Opinion ID: 2299913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other States' Approaches to Factually Inconsistent Verdicts

Text: As noted by the concurring opinion in Price, several jurisdictions allow factually inconsistent verdicts to stand although, at the same time, prohibit legally inconsistent verdicts. In Florida, legally inconsistent verdicts, where the jury negates an element of one count that is necessary for a conviction of another count, have been prohibited for a long time. See State v. Connelly, 748 So.2d 248, 253 (Fla.1999); Naumowicz, 562 So.2d at 713; Streeter v. State, 416 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1982). Inconsistent verdicts based on a jury's interpretation of facts, however, are permissible. Connelly, 748 So.2d at 252 (citing Fayson v. State, 698 So.2d 825, 826-27 (Fla.1997)). Florida allows these verdicts because they may be the result of jury lenity, rather than a legal determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. New York takes the approach that verdicts which are repugnant on the law are reviewable by appellate courts. People v. Muhammad, 17 N.Y.3d 532, 935 N.Y.S.2d 526, 959 N.E.2d 463, 467 (2011) (citing Tucker, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d at 617). Repugnant verdicts are those which are `inherently inconsistent when viewed in light of the elements of each crime as charged to the jury' ... without regard to the accuracy of those instructions. Muhammad, 935 N.Y.S.2d 526, 959 N.E.2d at 467 (quoting Tucker, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d at 617). New York allows, however, a jury to exercise leniency and render verdicts that are illogical factually, even in contravention of jury instructions. Muhammad, 935 N.Y.S.2d 526, 959 N.E.2d at 467. Noting the difficulties associated with understanding the precise reason behind a factually inconsistent verdict, Tucker prohibited consideration by an appellate court of the particular facts in a case and allowed only the elements of the crimes to be used to determine whether a verdict is repugnant. Muhammad, 935 N.Y.S.2d 526, 959 N.E.2d at 467 (citing Tucker, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d at 618). Thus, illogical verdicts based on mistake, compromise or the exercise of mercy by the jury do not undermine verdicts under New York law. Muhammad, 935 N.Y.S.2d 526, 959 N.E.2d at 468 (citing, among others, People v. Horne, 97 N.Y.2d 404, 740 N.Y.S.2d 675, 767 N.E.2d 132 (2002)). Missouri courts consider each count in a criminal indictment separately. State v. O'Dell, 684 S.W.2d 453, 465-66 (Mo.Ct. App.1984) (internal citations omitted). Any inconsistency between verdicts on counts are assumed to be a result of possible mistake or compromise, and courts are prohibited from speculating as to the reasons behind the inconsistency. Id. Rhode Island exalts the jury's traditional, broad power to compromise as the basis for allowing inconsistent acquittals and convictions. Arroyo, 844 A.2d at 170. Massachusetts allows factually inconsistent jury verdicts for reasons of leniency or compromise, but prohibits legally inconsistent verdicts. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 452 Mass. 142, 892 N.E.2d 255, 262 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Diaz, 19 Mass.App. Ct. 29, 471 N.E.2d 741 (1984); Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 812 N.E.2d 262 (2004)). Factually inconsistent verdicts are not allowed, however, in a bench trial, where the only opportunity to exercise lenity occurs during sentencing. Gonzalez, 892 N.E.2d at 262-63. Since Price was decided, Iowa aligned itself with the states discussed, supra. In State v. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d 805, 815 (Iowa 2010), Iowa departed from the general rule allowing all inconsistent jury verdicts to stand, but stopped short of opening Pandora's box by probing into the sanctity of jury deliberations by limiting review to compound inconsistencies. Compound inconsistencies occur when a defendant is convicted of a compound crime [10] and acquitted of the predicate crime in a single proceeding. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815. Alaska, as it turns out, is the sole state to take a position rejecting both factually and legally inconsistent verdicts. See DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 377. In doing so, the Supreme Court of Alaska rejects the possibility that inconsistent verdicts are the product of juror lenity, noting that there is no way for a court to know with certainty whether there was compromise, mistake, or confusion. Id. As that reasoning goes, because jurors are required to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and judges are required to acquit if there could be no reasonable disagreement based on the facts, the Alaska court concluded that it was compelled to require juries to present reasonable verdicts, i.e., those that are not factually or legally inconsistent. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 378.