Opinion ID: 1146712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: supplement

Text: This Court considers it proper to address discovery questions posed by appellants, since they probably will appear again, absent our comment thereon. The initial contention raised concerns whether a party litigant should be compelled to search for, obtain, and disclose in answers to interrogatories within certain time constraints, expert witnesses he intends to use. Appellants complain that their interrogatories were filed on October 5, 1982, which included a request for the identity of expert witnesses. Appellees continually stated that they had not procured expert witnesses and upon doing so would notify the appellants, accordingly. The lower court denied appellants' motion to compel, although directing the appellees to advise appellants of their expert witnesses at a reasonable time prior to trial. On June 28, 1983, appellees filed the motions for summary judgment with a disclosure of their expert witnesses still pending. Miss.R.Civ.P. 26(f)(1) requires the supplementation of responses to discovery with respect to any interrogatory directly addressed to the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony. However, this affords little comfort to the litigant, who finally receives the identity of his opponent's expert witness subsequent to the end of discovery. The appellants are foreclosed from conducting further discovery thereon without court order. The United States District Court judges of Mississippi have circumvented this dilemma by promulgating local Rule 6(g) which provides: Expert witnesses for all parties shall be designated not later than sixty (60) days prior to the discovery deadline set forth in the scheduling order, and discovery regarding experts shall be completed within the discovery period. The court will allow the subsequent designation and/or discovery of expert witnesses only upon a showing of good cause. The sixty-day period provided in the foregoing United States District Court local rule may be too stringent and restrictive for the state procedure. However, to accomplish the purpose of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure as stated by Rule 1, to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and to prevent discovery of expert opinion from degenerating into a game of evasion, Square D Company v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327, 1329 (Miss. 1982), we are of the opinion that the rule relating to this question should be considered by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules in the State of Mississippi, and that the matter should be referred to that committee for study. Further, there appears to be an erroneous belief by the lower court that an expert witness cannot be deposed under our Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the rules do not state this as an absolute. With some qualification as to experts, Miss. R.Civ.P. 30(a) provides: After commencement of the action, any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination. Miss.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) qualifies this by limiting discovery of expert opinion as of right to interrogatories, but upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other means... . This is not an absolute bar to deposing expert witnesses. Appellants pose another question to this Court that should be discussed. They claim error precipitated from the lower court's failure to overrule Dr. McQuinn's motion for protective order. Dr. McQuinn, who was previously deposed by appellants, sought a protective order in response to appellants' notice for a second deposition. The frequency of employing the methods of discovery is limited by, inter alia, Miss. R.Civ.P. 26(d) pertaining to protective orders. While the appellee's motion for protective order was pending, the lower court ordered discovery ended with regard to appellee Dr. McQuinn. Thus, the lower court avoided ruling on the pending motion for protective order. Therefore, on remand, the lower court should make a determination as to whether Dr. McQuinn has shown good cause in seeking a protective order to avoid annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden and expense as a consequence of being deposed a second time. See Miss.R.Civ.P. 26(d). The judgments of the lower court are reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial on the merits. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALKER, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. GRIFFIN, J., not participating.