Opinion ID: 2173465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Other Insurance Clause: Excess-escape clause

Text: By the great weight of authority, an excess-escape clause such as contained in the Allstate-Wescott policy (see footnote 7, supra) is void as against public policy and unenforceable. [9] We agree and conclude that, where a covenant not to sue is executed by the passenger of an insured vehicle in favor of, and in settlement with, the host driver's uninsured motorist insurer, the release document expressly stating that the settlement is not intended to release any claim or cause of action against any person or organization legally responsible for causing the injury on account of which said payment is made, the mere fact that the passenger acknowledged therein accepting the payment as a compromise and full settlement for all sums which are or shall become due under the uninsured motorist coverage did not bar action by the passenger against her own uninsured motorist insurer for damages factually remaining unsatisfied in the settlement agreement. Lebs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 592 (Mo.App.1978). The Maine statute compels the insurance industry to make uninsured vehicle coverage available as a condition of the delivery or issuance for delivery in this state of any liability insurance policy arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state. The statute fixes a minimum standard of protection against the uninsured motorist, rather than a maximum. The statutory language does not profess to impose any ceiling upon the insured's right of recovery. It would seem logical to believe our Legislators, in enacting the uninsured vehicle legislation, were aware that many motorists are insured under multiple insurance policies, under their own as well as under policies issued to the owners or operators of vehicles in which they may be injured while passengers therein. If the Legislature had intended to limit the injured insured to recovery under one policy only, it would seem that it would have so indicated by proper expression. Since the statute explicitly states without any equivocation whatever that each liability policy must supply the required minimum degree of protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured vehicles, any legal recognition of the excess-escape clause under the uninsured vehicle coverage portion of such insurance policies would subvert the purpose of the statute and frustrate the State policy. Hence, such clause is void and unenforceable. [10] Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584, 591 (1971). Even if it might be said that our present holding may result in a windfall, because the insured is permitted recovery in excess of what she would have received if the uninsured motorist had been insured for the minimum amount required under our Financial Responsibility Act (29 M.R.S.A. §§ 781-788), such is not inconsistent with the uninsured vehicle coverage legislation which, we believe, was intended to protect an insured to the extent of his actual loss. As stated in Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Insurance Company, 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348, 352 (1973): But if the question must be resolved on the basis of who gets a windfall, it seems more just that the insured who has paid a premium should get all he paid for rather than that the insurer should escape liability for that for which it collected a premium. See also Pleitgen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 296 Minn. 191, 207 N.W.2d 535 (1973). Under the terms of the uninsured motorist endorsement, the appellant must now prove her legal entitlement to damages from the uninsured motorist, as in tort, in order to recover from Allstate. Since there existed factual issues of liability and damages which remained undetermined, it was error for the Superior Court Justice to grant summary judgment in favor of Allstate. The entry will be Allstate's motion to dismiss the appeal denied. Appeal sustained. Summary judgment vacated. Order granting summary judgment set aside. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of order denying motion for summary judgment and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. POMEROY, J., did not sit.