Opinion ID: 2622503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF DOE v. MARET

Text: ¶ 19 In holding that Munson violated the confidentiality requirements of Utah Code section 78-14-12(1)(d), the district court relied heavily on our opinion in Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, ¶ 21, 984 P.2d 980. In the last paragraph of that opinion, we commented on a matter unrelated to the question at issue in that appeal. Id. In his briefing to this court, Maret had attached a copy of the notice of intent that he had received. Id. In her reply brief, the plaintiff had asserted that this act violated the confidentiality requirement of Utah Code section 78-14-12(1)(d). We agreed, stating, Today we hold that because the notice of intent serves as the basis for the prelitigation panel review . . . it is part of the proceedings and must be kept confidential. Maret, 1999 UT 74, ¶ 21, 984 P.2d 980. While we declined to impose any sanctions, we stated that future infractions could be penalized. Id. ¶ 20 Upon a more considered analysis of the issue, we overrule the last paragraph of Maret. Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we may overrule it where the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n. 3 (Utah 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Maret decision is clearly erroneous inasmuch as it suggests that all documents submitted to a prelitigation panel are confidential  a suggestion that is simply not supported by the statutory language. ¶ 21 Our decision to overrule the last paragraph of Maret is supported by the fact that it is not the most weighty of precedents. Id. at 399. The paragraph at issue was appended to our opinion in Maret almost as an afterthought. Indeed, we devoted only a single paragraph to our analysis of the issue, an analysis consisting almost entirely of a conclusory sentence asserting that because the notice of intent is part of the proceedings, it must be kept confidential. This lack of analysis, combined with the unique way in which the issue was presented, reduces the precedential value of the applicable language. Unlike the vast majority of cases in which we either affirm or assign error to a decision by a lower court, in Maret we were asked to exercise our inherent jurisdiction over the proceedings before us to impose sanctions for an act that occurred during briefing. Because of this unique procedural posture, the issue did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts. Moreover, because the issue was first raised in a reply brief, we were not able to benefit from any adversarial briefing of the issue. We accordingly conclude that it is appropriate to overrule the last paragraph of our opinion in Doe v. Maret .