Opinion ID: 854034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Appoint Trace Evidence Expert

Text: Finally, Kriner argues that the trial court erred in refusing his request for a state-funded expert on trace evidence. The contention is that a trace evidence expert would have testified that the failure to find any physical evidence to connect Mr. Kriner to the murder was unlikely at best if he had been in fact the one who had committed the murder. Kriner specifically focuses on the lack of blood and glass on his shoes or in his car and maintains that an expert would have testified that the chances of this result were remote if Kriner was the killer. He offers no factual support for the proposition that an expert would have so testified and the State offers nothing to controvert it. The State replies that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because expert testimony would not have added to the testimony on trace evidence that was given. A defendant who requests funds for an expert witness must demonstrate a need for the expert. The appointment of experts for this purpose is within the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1383 (Ind.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 117 S.Ct. 1828, 137 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1997). We agree with Kriner that trace evidence was an important issue in this case. The likelihood that he could have done what the State alleged without leaving any trace on his shoes was a significant factual question for the jury in evaluating the State's entirely circumstantial case. However, one of the evidence technicians who investigated the crime scene testified on cross-examination that blood in the cracks of Kriner's tennis shoes would have been very difficult to wash away completely. The State's witness thus conceded a critical part of what Kriner argues would have been established by the expert he was denied. Kriner's contention at trial was that he could not have been the killer due to the lack of blood on his shoes and clothes or in his car. Although scientific analysis might have bolstered this claim, it was largely an appeal to jurors' common sense and experience. This cuts against the appointment of an expert on this issue. Scott v. State, 593 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Ind.1992) (whether expert opinion is necessary is one factor to be taken into account in deciding whether expert should be appointed); but cf. James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 20-22 (Ind. 1993) (failure to provide defendant with blood spatter expert in a death penalty case was reversible error). Based on these considerations, the trial court could have found that Kriner did not meet his burden of showing the need for a trace evidence expert. Accordingly, there was no error. [5]