Opinion ID: 2569285
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Text: To prevail at trial, indeed, to avoid a nonsuit, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. (See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668; maj. opn, ante, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 378-379, 8 P.3d at p. 1113; Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203-204, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 448.) I agree with the majority regarding what this prima facie burden is. It is not onerous, but the plaintiff must show that the employer's actions, if unexplained, support an inference that they were more likely than not based on a prohibited discriminatory criterion. (Maj. opn, ante, at p. 379, 8 P.3d at p. 1114.) Specifically, the plaintiff must show some circumstance [that] suggests discriminatory motive. ( Ibid.; see also O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. (1996) 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433.) [1] Some uncertainty currently exists regarding the way this rule applies to an employer's motion for summary judgment in a discrimination action. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 380-381, 8 P.3d at pp. 1114-1115.) California's traditional rule was that to prevail on summary judgment, a defendant must conclusively negate a necessary element of the plaintiffs case, and demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of a trial. ( Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107, 252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46.) In 1992 and 1993, however, the Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, the statute concerning summary judgment. (See generally Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 581-584, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653.) Today, as relevant, Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (o)(2), provides that a defendant has met its burden on summary judgment of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant ... has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff ... may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. This court has not yet considered the effect of these amendments in a discrimination case. The Courts of Appeal have, however, considered this question in detail, and not always consistently. (See, e.g., the exhaustive discussion in Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal. App.4th 64, 69-83, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ( Scheiding ).) Some courts have held that to prevail on summary judgment, the defendant need merely point to the plaintiffs lack of evidence establishing a prima facie case. ( Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 [The burden-shifting system requires the employee first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination]; Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 806, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 459; Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist, supra, 41 Cal. App.4th at p. 203, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 448 [Thus, the burdens of proof for purposes of a defendant's motion for summary judgment are precisely the same as those mandated by McDonnell Douglas ].) Others have required the defendant to prove the plaintiffs inability to prove its own case.... ( Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 952, 959, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 821, italics omitted.) Others have suggested that because the moving party must negate the plaintiffs right to prevail on a particular issue, the burden is reversed on summary judgment. ( Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138, 150, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 112; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 216, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 642.) I believe the Court of Appeal cases can generally be reconciled. The recent decisions recognize that Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (o)(2), significantly changed California summary judgment law. To prevail on summary judgment, the defendant no longer must conclusively negate the plaintiffs case. Given the difficulty of proving a negative, such a test is often impossibly high. However, the statute also places an initial burden on the defendant in order to prevail on summary judgment. As explained in Scheiding, the differences in the cases can largely be described as differing degrees of caution rather than outright disagreement. ( Scheiding, supra, 69 Cal. App.4th at pp. 82-83, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360.) That case quoted with approval ( ibid. ) most of the following discussion in Hagen v. Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 168, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 197: We cannot agree with those who may be understood to suggest that a moving defendant may shift the burden simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case. It is clear to us, from the requirement ... that a defendant have `shown that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established' (Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, former subd. (n)(2) [now subd. ( o )(2)]; ...), that a defendant must make an affirmative showing in support of his or her motion. Such a showing connotes something significantly more than simply `pointing out to the ... court' that `there is an absence of evidence': before the burden of producing even a prima facie case should be shifted to the plaintiff in advance of trial, a defendant who cannot negate an element of the plaintiffs case should be required to produce direct or circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff not only does not have but cannot reasonably expect to obtain a prima facie case. But where such a showing can be made we consider it both fair to the defendant and consistent with efficient administration of justice that the plaintiff be called upon, on risk of summary judgment, to make a prima facie case. ( Id. at p. 186, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 197.) I think this discussion aptly summarizes the law. To prevail on summary judgment in a discrimination case, the defendant must show that the plaintiff both has not established and cannot reasonably expect to establish a prima facie case. A defendant can meet the former burden merely by showing the absence of evidence of discrimination. But that is not enough. The defendant must also show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the plaintiff cannot reasonably expect to obtain a prima facie case. This latter showing, however, is not impossibly difficult. If a plaintiff has had the full opportunity to obtain discovery and to present all available evidence in support of a discrimination claim, and still has failed to establish a prima facie case, the trial court may reasonably infer that the plaintiff cannot do so. If the plaintiff cannot present a prima facie case, a nonsuit at trial would be inevitable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c; Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 203-204, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 448.) In that case, the trial court should grant summary judgment and avoid a useless trial.