Opinion ID: 411639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Collateral Statutory Limitations on Section 15: Section 33

Text: 174 I cannot dismiss as easily as the majority the argument that section 33 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 832, which withholds from the FMC concurrent power or jurisdiction of [the] Interstate Commerce Commission, 7 may in fact be violated by the Commission's approval of Agreement No. 10140, but would have the hearing on remand go into that issue more thoroughly. The FMC's assertion of jurisdiction over the through intermodal rates of Agreement No. 10140 rests on the assumption, adopted by the majority opinion, that there is no functional difference between permitting the ocean carriers to agree on the ocean division proportion of a joint through fare (the Department does not contest that power) and permitting them to agree on joint intermodal through fares since in each case each intermodal member has to make its own arrangement with the land carrier as to the ICC-regulated land division proportional rate. See Maj.Op. at 813-14. I agree with the Department that agreements on joint intermodal through fares (which include surface land rates) may have a significantly different anticompetitive effect on shippers and carriers than simple agreements on the proportion of payments from an intermodal fare that go to the ocean division. That a difference may exist is all the more likely now that ICC policy, exercised pursuant to new legislation, frowns heavily on collective setting of the landbased rates and aggressively promotes competition as to such rates. 175 While the record before us is too bare to support any final conclusions, I can envision several repercussions from allowing ocean carriers and intermodal carriers to agree on joint through rates. If railroads cannot collectively set the inland division in their negotiations with shippers, shippers may gain price advantages through competition on that portion of the route. If Agreement No. 10140 were not in effect, those same shippers might obtain a lower total rate by adding the agreed upon ocean rate to the individually negotiated land rate, or they might comparison shop between the ocean-only rate and the intermodal rate. But because Agreement No. 10140 sets the same total through rates for all minibridge and water carriers who are parties to the agreement affecting both all-water routes and intermodal routes, it provides no incentive for the shippers to shop for a bargain or for the railroads, who are supposed to compete for the shippers' business, to try and reduce their costs. The only negotiable point would be between the individual railroads and the individual ocean carriers as to their proportional divisions of the uniform through rate. I have no idea whether such competition could or would develop; I do know one cannot judge whether the ICC's regulatory jurisdiction over the railroad leg of the trip is effectively undermined without knowing more about what would happen to existing patterns of competition under such circumstances. 8 Moreover, this limited potential for competition differs significantly from the potential that exists when carriers can agree only on the ocean division, leaving the shippers free to partake of any benefits accruing from the railroads' competition for their business. 176 In sum, I find the question of the scope of section 15 a difficult one, one which no court has ever expressly considered. It is too important a question to be finally decided in this case on the puny record provided by the Commission. Rather, the full implications of immunity for intermodal tariff agreements should be carefully reviewed in light of the origins and purpose of that section and the Act as a whole. 177