Opinion ID: 3134964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Damages for Loss of Consortium

Text: Finally, Johnson claims that the appellate court improperly allowed damages for loss of consortium due to its erroneous belief that the decedent’s wife could have amended the original complaint to add a new claim for loss of consortium in her individual capacity. Johnson contends that, while acknowledging that the statute of limitations had expired on this claim, the appellate court incorrectly believed that an amendment would have been allowed because it would have “related back” to the original filing, making it a change “of form and not of substance.” 319 Ill. App. 3d at 632 n.1. Johnson maintains, however, that since Glenn had not previously filed a complaint in her individual capacity, appending an individual claim for loss of consortium to the original complaint would have added a separate claim by a new party. Under these circumstances, the amendment could not have related back to the original complaint. See McGinnis v. A.R. Abrams, Inc. , 141 Ill. App. 3d 417 (1986). We believe that the relation back doctrine is irrelevant in this case. The Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1996)) states: “Every [wrongful-death] action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and,  except as otherwise hereinafter provided .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, to recover damages under the Wrongful Death Act, the decedent’s personal representative must file the cause of action alleging wrongful death. Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering , 166 Ill. 2d 337, 360-61 (1995). The personal representative is merely a nominal party to this action, effectively filing suit as a statutory trustee on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of kin, who are the true parties in interest. VanMeter v. Goldfarb , 317 Ill. 620, 622 (1925); In re Estate of Fields , 588 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1979) (applying Illinois law). In addition, the Wrongful Death Act provides that “the amount recovered in every [wrongful-death] action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person .” (Emphasis added.) 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1996). This provision is designed “to compensate the surviving spouse and next of kin for the pecuniary losses sustained due to the decedent’s death.” Elliott v. Willis , 92 Ill. 2d 530, 540 (1982). See also Knierim v. Izzo , 22 Ill. 2d 73, 82 (1961); Hall v. Gillins , 13 Ill. 2d 26, 30 (1958). This court has recognized loss of consortium as a compensable “pecuniary injury” under the Wrongful Death Act. Elliott , 92 Ill. 2d at 540. Here, the decedent’s personal representative is the administratrix of his estate, Glenn. As the decedent’s personal representative, Glenn properly filed a cause of action under the Wrongful Death Act alleging, inter alia , that due to the decedent’s death his next of kin “have sustained other pecuniary damage, including loss of his love, companionship, society, affection, guidance, comfort and consortium.” This allegation undeniably sought damages for loss of consortium on behalf of the decedent’s surviving spouse. As the surviving spouse, Glenn was a real party in interest in the original complaint. Thus, the amount recovered for loss of consortium is for her exclusive benefit and not subject to the workers’ compensation lien of the decedent’s employer. See Page v. Hibbard , 119 Ill. 2d 41, 47-48 (1987). The identity of the personal representative who filed the complaint is irrelevant since the representative is merely a nominal party acting on behalf of the true beneficial plaintiffs, who include Glenn in this case. See Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co. , 73 Ill. 2d 58, 68 (1978); VanMeter v. Goldfarb , 317 Ill. 620, 622 (1925); In re Estate of Fields , 588 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1979) (applying Illinois law). Thus, requiring Glenn to file an amendment to the original complaint for loss of consortium in her individual capacity would be unnecessarily duplicative and have no substantive effect on the cause of action. See Knierim , 22 Ill. 2d at 82-83 (holding that a surviving spouse may not seek damages for loss of consortium under both the Wrongful Death Act and the common law since the differences between the two counts are not sufficiently significant). Moreover, only the decedent’s personal representative is permitted to file a claim under the Wrongful Death Act. The statute does not authorize the filing of individual causes of action. 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1996) (“Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of” the decedent (emphases added)). See also Hall , 13 Ill. 2d at 30 (recognizing that the requirement of a single action filed on behalf of the beneficial plaintiffs avoids multiple lawsuits); Johnson v. Village of Libertyville , 150 Ill. App. 3d 971, 974 (1986) (noting that the Wrongful Death Act does not create any individual right to sue). In the context of the wrongful-death action filed in the instant case, it would be futile to require Glenn to file an additional claim as an individual to protect her interests under the Wrongful Death Act as the decedent’s surviving spouse. Finally, we note that the settlement in this case did not apportion the award between the two beneficiaries. Although trial courts have the authority to allocate settlement proceeds among competing claims (see Bart v. Union Oil Co. , 236 Ill. App. 3d 964, 966 (1992)), such determinations must be made based on adequate factual support (see Fret v. Tepper , 248 Ill. App. 3d 320, 328 (1993)). In addition, the Wrongful Death Act requires the trial judge to “conduct a hearing to determine the degree of dependency of each beneficiary upon the decedent” prior to calculating the damages to be awarded to each beneficiary. 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1996). Our review of the record in this case reveals that no such hearing was held and that the trial court had virtually no basis for allocating the settlement proceeds between Glenn’s claim and the claim of her minor son. The only facts in the record that are relevant to this determination may be gleaned from comments made during counsel’s arguments at the hearing. These comments reveal that Glenn is a registered nurse and that the decedent was apparently working only part-time, earning relatively low wages, at the time of his death. Due to this dearth of evidence, the trial court had no basis in the record to support any allocation of the settlement. Thus, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and trial courts and remand the cause for further evidentiary proceedings on the proper allocation of the settlement proceeds. On remand, the trial court should allocate the settlement proceeds fairly and reasonably in light of the entire settlement and taking into account that Johnson’s lien does not attach to Glenn’s loss of consortium award as well as the importance of protecting Johnson’s lien rights under section 5(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Page , 119 Ill. 2d at 47-48; Bart , 236 Ill. App. 3d at 966.