Opinion ID: 821294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing on Behalf of the MPA Itself

Text: To bring suit in its own right, an organization must itself satisfy the requirements of standing. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1982); see also Disability Rights Wis., Inc. v. Walworth Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 522 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, the MPA fails to do so. It does not assert any injury to itself as an entity. Rather, the MPA only alleges injuries to its members, and such injuries are insufficient to establish standing on an organization’s own behalf. Illustrating this distinction well, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board warrants consideration. 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (Crawford I), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Crawford II). In Crawford I, this court found that the Democratic Party had standing in its own right to challenge the constitutionality of a new Indiana law requiring voters to present a photo ID. 472 F.3d at 951. Specifically, because the Party alleged that it would be forced “to devote resources to getting to the polls those of its supporters who would otherwise be discouraged by the new law from bothering to vote,” the organization itself had the requisite injury-in-fact. Id.3 3 Although the Supreme Court agreed on little else when reviewing this court’s opinion, a majority of the Justices ex- (continued...) 10 No. 11-2314 Here, in contrast, the MPA has not pled any injury to itself. In the Amended Complaint, the entire discussion of the MPA’s interest was to claim that, “as a result of having a duty to represent and advise its members on matters related to [this litigation], the MPA possesses a tangible interest in knowing the law as it may impact its members, as well as ensuring that its members are afforded due process.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 3.) This pleading leaves little doubt that the MPA’s claim to standing derives entirely from its members. There is no mention of any injury to the MPA as an organization, such as having to expend greater resources to defend members who were wrongfully terminated. Such failure to allege injury in a complaint is fatal to standing, notwithstanding new arguments made on appeal. See Disability Rights Wis., 522 F.3d at 801. Yet, relying on North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, the MPA argues that the “probabilistic benefit” described in its Amended Complaint is sufficient to confer standing. 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1991). That theory misconstrues our precedent. In North Shore, the namesake company sought to enjoin construction of a boat slip that would have made an environmental clean-up operation more costly. Id. at 1241. Because the EPA had identified North Shore as a party potentially responsible for pollu- 3 (...continued) plicitly approved of how we handled the standing issue. Crawford II, 553 U.S. at 189 n.7 (Stevens, J., lead opinion); id. at 209 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). No. 11-2314 11 tion to the site in question (and thus responsible for the clean-up), North Shore could have been saddled with that additional expense. Id. Ironically, the EPA was compelling another company to construct the boat slip that would have made the clean-up more expensive. Id. In seeking an injunction, North Shore claimed that the EPA failed to file the requisite environmental impact statement and to obtain the necessary permit. Id. at 124142. The EPA responded by challenging North Shore’s standing. Id. at 1242. We held that “North Shore has standing in the Article III sense—it would derive a benefit if it won the suit, mainly because the construction of the new slip may increase the cost of cleaning up the . . . site and North Shore may be socked with that cost.” Id. The result in North Shore is distinguishable from this case. North Shore had standing not simply because it stood to benefit from the outcome of the case but because it also stood to lose money if the slip was constructed. Such economic harm is the prototypical injuryin-fact. In other words, North Shore does not abrogate the injury-in-fact requirement; it merely restates it. In light of the above, the MPA has not presented this court with a cognizable injury to itself. The MPA pled only that it stood to benefit from knowing how the law limits the Board’s powers. This mere desire for information is not cognizable without a corresponding injury-in-fact, which the MPA has not pled. Therefore, the organization does not satisfy the first requirement for standing and cannot bring suit on its own behalf. Addressing the 12 No. 11-2314 MPA’s own claims would produce an advisory opinion— a task we cannot undertake. In so holding, we do not imply that federal courts can never hear cases regarding prospective injuries. To the contrary, prospective injury, such as the threat of enforcement, can indeed present a cognizable injury-in-fact. See, e.g., Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2012). We need not discuss such principles here, however, since the MPA has pled no injury at all, no less a prospective one.