Opinion ID: 2594574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: summary dismissal was proper

Text: Pratt's two ineffective assistance of counsel allegations are based on Greene's evidentiary stipulations and on Greene's failure to obtain an independent expert mental evaluation of Pratt. Both allegations amount to conclusory statements which fail to meet the minimum requirements justifying an evidentiary hearing. A. Greene's evidentiary stipulations. Pratt's only statement regarding the stipulations is as follows: Joseph Pratt Was Denied His Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel When His Appointed Counsel Stipulated to Every Element Of the Crimes of Felony Murder, Robbery and Burglary At the Beginning of the Trial. There are no other statements, either in the Amended Petition or in Pratt's affidavit, which present any other information. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact and will not preclude summary dismissal. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-700, 992 P.2d 144, 148-49 (1999). The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1190, 145 L.Ed.2d 1095 (2000) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692-93 (1984)). The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective assistance of counsel is two-pronged and requires the petitioner to establish: (1) counsel's conduct was deficient because it fell outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of that deficient conduct. [1] Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P.2d 931, 936 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693). In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance, counsel is presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 329-30 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695). In addition, strategic and tactical decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1130, 115 S.Ct. 942, 130 L.Ed.2d 886 (1995). Pratt has presented no facts which would give rise to a genuine issue as to whether Greene's conduct fell outside the wide range of professional norms. Moreover, in his affidavit filed as a part of the post-conviction proceeding, Greene's uncontroverted statements indicate the basis for the tactical decisions he made in representing Pratt. We, therefore, find no error in the district judge's summary dismissal of Pratt's first claim of ineffective assistance. B. Independent expert mental evaluation of Pratt. Pratt's allegation in the Amended Petition is as follows: Joseph Pratt was Deprived of His Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel When his Appointed Counsel Failed to Obtain An Independent Expert Mental Evaluation and Failed to Force the State to Prove that Petitioner Possessed the Capacity to Form Criminal Intent Necessary for the Crimes of Burglary and Robbery. The only relevant factual support for this allegation appears in Pratt's affidavit and reads: At no time in the pretrial process did my attorney, Bruce Greene, have me evaluated by an expert psychiatrist. At trial, no independent expert mental evaluation was proffered on my behalf. Pratt's contention again amounts to a conclusory allegation which is not supported by the record and is insufficient to preclude summary disposition. See McKinney, 133 Idaho at 699-700, 992 P.2d at 148-49. We therefore hold the district judge did not err in determining that Pratt failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary dismissal of his amended petition for post-conviction relief.