Opinion ID: 220788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pabon's Confrontation Clause Claim

Text: Pabon claims that the introduction at trial of the confession of DeJesus, Pabon's non-testifying codefendant, violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right under Bruton. To resolve whether this claim is debatable, we make a threshold inquiry regarding the application of Bruton and its progeny to Pabon's trial and conviction. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029.
Trials with multiple defendants create opportunities for violations of the Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination. Bruton held that, in a joint trial, a defendant's right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated by introducing a non-testifying codefendant's confession that implicates the defendant as a participant in the crime. Such statements violate the Sixth Amendment even when the jury is explicitly instructed that the testimony at issue is only to be considered as evidence against the codefendant. [10] This is because jurors in joint trials cannot be expected to perform the overwhelming task of considering a codefendant's confession in determining the guilt or innocence of the declarant and then of ignoring it in determining the guilt or innocence of any codefendants.... Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131, 88 S.Ct. 1620. [11] In these circumstances, jury instructions are intrinsically ineffective because the inadmissible confession cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. Id. at 129, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Supreme Court elaborated on Bruton 's core holding in a case issued the same day, Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 194, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987). When a defendant's confession substantially interlocks with the non-testifying codefendant's confession, this exacerbates the potential for a Bruton violation rather than rectifying it. Id. at 192, 107 S.Ct. 1714. This is because it is not the reliability of the codefendant's confession that is at issue in Bruton situations, but the likelihood that the jury is not able to disregard it. Id. at 192-93, 107 S.Ct. 1714. The more interlocking the codefendant's confession, the less likely jurors will be capable of putting it out of their minds in deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. Thus, while a codefendant's confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, [it would be] enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant's alleged confession. Id. at 192, 107 S.Ct. 1714. The damage to the defendant might be less devastating if [he] were standing by his confession.... Id. (emphasis in original). However, in the real world of criminal litigation, [when] the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession, the damage is significant, like that in Bruton. Id. (emphasis in original). Two subsequent cases addressed the thorny issue of redacted statements of non-testifying codefendants. In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court held that when any reference to [the defendant's] existence has been removed and the confession bec[omes incriminating] only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial, limiting instructions may cure what would otherwise be a Bruton violation. 481 U.S. 200, 211, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). While the testimony in Bruton directly named the defendant, in Richardson the confession was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with the defendant's testimony. Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The Court noted that [w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence. Id. However, the distinction between directly naming a codefendant and indirect linkage is not rigid. Even redacted confessions that remove the defendant's name completely, using a blank space or neutral pronoun instead, may sometimes violate Bruton. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998). Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as `deleted' or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration... so closely resemble Bruton 's unredacted statements that ... the law must require the same result. Id. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151. An obvious deletion is likely to call the jurors' attention specifically to the removed name and may overemphasize the importance of the confession's accusation. Id. at 193, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Jury instructions are likely to exacerbate the situation, as the instruction itself will provide an obvious reason for the [redaction]. Id. In limiting Richardson, Gray noted that inference [connecting a codefendant's statement to the defendant] pure and simple cannot make the critical difference between a Bruton violation and permissible testimony under Richardson. Id. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1151. It is the  kind of, not the simple fact of, inference that might lead a jury to infer that testimony incriminated a codefendant in some redacted statements but not others. Id. at 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (emphases in original). Thus, context is relevant to determining whether a Bruton violation has occurred, regardless whether the challenged testimony has been redacted or curative instructions given. For example, our Court held in Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir.2008), that even when neutral pronoun substitution or its equivalent is used (in that case, my boy or the other guy), if there is a strong implication that the non-testifying codefendant's confession refers to the defendant, it may still violate Bruton despite the substitution and use of jury instructions. [12] In addition, the number of codefendants that could be implicated in a Gray analysis, where redactions or substitutions have been used, is also important. Compare United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir.2001) ( Bruton violated where only three people were involved in crime) with Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 400-01 (3d Cir.2004) (another guy did not implicate any particular person given that at least 15 persons were involved in the crime, and the placeholder used was bereft of any innuendo [linking] them to particular defendants, in contrast to Richards in which redactions were tantamount to an explicit reference to a codefendant). Under AEDPA's deferential review standard, our Court in Vazquez rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's seeming bright-line rule that when terms like `my boy,' the `other guy,' or the `other man' are used [as substitutions,] ... there cannot be a Bruton violation. Vazquez, 550 F.3d at 281. Rather, as Vazquez instructs, using a bright line is an unreasonable application `of clearly established Federal law under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States' given the necessity of determining how strongly a codefendant's statement implicates the defendant and the likelihood that it would be disregarded by the jury. Id. at 282.
Pabon's codefendant DeJesus confessed to the crime (from the conspiracy to murder Vargas through payment he received for the murder) in a statement recorded by Detective McDermott. The relevant portion of DeJesus's confession that Detective McDermott read to the jury at trial follows: Question, José, when the shootings happened, how many times did you shoot? Answer, like a good twelve times. I was standing in front of [Vargas]'s car shooting into it. Question, did you see a female standing near [Vargas]'s car when you were shooting? Answer, yeah. She was on the side of the car. I screamed at her, yo, get the fuck out of here. She moved away, and that is how I know I didn't hit the girl. I am standing real close to [Vargas]'s car, so I know that everything I shot was at [Vargas]. How could I miss, I was so close. Question, do you know how the two females who were standing on Franklin Street were shot ? Answer, no, I didn't even see them. . . . Question, José, is there anything you would like to add to your statement? Answer, Yeah. I know that I didn't shoot the girl who got killed. Another should be arrested for this. (N.T. 8/2/99: 42-44) (emphases added). As noted above, DeJesus's statement initially implicated Pagan. It stated that the person who should be arrested for Carisquilla's shooting should be the person who paid it off ( i.e., provided money and weapons). (N.T. 8/2/99: 22-23). However, it was truncated to stop at another should be arrested for this, with all further references to Pagan's identity and role deleted, as Pagan's counsel requested because of his own client's Bruton rights. (N.T. 8/2/99: 1-33). The prosecution, defense counsel, and trial court were involved in redacting DeJesus's statement. Judge Greenspan instructed the jury that DeJesus's confession could only be used as evidence against him, not any of his codefendants. (N.T. 8/2/99: 38-39). She repeated this caution at the end of trial in regard to Pabon in particular. Though DeJesus's confession did not identify Pabon by name, he argues that the use of another (in the statement [a]nother should be arrested for this) was an unnatural locution that revealed reference to a codefendant's participation in the shooting. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (obvious indications of alteration may cause a Bruton violation even in a redacted statement). He claims that DeJesus's confession would have implicated Pagan, had it not been truncated, but was altered to implicate Pabon (or Hernandez or Guatauba) as read to the jury at trial. In context, DeJesus's statement that another should be arrested for Carrisquilla's death does seem to refer to another of the alleged shooters. [13] It is in a passage of DeJesus's confession discussing how the shooting occurred, making the natural inference from the cropped statement that DeJesus was implicating another shooter. Of the five codefendants, two were not alleged to have been shooters, Pagan and Centeno. That leaves only Pabon, Hernandez, and Guatauba (with DeJesus the fourth alleged shooter) as the person referred to as another. If the jury credited DeJesus's confession that he shot Vargas but another should be arrested for shooting Carisquilla, Pabon and Hernandez are the only two codefendants to whom he plausibly could have referred in this passage of his confession (three persons in all could have been referenced, but one was not a codefendant [14] ). While this is not so clear-cut a situation that only one defendant is implicated by a codefendant's statement, it is also a far cry from the situation in Priester, for example, in which 15 codefendants were all equally implicated. 382 F.3d at 401. Here, because one of three persons was implicated by the statement, it is possible that attempting to avoid a Bruton violation for one codefendant may have created one for two of the others. [15] In addition, as noted above, Pabon allegedly confessed to shooting toward Franklin Street, the street from which shots were fired at Ortiz. (N.T. 7/30/99: 64). This increases the likelihood that DeJesus's statement regarding the shooting of two females who were standing on Franklin Street was particularly damaging to Pabon (rather than Hernandez or Guatauba, the other alleged shooters). Pabon claims that his challenged confession is cumulative to the harm suffered ... because of the admission of the DeJesus statement.... Pabon Br. 22. The potential corroboration of Pabon's confession by DeJesus's does raise flags under Cruz. That is, the interlocking nature of these two confessions makes it less likely, not more, that curative instructions would solve the Bruton problem. Reinforcing this point, Pabon also argues that the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury contended that Pabon and DeJesus's confessions corroborated each other. (N.T. 8/4/99: 94). In these ways, DeJesus's confession may have prejudiced Pabon by increasing the likelihood that the jury would believe he was one of the shooters.
The DA asserts that the state trial court reasonably concluded that Pabon's Bruton claim is plainly meritless. Supp. Br. for Appellees 28. As noted, however, in Vazquez we rejected explicitly the bright-line approach taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, under which a substitution of a pronoun for a name is adequate provided no specific name was used and limiting instructions were given. Vazquez, 550 F.3d at 282. That same flawed, bright-line approach was applied in deciding Pabon's direct appeal. This implies that Pabon's Bruton claim was decided under Pennsylvania case law that is an unreasonable application of Federal law. Id. In addition, Judge Greenspan repeatedly emphasized the curative instructions issued at several times during the trial. These instructions, however, are beside the point. The central premise of Bruton is that [l]imiting instructions may not in fact erase the prejudice created by a codefendant's confession. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Moreover, as Cruz noted, under Bruton it is the likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded, not the quality of the instruction or its repetition, that is relevant in determining whether a Bruton violation has occurred. Cruz, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S.Ct. 1714. The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that instructions can exacerbate the problem jurors face in trying to segregate evidence that is admissible as to one codefendant but not another. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 193, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Thus, the Court that decided Pabon's direct appeal should have focused on the degree to which DeJesus's confession implicated Pabon and the extent of any resulting prejudice in the particular circumstances of the trial, rather than the quality or number of jury instructions given.