Opinion ID: 684143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of an Age Discrimination Claim

Text: 19 A plaintiff who seeks to prove that an employer discriminated against him or her can use either direct or circumstantial evidence. Ingels primarily offers circumstantial evidence in his case to prove that Thiokol discriminated against him based on his age. 20 Circumstantial proof is often offered in cases alleging discrimination because there is rarely direct evidence of discrimination. To ensure an orderly presentation of circumstantial evidence, this Circuit has adopted the burden-shifting format of proof originally set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case. 21 [T]o set forth a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must ordinarily prove that (1) the affected employee was within the protected age group; (2) [he] was doing satisfactory work; (3) [he] was discharged despite the adequacy of his work; and (4) a younger person replaced [him]. 22 Lucas v. Dover Corp., Norris Div., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir.1988) (alteration in original) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503, 507 (10th Cir.1988)). This test has been somewhat modified in a reduction-in-force context because the discharged employee is not always replaced with another employee. Thus, 23 courts have modified the fourth prima facie element by requiring the plaintiff to produc[e] evidence, circumstantial or direct, from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching the decision at issue. ... This element may be established through circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than younger employees during the reduction-in-force. 24 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 771 (10th Cir.1988)). 2 Evidence that an employer fired qualified older employees but retained younger ones in similar positions is sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory intent.... Branson, 853 F.2d at 771. 25 In order to rebut this presumption, the employer must assert, in a reasonably specific and clear manner,  'some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'  E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824). 26 The defendant's burden is merely to articulate through some proof a facially nondiscriminatory reason for the termination; the defendant does not at this stage of the proceedings need to litigate the merits of the reasoning, nor does it need to prove that the reason relied upon was bona fide, nor does it need to prove that the reasoning was applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 27 Id. at 1316 (footnote omitted). After the defendant meets the burden of producing a facially nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision, the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie showing simply drops out of the picture. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The plaintiff then carries the full burden of persuasion to show that the defendant discriminated on the illegal basis of age. The plaintiff may do so by either showing that the proffered reason is a pretext for illegal discrimination, or by providing direct evidence of discrimination. 28 If the plaintiff produces evidence that the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual, 29 [t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, ... [n]o additional proof of discrimination is required. 30 Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, a factfinder may, but is not required to, find discrimination when a plaintiff presents evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons are unworthy of credence. See also, Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1320. 3 31 However, this case arrives to us at the summary judgment stage. At that stage, if a plaintiff advances evidence establishing a prima facie case and evidence upon which a factfinder could conclude that the defendant's alleged nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decisions are pretextual, the case should go to the factfinder. Durham v. Xerox, Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 839-40 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 80, 130 L.Ed.2d 33 (1994); Merrick v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir.1990). Accord Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir.1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir.1994); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir.1993) (If a plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the authenticity of the employer's stated motive, summary judgment is inappropriate, because it is for the trier of fact to decide which story is to be believed.).