Opinion ID: 1837467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiently Informing the Hospitals of a Cumulative-Injury Claim

Text: The district court determined the chief deputy commissioner abused his discretion in permitting an award upon a cumulative injury theory. The court reasoned acute and cumulative injury cases require proof of different elements, and therefore the Hospitals was, in effect, deprived of a defense. We begin our analysis with the recognition that our workers' compensation law is for the benefit of working men and women, and should be, within reason, liberally construed. Barton v. Nevada Poultry Co., 253 Iowa 285, 289, 110 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1961); see Orr v. Lewis Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Iowa 1980) (workers' compensation law should be liberally construed). Its beneficient purpose should not be defeated by reading something into a section which is not there, or by a narrow or strained construction. Disbrow v. Deering Implement Co., 233 Iowa 380, 392, 9 N.W.2d 378, 384 (1943). With respect to the merits of the case, it should be pointed out that we have stated [a]n application for arbitration is not a formal pleading and is not to be judged by the technical rules of pleading. Coghlan v. Quinn Wire & Iron Works, 164 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Iowa 1969) (emphasis added). [2] As one commentator has noted, The petition for arbitration may state the claims in general terms and technical or formal rules of procedure need not be observed. The key to pleading in an administrative process is nothing more than opportunity to prepare and defend. The employer is to be afforded a substantive right to be at least generally informed as to the basic material facts upon which the employee relies as a basis for compensation. James R. Lawyer and Judith Ann Graves Higgs, Iowa Workers' CompensationLaw & Practice § 21-7, at 231 (3d ed.1999) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted). Although Waters' application for benefits was styled an Original Notice and Petition, in truth such documents are nothing more than easily filled out forms in which workers may seek redress in arbitration for alleged injuries sustained on the job. Waters' application, despite its title, bears little resemblance to formal pleadingcommon law or notice. Instead, Waters' form merely consists of approximately thirty boxes, in which he was asked to supply basic information about his claim. This form appears relatively simple to complete, and was ostensibly designed so a non-lawyer could initiate the arbitration process without assistance from persons trained in the law. It is important to point out the form does not ask applicants to state whether their injuries were cumulative or acute. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1992), is similar to the case at bar. In Oscar Mayer, the employee alleged four specific injury dates in her pleadings. 483 N.W.2d at 827. The industrial commissioner found the employee failed to prove compensable injuries on each of the four incidents, but found she had demonstrated a cumulative injury claim once all four were taken into account. Id. at 827-28. The employer challenged the industrial commissioner's decision, alleging it suffered prejudice because the employee recovered on a theory which she had not pled. Id. at 828. In analyzing the employer's argument, we stated due process requires that a party be informed somehow of the issue involved in order to prevent surprise at the hearing and allow an opportunity to prepare.... The test is fundamental fairness, not whether the notice meets technical rules of common law pleading. Id. (quoting Wedergren v. Rd. of Directors, 307 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Iowa 1981)). In Oscar Mayer, we concluded the employer was sufficiently apprised of the possibility that the cumulative injury doctrine might be relied upon to justify awarding [the employee] workers' compensation. Id. We pointed out that in one of her four petitions for arbitration the employee referred to the cause of her injury as gradual, and, in another, as repetitive. Id. Moreover, we stated it is not clear how [the employer] has been prejudiced by the allegedly deficient pleading as [the] essential cause of action as well as the supporting facts remain unchanged under a cumulative injury rationale. A showing of prejudice is essential to establishing a due process violation.... Id. Similar considerations apply to Waters' case. As previously noted, the chief deputy commissioner determined Waters' June 16, 1997 injury petition, later amended to June 21, 1997, could have been read as either claiming a cumulative or a traumatic injury. Even if read as a traumatic injury pleading, defendants were well aware of claimant's long-standing history of back injuries, and were not prejudiced by a finding of a cumulative injury. Although Waters' petition does not specifically plead a cumulative injury, neither does it specifically plead an acute injury. This is not surprising, since the form does not require claimants to specify whether their injuries are cumulative or acute. Nonetheless, Waters' vague use of three gerunds (lifting, carrying, and dumping) implies his injury resulted from repetitive work-related behavior. This language contrasts with Waters' February 3, 1999 claim for workers' compensation benefits, in which he referred to a specific incident using the past tense (pushing a loaded custodial cart around corner and lower back gave way). This conclusion is not inconsistent with the fact Waters alleged a specific date of injury (June 16, 1997). The instructions accompanying the form Waters filled out require claimants to allege [a] separate date of injury for a cumulative injury claim. Nor, under these circumstances, is a five-day discrepancy between proof and pleading regarding the injury date fatal to Waters' cumulative injury theory of recovery. See Yeager v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 253 Iowa 369, 373-74, 112 N.W.2d 299, 301 (1961) (difference of approximately two weeks). Discovery should have informed the Hospitals' attorney of the cumulative nature of Waters' injury. Counsel for the Hospitals does not claim to have asked Waters' legal theory in discovery. Testimony taken at the deposition stage of the proceedings should have alerted the Hospitals to a cumulative injury claim. A doctor testified to Waters' long history of back problems, which Waters confirmed in his own deposition. Although a history of back problems does not always necessitate a cumulative injury finding (in some cases these two facts could be unrelated), such a history should alert an employer to the possibility of a cumulative injury claim. See George A. Hormel & Co. v. Jordan, 569 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Iowa 1997) (finding employer had adequate notice of cumulative injury where employer accommodated employee by moving him to less strenuous job and authorized physicians to examine injuries). Moreover, two of Waters' statements clearly informed the Hospitals of a cumulative injury: A. I tried to ask them to help me get into some other kind of work, so I wouldn't be doing what I was doing that was causing the harm Q. Sure. A.the deterioration. . . . A. I guess I would say it's like if you got a jackhammer, and you put somebody on a jackhammer that has a bum back, you're going to end up with more of a bum back. And that's what, more or less, they did. (Emphasis added.) Given these statements, as well as for the reasons noted above, we conclude the Hospitals was sufficiently apprised of the possibility that the cumulative injury doctrine might be relied upon to justify awarding ... workers' compensation. Oscar Mayer, 483 N.W.2d at 828; accord Beckstead v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 60 Cal.App.4th 787, 791-92, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 256 (1997) (holding appeal board abused its discretion in failing to consider cumulative trauma injury because employee failed to formally amend pleadings); Bassett-McGregor v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 205 Cal. App.3d 1102, 1116, 252 Cal.Rptr. 868, 877 (1988) ([A]n amendment substituting a claim for cumulative rather than specific injury does not constitute a new and different cause of action [where] ... the disability is the same and the injury arose from the same set of facts, and is consistent with the guiding principle that claims should be adjudicated on substance rather than formality of statement.). The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from those of another case filed today, Eberhart Construction v. Curtin, in which we find an abuse of discretion because of a surprise development that prejudiced the employer. 674 N.W.2d 123, 125-28 (Iowa 2004). In reaching our decision, we recognize a defendant may approach a cumulative injury case differently than an acute injury case; in this case, however, we simply hold the Hospitals was not unfairly surprised by the evidence or the award. The Hospitals has not proved the commissioner exercised its discretion on untenable grounds or its exercise of discretion was clearly erroneous. IBP, 604 N.W.2d at 630.