Opinion ID: 1254179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: construction of search statute

Text: Section 968.11, Stats., provides as follows: 968.11 Scope of search incident to lawful arrest. When a lawful arrest is made, a law enforcement officer may reasonably search the person arrested and an area within such person's immediate presence for the purpose of: (1) Protecting the officer from attack; (2) Preventing the person from escaping; (3) Discovering and seizing the fruits of the crime; or (4) Discovering and seizing any instruments, articles or things which may have been used in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, the offense. Although the legislature enacted the statute in November, 1969, this court has never construed the statute. We have continued to decide the validity of searches solely in accordance with the constitutional law. The defendant, however, contends that the statute codifies the law as it existed at the time of enactment, and that the degree of protection then codified was greater than that provided by subsequent constitutional developments. Thus, the defendant claims that the court should evaluate the search in this case under the more rigorous statutory test. Section 968.11, Stats., was intended to codify existing case law. See Comment by Judicial Council's Criminal Rules Committee, 1969 Wis. Laws 625. The parties disagree, however, about what existing case law was codified. The defendant argues that the statute codifies the decision of the United States Supreme Court, issued on June 23, 1969, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 762 (1969). That decision defined a permissible search incident to arrest to include a search of the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control'construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a Weapon or destructible evidence. Id. at 763. The defendant claims that sec. 968.11 codifies Chimel because the Supreme Court rendered that decision prior to legislative enactment of the statute; Chimel was the controlling case law at the time of legislative enactment. The state contends that sec. 968.11, Stats., as drafted by the Judicial Council's Criminal Rules Committee, was intended to codify the existing case law prior to Chimel. The state bases this conclusion on the fact that the statute and committee note were drafted and adopted by the committee prior to the Chimel decision. The Judicial Council's Criminal Rules Committee completed its work on the general revision of the Criminal Procedure Code, of which sec. 968.11 was a part, in March 1969. See meeting notes of Judicial Council's Criminal Rules Committee on microfiche in drafting file for ch. 255, laws of 1969, maintained by the Legislative Reference Bureau.) The revision, with its explanatory note to sec. 968.11 stating that such section was intended to codify existing law, was introduced on March 27, 1969, as 1969 Assembly Bill 603. See Assembly Bulletin, Regular Session 1969 (January 6, 1969-January 16, 1970) at 379; 1969 Assembly Bill 603 at 50-51. That was almost three months before the release of the Chimel decision. Thus, the state reasons that sec. 968.11 was intended to codify pre- Chimel law. At the outset, we note that the Chimel decision did effect a change in the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest. In Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 688, 207 N.W.2d 589 (1973), we stated that Chimel substantially restricted the `search incident' exception to [the] warrant requirement. Chimel accomplished this result, however, by giving a more restrictive definition to the prior test for a search incident to arrest, rather than stating a wholly new test. The pre- Chimel test permitted a search incident to arrest to extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises within his immediate presence or control. Leroux, 58 Wis. 2d at 688. Thus, Chimel did not establish the immediate presence or control test. Instead, it defined that key phrase in terms of the area from within which he [the defendant] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. This arm's reach restriction on the immediate presence or control test deviated from prior case law which permitted searches of entire apartments and automobiles as an incident to arrest. LaFave, Search & Seizure, sec. 7.1 (a) at 490 (1978), discusses the broader scope of the pre- Chimel test for searches incident to arrest: During the days of the Harris-Rabinowitz rule, when courts generally permitted a full warrantless search of the defendant's premises merely because of the defendant's arrest there, a comparable unrestrained search was permitted of vehicles in the possession or general control of an arrestee. Somehow, the fact a lawful arrest had been made in such circumstances was thought to justify a full search of the car. It made no difference that there was no way the arrestee could get at the particular place being searched; such a search was permitted to extend to a locked trunk, and to the passenger area of the vehicle after the arrestee had been removed to a nearby squad car. (Footnotes omitted.) Recognizing that Chimel restricted the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest, we must determine whether sec. 968.11, Stats., codified the restrictions of that decision or the broader test recognized in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). This court applied the Harris-Rabinowitz test prior to Chimel.See State v. Phillips, 262 Wis. 303, 309, 55 N.W.2d 384 (1952); State v. Cox, 258 Wis. 162, 171, 45 N.W.2d 100 (1950); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 504-06, 129 N.W.2d 175 (1964); Jackson v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 225, 230-31, 138 N.W.2d 260 (1965). Our construction of sec. 968.11, Stats., is influenced by the fact that the statute is unconstitutional if construed to codify pre- Chimel law. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768, expressly overruled Harris and Rabinowitz, to the extent that they permitted a search incident to arrest beyond the area within which the defendant might grab a weapon or evidentiary item. The Chimel test has not been abandoned by the Supreme Court, as recognized by Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, n. 3. In fact, Belton specifically applied the Chimel test when determining whether the passenger compartment of an automobile was within the area into which an arrestee might reach. Id. at 460. Thus, the state's claim that sec. 968.11 codifies the pre- Chimel test for a search incident to arrest would be fatal to the statute. Before the court can conclude that the statute is unconstitutional, however, we must construe it in light of the canon of statutory construction providing that statutes should be construed so as to avoid constitutional objections. Jankowski v. Milwaukee County, 104 Wis. 2d 431, 439, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981). We conclude that sec. 968.11, Stats., can be construed to be consistent with the Chimel test. The statute expressly limits searches to the area within the immediate presence of the defendant. This language is consistent with Chimel's immediate control test. Decisions prior to Chimel used presence and control interchangeably, and post- Chimel decisions describe the acceptable area of search in terms of control, as well as the vicinity of the arrest. Dary v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 236, 248, 212 N.W.2d 489 (1973); State v. Phelps, 73 Wis. 2d 313, 317, 243 N .W .2d 213 (1976). On its face, therefore, the language of sec. 968.11 is consistent with Chimel. The permissible purposes for a search incident to arrest, stated in sec. 968.11, Stats., also are consistent with Chimel. The statute permits searches in order to protect the officer from attack, to prevent escape, and to discover and seize the fruits of the crime and evidence of the crime. These purposes are the same as Chimel's justification for a search incident to arrest, i.e., protection of officers, prevention of escape, and discovery of evidence which the defendant otherwise might destroy or conceal. We hold, therefore, that the language of sec. 968.11, Stats., is consistent with the constitutional test for a search incident to arrest under Chimel. Because the language is consonant with Chimel, we also construe the immediate presence requirement to limit searches to the area from which a defendant might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Our construction of sec. 968.11 results in the constitutionality of the statute. The defendant contends, however, that this construction of the statute freezes the scope of a search incident to arrest to that permitted by Chimel. He notes that the statute codified existing case law, which we now have construed to mean Chimel in order to avoid constitutional objections. The defendant then concludes that the legislature intended to freeze the scope of searches incident to arrest to that codified by the statute. He claims that the act of codification implicitly limited the judiciary's authority to subsequently change the scope of searches, except as required to provide constitutional protection. Finally, the defendant interprets the Supreme Court's Belton decision, in the context of automobile searches, to relax Chimel limitation on such searches to the area from which the defendant might secure a weapon or evidence. Because Belton allegedly relaxes the constitutional safeguards of Chimel, as codified in sec. 968.11, Stats., the defendant concludes that this court is statutorily foreclosed from adopting Belton. We do not consider Belton to represent a relaxation of the Chimel test. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, n. 3, specifically stated that: Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests. In particular Belton construed the key Chimel phrase, the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, as it applied to automobile searches. Id. at 460. The Supreme Court concluded from its review of cases from other jurisdictions that some courts were treating the passenger compartment of automobiles as within the immediate control of the arrestee, even, when the defendant was removed from the vehicle at the time of the search; other courts refused to permit searches of automobile passenger compartments in comparable factual circumstances. Id. at 459. Belton resolved these conflicting interpretations of Chimel by deciding that the interior of an automobile is an area into which an arrestee might reach in. order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item, Id. at 460, even when the defendant is not in the automobile during the search. The Court stated: While the Chimel case established that a search incident to an arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of `the area within the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area arguable includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within `the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].' Chimel, 396 U.S., at 763. In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of the limits of the area that may be searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Id. The Belton decision, therefore, merely represents an application of the Chimel test to a specific factual situation. Chimel is not inconsistent with Belton. Thus, Belton is an entirely appropriate decision for this court to rely on in construing sec. 968.11, Stats. This court has never previously decided, when considering the legality of a search, whether the interior of an automobile is within the area from which a defendant might grab a weapon or evidence. Because we have construed the statute to be consistent with Chimel, however, subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of that decision are relevant in determining the meaning of our statute. Contrary to the defendant's contention, there-fore, we conclude that an automobile search consistent with Belton does not violate sec. 968.11 The defendant makes one further statutory attack on the search in this case. He contends that the sheriff officers did not search his automobile pursuant to one of the permissible purposes in sec. 968.11, Stats. Under this argument, the state must prove in each case the subjective intent of the officers who conduct a search incident to arrest. We disagree that sec. 968.11, Stats., requires case-by-case litigation, and proof of the officer's subjective intent when conducting a search incident to arrest. The statute authorizes searches incident to arrest and then defines the underlying justifications for this exception to the warrant requirement. The justifications for such a search of the person arrested and an area within the person's immediate presence exist regardless of the officer's subjective intent. In State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 625, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974), we specifically recognized that the state does not have to prove the purpose of a search incident to arrest. We based our conclusion on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), in which the Court stated: But quite apart from these distinctions, our more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest. We do not think the long line of authorities of this Court dating back to Weeks, or what we can glean from the history of practice in this country and in England, requires such a case-by-case adjudication. A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a `reasonable' search under that Amendment. We recognize that Mabra and Robinson involved searches of the person. However, the justification and exigency for a search of the area within the immediate presence of a defendant is the same as for a search of the person. Belton, 453 U.S. at 459, applied this same reasoning to searches beyond the person of the defendant. Thus, we conclude that sec. 968.11, Stats., does not require proof of an officer's subjective intent when conducting a search incident to arrest. The validity of a search incident to arrest is determined by the legality of the arrest and whether the search was limited to an area from which the defendant might gain possession of a weapon or evidentiary items. Here, the defendant does not question the legality of his arrest. The officers also limited the search to the passenger compartment of his automobile, which Belton holds is within the acceptable area of a search incident to arrest. Thus, we conclude that the search in this case does not violate sec. 968.11.