Opinion ID: 1934270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admissible As Supervening Cause

Text: Otis and Sears' second argument is that, even if the Mother is immune from direct liability or liability for contribution, they should be allowed to present evidence to establish that the Mother's negligent supervision (control) was a supervening cause of her minor child's injuries. This Court responded affirmatively to a similar argument in McKeon v. Goldstein, Del.Supr., 53 Del. 24, 164 A.2d 260 (1960). In McKeon, this Court stated that the determination of proximate cause is a question of fact for the trier of facts. Id. 164 A.2d at 263. Thus, in McKeon, we held that even when the parent was not (and could not be) a named defendant, the trier of fact must decide whether the parent's negligent supervision was the sole proximate cause, i.e., supervening cause, of her minor child's injury. If the parent's negligence was a supervening cause of the child's injury, the named defendants' negligence would be a remote cause, rather than a proximate cause, and the defendants would not be liable as tortfeasors. [4] We adhere to that holding in this case. Huang contends that the holding in McKeon was modified in 1980, when the Schneider litigation came before this Court a second time in Coe v. Schneider, Del.Supr., 424 A.2d 1 (1980) ( Schneider II ). The question presented in Schneider II was whether evidence of the parent's negligent supervision of a child was admissible in a suit based on the attractive nuisance doctrine. This Court held that any reference to the parent's negligent conduct was inadmissible, even with regard to the issue of proximate cause. In Schneider II, this Court held that [g]iven Delaware's adherence to the rule of Restatement [of Torts] (2d) § 339, [5] under the facts of this case, parental supervision is immaterial to the question of the defendants' liability. Id. at 2. See Cox v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., D.Del., 823 F.Supp. 241, 247-48 (1993) (holding that under facts of case, evidence of employer's negligence was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible to demonstrate intervening/superseding causation). Notably, § 339 and the official comments thereto do not make the possessor's liability contingent upon a showing that the child's trespass was not due to parental negligence in failing to properly supervise the child. Schneider II, 424 A.2d at 2. Thus, our holding in Schneider II, regarding the immateriality of the parent's negligent control, was explicitly based on the attractive nuisance doctrine theory of liability. Our holding in McKeon was not cited in Schneider II because the issue of parental control was irrelevant. McKeon has not been overruled but has, in fact, been cited with approval in other contexts. Moffitt v. Carroll, Del.Supr., 640 A.2d 169 (1994); Culver v. Bennett, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1094 (1991); Naidu v. Laird, Del.Supr., 539 A.2d 1064 (1988); Chudnofsky v. Edwards, Del. Supr., 58 Del. 280, 208 A.2d 516 (1965); Sweetman v. Strescon Indus., Inc., Del.Super., 389 A.2d 1319 (1978). Delaware's recognition of a limited parental immunity doctrine in Schneider I is completely consistent with the recognition that, when parental negligence is relevant but not actionable, a defendant may introduce evidence to establish that parental negligence was the supervening cause of a minor child's injury. See McKeon v. Goldstein, 164 A.2d at 262-63. Cf. Schneider II, 424 A.2d 1.