Opinion ID: 2332043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process Requires The Opportunity To Be Heard At A Meaningful Time And In A Meaningful Manner.

Text: Because Ms. Jamison's and Ms. Dotson's liberty interests are affected by their listing, this Court must determine whether the Act's procedures adequately protect their interests. This Court will address each of their claims in turn. In so doing, it is guided by the admonition stated above that a court must weigh three factors when determining what process is required: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any of different procedures; and (3) the State's interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893.
Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson argue the Act is constitutionally infirm because it permits their names to be listed in the Central Registry without first providing adequate notice of the claims or an adequate opportunity to be heard in response. They aver that they are entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being listed. In considering this claim, the Court is guided by the well-settled principle that if the State feasibly can provide a hearing before deprivation of a protected interest, it generally must do so in order to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); Cleveland Bd. of Edu. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (root requirement of due process is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest) (emphasis in original); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 81, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented). Here, a hotline call was made to the division alleging that Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson had negligently failed to supervise children in their care. In response, an investigator from the division interviewed them and several others about the alleged negligence. At the conclusion of this investigation, the investigator determined that there was probable cause to believe they had committed child neglect, so they were listed in the Central Registry. Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson were not given formal notice of the charges prior to being listed and, therefore, had no opportunity to respond to the specific charges made. Even after they were listed, the division was not required to and apparently did not give the women notice of the charges but merely informed them of the division's determination. See sec. 210.152.2. Additionally, although Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson were allowed to file affidavits explaining their side of what they thought the charges were about, the Act does not provide alleged perpetrators a formal opportunity to present an explanation when the local director reviews the investigator's findings. Id. The investigation alone, even after review by the local director, is plainly insufficient to support the loss of liberty that accompanies listing in the Central Registry. Although Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson responded to an investigator's queries, they were not afforded specific notice of the allegation being investigated. Consequently, this did not constitute an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time or in a meaningful manner. See also Div. of Family Serv. v. Cade, 939 S.W.2d 546, 554 (Mo.App. W.D.1997) (due process requires pre-deprivation notice that provides enough information to be able to defend the allegations and to present conflicting evidence in a timely manner). No matter how elaborate, an investigation does not replace a hearing. Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 901 (8th Cir.1994). The high risk of an erroneous deprivation provides an additional reason that investigation alone is insufficient to support placement on the Central Registry. The evidence adduced below shows that the CANRB reverses the local director's probable cause determination somewhere in the vicinity of 35-40% of the time, and this presumably occurs after the local director has reversed additional initial probable cause by the investigator. As this rate of reversal makes evident, the the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest through the procedures used, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 is high indeed, and the probable value providing notice and hearing before being listed is significant. Furthermore, under the current procedures there is a considerable post-listing delay before individuals receive a CANRB hearing, at which they are first provided with an opportunity to be heard. The length and consequent severity of a deprivation are considered in determining what procedural protections are constitutionally required. Belton, 708 S.W.2d at 137. Here, although all parties conformed to statutory time frames, more than six months passed between the date Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson were informed of the finding of probable cause and the date of their CANRB hearing. [10] See sec. 210.152.2; 13 CSR 40-31.025(2), (8)(A). Significantly, the Act sets no time limit on how long the CANRB can take to schedule a hearing or to reach its decision after the hearing. As the parties acknowledge, in the typical case, it takes several months before a CANRB hearing can be scheduled. This months-long process before a party receives notice and an opportunity to be heard counsels strongly for a pre-deprivation hearing. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42, 96 S.Ct. 893 (delay between the deprivation and final decision after a hearing is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests); Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 270, 107 S.Ct. 1740, 95 L.Ed.2d 239 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (the adequacy of and need for predeprivation procedures is in significant part a function of the speed with which a post-deprivation or final determination is made). Failure to provide a pre-deprivation hearing is acceptable only if (1) a pre-deprivation hearing would be unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake, (2) the State is unable to anticipate the deprivation, or (3) an emergency requires immediate action. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132, 110 S.Ct. 975; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). The division does not argue that either of the first two situations apply, and they clearly do not. See Greene, 360 U.S. at 492, 79 S.Ct. 1400 (private interest not insignificant or illegitimate); Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136, 110 S.Ct. 975 (when an erroneous deprivation of a protectable interest will occur, if at all, at a specific, predictable point, it can be sufficiently anticipated so as to require a pre-deprivation hearing). Nonetheless, and despite the lengthy and often erroneous deprivation of liberty interests prior to an opportunity to be heard, the division argues that this case falls within the narrow category of cases in which a post-deprivation hearing is sufficient to satisfy due process because the urgency of child abuse situations requires the division to take immediate action to protect children. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 542, 91 S.Ct. 1586. Citing the State's strong interest in protecting children from abuse and neglect, see, e.g., Jane Doe I v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 845 (Mo. banc 2006), the division notes that listing perpetrators of abuse in the Registry provides a means to protect both victims of child abuse and other children with whom a perpetrator of abuse or neglect might come into contact by ensuring that information about cases of abuse is available to individuals and entities responsible for caring for and protecting children. See sec. 210.109.2. Thus, the division argues, it should be able to include persons in the Registry based solely on the initial investigation or local director's review. Although protecting children from abuse and neglect is a significant state interest, it can be fulfilled by means other than depriving individuals of substantial liberty interests without a prior opportunity to be heard. The division has not shown that inclusion in the Registry is required for the division or law enforcement to respond to emergencies by investigating reports of abuse or neglect, removing children from dangerous environments, or pursuing criminal charges against an alleged perpetrator. Rather, the Registry provides information to employers in the child care industry as a complement to the additional and more immediate protective measures permitted by Missouri law. The need for expediency cannot overshadow the fact that a critical decision [is] being made about an individual. New York v. David W., 95 N.Y.2d 130, 711 N.Y.S.2d 134, 733 N.E.2d 206, 210-13 (2000) (although streamlined procedures used to determine sex offender registry requirements and dissemination guidelines helped notify[] vulnerable populations of a possible threat, the procedures were unconstitutional because they failed to provide probationers an opportunity to be heard before deprivation of a liberty interest). [11] Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson have a right to pre-deprivation notice and opportunity to be heard. It violated their due process rights to list them in the Central Registry prior to the CANRB hearing, when such procedural protections are first granted.
The next question is what standard of proof the division must meet at the CANRB hearing to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process. At the time Ms. Jamison's and Ms. Dotson's names were placed in the Central Registry, an alleged perpetrator's name was required to be listed once a division investigator found probable cause to believe they had committed child abuse or neglect. Sec. 210.110(2). Probable cause exists when the available facts would cause a reasonable person to believe a child was abused or neglected when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. Sec. 210.110(10). Similarly, once Ms. Jamison's and Ms. Dotson's appeal reached the CANRB, if it found the allegations of neglect were supported by evidence of probable cause and were not against the weight of the evidence, sec. 210.152.4, the CANRB left their names in the Central Registry, without inquiring whether the alleged abuse or neglect could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. [12] A probable cause standard does not require a fact finder to balance conflicting evidence. Thus, it is ill suited to the determination of whether an individual has abused or neglected a child, for abuse frequently involves private conduct for which there is no supporting evidence or objective eyewitness. Questions about whether abuse occurred are, therefore, often resolved by means of subjective determinations of credibility. As the probable cause standard does not require a balancing of available evidence, it leaves the ultimate assessment open to the subjective values of the fact finder, thereby magnifying the risk of erroneous fact finding. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). An equally important problem with the probable cause standard is that it places the brunt of the risk of error, if not the entire risk of error, on the alleged perpetrator. Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d at 594; cf. Cavarretta , 214 Ill.Dec. 59, 660 N.E.2d at 258 (requiring use of preponderance standard so that the child protection agency and the subject share the risk of error, rather than have the accused bear the brunt of the risk). Due process requires the use of a standard of proof that reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, 102 S.Ct. 1388. Since the interests of both parties involved in this case are substantial, it is unacceptable that one party should bear the majority of the risk of error. For these reasons, a number of other courts have rejected statutes similarly permitting listing of persons in child abuse registries based on application of only a probable cause or a credible evidence standard at the agency level. For instance, Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003-04, found that a credible evidence standard was insufficient to meet due process requirements because it required less than a preponderance of the evidence. Similarly, Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d at 593-95, rejected a probable cause standard, which required a showing of information `that would justify a reasonable person to believe that a child' was abused. [13] This Court, too finds that the use of the probable cause standard during a CANRB proceeding does not provide constitutionally sufficient safeguards. Due process requires a CANRB to substantiate a report of child abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence before an individual's name can be included in and disseminated from the Central Registry. [14] The Act as amended requires such proof in cases arising after August 28, 2004; it mandates a balancing of all the evidence so that one party does not bear a disproportionate share of the risk of error, Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (parties should share the risk of error in a roughly equal fashion), thereby negating the concerns presented by the probable cause standard and properly safeguarding the rights of alleged perpetrators. The Act as applied below and as is applicable to all cases arising before August 28, 2004, does not. The provisions of the Act allowing for inclusion of Ms. Jamison's and Ms. Dotson's names in the Central Registry and dissemination of those names based on a probable cause standard and without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard violated the women's liberty interests and are constitutionally invalid.
Unlike at the investigation and the first review stages, at the CANRB level, alleged perpetrators are provided notice of the charges and an opportunity to present their side of the case. See generally 13 CSR 40-31.025(2)(C) (notice) and section 210.153.4; 13 CSR 40-31.025(8)(C), (E), (F) (opportunity to be heard). Specifically, alleged perpetrators may be represented pro se or be represented by legal counsel and may appear in person or submit a written statement . . . in lieu of personal appearance. Sec. 210.153.4(2). The statute further provides that witnesses providing information on behalf of the child, the alleged perpetrator or the department may be called. Sec. 210.153 .4(3). Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson acknowledge that the CANRB hearing gives them notice and an opportunity to present their side of the case. They allege, however, that this is insufficient and that they are entitled to a full, trial-type adversarial hearing at which they would be entitled to not only notice, a hearing, and proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but also (1) a neutral decision maker, (2) application of rules prohibiting use of hearsay evidence, (3) the right to cross-examine the division's witnesses, and (4) the right to require testimony of witnesses to be under oath. Due process requires an impartial decision maker, see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), but it also presumes the honesty and impartiality of decision makers in the absence of a contrary showing. Wagner v. Jackson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 857 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo.App. W.D.1993). Since there is no suggestion or showing that a CANRB is incapable of deciding the issue before it fairly, there is no need for a decision maker other than is already provided by the Act. [15] Similarly, although Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson argue that requiring witnesses who testify in a CANRB proceeding to be under oath is in the interests of both citizens and the state, and is relatively cost-free, they offer no authority suggesting that a failure to do so at an administrative level violates due process. No Missouri case has recognized such a right, [16] and federal cases addressing similar claims have almost universally determined that due process does not require testimony to be taken under oath in an administrative proceeding. [17] This Court concurs. As to the other claimed procedural protections demanded, their provision would, in effect, turn the CANRB hearing into a full-blown evidentiary hearing with most of the indicia of a trial court hearing. The legislature can provide for such protections at the administrative level, as it has done in contested case proceedings under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), see generally Hagely v. Bd. of Educ. of the Webster Groves School Dist., 841 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Mo. banc 1992) overruled on other grounds by Weber v. Firemen's Retirement Sys., 872 S.W.2d 477, 480 n. 3 (Mo. banc 1994). Here, the legislature has chosen instead to provide more limited administrative procedural protections, but then to provide, upon request of the alleged perpetrator, a de novo review more extensive than that provided for MAPA contested case review. Compare sec. 210.152.5 with sec. 536.140. In this circumstance, the procedure provided at the administrative level is sufficient to satisfy minimum due process standards. Courts have recognized a right to a full evidentiary hearing of the type sought by Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson only in situations in which the deprivation results in the denial of the basic necessities of life. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011. In other cases, the courts have held that protections akin to those provided before the CANRB, which include notice and the opportunity to be heard, are sufficient to satisfy due process. In Loudermill , for example, the Supreme Court considered the process due to state public employees prior to termination. Specifically noting that its holding rested in part on the statutory provision for a full post-termination hearing, the Court found that due process was satisfied by an employee's receipt of oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story before deprivation of his interest. 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487. [18] Similarly, this Court determined that due process did not require extensive, formal hearings before suspension of a police officer. Belton, 708 S.W.2d at 138. Belton noted that when pre-deprivation procedures are coupled with adequate post-deprivation remedies, they are sufficient if they provide `an initial check against mistaken decisions.' Id., citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487. It held that providing the officer with notice of the charges and the evidence against her and an opportunity to present her side of the story before suspension satisfied due process requirements. Id. Dupuy , a case in which an alleged perpetrator of child abuse challenged the procedures attendant to Illinois' child abuse registry, used similar reasoning. Analogizing the alleged perpetrator's interest to that of a terminated public employee, Dupuy first noted that, in most situations, the pre-termination process need only include oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to tell his side of the story. 397 F.3d at 504. Balancing the interests involved, the court determined that, given the state's interest in identify[ing] individuals who pose a continuing threat to children and the opportunity for prompt post-deprivation judicial review, due process did not require the provision of additional procedural protections. Id. at 508-09. The reasoning in these cases is applicable here. While, Ms. Jamison's and Ms. Dotson's right to pursue professions of their choosing is significant, Greene, 360 U.S. at 492, 79 S.Ct. 1400; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543, 105 S.Ct. 1487, neither woman is entirely deprived of a means of livelihood as a result of the inclusion of their names in the Central Registry. Although they may be forced to work in a field with which they have no experience and for which they have no special training or skills, and although finding such work will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which [they] left [their] previous job, Id., they can still earn a living. Compare Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, 267-68, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (discontinuance of welfare benefits entitled person to full evidentiary hearing because they provide the very means by which to live); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-41, 96 S.Ct. 893 (comparing welfare recipient's interest with plaintiff's interest in disability benefits, which are not based on financial need and could be supplemented by other sources and, so, entitled plaintiff to something less than an evidentiary hearing). In light of the State's interest in protecting children and the fact that the Act provides Ms. Jamison and Ms. Dotson with the right to seek de novo judicial review, the protections given at the CANRB hearing are sufficient.