Opinion ID: 170226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ICE Database

Text: At trial, Agent Hummel testified that he performed a search of the ICE database, known as the Central Index System. He testified that the Central Index System is a nation-wide database of information which archives records of entry documents, such as permanent resident cards, border crossing cards, or certificates of naturalization. Agent Hummel performed a search of the database using Mendez's name and the social security number. Mendez provided officials at the time of his arrest and found no match, indicating that Mendez had not entered the country legally. Mendez challenges Agent Hiimmel's testimony and the underlying database records. He argues the testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser and is inadmissible hearsay. Agent Hummel's testimony is not hearsay because he testified in court. Fed. R.Evid. 801(c) (Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. (emphasis added)). In a recent unpublished decision this court stated that in cases in which a Certificate of Non-Existence Record (CNR) is introduced into evidence to prove a person did not legally enter the country, the declarant is the person who actually performed the data search and did not, discover a record pertaining to the defendant. United States v. Salinas-Valenciano, 220 Fed.Appx. 879, 883 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) [4] ; see also United States v. Valdez-Maltos, 443 F.3d 910, 911 (5th Cir.2006) (holding as long as an immigration official testifies at trial about the absence of entry documents and the relevant circumstances indicate an adequate search was performed, the testimony is not hearsay), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 265, 166 L.Ed.2d 205 (2006). We agree. In this case, no CNR was received into evidence, but rather Agent Hummel took the stand and testified to the search he ran. Because the Confrontation Clause restricts only statements meeting the traditional definition of hearsay, Agent Hummel's in-court testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir.2006). Mendez also challenges the underlying database embedded in Agent Hummel's testimony. The ICE database, containing records of requests for permission to reenter, is a public record. The Federal Rules of Evidence define public records as [r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report. . . . Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(A)-(B). Excluded from this definition are matters observed by police officers or other law enforcement personnel in criminal cases. Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(B). This exclusion applies when law enforcement personnel create records for the purpose of prosecution. See United States v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 162 (10th Cir.1986). Even if ICE personnel are classified as law enforcement, the U.S. Central Index System is created in connection with ongoing regulatory functions independent of prosecution and public officials are under a duty to accurately create records. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1103, 1304; 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.1, 264.1. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the absence of a public record or the nonoccurrence of a matter for which a record is regularly made is not excluded by the rule against hearsay. Fed.R.Evid. 803(10). The rule includes situations in which the absence of a record may itself be the ultimate focal point of the inquiry, as was the case here. Fed.R.Evid. 803(10) advisory committee's note. Evidence that the ICE database did not contain a record for Mendez is therefore admissible under the Rule 803(10) exception. As a public record, the ICE Central Index System is not testimonial. The definition of public record in Rule 803(8)(B) excludes records created with an eye toward litigation and criminal prosecution. Bohrer, 807 F.2d at 162. Crawford suggests the very same characteristics that preclude a statement from being classified as a public record are likely to render the statement testimonial. 541 U.S. at 56 n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (describing testimonial as statements produced through the [i]nvolvement of government officers and made with an eye toward trial). Where records are not prepared for litigation or criminal prosecution, but rather administrative and regulatory purposes, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed is not implicated. Id. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford suggests public records and business records fall outside the testimonial ambit of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 76, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial-for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.). Other circuits addressing this issue have held public records are not testimonial. See United States v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir.2007) (holding warrants of deportation are public records and not testimonial); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 237 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding autopsy reports are public records and not testimonial), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 1323, 167 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007); United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1076-77 (9th Cir.2005) (holding records of conviction and routine certifications of public records are not testimonial), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1114, 126 S.Ct. 1911, 164 L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 437 (5th Cir.2005) (holding ICE computer records are public records and not testimonial), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1222, 126 S.Ct. 1449, 164 L.Ed.2d 146 (2006). We therefore hold the ICE database is not testimonial and not subject to the strictures of the Confrontation Clause.