Opinion ID: 1253249
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Permissible Inferences from the Assessments

Text: Finally, Josephberg asked the district court to instruct the jury that an IRS certificate of assessments is only prima facie proof of a deficiency and is not conclusive proof, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in a criminal trial that taxes were in fact owing. (Defendant's Requests for Jury Instructions at 16.) After the court gave instructions that included the statement that assessments by the IRS constitute prima facie  that's a Latin word which means [']on its face[']  constitute sufficient evidence of the asserted tax deficiencies (Tr. 2318), Josephberg asked the court to amend its instruction and tell the jury that the assessments may be prima facie evidence, may constitute ( id. at 2379 (emphases added)). The district court declined, and Josephberg contends on appeal that this was error. Quoting only the phrase constitute sufficient evidence from the instruction, he argues that the charge as given amount [ed] to an improper conclusive presumption that took away from the jury the ability to determine on its own whether the government proved the requisite element of a substantial additional tax. (Josephberg brief on appeal at 65.) We disagree. In determining whether the district court properly instructed the jury, we must not judge any instruction in isolation but must instead view the charge as a whole. See, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973); United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1555 (2d Cir.1989). Thus, we will not make our determination on the basis of excerpts taken out of context. United States v. Zvi, 168 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 872, 120 S.Ct. 176, 145 L.Ed.2d 148 (1999). Here, although we question the wisdom of instructing a jury in terms of procedure-driving concepts such as the prima facie case, we see no error in the court's instructions as a whole or in its rejection of Josephberg's requested modifying language. Our concern for the inclusion of reference to prima facie evidence in a jury charge is that it may tend to confuse rather than enlighten the jury. See, e.g., L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions  Criminal ¶ 32.01, Comment (rev. Nov.2008)(even where the relevant statute specifies what constitutes prima facie evidence, instructions to the jury using the term prima facie may be `needlessly confusing' (quoting United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1977))). That a prima facie case was established, in this context, means, in theory, simply that the government presented enough evidence to have the case submitted to the jury. In practice, of course, the judge may, in the interests of justice, submit the case to the jury even if he believes that a prima facie case was not established, planning to enter a judgment of acquittal if the jury returns a verdict of guilty and preserving the sufficiency issue for appeal. See generally United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) (Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution protects a defendant against an appeal by the government from a judgment of acquittal entered prior to a jury verdict). But in instructing the jury on the law, in preparation for submitting the case to it, the trial court has no need to tell the jury that there is sufficient evidence for the case to be submitted to the jury. The risk is that the jury may be confused by the announcement of such a self-evident proposition and believe that it has some other meaning. Further, we reject Josephberg's contention that the court should have instructed only that the IRS tax assessments may be prima facie evidence of Josephberg's tax debts. As a matter of law, given a defendant's right to a jury trial, the assessments could not be conclusive, see, e.g., United States v. Silkman, 156 F.3d at 835-36; see generally Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 572-73, 97 S.Ct. 1349 (a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing a jury to come forward with such a verdict, ... regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction); but the assessments were, as a matter of law, see Part II.B.1, above, prima facie evidence of those debts. The equivocal language suggested by Josephberg could only have served to confuse. Finally, we reject Josephberg's contention that the phrase constituted sufficient evidence created a conclusive presumption (Josephberg brief on appeal at 65) that the government had proven that Josephberg had a substantial tax debt. The challenged snippet was part of the following instruction: You are instructed that assessments by the IRS constitute prima facie  that's a Latin word which means on its face  constitute sufficient evidence of the asserted tax deficiencies. You may, however, consider whether there is evidence from which it can be concluded that the IRS improperly or incorrectly assessed the taxes in determining whether Mr. Richard Josephberg owed additional taxes for any of those years. And you must consider all the evidence in the case and consider and decide whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Josephberq owed substantial additional income tax for the tax year or years that you're then considering. As I mentioned earlier, the government does not have to prove the precise amount owed so long as it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it is substantial for the count of the indictment you are then considering. It is for you to decide whether a substantial tax deficiency exists for the years in issue, and in making that decision, you should consider all the evidence in the case. (Tr. 2318-19 (emphases added); see also id. at 2320 (You should decide, based on all relevant factors, whether the tax owed, if any, was substantial or merely trivial.).) Plainly, the court did not indicate that the assessments were conclusive.