Opinion ID: 848846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: immunity as an affirmative defense

Text: The majority has opportunistically seized on the circumstances presented in this case to overrule decades of sound precedent and unsettle an area of law that had finally achieved some stability. In proclaiming that plaintiff must plead in avoidance of immunity, the majority ignores not only the value of precedent, but also the sound principles on which McCummings v. Hurley Medical Ctr., 433 Mich. 404, 446 N.W.2d 114 (1989), was based. In McCummings, the Court held that the entity claiming immunity must affirmatively plead the defense. This unanimous pronouncement was based, in part, on the doctrine's statutory foundation. No longer could we solely rely on the doctrine's common-law history to determine the parameters of the defense. [6] Therefore, though the judiciary traditionally considered sovereignty a characteristic of government, this understanding was no longer dispositive of procedural or substantive issues once the Legislature codified the doctrine. This view is no less relevant today, and the majority's attempt to proclaim otherwise by once again relying on outdated jargon adds little to our understanding of governmental immunity. Having identified a flaw in the majority's deceptively useful rationale (i.e., because the Court has declared immunity a characteristic in the past, it is not an affirmative defense), we must now turn to its substantive conclusions. Does the governmental immunity statute require that plaintiffs plead in avoidance of immunity? MCL 691. 1407(1) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this act, a government agency is immune from tort liability if [it] is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Although this section makes clear that governmental entities may claim immunity when performing a governmental function, it does not, as the majority claims, create a textual presumption in favor of the government. Rather, the statute identifies the scope of immunity. The procedural duty to plead is simply not mentioned, and as such, the textas it pertains to pleadingis silent. Building on this Court's pronouncement in Ross v. Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 333 N.W.2d 641 (1984), which clarified that the Legislature intended that immunity from tort liability exist only when an entity was engaged in a governmental function, the McCummings Court arrived at the most logical conclusion, i.e., that [t]he question whether a governmental agency was engaged in a governmental function when performing the act complained of is a question best known to the agency and best asserted by it. Id. at 411, 446 N.W.2d 114. [7] Furthermore, the McCummings Court correctly noted that no valid reason to exempt agencies from the pleading burden placed upon individuals could be discerned. The source of immunity for both government bodies and individuals is grounded in § 1407. Because the text makes no distinction in this regard, a prudent observer will agree that the majority's reversal is based on its own policy considerations, which ignore both the intent of the Legislature and the judicially sound doctrine of stare decisis. This is particularly true because, though the Legislature revised the GTLA after McCummings in 1986, 1996, and 1999, it failed to amend the statute to alter the rule that placed the burden of pleading on the government. Unfortunately, the majority dismisses this legislative acquiescence, an indicator of its intent. In sum, the fact remains that governmental immunity is a defense to liability. Although the majority erroneously declares that plaintiff must plead in avoidance of the doctrine, the government continues to bear the onus of proof. If a trial court finds the parties have equally carried the burden of production concerning the applicability of the doctrine, the court must find for the plaintiff. Any indication to the contrary in the majority's opinion may only be referenced as dicta, as the issue this case presents is limited to the sufficiency of the pleadings. Shockingly, without the issue being contemplated, let alone raised by the parties, the majority concludes that plaintiff's claim should have been dismissed for its failure to plead in avoidance of government immunity. Op. at 49, 58-60. However, our precedent and court rules had expressly placed this burden on the government. I object to the majority's application of its holding, which placed the burden of prescience on plaintiff.