Opinion ID: 1855302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court committed manifest error in denying mr. humphrey's motion to dismiss indictment for failure to provide him with a speedy trial

Text: ¶ 11. Though Humphrey does not raise the issue on appeal, it is worthy of note that the Legislature has addressed the speedy trial question by statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (1994), which states that unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than 270 days after the accused has been arraigned. The record shows that when the State, Humphrey and his counsel agreed that all matters previously filed in cause number CR97-29-B(T) should carry over and be made part of CR 97-155-B(T) in order to comply with the requirements of State v. Berryhill, 703 So.2d 250 (Miss.1997) the following discourse took place on November 7, 1997: THE COURT: All right. Mr. Walker, have you and Mrs. Lamar reached an agreement as to how discovery would be handled under this new cause number? We've got a case that dates back some 10 or 15 years ago that came out of Tallahatchie County that gave us some guidance that discovery, you ought to have an agreement. MR. WALKER [Humphrey's attorney]: I think we do, Your Honor. I made Ms. Lamar aware of one concern. I have no problem incorporating the motion hearings previously held in here in this case, the discovery and all the motions. But I told Mrs. Lamar that I wanted to be up front with her and get this clear with respect to any Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim that we may file later on that our position is that his speedy trial rights run from the date of his arrest from the Sixth Amendment standpoint and that just because she reindicted him or Mr. Williams did that  THE COURT: I think you're right. In other words, if you made a speedy trial claim, not a 270 day claim, but at least a speedy trial, I would have to look from the date of MR. WALKER: Yes, sir. I told her with that understanding of my position and Mr. Humphrey's position, then I have no problem incorporating everything previously done in the prior file into the new file. ¶ 12. The trial court heard a pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment on an alleged speedy trial violation on Friday January 16, 1998, and the record shows the following: MRS. LAMAR [the prosecutor]: Your Honor, do I understand by reference to the motion that was filed that this is a speedy trial motion that was filed under Amendment Six of the Constitution and not under the statutory 270 day rule? MR. WALKER: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay: The Barker v. Wingo standard. ¶ 13. It is clear from the record that Humphrey was unable to assert a 270 day violation because of the second indictment. The trial court then held a hearing to assess the speedy trial motion in light of the constitutional analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). A trial judge's finding is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict and will not be reversed upon appeal unless manifestly wrong. Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Miss.1992) (collecting authorities). A delay in excess of eight (8) months is presumptively prejudicial, Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989). Once a delay is presumptively prejudicial, the State must rebut this presumption of prejudice. For constitutional purposes the right to a speedy trial attaches and the time begins to run at the time of the arrest. Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss.1990). The appropriate test, which was undertaken by the trial court, in considering whether a defendant receives a speedy and public trial in compliance with the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution, is that set forth in Handley, at 673 whereby Mississippi adopted the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) which provides the following four-step functional analysis: First, we must calculate the time periods. Second, we must analyze those time periods in light of all circumstances, including the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, in conjunction with the Barker factors: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) resulting prejudice to the defendant. Vickery, 535 So.2d at 1376. Third, we must weigh each of these factors in light of the particular facts of the case, keeping in mind that it is often impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 2187. Handley, at 676.