Opinion ID: 2167556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing Under Society of Plastics

Text: For standing to sue, petitioners must show that they have suffered an injury in fact, distinct from that of the general public ( Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk , 77 N.Y.2d 761, 771-774). This is so since, under common law, a court is without power to right a wrong where civil, property or personal rights are not affected ( id. , at 772; Schieffelin v Komfort , 212 N.Y. 520, 530). Moreover, petitioners must demonstrate that the injury claimed falls within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute challenged ( Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk , supra , at 774). This prerequisite ensures that a group or an individual whose interests are only marginally related to, or even inconsistent with, the purposes of the statute cannot use the courts to further their own purposes at the expense of the statutory purposes ( id. , at 774). Because Check Cashers had no direct stake in the outcome of the bidding process, it did not suffer an injury in fact. Although it stood to lose remuneration for services performed under the pre-EBTS arrangement, that would be the case no matter who was awarded the contract. The injury suffered by Check Cashers, then, arose from the decision to have the EBTS, not from the procurement process to determine who would implement it. Additionally, Check Cashers' alleged injury is not within the zone of interests protected by State Finance Law § 163. One of the purposes of article 11 of the State Finance Law is to protect those who bid on service contracts by insuring that the decisionmaking procedures are equitable. The procurement process of the State exists to promote purchasing from responsive and responsible offerers    based on clearly articulated procedures (State Finance Law § 163 [2] [a], [b]). Check Cashers, however, was not an offerer within the meaning of article 11 and acknowledged that it did not have the capacity to be a bidder and prime responsible contractor for this project. Transactive, by contrast, may be viewed as having suffered a potential economic injury, distinct from the public at large. As the lead subcontractor for Fleet, and as a member of the Fleet team assembled to implement the contract, if awarded to Fleet, Transactive lost the opportunity to perform work on the EBTS contract, and to benefit financially. Transactive, however, is not within the zone of interests protected by State Finance Law § 163 because it was not a bidder or offerer under State Finance Law article 11. Allowing any entity to bring suit based upon its status as a bidding team member would confer standing for far too many potential litigants and allow those whose interests are only marginally related ( Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk , supra , at 774) under State Finance Law § 163 concerns to assert collateral challenges. That repercussion would not only create uncertainty in the minds of bidders, but also would be inconsistent with the policy of protecting the welfare of the community by limiting judicial review of remedial legislation when such challenges are made by pressure groups seeking to delay or defeat action in order to further their own economic interests ( id. , at 779). Transactive's reliance upon Matter of Automated Wagering Intl. v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin. (195 AD2d 169, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 803), recognizing the standing of a wholly owned subsidiary of an actual bidder to whom the contract was to be formally assigned, is misplaced. Even if we agreed with that standard  a question we do not reach  Transactive is not alleged to be a wholly owned subsidiary of Fleet. Nor is petitioners' reliance on Matter of Kick v Regan (110 AD2d 934, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 601) and Elia Bldg. Co. v New York State Urban Dev. Corp. (54 AD2d 337) persuasive. The courts permitted plaintiffs to continue actions in those cases, even though they were not offerers, because the State was found to have violated the competitive bidding statutes in preventing the aggrieved parties from submitting an actual bid. Petitioners do not persuasively fit within the ambit of that circumstance, in any event.