Opinion ID: 1058936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the SVPA

Text: In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), the Supreme Court held: The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. The Supreme Court has reviewed civil commitment statutes very similar to the SVPA on three occasions. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). In each of these three cases, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes in question. In Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that the definition of mental abnormality in the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act satisfied substantive due process requirements. 521 U.S. at 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Court recognized that freedom from restraint is not absolute, and that a State may in certain narrow circumstances provide[ ] for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety, so long as the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary safeguards. Id. at 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Court considered the level of dangerousness necessary to justify indefinite involuntary civil commitment, compared the Kansas Act to other civil commitment statutes previously reviewed by the Court, and concluded: The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. Id. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Supreme Court also reviewed Hendricks's claim that the Kansas Act violated the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition and its ban on ex post facto laws. Because the Kansas Act was a civil statute and was nonpunitive, the Court held that the Kansas Act did not violate double jeopardy prohibitions and was not an ex post facto enactment. Id. at 360-71, 117 S.Ct. 2072. In Seling, Andre Brigham Young (Young) was civilly committed pursuant to the Washington Community Protection Act of 1990, Wash. Rev.Code § 71.09.010 et seq. (1992). Seling, 531 U.S. at 253, 121 S.Ct. 727. After unsuccessful challenges to his civil commitment in state court, Young brought a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 contending that the Washington Act was unconstitutional and that his confinement was illegal. 531 U.S. at 258, 121 S.Ct. 727. The district court granted the writ, concluding that the Act violated substantive due process, that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. Id. While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided Hendricks and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Hendricks. 531 U.S. at 258, 121 S.Ct. 727. On remand, the district court denied Young's petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. Id. at 258-59, 121 S.Ct. 727. In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals held that the Washington Act was punitive as applied and therefore violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees. Id. at 258-60, 121 S.Ct. 727. The Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals, and held that an act, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive `as applied' to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for release. Id. at 267, 121 S.Ct. 727. In Crane, Michael Crane was determined to be a sexually violent predator and was civilly committed by a Kansas state court. 534 U.S. at 411, 122 S.Ct. 867. The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed and held that Hendricks required a state to demonstrate a person has a complete lack of control in order to be civilly committed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Kansas and clarified its language from Hendricks regarding the proof of lack of control required to determine that a person is a sexually violent predator. The Court began by re-affirming the constitutionality of civil commitment statutes where: (1) the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards; (2) there is a finding of dangerousness either to one's self or to others; and (3) proof of dangerousness is coupled ... with the proof of some additional factor, such as a `mental illness' or `mental abnormality.' Crane, 534 U.S. at 409-10, 122 S.Ct. 867 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58, 117 S.Ct. 2072). Further, the Court emphasized the requirement stated in Hendricks that links a finding of dangerousness to the existence of a `mental abnormality' or `personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. Crane, 534 U.S. at 410, 122 S.Ct. 867 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072). In clarifying the lack of control element required, the Court stated: [W]e recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, inability to control behavior will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. First, Crane restated the requirements from Hendricks that civil commitment must be attended by procedural safeguards, there must be a finding of dangerousness to one's self or others, and there must be a link from the finding of dangerousness to a mental abnormality or illness that makes it difficult for the person to control his dangerous behavior. Second, Crane clarified the evidentiary burden that must be satisfied in order to show the requisite nexus between a person's condition and his lack of control and consequent dangerousness. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. We recently reviewed in detail the procedural aspects and evidentiary requirements of the SVPA, see Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234, 609 S.E.2d 1 (2005); McCloud v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 242, 609 S.E.2d 16 (2005); and Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 609 S.E.2d 4 (2005), and will not do so again for purposes of this opinion. A brief summary in light of the requirements of Crane will suffice. Pursuant to Code § 37.1-70.9, [t]he [trial] court or jury shall determine whether, by clear and convincing evidence, the person who is the subject of the petition is a sexually violent predator. A sexually violent predator is [A]ny person who (i) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense or has been charged with a sexually violent offense and is unrestorably incompetent to stand trial pursuant to § 19.2-169.3 and (ii) because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts. Code § 37.1-70.1. A mental abnormality or personality disorder is defined as a congenital or acquired condition that affects a person's emotional or volitional capacity and renders the person so likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he constitutes a menace to the health and safety of others. Id. The SVPA survives constitutional scrutiny because it satisfies the criteria most recently stated by the Supreme Court in Crane. First, there are proper procedures and evidentiary safeguards. See, e.g., Code §§ 37.1-70.2, -70.5, -70.6, -70.7, -70.8, and -70.9; see also McCloud, 269 Va. at 252-56, 609 S.E.2d at 21-23 (reviewing the procedures which must be followed by the Commonwealth in order to have a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense declared to be a sexually violent predator and to have that person involuntarily committed to a secure mental health facility upon his release from prison). Second, the SVPA satisfies the requirement that there be a finding of dangerousness either to one's self or to others. Under the SVPA, a finding that a person is a sexually violent predator includes the finding that the person has a mental abnormality or personality disorder, which is further defined as a congenital or acquired condition that affects a person's emotional or volitional capacity and renders the person so likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he constitutes a menace to the health and safety of others.  Code § 37.1-70.1 (emphasis added). Finally, proof of dangerousness and lack of control is linked to the condition of the person. For a person to be found to be a sexually violent predator, the Commonwealth must show that because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, [the person] finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts. Code § 37.1-70.1. Both Shivaee and Butler contend the SVPA is constitutionally infirm because the statute only requires proof that a person finds it difficult to control his behavior and fails to require serious difficulty, a term used in Crane. They are correct that the Supreme Court used the phrase serious difficulty in controlling behavior. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. But the Supreme Court also used the phrases special and serious lack of ability to control behavior, id., and particularly difficult to control their behavior. Id. at 414, 122 S.Ct. 867. The use of various phrases underscores the Supreme Court's clear direction that the States retain considerable leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an individual eligible for commitment. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359, 117 S.Ct. 2072). The Court expressly stated, we recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, `inability to control behavior' will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 867. The object of the definitions and proof requirements is to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. Id. We are convinced that the SVPA in its definitions and proof requirements accomplishes this objective. In addition to the arguments discussed above, Butler advances the argument that the SVPA is void for vagueness. He maintains that the language is indefinite and that people of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning. His argument is predicated upon a strained attempt to find multiple meanings in the portion of the definition of a sexually violent predator that recites because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts. Apparently Butler finds multiple interpretations of this language, primarily because he focuses only on the text of that portion of the definition and fails to consider the language in context of other definitions. The definition of sexually violent predator in Code § 37.1-70.1 makes specific reference to mental abnormality or personality disorder, a term also defined in that section. When the language is considered in context, its meaning is quite clear. A mental abnormality or personality disorder is defined as a congenital or acquired condition that affects a person's emotional or volitional capacity and renders the person so likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he constitutes a menace to the health and safety of others. Such a definition includes a causal link between the condition and the potential consequences of the condition, namely, lack of control and dangerousness. Importantly, the definition is personalized because it focuses upon the person whose commitment is at issue. Because a finding that the person is a sexually violent predator includes the predicate finding of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, a fortiori, the determination requires, first, the finding of a condition affecting emotional or volitional capacity and, second, the finding that the particular person subject to commitment is rendered by that condition so likely to commit sexually violent offenses that he is dangerous. While the additional language in the definition of sexually violent predator (finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent acts) may be redundant, its meaning in context of other definitions in the SVPA is not unclear. Significantly, even under the multiple and strained interpretations Butler tries to give the statute, he does not argue that his conduct fails to be reached. As such, Butler argues hypothetically. In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 267 Va. 573, 596 S.E.2d 74 (2004), we observed: A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. Id. at 580-81, 596 S.E.2d at 78 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)).