Opinion ID: 2509217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The district court's failure to give a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was admitted

Text: Rhymes contends that the district court erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction prior to the testimony of the two witnesses who testified concerning Rhymes' alleged prior bad acts. In contrast, the State contends that it was unnecessary to provide an instruction at the time the evidence was admitted because here the prior bad acts evidence involved acts that were not uncharged bad acts in that Rhymes had been previously charged with crimes based on his actions. We disagree with the State, and today we clarify the meaning of the term uncharged bad acts as set forth in Tavares. In Tavares, we determined that when a district court admits uncharged bad acts into evidence, a limiting instruction should be given both at the time evidence of the uncharged bad acts is admitted and in the trial court's final charge to the jury. [8] We considered the provision of the instruction upon the admission of the evidence particularly important because it permits the instruction to take effect before the jury has been accustomed to thinking of it in terms of the inadmissible purpose. [9] In Tavares, the district court failed to provide a limiting instruction on prior bad acts that occurred six years prior to the crime charged. [10] The State never brought charges against Tavares for the commission of those prior bad acts. The State contends that as a result the instant case is distinguishable because the testimony admitted here concerned acts for which Rhymes was charged in another case. Therefore, the State contends that Tavares is inapplicable. We disagree. We note that the term uncharged bad acts refers to any acts uncharged in the case at bar. It does not refer to acts that were never charged in any case. The fact that the prior bad acts have been charged in another matter does not negate the requirement that the State must request a limiting instruction prior to the admission of bad acts evidence, nor does it alleviate the district court of its burden to give such an instruction sua sponte if the prosecutor fails to request one. However, under Tavares we consider the failure to give such a limiting instruction to be harmless if the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence the jury's verdict. [11] Here, the district court gave an instruction prior to the jury being charged. Therefore, the jury was properly informed that the prior bad acts evidence could be considered only for the limited purpose of proving intent and similarity between the acts. Inasmuch as the jury was provided with this critical information prior to its deliberation and there was uncertainty whether the prior bad acts were uncharged bad acts, we conclude that the absence of such an instruction at the time the evidence was admitted did not substantially affect Rhymes' rights. Accordingly, we conclude that the failure to give the limiting instruction upon admission of the evidence in this case was harmless error under the facts of this case.