Opinion ID: 347588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Job Allocations

Text: 35 The plaintiffs-appellants and the amicus EEOC contend that the district court committed plain error in its finding that Stockham has at no time made initial job assignments (either to departments or to specific jobs) on the basis of an employee's race. 394 F.Supp. at 455. We agree. 36 The evidence in the record of pre-Act assignment of employees to departments and jobs by race at Stockham is overwhelming. The plaintiffs adduced testimony from a variety of company officials that the racial allocation of jobs was the general rule. E. Reeves Sims, the employee relations manager, testified: 37 Q (Plaintiffs' attorney) Mr. Sims, do you know of any job prior to 1965 which was manned by both black and white employees? 38 A (Sims) I can't remember one. 39 Q Mr. Sims, I'm referring to your deposition which was taken on the 6th day of November, 1973, to Page 146 and 147 starting on line 17. 40 A May I see it? Q I was going to say 41 MR. NEWTON: Right there. 42 Q Now, if I may, I will read the question. The question was, Was there a time, Mr. Sims, when blacks were initially assigned to some jobs and whites were initially assigned to other jobs as a general rule? Answer: Was there a time? Question: Yes. Answer: Yes. 43 A As a general rule, yes, as a general rule. But you asked me another question in a different context, Mr. Goldstein. 44 Q And if we can continue then on 147, And did this practice continue until 1965? Answer: Yes, sir. 45 Now, Mr. Sims, you say as a general rule that was true? 46 A (Nodding head affirmatively). 47 Q Can you think of any exceptions to that general rule? 48 A Not offhand right now, no sir. 49 Q Now, Mr. Sims, this general rule which we have discussed about there being black jobs and white jobs at the company, is that written down anywhere? 50 A No sir. 51 Q How was it enforced, or how was it put into practice? 52 A It was in practice when I came to Stockham, and 53 Q Would you just say it was a custom? 54 A Yes, sir, custom. 55 Harry M. Burns, vice-president for corporate products, confirmed that there were no jobs at Stockham before 1965 in which both black and white employees were working. Norman E. Carlisle, superintendent of the tapping room, and an employee at Stockham since 1942, reiterated this fact. Terrell G. Burt, manager of technical services, admitted that prior to 1965 only the best qualified whites were considered for clerical positions at Stockham. 10 56 Finally, in addition to the uncontradicted testimony of company officials, the plaintiffs introduced evidence that in June 1965 not one of the several hundred hourly jobs at Stockham was filled by both a black and a white. 11 The plaintiffs augmented the evidence of racial staffing by jobs with statistics showing that in 1965 jobs for whole seniority departments were allocated on the basis of race. For example, eight of twenty departments 12 were 100 percent black in 1965 and two others were more than 95 percent black while two departments were 100 percent white and two additional ones were more than 85 percent white. 13 Further, in those departments staffed by black and white employees blacks were concentrated in jobs with the lowest job classifications. While no blacks worked in jobs classified in job class seven (JC 7) or above, 95 percent of the white workers were employed in jobs classed above JC 6. 14 The employee relations manager, E. Reeves Sims, also testified that blacks were not hired for clerical positions until 1965. 15 In addition, there were no black timekeepers or guards at Stockham before 1965. The salesforce was all white at least until the time of trial. 57 In short, the record demonstrates that the district court plainly erred in concluding that at no time were initial job assignments made on the basis of race at Stockham. The custom of job assignments by race at least until 1965 was established without contrary evidence. The testimony of Stockham officials that segregation within and between departments was the rule plus the plaintiffs' statistics on racial staffing discussed above establish conclusively that Stockham engaged in racially motivated job assignments before 1965. 58 The plaintiffs carry their assertion of discrimination in job assignments into the post-Act period. They contend that all relevant evidence compels the conclusion that discrimination in job assignments continued at least until the time of trial. In support of their contention that racial allocation of employees by departments and by jobs within departments is the usual rule at Stockham the plaintiffs emphasize the patterns revealed by statistical evidence. 59 Chart A bears out this contention. Chart A presents data on the percentage of black employees working in each seniority department in 1973, as compared with the percentage of those employees working in each department in 1965. CHART A 60 DEPARTMENTAL EMPLOYEES BY RACE 1965 % B 1973 % B Seniority Departments B W 1965 B W 1973 -------------------------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- Galvanizing 9 0 100% 15 0 100% Coreroom & Yard 24 0 100% 76 1 99% Grey Iron Foundry 92 0 100% 292 16 95% Final Inspection 16 0 100% 52 4 93% Malleable 88 4 96% 259 19 93% Brass Foundry 30 1 97% 59 8 88% Shipping 22 0 100% 56 8 88% Foundry Inspection 25 0 100% 56 9 86% Dispatching 4 0 100% 27 7 79% Brass Core Room 11 0 100% 11 3 79% Tapping Room 53 16 77% 151 45 77% Valve Finishing Insp. 8 4 67% 20 18 53% Construction 5 6 45% 15 18 45% Valve Machining & Assembly 76 36 68% 70 171 29% Foundry Repairs 4 10 29% 12 55 18% Machine Shop 3 9 25% 8 50 14% Electrical 1 7 12% 2 19 10% Pattern Shop 1 7 12% 3 37 8% Valve Tool Room 0 5 0% 1 17 6% Tapping Tool Room 0 11 0% 2 30 6% 61 Chart A reveals a slight reduction in racial staffing by departments between 1965 and 1973. Nevertheless, in 1973 eleven of the twenty departments 16 were predominantly black, while seven of the departments were predominantly white. Only two departments contained black and white employees in approximately equal numbers. As of September 1973 nine hundred and three or 72 percent of all blacks in the hourly work force worked in the departments of galvanizing, coreroom and yard, grey iron foundry, final inspection, malleable, brass foundry, shipping, foundry inspection, dispatching, and brass coreroom. Only 75 whites or 13 percent of all whites worked in those departments. In September 1973 thirty-six percent or 208 of all whites in the hourly work force and two percent or 28 of all blacks worked in the seniority departments of the tapping tool room, valve tool room, pattern shop, electrical shop, machine shop, and foundry repairs. Even more significantly, of the 162 employees hired since 1965 to work in predominantly white departments, and working as of September 1973, 147 or 90.7 percent were white; whereas, of the 695 hired since 1965 to work in predominantly black departments, 624 or 89.8 percent were black. 17 62 According to the plaintiffs, individual jobs at Stockham have also continued to be assigned largely on the basis of race. Chart B offers statistical support for this contention. 63 NOTE--Some parts of this form are wider than one screen. To view 64 material that exceeds the width of this screen, use the right arrow 65 key. To return to the original screen, use the left arrow key. 66 RACIAL STAFFING OF JOBS AT STOCKHAM  SENIORITY DEPARTMENT JUNE 1965 JUNE 1968 NOVEMBER 1970 JUNE 1973 ----------------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- --------------- AW AB BW AW AB BW AW AB BW AW AB BW --------------------------------------------------------------------- Malleable 2 24 - 3 25 - 2 24 2 3 25 6 Brass Foundry 1 11 - - 14 - - 12 - 3 14 5 Grey Iron Foundry - 29 - 2 37 - 2 36 - 5 41 3 Core Room & Yard - 12 - - 18 - - 21 - - 23 2 Pattern Shop 3 1 - 5 1 - 7 1 - 8 1 1 Valve Mach. & Assembly 20 20 - 17 13 1 16 15 3 18 18 6 Valve Tool Room 3 - - 4 - - 3 - - 5 2 - Electrical 4 1 - 5 1 - 6 1 - 4 1 2 Machine Shop 6 3 - 6 2 - 8 4 - 11 4 1 Foundry Repairs 3 2 - 3 1 - 4 1 - 5 - 2 Final Inspection - 6 - 7 - - - 7 - 2 7 1 Foundry Inspection - 6 - - 5 - - 7 1 - 8 3 Valve Finishing 3 6 - 2 6 1 2 6 1 6 9 3 Inspection Galvanizing - 6 - - 5 - - 5 - - 6 - Tapping Room 5 5 - 5 9 3 2 11 3 2 15 7 Tapping Tool Room 4 - - 4 - - 4 - - 4 - - Shipping - 9 - - 12 - - 13 1 - 13 3 Dispatching - 2 - - 2 - - 1 1 - 2 4 Metallurgical - - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 1 - Brass Core Room - 7 - - 7 - - 9 - - 6 3 Construction 3 3 - 4 3 1 6 4 1 5 3 2 Purchasing - - - - 1 - - 3 - 1 2 - Employment/Industrial - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 Plant Protection & Personnel Services 1 3 - 1 5 1 - 6 2 3 5 1 Medical - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - Y.M.C.A. - 5 - - 5 - - 5 - - 5 - TOTAL 58 161 - 61 180 8 62 194 15 87 212 56 (Percentage of intergrated jobs) (0%) (3%) (6%) (1- 6 % ) 67 Note FNAW designates jobs filled by white employees; AB designates jobs filled by black 68 Note employeees; BW designates intergrated jobs.1/5The data reveal that while no jobs were staffed by both blacks and whites in any department in 1965, that pattern had improved only slightly by 1973 when only 16 percent of all production and maintenance jobs were integrated. In addition, much of the improvement came between November 1970 and June 1973, after the plaintiffs had brought this action in the district court and long after the initial EEOC charge was filed. 18 69 The plaintiffs also make the point that post-Act racial allocation of job opportunities extended to clerical, timekeeper, and guard positions. Chart C gives the number of black and white clerical employees for selected years between 1966 and 1973. CHART C 70 CLERICAL EMPLOYEES BY RACE 1966 1968 1971 1973 ----- ----- ----- ----- White 193 200 184 189 Black 5 6 14 18 % black 2.5 2.9 7.1 8.7 71 Thus, in 1973 only 8.7 percent of clerical workers were black. In addition, although the company employs 22 timekeepers, only two blacks have ever been chosen for that job. About half of all timekeepers are selected from the hourly production and maintenance work force, which is 66 percent black. As of June 1973 there were 25 white plant guards and seven black guards. All three of the sergeants were white. Finally, in 1973 the company's Birmingham sales department had twenty-two employees; all were white. 72 The plaintiffs point out that in production and maintenance departments staffed with white and black employees, the blacks were principally concentrated in jobs with the lowest job classifications whereas whites worked largely in jobs with the highest job classifications. Chart D lists the job classes of white and black employees, working at Stockham in September 1973, 19 for four different time periods between June 1965 and June 1973. 73 Because base pay rates at Stockham are determined by job classifications, the data revealed in Chart D support the conclusion that lower-paying jobs were allocated to blacks at Stockham, at least until 1973. The plaintiffs emphasize that the job class statistics reveal that of 366 white non-incentive workers, 274, or 75 percent, were in JC 9 or above while only 11, or 3 percent, of the 371 black non-incentive workers were in the higher job classes. Of the 178 white incentive workers, 135, or 76 percent, were in the two highest incentive job classes; whereas, only 20, or 2 percent, of the 872 black incentive workers were in JC 8 and 9. Further, the plaintiffs note that the average job class for blacks was substantially lower than the average job class for whites between 1965 and 1973. 20 74 Further, the plaintiffs presented evidence of the disparities in black and white employee wages and gross earnings at Stockham. The job class differences between black and white workers also reveal the disparities in base pay for blacks and whites; the pay rate for each job is determined by the job class in which the job is located. Non-incentive workers are paid at an established hourly rate. As of June 1973 the pay range for JC 2 was $2.85 to $3.30 per hour while the range for JC 13 was $3.66 to $4.47 per hour. An incentive worker is paid at a guaranteed base pay rate somewhat below that paid a non-incentive worker in the same job class. For example, the incentive rate for JC 2 is $2.85 per hour while it is $3.29 per hour for JC 9. An indirect incentive worker is guaranteed a slightly higher base pay rate and receives on the average less incentive pay than an employee on the direct incentive system. A direct incentive worker's pay averages approximately 25 percent above his base rate because of his incentive earnings. The exact amount of incentive pay varies with the productivity of the employee. 75 The plaintiffs showed that the average hourly earnings rate of black employees, including base, incentive, and overtime pay, as of September 1973 was $3.83, or $0.37 less per hour than the average earnings of white employees. Similarly, white employees averaged approximately 12.8 percent more in yearly gross earnings than black employees during the period from January 1, 1973, through September 1, 1973. These pay disparities existed in 1973 even though blacks had greater seniority on the average than whites. The average hiring year for black employees in September 1973 was late 1963; whereas, white employees had an average hiring year of mid-1965. These statistics on pay disparities demonstrate that blacks have been assigned to jobs with lower economic returns than have white employees. 76 Finally, the plaintiffs assert that blacks were assigned the least desirable jobs at Stockham both in terms of working conditions and the pressures associated with the work. Otto Carter, a white company superintendent, admitted that the hottest, dirtiest, and dustiest parts of the operation at Stockham are the foundry departments, grey iron, malleable, and ductile. Of the 586 hourly employees in these departments as of September 1973, 551 or 94 percent were black. 21 77 As we mentioned, the incentive pay system at Stockham applies to highly repetitive jobs. 22 Stockham's production manager, Jack Marsh, in describing the work of an employee on the incentive system stated: (H)e does the same thing over and over. An employee receives incentive pay only if his production output exceeds the norm established by the company for the particular job. For this reason the pressures associated with incentive work at Stockham have led employees to call it the racetrack. 23 As of September 2, 1973, 70 percent of all black workers were assigned to incentive jobs as compared with only 31.7 percent of white employees. This concentration of blacks in incentive jobs and in the foundry departments supports the inference of discriminatory job assignments. 78 The pattern of job assignments at Stockham appears to result from a process that is largely subjective. First, employees are selected for individual seniority department jobs by departmental supervisors. The selection decision is totally discretionary and is not guided by written instructions. 24 Second, apart from testing and seniority requirements, the decision to promote or transfer an employee into a new department is discretionary with the appropriate departmental supervisor and there are no written standards for the selection process. 25 The supervisory staff at Stockham is composed overwhelmingly of whites, 26 and there are no safeguards against racial bias in the selection process. 79 In sum, even on the eve of trial the defendant Stockham discriminated in allocating jobs on the basis of race. A definite pattern of intentional racial staffing is revealed by statistical evidence on the disparities in black and white representation in seniority departments, on the relatively few integrated jobs in 1973, on the concentration of blacks in the lower job classes of both incentive and non-incentive jobs, and on the wage disparities between blacks and whites. In addition, it seems clear the undesirable working conditions associated with the jobs to which a vast majority of blacks are assigned verify the contention that jobs are allocated on the basis of race. The statistics must be evaluated in light of the admitted total segregation of jobs at Stockham until 1965; the persistent segregation of facilities and programs at least until 1974; and the roles played by white supervisors in discretionary and subjective assignment, transfer, and promotion decisions. This evidence taken together establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination according to the amicus EEOC. 80 The plaintiff in an action under Title VII has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in employment practices. That burden may be met with statistical proof when it reaches proportions comparable to those in this case. Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 5 Cir. 1976, 528 F.2d 508, 516-17; United States v. Hayes International Corp. (Hayes II), 5 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 112, 120. See also Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 5 Cir. 1974, 494 F.2d 211, 225 n.34; United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 5 Cir. 1971, 451 F.2d 418, 442, 446, cert. denied, 1972, 406 U.S. 906, 92 S.Ct. 1607, 31 L.Ed.2d 815. Indeed the Supreme Court has recently approved the use of statistical proof in establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the trucking industry. Statistics are equally competent in proving employment discrimination. . . . Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 and n.20, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1856, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (Teamsters). 81 Here the plaintiffs have produced evidence of gross disparities in job allocations at Stockham on the basis of race. All but two of the seniority departments were either predominantly white or predominantly black at Stockham at the time of trial in 1973. Only sixteen percent of the hourly jobs were integrated by that time. 27 In 1973 the overwhelming majority of both incentive and non-incentive white workers were employed in jobs with the highest job classifications. 82 Blacks earn, on the average, $0.37 less per hour than whites, including overtime and incentive pay. 28 Seventy percent of all black employees work in the monotonous, pressurized conditions of the incentive system, and 94 percent of all workers subject to the hot, dusty, dirty conditions of the foundry departments are black. The disparities revealed by the statistics on job allocations at Stockham are gross and the statistical evidence compelling; they establish a clear prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. 83 The statistical patterns do not complete the plaintiffs' case. In addition, they offer persuasive evidence of total job segregation prior to 1965 and the intransigent retention of segregated facilities and programs at Stockham until at least 1974. As this Court recently observed through Judge Clark in Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 5 Cir. 1976, 539 F.2d 77, 97: 84 (T)he prior history of discriminatory job class assignments is clearly relevant to the issue of whether the present discrepancies in departmental assignments were part and parcel of a broad scheme to treat black and white workers differently. Historical policies of racial discrimination have often been used by other courts as indicia of plant-wide discriminatory conduct. (Footnote omitted.) 85 In erroneously concluding that Stockham has never discriminated in job assignments the district court did not have a finding of prior discriminatory job class assignments at Stockham on which to rely in evaluating the post-1965 statistical evidence. Nevertheless, the court had before it unrebutted evidence of post-Act policies of segregation in facilities and programs as indicia of discriminatory conduct on the part of Stockham. The district court erred in not relying on that evidence in evaluating the plaintiffs' case. 86 In Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 5 Cir. 1974, 493 F.2d 191, 195, this Court observed that the significance of statistical disparities between the races revealed in evidence of job assignment and employee discharges 87 is magnified when appraised in light of the fact that (the defendant) has little, if any, initial job qualifications requirements. In nearly every situation, the hiring, initial job assignment, and promotion is almost exclusively a subjective determination made by white supervisors. 88 Here initial job assignments were made on the basis of decisions by white departmental supervisors 29 without any formal selection standards or written guidelines. Similarly, transfer decisions were made without objective standards by the largely white supervisory staff. For promotions, seniority controlled only when the supervisor decided that applicants were approximately equal in qualifications, a largely subjective decision made by predominantly white supervisors. In Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 5 Cir. 1972, 457 F.2d 348, 359, this Court examined procedures involving subjective evaluations of employees: 89 All we do today is recognize that promotion/transfer procedures which depend almost entirely upon the subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation of the immediate foreman are a ready mechanism for discrimination . . . . We and others have expressed a skepticism that black persons dependent directly on decisive recommendations from Whites can expect non-discriminatory action. 90 See also Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d at 231-32; United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d at 442. In addition, in Pettway this Court emphasized that (c)ourts have condemned procedures for promotion and job assignment which are not objective and uniform. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d at 232 n.47. 91 We conclude that the plaintiffs' evidence of racial disparities in job allocations after 1965, of total job segregation prior to 1965, of the continued segregation of facilities and programs until long after the effective date of Title VII, and of subjective assignment, transfer, and promotion decisions by white supervisors at Stockham make a prima facie case of discriminatory employment practices in job allocations at Stockham. Once the plaintiff in a Title VII case has presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the onus of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion is on the defendant. United States v. Hayes International Corp., 456 F.2d at 120. The strength of the evidence presented in this case imposes on the defendant a heavy burden in attempting to counter the inference of systematic and purposeful discrimination. 92 The defendant Stockham seeks to rebut any colorable inference of discrimination primarily by means of two arguments, both of which focus on the disparities in job classes of positions in which blacks and whites are employed. First, Stockham contends that an employee's job class has only a negligible impact upon employee earnings. In support of this argument the defendant points to four facts: (a) that incentive workers earn approximately 25 percent more than their base pay rate, (b) that of 75 employees in the production and maintenance unit making more than $9,000 a year in 1972, 40 of these persons were in job classes 9 and below, (c) that no JC 11 or 12 workers earned more than $9,000 in 1972, and (d) that some black employees earned more than white employees. The district court relied on these same facts in finding that Stockham has not engaged in discriminatory job assignments. These four facts are unpersuasive of the negligible impact of job class on employee earnings and largely irrelevant to the issue of present discrimination in job allocations. First, the evidence is uncontradicted that the job class in which a job is located determines the base pay rate for the job and that the lower the job class, the lower the pay rate. That incentive workers earn more than the base rates for their jobs does not refute the direct relationship between pay rate and job class. Further, that some incentive workers are industrious enough to earn more than $9,000 also does not refute the relationship. Moreover, that workers in JC 11 and 12 do not earn more than $9,000 suggests only that incentive pay augments base pay. More importantly, it suggests that incentive jobs may not be as desirable as the defendant would have us believe. 30 Workers obviously seek the skilled craft jobs in job classes 11 and 12 even though they are not on the incentive system and thus have built-in limitations in pay. In its argument the defendant overlooks the fact that many jobs in JC 11 and 12 serve as training grounds for JC 13 positions and thus have greater earnings potential over the long term than do incentive jobs with lower job classes. 93 Finally, Stockham attempts to show that whites in one of the higher-classified jobs, crane operator in the iron grey foundry, did not earn more than some of the blacks in that department working in lower job classifications. For example, as the plaintiffs point out, one white crane operator in 1972 earned less than 81 of the 292 blacks in the department. When the data are controlled for seniority, however, and the white crane operator's salary is compared with that of blacks hired the same year as he was, 1968, the evidence is more revealing. The white employee had a higher earning rate per hour than all but one black. 94 The defendant seeks to refute the plaintiffs' evidence that blacks earn an average of $0.37 less per hour than whites, including incentive and overtime pay, by means of the testimony of an expert witness. Dr. James Gwartney, an economist who testified for the defendant, conducted a study of the earnings of production and maintenance employees at Stockham in an attempt to determine the factors that explain earnings disparities between employees. He concluded that such productivity factors as education, skill, building experience, craft skill level, and absenteeism not discrimination explain the earnings differences between blacks and whites at Stockham. In studying the earnings opportunities at Stockham Dr. Gwartney considered four factors: (1) the earnings of employees at Stockham compared with the earnings of those in local, regional, and national labor markets and with earnings in other companies; (2) relative changes in the earnings of company employees over a long period of time; (3) relative changes in the earnings of company employees recently hired; and (4) application of the residual approach of scientifically adjusting earnings for productivity factors. 95 Dr. Gwartney's analysis does not meet the point that wage differences between blacks and whites at Stockham are explained by racially discriminatory job allocations. The first three factors are irrelevant to the question of discrimination at Stockham. The critical question is whether blacks at Stockham earn less than whites at Stockham, not whether blacks at Stockham earn more or less than blacks in various other geographic areas or in other companies. Those statistics will suggest only whether there is more or less discrimination in earnings opportunities for blacks in other settings as compared with Stockham. In addition, such statistics are totally irrelevant to the issue whether blacks are segregated by jobs and departments at Stockham and to the issue whether blacks must earn their wages under conditions less desirable than those of whites. 96 On its face, Dr. Gwartney's fourth factor deals with relevant and persuasive statistics on earnings disparities between blacks and whites. His regression analysis of productivity factors will not stand scrutiny. 97 Regression analysis is a statistical method that permits analysis of a group of variables simultaneously as part of an attempt to explain a particular phenomenon, such as earnings disparities between blacks and whites. The method attempts to isolate the effects of various factors on the phenomenon. Dr. Gwartney's analysis is based on the assumption that productivity factors, not discrimination, may explain the wage differences between Stockham's black and white employees. The productivity factors Dr. Gwartney employed were years of schooling, achievement, seniority, skill level, outside craft experience, outside operative experience, absenteeism, and merit ratings. 98 The rub comes with how these factors were defined in Dr. Gwartney's study. As the plaintiffs point out, the critical factors of skill level and merit rating were defined in such a way as to incorporate discrimination. Skill level was derived from an employee's job class; he had skill only if he worked in a job with a rating between JC 10 and 13. The systematic exclusion of blacks from promotion and training opportunities for such jobs, as is alleged here, will automatically produce no black employees with skill level. A regression analysis defining skill level in that way thus may confirm the existence of employment discrimination practices that result in higher earnings for whites. 99 Dr. Gwartney used the merit ratings of Stockham supervisors, who are overwhelmingly white, for his merit rating factor; blacks average 71.3 in these ratings while whites average 79.3. If there is racial bias in the subjective evaluations of white supervisors, then that bias will be injected into Dr. Gwartney's earnings analysis. 31 100 Further, Dr. Gwartney included education as one of his productivity factors, even though education is not a job requirement at Stockham, because, according to the defendant, an individual's educational level, regardless of race, impacts earnings. The fallacy in this conclusion stems from two facts: (1) as the defendant concedes, education is not a job requirement at Stockham, and (2) white employees at Stockham have more education than blacks. 32 Thus, adjusting for education in a regression analysis of earnings where education is not related to job performance and where one race is more educationally disadvantaged than another, masks racial differences in earnings that may be explainable on the basis of discrimination. Certainly such differences cannot fairly be explained on the basis of a factor, such as education, concededly irrelevant to adequate job performance. 33 101 Significantly, although Dr. Gwartney asserted that his study proves that productivity factors and not discrimination explain the wage differences between black and white employees at Stockham, he concedes that he made no attempt to control or check for racial bias in his analysis. Our examination of his analytical approach compels us to conclude that the results of Dr. Gwartney's study in no way refute the plaintiffs' prima facie case of racial discrimination in job allocations at Stockham. 102 Stockham's attempt to refute the plaintiffs' evidence of racial job allocations by focusing on earnings differences misses the point. First, such an emphasis ignores the lopsided statistics on the number of all-black and all-white jobs at Stockham. Second, the defendant's focus on earnings avoids consideration of whether job segregation by itself, apart from any issue of economic harm, violates Title VII. This Court recently ruled on this issue in Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d at 89-90, in an opinion by Judge Clark: 103 (A) Title VII plaintiff does not have to show economic loss to prove discrimination. 104 . . . The key for this case is whether there was past discrimination . . . . Going further and requiring plaintiffs to prove that past assignment practices produced lower pay checks is contrary to law and precedent. . . . 105 Title VII contains neither requirement nor implication that economic harm must be shown before a class can be found to have made out a prima facie case of racially discriminatory job assignment. Indeed, the statutory prohibitions of the enactment are explicitly broader than economic harm. 106 Thus, not only is the defendant's attempt to rebut the inferences of discrimination presented by the plaintiffs' evidence factually inadequate, it is also legally insufficient. 107 The defendant seeks to augment its rebuttal of the plaintiffs' prima facie case with a second argument on the issue of the working conditions associated with departments and jobs in which blacks work. The defendant relies in part on the finding of the district court that the plaintiffs' allegation that blacks work in the hottest, dirtiest, and dustiest jobs at Stockham is unsupported. We have previously discussed the evidence offered by the plaintiffs to substantiate this assertion. 34 We reject the conclusion that the allegation is unsupported. 108 In addition, the defendant contends that the plaintiffs failed to establish any correspondence between job classifications and work conditions. Stockham argues that many of the job class 10 through 13 positions held at Stockham by whites involve working conditions similar to the ones described by the plaintiffs. This argument does not reach the evidence that an overwhelming majority of blacks work in the tedious and pressure-filled atmosphere of incentive jobs while a substantial majority of whites do not. In addition, this argument in effect confirms another of the plaintiffs' contentions, that even in the largely all-black foundries the few jobs held by whites are the ones in the highest job classes. Even more significantly, this defense, focusing on the relative desirability of jobs and departments, like the defendant's emphasis on earnings data, is legally irrelevant. In Swint we made clear that departmental desirability is not an essential part of a plaintiff's prima facie proof. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d at 91. In Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., Inc., 8 Cir. 1973, 476 F.2d 721, 723, discussed in Swint, the Eighth Circuit concluded: (S)tatistics which show segregated departments and job classifications establish a violation of Title VII. Along with that court, our concern is that black employees have suffered the indignities of segregation. Id. at 726. Here the plaintiff presents undeniable evidence of segregated jobs, the concentration of blacks in certain departments, the lengthy unlawful segregation of facilities and programs, the admitted total allocation of jobs on the basis of race before 1965, and the subjective selection of employees for assignment, transfer, and promotion by an overwhelmingly white supervisory staff. Evidence of disparities in the earnings and working conditions of blacks and whites are persuasive, as in this case, but unnecessary to a determination that Title VII has been violated in the allocation of jobs on the basis of race. 109 The district court bases its holding that Stockham did not discriminate in job assignments after 1965 essentially on two conclusions: (1) that blacks were not qualified for more skilled positions and (2) that blacks voluntarily chose the jobs to which they were assigned. The EEOC points out the dearth of factual support for the court's reasons. First, the court relies on the testimony of Flount R. Hammock, manager of the Alabama State Employment Service in Birmingham, in support of its first conclusion. But Hammock stated: (W)hen we're talking about skilled trade, there are very few white or black available. Thus the court's first factual conclusion is clearly erroneous. In addition, Stockham trains a substantial number of all craftsmen it employs at Stockham. 110 In support of its conclusion that blacks were assigned to positions they requested or preferred, the district judge stated: 111 Of the 626 employees (251 white and 375 black) employed as of January 1, 1974, who had sought a specific job when applying to Stockham for employment, 61% of the white employees and 53% of the black employees were placed in the job of their own selection. 112 394 F.Supp. at 455. As the EEOC correctly observes, these statistics are factually insufficient and legally irrelevant. First, over two-thirds of Stockham's work force has been assigned to jobs without assignment requests. In addition, these statistics do not reflect the number of blacks not hired at Stockham who sought traditionally white jobs and were rejected. Further, the statistics do not include information on the number of blacks who sought to transfer to jobs in traditionally white departments or positions after having worked for a time at Stockham. Finally, this Court has frequently recognized the meaningless request phenomenon. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d at 232; Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 5 Cir. 1973, 485 F.2d 441, 451. Recently, in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 367, 97 S.Ct. at 1870, the Supreme Court observed: 113 (A) nonapplicant can be a victim of unlawful discrimination . . . when an application would have been a useless act serving only to confirm a discriminatee's knowledge that the job he wanted was unavailable to him. 114 The district court's reliance on the percentage of requests for specific jobs granted new black employees is legally misplaced in cases such as the one before us. 115 We hold that the district court erred in concluding that jobs have never been allocated on the basis of race at Stockham. There is overwhelming evidence in the record of past and present discrimination in the allocation of jobs in violation of Title VII.