Opinion ID: 2564099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applying brisbane

Text: ¶ 38 While the parties essentially agree that KCO 15051 is not referendable if Brisbane remains (as it does) good law, they are divided on whether KCO 15052 and 15053 fall under it. The proponents of the initiative and two amici believe Brisbane does not apply; the county and the other four amici disagree. The county bears the burden of persuasion because it is the proponent of declaratory relief. E.g., Maleng v. King County Corr. Guild, 150 Wash.2d 325, 334, 76 P.3d 727 (2003). ¶ 39 As amicus Pacific Legal Foundation quite properly notes, if read too broadly, Brisbane could remove all land use regulation from local referendum. Amicus Br. of Pac. Legal Found. at 15. It is not enough that an ordinance is related in some way to the implementation of a comprehensive plan. County ordinances must implement state policy at the direction of the State to be immune from local referenda. In general, those who oppose an election on a referendum will have the burden of showing that the challenged ordinance is necessary to or was passed for the purpose of implementing state policies. ¶ 40 We hold that whether a specific ordinance is subject to a referendum must be decided on a case by case basis, considering, at the least, the scope of the statutory schema undergirding the ordinance, and whether the ordinances were necessary to or passed for the purposes of implementing that statutory scheme. We will show appropriate deference to the expressed intent of the legislative body enacting that ordinance, and if that intent is clear, the challenger must show, by evidence and argument, that in fact the ordinance is outside of the scope of the state statutory schema. [9] ¶ 41 First, we turn to the scope of the statutory schema. McFarland argues that KCO 15052 (regulating surface water flows, especially storm waters) and KCO 15053 (regulating clearing and grading) are outside the scope of the GMA and thus not matters of state policy. ¶ 42 But this is a strained and artificial way to read the county's obligations to protect critical areas. Under the GMA, [e]ach county . . . shall adopt development regulations that protect critical areas that are required to be designated under RCW 36.70A.170. RCW 36.70A.060(2) (emphasis added). ¶ 43 Critical areas that counties must protect include wetlands, areas critical to recharging aquifers used for potable water, areas used for fish and wildlife habitat conservation, areas that are frequently flooded, and areas that are geologically hazardous. RCW 36.70A.030(5). Clearly, critical areas are particularly sensitive to water flows, which are regulated by KCO 15052 and 15053. The county concluded that it needed to regulate water flows and developed these ordinances as a part of the protection it is providing to critical areas. The county produced considerable evidence to support its conclusion. See, e.g., CP at 269-75 (Decl. of Harry Reinert, detailing process and need for the regulations). We find it has satisfied its burden. ¶ 44 Next, we turn to whether the ordinances were necessary to, or passed for the purposes of, implementing the GMA. We note that the three ordinances were developed together, and that the county's statement of facts appended to KCO 15051 specifically discuss the need for storm water and grading regulations to prevent harm to critical areas, and that KCO 15052 and 15053 have been enacted to accomplish that purpose. KCO 15051(3). The county concluded that to accomplish the mandates of the GMA, it must go beyond merely designating critical areas to protecting critical areas, and that means regulating the actual flow of water in and over the land. See, e.g., RCW 36.70A.172(1) (In designating and protecting critical areas . . . counties . . . shall include the best available science in developing policies and development regulations to protect the functions and values of critical areas.). ¶ 45 The record amply demonstrates that these three ordinances were developed together for the explicit purpose of protecting critical areas and that the county reasonably believed these ordinances were necessary to implement the purposes of the GMA. See KCO 15051(1)(a) (Statement of Facts); KCO 15051(3) (explaining the interplay of these three ordinances); CP at 269-75 (Decl. of Harry Reinert, detailing process and need for the regulations); accord City of Seattle v. Yes for Seattle, 122 Wash.App. 382, 387, 390, 93 P.3d 176 (2004) (holding that critical areas ordinances are development ordinances beyond the scope of the people's power of referendum), review denied, 153 Wash.2d 1020, 108 P.3d 1228 (2005). [10] We decline the invitation to remand for further fact finding on this point, without prejudice, of course, to any timely substantive challenge to the ordinances under the Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 34.05 RCW) or RCW 36.70A.290 that may be pending. ¶ 46 We accordingly hold that King County has established sufficiently that KCO 15052 and 15053 were passed pursuant to the GMA's requirement that critical areas be designated and protected. RCW 36.70A.040(2); .170 (requiring counties to designate and protect critical areas); .050 (requiring consultation); .060 (establishing procedures); .172 (requiring use of the best available science). Thus, these ordinances implement state policy and are not subject to local referenda.