Opinion ID: 1965004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admissibility of Robertson's Testimony

Text: The issue with respect to Robertson's testimony is whether his opinion regarding causation is sufficiently certain. This does not entail an analysis of the methods used by Robertson in reaching his conclusions; rather, it is simply a question of whether Robertson's conclusions regarding causation were definitive enough to be relevant evidence on that point. Consequently, this question does not implicate the issues raised in Phillips v. Industrial Machine, 257 Neb. 256, 597 N.W.2d 377 (1999) (Gerrard, J., concurring). Lack of certainty in an expert's opinion is a problem of relevance. Menkens v. Finley, 251 Neb. 84, 555 N.W.2d 47 (1996). Because the exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in determinations of relevancy and admissibility under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1995), the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Seeber v. Howlette, 255 Neb. 561, 586 N.W.2d 445 (1998). Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. § 27-401. Thus, for evidence to be relevant under § 27-401, all that must be established is a rational, probative connection, however slight, between the offered evidence and a fact of consequence. State v. McManus, 257 Neb. 1, 594 N.W.2d 623 (1999). In the instant case, the issues were the standard of care, the defendants' deviation from that standard of care, and the relationship between that deviation and Brianna's injuries. See Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885 (1999). As Robertson's testimony was rationally and probatively connected to those issues, as noted above, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony. Weir and COG's assignment of error is without merit.