Opinion ID: 2307522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Defenses available to Mr. Linn under 13 Del. C. 666(a)

Text: Mr. Linn contends that the Delaware Family Court erred by rejecting the three defenses that he raised under 13 Del. C. § 666(a): [68] 1) that Ms. Toman was equitably estopped from enforcing the Minnesota order because of the alleged oral modification by the parties in 1984; 2) that Ms. Toman was equitably estopped from seeking payment of medical bills and insurance premiums because she never presented the bills to Mr. Linn for payment until she filed her 1995 action in Minnesota; and 3) that Mr. Linn should be able to reduce the amount of the Minnesota 1995 Arrearages Order by showing the Delaware Family Court all the payments he previously made. Although Mr. Linn received notice of the 1995 motion in Minnesota, he took no action to request a modification or challenge the arrears. Mr. Linn can not now attempt to modify, in Delaware, the Minnesota 1995 Arrearages Order that has been filed for enforcement in Delaware. Mr. Linn's assertion that because UIFSA (1992) was not adopted in Delaware until July 1, 1995, this action should be governed by URESA is without merit. As discussed above, the enforcement action was not filed in Delaware until after UIFSA (1992) had been adopted; therefore URESA does not apply. UIFSA (1992) attempted to address the problems that occurred under URESA and RURESA (1968) whereby an obligor would wait for an enforcement action to be commenced and then request a modification in the obligor's then home state to a lesser sum. [69] Section 604 of UIFSA (1992) states that [t]he law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the order. [70] The Family Court, therefore, did not err in not granting Mr. Linn's request for equitable relief under the circumstances. It would be inequitable to allow Mr. Linn to assert defenses that probably would not have been available to him in Minnesota [71] when he did not provide any information as to his net income. [72] To allow Mr. Linn to challenge the Minnesota 1995 Arrearages Order would violate 28 U.S.C. 1738B [73] and the full faith and credit provisions of the United States Constitution. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(g) even if a state loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the state may still enforce the unsatisfied obligations that accrued before the date on which a modification of the order is made. [74] Thus, if Mr. Linn wishes to challenge the arrears calculation in the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order, he must do so in Minnesota. [75] As discussed above, Minnesota had jurisdiction to enforce its 1983 Child Support Order. It is not for this Court to decide if Minnesota improperly modified its 1983 Child Support Order; it is well settled that an appealable error underlying a final judgment must be corrected by the appellate process of the state entering the order, and not by collateral attack when enforcement is sought in a sister state. [76] Mr. Linn now attempts to improperly assert an error underlying the final judgment entered in Minnesota by collaterally attacking the judgment in Delaware; therefore, Delaware must give Minnesota's order full faith and credit and treat the judgment as though it were perfectly correct under substantive principles of Minnesota law. [77] Although we note that the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order may not have accounted for all the support payments made by Mr. Linn, [78] we find that the Delaware Family Court properly rejected Mr. Linn's request to introduce evidence of support payments made before the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order reduced the arrears to a judgment. Section 607(a)(6) of UIFSA (1992) states: [a] party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses: ... (6) full or partial payment has been made. [79] The Delaware Family Court found that (a)(6) did not authorize a new or de novo hearing to determine what payments were made for the time period in question that the foreign state court considered ... [but did] mean that [it] should determine what payments have been made subsequent to the entry of the foreign order in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation established by the foreign court. [80] The Delaware Family Court stated: [i]t is neither in the interests of judicial economy, nor fair to the opposing party, nor logical to require a registering or enforcing state to hold a second hearing on the merits. It would be grossly unfair for a party, who voluntarily elected not to appear and participate in a hearing on the merits in the Court with subject matter jurisdiction, to now be entitled to a new hearing on the merits in a State not selected by the petitioner or plaintiff. [81] We agree with the Family Court that to interpret section 607(a)(6) of UIFSA (1992) to allow the Respondent to relitigate the Minnesota Arrearages Judgment Order on the merits in Delaware would be inconsistent with the intent of UIFSA (1992). Because the 1995 Minnesota Arrearage Order was a final judgment, Delaware must give full faith and credit to it and enforce the judgment. [82] Any direct attacks on the judgment must be raised in Minnesota. [83]