Opinion ID: 1968060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: I believe the majority opinion insufficiently recognizes, or fails to recognize, that § 39-17-03, NDCC, requires some court or other to perform two entirely different functions. One of those functions is the traditional function which courts exercise in hearing and deciding cases, while the other is the semi-administrative function of deciding when post-judgment proceedings are sufficient to justify payment from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. When Indians are involved as defendants in actions for damages arising from automobile accidents and the accidents occur on Indian reservations, serious questions of jurisdiction of state and federal courts arise. In a whole series of cases including Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973); Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D.1975); and Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D.1975), we have held that the state courts have no jurisdiction over Indian defendants involved in automobile accidents on Indian reservations. All of these cases involved automobile accidents with potential claims against the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, just as the case before us does. But the important distinction between those cases and the one now before us is that the actions were brought in state court in the three cases just cited, and it was held that the state court had no jurisdiction, while in the case now before us that action was brought and the judgment obtained in tribal court, which had undoubted jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter. Thus, the question of jurisdiction in the obtaining of the judgment against the defendant is not before us in the present case, while the other cases were all decided adversely to the plaintiff on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court in which the action was brought. We are therefore breaking new ground in the present case. It is my view that once a judgment is obtained in a court of competent jurisdiction against an Indian defendant for negligence in an automobile accident on an Indian reservation, in this State, the plaintiff may thereupon go into state court to obtain an order for payment from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. To illustrate the difference between the two functions performed by courts in Unsatisfied Judgment Fund cases, I will set out the statute in question, emphasizing that portion which relates to the semi-administrative function. 39-17-03. Recovery from fundProvisions governing.Where any person, who is a resident of this state, recovers in any court in this state a judgment for an amount exceeding three hundred dollars in an action for damages resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of, any person occasioned by, or arising out of, the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of a motor vehicle by the judgment debtor in this state, upon such judgment becoming final, such judgment creditor may, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, apply to the judge of the district court in which such judgment was rendered, upon notice to the attorney general, for an order directing payment of the judgment out of said fund. Upon the hearing of the application, the judgment creditor shall show: (1) that he has obtained judgment as set out in this section, stating the amount thereof and the amount owing thereon at the time of the application; (2) that he has caused an execution to be issued thereon, and that (a) the sheriff has made a return thereon showing that no property of the judgment debtor liable to be seized in satisfaction of the judgment debt, could be found, or (b) the amount realized on the sale of property seized, or otherwise realized under the execution, was insufficient to satisfy the judgment, stating the amount so realized and the balance remaining due thereon; (3) that he has caused the judgment debtor, where the judgment debtor is available, to be examined pursuant to law for that purpose, touching his property, and in particular as to whether the judgment debtor is insured under a policy of automobile insurance against loss occasioned by his legal liability for bodily injury to, or the death of, another person; (4) that he has made an exhaustive search and inquiry to ascertain whether the judgment debtor is possessed of property, real or personal, liable to be sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment; and (5) that as a result of such search, inquiry and examination, he has learned of no property, real or personal, possessed by the judgment debtor and liable to be sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment debt, or that he has learned of certain property, describing it, owned by the judgment debtor and liable to be seized or applied in satisfaction of the judgment, and has taken all necessary proceedings for the realization thereof, and that the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment, stating the amount so realized and the amount remaining due thereon. As I have said, the tribal court had jurisdiction over the defendant beyond all question. It entered a valid judgment against the defendant. All that remained to be done, in order to collect from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, is to obtain an order from a district court for payment from the Fund. Jurisdiction over Indians on Indian reservations is no longer involved. The only dispute now remaining is between the Indian plaintiff, a resident of this State and entitled to be a beneficiary of the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, to which he must contribute in order to have a driver's license, and the State itself, acting through the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. In such a dispute the State has no reason to claim any lack of jurisdiction over the Indian defendant. What we have before us, then, is simply a dispute between a resident of this State, who happens to be an Indian, and the State itself, acting through the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. The only issue before us is the interpretation of § 39-17-03, NDCC, and particularly the language relating to judge of the district court in which such judgment was rendered, contained in the portion of the statute relating to the obtaining of an order for payment from the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, which I have described above as the semi-administrative portion of the statute.