Opinion ID: 2742016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Course of Conduct of Stalking

Text: [¶9] The jury was instructed that, to establish the crime of stalking, the State must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. On or between January 25, 2013 and January 26, 2013; 2. In Campbell County, Wyoming; 3. The defendant, Gregory M. Hawes; 4. With the intent to harass Donna Hawes; 5. Engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass Donna Hawes; and 6. The defendant committed the acts set forth in elements 4 and 5 in violation of a condition of bail. 2 The State contended at oral argument that it only raised this issue because of the way in which Mr. Hawes styled his statement of the issues on appeal. We overlook any ambiguity that might be found in that statement of the issues because the substance of the argument is clearly directed to the sufficiency of the evidence. 3 “Course of conduct” is defined by statute as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over any period of time evidencing a continuity of purpose.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2- 506(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2013). “Harass” means: to engage in a course of conduct, including but not limited to verbal threats, written threats, lewd or obscene statements or images, vandalism or nonconsensual physical contact, directed at a specific person or the family of a specific person, which the defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and which does in fact seriously alarm the person toward whom it is directed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2013). [¶10] The State concedes that there can be no “course of conduct” if there was no intent to harass on January 25. Giving the State the benefit of every favorable inference, the facts regarding what occurred on January 25 are insufficient to conclude that Mr. Hawes acted with the intent to harass Mrs. Hawes on that day. Mrs. Hawes found herself following behind a white pickup at a location several miles from her home and near the turnoff to Mr. Hawes’ home. The State presented no evidence to dispute Mr. Hawes’ explanation that he was on his way home. Instead, the State contends that Mr. Hawes’ statement to Mrs. Hawes on January 26 when she asked whether that was him the day before, and he answered that he was watching her, is evidence that he intended to harass her. We cannot conclude that watching her during a chance encounter in a small Wyoming town gives rise to a reasonable inference that Mr. Hawes had an intent to harass Mrs. Hawes on January 25. See Walker v. State, 2013 WY 58, ¶ 33, 302 P.2d 182, 192 (Wyo. 2013). [¶11] We hold there was insufficient evidence to support the stalking conviction and we reverse it. II. Was there sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Mr. Hawes did not voluntarily release his kidnapping victim and was thus not entitled to sentence mitigation? [¶12] Wyoming law provides that when a defendant shows that he voluntarily released the victim, substantially unharmed, in a safe place, prior to trial, then he is entitled to mitigation in sentencing.3 The burden of proof is on the defendant to establish these 3 With mitigation, the maximum penalty for kidnapping is not more than twenty years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(c) (LexisNexis 2013). Without mitigation, the penalty is not less than twenty years to life. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(d) (LexisNexis 2013). 4 mitigating factors. Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Wyo. 1989). We apply the standard of review stated supra, ¶ 8, for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim. [¶13] Mr. Hawes argues he “voluntarily released” his victim when he cut her hands free and then allowed her to cut her own feet free and again when he stopped chasing her when she reached the edge of her neighbor’s property. However, a reasonable jury could certainly have concluded that Mrs. Hawes cutting her own feet free and then running from the house and across the pasture with Mr. Hawes in pursuit did not constitute “voluntary release.” Because Mr. Hawes has not shown that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of no voluntary release, we do not address the remaining factors, and we affirm the jury’s finding that he was not entitled to a mitigated sentence for the kidnapping charge. III. Was the jury properly instructed on the lesser included charge of felonious restraint? [¶14] The trial court instructed the jury that the elements of felonious restraint, a lesser included offense to kidnapping, are as follows: The elements of the lesser included offense of Restraint are:

6. In circumstances exposing her to risk of serious bodily injury. [¶15] At the jury instruction conference, counsel for Mr. Hawes objected to the omission of the word “felonious” from the description of the offense of felonious restraint. We will therefore review this issue concerning the title of the crime under an abuse of discretion standard, affording significant deference to the trial court’s decisions. “A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the instructions in their entirety sufficiently cover the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found.” Gonzalez-Ochoa v. State, 2014 WY 14, ¶ 18, 317 P.3d 599, 605 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 90, 99 P.3d 928, 954 (Wyo. 2004)). [¶16] The trial court judge explained that he took out the word “felonious” and used only “restraint” in the instruction in order to avoid prejudice to the defendant. Mr. Hawes contends that the omission of the word “felonious” somehow misled the jury into believing that the lesser included offense was not a “serious crime.” Although we agree that a trial court does not have the discretion to change the words of the statute when it 5 drafts jury instructions, we find no abuse of discretion in this case because the jury did not reach the lesser included offense of felonious restraint; instead, it first considered and found Mr. Hawes guilty of the greater offense of kidnapping. When a greater and lesser offense are charged to the jury, the proper course is to tell the jury to consider first the greater offense, and to move on to consideration of the lesser offense only if they have some reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the greater offense. A jury that finds guilt as to the greater offense does not enter a verdict concerning guilt of the lesser offense. The reason for this absence of consideration is not any inconsistency between the offenses. It rather reflects the very ‘inclusion’ that defines the lesser offense as one ‘included’ in the greater. Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶ 9, 178 P.3d 396, 400-01 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted). [¶17] This was the course followed in this case, in which the jury was instructed: If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements [of kidnapping] has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty of Kiddnapping [sic]. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should consider the lesser included offense of Restraint and the lesser included offense of False Imprisonment. [¶18] The verdict form likewise instructed the jury to consider first, the charge of kidnapping; and then only if it found Mr. Hawes “Not Guilty” of kidnapping, to go on to consider the lesser included offenses. The jury did find Mr. Hawes guilty of kidnapping, and thus had no occasion to consider the lesser included offense of felonious restraint. Because the jury was correctly instructed on the relevant issues, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s omission of the word “felonious” in the felonious restraint instruction. [¶19] Mr. Hawes also argues that the felonious restraint instruction failed to instruct the jury that the State must prove the accused acted knowingly on each element of the offense. Because this issue was not raised below, we apply a plain error standard to our review. “The plain error standard requires a defendant to establish that a violation of an unequivocal rule of law occurred. The record must clearly reflect the error, and the violation must result in the abridgment of a substantial right of the [defendant] to his 6 material prejudice.” Brown v. State, 2014 WY 104, ¶ 19, 332 P.3d at 1772 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We afford the trial judge “latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover the issues.” Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶ 8, 64 P.3d 104, 106-07 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo. 1987)). Because we have concluded that the jury had no occasion to consider the lesser included felonious restraint instruction, we find that any error in the instruction did not result in material prejudice to Mr. Hawes, and we affirm the district court on the jury instruction issue.