Opinion ID: 1106252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: multi-count indictments

Text: By 1986 Miss. Laws Ch. 444, the Legislature adopted the multi-count indictment statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-2. Until then, and precisely because no statute authorized them, multi-count indictments were condemned by this Court. Thomas v. State, 474 So.2d 604 (Miss. 1985); Stinson v. State, 443 So.2d 869 (Miss. 1983). After the passage of the Act, and solely because this statute authorized them, this Court approved multi-count indictments in criminal prosecutions. The first paragraph of the Act makes abundantly clear circumstances in which this State (and most other states and the federal courts already had done so; Stinson, 443 So.2d at 873.) authorizes multi-count indictments: (1) Two (2) or more offenses which are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment with a separate count for each offense if: (a) the offenses are based on the same act or transaction; or (b) the offenses are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a common scheme or plan. Following enactment of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-2, the first case in which we addressed multi-count indictments was Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418 (Miss. 1988), cert. denied, Woodward v. Mississippi, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1767, 104 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989). Speaking for the Court, Justice Prather announced that although this Court had historically disapproved a single multiple count indictment: The Legislature has now addressed the use of the single indictment containing multi-counts, and it has stated that as a matter of state policy no objections may be validly raised to an indictment containing multi-counts if the statute is otherwise followed. Thus, this Court holds that there is no error in the State's charging of three felony counts within a single indictment since this indictment was returned after the effective date of the statute and followed its dictates. (Emphasis added) Id. at 422. Of course, the reason this Court had previously disapproved multi-count indictments was that no statute authorizd it. Stinson. Closely following was Estes v. State, 533 So.2d 437, 439 (Miss. 1988), in which Justice Sullivan, speaking for the Court, answered the complaint that the accused had been tried under a multi-count indictment: The cases cited by the defendants all pre-date the passage of the statute. We are of the opinion that there is no merit to this assignment of error. Id. at 439. In Brown v. State, 534 So.2d 1019 (Miss. 1988), cert. denied, Brown v. Mississippi, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1643, 104 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989), Justice Griffin, speaking for the Court, answered the complaint that the accused had been tried under a multi-count indictment: Appellant, Brown, was charged in a multi-count indictment on May 9, 1986. At that time there was no statute in effect allowing this type of indictment. Appellant filed a demurrer to the indictment, citing Stinson v. State, 443 So.2d 869 (Miss. 1983); Bennett v. State, 451 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1984); Johnson v. State, 452 So.2d 850 (Miss. 1984); Friday v. State, 462 So.2d 336 (Miss. 1985); Thomas v. State, 474 So.2d 604 (Miss. 1985). This demurrer was over-ruled. (Emphasis added) On July 1, 1986, § 99-7-2 Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1986) went into effect. This statute states: [statute quoted]. Id. at 1021-1022. And that was that. Again, in Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316, 1321-1322 (Miss. 1989), Justice Prather, speaking for the Court, addressed plain error in joining eight counts in a single indictment which did not meet the standards of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-2. There it was pointed out that although the statute permitted such joinder, it must meet the statute and Constitutional safeguards designed to protect the accused. That indictment did not, and we reversed. In none of these cases did this Court so much as hint that we allowed the Legislature to pass the statute. The Legislature enacted it; we enforced it. In Blanks v. State, 542 So.2d 222 (Miss. 1989), the oversight was rectified when Justice Robertson, speaking for this Court, stated about the Act: This statute, although addressing a matter of practice and procedure in criminal prosecutions, has been accepted and enforced by this Court. [Citing Brown, Estes, Woodward, supra ] See also McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 n. 2 (Miss. 1989). (Emphasis added) Id. at 225. And what does note 2 in McClendon, a case written by Justice Robertson dealing with the Mississippi Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, state? It has been suggested that the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act arguably represents an invasion of this Court's rule making power. See Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss. 1989); ... The provisions of the act relevant to today's proceeding enjoy enforceability, not because of any legal validity conferred upon them by the legislature but because we have adopted them in prior proceedings before this Court. (Emphasis added) 539 So.2d at 1377, n. 2. Thereafter, in McCarty v. State, 554 So.2d 909, 913 (Miss. 1989), Justice Anderson, speaking for this Court concerning the statute, parroted Blanks: The Legislature adopted this statute as a matter of public policy and although it addressed a matter of practice and procedure in criminal prosecutions this Court accepted it and enforced it. [Citing Blanks as well as other cases which did not support the statement.] But cf. Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss. 1989) . ... Hence, this statute enjoys enforceability,  not because of any legal validity conferred upon them by the legislature, but because we have adopted them in prior proceedings before this Court. McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 n. 2 (Miss. 1989). (Emphasis added) McCarty, 554 So.2d at 914. So, not only has the Legislature of this State no authority (unless approved by this Court) to (1) enact statutes dealing with criminal practice and procedure, it has no authority to (2) pass valid statutes dealing with the pleadings and procedure which should be necessary for a convict in the penitentiary to get out. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-1, et seq. (Supp. 1990), 1984 Miss. Laws Ch. 378. This authority is vested solely in this Court. The legislative function is simply to funnel this Court with ideas and suggestions in the form of statutes which we are free to reject or, if they happen to be good ideas, to accept or allow. It is thus abundantly clear that this Court intends to pursue and broaden its assertion of power, not only as to the Legislature's authority to (1) pass an evidentiary statute in a criminal case as it did in Hall, but also (2) in any type of indictment, Miss.Code. Ann. § 99-7-2, and (3) any type of procedure or practice involving efforts by those in the penitentiary to get out.