. came in contact with several other people during this time. The victim and the defendant saw three of the defendant's friends at a convenience store and then returned home to have dinner with the defendant's wife. The victim also possibly made a phone call to her boyfriend that evening. The next morning, the victim went to work where she encountered co-workers and customers. She did not mention the rape until her sister came to see her later that morning. Admittedly, she had an opportunity to talk with Deniece by phone the next morning, but her father was also at home and she testified that she was afraid he would come into the room while she was talking. She told her sister very quickly that something had happened, asked her to come and get her at work, then hung up. She had an opportunity to talk with other adults when she arrived at work, but she knew her sister was coming to get her; there was no reason at that point for S.H. to go through the extreme embarrassment of telling this shameful story to anyone else. The statement must be spontaneous and made while under the stress of the assault to qualify as an excited utterance. Evans v. State, 547 So.2d 38 (Miss. 1989). The defense argues that because of the time elapsed and the other people S.H. encountered that the victim's statement cannot be called spontaneous. This ignores the very unique personal shame, embarrassment, and stress associated with rape, particularly of a child by a father. The people S.H. first encountered were the defendant's friends and wife. Her sister was the first person she encountered with whom she could share this information or, as phrased by the State, the first reasonable opportunity for her to tell a responsible and caring adult what had happened to her. The record clearly shows this to be the first opportunity for S.H. to talk face to face with someone whom she loved and trusted. As S.H. put it, anything short of this would have been dangerous. Rule 803(2) defines an excited utterance as a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. The rule sets no time limit. It is not unreasonable that a sixteen-year-old victim was still under the stress of the event the morning after her father hit her repeatedly and raped her three times. The stress did not dissolve simply because she 1) encountered adults at a convenience store with whom she realistically could not speak because her father was present, 2) had a meal with her father, his wife and his friend, and 3) went to work the next morning. McClure's testimony was that when she picked up her sister, S.H. was crying. She felt compelled to pull off the interstate to comfort her sister for fifteen minutes. In Davis v. State, 611 So.2d 906, 914 (Miss. 1992), this Court reiterated the principle that the determination of the competency of an excited utterance is within the discretion of the trial court. In that case, the Court found no abuse of discretion where the trial judge allowed testimony by the victim's sister. See also Gill v. State, 485 So.2d 1047, 1050 (Miss. 1986). Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, this Court approved the language of the Michigan Court of Appeals which stated that (h)earsay testimony concerning the details of a complaint of sexual assault is admissible ... if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufacture, and if any delay in making the complaint is excusable insofar as it is caused by fear and other equally effective circumstances. People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 116, 269 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1978). (emphasis added) See Cunningham v. State, 467 So.2d 902, 905 (Miss. 1985); Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 100, 102-103 (Miss. 1983). In the present case, any delay can be explained by circumstances immediately after the incident which effectively prevented S.H. from telling what happened until she got in her sister's car. That is, she had not before had the opportunity to confide face-to-face in a person in whom she had trust and outside the presence of her father. Moreover, even though the statement was admitted under Rule 803(2), the statement also could be considered as not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1). Rule 801(d)(1) provides that a statement is not hearsay if: The declarant testified at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him. McClure testified after S.H. The thrust of the extensive cross-examination of S.H. was an attempt to show that she had fabricated the story of the rape and that her motive was to get away from the strict discipline imposed by her father. McClure's testimony comes within the provision of Rule 801 which provides that such statements are not hearsay when offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive. Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051 (Miss. 1992) Under either Rule 801(d)(1) or 803(2), the statement was admissible and the trial court made no error in overruling Heflin's objection.