Opinion ID: 28771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amount of Liquidated Damages

Text: We must now consider whether the finding of willfulness necessitated a mandatory liquidated damages award equal to the amount of the back pay award. We hold that it does. The ADEA statute provides for liquidated damages by means of cross-reference to the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (b) (providing that ADEA remedies shall be enforced in accordance with, inter alia, 29 U.S.C. § 216 and that back pay under ADEA is treated as unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation for purposes of applying FLSA provisions); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (employers who 42 violate minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of FLSA shall be liable for the back pay “and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages”).11 11 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) provides in full: “(b) Enforcement; prohibition of age discrimination under fair labor standards; unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensation; liquidated damages; judicial relief; conciliation, conference, and persuasion. The provisions of this title shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this section. Any act prohibited under section 623 of this title shall be deemed to be a prohibited act under section 215 of title. Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided, That liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section. Before instituting any action under this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.” 29 U.S.C. 216(b) provides: “Damages; right of action; attorney's fees and costs; termination of right of action Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any employer who 43 This circuit has never ruled on the precise question posed by this case – whether the ADEA mandates an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the back pay award upon a finding of willfulness.12 In Thurston, the Supreme Court assumed that violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor in an action under section 217 of this title in which (1) restraint is sought of any further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, owing to such employee under section 206 or section 207 of this title by an employer liable therefor under the provisions of this subsection or (2) legal or equitable relief is sought as a result of alleged violations of section 215(a)(3). “ 12 In at least two post-Thurston cases, we have commented on the issue in dicta. See Smith v. Berry Co., 165 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[L]iquidated damages may not exceed the back pay award. That is, a finding of willfulness can double the damages awarded to 44 the double recovery was required after any finding of willfulness. See Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 625 (observing that too broad a standard for willfulness “would result in an award of double damages in almost every case”). In at least one postThurston decision, this court has assumed the same thing. Burns v. Texas City Refining, 890 F.2d 747, 752 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), a finding of willfulness entitles the plaintiff to a doubling of any back pay award.” (emphasis added)). A majority of our sister circuits have expressly held or have assumed that double damages were mandatory after a finding of willfulness: Four circuits have expressly held that this is the case. Mathis v. Phillips Chevrolet, Inc., 269 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 2001); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000); Spencer v. Stuart Hall Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 1999); Hill v. a successful ADEA plaintiff.” (emphasis added)); Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven when the plaintiff has proved willfulness, the court has discretion about whether to award liquidated damages.”). The precise issue we decide today was not necessary to the decision of either case. In Smith, the district court had awarded double damages and the appellate court affirmed the willfulness finding and the damage award. Id. at 395. In Purcell, there was no evidence supporting the willfulness finding, so no liquidated damages were awarded. Id. at 958. The dicta in Purcell can be further distinguished because it relied for support on the pre-Thurston case of Elliot v. Group Medical & Surgical Service, 74 F2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1983), which in turn relied on Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976). Hays was expressly disapproved in Thurston. Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 625 n.22. 45 Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1983). Three circuits have at least assumed that it was so. See McGinty v. State, 193 F.3d 64, 71 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1999); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1099 (3d Cir. 1995) (“ADEA provides double damages when the employer's discriminatory conduct is willful”); Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1416 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 113 S.Ct. 1701 (1993).13 We hold that the plain language of the statutes requires the interpretation that liquidated damages in an amount equal to the back pay award are mandatory upon a finding of willfulness.14 Accordingly, we remand this portion of the case to the district 13 A case from the Eleventh Circuit seems to have assumed that a willfulness finding “entitles” the plaintiff to liquidated damages, but did not address whether double recovery was a mandatory amount. Day v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 1012, 1016 (11th Cir. 1997). Cases from the Fourth and Ninth Circuits seem to have assumed that liquidated damages were permitted, but perhaps not mandatory, after a finding of willfulness. Herold v. Hajoca Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff “may recover” liquidated damages); AARP v. Farmers Group, Inc., 943 F.2d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 1991) (statute “authorizes” liquidated damages). 14 This conclusion is further bolstered by 29 U.S.C. § 260, which provides an employer with a “good faith” defense under the FLSA. In an FLSA case, the liquidated damages provided for in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) are mandatory unless the employer satisfies the requirements for the good faith defense, in which case 29 U.S.C. § 260 expressly provides the district court with discretion to award no liquidated damages or to award such damages in an amount not to exceed the amount provided for in § 216(b). 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1414 - 15 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1990). But “the ADEA does not incorporate [29 U.S.C. § 260].” Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 625 n.22. Thus, there is no provision in the ADEA for discretion in the award of liquidated damages once a willfulness finding has been made. 46 court with instructions to enter judgment awarding liquidated damages in an amount equal to the back pay award for each of the Appellees.