Opinion ID: 2155426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory background and elements of the offense.

Text: At all times relevant to this appeal, our CPO statute provided in pertinent part as follows: Violation of any temporary or permanent order issued under this subchapter... shall be punishable as contempt. D.C.Code § 16-1005(f) (2001). Any person who violates any protection order issued under this subchapter shall be chargeable with a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 180 days, or both. D.C.Code § 16-1005(g) (2001). [11] The criminal information filed by the United States Attorney in this case does not specify whether Davis was being prosecuted under subsection (f) or subsection (g). We do not believe, however, that the appeal turns on this distinction, for the elements of a CPO violation are the same under the two subsections. Ba v. United States, 809 A.2d 1178, 1182 n. 6 (D.C.2002). Although subsection (g) does not use the word contempt, subsection (f) does. Id. at 1182. For all practical purposes, this is a criminal contempt case in which Davis has been charged with intentionally violating a court order. To establish the elements of a CPO violation, the government must present evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants engaged in: (1) willful disobedience (2) of a [civil protection] order. Id. at 1183. In a criminal contempt case, as in any other criminal prosecution, each element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Bethard v. District of Columbia, 650 A.2d 651, 653 (D.C.1994) (per curiam) (citing In re Gorfkle, 444 A.2d 934, 939 (D.C.1982)); Thompson v. United States, 690 A.2d 479, 482 (D.C.1997). The offense requires both a contemptuous act and a wrongful state of mind. Swisher v. United States, 572 A.2d 85, 89 (D.C.1990) (per curiam); Fields v. United States, 793 A.2d 1260, 1264 (D.C.2002) (quoting Gorfkle, 444 A.2d at 939). [12]