Opinion ID: 2225166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct

Text: The court concluded that this factor was neutral, weighing neither for nor against exclusion. It found that the detectives' purpose was investigatory in design and that the search was executed in the hope that contraband would be found. But it concluded that it could not find that search incident to arrest was an obvious violation of [Gorup's] constitutional rights. It further stated that it could not find that [the detectives] recognized that such an intrusion was, on its face, unconstitutional. The State argues that the detectives, while mistaken in their belief that their conduct was legal, did not engage in flagrant misconduct. But the State fails to recognize that flagrant misconduct includes investigatory conduct that results in an obvious Fourth Amendment violation. We agree with federal courts that have stated the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct is the most important attenuation factor because it is directly tied to the exclusionary rule's purpose  deterring police misconduct. [46] In applying this factor in Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: The illegality here ... had a quality of purposefulness. The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was for investigation or for questioning. ... The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up. The manner in which [the petitioner's] arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. [47] The Eighth Circuit has stated, consistent with the above quote from Brown, that purposeful and flagrant conduct can be found when `(1) the impropriety of the official's misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope that something might turn up.' [48] We agree with this standard. Other courts have also stated that purposeful and flagrant conduct includes fishing expeditions in the hope that `something might turn up.' [49] In this case, the court's reliance on whether the detectives knew their conduct was illegal missed the mark because it applied a subjective standard. Obviously, if the detectives had admitted that they knew the search was illegal, their misconduct would have been flagrant. But, here, the detectives were never asked whether they subjectively believed the search was legal. And even if law enforcement officers do not subjectively know that their conduct is illegal, they are also chargeable with knowing when their conduct is an obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment under an objective standard of reasonableness. [50] This court has specifically stated that in evaluating the reasonableness of a search or seizure without a warrant, it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard. Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search or the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? [51] Grounding the exceptions to the warrant requirement in objective reasonableness `retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for [members of] the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment.' [52] The issue here was whether an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that a search of Gorup's apartment under these circumstances was an obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment. But the court did not apply an objective reasonableness standard. And, because of the extensive case law on this issue, the district court was in no better position to determine this issue than is this court. We owe no deference to its conclusion. [53] Objective reasonableness cannot turn on different trial judges' individual determinations about whether the facts are sufficient or insufficient to justify a law enforcement officer's conduct. Avoiding such varied results and setting clear precedent for law enforcement officers to follow are the reasons for de novo review in Fourth Amendment cases. [54] So it is our duty to maintain coherent Fourth Amendment principles and determine whether the detectives' actions were objectively reasonable or unreasonable. Our adherence to solid legal moorings requires that we reverse the trial court's ruling. For 40 years, U.S. Supreme Court case law has prohibited this type of search. In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Chimel v. California [55] that a search incident to arrest is limited to the arrestee's person and the area within his or her immediate control. The following year, the Court specifically held that a warrantless search of a house was invalid as a search incident to an arrest when the defendant was arrested on the front steps of his house. [56] We applied both of these decisions in a 1982 case to conclude that a warrantless search of a house was illegal. [57] Many courts have long held that an arrest must take place within a suspect's residence to justify the search of the residence as an incident to the arrest, even in cases preceding Chimel. [58] Under an objective reasonableness standard, it should have been obvious to the detectives that after they had arrested Gorup outside the door to his apartment, they were required to have a search warrant before attempting to conduct a search within the apartment. Moreover, the search suggested a quality of purposefulness, which was shown by the detectives' inconsistent testimony. Simones testified that the narcotics unit officers regularly arrested people with outstanding warrants without having a uniformed officer or patrol car present. Yet, he also testified that the detectives did not immediately transport Gorup to the police station house because they were waiting for a uniformed officer in a patrol car to assist them. In contrast, Stuck testified that while Simones was entering the apartment, Stuck and the uniformed officer were handcuffing Gorup and that the officer had a patrol car parked just outside the apartment building. The record does not support a finding that the officers could not have transported Gorup to the station if that had been their intent. And despite Simones' statement that they had intended to conduct a knock-and-talk and gain Gorup's consent to search, both Simones and Stuck admitted that they did not ask for Gorup's consent to search before arresting him and conducting a protective sweep and search incident to arrest. Obviously, the detectives did not have probable cause sufficient to support a search warrant at this point, and the State does not contend otherwise. Most tellingly, Stuck knew that only 2 weeks earlier, an officer had gone to Gorup's apartment and asked for his consent to search the apartment and that Gorup had refused to permit a search. This record compels the conclusion that (1) the detectives intended to conduct a protective sweep or a search incident to arrest, rather than a knock-and-talk investigation that had already failed; and (2) despite the obviousness of the search's illegality, the detectives exploited their search to obtain Gorup's consent after the fact. In sum, none of the attenuation factors show that the causal chain between the detectives' illegal conduct and Gorup's consent to search was broken. Further, suppressing the evidence here would serve the deterrence aim of the exclusionary rule. Investigatory shortcuts cannot justify Fourth Amendment violations. [59] We will not uphold the admission of evidence that encourages Fourth Amendment violations. To ignore this violation would be setting a low bar for future police conduct.