Opinion ID: 686766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Modification of the Coercive Sanctions

Text: 22 We reject appellant's contention that the contempt fines set forth in the preliminary injunction necessitate modification because state law caps the permissible amount of the sanctions at $250. See N.Y.Jud.Law Sec. 773 (McKinney 1992). Even if the district court finds that there is no valid claim under section 1985(3), thereby leaving only the state law claims as the underlying basis for the injunction, we hold that federal law governs the severity of the sanction for contumacious disregard of a federal court injunction. 23 It is a firmly established principle that the power to punish for contempt is an inherent power of the federal courts. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.) (quotation omitted); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795-96, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2131-32, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987); Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924, 931 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832, 102 S.Ct. 131, 70 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981). These powers, moreover, are  'governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.'  Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43, 111 S.Ct. at 2132 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)). Thus, it is quite anomalous to suggest that a federal court must look to the New York state legislature to vindicate an abuse of the federal judicial power. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450, 31 S.Ct. 492, 501, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911) (the power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary). 24 Nor will failure to apply New York state law in this instance undermine the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), as appellant claims. Contempt penalties are not intended to punish violations of substantive law. Rather, they are fashioned to serve a limited purpose: vindication of the authority of the court. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 55, 111 S.Ct. at 2138; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). Thus, the rule of Erie does not apply and, accordingly, we affirm the district court's refusal to modify the coercive penalties of the injunction.