Opinion ID: 2549367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Fowler's Testimony

Text: Graham also assigns error to the trial court's admission of Fowler's conversation with the police the night of the murder. The application of a hearsay exception is a question of law that we review de novo. ( Larry) Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C.2004); see also ( Henry) Brown v. United States, 881 A.2d 586, 599 (D.C.2005). Graham argues that the trial court erred by allowing Fowler to testify on direct examination regarding his statements to police the night of the murder. [6] The exchange went as follows: Q: Mr. Fowler, when you were down at the police station did you tell the police who did this that night? A: Yes I did. Q: And who did you tell them did it? A: Kamau's [Walker's] friend, Dave [Graham]. Over Graham's objection, the trial court admitted the statement as a prior statement of identification. See D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(3) (2001). On appeal, characterizing the testimony as a prior consistent statement, [7] Graham argues that its admission was improper because Fowler had not been impeached. See Daye v. United States, 733 A.2d 321, 325 (D.C.1999) (Prior consistent statements may not be used to bolster an unimpeached witness. (quoting Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C.1982))). We find no merit in this claim. The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made. ( Larry) Brown, supra, 840 A.2d at 88 (citing Morris v. United States, 398 A.2d 333, 336 (D.C.1978); Clemons v. United States, 133 U.S.App. D.C. 27, 39-40, 408 F.2d 1230, 1242-43 (1968)). Codified in D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(3) (2001), the exception provides that [a] statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is. . . an identification of a person made after perceiving the person. Such prior statements are substantive evidence. Descriptions of an event itself are admissible only to the extent necessary to provide context to the identifications. See Lewis v. United States, 996 A.2d 824, 829-30 (D.C. 2010) (citing Porter v. United States, 826 A.2d 398, 410 (D.C.2003)). We admit prior statements of identification because the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. Morris, supra, 398 A.2d at 337 (citations omitted). Where a statement fits within the prior identification exception, it is properly admitted as substantive evidence, and is not an impermissible prior consistent statement. ( Henry) Brown, supra, 881 A.2d at 600 (Although [appellant] argues that it was improper to use the consistency of [prior] descriptions to bolster [a witness's] in-court testimony in the absence of a prior attack on that testimony, we see nothing inherently wrong with using prior statements of identification in this way.) Here, the statement fits the exception, and was properly admitted as a prior statement of identification. Fowler's statement to the police identified Graham as the shooter [8] and Fowler, the declarant, was available for cross examination. [9] See, e.g. Lewis, supra, 996 A.2d at 829 (allowing statements made to police and prosecutors to be introduced as prior statements of identification where the statements provided names of the accused and the declarant was available for cross examination); Taylor v. United States, 866 A.2d 817, 822-23 (D.C.2005) (admitting prior statements naming and describing the accused, where the statement was not detailed and the declarant was available for cross examination); ( Randolph) Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 386-87 (D.C.2000) (admitting a victim's statement to a friend, where the statement identified the accused and the victim was available for cross examination).