Opinion ID: 77388
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impermissible Considerations Affecting the Sentence

Text: 26
27 Under 21 U.S.C. § 841 and § 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant convicted of an offense involving cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine) 6 faces a longer possible sentence than a defendant convicted of an offense involving the same amount of powder cocaine, a chemically-similar substance. This disparity is commonly referred to as the 100-to-1 ratio, so named because of the relative quantities of each drug required to trigger the mandatory sentencing ranges in § 841(b). For example, § 841(b)(1)(B) provides that offenses involving 5 grams or more of crack cocaine or 500 grams or more of powder cocaine call for sentences in the range of 5 to 40 years' imprisonment. Where the defendant has at least one prior conviction for a felony drug offense, § 841(b)(1)(B) enhances the sentencing range to ten years to life in prison. 7 Congress enacted harsher penalties for crack cocaine than for powder cocaine based on its conclusion that crack cocaine poses a greater threat to society. Specifically, Congress found crack cocaine (1) has a more rapid onset of action, (2) is more potent, (3) is more addictive, (4) is less expensive than powder cocaine, (5) has widespread availability, (6) more highly correlates with the incidence of violence and other crimes, (7) is more likely to have physiological effects, and (8) is more likely to attract users who are young or especially vulnerable. See United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165, 1169 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947, 953 (10th Cir.1993)); U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 118 (1995). The Sentencing Commission adopted the same 100-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio in establishing the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), which sets the offense levels for drug offenses. For example, § 2D1.1(c)(6) designates offense level 28 for offenses involving 20 to 35 grams of crack cocaine or 2 to 3.5 kilograms of powder cocaine. 28 In 1994, Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to conduct a study of the disparities in penalties for different forms of cocaine and to make recommendations about retaining or modifying the disparities. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322, § 280006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097 (1994). Pursuant to this directive, the Commission issued a report to Congress in 1995 in which it agreed with Congress's finding that crack cocaine poses greater harms to society than does powder cocaine, but concluded it [could not] recommend a ratio differential as great as the current 100-to-1 quantity ratio. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 195-96 (1995). 8 One reason why the Commission rejected the 100-to-1 ratio was that Congress adopted it prior to the Guidelines taking effect, and the Commission believed that many, but not all, of the attendant additional harms of crack vis-à-vis powder cocaine (such as the increase in violent and other crimes) are now accounted for in the Guidelines. Id. at 196 ([I]f Congress believed that certain factors warranted a 100-to-1 quantity ratio and if the subsequently adopted guidelines provided a punishment for some of those factors, then, as a logical matter, the ratio should be lowered by an amount commensurate with the extent to which these factors are addressed by the guidelines.). 29 The Commission subsequently proposed Guidelines amendments that would eliminate entirely the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. See Notice of Submission to Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 60 Fed.Reg. 25,074, 25,076 (May 10, 1995). Although Congress stated the current 100-to-1 quantity ratio may not be the appropriate ratio, it rejected the Commission's proposals because the evidence clearly indicates that there are significant distinctions between crack and powder cocaine that warrant maintaining longer sentences for crack-related offenses and gross sentencing disparities would result if the proposals were to take effect without Congress lowering the statutory mandatory minimum penalties. H.R.Rep. No. 104-272, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 337; see also Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Pub.L. No. 104-38, § 1, 109 Stat. 334, 334 (1995). 30 The Commission issued a second report in 1997, again at the direction of Congress. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (1997). In this report, the Commission reiterated its earlier finding that although research and public policy may support somewhat higher penalties for crack than for powder cocaine, a 100-to-1 quantity ratio cannot be justified. Id. at 2. The Commission recommended that Congress adjust the mandatory sentencing ranges to reflect a 5-to-1 ratio. Id. Congress, however, took no action. 31 In 2002, at the request of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Commission issued a third report on the crack-to-powder disparity. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (2002). In the report, the Commission firmly and unanimously declared the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio is unjustified and fails to meet the sentencing objectives set forth by Congress. Id. at 91. The Commission made four principal findings. First, it found that current penalties exaggerate the relative harmfulness of crack cocaine. 9 Id. at 93-97. Although the Commission found that crack was the most addictive form of cocaine because of the method of ingestion, it concluded this difference alone did not warrant the 100-to-1 ratio. Id. at 94. Second, the Commission concluded the current penalties sweep too broadly and apply most often to lower-level offenders, creating disparate penalties in comparison to similar powder cocaine offenders and overstating the culpability of most crack cocaine offenders. Id. at 97-100. Third, the Commission found the penalties overstate the seriousness of most crack cocaine offenses and fail to provide adequate proportionality. 10 Id. at 100-02. Fourth, the Commission found that the current penalties impact minorities most severely, fostering disrespect for the criminal justice system. Id. at 102-03. Based on these findings, the Commission recommended that Congress revise the mandatory sentencing range for crack and powder cocaine to implement a 20-to-1 drug quantity ratio. Id. at 107. The Commission also asked Congress for guidance in changing the Guidelines structure to better target the most serious drug offenders. Id. at 108. Again, Congress did not act on the Commission's recommendations. 32 With this background in mind, we turn to the district court's treatment of the cocaine sentencing disparity. The district court disapproved of the severity of Congress's disparate treatment of crack cocaine offenders relative to powder cocaine offenders. At sentencing, the district court expressed its belief that the disparity smacks of discrimination and that the difference between crack cocaine and powder cocaine has never justified the substantial disparity in sentences. Even though the district court did not completely reject Congress's policy of imposing harsher penalties on crack offenders, it took into account its personal disagreement with Congress's judgment as to how much harsher the penalties for crack offenders should be. To the extent the district court did so, it considered an impermissible factor in fashioning Williams' sentence. 33 The First Circuit's decision in United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir.2006), and the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir.2006), are particularly instructive. 11 The district courts in both cases categorically rejected the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio because they believed it overstated what the penalties ought to be for crack cocaine offenders relative to powder cocaine offenders. Pho, 433 F.3d at 58-59; Eura, 440 F.3d at 631-32. In sentencing the defendants below the advisory Guidelines range, the district courts failed to mention any facts concerning the defendants as individuals that would have warranted non-Guidelines sentences, but instead relied on the general inequities they perceived existed in the 100-to-1 ratio. Pho, 433 F.3d at 64; Eura, 440 F.3d at 634. The First and Fourth Circuits vacated the sentences, concluding that district courts are bound by Congress's policy judgments concerning the appropriate penalties for federal offenses. Pho, 433 F.3d at 62-63; Eura, 440 F.3d at 633-34. Both courts held that sentences must be based on individualized aspects of the defendant's case that fit within the § 3553(a) factors, and not on generalized disagreement with congressional sentencing policy. Pho, 433 F.3d at 64-65; Eura, 440 F.3d at 634. 34 We agree with the First and Fourth Circuit's conclusions. Congress's decision to punish crack cocaine offenders more severely than powder cocaine offenders is plainly a policy decision. It reflects Congress's judgment that crack cocaine poses a greater harm to society than powder cocaine. We have repeatedly held Congress's disparate treatment of crack cocaine offenders is supported by a rational basis. See, e.g., Byse, 28 F.3d at 1168-71 (rejecting equal protection challenge that the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity constitutes intentional race discrimination); United States v. Sloan, 97 F.3d 1378, 1383-84 (11th Cir.1996) (holding the sentencing disparity is supported by a rational basis). 12 The 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio not only reflects Congress's policy decision that crack offenders should be punished more severely, but also reflects its choice as to how much more severe the punishment should be. Federal courts are not at liberty to supplant this policy decision. See Pho, 433 F.3d at 62-63; Eura, 440 F.3d at 633; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364, 109 S.Ct. 647, 650-51, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (Congress, of course, has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime, and the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control. (internal citation omitted)). Although the two drugs may be chemically similar, their effect on society is not the same, and it is not for the courts to say just how much worse crack cocaine is than powder cocaine. This is simply an impermissible sentencing consideration. As the Seventh Circuit aptly put it: § 3553(a) . . . does not include a factor such as `the judge thinks the law misguided.' Miller, 450 F.3d at 275. 35 Williams, however, asserts that the crack versus powder cocaine sentencing disparity is a valid consideration under § 3553(a)(6), which requires courts to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. Several district courts that have addressed the issue agree with Williams' position. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, ___, 2006 WL 2542916 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); United States v. Smith, 359 F.Supp.2d 771, 781 (E.D.Wis.2005). Powder cocaine offenders, however, have not been found guilty of similar conduct in any relevant sense. Congress has determined that crack offenders and powder offenders are not similarly situated, and that the disparities caused by its choice of the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio are warranted. See Pho, 433 F.3d at 64 (Congress plainly believed that not all cocaine offenses are equal and that trafficking in crack involves different real conduct than trafficking in powder . . . . Clearly, then, Congress intended that particular disparity to exist, and federal courts are not free to second-guess that type of decision.). The district court's rejection of the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio, therefore, cannot be justified under § 3553(a)(6). 36 Williams also contends the district court did not impermissibly usurp Congress's policy judgment because Williams was sentenced within the statutory range. He argues the 100-to-1 ratio embedded in the Guidelines is not Congress's policy, but the Sentencing Commission's policy, one the Commission has unanimously rejected. He suggests that the district courts can exercise their sentencing discretion to reject the advisory crack cocaine Guidelines without running afoul of Congress's policy judgment. 37 Williams is incorrect in suggesting the 100-to-1 ratio embedded in the Guidelines is merely the Sentencing Commission's policy and not Congress's policy. In determining the threshold quantities for triggering the statutory sentencing ranges in § 841(b), Congress decided on a 100-to-1 differential, and the Sentencing Commission was left no choice but to employ the same ratio in crafting the various Guidelines ranges within those statutory ranges. See id. at 63 (As the Sentencing Commission recognized when it superimposed the guidelines on the statutory framework, it would be illogical to set the maximum and minimum sentences on one construct and then to use some other, essentially antithetic construct as the basis for fashioning sentences within the range.). Indeed, Congress rejected the Commission's proposal that would have equated the drugs for Guidelines purposes because of the gross sentencing disparities that would result if the Guidelines did not employ the same drug quantity ratio as the statutory scheme. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-272, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 337. The same is true if instead of equating the two drugs, the Guidelines used a different drug quantity ratio, say a 20-to-1 ratio. See Pho, 433 F.3d at 63-64. If the Guidelines used a 20-to-1 ratio, a first time offender convicted of selling 50 grams of crack cocaine (the equivalent of one kilogram of powder cocaine in our hypothetical) would have a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7), but would have a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months' incarceration under § 841(b)(1)(A). In contrast, a first time offender convicted of selling 49 grams of crack cocaine (the equivalent of 980 grams of powder cocaine in our hypothetical) would also have a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment, but would not be subject to the 120-month mandatory minimum. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B). In this scenario, the difference of one gram of crack cocaine would result in a sentencing disparity of at least 42 months. Thus, the statutory minimums and maximums and the Guidelines reflect Congress's policy decision to punish crack offenses more severely than powder cocaine offenses by equating one gram of crack to 100 grams of cocaine. 38 The same unwarranted disparities between similarly situated defendants would result if a district court were permitted to use its discretion to disregard the 100-to-1 ratio. Thus, a district court's rejection of the 100-to-1 ratio embedded in the Guidelines not only countermands Congress's policy choice, but also undermines sentencing uniformity in direct contravention of § 3553(a)(6)'s command that district courts seek to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants. See Pho, 433 F.3d at 63-64; Eura, 440 F.3d at 633 ([G]iving a sentencing court the authority to sentence a defendant based on its view of an appropriate ratio between crack cocaine and powder cocaine would inevitably result in an unwarranted disparity between similarly situated defendants in direct contradiction to the specific mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).). Of course, some disparity between similarly situated defendants is an inevitable result of Booker. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 263, 125 S.Ct. at 766-67 (We cannot and do not claim that use of a `reasonableness' standard will provide the uniformity that Congress originally sought to secure.). This inevitable disparity, however, should only be the product of the district court's discretion in weighing individualized § 3553(a) factors in a given case, not the consequence of the district court's general, across-the-board policy considerations. Pho, 433 F.3d at 62. 39 Williams is correct that a sentence below the Guidelines range in a crack cocaine case may be reasonable, so long as it reflects the individualized, case-specific factors in § 3553(a). It may be that for some of the reasons stated in the Sentencing Commission's reports, the Guidelines range in a given crack case overstates the seriousness of the particular defendant's offense or that individualized mitigating factors counsel against a Guidelines sentence. See Eura, 440 F.3d at 637 (Michael, J., concurring) (While the Commission's findings alone cannot justify a below-guidelines sentence, in certain cases they can help sentencing courts analyze the § 3553(a) factors and select a sentence that is `sufficient, but not greater than necessary' to punish, deter, and rehabilitate the defendant.). But to say Congress's choice of a 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio is never justified is a categorical rejection of congressional policy, not an individualized, case-specific consideration. Congress concluded the 100-to-1 ratio is justified, and the courts have no authority to change that. 40 In short, the district court erred in mitigating Williams' sentence based on its personal disagreement with Congress's policy decision to employ a 100-to-1, crack-to-powder drug quantity ratio in punishing crack cocaine offenders more severely than powder cocaine offenders. In so doing, the district court impermissibly usurped Congress's authority to set sentencing policy and failed to properly consider § 3553(a)(6)'s directive to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities between similarly situated defendants. We agree, moreover, with the Fourth Circuit that allowing sentencing courts to subvert Congress' clearly expressed will certainly does not promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense of conviction, or result in a sentence reflective of the offense's seriousness as deemed by Congress. Id. at 633 (majority opinion). 41
42 Appellant next argues the district court erred in refusing to sentence Williams as a career offender. There is no dispute that Williams qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. At sentencing, however, the district court stated the career offender enhancement is a totally inappropriate way to consider the individual nature of an offense or a defendant's individual background and said it was not going to sentence Williams as a career offender. In its sentencing memorandum, the district court again explained what it considered to be the arbitrary compounding effect of the career offender enhancement. Williams, 372 F.Supp.2d at 1339. This, too, was error. 43 In creating the Sentencing Commission and charging it with establishing sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system, Congress directed the Commission to: 44 assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and— 45
46 (A) a crime of violence; or 47 (B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841) . . .; and 48 (2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior felonies, each of which is— 49 (A) a crime of violence; or 50 (B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841). . . . 51 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). Section 994(h) reflects Congress's policy that repeat drug offenders receive sentences at or near the enhanced statutory maximums set out in § 841(b). See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 137 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997) (holding the phrase `at or near the maximum term authorized' . . . requires a court to sentence a career offender `at or near' the `maximum' prison term available once all relevant statutory sentencing enhancements are taken into account). 52 Congress's goal was not simply to punish offenders with prior criminal histories more severely than first time offenders; Congress also wanted to target specific recidivism, particularly repeat drug offenders. There is no question Williams is a recidivist drug dealer. To the extent the district court believed Williams' prior criminal history was adequately taken into consideration in his criminal history category of VI, it ignored Congress's policy of targeting recidivist drug offenders for more severe punishment. The district court, therefore, erred in mitigating Williams' sentence based on its disagreement with the career offender Guidelines provision. 53
54 Finally, Appellant argues the district court erred in mitigating Williams' sentence based on its belief that the DEA snared Williams by arranging to purchase crack cocaine from him, when a powder cocaine purchase would have been consistent with his prior drug sales. The district court's decision to mitigate Williams' sentence because of the DEA's conduct in investigating Williams calls to mind a claim we have referred to as sentencing factor manipulation. United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir.1998). 55 A sentencing factor manipulation claim `requires us to consider whether the manipulation inherent in a sting operation, even if insufficiently oppressive to support an entrapment defense, . . . or due process claim, . . . must sometimes be filtered out of the sentencing calculus.' Id. (quoting United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir.1992)). The claim focuses on the Government's conduct and points to `the opportunities that the sentencing guidelines pose for prosecutors to gerrymander the district court's sentencing options and thus, defendant's sentences.' Id. (quoting Connell, 960 F.2d at 194). 56 We need not decide whether a finding of sentencing factor manipulation is a valid mitigating consideration under § 3553(a) because, even if it can be, it was not an appropriate consideration here. There is no question Williams' arrest and conviction was the result of a valid sting operation, and the DEA no more snared Williams or engaged in sentencing factor manipulation than in any other sting operation. To say a district court may factor into a crack cocaine offender's sentence the bare fact that the Government chose to purchase crack instead of powder cocaine, without more, would undermine Congress's policy of punishing crack cocaine offenders more severely and impermissibly interfere with the executive branch's performance of legitimate law enforcement practices. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, it does not promote respect for the law to imply Government misconduct from the mere fact that the Government chose to purchase crack cocaine from a crack dealer instead of any other controlled substance. 13 To the extent the district court considered this fact as a mitigating consideration, it erred as a matter of law. This is not to say that sentencing manipulation may never be a valid consideration in sentencing. In this case, however, it was error to mitigate Williams' sentence based on the fact that the DEA purchased crack cocaine from Williams instead of powder cocaine. 57