Opinion ID: 854102
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Out-of-court statements by co-conspirators

Text: The State's theory was: (1) Christine Loprete, Pronger's wife, instigated the scheme to kill her husband; (2) Murray Klebs, with whom Loprete was having an affair, financed the scheme and made the necessary arrangements; (3) Larry Harth, an employee of Klebs, acted as a middleman for Klebs; and (4) Haak was the hired killer. Various other witnesses played roles described below. Neither Klebs nor Loprete testified at trial but other witnesses reported statements attributed to them. Harth testified over Haak's objection that in July 1988 Klebs asked Harth if he knew anyone who could be hired to murder Pronger and how much the person would charge for the killing. Harth told Klebs that he would look into it and that it would probably cost $10,000. Harth then called Haak to ask if he was interested in carrying out the killing. In a second piece of co-conspirator testimony, Lonnie Bramlett testified over Haak's objection that Loprete told him around three weeks before the murder that she may have to kill Pronger. A statement offered against a party is not hearsay if the statement is by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Ind.Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Haak maintains that Harth's and Bramlett's testimony relaying Klebs's and Loprete's out-of-court statements was not admissible against him because the statements were made before Haak joined the conspiracy. Although there is no case on point under Indiana Evidence Rule 801, this claim is contrary to secondary authority and to federal doctrine under the analogous federal evidence rule. [1] In any event, it is waived because Haak objected on different grounds at trial. He argued that Harth's testimony was inadmissible because the existence of a conspiracy to kill Pronger at the time of the statements had not been sufficiently proved. Similarly, Haak's objection to Bramlett's testimony was that Loprete's statement to Bramlett occurred before any conspiracy began. Having failed to convince the trial court that a conspiracy to kill Pronger was not under way at the time of the challenged statements, Haak cannot change course and assert a different objection on appeal. Jester v. State, 551 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind.1990). His new argument is therefore foreclosed at this point. Haak next contends that Harth's and Bramlett's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation because there was no proof that Klebs and Loprete were unavailable to testify at trial. The Supreme Court of the United States has squarely held that the Sixth Amendment does not require a showing of unavailability before the admission of a co-conspirator's out-of-court statements made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986) (construing analogous Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(E)). Inadi is controlling on this point of federal constitutional law because the Indiana Rule is word for word the same as the federal rule examined in Inadi. Accordingly, this provides no basis for reversal.