Opinion ID: 2631133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Robbery, burglary, and. first degree felony-murder

Text: Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his robbery conviction and the robbery-murder special circumstance finding because the prosecution failed to present substantial evidence that he formed the intent to steal before or during, rather than after, the fatal shootings of Skillman and Rita. The absence of this evidence, defendant argues, infects the burglary conviction, the burglary-murder special circumstance, and the convictions for first degree murder to the extent they are based on a theory of felony murder. We conclude sufficient evidence supports the convictions and special circumstance findings. To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; see also People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 790-791, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485 [same standard of review applies to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a special circumstance finding].) Where, as here, the jury's findings rest to some degree upon circumstantial evidence, we must decide whether the circumstances reasonably justify those findings, `but our opinion that the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding' does not render the evidence insubstantial. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887-888, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. (§ 211.) If the other elements are satisfied, the crime of robbery is complete without regard to the value of the property taken. ( People v. Simmons (1946) 28 Cal.2d 699, 705, 172 P.2d 18; People v. Coleman (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 722, 728, 87 Cal.Rptr. 554.) The intent to steal must be formed either before or during the commission of the act of force. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1128, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; see also People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 956, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) With respect to burglary, that crime requires an entry into a specified structure with the intent to commit theft or any felony. ( People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 903, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228; People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 723-724, fn. 7, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083; § 459.) Under the felony-murder rule, a murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate one of several enumerated felonies, including robbery and burglary, is first degree murder. (§ 189.) The robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances apply to a murder committed while the defendant was engaged in ... the commission of, [or] attempted commission of robbery and burglary, respectively. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G).) [T]o prove a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation, the prosecution must show that the defendant had an independent purpose for the commission of the felony, that is, the commission of the felony was not merely incidental to an intended murder. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 182, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Here, the prosecution's theory was that defendant and codefendant Wynglarz planned to steal drugs or money from Skillman, a known drug dealer, at his house; once there, defendant killed Skillman and Rita during that planned burglary and robbery. The prosecution presented evidence that on the day of the murders defendant needed money because he was behind on his truck payments. Defendant armed himself with a loaded gun and followed Wynglarz to Skillman's house. Defendant and Wynglarz fought with Rita on the front porch and pushed him into the house. Moments after defendant and Wynglarz entered the house, they subdued Skillman and Rita, who were both unarmed. Defendant shot Skillman and Rita, each twice. Skillman was shot at close range; Rita was shot from just a few feet away. When defendant and Wynglarz left the house, they were calm, smiling as they walked over to defendant's truck. From a neighbor's yard, to which he had escaped, Gattenby saw defendant carry a paper or canvas bag in his hand. From across the street, another neighbor saw Wynglarz carry a nylon-like bag that bowed down under the weight of its contents. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had gone into Skillman's house with the intent to steal, thus committing burglary. For the same reason, the evidence is sufficient to support not only defendant's first degree murder convictions based on the theory that they occurred in the commission of a burglary, but also the jury's burglary-murder special-circumstance findings. Based on this same evidence, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that before he murdered Skillman and Rita, defendant had formed the intent to take their propertydrugs or money or bothand that defendant committed the murders to facilitate the taking of that property. A rational jury could also find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took property from Skillman and Rita. When defendant and codefendant Wynglarz left the house after the murders, they took with them a bag and the bag's contents, which a rational jury could infer consisted of stolen money or drugs, or both, together with the murder weapon. Therefore, we conclude that substantial evidence supports not only defendant's convictions of robbery and first degree murder based on the theory that the murders of Skillman and Rita occurred in the commission of a robbery, but also the jury's robbery-murder special-circumstance findings that each murder occurred during the commission of robbery. (See People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th 871, 904, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 554, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 956, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.)