Opinion ID: 369077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: leroy nicky barnes

Text: 130 Barnes was convicted of Count 1 (conspiracy), Count 2 (continuing criminal enterprise), and Count 3 (possession and distribution). On Count 1 no sentence was imposed in view of the imposition of a life sentence (and a $100,000 fine) on Count 2. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977). On Count 3, Barnes was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, a special life parole term, and a $25,000 fine. Barnes' principal point, other than error claimed with respect to the denial of his motions to suppress evidence (which we find without merit), 21 is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under Count 2. 131 There can be little doubt that the proof presented at trial was adequate to place Barnes within the ambit of a conspiracy. One does not use $150,000 worth of quinine a month for the altruistic purpose of curing the population of New York of malaria, or use mannite as a dusting powder. It was no coincidence (at least a jury could so find) that many defendants, including Barnes, chose the same Detroit tax firm to prepare their income tax returns or that the term miscellaneous was used to describe income running collectively to over a million dollars. The jurors were entitled to draw their own inferences from evidence of the galaxy of high-price automobiles, corporate-owned to shield them from forfeiture, used and/or leased by the defendants. The many money washes could easily be interpreted as an essential part of any narcotics distribution organization. The conspiracy count was thus properly supported, as was Barnes' conviction under substantive Count 3. 132 We are satisfied, moreover, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Barnes' conviction on Count 2. The Continuing criminal enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, was aimed at the organizers of criminal conspiracies having five or more members. United States v. Crisp, 563 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1977). Because conspiracy to distribute is a lesser included offense, Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977), evidence admissible on one count will generally be admissible on the other. United States v. Crisp, supra, 563 F.2d at 1244-45. It is well established that the out-of-court declarations of co-conspirators made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against all those involved in the conspiracy. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E); United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 590 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947, 92 S.Ct. 298, 30 L.Ed.2d 264 (1971). Indeed, where the parties are engaged in a concert of action or  joint venture involving criminal conduct, out-of-court declarations are admissible even though the indictment does not charge conspiracy. United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1346-47 (2d Cir. 1973), Rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975); United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied,404 U.S. 943, 92 S.Ct. 294, 30 L.Ed.2d 257 (1971). 133 It is equally well established that the commission of a crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994, 1006-7 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 96, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971); United States v. Bowles, 428 F.2d 592, 597 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928, 91 S.Ct. 193, 27 L.Ed.2d 188 (1970). Moreover, to establish a defendant's guilt, the evidence need not be of such a nature as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Aadal,368 F.2d 962, 964 (2d Cir. 1966), Cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970, 87 S.Ct. 1161, 18 L.Ed.2d 130 (1967). It must be examined in its totality, not by microscopic dissection of bits and pieces. United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 335 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845, 869, 85 S.Ct. 50, 117, 13 L.Ed.2d 50, 73 (1964); United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400, 401 (2d Cir. 1961), Cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953, 82 S.Ct. 395, 7 L.Ed.2d 386 (1962). Finally, the evidence on the whole must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). If the proof, so viewed, is such that a jury, drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, may fairly and logically have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it is sufficient. United States v. Taylor, supra, 464 F.2d at 244-45; United States v. Glasser, supra, 443 F.2d at 1007. The Government's evidence against Barnes, when examined in accordance with the above precepts, was sufficient to sustain his conviction under Count 2. 134 Section 848 requires that the defendant's narcotics violation must be part of a continuing series of violations which are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the defendant occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management and from which the defendant obtains substantial income or resources. The statute does not require that the five subordinates must act in concert at the same time. United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 320-21 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied sub nom. Hicks v. United States, 434 U.S. 930, 98 S.Ct. 417, 54 L.Ed.2d 290 (1977). As already discussed, Barnes' financially rewarding participation in a continuing criminal enterprise with five others was clearly established. 135 In determining whether Barnes played a supervisory role in this continuing enterprise, the jury could have considered the evidence concerning his negotiations for the purchase of large quantities of quinine and mannite and could have concluded that purchases such as these would not be made by an underling in the organization. The jury could also have weighed the evidence concerning Barnes' arrangements for money-washing and reached the same conclusion. Proof that Barnes rented two expensive apartments in New Jersey, masquerading in one as Hoby Darling and in the other as Wallace Rice, gave rise to a reasonable inference that he was entitled to exercise certain prerogatives of authority. Evidence that he was attended by bodyguards was likewise illuminating; ordinary narcotic dealers are not so carefully shielded. The jury could also conclude that narcotic underlings do not drive around with $132,000 in cash in the trunk of their car. 136 Barnes' role in the December 29, 1976 transaction charged in Count 3 gave the jury an even clearer picture of his status. The convicted participants in this transaction were Barnes, Steven Baker, Steven Monsanto, James McCoy and Wallace Fisher. Under the rules of evidence above discussed, the declarations of the parties engaged in carrying out this concert of illegal action were admissible against their joint venturers. Fisher was Geronimo's entree into the Barnes' narcotics organization, and Geronimo testified that Barnes sent him and Fisher to Monsanto and that Monsanto was so informed. During the course of this transaction, Fisher in conversations that were tape-recorded, stated that Barnes was the boss. Fisher stated that he didn't even address Barnes as Nick but always called him Sir. When Geronimo subsequently complained to Barnes about the quality of the heroin received from Monsanto, Fisher stated that Geronimo should not have done it, that you don't confront a boss like that. 137 At a later date, when Geronimo and Diaz went with Fisher to the Harlem River Motors Garage to purchase additional heroin from Steven Baker, Barnes and his bodyguards were in the garage. Fisher told Diaz that Nicky Barnes oversees all transactions that take place in the garage. Statements such as these from a co-venturer who was attempting to make the venture a success were properly admitted. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d at 1347, 1358 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bynum, 566 F.2d 914, 926 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978); Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824, 96 S.Ct. 38, 46 L.Ed.2d 40 (1975). 138 Putting all the evidence together and looking at the totality of the proof, the jury could fairly and logically have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Barnes was indeed a boss who supervised the activities of his co-conspirators and was guilty of violating Section 848.