Opinion ID: 179282
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony related to Ms. Dick's DNA report

Text: Pablo first objects to the admission of Ms. Snider's testimony as it relates to Ms. Dick's DNA analysis and report, arguing that the Confrontation Clause requires that he have an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Dick. We need not decide, however, whether the district court erred in this regard. Pablo cannot succeed on appeal because we find that his alleged error is not plain, either as a factual or legal matter. For purposes of plain error review, the term plain requires that the error be clear or obvious under current law. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). As to the factual basis for his alleged error, Pablo argues that Ms. Snider's testimony parroted Ms. Dick's DNA report. Ms. Dick's DNA report, however, is not a part of the appellate record. And the absence of that report prevents us from determining the extent to which, if any, Ms. Snider parroted Ms. Dick's DNA report. Conversely, we also cannot discern the extent to which, if any, Ms. Snider is testifying to her own opinion drawn from that report. Without Ms. Dick's DNA report, we are left to divine from Ms. Snider's testimony whether she was parroting Ms. Dick's report, but Ms. Snider's testimony on its own does not make it clear that Ms. Snider parroted Ms. Dick's DNA report. Thus, we cannot characterize Ms. Snider's testimony as a clear or obvious parroting of Ms. Dick's DNA report. See Sykes v. United States, 373 F.2d 607, 613 (5th Cir.1966) (explaining that appellate courts are not equipped for divination and [t]hat which is not visible cannot be `plain.'); see also United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 700-01 (5th Cir.2009) (finding no plain error where supervising lab analyst relayed to the jury some testimonial hearsay contained in a drug analysis report she did not perform because there were factual ambiguities regarding the supervisor's role in, and personal knowledge of, the testing and report) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1915, 176 L.Ed.2d 387 (2010). Pablo attempts to counter the factual ambiguity in the record by emphasizing portions of Ms. Snider's testimony where she indicates that DNA analysts write their reports so that other analysts can read those reports and testify about them. For example, when asked whether she would simply be testifying like reading somebody else's report, Ms. Snider responded in the affirmative, explaining that analysts are trained to write their report or write [their] notes so somebody can ... go to testify in court if [they] can't go. (Supp. R. vol. 3 at 177:2-10.) Pablo argues that this makes plain that Ms. Snider merely read Ms. Dick's DNA report to the jury. Pablo's interpretation of this testimony is reasonable. But Ms. Snider's testimony in this respect is susceptible to a different but still reasonable interpretationnamely, that analysts are trained to record their data and processes in a manner that allows other analysts to review the information in order to draw an independent judgment about the DNA analysis and to testify to that independent judgment drawn from others' reports. Nowhere does Ms. Snider testify that she is simply parroting Ms. Dick's DNA report to the jury. To the contrary, her testimony revealed her own extensive review of the entire test procedure in this case and she expressed her own expert conclusions. In the course of discussing her review of this record, she does once or twice discuss Ms. Dick's conclusions as well, but she apparently does so in the context of explaining some of the data and information she is relying on in giving her own expert opinion. Thus, Ms. Snider's testimony fails to make clear or obvious the alleged factual basis for the asserted error and thus the admission of that testimony when no confrontation clause objection was raised below is not plain error. Moreover, as a legal matter, we also do not think it is plain or obvious that Melendez-Diaz resolves the issue. In Melendez-Diaz, the state trial court admitted into evidence affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis which showed that material seized by the police and connected to the defendant was cocaine. 129 S.Ct. at 2530. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that, under Crawford v. Washington , the affidavits were testimonial statements of witnesses admitted against the defendant. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532. And a witness's testimonial statements are inadmissible unless either the witness appears at trial, or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 2531. In Melendez-Diaz, then, the affidavits disclosing the results of a forensic analysis were admitted into evidence. 129 S.Ct. at 2530. That is, the actual out-of-court testimonial statements were admitted into evidence against the defendant and the government failed to call the declarants of that testimonial hearsay. In contrast, here, Ms. Dick's DNA report was never admitted into evidence. The degree to which an expert may merely rely upon, and reference during her in-court expert testimony, the out-of-court testimonial conclusions of another person not called as a witness is a nuanced legal issue without clearly established bright line parameters, even today with the benefit of Melendez-Diaz. Therefore, both factually and legally we conclude that the admission of Ms. Snider's testimony as it relates to Ms. Dick's DNA report did not constitute plain error.