Opinion ID: 2778011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Vagueness Analysis

Text: HRS § 707-756(1) provides that the agreement to meet with the Minor at a certain place and at a certain time may occur with the intent to promote or facilitate murder, a class A felony, or, alternatively, “[w]ith intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony . . . that is another covered offense as defined in HRS § 846E-1.” HRS § 707-756(1) (emphasis added). HRS § 846E-1 is the definition section of the State’s sex offender registration Chapter. Id. HRS § 846E-1 defines two types of “covered offenses”; a “covered offense” 26 Thus, the statement of the ICA that “before a law may be held to be unduly vague, . . . it must be demonstrated that the law is impermissibly vague in all its applications,” Alangcas, 131 Hawaiʻi at 325, 318 P.3d at 615, is contrary to our prior decision in Beltran. 116 Hawaiʻi at 154-55, 172 P.3d at 466-67 (permitting a vagueness challenge to “invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application”). - 39 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER means a criminal offense that is either (1) a “crime[] against [a] minor[]” or (2) a “sexual offense.” HRS § 846E-1 (Supp. 2009). For each covered offense, the statute lists crimes that are included in the definition, and each definition also includes a Catch-all Clause providing that the definition includes any criminal offense that “is comparable to or that exceeds” one of the listed offenses.27 Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 152, 172 P.3d at 464. 27 A “crime[] against [a] minor” includes
parent; (2) Unlawful imprisonment in the first or second degree that involves the unlawful imprisonment of a minor by someone other than a parent; (3) An act, as described in chapter 705, that is an attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit one of the offenses designated in paragraph (1) or
(4) A criminal offense that is comparable to or which exceeds one of the offenses designated in paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) Any federal, military, out-of-state, tribal, or foreign conviction for any offense that, under the laws of this State, would be a crime against minors as designated in paragraphs (1) through (4). HRS § 846E-1 (emphases added). Similarly, a “sexual offense” is defined as an offense that is, (1) Set forth in section 707-730(1), 707-731(1), 707732(1), 707-733(1)(a), 707-733.6, 712-1202(1), or 7121203(1), but excludes conduct that is criminal only because of the age of the victim, as provided in section 707730(1)(b), or section 707-732(1)(b) if the perpetrator is under the age of eighteen; (continued. . .) - 40 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER A Conviction Clause is also included in each definition; under the Conviction Clauses, any previous (. . .continued) (2) An act defined in section 707-720 if the charging document for the offense for which there has been a conviction alleged intent to subject the victim to a sexual offense;
(A) Criminal sexual conduct toward a minor, including but not limited to an offense set forth in section 707-759; (B) Solicitation of a minor who is less than fourteen years old to engage in sexual conduct; (C) Use of a minor in a sexual performance; (D) Production, distribution, or possession of child pornography chargeable as a felony under section 707-750, 707-751, or 707-752; (E) Electronic enticement of a child chargeable under section 707-756 or 707-757 if the offense was committed with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of another covered offense as defined in this section; or (F) Solicitation of a minor for prostitution in violation of section 712-1209.1; (4) A violation of privacy under section 711-1110.9; (5) An act, as described in chapter 705, that is an attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit one of the offenses designated in paragraphs (1) through (4); (6) A criminal offense that is comparable to or that exceeds a sexual offense as defined in paragraphs (1) through (5); or (7) Any federal, military, out-of-state, tribal, or foreign conviction for any offense that under the laws of this State would be a sexual offense as defined in paragraphs (1) through (6). Id. (emphases added). - 41 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER conviction from another jurisdiction that would be a “crime against [a] minor” or a “sexual offense” under Hawaiʻi law is also included in the definition for each covered offense. Thus, both types of covered offenses appear to be broadened by the Catch-all Clauses and the Conviction Clauses. Alangcas argues that HRS § 707-756 is unconstitutionally vague due to its incorporation of the definition of “covered offenses” from HRS § 846E-1. Alangcas contends the Conviction Clauses and the Catch-all Clauses introduce unconstitutional vagueness into HRS § 707-756 because “[p]ersons of ordinary intelligence are left to guess and no doubt differ in opinion as to what offenses are ‘comparable to’ or ‘exceed’ the offenses mentioned in the statute.” “Such guesswork,” Alangcas concludes, “not only among citizens, but among police officers, creates a danger of discriminatory enforcement on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Additionally, as a separate vagueness challenge, Alangcas contends that because the word “communicate” is undefined, HRS § 707-756 is constitutionally flawed.
To reiterate, under Beltran, a penal statute is void for vagueness unless the criminal offense is defined “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage - 42 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 151, 172 P.3d at 463. Thus, a challenged statute is examined as to whether it is internally inconsistent and incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence or invites delegation of basic policy matters to police for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Id. at 153, 172 P.3d at 465. A statute that is internally inconsistent may prevent a person of ordinary intelligence from knowing what conduct is prohibited.28 Id. at 151, 172 P.3d at 463. However, HRS § 707756(1) is not internally inconsistent. There is nothing about the reference in HRS § 707-756(1)(b)(iii) to the covered offenses in HRS § 846E-1 that contradicts any other part of the prohibition of electronic enticement in HRS § 707-756. A statute is not incomprehensible if “a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to ascertain the nature of conduct prohibited.” Bui, 104 Hawaiʻi at 465, 92 P.3d at 474. The ICA in this case held that the “exceeds” language in the Catch-all Clauses introduced unconstitutional vagueness into HRS § 707-756, Alangcas, 131 Hawaiʻi at 325, 318 P.3d at 615, but 28 One standard for an internally inconsistent statute was highlighted in Beltran: a law is inconsistent if it instructs that a violation occurs where “it reasonably appears, in light of the circumstances, that the participants in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any activities in which they may also be engaging,’” because of the conflict between “reasonably appears” and “in fact.” Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 153, 172 P.3d at 465. - 43 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER that the “comparable” language in the Catch-all Clauses did not suffer the same deficiency. Id. at 321-22, 325, 318 P.3d at 611-612, 615. HRS § 707-756(1)(b) requires that the actor intend to promote or facilitate a “felony.” Thus, the qualifying “covered offense” set forth in HRS § 846E-1 must be a felony. HRS § 707756(1)(b). That is, whatever covered offense may be alleged as part of the mens rea to the agreement element of an electronic enticement prosecution, including an offense that is “comparable to” or that “exceeds” a crime against a Minor or a sexual offense, the intended conduct must be classified as a felony by the Hawaiʻi legislature.29 A person of ordinary intelligence would know that intending to promote or facilitate a felony, as defined by 29 HRS § 701-107 provides the following regarding grades and classes of offenses: (1) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized constitutes a crime. Crimes are of three grades: felonies, misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors. Felonies include murder in first and second degrees, attempted murder in the first and second degrees, and the following three classes: class A, class B, and class C. (2) A crime is a felony if it is so designated in this Code or if persons convicted thereof may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term which is in excess of one year. HRS § 701-107 (1993) (emphases added). Consequently, a crime is a “felony” if it is so designated by the Hawaiʻi penal code or if another statute of this State authorizes a sentence of “imprisonment for a term which is in excess of one year.” HRS § 701-107(2). - 44 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Hawaiʻi law, against a Minor is prohibited. Future cases may reveal a dispute as to whether a given felony is actually “comparable to” or actually “exceeds” the listed offenses included within the covered offenses, such that a question is present as to whether the intent to promote or facilitate the felony was properly included as a mens rea in a prosecution under HRS § 707-756. However, such a hypothetical dispute is irrelevant to a vagueness challenge to HRS § 707-756 because there is no question that a person of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to know that, as a felony, the intended conduct upon a Minor was indeed prohibited. To put it another way, when the intended conduct in question is indisputably proscribed by Hawaiʻi law as a felony, a person cannot complain in a vagueness challenge that the person is rendered unsure as to whether the intent to promote or facilitate that conduct upon a Minor is against the law. Thus, the reference to HRS § 846E-1 does not render HRS § 707-756 incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence. Bui, 104 Hawaiʻi at 465, 92 P.3d at 474 (“Consequently, we conclude a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to ascertain the nature of conduct prohibited.”). The same analysis eliminates the concern of “a delegation of basic policy matters to police resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,” Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 153, 172 P.3d - 45 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER at 465, because if the intended conduct is already prohibited as a felony, there is no concern of arbitrary or subjective police enforcement. That is, so long as the intended conduct designated as a felony in Hawaii’s statutory code is not defined so vaguely as to permit “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,” Gaylord, 78 Hawaiʻi at 138, 890 P.2d at 1178, prosecuting the intent to promote or facilitate such conduct under the electronic enticement prohibition does not jeopardize consistent nondiscriminatory enforcement. Thus, as the Catch-all Clauses are narrowed in application to HRS § 707-756 by the requirement that the intended conduct be a felony, they are neither incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence, nor do they risk subjective or arbitrary enforcement by police. Therefore, HRS § 707-756 is not unconstitutionally vague.30 As the statute is not vague, the question of whether the statute is vague as applied to Alangcas’ conduct is inapplicable. 30 Had this court determined that the term “exceeds” introduced unconstitutional vagueness, as set forth supra in section II.C.1, into either HRS §§ 707-756 or 846E-1, it is noted that an offending portion of a statute may be severable such that the remaining portion of the law is constitutional. “A part of a statute may be unconstitutional and at the same time the remainder may be upheld as constitutional.” Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Smith, 31 Haw. 196, 202 (Haw. Terr. 1929); see also Nelson v. Miwa, 56 Haw. 601, 611, 546 P.2d 1005, 1013 (1976) (“Where part of a statute is unconstitutional [but] is inseparable from the remainder, the whole statute is invalid.”). - 46 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
The effect of the Conviction Clauses is to require registration by sex offenders and other covered offenders under HRS Chapter 846E for particular convictions from other jurisdictions; that is, completed conduct in another jurisdiction. HRS §§ 846E-1, 846E-2. In contrast, HRS § 707756 prohibits conduct committed with the intent to facilitate or promote a felony; i.e. relating to uncompleted or future conduct. The scope of HRS § 707-756 is not broadened by the reference in HRS § 846E-1 to convictions in other jurisdictions because it is of no meaning to say that a person has the “intent to promote or facilitate” completed conduct; one cannot have the legal intent to do what one has already done. Thus, with regard to the Conviction Clauses, the ICA correctly determined that HRS § 707-756 does not incorporate convictions from other jurisdictions, and therefore the statute is not unconstitutionally vague on that basis.31 Alangcas, 131 Hawaiʻi at 321, 318 P.3d at 611. 31 However, the incorporation of the Conviction Clauses into HRS § 707-756 through HRS § 846E-1 is not “redundant,” Alangcas, 131 Hawaiʻi at 321, 318 P.3d at 611, but instead, it is of no substantive legal effect. - 47 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Alangcas suggests that the word “communicates” in HRS § 707-756(1)(a) is vague because it is undefined;32 he argues that this vagueness invites arbitrary enforcement by police. However, the “likelihood that anyone would not understand any of those common words seems quite remote” when a statute includes a scienter element requiring a felonious intent. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). Thus, when read with the rest of the statute, it is unlikely that the public will misunderstand “communicates” because of the clear requirements of the statute defining the prohibited communication. First, the communication must be made intentionally or knowingly. Second, the communication must be with a Minor; thus, at a minimum the person must consciously disregard a substantial risk that the other person is less than eighteen years of age. Third, the communication itself is not sufficient; it must be made in conjunction with an agreement to meet the Minor, with the intent to promote or facilitate a felony. Delimited by these three requirements, the general public is clearly informed of the nature of the “communication” 32 The subsection defines the prohibited conduct, in part as, “[a]ny person who, using a computer or any other electronic device[] [i]ntentionally or knowingly communicates . . . with a minor.” HRS § 707-756(1). - 48 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER that is prohibited. Consequently, there is nothing internally inconsistent about the reference to “communicates.” Further, as the communication and agreement elements must then be consummated with an intentional or knowing travel to the agreed upon place at the agreed upon time, there is little risk that police will enforce HRS § 707-756 in an arbitrary, ad hoc, or subjective manner. The term “communicates” is accordingly not vague. Thus, as the Catch-all Clauses, the Conviction Clauses, and the term “communicates” provide citizens of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited and provides explicit standards for those who apply the statute to do so in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner, HRS § 707-756 is not unconstitutionally vague on these bases.33 Accordingly, we do not consider whether the statute is vague as applied to the specific conduct charged to Alangcas.