Opinion ID: 769245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable probability of success on the merits

Text: 55 We begin our analysis by considering what, for this case, is the most significant prong of the preliminary injunction test -- whether the ACLU met its burden of establishing a reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits in proving that COPA trenches upon the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Initially, we note that the District Court correctly determined that as a content-based restriction on speech, COPA is both presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny analysis. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493. As in all areas of constitutional strict scrutiny jurisprudence, the government must establish that the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest, and that it seeks to protect its interest in a manner that is the least restrictive of protected speech. See, e.g., Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980); Sable Comm of Calif. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989). 18 These principles have been emphasized again in the Supreme Court's most recent opinion, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (U.S. May 22, 2000), where the Court, concerned with the bleeding of cable transmissions, held S 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment. 56 It is undisputed that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from material that is harmful to them, even if not obscene by adult standards. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (1989); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)). At issue is whether, in achieving this compelling objective, Congress has articulated a constitutionally permissible means to achieve its objective without curtailing the protected free speech rights of adults. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 127; Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). As we have observed, the District Court found that it had not --holding that COPA was not likely to succeed in surviving strict scrutiny analysis. 57 We base our particular determination of COPA's likely unconstitutionality, however, on COPA's reliance on contemporary community standards in the context of the electronic medium of the Web to identify material that is harmful to minors. The overbreadth of COPA's definition of harmful to minors applying a contemporary community standards clause -- although virtually ignored by the parties and the amicus in their respective briefs but raised by us at oral argument -- so concerns us that we are persuaded that this aspect of COPA, without reference to its other provisions, must lead inexorably to a holding of a likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute. Hence we base our opinion entirely on the basis of the likely unconstitutionality of this clause, even though the District Court relied on numerous other grounds. 19 58 As previously noted, in passing COPA, Congress attempted to resolve all of the problems raised by the Supreme Court in striking down the CDA as unconstitutional. One concern noted by the Supreme Court was that, as a part of the wholly unprecedented broad coverage of the CDA, the `community standards' criterion as applied to the Internet means that any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78. We are not persuaded that the Supreme Court's concern with respect to the community standards criterion has been sufficiently remedied by Congress in COPA. 59 Previously, in addressing the mailing of unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California obscenity statute, the Supreme Court held that the fact-finder must determine whether  `the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find the work taken as a whole, [to appeal] to the prurient interest. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). In response to the Supreme Court's criticism of the CDA, Congress incorporated into COPA this Miller test, explaining that in so doing COPA now conforms to the standards identified in Ginsberg, as modified by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). H.R. REP. NO. 105-775 at 13 (1998); 47 U.S.C. S 231(e)(6)(A). Even in so doing, Congress remained cognizant of the fact that the application of community standards in the context of the Web is controversial. H.R. REP. N O. 107-775, at 28. Nevertheless, in defending the constitutionality of COPA's use of the Miller test, the government insists that there is nothing dispositive about the fact that [in COPA] commercial distribution of such [harmful] materials occurs through an online, rather than a brick and mortar outlet. See Reply Brief at 18 n.3. 60 Despite the government's assertion, [e]ach medium of expression `must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.'  Reno III, 31 F. Supp.2d at 495 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)). See also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1887 (U.S. May 22, 2000). In considering the unique factors that affect communication in the new and technology-laden medium of the Web, we are convinced that there are crucial differences between a brick and mortar outlet and the online Web that dramatically affect a First Amendment analysis. Id 61 Unlike a brick and mortar outlet with a specific geographic locale, and unlike the voluntary physical mailing of material from one geographic location to another, as in Miller, the uncontroverted facts indicate that the Web is not geographically constrained. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482-92; American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 169 (geography, however, is a virtually meaningless construct on the Internet). Indeed, and of extreme significance, is the fact, as found by the District Court, that Web publishers are without any means to limit access to their sites based on the geographic location of particular Internet users. As soon as information is published on a Web site, it is accessible to all other Web visitors. See American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 166; Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 483. Current technology prevents Web publishers from circumventing particular jurisdictions or limiting their site's content from entering any [specific] geographic community. Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484. This key difference necessarily affects our analysis in attempting to define what contemporary community standards should or could mean in a medium without geographic boundaries. 62 In expressing its concern over the wholly unprecedented broad coverage of the CDA's scope, the Supreme Court has already noted that because of the peculiar geography-free nature of cyberspace, a community standards test would essentially require every Web communication to abide by the most restrictive community's standards. See Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78. Similarly, to avoid liability under COPA, affected Web publishers would either need to severely censor their publications or implement an age or credit card verification system whereby any material that might be deemed harmful by the most puritan of communities in any state is shielded behind such a verification system. Shielding such vast amounts of material behind verification systems would prevent access to protected material by any adult seventeen or over without the necessary age verification credentials. Moreover, it would completely bar access to those materials to all minors under seventeen -- even if the material would not otherwise have been deemed harmful to them in their respective geographic communities. 63 The government argues that subjecting Web publishers to varying community standards is not constitutionally problematic or, for that matter, unusual. The government notes that there are numerous cases in which the courts have already subjected the same conduct to varying community standards, depending on the community in which the conduct occurred. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal judicial districts into which they transmit the material [but that] does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of the application of uniform national standards of obscenity. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974). Similarly, the government cites to the dial-a-porn cases in which the Supreme Court has held that even if the audience is comprised of different communities with different local standards the company providing the obscene material ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene messages under each community's respective standard. Sable Comm. of California v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989). 64 These cases, however, are easily distinguished from the present case. In each of those cases, the defendants had the ability to control the distribution of controversial material with respect to the geographic communities into which they released it. Therefore, the defendants could limit their exposure to liability by avoiding those communities with particularly restrictive standards, while continuing to provide the controversial material in more liberal-minded communities. For example, the pornographer in Hamling could have chosen not to mail unsolicited sexually explicit material to certain communities while continuing to mail them to others. Similarly, the telephone pornographers (dial-a-porn) in Sable could have screened their incoming calls and then only accepted a call if its point of origination was from a community with standards of decency that were not offended by the content of their pornographic telephone messages. 20 65 By contrast, Web publishers have no such comparable control. Web publishers cannot restrict access to their site based on the geographic locale of the Internet user visiting their site. In fact, an Internet user cannot foreclose access to . . . work from certain states or send differing versions of . . . communication[s] to different jurisdictions . . . The Internet user has no ability to bypass any particular state. American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). As a result, unlike telephone or postal mail pornographers, Web publishers of material that may be harmful to minors must comply with the regulation imposed by the State with the most stringent standard or [entirely] forego Internet communication of the message that might or might not subject [the publisher] to prosecution. Id. 66 To minimize this distinction between Web publishers and all other forms of communication that contain material that is harmful to minors, the government cites to one Sixth Circuit case -- presently the only case in which a court has applied a community standards test in the context of the electronic medium. See United States v. Thomas , 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). The Thomas court determined that whether the material on the defendant's electronic bulletin board is harmful must be judged by the standards of each individual community wherein the disputed material was received, even if the standards in each of the recipient communities varied one from the next, and even if the material was acceptable in the community from which it was sent. See id at 711. Despite the electronic medium in which electronic bulletin boards are found, Thomas is inapposite inasmuch as electronic bulletin boards, just as telephones, regular mail and other brick and mortar outlets, are very different creatures from that of the Web as a whole. Thomas itself recognized this difference, and by limiting its holding accordingly, completely undercuts the government's argument, stating explicitly that: 67 Defendants and Amicus Curiae appearing on their behalf argue that the computer technology used here requires a new definition of community, i.e., one that is based on the broad-ranging connections among people in cyberspace rather than the geographic locale of the federal judicial district of the criminal trial. . .. Therefore, they contend . . . [bulletin board publishers] will be forced to censor their material so as not to run afoul of the standards of the community with the most restrictive standards. Defendants' First Amendment issue, however, is not implicated by the facts of this case. This is not a situation where the bulletin board operator had no knowledge or control over the jurisdictions where materials were distributed for downloading or printing. Access to the Defendants' [bulletin board] was limited. Membership was necessary and applications were submitted and screened before passwords were issued and materials were distributed. Thus, Defendants had in place methods to limit user access in jurisdictions where the risk of a finding of obscenity was greater than in California . . . . If Defendants did not wish to subject themselves to liability in jurisdictions with less tolerant standards for determining obscenity, they could have refused to give passwords to members in those districts, thus precluding the risk of liability. . . . . Thus, under the facts of this case, there is not need for this court to adopt a new definition of community' for use in obscenity prosecutions involving electronic bulletin boards. This court's decision is guided by one of the cardinal rules governing the federal courts, i.e., never reach constitutional questions not squarely presented by the facts of a case. Id. at 711-12. 68 Thus, it is clear that Thomas fails to support the government's position. Indeed, no federal court has yet ruled on whether the Web/Internet may be constitutionally regulated in light of differing community standards. 69 Our concern with COPA's adoption of Miller's contemporary community standards test by which to determine whether material is harmful to minors is with respect to its overbreadth in the context of the Web medium. Because no technology currently exists by which Web publishers may avoid liability, such publishers would necessarily be compelled to abide by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78, even if the same material would not have been deemed harmful to minors in all other communities. Moreover, by restricting their publications to meet the more stringent standards of less liberal communities, adults whose constitutional rights permit them to view such materials would be unconstitutionally deprived of those rights. Thus, this result imposes an overreaching burden and restriction on constitutionally protected speech. 21 70 We recognize that invalidating a statute because it is overbroad is strong medicine. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1972). As such, before concluding that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, we seek to determine if the statute is  `readily susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional . . . [because courts] will not rewrite a . . . law to conform it to constitutional requirements. Virginia v. American Booksellers' Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)). See also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 939. 71 Two possible ways to limit the interpretation of COPA are (a) assigning a narrow meaning to the language of the statute itself, or (b) deleting that portion of the statute that is unconstitutional, while preserving the remainder of the statute intact. See e.g. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985); Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 939. We therefore turn our attention to whether either limiting construction is feasible here. 72 The government, in attempting to make use of the first of these salvaging mechanisms, suggests that we should interpret narrowly the contemporary community standards language in COPA as an adult rather than as a geographic standard. The House Report itself suggests this construction to sidestep the potential constitutional problems raised by the Supreme Court in interpreting the CDA's use of a community standards phrase. Congress explained: 73 The committee intends for the definition of material harmful to minors to parallel the Ginsberg and Miller definitions of obscenity and harmful to minors. . . . In essence, the Committee intends to adopt the `variable obscenity' standard for minors. The Committee recognizes that the applicability of community standards in the context of the Web is controversial, but understands it as an `adult' standard, rather than a `geographic' standard, and one that is reasonably constant among adults in America with respect to what is suitable for minors. . . . . Thus, the person posting the material is engaged in interstate commerce and is subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of all communities in a manner similar to the way obscenity laws apply today. 74 H.R. REP. NO. 105-775 at 28 (1998). Congress reiterated this very position in its amicus brief stating: COPA adopted a non-geographic, adult age community standard for judging the prurience and offensiveness prongs of the Harmful to Minors test. Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae, at 16. 75 Despite the government's effort to salvage this clause of COPA from unconstitutionality, we have before us no evidence to suggest that adults everywhere in America would share the same standards for determining what is harmful to minors. To the contrary, it is significant to us that throughout case law, community standards have always been interpreted as a geographic standard without uniformity. See, e.g., American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Courts have long recognized, however, that there is no single `prevailing community standard' in the United States. Thus, even were all 50 states to enact laws that were verbatim copies of the New York [obscenity] Act, Internet users would still be subject to discordant responsibilities.). 76 In fact, Miller, the very case from which the government derives its community standards concept, has made clear that community standards are to be construed in a localized geographic context. People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. Miller 413 U.S. at 33. Even more directly, the Supreme Court stated in Miller that our nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards [of what is patently offensive] could be articulated for all 50 states in a single formulation. . . . To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national `community standard' would be an exercise in futility. Id. at 30. We therefore conclude that the interpretation of contemporary community standards is not readily susceptible to a narrowing construction of adult rather than geographic standard. 77 With respect to the second salvaging mechanism, it is an  `elementary principle that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected'  Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) (quoting Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 (1881)). As a result, if it is possible for a court to identify a particular part of the statute that is unconstitutional, and by striking only that language the court could leave the remainder of the statute intact and within the intent of Congress, courts should do so. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1987). 78 Here, however, striking contemporary community standards from COPA is not likely to succeed in salvaging COPA's constitutionality as this standard is an integral part of the statute, permeating and influencing the whole of the statute. We see no means by which to excise those unconstitutional elements of the statute from those that are constitutional (assuming for the moment, without deciding, that the remaining clauses of COPA are held to be constitutional). This is particularly so in a preliminary injunction context when we are convinced that the very test or standard that COPA has established to determine what is harmful to minors is more likely than not to be held unconstitutional. See Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504-05. 79 Our foregoing discussion that under either approach-- of narrowing construction or deleting an unconstitutional element -- COPA is not readily susceptible to a construction that would make it constitutional. We agree with the Second Circuit that [t]he State may not regulate at all if it turns out that even the least restrictive means of regulation is still unreasonable when its limitations on freedom of speech are balanced against the benefits gained from those limitations. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988). As regulation under existing technology is unreasonable here, we conclude that with respect to this first prong of our preliminary injunction analysis, it is more likely than not that COPA will be found unconstitutional on the merits. 22 80 Our holding in no way ignores or questions the general applicability of the holding in Miller with respect to contemporary community standards. We remain satisfied that Miller's community standards test continues to be a useful and viable tool in contexts other than the Internet and the Web under present technology. Miller itself was designed to address the mailing of unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of California law, where a publisher could control the community receiving the publication. Miller, however, has no applicability to the Internet and the Web, where Web publishers are currently without the ability to control the geographic scope of the recipients of their communications. See Reno II , 521 U.S. at 889 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the twin characteristics of geography and identity differentiate the world of Ginsberg [and Miller] from that of the Internet.).