Opinion ID: 399380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: statements by deltron's salesman

Text: 21 The defendants contend that the district court improperly admitted statements made to investors by Ron Dickey, a Deltron salesman. The defendants argue that the government did not establish a sufficient predicate (1) of agency authorization, or (2) of conspiracy between the defendants and Dickey, as required by James. We conclude that the district court properly admitted the statements. 22 Nearly all of Dickey's statements constitute misrepresentations made to investors concerning the availability of certain equipment and supplies, the rejection of hood scoops manufactured by the investors, and contracts for the resale of the hood scoops. Dickey himself did not testify. Instead, the investors to whom he spoke related his statements. According to them, Dickey said that Deltron could not send the initial batch of hood scoop molds to its investors or repair damaged molds because its mold makers were on strike. Dickey also said that the hood scoops rejected by him on behalf of Deltron were of unacceptable quality. Further, Dickey told prospective investors that Deltron had contracts to resell the hood scoops with auto manufacturers, auto parts stores, and a marketing agency. The government eventually demonstrated that all of these statements were misrepresentations. 23 We cannot agree that the admissibility of Dickey's statements depended upon whether the government established the James predicate. Most of the challenged statements simply were not hearsay, because the government did not introduce them to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See United States v. Toney, 605 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1090, 100 S.Ct. 1055, 62 L.Ed.2d 779 (1980) (misrepresentations by salesmen about product not hearsay). Indeed, the government sought to prove that Dickey's representations (1) about the availability of equipment and supplies, (2) about the reason for rejecting hood scoops produced by the investors, and (3) about the existence of resale contracts, were false, were intended to deceive, and in fact did deceive investors into participating and continuing in the production of hood scoops for Deltron. As to these statements, no James predicate was required because James applies only to hearsay statements by co-conspirators. United States v. Wilson, 657 F.2d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original). Further, any hearsay statements by Dickey were fully admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2)(D), as statements by a servant within the scope of his employment. No James predicate was required as to these hearsay statements either, because James is limited to the admissibility of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator rule. United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381, 1388 (11th Cir. 1981). 24 The government laid an ample foundation for the admission of any of Dickey's hearsay statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Tietjen himself introduced Dickey to O'Madigan, a Deltron consultant, as Tietjen's sales representative in the Cleveland area. Roe's secretary also characterized Dickey as a Deltron salesman. Moreover, another Deltron salesman testified that he was fired by Dickey and that Dickey then replaced him. Several salespersons, at least some of whom were interviewed, selected and trained by Tietjen, testified that the job of a Deltron salesman was to sell the manufacturing package to prospective investors. The scope of Dickey's employment also extended to the acceptance and rejection of hood scoops manufactured by investors. Both defendants told O'Madigan that Dickey was sent to Ohio to find that 90% of the hood scoops were defective. All of the statements made by Dickey that the defendants' attack were made either to prospective investors or to investors attempting to sell their hood scoops back to Deltron. Dickey also appears to have been employed as a Deltron salesman at all relevant times. 25 From the evidence discussed above, we conclude that Dickey was a servant of the defendants, that Dickey's statements concerned matters within the scope of his employment, and that Dickey made the statements during his employment relationship. Thus, we hold that Dickey's statements were fully admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D).