Opinion ID: 1283629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: General Intent Required

Text: Appellant also argues that the statute under which he was convicted is void for vagueness because it does not specify a criminal intent. The same question was raised in Armijo v. State , and our response was:    We conclude that the legislature of the State of Wyoming by failing to encompass a statement of intent in § 31-5-1117(a), W.S. 1977 (May 1982 Cum.Supp.), did not intend to eliminate the element of a culpable mental state. 678 P.2d at 869. We explained further that aggravated vehicular homicide was a general-intent crime. Appellant also urges that the State failed to establish the requisite intent. In Armijo, there was no question but that intent had been established, because Armijo pled guilty, thus admitting every element of the crime with which he was charged. Armijo v. State , 678 P.2d at 870. In the case at bar, the defendant did not plead guilty. He claims that he did not admit any evil intent and that the State has proved none, and so his conviction must be reversed. Specifically, he contends that the two elements of the offense going to intent were not established by the State and that there is no evidence at all that appellant voluntarily drove the vehicle or knowingly or voluntarily consumed alcoholic beverages. We will hold that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that appellant voluntarily drove the vehicle. See discussion, infra. We need not address the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to find that appellant voluntarily consumed alcoholic beverages because voluntary intoxication is not an element of the crime of aggravated homicide by vehicle under § 31-5-1117(a). Appellant contends that voluntary intoxication is an element which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. He supports his contention by quoting the following from Armijo v. State , 678 P.2d at 870:    It follows that to prove a violation of this statute the only intent which must be established beyond a reasonable doubt is that the acts which establish the offense were committed voluntarily. [Citations.] In this case [ Armijo v. State ] the appellant admitted in establishing the factual basis for his plea of guilty that he voluntarily became intoxicated to the extent that he was rendered incapable of safely driving his vehicle, and while so driving it he collided with the victim, causing the victim's death. It is conceded that language from Armijo carries with it some indication that voluntary intoxication is an element which the State must prove under § 31-5-1117(a). Other language in Armijo, however, indicates that voluntary intoxication is not an element of the offense. For example, at one point we spoke of the driving-while-intoxicated element. 678 P.2d at 869-870. In any event, what we said there was dicta since, in Armijo v. State , we were not required to decide whether voluntary intoxication was an element since Armijo admitted his intoxication and that it was voluntary. 678 P.2d at 870. Now that the issue is squarely before us, we hold that voluntary intoxication is not an element which the State must prove under § 31-5-1117(a). We hold firm to our conclusion in Armijo v. State that aggravated vehicular homicide is a general-intent crime under § 31-5-1117(a). The prohibited conduct, however, is not the act of becoming intoxicated; rather it is the act of operating a vehicle when so intoxicated as to be unable to do it safely. The act which the State must prove was voluntary is the operation of the vehicle. Section 31-5-1117(a) provided: (a) Whoever, while driving any vehicle under the influence of either intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of both, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another person shall be guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years. The statute does not indicate that the intoxication must be voluntary. We have previously noted that the purpose of such a statute is to reduce the carnage on the highways by the drunk driver. Small v. State, Wyo., 689 P.2d 420, 426, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1215, 84 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984). The statute would best achieve its purpose by deterring everyone who is intoxicated from driving their vehicles. Whether a driver became intoxicated voluntarily or involuntarily, he presents a great danger to others. Therefore, we believe that the legislature intended to deter all intoxicated persons from driving their vehicles, regardless of how that condition came about. Other jurisdictions have also reached the conclusion that the act with which the legislatures are concerned is the driving of the vehicle while intoxicated. In reaching our decision in Armijo v. State , we found that People v. Rostad, Colo., 669 P.2d 126 (1983), was particularly helpful. In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court, in holding that their vehicular homicide statute required general intent, stated that the prosecution must prove voluntary conduct in the operation or driving of a motor vehicle. That court did not conclude that the prosecution must also prove voluntary intoxication. The Colorado court had earlier held, in a prosecution for driving while under the influence, that it was not necessary to prove the process, often a secret one, by which he [the defendant] got intoxicated. Bauer v. People, 103 Colo. 449, 86 P.2d 1088 (1939). That court followed their holding in Bauer v. People when a defendant was prosecuted for causing the death of another while driving under the influence. McRae v. People, 131 Colo. 492, 286 P.2d 618 (1955). We agree that the process of becoming intoxicated is not something which the State must prove under § 31-5-1117(a). That section is intended to proscribe the driving of a vehicle when intoxicated, it is not aimed at preventing intoxication. Our conclusion is well stated by the following: If one should become intoxicated as a result of an innocent mistake, force or fraud, but after becoming drunk was still sufficiently in possession of his faculties to know what he was doing, and to understand the character of his acts and with such knowledge    should voluntarily    drive a motor vehicle on a public highway, the involuntariness of the intoxication would not excuse him because the prohibited act itself was done voluntarily. Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law (3rd ed. 1982), p. 999.