Opinion ID: 2304797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District's Liability

Text: In determining what rights, if any, a purchaser at a tax sale may have against a municipality where the transaction, or some part of it, has gone awry, we must first consider the somewhat esoteric character of the tax sale process. The District disposes of property at a tax sale simply to recover taxes due. The amounts in question are often relatively small. By offering properties for sale, the District is not entering the fray in order to invest public funds in a speculative venture, nor is it voluntarily taking substantial risks in the hope of reaping rich rewards. The private purchaser's tax sale perspective is entirely different. As we explained in Robinson v. District of Columbia, 372 A.2d 1005 (D.C.1977), Economic risk  with the possibility of substantial gain or loss  is accepted and welcomed by those who bargain for tax liens. On the one hand, there is the possibility of gaining title to a valuable parcel for relatively small sums. But, on the other hand, changing circumstances can harm the lien-holder's investment with no remedy against the taxing authorities. Id. at 1008 (quoting United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 366 F.Supp. 302, 306 (E.D.N.Y.1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.1974)). The law may, and does, take into account the variant postures of the participants in this little melodrama. At common law, the tax sale purchaser bought under the rule of caveat emptor  and would get nothing unless he got the land itself. Robinson, 372 A.2d at 1008. The common law has now been modified by a detailed statutory and regulatory regime, and we have held that in the absence of [applicable] statutory provisions, the tax certificate purchaser assumes the risks involved and has no remedy against the taxing authorities. Id. Rights and liabilities under tax sale proceedings rest entirely upon the statutes involved. Id. (citations omitted); see also Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488, 127 P.2d 1, 2 (1942) (in tax sales, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies in all its vigor). The legislature did not contemplate the kind of relief against the District which the McCullochs have requested here. On the contrary, the tax sale statutes in this jurisdiction provide specific remedies for the tax sale purchaser who has bid on a property but who ultimately does not obtain title to it. Where the record owner redeems the property within the two-year period, the District must reimburse the tax sale purchaser, pursuant to § 47-1306, by refunding the purchase price together with interest. Similarly, when the Mayor discovers that a tax sale was for any cause invalid and ineffectual to give title to the property sold, the District is required by § 47-1308 to return the purchase money and to pay interest. If a court sets aside a conveyance as invalid, then the party in whose favor the decree is rendered shall pay to the party holding such conveyance... the amount paid for such taxes and conveyances, together with interest. Id. The existence of these limited statutory remedies cannot be reconciled with the notion that, on facts such as those revealed by this record, a qualitatively different and more extensive remedy is also authorized. Cf. Mack v. United States, 637 A.2d 430, 433 (D.C.1994) (Where, as here, the legislature has specified the relief which is appropriate to redress a violation, courts are not authorized to devise different (and in this case far more drastic) remedies; expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  (Footnote omitted)); 72 AM.JUR. 2d State & Local Taxation § 1036, at 307 (1974) ([t]he fact that statutes have been adopted in [the District] providing for refund of moneys paid under invalid tax sales is itself a strong argument against the existence of any right to recovery in [the] absence of statute.). The McCullochs contend, however, that we are dealing here not with a defect in the tax sale proceeding, to which the statutory remedies would apply, but rather, with negligence on the part of the District after that proceeding was over and after the redemption period had expired. All that remained to be done, according to the McCullochs, was for the District to carry out its statutory duty and to issue tax deeds in their favor. If the District had done what it was supposed to do, the appellants tell us, then the properties would be theirs. Accordingly, they contend, they are entitled to recover from the District the fair market value of the properties which the District wrongfully failed to convey to them. The McCullochs' argument is not without some appeal, but we conclude that it cannot carry the day. This court had occasion to consider a similar set of facts in Robinson. In that case, Robinson purchased a tax certificate for a single family home in northeast Washington after the record owner had failed to pay the real estate taxes due. Relying on an oral extension granted by the DFR, the record owner attempted to redeem her property two weeks after the statutory two-year period had expired. Citing equitable considerations, the trial judge permitted the belated redemption and enjoined the District from issuing a tax deed to Robinson. Robinson cross-claimed against the District, seeking as damages the fair market value of the property. He contended (as the McCullochs claim here) that his right to a tax deed had vested indefeasibly because the period during which the record owner had a statutory right to redeem had expired. 372 A.2d. at 1007. This court, however, rejected Robinson's argument and held that, notwithstanding his claim of vesting, the [only] relief available was or is repayment of the money he paid for the tax certificate on the property. Id. at 1009. In denying Robinson's prayer for more extensive damages, the court explicitly stated in a footnote that Robinson made no allegation of liability on the part of the City because of negligence. Id. n. 3. Seizing on that observation, the McCullochs point out that in this case they have alleged that the District was negligent. Accordingly, they insist, this court's decision in Robinson has no application. We cannot agree. Notwithstanding our recognition in the Robinson footnote that the plaintiff had not characterized his claim as sounding in negligence, we think that the central question in that case was whether a tax sale purchaser, even one whose claim to the property had indefeasibly vested, was entitled to relief which was different in kind from that specifically authorized by statute. Having answered that question in the negative, we are not prepared to undermine the basic holding of Robinson because the McCullochs have attached a different label to what we perceive to be an essentially identical claim. [5] To hold that the McCullochs are entitled to recover from the District the fair market value of the properties, when nothing in the statutory scheme relating to tax sales authorizes such relief, would potentially undermine the integrity of the tax sale process, for the District could become liable for amounts far greater than those that it has attempted to collect. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated in a different but related context, municipal exposure could spread, pebble in a pond, until the governmental agency would be engulfed in a tidal wave of liability. In re Upset Sale of Properties (Skibo), 522 Pa. 230, 560 A.2d 1388, 1389 (1989). The court concluded in Skibo that the tax sale purchaser, however imposed upon by the clear negligence of the tax claim unit, [is] not entitled to more [than a refund with interest] under the clear intent of the legislature. Id. Although clarity of intent, like beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder, we are disposed to agree with the analysis in Skibo. We note that our disposition of this case does not necessarily leave without a remedy those tax sale purchasers who present meritorious claims. If the McCullochs believe that some of the properties were redeemed by the original owners in violation of the McCullochs' rights, for example, they are free to put that view to the test by bringing an action against the original owners for ejectment or to quiet title. We express no opinion on the outcome of such hypothetical proceedings, but hold only that under circumstances such as those presented by this record, the sole remedy available against the District is the return of the McCullochs' payments, with interest.