Opinion ID: 2524378
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Comments by the Prosecutor

Text: {32} Defendant asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly referred to her postarrest silence and commented upon her character. She argues that it was error for the trial court to deny her motion for a mistrial. The denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Foster, 1998-NMCA-163, ¶ 24, 126 N.M. 177, 967 P.2d 852. We rely upon the judgment of the trial court because [t]he trial judge is in a much better position to know whether a miscarriage of justice has taken place and his opinion is entitled to great weight in the absence of a clearly erroneous decision. Sutphin, 107 N.M. at 130, 753 P.2d at 1318 (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). As we observed in Sutphin, [t]he power to declare a mistrial should be exercised with the greatest caution. Id. Evidence of a defendant's postarrest silence is generally inadmissible because the probative value of the silence is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. State v. Garcia, 118 N.M. 773, 776, 887 P.2d 767, 770 (Ct.App.1994). {33} Defendant does not cite to the record for any instances of a comment upon character, so we address only the claim about two comments made by the prosecutor which allegedly were comments on the right to silence. See State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 47, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140 (discussing preservation); Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA 2001 (requiring appellant to explain how issue was preserved with citations to record proper or transcript of proceedings). {34} During the prosecutor's direct examination of the officer in charge of the investigations, she asked several questions about Apodaca's arrest and the voluntary statement he had given. She then asked about the officer's role in the arrest of the other two suspects, Smith and Defendant. During that line of questioning, the prosecutor asked if he had taken a statement from either of them. Before the officer could respond, the prosecutor said, Strike that. Defendant also objected before any response could be made by the officer. {35} Defendant then moved for a mistrial, and argument was heard by the trial court outside the jury's presence. Defendant argued that the prosecutor was attempting to elicit whether Defendant had invoked her Fifth Amendment rights when she was arrested and to contrast Defendant's silence with Apodaca's having given a voluntary statement. In response, the prosecutor apologized for the question and explained that she realized that, as soon as she asked the question, it was a mistake and so had acted to withdraw it. The trial court accepted this explanation and denied Defendant's motion, finding that the initial questions about Apodaca's statement were not error and concluding that the single unanswered question did not give rise to adequate grounds for granting a mistrial. The court offered to give a curative instruction; Defendant declined the offer. Cf. State v. Gibson, 113 N.M. 547, 556, 828 P.2d 980, 989 (Ct.App.1992) (Failure to accept the court's offer of a cautionary instruction may in itself justify a refusal to grant a mistrial. . . .). {36} We hold that there was no violation of Defendant's right to silence when the prosecutor's single question was not answered, defense counsel immediately objected, the prosecutor did not pursue the matter further, and defense counsel refused a curative instruction. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (holding that single question by prosecutor during cross-examination concerning defendant's postarrest silence does not violate Fifth Amendment). The trial court properly denied the motion for a mistrial. Cf. Foster, 126 N.M. 177, 967 P.2d 852, 1998-NMCA-163, ¶ 24 (observing that the district court acted well within the bounds of its discretion in determining that the evidence did not so taint the trial as to require a mistrial). {37} Defendant also contends that the State's closing argument contained an improper comment upon her right to silence. In his opening statement, defense counsel had told the jury that while Apodaca and Smith were shooting the victim, this young lady [Defendant] was sitting in the front of Eric Smith's car in the middle of the front seat. Defendant did not testify herself, and no evidence was introduced in support of defense counsel's assertion. During closing argument, as the prosecutor was reviewing the evidence that had been presented during trial, she stated that Darcy Smith did not sit in the car while [the victim] was murdered. Darcy Smith was not helpless sitting in the car too, too scared, I guess to drive away. Too scared to call the police. Defendant objected, and the prosecutor concluded her remarks with the observation that although defense counsel had stated that Defendant remained in the car, there had been no testimony to that effect. Defendant made a motion for mistrial on the basis that the prosecutor had commented on Defendant's silence. The trial court denied the motion. {38} The privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's failure to testify at trial. Foster, 126 N.M. 177, 967 P.2d 852, 1998-NMCA-163, ¶ 10 (relying upon Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), which held that when a prosecutor asks the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence, the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege is violated). We review comments made in closing argument in the context in which they occurred so that we may gain a full understanding of the comments and their potential effect on the jury . State v. Armendarez, 113 N.M. 335, 338, 825 P.2d 1245, 1248 (1992). During closing argument, both the prosecution and defense are permitted wide latitude, State v. Gonzales, 113 N.M. 221, 229, 824 P.2d 1023, 1031 (1992), and the trial court has wide discretion in dealing with and controlling closing argument, State v. Taylor, 104 N.M. 88, 94, 717 P.2d 64, 70 (Ct.App.1986). Nevertheless, remarks by the prosecutor must be based upon the evidence or be in response to the defendant's argument. Id. Where it is alleged that improper prosecutorial comments have been made in closing argument, the question is whether the comments deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Brown, 1997-NMSC-029, ¶ 23, 123 N.M. 413, 941 P.2d 494. The general rule is that an isolated comment made during closing argument is not sufficient to warrant reversal. Id. We conclude that there was no violation of Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights and therefore no error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. {39} In a factually similar case, State v. Henry, 101 N.M. 266, 681 P.2d 51 (1984), the defense counsel told the jury in opening argument that the defendant would testify and related many of the facts that his testimony would allegedly cover. The defendant, however, did not take the stand. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that certain statements made by the prosecutor were comments on the defendant's failure to testify. Id. The state responded that the defense attorney had essentially testified for the defendant during opening and then prevented any cross-examination about the claims made during that opening statement. Id. at 267, 681 P.2d at 52. This Court determined that under certain circumstances, defense counsel may `open the door' during an opening statement to comments by the prosecutor during closing. Id. at 268, 681 P.2d at 53. {40} We determine that those circumstances occurred during this case. Taken in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was responding to defense counsel's claim during opening argument and was thus commenting on what Defendant had already invited. See State v. Padilla, 1996-NMCA-072, ¶ 15, 122 N.M. 92, 920 P.2d 1046 (holding that prosecutor's comment was a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel and did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988)); cf. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (holding that prosecutor's comments about uncontradicted evidence did not violate the Constitution when they were merely responsive to the defendant's failure to present the defense asserted during the opening argument). The remarks were a very brief part of her closing statement and were based on the evidence presented at trial; they were not a comment upon Defendant's refusal to testify. Additionally, we observe that the jury was instructed, under UJI 14-5031 NMRA 2001, that they must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant did not testify in this case, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way. Juries are presumed to have followed the written instructions. See Armendarez, 113 N.M. at 338, 825 P.2d at 1248. We conclude that there was no violation of Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights and therefore no error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.