Opinion ID: 176377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dorsett.

Text: Dorsett also filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that the district court's aiding and abetting jury charge was improper because it did not contain an adequate specific intent instruction. Dorsett now argues that the district court erred in denying that motion. [7] Title 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) provides: Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. To convict a person of aiding and abetting, the government must prove [beyond a reasonable doubt]: (1) that the substantive crime has been committed; and (2) that the defendant charged with aiding and abetting knew of the commission of the substantive offense and acted with intent to facilitate it. United States v. Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir.2008). To establish liability for a crime based on an aiding and abetting theory, the government must prove that the underlying crime occurred and that the defendant knew of the crime and attempted to facilitate it. Gordon, 290 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The government must also prove that the defendant had the specific intent of facilitating the crime ... mere knowledge of the underlying offense is not sufficient for conviction. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Specific intent requires not simply the general intent to accomplish an act with no particular end in mind, but the additional deliberate and conscious purpose of accomplishing a specific and prohibited result. Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir.2008). At the charging conference, Dorsett asked the court to instruct the jury that: An aider and abettor must have some interest in the criminal venture, and the prosecution must prove the defendant's intentional involvement in the crime with the specific intent of making the crime succeed, and his participation in the commission of every element of the offense as defined in these instructions. Rather than give that instruction, the court gave the following intent instruction: Evidence that a defendant was merely present during the commission of the offense is not enough for you to find a defendant guilty as an aider and abettor. In addition, ... if the evidence shows that the defendant knew that the offense was being committed, or was about to be committed, but does not also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant's intent and purpose to aid or otherwise associate himself with the offense, you may not find the defendant guilty of the offense as an aider and abettor. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in some way participated in the offense as something the defendant wished to bring about and make succeed. Dorsett appears to be arguing that because we said in Gordon that [t]he government must ... prove that the defendant had the specific intent of facilitating the crime, 290 F.3d at 547, the aiding and abetting instruction must contain the words specific intent. His argument fails for two reasons. First, the district court used the Third Circuit's Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 7.02 for aiding and abetting. The district court's instruction on intent is taken verbatim from those model instructions. We have a hard time concluding that the use of our own model jury instruction can constitute error, and nothing that Dorsett says removes our doubt that use of such an instruction can constitute error. Moreover, Dorsett does not even contend that the model instruction is wrong. Second, we believe that the phrases the defendant's intent and purpose to aid or otherwise associate himself with the offense and that the defendant in some way participated in the offense as something the defendant wished to bring about and make succeed sufficiently informed the jury that it had to find that Dorsett had the specific intent to aid and abet the crime charged in the indictment. Accordingly, we will also affirm Dorsett's judgment of conviction.