Opinion ID: 1115370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Interests of the State

Text: Balanced against the foregoing negative impact on candidates and voters flowing from the challenged measure are the considerable state interests assertedly promoted thereby. In the words of new article IV, section 1.5, of the state Constitution, term limitations are deemed necessary to restore free, fair, and competitive elections, to encourage qualified candidates to seek public office, and to eliminate unfair incumbent advantages that have resulted in an extremely high number of incumbents and created a class of career politicians instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers. According to respondents, the state's interests in limiting incumbency should support measures considerably stronger than a mere temporary disability from holding office. As respondents argue, the state's strong interests in protecting against an entrenched, dynastic legislative bureaucracy, and in thereby encouraging new candidates to seek public office, are both legitimate and compelling ones that support a lifetime ban from the office and outweigh any interest the incumbent legislators, or the voting public, may have in perpetuating the incumbents' positions of control. The legitimacy of the foregoing asserted state interests in limiting incumbency are well recognized in analogous contexts. As stated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in rejecting a similar challenge to a state constitutional amendment limiting the right of the Governor to seek a third consecutive term, Constitutional restrictions circumscribing the ability of incumbents to succeed themselves appear in over twenty state constitutions, and exist in the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States with regard to the Presidency. The universal authority is that restriction upon the succession of incumbents serves a rational public policy and that, while restrictions may deny qualified men an opportunity to serve, as a general rule the over-all health of the body politic is enhanced by limitations on continuous tenure. [Citations and fn. omitted]. ( State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney (1976) 159 W. Va. 513 [223 S.E.2d 607, 611] [hereafter Maloney ], app. dism. sub nom. Moore v. McCartney (1976) 425 U.S. 946 [48 L.Ed.2d 190, 96 S.Ct. 1689]; see Maddox v. Fortson (1970) 226 Ga. 71 [172 S.E.2d 595, 598-599], cert. den. 397 U.S. 149 [25 L.Ed.2d 183, 90 S.Ct. 999]; cf. Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic Process: Voter Standing to Challenge Abuses of Incumbency (1988) 49 Ohio St. L.J. 773 et seq.; Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) § 13-18, at p. 1097 [Democracy envisions rule by successive temporary majorities. The capacity to displace incumbents in favor of the representatives of a recently coalesced majority is, therefore, an essential attribute of the election system in a democratic republic.]; cf. Annot. (1958) 59 A.L.R.2d 716 [construction and effect of incumbency limitation laws].) The Maloney decision continues by describing at length the substantial reasons for limiting the right of incumbents to succeed themselves. These include The power of incumbent officeholders to develop networks of patronage and attendant capacities to deliver favorably disposed voters to the polls, fears of an entrenched political machine which could effectively foreclose access to the political process, and the belief that regularly disrupting those machines would stimulate criticism within political parties and insure a meaningful, adversary, and competitive election. (223 S.E.2d at p. 611.) In addition, Maloney explains that it has long been felt that a limitation upon succession of incumbents removes the temptation to prostitute the government to the perpetuation of a particular administration. [Citation.] ... Meretricious policies which sacrifice the well-being of economic, social, racial, or geographic minorities are most likely where a political figure, political party, or political interest group can rely upon electorate inertia fostered by the hopelessness of encountering a seemingly invincible political machine. (223 S.E.2d at pp. 611-612.) Petitioners observe that Maloney involved a limitation on consecutive terms of a Governor, rather than a lifetime ban on incumbent legislators. They suggest that term limitations on the executive branch are justified by the need to check the substantial concentration of power that the chief executive possesses, a consideration assertedly not applicable to the legislative branch. But we think that many, if not all, of the considerations mentioned in Maloney (e.g., eliminating unfair incumbent advantages, dislodging entrenched political machines, restoring open access to the political process, and stimulating electorate participation) would apply with equal force to the legislative branch. In connection with petitioners' argument that Proposition 140's lifetime ban is unconstitutional, two other cases are instructive, though factually distinguishable. In Clements v. Fashing, supra, 457 U.S. 957, cited with apparent approval in Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. at page 789, footnote 9 [75 L.Ed.2d at page 558], the high court upheld the validity of a Texas statute that rendered incumbent justices of the peace ineligible for the Texas Legislature. The disability from office extended only during the term for which the justices were elected or appointed. A plurality of the high court took the position that barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot do not compel close scrutiny (457 U.S. at p. 963 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 516]), and stressed the de minimis nature of the restriction, noting that the act merely imposed a brief waiting period on current officeholders, and therefore could be sustained by a mere showing of some rational predicate to support it ( id. at pp. 967-968 [73 L.Ed.2d at pp. 518-519]). The Clements v. Fashing plurality did not affirmatively indicate that a lifetime bar to legislative service necessarily would be invalid. Significantly, unlike Proposition 140, the Texas act apparently was not aimed at limiting the powers of incumbency, but was based on the rational predicate that an affected justice will be less inclined to abuse his position or neglect his duties because of the justice's aspirations for higher office. (457 U.S. at p. 968 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 519].) In De Bottari v. Melendez (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 910 [119 Cal. Rptr. 256], the Court of Appeal struck down a local ordinance prohibiting recalled council members from running for city council within a year of the recall. Although petitioners believe the case supports their position, closer scrutiny indicates otherwise. Finding the candidacy restriction too severe, the De Bottari court observed, Cases in other jurisdictions upholding limitations on successive terms in office [citations] involve similar restrictions but are not authoritative here since such limitations serve totally different governmental interests.  (44 Cal. App.3d at p. 913, fn. 1, italics added.) De Bottari, using strict scrutiny, reviewed the interests that assertedly supported a temporary ban on candidacy by recalled candidates and found them insufficient to sustain the restriction. The court had no occasion to review the different interests served by general limitations on incumbency, as outlined by Maloney, supra . In sum, despite its distinguishing features, we conclude that Maloney 's ( supra, 223 S.E.2d 607) analysis is quite pertinent to our determination whether permanent incumbency limitations are supported by legitimate and compelling considerations. We conclude they are so supported.