Opinion ID: 1665171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Failing to Add Distinguishing Characteristics to Each Sexual Abuse Charge.

Text: Harp argues that it was error for the trial court not to add language to each of the seven sexual abuse instructions so that the jury would be required to distinguish from the evidence one count from another. We agree. Each sexual abuse instruction was identical and read, in pertinent part, as follows: You will find the defendant, Wilbert Hiatt Harp, guilty under this Instruction if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following: (a) That in this county, between the 1st day of December 2003 and the 1st day of February 2006, the defendant subjected [B.B.] to sexual contact; AND (b) That at the time of such contact, [B.B.] was less than 12 years of age. We have previously held that when multiple offenses are charged in a single indictment, the Commonwealth must introduce evidence sufficient to prove each offense and to differentiate each count from the others, and the jury must be separately instructed on each charged offense. [2] Thus, we have clearly heldbefore Harp's trialthat a trial court errs in a case involving multiple charges if its instructions to the jury fail factually [to] differentiate between the separate offenses. [3] Very recentlyafter Harp's trialwe similarly reinforced that holding by again explaining that [w]hen the evidence is sufficient to support multiple counts of the same offense, the jury instructions must be tailored to the testimony in order to differentiate each count from the others. [4] Based on this precedent, it is apparent that the trial court erred by submitting seven identical sexual abuse instructions to the jury. We again instruct the bench and bar of the Commonwealth that in a case involving multiple counts of the same offense, a trial court is obliged to include some sort of identifying characteristic in each instruction that will require the jury to determine whether it is satisfied from the evidence the existence of facts proving that each of the separately charged offenses occurred. Having found that the instructions at issue were erroneous, we now turn to the more difficult question of whether that error may be deemed harmless. Despite our earlier statements seemingly to the contrary, we now hold that a failure to include proper identifying characteristics in jury instructions is reversible error, provided that a timely objection to the error has been made. We recognize, of course, that an erroneous jury instruction may sometimes be an unfortunate, yet ultimately harmless error. [5] But a party claiming that an erroneous jury instruction, or an erroneous failure to give a necessary jury instruction, bears a steep burden because we have held that [i]n this jurisdiction it is a rule of longstanding and frequent repetition that erroneous instructions to the jury are presumed to be prejudicial; that an appellee claiming harmless error bears the burden of showing affirmatively that no prejudice resulted from the error. [6] Regrettably, we have sometimes failed to utilize the presumption of prejudice associated with erroneous jury instructions in at least some of our recent decisions. [7] However, to clear up any possible confusion among the bench and bar of the Commonwealth, we now expressly return and adhere to the presumption of prejudice inherent in an erroneous instruction as expressed in McKinney . Of course, that presumption can be successfully rebutted by showing that the error did not affect the verdict or judgment. [8] But viewed through that proper procedural lens, the erroneous instructions in the case at hand cannot be deemed harmless. Our precedent of longstanding leaves no doubt that we have adhered to the bare bones principle of jury instructions. [9] Indeed, former Chief Justice Palmore apparently coined the bare bones phrase in a 1974 civil case, although the phrase has been similarly applied to criminal cases. [10] We have explained this bare bones approach to instructions as meaning that as a general matter, evidentiary matters should be omitted from the instructions and left to the lawyers to flesh out in closing arguments. [11] Or, as we more recently explained, jury instructions should tell the jury what it must believe from the evidence in order to resolve each dispositive factual issue while still providing enough information to a jury to make it aware of the respective legal duties of the parties. [12] We remain committed to the bare bones instructional principle, confident that it works well in most cases to pare down unfamiliar and often complicated issues in a manner that jurors, who are often not familiar with legal principles, can understand. [13] But instructions must not be so bare bones as to be misleading or misstate the law. [14] As mentioned, we have determined that the law requires specific identifiers to be placed in each count in a case involving multiple counts of the same offense. So a failure to include at least some basic evidentiary identification in the sexual abuse instructions at hand was a misstatement of the law. Furthermore, the lack of specificity in the instructions readily lends itself to a potential unanimity problem. [15] No doubt able counsel couldand in this case, didattempt to flesh out the generic sexual abuse instructions in closing argument by telling the jury which specific act of sexual abuse was covered by which specific count of the charges. And, in dictum, we have appeared to approve of such attempted corrective and curative action by the Commonwealth. Earlier this year, in Bell v. Commonwealth , we encountered a similar situation whereby a trial court gave multiple jury instructions on sexual offenses without including any distinguishing characteristics. [16] And earlier in the opinion, we had already held that Bell's convictions must be reversed due to the trial court's unduly coercive actions during jury deliberations. [17] But we exercised our discretion to address the jury instruction issue because it was likely to occur on retrial. [18] We held that the failure to include any distinguishing characteristics in the instructions was error but found that the error would have been harmless because [t]he Commonwealth, in its closing, identified the five distinct incidents [of rape or sexual abuse]. Because the jury ultimately found Bell guilty of all five counts of sexual abuse, it can be rationally and fairly deduced that each juror believed Bell was guilty of the five distinct incidents identified by the Commonwealth. [19] In essence, our imprecise and unfortunate dictum in Bell can be taken to stand for the proposition that able counsel may cure a defective jury instruction in closing argument. But we very recently made it clear in a unanimous opinion that jury instructions, which a jury is presumed to follow, must be based solely upon the evidence; and an attorney's arguments do not constitute evidence. [20] Therefore, we reached the plain conclusion that the arguments of counsel are not sufficient to rehabilitate otherwise erroneous or imprecise jury instructions. [21] Our conclusion that arguments of counsel cannot rehabilitate erroneous jury instructions is directly in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement that arguments of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court because a defendant's right to have the jury base its deliberations solely upon the evidence cannot be permitted to hinge upon a hope that defense counsel will be a more effective advocate than the prosecution. [22] Or, in other words, the concept of fleshing out bare bones instructions permits counsel to attempt to explain the instructions to the jury but does not permit counsel to attempt to correct erroneous jury instructions. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the instructional error in the case at hand was not cured by the Commonwealth's closing argument. Indeed, we have previously stated in a similar case that if the issue had been preserved, we would have found a similar instructional error to necessitate reversal. [23] Likewise, we find that the Commonwealth has failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice in the case at hand, [24] meaning that the failure to include identifying language in the sexual abuse instructions necessitates reversal of Harp's sexual abuse convictions. Bell is overruled to the extent that its dictum suggests that a failure to include the requisite specific identifying language in jury instructions can be rendered a harmless error by the curative powers of counsel's closing argument. [25]