Opinion ID: 781123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preemption of Miami Beach's Zoning Ordinance

Text: 11 Miami Beach argues that a state agency's authority to regulate the location of pay phones on private property must be based upon a specific grant of authority by the legislature in the enabling statute which created the agency's power. The city contends that the Florida Legislature failed to grant the FPSC this explicit power. Miami Beach relies primarily on Southwest Florida Water Management District v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) to support this proposition that the Florida Legislature must specifically grant to the FPSC the authority to regulate the location of pay phones located on private property in the enabling statute. A reading of the enabling statute shows that the Florida Legislature granted to the FPSC broad and exclusive powers to regulate telecommunications companies. Specifically, section 364.01, Florida Statutes grants to FPSC the exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of telecommunications companies within Florida. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1177 (11th Cir.2001). The language of the statute leaves no doubt about the broad and exclusive powers granted to the FPSC to regulate telecommunications companies including their services and facilities. In contrast, in Southwest Florida Water Management District, the court concluded that the Florida Legislature did not grant to the Southwest Florida Water Management District (the District) such broad powers but only very specific and limited powers. We find no merit in this argument about the extent of the enabling statute in this case. 12 It is also clear that the limitations to this broad authority are very specific. In relevant part, section 364.01(2), Florida Statutes provides that: 13 It is the legislative intent to give exclusive jurisdiction in all matters set forth in this chapter to the Florida Public Service Commission in regulating telecommunications companies, and such preemption shall supersede any local or special act or municipal charter where any conflict of authority may exist. However, the provisions of this chapter shall not affect the authority and powers granted in s. 166.231(9) or s. 337.401. 14 Since the Florida Legislature granted the FPSC exclusive jurisdiction to regulate telecommunication companies, it clearly has the power to regulate pay phones and their locations on private property within Florida. See Teleco Communications Co. v. Clark, 695 So.2d 304 (Fla.1997). We find it unpersuasive to argue that the Florida Legislature should have itemized the powers of the FPSC when it gave it such broad and exclusive authority over telecommunications companies. 15 The only limitation on this exclusive jurisdiction to regulate telecommunications companies relevant to this case is that municipalities and counties retain the right to manage their roads and public rights-of-way pursuant to their police power. Section 337.401(3)(b), Florida Statutes, states that [e]ach municipality and county retains the authority to regulate and manage municipal and county roads or rights-of-way in exercising its police power. Thus, municipalities' and counties' right to regulate their roads and the public rights-of-way allow them to regulate telecommunications companies' facilities including pay phones located in those spaces. It is undisputed that pay phones are facilities of telecommunications companies as those words are used in the statute. Thus, as the district court correctly found, the enabling statute broadly granted the FPSC exclusive jurisdiction over all matters except for those involving the management of municipal or county roads and the public rights-of-way. Consequently, the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance which regulates pay phones located on private property is preempted in its entirety under Florida state law.