Opinion ID: 853120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claimed Mitigators

Text: Highbaugh next contends that the trial court wrongfully rejected proffered mitigators, failed to give enough weight to recognized mitigators, and did not properly articulate how it weighed the recognized mitigators against the lone aggravator. He asks us to vacate the sentence of life without parole and sentence him to a term of years. Highbaugh's father testified on his behalf, as did a psychotherapist. Both testified about how Highbaugh's childhood may have contributed to his drug use and this crime. The trial court recognized several mitigating circumstances: Highbaugh came from a dysfunctional family whose father was involved in drugs and committed acts of domestic abuse; Highbaugh maintained steady employment during periods of his life; Highbaugh had a loving relationship with his wife and children; Highbaugh surrendered himself to police and did not resist arrest; and Highbaugh accepted responsibility, in part, by pleading guilty to some of the crimes. (Supp. R. at 49-50.) Highbaugh offered other mitigating circumstances that the court rejected. These circumstances included: (1) Hairston facilitated the offense; (2) Highbaugh was under the control of Powell; (3) Highbaugh's sentence for life without parole is not proportional to Powell's sentence of sixty-five years; and (4) Powell was found not guilty of robbery. ( Id. ) A trial court is not obligated to find a circumstance to be mitigating simply because the circumstance is proffered by the defendant. Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied. On appeal, a defendant must show that the mitigating circumstance advanced is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Id. Although a finding of mitigating factors is within the discretion of a trial court, a trial court is not obligated to weigh or credit the mitigating factors as the defendant requests. Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind.2000). Only when a trial court fails to find a mitigator that the record clearly supports do we reasonably believe the trial court improperly overlooked a mitigator. Id. Highbaugh claims that because Hairston was a drug dealer, he implicitly consented to the risks of the trade, including death. The trial court noted that Hairston did nothing to facilitate his own murder. In fact, Hairston was in the basement of his home when Highbaugh and Powell arrived. (R. at 1270.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this proposed mitigator. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when it declined to find that Highbaugh was under the substantial control of Powell. Highbaugh unquestionably had an accomplice, but he was the major participant in these crimes. In light of the fact that Highbaugh fatally shot Hairston, shot Michael, and stabbed Khalalah without direction or help from his accomplice, there was no abuse of discretion to reject this a mitigating circumstance. As for Highbaugh's proffered mitigators that his sentence is not proportional to Powell's and that Powell was found not guilty of robbery, the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting these. First, a constitutional proportionality analysis does not require a court to compare the sentence of a particular crime to others convicted of the same or similar crimes. Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570, 584 (Ind.1996). Moreover, Highbaugh was the principal actor in the murder of Hairston and the attempted murders of Michael and Khalalah. Highbaugh shot Hairston and tried to murder Michael and Khalalah while Powell stood by saying nothing. The court properly gave Highbaugh a stiffer sentence than his accomplice. Finally, given that the State proved the statutory aggravator of intentional killing during the course of a robbery, there was no abuse of discretion when the trial court ignored the fact that Powell was acquitted of robbery. As for Highbaugh's claim that the trial court is required to articulate the weight given to each mitigator, this Court recently rejected such a requirement in Hollen v. State, 761 N.E.2d 398 (Ind.2002). Although we acknowledged in Hollen that trial courts facilitate a more thorough appellate review by delineating how much weight to give to a specific aggravating or mitigating circumstance, we nonetheless held that a trial court is not required to assign specific weight to each aggravator and mitigator. Id. at 402. Accordingly, we find no error.