Opinion ID: 2382406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pennsylvania Shield Law

Text: At common law, reporters had no right to remain silent when asked to divulge information given to them in confidence. See, 8 Wigmore  2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Pennsylvania abrogated this common law rule by legislative enactment privileging a newspaper publisher or reporter to withhold the identity of sources of information. The current version of the Shield Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 5942(a), provides: Confidential communications to news reporters No person engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general circulation or any press association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation, for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news, shall be required to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any government unit. (emphasis supplied) The Pennsylvania Shield Law was enacted to protect the identity of an informant and confidential communications between that informant and the reporter. [3] This legislation would necessarily foster the free flow of news to the public inasmuch as it would encourage individuals to divulge information who might otherwise not do so absent assurances of confidentiality. Recently in Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984), appeal pending, ___ U.S. ___ 105 S.Ct. 3496, 87 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated that the Shield Law is designed to protect the confidentiality of the source. The court stated that sources are excludable whether or not they contain the identity of sources actually used by the newspaper since the identity of all persons named or implicated in these sources is also within the protection of the `shield law'. Id. at 328, 485 A.2d at 387. Instantly, appellants do not contend that the discovery request for documentary materials or outtakes is irrelevant, though they do urge that the information sought can be garnered by other discovery tools. Instead, appellants assert that as a matter of Pennsylvania law, the materials ordered to be produced, that may reveal a source of information, are absolutely privileged under the Pennsylvania Shield Law. With this assertion we cannot agree, since appellants do not consider the countervailing fundamental right to the protection of one's reputation provided by the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, Declaration of Rights, Sections 1, 11. See Wolfe v. Beal, 477 Pa. 477, 480, 384 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1978); Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 400, 341 A.2d 441, 443 (1975). See also, Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Meas v. Johnson, 185 Pa. 12, 39 A. 562 (1898); In re Sharpe, 248 Pa.Super. 74, 88-89, 374 A.2d 1323, 1338 (1977) (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting); Commonwealth v. Swallow, 8 Pa.Super. 539 (1898). The seminal case and only Pennsylvania appellate decision applying the earlier version of the Shield Law is In Re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963). [4] The Taylor Court gave the Shield Law a broad interpretation, although it did so in the context of a grand jury proceeding. Taylor arose out of a grand jury investigation in November, 1962, into alleged criminal activity in Philadelphia city government. Among those questioned was John Fitzpatrick, who revealed that he had given information to Philadelphia Evening and Sunday Bulletin reporters. Fitzpatrick had been questioned by the District Attorney's office in February, 1962, but the contents of the interrogation were not made public. On December 30, 1962, the Bulletin published an article entitled Fitzpatrick's Secret Talk to D.A. is Barred and revealed portions of the February interrogation to which the Bulletin had acquired access. The article stated that much of the District Attorney's questioning dealt with what John Fitzpatrick had told Bulletin reporters. Id., 412 Pa. at 36, 193 A.2d at 183. As a result, the grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum on Robert Taylor, the president of the Bulletin and on Earl Selby, the paper's city editor. The subpoena directed them to produce before the grand jury all material, documents, and tape recordings relating to Fitzpatrick's disclosures to them and any material relating to independent investigations deriving from their discussions. Taylor and Selby appeared before the grand jury but refused to relinquish the requested material and documents and to answer certain related questions. They contended the Shield Law privileged them from disclosing the source of any information procured during the course of the preparation of the story. The lower court found them in contempt of court, and they appealed. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the lower court's determination that the phrase source of information, as used in the statute, includes only the identity of the person who disclosed the information, and it reversed the contempt citations. The term source of information, according to the Court, means not only the identity of the person but likewise includes documents, inanimate objects and all sources of information. Id., 412 Pa. at 40, 193 A.2d at 185 (emphasis deleted). This construction, according to the Court, accords with its view of the Shield Law as being: [A] wise and salutary declaration of public policy whose spiritual father is the revered Constitutionally ordained freedom of the press. The Act must therefore, we repeat, be liberally and broadly construed in order to carry out the clear objective and intent of the Legislature which has placed the gathering and the protection of the source of news as of greater importance to the public interest and of more value to the public welfare than the disclosure of the alleged crime or the alleged criminal. Id., 412 Pa. at 42, 193 A.2d at 185-86 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, the court concluded that all the notes and recordings of Fitzpatrick's discussion with the Bulletin were protected by the Shield Law, except those portions of statements actually published or publicly disclosed. Although Fitzpatrick was the primary source of the information contained in the notes and recordings, non published information given by Fitzpatrick was protected because the identity of many other persons may have been revealed in the questions and/or the answers. Id., 412 Pa. at 43, 193 A.2d at 186. The Court's position was taken in response to the lower court's ruling that only the documents and recordings allegedly evidencing what Fitzpatrick had told reporters must be produced but with all the names deleted. This approach to balancing the interest of the public in the discovery of crimes with that of protecting the identity of confidential sources was apparently rejected by the Court as it stated: If a Court can select or direct newsmen in its or their judgment to select or delete what information is disclosed by the informer or to furnish the documents in full with only the names deleted which the newsman or the Court sincerely believes should be deleted, the purpose, the object and the intent of the Act will be realistically nullified. Id., 412 Pa. at 43-44, 193 A.2d at 186 (emphasis in original). The Court did not distinguish between confidential and nonconfidential subpoena materials, nor did it limit its holding to only those materials that would reveal the identity of the confidential source. Instead, the Court concluded that the term source of information includes and thereby protects from compelled disclosure the identity of an informant, as well as documents and recordings. Only those statements made by the informant waived by actual publication or public disclosure by the reporter are not afforded protection under the statute. Id., 412 Pa. at 44, 193 A.2d at 186. By interpreting the phrase source of information as encompassing both the identity of the informant and the information itself, the Taylor Court adheres to the principal focus of the statute. The statute protects from disclosure the name of the informant and that information which would inferentially reveal an informant's identity. [5] But Taylor appears to go one step further. The Court suggests, even after the primary source is revealed, that the mere possibility that secondary sources could similarly be revealed by compelled discovery of information is sufficient to invoke the protection of the statute. This position is predicated on the assumption that judicial involvement in the administration of the privilege would compromise the editorial process and freedom of the press. The Court, in so holding, seemingly forecloses inspection of documents by a court in order to make an evaluation to assure the nondisclosure of primary or secondary sources and, likewise, court instruction to a media defendant to produce only those materials not revealing the same. Consequently, as appellants urge, the Shield Law as construed in Taylor privileges them from disclosing information in and of itself, except those portions actually published or publicly disclosed. Hence, a carte blanche privilege of nondisclosure of information is given to reporters, and waiver of that privilege by the reporter extends only to information actually published or publicly disclosed and not to other statements made by the informer to the newspaper. Id., 412 Pa. at 44, 193 A.2d at 186. Appellants contend that the Taylor decision applies with equal force in the context of a libel action. Taylor has been analyzed in this setting. In Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3rd Cir. 1980), a case factually analogous to the cases sub judice, the Pennsylvania Shield Law was construed by the Third Circuit to accord protection to filmed outtakes sought to be produced in a defamation suit brought against WTAE-TV, a Pittsburgh station. WTAE-TV broadcast a news segment raising questions about the quality of meat sold by Steaks. During the broadcast, a portion of an interview conducted by a WTAE-TV reporter with Aubrey Mills, an employee of Steaks, was aired. Other Steak's employees were interviewed, but their names were not disclosed during the broadcast. Steaks, an Ohio based corporation, commenced a defamation suit against WTAE-TV in federal court based on diversity of citizenship. During pre-trial discovery, Steaks requested that WTAE-TV produce the outtakes of the Mill's interview that had not been included in the broadcast. Additionally, Steaks requested the outtakes of interviews of two customers whose identities had not been disclosed. The Third Circuit court, applying Pennsylvania law, held that the Shield Law, as construed in Taylor, clearly protected the discovery of the outtakes of the interviews with the two customers whose identities had not been disclosed, since compelling production would reveal their identities as primary sources of information. More pertinent, the court construed Taylor as protecting all nonpublished portions of a source's statements from compulsory disclosure because of the Taylor concern that disclosure of statements not actually published or publicly disclosed might reveal the identity of secondary sources. Id. at 279. [6] Appellants urge that Taylor, as construed in Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers Inc., 3 Pa.D.C.3d 693 (1977) (lower court decision reversed on other grounds) and in Steaks Unlimited, erects an impenetrable barrier to the enforcement of the discovery order at issue here. However, neither Hepps nor Steaks Unlimited carry the force of binding precedent on this Court [7] , and indeed, neither case heeds the fundamental right of reputation impressed upon the Pennsylvania Constitution. Inasmuch as the Taylor case arose in the context of a grand jury proceeding rather than in the setting of a libel action, it is not controlling here. The Taylor Court did not have before it a plaintiff seeking to vindicate his fundamental constitutional right. [8] Article 1, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness. (emphasis supplied) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that the protection of one's reputation is a fundamental right classified with life, liberty and property. Moyer v. Phillips, supra , (emphasis supplied); see also, Wolfe v. Beal, supra ; Matson v. Margiotti, supra ; Meas v. Johnson, supra ; In re Sharpe, supra ; Commonwealth v. Swallow, supra . The vindication and restoration of one's reputation is further etched into the Pennsylvania Constitution in article 1, section 7, the freedom of speech and press clause, and in article 1, section 11, the legal remedies clause. Article 1, section 7 provides: The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. (emphasis supplied) Article 1, section 11 provides: All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay . . . (emphasis supplied) The former section assures that freedom of the press cannot preclude a defamation action and the latter section expressly recognizes a remedy to one whose reputation has been injured. These provisions, then, make clear that the citizens of this Commonwealth enjoy a fundamental right in the protection of reputation, see Moyer v. Phillips, supra , and are given a remedy to right any wrong done to it. Accordingly, a limitation upon that remedy through the operation of a testimonial privilege must be scrutinized. [9] Where the operation of a testimonial privilege would deny a plaintiff the ability to pursue the vindication of his fundamental right through a defamation action to an extent that the right is impermissibly impaired or nullified, it cannot be condoned. Where there is a right and no remedy, there is no right. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.  5101; Art. I,  11, Pa. Constitution. Severe barriers face appellees in the instant matter. Appellees must meet their burden of proving the defamatory character of the broadcasts and that the television audience understood the broadcasts as having a defamatory meaning. [10] Assuming that appellees can meet this burden, they must then, in a given situation, rebut appellants' assertion of qualified privilege by proving its abuse. [11] In order to establish abuse of qualified privilege, appellees must prove, dependent on their status as defamation plaintiffs, that the broadcasts were either maliciously or negligently made. [12] In particular, comparison of the film segments actually broadcast with outtakes possibly favorable to appellees, and undisclosed by appellants would be crucial in proving the requisite degree of constitutional fault. [13] Compare Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167, 181, 191 A.2d 662, 669 (1963). Such a showing could have the effect of vitiating the assertion of qualified privilege by appellants. Appellants' contention that the Shield Law creates an absolute privilege of nondisclosure of outtakes that may reveal a source of information would effectively deny appellees the opportunity to vindicate their legal guarantee. Taylor cannot be construed as sanctioning such a result, and I believe such an interpretation would be impermissible as a matter of state constitutional law. [14] Furthermore, I am convinced the Taylor Court would have recognized the inherent unfairness of a media defendant's asserting the defense of truth, when a libel plaintiff is required to prove the requisite degree of constitutional fault without crucial objective evidence from which the critical element of fault could be inferred. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979) makes this point. Noting that evidentiary privileges in litigation are disfavored, [15] the United States Supreme Court held that the first amendment to the United States Constitution is not to be construed as creating an absolute discovery privilege for materials implicating the editorial process, i.e., materials that directly reveal the media defendant's subjective state of mind. Id. at 169, 99 S.Ct. at 1645, 60 L.Ed.2d at 129. See Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 175, 439 A.2d 652, 658 (1981). The Court emphasized that an individual's interest in his reputation is a basic concern and observed that a libel plaintiff would be severely hampered if direct evidence of the editorial process relevant to proving knowing or reckless disregard of truth was placed beyond his reach. Id. at 169, 99 S.Ct. at 1645, 60 L.Ed.2d at 129. The majority noted that foreclosing discovery of editorial processes would erect an impenetrable barrier to the plaintiff's use of such evidence and is a matter of some substance, particularly when defendants themselves are prone to assert their good faith belief in the truth of their publications, and libel plaintiffs are required to prove knowing or reckless falsehood with `convincing clarity'. Id. at 170, 99 S.Ct. at 1646, 60 L.Ed.2d at 130. This rationale applies when a libel plaintiff's burden is only to prove some degree of culpability. Herbert, supra at 172, 99 S.Ct. at 1646, 60 L.Ed.2d at 131; see also, Id. at 174-76, 99 S.Ct. at 1648-49, 60 L.Ed.2d at 132-33. Moreover, punitive damages may not be recovered by a private figure plaintiff absent a showing of actual malice. See, Hepps, supra, 506 Pa. at 28, 485 A.2d at 388; Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., supra, 411 Pa. at 187, 191 A.2d at 672 (1963). Indeed, the Supreme Court did not hold that it is unconstitutional as a matter of federal law for a state to establish a privilege against state of mind discovery through, as here, a Shield Law. Inquiry into the editorial processes vis-a-vis a comparison of outtakes with film actually broadcast could be absolutely foreclosed by legislative enactment, absent any countervailing constitutional right. [16] Appellants' construction of the Shield Law does as much. However, we do not think that the Taylor Court, presented with our facts, would have construed the Shield Law to permit this. [17] Appellees' right of reputation is more compelling than the public's interest in the discovery of crimes which was found insufficient to warrant piercing the reporter's shield in Taylor. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Hepps acknowledged that the Shield Law presented an obstacle to a plaintiff who finds it necessary to prove the falsity of the defamatory publication in establishing fault but noted that the Shield Law was never intended to be interpreted as insulating the publisher from its negligence or actual malice. Hepps, supra, 506 Pa. at 328 n. 14, 485 A.2d at 387 n. 14. Thus, we are led to conclude that a viewing of the outtakes would be an important means of determining appellants' culpability or innocence, and we think, a means least intrusive into the editorial process. No salutary purpose would be served by a construction of the Shield Law permitting a media defendant to avoid discovery and the truthfinding process by hiding behind the veil of disclosure of possible secondary sources, where the vindication of a libel plaintiff's constitutional right is at stake. Inasmuch as the Shield Law was enacted to protect the identity of sources and the confidential communications between the source and the reporter, we fail to see that any purpose would be served by protecting from disclosure such nonconfidential material as was ordered to be produced by KYW and NEP here. The lower court's order, carefully worded so as to assure no discovery of materials would be permitted that would lead to the disclosure of a primary or secondary source, accommodates the competing interests of the parties. A similar modification of the order in NEP (to eliminate possible discovery of identity of sources) would cure any possible infirmity in that order. However, for the reasons given below, even this careful procedure is not essential. Although there is language in Taylor suggesting that judicial involvement in the administration of the privilege would realistically nullify the Act, we can only conclude that participation by the lower court would be permissible given the reputation interest vouchsafed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. However, appellants urge that if the Shield Law does not protect them from compelled disclosure of the outtakes, then a limited privilege grounded in the first amendment does.