Opinion ID: 294587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Access to Airport

Text: 8 Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23, a starting point for judicial development of the meaning of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, established that the State of New York could not bar from the navigable waters of that State one licensed by an act of Congress to engage in interstate commerce on those waters. Since Gibbons the development of the commerce clause and a correspondingly strong national economy free from protective provincial legislation has rested on the common rubric of constitutional law that a state or local regulation affecting interstate commerce is invalid when it conflicts with a valid federal statutute or administrative regulation. See, e. g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 1959, 359 U.S. 520, 79 S.Ct. 962, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 1945, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915; South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 1938, 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510, 82 L.Ed. 734. Because state and local bodies have valid authority to prescribe regulations in many areas, the test of whether a particular state or local enactment conflicts with an exercise by Congress of its commerce powers entails ascertainment of whether the national interest in unfettered flow of interstate commerce outweighs local needs to protect public health, safety, welfare, or morals. Moreover, since conflicts with the commerce power are not always patent, it is often necessary for courts to determine whether a state or local enactment not facially in conflict is nonetheless (1) in application a discrimination against interstate commerce to the advantage of intrastate commerce; (2) is inconsistent with a congressional policy; (3) is pre-empted by a pervasive pattern of federal legislation; (4) concerns a problem which is national in scope and should therefore be regulated only by a national authority. See, e. g., Florida Lime and Avocado Growers Incorporated v. Paul, 1963, 373 U.S. 132, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248; City of Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 1958, 357 U.S. 77, 78 S.Ct. 1063, 2 L.Ed.2d 1174; Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 1951, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S.Ct. 295, 95 L.Ed. 329; Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Arizona, ex rel. Sullivan, 1945, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 1926, 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L. Ed. 432; Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, etc., 1851, 53 U.S. 299 (12 How. 299), 13 L.Ed. 996. 9 We recognize the validity of the Board's interest in continued control over the operation of the Airport, and the right of the Board to charge a reasonable fee for the use of Airport facilities, but it is clear here that the outright refusal of the Board to allow an interstate carrier access to its facilities engenders open and obvious conflict with the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. Coast holds permanent ICC authority to transport paying customers interstate from Mississippi Gulf Coast points to Moisant Internaal Airport. If Toye and the Board's exclusive franchise argument is permitted to stand, Coast would be required to drop its passengers outside the Airport grounds, approximately one-half mile from the terminal building where baggage is checked, passengers ticketed and boarding of flights takes place. Local carriers and their passengers meanwhile would be provided the convenience of using the Airport's roadways and facilities. 3 The burden on interstate commerce in this instance is great, and there is no justifiable local interest to be protected by the refusal to allow Coast access to the Airport. The conflict of the Board's denial of access to the Airport with the intent of the ICC permit is clear, and the discrimination against Coast as an interstate carrier is manifest. Gibbons, supra; Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 1954, 348 U.S. 61, 75 S.Ct. 191, 99 L.Ed. 68. See also Dean Milk, supra; Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Arizona, ex rel. Sullivan, supra. 10 The Board complains that they believed then and now that the exclusive contract with Toye must be protected. There is nothing at issue in this lawsuit to restrict the Board's exclusive contract with Toye for transportation to and from the Greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area. What is at issue is the right of Toye to demand that interstate travelers be funneled through Toye's transportation system to and from downtown New Orleans to the exclusion of a competing certificated interstate carrier ready to provide direct interstate transportation to the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Stated differently, the bone of contention is the route over which interstate travelers may be required to travel because of existing transportation facilities on their journeys between the Mississippi Gulf Coast and Moisant International Airport. A similar issue was presented to the Third Circuit in the case of Southerland v. St. Croix Taxicab Association, 1968, 315 F. 2d 364. In that case a tour agency which had contracted to pick up air passengers from the United States brought an action against the taxicab association and the government of the Virgin Islands to enjoin them from interfering with the pickup of passengers at the Airport. The defendant taxicab association had an exclusive franchise with the government of the Virgin Islands to transport all passengers from the airport. The court held that persons served by the plaintiff tour agency were in interstate commerce and that to force passengers to utilize one form of transportation when another more convenient and desirable mode of transport was available was an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, citing United States v. Yellow Cab Company, 1947, 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010. 11 Indisputably, the passengers and the commerce involved here is interstate in nature. Coast's service is limited to stops at the Airport in Kenner, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and stops along the resort area of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. No stops are made between these points. This direct service is calculated to find favor with many travelers, and it may be assumed will eliminate some of Toye's passenger traffic which formerly traveled to downtown New Orleans and then used other common carriers between there and the Mississippi Gulf Coast. But the Board's attempt to protect this local enterprise at the cost of an interstate competitor is precisely what the commerce clause prohibits. Southerland, supra. 12 We further think that the appellants have not utilized the proper procedure for obtaining judicial review of the ICC certificate. The district court noted that Title 28, U.S.C., Sections 2321-2325, provide for a three-judge court to be convened to enforce, suspend, enjoin, annul or set aside in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Section 2323 requires the Attorney General to represent the United States. But here the ICC order has not been attacked directly, nor has the United States been sued nor made a party to the action. The district court held that a collateral attack of this nature on the ICC certificate would not be permitted, and that pending a proper successful attack and determination of invalidity, the ICC order would be respected as valid. We endorse the district court's reasoning. The holding in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 7 Cir. 1968, 398 F.2d 36, is not in actual conflict with the view we adopt. The decision does not entertain a collateral attack on the ICC certificates there involved, but instead holds, as to one, that it does not purport on its face to authorize the litigated bus service to O'Hare Airport, and as to another, that the record was unripe for adjudication. If there was a collateral attack, it was, at most, on an ex parte interpretation by the ICC of its own certificate, and validity of the certificate itself was not in issue. Here, on the contrary, to reverse at the behest of Toye and the Board, we would have to hold the certificate invalid.