Opinion ID: 210555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Propriety of the Agency's Regulations and Actions

Text: 25 Bender argues that 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2)(D) and 32 only authorize the PTO to establish regulations governing the conduct of attorneys before the Office and that the regulations at 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.62, 10.68, and 10.77 exceed that authority because they relate to client communications that are not made before the Office. The language of those statutes indicates that they are broadly directed to service, advice, and assistance in the prosecution or prospective prosecution of applications. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (ensuring that attorneys render to applicants or other persons valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office); id. § 32 (providing for the suspension or exclusion of any attorney that defrauds, deceives, misleads or threatens any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the Office). The regulations in question are well within the scope of the enabling statutes. To the extent the phrase before the Office in sections 2 and 32 is ambiguous, we defer to the PTO's reasonable interpretation of that phrase as authorizing regulations that govern a patent attorney's communications with and disclosures to a client in connection with the prosecution of applications before the PTO. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-845, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Lacavera, 441 F.3d at 1383 (Because the PTO is specifically charged with administering [35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)], we analyze a challenge to the statutory authority of its regulations under the Chevron framework.).
26 Bender also argues that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goldstein v. Moatz, 364 F.3d 205 (4th Cir.2004), establishes that the PTO's use of RFIs in his disciplinary investigation lacked procedural safeguards and was therefore constitutionally defective. The constitutionality of such RFIs was not at issue in Goldstein. Rather, the issue in that case was whether employees of the PTO were entitled to absolute or qualified immunity when conducting a disciplinary investigation. Id. at 211. The Fourth Circuit held that the employees were entitled only to qualified immunity, a determination it supported by the fact that such an investigation lacked procedural safeguards to protect the investigated attorney's rights. See id. at 217-19. The Fourth Circuit's decision did not hold that the use of RFIs in a disciplinary investigation was unconstitutional. 27 As the Supreme Court has recognized, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960); see also id. at 444-49, 80 S.Ct. 1502 (surveying legislative, executive, and judicial investigative agencies and noting that those that appear before such agencies are generally not accorded procedural safeguards). That is because such procedures would unduly stifle the agency in its gathering of facts. See id. at 443-44, 80 S.Ct. 1502. Here, the PTO issued to Bender RFIs in the course of conducting a nonadjudicative, fact-finding investigation prior to the initiation of any adjudicative proceedings. 37 C.F.R. § 10.131. This type of RFI not only assists the agency in gathering facts, it also protects practitioners by providing them with an opportunity to explain any questionable conduct and present reasons why disciplinary proceedings are not warranted. We therefore reject Bender's arguments based on Goldstein that the PTO's use of RFIs in its disciplinary investigation violated his right to procedural due process. We have considered Bender's remaining constitutional arguments and find them unpersuasive.