Opinion ID: 220347
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mitigation Stage of Henness's Trial

Text: Henness maintains that the mitigation phase of his trial was flawed because the trial court denied his counsel's motion to withdraw from the case and, as a result, counsel rendered ineffective assistance. These claims present no procedural default issue. Because the Ohio courts reached the merits, we apply AEDPA deference to the state courts' decision.
The Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant have a reasonable opportunity to employ counsel of his own choosing. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 979 (6th Cir.2005). However, this right is not absolute. Sullivan, 431 F.3d at 979; United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 (6th Cir.1990). To substitute counsel during trial, the defendant must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney. Sullivan, 431 F.3d at 979-80. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to substitute counsel, we consider four factors: (1) the timeliness of the motion, (2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the matter, (3) the extent of the conflict between the attorney and client and whether it was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense, and (4) the balancing of these factors with the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir.2009). If the defendant's motion would necessitate a last-minute continuance, the trial judge's actions are entitled to extraordinary deference. Id. at 467. A significant breakdown in communication and trust occurred between Henness and his counsel. During the pre-trial stage, Henness rejected his counsel's recommendation that he accept the prosecution's offer of a guilty plea with a non-capital sentence. The relationship continued to deteriorate during trial, as Henness frequently disagreed with trial strategy and accused counsel of violating attorney-client confidentiality. Lead counsel subsequently stated that he never had any other client so difficult and so stressful as Henness. Counsel repeatedly advised the trial court of the situation and the adverse impact on Henness's representation. By the time the jury rendered its guilty verdict, Henness was refusing to speak with counsel. Henness then refused to allow counsel to present evidence during the mitigation phase, and insisted on planning his own mitigation strategy, which he would not share with counsel. Counsel then moved the trial court to allow them to withdraw, believing that their ability to effectively represent Henness was compromised. Counsel described the nature of the relationship and their inability to work with Henness. Henness expressed his disenchantment with counsel, his low opinion of their ability as lawyers, and his lack of trust in their willingness to work on his behalf. The trial court denied counsel's motion, noting that the situation appeared largely to be of Henness's own making and changing counsel at such a late stage would result in significant delay and additional expense. Applying the relevant factors, the Ohio courts' denial of this claim was a reasonable application of constitutional law. First, Henness and his counsel did not move to withdraw until after the guilt phase of his trial, and changing counsel at that stage would have disrupted the proceedings. The difficulties began in the pretrial stage, but the relationship did not deteriorate to the point of requesting new counsel until late in the proceedings. Second, the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the matter before denying the motion. The court heard from both attorneys and Henness, as well as the prosecutor. The court noted that Henness's concerns about a breach of attorney-client confidentiality appeared unfounded, that both attorneys were experienced and talented lawyers, and that the appointment of new counsel at such a late stage would be difficult because of the time needed to become familiar with the case. The third factor weighs in Henness's favor, as a significant breakdown in his relationship with counsel did occur. Counsel described representing Henness as exhausting and difficult. Following the guilty verdict, Henness refused to meet or cooperate with counsel. Turning to the fourth and final factor, we must balance the previous three factors with the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. This balance appears to have been forefront in the trial court's decision. The court noted that it would be very difficult, if next to impossible, for a new set of counsel to become as totally familiar with this case. Additionally, the court commented that much of the difficulty resulted from Henness's own refusal to cooperate with his counsel. The court concluded that nothing in the totality of these circumstances [] would cause this court at this date in this trial to further delay this proceeding at a great expense to the state, and great expense to the jurors, and great expense to the court, and at great expense to this defendant in delaying the further conclusion of this matter. The court did not unreasonably apply constitutional law in denying the motion to withdraw. See Vasquez, 560 F.3d at 466-68. It carefully evaluated Henness's motion, and reasoned that the situation appeared largely to be of Henness's own making. It also found that changing counsel at such a late stage would result in significant delay and additional expense. Moreover, the court determined that Henness would suffer, as it would be very difficult, if next to impossible for new attorneys to adequately prepare for the case at such a late stage in the proceedings.
In a related argument, Henness argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing stage as a result of the denial of the motion to withdraw. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A defense attorney's failure to reasonably investigate a defendant's background and present mitigating evidence to the jury at sentencing can constitute ineffective assistance. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Defense counsel must either perform a reasonable investigation or make a reasonable decision that such investigation is unnecessary. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The duty to thoroughly investigate potential mitigating evidence exists regardless of the defendant's reluctance to investigate and disclose such evidence. Porter v. McCollum, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 447, 453, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (per curiam); Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir.2005). However, a habeas petitioner cannot establish prejudice resulting from counsel's failure to conduct a thorough investigation when the petitioner refuses to allow the presentation of any mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 480-81, 127 S.Ct. 1933; Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 412 (6th Cir.2008). Henness's counsel conducted a thorough investigation into potential mitigating factors. One of his attorneys obtained Henness's school records, police records, and prison records. He spoke with Henness's mother and sisters on multiple occasions. He also discussed with Henness's wife, father, stepmother, and other individuals the possibility of testifying during the mitigation stage. Counsel also retained a psychologist, who evaluated Henness and was available to testify. They subpoenaed a number of these individuals to appear at trial. Despite counsel's efforts, Henness refused to allow them to use the mitigating evidence. He would not tell counsel whether he intended to make an unsworn statement to the jury, and he continually changed his mind regarding the witnesses he wished to call at sentencing. Henness directed his counsel to call witnesses they were not aware of and did not have time to prepare for. In spite of the confusion, his counsel presented several witnesses during the mitigation phase, including supervisors from the local jail, fellow inmates, and police personnel who investigated the crime. Henness also made an unsworn statement to the jury. Even if we assume counsel's performance was deficient, Henness cannot show that he suffered prejudice because he prevented counsel from presenting the mitigating evidence available to them. He refused to cooperate with his counsel during sentencing and would not allow them to introduce the mitigating evidence they discovered. Instead, he directed counsel to call witnesses to testify about the investigation of his crime or his behavior in prison. Accordingly, he cannot establish prejudice to support his ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim. See Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 476-77, 127 S.Ct. 1933; Owens, 549 F.3d at 406. Henness argues he does not need to show prejudice. He relies on United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), which held that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in certain situations. Id. at 658-61, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The presumption may arise in three types of cases: (1) when the accused is denied the presence of counsel at a critical stage, resulting in the complete denial of counsel; (2) when counsel does not subject the prosecution's case to any meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) when counsel is placed in circumstances in which competent counsel very likely would be unable to render effective assistance. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Ivory v. Jackson, 509 F.3d 284, 294 (6th Cir.2007); Mitchell v. Mason, 325 F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir.2003). He argues the third type occurred here, because the court's denial of counsel's motion to withdraw made it impossible for them to render effective assistance. The third type of case is limited to circumstances of such magnitude that the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039; see also Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 305 (6th Cir.2007). Examples include: when counsel is appointed immediately before the start of trial with the defendants facing a possible death sentence, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58-59, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); when the attitude of the community is one of great hostility and the defendant is actually in danger of mob violence, id. at 51, 53 S.Ct. 55; when state procedure allows for the appointment of counsel shortly before a pre-preliminary examination, [3] resulting in minimal preparation time, inadequate opportunity to meet and consult privately with the defendant, and a rushed decision-making process, United States v. Morris, 470 F.3d 596, 601-02 (6th Cir.2006); and when recently-appointed counsel is compelled to proceed to trial without adequate preparation time because of the court's speedy trial concerns, Hunt v. Mitchell, 261 F.3d 575, 584-85 (6th Cir.2001). These egregious circumstances do not exist in Henness's case. Defense counsel had sufficient time to prepare for the guilt and sentencing stages of his trial. Indeed, the trial court's denial of counsel's motion to withdraw was based on its decision that new counsel would not have time to adequately prepare. His attorneys were able to present several witnesses, notwithstanding the deteriorated relationship. The Cronic presumption does not apply under these circumstances.