Opinion ID: 1356054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Trial Motion Based on Jury Misconduct

Text: In addition to the claim of newly discovered evidence, defendant moved for a new trial due to jury misconduct. A defense investigator stated in a declaration that one of the jurors had told him that during the penalty phase she heard another juror make a statement to the effect that `If we give him the death penalty, the judge will just commute it to life in prison anyway.' At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel stated that they were unable to interview the juror who allegedly made the statement or obtain additional declarations. They requested an evidentiary hearing at which they could subpoena the jurors. The court believed that it had authority to order an evidentiary hearing, but it declined to do so and denied the new trial motion. It noted that the alleged statement was merely an opinion, an estimation, a guess, a projection of what somebody might do in the future and found that the mere expression of an opinion by one juror as to what may happen or what that person thinks will happen in the future was not misconduct. Defendant contends the court erred. He notes that the trial court's authority to commute a death verdict is discretionary, not mandatory. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) The juror's contrary implication, he argues, is legally erroneous and thus misconduct. We disagree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial motion. A prediction that the court would commute a death verdict, if in fact made, was merely the kind of comment that is probably unavoidable when 12 persons of widely varied backgrounds, experiences, and life views join in the give-and-take of deliberations. Not all comments by all jurors at all times will be logical, or even rational, or, strictly speaking, correct. But such comments cannot impeach a unanimous verdict; a jury verdict is not so fragile. The introduction of much of what might strictly be labeled `extraneous law' cannot be deemed misconduct. The jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but also fundamentally human. Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and experience. That they do so is one of the strengths of the jury system. It is also one of its weaknesses: it has the potential to undermine determinations that should be made exclusively on the evidence introduced by the parties and the instructions given by the court. Such a weakness, however, must be tolerated. `[I]t is an impossible standard to require ... [the jury] to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any external factors.' [Citation.] Moreover, under that `standard' few verdicts would be proof against challenge. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 950, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676; see also People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 696, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Defendant argues that the juror who allegedly made the comment stated during jury selection that she had once worked as a nurse in county jail for two years. He asserts that [n]o doubt that experience lent credibility to her statement with the jury, thus making this case similar to People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 950, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676, where we found misconduct when a juror vouched for a misstatement of law on the strength of his `background in law enforcement.' We disagree. No indication exists that the juror in this case did anything but express a personal opinion. Defendant also asserts that defense counsel may have misled some of the jurors during jury selection about the meaning of a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole, thus exacerbating any confusion over the meaning of a death verdict. While questioning some of the jurors, counsel said that life without parole meant the person would presumably, or hopefully, or supposedly die of old age in prison. As a typical example, defense counsel referred to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, which means literally that ... the person dies, hopefully, of old age in prison. Contrary to defendant's argument, in context, counsel clearly referred to the possibility of a violent or otherwise premature death in prison before the onset of old age, not to the possibility of release from prison. We see no reason to believe the jury was confused or that counsel acted ineffectively in this regard.