Opinion ID: 1984560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: iii(b reinstatement of lasege's eligibility

Text: The trial court made a preliminary determination that the arbitrary nature of the enforcement of its by-laws by the members of the NCAA and its committees raises a substantial issue concerning the merits of their rules. The trial court further found that Mr. Lasege faces irreparable harm because without reinstatement, he will not be able to continue in classes, and may be deported back to Nigeria. Although we agree with the trial court's assessment of the magnitude of the harm from an erroneous NCAA eligibility decision, we find that Lasege's chances of prevailing on the merits of his claim are too remote to justify injunctive relief. We believe the trial court clearly erred when assessing the merits of Lasege's claim. In our opinion, the trial court wrongfully substituted its judgment for that of the NCAA after it analyzed the evidence and reached a different conclusion as to Lasege's intent to professionalize. The mere fact that a trial court considering mitigating evidence might disagree with the NCAA's factual conclusions does not render the NCAA's decision arbitrary or capricious. We have held that a ruling is arbitrary and capricious only where it is clearly erroneous, and by `clearly erroneous' we mean unsupported by substantial evidence. [16] Here, the NCAA's ruling has strong evidentiary supportLasege unquestionably signed contracts to play professional basketball and unquestionably accepted benefits. Contrary to the trial court's allegations of disparate treatment, the NCAA submits that no individual has ever had his or her eligibility reinstated after committing a combination of rules violations akin to those compiled by Lasege. The NCAA's eligibility determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctnessparticularly when they stem from conceded violations of NCAA regulations. Although we recognize that Lasege's mitigation evidence is relevant to review of the NCAA's determination, we believe the trial court simply disagreed with the NCAA as to the weight which should be assigned to this evidence. Accordingly, we believe the trial court abused its discretion when it found that Lasege had a high probability of success on the merits of his claim. We also find extraordinary cause warranting CR 65.09 relief in the trial court's balancing of the equities. The trial court's order contrasts Lasege's risk of irreparable injury with the NCAA's interest and states that [t]he NCAA, on the other hand, will not suffer any potential harm by this court's order. We find this conclusion clearly erroneous, and accordingly believe the trial court's subsequent balancing of the equities suffers from an inherent computational error. The NCAA unquestionably has an interest in enforcing its regulations and preserving the amateur nature of intercollegiate athletics. [17] As the trial court entered a temporary injunction on the basis of its preliminary findings, the trial court could eventually determine that the NCAA properly denied the reinstatement request. If that is the case, the trial court's order would have erroneously allowed an ineligible player to participate in intercollegiate athletics. While the NCAA has no identifiable interest in the arbitrary application of its regulations to the detriment of a student-athlete, it certainly has an interest in the proper application of those regulations to ensure competitive equity. Here, it appears that the trial court considered the equities of only one partyLasegeand it overvalued that interest with an unrealistic finding as to Lasege's probability of success on the merits. The trial court could not possibly have weighed the NCAA's interests, because it did not believe the NCAA had any interest for it to consider. Nor does it appear that the trial court gave any consideration to the possible injury to those programs and student-athletes who, because of the temporary injunction, would compete against a U of L Men's Basketball team with Lasege on the roster. In fact, as will be discussed in Section III(C), the trial court stripped the NCAA of even the somewhat ham-fisted, post-hoc restitutionary measures it uses to correct competitive inequities created by court orders. We cannot conclude that the trial court's determination was supported by substantial evidence when it so clearly mischaracterized the equities before balancing them. Logically speaking, a conclusion is flawed when it flows from an invalid premise. We believe this flaw in the trial court's conclusion constitutes clear error and warrants CR 65.09 relief. We find clearly erroneous both the trial court's finding regarding Lasege's probability of success on the merits and its failure to evaluate the opportunity costs to the NCAA and others when balancing the equities. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the temporary injunction which declares Lasege eligible to participate in NCAA intercollegiate basketball.