Opinion ID: 1291712
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Heading: Whether a Life Term Is Determinate or Indeterminate Under the DSA

Text: The punishment for first degree murder without special circumstances is a prison term for 25 years to life. (§ 190, subd. (a).) The punishment for attempted premeditated murder is a prison term for life with the possibility of parole. (§ 664, subd. (a).) Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeal held, that while the 25-year-to-life term for murder is indeterminate, the straight life term for attempted murder is determinate, and thus is subject to section 1170.1's one-third limit for consecutive enhancements. Our own terminology has been inconsistent. The Court of Appeal cited People v. Yates, supra, 34 Cal.3d 644, 194 Cal.Rptr. 765, 669 P.2d 1, and People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 808-809, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886, both of which repeatedly describe a life term as determinate. (See also In re Jeanice D. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 210, 214-221, 168 Cal.Rptr. 455, 617 P.2d 1087 [implying that a life sentence is determinate in contrast to a sentence of 25 years to life, which is indeterminate].) More recently, we have described life sentences as indeterminate. ( Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 462, fn. 14, 279 Cal.Rptr. 834, 807 P.2d 1063; see also People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 673, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Most recently, we noted that attempted premeditated murder is punishable by life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, which both parties agree is an indeterminate prison term. ( People v. Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 90, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) Accordingly, we described a straight life term as indeterminate but, because the parties agreed with this designation, we did not discuss the question further. ( Id. at pp. 92-93, 95, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441; see also id. at p. 104, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) Defendant argues that he does not agree that life is an indeterminate term, and that People v. Yates, supra, 34 Cal.3d 644, 194 Cal.Rptr. 765, 669 P.2d 1, and People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d 798, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886, were correct. We must focus here on the precise question whether a straight life term is subject to the requirements of section 1170.1, i.e., whether it is a determinate term within the meaning of the DSA. Yates and Smith did not interpret the DSA; indeed, neither case involved sentencing. Both cases faced essentially the same question. Former section 1070 (now Code Civ. Proc., § 231) gave the defense and prosecution more peremptory challenges to prospective jurors when the charged offense was punishable with death or imprisonment in the state prison for life than for other crimes. Long before the DSA, we interpreted this provision as applying only to straight life terms and not to the then prevalent indeterminate terms of some number of years to life. (See People v. Yates, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 647-648, 194 Cal.Rptr. 765, 669 P.2d 1.) Until 1978, murder was punishable by life, and therefore defendants charged with murder received the larger number of peremptory challenges. In 1978, the punishment for first degree murder without special circumstances was changed to prison for 25 years to life, and that for second degree murder to prison for 15 years to life. (§ 190, subd. (a).) The question in Yates was whether this change meant that persons charged with first degree murder would receive fewer challenges. We concluded the change in the punishment did not change the number of available challenges. ( People v. Yates, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 653, 194 Cal.Rptr. 765, 669 P.2d 1.) People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pages 808-809, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886, extended Yates to defendants charged with second degree murder. Our analysis in Yates and Smith merely used the words indeterminate and determinate as a convenient means of distinguishing between the two types of sentences that prevailed before the DSA took effect in 1977: straight life sentences and sentences of some number of years to life. It was not necessary to use those words; the analysis would have been the same without them. When the universe of sentences was limited to these two types, this distinguishing terminology was understandable. A sentence of some number of years to life was certainly more clearly indeterminate than one of life alone, which had a specific, readily determinable event as its measure. The terminology was thus understandable but, after passage of the DSA, also potentially confusing. We did not intend to hold in Yates or Smith that a straight life sentence was subject to the provisions of the DSA. As noted, those cases did not involve sentencing. In deciding this question, we must look beyond Yates and Smith and consider whether a straight life sentence is determinate in the sense that it is subject to the DSA, section 1170 et seq. We believe our more recent cases, such as People v. Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th 86, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441, which do involve sentencing and the DSA, correctly describe straight life sentences as indeterminate for this purpose. Court of Appeal opinions have also generally described a life sentence as indeterminate. (E.g., People v. Reyes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 852, 856, 260 Cal.Rptr. 846; People v. Gallegos (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 386, 389, 216 Cal. Rptr. 230; People v. Day (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 932, 935-936, 173 Cal.Rptr. 9.) The drafters of the California Rules of Court also considered a life sentence indeterminate. California Rules of Court, rule 403, provides that the rules apply only to a determinate sentence under the DSA. The Advisory Committee Comment to that rule states, The sentencing rules do not apply to offenses carrying a life term or other indeterminate sentences for which sentence is imposed under new section 1168. (Advisory Com. com., 23 pt. 1 West's Ann. Codes, Rules (1996 ed.) foll, rule 403, p. 742, italics added.) A review of the relevant statutes shows that these cases and the comment are correct. Section 1170, subdivision (a)(1), makes clear that the DSA involves determinate sentences. Section 1170, subdivision (a)(3), states that the DSA does not affect any provision of law that ... expressly provides for imprisonment in the state prison for life, thus demonstrating that such a sentence is not determinate. Moreover, both now and when defendant committed his crimes, section 669 provided that whenever a life sentence runs consecutively to a determinate term, the determinate term shall be served first and no part thereof shall be credited toward the person's eligibility for parole as calculated pursuant to Section 3046 or pursuant to any other section of law that establishes a minimum period of confinement under the life sentence before eligibility for parole. Section 3046, in turn, provides, as relevant, No prisoner imprisoned under a life sentence may be paroled until he or she has served at least seven calendar years or has served a term as established pursuant to any other section of law that establishes a minimum period of confinement under a life sentence before eligibility for parole, whichever is greater. All of these statutes clearly show that a straight life sentence, as well as a sentence of some number of years to life, is not a determinate sentence within the meaning of the DSA. For these reasons, we conclude that both straight life sentences and sentences of some number of years to life are indeterminate sentences not subject to the DSA. Accordingly, the trial court correctly imposed full term enhancements for the straight life terms as well as for the 25-year-to-life term.