Opinion ID: 705948
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Exceptions to Abstention

Text: 14 Although a federal court is normally required to abstain if the three prongs of the Younger test are satisfied, abstention is inappropriate in the extraordinary circumstance that the state tribunal is incompetent by reason of bias. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1697-1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). However, one who alleges bias 'must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.'  Kenneally, 967 F.2d at 333 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464-1465, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975)). Appellants failed to overcome this presumption. 15 Appellants contend California Supreme Court justices and Bar Court judges have a direct and substantial financial interest in the outcome of disciplinary hearings. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824-25, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 1586-87, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986). However, appellants offer no evidence that the justices or judges receive improper payments to influence attorney disciplinary proceedings or that they are competitors who might have a financial interest in seeing appellants disbarred. See Gibson, 411 U.S. at 577-79, 93 S.Ct. at 1697-98 (optometrists who sat on licensing board were biased because of their financial interest in the outcome of hearings to revoke the licenses of optometrists with whom they competed). 16 The fact that fines imposed in attorney disciplinary proceedings are paid to the treasury of the State Bar does not establish an impermissible financial interest. Although the State Bar pays the salaries of the Bar Court judges, the salaries are set by statute, see Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Sec. 6079(d), and no evidence suggests that they are in any way dependent on the amount of fines collected or that the State Bar would be unable to pay the salaries of Bar Court judges without the money collected in disciplinary proceedings, which totals less than 1% of the State Bar's revenues. 3 17 Appellants offer only conjecture in support of their claim that Supreme Court justices are impermissibly biased because they appoint Bar Court judges. As the district court noted, district court judges are not deemed incompetent to review the findings of magistrate judges whom they participate in appointing. Compare Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 779-80 & n. 10 (9th Cir.1982) (school board reviewing its own prior decision was not impermissibly biased). 18 The absence of a mandatory statutory recusal mechanism applicable to justices of the California Supreme Court does not make a showing of bias unnecessary. The case upon which the appellants rely, Flangas v. State Bar of Nevada, 655 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.1981), held only that the court would not consider the bias exception to Younger because the plaintiff had not exhausted his state court remedies by invoking the available statutory recusal procedure. See id. at 950. Flangas did not imply that the absence of a particular recusal mechanism made it unnecessary to consider whether bias existed in fact. 19 Finally, appellants suggest the disciplinary process is tainted by bias because the State Bar has both investigative and adjudicative functions. However, the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that such a combination necessarily creates an unacceptable risk of bias. Such decisionmakers are still entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity when serving as adjudicators. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464-65. Appellants offer no evidence to rebut this presumption.
20 We reject appellants' contention that abstention is inapplicable because the California disciplinary system allegedly involves an unconstitutional delegation of power, violates separation of powers, and deprives appellants of a right to vote. 4 The California Supreme Court has previously rejected similar constitutional challenges on the ground the Bar Court functions as an administrative arm of the Court, which maintains final authority over discipline. See Lebbos v. State Bar, 53 Cal.3d 37, 48, 278 Cal.Rptr. 845, 806 P.2d 317 (1991). In any case, regardless of the ultimate merits of these claims, the pertinent statutes are not  'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.'  Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. at 755 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402, 61 S.Ct. 962, 967, 85 L.Ed. 1416 (1941)). Accordingly, any violation would not justify refusal to abstain.