Opinion ID: 1202533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: constitutionality of the sexual abuse statute

Text: Defendant's sixteenth point is that the enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. ง 76-5-404.1 (Supp. 1983) (amended 1984) is unconstitutional on its face and was unconstitutionally applied by the trial court. As previously indicated, defendant was charged with sexually abusing Graeme Cunningham in violation of section 76-5-404.1. The information additionally alleged that the offense was committed in conjunction with one or more of the following circumstances taken from subsection 76-5-404.1(3): (1) The offense was committed by force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace or threat of harm or was committed during the course of a kidnapping. (2) The defendant used, showed, or displayed pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition during the course of the offense. (3) The defendant committed more than (5) separate offenses under the above section (76-5-404.1) before or after the instant offense. Defendant brought a pretrial motion to dismiss these allegations on various grounds. The motion was denied. At trial, the State called six adolescent boys to testify regarding sexual improprieties defendant had taken with them. Defendant objected to this testimony for the same reasons as were advanced in the pretrial motion and also claimed that the testimony was inappropriate during the guilt phase of the trial. At the close of the State's case, defendant again made a motion to dismiss the allegations listed in the sexual abuse count. The motion was denied. Finally, defendant attacked section 76-5-404.1 in an unsuccessful motion for a new trial. On appeal, defendant focuses his attack only upon subsection 76-5-404.1(3)(g) (Supp. 1983) (amended 1984), under which the testimony of the boys was admitted. The State responds that this case should be analyzed pursuant to the 1984 version of the statute. Utah Code Ann. ง 76-5-404.1 was enacted March 9, 1983, and became effective May 10, 1983. [194] The statute was amended January 28, 1984, and the amendments became effective February 16, 1984, [195] nineteen days before the first witness was called by the State in defendant's trial. Defendant claims that analysis under the 1984 version of the statute would be improper because (1) the defendant was charged under the 1983 statute and the state never moved to amend the information or try to take advantage of the new law, (2) the trial court had required all motions to be heard prior to thirty days before trial, requiring use of the then current 1983 statute, (3) neither the judge nor prosecutors, nor defense attorneys had knowledge of the amendments and all legal arguments and rulings prior to and during trial were based on the 1983 statute, and (4) post trial application of the 1984 statute would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The trial court ruled on and applied the 1983 version of section 76-5-404.1, and given the facts of this case, the 1983 version of the statute is the law under which defendant's conviction must be reviewed. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by interpreting subsection 76-5-404.1(3)(g) such that the existence of circumstances enumerated in that subsection were to be found by the jury during the guilt phase of the criminal action. In 1983, subsection 76-5-404.1 provided, in pertinent part: (1) A person commits sexual abuse of a child, if, under circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, or sodomy upon a child or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, the actor touches the anus, buttocks, or genitalia of a child who is under the age of 14, or touches the breast of a female child who is under the age of 14, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child, or causes a child to take indecent liberties with the actor or another, with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant. (2) Sexual abuse of a child is a felony of the first degree. (3) Sexual abuse of a child is punishable, as a felony of the first degree, by imprisonment in the state prison for a term which is a minimum mandatory term of 3, 6, or 9 years and which may be for life when any of the following circumstances have been charged and admitted or found true in the action for the offense: ... . (g) The convicted person committed more than five separate offenses under this section at the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant offense... . The 1983 version of this statute provided that the existence of the circumstances were to be found in the action for the offense. Defendant argues that since seven of the nine subsections in the statute were prefaced with the phrase convicted person, the phrase action for the offense must have contemplated a post-conviction hearing at which the presence of the circumstances was to be determined with respect to a previously convicted defendant. Defendant also argues that the prosecution had the burden of establishing the circumstances at this post-conviction hearing. Defendant's brief claims that the following procedure was required: (1) [A] jury determination (unless bench trial) of innocence or guilt on the substantive offense based solely on evidence relevant to that charge; (2) [A]fter return of a guilty verdict (a not guilty verdict having concluded the matter as would a conviction on a lesser included offense), presentation to fact-finder of evidence regarding basis of enhancement; (3) [A] finding by fact-finder that the allegation is or is not proven (which although unstated ought to be beyond a reasonable doubt); (4) [C]onsideration by the court of matters in aggravation or mitigation as may be presented in a pre-sentence report or through evidence in a sentencing hearing; and (5) [I]mposition of sentence upon the defendant. When construing a statute, our duty is to give effect to the plain and obvious language chosen by the legislature unless it is inconsistent with that body's intent. [196] When uncertainty in statutory language exists, this Court must look to other sources for guidance. [197] Thus, the determination to be made is whether the enhancement provision of the 1983 statute was ambiguous. The word offense is generally defined in the Utah Criminal Code as a violation of any penal statute... . [198] Although the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure defines the phrase criminal action, that definition is limited to that code by its terms. [199] Applying commonly used definitions of action in the criminal context (e.g.,  criminal action. Proceeding by which person charged with a crime is brought to trial and either found not guilty or guilty and sentenced. [200] ) offers some support to defendant's argument that the statutory language was broad enough to include a post-conviction hearing. However, when the language is taken in context, it is ambiguous. This is so because two of the enumerated circumstances in subsection (3) did not lend support to such a construction; [201] the legislature omitted the term convicted person in subsections (3)(a) and (3)(h). Therefore, it is proper to look to other sources to ascertain legislative intent (i.e., historical background of enactment, objectives attending passage, the circumstances to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under various construction suggestions). [202] Our research has yielded little useful history on the 1983 version of section 76-5-404.1. It is noteworthy that from the time of the statute's enactment to the present, neither the Utah Criminal Code nor the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure has provided for a separate hearing to determine the existence of the circumstances found in subsection (3) of section 76-5-404.1. Moreover, critical review of the Act out of which the statute arose does not support the post-conviction hearing espoused by defendant. Chapter 88 of the 1983 Laws of Utah, in addition to creating section 76-5-404.1, amended Utah Code Ann. ง 76-3-201 (1978) by adding subsection (5). [203] This provision allowed for the submission of a statement of circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime after trial and before sentencing and further provided for judicial consideration of these circumstances at the sentencing hearing to determine which minimum mandatory sentence should be imposed. [204] Implicit within this provision is the determination that the trier of fact has found the defendant guilty of a crime and has found the existence of a circumstance such that a minimum mandatory sentence must be imposed. Notwithstanding this implication, the section was silent concerning a post-conviction hearing at which the trier of fact was to determine aggravating circumstances. Additionally, subsection 76-3-201(10) was amended by chapter 88. That provision stated, in pertinent part, that should the trier of fact find the defendant to have caused substantial bodily injury, at trial the defendant must be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term. [205] The bodily injury circumstance that the jury had to have found for the provision to apply was found at subsection 76-5-404.1(3)(b) (the convicted person caused bodily injury or severe psychological injury to the victim during or as a result of the offense). Surely the legislature did not intend to create a bifurcated trial of fact on issues as closely related as those in subsection 76-3-201(10) and subsection 76-5-404.1(3)(b). The addition of these provisions is persuasive evidence that the legislature intended the trier of fact to determine the existence of the circumstances found in subsection 76-5-404.1(3) during the guilt phase of a criminal action prosecuted pursuant to the 1983 version of the statute. When a statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended statute. [206] In 1984, the legislature passed chapter 18, entitled Clarifying Child Kidnapping and Sexual Abuse Act. [207] Indeed, the bill's sponsors characterized the act as basically a housekeeping bill with one substantive modification. [208] While the 1984 act did not affect subsection 76-3-201(10), it did delete a portion of subsection (5), which had previously allowed the State or the defendant to dispute aggravating or mitigating facts in the record or probation officer's report. [209] This further narrowing of subsection (5) lends additional support for the conclusion that the legislature intended the trier of fact to be the ultimate fact finder of the circumstances found in subsection (3) of the 1983 version of section 76-5-404.1. Much more significant were the amendments made to subsection 76-5-404.1(3). The phrase convicted person was substituted with the term accused in all seven paragraphs where the former phrase had been used. And under the 1984 version of section 76-5-404.1, it is clear that the fact finder is to determine the existence of the enumerated circumstances at trial. Pursuant to the principles discussed above, it appears that when read in the context of the Code and subsequent legislation, the phrase convicted person in the 1983 statute, although being a poor choice of words, must be read to be consistent with the 1984 version of the statute; the legislature's words must be read as referring to subsection 76-5-404.1(1) and the requirement that the defendant committed the prohibited act with the requisite mens rea. In summary, the 1984 modifications and other sources indicate that the legislature intended that the presence of the triggering circumstances under the 1983 version of the Code be determined by the fact finder at trial. Since the trial court applied the statute consistently with this interpretation, we should not hold that it erred in applying the statute. Defendant further claims that subsection (3)(g) suffers from various constitutional infirmities. Defendant first contends that the provision violates the due process clause. The essence of defendant's argument appears to be that the subsection interferes with his right to a fair trial. Defendant's point is without merit. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, [210] the United States Supreme Court said: [W]e should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties. [211] The state legislature has chosen to have the jury consider the circumstances found in subsection (3)(g) at trial. Allowing such evidence during the guilt phase of a criminal action is not patently offensive and is the procedure sometimes used in the other penal statutes. [212] Defendant was given notice of the charge in the information, as well as a list of the State's witnesses and the opportunity to impeach the testimony of the State's witnesses or offer evidence in rebuttal. The fact that some members of this Court might have drafted the statute in issue differently does not render the statute invalid as unconstitutional. This conclusion is not changed because the legislature has seen fit to allow the trier of fact to consider uncharged prior bad acts in the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding. [213] If a statute is constitutional, it is not proper for this Court to edit the legislature's work to conform the statute so that it reads in accordance with this Court's view on how the statute should have been drafted. The legislature has made the determination that a defendant who has repeatedly committed crimes against persons and then violates section 76-5-404.1 poses a special threat to children. The statutory scheme evinces an intent to deal severely with such offenders by removing, for a specified period of time, the discretion of the trial court and the probation board to allow such offenders back into society. Defendant next claims that the statutory scheme infringes upon the presumption of innocence. Defendant asks, [H]ow can a court ever allow testimony that is exclusively relevant to punishment before an accused has been convicted? The presumption of innocence is a basic component of the fair trial secured by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. [214] It is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials and also serves as an admonishment to the jury to judge an accused's guilt on the evidence adduced at trial. [215] Estelle v. Williams [216] warns that to assure the fairness of the fact-finding process, implementation of the presumption requires courts to be vigilant in assuring that guilt is established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. [217] As stated above, the legislature has determined that the repeat offender must be incarcerated for a determinate period. Subsection 76-5-404.1(3)(g) was drafted so as to afford a defendant the opportunity of having a jury determine the existence of the circumstances (the six separate offenses) under the most stringent burden of proof in the law. Evidence of these other offenses was regulated by the Utah Rules of Evidence and was relevant because of the method in which the statute was designed. As drafted, subsection (3)(g) promotes a legitimate legislative objective without undermining the principle that guilt must be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant finally claims that section 76-5-404.1(3)(g) violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws. He relies on that portion of the 1983 statute which provided for application of the minimum mandatory provisions if the person committed more than five separate offenses under this section ... before ... the instant offense. The argument apparently is that only one of the boys who testified was victimized after the subsection came into effect on May 10 and that the trial court therefore erred by allowing into evidence the testimony of the other boys, who were victimized under section 76-5-404 (1978) (forcible sexual abuse). However, defendant's contention that the trial court's interpretation of the statute made punishment for the crime more burdensome after its commission does not follow. The obvious intent of the legislature was to include unlawful conduct under former statutes (e.g., section 76-5-404). The 1984 amendments enumerated in chapter 18 of 1984 Utah Laws support such a construction. [218] In any event, the statute in no way makes punishment more burdensome for acts perpetrated prior to enactment. Defendant was punished under section 76-5-404.1 for sexually abusing Graeme Cunningham and was accordingly convicted of a first degree felony. The circumstances did not alter the severity of the punishment to which defendant was subjected under the 1983 version of the statute. It merely limited the discretion of the trial court and the parole board. [219] Based upon the above discussion and after a review of defendant's arguments under Rules 404(b), 403, and 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, defendant's argument is without merit.