Opinion ID: 4587712
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination and the OPC Investigation

Text: Our decision in Lewis v. United States, 10 A.3d 646, 653-54 (D.C. 2010), summarizes the considerations for determining the standard of review that applies _____________________ 8 Appellant attempts to dismiss the power of this testimony by stating that the officers were “heavily impeached.” This argument fits awkwardly with appellant’s claim that the defense was denied the opportunity to effectively crossexamine Officer Minzak. We do not agree with appellant’s argument that the testimony of the officers held little value. 18 when a trial judge has imposed limits on defense counsel’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness for bias: While the exposure of a witness’ motivation to testify is a proper function of cross-examination, the Sixth Amendment does not “prevent [ ] a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678–79 (1986). The Sixth Amendment “guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). Only when a trial court’s limitation “prohibit[s] all inquiry into the possibility that [a witness] would be biased” as a result of favorable treatment from the government is the Sixth Amendment violated. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 679. If a defendant is permitted to elicit facts sufficient to enable defense counsel to argue to the jury that the witness is biased, there is no constitutional error. Gardner v. United States, 698 A.2d 990, 998 (D.C. 1997). To make cross-examination based upon witness bias effective (and thus satisfy the Sixth Amendment), defense counsel must be “permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). As in Lewis, “[i]t is significant here that during [appellant’s] closing argument, his counsel was able to make the very argument to the jury that he now claims the trial court precluded him from eliciting on cross-examination.” 10 A.3d at 654. If there is no constitutional error, we review for abuse of discretion. Id. at 19 656. When exercising that discretion, “[t]he trial judge must balance the probative value of the evidence against the risk of prejudicial impact, including the risk of jury confusion from a trial-within-a-trial, and may exclude marginally relevant evidence if it will distract the jury from the issue in this case.” (Shawn) Smith v. United States, 180 A.3d 45, 60 n.50 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Hager v. United States, 791 A.2d 911, 914 (D.C. 2002)). Appellant relies heavily on Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836 (D.C. 2012), in claiming that the trial court violated his constitutional rights, but we do not find the comparison apt. Longus faulted the trial judge for “not permit[ting] questioning or evidence about the facts underlying the investigation into Detective Brown’s actions in the Club U investigation or the potential sanctions he would face if found to have coached witnesses.” 52 A.3d at 851. Here, however, the court was careful to allow exactly that kind of questioning; in fact, Judge McKenna conscientiously applied Longus when addressing the issue: I think what Longus has established is that it would be an undue restriction on the defense’s right to cross-examine government witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to limit that inquiry solely to the fact that the officer is the subject of a pending investigation. But that defense counsel needs to be able to go further than that to also question the officer not only about the existence of the pending investigation, but also what the subject of the 20 pending investigation is in order for the jury to be able to make a meaningful determination about how the officer views the gravity of the situation, how strong the motivation to curry favor might be; and enable the jury to make sort of an informed appraisal of the witness’ potential motives and bias. Officer Minzak confirmed during cross-examination that: (1) the OPC investigation involved “approaching a vehicle for an alleged traffic violation, searching the car for a firearm and not finding a firearm”; (2) the investigation was for “harassment and excessive force”; (3) the investigation was pending at both the time of the stop in this case and at the time of trial; (4) the “victim states that he was ordered out of the vehicle and that he was injured by the officers”; (5) Officer Minzak could get demoted; (6) he could get fired; (7) he could face criminal charges; and (8) any criminal charges brought for injuring a civilian would be brought by the United States Attorney’s Office, the same office on whose behalf he was testifying that day. 9 _____________________ 9 While Officer Minzak was on the stand, cross-examination for bias was not limited to the use of force investigation. Appellant was also permitted to separately explore another pending OPC complaint about the GRU logo. The investigation alleged that the GRU logo, which featured “a skull and cross bones” with “a bullet hole through the center of the skull in between the eyes,” “handcuffs,” a gun, and the motto “vest up, one in the chamber,” “promot[ed] a culture of violence.” The defense was permitted to ask questions about that investigation, introduce a photograph of Officer Minzak posing with the logo, and (continued…) 21 Defense counsel was thus permitted to explore on cross-examination why Officer Minzak might be biased, and further permitted to argue during closing that he was indeed biased. Counsel asserted that Minzak had “a motive to make this seem legit . . . like it was a legitimate practice to go upon that Corolla holding a gun” and that he “faces penalties . . . if he is found to have violated that other young man’s rights,” “giv[ing] him a reason to conceal key facts from his statements to you.” After hearing the cross-examination and the argument built upon it, the jury was equipped to make a “discriminating appraisal of the witness’s motives and bias.” Longus, 52 A.3d at 851; see also Lewis, 10 A.3d at 653 (“If a defendant is permitted to elicit facts sufficient to enable defense counsel to argue to the jury that the witness is biased, there is no constitutional error.”). A second crucial difference is that the defendant in Longus was able to point to a demonstrably false statement made by the testifying officer, a discrete instance in which counsel sought additional cross-examination. 52 A.3d at 850. Counsel for Longus was nonetheless prevented from confronting the officer about that statement and forced to accept the dishonest answer, despite being able to proffer _____________________ (…continued) elicit testimony that another officer was wearing the logo during the stop and arrest of appellant. 22 that he had legitimate reasons to believe that the response, given under oath, was false. See id. at 853 (“Defense counsel’s proffer in this case did not ‘manufacture’ allegations of bias out of thin air, but based the proposed bias questioning on an article in a flagship newspaper, which the prosecutor acknowledged was ‘not inaccurate,’ and the government’s suspension and investigation of Detective Brown for witness coaching.”) (citation omitted). Here, appellant did not allege that any of Officer Minzak’s statements about the OPC investigation were false. Instead, appellant now asserts that Officer Minzak was able to respond to questions with a “dismissive[]” tone, and complains that counsel “could not dispel the suggestion that the complaint was frivolous.” We do not discern such a tone from Officer Minzak’s testimony, and he did not characterize the complaint as frivolous at any point.10 Appellant also did not make this argument to the trial court, which would have been better suited than this court to address any issue with Officer Minzak’s tone. _____________________ 10 Officer Minzak responded “yes,” “yes ma’am,” or “correct” to nearly every question defense counsel posed about the OPC investigation as he confirmed the existence of the investigation, possible sanctions, and the nature of the allegations. The only notable exception is a question regarding whether any officer had drawn his or her firearm during that traffic stop, to which Officer Minzak responded: “I did not personally pull my gun out. I do not recall seeing any other officers on that traffic stop pull their gun out based on what you are asking me.” 23 But the more fundamental problem is appellant’s failure to acknowledge that the right of cross-examination “does not mean ‘cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’” Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 31 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679). Quoting from a Supreme Court decision, appellant claims that “defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974). But Davis was a case where defense counsel had been precluded from revealing that a key prosecution witness was on probation following a juvenile adjudication, a status that created a motive to curry favor with the government. Appellant has taken the Court’s language in Davis out of context in asserting that, in this case, “[d]efense counsel should have been allowed to use evidence such as medical records or photographs of the [OPC] complainant’s injuries, body camera footage, or witness statements to paint a complete picture of the gravity of Officer Minzak’s situation and expose his bias in the face of his denials.” In other words, appellant asserts that, in order to expose Officer Minzak’s motive to curry favor, he was entitled to try the merits of the OPC complaint. 24 Putting aside the issue of whether counsel had any of these items available for use in cross-examination, 11 neither Davis nor Longus endorses such an unfettered right of cross-examination. While we have made clear that “counsel must be permitted to present the nature and extent of the bias,” Longus, 52 A.3d at 851, including by way of probative extrinsic evidence, “[t]he judge must retain full authority to prevent this sort of trial-within-a-trial.” (Shawn) Smith, 180 A.3d at 61 n.55. After the requirements of the Constitution have been satisfied, the scope of cross-examination must be balanced against other interests, and the trial court “has discretion to impose reasonable limits.” See Hagans, 96 A.3d at 31 (post-Longus decision holding that, when the trial judge permitted cross-examination for bias demonstrating that a cooperating witness had received a plea bargain, but precluded counsel from eliciting that the bargain allowed the witness to “escape[] _____________________ 11 Though appellant often references the trial court’s protective order and its prohibition on conducting an independent investigation into the facts underlying the OPC complaint, he does not make a freestanding argument that the order was issued in error. He relies instead on Longus and Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246 (D.C. 1997), for the proposition that it is error to preclude questioning or the introduction of evidence. However, counsel in those cases had the evidence readily available, while counsel in this case did not. Similar to Longus, Newman is distinguishable because it involved: (1) the complete preclusion of defense counsel’s ability to demonstrate bias, and (2) a specific, discernible allegation that the officer was testifying falsely alongside a detailed proffer about what a defense witness, who was present in the courthouse, could testify to in order to demonstrate the falsity. 25 being charged with two murders,” “the limitation . . . did not prevent [appellant] from ‘meaningfully’ cross-examining” the witness). The trial court did not abuse its discretion here.