Opinion ID: 2831405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Compliance with Section 90.010(f)(1)

Text: In lieu of pulmonary function testing demonstrating a specified threshold of functional impairment, the safety valve provisions in section 90.010(f) require pulmonary function testing to have been performed on the exposed person and the physician making the report to have interpreted that testing. TEX . CIV . PRAC . & REM . CODE § 90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii). The only pulmonary testing performed on Joseph occurred before he retired from Union Carbide in 1979 and that testing did not show functional pulmonary impairment. As the court of appeals noted, neither the Emmites nor Dr. Prince rely upon the testing to show that Joseph suffered from asbestos-related functional pulmonary 18 impairment while he was alive, or that he died as a result of his exposure to asbestos. 386 S.W.3d at 296. The Emmites contend section 90.010(f) requires only that testing was performed and that the reporting physician interpreted the tests, not that the tests were relevant to the physician’s diagnosis of functional pulmonary impairment by showing some level of functional impairment or otherwise playing some part in the physician’s diagnosis. They argue that the forty-year-old tests satisfy section 90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii) even though Dr. Prince testified the tests were normal and he did not rely on them in diagnosing Joseph as having had functional pulmonary impairment. We disagree. As previously noted, our primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 625. We derive the Legislature’s intent from the statute as a whole, not from individual provisions in isolation. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 454. We construe a statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning unless they are statutorily defined otherwise, a different meaning is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. See Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010). We take statutes as we find them, presuming the Legislature included words that it intended to include and omitted words it intended to omit. See, e.g., Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. 2010). We do not read words into a statute to make it what we consider to be more reasonable, rather we may do so only to prevent an absurd result. Id. at 930. The language of section 90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii) does not expressly require that the pulmonary function test show functional impairment or otherwise be relevant to the physician’s diagnosis of asbestos-related functional pulmonary impairment. See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE 19 § 90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii). But in comparing that section to section 90.003, we note the Legislature retained pulmonary function testing as a requirement in section 90.010(f)(1) while omitting other objective criteria. That indicates that the Legislature expected pulmonary function testing to play a key role in the physician’s diagnosis. Comparison of the two sets of requirements provides context for the role each provision plays. And, it is clear that both in context and in order to avoid nonsensical, absurd results, section 90.010(f)(1) must be read to require pulmonary function testing and its results to be relevant to the reporting physician’s medical conclusions. First, as to context, section 90.010(f)(1), unlike section 90.003, does not require specific x- ray readings, but instead simply requires the physician to conclude that the radiographic and other evidence establishes that the exposed person had asbestos-related disease. Compare id. § 90.003(a)(2)(c), with § 90.010(f)(1)(iii). However, while section 90.010(f)(1) omits a minimum threshold showing, by way of pulmonary function testing, that either the exposed person’s (1) forced vital capacity, or (2) total lung capacity, falls below a statutorily set level of pulmonary impairment, section 90.010(f)(1) still requires that pulmonary function testing has been performed and that the reporting physician has interpreted that testing. Compare id. § 90.010(f)(1), with § 90.003(a)(2)(D). By specifically retaining pulmonary function testing in the safety valve provisions while omitting other requirements, the Legislature singled out pulmonary function testing as a paramount consideration in a physician’s medical conclusions, and not merely an inconsequential procedural hurdle. A section 90.010(f)(1) report must include a detailed medical, occupational, and exposure history. Id. § 90.010(f)(1)(A) (incorporating the requirements from section 90.003(a)(2)(A)-(B)). 20 The reporting physician must rule out causes of functional impairment other than asbestos exposure. Id. (incorporating the requirements from section 90.003(a)(2)(E)). And a section 90.010(f)(1) report must include copies and documentation of all testing, including pulmonary function testing, that the physician reviewed in reaching the physician’s conclusions. Id. (incorporating the requirements from section 90.003(a)(2)(F)). By requiring copies of all pulmonary function tests reviewed by the physician in reaching his conclusions, as well as requiring pulmonary function testing to have been performed, the Legislature indicated that the pulmonary function testing must play a role in the physician’s medical conclusions under the safety valve. Id. § 90.010(f)(1). Moreover, absent the pulmonary function test required by section 90.010(f) being relevant to the diagnosis of functional pulmonary impairment, the safety valve requirement would yield results completely at odds with the rest of Chapter 90’s testing requirements by permitting claims to go forward based on the fortuity of pulmonary testing having occurred sometime in the exposed person’s past—as with Joseph’s pulmonary tests—but not requiring the testing to be relevant to any diagnosis of impairment, while the other testing requirements in Chapter 90 are required to be relevant to the diagnosis of pulmonary functional impairment. The associated result would be that persons with asbestosis but no pulmonary function test in their past will be precluded from pursuing claims because they never underwent testing—even though such a test might have been completely irrelevant to a diagnosis of asbestos-related pulmonary function impairment. If the required testing is sufficient absent any relationship to the diagnosis, the requirement might just as well be some other non-relevant accomplishment or event such as requiring the exposed person to have been born on a particular day of the week. We do not attribute to the Legislature an intent that Chapter 90, with 21 its detailed processes and procedures, should yield such a nonsensical, arbitrary result. The Legislature’s stated purpose was to preserve and allocate limited resources for compensating persons impaired by asbestosis, not to arbitrarily deny compensation to persons with asbestosis. Thus, in order to interpret the pulmonary function testing requirement in the safety valve provision in a manner that contextually meshes with the remainder of Chapter 90, and yields nonarbitrary, non-absurd results, we are compelled to conclude that the Legislature intended that the testing have some relevance to the physician’s diagnosis of asbestos-related pulmonary impairment, such as by showing some level of pulmonary impairment, even though the testing results do not meet the section 90.003 threshold. Reading the statute otherwise would ignore the Legislature’s purpose in enacting Chapter 90, which was to respond to the asbestosis litigation crisis that was in large part the result of lawsuits filed by persons who had been exposed to asbestos and may even have had asbestos-related physical changes, but who had not developed asbestos-related physical impairment. Act of May 16, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 97, § 1(f), (n), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 169, 169-70.