Opinion ID: 2615850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of used ampoules to impeach original test results.

Text: The courts below each heard expert testimony regarding the feasibility of performing scientific tests of the contents of a used ampoule, with the goal of supporting or refuting the validity of the original test results. Retesting procedures are enthusiastically supported by some scientists. They believe the ampoule contents can be analyzed for volume and composition in such a way as to yield reliable results which can be compared significantly to the original test results. These procedures, defendants maintain, would allow them to introduce expert testimony at their trials to rebut the evidence of the original test. The materiality of this expert testimony is the basis of their claim the used ampoules must be preserved. The threshold question, however, considered by the superior courts below, is whether such expert testimony would be admissible at trial. Although retesting is claimed to be reliable by some scientists, others are not persuaded. The courts heard testimony from recognized experts in the fields of analytical chemistry and toxicology, with long experience with the development and use of the Breathalyzer machine. These experts testified that retesting procedures are not scientifically reliable due to unpredictable changes in the stored chemicals and inadequacy of volume-testing techniques, and the principles used to draw conclusions based on these procedures are not generally accepted in the scientific community. Both superior courts applied the prevailing test for admissibility of scientific experimental evidence, which is discussed below, and held that expert testimony regarding the results of retesting used ampoules would be inadmissible. They concluded the State had no duty to preserve the ampoules for this purpose. The district court below did not consider the threshold question of admissibility. [1] The test applied by the courts below, commonly known as the Frye standard, is whether the scientific principle from which deductions are made is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the scientific community. The standard was originally set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.1923). It has since been adopted by at least four other federal courts of appeal and reaffirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit. [1] This court implicitly adopted this standard in State v. Woo, 84 Wn.2d 472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974). Moreover, courts of at least nine other states have adopted it. [2] It is therefore the prevailing rule and no court to our knowledge has rejected it with regard to the admissibility of testimony based on scientific experimental procedures at a criminal trial. The rationale of the Frye standard is that expert testimony may be permitted to reach a trier of fact only when the reliability of the underlying scientific principles has been accepted by the scientific community. See United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.1975). See also J. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence §§ 6.2, 6.3 (2d ed. 1974). In other words, scientists in the field must make the initial determination whether an experimental principle is reliable and accurate. This court adheres to the rule that the reliability of scientific evidence must be shown as a prerequisite to its admission. State v. Baker, supra . We therefore hold that the superior courts below properly applied the Frye standard of general acceptance in the scientific community to determine the admissibility of expert testimony regarding retesting of Breathalyzer test ampoules. The district court erred in failing to consider this question and assuming the testimony is admissible. Although certain of the defendants involved in the superior court proceedings argue before this court that the Frye standard should not be applied, they do not suggest any alternative standard for admissibility. Furthermore, they conceded at their hearing below that the Frye standard generally governs admissibility of scientific evidence. We therefore reject the contention the Frye standard does not apply. We also hold the superior courts' findings that the ampoule retesting procedures are not generally accepted are supported by substantial evidence in the record. We decline to adopt defendants' suggestion we review the record de novo in this regard and dispense with our rule that findings supported by substantial evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Parkridge v. Seattle, 89 Wn.2d 454, 464, 573 P.2d 359 (1978). The trial judges below were in a position uniquely suited to making this determination. Even were we to undertake a de novo review, though, we would find the weight of expert opinion denying acceptance of such procedures in the scientific community very persuasive. [2] We conclude that expert testimony based on scientific retesting of used Breathalyzer ampoules is inadmissible as evidence at defendants' trials. The used ampoules are therefore not material evidence which can be used as a basis for impeaching the original test results, and the State has no duty to preserve them for such a purpose. We note the three states which have held due process requires retention of used ampoules for this purpose have done so without considering the question whether proffered expert testimony based on retesting of the ampoules is properly admissible. See Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376 (Ala. 1976); People v. Hitch, 12 Cal.3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974); State v. Michener, 25 Ore. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (1976). Indeed, the only previous case we have found which does consider the admissibility question found there was no generally accepted procedure for retesting, and held destruction of the ampoules did not violate due process. State v. Bryan, 133 N.J. Super. 369, 336 A.2d 511 (1974).