Opinion ID: 2402307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Redaction of the Doctors' Records

Text: Riley next asserts that the trial justice erred when she redacted portions of Dr. Duff's and Dr. Janecka's notes. He contends that the following excerpt from Dr. Duff's treatment notes should have been admitted: Review of prior MRI's done in February 1996, reveals a soft tissue nasapharyngeal [ sic ] mass lesion which would be quite atypical to be adenoid tissue [for] what was then a 42 y.o. He also asserts that redacted portions of Dr. Janecka's notes were admissible: MR (9-98 and '96) reviewed; there is a nasopharyngeal mass on '96 MR localized to the nasopharynx.    Patient was unaware of tumor on '96 films. The trial justice ruled that these statements were inadmissible because they were not opinions made to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Riley maintains, however, that the doctors' opinions satisfied the requisite level of certainty, despite the fact that neither doctor recited the words, reasonable degree of medical certainty. Essentially he contends that the trial justice's rulings placed form over substance. It is well settled that when doctors offer their expert opinions, their opinions must be stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. See, e.g., Morra, 791 A.2d at 477; Parrella v. Bowling, 796 A.2d 1091, 1099 (R.I.2002). In lieu of live testimony, G.L.1956 § 9-19-27 allows for admission of a medical opinion through documentation. This statute, however, in no way relaxes the minimum requirements for the admission of competent medical testimony. Parrillo v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 518 A.2d 354, 355 (R.I.1986). Moreover, when such evidence is offered to establish that a defendant's acts or omissions caused the plaintiff's injury, such testimony must speak in terms of `probabilities' rather than `possibilities.' Id. (quoting Sweet v. Hemingway Transport, Inc., 114 R.I. 348, 355, 333 A.2d 411, 415 (1975)). Although the admission of medical opinions does not hinge on the recitation of talismanic words, the expert's opinion nevertheless must be stated with the requisite level of certainty. Morra, 791 A.2d at 477 (the admissibility of expert testimony does not require the use of `magic words' or `precisely constructed talismanic incantations') (quoting Gallucci v. Humbyrd, 709 A.2d 1059, 1066 (R.I.1998)); accord Bailey v. Cataldo Ambulance Service, Inc., 64 Mass.App.Ct. 228, 832 N.E.2d 12, 17-18 (2005) (admissibility of medical records containing expert opinion does not hinge on the recitation of `magic words,' but the opinion must be stated with sufficient firmness and clarity). Riley argues that the doctors' statements met the requisite level of certitude required for admission. Doctor Duff's statement that there was a mass in Riley's 1996 MRI is followed by a statement that it may be that [the 1996 mass] has progressed in size   . The use of the term may underscores his uncertainty. Doctor Janecka's statements suffered similar infirmities. His note says that a mass appeared in Riley's 1996 MRI and that Riley was unaware of its presence at that time. Yet there is no indication, to any degree of certainty, whether this mass is the same mass that proved to be cancerous in 1998. Given the equivocal nature of Dr. Duff's and Dr. Janecka's opinions, I would affirm the trial justice's rulings, and therefore I concur in the Court's holding.