Opinion ID: 2377915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: BECAUSE GILLMOR COMPLIED WITH THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 801(2)(a) OF CLUDMA, HER CLAIMS ARE TIMELY AND ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Text: ¶ 18 Based on the plain language of the applicable statute of limitations contained in section 801(2)(a) of CLUDMA, we conclude that Gillmor's claims are timely and entitled to judicial review. Section 801(2)(a) expressly grants parties the right to seek judicial review of county land use decisions in district court. [6] Specifically, that section provides that [a]ny person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of [CLUDMA] may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision is final. [7] Based on CLUDMA's plain language, a party is affirmatively entitled to judicial review of any final county land use decision whenever (A) the decision adversely affects the party's interests, (B) the decision was made in the exercise of or in violation of provisions of CLUDMA, and (C) the party files a petition for review within thirty days of the date the county's decision is final. ¶ 19 In 2004, Gillmor filed her Petition for Review in response to the County's decisions to deny her Amendment and Plat Applications. Because Gillmor sought review of these decisions in a petition for review pursuant to section 801(2)(a), the procedural requirements of that section govern this action. [8] As explained below, in the instant case each of section 801(2)(a)'s jurisdictional requirements is satisfied and Gillmor's claims are therefore entitled to judicial review.
¶ 20 The County rendered land use decisions that adversely affected Gillmor's interests when it rejected Gillmor's Amendment and Plat Applications. Before the right to district court review under section 801(2)(a) may be invoked, a County must render a final land use decision that adversely affects the interests of the party seeking review. [9] In the instant case, the County rendered land use decisions that adversely affected Gillmor's interests when it rejected Gillmor's applications. In each of her applications, Gillmor made requests to develop her property in ways that would have been financially beneficial to her. Although it may have been within the County's discretion to deny these applications, by doing so the County adversely affected Gillmor's ability to develop or potentially sell her property. Because these decisions adversely affected Gillmor, and because section 801(2)(a) expressly states that it is applicable to any final decision adversely affecting any party, we conclude that the County's decisions constitute reviewable land use decisions under section 801(2)(a). ¶ 21 The County contends that its decisions to deny Gillmor's applications were not reviewable land use decisions because Gillmor's applications did not comply with the requirements of the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code. Following this reasoning, the district court concluded that [h]owever characterized or labeled, [Gillmor's] claims are not really an appeal from a land use decision because her applications did not comply with the requirements of the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code. We find these arguments unpersuasive. There is certainly no dispute concerning whether or not Gillmor's applications complied with the requirements of the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code. Indeed, Gillmor concedes that her applications were noncompliant. But the noncompliance of Gillmor's applications does not determine whether the decisions to deny those applications constitute reviewable land use decisions. This is because the noncompliance of Gillmor's applications does not render the County's rejections nondecisions and does not shield these rejections from judicial review. Instead, the noncompliance of Gillmor's applications relates solely to the question of whether the County's decisions were arbitrary, capricious, or illegal-the exact question a district court will consider on review. [10] Whether or not the applications complied with the requirements of the 1997 Plan or 1998 Code, the County's decisions to deny Gillmor's requests adversely affected her interests. Because this is what section 801(2)(a) requires to entitle a petitioner to district court review, we hold that the County's decisions qualify as reviewable land use decisions under section 801(2)(a).
¶ 22 The County's decisions to deny Gillmor's applications were made in the exercise of provisions of CLUDMA. To be subject to district court review under section 801(2)(a), a county's land use decision must be made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of [CLUDMA]. [11] CLUDMA provides counties with the authority to enact zoning ordinances, [12] enforce those ordinances in the review of land use applications, [13] and to establish appeal authorities to hear and decide ... requests for variances from the terms of ... land use ordinances and ... appeals from decisions applying th[ose] land use ordinances. [14] ¶ 23 The County's decisions to deny Gillmor's applications were made in the exercise of these provisions. Specifically, in addition to applying the 1997 Plan and 1998 Code to Gillmor's applicationsas authorized by CLUDMAthe County also exercised the appellate authority provided by section 701 of CLUDMA when it reviewed the denials of Gillmor's applications in hearings before the BCC and BOA. Because these denials and reviews specifically exercised authority granted by CLUDMA, we conclude that Gillmor's petition seeks review of County land use decisions made in the exercise of provisions of CLUDMA.
¶ 24 It is undisputed that Gillmor complied with the timeliness requirement set forth in section 801(2)(a). To receive district court review under section 801(2)(a), a party must file a petition for review within thirty days of the date on which a county renders its final land use decision. [15] It is undisputed that Gillmor filed her Petition for Review within thirty days of the date the County rendered its final decisions to deny her applications. Indeed, in its brief, the County agrees that [t]o the extent Gillmor's complaints could be considered bonafide petitions for review ... [they] were timely filed. Based on this concession, we conclude that Gillmor's petition satisfied section 801(2)(a)'s thirty-day timing requirement. ¶ 25 Because Gillmor's Petition for Review satisfies the three requirements set forth in section 801(2)(a), we hold that her claims are not time barred and are entitled to judicial review.