Opinion ID: 6494575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ex Parte Communications Has the Potential to Render Voidable an Agency Decision

Text: The introduction of ex parte communications into a quasi-judicial administrative deci-sionmaking does not automatically invalidate the agency’s decision. If the ex parte communications are disclosed and the parties are given the opportunity to respond to the contents of the communications, this court has held that due process is not denied. In Mauna Kea Power, the parties’ attorneys, after the contested ease hearing had concluded, “made several written ex parte communications to members of the BLNR, sending them copies of news articles, reports, and a community petition against the project.” 76 Hawai'i at 261, 874 P.2d at 1086. Subsequently, BLNR reopened the contested ease hearing in order to address, among other things, the propriety of the ex parte communications that the parties’ attorneys conveyed to members of BLNR after the hearing had closed. Id. In concluding that Mauna Kea Power was afforded due process, this court reasoned that the reopening of the contested case hearing, together with the disclosure of the ex parte communications, provided Mauna Kea Power with the opportunity to effectively respond to the contents of the ex parte communications. Id at 263, 874 P.2d at 1088. Thus, the dispositive factors that this court considered in Mauna Kea Power as rectifying any prejudicial effect flowing from the ex parte communications were the disclosure of the ex parte communications and the opportunity for the opposing parties to respond to the contents of the ex parte communications through the reopening of the hearing. Id. In Korean Buddhist, the Director of the Honolulu Department of Land Utilization considered a book concerning Buddhism that was not made part of the contested case record and consulted an unidentified qualified individual regarding the Buddhist belief system. 87 Hawai'i at 241, 953 P.2d at 1339. In reviewing the decision, this court reasoned that a violation of HAPA does not result in the invalidation of the agency’s decision if the violation is “harmless” in that the violation did not prejudice the “substantial rights” of a party in the contested case. Id. Because the Director’s consultation of evidence outside the record did not affect the Temple’s substantial rights, this court concluded that the Director’s decision must be affirmed despite the HAPA violation. Id. at 245, 953 P.2d at 1343. Thus, under both constitutional due process and HAPA, only when the inappropriate ex parte communication at issue had prejudiced the complaining party would the invalidation of the agency decision be warranted. In light of this standard, the following email communications are relevant to the issue of whether the discussion at the March 21, 2012 meeting necessitates further disclosure from BLNR in order for this court to determine whether the discussion at the meeting constituted improper ex parte communications that could potentially invalidate the ATST permit on due process grounds: • January 30, 2012 at 4:02 p.m. (from the UHIfA associate director to Senator Inouye’s chief of staff): “I know you’ve talked with Aila [the then BLNR Chairperson], but as previously mentioned, Steve Jacobsen [sic] doesn’t work for Aila he works for Fuddy [the Director of the Hawai'i Department of Health], Would it be possible for you or someone to talk with Fuddy to see if it could be clarified that Steve’s work priority is to complete the Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation in the ATST Contested Case?” “By mid-March, the project will have burned through $4M and will bleed $ .6M each month after that.” “In order to keep from losing the project, we may have to start construction whether Jacobsen [sic] files or not.” • January 30, 2012 at 6:43 p.m. (Senator Inouye’s chief of staff to Governor’s chief of staff): “This will be bad if we lose it. Can we do this - if you all can’t get a handle on this guy by mid-week, can you call a meeting with uh, me, and your depts.—dlnr, health and ag. We need a plan b—we need to review our options before we get notified that we are losing the moneis [sic]—I think it’s been 14 weeks!” • January 30, 2012 at 10:42 p.m. (from the Governor’s chief of staff to Senator Inouye’s chief of staff): “I will speak with [Fuddy]. I also spoke with [Aila] and asked to please help.” • January 31, 2012 at 9:25 a.m. (from the UHIfA associate director to Senator Inouye’s chief of staff): “UH can’t meet with DLNR until after the Board acts on the Hearing Officers [sic] recommendation or it could jeopardize the Contested Case. What do you think about Tony attending the meeting rather than UH? The NSF is not a party in the Contested Case.” • January 31, 2012 at 11:20 a.m. (from Senator Inouye’s chief of staff to the UHIfA associate director): “I can carry the message and I can also carry the uh message.” • February 21, 2012 at 9:52 a.m. (Gary Gill to the Governor’s chief of staff, the DOH Director, Aila, and Senator In-ouye’s chief of staff): giving advance notice to the recipients that “Steve Jacobson, hearings officer, will serve the Haleakala ATST contested case recommended decision today. This morning he is adding some photos to illustrate the location of historic sites and ahu-puaa boundaries. He tells me that so long as the approximately 200 page document is in the mail by midnight it will be considered served today. He is confident it will be done. I have seen the document and discussed it briefly with him. He has been keeping me informed every day over the weekend of his progress.” (This email was thereafter forwarded by Senator Inouye’s chief of staff to the UHIfA associate director.) • March 21, 2012 at 12:13 p.m. (from Tracy Kubota to the Governor’s chief of staff): “[Senator Inouye’s chief of staff] requested a meeting today at 3 p.m. to discuss the telescope, hearings officer and funding issue. AG will be coming in and Chair Aila is pending.” • March 21, 2012 at 12:37 p.m. (from Susan N. Richey to Tracy Kubota): “Chairman Aila will attend todays [sic] 3 p.m. meeting on the Maunakea Telescope” 7 As it now stands, the record is inadequate for this court to make an informed ruling as to whether the March 21, 2012 meeting constituted improper ex parte communication that prejudiced Kilakila and, consequently, whether Kilakila’s due process rights were violated to such an extent as to require the invalidation of the ATST permit. See Mauna Kea Power Co., 76 Hawai'i at 263, 874 P.2d at 1088 (reasoning that an agency decision need not be invalidated if the ex parte communications to parties were harmless). While BLNR disclosed that the “sole topic of discussion” at the March 21, 2012 meeting “was when the final decision in this contested ease would be issued[ ]—in light of Minute Order No. 14, filed on March 19, 2012,” 8 — the email from Kubota to the Governor’s chief of staff indicated that the purpose of the March 21, 2012 meeting was “to discuss the telescope, hearings officer and funding issue.” 9 This is inconsistent with BLNR’s post hoe disclosure that the sole topic of discussion was when the final decision of BLNR was going to issue. Given this inconsistency, there is at least a legitimate and substantial question as to whether the discussion that transpired at the March 21, 2012 meeting violated HAPA and the due process guarantees of both the State and federal constitutions. Re-latedly, because of BLNR’s cursory and unsubstantiated description of what occurred in the March 21, 2012 meeting, Kilakila was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to respond to the contents of the March 21, 2012 ex parte communications. Cf. id. The majority, however, reasons that the March 21, 2012 meeting between Aña, the Governor’s office, the Attorney General’s office, and Senator Inouye’s office was not an impermissible ex parte communication because (1) none of the participants was a party or a party’s employee, representative or agent and (2) even assuming that the Governor’s office or Senator Inouye’s office was acting as a representative or an agent for one of the parties, the subject matter of the meeting related solely to the procedural status of the contested case and was therefore allowed under HAR § 13-1-37(b)(2). HAR § 13-1-37 contains a general prohibition on ex parte communications: (a) No party or person petitioning to be a party in a contested case, nor the party’s or such person’s [sic] to a proceeding before the board nor their employees, representatives or agents shall make an unauthorized ex parte communication either oral or written concerning the contested ease to the presiding officer or any member of the board who wfll be a participant in the decision-making process. (b) The following classes of ex parte communications are permitted: (1) Those which relate solely to matters which a board member is authorized by the board to dispose of on ex parte basis. (2) Requests for information with respect to the procedural status of a proceeding. (3)Those which all parties to the proceeding agree or which the board has formally ruled may be made on an ex parte basis. HAR § 13-1-37 (2007). As an initial matter, HAR § 13-1-37, which does not prohibit substantive ex parte communications from nonparties, is inconsistent with the demands of HAPA. As discussed, supra, HAPA proscribes an agency’s consideration of substantive information outside of the record regardless of the source. See HRS §§ 91-9(g), 91-13. Thus, by not prohibiting substantive ex parte communications from nonparties and interested persons, HAR § 13-1-37 is at variance with HAPA. 10 Even assuming that HAR § 13-1-37 is consistent with HAPA, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the state of the record in this ease is such that it precludes this court from determining whether the Governor’s office or Senator Inouye’s office was acting as a representative or an agent of UHIfA “A ‘representative’ is defined as an ‘agent, deputy, substitute, or delegate usually being invested with the authority of the principal.’ ” Olelo: The Corp. for Cmty. Television v. Office of Info. Practices, 116 Hawai'i 337, 350, 173 P.3d 484, 497 (2007) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 1926-27) (emphasis omitted). There is no indication in the record that the attendees at the March 20, 2012 meeting from the respective offices of the Governor and Senator Inouye were not serving as an agent, deputy, substitute, or delegate for one of the parties. See id. Indeed, the record establishes that Senator Inouye’s chief of staff, in her January 31, 2012 emaü to the UHIfA associate director, offered to “carry the [UH] message” for UHIfA since the UHIfA associate director could not attend a planned meeting. In what manner and the extent to which Senator Inouye’s chief of staff carried the UH “message” during the March 21, 2012 meeting are unclear, and, therefore, whether Senator In-ouye’s chief of staff acted as an agent or representative for UHIfA cannot be determined, 11 The Governor’s chief of staff previously talked to the Director of the Department of Health and asked Aña for “help.” As to what kind of “help” the Governor’s chief of staff requested, and on whose behalf, is unclear. Hence, there is a material question as to what roles the chiefs of staff of the Governor and Senator Inouye assumed at the March 21, 2012 meeting. In short, without a deeper exploration into what the topics of conversation were between the participants at the March 21, 2012 meeting, without knowing what role the chiefs of staff of the Governor and Senator Inouye assumed during that meeting, and without knowing what was actually said between the participants at the meeting, this court cannot determine whether the chiefs of staff of the Governor and Senator Inouye were acting as representatives or agents for one of the parties. Deprived of such information, this court is left to speculate on the roles that the chiefs of staff of the Governor and Senator Inouye played during the March 21, 2012 meeting. Thus, the conclusion reached by the majority—that neither the Governor’s office nor Senator Inouye’s office was UHIfA’s agent or representative—is premature and not supported by the record. 12 The majority further concludes that the ex parte communication during the March 21, 2012 meeting was permissible because the topic of the discussion was the expected issuance date of BLNR’s final decision following the contested case hearing. For this conclusion, the majority relies solely on the conelu-sory statement made by BLNR in the minute order it issued granting in part and denying in part Kilaküa’s motion for reconsideration. It cannot be the case that a post-hoc, conclu-sory statement regarding the subject matter of an ex parte communication is in itself sufficient to establish that the communication is permissible. If after-the-fact, unsubstantiated explanations are sufficient to demonstrate the procedural nature of an ex parte communication, BLNR and any other agency can engage in substantive ex parte communications and then, when those communications are brought to light, provide a post-hoc explanation that the subject of the communication was procedural. An appellate court, as the majority does in this case, would then just summarily accept the agency’s explanation as true and dispositive without engaging in an independent and objective inquiry on a complete record into whether the communication in fact constituted a request for a procedural status of a contested case. The minute order upon which the majority relies states that “[djuring the meeting, the sole topic of discussion was when the final decision in this contested case would be issued.” No further elaboration or supporting document substantiates this eonclusory statement, The majority takes BLNR at its word and accepts as dispositive BLNR’s after-the-fact and unsubstantiated explanation as to the subject matter of the March 21, 2012 meeting. This post-hoc disclosure is insufficient for purposes of due process because it precludes parties from effectively responding to the contents of the ex parte communications and prevents a reviewing court from independently assessing the propriety of such communications. See Mauna Kea Power Co., 76 Hawai'i at 262-63, 874 P.2d at 1087-88; PATCO v. FLRA II, 685 F.2d at 564 n.32. BLNR’s disclosure is also inconsistent with the email from Kubota to the Governor’s chief of staff; this email was explicit that the topic of the March 21, 2012 meeting included the telescope, funding, and the hearing officer, none of which can be considered procedural. Thus, there is a substantial question as to the substance and subject of the discussions that occurred at the March 21, 2012 meeting. Even assuming that the “discussion” at the March 21, 2012 meeting solely involved when the Board would issue its final decision, the “discussion” would still not qualify as a request “for information with respect to the procedural status of a proceeding,” which is an allowable ex parte communication under HAR § 13-1-37. This is because a “discussion” about when BLNR would issue its final decision was specifically stated by BLNR to be “in light of Minute Order No. 14, filed on March 19, 2012.” This order outlined the alternatives that BLNR was considering to remedy the effects of Jacobson’s ex parte communications to UHIfA’s counsel. Given that BLNR was still considering how to address Jacobson’s ex parte communications, the “discussion” during the March 21, 2012 meeting necessarily implies that it may have involved discussions as to whether and when Jacobson would be removed, the appointment process for a new hearing officer, whether there would be a complete rehearing, and whether new findings of fact and conclusions of law would be issued. These topics go far beyond what is contemplated as “[Requests for information with respect to the procedural status of a proceeding” because they touch upon substantive issues concerning procedural due process and the agency’s interpretation of its administrative rules. 13 HAR § 13-1-37. In addition, if the March 21, 2012 meeting was a request for a procedural status on the contested case involved in this case, it has been recognized that procedural ex parte communications “may in effect amount to an indirect or subtle effort to influence the substantive outcome of the proceedings.” PATCO v. FLRA II, 685 F.2d at 563 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-354, at 37 (1975); Government in the Sunshine Act—S.5 (Public Law 94-409) Sourcebook: Legislative History, Texts, and other Documents 232 (Jt. Comm. Print 1976)). In such instances, “[t]he judgment will have to be made whether a particular communication could affect the agency’s decision on the merits.” Id. Said another way, an ex parte communication whose subject matter is procedural on its face may in fact influence the substance of the administrative proceedings. Hence, a reviewing court should not be hasty in proclaiming that an ex parte communication is procedural in nature simply because the agency says so, for there are instances in which a procedural communication could influence the substance of the proceedings. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1255, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see, e.g., PATCO v. FLRA II, 685 F.2d at 568. The relevant inquiry “is not the label given the communication, but rather whether there is a possibility that the communication could affect the agency’s decision in a contested on-the-record proceeding.” Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 391 F.3d at 1259. 14 It follows that a court must take a more careful and critical look at the nature and character of the communication that transpired, together with the surrounding circumstances and the purpose of the participants in the ex parte communication, in order to ensure that the ex parte communication in fact concerned procedural issues and did not affect the manner in which the administrative proceeding was decided. See id.