Opinion ID: 546225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 158 Appellants Nicholas Virgilio and Joseph Ciancaglini maintain that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions under various counts. 62 We find that there was substantial evidence with respect to each charge challenged by appellants and will affirm. 159 The standard governing our review of these claims is firmly established. Our inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, there was substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have based its verdict. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); United States v. Leon, 739 F.2d 885, 890 (3d Cir.1984). The evidence need not unequivocally point to the defendant's guilt as long as it permits the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1831, 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990). We will consider the appellants' contentions in turn.
160 The indictment charged Nicholas Virgilio, a/k/a/ Nick the Blade, in both RICO counts, the substantive RICO offense under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c), Count 2, and the RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d), Count 1. The jury's answers to special interrogatories indicated that it had based its verdict of guilt as to both RICO counts on Virgilio's participation in the murder of Judge Helfant, racketeering act 1, and on the extortions of John Hartung, racketeering act 24, and Jerome Slobotkin, racketeering act 25. Virgilio does not deny that there was sufficient evidence to prove his involvement in Helfant's murder. 63 Brief for Virgilio at 7. Nor does he contest that the two extortions were committed by members of the enterprise. However, he asserts that there was no evidence linking him to the extortions and, as a RICO pattern of racketeering must consist of at least two related predicates, he urges us to reverse his RICO convictions under both counts. 64 161 Virgilio's defense is not one calculated to elicit much sympathy, as it amounts to an assertion that he may be a murderer but is not an extortionist. But the real infirmity of his argument is that it relies exclusively on the absence of direct evidence linking him to the particular shakedowns of Hartung and Slobotkin and completely discounts the significance of circumstantial evidence which would support a reasonable inference of guilt. The testimony of several witnesses unequivocally demonstrated that the extortions of John Hartung and Jerome Slobotkin occurred over prolonged periods of time as part of the LCN's massive shakedown operation of minor criminals unconnected to the enterprise. Tr. 10/28/89 at 26, 45-46; 11/4/88 at 161-64, 207-10. 162 The primary evidence connecting Virgilio to the shakedowns was DelGiorno's testimony that Virgilio received a share of the shakedown proceeds: 163 Q: After Salvatore Merlino and Larry Merlino were taken down in early 1986, did the division of the shake or elbow change? A: Yes 164 Q: How did it change?A: It was split between Scarfo, Leonetti, Faffy, me, Ciancaglini still got his end. He gave Joe Grande 400 a month. He gave the blade [Virgilio] 200 a month, gave Nicky Whip 200 a month, and he gave Salvatore Scafidi 200 a month. 165 Q: When you say He, who are you talking about giving those people that money per month? 166 A: Scarfo. 167 Q: What part of the shake money did that division that you just talked about come out of? 168 A: That came out of the stuff that they got every week. 169 Q: And what about the people who were still doing the shakedowns, what percentage of the money did they get? 170 A: Half. 171 Q: Do you know the what was the reason that the people who you mentioned, Nicholas Virgilio, Salvatore Scafidi, Joe Grande, got the money from the shakes per month? 172 A: Well, they were in Philip's regime and they did things for Scarfo, errands, I guess, or jobs, whatever you want to call them. 173 Tr. 10/12/88 at 67-68 (emphasis supplied). 174 From this, the jury reasonably could infer that Virgilio regularly accepted a portion of the shakedown money, including that extorted from Hartung and Slobotkin, in return for various services rendered for Scarfo. Virgilio argues, however, that it would be speculative to infer that he had knowledge of the source of his income or that the jobs or errands mentioned by DelGiorno related to the shakedowns. We disagree. 175 Under these circumstances, Virgilio's receipt of the shakedown proceeds was sufficient to establish his agreement to the shakedown operation, and we will affirm his RICO conspiracy conviction on that basis. This court repeatedly has held that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d) does not require the defendant's agreement to commit personally two acts of racketeering. United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 395-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 78, 107 L.Ed.2d 44 (1989); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971, 106 S.Ct. 336, 88 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985). The government need only prove that the defendant agreed to conduct the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity to be accomplished through the acts of co-conspirators. Adams, 759 F.2d at 1116. 176 As the district court observed, in view of the immense scale of the shakedown operation, the scheme could not have escaped Virgilio's notice. 711 F.Supp. at 1337. Virgilio protests that there was no direct evidence that he knew of the shakedowns, much less the particular shakedowns of John Hartung and Jerome Slobotkin. 65 He urges us to analogize this case to United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir.1987), where the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which follows the Adams rule, reversed a RICO conspiracy conviction because the defendant, although guilty of one predicate offense, had no knowledge of the other two offenses with which he was charged. However, the circumstances of Kragness were quite different than those here. The Kragness defendant was the Houston distributor of cocaine and quaaludes imported by a widescale drug enterprise with operations spanning several states. Id. at 851. Given the nature of the enterprise, the defendant's claim that he had no knowledge of two marijuana import schemes was credible. 177 In this case, the shakedowns were committed in the Philadelphia area by co-conspirators with whom Virgilio was closely associated and Virgilio directly profited from them. These facts provide strong circumstantial evidence that Virgilio agreed to the shakedown operation. The possibility that Virgilio may not have known of the particular extortions of Hartung and Slobotkin does not require a reversal of his conviction, as that could easily be attributed to the fact that hundreds of individuals paid street taxes to the enterprise over a period of years. 711 F.Supp. at 1337. It would be curious indeed if Virgilio's apparent indifference as to the identities of the enterprise's extortion victims required a reversal of his RICO conspiracy conviction. 178 The validity of Virgilio's substantive RICO conviction requires more discussion. The district court acknowledged that DelGiorno's testimony may not have been sufficient to prove Virgilio's personal participation in the shakedowns, but considered that under a Pennsylvania statute consolidating theft offenses, 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 3902 (Purdon 1983), Virgilio was guilty of receipt of stolen property even if the evidence did not establish extortion. 711 F.Supp. at 1337-38. Accordingly, the court concluded that, under Pennsylvania law, Virgilio [was] as guilty of an act involving extortion in receipt of the extorted monies as the individuals who personally committed the extortionate acts. Id. at 1338. 179 Although we do not accept the district court's reasoning, we reach the same result. We depart from the district court insofar as it held that proof of Virgilio's knowing receipt of the extorted monies was sufficient to establish his personal commission of an act involving extortion for purposes of the RICO statute. 66 Section 1961(1) includes within the definition of racketeering activity any act or threat involving ... extortion ... which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The government correctly points out that its proof of extortion need not satisfy all of the peculiarities of the state law, as the state offenses enumerated in section 1961(1) are merely definitional. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d at 361-62; United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (3d Cir.1977). But it still must establish extortion, generically defined. 180 The gravamen of an extortion offense under the Pennsylvania statute cited in the indictment is an express or implied threat that some harm will befall the victim should he fail to comply with the extortionist's demands. 67 Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 502 Pa. 359, 370-71, 466 A.2d 991, 997 (1983). Those elements are lacking in a theft through receipt of stolen property which, under Pennsylvania law, is established through proof that the defendant intentionally receiv[ed], retain[ed], or dispos[ed] of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen.... 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 3925. In view of the different natures of the two offenses, we conclude that the RICO statute does not authorize the substitution of theft through receipt of stolen property for an act involving extortion. 181 Nevertheless, we find adequate support for the government's theory that Virgilio aided and abetted the shakedown operation and will sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c) on that basis. 68 Brief for the United States at 92. Virgilio argues that his conviction may not be sustained under an aiding and abetting theory because the indictment did not mention that offense. We disagree. Federal courts have long recognized that a defendant indicted as a principal may be convicted upon proof that he aided and abetted the charged offense. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-20, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769-70, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949); United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 94-97 (3d Cir.1973) (en banc). Moreover, the district court expressly instructed the jury as to the elements of an aiding and abetting offense. Tr. 11/17/88 at 34-36, 62, 91-92. There is no question that the jury was entitled to consider aiding and abetting as a possible basis of guilt. 182 To prove aiding and abetting, the evidence must show that the defendant in some way associated himself with the criminal venture as something he wished to bring about and that he sought by his actions to make it succeed. United States v. American Investors of Pittsburgh, Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 1103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 368, 107 L.Ed.2d 354 (1989). As discussed above, Virgilio directly profited from the shakedown operation with full knowledge of how his income was generated. In the circumstances of this case Virgilio's knowing receipt of the extorted monies is sufficient to show that he associated himself with the criminal venture as something he wished to bring about. 183 The requisite conduct element is supplied by DelGiorno's testimony that Virgilio was paid for his performance of errands for Scarfo as part of Philip Leonetti's crew and by evidence that on September 12, 1985, he attended a meeting with Leonetti, Scarfo, and DelGiorno at which they discussed the implications of the FBI's recent confiscation of shakedown proceeds from Salvatore Scafidi's house. Tr. 10/11/88 at 107, 123. Even if it would be speculative to infer that Virgilio's errands for Scarfo required his personal participation in the acts of extortion performed by the shakedown crews, 69 the jury was entitled to infer that the errands related in some fashion to the shakedowns, especially considering his close association with Leonetti, who supervised a shakedown crew. This evidence, considered in tandem with his attendance of a meeting convened to address the threat to the shakedowns posed by the FBI, supplies substantial support for an inference that Virgilio acted in furtherance of the shakedown operation. Cf. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 838 (evidence that defendant knowingly received extortion proceeds, coupled with his admission that if he ever did 'a favor for [the crime family in control of the extortion] [he] would get something'  was sufficient to prove his guilt of an extortion conspiracy). 184 Reading the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we will sustain Virgilio's convictions under both RICO counts. With respect to the substantive RICO count, we emphasize that our decision does not rest solely upon Virgilio's knowing receipt of the extortion proceeds or upon his close association with the principals in the shakedown extortions. The evidence supports a reasonable inference that Virgilio personally furthered the shakedown operation by performing acts entitling him to remuneration from the shakedown proceeds and by discussing with his co-conspirators the FBI's intrusion into the operation. Accordingly, the jury reasonably found that Virgilio committed the requisite extortionate predicates by aiding and abetting the acts of his co-conspirators.
185 Joseph Ciancaglini was convicted under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 of distributing or aiding and abetting the distribution of methamphetamine, a controlled substance. 70 He argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove a completed delivery of methamphetamine or that he aided any such distribution. He also asserts that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we should not consider DelGiorno's testimony concerning the nature of the substance because it consisted entirely of inadmissible hearsay. Brief for Ciancaglini at 36. Based on our review of the record, we find no substance to these contentions. 186 Ciancaglini's guilt as to the distribution offense was established through the testimony of Thomas DelGiorno. Tr. 10/12/88 at 29-32. DelGiorno stated that in May of 1983, Ciancaglini, then a captain in the enterprise, authorized him to arrange a methamphetamine deal between two drug dealers, John Santilli and Vinnie Perry. Ciancaglini and DelGiorno, with underboss Salvatore Merlino's approval, agreed that certain members of the enterprise would receive $3000 for every pound of methamphetamine Santilli sold to Perry. Although DelGiorno never actually saw the drugs, 71 he stated that he received $150,000 from a series of transactions involving fifty pounds of methamphetamine. Pursuant to the co-conspirators' agreement, DelGiorno turned half of the profits over to Ciancaglini, who provided Scarfo and Merlino with their shares: 187 Q: What did you actually do with the $150,000? 188 A: I gave him $75,000. 189 Q: Who did you give the $75,000 to? 190 A: Ciancaglini. 191 Q: And what was your understanding of what he was supposed to do with the $75? 192 A: Half of it he had to give to Chuckie [Salvatore Merlino] and Scarfo. 193 Q: Do you know if he did do that? 194 A: Yes. 195 Q: How do you know that? 196 A: He told me and Chuckie told me he got the money. 197 Tr. 10/12/88 at 32-33. 198 Section 841(a)(1) makes it a crime knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense ... a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1). 72 Courts have broadly construed the term, distribute, as encompassing any acts perpetrated in furtherance of a transfer or sale, such as arranging or supervising the delivery, or negotiating for or receiving the purchase price. United States v. Brunty, 701 F.2d 1375, 1381 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983). See also United States v. Baresh, 790 F.2d 392, 399 (5th Cir.1986) (aiding and abetting charge under section 841 did not require proof that defendant had actual or constructive possession of marijuana or that he was physically present when the drugs were distributed); United States v. Winston, 687 F.2d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1982). Thus, assuming that Santilli and Perry engaged in a methamphetamine deal, DelGiorno's testimony that Ciancaglini authorized him to arrange the deal would be sufficient to prove that he participated in a distribution of that substance. 199 Although DelGiorno had no personal knowledge about what actually transpired between Santilli and Perry, a reasonable jury could infer from DelGiorno's receipt of the $150,000 that the methamphetamine deal was consummated. Furthermore, contrary to Ciancaglini's assertions, the government's proof that the substance sold was methamphetamine did not rest solely on the hearsay declarations of Santilli and Perry, as the manner in which the deal was arranged and the large sums of money involved provide strong circumstantial evidence that the transaction concerned an illicit substance. United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir.1985) (A high price for the substance purchased and the covert nature of the transaction ... may provide support that the substance was a drug); United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1456 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189, 105 S.Ct. 957, 83 L.Ed.2d 964 (1985). As the parties contemplated a methamphetamine deal, the jury certainly was justified in concluding that the substance in fact was methamphetamine. 200 In short, we have no difficulty concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support Ciancaglini's conviction under section 841(a)(1).