Opinion ID: 3036105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competing Rights And Privileges

Text: [1] In Franks, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment entitles a defendant to challenge the validity of a search warrant affidavit if the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” inserted a false statement in the warrant affidavit. 438 U.S. at 155-56. Here, because Napier was not permitted to examine the sealed portions of the search warrant, he asserts that he was wrongly thwarted from making the “substantial preliminary showing” required by Franks. Napier argues that because Franks recognized a defendant’s right to challenge the truthfulness of war1408 UNITED STATES v. NAPIER rant affidavits, it necessarily means that any interference with the defendant’s ability to mount that challenge is impermissible. [2] We find this argument untenable. Although we agree that Franks identifies an important right—testing the validity of a search warrant—we disagree that Franks creates an unlimited right to access all information possibly needed to meet the preliminary showing requirement. Napier’s interest, although significant, must be balanced against other values. Here, that value is the government’s interest in maintaining integrity of ongoing criminal investigations and ensuring the safety of the informant. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-64 (1957) (recognizing “Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law”). [3] Napier argues that Roviaro is not applicable because he was not asking for the identity of the informant. We disagree. The privilege identified in Roviaro protects more than just the name of the informant and extends to information that would tend to reveal the identity of the informant. Id. at 59-60. As articulated in Roviaro, the scope of the government’s privilege is as great as the “underlying purpose” of the privilege. Id. The purpose of the privilege is to protect the anonymity of the confidential source. Id. at 59. Thus, the information regarding the drug sales sought by Napier, which would tend to reveal the informant’s identity, is protected to the same extent as the confidential informant’s name. Consequently, Napier’s assertion that the privilege identified in Roviaro is inapplicable to this case is incorrect. As we recognized in United States v. Kiser, courts must balance two important considerations: the right announced in Franks, on one hand, and the competing interest in keeping confidential the identity of an informant, on the other. 716 F.2d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1983) (“We must reconcile the right UNITED STATES v. NAPIER 1409 announced in Franks with the informer’s privilege recognized in Roviaro . . . .”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, because it is axiomatic that a right that must be balanced against other rights cannot be absolute, Napier’s assertion is unsupported. [4] Napier’s argument for an absolute right is further weakened by the Supreme Court’s determination that due process requirements at suppression hearings are less elaborate and demanding than those at trial. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980). As set forth by the Supreme Court, in a suppression hearing: [w]e are not dealing with the trial of the criminal charge itself. There the need for a truthful verdict outweighs society’s need for the [confidential] privilege. Here, however, the accused seeks to avoid the truth. The very purpose of a motion to suppress is to escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand, not because its probative force is diluted in the least by the mode of seizure, but rather as a sanction to compel enforcement officers to respect the constitutional security of all of us under the Fourth Amendment. If the motion to suppress is denied, defendant will still be judged upon the untarnished truth. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307, reh’g denied, 386 U.S. 1042 (1967). [5] It is for this reason the Supreme Court noted in Franks that, notwithstanding the defendant’s interest in showing that a search warrant contained a false statement, “[t]here is, of course, a presumption of validity,” and that the presence of “competing values . . . lead us to impose limitations.” 438 U.S. at 165, 171. Consequently, because the underlying Franks interest that forms the basis for the right asserted by Napier is one that has limits, it follows that any rights and 1410 UNITED STATES v. NAPIER interests that build upon that interest must also be limited and balanced.