Opinion ID: 1925880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Verdict of Guilty But Mentally Ill

Text: Daniels' second argument on appeal is a two-pronged challenge to his guilty but mentally ill convictions, claiming that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that such a verdict was a proper option for it to consider. Daniels begins by first suggesting that because he did not offer the defense of guilty but mentally ill, it was legally impossible for the trial court to give such an instruction. This position was expressly rejected by the General Assembly. The original proposal to amend 11 Del.C. § 401(b) appeared in House Bill 567. It read as follows: § 401. Insanity; Mental Illness; Defenses and Verdicts . . . . (b) Where the trier of facts determines that, at the time of the conduct charged, a defendant suffered from a psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbed such person's thinking, feeling, or behavior and/or that such psychiatric disorder left such person with insufficient willpower to choose whether he would do the act or refrain from doing it, although physically capable, the defendant may move for a verdict of guilty, but mentally ill. H.R. 567, 131st Del.Gen. Assembly, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1982) (emphasis added). It is obvious that the original version of the proposed amendment provided for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill only if there was a motion for such a determination by the defendant. However, Amendment No. 2 to House Bill 567 provided in part that it would: AMEND Section 1 of House Bill 567 by striking the words the defendant may move for as the same appear on line 12 of page 1, and substituting the words the trier of fact shall return a verdict of' in lieu thereof. Amend. 2 to H.R. 567, 131st Del.Gen. Assembly, at 1 (May 25, 1982). Therefore, the final version of House Bill 567, which was ultimately enacted into law, provides for the trier of fact to return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill if the trier of fact determines that such a verdict is appropriate. There is no doubt that the legislature considered and rejected the concept of limiting the verdict of guilty but mentally ill to only those situations where the defendant filed such a motion. Moreover, a separate portion of House Bill 567 added a new section, 11 Del.C. § 3905. That section was enacted into law and reads as follows: At the conclusion of a trial under this title, where warranted by the evidence, the charge to the jury shall contain instructions that shall consider separately the issues of guilt and the presence or absence of insanity, and shall also contain instructions as to the verdicts of guilty; guilty, but mentally ill; not guilty by reason of insanity; and not guilty with regard to the offense or offenses charged and, as required by law, any lesser included offenses. 11 Del.C. § 3905 (1987) (emphasis added). Thus, where warranted by the evidence, such an instruction is required regardless of a defendant's desire to avoid it. Id. Daniels' challenge to the court's authority for charging the jury that it might consider a verdict of guilty but mentally ill must be denied. The language of the statute imposes a duty upon trial judges to use this instruction when the evidence warrants it. Cf. People v. Ritsema, 105 Mich.App. 602, 307 N.W.2d 380, 385 (1981) (holding that when required by statute, a defendant cannot waive a jury instruction on the guilty but mentally ill verdict). The last issue which we address is the second prong of Daniels' challenge to the jury instruction. Daniels contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an instruction to the jury about the possibility of rendering a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. Accordingly, we must examine the evidence to ascertain whether or not such an instruction was warranted. In support of his defense of insanity, Daniels presented the expert testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Cornelison. Dr. Cornelison testified that Daniels suffered from a long-standing mental illness  paranoid personality disorder. This paranoid personality disorder apparently persisted throughout Daniels' life and was indicated by Daniels being a loner. Dr. Cornelison further explained that Daniels' sense of self-devaluation intensified when he began to sense that the other sisters and brother, all of whom had children, made a point of his not having children. Dr. Cornelison concluded that when Daniels killed his brother, he was unable to function in a way that would have prevented him from shooting his brother. In fact, Dr. Cornelison was of the opinion that Daniels was legally insane when Daniels went to his sister's house, assaulted her, fired a pistol towards his nephew, and damaged her residence. In other words, after killing his brother, Daniels was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct because of post-traumatic stress. See 11 Del.C. § 401(a). However, during his cross-examination by the State, Dr. Cornelison described Daniels' mental illness at the time of the instant offense as automatic and not subject to Daniels' logical control. Dr. Cornelison testified that when Daniels committed these offenses, he reacted impulsively because of the relationship between Daniels and his sister, Hanna, and he acted automatically and in a way which suggests that he was suffering a post-traumatic stress disorder from the time after he shot his brother during and through the time he was at his sister's home. The Delaware statute establishing the verdict of guilty, but mentally ill, 11 Del. C. § 401(b), requires the jury to find that at the time of the offense, the defendant: (1) suffers from a psychiatric disorder; and (2) the disorder leaves the defendant with insufficient willpower to choose whether he would do an act or refrain from doing it. Dr. Cornelison's testimony on cross-examination provided evidence of two psychiatric disorders: long-standing paranoid personality disorder and post-traumatic distress. Therefore, the first requirement of Section 401(b) was established. The second requirement of the statute is insufficient willpower to choose to act or refrain from acting. Although Dr. Cornelison's opinion was not expressly phrased in the statutory terms of insufficient willpower to choose, his testimony that Daniels' actions at his sister's house were automatic and impulsive would support that conclusion by the trier of fact. The Delaware law, unlike the Michigan law, does not require a guilty but mentally ill instruction every time an instruction on the defense of insanity is given. See People v. Ritsema, 307 N.W.2d at 384-85. However, the applicable Delaware statute does provide that where warranted by the evidence, the charge to the jury shall contain instructions ... as to the verdict[] of ... `guilty, but mentally ill.' 11 Del.C. § 3905 (emphasis added). Cf. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973). The fact that the evidence supporting the Section 401(b) instruction appeared during the State's cross-examination of the defense psychiatric expert is not significant. This Court has previously held that it is permissible for the evidence supporting an instruction to appear in the moving party's cross-examination of a witness. See Ward v. State, Del.Supr., 366 A.2d 1194, 1196-97 (1976). Indeed, Daniels concedes that when supported by some credible evidence, both the State and the defense are entitled to an instruction on a point of law, e.g., a lesser included offense, 11 Del.C. § 206(c), or a defense, 11 Del.C. § 303(c). Based upon our examination of the evidence in the record in this case, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court to instruct the jury on the possible verdict of guilty but mentally ill.