Opinion ID: 202376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary basis for Grigous's claim

Text: 15 We note at the outset the government's contention that Grigous lacks a factual basis for his argument that the government failed to provide him oral warnings, in a language he could understand, of the consequences of failing to appear at his hearing. The written Notice to Appear, which Grigous signed, states that Grigous received oral notice in English of the consequences of failing to appear at his hearing before the IJ. Grigous contends in his brief that he does not understand English, but he failed to offer evidence below in support of this assertion. For example, Grigous's affidavit in support of his motion to reopen says nothing regarding his English proficiency and makes no assertion that he was not given the proper oral warnings. 16 To make up for this absence of evidence, Grigous's attorney notes that the district court granted a continuance in Grigous's conflict hearing in order to secure an interpreter. Although this fact may provide some support for Grigous's claim, it does not, in and of itself, demonstrate that he does not understand English. Moreover, as we explain below, even assuming that Grigous does not understand English and was not given oral warnings in his native language of the consequences of his failure to appear at his hearing, he nonetheless fails to establish that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen to apply for asylum. 17 B. Requirements for filing a motion to reopen to apply for relief following an in absentia removal order 18 Grigous relies heavily on In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349 (BIA 1998) (en banc), for the proposition that the BIA should have granted his motion to reopen due to the lack of appropriate oral warnings. In that case, the BIA explained that a petitioner may seek reopening to apply for certain forms of previously unavailable discretionary relief, without meeting the requirements for rescinding an in absentia removal order, where the government failed to give oral warnings of the consequences of failing to appear in a language that the petitioner understands. See In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 352-57; see also Wu, 436 F.3d at 163 (discussing the BIA's decision in In re M-S- ). As we explain in further detail below, however, the question of whether oral warnings were given prior to an in absentia removal order is important under the INA only in narrow circumstances. 19 The petitioner in In re M-S- sought to reopen her proceedings to file for adjustment of status, discretionary relief that was not available to her at the time of her hearing when she was ordered deported in absentia. See id. at 356-57. She did not seek to challenge her removability through a motion for reopening to rescind the in absentia order, and instead filed a motion to reopen under the regulations permitting reopening in cases generally. However, the INA explicitly bars petitioners with in absentia removal orders from reopening their cases to apply for certain forms of discretionary relief within 10 years from the date of the final order of removal: 20 Any alien against whom a final order of removal is entered in absentia under this subsection and who . . . was provided oral notice, either in the alien's native language or in another language the alien understands, of the time and place of the proceedings and of the consequences . . . of failing, other than because of exceptional circumstances . . . to attend a proceeding under this section, shall not be eligible for relief under [8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b, 1229c, 1255, 1258, or 1259] for a period of 10 years after the date of the entry of the final order of removal. 21 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(7). 4 The BIA noted that adjustment of status was one of the forms of discretionary relief specifically mentioned in this provision and thus, if the petitioner was provided with the proper oral notice, she would not be eligible for adjustment of status. See In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 355. However, because the petitioner was not provided with appropriate oral warnings, the BIA reasoned that this failure meant that the petitioner was not ineligible for adjustment of status under the INA: 22 [S]ection [1229a(b)(7)] specifies that if an alien fails to appear at a deportation hearing after receiving oral notice, in a language the alien understands, of the consequences of failing to appear, the alien is ineligible . . . for the forms of relief from deportation listed in [§ 1229a(b)(7)]. Conversely, if the oral warnings are not provided, relief is not precluded. To rule otherwise would render surplusage the requirement of [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7)] that the oral warnings be given before the consequences ensue. 23 Id. Because relief was not precluded, the BIA could consider whether the petitioner had established a prima facie case for adjustment of status, warranting reopening under the applicable regulations. Id. 24 Grigous relies solely on this case and the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7) to support his argument that he is entitled to reopening due to the government's alleged failure to provide him with oral warnings, in his native language, of the consequences of his failure to appear. However, In re M-S- and the statute do not help him. First, asylum is not one of the forms of relief listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7), and thus Grigous's eligibility for asylum is unaffected by this provision. In other words, Grigous can apply for reopening under the regulations governing motions to reopen in general, and the IJ or the BIA can exercise discretion to grant or deny his motion, without regard to any bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7). Second, even if 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7) applied and the government was required to provide oral warnings in Grigous's language pursuant to that provision, the government's failure to do so would not mean that Grigous is automatically entitled to reopening. It only means that relief is not precluded under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7) and that he must still meet the requirements for motions to reopen under the general regulations. In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. at 355. Thus, in any event, Grigous's motion to reopen could have been denied if it failed to meet the requirements of the applicable regulation governing his motion to reopen. 25 Grigous's motion does not meet the requirements of the applicable regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 (setting the general standards for granting motions to reopen before the IJ). Grigous, unlike the petitioner in In re M-S-, is not seeking previously unavailable relief. He applied for asylum in 1993 and it is this application for which he seeks an adjudication. Typically, a motion to reopen to apply for relief may only be granted if the petitioner offers evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Grigous fails to address these requirements or even discuss the merits of his asylum claim in his petition for review. Thus, his case differs from In re M-S- and other cases where the petitioner was able to show a basis for reopening to apply for discretionary relief. See In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 357 (finding that the petitioner has met the general motions requirements and has provided sufficient evidence to indicate a reasonable likelihood that her application [for adjustment of status] may succeed on the merits); Wu, 436 F.3d at 164 (remanding where the BIA failed to consider the petitioner's argument that he was entitled to reopening to apply for asylum based on a change of law arising after his in absentia removal order). Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion, under the INA and its regulations, in affirming the IJ's denial of Grigous's motion to reopen. C. Due process 26 Finally, we note that insofar as Grigous argues that the right to receive oral warning in his native language arises from the due process right to adequate notice, as opposed to any statutory requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7), that contention suffers from at least three serious flaws. 27 First, Grigous has utterly failed to develop that argument in his briefs. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). Second, as we have previously discussed, he has not established a factual basis for this argument. Third, even assuming that his argument is not waived and has an adequate factual basis, Grigous has failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the lack of appropriate oral warnings. See Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20 (1st Cir.2004) ([B]efore a petitioner in an immigration case may advance a procedural due process claim, he must allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the challenged process.). This was not the first time that Grigous had been ordered deported in absentia. He was able to get his first in absentia deportation order rescinded through a motion to reopen, providing a letter from his doctor explaining that he had been too ill to attend that hearing. Under these circumstances, Grigous is hard pressed to explain why the alleged failure of the government to provide him with oral warnings in his native language of the consequences of his failure to appear prejudiced him with respect to missing this subsequent hearing. Furthermore, as we have noted, Grigous has not even addressed the merits of his asylum claim and whether there is a likelihood that he would have been granted relief. Having failed to establish prejudice, Grigous may not advance this due process claim here. 5