Opinion ID: 1311766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the church's cross-complaint against maxwell

Text: The Church alleged that Maxwell's deprogramming activities violated the federal and state civil rights of the Church and its members. (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) [hereafter section 1985(3)]; Civ. Code, §§ 51.7, 52.) It also asserted a cause of action against Maxwell for full or partial indemnity, on the theory that he, by kidnapping and deprogramming Molko, had wholly or partially caused any damages for which the Church might be held liable to Molko. The trial court sustained without leave to amend Maxwell's demurrers to all three causes of action, and entered judgments of dismissal for him. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments of dismissal on the state and federal civil rights causes of action, holding that the court abused its discretion by refusing leave to amend the complaint. Because it affirmed the summary judgment for the Church in the action by Molko and Leal, it did not review the dismissal of the Church's cause of action for indemnity.
(24) The Church alleged that Maxwell conspired with others to deprive it and its members of equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. It contended Maxwell's purpose was, inter alia, to prevent Church members from freely exercising their religious beliefs through interstate travel. The Church sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. In its appeal to the Court of Appeal it abandoned its contention that it could assert free exercise claims under section 1985(3), but continued to assert it had representational standing to sue for a violation of its members' constitutionally guaranteed right to travel. ( Zobel v. Williams (1982) 457 U.S. 55 [72 L.Ed.2d 672, 102 S.Ct. 2309].) The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the dismissal on that ground. Maxwell offers three arguments why his demurrer to the Church's federal claim was properly sustained. As will appear, none is persuasive. First, he contends the Church failed to meet the second of three requirements for representational standing set forth in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n (1977) 432 U.S. 333, 343 [53 L.Ed.2d 383, 394, 97 S.Ct. 2434]. The requirement in question is that the interests [that the organization] seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose. ( Ibid. ) Maxwell asks us to infer from that requirement a test of the Church's status as a bona fide religious organization: apparently he wishes to argue that the Church is a political rather than religious organization, and that its members' right to travel is somehow not germane to the organization's true purpose. But the contention has no support in the law, and we decline to adopt such a novel reading of a federal statute. Second, Maxwell contends his demurrer was properly sustained because a conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights does not violate section 1985(3) unless either a state is involved in the conspiracy or the conspiracy aims to influence the state's activity. While the contention correctly states the Supreme Court's holding in Carpenters v. Scott (1983) 463 U.S. 825, 830 [77 L.Ed.2d 1049, 1055, 103 S.Ct. 3352], it overlooks the court's further statement in Carpenters that in accordance with Griffin v. Breckenridge (1971) 403 U.S. 88 [29 L.Ed.2d 338, 91 S.Ct. 1790], section 1985(3) does reach purely private conspiracies aimed at depriving persons of the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel. ( Carpenters v. Scott, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 832-833 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1056-1057].) The Church alleges just such a conspiracy here. [20] Third, Maxwell contends the Church's federal cause of action was barred by the state statute of limitations because it was subject to the one-year limitation period for personal injury claims set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (2). However, as the Court of Appeal correctly held, the Church seeks to amend its complaint to seek injunctive relief only as to what it alleges to be an ongoing conspiracy among Maxwell and the other cross-defendants. The statute of limitations does not begin to run in civil conspiracy cases until the last overt act of the conspiracy has been completed. ( Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 787 [157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45].) Thus, if a continuing conspiracy is proved, the action is obviously timely; if no conspiracy is proved, injunctive relief will be denied. The determinative issue is factual and cannot be resolved by demurrer.
As stated above, the trial court sustained Maxwell's demurrer to the Church's cause of action for indemnification, and entered a judgment of dismissal; the Court of Appeal, because it affirmed the summary judgment for the Church in plaintiffs' action for damages, did not address any of the issues raised in the Church's appeal from the judgment of dismissal. Because we reverse the summary judgment on the merits, however, those issues are no longer moot. The Church bases its indemnification action on the theory that Maxwell, by kidnapping and deprogramming Molko, wholly or partially caused any damages for which the Church might be held liable to Molko. The Church contends, in other words, that if it is held liable to Molko as an intentional tortfeasor, it should be allowed to seek indemnification from Maxwell as a concurrent intentional tortfeasor. Thus the Church asks us to consider an issue of first impression  whether the equitable indemnity doctrine, as set forth by this court in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899], permits an intentional tortfeasor to obtain indemnity from concurrent intentional tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. We must decline the invitation, however, because the facts in the present case would not support such an action even if it were otherwise permitted. (25) It is not sufficient, for purposes of indemnification, for a defendant simply to claim someone else caused all or part of the plaintiff's damages. To state a claim for indemnification, a defendant must allege that the same harm for which he may be held liable is properly attributable  at least in part  to the alleged indemnitor. (See, e.g., Rest.2d Torts, § 886B, subd. (1): If two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and one of them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to indemnity from the other....) If a defendant believes the plaintiff's injuries were the result of a different harm altogether, he may argue the point to the jury and escape liability if successful. Absent some claim of mutual liability for the same harm, however  under joint-and-several or vicarious liability principles, for example  an indemnification action will not lie. (See American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578 at p. 606 [[W]e think it only fair that a defendant who may be jointly and severally liable for all of the plaintiff's damages be permitted to bring other concurrent tortfeasors into the suit.].) The Church claims not that Maxwell shares responsibility for any harm the Church caused Molko through its alleged deception and coercive persuasion, but rather that Maxwell's kidnapping and deprogramming of Molko were the actual causes of Molko's damages  i.e., that Molko's damages were the result of a different harm than the one for which the Church might be held liable. Although the Church may freely attempt to convince the jury that Maxwell's actions rather than its own caused any damages Molko suffered, it does not allege that it and Maxwell are in some way mutually liable for the same harm; thus it does not state facts sufficient to support an indemnification action. Accordingly, we leave for another day the question whether an intentional tortfeasor may obtain indemnity from concurrent intentional tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.