Opinion ID: 852804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Homicide Exception

Text: Both the counselor/client privilege and the psychologist/patient privilege contain exceptions to the non-disclosure of confidential communication. At issue here are what are commonly referred to as the homicide exceptions. For the counselor/client privilege the exception applies, [i]n a criminal proceeding involving a homicide if the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide. I.C. § 25-23.6-6-1(1). Worded only slightly differently the exception for the psychologist/patient privilege applies in [t]rials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of said homicide. I.C. § 25-33-1-17(1). After conducting an in camera inspection of the contested documents, the trial court determined that the homicide exceptions did not apply. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in making this determination. Although not necessarily raising the issue as error, the State makes a related claim that it has not been able to review the documents, even for the limited purpose of arguing whether the documents fall within an exception to the privilege. Appellant's Pet. to Trans. at 11. We first observe that we have already determined that the counselor/client privilege is not applicable in this case. Thus, our focus here is on the psychologist/patient privilege, which predated the time the Pelley family received counseling. Unless the homicide exception applies, any communication between Center's psychologist and the Pelley family is privileged and not discoverable. As for the State's claim that it has not been afforded the opportunity to review the privileged documents to determine if they contain non-privileged information, we conclude the State is not entitled to review the documents. And this is so because the very nature of the psychologist/patient privilege precludes the State from gaining access to confidential communications absent an exception. Rather, a determination must be made in the first instance as to whether the State has a right of access to the documents. Allowing the State itself to review the documents in order to make that determination would eviscerate the reason the privilege exists in the first place, namely: to protect confidential communications between psychologists and patients. In essence we entrust trial courts rather than sparring litigants with the authority to preserve the inviolability of privileged information. And although the trial court may have allowed the State to review the requested documents in this case under a confidential protective order, it was not compelled to do so. See Van Meter v. Zimmer, 697 N.E.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Ind. Ct.App.1998) (observing that the trial court could either conduct an in camera inspection of a joint tax return or allow discovery by the opposing party under a confidential protective order). Further, the notion of a trial court conducting an in camera inspection of documents to determine whether information contained in them is or is not discoverable is not particularly remarkable. For example in Owen v. Owen, 563 N.E.2d 605 (Ind.1990), we addressed the physician/patient privilege declaring: [I]n those rare cases where the physician-patient privilege is properly invoked, it is incumbent on the party seeking to assert the privilege to identify to the court specifically which documents are believed to remain within the privilege, after which the court will review the contested documents in camera to ascertain their entitlement to the protection of the privilege. Id. at 608 (emphasis added); see also Hulett v. State, 552 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ind.Ct. App.1990), trans. denied, (ruling the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in camera inspection of a counselor's file, because [w]ithout such inspection, it was not possible for the trial court to exercise its discretion in ruling upon the presence of discoverable evidence as opposed to irrelevant or immaterial matter.); Sturgill v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986) (ruling the trial court erred in denying defendant's pre-trial discovery request. At the very least, the trial court should have conducted an in camera inspection of [the victim's] statements given to the welfare department ... to determine whether any of the statements benefited [Defendant's] defense.). In sum, the State has not shown any entitlement to review the contested documents, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by conducting the in camera inspection. Concerning the State's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the contested documents did not fall within the homicide exception, the case of Jorgensen v. State, 574 N.E.2d 915 (Ind.1991) is instructive. In Jorgensen, after a trial by jury the defendant was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The conviction was affirmed on appeal and the defendant sought transfer raising a number of issues. We remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings after finding one issue dispositive: whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant an opportunity to depose two people. The essential facts were these. While married to the murder victim, the defendant was involved in a relationship with Gary Cochran. There was testimony at trial that Cochran told a friend that he wanted to kill the victim. Cochran had also supplied written confessions admitting to having committed the murder. Defendant claimed that William Ball, a social worker, and Dr. Robert Greenburg, a psychologist, counseled Cochran. Claiming these two people had information that might tend to show that Cochran rather than the defendant committed the murder, the defendant moved to take their depositions. The trial court denied the request apparently on the grounds that the information possessed by both Ball and Dr. Greenburg was privileged or that the defendant had not shown that the information requested was material to her defense. Addressing the homicide exception to the psychologist/patient privilege, we noted the privilege did not protect the communications made to the social worker, [3] and that to the extent the defendant was seeking information relating to the facts or immediate circumstances of the homicide, the psychologist/patient privilege may not exist. Id. at 917. We went on to explain that with respect to non-privileged information, there are two principal questions a trial court must consider when ruling on discovery matters in a criminal trial: (1) is there a sufficient designation of the items to be discovered; and (2) are the items sought material to the defense? Id. Noting that the answer to the first question was affirmative, we then said: However, we cannot determine whether the information sought is material to her defense because we do not know what information Ball or Dr. Greenburg have relative to the homicide. The catch-22 is that there is no method of determining what information they may hold unless some discovery is conducted.    Although the trial court has wide discretion in discovery matters, we conclude that the court should have allowed some discovery in order to make possible the determination of whether Ball and Dr. Greenburg possessed information which would have been material to Jorgensen's defense. It was error for the trial court to have concluded that whatever information they possessed was privileged without a factual basis for arriving at such a conclusion. Similarly, it was error to have denied discovery because of no showing of materiality where the only method for Jorgensen to have met the materiality requirement was to have the information made available to her. Id. (emphasis added). Among other things Jorgensen stands for the proposition that some discovery is permissible in order to make the determination whether a witness may have information not subject to a privilege. Here, the State makes no claim that it has sought discovery in this case and that its efforts to do so have been thwarted. Indeed the State readily admits that it has interviewed several witnesses, which has given the State reason to believe that the documents it requests should include information concerning the facts and immediate circumstances of the murders. Appellant's Pet. to Trans. at 12. But the State does not elaborate further to explain what information the State obtained from these witnesses that formed the basis for its belief. In fact, had the State presented such evidence to the trial court then there may have been evidence of record before this Court to evaluate the State's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the homicide exception did not apply. However, on this record there is simply nothing before us to support the State's claim. A trial court is accorded broad discretion in ruling on issues of discovery. Vernon v. Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976, 982 (Ind.1999). On review, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the party challenging the decision has the burden of persuading us that the trial court abused its discretion. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind.2001). In this case the State has failed to carry its burden.