Opinion ID: 2189497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court's entry of a judgment on the issue of punitive damages

Text: Gilliland argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the athletic club's liability for punitive damages. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages is a question of law, and this Court's review is de novo. Hoyt v. GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 193 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Mo.App.2006); 75A AM. JUR.2D Trial § 627 (2008). Section 213.111.2 permits recovery of punitive damages in claims brought under the Missouri Human Rights Act. [4] Under Missouri law, a plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages if the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's conduct was outrageous because of the defendant's evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others. Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 787 (Mo. banc 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT 2D OF TORTS SEC. 908(2) (1979)); Brady v. Curators of University of Missouri, 213 S.W.3d 101, 107 (Mo.App.2006). There is a fundamental problem with Gilliland's position in this appeal: After the jury's verdict, he no longer has a claim recognized under the Missouri Human Rights Act. The jury rejected his claims for sexual harassment and race discrimination, as well as his claim for assault, an intentional tort. The jury instruction that separately submitted a claim for constructive discharge did not submit a claim for constructive discharge based on sexual or racial harassment or discrimination causing a hostile work environment. In fact, the jury instruction made no reference to any discriminatory conduct prohibited by the human rights act, such as was included in the other claims separately submitted to the jury. [5] With his constructive discharge claim, Gilliland simply sought to recover because Millen's unwelcome conduct made the work atmosphere so hostile that Gilliland was constructively discharged. But the act provides no basis for recovery for an unwelcome or hostile work environment in and of itself  that is, in the absence of discrimination as a factor in the hostile work environment leading to the constructive discharge. As with demotions, firing, and other forms of adverse employment action, constructive discharge based on a hostile work environment merits relief under the act only if the plaintiff can establish a discriminatory motive for the constructive discharge. [6] Gamber v. Missouri Dept. of Health and Senior Services, 225 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Mo.App. 2007). See also Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004) (discussing constructive discharge in the context of federal discrimination claims under Title VII). A showing of constructive discharge negates the theory that the victim quit voluntarily. [7] Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Group, 11 S.W.3d 754, 764 (Mo.App.1999); 14A CJS CIVIL RIGHTS sec. 216 (2008). But in order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that the constructive discharge or other adverse employment decision was motivated by discrimination against a category protected by the anti-discrimination statute at issue which, under the Missouri Human Rights Act, includes race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability. Section 213.055. In other words, a hostile work environment is not a basis for relief under the Missouri Human Rights Act unless the hostility is directed at the victim because of his or her race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability. [8] Id. While the act is not implicated in the absence of any claim of discrimination, a common law claim of constructive discharge based on other types of allegedly intolerable working conditions was recognized in dictum in Bell v. Dynamite Foods, 969 S.W.2d 847, 853 (Mo.App.1998). The validity of Gilliland's constructive discharge claim, however, is not before this Court because the athletic club paid the judgment and did not appeal. The jury's verdict in favor of the athletic club on the grounds of sexual harassment and race discrimination eliminated any of the protected grounds  which Gilliland claimed  as a basis for its decision. Because there is no viable claim for actual damages under the human rights act, there is no basis for punitive damages under the act. The question remains whether punitive damages are available for a claim under a common law constructive discharge theory. The conduct that Gilliland cites in support of his constructive discharge claim is the same conduct as he cites in support of his sexual harassment claim, which the jury rejected. Section 213.111.2 specifically authorizes punitive damages for human rights act claims, and it does not seem appropriate, in light of the statute, to recognize a claim for punitive damages on facts that the jury determined did not support a claim under the act. It does appear that Gilliland is trying to argue that the constructive discharge violates the act, but he lost on that theory. What Gilliland has is an intentional tort theory that sounds like a human rights act case. But, as noted, it is not a human rights case. Even if there is, as the Bell dictum suggests, a common law claim for constructive discharge in the absence of discrimination or a claim under the act, Gilliland's claim does not qualify because Bell says that such a claim must be based upon a violation of public policy. 969 S.W.2d at 852. The constructive discharge jury instruction here was premised on the athletic club's hostile environment. Gilliland did not base his case on the theory that a hostile environment is a violation of public policy. A hostile work environment may involve conduct that is extremely rude, but unless it is based on conduct prohibited by law  in this case, sexual harassment as prohibited by the human rights act  it is not a violation of public policy. On this record, it appears the parties and the trial courts were treating this as a human rights case. In these circumstances, it is inappropriate to apply a punitive damages remedy under the common law to a claim whose legitimacy and applicability are not before the Court on this appeal. The common law cannot be developed so haphazardly. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW (1881). The Missouri Athletic Club's decision to pay the judgment entered on the verdict  even though the verdict rested on grounds not recognized under the act  was a strategic choice. Had the athletic club pursued its appeal, an appellate court may have concluded that the jury verdicts were inconsistent and that a new trial was warranted. In view of the facts of the case, recited above, a retrial might have resulted in a larger award and possibly punitive damages, given the outrageous nature of the acts at least as Gilliland portrays them, plus attorneys' fees well in excess of the $22,000 the club was assessed by the trial court. Similarly, Gilliland's decision not to raise issues as to the jury's denial of recovery on the basis of sexual harassment, race, and assault was a strategic choice. If Gilliland had raised these issues  which would have highlighted the possibility that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent  he may not have received the payment of the judgment. [9] Because of the strategic choices of both parties, this Court has no choice but to affirm the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the simple ground that there no longer was a claim under the human rights act on which punitive damages could be awarded, regardless of how outrageous the jury believed the conduct of the club and its manager to have been. The Court similarly declines the opportunity to endorse a common law punitive damages remedy on this record.