Opinion ID: 498379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cohen

Text: 23 Even if the insanity burden applicable to the underlying felony were of some significance, this court's decision in United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), would prevent Greene from successfully challenging the application of the insanity burden of D.C.CODE ANN. Sec. 24-301(j) to his felony murder charge. In Cohen, this court interpreted section 24-301(d)(1) of the D.C.Code, which provides for automatic commitment of defendants acquitted solely by reason of insanity. It held, first, as a matter of statutory construction, that the provisions of section 24-301 applied to all offenses committed in the District of Columbia, including U.S. Code offenses. 733 F.2d at 131-32. Second, the court rejected an equal protection challenge to the constitutionality of section 24-301(d)(1). Applying rational basis scrutiny, 733 F.2d at 132-36, it held that Congress could treat federal defendants in the District of Columbia differently than those in other places because of Congress' solicitude for federalism, its special concern for the District of Columbia, and the Constitution's separate grant of legislative authority over the District of Columbia. 733 F.2d at 136-39. 24 The statutory and constitutional holdings of Cohen are equally applicable to section 24-301(j). In regard to the statutory question, it is clear that Cohen was interpreting all of section 24-301, not only subsection (d)(1). See 733 F.2d at 132. It is particularly noteworthy that the court buttressed its statutory interpretation by citing Chief Judge Bazelon's statement dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in Greene, 489 F.2d at 1171-72 & nn. 65-66, to the effect that section 24-301(j) could not reasonably be read as limited to D.C.Code offenses. 733 F.2d at 132 n. 9. 25 The constitutional issue is perhaps more difficult, because much of the discussion in Cohen was specifically directed to the mandatory commitment provisions of subsection (d)(1). One of the concurring opinions--which based its analysis on whether Congress was exercising its powers as national or local sovereign and which regarded the mandatory commitment provisions as an exercise of the latter power, 733 F.2d at 141-50 (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment)--might well have dictated a different result in regard to subsection (j)'s assignment of the insanity burden. But the Cohen majority opinion contains no such qualifications, and it is clear that under its analysis section 24-301(j) could be upheld on the basis of the Constitution's separate grant of legislative authority alone. Congress could rationally choose to pursue a particular legislative goal, such as reform of the insanity defense, under its special legislative authority over the District of Columbia, without being obliged simultaneously to take like measures under its general legislative powers. See 733 F.2d at 138-39 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955)). We see no reason why Cohen 's constitutional analysis should not extend to subsection 24-301(j). 26 The parties have vigorously debated whether the 1984 Cohen decision can tell us anything about the standard that should have been applied when Greene's direct appeal was decided in 1973. See Brief for the United States at 23-25; Reply Brief for Appellant at 12-18. We find it unnecessary to decide this question, for Cohen makes it very clear what standard would apply if Greene were to be retried now. The applicable insanity burden now would be the same one that was applied to Greene's felony murder count in 1973, namely that specified in section 24-301(j) of the D.C.Code. Thus, if there was error, it would not be sufficient to require reversal even on direct appeal, see FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(a), much less on collateral review. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2239, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979).