Opinion ID: 2683355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Forfeiture of JMOL

Text: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 sets forth the procedural requirements for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil jury trial and establishes two stages for such challenges. Rule 50(a) allows a party to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence prior to submission of the case to the jury. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Rule 50(b), by contrast, sets forth the procedural requirements for renewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge after the jury verdict. See id. 50(b); see generally Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 399-400 (2006). These two provisions are linked together, as “[a] motion under Rule 50(b) is not allowed unless the movant sought relief on similar grounds under Rule 50(a) before the case was submitted to the jury.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008). In the past we have found that parties forfeited the right to move under Rule 50(b) by failing to first properly move under Rule 50(a). For example, in Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., we rejected the appellant’s contentions that its specific JMOL motions at the close of evidence regarding inequitable conduct and the on-sale bar encompassed broader motions that the patents were not invalid for obviousness. 321 F.3d 1089, 1107-08 (Fed. Cir. 2003). MEDISIM LTD. v. BESTMED, LLC 7 We then explained that “[s]ince a post-trial motion for JMOL can be granted only on grounds advanced in the pre-verdict motion, Duro-Last was precluded from making a post-trial motion under Rule 50(b) for JMOL that its patents were not invalid for obviousness.” Id. at 408. Similarly, in i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., we concluded that the appellant waived its right to challenge the factual findings underlying the jury’s implicit obviousness verdict because it did not file a pre-verdict JMOL on obviousness for three specific references. See 598 F.3d 831, 845 (Fed. Cir. 2010) aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). With this precedent in mind, we can now turn to the questions of whether BestMed failed to properly move for JMOL on anticipation and unjust enrichment.
Medisim first argues that BestMed failed to move for JMOL on anticipation under Rule 50(a), so it was foreclosed from doing so under Rule 50(b). Therefore, Medisim claims that the district court should have refrained from ruling on anticipation after the jury verdict under Rule 50(b). BestMed denies such forfeiture. In support of its argument, it points to a statement it made on the record at the close of evidence in opposition to Medisim’s JMOL motion for no anticipation. Its counsel stated: “On . . . anticipation, I submit that the jury can readily find that the FHT-1 product, Medisim’s own product, is anticipatory. There’s clear and convincing evidence, we submit, on that issue. Also [Medisim’s witnesses’] testimony support[s] that position. But, again, it’s definitely something for the jury.” J.A. 4530. While BestMed concedes that this statement was “not a model of clarity,” it argues that Medisim was on notice of BestMed’s position. Appellant’s Br. 59. Further, BestMed notes that when Medisim moved to strike BestMed’s Rule 50(b) motion on anticipation, the district court 8 MEDISIM LTD. v. BESTMED, LLC recognized that BestMed had “asserted its present invalidity contentions on the record, and the Court ha[d] stated that all of its contentions had been re-asserted and preserved.” Order at 3, Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed LLC, No. 1:10-cv-02463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2013), ECF No. 190. The district court concluded that Medisim had not been unfairly surprised by BestMed’s anticipation contentions. Id. The district court explained: [T]he rule of Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., which i4i Partnership applies, is based on the proposition that it would be impermissible under the Seventh Amendment to re-examine the jury’s verdict upon grounds not raised prior to the ver- dict. Here, this rule is easily met: BestMed has pressed its invalidity contentions since well before the jury was sworn, the jury was instructed as to invalidity, and BestMed presented its present invalidity contentions, and its supporting evidence, on the record. Id. at 4. While Medisim may not have been surprised by BestMed’s invalidity contentions, the Supreme Court has held previously that our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be strictly followed in circumstances such as this one. In Unitherm, for example, a party moved for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a) prior to the district court’s submission of the case to the jury, but following the verdict the party failed to renew its motion for JMOL pursuant to Rule 50(b). See 546 U.S. at 398. In preventing the party from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the Supreme Court stated that “a party is not entitled to pursue a new trial on appeal unless that party makes an appropriate postverdict motion in the district court.” Id. at 404. While the issue here is whether BestMed failed to move under Rule 50(a), the principle of forfeiture articulated in Unitherm reMEDISIM LTD. v. BESTMED, LLC 9 mains the same. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a . . . right may be forfeited . . . by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.”). With that principle in mind, we conclude that BestMed forfeited its right to move for JMOL on anticipation. The statement that BestMed now relies on as evidence of a motion for JMOL actually indicates the opposite— BestMed’s counsel stated that anticipation was “definitely something for the jury.” J.A. 4530. Further, BestMed’s counsel made this statement in opposition to Medisim’s motion for JMOL under Rule 50(a); BestMed never moved on its own for JMOL on anticipation before the case was submitted to the jury. See id. Indeed, BestMed’s counsel conceded that BestMed “did not expressly say [that] we cross-move for JMOL when they moved for JMOL on the anticipation issue . . . .” Oral Arg. 22:59-23:08 available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/ 13-1451/all. Finally, regarding the district court’s statement that BestMed had “preserved the record, [and] renewed all the motions previously made,” we note that this statement was made following a discussion of BestMed’s unjust enrichment claims. See J.A. 4398. The district court’s later statement that “the [c]ourt ha[d] stated that all of its contentions had been re-asserted and preserved” came only after Medisim requested that the district court strike BestMed’s Rule 50(b) motion regarding validity. See Order at 3, Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed LLC, No. 1:10-cv-02463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2013), ECF No. 190. But by then it was too late—BestMed had already forfeited the right to move for JMOL under Rule 50(b). Therefore, we conclude that the district court legally erred in ruling on any validity issues after the jury verdict under Rule 50(b). Because we vacate the district court’s grant of JMOL on anticipation due to forfeiture, we need not consider 10 MEDISIM LTD. v. BESTMED, LLC whether the district court erred in granting JMOL on anticipation on the merits.
We next turn to Medisim’s procedural challenge to the district court’s grant of JMOL on unjust enrichment. Again, Medisim argues that BestMed forfeited its right to move for JMOL under Rule 50(b) when it failed to properly move for JMOL under Rule 50(a). Medisim claims that although BestMed did move for JMOL under Rule 50(a), the basis for its pre-verdict motion bears no resemblance to the basis for its post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion. BestMed responds that it expressly moved for JMOL of no unjust enrichment at the close of Medisim’s case-inchief, generally contending that “[t]here is no evidence of unjust enrichment” and particularly challenging Medisim’s evidence on each element of the claim. J.A. 4141. BestMed alleges that the district court cut BestMed’s counsel off and denied the motion. When BestMed’s counsel tried to renew BestMed’s JMOL motions later, the district court barred any further discussion, saying “you preserved the record.” J.A. 4398. We conclude that BestMed did not forfeit its right to move for JMOL on unjust enrichment under Rule 50(b) because it adequately made such a motion under Rule 50(a). On appeal, Medisim bases its unjust enrichment argument on misappropriation of its allegedly proprietary water bath testing procedure, but during a two-week trial Medisim did not present much evidence on this issue. In fact, during oral argument, we asked Medisim’s counsel to show us where in the record it had presented an unjust enrichment claim based on its water bath testing procedure. Medisim’s counsel responded by saying, “At this point I couldn’t specifically say where . . . .” Oral Arg. 18:07-11 available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralargument-recordings/13-1451/all. He then admitted that “[s]ometimes things are not as precise as you would like.” MEDISIM LTD. v. BESTMED, LLC 11 Id. at 18:46-49. After reviewing the record, we too could not find a precise presentation of an unjust enrichment claim based on the water bath testing procedure. Instead, Medisim used its unjust enrichment claim to request a disgorgement-of-profits remedy without explaining its basis for the actual claim. Faced with a generic case, BestMed could only make a generic motion under Rule 50(a). And it clearly accomplished that—its motion explained why Medisim was not entitled to prevail on unjust enrichment because it had failed to show that it had been denied a legitimate expectation of compensation, a necessary element of the claim. Since we conclude that there was no forfeiture of JMOL under Rule 50(b), we next review whether the district court erred in granting BestMed’s motion on the merits.