Opinion ID: 161263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Farrar v. Hobby

Text: 15 After the jury rendered its verdict, Mr. Barber asked that the magistrate judge grant him attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k). See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) ([T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs . . . .). Williamson objected, arguing that Mr. Barber was not entitled to a fee award because the jury had awarded him nominal damages only and, under Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), [w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages . . . , the only reasonable [attorney's] fee is usually no fee at all. Id. at 115. In his order, the magistrate judge considered Williamson's objection but rejected it in light of several Tenth Circuit cases that interpreted Farrar, including Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 158 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1998), and Brandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d at 1179. Based on these cases, the magistrate judge concluded that an award of attorney's fees was justified. On appeal, Williamson argues that Gudenkauf and Brandau are at odds with Farrar and so Mr. Barber should have been denied attorney's fees altogether. Aplt's Br. at 22. 16 To the extent Williamson contends that Gudenkauf and Brandau are at odds with Farrar because they misinterpreted it, we reject the argument. Even if the argument had any merit, it is well established that one panel cannot overrule the judgment of another panel of this court . . . absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court. In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Of course, while we lack the authority to overrule Gudenkauf and Brandau, it is within our authority to clarify the cases, especially if the magistrate judge misread or misapplied them. Because the magistrate judge did not altogether interpret these cases correctly, we provide clarification and remand so that the magistrate judge (or the district court) may reconsider the issue of attorney's fees. 17 In Farrar, the Supreme Court held that, [w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief [such as actual, compensable injury], the only reasonable [attorney's] fee is usually no fee at all. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115. Notably, Justice O'Connor joined the opinion of the majority but also authored a special concurrence. In her concurrence, she agreed with the conclusion of the majority that, [w]hen the plaintiff's success is purely technical or de minimis, no fees can be awarded. Id. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, she explained that not all nominal damages awards are in fact de minimis: As she put it, [n]ominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory make. Id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 124 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority did not hold that recovery of nominal damages never can support the award of attorney's fees). As to what makes a victory nominal or otherwise, she like the majority found [t]he difference between the amount recovered and the damages sought to be a relevant consideration. Id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But, unlike the majority, she also identified two other factors of import: first, the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed and, second, the accomplishment of some public goal other than occupying the time and energy of counsel, court, and client. Id. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 18 In the instant case, the magistrate judge in determining whether to award attorney's fees to Mr. Barber stated that he would be guided by two things: (1) the 'general rule' that attorneys fees are awarded to prevailing parties absent [special] circumstances which would make such an award unjust, Aplt's App. at 87 (magistrate judge order, filed Jan. 6, 2000), and (2) the three-part analysis identified by Justice O'Connor in her special concurrence. In looking to both, the magistrate judge properly followed this court's precedent. See, e.g., Brandau, 168 F.3d at 1182-83 (recognizing the general rule and applying the three O'Connor factors). However, we caution that the former should not be unduly emphasized to the detriment of the latter. 19 In Gudenkauf, though a mixed motive case, this court specified the proper approach to take: Under the generally applicable approach to a fee request by a civil rights plaintiff, a court must first assess whether special circumstances would make any award unjust. . . . Upon determining that the award of a fee is proper . . . , the court must then fix a reasonable fee, Gudenkauf, 158 F.3d at 1082 (emphasis added) and, in certain circumstances, a reasonable fee could be zero. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 (When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief [such as actual, compensable injury], the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.). Of course, this statement in Gudenkauf is somewhat tempered by Justice O'Connor's statement in Farrar that, [w]hile that exception to fee awards has often been articulated separately from the reasonableness inquiry, sometimes it is bound up with reasonableness . . . . [W]here the only reasonable fee is no fee, an award of fees would be unjust; conversely, where a fee award would be unjust, the reasonable fee is no fee at all. 3 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 118 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 20 As to what constitutes a reasonable fee, this court looks, as noted above, to the O'Connor factors. (Several of our sister circuits also look to the O'Connor factors for guidance. 4 ) The first factor i.e., [t]he difference between the amount sought and the damages recovered, id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring) does not require much explanation. Suffice it to say, the difference in Farrar, $17 million to $1 after ten years of litigation (including two appeals to the Fifth Circuit), indicated that the litigation accomplished little beyond giving the [plaintiffs] the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their] rights had been violated in some unspecified way. Id. at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 The second factor i.e., the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed, id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring) has received different treatment in different courts. Some courts appear to have equated significance of the legal issue with importance of the legal issue. See Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 1994) ([W]e understand the second Farrar factor to address the legal import of the constitutional claim on which plaintiff prevailed.) 5 ; see also Milton v. City of Des Moines, 47 F.3d 944, 946 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that the civil right [the plaintiff] sought to vindicate [in his excessive force claim] was a significant issue contrary to the issue in Farrar); Piper v. Oliver, 69 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that the plaintiff's right to be free from illegal detention was a significant one); Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that vindication of the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is a significant legal issue in contrast to the injury to a business interest alleged in Farrar); Richard v. City of Harahan, 6 F. Supp. 2d 565, 576 (E.D. La. 1998) (noting that the plaintiff prevailed on a significant substantive issue the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures); Lucas v. Guyton, 901 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 (D.S.C. 1995) (noting that the plaintiff prevailed on a significant legal issue i.e., the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment). Notably, the magistrate judge in the instant case seems to have construed significance of the legal issue in this way. See Aplt's App. at 86 (magistrate judge order, filed Jan. 6, 2000) (Certainly prevailing on a hostile work environment claim, in the abstract, is a significant legal issue.). 22 This court, however, has not understood significance of the legal issue to mean importance of the legal issue a sensible position as otherwise there would be little difference between the second and third O'Connor factors. In this circuit, [t]he second factor . . . goes beyond the actual relief awarded [which is the focus of the first factor] to examine the extent to which the plaintiff[] succeeded on [his] theory of liability. Phelps, 120 F.3d at 1132 (emphasis added); see also Brandau, 168 F.3d at 1182 (affirming the district court's decision that the plaintiff succeeded on a significant legal issue because, although she lost her retaliation and constructive discharge claims, she prevailed on her primary claim of sexual harassment). That the second factor focuses on the extent of success as opposed to the importance of the legal issue is supported by Justice O'Connor's application of the second factor in Farrar. She stated in her concurrence that 23 [the plaintiff] cannot be said to have achieved a true victory. Respondent was just one of six defendants and the only one not found to have engaged in a conspiracy. If recovering one dollar from the least culpable defendant and nothing from the rest legitimately can be labeled a victory and I doubt that it can surely it is a hollow one. [The plaintiff] may have won a point, but the game, set, and match all went to the defendants. 24 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 25 As for the third factor i.e., the accomplishment of a public goal other than occupying the time and energy of counsel, court, and client, id. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring) again, there has been different treatment in different courts. Some courts appear to read the factor restrictively. See Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that not every tangential ramification of civil rights litigation ipso facto confers a benefit on society); see also id. (concluding that a public purpose was served in Cabrera, 24 F.2d at 372, but only because the plaintiff in that case prevailed on a novel issue of law) (emphasis added); Maul, 23 F.3d at 146 (concluding that a public purpose was not served because the [p]laintiff brought suit only on his own behalf, alleging only violations of his own rights and seeking redress for his injuries only). 26 Other courts, however, have looked at the third factor in more generous terms, concluding that a public goal is accomplished if the plaintiff's victory encourages attorneys to represent civil rights litigants, affirms an important right, puts the defendant on notice that it needs to improve, and/or provokes a change in the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., O'Connor, 117 F.3d at 18 (noting that the plaintiff's victory was not de minimis because, among other things, it provided an incentive to attorneys to represent civil rights litigants such as the plaintiff and it served as a deterrent to future abuses); Muhammad v. Lockhart, 104 F.3d 1069, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the verdict in favor of the plaintiff accomplished a public goal, namely, encouraging governments scrupulously to perform their constitutional duties); Piper, 69 F.3d at 877 (stating that a public goal had been served by [the plaintiff's] victory in encouraging [the defendants] to refashion their forfeiture procedures to avoid future illegality); Wilcox v. Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a public purpose would be served if the plaintiff's suit achieved . . . tangible results such as sparking a change in policy or establishing a finding of fact with potential collateral estoppel effects); Jones, 29 F.3d at 424 (noting that in general civil rights litigation serves an important public purpose because  [a] plaintiff bringing a civil rights action does so not for himself alone but also as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cartwright, 7 F.3d at 110-11 (noting that a public purpose is more likely served [t]he more important the right at stake and the more egregious the violation; also suggesting that a public purpose would be served if the plaintiff's victory had external benefits or [a] future deterrent effect) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lucas, 901 F. Supp. at 1055 (concluding that a public purpose was served based on the private attorney general theory). 27 In this circuit, the broader approach has been adopted, as evidenced by Koopman v. Water District No. 1 of Johnson County, Kansas, 41 F.3d 1417 (10th Cir. 1994), and Brandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d at 1179. In Koopman, this court discussed the third O'Connor factor and noted that, 28 [in Farrar, the plaintiff's] suit could not fairly be said to have any prospect of benefitting anyone other than [himself]. [Here,] Koopman's victory, like Farrar's, did little for him personally, but in sharp contrast to Farrar's, had significant implications in establishing basic rights for public employees holding a similar property interest. 29 Id. at 1421; see also id. (Although it is true Koopman received only a nominal award, the present and future employees of the [defendant] benefit by having their rights affirmed.). In Brandau, this court reiterated what it had said in Koopman: 30 Although the jury's verdict in this case did not order [the defendant] to change its policies, according to Koopman, circuit precedent does not require the judgment to order a policy change. Nor does precedent require the legal victory to be novel to constitute a significant degree of success. 31 Instead, Koopman instructs us that what is controlling is Plaintiff's vindication of her civil rights and of important rights of her co-workers. . . . Brandau, 168 F.3d at 1183. 6 32 We caution, however, that even as this court has adopted the broader approach the third O'Connor factor should not be construed too liberally. For guidance, we look to Justice O'Connor's application of the third factor in Farrar. There, she noted that the attorney's fee provision ensures the vindication of important rights, even when large sums of money are not at stake, by making attorney's fees available under a private attorney general theory. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She then suggested that in Farrar, a 1983 deprivation of liberty and property interest case, no important right had been vindicated because it was not even clear what kind of lawless conduct . . . might be prevented. Id. ([The] judgment cannot deter misconduct any more than a bolt of lightning can; its results might be devastating, but it teaches no valuable lesson because it carries no discernible meaning.). 33 To conclude, we remand the instant case to the magistrate judge (or the district court) so that he may reconsider the award of attorney's fees in light of this opinion more specifically, our clarification of the second O'Connor factor. We emphasize that our remand should not be taken as either an endorsement or a condemnation of the original fee award to Mr. Barber. We also emphasize that, on remand, the magistrate judge (or the district court) should not apply the O'Connor factors rigidly: No one factor is necessarily controlling; nor should all three factors necessarily be given equal weight. The bottom line is that all three factors should be given due consideration but ultimately it is within the discretion of the magistrate judge (or the district court) to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee given the particular circumstances. 34