Opinion ID: 4694833
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gubernatorial Pardon

Text: McCalla’s argument that a gubernatorial pardon extinguishes the immigration consequences of his conviction is foreclosed by this Court’s recent opinion in Aristy-Rosa v. Attorney General United States, 994 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2021). Aristy-Rosa involved a petitioner who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Id. at 113. Several years later, he was convicted of attempted 3 criminal sale of cocaine, in violation of New York state law. Id. He then received a Notice to Appear in the Immigration Court, which charged him with being subject to removal under the INA because (1) he had committed a crime relating to a controlled substance, (2) the controlled substance conviction constituted an aggravated felony, and (3) he was inadmissible at the time of his application for adjustment of status. Id. at 11314. After New York Governor Andrew Cuomo pardoned his controlled substance conviction, the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings, arguing the pardon eliminated the basis for his removal. Id. at 114. The Immigration Judge denied the motion, the BIA dismissed the appeal, and the petitioner petitioned this Court for review. Id. On appeal, we noted that the INA contains an express provision addressing the effect of gubernatorial pardons on certain deportable aliens. Id. at 115. Pursuant to that provision, crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and high-speed flight cannot serve as the basis for removing an alien who has received a full and unconditional pardon by the President or a state governor for those crimes. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi)). However, “Congress did not explicitly provide that a full pardon for a controlled substance conviction extinguishes the immigration consequences of that offense.” Id. We therefore concluded that, under the plain text of the statute, the petitioner’s pardon eliminated the aggravated felony ground for his removal but not the controlled substance ground. Id. 4 Here, too, McCalla is ineligible for a waiver because the statute’s express waiver provision does not apply to him. First, like the petitioner in Aristy-Rosa, McCalla was convicted of a controlled substance offense, which the pardon waiver provision does not cover. See id. Second, even if the waiver did cover a controlled substance offense, the provision applies only to immigrants who are deportable and would not waive the grounds for McCalla’s inadmissibility. 1 See Balogun v. Att’y Gen., 425 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Section 1182 does not have a pardon provision like section 1227 does, and we believe that if Congress had intended to extend the pardon waiver to inadmissible aliens, it would have done so.”); see also Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[The petitioner’s] state pardon does not entitle him to a waiver that does not exist in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).”). Accordingly, McCalla’s gubernatorial pardon did not extinguish the immigration consequences of his controlled substance conviction.