Opinion ID: 763102
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jury Charge In This Case

Text: 24 A jury charge is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard, or if it does not adequately inform the jury of the law. Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 552 (2d Cir.1996). When examining a supplemental instruction, the original and supplemental charges must be considered together; [i]t is basic law that a jury charge should be examined in its entirety, not scrutinized strand-by-strand. Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1990). We will reverse a jury verdict due to an erroneous instruction only if we are persuaded that the error was prejudicial or the charge was highly confusing. Id. 25 In his original charge regarding the strength of the mark, Judge Baer instructed the jury about the different categories of marks, and about the need to prove secondary meaning in order to protect a descriptive mark. He instructed that the sales success of Teen magazine could contribute to a finding of secondary meaning, and significantly, that the length and exclusivity of the mark's use was also a consideration. At the end of his original charge relating to the strength of the mark, Judge Baer underscored that the ultimate issue is whether the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among ordinary purchasers of the magazine as to the source of the product. Petersen takes no issue with any of these instructions. 26 Petersen contends that the district court erred, however, when it stated in its supplemental charge, with reference to Petersen's adoption of a new logo in July, 1997, that it is for you to determine whether Petersen has acquired common law trademark rights in that new design. Petersen insists that this charge effectively instruct[ed] the jury that it should disregard the previous 40 years of Petersen's continuous use of the Teen mark. Petersen argues that the district court's charge compelled the jury to ignore the common law rights that accrued over that period of use. Reviewing the entire charge, both original and supplemental, in light of the applicable legal standards, we disagree. 27 The district court was correct to distinguish between the new stylized logo and the previous one. As Gruner + Jahr made clear, trademark rights in the stylized appearance of a word are distinct from trademark rights in the word itself. See 991 F.2d at 1077-78. The earlier registered trademark held by Petersen protects not only the word Teen, but also a particular stylized version of that word, a version no longer employed by Petersen. To the extent that Petersen acquired common law rights in the new design of the word, they could only have been acquired after use of that new design commenced. 28 Petersen also possesses trademark rights in the word itself that began accruing from its earliest use of the word Teen. The district court's instructions did not preclude the jury from considering whether these rights had been infringed. Judge Baer's supplemental charge made it clear that protection from infringement was not limited to an exact replication of the mark. And by referring back to his original charge, he reiterated that the entire history of Petersen's use was legally significant. 29 The district court might have done better to emphasize more clearly the difference between rights in a word and rights in a particular version of that word. It is not at all certain whether, if this had occurred, Petersen's case would have been assisted. We remain unpersuaded that the supplemental charge did any of the damage of which Petersen complains. Judge Baer made plain to the jury that the bottom line in the case, as in most trademark cases, was whether there was a likelihood of consumer confusion. Gruner + Jahr, 991 F.2d at 1074. The jury found in favor of Time, and the charge was neither so prejudicial nor so confusing as to warrant reversal.