Opinion ID: 71968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Revival of Procedural Defaulted Claims

Text: If there is “evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits of the underlying claims,” despite procedural defaults.3 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. To make this 3 We have specifically rejected the argument that a showing of actual innocence would warrant habeas relief absent a constitutional violation. Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 741 (5th Cir. 2000). “This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution — not to correct errors of fact.” Id. at 741 n.4 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993)). Thus, the 5 Case: 09-70001 Document: 00511051699 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/15/2010 No. 09-70001 claim, a petitioner must “support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324. Thus, the petitioner must demonstrate “that ‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. at 327 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). Actual innocence means that “in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 329. Foster provided the district court with the following evidence in an effort to establish his actual innocence: (1) Ward’s February 22, 2002 confessions to his friend and to the police; (2) a handwritten note left by Ward in the motel room he shared with Foster; (3) a statement made by Ward in May 2005; and (4) a police report summarizing interviews with Jalissa Polk and her daughter. The district court found this evidence to be insufficient to meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating actual innocence. First, Ward’s confessions to his friend and the detective were both admitted at trial, and therefore neither confession was new evidence. Second, the handwritten note left by Ward for Foster in the motel room did not constitute new, reliable evidence of actual innocence. In the note, Ward admitted to drugging Foster with Foster’s own sleeping pills, having “Mary ride you while you slept,” and “t[aking] your truck” all while Foster was passed out. Thus, the potentially exculpatory note explained the presence of Foster’s semen in Pal’s vagina and tended to show that he was passed out at the time of her murder. petitioner must first raise substantial doubt about his guilt, and then this allows us to examine any procedurally barred constitutional claims. Id. at 741. 6 Case: 09-70001 Document: 00511051699 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/15/2010 No. 09-70001 The contents of the note were not admitted into evidence,4 but its existence was known and discussed at trial. However, simply because the evidence was not admitted does not make it “new.” See Moore, 534 F.3d at 465 (evidence “within the reach of [petitioner’s] personal knowledge or reasonable investigation” is not new). Yet, even if it was new evidence, the district court found that this was yet another statement contradicting statements made by both Ward and Foster. Therefore, the district court concluded that it was not persuasive evidence that Foster was actually innocent of Pal’s murder. In addition, the district court found that Ward’s May 2005 statement was not a credible declaration of guilt. Ward explained that he and Foster had consensual sex with Pal in their hotel room, that there was no kidnapping or rape, that Foster later fell asleep, and that “if I used [Foster’s] truck later that morning, he was not aware of it.” However, the district court noted that the May 2005 statement contradicted both Ward’s and Foster’s earlier statements. Based on the numerous contradictory statements made by both Foster and Ward, the district court concluded that “yet another statement by Ward in which he minimizes both his and Foster’s role in the crime is not a credible admission of guilt on his part.” Thus, although the May 2005 statement was new evidence, it was not new, reliable evidence of Foster’s actual innocence. Finally, the district court found that the police report of Jalissa Polk and her daughter was not persuasive evidence of Foster’s actual innocence. According to the police report, at approximately 8:30 p.m. on February 12 or 13, 2002, Polk’s nine-year-old daughter witnessed a black man chase a nude black woman into the woods and then heard a gun shot. Pal was alive, though, and at Fat Albert’s at 2:00 a.m. on February 14, 2002. 4 The trial court ruled the note was not an admissible statement against interest pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24) because Foster’s counsel was unable to authenticate the note. 7 Case: 09-70001 Document: 00511051699 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/15/2010 No. 09-70001 The district court found that Foster did not produce “new, reliable evidence not presented at trial that establishes, that more likely than not, no reasonable juror would have found” Foster guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Even considering the 2005 communication from Ward, and assuming that the other statements are new, the evidence does not meet the high bar imposed by Schlup. One more contradictory story would not have compelled jurors to find Foster not guilty. To qualify under the miscarriage of justice exception, evidence must be “‘material, not merely cumulative or impeaching.’” Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354, 364 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998)). In Moore, the court likewise considered both the lack of reliability and the contradictory nature of affidavit evidence offered after a trial, and concluded that such factors weighed against the persuasiveness of the evidence. Moore, 534 F.3d at 465. In addition, the police report from Polk’s daughter does not even appear to be related to this case. In the alternative, Foster claims that his otherwise defaulted claims should be revived because he can demonstrate cause and prejudice for his failure to exhaust them. Most of Foster’s unexhausted claims relate to ineffectiveness of counsel. Foster contends that because Texas law does not typically permit ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be raised on direct appeal, his state habeas case was his first opportunity to raise them. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Petitioners are not typically entitled to effective assistance of counsel in state habeas proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). On the other hand, Justice Scalia, at least, has concluded that the Supreme Court “left open the question whether such ineffective assistance [in post-conviction proceedings] can establish a constitutional violation” when the state habeas claims are the first time a state court could examine a question on the merits. Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 387 (2001) (Scalia, J. concurring). 8 Case: 09-70001 Document: 00511051699 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/15/2010 No. 09-70001 We reject Foster’s alternate theory because he did not present the argument in the district court. He first raised it here in his reply brief. Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553, 562 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009).5 Foster fails in the attempt to overcome the procedural bar of failing to exhaust his claims in state court. He has not shown that he is qualified to pass through the actual innocence gateway nor has he shown that he can successfully use the cause and prejudice standard to revive these defaulted claims. The district court was correct in holding that all but two of Foster’s claims were procedurally defaulted.6 Reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s assessment of this issue debatable or wrong. Accordingly, we will not issue a COA for any of Foster’s procedurally defaulted claims.