Opinion ID: 788423
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Options

Text: 51 In considering our potential options — sending this case back to the BIA to untangle the confusion it has created or proceeding straight to the merits — we must decide at the out-set whether we even have the power to proceed to the merits. The First Circuit touched on this issue briefly in Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 205 (1st Cir.2003). In Haoud, the IJ found that the petitioner's asylum application was untimely 16193 and alternatively denied the petitioner's application on the merits. Id. at 203. The BIA affirmed without opinion. Id. at 204. Faced with the same problem that we face here, the First Circuit noted that [the affirmance without opinion] in this case gives us no guidance as to whether the Board affirmed the IJ's decision on a non-reviewable basis, i.e. untimeliness, or a reviewable basis, i.e. the merits of Haoud's asylum claim. Id. at 206. Although it ultimately remanded the case to the BIA for a different reason, 9 it stated in dictum that [the affirmance without opinion] cannot be used to deny our legitimate review power if we are left without a proper basis to determine our own jurisdiction. 10 Id. at 205. 52 This statement reveals that the First Circuit assumed it had no power to proceed directly to the merits of the petitioner's asylum claim — that it could not determine its jurisdiction without more. Undoubtedly animating the court was a reluctance to issue a potentially nondispositive opinion. If the court reached the merits and reversed the IJ, it would have to remand the case to the BIA to adopt or reject the IJ's untimeliness finding as only the BIA has the power to do. See Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 856 n. 2 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). If the BIA then adopted the untimeliness determination on remand, the court's decision on the merits would have no effect on the judgment. Given the constitutional ban on advisory opinions, there exists a strong judicial aversion to render potentially nondispositive rulings. 53 As Justice Jackson commented in a related context, judicial review serves to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126, 65 S.Ct. 459, 89 L.Ed. 789 (1945). 54 Justice Jackson was speaking of the Supreme Court's adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, and that doctrine is instructive here. The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction — like this Court's jurisdiction — is a creature of statute. In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635, 22 L.Ed. 429 (1874), the Supreme Court — construing the 1867 amendments to the Judiciary Act of 1789 — held that it is not authorized to examine [state law] questions for the purpose of deciding whether the State court ruled correctly on them or not. The Court concluded that if an appellant presented a federal question that had been decided incorrectly by the state court, it would examine the record to see if it contained alternative grounds actually decided by the State court which are sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court, notwithstanding the error in deciding the Federal question. Id. If such a ground existed, the Court stated,the judgment must be affirmed without inquiring into the soundness of the decision on such other matter or issue. Id. at 636. 55 Soon after the Murdock decision, the Court began its current practice of dismissing for want of jurisdiction cases in which the judgment rested on an adequate and independent state law ground, commenting that this was the logical course. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 370, 14 S.Ct. 131, 37 L.Ed. 1111 (1893). Later, the Court held that the existence of an adequate and independent state ground supporting a judgment meant that the Court ha[d] no power to disturb it. Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164, 37 S.Ct. 318, 61 L.Ed. 644 (1917). Finally, in Herb, 324 U.S. at 126, the jurisdictional barrier was described as one of constitutional magnitude: [I]f the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion. In this case — as in an adequate and independent state grounds case — if the BIA had clearly affirmed on the basis of the IJ's untimeliness determination, we would lack jurisdiction to review the merits of Lanza's asylum claim. Any decision on the merits would be purely advisory and would have no effect on the judgment. 56 Some limitations on the state grounds doctrine exist, however, and one is particularly relevant here. As in this case, the state court's decision sometimes leaves it unclear whether the decision rests on a reviewable (i.e., federal law) or unreviewable (i.e., state law) ground. In the typically ambiguous case, the state court will have focused almost exclusively on federal constitutional law and then concluded that the result was required under both federal and state law. Before 1983, the Supreme Court used several ad-hoc approaches to deal with this problem. In some cases, the Court examined the state's theory of state constitutional law in an attempt to determine whether the state's rule operated independently. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 733 n. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). In others, the Court refused to hear the matter until the state court clarified whether its decision was meant to rest on an independent state law basis. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557, 60 S.Ct. 676, 84 L.Ed. 920 (1940). And in others, the Court dismissed the appeal when the grounds for the decision were unclear. See, e.g., Adams v. Russell, 229 U.S. 353, 358-61, 33 S.Ct. 846, 57 L.Ed. 1224 (1913). 57 In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-42, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Court reconsidered these approaches and articulated a presumption in favor of Supreme Court review. The Court held that in ambiguously grounded cases, it would assume that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so whenever the following two conditions exist. Id. at 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469. First, the decision must fairly appear[ ] to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and second,the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground[must] not [be] clear from the face of the opinion. Id. at 1040-41, 103 S.Ct. 3469. The Court found that the alternative approaches were inadequate because they required either interpretation of unfamiliar state law, imposition of burdens on state courts through requests for clarification, or sacrifice of uniformity in federal law through dismissal of cases with federal law issues. Id. at 1039-40, 103 S.Ct. 3469. 58 In her brief, Lanza urges this Court to presume that the BIA affirmed on the merits and to review the merits of her asylum claim. While Long would provide a doctrinal linchpin to do so, we find that its rationale is inapplicable here, and that remand for clarification is the only constitutionally acceptable approach. The Supreme Court's holding in Long reveals an expansive attitude toward federal jurisdiction. But federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and [Congress] and unlike state courts are not vested with general subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (internal citations omitted). There is a general presumption against federal court review, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. And even when federal courts have jurisdiction, they often decline review. The Supreme Court has, for instance, held that federal courts should abstain when there is an unclear issue of state law and clarification might avoid a ruling on a constitutional question. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501-02, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). It therefore seems strange that a Supreme Court which has repeatedly limited federal jurisdiction and emphasized deference to state courts should create a strong presumption in favor of federal court review. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 10.5.3 (4th ed.2003). 59 Long 's presumption in favor of jurisdiction is, perhaps paradoxically, best understood through the prism of federalism. In Long, the Supreme Court argued that its presumption would allow it to avoid engaging in detailed analysis of how states understand their own constitutional law — a method that results in a decision of state law that[goes] beyond the opinion [under] review. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040, 103 S.Ct. 3469. The Court 16197 viewed the act of presuming jurisdiction in order to decide questions of federal law as more respectful of the state court than the act of scrutinizing the state's law. Under the Long approach, the state gains control over an interpretation of state law even as it suffers the loss of autonomy that comes with Supreme Court review. Similarly, the Court viewed remand for clarification as unduly intrusive on state courts. It found that remand put significant burdens on state courts to demonstrate the presence or absence of [Supreme Court] jurisdiction. Id. The Court implied that this method shifts the burden of establishing jurisdiction away from the party asserting it, where it usually belongs, and intrusively places it on the state courts. Id. 60 Long's federalism concerns, however, are simply not applicable here. While federal courts give deference to administrative agencies in certain circumstances, see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), our relationship with those agencies is significantly less deferential than our relationship with the state courts. Congress has given us appellate jurisdiction over a wide variety of immigration decisions, and, in non-streamlined cases, we do not hesitate to remand to the BIA where the BIA has failed to clearly articulate the grounds for its decision. See, e.g., Arrozal v. INS, 159 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir.1998) ([T]he BIA must indicate how it weighed [the favorable and unfavorable] factors and indicate with specificity that it heard and considered petitioner's claims.); Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir.1985) (remanding where BIA failed to give reasoned explanation for denial of alien's motion to reopen deportation proceedings); see also Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575 (10th Cir.1994) (If the agency has failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its action ... the reviewing court may supplement the record or remand the case to the agency for further proceedings....). While remand for clarification may inconvenience the BIA, it is not as intrusive as remand to a state court; it is in fact our customary procedure. 61 Further, in Long, the Supreme Court did not apply its jurisdictional presumption without first reviewing the state court decision to determine whether it fairly rested on federal law or was interwoven with federal law. Rather, it analyzed the state court's decision to determine whether the state court had relied exclusively on its understanding of Terry and other federal cases. Long, 463 U.S. at 1043, 103 S.Ct. 3469. Only after finding that the bare references to the state constitution in no way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any way independent from the state court's interpretation of federal law, did the Court conclude that the state court relied primarily on federal law. Id. at 1044, 103 S.Ct. 3469. Thus, despite the ambiguity in the state court's opinion, the Court did not automatically presume jurisdiction. In this case, though we have a decision from the IJ, we have no means of even superficially determining whether the BIA relied on a reviewable or unreviewable ground in affirming the IJ. Unlike the Court in Long, we have nothing to rely on but speculation. Consequently, applying a presumption in favor of jurisdiction would be all the more drastic. 62 Application of the Long rule here might also have the undesirable effect of wasting scarce judicial resources and increasing the likelihood that our review of the merits would be nondispositive. In her dissenting opinion in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 31-34, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995), Justice Ginsburg urged the Supreme Court to overrule Long. Among other things, she argued that the Long presumption has increased the incidence of nondispositive United States Supreme Court determinations — instances in which state courts, on remand, have reinstated their prior judgments after clarifying their reliance on state grounds. Id. Even if these reinstatements do not render the Supreme Court's opinion technically `advisory,' she explained, they do suggest that the Court unnecessarily spent its resources on cases better left, at the time in question, to state-court solution. Id. Remand for clarification in this case would not only avoid the unnecessary expenditure of time and effort but would also forestall the possibility of issuing a nondispositive opinion. 63 At any rate, Long's presumption in favor of review was never intended to be applied with inflexibility. Long itself reserved the possibility of remand for clarification in appropriate cases, 463 U.S. at 1041 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 3469, and the Court has on occasion exercised that option. See, e.g., Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 466 U.S. 378, 378, 104 S.Ct. 2144, 80 L.Ed.2d 378 (1984) (post- Long decision vacating state court judgment and remanding for clarification). A recent example occurred in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70, 78, 121 S.Ct. 471, 148 L.Ed.2d 366 (2000). In that case, a dispute arose over the deadline for county canvassing boards to submit their 2000 presidential election returns to the Florida Secretary of State. Id. at 73-74, 121 S.Ct. 471. The Secretary of State declined to waive the November 14, 2000 deadline set by statute to allow a recount to proceed. Id. at 74, 121 S.Ct. 471. The Florida Supreme Court, however, set the deadline at November 26. Id. at 76, 121 S.Ct. 471. After reviewing the state court's decision, the Court found `considerable uncertainty' as to whether the court relied on state or federal grounds in setting the deadline and remanded for clarification. Id. at 78, 121 S.Ct. 471(quoting Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. at 555, 60 S.Ct. 676). `Intelligent exercise of [its] appellate powers,' the Court held, `compel[led it] to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from [the state court's opinion].' Id. (quoting Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. at 557, 60 S.Ct. 676.) 64 We too find that intelligent exercise of our appellate jurisdiction requires remand. Because the BIA affirmed without opinion, we have no way of knowing whether the BIA rejected Lanza's asylum claim on the basis of the IJ's procedural determination or his alternative finding on the merits. Due process requires us to either reach the merits or remand for clarification. Although Long provides some authority for proceeding to the merits, its functional justifications do not apply here. Given our limited jurisdiction and the general presumption against federal court review, we remand to the BIA with instructions to clarify the grounds for its rejection of Lanza's asylum application.