Opinion ID: 2272453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coerced Confession

Text: J.F. also argues that his confession to sexual assault during the second portion of the interrogation was involuntary. We agree. Our finding that this portion of the interrogation was custodial, while not required for a finding of coercion, informs our determination. [A]n involuntary statement is inadmissible at trial for any purpose. Graham, supra, 950 A.2d at 735 (internal quotation marks omitted). The test for determining the voluntariness of specific statements is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the will of the [suspect] was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion. Graham, supra, 950 A.2d at 735-36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne, we assess both the characteristics of the accused, specifically the suspect's age, education, prior experience with the law, and physical and mental condition, and the details of the interrogation, specifically its duration and intensity, the use of physical punishment, threats or trickery, and whether the suspect was advised of his rights. Id. at 736. In the case of juvenile confessions, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts should pay particular attention to [t]he age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, [and] the callous attitude of the police towards his rights. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). Importantly, while we consider the totality of the circumstances, coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary.... Graham, supra, 950 A.2d at 736 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). In voluntariness determinations, the burden is on the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's statements were made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); see also Graham, supra, 950 A.2d at 735-36. The government has conceded that the questioning [in this portion of the interrogation] was insistent and persistent, but it argues nonetheless that this does not show that the confession was the product of coercion. The trial court agreed that J.F.'s will was not overborne, specifically because the court found that J.F. did not appear to be intimidated by the sergeant. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, but analyze the voluntariness of J.F.'s confession de novo. Graham, supra, 950 A.2d at 735. While the evidence on this issue is far from one-sided, we ultimately hold that J.F.'s confession of sexual assault was involuntary. In reaching this conclusion, four factors are of particular significance: J.F.'s youthful age; the officers' clear indications to J.F. that he would not be leaving the interrogation room until he confessed to sexually assaulting his sister; J.F.'s sixty-three denials; and the fact that the majority of J.F.'s final confession was comprised of details that J.F. had adopted from the officers' suggestions. J.F.'s individual characteristics, which the Supreme Court instructs us to consider, indicate susceptibility to coercion and require us to more carefully scrutinize the police interrogative tactics. At the time of the interrogation, J.F. was fourteen years old. [16] He was not shown to have any prior experience with the criminal justice system. [17] Moreover, he was in a vulnerable mental condition, both because he was informed of his sister's death shortly before the interrogation began and because he had been removed from his family and placed in foster care for the three previous days. [18] J.F.'s vulnerability was exacerbated by the fact that he was questioned for three hours, with only a brief break, in an interrogation that did not end until nearly eleven at night, and because no adult accompanied him to the police station to supervise the questioning or provide him a ride home when he wanted to leave. [19] The government is correct that officers will sometimes need to be aggressive in their investigation of crimes, especially heinous crimes and in maintaining that the fact that they are aggressive does not mean that a suspect's will was actually overborne. But here the officers' aggressive tactics, including repeated accusations, threats of invasive procedures, [20] and false promises of leniency [21] were not determinative. Rather, of more significance were J.F.'s sixty-three denials of committing the sexual assault before the officers were able to obtain a useable confession; the fact that the police clearly conditioned J.F.'s ability to leave on a confession despite the fact that he had not been formally arrested; [22] and the fact that most of the details of J.F.'s confession were initially provided by the officers, rather than J.F. Accordingly, we find that J.F.'s will was overborne and his confession to sexual assault was coerced. [23] Admission of a coerced confession is an error of constitutional magnitude, in violation of the Due Process Clause. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288-89, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). This court has observed that [a] confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 211 (D.C.2006) (quoting Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246). [24] [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, supra note 3, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967). Here J.F.'s coerced confession was the only direct evidence of first-degree sexual abuse presented at trial other than medical testimony of sexual abuse, which was sharply disputed, thus we cannot find that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we must vacate the adjudication for first-degree sexual abuse and the adjudication for felony murder predicated on that first-degree sexual abuse. [25]