Opinion ID: 211760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it was: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000); Gibson v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 160 F.3d 722, 725 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Section 333.201(b) is titled “Making appointments from an unranked list,” and provides that: In making temporary and term appointments from a list of eligible candidates who have not received numerical scores, an agency shall give preference to preference eligibles as follows: .... (b) For other positions, preference shall be given first to preference eligibles with compensable service connected disability of 10 percent or more, and second to other preference eligibles. Thus, the regulation talks in terms of giving “preference” to preference eligibles and states that “preference eligibles with compensable service connected disability of 10 percent or more” must be given preference first. The regulation does not state that 04-3395 5 10-point preference eligibles must be hired. Indeed, the surrounding sections in Part 333 explicitly contemplate that the Agency can pass over a first preference eligible as long as the Agency affords the candidate “prior consideration.” Section 333.203 is entitled “Passing over a preference eligible,” and states that “[w]hen an agency making an appointment passes over the name of a preference eligible who is entitled to prior consideration under paragraph (b) of § 333.201 . . . and proposes to select a nonpreference eligible,” the agency must, at the least, record its reasons for so doing and provide a copy of the reasons to the preference eligible upon request. See § 333.203(a), (b). Moreover, § 333.203(c) contemplates a preference eligible being passed over several times. If a preference eligible given prior consideration can be passed over in favor of a non-preference eligible, then logically a preference eligible given prior consideration can be passed over in favor of another preference eligible. Spigner argues that consideration of other sections in Part 333 is legal error and that Spigner l admonished the Board not to look outside of § 333.201. However, our case law is clear that courts should interpret the regulation as a whole and thus consider sections linked to the section in question. See Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that the proper interpretation of the plain language of the regulation “examines and reconciles the text of the entire regulation, not simply isolated sentences”). Spigner I acknowledged that it was error for the Agency to rely on 5 C.F.R. § 302.401, but did not say that the Agency could not look to other sections of Part 333 and construe the regulation as a whole. 04-3395 6 Spigner asserts that the text is clear that “preference” means “hiring.” Spigner argues that use of the word “selection” in the title to Part 333 and use of the word “appointments” in § 333.201 indicate that the language “preference shall be given first to preference eligibles” requires “selection” or “appointment.” However, Spigner takes “selection” and “appointment” out of context. Part 333 in general, and § 333.201(b) in particular, detail processes for making selections or appointments. The text does not equate being given a preference with being selected for the position. Spigner argues that nowhere does the text of § 333.201(b) specify “first consideration.” However, § 333.203 expressly refers to a “preference eligible who is entitled to prior consideration under paragraph (b) of § 333.201.” Because § 333.201(b) states that “preference shall be given first to preference eligibles with compensable service-connected disability of 10 percent or more, and second to other preference eligibles,” prior consideration is first consideration in this instance. Spigner asserts that this court rejected the Board’s interpretation of § 333.201(b) in Spigner I. Spigner points to language in Spigner I that referred to “priority consideration” as a term of art which was not found in this regulation. However, our reference to “priority consideration” was in response to the Board’s citation to Langston v. Department of the Army, 84 M.S.P.R. 597, 601 (1999). Because that case dealt with the breach of a settlement agreement provision providing a party with “priority consideration” for available positions, see id., and thus did not lend direct support for the Board’s interpretation of § 333.201(b), we were hesitant to affirm the Agency’s interpretation on that rationale. 04-3395 7 Spigner argues that the Agency’s stipulation that he met the minimum qualifications for the job and its later determination that he lacked the desired experience are inconsistent. However, we see no inconsistency. Spigner may have been minimally qualified, but substantial evidence supports the Agency’s determination that because the position was specialized, Spigner lacked the breath and depth of experience that the Agency desired the candidate to possess. Spigner asserts that if the regulation were interpreted to give him only first consideration, then the benefit that the regulation confers on disabled veterans would be illusory. However, the regulatory history shows that OPM contemplated that the positions covered by Part 333 “often have specialized qualification requirements that should be recognized in the referral process.” 52 Fed. Reg. 49,023, 49,023 (Dec. 29, 1987). Indeed, OPM struck a balance in promulgating Part 333. The regulation provides “eligible veterans as much preference as they would receive in competitive examinations” and “give[s] agencies greater flexibility in recognizing qualitative differences among candidates.” Id. The Board instructed the Agency to consider Spigner’s resume before looking to any other candidates, make a decision on whether to offer Spigner the job, and if the Agency chose to pass-over Spigner, to provide Spigner with a detailed explanation of why it found Spigner’s experience lacking. The Agency considered Spigner and provided that detailed explanation. Substantial evidence supported the Agency’s rationale for passing over Spigner. As a result, we do not believe that the benefit to a 10-point preference eligible veteran like Spigner is illusory. Without the preference, Spigner may never have been considered for the position. Although the preference 04-3395 8 may not result in hiring the preference eligible veteran in all instances, it is OPM’s belief that this method struck the balance that Congress intended.