Opinion ID: 779429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overview of Qualified Immunity

Text: 34 Qualified immunity strikes a balance between the need to provide a means for the vindication of constitutional guarantees and the societal costs that inhere in litigation against public officials, including the danger that fear of being sued will `dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.' Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949)); see Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). It does so by shield[ing them] from liability for civil damages if their actions were objectively reasonable, as evaluated in the context of legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time. Poe, 282 F.3d at 132; see Elder, 510 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 1019. Qualified immunity is more than a simple defense — it is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,... an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. As a result, the Supreme Court has made clear that [w]here the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); see Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam). 35 We conduct a two part inquiry to determine if an official is entitled to qualified immunity. The threshold question is whether, [t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Addressing this initial question serves the important role of providing a clear standard against which officers can measure the legality of future conduct. See id.; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (noting that if the policy of avoidance [of determining constitutional issues] were always followed in favor of ruling on qualified immunity whenever there was no clearly settled constitutional rule of primary conduct, standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and individuals). Thus, although we have under certain circumstances bypassed this first step and proceeded directly to the qualified immunity inquiry, that is the exception rather than the rule. See Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir.2002) (declining to address the threshold inquiry where the issue was likely to arise in context of a suppression motion). 36 If we determine that the officer's conduct did not violate a constitutional right, we proceed no further and hold that the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. However, if we decide otherwise, we proceed to ask whether the right was clearly established at the time it was allegedly infringed. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151; see Hope v. Pelzer, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2516, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) ([T]he salient question ... is whether the state of the law [at the time of the challenged conduct] gave [the officers] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.). 37 Said differently, if the officer's conduct violated a right, we analyze the objective reasonableness of the officer's belief in the lawfulness of his actions. See Poe, 282 F.3d at 133. If the officer reasonably believed that his actions did not violate the plaintiff's rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity even if that belief was mistaken. See id.; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.). However, if his belief was not objectively reasonable, qualified immunity offers him no solace and the plaintiff's claims must be allowed to proceed. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727.