Opinion ID: 2559529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Classifying and Allocating Property

Text: [¶ 11] At the time of divorce, a court must classify the parties' property as marital or nonmarital and divide the marital property in just proportions between the parties. 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) (2010). The term property includes choses in action, Levy, Maine Family Law § 7.3 at 7-13 to 7-14 (2010 ed. 2011), which are defined as `[a] proprietary right in personam, such as a ... claim for damages in tort,' id. § 7.3[1] at 7-15 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 234 (7th ed. 1999)); accord Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d 976, 978 (Me.1984). All property acquired during the marriage is presumed marital and will be subject to equitable distribution unless it falls within a statutory exception. [4] 19-A M.R.S. § 953(3) (2010). The burden of establishing that property acquired during the marriage falls within one of these exceptions, and is therefore nonmarital, rests with the party asserting that the property is nonmarital. Doucette, 2001 ME 38, ¶¶ 9, 10, 19, 766 A.2d at 582-83, 585. [¶ 12] In Doucette, we reviewed the divorce court's decision to distribute some components of a workers' compensation award, which the husband had received during the marriage, as marital property. Id. ¶¶ 1, 7, 766 A.2d at 580-81. At the divorce hearing, the husband had presented evidence to the court of his workers' compensation award comprising three forms of compensation: permanent impairment, wage replacement, and medical costs. Id. ¶ 11, 766 A.2d at 583. The divorce court then set aside the permanent impairment component of the award, and some, but not all, of the wage replacement and medical cost components as the husband's nonmarital property. Id. ¶ 8, 766 A.2d at 581. [¶ 13] In addressing the husband's argument that the entire award was nonmarital property, we held that, consistent with the mandate of section 953, all property acquired during the marriage was presumed marital and [t]he spouse urging the nonmarital status of any or all of [a lump sum workers' compensation] award must prove the existence of the nonmarital component. Id. ¶ 9, 766 A.2d at 582; see 19-A M.R.S. § 953(3). Because the husband had failed to establish that the entirety of the wage replacement and medical cost components of his award were nonmarital, we affirmed the divorce court's distribution of the marital portion of those components. Id. ¶¶ 12-16, 18-20, 766 A.2d at 583-85. In addition, because the permanent impairment award was separate from the other components and compensated a uniquely personal loss, we concluded that the court properly classified it as the husband's nonmarital property. Id. ¶ 17, 766 A.2d at 584-85. [¶ 14] Thus Doucette demonstrates that, by presenting sufficient evidence to the divorce court, a spouse may establish that a damages award received or a claim for damages accrued during the marriage comprises various components, [5] and that some or all of each component is or will be a direct replacement of nonmarital assets pursuant to section 953(2)(B). Id. ¶ 10, 766 A.2d at 582. However, to the extent that entitlement to [a claim] arises from the loss of a marital asset, including income that the beneficiary-spouse would have earned during the marriage, it will be marital property. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.08(2)(a) (2002). And if a party does not present evidence to support a finding that an inchoate claim accrued during the marriage is nonmarital, the court will presume it is marital property. See 19-A M.R.S. § 953(3). [¶ 15] Although the value and composition of a potential damages award may be unknown at the time of divorce, the court should still distribute the property. See Moulton, 485 A.2d at 979. To do so, as the court did here, the court may fix the spouses' respective shares in the future payment if and when received. See id.; Hanify v. Hanify, 403 Mass. 184, 526 N.E.2d 1056, 1059-61 (1988); American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.08(3)(a). [¶ 16] In this case, the divorce court fixed the respective shares of Ramsdell and Worden in the inchoate lawsuit claims. Pursuant to Maine law, the onus was on Ramsdell to establish before the divorce court that some or all of his inchoate lawsuit claim was nonmarital property. He did not do so. Following the divorce judgment, Ramsdell did not move for findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the court's distribution of his inchoate claim, nor did he appeal from the divorce judgment. Consequently, on appeal we are reviewing only whether the divorce judgment is ambiguous in its distribution of Ramsdell's claim.