Opinion ID: 2457806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Background: Relevant Authority on the Question of Waiver of Counsel Federal Cases

Text: ¶ 9 In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court affirmed a defendant's constitutional right to represent himself at trial, implied under the federal Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Faretta, there was no question as to the defendant's competency. See id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (observing that [t]he record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will). The Court did not find an absolute right to self-representation, but rather required that the waiver of counsel be knowing and intelligent. Id. In choosing self-representation, a defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). Thus, although Faretta recognized that the right to self-representation is rooted in `that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law,' id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring)), it placed on that right certain limits. ¶ 10 The outer bounds of those limits were explored in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379. There, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a state may insist that a defendant who is found mentally competent to stand trial must nevertheless proceed to trial with counsel, rather than be allowed to represent himself. Id. at 167, 128 S.Ct. 2379. Recognizing that Faretta and authority since Faretta placed limits on the right to self-representation, id. at 171, 128 S.Ct. 2379, the Edwards Court further held that it is constitutionally permissible for a state to deny a defendant pro se status on the ground that [he] lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense even though he was found competent to stand trial. Id. at 174, 128 S.Ct. 2379. ¶ 11 The Edwards Court observed that the standard to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial assumes he will assist in his defense, not conduct his defense, and therefore competency to stand trial does not automatically equate to a right to self-representation. Id. at 174-75, 128 S.Ct. 2379. In addition, while the dignity and autonomy of an individual underscore the right to self-representation, in the Edwards court's view, [A] right of self-representation at trial will not affirm the dignity of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel. To the contrary, given that defendant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling. Id. at 176, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (citation omitted) (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)). Furthermore, insofar as a defendant's lack of capacity [for self-representation] threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. Id. at 176-77, 128 S.Ct. 2379. Finally, in addition to a concern that the proceeding be fair, the Edwards court also worried that self-representation in this context might damage the appearance of fairness observers expect from our justice system. Id. at 177, 128 S.Ct. 2379. ¶ 12 With these concerns in mind, the Edwards Court concluded that it is constitutionally permissible for a state to set limits on a defendant's pro se right even when he is competent to stand trial. However, the Edwards Court declined to announce a constitutional standard by which courts must judge a defendant's right to self-representation when his competency to stand trial has been questioned. Id. at 178, 128 S.Ct. 2379.