Opinion ID: 1925998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Minimal Reliability of Tape-to-Tape Comparison

Text: As we recognized in Taylor II, [b]ecause of the persuasive power of [demonstrative] evidence, however, courts are obligated to make a thorough foundational inquiry into its reliability before admitting it, given the potential it may mislead, confuse, divert or otherwise prejudice the purposes of the trial if not reliable. 661 A.2d at 643. (internal quotation omitted). Such an inquiry is especially needed of a voice exemplar, which is relatively easy to feign because a defendant can alter the sound of his or her voice with relative ease. Id. In Taylor II, we adopted the following test to determine the admissibility of experimental evidence, of which comparison of a taped voice exemplar with a previous recording is a form: [T]he foundation for admissibility should be scrutinized closely to determine whether the conditions surrounding the experiment were substantially similar to those of the alleged occurrence. In applying the test of substantial similarity, the trial court should be guided by the following principles: Are the dissimilarities likely to distort the results of the experiment to the degree that the evidence is not relevant? Can the dissimilarities be adjusted for or explained so that their effect on the results of the experiment can be understood by the jury? In this connection the court must consider the purpose of the experiment and the degree to which the matter under experiment is a subject of precise science. Absolute certainty is not required if the experiment would be considered valid by persons skilled or knowledgeable in the field which the experiment concerns. Taylor II, 661 A.2d at 643-44 (quoting Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 628 (Alaska 1969)). On remand, the trial court applied this approach, finding that the proposed tape-to-tape comparison was not minimally reliable for submission to the jury for the following reasons: First, the circumstances surrounding the recording of the two tapes were totally different and as a result of those differences, two very distinctive sounding tapes have been produced. Second, the court credits the government expert's testimony that the tape produced at the time of the offense that any attempt to compare it with the known tape recorded voice of the defendant would be meaningless. Third, the dissimilarities between the two tapes cannot be adjusted or explained so that a comparison of the tapes will render a reliable result. The trial court's findings were firmly grounded in the testimony of the government's expert and the trial court's own review of the respective tapes, and, notably, Taylor does not challenge this finding on appeal. Because it would not have been proper to admit the tape-to-tape comparison into evidence, we are not bound by Taylor I, wherein we held that the exclusion of the [proffered] exemplar- if improper -would not have been harmless error under either Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), or Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). See 601 A.2d at 1066. Rather, in both Taylor I and Taylor II, we held that if the proposed comparisons were found not to be minimally reliable, Taylor's conviction would stand affirmed. See Taylor II, 661 A.2d at 648 (If ... the trial court finds that the tape-to-tape comparison would not be minimally reliable and therefore could not properly be admitted in evidence, [Taylor's] conviction will stand affirmed, subject to his right to appeal the trial court's ruling.); Taylor I, 601 A.2d at 1067 (If, after considering the appropriate factors, the judge ... adheres to his decision excluding the demonstration, appellant's conviction shall stand affirmed subject to the right to appeal the trial court's ruling.). Absent other error, then, we will affirm Taylor's conviction.