Opinion ID: 6984389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The NRC’s Enforcement Policy

Text: In Niagara Mohawk I, we declared that “public policy” in the context of nuclear safety is defined by the NRC’s regulations. 143 F.3d at 706. Here, as in Niagara Mohawk I, the Company points to no materials outside of those regulations that might elucidate the contours of the relevant public policy; thus, as in Niagara Mohawk I, the NRC regulations comprise “the prime source” and the “most persuasive evidence” of public policy in this case and will guide our analysis. Id. at 718, 722. The NRC’s enforcement policy provides the strongest indication of the contours of the public policy implicated in this case. As explained below, that policy and the NRC’s enforcement decisions in a variety of cases indicate a degree of flexibility within the regulatory scheme and suggest that not all violations necessarily render an individual unqualified for employment under 10 C.F.R. § 73.56. The NRC has set forth a specific policy to guide its enforcement program, which supports its “safety mission in protecting the public and the environment.” See General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions, 63 Fed.Reg. 26,630 at 26,633 (1998). Acknowledging that violations of nuclear safety requirements “have varying degrees of safety ... significance,” the NRC categorizes violations into four levels of relative severity. “Severity Level I,” which applies to the “most significant” violations, is reserved for violations that are of “very significant regulatory concern” and which “involve actual or high potential impact on the public.” 63 Fed.Reg. at 26634. “Severity Level IV,” in contrast, applies to the “least significant” violations: violations that “are less serious but are of more than minor concern; i.e., if left uncorrected, they could lead to a more serious concern.” Id. In addition, the NRC recognizes that there may be some violations of “minor safety ... concern” that are “not the subject of formal enforcement action.” Id. In this case, if the Company could demonstrate that the NRC itself — if confronted with the Arbitrator’s findings concerning O’Hearn’s conduct — would unequivocally deem O’Hearn’s conduct so severe as to render him ineligible for future employment in licensed activities, then perhaps there would be a sufficient basis on which to conclude that his reinstatement would necessarily run contrary to public policy. But, as noted above, the NRC was not notified of O’Hearn’s wrongdoing and thus, we are without definitive guidance as to the level to which O’Hearn’s future employment represents an unacceptable threat to nuclear safety. Furthermore, as explained below, the NRC’s actions in different cases do not establish with any degree of certainty that public policy would be offended by O’Hearn’s continued employment.