Opinion ID: 386908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 30 DeLaval next contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. We agree. 31 For goods to be merchantable, they must be, inter alia, fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 2.314(b) (3) (Vernon 1968). To recover from a manufacturer on a theory of implied warranty under Texas law, one must establish that there is a defect in the object sold as it left the manufacturer. Jack Roach-Bissonnet, Inc. v. Puskar, 417 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.1967); Kriedler v. Pontiac Division of General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd. n. r. e.): Jones v. Philco Distributors, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.Civ.App. Ft. Worth 1967, no writ). The defect may be one of design, material, or manufacture. Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th Dist.) 1975, no writ). 32 Clark failed to meet this burden. He offered no evidence specifically identifying a defect, of either design or manufacture, in the milking system, much less one that existed when it left DeLaval's hands. Clark's evidence basically showed only that his cows developed mastitis after he purchased the two additional milking units in 1976. Clark's only witness who attempted to connect Clark's losses with the DeLaval milking machines was Dr. Hubert Schull, who was a veterinarian and the city milk inspector. With respect to the presence of a defect in the milking equipment, Dr. Schull testified only that milking machines in general cause mastitis, primarily by what is commonly known as slippage, which is the introduction of air between the cow's teat and the milking machine inflation. He testified that slippage can occur in all models of milking machines. He also admitted that mastitis can be caused by many factors other than milking machines, and that all milking machines injure a cow's udder at least to some extent. 33 Dr. Schull did express an opinion, based only on the temporal relationship between the 1976 purchase and the mastitis, that the DeLaval milking equipment caused the disease. 3 In his opinion, the mastitis may have been caused either by the slipping of the teat cup or by the milking dry of the front two quarters of the cow's udder before the back two quarters were milked. According to Dr. Schull, this latter phenomenon occurs quite often with milking machines. Dr. Schull did not, however, conduct any tests on Clark's milking machines or Clark's herd, nor did he or anyone else investigate to determine whether slippage was the cause of mastitis in Clark's cows. Further, he admitted that he did not have the expertise to express an opinion as to the inadequacy of the design or mechanics of milking machines. Moreover, neither he nor any of Clark's other witnesses refuted DeLaval's expert testimony that the Model 200 milking machine was designed in such a manner that, if properly used, it would decrease rather than increase the incidence of mastitis. 34 We believe that this evidence was insufficient to establish the presence of a defect in the DeLaval milking machines purchased by Clark when they left DeLaval's hands. Since there was insufficient evidence that the DeLaval milking machines caused the mastitis, and no evidence that they caused any more mastitis than other milking machines on the market, it cannot be said that the DeLaval milking machines were not fit for the ordinary purposes for which milking machines are used. Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 2.314(b)(3) (Vernon 1968).  'Merchantable' is not a synonym for perfect, J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-7 (1972); and a manufacturer of a product is not an insurer of that product. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.1967). 35 We therefore hold that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict in favor of Clark. Kelly v. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp., 171 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 917, 69 S.Ct. 1159, 93 L.Ed. 1727 (1949); Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124, n.6 (5th Cir. 1978). We accordingly reverse the district court's judgment in favor of Clark and render judgment in favor of DeLaval. 36 Since we reverse and render for DeLaval, it is unnecessary for us to address DeLaval's contention on appeal that the jury verdict was fatally tainted by jury misconduct. 37 REVERSED AND RENDERED.