Opinion ID: 760396
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment

Text: 28 Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). An employer violates Title VII when discrimination based on sex ... create[s] a hostile or abusive work environment. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). However, not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII. Id. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. Rather, [f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 29 In order to prevail on a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must show that his or her work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). Furthermore, while employers are vicariously liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors (subject to certain defenses), Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, ---- - ----, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2292-93, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc., 118 S.Ct. at 2270, a plaintiff must show negligence in order to hold an employer liable for co-worker harassment, Baskerville v. Culligan Internat'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431-32 (7th Cir.1995). The district court assumed that Adusumilli had been sufficiently adversely affected to satisfy the subjective test for hostile environment harassment; however, the court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to either the objective test for harassment, or the negligence test for employer liability. Adusumilli, 1997 WL 769457 at  10-11. Either deficiency is sufficient to sustain the district court's grant of summary judgment. Adusumilli challenges both holdings. 30 An objectively hostile environment is one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. at 370. In determining whether a plaintiff has met this standard, courts must consider all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Id. at 23, 114 S.Ct. at 371. 31 In this case, the most salient feature of the harassment is its lack of severity. As the Supreme Court recently cautioned,  'simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.'  Faragher, 118 S.Ct. at 2283 (internal citations omitted). Yet that is precisely what we have here. Adusumilli complains of no more than teasing about waving at squad cars, ambiguous comments about bananas, rubber bands, and low-neck tops, staring and attempts to make eye contact, and four isolated incidents in which a co-worker briefly touched her arm, fingers, or buttocks. The low-neck comment was not even directed at Adusumilli, and was, therefore, only second-hand harassment. See Gleason v. Mesirow Financial, Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1144 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that the impact of 'second-hand harassment' is obviously not as great as the impact of harassment directed at the plaintiff). Furthermore, the most serious misconduct, the unwanted touching of Adusumilli's buttocks, took the relatively mild form of a poke and occurred only once. It is well established in this Circuit that there is a safe harbor for employers in cases in which the alleged harassing conduct is too tepid or intermittent or equivocal to make a reasonable person believe that she has been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir.1996). Adusumilli's allegations clearly fall within this safe harbor. 32 Adusumilli raises the additional argument that the City created an environment that was sexually hostile to her by assigning Gray to work near her after she had complained about his conduct. It is true that in some cases the mere presence of an employee who has engaged in particularly severe or pervasive harassment can create a hostile working environment. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883 (9th Cir.1991) (emphasis added). See also Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that an employer created a sexually hostile environment by transferring an employee to a department supervised by someone who had previously harassed the employee). However, in this case, as discussed above, Gray did not engage in harassment, let alone particularly severe or pervasive harassment. Therefore, as a matter of law, the City's actions in assigning Gray to work near Adusumilli did not create an objectively hostile environment. See Saxton v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 10 F.3d 526, 536 n. 18 (7th Cir.1993) (holding misconduct insufficiently severe or pervasive to cause supervisor's mere presence to render the employee's environment hostile when misconduct consisted of supervisor placing his hand on employee's leg above the knee, rubbing his hand along her upper thigh, forcibly kissing her, and lurching at her from behind bushes). 33 Because we hold that the incidents alleged by Adusumilli do not constitute harassment, we need not discuss the City's liability for the conduct of its employees.