Opinion ID: 2615183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The narrow issue before us involves federal preclusion under the commerce clause.

Text: As the majority observe, the Chargers do not base their argument against state antitrust regulation of their business activities on the traditional preemption doctrine. [6] The Chargers do not claim a violation of the supremacy clause. Nor can they do so. The contention that the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) occupies the field of antitrust (so that state regulation of the field is preempted as conflicting with the declared or presumed intent of Congress) was persuasively rejected in the well-reasoned Court of Appeal opinion R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co. (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 653 [112 Cal. Rptr. 585]. The court in Coors noted that the legislative history of the Sherman Act unequivocably evidences a congressional intent to supplement, not preempt, state antitrust enforcement. [7] Moreover, because the Cartwright Act was patterned after the Sherman Act, both laws have identical objectives and are harmonious with each other ( Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 315 [70 Cal. Rptr. 849, 444 P.2d 481]); thus, decisions under the latter act are applicable in construing the former ( Mailand v. Burckle (1978) 20 Cal.3d 367 [143 Cal. Rptr. 1, 572 P.2d 1142]). The adoption and incorporation of federal precedent effectively precludes the possibility of conflicts. [8] In light of Supreme Court holdings that mere coincidence of state and federal regulation is not enough to preempt state law (see, e.g., California v. Zook, supra, 336 U.S. at pp. 731-733 [93 L.Ed. at pp. 1010-1011]), it cannot be seriously disputed, therefore, that state and federal laws may operate concurrently in the area of antitrust regulation. (See Younger v. Jenson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 397, 405 [161 Cal. Rptr. 905, 605 P.2d 813] [Obviously there is an overlap between coverages of the Sherman Act ... and state antitrust laws that prohibit substantially the same conduct, ...].) Federal preemption, then, is applicable in this case, if at all, because of the operation of commerce clause limitations on this concurrent state jurisdiction. [9] The Chargers make clear that their position is grounded on commerce clause principles. Particularly, they contend that state regulation through the Cartwright Act is precluded by the commerce clause because the structure of professional football is (1) exclusively interstate commerce, and (2) uniquely interstate commerce. The distinction set forth by the Chargers is not without significance. The former characterization  exclusivity  goes to the impact of the activity on the state: does it have a sufficient local consequence or nexus with the state? The latter  uniqueness  relates more properly to the nature of the activity: is it an activity requiring national uniformity, the regulation of which imposes a burden on interstate commerce?