Opinion ID: 739683
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shay's Assertions of Error

Text: 59 Shay asserts that his sentence was issued in violation of the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. He also argues that two sentence increases were improperly applied to him: the two-level Conscious or Reckless Risk of Serious Bodily Injury enhancement, and the twelve-level Fraud and Deceit Loss increase. He therefore asks that we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. 60 We begin by setting out the principles of law applicable to our review of a district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines, which will apply to much of the section of this opinion addressing Herzog's claims as well as those of Shay. 61 Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines provides that relevant conduct may be considered at sentencing as a reason for upward departure. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.3 (1989). Despite the contrary view held by some members of this court, see United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392-94 (2d Cir.1994) (per curiam) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1052, 115 S.Ct. 1433, 131 L.Ed.2d 313 (1995); United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 395-96 (2d Cir.1992) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review), the Supreme Court recently confirmed the prior holdings of this court that the burden of proof for relevant conduct increases, including conduct of which the defendant has been acquitted, need only meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, not the higher clear and convincing evidence standard. United States v. Watts, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (per curiam); Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 388 (majority opinion); United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir.1996). We therefore must refuse Appellants' request that we apply a clear and convincing standard to certain of the points argued below, and instead review the district court's application of the preponderance standard. Of course, we review a district court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo, United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 54 (2d Cir.1995), and its findings of related fact for clear error, United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 62
63 The district court sentenced Shay to 60 months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release, as well as a $50 assessment, for his conviction on the wire fraud charge. 64 Shay's primary argument at sentencing and here is premised upon the ex post facto clause, 15 which prohibits Congress from passing a law that increases the punishment for a crime after it has been committed. United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir.) (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2718-19, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 142, 136 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Ordinarily, a court ought to apply the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A). If, however, there is an ex post facto problem, the version in effect at the time the offense occurred should be used. United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1204 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Adeniyi, 912 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1990). See also, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(1) (1995) (If the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed.). An ex post facto problem arises if the version in effect at the time of sentencing  'makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment.'  Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2453-54, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 968, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)); accord, Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1204. 65 Shay objects to Judge Brieant's application of the November 1, 1989, Guidelines Manual which, he asserts, became effective after the wire fraud scheme was completed. Shay maintained at sentencing that as soon as they got a preliminary injunction from the court [in October 1989], no further representation was made to a trucker that further dumping was legal.... He asserted that, because the offense conduct for which he was convicted took place between February and early October of 1989, he could not constitutionally be sentenced under Guideline amendments which became effective after that time period, and his sentence must therefore be vacated and remanded. 66 If Shay is accurate in stating that his conduct ended in October of 1989, the trial court's use of the November 1989 Guidelines does violate ex post facto principles, because the later Manual yields a more onerous offense level--up to five levels higher--than does the earlier Manual. 16 The Government, however, argued that Shay's misconduct continued past October of 1989 and through 1992, by virtue of his attempt to re-open the landfill, with respect to misrepresentations to the victim, which is [PADER]. The Government therefore insisted that the date of the Count Five wire fraud offense, for Guidelines purposes, was the last day of that continuing misconduct. Shay responded by pointing out the Government's concession that the victims of the misconduct charged in the wire fraud were these truck drivers, not PADER. He argues that the facts alleged to support the continuance of the wire fraud scheme beyond October of 1989 concern a separate set of misconduct involving different actus rei and affecting different victims. Notably, the charges asserting misrepresentations against PADER were separately charged, and later dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c). 67 Judge Brieant initially noted that all of the wire communications specified in the charge were alleged to have been made prior to November 1, 1989, and observed that if no later misrepresentations were alleged, the ex post facto clause would require application of those Guidelines in effect in October of 1989. He expressed his concern that the object of the wire fraud scheme could no longer be achieved once the dump closed on October 5th or 6th of 1989 and money was no longer being received from any trucker. Ultimately, though conceding that it was a close question, the judge imposed the November 1989 Guidelines in reliance on the dismissed PADER fraud counts, reasoning that even though a prima facie case was not made out on those counts, the conduct was relevant conduct which could be used as the basis for the enhancement. 68 The question which we must initially answer, therefore, is whether the conduct which was charged under Count Five can properly be held to include Shay's continuing conduct into 1992. We hold that it does not. Not only was the conduct against PADER separately charged, but the trial judge dismissed that charge for lack of a critical element--loss of money or property on PADER's part. This, along with the judge's initial comments at sentencing, indicates to us that the two counts are not properly subsumed into one huge scheme to defraud, as the Government asserts, but rather should be thought of as separate schemes to defraud separate victims. 69 As noted supra, uncharged or unconvicted relevant conduct, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, may be considered when calculating the base sentence. As the judge noted, therefore, he could have properly considered the fraud against PADER as a relevant conduct enhancement to Shay's sentence, assuming the Government met the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on that conduct. Unfortunately, this is not what the court actually did, and therefore Watts and Concepcion principles do not decide this case. Rather than applying an enhancement, the court seemed to meld together the two separate schemes and consider them as one large, continuing scheme of fraud. This was not appropriate. The judge was not permitted to alter the date on which the convicted conduct occurred to reflect the date on which unconvicted relevant conduct was committed. 70 Having decided that Count Five refers only to the fraud against the truckers and does not encompass fraud against PADER, the question we must answer, for ex post facto analysis, is a very narrow one: When uncharged or acquitted conduct occurs after the conduct of conviction, does the ex post facto clause prohibit application of Sentencing Guidelines applying to the later conduct rather than those in effect at the time the convicted conduct ended? The Commentary to the November 1995 Manual has addressed this specific constitutional issue, and states unequivocally that Congress did not intend for a particular set of Guidelines to apply to conduct which occurred prior to its passage: 71 Under subsection (b)(1), the last date of the offense of conviction is the controlling date for ex post facto purposes. For example, if the offense of conviction (i.e., the conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted) was determined by the court to have been committed between October 15, 1991 and October 28, 1991, the date of October 28, 1991 is the controlling date for ex post facto purposes. This is true even if the defendant's conduct relevant to the determination of the guideline range under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) included an act that occurred on November 2, 1991 (after a revised Guideline Manual took effect). 72 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 comment. (n.2) (Nov.1995). This set of Guidelines thus requires the district court to determine the last date of the offense of conviction, and instructs that the date of relevant conduct may not be substituted for the date of convicted conduct. Although we are not compelled to rely upon this Commentary because it is not incorporated in either of the Manuals considered here, we find it to be highly persuasive evidence of the Sentencing Commission's intent. Because it comports with ex post facto considerations, we happily utilize it in our interpretation of the Guidelines. We therefore hold that Judge Brieant's use of the November 1989 Guidelines to sentence Shay for a course of conduct which ended in October 1989 violated the ex post facto clause. 73 Shay's sentence is vacated and remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with the Guidelines in effect during October 1989. Upon resentencing, the court may take into account any secondary conduct proved by a preponderance of the evidence. We caution the court, however, that if it finds such relevant conduct occurred, Shay's penalty may only be increased to the extent permitted under § 1B1.3 of the Guidelines in effect in October of 1989, even if the relevant conduct occurred when the November 1, 1989, Guidelines were in effect. We so instruct the court in reliance upon the one-book rule. See United States v. Keller, 58 F.3d 884, 890 (2d Cir.1995) (A sentencing court has no authority to pick and choose, taking one provision from an earlier version of the guidelines and another from a later version. We adhere to the so-called 'one-book rule' that most other circuits use to avoid twisting the guidelines, depriving them of uniformity and consistency.). See also, United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1404 n. 17 (3rd Cir.1994) ([W]hen ex post facto clause issues arise, while the one-book rule cannot apply to compel application of the later Manual to all counts, it can certainly compel application of the earlier Manual.). 74
75 Having determined that the court improperly utilized the November 1989 Guidelines, our task becomes simpler and the district court's more burdensome with regard to Shay's other assertions of error. First, he argues that the district court improperly imposed a two-point enhancement for Shay's conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily injury pursuant to § 2F1.1(b)(4) (1989). The court imposed the sentence in consideration of Shay's asserted disregard for the health of his neighbors, whose water wells were contaminated by the waste in the Matamoras landfill. Although Appellants and the Government have fully briefed the issue of whether Shay's conduct constituted conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily injury, as defined by § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(j)), we need not address that point. The § 2F1.1(b)(4) enhancement was not in effect until the November 1989 version of the Manual, and thus Shay cannot be sentenced in consideration of it. 17 We therefore remand for resentencing in consideration of the October 1989 Guidelines. 18 76 We likewise must remand for recalculation of the Fraud and Deceit Loss for which Shay was responsible. The PSR's calculation of the loss under § 2F1.1(b)(1) (1989) determined that a 12-level enhancement was appropriate based on an estimate of between $1,500,000 and $2,500,000 in loss, nearly the entire amount grossed by TSLD between February and October 1989. Appellants asked the court to make particularized findings as to what amount of fraud was attributable to Shay, and asked that the court find both what conduct or acts were within the scope of the defendant's agreement to participate in the jointly undertaken criminal activity and whether the jointly undertaken criminal activity was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Shay contended that only the receipts available during September and October of 1989 were reasonably attributable to him. At sentencing, the court made no particularized findings on this point, but stated that an awful lot or a considerable amount of the materials dumped at the site were known by Shay to be in non-compliance with what PADER was shown on the April 1989 visit to the transfer stations, and that such non-complying dumping continued almost throughout the period. 77 Two issues are at play here: a legal issue, again relating to ex post facto considerations, and a factual issue, relating to Shay's criminal liability. Under the Guidelines in effect in October of 1989, even if Shay actually was responsible for between $1,500,000 and $2,500,000 in loss, his base sentence would only be increased by either 9 or 10 levels, not 12 levels. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(J)-(K) (1988). Upon remand, the court is to consider that version of the Guidelines, and to likewise reconsider the second factual issue, whether Shay can be held responsible for the entire fraud amount, in the light of the language and policies enunciated in that version of § 1B1.3 and § 2F1.1(b)(1).