Opinion ID: 779927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overview; Commerce Power Categories

Text: 49 In Lopez the Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power, namely: 50 First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce (citing, inter alia, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 657, 61 S.Ct. 451 at 457, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941), sustaining statute prohibiting shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced for interstate commerce by employees whose wages and hours do not conform to the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act; statute not invalid even if its motive was to regulate local wages not otherwise subject to commerce power). 51 Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities (listing as examples `destruction of an aircraft,' `thefts from interstate shipments,' and Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 S.Ct. 2, 56 L.Ed. 72 (1911), upholding Safety Appliance Act equipment requirements as applied to cars of interstate carrier moving on interstate railroad line even though particular cars were carrying only intrastate traffic). 52 Third, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e. those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.... 53 Within this final category, admittedly, our case law has not been clear whether an activity must `affect' or `substantially affect' interstate commerce in order to be within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.... We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity `substantially affects' interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 at 1629-30 (1995). 54 Lopez held unconstitutional, as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 ed., Supp. V). It quickly disposed of the first and second categories of congressional commerce power, noting that section 922(q) clearly fell within neither and that if § 922(q) is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. at 1630. It then went on to hold that the statute likewise could not be sustained under the third category, rejecting the Government's argument that possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 1632. 55 Some five years later in Morrison the Court reconfirmed Lopez's Commerce Clause analysis and holding as well as its articulation and description of the `three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.' Morrison at 1749. Morrison held unconstitutional, as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, the civil action portion of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. 23 Morrison observes that [p]etitioners do not contend that these cases fall within either of the first two categories of Commerce Clause regulation. They seek to sustain § 13981 as a regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.... [w]e agree that this is the proper inquiry. Id. at 1749. The Court held that section 13981 did not meet the requirements of the third Lopez category, stating petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime so long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption, Morrison at 1752-53, contrary to the constitutionally required distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. Id. at 1754. 24 56