Opinion ID: 794869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dickerson's mother referred to him as the moron;

Text: 30 5. Dickerson had an ideation attachment to his mother that resulted in his failure to develop a meaningful relationship with another woman; 31 6. Dickerson was continually teased at school and became quiet and withdrawn; 32 7. Dickerson was raised in an atmosphere of pimps, prostitutes, and drug dealers. The younger children generally had to fight their way home from school. Several homosexual advances were made upon Dickerson. 33 8. Dickerson's relationships with women were unsuccessful. He fathered children with several women; 34 9. Dickerson's relationship with Denise Howard centered around prostitution and drugs. He believed that he had contracted a venereal disease from her. 35 10. Dickerson had a full-scale I.Q. of 77, placing him in the lower seven percent of cognitive ability; 36 11. Psychological testing would have explained his primitive thinking, how it developed and the effect the combination of the above had on his ability to make appropriate choices. It would have revealed that he had a borderline personality disorder. This disorder and its nexus to the offense would have been available to the panel. 37 Petition, at 15. Respondent does not allege that this claim is procedurally defaulted. Thus, the Court will address the claim on the merits. 38 Dickerson v. Mitchell, 336 F.Supp.2d 770, 809 (N.D.Ohio 2004). 39 The basis for these eleven factual propositions is a series of affidavits, including those of relatives, family friends and acquaintances, and a psychologist. ( See generally App. 2686-2714, 2723-30, 2825-28.) The district court, like the state appellate court in this case, did not reject the ineffective assistance claim on any factual ground. Like the Ohio courts, it accepted Dickerson's eleven-point factual statement of counsel's failures. It accepted these facts as well-established in the record. Neither the district court, nor the state court, asserts that defense counsel performed a full mitigation investigation, or discovered or offered at the trial any proof regarding this list of eleven propositions of fact asserted by Dickerson. The reasoning of both courts rejects the claim only because of so-called strategic decisions of counsel not to conduct such a comprehensive investigation. The district court simply accepted the reasoning of the Ohio state court by adopting its language, as follows: 40 [T]he Sixth District Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply United States Supreme Court precedent in its post-conviction appeal opinion denying this claim. It stated: 41 The record in this case and the affidavits provided by the appellant clearly indicate that the appellant's trial counsel made strategic decisions concerning the presentation of witnesses and testimony during the mitigation phase of trial. Thus, the trial court correctly held that the appellant's trial counsel did prepare and present mitigation evidence and that the type of mitigation evidence presented at the mitigation phase of the trial was the result of tactical decisions made by the appellant's trial counsel. Strategy and tactical decisions exercised by defense counsel well within the range of professional reasonable judgment need not be analyzed by a reviewing court. Strickland, supra. 42 State v. Dickerson, 2000 WL 28320, at  (Jan. 14, 2000). Although in summary form, the Sixth District's opinion is not an unreasonable application of Strickland and its progeny. 43 Dickerson, 336 F.Supp.2d at 812-13 (emphasis added). These statements form the sole basis of the ruling of both courts on this issue. Neither court further explains what the strategic reasons of counsel were for not conducting any mitigation investigation of facts concerning Dickerson's medical history, family and social history, educational history, or any of the other factors listed in the ABA Guidelines. 44 2. Strategic Decisions Must Be Based on Full Information 45 It seems obvious that the decisions of the district court and the state court unreasonably apply Strickland, Wiggins, and Rompilla and do not comply with the requirements of Hamblin and Harries or our Court's opinion in Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir.2003). These cases say that strategic choices made after less than complete investigation will not pass muster as an excuse when a full investigation would have revealed a large body of mitigating evidence. It is not reasonable to refuse to investigate when the investigator does not know the relevant facts the investigation will uncover. As the Supreme Court has made clear, an incomplete mitigation investigation resulting from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment is unreasonable, as is abandoning investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527-28, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Had the investigation been conducted, reasonable lawyers surely would not have limited the mitigation proof in this case to simply an effort to show only that Dickerson was provoked by jealousy and could not control his impulses, and therefore suffered from diminished capacity at the time of the crime. They would have put on proof that his low IQ brought him close to the line of retardation and that his family background and educational and social history showed extreme deprivation that affected his moral culpability. The only significant mitigation proof was the testimony of two mental health experts who had interviewed Dickerson for an hour and a half to determine if he was sane. They simply testified that he was fully sane but in emotional turmoil. 46 It seems that counsel, as a result of an ex parte conversation with one of the judges, before waiving a jury, thought that the judges would not impose the death penalty. Based on that one brief conversation in which the judge only suggested that Dickerson give consideration to a waiver of jury trial in favor of an Ohio three-judge panel, counsel drew the conclusion that the judges would not invoke the death penalty. He thought that the ex parte judge would not have suggested a jury waiver but then vote to execute. He was wrong. But based on this conclusion, he not only waived the jury but also waived conducting the normal, necessary investigation required by ABA Guidelines referred to by the Supreme Court and our Court. Without conducting a complete mitigation investigation, counsel did not know what an investigation would reveal and had no basis for making a strategic decision based on the ex parte conversation that the judges would not impose the death penalty based on diminished capacity. It was not reasonable to limit his investigation to the crime itself and the immediate mental state of the defendant when the crime was committed. There was abundant mitigating evidence, much stronger evidence than the mental health testimony that Dickerson was sane when he committed the crime. Accordingly, the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it simply assumed that counsel's oversights were motivated by strategy, instead of requiring a complete and thorough mitigation investigation as mandated by Strickland and its progeny.