Opinion ID: 510247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BIG FOOT TWO as Seagoing

Text: 13 The district court found the BIG FOOT TWO to be a seagoing vessel under Sec. 183(b) by applying the principles in In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F.Supp. 561, 570-72 (S.D.Tex.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.1985). The Sedco court, however, was determining whether a particular semisubmersible drilling rig, which had made numerous ocean voyages, was a vessel for purposes of invoking the Limitation of Liability Act generally. The Sedco court was not confronted with, and did not address, the effect of Sec. 183(f). Since the designation of the BIG FOOT TWO as a vessel entitled to the benefits of the Act is not at issue, Sedco affords no assistance in our resolution of this case. 14 While the Act does not define seagoing, it does expressly delineate certain craft which, even though arguably seagoing, are deemed not to be seagoing for purposes of Sec. 183(b). 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 183(f). The vessel owners contend that the term nondescript non-self-propelled vessels included in Sec. 183(f) encompasses the BIG FOOT TWO. The crewmen argue that the Sec. 183(f) listing includes only craft designed for local harbor and river usage. They claim that the BIG FOOT TWO was designed to drill for oil in the gulf seas and is capable of being transported overseas. The record, however, contains limited information about the BIG FOOT TWO. It is non-self-propelled, measures 137.6' in length and 100.1' in beam, and weighs 1,962 tons. It was designed to transport a drilling work station from place to place, attaching temporarily to the seabed by the use of its retractable legs while a drilling operation is in progress. It was involved in a drilling operation within the contiguous zone at the time of the accident. 15 We do not find in the term nondescript non-self-propelled vessels in Sec. 183(f) the definition to resolve the question before us. We are told that the purpose of the Sec. 183(f) laundry list of vessels deemed nonseagoing under Sec. 183(b), and thus not subject to Sec. 183(b)'s increased liability, was to protect the interests of the owners of harbor and river vessels. See 3 Benedict on Admiralty Sec. 47, at 5-46 (7th ed. 1986) (This list was offered to the Committee on Commerce of the House of Representatives by representatives of harbor and river interests owning what was termed 'marine equipment,' and it is thought proper to construe the list, with the exception of pleasure yachts, as limited to harbor and river vessels.). This restriction of Sec. 183(f) to river- and harbor-type vessels has been adopted by other courts interpreting the provision's scope. See In re Petition of the Dodge, Inc., 282 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir.1960). 16 In determining whether a particular craft is a vessel under the Act, the courts have looked to the function and capabilities of the craft. Sedco, 543 F.Supp. at 570-71. Similarly, one court deeming a vessel seagoing under Sec. 183(b) focused on the particular craft's intended routine usage  'outside the headlands or fauces of a harbor, or ... outside the boundaries of inland waters as established by a competent authority....'  Petition of Bogan, 103 F.Supp. 755, 759 (D.N.J.1952) (quoting 3 Benedict on Admiralty, 6th ed., at 405). 17 While not directly on point, analysis of the statutory definitions of barge and seagoing barge is helpful in our effort to devise the proper test for whether a vessel is seagoing under Sec. 183(b). Section 2101(2), 46 U.S.C., defines barge as a non-self-propelled vessel. Section 2101(32) defines a seagoing barge as a non-self-propelled vessel of at least 100 gross tons making voyages beyond the Boundary Line. The Boundary Line is that line which divides the high seas from rivers, harbors, and inland waters. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 151. Under proper authority, the Boundary Line has been set by the Coast Guard as twelve nautical miles from the Gulf Coast. 2 46 C.F.R. Sec. 7.105(a). By these definitions, whether a barge is seagoing is determined by an examination of the function of the particular vessel. 18 It is not enough to decide that a particular craft has the capability to go beyond inland waters and the Boundary Line, because most of the vessels enumerated in Sec. 183(f) have that capability. Nor is the actual use of the vessel the measure, because ocean liners may be used on inland waters for entertainment purposes. It is rather the usual operations to be expected, for a vessel of its design, that defines whether a particular vessel is seagoing in the meaning of this statute. 19 We conclude that the inquiry to determine whether a particular vessel is seagoing under Sec. 183(b) and not exempted by Sec. 183(f) is whether the vessel does, or is intended to, navigate in the seas beyond the Boundary Line in the regular course of its operations. These operations may in fact proceed on either side of the Boundary Line; but the court must find that, considering the design, function, purpose, and capabilities of the vessel, it will be normally expected to engage in substantial operations beyond the nautical boundary. 20 There has been no finding made by the district court to meet this test, and the record gives us no basis for making a finding. We remand the case to the district court for this purpose. We do not vacate the existing order but direct that the court promptly determine whether to affirm or vacate, pursuant to this opinion. 21 REMANDED.