Opinion ID: 2023181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Habitual Criminal Enhancement.

Text: The State sought enhancement of Nelson's sentence pursuant to the habitual criminal statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1995), based on two prior felony convictions. Nelson asserts that the district court erred in finding him to be a habitual criminal because the State did not present evidence proving that his prior plea-based convictions were obtained when he either was represented by counsel or had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. We have held that in a proceeding for an enhanced penalty, the State has the burden to show that the records of a defendant's prior felony convictions, based on pleas of guilty, affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant was represented by counsel, or that the defendant, having been informed of the right to counsel, voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived that right. State v. Orduna, 250 Neb. 602, 550 N.W.2d 356 (1996). The State in this case concedes that the evidence of Nelson's two prior felony convictions presented at the enhancement hearing did not affirmatively establish that Nelson was represented by counsel at the time of his pleas or that he voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived counsel. The State nevertheless argues that such evidence was subject to challenge by Nelson and that Nelson waived the error regarding the sufficiency of the enhancement evidence by failing to object at the enhancement hearing and instead raising the challenge for the first time on appeal. Given the constitutional dimension of the right to counsel, we have held, however, that in the absence of proof on the record that the prior convictions were obtained at a time when the defendant was represented by counsel or had knowingly waived such right, it is plain error for a court to use a defendant's prior convictions to enhance the defendant's sentence. State v. Ristau, 245 Neb. 52, 511 N.W.2d 83 (1994); State v. Huffman, 222 Neb. 512, 385 N.W.2d 85 (1986). The State recognizes such authority in its brief, but asserts that such holdings were in error and urges this court to overrule such cases. The State further refers to State v. McGhee, 184 Neb. 352, 359, 167 N.W.2d 765, 770 (1969), in which this court held that the failure of the defendant to initiate inquiry into the constitutional basis of his prior conviction at or prior to its offer into evidence forecloses him from challenging its validity on an appeal to this court. See, similarly, State v. Cole, 207 Neb. 318, 298 N.W.2d 776 (1980) (stating in postconviction case that validity of prior conviction offered to enhance punishment under habitual criminal statute must be challenged at habitual criminal hearing and that failure to challenge prior conviction at trial level waives issue, and prior conviction not subject to collateral attack in postconviction proceeding). See, also, State v. Fowler, 201 Neb. 647, 271 N.W.2d 341 (1978). We have stated that plain error will be noted only where an error is evident from the record, prejudicially affects a substantial right of a litigant, and is of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. State v. Gutierrez, 260 Neb. 1008, 620 N.W.2d 738 (2001). We conclude that based on these standards and our prior cases, Ristau, supra, and Huffman, supra, the use of a defendant's prior convictions to enhance the defendant's sentence absent proof on the record that the prior convictions were obtained at a time when the defendant was represented by counsel or had knowingly waived such right is plain error. We observe that the holdings in Ristau and Huffman, decided in 1994 and 1986, respectively, created an exception to the proposition stated earlier in McGhee, decided in 1969. Although McGhee foreclosed a challenge to the validity of a prior conviction on direct appeal when such challenge was not raised at the trial level, we have held in Ristau and Huffman that in the circumstance in which the challenge to the validity of the prior conviction was limited to the absence of proof on the record in an enhancement hearingthat the prior conviction was obtained at a time when the defendant was represented by counsel or had knowingly waived such rightsuch error was plain error, meaning that it could be considered on appeal even though it had not been raised at the trial level. Ristau and Huffman therefore overruled McGhee to the extent that under Ristau and Huffman, such counsel-based challenges will be permitted on direct appeal, notwithstanding a failure by trial counsel to raise such challenges. In the present case, the district court committed plain error in sentencing Nelson as a habitual criminal where the State failed at the enhancement hearing to affirmatively establish that Nelson was represented by counsel at the time of the pleas in his two prior felony convictions. See, State v. Orduna, 250 Neb. 602, 550 N.W.2d 356 (1996); State v. Ristau, 245 Neb. 52, 511 N.W.2d 83 (1994); State v. Huffman, 222 Neb. 512, 385 N.W.2d 85 (1986). We therefore vacate Nelson's enhanced sentence and remand the cause to the district court for resentencing. Because of the disposition of this assignment of error, we need not consider Nelson's assignment of error claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the enhancement hearing.