Opinion ID: 1278176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The State contends Williams failed to preserve error on his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim because he did not make a specific motion for judgment of acquittal. In State v. Crone, we held that when the motion for judgment of acquittal did not make reference to the specific elements of the crime on which the evidence was claimed to be insufficient, it did not preserve the sufficiency of the evidence issue for review. 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996) (citing State v. Geier, 484 N.W.2d 167, 170-71 (Iowa 1992)); accord State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999) (holding error not preserved on sufficiency of the evidence issue when counsel made a general motion for judgment of acquittal, [but] failed to identify in the district court the specific elements of the charge that were insufficiently supported by the evidence (citing Crone, 545 N.W.2d at 270); 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1046, at 588 (1991) (A motion for judgment of acquittal must fully set forth the grounds upon which it is based. Unless there is a total failure of proof, a motion to direct an acquittal must specify the particulars in which the evidence is insufficient.). The State is correct that Williams' motion did not reference any specific element of the crime charged. However, we recognize an exception to the general error-preservation rule when the record indicates that the grounds for a motion were obvious and understood by the trial court and counsel. See In re Detention of Hodges, 689 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 2004) (An appellate court will consider grounds not precisely raised in a motion for directed verdict where the record indicates the trial court, counsel, and both parties had no doubt what the grounds for the motion were and these grounds were obvious and discussed thoroughly in the court below.). The elements of domestic abuse assault that the State was required to prove in this case were: (1) Williams committed any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another or any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, Iowa Code § 708.2A(1); id. § 708.1(1)-(2); and (2) Williams had the apparent ability to execute the act, id. The parties stipulated that if an assault was established, it qualified as domestic abuse because Williams and Raegen were married, living together and had children together. See id. § 236.2(2) (defining domestic abuse). Thus, the fighting issue throughout the trial was whether Williams choked Raegen or she falsely accused him of choking her. Under these circumstances, the record clearly reveals the trial court and counsel understood that the grounds for the motion for judgment of acquittal targeted the insufficiency of the evidence to support the first element of assault due to the limited physical evidence and the hearsay nature of the testimony. We conclude error was properly preserved. Evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable inferences in the State's favor, there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding of the challenged element. State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405, 409 (Iowa 2003). Substantial evidence means evidence that `could convince a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. at 410 (quoting State v. Bayles, 551 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa 1996)). Moreover, [t]he function of the court, on a motion to direct a verdict of acquittal, is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could have found the defendant guilty as charged. It is not the province of the court, in determining the motion, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.... Any inconsistencies in the testimony of a defense witness are for the jury's consideration, and do not justify a court's usurpation of the factfinding function of the jury. 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1026, at 573-74 (emphasis added); see also State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1999) ([I]t is for the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence. (Citation omitted.)). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the conviction. Admissible hearsay can be used to support a conviction just as other admissible evidence. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(2) (A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.). Additionally, the jury was free to sort out the inconsistency between Raegen's trial testimony and her prior statements to police. The red mark on Raegen's face constituted corroborative evidence.