Opinion ID: 1189801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Test and Legislative History

Text: We next consider whether the Subdivision Map Act (the Act) impliedly preempts the challenged county ordinances. (6) In determining whether the Legislature has preempted by implication to the exclusion of local regulation, we must look to the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme. There are three tests: `(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.' ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d 476, 485, quoting In re Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, 128 [41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809]; accord, Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th 893, 898; IT Corp. v. Solano County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 1 Cal.4th 81, 90-91; Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 408, 423 [261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 777 P.2d 157]; Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 708 [209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261]; Galvan v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal.2d 851, 859-866 [76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930].) The first and third tests do not, of course, establish implied legislative preemption here. As we have seen, the Act expressly regulates only mergers of parcels initiated and carried out by local agencies to effect the parcels' sale, lease, or financing, and so does not fully cover the subject of zoning laws that require parcel merger as a condition to issuance of a development permit. As for the third test, the county ordinances present no basis for concern over their effect on transient citizens. (7) Our analysis therefore focuses on the second test, whether the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further additional local action ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 485). The material subject matter of the present zoning ordinances is a requirement that the owner of contiguous parcels merge them as a prerequisite to being granted permission to build on one of the parcels. The statewide merger provisions (§ 66451.10 et seq.) appear to reflect two overall concerns. First, they provide landowners with elaborate procedural safeguards of notice and opportunity to be heard before their lots can be involuntarily merged. Second, although the merger provisions' literal terms apply only to local agency initiated merger of parcels for purposes of sale, lease, or financing, an examination of the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d 476, 485) reveals a state concern over local regulation of parcel merger for purposes of development as well. Accordingly, we proceed to examine the relationship of these statutory concerns to the county ordinances by `study[ing] the history and purpose of the [state] enactment and the previous state of the legislation on the subject, as well as other statutes in pari materia and the benefits sought to be provided' ( Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 677, fn. 9 [94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [122 P.2d 526]). The Act's provisions on merger of parcels (§§ 66451.10-66451.21; see fn. 13, ante ) were enacted in 1983 (Stats. 1983, ch. 845, § 2, p. 3097) and were modified by various amendments in 1984, 1985, and 1986. The enactment repealed ( id., § 1) and replaced former section 66424.2, which was adopted in its original form in 1976 (Stats. 1976, ch. 928, § 4, p. 2120) and amended or revised in 1977 and 1980 (Stats. 1977, ch. 234, § 5, p. 1034; Stats. 1980, ch. 402, § 2, p. 788; id., ch. 1217, §§ 2-3, p. 4127). Each version of former section 66424.2, as well as the present legislation (§ 66451.10 et seq.), begins by providing, subject to stated exceptions and qualifications, that [n]otwithstanding section 66424 [defining `Subdivision'] [...], two or more contiguous parcels or units of land ... shall not [merge or be deemed merged] by virtue of the fact that [such] contiguous parcels or units are held by the same owner, and no further proceeding under the provisions of this division [the Act] or a local ordinance enacted pursuant thereto shall be required for the purpose of sale, lease, or financing of [such] contiguous parcels or units or any of them. (§ 66451.10; Stats. 1976, ch. 928, § 4, p. 2120; Stats. 1977, ch. 234, § 5, p. 1034; Stats. 1980, ch. 402, § 2, p. 788; id., ch. 1217, §§ 2-3, p. 4127.) [17] Thus, the enactments apparently sprang from a concern that without them, section 66424 would cause contiguous units of land that had already been qualified as separate parcels under the Act to be automatically merged by virtue of common ownership and thus to require further compliance with the Act before they could be sold separately. As stated earlier, section 66424 generally defines a subdivision as the division ... of any unit or units of ... land, ... shown on the ... county assessment roll as a unit or as contiguous units, for the purpose of sale, lease or financing.... (Italics added.) The italicized wording has been part of the Act as far back as 1937. [18] In 1973, a California Attorney General's opinion (56 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 509 (1973)) concluded that because of the reference to contiguous units in section 66424, the scheme of the Subdivision Map Act treats contiguous units under a common ownership as one unit with respect to the regulation of its later redivision. ( Id. at p. 515.) The opinion said that applying the Act to the redivision enables local governments to obtain more effective compliance with community standards. Were the parcels separately held by different owners, zoning ordinances which prohibit use of lots that previously were legal building sites, would then be constitutionally suspect.... ( Id. at p. 513.) The opinion relied principally on our decision in Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279 [98 Cal. Rptr. 785, 491 P.2d 369] (hereafter Hill ), which is apparently the only California appellate decision that both addresses the question of treating otherwise separate parcels as merged by virtue of their common ownership and antedates any of the enactments of parcel merger provisions between 1976 and 1986, including former section 66424.2, and section 66451.10 et seq., and their amendments. The Attorney General's opinion characterizes the Hill decision as inferentially approv[ing] the concept that when a statute regulating land use treats adjoining or contiguous parcels under the same ownership as one parcel, the parcels will be regarded as `merged.' (56 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 512.) In Hill, an unimproved unit of land shown as a single lot on a recorded tract map was split into 2 parcels, each of about 5,300 square feet, without recordation of the split. After the adoption of a zoning ordinance prescribing a minimum lot size of 4,800 square feet, plaintiff acquired and built a house on one of the half-lots and thereafter acquired the other half-lot. Later, after the minimum lot size had been increased to 7,500 square feet, the defendant city rejected the plaintiff's application for a permit to build another house on the second half-lot. We held the rejection to be proper under the applicable ordinance and not unconstitutional. The ordinance permitted development on undersized parcels only if the parcel were (1) shown in a recorded subdivision, or (2) constituted a portion of a lot of which another portion contained a lawfully constructed dwelling `under separate ownership from the remainder of the original subdivided lot as of the date of [the ordinance's] enactment' (6 Cal.3d, supra, at p. 283). Our Hill opinion discusses Vetter v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attleboro (1953) 330 Mass. 628 [116 N.E.2d 277] as a case closely in point (6 Cal.3d at p. 283). In Vetter, denial of a building permit was upheld on similar facts, but plaintiff Hill sought to distinguish Vetter because the ordinance there included a provision that construction would be permitted on an undersized lot which on the effective date hereof does not adjoin other land of the same owner available for use in connection with said lot (quoted at 6 Cal.3d at p. 284). We characterized that provision as a merger clause and concluded that [o]pposed to the implications raised by the absence of a merger clause [in the ordinance challenged by plaintiff Hill] are more compelling implications raised by those provisions [of the ordinance] which expressly preclude the individual development of [an undersized] parcel, whether or not adjacent to other lands under common ownership ( ibid. ). [19] Against this background, the Legislature enacted the various versions of former section 66424.2 between 1976 and 1980 and then, from 1983 to 1986, the present parcel merger sections (§ 66451.10 et seq.) and their amendments. All of that legislation begins with a general negation of automatic parcel merger by virtue of common ownership, followed by a delineation of particular circumstances and conditions under which merger will take place. Those circumstances and conditions, which vary from statute to statute, are the primary indicators of the paramount state concern affecting the county ordinances before us. The original section 66424.2 provided that if any one of such contiguous ... units held by the same owner does not conform to standards for minimum parcel size to permit use or development under a [local] zoning, subdivision, or other ordinance, and at least one of the parcels is not developed with a building for which a permit has been issued or was not required, [20] the parcels shall be merged for purposes of the Act unless an ordinance provides otherwise. (Stats. 1976, ch. 928, § 4, p. 2120.) Moreover, a local agency having knowledge of any such merger was required to record a notice of the merger, but was also required, at least 30 days before that recordation, to give the owner written notice specifying a time, date and place at which to show the agency why the notice of merger should not be recorded. The 1977 amendment replaced the provision for automatic merger with one authorizing local agencies to adopt the merger provisions by ordinance. The ordinance could also deem any automatically merged parcels to be unmerged. (Stats. 1977, ch. 234, § 5, p. 1034.) In 1980, all parcels merged by operation of law (under the 1976 statute) and not deemed merged by ordinance were automatically deemed unmerged. (Stats. 1980, ch. 402, § 2, p. 788; id., ch. 1217, §§ 2-3, p. 4127.) The present merger provisions (§§ 66451.10-66451.21), enacted in 1983 and amended during the next three years, expand and elaborate upon former section 66424.2 by providing (1) stricter procedural safeguards for owners of contiguous parcels, and (2) specific substantive conditions, relating primarily to suitability for development, under which parcels would be eligible for merger. We turn to an examination of each of those two aspects of the merger provisions to ascertain whether either reflects `a paramount state concern [that] will not tolerate further or additional local action [i.e., the present county ordinances]' ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d 476, 485, quoting In re Hubbard, supra, 62 Cal.2d 119, 128).