Opinion ID: 844204
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of defense motion for a “ski mask” lineup

Text: Prior to the start of trial, the defense moved for a live lineup at which the participants would wear ski masks to partially obscure their faces. Defendant claims that the trial court‟s denial of that motion was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his right to due process and other constitutional protections. We conclude there was no error. The record shows the following. At a live lineup conducted on April 30, 1996, 10 days after the restaurant crimes, four eyewitnesses to those crimes identified defendant as the perpetrator who was wearing a ski mask. Four years later, the defense moved that the court order a live lineup at which the participants would wear ski masks. At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that, as a matter of fundamental fairness, the eyewitnesses who identified defendant at the earlier lineup ought to be provided the opportunity to identify him while he was wearing a ski mask, which is how they described the perpetrator. The court observed that it was incumbent on investigators to conduct the initial live lineup, which had occurred shortly after the shooting. The court also noted that at that lineup, investigators adopted defense counsel‟s suggestion to have the participants wear a black knit cap pulled down to the forehead, covering their hair and ears. In the court‟s view, the initial lineup amply protected defendant‟s due process rights and a second lineup was not required. As the court pointed out, whether or not an eyewitness could pick out defendant in a ski mask four years after the incident would neither bolster nor cast doubt on his or her original identification. Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625 (Evans), held that the due process clause requires the trial court, in an appropriate case, to grant a 26 defendant‟s timely request for a pretrial lineup. The right to a lineup is not absolute, however. Rather, it arises “only when eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup would tend to resolve.” (Ibid.) The decision whether to order a pretrial lineup rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Ibid.; see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 235-236.) Here, less than two weeks after the incident, eyewitnesses to the restaurant crimes viewed a live lineup. To account for the fact that there was no opportunity for the eyewitnesses to observe the robber‟s hairstyle, and at counsel‟s behest, all of the lineup participants donned black watch caps that were pulled down to cover their hair, foreheads, and ears. Some of the eyewitnesses identified defendant. Others identified a different individual or made no identification at all. At trial, defense counsel cross-examined the eyewitnesses who had positively identified defendant at the live lineup, eliciting from them that the robber‟s face had been covered by the ski mask. On this record, we agree with the trial court that defendant received due process. Defendant‟s real complaint appears to be that the initial lineup was suggestive and its results unreliable because, by presenting participants whose faces were not covered by ski masks, it failed to duplicate the conditions at the crime scene. We note that Donna testified she was able to see most of defendant‟s face when his mask slipped down below his nose. But even if it might have been proper for each of the lineup participants to wear a ski mask like the one worn by the perpetrator (United States v. Hinton (D.C. Cir. 1980) 631 F.2d 769, 774), there is no authority supporting the proposition that they were required to do so. Even assuming that the participants at the initial lineup should have worn ski masks rather than knit caps, it would not establish defendant‟s right to a second pretrial lineup. In considering the defendant‟s claim of a due process right to a pretrial 27 lineup in Evans, this court explained that the inquiry was not whether the receipt of identification evidence at trial is so unfair to the accused as to infringe due process but rather whether “the accused can insist that procedures be afforded whereby the weakness of the identification evidence, if it is in fact weak, can be disclosed.” (Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 621-622.) In this case, the original lineup adequately revealed to the defense the weakness of the eyewitnesses‟ identifications, and defense counsel vigorously challenged the evidence during cross-examination. The court observed, and we agree, that a second lineup would do nothing to assist the defense in testing the reliability of the identifications. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant‟s request for a ski mask lineup. 3. Denial of the third request for substitution of counsel The trial court granted defendant‟s requests to replace his first two appointed counsel. Ten months before the commencement of trial, when defendant sought to discharge his third attorney and substitute new counsel, the court denied the motion. Defendant asserts that the trial court‟s refusal to grant his request for substitution of counsel constituted an abuse of discretion. As we shall explain, the court‟s ruling was neither an abuse of discretion nor did it violate defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
In February 2000, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing on various motions. Defendant addressed the court directly with regard to one motion, requesting an order for access to the law library. Defendant explained that he needed library access in order to fully understand the proceedings and determine which motions he had a right to file. He complained that his defense attorney, 28 Chuck Nacsin, had failed to properly advise him, advocate for him, and protect his rights. The trial court denied defendant‟s request for law library privileges on the ground that it was counsel‟s role to present motions on defendant‟s behalf. The court added that Nacsin was one of the most experienced criminal defense attorneys in the county, and, in the court‟s view, always had demonstrated the highest degree of professionalism and competence. The court also found, however, that defendant‟s expression of dissatisfaction with Nacsin suggested that he might be requesting substitution of counsel. The court excused the prosecutor from the courtroom so that it could conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. At the hearing, defendant read into the record a written statement entitled “Request for a Marsden Hearing,” which set forth numerous accusations against Nacsin. Specifically, he claimed that counsel was attempting to “railroad” him by refusing to provide discovery. He also complained that counsel refused to interview the witnesses he had suggested and was not properly investigating issues that defendant brought to his attention. For instance, defendant faulted counsel for failing to follow up on evidence indicating that a defense investigator and detectives from the Colton Police Department had sabotaged the investigation because they knew the victim Fred Malouf and evidence that investigative officers were threatening the witnesses. Defendant also complained that counsel refused to file a motion for the release of police officer personnel files or to seek recusal of the court and the prosecutor on the ground that they likewise knew Fred Malouf. Defendant repeated his earlier allegations that Nacsin was not properly advising him regarding his rights or working in his best interests. He also reiterated that he had no trust or faith in counsel and accused him of conspiring with the police and prosecutors to secure his conviction. Defendant complained finally that Nacsin 29 visited him only once every two to three months and that Nacsin‟s law office refused to accept his collect calls. When defendant had finished reading his written statement, he indicated to the court that he was not actually making a Marsden motion at that time but rather seeking discovery, which he would review, and then would present his Marsden motion at a subsequent hearing. Counsel objected to defendant‟s having access to discovery materials while in jail because of the risk that they would fall into the hands of jailhouse informants. The court, however, directed counsel to provide defendant with all discovery and the transcripts of all proceedings that had occurred since his appointment as counsel of record. The hearing on defendant‟s eventual Marsden motion occurred four months later in June 2000. Defendant repeated his earlier complaints that counsel was ignoring his requests to explore whether investigative officers were threatening the witnesses and falsifying evidence. When the court asked Nacsin whether he had discussed those subjects with defendant, he replied that he had done so “many times.” Nacsin also indicated that he was pursuing everything he could pursue in the case. Defendant responded that he did not know what counsel was doing. He also asserted that when he and counsel discuss the case, they “collide” and he cannot understand him. As defendant further explained, “I got to be able to trust him, for us to have that attorney-client relationship. And I don‟t trust him because I don‟t know . . . what he‟s doing.” The court found no basis for ordering substitution of counsel at that time and denied the Marsden motion without prejudice. In the court‟s view, defendant‟s appointed counsel was “one of the more tenacious defense attorneys” to appear in his courtroom over the past 20 years, and the court was certain that if there was evidence suggesting that a witness had been threatened, counsel would vigorously pursue that point during cross-examination. Defendant continued to express 30 frustration with attorney-client communications, saying that when he would ask counsel certain things about the proceedings, he would come away even more confused. He also disclosed, however, that he wanted an opportunity to see if he and counsel could “come to some type of understanding” and “somehow see eyeto-eye” before deciding to go through with his request for a new attorney. Although the court invited defendant to renew his Marsden motion after he had an opportunity to review additional discovery, defendant did not renew the motion.
Defendant contends that the court‟s denial of his request for substitution of counsel was an abuse of discretion because the complaints summarized, ante, were emblematic of a difficult, unproductive relationship between him and his counsel, which led to an irretrievable breakdown in their ability to work together that substantially impaired his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree, as explained, post. Established principles govern our assessment of whether the court abused its discretion in denying defendant‟s Marsden motion. “Once a defendant is afforded an opportunity to state his or her reasons for seeking to discharge an appointed attorney, the decision whether or not to grant a motion for substitution of counsel lies within the discretion of the trial judge. The court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Marsden motion „ “unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the defendant‟s right to assistance of counsel.” ‟ [Citations.] Substantial impairment of the right to counsel can occur when the appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation or when „the defendant and the attorney have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citation].‟ [Citations.]” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 912.) 31 Contrary to defendant‟s contention, none of his various complaints concerning counsel suggests an irreconcilable conflict between them. Defendant‟s main grievance was that counsel refused to pursue his suggested motions and lines of investigation. However, “ „[t]actical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an “irreconcilable conflict.” ‟ ” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 682; accord, People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1192.) Although defendant complained that he did not know what counsel was doing, counsel informed the court that he and defendant had discussed defendant‟s suggestions “many times,” and that he was pursuing everything he could. The court was entitled to credit counsel‟s representations in this regard. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 912; People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.) Nor was an irreconcilable conflict shown by defendant‟s assertions that he did not trust his attorney and “collided” with him when they discussed the case. As we explained in People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, “If a defendant‟s claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment, and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law.” (Id. at p. 1246; see also People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 489.) Furthermore, “[a] trial court is not required to conclude that an irreconcilable conflict exists if the defendant has not made a sustained good faith effort to work out any disagreements with counsel . . . .” (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 860.) Here, after defendant indicated his willingness to try to “come to some type of understanding” with counsel, the court reasonably could find that any asserted conflict between defendant and his attorney was not irreconcilable. That conclusion was borne out by the fact that although the court‟s denial of the request for substitution of counsel was without prejudice, defendant 32 did not renew his Marsden motion. As for defendant‟s complaint that counsel rarely visited him, such an allegation does not justify substitution of counsel. (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 604.) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Marsden motion. 4. Disclosure of police officer personnel records Defendant filed a pretrial motion for an order directing the prosecution to provide the confidential personnel records of 10 law enforcement officers involved in the investigation of the crimes and his postarrest confinement in county jail. He argued that the prosecutor was obligated to disclose the identified records because they amounted to favorable, material evidence within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. At a hearing on the motion, the court indicated that, in an abundance of caution, it found good cause to conduct an in camera review of the personnel records in issue to determine whether any of them showed complaints or disciplinary action involving improper conduct such as falsifying evidence or testifying falsely, or any other potential impeachment material that should be disclosed to the defense. (See Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b); Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531; see generally People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 [summarizing the state law procedures by which a defendant may seek disclosure of police personnel records].) The court conducted separate in camera hearings to review the files provided by the three different law enforcement agencies involved. Neither defendant nor the prosecutor attended the hearings. The court ordered that the reporter‟s transcripts of each of the three hearings be sealed, but it announced its rulings in open court. Specifically, the court indicated that it denied disclosure of the records of San Bernardino Police Officers Voss and Filson and Colton Police Officers Morenberg, Owens, and Schiller, 33 finding nothing in their personnel files that was likely to lead to any admissible impeachment evidence. The court ordered that defense counsel be provided access to reports and handwritten notes by two San Bernardino Sheriff‟s deputies who claimed they were injured in the incident involving defendant at the jail, but it denied disclosure of the remaining files. The transcripts of the in camera hearings that the court ordered sealed have remained under seal. Noting that neither the transcripts nor the documents reviewed by the trial court were made available to him or his appellate counsel, defendant requests that this court conduct an independent review of these materials. He asserts that such review is necessary to ensure that the trial court‟s rulings did not infringe his right to due process. Respondent does not oppose the request. “This court routinely independently examines the sealed records of such in camera hearings to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant‟s motion for disclosure of police personnel records. [Citations.]” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285; accord, People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 398.) We have done so in this case. The sealed record at issue here includes a full transcript of the three in camera hearings, but not the actual personnel files that formed the basis of the trial court‟s ruling barring disclosure of most of the requested materials. As defendant points out, the trial court refused appellate counsel‟s suggestion to include in the record on appeal the actual documents that it had reviewed during the in camera hearings. We agree with the trial court‟s ruling that the transcript of the hearings was sufficient. The sealed transcript that is before us, in which the court “state[d] for the record what documents it examined,” is adequate for purposes of conducting a meaningful appellate review. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229.) 34 Having independently reviewed the sealed records, we conclude that the trial court‟s ruling refusing to disclose the requested personnel files except for the portions relevant to the May 1997 jail incident that involved defendant was neither an abuse of discretion nor a violation of defendant‟s due process rights. (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535; People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042.)