Opinion ID: 1042298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp.

Text: In Jackson, the plaintiff was a sixty-nine-year-old male who was terminated after a coworker complained that the plaintiff had sexually harassed her. Id. at 376. The plaintiff claimed that his employer discriminated against him on account of his age. Id. In assessing his claim, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, in which the employee retains the burden to demonstrate that any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason the employer proffers for the adverse employment action is in fact pretextual. Id. at 377–78. In Jackson, the parties did not dispute whether the plaintiff had alleged a prima facie case. Id. at 378. The parties also did not dispute that the plaintiff was fired for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason—sexual harassment. Id. 21 Case: 12-60682 Document: 00512388400 Page: 22 Date Filed: 09/26/2013 No. 12-60682 The parties’ dispute focused on whether the plaintiff had successfully established that the defendant’s reasons for his termination were pretextual. Id. at 378–79. In analyzing the claim, the court stated that when considering a case where an employer discharges an employee based on another employee’s complaint, “the issue is not the truth or falsity of the allegation, but whether the employer reasonably believed the employee’s allegation and acted on it in good faith.” Id. at 379. In attempting to establish pretext, the plaintiff in Jackson presented as evidence (1) his own statements denying that he had made sexually harassing comments, (2) a purported derogatory statement made by a supervisor, (3) evidence of disparate punishment, and (4) a coworker’s testimony that she did not perceive his comments to be harassing. Id. at 379. However, the court did not credit all of the plaintiff’s pretext evidence. First, the court did not consider the evidence of disparate treatment or the coworker’s testimony because the plaintiff had failed to identify this evidence in his opposition to the summary judgment motion. Id. at 379–80. Second, the district court considered the purported derogatory comment to be a “stray remark” since the plaintiff provided no proof that the comment was proximate in time to his firing or related to his termination. 14 Id. at 380–81. Therefore, the only pretext evidence that the court considered in its analysis, besides this “stray remark,” was the plaintiff’s own statements denying the allegations. Id. at 380. With only this evidence before it, the court held that this evidence was insufficient to establish 14 “Comments are evidence of discrimination only if they are ‘1) related to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member; 2) proximate in time to the complained-of adverse employment decision; 3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue; and 4) related to the employment decision at issue.’ Comments that do not meet these criteria are considered ‘stray remarks,’ and standing alone, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Id. at 380 (citations omitted). 22 Case: 12-60682 Document: 00512388400 Page: 23 Date Filed: 09/26/2013 No. 12-60682 a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. Id. (“This comment alone, or in combination with Jackson’s uncorroborated denial of any sexual harassment, is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. . . . Without more, we simply cannot conclude that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether [the defendant] discriminated against Jackson . . . .” (emphasis added)).