Opinion ID: 2581350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure of Trial Court to Strike a Juror for Cause

Text: [¶ 17] Garnick contends that the district court committed reversible error in denying her request to challenge a juror for cause. [12] The basis for the challenge lay in a potential bias of the juror in favor of the School and its chief witnesses. We apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause. Krahn v. Pierce, 485 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Wyo.1971). In connection with the review standard, Garnick does point out a recent decision of this Court wherein we opined, in the form of dicta, that district judges should be wary of rehabilitating a prospective juror who has vehemently articulated bias or prejudice with respect to a party or issue. Ormsby v. Dana Kepner Company of Wyoming, Inc., 997 P.2d 465, 472 (Wyo.2000). While that remains sound advice, it does not alter the applicable standard of review or Garnick's burden of persuasion with respect to this issue. More importantly, nothing resembling a vehemently articulated bias or prejudice with respect to a party or issue can be found in this record. [¶ 18] Garnick contends that because this juror was a friend of Mr. Holzer, who was the gym teacher who designed the obstacle course on which Garnick injured herself, the trial court should have granted a challenge for cause. The record shows that the juror indicated she knew Holzer because he had coached her children, both children had done the obstacle course as a part of their schooling, and because she had taken some ropes courses that Holzer taught. She did consider Holzer to be a friend. Her children knew Garnick, and one of them talked to Garnick about the accident wherein Garnick was injured. After these facts were revealed by the juror, she was asked if her relationship with Holzer would cause her problems in serving as a juror, to which she answered No. When asked if she could give Garnick a fair shake, she answered Yes. In several follow-up questions, the juror continued to indicate she could be fair. Garnick includes in this challenge the fact that the juror also knew the high school principal, but the juror likewise indicated that would create no problems in her jury service. Later in the voir dire, it was revealed that one of the juror's sons served as a teaching assistant for Mr. Holzer. Counsel for Garnick again asked if that would make it difficult for her to serve as a juror, and she indicated that it could be, and that it might be awkward for her. Based upon those responses, counsel asked that the juror be excused. The trial court then asked if she could be fair to both sides, and the juror responded, I guess I still feel that I could listen to both sides and judge fairly. The trial court indicated that that was fair enough for me, and denied the request. Counsel then asked another series of questions and concluded that series by asking the juror if, as you sit here on this jury, could you give Jessica Garnick the same consideration you would give Mr. Holzer? The juror answered, Yes. On two more occasions, counsel for Garnick renewed his objections to the seating of this juror and, although the trial court expressed some misgivings about the juror, he did not alter his initial ruling. [¶ 19] We are unable to characterize these circumstances as an abuse of discretion, and Garnick has cited no pertinent authority that would dissuade us from this conclusion. We note briefly that Garnick goes to some length to describe the juror upon whom they would have exercised a peremptory challenge had they not found it necessary to use it on the juror more fully described above. We need not further elaborate on that matter because we find no error in the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause.