Opinion ID: 211886
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tunik's Appeal

Text: 18 As a preliminary matter, the Agency, as Intervenor, argues that Tunik's appeal is moot because he voluntarily retired. Tunik responds that his claim for attorney's fees remains alive and that he may choose to claim on remand that his retirement was involuntary. Moreover, he argues that there remains a risk that the Agency would take similar actions to impair his decisional independence in the future. First, we are unable to discern the claim for attorney's fees to which Tunik refers. He has presented no claim for attorney's fees to this court, nor did he present a claim for attorney's fees to the Board. Moreover, even if he had presented a claim for attorney's fees, [an] interest in attorney's fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). Second, although Tunik is free to assert a claim that his retirement was in fact involuntary, he has not done so before this court, nor has he done so before the Board. Thus, any claim for involuntary retirement is not a part of this case and is not before us. Tunik's complaint only seeks prospective relief to prevent his supervisors from interfering with his decisional independence. Given that Tunik has retired, it is difficult to see how any of Tunik's supervisors could interfere with his decisional independence in the future. Thus, Tunik's appeal is moot and must be dismissed. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) ([J]urisdiction, properly acquired, may abate if the case becomes moot because (1) it can be said with assurance that `there is no reasonable expectation . . .' that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. (citation omitted)); United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968) (A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.). 19 The fact that Tunik's appeal is moot is not changed by 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j). That statute states: 20 In determining the appealability under this section of any case involving a removal from the service (other than the removal of a reemployed annuitant), neither an individual's status under any retirement system established by or under Federal statute nor any election made by such individual under any such system may be taken into account. 21 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j) (2000). In Mays v. Department of Transportation, 27 F.3d 1577, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1994), we held that [t]he plain language of section 7701(j) means that retirement status cannot be taken into account in determining the appealability of `any case involving a removal.' That case involved an employee of the Department of Transportation that retired on the effective date of her removal. We held that her retirement did not render her appeal moot under the statute. Id. However, Mays involved an involuntary retirement. Id. at 1580 ([T]he agency does not dispute that Mays would not have retired when she did if it had not been for the removal action.); see also Heelen v. Dep't of Commerce, 154 F.3d 1306, 1309 n. 1 (Fed.Cir.1998) (applying section 7701(j) again in the context of an involuntary retirement). If Mays prevailed in her action, presumably she would have been entitled to some relief, even though she retired in the interim. Here, however, even if Tunik prevails, it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Concentrated Phosphate, 393 U.S. at 203, 89 S.Ct. 361. Even if the statute extended to the situation before us, it could not confer authority on this court to hear a case where that authority is constitutionally lacking. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407, 92 S.Ct. 577, 30 L.Ed.2d 560 (1972) (Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy. (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 22 The fact that Tunik retired prior to the Board's decision in this case raises an additional issue. Although the Board is a creature of statute and is not necessarily subject to the requirements of Article III of the Constitution, Congress has nonetheless provided that [t]he Board shall not issue advisory opinions. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h) (2000). Given that Tunik's appeal was moot when the Board issued its decision in this case, the Board's opinion was advisory and must be vacated. Because the remaining appeals relied on and thus implicate the rationale of the Board's decision in Tunik's case, we will address that rationale to the extent it relates to the other appeals before us.