Opinion ID: 1140735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the circuit court committed evidentiary errors.

Text: (A) The use of Fitch's prior inconsistent statements, set forth in the pleadings, during Valentine's opening statement. ¶ 17. In Valentine's opening statement, his counsel discussed the charges contained in the complaint and Fitch's various responses found in his answer, answers to interrogatories, and responses to requests for admissions which set forth Fitch's repeated denials of having sexual relations with Sandra or being the father of K.V. Counsel for Fitch objected to the pleadings being referenced in Valentine's opening statement, arguing they are not proof or evidence. The circuit judge overruled Fitch's objection. ¶ 18. Fitch now contends that the circuit court erred, maintaining that argument and comments upon the credibility of witnesses are improper when made in opening statement. In support thereof, he cites Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 749-50 (Miss.1992), for the proposition that before there can be impeachment, there must be testimony which is impeachable. According to Fitch, Valentine: proceeded to publish to the jury what he obviously considered passed for a predicate from which impeachment may commence: unsworn allegations of the [c]omplaint, unsworn denials in the [a]nswer. From here, [Valentine] proceeded with the `testimony'answers to interrogatories, deposition testimony, and responses to request for admissions. . . . [Fitch] had not taken the stand. In Fitch's estimation, the unsworn allegations were blown up and published to the jury obviously disproportionate to their significance . . . in light of the fact that many claims were abandoned in subsequent testimony. As such, Fitch contends that this error warrants a new trial. ¶ 19. In response, Valentine first submits that Fitch has waived this issue as he only objected to [Valentine's] use of the unsworn pleadings on the basis for use as evidence[,] but never objected to the use of the unsworn pleadings on the basis of impeachment, which is the issue [Fitch] is raising on appeal. See Johnson v. Alcorn State Univ., 929 So.2d 398, 407 (Miss. Ct.App.2006) ([a]ppellate courts may not rule upon material matters which the trial judge did not have the opportunity to judge. Ditto v. Hinds County, Miss., 665 So.2d 878, 880 (Miss.1995). Issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal. Southern v. Mississippi State Hosp., 853 So.2d 1212 (Miss.2003).). ¶ 20. Notwithstanding the alleged procedural bar, Valentine maintains that the prior inconsistent statements: were not being introduced during [Valentine's] opening statement as substantive evidence nor were they being `offered for the truth of the matter asserted' but the pleadings were being used merely to define the issues the jury would decide and show [Fitch] made the statements and as such it is relevant regardless of its truth and it does not matter that the trier of fact is unable to ascertain [Fitch's] credibility. In support of this position, Valentine notes that both his counsel and the circuit court informed the jury that the substance of the opening statement did not constitute evidence. Moreover, Valentine asserts that the pleadings were used as demonstrative aids only . . . to describe the issues that the jury would decide, [Fitch's] defenses and that [Fitch] had made prior inconsistent statements. In Haggerty v. Foster, 838 So.2d 948 (Miss.2002), this Court stated: [d]emonstrative evidence may be admitted at the trial court's discretion, if such evidence was reasonably necessary and material, Murriel v. State, 515 So.2d 952, 956 (Miss.1987), and appropriate and relevant. Gandy v. State, 373 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Miss.1979). Furthermore, where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party. In re Estate of Mask, 703 So.2d 852, 859. . . . Haggerty, 838 So.2d at 958. Valentine argues that this evidence was necessary, material, appropriate, and relevant since [Fitch] testified that he provided information to his counsel to be used in answering the [c]omplaint. Finally, Valentine insists that this reference was cumulative of other and later similar denials, under oath, in response to both interrogatories and requests for admissions (which were also sworn) and if error at all, it was harmless. ¶ 21. The circuit judge's decision to overrule Fitch's objection is reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. See id. This Court finds that the use of Fitch's prior inconsistent statements in Valentine's opening statement was permissible and the circuit court's decision to overrule Fitch's objection was not an abuse of discretion. Not only was the jury repeatedly informed that the content of the opening statements were not evidence, but Fitch's prior inconsistent statements in these pleadings were developed during his testimony at trial. Accordingly, this issue is without merit. (B) Evidence of Valentine's conduct prior to and after his marriage to Sandra. ¶ 22. Fitch sought to solicit testimony regarding Valentine's adulterous conduct with Sandra at the inception of their relationship. Valentine filed a motion in limine to prevent Fitch from introducing any such evidence. The circuit judge granted Valentine's motion in limine. In support of that position, the circuit judge stated that if you have any evidence of . . . relevant marital misconduct on his part while he's married to [Sandra], that's one thing. Proof beforehand is something else.  (Emphasis added). ¶ 23. [T]he standard of review regarding Rule 403 determinations is an `abuse of discretion.' Baldwin v. State, 784 So.2d 148, 160 (Miss.2001). Applying that deferential standard of review, this Court finds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Valentine's motion in limine. Fitch's wrongful conduct was the issue in this case. The presence of a marriage relationship is necessary for the tort of alienation of affections to apply. Therefore, the time frame in which Valentine and Sandra were married, not their pre-marriage conduct, was key. The meager probative value of evidence on the beginning of Valentine's relationship with Sandra was found to be outweighed by the undue prejudice it would create. As such, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Valentine's motion in limine, and this issue is without merit. ¶ 24. At trial, Valentine objected to Fitch mentioning another child born to Valentine following his divorce from Sandra. The circuit court precluded the introduction of such evidence, finding that you should not inquire as to any after born children, if that's a correct term for it because that, in the Court's opinion, is unduly prejudicial and of limited or no probative value.  (Emphasis added). ¶ 25. Once again, this Court applies the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review, see id., and finds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the introduction of evidence regarding the child born to Valentine following his divorce from Sandra. The key time frame for the tort of alienation of affections is that of the marriage, within which this evidence clearly does not fit. Moreover, the circuit court found this evidence to be unduly prejudicial and of limited or no probative value. As the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in so finding, this issue is without merit.