Opinion ID: 563814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attribution of Quantity of Drugs under Sentencing Guidelines

Text: 43 Initially, Nichols' pre-sentence report stated that Nichols possessed two pounds of amphetamine with the intent to distribute. The government objected to the pre-sentence report, and an amended report was filed, crediting Nichols with possession of over 390 pounds of amphetamine, the entire amount of the drug attributed to the conspiracy. The trial court gave no reason for attributing to Nichols amphetamine possessed by other members of the conspiracy other than the fact that Nichols was a co-conspirator. 44 The sentencing guideline pertaining to conspiracy, Sec. 2D1.4, comment 1, allows conspirators to be sentenced on the basis of the defendant's conduct or the conduct of co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy that was known to the defendant or was reasonably foreseeable. USSG, Sec. 2D1.4 Comment (emphasis added). In order to attribute to a particular defendant amounts of a controlled substance that was the subject of a conspiracy, the sentencing court must determine the quantity of controlled substance that the defendant knew or should reasonably have foreseen the conspiracy would have involved. 45 The reasonable foreseeability required of Sec. 2D1.4 requires a finding separate from a finding that the defendant was a conspirator. United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266, 1273 (5th Cir.1989). In Warters, this court vacated the sentence for misprision of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana for express findings of the amount of marijuana attributable to the defendant. Warters, 885 F.2d at 1272. This court noted that the entire amount of marijuana involved in the conspiracy was not automatically attributable to the defendant. Rather, the trial court would need to expressly determine not only the actual amount involved in the entire conspiracy ... but also the amount ... which the defendant knew or should have known or foreseen was involved. Id. at 1273. 46 The district court here should have expressly found the quantity of amphetamine that Nichols ought reasonably to have foreseen was involved in the conspiracy. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that Nichols was convicted of conspiracy that he could have reasonably foreseen the total quantity involved in the conspiracy: the acts of co-conspirators may be unforeseeable. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1184-85, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Reasonable foreseeability is mentioned in the comment to Sec. 2D1.4 as an addition to an act's being in furtherance of a conspiracy. The government's argument that reasonable foreseeability follows automatically from membership in a conspiracy leaves the second clause of the comment without meaning. 47 We express no opinion regarding the evidence of the quantity Nichols could have reasonably foreseen that the conspiracy would involve. We state only that proof of reasonable foreseeability does not follow automatically from proof that Nichols was a member of the conspiracy. 48 We AFFIRM in all respects except we VACATE Nichols' sentence. We REMAND Nichols' case only for additional fact finding and re-sentencing.