Opinion ID: 1191875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: When a party seeks appellate reversal of a jury verdict based upon the claim of insufficient evidence, the party is, in effect, seeking appellate review of the trial court's denial of either a motion for directed verdict, a motion for JNOV, or a motion for a new trial. See Sheraton Hawaii Corp., 51 Haw. at 147-48, 454 P.2d at 372-73. It is well settled that a trial court's rulings on directed verdict or JNOV motions [are reviewed] de novo. Verdicts based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence to support the jury's findings. We have defined substantial evidence as credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a [person] of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. In deciding a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, the evidence and the inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and either motion may be granted only where there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment. Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai`i 475, 486, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (1995). . . . Thus, [w]here there is conflicting evidence, or there is insufficient evidence to make a one-way verdict proper, [JNOV] should not be awarded. Id. at 487, 904 P.2d at 501 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Lee v. Aiu, 85 Hawai`i 19, 30-31, 936 P.2d 655, 666-67 (1997) (citation omitted). Both the grant and the denial of a motion for new trial is within the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Richardson, 76 Hawai`i at 503, 880 P.2d at 178; see also Stahl v. Balsara, 60 Haw. 144, 152, 587 P.2d 1210, 1215 (1978). . . . Unlike motions for a directed verdict or a JNOV, the movant need not, on a motion for new trial, convince the court to rule that no substantial evidence supports its opponent's case, but only that the verdict rendered for its opponent is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Richardson, 76 Hawai`i at 503, 880 P.2d at 178. Carr, 79 Hawai`i at 488, 904 P.2d at 502. A... court abuses its discretion whenever it exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party. Abastillas v. Kekona, 87 Hawai`i 446, 449, 958 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In cases of conflicting evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are within the province of the trial court and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. See Steinberg v. Hoshijo, 88 Hawai`i 10, 18, 960 P.2d 1218, 1226 (1998) (citation omitted). It is not the function of appellate courts to secondguess the trier of fact where there is substantial evidence in the record to support its conclusion. See Krohnert v. Yacht Systems Hawaii, Inc., 4 Haw.App. 190, 197, 664 P.2d 738, 743 (1983).
The requirement that the testator [or testatrix] have mental capacity is an ancient one. Jesse Dukeminier and Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 147 (1995) (brackets added). This requirement emanates from two important and apparently contrasting principles: (1) that a will should be given effect only if it represents the testator's true desires and (2) that the law requires mental capacity to protect the decedent's family. Id.; see also In re Estate of Christian, 65 Haw. 394, 401, 652 P.2d 1137, 1142 (1982). A testator or testatrix is presumed to possess the requisite mental capacity to execute a will. See In re Estate of Lopez, 25 Haw. 197, 199 (1919); In re Estate of Coleman, 1 Haw.App. 136, 139, 615 P.2d 760, 762 (1980); see also In re Bakke's Will, 160 Minn. 56, 199 N.W. 438 (1924). Testamentary capacity has been defined as the ability to know: (1) the nature and extent of the testator or testatrix's estate; (2) the identity of the beneficiaries and their relationship, whether by blood or other circumstances, to the testator or testatrix ( i.e., the objects of his or her bounty); (3) the disposition that the testator or testatrix is making; and (4) how these elements relate so as to form a rational and orderly plan for the disposition of the testator or testatrix's estate. See 1 Page on the Law of Wills § 12.21, at 606-09, 614-15 (William J. Bowe and Douglas H. Parker, eds., 1960) ( Page on Wills ); Wills, Trusts, and Estates, supra, at 149; see also Estate of Adams, 234 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa 1975); Evans v. Liston, 116 Ariz. 218, 568 P.2d 1116, 1117 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1977); cf. Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985) (The classic test of general testamentary capacity has three elements: to make a will, one must be able to (1) identify the natural object of one's bounty and recognize one's relationship to them, (2) recall the nature and extent of one's property, and (3) dispose of one's property understandingly, according to a plan formed in one's mind.). A party, who has standing to challenge the validity of a will, may contest the will based upon a lack of the requisite testamentary capacity. See Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills and Other Principles of Succession Including Intestacy and Administration of Decedents' Estates § 99, at 521 (2d ed. 1953) ( Atkinson on Wills ). [8] The contestant of a will bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator or testatrix lacked the requisite testamentary capacity. See Hawai`i Revised Statues (HRS) § 560:3-407 (1993). Through the testimony of Richard Mirikitani, Betty Pettus, and Linda Parker, First Church adduced evidence showing that Carmen did not have the mental capacity in December 1989 to know the nature and extent of her estate, to know the objects of her bounty, to know the disposition she was making, or to formulate a rational plan for the disposition of her estate. Although not conclusive on the issue of testamentary capacity, First Church also adduced, for example, evidence that Carmen was diagnosed with organic brain syndrome secondary to aging in September 1988 and January 1990, as well as evidence that, throughout 1989, Carmen would frequently get lost when traveling to familiar places, fail to recall her assets when asked about them, and fail to remember what she had for lunch or what was in the morning paper. In contrast, Soth adduced through the testimony of Dr. Schulz, Dorothy Theaker, Ruth Kerr, Jerry Breeden and Steve Bobko, that Carmen, indeed, possessed the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the 1989 Will. In addition to the factual section supra, the foregoing demonstrates that there was conflicting evidence presented to the jury on whether Carmen possessed the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the 1989 Will. Further, the evidence presented by First Church was credible and of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to conclude that Carmen lacked the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the 1989 Will. Therefore, the probate court did not err in denying Soth's motions for a directed verdict and for JNOV on this issue. As shown above, the record also shows that the jury's verdict, concluding that Carmen lacked the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the 1989 Will, was supported by substantial evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Soth's motion for a new trial.
Although there is a strong presumption that an able-bodied testator or testatrix knew the contents of his or her will, a will may be denied probate if he or she was ignorant of its contents. Atkinson on Wills, supra, § 58, at 273; 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 13.4, at 666; see also In re Will of Ely, 2 Haw. 649, 651 (1863) (affirming admission of will into probate because record revealed substantial evidence that testator had knowledge of its contents even though it was not read to testator at time of execution). The mere execution of a will creates the presumption that the testator or testatrix knew the contents of the will. Atkinson on Wills, supra, § 58, at 275-76; see also In re Estate of Lopez, 25 Haw. 197, 199 (1919); Estate of Coleman, 1 Haw.App. at 139, 615 P.2d at 762; Will of Ely, 2 Haw. at 651. The fact that the will was read by, or to, the testator is strong evidence that he had knowledge of the contents. It is not conclusive, however, and particularly when it was not read, there may be a denial of probate on the ground that the testator was mistaken as to its contents. Atkinson on Wills, supra, § 58, at 276 (emphasis added); see also 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 13.4, at 667. [9] Here, First Church adduced evidence showing that the 1989 Will was not read to Carmen at the time of its execution at First Hawaiian Bank. After December 1989, Carmen appeared not to remember that she had executed another will after the 1988 Will. Soth, contrastingly, testified that Carmen requested and instructed him to write the 1989 Will and that he read over the 1989 Will with Carmen before its execution. Soth testified that he remembered the First Hawaiian Bank employee, Diane Chong, slowly paging through the 1989 Will, apparently permitting Carmen to read the will prior to execution, even though Chong testified to the contrary and Soth conceded that he could not remember whether Carmen had her reading glasses on at the time. Soth also testified that he never revealed the contents of the 1989 Will to another person out of respect for Carmen's privacy. As was the case regarding Carmen's testamentary capacity, the foregoing demonstrates that conflicting evidence was presented to the jury on the question of mistake. Nevertheless, the evidence presented by First Church was credible and of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to conclude that Carmen was mistaken about the contents of the 1989 Will. Therefore, the probate court did not err in denying Soth's motions for a directed verdict and for JNOV. Similarly, the record shows that the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Soth's motion for a new trial.
A will may also be denied probate if it is determined that the will's execution is the result of undue influence. 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 15.3, at 720, and § 15.11, at 740; see also In re Will of Naoiwi, 14 Haw. 43, 45 (1902) (affirming the denial of probate of a will because there was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict of undue influence). Undue influence [however] is one of the most bothersome concepts in all of law. It cannot be precisely defined. Wills, Trusts, and Estates, supra, at 160. [10] It is sometimes said that the elements of undue influence are, susceptibility of [the] testator [or testatrix], opportunity for the exertion of undue influence, disposition to exert undue influence, and the result, in the will, of such undue influence. 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 15.5, at 722 (footnotes omitted) (brackets added); see also In re Estate of Kamesar, 81 Wis.2d 151, 259 N.W.2d 733, 737 (1977) (The elements of undue influence are: (1) susceptibility to undue influence, (2) opportunity to influence, (3) disposition to influence, and (4) coveted result.); In re Estate of Anders, 88 S.D. 631, 226 N.W.2d 170, 173-74 (1975). The so-called SODR factors have evolved to aid courts in determining whether to deny probate of a will based upon the theory of undue influence. Well established Hawai`i case law involving undue influence has impliedly recognized and adopted the SODR factors. See In re Will of Charles Notley, 15 Haw. 435, 440-41 (1904); In re Estate of Afong, 26 Haw. 147, 152-54 (1921). This court stated that undue influence may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Mental weakness on the part of the testator and general control over him, and desire and opportunity to control him in the disposition of his property by will may be shown but only in so far as it tends to show that undue influence was in fact operative at the time of the execution, and in such cases the indirect evidence must be of a clear and convincing character; indeed, it is said that it must be not merely consistent with the theory of undue influence, but inconsistent with a contrary theory. Mere suspicion and conjecture are not enough. Will of Notley, 15 Haw. at 440-41 (emphases added) (citations omitted). Mental weakness on the part of the testator is, in effect, the susceptibility of the testator to be unduly influenced. [O]pportunity to control him in the disposition is the opportunity to exert undue influence. [D]esire . . . to control him in the disposition is the disposition to exert undue influence. Finally, Will of Notley 's focus upon the disposition of the property equals the factor of the result of the disposition. [11] Therefore, Hawai`i has already recognized and impliedly adopted the SODR factors in determining whether the exertion of undue influence resulted in the execution of a challenged will. Hawai`i law, however, expressly requires an additional consideration: that the undue influence must be proved to have operated as a present constraint at the very time of making the will[.] Id. at 440; see also 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 15.10, at 737 (Undue influence does not render a will invalid unless it operates at the time that the will is made and causes its execution.). Ultimately, [t]o sustain a claim of undue influence[,] it must appear that the influence exercised amounted to fraud or coercion destroying free agency, or the substitution of another's will for that of the testator [or testatrix] so that the product is not that of the testator [or testatrix]. Estate of Heeb, 26 Haw. at 540 (holding motion for new trial properly granted and citing to Will of Notley as a splendid exposition of the law of wills in respect to their invalidity as a result of undue influence). It is well settled that a trial court may direct a verdict in favor of the proponent of a will if the evidence offered to prove undue influence is insufficient as a matter of law. See In re Will of Kalua, 23 Haw. 149, 155 (1916) (affirming directed verdict in favor of proponent because the only evidence offered was that the attorney who drafted the will was also a member and trustee of a church organization which was named as a beneficiary in the will). However, a trial court should not direct the verdict in favor of the proponent when evidence of all four of the SODR factors is presented. Where the evidence is conflicting, most jurisdictions submit the case to the jury and instruct the jury that the burden of persuasion is upon the contestant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of undue influence. See 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 29.81, at 591. Here, conflicting evidence on all four of the SODR factors was presented to the jury with respect to the execution of Carmen's 1989 Will. First Church adduced evidence of Carmen's susceptibility to be unduly influenced by showing that, in September 1988, Carmen was diagnosed as having shortterm memory deficit or organic brain syndrome. Addressing both susceptibility and opportunity, First Church adduced evidence showing that Carmen and Soth were in a romantic relationship and that Soth, who only knew Carmen for approximately two and one-half years, drafted the 1989 Will for Carmen, drove her to First Hawaiian Bank where it was executed, and was present during its execution. First Church also adduced evidence of Soth's opportunity to exert undue influence over Carmen by showing that, two days prior to the execution of the 1989 Will, Soth gained control over all of Carmen's business and financial affairs through a general power of attorney. With respect to Soth's disposition to exert undue influence over Carmen, First Church adduced evidence of Soth's character, [12] through evidence of lay opinion testimony and specific instances of conduct, from which the trier of fact could infer a plan to get Carmen's house on the corner, obtain her money for law school, and gain control of her estate in order to gain control over her money. Regarding the coveted result, Soth was named as the residuary legatee, potentially receiving over $1.5 million dollars. In contrast, Soth adduced evidence that Carmen was independent and was not easily influenced. Soth adduced evidence that the 1988 Will, naming First Church as the residuary legatee, did not represent her wishes and that she wanted to revoke that will. Soth also testified that Carmen wanted to leave the majority of her estate to him and that the 1989 Will represented those wishes. Soth countered the allegations of a romantic relationship with evidence that Carmen and Soth shared a grandmother/grandson-type relationship. In light of the foregoing, the evidence presented to the jury wasonce againconflicting. Therefore, the probate court correctly denied Soth's motions for a directed verdict and for JNOV. Further, the record reveals a substantial amount of evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that Carmen was unduly influenced to execute the 1989 Will. This conclusion was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Soth's motion for a new trial.
Finally, although neither raised nor briefed on appeal, Judge Acoba wrote in his dissent that the affirmative verdicts on all three issues of contest were inconsistent. From the standpoint of appellate review, [a] conflict in the jury's answers to questions in a special verdict will warrant a new trial only if those answers are irreconcilably inconsistent, and the verdict will not be disturbed if the answers can be reconciled under any theory. . . . When faced with a claim that the verdicts are inconsistent, the court must search for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case, and must exhaust this effort before it is free to dismiss the jury's verdict and remand the case for a new trial. Carr, 79 Hawai`i at 489, 904 P.2d at 503 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Craft v. Peebles, 78 Hawai`i 287, 307, 893 P.2d 138, 158 (1995). Regarding this area, Page on Wills has provided the following: It was once thought that mistake, misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence could only occur with respect to a testator of sound mind, meaning one possessed of the necessary mental capacity to make a will. This view undoubtedly developed as the corollary position, once thought to be the prevailing rule, that an unsound mind, one lacking mental capacity, could not be the subject of mistake, misrepresentation, fraud or undue influence. Whether this position was scientifically accurate or not it is somewhat obvious as a legal matter that if the testator lacks the mental capacity required by the legal standard of testamentary capacity, the will is totally invalid for that reason alone and the existence of fraud or one of the other matters listed above is immaterial. But the corollary, which was stated first, does not logically follow. Evidence of fraud, undue influence, or mistake should not be taken as negating or running counter to evidence showing a lack of mental capacity. The establishment of mistake, fraud, etc., should not presuppose a mentally competent testator. Almost all modern cases now recognize the close relationship and overlapping nature of the doctrines of mental capacity, mistake, misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence. Of the persons having mental capacity, some have exceedingly strong and vigorous minds and dominating personalities and are little, if at all, susceptible of being overcome by undue influence, whereas others have weak minds and timid nature and are highly susceptible of giving way to undue pressure or of being tricked through fraud. 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 13.1, at 661-62 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the three issues of contest were presented to the jury, in the alternative, on a special verdict form. A thorough review of the record reveals that it is reasonably conceivable for the jury to have found that Carmen lacked the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the 1989 Will, that she was mistaken about its contents, and that she was unduly influenced in its execution. Therefore, although the issues of contest were submitted to the jury in the alternative, the affirmative verdicts on all three issues are not irreconcilably inconsistent and will not be reversed.