Opinion ID: 867411
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury determination of mental retardation

Text: ¶ 42 Grell argues that, under Ring, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant does not have mental retardation before it may impose a sentence of death. Furthermore, he argues, the process should be bifurcated: a judge should make a preliminary finding on mental retardation, and if the judge finds the defendant death-eligible, the state still must prove a defendant's lack of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. ¶ 43 Ring and Apprendi require that a jury find all functional elements of a crime and all non-admitted facts except prior convictions that increase the sentence above the presumptive sentence. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Although mental retardation does indeed involve fact-finding, it is not the functional equivalent of an element of the crime. It has nothing to do with the acts that make up the crime itself or the defendant's mental state while committing the crime, facts the state traditionally must prove. As a result, Ring does not require that a jury find the absence of mental retardation. See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 43 (Fla.2005); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 604 S.E.2d 21, 50 (2004). ¶ 44 Nor is the absence of retardation a fact that increases the available penalty. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n. 16, 120 S.Ct. 2348; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The finding that a defendant does not have mental retardation neither expos[es] the defendant to a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to statute, nor . . . impos[es] upon the defendant a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 379 (Ky.2005); see also Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619-20 (2003); Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95, 147-48 (Miss.2003); State v. Flores, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264, 1267 (2004); State v. Laney, 367 S.C. 639, 627 S.E.2d 726, 731 (2006); Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 467 (Tenn.2004). Thus nothing in the Apprendi line of cases requires that a jury find the absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 45 The Supreme Court itself has signaled that a jury need not decide the issue of mental retardation. When the Ninth Circuit suspended federal habeas proceedings in Schriro v. Smith and ordered a state jury trial on the issue of mental retardation, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the decision, implicitly rejecting the conclusion that Atkins requires a jury trial. ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 7, 9, 163 L.Ed.2d 6 (2005) (per curiam). The defendant in Schriro had argued that he suffered from mental retardation and could not be executed. Id. at 8. Observing that Arizona and many states had adopted procedures for adjudicating the mental retardation question, the Court said, While those measures might, in their application, be subject to constitutional challenge, Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen procedures when the Ninth Circuit preemptively imposed its jury trial condition. Id. at 9. Although we hesitate to read too much into the summary reversal, we draw from it a suggestion that a jury trial is not required. ¶ 46 Grell also compares the mental retardation finding to Enmund/Tison findings, arguing that both are findings of fact that should be made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). The analysis fails for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has held that Enmund/Tison findings, that a defendant actually killed or intended to kill, need not be made by a jury. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385-86, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). The Court's reasoningthat Enmund/Tison findings serve to disqualify an otherwise seemingly death-eligible defendant from deathsuggests that that part of the opinion will survive Apprendi, because the findings mitigate rather than aggravate a potential sentence. Id.; see also Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 564, ¶ 100, 65 P.3d at 945 (concluding that Cabana survives Apprendi because it involves an Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, traditionally done by a trial judge). Similarly, mental retardation serves to exclude a defendant from eligibility for the death penalty; its absence does not render an otherwise ineligible defendant eligible for the death penalty. ¶ 47 Second, Enmund/Tison findings lend themselves more logically to proof beyond a reasonable doubt than does proof of mental retardation. Enmund/Tison findings are based on evidence of participation in the crime and intent. Mental retardation, on the other hand, requires evaluation of the defendant's past and present mental functioning, using documentation and evidence largely within the control of the defendant. Placing the burden on the prosecution to prove lack of retardation beyond a reasonable doubt would require it to prove a negative against a party with a motive to misrepresent his mental health and his past. The burden on the prosecution would be almost impossibly high. ¶ 48 Grell argues not only that the jury should hear the mental retardation evidence in mitigation, but also that it should decide whether mental retardation should serve as a bar to execution following an initial determination by the trial judge on that issue. Because Atkins left the procedure for determining mental retardation to the states, such a procedure would not be prohibited; but neither is it required. Indeed, the statute already requires that both the judge and jury evaluate mental retardation before a sentence of death may be imposed. The judge hears mental retardation evidence as a legal bar to execution and the jury hears it for mitigation purposes. ¶ 49 Grell acknowledges that having the jury serve as the only arbiter of mental retardation is not wise. The difficulties a mentally retarded person may have in testifying, communicating, and expressing remorse may negatively influence the jury. That factor formed an explicit basis of the Supreme Court's prohibition on execution of the mentally retarded. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. But because the statute requires an initial judicial determination, Grell's concern is ameliorated. The trial court did not err in determining that a jury need not determine mental retardation as a bar to execution.