Opinion ID: 1152592
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to grant judicial immunity.

Text: (15a) Defendant argues the trial court should have extended judicial immunity to Croffoot and Sandoval for any potential drug offenses in order to vindicate defendant's right to present a defense. He argues the issue was preserved below because defendant requested that the prosecutor immunize Sandoval and Croffoot for any liability for drug offenses in order to secure their testimony. Here, defendant did not request judicial immunity in the trial court. He failed to direct the court's attention to any authority in support of such immunity, and he did not attempt to meet the standards expressed in the one federal case recognizing such judicial power. ( Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir.1980) 615 F.2d 964, 972 ( Smith ).) We conclude he waived the claim. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 619 [failure to request immunity from either prosecutor or court waives issue on appeal].) (16) Further, even if the issue were preserved for appeal, we have pointed out that the vast majority of cases, in this state and in other jurisdictions, reject the notion that a trial court has `inherent power' to confer immunity on a witness called by the defense. ( In re Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 610.) The one jurisdiction that recognizes such a power, we have observed, also recognizes that `the opportunities for judicial use of this immunity power must be clearly limited; ... the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity.... [¶] [T]he defendant must make a convincing showing sufficient to satisfy the court that the testimony which will be forthcoming is both clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's case. Immunity will be denied if the proffered testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or it is found to relate only to the credibility of the government's witnesses.' ( People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 974 [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608], quoting Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 972.) (15b) In several recent cases in which this claim has been raised, we have found the defendant failed to meet the stringent offer of proof requirements of the Smith case, even assuming arguendo the doubtful proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity. (See, e.g., In re Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 610; People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 619; People v. Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 974.) Again, we conclude defendant did not meet the stringent standards of Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964. Although he asserted that the witnesses would provide crucial exculpatory evidence and made an offer of proof regarding their testimony, it seems evident that immunity for drug offenses would not have sufficed to procure the testimony of Sandoval and Croffoot, who faced a danger their testimony might lead to charges of accomplice liability for the murders of which defendant stood accused. As the prosecutor declared in arguing that a grant of immunity for drug offenses would not procure the witnesses' testimony: It's not the theory of our case they were involved but I cannot exclude that. I might grant one of these people immunity [for murder] or both and they might say, `I did it, thanks for the immunity, Mr. Watson, I appreciate it, I wanted to get off these charges and you've done it for me,' so that's never going to happen. The final judgment would not be mine, but even with the people that run my office I can't believe them making a decision that stupid.... Further, defendant cannot meet another element of the Smith standard, that is, there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity. ( Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 972, fn. omitted.) Obviously, as the prosecutor stated, it was contrary to the People's interest to grant immunity to one potentially involved in a double murder. Defendant failed below, and fails now, to show that immunity for any drug offenses would have been effective in procuring the testimony of the witnesses, or that any broader grant of immunity would not have countervailed a strong governmental interest in the prosecution of serious crimes such as murder. Accordingly, assuming arguendo that the issue was preserved and that there is any judicial authority to grant immunity, we reject the claim. [7]