Opinion ID: 199140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Otero's Testimony Was Also Inadmissible

Text: Hearsay. Before appellant took the stand, his attorney tried to elicit the same information about Gonzalez' involvement in firearms dealing from Otero, the co-defendant whose case was severed before trial. On redirect examination, Otero testified that, after driving the wounded Betancourt to the hospital and dropping off the other passengers, he proceeded to a friend's house, where the police caught up with him. Observing the officers checking out his vehicle, Otero fled on foot. Counsel asked Otero whether, at the time the police were looking at his car, he knew Gonzalez was involved in anything illegal. The government objected, claiming the question was beyond the scope of its cross examination. The court sustained the objection.4 At sidebar, counsel argued for admitting the statement to show Otero's state of mind: he fled fearing retribution from the police because he was aware Gonzalez was a crooked cop. 4 The Rules of Evidence do not explicitly address the scope of redirect, but state only that cross examination should be limited to the scope of direct. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). We have recognized the Eighth Circuit's rule granting trial courts discretion to limit redirect examination to the scope of cross. See United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 226 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Braidlow, 806 F.2d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1986)). We need not further address that issue today, however, because the district court ruled in the alternative that the proffered statement was hearsay, and we deem this alternative ruling correct. -16- Otero had testified earlier that he knew of Gonzalez from Betancourt prior to the carjacking, but had no personal knowledge of a debt owed by Gonzalez purportedly due to dealings in illegal firearms. The court sustained the objection, ruling that the question called for inadmissible hearsay. This ruling seems entirely proper. The fact of any illicit activity on the part of Gonzalez could not be proven through the back door, so to speak, by the state of Otero's mind, which was irrelevant to appellant's case. C. Prosecutor's Closing Appellant's third claim of error is that, during his closing argument, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a government witness and made derogatory remarks about defense witnesses. Because none of the offensive statements were objected to, our review is for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294, 302 (1st Cir. 1999).5 During his closing argument, the prosecutor referred to Aleman's plea agreement, in which she had pledged to testify honestly, suggesting that Aleman had no incentive to lie and had 5 The one comment to which an objection was made -- the penalties at the federal level are a lot stiffer than at the local level -- was ameliorated by a limiting instruction, which rendered any error harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). -17- indeed testified truthfully.6 Because the verdict in this case turned, in part, on Aleman's credibility, appellant argues that the prosecution's assurance about her testimony was plain error. Although a prosecutor may not place the prestige of the government behind a witness by making personal assurances about the witness's credibility, United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999), an argument that does no more than assert reasons why a witness ought to be accepted as truthful by the jury is not improper witness vouching. United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 123 (1st Cir. 2000). Here, the prosecutor simply pointed out a fact in evidence -- that Aleman's plea agreement required her to testify candidly -- and asserted that she had upheld her end of the bargain by doing so. This was not error. See Bey, 188 F.3d at 7 ([A] prosecutor properly may admit a witness's plea agreement into evidence, discuss the details of the plea during closing arguments, and comment upon a witness's incentive to testify truthfully.) (citing United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 156 (1st Cir. 1991)). 6 The specific passage to which appellant takes exception reads: I submit to you she is testifying, she has a plea agreement, she has kept that plea agreement. . . . She has a plea agreement to testify truthfully. . . . I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you can consider the fact, consider the fact that she has indeed testified truthfully. -18- Appellant enumerates several derogatory comments as improperly discrediting himself and other defense witnesses. These remarks generally suggest that appellant concocted the story about Gonzalez' involvement in selling illegal weapons to paint the shooting as precipitated by a dispute over a debt, not a carjacking. For example, in reference to appellant's testimony, the prosecutor told the jury: you do not have to believe that which nobody else will believe; [y]ou have a right not to have anyone insult your intelligence; you cannot cover the sky with your hands . . . . [Appellant] has had approximately two and a half years [in pretrial detention] to come up with this story. Referring to Gonzalez and Betancourt, the prosecutor remarked, Dead men don't come to testify in court. So now it's very easy to try to put words in the mouths of dead people and build a story around these two individuals. And in reference to appellant's cousins, he said, the testimony of both of the Esquilin sisters are [sic] part of a fabrication. We have considered each of these remarks and find no one particularly egregious; nor do they rise to the level of plain error in the aggregate because they did not affect[] the outcome of the proceedings. United States v. Hughes, 211 F.3d 676, 684 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). -19- For the foregoing reasons, the conviction is affirmed. -20-