Opinion ID: 671494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cruel & Unusual Punishment.

Text: 34 Ricker also claims an Eighth Amendment violation. After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). Prison conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Assuming the pain inflicted by a prison condition is harmful enough to satisfy that objective standard, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2325, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). 35 Ricker alleges that Weber and Leapley's intentional conduct in subjecting Ricker to continued confinement in punitive segregation and denying him the opportunity for trustee status violated the Eighth Amendment. This argument is fatally flawed. While the Eighth Amendment certainly would be implicated if prison officials imposed a barbaric disciplinary penalty, such as flogging, serving an additional thirty to sixty days in punitive segregation is not cruel and unusual punishment as defined in Rhodes. 36 Ricker does not complain about the nature of his punishment; he complains that it was imposed on him when he was innocent of the charges. In general, allegations that procedural irregularities occurred during [an inmate's] disciplinary proceeding do not involve the Eighth Amendment's protection against the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1494-95 (10th Cir.1987). Ricker cites no case applying the Eighth Amendment to this type of claim. We have found a few cases from other circuits holding that jailers may be liable under the Eighth Amendment for failing to release an inmate who has completed his prison sentence if 37 a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted.... [and] the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight. 38 Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993). Even if we agreed with this Eighth Amendment standard--a question we do not decide 2 --Ricker's case is fundamentally distinguishable. As we have explained, the favorable lab test results did not give Ricker a clear right to release from punitive segregation. At most, the test results suggested that prison officials might have reopened his disciplinary hearing, a remedy that due process did not require. In these circumstances, the Eighth Amendment affords Ricker no greater protection than the Due Process Clause provides. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 326-27, 106 S.Ct. at 1087. 39