Opinion ID: 3154798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plain Error Review of Untimely Objections

Text: “Where defense counsel fails to raise a timely and pertinent objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial and the trial judge does not intervene sua sponte, we review only for plain error.”47 In plain error review, we first examine the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred, a process reflective of the procedure followed in connection with harmless error review. If we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends there. 48 If, however, the prosecutor did engage in misconduct, we move to the second step in the plain error analysis by applying the Wainwright standard.49 Under the Wainwright standard, “the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process” (the “Wainwright test”).50 Further, “the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial 47 Baker, 906 A.2d at 150 (citations omitted). 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982)). 20 right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”51 If we find plain error under Wainwright, we must reverse without reaching the third step of the analysis. “As with the harmless error analysis, if we conclude that the misconduct would not warrant reversal under the Wainwright standard, we proceed to apply Hunter as the third analytical step and consider whether the prosecutor’s statements are repetitive errors that require reversal because they cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.”52 Under the Hunter analysis, we can reverse, “even if the prosecutorial misconduct would not warrant reversal under the Wainwright standard.”53 Spence identifies three instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct that he did not object to during the proceedings below, namely: (1) the State, during its slideshow, impermissibly characterized the victims as “helpless;” (2) the State misstated the law of the justification defenses of self-defense and defense of others in its PowerPoint presentation; and (3) the State included the statement “[t]he defendant is guilty of all the charges against him” in its slideshow. The trial court found, in each instance, that the prosecutor’s statements did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. 1. The PowerPoint’s Characterization of the Victims We reject Spence’s contention that the State’s characterization of the victims as “helpless” in its PowerPoint presentation was misconduct and an impermissible appeal to the jury’s emotions. The slides in question included the following statements: “Intent can be formed in an instant…like when walking over top of a helpless person and 51 Baker, 906 A.2d at 150 (quoting Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100). 52 Id. (emphasis removed). 53 Id. 21 shooting them as they lay helpless” and “[s]hot him as he lay helpless on the floor[.]” Spence argues that the State could have used another word, such as “unarmed,” which would not have packed an emotional punch. We agree with the trial court that it would have made little difference, in terms of emotional appeal to the jury, if the State had substituted the term “unarmed” for the word “helpless.” When viewing the statements as a whole, saying that a defendant shot an “unarmed” victim versus saying that a defendant shot a “helpless” victim is a question of semantics. The terms “unarmed” and “helpless” are substantially similar in effect—to be unarmed during the shooting at the elevator was to be helpless. Further, it was reasonable for the State to draw the inference, based on the facts, evidence, and testimony presented, that Williams and Allen, at the time of the attack, were helpless to defend themselves. According to Spence’s testimony, the victims were waiting for the elevator at the time of the shooting. Although Spence testified that he perceived Williams “reaching for his waist” after Spence had approached with the shotgun, he admitted that he never observed Williams or Allen with a gun. In fact, no gun was found on Williams’s body, nor was there any testimony or evidence presented suggesting that either victim was armed. Thus, based on the evidence before this Court, the State could logically infer that Williams and Allen were “helpless” at the time of the shooting. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that these statements were not improper appeals to the jury’s emotions amounting to prosecutorial misconduct. 2. The PowerPoint’s Statement of the Law of Self-Defense 22 Spence also untimely objected to four slides that, he contends, misstate the law regarding the justification defenses. Spence objected to slides, which stated: “They (i.e. SureShots) + Might (i.e. what could happen) ≠ Self Defense[.]” Spence also objected to slide 059, which appeared as follows: Self Defense  Immediately necessary to protect against the unlawful use of force  To protect against death or serious physical injury  When you are the aggressor and  You assume they might have a gun There is no Self Defense54 Spence further objected to slide 060, which largely mirrored slide 059, but substitutes “There is no Defense of Others” for “There is no Self Defense[.]”55 Spence contends that these slides misstated the law because knowledge that someone “might” be armed, coupled with movements toward his waist, could reasonably support a subjective belief that the person was in imminent physical harm. Therefore, he argues that the fact that he did not know for certain whether the victims were armed did not preclude a justification defense. The State argued that the PowerPoint slides were only demonstrative aids and must be taken in conjunction with the comments that accompanied each slide. We agree that the slides were improper, as they misstate the law of self-defense. 54 A201 (emphasis in original). The last line, “There is no Self Defense,” appeared in enlarged text. 55 A201-02. The last line, “There is no Defense of Others,” appeared in enlarged text. 23 While a portion of the State’s oral presentations focused on Spence’s subjective belief, the inaccurate slides created the potential for confusion.56 That is, the slides do not properly represent the substance of 11 Del. C. § 464 to the jury. 11 Del. C. § 464(b) provides, in part, that “a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as the person believes them to be when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which the person has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.”57 Further, 11 Del. C. § 464(c) sets forth: “The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect the defendant against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.”58 In that regard, the slides are inaccurate and improper. 3. The PowerPoint’s Assertion that the Defendant is Guilty Spence’s third untimely objection was to slide 066, which includes the following statement: “The defendant is guilty of all the charges against him[.]”59 Spence argues that this statement constituted improper vouching, as it was a personal expression 56 During closing arguments, the prosecutor paraphrased the trial court’s instructions to the jury with respect to the defendant’s subjective belief, stating that “self-defense is when you use the immediate use of force to protect yourself or others and you use deadly force when you think you are going to be killed or seriously injured, and that has to be reasonable.” The prosecutor further stated that “if someone is using self-defense, it is justifiable when that force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself.” The prosecutor also argued to the jury: “. . . you’ve heard about the Sure Shots and them and how dangerous they were. If you think that was something the defendant was considering, but if that was not reasonable, if he thought because the Sure Shots are bad, I’ve got to kill these guys, and that thought is not based on a sound reason, then self-defense doesn’t apply to those offenses which have a reckless mindset.” 57 11 Del. C. § 464(b). 58 11 Del. C. § 464(c). 59 A153 (emphasis in original). In the slideshow, the relevant typeface was enlarged. 24 attributable to the State concerning Spence’s guilt. “Conceptually, improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor implies personal superior knowledge, beyond what is logically inferred from the evidence at trial.”60 In Kirkley v. State, we addressed the issue of improper vouching regarding the following statement made during closing arguments: “The State of Delaware is bringing this charge because it is exactly what [the defendant] did.”61 This Court found that “[a]sserting that the State brought the charges because [the defendant] committed the crime implies personal knowledge outside the evidence and emasculates the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence.”62 We agree that the statement contained in slide 066 was improper. While the State asserts that the statement appeared at the end of a series of slides in which it set forth its arguments for each offense, the State should have included a qualifier before its statement, such as, for example, “the evidence demonstrates.”