Opinion ID: 2166559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objective Examination

Text: The parties differ about whether an objective examination of the facts of this case would cause a reasonable examiner to question Judge Amundson's impartiality. Powell refers to: (1) Judge Amundson's continuing, concurrent attorney-client relationship with the Rider Bennett Firm; (2) the fact that Judge Amundson had to submit all of his bills and accounts to [Rider Bennett] so Greene could prepare the annual trust petitions; (3) the letters between Judge Amundson and Rider Bennett immediately before and after the Powell oral argument; and (4) the fact that Judge Amundson was stealing from that trust. Respondents emphasize that the trust attorney, Greene, had no contact with the attorneys who argued the Powell case, and they argue that Judge Amundson's resignation and misconduct are wholly unrelated to this case. Respondents cite Desnick v. Mast, 311 Minn. 356, 249 N.W.2d 878 (1976), as controlling precedent. Desnick involved a plaintiff's contention that he should be granted a new trial because the attorney for one of the defendants was concurrently representing the trial judge as a nominal party in a legal malpractice suit. Id. at 362-63, 249 N.W.2d at 882-83. This court held that [t]he circumstances of the relationship    clearly indicate it was a technical, rather than a direct or a personal, relationship, and that the plaintiff was therefore not denied a fair trial. [7] Id. We do not consider Desnick to be controlling precedent on the issue of disqualification. First, Desnick did not address the question of disqualification under the Code of Judicial Conduct but rather went directly to the question of whether the plaintiff was denied a fair trial, which is relevant to the issue of vacatur. Second, as we will discuss below, the issue of disqualification is fact-dependent, and Desnick is factually distinguishable from the present case. The caselaw from other jurisdictions regarding the effect on disqualification of the existence of an attorney-client relationship between the judge and an attorney or firm appearing before the judge is mixed and also largely fact-dependent. [8] Several courts have held that, under their peculiar facts, the appearance of impropriety arising from an attorney-client relationship mandated disqualification of the conflicted judge. [9] A smaller number of courts have refused to require disqualification in cases involving attorney-client relationships between judges and attorneys appearing before them. [10] Our review of the applicable precedent leads us to the conclusion that a reviewing court, pursuing an objective examination of a case where a judge has had an attorney-client relationship with an attorney appearing before the judge, should generally weigh four factors in deciding on disqualification. First, the reviewing court should consider the extent of the attorney-client relationship. If the relationship consisted of a single, short episode, or even a series of sporadic contacts, disqualification is less likely than if it consisted of a long-term, continuous course of representation. Similarly, representation that had been concluded prior to the instant case is less likely to lead to disqualification than representation that is concurrent with the case. [11] Second, the reviewing court should examine the nature of the representation. A direct relationship, where the judge is represented personally, is more indicative of a reasonable question regarding the judge's impartiality than a relationship that only involves the judge in some institutional or technical role. [12] Further, the more serious the matter for the judge, the greater the impact of the representation on the judge's impartiality. Third, the reviewing court should consider the frequency, volume and quality of contacts between the judge and the attorney or law firm. The more frequent and substantial these contacts, the more likely the relationship is to create a reasonable question as to impartiality. Likewise, the closer the contacts come to the subject of the case before the judge, the greater the impact on impartiality. Fourth, the reviewing court should take into account any special circumstances that might either enhance or limit (1) the importance of the attorney or firm to the judge and/or (2) the appearance of impropriety to the public. [13] On the facts before us, the first three of these factors reveal a close case that would perhaps have fallen within the discretion of Judge Amundson. With regard to the extent of the representation, this weighs toward disqualification because Greene represented the trust for nearly six years, and this time period overlapped the entire course of the Powell litigation through our denial of Powell's petition for further review in September 2000. As to the nature of the representation, this weighs against disqualification because Rider Bennett's representation was somewhat less personal than a prototypical attorney-client relationship, even though Judge Amundson was not an entirely nominal party. As to the frequency and quality of contact, this weighs against disqualification because Judge Amundson did not communicate extensively with Rider Bennett attorneys, and when he did, it concerned technical aspects of the management and representation of the trust. As respondents emphasize, the connection between Rider Bennett and Judge Amundson's role in Powell is further attenuated by the fact that the Rider Bennett attorneys who argued this case were unaware of the concurrent representation. However, the special circumstances have more impact in this case than in any other we have seen. Specifically, Judge Amundson's theft from the trust that was the subject of Rider Bennett's representation significantly enhanced the importance of that law firm to him. Judge Amundson was undoubtedly aware that the Rider Bennett attorneys were in a position to discover his wrongdoinga fact that provided him with a strong motive to favor that firm. Judge Amundson's theft also made the risk of an appearance of impropriety to the public extremely high. Moreover, the details of Judge Amundson's misdeeds undercut respondents' argument about the technical nature of the representation. While it is true that the trust, not Judge Amundson, was technically the client, it is also true that Judge Amundson treated the trust funds as his own. We conclude that an objective examination into the Powell appeal reveals that Judge Amundson's impartiality is subject to reasonable question. We do not conclude that Judge Amundson was actually partial to the Rider Bennett respondents, but instead rely on the appearance of partiality that inevitably arises from this unique combination of facts. Therefore, Judge Amundson should have disqualified himself from hearing this case. II. We turn now to the issue of whether Judge Amundson's failure to disqualify himself requires that the court of appeals' opinion be vacated and the case reversed and remanded. We have found no Minnesota case addressing the issue of vacatur on the basis of the participation in an appellate proceeding by a disqualified judge. Therefore, this is a case of first impression for this court. Respondents argue that we should adopt the standard followed by Minnesota appellate courts when reviewing an appeal from the denial of a motion to disqualify a district court judge. In that context, our courts have engaged in a two-part inquiryasking, first, whether there was judicial misconduct and, second, whether the misconduct denied the litigants a fair trial. See, e.g., Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 139 (Minn.1990) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Radloff v. First Am. Nat'l Bank of St. Cloud, N.A., 470 N.W.2d 154 (Minn.App.1991); Desnick, 311 Minn. at 362-63, 249 N.W.2d at 882-83; Nachtsheim, 411 N.W.2d at 891. As to the first partjudicial misconductrespondents argue that Powell should be required to show that Judge Amundson was in fact biased against her. Powell responds that requiring her to prove actual bias and injury would eviscerate the objective appearance-of-impropriety standard of Canon 3D(1) and create a standard that is nigh-impossible to meet. She also forecasts a procedural morass if attorneys are forced to engage in invasive discovery to discern what contacts presiding judges have with the parties and law firms that appear before them and what actual impact those contacts may have had. We share Powell's concerns regarding an actual bias standard. While the existence of actual bias may be relevant to one of the objectives of disqualificationto provide a fair trial to litigants it is not necessarily relevant to the other objectiveto promote confidence in the judiciary. [14] But we agree with respondents that not every case involving judicial disqualification deserves vacatur. The United States Supreme Court offers a third option. In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp ., the Court adopted the appearance of partiality test urged by Powell but tempered it with a harmless error analysis. 486 U.S. 847, 864, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). The Liljeberg Court addressed a case regarding the ownership of St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana. Id. at 849, 108 S.Ct. 2194. Loyola University had an interest in the hospital, and the district court judge was a Loyola trustee. Id. at 850-51, 108 S.Ct. 2194. The judge claimed to have forgotten that Loyola held an interest in St. Jude. Id. at 851, 108 S.Ct. 2194. Petitioner could not prove that the judge was actually aware of the conflict, but the Court nonetheless found that his actions violated the federal judicial disqualification statute because an objective observer would have questioned Judge Collins' impartiality. Id. at 861, 108 S.Ct. 2194. The Liljeberg Court rejected any requirement of proof of actual bias and upheld the Fifth Circuit's reading of the federal disqualification statute: The goal of [28 U.S.C.] section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. Id. at 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (quoting Health Servs. Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir.1986)). However, the Court recognized that not every case presenting an appearance of impropriety merits vacatur: A conclusion that a statutory violation occurred does not, however, end our inquiry. As in other areas of the law, there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance. Id. at 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194. The Court then developed the following balancing test to be used for purposes of vacatur: We conclude that in determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of § 455(a), it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process. We must continuously bear in mind that to perform its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. Id. at 864, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Applying that test, the Court concluded that vacatur was the appropriate remedy on its facts. Id. at 867-70, 108 S.Ct. 2194. We find the Supreme Court's test for vacatur appropriate. It properly considers each of the two objectives of disqualification: to provide the parties a fair trial (and appeal) and to promote confidence in the judicial system. And by using a risk analysis, it allows the balancing of those objectives against the potential burdens placed on the judicial system and the parties by reopening a final judgment.