Opinion ID: 1810081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Apportionment of Industrial Disability Among Separate and Distinct Causes.

Text: In Nelson we determined that [w]hen there are two successive work-related injuries, the employer liable for the second injury `is generally held liable for the entire disability resulting from the combination of the prior disability and the present injury.' Nelson, 544 N.W.2d at 265 (quoting Celotex Corp., 541 N.W.2d at 254). In Nelson the claimant incurred a work-related injury in 1963, which resulted in a compensable impairment of a scheduled member (leg). In 1988 he suffered a shoulder injury at work that produced additional permanent industrial disability. This court held that in determining his disability his present employer was liable for the full amount of the permanent disability produced by work-related injuries. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d at 265. IBP urges that the applicability of the rule espoused in Nelson only extends to situations where the successive compensable injuries are with the same employer. We disagree. We find no basis for distinguishing between work-related disabilities with the same employer and work-related disabilities with different employers in the application of the full-responsibility rule. No such distinction was made in Nelson in which we stated: [T]he employer liable for the current injury is also liable for any preexisting industrial disability caused by a work-related injury when that disability combines with industrial disability caused by a later injury. Id. (emphasis added). In Celotex we reviewed the provisions of Iowa Code section 85.36(10)(c) (later recodified as section 85.36(9)(c)). That statute provides: In computing the compensation to be paid to any employee who, before the accident for which the employee claims compensation, was disabled and drawing compensation under the provisions of this chapter, the compensation for each subsequent injury shall be apportioned according to the proportion of disability caused by the respective injuries which the employee shall have suffered. In determining the consequences of this statute on the apportionment of disabilities, Celotex interpreted the requirement of drawing compensation before the accident as meaning drawing compensation at the time the second injury was sustained. Id. at 256. Based on that interpretation, we concluded that the legislature had only provided for apportionment in a limited situation not applicable in that case. The present case is similarly outside the application of this statute as interpreted in Celotex. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. AFFIRMED.