Opinion ID: 487400
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Aviation Act's General Prohibition

Text: 44 As we conclude that section 306(a)(2) supersedes whatever provisions of the Agreement may be in conflict with that section, so must it supersede, to the degree required, the Secretary's general duty under section 1102 of the Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1502(a) (1982), to exercise her powers consistently with any obligations assumed by the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force between the United States and any foreign country. Section 306(a)(2) of the Anti-Apartheid Act is a very specific congressional directive. Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2482-83, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (citations omitted). Petitioner's argument that the Secretary was bound by section 1102 of the Aviation Act to construe section 306(a)(2) consistently with the permit revocation provisions of the Agreement is therefore without merit.