Opinion ID: 1908480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Landlord's Right of Entry

Text: The landlords contend that § 93A-26(s) is void as an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable exercise of the police power. That section requires that a lease: contain a provision requiring that the landlord exercise his right to access to any dwelling unit, after due notice to the tenant, and without objection from the tenant, in order to make necessary repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements, supply services only by mutual agreement during normal business hours except in an emergency; to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective purchasers, mortgagees, or tenants only during normal business hours, including weekends, except as otherwise may be agreed upon by the parties; and providing that nothing in this subsection shall prevent the landlord from entering any leased premises in an emergency situation or, after due notice, when the landlord has good cause to believe the tenant may have damaged the premises or may be in violation of this Chapter. The lower court refused to invalidate this section, and, in its opinion, noted that it did not consider the provision arbitrary and capricious. Nor do we. The landlords' objection to the section appears to be that they should not be forced to wait until emergency conditions exist before entering an apartment to make necessary repairs without the consent of the tenant; and (2) that a landlord should be able to make routine inspections, whether or not he has cause to believe that damage has been done or that violations of Chapter 93A exist. The objections of the landlords are more properly addressed to the legislative body. The wisdom of § 93A-26(s) is not, of course, a matter of our concern, and we find nothing in the section requiring its invalidation on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious. Decree vacated; case remanded for the entry of a decree consistent with this opinion; costs to be paid one-half by the County. Council for Montgomery County and one-half by Investors Funding Corporation et al. I also dissent in regard to the dictum in the majority opinion indicating that certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, Article 41, Sections 244-256A (APA) are, by construction of the Act, applicable to appeals from the Commission to the courts. My reasons for dissent are (1) that the provisions of § 93A-43(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) and 93A-43(c)(i) and (ii) attempt to confer judicial powers and functions upon the Commission in violation of Article IV, Section 1 of the Maryland Constitution and Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of that Constitution; (2) that the provisions of § 93A-26(b) and § 93A-27(c) are beyond the power of the Commission to adopt under Article XI-A of the Constitution and the Express Powers Act, inasmuch as Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.) Article 21, Section 8-402(b)(1), (4) and (5) permits leases for a definite term as well as from year to year, month to month, and week to week so that such leases are permitted by a public general law of the State and may not be abolished by a public local law in light of our holding in Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Sitnick & Firey, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969); and (3) that, in regard to the dictum relating to criteria for appeals derived by construction from the APA, there is no provision in the Act authorizing or justifying this dictum, which, in my opinion, represents judicial legislation in an aggravated form and violates the provisions of Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution. I am also of the opinion that § 93A-9(c) in regard to the imposition of a civil penalty not exceeding $1,000.00 as punishment for violation of the Act is unconstitutional for several reasons in addition to that relied upon by the majority.