Opinion ID: 2766899
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identifying a Predicate Crime of Violence

Text: Under the Guidelines, an offense qualifies as a crime of violence if it is punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and either (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is one of several enumerated crimes not pertinent here, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). To determine whether a defendant's past conviction falls within the scope of § 4B1.2(a), courts use either a categorical approach or a crime of conviction. See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (plurality opinion); Carter, 752 F.3d at 19. -41- modified categorical approach. See, e.g., Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013); Carter, 752 F.3d at 16-17.24 Under the categorical approach, an offense constitutes a crime of violence only if its elements are such that we can conclude that a person convicted of the offense has 'necessarily' been found guilty of conduct that meets the [§ 4B1.2(a)] definition. United States v. Martínez, 762 F.3d 127, 133 (1st Cir. 2014). The categorical approach limits the court's inquiry to 'the elements of the statute of conviction, not . . . the facts of each defendant's conduct.' United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990)). Hence, under the categorical approach, we would ask whether Ramos's conviction for violating Article 256 necessarily means -- without considering his actual conduct -- that he used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force against another person, or engaged in conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). However, when a defendant's prior conviction is for violating a divisible statute -- i.e., a statute that sets forth 24 Much of the case law developing the two approaches has arisen in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act, which imposes sentencing enhancements on defendants who have three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 15; see also, e.g., Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577-78 (1990). We have long recognized the applicability of this precedent to the career offender inquiry. See United States v. Dávila-Félix, 667 F.3d 47, 55-56 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2011). -42- one or more elements of a particular offense in the alternative, Fish, 758 F.3d at 6 (citing Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281) -- the modified categorical approach may be the appropriate method for resolving the crime-of-violence question. If such a provision alternatively criminalizes qualifying violent conduct and nonqualifying conduct, making it impossible to determine from the face of the statute whether the defendant's conviction was for a crime of violence, the sentencing court is permitted to consult a limited set of approved records to determine which alternative provided the basis for the conviction. Carter, 752 F.3d at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284-85. These records include charging documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, jury instructions, and verdict forms. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010); see also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (acknowledging the need for courts to look to the charging papers and jury instructions in a narrow range of cases involving crimes with alternative elements); United States v. Dávila-Félix, 763 F.3d 105, 110 n.5 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting the need to consult certain documents of record for divisible statutes (citing Taylor and Descamps)). The question then becomes whether the variant of the crime revealed by those documents satisfies the crime of violence definition. -43- 2. Does Ramos's Article 256 conviction qualify as a predicate crime of violence? As described above, Article 256 criminalizes the use of violence or intimidation against a public official or employee. The government maintains that both alternatives constitute crimes of violence, making it unnecessary to perform the modified categorical inquiry, while Ramos asserts that a violation based on intimidation does not necessarily qualify as such an offense because a threat to damage property suffices to satisfy that prong. Neither party offers useful support for its argument. The government cites only a single, inapposite case,25 and Ramos relies on what is apparently his own translation of a sentence from a Spanish-language treatise on Puerto Rico's penal code.26 25 The government relies on United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1997), where the defendant was charged with threatening the life of and bodily harm to the President, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. Id. at 21. We concluded that the district court properly classified the offense as a crime of violence because it had as an element the threatened use of physical force against another person, one of the triggering attributes of a crime of violence under Guidelines § 4B1.2. Id. Santos sheds no light on whether a conviction for use of intimidation under Article 256 would necessarily include any of the requisite elements of a crime of violence. 26 Ramos quotes a text titled Penal Code of Puerto Rico by Dora Nevares-Muñiz for the proposition that intimidation refers to the use of coercion or psychological pressure on the person, characterized by the threat that he will suffer imminent and unjustified damage to his or her person or property. It does not appear that the volume (Código Penal de Puerto Rico) is available in English. -44- The government has offered no basis on which we could conclude that both the violence and intimidation prongs of Article 256 necessarily include an element related to either physical force against an individual or a serious potential risk of physical injury to a person, which would allow us to classify the statute as a crime of violence under the categorical approach. Although the government states in its brief that judicial records report that Ramos's Article 256 crime involved physical action against a police officer, it does not argue that the conviction qualifies under the modified categorical approach. Hence, the government has waived that backup position. Nonetheless, given the significance of the issue here and the likelihood that similar circumstances will arise in other cases, we think it important to explain why the argument would in any event fail. Although most of the Superior Court documents submitted by the probation officer do not fall into any of the usual categories of permissible records, we have observed that, [i]n addition to these 'approved' records, a federal court may also consider some comparable judicial record. Carter, 752 F.3d at 19 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review, however, 'must be confined to [the] records of the convicting court,' id. (quoting United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 23) (alteration in original)), and we thus may not rely on the police -45- reports related to the earlier conviction, id. at 20 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16). The only commonwealth document among the submitted records that describes the episode leading to Ramos's Article 256 charge is a Complaint filed by a Caguas police officer, stating as follows: Above-referenced defendant, Cruz Roberto Ramos-Gonzalez, on or about November 15, 1986 at 7:00 p.m. at the Boneville Height hous. proj. in Caguas, P.R., used violence and intimidation against OFF. Orlando Rosa-Santana #8812 who was a PUBLIC OFFICIAL at the time, member of the P.R. Police, offering resistance during an act in compliance of his duty and functions: The act consisted of jumping on the office[r,] causing him to fall to the ground, and grabbing him once he got back up. Dkt. 237, at 18. The PSR in this case depicts a similar encounter, stating that Ramos resisted arrest on the drug charge by pushing and grabbing one PRPD officer. Neither of these documents, however, is an approved source for determining whether Ramos's conviction was based on the use of violence or intimidation. See Carter, 752 F.3d at 20 ([T]he police incident report . . . might include sufficient details to make such a determination, but we are precluded from using it for that purpose.); see also id. ([A] presentence report in a subsequent case ordinarily may not be used to prove the details of the offense conduct that underlies a prior conviction. (internal quotation marks omitted)). -46- The charging document for the Article 256 violation, an approved record under Shepard and related precedent, is less specific. It states, in pertinent part, that Ramos unlawfully, voluntarily, knowingly and criminally, making use of violence or intimidation, resisted a public official and/or government employee in the performance of his duties. See Dkt. 237, at 5. In addition, the Minutes of a proceeding held on March 12, 1987 in Puerto Rico Superior Court report that Ramos waived jury trial on the related drug and Article 256 charges and that he, in accordance with a plea agreement with the Prosecutor, pleads guilty to the crime of violation of the Controlled Substances Act, possession, Art. 404 on case G87-222 and violation of Art. 256 of the Penal Code in case G87-221. Dkt. 237, at 37. Neither the plea agreement nor the plea colloquy are among the submitted records, and no other document sheds light on Ramos's admissions in connection with his guilty plea. Relying on the documents in the record that we are permitted to consult, we cannot conclude that Ramos's 1987 conviction was for a crime of violence within the meaning of the career offender provision of the Guidelines. We have been cited no authority for categorically classifying an act of intimidation in violation of Article 256 as a crime of violence, and the record does not permit us to know the type of conduct admitted by Ramos. The charging document asserted that Ramos made use of violence or intimidation. Although the police complaint described a physically -47- violent interaction, Ramos's admission of guilt may not have incorporated those details. Cf. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2289 (noting the unfairness of imposing a sentence enhancement based on facts in the record when the defendant may have bargained for a guilty plea to a lesser crime). In that regard, the circumstances of the drug conviction are telling. The police complaint alleged that Ramos had possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it, a violation of Article 401 of the Puerto Rico Controlled Substances Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 2401, see Dkt. 237, at 16, 21, but, as noted above, he pleaded guilty to a possession crime in violation of Article 404, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 2404. It appears that the severity of the drug crime was reduced in the course of plea negotiations.27 In short, on this record, Ramos's Article 256 conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence either categorically or, under the modified categorical approach, based on the elements that Ramos admitted. The absence of any support for classifying that conviction as a crime of violence makes the court's error in relying on it plain.28 The remaining components of the plain error 27 The Article 404 drug possession conviction is not a controlled substance offense for career offender purposes. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (defining controlled substance offense in that context to include possession accompanied by intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense the drug); see also Dávila-Félix, 763 F.3d at 107-08 & n.3. 28 Ramos notes that the district court did not expressly identify the Article 256 violation as one of the two triggering -48- test -- prejudice to the defendant and the threat of a miscarriage of justice -- also are satisfied here. See United States v. Jones, 748 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2014). The government does not dispute Ramos's assertion that, without career offender status, his applicable Guidelines range would be substantially lower.29 We previously have observed that, as to the threat of miscarriage of justice if we declined to remand, the difference in potential jail time would be a concern in any balance. United States v. TorresRosario, 658 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2011).30 To the extent relevant to the plain error inquiry, the government asserts no offsetting circumstances. See id. (noting the ease of addressing convictions, but its colloquy at the sentencing hearing rejecting Ramos's objections to the commonwealth records inescapably shows that it did. 29 Ramos asserts that, without career offender status, his total offense level would be 30, which would carry a Guidelines sentencing range of 151-188 months under CHC V (which he claims is applicable) and 168-210 months under CHC VI (which the government claims is applicable). In fact, as described infra, the district court began with a lower BOL than Ramos suggests, which would have produced a sentencing range of 130-162 months under CHC V without career offender status (and 140-175 months under CHC VI) if all other factors remained the same. 30 Although it might seem that the career offender error is harmless because Ramos was sentenced to multiple life terms for his convictions in the conspiracy case, Ramos's pending appeal in that case challenges both his convictions and sentences. We decline to rely on a non-final term of imprisonment in a separate case to justify leaving intact the erroneous term of imprisonment here. Cf. United States v. Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d 84, 92 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting a preference for trimming back an excessive sentence on plain error review, even when a defendant's overall period of immurement will not be affected, where defendant was improperly sentenced in excess of a statutory maximum). -49- the Shepard issue on remand without need for a new trial); DávilaFélix, 667 F.3d at 57 (holding that [t]he standards of plain error review clearly are met, without analyzing the third and fourth prongs, where the record did not show qualifying predicate crimes). 3. The Scope of Resentencing In other cases, we have explicitly allowed the parties to further develop the record on the question of career offender status. See, e.g., Carter, 752 F.3d at 21; Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 117; cf. Dávila-Félix, 763 F.3d at 113-114 (upholding career offender enhancement where district court accepted new evidence of predicate crimes on remand). In this case, however, the government already has had two opportunities to offer evidence in support of the career offender enhancement. As noted earlier, the Probation Office acknowledged relying on an ineligible conviction in Ramos's first PSR, and it substituted the March 1987 conviction to establish career offender status. See supra note 20. We recently observed that no party -- including the government -- is entitled to an unlimited number of opportunities to seek the sentence it desires. Dávila-Félix, 763 F.3d at 113. Moreover, in a case where the government asked for [an] enhancement but failed to adduce sufficient proof for its imposition . . . there would not likely be reason to permit a second bite at the apple. Id. (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation -50- marks omitted). A fortiori, the government here may not reopen the record to take a third bite at the career offender apple.31 Accordingly, we must vacate Ramos's sentence and remand for resentencing without the career offender enhancement.