Opinion ID: 2594735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Insufficiency of Evidence of Arson murder Special Circumstance

Text: A felony-murder special circumstance, such as arson murder, may be alleged when the murder occurs during the commission of the felony, not when the felony occurs during the commission of a murder. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 41, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 59-62, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) Thus, to prove a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation, the prosecution must show that the defendant had an independent purpose for the commission of the felony, that is, the commission of the felony was not merely incidental to an intended murder. ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 608, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) By finding the special circumstance allegations true, the jury here necessarily determined that defendant intentionally killed Mary Frances Litovich while committing arson. The murder of Litovich occurred after our decision in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, and before our decision in People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306. For murders committed during this period, intent to kill is an element of a felony-murder special circumstance whether or not the defendant was the actual killer. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 41-42, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Here, the jury was instructed that to find the special circumstance allegations true, it had to find that defendant intended to kill a human being. Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's true finding of the arson-murder special-circumstance allegation. He argues that because fire caused Litovich's death, and because the jury determined that he intentionally killed Litovich, it necessarily follows that he set the fire for the purpose of killing Litovich and thus did not have the independent felonious intent required for the arson-murder special circumstance under People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, and for the felony-murder rule under People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580. The Attorney General argues that Green is inapplicable because defendant set the fire with concurrent intents to kill Litovich and to destroy evidence of other crimes. In People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712, we addressed these same arguments in the context of a murder committed during a kidnapping. The defendant there argued that People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, precluded a kidnap-murder special circumstance because he had kidnapped his victims for the purpose of killing them. We reviewed the evidence to determine whether the defendant had a purpose for the kidnapping apart from murder ( People v. Raley, supra, at p. 902, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712), concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support such a finding by the jury ( id. at pp. 902-903, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712). We rejected the defendant's argument in Raley that if the jury found intent to kill at the time of the kidnapping, there could be no kidnap-murder special circumstance: Concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance. ( People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 608-609, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) It is when the underlying felony is merely incidental to a murder that we apply the rule of Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468. ( People v. Raley, supra, at p. 903, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) We must therefore determine here whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant had a purpose for the arson apart from the murder. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 34, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 902, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) We conclude the evidence is sufficient to establish that defendant started the fire with independent, albeit, concurrent goals. ( People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 609, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) The testimony of arson investigator Anthony Jakubowski supports the conclusion that defendant committed the arson not just to kill the victim, but also as a means of concealing the rape or avoiding detection. Jakubowski testified the fire was started when a water-soluble flammable liquid was poured over the bed and distributed throughout the room and then ignited with an open flame. This testimony supports the conclusion that defendant harbored independent, albeit, concurrent goals. He intended not only to kill the victim, but also to destroy evidence of the rape (such as the victim's torn clothing or bruises on her body) as well as evidence of his presence (such as fingerprints). For the same reason, we reject defendant's argument that the rule of People v. Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, applies here. ( People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 609, fn. 15, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.)