Opinion ID: 420817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competence to Plead Guilty

Text: 7 It is well established that the conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). The standard for determining competency to stand trial is whether the defendant, has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). In Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.1974), we rejected a contention that the competency required of an accused to enter a voluntary plea of guilty is of a higher degree than the competency to stand trial and specifically held that the test of mental competency at the time of trial or the entering of a plea in a criminal case is the same. Id. at 654. We decline to deviate from our precedent to follow Stinson's suggestion that we adopt a higher standard of competency to enter a plea of guilty. 8 The state trial judge had the reports of Drs. Mann and Miller, two psychiatrists who examined Stinson, before him and based upon those reports found Stinson competent. (Plea Hearing Transcript at 3). Dr. Miller's report states that Stinson's functioning level at the present time is such that he can understand the proceedings facing him and adequately assist counsel in his own defense. Dr. Mann's report concludes that Stinson appears to be capable of using good judgment, has a very good understanding of his present circumstances, and is considered to be mentally competent and that certainly at the present time he is not psychotic and is capable of helping his attorney prepare his defense. 9 Stinson has not alleged facts in the federal habeas petition to create any factual dispute the merits of which were not resolved in the state proceeding. The state factual determination of competency is fairly supported by the record as a whole. Thus, Stinson is not within either of the two categories of Townsend he contends govern this case, nor is he within any of the other circumstances enumerated by Townsend. We therefore find Stinson was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal district court on this issue.