Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: post-conviction relief as civil or criminal action

Text: This Court recognizes the unique nature of the post-conviction remedy. Montana law does not label the proceeding as either civil or criminal, although the chapter providing post-conviction relief is in the criminal procedure title. Title 46, Chapter 21, Montana Code Annotated. The Montana provisions of section 46-21-101 et seq., MCA, are derived from the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act and are essentially similar to the federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 2255). The federal courts have consistently held that an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is a civil action, independent of the original criminal conviction. See Heflin v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407. The same rule has been adopted in other states which have adopted the uniform act. Clark v. State (1969), 92 Idaho 827, 452 P.2d 54. In those states with similar provisions not necessarily deriving from the uniform act, the courts have been consistent in their view that post-conviction relief is civil in nature and independent of the criminal action. State v. Hannagan (Alaska 1977), 559 P.2d 1059; Noble v. State (1973), 109 Ariz. 537, 514 P.2d 458; State v. Richardson (1965), 194 Kan. 471, 399 P.2d 799; Smith v. State (1968), 79 N.M. 450, 444 P.2d 961; Noble v. Sigler (8th Cir.1965), 351 F.2d 673, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 853, 87 S.Ct. 98, 17 L.Ed.2d 81, (held only that post-conviction applications are civil in nature); People v. Jones (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 706, 332 N.E.2d 411; State v. Smith (Mo. 1959), 324 S.W.2d 707; Tolar v. State (Fla.App. 1967), 196 So.2d 1. Clearly, this is not intended to be another form of appeal from a criminal case, but a separate civil action aimed at vacating, setting aside or correcting a sentence. There is no Montana case interpreting the nature of the post-proceeding petition, but the proceeding could be closely analogized to that seeking a writ of habeas corpus which this Court decided in 1927 was an independent civil proceeding. August v. Burns (1927), 79 Mont. 198, 213, 255 P. 737, 741. It is important to note that we do not here intend to erode the fundamental principle discussed below that the sentencing court is the proper court for the post-conviction petition. We are mindful that a party to a civil action is entitled to two substitutions of presiding judges. Section 3-1-801, subd. 4, MCA (adopted by order of this Court on December 29, 1976, 34 St.Rep. 26). However, because an applicant for post-conviction relief is directed by the more specific provisions of the post-conviction statute to bring the petition in this Court or in the court that sentenced him, we find that the two judge disqualification grant of section 3-1-801, subd. 4, MCA, is unavailable to the post-conviction petitioner. In Montana, when a general statute is in conflict with a specific act, the specific statute will take precedence. Section 1-2-102, MCA; In re Coleman's Estate (1957), 132 Mont. 339, 317 P.2d 880. We hold that the Montana post-conviction relief procedure is civil in nature and independent of the underlying criminal cause. We will proceed to consider the issues raised on the appeal to this Court. Coleman contends that it was error to deny various of his requests without an evidentiary hearing. It is not error to deny an application for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing if the allegations are without merit or would otherwise not entitle the petitioner to relief. Clark v. State, supra; Tramel v. State (1968), 92 Idaho 643, 448 P.2d 649; Donnelly v. State (Alaska 1973), 516 P.2d 396 (allegations in post-conviction petition were too vague and illusory to warrant evidentiary hearing); Widermyre v. State (Alaska 1969), 452 P.2d 885; People v. Lyons (1978), 196 Colo. 384, 585 P.2d 916; Cook v. State (1976), 220 Kan. 223, 552 P.2d 985. The decision to admit or deny an application for post-conviction relief is a discretionary one and one that will not be disturbed by this Court absent a clear abuse of discretion. Section 46-21-201, MCA; State v. Ybarra (1974), 22 Ariz. App. 330, 527 P.2d 107; Brudos v. Cupp (1977), 31 Or. App. 25, 569 P.2d 680; Sullivan v. State (1977), 222 Kan. 222, 564 P.2d 455.