Opinion ID: 1795596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Improper Comments in Voir Dire and Guilt-Phase Closing Argument

Text: Defendant argues that the prosecutor made two improper comments during voir dire. Defendant acknowledges he did not object to either comment. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made seven improper statements during guilt-phase closing argument. Again, defendant acknowledges that he did not object to any of these comments. By failing to object to the prosecutor's comments made during voir dire and closing argument, defendant failed to preserve his claims of error as to those comments for review. See, e.g., Mayes, 63 S.W.3d at 632; State v. Barnum, 14 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Mo. banc 2000) (defense counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's statements during voir dire constituted waiver). Counsel nonetheless asks this Court to review his claims for plain error under Rule 30.20, claiming that the comments were so egregious that the trial court erred in not sua sponte declaring a mistrial. Courts especially hesitate to find plain error in the context of closing argument because the decision to object is often a matter of trial strategy, [citation omitted], and `in the absence of objection and request for relief, the trial court's options are narrowed to uninvited interference with summation and a corresponding increase of error by such intervention.' Mayes, 63 S.W.3d at 632-33, quoting, State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 907-08 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948, 109 S.Ct. 380, 102 L.Ed.2d 369 (1988). A conviction will be reversed based on plain error in closing argument only when it is established that the argument had a decisive effect on the outcome of the trial and amounts to manifest injustice. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d at 456. Moreover, both the state and the defense are entitled to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 873 (Mo. banc 1996). A trial court maintains broad discretion in the control of closing arguments. State v. Barton, 936 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. banc 1996). An argument does not require reversal unless it amounts to prejudicial error. Barnum, 14 S.W.3d at 592; see also State v. Johnson, 558 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Mo.App. E.D.1977) ([A]n improper statement on part of counsel during voir dire does not necessarily require declaration of a mistrial or discharge of a jury.). Closing arguments must be interpreted with the entire record rather than in isolation. State v. Graham, 916 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Mo. App. E.D.1996). Burden of Proof. Defendant notes that at one point during voir dire, when discussing the need to find aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof by stating that the state had the burden of proving aggravating circumstances to your satisfaction unanimously. Counsel's comment can either be taken as a misstatement of the definition of reasonable doubt or as a misstatement of the burden of proof as being to the jury's satisfaction rather than to a reasonable doubt. In either event, the comment was improper. See sec. 565.030.4 (The trier shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor: (1) If the trier does not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances....). Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the truth of a proposition. MAI-CR3d 313.30A; State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 275 (Mo. banc 1997). But, where, as here, no objection was made to the comment, this Court will not reverse the judgment unless the Court believes the comment affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Rosendahl, 938 S.W.2d 274 (Mo.App. W.D.1997), is instructive in making this determination. In that case the prosecutor was held to have attempted to define reasonable doubt by stating `what you reasonably believe, you cannot reasonably doubt.' Id. at 277. The court noted that counsel is free to discuss reasonable doubt during argument, but cannot attempt to define it, as it may confuse the jury. Id. But, the prejudicial effect of the comment must be viewed in context and in light of the proper definition given in the instructions. Considered in this light, the court concluded: We review the impermissible argument in the context of the whole argument and under the stricter plain error standard. We are not persuaded that the jury was misled or confused by the prosecutor's argument so as to result in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Id. As this Court concluded on similar facts in State v. Burnfin, 606 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. banc 1980), in view of the instructions that were given by the court, we cannot say as a matter of law that a jury composed of reasonably intelligent persons were [sic] confused or misled by the argumentative statement of the prosecutor so as to result in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 631. Here, while the prosecutor did misstate the law at one point, the correct standard of proof was restated multiple other times during voir dire and in argument, and the jury was properly instructed. No manifest injustice resulted. Contract Killing. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly argued an element of the case when he said that this was a contract killing case and may have confused the jury that this was to be taken as fact rather than that it was a matter that the state had to prove. In context, however, it was clear that the prosecutor was stating that this was the theory of the case, not that this was a matter the jury could take as given, and the jury was repeatedly told on multiple other occasions that this was a contested issue. No manifest injustice resulted from the statement. Victim Impact Argument. Defendant objects to the prosecutor's comments that [t]his child was denied the joy of having her mother seeing her while she is going to high school proms, the joy of having her mother help her plan her wedding, the joy of her mother seeing her daughter grow in with a family, ... and the tragedy Phyllis will never forget and that picture of your sister laying lifeless on the floor. He argues that these were really arguments about the impact of the murder on the victim's family and that such arguments are proper only in penalty-phase closing argument. The second comment was simply a description of what Phyllis experienced as the person who discovered the body and did not constitute victim impact evidence. The first comment did address the impact of the murder on the victim's daughter, although, as the prosecutor argues, the comment was one that the jury's common sense would tell them was true even if it had not been mentioned. Nonetheless, it should have been saved for penalty-phase closing argument. See State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 766 (Mo. banc 1997) (victim impact evidence is permissible in penalty-phase closing argument). But, considered, as here, for plain error, it cannot be said the outcome of the case was affected or manifest injustice occurred. Improper Personalization by Prosecutor. Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly personalized the case by telling the jury, [Y]ou know what, I don't think most people in here believe that Michael actually exists. This was not improper personalization, however, but merely a permissible comment by the prosecutor on reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Clemmons v. State, 785 S.W.2d 524, 530 (Mo. banc 1990); State v. Weathersby, 935 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Mo.App. W.D.1996). This includes the right, within the limits of closing argument, to provide the State's view on the credibility of witnesses. Clemmons, 785 S.W.2d at 530. Improper References to Facts Not in Evidence. Defendant also argues that three comments by the prosecutor constituted improper references to facts not in evidence. He is incorrect. The first comment, [I]f a contract killing is not cool reflection then, there is not cool reflection, was merely a comment on whether the state had met its burden of proof as to the state of mind necessary for first-degree murder. The second comment, made to counter defendant's claim that he confessed to the crime only to protect his family from further interrogation and not because he was guilty, was a comment on the credibility of that claim. [4] The third comment objected to was made in response to defendant's argument that the fact he did not cash a check to pay the killer showed he did not hire someone to kill his ex-wife. While the comment may not have been very persuasive, since all criminals must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to be convicted, the comment that prisons are full of such people cannot be considered an attempt to argue matters not in evidence. [5] Uncharged Misconduct. Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor referred to uncharged misconduct when he stated, And this business about Florida, he couldn't do any of the things he said because he was in Florida. Was anybody offended by that? Here's a guy who hasn't paid child support taking trips to Florida. It's not just a trip, he's looking at a time share to buy into. But, this comment must be considered in context. The portion of the argument defendant objected to is only part of the prosecutor's argument on this point. Defendant was accused of killing his ex-wife to avoid paying $500 per month in child support. The prosecutor's argument continued, I guess he'd have money freed up, he wasn't going to have to be paying five hundred dollars a month. He was expected to give his ex-wife five hundred dollars a month from the family budget he could be using in the time share in Florida. In other words, the argument was a proper comment on defendant's motive for the murderto save child support money that he could use for other purposesnot an attempt to refer to uncharged misconduct.