Opinion ID: 2546552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are the Specific Sentences at Issue Here Unconstitutional?

Text: ¶ 22 In each of these cases, the judge found facts not supported by jury findings, which they used to impose exceptional sentences. Those facts not based on prior convictions clearly violated Blakely. However, some of the facts arguably were based on prior convictions. Blakely left intact the validity of exceptional sentences based on prior convictions. ¶ 23 Not every aggravating factor cited must be valid to uphold an exceptional sentence: [w]here the reviewing court overturns one or more aggravating factors but is satisfied that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon a factor or factors that are upheld, it may uphold the exceptional sentence rather than remanding for resentencing. State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 276, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). Although some of the aggravating factors used in each sentence at issue violated Blakely, we must still address whether the sentences here could be saved by independently valid aggravating factors based on prior convictions. ¶ 24 The United States Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), held that a defendant did not have a right to a jury trial on facts of recidivism, specifically, prior convictions. The Court further clarified in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), that facts of prior conviction were distinguishable from other factors increasing a sentence, which would have to be found by a jury because a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. The Court in Apprendi then held what was foreshadowed by Jones, that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Rather than alter that rule, the Court in Blakely merely applied the Apprendi holding. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536. ¶ 25 The exceptional sentences here need not have been found by juries if they are supported by aggravating factors of prior convictions. Under Washington law, however, the court may not consider criminal history per se in issuing exceptional sentences because prior convictions are used to compute presumptive sentences. State v. Nordby, 106 Wash.2d 514, 518 n. 4, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986). Therefore, prior convictions alone can never be enough to warrant an exceptional sentence under Washington lawaggravating factors require something more than just prior conviction history.
¶ 26 In Anderson, the trial judge made factual findings supporting several aggravating factors and stated that any one of those factors would warrant the exceptional sentence he imposed. Under Jackson, so long as one of those factors is valid, the exceptional sentence can stand. 150 Wash.2d at 276, 76 P.3d 217. ¶ 27 There can be no doubt that the aggravating factors found by the trial judge(1) a particularly vulnerable victim, (2) an on-going pattern of sexual abuse, (3) use of a position of trust to commit the offenses, (4) an abuse of trust, and (5) an offense that involved a high degree of sophistication, planning, and groomingviolated Anderson's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as defined by Blakely. The judge made specific findings of fact, which the jury had not found and which increased Anderson's punishment, thereby violating the express terms of Blakely. But there is still a question of whether the judge's conclusion that operation of the multiple offense policy would result in a presumptive sentence that was clearly too lenient would fall within the Apprendi/Blakely exception to the jury requirement for prior convictions. ¶ 28 The aggravating factor at issue requires finding that [t]he operation of the multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter, as expressed in RCW 9.94A.010. RCW 9.94A.535(2)(i). The multiple offense policy it refers to states that except for certain circumstances, when a person is to be sentenced for two or more current offenses, the sentence range for each current offense shall be determined by using all other current and prior convictions as if they were prior convictions for the purpose of the offender score. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). It allows courts to consider current convictions as prior convictions for purposes of calculating the offender score. And it is not based solely on the objective determination of the existence of prior convictions; instead, it also requires the conclusion of whether the presumptive sentence calculated is clearly too lenient in light of the other convictions. ¶ 29 This court has held that a judge may rely on the aggravating factor that the presumptive sentence is too lenient [4] when there is some extraordinarily serious harm or culpability resulting from multiple offenses which would not otherwise be accounted for in determining the presumptive sentencing range. State v. Fisher, 108 Wash.2d 419, 428, 739 P.2d 683 (1987). We have further defined that inquiry to require a court to find one of two factual bases to support the too lenient conclusion: (1) `egregious effects' of defendant's multiple offenses [or] (2) the level of defendant's culpability resulting from the multiple offenses. State v. Batista, 116 Wash.2d 777, 787-88, 808 P.2d 1141 (1991). ¶ 30 Blakely left intact the trial judge's authority to determine whether facts alleged and found are sufficiently substantial and compelling to warrant imposing an exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.535. That decision is a legal judgment which, unlike factual determinations, can still be made by the trial court. See State v. Van Buren, 123 Wash. App. 634, 646, 98 P.3d 1235 (2004) (citing Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538 n. 8). ¶ 31 Blakely only made one exception to the rule that juries must find facts that increase sentences Blakely held that judges can still find the existence of prior convictions. [5] But this court has outlined specific factual findings a court must show to support a too lenient conclusionit is not merely a legal conclusion, nor does it entail solely the existence of prior convictions. Blakely did not authorize such additional judicial fact finding. The too lenient conclusion is one that must be made by the jury. Anderson's exceptional sentence is vacated.
¶ 32 In Selvidge, the trial court found that (1) Selvidge violated a position of trust, (2) his presumptive sentence was too lenient because Selvidge had more than nine points from prior convictions, which would allow his second current offense/conviction to have no punishment, and (3) he would not benefit from rehabilitation. There can be no doubt that factors one and three required judicial factual findings that violated Selvidge's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as defined in Blakely. There is still a question, however, as to whether the second factor fits within the Apprendi/Blakely exception allowing judges to find facts of prior convictions for exceptional sentencing purposes. Although the same aggravating factor provision at issue in Anderson, RCW 9.94A.535(2)(i), is at issue here, Selvidge raises a situation not present in Anderson where, because of the number of prior convictions, the presumptive sentence would leave one new offense with no punishment. It presents the question of whether a judge can determine that leaving an offense with no punishment is too lenient as a matter of law. ¶ 33 This court has held that the factual inquiry required to find a presumptive sentence clearly too lenient is automatically satisfied whenever `the defendant's high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in `free' crimescrimes for which there is no additional penalty.' State v. Smith, 123 Wash.2d 51, 56, 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting State v. Stephens, 116 Wash.2d 238, 243, 803 P.2d 319 (1991)). Selvidge argues that the too lenient conclusion in free crime cases still requires factual findings under Batista. He posits that this court did not consider the constitutional issues now presented by Blakely when it decided Smith, and that its conclusion that `free crimes' automatically equal egregiousness or extraordinary culpability usurps factual findings that are properly before the jury. Pet'r Supp. Br. at 8. Selvidge, therefore, asks this court to overrule Smith to the extent that it finds free crimes automatically satisfy the too lenient requirement of RCW 9.94A.535(2)(i). ¶ 34 Amicus Curiae Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA) argues that Batista does not apply to prior convictions because that case involved current offenses. Instead, they posit that the free crime conclusion only requires two factual findingsSelvidge's prior criminal history and his current offensesboth of which the judge can find under Blakely. In support of its position, WAPA cites Van Buren, where the Court of Appeals made a similar conclusion: Free crime analysis is a function of determining the defendant's offender score from the record of his prior and current criminal convictions. It does not require weighing evidence, determining credibility, or making a finding of disputed facts. Thus, it is not affected by the Blakely requirement that factual issues used to impose an exceptional sentence must be pleaded and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Buren, 123 Wash.App. at 653, 98 P.3d 1235 (footnote omitted). ¶ 35 The court reached that conclusion by discussing this court's reasoning in Smith. It quoted our holding on free crimes as: This inquiry [whether there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence] is automatically satisfied whenever the `defendant's high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in free crimes  crimes for which there is no additional penalty.' Id. at 652-53, 98 P.3d 1235 (quoting Smith, 123 Wash.2d at 56, 864 P.2d 1371 (quoting Stephens, 116 Wash.2d at 243, 803 P.2d 319)). The Court of Appeals noted that Blakely did not relieve the sentencing judge of the duty to make a judgment as to whether properly found aggravating facts were `substantial and compelling' reasons requiring an exceptional sentence. Id. at 651-52, 98 P.3d 1235 (quoting Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2540). Because the court reasoned that a judge could make factual findings on current convictions and offender score, and could make the substantial and compelling legal conclusion, it held that the conclusion that a free crime was too lenient was a Blakely exception and could be determined by a judge. See id. ¶ 36 That conclusion, though, is premised on an incorrect interpretation of this court's ruling in Smith. Instead of holding that the inquiry into whether there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence was automatically satisfied by finding a free crime, as Van Buren reasons, Smith actually held that the inquiry into whether under former RCW 9.94A.390(2)(f) (1993) [6] there is `some extraordinarily serious harm or culpability resulting from multiple offenses which would not otherwise be accounted for in determining the presumptive sentencing range,' was automatically satisfied. Smith, 123 Wash.2d at 55-56, 864 P.2d 1371 (emphasis added) (quoting Fisher, 108 Wash.2d at 428, 739 P.2d 683). The inquiry that the Van Buren court referred to, whether there were substantial and compelling reasons for an exceptional sentence, is a legal conclusion that the trial court is still allowed to make following Blakely. But the inquiry actually analyzed in Smith was the same that was defined by this court in Batista to require two factual findings. The conclusion that allowing a current offense to go unpunished is clearly too lenient is a factual determination that cannot be made by the trial court following Blakely. We overrule Smith to the extent that it allows the too lenient conclusion to be made by judges and vacate Selvidge's exceptional sentence.
¶ 37 In Hughes, the trial court found facts supporting four aggravating factors: (1) the crime was a major economic offense, (2) the environmental harm was severe, and not considered by the Legislature in setting the standard range, (3) the defendant committed rapid recidivism, and (4) the defendant had an ongoing pattern of the same criminal conduct. CP (Hughes) at 21-23. The State argues that Hughes' rapid recidivism and ongoing pattern of criminal conduct are based on prior convictions and, therefore, can be found by the court without violating Hughes' Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as defined by Blakely. See Resp't Br. at 10.
¶ 38 Rapid recidivism was recognized as a valid aggravating factor in State v. Butler, 75 Wash.App. 47, 53-54, 876 P.2d 481 (1994). Amicus Curiae WAPA cites Butler as its only support for rapid recidivism as a valid aggravating factor. It argues that the only factual findings related to that aggravating factor are Hughes' prior conviction and his current offense, both of which a trial court is authorized to find under Blakely. Amicus Curiae WAPA Br. at 17. ¶ 39 Butler clearly states, however, that if rapid recidivism were solely based on prior convictions, an exceptional sentence could not be based on that factor, as the presumptive sentence ranges already consider prior convictions. Butler, 75 Wash.App. at 53-54, 876 P.2d 481. In fact, the Court of Appeals explicitly stated that [t]he trial court's findings here are distinguishable from mere criminal history. Id. at 54, 876 P.2d 481. In finding that aggravating factor, the court actually considered the especially short time period between prior incarceration and reoffense. Id. The court further stated that an exceptional sentence is justified where the circumstances show a greater disregard for the law than otherwise would be the case and found that the defendant's immediate reoffense reflected that disdain. Id. ¶ 40 Those same considerations are evident in Hughes. The trial court's findings of fact state that [l]ess than three (3) months after being released from custody [for a prior similar crime], he committed the exact same offense against the same exact victim. This offense was committed only days after the defendant sat and heard testimony about the severe harm that he had done to the forest. CP (Hughes) at 22. The judge then stated that Hughes demonstrated a flagrant disregard for the law and shows a complete lack of remorse. Id. These findings are extremely similar to the court's conclusion in Butler that the short time between release from prison and reoffense demonstrated a disregard and disdain for the law. The conclusions go well beyond merely stating Hughes' prior convictions. Indeed, if that was all that the aggravating factor was based on, it could not support an exceptional sentence under Washington law. ¶ 41 The Supreme Court has made an exception to the jury requirement only for prior convictions. The findings at issue here involve new factual determinations and conclusions, such as the defendant's disregard for the law, which are not properly made by the trial court following Blakely.
¶ 42 The Hughes trial court found an ongoing pattern of the same criminal conduct to be an aggravating factor. We found no cases discussing this aggravating factor per se, [7] and the issue was not briefed beyond a conclusory assertion. Yet, we know that if this factor considered solely prior convictions it would be insufficient to support an exceptional sentence under Washington law. Instead, the factor must consider the combination of the various similar offenses and the heightened harm or culpability that pattern indicates. Like the conclusion that a presumptive sentence for multiple current offenses is too lenient, this determination implicitly must involve factual findings beyond the existence of prior convictions. Per Blakely, those factual findings are for a jury. ¶ 43 Hughes' exceptional sentence is vacated.