Opinion ID: 6321648
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: proper interpretation of mcr 9.231(b)

Text: When we interpret a provision of the court rules, the same principles that govern the interpretation of statutes apply. People v Comer, 500 Mich 278, 287; 901 NW2d 553 (2017). Thus, we begin with the court rule’s plain language, examining the court rule as a 2 whole and reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire scheme of the relevant court rules. Id. When the court rule’s language is unambiguous, we must enforce it as written. Id. If a word is undefined, it is proper to consult a dictionary to aid in the proper interpretation of the court rule. People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 723; 835 NW2d 399 (2013). Finally, MCR 9.200 provides the following instructions for how the court rules governing the JTC are to be interpreted: An independent and honorable judiciary being indispensable to justice in our society, subchapter 9.200 shall be construed to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, to enhance public confidence in that system, and to protect the public, the courts, and the rights of the judges who are governed by these rules in the most expeditious manner that is practicable and fair. At issue is MCR 9.231(B), which establishes a number of duties assigned to the master, one of which is that “[t]he master shall set a time and a place for the hearing and shall notify the respondent and the examiner at least 28 days in advance.” The word “place,” respondent contends, refers to a physical location. Our court rules do not define the word “place,” and this Court has never interpreted the word as it is used in MCR 9.231(B). Although MCR 9.231 was adopted in 2019 as part of a broader update and modernization of the court rules governing judicial disciplinary proceedings, the relevant phrase—“shall set a time and a place for the hearing”—has remained essentially unchanged since GCR 1963, 932 initially established court rules governing the JTC in 1969. 1 Based on the context in which it appears, “place” 1 GCR 1963, 932.10(a) stated, in relevant part, “Upon the filing of an answer or upon expiration of the time for its filing, the commission shall set a time and place of hearing before itself or before a master and shall give notice of such hearing to the respondent . . . .” 381 Mich xc (1969) (emphasis added). When the Michigan Court Rules were revised in 1985, MCR 9.210(B) required that the master, rather than the JTC, “set a time and place 3 is relevantly defined as “a building or locality used for a special purpose [.]” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1973). 2 This definition is apt because the rule requires the master to select a location to be used for a particular purpose, i.e., “for the hearing.” That the rule is referring to a physical location seems obvious on its face (even more so in light of the history discussed below), but that conclusion is obvious even before we leave the dictionary—I could not locate a single definition of “place” in any dictionary that includes as one of its many meanings (or examples) a virtual meeting space. for the hearing . . . .” This provision was moved to MCR 9.210(B)(2) and changed to “set a time and a place for the hearing” in our rewrite of the JTC rules in 2003. 467 Mich clii (2003) (emphasis added). The provision was moved to MCR 9.231(B) in 2019 but otherwise remained the same. 503 Mich cclxi (2019). 2 See also Lexico, Place (accessed January 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/H6FP-N8GC] (“A building or area used for a specified purpose or activity.”); Dictionary.com, Place, def 17 (accessed January 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/4YB9-WGRD] (“[A] building, space, location, etc., set apart or used for a specific purpose: A nightclub is a place of entertainment. You are encouraged to dress modestly in places of worship.”). The JTC believes a different definition of “place” supports its view, one that defines the term as “space in general: time and place.” Dictionary.com, Place, def 2 (accessed January 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/4YB9-WGRD]. But, other than the superficial appeal of having an example with language similar to the term’s usage in MCR 9.231(B), that definition has no application here. For one thing, by its use of “a place,” the court rule obviously refers to a particular meeting place. This would be true even if I were to agree with the JTC that the meeting place could be virtual—it would make no sense to identify as a “place for the hearing” any “space in general” on the Internet, regardless of its uniform resource locator (URL), Internet protocol (IP) address, or website domain. Either way, this definition is at such a level of generality as to be meaningless here—which is proven by any attempt to plug the definition into the rule (i.e., “[t]he master shall set a time and [space in general] for the hearing”). 4 The historical context of the rule supports this conclusion. At the time GCR 1963, 932.10 was adopted, the relevant sense of “place” would have been a physical location, since the judiciary in Michigan was not using telecommunications technology for hearings at that time. See DeFoor & Sechen, Telephone Hearings in Florida, 38 U Miami L Rev 593, 597-598 (1984) (discussing the history of telephone hearings in courts); Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote Defendant, 78 Tulane L Rev 1089, 1094-1095 & n 8 (2004) (discussing the history of videoconferencing in courts); Clark, Symposium: The Use of Video in the Courtroom, 1975 BYU L Rev 327, 328-329 (1975) (explaining that the federal judiciary did not start experimenting with video technology until 1970). Indeed, in the analogous context of general litigation, courthouses have historically served as important public spaces that convey a sense of community identity, legal authority, legitimacy, and decorum. Resnik & Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp 135-136, 303, 339, 342-344. 3 Some of the same considerations apply in the present context. Like trials and other court processes, the master’s hearing is public. MCR 9.233. Additionally, JTC disciplinary actions involve allegations of misconduct by judicial officers and, consequently, are serious matters in this 3 Even those currently advocating for more robust use of technology acknowledge the “everyday impression of a court” as “very much a place,” meaning a “physical courtroom.” Susskind, Online Courts and the Future of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2019), p 57. The author notes that members of the legal profession, “emotionally and psychologically, . . . often find it hard to imagine serious judicial work being carried out anywhere other than in a physical courtroom.” Id. 5 state’s civic life. Thus, the meaning conveyed by the term “place” at the time of its adoption was that the parties would be directed to go to a physical location for the hearing. Providing further support for this interpretation (if any is needed) is the fact that, on two occasions, this Court has taken affirmative steps to expressly allow for remote proceedings in the JTC. The first such change occurred when the Court rewrote the JTC court rules in 2019. We added a provision to MCR 9.210 expressly allowing for meetings by telephone or teleconference if no public hearing is scheduled to be held: “Regular meetings at which no public hearing is scheduled may be held in person, by telephone, or by teleconference, provided that the telephone or teleconference method is a secure connection.” MCR 9.210(F)(4). Under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others . . . .” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2012), p 107. The implication from MCR 9.210(F)(4) is that JTC meetings at which a public hearing is scheduled may not be held by telephone or teleconference. Although this court rule is not applicable to the hearing at issue in this case, it shows that we have acknowledged the JTC’s general lack of authority to hold remote proceedings by expressly allowing remote proceedings under certain conditions. Yet a public hearing before a master is not among the JTC proceedings that we indicated may be held remotely. The second change was made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court amended MCR 9.221(C) to allow a subpoena issued under MCR 9.221 to “require a party or witness to appear by telephone, by two-way interactive video technology, or by other 6 remote participation tools.” MSC Administrative Order, 507 Mich ___ (July 26, 2021). 4 But if remote hearings had been authorized by MCR 9.200 et seq. before this amendment, the JTC would have already possessed the authority to require a witness to appear via a remote participation tool. 5 I would interpret MCR 9.231(B) as requiring the master to set a physical location for respondent’s hearing. I believe the master erred by issuing the scheduling order providing for a virtual hearing and by denying respondent’s motion to hold his hearing in person. B. EFFECT OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT RULES ON THE VALIDITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS Noncompliance with MCR 9.231(B) does not automatically render the proceedings invalid. MCR 9.211(D), which addresses errors and irregularities in JTC proceedings, states, “An investigation or proceeding under this subchapter may not be held invalid by reason of a nonprejudicial irregularity or for an error not resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” MCR 9.211(D) functions similarly to our criminal harmless-error statute, MCL 4 These amendments were made after respondent’s hearing occurred. 5 The changes to MCR 9.221(C) relate only to subpoenas; no changes were made to MCR 9.231(B) or MCR 9.210(F)(4). Thus, even under the current rules, a master is still required to set a place for a hearing. For similar reasons, the JTC’s reliance on Administrative Order No. 2020-19, which this Court issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, is misplaced. The only effect that administrative order had on JTC proceedings was to allow a subpoena to require a party or witness to appear remotely. The administrative order required courts to continue using remote participation technology as much as possible, but the JTC is not a court; therefore, the administrative order did not allow the master to appear remotely, nor did it allow the master to require respondent to appear remotely to observe the testimony of other witnesses. 7 769.26, except in the judicial discipline context. See 6 Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice, Text (7th ed), § 9211.3, p 774. Although the remote nature of the hearing meant that the master, respondent, and respondent’s attorneys were unable to observe the body language of witnesses or verify that witnesses were not referring to materials or other individuals in the room for guidance, respondent has not demonstrated any miscarriage of justice that resulted from his hearing being held remotely. He was not deprived of the ability to put on a defense, and he was able to—and in fact did—examine and cross-examine witnesses. See MCR 9.233(A) (“The public hearing must conform as nearly as possible to the rules of procedure and evidence governing the trial of civil actions in the circuit court.”). Most significantly, nearly all the pertinent facts in this case were undisputed. Under these circumstances, holding respondent’s hearing remotely did not result in a miscarriage of justice.