Opinion ID: 2446125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: johnson et al. v. kimbel et al.

Text: As related, Elpers' passengers were Mrs. Marie Elpers, his mother; Mrs. Catherine Johnson, his aunt; and Mrs. Anna Mary Herbold, his greataunt. All of them instituted actions against both Elpers and Kimbel for personal injuries. The verdict for Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Elpers each was $2,700 against Elpers and $300 against Kimbel. The verdict for Mrs. Herbold was $4,500 against Elpers and $500 against Kimbel. But, as stated in the foregoing opinion, judgments n. o. v. set aside the verdicts for Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Elpers and denied them recovery of Elpers on the ground that they had made judicial admissions. They appeal. Mrs. Elpers was riding on the front seat, and the other ladies were in the rear. They were on the way to a birthday party for Mrs. Elpers' mother, and as they approached the intersection of Texas Avenue, Mrs. Elpers and Mrs. Johnson were engaged in conversation, and, apparently, were paying no attention to the way the car was being driven. Mrs. Herbold, just before the accident, was looking out the car window trying to locate a friend's house on Goss Avenue. Mrs. Elpers had turned and handed Mrs. Johnson a paper, and as she again faced forward (when probably entering the intersection), she saw the Kimbel car turning in front of them and heard the screech of the brakes, and then came the crash. On direct examination Mrs. Elpers stated she had not noticed her son speeding or doing anything reckless in driving the car. On cross-examination she testified that he had been driving normally and slowly. She estimated his speed at 25 or 26 mph. She had seldom ridden with anyone but her son, and her judgment as to speed was based upon the way he usually drove. In answer to a leading question, if at the time she had seen her son do anything that contributed to the happening of the accident, so far as you could see?, she answered, No, sir. In the same way she stated she had not seen or noticed anything unusual about the way he was driving. Mrs. Herbold testified she had not noticed any recklessness or speeding by the driver that made her afraid. On further cross-examination she testified she had not been watching the driver, but she knew he was not going fast, and she did not know of anything he had done that she thought improper. She insisted she was not a good judge of speed, but she knew when somebody is going fast. Mrs. Johnson judged or believed her nephew had been driving 28 mph during the whole trip and said he had done nothing to make her afraid for her safety. During the course of her cross-examination she answered leading questions that he appeared to have his car under reasonable control and to be driving normally. Her qualification for judging speed was that she usually rode with her boss and watched his speedometer. She was looking ahead when she heard the brakes squealing. She saw some cars in front in the same lane going in the same direction, but she did not see the Kimbel car before or as it was turning. This and other courts have sometimes inaccurately called judicial admissions testimony of a party adverse to his claims when it would have been more accurate to designate the testimony as binding admissions against interest or favorable to the opposing party, although there may be formal admissions or positive testimony of a character that come within the term. Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021; Fannon v. Hensley, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 614; Schoenbaechler v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., Ky., 328 S.W.2d 514; Annotation, Binding effect of party's own unfavorable testimony, 169 A.L.R. 798. The Annotation reveals diversity of opinion as to whether a party having made adverse admissions may rely on other evidence more favorable to his cause or defense. In Sutherland v. Davis, supra, and City of Lexington v. Clarke, 290 Ky. 290, 160 S. W.2d 653, we held that if the circumstances and conditions give rise to the probability of error in the party's adverse admissions, he may not be bound by them as a matter of law; otherwise, they are binding upon him, and he cannot avert the consequences thereof. In Halbert v. Lange, 313 Ky. 648, 233 S.W.2d 278, a defendant had testified in a pretrial deposition to facts indicating his own negligence. The plaintiff introduced it on the trial. The defendant, on the trial, modified or qualified that testimony. We held the statements in the deposition not binding on the defendant, stating that they must be considered together with his testimony on the trial. Thompson v. Marcum, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 139, is to the same effect. In the City of Lexington case, supra, plaintiff's statement relied on as a judicial admission was purely a matter of estimation or guesswork on his part and the probability of error in his testimony is easily recognizable. We held plaintiff was entitled to rely on other testimony supporting his case. In the Sutherland case, supra, the plaintiff's admissions, held to have barred recovery, were clear and positive, and they stood alone. The admissions in Bell v. Harmon, Ky., 284 S.W.2d 812, were of like character in that the party was in a position to observe and did observe what he deliberately testified. In the more recent case of Zipperle v. Welsh, Ky., 352 S.W.2d 556, the plaintiffs were guests in one of the defendants' automobiles which collided with the other's car at a street intersection. The only issue presented was which driver ran a red light. The plaintiffs testified they had no specific complaint respecting their host's operation of the car which might have caused the accident. We affirmed a judgment n. o. v. for the defendant on the ground that plaintiffs had made judicial admission that he was not negligent. In Halbert v. Lange, supra, 313 Ky. 648, 233 S.W.2d 278, in the course of the opinion, discussing judicial admissions, we observed: It appears difficult to lay down an ironclad or entirely satisfactory rule. The true test seems to be whether the party's testimony is merely a narrative of events observed or participated in, wherein there is always present the obvious possibility that he, like any other witness, could be mistaken, or whether he was testifying to facts peculiarly within his own knowledge. See Harlow v. LeClair, 82 N.H. 506, 136 A. 128, 50 A.L.R. 973. This can be observed by taking into consideration all the conditions and circumstances proven in the case. And in Bell v. Harmon, Ky., 284 S.W.2d 812, we made this comment with reference to the inconclusive nature of judicial admissions: The rule should be applied with caution because of the variable nature of testimony and because of the everpresent possibility of honest mistake. A judicial admission of this kind should in essence contain the elements of waiver. See Alamo v. Del Rosario, 69 App.D.C. 47, 98 F.2d 328. It is in some respects similar to an election of causes of action. See Rowe v. Shepherd, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 188. Our decisions are in accord with Wigmore's rationale. The eminent author on evidence questions, for given reasons, the conclusive nature of a party's testimony as a judicial admission. IX, Wigmore on Evidence, § 2594a, p. 597. He says, p. 601: In the first place, the proposed rule is not a simple rule of thumb, but a flexible one, requiring especial judicial wisdom for its sound application. Therefore, while seeking justice, it might often do injustice. In the second place, it affords one more ground for an appeal on a question of law, and thus one more element of delay and technical disputation. In the third place, its purpose can usually be as well attained by a ruling upon the insufficiency of evidence for the jury (ante, § 2494). In the fourth place, and chiefly, it assimilates testimony on the stand to formal deliberate admissions. But testimony cannot be treated that way. Testimony in court is an elusive matter of mental operations. It is the culmination of much talk and reflection and memory-stirring between all concerned. It is full of surprises at the trial. The truth of the case depends on a comparison of what all the witnesses say and all the circumstances indicate. A rule which binds a party to a particular statement uttered on the stand becomes an artificial rule. It is out of place in dealing with testimony. Let the judge test each case by itself. We look to the application of the law to the case at bar. The testimony of these elderly ladies throughout their several vigorous cross-examinations reveals a natural purpose not to blame their son and nephew. Yet, it is to be noted that in the main they expressed only broad legal conclusions that he was operating his car properly, and opinions as to speed without having proper qualifications to judge the rate. The testimony, as that in City of Lexington v. Clarke, supra, 290 Ky. 290, 160 S.W.2d 653, was purely a matter of estimation or guesswork. In Head v. Russell, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 557, a case much like the present, similar testimony of two lady guests in an automobile involved in an intersection collision was likewise regarded as not constituting judicial admissions of no negligence on the part of their host, whom they were suing. We so held since they do not establish unequivocally that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of another as was required in Bell v. Harmon, Ky., 284 S.W.2d 812. See also 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 381d. The facts and circumstances revealed by these witnesses as well as by others were sufficient to raise a question for the jury. In the instant case, we think the admissions were of a character that entitled the plaintiffs to the benefit of other and more definite testimony concerning the excessive speed of the driver of the car, Elpers, and the reasonable inference, among other things, that he did not have it under control under the circumstances. The trial court was in error in holding these were fatal judicial admissions. Moreover, as we have observed, there was another prime factor which could well be deemed negligence on the driver's part, namely, his failure to avoid the collision by going around Kimbel's car. If it was moving, he might have gone behind it. If it had stopped, he could have gone either in front or behind it. The plaintiffs did not undertake to testify concerning that factor. We are of opinion that the judgment n. o. v. in favor of the defendant was error. The judgment is accordingly reversed with directions to enter another according to the verdicts. The judgment in Elpers v. Kimbel is affirmed. The judgment in Johnson v. Kimbel is reversed.