Opinion ID: 857825
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review and Chevron Deference

Text: We ordinarily review questions of law de novo. However, the Court must afford deference under Chevron 10 BLANDINO -MEDINA V . HOLDER U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes it is charged with administering. See INS v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). The first step of the Chevron analysis considers whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. Courts “only defer . . . to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying the normal ‘tools of statutory construction,’ are ambiguous.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.45 (2001) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court moves to step two of the Chevron inquiry, and considers “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Deference “is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’” Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).