Opinion ID: 688157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Successive Petition and Abuse of the Writ

Text: 5 The district court may dismiss a second or successive 2254 petition if, following the dismissal of the initial petition on the merits, the new petition fails to allege new or different grounds for relief. Rules Governing Sec. 2254 Cases, Rule 9(b). Ellis' claims that the prosecution improperly used peremptory challenges to keep blacks off of the petit jury and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to this activity were raised in his first petition and dismissed as unmeritorious. 2 Thus, the district court correctly dismissed this claim as a successive petition. 6 In addition, we agree with the district court that Ellis' claim that the state's attorney's office conspired to keep blacks off the jury is a successive claim, as it differs little in substance from his claim that the prosecutor improperly used his peremptory challenges. Even if the conspiracy claim constitutes new grounds for relief, however, the district court may still dismiss the petition under Rule 9(b) as an abuse of the writ. The government satisfies its burden of pleading abuse of the writ by not[ing] petitioner's prior writ history, identif[ying] the claims that appear for the first time, and alleg[ing] that petitioner has abused the writ. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991). The government has met this burden here by introducing Ellis' 1983 petition. To overcome the abuse claim, Ellis must show cause for failing to raise his claims earlier and prejudice therefrom. Id. As cause for failing to raise the conspiracy claim, Ellis asserts that he did not have a copy of the trial transcript when he filed his first petition. He does not, however, allege that his failure to obtain a transcript arose from anything other than his own neglect. Thus, as Ellis shows no cause, this claim qualifies as an abuse of the writ. 3 7 Finally, Ellis' second petition may not constitute abuse of the writ if he can demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 495, 111 S.Ct. at 1470. A petitioner meets this standard if he makes a colorable showing of factual innocence. Id.; Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 (1986) (plurality opinion). Although Ellis makes passing references to his innocence, he offers no facts or probative evidence that would constitute a colorable showing of innocence. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454, 106 S.Ct. 2627. Thus, Ellis has not demonstrated that the ends of justice require consideration of his petition. See id.