Opinion ID: 3019903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meaning of the term “Sexual Acts”

Text: Levi claims that the charged offense, “engaging in sexual acts,” does not include the conduct with which he was charged. In other words, he argues that public clothed masturbation while looking at a prison official is not engaging in a sexual act. The BOP has not officially defined the term “engaging is sexual acts.” Levi argues that the term is ambiguous and that the DHO’s definition is too broad. The BOP’s interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling . . . unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” See Chong v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S., 2 For similar reasons, we do not address the denial of Levi’s motions for a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction. Neither of these requests relates to the challenge underlying his § 2241 petition and neither alleged BOP violation affects the fact or length of his sentence. 4 264 F.3d 378, 389 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). On administrative appeal, the BOP Regional Director explained that “[t]he prohibited act is committed when an inmate takes part in intimate physical contact with himself or another.” This definition is not clearly erroneous, and Levi’s action plainly falls within it. The word “sexual” means “of or involving sex, the two sexes, or the sexual organs.” Webster’s Desk Dictionary 829 (1990). This definition is extremely broad. The Director’s definition of “sexual acts” encompasses conduct which reasonably falls within the broad definition of the term “sexual”. Levi argues that the term “sexual act” should not be read as broadly in this context as its dictionary definition suggests. Instead, he believes the definition should be based on 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2), which defines “sexual act” as: (A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for the purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however[] slight; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person . . . . § 2246(2). Just because Code 205 and § 2246 use the same terms does not lead to the conclusion that the meanings are or were meant to be identical. Levi presents no reason 5 for us to presume that the BOP intended to adopt the criminal definition of “sexual act.” Nothing in the disciplinary code even implies that the two sections are related. The fact that Congress believed it necessary to define the precise contours of what it meant by “sexual act” actually counters Levi’s position that the BOP’s definition is clearly erroneous. By defining the term, Congress implied that without a definition, it would be unclear that crimes including the term applied only to certain forms of sexual conduct. In other words, Congress was well aware that “sexual acts” could include conduct outside the acts specified in the statute. The BOP’s reading of Code 205 reflects this broader understanding. Levi also argues that the disciplinary code makes indecent exposure an offense, thus requiring something more to establish a sexual act. Otherwise, he continues, the offense of indecent exposure would be superfluous. Even if this were true, it does not make the BOP’s definition erroneous. Traditionally, the act of indecent exposure required a lewd public display of exposed genitalia. See Black’s Law Dictionary 909 (4th ed. 1951). The agency’s reading of “sexual acts” sufficiently distinguishes it from the offense of indecent exposure. The DHO’s definition includes the term “intimate contact,” which implies greater intensity, such as prolonged touching or touching with emotional feeling, than does the exposure of one’s genitals alone. Upon review of the standard definitions of the terms at issue and the context in which they are presented, the BOP’s reading of the offense is not clearly erroneous and Levi’s conduct falls within Code 205.