Opinion ID: 363952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: employee discharges

Text: 27 From March through August, 1974, Hartz discharged a large number of employees, 60 of whom were alleged to be the victims of unlawful discrimination. In extensive and detailed findings the administrative law judge reviewed the evidence as to each discharged employee. On the basis of these findings the Board concluded that in the termination of the employment of 46 employees Hartz discouraged membership in District 65 and encouraged membership in Local 806 in violation of § 8(a)(3) of the Act; unlawfully assisted Local 806 in violation of § 8(a)(2) of the Act; and interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board concluded further that it had not been established by substantial credible evidence upon the record as a whole, that Hartz' termination of the remaining 14 employees was in violation of the Act. Two of the 14 were found to have been discharged for cause unrelated to their union activities.
28 The Board found that Hartz terminated 46 employees because of their adherence to District 65 and their refusal to join or support Local 806. Hartz contends that (1) there is no evidence that it had knowledge of the current union affiliation of any of the alleged discriminatees; (2) it had substantial and legitimate business reasons for each termination; and (3) the terminations were neither inherently destructive of employee rights nor motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 29 The administrative law judge found that Hartz had knowledge of the identity of the District 65 supporters, either through the authorization cards delivered to the company on April 11, 1974 or through observation of its supervisory employees. The judge credited testimony from the 46 dischargees to establish discriminatory intent. Their testimony differed in some particulars, but generally established that they were summoned to the plant cafeteria, singly or in groups, and informed that they had a choice of either affiliating with Local 806 or facing termination. The plant public address system was often used to summon the employees, and the plant manager was often present. The 46 discharged employees resisted this coercion and were later terminated. To recite in detail the testimony of the employees witnesses would unduly lengthen this opinion and would serve no useful purpose. We are convinced that the record supports the Board's conclusion that Local 806 was engaged in its activities to enforce the security clause of the contracts with the knowledge and assistance of Hartz, and that a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination was made. 30 Hartz argues that the discharges were justified by either substantial business reasons or poor work performance. Hartz vice-president Kaye testified that during the period in question the company was in a financial decline which required a reorganization of its production operations, with a concomitant lay-off of employees. He testified further that he personally decided which employees to terminate based on reports from high-level supervisors at the Jersey City plant and on his personal review of the personnel folders of the employees. 31 The administrative law judge discredited Kaye's testimony that the discharges were due to business retrenchment and found that under admitted facts less qualified employees were in many instances retained, many new employees were hired while the 46 discriminatees were terminated, 18 none of the laid off employees were recalled, and the economic justifications offered were belatedly added to Hartz' answer to the complaint by amendment during the trial. While the judge's inference of incredibility is not compelled, we agree that it is warranted by the evidence, and we will not disturb it. 32 The Board likewise found no justification for Hartz' contention that poor work performance was the basis of the discharge of the 46 employees. On the contrary, the administrative law judge, following his analysis of the work records of each of the employees, noted, Inter alia, the fact that, without explanation, no line supervisors were produced by the Employer to testify to dispute or refute the testimony of the terminated employees as to lack of criticism or fault found with their work, and the precipitate nature of the terminations and the manner in which they were effected for what was in most cases long-term, satisfactory employees. 19 33 Kaye's testimony that he personally reviewed each personnel file and ordered the discharges on the advice of plant supervisors was strongly discredited. 20 At the time the alleged file review took place, there were, according to Hartz Personnel Manager Levy, no centralized personnel files at Hartz' Harrison headquarters. Hartz did not call any official other than Kaye or any supervisor to testify as to the poor work performance of these employees. 21 The only supervisor who testified, Domingo Negron, 22 was called by the General Counsel. He testified that neither he nor the other supervisors knew why their employees were being discharged; that no one asked his opinion on their work performance; that he found no fault with the work of these employees who were working for him; and that he was informed by General Manager Feinberg that the discharges were upon orders from Harrison. 34 On the basis of this testimony and other inconsistencies in the evidence presented by Hartz, 23 the administrative law judge concluded that the offered justifications were mere pretext and insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. From our review of the record we find substantial support for this conclusion. The portion of the Board's order finding discriminatory discharge of 46 Hartz employees will therefore be enforced. 24
35 The Board concluded that it was not established by substantial credible evidence upon the record as a whole that 12 employees had been discharged in violation of the Act. This court has held that the Board's determination that there has been no violation of the Act must be upheld unless it has no rational basis. ILGWU v. NLRB, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 83, 463 F.2d 907, 919 (1972). Findings of the Board should not be disturbed unless they are irrational or unsupported by substantial evidence. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 4-243 v. NLRB, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 116, 362 F.2d 943, 946 (1966). 36 District 65 contends that there is no legal justification for drawing a distinction between these 12 employees and the 46 who were granted relief, and that relief was denied in the 12 cases solely by reason of the fact that none of these employees testified regarding the circumstance of his or her dismissal. District 65 argues that neither principle nor common sense requires that each employee fired in a mass discriminatory discharge testify in order to secure reinstatement. While we might agree with this statement as a broad general principle, we do not believe it is applicable under the circumstances of this case. 37 This is not a case in which a group of employees was unlawfully terminated in one discrete action by the employer. Rather approximately 308 employees were terminated over a span of nine months. Of this group over 100 were District 65 supporters, as evidenced by signed authorization cards. Yet the General Counsel brought charges with respect to only 60. The Board made individual detailed findings as to each of the 60. The contention that the Board's award of relief to the 46 employees rested solely on a conclusion that they were part of a class of District 65 members subject to unlawful discrimination is incorrect. The General Counsel did not include some 60 District 65 members in his charge and the administrative law judge made specific findings with respect to each of the 60 who were charged. 38 Two of the 12 employees did in fact testify at the hearing. One of them, Jose Maisonet, had worked for about five and one half months. The administrative law judge found slight indication of activity on behalf of District 65 other than mere membership therein and wearing its button and a seemingly atypically long list of attendance defalcations disclosed by his personnel record considering his short term of employment. With respect to the other employee who testified, Wilfredo Lorenzana, the administrative law judge found no indication of any protected concerted activities on his part and that his personnel file indicated that he received two work warnings and what appears to be an atypically poor attendance and punctuality record during his short 43/4 month tenure of employment. 39 With respect to the remaining 10 employees, who did not testify, the administrative law judge found no indication that one of them, Maria L. Sanchez, was a member of any of the unions and that her personnel folder discloses, among other things, a seemingly extremely poor attendance and punctuality record. As to the remaining nine employees, the administrative law judge found generally no indication of any District 65 activity other than membership. In addition he found that Francisco Altamirano, who had worked about five months had an arguably poor attendance and punctuality record, as well as a warning during his short-term employment. Fulvia Benjumeda, who had worked for two years and five months was also found to have an arguably unsatisfactory punctuality and attendance record. 40 Each of the 46 employees the Board ordered to be reinstated was found to have been an active supporter of District 65 and a victim of coercive demands to abandon District 65 and embrace Local 806. In contrast, none of the 12 alleged discriminatees were shown to be active supporters of District 65. Rather the record reflects little more than mere membership. 25 The record contains no evidence of any pressure or threat against any of these 12 employees to join Local 806 or be fired. This case is thus distinguishable from Riley Stoker Corp., 223 NLRB No. 178, 92 LRRM 1110 (1970), on which District 65 heavily relies. In that case, unlike this one, the administrative law judge specifically found that the three discharged employees were terminated under identical unlawful circumstances. Here no such finding was, or could be, made. 41 It is undisputed that the burden is on the general counsel to prove unlawful discharge. NLRB v. Patrick Plaza Dodge, Inc., 522 F.2d 804 (4 Cir. 1975). We cannot say that the conclusion of the Board that it was not established by substantial credible evidence that any of the 12 employees had been discharged in violation of the act was either irrational or unsupported by substantial evidence. See ILGWU v. NLRB, supra, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. NLRB, supra.
42 District 65 also contends that the other two discharged employees, Jose Peguero and Rafael Bueno, two active adherents of District 65, were unlawfully terminated. It is undisputed that both men were known to Hartz to be District 65 supporters. 43 Peguero was discharged on December 10, 1973 after he had urinated on the plant floor in the area where he worked. The Board could properly conclude from the evidence that this was the reason for his termination and that Peguero's adherence to District 65 did not influence the decision to discharge him. 44 Bueno was discharged on January 3, 1974 for a variety of reasons, including repeated absences from work, insubordination to supervisors, freshness with female employees, and other work shortcomings. The incident which precipitated his discharge was his leaving work at noon on December 27, 1973 and failing to return until January 3, 1974. Both his foreman and supervisor testified that this absence was unauthorized. At the request of his supervisor, Bueno's employment was terminated. Although Bueno's testimony conflicts with that of the other witnesses, the administrative law judge credited those witnesses. We do not find their testimony inherently incredible and therefore accept the Board's finding. 45 There was ample cause for the discharge of both Peguero and Bueno. Mere activism in union affairs does not insulate an employee from discharge for any reason other than the employee's union activity. See NLRB v. Bangor Plastics, Inc., 392 F.2d 772, 776-77 (6 Cir. 1967). An employee may be discharged for any reason without violating the Act, as long as the discharge is not motivated by anti-union reasons. NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 218-19, 60 S.Ct. 493, 84 L.Ed. 704 (1940). We conclude that the Board properly evaluated the evidence in determining the motivation for the discharge of both Peguero and Bueno.