Opinion ID: 2582638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: liability exists under the public duty doctrine because the state stands in loco parentis to foster children

Text: ¶ 44 The majority concludes that the State is not liable to Sheikh for negligently placing Pierre and Anderson with a foster parent incapable of controlling them because it has no special relation to foster children. Under the public duty doctrine, the State is liable for negligence only when it owes a duty specific to the injured person because `a duty to all is a duty to no one.' Babcock v. Mason County Fire Dist. No. 6, 144 Wash.2d 774, 785, 30 P.3d 1261 (2001) (quoting Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash.2d 159, 163, 759 P.2d 447 (1988)). But the State owes a duty specific to an injured person when it has a special relation to a third person who injures that person. ¶ 45 After lengthy analysis, the majority concludes no special relation exists because children are not parolees. See majority at 577-78 (discussing Taggart, 118 Wash.2d 195, 822 P.2d 243). While many teens might take exception, the majority is quite correct, as far as it goes.
¶ 46 But the State does not limit its special relations to parolees. It is well-settled that the State stands in loco parentis or in the place of a parent to minor children in its custody. [T]he standard of care imposed upon the state in its treatment, management, and control of delinquent children committed to its custody may be likened to that of parent to child. Evangelical United Brethren Church, 67 Wash.2d at 259-60, 407 P.2d 440. See also Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wash.2d 402, 408, 583 P.2d 626 (1978) (As the court's agent, the standard of care imposed upon Kamp is that of a parent.). And see, e.g., Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1297 (7th Cir.1995); P.G. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 4 P.3d 326, 332 (Alaska 2000); E.P. v. Riley, 604 N.W.2d 7, 12 (S.D.1999); Calabria v. State, 289 N.Y. 613, 43 N.E.2d 836 (1942). ¶ 47 Curiously, the majority characterizes the in loco parentis relationship as not well defined in our case law. Majority at 581. In fact, there is little to define. A party stands in loco parentis by acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed.2004). See State v. Waleczek, 90 Wash.2d 746, 752-53, 585 P.2d 797 (1978) (following State ex rel. Gilroy v. Superior Court, 37 Wash.2d 926, 933, 226 P.2d 882 (1951)). The relationship thereby established is undefined only in that the duties accompanying it depend on the circumstances.
¶ 48 And a parent's duty to control the conduct of a child is a canonical special relation establishing liability for negligent failure to control the actions of a third party. A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent: (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965). See Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 248, 281 P. 991 (1929) (holding parent responsible for the negligence of the parent in causing the child to become dangerous and not attempting to restrain it); Sun Mountain Prods., Inc. v. Pierre, 84 Wash.App. 608, 615-16, 929 P.2d 494 (1997) (adopting objective standard of care for negligent supervision); Barrett v. Pacheco, 62 Wash.App. 717, 724, 815 P.2d 834 (1991); Carey v. Reeve, 56 Wash.App. 18, 22, 781 P.2d 904 (1989). Cf. RCW 4.24.190 (holding parents statutorily liable for up to $5,000 for their child's willful[] and malicious[] torts, in addition to any common law liability); Cornelius J. Peck, Parental Liability for Wilful and Malicious Acts of Children, 36 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 327, 331 (1961) (emphasizing that RCW 4.24.190 does not limit the amount of recovery against the parents for their own common law negligence). The public duty doctrine merely asks whether the State had a duty to the plaintiff. Taggart, 118 Wash.2d at 218, 822 P.2d 243. Because the State explicitly assumes a duty, the public duty doctrine cannot absolve it of liability. ¶ 49 In any case, any party standing in loco parentis has a duty to control its ward. The State no more assumes [g]eneral responsibility for the rearing of incorrigible children than does a parent. Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 895 (1934). But it must exercise the care which a reasonable parent should exercise to prevent his child from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons. Id. See, e.g., Evangelical United Brethren Church, 67 Wash.2d at 259-60, 407 P.2d 440; Riley, 604 N.W.2d at 12 (holding that public duty doctrine is inapplicable to the State's duty to control foster children); P.G., 4 P.3d at 331 (holding State stands in a special relationship ... with children in need of aid who come under its supervision). Thus, the State is liable for the tortious conduct of a child in its custody if [it] know[s] of the child's dangerous proclivity and fail[s] to take reasonable measures to control that proclivity. Carey, 56 Wash.App. at 26, 781 P.2d 904 (citing Eldredge, 90 Wash.2d at 408, 583 P.2d 626). See also Riley, 604 N.W.2d at 15 n. 6 (holding that the State owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to control a child in its custody). In fact, the State's relation to foster children is arguably more intimate and comprehensive even than its relation to parolees. If the State has a duty to control parolees merely because it exerts limited authority over them, it certainly has a duty to control children actually in its custody.