Opinion ID: 200745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government's Opening Statement and Closing Argument

Text: 15 In his opening statement, the prosecutor referred to White and Capelton as drug dealer number one and drug dealer number three while describing a scene in front of White's residence that he would later show to the jurors on videotape. The government also explained that defendant Capelton's voice was never caught on audio-tape because he was a pretty clever drug dealer. 16 Assuming arguendo that defendants properly preserved their objection to the prosecution's opening remarks, we find no manifest abuse of discretion, United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.2002), in the court's refusal to grant a mistrial after the government's opening statement. To prevail on this ground for a new trial, defendants must demonstrate that the prosecutor's comments so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected. United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274 (1st Cir.1987). Defendants' allegations fall considerably short of this threshold. 17 It is true that a lawyer may not, in the presence of the trier of fact[,] state a personal opinion about the ... the guilt or innocence of an accused. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers Sec. 107 (2000). Ideally, to preclude any argument of error, the prosecutor might have used the locution that the evidence will show that the defendants were drug dealers. Such a locution avoids any suggestion that the prosecution is offering a personal opinion about the guilt of the defendants. However, the opening statement of the prosecution was preceded by the reminder from the trial judge that: 18 the words of counsel are not evidence, and if there's any difference between this prediction of what the evidence will show and what you actually hear from the witness stand, you of course are to be guided by and consider only evidence as it comes in through the testimony of the witnesses or other documents or exhibits in the case. 19 In fact, the government introduced substantial evidence proving that Capelton and White were drug dealers. Under these circumstances, even if the prosecution's conclusory references to drug dealers could be deemed inappropriate expressions of opinion on guilt (an issue we do not decide), those references did not unfairly inflame or prejudice the jury against the defendants. 20 Capelton also alleges that the government inflamed the jury by misrepresenting statements made by his counsel during closing argument. While commenting on inconsistencies in the testimony of the two police officers who stopped Capelton's car on August 23, 2000, his attorney recalled one officer's testimony that only one child was in the backseat of Capelton's car when he was pulled over by the Connecticut State Police: 21 Now, everybody else said two, every officer said two. Let's assume that it's two, he remembers one. Why does he remember one? Because he lost his police report. How does that bear on other testimony? Because all the officers that testified rely on other people's reports. 22 The prosecutor apparently understood Capelton's attorney to say that all the officers that testified will lie on other people's reports, and argued to that effect in his rebuttal to the defendants' closing arguments. Capelton immediately objected to that statement and requested a mistrial. On appeal, he claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's attribution of those comments to his attorney. 23 We apply abuse of discretion review to a district court's refusal to grant a mistrial on the basis of an inappropriate remark by the prosecution in its closing argument. United States v. Hernandez, 218 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir.2000). Here, Capelton does not claim that the government intentionally misrepresented defense counsel's statements, or otherwise acted in bad faith. While the transcript produced on appeal contains the word rely, even the court was unable to discern what Capelton's attorney actually said. Nevertheless, the judge issued the following curative instruction to the jury: 24 First of all, as you heard the closings I believe Mr. Newhouse [the prosecutor] made reference to his recollection of a statement made during Mr. Black's closing. His recollection of this statement was that Mr. Black said, All officers will lie on other officer's reports. During the break I wanted to make sure you understand that Mr. Black's recollection of what he said, and his intent was to say, All the officer's rely on other officer's reports. I passed that on to you so that you will know it, but remind you again that it's your recollection of what is said that controls, not mine or the attorneys' recollection of what was said. 25 This corrective instruction refutes any argument that the district court abused its discretion in denying the request for a mistrial.