Opinion ID: 2629622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr Rawlings

Text: ¶ 11 Duncan first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony regarding his refusal to submit to a second mental examination by Dr. Rawlings. CR 35 allows a court to order a party to submit to a mental examination by a psychologist if the party's mental condition is in controversy. However, in 2002, we held that the State is not entitled to a CR 35 mental examination of an individual for whom the State seeks commitment as a sexually violent predator. In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476, 479, 55 P.3d 597 (2002). After analyzing CR 35 against chapter 71.09 RCW, we concluded that the civil rule was inconsistent with the special proceedings set out in the SVP statute. Id. at 491, 55 P.3d 597. We limited the State's ability to conduct mental examinations in SVP proceedings to the procedures set forth in RCW 71.09.040(4). [3] Id. ¶ 12 Duncan contends that the trial court's decision was based on an erroneous understanding of the law and that because the court had no authority to force him to submit to a CR 35 examination, evidence of his refusal was irrelevant and prejudicial. Specifically he asserts that evidence regarding his refusal to agree to a second examination allowed the jury to believe he had reason to be apprehensive about another evaluation and that he was being less than honest and open about his rehabilitation. Pet. for Review at 10. But, as the trial court noted, it was Duncan who first raised the issue of Dr. Rawlings's failure to examine him after the initial examination in 1996. In explaining his decision, the trial court specifically noted that the defense has raised a point that this [Rawlings's conclusion] was all based on hearsay reports. RP (Nov. 4, 2005) at 1340. The trial court concluded that Duncan had opened the door to the State's questioning in this area. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that allowing the State's response was appropriate in light of Duncan's attack on Dr. Rawlings's credibility. ¶ 13 With regard to Duncan's claim that Dr. Rawlings's testimony was overly prejudicial, the record demonstrates that in fact very little was said about the refusal to submit to a second examination. After the court made its ruling the following exchange took place between counsel for the State and Dr. Rawlings: Q. When we broke yesterday I was just in the process of asking you whether you would like to have had an opportunity to meet with Mr. Duncan again. A. Yes. Q. That is yes, you would have liked to? A. Yes, you were asking me that, and, yes, I would like to have. Q. And did you request an opportunity to interview him again? A. I did through the Attorney General's Office. Q. And were you able to interview him? A. No. RP (Nov. 4, 2005) at 1341. No further testimony was offered regarding Duncan's decision not to be reevaluated by Dr. Rawlings. When the jury asked Duncan why he chose not to be reevaluated for the trial, [4] the court answered for Duncan stating, [a]nd to the members of this jury, Mr. Duncan did not wish to do so, and the Court did not order him to participate in further evaluation. RP (Nov. 9, 2005) at 1921. ¶ 14 While it is possible to view these exchanges as having some prejudicial effect on Duncan, taken in context, we do not believe that the trial court's decision to admit them was manifestly unreasonable. The trial judge concluded that the testimony was proper as a response to the defense's attack on the expert's credibility. It was Duncan's attack that opened the door to the State's response. In addition, the testimony at issue was of a very limited nature. We hold the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.