Opinion ID: 2295861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: curtailment of cross-examination

Text: Eight appellants [36] argue that the trial court, in curtailing cross-examination of Rabbi Fishman, violated their Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, as well as their right to due process. Counsel sought to cross-examine Rabbi Fishman about appellants' reactions to Khaalis' instructions during the takeover and siege, hoping to establish that they responded unhesitatingly and automatonlike  and thus lacked the specific intent required for the conspiracy count. More specifically, according to their brief: If the followers responded reflexively, without exercising independent judgment to each and every command, then a serious question as to their mental state in terms of specific intent is raised. They claim, additionally, that in showing through questions of Rabbi Fishman that the takeover was military-like, they could have demonstrated that they acted only on a need to know basis and therefore lacked knowledge of the essential nature of the conspiracy. Recently, this court summarized the law applicable to cross-examination: Although the right to cross-examine is. . . inherent in the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, [the] extent of cross-examination [of a witness] with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 220, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). Some meaningful degree of cross-examination must be allowed in the first instance in order to comply with the Sixth Amendment's command in this regard. The question of the degree to which the powerful tool of cross-examination must be permitted beyond that point cannot be reduced to a definitive abstract formula, but rather must be evaluated in light of the specific circumstances presented by each case. United States v. Houghton, 554 F.2d 1219 (1st Cir. 1977). [ Springer v. United States, D.C.App., 388 A.2d 846, 854 (1978).] Therefore, we must consider, first, whether the Sixth Amendment concerns have been satisfied here and, if so, whether the trial court nonetheless abused its discretion in the limits it imposed on the cross-examination of Rabbi Fishman. It is clear from the record that the trial court did not commit constitutional error. Appellants were permitted to cross-examine the rabbi extensively about the only subject of his testimony  in-court identifications  and were allowed to establish through his testimony that Khaalis was the leader of the takeover at B'nai B'rith. They had ample opportunity to challenge his credibility, and there is no claim that the trial court unduly restricted appellants' effort to demonstrate bias. See Springer, supra at 854-57. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion. See Morris v. United States, D.C.App., 389 A.2d 1346 (1978). As already indicated, the court sustained objections by Khaalis to questions intended to establish the existence of a military-type operation, as well as to show appellants' reactions to Khaalis' instructions. The court deemed the first too broad, the latter irrelevant. In light of substantial evidence that all the appellants were aware of the overall objectives of the conspiracy, the fact that appellants may have followed Khaalis' orders without question or comment is of marginal, if any, relevance to the issue of specific intent. [37] In any event, the government called Rabbi Fishman to the stand only to identify the appellants who were present at B'nai B'rith headquarters, to identify those who were armed, and to testify generally about the early stages of the takeover at B'nai B'rith. There were no questions about the appellants' respective roles in the seizure. Accordingly, the effort to establish through Rabbi Fishman that all appellants but Khaalis were automaton-like  that they lacked specific intent  was beyond the scope of the direct examination, and thus properly curtailed for that reason. (Curtis) Smith v. United States, supra at 520.