Opinion ID: 3039321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We adopt the portion of the panel’s opinion addressing the government’s claim that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we lack jurisdiction to consider Fernandez-Ruiz’s petition. See Fernandez-Ruiz, 410 F.3d at 586-87. As the panel explained, under section 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, “we are no longer barred by § 1252(a)(2)(C) from reviewing Fernandez-Ruiz’s petition on account of his past convictions.” Fernandez-Ruiz, 410 F.3d at 587. 2 Holding Fernandez-Ruiz removable on this ground obviated the panel’s need to address whether he was also removable because his domestic violence offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude or because his theft by control of property offense was an aggravated felony. See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 585, 588 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). 3 The three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit, except to the extent adopted by the en banc court. Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 1212, 1212 (9th Cir. 2005). FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 17859 III. Crime of Domestic Violence: Categorical Analysis [1] The government claims Fernandez-Ruiz’s 2003 misdemeanor domestic violence conviction subjected him to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which permits the deportation of “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence.”4 In this context, a “crime of domestic violence” is “any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18) against a person” who has one of several enumerated domestic relationships with the perpetrator. Id. [2] To determine whether Fernandez-Ruiz’s state law domestic violence offense meets the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of a crime of domestic violence, we begin by applying the “categorical approach” laid out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). See Ruiz-Morales v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1219, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the categorical approach to determine whether mayhem under California law was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16). Under this approach, without regard to the particular facts of Fernandez-Ruiz’s offense—and looking beyond the Arizona statutes’ title for the offense—we must ask whether the “full range of conduct” proscribed by the statutes under which Fernandez-Ruiz was convicted meets the definition of a crime of domestic violence. United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Lomas, 30 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1994)); see Leocal, 543 U.S. at 7 (explaining that the language of 18 U.S.C. § 16 requires “look[ing] to the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to [a] petitioner’s crime”). Interpreting the definition of a crime of domestic violence requires us to consider the “ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the language Congress used in defining” a crime of violence. Ruiz-Morales, 4 The government does not now argue that Fernandez-Ruiz’s 2002 misdemeanor domestic violence conviction met these requirements. 17860 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 361 F.3d at 1222 (quoting United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001)); see Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (“When interpreting a statute, we must give words their ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning.” (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993))). [3] Of the two statutes under which Fernandez-Ruiz was convicted, only the assault statute requires in-depth analysis. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203.5 Both parties agree the specific focus of our analysis must be whether the offense defined in Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1203(A)(1) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).6 The state statute reads: “A person commits assault by . . . [i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing any physical injury to another person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203(A)(1) (emphasis 5 The other statute simply provides that, when the perpetrator of an assault has one of several domestic relationships with the victim, the assault constitutes a state law crime of domestic violence. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601(A). All of the relationships covered under the state statute are covered under the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (“[T]he term ‘crime of domestic violence’ means any crime of violence . . . by any . . . individual against a person who is protected from that individual’s acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the United States or any State . . . .”). 6 As a class two misdemeanor, Fernandez-Ruiz’s 2003 domestic violence conviction could have been under either Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1203(A)(1) or (A)(2). See id. § 13-1203(B). The documents of conviction do not reveal whether Fernandez-Ruiz was charged and convicted under one or both of these provisions. As already explained, however, Fernandez-Ruiz committed a categorical crime of violence only if the “full range of conduct” for which he could have been convicted meets the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 16. United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Lomas, 30 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1994)). Thus, because we ultimately conclude that not all of the conduct proscribed by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1203(A)(1) meets the definition of a crime of violence, we do not consider Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1203(A)(2). Additionally, we need not consider 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because Fernandez-Ruiz’s assault convictions were both misdemeanors. See id. (defining a crime of violence, in relevant part, as “any other offense that is a felony” (emphasis added)). FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 17861 added). The federal statute defines a crime of violence as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Thus, the determinative question is whether “recklessly causing . . . physical injury to another person,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203(A)(1), necessarily involves the “use of physical force against the person . . . of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).7
[4] Until recently, it was well established in this circuit that crimes involving the reckless use of force could be crimes of violence. For example, in United States v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000), we interpreted the very statute at issue here and concluded it satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 16(a): A conviction under § 13-1203(A)(1) may be based on reckless conduct, which Ceron-Sanchez argues does not constitute violent conduct. However, in order to support a conviction under § 13-1203(A)(1), the reckless conduct must have caused actual physical injury to another person. Therefore, the use of physical force is a required element of § 13- 1203(A)(1). Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d at 1172-73. We held that crimes of recklessness could be crimes of violence even though we recognized there is an element of voli- 7 Our standard of review is de novo. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Because the BIA is not charged with administering 18 U.S.C. § 16 and has no special expertise regarding the interpretation of that criminal statute, we do not defer to the BIA’s interpretation of that provision.”); Singh, 386 F.3d at 1230 (“We reject the . . . assertion that we owe ‘substantial deference’ to the Attorney General’s interpretations of general state and federal criminal statutes.”). 17862 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES tion inherent in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)’s requirement that an offender “use” physical force “against” another person. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2001). Our reasoning was that recklessness “requires conscious disregard of a risk of a harm that the defendant is aware of.” Id. at 1146. On similar grounds, we held that offenses requiring “criminal negligence” could be crimes of violence. See Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001). By contrast, we held that crimes of simple negligence lacked the volitional element necessary for crimes of violence. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1145. Recently, however, we cast doubt on our cases distinguishing recklessness and criminal negligence from simple negligence. In Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2005), a Mexican citizen and national had previously been convicted under California law of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Id. at 1219. Although this conviction required a minimum culpability of “gross negligence,” an IJ found the underlying offense to have been a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and ordered the alien’s removal. LaraCazares, 408 F.3d at 1219. The BIA affirmed, citing our cases holding that crimes of criminal negligence and recklessness could be crimes of violence. Id. We reversed on the basis of Leocal. Id. at 1222. In Leocal, the Supreme Court held that driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) cannot be a crime of violence if the statute defining the offense “reach[es] individuals who were negligent or less.” 543 U.S. at 13. Rejecting the government’s argument “that Leocal add[ed] nothing to our analysis in Trinidad-Aquino and [did] not extend to gross negligence,” we held that gross negligence “does not constitute the kind of active employment of force against another that Leocal requires for a crime of violence.” Lara-Cazares, 408 F.3d at 1221. Although the facts of Lara-Cazares did not require us to discuss in detail the implications of Leocal for crimes of criminal negligence or recklessness, we concluded that Leocal FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 17863 abrogated our holdings in Park and Ceron-Sanchez. See id. at 1222 (“To the extent that our decision in Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001), and the cases there cited [including Ceron-Sanchez] support a contrary result, we conclude that they are no longer good law in light of Leocal.”). Nonetheless, shortly after deciding Lara-Cazares, we relied on Ceron-Sanchez to hold a crime of recklessness—seconddegree assault under Washington law—a categorical crime of violence. See United States v. Hermoso-Garcia, 413 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J.). In doing so, we failed to distinguish Lara-Cazares or Leocal. See id. [5] Because our existing precedent is inconsistent, we must examine the reasoning of Leocal to decide the present case.

[6] In determining that DUI offenses requiring a mens rea of mere negligence or less cannot be “shoehorn[ed]” into the federal definition of a crime of violence, Leocal, 543 U.S. at 13, the Supreme Court emphasized that 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the “ ‘use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another,’ ” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)). Whereas the word “use,” taken alone, could “in theory” connote the accidental employment of force, it would be “much less natural to say that a person actively employs [i.e., uses] physical force against another person by accident.” Id. Thus, the Court reasoned, 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)’s requirement that force be used “against” someone or something suggested that crimes of violence require “a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added). As further support for the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 16 does not reach merely accidental offenses, the Court looked 17864 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES to the ordinary meaning of the term “crime of violence.” See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11. That term, the Court observed, naturally suggests a category of crimes more “violent” and “active” than DUI offenses. Id. The Court also remarked that, because courts must interpret 18 U.S.C. § 16 consistently in both criminal and noncriminal cases, the rule of lenity applies. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8. Under this rule, to whatever extent 18 U.S.C. § 16’s definitions of a crime of violence lack clarity, courts should construe the ambiguous statutory language against the government. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8.
[7] Although the Court in Leocal expressly reserved the question whether crimes of violence can include offenses involving the reckless use of force, see id. at 384, two of our sister circuits have interpreted the reasoning of Leocal to place such offenses beyond the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 16.8 In Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. 2005), a native and citizen of Mexico petitioned for review of an order that he be removed from the United States for having committed involuntary manslaughter by driving intoxicated. Id. at 445. The Virginia statute of conviction required reckless disregard for human life, but not necessarily reckless disregard for whether force would be used. Id. at 447. Thus, the court was not required to decide whether offenses requiring the reckless use of force, or reckless disregard for a risk that force might be used, can be crimes of violence. See id. Nevertheless, the court deemed Leocal controlling: 8 In so doing, these circuits joined three other circuits that, even before Leocal, restricted the category of crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 to crimes requiring specific intent to use force against a person or property. See Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367, 373-74 (2d Cir. 2003); BazanReyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 610-11 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 926-27 (5th Cir. 2001). FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 17865 [T]he conclusion of the Leocal Court that “[i]n no ‘ordinary or natural’ sense can it be said that a person risks having to ‘use’ physical force against another person in the course of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and causing injury” strongly indicates that the result in Leocal would have been the same even had a violation of the statute there at issue required recklessness rather than mere negligence. Id. (citation omitted). Applying this reading of Leocal, the Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review. Id. The Third Circuit has on three occasions endorsed a similar reading of Leocal—beginning with Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2005). Tran involved the petition for review of a Vietnamese citizen ordered removed from the United States for having been convicted, under Pennsylvania law, of “conspiracy to commit reckless burning or exploding.” Id. at 468. The Tran court began its assessment of whether reckless burning or exploding was a crime of violence by citing dictionary definitions of “use.” Id. at 470. An “obvious commonality” among these definitions was that “the ‘use’ of force means more than the mere occurrence of force; it requires the intentional employment of that force, generally to obtain some end.” Id. (emphasis added). In concluding that mere recklessness was insufficient under such a standard, the Tran court expressly disagreed with our decision in Trinidad-Aquino. Id. Trinidad-Aquino, the court suggested, could not be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Leocal that “ ‘use’ requires active employment.” Id. (quoting Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the court granted Tran’s petition for review. Id. at 473. The Third Circuit reaffirmed its interpretation of Leocal in another immigration case, Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2005). In Popal, the offense at issue was Pennsylvania’s misdemeanor simple assault offense. Id. at 253. The stat17866 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES ute of conviction required a minimum culpability of recklessness. Id. at 254.9 In granting the petition for review, the Popal court both reaffirmed the reasoning of Tran and rejected a contrary argument based on the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). See Popal, 416 F.3d at 254-55. A Senate Report discussing the crime of violence definition now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) suggested this definition “would include a threatened or attempted simple assault or battery on another person.” S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 307 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3487. In reference to this suggestion, the Popal court stated: We acknowledge that the legislative history of § 16(a) provides some support for the government’s theory that that section encompasses simple assault. Nonetheless, we do not think that this legislative history undermines our conclusion [that simple assault committed recklessly is not a crime of violence]. Instead, we think it likely that, when the drafters of § 16 mentioned simple assault as an exemplary crime of violence, they had in mind traditional common-law simple assault, defined as a crime “committed by either a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the person of another, or by a threat to inflict injury upon the person of another which, when coupled with an apparent present ability, causes a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm.” The common law thus required ‘wilfull- ness,’ i.e., intent, in order to find a defendant guilty of simple assault. It is entirely plausible that this definition might have been Congress’s referent in discussing § 16(a). 9 The statute was nearly identical to the one at issue here. It provided, “A person is guilty of assault if he: (1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . .” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a). FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 17867 Popal, 416 F.3d at 254 n.5 (citations omitted). Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the Third Circuit interpreted the reasoning of Leocal to reach crimes of recklessness in Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005). Oyebanji involved a Nigerian citizen who faced removal for a New Jersey vehicular homicide conviction. Id. at 261-62. The statute of conviction required proof of recklessness—defined in part as “consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [a] material element [of an offense] exists or will result from [the actor’s] conduct.” Id. at 263 n.4 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-2(3)). The court concluded that Leocal controlled primarily because of Leocal’s repeated emphasis that crimes of violence cannot be “accidental.” See id. at 263-64. The term “accidental,” the court explained, “is most often used to describe events that did not ‘occur [ ] as a result of anyone’s purposeful act.’ ” Id. at 264 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 16 (8th ed. 2004)) (alteration in original). As such, even though New Jersey’s definition of recklessness involved conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, the reckless use of force was not sufficiently “intentional” to prevent an offense from being accidental. See id. (“[W]e cannot overlook the Court’s repeated statement that ‘accidental’ conduct (which would seem to include reckless conduct) is not enough to qualify as a crime of violence.” (emphasis added)). As in Popal, the court in Oyebanji acknowledged that “reasonable arguments can be made in support of the proposition that” crimes of recklessness may be crimes of violence. Id. Nonetheless, the court interpreted Leocal to foreclose such arguments—at least at the circuit court level. See id. (“We recognize that there are plausible grounds for distinguishing Leocal and that reasonable arguments can be made in support of the proposition that Oyebanji’s offense of conviction should be viewed as a crime of violence. But as a lower fed17868 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES eral court, we are advised to follow the Supreme Court’s ‘considered dicta.’ ”) (citation omitted).
[8] We agree with our sister circuits that the reasoning of Leocal—which merely holds that using force negligently or less is not a crime of violence—extends to crimes involving the reckless use of force. [9] Citing with approval our holding in Trinidad-Aquino that crimes of violence must have a volitional element and so cannot include crimes of negligence, the Leocal Court went a step further: the Court not only endorsed the position that crimes of violence must be volitional but also repeatedly emphasized that such crimes cannot be “accidental.” See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8-10; see also Lara-Cazares, 408 F.3d at 1221 (rejecting the argument that Leocal adds nothing to Trinidad-Aquino). “Accidental” means “[n]ot having occurred as a result of anyone’s purposeful act.” Black’s Law Dictionary 16 (8th ed. 2004). “Purposeful” means “[d]one with a specific purpose in mind; DELIBERATE.” Id. at 1272. Reckless conduct, as generally defined, is not purposeful. See id. at 1298 (defining recklessness as “[c]onduct whereby the actor does not desire harmful consequence but nonetheless foresees the possibility and consciously takes the risk” (emphasis added)). Even more clearly, reckless conduct as defined by Arizona law is not purposeful. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-105(9)(c) (defining recklessness as “consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists,” and providing that “[a] person who creates such a risk but is unaware of such risk solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly” (emphasis added)). Thus, the reckless use of force is “accidental” and crimes of recklessness cannot be crimes of violence. See Oyebanji, 418 F.3d at 264; Tran, 414 F.3d at 470-71. FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 17869 [10] Contrary to the dissent, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 16, we see no “important differences between negligence and recklessness.” See Dissent Op. at 17890. To the extent recklessness differs from criminal negligence, “[t]he difference between them is that criminal negligence requires only a failure to perceive a risk, as compared to the recklessness requirement of an awareness and conscious disregard of the risk.” In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 292 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); accord 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 27 (15th ed. 1993). But this subjective awareness of possible injury is not the same as the intentional use of physical force against the person of another. Neither gross negligence in failing to perceive, nor conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of injury implies that physical force is instrumental to carrying out the crime, such as the plain meaning of the word “use” denotes. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 (“The reckless disregard in § 16 relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person’s conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force might be required in committing a crime.”). Therefore, neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence under § 16. As the Court suggested in Leocal—and as illustrated by considering the full range of conduct proscribed by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1203(A)(1)—any other conclusion would “blur the distinction between the ‘violent’ crimes Congress sought to distinguish for heightened punishment and other crimes.” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11. Under the language of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1203(A)(1), a wife and mother could be convicted of assault and domestic violence under Arizona law by recklessly running a stop sign and causing a traffic accident that injured her passenger-husband and child. Indeed, a person could be convicted of assault under Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1203(A)(1) by running a stop sign “solely by reason of voluntary intoxication” and causing physical injury to another. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 1317870 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 105(9)(c). Such conduct cannot, in the ordinary sense, be called “active” or “violent.” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.10 10 The dissent calls the above hypotheticals “absurd.” Dissent Op. at 17885. However, our example of running a stop sign is similar to actual cases where a defendant has been convicted of aggravated assault. See State v. Miles, 123 P.3d 669, 671 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (sustaining conviction for aggravated assault under Arizona Revised Statutes § 131204(A)(1)—which requires a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 131203—of a man who ran a stop sign and caused an accident that injured his passenger); State v. Freeland, 863 P.2d 263, 265-66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming aggravated assault conviction “prosecuted on the theory that defendant, by driving while intoxicated and causing a collision, recklessly caused serious injury to his victim”). Moreover, the dissent fails to cite us to, nor are we aware of, any authority suggesting that Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1203(A)(1) cannot reach the conduct described in our hypothetical examples. Accordingly, our categorical analysis must address such conduct. The dissent leads its argument with the trenchant phrase “[m]en do not beat their wives by accident.” Dissent Op. at 17879. True. But the terms of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-3601(A) do not require, and the judicially noticeable documents in the record do not prove, that FernandezRuiz beat his wife. Rather, whether our record shows a conviction under such a statute requires a beating, and whether the documents of conviction show a beating took place, are the precise issues before us. Instead of looking to the record, the dissent would infer that wife-beating took place from the “trust and related vulnerability that characterize domestic relationships.” Dissent Op. at 17883. The dissent does not explain how, within the confines of Taylor, the perpetrator’s mere domestic relationship to the victim proves that he intentionally used force against her. The statute’s title is not enough. See Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d at 1146 (“We look solely to the statutory definition of the crime, not to the name given to the offense or to the underlying circumstances of the predicate conviction.”) (emphasis added). Further, it is a commonplace of the criminal law that the confidential relationship that exists between the perpetrator and the victim cannot supply the proof of the requisite element of the mens rea with which an act was done. Were a husband to take his wife’s car without her consent, the “trust and vulnerability” of the wife would not automatically supply the proof of the husband’s intent permanently to deprive her of possession of the car, so as to convert misdemeanor joy-riding into felony car theft. FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 17871 Finally, because the text of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) is sufficiently clear, we see no need in this case to employ legislative history as an interpretive aid. See, e.g., United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 719 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We need not factor in legislative history because the meaning of the statute is clear from the text.”). The requirement that the offense have “as an element, the use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (emphasis added), implies the use of force must be a means to an end.11 11 The dissent relies on the Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See Dissent Op. at 17891 (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 307 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486-87). This report cites “battery” as an example of a crime of violence within the meaning of § 16(a). See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 307 & n.12. Since battery as defined by the Model Penal Code may be accomplished through recklessness, the dissent asserts that Congress intended § 16 to include reckless conduct. See Dissent Op. at 17892. Since the statutory language is clear, we need not look to a report issued by one chamber of Congress as evidence of the statute’s meaning. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is not only . . . improper but also quite unnecessary to seek repeated support in the words of a Senate Committee Report —which, as far as we know, not even the full committee, much less the full Senate, much much less the House, and much much much less the President who signed the bill, agreed with.”). Even if we do consider the legislative history, it is far from clear that Congress intended § 16(a) to reach reckless conduct. The Senate Report cites 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1976) in a footnote to the term “battery.” See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 307 n.12. Presumably, the Committee had § 113(d) in mind when it referred to battery. Yet, at least at the time of § 16’s enactment, § 113(d) was a “general intent” crime. See United States v. Knife, 592 F.2d 472, 481-82 & n.12 (8th Cir. 1979) (“The element of intent in § 113(f)”—defined as an assault under § 113(d) that results in serious bodily injury—“is satisfied if the general intent to commit the acts of assault arose when [defendant] initially approached [the victim].”); United States v. Martin, 536 F.2d 535, 535-36 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (finding the mental element of § 113(d) to be adequately proven where “the magistrate found an intent to strike and to scuffle”). Both these cases involve facts showing an intent to strike the victim, not merely the creation of such risk. We therefore doubt that “general intent” under § 113(d) includes reckless 17872 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES [11] For these reasons, we hold that the offense underlying Fernandez-Ruiz’s 2003 misdemeanor domestic violence conviction was not a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) or, by extension, a categorical crime of domestic violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The bedrock principle of Leocal is that to constitute a federal crime of violence an offense must involve the intentional use of force against the person or property of another. In light of Leocal, we expressly overrule our cases holding that crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 may include offenses committed through the reckless, or grossly negligent, use of force. IV. Crime of Domestic Violence: Modified Categorical