Opinion ID: 3166755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: introduction

Text: Something there is that doesn't love a wall / That wants it down, observed Robert Frost, blaming nature's assault—winter's frozen ground swell. Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in North of Boston 11-13 (1917). As with nature, so too with governments. There is something about power that doesn't love a wall; that wants it down. It is in the centripetal nature of governmental power—if dispersed like so many 29 iron filings across a surface—to be restless until it is united in one place, as though drawn by an unseen magnet beneath. See, e.g., James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, p. 321 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (warning against the gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department of government). Knowing this—and having a healthy fear of consolidated power—the drafters of both our national and our state constitutions structured our government to be crisscrossed by numerous walls of separation. The most important of these walls of separation are those that both hem in and protect the exercise of the three distinct forms of governmental power in our constitutional system—the executive, the legislative, and the judicial powers. This separation of powers that divides our three co-equal departments of government—while nowhere explicitly set forth in the United States or Kansas constitutions—has been variously described as inherent, integral, and firmly entrenched in United States and Kansas constitutional law. See Solomon v. State, slip op. at 18-19; see also James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, p. 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than [the separation of powers]. . . .The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.). But as Frost understood, walls fall down. And within our constitutional system, it is the duty of the courts to not only stand guard over the integrity of our governmental walls of separation, but also, as time and neglect may require, to rebuild them. 30 A SHORT REVIEW OF OUR 20TH CENTURY SEPARATION OF POWERS JURISPRUDENCE In the decades following statehood, this court routinely adhered to a principle of strict separation of powers as illustrated by our turn-of-the-century decision in State v. Johnson, 61 Kan. 803, 60 P. 1068 (1900). In Johnson, we struck down a legislative conferral upon the judiciary of the legislative power to set railroad rates, holding that the functions of the three departments should be kept as distinct and separate as possible, except so far as the action of one is made to constitute a restraint upon the action of the other. 61 Kan. at 814. The remainder of the century would not prove so solicitous to our constitutional structure. By the 1950s, this court was regularly refusing to strike down governmental combinations of power in one place, often in the name of what was practicable. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hawks v. City of Topeka, 176 Kan. 240, 245, 270 P.2d 270 (1954) (upholding an act granting power to cities to acquire real estate for off-street parking by eminent domain on the grounds that 'the absolute independence of the departments and the complete separation of the powers is impracticable, and was not intended') (quoting In re Sims, 54 Kan. 1, 11, 37 P. 135 (1894) [Johnston, J., concurring]); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, 695-96, 308 P.2d 537 (1957) (upholding an act creating the State Finance Council, holding it cannot be overlooked as a practical matter that as between the legislative and the executive departments of our government the enactment contemplates comity and cooperation and not a blending of powers). By 1976, our new practical approach to determining when a government combination of power had become too great dictated that we create a legal test, and in State ex rel Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976), we settled on a four-factor test—the same test the majority applies today—intended to establish whether 31 any specific combination created a significant interference with the independent function of any department of government. Along the way, we stated: Although the theoretical separation of powers of government was strictly enforced in our early history without qualification, the more recent cases have modified the doctrine and applied a more practical approach. . . . In our judgment a strict application of the separation of powers doctrine is inappropriate today in a complex state government where administrative agencies exercise many types of power including legislative, executive, and judicial powers often blended together in the same administrative agency. The courts today have come to recognize that the political philosophers who developed the theory of separation of powers did not have any concept of the complexities of government as it exists today. Under our system of government the absolute independence of the departments and the complete separation of powers is impracticable. We must maintain in our political system sufficient flexibility to experiment and to seek new methods of improving governmental efficiency. Bennett, 219 Kan. at 288-89. A few years later, we reiterated: [A]n entire and complete separation is [n]either desirable [n]or was ever intended by the framers of the Constitution. The fact that the powers of one department may overlap with another department's powers has long been a recognized fact. Throughout the judicial history of this state early decisions attempted to apply the doctrine strictly, refusing to tolerate any overlapping of powers. State v. Johnson, 61 Kan. 803, 60 P. 1068 (1900). The more recent cases have modified the doctrine, taking a more pragmatic, flexible and practical approach giving recognition to the fact there may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the three powers of government and that absolute separation of powers is impossible. [Citations omitted.] State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712, 715-16, 620 P.2d 1132 (1980). 32 Contrary to our history of casually dismissing the theory behind our constitutional structure, we should have paused somewhere along this path and soberly reflected that [t]o the Framers, the separation of powers and checks and balances were more than just theories. They were practical and real protections for individual liberty in the new Constitution. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1216, 191 L. Ed. 2d 186 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). But—in the absence of such reflection—the death blow to Johnson and our early separation of powers jurisprudence finally arrived in State v. Mitchell, 234 Kan. 185, 193, 672 P.2d 1 (1983). In Mitchell, this court was required to determine whether the Supreme Court has exclusive constitutional power to make rules pertaining to court administration. 234 Kan. at 193. In deciding whether a legislative enactment dictating a rule of court procedure violated the separation of powers, the Mitchell court held that [a]lthough the Supreme Court has the constitutional power to determine court procedure, it may cooperate with the legislature in the exercise of that power. The Supreme Court's acquiescence [to the statute in question] is an example of cooperation. Mitchell, 234 Kan. 185, Syl. ¶ 7. The Mitchell court followed the logic of this holding through to its inevitable conclusion, reasoning that because the judiciary can acquiesce in legislative action which dictates aspects of the judicial function, a problem only emerges when court rules and a statute conflict; and in such circumstances, the court's rule must prevail and the statute must give way. Mitchell, 234 Kan. at 195. Mitchell is the culmination of decades of our straying further and further from the Constitution without so much as pausing to ask why. Michigan v. E.P.A., 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2714, 192 L. Ed. 2d 674 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). Its rule that the constitutional separation of powers can essentially be waived by the departments of government whenever they find such separation an inconvenient impediment to some sought-after governmental end misapprehends and may fatally undermine the 33 fundamental purpose of such walls of separation in the first instance—to prevent the gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department which may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Madison, at 301. The separation of powers contains no opt-out clause. The departments are not free to ignore the strictures of separate powers upon a mutual declaration of cooperation in furtherance of some jointly agreed upon governmental objective. And if there is such an opt out, upon what grounds other than the arbitrary whim of one department refusing to cooperate could a violation of the separation of powers ever be found? In a government founded upon and itself governed by the rule of law, the governmental departments cannot by agreement alter the constitutional structure. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2594, 189 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) K.S.A. 2014 SUPP. 20-329 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOUR-FACTOR BENNETT TEST However, as discussed above, our precedent has established that in Kansas the departments may in fact alter our constitutional structure so long as such alteration is not significant. In Bennett—relying on our dismissal of the antiquated theory of separation of powers as it was actually embedded into our constitutional structure by the drafters of our governmental charters—we established a four-part test to determine when the flexibility to experiment in the name of governmental efficiency has gone too far and created a significant interference with the separation of powers: First is the essential nature of the power being exercised. Is the power exclusively executive or legislative or is it a blend of the two? A second factor is the degree of control by the legislative department in the exercise of the power. Is there a coercive influence or a mere cooperative venture? A third consideration of importance is the nature of the objective sought to be attained by the legislature. Is the intent of the legislature to cooperate with the executive by furnishing some special expertise of one or 34 more of its members or is the objective of the legislature obviously one of establishing its superiority over the executive department in an area essentially executive in nature? A fourth consideration could be the practical result of the blending of powers as shown by actual experience over a period of time where such evidence is available. Bennett, 219 Kan. at 90-91. We thereby replaced the clear constitutional prescription demanding the sequestering of powers into three separate co-equal and coordinate branches with a 'balancing test.' See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 101 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, following Bennett and its progeny, in the name of balance, cooperation, and harmony, we have permitted breaches of the walls of separation between the departments so long as no single breach is determined to be significant. The majority today applies the four-factor Bennett test to find that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-329 amounts to a significant interference with the judicial department and is therefore unconstitutional. This holding, however, cannot be reconciled with the facts before us—especially in light of our prior decisions discussed above refusing to strike down far more significant interferences. For example, in State v. Reed, 248 Kan. 792, 793, 800, 811 P.2d 1163 (1991), we upheld a statute providing that a district court shall modify a defendant's sentence when recommended by the [executive branch] unless specific findings are made by the trial court. To reach this result, we applied the first Bennett factor and found no violation because the judiciary retained the final discretion regarding sentence. As such, we found the essential nature of the power being exercised was cooperative and advisory. 248 Kan. at 800. Similarly, when considering the second factor, the Reed court did not find an unlawful level of control over judicial discretion but rather found that the statute merely channels the discretionary authority of the court. 248 Kan. at 801. 35 By the same token—when viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the constitutionality of the law as the majority states it is doing—K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-329 could reasonably be characterized as a cooperative effort to advise and channel the administrative power of the Supreme Court. After all, as the State has repeatedly pointed out, the appointment power is still being exercised entirely within the judicial branch and the actual performance of judicial administrative duties remains entirely subject to the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the legislature has exercised the same fundamental control over the position of chief judge since it began requiring this court to fill that position in each judicial district. L. 1976, ch. 146, sec. 28. Simply put, today's holding cannot be reconciled with Chief Judge Solomon's concession, and this court's implicit admission, that under the precedents of harmony, the legislature does in fact have the power to create the position of chief judge in the first instance and to assign duties of judicial administration to that position. In view of this, we today demonstrate that the standard by which we determine significance is simply the unfettered wisdom of a majority of this Court. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This difficult judgment is unavoidable, especially in light of the manner in which the majority opinion glosses quickly over the district court's application of Mitchell and the parties' focus on the meaning and application of the Mitchell rule. Mitchell's transparent elevation of judicial policy to the level of constitutional law is perhaps more easy to forget than to confront because Mitchell rather bluntly (if impolitely) asserts what actually happens in the world Bennett established—a world in which judges recognize the naiveté of those who developed the theory of separation of powers but who had no concept of the complexities of government as it exists today. Bennett, 219 Kan. at 288. By rejecting the original strictures of the constitution, the Bennett court gave to itself—and to successive generations of judges and governmental officials—sufficient flexibility to experiment and to seek new methods of improving governmental 36 efficiency. Bennett, 219 Kan. at 289. The consequences of this kind of constitutional amendment by experimentation are perfectly illustrated by Mitchell's rule that a legislative enactment dictating a matter of judicial administration is either constitutional or unconstitutional depending on nothing more substantial than whether the Supreme Court agrees with the policy choices represented by the statute. A QUESTION OF DEFERENCE The descent of this court's separation of powers jurisprudence from Johnson to Bennett and Mitchell was aided in no small part by our application of judicial deference. We have routinely stated the rule that [i]f there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, the court must do so. Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 251 Kan. 240, 243, 834 P.2d 368 (1992). We have regularly repeated this rule in separation of powers cases, and we do so again today (though I find little evidence that the majority has made an effort to construe K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-329 as constitutionally valid in light of the four Bennett factors). See Solomon v. State, slip op. at 16. This deferential rule and practice played a key role at the fulcrum of this particular history in this court's decision in State ex rel. Anderson v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652. There, in a 4-2 decision, we ruled that the legislative act creating the State Finance Council did not violate the separation of powers. The Fadely majority relied heavily on our earlier decision upholding the Kansas Turnpike Authority in State ex rel. Fatzer v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 176 Kan. 683, 273 P.2d 198 (1954)—a case that had been brought by then Attorney General Harold Fatzer. By the time Fadely was heard and decided, Fatzer