Opinion ID: 782716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FOIA's Legislative History

Text: 25 UNITE also argues that FOIA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to permit fee awards under the catalyst theory. FOIA's legislative history has been recounted by this Court before. In Vermont Low Income, Judge Friendly described Congress' deliberations over the threshold requirement for an award of attorney's fees under FOIA. See Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 512-13. The version of the bill originally recommended by the House Committee on Government Operations provided for an award of fees, in the discretion of the court, to a complainant in instances where the court issues an injunction or order against the Government agency. Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As passed by the House, however, the bill broadened a party's eligibility for a fee award to cases in which the United States... has not prevailed. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Senate bill, as Judge Friendly described it, changed the emphasis by permitting an assessment of fees in cases where the complainant has substantially prevailed and by listing four factors for a court to consider when exercising its discretion to award fees: the benefit to the public, if any, deriving from the case, the commercial benefit to the complainant and the nature of his interest in the records sought, and whether the government's withholding of the records sought had a reasonable basis in law. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Conference Committee's version, which ultimately passed into law, incorporated the substantially prevailing standard from the Senate proposal, but eliminated the four criteria discussed above. See id. at 513. Based on this legislative record, UNITE maintains that the House's rejection of a version of the bill that awarded fees where the court issues an injunction or order against the Government agency demonstrates Congress' intent that a FOIA complainant need not secure judicially sanctioned relief to be eligible for an award of attorney's fees. 26 While Judge Friendly made a forceful case on this score, we are guided in our view of FOIA's legislative record by the Supreme Court's consideration of a similar legislative history argument in Buckhannon. At the petitioners' urging, the Buckhannon Court examined the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which, the petitioners argued, supported a broader reading of the term prevailing party — one which encompassed the catalyst theory. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Taking up this argument, the Court pointed to the House Report to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which states that [t]he phrase `prevailing party' is not intended to be limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits. Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7 (1976)). The Court also referenced the Senate Report, which explains that `parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.' Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5, (1976), U.S. Code Cong & Admin.News 1976, p. 5912.). Further, the Court noted that both Reports made explicit reference to an Eighth Circuit decision describing the catalyst theory. See id. (citing Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.1970)). 27 In spite of this record, the Buckhannon Court dismissed the petitioners' argument as insufficient, concluding that, in view of the American Rule that courts may not award fees absent explicit statutory authority, the legislative history cited was at best ambiguous as to the availability of the `catalyst theory' for awarding attorney's fees. Id. at 607-08, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The legislative history underlying the passage of FOIA is no more persuasive than that recounted in Buckhannon. Indeed, one of the Reports cited in Buckhannon explicitly states that the term prevailing party was not intended to be limited to those acquiring a judgment on the merits, yet that did not prevent the Supreme Court from ultimately concluding that some form of judicially sanctioned relief is required to support an award of fees. See id. at 607, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7 (1976)). In contrast, none of the Reports in FOIA's legislative history references awarding fees in the absence of a judgment. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 456. Buckhannon 's characterization of what we believe to be a more persuasive legislative record as ambiguous and insufficient convinces us that the legislative history underlying FOIA is inconclusive. Id. 2 28