Opinion ID: 3188785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Class Writs.

Text: In the alternative, the Estate argues that the trial court erred when it set aside its dismissal of the will contest claim after more than two years of litigation and without a CR 60.02 motion from Andrew. However, before we can address the merits of the Estate's argument, the Estate, as the petitioner, bears the burden of showing the necessary prerequisites: (1) there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and (2) great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. Robertson v. Burdette, 397 S.W.3d 886, 889-90 (Ky. 2013). Failure to show these prerequisites results in dismissal of the writ action. Id. at 890 (citing Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961)). We consider each of those prerequisites in turn. 7
The Estate's only argument regarding the adequacy of a remedy by appeal or otherwise is that the trial court is requiring the Estate to expend time, resources, and money to defend a claim that had been previously dismissed. We are not persuaded by this argument for two reasons. First, we have previously held that simply because a party might be required to prosecute an appeal to protect its rights does not establish that it has no adequate remedy by appeal, just as we have similarly rejected another party's argument that an appeal could not remedy [that party] having to go to the expense of litigating its case at trial in the first place. Estate of Cline v. Weddle, 250 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Ky. 2008). In other words, expending time, resources, money, or any other ordinary expense of litigation does not render an appeal inadequate. Sunbeam Corp. v. Dortch, 313 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Ky. 2010). Second, our predecessor Court denied issuing such a writ in a case almost directly on point. In Karem v. Marquette, 383 S.W.2d 127, 127 (Ky. 1964), the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition because the respondent judge set aside an order, dismissing the complaint of the real party in interest. In denying the writ, the Court recognized that the petitioner had an adequate remedy by appeal. Id. Furthermore, the Court also found that setting aside the dismissal was not erroneous because the earlier order did not contain CR 54.02 finality language and, therefore, was interlocutory and subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims. Id. 8 As did the petitioner in Karem, the Estate has failed to show that no adequate remedy exists by appeal or otherwise; thus, it has failed to show a mandatory prerequisite for granting a second class writ. Nevertheless, we briefly consider the magnitude of any injury for the sake of completeness. 2. Great Injustice and Irreparable Injury. The Estate identifies two injustices or injuries which will occur if a writ is not granted: (1) the burden and expense of defending the will contest claim and (2) the relinquishment of evidence which would have been crucial to its defense. We disagree that these injuries amount to something of a ruinous nature. Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801. As to the first claim of injury, we have held that being forced to bear the cost of defending a lawsuit simply does not rise to the level of great and irreparable injury (.1 Indep. Order of Foresters v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610, 616 (Ky. 2005); see also Fritsch v. Caudill, 146 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Ky. 2004) (As to great and irreparable injury, we see none. Inconvenience, expense, annoyance, and other undesirable aspects of litigation may be present, but great and irreparable injury is not.). The Estate's second claim of injury is that it relinquished crucial evidence as a result of the claim being dismissed. The Estate contends that it failed to secure the testimony of two parties who have since died because it relied on the trial court's dismissal. We are not persuaded that this injury is great or irreparable. First, the Estate fails to identify exactly what the missing testimony would have been, whether it would have been admitted, and how it 9 would have been relevant to the will contest claim. Moreover, the Estate makes no argument that this testimony was unique to these parties and is not cumulative of other evidence. Second, Andrew filed the will contest claim in 2002, and the trial court entered the dismissal order in 2012. Even assuming that the Estate believed this order dismissed the will contest claim, the Estate had 10 years to secure the testimony of these two parties. While this Court is generally hesitant to evaluate litigation strategy, we are convinced that 10 years is more than a reasonable amount of time to secure the testimony of two witnesses who also happen to be parties. Thus, the Estate has failed to show a great injustice or irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. Because the Estate has failed to show both prerequisites, this case does not satisfy the requirements for a second class writ, and we need not consider the merits of the Estate's alleged error.