Opinion ID: 613481
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: H.S.’s First Amendment Claim

Text: Finally, H.S. claimed that the Defendants violated her First Amendment rights by taking her off the cheerleading squad in retaliation for her protected speech, namely her symbolic protest of Bolton. Unlike H.S.’s equal protection and due process claims, she did not fail to allege facts underlying the essential elements of her First Amendment claim. H.S. undisputedly refused to cheer for Bolton, and the Defendants undisputably removed her from the cheerleading 8 Case: 10-40319 Document: 00511599155 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/12/2011 No. 10-40319 team because she refused to cheer. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-14 (1969) (holding that school violated students’ First Amendment rights by suspending them for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War). The only question, therefore, was whether H.S.’s silent protest was speech protected by the First Amendment. “The First Amendment protects not only verbal and written expression, but also symbols and conduct that constitute ‘symbolic speech.’” Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 283 (5th Cir. 2001). “In evaluating whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to implicate First Amendment protections, courts must ask whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and . . . [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). It is also well settled that students’ First Amendment rights are curtailed while in school. For instance, “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). Alternately, educators may prohibit students from expressing their opinion if the prohibition is necessary to avoid “substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. The district court concluded that H.S.’s conduct was not protected speech because the likelihood that the audience would understand H.S.’s message “seem[ed] low.” On appeal, we assumed, arguendo, that the audience would have understood the message but held that H.S.’s speech was not protected because (1) she was participating in school-sponsored speech as a cheerleader or, alternatively, (2) her silent protest would result in “substantial interference with the work of the school.” Doe, 402 F. App’x at 855. Although H.S.’s free speech 9 Case: 10-40319 Document: 00511599155 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/12/2011 No. 10-40319 claim was eventually unsuccessful, we believe that her argument had at least “some arguable merit.” Jones v. Tex. Tech Univ., 656 F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981). Even if the likelihood that the audience would understand her protest “seem[ed] low,” H.S. reasonably could have argued that the audience knew the background of her alleged sexual assault by Bolton and would have understood the meaning of her conduct. Likewise, H.S. could have reasonably argued that (1) her participation in the cheerleading squad is not school sponsored speech and would not result in “substantial interference with schoolwork,” or (2) forcing her to cheer was not “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Although these arguments did not win the day, it was error to conclude that H.S.’s First Amendment claim was “so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation.” Because the district court clearly erred in finding that H.S.’s First Amendment claim was frivolous, it abused its discretion in awarding the Defendants attorney’s fees related to that claim. On remand, the court should recalculate the attorney’s fee award to reflect only “reasonable attorney’s fees incurred because of, but only because of, [the remaining] frivolous claim[s].” Fox, 131 S. Ct. at 2215.