Opinion ID: 1349697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Political Freedom Act

Text: The political freedom act [4] is an uncommon exercise of the Legislature's power to protect and insure the personal freedoms of all citizens, including the rights of free speech and political association.... Council No 11, supra at 394, 292 N.W.2d 442. As a unanimous Court stated, the act undertakes to authorize and extend to a specific class of citizensemployees in the state classified civil servicethe right to engage in partisan political activity ... while on mandatory leave of absence. Id. at 395, 292 N.W.2d 442. In Council No 11, this Court stated: We do not question the commission's authority to regulate employment-related activity involving internal matters such as job specifications, compensation, grievance procedures, discipline, collective bargaining and job performance, including the power to prohibit activity during working hours which is found to interfere with satisfactory job performance.... The Court has also recognized the commission's power to regulate and even prohibit off-duty activity which is found to interfere with job performance.... That power does not extend, however, to the blanket prohibition of off-duty activities, political or otherwise, as a matter of policy simply because such activities may conceivably interfere with satisfactory job performance. What an employee does during his off-duty hours is not of proper concern to the Civil Service Commission unless and until it is shown to adversely affect job performance. Even then the commission's authority is not to curtail the off-hours activity, it is to deal with the adequacy of job performance ... on a case-by-case basis. [ Id. at 406-407, 292 N.W.2d 442 (citations omitted).] Our decision in Council No. 11 held that the state may not regulate the off-duty political activities of state classified civil service employees, unless those activities were found to interfere with job performance. [5] The parties in this case dispute whether union leave is off-duty or actual-duty activity. If the activity is actual duty, the commission has the power under the Michigan Constitution to regulate it. If, however, the activity is off-duty, the commission may only regulate it if it affects job performance. We hold that union leave is not actual-duty merely because the commission has so defined it. If that were the case, the commission could define evenings and weekends as actualduty, and thus impermissibly regulate what employees do on their own time. Instead, we think that whether an activity is off duty or actual duty depends on the particular circumstances of the activity in question. In order to determine the status of union leave, we must look to the applicable provision of the political freedom act, which gives guidance regarding whether an activity is actual duty. The political freedom act allows a state employee to engage in partisan political activity except during those hours when that person is being compensated for the performance of that person's duties as a public employee. 1976 P.A. 169, M.C.L. § 15.404; M.S.A. § 4.1702(4) (emphasis added). We hold that the language of the political freedom act is unambiguous. It prohibits partisan political activity during work hours when two conditions are met: (1) the employee is being compensated by the employer, and (2) such compensation is for the performance of the employee's duties as a public employee. Whether the revised Rule 1-5.7 violates the political freedom act necessarily depends on whether the employee, when taking union leave to engage in partisan political activities, is compensated by the state for the performance of duties as a public employee. While the revised rule was enacted after the political meeting took place, the rule was created because of what the commission perceived to be a misuse of union leave. Therefore, by way of example only, we find it is illustrative to examine the particular facts relating to the employees who took union leave to participate in the seminar. As stated previously, there were fifty-six employees who took union leave to participate in the three-day seminar. However, because not all union leaves of absence are paid for by the state, we must examine each type of union leave invoked.
Seventeen union members invoked their union officer leave to participate in the seminar. Union officer leave applies to union representatives who devote over twenty-five percent of work a year to union business. Because these union members are not full time employee[s] of an employee organization holding exclusive representation rights as required under the revised rule, they would be prohibited from engaging in partisan political activities while on leave. However, pursuant to article 7(D)(2) of the collective bargaining agreement, the union reimburses the employer for the gross total cost of the employee's wages and the employer's share of the insurance premiums and retirement. Therefore, the employer does not pay any compensation to these employees for the use of union officer leave. Because the revised rule is violative of the first prong of the test for the political freedom act, the rule is invalid as it applies to union officer leave.
Thirty-seven employees invoked their administrative leave buy-back in order to participate in the seminar. Under this type of leave arrangement, the union designates those employees who will attend, and the employer submits a bill to the union for the net salary for the period of absence. Under the first prong of the test, the employer is reimbursed only the net salary of the employee for the period of absence. However, the insurance premiums and fringe benefits are paid by the employer. Because this partial payment constitutes compensation by the employer, the state may have a legitimate interest in regulating the conduct of its employees. Therefore, the first prong of the test is satisfied. As to the second prong, the state must demonstrate that the compensation is for the performance of [the employee's] duties as a public employee. The plaintiffs contend that the payment of fringe benefits is not compensation directly for the performance of duties. They cite federal cases that distinguish between `wages,' i.e., compensation paid to an employee specifically for the work he performs, and ... compensation occasioned by the fact that the employee has performed or will perform work for the employer, but which is not payment directly for that work.' BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, Int'l Chemical Workers Union, 791 F.2d 1046, 1049 (C.A.2, 1986). Plaintiffs contend that continuation of fringe benefits during an employee's union leave is not direct payment for services rendered, but rather an incident of the employer-employee relationship generally. We agree. Whether an employee on union leave is compensated for the performance of the employee's duties as a public employee under the political freedom act is an issue of first impression. However, we have previously considered whether an employee's injury that occurred while the employee was conducting union business arose out of, and in the course of, his employment for purposes of worker's compensation. In Tegels v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 329 Mich. 84, 44 N.W.2d 880 (1950), we held that an employee is not considered to be in the employer's service when he is engaged in union activity. Citing California precedent, we stated [R]espondent[] was attending a union meeting from which her employer and his representatives were expressly excluded. At the time respondent [] was injured she was not acting for her employer nor engaged in his service. She was exercising a personal privilege for her own personal benefit in attending a meeting of an organization of which she was a member and the purposes of which were clearly for her own interests and not necessarily in any way for the benefit of her employer. [ Id. at 88, 44 N.W.2d 880, quoting Associated Oil Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 191 Cal. 557, 562, 217 P. 744 (1923).] We agree with Associated Oil that an employee is acting in the scope of employment when the employee is doing the duty he is employed to perform.... Id. Similarly, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act [6] , the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public and the private sector that the parties proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l, 361 U.S. 477, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 394, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3152, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982). [ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 U.S. 89, 107-108, 104 S.Ct. 439, 449, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983).][ [7] ] Finally, the collective bargaining agreement with the union and the state clearly indicates that employees on union leave are conducting business for the union and not for the state. The agreement provides that union representatives are to be considered as employees of the Union during the periods of absence covered by Administrate Leave from the bank. These arguments, while not binding on the issue presented, are persuasive authority for our holding today. We hold that under the political freedom act, an employee who receives fringe benefits for attending a union meeting is not being compensated by the employer for the performance of [the employee's] duties as a public employee. While attending a union meeting, the employee is not doing the duty he was employed to perform. Furthermore, the interests of the union and the employer are often antagonistic. It would be paralogistic to hold that an employee who receives compensation from the employer to engage in activity that is antagonistic to the employer's interest is somehow receiving compensation for the performance of the employee's duties as a public servant. Therefore, because the compensation is not for the performance of the employee's duties as a public employee, the prohibition is invalid under the political freedom act as it applies to administrative leave buy-back.
One employee invoked administrative leave bank 1 in order to participate in the seminar. With this type of leave, the employee suffers no loss of pay or benefits. Therefore, the first prong of the test is satisfied because the employee receives compensation and fringe benefits from the employer. However, like administrative leave buy-back, the second prong is not satisfied because the employee is not being compensated for the performance of his duties as a public employee.
Because the parties have not submitted any documentation regarding whether the employee using his own time was being paid by either the union or the employer, we cannot make a determination that prohibiting him from engaging in political activities was violative of the political freedom act. Therefore, we hold that where the union reimburses the state not only for the wages of the employee, but also the fringe benefits, the state may not prohibit those employees from participating in partisan political activities pursuant to the political freedom act. Furthermore, because union leave is antagonistic to an employer's interest and because an employee on union leave is not doing the duty he was employed to perform, the state may not prohibit employees from participating in partisan political activities while on union leave pursuant to the political freedom act unless such activities are shown to adversely affect job performance. [8] We caution that our holding today is limited to the application of the political freedom act to union leave. We do not express an opinion with regard to any other leave arrangement that is regulated by the state. In view of the invalidity of Rule 1-5.7 under the political freedom act, we decline to reach the constitutional issues framed by the plaintiffs-appellants. As we have repeatedly stated, there exists a general presumption by this Court that we will not reach constitutional issues that are not necessary to resolve a case. Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 444 Mich. 211, 234, 507 N.W.2d 422 (1993); Taylor v. Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 154, 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960). Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.