Opinion ID: 1461836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eliciting Evidence of A Witness' Fear of Testifying on Re-Direct Examination

Text: Appellants also argue that the trial court erred when it failed to grant their request for a mistrial after Kandie Gravette tearfully testified that she feared for her life because of her involvement as a witness against the appellants. In response, the government argues that the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for a mistrial because the evidence was properly admitted to explain Gravette's reluctance to testify at trial, as well as to explain the inconsistencies between her grand jury testimony and her trial testimony. The decision to order a mistrial is subject to the broad discretion of the trial court and our standard of review is deferential. Wright v. United States, 637 A.2d 95, 100 (D.C.1994). This court is only inclined to reverse in extreme situations threatening a miscarriage of justice. Id. (citing Goins v. United States, 617 A.2d 956, 958 (D.C.1992)). We review a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1182 (D.C.1999). The trial judge may exclude relevant and otherwise admissible evidence `if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.' Id. at 1184 (citation omitted). We review the trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.' Id. at 1185 (citation omitted). Gravette was called as a witness by the government to testify about her personal observations of the appellants' involvement in the distribution of drugs. As a followup to her testimony that she had seen crack cocaine in the kitchen area of an apartment that the government alleged was used as the headquarters for the drug operation run by appellants, she was asked to identify the persons she had seen in the apartment handling the drugs. At that point, and contrary to her grand jury testimony, Gravette testified that she did not see appellants in the apartment with the drugs. The actual exchange was as follows: Q. Did you see, Ms. Gravette, anybody involved with anything you saw in the apartment? A: I didn't actually see them with the drugs. Q: What did you see? A: What did I see? Q: When you say you didn't see them actually with the drugs. A: With, no. Not in their hand or anything like that. Q: Where did you see it? A: Where did I see the drugs? Q: Uh-huh. A: Where I seen it, it was just sitting out. I didn't see nobody with it at the time.     Q: Ms. Gravette, do you recall testifying in the grand jury? A: Yeah. At this point, the prosecutor read to her that portion of her grand jury testimony where she testified that she saw appellants cooking and packaging drugs in the apartment. After she acknowledged that she had testified before the grand jury that she had witnessed those events in the apartment, the prosecutor continued to question Ms. Gravette about what she saw in the apartment: Q: Now, Ms. Gravette, in light of your telling us that you did make the statement that you just told us about and I just read to you, I ask you again, what did you see in the apartment.     A: Nothing. But a half empty apartment, almost empty, no furniture, a couple of times I did see drugs. Q: Are you saying you never saw the things you testified about in the grand jury? A: That is what I testified about in the grand jury. Q: Did you see those things? A: Yes. Gravette, however, continued to waffle during the prosecutor's direct examination and later testified that she did not see appellants inside the apartment handling the drugs, but she testified that she saw both men outside of the apartment. On cross-examination, Gordon's counsel suggested through his questioning that the government influenced Gravette's grand jury testimony by implying that she should cooperate because they knew of her visits to the 11th Street apartment and that they then threatened her with perjury if she tried to recant her testimony at trial: Q: Okay. Now, you talked about seeing, when the prosecutor asked you a question, you said you saw some drugs cooked in there. Is that what you said? A: Yeah. Q: That is not true; is it? A: No. Q: Why did you say it? A: Because I didn't mean it like I said it. Q: Now, before you went into the grand jury, Ms. Gravette, . . . you met with various police officers; is that right? A: Yes. Q: And was one of them [Detective Hewick?] A: Yeah. Q: And did he come and get you at your house where you were staying and bring you down? A: Yes.     Q: Well, he told you, in effect, that he knew that you went to [the 11th Street apartment] occasionally; right?     A: [Y]es.     Q: And your grand jury testimony about seeing drugs being cooked up in that apartment was not accurate; right? Not accurate? A: No.     Q: Let me ask you this: Were there any persons connected with the government, Mr. McDaniel, Detective Hewick, any police officers connected with the government that led you into saying certain things? A: No. Q: Is there anybody who made known to you that they wanted you to say certain things? A: Not in my grand jury testimony.     Q: But haven't they told you if you don't testify in accordance with the grand jury testimony, you are going to get locked up? A: Yes. On redirect examination the prosecutor sought to establish that Gravette's reluctance to testify in a manner consistent with her grand jury testimony was not the result of any threats by the government. The following exchange between the prosecutor and Gravette is at the heart of this controversy: Q: And the reason [you do not want to be here] is because you are afraid; isn't that right? A: Yes. Q: In fact, the reason that you are here is because Trevor and myself came and got you; isn't that right? A: Yes. Q: You would like if you had never been a part of this; is that right? A: Yes. Q: You don't really want to say what you saw in front of these people; do you? A: Lord of mercy. What do you think, Oliver? Q: Kandie, I know the answer to that. (stricken) A: But I'm still here though; ain't I? Q: But there are people here who don't understand what the situation is? (stricken) Q: I am only trying to ask you a question so the Court and jury can understand your testimony. Now I am asking you, why is it that you don't want to say the things that you saw? A: Let's trade places then, then you will know why. What I have been crying about all week? So stupid. You know why. I live right down the street from these people. I am scared for my life. A: You keep pushing me to do something. I don't even have a lawyer. I ain't protecting nobody. I never was. You all just want help, trying to get you some good. I ain't doing myself no good here.     Q: Now the things I asked you about in your grand jury testimony, Ms. Gravette, at the time that you testified in the grand jury, you were less afraid than you are now? A: Yeah, I was afraid then. Yes. A: You see what it took for you to get me down here them times.     A: You know I didn't want to come. Q: But did you feel as afraid as you do now? A: No. (Witness crying) It was at this point that counsel for each of the appellants requested a mistrial. The government opposed the mistrial arguing that the appellants had opened the door for the line of questioning they were now objecting to because of their allegations of government misconduct. In addition, the government argued that Gravette's testimony regarding her fear of appellants was also properly admitted because the prosecutor had a well-reasoned suspicion that Gravette had been threatened by one of the appellants. The trial court's stated reason for denying appellants' motion for a mistrial was that Gordon had opened the door for the prosecutor to elicit this testimony by alleging that the witness had been intimidated into giving false testimony by the government. While appellants take issue with the trial court's finding that they opened the door for the government to elicit this testimony, we understand the crux of their argument to be that the trial court erred in denying their request for a mistrial by failing to appropriately weigh the prejudicial impact of Gravette's testimony on the appellants' right to a fair trial. While appellants do not necessarily concede that the trial court was correct in ruling that it was appropriate for the government to elicit testimony regarding the reasons for Gravette's general fear of testifying, they contend that it was nevertheless an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to go forward once the witness had indicated that she was reluctant to testify because she was afraid for her life. Generally, evidence showing the bias or motivation of a witness may be relevant in assessing a witness' credibility. Mercer, supra, 724 A.2d at 1184. However, it is the responsibility of the trial judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. We have defined unfair prejudice to mean an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. Id. (citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while it may be proper to admit evidence to explain the specific behavior of a witness, such as inconsistent statements, delay in testifying, or unusual courtroom demeanor, evidence concerning a witness' fear tends to be extremely prejudicial because it appeals to the passions of the jury and may cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the rule of law. Id. at 1184. See also McClellan v. United States, 706 A.2d 542, 551 (D.C.1997). Given this legal framework, we now turn to the facts of this case. Although appellants do not appear to be seriously challenging the trial court's decision to allow the government to delve into the reasons why Gravette was a reluctant witness, we will nonetheless briefly address this issue. It is clear from the record that counsel for Gordon was attempting to discredit Gravette's grand jury testimony by suggesting that the police had coerced her into testifying in an untruthful manner to protect herself from prosecution. The record also indicates that counsel for Gordon was attempting to bolster the credibility of Gravette's trial testimony by insinuating that Gravette was testifying reluctantly because she wanted to tell the truth but was being constrained by the threatened perjury prosecution if she recanted her earlier false grand jury testimony. Given Gordon's cross-examination of Gravette, the government was certainly entitled to further explore the allegations of misconduct raised by the defense and explore with the witness the reasons for her reluctance to testify at trial in a manner consistent with her prior grand jury testimony. Mercer, supra, 724 A.2d at 1184. Thus, under the circumstances presented in this case, the court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to initially pursue this line of questioning because Gordon opened the door by suggesting that the government had suborned perjury. As we noted in Mercer, however, the fact that the trial court in its discretion determines that the defense has opened the door for the admission of certain testimony does not end the trial court's obligation to weigh the evidence and determine whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Id. at 1192. There we stated that: [T]he doctrine of curative admissibility is one dangerously prone to overuse[] and [t]his business about `opening the door' is a much overused issue and it carries with it an oversimplification. Opening the door is one thing. But what comes through it is another. Everything cannot come through the door. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the question before this court is whether Gravette's testimony regarding her fear of the appellants was substantially more prejudicial than probative, and whether, looking at the totality of the circumstances, the introduction of the fear evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice, warranting a mistrial. In this regard, we note that in Mercer we warned trial courts to be cautious with respect to their decisions to admit highly charged evidence of witness fear and intimidation because evidence of threats solely going to the general credibility or bias of the witness ... [is] an abuse of discretion as such evidence ha[s] the potential for great prejudice against the defendant. Mercer, supra, 724 A.2d at 1184 (citation omitted). In this case, the prosecution had every right to attempt to establish that Gravette's reluctance to testify at trial was not due to her fear of a possible perjury prosecution, even if, in so doing, the government elicited evidence of her general fear of testifying in open court as a witness in a criminal case. See id. at 1193. When the prosecutor began his redirect examination of Gravette, he immediately began to clarify whether the substance of her grand jury testimony was coerced by threats of throwing her in jail or whether she was simply informed of the penalty of perjury. According to the transcript of her testimony, Gravette stated, I don't want to be in here before the prosecutor even began his redirect examination focusing on her fear of testifying. Thereafter, the prosecutor's first three questions to Gravette established that 1) she was afraid, 2) the only reason she was testifying was because the prosecutor came to get her, and 3) she never wanted to participate in the proceedings. At that point, the prosecutor had solicited the reasons for Gravette's reluctance to testify and her possible motive for not testifying in a manner consistent with her grand jury statement. Once the prosecution had elicited this testimony, it should have ended its re-direct examination. Id. at 1186. By encouraging Gravette to tell the jurors why she did not want to testify in front of these people, referring to Gordon and Williams, the questioning by the prosecutor was no longer narrowly tailored to respond to the specific allegation of government intimidation made by Gordon. In Mercer, we explained that the doctrine of curative admissibility is to prevent prejudice and is not to be subverted into a rule for injection of prejudice. Id. at 1192. Thus, the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence under the shield of this doctrine is permitted only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence. Id. (citation omitted). Here, instead of attempting to elicit testimony from Gravette designed to rebut the allegation of police misconduct, the prosecutor pressured Gravette to testify that it was her fear of the appellants that was causing her to testify inconsistently. Despite several trial court rulings sustaining defense objections to this line of questioning by the prosecutor, including the striking of portions of the redirect examination, the prosecutor's insistent questioning ultimately resulted in the following highly inflammatory statement by Gravette: Let's trade places then, then you will know why [I don't want to say the things I saw]. What I have been crying about all week? So stupid. You know why. I live right down the street from these people. I am scared for my life. This court in Mercer denounced the introduction of unsubstantiated fear of specific reprisal from defendants, concluding that such testimony is prejudicial because it . . . implie[s] that [the witness] had received some type of threat regarding her testimony and . . . could very well have aroused the passions of the jury, and suggested a conviction based on their aversion [of the defendants]. 724 A.2d at 1186. In this case, Gravette's testimony introduced exactly the type of prejudice condemned by this court in Mercer. In response to the prosecutor's questions, Gravette had presented the jury with extremely emotional testimony that was without relevance to the specific charges faced by the appellants in this case. Gravette's testimony ended with her crying on the stand after answering the prosecutor's questions. During this portion of the government's redirect examination of Gravette, it is clear from the interaction between the prosecutor and Gravette that the prosecutor was well aware that she was reluctant to testify in front of Gordon and Williams because she feared for her life. However, the prosecutor failed to alert the trial court about the potentially prejudicial evidence and failed to make any effort to avoid an improper response from the witness by limiting the scope of his questions to address only the defense allegations of government impropriety. In this case, as in Mercer, [g]iven the potential for unfair prejudice, and the availability of an alternative, less prejudicial method to accomplish the same goal [ i.e., through questions targeted to elicit testimony only about the alleged potential perjury prosecution], the suggestion that [Gravettes'] recantation of [her] grand jury testimony was the product of fear, was improper. Id. at 1188. Finding that the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to elicit the improper testimony, however, is only the first step. In order to determine whether the error is reversible, we must look to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1194 (citation omitted). We will reverse, under the nonconstitutional harmless error doctrine, if we cannot say with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. Id. (citations omitted). However, reversal is required when the error compromised the fairness of the trial, or if the error had a possible substantial impact upon the outcome. Id. (citations omitted). In making this determination, we must consider the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. Id. (citations omitted). Because appellants also contend that the prosecutor made several erroneous statements in his closing arguments that prejudiced their right to a fair trial, we will first address those additional claims of error before determining whether the cumulative impact of Gravette's testimony, and any errors resulting from the alleged improper argument by the government, resulted in a miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial on any or all of the counts for which the appellants were convicted.