Opinion ID: 1244110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Suppression of Statements Obtained by Private Security Guards

Text: Ragland was permitted to testify to several statements made by Chastain while in the security office at the hospital. The defendant contends that his statements were elicited without a Miranda warning, and that the statements should have been suppressed. [8] Central to the defendant's argument is his characterization of the security guard as an agent of the state. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Court defined custodial interrogation in part as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers, id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, and thus Miranda by its own terms applies only to actions of law enforcement officials. See, e.g., United States v. Parr-Pla, 549 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972, 97 S.Ct. 2935, 53 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1977); United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir.1971); cf. Boynton v. Casey, 543 F.Supp. 995, 997 (D.Me.1982) (student had no right to Miranda advisement prior to questioning by public school authorities). In a related context, the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to those searches or seizures conducted by state officials. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S.Ct. 574, 576, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921); People v. Brewer, 690 P.2d 860, 862 (Colo.1984); People v. Benson, 176 Colo. 421, 425, 490 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1971). It is well-established, however, that where civilians act as agents of the state, evidence obtained from an unlawful, privately conducted search must be suppressed. Compare United States v. Harvey, 540 F.2d 1345, 1353 n. 10 (8th Cir.1976) (statutorily authorized monitoring of telephone line by telephone company did not constitute state action) with United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1975) (search by security guard at airport constituted state action), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867, 97 S.Ct. 177, 50 L.Ed.2d 147 (1976). The agency rule exists to prevent police authorities from circumventing the requirements of the fourth amendment by directing a third party to perform a search that would be improper if the police did it themselves. See United States v. West, 453 F.2d 1351, 1356 (3d Cir.1972). The defendant concedes that the Miranda rule is applicable only to custodial interrogations conducted by state agencies, but insists that Ragland was a de facto agent of the Colorado Springs Police Department. Cf. United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (9th Cir.1978) (statements of suspect while under interrogation by Mexican officials were inadmissible where evidence established a joint venture between Mexican and United States law enforcement authorities). Ragland's past law enforcement experience and his personal association with members of the police department in Colorado Springs does not cause him to be a police agent. Ragland apprehended and interrogated Lopez and Chastain as a security guard at the hospital. The record reveals that Ragland received no compensation or remuneration from any public agency, nor did Ragland act at the direction of the Colorado Springs Police Department. The fact that Ragland contacted police officers after he apprehended the defendant and Lopez is not sufficient to make him an agent of the police department. The statements made to Ragland were properly admitted into evidence. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction is affirmed.