Opinion ID: 2434257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Secured Tools

Text: As heretofore noted, defendants have been temporarily enjoined from using, renting or leasing sand-line cutters secured from plaintiff under the terms of the licensing agreement. Defendants contend there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that they are using, renting or leasing tools which were secured from plaintiff. It was plaintiff's burden to prove that defendants were in possession of such tools. In regard to defendant, John Luccous, Jr., this burden has not been met since there is not one scintilla of evidence that he is renting, leasing or using tools secured' from plaintiff. In regard to defendant, John Luccous, Sr., it is undisputed that at one time he did have sand-line cutters which he had acquired under the terms of the license agreement. However, plaintiff testified that he had no personal knowledge of any sand-line cutters owned by him which were still in the defendants' possession. Furthermore, the testimony of J. D. Whiteside, which was introduced by plaintiff, was that he had acquired all of the plaintiff's tools from defendant and had returned them to plaintiff. Since there is no evidence that defendants failed to return any sand-line cutters to plaintiff, the temporary injunction is futile. If the evidence shows no intention on the part of a defendant to do the thing sought to be enjoined, then an injunction should be denied. See Davis v. Upshur County, 191 S.W.2d 524, Tex.Civ.App., no wr. hist. Plaintiff argues this is a breach of contract as well as a trade secret case, and in his petition he sets forth several alleged violations by defendants of the license agreement. The only issue necessary for decision by this court is whether or not the lower courts have erroneously enjoined defendants from using sand-line cutters allegedly copied or secured from plaintiff and from personally manufacturing such tools now and in the future. It is undisputed by the testimony of the plaintiff himself that the license agreement has been terminated by written agreement since February 21, 1962. This being so, it has no relevancy as to the propriety of the injunction. If defendants have breached the terms of the agreement, plaintiff's remedy is damages, and not injunction. An applicant for a temporary injunction seeks extraordinary equitable relief in that he seeks to immobilize a person from a course of conduct which that person may have a legal right to pursue. See Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 348 S.W. 2d 517. In the present case, the trial court and Court of Civil Appeals have enjoined defendants on the basis of the well-settled rule that injunctive relief may be employed when one breaches his confidential relationship in order to unfairly use a trade secret. As heretofore noted, the above rule is not presently applicable. The judgments of the trial court and Court of Civil Appeals are reversed, and the temporary injunction dissolved.