Opinion ID: 627152
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intermediate Scrutiny Applies

Text: Having identified § 399b's speech restrictions as content-based on two levels, we must determine what level of scrutiny to apply in our analysis. Because government regulation of content is one of the primary evils contemplated by the First Amendment, content-based restrictions are strongly disfavored and are often subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, in the typical case, [c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Further, the bans on public issue and political advertisements appear at first glance to be especially strong candidates for strict judicial scrutiny because political speech is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 at 375, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Under strict scrutiny, the government would be required to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Citizens United v. FEC, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 898, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). But this is not the typical case, because these particular content-based restrictions on speech apply to broadcasters. For decades now, the Supreme Court has held that content-based speech restrictions that apply to broadcasters are subject to a less demanding form of judicial scrutiny than similar restrictions that arise in other media contexts. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). Indeed, in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984), the Court held that this intermediate level of scrutiny applies to regulations governing public broadcasters in particular. Id. at 376-77, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Specifically, in League of Women Voters, the Court observed that because broadcast regulation involves unique considerations, our cases have not followed precisely the same approach that we have applied to other media and have never gone so far as to demand that such regulations serve `compelling' governmental interests. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress regulates the broadcast spectrum  which is a scarce and valuable national resource  to ensure that stations which broadcast on those frequencies satisfy the public interest, convenience, and necessity. [4] Id. Thus, when Congress acts pursuant to its regulation of the broadcast spectrum, it does not operate under the same First Amendment standards that apply to regulation of other forms of media. Instead, in light of the history behind Congressional regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Supreme Court has held that laws enacted pursuant to Congressional broadcast regulation  even those which, as here, impose a content-based restriction on core political speech  are subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must prove a challenged statute is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest. Id. at 380, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Despite the Court's pronouncement in League of Women Voters, which was a public broadcasting case, Minority urges us to apply strict scrutiny for two different reasons. First, citing a concurring opinion in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009), which questioned the continuing validity of the broadcast regulation precedents on which League of Women Voters relied, Minority contends that new technologies such as cable and the Internet have undermined the core spectrum scarcity rationale of broadcast regulation cases. Id. at 1821 (Thomas, J., concurring). Under this theory, because traditional broadcast television and radio are no longer the `uniquely pervasive' media forms they once were, id., courts should no longer treat broadcast restrictions any differently from other restrictions on speech. Minority is surely correct that much has changed in the media landscape since the Supreme Court, in the 1970s, first adopted a standard that treats broadcasters differently under the First Amendment. Indeed, it is possible that the Supreme Court itself may soon declare that the era of a special broadcast exemption from strict scrutiny is over. After briefing and argument in this case, the Supreme Court heard argument in a case in which a coalition of the nation's major broadcasters have asked the Court to overrule Pacifica and its progeny and announce firmly and finally that the time for treating broadcast speech differently than all other communications is over. Br. of Respondents Fox Television Stations et al. in FCC v. Fox Television Stations , No. 10-1293, at 1. But that case has not yet been decided. Thus, just as golfers must play the ball as it lies, so too we must apply the law of broadcast regulation as it stands today. A majority of the Supreme Court has not overruled Pacifica, League of Women Voters, and related cases. Intermediate broadcast scrutiny remains in vigor, and it governs this case. Second, pointing to the bans on public issue and political advertising in particular, Minority contends that § 399b should be subject to strict scrutiny in the wake of Citizens United v. FEC, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 886, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). Citizens United applied strict scrutiny to 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which prohibited corporations from engaging in electioneering communications [5] within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, and held that the statute violated the First Amendment. Id. at 890. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from Citizens United,  contends Minority, is that any restriction or prohibition of political speech on broadcast radio or television is subject to strict scrutiny. We disagree. Citizens United was not a broadcast regulation case, so the Court there had no reason to revisit League of Women Voters and related cases. Instead, the Court relied on its previous application of strict scrutiny in cases which challenged the constitutionality of restrictions on campaign expenditures, not broadcast spectrum regulation. See id. at 899 (citing FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007), a previous case which analyzed § 441b, for the proposition that laws that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny). Thus, in Citizens United, the Court applied strict scrutiny to § 441b because that statute dealt with regulations on campaign expenditures generally. See, e.g., id. at 897 (listing, as acts that would be outlawed under § 441b, corporations running advertisements, publishing books, or creating websites). Citizens United in no way dealt with the unique considerations inherent in Congress's regulation of the broadcast spectrum. Moreover, Citizens United expressly overruled two of the Court's prior decisions: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990), which permitted a ban on speech based on corporate identity, and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), which relied on Austin to uphold a facial challenge to § 441b. Neither case involved regulation of public broadcasting. Thus, it is not surprising that the Court in Citizens United did not once mention League of Women Voters; it was neither overruled nor distinguished away. That is fatal to Minority's contention, because in League of Women Voters, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that content-based laws which burden political speech and are enacted pursuant to the broadcast spectrum require the application of strict judicial scrutiny. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376, 104 S.Ct. 3106. We therefore apply intermediate scrutiny to the restrictions. As explained below, we keep in mind as we apply that standard that public issue and political speech in particular is at the very core of the First Amendment's protection. We also must be mindful that the narrow tailoring prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard itself has undergone additional elaboration by the Supreme Court since League of Women Voters was decided in 1984. It is the details of that standard to which we now turn.