Opinion ID: 1954355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: gender discrimination under chapter 14-02.4, n.d.c.c.

Text: The first issue on appeal is whether or not Swenson is entitled to relief under North Dakota's anti-discrimination statutes, or in the alternative, whether or not those statutes were unconstitutional at the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct. The anti-discrimination statutes in effect in 1986 and 1987, the time of the alleged violations, only prohibited discrimination in workplaces with ten or more employees because employer was defined in the Chapter as one employing ten or more employees. Chapter 14-02.4, N.D.C.C. (1985 and 1987). [2] Swenson's gender discrimination claim was dismissed by the trial court because less than ten people were employed at NCI when the alleged discrimination occurred. The statutory definition of employer in effect in 1986 and 1987 was very clear and unambiguous. This Court is under a legislative directive to construe unambiguous statutes so that the meaning of the words are given full effect. When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Section 1-02-05, N.D.C.C. See Wills v. Schroeder Aviation, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 544, 546 (N.D.1986) (legislative intent is presumed clear from the face of the statute); Haggard v. Meier, 368 N.W.2d 539, 541 (N.D.1985) (it is improper for courts to attempt to construe statutory provisions so as to legislate additional requirements or proscriptions which the words of the provisions do not themselves include). Thus, under the wording of Chapter 14-02.4, as it was in 1986 and 1987, the anti-discrimination statutes did not apply to NCI. The inquiry, however, does not end here. In the alternative, Swenson asserts that if the anti-discrimination statutes did not apply to NCI in 1986 and 1987, due to the ten-employee limitation, then the statutes were unconstitutional as invidious discrimination and violative of her equal protection rights. Swenson, however, has failed to clear various procedural hurdles in presenting this argument to our Court. Not only is this part of her argument anemic on appeal due to lack of attention and support in her appellate brief, but it is unavailing because it was not raised in the trial court. In her brief to the trial court opposing summary judgment, Swenson's comments pertaining to the constitutionality of the earlier statutory definition were vague, very brief, and lacking case citation. We have repeatedly said: It is well established that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Gange v. Clerk of Burleigh County District Court, 429 N.W.2d 429, 432 n. 3 (N.D.1988). This constraint applies with particular force to a constitutional issue. Gange, 429 N.W.2d at 432 n. 3; State v. Slapnicka, 376 N.W.2d 33, 36 (N.D. 1985). We therefore decline to address [the constitutional] argument. Hanson v. Williams County, 452 N.W.2d 313, 315 (N.D.1990). During oral argument before this Court, Swenson urged that the attention afforded the constitutional issue in the trial court was sufficient to raise the issue below. We disagree. Swenson must do much more than acknowledge, in passing, the constitutional difficulties of a statute. We very recently reiterated the rule that parties must bring up the heavy artillery when asserting constitutional claims. The attention given the constitutional challenge [at the trial court] was not sufficient to `raise the issue below.' One must do more than merely assert that a statute is [unconstitutional] to appropriately raise a constitutional issue. As Justice Vogel said: `One who attacks a statute on constitutional grounds, defended as that statute is by a strong presumption of constitutionality, should bring up his heavy artillery or forego the attack entirely. ' So. Valley Grain Dealers v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs, 257 N.W.2d 425, 434 (N.D.1977) (emphasis added). State v. Tweed, 491 N.W.2d 412, 417 n. 5 (N.D.1992) (further emphasis added). Thus, Swenson's failure to sufficiently raise her constitutional claim in the trial court precludes her from presenting it here. [3] We affirm the trial court on the issue that Chapter 14-02.4, N.D.C.C., did not apply to NCI in 1986 and 1987.