Opinion ID: 1903131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Method of Challenge to Revocation of Work Release.

Text: Maghee challenged the revocation of his work release by filing this postconviction-relief action. The district court dismissed his action on the State's motion, ruling the revocation should have been contested in an administrative appeal to the Iowa parole board. Based upon our review of prior case law and the current statutory scheme, we conclude a postconviction-relief action is the proper vehicle to challenge the revocation of work release and resulting transfer to a secure facility. We begin our discussion by recognizing the district court's ruling was entirely consistent with this court's decision in Dougherty v. State, 323 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1982). In that case, we considered whether a revocation of . . . work release can be challenged by a postconviction action and concluded the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 17A, provides the exclusive method for attacking the revocation. Dougherty, 323 N.W.2d at 249. Maghee claims this case is no longer good law because the statutory mechanism governing work release and its revocation has changed considerably. We question whether Dougherty was correct when decided, but in any event we are confident it is no longer good law. To understand why Dougherty must be overruled, it is necessary to review our cases addressing the scope and interplay of Iowa's Administrative Procedure Act and other methods of obtaining relief from unlawful government action. A. Prior Case Law. We start with Allen v. State , a case predating Iowa's adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act. Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 1974), departed from as stated in Davis v. State, 345 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1984). In that case, an inmate filed a postconviction-relief action, asserting institutional disciplinary procedures violated his due process rights. Id. at 531. This court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing the prisoner's claim on the basis it was not properly raised in a postconviction action. Id. We noted the postconviction-relief statute was intended to provide a vehicle to challenge the validity of a `conviction or sentence.' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa Code § 663A.2 (1973) (now codified at Iowa Code § 822.2 (2009))). In contrast, prison discipline should be challenged by way of a habeas corpus action, we advised. Id. Several years later, after enactment of chapter 17A, this court was asked to decide whether the contested case procedures outlined in that chapter applied to prison disciplinary proceedings. See Langley v. Scurr, 305 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Iowa 1981). In Langley, an inmate claimed prison officials failed to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of chapter 17A when they disciplined him for participating in a fracas at the prison hospital. Id. We held chapter 17A did not apply to prison disciplinary proceedings because contested cases included only those proceedings required by statute or the constitution `to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.' Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.2(2) (1981)). In rejecting the inmate's claim that chapter 17A required an evidentiary hearing, we summarily concluded: We think the legislature did not include prison disciplinary committees within the definition of agencies under section 17A.2(1). Id. Shortly after our Langley decision, we decided Dougherty, a postconviction-relief action in which an inmate challenged the revocation of his work release. 323 N.W.2d at 249. At the time of the events giving rise to the action in Dougherty, a work release committee had the authority to revoke an inmate's work release. Id. at 250 (citing Iowa Code §§ 247A.3, .4 (1981)). With no analysis, we concluded the committee's revocation decision was agency action within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 17A.2 (1) (1981)). We distinguished Langley, in which we had held a prison disciplinary committee was not an agency under section 17A.2(1), on the basis that the work release committee was created by statute. Id. (Because the work release committee is established by statute, it differs from the prison disciplinary committee involved in Langley . . . .). Having concluded that chapter 17A applied to the work release committee, we then considered whether the judicial review provisions of chapter 17A provided the exclusive means to challenge revocation of work release. Id. We pointed out that, by the terms of the act, its judicial review provisions were the exclusive means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of [such] agency action except as expressly provided otherwise by another statute referring to chapter 17A by name. Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1981)). We held that, because the postconviction statute did not expressly negate the applicability of chapter 17A, chapter 17A provided the exclusive means for challenging a chapter 247A work release revocation. Id. Two years later, this court again addressed the availability of the postconviction-relief statute as a means of challenging prison discipline. See Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 98. In Davis, an inmate contested a disciplinary sanction of thirty-six months in administrative segregation and the loss of other privileges in a postconviction action notwithstanding the Allen decision holding that prisoners could not use postconviction-relief actions to challenge prison discipline. Id. Although the postconviction-relief statute had been amended after Allen to encompass a prisoner's claim that the department had unlawfully forfeited the inmate's good-time credits, the State argued disciplinary proceedings that did not involve the forfeiture of credits, such as the one at issue in Davis, could not be challenged in a postconviction-relief action. Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 663A.2(6) (1983) (now codified at Iowa Code § 822.2(1)( f ) (2009))). The inmate argued his claim was encompassed in subsection (5) of section 663A.2, which allows postconviction review if the convicted person `is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint.' Id. at 99 (quoting Iowa Code § 663A.2(5) (1983) (now codified at Iowa Code § 822.2(1)( e ) (2009))). Acknowledging that subsection (5) existed at the time of this court's decision in Allen, we concluded nonetheless that substantial reasons exist for departing from the position taken in Allen with respect to postconviction review of the actions of prison officials which involve a substantial deprivation of liberty or property rights. Id. The primary reason for our decision to overrule Allen was this court's belief that [i]t would be unwieldly [sic] to require separate actions and different procedures to review prison disciplinary proceedings depending on the type of punishment imposed. Id. We held, therefore, that disciplinary challenges involving substantial deprivation of liberty or property interests should be litigated in postconviction-relief actions. Id. The final decision of relevance here is Drennan v. Ault, 567 N.W.2d 411 (Iowa 1997). In Drennan, an inmate serving time for operating while intoxicated (OWI) was placed in a community-based corrections program. 567 N.W.2d at 412. After the inmate violated a number of institutional rules, he was transferred to a secure facility. Id. The inmate brought a postconviction-relief action challenging the procedures employed by the department of corrections. Id. Citing our Davis decision, we observed: Both parties agree Drennan's appeal is properly reviewable as a postconviction action. Id. at 413 (citing Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 99). Our citation to Davis implies that we considered the disciplinary proceeding in Davis, in which the inmate's violation of an institutional rule resulted in the inmate's administrative segregation, the same as, or analogous to, the proceeding in Drennan, in which the inmate's violation of institutional rules resulted in the inmate's transfer to a more secure setting. With these cases in mind, we now consider whether Maghee's challenge to his transfer is properly reviewed in a postconviction action under chapter 822. B. Applicability of Postconviction-Relief Provisions of Chapter 822. Maghee argues that, since our decision in Dougherty, the mechanism for revocation of work release has changed, undermining the basis for our decision in that case. Now, the department of corrections is responsible for termination of work release in accordance with rules of the department. Iowa Code § 904.903 (2003). Under the department's rules, such transfer decisions are made using the same procedure as that for transfer of OWI offenders in community-based programs. See DOC Policy WR/OWI-42 (2006) (providing for structured classification process to remove/transfer offenders from Work Release, OWI and Pre-Placement programs to an institution setting). As illustrated by Drennan and this case, transfer decisions for prisoners in work release or community-based correctional programs are often triggered by rule violations. See also Iowa Code § 904.513(1)( b )(4) (2003) (stating that assignment of OWI violators may be made as a disciplinary measure). In this respect, there is little to distinguish the nature of a proceeding resulting in transfer under DOC Policy WR/OWI-42 and a disciplinary proceeding resulting in administrative segregation, as occurred in Davis. We think the following observation in Davis is now equally applicable to proceedings resulting in the transfer of an inmate from work release to a secure institution: It would be [unwieldy] to require separate actions and different procedures to review prison disciplinary proceedings depending on the type of punishment imposed. Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 99. There is simply no principled reason to distinguish a transfer from work release to a secure institution from a transfer from the general prison population to segregation when both are based on rule violations. Surely if the latter transfer decision falls within section 822.2(5) (2003), providing for postconviction review if the convicted person is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint, as we held in Davis, then the transfer decision at issue in this proceeding does as well. While it is true transfers from work release and community-based correctional programs can occur for reasons other than a disciplinary one, see DOC Policy WR/OWI-42 (listing reasons for transfer, including a mental condition that cannot be managed in work or community release), we think a more manageable and consistent review process results when all transfer decisions are subject to the same postconviction-relief method of review. Cf. Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 99 (noting desirability of using same review procedure for all disciplinary proceedings). The State argues that Davis cannot be applied here because work release decisions do not implicate a substantial liberty or property interest. See Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 99 (holding disciplinary challenges involving substantial deprivation of liberty or property interests may be litigated in postconviction-relief actions). The State points out that this court has held a prisoner transferred from a community-based correctional program to prison has no due process liberty interest. Drennan, 567 N.W.2d at 414. The State's argument confuses the ultimate merits of Maghee's claim with his right to present his claim. In this appeal, we address only the proper vehicle for Maghee's challenge to the department's decision to transfer him from work release to secure confinement. Whether his challenge has any merit is a different question. Cf. Lewis Cent. Educ. Ass'n v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam'rs, 625 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 2001) (noting chapter 17A subjects nearly all agency action to judicial review, but `[s]uccess on the merits in such cases . . . is another thing' (emphasis omitted) (quoting Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 1-102(2) cmt. (1981))). C. Exclusivity of Chapter 17A. We now address the State's argument that, even if a work-release transfer decision falls within the scope of chapter 822, inmates subject to such decisions must follow the judicial review procedure of chapter 17A. The State cites to our discussion in Dougherty that chapter 17A is the exclusive vehicle for review of agency action except as expressly provided otherwise by another statute referring to chapter 17A by name, and our conclusion that the postconviction statute does not contain an express reference to chapter 17A. 323 N.W.2d at 250 (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1981)). Maghee responds that the internal committee responsible for transfer decisions is outside the scope of chapter 17A, just like the disciplinary committee in Langley. In Langley, we summarily concluded chapter 17A did not apply to disciplinary proceedings because prison disciplinary committees were not agencies as defined in chapter 17A. 305 N.W.2d at 419. We choose not to rely on Langley and its unsupported conclusion. [3] Instead, we are convinced the exclusivity provisions of chapter 17A do not prevent an inmate from challenging the department's transfer decision in a postconviction-relief action. Since our Dougherty decision, we have taken a less rigid view of the exclusivity provisions of chapter 17A. There are three references in chapter 17A to exclusivity, and we address each separately. 1. Section 17A.1(2). Section 17A.1(2) contains a statement of purpose that provides in relevant part: This chapter is meant to apply to all rulemaking and contested case proceedings and all suits for the judicial review of agency action that are not specifically excluded from this chapter or some portion thereof by its express terms or by the express terms of another chapter. Iowa Code § 17A.1(2) (2003). In Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1987), we held: Section 17A.1(2) is susceptible of an interpretation that, where actions for judicial review of agency action are in fact brought, they shall be maintained in accordance with the provisions of section 17A.19. It does not speak to the issue of exclusivity. 398 N.W.2d at 865. Therefore, section 17A.1(2) does not prevent Maghee's pursuit of a postconviction-relief action. 2. Section 17A.19. This section outlines the judicial review process and contains the following statement: Except as expressly provided otherwise by another statute referring to this chapter by name, the judicial review provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of such agency action. However, nothing in this chapter shall abridge or deny to any person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any agency action the right to seek relief from such action in the courts. Iowa Code § 17A.19 para. 1 (2003). We considered the effect of this provision in City of Des Moines v. City Development Board, 633 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 2001). In that case, the City of Des Moines had sought judicial review of a decision of the City Development Board to stay proceedings on an annexation petition filed by the city. City of Des Moines, 633 N.W.2d at 307. The district court determined the city's petition for judicial review was timely filed, but dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 309. On appeal, the timeliness of the city's filing depended on whether the judicial review provisions found in chapter 17A or the conflicting provisions in Iowa Code chapter 368 controlled. Id. at 309-10. Chapter 368 creates the City Development Board and also contains a set of provisions for judicial review of board decisions that are to be applied together with chapter 17A judicial review provisions. Id. at 310 (citing Iowa Code § 368.22 (1997)). In concluding chapter 368 controlled, this court relied on the principle that, when two pertinent statutes cannot be harmonized, the court will apply the statute that deals with the subject in a more definite and minute way, as opposed to a statute that deals with [the] subject in a general and comprehensive manner. Id. at 311. Applying this principle, we held that chapter 368, as the more specific statute, governed. Id. at 312. We acknowledged the language of section 17A.19, quoted above, but concluded there is no indication our legislature intended to make section 17A.19(3) controlling. Id. While the conflict here between chapter 17A and chapter 822 is more comprehensive than the conflict considered in City of Des Moines, we think the analysis should be the same. As we discussed above, Maghee's claim falls within chapter 822, allowing review of the department's transfer decision in a postconviction-relief action. Even though the department's decision may also fall within chapter 17A, we think the more specific statutechapter 822 should control the procedure for judicial review. The legislature provided for postconviction review of specified claims, some of which could only arise from agency action by the department. See Iowa Code § 822.2(6) (2003) (providing for postconviction review of claims that earned-time credits were unlawfully forfeited) (now codified at Iowa Code § 822.2(1)( f ) (2009)). If we were to conclude that chapter 17A provided the exclusive means to obtain review of agency action by the department, we would render subsection (6) a nullity. We do not believe the legislature intended such a result by its enactment of section 17A.19. See Iowa Code § 4.4(2) (2009) (stating presumption that in enacting a statute, legislature intends the entire statute to be effective); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Alamo Motel, 264 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Iowa 1978) (We cannot presume the legislature intended to enact a futile or ineffectual law or one that would lead to absurd consequences.). Nonetheless, before we conclude that chapter 822 provides the method for review of agency action falling within its terms, rather than chapter 17A, we must consider the last provision in chapter 17A that talks about the exclusivity of that chapter. 3. Section 17A.23. Section 17A.23 addresses the construction of chapter 17A, stating in relevant part: Except as expressly provided otherwise by this chapter or by another statute referring to this chapter by name, the rights created and the requirements imposed by this chapter shall be in addition to those created or imposed by every other statute in existence on July 1, 1975, or enacted after that date. If any other statute in existence on July 1, 1975, or enacted after that date diminishes a right conferred upon a person by this chapter or diminishes a requirement imposed upon an agency by this chapter, this chapter shall take precedence unless the other statute expressly provides that it shall take precedence over all or some specified portion of this named chapter. The Iowa administrative procedure Act shall be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. This chapter shall also be construed to apply to all agencies not expressly exempted by this chapter or by another statute specifically referring to this chapter by name; and except as to proceedings in process on July 1, 1975, this chapter shall be construed to apply to all covered agency proceedings and all agency action not expressly exempted by this chapter or by another statute specifically referring to this chapter by name. Iowa Code § 17A.23 paras. 1-2 (2003). In Jew, we considered whether a sex discrimination claim against the University of Iowa could be pursued under our state civil rights statute, Iowa Code chapter 601A (1985) (now codified at Iowa Code chapter 216 (2009)), as an original action in district court or whether chapter 17A provided the exclusive means of review of the university's actions. 398 N.W.2d at 863. We rejected the defendants' contention that, in claims based on action by state agencies, [section 17A.23] create[s] a conclusive presumption of the exclusivity of the chapter 17A judicial review procedure over all other statutory remedies, unless the competing legislation has negated application of [chapter 17A] by specific reference somewhere in its provisions. Id. at 864. We observed that the exclusivity of chapter 17A as a means of assailing acts or omissions of administrative agencies, must necessarily vary, based on the context of the transaction. Id. We held that, with respect to other agency action in particular, the lines of exclusivity are not as rigidly drawn as defendants' argument suggests. Id. We concluded that where, as in the present case, the action challenged bears scant relation to the agency's statutory mandate or supposed area of expertise, agency employees should enjoy the same right to pursue matured statutory causes of action as other employees. This is particularly true where public employees are expressly included as beneficiaries of the enabling statute in its definitional provisions. Id. We distinguished our decision in Dougherty, noting in that case the action challenged was the very decision which the agency's mandate directed it to make. Id. at 865. As for the exclusivity provisions, we concluded our decision to allow the plaintiff to pursue an original action in the district court under the civil rights act based on actions of a state agency did not run counter to the `specific reference' mandates of . . . section 17A.23. Id. Focusing only on the first paragraph of section 17A.23, we reasoned: Section 17A.23 also talks around the subject of exclusivity, except with regard to statutes diminishing rights conferred upon a person by chapter 17A. No suggestion has been made in the present case that section 601A.16(1) or any other provision of chapter 601A serves to diminish plaintiff's rights under chapter 17A. Id. We did not discuss the second paragraph of section 17A.23 in Jew. We did, however, consider the meaning of the second paragraph in a later case. In Lewis Central Education Association, we construed the second paragraph as addressing the unreviewability of agency action: Under the Iowa act, there is clearly no room for a presumption of unreviewability; any exception under our act must be express and specifically name the act. 625 N.W.2d at 691 (referring to section 17A.23). Based on our construction of section 17A.23 in Jew and Lewis Central Education Association, we are convinced that allowing postconviction review of disciplinary decisions of the department of corrections, whether the resulting discipline is the forfeiture of earned-time credits, administrative segregation, or transfer out of a work release or other community program, does not contravene that statute. The decisions of the department are certainly not rendered unreviewable by allowing review under chapter 822 rather than chapter 17A. Moreover, Maghee does not claim that any provision of chapter 822 diminishes his rights under chapter 17A. And finally, it would violate our rules of statutory construction to conclude that chapter 822 encompasses no agency action notwithstanding its express provisions making agency action subject to chapter 822 review procedures. We recognize disciplinary decisions are within the mandate of the department of corrections, a factor deemed important in Jew. Nonetheless, this fact does not outweigh the other factors that support our conclusion that chapter 822, not chapter 17A, provides the method of review for decisions falling within section 822.2. For these reasons, we find no basis to distinguish Maghee's claim from those asserted in Drennan and Davis with respect to the appropriate method to challenge the department's transfer decision. Therefore, we overrule our Dougherty decision, hold Maghee properly sought review through a postconviction-relief action, and reverse the district court's contrary decision dismissing Maghee's petition on this basis.