Opinion ID: 2087709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: jury instructions at sentencing

Text: The defendant next contends that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing due to the trial court's refusal of three of the defendant's requested jury instructions. The first two of the requested instructions related to the jury's consideration of mitigating factors. The defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on a list of nonstatutory mitigating factors, and further asked the trial court to instruct the jury that a juror may consider as evidence any mitigating factor even though all of the other jurors do not believe that the mitigating factor exists. The trial court refused both requests. The defendant's arguments are without merit. With regard to the requested list of nonstatutory mitigating factors, the defendant acknowledges that this court has repeatedly held that it is not error for the trial court to refuse such a request, as long as the jury is instructed that it should consider all potential mitigating circumstances. (See People v. Gosier (1991), 145 Ill.2d 127, 159, 163 Ill.Dec. 823, 582 N.E.2d 89; People v. Pitsonbarger (1990), 142 Ill.2d 353, 405-07, 154 Ill.Dec. 562, 568 N.E.2d 783.) Here, the trial court instructed the jury that mitigating factors include any reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Under our previous cases, then, there was no error in refusing to specifically list nonstatutory mitigating factors. We see no reason to reconsider our long line of holdings on this issue. The defendant claims that his requested instruction on the nonunanimity requirement for mitigating factors was mandated by the Supreme Court decisions in Mills v. Maryland (1988), 486 U.S. 367,108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384, and McKoy v. North Carolina (1990), 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369. A review of those decisions, however, reveals that both are clearly distinguishable. In Mills, the Supreme Court overturned a Maryland death sentence where the jury had received a verdict form which contained a list of possible mitigating circumstances, accompanied by spaces in which the jury could check yes or no and preceded by a statement that the jury unanimously find[s] that each of the following mitigating circumstances which is marked `yes' has been proven to exist. (Emphasis added.) ( Mills, 486 U.S. at 384-89, 108 S.Ct. at 1870-72, 100 L.Ed.2d at 400-03.) The verdict form in Mills further asked the jury to affirm or deny that it unanimously found that the mitigating circumstances marked yes outweighed the aggravating circumstances, and the trial court's instruction of the jury in that case emphasized the unanimity requirement. The Mills Court determined that these instructions and verdict form violated the Federal Constitution because the jury could have interpreted them as precluding the consideration of all possible mitigating evidence. Mills, 486 U.S. at 375, 108 S.Ct. at 1865-66, 100 L.Ed.2d at 394. In McKoy, the Supreme Court applied the Mills decision to overturn a North Carolina death sentence where the sentencing jury received an instruction which expressly prevented the jury from considering any mitigating factor that the jury did not unanimously find to exist. Following Mills, the McKoy Court held that the instruction violated the eighth amendment because it impermissibly limited the jurors' consideration of mitigating evidence. McKoy, 494 U.S. at 442-44, 110 S.Ct. at 1233-34, 108 L.Ed.2d at 380-81. In contrast to Mills and McKoy, the jury in the present case was instructed with regard to mitigation as follows: If you unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, then you should sign the verdict requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death. If you do not unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, then you should sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a sentence other than death. Further, defense counsel argued to the jury during closing that each of you has the power to give death, [and] each of you has the opportunity to give life. We find that the instructions in this case did not, as in Mills or McKoy, convey the impression that unanimity was required before a mitigating factor could be considered in the balance. Rather, the instructions and argument in this case adequately informed the jury that unanimity was not required to find a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude death. In People v. Ramey (1992), 152 Ill.2d 41, 77, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275, this court, considering a slightly different issue, discussed the crucial differences between the Maryland sentencing scheme invalidated in Mills and that existing in Illinois: Unlike the Maryland statute construed in Mills, the Illinois death penalty statute does not require the jury to reach unanimous agreement as to the existence of any mitigating factors before it can decide not to impose the death penalty. Rather, in Illinois, a sentencing jury is required to unanimously determine that mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the death penalty do not exist before that penalty can be imposed. In Illinois, unlike Maryland, the belief by one juror that any one mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the death penalty exists is sufficient to do so. As such, Illinois' death penalty procedure clearly provides for meaningful consideration of any and all mitigating factors. (Emphasis in original.) Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 77, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury in this case was properly instructed regarding the consideration of mitigating factors. The instruction of the jury is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Cloutier (1993), 156 Ill.2d 483, 509, 190 Ill.Dec. 744, 622 N.E.2d 774.) The trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the defendant's request for an express instruction on the nonunanimity requirement for mitigating factors. The defendant also claims error with regard to the trial court's refusal to give a third sentencing instruction requested by the defendant. The trial court instructed the jury that [y]ou are not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. The defendant requested that the court add a sentence to that instruction stating, You may consider feelings of sympathy or mercy, if those feelings are based on mitigating factors. The trial court denied this request. The defendant now contends that the trial court's denial of this additional language was error because the requested instruction was accurate and important to balance the mere sympathy language in the preceding language. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. This court has held that, while mercy is a relevant factor for consideration at a capital sentencing hearing, it is to be considered within the context of all factors in aggravation and mitigation. ( Simms, 143 Ill.2d at 182, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947; People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill.2d 133, 170, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119.) A separate mercy instruction need not be given as long as the jury is instructed that it should consider all circumstances that provide reasons for imposing a sentence other than death. ( Simms, 143 Ill.2d at 182-83, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947.) This court has determined that, in such circumstances, the jury is free to consider mercy or any other mitigating factor despite the absence of a specific instruction to do so. ( Simms, 143 Ill.2d at 183, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947.) As noted, the jury here was instructed that it should consider as mitigation any reason why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. The trial court's refusal to expressly instruct the jury that it may consider mercy was thus not error. Additionally, no error occurred with respect to the trial court's refusal of the sympathy prong of the defendant's requested instruction. This court has specifically approved the use, in capital sentencing proceedings, of the sympathy and prejudice instruction given by the trial court in this case. ( People v. Emerson (1987), 122 Ill.2d 411, 443, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 522 N.E.2d 1109.) This court has determined that jurors would understand this instruction to mean only that they should ignore the sort of sympathy that is totally divorced from the evidence, not that they should ignore sympathy that stems from the evidence presented. ( Emerson, 122 Ill.2d at 443, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 522 N.E.2d 1109, citing California v. Brown (1987), 479 U.S. 538,107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934.) We adhere to our previous determination that the sympathy and prejudice instruction given in this case adequately conveys to the jurors that they should ignore only that type of sympathy that is not based upon the evidence. A separate instruction directing the consideration of sympathy, such as that requested by the defendant, is not required. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the additional language specifically directing the jury to consider sympathy.