Opinion ID: 2211561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MRE 404(b)(1) provides:

Text: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case. In VanderVliet, supra at 74-75, 508 N.W.2d 114, we adopted the approach to other acts evidence enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-692, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). That approach employs the evidentiary safeguards already present in the rules of evidence. First, the prosecutor must offer the other acts evidence under something other than a character to conduct or propensity theory. MRE 404(b). Second, the evidence must be relevant under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b), to an issue of fact of consequence at trial. Third, under MRE 403, a `determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice [substantially] outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other facts appropriate for making decision of this kind under Rule 403.' VanderVliet, supra at 75, 508 N.W.2d 114, quoting advisory committee notes to FRE 404(b). Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105. The VanderVliet analytical framework reflects the theory of multiple admissibility on which MRE 404(b) is founded. MRE 404(b)(1) does not require exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence. Rather, the first sentence of MRE 404(b)(1) reiterates the general rule, embodied in MRE 404(a) and MRE 405, prohibiting the use of evidence of specific acts to prove a person's character to show that the person acted in conformity with character on a particular occasion. The second sentence of MRE 404(b)(1) then emphasizes that this prohibition does not preclude using the evidence for other relevant purposes. MRE 404(b)(1) lists some of the permissible uses. The list is not, however, exhaustive. MRE 404(b)(1) thus reiterates that, under MRE 402, all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the United States and Michigan Constitutions and other rules. That our Rules of Evidence preclude the use of evidence for one purpose simply does not render the evidence inadmissible for other purposes. Rather, the evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, subject to a limiting instruction under MRE 105. Under VanderVliet, the trial court's initial determination in deciding whether to admit other acts evidence is one of relevance. MRE 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Relevant evidence thus is evidence that is material related to any fact that is of consequence to the action) and has probative force (any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence). People v. Mills, 450 Mich. 61, 66-68, 537 N.W.2d 909 (1995). Materiality, however, does not mean that the evidence must be directed at an element of a crime or an applicable defense. Id. at 67-68, 537 N.W.2d 909. A material fact is one that is `in issue' in the sense that it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy. Id. at 68, 537 N.W.2d 909, quoting United States v. Dunn., 805 F.2d 1275, 1281 (C.A.6, 1986). [5] On determining that the evidence is admissible under a permissible theory of logical relevance, the trial court must consider whether to exclude the evidence nonetheless under MRE 403. The trial court may exclude the admissible evidence of other acts if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. MRE 403. In VanderVliet, supra at 90-91, 508 N.W.2d 114, we encouraged trial courts to utilize a flexible approach for determining admissibility to facilitate the informed exercise of their discretion under MRE 403. We explained: The probative value of other acts evidence and its true potential for prejudice is often unclear until the proofs are actually presented. Other acts evidence relevant to elements technically at issue because of a not guilty plea may initially have only marginal probative value in comparison to the potential prejudice generated by the evidence. Where, for example, the real issue contested is whether the act was committed, and the prosecution's claim is that the disputed issue of mens rea requires admission of other acts evidence in the case in chief, the trial court should defer the ruling on admissibility where the jury would be likely to determine criminal state of mind from the doing of the act, allowing admission in the case in chief only if the evidence of other acts meets the standards for admission as proof of actus reus. On the other hand, in some cases the cross-examination of witnesses in the case in chief may make it clear that the intent with which the act was committed is likely to be a matter of significant concern to the factfinder. The prosecutor should not be allowed to introduce other acts evidence only because it is technically relevant, nor should the defendant be allowed to interdict proofs that are highly probative of a truly contested issue. By waiting to determine the admissibility of other acts evidence relevant to an element only technically at issue, the trial court is able to forestall gamesmanship by the parties and insure the admission of evidence that possesses significant probative value. The ultimate goal is an enlightened basis for the trial court's conclusion of relevance and for the attendant inquiry under MRE 403. We again encourage trial courts to use this approach.
In this case, the prosecution argues that the other acts evidence was admissible to show defendant's scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, to show defendant's motive and intent, to show an absence of mistake, and to bolster the complainant's credibility. [6] We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings under MRE 401 and MRE 403 for an abuse of discretion. People v. Bahoda, 448 Mich. 261, 289, 531 N.W.2d 659 (1995); see Crawford, supra at 383, 582 N.W.2d 785; Starr, supra at 494, 577 N.W.2d 673. As we have often stated, a defendant's general denial places all the elements of the charge at issue. Starr, supra at 501, 577 N.W.2d 673; VanderVliet, supra at 78, 508 N.W.2d 114. That the prosecution has identified a permissible theory of admissibility and the defendant has entered a general denial, however, does not automatically render the other acts evidence relevant in a particular case. The trial court must still determine whether the evidence, under a proper theory, has a tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence in the case more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401; Mills, supra at 66-68, 537 N.W.2d 909. We recognize that determining relevance is often difficult because it necessarily involves drawing subtle distinctions. Although we sympathize with the trial courts in their struggle with evidentiary rulings in sexual abuse cases involving children, our evidentiary rules require that trial courts engage in the inquiry. Unlike the courts of other jurisdictions, we have never adopted the so-called lustful disposition rule, [7] which allows the use of other acts for propensity purposes in sex offense cases. Nor do the Michigan Rules of Evidence contain a rule analogous to FRE 414. [8] Under our rules of evidence, the trial court must make an individualized determination of relevance in each case. Accordingly, we examine the prosecution's theories of logical relevance in this case.
In this case, the trial court apparently held that the evidence was relevant under a theory that it showed defendant's plan, scheme, or system in doing an act. In People v. Engelman, 434 Mich. 204, 453 N.W.2d 656 (1990), this Court rejected the notion that use of other acts evidence is limited to proof of identity or intent. We held that evidence of other instances of sexual misconduct that establish a scheme, plan, or system may be material in the sense that the evidence proves that the charged act was committed. Engelman, supra at 220-221, 453 N.W.2d 656, explained: If it could be shown in this case that defendant did indeed follow a common scheme or plan in committing such acts against young children, it would defy logic to limit the use of that evidence to proof of identity or state of mind. The former will never be in dispute where the defendant and the victim know each other, and the defendant's state of mind is not an element of many of the offenses set forth in the criminal sexual conduct act. Yet, in many cases such evidence might be not only relevant to the determination of defendant's guilt or innocence, but also material in the sense required by [ People v. Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 298, 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982)], as proof that the act was committed. As explained in 2 Wigmore (Chadbournrev.), Evidence, § 304, p. 249, [w]hen the very doing of the act charged is yet to be proved, one of the evidential facts receivable is the person's design or plan to do it.... Engelman, however, provided little guidance for lower courts in determining the existence of a plan, scheme, or system. This Court suggested that to establish a true plan, the evidence must show `that the defendant in fact and in mind formed a plan including the charged and uncharged crimes as stages in the plan's execution.' Engelman, supra at 221, 453 N.W.2d 656, quoting Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, § 3:21, p. 53. We also quoted a passage from 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (14th ed.), § 186, pp. 786-787, stating that evidence `is admissible when it tends to establish a common plan, design, or scheme embracing a series of crimes, including the crime charged, so related to each other that proof of one tends to prove the other.' Id. at 221, n. 25, 453 N.W.2d 656. Engelman thus focused on one of the two situations that fall within this theory of logical relevance. The situation identified in Engelman is where the charged and uncharged acts are constituent parts of a plan in which each act is a piece of the larger plan. That situation is not present in this case. Instead, this case is one where the defendant allegedly devis[ed] a plan and us[ed] it repeatedly to perpetrate separate but very similar crimes. State v. Lough, 125 Wash.2d 847, 855, 889 P.2d 487 (1995). [9] Today, we clarify that evidence of similar misconduct is logically relevant to show that the charged act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system. [10] See People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 380, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757 (1994). Logical relevance is not limited to circumstances in which the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single continuing conception or plot. General similarity between the charged and uncharged acts does not, however, by itself, establish a plan, scheme, or system used to commit the acts. 2 Wigmore (Chadbourn rev.), Evidence, § 304, p. 249, explains: But where the conduct offered consists merely in the doing of other similar acts, it is obvious that something more is required than that mere similarity, which suffices for evidencing intent.... The object here is not merely to negative an innocent intent at the time of the act charged, but to prove a preexisting design, system, plan, or scheme, directed forwards to the doing of that act. In the former case (of intent) the attempt is merely to negative the innocent state of mind at the time of the act charged; in the present case the effort is to establish a definite prior design or system which included the doing of the act charged as part of its consummation. In the former case, the result is to give a complexion to a conceded act, and ends with that; in the present case, the result is to show (by probability) a precedent design which in its turn is to evidence (by probability) the doing of the act designed. The added element, then, must be, not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations. [Emphasis in original.] Wigmore, id. at 250-251, expounds on the common features between the uncharged and charged act necessary to support an inference of a plan, scheme, or system: [T]he difference between requiring similarity, for acts negativing innocent intent, and requiring common features indicating common design, for acts showing design, is a difference of degree rather than of kind; for to be similar involves having common features, and to have common features is merely to have a high degree of similarity.... The clue to the difference is best gained by remembering that in the one class of cases the act charged is assumed as done, and the mind asks only for something that will negative innocent intent; and the mere prior occurrence of an act similar in its gross features-i.e., the same doer, and the same sort of act, but not necessarily the same mode of acting nor the same sufferermay suffice for that purpose. But where the very act is the object of proof, and is desired to be inferred from a plan or system, the combination of common features that will suggest a common plan as their explanation involves so much higher a grade of similarity as to constitute a substantially new and distinct test. In Ewoldt, supra at 402-403, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757, the Supreme Court of California provided guidance for ascertaining the existence of a common plan used by the defendant to commit the charged and uncharged acts. As Ewoldt explains, the necessary degree of similarity is greater than that needed to prove intent, but less than that needed to prove identity. To establish the existence of a common design or plan, the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual. For example, evidence that a search of the residence of a person suspected of rape produced a written plan to invite the victim to his residence and, once alone, to force her to engage in sexual intercourse would be highly relevant even if the plan lacked originality. In the same manner, evidence that the defendant has committed uncharged criminal acts that are similar to the charged offense may be relevant if these acts demonstrate circumstantially that the defendant committed the charged offense pursuant to the same design or plan he or she used in committing the uncharged acts. Unlike evidence of uncharged acts used to prove identity, the plan need not be unusual or distinctive; it need only exist to support the inference that the defendant employed that plan in committing the charged offense. [ Ewoldt, supra at 403, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.] In this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant's alleged assault of the complainant and alleged abuse of his stepdaughter shared sufficient common features to infer a plan, scheme, or system to do the acts. The charged and uncharged acts contained common features beyond mere commission of acts of sexual abuse. Defendant and the alleged victims had a father-daughter relationship. The victims were of similar age at the time of the abuse. Defendant allegedly played on his daughters' fear of breaking up the family to silence them. One could infer from these common features that defendant had a system that involved taking advantage of the parent-child relationship, particularly his control over his daughters, to perpetrate abuse. [11] We acknowledge that the uncharged and charged acts were dissimilar in many respects. Defendant's stepdaughter testified that, over the course of seven or eight years beginning when she was in kindergarten, defendant performed oral sex on her three to seven times weekly. The abuse took place at night in her bedroom. She recalled one incident when she was in the fifth grade during which defendant had her lay on her side and he placed his penis between her legs. The charged act in this case, in contrast, was the only time defendant assaulted the complainant. The complainant did not allege prolonged sexual abuse. The incident occurred during a weekday afternoon, not at night while the complainant slept. The sexual act was intercourse, not oral sex. On the basis of this evidence, one could infer that the uncharged and charged acts involved different modes of acting, both in terms of sexual acts and the manner in which defendant allegedly perpetrated the abuse. This case thus is one in which reasonable persons could disagree on whether the charged and uncharged acts contained sufficient common features to infer the existence of a common system used by defendant in committing the acts. As we have often observed, the trial court's decision on a close evidentiary question such as this one ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion. E.g., People v. Smith, 456 Mich. 543, 550, 581 N.W.2d 654 (1998); Bahoda, supra at 289, 531 N.W.2d 659. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining, under the circumstances of this case, that the evidence was admissible under this theory of logical relevance.
The prosecution next argues that the evidence was admissible to prove defendant's motive and intent. A motive is the inducement for doing some act; it gives birth to a purpose. People v. Kuhn, 232 Mich. 310, 312, 205 N.W. 188 (1925). Evidence of the defendant's motive to commit the charged crime lends itself to three theories of logical relevance: (1) identity; (2) actus reus, and (3) mens rea. Imwinkelried, supra, §§ 3:15, 4:19, and 5:35. In this case, the prosecution argues that defendant's motive was to have sex with young girls who were related to him and that the existence of this motive, as evidenced by other sexual misconduct with his stepdaughter, tended to prove that the sexual assault alleged by the complainant actually occurred. This proffered purpose is undistinguishable from the so-called lustful disposition rule. However, as stated, this Court has never adopted that rule, and we decline to do so here. To accept the prosecutor's theory of logical relevance would allow use of the evidence for the prohibited purpose of proving defendant's character to show that he acted in conformity therewith during the events underlying the charged offense. We likewise conclude that the evidence was not logically relevant under a theory that it proved defendant's intent. First-degree criminal sexual conduct is a general intent crime. People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630, 645, 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982). `[N]o intent is requisite other than that evidenced by the doing of the acts constituting the offense.  Id. at 644, 331 N.W.2d 171. In this case, because the charged act was sexual intercourse and accident was not an issue, the evidence was not relevant to prove defendant's general intent.
We reject the prosecution's argument that the evidence was relevant to show the absence of mistake in the victim's perception of the incident underlying the charges. We agree that the ultimate fact-that sexual penetration occurred-was a fact of consequence at trial. Nevertheless, the thirteen-year-old complainant's perception of the incident, i.e., whether she mistakenly believed that sexual penetration occurred when, in fact, it did not, was not in issue. The complainant's perception of the incident was not within the range of litigated matters in controversy. Mills, supra at 68, 537 N.W.2d 909. The relationship of the elements of the charge, the theories of admissibility, and the defenses asserted governs what is relevant and material. VanderVliet, supra at 75, 508 N.W.2d 114. In this case, defendant's theory of defense was not that the complainant mistakenly perceived his actions, but that the entire incident did not take place. We therefore conclude that the evidence was not relevant under a theory of absence of mistake.
The prosecution lastly argues that the evidence was relevant to bolster the complainant's credibility. In People v. DerMartzex, 390 Mich. 410, 213 N.W.2d 97 (1973), this Court held that evidence of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct perpetrated by the defendant on the complainant was admissible for the purpose of corroborating the complainant's testimony. In People v. Jones, 417 Mich. 285, 289, 335 N.W.2d 465 (1983), this Court described the rationale for DerMartzex, supra, as follows: the prior sexual acts between the victim and the defendant were a part of the `principal transaction' necessary for the jury to weigh the victim's testimony about the principal transaction. In Jones, supra at 289-290, 335 N.W.2d 465, this Court held that evidence of sexual acts between the defendant and persons other than the complainant is not relevant to bolster the complainant's credibility because the acts are not part of the principal transaction. Today, as we did in Engelman, supra at 222, 453 N.W.2d 656, we decline to reconsider our decision in Jones. [12]
We turn to the trial court's determination under MRE 403 because the other act evidence was relevant under a permissible theory of logical relevance. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude the evidence under MRE 403. The evidence was admissible to show the actus reas of the offense. The probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In VanderVliet, supra at 81, 508 N.W.2d 114, this Court observed that the MRE 403 determination is best left to a contemporaneous assessment of the presentation, credibility, and effect of testimony. In this case, the defense contended that the complainant fabricated the entire incident to remove defendant from her life. The evidence was thus probative of a disputed element of the offense-that sexual penetration occurred. Although the potential for prejudice existed, the evidence was probative in showing a system that defendant may have used to sexually assault his daughters, and consequently, in rebutting defendant's claim of fabrication. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
We agree with the prosecution that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the existence of the agency order. In this case, the prosecution did not offer the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating defendant's bad character by means of an inference from his having violated the order. The evidence was instead clearly relevant because it explained the complainant's testimony regarding the threat used by defendant in an effort to secure her silence. The complainant testified that defendant told her that if she reported the incident to her mother, her mother would be really upset with [her] for breaking her family up again.... Evidence regarding the existence of an agency order that effectively separated the family filled a conceptual void regarding the events by providing information that the jury needed to understand defendant's reference to breaking up the family again. See Starr, supra at 502, 577 N.W.2d 673. We conclude that the evidence was also relevant to the issue of the complainant's delay in reporting the assault, even though defendant ultimately chose not to vigorously argue that the delay signified that the assault did not occur. Materiality does not mean that the evidence must be directed at an element of a crime or an applicable defense. Mills, supra at 67-68, 537 N.W.2d 909. Rather, a material fact is one that is `in issue' in the sense that it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy. Id. at 68, 537 N.W.2d 909, quoting United States v. Dunn, supra at 1281. Evidence regarding the existence of the agency order shed light on the family secret that possibly caused the complainant to hesitate before reporting the abuse for fear that the report would get her parents in trouble. Therefore, viewed from the trial court's perspective at the time it ruled on the prosecution's motion, the evidence was admissible to explain the complainant's delay in reporting the assault in order to rebut defendant's claim that the complainant fabricated the allegation of a sexual assault. We further conclude that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. We disagree with the Court of Appeals that the evidence implied that defendant was on parole at the time of the instant offense. The trial court took great care to reduce the likelihood that the jury would draw a unfairly prejudicial inference from the evidence by precluding any reference to the origins of the order. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant sexually assaulted his stepdaughter and that an agency order existed prohibiting defendant from having contact with children under the age of seventeen. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining arguments.