Opinion ID: 2219221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bank Applications/Federal Convictions

Text: On December 11, 1979, respondent was charged by indictment, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, with five counts of knowingly making false statements to influence a bank. (18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988).) Each count of the indictment related to separate conduct involving five different banks. On March 27, 1980, respondent pled guilty to counts I and IV of the indictment and counts II, III and V were dismissed pursuant to respondent's plea agreement. Count I of the Administrator's complaint is based on the conduct alleged in the two counts of the indictment to which respondent pled guilty. Counts II through IV of the Administrator's complaint are based on the remaining three counts of the indictment, which were dismissed. The Administrator presented certified copies of the following documentary evidence to the Hearing Board to support counts I through V of his complaint against respondent: respondent's Federal indictment, respondent's Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, the Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order, and an Exhibit in Furtherance of Rule 11(f), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure prepared by the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee. This Rule 11(f) exhibit was prepared during the investigation which led to respondent's indictment, and attached to it are photostatic copies of the personal financial statements that respondent furnished to the various banking institutions delineated in the indictment. On January 26, 1987, the ARDC initiated Supreme Court Rule 761 proceedings (107 Ill.2d R. 761) against respondent based on his Federal convictions. ( In re Bell, No. M.R. 4217.) Pursuant to Rule 761, if an attorney is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the Administrator must petition this court to suspend the attorney from the practice of law until further order. (107 Ill.2d R. 761(b).) Whether to temporarily suspend the attorney pursuant to Rule 761 is a matter of discretion. (107 Ill.2d R. 761(b).) On February 12, 1987, this court issued a rule to show cause why respondent should not be suspended from the practice of law until further order pursuant to Rule 761. (107 Ill.2d R. 761.) Respondent answered and this court discharged the rule to show cause on July 15, 1987.