Opinion ID: 2506499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application ii would be enforceable as a matter of law.

Text: As noted, we held that Application I would not be enforceable as a matter of law because, contrary to the language of the proposed initiative, the City could not under state law simply stop operating as an electrical utility 120 days after the initiative passed. [12] We concluded that it would be inappropriate to read into the proposal an implied condition that the proposal would only be effective upon the RCA's approval of the City's cessation of service. [13] Such an implication would be uncalled for, we concluded, because the proposal's language did not suggest it, the likelihood of RCA approval was uncertain, the process of undertaking to obtain RCA approval would be time consuming and expensive, and the proposal would likely mislead voters, who would not be aware of the judicially implied condition. [14] In Application II, the condition of RCA approval is express. It therefore does not suffer from the same deficiency as Application I. But the City contends that because the RCA may never approve discontinuance of service by the City, the proposal is merely aspirational and would not be enforceable as a matter of law. In support of this point the City cites footnote 21 of Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, where we observed that [b]ecause the language of AS 29.26.110(a)(4) requires the rejection of initiative petitions that would be unenforceable as a matter of law, we also believe that a clerk must reject an initiative that proposes an ordinance which is merely aspirational or which otherwise lacks the attributes of an enforceable law. For example, the proposal must be comprehensible and concrete enough to be capable of enforcement.[ [15] ] Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine [16] answers the question of whether Application II is sufficiently concrete as to be capable of enforcement. The initiative proposal there, in part, required the governor to use his best efforts to seek the repeal of the federal Jones Act  which requires shipments between domestic ports to be made on United States ships. [17] The governor was also required to report annually on progress toward that end and on the harmful effects of the Jones Act on Alaska commerce. [18] The initiative's opponents argued that the part of the proposal addressing the Jones Act, even if passed, would not be a law, but merely an aspirational resolution. [19] The premise of this argument was that the constitutional power of initiative is limited to the proposal and enactment of laws. [20] We held in Yute Air that because the proposal mandated action by the governor, it was a law rather than merely an aspirational resolution. [21] Like the proposal in Yute Air, Application II mandates action. It requires the City to take all necessary steps including obtaining regulatory approval to discontinue electric utility service. While the steps mandated by the proposal might ultimately not succeed, the requirement that they be taken is as binding on the City as the best efforts requirement in Yute Air. We conclude therefore that Application II satisfies the enforceable as a matter of law requirement.